¦l-^i ¦) ¦¦¦< ••^*rt'tf*n/tf% k Yale University Library 39002014532387 « • six m) l-.k E^S'^J • • ,i^ .1 ^ LJ : nt<^ THE STORY OF THE CAMPAIGN IN EASTERN VIRGINIA. Story of the Campaign IN Eastern Virginia, April, 1861 to May, 1863. Including " Stonewall Jackson's " Operations in the Valley. With Maps and Plans. BY LiEUT.-CoLONEL H. M. E. BRUNKER, Author of " Notes on Organization," etc. 2nd edition. LONDON : FORSTER GROOM & Co,, Ltd., 15 CHARING CROSS, S.W. 1910. I /ktt^L had been broken. Jackson, finding the Federal resistance so stub born, and that his first attacks had failed, determined to concentrate his whole force against Tyler, and give up his intention of recrossing the river to overwhelm Fremont. Accordingly, orders were sent to Trimble, Patton, and Taliaferro to cross to the right bank of the river and burn the bridge near Port Republic. Fremont, finding the force before him moving off followed, and during the afternoon reached the bluffs on the river to the north of Port Republic. Taylor, after being driven back more than once, captured the six-gun battery on the rise on Tyler's left; these guns were turned on the Federal posit ion, and so enfiladed it. The frontal attack, now supported by Taliaferro, was pushed on, and the Federals gave way. None too soon, for the re mainder of Jackson's force (delayed by an inferior bridge over the river) was coming on the scene. The pursuit was carried out by Taliaferro and Winder for some miles, and then taken up by the cavalry, under Munford, till they came on Shields' two brigades (Kimball's and Sullivan's) drawn up across the road near Conrad's Store. Jackson had in all 5,900 men engaged and lost 800. Tyler, who had 3,500, lost 1,000 men. During the battle as mentioned some time after noon, Fremont reached the bluffs above the river, from this his guns commanded the plain east of the river. Jackson's trains had been moved to Brown's Gap. Jackson, to avoid coming under the fire of Fremont's guns, moved by a road through the for est to Brown's Gap in the evening. And so the battle of Cross Keys ended. The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. 51 Jackson's successes on the 8th and 9th were most important. Not only had his pursuers been roughly handled, but the sudden counterstroke, delivered by a force believed to be in full retreat, had the usual effect on Mr. Lincoln. McClellan's hopes of immediate support by Mct)owell were again dashed "to the ground. Shields was detained at Luray, and Ord's divi sions at Front Royal, until the 20th. Fremont, thinking himself too much exposed, retired to Mount Jackson; while Jackson, at Brown's Gap, was no more than nine marches from Richmond, and could move there when required by Lee, the gap between the two Federal armies, McClellan's and McDowell's, had been widened to 15 marches. Remarks on the Battles. Cross Keys. — Attack made piece-meal; the left of Fremont's attack defeated before his right came into action. Ewell made no counterstroke, as he expected an attack on his left, but he, during the night, disposed his force ready for an attack on Fremont on the morning of the 9th; but this did not come off, as Jackson concentrated his whole force on right bank of the river. Port Republic. — Jackson's hurry to defeat Tyler and get back over the river, led him to attack with inferior numbers; this attack was re pulsed with loss. The danger of a wood on a flank, even though it was deemed impenetrable, is emphasized. It was Taylor's advance through this forest on Tyler's left which decided the day. After Cross Keys and Port Republic — to 25th June, when Jackson, with his command reached Ashland in close touch with Lee. Shields, after Port Republic, retired by order of McDowell, by Luray and Front Royal, and 52 The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. thence to Manassas to join McDowell's corps. On the 10th Fremont retired, followed by Munford, whose active pursuit led him to belive that a further advance by Jackson was in progress. On the 14th, he fell back to Middletown, and there joined Banks and Sigel, who had superceded Saxton. Jackson, on the 12th moved to Mount Meridian, halting there until his move on Ashland com menced on the l7th of June. On the 11th, Lee despatched two brigades from his force at Richmond, 7,000 strong, to join Jack son. The move of these troops to join Jackson again mystified the Federals as to what further move was to be made. Lee now considered the time had come for a grand counterstroke against McClellan. To carry this out Jackson was to join, unhampered by Mc Dowell. His instructions to Jackson were : "Leave your enfeebled troops to watch the country and guard the passes covered by cavalry and artillery, and with your main body, including Ewell's division and Lawson's and Whiting's bri gades, move rapidly to Ashland by rail or other wise, as you may find best, and sweep down between the Chickahominy and the Pamunkey, cutting the enemy's communications, etc., while this army attacks McClellan in front. He will then, I think, come out of his entrenchments on the Chickahominy." On the 17th Lee added that the sooner Jackson could join him the better; that to be effective the movement must be secret ; that the troops left were to be so disposed as to deceive the enemy. Jackson's plans for his move were : Munford was to spread false reports of an advance on the Potomac. Ewell's division was ordered to Char- The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. 53 lottesville, the rest of the Valley troops were to follow Ewell; Whiting and Lawton's brigades, which, to bewilder Fremont, had been marched from Staunton to Mount Meridian, and then back to Staunton, were to move by train to Gordons ville. Secrecy was absolutely necessary. Not only that McClellan should not be reinforced, but that he should not get an inkling as to the move, and so be enabled to correct the faulty disposition of his army, now separated by the Chickahominy with a wing on either bank of the river. If Mc Clellan, warned by Jackson's approach, was to concentrate his whole force on one bank or the other, Lee's prospect of success would be largely diminished. To no one but Munford, who was to cover the movement, did Jackson divulge his plan. Cavalry covered every road ; no one was allowed to pass the cordon; strong patrols covered the march; a strong rearguard swept before it camp followers and stragglers. On the 21st, Jackson's leading division reached Frederickshall, to which place the railway was utilised as far as possible; beyond this place the railroad had been destroyed. On the 25th, Jackson's command was at Ash land. So well had the move been conducted that on the 25th Banks expected an attack by Jackson on Winchester, and on the 28th, after Jackson had been fighting McClellan for two days, an attack on Middletown was confidently expected. To carry out this attack Jackson would have had to move by some means from where he then was, a distance of 150 miles. On this day Banks, with Fremont, were at Middletown, McDowell, once more with his corps, at Fredericksburg. It was only on the 26th that MisClellan learnt that Jack- 54 The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. son was on. his most vulnerable point, his right, still separated by the Chickahominy from the left wing. CHAPTER VIII. Resume of the Valley Campaign. In March, 1862, over 200,000 Federals were pre pared to invade Virginia. McClellan, when joined by McDowell, calculated on having 150,000 men on the Peninsula for the capture of Rich mond. Fremont, with 30,000 in Western Virginia, was to invade the valley, while Banks, with 30,000, had crossed the Potomac into the Shenandoah valley. Against all these the Confederates had no more than 60,000 men; but within three months, owing to the strategy of Lee and his trusted lieutenant, Jackson, matters improved and the Federal plans were completely upset. McClellan did not get the promised assistance of McDowell's corps, and other forces were retained for the defence of Washington, when their services would have been of the utmost value elsewhere. The first principle of war is to concentrate superior numbers on the decisive point; this principle, except at Cross Keys, where he intended only to check Fremont, Jackson always adhered to in his valley campaign. And though inferior in numbers to the forces against him when concentrated, he always man aged to be superior in numbers to that portion of the enemy's forces against which he was operating. Jackson's principles in all his operations were : First, to mystify and surprise his enemy, and when he had defeated him, to pursue to the bitter end; The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. 55 Second, never to fight against odds,- but to deal with the opposing forces in detail. In carrying out his role in the valley Jackson was sadly handicapped in many ways; not only were his forces inferior to those of the enemy, but they were badly equipped ; boots, an all-important article in war, were always wanting. It is said that in one brigade of his force alone, no less than one-quarter of the men went into action on one occasion barefooted. This want of boots largely increased the number of stragglers. Discipline again was lacking; this lack of discipline led to all sorts of irregularities. The misconduct of Ashby's cavalry on May 24th and 25th, 1862, saved Banks' army from destruction. Without discip line it is impossible for a commander to feel certain that his plans and combinations will be effectively carried out. No one knew better than Jackson how to use his cavalry. In most instances in war, defeat and disaster is due to want of information. To gain information mounted troops are necessary, and to carry out their task these mounted troops must be properly employed. With Jackson the cavalry was left to its proper work, viz. : reconnoitring and screening the force it belonged to, taking part in the battle at the proper moment. (Note charge of the cavalry at Cedarville on 23rd May, and pursuit.) It must be noticed that Lee always gave Jack son a free hand in carrying out his instructions — Lee told Jackson what was wanted, and left Jackson to carry out his task in his own way. This freedom of action was conspicuous in its ab sence with the Federal commanders; these were tied down by orders, and little or nothing was left to their initiative. In many cases officers were forced to act against their better judgment in 56 The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. order to carry out their orders. This difference in procedure alone gave Jackson a decided advan tage. Object and Result of the Operations. Romney. — Object was to regain this place, a decisive point, from which many roads led in diff erent directions, and the country round, which was most fertile, and a fruitful source of supplies and also of recruits. The result was all that could be desired; but the advantages gained were lost by Mr. Davis' action, who ordered the withdrawal of the force Jackson left to hold the country, in consequence of which the territory was re-occupied by the Federal forces. The Federals under a more active commander might have advanced from Williams Port or Harper's Ferry, and cut Jackson at Romney from Winchester, but no attempt to do so was made. Kernstown. — Here Jackson's object in attacking Shields was to hold the Federals to the Valley and prevent forces being sent from there to aid McClellan in the Peninsula. The result far exceed ed the expectation, for Jackson, though he was tactically defeated, gained a startling strategical victory : McClellan was deprived of 46,000 men, viz., McDowell's corps, 37,000 strong, and Blen ker's division, 9,000, sent to the valley. The Federal forces, already much scattered, were further divided, and formed into four distinct armies independent of each other, and McClellan, who should have had a free hand to deal with all available forces, viz. : McClellan's army in the Peninsula; McDowell's detained in Northern Virginia; Banks' in the Shenandoah Valley; Franklin's preparing to move into the valley. McDowell. — In these operations Jackson's The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. 57 object was to separate Fremont with his 18,000 men from Banks, and having done so to turn on the latter and drive him out of the valley. The result was again complete success, as we have seen from the Winchester operations. While Jackson was operating against Fremont and far away at Franklin, a more energetic commander than Banks might, with his force, superior to either Jackson's or Ewell's when divided, have, acting on interior lines, interposed between Ewell and Jackson and dealt with each in succession. But is is more than probable that Jackson, knowing his opponent, felt sure that he was, while dealing with Fremont, safe from any such attempt. Winchester. — The object here was, having iso lated Banks by widely separating him from Fremont, to concentrate his own with Ewell's forces, to attack him and drive him out of the valley; and further, by threatening an invasion of Maryland and attack on Washington, work on Mr. Lincoln's fears for the safety of the Capital, and so direct troops, which might have advantageously aided McClellan to guard against any such attack. The result was eminently successful; McDowell's corps was again detained, and, in consequence, McClellan found himself in a some what dangerous position on the Chickahominy The Federal cavalry was as usual found wanting, and Banks was in the dark as to Jackson's moves. Had the work of his cavalry and spies been thor oughly carried out, Jackson's move should have been anticipated, and Banks, reinforced by being joined by Blenker's division, 9,000 strong, could have met Jackson's advance with every prospect of success, while McDowell's (30,000 men) troops, instead of being directe/d on Front Royal and 58 The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. Strasburg as they were, might, as McDowell him self wished and suggested, have moved on Gordonsville and then cut off Jackson's retreat to Richmond. As conducted, the Federal efforts, though made with over 60,000 (Banks, Fremont and McDowell) to cut off Jackson's retreat up the valley, were futile. Cross Keys and Port Republic. — Jackson, having successfully got through the meshes of the net set for him, moved up the valley with the object of separating Shields, advancing up the Luray Valley, from Fremont, moving up the valley Turnpike road by the Massanuttons; and then, from a position south of the mountains about where the routes to be traversed by Shields and Fremont unite, to defeat them in detail; while he himself would be well placed to move from the valley and join Lee for the grand counterstroke against McClellan. Again Jackson's object was fully attained. Fre mont was defeated at Cross Keys on 8th June, and next day Shields' more advanced brigades defeated at Port Republic. Then Jackson, by various ruses and the skilful action of his cavalry, obliged both Fremont and Shields to retire down the valleys, and Banks was so far misled by all reported to him, that he and throusrh him, the would-be strategists at Washington fully expected an attack by Jackson's forces, which were grossly exaggerated in strength, in the valley while that commander, with his command, was fighting McClellan, some one hundred and fifty miles from the locality in which the expected battle was to take place. The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. 59 CHAPTER IX. The Peninsula Catnpaign. From nth March, to \Qth August, 1862. McClellan's object was, with 150,000 men com bined (120,000 to move by sea and McDowell to join him by land), to capture Richmond. The Confederate commander's object was to protect the capital. McClellan's plan was to move his whole force by water to the Peninsula, but Mr. Lincoln, ever nervous about the safety of Washington, and not realising that the best way of securing the safety of Washington was to move with all his force on Richmond, modified this plan, and it was settled that McClellan, with some 120,000 men, was to move to the Peninsula by water, while McDowell, with 40,000 men and 100 guns, was to remain north of the Rappahannock, until such time as Mr. Lincoln might think fit to allow him to join McClellan by marching. It must be kept in view that the plan of oper ations against Richmond hinged on the combination of McClellan and McDowell; and that it was the Confederate commander's object to prevent this combination. The situation at the outset was : Richmond threatened from several directions; McClellan, with his 100,000, landed at Fortress Monroe, mov ing up the Peninsula opposed by Magruder, with only 12,000. On the Rappahannock, about Fredericksburg, McDowell, with some 40,000 men, waiting till it was time to move south and combine with McClellan. Sigel, at Manassas Junction, con nected by a brigade of 2,000 men, under General Geary at Rectorville, with Banks on the Shenan- 60 The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. doah Valley. Banks with some 20,000 in the Shenandoah Valley. Fremont with 30,000 men, was in Western Virginia moving eastwards. Johnston, with the main Confederate army, about 40,000 strong, about Richmond, having just moved down from Centreville and Manassas. Jackson, with only 4,600, opposed Banks, and Johnson, with some 3,000, west of Staunton, faced Fremont. A Confederate corps, of some 10,000 men, faced McDowell on the Rappahannock, under General Anderson. On the 17th March, McClellan's army com menced to embark for the Peninsula at Alexandria, moving 10,000 men at a time. The place of disembarkation was to be Fortress Mon roe, still in Federal hands. The first hitch in the plan of campaign occurred as a result of Jackson's attack on Shields' divi sion at Kernstown, on the 23rd, when, by orders from Mr. Lincoln, McDowell's corps was directed to stand fast. On the 5th of April, McClellan, with some 60,000 men already landed, was a few miles inland. From Yorktown to the south, covered by a stream, was a strong line of earthworks, held by Magruder, with some 12,000 men, the flanks were protected by the York and James Rivers. On the 10th of April, Johnston's army (40,000), moving south to join Magruder, commenced to arrive, and before long the Yorktown lines were held by some 53,000 men (Johnson's and Magru- der's forces combined). Magruder, who skilfully manoeuvred his delay ing force, had secured time for the arrival of Johnston with the main army from Centreville. McClellan's army in the meantime had been in creased by the arrival of fresh detachments from The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. 61 Fortress Monroe; he had also landed and brought to the front large numbers of heavy siege guns. When all was ready for the assault Johnston vacated the lines and moved northward; on the 3rd of May, McClellan occupied the Yorktown lines. Commencing his advance, and fighting his way on, he, after an action at Williamsburg, on the 5th, reached White House on the Pamunkey, and established there a "Base of Supply." So far McClellan's advance had been delayed for six weeks. On the 22nd of May, the Federal army reached the Chickahominy. On the 27th, Hanover Court House, held by Anderson's force, retiring from Fredericksburg, was captured. A portion of McClellan's force posted here cdiihected Mc Dowell's force on "the Rappahannock with McCTellan's main army. Johnston's main army, less Jackson, with his 17,000 men in the valley, was before Richmond facing McClellan. All now looked well for the Federals, and Rich mond seemed within their grasp. On the 28th of May, ^Mcpowell's 40,000 men, witE^lOO guns, after inspection by Mr. Lincoln, was to have crossed the Rappahannock and marched south. In anticipation of this move Mc Clellan had, on the 30th May, advanced his left wing (two corps), across the Chickahominy, leav; ing his right wing (three corps, under Porter) on the far side of the river. For a second time Mc Dowell's move was to be countermanded. Lee, to whom Mr. Davis, in April, had handed over the entire control of the Confederate armies in Virginia, had directed Jackson to create a diversion, and strike Banks, then at Strasburg, and so, by working on Mr. Lincoln's fears, draw off troops to the valley, and take the strain off Rich mond. 62 The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. We have already seen how well these instruc tions had been carried out by Jackson; his surprise of Front Royal, on the 23rd, and battle of Winchester on the 25th of May, obliging Banks to retreat from Strasburg, and to recross the Poto mac in disorder on the 26th, caused alarm for the safety of Washington, and again McDowell's corps was held back from McClellan and the bulk sent off to the valley to try to cut off Jackson's retreat. McClellan in consequence was in a dangerous position; the wings of his army separ ated by a river difficult to cross. On the 31st of May, Johnston, from before Richmond, attacked McClellan's left wing, then only partially entrenched, at Fair Oaks and Seven Pines. The battle was continued on the 1st of June, but, owing to faulty arrangements, defec tive orders and a want of combination on the part of the subordinate commanders, the attack failed. | Johnston was wounded, and General Lee assumed command of the Confederate army. Jackson on this day was at Strasburg in a somewhat pre carious position between the forces of McDowell moving westward, and those of Fremont eastward, to try to cut him off from the Upper Shenandoah Valley. McClellan now occupied himself in entrenching his position west of the river, in bridging the Chickahominy, and preparing for an advance on Richmond. On the 8th and 9th of June, Jackson fought the battles of Cross Keys and Port Republic ; the effect of these we have already seen. About the 10th or 11th of June, Lee, in spite of the threat ening attitude of McClellan in greatly superior force before him, detached two brigades of veter ans, 7,000 strong, to join Jackson, who was now instructed to move with the utmost secrecy, after The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. 63 imposing on the enemy by demonstrations, and join Lee, via Ashland, for the grand counter- stroke against McClellan. Jackson was to sweep down between the Chickahominy and the Pamun key rivers on to McClellan's right flank before McClellan could concentrate his divided wings, Jackson, utilising the railway as far as possible, commenced this movement on the 17th of June. On the 21st he reached Frederickshall, beyond which place the railway had been destroyed, and on the 25th his whole command, some 23,000 to 25,000, was concentrated at the appointed place, Ashland, within striking distance of McClellan, and in close contact with Lee, whose whole force was thus concentrated and prepared for a grand move against McClellan's divided army, while no reinforcements could reach the latter for several days, for McDowell's scattered corps was miles away, north of the Rappahannock, far beyond supporting distance. This, too, from no fault of the Federal commander, who had over and over again implored that McDowell should be sent to him, as Washington was quite safe. Stuart, with 1,200 cavalry and two guns, from the 12th to 14th of June, raided round McClellan's army from right to left. From information gained during this raid of the dispositions of the Federal army, Lee framed orders for the attack of McClellan's right wing on the 26th. On the 26th of June, leaving Magruder, with 28,000 men, to protect Richmond and hold Mc Clellan in front, Lee, with the remainder of the army, crossed the river about Meadows Bridge, and the battle of Mechanicsville was fought. The Battle of Mechanicsville. Porter, with two corps (McClellan's right wing), was to be attacked- by Lee with 55,000 men, made 64 The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. up as follows : Longstreet, with 9,000; A. P. Hill, 14,000; D. P. Hill, 10,000; Jackson, 18,500; Stuart's (cavalry), 2,000. By some error in orders, Jackson's corps did not come up in time for the battle, though from the position he occupied at the close of the day he threatened Porter's right rear. Porter, during the battle, was reinforced, bringing his command up to a strength of 36,000 infantry, 4 regiments of cavalry, and 22 batteries ; after the battle, and during the night. Porter retired to a position at Gaines' Mill, probably in consequence of the posi tion Jackson occupied on his right rear. Mc Clellan, who had 60,000 men in his works on the right bank, beyond sending 9,000 men to reinforce Porter, did nothing to create a diversion in favour of his right wing, sorely pressed, but remained inactive, held by the demonstrations of Magruder, with a force less than half his strength. Battle of Gaines' Mill, 27th June. Porter, with his 35,000 men, occupied a strong position, covered by a deep, sluggish stream, bordered by swamps and timber; this, while ren dering his position difficult of access, favoured a flank attack, as this stream prevented a counter- stroke by the defence. Porter now fronted to his flank, that is, his position was parallel to his line of communications with White House, which Lee still thought was McClellan's "base of supply." But McClellan, foreseeing that he might have to give up his original base on the Pamunkey, had for some days past been, unknown to Lee, remov ing his supplies to Harrison's Landing on the James River. The command of the sea gave him this power of safely moving his base. The result of Gaines' Mill battle was that Porter was defeated, but night coming on, and the arrival of reinforce- The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. 65 ments sent from the left wing, pursuit was checked, and during the night Porter crossed to the right bank of the Chickahominy, destroying the bridges as he passed. It was clear now to Lee that McClellan had abandoned his line of communication with White House, and intended to retire on the James River ; it was late in the day when this was discovered. The pursuit was ordered for the 28th, but Mc Clellan had got a start. McClellan decided to retire through the White Oak Swamp to Harrison's Landing, and, sending on his heavy guns and train, followed with the army to cover their march. By a series of well- executed rearguard actions, at Savage Station on the 29th, Glendale or Frayser's Farm on the 30th, and at Malvern Hill on the 1st of July, McClellan reached Harrison's Landing on the 2nd of July, under cover of his gunboats on the James River. Malvern Hill was a bad day for the Confede rates and they were severely handled. Had McClellan made a counter-attack the effect might have been disastrous. But no such attack was made. The peculiarity of this "strategic move ment to the rear" of McClellan's army, was that the pursuing army was about 70,000, whereas that pursued was over 90,000 strong. Around Harrison's Landing, to the north, ran a semi-circle of heights, called the Evelington Heights, in rear of these, which were soon well fortified, McClellan and his army rested secure, flanked by the gunboats on the James. The Confederates in the seven days' fighting, 26th of June to 2nd July, lost close on 20,000 men. The Federals, though in retreat, about 16,000. But the Confederates gained much in equipment, capturing for future use 52 guns and some 35,000 rifles. 66 The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. On the 8th of July, Lee, leaving Stuart to ob serve McClellan, moved back to Richmond. McClellan, under order from Washington, on the 16th of August, in spite of his protests, was obliged to commence the embarkation of his force, which was to be moved north to Acquia and Alexandria to commence another futile attempt to reach Richmond by road. In other words McClellan's army, within easy reach (some 20 miles) of Rich mond, and securely based at Harrison's Landing, covered by practically impregnable works on the Evelington Heights, was, by the dictum of the would-be strategists at Washington, to return to the place from whence it started (on l7th March) five months previously to work down overland over a most difficult and intersected country to reach almost the very locality where it was up to the 16th of August safely posted, and where it could easily be reinforced to any extent by sea, for a short and direct advance on Richmond. Result of the Operations. Lee's strategy had again been successful ; Rich mond for a time, at any rate, was safe. But this was due more to Mr. Lincoln than to his general. McClellan, though his attempt to capture Rich mond had not succeeded, was not altogether to blame, deprived as he had been of McDowell's 40,000 men, the plan of operations as modified at Washington failed. Though had McClellan on the 26th or 27th pushed on his 60,000 men vigor ously, he should have driven Magruder back, though even if he had succeeded here and reached Richmond, it is more than probable that Lee would have succeeded in keeping him in the place, and isolating him and his force. McClellan's change of base from Yorktown to The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. 67 Harrison's Landing will ever stand out as a most able movement, and one which rebounds to that commander's prevision and ability. From this base Mculellan had also gained a secure starting point within easy reach of Richmond. It was not his fault that this decided strategical advantage was ignored by those whose orders this general had to obey. Lee's strategy exemplifies the advantage of acting on "interior lines." He was able, when Jackson, with his detached force in the valley, had carried out his allotted task in withdrawing aid from McClellan at the right time, and place, to concentrate the whole of his available force on the decisive point, thus acting up to the first princi ple of strategy. The opposing forces in these operations were : Confederates, under Lee, 83,000 men m seven corps. Longstreet, 9,000; A. P. Hill, 14,000; Magruder, 13,000; Huger, 9,000; Anderson, 6,500; D. P. Hill, 10,000; Jackson, 18,500; Stuart's cavalry, 3,000; total 83,000. Federals, under McClellan, 105,000, in five corps, commanded by Generals Porter, Sumner, Couch, Slocum, Heinzleman, each, on the average, some 20,000 strong, with 5,000 cavalry. Note. — The cavalry on either side was weak in proportion to the other arms. That under Stuart was far superior in every way, except in numbers, to the cavalry in McClellan's army; though, excepting the raid referred ^, it does not appear to have acted up to its reputation. CHAPTER X. Cedar Run McClellan, as we know, was under orders to move his force from Harrison's Landing to about 68 The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. Acquia Creek to join Pope on the Rappahannock. This operation would take time. Two courses were open to Lee, acting, as usual, on "interior lines" :— 1. Detach a force to check Pope, and with the bulk of the army attack McClellan as soon as an opportunity was offered. 2. Watch McClellan and move rest of the force against Pope before McClellan's army could join him. The object of the Federal authorities, who thought the attack on McClellan was the more likely, was that Pope should threaten Gordons ville, and thus force Lee to detach such a large force against him from Richmond as to prevent his being strong enough to attack McClellan. Lee's instructions to Jackson, detached against Pope, were : — To conceal his strength as much as possible till a blow against Pope could be struck, and to be prepared to return if required. Meanwhile, Lee said he would try to keep McClellan quiet. The position of opposing forces at the outset was : — McClellan, who had been reinforced by the rem nants of Shields' division, covered by his almost impregnable position on the Evelington Heights, with 90,000 men at Harrison's Landing, Burnside with 14,000 at Fortress Monroe, Pope with 47,000 men, much scattered, from Sperryville on the right and along the Robertson and Rappahannock rivers to Fredericksburg on the left. Lee with his army now reduced to 60,000 by losses in the seven days' fighting at Richmond, with Stuart's cavalry watching McClellan. Jackson with his old command, the valley troops : Winder's division (late Jackson's Own), The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. 69 3,000 men; Ewell's division, 7,550 men; cavalry division, 1,200 men; 11,750 in all was detached tb Gordonsville, where he arrived on the 16th July, to protect the railway, which was the chief line of supply. Towards the end of the month Jackson was joined by General A. P. Hill with 12,000 men. This brought his force up to 23,750 all told, none too many to confront Pope's 47,000. Pope's army was in three corps of two divisions each, with cavalry; Sigel's division, 13,000; Banks' division, 11,000; McDowell's division, 18,000; Bayard's and Bulford's cavalry, 5,000. Lee no doubt by detaching Jackson also hoped to work on Mr. Lincoln's fears, as he had done by means of Jackson's operations in the valley. Jackson's object was to entice Pope so far south that when reinforced from Richmond that Fede ral commander might be attacked with advantage. About the time that Hill reinforced Jackson, Pope, under orders from Washington, moved forward, covered by his cavalry pushed well in advance. On 6th August Banks was about Cul peper. Jackson's object was to defeat Banks be fore he could be reinforced. On the 7th Jackson advanced, and on the 9th the battle of Cedar Run took place. At first Banks gained some advant age in his attack on Jackson's left, but ultimately being enveloped on both flanks. Banks was de feated. Next day, the 10th, it was found that the greater part of Pope's army had come up. On this Jackson retired to Cedar Run, and on the 12th he retired unmolested to Gordonsville. Hav ing practically destroyed Banks' two divisions Jackson by his retirement hoped to induce Pope to follow him; this he would have done had he not been restrained by General Halleck, now 70 The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. directing operations from Washington, who cor rectly judged the situation. Pope therefore remained north of the Rapidan. CHAPTER XL Groveton and the Second Manassas. Object of these operations : Pope was strongly posted on the Rappahannock and being steadily reinforced by McClellan's troops from Harrison's Landing. Lee's object now was to attack and dispose of Pope before such reinforcements could reach him as would render his army irresistible. Pope's position was too strong to attack in front, therefore Lee determined to turn his flank, dislodge him, and then attack under more favour able circumstances. Lee's first plan was to turn Pope's left flank, but this did not come off. He then decided to divide his forces, and while a part watched Pope along the river, the remainder under Jackson was to move round Pope's right flank and fall on his line of communications through Manassas to Alexandria. On 13th August, Lee, learning that Burnside had left Fortress Monroe, and that part of Mc Clellan's army had embarked, and further, that these troops were to reinforce Pope, determined at once to move north-west, pick up Jackson's force and take the offensive against Pope, before he could be reinforced to too great an extent by Mc Clellan's troops. On 15th August, Longstreet, less D. H. Hill's and McLaw's divisions left to watch Harrison's landing, moved on Gordonsville. Longstreet, com bined with Jackson, gave Lee 55,000 men for operations against Pope, who now had 52,000 The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. 71 posted along the Rapidan, on a front of 12 miles, in a strong position from Locustdale ford on the right, to Raccoon ford on the left. On 18th, Lee's army, covered by cavalry, was massed behind Clarke's Mountain, with the object of turning Pope's left. Pope himself was in utter ignorance of Lee's move, imagining that any advance against him, if made, would be by the Gordonsville-Cul- peper road. Lee's plan now was, covered by his cavalry, of which one brigade was on the night of the 17th to be posted at Verdersville (15 miles E. of Orange C. H.) to cross the river, turn Pope's left, and roll him up, cutting him off from his base of sup ply and the railroad. The brigade allotted to Verdersville did not turn up, and the movement was postponed ; mean while. Pope got information of the state of affairs, ordered a retreat to the Rappahannock, and thus escaped disaster. Lee followed, and on the 21st found the whole of Pope's army massed on the left bank of the Rappahannock from Kelly's Ford on the left to Hazel Run on the right, supported by a powerful artillery. To turn this position from the south was not practicable, so a turning movement by the north was to be attempted. On 22nd, Longstreet demonstrated against the tete-de-pont on Rappahannock station south of the river, while Jackson, covered by Stuart, and concealing his march, moved northward, and late in the day reached Sulphur Springs. The ford here was crossed; on the 24th before a strong advance, the force recrossed to the southern bank ; Pope was convinced that a serious attack had been repulsed, and that his right was not in any immediate danger. In the interim, Stuart, with the bulk of his 72 The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. cavalry (1,500 men and two guns), crossed at Waterloo, north of Sulphur Springs, and moving through Warrenton reached Catlett's Station (where Pope's supply trains were parked) at night, rushed the escort, and after partially destroying the stores reached Sulphur Springs on 23rd. In this raid Stuart captured Pope's despatch book, which gave valuable information as to his strength, dispositions, etc. Pope had marched north, opposite Jackson, and on 24th his whole force was concentrated about Sulphur Springs in a strong position, where, with a force (now increased by reinforcement) of 80,000, he imagined his position and prospects secure. Reinforcements of Hill's and McLaw's divisions with Hampton's brigade of cavalry, some 20,000 in all, were promised to Lee, but immediate action was necessary, and Lee could not wait till these came up. Lee decided on a bold plan, i.e., with his 55,000 to march against Pope with 80,000 concentrated, and another 20,000 wifhin easy distance (Acquia and Washington). The plan decided on was that Jackson, with 20,000, was to move via Amissville, Orleans, Salem and Thoroughfare Gap, and strike Pope's line of communications about Manassas, while Longstreet held him occupied in front. This, with a view to compel Pope to fall back in a ndrth-easterly "direction, tliereby drawing him away from McClellan. Longstreet was then to follow Jackson, and, if possible. Pope's forces were to be attacked in de tail. Preparations for this grand but risky move were commenced. Jackson withdrew his troops from Sulphur Springs, their places being taken at once, unob served by the Federals, by Longstreet's division. The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. 73 Jackson's force consisted of some 20,000 and Stuart's cavalry, organised in three divisions. Hill's, Ewell's and Taliaferro's. The start was made before dawn on the 25th August. On 26th, Jackson passed through Thoroughfare Gap and reached Bristoe station (four miles S.W. of Man- asses Junction), a force being at once detached to the Junction, where a Federal force of all arms was surprised and scattered. On 27th, Ewell with his division remained at Bristoe, Hill and Taliaferro moved on Manassas Junction, cavalry patrols watching the country all round. A bri gade of Federals with a battery sent by train from Washington was defeated at Manassas. On this day, Ewell's force was attacked at Bristoe and fell back on the Junction. After supplying himself with all that was re quired, the Federal stores were burnt. Jackson moved along Bull Run towards Sudley's Ford, and took up a strong position to wait for Lee with Longstreet's corps. Pope, when he heard that the force at Manassas was under Jackson and not only a raid, issued orders and counter-orders, ulti mately moving by several roads on Bull Run and Manassas. Now to turn to Lee : on 26th he, with Long- street's corps taking the same road as that used by Jackson, reached Salem on 27th. Pope should have effectually blocked Thoroughfare Gap and delayed Longstreet until Ee~crushed Jackson, but only a comparatively small force was detailed for this task. Jackson's object now was to hold Pope until Lee came up; accordingly on 28th he at tacked King's division, which he thought was a flank guard to Pope's army marching eastward, at Groveton. Severe fighting took place, and Jackson lost heavily; both Ewell and Taliaferro were killed; 74 The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. though not a victory, strategically this engage ment was a complete success, as Jackson attained his object, and Pope's army was now directed northward and westward, determined to attack Jackson in superior numbers on the 29th. Jack son's position on this date lay along Stony Ridge, concealed in woods; an unfinished railroad ran along his front, with his left on Bull Run. This position covered the road to Aldie Gap, an alter native route by which, if obliged, he could retire, or by which, if he could not force Thoroughfare Gap, Longstreet could join him. Jackson's three divisions, now commanded by Generals A. P. Hill, Lawton (vice Ewell) and Starke (vice Taliaferro), were drawn up in three lines with 16 guns behind the left, and 24 behind the right centre. Two brigades and a battery were posted some distance to his right to connect towards Longstreet, both flanks were protected by cavalry, and a portion of Stuart's cavalry was de tached to the right rear to communicate as soon as possible with Longstreet. Lee, with Longstreet, had overcome the small force guarding Thorough fare Gap, and on this day, 29th, was moving towards Haymarket, completely concealed by Stuart's cavalry and the woods. Early in the morning. Pope's superior force, nearly four to one, advanced to the attack. The attacks, as usual with the Federal commanders, were successive : there was no combination, and all were frontal. About 5 p.m., after five unsuccessful assaults. Pope ceased further effort. By this time Long- street had arrived on the scene, and, unknown to Pope, covered by cavalry on his right, had de ployed his whole force (less one division) in the woods on Jackson's right. Though urged to do so, Longstreet refused to make the counterstroke on Pope's left, and so the The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. 76 battle ended for the day. Lee's promised rein forcements* had crossed the Rappahannock and were marching to join him. The battle was renewed on the 30th August. Lee's army was hardly 50,000 in all. Jackson, reduced by losses, had 17,000 men; Longstreet, 30,000. The cavalry amounted to 2,500. Pope, with 65,000 men and 28 batteries, de cided to attack without waiting for two divisions of McClellan's army, which had reached Alexan dria; and, be it remembered, still in ignorance of Longstreet's having joined Jackson, Pope's attack was as on the day before directed on the position held by Jackson. It is difficult to imagine why, with the force actually at his immediate disposal, and under the idea that only Jackson was before him. Pope did not combine a flank attack on Jackson's right, with a frontal attack. This flank attack would, had Jackson been alone, have de cided the day : as things were, it would have showed Pope that he had to deal with Lee's whole army, united on the battlefield, and not only with Jackson's command. Pope's men attacked with the utmost bravery, but Jackson's troops held their ground though they had suffered severely. At 4 p.m., when Pope's last attack had been repulsed, Lee saw his opportunity and ordered the whole army to advance, 50,000 men, on a front of four miles. As a result, Pope's army was driven over Bull Run, night putting an end to the battle. Under cover of heavy rain. Pope's army with drew during the night to Centreville. 31st August. — Pope, joined by 20,000 (Franklin and Sumner), and his outlying troops (Banks) now determined to make a stand in the works at Cen- * The Divisions of D. H. Hill, McLaws, and Walker with Hamp ton's Brigade of Cavalry and some reserve Artillery, in all some 20,350. 76 The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. treville, a very strong position. Longstreet remained about Bull Run, with his cavalry within range of the guns at Centreville, to engage Pope's attention, while Jackson, again moving by his left, was to turn Pope's flank and force him out of the strong position he held. Starting 31st, owing to the state of the roads, Jackson made slow pro gress, only appearing before Chantilly, some 4 miles north of Centreville, on the 1st September. Pope, hearing of Jackson's move, evacuated Cen treville and took a new position at and round Fairfax Court House There was a combat at Chantilly on 1st Septem ber, and on 2nd September Pope retired under cover of the guns of the works round Alexandria. On this day Pope was permitted to resign ! ! 1 and McClellan was entrusted with the defence of Washington, and the reorganisation of Pope's army. Result of the Operations against Pope. In three weeks Lee, with never more than 55,000 men, had driven Pope with at first 80,000 and then 100,000, under the guns of the works at Alexan dria and Washington. He had captured 30 guns, 7,000 prisoners, 20,000 rifles, killed and wounded 13,500 Federals, destroyed vast quanties of stores and supplies, and again relieved Virginia of the presence of the in vaders, and all this with a loss of 10,000 Confed erates. Remarks on the Operations. Nothing was left to chance; until Lee was sure that McClellan was leaving Harrison's Landing, he remained with the bulk of his army to guard Richmond. Then, leaving a comparatively small force to guard Harrison's Landing, he moved with all his available force to combine with Jackson, The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. 77 and deal with Pope before the latter could be fully reinforced by McClellan's command, ordered up from Harrison's Landing. Lee's move of the whole of his force without the knowledge of Pope to a point, Clarke's Mountain, within six miles of Pope's left flank, in readiness to turn that flank, on the 18th, was a fine strategical move, but had to be postponed on account of the want of punc tuality of some of his cavalry. But though the actual turning movement did not come off, this massing of the army at a point threatening Pope's flank, obliged him to leave his strong position on the Rapidan without fighting, and to retire to an other on the Rappahannock. Next to be noticed is Lee's separation of his army to carry out his object to get round Pope's flank, and on to his line of communications with one part, while with the other, by means of active demonstrations, he held Pope to his position for the required time. Then, giving Jackson with the detached wing time to attain his object, Lee, with the remainder of the army, moved off to join Jackson at the decisive point to strike Pope with his whole available strength; that is, uniting his divided army on the battlefield. This separation of the wine:& of an army, with the enemy between them, is a most hazardous man oeuvre ; but Lee knew his opponent, and the result justified the risk. Moreover, Lee had implicit confidence in Stuart and his men, and also in Jackson, in charge of the turning force; then again, he had one great advantage in that he was operating in his own country, the inhabitants of which were wholly hostile to his enemies; thus, while he was sure of every possible help in the way of information of the enemy, the enemy was kept in the dark as to the movements of the Confe derates. 78 The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. Unlike Pope, who tied his subordinates down by orders, Lee gave Jackson only instructions as to his task, leaving him free to carry out the task as he thought fit. In this operation against Pope's - communications, Jackson's instructions were : If ; possible to cut the railway, and so delay reinforce ments coming up; and then hold Pope until he I (Lee) could come up, when the whole combined I army could act in concert. CHAPTER XII. Invasion of Maryland, 2nd to 22nd September, 1862. Lee's object in carrying the war into Maryland were : — 1. To draw the enemy away from Virginia. 2. To get recruits in Maryland. 3. To draw on the enemy and if possible de feat them decisively. 4. To capture Washington or Baltimore and end the war. Having driven Pope's disorganised army under the guns of the works round Alexandria Lee, with the approval of Mr. Davis, ordered the invasion of Maryland, where great things were expected, as many of the inhabitants were known to be fav ourably disposed towards the Confederates. The situation at the outset was : — Federals : McClellan, recalled to reorganise Pope's army, got together at Washington six corps under Porter, Sumner, Hooker, Franklin, Burnside and Mansfield, 82,844 men, 259 guns; cavalry, under Pleasanton, 4,320 men, 16 guns; total, 87,164 men, 275 guns. Still in the valley, 14,000 men, disposed as under : Winchester, 3,000 ; Martinsburg, 3,000; Harper's Ferry, 8,000. The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. 79 Lee's army consisted of : — Longstreet's corps, four divisions, 35,600 men; Jackson's corps, three divisions, 16,800 men; D. H. Hill's division, 7,000 men; Pendleton's reserve artillery, 1,000 ; Stuart's cavalry (three brigades), 4,000; total. 64,400 men. But deducting strag glers, of which there were an enormous number, it is doubtful if Lee during the invasion had more than 55,000 men available. It must be remembered that Lee's army, in spite of the large capture* made in the operation against Pope, was poorly equipped. Transport was wanting, ammunition scarce, the men badly clad and shod, the want of boots tended to add to the stragglers. The point of crossing of the Potomac was at and about White's Ford north of Leesburg. The march to the river, covered well by Stuart's cav alry, was commenced on the 3rd September : one brigade followed the Federals towards Alexan dria, one brigade from Dranesville demonstrated towards Washington and covered the right flank, the third brigade covered the front, and cleared a Federal detachment out of Leesburg. The Poto mac was crossed on the 6th and Frederick occupied on the 7th. Stuart's cavalry about Urbanna, six miles to the south-east, watched all the roads towards Washington. Lee's idea that the 14,000 men still in the Shenandoah Valley would retire on the invasion of Maryland was not realised. Up to now Lee's line of communi cation ran northward from Rapidan Station via Leesburg and across the Potomac. This was inse cure, and liable to interruption from Alexandria. Therefore a fresh line was to be established through the valley, but before this could be done * Stores, etc., captured at Manassas. In addition to other Stores and Equipment — 30 Guns and 20,000 Rifles. 80 The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. and rendered secure the Federals still at Harper's Ferry and Martinsburg had to be cleared out, and Harper's Ferry secured. This task was assigned to Jackson with a force of 25,000 men. On the 8th and 9th McClellan with his army started from Washington, advancing slowly and with great caution. On the 12th, after a skirmish with Lee's cavalry, his advanced guard reached Frederick and found that the Confederates had marched out, moving in two directions, one column towards Hagqrstown the otiher towards Harper's Ferry. It was not until the 13th from a captured order that McClellan found out the actual objects of Lee's retirement. This order directed the following moves for the 10th Septem ber : — Jackson was to move via Middletown, cross the Potomac, clear the enemy out of Martinsburg, and, aided by McLaw's, Anderson's and Walker's divi sions which were to move by the direct road, appear before Harper's Ferry on or about the 12th and capture the place as soon as possible, Longstreet's corps, covered by General D. H. Hill's division as rearguard, to move to Hagerstown. When Harper's Ferry was secured Jackson's whole force was to rejoin Lee at Boonsborough or Hagerstown, as circumstances might direct. The following distances should be noted : — Frederick to Harper's Ferry by direct road 20 miles I, ,, ,, by road Jackson took 58 ,, ,, to Hagerstown 25 „ Harper's Ferry to Hagerstown 25 ,, ,, ., Sharpsburg 17 ,, To first follow Jackson's move on Harper's Ferry. Starting on the 10th, Jackson moved by Turner's Gap on the South Mountain, Boons- borough, crossing the Potomac at Williamsport, thence via Martinsburg and Hall Town, appeared before Harper's Ferry on the 13th, having in four The Catnpaign in Eastern Virginia. 81 days marched 58 miles. On the same day the divi sions of McLaw and Anderson occupied the Mary land Heights, and Walker's division was on the Loudoun Heights. Thus Harper's Ferry was sur rounded. It is to be noted that on this day, the 13th, McClellan, who up to then was in ignorance of Lee's dispositions, learnt from the captured order every detail, and the exact position of the different units of Lee's army. McClellan, who was only 20 miles from Harper's Ferry (the place still held out, for the sound of the guns there could be heard), could have advanced and raised the siege, containing Lee with a force while doing so, and have moved his whole army into a position separating Lee's wings, now 25 miles apart, and dealt with each in succession. But Mc Clellan pushed slowly on, and found the gaps on the South Mountain (Turner's to the north and Crampton's six miles below it) held by Stuart's cayalry and Hill's division. On the 14th little was done ; on the 15th, the date on which Harper's Ferry surrendered with 73 guns, 13,000 rifles, numberless wagons, and tons of stores and 12,000 prisoners, McClellan's forces were engaged in forcing the gaps over the South Mountain. Lee in the meantime had moved to Sharpsburg with Longstreet's corps. On the 16th McClellan's army was moving through the passes. On this day Lee had but 15,000 available to meet the Federal advance at Sharpsburg. McClellan could still crush forces opposed to him in detail, but his over-caution enabled Lee to concentrate his divided wings on the l7th, the day of the battle of Sharpsburg. In advancing through the gaps McClellan, not apparently grasping the situation, directed 70,000 men against Turner's Gap and only 20,000, against Crampton's. He should have reversed the order, and sent the bulk of his army 82 The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. against the Southern (Crampton's) Gap, by so doing he could still have intervened between Jack son and Lee, but to do so decisive action was necessary. As it was, the attacks on the gaps were not made with resolution, inferior forces were brought into action, and thus Lee, by the stout defence of the gaps, gained twenty-four hours respite. On the l7th, even when joined by Jackson, Lee had only about 40,000 men against McClellan's 86,000. Lee's actual forces were : 35,000 infantry 4,000 cavalry, 194 guns. McClellan's were: 82,000 infantry, 4,000 cav alry, 275 guns. The Battle of Sharpsburg, 17th September, 1862. The position over a front of three miles was occupied as follows : — On the left Jackson's corps with Hood's divi sion of Longstreet's corps in third line- Centre and right was held by Longstreet, with one divi sion in reserve behind the right. Stuart with two cavalry brigades on the left rear from West Wood towards the Potomac. One cavalry brigade with a battery on the right kept open communication with Harper's Ferry, from which place some of Jackson's late command were still to arrive. The river Antietam ran along this part of the posi tion. The position fairly suited Lee's purpose. The flanks were secure. The Potomac running rather near the rear of the position, in case of retreat could only be crossed by a few deep fords. This was a decided disadvantage, but could not be avoided. McClellan's attacks were made in succession; at 5 a.m. the attack on Lee's left commenced, and The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. 83 was continued till about 10, but failed against Jackson's troops. The attacks on the left having failed, the centre was attacked, and the battle raged furiously till about 1 p.m., but Longstreet's troops, though suffering severely, held their ground. Next, about 1 p.m., the right of Lee's line was attacked by only one corps, Burnside's. This attack lasted till 3 p.m., when General A. P. Hill's division coming up, after a 17 miles march from Harper's Ferry, at once fell on Burnside's flank, drove him back, and Lee's right was saved. Lee, both on the evening of the 17th and on the morning of the 18th, wished to make a counter- stroke on McClellan's right flank, and so roll his army up, but after careful consideration of the situation and the enormous strength of guns in position, this attack was deemed to be impractic able and was abandoned. The losses in this hard-fought battle were severe. The Federals lost 12,000, easily replaced, the Confederates 9,000, a loss not easily made good. On the 18th Lee, reinforced by some 5,000 to 6,000 stragglers who came in, stood ready to re ceive another attack, but as no attack was made he during the night recrossed the Potomac unmo lested at Shepherdstown and retired leisurely to Winchester, where he remained for a month or more recouping and refitting after recent hard ships. During this interval Stuart, with 1,800 men and four guns, made another raid round Mc Clellan's army. Starting on the 10th October he crossed the Potomac by McCoy's Ford, west of Williamsport, and moving by Chambersburg, Gettysburg, and Frederick recrossed the Potomac by White's Ford on the 12th, having in fifty-six 84 The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. hours ridden 126 miles, captured or destroyed a large amount of stores, supplies and ammunition, securing several hundred horses, to remount part of his cavalry, and re-equipped his force. This raid caused much inconvenience to the Federals, and delayed McClellan's operations, as a large number of his cavalry, already overworked, were knocked up in unsuccessful attempts to cut off Stuart's troopers. Rem^arks on the Operations. Lee's passage of the Potomac and occupation was a fine strategic operation. Jackson's cap ture of Harper's Ferry, and return to join Lee for the battle on the 17th, was admirably carried out. As regards McClellan, his strategy cannot be commended. On learning of Lee's invasion of Maryland, two courses were open to him : 1. A direct advance north of the Potomac on Frederick. This, though it covered Washington, could not have the same decisive result as — 2. To move south of the river and get on Lee's line of communications, which at the time ran through Leesburg. This interference with the Confederate line of supply would probably have necessitated Lee's retreat without a battle. Full advantage was not taken of the order cap tured on the 13th. A most critical time for the Confederate army widely separated. From this order McClellan's gained every information jof Lee's dispositions, and it was within his power to crush the separated wings in succession. Then again, McClellan's dispositions for forcing the gaps in the South Mountain were defective and wrong in principle. He should have directed the bulk of his army on Crampton's Gap, thereby coming out on Lee's inner flank, and separating him from Jackson. Instead of this, as we have The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. 86 seen, the bulk of the force was directed on Lee's outer and less important flank. As regards the tactics of the battle. Though kept informed of all that was going on there was no combination in the attacks, and consequently no mutual support. The attacks were made in succession, first on Lee's left, then on his centre, and lastly on his right. The subordinate leaders seem to have been tied down by orders, and lacked initiative. Instead of carrying out the main principle of tactics to be as strong as possible at the decisive point, only about two-thirds of McClellan's army was engaged throughout the day. One-third at least did not fire a shot. It may be imagined what might have been the result if this force, which remained inactive, had been added to Burnside's corps which made the attack on Lee's right. Also if McClellan's attacks had been made simultaneously, instead of as they were in suc cession. CHAPTER XIII. Fredericksburg Campaign, October to December, 1862. McClellan's plan was to cross the Potomac and marching south to act against Lee's line of com munication, which he thought led through Culpeper to Richmond, and, if possible, crush Lee and Jackson in succession. Lee, moving from the valley, took up with his main body a flanking position at Culpeper, but in stead of his line of supply being from Richmond, Lee, anticipating this very move of McClellan's, had established a line from Staunton, secure from interruption. Jackson was left for the present 86 The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. at Millwood (south-east of Winchester in the val ley). So placed, he could, if McClellan advanced beyond Warrenton, act on his line of communi cations, or if required join Lee's main wing wherever thought best. We may here describe a "Flank position," and its requirements, as defined by Von Moltke. A flank position is a position which is taken up near and parallel to the enemy's line of operation — a position which the enemy cannot pass without laying open his lines of communication — a posi tion which he cannot attack without changing his front, thus fronting to a flank — a position where a victorious action and a pursuit divert him from his original object. At the same time we must consider, of course, that we abandon our line of retreat. A flanking position can, there fore, as a rule, only be taken up in our own country, where a friendly hinterland exists upon which we can live. That will be much more diffi cult in an enemy's country. It is to be noted that Lee's position fulfilled all the above conditions. Position at the Outset. McClellan's army, 125,000 strong, with 320 guns, divided into six army corps, with a strong cavalry division of about 8,000, was north of the Potomac, preparing for the fourth invasion of Virginia. Lee's army, now 72,000, with 275 guns, was, in and around Winchester, composed as follows : 1st Army corps, Longstreet, 32,000, with 112 guns (54 smooth-bores); 2nd Army corps, Jackson, 31,800, with 123 guns (53 smooth-bores); Cavalry division, Stuart, 7,200, with 4 guns (horse artillery); Reserve artillery, 1,000, with 36 guns (20 smooth-bores) ; total 72,000 men and 275 guns. The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. 87 In addition to McClellan's host, over 100,000 Federal troops lay along the Potomac from Washington westward through Harper's Ferry, and along the Baltimore and Ohio railway. The whole, practically, of the Confederate forces were in the field. The garrison of Richmond itself was very weak. McClellan, though he did not consider his army yet fit for operations, urged on by Washington, commenced to cross the Potomac about Berlin, on the 26th of October. Lee, as soon as he saw Mc Clellan's line of operations, moved, with Longstreet's corps and two brigades of cavalry, to Culpeper Court House, leaving Jackson for the present with his corps and one brigade of cavalry at Milwood. Thus situated, the wings of Lee's army were widely separated. McClellan thought to crush them in detail, commencing with the wing at Culpeper. Lee's object in dividing his army was probably with a view to concentrating at the right time on the field of battle. McClellan advanced on Warrenton, and on the 7th of Novem ber his army was concentrating in and around that place, with his cavalry along the Rappa hannock facing Lee's troopers on the southern bank. Owing to disease and illness among the Con federate cavalry horses, McClellan's cavalry afforded more accurate information than usual. He, by this means, knew that Lee, with Long- street's corps, was at Culpeper, and that Jackson was still in the valley at Milwood, 40 miles dis tant. McClellan saw a possibility of separating the wings of Lee's army, and of either attacking and defeating Longstreet or forcing him to fall back on Gordonsville before Jackson could come up, and determined to make the attempt. Lee's plan, on the 7th of November, was to unite his 88 The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. separated wings, as soon as the Federals left Warrenton. To do so, Jackson was to move up the valley, cross the Blue Ridge, by Fisher's Gap, and join Longstreet near Gordonsville to which place he was to retire from Culpeper. Here the Confederate army would be on Mc Clellan's right flank, should he move on Richmond, ready for any opportunity to attack, or, if the attack was thought too risky, to move on his line of communications, and oblige his retreat to the Potomac. Jackson wished to remain in the valley, and when the opportunity came to operate on the flank and rear of the Federal line of communi cations. Lee, it appears, fell in with Jackson's idea; but unfortunately for all concerned, McClellan, on the 7th of November, was superseded by Burn side, who, thinking McClellan's plan too risky with such a commander as Jackson within measurable distance of his line of communi cations, altered the plan of operations. Burnside's plan was to move on Falmouth and Fredericksburg, establish a new, shorter, and more secure line of supply, based on Acquia Creek, connected with Fredericksburg by a line of railway, then cross the Rappahannock by pon toon bridges, and move south of Richmond. Before carrying out his plan, Burnside deter mined to reorganise the army of the Potomac, and to do so decided to halt for a time at Warrenton. Lee, suspecting such a change of operations, had posted a small force of infantry, with some guns, and a brigade of cavalry south of Freder icksburg to observe the Rappahannock, and patrol its banks. The outcome of Burnside's reorganisation was the army divided into three grand divisions and The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. 89 a cavalry division of some 8,000 sabres. Each grand division consisted of two army corps. Right Grand Division, Sumner, 23,000 infantry and artillery; Crouch, 2nd 'Corps; Wilcox, 9th Corps. Centre Grand Division, Hooker, 40,000, infan try and artillery; Stoneman, 3rd Corps; Butterfield, 5th Corps. Left Grand Division, Franklin, 43,000, infan try and artillery; Reynolds, 1st Corps; Smith, 6th Corps. Cavalry Division, Pleasanton, 8,000 sabres. Burnside's army might have, without any risk to the safety of Washington, been further in creased by the addition of 35,000 more men, but Mr. Lincoln thought otherwise. Banks' corps, 20,000, was to remain in the valley, and Sigel's, 15,000, remained at Centreville. This infringed the main principle of strategy by wasting useless detachments, when they should have been at the decisive point. Burnside's march to Falmouth commenced on the 15th of November; his line of march was covered by the Rappahannock, and watched by his cavalry. On the l7th of November, his advanced- guard, under General Sumner, reached Falmouth; Sumner wanted then and there to cross the river and occupy the heights south of Fredericksburg, but this move, on account of the state of the river, etc., Burnside would not agree to, and the whole of Burnside's army was concentrated on the left bank of the river from Falmouth eastward. On the 17th of November, finding Burnside had marched, Lee ordered Longstreet to concentrate at Fredericksburg, and called Jackson from the valley. Leaving Winchester on the 22nd November, Jackson reached Maddison Court House on the 90 The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. 26th, and next day was at Orange Court House, 36 miles from Fredericksburg. Lee's original intention had been to concentrate on the North Anna, a position better fitted for many reasons, as first, had Burnside crossed the river and moved south, his line of communications would be threatened by Jackson, while Lee held him in front; and second, it was a better site for a defensive-offensive battle, whereas Fredericks burg 'was good for defence, but bad for pursuit after a victory. The Stafford Heights, north of the river, commanded all ground on the right bank. However, ultimately, the concentration was carried out on the heights south of Freder icksburg, and there the battle was fought. On the 29th, Jackson was ordered forward, and took position on Lee's (Longstreet's) right, from Yerby's House, close to the Richmond-Fredericks burg railroad, to Port Royal, on the Rappahannock, 18 miles south-east of Fredericks burg. Lee's army, now over 78,000 strong, was ready for immediate concentration. For the present Longstreet held the heights from opposite Falmouth to the Massaponax Creek. Jackson was on his right rear. Stuart's cavalry division, now four brigades (some 7,500 strong), guarded the front and flanks. One brigade on extreme right, another guarding the front; two brigades on the left, at about Chancellorville, and south of Banks' and U. S. Fords. Burnside's Army in Old Position North of River. Burnside's object was Richmond, 60 miles south of Fredericksburg. Before the Confederate capital could be captured, Lee's army must be annihilated, and before that could be done the Rappahannock must be crossed. Burnside had first to cross the river and then fight Lee. The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. 91 On the 5th of December, moving down the river, Burnside attempted the passage of the river at Skenker's Neck, but the attempt failed. He still, instead of crossing about Fredericksburg and at tacking Lee in front in his prepared position, might have moved to his right, and crossing the Rapidan by the fords (Elys and .Germania fords) up the rivers, and turning Lee's left flank, have attacked and, perhaps, crushed Lee's left before the right, as we know some distance off, could arrive on the scene. This very operation, as we shall see in the Chancellorville campaign, a few months later, was carried out with complete suc cess, up to the battle of Chancellorville, by Hooker. This is undoubtedly the line Burnside should have taken, but for reasons best known to himself he crossed the river, attacked Lee in front, and had a crushing defeat. His army was not annihilated, because the counterstroke. under fire of Burnside's heavy guns on the Stafford Heights, was deemed almost impossible. On the 10th of December, Burnside ordered the passage of the river. Pontoon bridges were to be laid about and below Fredericksburg. On the 11th bridges were laid and the Federal advanced guards crossed. Early on the morning of the 13th, the bulk of the army crossed, and the battle began. The Battle of Fredericksburg, I3th December. 1862. Up to the 12th of December — that is until Lee was satisfied that the whole of Burnside's army was crossing the Potomac — the Confederate army was disposed as follows, ready for any contin gency : Longstreet's corps, 32,000 strong, and 112 guns. 92 The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. held the heights above right bank from Taylor's Hill, on the left to Prospect Hill, above the Mas saponax Creek on the right. Jackson's corps, four divisions, 32,500, and 123 guns, was distributed as follows : A. P. Hill's division, 11,000, at Yerby House; Taliaferro's division, 5,000, at Guineas Station; Early's division, 7,500, at Skenker's Neck; D. H. Hills division, 9,000, at Port Royal. Stuart's cavalry, four brigades, 7,800 in all : W. Lee's brigade, 1,000, on extreme right; F. Lee's brigade, 1,800, watching the front; Hampton's brigade, 2,500, watching fords on left from south of U.S. and Banks' fords ; Rosser's Brigade, 2,500, on extreme left, watching river and country from about Chancellorville. When Burnside's real intentions were apparent, Longstreet's corps closed to its left, and occupied the heights from Taylor's Hill to Deep Run. Jackson's corps, ordered in, arrived on the ground, unknown to Burnside, and took up its position within the woods, and concealed, on Longstreet's right from Deep Run to Prospect Hill. From Hamilton's Crossing to the river, almost at right angles to Lee's general front, Stuart, with 4,000 cavalry and 18 guns, was posted. The whole front occupied was about 11,000 yards. The left of Lee's position from Taylor's Hill to Hazel Run was open and bare. From Hazel Run to the Massaponax the ground was thickly wooded. The Massaponax itself was a sluggish stream, between deep but marshy banks. The part held by Stuart was open but marshy, intersected by numerous streams, and unfit for cavalry mounted action. During the day Stuart's troopers, acting dismounted, kept Doubleday's division fully occupied. The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. 93 The Confederate position was strong for de fence, and suited to Lee's force, but it was defective in that it offered a poor chance for effec tive counter-attack — and none for pursuit, after a victory — as the guns and position on Stafford Heights would cover the retreat of any defeated army. Between the wooded heights and the river ran the old stage road between stiff banks, three to four feet high, suitable for defence; and the rail road, which ran over an embankment, three to four feet high affording a ready-made breastwork, but this was only used by Jackson's skirmishers. At the foot of Mary's Hill was a Stout stone wall, about a mile long; this was strongly held. Across the Hazel Run a log parapet was erected, covered by abattis. Communications through the woods were im proved or constructed, to allow of free lateral communication. One special feature must be noted, that of the triangular wood which abutted from about the centre of Jackson's position; this wood projected about 600 yards beyond the railroad, with its base, about 500 yards long, towards the Federal lines. Beyond this base, and in the interior of the wood, the ground was swampy and covered with scrub. The wood itself was so thick that it was considered impassable. The ground beybnd it was unseen from the main position, and undefen ded by fire of any sort. The wood itself was not only not occupied, but not observed. This neglect cost the Confederates dear. Though this neglect was noticed and reported, no steps were taken to minimise the danger of this weak spot in the position. 94 The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. The Occupation of the Confederates' Position The Left.— Taylor's Hill and Stanbury Hill to the Plank Road, a strong point, 2,500 yards in extent, was held by one division, Anderson's, with 7,000 men and 34 guns. The guns, in pits, com manded the whole of the ground in front, and exits from Fredericksburg. Mary Hill. — The Mary Hill position between the Plank Road and Hazel Run, about 1,000 yards, was held by two divisions, about 11,000 in all, with 55 guns ; of these there was a strong battery on the hill itself. Ransom's division, in two lines, held the hill. McLaw's division was in third line, and reserve. The Centre. — The centre of the position, some 3,0oo yards. Hazel Run to Deep Run, was held by Pickett's and Hood's divisions, each 7,500 strong; 14 guns were in position before each division, and on Lee's Hill was a battery of 21 guns ; these commanded the ground in front, and up to Fred ericksburg, and took several of the Federal attacks on Mary's Hill in flank. The Right. — From Deep Run to the Massa ponax 2,600 yards, was held by the whole of Jackson's corps, 32,000 men with 123 guns. This was Lee's strategic or inner flank, and therefore made the most secure. In front of the railway, guarded by a battalion on the railway embank ment, were 12 guns. These had to retire on Meade's second advance, and joined a battery on Jackson's left, near Barnard's Cabin. Other guns were posted along the front inside the edge of the wood and concealed. On Prospect Hill was a battery of 14 guns. A. P. Hill's division, 11,000 strong, held the whole front, with four brigades in first line and two in second, with skirmishers on the railway embankment. The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. 95 On tht bStvrtre Archer's left rested on the tri angular wood; on the other, the northern, side of the wood a space of 200 yards intervened be tween the edge of the wood and the right of Lane's brigade. Two divisions. Early, 7,500, on right, and Taliaferro, 5,000, on his left, formed third line, about half a mile in rear of Hill's division. General D. H. Hill's division, 9,000 strong, with a large number of guns, was posted in rear of the right, the dangerous flank. Stuart, with 4,000 cavalry and 18 guns, held the ground between Hamilton's Crossing and the river, almost at right angles to Lee's front. In the occupation of this position we see the strong points weakly held, and the weak points strongly held. The guns, so posted as to bring effective fire on all ground within range, and the reserve in rear of the strategic flank, not only to protect that flank from a flank attack, but so situated as to be able to make a counter-attack on the enemy's left. Burnside's Plan of Attack. Burnside's plan for the attack on Lee's position was based on the erroneous idea that Jackson's corps was still strung out as far as Port Royal, which was 18 miles south-east 'of Fredericksburg, but as we know, Jackson, with his whole army corps, was in the assigned position on Lee's line of defence, before the attack commenced. The plan of attack was : — Sumner's force, 30,000 men and 60 guns, made up from his own grand division, with Whipple's division of the 3rd corps of the Central grand 96 The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. division, was to attack Lee's left a|«?rthe Mary Hill position. Franklin's force, 55,000 men with 116 guns, made up from his own left grand divi sion, with Sickle's and Birney's divisions of the 3rd corps of the Central grand division, was to attack Lee's right and strategical flank. The re mainder of Hooker's grand division, the 5th corps under Butterfield (three divisions, under Sykes, Humphrey and Griffin), 19,000 men with 30 guns, was to remain in general reserve on the far side of the river. The cavalry, 8,000 strong, crossed the river, and remained inactive and useless in rear of Franklin's force on the river bank through out the day. This plan of attack was sound enough, if car ried out in its entirety, and had the attacks been made in sufficient strength and simultaneously to ensure combination, but we will see that this was not the case. Both commanders, Sumner and Franklin, were hampered, and limited to num bers in making their attacks — each to one division. Moreover, Burnside, still imagining Jackson's force was absent from the field, issued orders to Franklin to attack with not less than one division, and to be prepared to move his troops rapidly down the Old Stage Road. Again, the right, being Lee's strategic or inner flank, should have been attacked with the utmost vigour and in overpowering strength, but on this side but two attacks were made, and those with inferior numbers, first by one division only 4,600 strong, and later by two divisions, only 11,000 in all. While Burnside wasted his strength in six successive attacks on Mary's Hill, every one of which was easily repulsed with a total loss of some 8,000 men, no attempt was made to demon strate, at the time these attacks were made, The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. 97 against other points in Lee's position. The near est approach to simultaneous action was when, at 1. 15 p.m., Howard's division on the right ad vanced against Mary's Hill and Meade and Gibbon advanced against Lee's right. This combination would appear to be more from luck than judg ment. The attacks were made without sufficient pre paration by artillery; though Burnside had a large force of heavy guns (74) available. The following table will best show how Bum- side's divisions dribbled successively into the attack : — TABLE SHOWING THE DIFFERENT ATTACKS MADE BY FEDERALS ON LEES POSITION. THE LEFT. Anderson, 7,000 men and 34 guns, 2,500 yards. Not attacked at THE MARY'S HILL POSITION. Rawson's and McLaws' Divisions 11,000 with 55 guns, 1,000 yards. Six successive attacks made. I. II. in.IV. V. VI. 12 noon. By French's Div. 4.500, lost 1,200. 12.30 p.m. By Hancock's Div. 5.0°°. lost 2,171- By Howard's Div. 6,500, lost 877. 1. 15 p.m, 2 p.m. By Sturges and Griffin's Divs. Hjooo, lost 4 p.m. By Getty's Div. lost 5 p.m. By Humphrey and Sykes Divs. 12,000, lost ,760. This attack was to have been made with the bayonet alone, in the twilight, but fire was opened, and the bayonet assault did not come off. The attacks were made on a narrow front, by successive ' lines, each line, as a rule, being swept away by fire from the men holding the wall and the hill. Many of these attacks were taken in flank by the guns on Lee's Hill, and were under fire of the guns on Stanburg and Mary's Hill as well. CENTRE. Pickett's and Hood's divisions, 15,000 strong Lee's Hill Bat tery 21 guns, di visional guns 14 each. 32 in re- erve. 2,500 yards of front. No real made on position, or monstration aid attack either side. attack this r de- to At 3 solitary p.m. a brigade coming up the wooded Deep Run attacked Pickett's right, but easily driven off by counter attack. Pickett was able, when re quired, to send troops to his left ready to re-in- force Mary's Hill if required. THE RIGHT. 2,600 yards frontage, held by Jackson's whole corps. 32,000 men, 123 guns. I. — 9.30 a.m. One division, Meade's 4,600 strong attacked, advanced checked by fire of Pel- ham's H.A. guns, after some delay the attack was resumed at 11 a.m. but repulsed by artillery fire alone. II.- — I p.m. Meade and Gibbons' divisions, some ii,oqo strong, at tacked after artillery preparation. Two of Meade's brigade get into through " Triangular Wood," yet not re-inforced were driven back with heavy loss. Jackson's counter attack very effective, but went too far. Federals in this attack lost 5,000. The division — broken, retired to river banks to re-organise. At 2.30 p.m. Burnside after the repulse of the fourth attack on Mary's Hill, sent orders to Franklin to attack again. But this com mander having lost faith in his commander-in-chief did not at tempt to carry out the order. Cavalry. — Stuajrt 4,oQO men and x8 guns. Kept Double- da^y's division, some 7,000 strong, fully oc cupied, by dis mounted action throughout the day. Doubleday's division posted S.E. with its left on the river, apparently s o posted in fear of a counter attack on Franklin's left. CO00 O 3 The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. 99 Almost all the Federal troops on the right were at one time or another during the day engaged, but of the 55,000 Franklin had at his disposal, only a small portion was actively employed. Burnside's faults : — 1. After communicating his plan of attack to his subordinate commanders, not leaving them a free hand to carry out their respective tasks, but hampering them by limiting numbers with which the attacks were to be made. 2. Not arranging that the attacks should be made in sufficient force and simultaneously. 3. These attacks were made without sufficient preparation by artillery. 4. When a footing was gained inside Jackson's position, no attempt was made to reinforce the gallant men who had got in; these, after heavy fighting and with severe loss, were driven out, and the advantage gained thereby lost. This error was due to Franklin's want of initiative, pro bably due to his hands having been already tied by Burnside. 5. When reinforcements were sent up, the bulk went to the right flank, to Sumner, whereas these should have gone to Franklin, for it was all-im portant to defeat Lee's right, not his left. Lee's errors : — 1. In taking up the position at Fredericksburg, instead of on the North Anna. 2. In limiting himself to passive defence. No counterstroke was made on the 13th after the battle, though Burnside's army was terribly shattered, such a counterstroke by the whole force was arranged for at 5 p.m., but never carried out. On the 14th, though quite possible, nothing was attempted. Even on the 15th, if the whole force, covered by every available gun, had advanced at day- 100 The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. break, the Federal army might have been driven into the river. The escape of Burnside's army, on the 15th, is inexcusable, and showed gross carelessness on the part of the Confederate outposts. The move, as carried out by the Federals, was well executed; by it, in silence and secrecy 100,000 men, with over 100 guns, recrossed the river by six bridges, one may say from under the very noses of their oppon ents. Remarks on the Fredericksburg Campaign, from, the 26th of October, 1862, to the 26th January, 1863. In these operations we have three changes. First, a change in commanders, Burnside, vice McClellan, superseded; second change in plan of operations; third, change in the organisation of the Federal Army. As regards the first, there is an old saying that "It's dangerous to swop horses when crossing a stream" ; this danger would apply in most cases to swopping commanders during a campaign. Whether in this case the swop of Burnside for McClellan was an advantage or not must be judged by the result of the campaigns. McClellan's operations in the Peninsula failed from no fault of his own. Burnside's campaign of Fredericksburg was a failure due to himself. As regards the second, an axiom of strategy lays down, "Changes in the plan of operations lead to incalculable losses of strength and time. Unless, therefore, the enemy or the elements enforce such alterations, they are to be avoided. Sudden changes of intention in the leader have often pro duced the greatest misfortunes." As regards the third, McClellan, whose gift as an organiser was undoubted, had organised the The Campaign m Eastern Virginia. 101 army of the Potomac into army corps. Burnside, on assuming command of the army, on the 7th of November, re-organised the army into three grand divisions, under Generals Hooker, Sumner, and Franklin. Each grand division (consisted of two army corps) varied in strength from about 23,000 to 43,000 men. This organisation did not turn out to be a suc cess; and in 1863, when Hooker in turn superseded Burnside, grand divisions disappeared, and the army worked again in army corps. Both McClellan and President Lincoln were in error as to Lee's line of communications; they thought these ran south to Richmond, whereas Lee had arranged a new line, which was safe through Staunton. A comparatively simple operation, as he was acting in his own country, of which, of course, the inhabitants were friendly. The concentration of the Confederate army at Fredericksburg, instead of on the North Anna, was a strategic blunder. For, though the position selected was strong for passive defence, there was little scope for a counterstroke, and none for pur suit, because the guns on the Stafford Heights covered the retreat of the defeated army. In this case we see that the popular idea, that a river in rear of a defeated army is a source of danger, does not hold water. Six bridges had been constructed over the river by Burnside's or ders and thus the Federals had more lines of retreat than are usually afforded by roads in ord inary country. Had the battle been fought on the North Anna, the result would probably have been different, as there the pursuit might have been directed against the flanks and line of retreat of the defeated army. 102 The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. For the battle, Lee, once more, concentrated his divided wings on the decisive point, and there had all his available troops. Not so with the Federals. Useless detachments (Banks, 20,000; Sigel, 15,000), amounting to 35,000, were absent from the field, where their presence might have been decisive. Burnside, instead of crossing the river and attacking Lee in front, should have crossed the Rappahannock and the Rapidan by the fords above Falmouth, and thus, very possibly, defeat ing Lee's left, before Jackson, with the right wing, could come up. Later on he tried this very oper ation, but it failed on account of the state of the roads and the country. As to the tactics of the battle, we again see want of combination; the attacks were not simultaneous, and not carried out with all the available forces. The Federal cavalry, 8,000 strong, did nothing during the day ; had they, or a part of them, been dismounted, and taken the place of the division (Doubleday's) on Burnside's left, engaged with Stuart's dis mounted troopers, that division would have been available for attack on Jackson's right. The Federal attacks, too, were made before the artil lery had sufficient effect on the defence. 'The passage of the river on the 11th and the retreat over it on the night of the 14th were well carried out, but the successful recrossing was largely due to the culpable negligence of the Confederate outposts. The want of vigilance which permited the un molested retreat of the Federals is inexcusable. This carelessness was due to want of discipline and defective training. Tha Campaign in Eastern Virginia. 103 CHAPTER XIV. Chancellorville Campaign, April and May, 1863. Hooker, based on Acquia, with the object of capturing Richmond, determined, by crossing the rivers by fords westward of Falmouth, to turn Lee's flank, while another portion of his force held Lee on the heights above Fredericksburg by cross ing the Rappahannock and menacing his front. The result of the operations, lasting six days, was Hooker's 130,000 utterly defeated and driven back over the rivers with heavy loss, by Lee, with 60,000 men. Situation at the Outset. Hooker's army now no longer in grand divi sions, as carried out by Burnside, is organised in seven army corps of three divisions each, with a cavalry division of 10,000 sabres, under General Stoneman. The total force was 130,000, with 428 guns. Lee's army now consisted of but 62,000 men, 2 cavalry brigades and 170 guns. Less in numbers than in the Fredericksburg campaign in the pre ceding year, owing to Longstreet with three divisions, 20,000 strong, detached south to the James river, where he was uselessly employed in operations against Suffolk; and two cavalry bri gades some 4,000 strong, one sent to the Shenandoah Valley and the other to South Caro lina. The absence of these troops seriously affected the result of Lee's victory at Chancellor ville. Moreover, another change had come over the situation. . Mr. Lincoln and his Secretary of State haying at last realised that they were not strategists, ceased to interfere, and left military operations 104 The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. to the responsible military authorities; whereas Mr. Davis, who had hitherto left his commander- in-chief to deal with the situation, now practically assumed control over military operations, with the usual result in such cases : On the Northern side we find unity of purpose and concentration. On the Southern side uncertainty of aim and dis persion. Longstreet, detached 120 miles off, could not compare with Jackson as leader of a detached force. Such a leader, whilst carrying out his in structions, should always have the object of his commander-in-chief in view, and at all times, when required to do so, be ready to rejoin his chief at the decisive point, for the decisive battle. This role Longstreet did not carry out. Hooker's plan,in detail, for his grand movement against Lee in his entrenched position on the heights overlooking the Rappahannock and Fred- ericks.burg was : His strong cavalry division, less one brigade, was to move from about Warrenton by Culpeper and Gordonsville, to cut Lee's line of oominuni- cations with Richmond, and if Lee retired to hold him fast. Sedgwick with the left wing, two corps was to cross below Fredericksburg, and make a brisk demonstration of attack ; should Lee retire, he was to follow him down the Bowling Green and other roads south ; then, while Lee was thus occupied with Sedgwick, Hooker with three corps (the right wing) and a brigade of cavalry was to move up the Rappahannock, cross at Kelly's Ford, push rapidly over the Rapidan by the Germania and Ely's Fords, and move on Chancellorville. The centre (two corps about Falmouth) was to be held in readiness to support either wing as re quired. The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. 105 This gap between the wings with Lee in a cen tral position on interior lines, gave that commander an opportunity of containing one wing while he dealt with the other. In this case, how ever, the wide separation of Hooker's wings was not so dangerous as it looked, as both Hooker's and Sedgwick's forces outnumbered the whole of Lee's concentrated army. The distance from Franklin's crossing below Fredericksburg, where Sedgwick was to cross the river to Kelly's Ford, was 27 miles ; to Ely's Ford, 20 miles, and to Chancellorville about 12 miles. On 28th and 29th, Hooker's right wing crossed the Rapidan almost unopposed, and moved on Chancellorville; while Sedgwick crossed below Fredericksburg. Lee before this had directed one cavalry bri gade to carefully guard his left about Culpeper; the other to watch the line of the Rappahannock. On 28th, Stuart reported a strong force of all arms moving on Kelly's Ford. On the 29th, Sedgwick engaged Lee's outposts. On 30th, Lee was convinced that Hooker's real move was to turn his left ; he had now to decide which wing to move against first. He decided to delay Sedgwick while, with the bulk of his force, he moved to meet Hooker. (On 29th Lee had sent a division towards Chancellorville.) Hooker's three corps were assembled by mid night, 30th April, at Chancellorville; the centre crossed, one corps by east of the fords (XT. S. and Bank's), and moved on Chancellorville. 1st May. — Hooker formed his line and en trenched it. One corps on the extreme right, two in the centre, one near the river, covering Bank's Ford, and one corps in reserve. Lee, through Stuart's cavalry, which was suj)- erior in strength to the brigade with Hooker's 106 The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. right, gained full information of the move, while Stuart's cavalry prevented the Federals' cavalry, but one brigade with Hooker, gaining any in formation, or finding out what Sedgwick was doing. The Wilderness in which the operations were taking place was densely wooded, and a most difficult country to manoeuvre over. The roads leading to the position at Fredericksburg were held by Lee, with 45,000 men, 100 guns and a brigade of cavalry entrenched on a front of 3 miles. Sedgwick, on 1st May, had done nothing but demonstrate. On the 2nd of May, Lee decided to send Jack son with his corps by the Spotsylvania road to get round Hooker's right flank and on to his rear, while he himself with the remainder of Lis force held him in front. Jackson moved by a road he discovered through the forest, and, coming out about a mile in rear of Hooker's right flank with his 25,000 men, at 6 p.m., advanced to attack; the Federals were completely surprised and driven back in confusion, Jackson's men following in pursuit. It was late in the day when Jackson was wounded by some of his own men. Lee attacked the Federals in front; Hooker was driven back to the river, his right below Ely's Ford, his left below United States Ford. On this day, 3rd of May, Sedgwick pushed his attack on the heights above Fredericksburg, de fended now by only four brigades, and carrying them, drove the defenders westward. On the 4th of May, Lee detached some 20,000 against Sedgwick (holding Hooker's force with his remaining 20,000), and turning his left flank, drove him over the river at Bank's Ford, thence he joined Hooker. On the 5th of May, Hooker, who had done nothing with his large force, held by only 20,000 Confederates, having cut roads The Campaign tn Eastern Virginia. 107 through the woods to U. S. Ford and constructed bridges over the river, retired to his original position on the north of the Rappahannock, while Stoneman's cavalry division retired by Kelly's Ford. Stoneman's raid had effected nothing, though great things were expected from it, while his absence from the battlefield upset Hooker's plans, ably carried out until Jackson's turning move ment came off and surprised Hooker : with a strong force of cavalry on the right flank, ample warning would have been given, and Jackson's move would probably have been anticipated, and measures taken to meet it. The absence of Longstreet's 20,000 men was a sad loss to Lee ; had these been with him, the pro bability is that most of Hooker's army would have been annihilated. The loss in these opera tions was heavy. Federals lost about 17,000 men and 13 guns; Confederates, who could ill afford it, lost over 12,000. Jackson on the 10th, but a week from the day on which he was wounded, died. His loss was the heaviest incurred by the Confederates since the outbreak of the war. Lee had lost his most trusted commander, and hereafter nsver dared to attempt such turning movements as had been so successfully carried out by Jackson. Hooker shared the usual fate of his unsuccess ful predecessors, and was superseded on the 26th May by General Meade in command of the Army of the Potomac. 108 The Campaign in Eastern Virginia. CHAPTER XV. Remarks on the Passages by the Federals of the Bull Run on the 21st July, 1861, and of the Rappahannock and Rapidan on the 28th and 2dth of April, 1863. In each case the Federals crossed beyond the Confederate left and advanced on a front at right angles to the river, thereby exposing their outer, the right flank. In each case, too, the Confederate counter- stroke was made on the Federals outer flank, at Bull Run by Kirby Smith, at Chancellorville by Jackson, and driven over the river. In the case of Bull Run, had the Federals let go hold of Stone bridge before gaining passages further down the river, or, in the case of the Rapidan, had Hooker, moving down the river, passed U. S. Ford without first gaining Bank's Ford, the Federals in each case would probably have been driven into, not only over the river. At Bull Run, McDowell retained a division at Centreville as a reserve and to cover a possible retreat; at Chancellorville the whole of Hooker's force crossed the river, and after Sedgwick had joined the right there was no reserve t)o meiet eventualities, and the whole Federal army was off its line of operation, with its line of communi cation open to attack by a force passed over the river about Fahnouth. It is worth considering under the above con ditions what might have been the fate of Hooker's army had Longstreet, with his 20,000 The Catnpaign in Eastern Virginia. 109 men, and the two detached cavalry brigades, some 4,000 strong, been at Lee's disposal. Longstreet had been detached by order of Mr. Davis, and so was absent from the decisive battle. YALE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 3 9002 01453 2387 ^ '-A