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LEE AT APPOMATTOX, AND OTHER PAPERS.
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LEE AT APPOMATTOX
AND OTHER PAPERS

BY

CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS

SECOND EDITION, ENLARGED.

BOSTON AND NEW YORK
HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY
1902

Copyright, 1902,
By CHAELBS FRANCIS ADAMS.
All rights reserved.

Published May, /goa

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CVS

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PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION
The last paper included in the present volume —
that entitled " Shall Cromwell have a Statue ? " — was
not in the first edition of it. The obvious sequel to
the paper entitled " Lee at Appomattox," the occasion
for it had not arisen at the time the material for
the earlier edition was brought together. Head at
Worcester in October, 1901, the " Lee at Appomat
tox " was designed to influence, if possible, the course
of events then taking place in South Africa, calling at
tention to the example of Lee, thirty-six years before,
under not dissimilar circumstances. Republished in
England, it excited no inconsiderable notice, and was
referred to by Mr, Chamberlain in the House of Com
mons. Subsequently, and during the final stages of
the South African war, the capitulation of Lee was
always in the minds of influential members of the
British Cabinet, and ofiicial instructions were sent to
Lord Milner to take it as an example.
The future of South Africa is hereafter to develop
itself. As bearing upon its possibilities, it was of
interest to ascertain the existing state of feeling in
the United States, now that a generation had passed
away since Appomattox. An invitation to deliver the
annual oration before the Phi Beta K!appa Society of

iv PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION
the University of Chicago seemed to offer a fitting
place, as well as a favorable opportunity, for ehciting
an expression. The paper entitled " Shall Crom
well have a Statue ? " was prepared with this end
in view. The result was undeniably instructive. A
very general response followed from all sections of
the country, though more especially from the South.
The character of that response varied. The response
from the North was, as a rule, couched in terms of gen
eral dissent from the proposition ; but this dissent,
whether uttered through the press or by letter, was in no
single case couched in the declamatory, patriotic strain,
at once injured, indignant, and denunciatory or vitu
perative, which would no less assuredly than naturally
have marked it thirty years ago. On the contrary, the
objections urged were invariably rational, and, in many
cases, well reasoned. Great personal respect for Lee,
and even admiration of him, were expressed ; but the
noticeable feature was that, almost without exception,
the writers reverted to the days of slavery, and the
issues and events of the Civil War. The ground upon
which recognition was urged in the address seemed to
escape notice, though emphasized in its closing lines.
The essential and distinctive feature of the Amer
ican Civil War, as contrasted with all previous strug
gles of a similar character, was the acceptance of
results by the defeated party at its close, and the sub
sequent rebuilding of an entire geographical com
munity, socially and industrially, upon a new and,

PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION v
in certain aspects, odious basis imposed on it by ex
ternal force. The course thus instinctively pursued
was indicative of much political sound sense ; for it
was due to a statesmanlike confidence in time, and the
consciousness of an inherent race-capacity for leader
ship. It was with this outcome of the war, and not with
its anterior causes or its vicissitudes, that the name
of Robert E. Lee should hereafter be commemorated.
As is well known, after the total collapse of the
Confederacy Jefferson Davis, accepting the position
in which he found himself placed, lived and died,
not without dignity, a disfranchised Confederate. To
make use of the ordinary expression, he was never
" reconstructed." Lee, on the other hand, in a way
at once more marked and more dignified than any
other character prominently connected with the Con
federacy, contributed to the acceptance and rebuild
ing above referred to. He went home ; and, thence
forward, silently minded his own business. The
Confederate, as well as the Unionist, enters as an
essential factor into the Nation that now is, and, in
future, is to be. It is this, the statue of Lee in
Washington would typify, and preserve in perpetual
memory.
C. F. A.
Lincoln, Mass., August 8, 1902.

CONTENTS
Chap. Paob
L LEE AT APPOMATTOX  1
n. THE TEEATY OF WASHINGTON: BEFORE AND
AFTER  31
III. T^HE BRITISH "CHANGE OF HEART". . . 256
IV. AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION , , , , 274
V. A\ PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY . . .339
VI. "SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?" . 376
INDEX  431

LEE AT APPOMATTOX
AND OTHER PAPERS

LEE AT APPOMATTOX 1
The present seems a sufficiently proper occasion,
and this an appropriate place, to call attention to a
matter perhaps only germane to the purpose of this
Society, because as yet hardly antiquarian. None the
less, historical in character, it conveys a lesson of grave
present import.
One of the most unhappy, and, to those concerned
in it, disastrous wars since the fall of Napoleon, is, in
South Africa, now working itself to a close appar
ently still remote, and in every way unsatisfactory.
There is reason to think that the conflict was unne
cessary in its inception ; that by timely and judicious
action it might long since have been brought to a
close ; and that it now continues simply because the
parties to it cannot be brought together to discuss and
arrive at a sensible basis of adjustment, — a basis
upon which both in reality would be not unwilling
to agree. Nevertheless, as the cable despatches daily
^ A paper read before the American Antiquarian Society at its
annual meeting in Worcester, Mass., Wednesday, Octoter 30, 1901,

2 LEE AT APPOMATTOX
show, the contest drags wearily along, to the probable
destruction of one of the combatants, to the great loss
of the other, and, so far as can be seen, in utter dis
regard of the best interests of both.
My immediate purpose, however, is to draw atten
tion to the hairbreadth escape we ourselves had from
a similar experience, now thirty-six years ago, and to
assign to whom it belongs the credit for that escape.
In one word, in the strong light of passing events, I
think it now opportune to set forth the debt of grati
tude this reunited country of ours — Union and Con
federate, North and South — owes to Robert E, Lee,
of Virginia.
Most of those here — for this is not a body of young
men — remember the state of affairs which existed in
the United States, especially in what was then known
as the Confederate States, or the rebellious portion of
the United States, in April, 1865. Such as are not
yet as mature as that memory implies have read and
heard thereof. It was in every respect almost the
identical state of affairs which existed in South Africa
at the time of the capture of Pretoria by General
Roberts, in June a year ago.
On the 2d of April, 1865, the Confederate army
found itself compelled to abandon the lines in front
of Petersburg ; and the same day — a very famous
Sabbath — Jefferson Davis, hastily called from the
church services he was attending, left Richmond to
find, if he might, a new seat of government, at Dan
ville. The following morning our forces at last
entered the rebel capital. This was on a Monday ;
and, two days later, the Confederate President issued
from Danville his manifesto. In it he said to the

LEE AT APPOMATTOX 3
people of the South, — " We have now entered upon
a new phase of the struggle. Relieved from the ne
cessity of guarding particular points, our army wOl
be free to move from point to point, to strike the
enemy in detail far from his base. If, by the stress
of numbers, we should be compelled to a temporary
withdrawal from her [Virginia's] limits, or those of
any other border State, we wiU return until the baffled
and exhausted enemy shall abandon in despair his
endless and impossible task of making slaves of a
people resolved to be free." The policy, and line of
military action, thus indicated were precisely those laid
down and pursued by the Boer leaders during thelast
sixteen months.
It is imnecessary for me even to refer to the series
of events which followed our occupation of Richmond,
and preceded the surrender of Appomattox, It is
sufficient to say that on the Friday which followed
the momentous Sunday, the capitulation of the Army
of Northern Virginia had become inevitable. Not
the less for that, the course thereafter to be pursued
as concerned further resistance on the part of the
Confederacy was still to be decided. As his Danville
proclamation showed, Jefferson Davis, though face to
face with grave disaster, had not for an instant given
up the thought of continuing the struggle. To do so
was certainly practicable, — far more practicable than
now in South Africa, both as respects forces in the
field and the area of country to be covered by the
invader. Foreign opinion, for instance, was on this
point settled; it was in Europe assumed as a cer
tainty of the future that the conquest of the Confed
eracy was " impossible." The English journals had

4 LEE AT APPOMATTOX
always maintained, and still did maintain, that the
defeat of Lee in the field, or even the surrender of all
the Confederate armies, would be but the close of one
phase of the war and the opening of another, — the
final phase being a long, fruitless effort to subdue a
people, at once united and resolved, occupying a re
gion so vast that it would be impossible to penetrate
every portion of it, much less to hold it in peaceful
subjection. As an historical fact, on this point the
scales, on the 9th of April, 1865, hung wavering in
the balance ; a mere turn of the hand would decide
which way they were to incline. Thus, on the morn
ing of that momentous day, it was an absolutely open
question, an even chance, whether the course which
subsequently was pursued should be pursued, or
whether the leaders of the Confederacy would adopt
the policy which President Kriiger and Generals
Botha and De Wet have in South Africa more re
cently adopted, and are now pursuing.
The decision rested in the hands of one man, the
commander of the Army of Northern Virginia. Fairly
reliable and very graphic accounts of interviews with
General Lee during those trying days and in the
morning hours of April 9th have either appeared in
print or been told in conversation, and to two of
these accounts I propose to call attention. The first I
find in a book, entitled The End of an Era, recently
published by John Sargent Wise, a son of Henry
A. Wise, once prominent in our national politics.
Though in 1865 but a youth of nineteen, John S.
Wise was a hot Confederate, and had already been
wounded in battle. At the time now in question he
chanced, according to his own account, to have been

LEE AT APPOMATTOX 5
sent by Jefferson Davis, then on his way to Danville,
with despatches to Lee. At length, after many hair
breadth escapes from capture, he reached the Confed
erate headquarters late in the night following the
disastrous battle of Sailor's Creek. By it the line of
march of the Confederate army towards Danville had
been intercepted, and it had been forced to seek a
more circuitous route in the direction of Lynchburg.
" It was past midnight," writes Mr. Wise, " when I
found General Lee. He was in an open field north
of Rice's Station and east of the High Bridge. A
camp-fire of rails was burning low. Colonel Charles
Marshall sat in an ambulance with a lantern and a
lap-desk. He was preparing orders at the dictation
of General Lee, who Stood near, with one hand rest
ing on a wheel and one foot upon the end of a log,
watching intently the dying embers, as he spoke in a
low tone to his amanuensis."
Explaining his mission to the Confederate leader,
Mr. Wise passed the remaining hours of the night in
bivouac near by ; and early in the morning, the head
quarters having moved, he again set out on his quest.
It was now Friday, the 7th, He had not gone far
when he stumbled across his father, in bivouac with
his brigade, Henry A. Wise was then nearly sixty
years of age ; but the son found him wrapped in a
blanket, stretched on the ground like a common soldier,
and asleep among his men. Essentially a Virginian,
and in many respects typically a Southerner and " fire-
eater," Henry A. Wise was governor at the time of
the John Brown Harper's Ferry raid, in October,
1859, his term expiring shortly after Brown's execu
tion. A member of the Virginia Convention which.

6 LEE AT APPOMATTOX
immediately after the fall of Sumter, passed the ordi
nance of secession, Wise, though an extreme States-
rights man, had been in favor of " fighting it out in
the Union," as the phrase then went ; but when Vir
ginia became plainly bent on secession, he unhesitat
ingly " went with his State." Commissioned as a
brigadier-general almost at once, he had served in
the Confederate army throughout the war, and was in
the thick of the fight at Sailor's Creek. Now, on the
morning after that engagement, aroused from an un
easy sleep by the unexpected appearance of his son,
almost the first wish he expressed was to see General
Lee, and he asked impetuously of his whereabouts.
The two started together to go to him. John S. Wise
has described vividly the aspect of affairs as they passed
along : — " The roads and fields were idled with strag
glers. They moved looking behind them, as if they
expected to be attacked and harried by a pursuing foe.
Demoralization, panic, abandonment of all hope, ap
peared on every hand. Wagons were roUing along
vnthout any order or system. Caissons and limber-
chests, without commanding officers, seemed to be
floating aimlessly upon a tide of disorganization. Ris
ing to his full height, casting a glance around him like
that of an eagle, and sweeping the horizon with his
long arm and bony forefinger, my father exclaimed :
' This is the end ! ' It is impossible to convey an idea
of the agony and the bitterness of his words and ges
tures." Then follows this description of the interview
which ensued : —
" We found General Lee on the rear portico of the
house that I have mentioned. He had washed his face
in a tin basin, and stood drying his beard with a coarse

LEE AT APPOMATTOX 7
towel as we approached. ' General Lee,' exclaimed
my father, ' my poor, brave men are lying on yonder
hill more dead than alive. For more than a week they
have been fighting day and night, without food, and,
by God, sir, they shall not move another step until
somebody gives them something to eat ! '
" ' Come in, general,' said General Lee soothingly.
' They deserve something to eat, and shall have it ; and
meanwhile you shall share my breakfast.' He disarmed
everything like defiance by his kindness.
" It was but a few moments, however, before my
father laimched forth in a fresh denunciation of the
conduct of General Bushrod Johnson ^ in the engage
ment of the sixth, I am satisfied that General Lee
felt as he did ; but, assuming an air of mock severity,
he said, ' General, are you aware that you are liable to
court-martial and execution for insubordination and
disrespect toward your commanding officer? '
" My father looked at him with lifted eyebrows and
flashing eyes, and exclaimed : ' Shot ! You can't af
ford to shoot the men who fight for cursing those who
run away. Shot ! I wish you would shoot me. If
you don't, some Yankee probably wiU within the next
twenty-four hours,'
" Growing more serious. General Lee inquired what
he thought of the situation,
" ' Situation ? ' said the bold old man, ' There is
no situation ! Nothing remains. General Lee, but to
put your poor men on your poor mules and send them
home in time for spring ploughing. This army is
1 Elsewhere in his hook (pp. 358, 359), and in another connection,
J. S. Wise is equally severe in his characterization of Bushrod John-

8 LEE AT APPOMATTOX
hopelessly whipped, and is fast becoming demoralized.
These men have already endured more than I believed
flesh and blood could stand, and I say to you, sir,
emphatically, that to prolong the struggle is murder,
and the blood of every man who is killed from this
time forth is on your head. General Lee.'
"This last expression seemed to cause General Lee
great pain. With a gesture of remonstrance, and even
of impatience, he protested : ' Oh, general, do not talk
so wildly. My burdens are heavy enough. What
would the country think of me, if I did what you sug
gest ? '
" ' Country be d  d ! ' was the quick reply.
' There is no country. There has been no country,
general, for a year or more. You are the country to
these men. They have fought for you. They have
shivered through a long winter for you. Without pay
or clothes, or care of any sort, their devotion to you
and faith in you have been the only things which have
held this army together. If you demand the sacrifice,
there are stiU left thousands of us who wiU. die for you.
You know the game is desperate beyond redemption,
and that, if you so announce, no man or government
or people will gainsay your decision. That is why I
repeat that the blood of any man killed hereafter is
upon your head.'
" General Lee stood for some time at an open win
dow, looking out at the throng now surging by upon
the roads and in the fields, and made no response." ^
It will be remembered that John Sargent Wise was
individually present at this conversation, a youth of
nineteen. I have as little respect as any one well can
1 The End of an Era, pp. 433-435.

LEE AT APPOMATTOX 9
have for the recollection of thirty years since as a basis
of history. Nevertheless, it would seem quite out of
the question that a youth of only nineteen could have
been present at such a scene as is here described, and
that the words which then passed, and the incidents
which occurred, should not have been indelibly im
printed upon his memory. I am disposed, therefore,
to consider this reliable historical material. Mean
while, it so chances that I am able to supplement it by
similar testimony from another quarter.
Some years ago I was, for a considerable period,
closely associated with General E. P. Alexander, who,
in its time, had been chief of artUlery in Long-
street's famous corps ; and it was General Alexander
who, on the morning of July 3, 1863, opened on the
Union line at Gettysburg what Hancock described as
" a most terrific and appalling cannonade," intended
to prepare the way for the advance of Pickett's divi
sion. In April, 1865, General Alexander was, if my
recollection serves me right, in command of the artil
lery of the Army of Northern Virginia. In many
connections I had found occasion to notice the singu
lar tenacity of his memory. He seemed to forget
nothing ; nor was he less accurate in matters of detail
than in generalities. He delighted in reminiscence
of the great war, and he recalled its incidents with
the particularity of a trained officer of the general
staff. He thus many times, always with the same
precision, repeated to me, or in my hearing, the details
of interviews with Lee during the retreat from Peters
burg, and more especially of one, on the morning of
April 9th, Of what he said I have since retained
a vivid memory. During Friday, April 7th, the

10 LEE AT APPOMATTOX
day Wise foimd his way to Lee's headquarters, the
weary Confederate army pressed forward, vainly try
ing to elude the hot pursuit of the Union advance,
led by Sheridan. On Saturday, the 8th, according to
General Alexander, the leading Confederate officers
became so demoralized that one of them. General
Pendleton, was authorized by a sort of informal coun
cil to wait on Lee, and to tell him that, a surrender
seeming inevitable, they were prepared to take the
responsibility of advising it. Recognizing his mili
tary obligations, and not yet convinced that his com
mand was hopelessly involved, Lee distinctly resented
the advice. He told General Pendleton that there
were too many men yet remaiaing in the ranks to
think of laying down arms, and his air and manner
conveyed a rebuke.
Twenty-four additional hours of fasting, marching,
and fighting put a new face on the situation. Two
days before, on the 7th, shortly after the Wise inter
view. General Alexander had met Lee at Farmville,
and a consultation over the maps took place. Alex
ander had then pointed out Appomattox as " the dan
ger point," the roads to Lynchburg there intersecting,
and the enemy having the shortest line. Sheridan
did not lose his advantage, and, on Sunday, the 9th
of April, Lee found his further progress blocked.
That morning General Alexander again met Lee,
Both realized the situation fully. Moreover, as chief
of artillery, Alexander was well aware that the lim
ber-chests were running low ; his arm of the service
was in no condition to go into another engagement.
Yet the idea of an abandonment of the cause had
never occurred to him as among the probabilities.

LEE AT APPOMATTOX 11
All night he had lain awake, thinking as to what
was next to be done. Finally he had come to the
conclusion that there was but one course to pursue.
The Confederate army, while nominally capitulating,
must in reality disperse, and those composing it should
be instructed, whether individually or as part of de
tachments, to get each man to his own State in the
most direct way and shortest possible time, and report
to the govemor thereof, with a view to a further and
continuous resistance.
Thus, exactly what is now taking place in South
Africa was to take place in the Confederacy. Gen
eral AJexander told me that, as he passed his batteries
on his way to headquarters, the men caUed out to him,
in cheery tones, that there were stfll some rounds re
maining in the caissons, and that they were ready to
renew the fight. He found Lee seated on the trunk
of a fallen tree before a dying camp-fire. He was
dressed in uniform, and invited Alexander to take a
seat beside him. He then asked his opinion of the
situation, and of the course proper to be pursued.
FuU of the idea which dominated his mind, Alexander
proceeded at once to propound his plan, for it seemed
to him the only plan worthy of consideration. As he
went on, General Lee, looking steadily into the fire
with an abstracted air, listened patiently. Alexander
said his fuU say. A brief pause ensued, which Lee
finally broke in somewhat these words : " No ! Gen
eral Alexander, that will not do. You must remem
ber we are a Christian people. We have fought
this fight as long as, and as weU as, we knew how.
We have been defeated. For us, as a Christian
people, there is now but one course to pursue. We

12 LEE AT APPOMATTOX
must accept the situation ; these men must go home
and plant a crop, and we must proceed to build up
our country on a new basis. We cannot have re
course to the methods you suggest." I remember
being deeply impressed with Alexander's comment, as
he repeated these words of Lee. They had evidently
burned themselves into his memory. He said : " I
had nothing to urge in reply. I felt that the man
had soared way up above me, — he dominated me com
pletely. I rose from beside him; silently mounted
my horse ; rode back to my command ; and waited
for the order to surrender."
Then and there, Lee decided its course for the Con
federacy. And I take it there is not one solitary man
in the United States to-day. North or South, who does
not feel that he decided right.
The Army of Northern Virginia, it will be remem
bered, laid down its arms on the 9th of April. But
General Joseph Johnston was in command of another
Confederate army then confronting Sherman, in
North Carolina, and it was stiU an open question what
course he would pursue. His force numbered over
40,000 combatants ; more than the entire muster of
the Boers in their best estate. Lee's course decided
Johnston's. S. R. MaUory, who was present on the
occasion, has left a striking account of a species of
council held at Grreensboro, North Carolina, on the
evening of the 10th of April, by Jefferson Davis and
the members of his cabinet, with General Johnston.
Davis, stubborn in temper, and bent on a policy of con
tinuous irregular resistance, expressed the belief that
the disasters recently sustained, though "terrible,"
should not be regarded as " fatal." " I think," he

LEE AT APPOMATTOX 13
added, "we can whip the enemy yet, if our people
will turn out." When he ceased speaking, a pause
ensued. Davis at last said, " We should like to hear
your views. General Johnston." Whereupon John
ston, without preface or introduction, and with a tone
and manner almost spiteful, remarked in his terse,
concise, demonstrative way, as if seeking to condense
thoughts that were crowding for utterance: "My
views are, sir, that our people are tired of the war,
feel themselves whipped, and wiU not fight." ^
We aU know what followed. Lee's great military
prestige and moral ascendency made it easy for some
of the remaiaing Confederate commanders, like John
ston, to foUow the precedent he set ; while others of
them, like Kirby Smith, found it imposed upon them.
A firm direction had been given to the course of
events; an intelligible policy was indicated.
I have in my possession a copy of the Index, the
weekly journal published in London during our civil
war. The official organ of the Confederate agents
in Europe, it was intended for the better enlighten
ment of foreign opinion, more especially the English
press. The surrender of Lee was commented upoQ
editorially in the issue of that paper for April 27th.
" The war is far from concluded," it declared. " A
strenuous resistance and not surrender was the un
alterable determination of the Confederate authorities,
. . . and if the worst comes to the worst there is the
trans-Mississippi department, where the remnant of
[Johnston's] army can find a shelter, and a new and
safe starting-point,"^ On the 11th of May foUow-
1 Alfriend: Life of Jefferson Davis, pp. 622-626.
^ Captain Raphael Semmes, of Alabama fame, wrote as follows, in

14 LEE AT APPOMATTOX
ing, the surrender of Johnston's army was announced
on the same terms as that of Lee ; but in summing up
the situation, the Index still found " the elements of
a successful, or, at least, a protracted resistance." On
the 25th of May, it had an article entitled " Southern
Resistance in Texas," in which it announced that,
" Such a war will be fierce, ferocious, and of long
duration," — in a word, such an expiring struggle as
we are to-day witnessing in South Africa. In its
issue of June 1st, the Index commented on "The
capture of President Davis ; " and then, and not until
then, forestalling the trans-Mississippi surrender of
Kirby Smith, brought to it by the following mail, it
raised the wailing cry, "i^wi^ /Ziwm. . . . The South
has fallen."
Comparing the situation which then existed in the
Confederacy with that now in South Africa, it must
also be remembered that General Lee assumed the
responsibility he did assume, and decided the pohcy
to be pursued in the way it was decided, under no
a private letter to an English friend, published in the London Morning
Herald, during March, 1865 : " The State of Texas alone has within
her limits all the materials, and is fast getting the appliances, for
equipping and maintaining armies, and when you reflect that she has
three times as much territory as France, and that countless herds of
horses and beef cattle wander over her boundless prairies, you can
well imagine with what contempt this warlike people regard the insane
threat of subjugation. If our armies were driven to-morrow across
the Mississippi River, we could still fight the enemy for a century to
come in Texas alone. So dismiss all your fears, my friend, our inde
pendence is an accomplished fact, let the war continue as long as the
Yankee pleases, and with what varying results it may." In its issue
of March 15, 1865, the London Times editorially said : " These ter
ritories are too vast to be occupied, and the elements of rebellion they
contain are too rife to be left to themselves. They may be penetrated
in every direction, but we do not see how they are to be held or sub
dued."

LEE AT APPOMATTOX 15
ameliorating conditions. Politically, unconditional
surrender was insisted upon ; and Lee's surrender was,
politically, unconditional. Even more so was John
ston's ; for, in Johnston's case, the modifying terms of
capitulation agreed on in the first place between him
and Sherman were roughly disallowed at Washington,
and the truce, by an order coming thence, abruptly
terminated. Then Johnston did what Lee had already
done ; ignoring Davis, he surrendered his army.
In the case of the Confederacy, also, an absolutely
unconditional political surrender implied much. The
Emancipation Proclamation of January, 1863, which
confiscated the most valuable chattel property of the
Confederacy, remained the irreversible law of the land.
The inhabitants of the South were, moreover, as one
man disfranchised. When they laid down their arms
they had before them, first, a military government ;
and, after that, the supremacy of their former slaves.
A harder fate for a proud people to accept could not
well be imagined. The bitterness of feeling, the
hatred, was, too, extreme. It may possibly be argued
that the conditions in this country then were different
from those now in South Africa, inasmuch as here it
was a' civil war, — a conflict between communities of
the same race and speech involving the vital question
of the supremacy of law. This argument, however,
seems to imply that, in case of strife of this descrip
tion, a general severity may fairly be resorted to in
excess of that permissible between nations ; in other
words, that we are justified in treating our brethren
with greater harshness than we would treat aliens
in blood and speech. Obviously, this is a questionable
contention.

16 LEE AT APPOMATTOX
It might possibly also be claimed that the bitter
ness of civil war is not so insurmountable as that of
one involving a question of race dominance. Yet it
is difficult to conceive bitterness of greater intensity
than existed between the sections at the close of our
civil war. There is striking evidence of this in the
book of Mr. Wise, from which I have already quoted.
Toward its close he speaks of the death of Lincoln,
He then adds the following : —
" Perhaps I ought to chronicle that the announce
ment was received with demonstrations of sorrow. If
I did, I should be lying for sentiment's sake. Among
the higher officers and the most intelligent and con
servative men, the assassination caused a shudder
of horror at the heinousness of the act, and at the
thought of its possible consequences ; but among the
thoughtless, the desperate, and the ignorant, it was
hailed as a sort of retributive justice. In maturer
years I have been ashamed of what I felt and said
when I heard of that awful calamity. However, men
ought to be judged for their feelings and their speech
by the circumstances of their surroundings. For four
years we had been fighting. In that struggle, all we
loved had been lost. Lincoln incarnated to us the
idea of oppression and conquest. We had seen his
face over the coffins of our brothers and relatives and
friends, in the flames of Richmond, in the disaster at
Appomattox. In blood and flame and torture the tem
ples of our lives were tumbling about our heads. We
were desperate and vindictive, and whosoever denies it
forgets or is false. We greeted his death in a spirit
of reckless hate, and hailed it as bringing agony and
bitterness to those who were the cause of our own agony

LEE AT APPOMATTOX 17
and bitterness. To us, Lincoln was an inhuman
monster, Grant a butcher, and Sherman a fiend."
Indeed, recalling the circumstances of that time, it
is fairly appalling to consider what in 1865 must have
occurred, had Robert E. Lee then been of the same
turn of mind as was Jefferson Davis, or as implacable
and unyielding in disposition as Kriiger or Botha
have more recently proved. The national government
had in arms a million men, inured to the hardships
and accustomed to the brutalities of war ; Lincoln had
been freshly assassinated ; the temper of the North
was thoroughly aroused, while its patience was ex-.
hausted. An irregular warfare would inevitably have
resulted, a warfare without quarter.^ The Confederacy
would have been reduced to a smouldering wilder
ness, — to what South Africa to-day is. In such a
death grapple, the North, both in morale and in
means, would have suffered only less than the South.
From both sections that fate was averted.
It is not my purpose to enter into any criticism of
the course of events in South Africa, or of the policy
there on either side pursued. It wiU be for the future
to decide whether the prolonged, irregular resistance
we are witnessing is justifiable, or, if justifiable,
whether it is wise. Neither of these questions do I
propose to discuss. My purpose simply is to call at
tention, in view of what is now taking place elsewhere,
1 Commenting on the " Suddenness of the Collapse," the Index said,
editorially, in its issue of June 8, 1865 : " The loss of the armies left
no alternative but private war, which never yet redeemed a country
without foreign help, and which is as much directed against society as
against a public foe. Such a course was inconsistent with the genius
of the Southern people, which is eminently law-abiding and orderly.
Brave men know how to accept defeat, and the .Southerners have
accepted theirs, bitter though it is, as only brave men can."

18 LEE AT APPOMATTOX
to the narrow escape we ourselves, thirty-six years
ago, had from a similar awful catastrophe. And I
again say that, as we look to-day upon Kriiger and
Botha and De Wet, and the situation existing in the
Transvaal and the Orange Free State, I doubt if one
single man in the United States, North or South, —
whether he participated in the civil war or was born
since that war ended, — would fail to aclsnowledge an
infinite debt of gratitude to the Confederate leader,
who on the 9th of April, 1865, decided, as he did
decide, that the United States, whether Confederate
or Union, was a Christian community, and that his
duty was to accept the responsibility which the fate
of war had imposed upon him, — to decide in favor of
a new national life, even if slowly and painfully to be
built up by his own people under conditions arbitrarily
and by force imposed on them.
In one of the Confederate accounts of the great
war 1 is to be found the following description of Lee's
return to his Richmond home immediately after he
had at Appomattox sealed the fate of the Confed
eracy. With it I will conclude this paper. On the
afternoon of the previous day, the first of those paroled
from the surrendered Army of Northern Virginia had
straggled back to Richmond. The writer thus goes
on : " Next morning a small group of horsemen ap
peared on the further side of the pontoons. By some
strange intuition it was known that General Lee was
among them, and a crowd collected all along the route
he would take, silent and bareheaded. There was no
excitement, no hurrahing; but as the great chief
passed, a deep, loving murmur, greater than these,
«
1 De Leon : Four Years in Rebel Capitals, p. 367.

LEE AT APPOMATTOX 19
rose from the very hearts of the crowd. Taking off
his hat and simply bowing his head, the man great in
adversity passed silently to his own door ; it closed
upon him, and his people had seen him for the last
time in his battle harness."

After preparing the foregoing paper, I wrote to
General Alexander, asking him to verify my recollec
tion of the account of what passed at his meeting with
General Lee at Appomattox. His reply did not reach
me in time for the meeting of the American Anti
quarian Society, at which the paper was read. He
wrote in part as follows : " I am greatly interested in
what you wish, having often thought and spoken of
the contrast between Lee's views of the duty of the
leaders of a people, and those held at the time by
President Davis, and now held by Kriiger and the
Boer leaders ; and I have written of it, too, in my
own war recollections, which I am writing out for my
children. '¦^Essentially, your recollections are entirely cor
rect ; though some of the details are not exact. Two
days before, I had talked with General Lee over his
map, and noted Appomattox Courthouse as the ' dan
ger point.' When I came up on the 9th to where he
had halted on the road, he called me to him, and
began by referring to previous talk, and then he asked
me, — ' What shall we do to-day ? ' For an account
of our conversation I wiU cut out of a scrap-book two
pages which contain a clipping from the Philadelphia
Press of a letter I wrote twenty years ago."
In the course of his letter. General Alexander fur
ther said, — " The gist of my argument to General
Lee was that the governors of the Southern States
might make some sort of ' Terms,' which would bar

LEE AT APPOMATTOX 21
trials for treason, etc, ; and it was based on the as
sumption that Grant would demand ' unconditional
surrender.' And I certainly think, too, that Grant
deserves equal praise and gratitude for his high-
mindedness in his liberal treatment of his foe — more
absolutely at his mercy than was Buckner at Fort
Donelson, or Pemberton at Vicksburg." . . .
" I particularly remember, too, his (Lee's) dwell
ing on the fact that the men were already, as it were,
' demoralized ' by four years of war, and would but
too easily become mere bushwhackers."
The clipping referred to was from an issue of the
Press of July, 1881. The narrative contained in
it, now not easily accessible, is of such interest and
obvious historical value, as throwing light on what
was passing in Lee's mind at one of the most critical
moments in the national history, that I here reproduce
it in full : —
" The morning of the 9th of April, 1865, found the
Confederate army in a position in which its inevitable
fate was apparent to every man in it. The skirmish
ing which had begun in its front as its advance guard
reached Appomattox Courthouse the night before had
developed into a sharp fight, in which the continu
ous firing of the artillery and the steady increase of
the musketry told to all that a heavy force had been
thrown across our line of march, and that reinforce
ments to it were steadily arriving. The long trains
of wagons and artillery were at first halted in the road
and then parked in the adjoining fields, allowing the
rear of the column to close up and additional troops
to pass to the front to reinforce the advanced guard
and to form a reserve line of battle in their rear,

22 LEE AT APPOMATTOX
under cover of which they might retire when neces
sary. While these dispositions were taking place.
General Lee, who had dismounted and was standing
near a fire on a hiU about two miles from the Court
house, called the writer to him, and, inviting him to a
seat on a log near by, referred to the situation and
asked : ' What shall we do this morning ? ' Although
this opportunity of expressing my views was unex
pected, the situation itself was not, for two days
before, while near Farmville, in a consultation with
General Lee over his map, the fact of the enemy's
having the shortest road to the Appomattox Court
house had been noted and the probability of serious
difficulty there anticipated, and in the mean time
there had been ample opportunity for reflection on all
of the emergencies that might arise. Without reply
ing directly to the question, however, I answered first
that it was due to my command (of artillery) that I
should teU him that they were in as good spirits,
though short of ammunition and with poor teams, as
they had ever been, and had begged, if it came to a
surrender, to be allowed to expend first every round
of ammunition on the enemy, and surrender only the
empty ammunition chests. To this General Lee re
plied that there were remaining only two divisions of
infantry sufficiently weU organized and strong to be
fully relied upon (Field's and Mahone's), and that
they did not number eight thousand muskets together ;
and that that force was not sufficient to warrant him
in undertaking a pitched battle. ' Then,' I answered,
' general, there are but two alternatives, to surrender
or to order the army to abandon its trains and dis
perse in the woods and bushes, every man for himself.

LEE AT APPOMATTOX 23
and each to make his best way, with his arms, either
to the army of General Johnston, in North Carohna,
or home to the governor of his State. We have all
foreseen the probability of such an alternative for two
days, and I am sure I speak the sentiments of many
others besides my own in urging that rather than sur
render the army you should allow us to disperse in
the woods and go, every man for himself.'
" ' What would you hope to accomplish by this ? '
" I answered : ' If there is any hope at aU for the
Confederacy or for the separate States to make terms
with the United States or for any foreign assistance,
this course stands the chances, whatever they may be ;
while if this army surrenders this morning, the Con
federacy is dead from that moment. Grant will turn
150,000 fresh men against Johnston, and with the
moral effect of our surrender he wiU go, and Dick
Taylor and Kirby Smith wiU have to follow like a row
of bricks, while if we aU take to dispersing in the
woods, we inaugurate a new phase of the war, which
may be indefinitely prolonged, and it will at least
have great moral effect in showing that in our pledges
to fight it out to the last we meant what we said. And
even, general, if there is no hope at all in this course
or in any other, and if the fate of the Confederacy is
sealed whatever we do, there is one other considera
tion which your soldiers have a right to urge on you,
and that is your own military reputation, in which
every man in this army, officer or private, feels the
utmost personal pride and has a personal property
that his children wiU prize after him. The Yankees
brought Grant here from the West, after the failure
of all their other generals, as one who had whipped

24 LEE AT APPOMATTOX
everybody he had ever fought against, and they call
him " Unconditional Surrender " Grant, and have
been bragging in advance that you would have to sur
render too. Now, general, I think you ought to spare
us all the mortification of having you to ask Grant for
terms, and have him answer that he had no terms to
offer you.'
"I still remember most vividly the emotion with
which I made this appeal, increasing as I went on,
imtil my whole heart was in it ; and it seemed to me
at the moment one which no soldier could resist and
against which no consideration whatever could be
urged ; and when I closed, after urging my sugges
tions at greater length than it is necessary to repeat,
looking him in the face and speaking with more bold
ness than I usually found in his presence, I had not a
doubt that he must adopt some such course as I had
urged. " He heard me entirely through, however, very
calmly, and then asked : ' How many men do you
estimate would escape if I were to order the army to
disperse ? '
" I replied : ' I suppose two thirds of us could get
away, for the enemy could not disperse to follow us
through the woods.'
" He said : ' We have here only about sixteen
thousand men with arms, and not all of those who
could get away would join General Johnston, but most
of them would try and make their way to their homes
and families, and their numbers would be too small to
be of any material service either to General Johnston or
to the governors of the States. I recognize fully that
the surrender of this army is the end of the Confeder-

LEE AT APPOMATTOX 25
acy, but no course we can take can prevent or even
delay that result. I have never believed that we
would receive foreign assistance, or get our liberty
otherwise than by our own arms. The end is now
upon us, and it only remains to decide how we shall
close the struggle. But in deciding this question we
are to approach it not only as soldiers but as Christian
men, deciding on matters which involve a great deal
else besides their own feelings. If I should order
this army to disperse, the men wdth their arms, but
without organization or control, and without provisions
or money, would soon be wandering through every
State in the Confederacy, some seeking to get to their
homes, and some with no homes to go to. Many
would be compelled to rob and plunder as they went
to save themselves from starvation, and the enemy's
cavalry would pursue in small detachments, particu
larly in efforts to catch the general officers, and raid
and burn over large districts which they will other
wise never reach, and the result would be the inau
guration of lawlessness and terror and of organized
bands of robbers aU over the South. Now, as Chris
tian men, we have not the right to bring this state of
affairs upon the country, whatever the sacrifice of per
sonal pride involved. And as for myself, you young
men might go to bushwhacking, but I am too old ;
and even if it were right for me to disperse the army,
I should surrender myself to General Grant as the
, only proper course for one of my years and position.
But I am glad to be able to teU you one thing for
your comfort : General Grant wiU not demand an un
conditional surrender, but offers us most hberal terms
— the paroling of the whole army not to fight until

26 LEE AT APPOMATTOX
exchanged.' He then went on to speak of the proba
ble details of the terms of surrender, and to say that
about 10 A. M. he was to meet General Grant in the
rear of the army, and would then accept the terms
offered. " Sanguine as I had been when he commenced that
' he must acquiesce in my views,' I had not one word
to reply when he had finished. He spoke slowly and
deliberately, and with some feeling ; and the complete
ness of the considerations he advanced, and which he
dwelt upon with more detail than I can now fully re
call, speaking particularly of the women and children,
as the greatest sufferers in the state of anarchy which
a dispersion of the army would bring about, and his re
ference to what would be his personal course if he did
order such dispersion, all indicated that the question
was not then presented to his mind for the first time.
" A short time after this conversation General Lee
rode to the rear of the army to meet General Grant
and arrange the details of the surrender. He had
started about a half hour when General Fitz Lee sent
word to General Longstreet that he had broken through
a portion of the enemy's line, and that the whole army
might make its way through. General Longstreet, on
learning this, directed Colonel Haskell of the artillery ,i
1 Colonel J. C. Haskell, of South Carolina ; " a bom and a resource
ful artilleryman, [who] knew no such thing as fear." Genersil Long-
street evidently used General Alexander's paper in the Philadelphia
Press in preparing the account, contained in his Manassas to Appo
mattox, of what occurred on the day of Lee's surrender. A further re
ference to Colonel Haskell may be found in Wise : The End of an Era
(p. 360). Longstreet says that, at Appomattox, " there were ' surren
dered or paroled ' 28,356 officers and men." A week previous to the
capitulation, Lee's and Johnston's combined forces numbered consid
erably over 100,000 combatants; [C. F. A.]

LEE AT APPOMATTOX 27
who was very finely mounted, to ride after General Lee
at utmost speed, killing his horse, if necessary, and re
call him before he could reach General Grant. Colonel
Haskell rode as directed, and a short distance in rear
of the army found General Lee and some of his staff
dismounted by the roadside. As he with difficulty
checked his horse. General Lee came up quickly, ask
ing what was the matter ; but, without waiting for a
reply, said : ' Oh ! I 'm afraid you have killed your
beautiful mare. What did you ride her so hard for ? '
On hearing General Longstreet's message, he asked
some questions about the situation, and sent word to
General Longstreet to use his own discretion in making
any movements ; but he did not himself return, and in
a short while another message was received that the
success of the cavalry under General Fitz Lee was but
temporary, and that there was no such gap in the
enemy's line as had been supposed. Soon afterward
a message was brought from the enemy's picket that
General Grant had passed around to the front and
would meet General Lee at Appomattox Courthouse,
and General Lee accordingly returned.
" Meanwhile, as the Confederate line under General
Gordon was slowly falling back from Appomattox
Courthouse after as gallant a fight against overwhelm
ing odds as it had ever made, capturing and bringing
safely off with it an entire battery of the enemy's. Gen
eral Custer, commanding a division of Federal cavalry,
rode forward with a flag of truce, and, the firing hav
ing ceased on both sides, was conducted to General
Longstreet as commanding temporarily in General
Lee's absence. Custer demanded the surrender of the
army to himself and General Sheridan, to which Gen-

28 LEE AT APPOMATTOX
eral Longstreet replied that General Lee was in com
munication with General Grant upon that subject, and
that the issue would be determined between them.
Custer replied that he and Sheridan were independent
of Grant, and unless the surrender was made to them
they would ' pitch in ' at once. Longstreet's answer
was a peremptory order [to Custer] at once [to return]
to his own lines, and ' try it if he liked.' Custer was
accordingly escorted back; but fire was not reopened,
and both lines remained halted, the Confederate about
a half mile east of the Courthouse.
" General Lee, returning from the rear shortly after
ward, halted in a small field adjoining Sweeney's house,
a little in rear of his skirmish line, and, seated on
some rails under an apple-tree, awaited a message from
General Grant. This apple-tree was not only entirely
cut up for mementos within two days afterward, but
its very roots were dug up and carried away under
the false impression that the surrender took place
under it.^
" About noon a Federal staff officer rode up and an
nounced that General Grant was at the Courthouse,
and General Lee with one of his staff accompanied
him back. As he left the apple-tree General Long-
street's last words were : ' Unless he offers you liberal
terms, general, let us fight it out.'
" It would be a difficult task to convey to one who
1 The surrender took place in the house of a Mr. McLean, a gentle
man who, by a strange coincidence, owned a farm on Bull Run at the
beginning of the war. General Beauregard's headquarters were at
McLean's house, just in the rear of Blackburn's ford, during the first
battle fought by the army, July 18, 1861. McLean moved from Bull
Run to get himself out of the theatre of war. The last battle took
place on his new farm, and the surrender in his new residence.

LEE AT APPOMATTOX 29
was not present an idea of the feeling of the Confed
erate army during the few hours which so suddenly,
and so unexpectedly to it, terminated its existence, and
with it all hopes of the Confederacy. Having been
sharply engaged that very morning, and its movements
arrested by the flag of truce, while one portion of it
was actually fighting and nearly all the rest, infantry
and artillery, had just been formed in line of battle in
sight and range of the enemy, and with guns unlim-
bered, it was impossible to reahze fuUy that the war,
with all its hopes, its ambitions, and its hardships, was
thus ended. There was comparatively very little con
versation, and men stood in groups looking over the
scene ; but the groups were unusually silent. It was
not at first generally known that a surrender was in
evitable, but there was a remarkable pre-acquiescence
in whatever General Lee should determine, and the
warmest expressions of confidence in his judgment.
Ranks and discipline were maintained as usual, and
there is little doubt that, had General Lee decided to
fight that afternoon, the troops would not have disap
pointed him. About 4 p. m. he returned from the
Courthouse, and, after informing the principal officers
of the terms of the surrender, started to ride back to
his camp.
"The universal desire to express to him the un
abated love and confidence of the army had led to the
formation of the gunners of a few battalions of artil
lery along the roadside, with orders to take off their
hats in silence as he rode by. When he approached,
however, the men could not be restrained, but burst
into the wildest cheering, which the adjacent infantry
lines took up ; and, breaking ranks, they all crowded

30 LEE AT APPOMATTOX
around him, cheering at the tops of their voices. Gen
eral Lee stopped his horse, and, after gaining silence,
made the only speech to his men that he ever made.
He was very brief, and gave no excuses or apologies
for his surrender, but said he had done all in his
power for his men, and urged them to go as quickly
and quietly to their homes as possible, to resume
peaceful avocations, and to be as good citizens as they
had been soldiers ; and this advice marked the course
which he himself pursued so faithfully to the end,"
Boston, November 6, 1901.
Note. — While the foregoing was passing through the press, there
appeared in the Century nlagazine for April, 1902 (volume Ixiii. pp.
921-944), a series of papers relating to the surrender of Appomat
tox. One of these papers, entitled ' ' Personal Recollections of the
Break-up of the Confederacy," was by General Alexander. Another
was by Colonel Charles Marshall, the military secretary to General
Lee, referred to by Mr. John Sargent Wise. (Supra, page 5.) In the
Century paper General Alexander recounts the circumstances of his
interview with General Lee more in detail, and with greater exactness,
than in his contribution to the Philadelphia Press of twenty years be
fore ; but the two narratives differ in no material respect.

II
THE TEEATY OF WASHINGTON: BEFORE AND
AFTER 1
Negotiated during the spring of 1871, and signed
on the 8th of May of that year, the Treaty of Wash
ington not only put to rest questions of dift'erence of
long standing, big with danger, between the two lead
ing maritime nations of the world, but it incorporated
new principles of the first importance into the body
of accepted International Law. The degree, more
over, to which that treaty has influenced, and is now
influencing, the course of human affairs and historical
evolution in both hemispheres is, I think, little appre
ciated. To that subject I propose this evening to
address myself.
The time to make use of unpublished material bear
ing on this period — material not found in newspapers,
public archives, or memoirs, which have already seen
the light — has, moreover, come. So far as any con
siderable political or diplomatic result can be said to
be the work of one man, the Treaty of Washington
1 This paper was originally prepared as an address, to be delivered
before the New York Historical Society on its ninety-seventh anni
versary, on the evening of Tuesday, November 19, 1901. Owing to
the length to which it grew in preparation, it was on that occasion
so compressed in delivery as to occupy but one hour. Subsequently
revised, it supplied the material for a course of four lectures before
the Lowell Institute in Boston, on the 3d, 6th, 10th, and LSth of the
following December.

32 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
was the work of Hamilton Fish. Mr. Fish died in
September, 1893 — now over eight years ago. When
the treaty was negotiated. General Grant was Presi
dent ; and General Grant has been dead more than
sixteen years. In speaking of this treaty, and describ
ing the complications which led up to it, and to which
it incidentally gave rise, frequent reference must be
made to Charles Sumner and John Lothrop Motley;
and, while Mr. Sumner died nearly twenty-eight years
ago, Mr. Motley followed him by a little more than
three years only. Thus, between the 11th of 'March,
1874, and the 7th of September, 1893, all those I have
named — prominent actors in the drama I am to de
scribe — passed from the stage. They belonged to a
generation that is gone. Other public characters have
since come forward ; new issues have presented them
selves. The once famous Alabama claims are now
" ancient history," and the average man of to-day
hardly knows what is referred to when allusion is
made to " Consequential Damages," or " National
Injuries," m connection therewith ; indeed, why should
he ? — for when, in June, 1872, that issue was at Geneva
finally put to rest, he who is now (1901) President of
the United States was a boy in his fourteenth year.
None the less, as the Treaty of Washington was a very
memorable historical event, so President Grant, Sec
retary Fish, Senator Sumner, and Minister Motley are
great historic figures. Their achievements and dissen
sions have already been much discussed, and will be
more discussed hereafter ; and to that discussion I
propose now to contribute something. My theme in
cludes the closing scene of a great drama ; a scene in
the development of which the striking play of indi
vidual character will long retain an interest.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 33
History aside, moreover, the Treaty of Washington
itself is a living, and it may even be said a controlling,
factor in the international situation of to-day : —
"And enterprises of great pith and moment
With this regard their currents turn awry,
And lose the name of action."
That treaty was signed at Washington on the 8th of
May, 1871 ; the battle of Majuba HiU took place in
South Africa nine years from the following 27th of
February. Separated in time, and occurring on dif
ferent sides of both the equator and the Atlantic, the
two events had little apparent bearing on each other ;
yet the settlement effected through the American treaty
forestalled the outcome of the African war.

Between 1861 and 1865 the United States was
engaged in a struggle which called for the exertion of
all the force at its command ; as, to a lesser extent.
Great Britain is now. The similarity between the
war in South Africa and the Confederate war in this
country early attracted the attention of English
viTiters, and one of the most thoughtful of their civil
and military critics has put on record a detailed com
parison of the two.^ " Each of these conflicts," this
authority asserts, "had its origin in conditions of long
and gradual growth, rendering an ultimate explosion
inevitable. Each of them deeply affected the whole
existence of the communities which found themselves
in antagonism. In each case, therefore, the energy
and the duration of the fighting far exceeded the
expectations of most of those who might have seemed
1 Spenser Wilkinson : War and Policy (1900), pp. 422-439.

34 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
to be in a position to judge." To the same effect,
another author ^ refers to the " striking resemblance "
between the two struggles. " The analogy," he says,
" like any other historical analogy, must not be pressed
too far, but there is a remarkable parallelism in the
general character of the political issues, in the course
of negotiations preceding war, and in the actual con
duct of the campaigns, a parallelism which sometimes
comes out in the most insignificant details." This
analogy the writer might advantageously have carried
into his discussion of the effect of both wars on foreign
opinion at the time of each. He correctly enough
admits that, during the struggle in South Africa, —
" The whole of Europe almost was against us, not so
much from any consideration of the merits of the case,
as from the dislike and jealousy of England which
have developed so enormously in the last decade ; "
but he significantly adds, — " In the United States
sympathies were much divided." In fact, during our
Civil War the entire sympathies and hearty good-will
of the great body of those composing what are known
as the governing and influential classes throughout
Europe, west of the Vistula, were enlisted on the side
of the Confederacy. In these classes would be included
all those of rank, members of the learned professions,
the commercial, financial and banking circles, and
officers of the two services — the army and the navy.
And then also, as in the case of the South African
war, this instructive accord arose, not " from any con
sideration of the merits of the case," but from " dis
like and jealousy ; " — the dislike and jealousy of
American democracy, which " had developed so enor-
1 The Times : History of the War in South Africa.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 85
mously in the course " of the decade or two immedi
ately preceding the outbreak of 1861. This was no
ticeably the case in England ; there " sympathies were
much divided," but the line of cleavage was horizontal.
Speaking largely, and allowing, of course, for numerous
exceptional cases, the more conscientious and think
ing among the poor and lowly, especially of the non
conformists, instinctively sympathized with the Union
and the North ; while of the privileged and the monied,
the commercial and manufacturing classes, it may
safely be asserted that nine out of ten were heart
and soul on the side of the rebel and slaveholder. It
is only necessary for me further to premise that as
respects foreign governments, and the principles of
international law and amity relating to the concession
of belligerent rights, — the recognition of nationality,
neutrality, and participation of neutrals, direct and
indirect, in the operations of war, — the position of
the Confederacy and the two South African republics
were in essentials the same. The latter, it is true,
were not maritime countries, so that no questions of
blockade, and comparatively few of contraband, arose ;
but, on the other hand, while the Confederates were,
as respects foreign nations, insurgents, pure and simple,
the South African republics had governments de jure
as well as de facto. Great Britain claimed over them
a species of suzerainty only, undefined at best, and
plainly questionable by any power disinclined to recog
nize it. This the British authorities ^ deplore, and
try to explain away ; but the fact is not denied.
So far, therefore, as the status of those in arms
against a government claiming sovereignty is of mo-
1 The Times : History, vol. i. chap. iv.

36 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
ment, the position of the South African republics was,
in 1900, far stronger with all nations on terms of
amity with Great Britain than was the position of the
Confederacy in 1861—62 with nations then at amity
with the United States. It consequently followed
that any precedent created, or rule laid down, by a
neutral for its own guidance in international relations
during the first struggle was applicable in the second,
except in so far as such rule or precedent had been
modified or set aside by mutual agreement of the par
ties concerned during the intervening years. What,
then, were these rules and precedents established by
Great Britain in its dealings with the United States
in 1861-65, which, unless altered by mutual consent
during the intervening time, would have been ap
plicable by the United States to Great Britain in
1899-1901 ?
In the opening pages of his account of the doings
of the agents of the Confederacy in Europe during
our Civil War, Captain James D. Bulloch, of the Con
federate States Navy, the most trusted and efficient of
those agents, says that " the Confederate government
made great efforts to organize a naval force abroad ; "
and he adds, truly enough, that " the naval operations
of the Confederate States which were [thus] organized
abroad possess an importance and attraction greater
than their relative effect upon the issue of the strug
gle." Captain Bulloch might well have gone further.
He might have added that, in connection with those
operations, the public men, high officials, courts of
law, and colonial authorities of Great Britain more
especially, supported by the press and general public
opinion of that country, labored conjointly and strenu-

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 37
ously, blindly and successfully, to build up a structure
of rules and precedents, not less complete and solid
than well calculated, whenever the turn of Great Brit
ain might come, — as come in time it surely would, —
to work the downfall of the empire. As that record
carries in it a lesson of deep significance to all in
trusted with the temporary administration of national
affairs, it should neither be forgotten nor ignored. It
is weU. that statesmen, also, should occasionally be
reminded that, with nations as with individuals, there
is a to-morrow, and the whirligig of time ever brings
on its revenges. " All things come to him who waits ; "
and the motto of the house of Ravenswood was, " I
bide my time."
When hostilities broke out in April, 1861, the so-
called Confederate States of America did not have
within their own limits any of the essentials to a mari
time warfare. With a long coast line and numerous
harbors, in itself and by itself, so far as aggressive ac
tion was concerned, the Confederacy could not be, or be
made, a base of naval operations. It had no machine
shops nor yards ; no shipwrights, and no collection of
material for shipbuilding or the equipment of ships.
In the days when rebellion was as yet only incipient,
it was correctly deemed of prime importance to get
cruisers ; but a diligent search throughout the ports
of the seceding States disclosed but one small steamer
at aU adapted for a cruising service. Under these cir
cumstances, the minds of those composing the as yet
embryonic government at Montgomery turned natu
rally to Europe ; and, in the early days of May, 1861,
immediately after the reduction of Fort Sumter, a
scheme was matured for making Great Britain the base

38 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
of Confederate naval operations against the United
States. The nature and scope of the British statutes
had already been looked into ; the probability of the
early issuance of a proclamation of neutrality by the
government of Great Britain was considered, and the
officials of the Confederate Navy Department were
confident that the Montgomery government would be
recognized by European powers as a de facto organi
zation. If belligerent rights were then conceded to it,
the maritime shelter and privileges common to belli
gerents under the amity of nations must, it was assumed,
be granted to its regularly commissioned cruisers.
The officials in question next looked about for some
competent Confederate sympathizer, who might be
despatched to Europe, and there be a species of sec
retary in partibus. They decided upon James D.
Bulloch, at the time a lieutenant in the United States
Navy, detailed by the government for the command
of the Bienville, a privately owned mail steamer run
ning between New York and New Orleans. A Geor
gian by birth and appointment. Lieutenant Bulloch,
according to the form of speech then much in vogue,
went with his State, and at once, after Georgia seceded,
put his services at the disposal of the Confederate gov
ernment. He was requested forthwith to report at
Montgomery ; and there, on the 8th and 9th of May,
he received from S. R. Mallory, the Confederate naval
secretary, verbal instructions covering aU essential
points of procedure. On the night of the 9th of May,
BuUoch left Montgomery for Liverpool, his duly des
ignated seat of operations. Arriving there on the 4th
of June, Secretary Mallory's assistant at once entered
on his duties, not only purchasing naval supplies, but,

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 39
before the close of the month, he had contracted with
a Liverpool shipbuilder for the construction of a
cruiser, and it was already partly in frame. The
Queen's proclamation of neutrality had then been
issued some six weeks. The vessel now on the stocks
was at first called the Oreto ; afterwards it attained
an international celebrity as the Florida. Acting
with an energy which fuUy justified his selection for
the work of the Confederacy then in hand to be done.
Captain Bulloch, on the 1st of the following August,
entered into another contract, this time with the
Messrs. Laird, under which the keel of a second
cruiser was immediately afterwards laid in the yards of
that firm at Birkenhead. The purpose of the Con
federate government was well defined. In the words
of Captain Bulloch, it was " not merely to buy or
build a single ship, but it was to maintain a perma
nent representative of the Navy Department [in
Great Britain], and to get ships and naval supplies
without hindrance as long as the war lasted." The
ports of the Mersey, the Clyde, and the Thames were
to be the arsenals, and furnish the shipyards, of the
Confederacy. Nor did the scheme stop here. A cor
responding branch of the Confederate Treasury De
partment had already been established in Liverpool,
officially designated the " Depositories " of that organi
zation ; ^ and, regardless of any pretence of conceal
ment, the naval representative of the Confederacy had
an office in the premises hired by its fiscal agents.^
1 Bulloch : Secret Service of the Confederate States in Europe, vol.
i. p. 65 ; also vol. ii. pp. 216, 416.
^ Geneva Arbitration : Correspondence concerning Claims against
Great Britain, vol. vi. p. 185. The papers officially published in con
nection with the Geneva Arbitration are voluminous and confusing.

40 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
No hindrance to the operations of the combined branch
bureaus was anticipated. In other words. Great Brit
ain was to be made the base of an organized maritime
warfare against the United States, the Confederacy
itself being confessedly unable to conduct such a war
fare from within its own hmits. The single question
was, — Would Great Britain permit itself to be thus
utilized for the construction, equipment, and despatch
of commerce-destroyers and battleships intended to
operate, in a domestic insurrection, against a nation
with which it was at peace ?
Excepting only the good faith, friendly purpose,
and apparently obvious self-interest of a civilized gov
emment in the last half of the nineteenth century,
the provisions of the British Foreign Enlistment Act
of 1819 constituted the only barrier in the way of the
consummation of this extraordinary project, — a pro
ject which aU will now agree was tantamount to a
proposal that, so far as commerce-destroyers were con
cerned, the first maritime nation of the world should
become an accomplice before the fact in what bore a
close family resemblance to piracy. As the date of
its enactment (1819) implies, the British Foreign
Enlistment Act was passed at the time of the .trou
bles incident to the separation of its American de
pendencies from Spain, and was designed to prevent
the fitting out in British ports of piratical expeditions
The references under the title " Geneva Arbitration," in the notes to
this volume, are to the original editions presented to the tribunal at
Geneva. These papers were printed between 1869 and 1872 in Wash
ington, London, Paris, and Geneva, as the exigencies of the case re
quired. To supersede them in part, Congress (as Cong. Doc, Serial
Nos. 1553-1556) caused four volumes to be printed, here cited as
Papers relating to Treaty of Washington (1872).

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 41
against Spanish commerce, under cover of letters of
marque, etc., issued by South American insurrection
ary governments. Owing to the long peace which
ensued on its passage, the act had slept innocuously on
the statute-book, no case involving a forfeiture ever
having been brought to trial under it. It was an
instance of desuetude, covering more than forty years.
" Labored and cumbrous in the extreme," ^ the
Foreign Enlistment Act was, after the manner of
English Acts of Parliament, " overloaded with a mass
of phrases, alike unprecise and confused, with so much
of tedious superfluity of immaterial circumstances " as
to suggest a suspicion that it must have been " spe
cially designed to give scope to bar chicanery, to facil
itate the escape of offenders, and to embarrass and
confound the officers of the government charged with
the administration of law."^ It was, in short, one
of those statutes in which the British parliamentary
draughtsman has prescriptively revelled, and through
the clauses of which judge and barrister love, as the
phrase goes, to drive a coach-and-six. But it so
chanced that, in the present case, the coach-and-six
had, as passengers, the whole British Ministry ; and
in it they were doomed to flounder pitifully along " in
the flat morass of [a] meaningless verbosity and con
fused circumlocution." ^ Upon the proper construc
tion of this notable act, the Confederate representa
tives at once sought the opinion of counsel ; and they
were presently advised that, under its provisions, it
would be an offence for a British subject to build,
1 Montague Bernard : Historical Account of the Neutrality of Great
Britain during the American Civil War (London, 1870), p. 404.
2 Geneva Arbitration : Argument of the United States, pp. 52, 61.
8 it., p. 52.

42 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
arm, and equip a vessel to cruise against the com
merce of a friendly state ; but the mere building of a
ship, though with the full intent of so using her, was
no offence ; nor was it an offence to equip a vessel so
built, if it was without the intent so to use her. To
constitute an offence, the two acts of building a ship
with intent of hostile use, and equipping the same,
must be combined ; and both must be done in British
waters.! Jt hence followed that, under the act, it
was lawful for an English firm to build a ship in a
British shipyard designed purposely to prey on Amer
ican commerce ; it was also lawful to sell or buy, of
this same English firm if more convenient, the arti
cles of necessary equipment for such vessel from cord
age to arms and ammunition ; but the articles of war
equipment must not go into the vessel, thus making of
her a complete cruiser, within British maritime juris
diction. The final act of conjunction must be effected
at some distance greater than one league from where
a British writ ran. Assuming this construction of the
Foreign Enlistment Act to be correct, its evasion was
simple. It could be enforced practically only with
a government strong enough to decline to allow its
international obligations to be trifled vdth. If, how
ever, officials evinced the slightest indifference respect
ing the enforcement of those obligations, and much
more if the government was infected by any spirit of
connivance, the act at once became a statute mockery.
In any large view of policy Great Britain then was,
as it now is, under strong inducement to insist on the
highest standard of international maritime observance.
As the foremost ocean-carrier of the world, it ill be-
1 Bulloch, vol. i. pp. 65-67.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 43
came her to connive at commerce-destroying. But, in
1861, Great Britain had a divided interest ; and Brit
ish money-making instincts are well developed. She
was the arsenal and shipbuilder of the world, as well
as its ocean-carrier. Her artisans could launch from
private dockyards vessels of any size, designed for
any purpose, thoroughly equipped whether for peace
or war ; and aU at the shortest possible notice. Under
ordinary circumstances, this was a legitimate branch
of industry. It admitted, however, of easy perver
sion ; and the question in 1861 was whether the first
of commercial nations would permit its laws to be so
construed as to establish the principle that, in case of
war, any neutral might convert its ports into nurseries
of corsairs for the use or injury of either belligerent,
or of both.
It is now necessary briefly to recall a once familiar
record showing the extent to which Great Britain lent
itself to the scheme of the Confederacy, and the pre
cedents it created while so doing. All through the
later summer of 1861, • — the months following the dis
grace of Bull Run and the incident of the Trent, —
the work of Confederate naval construction was pushed
vigorously along in the Liverpool and Birkenhead ship
yards. Hardly any concealment was attempted of the
purpose for which the Oreto and the " 290 " — as the
two vessels were called or designated — were designed.
As the work on them progressed, it was openly super
vised by agents known to be in the Confederate employ,
while British government officials, haviag free access
to the yards, looked to it that the empty letter of the
law was observed. Never was a solemn mockery more
carefully enacted ; never was there a more insulting

44 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
pretence at the observance of international obliga^
tions ; never a more perfect instance of connivance at
a contemplated crime, though not so nominated in the
bond. The Oreto, or Florida, we are told by Captain Bul
loch, was the first regularly built war vessel of the
Confederate States Navy. " She has," he wrote at
the time, " been twice inspected by the Custom House
authorities, in compliance with specific orders from the
Foreign Office. . . . The hammock-nettings, ports,
and general appearance of the ship sufficiently indicate
the ultimate object of her construction, but , . . regis
tered as an English ship, in the name of an English
man, commanded by an Englishman, with a regular
official number under the direction of the Board of
Trade, she seems to be perfectly secure against cap
ture or interference, until an attempt is made to arm
her." Another vessel, carrying the armament of this
contemplated commerce-destroyer, left England at so
nearly the same time as the Oreto that those in
charge of the latter increased her speed, being appre
hensive that their consort would arrive first at the
point of rendezvous. Making Nassau, an English
port, the last pretence at concealment as to character
and destination disappeared, in consequence of the
heedless talk of a Confederate officer there to join
her. A portion of her crew, also, immediately re
ported to the British naval commander at the station
that the vessel's destination could not be ascertained.
She was seized; but, after some legal forms and a
pretence of a hearing, a decree of restoration was
entered. Subsequently, before being herself destroyed,
she captured, and burnt or bonded, some forty ves-

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 45
sels carrying the United States flag. A precedent
complete at every point ha,d been created.
Relying on the advice of counsel and the experience
gained in the case of the Florida, there was absolutely
no concealment of purpose even attempted as respects
the Alabama. Built under a contract entered into
with the avowed agent of the Confederacy, that the
" 290 " was designed as a Confederate commerce-
destroyer was town talk in Liverpool, — " quite noto
rious," as the American consul expressed it. She was
launched on the 15th of May, 1862, as the Enrica,
with " no attempt," as Captain Bulloch testifies, " to
deceive any one by any pretence whatever." Every
thing was done in the " ordinary commonplace way ; "
and, as BuUoch afterwards wrote, he " always at
tributed the success of getting the Alabama finished
as a sea-going ship, and then despatched, to the fact
that no mystery or disguise was attempted." i John
Laird, Sons & Co., of Birkenhead, the contracting
shipwrights, knew perfectly weU that they were buUd-
ing a cruiser for the Confederate government, spe-
ciaUy constructed as a commerce-destroyer ; and they
carefuUy observed what their counsel advised them
was the law of the land. They simply built a vessel
designed to do certain work in a war then in pro
gress ; the equipment of that vessel, including its arma
ment, was in course of preparation elsewhere. Of
that they knew nothing. They were not informed ;
nor, naturally, did they care to ask. The vessel and
her equipment would come together outside of British
jurisdiction. Such was tbe law ; Great Britain lived
under a government of law ; and " to strain the law "
1 BuUoch, vol. i. p. 229.

46 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
the government was then in no way inclined. The
agents of the Confederacy, moreover, " had the means
of knowing with well-nigh absolute certainty what was
the state of the negotiations between the United
States Minister and Her Majesty's Government." ^
The work of completion was, however, pressed forward
with significant energy after the launching of the
vessel ; so that, by the middle of June, she went out
on a trial trip. An Englishman, having a Board of
Trade certificate, was then engaged " merely to take
the ship to an appoiated place without the United
Kingdom," 2 where she was to meet a consort bearing
her armament.
This was in Liverpool ; meanwhile the proposed com
merce-destroyer's armament was in course of prepara
tion at London, and included " everything required
for the complete equipment of a man-of-war." The
goods, when ready, were " packed, marked, and held for
shipping orders." The Agrippina, a suitable barque
of 400 tons measurement, was then purchased, and
quietly loaded. Between the two vessels — the one
building on the Mersey, the other taking on board a
cargo in the Thames — there was no apparent connec
tion. Every arrangement for the destruction of the
commerce of a nation at peace with Great Britain was
being made under the eyes of the customs officials, but
with scrupulous regard to the provisions of the For
eign Enlistment Act.
A single word from the British Foreign Office would
then have sufficed to put a stop to the whole scheme.
That office was fuUy advised by the American Minister
1 Bulloch, vol. i. pp. 229, 260, 261.
2 lb., vol. i. p. 231.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 47
of what was common town talk at Liverpool. The
Confederate agent there in charge of operations was
as weU known as the Collector of the Port ; probably
much more frequently pointed out, and curiously ob
served. Had those then officiaUy responsible for Great
Britain's honor and interests been in earnest, public
notice would have been given to all concerned, includ
ing belligerents, — under the designation of evil-dis
posed persons, — that Her Majesty's Government did
not propose to have Great Britain's neutraUty trifled
with, or the laws evaded. Her ports were not to be
made, by either beUigerent, directly or through eva
sion, a basis of naval operations against the other.
Any ship constructed for warlike purposes, upon the
builders of which notice had been served at the appU-
cation of either beUigerent, would be held affected by
such notice ; and thereafter, in case of evasion, would
not be entitled to the rights of hospitality in any Brit
ish waters. Whether, under the principles of inter
national law, such vessel could be held so tainted by
evasion after notice as to be subject to seizure and
detention whenever and wherever found within British
jurisdiction, would be matter of further consideration.
This course was one authorized by international law,
and weU understood at the time. At a later day, the
Attorney-General, for instance, in debate declared, ¦ —
" I have not the least doubt that we have a right, if
we thought fit, to exclude froin our own ports any par
ticular ship or class of ships, if we consider that they
have violated our neutrality." ^ And, three months be
fore the first law adviser of the Crown thus expressed
1 House of Commons, May 13, 1864. Geneva Arbitration : Corre
spondence, etc., vol. V. p. 583 ; see, also, lb., p. 571. The situation was

48 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
himself, Mr. WUliam Vernon Harcourt, then first
coming into notice as a writer on questions of interna
tional law under the pseudonym of " Historicus," had
said in a letter published in the Times, — " It is a sound
and salutary rule of international practice, established
by the Americans themselves in 1794, that vessels
which have been equipped in violation of the laws of
a neutral state shall be excluded from that hospitality
which is extended to other belligerent cruisers, on
whose origin there is no such taint. ... I think that
to deny to the Florida and the Alabama access to
our ports would be the legitimate and dignified man
ner of expressing our disapproval of the fraud which
has been practised on our neutraUty. If we abstain
from taking such a course, I fear we may justly he
under the imputation of having done less to vindicate
our good faith than the American government con
sented at our instance, on former occasions, to do." i
novel, and the solution of the difficulty through " notice " does not
seem to have suggested itself to the govemment. Writing long after
the event. Lord Selbome, who, as Sir Roundell Palmer, was, during
the Rebellion, the chief law adviser of the Crown, thus expressed
himself : — " [The neutral] might, indeed, by previous notice, exclude
all or any particular ships of war of either belligerent from his ports ;
and it might be a reasonable opinion, (;hat an exclusion of a particular
ship on the ground that she had been equipped within his territory,
contrary to his neutrality laws, would be justifiable." (Memorials,
Part XL, Personal and Political, 1865-95, vol. i. p. 268.) Viscount
D'ltajuba, in his opinion at Geneva, formulated the rule in its full
extent : — " This principle of seizure, of detention, or at any rate of
preliminary notice that a vessel, under such circumstances, will not
be received in the ports of the neutral whose neutrality she has vio
lated, is fair and salutary. . . . The commission with which such a
vessel is provided is insufficient to protect her as against the neutral
whose neutrality she has violated." Papers Relating to Treaty of
Washington (1872), vol. iv. pp. 97, 98.
^ London Times, February 17, 1864. Geneva Arbitration : Corre
spondence, etc., vol. iv. pp. 203, 204. This point was vigorously insisted

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 49
Finally, England's Chief Justice laid down the rule in
the foUowing broad terms, — "A sovereign has abso
lute dominion in and over his own ports and waters.
He can perifait the entrance into them to the ships of
other nations, or refuse it ; he can grant it to some,
can deny it to others ; he can subject it to such restric
tions, conditions, or regulations as he pleases. But,
by the universal comity of nations, in the absence of
such restrictions or prohibition, the ports and waters
of every nation are open to all comers." ^
Unless, therefore, the British Ministry was willing
to stand forward as openly conniving at proceedings
calculated to bring into contempt the law and the
Queen's proclamation, the course to be pursued was
plain ; and the mere declaration of a purpose to pur
sue that course, while it would not in the sUghtest have
interfered with legitimate ship construction, would
have put an instant and effectual stop to the building
and equipment of commerce-destroyers. The law, even
as it then stood, was sufficient, had the government
only declared a purpose. Had the wiU been there, a
way had not been far to seek.
No such notice was conveyed. In vain the Ameri
can Minister protested. No evidence as to the charac
ter of the proposed cruiser, or the purpose for which
upon by Mr. Cobden in his speech in the House of Commons, April
24, 1863. " Why," he said, " do you not forbid the reentry of those
vessels into your ports, that left them, manned by a majority of Eng
lish sailors, in violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act ? Would any
person have a right to complain of that ? Proclaim the vessels that
thus steal away from your ports, outlaws, so far as your ports are con
cerned." Speeches (London, 1870), vol. ii. p. 97.
1 Papers relating to Treaty of Washington (1872), vol. iv. pp. 416-
418. Supplement to the London Gazette, September 24, 1872, pp.
4263, 4264.

50 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
she was designed, possible for him to adduce, was ad
judged satisfactory ; and, finaUy, when the case became
so flagrant that action could not in decency be delayed,
a timely intimation reached the Confederate agent
through some unknown channel, and, on the 29th of
July, 1862, the Alabama went out on a trial trip at
the mouth of the Mersey, from which she did not
return.! With British papers, and flying the Brit
ish flag, she two days later got under weigh for
the Azores. At almost the some hour, moving under
orders from the Confederate European naval bureau
at Liverpool, her consort, the Agrippina, loaded with
munitions and equipment, cleared from London. The
two met at the place designated ; and there, outside
of British jurisdiction, the stores, arms, and equipment
were duly transferred. A few days later, the forms
of transfer having been gone through with, the British
master turned the ship over to the Confederate com
mander, his commission was read, and the Confederate
1 Much has been written, and more said, as to the particular person
upon whom rested responsibility for the evasion of the Alabama. Col
lusion on the part of officers has been charged, and it was at one time
even alleged that Mr. S. Price Edwards, then collector of the port of
Liverpool, had been the recipient of a bribe. This is emphatically
denied by Captain Bulloch (vol. i. pp. 258-264), and no evidence has
ever come to light upon which to rest such an improbable imputation.
Under these circumstances, the following intensely characteristic
avowal of Earl Russell, in his volume of Recollections and Suggestions,
published in 1875, has a refreshing sound. Such curt frankness causes
a feeling of respect for the individual man to predominate over any,
or all, other sentiments. The passage referred to (p. 407) is as fol
lows : — "I assent entirely to the opinions of the Lord Chief Justice
of England [in his award in the Geneva Arbitration] that the Ala
bama ought to have been detained during the four days in which I
was waiting for the opinion of the Law Officers. But I think that the
fault was not that of the Commissioners of the Customs [as asserted
by Lord Cockburn] ; it was my fault, as Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs."

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 51
flag run up. Upon which somewhat empty ceremonies,
the " 290," now the Alabama, stood purified of any
evasion of English law, and, as a duly commissioned
foreign man-of-war, was thereafter entitled to all bel
ligerent rights and hospitalities within British jurisdic
tion. Incredible as it now must seem to Englishmen
as weU as to us, a British Ministry, of which Lord
Palmerston was the head, then professed itself impo
tent to assert the majesty, or even the dignity, of the
law. It had been made the dupe of what Lord Cock
burn afterwards not inaptly termed " contrivances,"
— " the artifices and tricks, to which the unscrupulous
cunning of the Confederate agents did not hesitate to
resort in violation of British neutrality ; " ^ and yet
the poor victim of these " artifices and tricks " pro
fessed itself utterly unable to make itself respected,
much less to vindicate its authority. At a later day
Earl RusseU recovered the use of his faculties and
his command of language. He then, though the law
had not in the mean time been changed, found means
to let the Confederate agents understand that " such
shifts and stratagems " were " totally unjustifiable and
manifestly offensive to the British Crown." ^
Such are the simple facts in the case. And now,
looking back through the perspective of forty years,
and speaking with aU moderation, is it unfair to ask,
— Was any great nation ever guilty of a more wan
ton, a more obtuse, or a more criminal dereUction?
The world's great ocean-carrier permitted a beUiger-
! Supplement to the London Gazette, September 24, 1872, p. 4231.
Papers relating to Treaty of Washington (1872), vol. iv. p. 377.
2 Earl Russell to Messrs. Mason, Slidell, and Mann, February 13,
1865. Geneva Arbitration : Correspondence, etc., vol. i. p. 631.

52 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
ent of its own creation to sail a commerce-destroyer
through its statutes ; and then, because of an empty
formality observed in a desert mid-ocean rendezvous,
which chanced to be under Portuguese jurisdiction,^
set up a pretence, which can only be adequately char
acterized as both brazen and sneaking, that in afford
ing protection and hospitality to the vessel thus exist
ing through a contemptuous evasion of its own law.
Great Britain did not stand an accompUce in com-
merce-destroying.2 « Shall the blessed sun of heaven
prove a micher and eat blackberries ? — a question not
to be asked. Shall the son of England prove a thief,
and take purses ? — a question to be asked."
1 BuUoch, vol. i. p. 117.
2 Something bearing a close family resemblance to this plea of
impotency to resent a fraud practised on itself in contempt of law,
or to vindicate the majesty of the Crown, was advanced by Dr. Ber
nard, in defence of the Palmerston-Russell Ministry, even as late as
1870. The rule of international law he first laid down correctly : —
"Every Sovereign has a general right to exclude from his ports
either all ships-of-war, or any particular ship, or to impose on ad
mission any conditions he may think fit ; although the exclusion of a
particular ship would be unjust and offensive, unless reasonable
grounds could be shown for it." (Historical Account, p. 413.) He
then admits (lb., p. 437) that : — " The various contrivances by which
[the Confederate commerce-destroyers] were procured and sent to
sea were discreditable to the Confederate Govemment, and offensive
and injurious to Great Britain. Such enterprises were, and were
known to be, calculated to embroU the country with the United States ;
they were carried into effect by artifices which must be accounted
unworthy of any body of persons caUing themselves a Government
— of any community making pretensions to the rank of an independ
ent people. Every transaction was veUed in secrecy, and masked
under a fictitious purchase, or a false destination. By such devices it
was intended to blind the eyes of the government of Great Britain."
Moreover, — " It would be erroneous, I conceive, to contend that the
taint of iUegality, if any, adhering to the ./lZa6ania,wasever 'deposited,'
as the phrase is, by the termination of her original cruise. She never
made but one cruise." (16., p. 414 n.) AU this, it might naturaUy be

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 63
It is not necessary . further to foUow the law of
Great Britain as then laid down, or to enumerate
the precedents created under it. One thing led to
another. In the autumn of 1861 Captain Bulloch
ran the blockade, and, visiting Richmond, conferred
with his chief, the Secretary of the Confederate Navy.
He then learned that the designs of the Richmond gov
ernment, as respects naval operations from a British
base, had " assumed a broader range," ^ Secretary
MaUory now contemplated the construction in Great
Britain of " the best tj'pe of armored vessels for oper
ations on the coast . , . to open and protect the
blockaded ports. ... It was impossible to build them
in the Confederate States — neither the materials nor
the mechanics were there; and besides, even if iron
inferred, would constitute, if anything could constitute, " reasonable
grounds " for the exclusion of the vessel in question from the ports
of the country so -outraged. Instead, however, of reaching that obvi
ous conclusion, the learned pubUcist concluded that to exclude the
ship so offending would have been " a measure likely to be embar
rassed by some difficulties ; " and that for the losses occ^ioned by
failure to resent an outrage on itself, " the British nation is not justly
responsible." In justice to Earl Russell it should be said that, on the suggestion
of the Duke of Argyll, he did propose to the Cabinet that the colonial
authorities should be instructed to detain the " 290," or the Alabama,
if she should come within their power, and he even drew up a despatch
to that effect. AU the other members of the Cabinet were, however,
against this course, and the despatch was not sent. Lord Westbury,
the Chancellor, was " vehement " against it. (Spencer Walpole :
Lord John Russell, vol. ii. p. 355. See, also, Sir EoundeU Palmer :
Memorials, 1766-1865, vol. ii. p. 431.) In this case it does not appear
that the order of detention was intended to apply to the vessel after
its transfer in other waters to the Confederate authorities. Pre
sumably, it was limited to the " 290," or Enrica, in case she fol
lowed the course of the Oreto, going direct from the port of evasion
to some other port within British jurisdiction. This the " 290 " did
not do.
1 BuUoch, vol. i. p. 377.

54 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
and skUled artisans had been within reach, there was
not a mill in the country to roll the plates, nor fur
naces and machinery to forge them, nor shops to make
the engines." ^ This was a distinct step in advance ;
also a long one. It might almost be called a stride.
Earl RusseU had declared that one great object of the
British government was to preserve "for the nation
the legitimate and lucrative trade of shipbuilding ; "
and if it was " legitimate " to construct a single com
merce-destroyer to take part in hostilities then going
on, why was it not legitimate to construct a squadron
of turreted iron-clads ? It certainly was more " lucra
tive." In the words of Mr. Gladstone, then Chan-
ceUor of the Exchequer, the Confederate leaders, hav
ing made an army, " are making, it appears, a navy; "
and the " lucrative trade " of constructing that navy
naturaUy fell to the shipwrights of the Mersey. The
Prime Minister of Great Britain now, also, boldly
took the ground in parliamentary debate — speak
ing, of course, for the Government — that of this no
beUigerent had any cause to complain. " As a mer-
cantUe transaction," British merchants and manu
facturers were at liberty to supply, and had a right
to supply, one or both of " the belligerents, not only
with arms and cannon, but also with ships destined
for warUke purposes." ^ To the same effect the
1 BuUoch, vol. i. p. 380.
^ House of Commons, July 28, 1863. Geneva Arbitration : Corre
spondence, etc., vol. V. p. 695. " It is quite as much within the Inter
national Law to sell ships of war to another nation as it is to sell any
munitions of war." (Lord Robert CecU, now (1902) Marquis of Salis
bury, House of Commons, May 13, 1864.) Per contra, in April, 1863,
Mr. Cobden drew the distinction forcibly. He declared the two
questions totally distinct. "There is no law in this country that
prohibits the buying and selling or manufacturing or exporting

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 55
Secretary for Foreign Affairs informed the United
States Minister that, " except on the ground of any
proved violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act . , .
Her Majesty's Government cannot interfere with
commercial dealings between British subjects and the
so-styled Confederate States, whether the subject of
those dealings be money or contraband goods, or even
ships adapted for warlike purposes." " The cabinet,"
he moreover on another occasion stated, " were of
opinion that the law [thus set forth] was sufficient ;
but that legal evidence could not always be pro
cured." ^ Of the sufficiency of that evidence, the
Government, acting through its legal advisers, was
the sole judge. As such, it demanded legal proof of
a character sufficient not only to justify a criminal
indictment, but to furnish reasonable grounds for
securing a conviction thereon. The imputation and
strong circumstances which led directly to the door of
proof gave, in this case, no satisfaction. Facts of
unquestioned notoriety could not be adduced, — " no
toriety " was not evidence.2 A petty jury in an Eng
lish criminal court became thus the final arbiter of
Britain's international obligations. If that august
arms and munitions of war. ... I am astonished," he went on, in
terms .peculiarly Cobdenesque, " that Mr. Adams and Mr. Seward
should have mixed that question up in their correspondence with that
of equipments for war. I will not say that I was astonished at Mr.
Seward, because he writes so much that he is in danger of writing on
every subject, and on every side of a subject; but I am astonished
that Mr. Adams should have mixed this question up with what is
really a vital question — that of furnishing and equipping ships of
war." Speeches (London, 1870), vol. ii. pp. 84, 85.
1 Russell to Lyons, March 27, 1863. Geneva Arbitration: Cor
respondence, etc., vol. i. p. 585.
2 Geneva Arbitration : Treaty of Washington Papers (1872), vol. iv.
pp. 377, 479 ; see, also. Correspondence, etc., vol. iv. p. 530.

56 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
tribunal pronounced a case not proven, though the real
facts were common town talk, the law was not violated,
and, whatever acts of maritime wrong and ocean out
rage foUowed, foreign nations had no grounds for
reclamation. And this was gravely pronounced law ;
" Ay, marry ; crowner's quest law ! "
Here, indeed, was the inherent, fundamental defect
of the British position, — what was afterwards de
scribed as the " insularity " of the British contentions.
Unable to rise above the conception of a municipal
rule of conduct, the governmental vision was bounded
on the one side by a jury box, and on the other by the
benches of the House of Commons. Uncertainty,
closely bordering on vaciUation, naturaUy resulted;
for Earl RusseU had a firm grasp neither on the prin
ciples of international law involved, nor on the ques
tions of policy. On the one hand, he wished to pre
serve for the shipwrights of the Mersey and the Clyde
that " trade of shipbuilding, in which our people excel,
and which is to great numbers of them a source of
honest livelihood ; " ^ but, on the other, in an appar
ently unguarded moment, he admitted that it was
" the duty of nations in amity with each other not to
suffer their good faith to be violated by iU-disposed
persons within their borders, merely from the ineffi
ciency of their prohibitory policy." One day he would
write to Mr. Adams that the government found itseH
" unable to go beyond the law, municipal and inter
national," — a proposition which few would be disposed
to controvert ; and then, twelve days later, he went
through a similar form of reply, assigning " the letter
1 RusseU to Adams, October 26, 1863. Geneva Arbitration : Cor
respondence, etc., vol. iii. p. 201.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 57
of the existing [meaning, apparently, the municipal]
law " 1 as the extreme of interference.^
At last, on fuU reflection and at a subsequent day,
he settled on a defence of his action which was almost
humorously illustrative of " insularity." He trium
phantly declared, in complete aud final justification
thereof, that the object of the Palmerston-Russell Min
istry throughout was "to preserve for the subject the
security of trial by jury, and for the nation the legiti
mate and lucrative trade of shipbuUding " ! ^ British
Shipyards and Trial by Jury ! — here, indeed, was
a hustings cry. When he formulated it, no trial was
impending ; no general election was imminent ; he
was himself permanently retired from official life. Yet
instinctively, and in obedience to a lifelong parlia
mentary habit, his mind reverted to time-honored po
litical catch- words. Invoking them, a Britisli ministry
could face with confidence either the benches of the
Opposition or the ordeal of the constituencies. The
1 Earl Russell to Mr. Adams, October 4 and 16, 1862. Geneva Ar
bitration : Correspondence, etc., vol. vi. pp. 426-429.
° Subsequently Lord Selborne expressed himself on this point, as
follows : — "It is unnecessary to say that no one in this country con
tended for a proposition so plainly untenable as that municipal law is
a proper and sufficient measure of the neutral rights and obUgations
of nations." {Memorials, Part I., 1766-1865, vol. ii. p. 413.) This
was written subsequent to the Geneva Arbitration ; the converse was
certainly assumed at Geneva ( Treaty of Washington Papers, etc. (1.872) ,
vol. iii. pp. 19-24), and it is difficult in reading the Alabama corre
spondence to avoid the conclusion that Earl RusseU was not clear
in thought and expression, and his difficulty arose from his inability
to grasp the fact that Great Britain was under an obligation beyond
any established by act of Parliament. He did not really attain to a
clear perception of this principle until actually confronted with the
issue presented by the case of the Laird rams. It seems to have
been an instance of education in the elements of international law, so
gradual as to be suggestive of extreme reluctance under instruction.
* Speeches and Despatches (1870), vol. ii. p. 266.

58 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
cry was epigrammatic ; any one could understand it ;
it did not admit of an answer, — at least, not at West
minster nor at the polling-booths.
But to those of other nations, called on to stand
impassively by while their merchant-marine vanished
in smoke, this sturdy British appeal carried in it a
somewhat empty, not to say mocking, sound. Trial
by jury might be the paUadium of the British consti
tution ; shipbuilding was unquestionably a lucrative
craft: but when the last became an instrument for
utiUzing Great Britain as a base of naval warfare in
the hands of one belligerent against another, between
whom, being at peace with each. Great Britain pro
fessed to maintain a perfect and even-handed neutral
ity ; and when trial by jury, through pre-ordained
verdicts of " not proven," was perverted into an accom
plice before the fact in piracy, — when these things
came about, foreign nations would not improbably
find themselves compelled to have recourse to such
other means of self-preservation as the law of nations
might afford. The hustings and jury box were not
the final arbiters between warring States.
Those tribunals, moreover, highly respectable, no
doubt, as weU as ancient, were distinctly insular.
They had no place in the code. On the contrary, the
principle of international law controUing the situation
was plain. As laid dovm by the leading EngUsh pub
licist of that day, it read as follows : — " Each State has
a right to expect from another the observance of inter
national obligations, without regard to what may be the
municipal means which it possesses for enforcing this
observance." i But, with one eye always fixed on the
1 PhiUimore : International Law, vol. i., preface to second edition,
p. 21, cited in Geneva Arbitration : Argument of United States, p. 35.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 59
Opposition benches at Westminster, and the other
wandering in the direction of the Lancashire jury box.
Earl RusseU instinctively contended that the interna
tional obligations of Great Britain were coterminous
with its parliamentary enactments. If the law of Eng
land did not provide adequate protection for the rights
of foreign nations, it might indeed be changed ; but,
until changed, it was most unreasonable for the re
presentatives of those nations to present claims and
complaints to Her Majesty's Government. The gov
ernment, responsible to Parliament and the jury, had
done its best. Against it no charge of inefficiency
would lie. The fact that Great Britain was being
made the base of naval warfare was ignored, — al
though notorious, " not proven," — and the trade in
ships was pronounced no more contraband than that
in guns. It is almost unnecessary to say that this
rule also is one which, in its converse operation, might
not infrequently lead to inopportune results.
The Foreign Enlistment Act of 1819 was then
passed in review. It was pronounced " effectual for
aU reasonable purposes, and to the full extent to which
international law or comity can require." ^ In the
opinion of the Government, there was no occasion for '
its amendment or strengthening. No move was made
to that end ; no recommendation submitted to Parliar
ment. On the contrary, when in March, 1863, the
neutrality laws were in debate. Lord Palmerston did
not hesitate to declare from the ministerial benches, if
the cry that those laws were manifestly defective was
raised " for the purpose of driving Her Majesty's Gov-
1 Mr. Hammond to Messrs. Lamport and others, July 6, 1863. Ge
neva Arbitration : Correspondence, etc., vol. i. p. 673.

60 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
ernment to do something . . . which may be derogatory
to the dignity of the country, in the way of altering
our laws for the purpose of pleasing another govern
ment, then all I can say is that such a course is not
likely to accomplish its purpose ; . . . but the people
and Government of the United States . . . must not
imagine that any cry which may be raised wiU induce
us to come down to this House with a proposal to alter
the law." ^ Thus another door of future possible escape
was on this occasion closed, so to speak with a slam,
by the British Premier. The law, however manifestly
defective, was not to be changed to please any one.
Meanwhile, as if to make the record at all points
complete, and to show how very defective this immu
table law was, the courts passed upon the much dis
cussed Act. Under the pressure brought to bear by the
United States Minister a test case had been arranged.
It was tried before a jury in the Court of Exchequer
on the 22d of June, 1863, the Laird iron-clads being
then stUl on the ways, but in an advanced stage of
construction. The vessel thus seized and proceeded
against, in order to obtain a construction of the forty-
four years old statute, was the Alexandra. This vessel
was being built with a view to warlike equipment.
Of that no denial was possible. That she was in
tended for use in the Confederate service was a moral
certainty. The Alabama was at that time in its fuU
career of destruction, — carrying out the declared
purpose of its commander, to "burn, sink, and de
stroy." Before her ravages the merchant marine of
the United States was fast disappearing, — the ships
^ Debate of March 27, 1863. Geneva Arbitration : Correspondence,
etc., vol. iv. pp. 530, 531. See, also, RusseU to Adams, September
25, 1863. lb., vol. i. p. 674.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 61
composing it either going up in smoke, or being trans
ferred to other flags. With all these facts admitted,
or of common knowledge, the Lord Chief Baron pre
siding at the Alexandra trial proceeded to instruct
the jury on the law. The Foreign Enlistment Act
was, he told them, not designed for the protection of
beUigerent powers, or to prevent Great Britain being
made the base of naval operations directed against
nations with which that country was at peace. The
purpose of the Act was solely to prevent hostile naval
encounters within British waters ; and, to that end, it
forbade such equipment of the completed ship as would
make possible immediate hostile operations, it might
be, " before they left the port." Such things had
happened ; " and that has been the occasion of this
statute." He closed with these words: — "If you think
the object was to build a ship in obedience to an order,
and in compliance with a contract, leaving those who
bought it to make what use they thought fit of it, then
it appears to me the Foreign Enlistment Act has not
been in any degree broken."
Under such an interpretation of the statute, the
jury, of course, rendered a verdict for the defendants ;
and that verdict the audience in the court-room re
ceived with an outburst of applause. This outburst
of applause was significant ; more significant than
even the charge of the judge. Expressive of the
feelings of the British people, it pointed directly to
the root of the trouble. The trial took place towards
the close of June, 1863, — a few days only before
Gettysburg ; and, at that time, England, so far as the
United States was concerned, had reached a state of
mind EUzabethan rather than Victorian. The buc-

62 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
caneering blood — the blood of Drake, of Cavendish,
and of Frobisher — was stirring in British veins.
The Alabama then stood high in pubUc admiration,
— a British built ship, manned by a British crew,
armed with British guns, it was successfully eluding
the " Yankee " ships of war, and destroying a rival
commercial marine. Wherever the British jurisdic
tion extended, the Alabama was a welcome sojourner
from the weary sea.i The company on the decks of
British mail steamers cheered her to the echo as they
passed. Speaking in the House of Commons on the 24th of
April, 1863, Mr. Cobden dryly observed of the Eng
lish people, — " We generally sympathize with every
body's rebels but our own ; " and passing utterances
in both Europe and this country relating to opera
tions now in progress, whether in South Africa or on
the islands of the Pacific, point distinctly to the gen
eral truth of the remark. The sympathy, and the lack
of sympathy, referred to are in no way peculiar to the
people of Great Britain. But, in accordance with the
principle of human nature thus aUuded to, so strong
among the influential classes of Great Britain was the
feeling of sympathy for the South in 1863, and so
intense was the enmity to the Union, mixed with a
contempt as outspoken as it was Ul-advised, that those
sentiments were weU-nigh aU-pervasive. Speaking
shortly after, Mr. Cobden again said : — "I declare to
you that, looking at what is called in a cant phrase in
London, ' society ; ' looking at society - — and society,
I must tell you, means the upper ten thousand, with
whom members of Parliament are liable to come in
1 Geneva Arbitration : Correspondence, etc., vol. vi. pp. 494-501.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 63
contact at the clubs and elsewhere in London ; look
ing at what is called ' society ' — looking at the rul
ing class, if we may use the phrase, that meet in the
purlieus of London, nineteen-twentieths of them were
firmly convinced from the first that the CivU War in
America could only end in separation." i Captain
BuUoch asserted twenty years later that, being thrown
while in England a good deal among army and navy
men, " I never met one of either service who did not
warmly sympathize with the South ; " ^ and he fur
ther expressed his belief that this was the feeUng of
" at least five out of every seven in the middle and
upper classes." 3 To the Uke effect, Mr. G. W. P.
Bentinck — a member of Parliament — declared in a
speech at Kings Lynn, October 31, 1862, that, as far
as his experience went, " throughout the length and
breadth of the land, wherever I have travelled, I never
yet have met the man who has not at once said, —
' My wishes are with the Southerners ; ' " and he went
on to add that this feeling was mainly due to the fact
that the Southerner was " fighting against one of the
most grinding, one of the most galling, one of the most
irritating attempts to establish tyrannical government
that ever disgraced the history of the world." * Mr.
1 At Rochdale, November 24, 1863. Speeches (London, 1870), voL
ii. p. 103.
2 BuUoch, vol. ii. p. 303.
s lb., vol. i. p. 294.
" Mr. G. W. P. Bentinck was a member of Parliament in his day,
and doubtless esteemed by others, as by himself, a man not wholly
devoid of intelligence, nor, perhaps, of judgment even. In the light
of comments now frequently heard throughout continental Europe,
and also in America, on the methods of warfare pursued by the Eng
lish in South Africa, the foUowing extract from the closing sentences
of Mr. Bentinck's speech on the occasion referred to is suggestive.
Every struggle seems, in the opinion of observers in sympathy with

64 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
Gladstone's unfortunate utterance at about the same
time passed into history ; from which it faUed not
afterwards to return sorely to plague him. " We may
anticipate with certainty the success of the Southern
States so far as regards their separation from the
North. . . . That event is as certain as any event yet
future and contingent can be ; " ^ and again, ten months
later, he said in Parliament, — " We do not believe
that the restoration of the American Union by force
is attainable. I believe that the public opinion of this
country is unanimous upon that subject. ... I do not
thiak there is any real or serious ground for doubt as
to the issue of this contest." ^ Four months previous,
Mr. Gladstone's associate in the cabinet. Earl RusseU,
the worsted combatant, to be marked by atrocities theretofore unpre
cedented in civilized warfare. Mr. Bentinck thus delivered himself :
— *' So long, I say, as such acts, in open defiance of all humanity and
aU civilization, are performed and are avowed by the government of
the Northern States, they cease to have a claim to be ranked among
civilized nations. I am not asserting that there are not hundreds and
thousands of men in the Northern States who are men of education, of
right, and of Christian feeling, of civilized habits and ideas. Far be it
from me to make so unfounded an assertion. But there is a further
lesson to be learned. The result of these much vaunted institutions,
which we have heard praised before, and which we shall again hear
praised by the hired spouters of associations, is this, that the nation
becomes so brutalized that the civilized man disappears ; he is afraid
to put himself forward; he is ashamed of his country; he has no
voice in the conduct of her affairs ; and the whole nation is turned
over to the control of men such as Lincoln and Butler, whom I do not
hesitate to denounce, after their conduct in the last few months, as
men who are a disgrace to civilization."
The whole of this interesting, and extremely suggestive, speech can
be found in the columns of the London Morning Post, of November 4,
1862. 1 Speech at Newcastle, October 7, 1862. London Times, October 9,
1862. 2 House of Commons, June 30, 1863. Geneva Arbitration : Corre
spondence, etc., vol. V. p. 666.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 65
had lent emphasis to this opinion by declaring in the
House of Lords, — " There may be one end of the war
that would prove a calamity to the United States and
to the world, and especiaUy calamitous to the negro
race in those countries, and that would be the subjuga
tion of the South by the North." ^ With this idea that
there could be but one outcome of the struggle firmly
established in their minds, influential members of the
Cabinet did not urge recognition simply because, in
view of the certainty of the result, they deemed such
action unnecessary and impolitic.^ The whole British
policy during the Civil War was shaped with a view
to this future state of affairs, and the creation of bad
precedents was ignored accordingly. The Union was
to be divided into two republics, unfriendly to each
other. There was to be one democratic, free-labor
republic, or more probably two such, lying between
the British possessions on the north, and a slave-labor,
cotton-growing republic on the south; the latter, almost
of necessity, acting in close harmony of interest, com
mercial and political, with Great Britain. For Great
Britain, eternity itself had thus no day of reckoning.
Relying on this simple faith in a certain future, —
this absolute confidence that the expected only could
occur, — utterances like the foUowing appeared in the
editorial columns of the Morning Post, the London
journal understood most closely to reflect the opinions
of the Prime Minister : — " From the ruling of the
judge [in the case of the Alexandra'] it appeared that
the Confederate government might with ease obtain
1 House of Lords, February 5, 1863. Geneva Arbitration : Corre
spondence, etc., vol. iv. p. 535.
2 BuUoch, vol. ii. p. 5.

66 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
as many vessels in this country as they pleased with
out in any manner violating our laws. It may be a
great hardship to the Federals that their opponents
should be enabled to create a navy in foreign ports,
but, like many other hardships entaUed on beUigerents,
it must be submitted to ; " while, five months before,
this same organ of " society " and the " influential
classes " had reached the comfortable conclusion that,
so far as the Alabama was concerned, the fact " she
sails upon the ocean is one of those chances of war
to which the government of the United States ought
with dignity and resignation to submit." ^

II
Fortunately for maritime law, fortunately for itself,
the British government paused at this point. The
" Laird rams," as they were now known, presented a
test case. London " society " and the irresponsible
press of Great Britain might, like the audience in the
Court of Exchequer, applaud the charge of the Lord
Chief Baron, and gladly accept the law he laid down
that it was legal for a belligerent to create a navy in
a neutral port ; but, none the less, in the words of one
of the dissenting Barons, by the rulings of the Court
"the spirit of international law [had been] violated, and
the spirit and letter of the statute evaded." ^ There
1 Morning Post, March 14, August 10, 1863.
2 " A very learned judge has said that we might drive, not a
coach-and-six, but a whole fleet of ships through that [Foreign En
listment] Act of Parliament. If that be a correct description of our
law, then I say we ought to have the law made more clear and intel
ligible." Earl RusseU in the House of Lords, February 16, 1864
Geneva Arbitration : Correspondence, etc. , vol. v. p. 528.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 67
was no longer any danger, scarcely any inconvenience,
in a beUigerent fitting out a vessel of war in a Brit
ish port, and sailing directly thence to begin a hostile
cruise.^ This, indeed, was at that very time actually in
preparation. Theretofore the cases had been those of
individual commerce-destroyers only. Now, an arma
ment was in course of construction in a British port,
intended for a naval operation of magnitude against
a foreign beUigerent with which Great Britain was
at peace. The vessels composing it were, moreover,
equipped with weapons of offensive warfare — their
beaks. Their purpose and destination could not be
proven in any legal proceedings ; but, known of all
men, they were hardly concealed by fraudulent bills
of sale. The law as laid down by the Lord Chief
Baron in the case of the Alexandra might, therefore,
as " crowner's quest law," be of the very first class ;
but for Her Majesty's Government, such a construc-
^ The construction of such cruisers was, moreover, for the ship
wright, an uncommonly safe, as well as profitable, business ; and under
the practical working of the law as it then stood, the more the inter
ference, the greater the profit. This was curiously illustrated in
the case of the Laird iron-clads. The original contract price for the
two vessels was £187,500. (Bulloch, vol. i. p. 386.) Owing to fear
of a seizure by the Government, the contract was transferred to a
French banker named Bravay, who professed to represent the Pacha
of Egypt. A gratuity of £5000 was paid to the Messrs. Laird as
a consideration for their consent to this transfer, (ii., p. 404.) It
then became apparent that the transfer was a mere cover for fraud,
and the vessels were seized. In the existing state of public opinion,
the Government was unwilling to go to a jury, — in fact, after the
ruling of the Chief Baron in the Alexandra trial, it could not have
done so with any chance of a condemnation, — and accordingly it pro
ceeded to negotiate for the purchase of the vessels on its own account.
The Messrs. Laird now asked for them £300,000, and in the end
actually got £220,000. (Lord Selborne : Memorials, Part I., 1766-
1865, vol. ii. p. 450.) Thus, contrary to the usual experience, the
more their business was interfered with, the richer they became.

68 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
tion of the law — an act in the statute-book of Great
Britain — obviously involved serious consequences.
Were they prepared to go to the journey's end on the
road thus pointed out ? To what might it lead ? To
what might it not lead ?
Into the causes of the change of policy which now
took place it is not necessary here to enter. The law
was expounded in the Alexandra case on the 24th of
June, 1863 ; the battle of Gettysburg was fought,
and Vicksburg surrendered, on the 3d and 4th of
the foUowing July ; three months later, on the 9th
of October, the detention of the Laird iron-clads
was ordered. After the rulings of the court in the
Alexandra case, there can be no question that in
this instance the law was " strained." In due time
the proceeding was made the ground of attack on the
government in both Houses of Parliament, on the
ground that the detention was in violation of law, and
without sufficient proofs. In these debates the spokes
men of the government at last took the proper ground.
They admitted that Great Britain was under an obli
gation to give to the United Sljates its rights under
the law of nations, whether acts of Parliament fur
nished the means of so doing or not. The position
thus at last assumed was approved by a comparatively
small majority. A surprise to the American Minister
then representing the country in London, the deten
tion of the iron-clads thus marked a radical change in
the policy pursued by the Palmerston-RusseU Ministry.
Earl RusseU apparently now first realized the fact he
afterwards announced in ParUament, "that in this
conflict the Confederate States have no ports, except
those of the Mersey and the Clyde, from which to fit

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 69
out ships to cruise against the Federals ; " i and it
seems to have dawned upon him that, in the case of
future hostUities, other nations besides Great Britain
had ports, and, in certain not impossible contingencies,
those ports might become bases — perhaps inconven
ient bases — of maritime warfare, as were now those
of the Mersey and the Clyde. It was a thing much to
be deplored that rules did work both ways, and that
curses, like chickens, would come home to roost ; but,
this being so, it behooved prudent statesmen to give
a certain degree of consideration to the precedents
they were creating.
Whether Earl Russell reasoned in this wise or not,
certain it is that after September, 1863, Great Britain
ceased to be available as a base of Confederate naval
operations. The moment it felt so disposed. Her
Majesty's Government found means to cause the neu
trality of Great Britain to be respected. My own be
lief, derived from a tolerably thorough study of the
period, is that numerous causes contributed to that
change. Among the more potent of these I should
enumerate the stirring of the British conscience which
followed the Emancipation Proclamation of September,
1862 ; the conviction, already referred to, that any
decisive action on the part of Great Britain was unne
cessary as weU as impoUtic, the ultimate success of the
Confederacy being a foregone conclusion ; the troubled
state of affairs on the Continent as respects both Po
land and Denmark ; and, above aU, the honest anger
of Earl Russell at the consequences which had ensued
from the evasion of the Alabama. The precedent he
1 House of Lords, April 26, 1864. Geneva Arbitration: Carre'
spondence, etc., vol. v. p. 535.

70 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
had himself helped to create startled him, — he recoiled
in presence of its logical consequences ; and, in view
of the complications then existing on the Continent, or
there in obvious process of development, the great
financial and commercial interests of Great Britain
showed signs of awakening. Awkward questions were
shortly in order ; and, on the evening of the 13th
of May, 1864, the head of the great commercial house
of Barings fairly startled the country by rising in the
House of Commons, and suggesting certain queries to
the Government, — queries, now, thirty-seven years
later, of much significance in- connection with events
in South Africa. " I am," Mr. Baring said, " desir
ous of inviting the attention of the House to the situa
tion in which this country wUl be if the precedents now
estabUshed are acted upon in the event of our being
involved in war, while other States are neutral. Under
the present construction of our municipal law there is
no necessity that a belligerent should have a port or
even a seashore. Provided she has money, or that
money is supplied to her by a neutral, she may fit out
vessels, and those vessels need not go to the country
to which they are said to belong, but may go about
the seas dealing destruction to British shipping and
property. Take the case, which I hope we shaU avoid,
of our being at war with Germany. There would, as
things now stand, be nothing to prevent the Diet of
Frankfort from having a fleet. A number of the small
States of Germany might unite together, and become
a great naval power. Money is aU that is required
for the purpose ; and Saxony, without a seashore, might
have a First Lord of the Admiralty, without any
docks, who might have a large fleet at his disposal.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 71
The only answer we could make under those circum
stances to France and the United States, who as neu
trals might fit out vessels against us on the pretence
that they were German cruisers, was that we would
go to war with them ; so that by the course of poHcy
which we are pursuing we render ourselves Uable to
the alternative of having our property completely de
stroyed, or entering into a contest with every neutral
jPower in the world. We ought, under these circum
stances, to ask ourselves what we have at stake. I wUl
n6(t trouble the House with statistics on the point, but
weNall know that our commerce is to be found ex
tending itself to every sea, that our vessels float in the
waters laf every clime, that even with our cruisers afloat
it would not be easy to pick up an Alabama, and that
the destruction of our property might go on despite all
our powers and resources. What would be the result ?
That we must submit to the destruction of our property,
or that our shipping interests must withdraw their
ships from the ocean. That is a danger, the appre
hension of which is not confined to myself, but is
shared by many who are far better able to form a judg
ment than I am. RecoUect that your shipping is
nearly twice as large as that of the United States. If
you foUow the principle you are now adopting as re
gards the United States, you must be prepared to stand
the consequences ; so strongly was this felt by ship
owners that memorials have already been addressed to
the Government upon the subject. . . . Last night the
honorable Member for Liverpool presented a peti
tion, signed by almost all the great ship-owners of that
place, enforcing the same view and expressing the same
anxiety. I am a Uttle surprised at this manifestation,

72 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
because what is happening around us is a source of
great profit to our ship-owners ; but it is a proof that
they are sensible that the future danger wUl far pre
ponderate over the present benefit and advantages." ^
When too late, it thus dawned even on the ship
builders of the Mersey that, for a great commercial
people, confederacy with corsairs might be a danger
ous, even if not, in their own eyes, a discreditable
vocation. Firms openly dealing in burglars' tools are
not regarded as reputable.
But one way of escape from their own precedents
might yet remain. It was always the contention of
Mr. Charles Sumner that a neutral-buUt ship-of-war
could not be commissioned by a beUigerent on the
high seas. It was and remained a pirate, — the com
mon enemy of mankind, — until its arrival at a port
of the beUigerent to which it belonged, where alone,
after " depositing its taint," it could be fitted out and
commissioned as a ship-of-war.^ As any port wiU do
in a storm, and drowning men proverbiaUy clutch at
straws, it is possible to imagine a British ship-owner,
as he foresaw in vision the Transvaal and the Orange
Free State involved in a war with Great Britain, appro
priating this contention, and trying to incorporate it
into the International Code. He would then have pro
ceeded to argue somewhat as foUows : — " Mr. Baring
was a banker, not a publicist. As a publicist he was
wrong. A non-maritime nation cannot be a maritime
belligerent," etc., etc. But, during the course of our
Civil War, the British authorities, legal and political,
1 Geneva Arbitration : Correspondence, etc., vol. v. p. 579.
"^ Works, vol. vu. pp. 358, 452^60 ; vol. xiii. p. 68. Pierce : Sumner,
vol. iv. p. 394.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 73
seemed to take pleasure in shutting against themselves
every possible outlet of future escape. So, in this case,
referring to the contention of Mr. Sumner, the Attor
ney-General, speaking after Mr. Baring, expressed
himself as f oUows : — "To say that a country whose
ports are blockaded is not at liberty to avail herself
of aU the resources which may be at her command
in other parts of the world, that she may not buy ships
in neutral territory and commission them as ships of
war without bringing them to her own country first,
is a doctrine which is quite preposterous, and aU
the arguments founded upon such a doctrine only
tend to throw dust into men's eyes, and to mislead
them." 1
The morning foUowing this significant debate the
tone of Lord Palmerston's London organ underwent
a notable change. Grant and Lee were that day
confronting each other in the Wilderness, resting for
a brief space after the fearful wrestle of Spottsylvania;
in London, the conference over the Schleswig-Holstein
struggle was in session, and the feelings of Great
Britain were deeply enlisted on behalf of Denmark,
borne down by the united weight of Prussia and
Austria. So, in view of immediate possible hostili
ties, the Post now exclaimed, — " We are essentiaUy
a maritime power, and are bound by every motive of
self-interest to watch with jealousy the observance of
neutral maritime obligations. We may be at war
ourselves ; we have a future [South Africa !] to which
to look forward, and we must keep in mind the pre
cept which inculcates the necessity of doing to others
as we would be done by. . . . War is no longer con-
1 Geneva Arbitration : Correspondence, etc., vol. v. p. 583.

74 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
sidered by the commercial classes an impossibUity ;
and the ship-owners of Liverpool are considering what
is to become of their property should we unhappUy
become involved in war, and innumerable Alabamas
issue from neutral [American] ports to prey upon
British commerce throughout the world. Suppose that
circumstances obliged us to espouse the cause of Den
mark against her ruthless enemies, would not the
German States hasten to foUow the bad example set
them by the Confederates, and at which the inefficiency
of our law obliges us to connive ? " And the London
organ of " society " and the " influential classes " then
added this sentence, which, under certain conditions
actually existing thirty-five years later, would have
been of very pregnant significance : — " Some petty
principality which boasts of a standing army of five
hundred men, but not of a single foot of sea-coast
[e. g. the Transvaal, the Orange Free State], might
fit out cruisers in neutral [e. g. American] ports to
burn, sink, and destroy the commerce of Great Britain;
and the enormous amount of damage which may be
done in a very short time, even by a single vessel, we
know from the history of the Alabama.'" i
Thus when the War of the Rebellion closed, the
trans-Atlantic outlook was, for Great Britain, omi
nous in the extreme. Just that had come about which
English public men and British newspapers had wea
ried themselves with asseverating could not possibly
happen. The Times and Morning Post especially
had loaded the record with predictions, every one
of which the event falsified ; and, in doing so, they
had gone out of their way to generate bitter iU-
1 The Post, May 14 and 18, 1864.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 75
feeling by the arrogant expression of a contemptuous
dislike pecuUarly British and offensive. For example,
the Times, " well aware that its articles weigh in
America more heavily than despatches," first referred
to us as " this insensate and degenerate i people," and
then proceeded to denounce " this hateful and atro
cious war, . . . this horrible war," which it declared
was of such a character that its defenders could not
find in aU Europe a single society where they could
make themselves heard.^ In the same common temper,
the Standard, reviewing the results of the conflict on
the very day that Vicksburg, unknown to it, had sur-
^ The " degeneracy ' ' of the American was, at this time, the sub
ject of much lachrymose contemplation on the part of British jour
nalistic scribes. A writer in that highly respectable quarterly, the
North British Review, thus delivered himself, for instance, in its
February number for 1862 (p. 248) : — "In nearly every element of
political and moral, as distinguished from material, civiUzation, the
deterioration of America since the days of Washington had been
appallingly rapid and decisive. It had ceased to be the land of pro
gress, apd had become in a peculiar manner the land of retrogression
and degeneracy."
^ July 9, 12, 1862. The course and language of the Times at this
period were peculiarly ill-advised. American opinion on that point
might be considered prejudiced ; but Mr. Leslie Stephen, then a man
of thirty-three, has since established a world-wide reputation as a
critic on questions of taste. Mr. Stephen, in 1865, thus expressed him
self in a pamphlet (pp. 105, 106) entitled The " Times " on the American
War : A Historical Study ; a production not included in his recognized
writings, and long since forgotten : — " But my complaint against the
Times is that its total ignorance of the quarrel, and the presumption
with which it pronounced upon its merits, led to its pouring out a
ceaseless flood of scurrilous abuse, couched, indeed, in decent lan
guage, but as essentiaUy insulting as the brutal vulgarities of the New
York Herald. No American — I will not say with the feelings of a
gentleman, for of course there are no gentlemen in America — but no
American with enough of the common feelings of humanity to resent
the insult when you spit in his face could fail to be wounded, and, so
far as he took the voice of the Times for the voice of England, to be
irritated against England."

76 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
rendered, declared, — " We have learned to dislike,
and almost to despise the North ; to sympathize with,
and cordially to admire, the South. We have learned
that the South is, on the whole, in the right ; that
the North is altogether, wilfuUy and wickedly in the
wrong." But these expressions of heartfelt contempt
were not confined to the London press. Liverpool,
for instance, was conspicuous as a hot-bed of Confed
erate sympathy; and, as early as August, 1861, the
leading journal of that city expressed itself as foUows :
— " We have no doubt whatever that the vast major
ity of the people of this country, certainly of the peo
ple of Liverpool, are in favor of the cause espoused by
the Secessionists. The defeat of the Federalists gives
unmixed pleasure ; the success of the Confederates is
ardently hoped, nay, confidently predicted." A year
later, the London Post referred in the same tone
to those whom it saw fit, in the rarefied and luminous
atmosphere of its own exalted wisdom, to describe as
" the infatuated people across the Atlantic." " The
whole history of the war is a history of mistakes on
the Federal side. Blinded by self-conceit, influenced
by passion, reckless of the lessons of history, and deaf
to warnings which every one else could hear and
tremble at, the people of the North plunged into hos
tilities with their fellow-citizens without so much as a
definite idea what they were fighting for, or on what
condition they would cease fighting. They went to
war without a cause, they have fought without a plan,
and they are prosecuting it still without a principle."
It would then pleasantly allude to the "suicidal frenzy"
of a contest in which two sections were striving "with
a ferocity unknown since the times when Indian

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 77
scalped Indian on the same continent ; " and sorrow
fully add, — " American pride contemptuously dis
dains to consider what may be thought of its pro
ceedings by the inteUigent in this country ; inflated
self-sufficiency scorns aUke the friendly advice of the
disinterested and the indignant censures of a disap
proving world." And then, finaUy, when its every
prevision had proved wrong, and all its predictions
were falsified, as it contemplated the total collapse of
the Confederacy, this organ of " society " and the
*' influential classes " innocently observed : — " The
antipathy entertained by the United States toward
England has, owing to circumstances entirely beyond
our control, and into which it is unnecessary now to
enter, been fanned into a fiercer flame during the
progress of the war ; " ^ and it now spoke of Great
Britain as " the mother country ! "
Recorded utterances of this character could be
multipUed indefinitely ; ^ I take these few, selected at
1 May 15, 1865.
^ Those of the Post, read a generation after the event, and in the
light of passing South African events, are simply inconceivable.
They reflect a degree of ignorance, and a malignity of disposition,
difficult to account for. Take, for instance, the following : — "Yet
what wild tribe, from the Red River or the South Sea Islands, dan
cing round its fires, and goading each other to fury by its cries, could
exceed in deUberate cruelty and implacability the citizens of Wash
ington on the occasion to which we refer ? " (August 19, 1862.) The
" occasion " was a " war-meeting " at that time held, " under the au
spices of President Lincoln." " But as the contest went on, it was
soon seen how little slavery had to do with it ; and even Europe, to a
man, has lost every spark of interest in the Federal cause. Sympathy
goes continuously southward." (August 29, 1862.) "We doubt if
there could be found in the entire universe a more degrading spectacle
than that of a regiment of negro soldiers fighting in support of the
Federal government." (September 22, 1862.) " A proclamation would
almost suffice to dislodge Abraham Lincoln. . . . We beUeve that if

78 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
random, merely to illustrate the extreme difficulty
of the position into which the precedents and declara
tions she herself had established, and put freely on
record, brought Great Britain at the close of our Civil
War. It is useless to say that, as between nations,
irresponsible utterances through the press and from the
platform are entitled to no consideration, and should
not be recaUed. They, none the less, are a fact ; and
they are not forgotten. On the contrary, they rankle.
They did so in 1865.
Happily, however, for the peace of the world, a few
great facts then stood forth, established and of record ;
and it is these prominent facts which influence popular
feeling. English built ships — English manned and
EngUsh armed — had swept the American merchant
marine from the seas ; but, most fortunately, an Ameri
can man-of-war of not unequal size had, within sight
of Enghsh shores, sent to the bottom of the British
Channel the single one of those commerce-destroyers
which had ventured to trust itself within the range of
President Davis were to assume the functions of President of the
United States, the population of the North would gladly accept this
ready mode of preserving the integrity of the country, and at once
acknowledge his authority." (September 24, 1862.) " It is easy to
conceive, though it may be difficult to express, the language in which
future historians will speak of this deplorable contest. Foolish it has
been, without --^ parallel in the annals of human folly. Aimless it
has been, when the utter hopelessness of the object with which it was
prosecuted is borne in mind. In no previous wars has the sacrifice of
human life been proportionaUy greater ; in none has the expenditure
been so wantonly, so profligately, extravagant. There remains, how
ever, one term which must still be applied. It has been profitless.
Life, money, and national credit have all been frittered away to pro
cure — nothing!" (October 2,1802.) It is difficult now to recall
these, and endless similar lucubrations, without mirth ; then they
hurt. And they were meant to hurt. Perhaps the cruelest possible
revenge for such utterances is, subsequently, and in the cold Ught of
actualities, to confront the utterer with them. ,

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 79
our guns. In this there was much balm. Again, Amer
ica was weary of strife, and longed for rest ; and it
could weU afford to bide its time in view of the changed
tone and apprehensive glances which now came across
the Atlantic from those whose forecast had deceived
them into a position so obviously false. In common
parlance. Great Britain had made her bed ; she might
now safely be left to a prolonged nightmare as she lay
in it. The United States ¦ — no longer an " insensate
and degenerate people " — could wait in confidence.
Its time was sure to come.
Great Britain, also, was most uncomfortably of this
same opinion. The more her public men reflected on
the positions taken by the Palmerston-RusseU Min
istry, and the precedents therein created, the worse
they seemed, and the less propitious the outlook. The
reckoning was long; and it was chalked plainly on
the wall. It was never lost to sight nor out of mind.
The tendency of events was obvious. They aU pointed
to retaliation in kind ; for, in the summer of 1866, the
House of Representatives at Washington passed, with
out one dissenting vote, a biU to repeal the inhibitions
contained in the American neutrality laws against
the fitting out of ships for belligerents. The threat
was overt ; Great Britain deprecatingly met it by the
passage, in 1870, of a new and stringent Foreign
Enlistment Act.
Just six years elapsed between the close of the War
of the Rebellion (May, 1865) and the signing of the
Treaty of Washington (May, 1871). For Great
Britain those were years of rapid education toward a
new code of international law. Considering the in
terval traversed, the time of traversing it cannot be

80 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
said to have been long. When, in the midst of the Civil
War, tidings of the depredations of the British built
Confederate commerce-destroyers reached America,
instructions were sent to the Minister of the United
States in London to demand reparation. To this de
mand Earl RusseU, then Foreign Secretary, in due time
responded. Not only did he deny any liability, legal
or moral, but he concluded- his reply with this highly
significant, not to say petulant remark :¦ — "I have
only, in conclusion, to express my hope that you may
not be instructed again to put forward claims which
Her Majesty's Government cannot admit to be
founded on any grounds of law or justice." ^
The discussion seemed closed; Great Britain had
apparently taken her stand. In the words of the
Foreign Secretary, — " Her Majesty's Government
entirely disclaim aU responsibility for any acts of the
Alabama:' ^ This was in March, 1863. On the 19th
of June, 1864, the depredations of the Alabama
were brought to a summary close. When the Con
federate Secretary of War at Richmond heard of the
loss thus sustained, he wrote immediately (July 18)
to the Liverpool bureau of his department : " You
must supply her place if possible, a measure [now]
of paramount importance."^ Tliis despatch reached
its destination on the 30th of August, and on the 20th
of October the head of the bureau had " the great
satisfaction of reporting the safe departure on the
8th inst." of the Shenandoah from London, and its
1 Dip. Cor., 1863, p. 380. RusseU to Adams, September 14, 1863.
Geneva Arbitration : Correspondence, etc., vol. iii. p. 164.
2 RusseU to Adams, March 9, 1863. Geneva Arbitration : Corre
spondence, etc., vol. iii. p. 122.
3 BuUoch, vol. ii. p. 112.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 81
consort, the Laurel, from Liverpool, " within a few
hours of each other ; " and this in spite of " embar
rassing and annoying inquiries from the Customs
and Board of Trade officials." ^ The Shenandoah now
took up the work of destruction which the Alabama
was no longer in position to continue. It thus de
volved on the American Minister to present further
demands on the Foreign Secretary. But, in the mean
time, the situation had materiaUy changed. The cor
respondence over the depredations of the Alabama
was abruptly closed by Earl RusseU seven weeks be
fore the unfortunate battle of ChancellorsviUe ; Lee
surrendered at Appomattox just two days after Mr,
Adams brought to the notice of the Foreign Secretary
the depredations of the Shenandoah.
A long correspondence ensued, which was closed on
the 2d of the foUowing December by Lord Clarendon,
Earl Russell's successor as Foreign Secretary. His
despatch was brief ; but in it he observed, " that no
armed vessel departed during the war from a British
port to cruise against the commerce of the United
States ; " and he further maintained that throughout
the war " the British government have steadily and
honestly discharged aU the duties incumbent on them
as a neutral power, and have never deviated from the
obUgations imposed on them by international law." ^
And yet in this correspondence the first step in the
direction of a settlement was taken, — a step curiously
characteristic of Earl RusseU. As indicative also of
the amount of progress as yet made on the long road to
be traversed, it was the reverse of encouraging. Earl
1 BuUoch, vol. ii. pp. 131-133.
* Geneva Arbitration : Correspondence, eta., vol. iii. p. 625.

82 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
RusseU had brought Great Britain into a position from
which she had in some way to be extricated. The
events of April and May, 1865, in America were very
significant when viewed in their bearing on the fast
rising European complications incident to the blood-
and-iron policy to which Count Bismarck was deliber
ately giving shape. Dark clouds, ominous of coming
storm, were hanging on the European horizon ; while
America, powerful and at peace, lowered angrily
British-ward from across the Atlantic. It was a con
tinuous, ever-present menace, to be averted only when
approached in a large way. One course — one course
alone — was open to the British statesmen. But to see
and foUow it caUed for an eye and mind and pen
very different, and far more quick and facile, than the
eye, mind, and pen with which nature had seen fit to
endow the younger scion of the ducal house of Bed
ford. Had he been equal to the situation, it was then in
the power of Earl Russell to extricate Great Britain
from the position into which he had brought her, and
out of the nettle, danger, to pluck the flower, safety.
Nor would it have been difficult so to do ; and that
without the abandonment of any position he had taken.
Weary of battle and satiated with success, America
was then in complaisant mood. A complete victor is
always inclined to be magnanimous, and that was a
time when, as Mr. Sumner afterwards expressed it,
"we would have accepted very little." ^ Taking ad
vantage of this national mental mood, it would have
been possible for Earl RusseU then, while extricating
Great Britain from a false position, to have at once
1 Pierce : Sumner, vol. iv. p. 384.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 83
obliterated the recoUection of the past and forestaUed
the Treaty of Washington, securing at the same time
the adoption at little cost of a new principle of inter
national law obviously in the interest of Great Britain.
Still insisting in his correspondence with the American
Minister that Her Majesty's Government had, in the
language of his successor, " steadily and honestly dis
charged all the duties incumbent on them as a neutral
power," and hence had incurred no liability under any
recognized principle or precedent of international law
for depredations committed by Her Majesty's subjects
beyond her jurisdiction, — adhering firmly to this con
tention, he might have gone on to recognize, in the
light of a record which he had already over and over
admitted was a "scandal" and "a reproach to our
laws," that a radical change in the international code
was obviously desirable, and that the time for it had
come. The neutral should be responsible for results
whenever, after due notice of a contemplated infrac
tion was given (as in the cases of the Florida and
Alabama"), she permitted her territory to be made by
one beUigerent the base of operations against another.
The laws ought, he would have admitted, to be ade
quate to such an emergency ; and they should be en
forced. He might well then have expressed the honest
regret Great Britain felt that her laws had during our
rebeUion proved inadequate, and a proper sense of the
grievous injury the United States had in consequence
sustained. The rest of the way out would then have
been plain. In view of Great Britain's commercial
and maritime interests, she could weU afford to incur
large pecuniary sacrifices to secure the future protec
tion involved in the change of international law con-

84 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
tended for by the American government. She could
not ask that protection for the future with no regard
to the past. That Great Britain had incurred to a
certain extent a moral obligation through the insuf
ficiency of her statutes, combined with the unsatisfac
tory state of international law, could not be denied in
view of the oft recorded admission that the cases of the
Confederate commerce-destroyers were a " scandal "
and a " reproach." Under these circumstances. Great
Britain was prepared to assent to the modifications of
international law now contended for by the United
States ; and, to secure the manifest future advantage
involved in their adoption, would agree, subject to
reasonable limitations as to extent of Uabihty, etc., to
have those principles operate retrospectively in the case
of such Confederate commerce-destroyers as had, after
notice given, saUed from British ports of origin during
the CivU War.
In the light of what afterwards occurred, including
the Treaty of Washington and the results of the
Geneva Arbitration, it is not difficult to imagiue the
astonishment with which the American Minister would
have read a despatch couched in these terms, and the
gratification with which the American people would
have haUed it. It would have been, in the reverse, a
repetition of the Trent experience, — the honest ac
knowledgment of a false attitude. The clouds would at
once have rolled away. While the national pride of
Great Britain would have suffered no hurt, that of the
United States would have been immensely flattered.
The one country would have got itself gracefuUy, and
cheaply, out of an impossible position. It would have
secured an advantage of inestimable future value at a

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 85
cost in reality nominal, and a cost which it afterwards
had to pay ; the other party would have achieved a great
diplomatic victory, crowning and happily rounding out
its military successes. Most unfortunately, as the re
sult showed. Earl RusseU did not have it in him thus
to rise to the occasion. On the contrary, with that
curious conventional conservatism which seems innate
in a certain class of English public men, — an inability
to recognize their own interests if presented in unac
customed form, — the British Foreign Secretary de
clined to consider those very changes in the law which
Parliament five years later voluntarily adopted, and
which, seven years later. Great Britain agreed to in
corporate in a solemn treaty. The proposed habUity
for the abuse of neutrality by belligerents, so invalu
able to England, Lord RusseU now characterized as
"most burdensome, and, indeed, most dangerous;"
whUe, with a simplicity almost humorous, he ejacu
lated, — " Surely, we are not bound to go on making
new laws, ad infinitum, because new occasions arise." ^
So, high-toned Englishman as he was. Lord Russell,
guided by his instincts and traditions, as Prime Min
ister characteristically went on to make perceptibly
worse what, as Foreign Secretary, he had already
made quite sufficiently bad. He did not aggrandize,
he distinctly belittled, his case. In reply to the re
newed demands of the American Minister, he sug
gested, in a most casual way, the appointment of a
joint commission, to which should be referred " all
claims arising during the late CivU War [his note was
dated August 30, nearly four months after the cap-
1 RusseU to Adams, August 30, 1865. Geneva Arbitration : Cor
respondence, etc., vol. i. p. 677 ; vol. iii. p. 561.

86 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
ture of Jefferson Davis], which the two powers shaU
agree to refer." ^ The correspondence was at once
published in the Gazette ; and, so general was the pro
position of reference, that the Times, in commenting
editoriaUy on it the morning after publication, ad
mitted the desirability of a settlement, and construed
the proposal of a commission as designed to embrace
all the American claims. The " Thunderer's " utter
ance on this point might be inspired, — a feeler of
public opinion ; a possible way out seemed to open.
Earl Russell characteristicaUy lost no time in closing
it. At a later day, after the Alabama claims had been
arbitrated and paid, his Lordship asserted that he had
always been wiUing to have them assumed, or, as he
expressed it, would " at once have agreed to arbitra
tion," could he have received assurances on certain
controverted issues, involving, as he considered, the
honor and dignity of Great Britain.^ This was clearly
an afterthought in the light of subsequent events.
No suggestion of that nature was ever made by him
to Mr. Adams ; and when, in October, 1865, such a
possible construction was put upon his despatches, he
made haste to repudiate it. In fact. Earl RusseU,
stiU Foreign Secretary, but soon to become Premier,
was not yet ready to take the first step in the edu
cational process marked out for Great Britain. The
dose was, indeed, a bitter one ; no wonder Lord Rus
seU contemplated it with a wry face.
So the Foreign Secretary, in October, 1865, lost no
time in firmly closing the door which seemed opening.
The day following the editorial implication of the
1 Geneva Arbitration : Correspondence, etc., vol. iii. p. 562.
2 Recollections and Suggestions, p. 278.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 87
Times, there appeared in its columns an official correc
tion. The correctness of the implication was denied.
As Mr. Adams wrote in his diary, the proposal of a
joint commission, thus explained, "really stands as
an offer to refer the British claims, and a facile re
fusal to include ours. Wonderful liberality ! " And,
a few days later, he added : — " The issue of the pre
sent complication now is that Great Britain stands as
asking for a commission through which to procure a
settlement of claims advanced by herself, at the same
time that she refuses at the threshold to permit the
introduction of aU the material demands we have
against her. Thus the British position passes aU the
time from bad to worse. The original blunder, in
spired by the over-eagerness to see us divided, has
impelled a neutral policy, carried to such extremes of
encouragement to one belligerent as seemingly to haz
ard the security of British commerce, whenever the
country shaU become involved in a war. The sense
of this inspires the powers of eastern Europe with
vastly increased confidence in pursuing their particu
lar objects. It is not difficult to see that whatever
views Russia may ultimately have on Constantinople
will be piuch fortified by a consciousness of the diver
sion which it might make through the neutral ports
of the United States against the British commerce of
one half of the globe. We lose nothing by the passage
of time ; Great Britain does."
This somewhat obvious view of the situation evi
dently suggested itself to the mind of Earl Russell's
successor in the Foreign Office, for Earl RusseU, on
the death of Lord Palmerston, in the autumn of 1865,
became Prime Minister. So, one day in the foUowing

88 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
December, Mr. Adams was summoned to an official
interview with the new Secretary. The conversation
at this interview, after the matters immediately in hand
were disposed of, passed to the general and well-worn
subject of the neutrality observed by Great Britain
during the struggle which, seven months before, had
come to its close. Lord Clarendon, Mr. Adams wrote,
insisted that the neutrality " had been perfectly kept ;
and I signifying my conviction that a similar observa
tion of it, as between two countries so closely adjacent
as Great Britain and France, would lead to a declara
tion of war by the injured party in twenty-four hours.
Here we might have closed the conference, but his
Lordship proceeded to continue it by remarking that
he had it on his mind to make a suggestion. He
would do so. He went on to express his long convic
tion of the expediency of a union of sentiment and
policy between two great nations of the same race.
He hoped to see them harmonize, after the immediate
irritation consequent upon the late struggle should
have passed away, more than ever before. There
were many things in what was caUed International
Law that are now in a vague and unsatisfactory con
dition; it would, therefore, seem very desirable that
by some form of joint consultation, more or less exten
sive, these points could be fixed on something like a
permanent basis. He inquired of me whether I thought
my government would be at aU inclined to entertain
the idea. I rephed that the object was certainly de
sirable ; but that, in the precise state in which things
had been left, I could give no opinion on the question
proposed. AU that I could do was to report it ; and
that not in any official way. His Lordship talked a

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 89
little grandly about our overlooking the past, letting
bygones be bygones, and considering these questions
solely on their abstract importance as settling great
principles. He said that two such very great coun
tries could scarcely be expected to stoop to concessions
or admissions in regard to one another. Would I
reflect upon the whole matter. All this time I was
rather a listener than a speaker, and committed myself
to nothing but vague professions. The fact stares up
that this government is not easy at the way the case
has been left by Lord RusseU, and desires to get out
of it without mortification. My own opinion is rather
against any effort to help them out. I ought to note
that yesterday Mr. W. E. Forster caUed to see me
for the purpose of urging precisely the same tentative
experiment at Washington. He reasoned with me
more frankly, in the same strain, and evidently con
templated a more complete process of rectification of
the blunder than Lord Clarendon could hint. I also
talked to him with more freedom, in a strain of great
indifference about arriving at any result ; the advan
tage was on our side, and I saw no prospect of its
diminishing with time. He ended by asking me to
think a little longer about a mode of running the
negotiation ; for, if it could be done, he felt sure that
enough power could be applied to bring this govern
ment to consent to it. I replied that aU that could
be done now must pass through private channels.
The record was made up, and I had no inclination to
disturb it."
This caU of Mr. Forster at that particular junc
ture was significant ; for Mr. Forster less than a
month before had gone into Earl Russell's Ministry,

90 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
becoming Under-Secretary for the Colonies ; and Mr.
Forster was weU known to be a friend of the United
States. Badly compromised by Lord RusseU's blun
dering committals, the government at last appreciated
the situation, and was feeling for a way out. The
position now taken by the Foreign Secretary and Mr.
Forster was clearly suggestive of the subsequent John
son-Clarendon Convention. Nothing, however, imme
diately resulted. Lord Clarendon had, indeed, at the
time of his talk with Mr. Adams, already put his sug
gestion in shape to be formally submitted to Secretary
Seward through the British Minister at Washington ;
and when, six weeks later, his despatch appeared in
the Blue Book, Mr. Adams wrote : " The object is
now evident. It is to blunt the effect of Lord Rus
seU's original blunder, and try to throw the odium of
it back by a new offer, which we must decline. The
contrivance will scarcely work. It is certainly civil
to propose that we shoidd bear all the consequences
of their policy, and consent to secure them against
any future application of it to themselves."
As showing how very sensitive to the situation in
which they had been placed the English now were,
Mr. Adams two days later mentioned a long conversa^
tion with Mr. Oliphant, a member of Parliament, then
just back from a visit to America. The Fenian move
ment was at that time much in evidence through its
British dynamite demonstrations, and the Irish in the
United States were consequently in a state of chronic
excitement. Mr. Oliphant caUed in regard to it.
After some discussion of that matter, the conversation
drifted to the policy pursued by the British govern
ment toward the United States, of which Mr. Oli-

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 91
phant " evidently had not approved. It should have
been either positive intervention, or positive amity.
The effort to avoid both had excited nothing- but iU-
will from both parties in the war. One Southern
man whom he had met had gone so far as to declare
that he was ready to fight England even on the case
of the Alabama. I briefly reviewed the course taken,
and pointed out the time when the cordiality between
the countries could have been fuUy established. It
was not improved ; and now I had little hope of re
storing it for many years." It was during the ensu
ing summer that the lower house of Congress passed
by acclamation the bill already referred to, repealing
the inhibitions of the neutrality laws.
A change of ministry at this time took place in
Great Britain. Earl Russell, with the Liberals, went
out of office, and Lord Derby, at the head of the
Conservatives, came in. Lord Stanley, the oldest son
of the new Premier, succeeded Lord Clarendon in the
Foreign Office, and again the old straw was threshed
over. A distinct step was, however, now marked in
advance. The new Prime Minister took occasion to
intimate publicly that a proposition for the arrange
ment of the Alabama claims would be favorably
entertained ; and the Times, of course under inspira
tion, even went so far as to admit that Earl Russell's
position on that subject was based on a " somewhat
narrow and one-sided view of the question at issue.
It was not safe," it now went on to say, " for Great
Britain to make neutrals the sole and final judges of
their own obligations." This was a distinct enlarge
ment of the " insular " view. It amounted to an
abandonment of the contention that a petty jury in

92 THE TREATY OF YASHINGTON
an English criminal court was the tribunal of last
resort on aU questions involving the international
obligations of Great Britain.
The interminable diplomatic correspondence then
began afresh; and, in the course of it, Secretary
Seward rested the case of the United States largely
on what both he and Mr. Adams termed " the pre
mature and injurious proclamation of beUigerency"
issued by the British government in May, 1861.
This he pronounced the fruitful source whence all
subsequent evil came. Lord Stanley took issue with
him on that point. He did not deny a responsibility
for the going forth of Confederate commerce-destroy
ers from British ports, and a certain liability for the
damages by them caused ; but, he contended, the Brit
ish government could not consent to arbitrate the
question whether the Confederacy was prematurely
recognized as a belligerent. The recognition of beUi
gerency in any given case was, he contended, a matter
necessarily resting in the discretion of a sovereign,
neutral power. He intimated, however, a wilhngness
to arbitrate all other questions at issue.
In view of the position always from the commence
ment taken by the American Secretary of State and
his representative in London, this limited arbitration
could not be satisfactory. Time and again Secretary
and Minister had emphasized the impropriety and un
friendliness of the Queen's proclamation of May 13,
1861, and the consequences thereof, so momentous as
scarcely to admit of computation. Accordingly, the
discussion again halted. In July, 1868, Mr. Reverdy
Johnson of Maryland succeeded Mr. Adams in Lon
don ; and, once more, negotiations were renewed. But

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 93
now the British government had so far progressed
towards its ultimate and inevitable destination that,
a discreet sUence being on both sides observed in the
matter of the proclamation of May, 1861, a conven
tion was readUy agreed to covering all claims of the
citizens and subjects of the two countries against
the government of each. WhUe this treaty was in
course of negotiation, another change of ministry took
place in Great Britain ; and Mr. Gladstone, who had
been Chancellor of the Exchequer throughout the
Civil War, became Premier, Earl Russell being now
finally retired from official life. Lord Clarendon was
again placed in charge of the Foreign Office. Under
these circumstances, the form of convention agreed to
by Lord Derby was revised by his successor in such a
way as to make it satisfactory to Secretary Seward,
and, on the 14th of January, 1869, it received the
signatures of Mr. Johnson and Lord Clarendon. It
was known as the Johnson-Clarendon Convention.
In hurrying this important negotiation to so quick
a close, both Secretary Seward and Reverdy Johnson
were much influenced by a natural ambition. They
both greatly desired that a settlement of the moment
ous issues between the two English-speaking nations
should be effected through their individual agency.
Mr. Seward especially was eager in his wish to carry
to a final solution the most difficult of the many intri
cate complications which dated back to the first weeks
of his occupation of the State Department. Accord
ingly, he did not now repeat his somewhat rhetorical
arraignment of Great Britain in the correspondence of
two years before, because of the proclamation of 1861.
No longer did he roar so as to do the genuine Ameri-

94 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
can's heart good to hear hun, but he did so aggravate
his voice as to roar as gently as a sucking dove ; he
roared as 't were a nightingale. It thus became sim
ply a question of the settlement of the money claims of
individual citizens and subjects of one country against
the government of another. Lord Stanley's contention
on the recognition of beUigerency issue was tacitly ac
cepted as sound. This, as vriU presently appear, im
plied a great deal. It remained to be seen whether
that primal offence — that original sin which
" Brought death into the world and all oiir woe " —
could thus lightly and in silence be relegated to the
limbo of things unimportant, and so, quite forgotten.
The negotiation had been entered upon in Septem
ber, 1868 ; the convention was executed in January fol
lowing. But in the interim a presidential election had
taken place in the United States ; and, when the treaty
reached America, the administration of Andrew John
son was, in a few weeks anij, to be replaced by that of
General Grant. Secretary Seward would then cease
to be at the head of the Department of State ; and, as
he now wrote to Reverdy Johnson, " the confused Ught
of an incoming administration was spreading itself over
the country, rendering the consideration of political
subjects irksome, if not inconvenient." Charles Sumner
was at that time chairman of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, a position he had held through eight
years. As chairman of that committee, the fate of the
treaty rested largely with him. The President-elect,
with no very precise policy in his mind to be pursued
on the issues involved, wished to have the claims con
vention go over until his administration was installed ;

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 95
and when, in February, the convention was taken up
in the Senate committee, all its members expressed
themselves as opposed to its ratification. " We begin
to-day," Mr. Sumner then said, referring to the rejec
tion of the proposed settlement as a foregone conclu
sion, " an international debate, the greatest of our
history, and, before it is finished, in aU probability the
greatest of aU history." ^

III
It was now that Mr. Fish came upon the scene, —
the successor of Secretary Seward in the Department
of State. And here, perhaps, it would be proper for
me to say that I had no personal acquaintance with
Mr. Fish. I never met him but once. In the summer
of 1890, 1 think it was, some years preceding his death,
I passed a morning with him by appointment at his
country home at Garrison, going there to obtain from
him, if I could, some information on a subject I
was then at work on. Beyond this, I knew him only
as a public character, more or less actively engaged in
political life through twenty-five exceptionally event
ful years.
Held in its Committee of Foreign Relations, the
Johnson-Clarendon Convention was not acted upon by
the Senate, at the time sitting in executive session,
until the 13th of April, 1869. It was then rejected
by a practicaUy unanimous vote (54 to 1) foUowing an
elaborate speech in condemnation of it by the chairman
of the committee having it in charge. That speech
was important. It marked a possible parting of the
1 Pierce : Sumner, vol. iv. p. 384.

96 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
ways. In that speech, and by means of it, Mr. Sum
ner not only undid, and more than undid, all that yet
had been done looking to an amicable adjustment of
the questions at issue between the two nations, but he
hedged thick with difficulties any future approach to
such an adjustment. To appreciate this, the essential
feature of the Clarendon-Johnson Convention must be
borne constantly in mind.
As I have already said, that convention provided
only for the settlement of the claims of individuals,
AU questions of liability were to be referred to arbi
tration. The right of Great Britain to judge for it
self as to the time and manner of the recognition of the
Confederacy as a beUigerent power was not caUed in
question, or submitted to arbitrament. A settlement
was thus made possible ; indeed, the way to a settle
ment was opened wide. The concession was also
proper ; for, viewed historically, and with a calm regard
for recognized principles of international law, it must be
admitted that the long and strenuously urged conten
tion of Secretary Seward and Mr. Adams over what
they described as the " premature and injurious pro
clamation of beUigerency," and the consequences of the
precipitancy of Great Britain in the early stages of the
RebeUion, was by them carried to an undue length.
Indisputably, the British Ministry did issue the very
important proclamation of May, 1861, with undue
haste ; and, in so doing, they were presumably actu
ated by a motive they could not declare. The newly
accredited American Minister had not then reached
London ; but he was known to be on his way, and, in
fact, saw the just issued proclamation in the Gazette
the morning of his arrival. The intention of the

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 97
government may fairly be inferred. It apparently
was that this question should be disposed of, — be an
accomplished fact, — in advance of any protests. It
had been decided on; discussion was useless. This
was neither usual nor courteous. It was, moreover, in
direct disregard of assurances given : and, in the ex
cited state of the American public mind at that time,
while it was passionately denounced, evil auguries were
drawn from it. Yet it by no means foUowed that the
step was taken in an unfriendly spirit, or that it in
fact worked any real prejudice to the Union cause.
That it was a grievous blow, given with a hostile intent,
and the source of infinite subsequent trouble and loss
to the United States government, Secretary Seward
and Mr. Adams always afterwards maintained ; and,
during the war, very properly maintained. But for
it, they asserted and seem even to have persuaded
themselves, the Rebellion would have coUapsed in its
infancy. Because of it, the struggling insurrection
grew into a mighty conflict, and was prolonged to at
least twice the length of life it otherwise would have
attained. For this, they then proceeded to argue,
and for the loss of life and treasure in it involved.
Great Britain stood morally accountable ; or, as Secre
tary Seward years afterwards saw fit to phrase it, in
rhetoric which now impresses one as neither sober nor
weU considered, it was Her Majesty's proclamation
which conferred " upon the insurrection the pregnant
baptismal name of Civil War."
There then was, and there now is, nothing on which
to base so extreme an assumption. On the contrary,
the historical evidence tends indisputably to show that,
though designedly precipitate, the proclamation was

98 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
issued with no unfriendly intent. On this point, the
statement of WiUiam E. Forster is conclusive. Mr.
Forster, then a newly elected member of Parliament,
himself urged the issuance of the proclamation, and
looked upon it as a point gained for the cause of the
Union ; ^ and eight years later he declared that " from
personal recoUection and knowledge " he could testify
that " the proclamation was not made with unfriendly
animus " to the United States. On the contrary, he
showed it was issued " in accordance with the earnest
wishes of himself and other friends of the North." 2
The principle of international law involved is simple,
and founded on good sense. In no case and under no
circumstances can a declaration of neutrality, which
carries with it of necessity a recognition of the fact
of belligerency, be a wrong to a power which is itself
exercising, or has assumed to exercise against neutrals,
any of the rights of war. Exclusion by blockade,
search for contraband, and capture as prize on the
high seas are distinct acts of war. All these rights
the govemment of the United States claimed, and
exercised, after the 19th of April, 1861. It is diffi
cult to see how foreign governments, in view of the
consequent interruptions of commerce and seizure of
property, could long ignore such an abnormal state
of affairs. They might, from an excess of comity, do
so for a few weeks, and until the state of war and its
consequences became fixed and manifold ; but of this
they were of necessity the judges.^
Neither is there any ground not admitting of dis
pute on which to argue that the issuance by the British
^ Reid ; Forster, vol. i. p. 335. 2 jj_^ y^^i ;; pp j2, 21.
^ See Appendix A, infra p. 199.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 99
government of the proclamation of May, 1861, how
ever premature, and with whatever intent, was pro
ductive of any injury to the United States. On
the contrary, it has been plausibly contended that
it worked in the end most potently in favor of the
Union cause.^ It is obvious that the proclamation
could not in any event have been withheld more than
ninety days ; for within that period the Confederacy
had at Manassas incontrovertibly established its posi
tion as a beUigerent, and the Confederate flag on the
high seas, combined with a Union blockade of three
thousand miles of hostile coast, was evidence not easily
explained away of a de facto government on land.
Under such conditions, it is idle to maintain that the
recognition of beUigerency did not fairly rest in the
discretion of neutrals. Moreover, had the recognition
been delayed until after the disgrace of Bull Run, it
would in all probability have been complete, and have
extended to a recognition of nationality as well as of
mere de facto beUigerency. Nor, finaUy, is there any
thing in the record, as since more fully developed,
which justifies a belief that the struggle would have
been shorter even by a month, or in any degree less
costly as respects either life or treasure, had the Con
federacy never been buoyed up by the confident hope
of foreign recognition, and consequent aid from with
out. The evidence is indeed all the other way. As
since developed, it is fairly conclusive that, almost to
the end, and unquestionably down to the close of
1863, whUe the Confederates, rank and file as weU
as leaders civil and military, confidently counted on
being able, through the potency of their cotton con-
1 Life of C. F. Adams, American Statesmen Series, pp. 171-174.

100 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
trol, to compel an even reluctant European recogni-
tion,i yet they never for a moment doubted their
ability to maintain themselves in arms and achieve
independence without extraneous aid of any kind.
Thirty years in preparation, caUing into action aU the
resources of a singularly masterful and impulsive race,
numbering miUions and occupying a highly defensible
territory of enormous area, the Confederate rebeUion
was never that sickly, accidental foster-child of Great
Britain which, in aU their diplomatic contentions.
Secretary Seward and Senator Sumner tried so hard
to make it out, — a mere bantling dandled into pre
mature existence by an incomplete foreign recognition.
On the contrary, from start to finish, it was Titanic
in proportions and spirit. It presented every feature
of war on the largest scale, domestic and foreign. From
the outset, neutral interests were involved ; European
opinion was by both sides invoked. In face of such
conditions and facts as these, to go on, to the end of
the chapter, asserting that such a complete and for
midable embodiment of aU- pervasive warlike energy
should, through years, have been ignored as an exist-
^ The evidence on this point, though now largely forgotten, is over
whelming. Jefferson Davis, in common with the great mass of the
people of the Confederacy, had an implicit — an almost childlike faith
in the commercial, and consequent political, supremacy of cotton.
They wanted no other ally. They went the full length gone by J.
H. Hammond of South CaroUna when, on the 4th of March, 1858,
he thus expressed himself in the Senate at Washington : — " Without
firing a gun, without drawing a sword, should [the States of the North]
make war on us, we could bring the whole world to our feet. What
would happen if no cotton was furnished for three years ? I will not
stop to depict what every one can imagine ; but this is certain, Eng
land would topple headlong, and carry the whole civilized world with
her. No, you dare not make war on cotton. No power on earth dares
to make war on it — Cotton is King ! "

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 101
ing fact by aU foreign nations, and refused a recog
nition even as beUigerent, was, historically speaking,
the reverse of creditable — it was puerile. Yet, after
this unparalleled struggle had been brought to a close.
Secretary Seward had the assurance to assert in a
despatch to Mr. Adams, written in January, 1867 : —
" Before the Queen's proclamation of neutrality the
disturbance in the United States was merely a local
insurrection. It wanted the name of war to enable it
to be a civil war and to live ; " and this was merely
the persistent iteration of a similar statement likewise
made to Mr. 'Adams shortly prior to the 1862 disasters
at Shiloh and before Richmond : — "If Great Britain
should revoke her decree conceding belligerent rights
to the insurgents to-day, this civil strife . . . would
end to-morrow." ^
The Johnson-Clarendon Convention was open to
criticism at many points, and its rejection by the Sen
ate was altogether defensible. It did,, however, have
one merit, it quietly relegated to obUvion the alto
gether untenable positions just referred to. By so
much the discussion approached a rational basis. Un
fortunately, it was upon that very feature of the set
tlement Mr. Sumner characteristicaUy directed his
criticism, and brought his rhetoric to bear. In so
doing he gave the debate a violent wrench, forcing it
back into its former impossible phase ; and, in so far
as in him lay, he put obstacles, weU-nigh insuperable,
in the way of any future approach to an adjustment.
Recurring in his speech, subsequently published by
order of the Senate, to the sentimental grounds of
complaint because of conjectural injuries resulting
1 Dip. Cor. 1862, p. 43. See Appendix B, infra, p. 204.

102 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
from precipitate action based on an assumed un
friendly purpose in the issuance of the proclamation
of May 13, 1861, he proceeded to do what his great
model Burke had declared himself unwilling to do,
— he framed an indictment of a whole people, — an
indictment of many counts, some small, others gran
diose, all set forth in rhetoric incontestably Sumner-
esque. In 1869 he fairly outdid Seward in 1862.
Because of the proclamation, and because of that
solely, he pronounced Great Britain responsible not
only for the losses incurred through the depredations
of aU British built Confederate commerce-destroyers,
but for aU consequent losses and injuries, conjectural
and consequential, computable or impossible of com
putation, including the entire cost of the CivU War
during half its length, and an estimate of the value
of a large and increasing proportion of the world's
carrying trade. The " war prolongation " claim, as
it was caUed, Mr. Gladstone afterwards estimated as
alone amounting to eight thousand miUion doUars
(£1,600,000,000).! From lack of information only,
Mr. Sumner failed to include a trifle of an hundred
millions, which the Confederate Secretary of the Navy
had, in 1864, put down as the increased expenditure
imposed on the United States by the naval opera
tions set on foot by his department alone ;2 but he
counterbalanced this omission by including an hun
dred and ten miUions on account of "our natural
increase in [a certain] branch of industry which an
intelligent statistician " had told him we might have
looked for, if, etc., etc. He then triumphantly added,
" Of course this (1110,000,000) is only an item in
1 Reid : Forster, vol. ii. p. 24. 2 Bulloch, vol. ii. p. 112.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 103
our biU." ^ The chairman of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations then put himself on record deliber
ately, and not in the heat of debate, as estimating the
money liability of Great Britain, because of the issu
ance of the proclamation of May 13, 1861, at- twenty-
five hundred miUions of doUars ; and he clinched the
matter by declaring that " whatever may be the final
settlement of these great accounts, such must be the
judgment in any chancery which consults the simple
equity of the case." And this proposition the Senate
of the United States now by formal vote approved,
promulgating it to the world as its own.
No one in the United States was at that time so
familiar with the issues between the two countries, or
so qualified to speak understandingly of them, as Mr.
Adams, from his Boston retirement then watching the
course of events with a deep and natural interest. On
reading Mr. Sumner's speech, and noting the unanim
ity of the vote by which the Senate had rejected the
convention, he wrote, — "The practical effect of this
is to raise the scale of our demands of reparation so
very high that there is no chance of negotiation left,
unless the English have lost all their spirit and char
acter. The position in which it places Mr. Bright
and our old friends in the struggle is awkward to the
last degree. Mr. Goldwin Smith, who was at the
meeting of the [Massachusetts] Historical Society
[which chanced that day to be held], spoke of it to me
with some feeling. The whole affair is ominous of
the change going on in our form of government ; for
this is a pronunciamento from the Senate as the treaty-
making power. There were intimations made to me
' Works, vol. xiii. p. 83.

104 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
in conversation that the end of it all was to be the
annexation of Canada by way of fuU indemnity.
Movements were going on in that region to accelerate
the result. I suppose that event is inevitable at some
time ; but I doubt whether it wiU come in just that
form. Great Britain will not confess a wrong, and
seU Canada as the price of a release from punishment.
... I begin to be apprehensive that the drift of this
government under the effect of that speech wiU be to
a misunderstanding ; and, not improbably, an ultimate
seizure of Canada by way of indemnification." To
the same effect the British Minister at Washington,
Mr. Thornton, was apprising his government that,
in the Senate debate held in executive session, Mr.
Sumner was foUowed by a few other Senators, aU
speaking in the same sense. Mr. Chandler, Senator
from Michigan, seeming to be most violent against
England, indicating his desire that Great Britain
should possess no territory on the American Conti
nent. General Grant was now fairly entered on his first
presidential term, and Mr. Fish had, for some five
weeks, been Secretary of State. So far as concerned
an amicable settlement between Great Britain and the
United States, the outlook was unpropitious ; less pro
pitious, in fact, than at any previous time. The new
President was a military man, and, in the language of
Mr. Sumner, he was " known to feel intensely on the
Alabama question." At the close of the war he had
expressed himself in a way hostile to Great Britain, not
caring whether she " paid ' our little bUl ' or not ; upon
the whole he would rather she should not, as that
would leave the precedent of her conduct in fuU force

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 105
for us to foUow, and he wished it understood that we
should follow it." During the war, he had been accus
tomed to regard Great Britain as " an enemy," and the
mischief caused by her course he thought not capable
of overstatement; and, in May, 1869, Sumner wrote
that the President's views were in close conformity
with those set forth in his speech, and that after its
delivery General Grant had thanked and congratulated
him.! Everything, consequently, now seemed to indi
cate that events must take the course thus marked out
for them. Great Britain would have to face the con
tingencies of the future weighted down by the policy
followed by Palmerston and Russell, and confronted
by the precedents of the Florida, the Alabama, and
the Shenandoah. She had taken her position in
1861—65, defiantly proclaiming that, for her, condi
tions could never be reversed, the womb of the future
contained no day of reckoning, — no South Africa.
Into the details of what now ensued, it is not neces
sary here to enter. They are matter of history ; and
as such, sufficiently familiar. I shaU pass rapidly
over even the Motley imbroglio, coming directly to the
difficulty between Mr. Fish and Mr. Sumner, — high
officials both, the one Secretary of State, the other
chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela
tions. In regard to this difficidty much has been
written ; more said. In discussing it, whether by
pen or word of mouth, no little temper has been dis
played ; 2 but, so far as I am aware, its significance
in an historical way has never been developed. As
I look upon it, it was an essential element, — almost
1 Pierce: Sumner, vol. iv. pp. 255, 389, 393,410.
2 See, for example. Pierce : Sumner, vol. iv. p. 469.

106 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
a necessary preliminary to that readjustment between
the United States and Great Britain now so influ
ential a factor in the international relations of four
continents. The divergence between the two was almost imme
diate. The position of Mr. Fish, as head of the State
Department, was, so far as Mr. Sumner was concerned,
one of great and constantly increasing difficulty. The
latter had then been seventeen years a member of the
Senate, and, during eight of the seventeen, chairman
of the Committee on Foreign Relations. Secretary
Seward had been Mr. Sumner's senior in the Senate,
and afterwards Secretary of State from the commence
ment of Sumner's chairmanship of his committee.
NaturaUy, therefore, though he had often been bitter
in his attacks on the Secretary, — at tunes, indeed,
more sua, indulging even in language which knew no
limit of moderation,! — he regarded him with very dif
ferent eyes from those through which he cast glances
of a somewhat downward kind on Seward's successor
in office. In earlier senatorial days, when they sat
together in that body during the Pierce administra^
tion, Mr. Fish had always evinced much deference
to Sumner's scholarly and social attributes, and had
treated him with a consideration which the latter not
impossibly misconstrued. The evidence is clear and
of record that, when unexpectedly caUed to take
charge of the State Department, Mr. Fish was solicit
ous as to Sumner's feeling towards him, and anxious
to assure himself of the latter's cooperation and even
guidance. MeanwhUe, though wholly unconscious of
the fact, Mr. Sumner could not help regarding Mr.
1 Adams : B. H. Dana, vol. ii. pp. 258, 259.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 107
Fish as a tyro, and was not disposed to credit him
with any very clearly defined ideas of his own.i He
assumed, as matter of course, that at last the shaping
of the foreign policy of the country would by seniority
devolve upon him. The appointment of Mr. Motley
to succeed Mr. Reverdy Johnson in the English mis
sion undoubtedly confirmed him ia this opinion. Mr.
Motley was his appointee. That the new plenipoten
tiary regarded himself as such at once became appar
ent ; for, immediately after his confirmation, he pre
pared a memoir suggestive of the instructions to be
given him. The Johnson-Clarendon Convention had
just been rejected ; the course now to be pursued was
under advisement ; Mr. Sumner's recent speech was
stiU matter of general discussion. The new President
was understood to have no very clearly defined ideas
on the subject; it was assumed that Mr. Fish was
equally susceptible to direction. Mr. Motley, there
fore, looked to Mr. Sumner for inspiration. In his
memorandum he suggested that it was not advisable
at present to attempt any rene-^al of negotiations.
And then he feU back on the proclamation of May,
1861 ; proceeding to dUate on that wrong committed
by Great Britain, — a wrong so deeply felt by the
American people ! This sense of wrong had now been
declared gravely, solemnly, without passion ; and the
sense of it was not to be expunged by a mere money
payment to reimburse a few captures and conflagra
tions at sea. And here, for the present, he proposed
to let the matter rest. A time might come when
Great Britain would see her fault, and be disposed to
confess it. Reparation of some sort would then nat-
1 Pierce : Sumner, vol. iv. pp. 375, 378.

108 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
uraUy foUow ; but, meanwhile, it was not for the
United States to press the matter further.
Distinct indications of a divergence of opinion as to
the course to be pursued were at once apparent. The
President, acting as yet under the influence of Mr.
Sumner, wished Mr. Motley to proceed forthwith to
his post ; Mr. Fish inclined to delay his going. Mean
while the Secretary was at work on the new Minister's
letter of instructions ; and in them he clearly did not
draw his inspiration from the Motley memoir. On
the contrary, referring to the fate of the Johnson-
Clarendon Convention in the Senate, he proceeded to
say that, because of this action, the government of the
United States did not abandon " the hope of an early,
satisfactory, and friendly settlement of the questions
depending between the two governments." The sus
pension of negotiations, he added, would, the President
hoped, be regarded by Her Majesty's Govemment, as
it was by him, " as wholly in the interest, and solely
with a view, to an early and friendly settlement."
The Secretary then went on to open the way to such
a settlement by defining, in terms presently to be re
ferred to, the views of the President on the effect to be
ascribed to the Queen's proclamation of May, 1861.
At this point, the reason became apparent why Mr.
Fish was in no haste to have the newly appointed Min
ister proceed at once to London. The Secretary was
in a dUemma. The rule of action he was about to lay
down as that which should have guided the British
government in 1861 must control the United States
in 1869. That was obvious ; but, in 1869, the United
States was itself the interested observer of an insur
rection in the neighboring island of Cuba ; and, more-

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 109
over, the new President was not backward in express
ing the warm sympathy he felt for the insurgents
against Spanish colonial misrule. He wished also to
forward their cause. That wish would find natural ex
pression in a recognition of belligerent rights. General
Grant was a man of decided mind ; he was very per
sistent ; his ways were military ; and, as to principles
of international law, his knowledge of them can hardly
be said to have been so much limited as totally want
ing. He inclined strongly to a policy of territorial
expansion ; but his views were in the direction of the
tropics, — the AntiUes and Mexico, — rather than to
wards Canada and the north. As the event, however,
showed, once his mind was finally made up and his
feelings enlisted, it was not easy to divert him from his
end. In the matter of foreign policy, the course he
now had in mind, though neither of the two at first
realized the fact, involved of necessity and from the
outset a struggle with Mr. Sumner ; and, to one who
knew the men, appreciating their characteristics and
understanding their methods, it was plain that the
struggle would be bitter, prolonged and unrelenting.
As different in their mental attributes as in their
physical appearance, while Mr. Sumner was, inteUectu-
aUy, moraUy and physicaUy, much the finer and more
imposing human product, Grant had counterbalancing
qualities which made him, in certain fields, the more
formidable opponent. With immense wUl, he was
taciturn ; Sumner, on the contrary, in no way deficient
in wiU, was a man of many words, — a rhetorician.
In action and among men. Grant's self-control was
perfect, — amounting to complete apparent imperturb
ability. Unassuming, singularly devoid of self-con-

110 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
sciousness, in presence of an emergency his blood never
seemed to quicken, his face became only the more set
— tenacity personified ; whereas Sumner, — when mor
ally excited, the rush of his words, his deep, tremulous
utterance, and the light in his eye did not impart
conviction or inspire respect. Doubts would suggest
themselves to the unsympathetic, or only partiaUy
sympathetic, hstener whether the man was of alto
gether balanced mind. At such times, Mr. Sumner
did not appreciate the force of language, nor, indeed,
know what he said ; and, quite unconsciously on his
part, he assumed an attitude of moral superiority and
inteUectual certainty, in no way compatible vrith a
proper appreciation of the equality of others. In the
mind of a man Uke Grant, these peculiarities excited
obstinacy, anger and contempt. Thus, an agitator and
exponent of ideas, Mr. Sumner might and did stunu-
late masses, but never, man or boy, was he a leader
among equals. Moreover, as one of his truest friends
and warmest admirers said of him, he was prone to re
gard difference of opinion as a moral delinquency.!
Grant, on the contrary, not retentive of enmities, re
gardless of consistency, and of coarse moral as weU as
physical fibre, moved towards his ends with a stubborn
persistency which carried others along with him, and
against which a perfervid, rhetorical opposition was
apt to prove unavaUing.
Mr. Fish stood between the two. So far as ques
tions of foreign policy, and problems of international
law, were concerned, though, as the result unmistakably
^ " A man who did not believe there was another side to the ques
tion, who would treat difference of opinion almost as moral delin
quency." George WiUiam Curtis, in his oration on Charles Sumner,
Orations and Addresses, vol. iii. p. 230.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 111
showed, weU grounded in fundamental principles and
with a grasp of general conditions at once firm and
correct, there is no evidence that, before his quite
unexpected summons to the Department of State, the
new Secretary had felt called upon to form definite
conclusions. Mr. Fish was, however, not only a law
yer by profession, but, without any claim to being
what is known as a jurist or publicist, his thought
had a distinctly legal turn. No more doctrinaire
than mercantile or philanthropic, his was essentially a
practical mind, strongly infused with saving common
sense. By nature cautious and conservative, not an
imaginative man, having passed his whole Ufe in a New
York social and commercial environment, he would
have inclined to proceed slowly in any path of national
expansion, most of all in one heading towards the
tropics, and an admixture of half-breeds. So far as
Great Britain was concerned, he would, on the other
hand, be disposed to effect, if he could, an amicable,
business-Uke settlement on rational terms. From the
beginning he was inclined to think Mr. Sumner had
in his speech gone too far, — that the positions he had
taken were not altogether tenable. The British pro
clamation of May, 1861, he regarded as a "grievous
wrong " under all the circumstances of the case ; but
he assented to the position of Lord Stanley that issu
ing it was -within the strict right of the neutral, and
the question of time was one of judgment. As he
wrote to a friend in May, 1869, four weeks after Mr.
Sumner had enunciated very different views in his
Senate speech, the proclamation could be made subject
of complaint only as leading in its execution and en
forcement to the fitting out of the Alabama, etc., and

112 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
the moral support given in England to the rebel cause.
" Sumner's speech was able and eloquent, and perhaps
not without a good effect. . . . Although the only
speech made in the debate, it was not the argument
of all who agreed in the rejection of the treaty, and
we cannot stand upon it in all its points." ! Within
a week of the rejection of the Johnson-Clarendon
Convention he -wrote to another friend, — "Whenever
negotiations are resumed, the atmosphere and the sur
roundings of this side of the water are more favorable
to a proper solution of the question than the dinner-
tables and the public banquetings of England."
Thus, from the very commencement, there was an
essential divergence of view between the Secretary of
State and the Senator from Massachusetts, as weU as
between the latter and the President. As between
Charles Sumner and Ulysses S. Grant, past friendly
relations, similar social connections, and common tastes
would decidedly have drawn Mr. Fish towards the
former ; but, by nature loyal, he was distinctly repeUed
by Mr. Sumner's demeanor.
I have dwelt on these personal factors, and diver
gences of view and aim, for they must be kept con
stantly in mind in considering what was now to occur.
They account for much otherwise quite inexplicable.
In history as a whole, — the inexhaustible story of
man's development from what he once was to what he
now is, — the individual as a factor is so far minimized
that the most considerable unit might probably have
been left out of the account, and yet the result be in
no material respect other than it is. Exceptional forces
and individual traits counterbalance each other, tend-
^ See Appendix C, infra, p. 206.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 113
ing always to average results. With episodes it is far
otherwise. In them the individual has free play ; and,
accordingly, the personal factor counts. The Treaty
of Washington was an episode. In dealing with the
conditions which led up to that treaty, the minds of
Charles Sumner and HamUton Fish naturally moved
on different lines ; while it so chanced that the likes
and dislikes, the objectives, surroundings and methods
of Ulysses S. Grant , — disturbing factors, — largely
affected the result.

IV
In the years 1869 and 1870, as indeed throughout
his public life, Charles Sumner was intent on the Afri
can, and questions of human right ; and consequently,
whUe, in the matter of territorial expansion, he might
look vaguely to Canada and a Greater American policy,
he would instinctively be opposed to any movement in
the direction of the tropics. President Grant, on the
contrary, from the beginning of his first presidential
term, was bent on early acquisitions in the West In
dies, and disposed to adopt a summary tone towards
Spain. As respects Great Britain, his attitude, one
of comparative indifference, admitted of almost indefi
nite shaping. Mr. Fish, new, and not comfortable, in
his unsolicited position, was inclined to be influenced,
— almost to be led, by Sumner ; but he at the same
time looked to Grant as the head of an administration,
in which he himself held the place of precedence, and
was disposed to give to his chief a thoroughly loyal
support. New in their positions, and, so far as Grant
was concerned, strange to each other, they had aU to

114 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
find their bearings. Under such circumstances, inex
perienced in foreign affairs and unduly distrustful of
himself on questions of international law, the new
Secretary seems in some degree to have turned to
Caleb Cushing ; nor could he, among men then avail
able at Washington, have found a more competent or
tactful adviser. Of decided parts, with good attain
ments and remarkable powers of acquisition, Caleb
Cushing was a man of large experience, much human
insight, and, while given to manipulation, he was not
hampered either in council or in action by any excess
of moral sensibility. He understood the situation ;
and he understood Mr. Sumner.
In the matter of the Queen's proclamation of May,
1861, and the concession of beUigerent rights, it was
thus a case of alternatives, — the rule of British ac
countability to be laid down for the new administration
must not stand in the way of a more than possible line
of aggressive action towards Spain, That the instruc
tions now prepared for Mr. Motley were more rational
than the positions assumed by Mr. Sumner four weeks
before, must be admitted ; they were also more in ac
cordance with recognized principles of international
law. In his Senate speech Mr. Sumner had contended
that, because of the proclamation, the UabUity of Great
Britain must be fixed at amounts scarcely calculable
in money, — a damage " immense and infinite," — "a
massive grievance," all dependent on " this extraordi
nary manifesto," the " ill-omened," the " fatal " pro
clamation which " had opened the floodgates to infinite
woes." Mr. Fish, with the Cuban situation obviously
in mind, declared, on the contrary, that the President
recognized " the right of every power, when a civU con-

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 115
flict has arisen in another state, and has attained a
sufficient complexity, magnitude and completeness, to
define its own relations and those of its citizens and
subjects toward the parties to the conflict, so far as
their rights and interests are necessarily affected by
the conflict." Then foUowed some saving clauses, care
fully framed ; but, as already foreshadowed in Mr.
Fish's correspondence, the precipitate character of the
" unfriendly " proclamation was dwelt upon only as
showing " the beginning and the animus of that course
of conduct which resulted so disastrously to the United
States." In the original draught, these instructions had
been even more explicit on this point ; and, for that
reason, had led to a characteristic remonstrance on the
part of Mr. Sumner. Having early got some inkling
of their character, he at once went to the house of Mr.
Davis, and there, speaking to the Assistant Secretary
in a loud voice, tremulous and vibrating with excitement,
he had exclaimed, — " Is it the purpose of this Admin
istration to sacrifice me, — me, a Senator from Massa
chusetts ? " — and later he wrote to the Secretary him
self, declaring his dissent " from the course proposed,"
on the ground that " as chairman of the Senate com
mittee I ought not in any way to be a party to a state
ment which abandons or enfeebles any of the just
grounds of my country as already expounded by Seward,
Adams, and myself." To this more than merely im
plied threat, Mr. Fish had contented himself by reply
ing that, whether the modifications were of greater or
of less significance, they could " hardly be of sufficient
importance to break up an effort at negotiation, or to
break down an Administration." ! Mr. Cushing here
1 Davis : Mr. Fish and the Alabama Claims, pp. 31-34, 114-116.

116 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
intervened, and his skilful hand temporarUy adjusted
the difficulty.! fj^g adjustment was, however, only
temporary. The inevitable could not be averted, and
coming events already cast their shadows before.
To revive in detail the painful Motley imbrogUo of
1870 is not necessary for present purposes. Suffice
it to say that, when he reached England, Mr. Motley
was, apparently, quite unable to clear his mind of what
might, perhaps, not inaptly be described as the Procla
mation Legend ; and, both in his official interviews with
the British Foreign Secretary and in social intercourse,
he failed to follow, and apparently did not grasp, the
spirit of his instructions. Confessing to a " despondent
feeling " as to the " possibiUty of the two nations ever
understanding each other, — of the difficulty, at this
present moment, of their looking into each other's
hearts," — he, in his first inter-view with Lord Claren
don, fell heavily back on the ubiquitous and everlasting
proclamation, as the " fountain-head of the disasters
which had been caused to the American people, both
individuaUy and collectively, by the hands of Enghsh-
men." HistoricaUy untrue and diplomatically injudi
cious, this tone and stand evinced, on the part of Mr.
Motley, an inability to see things in connection -with
his mission otherwise than as seen by Mr. Sumner.
His misapprehension of the objects his official supe
rior had in view was obvious and complete.
Grant afterwards said that when Mr. Motley's de
spatch containing his report of this interview reached
Washington, it made him very angry, adding, as it did,
"insult" to "injury." This statement, though made
some eight years after the event,^ is altogether probable
1 Pierce : Sumner, vol. iv. p. 405.
2 Interview at Edinburgh, New York Herald, September 25, 1877.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 117
in view of the somewhat complicated, if extremely in
teresting, state of affairs then existing at Washington.
But to a complete understanding of what can only
be described as Mr. Motley's most unfortunate diplo
matic faux pas, it is necessary here to diverge from
the narrative.
The despatch of the new Minister containing the
report of his first conference with Lord Clarendon
reached the Department of State in due course of
time, and was acknowledged by the Secretary on the
28th of June. In the course of the Edinburgh inter
view of eight years later, just referred to, Grant said,
— "As soon as I heard of [the tenor of Motley's con
versation with Clarendon] I went over to the State
Department, and told Governor Fish to dismiss Motley
at once. ... I have been sorry many a time since
that I did not stick to my first determination." Grant
was, indeed, as he stated, " very angry " on this occa
sion. Nor, in the light of what is now known, was
the cause of his anger far to seek. It was due to the
state of affairs in Cuba, and the course he then had
in mind to pursue in respect thereto.
One of the inherent defects of Grant as a civil
administrator was what Mr. Sumner, at a later day,
termed his " aide-de-campish " tendency. As President
he was surrounded, and greatly influenced, by his old
field associates, — at once the terror and despair of his
constitutional advisers and official associates. The best,
and by far the most influential, of this White House
staff was General Rawlins, Grant's first Secretary of
War. He, at least, held an official position ; most of
The report of the conversation was, in this case, authorized, and pre
pared by John RusseU Young, Grant's recognized traveUing companion.

118 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
the others were irregular army assignments, holding
no position at the White House recognized by law.!
During the early months of Grant's first administra
tion, the Secretary of War, though in declining health,
was greatly concerned over the course of events in
Cuba. As afterwards appeared, he had even a money
interest in the success of the insurrection then on foot
in the island. With his customary energy, he pressed
the cause of the insurgents on the President, demand
ing their recognition as beUigerents. For this no
grounds existed. As Secretary Fish afterwards pri
vately wrote, — " They have no army, . . . no courts,
do not occupy a single town, or hamlet, to say nothing
of a seaport, . . . carrying on a purely guerrilla war
fare, burning estates and attacking convoys, etc. . . .
There has been nothing that has amounted to ' War.'
Belligerency is a fact. Great Britain or France might
just as weU have recognized belligerency for the Black
Hawk War." None the less, so far did General Raw
lins's urgency prevail on the President that, as Mr.
Motley's malign diplomatic star would have it, the
detailed report of his arraignment of the Queen's pro
clamation of 1861 reached Washington at the very
time when the President was himself meditating, and
the Secretary of State was apprehending, a similar
proclamation as respects the Cuban insurgents. Nor
merely that. A few weeks later, the President not
only caused such a proclamation to be drawn up, but
signed it himself, directed the Secretary of State to
affix to it the official seal, and then to promulgate it.
^ J. D. Cox : " How Judge Hoar ceased to be Attorney-General,"
Atlantic Monthly Magazine (August, 1895), vol. Ixxvi. p. 162 ; Sumner:
" Republicanism vs. Grantism," Works, vol. xv. pp. 131-138.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 119
This was on the 19 th of August. Mr. Bancroft Davis,
the Assistant Secretary of State, was intrusted -with
the order for the purpose of affixing the seal, — it
having been signed in the cabin of the FaU River
boat, — and with it returned to Washington ; and
there, in obedience to the direction of Mr. Fish, he
deposited the document in a safe place, to await fur
ther directions. In that " safe place " this proclama
tion, vital to Cuba's insurrectionists and, probably, to
the country's peace, rested for months and years. It
never was promulgated.!
With Grant, an order was an order ; and an order.

^ Some facts concerning this singular episode, copied from Mr.
Fish's diary by his son, Hamilton Fish, were published in an Asso
ciated Press despatch, from Albany, in the New York papers of
March 16, 1896. Writing a year after the occurrences referred to in
the text, July 10, 1870, Mr. Fish said that Grant made use of these
expressions to him, — " On two important occasions, at least, your
steadiness and wisdom have kept me from mistakes into which I
should have fallen." Mr. Fish then added, these two occasions were
" one preventing the issuing, last August and September, of the pro
clamation of Cuban belligerency, which he had signed, and which
he wrote me a note instructing me to sign (which I did) and to issue
(which I did not), and, second, the Cuban message of June 13"
(1870). The message last referred to (Messages, etc., of the Pre
sidents, vol. vii. p. 64), setting forth a definite policy as respects Cuba
and Spain, was at the time a great relief to the members of the
Cabinet. It amounted to a complete change of administration front,
brought about by the insistence of the Secretary of State, and almost
as the alternative to his resignation. Though very reluctant to yield
on this point, the President finaUy did so, affixing his signature to the
message as drawn up by the Secretary. In response to a request
therefor, the family of Mr. Fish have kindly furnished me extracts
from the diary relating to this interesting bit of history, supplement
ary to those already published by Mr. Hamilton Fish, in the Asso
ciated Press despatch above referred to. These are of such value,
and so extremely creditable to Mr. Fish, that they are printed in
fuU, together with those previously published by Mr. Fish's son, in
Appendix E (infra, p. 215) of this paper.

120 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
something to be obeyed. Why, in this case, the order
was not obeyed, or some one held to strict account for
disobedience, does not appear. He seems to have for
gotten all about it at the time ; and, subsequently, he
expressed much gratification at this failure of memory.
In point of fact he, at that particular juncture, had
other things to think of. It was the vacation season,
and he was away from Washington, — at Newport, in
New York, and in the mountains of western Penn
sylvania ; Mr. Fish was at his country place, at Gar
rison on the Hudson ; General Rawlins was Ul at
Washington, — dying, in the last stages of pulmonary
consumption. It so chanced that Messrs. Jay Gould
and James Fisk, Jr., of New York had made up
their minds that this particular period was one favor
able for the execution of a great financial stroke.
They proceeded accordingly, and their operations cul
minated in the famous " Gold Corner," and the long-
remembered Wall Street " Black Friday " of Septem
ber 24, 1869. Never fastidious in the selection of his
company, the President had been brought into some
sort of an association -with these men through his
brother-in-law, Abel R. Corbin, a resident of New
York. Him they had fairly entangled in their meshes ;
through him they were scheming to ensnare the Pre
sident.! They did not succeed; but they did influ
ence his action as President, and they threw the whole
financial machinery of the country, including that of
the United States government, into confusion. For
some time public attention was concentrated on them
and their misdoings, to the utter exclusion of aU else,
' Henry Adams : Chapters of Erie, The New York Gold Conspiracy,
pp. 100-134. See, also, infra, p. 224.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 121
including Cuba. It was Grant's first experience with
men of that stamp in WaU Street ; weU for him had
it been his last.
Thus the last formal act preliminary to the issuance
of a proclamation of Cuban beUigerency was performed
during the evening of August 19 ; the Secretary of
War died on the 9th of the month following ; fifteen
days later was WaU Street's " Black Friday." The
Rawlins pressure on Grant had then ceased; thenceforth
the proclamation slept, innocuous, in the safe of the
Department of State. But, though thus pigeon-holed,
it might weU have been issued at any time subsequent
to the 19th of August ; and that it was not so issued
was due, apparently, to the fact that Secretary Fish
withheld it during the President's vacation absence
from Washington. Grant's thoughts chanced then to
be otherwise directed, and subsequent events made the
action he had decided on manifestly inexpedient.
Returning to Mr. Motley and the report of his first
conversation with Lord Clarendon, it is now quite
apparent why Grant was " very angry indeed " when
he first heard of it. The diplomacy of Mr. Motley
certainly was not happy. With a degree of fortuitous
infelicity truly remarkable, it was most nicely calcu
lated to compromise the President and the Secretary
of State. By the merest chance did it faU so to do.
The lesson could not have been lost ; and it was small
matter of surprise that Mr. Motley was promptly
reUeved from the necessity of further discussing the
Alabama claims, and the Queen's proclamation of
May, 1861, in its connection therewith. However
Mr. Fish felt about Cuba, — and on that subject his
views were quite well defined, — he could have enter-

122 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
tained no wish to have his representative in London
get him into a position which might not improbably
demand of him much awkward explanation, founded
on distinctions not at once apparent.! However, as it
was almost immediately decided that, so far as the
settlement of outstanding difficulties between the two
nations was concerned, any future negotiations should
be conducted in Washington, Mr. Motley ceased at
this point to be a factor in the course of events.
Now, however, an extremely adroit, though unoffi
cial, intermediary appeared on the stage ; and his
presence almost immediately made itself felt. Born
in Scotland in 1820, and emigrating with his parents
^ Though a man of extensive research, Mr. Sumner, unUke Mr.
Fish in that respect, had not a legal mind. He prided himself on
his acquaintance with International Law ; but, when occasion arose,
he instinctively evolved his law from his inner consciousness, and it
rarely failed to meet the emergency. The difficulty with it was that
it was apt to be of a code peculiarly his own, and not found in the
books usually accepted as authoritative. It was so in the case of
foreign built Confederate cruisers ; it was so as respects the Queen's
proclamation of May, 1861 ; it was so as respects national, as con
tradistinguished from private, claims. An accomplished Utt^rateur
and brilliant historian, Mr. Motley was unacquainted with law, and
quite innocent of any legal instinct. When, therefore, Mr. Motley
undertook to expound Mr. Sumner's jurisprudence, the result might
not improbably be something for which a matter-of-fact government
would not care always to be held responsible. In the present case,
Mr. Motley in June descanted most eloquently to Lord Clarendon
on the sin of commission involved in the premature recognition
of Confederate belligerency by the British government; but, six
months later. President Grant declared that a " nation is its own
judge, when to accord the rights of belligerency, either to a people
struggling to free themselves from a government they believe to
be oppressive, or to independent nations at war with each other."
(Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. vii. p. 32.) Even this
discrepancy was unquestionably embarrassing ; a Cuban proclamation
actually outstanding would obviously have aggravated the embarrass
ment.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 123
to America at the age of sixteen. Sir John Rose, or
Mr. Rose as he stiU was in 1869, had been for a num
ber of years prominent in Canadian public life. A
natural diplomat of a high order, he was at this time
acting as British commissioner on the joint tribunal
provided by the treaty of 1863 to arbitrate the claims
of the Hudson's Bay and Puget Sound companies. Mr.
Caleb Cushing was of counsel in that business, and
relations of a friendly nature grew up between him and
the British arbitrator. Whether already privately au
thorized so to do or not, Mr. Rose, who was very solicit
ous of an arrangement between the two nations, skU-
f uUy instUled into Mr. Cushing a belief that he, Mr.
Rose, might be of use in the delicate work of reopening
negotiations on new Unes, Accordingly, on the 26th
of June, — not eleven weeks from the rejection of the
Johnson-Clarendon Convention, and sixteen days after
Mr. Motley's despondent interview with Lord Clar
endon just referred to, — Mr. Cushing, then in Wash
ington, wrote to Mr. Rose, in Ottawa. Referring to
previous letters between them, he now told him that
he had that day seen Secretary Fish, and had arranged
for Mr. Rose to meet him. " I am," he wrote, " not
sanguine of immediate conclusion of such a treaty as
either you or I might desire. But I think the time
has arrived to commence, trusting that discretion, pa
tience, and good-will on both sides may eventuate, in
this important matter, satisfactorily to the two govern
ments." ! Accordingly, on the 8th of July, Mr. Rose
1 In this letter Mr. Cushing significantly went on to say, — " In view
of the disposition which the Senate of the United States has recently
shown to assume more than its due, or at least than its usual part, in
the determination of international questions, you wUl appreciate the
Unreadiness of the Executive, at the present time, to take upon itself

124 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
called on the Secretary in Washington. The first of
the interviews which led up to the Treaty of Wash
ington two years later took place next day at Mr.
Fish's dinner-table. The basis of a settlement was
then discussed, and that subsequently reached out
lined by Mr. Fish, who laid especial emphasis on the
necessity of " some kind expression of regret " on
the part of Great Britain over the course pursued in
the CivU War. The two even went so far as to con
sider the details of negotiation. The expediency of a
special commission to dispose of the matter was dis
cussed, and, among others, the names of the Duke of
ArgyU and John Bright were canvassed in connection
therewith. Immediately after this _ interview Mr. Rose went to
England. His official and personal relations with men
high in influence were close ; and, moreover, another
personage of growing consequence in Enghsh minis
terial circles was now at work laboring eamestly and
assiduously to promotg an adjustment. In 1869
WiUiam E. Forster was fast rising into the front
rank of English public men. President of the Privy
Council in Mr. Gladstone's first Ministry, he was act
ing as Minister of Education. Nine years later, in the
second Gladstone Ministry, he was to occupy the crucial
position of Secretary for Ireland. Always, from his
first entrance into pubUc life in 1861, an earnest, out-
any spontaneous or doubtful ventures, especially on the side of Eng
land." The reference was, of course, to Mr. Sumner, and pointed to
an already developing source of trouble. Grant's first presidential term
was yet in its fourth month only. On the " disposition " referred to
by Mr. Cushing, see the paper by A. M. Low, entitled " The Oligarchy
of the Senate," in the North American Review for February, 1902,
vol. 174, pp. 238-243.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 125
spoken, consistent and insistent friend of democratic
United. States, — during the CivU War the one in that
smaU group of friends held by Mr. Adams in " most
esteem," ! — Mr. Forster was now strenuous in his
advocacy of a comprehensive settlement of the issues
arising out of the RebeUion, and the honest admission
by Great Britain of the ill-considered policy then pur
sued. His name also had been discussed by Mr. Fish
and Mr. Rose as one of the proposed special mission.
Within less than two months, therefore, of the re
jection of the Johnson-Clarendon Convention, the
Treaty of Washington was in the air ; and, curiously
enough, within a month of the time when Mr. Motley
in London was confessing to Lord Clarendon his
" despondent feeling " in view of the " path surrounded
by perils," and talking of " grave and disastrous
misunderstandings and cruel wars," Secretary Fish
and Mr. Rose, comfortably seated at a dinner-table
in Washington, were quietly paving the way to a com
plete understanding. Nothing more occurred during
that summer ; but, in the course of it, Mr. Fish thus
expressed his views in a letter to a correspondent, —
an expression at this early date to which subsequent
events lent much significance : — " The two Enghsh-
speaking progressive liberal Governments of the world
should not, must not, be divided — better let this
question rest for some years even (if that be neces
sary) than risk failure in another attempt at settle
ment. I do not say this because I wish to postpone a
settlement — on the contrary, I should esteem it the
greatest glory, and greatest happiness of my life, if it
could be settled while I remain in official position;
1 Reid : Forster, vol. ii. p. 10.

126 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
and I should esteem it the greatest benefit to my
country to bring it to an early settlement. ... I want
to have the question settled. I would not, if I could,
impose any humiliating condition on Great Britain.
I would not be a party to anything that proposes
to ' threaten ' her. I believe that she is great enough
to be just ; and I trust that she is -wise enough to
maintain her own greatness. No greatness is incon
sistent with some errors. Mr. Bright thinks she was
drawn into errors — so do we. If she can be brought
to think so, it wiU not be necessary for her to say so ;
— at least not to say it very loudly. It may be said
by a definition of what shall be Maritime International
Law in the future, aud a few kind words. She wiU
want in the future what we have claimed. Thus she
wiU be benefited — we satisfied." Written in the
early days of September, 1869, this letter set forth
clearly the position of Mr. Fish : it also correctly
foreshadowed the course of the diplomacy which had
already been entered upon.
During the autumn of 1869 the Alabama claims,
and the unsatisfactory relations of the country with
Great Britain, were discussed at more than one Cabi
net meeting in Washington. At this time, whUe the
Secretary of State professed himself as ready to nego
tiate whenever England came forward with a fairly
satisfactory proposition, the President favored a policy
of delay. Presently, Mr. Rose was again heard from.
The letter he now wrote has since often been referred
to and much commented upon, though it was over
twenty years before its authorship was revealed.! In
1 By Mr. J. C. Bancroft Davis, in his Mr. Fish and the Alabama
Claims, p. 48.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 127
it he said, — "I have had conversations in more than
one quarter, — which you wiU readily understand
without my naming them, and have conveyed my
own belief, that a kindly word, or an expression of
regret, such as would not involve an acknowledgment
of wrong, was likely to be more potential than the most
irrefragable reasoning on principles of international
law." Mr. Rose then went on to touch upon a very
delicate topic, — Mr. Motley's general London presen
tation of his country's attitude. " Is your representa
tive here," he added, " a gentleman of the most con-
ciUatory spirit ? . . . Does he not — perhaps naturally
— let the fear of imitating his predecessor influence
his course so as to make his initiative hardly as much
characterized by consideration for the sensibilities of
the people of this country, as of his own ? . . . I think
I understood you to say, that you thought negotiations
would be more likely to be attended with satisfactory
results, if they were transferred to, and were concluded
at, Washington ; because you could from time to time
communicate confidentially with leading Senators, and
know how far you could carry that body with you.
. . . But again is your representative of that mind ?
— and how is it to be brought about ? By a new, or
a special envoy — as you spoke of — or quietly through
Mr. Thornton ? ... If I am right in my impression
that you would prefer Washington and a new man,
and you think it worth while to enable me to repeat
that suggestion as one from myself in the proper quar
ter, a line from you — or if you prefer it, a word by
the cable, will enable me to do so."
Eight days later, on the 11th of the same month,
Mr. Rose again wrote to Mr. Fish, caUing his atten-

128 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
tion to the speech of Mr. Gladstone at the GuUdhall,
which, he said, "hardly conveys the impression his
tone conveyed -with reference to United States affairs.
There was an earnest tone of friendship that is hardly
reproduced." !
At the time these letters reached Mr. Fish, the
relations between him and Mr. Sumner were close,
and still friendly. The Secretary spoke to the Senator
freely of Mr. Rose's visits, and consulted with him
over every step taken. Knowing that Mr. Sumner
and Mr. Motley were constantly interchanging let
ters, he took occasion to advise Mr. Sujnner of the
intimations which had thus reached him, giving, of
course, no names, but saying simply that they were
from a reliable quarter. The well-meant hint was
more than disregarded, Mr. Sumner contenting himself
with contemptuous references to the once celebrated
McCracken episode.^ Years afterwards, in the same
spirit, Mr. Motley's biographer sneeringly referred to
the still unnamed -writer of the Rose letters as "a
faithless friend, a disguised enemy, a secret emissary,
or an injudicious alarmist." ^
The reply of Mr. Fish to the letters of Mr. Rose
revealed the difficulties of the Secretary's position.
The individuality of Mr. Sumner made itseK felt at
every point. In London, Mr. Motley reflected the
views of the chairman of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations rather than those of the Secretary
of State ; in Washington, the personal relations of
Mr. Sumner with the British Minister were such as
1 See Appendix D, infra, p. 212.
" Davis : Mr. Fish and the Alabama Claims, p. 128.
8 0. W. Holmes : Memoir of John Lothrop Motley (1879), pp. 178,
179.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 129
to render the latter undesirable at least as a medium
of negotiation. Referring first to his intimations con
cerning Mr. Motley, Mr. Fish replied to Mr. Rose as
foUows : —
" Your questions respecting our Minister, I fear
may have been justified by some indiscretion of ex
pression, or of manner, but I hope only indiscretions
of that nature. Intimations of such had reached me.
I have reason to hope that if there have been such
manifestations, they may not recur. Whatever there
may have appeared, I cannot doubt his desire to aid
in bringing the two Governments into perfect accord.
... I have the highest regard for Mr. Thornton,
and find him in aU my intercourse, courteous, frank,
and true. A gentleman -with whom I deal and treat
with the most unreserved confidence. He had, how
ever, given offence to Mr. Sumner (chairman of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations), whose posi
tion with reference to any future negotiation you un
derstand. I chance to know that Mr. Sumner feels
deeply aggrieved by some things which Mr. Thornton
has written home, and although he would not con
sciously allow a personal grief of that nature to preju
dice his action in an official intercourse with the
representative of a State, he might unconsciously be
led to criticism unfavorable to positions which would
be viewed differently, if occupied by some other per
son. ... I am very decidedly of opinion that when
ever negotiations are to be renewed, they would be
more likely to result favorably here than in London.
I have so instructed Mr. Motley to say, if he be ques
tioned on the subject."
Such was the posture of affairs at the close of the

130 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
year 1869. Events now moved rapidly, and the gen
eral situation became more and more complicated. In
Europe, the war-clouds which preceded the Franco-
Prussian storm-burst of 1870 were gathering; in
America, President Grant was, persistently as ear
nestly, pressing his schemes of West Indian annexa
tion. In London, Mr. Rose was informally sounding
the members of the government to ascertain how far
they were wUling to go ; in Washington, Mr. Thorn
ton was pressing the Secretary " with much earnest
ness to give him an intimation of what would be
accepted " by the United States. The outbreak of
hostilities between France and Germany six months
later brought matters, so far as Great Britain was
concerned, fairly to a crisis. In presence of serious
continental complications, — in imminent danger of
being drawn into the vortex of conflict, — Great Brit
ain found itself face to face with the Alabama prece
dents. Like " blood-bolter'd " Banquo, they would not
do-wn. The position was one not likely to escape the
keen eye of Count Bismarck. England's hands were
tied. InternationaUy, she was obviously a negUgible
quantity. The principles laid down and precedents
established only six years before were patent, — fresh
in the minds of all. Her Majesty's Government re
membered them ; Count Bismarck was advised of
them ; each was weU aware of the other's knowledge.
The Ministry were accordingly in an extraordinarily
receptive mental condition.
On this side of the Atlantic the situation compli
cated itself no less rapidly. Colonel Babcock, one of
the group of young army officers already referred to,
who, having been members of General Grant's miU-

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 131
tary staff, were retained, under detail, near his person
during his presidency, had been sent down by him to
examine, as an engineer, the bay of Samana, and to
report upon it as a coaling station. Presently he got
back, and, at the next meeting of the Cabinet, the
President paralyzed his official advisers by announc
ing, in a casual sort of way, " Babcock has returned,
as you see, and has brought a treaty of annexation."
To say that never before in the whole history of the
government had any President made such a naive
exhibition is quite within safe bounds. Ignorance
of law and usage, and an utter absence of the sense
of propriety, were about equaUy pronounced. A sub
ordinate officer of engineers, sent to a West Indian
island to make a report on a coaling station, had not
only undertaken to negotiate a formal treaty for the
annexation of an entire foreign country to the United
States, but had actuaUy executed it, entitling himself
in the solemn instrument " Aide-de-camp " to His Ex-
ceUency, and his " special agent to the Dominican Re-
pubUc." Instead of charitably concealing the mingled
assurance and incompetency of the young man under
a private rebuke, the President now adopted as his
own this pronounced opera bouffe performance, irre
sistibly suggestive of the Grand Duchy of Gerolstein.
Sent to examine a harbor, the President's aide had
undertaken to annex a negro republic ! This being so,
there is small occasion for surprise that, when the
President brought the matter up in cabinet meeting,
the gaze of all about the table involuntarily turned
toward the Secretary of State. Mr. Fish sat " impas
sive, and his eyes were fixed on the portfolio before
him." Had it not been somewhat appaUing, the sit-

132 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
nation would have been farcical in the extreme. As
it was, it may weU be doubted whether even Judge
Hoar's strong sense of humor rose to the occasion.
The startling bit of information thus conveyed by the
President was received in expressive sUence, broken
at last by a single hesitating query, which remained
unanswered. The atmosphere of general disapproval
was, however, pervasive, and painfully apparent; so
nothing more was then said, nor was the matter ever
again submitted to the assembled Cabinet.! None
the less, the idea of annexation had taken possession
of the presidential mind, and from that time Grant
became intent upon it ; and intent in his character
istic way. It was a cardinal point in his poUcy.
Obviously, the support of the chairman of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations was very necessary
to the success of the scheme, for the treaty, however
irregularly negotiated, must go to the Senate for rati
fication ; a foreign country and its people could not
be annexed by a proclamation of the Commander-
in-chief, even though countersigned by an aide-de
camp. So, warned by his Cabinet experience, as well
as by the fate of the Johnson-Clarendon Convention,
the President-General made up his mind to exert aU
his influence on the chairman of the committee ; and,
consequently, in the early days of January, he, the
Chief Executive of the United States, dropped in one
evening at Mr. Sumner's house, whUe the latter was
at dinner -with some friends, and sought to enlist his
influence, — designating him repeatedly as chairman
of the " Senate Judiciary Committee," — in support of
' Cox: " How Judge Hoar ceased to be Attorney-General," Atlan
tic Monthly Magazine (August, 1895), vol. Ixxvi. pp. 165-167.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 138
what afterwards became known as President Grant's
Dominican policy. What foUowed is famiUar his
tory. During the immediately ensuing months there
took place a complete division between the two men.
They thereafter became not only politicaUy opposed,
but bitter personal enemies.
To all outward appearances, during those months,
no advance whatever was being made towards an
adjustment with Great Britain ; but, in point of fact,
both time and conditions were rapidly ripening. In
the early days of September, 1870, the Imperial gov
ernment of France coUapsed at Sedan ; and, on the
13th of that month, M. Thiers arrived in London
soliciting on behalf of the new French repubUc the
aid and good offices of Great Britain. His mission
was, of course, fruitless ; but, none the less, it could
not but emphasize in the minds of those composing
the Ministry the difficulty of England's position. If
it failed so to do, a forcible reminder from America
was imminent, and foUowed almost immediately. In
December, with Paris blockaded by the Prussians,
France was brought face to face with dismemberment.
The general European situation was, from an EngUsh
point of view, disquieting in the extreme. At just
this juncture, within one week of the day on which his
Parliament caUed on the Prussian King to become
Emperor of Germany, and the French delegate gov
ernment, to avoid a German army operating in the
heart of the country, removed its sittings from Tours
to Bordeaux, — at just this juncture (December 5)
President Grant took occasion to incorporate the fol
lowing distinctly minatory passage, draughted by his
Secretary of State, into his annual message : —

134 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
" I regret to say that no conclusion has been reached
for the adjustment of the claims against Great Britain
growing out of the course adopted by that Govern
ment during the RebeUion. The cabinet of London,
so far as its -dews have been expressed, does not
appear to be wiUing to concede that Her Majesty's
Government was guUty of any negligence, or did or
permitted any act during the war by which the United
States has just cause of complaint. Our firm and
unalterable convictions are directly the reverse. I
therefore recommend to Congress to authorize the
appointment of a commission to take proof of the
amount and the ownership of these several claims, on
notice to the representative of Her Majesty at Wash
ington, and that authority be given for the settlement
of these claims by the United States, so that the
Government shall have the ownership of the private
claims, as weU as the responsible control of aU the
demands against Great Britain. It cannot be neces
sary to add that whenever Her Majesty's Government
shaU entertain a desire for a full and friendly adjust
ment of these claims, the United States wiU enter
upon their consideration with an earnest desire for a
conclusion consistent with the honor and dignity of
both nations."
The hint thus forcibly given was not lost in Lon
don. The educational process was now complete. The
message, or that portion of it which most interested
the British public, appeared in the London journals
of December 6, and was widely commented upon.
It was characterized as "menacing" in tone, and
" thoroughly unpromising of any friendly settlement."
Significantly enough, in another column of the same

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 135
issue of the Times appeared the headline, " Rouen and
Orleans have fallen ! " while the paper was crowded with
letters descriptive of the conflicts at Gravelotte and
Metz, together -with accounts of the investment of Paris
and of Gambetta's harangues at Tours. The general
continental situation was even more " menacing " than
the message of the American President. In any event,
the steps of diplomacy, ordinarUy so very sedate, were
now quickened to an unusual, not to say unprecedented,
pace. Indeed, the gait now struck in London bore,
so to speak, a close resemblance to a run. Exactly
five weeks later, on the 9th of January, 1871, Mr.
Rose was again in Washington. Coming ostensibly
on business relating to the Dominion of Canada,
he was in reality at last fuUy empowered to open
negotiations looking to an immediate settlement. The
yery evening of the day he arrived, Mr. Rose dined
with Mr. Fish. The after-dinner talk between the
two, lasting some five or six hours, resulted in a con
fidential memorandum.! More carefuUy formulated
by Mr. Rose the following day, this paper reached
Mr. Fish on the 11th of January. He expressed him
self, on acknowledging its receipt, as inspired with
hope. HamUton Fish was no more ambitious than imagi
native. Though he held the position of Secretary
of State during both of the Grant administrations,
he did so with a genuine and well-understood reluc
tance, and was always contemplating an early retire
ment. At this juncture, however, there can be no
doubt his ambition was fired. That which a year
before he had pronounced as, among things possible,
1 Davis : Mr. Fish and the Alabama Claims, p. 59.

136 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
"the greatest glory and the greatest happiness" of
his life, was within his reach. He was to be the
official medium through which a settlement of the
questions between "the two English-speaking, pro
gressive liberal " countries was to be effected. That
was to be his monument. To a certain extent, also,
conditions favored him. Mr. Sumner and his Senate
speech on the Johnson-Clarendon Convention were
the great obstacles in the way. For, as Mr. Fish had
himself expressed it a year previous, — " The elo
quence, and the display of learning and of research
in [that] speech, and — perhaps above aU — the
gratification of the laudable pride of a people in being
told of the magnitude of wealth in reserve for them
in the way of damages due from a wealthy debtor,
captivated some, and deluded more." Of this -wide
spread popular feeling, reinforced by the anti-British
and Fenian sentiment then very prevalent, account had
to be taken. Strangely enough, moreover, Mr. Sum
ner's lukewarmness as respects any settlement at that
time, much more his possible opposition to one origi
nating with the State Department, indirectly forwarded
that result ; for, as already seen, the President and the
Massachusetts Senator were now in open conflict over
the former's Dominican policy. In that struggle Sec
retary Fish had most properly, if he remained in office,
reconciled himself to siding with his official head. The
Motley imbroglio had foUowed. With the most friendly
feeling towards Mr. Motley personaUy, and sincerely
desirous of avoiding so far as possible any difficulty
with Mr. Sumner, Mr. Fish's expressed wish was to
continue Mr. Motley in his position, taking from him
aU part in the proposed negotiation, and giving him

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 137
explicit instructions in no way to refer to it, or seek
to influence it. He was practicaUy to be reduced to a
functional representative. To this the President would
not assent. He insisted that Mr. Motley represented
Mr. Sumner more than he did the Administration,
and he declared in a cabinet meeting, at which the
matter was discussed, that he would " not aUow Sum
ner to ride over " him. The Secretary continued to
plead and urge, but in vain. The President was im
placable. It was then suggested that Mr. Sumner
should himself be nominated to succeed Motley, and
General Butler, then in the House of Representatives,
and Mr. Cameron, Senator from Pennsylvania, called
on the Secretary to advocate this solution of the diffi
culty. They pronounced Sumner unpractical and arro
gant, and urged that he should be got out of the
way by any practicable method. ^ This suggestion also
was discussed at a cabinet meeting, and the President
expressed a willingness to make the nomination, on
condition that Sumner would resign from the Senate ;
but he also intimated a grim determination to remove
him from his new office as soon as he had been con
firmed in it. At last Mr. Fish was compeUed to
yield; and, under the President's explicit direction,
he wrote to Mr. Motley a private letter, couched in
the most friendly language, in which he intimated as
clearly as he could that so doing was most painful to
him, but he must ask for a resignation. The incident
had no historical significance, but was very character
istic of Grant. The method of procedure was his, —
less abrupt, less marked by military curtness than three
similar dismissals from his Cabinet ; but, owing to Mr.
Motley's international position and literary prestige,

138 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
such an unwonted proceeding at the time excited much
comment, whUe it has since been exhaustively dis
cussed. Grant gave his own explanation of it,! ^nd
diplomatists,^ biographers,^ and essayists* have each
in turn passed judgment upon it. Under these cir
cumstances, it is sufficient here to say that whatever
was then done, was done by General Grant's impera^
tive order, and solely because of Mr. Motley's inti
mate personal relations with Mr. Sumner, and the
latter's opposition to the President's Dominican poHcy.
The urgent and repeated remonstrances of the Secre
tary of State were of no avail. Utterly unqualified for
poUtical Ufe, and only partiaUy adapted for diplomacy,
Mr. Motley was thus doomed to iUustrate the truth of
Hamlet's remark as to the danger incurred by him of
lesser weight who chances
" Between the pass and feU incensed points
Of mighty opposites."
It may, however, be pertinent to say, that, in -view of the
close personal relations existing between Mr. Sumner
and Mr. Motley, it is not easy to see how the latter
could have been allowed to remain at London, the
supposed representative of the United States, with the
Massachusetts Senator in open opposition to the Ad
ministration. Indeed, bearing in mind the whole situa
tion as it then existed, there seems reason to conclude
that the President, with his instinctive strategic sense,
^ In the conversation, already referred to, with Young, at Edin
burgh, September 11, 1877, three months after Mr. Motley's death;
reported in the New York Herald of the 25th of the same month.
^ " Motley's Appeal to History," by John Jay. An Address before
the New York Historical Society ; subsequently printed in the Inter
national Review (1877), vol. iv. pp. 838-854.
^ Pierce : Sumner, vol. iv. pp. 446-451.
» 0. W. Holmes : Memoir of Motley (1879), pp. 155-190.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 139
grasped the essential fact in the case more firmly than
did the Secretary. The immediate control of the exter
nal relations of the government, and the shaping of
its foreign policy, were fast passing out of the hands
of the executive, and into those of a Senate committee.
This tendency had to be checked. The correspondence
between Senator Sumner and Minister Motley has
never been pubhshed, and it is questionable whether
it now exists. A few brief extracts from Sumner's
letters to Motley are to be found in Pierce's biography
of the former ; but Motley's letters to Sumner were
looked upon by Mr. Pierce as " absolutely confiden
tial," and of them he made no use. Those are not
now to be found in the files ; but the few short excerpts
from the Sumner letters, which have been printed,
are very suggestive. They show conclusively the
nature of the intercourse. It was intimately semi-offi
cial. Difficulty from this source had from the outset
been foreseen ; for when, immediately after his appoint
ment to the English mission, Mr. Motley was in Bos
ton, he naturally caUed on Mr. Adams, seeking light
on the course best to be pursued in his new position.
Referring to the interview, Mr. Adams then wrote, —
" His embarrassment is considerable in one particular
which never affected me, and that is in having two
masters. Mr. Seward never permitted any interfer
ence of the Senate, or Mr. Sumner, with his direction
of the pohcy." Under these circumstances, when the
break between Grant and Sumner became pronounced,
the displacement of Motley almost of necessity fol
lowed. The executive had to resume its functions ;
and, to do so effectively, it must be represented by
agents in whom it had confidence, and who were not

140 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
in the confidence of its opponents. It is somewhat
strange that Mr. Motley should have had no suspicion
of so obvious a fact.
His failure to suspect it, and foUow the reluctant
suggestion of the Secretary, , affronted, none the less,
the military instincts of the President, whose anger
towards the Massachusetts Senator was now at white
heat. It was even publicly said that he had de
clared to a Senator that, were he not President, he
"would caU [Mr. Sumner] to account."! jjg h&A,
also, cause for wrath ; not only was there notoriously
very " free talk " about the President at Mr. Sum
ner's table,^ but those holding confidential relations at
the White House — the military household — openly
asserted that Mr. Sumner had more than intimated
that he. Grant, was intoxicated when, early in Janu
ary, 1870, he had made his memorable after-dinner
call at his, the Senator's, house. The Senator from
Massachusetts coiUd not forthwith be called "to
account ; " the Minister to Great Britain could, in a
way. So, when Mr. Motley refused to resign, his
removal was ordered. This the Secretary delayed, for
he expected then himself shortly to retire, and was
more than willing to leave the final act of displace
ment to his successor. At the last moment he was,
however, prevailed upon to continue in office, sorely
against his own wishes ; and what then, as respects
the English mission, occurred, is matter of record.
That the patience of the Secretary had been sorely
tried during the intervening time, does not admit of
question. To this subject, and the probable cause of
^ Sumner : Works, vol. xiv. p. 256.
^ Davis : Mr. Fish and the Alabama Claims, p. 56.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 141
his irritation, I shall have occasion to refer presently.
Unfortunately, as is apt to be the case -with those of
Netherlandish blood, though slow to wrath, Mr. Fish's
anger, once aroused, was neither easily appeased nor
kept within conventional bounds ; and now it extended
beyond its immediate cause. He felt aggrieved over
the course pursued by Mr. Motley. In it he saw no
regard for the difficulties of the position in which
he himself stood ; and he was especiaUy provoked by
the minister's voluminous record of the circumstances
attending his displacement, placed by him on the files
of the Department, and entitled " End of Mission."
Accordingly, Mr. Fish's long-contained anger found
expression in the weU-known letter, addressed to Mr.
Moran, secretary of the legation at London, and then
acting as charge d'affaires. This letter, in a first
draught, was read by the Secretary to the President,
in presence of Vice-President Colfax and Senator
ConkUng, before it was despatched ; and, wMle the
last-named gave to it his approval, the President not
only declined to allow certain alterations suggested by
Mr. Colfax to be made, but expressed his wish that
not a word in the paper be changed.
Immaterial as all this may at first seem, it had a
close and important bearing on the negotiations pre
liminary to the Treaty of Washington, now fairly
initiated. In this case, indeed, one negotiation may
be said to have hung upon the fate of another ; for,
though the outcome of Colonel Babcoek's diplomacy
had not again been brought to the attention of the
Cabinet, it was an open secret that all those composing
it were by no means earnest in support thereof. The
White House hangers-on and tale-bearers were also

142 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
abnormaUy busy, even for them. The newspapers
consequently teemed with rumors ; the atmosphere was
rife with gossip. General Grant was not the man
long to submit to this state of things ; if nought else,
he was a disciplinarian. So he presently intimated,
with much show of feeling, that certain members of
his Cabinet — more particularly the Secretary of the
Treasury, the Attorney-General, and the Secretary of
the Interior — Messrs. Boutwell, Hoar, and Cox —
were not giving the support he deemed proper to the
San Domingo treaty. The first he declared was op
posed to the treaty ; the second said " nothing in its
favor, but sneers at it ; " the third did not open his
mouth to utter a word in its support. A few days
later he brought up this cause of complaint in a cabi
net meeting, plainly saying that he wished all the
members of his Cabinet, and aU his friends, to use
every proper effort to aid him. He went on to state
that he did not propose to let those who opposed him
in this matter " name Ministers to London," etc., etc.,
and he then entered on a warm defence of Colonel
Babcock, proclaiming his belief in the utter falsity
of the charges made against that officer. After some
further discussion, and a general expression of approval
of the plan of holding members of the party to the
support of an administration policy, the matter was
allowed to drop. This was on the 14th of June. The
very next day the resignation of the Attorney-General
was caUed for, in the way and under the circumstances
his coUeague, General Cox, afterwards described in
the pages of The Atlantic Monthly. Evidently, the
President-General was disciplining his Cabinet.! A
^ It is proper to say that the President assigned for this proceeding

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 143
day or two later he caUed in the evening on Mr. Fish
at his house, and, in the course of the conversation
which ensued, took occasion to express his sense of the
support the Secretary had given his favorite measure,
and to intimate a sense of obligation therefor. He
probably felt this the more, as he was not unaware
that Secretary Fish had taken the course he did solely
from a sense of loyalty, and in opposition to his own
better judgment. Mr. Fish had finaUy brought him
self to regard the treaty as a measure of policy
inaugurated by the head of the Administration ; and,
after that policy was fairly entered upon, did what
he properly could to forward it. This, also, not
withstanding the fact that the treaty had been most
irregularly negotiated in derogation of the Depart
ment of State, and that it was in charge of persons
whose standing had in no degree increased public
confidence.! But, in dealing historicaUy with Presi
dent Grant, and seeking to explain both the influ
ences which operated upon him and his methods of
procedure, the fact must ever be kept in mind that
he was essentiaUy a soldier, and not a ci-viUan. As a
soldier, he achieved aU his successes, and they were
great ; as a civilian, his life was a conspicuous failure.
different reasons to various people. The reason stated in the text was
that clearly intimated to Secretary Fish. Secretary BoutweU was
given to understand that the change was made because divers Sen
ators declared themselves as not on speaking terms with the Attorney-
General, and refused to visit his department whUe he was at its head ;
on the other hand. Secretary Cox was told that it was thought desirable
to have one representative from the South in the Cabinet, rather than
two from Massachusetts. All these reasons may have had weight in
the President's mind; and, in selection for immediate use, he took
into more or less careful consideration the individual with whom he
was talking.
1 See Appendix E, infra, p. 222.

144 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
In his military capacity, exacting obedience, he ap
preciated loyalty. As a civilian, he looked upon
the members of his cabinet as upon a headquarters
staff, and, while he enforced disciphne by curt dis
missal, he rewarded fidelity by return in kind. It was
so now : Hoar, he abruptly dismissed ; to Fish, he gave
a reciprocal support. As the Secretary of State had
proved loyal to him in the Dominican matter, he, in
return, stood ready to adopt any policy towards Great
Britain the Secretary might see fit to recommend.
If, moreover, such a policy implied of necessity a
conflict with Mr. Sumner, it would, for that very
reason, be only the more acceptable. The President
thus became a tower of strength in the proposed nego
tiation. StiU while, on the whole, the conditions contribut
ing to success seemed to predominate, the fate of the
Johnson-Clarendon Convention had to be borne in
mind. Mr. Sumner was chairman of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations. To defeat the
result of a negotiation, it was necessary to control but
a third of the Senate ; and his influence in that body
had recently been emphasized by the rejection of the
Dominican treaty, in favor of which the President
had made use of every form of argument and induce
ment within the power of an executive to employ.
So, after the proposal of Sir John Rose had been dis
cussed by the Secretary with Senator Conkling and
General Schenck, the newly designated minister to
England, it was agreed that Mr. Fish should seek
an interview with the Massachusetts Senator, and, by
a great show of consideration, see if he could not be
induced to look favorably on the scheme.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 145
What ensued was not only historically interesting,
but to the last degree characteristic ; it was, moreover,
altogether unprecedented. The Secretary of State
actually sounded the way to an interview with the
chairman of a Senate committee through another
member of that committee, — a species of " mutual
friend," — the interview in question to take place,
not at the Department of State, but at the house of
the autocratic chairman.! The meeting was arranged
accordinglj'- ; and, on the morning of the 15th of
January, six days only after Sir John Rose's arrival
in Washington, Mr. Fish, with Sir John's confidential
memorandum in his pocket, stood at Mr. Sumner's
door. In the meeting that ensued the business in
hand was discussed. At the close of the interview,
Mr. Sumner expressed a wish to take further time in
which to consider the matter, but promised an answer
shortly. Thereupon the Secretary took his leave.^
1 Davis : Mr. Fish and the Alabama Claims, p. 183.
'•^ In answer to a request for any entry in the diary of Mr. Fish relat
ing to what passed at this interview, I have received the following
from the family of Mr. Fish, with permission to use it : —
" 1871. January 15. Sunday. CaU upon Sumner ; introduce the
question and read to him Rose's ' Confidential Memorandum.' He
declaims ; Boutwell comes in at this point, conversation continued.
Sumner insists that it should be understood in advance what Great
Britain is wiDing to agree to, on the several questions. Boutwell
says he has learnt through the Bankers that Great Britain intends to
concede the inshore Fisheries in consider£(Jion of our yielding San
Juan. I say that cannot be conceded ; the West will be united
against the cession of San Juan.
" I try to obtain from Sumner an expression of opinion as to the an
swer to be given to Rose ; ask what will be the candid judgment of
the world when it is known that Great Britain makes the overtures
she has made, if she accompany them with a distinct understanding that
her liability for the acts of the Alabama is to be admitted if the
United States decline the negotiation. Refer to the danger of actual
collision on the Fishery grounds, and the serious compUcations that
would ensue.

146 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
Then, in due time, followed one of the most curious
incidents in diplomatic history, an incident than which
few could more strikingly iUustrate the changes which
in a comparatively short space of time take place in
public opinion, and the estimate in which things are
held. Two days later, on the 17th of January, Sec
retary Fish received from Senator Sumner a brief,
initialed memorandum, embodying this, to those of the
present time, fairly astounding proposition : ! —
" Finally I tell him that I have come officially to him as chairman
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to ask his opinion and
advice ; that I am entitled to it, as I must give an answer, etc.
" He says that it requires much reflection, etc.
" I then on learing him request him to consider the subject, and to
let me know his opinion within a day or two.
" In the evening I call upon Gov. Morton at the National. Explain
the proposition to him, and read him Rose's * Confidential Memoran
dum.' He thinks the Alabama question ought to be settied, and the
sooner the better ; that it would justify the President in convening
an extra session of the Senate. Thinks the country would regard
the recognition by Great Britain of liability for the Alabama, and
reference of the question of liability as to the other vessels as satis
factory ; that the public mind considers the Alabama as embrac
ing the whole class of questions ; but he says that beside the actual
losses by the Alabama, Great Britain should assume the expenses of
this Government in endeavoring to capture her ; that this would be
regarded as ' consequential ' damage, and would satisfy the public
expectation on that point.
" I ask whether a treaty on that basis could be ratified by the Senate
against Sumner's opposition. He thinks it would. Says Casserly fol
lows Sumner, so does Schurz and Patterson ; on mentioning that Pat
terson had been consulted and approved, he replies, that * gives a
majority of the commit^e, and there can be no doubt of the Senate.' "
In the Appendix to the American Case, submitted to the tribu
nal at Geneva, the expenses incurred by the United States govern
ment in its efforts to capture the British built commerce-destroyers
was estimated, and reimbursement on that account was demanded
as a consequential injury. The expense incurred was estimated at
$7,080,478.70. (Geneva Arbitration ; Correspondence, etc., vol. -vii.
p. 120, table.) The claim was disaUowed.
1 Moore : International Arbitrations, vol. i. p. 525.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 147
"First. — The idea of Sir John Rose is that aU
questions and causes of irritation between England
and the United States should be removed absolutely
and forever, that we may be at peace really, and good
neighbors, and to this end aU points of difference
should be considered together. Nothing could be
better than this initial idea. It should be the start
ing-point. " Second. — The greatest trouble, if not peril, be
ing a constant source of anxiety and disturbance, is
from Fenianism, which is excited by the British flag
in Canada. Therefore the -withdrawal of the British
flag cannot be abandoned as a condition or prelimi
nary of such a settlement as is now proposed. To
make the settlement complete, the withdrawal should
be from this hemisphere, including provinces and is
lands."

Since his death, nearly thirty years ago, Charles
Sumner has been made the subject of one of the most
elaborate biographies in the language. Patient and
painstaking to the last degree, nothing seems to have
escaped the notice of Mr. Pierce, and the one conspic
uous fault of his work is its extreme length. Con
ceived on a scale which assumes in the reader an
interest in the subject, and an indifference to toil,
commensurate with those of the author, it was carried
to completion in strict conformity with the initial plan.
The official biography of Lincoln by Messrs. Nicolay
and Hay is not inaptly caUed by them " A History ; "
and its ten substantial volumes, averaging over 450
pages each, defy perusal. Life simply does not suffice

148 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
for literature laid out on such a Brobdingnagian scale ;
all sense of proportion is absent from it. Yet the ten
volumes of the Lincoln include but a quarter part
more reading matter than Mr. Pierce's four. On a
rough estimate, it is computed that these fourteen
volumes contain some two mUUon words. The most
remarkable, and highly characteristic, memorandum
just quoted is expressed in about 220 words ; and yet
for it Mr. Pierce found no space in his four solid
volumes. He refers to it indeed, showing that he was
aware of its existence ; but he does so briefly, and
somewhat lightly, in his text,! though laboring painfuUy
over it in an appendix.^ Mr. Storey, in his smaUer
biography of Sumner, makes no reference at aU to it ;
apparently it had failed to attract his notice. And yet,
that memorandum is of much historical significance.
A species of electric flash, it reveals what then was,
and long had been, in Sumner's mind. It makes
inteUigible what would otherwise remain weU-nigh
incomprehensible ; if, indeed, not altogether so.
To those of this generation, — especiaUy to us with
the war in South Africa going on before our eyes, • —
it would seem as if the first perusal of that memoran
dum of January 17 must have suggested to Mr. Fish
grave doubts as to Mr. Sumner's sanity. It reads
like an attempt at clumsy ridicule. The Secretary of
State had gone to an influential Senator in a serious
spirit, suggesting a business settlement of grave inter
national compUcations ; and he was met by a proposi
tion which at once put negotiation out of the question.
What could the man mean ? Apparently, he could
^ Pierce : Sumner, vol. iv. pp. 480, 481.
2 lb., pp. 635-638.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 149
only mean that he did not intend to permit any ad
justment to be effected, if in his power to prevent.
Such unquestionably is the impression this paper now
conveys. Meanwhile, strange as it seems, when re
ceived it could have occasioned Mr. Fish no especial
wonder ; except, perhaps, in its wide inclusiveness, it
suggested nothing new, nothing altogether beyond the
pale of reasonable expectation, much less of discus
sion. It brought no novel consideration into debate.
Surprising now, this statement measures the revolu
tion in sentiment as respects dependencies which has
taken place during the last thirty years.
" From 1840 to, say, 1870, the almost universal
belief of thoughtful Englishmen was that the colonies
contributed nothing or little to the strength of Eng
land. We were bound, it was thought, in honor, to
protect them ; the mother country should see that her
children were on the road to become fit for independ
ence ; the day for separation would inevitably come ;
the parting, when it took place, should be on friendly
terms ; but the separation would be beneficial, for
both parent and children. Even a Conservative min
ister spoke, or wrote, it is said, about our ' wretched
colonies.' To-day the whole tone of feeling is changed ;
her colonies are, it is constantly asserted, both the
glory and the strength of Great Britain. Not the
extremest Radical ventures to hint a separation." ! To
similar effect another authority, an American, refer
ring to the same period, says, — " We find England
declining to accept New Zealand when offered to her
by English settlers ; treating Australia as a financial
1 Letter signed " An Observer," dated Oxford, August 22, 1901, in
New York Nation of September 12, 1901.

150 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
burden, useful only as a dumping-ground for crimi
nals ; discussing in Parliament whether India be
worth defending; questioning the value of Hong-
Kong, and even refusing to be responsible for terri
tories in South Africa." ! So late even as 1881, ten
years after the negotiation of the Treaty of Washing
ton, there can be little doubt that this feeling — the
conviction of the Uttle worth of dependencies — in
spired the policy pursued towards the South African
republics by the second Gladstone administration,
after the disaster of Majuba HiU.
In the mind of Mr. Sumner, the ultimate, and, as
he in 1870 believed, not remote withdrawal of aU
European flags, including, of course, the British, from
the western hemisphere, was a logical development of
the Monroe doctrine. That doctrine, as originally set
forth, was merely a first enunciation, and in its sim
plest form, of a principle which not only admitted of
great development, but was in the direct line of what
is known as Manifest Destiny. Secretary Seward's
Alaska acquisition, bringing to an end Russian do
minion in America, created a precedent. One Euro
pean flag then disappeared from the New World.
Covering areas of consequence, those of Spain and
Great Britain only remained ; and more than twenty
years before, Richard Cobden had written to Sumner,
— "I agree -with you that Nature has decided that
Canada and the United States must become one for
all purposes of inter-communication. ... If the peo
ple of Canada are tolerably unanimous in wishing to
sever the very shght thread which now binds them
to this country, I see no reason why, if good faith and
1 Poultney Bigelow: The Children of the Nations, p. 332.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 151
ordinary temper be observed, it should not be done
amicably." Charles Sumner did not belong to the
Bismarckian school of statesmanship, — he was no
welder in blood and iron ; and these words of Cobden
furnished the key of the situation as it lay in his
essentiaUy doctrinaire mind. He, accordingly, looked
forward with confidence to the incorporation of the
British possessions into the American Union ; but, as
Mr. Pierce truly enough says, he always insisted that
it " should be made by peaceful annexation, by the
voluntary act of England, and with the cordial assent
of the colonists." ! Nor, in April, 1869, when he
delivered his National Claims or Consequential Dam
ages speech in the Senate, did this result seem to
him remote. Five months later, stUl borne forward
on the crest of a flooding tide, — Uttle prescient of
the immediate future, — he quoted before the Massa
chusetts State Republican convention Cobden's words
of prophecy, and triumphantly exclaimed, — " The
end is certain ; nor shall we wait long for its mighty
fulfUment. In the procession of events it is now at
hand, and he is bUnd who does not discern it." ^
Read with this clue in mind, Mr. Sumner's utter
ances between 1869 and 1871 — including his speech
on the Johnson-Clarendon negotiation, his address be
fore the Massachusetts Republican convention in the
foUowing September, and his memorandum to Secre
tary Fish of sixteen months later — become intelligible,
and are consecutive. The claims against Great Brit
ain, mounting into the thousands of miUions, were
formulated and advanced by him as no vulgar pot-
1 Pierce : Sumner, vol. iv. p. 637.
2 Works, vol. xiii. p. 129. See, also, vol. xii. p. 173.

152 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
house score, to be itemized, and added up in the form
of a bUl, and so presented for payment. On the con
trary, they were merely one item in the statement of
a "massive grievance," become matter of gravest in
ternational debate. The settlement was to be com
mensurate. Comprehensive, grandiose even, it was to
include a hemispheric flag-withdrawal, as well as a
revision of the rules of international law. The ad
justment of mere money claims was a matter of alto
gether minor consideration ; indeed, such might weU
in the end become makeweights, — mere pawns in the
mighty game.
It is needless to say that the unexpected was sure
to occur in the practical unfolding of this picturesque
programme. Indeed, a very forcible suggestion of the
practical danger involved in it, just so long as the
average man is what he is, was brought home to the
Senator from Massachusetts when he resumed his seat
in executive session after completing his speech on the
Johnson-Clarendon Convention, — the carefuUy pre
pared opening of the great world debate. Mr. Zacha-
riah Chandler of Michigan subsequently took the
floor. He was a Senator much more closely than Mr.
Sumner representative of the average American public
man. And Mr. Chandler proceeded unconsciously to
furnish an iUustration of the practical outcome of
Mr. Sumner's scheme as he, the average American,
understood it. He entirely concurred in Mr. Sumner's
presentation of national injuries, consequential dam
ages, and a sense of " massive grievance." " If Great
Britain," he then went on to say, " should, meet us ia
a friendly spirit, acknowledge her wrong, and cede aU
her interests in the Canadas in settlement of these

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 153
claims, we will have perpetuate peace with her ; but, if
she does not, we must conquer peace. We cannot
afford to have an enemy's base so near us. It is a
national necessity that we should have the British
possessions. He hoped such a negotiation would be
opened, and that it would be a peaceful one ; but, if
it should not be, and England insists on war, then
let the war be ' short, sharp, and decisive.' " ! The
1 See report of debate in New York Tribune, April 21, 1869. ' There
is reason to believe that, in this utterance, Mr. Chandler more nearly
reflected the original views of General Grant than did Mr. Sumner, or,
subsequently, Mr. Fish. Always miUtary, Grant, as President, looked
upon the accession of the British Dominion to the American Union as
both inevitable and highly desirable for all concerned. He was what
is now known as a thorough expansionist. Hence, when the Civil
War closed, he was in favor of an immediate invasion of Mexico.
(Around the World with General Grant, vol. ii. p. 163.) As President,
he later proceeded to annex island^ in the West Indies in the wholly
unceremonious fashion already described in this paper. He had fully
considered a Canadian campaign, and was of opinion that " if Sheri
dan, for instance, with our resources, could not have taken Canada in
thirty days, he should have been cashiered." (lb., p. 167.) Mr. Sum
ner never contemplated forcible annexation as the result of a war
with Great Britain growing out of his theory of national injuries. He
did look to a voluntary and peaceable consolidation of adjacent Eng
lish-speaking territories aud their inhabitants. Grant also looked for
such a consolidation, but was quite ready to have it come about as the
result of a campaign, and incidental beneficent compulsion. Again,
Secretary Fish stood between the two. Mr. Sumner's policy was, under
the circumstances, fraught with immediate danger. He was for keep
ing the questions at issue open, a cause of possible rupture at any
moment ; and for that rupture Grant always stood ready. This the
English Minister (Sir Edward Thornton) perfectly understood. Hence
his eagerness to effect a settlement. Grant, meanwhUe, was indiffer
ent, and Sumner, unconsciously, was playing into his hands. FinaUy,
as the result of a quarrel with Sumner, Grant gave Fish a free hand.
He might effect a settlement if he could ; but if, for any reason, he
failed in so doing, recourse would be had to the other plan of pro
cedure. The Secretary might then stand aside, and the Commander-
in-chief would settle the question of claims against Great Britain,
individual and national, through a process never contemplated by the

154 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
report of these utterances was at once transmitted by
the British Minister to his government ; and, taken in
connection with Mr. Sumner's arraignment, and his
presentation of consequential damages, furnished those
composing that government, as weU as Professor Gold-
win Smith, with much food for thought.!
The policy proper to be pursued in the years fol
lowing 1869 rapidly assumed shape, in Mr. Sumner's
mind. He worked it out in every detaU. As, shortly
after, he wrote to his friend, Dr. S. G. Howe, — "I
look to annexation at the North. I wish to have that
whole zone from Newfoundland to Vancouver." It
was with this result distinctly present to him, and as
a first step thereto, that he secured the English mis
sion for Mr. Motley. Through Motley he thought to
work. He, chairman of the United States Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, was to mould and
shape the future of a hemisphere, — President, Secre-
Massachnsetts Senator. It is not suggested that evidence in support
of this statement can be adduced ; or even exists. That, however,
Grant's extreme personal dislike for Mr. Sumner, and his sense of
obligation to Mr. Fish, greatly influenced his action on the question
of a settlement with Great Britain, admits of no doubt. It gave Mr.
Fish the opportunity, of which he avaUed himself. The alternative
Grant always had in mind in the event of his Secretary's faUure, or
British recalcitrancy, is alone open to question.
^ It was unquestionably to this utterance of Senator Chandler's,
and to counteract its effect, that Mr. Sumner used the following lan
guage, in his speech of five months later, just referred to : — " Some
times there are whispers of territorial compensation, and Canada is
named as the consideration. But he knows England littie, and Uttle
also of that great English Uberty from Magna Charta to the Somerset
case, who supposes that this nation could undertake any such transfer.
And he knows our country little, and little also of that great liberty
that is ours, who supposes that we could receive such a transfer. On
each side there is impossibUity. Territory may be conveyed, but not
a people. I allude to this suggestion only because, appearing in the
public press, it has been answered from England."

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 155
tary of State, and Her Majesty's Ministers being as
clay in his potter hands, with Motley for the deftly
turning wheel. Concerning this project he seems dur
ing the summer of 1869 to have been in almost daily
correspondence with his friend near the Court of St.
James, and in frequent conference with Secretary
Fish at Washington. On June 11 he wrote to the
former that the Secretary had, two days before, sounded
the British Minister on the subject of Canada, the
American claims on Great Britain being too large to
admit of a money settlement. Sir Edward Thornton,
he went on, had replied that England " did not wish to
keep Canada, but could not part with it without the
consent of the population." The Secretary next wanted
Mr. Sumner to state the amount of claims ; to which
he had replied that he did not regard it as the proper
time for so doing. This letter, it so chanced, was
dated the very day after Mr. Motley's first unfortunate
interview with the British Foreign Secretary; and
that diplomatic jeremiad might not inaptly have con
cluded with a premonitory hint of what his mentor
and guide was on the morrow to -write, — a hint of
the nature suggested by Mr. Schurz in a letter to
Secretary Fish,! -written at this very time. Then, only
four days later, — on the 15th of June, — Mr. Sum
ner again advises his correspondent of a dinner-table
talk with men in high official circles, and significantly
adds, — " All feel that your position is as historic as any
described by your pen. England must listen, and at
last yield. I do not despair seeing the debate end —
(1) In the withdrawal of England from this hemi
sphere ; (2) In remodeUing maritime international law.
' Infra, Appendix C, p. 209.

156 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
Such a consummation would place our republic at the
head of the civilized world." Here was no whisper
of mere money claims ; and, five days after, he writes
in the same spirit, referring apparently to the Sec
retary of State, — " With more experience at Wash
ington, our front would have been more perfect." !
The " debate " referred to was, of course, that " inter
national debate, the greatest of our history, and, before
it is finished, in aU probability the greatest of aU
history." Thus, in June, 1869, the chairman of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations was sending
what were in effect unofficial instructions to a facile
national representative, couched, be it noticed, in the
very words used by the -writer eighteen months later
in the memorandum just quoted.
In one of these letters, it wiU be observed, Mr. Sum
ner told Motley that Secretary Fish had that day
sounded the British Minister as to a possible cession
of Canada in liquidation of our national claims, and
appeasement of our sense of " massive grievance." ^
The statement was correct ; and not only at this junc
ture, but repeatedly, was a comprehensive settlement on
such a basis urged on the British government. Both
President and Secretary were thus of one mind -with
Mr. Sumner. In November, 1869, for instance, four
months after Sir John Rose's first visit to Washington,
and at the very time he was -writing to Mr. Fish about
Mr. Motley's attitude in London, an entire cabinet
meeting was occupied in a discussion of the Alabama
claims. The President then suggested the possibility
of Great Britain quitting Canada ; and he intimated
1 Pierce : Sumner, vol. iv. pp. 409-412.
'^ lb., vol. iv. p. 409.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 157
his belief that, in such case, we ought to be satisfied
with the payment for the losses actuaUy sustained
through the Confederate commerce-destroyers, com
bined with a settlement satisfactory to us of the prin
ciples of maritime neutrality law. A few days later
he expressed his unwiUingness at that time to adjust
the claims ; he wished them kept open until Great Brit
ain was ready to give up Canada. When certain
members of the Catfinet thereupon assured him that
Great Britain looked upon Canada as a source of weak
ness, quoting Lord CarUsle and Sir Edward Thornton,
the President at once replied, — "If that be so, I
would be wiUing to settle at once." During the fol
lowing weeks, — December, 1869, and January, 1870,
— the subject was frequently discussed between Secre
tary Fish and Sir Edward Thornton. The former
urged on the latter the entire -withdrawal of Great
Britain from Canada, and an immediate settlement of
aU claims on that basis. To this Sir Edward repUed,
— " Oh, you know that we cannot do. The Canadians
find fault with me for saying so openly as I do that
we are ready to let them go whenever they shaUwish ;
but they do not desire it." In its issue of December
18, 1869, whUe these conversations, taking place in
Washington, were duly reported in Downing Street,
the Times, probably inspired, expressed itself as fol
lows : — " Suppose the colonists met together, and,
after deliberating, came to the conclusion that they
were a very long way off from the United Kingdom, . . .
and that every natural motive of contiguity, similar
ity of interests, and facility of administration induced
them to think it more convenient to slip into the Union
than into the Dominion. Should we oppose their de-

158 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
termination ? We aU know we should not attempt
to withstand it, if it were clearly and intelligibly pro
nounced. . . . Instead of the Colonies being the de
pendencies of the Mother Country, the Mother Country
has become the Dependency of the Colonies. We are
tied, while they are loose. We are subject to danger,
while they are free." And a few months later, when
the Dominion undertook to find fault with some of the
provisions of the Treaty of Washington, the same
organ of English opinion thus frankly delivered itself :
— " From this day forth look after your own business
yourself ; you are big enough, you are strong enough,
you are inteUigent enough, and, if there were any de
ficiency in any of these points, it would be supplied by
the education of self-reUance. We are both now in a
false position, and the time has arrived when we should
be relieved from it. Take up your freedom ; your days
of apprenticeship are over." In view of such utter
ances as these from the leading organs of the mother
country, Mr. Sumner certainly had grounds for as
suming that a not unwiUing hemispheric flag-with
drawal by Great Britain was more than probable in the
early future.
Returning to what took place in Washington in
March, 1870, on the eve of the Franco-Prussian war.
Secretary Fish had another long conversation with Sir
Edward Thornton, which showed forcibly how conscious
those composing the English Ministry were of the
falseness of Great Britain's position, and of the immi
nence of danger. The Secretary again urged on the
Minister that her American provinces were to Great
Britain a menace of danger ; and that a cause of irri
tation, and of possible complication, would, especially

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 159
in those times of Fenianism, be removed, should they
be made independent. To this Mr. Thornton rephed,
— " It is impossible for Great Britain to inaugurate
a separation. They are wiUing, and even desirous, to
have one. Europe may at any moment be convulsed ;
and, if England became involved, it would be impossi
ble to prevent retaliation, and the ocean would swarm
with Alabamas. England would then be compeUed
to declare war." The Secretary consoled him by agree
ing that commerce-destroyers would then be fitted out
in spite of all the government might, or could, attempt
to prevent them.
Up to this point the chairman of the Senate Com
mittee on Foreign Relations, the President, the Sec
retary of State, and the members of the Cabinet
generaUy had gone on in happy concurrence. They
had the same end in view. But now the cleavage
between President and Senator rapidly widened. A
week only after the conversation with Sir Edward
Thornton last referred to. General Grant cautioned
Mr. Fish against communicating to Mr. Sumner any
confidential or important information received at the
State Department. Later, he became persuaded that
the Massachusetts Senator was constitutionally un
truthful; but, as yet, he considered him only unfair and
inaccurate. The chairman of the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations ceased, however, to be thereafter
a direct factor in the negotiation with Great Britain.
Thus far, in pursuance of the policy dimly outlined
in the executive session debate on the Johnson-Clar
endon Convention, the two questions of a settlement
of claims and Canadian independence had been kept
closely associated. They were now to be separated.

160 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
Yet the change was gradual ; for Mr. Sumner's policy
had a strong hold on the minds of both President and
Secretary.! Even as late as September, 1870, only
five months before the Treaty of Washington was
negotiated. Secretary Fish and Sir Edward Thornton
had another conversation on the subject of Canadian
independence. It originated in one of the endless
squabbles over the Fisheries. The Secretary intimated
his belief that the solution of that question would
be found in a separation of the Dominion from the
mother country. Thereupon Mr. Thornton repeated
what he had, he declared, often said before, — that
Great Britain was willing, and even anxious, to have
the colonies become independent ; but could do no
thing to force independence on them. He then added,
— " It is impossible to connect the question of Ca
nadian independence -with the Alabama claims ; not
even to the extent of providing for the reference of
the question of independence to a popular vote of the
people of the Dominion. Independence," he added,
"means annexation. They are one and the same
thing." This conversation, it will be observed, took
1 In his first annual message to Congress, December 6, 1869 (Mes
sages of the Presidents, vol. vii. p. 32), General Grant thus expressed
himself, — the Secretary of State undoubtedly having draughted the
paragraph: — "The United States have no disposition to interfere
with the existing relations of Spain to her colonial possessions on this
continent. They believe that in due time Spain and other European
powers will find their interest in terminating those relations, and estab
lishing their present dependencies as independent powers — members
of the famUy of nations." Seven months later (July 14, 1870), the
President transmitted to the Senate, in reply to a resolution, a repmt
from the Secretary of State, in which was the foUowing: — "This
policy . . . looks hopefully to the time when, by the voluntary de
parture of European governments from this continent and the adjacent
==lands, America shaU be whoUy American." (lb., p. 74.)

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 161
place on the very day the investment of Paris by the
victorious German army was pronounced complete.
In the existing European situation everything was
possible, anything might be anticipated.
Though his resignation had been requested, Mr.
Motley stUl remained in London. His early removal
was contemplated by the President, and the question
of who should replace him was under consideration.
The appointment was offered to O. P. Morton, then a
Senator from Indiana. WhoUy the President's, the
selection was the reverse of happy. Governor Mor
ton was inclined to accept; but he desired first to
know whether he would, as Minister, have the Ala
bama claims settlement intrusted to him. The Presi
dent then talked the matter over with Secretary Fish,
and what he said showed clearly the hold which Sum
ner's views had on him. He proposed that the new
Minister should attempt a negotiation based on the
foUowing concessions by Great Britain : (1) the pay
ment of actual losses incurred through the depre
dations of British Confederate commerce-destroyers ;
(2) a satisfactory revision of the principles of inter
national law as between the two governments ; and
(3) the submission to the voters of the Dominion of
the question of independence. In commenting imme
diately afterwards on this conversation, Mr. Fish
wrote, — " The President evidently expects these Pro
vinces to be annexed to the United States during his
administration. I hope that it may be so. That
such is their eventual destiny, I do not doubt ; but
whether so soon as the President expects may be a
question." Owing to the result of an election in In
diana held shortly after, it was deemed inexpedient

162 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
for Governor Morton to vacate his seat in the Senate.
He consequently declined further to consider a dip
lomatic position. Though in no way germane to the
subject of this paper, it is interesting to know that
it was to fill the vacancy thus existing that General
Butler shortly after brought forward the name of
WendeU PhiUips. The President, Mr. Fish noted,
" very evidently will not consider hun within the
range of possibilities of appointment."
The pressure for some settlement now brought to
bear on the British government was day by day be
coming greater. About the middle of November the
Russian Minister took occasion to suggest to Secre
tary Fish, in a neighborly sort of way, that the
present time — that of the Franco-Prussian war —
was most opportune to press on Great Britain an
immediate settlement of the Alabama claims. Two
weeks later the message of the President was sent
to Congress, with the significant paragraph already
quoted. In his next talk with Sir Edward Thorn
ton, Secretary Fish alluded to the suggestion made
to him by the Russian Minister, and Sir Edward,
in return, frankly asked him what the United States
wanted. And now at last the negotiation took a new
and final turn. The Secretary, dropping Canada
from the discussion, asked merely an expression of
regret on the part of Great Britain, an acceptable de
claration of principles of international law, and pay
ment of claims. This conversation took place on the
20th of November ; nineteen days later, on the 9th of
December, at a cabinet meeting held that day. Sec
retary Fish read in confidence a private letter to him
from Sir John Rose, " intimating that the British

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 163
cabinet is disposed to enter on negotiations." It
would thus appear that the obstacle in the way of a
renewed negotiation had been the purpose of the
United States to combine in some way a settlement of
money claims, private and national, with a movement
looking to the withdrawal of the British flag, in whole
or in part, from the North American continent. The
moment this suggestion was withheld, the British cabi
net lost no time in signifying its readiness to negoti
ate. None the less, the whole scheme of Mr. Sumner,
underlying his famous speech of April 13, 1869, and
the appointment of Mr. Motley to the English mis
sion, was thereby and thenceforth definitely aban
doned. In his memorandum, therefore, the chairman of
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations demanded
nothing altogether new ; he merely, stating the case
in its widest form, insisted upon adherence to a famil
iar poUcy long before formulated. None the less, there
is a wide difference between the concession of its
independence to a particular dependency, no matter
how considerable, and the somewhat scenic, and obvi
ously compulsory, withdrawal of a nation's flag from
half the globe. In Mr. Sumner's imagination, the
British drum-beat was no more to foUow the rising
sun.

VI
The narrative now returns to the point when Mr.
Sumner's memorandum of January 17 reached the
Secretary of State. Mr. Davis says, " I well remem
ber Mr. Fish's astonishment when he received this
document. At first he almost thought any attempt

164 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
at negotiation would prove futile." ! Probably the
word " dismay " would describe more accurately than
" astonishment " Mr. Fish's state of mind at this
juncture. Undoubtedly, he had, time and time again,
discussed with Mr. Sumner the whole question of
European withdrawal from America, altogether or in
part, whether from Canada alone or from the hemi
sphere. He had referred to it publicly in the pas
sages already quoted from the President's messages.
The proposition, therefore, can have excited no " as
tonishment " in him. It might well, however, have
caused a feeling of dismay, for it threatened to bring
to an abrupt close the incipient negotiation he so
much had at heart. It was phrased also as an ulti
matum. Closing the door to discussion, it precipitated
into the immediate present the academic problem of a
possibly remote future. After fuU talk, and subse
quent mature reflection, the chairman of the Senate
Committee gave it as his judgment that the demand,
known to be at that time impossible of concession,
" cannot be abandoned as a condition or preliminary."
Language could scarcely be stronger. The Secre
tary had cause for discouragement. His failure had
been complete. But, whatever may have been the
sensations of the Secretary when gasping under the
first effects of this icy douche, those of the Presi
dent must also be taken into account. He was es
sentially the man for that situation. He was in his
element. What followed bore unmistakably the im
press of his handiwork ; for, to the military eye, one
thing must at once have been apparent. The situ
ation was simplified; his opponent had put himself
1 Davis : Mr. Fish and the Alabama Claims, p. 137.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 165
in his power. Instinctively, he grasped the oppor
tunity. The natural, indeed the only inference to be
drawn from the memorandum, was that the chairman
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in
tended to put an immediate stop to the proposed
negotiation, if in his power so to do. The considera
tions influencing him were obvious. The course of
procedure now suggested was whoUy at variance with
the policy outlined by him. In June, 1869, he had
written to Mr. Motley, — "I should make no ' claim '
or ' demand ' for the present ; " and to Caleb Cushing
a month later, — "Our case, in length and breadth,
with aU details, should be stated to England without
any demand of any kind." And now, in January,
1871, he did not regard the conditions of a success
ful and satisfactory settlement with Great Britain, on
the basis he had in view, as being any more propi
tious than in June, 1869. Eighteen months only
had elapsed. The fruit was not yet ripe ; — then why
shake the tree ? That " international debate, the
greatest of our history, and before it is finished, in all
probabiUty the greatest of aU history," seemed draw
ing to a lame and impotent, because premature, con
clusion. His memorandum was, therefore, an attempt
at a checkmate. By formulating demands which he
knew would not be entertained, he hoped at once
to end the proposed negotiation. The country would
then await some more convenient occasion, when,
Great Britain being entirely -wiUing, a mild com
pulsion in favor of independence could be brought
to bear upon her American dependencies. On the
other hand, the issue presented in this memorandum
was clear and not to be evaded, — Was the Executive

166 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
to shape the foreign poUcy of the United States ;
or was it to receive its inspiration from the room of
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations? Either
that committee must be brought into Une with the
State Department, or the Secretary of State should
accept his position as a chairman's clerk.
A delicate question between the executive and legis
lative departments of the government — a question as
old as the Constitution — was thus involved. What
constituted an attempt at improper interference by
one department with the functions and organization
of the other ? It is obvious that, in a representative
government under the party system, where both the
legislative and the executive departments are con-
troUed by the same party organization, the legislative
committees should be so organized as to act in rea
sonable accord with the responsible executive. It is
a purely practical question. The executive cannot, of
course, directly interfere in the organization of the
legislative body ; but it has a perfect right to demand
of its friends and supporters in the legislative bodies
that those having charge through committees of the
business of those bodies should be in virtual harmony
with the Administration. Certainly, they should not
be in avowed hostUity to it. As Grant himself
later said,! it was indeed a singular spectacle " to find
a Senate with the large majority of its members in
sympathy with the Administration, and with its chair
man of the Foreign Committee in direct opposition to
the foreign policy of the Administration, in theory and
detail." There was force in this statement, and the
President was fully justified in asking of his party a
1 At Edinburgh, New York Herald, September 25, 1877.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTOJff 167
release from a position of such obvious embarrassment.
Indeed, under any proper construction of functions,
those thus finding themselves in virtual opposition
might weU decline committee appointments necessarily
placing them in a position where they feel under com
pulsion to thwart and hamper the measures of the party
of which they nominally are members. Such should, in
parliamentary parlance, take their places below the
gangway. In the winter of 1870—71 Mr. Sumner was
in that position. Chairman of the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, on cardinal features of foreign
policy he was notoriously in proclaimed opposition.
Such being the case, it is at least an open question
whether, in view of the executive functions of the Sen
ate, he should not have voluntarily declined longer to
serve as chairman of that particular committee. His
serving was clearly an obstruction to the Administra
tion, and its friends constituted a large majority of
the Senate ; it would, moreover, be perfectly possi
ble for him to exert his influence both in the cham
ber and in the committee-room without being the offi
cial head of the committee, intrusted as such -with the
care of measures on the defeat of which he was intent.
He was in an obviously false position. The practice
under our government is the other way. Senatorial
courtesy and seniority, it is well known, prevail ;
and Secretaries must govern themselves accordingly.
Nevertheless, in the case of Mr. Sumner and his
chairmanship in 1870-71, this practice was carried
to its extreme limit ; and, after the presidential can
vass of the following year, he must necessarily, and
by common consent, have been superseded. Even
now, indeed, when, having been active in opposition

168 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
to one measure of foreign policy by which the Presi
dent set great store, he declared himself in advance
opposed to another measure of yet greater moment,
the future was plainly foreshadowed. A whoUy im
possible preliminary condition to the proposed measure
must, he declared, be insisted upon, — or, once more
to quote his own words, " cannot be abandoned."
In January, 1871, the Forty-first Congress was
fast drawing to its close. Chosen at the election
which made Grant President for the first time, that
Congress was overwhelmingly Republican ; so much so
that, of seventy-two Senators admitted to seats, sixty-
one were supporters of the Administration. And
yet, in a body thus made up, — a body in which
the opposition numbered but eleven members, — not
one in six, — a treaty in behalf of the ratification of
which the President had exerted aU his influence,
personal and official, had faUed to secure even a
majority vote. The chairman of the Committee on
Foreign Relations, regardless of private personal solici
tation on the part of the chief Executive whoUy unprece
dented in character, had been not only unrelenting but
successful in his opposition. The President-General
looked upon this action on the part of a Senator at
the head of the Committee on Foreign Relations as,
during war, he would have regarded the action of a
department commander who, refusing to cooperate in
the plan of general campaign laid down from head
quarters, should exert himself to cause an operation
to faU. Such a subordinate would be summarUy re
lieved. He seems actuaUy to have chafed under his
inability to take this course with the chairman of a
Senate committee ; and so he primarily relieved his

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 169
feelings at the expense of the friend of the chairman,
the Minister to England. He was -within his power,
and him he incontinently dismissed.
This distinctly savored of Jackson rather than of
Washington. The White House had, in truth, be
come a military headquarters. But the President's
personal feelings, as well as the General's instinct for
discipline, had been outraged, and he was intent on
the real offender, — the Senator from Massachusetts.
Hence it foUowed that, when Secretary Fish, with Mr.
Sumner's memorandum in his hand, went to the White
House for instructions, the President's views as to the
independence, and subsequent early annexation, of the
British possessions at once underwent a change. As
he welcomed an issue with his much-disliked antago
nist upon which he felt assured of victory, hemispheric
flag-withdrawals ceased to interest him. A great pos
sible obstruction in the path of the proposed negoti
ation was thus suddenly removed. The General-Pre
sident promptly instructed the Secretary to go to Sir
John Rose, and advise him that the Administration
was prepared to accept the proposal for a commission
to settle aU questions between the countries. That
was, however, a preliminary move only. By it, the
Administration was committed to action of great
import. A crucial case was presented; one on which
no unnecessary risk would be incurred. The next
and really vital step remained to be taken.
When the first Congress of Grant's earlier admin
istration met in its final session at the usual date in
December, 1870, an attempt was made foreshadowing
what occurred four months later. A partial reorgan
ization of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

170 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
was discussed, with a view to the introduction into that
committee of some element less under its chairman's
influence, and holding more intimate relations -with
the Executive. A place was to be found for Roscoe
Conkling of New York. If possible, Mr. Conkling
was to be substituted for Mr. Sumner ; but if Mr.
Sumner was found too firmly fixed, Mr. Schurz was
to be replaced as a member of the committee ; or, as
a final resort, Mr. Patterson of New Hampshire, if
Mr. Schurz also proved immovable. The last change
was finally decided upon ; but, when the committee as
thus altered was reported in caucus, Sumner objected.
Senatorial courtesy then prevailing, the scheme was
for the time being abandoned.! Charles Sumner was,
however, yet to learn that, in civil as in military life,
Ulysses S. Grant was a very persistent man.
Two weeks later Mr. Sumner did what he had
hitherto refrained from doing. Up to this time he
had expressed himself -with characteristic freedom,
denouncing the President in conversation and in
letter,^ but he had not opposed him in debate. He
now openly broke ground against him in a carefuUy
prepared speech on the Dominican question. In the
position he took, he was probably right. He would
certainly be deemed so in the light of the views then
generally taken of the world-mission of the United
States ; but that was during the country's earlier
period, and before the universaUty of its mission
was so plainly disclosed as it now is. Whether cor
rect, however, in his position or not, his manner and
language were characteristic, and unfortunate. The
1 Pierce : Sumner, vol. iv. p. 456.
^ lb., pp. 448, 454; Forum, vol. xxlv. p. 408.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 171
question on both sides had become personal ; the feel
ing uncontrollable : and, throughout his career, —
early and late, — Mr. Sumner did not appreciate the
significance of words. He faUed to appreciate them
in the speech now made, entitled by him " Naboth's
Vineyard," wherein he accused the President of seek
ing surreptitiously to commit the country to a " dance
of blood." On the 9th of January, less than three
weeks after this outbreak, the papers relating to the
recall of Mr. Motley were, by order of the President,
sent to the Senate. This was on a Monday ; and
it was on the foUowing Sunday morning that Mr.
Fish called on Mr. Sumner by arrangement, with
the Sir John Rose memorandum. The climax was
then at hand. Among the papers relating to the
removal of Mr. Motley was one in which the Secre
tary had referred to some unnamed party as being
" bitterly, personally, and -vindictively hostile " to the
President ; while, in another passage, he had spoken
of the President as a man than whom none " would
look with more scorn and contempt upon one who
uses the words and the assurances of friendship to
cover a secret and determined purpose of hostUity."
The aUusion was unmistakably to Sumner. It was
so accepted by him. There is nothing in the record
which justifies it ; and, whUe it indicates a deep per
sonal feeling on the part of Mr. Fish, it was unneces
sarily offensive. Mr. Sumner had a right to take
offence at it ; nor, indeed, could he well help so doing.
On the other hand, Mr. Fish was not improbably
equaUy incensed at some denunciatory remarks of
Mr. Sumner's brought to his ears by White House
intermediaries, then abnormaUy active. However this

172 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
may be, and the record is silent on the point, the
Motley papers were laid before the Senate on the
very Monday upon which Sir John Rose reached
Washington. A week from Tuesday, the eighth day
after the transmission of those papers, the memoran
dum of Mr. Sumner of January 17 reached the Secre
tary. The break between the two officials was com
plete ; they were no longer on speaking terms.
January was now more than half over, and, in six
weeks' time, the Forty-first Congress was to pass out
of existence. When, on the 4th of March, the new
Congress came into being, the committees of the Sen
ate would have to be reappointed, and, of necessity,
largely remodeUed, nineteen newly elected members of
the body replacing a similar number whose terms had
expired. Mr. Sumner's deposition from the chairman
ship he would then have fiUed through five successive
Congresses had meanwhile become a fixed idea in the
presidential mind;! ^nd Secretary Fish shaped his
course accordingly. On the 24th of January he again
met Sir John Rose. A week had intervened since
the receipt of Mr. Sumner's memorandum, and dur
ing that week the Secretary had been holding consul
tations with Mr. Sumner's senatorial colleagues ; of
course, absolutely ignoring that gentleman. While
so doing, he had carefully informed himself as to the
attitude of the Democratic minority in the chamber,
1 Mr. Da-ris says (Mr. Fish and the Alabama Claims, p. 67) : — " Mr.
Fish and the President thought it unwise to make the change.
When, however, this ultimatum [the Rose memorandum of Janu
ary 17] was received from Mr. Sumner, Mr. Fish, with the assent of
the President, withdrew all opposition." But, elsewhere (lb., p. 139),
Mr. Davis says, " No Senator has ever told me what induced the Sen
ate to make the change."

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 173
now increased to seventeen in a body numbering in
all seventy-four. Mr. Bayard and Mr. Thurman were
the recognized leaders of the opposition ; and, from
both, he received assurances of support. Upon the
other side of the chamber, the administration Sen
ators could, of course, be counted on ; and through
their leaders, Messrs. Conkling and Edmunds, it was
weU kno-wn that they were ripe for revolt against the
Sumner committee-regime. The personal relations of
Mr. Sumner with General Grant and Mr. Fish, or
rather the absence of aU personal relations between
the chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations and the President and Secretary of State,
was matter of common knowledge. The several Sen
ators consulted were also informed as to Mr. Sum
ner's attitude towards the proposed negotiations, and
a carefully drawn memorandum in relation thereto
was submitted to them by the Secretary. No pre
caution was neglected.!
Charles Sumner was a man with whom it is difficult
to deal historicaUy. His is a large figure ; senatoriaUy
viewed, perhaps none is larger. He projects himself
from the canvas. In referring also to any considera^
ble public character, it is not easy to caU attention to
his foibles and limitations, as affecting results, -without
appearing to lay undue emphasis upon them. It is
especially so in the case of Mr. Sumner ; for he was a
man of intense individuality, and, as he grew in years,
his foibles were always more in evidence. In the mat
ters now under consideration, also, they seem to have
affected his pubUc conduct and his relations with others
to a peculiar extent ; and this was, perhaps, to be in a
1 Moore : International Arbitrations, vol. i. pp. 525, 529.

174 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
degree accounted for by the fact that he had then re
cently passed through a most trying domestic experi
ence, weU calculated to disturb a temperament never
disposed to placidity.! Though highly respected, Mr.
Sumner was not a favorite among his colleagues. In
many respects a man of engaging personality, kind,
sympathetic, and considerate, essentially refined and
easy of approach, he could not brook sustained opposi
tion on any question which to his mind involved the
moral issue. Recognizing superiority in no one, he then
became restive in presence of any assertion of equahty.
The savor of incense was sweet in his nostrUs ; while he
did not exact deference, habitual deference was in later
life essential to his good-wUl. Among his coUeagues,
especially those not poUticaUy opposed but more or less
lacking in sympathy, his unconsciously overbearing
habit when what was ever present to his mind as " the
cause " was involved almost necessarily made him ene
mies. In those days, also, " the cause " was never quies
cent ; and, when intent upon it, Mr. Sumner's language
became rhetorically intemperate and his temper impla
cable. These terms seem strong ; and yet they are not
so strong as those used of him at the time by men of his
own age, and friends of years' standing. One instance
wiU suffice. " Sumner," wrote R. H. Dana not long
before, " has been acting like a madman ... in the
positions he took, the arguments he advanced, and the
language he used to the twenty out of twenty-five Re
publican Senators who differed from him. If I could
hear that he was out of his head from opium or even
New England rum, not indicating a habit, I should be
1 See on this point the suggestive incident mentioned by Mr. Davis :
Mr. Fish and the Alabama Claims, p. 55.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 175
relieved. Mason, Davis, and Slidell were never so in
solent and overbearing as he was, and his arguments,
his answers of questions, were boyish or crazy, I don't
know which." Again, in June, 1861, the same excel
lent authority describes, in the famiUarity of private
correspondence, the Senator as coming from Washing
ton "fuU of denunciation of Mr. Seward. . . . He
gave me some anxiety, as I listened to him, lest he
was in a heated state of brain.^ He cannot talk five
minutes without bringing in Mr. Seward, and always
in bitter terms of denunciation. . . . His mission is
to expose and denounce Mr. Seward, and into that
mission he puts all his usual inteUectual and moral
energy." Two years later Mr. Dana was in Wash
ington. In the interim he, an old personal as weU as
poUtical friend, had ventured to question the Senator's
policy. He now, as was his wont, at once called on
Mr. Sumner, leaving his card. The call was not re
turned, nor did Mr. Dana hear anything from Mr.
Sumner during the succeeding twenty days whUe in
Washington, or see him, except once when, by chance,
they encountered each other at a friend's house. All
this was characteristic of the man. To any question
in which he was deeply concerned, there was but one
side.^ As it was his mission to denounce Seward in
^ Mr. J. C. Bancroft Davis, under similar circumstances, records the
same impression. " Mr. Sumner seemed to be in a state of great ex
citement. His tremulous manner and loud voice made upon me the
impression that his mind was affected." (Mr. Fish and the Alabama
Claims, p. 32.)
2 " Once, in later days, when I argued with him that opponents
might be sincere, and that there was some reason on the other side,
he thundered in reply, ' Upon such a question there is no other side.' "
(Eulogy of George William Curtis, Massachusetts Memorial of Charles
Sumner, p. 148.) " But at the time of [the San Domingo affair] , aU he

176 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
1861, ten years later it was his mission to denounce
Grant ; and he fulfilled it. As he " gave the cold
shoulder" to Dana in 1863, so he gave it to Fish in
1871.! Con.sequently, in 1871, more than half the
body of which he was in consecutive ser-vice the senior
member were watching for a chance to humiliate him.
As Mr. Fish looked at it, Mr. Sumner had now
taken his position squarely across the path the Admin
istration proposed to pursue on a momentous question
of foreign policy, — a government measure. He
understood, or thought he understood, Mr. Sumner's
mental processes, and his methods of parliamentary
action. Assuredly, he was not without recent experi
ence of them. He shaped his course accordingly ; de
ciding to give, in the first place, to those now possibly
being invited to another diplomatic humUiation, frank
and fuU notice of the difficulties they must expect to
encounter, and the danger they would incur. There
was to be no ground on which to rest against him a
future charge of deception, or even of suppression of
facts. So, at his next meeting with Sir John Rose on
the 24th of January, — ¦ a meeting which took place at
the Secretary's house, and not at the State Depart
ment, — Mr. Fish began by quietly, but in confidence,
handing Sir John the Sumner hemispheric flag-with
drawal memorandum. Sir John read it ; and, having

said was so deeply grounded in his feeling and conscience, that it
was for him difficult to understand how others could form different
conclusions. ... It was difficult for him to look at a, question or
problem from more than one point of -view, and to comprehend its
different bearings, its complex relations with other questions or pro
blems ; and to that one point of view he was apt to subject all other
considerations.'' (Eulogy of Carl Schurz, lb., pp. 241, 255.)
1 Pierce : Sumner, vol. iv. p. 468 ; Adams : R.H. Dana, vol. ii. p. 265.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 177
done so, returned it, apparently without comment.
Mr. Fish then informed him that, after full consid
eration, the government had determined to enter on
the proposed negotiation ; and, should Great Britain
decide to send out special envoys to treat on the basis
agreed upon, the Administration would spare no effort
" to secure a favorable result, even if it involved a con
flict with the chairman of the Committee on Foreign
Relations in the Senate."!
The die was cast. So far as the chairman of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations was concerned,
the man of Donelson, of Vicksburg, and of Appomattox
now had his eye coldly fixed upon him. As to the
settlement with Great Britain, it was to be effected
on business principles, and according to precedent ;
" national " claims and hemispheric flag-withdrawals
were at this point summarily dismissed from consid
eration. The purport of the last interview between Mr. Fish
and Sir John Rose was immediately cabled by the
latter to London ; and, during the week that ensued,
the submarine wires were busy. The Gladstone Min
istry, thoroughly educated by fast-passing continental
events, — France prostrate and Germany defiant, —
was now, heart and soul, intent on extricating Great
Britain from the position in which it had, ten years
before, put itself under a previous administration of
which Mr. Gladstone had been a prominent, as weU
as an active and an influential, member. Before the
seven days had expired an agreement was reached ;
and, on the 1st of February, Su- Edward Thornton
notified Secretary Fish of the readiness of his gov
ernment to send a special mission to Washington
1 Moore : International Arbitrations, vol. i. pp. 528-530.

178 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
empowered to treat on aU questions at issue between
the two countries. The papers were duly submitted
to Congress, and, on the 9th of February, President
Grant sent to the Senate the names of five persons,
designated as commissioners to represent the United
States in the proposed negotiation. The nominations
were promptly confirmed. The question was now a
practical one : — Would Great Britain humble its pride
so far as to avail itself of the chance of extrica
tion thus opened ? — and, if it did humble its pride
to that extent, could the administration of President
Grant so shape the negotiation as to get the United
States out of the position in which Mr. Sumner had
partially succeeded in putting it? His more than
possible opposition to any settlement at that time had
to be reckoned with ; if necessary, overborne.
For present purposes, it is needless to enter into the
details of the negotiation which ensued. If not fa
miliar history, I certainly have no new light to throw on
it. Under the skilful business guidance of Mr. Fish,
the settlement moved quietly and rapidly to its fore
ordained conclusion. It is, however, stiU curious to
study, between the lines of the record, the extent to
which the Sumner memorandum influenced results,
and how it in the end only just failed to accomplish
its author's purpose. It rested among Mr. Fish's
private papers, a bit of diplomatic dynamite, the ex
istence of which was known to few, and mentioned by
no one. Not a single aUusion is to be found to it in
the debates, the controversies, or the correspondence
of the time. Mr. Pierce, in his life of Sumner, ear
nestly combats ! Mr. Bancroft Davis's statement 2 that
1 Pierce: Sumner, vol. iv. p. 481.
' Davis : Mr. Fish and the Alabama Claims, p. 137.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 179
certain Senators were fully, if confidentiaUy, advised
of the existence of the memorandum and of the atti
tude of Mr. Sumner. In this he is clearly in error.!
At least four Senators knew of both, but, not without
reason, seem to have been afraid of the former. The
danger, of course, lay in the direct and forcible appeal
to Fenianism contained in the memorandum ; for the
Irish-Americans then constituted a much more for
midable political factor than now, and they were in a
highly inflammatory condition. The echoes of the
last raid on the Dominion had hardly died away in the
press,^ and it would not have been a difficult task, es
pecially for Mr. Sumner, to have excited an outburst
of Irish- American feeUng which would have so affected
a minority at least of the Senate as effectuaUy to seal
the fate of any treaty. In view of this fact, George
F. Edmunds of Vermont, then serving in his second
senatorial term, and one of those in Mr. Fish's confi
dence and on whom he most depended, had good cause
subsequently to aUude in a somewhat mysterious way
to the Sumner propositions as " most astonishing and
extravagant, . . . the mere statement of [which]
would have put an end to all negotiations at once." ^
As a rule, United States Senators have not been re
garded as, among mortals, exceptionally discreet or
secretive. In this case, however, they proved so.
The references to Fenianism and hemispheric flag with
drawals were few, and, confined to the press and street
1 Moore : International Arbitrations, vol. i. p. 529.
2 Papers Relating to the Treaty of Washington (1872), vol. ii. p. 258.
The last Fenian move on the Dominion, calling for action on the part
of the United States govemment, occurred as late as October, 1871.
' Memorial Address before' the Legislature of New York, AprU 5,
1894, p. 47.

180 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
gossip, elicited no response from the Senate. Yet
when it came to the preparation of what is known as
" the American case " for the Geneva Arbitration, there
can be Uttle doubt that the knowledge of Mr. Sum
ner's attitude, and the desire to forestaU the effect of
any possible later appeal to the Irish- American element,
contributed sensibly to that extreme presentation of
national injuries, indirect claims, and consequential
damages which, in the foUowing autumn, startled
Great Britain from its propriety, and brought the
treaty to the verge of rejection. Had it led to that
result, the possible consequences might now, did space
permit, be interesting to consider ; but such a result,
whether an advantage or otherwise to the world at
large, would have been a singular tribute to the influ
ence of Charles Sumner. In all human probabUity,
also, a calamity to Great Britain.
But to return to the narrative. General Grant was
now handUng a campaign. He did it in character
istic fashion. His opponent and his objective were
to him clear, and he shaped his plan of operations
accordingly. So rapidly did events move, so ready
ripe for action were aU concerned, that the Joint High
Commission, as it was called, organized in Washington
on the 27th of February, exactly seven weeks from
the arrival there of Sir John Rose. On the 8th of
the foUowing May, the treaty was signed ; and, on the
10th, the President sent it to the Senate. It was at
once referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
Mr. Sumner was, however, no longer chairman of that
committee. On the 8th of March, — two months be
fore, — the negotiators were struggling with the vexed
question of indirect claims, Mr. Sumner's special sen-

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 181
atorial thunder ; and, on thq day foUowing, at a Sen
ate Republican caucus then held, he was deposed. As
the story has been told in aU possible detail, it is need
less here to describe what then occurred. The step
taken, Uke the situation because of which it was taken,
was one almost without precedent, and there is reason
to conclude that it had been decided upon in the coun
cils of the Administration Senators, acting in har
mony with inspiration from the White House, quite
irrespective of the fate of any possible treaty which
might result from negotiations then in progress. How
ever that may be, its complete- justification can be
found in facts now known in connection with that
negotiation. Upon certain points there is no longer
room for controversy. As already pointed out, in the
conduct of the foreign poUcy of the country, the chair
man of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
was, and is, virtually, and in everything but name, a
part of the Administration. He is, or should be, its
confidential mouthpiece, both in dealing vrith the com
mittee, and upon the floor of the Senate sitting in
executive session. He should accordingly be whoUy
and intimately in the confidence of the State Depart
ment on aU questions of foreign policy. No other
chairman of any congressional committee is similarly
placed ; for, as respects the treaty-making power, the
Senate is not a legislative body, it is the council of
the Executive. In March, 1871, a settlement with
Great Britain had become a cardinal feature, — it
miffht be said the cardinal feature in the President's
foreign policy, as represented by his official organ, the
State Department. With the head of that department
the chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign

182 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
Relations was no longer on speaking terms ; whUe, in
private, his denunciation of both Secretary and Presi
dent was unsparing. Mr. Sumner had, moreover, been
consulted in advance as to the negotiations ; and, in
reply to an official demand therefor, had expressed it as
his fixed opinion that " the withdrawal of the British
flag " from Canada at least, if not from the hemisphere
altogether, could not " be abandoned as a condition, or
preliminary," of a settlement such as was now pro
posed. The conclusion thus reached had then been
communicated to the head of the State Department in
an informal, but a written, memorandum. The fate of
the Johnson-Clarendon Convention was still fresh in
memory. Solemnly executed in London by the fuUy
accredited representative of the United States, it had
with short shrift, and by a vote practicaUy unanimous,
been set contemptuously aside by the Senate. In -view
of this experience, Mr. Fish privately communicated the
memorandum of the chairman of the Senate committee
to the confidential agent of the British government.
Under the circumstances, this was manifestly the only
course open to him to pursue. Its recent experience
had been mortifying ; and, in view of it, the British
government of right ought to be, — in ordinary good
faith had to be, advised of this danger, known only to
the Secretary, before being invited to enter upon a
fresh negotiation, which, not improbably, might result
in another rebuff. When so advising him, the Secre
tary had also intimated to its agent that, should Great
Britain still decide to proceed with the negotiation,
the Administration would spare no effort to secure a
favorable result, "even if it involved a conflict" with
Mr. Sumner. To any one who knew the President

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 183
and his methods, mental and military, such a committal
admitted of no misconstruction. Unquestionably, the
contents of Mr. Sumner's memorandum were weU
known to every one of the British plenipotentiaries,
as also was the pledge of the Administration in con
nection therewith. This premised, the course now
pursued was more than justifiable ; it was necessary,
as well as right.! ^gr the Administration, in face of
the notice thus given, to have permitted the continu
ance of Mr. Sumner in his chairmanship, if to prevent
was in its power, would have been worse than chUd-
ish; it would have distinctly savored of bad faith with
the British negotiators: and neither General Grant
nor Mr. Fish was ever chargeable with bad faith, any
more than the record of the former was indicative of
a proneness to indecisive or childish courses of pro
cedure. On the 9th of March, therefore, in accordance with
the understood wishes of the President, Mr. Sumner
was deposed by his senatorial colleagues from the chair
manship of the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela^
tions. But when, some two months later, the treaty was
reported back to the Senate by the committee as now
organized, with a favorable recommendation, the ques
tion of interest was as to the course Mr. Sumner would
pursue. Would he acquiesce ? It was weU under
stood that on aU matters of foreign policy the Senate,
if only from long habit, gave a more than attentive ear
to his utterances. Almost daily, after the treaty was
transmitted to the Senate and until it was reported
back from committee, intimations from this person and
from that — caUers on Mr. Sumner, or guests at his
1 See Appendix F, infra, pp. 225-244.

184 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
table — reached the Department of State, indicating
what the deposed chairman proposed to do, or not to
do. One day Judge Hoar, now serving as one of the
Joint High Commissioners, would announce that Mr.
Sumner had declared himself the evening before in
favor of the treaty, and was preparing a speech ac
cordingly ; on the evening of the very day of this
reassuring announcement another gentleman would
come to Mr. Fish directly from Mr. Sumner's table
to say that his host had just been criticising the
treaty, and proposed to urge amendments. The Brit
ish commissioners were especiaUy solicitous. They
even went so far as to ignore their instructions to
leave Washington as soon as possible after the treaty
was signed. The Administration wished them to re
main there, as one of the Englishmen wrote, on the
ground that they might be able to influence " par
ticular Senators, such as the Democrats and (stUl
more) Sumner, over whom [the Administration has]
no party control." Sir Stafford Northcote then goes
on to say of Mr. Sumner, — " We have paid him a
great deal of attention since he has been deposed, and
I think he is much pleased at being stiU recognized
as a power." ! Sir Stafford might well say that they
had paid him a great deal of attention. Mr. Sumner's
egotism and love of flattery were tolerably weU under
stood ; and the Englishmen, reaUzing that he was
" very anxious to stand well with England," humored
him to the top of his bent. Lord de Grey, for instance,
1 Sir Stafford Northcote added, — "He certainly is [a power], for
though I think the Govemment could beat him in the Senate, he could
stir up a great deal of bad feeling in the country, if he were so
minded." (Lang : Northcote, vol. ii. p. 23.)

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 185
presently to be made Marquis of Ripon, the head of
the British side of the commission, went out of his
way to inform the deposed chairman that, without his
speech on the Johnson-Clarendon Convention, "the
treaty could not have been made, and that he [Lord
de Grey] worked by it as a chart." Nor were the
American commissioners less solicitous, though they
went about it in a more quiet way. For, hardly was
the ink of the signatures to the treaty dry before Judge
Hoar called at Mr. Sumner's door with a copy, which
he commended to the Senator's favorable consideration
" as meeting on aU substantial points the objections
he had so weU urged against the Johnson-Clarendon
Convention." That Mr. Sumner, had he, on consideration, con
cluded that it was his duty to oppose the ratification
of the treaty, could, placed as he now was, have secured
its rejection, is not probable. As chairman of the
Committee on Foreign Relations it would almost un
questionably have been in his power so to do ; not
directly, perhaps, but through the adoption of plausi
ble amendments, — that practice of " customary disfig
urement," according to President Cleveland, which
treaties undergo " at the hands of the United States
Senate." ! This course Mr. Fish apprehended. On
the 18th of May, Mr. TrumbuU, then Senator from
IlUnois, and deservedly influential, caUed at the De
partment to inquire whether an amendment would
jeopardize the treaty. In reply he was assured that
any amendment, however trivial, would, in aU prob
ability, destroy the treaty, as it would enable Great
1 See paper of A. M. Low, " The Oligarchy of the Senate," North
American Review (February, 1902), voL 174, p. 242.

186 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
Britain either to withdraw entirely, or, in any event,
to propose counter-amendments. In point of fact, Mr.
Sumner, while advocating approval, did offer amend
ments ; ! but, no longer chairman of the committee, he
was shorn of his strength. Up to the very time of vot
ing, he was enigmatical. He would intimate a sense of
great responsibiUty, inasmuch as he realized the extent
to which the country was looking to him for guidance ;
and he would then suggest doubts. His mind was not
clear, etc., etc. On the direct issue of approval the
solid phalanx of administration Senators would un
questionably have been arrayed against him ; and, on
the Democratic side of the chamber, he was far from
popular. None the less, had he even remotely re
sembled his contemporary then in the House of Repre
sentatives, Benjamin F. Butler,^ it would have been in
his power, playing on the Hibernian element, and the
anti- EngUsh feeling then very rife, to have made much
trouble. The treaty bears distinct marks of having been
framed with this in view. In its provisions, not only
did Mr. Sumner find the ground in great degree cut
away from under him, but he could not help realizing
that, in view of his speech on the Johnson-Clarendon
Convention, he stood to a certain extent committed.
It was not open for him to take the hemispheric flag-
withdrawal attitude. So doing was impossible. He
had not taken it before ; and, though his reasons for
not taking it then were ob-vdous, to take it now would,
under the circumstances, inevitably expose him to ridi
cule. He was thus fairly and plainly circumvented.
1 Pierce : Sumner, vol. iv. pp. 489, 490.
^ General Butler subsequently made two pubUc speeches in opposi
tion to the Treaty of Washington.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 187
But, more and most of all, Charles Sumner was, be
It ever said, no demagogue. Somewhat of a doctri
naire and more of an agitator, he was stUl in his way
an enlightened statesman, with aspirations for America
and mankind not less generous than perfervid. His
egoism was apparent ; nor has his rhetoric stood the
test of time. A hearty hater, and unsparing of de
nunciation, he hated and denounced on pubUc grounds
only ; but his standards were invariably high, and he
was ever actuated by a strong sense of obligation.
His course now was creditable. In his beUef, an un
surpassed opportunity had been lost. A rejection of
the proposed adjustment, manifestly fair so far as it
went, could, however, result only in keeping alive a
source of acute irritation between two great nations.
That involved a heavy responsibility ; a responsibility
not in Mr. Sumner's nature to assume. Accordingly,
he accepted the inevitable ; and he accepted it not
ungracefuUy. General Grant numbered him with
Buckner, Pemberton, Johnston, Bragg, and Lee, —
among his vanquished opponents. As to Mr. Fish,
the two were never afterwards reconciled ; but the
Secretary now had his way.!
Into the subsequent difficulties encountered by Sec
retary Fish in his work of saving Great Britain in
spite of Great Britain's self, it is needless to enter.
Suffice it to say they can aU be traced back to the
positions assumed by Mr. Sumner in AprU, 1869.
As already pointed out, it was obviously from an
over-desire to forestaU Mr. Sumner that Secretary
Fish's Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Bancroft
Davis, a little later jeopardized the whole treaty by the
1 See Appendix G, pp. 245-255.

188 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
extreme grounds taken on the subject of national in
juries, indirect claims, and consequential damages, and
the somewhat intemperate way in which the same were
urged. It is wholly unnecessary here to enter into
the question of responsibility for this portion of what
was known as " The Case of the United States." In
preparing it, Mr. Da-ds unquestionably acted under
instructions from Secretary Fish, and in cooperation
with the very able counsel who had the matter in
charge. Whatever was done by him was done subject
to approval ; and was, undoubtedly, f uUy considered
before being approved. Those thus responsible for
the presentation of the case naturaUy felt that, with
Mr. Sumner's historic indictment of the Johnson-Clar
endon Convention fresh in memory, the fuU record of
grievance had to be set forth, or the American people
might resent a tacit abandonment of what they had
been taught to regard as their just demands. With
an eye to this possibility, — Sumner always in mind,
— Mr. Fish had at an early stage of the negotiations
significantly intimated to his coUeagues that " he sup
posed it was pretty well agreed that there were some
claims which would not be allowed by the arbitrators,
but he thought it best to have them passed upon." !
So, in avoiding the senatorial ScyUa, the counsel of the
United States subsequently brought the ark of settle
ment squarely up against the British Charybdis. Six
years later, when both Mr. Sumner and Mr. Motley
were dead ,2 General Grant made contemptuous refer-
1 Davis : Mr. Fish and the Alabama Claims, p. 77.
' In the interview at Edinburgh, published in the New York Her
ald of September 25, 1877. Another conversation with Grant on this
topic is given by Young in his Around the World with Grant (vol. ii. p.
279). It iUustrates the utter worthlessness of unverified recoUections

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 189
ence to the " indirect damage humbug," as he then
phrased it ; and, as set forth in the American " case "
presented at Geneva, it was a " humbug," — a by no
means creditable " humbug." As such it had by some
as a basis for the statement of historic details. He was at the time
of this interview on a steamship in Asiatic waters, far from books,
records, and memoranda. He is reported as then saying : — " When
Mr. Fish prepared our case against England, and brought it to me for
approval, I objected to the indirect claim feature. Mr. Fish said he
entirely agreed with me, but it was necessary to consider Mr. Sum
ner. Mr. Sumner was at the head of the committee in the Senate
that had charge of foreign affairs. He was not cordial to the treaty.
. . . Mr. Sumner had also laid great stress upon indirect claims.
Not to consider them in our case, therefore, would offend him, . . .
The argument of Mr. Fish convinced me, but somewhat against my
wUl. I suppose I consented because I was sincerely anxious to be
on terms with Sumner." It is not easy to conceive anything much
more mistaken than these utterances. Grant had quarreUed with
Sumner, and ceased to be on speaking terms with him, a year before
the negotiations, which preceded the treaty, were initiated. When
the case for the Board of Arbitration under the treaty was prepared,
Mr. Sumner had ceased to be chairman of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations. He had spoken and voted for the treaty ; and,
whUe the treaty was no longer at issue, neither President nor Secre
tary cared to concUiate him- The indirect claims were inserted in
the case by direction of Fish, and for reasons which he put on record,
wholly at variance with those attributed to him by Grant. FinaUy,
Grant, as President, never objected to the claims, and, subsequently,
was wholly unwilling that they should be withdrawn from the con
sideration of the Geneva tribunal. Indeed, in February, 1872, when
it seemed probable that Great Britain would, because of our insist
ence on those claims, refuse to go on at Geneva, he actuaUy wanted
Secretary Fish to instruct Mr. Adams to remain at Geneva, and to
sign the award alone should all the other arbitrators withdraw. It
was necessary for Mr. Fish to call his attention to the fact that, under
the terms of the treaty, the award had to be signed by a majority of
the arbitrators. The suggestion of Mr. Adams remaining behind,
after aU the others were gone, and then proceeding to mulct Great
Britain in satisfactory damages was again suggestive of op^ra bouffe
performances and Gerolstein methods. There can, however, be no
doubt that Grant was, in 1879, giving a perfectly truthful statement
of his recollection of the events of 1871. Merely, his recoUection
deceived him as to every particular.

190 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
means to be got rid of ; and at Geneva it was, with
general acceptance, so got rid of.! Be it always, how-
^ There is, however, another side to the question of indirect claims
as presented in the " case " at Geneva. It is weU put in the foUow
ing extracts of a despatch from Secretary Fish to Minister Schenck,
of April 23, 1872 (Papers relating to the Treaty of Washington (1872),
vol. ii. pp. 475, 476) : — " Neither the Government of the United States,
nor, so far as I can judge, any considerable number of the American
people, have ever attached much importance to the so-called * indirect
claims,' oi' have ever expected or desired any award of damages on
their account. . . . You wiU not faU to have noticed that through the
whole of my correspondence we ask no damages on their account ; we
only desire a judgment which will remove them for aU future time as
a cause of difference between the two Governments. In our opinion
they have not been disposed of, and, unless disposed of, in some way,
they wUl remain to be brought up at some future time to the disturb
ance of the harmony of the two Governments. . . In the correspond
ence, I have gone as far as prudence will aUow in intimating that we
neither desired nor expected any pecuniary award, and that we should
be content with an award that a State is not liable in pecuniary
damages for the indirect results of a failure to observe its neutral
obligations. It is not the interest of a country situate as are the
United States, with their large extent of sea-coast, a small Navy, and
smaUer internal police, to have it established that a nation is liable in
damages for the indirect, remote, or consequential results of a faUure
to observe its neutral duties. This government expects to be in the
future, as it has been in the past, a neutral much more of the time
than a beUigerent. It is strange that the British Government does
not see that the interests of this govemment do not lead them to
expect or to desire a judgment on the ' indirect claims ; ' and that they
fail to do justice to the sincerity of purpose, in the interests of the
future harmony of the two nations, which has led the United States
to lay those claims before the tribunal at Geneva."
The above contains a sufficient defence of the presentation of the
" claims." The defect in the American " case " was rather one of
taste. Its contentions were advanced with an aggressiveness of tone,
and attorney-like smartness, more appropriate to the wranglings of a
quarter-sessions court than to pleadings before a grave international
tribunal. In this respect they do not compare favorably with tiie
British papers. As Sir Roundell Palmer truly says, in these last
"no pains were spared to avoid the use of any language which could
wound the susceptibilities, or offend the high spirit of a. generous
nation. ... In all these respects, the American ' Case ' was in the
most marked contrast with our own. . . . Its tone was acrimonious,

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 191
ever, remembered, the vulgarized bill then presented
was not the sublimated balance-sheet Charles Sumner
had in mind. His was no debit-and-credit account,
reduced to dollars and cents, and so entered in an
itemized judgment ; nor was this better understood
by any one than by President Grant. It is but fair
to assume that, in the rapid passage of events between
1870 and 1877, the facts now disclosed had been by
him forgotten.
In Weniyss Reid's " Life of WiUiam E. Forster "
is a chapter devoted to this subject. I think it may
not unfairly be said that Mr. Forster now saved the
treaty. In the first outburst of indignation over the
resurrection in the American " case " of Sumner's self-
evolved equities and incalculable claims, a special
meeting of the British cabinet was summoned, at
which a portion of the members were for withdrawing
forthwith from the arbitration. Though he himself,
unadvised as to the real motive for so emphasizing the
demand on account of national injuries, held the whole
thing to be a case of " sharp practice," yet Mr. Fors
ter counseUed a moderate and prudent course, — as
he put it, "a cool head and a cool temper wanted ; "
adding, "I never felt any matter so serious." He
then drew up a special memorandum for the use of
his coUeagues, looking to such action as would be most
likely to leave open the way to an understanding.
Upon this aU the ministers, save four, were against
him. Mr. Forster next met Mr. Adams, then pass
ing through London on his way home from the pre-
totally wanting in international courtesy." (Memorials Personal and
Political, 1865-95 ; vol. i. p. 229.) The trath, as weU as the con
tained force, of this censure cannot be gainsaid.

192 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
liminary meeting of the tribunal of arbitration at
Geneva, he being a member of it ; and Mr. Adams
fairly told him that, for Great Britain, it was a case
of now or never. If, Mr. Adams said. Great Britain
insisted on the absolute exclusion of the indirect
claims, America must withdraw ; and, if it did, " the
arbitration was at an end, and America would never
make another treaty."
During those anxious weeks the British cabinet
was the scene of more than one heated discussion ;
and, so severe was the tension, the very existence of
the Ministry was threatened. On the afternoon of
April 24, Forster intimated to General Schenck, the
American Minister, that, unless something was done,
he and the Marquis of Ripon " could not keep the
treaty alive." Mr. Adams was now once more in
London on his way to Geneva, and Mr. Forster again
saw him, receiving the assurance that " Fish and the
President had the Senate weU in hand ; " yet, this
notwithstanding, when an article supplemental to the
treaty, obviating the cause of trouble, was agreed on
and submitted to the Senate, that body so amended
it before ratification that the English government
professed itself unable to concur. It seemed as if
the last chance of a pacific settlement was about to
vanish. On the 15th of June, the Court of Arbitration met
at Geneva, pursuant to adjournment. Everything was
in the air. At Geneva, however, the policy of the
State Department was understood ; and, intrusted to
experienced hands, it was, at the proper time, skil-
fuUy forwarded. A way out of the last and most
serious of all the dangers which imperiUed the settle-

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 193
ment was thus devised, and the arbitration moved
on thenceforth upon common-sense business lines to a
practical result.
Times change, and with them the estimate in which
nations hold issues. Recollecting the levity, at times
marked by more than a trace of sarcasm and petulance,
with which the British Foreign Secretary had received
our earliest reclamations because of injuries inflicted
on our mercantUe marine by British built commerce-
destroyers, I cannot refrain, before closing, from a
few words descriptive of the very different mood in
which the Ministry then in power awaited tidings of
the final results reached at Geneva. It was the 16th
of June, 1872. The treaty was in question. The
Court of Arbitration met at Geneva at noon ; in Lon
don, at the same hour, a meeting of the cabinet was
in session, — a meeting almost unique in character.
The members waited anxiously for tidings. For two
hours they attended listlessly to routine parliamentary
work ; and then took a recess. When, at 3 o'clock,
the time for reassembling came, no ad-vices had been
received. Thereupon, a further adjournment was
taken until 5.30. Still no telegram. AU subjects
of conversation being now exhausted, the members
sat about, or faced each other in silence. It was a
curious situation for a ministry. Had England hu
miliated herself by an expression of fruitless regret ?
Those present contemplated the situation in the true
parliamentary spirit. " The opposition would snigger
if they saw us," remarked one ; and the speaker soon
after sent for a chess-board, and he and Mr. Forster
took chairs out on the terrace in front of the cabinet-

194 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
room, and there sat down to a game, using one of the
chairs as a table. Three games were played ; but
stiU no tidings. So the company dispersed for din
ner. As the tribunal adjourned over until Monday,
no tidings came that night ; the method of procedure
had, however, been arranged, and Mr. Fish communi
cated -witii. His assent to what was proposed came
immediately ; and meanwhile Mr. Forster was bestir
ring himself in London to " urge help to Adams," and
a " short, helpful telegram " was forwarded. " After
all," wrote Mr. Forster that night, " this treaty, which
has as many fives as a cat, wiU live." On the
afternoon of the fourth subsequent day, this staunch
friend of America and of peace scribbled, from his
seat in the ministerial benches of the House of Com
mons, this note to his wife : " Hip, hip, hip, hooray ! the
final settlement of the indirect claims came during
questions to-day, and Gladstone announced it amid
great cheers on our side and the disgust of the Tories.
This is a good year now, whatever happens." It was
the 20th of June, 1872, — one month over eleven
years since the issuance of the famous proclamation.
A heavy shadow was lifted from off the future of the
British Empire. That it was thus lifted must in aU
historic truth be ascribed to Hamilton Fish.
In discussing the developments of history, it is
almost never worth while to waste time and ingenuity
in philosophizing over what might have been. The
course of past events was — as it was ! What the
course of subsequent events would or might have
been, had things at some crucial juncture gone other
wise than as they actuaUy did go, no one can more

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 195
than guess. Historical consequences are not less
strange than remote. For instance, the lessons of
our own War of Independence, closed six-score years
ago, are to-day manifestly influencing the attitude
and action of Great Britain throughout her system
of dependencies. Should . the ' system ever, as now
proposed, assume a true federated form, that result,
it may safely be asserted, -wiU be largely due to the
experience gained a century and a quarter ago on the
North American continent, supplemented by that now
being gained in South Airica. In view of the enor
mous strides made by science during the last third of
a century, it cannot be assumed that, as respects war
fare on land or on sea, what was possible in 1863
would be possible now. The entire globe was not
then interlaced with electric wires, and it may weU be
that another Alabama is as much out of the range of
future probabilities as a ship flying the black flag,
with its skull and crossed bones, was outside of those
of 1861. This, however, aside, it is instructive, as
weU as interesting, to summarize the record which has
now been recaUed, and to consider the position in
which Great Britain would to-day find itself but for
the settlement effected and principles estabhshed by
means of the Treaty of Washington.
So far as the international situation is concerned,
the analogy is perfect. Every rule of guidance appli
cable in our Civil War of 1861-65 is a fortiori
applicable in the South African war of 1899-1902.
The contention of Great Britain from 1861 to 1865
was that every neutral nation is the final judge of
its own international obligations ; and that, in her
o-wn case, no liabUity, moral or material, because of a

196 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
violation of those obligations was incurred, no matter
how scandalous the evasions might subsequently prove
to have been, unless the legal advisers of the gov
ernment pronounced the ascertainable e-vidence of
an intention to violate the law sufficient to sustain a
criminal indictment. In view of the " lucrative "
character of British shipbuilding, it was further main
tained that any closer supervision of that industry,
and the exercise of " due diligence " in restraint of
the construction of commerce-destroyers, would impose
on neutrals a " most burdensome, and, indeed, most
dangerous " liability. Finally, under the official con
struction of British municipal law, — a law pro
nounced by Her Majesty's government adequate to
any emergency, — there was "^iio necessity that a naval
belligerent should have a port, or even a seashore."
The South African republics, for instance, "might
unite together, and become a great naval power, "
using the ports of the United States as a base for their
maritime operations. " Money only was required for
the purpose." Then came the admission of Sir Ed
ward Thornton that, in case Great Britain were en
gaged in war, retaliations in kind for the Alabama and
the Florida would naturally be in order ; commerce-
destroyers would be fitted out on the Pacific coast as
well as the Atlantic, in spite of all the United States
government might, or could, do to prevent them ; and,
¦with them, the high seas would swarm. War must
follow ; and then Canada was " a source of weakness."
On land and on sea. Great Britain was equally vul
nerable. From such a slough of despond was Great Britain
extricated by the Treaty of Washington, That much

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 197
is plain ; aU else is conjecture. But it is still curious
to consider what might weU have now resulted had
the United States, between 1869 and 1871, definitely
for its guidance adopted the policy contemplated by
Charles Sumner instead of that devised by HamUton
Fish, and had then persistently adhered to it. In the
hands and under the direction of Mr, Sumner, the
method he proposed to pursue to the end he had in
mind might have proved both effective and, in the
close, beneficent. So long as aU things are possible —
Who can say ? But Mr. Sumner died in 1874 ; and
with him must have died the policy he proposed
to inaugurate. CharacteristicaUy visionary, he was
wrong in his estimate of conditions. He in no wise
foresaw that backward swing of opinion's pendulum,
from the " -wretched colonies " estimate of 1870 to the
Imperium et Libertas conceptions of 1900. Mr. Fish,
on the other hand, less imaginative, was more nearly
right. He effected a practical settlement ; and, in so
doing, he accomplished a large result. For to-day it
is apparent to all who carefuUy observe that, as the
direct outcome of the American Civil War, the world
made a long stride in advance. It is a great mistake
to speak of the Florida, the Alabama, and the Shen^
andoah as " privateers." They were not. No " pri
vateer," in the proper acceptation of the word, ever
sailed the ocean under the Confederate flag ; the com
merce-destroyers of that conflict, whether fitted out on
the Mersey and Clyde, or in home ports, were, one and
all, government ships-of-war, owned and regularly com
missioned by the beUigerent whose flag they flew, and
commanded by its officers. Their single mission was,
none the less, to burn, sink, and destroy private prop-

198 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
erty on the high seas. They were engaged in no legiti
mate — no recognized operation of modern warfare ;
unless it be legitimate for an invading army wholly to
devastate a hostile country, leaving behind it a smok
ing desert only. On the ocean, the archaic principle
stiU obtains that the immunity of private property
from capture or destruction is confined to times of
peace ; and, when war intervenes, mankind reverts to
piracy, as the natural condition of maritime life. So
the commerce-destroyers were not pirates, — common
enemies of mankind ; but, as a result of the Treaty of
Washington, a new and broad principle wUl inevitably,
in some now not remote hereafter, replace this reUc
of barbarism, — the principle that private property,
not contraband of war, is as much entitled to immunity
from destruction or capture on water as on land. It
is, accordingly, not unsafe even now to predict that the
Florida, the Alabama, and the Shenandoah will go
down in history, not as themselves pirates, but as the
last lineal survivals of the black-flagged banditti of the
olden time. If this so prove, it will in the close be
apparent that the Treaty of Washington supplemented
the Proclamation of Emancipation, rounding out and
completing the work of our Civil War. The verdict of
history on that great conflict must then be that the blood
and treasure so freely poured out by us between Sum
ter and Appomattox were not expended in vain ; for,
through it and because of it, the last vestiges of piracy
vanished from the ocean, as slavery had before disap
peared from the land.

APPENDIX A*
The grounds on 'which the British govemment
proceeded in May, 1861, when it issued the proclama
tion of beUigerency, were clearly set forth by Lord
Palmerston in the course of a debate in the House
of Commons, exactly four years later ; when, the Civil
War having been brought to a close, the proclama
tion was withdrawn. Throughout that period Lord
Palmerston was Premier ; and, on the 15th of May,
1865, — the proclamation having been issued on May
13, 1861, — he said, in answer to a question in the
House, — " The President of the United States issued
a proclamation declaring a blockade of aU the coasts
and certain ports of the Southern Confederacy, in
accordance, as he said, -with the law of nations. Now
a blockade, according to the law of nations, is a bel
ligerent right, which can only accrue to a State which
is at war ; and I need not say that if there is one bel
ligerent there must be two at least, and therefore the
fact of the President of the United States declaring
that he established a blockade in accordance -with the
law of nations gave him aU those rights which belong
to a belligerent in declaring a blockade — the right of
capture, and condemnation, and the right of search
in regard to neutral vessels. The British government
had only one of two courses to pursue ; the first, to
refuse to submit on the part of British vessels to
1 See supra, p. 98.

200 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
those beUigerent rights, on the ground that there was
no formal belligerent on the other side. That was
not a course which was at aU expedient to pursue, and
therefore the only course left us was to acknowledge
and submit to those belligerent rights ; and that neces
sarily involved the recognition that the other party
was also a beUigerent." , . .
Looking at the facts in the case through a vista of
forty years, and in connection -with all accepted prin
ciples of international law, it must now be acknow
ledged that there was much truth, as well as sound
legal sense, in the dictum on this point of Chief Jus
tice Cockburn, in his extremely unconventional " opin
ion " fUed in connection with the Geneva award: —
" The pretension that the Federal Government could
treat the contest as a war, so as to declare a blockade,
and thereby exclude neutral nations from access to
the blockaded ports for the purpose of trade, while
neutral governments, on the other hand, were not
entitled to treat the war as one going on between two
belUgerent powers, is a proposition which is, I say it
with aU respect for Mr. Adams, reaUy preposterous." !
But to appreciate the full audacity of the positions on
this point assumed by Secretary Seward, — the cor
rectness of which, largely through the utterances of
Senator Sumner, yet has vogue as a species of Amer
ican article of historic faith, — it is necessary to bear
certain facts and dates distinctly in mind. The Rebel-
1 Papers relating to the Treaty of Washington (1872), vol. iv. p. 321.
On this point, see also a forcible exposition of the correct principles
of international law in the letter of Earl RusseU to Mr. Adams of
May 4, 1865. Geneva Arbitration : Correspondence, etc., vol. i. p. 295.
The whole subject is thoroughly discussed by Lord Cockburn, in his
" opinion." Papers, etc., pp. 813-326.

APPENDIX A 201
lion assumed the shape of a fully developed civil war
on April 12, 1861, when the Confederates opened
fire on Fort Sumter. April 19, seven days later, the
President issued his proclamation, announcing the
blockade of some 2700 miles of sea-coast, " in pursu
ance of the laws of the United States and of the law
of nations in such case provided." ! The appeal was
thus made to " the law of nations," and the step was
not taken as a matter of mere municipal regulation.
At the same time. Secretary Seward informed for
eign ministers to this country, and instructed our own
representatives abroad, that the blockade would " be
strictly enforced upon the principles recognized by the
law of nations ; " and, further, provided for the treat
ment of the " armed vessels of neutral states."^ The
Queen's proclamation of May 13 was published four
teen days after the receipt in London of the news
of the surrender of Sumter, and of information that
the Confederate government had taken steps looking
to the issue of letters of marque ; twelve days after
receipt of inteUigence of President Lincoln's procla
mation of blockade ; and three days after the official
communication of the fact by Mr. Dallas, the American
Minister in London, to Lord John Russell, Secretary
for Foreign Affairs.^ One of the most considerable
branches of British commerce — that to and from the
American cotton ports — was thus, at a moment's no
tice, not only interfered with, but broken up ; British
vessels were, under the law of nations, subjected to
search, and liable to capture ; the law of contraband
1 Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. vi. p. 14.
^ Papers relating to Treaty of Washington (1872), vol. i. p. 213.
8 lb., p. 218.

202 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
and prize applied, and was enforced. Almost at once
the struggle involved armaments, by sea and land, of
the first magnitude, and conflicts marked by an almost
unparaUeled loss of life. Yet Secretary Seward per
sistently maintained that this struggle — weU-nigh the
fiercest on record — in no way concerned foreign na
tions, and that they had no right to even recognize it
as existing. So far as the world at large was con
cerned, — though its commerce was broken up, its
vessels searched, seized and condemned, and its pro
perty confiscated as contraband, — the disturbance was
merely local and insignificant in character, concerning
no one but ourselves. Most assuredly, official effront
ery could go no further.
That the recognition by the British government of
a state of beUigerency, of necessity involving two par
ties, should, if possible, have been in courtesy deferred
until the arrival of the newly appointed American
Minister, known to be on his way, is indisputable.
Most fortunately for the United States, it was not so
deferred. On the other hand, every hour of delay in
the recognition of the blockade by neutral governments
involved the possibility of unauthorized search, and
consequent seizures, due to hostilities, the existence
of which was stoutly denied by the United States, and,
therefore, not notified to those concerned by neutral
governments. The situation was, in the language of
Lord Cockburn, " preposterous," and could only con
tinue for a brief period, and that at great risk, through
the exercise of extreme comity on the part of neutrals.
And yet, so strong is tradition, the question is stUl
asked, — how could that proclamation have been con
sidered by Mr. Forster, or any one else, as a point

APPENDIX A 203
gained for the United States ? The answer seems
obvious. It was given by Lord Palmerston in the
speech above quoted. The United States declared an
extensive blockade, under and by virtue of interna
tional law and usage. By the Queen's proclamation,
that blockade was recognized. This was of vital im
portance to the United States, and an important
concession on the part of foreign powers. A re
cognition of the blockade, with all that recognition
implied, was, therefore, in May, 1861, the point gained
for the cause of the Union " in accordance with the
earnest wishes of [William E. Forster] and other
friends of the North." As to Secretary Seward's con
tention that our CivU War was no affair of any nation
but the United States, it wiU not, in the light of his
tory and of international law, bear an instant's exam
ination. The British proclamation of beUigerency of
May 13, 1861, was the logical and legal sequence of
the President's proclamation of blockade of the 19th
of the previous month. By the nations whose com
merce was affected by it, the blockade had either to
be recognized or disaUowed ; and its recognition was
essential to the Union cause.
The difficulty with Secretary Seward was one not at
aU uncommon among men, whether in public station
or private life. He claimed for the side he repre
sented all and every right known to the code ; he then
vehemently protested against the application to him
self, by those affected by his action, of its logical and
necessary consequences under that code. His conten
tions may have been wise, as weU as bold, under the
circumstances and at the time ; but American histo
rians and publicists cannot afford to profess responsi
bility for them now. They are quite untenable.

APPENDIX Bi
This assertion seems to have been a favorite one
with Secretary Seward ; and he repeated it so often,
in terms only slightly varied, that he evidently per
suaded himself of its truth. He thus -wrote to Mr.
Pike, the Minister at the Hague, — " This domestic
war . . . would come to an end to-morrow if the Euro
pean States should clearly announce that expectations
of favor from them must be renounced." ^ To the same
effect he wrote to Mr. Sanford, at Brussels, May 23,
1862, — " Europe has thus put this beneficent gov
ernment upon an ordeal more solemn and fearful," ^
etc. On the 19th of February, 1862, he wrote to
Mr. Dayton, at Paris, — " Let the European States
. . . concede now to the Union half as much toleration
as they have practicaUy, though unintentionally, shown
to disunion, and the Civil War will come to an end
at once." * Even a year later, after the battle of
Gettysburg, he wrote to Mr. Adams, — " The insur
rection . . . has now descended so low that mani
festly it would perish at once, if it were left like the
late insurrection in India, like the insurrection which
a few years ago occurred in Canada ... to stand by
means of its own strength, not as a recognized bellig
erent."^ The Sepoy mutiny of 1857 was undoubtedly
a fierce struggle for supremacy ; but it now seems in-
^ Supra, p. 101.
2 Dip. Cor. 1862, p. 597. See, also, pp. 597, 612.
8 lb., p. 056.
* lb., p. 317 ; see, also, pp. 320, 327, 332, 337, 338.
Ii Dip. Cor. 1863, p. 328.

APPENDIX B 205
credible that an American Secretary of State could,
in the summer of 1863, with Grant's Wilderness
campaign and Sherman's march to the sea in the womb
of the immediate future, have gravely put our Civil
War on an equal footing with the Canada " six-county
insurrection" of 1837, effectually suppressed by mili
tia and one regiment of infantry, after a single repulse
of a fourth of a regiment from a brewery extemporized
into a stronghold. But the same lack of any correct
sense of proportion is apparent in all the discussions
of the Rebellion period, and of the period immediately
succeeding the Rebellion, whether diplomatic and par
liamentary, or legal and historical. It permeates the
United States " Case," prepared for submission to the
Geneva tribunal. Seward and Sumner, Motley and
Davis, seemed aU affected by it, the difference being
only one of degree and temperament. It was a psy
chological phenomenon. America still hung on the
lips of Europe, as the old colonial, dependency spirit,
continually asserting itself, died slowly out. In the
case of Secretary Seward, it must be said that, though
he overdid the thing grossly, he yet wrote and talked
largely for effect ; but there is no reason to think Mr.
Sumner did not fuUy and actually believe what he said,
when, in April, 1869, he asserted in the Senate that
a certain paper manifesto, recognizing a fact of com
mon knowledge, put forth in London in May, 1861,
and foUowed by no act, added " not weeks or months,
but years to our war." It is not easy to see how the
genuine, innate, provincial spirit could have gone
further. The moment " Her Majesty's Proclamation "
entered into account, the nascent rebellion, no longer
a PaUadian giant, was suddenly transformed into a
puny, workhouse British bastard.

APPENDIX C!
Writing privately to his friend, S. B. Ruggles of
New York, on May 18, 1869, — just five weeks after
the delivery of Mr. Sumner's National Claims speech,
— Mr. Fish thus explains himself, covering the whole
situation, and indicating, on his part at least, a clear
comprehension of the law governing it : —
" Public law recognizes the right of a sovereign
power, when a civil confiict has broken out in another
country, to determine when that conflict has attained
sufficient complexity, magnitude, and completeness,
to require (not merely to excuse) for the protection of
its own interests and peace, and of the interests and
relations and duties of its own citizens or subjects,
a definition of its relations, and of the relations of
its citizens or subjects to those of the parties to the
confiict. " In the exercise of this right, the foreign power is
responsible to the general obligations of right, and must
be guided by facts, not by prejudice for or against
the parent country, or the insurgents — least of aU
against the parent country, when weU established, and
a friendly power.
" Having defined its relations to the parties in the
civU conflict as one of neutrality, it must enforce its
neutral position, and aUow no infraction thereof : give
no favor. 1 See supra, p. 112.

APPENDIX C 207
" England professes to have exercised only what is
a recognized right of a sovereign foreign power.
"We have held she was precipitate; much may
weU be said on this side — she had promised to
await Mr. Adams's arrival, but anticipated it, and of
course any information or explanation he might make.
StiU England says — the United States had declared
a blockade — which is ' war ' — the Confederates had
announced ' letters of marque ' and ' prize courts ' which
mean ' war ' — both sides had levied large armies ;
forts had been seized, etc., etc.
" This would seem to give some justification to her
concession of belligerency, and disprove the complaint
of this act [of concession] of some of its force. Then,
again, France and other powers were contemporaneous
with England in the same concession. The United
States make no claim against them, and it is impor
tant to separate them from any intent to unite with
England in resisting the claim.
" The complaint against England is, that she sub
sequently allowed acts inconsistent with neutrality,
and these acts (to a certain extent) reflect back upon
the act of concession of belligerency, and to this extent
alone should the complaint be limited of the procla
mation of neutrality. No other nation which conceded
beUigerency (even at or about the same time with
England) was guUty of such subsequent causes of
injury. " The British proclamation of neutrality is, there
fore, subject of complaint, only as leading to, as char.
acterized by, and authorizing in its execution and
enforcement the fitting out of the Alabama, etc., etc.,
the acts of hospitaUty, etc., given in their colonial

208 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
ports, to those piratical cruisers, and as leading to the
moral support given in England to the Rebel cause.
" Mr. Sumner makes the act of concession per se,
a grievance ; he draws a distinction not recognized by
publicists, between belligerency on land and what he
terms ' ocean belligerency.' BeUigerency is war, and
whether on land or on the ocean, or on both, is a fact,
and not susceptible of division — certainly not, when
the parties to the conflict each have seaboard, and
ports and commerce.
" This is (perhaps) the main point in his argument,
and is one which it will be difficult to maintain —
difficult, at least, to establish now, as appUcable to
Prize Courts.
" Pray let me hear from you. The newspapers seem
shy of dissent from what seems to be the controUing
argument in bringing the Senate to its vote.
" But the fact is, many Senators dissented from the
argument whUe agreeing in the conclusion."
As to the influence of Mr. Sumner's position and
legal contentions as contributing to the defeat of the
Johnson -Clarendon Convention, Mr. Fish at the same
time (May 17) wrote to Senator W. P. Fessenden,
then at his home in Portland, Maine, where he died
early in the following September. Mr. Fessenden, on
May 25, replied as follows : —
" As to Sumner's speech, I can only say that it
would not, in my judgment, be safe to look at it in
the Ught of an ultimatum. Such an idea would be
simply preposterous.
" When delivered, I considered it as intended for a

APPENDIX C 209
statement of our grievances, not of our claims. I per
ceive that the language is stronger than I had supposed
and in some particulars unguarded and exceptionable,
and calculated to give a wrong impression. I was
pleased with the tone of the speech, and so said ; though
it would have been vastly better to have made none at
all, and trusted to the effect of such a vote. But it
was not possible for Sumner to omit availing himself
of such an occasion. On the whole, I think no great
harm -will be done by it.
" It is absurd to suppose that the offence of recog
nizing beUigerency can be atoned for by the payment
of money. StiU, under the circumstances, it was a
grievous wrong, and coupled with subsequent avowals
and conduct would have justified a declaration of war.
The occasion for that, however, has gone by. Yet we
are entitled to something in the nature of a plaster
for the sore — a little of ' Mrs. Winslow's Soothing
Syrup ' at least. The fault of the treaty was that it
offered absolutely nothing, and might have left mat
ters in a worse condition than they now are."
Mr. Carl Schurz, then in the Senate, writing con
fidentially from St. Louis, said to Secretary Fish : —
" We shall then endeavor to find a form of settle
ment as regardful of the national pride of England,
and of her material interests, as possible. (Distant
hint at Canada.) In the mean time we prefer not to
indulge in possibly exciting discussions, but, for the
present, we are content to leave the question open,
giving the British Government a fair chance for quiet
consideration.

210 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
" Mr. Motley might furthermore be instructed,
when by Lord Clarendon a point of international law
is urged upon him, never to reply promptly, to refer
the matter to his Government whenever there is a
chance for it, and, when he cannot avoid giving an
answer, to be very short. He ought to produce the
impression that we are rather inclined to take the
matter very easy and are in no haste whatever. He
might, when very hard pressed, occasionaUy ask the
question, whether England would be content to have
us foUow the precedent set by her ? In private con
versation he might freely speak of the annexation of
the North American pro-vinces as being the decided
wish of the American people in settlement of the
claims, leaving the Government uncommitted. It is
our interest to familiarize them gradually with the
idea." George F. Edmunds of Vermont was, at the time
of the rejection of the Johnson-Clarendon Conven
tion, a member of the Senate. In a private letter,
¦written thirty-three years later, he thus gave his re
coUections of the effect of Mr. Sumner's speech on
the minds of his colleagues : —
" I am confident that the Johnson-Clarendon treaty
was not rejected by reason of its failure to embrace
the stupendous claims of Mr. Sumner based upon
Great Britain's recognition of beUigerency. I do not
believe there were more than ten Senators, if as many,
who stood upon any such gTound. I am sure the
majority of the Senate acted upon the ground that the
making of such a treaty, and in such a form, would
not only be a very smaU piecemeal toward the restora^
tion of good relations, but would be a kind of recog-

APPENDIX C 211
nition of the fact that we had nothing more to com
plain of than the ordinary and accidental wrongs that
the government of one country continually commits
or permits against the citizens of another. Nobody
who possessed even a moderate knowledge of the
principles of international law, and their practice,
would, unless laboring under some great emotion,
maintain for a moment that Great Britain had vio
lated international law, or had done an act in that
sense hostile to the United States. It was only valu
able and important as throwing Ught upon the later
conduct of that Government in permitting the building
and departure of Confederate vessels and munitions of
war from her ports."

APPENDIX D'
The foUo-wing is the speech referred to in the text,
so far as it related to the United States. It was
delivered at the Lord Mayor's banquet, November 9,
1869, and printed in the London Times, oi the follow
ing day.
" Without arrogating influence, I think we are
bound on every occasion that may offer to make every
effort towards composing those differences and allay
ing those disturbances which may arise in different
portions of the world ; and I rejoice to think that, on
more than one occasion since his return to office, my
noble friend who holds the seals of the Foreign-office
has had the satisfaction of receiving the liberal and
handsome acknowledgments of foreign Governments
for the useful contributions he has made towards the
accommodation of their relations. One exception, per
haps — one partial exception — I ought to name. It
is an exception of the deepest interest. I refer to our
relations with the United States. But there is no
occasion, my Lord Mayor, that I should refer to those
relations in any terms except those of peace and con
cord. (Cheers.) Were I tempted to depart from that
friendly strain I should, indeed, be admonished to
judge more correctly and to speak more wisely by an
event which has happened in the city in the course of
the last few days. Your quick associations will out-
' See supra, p. 128.

APPENDIX D 213
run my aUusions. You will know that I refer to the
death of Mr. Peabody, a man whose splendid benefac
tions — which, indeed, secure the immortality of his
name in that which he regarded as his old mother
country, but which, likewise, in a broader view, is
applicable to all humanity — taught us in this com
mercial age, which has witnessed the construction of
so many colossal fortunes, at once the noblest and
most needful of aU lessons — namely, he has shown us
how a man can be the master of his wealth instead of
being its slave. (Cheers.) And, my Lord Mayor,
most touching it is to know, as I have learnt, that
whUe, perhaps, some might think he had been unhappy
in dying in a foreign land, yet, so were his affections
divided between the land of his birth and the home of
his early ancestors, that that which had been his fond
¦wish has, indeed, been realized — that he might be
buried in America, but that it might please God to
ordain that he should die in England. (Cheers.) My
Lord Mayor, ¦with the country of Mr. Peabody we are
not likely to quarrel. (Loud cheers.) It is true,
indeed, that the care and skill of diplomacy, animated
by the purest and most upright feelings, though they
have not imperiUed, yet have faUed to lead to a final
issue at this moment the tangled questions of law that
have been in discussion between the two countries ; but
the very delay that has taken place, instead of being
a delay tending to anger, has been a delay promoted
by kindred good-wUl and by the belief that the inter
vention of a limited time may be likely to ob^viate any
remaining difficulty. (Cheers.) My Lord Mayor, I
speak with confidence in anticipating that that which
the whole world would view with horror and amaze-

214 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
ment, namely, a parricidal strife between England and
America, — is above all things the most unlikely to
grow out of this state of affairs. My confidence is, in
the first place, in the sentiment which I know ani
mates the Govemment of the United States as well as
our own, it is in the sentiment which we beUeve to
pervade the mind of the people of these two great
countries ; and, permit me to add, I have yet another
source of confidence, connected ¦with some of those
changes which we are witnessing in the age in which
we live. I mean this change in particular, that as in
every country there has long been, and especiaUy in
the best governed countries, not only a force of law,
but also of opinion that has tended to restrain it, so
¦with the augmenting intercourse of nations there is
now growing up what I may term an international
opinion, a standard of international conduct higher
than the standard which a particular nation sets up
for itself, and to which it becomes more and more from
year to year as we live necessary that each country
should conform consistently with the rights and duties
of the whole mass of the civUized community of the
world."

APPENDIX E!
The condition of affairs in Cuba became matter of
discussion again in 1896. Senator Sherman then
stated, in the course of a Senate debate, that, in 1870,
there had been a conflict of opinion between President
Grant and Secretary Fish. Mr. Hamilton Fish, son
of the Secretary, who had died three years before, was,
in 1896, Speaker of the New York House of Assembly,
and he permitted the publication of an Associated
Press despatch, dated Albany, March 15, which threw
much light on this question, — a question always of
interest, inasmuch as Cuban complications gave its
shape to the whole foreign policy of the government
during General Grant's first administration, includ
ing the country's attitude towards Great Britain, after
the rejection of the Johnson-Clarendon Convention.
The younger Hamilton Fish then said, — " During
his eight years' ser-dce in the State Department Mr.
Fish kept, chiefly as a reference record for his own
use, a diary in his own handwriting, containing a min
ute of important transactions and of his conversations
with the President, members of the Cabinet, Senators,
and other leading public men in regard to the more
prominent of the foreign questions -with which he had
to deal. From May 31 to June 13, 1870, the date
of President Grant's special message to Congress on
Cuban beUigerency, the entries in the diary are many,
1 Supra, p. 119.

216 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
and very full, in regard to the origin, preparation,
discussions in the Cabinet, and final completion of the
special message."
The foUowing passages from the diary were then
given to the correspondent of the Associated Press,
his despatch appearing, in whole or in part, in many
journals of the foUo^ng day (March 16, 1896) : —
February 19, 1870. " Called this morning, by ap
pointment, to see Senator John Sherman on subject
of the unit of coinage. After conversing on that
question, I referred to his resolution introduced in the
Senate, and his speech in favor of recognizing the
belligerency of Cuba, and asked if he had recently
examined the treaty with Spain of 1795. He said he
had not ; was not aware of the existence of such a
treaty. I referred to its provisions, and to the prob
able consequences of the exercise by Spain of the right
of visit (or of search) ; thought our people would not
submit to it, and that the consequences would soon
develop in war ; said that fighting was not belliger
ency ; there is fighting, but no beUigerency in Cuba ;
there is no government of the insurrectionary party,
no political organization, etc. He admitted that he
had not examined the subject closely, but said there
is a good deal of excitement in the country on the
subject. I advised him, in connection with the passing
of his resolution of beUigerency, to prepare biUs for
the increase of the public debt, and to meet the in
creased appropriation which wiU be necessary for the
army, navy, etc."
June 10, 1870. "Judge Orth and General Butler
caUed in the evening to urge the sending of a message
by the President on the question of Cuban beUiger-

APPENDIX E 217
ency, Orth says the vote wiU be close. Banks wiU
make the closing speech, but there are some twenty
or thirty quiet members who may be decided by his
speech, but would not go against the President's
views." June 12, 1870. " Stay at home and prepare a mes
sage on the Cuban beUigerency question, to be sub
mitted for the President's consideration, in case he
agreed to send one. He has not yet returned from
his fishing excursion,"
June 13, 1870, " It was generally admitted that if
war is to be resorted to it should be by a direct declar
ration, and not by embarrassing Spain by a declara
tion of beUigerency; agrees unanimously that no con
dition of facts exists to justify beUigerency. FinaUy
the President amends his sentences by referring in
general terms to seizures on the high seas, embargoes
of property, and personal outrages. Robeson adds
the concluding sentences, claiming that the question
of beUigerency is distinct from those questions of
wrongs which are being pressed for indemnification,
and, if not satisfied, they will be made the subject of
a future message. And thus it is agreed that the
message shall be sent in."
In view of the close bearing of the policy at this
time pursued towards Spain on the policy pursued
towards Great Britain, I asked the representatives of
Mr. Fish for any further entries from the diary made
at that time on this topic. In compliance ¦with my
request, the foUowing were furnished.
A cabinet meeting was held on the day following
that of the last passage from the diary quoted in the
Associated Press despatch above referred to : —

218 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
June 14, 1870. "Also read Clinton J. Trues'
(Consul at St. Thomas) despatch, not numbered,
dated April 16. . . . President thinks he may be
removed, and wishes to give the place to a nominee
of Governor Morton. He has wished to give almost
every place, for some weeks past, to some friend of
Morton. He then speaks of the San Domingo treaty ;
his desire for its ratification ; that he wishes all the
members of his Cabinet, and aU his friends, to use aU
proper efforts to aid him ; that he wiU not consider
those who oppose his policy as entitled to influence
in obtaining positions under him : that he ¦wiU not
let those who oppose him ' name Ministers to Lon
don,' etc., etc. ; refers warmly and affectionately to
Babcock, whose innocence of the charges against him
he confidently believes ; speaks very strongly against
Perry, against whom he says grave charges were made
while in the army. . . .
" A general approval is expressed by the members
of the Cabinet, on the announcement of his determi
nation to hold members of the party to the support
of the poUcy of the Administration. (I did not say
so, but hope it may mean something more than San
Domingo.) I did say that I was glad to hear this (it
is what I had recommended some months ago when the
President said he would remove men from New York
Custom House and Post Office, who had been appointed
on recommendation of Evarts and others connected
with the New York Sun; but BoutweU interposed
and prevented the carrying out of this determination),
and hoped it would be applied to the general policy of
the Administration, and referred to the paper read a
short time before from D. C. Forney, and said that

APPENDIX E 219
while J. W. Forney supported the Cuban poUcy,
etc." June 17,1870. " Not an allusion was made at the
Cabinet to Judge Hoar's resignation, or to the pro
ceedings in the House on the ' Cuba ' message ; after
the meeting (Hoar, Cox, Robeson and I, on the por
tico) Hoar and Cox congratulated me most cordiaUy,
saying it was ' the greatest triumph the Administra^
tion had yet achieved.' Robeson said, 'Yes — the
first triumph.' All concur in the opinion that the
movement was wise, and beneficial in its results, that
it has served to concentrate and consoUdate the party,
and to exhibit a policy, and the capacity of rallying
the party. This in truth has been the great want of
the party ; the presentation of some issue on which
they should be required, as party men, to say ' yes '
or ' nay ' distinctly upon some issue presented by the
Administration ; we have not done it before. Each
man has been aUowed to follow his own pecuUar views.
Consequently aU the measures presented by the Ad
ministration thus far have failed. I felt that the
' Cuban ' question was the one on which perhaps
more than on any other, the sensational emotions of
the party and of the country might be arrayed in
opposition to what is honest and right. Believing, as
I do, that the public sentiment, however much influ
enced by questions of sentiment, and of supposed
popular impulse, is sure eventually to be just and
correct, I have pressed this question in the way I
have done, and first tried the proposed message sub
mitted a short time since ; finding the President would
not adopt it, I tried the latter message, and he was
induced with great hesitation, and with much reluc-

220 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
tance, to sign it, and after it was sent in he told me
that he feared he had made a mistake. I never
doubted the propriety of it, nor the ' policy ' of it,
in the mere sense of ordinary politics. It evoked a
fierce debate, and much denunciation, but it evoked
also much good sense, in the speeches of those who
sustained it ; an expression of good, sound internar
tional law, and of honesty of purpose, and it brought
the gravity of the case to the consideration of Con
gress ; and the Administration, after the severest
debate on a question of Foreign Policy which has
occurred for years, was triumphantly sustained. In
the mere and the low sense, of a political or partisan
question, it has consolidated the party, and those who
are the demagogues and the disorganizers, — the men
who foUow a party so long as they can control it. In
a higher view, it has shown that the representatives
of the country can rise above the temporary and fer
vent appeals of a momentary excitement of popular
sympathy in support of the obligations of national
duties, and in the line and direction of honesty and of
right, even when opposed by clamor, and by appeals
to passion. Most sincerely am I thankful for the
result, and that I have been a very humble instrument
in bringing it to its conclusion. I have been most
grossly maligned and assailed. At times I have been
inclined to retire and abandon the cause, but I have
felt it a duty to stand or faU with what I felt to be a
principle. The office I hold has no attractions for
me ; it is attended with immense labor, with great
sacrifices of comfort, and of personal and family asso
ciations, with privations of pursuits with which I had
surrounded myself, and which were congenial to my

APPENDIX E 221
tastes and my years. . . . Most gladly would I be
relieved of its honors, and its labors, its responsi
bilities, and the constant criticisms and misrepresen
tations to which its incumbent is exposed. If I could,
now, to-day, when the vote of Congress has emphatic-
aUy sustained me, with a consciousness of duty, resign,
I would follow Hoar's example, and send a written
note, declaring myself once more free from official
duties and responsibilities. I do not quite yet see the
road clear. I hope to do so soon. I certainly shaU
find it open before long.
" While at dinner Judge Hoar called. He goes
home this evening, to return, and remain in office untU
the end of July.
" The public announcement of his resignation, he
tells me, was ' owing to one of the leaks at the White
House — that the President had given his reply to
one of the confidential clerks to be copied, and thus
it had gotten out ; ' hearing it had been telegraphed
to the public prints in New York, and thus given to
the world, he had advised the immediate nomination
of his successor, to relieve the President from the
importunity which would otherwise foUow. He said
that he caUed for the purpose of urging me ' under
all circumstances to hold fast,' and added most kindly
and flatteringly, that I was ' the bulwark now stand
ing between the Country and its destruction.'
" This may be very complimentary, but while I am
trying to do my duty, I can by no means accept either
the compliment or the responsibility — (I mean before
very long to retire from the Cabinet, and from all
public position) . I told the Judge that I did not feel
that I could much longer stand the labor, and the

222 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
annoyance and abuse of official position. With great
apparent (and I doubt not sincere) earnestness he
urged me not to think of lea'ving. But there is a
time in a man's life when he must leave public ser
vice, and there is a time when he ought to leave it,
and a time when he is entitled to leave it. I con
scientiously think that one of the two latter has very
nearly, if not quite, arrived in my case. If there be
no other ground for this opinion, I may honestly say
'the wish is Father to the thought.' I should be
infinitely happier out of office.
" In the evening the President came to see me. . . .
Again referring to the difference of views ¦with regard
to ' San Domingo,' he expressed regret that Boutwell
had not been present on Tuesday when he spoke of
his expected assistance from the Members of his Cabi
net ; said I had always given him aid with regard
to it. (I have certainly been loyal to a measure of
policy which he inaugurated, and after it was entered
upon have done what I could to sustain it. I might
have paused before entering upon it, and think it has
been embarrassed unnecessarily by the interference of
those who were not properly charged with the manage
ment of such negotiations, and by the intervention of
some persons whose standing had not increased public
confidence.) He also said that Belknap, Robeson and
Cresswell had sustained it. That there was no man
whom he loved more than Governor Cox, but regretted
he had not given the Treaty his support. He referred
to the newspaper rumors of further changes in the
Cabinet, and that reporters had called upon him
yesterday to inquire as to them ; said he had given
Mr. Gobright (Agent of the Associated Press) the

I'
APPENDIX E 223
correct statement, and asked if I had read it ; the New
York Times of this morning was lying on my table,
and I read Gobright's article, and the correspondence
between Hoar and him ; he says Gobright's article is
substantiaUy correct. Taking up the subject of news
paper rumors, and newspaper reporters, I say that I
had observed the rumors with respect to myself, and
had been ¦visited last evening by many reporters, and
I now desired again to repeat what I had more than
once before said to him, that I should be glad to
withdraw from the Cabinet, and would do so at any
moment when he would accept my resignation. He
replied, ' I wiU tell you when I want to do so — don't
speak of it until then.' I answered that it was a
laborious position, f uU of responsibilities, and without
thanks, exposing one to great abuse and misrepresen
tation, and I could not stand it much longer. He said
that he was aware of the thanklessness of the position,
and could understand that nothing, but a sense of
duty, would retain a man in the position of a Cabinet
Minister. He would not, however, listen to my wish
to withdraw. . . .
" I referred to the recent debate and vote in the
House on the Cuban question, and remarked in con
nection therewith, ' I hope that you have no reason to
regret sending the Message.' He replied, ' I like the
vote very much — the debate was violent, and denun
ciatory ; it is strange that men cannot allow others to
differ with them, without charging corruption as the
cause of the difference ; ' pressing the question again
as to the Message, he said, 'No — I think it has done
good ; ' he continued in deprecation of the personaUties
and abuse heaped upon public men ; said he had been

224 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
the subject of investigation (referring to the Davis-
Hatch inquiry, now in progress), and alluded to the
' Gold Speculation.' investigation of some months
back, with a good deal of feeling, and said, ' There is
little inducement other than a sense of duty in hold
ing public position in this country — but for that I
do not know what there is to induce a man to take
either the place I hold, or one in the Cabinet, and
were it not for that I would resign immediately.'
He seemed very weU satisfied with the result of the
Cuban discussion, and said that he observed that Gen
eral Butler had thought proper to disclaim the author
ship of the message for Cushing. I said that the
papers, especially the New York Sun, ascribe every
paper officiaUy written to Cushing, but that as to the
message on Cuban beUigerency, no person whatever
had seen a word of it, until I had read it to him on
Monday morning, except the Attorney-General, that I
wrote it every word ¦with my own hand on Sunday,
and went in the afternoon to Judge Hoar's; read it
to him, and he suggested the change of some three or
four words, only, which change was made,"

APPENDIX Fi
The expression used in the text that " this pre
mised, the course now pursued in the deposition of
Mr. Sumner from the chairmanship of the Com
mittee on Foreign Relations was more than justifi
able; it was necessary, as weU as right," has, since the
publication of this address, been criticised. Friends
and admirers of Mr. Sumner, of whom there are
many, especially in New England, have taken issue on
this point, contending that, under all the circumstances
even yet disclosed, the removal was unprecedented,
and an arbitrary exercise of power by a partisan ma
jority of Republican Senators, acting in obedience to
what was, practicaUy, an executive demand.
By the word " right " in the text, it was meant that
the action taken in this matter was taken for good
and sufficient reasons, and ¦with due regard to those
public interests which should always be the dominat
ing consideration in the minds of legislators, whether
members of the United States Senate or any other
parliamentary body. This conclusion was reached
after a careful examination of the record and the
principles involved ; nor have I seen any reason why
it should be -withdrawn, or in any way modified. In
reviewing the subject, some repetition of statements
made in the text is unavoidable.
The contention on the part of the adherents of Mr.
1 See supra, p. 183.

226 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
Sumner appears to be based upon erroneous premises,
leading to conclusions which would render parlia
mentary government in the United States practically
impossible. Some confusion of thought, as weU as
misapprehension of facts, seems also to pervade many
of the criticisms. It is, in the first place, tacitly,
perhaps unconsciously, assumed that the Senate of
the United States is, in some inscrutable way, a
judicial rather than a legislative body, and that the
chairmen of Senate committees are, by usage and pre
scription, amounting to an unwritten law, entitled to
retain their positions, in any event, untU the poUtical
complexion of the body is so changed that one party
supplants the other as the dominating power. This
subject ¦wiU be discussed presently ; here it is only
necessary to say that no ground whatever exists on
which to rest any such assumption. The United
States has a system of parliamentary government ;
and that term impUes a government by party, the
executive and the legislative being independent of
each other in' theory, but, in practice, expected to
cooperate and work in party harmony. As a rule, and
under normal conditions, it is essential to the proper
management of pubUc business that one political party
should control both departments of government - — the
legislative as well as the executive. If a poUcy is to
be carried out, the two cannot be continually at cross-
purposes. In 1871, a large majority of those composing both
branches of Congress were friendly to the administra
tion of General Grant. They were what are kno^wn,
and properly known, as Administration men, occupying,
in parliamentary language, the government benches.

APPENDIX F 227
In every legislative body, it is weU understood that the
committees should, for the proper transaction of busi
ness, reflect the feelings and sympathies of the whole
body, the majority being dominant in them. If they
faU so to do, they are, and should be, remodeUed so
as to bring the desired result about. This is essen
tial to any successful government by party. While
the Executive may not interfere in any improper
way in the appointment of legislative committees, the
Chief Executive has a perfect right, and, indeed, it is
his duty, to cause members of Congress, whether in
the Senate or the House, to be fuUy informed as to
the policy of the Administration ; and it has been the
practice that the machinery of each body is so ar
ranged as to work in harmony with that policy, and
not in opposition to it. Such has always been the
practice. AU this is elementary.
This being so, it is now contended that Mr. Sum
ner was deposed from the chairmanship of his com
mittee, which he held through usage and under pre
scriptive right, by executive action. In other words,
that President Grant brought his influence to bear
upon a subservient, not to say servile, majority of
the Senate, causing a gross injustice to be done to
an eminent leader of his own party. There is no
evidence on which to base such a contention. This
is apparent from a careful review of the facts as here
tofore disclosed, and it is improbable that any new or
additional facts wiU come to light.
It was asserted at the time, and is stUl asserted,
that the removal of Mr. Sumner was due entirely to
his course in regard to the San Domingo treaty. Of
this, again, there is no evidence. On the contrary, in

228 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
voting against the ratification of the San Domingo
treaty Mr. Sumner acted in unison with a majority
of the Senate, and reflected the views of a majority.
That the San Domingo treaty was the remote cause
of Mr. Sumner's displacement is true. It is not true
that it was the approximate, or moving, cause. The
quarrel — for in the end it became a personal quar
rel, and not a poUtical difference over a specific mea
sure — between Mr. Sumner, General Grant and Mr.
Fish — did, it is true, originate on the San Domingo
question ; but, so far as that issue went, it was an
ordinary political difference. Subsequently, in his
strong desire to secure the ratification of the treaty.
President Grant took the very unusual course of caU
ing upon Mr. Sumner personaUy at his house on an
evening in January, 1871, under the circumstances
fuUy described by Mr. Pierce, and in this paper. What
followed grew out of a difference of recollection be
tween himself and Mr. Sumner as to what then took
place, aggravated by a constitutional incompatibUity
in the tempers of the two men. President Grant
always insisted that Mr. Sumner then promised to
throw his influence in aid of the ratification of the
treaty. There is no question that General Grant was
here in error. Mr. Sumner, taken by surprise, natu
rally spoke in a guarded manner ; and the President
misconstrued his words. Afterwards, the tale-bearers
and gossip-mongers, especially of the White House
military staff, carried to General Grant's ears exag
gerated reports of indiscreet remarks on the part of
Mr. Sumner, for which, there is no question, there
was more or less basis. Subsequently, Mr. Sumner
did not go to the President, and frankly explain his

APPENDIX F 229
position, — a failure on his part for which he after
wards more than once expressed regret. The breach be
tween the two then rapidly widened, and soon involved
Mr. Fish ; for Secretary Fish, acting in loyalty to
the head of the Administration, endeavored to influ
ence Mr. Sumner. This attempt Mr. Sumner met in
a characteristic way ; that is, by charging the Secre
tary with a change of front, and insisting upon it
that, under the circumstances, the proper course for
him to pursue was to resign. This he did in a way
which deeply offended Mr. Fish ; and Mr. Fish had
not a forgiving disposition. The quarrel thus begun
culminated over the papers relating to the dismissal
of Mr. Motley, ending in an open affront put upon
the Secretary of State by the Senator from Massa^
chusetts, at a dinner given by General Schenck, in
January, 1871. At that very time the negotiations
leading to the Treaty of Washington were actively
going on.
Such was the position of affairs in January, 1871.
The Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Rela^
tions of the Senate, as it was then constituted, was
not on speaking terms with either the President or
the Secretary of State. Meanwhile, as stated in the
text, the position of the Chairman of the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate then was, as it
now is, different from that of any other member
of the whole legislative body. The Senate partici
pates in executive functions so far as treaties are con
cerned ; hence it is ob^dously necessary to the proper
conduct of any foreign policy that friendly, and even
intimate, relations should exist between the executive
department and the chairman of that committee ; for

230 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
he of necessity is the spokesman of the Executive on
the floor of the Senate, the Senate alone of the legis
lative department ha^vdng any immediate connection
with foreign policy. All business relating to treaties,
nominations, etc., is thus put in the hands of the
chairman of the committee. He shapes it, brings it
before his committee, and subsequently has charge of
it on the floor of the Senate. Under these circum
stances, it would seem to be so obvious as to caU for
no argument that matters relating to the foreign policy
of the government cannot be properly handled if the
chairman of the Senate committee having them in
charge and the two chiefs of the executive depart
ment do not act in harmony. When the friends of
the Administration, therefore, control the Senate, it is
eminently desirable, if the party to which the Admin
istration and they belong is to be responsible for
a foreign policy, that the Senate Committee on For
eign Relations should be so composed as to act in per
fect accord with the Executive. The friends of Mr.
Sumner contend, however, that, in his case, this was
unnecessary ; that the business of the country could
have been conducted without public detriment by a
chairman who was in open and avowed hostUity to
the Executive, and that, in such case, the Executive
had no good ground of complaint, and, certainly,
would not be justified in urging its friends in the
Senate to readjust the committee so as to give the
Administration a fair chance both to have a pohcy,
and to carry it into effect. This proposition I do not
care to argue. To my mind it is plainly untenable.
That the public business, under such circumstances,
would go on after a fashion, is probable; that it

APPENDIX F 231
would go on as it' should go on, is out of the ques
tion. Such being the facts, a change of assignments hav
ing become expedient, for the proper conduct of pub
lic affairs, it would seem unreasonable to expect the
President to dismiss from the executive councUs the
Secretary of State, and then to resign himself, in
order to make way for others less personally objec
tionable to the chairman of a Senate committee. A
reorganization of the committee, and the transfer of
its chairman to some other field of influence and
usefulness, would seem to offer a more practicable
solution of the trouble. This obvious fact could
hardly fail to suggest itself to the average senatorial
mind. It imphed no indisputable, or even pronounced,
tendency to subserviency. It is a conclusion, on the
contrary, which any seU-respecting man might so
discipline himself as, in time, to reach.
It is obvious that, in the early days of January,
1871, the Executive had not become fully satisfied
that a rearrangement of the Senate committee was
indispensable. Had such a conclusion been reached,
the Secretary of State would not, as he did, have
caUed on the chairman of the Committee on Foreign
Relations to get his views on the subject of the pro
posed negotiation with Great Britain, and, if possi
ble, to gain his support thereto. That proposed ne
gotiation, it must further be borne in mind, was the
cardinal feature in the policy of the Administration at
that time. As such it took precedence. On it the
Administration largely rested its claim for the support
of the country in a presidential election then nearly
impending. For the Secretary of State thus to seek

232 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
the opinion of the chairman of the Committee on
Foreign Relations was unprecedented. Nevertheless,
he did it. Greater deference could not have been
paid. The result of the inter^\dew that foUowed is set forth
in the text. But it is maintained by the friends of
Mr. Sumner that, when he said, as, in his memoran
dum to Mr. Fish he did say, that the " withdrawal of
the British flag cannot be abandoned as a condition
or preliminary " to the proposed negotiation, he should
not have been considered as ha^ving proposed an ulti
matum, as it is called ; and it indicated almost a
degree of moral turpitude on the part of the Secre-
'tary to suppose that he reaUy meant any such thing.
The Secretary, it is contended, should have assumed
that this utterance was on his part a mere diplomatic
pretence, and that subsequently he would prove amen
able to reason, or, at the proper time, change his
mind. Such a process of convenient and surely foreseeable
change is scarcely in accordance ¦with the general
understanding of Mr. Sumner's public record and
mental attributes. He had no sense of humor ; and,
therefore, it was improbable that he could have in
tended his memorandum as a pleasantry. What he
wrote was written after two days of careful considera
tion, in the fuU light of a prolonged oral discussion
with the Secretary. The whole ground had been
gone over. As the result of much meditation, and
acting unquestionably under a grave sense of pubUc
responsibiUty, he then penned his memorandum, than
which it would seem nothing could be more explicit.
The Secretary certainly was justified in assuming that

APPENDIX F 233
the Senator meant what he wrote. Mr. Fish then
found himself in a difficult position. Mr. Sumner
had also said in the memorandum, in a clause not
quoted in the text, that " no proposition [looking to
renewed negotiations] can be accepted unless the
terms of submission are such as to leave no reason
able doubt of a favorable result. There must not be
another failure." In that opinion the Secretary fully
coincided. Mr. Fish, therefore, found himself con
fronted with this proposition : — He was to begin a
negotiation, — which, on no account, should fail of
success, — in the face of an explicit statement of the
chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela
tions that the negotiation in question should be
entered upon only upon a condition, or preliminary,
which, if stated, would bring it at once to a close.
The dilemma was obvious; there was but one course
for the Secretary to pursue. If he proposed to deal
honestly by the British government, making no attempt
to inveigle it into a false position, he must explain the
situation to its representatives fairly and openly, and,
if they then expressed a willingness to proceed, it only
remained for him to pledge the Administration to
carry it to a satisfactory result, if it could, over any
opposition which the chairman of the Committee on
Foreign Relations might have it in his power to offer.
To those who knew Mr. Sumner, it needs no argu
ment to prove that, under the circumstances, it would
have been altogether unjustifiable for the Secretary
to enter into a negotiation, leaving Mr. Sumner as an
unknown quantity in position to control the result.
He had to be eliminated. At least, that was a rea
sonable view to take of the situation ; the only view.

234 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
unquestionably, which would commend itseK to the
military mind of General Grant. He could never have
been disposed to leave a formidable enemy intrenched
in his rear.
The rest followed, naturally and ine^vdtably. After
careful deliberation. Secretary Fish sent for four
leaders of the Senate, two of each party, — Messrs.
Thurman and Bayard on the part of the Opposition,
and Messrs. Conkling and Edmunds representing the
friends of the Administration. With them he con
sulted freely, making plain the situation. They ad
vised together as to the course best to pursue.
All apparently agreed. Naturally, being experi
enced men, skiKul in handling a parUamentary body,
the question at once arose, how the issue could best
be presented. Mr. Sumner's displacement from his
stronghold, the chairmanship of the Committee on
Foreign Relations, was the result to be brought about.
The fact that he was not friendly to the proposed
negotiation could not weU be put forward, in view
of the grounds upon which he rested his opposition.
This was obvious. Under these circumstances, the
parliamentary leaders naturally feU back upon the
very sufficient difficulty apparent in the attempt pro
perly to conduct a foreign policy under a condition
of affairs so wholly unexampled as that then exist
ing. It is said that the removal of Mr. Sumner was
unprecedented. So also, it wiU be agreed, was the
situation. An unprecedented situation can only
apparently be dealt with through exceptional mea
sures of correction.
Under the rules of that body, and the practice of
the government from the beginning, it is customary to

APPENDIX F 235
revise the committees of the Senate every two years,
the terms of one third of the Senators then coming to
a close, and the places of that third being fiUed, either
by reelection or by change of occupant. This peri
odical rearrangement was to be made in March, 1871,
after the Forty-first Congress expired. The matter
was considered in a caucus of Republican Senators, and
the necessity of reorganizing the Committee on For
eign Relations was discussed, upon the grounds stated.
Undoubtedly, the Executive had intimated to its
friends in the Senate that such a change was ui its
judgment necessary to the development of a policy, and
the proper conduct of public affairs. Those affairs
would sustain detriment by a continuance of existing
conditions. It was also right and proper that this
argument in favor of a change should be advanced.
Furthermore, it was right and proper that Senators
should give due consideration to it. To the majority
the argument seemed good ; and the change was made.
This is believed to be a fair statement of the case ;
and, in the light of such statement, it is difficult to
see how any allegation of improper interference of
the Executive in legislative action can be sustained.
It is futile to argue that the Senate is a quasi-judi
cial body, and that the Executive has consequently
no more right to try to influence its members than it
would have to seek to affect the decision of a court of
law by representations made to judges out of court.
The two cases are in no respect analogous. The is
sues before the Senate are political ; the issues before
the court of law are legal. On political issues —
questions of policy — it is the business and duty of
the Executive to try by aU legitimate means to bring

236 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
about harmonious action. The legislative department
should understand thoroughly the purpose and pohcy
of the Executive. In March, 1871, it was notorious
that Mr. Sumner had broken with the Administra
tion. A year later the' break was avowed. He then
went over to the Opposition. In 1871 his proper seat
was, so to speak, below the gangway ; in 1872 it was
on the opposition side of the chamber. Under such
circumstances it is difficult to see how his displace
ment by the act of a majority with whom he was no
longer in sympathy, and whose views he had ceased to
represent, can be characterized as " among the most
unwarrantable, grossly unjust, and inexcusable acts in
our political history." ! Stronger language could not
have been used had Mr. Sumner held his position by
vested right, or judicial tenure. The logical result of
such a contention would be to insist that the so-caUed
" courtesy of the Senate " is one of the precious muni
ments of the Constitution, having no limits and ad
mitting of no exceptions. The displacement of Mr.
Sumner was in disregard of "the courtesy of the
Senate ; " it was, therefore, equivalent to a wilful
infraction of the fundamental law.
That the contrary view here taken is sustained by
men of experience in public life, and after years of
reflection on the facts of this particular case, admits
' D. H. Chamberlain, in the Boston Herald and the Springfield
Republican, of Sunday, February 23, 1902. The paper here referred
to, afterwards published in pamphlet form under the title of " Charles
Sumner and the Treaty of Washington," is by far the most elaborate
and carefully argued discussion of the displacement of Mr. Sumner
from his committee chairmanship which has yet appeared. It is un
necessary to say that the conclusions reached by Govemor Chamberlain
are diametrioaUy opposed to those set forth in this paper.

APPENDIX F 237
of proof. George S. BoutweU, for instance, was at the
time Secretary of the Treasury. Though a member
of Grant's Cabinet, Mr. Boutwell sympathized with
Mr. Sumner on the Dominican issue. He has recently
expressed himself thus as regards the displacement of
Mr. Sumner from his chairmanship : —
" Mr. Sumner's course in regard to the acquisition
of San Domingo contributed to the separation between
the President and the chairman of the Committee on
Foreign Relations, but opposition without personality
would not have produced alienation on the part of the
President. Other Senators were opposed to the acqui
sition of San Domingo, and there were members of his
Cabinet who did not sympathize ¦with his policy, as the
President weU knew ; but those facts in themselves
did not tend in the least to alienation. ... As far as
I have knowledge, you have stated with accuracy the
conditions and circumstances which led to and required
the removal of Mr. Sumner from the head of the Com
mittee on Foreign Relations. The time had come when
Mr. Sumner limited his conversation with the Secre
tary of State to official matters. Such are the require
ments of administration that it is not possible for the
head of a department to conduct the business of his
department, unless he can have fuU and free conversar
tion with the members of committees, not even exclud
ing those who represent a party in Opposition. Inas
much as the hostility which Mr. Sumner entertained
for the Secretary of State extended to the President,
it was not possible that any change of intercourse be
tween the department and the head of the Committee
on Foreign Relations could be effected by the removal
of the Secretary. Hence a change in the chairmanship

238 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
of the Committee on Foreign Relations became a public
necessity, essential to the administration of the govern
ment." George F. Edmunds was, as stated in the text, then
a Senator from Vermont. After thirty-one years of
reflection, Mr. Edmunds has recently expressed himself
as foUows. In reading what he says, it is only neces
sary to bear in mind that many Senators who were
satisfied of the propriety of the act on grounds of pubUc
policy were opposed to it for reasons of party unity.
They felt apprehensive of the Ul feeling it would neces
sarily generate. Mr. Edmunds has said : —
"At the time of the caucus in December, 1870, it
was thought by a majority of the Republican Senators
that the relations between Mr. Sumner and Mr. Fish
had not become so absolutely broken as to prevent the
necessary communications between the Secretary of
State and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign
Relations. When the new Congress came into being,
and the Senate committees had aU expired, and many
changes had taken place in the personnel of the Senate,
and the relations between the Secretary of State and
Mr. Sumner had become entirely severed, it was
thought that the public interest absolutely demanded
that the chairman of the committee should be on terms
of personal good-wiU and civility with the Secretary
of State, and accordingly, aud I think almost unani
mously, the Republican caucus determined not to re
appoint Mr. Sumner, and this, so far as I recollect,
was done without any factional or other inquiry into
whether Mr. Sumner or Mr. Fish were in the wrong ;
and I beUeve that at least three fourths if not nine
tenths of the gentlemen concerned both respected, and

APPENDIX F 239
were on personally friendly terms, with Mr. Sumner,
as I was myself. The rules of the Senate were framed
with the purpose that at the opening of a new Con
gress the Senate should feel perfectly free to make such
changes in the chairmanship and personnel of aU her
committees as should be deemed expedient, without
giving any gentleman a right to complain that he had
been dismissed from office."
John Sherman of Ohio was then, as for many
years afterwards, a leading member of the Senate,
Few were more influential in that body. Writing
over twenty years later, Mr. Sherman said : — " Social
relations between the Secretary of State and Mr,
Sumner had become impossible ; and — considering
human passion, prejudice and feeling — anything like
frank and confidential communication between the
President and Mr. Sumner was out of the question.
A majority of the Republican Senators sided with the
President. . . . When we met in March it was known
that both [the San Domingo and British negotiations]
would necessarily be referred to the Committee on
Foreign Relations, and that, aside from the hostile
personal relations of Mr. Sumner and the Secretary
of State, he did not, and could not, and would not, re
present the views of a majority of his Republican col
leagues in the Senate, and that a majority of his com
mittee agreed ¦with him. Committees are, and ought
to be, organized to represent the body, giving a major
ity of members to the prevailing opinion, but fairly
representing the views of the minority. It has been
the custom in the Senate to allow each party to choose
its own representatives in each committee, and in pro
portion to its numbers. ... In deciding Mr. Sum-

240 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
ner's case, in ¦dew of the facts I have stated, two plans
were urged : —
" First — To place him at the head of the new and
important Committee of Privileges and Elections,
leaving the rest of the Committee on Foreign Rela
tions to stand in the precise order it had been, with
one vacancy to be fiUed in harmony with the majority.
" Second — To leave Mr. Sumner to stand in his
old place as chairman, and to make a change in the
body of the committee by transferring one of its mem
bers to another committee, and fill the vacancy by a
Senator in harmony with the majority.
" My own opinion was that the latter course was the
most polite and just ; but the majority decided, after
fuU consideration and debate, upon the first alter
native." !
Though Mr. Sherman expressed himself in the
subsequent debate in open Senate in terms of strong
opposition to the course pursued, his objection was
based on party considerations. In his judgment the
situation caUed for remedial action ; but not the action
proposed. He preferred to put Mr. Sumner in a
minority, and under guardianship, in the committee of
which he was to remain the nominal head. If he stiU
remained chairman, and, as such, the official mouth
piece of the committee and its intermediary with the
Department of State, this position would certainly
have been to him both embarrassing and mortifying.
He would scarcely have submitted to it. It would seem
more kindly, and scarcely less courteous, squarely to
reorganize the committee ; which, at least, had the
merit of accomplishing the result in ¦view, and avoid-
1 Recollections of Forty Years, vol. i. pp. 471, 472.

APPENDIX F 241
ing unseemly conflicts both in committee and on the
floor of the Senate.
The foUowing extracts from the editorial pages of
the New York Nation — then very critical of the
course pursued by the Administration — give a con
temporary view of the whole matter, and of the per
sonage chiefly concerned : —
" It seems not improbable that an attempt wiU be
made in the Senate to make the settlement of the
Alabama case depend on the willingness of Great
Britain to abandon aU her possessions on this side of
the ocean, including her West Indian Islands. The
germ of this idea made its appearance in the columns
of the Tribune about two years ago, in the shape of a
hint that nothing short of the cession of Canada would
suffice to satisfy the Ajnerican public for the wrongs
it had suffered. The source of this suggestion could
hardly have been doubtful, as it was a natural enough
deduction from Mr. Sumner's statement of the measure
of damages in his famous speech. Under the rule he
laid down, the surrender of Canada indeed would have
only been a moderate atonement. Since then the
conception has grown and expanded until it involves
the total retirement of England from the Western
continent and the adjacent isles ; and Mr. Sumner is
apparently as anxious to connect his name with the
execution of this great scheme as the President is
to connect his with the settlement of the affair in the
ordinary way by the payment of pecuniary damages.
Of course, the production of the plan by the American
commissioners is not at aU likely, as they are aU ra
tional politicians and men of business ; but it is not
at aU unlikely to find supporters enough in the Senate

242 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
to secure the rejection of any treaty the commissioners
may agree on." (February 23, 1871.)
" The main business of the chairman of the Senate
committee is not to negotiate treaties, but to discuss
with the Executive such treaties as have been negoti
ated, and to receive from it explanations about them.
His first business, therefore, is to be a good organ of
communication on this particular class of subjects be
tween the President and Senate, and nobody can be
said to be weU fitted for this duty whose personal rela
tions with the President are of an unpleasant nature.
In fact, we go so far as to say that a proper sense of
his duty, and of the fitness of things, and a proper
appreciation of the delicacy of the machinery of such
a government as ours, might have suggested to Mr.
Sumner the expediency of resigning the chairmanship
as soon as he found himself arrayed in open and bit
ter hostiUty to General Grant. It must be remem
bered that his resigning the chairmanship would not
deprive the Senate of the benefit of his counsels. It
would enable no act of the Administration to escape
his supervision. . . .
" We aUude to his [Sumner's] want of judgment
and want of sense of responsibUity in the use of lan
guage. He talks sometimes in the wildest way, and
apparently without being fuUy conscious of the force
or bearing of what he says. ... It would not be un
natural that, in view of all these facts, and on the eve
of an attempt to settle a most important controversy
with England, in which he has taken a most excited
part, and has given utterance to most extraordinary
views of international law and morality, the Adminis
tration should wish for some friendlier, cahner, and

APPENDIX F 243
more accurate organ of communication with the body"
which is to ratify any treaty it may enter into."
(March 16, 1871.)
" Some fresh light has, however, been thrown on
the causes of the great Sumner-Fish quarrel, by the
new Washington paper, the Capital, whose account
is said to be ' semi-official.' It appears to have arisen
out of an ill-judged attempt of the foolish Fish to get
Sumner to take the English mission and abandon his
opposition to the San Domingo scheme. Sumner, of
course, refused with a pitying smUe. The unhappy
Fish ' left the house a baffled and disappointed man,'
and then went to work to ' insult ' Mr. Motley. After
the appearance of his letter to Moran, however, the
poor old coward did not dare to go near ' the Old Bay
State Lion ' for some time, but at last mustered up
courage to caU at his den to meet Sir John Rose on
official business. The evening passed quietly enough,
and, we are glad to say, ' inteUectuaUy and profita
bly,' and the Fish doubtless thought he was forgiven
and restored to favor. Far from it. After he had
gone, Sumner sat down ' after midnight in the quiet
of his library,' and considered his case afresh, and
came to the conclusion that he ought stiU further to
punish him. This cruel but we presume just decision
reached, the house of Mr. Schenck was chosen for the
execution of the sentence. The judge and culprit met
there at dinner, and in the course of the meal poor
Fish, little knowing what was in store for him, ' made
a frivolous remark about duck and partridge ' across
the table to the ' Numidian Lion ' — for as such it
appears Mr. Sumner figured on this occasion, doubt
less having ascertained that an ' Old Bay State Lion '

244 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
was, to say the least, an anomaly. ' The Lion ' merely
looked at him, and made no reply. ' Fish's weak
nature,' says the chronicler, ' felt the shock.' Small
blame to him, say we ; whose nature would n't ' feel
the shock ' if a Numidian Lion looked at him in
silence across a smaU table ? The effect on American
securities of this dreadful business, we are glad to say,
has not yet been perceptible ; but mighty agencies
work slowly." (March 23, 1871.)

APPENDIX G!
It is curious, as weU as historicaUy interesting, to
trace in the correspondence and memoranda of Mr.
Fish the gradual change of his tone and feeling
towards Mr. Sumner. Their personal as weU as social
relations, as coUeagues in the Senate from 1851 to
1857, have already been referred to.^ Though tak
ing very different views, poUtically and morally, of
the issues of the day, they were intimate.^ Indeed,
in no house in Washington was Mr. Sumner so inti
mate or so welcome as in that of Mr. Fish. The
single term during which the latter served expired
in March, 1857. Twelve years later, in March,
1869, he was unexpectedly called into Grant's cab
inet. He then at once wrote to Mr. Sumner, ex
pressing the earnest hope that he might " rely upon
your friendship and your experience and ability, for
your support and aid to supply my manifold deficien
cies." During the earlier months of Secretary Fish's
tenure of office, the relations between the two were of
the most friendly character, — official, social and per
sonal. Indeed, officiaUy, no Senator had ever been
treated by the head of the State Department in so con
fidential a way, — it might almost be said, a way so
deferential. The first difference arose over the instruc
tions to Mr. Motley, as stated already. Mr. Sumner
1 See supra, p. 187. ^ Supra, p. 106.
' Pierce : Sumner, vol. iv. pp. 375-379.

246 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
on that occasion was, in his peculiar way, distinctly
overbearing ; and Mr. Fish did not conceal his sense
of the fact. It was on the 15th of May, and at the
State Department. After reading the draught of in
structions, Mr. Sumner walked up and down the room,
talking in a most excited way, and declaring that he
would " make Motley resign ; " speaking of the Min
ister to Great Britain as if he was his man, or agent.
To this the Secretary replied, — " Let him resign. I
will put a better man in his place."
Mr. Bancroft Da^vis describes another characteristic
scene which occurred at about this time. Mr. Sumner
one evening had caUed, this time by appointment, at
Mr. Fish's house, to discuss the instructions. When
his visitor rose to go, Mr. Fish accompanied him to the
door. " It was one of those mild evenings in May
which in Washington make the doorsteps so attrac
tive. Standing there, Sumner opened his case. They
talked long. Sumner's voice at last became so loud,
as his feelings were aroused, that Mr. Fish said,
pleasantly : ' Sumner, you roar like the bull of Bashan.
The police wUl be after us. I think we had better
adjourn.' Sumner smiled, and bade him good-night."
AU this occurred in May, nearly eight months before
that after-dinner caU on Mr. Sumner at which the
President tried to secure the Senator's approval of the
Babcock Dominican treaty. During that time the
friction between the Secretary and the Senator had
sensibly increased. Their correspondence was marked
by occasional exhibitions of feeling, indicative of less
cordiality. From January to June, 1870, this tend
ency to a separation developed apace, until, in June,
the President insisted on the recall of Mr. Motley.

APPENDIX G 247
Grant and Sumner had now openly quarreUed. Each
denounced the other. E. R. Hoar, up to that time
Attorney-General in Grant's cabinet, altogether sym
pathizing with Sumner in his opposition to the
West Indian expansion policy, yet maintained his
friendly, as well as official, relations with the Presi
dent. Judge Hoar was wont in after years to describe
with much humor the Washington doorstep interviews
he at that time had with Mr. Sumner. Going to the
house of that gentleman in the evening, his host
would accompany him to the door as he went away,
and there, on one side of Lafayette Square, using the
Attorney-General as a species of buffer between him
and the President, he would, gradually and uncon
sciously, raise his voice until he roared, as Mr. FLsh
expressed it, "like a buU of Bashan." He would
then, in terms equaUy unmeasured and stentorian, de
nounce the man in the White House on the other side
of the Square. It would at times seem, as Judge
Hoar expressed it, as if aU Washington, including
Mrs. Grant, must hear him, and the police would have
to interfere. On the issues now raised, the Secretary of State,
after much hesitation, sided with the President. He
did so with reluctance ; but he was a member of the
Cabinet, and, moreover, as he wrote to a friend at the
time, " I have a very strong affection for the Presi
dent ; he is a very true man, and warm friend, —
accustomed to deal with men of more frankness and
sincerity, and loyalty to a cause, than many of those
whom the business of Washington attracts hither."
He then went on in the same letter thus to refer to
Mr. Sumner : — " Congress is incapable, — suffering

248 THR TREATY OF WASHINGTON
from the want of leadership, and cursed with incap
able aspirants to leadership. Jealousies and disap
pointments develop in old Senators, who exhibit
arrogance, the attendant perhaps of long continuance
in senatorial position. Clay and Benton, each dom
ineered in their day, but they were men capable of
position ; the aspirant to their control, in the present
day, knows nothing but books, and not over-much of
them." This was written on the 23d of June, 1870,
fifteen months after Grant's inauguration. Within the
ten days preceding on foUo-wing, the Dominican treaty
was rejected by the Senate, and the resignation of the
Attorney-General, and the Minister to Great Britain,
called for. Though, in the Dominican matter. Judge
Hoar had not seen his way to foUow the same course
of loyalty to the head of the administration which Mr.
Fish had pursued, he recognized the fact that groimds
might exist for an honest difference of opinion, and
retained a warm friendly regard for Mr. Fish person
ally as weU as great respect for his character and
ability ; a respect which he always afterwards felt,
and did not fail freely to express. The evening of
the second day after that upon which he had, in re
sponse to the President's somewhat curt request, sent
In his resignation. Judge Hoar, as elsewhere appears,!
caUed on Mr. Fish to explain the reasons thereof, and
to urge him " under all circumstances to hold fast ; "
earnestly adding in language already quoted that in
his judgment the Secretary of State was "the bul
wark now standing between the Country and Its
destruction." It was characteristic of the two men
that Mr. Sumner was at the same time roughly de-
1 Supra, p. 221.

APPENDIX G 249
mandlug of Mr. Fish why, under the circumstances
In which he found himself placed, he did not forth
with resign.
On this point, Mr. Fish, fortunately, hearkened to
the appeal of Judge Hoar, disregarding the suggestion
of Mr. Sumner. But the breach between him and
the latter was now fast widening. Five weeks later,
on the 6th of August, Mr. Fish thus wrote to Senator
Howe of Wisconsin : —
" Mr. Sumner, I fear, is implacable. I passed an
hour in his study the evening before I left Washing
ton, His general tone towards me was very friendly,
and my farewell was cordial and kind as ever. But
he was very severe towards the President, and In one
or two outbursts of rhetorical denunciation he included
me and any one connected with the Administration.
I am quite convinced that on such occasions, he is
not conscious of the extent and violence of his expres
sions, and is not wholly the master of himself. . . .
With large abUIty, high culture, extended reading, and
remarkable power of oratory, he lacks knowledge of
men, is overborne by much vanity (much of It quite
justifiable), is arrogant and domineering, and these
qualities increase with years. He has no one of the
peculiar elements essential for leadership, to which he
thinks that his long service, and his admitted abil
ity, entitle him. . . . Under the name of Mr. Perley
Poore, he has made a publication neither generous nor
frank. I should have been quite justified In noticing
It and denouncing it, and should have done so but for
my desire to avoid anything to confirm him In his
estrangement or his antagonism to the Administration,
and for my determination to avoid, if practicable.

250 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
being brought personaUy into controversy with one
with whom for many years I have had such friendly
relations, and who has so many very fine qualities.
... I Intend not to lose him as a personal friend.
I ¦wish not to lose him as a political associate and co
worker." In the same spirit Mr. Fish some three weeks later
(August 25) wrote from his home at Garrison to
Senator MorrlU of Vermont : —
" I had several very friendly interviews with him
[Sumner], and made statements to the very limit that
the confidence of my official position would aUow, and
which ought to satisfy any sensible man. But on the
subject of Mr. Motley's removal, and on his own relar
tions with the President, I cannot regard Mr. S. as
either a reasonable or a reasoning man. He fell back
always from the facts I presented to a severe expression
of feeling, and some rhetorical phrase. He seemed to
me determined to consider himself the cause and the
object of all that had been, or might be, done. ... I
am not insensible of his arrogance and overbearing
temper, but I know, too, his extended Uterary attain
ments, his power of eloquence, and his many good
qualities, aud should deeply regret on his own ac
count, and on that of the Republican party, that at
this late day he should fall from the faith."
FinaUy, on the 6th of September following, he
wrote again, still to Senator Morrill : —
" He [Sumner] is of great value and importance to
us ; but, unfortunately, he thinks that value and im
portance to embrace the existence of the party. . . .
He nourishes his supposed griefs, and seems to take
comfort In Imagining everything that is done ¦without

APPENDIX G 251
him, or contrary bo his wishes, as a personal offence."
This letter was probably received by Senator Morrill
on the 7th of September. WhUe it was lying on his
table, there came to him from Mr. Sumner a most
characteristic effusion, dated the 8 th, to which, two
days later, he referred, in reply, as foUows : — " You
characterize [the President's] acts, and that with
severity ^ — -perhaps with greater severity than you are
aware of. Your words must leap out in your conver
sation, and they wiU inevitably reach the ears of the
President. 'Brutality,' 'indignity,' 'offensive,' 'utterly
indefensible conduct,' ' excuses, apologies, and reasons
which are obviously pretexts, subterfuges, and after
thoughts,' would make any man's ears tingle. It may
be too much to ask you to forget and forgive : but I
think it might be wise to let the subject ' alone se
verely.' " !
This excellent advice Mr. Sumner could not fol
low ; and, in the course of the next few weeks, inci
dents of personal intercourse apparently occurred which
brought matters to a crisis. Though not a man of
aggressive disposition, Mr, Fish seems, when aroused, to
have had In him a strong infusion of that stubbornness
so characteristic of the Dutch stock. He also was
resentful of what he regarded as affronts ; and of
anything of the nature of personal insult, he was un
forgiving. In view of past friendly relations he bore
much from Sumner, as being Sumner's way, but,
finaUy, the limit seems on some occasion to have been
passed. Thereafter, the sense of personal exaspera^
tion on the part of the Secretary of State was not less
1 " Notable Letters from my Political Friends," by Justin S. Mor
rill, The Forum, vol. xxiv. p. 409 ; December, 1897.

252 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
than that felt by the President ; and when Mr. Bout
well, the head of the Treasury, truthfuUy as weU as
charitably, suggested that Mr. Sumner was apt to for
get what he said, Mr. Fish sharply replied, — " Sum
ner is crazy. He is a monomaniac upon aU matters
relating to his own importance, and his relations to
the President." Mr. Sumner and Roscoe ConkUng,
then Senator fi-om New York, were naturally antago
nistic. As Rufus Choate would have phrased it, they
disliked each other, not for cause, but peremptorUy.
To Conkling, Mr. Fish now said, — " Sumner is par
tially crazy. Upon a certain class of questions, and
wherever his own importance or influence are con
cerned, or anything relating to himself, or his own
views, past or present, or his ambition, he loses the
power of logical reasoning, and becomes contradictory,
violent, and unreasoning. That is mental derange
ment." This evidence of such contemporaries as Mr. Dana
and Mr. Fish, both during long periods warm per
sonal as weU as close political friends of Mr. Sumner,
is highly suggestive. It affords indications of mental
methods and characteristics which, explaining much,
would in no wise be inferred from anything to be
found in the elaborate biography of Mr. Pierce. Cer
tainly, neither General Grant nor Mr. Fish were
considered among their contemporaries men difficult
to get on with, or prone to take offence. They were
both, at the outset, most solicitous of Sumner's friend
ship and support. They were anxious to concUiate
him. Grant and Sumner never were on terms of
personal Intimacy. They had little in common. But
the same is hardly less true of Grant and Fish. They

APPENDIX G 253
saw nothing of each other sociaUy, in later years, when
both were residents of the same city. Simply, they
were not congenial natures. But, in the early months
of his presidency, Grant was sincerely desirous of being
on good terms with Sumner. Hence the appointment
of Motley ; hence the unfortunate after-dinner visit in
January, 1870. Yet, all this being unquestionably
so as late as January, 1870, in January, 1871, —
twelve months afterwards only, — neither President
nor Secretary was on speaking terms ¦with the Sena
tor. The differences had become personal and bitter.
This was suggestive.
The simple fact was that Mr. Fish, instinctively
and unconsciously, knew how to deal with Grant, and
how to accomplish results which depended on him.
Mr. Sumner did not. He was essentiaUy aggressive ;
and General Grant resented aggressiveness. His
friends, while greatly admiring his strong and brUliant
qualities, could not but be conscious of his foibles ; they
did not, however, state them in the somewhat direct
language used by Mr. Fish. On the contrary, they
indulged in much circumlocution. For instance. Sen
ator Hoar of Massachusetts, almost a disciple of Mr.
Sumner's, once said of him : — "It has always seemed
to me as if Mr. Sumner thought the RebeUion was put
down by a few speeches he made in the Senate, and
that he looked upon the battles fought as the noise of
a fire-engine going by whUe he was talking." Mr.
Schurz furnishes a curious illustration of this idio
syncrasy. The renomination of President Grant was,
in 1872, a foregone conclusion, Mr, Sumner felt
impeUed to take ground against it In a speech. Mr.
Schurz then says : — " When, shortly before the Na-

254 THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON
tional Republican Convention of 1872, he had deliv
ered in the Senate that fierce philippic for which he
has been censured so much, he turned to me with the
question, whether I did not think that the statement
and arguments he had produced would certainly exer
cise a decisive Influence on the action of that conven
tion. I replied that I thought It would not. He was
greatly astonished — not as If he indulged in the delu
sion that his personal word would have such authorita
tive weight, but it seemed impossible to him that opin
ions which in him had risen to the fuU strength of
overruling convictions . . . should faU powerless at
the feet of a party which so long had foUowed inspira
tions kindred to his own. Such was the ingenuousness
of his nature."
Yet Mr. Sumner was essentiaUy a man of large,
kindly nature, and generous impulses. He felt slights
keenly, and made personal issues; but he did not
bear malice, nor was he smaU or ¦vindictive. A curi
ous IUustration of this occurred in the experience of
George F. Edmunds of Vermont, whose first fuU term
in the Senate coincided with Sumner's uncompleted
last term. Mr. Edmunds, it will be remembered, was
one of those in the confidence of Secretary Fish dur
ing the incipient negotiations which led up to the
Treaty of Washington. Active in effecting the reor
ganization of the Committee on Foreign Relations, he
had taken part adversely to Mr. Sumner in the debate
on that subject. He subsequently, in a familiar letter,
thus described what thereupon occurred: — "It is true
that I was visited with Mr. Sumner's resentment of
my connection -with the change, for he absolutely cut
my acquaintance ; which was not renewed until some

APPENDIX G 255
months afterwards, when, in vacation, we suddenly
met in a New York omnibus, and he at the moment
had forgotten my wickedness, and we cordiaUy shook
hands ; and were on the friendliest terms for the rest
of his Ufe."

Ill
A NATIONAL CHANGE OF HEART i
A TERRIBLE and tragic episode in our national life
has burned itself into history since the last meeting
of the Society, — the assassination of President Mc-
Kinley. Twice before have we, in common with
the whole land, been shocked by Uke occurrences.^
At the time of both, Mr. Winthrop occupied this
chair ; ^ and, on each occasion, fitting resolutions, sub
mitted by him and unanimously adopted, were spread
upon our records. From the precedents thus estab
lished I propose to deviate ; not that I have faUed to
sympathize in the outburst of feeling this truly terrible
event has excited, or the expressions elicited by It ;
but, on now reading the resolutions heretofore passed
on similar occasions, they seem to me, though dra'wn
with aU Mr. Winthrop's accustomed felicity, unequal
to the occasion, — in one word, almost of necessity,
formal, conventional, perfunctory. I also feel that I
could not express myself more adequately. Of Presi
dent McKInley aU has in this way been said that can
be said : —
1 A paper read before the Massachusetts Historical Society, at its
monthly meeting, October 10, 1901.
^ April 20, 1865, following the death of President Lincoln ; and
October 13, 1881, foUowing that of President Garfield.
^ Robert C. Winthrop was President of the Massachusetts Histori
cal Society from 1855 to 1885.

A NATIONAL CHANGE OF HEART 257
" Duncan is in his grave ;
After life's fitful fever he sleeps well ;
Treason has done his worst ; nor steel, nor poison,
Malice domestic, foreign levy, nothing,
Can touch him further."
He cannot hear ; and, as to her for whom the latter
years of the dead President's life were one long record
of affectionate, self-sacrificing care, no formaUy set
down words of mine could add one iota to the expres
sion of sympathy — deep and prolonged as sincere —
which has already gone forth. This being so, sUence
seems best.
StiU, to one aspect of this awe-impeUing tragedy I
wish to call attention, for that aspect has to my mind
an historic interest. Perhaps, already discussed, it is an
old story ; if such is the case I can only excuse myself
on the ground that, having been absent from the coun
try, and only just returned to it, I am less informed
as to what has been said than I otherwise might have
been. But, when some event like this last murder of
a high official startles and shocks the whole civUized
world, the first impulse always is to attribute its oc
currence to present conditions, — moral or material, —
to some circumstance or teaching or appliance peculiar
to the day, — and to ask in awe-struck tones, — To
what are we coming ? Whither do tendencies lead ?
In what will they result? So, as of genuine historical
interest, in this connection, I want to caU attention to
the very noticeable fact that this murder of President
McKInley by the wretched, half-^wItted Czolgosz has
no significance whatever, as respects either cause or
method, in connection with the times in which we live,
its destructive appliances, or its moral instruction.
This, somewhat curiously, is true not only of President

268 A NATIONAL CHANGE OF HEART
McKinley's assassination, but of all the assassinations
of a like nature, ¦with two exceptions, which have oc
curred within the last half century. Of such, I easUy
recall eight : (1) The Orsini attempt on Napoleon III.
in 1858, which resulted in numerous deaths, though
the person aimed at escaped unharmed ; (2) the slay
ing of President Lincoln In 1865 ; (3) that of the
Czar Alexander II. in 1881 ; (4) that of President
Garfield three months later In the same year ; (5) that
of President Carnot In 1894 ; (6) that of the Empress
Elizabeth of Austria in 1898 ; and (7, 8) those of
King Humbert in 1900, and, more recently, of Presi
dent McKInley.
This is truly enough the age of advance, — scientific
and intellectual. Strange doctrines are promulgated,
and vridely preached. There is a freedom given to
utterances, at once wild and subversive, the like of
which the world has not known before ; we do not be
lieve in the suppression of talk ; the press disseminates
incendiary doctrines broadcast among the partially ed
ucated, and the half, where not wholly, crazed. Then,
in its turn, science has put the most deadly and de
structive of appliances within easy reach of the Irra^
tional or reckless. Yet, of all the attempts I have
enumerated, two only have borne an earmark of this
age. The Orsini conspiracy of 1858 and the death of
the Czar Alexander in 1881 brought into play imple
ments of destruction unknown to former generations ;
the other six cases out of the eight had no features in
any respect different from similar crimes of the long
past. The impulses, the methods, and the weapons of
Booth and Guiteau, in 1865 and 1881, were identical
in every way with those of Gerard and Ravaillac in

A NATIONAL CHANGE OF HEART 259
1584 and 1610, three centuries before. They had In
them nothing epochal, — nothing pecuUar to the dy
namitic age. Consider, in the first place, the aim of
the assassin, the object of his animosity, — McKInley
and Garfield were neither tyrants nor despots ; nor
were WiUiam the Silent and Henry of Navarre. On
the contrary, all those named were men of a merciful,
not to say singularly genial disposition. Beneficent
as rulers and magistrates, they were in the popular
mind connected with no severities towards individuals.
In not one of these cases had the assassin, directly or
indirectly, immediately or remotely, suffered injury at
the hands of his victim. It was the same with Lincoln
and Carnot, Humbert and Elizabeth. In aU these in
stances, moreover, the weapons used in killing, if not
Identical, were common to the earlier and the later
period. Henry of Navarre in 1610, President Carnot
in 1894, and Elizabeth of Austria in 1898, were mur
dered by thrusts of a poniard ; William of Orange In
1584, King Humbert In 1900, and Presidents Lincoln,
Garfield and McKInley, all within forty years, met
their deaths from pistol-shots. In no one of these
tragedies did the modern high explosive play any part.
They were all ordinary shootings or stabbings of the
old style.
Nor was it otherwise as respects motive. The more
recent instances developed nothing peculiar to any
age or doctrines, except that in the earlier cases the
crun,^ originated In a morbid fanaticism born of reli
gious zeal ; whereas, in the later, social and anarchis
tic teachings had taken the place of theological. In
the process of human development, or evolution as we
call it, the same character of mind was set in action to

260 A NATIONAL CHANGE OF HEART
a like end by a common diseased impulse, only under
another name. There is no new factor at work :
merely the teaching of social rights now operates, in
a certain order of brooding minds, as the teachings
of theology once did on minds of the same temper.
So far as these recent murders are concerned, the
world and human nature have, therefore, undergone
no change. The Czolgosz of 1901 is the Gerard of
1584 reembodied, but actuated by the same impulse,
and armed with his old weapon ! Luccheni is Ravail
lac. The three centuries between introduced no ele
ment of novelty. Indeed, the thought this recent
murder has most forced on me has been one of sur
prise, on the whole, that such things so rarely happen.
Here in America are now seventy miUions of people,
— gentle and simple, rich and poor, sane and Insane,
healthy and morbid ; of those seventy miUions not a
few are men who, like Macbeth's hired assassin, might
truthfuUy enough declare themselves of those
' ' Whom the vile blows and bnfEets of the world
Have so incensed that I am reckless what
I do to spite the world ; "
and, when thus thought of, it seems cause for genu
ine surprise that among those seventy miUions there
do not more frequently develop single individuals —
some one person in the half million — ¦ who, seized in
his brooding moments with the homicidal mania,
asserts his equality and his hate by striking at the
most shining mark. To my mind, contemp]|itIng
mankind as an Infinitely varied and well-nigh count
less mass, it Is the rarity of these attempts in our day,
not their occasional occurrence, which should excite
our special wonder.

A NATIONAL CHANGE OF HEART 261
At the time of the assassination of the President,
I chanced to be in England, having left home on
the 10th of August. It was a vacation trip ; and,
in the course of it, I thus had some opportunity to
witness that singular, and very suggestive, outburst
of sympathy and fellow-feeling on the part of our kin
beyond the sea, which was so marked a feature of
that unhappy episode. On Thursday, September 19,
I was in London, and present at the memorial ser
vices in Westminster Abbey. Certainly, they were
most impressive. Seated in the choir, I was not in
position to see the nave of the Abbey, except in part
and by glimpses ; but, throughout the solemn obser
vances of that day and place, an atmosphere of genu
ine sympathy and deep feeling pervaded the great
assembly. Every nook and corner was occupied ; a
sense of awe was apparent. The day had been dull
and obscure, — a September noon in London, — but,
towards the close of the ceremonial, as the solemn
tones of the great organ, intermingled with the re
sponses of the choir, rolled up through the arches of
the vaulted roof, the clouds broke away without, and
the sun shone down through the windows of stained
glass on the vast congregation below. It was Mil
ton's " dim religious light ; " and the dusky atmos
phere seemed laden with the smoke of incense, as the
chant of the choir died slowly away.
To me personaUy, however, this outburst of English
sentiment towards the United States and aU things
American — the demonstration of an undemonstra
tive people — contained within itself much food for
thought. I freely acknowledge I have seen nothing
like it. And, as my eyes witnessed the Present,

262 A NATIONAL CHANGE OF HEART
memory called the Past to mind. What, I could not
but ask myself, did It signify ? In what did It origi
nate ? Was it merely external ? Was it matter of
poUcy ? Or did it indicate a true change of heart ?
And if a change of heart, to what was that change
due ?
My thoughts then reverted to remote days and
other experiences, now, in Great Britain, quite for
gotten, — memories stiU fresh with me, though a gen
eration has since passed on. I recaUed my first
experiences in England far back in the " sixties," —
in the dark and trying days of our Civil War ; and
again, more recently, during the commercial depres
sion, and contest over the free coinage of silver, in
1896. Then, especially In the earlier period, nothing
was too opprobrious — nothing too bitter and sting
ing — for English lips to utter of America, and men
and things American.! "^g were, as the Times, echo
ing the utterances of the governing class, never wear
ried of telling us, a " dishonest " and a " degenerate "
race, — our only worship was of the Almighty Dollar.
A hearty dislike was openly expressed, in terms of
contempt which a pretence of civUity hardly feigned
to veU. They openly exulted in our reverses ; our
civilization was, they declared, a thin veneer ; demo
cracy, a bursted bubble. In true Pharisaic spirit they
made broad their phylacteries, thanking God that
they were not as we, nor we as they. AU this I dis
tinctly recaUed ; It was the atmosphere — frigid, con-
1 See supra, pp. 74r-79; also Life of C. F. Adams, American
Statesmen Series, pp. 291-305 ; for a collection of parliamentary
utterances from the pages of Hansard, see Blaine : Twenty Years of
Congress, vol. ii. pp. 478-481.

A NATIONAL CHANGE OF HEART 263
temptuous, condescending — in which I had first lived
and moved in London. And now what a change ! —
and so very sudden I Nothing was too good or too
compUmentary to say of America. Our representa
tives were cheered to the echo. In the language of
Lord Rosebery, at the King Alfred miUenary celebra
tion at Winchester, on the day following the Mc
KInley observances, the branches of the great Anglo-
Saxon stock were clasping hands across the centuries
and across the sea ; and the audience applauded him
loudly as he spoke.!
The heartiness was all there. That at least admit
ted of no question. But what did It mean? Why had
this people so suddenly awakened to a kinship, in
which formerly they had felt something in no way
akin to pride ? It was over this I pondered. At last
I evolved an expla,natIon, mistaken, perhaps, — I may
say probably mistaken, — but still plausible, and to me
satisfactory. At the risk, perchance, of seeming un
gracious, — of appearing to respond somewhat unfeel
ingly to an outburst of genuine sympathy on the part
^ Mr. E. L. Godkin, formerly editor of the Nation, called atten
tion to this great change of tone in the very last published communi
cation from his pen, dated Lyndhurst, England, July 31, 1901, printed
in the New York Evening Post of the 10th of the foUowing month.
Mr. Godkin is peculiarly qualified to speak on this point. A Briton...
by birth, he has, after long residence in this country, been a frequent
visitor in England during recent years, returning there recently in fail
ing health. " The American," he wrote in the letter referred to, " who
in any profession enjoys ever so slight a distinction at home, has little
idea what a great man he is untU he comes to England. It is, how
ever, just as well for him in this respect that he comes now instead of
ten years earlier. . . . At the present time American fortunes, and
freedom in distributing them, and wide financial operations generaUy,
have so captured the English imagination that they now hasten to
embrace indiscriminately the cousins whom they snubbed for a cen
tury, and to pronounce them and their works good, one and all."

264 A NATIONAL CHANGE OF HEART
of a kindred people, calling on us to forgive and for
get the iU-considered utterances and unwise policy of
another time, I purpose here to put my much pon
dered explanation coldly on record.
In the first place let me premise, and, in so doing,
emphasize, my sense of the Uttle worth of the judg
ment of an individual, and that indmdual an alien,
on what may be the feeling of any community, taken
in the aggregate, on a question which does not at once
absorb and concentrate attention. Even in our own
country, except when deeply stirred by some outburst
of patriotism or sympathy, — a common Impulse sweep
ing over the land, and bending minds as a strong
gust inclines one way a field of ripening grain, — ex
cept on occasions such as this, we know how little real
insight the average man has into what is passing In
the minds of those among whom he has from his birth
lived and moved. We all are conscious of that sense
of weariness which almost daUy comes over us when
we read, in editorial parlance, what the American Peo
ple have made up their minds to do or not to do, —
to have or not to have. On this point the average
journalist Is always fuUy advised. His insight is in
fallible. To his conclusions, knowing by long expe
rience their utter worthlessness, we pay no attention.
Yet not an American goes to Europe for a vacation
trip, but he comes home f uUy convinced that he knows
more or less of the tendencies of foreign thought.
Yet all the insight he has, has been picked up from
newspapers and conversations in the railway carriage
or the smoking-room. It is true that, in the case of
Great Britain, descended from one parent stock, we
speak the same language. None the less, an Amer-

A NATIONAL CHANGE OF HEART 265
ican in Great Britain must almost of necessity draw
his inferences as to Great Britain as a community
from casual sources alid a narrow range of observa
tion. He may read the Times and the Saturday
Review, or the News and the Spectator; he may
have an introduction into English domestic and social
life, passing as a guest from one great house to an
other ; he may mix in business or financial circles, and
be familiar with " the city ; " he may belong to the
church, and breathe the atmosphere of the close or
the university ; he may be a non-conformist, and so
frequent the conventicle : — and yet, when all is said
and done, he Is still a stranger in a strange land. In
spite of himself, except it be as the result of a long
and varied sojourn, he necessarily draws his conclu
sions largely from matters of accident, — chance con
versations overheard or participated in at hotels and
in clubs, in waiting-rooms and in railway carriages, —
unsigned communications in copies of papers he may
pick up, — or even from talking with bagmen, waiters,
cab-drivers, and casual travelUng companions. In this
way what may be caUed the general drift of public
opinion, so far as it reaches him, finds its expression.
Much undoubtedly in such cases depends, also, on the
individual ; for, though every one is apt to generalize
from his individual experience, not aU men are either
sympathetic or approachable. Yet, aUowing for aU
these peculiarities of the Indmdual, — these kaleido
scopic chances of travel, — certain large features stand
forth and impress themselves ; some general infer
ences may at times not unsafely be drawn.
I think I know the Englishman fairly weU ; at any
rate, I have known him through personal contact for

266 A NATIONAL CHANGE OF HEART
over thirty years. I may add that I like him ; and,
individually, I think he does not dislike me. We cer
tainly get on fairly well together. About him and
her there is a downrightness, sometimes, it is true, bor
dering on brutality, which commands my respect. He
does not conceal his feelings. He is not good at play
ing policy. But, high or low, gentle or simple, rich
or poor, the EngUshman and the Englishwoman re
spect and admire the wealthy, the successful, the mas
terful. This is natural, for the English themselves
are essentiaUy masterful. They are also a commercial
people. Of late years the struggle for life In Great
Britain, as elsewhere, has become more intense, — the
cost of Uving higher, — the social scales more exact
ing. There, as in America, wealth, and the possession
of wealth, has become a larger and larger factor in the
common existence ; and the newspaper, with its elab
orate daily accounts of what is taking place among
the rich and the fashionable, has distorted ideals. Now,
of recent years, — since, we wIU say, the close of our
Civil War, or 1870, — no people on earth have been
comparably so successful as the Americans in the
rapid accumulation of wealth, none have sho^wn them
selves more masterful ; and, as he has more and more
so shown himself, the Englishman has undergone a
change of feeling towards him, — and this change Is,
I believe, real. Whether real or not, it certainly is
sudden. The outward expression is of recent date ;
but the influences which have gradually brought it
about have been a good whUe at work. The change,
as now witnessed, may, I think, be traced to one re
mote and several immediate causes. I wiU enumerate
some of the more prominent.

A NATIONAL CHANGE OF HEART 267
The first was the outcome of our gigantic, prolonged
CivU War. At one stage of that struggle, America
— loyal America, I mean — touched its lowest estate
in the estimation of those caUed, and in Great Britain
considered, the ruling class, — the aristocracy, the
men of business and finance, the army and navy, the
members of the learned professions.! None the less,
they then saw us accomplish what they had in every
conceivable form of speech pronounced " impossible."
We put down the RebeUion with a strong hand ; and
then, peacefuUy disbanding our victorious army, made
good our every promise to pay. We accomplished
our results in a way they could not understand, — a
way for which experience yielded no precedent. None
the less, the dIsUke, not unaUoyed by contempt, was
too deep-rooted to disappear at once, much more to
be immediately transmuted Into admiration and cor
diality. They waited. Then several striking events
occurred in rapid succession, — aU within ten years.
I am no admirer of President Cleveland's Venezu
ela diplomacy. I do not like brutality in public any
more than in private dealings. Good manners and
courtesy can always be observed, even when firmness
of bearing is desirable. None the less, bad for us as
the precedent then established was, and yet wiU prove,
there can be no question that, so far as Great Britain
was concerned, the tone and attitude on that occasion
adopted were productive of results at once profound
and, in some ways, beneficial. The average EngUsh
man from the very bottom of his heart respects a man
who asserts himself, — provided always he has the wIU,
as weU as the power, to make the self-assertion good.
1 Supra, pp. 62, 63.

268 A NATIONAL CHANGE OF HEART
This, as a result of our Ci^dl War, they felt we had.
We had done what they had most confidently pro
claimed we could not do, and what they, in their
hearts, feel they have failed to do. Throughout our
Rebellion they had Insisted that, even if the conquest
of the Confederacy was possible, — which they de
clared it manifestly was not, — the pacification of the
Confederates was out of the question. They thought,
also, they knew what they were talking about. Had
they not for centuries had Ireland on their hands ?
Was it not there now ? Were they not perpetuaUy
floundering in a bottomless bog of Hibernian discon
tent ? Would not our experience be the same, except
on a larger scale and in more aggravated form ? The
result worked out by us whoUy belled their predic
tions. Not only was the rebellion suppressed, but
the Confederates were quickly conciliated. The Brit
ish could not understand It ; in the case of the Trans
vaal they do not understand it now. They merely see
that we actually did what they had been unable to do,
and are stiU trying to do. The Spanish war showed
that our work of domestic conciliation was as com
plete as had been that of conquest.
Then came the commercial depression of 1893, and
the silver issue. Again they predicted all possible
disaster. I was in London in the summers of 1896
and 1897, in close touch with financial circles. The
tone and atmosphere at that time prevalent reminded
me forcibly of the dark days of the Rebellion. Even
as recently as four years back, nothing was too bad
for the Englishman " on 'Change " to say or to predict
of America, or "Americans," as our securities were
caUed. Suddenly, and in our own way, we emerged

A NATIONAL CHANGE OF HEART 269
from under the cloud, and, again erect and defiant,
challenged British commercial supremacy. That they
understood ; while they feared, in their hearts they
admired. Then came our Spanish war ; and at
Manila and Santiago they saw us crush a European
navy, such as it was, much as the lion they have
taken for their emblem might crush some captive
jackal of the desert. This they understood best, and
most admired. The rest naturaUy followed. We
were unquestionably rich, unmistakably powerful;
that we too were a masterful race was evident ; we
fearlessly chaUenged supremacy ; we had a way of
somehow accompUshIng results which they had been
at much pains vociferously to pronounce altogether
out of the question. So they respected and feared
us ; then they began, In a way, to feel proud of us.
Were we, after all, not flesh of their flesh, — bone of
their bone ?
FinaUy came their own war in the Transvaal.
Among the nations of Europe, Great Britain found
itself in a state of extreme isolation. We ourselves
know from recent experience to what this is due.
Under some law of development as yet only partially
understood, the leading nations of the earth have,
especially within the last quarter of a century, been
reaching out for dominion in every direction. In this
process Great Britain, for reasons plain to every ob
server, took the lead. In so doing, she had a century's
start ; but, none the less, she came in necessary but
sharp contact with others, all bent on the same work.
The result was logical. A few years ago we suddenly
entered on the same path, — Imperialism, it is caUed.
We all know what foUowed. We came in conflict

270 A NATIONAL CHANGE OF HEART
with a nation belonging to Latin Europe. Immedl.
ately, all the Latin communities were in sympatlj-
with Spain, and looked lowerlngly upon us. T^ir
English, at about the same time, came In conflict with
an offshoot of the Germanic stock ; and instantly aU
those of German blood scowled upon her. France,
she had offended in Africa ; Russia was traditlonaUy
a rival, and an enemy in Asia. It so chanced that a
feUow feeling then brought the United States and
Great Britain together. We were in a not dissimi
lar situation. As Mr. Richard Cobden observed long
ago of his countrymen, — " We generaUy sympathize
with everybody's rebels but our own." ! This is not a
peculiarly British characteristic. We, in America,
were Inclined to sympathize strongly with the rebels
of South Africa ; but we now have rebels of our o^wn.
Rebels, therefore, are with us not In such high favor
as they were, — temporarily, of course. Thus, in
stinctively and Insensibly, Great Britain and the
United States, each being to a degree isolated, drew
together In face of the Germanic and the Latin races.
EspeciaUy was this so with Great Britain ; for her
isolation and consequent unpopularity were much the
more pronounced of the two. It thus became, to a'
certain extent, those of the English-speaking race
against the world. Blood, speech, descent, told ; and
it told more plainly with them than ¦with us.
Thus, as I more and more reflected upon It, I be
gan to realize that the change In the English heart
was not only real, but altogether human, as well as
eminently characteristic. I saw, also, or thought I
saw, just how it came about. The mass of the English
1 Speeches, vol. ii. p. 88.

A NATIONAL CHANGE OF HEART 271

fi

people — the great wage-earning class, the toiUng mU-
"' lions — never had shared In the fear and dislike, so
"'' long and loudly proclaimed, of America and Demo
cracy. They, on the contrary, throughout the slave
holders' rebeUion, and during our time of greatest
stress, as a whole, sympathized with the national spirit
and the Union cause. They instinctively felt that
we somehow were fighting their battle with privilege
and aristocracy. Their hearts, therefore, were true ;
in them no change had to take place. The govern
ing or influential classes, on the other hand, though
prejudiced, were quick, in their way, to learn. They
now felt British isolation ; they feared for their trade ;
they found themselves In trouble in Ireland and In
Africa. So their hearts turned towards their kin
beyond the sea ; and they turned in good earnest.
The new-born sympathy was real ; its expression gen
uine. They themselves did not analyze the motive.
Perhaps it was as weU they did not, for that adulation
which goes forth to those whom success has cro^wned
savors of the Philistine, rather than of the disciples of
sweetness and h'ght. None the less it is human ; and,
moreover, there is much to urge in extenuation of it.
But, in this case, the worship of success was but one
of the factors which entered into the situation. We
ourselves, it must not be forgotten, had, in the years
that had passed and the bitter experiences through
which we had gone, been largely transmuted. More
assured of our position, we had that Increased confi
dence in ourselves which relieved us in a degree of
self-consciousness. We had a record, and a future.
The national crudeness, so conspicuous in the past,
was largely of the past. It was no longer necessary

272 A NATIONAL CHANGE OF HEART
to assert our equality, for our equality was no longer
challenged. Thus the change was as much in our
selves as in the estimate held of us by others.
All this we only partiaUy appreciate. In my o^wn
case, remembering the situation of a generation back,
while I saw how differently they regarded us, I could
but be to some extent conscious of a failure to reaUze
how different we had ourselves become. In reality it
was much as If, from under the parental roof, a father
had watched some rebeUious, self-assertive youth, who
had gone forth into the world to work out his destiny
in his own way and on his own account, not over and
above respectful, and setting all precept and expe
rience at defiance. At first, and for a good while, he
would be looked at askance ; failure would be pro
nounced his predestined fate. Then, by degrees, as,
always asserting his equaUty, he overcame difficulties,
— as he acquired wealth, power, fame, — the father
would begin to look with pride on the stalwart, broad-
shouldered, big-boned youth, moving on from success
to success, achieving ¦vdctory after victory, ever accom
plishing results before pronounced impossible, by pro
cesses peculiarly his own working out a great destiny
in defiance of rule, but ever changing, developing,
ripening as he did so. And graduaUy that father,
however set in his ideas, would undergo a change of
heart, not the less real because unconfessed, saying to
himself : " This is my offspring, — bone of my bone,
flesh of my flesh ! And what an extraordinary feUow
he is, — and enormously rich withal ! "
And this, unless I greatly err, is the process through
which Great Britain has gone, — is going ; we have
gone, and are* going. In any event, I now submit it

A NATIONAL CHANGE OF HEART 273
as a tentative explanation of an extremely noticeable
recent something, — a manifestation no less unmis
takable than suggestive. As a change of demeanor,
too, it was not otherwise than agreeable to some of
us, as, last month, we sat in quiet reminiscent mood
during the ringing plaudits. The " Old Home " had
not always welcomed us back in just that way ; we
probably were other than we had been ; they certainly
looked upon us with more kindly eyes.

IV
AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION i
" History is past Politics, and PoUtics are present History." — Ed-
WAKD A. Fkeeman.
' ' Politics are vulgar when they are not liberalized by history, and
history fades into mere literature when it loses sight of its relation to
practical politics.'' — SiB John Seblet.
Here are aphorisms from two ¦writers, both justly
distinguished in the field of modern historical research.
Sententious utterances, they would probably, like most
sententious utterances, go to pieces to a greater or less
extent under the test of severe analysis. They wUl,
however, now serve me sufficiently weU as texts.
That politics should find no place at its meetings
IsJ I believe, the unwritten law of this Association;
and, by politics, I refer to the discussion of those ques
tions of public conduct and policy for the time being
uppermost in the mind of the community. Taking
into consideration the character and purpose of our
body, and the broad basis on which its somewhat loose
membership rests, the rule may be salutary. But
there are not many general propositions not open to
debate ; and so I propose on this occasion to caU this
1 Address as President of the American Historical Association, de
livered at the Annual Meeting of the Association, in Washington,
December 27, 1901. Owing to its length, this address was compressed
in delivery, occupying forty-five minutes only ; it was printed, in
part, in the American Historical Review for January, 1902, vol. vii.
pp. 203-232.

AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 275
unwritten law of ours in question. While so doing,
moreover, I shall distinctly impinge upon it.
Let us come at once to the point. May it not be
possible that the unwritten law, — perhaps it would
be better to speak of it as the tacit understanding, — I
have referred to, admits of limitations and exceptions
both useful and desirable ? Is it, after aU, necessary,
or even, from a point of large view, weU considered,
thus to exclude from the list of topics to be discussed
at meetings of historical associations, and especiaUy of
this Association, the problems at the time uppermost
in man's thoughts ? Do we not, indeed, by so doing
abdicate a useful public function, — surrender an edu
cational office ; practicaUy admitting by our act that
we cannot trust ourselves to discuss poUtical issues in
a scholarly and historical spirit? In one word, are
not those composing a body of this sort under a species
of obligation, in a community like ours, to contribute
their share, from the point of ¦view they occupy, to
the better understanding of the questions In active
political debate ? This proposition, as I have said, I
now propose to discuss ; and. In so doing, I shall, for
purposes of iUustration, draw freely on present prac
tical politics, — using as object lessons the issues now,
or very recently, agitating the minds of not a few of
those composing this audience, — indeed, I hope, of
aU. I start from a fmidamental proposition. The Amer
ican Historical Association, like aU other associations,
whether similar In character or not, either exists for
a purpose, or it had better cease to be. That purpose
is, presumably, to do the best and most effective work
in its power in the historical field. I then further.

276 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTIOlt
and vrith much confidence, submit that the standard
of American political discussion is not now so high as
not to admit of elevation. On the contrary, while,
comparatively speaking. It ranks well both In tone and
conduct, yet its deficiencies are many and obvious.
That, taken as a whole, it is of a lower grade now
than formerly, I do not assert ; though I do assert,
and propose presently to show, that in recent years it
has been markedly lower than it was in some periods
of the past, and periods within my own recoUection,
That, however, it is not so high as it should be, —
that it is by no manner of means ideal, — all wIU, I
think, admit. If so, that admission suffices for present
purposes. My next contention is perhaps more open to dis
pute. It is a favorite theory now with a certain class
of philosophers, somewhat inclined to the happy-go-
lucky school, that in all things every community gets
about what it asks for, and is qualified to appreciate.
In poUtical discussion — as in railroad or hotel ser-
¦vice, and in Uterature or religion — the supply, as
respects both quality and quantity, responds ¦with suf
ficient closeness to the demand. There is, however,
good reason for thinking that, with the American
community which to-day is, or at least with some
sections and elements thereof, this at best specious
theory does not at the present time hold true. Our
recent poUtical debates have, I submit, been conducted
on a level distinctly below the intelligence of the
constituency ; the participants in the debate have not
been equal to the occasion offered them. Evidence
of this is found in the absence of response. I think I
am justified in the assertion that no recent political

AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 277
utterance has produced a real echo, much less a re
verberation; and it would not probably be rash to
challenge an immediate reference to a single speech,
or pointed expression even, which during the last
presidential campaign, for instance, impressed itself
on the public memory. That campaign, seen through
the vista of a twelve-month, was, on the contrary, from
beginning to end, with a single exception, creditable
neither to the parties conducting it, nor to the audi
ence to whose ^vel it was presumably gauged.
RecaU, I pray you, its incidents ; already almost
forgotten, they come back, when revived by an effort
of memory, with a remote, far away echo, as of mock
ery. In the first place, on neither side were the issues
of 1900 clearly defined or weU presented ; indeed, the
long indecision as to what should be accepted as the
"paramount Issue" was, not remotely, suggestive of
a certain very memorable " Hunting of the Snark."
Ignoring the personal element which entered so largely
into it, as it enters into all canvasses, the favorite
argument with one set of orators was the post ergo
propter, as illustrated in " the FuU Dinner Pail ; "
which argument those of the other side met by fierce
denunciation of " Department Stores," and the mani
festly pertinent inquiry, addressed to the general audi
tory, as to what they proposed to do with their sons.
The fate in store for their daughters, it was gloomily
intimated, would admit of little question, should the
opposing candidate be chosen. So far as what is
known as " Labor " is concerned, one candidate posed
as the prescriptive protector of American Industry,
while the other warmly declared himself in favor of
" The Man against the Dollar." The talk from the

278 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION
hustings under this head was irresistibly suggestive
of the scene in Dickens's Old Curiosity Shop, —
the adherents of both candidates stoutly maintained
that Codlin was the Workingman's friend, not Short ;
Short might be very weU as far as he went, but the
real friend was Codlin.
But, apart from this, the one noticeable feature,
possibly the single significant feature of the canvass,
was that it distinctly deteriorated as it progressed.
It was opened by Mr. Bryan, on the ^th of August,
with a speech at Indianapolis which struck a lofty
note, promising a high level of discussion. That
speech fairly startled the reflecting portion of the
community. It seemed for the moment as if the
party in power would be forced to reckon seriously
with the opposition throughout a sustained debate.
How completely this promise failed of realization Is
fresh In memory. No subsequent utterance on either
side made any impression on the public mind. Mr.
Bryan, using his audience as a sounding-board, seemed
thereafter to bid continually down ; and, finally, the
contest degenerated into a mere trial of endurance
between himself and the talking candidate of the other
side, the telegraph day by day recording the number
of speeches made by each. A less inspiring compe
tition could hardly be imagined ; and, as the papers
In flaring, modern-time head-lines declared that Mr.
Roosevelt had the previous day broken all records by
making eighteen speeches, they went on gravely to an
nounce that Mr. Bryan had arranged a programme for
the morrow under which he would " see " his opponent
and " go him two better," orating to a square score of
distinct audiences between 10 A. M. and midnight.

AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 279
But was this aU the occasion caUed for ? Did our
much vaunted American inteUigence demand nothing
better ? Credat Judceus ! Not for a moment do I
believe it. To that canvass, then, I propose presently
to return, using it as an object lesson. I shaU seek to
revive the memory of Its issues, — for already they
are far advanced on the road to oblivion, — - and I shaU
contrast what I have described as actually occurring
with what was easily possible, had that same debate
been actively participated in by organizations such
as this of ours ; organizations whose representative
spokesmen would have at least approached the dis
cussion, not in a partisan, but in a scientific spirit.
For even active political issues, I contend, freed from
the deflection always incident to party prejudice and
personal feeling, may be viewed in the light of prin
ciple, precedent and experience.
Perhaps, however, I can best illustrate what I have
to say, — enforce the lesson I would fain this even
ing teach, — by approaching It through retrospect.
So doing, also, if there is any sklU In my treatment,
cannot weU be otherwise than interesting, for I shaU
deal with events almost aU within the recollection
of those yet in middle Ufe. But whUe those events
are sufficiently removed from us to admif of the neces
sary perspective, ha-ring assumed their true propor
tions to what preceded and has foUowed, they have
an advantage over the occurrences of a year ago ; for
the controversial embers of 1900 may stiU be glowing
in 1901, — though, I must say, to me the ashes seem
white and cold and dead enough. StUl, I do not
propose to go back to any very remote period, and I
shaU confine myself to my own recoUection, speaking

280 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION
of that only of which I know, and in which I took
part. My review wUl begin with the year 1856,
— the year of my graduation, and that in which I
cast my first vote ; also one in which a President
was chosen, James Buchanan being the successful can
didate. Under the provisions of our Constitution, a great
national debate is preordained for every fourth year.
The whole policy of the government is thus at fixed
periods chaUenged and re^viewed. Whether, as the
country has expanded and its population multiplied,
while the questions involved in material interests of
ever growing volume have become more complex and
difficult of comprehension, this fixed Olympic period
is wise, or, if wise, that assigned is not too short, are
open questions. I think the period at any rate too
short. Large bodies proverbially move slowly, and
considerable stages of fixity are necessary to adjust
ment. In the case of so large and complex a body
politic as the United States has now become, four
years are manifestly insufficient for that purpose.
Recent experience has shown such to be the case.
But this is not now to be discussed. For our present
purpose we must take things as they are ; and the
fundamental law imposes on us a national poUtical
debate every fourth year, whoUy irrespective of cir
cumstance. As 1856 was one of the years thus in
advance assigned, I have now taken part in no less
than twelve presidential canvasses. Approaching them
in a spirit strictly historical, these I propose briefly to
review. Yet it must be premised that each election does not
represent a debate, — not infrequently it is merely a

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stage in a debate. It was so in 1856 ; it has been so
several times since. Indeed, since 1840, — the famous
" Log Cabin and Hard Cider " campaign of " Coon-
Skin Caps," and "Tippecanoe and Tyler, too," —
probably the most humorous, not to say grotesque,
episode in our whole national history, that in which
the plane of discussion reached its lowest recorded
level, — since 1840 there have been only six real de
bates ; the average period of a debate being, there
fore, ten years. These debates were (1) that over
Slavery, from 1844 to 1864 ; (2) that over Recon
struction, from 1868 to 1872; (3) Legal Tenders, or
" Fiat Money," and Resumption of Specie Payments
were the issues in 1876 and 1880 ; (4) the issue of
1888 and 1892 was over Protection and Free Trade;
(5) the debate over Bimetalhsm and the Demoneti
zation of Silver occurred in 1896 ; and, finally, (6)
Imperiahsm, as it Is called, came to the front in 1900.
Since 1856, therefore, the field of discussion has been
wide and diversified, — presenting several issues of
great moment. Of necessity, also, the debates have
assumed many and diverse aspects, — ethical, ethnolo
gical, legal, mUitary, economical, financial, historical.
The last-named aspect is that which interests us.
In every one of these debates, — and it goes almost
without saying, — the historical aspect has been pro
minent, — it Is, indeed, the one aspect which is aU-
pervasive. And this must be the case just so long as
men, yielding respect to precedent, seek guidance from
the experience of the past. My purpose is, briefly
passing these debates in review, to measure the degree
to which the trained historical element In the American
community entered Into them as an influencing factor,

282 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION
and to estimate the extent to which such an element
might have entered into them, with results manifestly
beneficial. I shall endeavor to show the great benefit,
the elevating influence, which in aU these debates,
though far more in some than in others, would have
been derived from the active participation therein of
such an organization as this, — an organization whoUy
free from party lines, but dl^vided in opinion, which
would approach the questions at issue from a point of
view distinctly scholarly and scientific. In doing this,
let it be always borne in mind that, in scholarship
and in science also, unanimity is not to be expected,
scarcely to be desired. In the study of history, as
in religion and in science, schools differ. The record
is voluminous and fuU of precedents from which very
contradictory conclusions, all more or less plausible,
may be drawn. In this field, as in others, the great
desideratum is to have every side fully and vigorously
presented, ¦with a fuU assurance that the soundest con
clusions wUl survive as being, here also, always the
most fit.
The first of these debates, that involving the slavery
issue, is now far removed. We can pass upon it his
torically ; for the young man who threw his maiden
vote in 1860, when It came to its close, is now nearr
ing his grand climacteric. Of all the debates in our
national history that was the longest, the most ele
vated, the most momentous and the best sustained.
It looms up in memory ; it projects itself from history.
As a whole, it was immensely creditable to the people,
— the community at large, — for whose instruction it
was conducted. It has left a literature of its o^wn, —
economical, legal, moral, political, imaginative. In

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fiction it produced Uncle Tom' s Cabin, stiU, if one
can judge by the test of demand at the desks of our
public libraries, one of the most popular books in the
English tongue. In the law, it rose to the height of
the Dred Scott decision; and, whUe the rulings in
that case laid down have since been reversed, it ¦wiU
not be denied that the discussion of constitutional
principles involved, whether at the bar, in the haUs
of legislatures. In the columns of the press or on the
rostrum, was intelligent, of an order extraordinarUy
high, and of a very sustained interest. It was to the
utmost degree educational.
So far as the historical aspect of that great debate
is concerned, two things are to be specially noted.
In the first place, the moral and economical aspects
predominated ; and, in the second place, what may be
called the historical element as an influencing factor
was then in its infancy. Neither in this country nor
in Europe had that factor been organized, as it now is.
The slavery debate was so long and intense that all
the forces then existing were drawn into it. The pul
pit, for instance, participated actively. The physiolo
gist was much concerned over ethnological problems,
trying to decide whether the African was a human
being or an animal ; and. If the former, was he of the
family of Cain. Thus, all contributed to the discus
sion ; and yet I am unable to point out any distinctly
historical contribution of a high order ; though, on
both sides, the issue was discussed historicaUy with
intelligence and research. Especially was this the
case in the arguments made before the courts and in
the scriptural dissertations ; whUe, on the political
side, the speeches of Seward and Sumner, of Jefferson

284 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION
Davis and A. H. Stephens, leave Uttle to be desired.
The climax was, perhaps, reached in the memorable
joint debate between Lincoln and Douglas, of which
It Is not too much to say the country was the auditory.
The whole constituted a fit prologue to the great
tragedy which ensued.
Beginning, In its closing stage, in January, 1854,
when the measure repealing the Missouri Compromise
of 1820 was Introduced Into the Senate of the United
States, and closing in December, 1860, ¦with the pas
sage of its ordinance of secession by South Carohna,
this debate was continuous for seven years, covering
two presidential elections, those of 1856 and 1860.
So far as I know, it was sui generis ; for it would, I
fancy, be useless to look for anything with which to
institute a comparison, except In the history of Great
Britain. Even there, the discussion which preceded
the passage of the Reform Bill of 1832, or that
which led up to the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846,
or, finally, the Irish Home Rule agitation between
1871 and 1893, — one and aU sink into insignificance
beside it. Of the great slavery debate it may then In
fine be said that, while the study of history and the
lessons to be deduced from history contributed not
much to it, it made history, and on history has left a
permanent mark.
Of the canvass of 1864, from our point of view
little need be said. There was in it no field fruitful
for the historical investigator, the issue then presented
to the people being of a character altogether excep
tional. The result depended less on argument than
on the outcome of operations in the field. There was,
I presume, during August and September of that

AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 285
year, a wordy debate ; but the people were too intent
on Sherman as he circumvented Atlanta, and on
Sheridan as he sent Early whirling up the valley of the
Shenandoah, to give much ear to it. Had this Asso
ciation then been in existence, and devoted aU its
energies to elucidating the questions at issue, I can
not pretend to think it would perceptibly have affected
the result.
Nor was it greatly otherwise in the canvass of 1868.
The country was then stirred to its very depths over
the questions growing out of the war. The shattered
Union was to be reconstructed ; the slave system was
to be eradicated. These were great political pro
blems ; problems as pressing as they were momentous.
For their proper solution It was above aU else neces
sary that they should be approached in a calm,
schomrly spirit, observant of the teachings of history.
Never was there a greater occasion ; rarely has one
been so completely lost. The assassination of Lincoln
silenced reason ; and to reason, and to reason only,
does history make its appeal. The unfortunate per
sonality of Andrew Johnson now intruded itself ; and,
almost at once, what should have been a calm debate
degenerated into a furious wrangle. Looking back
over the canvass of 1868, and excepting General
Grant's singularly felicitous closing of his brief letter
of acceptance, — " Let us have peace ! " — I think It
would be difficult for any one to recaU a single utter
ance of that campaign which produced any lasting
impression. The name even of the candidate nomi
nated in opposition to Grant is not readily recalled.
In that canvass, as in the preceding one, I should say
there was no room for the economist, the phUosopher,

286 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION
or the historian. The country had, for the time being,
cut loose from both principle and precedent.
The debate over Reconstruction, begun in 1865,
did not wear itself out until 1876. In no respect wIU
it bear comparison with that debate over slavery
which preceded It. Sufficiently momentous, it was
less sustained, less thorough, far less judicial. To
wards its close, moreover, as the country wearied,
it was gravely complicated by a new issue ; for, in
1867, began that currency discussion, destined to last
in Its various phases through the lifetime of a generar
tion. It thereafter entered. In greater or less degree,
into no less than nine consecutive presidential elec
tions, two of which, those of 1876 and 1896, actuaUy
turned upon it.
The currency debate presented three distinct
phases ; first, the proposition, broached in 1867,
known as the Greenback theory, under which the
interest-bearing bonds of the United States, issued
during the RebeUion, were to be paid at maturity in
United States legal tender notes, bearing no interest
at all. This somewhat amazing proposition was
speedily disposed of ; for, early in 1869, an act was
passed declaring the bonds payable "in coin." But,
as was sure to be the case, the so-caUed " Fiat Money "
delusion had obtained a firm lodgment in the minds
of a large part of the community, and to drive it out
was the work of time. It assumed, too, aU' sorts of
aspects. Dispelled in one form, it reappeared in an
other. When, for instance, the act of 1869 settled
the question as respects the redemption of the bonds,
the financial crisis of 1873 reopened It by creating
an almost irresistible popular demand for a govern-

AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 287
ment paper currency as a permanent substitute for
specie. FinaUy, when, seven years later, this issue was
put to rest by a return to specie payments, the over
production of silver, as compared with gold, already
foreshadowed the rise of one of the most serious and
far-reaching questions which has perplexed modern
times. Thus, as the ethical and legal issues, which
were the staples of public discussion from 1844 to
1872, were disposed of, or by degrees settled them
selves, a series of monetary questions arose, destined,
even if at times in a somewhat languid way, to occupy
public attention through thirty years.
Yet there is, in connection with the canvasses of
1876, 1880 and 1884, a suggestive reflection, which,
if laid properly to heart, ought to bear fruit in future
quadrennials. It is not now easy for those who took
part — perhaps an eager and interested part — in
those elections, to name off-hand the opposing candi
dates, much less to state the issues upon which the
country then divided. It is very suggestive how
much less momentous the average presidential choice
becomes, the further we get away from it. FinaUy,
we come to realize that, in world development, and
even in national Ufe, it would have been very much
the same whichever candidate was chosen. Perhaps,
after all, this lesson is that of not least historical
value to be deduced from the study of well-nigh for
gotten presidential campaigns.
It is difficult to say what the dividing issue of
1876 reaUy was. The country was then slowly re
covering from the business prostration which foUowed
the collapse of 1873. The issues involved in recon
struction, if not disposed of, were clearly worn out.

288 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION
The country, weary of them, would not respond, turn
ing impatiently from further discussion. Those issues
might now settle themselves, or go unsettled; and,
though that conclusion was reached thirty years ago,
they are not settled yet. The Imng debate was over
material questions, — the cause of the prolonged busi
ness depression, and the remedy for it. The favorite
specific was, at first, a recourse to paper money : the
government printing-press was to set it in motion ;
and even hard-money Democrats of the Jacksonian
school united with radical Republicans of the Recon
struction period in guaranteeing a resultant prosper
ity. Again, the teachings of history were ignored.
What, it was contemptuously exclaimed in the Senate,
do we care for " abroad " ? From this calamity the
country had been saved by the veto of President
Grant in 1874 ; and, the foUowing year, an act was
passed looking to the resumption of specie payments
on the 1st of January, 1879. Seventeen years of
suspension were then to close. Over this measure,
the parties nominaUy joined issue in 1876. The
Republicans, nominating Governor Hayes of Ohio,
demanded the fulfUment of the promise ; the Demo
crats, nominating Governor Tilden of New York,
insisted on the repeal of the law. Yet it was weU
understood that the candidate of the Democracy
favored the poUcy of which the law in debate was the
concrete expression. The contest was thus in reality
one between the " Ins " and the " outs." We all
remember how it resulted, and the terrible strain to
which our machinery of government was in conse
quence subjected. In the ¦wrangle which ensued, the
material and business interests of the country recuper-

AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 289
ated in a natural way, just as had repeatedly been the
case before, and more than once since ; and the United
States then entered on a new era of increased pros
perity. This brought the paper money debate to a
close. The issues presented had, in the course of
events, settled themselves.
But, not the less for that, in the canvass of 1876 a
field of great political usefulness was opened up to the
historical investigator ; a field which, I submit, he
failed adequately to develop. A public duty was left
unperformed. It was in connection with what John
Stuart MIU has In one of his Dissertations and Discus
sions happily denominated " The Currency Juggle."
From time immemorial, to tamper with the established
measures of value has been the constant practice of
men of restless and unstable mind, honest or dishonest,
whether rulers or aspirants to rule. History is replete
with instances. To cite them was the function of the
historical investigator ; to marshal them, and bring
them to bear on the sophistries of the day, was the
business of the poUtician. A professorial discussion
in a meeting of such an organization as this would
then have been much to the point ; and yet, curiously
enough, a new historical precedent was about to be
worked out. That was then to be done which had
never been done before, — a country which had gone
to the length the United States had gone in the direc
tion of " fiat money " — two thirds of the way to
repudiation — was actually to retrace its steps, and
resume payments In specie at the former standards of
value. History would have been searched in vain for
a paraUel experience.
The administration of President Hayes was curi-

290 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION
ously epochal. During it the so-called " carpet-bag
governments " disappeared from the southern states ;
the country resumed payments in specie ; and, on the
28th of February, 1878, Congress passed, over the
veto of the President, an act renewing the coinage of
silver doUars, the stoppage of which, five years before,
constituted what was destined thereafter to be referred
to as " the crime of 1873." This issue, however,
matured slowly. Public men, having recourse to pal
liatives, temporized with it ; and, through four presi
dential elections it lay dormant, except in so far as
parties pledged themselves to action calculated, in the
well-nigh idiotic formula of politicians, to " do some
thing for silver." The canvasses of 1880 and 1884
are, therefore, devoid of historical interest. The
first turned largely on the tariff ; and yet, curiously
enough, the single utterance in that debate which has
left a mark on the public memory was the wonderful
dictum of General Hancock, the candidate of the
defeated opposition, that the tariff was a local issue,
which, a number of years before, had excited a good
deal of Interest in his native state of Pennsylvania.
The gaUant and picturesque soldier, metamorphosed
into a poUtical leader pro hac vice, simply harked
back to the " Log Cabin " and " Coon-Skin " cam
paign of 1840, when, a youth of sixteen, he was on
his way to West Point.
Nor is the recoUection of the debate of 1884 much
more inspiring. It was a Uvely contest enough, under
Grover Cleveland and James G. Blaine as opposing
candidates ; — a struggle between the " outs " to get
in, and the " Ins " not to go out. But a single for
mula connected with it comes echoing down the corri-

AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 291
dors of time, the aUIterative " Rum, Romanism, and
RebeUion " of the unfortunate Burchard. An inter
lude in the succession of great national debates, the
canvass of 1884 caUed for no application of the les
sons of history.
That of 1888, presenting at last an issue, rose to the
dignity of debate. In his annual message of the pre
vious December, the President, in disregard of aU
precedent, had confined' his attention not only to the
tariff, but to a single feature in the tariff, the duty
on wool. In so doing he had, as the weU-understood
candidate of his party for reelection, flung down the
gauntlet ; for, only three years before, the Republi
can party, in its quadrennial declaration of articles of
cardinal political faith, had laid hea^vy emphasis on
"the Importance of sheep industry," and " the danger
threatening its future prosperity." The opposition
had thus pledged itself to " do something " for wool,
as weU as for silver ; and the President now struck
at wool as " the Tariff -arch Keystone." But, while in
this debate the economist came to the front, there was
no pronounced caU and, indeed, small opportunity for
the historian. The silver issue was in abeyance ; the
pension list and cml ser^vice were not calculated to
incite to investigation ; nor had history much to say
on either topic. As to the " sheep Industry," now so
much in evidence, the British woolsack might afford
a text suggestive of curious learning in connection with
England's once greatest staple, — how, for instance,
as a protective measure, it was by one Parliament
solemnly ordained that the dead should be buried in
wooUens ; but it wiU readUy be admitted that the his
toric spirit does not kindle over tariff schedules. The

292 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION
lessons of experience to be drawn from revenue tables
appeal rather to the school of Adam Smith than to
the disciples of Gibbon.
Returning to the review of our national debates, in
that of 1892 the shadow of coming events was plainly
perceptible. The tariff Issue had now lost its old sig
nificance ; for the infant industries had developed into
trade and legislation-compelling trusts. These were
suggestive of new and, as yet, 'Inchoate problems ; but
to them the constituency was not yet prepared inteUi-
gently to address itself. Populism was rife, ¦with its
crude and restless theories ; a crisis in the history of
the precious metals was clearly impending, with the
outcome in doubt ; indiscriminate and unprecedented
pension-giving had reduced an overflowing exchequer
to the verge of bankruptcy. The debate of 1892 ac
cordingly dropped back to the politician's level, — that
of 1876, 1880 and 1884. In it there was nothing of
any educational value ; nothing that history wiU dweU
upon. The " ins " pointed ¦with pride ; the " outs "
sternly arraigned the " Ins ; " while the student,
whether of economics or history, there found small
place and a listless audience. The memory of the can
vass which resulted in the second administration of
Cleveland is quite obliterated by the issues, altogether
unexpected, which the ensuing years precipitated.
Of quite another character were the two canvasses
of 1896 and 1900. StUl fresh In memory, the echoes
of these have indeed not yet ceased to reverberate ; —
and I assert without hesitation that, not since 1856
and 1860, has this people passed through two such
wholesome and educational experiences. In 1896 and
in 1900, as in the debates of forty years previous, there

AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 293
was a place, and a large place, for the student, whether
investigator or philosopher. Great problems, — pro
blems of law, of economics and ethics, problems involv
ing peace and war, and the course of development in
the oldest as in the newest ci^vdUzations, — had to be
discussed, on the way to a solution. That the pro
longed debate running through those eight years was
at all equal to the occasion, I do not think can be
claimed. Even his most ardent admirers wiU hardly
claim that Mr. Bryan in 1896 and 1900 rose to the
level reached by Lincoln forty years before ; nor do
the utterances of Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Depew, or Mr.
Hanna bear weU a comparison ¦with those of Seward,
Trumbull and Sumner. And that this momentous,
many-sided debate faded to rise to the proper height
was due, I now unhesitatingly submit, to the predomi
nance In It of the political " Boss," and the absence
from It of the scholar. In it, those belonging to this
association, and to other associations similar In char
acter to this, did not play their proper part, — they
proved themselves unequal to the occasion. Indeed,
in the whole wordy canvass of 1896, I now recall but
two instances of the professor or philosopher distinc
tively taking the floor ; but both of those were mem
orable. They imparted an elevation of tone to discus
sion, immediately and distinctly perceptible, in the
press and on the platform. I refer to the single utter
ance of Carl Schurz, before a smaU audience at Chi
cago, on the 5th of September, and to the subsequent
publications of President Andrew D. White, in which,
from his library at Ithaca, he drew freely on the stores
of historical experience in crushing refutation of dem
agogical campaign sophistry. Amid the petulant chat-

294 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION
tering of the political magpies, it was refreshing to
hear those clear-cut, incisive utterances, — calm,
thoughtful, well-reasoned. I have been told that in
its various forms of republication, no less than five
miUions, and some authorities say ten miUions, of copies
of that Chicago speech of Mr. Schurz were then put
in circulation. It was Indeed a masterly production,
— a production In which a high keynote was struck,
and sustained. But the suggestive and extremely en
couraging fact In connection with it was the response
it elicited. Delivering himself at the highest level to
which he could attain, Mr. Schurz was only on a level
with his audience. To the political optimist that fact
spoke volumes ; it revealed infinite possibUities.
Twelve presidential canvasses and six great national
debates have thus been passed in rapid review. It is
as If, in the earlier history of the country, we had run
the gamut from Washington to Van Bur en. Taken as
a whole, — viewed in gross and perspective, the retro
spect leaves much to be desired. That the debates
held in Ireland and France during the same time have
been on a distinctly lower level, I at once concede.
Those held in Great Britain and Germany have not
been on a higher. Yet ours have at best been only rela
tively educational ; as a rule extremely partisan, they
have been personal, often scurrUous, and more fre
quently stIU, I regret greatly to find myseK compeUed
to say. Intentionally deceptive. A singular feature
in them has been the noticeable fact that where,
from time to time, the clergy have intervened, their
so doing has not tended to elevate. They have been
conspicuous neither for moderation nor for charity,

AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 295
whUe they actually seemed to re/el in their igno
rance of the teachings of the past. One fact in the
review is, however, salient. With the exception of
the first, — that of 1856-60, — not one of the de
bates reviewed has left an utterance which, were it
to die from human memory, would by posterity be
accounted a loss. This, I am aware, is a sweeping
allegation ; in itself almost an indictment. Yet, with
some confidence, I chaUenge a denial. Those here are
not, as a rule, in their first youth, and they have all
of them been more or less students of history. Let
each pass in rapid mental review the presidential can
vasses in which he has In any degree participated, and
endeavor to recaU a single utterance which has stood
the test of time, as marking a distinct addition to man
kind's inteUectual belongings, — ^the classics of the
race. It has been at best a babel of the commonplace.
I do not believe one utterance can be named for which
a life of ten years wiU be predicted. Such a record
undeniably admits of improvement. Two questions,
then, naturaUy suggest themselves : — ¦ To what has
this shortcoming been due ? — Wherein lies the
remedy for it ?
The shortcoming, I submit, is in greatest part due
to the fact that the work of discussion has been left
almost wholly to the journalist and the politician, —
the professional journalist and the professional poli
tician. And in the case of both, there has in this
country, during the last forty years, been, so far as
grasp of principle is concerned, a marked tendency to
deterioration. Nor, I fancy, is the cause of this far to
seek. It is found in the growth, increased complexity,
and irresistible power of organization as opposed to

296 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION
individuality, — in the parlance of the day, it Is the
aU-potency of the machine over the man; equaUy
noticeable whether by that word, " machine," we refer
to the political organization or to the newspaper.
Let the last be considered first. The daUy journal
— the newspaper — is indisputably the one far-reach
ing organ of popular political education. Through its
columns, as a medium, the teachings of those who think
on aU subjects — educational, religious, moral, poUtical
— percolate slowly, and, as a rule, in a very diluted
form, finding thus at last lodgment and acceptance In
the public thought. They are slowly assimilated. But
the newspaper of to-day is altogether the product of
the last century — almost of the last half of the cen
tury. Practically brought into being by James Gordon
Bennett and Horace Greeley during " the forties," it
then, and for nearly thirty years after, represented an
editorial individuality, of which Greeley was the highest
type. From 1841 to 1872, Horace Greeley was the
New York Tribune ; and the New York Tribune dur
ing those years was the greatest educational factor —
economicaUy and morally — this country has ever
known. The protective tariff Is its monument, cere
perennius. The Tribune stIU exists ; but the Tribune
of to-day is no longer the organ of one man. A news
medium, owned by a syndicate, its utterances shaped
by a business management — an editorial Aulic Coun
cil — are turned out by the yard by salaried ready
writers, — quIU-drlvers of fortune, — whose necessary
fate It Is always to strive to reduce superficiaUty to a
system. "By journalism," a modern writer of much
acumen says, " is to be understood, I suppose, writing
for pay on matters of which you are ignorant ; " *
¦ 1 Leslie Stephen, Letters of John Richard Green, p. 66.

AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 297
and, as an evolution, the modern newspaper is the
necessary outcome of existing conditions. A financial
combination controls a most intricate, costly and in
fluential machine. Since 1872 the intense, ¦widely
pervasive personality of Horace Greeley has given
place to the ordered and stereotyped utterances of the
Tribune's editorial staff.
Mutatis mutandis, it is the same In politics. As
Tennyson ¦wrote two generations ago : —
" The individual withers, and the world is more and more.''
The Intricacy of modern political life, the magnitude
of interests and expenditure, the cohesive power of
plunder, the number of those who make of political
life a breadwinning trade, the size of the constituency,
— all these concurring conditions have resulted In a
state of affairs in which " the machine," of necessity,
predominates. Among the qualities which go to con
stitute that natural aptitude calculated to win success
in public life, — to secure office and retention in office,
— grasp of principle, or a philosophical or statesman
like turn of mind, no longer find a place. What Is
needed is the faculty of managing men, combining
interests, or conforming to tendencies. In a word,
what Is vulgarly but most expressively known as the
" Boss " Is, in our American public life, the logical out
come of the syndicate and machine principle applied
to existing political conditions. The " Boss " is, in
fact, to America what the Imperator was to Rome.
It is the master mechanic with his hand on the lever ;
but, as the machine responds to his touch, the indi
vidual is eliminated.
This tendency of the day, few, I think, deny. In
deed, all must recognize the growth of combination.

298 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION
It can be studied everywhere, save in the highest forms
of art and thought. Syndicates cannot turn out great
poems, or noble statues, or attain to a deep insight.
In letters, their power is confined to the profuse manu
facture of printed matter, — dictionaries, blue-books,
cooperative histories, and the like. But we have now
to do only with the political life, and the higher educar
tional forces there in action, or possible to bring into
action in any emergency ; and the increased power
of the machine in that field, I take to be one of the
indications of the time, not less unmistakable than
significant. Machine work always has a degenerating
tendency. The more powerful the machine, the more
it inclines to self-aggrandlzatlon and the perpetuation
of abuse. A perfect machine is as nearly souUess as
may be. Such a machine was the Church of Rome
in the days of Voltaire and the Calas tragedy ; such
a machine is the French army now, as exemplified in
the Dreyfus affair, and the experience therein of Zola.
The tendency from the indi^vddual towards the machine,
in American journalism and public Ufe, cannot be
denied. It distinctly does not promote a loftier, a more
Uberal and scholarly tone of discussion ; on the con
trary, it works always in the opposite way.
This being so, in what direction may we look for
the corrective agency ? In a body politic, so f uU of
vitality, so instinct with life, as that of ours, each evil
works its own cure. The remedial action is apt to
reveal itself in unexpected quarters, and in shapes not
at once recognized ; but, unless the body politic is
decadent, it is as sure to assert itself as it is in the case
of disease in a physical organization not moribund.
That those who philosophize and prescribe In this

AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 299
and kindred cases generaUy reach wrong conclusions
is quite indisputable ; it is safe. Indeed, to say that
they do so in more than nine cases out of ten. As
Mr. Disraeli long since sagely observed, " It is the
unexpected which is apt to occur." In the present
case I wish, therefore, in advance, to acknowledge that
I am probably quite wide of the mark In both my
diagnosis of the disease and my forecast of the remedy.
That remedy, moreover, when it comes, wIU, I am
confident, not be in the nature of some Ingenious dis
covery, — an invention which might admit of letters
patent. On the contrary, it wiU be an evolution, — the
natural development of internal healing force asserting
itself to meef a pathological condition. Not posing
here, therefore, as a physician prescribing a sure cure
of his own devising, but as an observer of conditions
and symptoms, I propose to point out, so far as my
observation and insight enable me so to do, the indica
tions of a self-curative process already asserting Itself.
The source of trouble being located in the tendency
to excessive organization, it would seem natural that
the counteracting agency should be looked for in an
exactly opposite direction ; that is, in the increased
efficacy of Indi-viduallsm. Of this, I submit. It is not
necessary to go far in search of Indications. Take, for
instance, the examples already referred to, of Mr.
Schurz and President White, in the canvass of 1896 ;
and suppose, for a moment, efforts such as theirs then
were, made more effective as resulting from the organ
ized action of an association Uke this. Our platform
at once becomes a rostrum, — and a rostrum from
which a speaker of reputation and character Is insured
a wide hearing. His audience, too, is present to Usten

300 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION
and repeat. From such a rostrum, the observer, the
professor, the student — be it of economy, of history,
or of philosophy — might readily be brought into
immediate contact ¦with the issues of the day. So
bringing him is but a step. He would appear, also, in
his proper character and place, — the scholar having
his say in politics ; but always as a scholar, not as an
office-holder, nor an aspirant for office. His appeal
would be to inteUigence and judgment, not to passion
or self-interest, or even to patriotism. The elements
are all there ; the question is only as to a method of
effective concentration. It must, I submit, be sought
for here on the floor of the academy, and not in the
confusion of the caucus. *
A due sense of political proportion might then
become possible. Heretofore, the view customarUy
taken has been too narrow and too close. The con
tinuity of movement has been ignored, and the true
relation of things intentionally distorted. The effort
has uniformly been to give each contest, in so far as
possible, a crucial aspect. All has been made to
depend on that particular cast of the dice. The future
of the race, one would suppose, rests on the outcome
of some struggle, in which, in fact, those immediately
participating are alone concerned. The retrospect I
have just invited you to teUs a very different story.
Sixteen presidential elections, and only six national
debates in sixty years ! The issues, moreover, involved
in those debates have in most cases been settled, not
on the hustings or in Congress, but by the course of
events, — the logic of the philosopher, the scientist, or
the economist. Illustrations of this, also, are not far
to seek. In the journal of the day on which I am

AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 301
writing these words, I find, for instance, a confession
of faith by a United States Senator, in which he
indulges in this, for a politician, refreshing form of
speech, — " In 1896 we had a campaign on the money
question. Everything was depressed, — idleness, dis
content, distrust and misery, everywhere. We were
told that the salvation of the country depended upon
the free coinage of silver. I believed then, and I
believe now, that theoretically we were right ; but
new and unforeseen forces came into play, and I have
enough sense to recognize the fact that the restoration
of confidence about which Mr. Cleveland talked, and
about which I did not know enough at the time to
understand, the discovery of gold in the Klondike,
the influx of money seeking investment from abroad,
and the Increase of banking facilities, have, for the
time being at least, settled the money question, and
nobody but a fool would make a ' free silver ' speech
now." What did the politicians have to do with the
restoration of confidence ? It was the work of time, and
of the producing and business community. What did
they have to do with the discoveries in the Klondike ?
or with the cyanide treatment of refractory ores?
or with the increase of capital, seeking employment
itself and giving employment to labor? Through
out that long and momentous debate, I submit, so far
as the result was concerned and the record shows, our
statesmen and journalists remind us only of Burke's
famous metaphor of the dozen grasshoppers making
the field ring with their importunate chink, while
thousands of great cattle, chewing the cud, silently
repose under the shadow of the British oak. Looking
back over the whole period that Is gone since that

302 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION
April day thirty-six years ago, when Grant and Lee,
at Appomattox, brought the conflict in the field to a
close, and speaking in perfect moderation, I cannot
point to one single beneficial result of a positive char
acter which can properly be classed as poUtical. As
a species of safety-valve, political debate has, I admit,
been of infinite service. Unending, and mostly idle
In character, it has prevented IU-considered and pre
cipitate action, and given natural influences time in
which to work out their results. Beyond this, what
can be put to its credit ? Take the debates in their
order. The poUtical Congressional reconstruction of
the slaveholding and rebeUIous South has certainly
failed to bear the test of time. What was then done
has since been undone, and the section concerned is
even now groping its way, painfully, and with no
excess of inteUigence and humanity, ^towards a more
practical and better-considered solution. Thanks to
a providential veto, the great currency debate ended
In an absolutely do-nothing policy. Of the tariff
debate I wiU not speak. Stretching through a whole
century, it once brought the country to the verge of
cml war, and its history is read in a vast literature
of its o^wn, — a veritable Serbonlan bog of sophistry,
saturated with bad rhetoric. The practical outcome,
as studied In our last general tariff re^vdslon, has not
been deemed specially creditable to American political
disinterestedness or scientific fiscal thought. Our
pension list is, indeed, a monument, but scarcely of
public liberality judiciously exercised. FinaUy, the
advocates of free-sUver coinage, having erased from
the statute-book that " Sherman-bill " which they
themselves had inscribed there, confess that " a fool "

AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 303
only would be guilty of " a silver speech " now. Con
gress has aU along been but a clumsy recording ma
chine of conclusions worked out in the laboratory and
machine-shop ; and yet the idea is still deeply seated
in the minds of men, otherwise intelligent, that, to
effect poUtical results, it Is necessary to hold office, or
at least to be a politician, and to be heard from the
hustings. Is not the exact reverse more truly the
case ? The situation may not be. Indeed It certainly
is not, as it should be ; it may be, I hold that It is,
unfortunate that the scholar and investigator are find
ing themselves more and more excluded from public
life by the professional with an aptitude for the
machine : but the result is none the less patent. On
aU issues of real moment, — issues affecting anything
more than a division of the spoils, or the concession
of some privUege of exaction from the community, —
it is the student, the man of affairs and the scientist
who, to-day, in last resort, closes debate and shapes
public poUcy. His, the last word. How to organize
and develop his means of influence is the question.
" Here 's what should strike, could one handle it cunningly :
Help the axe, give it a helve ! "
So far as the historian is concerned, this association
is, I submit, the helve to the axe.
Of this the presidential election which closed just
a year ago affords an apt Ulustration, ready at hand.
No better could be asked for. What might then weU
have been ? The American Historical Association, as
I have already said, is composed of those who have
felt a call for the investigation and treatment of his
torical problems. Its members — largely instructors

304 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION
in our advanced education — feel that keen interest in
the Issues of the day, natural and proper in aU good
citizens, irrespective of caUing. They want to con
tribute their share to discussion ; and, in that way, to
influence results, so far as in them lies. From every
conceivable point of view it is most desirable that they
should have facilities for so doing. I hold, therefore,
that, in the last presidential canvass, a special meeting
of this association, caUed to discuss the issues then
pending, might well have tended to the better general
and popular comprehension of those issues, and to the
elevation of that debate. Conducted on academic
principles, and looking to no formal expression of
results in any enunciated platform of principles, such
a gathering would have exercised an influence, as
perceptible as beneficial, in lifting the discussion up
into the domain of phUosophy and research. It would
have brought to bear the lessons of the past on the
questions of the day. In any event, it would certainly
not have descended to that contemptible post ergo
propter formula, which, on the one side or the other,
has in every presidential canvass been the main staple
of argument.
What were the issues of the last presidential can
vass ? — on what questions did its debate turn ? Three
in number, they were, I think, singularly inviting to
those historicaUy minded. To the reflecting man the
matter first in Importance was what is known as " Im
perialism," — the problem forced upon our considerar
tion by the outcome of the war with Spain. Next I
should place the questions of public policy involved
in the rapid agglomerations of capital, popularly de
nominated "Trusts." FinaUy, the sUver issue stiU

AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 305
lingered at the front, a legacy from the canvass of
four years previous. The debate of 1900 is a thing
of the past. Each of those issues can now be dis
cussed, as it might well then have been discussed, in
the pure historical spirit. Let us take them up in
their inverse order.
Historically speaking, I hold there were two dis
tinct sides to the silver question ; and, moreover, on
the face of the record, the advocates of bImetalUsm,
as it was called, had in 1896 the weight of the argu
ment wholly in their favor. In his very suggestive
work entitled Democracy and Liberty, Mr. Lecky
referred to the discovery of America as producing,
among other far-reaching effects, one which he con
siders most momentous of aU. To quote his words : —
" The produce of the American mines created, in the
most extreme form ever known In Europe, the change
which beyond all others affects most deeply and
universaUy the material well-being of man : it revolu
tionized the value of the precious metals, and, in
consequence, the price of all articles, the effects of aU
contracts, the burden of all debts." This was during
the sixteenth century, — the years foUowing the great
event of 1492. Again, the world went through a simi
lar experience within our own memories, in conse
quence of the California and AustraUa gold-finds, be
tween 1848 and 1852. These revolutions were due
to natural causes, and came about gradually. They
were also of a stimulating character. From the be
ginning of modern commercial times, however, to the
close of the last century, the exchanges of aU civiUzed
communities had been based on the precious metals ;
and sUver had been quite as much as gold a precious

306 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION
metal for monetary purposes. Shortly after 1870 the
policy of demonetizing silver was entered upon ; and,
in 1873, the United States gave In its adhesion to
that policy. Thereafter, in the great system of inter
national exchanges, silver ceased to be counted a part
of that specie reserve on which draughts were made.
Thenceforth, the drain, as among the financial centres,
was to be on gold alone. In the whole history of man,
no precedent for such a step was to be found. So far
as the United States was concerned, the basis on which
its complex and delicate financial fabric rested was
weakened by one half ; and the cheaper and more
accessible metal, that to which the debtor would
naturally have recourse in discharge of his obligations,
was made unavailable. It could further be demon
strated that, without a complete readjustment of cur
rencies and values, the world's accumulated stock and
annual production of gold could not, as a monetary
basis, be made to suffice for its needs. A continuaUy
recurring contest for gold among the great financial
centres was inevitable. A change which, in the
language of Lecky, "beyond all others affects most
deeply and universally the material well-being of
man," had been unvrittingly chaUenged. The only
question was, — - Would the unexpected occur ? —
Then, if It did occur, what might be anticipated?
Such was the silver issue, as it presented itself in
1896. On the facts, the weight of argument was
clearly with the advocates of the continued use of
silver. Four years later, in 1900, the unexpected had
occurred. As then resumed, the debate was replete
vrith interest. The lessons of 1492 and 1848 had a

AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 307
direct bearing on the present, and, in the light by
them shed, the outcome could be forecast almost with
certainty ; but it was a world-question. Japan, China,
Hindostan entered into the problem, in which also
both Americas were factors. It was a theme to in
spire Burke, stretching back, as it did, from this
latter day light to the middle age darkness, and in
volving the whole circling globe. Rarely has any
subject called for more inteUigent and comprehen
sive investigation ; rarely has one been more confused
and befogged by a denser misinformation. Tbe dis
coverer and scientist, moving hand in hand, had, dur
ing the remission of the debate, been getting in their
work, and, under the magic touch of their silent influ
ence, the world's gold production rose by leaps and
bounds. Less than ten millions of ounces In 1896, in
1899 It had nearly touched fifteen millions ; and, in
money value, it alone then exceeded the combined
value of the gold and sUver production of the earlier
period. What did this signify ? — History was only
repeating itself. The experiences of the first half of
the sixteenth century and the middle decennaries of
the nineteenth century were to be emphasized on the
threshold of the twentieth.
So much for the silver question and its possible
treatment. In the discussion of 1900, the last word
in the debate of 1896 remained to be uttered. A
page in history, both memorable and Instructive, was
to be turned. Next trusts, — those vast aggregations
of capital in the hands of private combinations, con
stituting practical monopolies of whole branches of
industry, and of commodities necessary to man. Was
the world to be subject to taxation at the wUl of a

308 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION
moneyed syndicate ? The debate of a year ago over
this Issue, if debate it may be called, is stiU very
recent. In it the lessons of history were effectuaUy
Ignored ; and yet, if applied, they would have been
sufficiently suggestive. The historian was as conspic
uous for his absence as the demagogue was In evi
dence. The cry was against monopoly and the monopolist,
— a cry which, as it has been ringing through all
recorded times, suggests for the historical investigator
a wide and fruitful field. Curiously enough, the first
lesson to be derived from labor in that field is a para
dox. PracticaUy, so far as extortion is concerned,
there is almost nothing in common between the old-
time monopoly and the modern trust. Of examples
of the first, the record is monotonously full. Mere
agents of the govemment, sometimes the favorites of
the Crown, the whole machinery of the state has time
out of mind been put at the service of monopolists to
enable them to exact tribute from aU. To the stu
dent of English history the names and misdeeds of Sir
Francis MIchell and Sir Giles Mompesson at once
suggest themselves ; while others, more familiar with
the drama, recaU Sir Giles Overreach, or that power
ful scene in Ruy Bias In which the Spanish courtiers
wrangle together, coming almost to blows, over a par
tition among themselves of the right to extort. The
old system stiU survives. For example, in France
to-day the manufacture and sale of salt is a govern
ment monopoly. A prime necessity of life, no person
not specially authorized may engage in the production
of salt, or Import it into France. If a peasant
woman, living on the sea-coast of Brittany or Nor-

AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 309
mandy, endeavors to procure salt for her family by
the slow process of evaporating a pailful of sea-water
in the sun, she is engaged In an illicit trade, and
becomes amenable to law. Her salt will certainly, if
found, be confiscate. So of improved pocket matches.
In France, their manufacture is a government revenue
monopoly. They are notoriously bad. Those made
and sold in Great Britain are, on the contrary, noted
for exceUence. If, however, passing from England to
France, a box of British matches is found in the
pocket of a traveUer, it is taken from him and the
contents are destroyed at once ; indeed, he is fortunate
if he escapes the payment of a fine. This is mono
poly ; the whole strength of a government being put
forth to exact an artificial profit on the sale of a com
modity in general use. There is a historical literature
pertaining to the subject, — a lamentation, and an
ancient tale of ¦wrong.
Into that literature I do not propose to enter. It
is familiar ; and fuUy explains the deadly effect of the
word " Monopoly " to-day, or of the opprobrious term
" Monopolist," when flung as a missile from the hus
tings. It is an epithet suggestive of a branding-iron,
and of the scars of burns, the recoUection of which is
imbedded in the popular mind.
The curious feature in the present discussion —
that which in the thought of the student of things
as opposed to words imparts a special interest to It —
is that, while the trust, or vast aggregation of capi
tal and machinery of production in the hands of indi
viduals designed to the end that competition may be
brought under control, is in fact the modern form of
monopoly, it is in its methods and results the direct

310 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION
opposite of the old-time monopoly ; for, whereas the
purpose and practice of that was to extort from all
purchasers an artificial price for an inferior article
through the suppression of competitors, the first law
of its existence for the modern trust is, through econ
omies and magnitude of production, to supply to aU
buyers a better article at a price so low that other
producers are driven from the market. The ground
of popular complaint against the trust is, not that it
exacts an inordinate profit on what it seUs, but that
it seUs so low that the small manufacturer or mer
chant is deprived of his trade. This distinction, with
a difference, explains at once the whoUy futUe charac
ter of the politician's outcry against trusts. It is easy,
for instance, to denounce from the platform the mag
nates of the Sugar Trust to a sympathizing audience ;
and yet not one human being in that audience, his
sympathies to the contrary notwithstanding, will the
next morning pay a fraction of a cent more per pound
for his sugar, that, by so doing, he may help to keep
alive some struggling manufacturer, who advertises
that his product does not bear the trust stamp.
As to the outcome of confilcts of this character, his
tory is a monotony. They can have but one residt,
— an industrial readjustment. A single famiUar
illustration wiU suffice. Any one who chooses to
turn back to it can read the story of the long con
flict between the spinning-wheel and the loom. For
merly, and not so very far back, the distaff and spin
ning-wheel were to be seen In every house ; homespun
was the common wear. To-day, the average man or
woman has never seen a distaff, nor heard the hum
of a spinning-wheel. Ceasing long since to be a com-

AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 311
modity, homespun would be sought for in vain. Yet
the struggle between the loom of the manufacturing
trust and the old dame's spinning-wheel was, llter-
aUy, for the latter, a fight to the death ; for. In that
case, the livelihood of the operator was at stake.
Her time was worth absolutely nothing, except at
the wheel. She must needs work for any wage ; on it
depended her bread. A vast domestic, industrial re
adjustment was involved ; one implying untold human
suffering. The result was, however, never for an in
stant in doubt. The trust of that day was left in un
disputed control of the field ; and it always must, and
always wiU be, just so long as it supplies purchasers
with a better article, at a lower price than they had
to pay before. The process does not vary ; the only
difference is that each succeeding readjustment is on
a larger scale, and more far-reaching in its effects.
Such, stripped of its verbiage and appeals to sym
pathy, is the trust proposition. But the popular ap
prehension always has been, as it now is, that this
supply of the better article at a lower price wiU con
tinue only until the producer — the monopolist — has
secured a complete mastery of the situation. Capital,
it is argued, is selfish and greedy; corporations are
proverbiaUy souUess and insatiable ; and, as soon as
competition is eliminated, nature wIU assert itself.
Prices wUl then be raised so as to assure Inordinate
gains ; and when, m consequence of such profits, fresh
competitors enter the field, they wIU either be crushed
out of existence by a temporary reduction in price, or
absorbed In the trust.
AU this has a plausible sound ; and of it, as a
theory of practical outcome, the poUtician can be re-

312 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION
lied upon to make the most. On this head, however,
what has the historical Investigator to say ? His ¦wiU
be the last word in that debate also ; his, the verdict
which wUl be final. The lessons bearing on this con
tention to be drawn from the record cover a wide field
of both time and space ; they also sUence discussion.
They tend Indisputably to show that the dangers de
picted are imaginary. The subject must, of course,
be approached in an unprejudiced spirit, and studied
in a large, comprehensive way. Permanent tendencies
are to be dealt with ; and exceptional cases must be In
stanced, classified, and aUowed for. Attempts, more
or less successful, at extortion, in a confidence of mas
tery, can unquestionably be pointed out ; but, in the
history of economical development, it is no less un
questionable that, on the large scale and in the long
run, every new concentration has been foUowed by a
permanent reduction of price in the commodity af
fected thereby. The world's needs are continuaUy
suppUed at a lower cost to the world. Again, the
larger the concentration, the cheaper the product ;
until now a new truth of the market-place has become
established and obtained general acceptance, — a truth
of the most far-reaching consequence, — the truth that
the largest returns are found in quick sales at small
profits. To manage successfully one of those great
and complex industrial combinations caUs for excep
tional administrative capacity in indi^riduals, — for
men of quick perception, and masterful tempers.
These men must be able correctly to read the lessons
of experience, and, accepting the facts of the situation,
they must find out how most exactly to adapt them
selves to those facts. No theorist, be he poUtician or

AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 313
phUosopher, appreciates so clearly as does the success
ful trust executive the fundamental laws of being of the
interests he has in charge. Such have good cause to
know that, under conditions now prevaUing, compe
tition is the sure coroUary of the attempted abuse of
control ; and, moreover, that the largest ultimate re
turns on capital, as weU as the only real security from
competition, are found, not in the disposal of a small
product at a large profit, but in a large output at
prices which encourage consumption. Throwing ex
ceptional cases and temporary conditions out of con
sideration, as not affecting final results, the historical
investigator will probably on this subject find himself
much at variance with the political canvasser. That
the last wiU get worsted in the argument hardly need
be said.
Does history furnish any instance of a financial, an
industrial, or a commercial enterprise — a bank, a
factory, or an importing company — ever having been
powerful enough long to regulate the price of any
commodity regardless of competition, except when act
ing in harmony with and supported by governmental
power ? Is not the monopolist practically impotent,
unless he has the constable at his caU ? To answer
this question absolutely would be to deduce a law of
the first importance from the general experience of
mankind. So doing would caU for a far more care
ful examination than is now in my power to make,
were it even within the scope of my ablUty ; but. If
my supposition prove correct, the corollary to be
drawn therefrom is to us as a body politic, and at
just this juncture, one of the first and most far-reach
ing import. In such case, the modern American trust.

314 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION
also, so far as it enjoys any power as a monopoly,
or admits of abuse as such, must depend for that
power, and the opportunity of abuse, solely on govern
mental support and cooperation. Its citadel is then
the custom-house. The moment the aid of the United
States revenue officer is withheld, the American mono
polist would cease to monopolize except in so far as
he could defy competition by always supplying a bet
ter article at a price lower than any other producer
in the whole world. And here, having deduced and
formulated this law, the purely historical investigator
would find himself trenching on the pro'vince of the
economist. The so-called protective system would
now be in question. Thus again, as so often before,
the tariff would become the paramount issue. But the
tariff would no longer stand in the popular mind as
the beneficent protector of domestic enterprise ; it
would on the contrary be there closely associated with
the idea of monopoly, it would be assaUed as the
stronghold of the trust. From the historical and
economical point of view, however, the debate would
not because of that undergo any diminution of interest.
Whatever the poUtician might in the course of that
debate assert, or the opportunist incorporate into
legislation, we may rest assured that this issue ¦wiU
ultimately settle itself in accordance ¦with those irre
sistible underlying influences which result In what we
know as natural evolution. History is but the record
of the adjustment of mankind in the past to the out
come of those influences ; and, in this respect, when
aU Is said and done, it Is tolerably safe to predict that
the future wIU present no features of novelty. If,
then, we can measure correctly the nature of the in-

AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 315
fluences at work, the character, as weU as the extent,
of the impending readjustment may be surmised. For
such a diagnosis the historian and economist must fur
nish the data.
It remains to pass on to the third and last of the
matters in debate during 1900 — that known as Im
perialism. This was the reaUy great issue before the
American people then, and, I submit. It is the reaUy
great issue before them now. That issue, moreover,
I with confidence submit, can be intelligently consid
ered only from the historical standpoint. Indeed,
unless approached through the avenues of human
experience, it is not even at once apparent how the
question, as it now confronts us, arose, and injected
itself into our political action ; and, accordingly, it is
in some quarters even currently assumed that It is
there only fortuitously, — a feature in the great chap
ter of accidents, — a passing incident, which may well
disappear as mysteriously and as suddenly as it came.
Studied historicaUy, I do not think this view of the
situation wUl bear examination. On the contrary, I
fancy even the most superficial investigator, if actu
ated in his inquiry by the true historical spirit, would
soon reach the conclusion that the issue so recently
forced upon us had been long In preparation, was
logical and inevitable, and, for our good or our evU,
must be decided, rightly or wrongly, on a large view
of great and complex conditions. In other words,
there may be reason to conclude that an inscrutable
law of nature, at last involving us, has long been, and
now is, evolving results. It is one more phase of nat
ural evolution, working itself out, as in the case of
Rome twenty-five centuries ago, through the survival
and supremacy of the fittest.

316 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION
I need hardly say, I feel myself now venturing on
a dangerous generalization ; and yet I do not see how
the American investigator, who endeavors to draw his
conclusions from history, can recoil from the venture.
His deductions will probably be erroneous, — indeed,
they are sure to be so to some extent ; — and, in making
them, he is more than likely to make a not inconsider
able display of superficial knowledge. None the less,
even if it be of smaU value, he is bound to offer what
he has. If the seed that sower sows bears no fruit, it
can do smaU harm.
Mr. Leslie Stephen, in one of his essays, truly
enough says, " The Catholic and the Protestant, the
Conservative and the Radical, the Individualist and
the Socialist, have equal faciUty in proving their own
doctrines with arguments, which habltuaUy begin,
'All history shows.' Printers should be instructed
always to strike out that phrase as an erratum; and
to substitute, ' I choose to take for granted.' " And
elsewhere the same writer lays it down as a general
proposition that " Arguments beginning ' AU his
tory shows ' are always sophistical." ! What is by
some known as the doctrine of Manifest Destiny is,
I take it, identical ¦with what others, more piously
minded, refer to as the WiU, or CaU, of God. The
Mohammedan and the modern Christian gospel-mon
ger say, " God clearly calls us " to this or that work ;
and with a conscience perfectly clear, they then pro
ceed to rob, oppress and slay. In like manner, the
political buccaneer and land-pirate proclaims that the
possession of his neighbor's territory is rightfuUy his
1 Social Rights and Duties, vol. i. p. 129; An Agnostic's Apo
logy, p. 260.

AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 317
by Manifest Destiny. The philosophical poUtician
next drugs the conscience of his feUow men by de
claring solemnly that " aU history shows " that might
is right ; and with time, the court of last appeal, it
must be admitted possession is nine points in the law's
ten. It cannot be denied, also, that quite as many
crimes have been perpetrated in the name of God and
of Manifest Destiny as in that of Liberty ; and that,
at least, " aU history shows ; " but, aU the same, just
as Liberty is a good and desirable thing, so God does
live, and there is something in Manifest Destiny.
As applied to the development of the races inhabiting
the earth, it is, I take it, merely an unscientific form of
speech, — the word now in vogue is evolution, — the
phrase " survival of the fittjest." When aU is said
and done, that unreasoning instinct of a people which
carries it forward in spite of and over theories to its
Manifest Destiny, amid the despairing outcries and
long-drawn protestations of theorists and ethical phi
losophers, is a very considerable factor in making his
tory ; and, consequently, one to be reckoned with.
In plain words, then, and Mr. Stephen to the con
trary notwithstanding, "aU history shows" that every
great, aggressive and masterful race tends at times
irresistibly towards the practical assertion of its
supremacy, usually at the cost of those not so well
adapted to existing conditions. In his great work,
Mommsen formulates the law ¦with a brutal directness
distinctly Germanic. " By virtue of the law, that a
people which has grown into a state absorbs its neigh
bors who are in political nonage, and a civUized people
absorbs its neighbors who are in inteUectual nonage,
— by virtue of this law, which is as miiversally vaUd

318 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION
and as much a law of nature as the law of gravity, —
the Italian nation (the only one In antiquity which was
able to combine a superior political development and
a superior civilization, though it presented the latter
only in an imperfect and external manner) was en
titled to reduce to subjection the Greek states of the
East which were ripe for destruction, and to dispossess
the peoples of lower grades of culture in the West —
Libyans, Iberians, Celts, Germans — by means of its
settlers ; just as England, ¦with equal right, has in Asia
reduced to subjection a ci-rillzation of rival standing,
but politicaUy Impotent, and in America and Austra
lia has marked and ennobled, and stUl continues to
mark and ennoble, extensive barbarian countries with
the impress of its nationality." ! Professor von Hoist
again states a coroUary from the law thus laid down
in terms scarcely less explicit, in connection ¦with a
weU-known and much discussed act of foreign spolia
tion in our own comparatively recent history. " It is
as easy to bid a baU that has flown from the mouth of
the gun to stop in Its flight, and return on Its path, as
to terminate a successful war of conquest by a volun
tary surrender of all conquests, because it has been
found out that the spoil wiU be a source of dissension
at home." ^ And then von Hoist quotes a very signifi
cant as weU as philosophical utterance of William H.
Seward's, which a portion of our earnest protestants of
to-day would do weU to ponder. " I abhor war, as I
detest slavery. I would not give one human life for
aU the continent that remains to be annexed. But I
cannot exclude the conviction that the popular passion
1 History of Rome, Book v. chap. 7.
2 History of the United States, vol. iu. p. 304.

AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 319
for territorial aggrandizement is irresistible. Pru
dence, justice, cowardice, may check it for a season,
but it will gain strength by its subjugation. ... It
behooves us then to quaUfy ourselves for our mission.
We must dare our destiny." ! One more, and I have
done with quotations. The last I just now commended
to the thoughtful consideration of those classified in
the political nomenclature of the day as Anti-Imperial
ists. A most conscientious and high-minded class, —
possessed with the fuU courage of their convictions,
— the efforts of the Anti-Imperialists will not fail,
we and they may rest assured, to make themselves felt
as they enter into the grand result. Nevertheless, for
them also there is food for thought, perhaps for con
solation, in this other general law, laid down in 1862
by Richard Cobden, than whose, in my judgment, the
utterances of no English-speaking man in the nine
teenth century were more replete with shrewd sense
expressed In plain, terse EngUsh : " From the moment
the first shot is fired, or the first blow Is struck, in
a dispute, then fareweU to all reason and argument ;
you might as weU attempt to reason ¦with mad dogs as
with men when they have begun to spill each other's
blood in mortal combat. I was so convinced of the
fact during the Crimean war, which, you know, I op
posed, — I was so convinced of the utter uselessness
of raising one's voice in opposition to war when it has
once begun, that I made up my mind that as long as
I was in political life, should a war again break out
between England and a great Power, I would never
open my mouth upon the subject from the time the
first gun was fired until the peace was made, because,
1 Works, vol. iii. p. 409.

320 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION
when a war is once commenced, it wUl only be by
the exhaustion of one party that a termination wUl be
arrived at. If you look back at our history, what
did eloquence, in the persons of Chatham or Burke, do
to prevent a war with our first American colonies?
What did eloquence, in the persons of Fox and his
friends, do to prevent the French Revolution, or bring
it to a close ? And there was a man who, at the com
mencement of the Crimean war. In terms of eloquence,
in power, and pathos, and argument equal — in terms,
I beUeve, fit to compare with anything that feU from
the lips of Chatham and Burke — I mean your distin
guished townsman, my friend Mr. Bright — and what
was his success ? Why, they burnt him in effigy for
his pains." !
Turning from the authorities, and the lessons by
them deduced from the record caUed History, let us
now consider the problem precipitated on the Ameri
can people by the Spanish war of 1898. There has
of late been much talk of the sudden development of
the United States as a " World Power," and of the
new and prominent part it henceforth has to play, —
talk, as I hold it, empty, idle and wearisome, — closely
bordermg on cant. The United States -without ques
tion is a world power ; but, that it has been such a
power hard upon a century, I hold not more open to
denial. The United States became a world power in
the eyes of all nations between five minutes after 6
o'clock p. M. of the 19th of August, 1812, and the
following half hour ; the frigate Constitution, within
those twenty-five minutes, having by her broadsides
put the frigate Guerriere in such a position that the
hes, vol. ii. p. 314.

AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 321
British flag had to come down. Since the hands of
the Constitution's chronometer marked the half hour
after 6 o'clock of that eventful afternoon, there has
been, I hold, no room for debate as to the United
States as a world power.
For more than eighty years afterwards, the efforts
of that power at supremacy were, in obedience to the
law of its being and subject to the conditions of its
environment, confined to filling up the waste spaces
in its immediate neighborhood or to aggressive atti
tude, sometimes resulting in action, towards the less
weU adapted who chanced to find themselves in its
path. But, as the world's solidarity increased, and
trade and intercourse, assuming new forms, forced
their way into fresh fields, it became ine-ritable, as
the prescriptive barriers, one by one, gave way, that a
new and larger policy would evolve itself for the
United States also. That policy, moreover, would not
fail to find expression soon or late in some assertion
of supremacy. It was only a question of place, time
and degree.
We aU know how it came about. It is needless for
me here and now to refer in detail to the war with
Spain, and the fight in Manila Bay. Suffice it to
say that, if human experience goes for anything in
such cases, what has since resulted was in its larger
scope inevitable, — in the nature of a logical outcome.
Nor in thus stating a conclusion do I imply a spirit
of fatalism, or say anything calculated to disparage
opposition at the beginning, or discourage discussion
now. On the contrary, " aU history shows " — and
this time, I submit, shows indisputably and conclu
sively — that final results are the outcome, not of

322 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION
some of the antecedent influences, or even of those
among them most preponderating, but of all of them,
combined and forever interacting. Every ingredient
goes Into the grand total, there making its presence
felt. This being premised, it must next be admitted
that there are few things which, when they first con
front perplexed mankind, caU more emphatically for
chaUenge than the apparitions of manifest destiny.
Such invariably come in questionable shapes. As our
own experience teaches, — " as aU history shows," —
not one time in ten that manifest destiny Is heralded
does the thing so confidently pronounced as destined
come to pass. How many times within our own mem
ories it has been appealed to, and in behalf of what
causes, — Ostend manifestoes, Fenian raids, servile
insurrections, "Naboth's vineyard," miscegenation,
and the like, — the record Indicates. It cannot, there
fore, and should not even for an instant be assumed
that the appeal to God's WiU, or Manifest Destiny,
is entitled to consideration untU it has so proved itself
by actually overcoming the most strenuous opposition.
That puts its reality to the test. Nor, when, in the
matter of so-caUed expansion, the given manifestation
has in the outcome proved itself genuine, and remains
an established fact, — as, citing our own experience,
in the cases of Texas, California, Alaska, Porto Rico
and Hawaii, — a condition, and no longer a theory,
— not then even is the struggle necessarUy over.
The details remain to be settled ; and the details. In
cluding aU questions of form, involve the whole final
character of the development. It is then to be decided
whether the Inevitable is to assume shape In harmony
with our traditions, or in defiance of them. This is

AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 323
the final outcome of conflicting views and opposing
forces. In the case now under discussion, therefore,
while the battle of Manila Bay and the Treaty of
Paris did, as is now apparent, settle the main issue,
and finaUy committed the United States to a new
phase and sphere of expansion, — a peopled, trans-
Pacific acquisition, — to that expansion a shape was,
and is yet to be given. It was in debate during the
last presidential canvass ; it is in debate now.
That question — the burning political issue of the
hour — I propose here and now to discuss. I propose
to discuss it, however, from the purely historical stand
point, and not at all in its moral or economical aspects.
So far, then, as this question is concerned, the last pre
sidential vote — that of 1900 — • settled nothing, except
that the policy which had assumed a certain degree of
form in the Treaty of Paris should not be reversed.
AU else was left for debate and ulterior settlement.
Certain lessons, calculated greatly to influence the
character of that settlement, can, I submit, now be
most advantageously drawn from history. At formu
lating those lessons, I propose here to try my hand.
The first and most important lesson is one which,
in theory at least, is undisputed ; though to live up
to it practically caUs for a courage of conviction not
yet In e^vidence. That a dependency is not merely a
possession, but a trust — a trust for the future, for
itself and for humanity — Is accepted; — accordingly
it is in no wise to be exploited for the general benefit
of the alien owner, or that of individual components
of that owner, but it is to be dealt with in a large
and altruistic spirit, with an unselfish view to its own
utmost development, materially, moraUy, and politi-

324 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION
caUy. And, through a process of negatives, " aU his
tory shows " that only when this course is hereafter
¦wisely and consecutively pursued — should that blessed
consummation ever be attained — wiU the dominating
power itself derive the largest and truest benefit from
its possession.
As yet no American of any character, much less of
authority, has come forward to controvert this propo
sition. That it wUl be controverted, and attempts
made by interested parties to sophisticate it away
through the cunningly arranged display of exceptional
circumstances, can with safety be predicted. In this
respect, to use a cant phrase, " we know how it is our
selves." We aU remember, for instance, the unspeak
able code of factitious morals and deceptive philosophy
manufactured to order in these United States as a
" Gospel of Niggerdom " less than half a century ago.
Coming do^wn to more recent times, we can, none of
us, yet have forgotten the wretched sophistry igno-
rantly resurrected from French Revolution and asslgnat
days in glorification of " Fiat Money," and a business
world emancipated at last from any heretofore accepted
measures of value. The leopard, rest assured, has not
changed Its spots since either 1860 or 1876. The
New Gospel phase of the debate now on is, however,
yet to develop itself. But, assuming the correctness
of the proposition I have just formulated, a corollary
follows from it. A formidable proposition, I state it
without limitations, meaning to chaUenge contradic
tion. I submit that there is not an instance in aU
recorded history, from the earUest precedent to that
now making, where a so-caUed inferior race or com
munity has been elevated in its character, or made

AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 325
self-sustaining and self-governing, — or even put on
the way to that result, — through a condition of
dependency or tutelage. I say " inferior race ; " but,
I fancy, I might state the proposition even more
broadly. I might, without much danger, assert that
the condition of dependency, even for communities of
the same race and blood, always exercises an emascu
lating and deteriorating influence. I would undertake,
if caUed upon, to show also that the rule is invariable,
— that, from the inherent and fundamental conditions
of human nature it has known, and can know, no
exceptions. Of this history affords well-nigh innum
erable examples, — ourselves among them. In our
case, it required a century to do away in our minds
and hearts with our colonial traditions. The CivU
War, and not what we caU the Revolution, was our
real war of Independence. And yet in our depend
ency days you wUl remember we were not emasculated
into a resigned and even cheerful self-incapacity as
the natural result of a kindly, paternal and protec
tive policy ; but, as Burke, with profound insight,
expressed it, with us the spirit of Independence and
self-support was fostered " through a wise and salutary
neglect." But, for present purposes, all this is unne
cessary, and coiUd lead but to a poor display of common
place learning. The problem to-day engaging the
attention of the American people is more Umited. It
relates solely to what are called " inferior races ; "
those of the same race, or of cognate races, we as yet
do not propose to hold In a condition of permanent
dependency ; those we absorb, or assimilate. Only
those of " inferior race " • — - the less developed or deca
dent — do we propose to hold in subjection, — dealing

326 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION
¦with them, in theory at least, as a guardian deals with
a famUy of wards.
My proposition then broadens. If history teaches
anything in this regard, it is that race elevation, the
capacity In a word of political self-support, cannot be
imparted through tutelage. Moreover, the mUder,
the more paternal, kindly and protective the guardian
ship, the more emasculating it wiU prove. A " wise
and salutary neglect " is in the end the more benefi
cent policy ; for, with races as ¦with indi^riduals, a
state of dependency breeds the spirit of dependency.
Take Great Britain, for instance. That people, —
working at It now consecutively through three whole
centuries, — after weU-nigh innumerable experiences
and as many costly blunders, — Great Britain has, I
say, developed a genius for dealing with dependencies,
— for the government of " inferior races ; " — a genius
far in advance of anything the world has seen before.
Yet my contention is that, to-day, after three rounded
centuries of British rule, the Hindostanese, — the
natives of India, — in spite of aU material, industrial
and educational improvements, — roads, schools, jus
tice and peace, — are in 1900 less capable of inde
pendent and ordered self-government than they were
in the year 1600, — the year when the East India
Company was incorporated under a patent of Eliza
beth. The native Indian dynasties — those natural
to the Hindoos — have disappeared ; accustomed to
foreign rule, the people have no rulers of their own,
nor could they rule themselves. The rule of aliens
has with Hindostan thus become a domestic necessity.
Remove it, — and the highest and most recent authori
ties declare it surely wIU some day be removed, —

AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 327
chaos would inevitably ensue. What is true of India
is true of Egypt. That, under British rule, Egypt is
to-day in better material and political case than ever
before in its history — modern, biblical, hieroglyphic
or legendary — scarcely admits of dispute. Schools,
roads, irrigation, law and order, and protection from
attack, she has them aU ; —
" But what avaU the plough or s^,
Or land or life, if freedom faU ? "
The capacity for self-government is not acquired in
that school.
This fact is to-day more than ever before forcing
itself on the attention and engaging the anxious thought
of those Englishmen most familiar with the imperial
system. " As yet there is no sign that the British are
accompUshing [in Hindostan] more than the Romans
accomplished in Britain, that they wiU spread any
permanently successful ideas, or that they wiU found
anything whatever. It is stiU true that if they de
parted, or were driven out, they would leave behind
them, as the Romans did in Britain, splendid roads,
many useless buUdings, an increased weakness in the
subject people, and a memory which in a century of
new events would be extinct. ... So far as one can
see, not a European idea, not a European habit, not
a distinctively European branch of knowledge, ever
penetrated into Asia. . . . We are told every day how
Europe has influenced Japan, and forget that the
change in those islands was entirely seK-generated,
that Europeans did not teach Japan, but that Japan of
herself chose to learn from Europe methods of organi
zation, civU and miUtary, which have so far proved
successful." !
1 Meredith Townsend : Asia and Europe, pp. 25, 27, 28.

328 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION
Such is the recent testimony of one closely observing
Englishman, the larger portion of whose life has been
passed in Asia. Another says, to the same effect,
" The very peace and security which a great Empire
establishes may prove a deadening influence. ... In
India peace reigns to-day, and order, but there is cer
tainly less scope for the Eastern patriotism of race
and class, less romance and food for poetry, less
motive for heroic self-sacrifice, less to stir the heart
and imagination of Rajput and Sikh, of Mahratta and
Pathan, than there was In those years of glorious
turbulence in the breaking up of the Mogul empire.
British rule tends to destroy native origlnaUty, ¦vigor
and initiative. How to replace that which our rule
takes away Is the great Indian problem." ! Evidence
on this head might be accumulated to any desired
extent ; and yet to-day a vague idea, almost an aspi
ration, is floating through our American popular mind
that a single generation of our beneficent rule vriU
suffice to convert Malays into self-governing commu
nities of the Anglo-Saxon type.
But England, in its own two thousand years of his
tory, furnishes an example of what I have been asserts
ing, — an example well-nigh forgotten. In fundar
mentals human nature is much the same now as twenty
centuries back. During the first century of the pre
sent era, the Romans, acting in obedience to the law
laid do^wn by Mommsen, ¦ — the law quoted by me In
full, and of which Thomas Carlyle is the latest and
most eloquent exponent, — the law known as the
Divine Right of the most Masterful, — acting in obe
dience to that law, the Romans in the year of Grace
* Bernard HoUand : Imperiud et Libertas, p. 12.

AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 329
43 crossed the British Channel, overthrew the Celts
and Gauls gathered in defence of what they mistakenly
deemed their own, and, after reducing them to sub
jection, permanently occupied the land. They remained
there four centuries — a hundred years longer than
the EngUsh have been In Calcutta. During that
period they introduced civilization, established Chris
tianity, constructed roads, dweUings and fortifications.
MateriaUy, the condition of the country vastly im
proved. The Romans protected the inhabitants against
their enemies ; also against themselves. During four
hundred years they benevolently assimilated them.
Doubtless, on the banks of the Tiber, the inhabitants
of what is now England were deemed incapable of
self-government. Probably they were ; unquestionably
they became so. When the legions were at last with-
dra^wn, the results of a kindly paternalism, secure
protection and inteUigent tutelage became apparent.
The race was wholly emasculate. It cursed its Inde
pendence; it deplored its lost dependency. As the
English historian now records the result, " crushing aU
local independence, crushed aU local vigor. Men for
got how to fight for their country when they forgot
how to govern it." !
There is a familiar saying to the effect that, whUe
Man is always in a hurry, God never is. Certainly,
Nature works with a discouraging indifference to time.
Each passing generation of reformers does love to
witness some results of its efforts ; but, in the case of
England, in consequence of the emasculation Incident
to tutelage, and dependency on a powerful, a bene
volent and beneficent foreign rule, after that rule
1 Green : Short History of the English People, vol. i. p. 9.

330 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION
ended, — as soon or late such rule always must end,
— throughout the lives of eighteen successive genera
tions emasculated England was overrun. At last,
with some half dozen intermediate rulers, the Nor
mans succeeded the Romans. They were conquering
masters; but they domesticated themselves in the
British Islands, and in time assimUated the inhabit
ants thereof, — Britons, Picts and Celts, — bene
volently, or otherwise. But, as nearly as the historian
can fix it, it required eight centuries of direst tribu
lation to educate the people of England out of that
spirit of self-distrust and dependency into which they
had been reduced by four centuries of paternaUsm,
at once Roman and temporarily beneficent. Twelve
centuries Is certainly a discouraging term to which to
look forward. But steam and electricity have since
then been developed to a manifest quickening of re
sults. Even the pace of Nature was in the nine
teenth century vastly accelerated.
Briefly stated, then, the historical deduction would
seem to be somewhat as foUows : Where a race has
in itself, whether implanted there by nature or as the
result of education, the elevating instinct and energy,
— the capacity of mastership, — a state of dependency
¦wiU tend to educate that capacity out of existence ;
and the more beneficent, paternal and protecting the
guardian power is, the more pernicious its influence
becomes. In such cases, the course most beneficial,
in the end to the dependency, now as a century ago,
would be that characterized by " a ¦wise and salu
tary neglect." Where, however, a race is for any
cause not possessed of the self-Innate saving capacity,
— being stationary or decadent, — a state of depend-

AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 331
ency, while it may improve material conditions, tends
yet further to deteriorate the spirit and to diminish
the capacity of self-government : if severe, it brutal
izes ; if kindly, it enervates. History records no in
stance in which it develops and strengthens.
FoUowing yet further the teachings of experience,
we are thus brought to a parting of the ways, —
a parting distinct, unmistakable. Heretofore the pol
icy of the United States, as a nationality, has, so far
as the so-caUed inferior races are concerned, been
confined in its operation to the North American con
tinent ; but, as a whole and in its large aspects, it has
been well defined and consistent. We have proceeded
on the theory that aU government should in the end
rest on the consent of the governed ; that any given
people is competent to govern itself in some fashion ;
and that, in the long run, any fashion of self-imposed
government works better results than ¦wiU probably
be worked by a government imposed from without.
In other words, the American theory has been that,
in the process of Nature and looking to ultimate, per
haps remote, conditions, any given people, not admit
ting of assimUation, wIU best work out its destiny
when left free to work it out in its own way. More
over, so far as outside influence is concerned, it could,
in the grand result, be more effectively exercised
through example than by means of active interven
tion. Where we have not therefore forcibly absorbed
into our system foreign and inferior races alien in
character and more or less completely assimilated
them, we have, up to very recently, adopted and ap
plied what may perhaps in homely speech best be de
scribed as a " Hauds-off and Walk-alone" doctrine,

332 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION
relying in our poUcy toward others on the theory
practised at our private firesides, — the theory that
self-government results from example, and is self-
taught. I have already quoted Richard Cobden in this con
nection ; I wIU quote him again. Referring, in 1864,
to the British foreign policy, then by him as by us
denounced, though by us now imitated, Cobden said,
— "I maintain that a man is best doing his duty at
home in striving to extend the sphere of liberty —
commercial, literary, political, reUgious, and in aU
directions ; for if he is working for liberty at home,
he is working for the advancement of the principles of
liberty aU over the world." !
Mexico and Haytl afford striking iUustratlons of a
long and rigid adherence to this policy on our part,
and of the results of that adherence. Conquering and
dismembering Mexico in 1847, we. In 1848, left it
to its own de-rices. So completely had the work of
subjugation been done that our representatives had
actually to caU into being a Mexican government with
which to arrange terms of peace. With that simula
crum of a national authority we made a solemn treaty,
and, after so doing, left the Aztec land to work out
its destiny, if it could, as it could.^ In spite of numer
ous domestic convulsions and much internal anarchy,
from that day to this we have neither ourselves inter
vened In the internal affairs of our southern conti
nental neighbor, nor long permitted such interference
by others. To Mexico, we have said, " Walk alone ; "
^ Speeches, vol. ii. p. 353.
^ See the very suggestive paper entitled " The Proposed Absorp
tion of Mexico in 1847-1848," by Professor E. G. Bourne : Essays in
Historical Criticism, pp. 227-242.

AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 333
to France, " Hands off." The result we aU know. It
has gone far to justify our theory of the true path of
human advancement. Forty years is, in matters of
race development, a short time. A period much too
short to admit of drawing positive, or final, infer
ences. Dr. Holmes was once asked by an anxious
mother when the education of a chUd should begin ;
his prompt, if perhaps unexpected, reply was, — " Not
less than two hundred and fifty years before it is
bom." To-day, and under existing conditions, Mexico,
though republican in name and form only, is self-gov
erning in reality. It is manifestly working its pro
blem out in its own way. The statement carries ¦with
it implications hardly consistent with the Might-is-
Right, latter-day dispensation voiced by Mommsen
and Carlyle.
Haytl presents another case in point, with results
far more trying to our theory. We have toward
Hayti pursued exactly the policy pursued by us with
Mexico. Not interfering ourselves in the internal
affairs of the island, we have not permitted interfer
ence by others. Occupied by an inferior race, appar
ently lapsing steadily toward barbarism, for the con
dition of affairs prevailing in Hayti the United States
is moraUy responsible. Acting on the law laid down
in the extract I have given from the pages of Momm
sen, we might at any time during the last quarter of
a century have intervened in the name of humanity,
and to the great temporary advantage of the inhabit
ants of the one region " Where Black rules White."
The United States, in pursuance of its theories, has
abstained from so doing. It has abstained in the be
lief that, in the long run and grand result, the inhabit-

334 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION
ants of Hayti wUl best work out their problem, if left
to work it out themselves. In any event, however,
exceptional cases are the rocks on which sound prin
ciples come to wreck ; and, so far as the race of man
on earth is concerned, it is better that Hayti should
suffer self-caused misfortune for centuries, as did Eng
land before, than that a precedent should be created
for the frequent violation of a great principle of nat
ural development. Yet the case of Hayti is crucial.
Persistently to apply our policy there evinces, it must
be admitted, a robust faith in the wisdom of its uni
versal appUcation. The logical inference, so far as
the Philippine Islands are concerned, is obvious.
The rule guiding, or that should guide, the United
States in its dealings with alien races, probably in
ferior, as being either as yet undeveloped or else in a
state of arrested development, is simple. The capacity
for self-government, and, consequently, the consent of
the governed, should be assumed, untU, as the result
of experience, a negative is proved ; the interference
should then be the least necessary to arrest decay or
secure stablUty. The assumption should ever be in
favor of a tendency to progressive self -development.
The British rule is the reverse. Incapacity is assumed,
until capacity is proved.
HistoricaUy speaking, those now referred to are the
only two theories of a national poUcy to be pursued in
dealing with practical dependencies, which chaUenge
consideration, — the American and the British. The
others, whether ancient and abandoned, or modem
and in use, — Phoenician, Roman, Spanish, French,
Dutch, German, or Russian, — may be dismissed from
the discussion. They none of them ever did, nor do

AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 335
any of them now, look to an altruistic result. In aU,
the dependency is confessedly exploited on business
principles, with an eye to the trade development of
the aUen proprietor. Setting these aside, there re
main only the American, or " Walk-alone and Hands-
off " theory ; and the British, or " Ward-in-Chancery "
theory. The first is exempUfied in Mexico and Hayti ;
the last in Hindostan and Egypt. The question now
in debate for the United States may, therefore, be
concisely stated, thus : Taking the Philippine Islands
as a subject for treatment, and the ultimate elevation
of the inhabitants of those islands to self-government
as the end in view, which is the policy best calculated
to lead to the result desired, — the traditional and
distinctively American system, as exemplified in
the cases of Mexico and Hayti, or the modern and
improved British system, to be studied in Hindostan
and Egypt?

Subject to limitations of time and space I have now
passed in review the great poUtical debates which have
occupied the attention of the American pubUc during
the last half century. I have endeavored to caU at
tention to the plane on which those debates have been
conducted, and to the noticeable absence from them
of a scholarly spirit. The judicial temper and the
patience necessary to any thorough investigation have
in them, I submit, been conspicuously lacking. Then,
starting from the point of view pecuUar to this Asso
ciation, I have examined the issues presented to the
country in the last presidential canvass, and, for pur
poses of iUustration, I have discussed them, always in
a purely historical temper.

336 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION
While the result of my experiment is for others to
pass upon, my own judgment is clear and decided. I
hold that the time has now come when organizations
such as this of ours, instead of, as heretofore, scrupu
lously standing aloof from the poUtical debate, are
under obligation to participate In it. As citizens, we
most assuredly should, in so far as we may properly
so do, contribute to results, whether immediate, or
more or less remote. As scholars and students, the
conclusions we have to present should be deserving of
thoughtful consideration. The historical point of view,
moreover, is, politicaUy, an important point of view ;
for only when approached historicaUy — by one look
ing before, as weU as after — can any issue be under
stood in its manifold relations ¦with a complex ci^riU-
zatlon. Indeed, the moral point of view can in its
importance alone compare with the historical. The
economical, ¦vital as it unquestionably often is, comes
much lower in the scale ; for, while an approach
through both these avenues is not infrequently neces
sary to the inteUigent comprehension of questions of
a certain class, — such, for instance, as the tariff or
currency, — it Is very noticeable that, though many
issues present themselves, — slavery or imperialism,
for example, — into which economical considerations
do not enter as controUing factors, there is scarcely
any matter of political debate which does not to some
extent at least have to be discussed historicaUy. Still,
though our retrospect has proven this to be the case,
the scarcely less significant fact also appears that not
more than one presidential canvass in two involves
any real issue at aU, — moral or economical. Of the
last twelve elections, covering the half century, — six

AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION 337
were mere struggles for political control ; and so far as
can now be seen, the course of subsequent events would
have been in no material respect other than it was,
whichever party prevailed. Judging by experience,
therefore, in only one future canvass out of two wUl
any occasion arise for a careful historical presentation
of facts. The investigator wiU not be caUed upon ;
and, if he rises to take part in the discussion, he will
do no harm, for the excellent reason that no one ¦wiU
listen to him. In the other of each two canvasses it
is not so. There is then apt to be a real debate over
a paramount issue ; and, in aU such, the strong search
light of experience should be thrown, clearly and fully,
over the road we are caUed upon to traverse. In
every such case, the presentation, provided always it
be made in the true historical spirit, should by no
means be of one side only. On the contrary, every
phase of the record should have its advocate ; every
plausible lesson should be dra^wn. The facts are
many, compUcated and open to a varied construction ;
and it is only through the clash of opposing views that
they can be reduced to comparative system, and com
peUed to yield their lessons for guidance.
As I have also, more than once already, observed,
this Association Is largely made up of those occupying
the chairs of instruction in our seminaries of the
higher education. From their lecture-rooms the dis
cussion of current political issues is of necessity ex
cluded. There it is manifestly out of place. Others
here are scholars, for whom no place exists on the
political platform. StiU others are historical Inves
tigators and writers, interested only incidentaUy in
political discussion. Finally, some are merely public-

338 AN UNDEVELOPED FUNCTION
spirited citizens, on whom the oratory of the stump
paUs. They crave discussion of another order. They
are the men whose faces are seen only at those gather
ings which some one eminent for thought or in char
acter is in^rited to address. To aU these, the suggestion
I now make cannot but be grateful. It is that, in
future, this Association, as such, shaU so arrange its
meetings that one at least shaU be held in the month
of July preceding each presidential election. The
issues of that election will then have been presented,
and the opposing candidates named. It should be
understood that the meeting is held for the purpose of
discussing those issues from the historical point of
view, and in their historical connection. Absolute
freedom of debate should be insisted on, and the par
ticipation of those best quaUfied to deal with the
particular class of problems under discussion should
be solicited. Such authorities, speaking from so lofty
a rostrum to a select audience of appreciative men and
women, could, I confidently submit, hardly fail to
elevate the standard of discussion, bringing the calm
lessons of history to bear on the angry wrangles and
distorted presentations of those whose chief, if not
only, aim is a mere party supremacy.

A PLEA FOB MILITARY HISTORY i
I AM to contribute to this occasion a paper under
the title of " A Plea for MUitary History." To this
subject I have already — more than six months ago —
elsewhere aUuded, — in the course of an address to the
Massachusetts Historical Society, on taking for the
fifth time the chair as its president.
" It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that there
are not many considerable branches of human know
ledge concerning which the historian of the future must
not in some degree inform himself. Somewhere and
somehow his researches wiU touch upon them, remotely,
perhaps, but stiU as factors in his problem. . . .
Formerly all necessary information, it was supposed,
could be acquired from books ; manuscripts were bet
ter yet, for those were, without any question, what are
termed ' original sources.' But the old-fashioned his
torian, rarely, if ever, hesitating, flies boldly at every
kind of game — aU are fish that come to his net. For
instance, history is largely made up of accounts of
operations and battles on land and on sea. Weary
of threading his way through a long period of most
unpicturesque peace, trying to make that interesting
1 A paper read, in part, at the Annual Meeting of the American
Historical Association, held in Boston, December 28, 1899. Printed
in the Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 1900,
vol. i. pp. 193-218. Revised and corrected.

340 A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY
which was at best commonplace, the historian draws a
breath of relief when at length he comes to a tumult
of war. Here are pride, pomp, and circumstance, —
a chance for descriptive power.
" The historian of the future seems now likely to
pursue a different method. Recognizing the fact that
he probably is not at once a litterateur, a soldier, a
statesman, a lawyer, a theologian, a physician, and a
biologist ; that he certainly will not live forever ; that
he has not the cosmogony at his fingers' ends, and
that to ransack every repository of information on aU
possible subjects transcends the powers of even the
most industrious ; recognizing in this degree the Umits
of possibility, he wIU be content to avail himself of
the labors of others, better ad^vdsed on many subjects
than himself, and, becoming the student of mono
graphs, derive the great body of his mformation, not,
as the expression now goes, from ' original sources,' or
even from personal observation, but, as we aU in the
end must, at secondhand. His insight will be largely
into the knowledge and judgment of others, and the
degree of reUance to be placed in them.
" I know of but one writer who has described mUi
tary operations and battles, — those intricate move
ments of human pa^wns on a chessboard of much topo
graphical uncertainty, and those scientific melees in
which skUl, luck, preparation, superiority of weapons,
human endurance, and racial characteristics decide the
question of mastery as between two marshaUed mobs,
— I know, I was saying, of but one writer who has
described battles and military operations in that real
istic way which impresses me with a sense of both
personal experience and literary skiU. That one is

A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 341
Tolstoi, the Russian philosopher and novelist. His
Austerlitz and Russian campaigns of Napoleon and
his Sebastopol are masterpieces. A man of imagina
tion and consummate literary capacity, he had him
self served ; and, curiously enough, in the same way,
his compatriot, Verestchagin, has put upon canvas the
sickening realism of war with a degree of force which
could come only from famiUarity -with the cumbered
field, and could by no possibility be worked up in the
studio through the study of photographs, no matter
how numerous, or the perusal of the accounts ' from
our special correspondent,' no matter how graphic and
detailed. " I once, in a very subordinate capacity, though for
a considerable period of time, was brought into close
contact with warfare and saw much of military opera
tions from within, or, as I may say, on the seamy
side. Since then I have read In books of history, and
other works more avowedly of fiction, many accounts
of campaigns and battles ; and in so doing I have
been most deeply impressed with the audacity, not of
soldiers, but of authors. UsuaUy, bookish men who
had passed their lives in libraries, often clergymen —
knowing absolutely nothing of the principles of strategy
or of the details of camp Ufe and military organiza
tion, never having seen a column on the march, or a
regiment in line, or heard a hostUe shot, — not taking
the trouble even to visit the scene of operations or to
study its topography, wholly unacquainted with the
national characteristics of the combatants, — these
' bookish theoricks ' substitute their imaginings for
realities, and in the result display much the same real
acquaintance ¦with the subject which would be expected

342 A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY
from a physician or an artist who undertook to treat
of difficult problems in astronomy or mechanics. They
are strongly suggestive of the good Dr. Goldsmith
and his ' Animated Nature.' Once or twice I have
had occasion to follow these authorities, — authors of
standard historical works, — and in so doing have
famUiarlzed myself with the topography of the scenes
they described, and worked down, as best I could, into
the characters of those in command, and what are
known as the ' original sources ' of information as to
their plans and the course of operations. The result
has uniformly been a distinct accession of historical
scepticism." !
I come now to the true occasion of my being here
to-day. Having a year ago passed this general cen
sure upon " bookish theoricks," I happUy bethought
me of a friend of a lifetime to whom it was possible
what I had said might be assumed to apply. I refer
to the late John Codman Ropes. I therefore added
this qualifying sentence, and I now greatly rejoice
that it occurred to me so to do ; for Mr. Ropes was
present when I spoke the words I have quoted, having
done me the compliment that day to leave his office
that he might listen to me. The qualifying sentence
was as foUows : —
" That among men of the closet and the historical
laboratory are to be found miUtary students of pro
found, detaUed knowledge and great critical acumen,
no one woidd dispute ; least of all we, with at least
one brUliant and recognized exemplar in our own
^ " Historians and Historical SoDietiea," Proceedings of the Massa-
chusetts Historical Society (April, 1899), Second Series, vol. xiii. pp.
81-119.

A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 343
ranks, — a man who never saw an army in movement
or a stricken field, and yet whom I once heard referred
to by one who had borne a part in fifty fights, the
general then commanding our army, as the first among
Uving military critics."
The hearty applause with which the audience re
ceived these words showed that the aUusion was under
stood, and Mr. Ropes did not fail, later on, to express
the gratification the incident afforded him. Not yet
a month ago, at midnight on the 29th— 30th of No
vember last, he died. As I have already said, the
friendship which existed between us was almost life
long. Nearly fifty years ago we were students to
gether at Harvard, though not classmates, and my
intimacy with him and my feeling of high regard for
him had increased with each passing year. In my
existence his death has left a void not to be fiUed.
That is a small matter and personal only ; but,
so far as the study of military history is concerned,
especially in connection with our Civil War, the loss
occasioned by his death is scarcely less great. The
work Mr. Ropes was engaged on must remain un
finished ; for the second of his four volumes was pub
lished less than a year ago, and of the third volume
the beginning only had been prepared. He had
brought down his narrative to the battle of Fredericks
burg on one side and that of Murfreesboro on the
other, following, as he did, the large strategic lines of
the conflict only, and paying little attention to those
minor operations, almost Innumerable, which did not
greatly affect the grand result. It was General Scho-
field, then commanding the armies of the United
States, who, in a conversation I had with him more

344 A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY
than ten years ago, referred to Mr. Ropes in the lan
guage I have quoted, as the first of li-ring military
critics. And now, standing here among historical
writers, scholars and investigators, speaking over the
scarcely closed grave of the man, the student and the
friend, I bear such witness as I may to the fact that
in my judgment General Schofield in this remark was
not guUty of exaggeration. And further let me add
that, in my judgment also, so far as the history of the
great struggle hereafter to be known as the American
Confederate RebeUion Is concerned, the death of Mr.
Ropes, leaving his work unfinished, is to the highest
class of historical research an irreparable loss. As a
student of mUitary historical problems he was, so far
as my knowledge of such goes, almost unique. Com
bined with a sufficient literary skill, he had a grasp of
the great principles of strategy which could hardly be
bettered. His knowledge of tactics, and of the detaUs
of the march and of the battlefield, was of course
defective. He, too, had never seen a column on the
road or a battery in action. Accordingly, when it
came to this portion of his subject he could not speak
as a man can speak who has himself shared in the
prolonged weariness of the march or the sharp stress
of conflict. He knew as Uttle of campaign variety as
he did of camp tedium. As respects all these elements
of warfare — and they have much to do with the evo
lution of mUitary results ; far more than most writers
are apt to realize — he was obliged to have recourse
to his Imagination ; and, while imagination is in good
historical writing a most important factor, yet when
imagination deals with topics of which the writer has
had no practical experience, it is a dangerous guide.

A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 345
Nevertheless, allowing for these limitations under
which Mr. Ropes necessarily labored, I am free to
- say that, in my estimation, he has contributed more
than any other one writer has done, or any other one
vrrlter is Ukely to do, to a correct historical imder-
standlng of the great military operations and strategic
results of the first two years of the RebeUion. I felt,
therefore, that it would not have been weU had this
meeting of the American Historical Association gone
by, the first held since his death, without bearing in
its record something indicative of the high appreciation
in which he and his work are by us held. But for
that feeling I should not trespass on your patience to
day. I am weU aware that our president has already
fittingly forestaUed me in this grateful task, and that
mine is but a concurrent testimony on a subject con
cerning which little new remains to be said. That
little, however, is very appropriate to my theme, for it
would not be possible on this occasion to enter " A
Plea for Military History," and not to feel that in
doing so the name and thought of our best exponent
of " military history " — he who, in fact, had with us
identified himself with it — at once suggested them
selves. In aU that our president has said of Mr. Ropes
I concur, and to it I have sought to add what I might.
Having thus rendered my tribute, I recur to my
aUotted theme, and I propose to Ulustrate the criti
cism I last spring ventured upon by references to a few
of the great military operations which have left dis
tinct marks upon American history ; and, in so doing,
I shaU endeavor to point out how inadequately they
have been treated, having, as a rule, been treated by
investigators who failed to combine technical know-

346 A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY
ledge and a professional experience with literary sklU.
Indeed, among writers who have undertaken to deal
with problems of this class we number in the whole
record of the United States, so far as I know, but
one striking instance to whom this criticism plainly
faUs to apply, and that exceptional instance is outside
the field of military operations. Captain Mahan has
recently shown us what naval history becomes when
handled by one who had himself sailed the ocean and
had thoroughly famUiarized himself with maritime
conditions. In this I think aU wiU agree. His work
constitutes, indeed, a veritable addition to naval his
torical lore. It marks a new departure ; and it does
so for the simple reason that he did combine the two
quaUties I have referred to, — literary skUl with pro
fessional knowledge. I think it hardly less safe to
say that, so far as strictly military operations are con
cerned, no similar American writer has yet come for
ward. These operations, past and present, recent and
remote, have been very copiously described and almost
lovingly, as altogether too patriotically, dwelt upon ;
they have been analyzed on paper, and fought over in
print more than enough, but it has been either by
military men who failed to possess Captain Mahan's
literary gift, or by literary men who had not shared in
his professional work. The result, except in the case
of Mr. Ropes, has been an inadequate and more or
less unsatisfactory treatment, and even his conclusions
are to a degree affected by his lack of that personal
observation and famiUarity bred of contact which was
an essential element in the success of Captain Mahan.
As Gibbon, referring to his own experience, observed
in a weU-remembered passage of his autobiography,

A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 347
" The captain of the Hampshire Grenadiers has not
been useless to the historian of the Roman Empire."
Coming to my first iUustration, I propose to sub
mit a few words concerning what was the most memo
rable incident in American military annals prior to
the struggle we know as the Revolution, more pro
perly called the War of American Independence. I
refer, of course, to Wolfe's capture of Quebec. It is
not too much to say that the faU of Quebec led to
results ¦which have affected the whole subsequent
history of the American continent and of civilization.
Though not included in his selection by Professor
Creasey, the short struggle on the Plains of Abraham
must, therefore, unquestionably be classed among the
decisive battles of the world.
In common ¦with every boy who was taught in an
American school during the first half of the century,
the story of Wolfe's victory and death had been
familiar to me from childhood. None the less, though
I believe I have been in every other considerable city
on the North American continent, with the exception,
possibly, of Vera Cruz, Quebec had until last summer
unaccountably escaped me. Putting a copy of Park-
man's Montcalm and Wolfe in my bag, I went
there in September last ; and, while there, of course
examined with no Uttle Interest the scene of the great
exploit in that work described. The defects In Park-
man's narrative, when studied on the spot, became at
once apparent. Written by a scholar who spared no
pains In preparation, the result yet showed on its
face that It was the work of one who had never him
self participated In military operations. It was defi
cient in precision ; inferences were not drawn ; tech-

348 A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY
nical expressions were incorrectly used; it lacked
firmness of touch.
I was, in the first place, much surprised oh examin
ing the ground over which Wolfe's force reached the
Plains of Abraham. AU my preconceptions, derived
from tradition and confirmed by Parkman's narrative,
were at variance with the actual topography. From
the descriptions, I had assumed that the path by which
Wolfe's forces made their ascent was narrow and very
steep, winding along the face of the cliff, and one by
which men could go up only in single file, or at most
by twos ; or, as I have seen it described within a few
days in the report of a discourse delivered here in
Boston, it was an " ascent up precipitous cliffs, by
means of overhanging boughs and projecting crags." !
On examination, I found it quite another thing. In
1759 the legendary " narrow path " must have been,
1 " He [WoU e] was the first to leap on shore and to scale the narrow
path where no two men could go abreast. His men foUowed, puUing
themselves to the top by the help of bushes and the crags." (Green ;
A Short History of the English People, vol. iii. p. 1655.) There has
been no more careful and contained British historian than J. R. Green.
His name can never be mentioned otherwise than with respect. But
Green had no military experience, and this quotation from his work
illustrates the difficulties under which merely bookish men write.
There is no reason to suppose that Wolfe " was the first to leap
ashore." In practical warfare, the General in command does not act
as a boatman holding a painter, or fending off with an oar. He was
not the first "to scale the narrow path." There was no "narrow
path," and he, very properly and in accordance with the necessities
of actual field service, immediately sent a reconnoitring party up the
gorge to secure the outlet at its summit. He followed, in his proper
place, with the main command. The men of the main command did
not " pull themselves to the top by the help of bushes and the crags,"
but tramped up in tolerably solid column, and deployed in the regu
lar way when they debouched at the summit. The accounts given by
Lord Mahon and in Knight's Popular History of England are open to
similar criticisms.

A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 349
as it now is, up an accUvity, steep, it is true, but
not difficult, and nowhere narrow. A somewhat pre
cipitous gorge, it then was, as it stUl is, wide and weU
wooded, — a bit of rough hiUsIde breaking a palisade,
up which any group of athletic young men could in
ten minutes easily clamber. Especially would this be
true of Scotch Highlanders, of whom Wolfe's command
was largely made up.
It is here, and in connection with this legendary
scaling of the heights, that the technical deficiencies
of Parkman's narrative become apparent. Though he
had himself, unquestionably, time and again gone over
the ground, yet his account fails, as that of no trained
military historian would have failed, to give the exact
time of the ascent. His narrative is indeed on this
important point exasperatingly vague. He says :
" Towards two o'clock the boats cast off and fell down
with the current." He then adds that " for fuU two
hours the procession of boats steered sUently down the
St. Lawrence." It must, therefore, have been four
o'clock in the morning when the landing was effected,
and a smaU scaUng party climbed the heights, " closely
foUowed by a much larger party." Meeting with no
resistance, those in the advance, the escaladers, sur
prised, and captured or routed, a smaU French out
post at the head of the ravine. Its commanding
officer was in bed, and, wounded while trying to es
cape, was taken prisoner. The shots and shouts of
those composing the scaling party notified their com
rades below of their success, and the advance of the
main body was at once ordered. Apparently this
could not have reaUy begun until 4.30 at least ; and
yet before 6 o'clock 5000 men were in Une of battle

350 A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY
on the Plains of Abraham. Before 9 o'clock, more
over, they had also hauled up by hand at least two
pieces of artUlery, besides more or less camp equipage.
These facts speak for themselves. Any one who has
ever participated in military movements knows that
for 5000 men, carrying their arms, ammunition, knap
sacks and rations, to scale a steep ascent of at least
half a mile in the short space of ninety minutes,
they must have been able to swarm up, not in file,
nor by twos and threes, but in a tolerably solid mass.
No one, ¦vie^wing the locaUty, would seek to detract
from Wolfe's achievement, • — daring in conception, it
was firmly executed. Throughout, it showed the hand
of a true soldier.! But that is not In question. The
point is that it was a boldly desperate, rather than a
physically difficult, undertaking. Like the night as
sault of any place rendered by nature or art hard of
access, the success of the attempt was purely a matter
of surprise and defence ; and at Quebec, the surprise
^ The last word in the Quebec campaign of 1759 is to be found in
the recently published volume of Colonel Townshend, The Military
Life of Field-Marshal George, First Marquess Townshend, 1724-1807
(pp. 142-251). From this it appears that the famous operation, which
resulted in the faU of Quebec, was not designed by Wolfe, but was
adopted by him, contrary to his own judgment, on the formal recom
mendation of his subordinates in command. From a purely nulitary
point of view, this should not detract from Wolfe's fame. He was
then a very sick man, probably dying ; a physical wreck, in conse
quence of the fatigues and anxieties he had undergone. None the
less, so to speak, game to the last, he, by adoption, made the plan his
own, and carried it out with spirit and determination. He then had
the great good fortune to be kiUed in the hour of victory. The pro
blem of the Quebec campaign was, on a very smaU scale, the same as
that which confronted Grant in his Vicksburg campaign, more than
a century later. It was solved by precisely the same strategic move
ment. Grant's campaign was, however, of a far higher and more
difficult strategic order than Wolfe's venturesome escalade.

A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 351
of the defenders being perfect, the ascent presented
no great obstacle. It was neither narrow nor pre
cipitous, as was proved by the fact that within two
hours artlUery and munitions were dragged up, fol
lowing 5000 men. Provided, therefore, the much-
discussed gorge was undefended, as was the case,
Wolfe's famous escalade was a by no means unprece
dented mUitary operation. Even had the gorge been
defended, and by a fairly adequate force, the very
steepness of the ascent, as any experienced military
authority would appreciate, and as we repeatedly
found in our Civil War, would have enabled those
composing the attacking party to scale the cliff ¦with no
great degree of personal danger. The enemy from
far above would almost inevitably have fired over the
heads of their assailants. In such case, the resistance
to be effective must be determined and by an ade
quate force ; a force, moreover, which does not await
attack at the summit, but stubbornly contests every
foot of ground from bottom to top.
Having now got Wolfe, with 5000 men In battle
array, upon the Plains of Abraham, only ninety
minutes after leaving their boats, the thing which
next bewildered me was why Montcalm played into
his opponent's hands as he did, by hastily attacking
him the next morning, — risking the fate of Quebec
and of Canada, not upon the result of protracted mil
itary operations, but on the cast of sudden battle.
What in Montcalm's mind led to this decision ?
Here again the judgment of the skUful miUtary his
torian would be of great value. On the face of things,
I was unable, as I stood on the Plains of Abraham, to
see how Wolfe had greatly bettered his situation by

352 A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY
getting there instead of remaining in his camp on the
other side of the river, provided always his opponent
availed himself to the uttermost of his advantages.
The escalade was effected on the morning of Septem
ber 13. Three days before, on the 10th, the uneasy
British naval commanders had held a council, and
decided that the lateness of the season required the
fleet to leave the St. Lawrence without delay. Among
the experienced French authorities some would hardly
aUow their opponents a week longer of campaigning
weather, while Montcalm conceded them only a month.
It was merely a question of a few days more or a few
days less, and the French could count on the Cana
dian ¦winter as a grim and irresistible aUy, just as
surely as did the Russians half a century later. As
a matter of fact, the British fleet, delaying to the last
moment in view of the success of Wolfe's operations,
did not leave Quebec untU " it was past the middle of
October," as Parkman again expresses it, about five
weeks after the escalade. It was, therefore, a ques
tion of prolonging the defence that amount of time
only. When the breaking of an equinoctial day revealed
Wolfe securely planted on the heights west of Quebec,
the outlook for him was, consequently, far from clear.
It is true he had vrith him a force of 5000 very reli
able troops, dra^wn up within striking distance of the
land-side defences of Quebec ; but, on the other hand,
provided he was not attacked by the covering army,
the lateness of the season left one course, and one only,
open to him. He must endeavor to storm those de
fences. And not only must he endeavor to storm for
tifications in his front, but, in so doing, he must prepare

A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 353
to be attacked both on his flank and rear by an enemy
who, when his detachments were aU concentrated, num
bered nearly double his own force, though greatly in
ferior to it in fighting qualities on an open field. Thus,
without any sufficient artUlery, Wolfe was confronted
with the difficult problem of immediately capturing a
stronghold, whUe subject to attack by a numerous
covering force, much better supplied than he with
artUlery. So far as I can yet see, the only thing his
opponent had to do was to wait untU Wolfe began his
necessary assault. It would have involved for him
great risk.
Under these circumstances, why did Montcalm decide
to take the immediate initiative ? Without artUlery,
without even waiting until his entire force had been
concentrated, he made a noisy, futUe rush at the Brit
ish, as if for him there was no other course open. Yet
his so doing was exactly what Wolfe must most have
hoped for. The result we aU know. On this most
interesting point, however, Parkman is curiously vague.
He is even contradictory ; thus betraying the lack of
professional insight. At first he says of Montcalm,
when the French commander saw the English army in
line of battle behind Quebec, — " He could not choose.
Fight he must, for Wolfe was now in position to cut
off aU his supplies " (p. 293). Lea^ring the immi
nence of winter out of consideration, this is, in a way,
plausible ; but a little farther on Parkman says of
Montcalm's immediate successor in command of the
beaten Canadian army : — " There was no need to
fight at once. . . . By a march of a few mUes he could
have [concentrated the covering force], and by then
intrenching himself he would have placed a greatly

354 A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY
superior force in the English rear, where his position
might have been made impregnable. Here he might
be easUy furnished with provisions, and from hence
he could readily throw men and supplies into Quebec,
which the English were too few to invest " (p. 306).
If this was the situation the day after Montcalm suf
fered defeat, why was it that officer had " no choice "
but to fight at once, thirty-six hours before ?
Parkman fails to teU us.
To supply the tantalizing omission, even were I com
petent so to do, is no part of my present plan. The
omission amounts, none the less. In itself, to a " Plea
for Military History ; " for I submit that a trained
miUtary historian, after a careful examination of the
locality and every record of the battle, could form
a presumably correct estimate of the considerations
which acted on Montcalm, and thus caused France
the loss of the key to a continent.
Coming now to a later period and events nearer
home, I propose to illustrate my thesis by a brief refer
ence to four battles in our own history, two from the
War of Independence and two from that of 1812-15,
¦ — the engagements at Bunker HIU and Long Island
in the one case, and those of Bladensburg and New
Orleans in the other. None of these incidents in our
history have, so far as I know, been treated by any
¦writer competent to handle them from a distinctively
military point of view, as, for instance, Captain Mahan
has handled the naval operations of Nelson.
Recurring to Bunker HIU, the mistakes and con
troversies which have arisen among historians and
critics in regard to that engagement have weU-nigh
partaken of the ludicrous. There has, in the first

A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 355
place, been an almost endless discussion as to who was
in command, — a discussion which would have caused
no man of military training a moment's pause. It has
been elaborately contended that General Putnam must
have been in command, because he was the officer of
the highest grade upon the ground, obviously outrank
ing Colonel Prescott. The proposition is simply absurd,
as being contrary to the first and elementary principles
of military subordination. General Putnam was, it Is
true, on the ground ; but he was on the ground as an
officer ha^ving a Connecticut commission only, and in
command of a detachment from that province. He
held no commission from Massachusetts, much less any
Continental commission. Colonel Prescott, command
ing a Massachusetts regiment, had received his orders
from his military superior, Major-General Ward,
an officer also in the Massachusetts service. Ward
thus was Prescott's superior officer ; Putnam was not.
During the operations which ensued, it was open for
Putnam to make to Prescott any suggestion he saw
fit ; and Prescott, acting always on his own responsi
bUity, might give to such suggestions the degree of
weight he deemed proper ; but he could report only
to his superior in the same service as hlmseU, — his
military commander. Prescott, therefore, showed per
fectly well that he knew what he was about when he
offered the command to Warren, who had been com
missioned by the Massachusetts authorities as a major-
general, when Warren appeared upon the field. War
ren, very properly, declined the command, remaining
purely as a volunteer. But, so far as Putnam was
concerned, he was in command merely of such Connect
icut troops as were cooperating with the Massachusetts

356 A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY
detachment ; and for a Massachusetts officer to have
received an order as such from him would have sub
jected that officer to a court-martial. All this is ele
mentary, — the very alphabet of the mUitary organiza
tion, — and yet the lay historians who have written
upon that battle have contended over the question for
years. The extraordinarUy bad tactics of both sides in the
affair of Bunker HUl I have dealt with elsewhere,! —
the opportunity which the British lost, the accidental
advantage which the Americans gained. Luck, com
bined with good marksmanship, on the one side, and
blundering, bull-headed persistence on the other, were
the predominating elements of the occasion ; and to
those features of it the historians have given scant
consideration. The cause of American independence
owed much that day to Yankee pluck and straight
shooting; but more yet to genuine British buUdog
stupidity. The race learns slowly. Its representa
tives then did just what they have recently attempted
in South Africa.
Nevertheless, the effect of the battle of Bunker HIU
upon that on Long Island fourteen months later is,
from a military point of view, interesting and very
worthy of study. It is not too much to say that the
experience of the earUer absolutely changed the fate
of the subsequent day ; and, on the 17th of June, 1775,
Colonel Prescott not only saved from destruction Gen
eral Washington and the American army on the 27 th
of August, 1776, but he saved the cause of American
independence itself. Sir WiUiam Howe commanded
at Bunker HiU ; he also commanded at Long Island.
1 American Historical Review, vol. i. pp. 401-413 ; April, 1896.

A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 357
Upon the latter field of operations his movements,
though slow, were skllfuUy planned and weU carried
out. For a wonder, he had recourse to a flanking
movement, which was successfully executed by Clin
ton; and, as the result of it, Howe found himself in
the early hours of that August day In an admirable
position to deliver an assault, with the chances at
least four out of five in his favor. But the bloody
experience at Bunker HIU was fresh in his mind;
and so, ha^ring his enemy completely in his grasp, he
hesitated. He aUowed his opponent to elude him ;
and that opponent chanced to be Washington.
When, some years ago, I had occasion to make a
study of operations about New York in August, 1776,
I was amazed at the mistakes, from a military point
of view, of which Washington was then guilty. Even
more amazing, however, was the partisanship of the
American historians. In their unwiUingness to see any
blemish in the career of Washington, their narratives
amounted to little less than a falsification of history,
— a literary misdemeanor, not to say crime, for which
the only plea in justification possible for them to enter
would be lack of technical knowledge. Suppressing
incontrovertible facts, they gave credence to absurd
stories. So much was I at the time surprised at the
conclusions to which I found myself compelled that I
took my narrative in the manuscript to Mr. Ropes, told
him of my perplexity, and asked him to read my paper
and give me the benefit of an outspoken criticism. I
found him singularly weU informed on the subject in
a general way, and he readily assumed the task. A
few days later he returned me my manuscript with
an emphatic written indorsement of the conclusions I

358 A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY
had reached. Subsequently the paper was printed in
the American Historical Review^ and may there be
consulted. Time and space do not permit of my now entering
again upon this subject, nor would it be worth your
or my while were I so to do. Suffice it to say that
during the latter part of August, 1776, Washington
appears to have disregarded almost every known prin
ciple of strategy or rule of tactics, some of them in a
way almost grotesque. For instance, while - lying on
Long and Manhattan islands awaiting the sluggish
movements of Howe, a body of Connecticut cavalry
appeared, volunteering their services. Substantial,
well-mounted men, they were some 400 in num
ber. Washington declined to accept their services
as mounted men, on the extraordinary ground that
operations being then conducted on islands, there
could be no occasion for cavalry. Men, however,
were greatly needed, and he suggested that members
of the troop should send back their horses, and agree
to serve as infantry. When they decUned so to do,
he roughly dismissed them. In reaching this decision
it is not too much to say that Washington betrayed a
truly singular ignorance of what cannot be regarded
otherwise than as the elementary principles of military
movements. It was true the operations then in hand
were necessarily conducted on islands ; but, as it sub
sequently appeared, the American army did not have
the necessary mounted men to do orderly and courier
duty. More than that, the disaster of the 27th of
August on Long Island, invoMng, as it did, the need
less destruction of the very flower of the American
1 Vol. i. pp. 650-670; July, 1896.

A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 359
army, was whoUy due to the lack of a small mounted
force. There were on that occasion three roads which
led from Gravesend, whence the British began their
movement, to Brooklyn, where Washington was in
trenched. We -will call these the eastern, the middle,
and the western roads. Of these three roads, two, the
western and the middle, the Americans had occupied
in force. The eastern road they wholly neglected.
It was assumed, apparently, that the enemy would
never go so far out of the direct way. There is
unquestionably a weU-developed propensity in British
commanders to butt their own heads and those of
their soldiers directly against any obstacle their ene
mies may see fit to put in their front. They can
generaUy be counted on so to do. Unfortunately for
the American army, it so chanced, as I have already
said, that for once a flanking movement suggested
itself to some one in the British army at Gravesend,
probably not Sir WiUiam Howe. Accordingly, hav
ing reconnoitred their front, a British division, under
the command of CUnton, made a night move on Brook
lyn by the easternmost of the three roads. That road,
under any known rules of warfare, even the most
elementary, should have been picketed, and watched
by a mounted patrol. Twenty-five men would have
sufficed ; fifty would have been ample. Four hundred
men could have picketed the whole of Washington's
front, and, holding the enemy in check, have given
ample notice of his approach. To neglect such an
obvious precaution was so unpardonable as not to
admit of explanation. As a matter of fact, the road
in question was left not only uncovered, but it was
not even observed. The American army had no cav-

360 A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY
airy, its commander having sent the mounted men
offered him home on the curiously suggestive ground
that they could be of no possible ser-vice, as on islands
" horses cannot be brought into action." By this
unconsciously innocent remark the trained miUtary
expert learns that, at the time it was made, Washing
ton had no conception of the duties and functions of
a mounted force in connection -with any extended
military operations; and, accordingly, the fact, not
otherwise comprehensible, is explained that during the
short summer night of August 26—27, 1776, Clinton
moved forward not only unopposed but actuaUy un
observed, until, in the early morning, he had got him
self between the defences at Brooklyn and the right
wing of Washington's army under Stirling and Sulli
van, thrown forward to cover the western and the
middle roads. As a result, that whole wing of the
army, its flower, was crushed between Howe, ad
vancing directly from Gravesend, and CUnton, who,
by a slightly circuitous night march to the eastward,
had got in its rear. The disaster was, as I have said,
wholly due to the lack of cavalry on Long Island, and
a consequent defective outpost ser-vice. Yet these
facts, so pregnant with both inferences and conse
quences, are not even aUuded to by any general his
torian of the operations. The writers of so-caUed
history did not in their turn realize the functions of
cavalry in warfare, or observe that the American army
in and before New York had no mounted ser-rice,
or why it had none. ' The disaster of August 27 on
Long Island just failed to bring irretrievable ruin on
the cause of American independence. Even as it was,
gravely compromising Washington, its influence was

A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 361
perceptible on the whole course of military operations
during the succeeding three years. To Washington
it was a lesson from which he learned much. Thence
forth he adopted Fabian tactics.
Turning now to the war of 1812-15, the influence
of the battle of Bladensburg, and the consequent cap
ture of the city of Washington, is not less apparent in
the operations which resulted in the defeat of Paken-
ham before New Orleans and the failure of the British
expedition against Louisiana than was the sharp lesson
of Bunker HiU in Howe's cautious movement against
the American Unes at Brooklyn. The affair at Bla
densburg occurred on the 24th of August ; the assault
on Jackson's lines before New Orleans was delivered
on the 8th of January following. Those engagements,
and the tactics pursued in them, are, moreover, of
peculiar interest just at this time in connection with
what is taking place in South Africa. A recurrence
to the events of eighty-five years ago wdU show how
very tenacious are military traditions, with the British
at least, and how racial characteristics assert them
selves, no matter how much conditions change, and in
spite of experience. It also, if taken In connection
with the other and earlier operations I have referred
to, iUustrates very curiously the slight degree of reli
ance which can be placed on the fundamental rules of
strategy when it comes to their practical application.
They are, in fact, about as dangerous to apply as they
are to disregard; for, when all is done and written,
in warfare almost everything depends on the character
of the- man at the head — on his insight into the real
facts of the situation, including the topography of the
country, and the quality of the material at his com-

362 A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY
mand and of that opposed to him. The reaUy great
military commander, as in the case of Napoleon in his
earlier days, effects his results quite as much by ig
noring aU recognized rules and principles as by acting
in obedience to them. New Orleans was a case in
point. At New Orleans, Jackson had no right to
succeed ; Pakenham had no excuse for failure. The
last brought defeat on his army, and lost his own
Ufe, while proceeding in the way of tradition and in
obedience to accepted principles of strategy ; the for
mer achieved a briUiant success by taking risks from
which any reasonably cautious commander woiUd have
recoiled. In the first place, however, to understand the why
and the wherefore of what took place at New Orleans
eighty-five years ago in January, it is necessary to
recaU to mind what occurred at Bladensburg and in
Washington eighty-five years ago last August. The
general in command of the British army had been
changed, for Ross was killed before Baltimore, and
Pakenham, fresh from the battlefields of the Penin
sula, had succeeded him ; but the regiments which
had simply, with a volley, a shout and a rush, walked
over the American line at Bladensburg, aU took part
in the attempt to walk over a similar line before New
Orleans. The tactics, if such they deserve to be called,
were the same in each case — those of the football
field. In other words, at Bladensburg the British
officers, proceeding In conformity ¦with their simple
traditions and good old rules, endeavored to do, and
succeeded in doing, exactly what they intended to do
and faUed in doing at Bunker HIU; that Is, they
marched directly up in front of the defending force,

A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 363
carried the position ¦with little loss, routed their oppo
nents, and then, as a matter of course in the case of
Washington, captured the city those opponents were
there to cover. The proceeding was perfectly simple,
— very much. In fact, what we have seen recently in
the Philippines, — a body of superior troops carrying
by front assault weakly defended defensive points, and
this with insignificant loss to themselves. At Ipth
Bladensburg and New Orleans the attempt Indicated
an overweening self-confidence in the attacking party,
due to a dangerous contempt for their opponents.
The veterans of Wellington's Peninsular campaigns
had to do with raw American levies. They regarded
them very much as our own volunteers have recently
regarded the Filipinos.
Thus New Orleans was the sequel of Bladensburg ;
it goes far also to explain the recent battle on the
Tugela. Thirty-four years after New Orleans, Charles
James Napier, brother of the historian of the Penin
sular war, writing in a reminiscent mood of the Span
ish battle of Busaco, said of Pakenham, — and he
and Pakenham had both been wounded at Busaco,
— " Poor f eUow ! He was a heroic man, that Edward
Pakenham, and it was a thousand pities he died in
defeat ; it was not his fault, that defeat." This
may possibly be, and Napier was unquestionably a
high authority on such a point. None the less there
is a large class of mUitary commanders commonly
known in camp parlance as "butt-heads," and it is
not at once apparent why Major-General Sir Edward
Pakenham should not be included therein.! James
1 See, also. Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society,
Second Series, vol. xiii. pp. 412-423.

364 A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY
Parton was, by birth, English, and in his life of Jack
son — one of the most picturesque and vivid biogra
phies, be it said, in the language — Parton speaks
thus of Pakenham, using forty years ago language
curiously appUcable to operations in South Africa
eighty-five years after those I am criticising: "The
British serrice seems to develop every high and noble
quality of man and soldier except generalship. Up to
the hour when the British soldier holds an independ
ent command, he is the most assured and competent
of men. Give him a plain, unconditional order, —
' Go and do that ! ' — and he wiU go and do it with
a cool, self-forgetting pertinacity of daring that can
scarcely be too much admired. All of the man below
the eyebrows is perfect. The stout heart, the high
j)urpose, the dextrous hand, the enduring frame, are
his. But the work of a general In command demands
head — a cool, calculating head, f ertUe In expedients ;
a head that is the controlling power of the man. And
this article of head, which is the rarest production of
nature everywhere, is one which the brave British
soldier is apt to be sIgnaUy wanting in ; and never so
much so as when responsibility rests upon him." For
the inteUigent student of military operations it is not
any easier now than it was for Parton half a century
ago to advance any sufficient reasons for the tactics
pursued by the British commander when, on the 8th
of January, 1815, he went to his own death while
thrusting his storming columns against breastworks
bristling with artiUery and swarming with riflemen.
It was simply the wanton throwing away of life to
accompUsh a result which could have been accom-
pUshed in another and more scientific way absolutely

A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 365
without loss ; for New Orleans was then ¦within the
easy grasp of the British.
Had Pakenham, as he perfectly well could have
done, passed a division of his army over to the west
ern bank of the Mississippi, and then threatened New
Orleans from that side of the river, operating upon
Jackson's flank and rear, Jackson would have had no
choice but to vacate his lines and aUow New Orleans
to fall. This, when too late, Jackson himself perfectly
appreciated ; but the British commander preferred the
desperate chance of an assault. The recoUection of
Bladensburg lured him to destruction.
In reading the literature of that campaign, it is curi
ous to come across the footprints of this fact. Paken
ham joined the army before New Orleans on the morn
ing of Christmas-day, 1814, only two weeks before
the battle. The English had then already met with
much stiffer resistance than they had anticipated, and
those whom Pakenham relieved of command recog
nized the difficulty of the problem before them to solve.
Nevertheless, as the reinforcements the new com
mander-in-chief brought ¦with him stepped on shore,
not a few of them expressed their fears lest they
should be too late to take part in the advance, as
they thought New Orleans would be captured before
they could get into Une. On the 7th of January, the
day before the fight, as one of the Bladensburg regi
ments was somewhat sulkUy moving to the rear for
the less valued service across the river, several of its
officers grumbled in passing, a new arrival wrote, that
" it would be now our turn to get into New Or
leans, as they had done at Washington." Among
those who had been at Washington, not one had been

366 A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY
more conspicuous than Admiral Cochrane, as, a naval
officer, mounted on a brood mare, white, uncurried,
with a black foal trotting by her side, he rode around
personaUy superintending the work of destruction.
And now, when the brave and unfortunate Pakenham
hesitated in face of the obstacles in front of him,
Cochrane, so the story goes, egged him on with a
taunt, teUing him, with Bladensburg fresh in mind,
that " if the army could not take those mud-banks,
defended by ragged militia, he would do it ¦with 2000
saUors, armed only with cutlasses and pistols."
On the other hand, Jackson on this occasion evinced
one of the highest and rarest attributes of a great
commander ; he read correctly the mind of his oppo
nent — di-rined his course of action. The British com
mander, not wholly imperrious to reason, had planned
a diversion to the west bank of the river, with a view
to enfilading Jackson's lines, and so aiding the pro
posed assault in front. As this movement assumed
shape, it naturaUy caused Jackson much anxiety. All
depended on its magnitude. If it was the operation
in chief of the British army. New Orleans could hardly
be saved. Enfiladed, and threatened in his rear, Jack
son must f aU back. If, however, it was only a diver
sion in favor of a main assault planned on his front,
the movement across the river might be checked, or
prove immaterial. As the thing developed during
the night preceding the battle. Commodore Patterson,
who commanded the American naval contingent on
the river, became alarmed, and hurried a despatch
across to Jackson, advising him of what was taking
place, and begging immediate reinforcement. At one
o'clock in the morning the messenger roused Jackson

A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 367
from sleep, stating his errand. Jackson listened to the
despatch, and at once said : — " Hurry back and tell
Commodore Patterson that he Is mistaken. The main
attack wiU be on this side, and I have no men to spare.
General Morgan must maintain his position at aU haz
ards." To use a vernacular but expressive term, Jack
son had "sized" Pakenham correctly, — the British
commander could be depended on not to do what a
true insight would have dictated, and the occasion
caUed for. He would not throw the main body of his
army across the river and move on his objective point
by a practically undefended road, merely holding his
enemy In check on the east bank. Had he done so,
he would have acted in disregard of that first princi
ple both of tactics and strategy which forbids the
division of a force in presence of an enemy In such a
way that the two parts are not in position to support
each other ; but, not the less for that, he would have
taken New Orleans. An attack in front was, on the
contrary, in accordance with British miUtary tradi
tions, and the recent experience of Bladensburg. He
acted, accordingly, as Jackson was satisfied he would
act. In his main assault he sacrificed his army and
lost his own life, sustaining an almost unexampled
defeat ; while his partial movement across the river
was completely successful, so far as it was pressed,
opening wide the road to New Orleans. A mere
diversion, or auxiliary operation, it was not persisted
in, the principal attack having failed.
Possibly it might by some now be argued that, had
Pakenham thus weakened his force on the east side of
the river by operating, in the way suggested, on New
Orleans and Jackson's flank and rear on its west side,

368 A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY
a vigorous, fighting opponent, such as Jackson unques
tionably was, might have turned the tables on him
for thus violating an elementary rule of warfare —
the very rule, by the way, so dangerously ignored by
Washington at Brooklyn. Leaving his lines and
boldly taking the aggressive, Jackson, it wiU then be
argued, might have overwhelmed the British force in
his front, thus cutting the column operating west of
the river from the fleet and its base of supplies — in
fact, destroying the expedition. Not improbably
Pakenham argued in this way ; if he did, however, he
simply demonstrated his incompetence for high com
mand. FaUing to grasp the situation, he put a wrong
estimate on its conditions. It is the part of a skilful
commander to know when to secure results by making
exceptions to even the most general and the soundest
rules. Pakenham at New Orleans had under his com
mand a force much larger, in fact nearly double that
confronting him. While, moreover, his soldiers were
veterans, the Americans were hardly more than raw
recruits ; but, like the Boers of to-day, they had in
them good material, and were indi-viduaUy accustomed
to handling rifles. As one of the best of Jackson's
brigadiers. General Adair, afterwards expressed it, —
" Our men were militia without discipline, and if once
beaten, they could not be reUed on again." They
were, in fact, of exactly the same temper and stuff as
those who were stampeded by a voUey and a shout at
Bladensburg; and the principle of mUitary morale
thus stated by General Adair was that learned by
Washington on Long Island. Troops of a certain
class, when once beaten, cannot be reUed on again.
They are not seasoned soldiers. The force Pakenham

A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 369
had under his command before New Orleans was,
on the other hand, composed of seasoned soldiers of
the best class. In the open field, and on anything
approaching equality of position, he had absolutely
nothing to fear. He might safely provoke attack ; in
deed, all he ought to have asked was to tempt Jackson
out from behind his breastworks on almost any terms.
So fuUy, moreover, did he realize all this that it in
spired him to his assault. It is useless, therefore, to
suggest that he hesitated to divide his command, over
estimating Jackson's numbers and aggressive capacity.
Had he done so, he would hardly have ventured to
assaU Jackson in front. On the contrary, Pakenham's
trouble lay not in overestimating, but in underesti
mating his adversary. He failed to operate on what
were correct principles for the conditions which con
fronted him, not because he was afraid so to do, but
because he did not grasp the situation.
In case, then, dividing his command, Pakenham had
thrown one half of it across the river to assaU New
Orleans in force, so turning Jackson's rear, and then
with the other half held his position on the east bank,
keeping open his communications with the British fleet,
the only possible way in which Jackson could have
taken advantage of the situation would have been by
leaving his lines, and attacking.
Now, it so happens that resisting attack under just
such circumstances is the position in which the British
soldier has always developed his best staying qualities.
Quebec was a case directly in point. Again, the men
under Pakenham before New Orleans were even more
reliable than those who only five months later at
Waterloo, after the auxiUary troops had been swept

370 A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY
from the field by the fury of the French attack, held
their position from noon to a June sunset against an
assaulting force of nearly twice their number com
manded by the Emperor himself. Indeed, the tena
city of the EngUsh infantry under such circumstances
is weU known, — It is even now receiving new illustra
tion. But concerning It there Is a statement of the
French marshal Bugeaud which is so curious, and
which bears upon its face such evidence that it was
written by a military man of practical experience, that
I cannot refrain from quoting It. It is not the utter
ance of a " bookish theorick," but of one who knew of
that whereof he spoke. Marshal Bugeaud, in making
this statement, referred not to Waterloo, but to the
operations in the Peninsular war, — that school in
which the soldiers under Pakenham had learned their
business. What he says reveals, moreover, a curious
insight into the characteristics of the French and Eng
Ush infantry : —
" The English generaUy occupied weU-chosen defen
sive positions, having a certain command, and they
showed only a portion of their force. The usual artil
lery action first took place. Soon, In great haste,
without studying the position, without taking time to
examine if there were means to make a flank attack,
we marched straight on, taking the bull by the horns.
About one thousand yards from the English line the
men became excited, spoke to one another, and hurried
their march ; the column began to be a little confused.
" The English remained quite silent, with ordered
arms, and from their steadiness appeared to be a long
red waU. This steadiness invariably produced an
effect on the young soldiers.

A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 371
" Very soon we got nearer, shouting, ' Vive I'Em-
pereur, en avant ! a la bayonette ! ' Shakos were
raised on the muzzles of the muskets ; the column
began to double, the ranks got Into confusion, the
agitation produced a tumult ; shots were fired as we
advanced. " The English line remained stIU, sUent and Im
movable, with ordered arms, even when we were only
three hundred paces distant, and it appeared to ignore
the storm about to break.
" The contrast was striking ; in our inmost thoughts
each felt that the enemy was a long time In firing,
and that this fire, reserved for so long, would be very
unpleasant when it did come. Our ardor cooled.
The moral power of steadiness, which nothing shakes
(even if it be only in appearance) over disorder which
stupefies itself with noise, overcame our minds. At
this moment of intense excitement the English waU
shouldered arms,' an indescribable feeling rooted many
of our men to the ground — they began to fire. The
enemy's steady concentrated volleys swept our ranks ;
decimated, we turned round, seeking to recover our
equilibrium ; then three deafening cheers broke the
sUence of our opponents ; at the third they were on
us, pushing our disorganized flight. But, to our great
surprise, they did not push their advantage beyond a
hundred yards, retiring calmly to their lines to await
a second attack."
Those thus -vividly described by an hereditary race
opponent, who had himself confronted them, were the
identical men Jackson would have had to attack on
their own ground had he found himself compeUed on
the 8th of January to leave his lines and assume the

372 A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY
aggressive, as the only possible alternative to a pre
cipitate retreat and the abandonment of New Orleans.
Certainly, that day Andrew Jackson was under great
obligations to Edward Pakenham.
I have referred to Washington's operations on
Long Island and the short Bladensburg campaign as
interesting military studies in connection with New
Orleans, or as directly influencing the course of events
there. But there is another and far more memorable
and momentous American campaign which is deserv
ing of mention in the same connection. I refer to
our o-wn army movements on the Mississippi nearly
half a century later. I have in this paper contended
that at New Orleans one half of the British force
there assembled would have been fully equal to hold
ing its own against an assault in front from any force
Jackson could have brought against it. Pakenham's
flank operations in front of New Orleans could, there
fore, in 1815 have been conducted with quite as much
safety as were those of Grant before Vicksburg in
May and June, 1863. In fact, the positions in the
two cases were much the same. Like Pakenham at
New Orleans, Sherman, it -wUl be remembered, before
Grant's flanking operations began, assaUed the works
at Vicksburg in front, meeting with a disastrous re
pulse. Subsequently, Grant devised his briUiant, sci
entific movement by Grand Gulf and the Big Black,
crossing the Mississippi t-wice and taking his oppo
nents in the rear, exactly as Pakenham could have
done from below New Orleans, though on a much
larger scale and incurring far greater risks. He thus
forced Pemberton to come out from behind his works,
to take the chance of even battle, in order to pre-

A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 373
serve his Une of communication. He then whipped
him. And this brings us face to face -with what is, after
aU, the fundamental condition behind all principles
and theories of warfare, the individuality and tactical
or strategic aptitudes — for they are very different
things — of commanders. It was the Confederate
general Forrest, I believe, one of the born fighters
developed in our Civil War, who defined strategy as
the art in warfare of " getting there first with most
men." The definition is rather general ; but in it
there is much native shrewdness, and, moreover, it
smacks strongly of practical experience. Grant iUus-
trated its truth in one way in 1863, just as poor Pak
enham iUustrated its obverse in 1815. The trouble,
however, with most books of so-caUed history is that
the industrious, but, as a rule, quite inexperienced,
writers thereof, fail conspicuously to get at what may
be caUed, for want of a better term, the true inward
ness of any given situation. They tell of what oc
curred, after a fashion ; they faU to show why it
occurred. The sequence is not revealed'. So, where
such are not written with a distinct bias of patriotism
or hero worship, they are apt to repeat in a stereotyped
sort of way accepted traditions or conventional theories;
and when, with this, is combined a lack of familiarity
and practical experience, the result is apt to be what
we are very famiUar with when a clergyman sets out
to explain difficult problems of constitutional law, or
some excellent man of affairs feels ImpeUed to impart
in some pubUc way his views upon art.
As I have sought to show, Wolfe at Quebec, Wash
ington on Long Island, Jackson at New Orleans, are

374 A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY
aU stiU interesting studies, studies than which few
are more interesting. But as chance and occasion
have led me to look into them, the result has been. In
the first place, as I stated when I began, a distinct
access of historical scepticism, foUowed by grave
doubts as to the real value of what are known as gen
eral histories, written on the plan heretofore in vogue.
They fail to bear the test of rigid special analysis.
Accordingly, I cannot help fancying that in some
future, not now very remote, a new historical method
must be developed, a method the general character of
which I have this evening iUustrated from a special
point of view. Pursuing in other fields of knowledge
the Une of thought I have tried to develop In connec
tion with a few famUIar military episodes, the general
historian on a large scale wiU seek to draw his narra
tive not from his inner consciousness, or his assumed
personal knowledge of military operations as of every
thing else, or from any supposed natural aptitudes
which he may infer exist in himself. On the contrary,
he will turn to others, and, Uke some good occupant
of the judicial chair, he will bring his judgment to
bear, not upon the problems themselves, but upon the
degree of reliability to be placed on the conclusions
reached by those speciaUy qualified for the task, who
have undertaken to speak on the problems, — the
laborious writers of scientific monographs. In mili
tary affairs as in others, the day of the historian of
the Oliver Goldsmith type, — the facUe writer who
knows it aU, who is at once a statesman, a diplomat, a
parliamentarian, a lawyer, a theologian, a physician,
a biologist, a mechanician, an architect, a Unguist, and,
though neither last nor least, a miUtary and naval

A PLEA FOR MILITARY HISTORY 375
strategist, — the day of the historian of this class is
practicaUy a thing of the past ; for even historical
writers begin to reaUze that no man can be a speciaUst
in everything ; neither is it any longer given to one of
finite powers to take aU knowledge for his province,
and to be a generalizer besides.

VI
"SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE ?"i
" Whom doth the king delight to honour ? that is the question of
questions concerning the king's own honour. Show me the man you
honour ; I know by that symptom, better than by any other, what kind
of man you yourself are. For you show me there what your ideal
of manhood is ; what kind of man you long inexpressibly to be, and
would thank the gods, with your whole soul, for being if you could."
" Who is to have a Statue ? means, -Whom shaU we consecrate
and set apart as one of our sacred men ? Sacred ; that aU men may
see him, be reminded of him, and, by new example added to old per
petual precept, be taught what is real worth in man. Whom do you
wish us to resemble ? Him you set on a high column, that aU men,
looking on it, may be continuaUy apprised of the duty you expect
from them." — Thomas Caklyle : Latter-Day Pamphlets (1850).
At about three o'clock of the afternoon of Septem
ber 3, 1658, the day of Worcester and of Dunbar, and
as a great tempest was wearing itself to rest, OUver
Cromwell died. He died in London, in the palace of
Whitehall ; the palace of the great banqueting-haU
through whose central window Charles I., a little less
than ten years before, had walked forth to the scaffold.
A few weeks later, " -with a more than regal solemnity,"
the body of the great Lord Protector was carried to
1 Oration delivered before the Beta of Illinois Chapter of the Phi
Beta Kappa Society, at the University of Chicago, on Tuesday, June
17, 1902. This address was the natural sequence and complement
of the paper, entitled "Lee at Appomattox" (supra, pp. 1-19), read
before the American Antiquarian Society, at Worcester, Mass., on the
19th of the previous October. It was compressed in deUvery, occupy
ing one hour and thirty minutes.

"SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?" 377
Westminster Abbey, and there buried " amongst
kings." Two years then elapsed ; and, on the twelfth
anniversary of King Charles's execution, the remains
of the usurper, having been previously disinterred by
order of the newly restored king, were by a unanimous
vote of the Convention Parliament hung at Tyburn.
The trunk was then buried under the gaUows, while
Cromwell's head was set on a pole over the roof of
Westminster HaU. Nearly two centuries of execration
ensued, until, in the sixth generation, the earlier ver
dict was chaUenged, and the question at last asked :
" Shall Cromwell have a Statue ? " CromweU, the
traitor, the usurper, the execrable murderer of the
martyred Charles ! At first, and for long, the sug
gestion was looked upon almost as an impiety, and, as
such, scornfuUy repelled. Not only did the old loyal
king-worship of England recoU from the thought, but,
indignantly appealing to the church, it declared that
no such distinction could be granted so long as there
remained in the prayer-book a form of supplication for
"King Charles, the Martyr," and of "praise and
thanksgiving for the wonderful deliverance of these
kingdoms from the great rebeUion, and all the other
miseries and oppressions consequent thereon, under
which they had so long groaned." None the less, the
demand was insistent ; and at last, but only after two
full centuries had elapsed and a third was well ad
vanced, was the verdict of 1661 reversed. To-day the
bronze effigy of Oliver CromweU — massive in size,
rugged in feature, characteristic in attitude — stands
defiantly in the yard of that Westminster HaU, from
a pole on the top of which, twelve-score years ago, the
flesh crumbled from his skuU.

378 "SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?"
In this dramatic reversal of an accepted verdict, —
this complete revision of opinions once deemed settled
and immutable, — there Is, I submit, a lesson, — an
academic lesson. The present occasion is essentiaUy
educational. The Phi Beta Kappa oration, as it is
called, is the last, the crowning utterance of the coUege
year, and very properly is expected to deal with some
fitting theme in a kindred spirit. I propose to do so
to-day ; but in a fashion somewhat exceptional. The
phases of moral and intellectual growth through which
the EngUsh race has passed on the subject of Crom-
weU's statue afford, I submit, to the reflecting man an
educational study of exceptional Interest. In the first
place. It was a growth of two centuries ; in the second
place, it marks the passage of a nation from an exist
ence under the traditions of feudalism to one under
the principles of self-government ; finaUy, it iUustrates
the gradual development of that broad spirit of toler
ance which, coming with time and study, measures the
men and events of the past independently of the pre
judices and passions which obscure and distort the
immediate vision.
We, too, as weU as the English, have had our " Great
RebeUion." It came to a dramatic close thirty-seven
years since ; as theirs came to a close not less dramatic
some seven times thirty-seven years since. We, also,
as they in their day, formed our contemporaneous
judgments and recorded our verdicts, assumed to be
irreversible, of the men, the issues, and the events of
the great conflict ; and those verdicts and judgments,
in our case as in theirs, wUl unquestionably be revised,
modified, and in not a few cases whoUy reversed.
Better knowledge, calmer reflection, and a more judi-

"SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?" 379
cial frame of mind come with the passage of the years ;
slowly passions subside, prejudices disappear, truth as
serts itself. In England this process has been going
on for close upon two centuries and a half ; with what
result, CromweU's statue stands as proof. We Uve in
another age and a different environment ; and, as fifty
years of Europe outmeasure In their growth a cycle
of Cathay, so I hold one year of twentieth century
America works far more progress in thought than
seven years of Britain during the interval between its
Great RebeUion and ours. We who took active part
in the Civil War have not yet whoUy vanished from
the stage ; the rear guard of the Grand Army, we lin
ger. To-day is separated from the death of Lincoln
by the same number of years only which separated
" the Glorious Revolution of 1688 " from the exe
cution of Charles Stuart ; yet to us is already given
to look back on the events of which we were a part
with the same perspective effects with which the Vic
torian Englishman looks back on the men and events
of the Commonwealth.
I propose on this occasion to do so ; and reverting
to my text, — " Shall CromweU have a Statue," — and
reading that text in the gloss of Carlyle's Latter-Day
Pamphlet utterance, I quote you Horace's famUIar
precept, — " Mutato nomine, de te
Fabula narratur," —
and ask abruptly, "ShaU Robert E. Lee have a
Statue ? " I propose also to offer to your considera
tion some reasons why he should, and, assuredly, vriU
have one, if not now, then presently.
Shortly after Lee's death In October, 1870, leave

380 "SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?"
was asked In the United States Senate, by Mr. Mc-
Creery, of Kentucky, to introduce a joint resolution
providing for the return of the estate and mansion of
ArUngton to the famUy of the deceased Confederate
Commander-in-chief. In Ariew of the use which had
then already been made of Arlington as a mUitary
cemetery, this proposal, involving, as it necessarUy did,
a removal of the dead, naturaUy led to warm debate.
The proposition was one not to be considered. If a
defect in the title of the government existed, it must
in some way be cured; as, subsequently, it was cured.
But I caU attention to the debate because Charles
Sumner, then a Senator from Massachusetts, partici
pated in it, using the foUowing language : " Eloquent
Senators have already characterized the proposition
and the traitor it seeks to commemorate. I am not
disposed to speak of General Lee. It is enough to
say he stands high in the catalogue of those who have
imbrued their hands in their country's blood. I hand
him over to the avenging pen of History." This was
when Lee had been just two months dead ; but, three-
quarters of a century after the Protector's skuU had
been removed from over the roof of Westminster HaU,
Pope wrote in simUar spirit —
" See CromweU, damn'd to everlasting fame ; "
and, sixteen years later, • — close upon a century after
CromweU's disentombment at Westminster and re-
burial at Tyburn, — a period from the death of Lee
equal to that which wIU have elapsed in 1960, Gray
sang of the Stoke Pogis churchyard —
" Some mute inglorious Milton here may rest.
Some CromweU guUtless of his country's blood."
And now, a century and a half later, CromweU's

"SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE!" 381
statue looms defiantly up in front of the ParUament
House. When, therefore, an appeal is in such cases
made to the " avenging pen of History," it is weU to
bear this instance in mind, whUe recalUng perchance
the aphorism of a greater than Pope, or Gray, or
Sumner, — " and thus the whirligig of Time brings in
his revenges."
Was, then, Robert E. Lee a " traitor," — was he
also guUty of his " country's blood ? " These ques
tions I propose now to discuss. I am one of those
who, in other days, was arrayed in the ranks which
confronted Lee ; one of those whom Lee baffled and
beat, but who, finaUy, baffled and beat Lee. As one
thus formerly lined up against him, these questions I
propose to discuss in the calmer and cooler, and alto
gether more reasonable Ught which comes to most men,
when a whole generation of the human race lies buried
between them and the issues and actors upon which
they undertake to pass.
Was Robert E. Lee a traitor ? TechnicaUy, I think
he was indisputably a traitor to the United States ;
for a traitor, as I understand it technicaUy, is one
guilty of the crime of treason ; or, as the Century Dic
tionary puts it, violating his aUegiance to the chief au
thority of the State ; whUe treason against the United
States is specifically defined in the Constitution as
" levying war against them, or in adhering to their
enemies, giving them aid and comfort." That Robert
E. Lee did levy war against the United States can, I
suppose, no more be denied than that he gave " aid
and comfort " to its enemies ; and to the truth of the
last proposition I hold myself, among others, to be a

382 "SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?"
very competent witness. This technicaUy; but, in
history, there is treason and treason, as there are
traitors and traitors. And, furthermore, if Robert
E. Lee was a traitor, so also, and indisputably, were
George Washington, Oliver Cromwell, John Hamp
den, and William of Orange. The list might be ex
tended Indefinitely ; but these wUl suffice. There can
be no question that every one of those named -violated
his aUegiance, and gave aid and comfort to the enemies
of his sovereign. Washington furnishes a precedent
at every point. A Virginian like Lee, he was also a
British subject ; he had fought under the British flag,
as Lee had fought under that of the United States ;
when, in 1776, Virginia seceded from the British Em
pire, he " went with his State," just as Lee went with
it eighty-five years later ; subsequently Washington
commanded armies in the field designated by those
opposed to them as " rebels," and whose descendants
now glorify them as " the rebels of '76," much as Lee
later commanded, and at last surrendered, much larger
armies, also designated " rebels " by those they con
fronted. Except in their outcome, the cases were,
therefore, precisely alike ; and logic is logic. It con
sequently appears to foUow, that, if Lee was a traitor,
Washington was also. It Is unnecessary to institute
similar comparisons with CromweU, Hampden, and
WiUiam of Orange. No defence can in their cases
be made. Technically, one and all, they undeniably
were traitors.
But there are, as I have said, traitors and traitors,
— CatUines, Arnolds, and Gorgeis, as weU as Crom-
weUs, Hampdens, and Washingtons. To reach any
satisfactory conclusion concerning a candidate for

"SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?" 383
" everlasting fame," — whether to deify or damn, —
enroU him as saviour, as martyr, or as criminal, — it
is, therefore, necessary still further to discriminate.
The cause, the motive, the conduct must be passed in
review. Did turpitude anywhere attach to the ori
ginal taking of sides, or to subsequent act? Was
the man a self-seeker? Did low or sordid motives
Impel him ? Did he seek to aggrandize himself at
his country's cost? Did he strike with a parricidal
hand? These are grave questions ; and, in the case of Lee,
their consideration brings us at the threshold face to
face with issues which have perplexed and dirided the
country since the day the United States became a
country. They perplex and divide historians now.
Legally, technically, — the moral and humanitarian
aspects of the issue wholly apart, — which side had the
best of the argument as to the rights and the wrongs
of the case in the great debate which led up to the
Civil War ? Before entering, however, on this weU-
worn — • I might say, this threadbare — theme, as I
find myself compeUed In briefest way to do, there Is
one preliminary very essential to be gone through with,
— a species of moral purgation. Bearing in mind Dr.
Johnson's advice to BosweU on a certain memorable
occasion, we should at least try to clear our minds of
cant. Many years ago, but only shortly before his
death, Richard Cobden said, in one of his truth-teUIng
deUverances to his Rochdale constituents, — "I reaUy
believe I might be Prime Minister. If I would get
up and say you are the greatest, the wisest, the best,
the happiest people in the world, and keep on repeat
ing that, I don't doubt but what I might be Prime

384 "SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?"
Minister. I have seen Prime Ministers made in my
experience precisely by that process." The same
great apostle of homely sense, on another occasion,
bluntly remarked In a simUar spirit to the House of
Commons, — " We generaUy sympathize with every
body's rebels but our own." In both these respects I
submit we Americans are true descendants from the
Anglo-Saxon stock ; and nowhere is this more un
pleasantly apparent than in any discussion which may
arise of the motives which actuated those of our coun
trymen who did not at the time see the issues involved
in our Civil War as we saw them. Like those whom
Cobden addressed, we like to glorify our ancestors and
ourselves, and we do not particularly care to give ear
to what we are pleased to term unpatriotic, and, at
times, even treasonable talk. In other words, and in
plain, unpalatable English, our minds are saturated
with cant. Only in the case of others do we see
things as they reaUy are. Ceasing to be individuaUy
interested, we then at once become nothing unless crit
ical. So, when it comes to rebeUions, we, like Cob
den's Englishmen, are wont almost invariably to sym
pathize with everybody's rebels but our own.
Our souls spontaneously go forth to Celt, Pole,
Hungarian, Boer, and Hindoo ; but when we are con
cerned, language quite fails us in which adequately to
depict the moral turpitude which must actuate Confed
erate or Filipino who rises in resistance against what
we are pleased really to consider, as weU as call, the
best and most beneficent government the world has yet
been permitted to see, — Our Government ! This, I
submit, is cant, — pure cant ; and at the threshold of
discussion we had best free our minds of it, whoUy, if

"SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?" 385
we can ; if not wholly, then in so far as we can.
PhiUp the Second of Spain, when he directed his cru
sade in the name of God, Church, and Government
against WiUiam of Orange, indulged in it in quite as
good faith as we ; and as for Charles " the Martyr "
and the " sainted " Laud, for two centuries after Crom
weU's head was stuck on a pole all England annuaUy
lamented in sackcloth and ashes the -wrongs inflicted
by sacrilegious hands on those most assuredly weU-
meaning rulers and men. AU depends on the point
of view ; and, during our own Civil War, while we
unceasingly denounced the wUful wickedness of those
who bore parricidal arms against the one immaculate
authority yet given the eye of man to look upon, the
leading newspaper of the world was referring to us in
perfect good faith "as an Insensate and degenerate
people." An English member of ParUament, speak
ing at the same time in equally good faith, declared
that, throughout the length and breadth of Great
Britain, public sentiment was almost unanimously on
the side of " the Southerners," — as ours was on the
side of the Boers, — because our " rebels " were " fight
ing against one of the most grinding, one of the most
gaUing, one of the most irritating attempts to estab
lish tyrannical government that ever disgraced the
history of the world." !
Upon the correctness or otherwise of these judgments
I do not care to pass. They certainly cannot be recon
ciled. The single point I make is that they were, when
made, the expression of views honestly and sincerely
entertained. We sympathize with Great Britain's
rebels ; Great Britain sympathized with our rebels.
1 Supra, pp. 63, 75.

386 "SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?"
Our rebels In 1862, as theirs in 1900, thoroughly
believed they were resisting an Iniquitous attempt to
deprive them of their rights, and to estabUsh over
them a " grinding," a " gaUing," and an " irritating "
" tyrannical government." We in 1861, as Great
Britain In 1898, and Charles " the Martyr " and Philip
of Spain some centuries earlier, were fuUy con-vinced
that we were engaged in God's work while we trod
under foot the " rebel " and the " traitor." Presently,
as distance lends a more correct perspective, and things
are viewed in their true proportions, we wiU get per
haps to realize that our case furnishes no exception to
the general rule ; and that we, too, like the EngUsh,
" generally sympathize with everybody's rebels but our
own." Justice may then be done.
Having entered this necessary, if somewhat hopeless
caveat, let us address ourselves to the question at issue.
I wUl state it again. Legally and technically, — not
moraUy, again let me say, and whoUy irrespective of
humanitarian considerations, — to which side did the
weight of argument incline during the great debate
which culminated in our Civil War? The answer
necessarUy turns on the abstract right of what we term
a Sovereign State to secede from the Union at such
time and for such cause as may seem to that State
proper and sufficient. The issue is settled now ; irrev
ocably and for all time decided : it was not settled
forty years ago, and the settlement since reached has
been the result not of reason, based on historical e^ri-
dence, but of events and of force. To pass a fair
judgment on the line of conduct pursued by Lee in
1861, it is necessary to go back in thought and im
agination, and see tlungs, not as they now are, but as

"SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?" 387
they then were. If we do so, and accept the judgment
of some of the more modern students and investigators
of history, — either whoUy unprejudiced or with a dis
tinct Union bias, — it would seem as if the weight of
argument falls into what I wiU term the Confederate
scale. For instance. Professor Goldwin Smith, — an
Englishman, a lifelong student of history, a friend
and advocate of the Union during the Ciril War, the
author of one of the most compact and readable nar
ratives of our national life, — Goldwin Smith has re
cently said : " Few who have looked into the history
can doubt that the Union originaUy was, and was
generaUy taken by the parties to it to be, a compact,
dissoluble, perhaps, most of them would have said, at
pleasure, dissoluble certainly on breach of the articles
of Union." ! To a like effect, but in terms even
stronger, Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge, now a Senator from
Massachusetts, has declared, not in a political utterance
but In a work of historical character, — " When the
Constitution was adopted by the votes of States at Phil
adelphia, and accepted by the votes of States in popu
lar conventions, it is safe to say that there was not a
man in the country, from Washington and Hamilton,
on the one side, to George Clinton and George Mason,
on the other, who regarded the new system as any
thing but an experiment entered upon by the States,
and from which each and every State had the right
peaceably to withdraw, a right which was very likely
to be exercised." ^
Here are two explicit statements of the legal and
technical side of the argument made by authority to
1 Atlantic Monthly Magazine (March, 1902), vol. Ixxxix. p. 305.
2 Webster, American Statesmen Series, p. 172.

388 "SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?"
which no exception can be taken, at least by those of
the Union side. On them, and on them alone, the case
for the abstract right of secession might be rested, and
we could go on to the next stage of the discussion.
I am un^wiUing, however, so to do. The issue in
volved is stiU one of interest, and I am not disposed to
leave it on the mere dictum of two authorities, however
eminent. In the first place I do not altogether concur
in their statement ; in the next place, this discussion
is a mere threshing of straw unless we get at the true
Inwardness of the situation. When it comes to sub
jects — political or moral — in which human beings
are involved, metaphysics are scarcely less to be avoided
than cant ; alleged historical facts are apt to prove
deceptive ; and I confess to grave suspicions of logic.
Old time theology, for instance, with its pitUess rea
soning, led the world Into very strange places and much
bad company. In reaching a conclusion, therefore, in
which a verdict Is entered on the motives and actions
of men, acting either individuaUy or in masses, the
moral, the sentimental, and the practical must be quite
as much taken into account as the legal, the logical, and
the material. This, in the present case, I propose
presently to do ; but, as I have said, on the facts even
I am unable whoUy to concur with Professor Smith
and Mr. Lodge.
Mr. Lodge, for instance, cites Washington. But
it so chances Washington put himself on record upon
the point at issue, and his testimony is directly at
variance with the views attributed to him by Mr.
Webster's biographer. What are known in history
as the Kentucky resolutions, drawn up by Thomas
Jefferson, then Vice-President, were passed by the

"SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?" 389
legislature of the State whose name they bear in
November, 1798. In those Resolutions the view of
the framers of the Constitution as to the original
scope of that instrument accepted by Professor Smith
and Mr. Lodge was first set forth. The principles
acted upon by South Carolina on the 20th of Decem
ber, 1860, were enunciated by Kentucky November
16, 1798. The dragon's teeth were then sown.
Washington was at that time li-ving in retirement at
Mt. Vernon. When, a few weeks later, the character
of those resolutions became known to him, he was
deeply concerned, and wrote to Lafayette, — " The
Constitution, according to their interpretation of it,
would be a mere cipher ; " and again, a few days
later, he expressed himself still more strongly in a
letter to Patrick Henry, — " Measures are systemati
cally and pertinaciously pursued which must eventu-
aUy dissolve the Union, or produce coercion." ! Co
ercion Washington thus looked to as the remedy to
which recourse could properly be had In case of any
overt attempt at secession. But, so far as the framers
of the Constitution were concerned, it seems to me
clear that, acting as wise men of conflicting views
naturally would act in a formative period during which
many conflicting views prevailed, they did not care
to incur the danger of a shipwreck of their entire
scheme by undertaking to settle, distinctly and in
advance, abstract questions, the discussion of which
was fraught with danger.^ In so far as they could,
1 Sparks : Writings of Washington, vol. xi. pp. 378, 389.
2 The discussion on this point has hitherto proved as inconclusive
as interminable ; and it seems likely so to remain. (See Proceedings
of Massachusetts Historical Society, New Series, vol. xvi. pp. 151-173,
May 8, 1902.) From the days of Mr. Webster, and his answer to

390 "SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?"
they, with great practical shrewdness, left those ques
tions to be settled, should they ever present them
selves In concrete form, under the conditions which
might then exist. The truth thus seems to be that
the mass of those composing the Convention of 1787,
working under the guidance of a few very able and
exceedingly practical men, of constructive mind,
buUded a great deal better than they knew. The
delegates met to harmonize trade differences ; they
ended by perfecting a scheme of poUtical union
that had broad consequences of which they Uttle
dreamed. If they had dreamed of them, the chances
Hayne, to the present time, it is all matter of inference and argument,
and of surmise. Meanwhile, no one wUl deny that the framers of the
Constitution were gifted with an entirely adequate power of express
ing themselves, when they thought fit so to do. The defenders of the
principle of nationality scrutinize the instrument in vain in search of
any clause declaring the absolute sovereignty of the Nation and pro
hibiting the secession of a State, or the dissolution of the compact by
a State ; or, under certain conditions, permitting it to such number, or
proportion, of States as were prescribed for original adoption. This
could easily have been expressed, and would have obviated any ques
tion. It was not. On the other hand, the advocates of State Sover
eignty, and defenders of the sovereign right of secession, make no
pretence of finding in the Constitution any words expressly setting
forth that right, or distinctly reserving the power to one State, or any
number of States, of dissolving what they designate as "the com
pact." They have to reach their results through =• process of elab
orate argumentation. The sUence of the framers is undeniable ;
the reason thereof is as obvious as the fact. They wisely refrained
from any declaration which, whUe setting forth precisely the rights
and obligations of the parties to the instrument, would inevitably
involve its rejection. They thus intentionally left the question in
doubt, to be decided by the course of events, and the process of what
we now know as evolution. Such seems to be the only common-
sense conclusion to be derived from a careful study of both the
Constitution and the debates on its adoption. Both sides to the sub
sequent discussion had, and have, reason ; neither, proof. Nor wiU
proof ever be attainable.

"SHALL CROMV/ELL HAVE A STATUE?" 391
are the fabric would never have been completed.
That Madison, HamUton and Jay were equaUy blind
to consequences does not foUow. They probably de
signed a nation. If they did, however, they were too
wise to take the public fuUy into their confidence ;
and, to-day, " no impartial student of our constitutional
history can doubt for a moment that each State rati
fied " the form of government submitted in " the firm
belief that at any time it could withdraw therefrom." !
A Mr. Davie, a North Carolina delegate to the Phila
delphia Convention of 1787, put the case very clearly
in the course of a speech In favor of the adoption of
the Constitution by his o-wn State. " Every man of
common sense knows that political power is political
right ; " ^ and, well assured that Virginia, Pennsyl
vania, or New England " could," at any time, " -with
draw," — for who was to withstand them in so doing ?
— the men of that day representing those States were
not disposed to scrutinize over closely the legal aspects
of such withdrawal. Probably, however, the more far-
seeing — and, in the long run, they alone count —
shared with Washington in the belief that in process
of time, after the machine was once put in success
ful action, this withdrawal would not be unaccom
panied by practical difficulty. And, after all Is said
and done, the legaUty of secession is somewhat of a
metaphysical abstraction so long as the right of revo
lution is inalienable. As matter of fact it was to
might and revolution the South appealed in 1861 ;
and it was to coercion the government of the Union
had recourse. So, with his supreme good sense and
1 Donn Piatt : George H. Thomas, p. 88.
2 ElUot : Debates, vol. iv. p. 238.

392 "SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?"
that poUtical Insight at once instinctive and unerring,
in respect to which he stands almost alone, Wash
ington foresaw this alternative in 1798.! He looked
1 Washington seems, indeed, to have foreseen it from the com
mencement. Hardly was the independence of the country achieved
before he began to direct his efforts toward the creation of a nation,
with a central power adequate to a coercive pohcy if caUed for by the
occasion. Thus, in March, 1783, he -wrote to Nathanael Greene (Ford :
Writings of Washington, vol. x. p. 203, note), " It remains only for
the States to be wise, and to establish their independence on the basis
of an inviolable, efficacious union, and a firm confederation." The
foUowing month he wrote in the same spirit to Tench TUghman (lb.
vol. X. p. 238), "In a word, the Constitution of Congress must be
competent to the general purposes of Government, and of such a nature
as to bind us together. Otherwise we shaU be like a rope of sand,
and as easily broken." Finally, in the Circular Letter addressed to
the Governors of aU the States on disbanding the Army, June 8, 1783
(lb. vol. X. p. 257), "There are four things which, I humbly con
ceive, are essential to the well-being, I may even venture to say, to
the existence of the United States as an independent power. First,
An indissoluble union of the States under one federal head." In
language even stronger he, July 8, 1783, — only a month later, —
wrote to Dr. William Gordon, the historian (lb. vol. x. p. 276), " We
are known by no other character among nations than as the United
States. Massachusetts or Virginia is no better defined, nor any more
thought of by Foreign Powers, than the County of Worcester in
Massachusetts is by Virginia, or Gloucester County in Virgmia is by
Massachnsetts (respectable as they are) ; and yet these counties with
as much propriety might oppose themselves to the laws of the States
in which they are, as an individual State can oppose itself to the
Federal Govemment, by which it is, or ought to be bound."
With the passage of time, Washington's feeUngs on this subject
seem to have grown stronger, and, March 10, 1787, he wrote to John
Jay, " A thirst for power, and the bantling — I had liked to have said
MONSTER — sovereignty, which have taken such fast hold of the
States," etc. (WUliam Jay: Life of John Jay, vol. i. p. 259.) A year
eariier, August 1, 1786, he had written to Jay, "Experience has
taught us, that men wiU not adopt and carry into execution measures
the best calculated for their own good, without the intervention of a
coercive power. I do not conceive we can exist long as a nation
without having lodged somewhere a power, which wUl pervade the
whole Union in as energetic a manner as the authority of the state
governments extends over the several States." (Ford : Writings of

"SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?" 393
upon the doctrine of secession as a heresy ; but, none
the less, it was a heresy indisputably then preached,
and to which many, not in Virginia only, but in New
England also, pinned their political faith. Even the
Devil is proverbiaUy entitled to his due.
So far, however, as the abstract question is of con
sequence, as the utterances of Professor Smith and
Mr. Lodge conclusively show, the Secessionists of
1861 stand in history's court by no means without a
case. In that case, moreover, they implicitly believed.
From generation to generation they had grown up in
doctrinated with the gospel, or heresy, of State Sov
ereignty, and it was as much part of their moral and
inteUectual being as was clanship of the Scotch high-
landers. In so far they were right, as Governor John
A. Andrew said of John Brown. Meanwhile, practi
cally, as a common-sensed man, leading an every-day
existence in a world of actuaUties, John Brown was
not right ; he was, on the contrary, altogether wrong,
and richly merited the fate meted out to him. It was
the same with the Secessionists. That, in 1861, they
could really have had faith in the practicability — the
real working efficacy — of that peaceable secession
which they professed to ask for, and of which they
never wearied of talking, I cannot believe. I find in
the record no real e^ridence thereof.
Of the high-type Southron, as we sometimes desig
nate him, I would speak in terms of sincere respect.
I know him chiefly by hearsay, having come in per-
Washington, vol. xi. p. 53.) This, it wiU be observed, was within a
few days less than seven months only before the passage by the Con
federation Congress of the resolution of February 21, 1787, caUing for
the Convention which, during the ensuing summer, framed the present
Constitution.

394 "SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?"
sonal contact only with individual representatives of
the class ; but such means of observation as I have
had confirm what I recently heard said by a friend of
mine, once Governor of South Carolina, and, so far
as I know, the only man who ever gave the impossible
and indefensible plan of reconstruction attempted
after our CivU War a firm, fair, and inteUigent trial.
He at least put forth an able and honest effort to
make effective a policy which never should have been
devised. Speaking from " much and varied experi
ence," I recently heard Daniel H. Chamberlain say of
the " typical Southern gentleman " that he considered
him " a distinct and really noble growth of our Amer
ican soU. For, if fortitude under good and under
eril fortune, if endurance without complaint of what
comes in the tide of human affairs, if a grim cling
ing to ideals once charming, if ¦rigor and resUIency of
character and spirit under defeat and poverty and
distress, if a steady love of learning and letters when
libraries were lost in flames and the ¦wreckage of war,
if self-restraint when the long delayed relief at last
came, — if, I say, all these qualities are parts of real
heroism. If these qualities can ¦rivify and ennoble a
man or a people, then our own South may lay claim
to an honored place among the differing types of our
great common race." Such is the matured judgment
of the Massachusetts Governor of South Carolina
during the Congressional reconstruction period ; and,
listening to it, I asked myself if it was descriptive of
a Southern fellow countryman, or a Jacobite Scotch
chieftain anterior to " the '45."
The Southern statesmen of the old slavery days —
the antedUuvian period which preceded our mid-cen-

"SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?" 395
tury cataclysm — were the outcome and representa
tives of what has thus been described. As such they
presented a curious admixture of qualities. Master
ful in temper, clear of purpose, with a firm grasp on
principle, a high sense of honor, and a moral percep
tion developed on Its peculiar lines, as in the case of
Calhoun, to a quality of distinct hardness, they were
yet essentiaUy abstractionists. Political metaphysi
cians, they were not practical men. They did not see
things as they reaUy were. They thus, while discuss
ing their " forty-bale theories " and the " patriarchal
institution " in connection with States' rights and nul
lification, failed to realize that on the two essential fea
tures of their policy — slavery and secession — they
were contending vrith the stars in their courses. The
whole world was moring irresistibly In the direction
of nationality and an ever increased recognition of
the rights of man ; whUe they, on both of these vital
issues, were proclaiming a crusade of reaction.
Moreover, what availed the views or intentions of
the framers of the Constitution ? What mattered it
in 1860 whether they. In 1787, contemplated a Nation
or only a more comprvCt-federatlon of Sovereign States ?
In spite of logic and historical precedent, and in sub
lime unconsciousness of metaphysics and abstractions,
realities have an unpleasant way of asserting their ex
istence. However it may have been in 1788, in 1860
a Nation had grown into existence. Its peaceful dis
memberment was impossible. The complex system of
tissues and hgaments, the growth of seventy years,
could not be gently taken apart, without wound or
hurt ; the separation. If separation there was to be,
involved a teaiing asunder, supplementing a liberal

396 "SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?"
use of the knife. Their professions to the contrary
notwithstanding, this the Southern leaders failed not
to reaUze. In point of fact, therefore, beUeving fuUy
in the abstract legality of secession, and the justice
and sufficiency of the grounds on which they acted,
their appeal was to the inalienable right of revolu
tion, and to that might by which alone the right
could be upheld. Let us put casuistry, metaphysics,
and sentiment aside, and come to actualities. The
secessionist recourse in 1861 was to the sword ; and
to the sword It was meant to have recourse.
I have thus far spoken only of the South as a whole.
Much has been said and written on the subject of an
aUeged conspiracy, in those days, of Southern men and
leaders against the Union ; of the designs and ulti
mate objects of the aUeged conspirators ; of acts of
treachery on their part, and the part of their accom
plices, towards the government, of which they were the
sworn officials. Into this phase of the subject I do
not propose to enter. That the leaders in Secession
were men with large views, and that they had matured
a comprehensive poUcy as the ultimate outcome of
their movement, I entertain no doubt. They looked
unquestionably to an easy military success, and the
complete establishment of their Confederacy ; more
remotely, there can be no question they contemplated
a policy of extension, and the establishment along the
shores of the Gulf of Mexico and in the AntiUes of
a great semi-tropical, slave-labor republic ; finally, all
my investigations have tended to satisfy me that they
confidently anticipated an early disintegration of the
Union, and the accession of the bulk of the Northern
States to the Confederacy, New England only being

"SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?" 397
sternly excluded therefrom — " sloughed off," as they
expressed it. The capital of the new Confederacy was
to be Washington ; African servitude, under reason
able limitations, was to be recognized throughout its
limits ; agriculture was to be its ruling interest, with
a tariff and foreign policy In strict accord therewith.
" Secession is not intended to break up the present
government, but to perpetuate it. We go out of the
Union, not to destroy it, but for the purpose of get
ting further guarantees and security," — this was said
in February, 1861 ; and this in 1900, — " And so we
believe that, with the success of the South, the ' Union
of our Fathers,' which the South was the principal
factor in forming, and to which she was far more at
tached than the North, would have been restored and
reestablished ; that in this Union, the South would
have been again the dominant people, the controlling
power." Conceding the necessary premises of fact
and law, — a somewhat considerable concession, but,
perhaps, conceivable, — conceding these, I see in this
position, then or now, nothing iUogical, nothing pro
vocative of severe criticism, certainly nothing treason
able. Acting on sufficient grounds, of which those
thus acting were the sole judge, proceeding in a way
indisputably legal and regular, it was proposed to re
construct the Union In the light of experience, and
on a new, and, as they considered, an improved basis,
without New England. This cannot properly be
termed a conspiracy ; it was a legitimate poUcy based
on certain assumed data legal, moral, and economical.
But it was in reality never for a moment believed that
this programme could be peaceably and quietly carried
into effect ; and the assent of New England to the

398 "SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?"
arrangement was neither asked for, assumed, nor ex
pected. New England was distinctly relegated to an
outer void, — at once cold, dark, inhospitable.
As to participation of those who sympathized in
these views and this policy in the councils of the gov
ernment, so furthering schemes for its overthrow whUe
sworn to Its support, I hold It unnecessary to speak.
Such were traitors. As such, had they met their
deserts, they should, at the proper time, and on due
process of law, have been arrested, tried, conricted,
sentenced, and hanged. That in certain well-remem
bered Instances this course was not pursued. Is, to my
mind, even yet much to be deplored. In such cases
clemency is only another form of cant.
Having now discussed what have seemed to me the
necessary preliminaries, I come to the particular cases
of Virginia and Robert E. Lee. The two are closely
interwoven, — for Virginia was always Virginia, and
the Lees were, first, over and above all, Virginians.
It was the Duke of WeUIngton who, on a certain mem
orable occasion, indignantly remarked in his deUght-
f ul French-English, — " Mais avant tout je suis gentil-
homme Anglais." So might have said the Lees of
Virginia of themselves.
As respects Virginia, moreover, I am fain to say
there was In the attitude of the State towards the
Confederacy, and, indeed, in its bearing throughout
the Civil War, something which appealed strongly, —
something unselfish and chivaUic, — worthy of Vir
ginia's highest record. History ¦wiU, I think, do jus
tice to it. Virginia, it must be remembered, while a
Slave State, was not a Cotton State. This was a dis
tinction Implying a difference. In Virginia the insti-

"SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?" 399
tution of slavery existed, and because of it she was
in close sympathy with her sister Slave States ; but,
while in the Cotton States slavery had graduaUy as
sumed a purely material form, in Virginia it still
retained much of its patriarchal character. The
" Border " States, as they were caUed, and among them
Virginia especially, had. It is true, gained an evil name
as " slave-breeding ground ; " but this was merely an
incident to a system in which, taken by and large, —
viewed in the rule and not in the exception, — the
being with African blood in his veins was not looked
upon as a mere transferable chattel, but practically,
and to a large extent, was attached to the house and
the soil. This fact had a direct bearing on the moral
issue ; for slavery, one thing in Virginia, was quite
another in Louisiana. The Virginian pride was more
over proverbial. Indeed, I doubt if local feeling and
patriotism and devotion to the State ever anywhere
attained a fuller development than in the community
which dwelt in the region watered by the Potomac and
the James, of which Richmond was the political centre.
We of the North, especiaUy we of New England, were
Yankees ; but a Virginian was that, and nothing else.
I have heard of a New Englander, of a Green Moun
tain boy, of a Rhode Islander, of a " Nutmeg," of a
" Blue-nose " even, but never of a Massachusettensian.
The word somehow does not lend itself to the mouth,
any more than the thought to the mind.
But Virginia was strongly attached by sentiment
as well as interest to the Union. The birthplace of
Washington, the mother of States as weU as of Presi
dents, " The Old Dominion," as she was called, and
fondly loved to caU herself, had never been affected by

400 "SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?"
the nullification heresies of South Carolina ; and the
long line of her eminent public men, though, in 1860,
showing marked signs of a deteriorating standard,
stiU retained a prominence in the national councUs.
If John B. Floyd was Secretary of War, Winfield
Scott was at the head of the Army. Torn by conflict
ing feeUngs, Virginia, still clinging to the Nation, was
unwiUIng to sever her connection ¦with It because of
the lawful election of an anti-slavery President, even
by a distinctly sectional vote. For a time she even
stayed the fast flooding tide of secession, bringing
about a brief but important reaction. Those of us
old enough to remember the drear and anxious winter
which followed the election and preceded the inaugu
ration of Lincoln, recall vividly the ray of bright hope
which, in the midst of its deepest gloom, then came
from Virginia. It was in early February. Up to
that time the record was unbroken. Beginning with
South Carolina on the 20th of December, State after
State, meeting in convention, had ¦with significant
unanimity passed ordinances of secession. Each suc
cessive ordinance was felt to be the equivalent of a
renewed declaration of war. The outlook was dark
Indeed , and, amid the fast gathering gloom, all eyes,
all thoughts, turned to Virginia. She represented the
Border States ; her action it was felt would largely
Influence, and might control theirs. John Letcher
was then Governor, — a States' Rights Democrat, of
course, — but a Union man. By him the legislature
of the State was caUed together in special session, and
that legislature, in January, passed what was known
as a convention blU. PracticaUy Virginia was to vote
on the question at Issue. Events moved rapidly.

"SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?" 401
South Carolina had seceded on the 20th of December ;
Mississippi, on the 9th of January ; Florida, on the
10 th ; Alabama, on the 11th ; Georgia foUowed on the
19th ; Louisiana on the' 26th, with Texas on the 1st
of February. The. procession seemed unending; the
record unbroken. Not > without cause might the now
thoroughly frightened friends of the Union have ex
claimed with Macbeth —
" What ! will the line stretch out to the crack of doom ?
Another yet ? A seventh ? "
If at that juncture the Old Dominion had, by a de
cisive vote, foUowed in the steps of the Cotton States,
it implied consequences which no man could fathom.
It involved the possession of the national capltol, and
the continuance of the Government. Maryland would
inevitably foUow the Virginian lead ; the recently
elected President had not yet been inaugurated ;
taken whoUy by surprise, the North was divided in
sentiment ; the loyal spirit of the country was not
aroused. It was thus an even question whether, on
the 4th of March, the whole machinery of the de facto
government would not be in the hands of the revolu
tionists. AU depended on Virginia. This is now for
gotten ; none the less, it is history.
The Virginia election was held on the 4th of
February, the news of the secession of Texas —
seventh in the line — having been received on the
2d. Evidently, the action of Texas was carefully
timed for effect. Though over forty years ago, I well
remember that day — gray, overcast, ¦wintry — which
succeeded the Virginia election. Then liring in Bos
ton, a young man of twenty-five, I shared — as who did
not? — in the common deep depression and intense

402 "SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?"
anxiety. It was as if a verdict was to be that day
announced in a case Involving fortune, honor, life
even. Too harassed for work, I remember abandon
ing my desk In the afternoon to seek relief In physical
actlrity, for the ponds in the riclnity of Boston were
ice-covered, and daily thronged with skaters. I was
soon among the number gloomily seeking unfrequented
spots. Suddenly I became aware of an unusual move
ment in the throng nearest the shore, where those
fresh from the city arrived. The skaters seemed
crowding to a common point ; and a moment later
they scattered again with cheers and gestures of relief.
An arrival fresh from Boston had brought the first
bulletin of yesterday's election. Virginia, speaking
against secession, had emitted no uncertain sound.
It was as If a weight had been taken off the mind of
every one. The tide seemed turned at last. For my
self, I remember my feelings were too deep to find
expression In words or sound. Something stuck in
my throat. I wanted to be by myself.
Nor did we overestimate the Importance of the
event. If it did not in the end mean reaction, it
did mean time gained : and time then, as the result
showed, was vital. WiUiam H. Seward, about to be
come Secretary of State, was then in the Senate, and
no one was better advised as to the true posture of
affairs, and the significance of events. His son now
wrote : " The people of the District are looking anx
iously for the result of the Virginia election. They
fear that if Virginia resolves on secession, Maryland
will follow ; and then Washington will be seized."
On February 3, Seward himself wrote to his wife:
" The election to-morrow probably determines whether

"SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?" 403
all the Slave States will take the attitude of disunion.
Everybody around me thinks that that wiU make the
separation irretrievable, and involve us in flagrant
civil war. PracticaUy everybody will despair." A day
or two later the news came " like a gleam of sunshine
in a storm." The disunion movement was checked,
perhaps would be checkmated. Well might Seward
remark, with a sigh of profound reUef : " At least
the danger of conflict, here or elsewhere, before the
4th of March, has been averted. Time has been
gained." ! Time was gained ; and the few weeks of
precious time thus gained through the expiring effort
of Union sentiment in Virginia involved the vital
fact of the peaceful delivery, four weeks later, of the
helm of state into the hands of Lincoln.
Thus, be it always remembered, Virginia did not
take its place in the secession movement because of
the election of an anti-slavery President. It did not
raise its hand against the national government from
mere love of any peculiar institution, or a wish to
protect and to perpetuate it. It refused to be precipi
tated into a civU convulsion ; and its refusal was of
vital moment. The ground of Virginia's final action
was of wholly another nature, and of a nature far
more creditable. Virginia, as I have said, made State
Sovereignty an article — a cardinal article — of its
political creed. So, logicaUy and consistently, it took
the position that, though it might be unwise for a
State to secede, a State which did secede could not,
and should not be coerced.
To us now this position seems worse than iUogical ;
it is impossible. So events proved it then. Yet, after
1 Seward at Washington, vol. i. p. 502.

404 "SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?"
aU, it is based on the great fundamental principle of
the consent of the governed ; and, in the days imme
diately preceding the war, something very like it was
accepted as an article of correct political faith by
men afterwards as strenuous in support of a Union
reestablished by force, as Charles Sumner, Abraham
Lincoln, WiUiam H. Seward, Salmon P. Chase, and
Horace Greeley. The difference was that, confronted
by the overwhelming tide of events, Virginia adhered
to It ; they, in presence of that tide, tacitly abandoned
it. In my judgment, they were right. But Virginia,
though mistaken, more consistent, judged otherwise.
As I have said, in shaping a practical outcome of hu
man affairs logic is often as irreconcilable with the dic
tates of worldly vrisdom as are metaphysics with com
mon sense. So, now, the issue shifted. It became a
question, not of slavery, or of the wisdom, or even the
expediency, of secession, but of the right of the Na
tional Government to coerce a Sovereign State. This
at the time was well understood. The extremists of
the South, counting upon it, counted with absolute
confidence; and openly proclaimed their reliance in
debate. Florida, as the representatives of that State
confessed on the floor of Congress, might in itself be
of smaU account ; but Florida, panoplied ¦with sov
ereignty, was hemmed in and buttressed against assault
by protecting sister States.
So, in his history, James F. Rhodes asserts that —
" The four men who in the last resort made the de
cision that began the war were ex-Senator Chestnut,
Lieutenant-Colonel Chisolm, Captain Lee, aU three
South Carolinians, and Roger A. Pryor, a Virginia
secessionist, who, two days before, in a speech at the

"SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?" 405
Charleston hotel, had said, ' I wUl tell your governor
what wiU put Virginia In the Southern Confederacy
in less than an hour by Shrewsbury clock. Strike a
blow ! ' " 1 The blow was to be in reply to what was
accepted as the first overt effort at the national coer
cion of a Sovereign State, — the attempted relief of
Sumter. That attempt, — unavoidable even if long
deferred, the necessary and logical outcome of a sit
uation which had become Impossible of continuance,
— that attempt, construed into an effort at coercion,
swept Virginia from her Union moorings.
Thus, when the long-deferred hour of fateful deci
sion came, the position of Virginia, be it in historical
justice said, however impetuous, mistaken, or iU-ad-
vised, was taken on no low or sordid or .selfish grounds.
On the contrary, the logical assertion of a cardinal
article of accepted political faith, it was made gener
ously, chivalrously, in a spirit almost altruistic ; for,
from the outset, it was manifest Virginia had nothing
to gain in that conflict of which she must perforce be
the battle-ground. True ! her leading men doubtless
believed that the struggle would soon be brought to a
triumphant close, — that Southern chivalry and fight
ing qualities would win a quick and easy victory over a
more materiaUy minded, even if not craven. Northern
mob of fanatics and cobblers and pedlers, officered by
preachers ; but, however thus deceived and misled at
the outset, Virginia entered on the struggle others had
initiated, for their protection and in their behalf. She
thrust herself between them and the tempest they had
invoked. Technically it may have been treasonable ;
but her attitude was consistent, was bold, was chivalrous:
1 Rhodes : United States, vol. iii. p. 349.

406 "SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?"
" An honourable murderer if you wUl ;
For nought did I in hate, but aU in honour."
So much for Virginia; and now as to Robert E.
Lee. More than once already, on occasions not un
like this, have I quoted Oliver Wendell Holmes's re
mark in answer to the query of an anxious mother as
to when a child's education ought to begin, — " About
250 years before it is born ; " and it is a fact — some
what necessitarian, doubtless, but stIU a fact — that
every man's life is largely moulded for him far back
in the ages. We phUosophize freely over fate and
free will, and one of the exc^Uent commonplaces of
our educational system is to instil into the minds of
the children in our common schools the idea that every
man is the architect of his own life. An admirable
theory to teach ; but, happily for the race, true only
to a very limited extent. Heredity is a tremendous
limiting fact. Native force of character — indi-rid-
uallty — doubtless has something to do with results ;
but circumstances, ancestry, environment have much
more. One man possibly in a hundred has in him the
inherent force to make his conditions largely for him
self ; but even he moves Influenced at every step from
cradle to grave by ante-natal and birth conditions.
Take any man you please, — yourself, for instance ;
now and again the changes of life give opportunity,
and the individual is equal to the occasion, — the
roads forking, consciously or instinctively he makes
his choice. Under such circumstances, he usually
supposes that he does so as a free agent. The world
so assumes, holding him responsible. He is nothing
of the sort ; or at best such only in a very limited
degree. The other day one of our humorists took

"SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?" 407
occasion to philosophize on this topic, delivering what
might not inaptly be termed an occasional discourse
appropriate to the 22d of February. It was not
only worth reading, but in humor and sentiment it
was somewhat suggestive of the melancholy Jacques.
" We are made, brick by brick, of influences, pa
tiently built up around the framework of our born
dispositions. It is the sole process of construction ;
there is no other. Every man, woman, and child is an
influence. Washington's disposition was born in him,
he did not create it. It was the architect of his char
acter ; his character was the architect of his achieve
ments. It had a native affinity for all influences fine
and great, and gave them hospitable welcome and per
manent shelter. It had a native aversion for all influ
ences mean and gross, and passed them on. It chose
its Ideals for him ; and out of its patiently gathered
materials it buUt and shaped his golden character.
" And we give him the credit."
Three names of Virginians are impressed on the
miUtary records of our civil war, — indelibly im
pressed, — Winfield Scott, George Henry Thomas,
and Robert Edward Lee ; the last, most deeply. Of
the three, the first two stood by the flag ; the third
went with his State. Each, when the time came,
acted conscientiously, impeUed by the purest sense
of loyalty, honor, and obligation, taking that course
which, under the circumstances and according to his
lights, seemed to him right; and each doubtless
thought he acted as a free agent. To a degree each
was a free agent ; to a much greater degree each was
the chUd of anterior conditions, hereditary sequence,
existing circumstances, — in a word, of human envi-

408 "SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?"
ronment, moral, material, inteUectual. Scott, or
Thomas, or Lee, being as he was, and things being as
things were, could not decide otherwise than as he did
decide. Consider them in order ; Scott first : —
A Virginian by birth, early association, and mar
riage, Scott, at the breaking out of the CivU War,
had not lived in his native State for forty years. Not
a planter, he held no broad acres and owned no slaves.
EssentiaUy a soldier, he was a citizen of the United
States ; and, for twenty years, had been the General
in command of its army. When, in April, 1861, Vir
ginia passed its ordinance of secession, he was well
advanced in his seventy-fifth year, — an old man, he
was no longer equal to active serrice. The course he
would pursue was thus largely marked out for him in
advance ; a violent effort on his part could alone have
forced him out of his trodden path. When subjected
to the test, what he did was infinitely creditable to
him, and the obligation the cause of the Union lay
under to him during the critical period between De
cember, 1860, and June, 1861, can scarcely be over
stated ; but, none the less, in doing as he did, it can
not be denied he followed what was for him the line
of least resistance.
Of George Henry Thomas, no American, North or
South, — above all, no American who served in the
Ciril War, — whether wearer of the blue or the gray,
— can speak, save ¦with infinite respect, — always with
admiration, often with love. Than his, no record is
clearer from stain. Thomas also was a Virginian.
At the time of the breaking out of the Cl^ril War, he
held the rank of Major in that regiment of cavalry of
which Lee, nine years his senior in age, was Colonel.

"SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?" 409
He never hesitated in his course. True to the flag
from start to finish, WiUiam T. Sherman, then General
of the Army, in the order announcing the death of his
friend and classmate at the Academy, most properly
said of him : " The very impersonation of honesty, in
tegrity, and honor, he wiU stand to posterity as the beau
ideal of the soldier and gentleman." More tersely,
Thomas stands for character personified ; Washington
himself not more so. And now baring said this, let
us come again to the choice of Hercules, — the parting
of those terrible ways of 1861.
Like Scott and Lee, Thomas was a Virginian ; but,
again, there are Virginians and Virginians. Thomas
was not a Lee. When, in 1855, the Second United
States cavalry was organized, Jefferson Davis being
Secretary of War, Captain Thomas, as he then was
and in his thirty-ninth year, was appointed its junior
Major. Between that time and April, 1861, fifty-one
officers are said to have borne commissions in that
regiment, thirty-one of whom were from the South ;
and of those thirty-one, no less than twenty-four en
tered the Confederate service, twelve of whom, among
them Robert E. Lee, Albert Sidney Johnston, and John
B. Hood, became General officers. The name of the
Virginian, George H. Thomas, stands first of the faith
ful seven ; but, Union or Confederate, it is a record
of great names, and fortunate is the people, great of
necessity their destiny, which in the hour of exigency,
on the one side or the other, naturaUy develops from
the roster of a single regiment men of the abUity, the
disinterestedness, the capacity, and the character of
Lee, Thomas, Johnston, and Hood. It is a record which
inspires confidence as weU as pride.

410 "SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?"
And now of the two men — Thomas and Lee.
Though born in Virginia, General Thomas was not of
a peculiarly Virginian descent. By ancestry, he was,
on the father's side, Welsh ; French, on that of the
mother. He was not of the old Virginia stock. Born
in the southeastern portion of the State, near the North
Carolina line, we are told that his family, dweUing
on a " goodly home property," was " weU to do " and
eminently " respectable ; " but, it is added, there
" were no cavaliers In the Thomas family, and not the
remotest trace of the Pocahontas blood." When the
war broke out, in 1861, Thomas had been twenty-one
years a commissioned officer ; and during those years
he seems to have lived almost everywhere except in
Virginia. It had been a life passed at military star
tions ; his wife was from New York; his home was on
the Hudson rather than on the Nottoway. In his
native State he owned no property, land or chattels.
Essentially a soldier, when the hour for choice came,
the soldier dominated the Virginian. He stood by
the flag.
Not so Lee ; for to Lee I now come. Of him it
might, and in justice must, be said, that he was more
than of the essence, he was of the very quintessence
of Virginia. In his case, the roots and fibres struck
down and spread wide in the soil, making him of It
a part. A son of the revolutionary " Light-Horse
Harry," he had married a Custis. His children re
presented all there was of descent, blood, and tradition
of the Old Dominion, made up as the Old Dominion
was of tradition, blood, and descent. The holder of
broad patrimonial acres, by birth and marriage he
was a slave-owner, and a slave-owner of tbe patri-

"SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?" 411
archal type, holding " slavery, as an institution, a
moral and political evU." Every sentiment, every
memory, every tie conceivable bound him to Virginia ;
and, when the choice was forced upon him, — had to
be made, — sacrificing rank, career, the fiag, he threw
in his lot with Virginia. He did so with open eyes,
and weighing the consequences. He at least indulged
in no self-deception, wandered away from the path
in no cloud of political metaphysics, nourished no
delusion as to an early and easy triumph. " Seces
sion," as he wrote to his son, " is nothing but revo
lution. The framers of our Constitution never ex
hausted so much labor, wisdom, and forbearance in
its formation, and surrounded it with so many guards
and securities, if it was intended to be broken by
every member of the Confederacy at wiU. It is idle
to talk of secession." But he also believed that his
permanent allegiance was due to Virginia ; that her
secession, though revolutionary, bound all Virginians,
and ended their connection with and duties to the
national government. Thereafter, to remain In the
United States army would be treason to Virginia.
So, three days after Virginia passed its ordinance, he,
being then at Arlington, resigned his commission, at
the same time writing to his sister, the wife of a Union
officer, — " We are now in a state of war which will
yield to nothing. The whole South Is in a state of
revolution, into which Virginia, after a long struggle,
has been dra^wn ; and, though I recognize no necessity
for this state of things, and would have forborne and
pleaded to the end for redress of grievances, real or
supposed, yet in my own person I had to meet the
question whether I should take part against my native

412 "SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?"
State. With aU my devotion to the Union, and the
feeling of loyalty and duty of an American citizen, I
have not been able to make up my mind to raise my
hand against my relatives, my children, my home. I
have, therefore, resigned my commission in the army ;
and, save in defence of my native State, I hope I may
never be caUed upon to draw my sword." Two days
before he had been unreservedly tendered, on behalf
of President Lincoln, the command of the Union army
then immediately to be put in the field in front of
Washington, — the command shortly afterwards held
by General McDoweU.
So thought and spoke and ¦wrote and acted Robert
E. Lee in April, 1861. He has, for the decision thus
reached, been termed by some a traitor, a deserter,
almost an apostate, and consigned to the " avenging
pen of History." I cannot so see it ; I am confident
posterity wiU not so see it. The name and conditions
being changed, those who uttered the words of cen
sure, invoking " the avenging pen," did not so see it
— have not seen it so. Let us appeal to the record.
What otherwise did George Washington do under
circumstances not dissimilar? What would he have
done under circumstances wholly sImUar ? Like Lee,
Washington was a soldier ; like Lee, he was a Vir
ginian before he was a soldier. He had served under
King George's flag ; he had sworn aUegiance to King
George ; his ambition had been to hold the royal com
mission. Presently Virginia seceded from the British
empire, — renounced its aUegiance. What did Wash
ington do ? He threw in his lot with his native pro
vince. Do you hold him then to have been a traitor,
— to have been false to his colors ? Such is not your

"SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?" 413
verdict; such has not been the verdict of history.
He acted conscientiously, loyally, as a son of Virginia,
and according to his lights. Will you say that Lee
did otherwise ?
But men love to differentiate : and of drawing of
distinctions there is no end. The cases were dis
similar, it will be argued ; at the time Virginia re
nounced its allegiance Washington did not hold the
King's commission, indeed he never held it. As a
soldier he was a provincial always, — he bore a Vir
ginian commission. True ! Let the distinction be
conceded ; then assume that the darling wish of his
younger heart had been granted to him, and that he
had received the King's commission, and held it in
1775; — what course would he then have pursued?
What course would you wish him to have pursued?
Do you not wish — do you not know — that, circum
stanced as then he would have been, he would have
done exactly as Robert E. Lee did eighty-six years
later ? He would first have resigned his commission ;
and then arrayed himself on the side of Virginia.
Would you have had him do otherwise ? And so it
goes in this world. In such cases the usual form of
speech is : " Oh ! that is different ! Another case
altogether ! " Yes, it is , different ; it is another case.
For it makes a world of difference with a man who
argues thus, whether it is his ox that is gored or the
ox of the other man !
And here in preparing this address I must fairly
acknowledge having encountered an obstacle in my
path also. When considering the course of another,
it is always weU to ask one's self the question, —
What would you yourself have done if simUarly placed ?

414 "SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?"
Warmed by my argument, and the great precedents
of Lee and of Washington, I did so here. I and
mine were and are at least as much identified with
Massachusetts as was Lee and his ¦with Virginia ;
traditlonaUy, historically, by blood and memory and
name, we with the Puritan Commonwealth {is they
with the Old Dominion. What, I asked myself,
would I have done had Massachusetts at any time
arrayed itself against the common country, though
without my sympathy and assent, even as Virginia ar
rayed itself against the Union without the sympathy
and assent of Lee in 1861? The question gave me
pause. And then 1 must confess to a sense of the
humor of the situation coming over me, as I found it
answered to my hand. The case had already arisen ;
the answer had been given ; nor had it been given
in any uncertain tone. The dark and disloyal days
of the earUer years of the century just ended rose
in memory, — the days of the Embargo, the Leopard
and the Chesapeake, and of the Hartford Convention.
The course then taken by those in political control
in Massachusetts is recorded in history. It verged
dangerously close on that pursued by Virginia and
the South fifty years later : and the quarrel then was
foreign ; it was no domestic broil. One of my name,
from whom I claim descent, was in those years promi
nent in public life. He accordingly was called upon
to make the choice of Hercules, as later was Lee. He
made his choice ; and it was for the common country
as against his section.! The result is matter of history.
1 " I fully opened to [Josiah Quincy, then a member of Congress
from Massachusetts] my motives for supporting the administration
at this crisis [February 1, 1808], and my sense of the danger which a

"SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?" 415
Because he was a Union man, and held country higher
than State or party, John Quincy Adams was in 1808
spirit of opposition is bringing on the Union. I told hinii where that
opposition in case of war must in its nature end, — either in a civil
war, or in a dissolution of the Union, with the Atlantic States in
subserviency to Great Britain. That to resist this I was ready, if
necessary, to sacrifice everything I have in life, and even life itself."
Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, vol. i. p. 510.
" With regard to the project of a separate Northern Confederacy,
formed in the winter of 1803-4, in consequence of the Louisiana ces
sion, it is not to me that you must apply for copies of the correspond
ence in which it was contained. To that and to every other project
of disunion, I have been constantly opposed. My principles do not
admit the right even of the people, still less of the legislature of any
one State in the Union, to secede at pleasure from the Union. No
provision is made for the exercise of this right, either by the Federal
or any of the State constitutions. The act of exercising it presup
poses a departure from the principle of compact, and a resort to that
of force.
" If, in the exercise of their respective functions, the legislative,
executive, and judicial authorities of the Union on one side, and of
one or more States on the other, are brought into direct collision with
each other, the relations between the parties are no longer those of
constitutional right, but of independent force. Each party construes
the common compact for itself. The constructions are irreconcilable
together. There is no umpire between them, and the appeal is to
the sword, — the ultimate arbiter of right between independent States,
but not between the members of one body poUtic. I therefore hold
it as a principle, without exception, that, whenever the constituted
authorities of » State authorize resistance to any act of Congress, or
pronounce it unconstitutional, they do thereby declare tiemselves and
their State quoad hoc out of the pale of the Union. That there is no
supposable case, in which the people of a State might place themselves
in this attitude, by the primitive right of insurrection against oppres
sion, I wiU not affirm ; but they have delegated no such power to their
legislatures or their judges: and if there be such a right, it is the
right of an individual to commit suicide, — the right of an inhabitant
of a populous city to set fire to his own dwelling-house. These are my
views." J. Q. Adams, December 30, 1828 : Correspondence between
John Quincy Adams . . . and several citizens of Massachusetts concern
ing the charge of a design, to dissolve the Union [1829], pp. 32,33;
Henry Adams : New England Federalism, pp. 57-8.
" FeUow-oitizens, if there be on this side of the grave a subject of

416 "SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?"
driven from office, a successor to him in the United
States Senate was elected long before the expiration
of his term, and he himself was forced into what at
the time was regarded as an honorable exUe. Nor
was the line of conduct then by him pursued — that
of unswerving loyalty to the Union — ever forgotten,
or whoUy forgiven. He had put country above party ;
and party leaders have long memories. Even so
broad-minded and clear-thinking a man as Theodore
Parker, when delivering a eulogy upon J. Q. Adams
forty years later, thus expressed himself of this act
of supreme self-sacrifice and loyalty to Nation rather
than to State : " To my mind, that is the worst act
of his public life ; I cannot justify it. I ¦wish I could
find some reasonable excuse for it. . . . However, it
must be confessed that this, though not the only in
stance of injustice, is the only case of serrile compli
ance with the Executive to be found in the whole life
of the man. It was a grievous fault, but grievously
did he answer it ; and if a long life of unfaltering re
sistance to every attempt at the assumption of power
is fit atonement, then the expiation was abundantly
made." !
deep and a-wful solemnity to you aU, it is this. Here, in this first
resolution appended to the final report of the Hartford Convention, is
the last result of that project which had been fermenting in New
England at least from the spring of the year 1804 until January,
1815. Here it is in its nakedness before you. It is a recommenda
tion to the legislatures of the five New England States to pass laws
for the protection of their citizens, in direct and open resistance
against existing acts of Congress, — against the supreme law of the
land. . . . To resist and defeat that system of measures has been the
greatest struggle of my life." It was that to which I have made
the greatest sacrifices, and for which I have received, in the support
and confidence of my country, the most ample rewards." Henry
Adams : New England Federalism, pp. 300, 301.
^ Works (London, 1863), vol. iv. pp. 154, 156.

"SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?" 417
What more, or worse, on the other side, could be
said of Lee ?
Perhaps I should enter some plea in excuse of this
diversion ; but, for me, it may explain itself, or go un
explained. Confronted with the question, what would
I have done in 1861 had positions been reversed, and
Massachusetts taken the course then taken by Vir
ginia, I found the answer already recorded. I would
have gone with the Union, and against Massachusetts.
None the less, I hold Massachusetts estopped in the
case of Lee. " Let the galled jade wince, our withers
are unwrung ; " but, I submit, however it might be
with me or mine, it does not lie in the mouths of
the descendants of the New England Federalists of
the first two decennials of the nineteenth century to
invoke " the avenging pen of History " to record an
adverse verdict in the case of any son of Virginia who
threw in his lot with his State in 1861.
Thus much for the choice of Hercules. Pass on to
what foUowed. Of Robert E. Lee as the commander
of the Army of Northern Virginia, — at once the
buckler and the sword of the Confederacy, — I shall
say few words. I was in the ranks of those opposed
to him. For years I was face to face with some
fragment of the Army of Northern Virginia, and
intent to do it harm ; and during those years there
was not a day when I would not have drawn a deep
breath of relief and satisfaction at hearing of the
death of Lee, even as I did draw it at hearing of the
death of Jackson. But now, looking back through a
perspective of nearly forty years, I glory in it, and In
them as foes ; they were worthy of the best of steel.
I am proud now to say that I was their countryman.
Whatever differences of opinion may exist as to the

418 "SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?"
course of Lee when he made his choice, of Lee as a
foe and the commander of an army but one opinion
can be entertained. Every inch a soldier, he was as
an opponent not less generous and humane than for
midable, a type of highest martial character ; cautious,
magnanimous, and bold, a very thunderbolt in war,
he was seU-contained in victory, but greatest In defeat.
To that escutcheon attaches no stain.
I now come to what I have always regarded — shaU
ever regard — as the most creditable episode in aU
American history, — an episode without a blemish, —
imposing, dignified, simple, heroic. I refer to Ap
pomattox. Two men met that day, representative
of American cIvUIzation, the whole world looking on.
The two were Grant and Lee — types each. Both
rose, and rose unconsciously, to the fuU height of the
occasion, — and than that occasion there has been none
greater. About it, and them, there was no theatrical
display, no self-consciousness, no effort at effect. A
great crisis was to be met ; and they met that crisis as
great countrymen should. Consider the possibUities,
think for a moment of what that day might have been ;
you ¦will then see cause to thank God for much.
That month of April saw the close of exactly four
years of persistent strife, — a strife which the whole
cirilized world had been watching intently. Demo
cracy — the capacity of man in his present stage of
development for seU-government — was believed to be
on trial. The wish the father to the thought, the
prophets of evil had been liberal in prediction. It so
chances that my attention has been specially drawn to
the European utterances of that time ; and, read in
the clear light of subsequent history, I use words of

"SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?" 419
moderation when I say that they are now both incon
ceivable and ludicrous.! Staid journals, grave public
men, seemed to take what was little less than pleasure
in pronouncing that impossible of occurrence which
was destined soon to occur, and in committing them
selves to readings of the book of fate in exact op
position to what the muse of history was wetting the
pen to record. Volumes of unmerited abuse and
false vaticination — and volumes hardly less amusing
now than instructive — could be garnered from the
columns of the London Times, — volumes in which
the spirit of contemptuous and patronizing dislike
sought expression in the profoundest ignorance of
facts, set down in bitterest words. Not only were
republican institutions and man's capacity for self-
government on trial, but the severest of sentences was
imposed in advance of the adverse verdict, assumed
to be inevitable. Then, suddenly, came the dramatic
climax at Appomattox, — dramatic, I say, not the
atrical, — severe in its simple, sober, matter-of-fact
majesty. The world, I again assert, has seen nothing
like it; and the world, instinctively, was conscious
of the fact. I Uke to dwell on the familiar circum
stances of the day, — on its momentous outcome, on its
far-reaching results. It affords one of the greatest
educational object-lessons to be found In history ; and
the actors were worthy of the theatre, the auditory,
and the play.
A mighty tragedy was drawing to a close. The
breathless world was the audience. It was a bright,
balmy AprU Sunday in a quiet Virginia landscape,
with two veteran armies confronting each other ; one,
1 Supra, pp. 74, 75, 77, 262.

420 "SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?"
game to the death, completely in the grasp of the
other. The future was at stake. What might ensue ?
What might not ensue ? Would the strife end then
and there ? Would it die in a death grapple, only
to reappear in that chronic form of a vanquished but
indomitable people writhing and struggling in the
grasp of an insatiate, but only nominal victor, — such
a struggle as all European authorities united in con
fidently predicting ?
The answer depended on two men, — the captains
of the contending forces. Grant that day had Lee
at his mercy. He had but to close his hand, and his
opponent was crushed. Think what then might have
resulted had those two men been other than they were,
— had the one been stern and aggressive, the other
suUen and unyielding. Most fortunately for us, they
were what and who they were, — Grant and Lee.
More, I need not, could not say ; this only let me add,
— a people has good right to be proud of the past and
self-confident of its future when on so great an occa
sion it naturaUy develops at the front men who meet
each other as those two met each other then. Of the
two, I know not to which to award the palm. Instinc
tively, unconsciously, they vied not unsuccessfully each
¦with the other, in dignity, magnanimity, simpUcity.
" Si fractus illabatur orbis
Impavidum ferient ruinas."
With a home no longer his, Lee then sheathed his
sword. With the silent dignity of his subsequent
life, after he thus accepted defeat, all are familiar.
He left behind him no querulous memoirs, no excul
patory vindication, no controversial utterances. For
him, history might explain itself, • — posterity formu-

"SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?" 421
late its own verdict. Surviring Appomattox but a
little more than five years, those years were not un
marked by incidents very gratifying to American re
coUection ; for we Americans do, I think, above aU
things love magnanimity, and appreciate action at
once fearless and generous. We all remember how
by the grim mockery of fate — as if to test to the
uttermost American capacity for self-government —
Abraham Lincoln was snatched away at the moment
of crisis from the hehn of state, and Andrew John
son substituted for him. I think it no doubtful anti
cipation of historical judgment to say that a more
unfortunate selection could not weU have chanced.
In no single respect, it is safe to say, was Andrew
Johnson adapted for the pecuUar duties which Booth's
pistol imposed upon him. One of Johnson's most
unhappy, most iU-considered convictions was that our
Civil War was a conventional old-time rebeUion ; that
rebellion was treason ; that treason was a crime ; and
that a crime was something for which punishment
should In due course of law be meted out. He, there
fore, wanted, or thought he wanted, to have the scenes
of England's Convention Parliament and the Restora
tion of 1660 reenacted here, as a fitting sequel of our
great conflict. Most fortunately, the American peo
ple then gave evidence to Europe of a capacity for
self-restraint and self-government not traceable to
English parentage or precedents. No CromweU's
head grinned from our Westminster Hall ; no con-
¦ricted traitor swung in chains ; no shambles dripped
blood. None the less Andrew Johnson called for
" indictments," and one day demanded that of Lee.
Then out spoke Grant, General of the Army. Lee

422 "SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?"
he declared was his prisoner. He had surrendered
to him, and In reUance on his word. He had received
assurance that so long as he quietly remained at his
home, and did not offend against the law, he should not
be molested. He had done so ; and, so long as Grant
held his commission, molested he should not be.
Needless, as pleasant, to say, what Grant then grunly
intimated did not take place. Lee was not molested ;
nor did the General of the Army indignantly fling
his commission at an accidental President's feet.
That, if necessary, he would have done so, I take to
be quite indubitable.
Of Lee's subsequent life, as head of Washington
College, I have but one anecdote to offer. I believe
it to be typical. A few months ago I received a let
ter from a retired army officer of high character from
which I extract the foUowing : " Lee was essentiaUy
a Virginian. His sword was Virginia's, and I fancy
the State had higher claims upon him than had the
Confederacy, just as he supposed it had than the
United States. But, after the surrender, he stood
firmly and unreservedly in favor of loyalty to the
Nation. A gentleman told me this anecdote. As a
boy he ran away from his Kentucky home, and served
the last two years in the rebel ranks. After the war
he resumed his studies under Lee's presidency ; and
on one occasion delivered as a college exercise an
oration, with eulogistic reference to the ' Lost Cause '
and what it meant. Later, General, then President,
Lee sent for the student, and, after praising his com
position and delivery, seriously warned him against
holding or advancing such views, impressing strongly
upon him the unity of the Nation, and urging him

"SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?" 423
to devote himself loyally to maintain the integrity
and the honor of the United States. The kindly
paternal advice thus given was, I imagine, typical of
his whole post bellum Ufe." Let this one instance suf
fice. It illustrates all. Here was magnanimity, phi
losophy, true patriotism, — the pure American spirit.
Accepting the situation loyally and in manly, sUent
fashion, — without self -consciousness or mental reser
vation, — he sought by precept, and yet more by a
great example, to rebuUd through constitutional action
the shattered community, of which he was the most
observed representative, in accordance with the new
conditions by war and fate imposed upon it. Talk of
traitors and of treason ! The man who pursued that
course and instilled that spirit had not, could not have
had, in his whole being, one drop of traitor's blood
or conceived a treacherous thought. His lights may
have been wrong, — according to our ideas then and
now they were wrong ; but they were his lights, and,
acting in f uU accordance with them, he was right.
But, to those thus speaking, it is sometimes repUed,
" Even tolerance may be carried too far, and is apt
then to verge dangerously on what may be better
described as moral indifference. It then, humanly
speaking, assumes that there is no real right or real
wrong in coUective human action. But put yourself
in his place, and to those of this way of thinking
PhiUp II. and WiUiam of Orange, Charles I. and
CromweU, are much the same; the one is as good
as the other, prorided only he acted according to his
Ughts. This wUl not do. Some moral test must be
applied, — some standard of right and wrong.
" It is by the recognition and acceptance of these

424 "SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?''
that men prominent in history must be measured, and
approved or condemned. To call it our Civil War is
but a mere euphemistic way of referring to what was
in fact a slaveholders' rebeUion, conceived and put
in action for no end but to perpetuate and extend
a system of human servitude, a system the relic of
barbarism, an insult to advancing humanity. To the
furtherance of this rebellion, Lee lent himself. Right
is right, and treason is treason ; and as that which
is morally wrong cannot be right, so treason cannot
be other than a crime. Why, then, because of senti
ment, or sympathy, or moral indifference, seek to con
found the two ? Charles Stuart and CromweU could
not both have been right. If Thomas was right, Lee
was wrong."
To this I would reply, that we, who take another
view, neither confound, nor seek to confound, right
¦with wrong, or treason -with loyalty. We accept the
verdict of time ; but, in so doing, we insist that the
verdict shall be In accordance ¦with the facts, and that
each indiridual shall be judged on his own merits, and
not stand acquitted or condemned in block. And,
in the first place, Philip II. and WiUiam the Silent,
Charles I. and Cromwell, were not much the same,
nor, indeed, in any respect the same. Characteristics
cannot thus be left out of the account ; indlriduallty
wiU not be ignored. So long as men differ, in one
we ¦wiU continue to see those qualities we all seek to
commemorate ; in another, those we condemn. PhiUp
II. was not an admirable character ; William the
Silent was. In the second place, the passage of the
centuries works wonders, especially in the riews men
hold of the causes and Incidents of ciril strife. We

"SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?" 425
get at last to see that the right is never whoUy on one
side ; that in the grand result aU the elements were
fused. Things then are seen with other eyes. Take,
for instance, one of the final contentions of Charles
Sumner, that, foUowing old-world precedents, founded,
as he claimed, in reason and patriotism, the names
of battles of the war of the rebeUion should be re
moved from the regimental colors of the national
army, and from the army register. He based it on the
ground that, from the republics of antiquity down to
our days, no civilized nation ever thought it wise or
patriotic to preserve in conspicuous and durable form
the mementos of victories won over feUow-citizens in
civU war. As the sympathizing orator said at the
time of Sumner's death, " Should the son of South
Carolina, when at some future day defending the Re
public against some foreign foe, be reminded by an
inscription on the colors floating over him that under
this flag the gun was fired that kUled his father at
Gettysburg ? " This assuredly has a plausible sound.
" His father ; " yes, perhaps. Though even in the
immediately succeeding generation something might
weU be said on the other side. Presumably, in such
case, the father was a brave, an honest, and a loyal
man, contending for what he believed to be right, —
for it, laying down his life. Gettysburg is a name
and a memory of which none there need ever feel
ashamed. As in most battles, there was a rictor and
a vanquished; but on that day the vanquished, as
well as the victor, fought a stout fight. If, in aU re
corded warfare, there is a deed of arms the name and
memory of which the descendants of those who par
ticipated therein should not wish to see obUterated

426 "SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?"
from any record, be it historian's page or battle-flag,
it was the advance of Pickett's Virginian division
across that wide vaUey of death in front of Cemetery
Ridge. I know in aU recorded warfare of no finer,
no more sustained and deadly feat of arms. I have
stood on either battlefield, and, in scope and detail,
carefuUy compared the two ; and, chaUenging denial,
I affirm that the much vaunted charge of Napoleon's
guard at Waterloo, in fortitude, discipline, and deadly
energy wiU not bear comparison with that other. It
was boy's work beside it. There, brave men did all
that the bravest men could do. Why, then, should
the son of one of those who feU coming up the long
ascent, or over our works and in among our guns, feel
a sense of wrong because " Gettysburg " is inscribed
on the flag of the battery, a gun of which he now may
serve? On the contrary, I should suppose he would
there see that name only.
But, supposing it otherwise in the case of the son,
— the wound being in such case yet fresh and gi'een,
— how wUl it be when a sufficient time has elapsed
to afford the needed perspective ? Let us suppose a
grandson six generations removed. WTiat English
man, be he CavaUer or Roundhead by descent, did
his ancestor charge with Rupert or CromweU, did
he fall while riding with levelled point in the grim
waU of advancing Ironsides, or go hopelessly down
in death beneath their thundering hoofs, — what de
scendant of any Englishman who there met his end,
but vrith pride would read the name of Naseby on his
regimental flag ? What Frenchman would consent to
the erasure of Ivry or Moncontour ? Thus, in aU these
matters, time is the great magician. It both meUows

"SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?" 427
and transforms. The EngUshman of to-day does not
apply to CromweU the standard of loyalty or treason,
pf right and wrong, applied after the Restoration ;
nor again does the twentieth century confirm the nine
teenth's verdicts. Even slavery we may come to re
gard as a phase, pardonable as passing, in the evolution
of a race.
I hold it wiU certainly be so with our Civil War.
The year 1965 wiU look upon its causes, its incidents,
and its men with different eyes from those with which
we see them now, — eyes whoUy different from those
¦with which we saw forty years ago. They — for we by
that time will have rejoined the generation to which
we belonged — ¦ wiU recognize the somewhat essential
fact, indubitably true, that all the honest conriction,
all the loyalty, aU the patriotic devotion and self-sac
rifice were not then, any more than all the courage, on
the victor's side. True ! the moral right, the spirit of
nationality, the sacred cause of humanity even, were
on our side ; but, among those opposed, and who in
the end went down, were men not less sincere, not
less devoted, not less truly patriotic according to their
lights, than he who among us was first in aU those
quaUties, — men of whom it was and is a cause of pride
and confidence to say, " They, too, were countrymen ! "
Typical of those men — most typical — -was Lee.
He represented, individualized, aU that was highest
and best in the Southern mind and the Confederate
cause, — the loyalty to state, the keen sense of honor
and personal obligation, the slightly archaic, the almost
patriarchal, love of dependent, famUy, and home. As
I have more than once said, he was a Virginian of
the Virginians. He represents a type which is gone,

428 "SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?"
— hardly less extinct than that of the great English
nobleman of the feudal times, or the Ideal head of the
Scotch clan of a later period ; but just so long as men
admire courage, devotion, patriotism, the high sense
of duty and personal honor, — aU, in a word, which
go to make up what we know as Character, — just so
long wUl that type of man be held in affectionate,
reverential memory. They have In them all the ele
ments of the heroic. As Carlyle wrote more than half
a century ago, so now — " Whom do you wish to re
semble ? Him you set on a high column. Who is to
have a statue? means. Whom shaU we consecrate and
set apart as one of our sacred men ? Sacred ; that aU
men may see him, be reminded of him, and, by new
example added to old perpetual precept, be taught what
is real worth in man. Show me the man you honor ;
I know by that symptom, better than by any other,
what kind of man you yourself are. For you show me
there what your ideal of manhood is ; what kind of
man you long inexpressibly to be, and would thank
the gods, ¦with your whole soul, for being if you could."
It is all a question of time ; and the time is, probar
bly, not quite yet. The wounds of the great war are
not altogether healed, its personal memories are stiU
fresh, its passions not whoUy aUayed. It would, in
deed, be cause for special wonder if they were. But,
I am as convinced as an uniUumined man can be of
anything future, that when such time does come, a
justice, not done now, wIU be done to those descend
ants of Washington, of Jefferson, of Rutledge, and
of Lee who stood opposed to us in a succeeding gen
eration. That the national spirit is now supreme and
the nation cemented, I hold to be unquestionable.

"SHALL CROMWELL HAVE A STATUE?" 429
That property in man has vanished from the ci-vUized
world is due to our CivU War. The two are worth
the great price then paid for them. But, wrong in
respect to these as he may have been, and as he was
proved by events to be, the Confederate had many
great and generous qualities ; he also was brave, chiv
alrous, self-sacrificing, sincere, and patriotic. So I
look forward with confidence to the time when he, too,
will be represented In our national Pantheon. Then
the query ¦wUl be answered here, as the query in regard
to Cromwell's statue, put sixty years ago, has recently
been answered in England. The bronze effigy of
Robert E. Lee, mounted on his charger and with the
insignia of his Confederate rank, will from its pedestal
in the nation's capital gaze across the Potomac at his
old home at Arlington, even as that of CromweU domi
nates the yard of Westminster upon which his skull
once looked down. When that time comes, Lee's
monument wiU be educational, — it ¦wUl typify the
historical appreciation of aU that goes to make up the
loftiest type of character, mUitary and civic, exempli
fied in an opponent, once dreaded but ever respected ;
and, above aU, it wiU symbolize and commemorate
that loyal acceptance of the consequences of defeat,
and the patient upbuilding of a people under new
conditions by constitutional means, which I hold to be
the greatest educational lesson America has yet taught
to a once skeptical but now silenced world.

INDEX

Adams, C. F., American Minister at
London, protests against the con
struction of the Alabama, 49 ; pre
sents demand for reparation, 80,
81; on Russell's proposal of a
Joint commission, 87 ; on reaction
of English policy, 87, 90 ; interview
with Clarendon, 88 ; with Forster,
89; with Oliphant, 90; on recog
nition of Southern belligerency,
92, 97 ; on rejection of the John
son-Clarendon Convention, 103 ; on
Motley, 139 ; ou the indirect
claims, 192.
Adams, J. Q., on State sovereignty,
414-416 n. ; personal efEect of his
views, 415.
Alabama, keel laid, 39; purpose
patent, 45 ; preparation of equip
ment, 46 ; evasion, 50 ; responsibil
ity for the evasion, 50 n. ; equipped,
60; purified of evasion, 51; rav
ages, 60 ; received in British ports,
62 ; destruction, 78 ; Great Britain
disclaims responsibility, 80; sta
tus, 197. See also Alabama claims.
Alabama claims. Great Britain re
fuses to consider, 80, 81; Great
Britain neglects a favorable op
portunity to settle, 82-87 ; Derby
favors a settlement, 91; Sumner
on greatness of the controversy,
95 ; and British withdrawal from
America, 104, 147, 156, 159, 162, 177,
209, 210, 241 ; retroactive effect
on English belligerency proclaraa^
tion, 115, 207, 209, 211; Fish on
basis of settlement, 125, 162 ; in
fluence of Franco-Prussian War,

130, 133, 135 ; Grant's message of
1870 on, 134; British comment,
134 ; Grant's proposals, 161 ; Great
Britain ready to negotiate, 163,
177. See also Indirect claims,
Johnson-Clarendon Convention,
Treaty of Washington.
Alexander II. of Bussia, assassina
tion, 258.
Alexander, E. P., Confederate gene
ral, retentive memory, 9; consulta
tion with Lee after Sailor's Creek,
10, 20, 22; advises dispersion of
Lee's army, 11, 22-24 ; account of
Lee at Appomattox, 20-30.
Alexandra trial, 60.
American Historical Association,
tabooes political discussions, 274 ;
political duty; 276, 282, 293, 299,
303, 336-338 ; purpose, 275.
Americans, English opinion during
the Civil War, 35, 61-66, 74-78, 267 ;
change in English opinion of, 261-
264, 266-273 ; insight into English
feelings, 264 ; wealth and master
fulness, 266, 269, 272; transmuta
tion of national character, 271,
272. See also United States.
Annexation, Grant's policy, 109, 113.
See also Canada, Imperialism,
Manifest Destiny.
Appomattox, Confederate army
blocked at, 10, 21; condition of
Confederate army at, 22, 29 ; tem
porary Confederate success, 26;
Custer's demands, 27; the apple
tree, 28; meeting of Lee and Grant,
28; Importance of the episode,
418-420. See also Lee, E. E.

432

INDEX

Arbitration of Alabama claims,
Eussell on, 86 ; Stanley friendly
to, 92.
Arlington, attempt to restore to the
Lee family, 380.
Assassination, of McKinley, 256,
269 ; of rulers, lack of contempo
rary significance in recent, 257-
259 ; motive, 259.
Babcock, 0. E., treaty of annexar
tion with San Domingo, 130-132 ;
Grant's faith in, 218.
Baring, Sir T., on reaction of Eng
lish policy, 70-72.
Belligerency, English recognition
of Confederate, Seward on, 92, 97,
100, 101, 202, 203-205 ; Stanley on,
92 ; checks negotiations, 92 ; John
son-Clarendon Convention ig
nores, 94 ; undue haste, 96, 202 ; no
unfriendly intent, 97; supported
by international law, 98 ; favor
able to the United States, 99, 202 ;
necessary, 100, 202; Sumner's ar
raignment, 101-103, 114; and
Grant's policy in Cuba, 108, 114;
retroactive effect of Alabama
claims on, 116, 207, 209, 211 ; Fish
on. 111, 115, 206-208 ; Grant on,
122 n. ; and the blockade, 199-201 ;
Palmerston on, 199 ; Cockburn on,
200; issue of the proclamation,
201 ; Fessenden on, 209 ; Edmunds
on, 211.
Bentinck, G. W. P., on English sym
pathy for the South, 63 ; on North
ern conduct of the war, 63 n.
Bernard, Montague, on the Ala
bama, 52 n.
Bigelow, Poultney, on former esti
mation of colonies, 149.
Bimetallism, and English opinion
of the United States, 268 ; period
of national debate, 281 ; question
solved by course of events, 301 ;
issue considered historically, 305-
307. See also Currency.
Bladensburg, battle of, effect on
New Orleans, 361-363, 366.
Blockade, and belligerency, 98, 199-
201, 207 ; proclamation, 201.

Boss and the machine, 297.
Boutwell, G. S., Secretary of the
Treasury, and the San Domingo
treaty, 142, 222; at interview of
Sumner and Fish, 145 n. ; on dis
placement of Sumner, 237.
Brown, John, ethics of his actions,
393.
Bryan, W. J., character of his po
litical campaigns, 278, 293.
Bugeaud, Marshal, on English in
fantry, 370.
BuUoch, J. D., on importance of
GoDfe,derate naval operations, 36 ;
sent to England as Confederate
agent, 38 ; activity, 39 ; on con
struction of the Florida, 44 ; and
the Alabama, 45 ; on English sym
pathy for the South, 63.
Bunker Hill, battle of, controver
sies, 354 ; question of command,
355 ; elements, 356 ; effect on Long
Island, 356.
Burchard, S. D., apothegm, 291.
Butler, B. F., suggests Sumner as
Minister to Great Britain, 137 ; sug-
gests Phillips, 162 ; opposes the
Treaty of Washington, 186.
Calhoun, J. C, an abstractionist, 396.
Cameron, Simon, suggests Sumner
as Minister to Great Britain, 137.
Campaigns. See Political discus
sions.
Canada, Alabama claims and Eng
lish withdrawal from, 104, 147, 156,
159, 162, 177, 209, 210, 241 ; Chandler
on annexation, 104, 162; Grant's
policy, 109, 113, 163 n. ; Sumner on
annexation, 147, 160-156; English
views on annexation, 165, 167, 169 ;
Schurz on annexation, 209, 210.
Cant and national glorification, 383-
385.
Carlyle, Thomas, on hero worship,
376, 428.
Carnot, M. F. S., President of
France, assassination, 268.
Chamberlain, D. H., on displace
ment of Sumner, 236 ; as Governor
of South Carolina, 394; on the
typical Southron, 394.

INDEX

433

Chandler, Zachariah, on annexation
of Canada, 104, 152.
Character of the present age, 258 ;
and assassination of rulers, 258-
260.
Civil War, and the South African
War, 2-4, 14, 15, 17, 33-36, 63 n., 196 ;
European attitude during, 34, 418 ;
English attitude, 36, 61-66, 74-78,
268, 386 ; magnitude, lOO, 202 ; world
results, 197 ; contemporary mis
understanding of, 204; effect of
success of, on English opinion of
America, 267, 268; predicted re
vision of judgments concerning,
378, 427-429 ; final cause, 402 ; clem
ency at close, 421. See also Bel
ligerency, Confederate States,
Great Britain, Lee, Secession.
Clarendon, Lord, English Foreign
Secretary, denies Uabihty for Ala
bama depredations, 81, 88 ; sug
gests a joint commission, 88 ; con
vention with Johnson, 93. See
also Johnson-Clarendon Conven
tion.
Cleveland, Grover, on the Senate's
exercise of treaty power, 185 ;
Venezuelan diplomacy, 267 ; mes
sage on the tariff, 291.
Cobden, Eichard, on exclusion of
belligerent vessels violating neu
tral rights, 49 ; on right of neutrals
to build belligerent vessels, 54 n. ;
on Seward, 55 n. ; on sympathy for
other people's rebels, 62, 270, 384 ;
on Canadian independence, 150 ;
on the spirit of war, 319 ; on duty
toward liberty, 332 ; on cant, 383.
Cochrane, Admiral Sir Alexander,
at Washington, 366 ; at attack on
New Orleans, 366.
Cockburn, Sir A. J. E., Lord Chief
Justice, on right to exclude bel
ligerents from neutral ports, 49 ;
on recognition of belligerency,
200.
Colonies, change in opinion of
value, 149 ; as a trust, 323, 324.
See also Inferior races.
Commercial depression of 1893 and
English opinion of America, 268.

Confederate States, condition in
April, 1865, 2; believed uncon
querable, 3, 13 n. ; Davis for con
tinued resistance, 3, 12; decision
of further resistance iu Lee's
hands, 4, 8 ; general surrender of
armies, 13 ; conditions implied in
the surrender, 16 ; joy over Lin
coln's death, 16 ; probable result
of further resistance, 17 ; lack of
essentials of maritime warfare,
37 ; make Great Britain a naval
base, 37, 39, 63; naval policy
checked, 69; faith in cotton, 99,
100 n. ; self-reliance, loo. See also
Belligerency, Civil War, Great
Britain, Lee, Secession.
Congress as a recording machine,
303. See also Legislative, Sen
ate.
Conkling, Koscoe, and Sumner,
252.
Consequential damages. See In
direct claims.
Constitution, intentionally silent on
secession, 389.
Cotton, Southern reliance on, 99,
100 n.
Cromwell, Oliver, death and burial,
376 ; remains hung, 377 ; reversal
of opinion concerning, 377, 380;
statue, 377.
Cuban insurrection, and English
recognition of Confederate belli
gerency, 108, 114, 117 ; Grant's pol
icy, 109 ; Fish's policy, 118, 216 ;
Grant's proclamation of belliger
ency, 118 ; detained by Fish, 119-
121 ; Grant's message, 119 n., 217,
219.
Currency debate, period of national,
281 ; phases, 286 ; in 1876, 288 ; neg
lected historical aspect, 289 ; dor
mant, 290; importance, 302. See
also Bimetallism.
Curtis, G. W., on Sumner, 110 n.,
175 n.
Cushing, Caleb, and Fish, 114 ; char
acter, 114 ; and Rose, 123 ; on the
Senate's share in foreign affairs,
123 n.
Custer, G. A., at Appomattox, 27.

484

INDEX

Dana, E. H., on Sumner, 174.
Davis, Jefferson, Danville mani
festo, 2; bent on further resist
ance, 3, 12 ; conference with John
ston, 12.
Davis, J. C. B., on Sumner, 175 n. ;
and the indirect claims, 187.
D'ltajuba, Viscount, on seizure of
belUgerent vessels violating neu
tral rights, 48 n.
DeLeon, T. C, on Lee's return to
Richmond, 18.
Dependencies. See Colonies, Infe
rior races.
Derby, Lord, Prime Minister, and
the Alabama claims, 91.
Dred Scott decision, educational
value, 283.
Edmunds, G. F., reference to Sum
ner's memorandum, 179; on re
jection of Johnson-Clarendon Con
vention, 210; on displacement of
Sumner, 238 ; on Sumner's charac.
ter, 264.
Edwards, S. P., collector of the port
of Liverpool, aud the evasion of
the Alabama, 60 n.
Egypt, effect of British rule, 327.
Elizabeth, Empress of Austria, as
sassination, 268, 269.
EngUsh, sympathy during the Civil
War, 35, 61-66, 74-78, 386 ; tribute to
McKinley, 261 ; change in attitude
toward Americans, 262-264, 266-
273; American insight into their
feelings, 264 ; character, 266, 267 ;
attitude of lower classes toward
United States, 270; military
methods, 366, 359, 361, 362, 364, 367,
369-371. See also Great Britain.
Ethics, test, 382, 388, 423-^26; of
John Brown's career, 393 ; of the
Southern cause, 394, 398, 427; of
Lee's career, 423, 424.
Evolution and Imperialism, 315-317.
Executive department, relation to
the legislative, 166, 226, 227, 235.
Expansion. See Imperialism.
Fenianism and the negotiation of the
Alabama claims, 147, 159, 179, 186.

Fessenden, W. P., on Sumner's
speech, 208 ; on English belUger-
ency proclamation, 209.
Fish, Hamilton, Secretary of State,
and the Treaty of Washington, 31 ;
author not personally acquainted
with, 95 ; early relations with
Sumner, 106, 112, 113, 156, 245, 246 ;
instructions to Motley, 108, 114-
116 ; character, llO ; and the Eng
Ush beUigerency proclamation,
111, 114, 206-208 ; relation to Grant,
112, 113, 119 n., 143, 144, 247, 262,
253; and Cushing, 114; and Cu
ban belUgerency, 118, 119, 121, 216,
217, 219, 223 ; unofficial interview
with Rose, 124 ; on basis of settle
ment of Alabama claims, 126, 162 ;
ambition, 125, 135 ; correspond
ence with Rose on Motley's di
plomacy, 126-129 ; favors negotia
tions in Washington, 129 ; mina
tory paragraph on England's re
luctance to negotiate, 134; and
Rose open negotiations, 135 ; dis
satisfied with official life, 136, 140,
220-223; conditions favoring his
negotiations, 136, 144 ; and the re
call of Motley, 136, 140; confers
with Senators on the proposed
negotiations, 144, 146 n., 172, 234 ;
interviews Sumner on Rose's pro
posal, 144, 146 ; on the interview,
146 n., 146 n. ; and annexation of
Canada, 166, 166, 158, 160, 161, 162,
176 ; and Sumner's memorandum,
163, 182, 232 ; break with Sumner,
171, 172, 187, 229, 243, 251 ; antici
pates Sumner's opposition, 176,
182, 233 ; and the indirect claims,
180, 187, 189 n., 190 n., 194 ; diary,
215 ; and Hoar, 219, 221, 248 ; on
Sumner's character, 248-251.
Fisheries and San Juan question,
146 n.
Fisk, James, Jr., "Gold Corner,"
120.
Florida, Confederate cruiser, con
tracted for, 39 ; inspected by Eng
lish officials, 43, 44 ; seized and
released at Nassau, 44; status,
197.

INDEX

435

Foreign Enlistment Act, British,
original object, 40; and interna
tional obUgations, 40, 42, 66-57;
character, 41 ; interpreted, 41, 60 ;
and the construction of the
cruisers, 44-46 ; considered effect
ual, 69 ; dissenting interpretation,
66 ; made stringent, 79.
Forster, W. E., interview with
Adams, 89; on recognition of
Confederate belligerency, 98 ; rise,
124 ; friend of the United States,
124 ; advocates settlement of Ala
bama claims, 125 ; and the in
direct claims, 191-194.
Franco-Prussian War, influence on
Alabama controversy, 130, 133,
135.
Freeman, E. A., on politics and his
tory, 274.
Garfield, J. A., assassination, 258,
259.
Geneva Arbitration, caution on its
ofiicial papers, 39 n. ; settles the
indirect claims question, 194.
Gettysburg, battle, equal glory, 426 ;
and Waterloo, 426.
Gladstone, W. E., on Southern suc
cess, 64 ; ou relations with United
States in 1869, 128, 212-214; on
municipal law and international
obligations, 214.
Gould, Jay, " Gold Corner," 120.
Godkin, E. L., on change in Eng
lish sentiment toward America,
263 n.
Grant, U. S., Southern opinion, 17 ;
Alexander on, 21, 23; terms to
Lee, 26; meeting with Lee, 28;
attitude as president on the Ala
bama claims, 104, 126, 134, 161, 188,
189 n. ; character compared with
Sumner's, 109; attitude toward
the Cuban insurrection and Eng
lish recognition of Confederate
belligerency, 108, 109, 114, 117-121,
122 n. ; as an expansionist, 109, 113,
130, 163 n., 156, 161, 218 ; and Fish,
112^113, 119 n., 143, 144; and Mot
ley, 116, 117, 121, 137, 140, 168 ; un
official advisers, 117; and the

" Gold Corner," 120 ; and the San
Domingo annexation treaty, 131,
218, 222 ; seeks Sumner's aid for it,
132 ; rupture with Sumner, 133, 136,
140, 159, 228, 263 ; on party loyalty
to the administration, 142, 166,218 ;
military methods of his adminis
tration, 142-144, 168; reason for
supporting Fish's negotiations,
144, 164, 169, 180; On European
abandonment of America, 160 n. ;
Sumner's opposition to the admin
istration, 166-169; Sumner at
tacks, in debate, 170 ; determines
to have Sumner deposed, 172, 181 ;
on troubles of official life, 223;
apothegm, 286 ; and Wolfe, 350 n. ;
before Vicksburg, 372 ; impor
tance of action at Appomattox,
418-420 ; protects Lee from indict
ment, 421.
Great Britain, made a Confederate
naval base, 37, 39 ; interests as an
ocean carrier, 42 ; divided inter
ests in 1861, 43, 54, 66 ; proper
course toward Confederate cruis
ers, 47-49; government ignores
the construction of the cruisers,
49, 53 n. ; professed impotency, 51,
62 n. ; dereUction, 61 ; reaction of
its poUcy during the Civil War, 36,
69-74, 79, 82, 87-92, 130, 168 ; inter
national obligations governed by
municipal law, 66-58 ; pohcy based
on prediction of Southern success,
66 ; the Laird rams detained, 68 ;
primacy of international obliga
tions acknowledged, 68 ; ceases to
be Confederate naval base, 69;
denies responsibiUty for cruiser
depredations, 80, 81 ; favorable
opportunity for settlement neg
lected, 82-87 ; Derby ministry, 91 ;
change in opinion of value of col
onies, 149; ready to negotiate, 163,
177 ; and the indirect claims, 191-
194; present infiuence of Ameri
can Revolution on, 195 ; resiimS of
her policy during the Civil War,
196 ; Gladstone on relations with
United States in 1869, 212-214;
modern social and economic con-

436

INDEX

ditions, 266 ; expansion, 269 ; iso
lation, 269, 270 ; result of poUcy
toward inferior races, 326-328, 334 ;
effect of Roman occupation, 328-
330. See also Alabama claims,
BeUigerency, Canada, EngUsh,
Foreign Enlistment Act, Treaty
of Washington,
Greeley, Horace, power, 296.
Green, J. E., on effect of Eoman oc
cupation of England, 329; defects
in his narrative of Wolfe at Que
bec, 348 n.
Hammond, J. H., on poUtical power
of cotton, 100 n.
Hancock, W. S., dictum on the
tariff, 290.
Harcourt, W. V., on seizure of belli
gerent cruisers violating neutral
rights, 48.
HaskeU, J. C, Confederate colonel,
at Appomattox, 26.
Hayes, E. B., candidate for presi
dent, 288 ; character of his admin
istration, 289.
Hayti, policy of United States to
ward, 333. See also San Domingo.
Heredity, influence on men's ac
tions, 406-408.
History, and politics, 274, 336 ; as an
aspect in great national debates,
281; in the slavery debate, 283,
284 ; in the currency debate, 288,
289 ; in the tariff debate, 291 ; and
the issues of the campaign of
1900, 304-336 ; field, 339 ; change in
method of writing, 339, 340, 374.
See also Military history.
Hoar, E. R., Attorney-General, and
the San Domingo treaty, 142 ; re
signation, 142, 219, 221; on Sum
ner's denunciation of Grant, 247 ;
and Fish, 248.
Hoar, G. F., on Sumner's self-con
sciousness, 253.
Holland, Bernard, on British rule in
India, 328.
Hoist, Hermann von, on Imperial
ism, 318.
Howe, Sir William, at Long Island,
366.

Humbert, King of Italy, assassina
tion, 258, 269.
ImperiaUsm, impulse, 269, 316-329 ;
period of national debate, 281;
issue considered historically, 315-
320, 323-335. See also Manifest
Destiny.
Index, Confederate organ in Lon
don, foretells continued resist
ance, 13 ; despair, 14 ; on result
of further resistance, 17 n.
India, effect of British rule, 326-328.
Indirect claims, Sumner on, 101-103,
114, 151, 182, 191 ; Adams on, 103,
192 ; Morton on, 146 n. ; presented,
146 n., 180, 187-190, 190 n.; disal
lowed, 146 n., 194 ; Grant on, 188,
189 n.; Fish on, 189 n., 190 n.;
effect in Great Britain, 191-194.
See also BelUgerency, Canada.
Individual opinion, value of, on
national thought, 264.
Individualism as corrective of ma
chine politics, 299.
Individuality and ethical tests, 424.
Inferior races, self -dependency nec
essary to advancement, 324r-326,
330; British policy, 326-328, 334,
336 ; policy of the United States,
331-336 ; other poUcies, 334.
International law, influence of
Treaty of Washington, 33, 198;
seizure of belUgerent ships vio
lating neutral rights, 47 ; and mu
nicipal law, 55-69, 68, 217; status
of ships commissioned on the high
seas, 72. See also Belligerency,
Great Britain.
Ireland, English experience in, 268.
See also Fenianism,
Jackson, Andrew, reason for suc
cess at New Orleans, 362, 366, 367.
Japan, reason of advancement, 327.
Johnson, Andrew, as president, 421.
Johnson, Bushrod, Confederate
general. Wise denounces, 7.
Johnson, Reverdy, American Minis
ter at London, 92 ; convention, 93,
96. See also next title.
Johnson-Clarendon Convention, 93,

INDEX

437

96; silent on beUigerency ques
tion, 94, 101 ; rejected by the Sen
ate, 96, 208-211; Sumner's speech
against, 101-103; effect of rejec
tion, 106 ; rejection as a step to
ward annexation of Canada, 104,
209, 210.
Johnston, J. E., Confederate gen
eral, council with Davis, 12 ;
against further resistance, 13 ;
his surrender politically uncon
ditional, 15.
Joint commission, Russell suggests,
85.
Laird rams, object, 67 ; price, 67 n. ;
detained, 68.
Lecky, W. E. H., on influence of
early American output of pre
cious metals, 305.
Lee, Fitzhugh, at Appomattox, 26,
27.
Lee, E. E., national obligation to, 2,
18 i decision of further resistance
rested with, 4, 8; after Sailor's
Creek, 5; condition of his army,
6, 7, 22, 29 ; interview with Wise,
6-8; advised to surrender, 7, 10;
devotion of his army, 8, 23, 29;
resents advice to surrender, 10;
blocked at Appomattox, 10, 21 ; ad
vised to disperse his army, 10, 22-
24 ; considers surrender the only
course, 11, 24-26 ; his course influ
ences other Confederate com
manders, 12, 13 ; surrender poli
tically unconditional, 14; return
to Eichmond, 18; meeting with
Grant, 26-28; advice to his sur
rendered army, 30 ; future statue
and its symbolism, 379, 429 ; Sum
ner's condemnation, 380; techni
cal traitor, 381 ; treason compared
with Washington's, 382, 412,413;
hereditary influences on, 410 ; on
secession, 411; reasons for re
signing from the army, 411 ; as a
commander, 417; importance of
action at Appomattox, 418-420;
post-helium life and loyalty, 420-
423 ; ethics of his career, 423 ; high
est type of Southern cause, 427.

Legislative department, relation to
the executive, 166, 226, 227, 236.
See also Senate.
Lincoln, Abraham, Southern joy at
his death, 16 ; Nicolay and Hay's
biography, 147 ; blockade procla
mation, 201 ; assassination, 258,
259, 285.
Lodge, H. C, on the views on seces
sion of the framers of the Consti
tution, 387 ; criticisedr 388.
Long Island, battle of, influence of
Bunker Hill, 356 ; effect of Wash
ington's mistake, 368-361.
Longstreet, James, at Appomattox,
26, 28.
McKinley, WilUam, assassination,
266, 259; lack Of contemporary
significance, 267 ; English tribute,
261.
McLean, Wilmer, at BuU Run and
Appomattox, 28 n.
Machine, poUtical, modern predom
inance, 297 ; effect, 298 ; corrective
agency, 298-300, 303.
Mahan, A. T., as a writer of naval
history, 346.
Manifest Destiny, Sumner's views,
150; and evolution, 316; appeals
to, 322 ; test of reality and devel
opment, 321-323. See also Im
perialism.
Manila Bay, battle of, effect, 321,
323.
Massachusetts, author identified
with, 414 ; and State sovereignty,
414-417.
Matches, government monopoly in
France, 309.
Mexico, poUcy of United States to
ward, 332 ; result, 333.
Military commander, importance of
his ability, 361, 373.
MiUtary history, Tolstoi as a writer
of, 340 ; usual defects, 341, 345,'
373 ; Eopes as a writer of, 342-345.
Mommsen, Theodor, on Imperial
ism, 317.
MonopoUes, and modern trusts, 308-
310 ; dependent on governmental
support, 313.

438

INDEX

Monroe doctrine, Sumner's view,
160.
Montcalm. See Quebec.
Morning Post, London, on Great
Britain as a Confederate naval
base, 65 ; on reaction of English
policy, 73 ; on the North, 76, 77 n.
MorriU, Justin, advice to Sumner,
261.
Morton, 0. P., Fish consults on
Rose's proposals, 146 n. ; offered
ministry to Great Britain, 161.
Motley, J. L., Minister to Great
Britain, Sumner's appointee, 107 ;
memoir of instructions, 107 ; Fish's
instructions, 108, 114-116 ; reflects
Sumner's opinions, 116, 128, 137-
139, 246 ; ignores his instructions,
116, 121, 122 n. ; relieved of further
negotiation, 121, 122 ; Rose on his
diplomacy, 127 ; Fish on, 129 ; re
signation requested, 136-140; un
qualified for poUtical life, 138 ; re
called, 140.
Municipal law and international ob
ligation, 40, 42, 66-69, 68, 214.
Napier, C. J., on Pakenham, 363.
Napoleon III., attempted assassi
nation, 258.
Nassau, Florida seized and re
leased at, 44.
Nation, New York, on demand for
British withdrawal from Amer
ica, 241 ; on displacement of Sum
ner, 242 ; on the Fish-Sumner quar
rel, 243.
Naval history, Mahan as a writer
of, 346.
Neutrality. See Belligerency, For
eign EnUstment Act, Great Brit
ain, International law.
New Orleans, battle of, influence of
Bladensburg, 361-363, 365 ; EngUsh
blunder, 364, 367 ; probable result
of a flank movement, 365-369, 371 ;
opposing forces compared, 368-
372; and the Vicksburg cam
paign, 372.
Newspaper, political influence, 296 ;
as, an organ, 296; present aspect,
296.

Iforth British Seview on degener
acy of Americans, 75 n.
Northcote, Sir Stafford, EngUsh
commissioner, on Sumner, 184.
Oliphant, Laurence, on EngUsh
policy during the Civil War, 90.
Oreto. See Florida.
Pakenham, Sir Edward, errors at
New Orleans, 362-372.
Palmer, Sir Roundell, EngUsh At-
torjiey-General, on exclusion of
belligerent ships violating neutral
rights, 47, 48 n. ; on municipal law
and international obUgations,
57 n. ; on ships commissioned on
the high seas, 73 ; on the British
and American " Cases," 190 n.
Palmerston, Lord, Prime Minister,
on right of neutrals to build bel
Ugerent ships, 54 ; on the Foreign
Enlistment Act, 59 ; on recogni
tion of Confederate belUgerency,
199.
Parker, Theodore, on J. Q. Adams,
416.
Parkman, Francis, defects in narra
tive of capture of Quebec, 347-
364.
Parton, James, on the English sol
dier and commander, 364.
Peabody, George, Gladstone's trib
ute, 213.
Pendleton, W. N., advises Lee to
surrender, 10.
Phillips, Wendell, proposed as Min
ister to Great Britain, 162.
PhiUppine Islands, choice of policy
toward, 336.
Pierce, E. L., biography of Sumner,
147.
Piracy and the Confederate cruis
ers, 40, 72.
PoUtical discussions, and the Amer
ican Historical Association, 274,
276, 282, 293, 303, 336-338 ; charac
ter of, in 1900, 277-279, 293-295;
quadrennial national debate, 280 ;
character of, in 1840, 281 ; periods
of great debates, 281 ; slavery de-
bate, 282-284; character of, in

INDEX

489

1864, 284 ; in 1868, 285 ; reconstruc
tion debate, 285, 286; currency
debate, 286-290 ; transient influ
ence of campaigns of 1876-1884,
and 1892, 287, 290, 292 ; character
of, iu 1876, 288 ; tariff debate, 291 ;
importance of campaigns of 1896
and 1900, 292; character of, in
1896, 292-294 ; standard of recent,
294 ; lack of pregnant utterances,
296 ; cause of low standard, 296 ;
influence of the newspaper, 296 ;
lack of influence on results of pro
fessional, 300-303 ; issues in 1900
considered, 304-335. See also Mar
chine. Politics.
Politics, and history, 274 ; use of the
term, 274 ; character of Hayes
administration, 289 ; decisive ele
ment in, 303. See aUo Machine,
Political discussions.
Prescott, William, in command at
Bunker HiU, 366.
President, term too short, 280 ; influ
ence of personal element, 287.
See also Executive.
Price and competition in relation to
trusts, 311-314.
Putnam, Israel, and the command
at Bunker Hill, 365.
Quebec, capture of, effect, 347 ; de
fects in Parkman's narrative,
347 ; ascent to the Plains of Abra
ham, 348-351 ; mystery of Mont
calm's attack, 351, 363-; ques
tionable advantage of English
position, 351-353.
Rawlins, J. A., Secretary of War,
117 ; interest in Cuban insurrec
tion, 118 ; death, 121.
Rebels, tendency to sympathize
with otherpeople's, 62, 270, 384-386.
Reconstruction debate, period of
national, 281 ; character, 285, 286 ;
unsettled, 288 ; failure, 302.
Regimental colors, question of in
scribing civil war battles on, 426-
427.
Revolution, American, present in
fluence on Great Britain, 195.

Rhodes, J. F., on final cause of Civil
War, 407.
Richmond, Va., evacuated, 2.
Rome, effect of occupation of Eng
land, 328-330.
Roosevelt, Theodore, character of
his campaign in 1900, 278, 293.
Ropes, J. C, as an expounder of
military history, 342-346.
Rose, Sir John, career, 122 ; unoffi
cial negotiations on Alabama
claims, 123, 126 ; return to Eng
land, 124 ; on Motley's diplomacy,
127 ; opens negotiations with Fish,
135 ; proposals accepted, 169, 177.
Eosebery, Lord, on Anglo-Saxon
soUdarity, 263.
RusseU, Earl, Foreign Secretary,
fully advised of construction of
the Alabama, 46 ; on the evasion
of the Alabama, 60 n., 51 ; pro
poses detention of Alabama in
colonial ports, 63 n. ; on right of
neutrals to build belligerent
ships, 65 ; on municipal law and
international obligations, 55-69 ;
sympathy for the South, 64; de
clares Foreign Enlistment Act
defective, 66 n., reaUzes naval
policy of the Confederacy, 68;
fears reaction of his policy, 69 ;
answer to demand for reparation,
80 ; neglects a favorable chance
for settlement, 82-86; suggests a
joint commission, 85-87;; and arbi
tration, 86 ; Prime Minister, 87.
Salisbury, Marquis of, on right of
neutrals to build belligerent ships,
54 n.
Salt, government monopoly in
France, 308.
San Domingo, Babcoek's treaty of
annexation, 130 ; reception by the
Cabinet, 131, 142; Grant's desire
for, 132, 218, 222 ; treaty rejected,
144, 168. See also Hayti.
San Juan question and the fisher
ies, 145 n.
Schofield, J. M., tribute to Ropes,
343.
Scholars, absence from political

440

INDEX

discussions, 293, 296; political
duty, 300, 304, 336-338 ; poUtical in
fluence, 303. See also American
Historical Association.
Schurz, Carl, on Sumner, 176 n. ; on
settlement with Great Britain,
209; on instructions to Motley,
210 ; on Sumner's self-conscious
ness, 253 ; influence on campaign
of 1896, 293.
Scott, Winfield, influences which
determined his loyalty, 408.
Secession, issue settled, 386; views
and actions of framers of the Con
stitution, 387-393; Southern be
Uef, 393-396 ; peaceful, impossible
in 1860, 396; South reaUzed im
possibility of peaceful, 396, 411 ;
comprehensive policy of South
ern, 396-398; real traitors, 398 ; Vir
ginia's, 398-406 ; Lee on, 411 ; early
¦views of Massachusetts, 414-417.
See also Civil War.
Second United States cavalry, re
cord of its early officers, 409.
Seeley, Sir John, on politics and
history, 274.
Selborne, Lord. See Palmer.
Self-government, development of ca
pacity for, 324-331 ; policy of the
United States, 331-334.
Semmes, Raphael, considers subju
gation of South impossible, 13 n.
Senate, rejects the Johnson-Claren
don Convention, 95, 208-211 ; Cush
ing on its treaty power, 123 n. ;
rejects the San Domingo treaty,
144, 168 ; " courtesy," 167, 236 ;
Cleveland on its exercise of treaty
power, 186 ; status, 226, 236 ; re
vision of committees, 226, 234, 239.
See also Legislative, and next
title.
Senate Committee on Foreign Rela
tions, Sumner chairman, 94, 106 ;
power of its chairman, 94, 132;
reports unfavorably on the John
son-Clarendon Convention, 96 ; po
sition of its chairman, 166, 181,
229; attempt to reorganize, 169;
Sumner removed from chairman
ship, 181, 183; removal justified.

181-183, 225-244 ; reports favorably
on Treaty of Washington, 183.
Seward, W. H., Cobden on, 55 n. ;
on English recognition of Confed
erate belUgerency, 92, 97, lOO,
101, 202-205 ; ambitious te end the
controversy, 93 ; accepts EngUsh
contention on belligerency, 93;
and Sumner, 106, 176 ; on Imperial
ism, 318 ; on Virginia's [first vote
on secession, 402.
Shenandoah, Confederate cruiser,
departure from London, 80; star-
tus, 197.
Sherman, John, on displacement of
Sumner, 239, 240.
Sherman, W. T., Southern opinion
of, 17 ; attack on Vicksburg, 372.
Slavery, in Virginia, 398 ; future
judgment concerning, 427. See
also next title.
Slavery debate, period of national,
281 ; greatness, 282 ; literature,
282; historical aspect, 283, 284;
uniqueness, 284.
Smith, Goldwin, on early views on
secession, 387.
South African War, conditions, 1 ;
and the Civil War, 2-4, 14, 16, 17,
33-36, 63 n., 195 ; effect of, on Eng.
lish feeUng toward the United
States, 270 ; American sympathy,
384-386.
Southrons, qualities, 393, 427-429 ;
statesmanship, 394. See also Se
cession.
Spanish-American War, effect of,
on EngUsh opinion of America,
269, 270.
Spectator, London, on the North, 76.
Stanley, Lord, Foreign Secretary,
on recognition of Confederate
belUgerency, 92; on arbitration
of the Alabama claims, 92.
State Sovereignty. See Secession.
Stephen, LesUe, on the Times dur
ing the CivU War, 75 n.; on
journaUsm, 296; on historical
sophistry, 316.
Strategy, English methods, 356, 369,
361, 362, 367 ; danger in rules, 361,
367.

INDEX

441

Sumner, Charles, on status of neu
tral built beUigerent ships, 72;
chairman of Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, 94, 106; on
greatness of the Alabama contro
versy, 96 ; opposition to the John
son-Clarendon Convention, 95, lOl ;
on EngUsh recognition of Confed
erate beUigerency and consequen
tial damages, 101-103, 114, 151, 180,
182, 188, 191, 205; and Seward, 106,
175 ; early relations with Fish, 106,
112, 113, 156, 246, 246 ; Motley his re
presentative, 107, 116, 128, 137-139,
166, 165, 246 ; character, 109, 173-176,
187, 248-256 ; opposed to tropical
annexation, 113; objects to Mot
ley's instructions, 115, 246 ; know
ledge of international law, 122 n. ;
influence, 123 a, 128, 129, 139, 144,
166, 179, 183-186; disregards a
hint on Motley's diplomacy, 128 ;
and Thornton, 128, 129 ; Grant
seeks his favor on the San Do
mingo treaty, 132, 228 ; rupture
with Grant, 133, 136-140, 159,
228, 263 ; suggested for minis
try to Great Britain, 137; inter
view with Fish on Rose's propo
sals, 144, 145, 231 ; memorandum
on the proposals, 146-149, 165;
policy of British withdrawal from
America and annexation of Can
ada, 147, 150-166, 163, 165, 186, 241 ;
Pierce's biography, 147 ; views on
Manifest Destiny, 150; effect of
the memorandum on Fish, 163;
and on Grant, 164, 169 ; in opposi
tion, 166-169, 236 ; attempt to re
strict his infiuence, 170, 172 ; at
tacks Grant in debate, 170 ; break
with Fish, 171, 172, 187, 229, 243,
261 ; Grant determined to have
him displaced, 172, 181 ; his oppo
sition to the negotiations antici
pated, 173, 176, 182, 233; influence
and publicity of his memorandum,
178-180; displaced from chair
manship, 181, 183 ; displacement
justified, 181-183, 225-244; impor
tance of his attitude on the treaty,
183-187; disappearance of his

policy, 197 ; contemporary opinion
on his displacement, 237-243 ; de
nunciations of Grant, 247, 261;
Fish on his character, 248-252 ;
and ConkUng, 252 ; on Lee, 380 ;
and the battle-flag inscriptions,
425.
Supply and demand as appUed to
poUtical discussions, 276.
Syndicates as an element in modern
life, 296-298.
Tariff, period of national debate,
281 ; debate in 1880, 290 ; in 1888,
291 ; outcome, 302 ; and trusts, 313.
Thiers, L. A., President of France,
asks good offices of Great Britain,
133.
Thomas, G. H., character, 408 ; in
fluences which determined his
loyalty, 410.
Thornton, Edward, British Minister
at Washington, and Sumner, 128,
129; on England and Canada,
166, 167, 169, 160 ; on reaction of
British poUcy, 196.
Time factor in Judgments of civil
strife, 378, 424, 426-428.
Times, London, on subjugation of
the Confederacy, 14 n. ; on the
North, 76 ; course during the Civil
War, 76 n., 419 ; on Russell's sug
gestion of a joint commission, 86 ;
on Russell's policy, 91 ; on England
and Canada, 167, 168.
Tolstoi, Count Leo, as a writer of
military history, 340.
Townsend, Meredith, on British
rule in India, 327.
Transvaal. See South African War.
Treason, deflned, 381 ; consideration
of motives, 38'2, 423.
Treaty of Washington, importance,
31-33, 196, 198 ; influencing per
sonal factors, 105, 113 ; first un-
offloial step, 123, 125 ; Rose opens
negotiations, 136; Great Britain
ready to negotiate, 163, 177 ; com
missioners appointed, 178 ; nego.
tiated, 178, 180 ; sent to the Sen
ate, 180 ; favorably reported, 183 ;
question of indirect claims, 187-

442

INDEX

194. See also Fish, Grant, Sum
ner.
Tribune, New York, former influ
ence, 296 ; present condition, 297.
Trusts, as an inchoate political
issue, 292; issue considered his
torically, 307-316 ; compared with
former monopolies, 307-310 ; and
industrial evolution, 310; price
and competition in relation to,
311-314; and the tariff, 313.
"290." See Alabama.
Uncle Tom's Cabin, popularity, 283.
United States, obUgation to Lee, 2,
18 ; retaUatlon on poUcy of Great
Britain, 79 ; Ungering spirit of de
pendency, 205, 325 ; polity, 226 ; aS
a world power, 320 ; direction of
the efforts as such, 321 ; policy to
ward inferior races, 331-334. See
also Americans, BelUgerency,
Civil War, Confederate States, Se
cession.
Venezuelan boundary dispute, ef
fect of, on English opinion of the
United States, 267.
Verestchagin, Vasili, as a painter
of military scenes, 341.
Vicksburg campaign and battle of
New Orleans, 372.
Virginia, slavery conditions, 398;
State pride, 399 ; Union sentiment,
399; importance of her first re

fusal to secede, 400-403 ; why she
seceded, 403-406.
War, irresistibleness of its spirit,
319. See also Civil War, South
African War.
Washington, George, blunders at
Long Island, 367-361; treason
compared with Lee's, 382, 412,
413 ; on secession, 388, 391-393 ;
hereditary influences, 407.
Waterloo, battle, and Gettysburg,
426.
West Indies, Grant's annexation
policy, 130. See also Cuba, Hayti,
San Domingo.
¦White, A. D., influence on campaign
of 1896, 293.
Wilkinson, Spenser, on the Civil
War and South African War,
33.
Wise, H. A., Confederate general,
character and career, 5 ; despairs
of further resistance, 6 ; advises
Lee to surrender, 7, 8.
Wise, J. S., The End of an Bra, 4;
interview -with Lee, 4 ; on condi
tion of Lee's army after Sailor's
Creek, 6; on interview between
his father and Lee, 6-8 ; on Con
federate joy over Lincoln's death,
16.
Wolfe, James, credit for fall of Que
bec, 360 n. ; and Grant, 360 n. See
also Quebec.

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