iii ,for ttefy&dfnig of a. College in litis Colmiyt • iLniBiaaisrar • J90P wt.wwcBW.WBt A COLLECTION THEOLOGICAL ESSAYS VARIOUS AUTHORS. WITH AN INTRODUCTION, GEORGE R. NOYES, D.D., PROFESSOR OF SACRED LITERATURE IK HARVARD UNIVERSITY. BOSTON: AMERICAN UNITARIAN ASSOCIATION, 21 BKOMFIELD STREET. 1856. Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1856, by The American Unitarian Association, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the District of Massachusetts. CAMBKIDGE : STEREOTYPED AND PRINTED BY METCALP AND COMPANY. CONTENTS. PAGE Introduction. By George R. Noyes v Faith and Science. By M. Guizot 1 The Law and the Gospel. By Bev. Baden Powell. ... 27 The Doctrine of Inspiration. By Dr. F. A. D. Tholuck. . 65 Holy Scripture. By Rev. Rowland "Williams 113 Servants of God speaking as moved by the Holy Ghost. By Rev. Rowland "Williams. 127 The Spirit and the Letter, or the Truth and the Book. By Rev. Rowland "Williams 147 On the Causes which probably conspired to produce our Saviour's Agony. By Rev. Edward Harwood 167 Of our Lord's Fortitude. By Rev. William Neweome. . . 197 The Doctrine of the Atonement. By Benjamin Jowett. . . 221 On Righteousness by Faith. By Benjamin Jowett. . . . 239 On the Imputation of the Sin of Adam. By Benjamin Jowett. . 265 On Conversion and Changes of Character. By Benjamin Jowett. 273 Casuistry. By Benjamin Jowett. 299 On the Connection of Immorality and Idolatry. By Benjamin Jowett 321 The Old Testament. By Benjamin Jowett. . ... 325 On the Quotations from the Old Testament in the New. By Benja min Jowett. 329 Fragment on the Character of St. Paul. By Benjamin Jowett. . 341 IV CONTENTS. St. Paul and the Twelve. By Benjamin Jowett. . . . 357 Evils in the Church of the Apostolical Age. By Benjamin Jowett. 383 On the Belief in the Coming of Christ in the Apostolical Age. By Benjamin Jowett 393 The Death of Christ, considered as a. Sacrifice. By Rev. James Foster 403 The Epistles to the Corinthians, in Relation to the Gospel History. By Rev. Arthur P. Stanley 415 Apostolical Worship. By Rev. Arthur P. Stanley. . . . 437 The Eucharist. By Rev. Arthur P. Stanley. ... 443 Unity and Variety of Spiritual Gifts. By Rev. Arthur P. Stanley. 447 The Gift of Tongues and the Gift of Prophesying. By Rev. Ar thur P. Stanley 453 Love, the greatest of Gifts. By Rev. Arthur P. Stanley. . . 472 The Resurrection of Christ. By Rev. Arthur P. Stanley. . . 477 The Resurrection of the Dead. By Rev. Arthur P. Stanley. . 482 On the Credibility of Miracles. By Dr. Thomas Brown. . . 485 Note A 505 NoteB 512 INTRODUCTION. The following collection of Theological Essays is designed for students in divinity, Sunday-school teachers, and all intelligent readers who desire to gain correct views of religion, and especially of the char acter, use, and meaning of the Scriptures. It was suggested by the recent excellent Commentary on the Epistles of St. Paul by Mr. Jowett, now Professor of Greek in the University of Oxford. Understanding that this work was not likely to be reprinted in this country, and that the high price of the English edition rendered it inaccessible to most readers, it appeared to me that a collection of Theological Essays, which should include the most important dissertations con nected with that Commentary, would be a valuable publication. Mr. Jowett seems to me to have pene trated more deeply into the views and spirit of Paul, and the circumstances under which he wrote, than any previous English commentator. Some of the best results of his labors are presented in the Essays which are now republished in this collection. Mr. Jowett's notes might have been more satisfactory in some respects if, in addition to other German commen taries which he has mentioned, he had made use of those of De Wette and Meyer. But no illustrative dissertations in any German commentary with which a* VI INTRODUCTION. we are acquainted are equal in value to those of Jowett. His freedom and independence are espe cially to be admired in a member of the Church of England, and Professor in the University of Oxford. In the selection of the dissertations by other writers, regard was had partly to their rarity, and partly to their intrinsic value, and the light which they throw on important subjects which occupy the minds of re ligious inquirers at the present day. Three Essays are taken from Kitto's Journal of Sacred Literature, an English periodical conducted by clergymen of the Established Church, of which few copies are circu lated in this country. The first, by M. Guizot, the eminent writer and statesman of France, presents the subject of Faith in an interesting point of view, and closes with an admirable lesson on the importance of the free discussion of religious subjects. The second Essay, by Rev. Baden Powell, an emi nent Professor in the University of Oxford, and author of several well-known publications, contains an able discussion of a very important subject, which appears to be now attracting some notice in this country ; distinguished divines of the Baptist denomination taking the view of Dr. Powell, and some of the Or thodox Congregationalists opposing it. The prevalent opinion, which regards the Old Testament as an au thority in religion and morals equally binding upon Christians with the New, appears to me to have had a disastrous influence on the interests of the Church and the interests of humanity. The history of the civil wars of England and Scotland, the early history of New England, and the state of opinion at the pres ent day on the subjects of war, slavery, punishment for religious opinion, and indeed punishment in gen- INTRODUCTION. vii eral, illustrate the noxious influence of ftie prevalent sentiment. A writer in one of the most distinguished theological journals in this country has been for some time engaged in the vain attempt to prove, in opposi tion to the plainest language, that the laws of the Pentateuch do not sanction chattel slavery. It was not thus that the great champion of the Protestant Reformation proceeded, when the authority of the Old Testament was invoked to justify immorality. "When some of his contemporaries were committing unjusti fiable acts against the peace and order of the commu nity, and vindicated themselves by appealing to the Old Testament, Luther wrote a treatise entitled " Instruc tion on the Manner in which Moses is to be read," containing the following passage, which, in the clear ness and force of its style, might have been imitated with advantage by some of his countrymen : " Moses was a mediator and lawgiver to the Jews alone, to whom he gave the Law. If I take Moses in one com mandment, I must take the whole of Moses. Moses is dead. His dispensation is at an end. He has no longer any relation to us. I will accept Moses as an instructor, but not as a lawgiver, except where he agrees with the New Testament, or with the law of nature. When any one brings forward Moses and his precepts, and would oblige you to observe them, answer him thus : ' Go to the Jews with your Moses ! I am no Jew. If I take Moses as a master in one point, I am bound to keep the whole law, says St. Paul.' If now the disorganizers say, ' Moses has commanded it,' do you let Moses go, and say, ' I ask not what Moses has commanded.' ' But,' say they, ' Moses has commanded that we should believe in God, that we should not take his name in vain, that VU1 INTRODUCTION. we should honor our father and mother, &c. Must we not keep these commandments ? ' Answer them thus : ' Nature has given these commandments. Na ture teaches man to call upon God, and hence it is natural to honor God, not to steal, not to commit adultery, not to bear false witness, &c. Thus I keep the commandments which Moses has given, not be cause he enjoined them, but because nature implanted them in me.' But if any one say, ' It is all God's word,' answer him thus : ' God's word here, God's word there. I must know and observe to whom this word is spoken. I must know not only that it is God's word, but whether it is spoken to me or to an other. I listen to the word which concerns me, &c. We have the Gospel.' " * I would not be understood to maintain every sentiment which Dr. Powell has advanced ; but his views in general appear to me not only sound, but highly important. The Essay on the subject of Inspiration, by Tho- luck, is to be found in English only in the same for eign journal. The views of a biblical student who enjoys so great a reputation among Christians of various denominations in all parts of the world need no recommendation. The translation I have carefully compared with the original, and found to be made with great fidelity and accuracy. The three Essays which follow on the use and character of the Scriptures are taken from a recent volume of sermons, entitled " Rational Godliness," by Rev. Rowland Williams, a clergyman and distin guished scholar of the Established Church of Eng land, having been delivered before the Chancellor and * See the passage in Luther's works, or as quoted by Bretschneider, Dogmatik, Vol. I. p. 181. INTRODUCTION. University of Cambridge. They appear to me suffi ciently valuable to be reprinted. The writer may be thought by some to undervalue external authority, while maintaining the rights of intuition and expe rience as means of attaining Christian truth. But have not many Christians since the time of Paley paid too exclusive regard to the former ? It seems to me that those who accept the New Testament records of miracles as genuine and authentic, will not fail to receive from them their due influence, and will be in no danger of attaching too great importance to intui tive faith and Christian experience. The older the world grows, the less must religious faith depend on history and tradition, and the more on the power of the human soul, assisted by the promised Paraclete, to recognize revealed truth by its own light. The four Essays which follow relate .to the great subject of the Atonement by Christ, and are designed to establish the true view of it, in opposition to cer tain false theories which human speculation has con nected with it, dishonorable to the character of God, pernicious in their influence on man, and having no foundation in the Scriptures or in reason. The Essay on the Causes which probably conspired to produce our Saviour's Agony, is by a distinguished English scholar of the last century, the author of an Introduc tion to the New Testament, and of a translation of the same, which, though it departs too much from the simplicity of the Common Version, is highly creditable to the author as a critic and a man of learning. The Essay which is here republished is commended by Archbishop Newcome in his very valuable observa tions, which follow, on substantially the same subject, — the Fortitude of our Saviour. The two Essays X INTRODUCTION. appear to me to give a triumphant vindication of the character of our Saviour from the charges which have been brought against it by unbelievers, and, hypothet- ically, by some Christian divines, founded on certain expressions of feeling manifested a short time before his death, which his faithful historians have recorded for our instruction and consolation. It so happens that that part of one of the specula tive theories connected with the Christian doctrine of atonement which is most repulsive to the feelings of many Christians, is absolutely without foundation in the Scriptures, or in the faith of the Church for many centuries after the death of Christ. I refer to that opinion which represents him as receiving supernatu ral pain or torture immediately from the hand of God, over and above that which was inflicted by human instrumentality, or which arose naturally from the circumstances in which he, as God's minister for es tablishing the Christian religion, was placed, and from the peculiar sensibility of his natural constitution. The very statement of this theory by some distin guished theologians shocks the feelings of many Chris tians like the language of impiety. Thus Dr. Dwight says : " Omniscience and Omnipotence are certainly able to communicate, during even a short time, to a finite mind, such views of the hatred and contempt of God towards sin and sinners, and of course towards a substitute for sinners, as would not only fill its capa city for suffering, but probably put an end to its existence. In this manner, I apprehend, the chief distresses of Christ were produced." * What ideas ! The omnipotence and omniscience of God are first * Dwight's Theology, Vol. II. p. 214. INTRODUCTION. xi called in to communicate a sense of his hatred and contempt to a sinless man, and, secondly, the suffer ings and even the death of Christ are represented as the immediate consequence of his sense of God's hatred and contempt ! Dr. Macknight, a theologian of considerable celeb rity, gives a somewhat different view, but equally appalling. He says : " Our Lord's perturbation and agony,- therefore, arose from the pains which were inflicted upon him by the hand of God, when he made his soul an offering for sin-. Though Jesus knew no sin, God might, by the immediate operation of his power, make him feel those pains ichich shall be the punishment of sin hereafter, in order that, by the visi ble effects which they produced upon him, mankind might have a just notion of the greatness of these pains His bearing those pains, with a view to show how great they are, was by no means punish ment. It was merely suffering." * Such is the repre sentation of Dr. Macknight, in a treatise entitled " The Conversion of the World to Christianity " ! Calvin, it is well known, represents our Saviour as actually suffering after death the pains of hell ; a representation, however, which differs not materially from those of Dr. Dwight and Dr. Macknight, except in reference to time and place. A recent work by Krummacher, which has been industriously circulated in New England, contains a representation similar to that of Dwight and Mac knight, in language still more horrible. Other recent writers in New England have sanctioned the same view. * See Macknight, in Watson's Tracts, Vol. V. p. 183. INTRODUCTION. Now to this theory a decisive objection is, that it has not the least foundation in the Scriptures, and that it is in fact inconsistent with the general tenor of the New Testament, which speaks of Christ's suffer ings in connection with the obvious second causes of them, recorded in the history; namely, the reviling and persecuting of his enemies, the coldness and desertion of his disciples, the dark prospects of his mission* his blood, his death, and the terrible persecution of his followers, which were to precede the establishment of his religion. Of the immediate infliction of pain by the Deity, over and above what Jewish malice in flicted upon him, we find not a word. There is not a particle of evidence to show that any of the sufferings of Christ were inflicted upon him by any more direct or immediate agency on the part of God, than those of other righteous men who have been persecuted to death in the cause of truth and righteousness. The text in Isa. liii. 10, — " Yet it pleased the Lord to bruise him ; he hath put him to grief ; when thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin," &c, — is often referred to. But such an application of this text can be shown to be wrong in two ways : — 1. It can be de monstrated, on principles of interpretation universally acknowledged, that the " servant of God," in this and the preceding chapters, denotes, at least in its primary sense, the Jewish church, the Israel of God, who suffered on account of the sins of others in the time of the captivity at Babylon. I cannot, for want of space, go into a defence of this view. But I fully believe it to be correct, and it is maintained by the most unbiassed and scientific interpreters of the Old * Luke xviii. 8 ; Matt. xxiv. 24. introduction. xiii Testament* 2. The language in question denotes no more direct and immediate agency of the Deity, than that which is everywhere, both in the Old Tes tament and the New, ascribed to the Deity in refer-. ence to the sufferings of the prophets and apostles. Comp. Ps. xxxix. 9, 10; Jer. xv. 17,18; xx. 7, &c; xi. 18, 19 ; Lam. iii. So in the New Testament, if St. Paul tells us that Christ was " set forth as a pro pitiatory sacrifice," he also says, " For I think that God has set forth us the apostles last, as it were appointed to death." Indeed, there is no idiom in the Scriptures more obvious " than that which represents all the blessings and afflictions of life, by whatever instrumentality produced, as coming from God. Modern speculative theologians, not finding in the sacred history, or in any Scripture statement, any au thority for their supposition of a miraculous suffering or torment, inconceivable in degree, inflicted by the immediate agency of God upon the soul of Christ, resort to mere theory to support their position. If, say they, Christ was not enduring " vicarious suffer ing," inconceivable in degree, inflicted on his soul by the immediate exertion of Almighty power, then it follows that he did not bear his sufferings so well as many martyrs, — so well as " the thieves on the cross," so well as " thousands and millions of common men without God and without hope in the world." f Without repeating the explanations of Dr. Harwood * That the phrase " servant of God " is a collective term, denoting the people of God, comprehending the Jewish nation, or the better part of the Jewish nation, that is, the Jewish Church, has been maintained by such critics as Doderlein, Rosenmiiller, Jahn, Gesenius, Maurer, Knobel, Ewald, Hitzig ; also by the old Jewish critics, such as Aben Ezra, Jar- chi, Abarbanel, and Kimchi. t See Stuart on Hebrews, Exc, JQ- P- 575. 6 xiv introduction. and Archbishop Newcome, it' may be remarked, — 1. That at best this is only an argument ad Christia- num. The sceptic and the scoffer are ready to accept the statement of the orthodox divine, and to tell him that, while the manner in which Christ endured his sufferings is matter of history, his way of accounting for them is pure theory. 2. It is very remarkable that the speculative theolo gians have not seen that a quality exhibited in such perfection by "thousands and millions without God and without hope in the world," " by the thieves on the cross," and, it might have been added, by any number of bloodthirsty pirates and savage Indians, was one the absence of which implied no want of moral excellence ; that it was a matter of natural temperament, of phys ical habits, and of the firm condition of the nervous system, rather than of moral or religious character. Moral excellence is seen, not in insensibility to pain or danger, but in unwavering obedience to duty in defiance of pain and danger. The greater sense Jesus had and expressed of the sufferings which lay in his path, the greater is the moral excellence exhibited in overcoming them. In order to satisfy myself of the perfection of the character of Jesus, all I wish to know is that his obedience was complete ; that his grief, fears, and doubts were momentary ; that his most earnest expostulations and complaints, if so they may be called, were wrung from him by causes which are plainly set forth in the sacred history, while he was engaged without hesitation, without voluntary reluctance, nay, with the most supreme devotion of his will, in the greatest work ever wrought for man. For my part, I am not ashamed to say, that I have a distinct feeling of gratitude, not only for the work introduction. which Christ performed, but for every expression of human feeling, whether of grief, or momentary doubt, or fear, or interrupted sense of communion with God, which he manifested. I should feel that I was robbed of an invaluable treasure of encouragement and con solation, if any one expression of feeling, whether in his words or otherwise, caused by such sufferings as all men, in a greater or less degree, are called to en dure, should be blotted from the sacred record. In the midst of deep affliction, and the fear of deeper, noth ing has given me greater support than the repetition of the prayer in Gethsemane, once uttered in agony of soul, " If it be possible, let this cup pass from me ! Nevertheless, not as I will, but as thou wilt ! " Now I know that " we have not a high-priest which cannot be touched with the feeling of our infirmities ; but was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin." 3. Those who maintain that the character of Christ was imperfect or sinful, unless he received immediate ly from the hand of God inconceivably greater suffer ings than were occasioned by human instrumentalities, and the second causes which are matters of history, do not make it clear how by their theory they relieve his character from the charges which they have hypo- thetically brought against it. If the manner in which Christ endured his sufferings was unworthy of him, — if it was faulty or sinful, — if his expressions in the garden of Gethsemane, or upon the cross, were wrong, — then no degree of suffering "which the hu man imagination can conceive to have been endured by him can make them right. Strength of temptation can palliate what is wrong, but cannot make it right. Whatever was the nature of Christ's sufferings, how ever great in degree, and however immediately they INTRODUCTION. were inflicted by God, still, unless his memory of the past, as recorded in the Gospels, was wholly effaced, he had greater advantages than other men. He knew what testimonials and powers he had received from God. He knew that he was the object of Divine love. He knew that he had consented to his sufferings, and that they were a part of his work ; he had no sense of sin to aggravate them ; he knew that they were for a short time, and that they were certainly to be fol lowed by a glorious resurrection, and by endless bless edness for himself and his followers. How then are what Dr. Dwight calls " the bitter complaints " of Jesus absolutely justifiable on his theory of the nature and causes of Christ's sufferings, if not on that view which has its basis, not in mere reasoning, but in the Scripture history, and which is set forth by Dr. Har- wood and Archbishop Newcome in this volume ? If all the mental and bodily sufferings naturally caused to Jesus by the malice of the Jews, the desertion of his disciples, and all the circumstances in "which he was placed, cannot justify our Saviour's expressions, whether in language or otherwise, then no sufferings or torments the human imagination can conceive to have been immediately inflicted by God can justify them. In fact, the knowledge that they were inflicted immediately by the hand of God would have a ten dency to make them more tolerable. Who would not drink the cup certainly known to be presented to his lips by the hand of his Almighty Father ? I have no difficulty in the case, because I believe all the expres sions of Jesus in relation to his sufferings, which have been supposed to indicate a want of fortitude, to have been momentary, extorted from him by overpowering pain of body and mind. INTRODUCTION. XVU It is also to be observed, in connection with the preceding remarks, that what may be called the rich imagination of Jesus, as displayed in the beauty of his illustrations and his parables, as well as various expressions of strong feeling on several occasions in the course of his ministry, indicate an exquisite sensibility, which no debasement of sin had ever blunted. Without anticipating what is said in the excellent Essays of Dr. Harwood and Archbishop Newcome, I may make one more remark. Injustice seems to me to have been done to Jesus by comparing his short distress of mind on two or three occasions with what may have been as short a composure of some distin guished martyrs, — Socrates for instance, — without taking into view the habitual fortitude of "Christ. Now if any one believes that the feelings which Socrates exhibited when he drank the hemlock in prison, as described by Plato, were all which entered his mind from the time when he incurred the deadly hatred and persecution of the Athenians, and that no doubts or fears or misgivings occurred to him at any moment, in the solitude of his prison or elsewhere, I have only to say that his view of what is incident to human nature is very different from mine. Would Jesus have prayed, an hour before his suffering in Geth semane, that his disciples might have the peace, and even the joy, which he possessed, had not the habitual state of his feelings been tranquil and composed ? Panegyrists have described the bravery with which some martyrs have endured their sufferings before the eyes of their admirers. Jesus, who suffered not with a view to human applause, but to human consolation and salvation, was not ashamed or afraid to express b* XV1U INTRODUCTION. all which he felt, and his faithful biographers were not ashamed or afraid to record it. I have intimated that the view of the cause of our Saviour's principal sufferings, which I have endeavored to oppose, is not found in the Scriptures, nor in the general faith of the Church. It is the fruit of com paratively modern speculation. For proof of the last assertion, I refer to the standard works on the history of Christian doctrines. In regard to the principal ut terance of our Saviour, to which reference has been made in relation to this subject, in the words of the first verse of the twenty-second Psalm, I cannot agree with those who find in them no expression of anguish or tone of expostulation, and who suppose them to be cited by our Saviour merely in order to suggest the confidence and triumph "with which the Psalm ends ; but which do not begin before the twenty-second verse. Under the circumstances of the case, the words appear to have had substantially the same meaning when uttered by Christ as when uttered by the Psalmist. They should not be interpreted as the deliberate result of calm reflection, but as an outburst of strong involuntary emotion, forced from our Saviour by anguish of body and mind, in the words which naturally occurred to him, implying momentary expos tulation, or even complaint. But that the interruption of the consciousness of God's presence and love was only momentary, both in the case of the Psalmist and of the Saviour, is evident, first, from the expression, My God! my God! repeated with earnestness; secondly, from the expressions of confidence in the course of the Psalm, which might follow in the mind of Christ as well as in that of the Psalmist ; and thirdly, from the usage of language, according to which the expression INTRODUCTION. xix " to be forsaken by God " merely means " not to be delivered from actual or impending distress." The very parallel line in the verse under consideration, " Why art thou so far from helping me ? " is, accord ing to the laws of Hebrew parallelism, a complete exposition of the language, " Why hast thou forsaken me ? " So Ps. xxxviii. 21, 22, " Forsake me not, O Lord ! O my God, be not far from me ! Make haste to help me, O Lord, my salvation ! " Other passages are Ps. x. 1, xiii. 1, lxxiv. 1, Lxxxviii. 14. As the historical passages in which Christ expressed his feelings under the sufferings which he endured or feared, are of great interest, it may be satisfactory to many readers if I translate, and place in a note at the end of the volume* the expositions of them given by men who are regarded by competent judges of all denominations of Christians as standing in the very first rank as unbiassed, learned, scientific expositors of the Scriptures. De Wette, Liicke, Meyer, Bleek, and Liinemann will be admitted by all who are acquainted with their writings to stand in that rank. After the Essays on the, nature and causes of the sufferings of Christ, and the manner in which he bore them, I have selected two on the design and influence of these sufferings in the atonement which he effected : one by that admirable writer, James Foster, f the most celebrated preacher of his day, of whom Pope wrote, long ago, " Let modest Foster, if he will, excel Ten metropolitans in preaching well " ; and the other by Professor Jowett, of whom I have al ready spoken. The two dissertations, taken together, * See Note A. t By accident this Essay does not appear in its proper place in this volume, but will be found on page 403. XX INTRODUCTION. appear to me to give a very fair and Scriptural view of the Christian doctrine of atonement. The great variety of theories which the specula tions of Protestants have connected with the Christian doctrine of atonement is alone sufficient to show on what a sandy foundation some of them rest. As sacrifices of blood, in which certain false views of Christian redemption had their origin, passed away from the world's regard gradually, so one error after another has been from time to time expunged from the theory of redemption which prevailed at the time of the Protestant Reformation. Luther laid it down plain ly, that the sins of all mankind were imputed to Christ, so that he was regarded as guilty of them and pun ished for them. Thus he says : " And this, no doubt, all the prophets did foresee in spirit, that Christ should become the greatest transgressor, murderer, adulter er, thief, rebel, and blasphemer that ever was or could be in all the world. For he, being made a sacrifice for the sins of the whole world, is not now an innocent person and without sin ; is not now the Son of God, born of the Virgin Mary ; but a sinner, which hath and carrieth the sin of Paul, who was a blasphemer, an oppressor, and a persecutor ; of Peter, which denied Christ ; of David, which was an adulterer, a murder er, &c Whatsoever sins I, thou, and we all have done, or shall do hereafter, they are Christ's own sins as verily as if he himself had done them But wherefore is Christ punished ? Is it not because he hath sin, and beareth sin ? " * Luther's theory was once the prevalent one in the Protestant Church. It is also to be observed, as it contributes to the better understanding of the New England theories * Luther on Gal. iii. 13. INTRODUCTION. XXI which prevail at the present day, that the view of Luther was at one time almost universal in New England. In the year 1650, William Pynchon, a gen tleman of learning and talent, and chief magistrate of Springfield, wrote a book in which, in the language of Cotton Mather, " he pretends to prove that Christ suffered not for us those unutterable torments of God's wrath which are commonly called hell torments, to redeem our souls from them, and that Christ bore not our sins by God's imputation, and therefore also did not bear the curse of the law for them." The General Court of Massachusetts, as soon as the book was received from England, where it was printed, immediately called Mr. Pynchon to account for his heresy, dismissed him from his magistracy, caused his book to be publicly burned in Boston mar ket, and appointed three elders to confer with him, and bring him "to an acknowledgment of his error.* They also chose Rev. John Norton, of Ipswich, to answer his book, after they had condemned all the copies of it to be burned. f Mr. Norton's answer is. now before us, in which he repeats over and over again the prevalent doctrine of the time : — " Christ suffered a penal hell, but not a local ; he descended into hell virtually, not locally ; that is, he suffered the pains of hell due unto the elect, who for their sin de served to be damned." " Christ suffered the essential penal wrath of God, which answers the suffering of the second death, due to the elect for their sin, before he suffered his natural death." " Christ was tor mented without any forgiveness ; God spared him nothing of the due debt." * See Records of Massachusetts Bay, Vol. IV. Part I. pp. 29, 30; also Holland's History of Western Massachusetts, Vol. I. p. 37, &c. t See Note B. XX11 INTRODUCTION. Flavel, a Nonconformist clergyman in England, whose writings continue to be published by the Amer ican Tract Society, and who was contemporaneous with John Norton, thus writes : " To wrath, to the wrath of an infinite God without mixture, to the very torments of hell, was Christ delivered, and that by the hands of his own Father." * "As it was all the wrath of God that lay upon Christ, so it was his wrath aggravated in diverse respects beyond that which the damned themselves do suffer." f In the Confession of Faith $ owned and consented to by the churches assembled in Boston, New Eng land, May 12, 1680, and recommended to all the churches by the General Court held October 5, 1679, is contained the following (Chi VIII. 4) : " The Lord Jesus Christ underwent the punishment due to us, which we should have borne and suffered, being made sin and a curse for us, enduring most excruciat ing torments immediately from God in his soul, and most painful sufferings in his body." This was copied verbatim into the celebrated Saybrook Plat form, adopted by the churches of Connecticut, Sep tember 9, 1708. Some of the preceding views, for questioning which one of the wisest and best men in Massachusetts was so much harassed as to feel obliged to leave the Commonwealth, are now as universally rejected as * Fountain of Life Opened, p. 10, Ser. IV. fol. edit. t Ibid., p. 106. j: This Confession was taken, with a few slight variations in conformity with the Westminster Confession, from the " Savoy Declaration," that is, "A Declaration of the Faith and Order owned and practised in the Congregational Churches in England ; agreed upon and consented unto by their elders and messengers at the Savoy [a part of London], October 12th, 1658," which may be seen in " Hanbury's Historical Me morials," p. 532, &c. INTRODUCTION. xxiii they were once received. But the most objectionable part of them, in a religious point of view, that which supposes supernatural sufferings or tortures to have been immediately inflicted by the Deity upon the soul of Christ, is still retained by many. The late Pro fessor Stuart, as we have seen, supported this view on the ground that the character of Christ for fortitude would otherwise suffer. Many of the books indus triously circulated by the Orthodox sects among the laity contain the doctrine in a very offensive form. The Assembly's Catechism, which declares that Christ " endured the wrath of God," evidently in the sense of Norton and Flavel, is scattered by thousands among the people, and made the standard of faith in the principal theological school of this Common wealth. Vincent, whose explanation of the Assem bly's Catechism has just been republished by the Presbyterian Board of Publication, says : " He, to gether with the pain of his body on the cross, endured the wrath of God, due for man's sin, in hjs soul." With the progress of intellectual and moral philos ophy, however, the doctrine of the imputation of sin to one who had not committed it, came to be held as a mere fiction by many, who yet retained that part of the old doctrine which maintains that Christ bore the punishment of the sins of all mankind. This view avoids the now evident fiction involved in charging the sins of the guilty upon the innocent ; but it has no advantage over Luther's doctrine in reference to the character of the Deity. Luther's theory paid so much homage to the natural sentiments of justice in the human soul, as to make the attempt, though a vain one, to reconcile the conduct which his theology ascribed to God with those sentiments. Luther, with INTRODUCTION. John Norton and others of his school, felt as strongly as any Unitarian of the present day, that, where there is punishment, there must be guilt, and an accusing conscience.* They held, therefore, that Christ was punished because he was guilty, and " sensible of an accusing conscience." But the more modern theory, which holds that Christ bore the punishment of all men's sins without bearing their guilt, involves the idea of punishment without guilt in him who suffers it. It takes away the hypothesis which alone gave it even the show of consistency with the justice of God. The perception of the incongruity involved in the supposition that one should receive punishment who is without guilt, has therefore led many theologians to give up this part of the old theory. It was aban doned by many in England as long ago as the time of Baxter. In New England, since the time of Dr. Edwards the younger, several theological writers have maintained that, as there can be no punishment with out a sense of guilt and condemnation of conscience, but only pain, suffering, torment, it is erroneous to say that Christ endured vicarious punishment for the sins of mankind. Vicarious pain or torment might be en dured by the innocent, but not vicarious punishment. Some, also, on the ground that the sufferings of Christ bear no proportion, in amount and duration, to the punishment which was threatened against sinners, have even rejected the term vicarious as inapplicable. Dr. Dwight says : " It will not be supposed, as plainly it cannot, that Christ suffered in his divine nature. Nor will it be believed that any created nature could in that short space of time suffer what would be equivalent to even a slight distress extended through * See Norton's Answer, &c. p. 119. INTRODUCTION. XXV eternity." * " When, therefore, we are told that it pleased Jehovah to bruise him, it was not as a punish ment." f " It is not true," says Edwards the younger, "that Christ endured an equal quantity of misery to that which would have been endured by all his people, had they suffered the curse of the law As the eternal Logos was capable of neither enduring misery nor losing happiness, all the happiness lost by the substitution of Christ was barely that of the man Christ Jesus, during only thirty-three years ; or rather during the last three years of his life." J Dr. Em mons says : " His sufferings were no punishment, much less our punishment. His sufferings were by no means equal in degree or duration to the eternal sufferings we deserve, and which God has threatened to inflict upon us. So that he did in no sense bear the penalty of the law which we have broken, and justly deserve." § But this concession of the more modern New Eng land theologians to the imperative claims of reason is not of so much importance as it may at first view appear. To say that Christ did not endure the punish ment of the sins of mankind, nor indeed any punish ment whatever, but only an amount of suffering or torment which, in its effect as an expression of the Di vine mind, and in upholding the honor of the Divine government, was an equivalent to the infliction of the punishment threatened against sin, is of little avail, so. long as it is maintained that the chief sufferings of our Saviour were of a miraculous character, incon ceivable in degree, immediately inflicted upon him by * Ser. LVf. Vol. II. p. 217. t Ibid., p. 211. X Sermons on the Atonement, Works, Vol. II. p. 43. § Works, Vol. V. p. 32. xxvi INTRODUCTION. the hand of God over and above those which he in curred from human opposition and persecution in the accomplishment of his work. The concession is made to philosophy, not to religion. So far as the Divine character is concerned, it is of little consequence Whether you call the sufferings of Christ punishment, or only torture immediately inflicted by God for the mere purpose of being contemplated by intelligent beings. Suppose that Christ had ordered the beloved Apos tle John to be crucified, in order to show his dis pleasure at sin, when he forgave Peter, of what conse quence would it be to say that John was not punished, but only tortured, for the sin of Peter? Would Christ deserve the more to be regarded as a righteous being, an upholder of law, a wise moral governor, for inflicting inconceivable anguish of body and mind upon John as the sole ground and condition of forgiv ing the sin of Peter ? How many of the theologians of New England at the present day retain this theory of miraculous suf fering immediately inflicted by the Deity upon the soul of Christ, I have no means of ascertaining. It is not easy to see why the advocates of the govern mental theory, after admitting that the sufferings of Christ were finite and of brief duration, that they were not the punishment, nor, as a penalty, equivalent to the punishment, of the sinner, should seek by mere ratiocination to magnify the sufferings of Christ be yond what the sacred history has recorded them to be, and to bring in the omnipotence and the omniscience of the Deity to inflict a pain which human malice and second causes could not inflict. The mere amount of suffering does not seem to be essential to this theory. The Scriptures contain, as we have seen, INTRODUCTION. XXvii nothing for it. On the contrary, they seem to be positively against it, in insisting, as they do, on the blood of Christ, the death of Christ as a sacrifice, rather than on what he suffered before he died. It is just to state that I do not find, in the sermons on the atonement by Dr. Edwards the younger, Dr. Em mons, and Dr. Woods, reference to any sufferings of Christ, except those which were naturally incident to the discharge of his duty. True, they say nothing against the view held by Dr. Dwight, Dr. Macknight, and some recent writers. But it is to be hoped that they omitted the theory of miraculous suffering, im mediately inflicted by the Deity upon the soul of Christ, because they had abandoned it. May the time soon come when all the advocates of the govern mental theory shall cease to insist on a fragment of the old theory of penal satisfaction, which has no his torical foundation, which is shocking to the feelings of many Christians, and strengthens the objections of the enemies of Christianity. On the other hand, it appears to me that some writers, looking at the subject chiefly in the light of the principles of moral and religious philosophy, have given a somewhat imperfect view of the sentiments of St. Paul respecting the significance of the death of Christ, by maintaining that he limited the influence of it to its immediate effect in producing the refor mation and sanctification of the sinner. This latter view is indeed prominent -throughout the Apostle's writings. Christians are represented as being bap tized to the death of Christ ; that is, to die to sin as he died for it ; to be buried in baptism to sin, and to rise to a new spiritual life, as he was buried and rose to a new life. But the Apostle regards the death of Christ, XXV1I1 INTRODUCTION. not only as exerting a sanctifying influence upon the heart, but as having a meaning and significance, con sidered as an event taking place under the moral government of God, according to his will. Its mean ing serves, according to him, at the same time to manifest the righteousness of God, and his mercy in accepting the true believer. " Whom in his blood, through faith, God has set forth as a propitiatory sacri fice, in order to manifest his righteousness on account of his passing by, in his forbearance, the sins of former times." * It is true that the design of this providential event was still manifestation, and that the contemplation of the sacrifice, and the appropriation of it by faith, were regarded by the Apostle as leading to repentance and sanctification, as "well as to peace of mind. But he contemplates it in this passage under another aspect. He has what may be called a transcendental, as well as a practical, view of this, as. of all events. He contemplates the death of Christ, taking place according to God's will, as illustrating the mind of God ; as manifesting his righteousness, though he forbore adequately to punish the sins of former times, and in mercy accepted as righteous the true Christian believer. His view seems to be that God, by suffering such a person as Jesus, standing in such a relation to him, having a sinless character, and sustaining such an office in relation to the world as Christ did, to suffer and die a painful and ignomin ious death, has declared how great an evil he regards sin to be, and how great a good he regards holiness to be ; in other words, his hatred of sin, and love of holiness. The greatness of the evil of sin, and of the * Rom. iii. 25. INTRODUCTION. good of righteousness, are to be seen in the greatness of the sacrifice which God, in his high providential government of the world, appointed, and which in the fulness of time Christ made. Why is not this view of St. Paul correct ? God is surely to be seen, not only in the works of nature, in the intuitions of the soul, in immediate revelation, but also in the events of Providence. Especially the fact, that under the moral government of God the most righteous men, those in whom the spirit of God dwells most fully and most constantly, are willing to incur reproach and suf fering in the cause of truth, righteousness, and human happiness, shows that the Giver of the Holy Spirit, the Source of all righteousness, regards sin as a great evil, and righteousness as a great good ; that is, hates sin, and loves holiness. Much more, then, if Christ, in whom was the spirit of God without measure, who knew no sin, and who was in various ways exalted above the sons of men, becomes, according to the will of God, and by his own consent, a sacrifice for sin, does he illustrate his Father's hatred of sin, and love of holiness. It appears to me that Edwards the younger, and other advocates of what is called the governmental , theory, have connected with, the view of the Apostle Paul two great errors. One consists in regarding that as the direct and immediate design of the death of Christ which was only incidental to it, as a providen tial event. This appears from the fact that the death of Christ is everywhere in the New Testament de nounced as an evil and a crime. Of course, then, it was opposed to the direct revealed will of God. Everywhere in the New Testament we may learn that the direct design of God in sending his Son was XXX . INTRODUCTION. that the Jews, as well as others, should reverence him. " This is my beloved Son, hear ye him." " He that honoreth not the Son, honoreth not the Father." " Woe unto that man by whom the Son of man is betrayed." It is admitted by all, that the direct will of God is declared in his commands rather than in his providence. Unless the Jews had acted against the will of God, it could not be said that by " wicked hands" they had crucified and slain the Saviour. But when, instead of hearing and reverencing Christ, they persecuted and crucified him, this event was overruled by Divine Providence, so as to convey a re ligious lesson concerning the attributes of God, and his government of the world. •, JThere is no more evi dence that the Jews were inaiagated by God to crucify Christ, than to kill any prophet who had preceded him. There is no more evidence that this was ac cording to the will of God, than any murder which ever took place. The Apostle Paul undoubtedly de clares that Christ gave himself for us according to the will of God (Gal. i. 4) ; and that God had set him forth as a propitiatory sacrifice to manifest his right eousness (Rom. iii. 25). But he uses similar language in regard to many other events. Thus he declares that Pharaoh, the tyrant, was raised up to make known the power of God. (Rom. ix. 17.) But will it be pretended that God gave existence and power to Pharaoh for the direct and exclusive purpose of mak ing known his power, and that his power could not be made known in any other way ? Was it not the will of God that Pharaoh should be a just and benefi cent sovereign ? It is evident from the nature of the case, as well as from the current phraseology of the Scriptures, that the treachery of Judas, and the cruci- INTRODUCTION. XXXI fixion of Christ, were not more immediately ordained by God, than any other case of treachery and murder which ever took place in the world. It is plain, then, that the manifestation of the righteousness of God by the sacrifice of Christ, referred to by St. Paul, was the incidental or indirect design of it, as an event taking place under the government of God, against his re vealed will. The crucifixion of Christ declares the righteousness of God, just as the wrath of man in all cases is caused to praise him. That the manifestation of the righteousness of God was only the incidental design of the sacrifice of Christ, appears also from this circumstance, that it is only when so regarded that it conveys to a rational mind an impression either of his righteousness or his wisdom. That God should so love the world as to send Christ to enlighten, reform, and bless it, though he foresaw that he would not accomplish his purpose without falling a sacrifice to human passions, gives an impression of his benevolence, and of his h'atred of sin and love of holiness. But if he had imme diately and directly commanded the Jewish priests to sacrifice him, or the Jewish rulers to insult, torture, and crucify him, simply that as an object of human contemplation he might manifest the righteousness of God, and his hatred of sin by his infliction of tor ture on an innocent being, then no such effect would be produced by it. The Jewish priests themselves would have said that such a sacrifice was heathenish, an offering such as the Gentiles used to make to Moloch. All the world would say, that such a God- commanded sacrifice, such a direct and immediate infliction of suffering by the Almighty upon an inno cent being, for the main purpose of making known his XXX11 INTRODUCTION. dispositions, and maintaining the honor of his govern ment, was a manifestation of any attribute rather than righteousness. We might believe an express verbal declaration, that such a direct infliction was designed to show God's righteousness ; but in the fact itself of such torture, one could perceive neither righteousness nor wisdom. This may be clearly illus trated by an example. If a human sovereign, the emperor of Russia for in stance, being engaged in war with a rebellious prov ince, and having a son distinguished by military skill, courage, and humanity above all his subjects, should send him at the head of an army, and expose him to all the casualties of war, in order to bring the province into submission, and this son should actually suffer death through the opposition of the rebels, who would not admire the self-denial and benevolence ex hibited by the monarch ? Suppose now, on the other hand, that the rebels ' should, by the labors and sacrifices of that son, have been brought to repentance and submission, and should humbly sue for pardon, and that the monarch should say, " I will forgive you, but in order to express my feelings concerning the crime of rebellion, and to uphold the honor of my government, and maintain the cause of order, I must, as the condition of the for giveness of your crime, inflict inconceivable anguish of mind and body upon my well-beloved son in the sight of all my subjects," and should actually do it with his own hands, would riot the whole, civilized world condemn such a monarch as guilty of injustice, cruelty, and folly ? The consent of the son, could it be obtained, would only serve to deepen the cruelty and folly of the father. INTRODUCTION. XXXlii The incidental effect of the sufferings of the Apostles is spoken of as designed, as expressly as that of the sufferings of Christ. Thus St. Paul says, " Wheth er we be afflicted, it is for your consolation and salvation." * Again, " Yea, and if I be offered up upon the sacrifice and service of your faith," f &c. Again, he speaks of himself as " filling up what is wanting of -the sufferings of Christ," % thus implying that his own sufferings had the same general purpose as those of his Master. Again, the casting away of the Jews is represented by Paul in one verse as the reconciling or atonement of the world ; in another, as the punishment of the Jews for their unbelief. § It is readily conceded that a greater prominence, importance, and influence are assigned by Paul and other New Testament writers to the sacrifice of Christ, than to that of other righteous men. This is owing in part to his pre-eminent character, his supernatural powers and qualifications, the dignity of his office as head of the Church, and to the peculiar circumstances of his life and death. He had a greater agency than others in the work of the Christian atonement, of which, however, the Apostles were yet ministers. || He was the head of the Church. The minds and feelings of the Apostles must have been in the highest degree affected by the ignominious death of their Master. It was the subject of the deepest gratitude that the blessings which they en joyed were purchased by his blood. They had lost all hopes when he expired. His death was opposed to all their views of the Messiah. They had supposed that he would live for ever, ^f This expectation was * 2 Cor. i. 6. t Phil. ii. 17. % Col. i. 24. § Rom. xi. 15, 20. || 2 Cor. v. 18. 1" See John xii. 34 ; Matt. xvi. 22. XXXIV INTRODUCTION. probably not wholly effaced from their minds till they saw him expire. When they preached the Gospel to the Gentiles, they preached the religion of one who had suffered like the vilest malefactor. The circum stance that the death of Christ was so ignominious was a strong reason for their insisting upon it the more, as the means through which they enjoyed the blessings of Christianity. The cross was a stum bling-block to the Jew, and folly to the Gentile. The oftener objections were made to it, the more would the Apostles be led to dwell upon it, and to present it in every light in which it could be presented. In re flecting upon the meaning of it as a providential event, the analogy between it and the sin-offerings of the Jews struck their imaginations forcibly. Certain passages in the prophetic writings, especially Isa. liii., which was originally spoken of the Jewish Church, were adapted to impart additional emphasis to this analogy. It is also very possible that I may have too closely defined the meaning of Paul and other Apostles, in representing the death of Christ as a sacrifice". This idea having once taken full possession of their imagi nations, they may not always have kept in mind the boundary which divides figurative from plain lan guage. They may have connected certain sacrificial ideas or feelings with the death of Christ, which a modern cannot fully appreciate, or strictly define. Being born Jews, familiar with sacrifices from their infancy, and writing to those who, whether Jews or Gentiles, had been accustomed to attach the same importance and efficacy to them, it was natural that they should represent the death of Christ in language borrowed from the Jewish ritual, and that they should INTRODUCTION. XXXV attach an importance to it which savors more of the religion which they had renounced, than of that which they had adopted. But so far as the question whether the atonement by Christ was effected by vica rious punishment, or vicarious suffering, is concerned, it is of no consequence how much importance the Apostles attached to the sacrificial view. For there is no reason to believe that in literal sacrifices vicarious punishment, or suffering, was denoted, or that the pain endured by the animals offered had anything to do with their efficacy or significance.* The other error in the theory of Edwards the younger, and other advocates of the governmental theory, consists in representing the sufferings of Christ as absolutely necessary, as the ground of forgiveness, in the nature of things, or in the nature of the Divine government, or on account of the Divine veracity in reference to the declaration, The soul that sinneth, it shall die. Now in regard to this last consideration, that of the Divine veracity, it is certain that the threat ened penalty of transgression is no more executed when the sinner is forgiven in consequence of severe suffering inflicted upon Christ, than if he were for given, without such an infliction, in consequence of the eternal mercy of God. For the penalty was never threatened except against the sinner. Of course it can never be executed except upon the sinner. It has also been maintained by the advocates of the governmental theory, that to forgive sin on any other ground than that of the infliction of suffering upon Christ, equivalent, in the impression produced by it, to the eternal punishment of all the wicked, would * See Christian Examiner for September, 1855. XXXVI INTRODUCTION. operate as encouragement of wickedness. But it is not easy to see why those who would be encouraged in sin by the hope of being forgiven through the eter nal mercy of God, would not also be encouraged in sin by the hope of being forgiven through the suffer ing inflicted upon Christ, or through any consideration founded on past historical fact. The forgiveness is certain to him who repents and becomes a righteous man on either theory, and may encourage an evil- minded person in one case as well as the other. He who can harden himself in sin in consequence of the infinite mercy of God in forgiving the penitent, can do the same thing in consequence of the exceed ing love of Christ as manifested in his death. That the advocates of some of the old theories should- maintain the absolute necessity of vicarious suffering, does not appear strange. But that the ad vocates of the governmental theory should maintain its absolute necessity as the condition of the forgive ness of sin, so that the Divine mercy could not be exercised, and the honor of the Divine government maintained without it, is surprising. Having denied that the sufferings of Christ are in any sense the punishment of the sins of men, or that they are in any sense penal in their nature, it is singular that they should believe them to be absolutely necessary in order to vindicate the righteousness of God, and cause his government to be respected, so that, without these sufferings as a condition, the mercy of God could not and would not have been exercised in the forgiveness of sin. What! Have men no reason to believe in the righteousness of God, and to respect his moral government, unless they can be convinced of the historical fact that' he immediately and directly INTRODUCTION. XXXvii caused inconceivable sufferings to Christ, as the indis pensable ground of his forgiving a single sin ? Have the unnumbered millions of the human race, who never heard of Christ, and yet believe in the forgive ness of sins, no reason to have faith in the righteous ness of God, and to respect his moral government ? Have the instinctive faith of the human soul in all the perfections of God, the condemnation of sin in the conscience, the retributions of Divine Providence, the intimations of a judgment to come in the human heart and in Divine revelation, no force to convince men that God hates sin and loves holiness, though he be long-suffering and ready to forgive ? Would all these considerations lose their force with one who should believe that God could forgive a penitent, thoroughly regenerated transgressor for his own. eter nal mercy's sake alone? Cannot a father forgive a penitent son, without conveying the impression that he is pleased with sin ? It has been alleged by Edwards the younger, and others, that the very fact of the sufferings and death of Christ as means of manifesting the righteousness of God, and maintaining the honor of his government, implies their absolute necessity; because otherwise they would not have been allowed by the Deity to take place. I am wholly unable to perceive on what principle the mere occurrence of the crucifixion of Christ by the Jews shows its absolute necessity, more than the occurrence of the murder of any prophet or apostle shows its absolute necessity. But it will not be pretended that the purposes of God in the renova tion of the world could not have been accomplished unless Stephen had been stoned to death, and James beheaded, and Peter crucified, however great may d XXXV1U INTRODUCTION. have been the actual influence of these cases of mar tyrdom in the regeneration of the world. Indeed, to argue the absolute necessity of the sacrifice of Christ from the fact of its actual occurrence, is to argue the absolute necessity of every murder that ever occurred in the world. Of course no one has ever denied the necessity of the sufferings of Christ in the same gen eral sense in which the sufferings of all righteous men are necessary, or in which all the evil in the world is necessary. Bishop Butler, in the fifth chapter of Part Second of his Analogy, has shown that by the stripes of righteous men in general, under the government of God, the people are often healed ; and of course that Christ might suffer in a similar way, and for similar ends. But he did not attempt to find anything on earth -analogous to the theories on which I have been remarking. If he had made the attempt, he would have found such analogy only in the practice of the most barbarous Oriental despots. It appears to me that he is guilty of a gross violation of the common use of language when he says, that " vicarious pun ishment is a providential appointment of every day's experience." No one has ever doubted or denied the vicarious punishment of Christ in the sense in which vicarious punishment is matter of every day's expe rience. Every Unitarian, every Deist, would accept such a creed. But this paradoxical use of language has been generally rejected and condemned by mod ern theological writers of every name.* It serves only to confound things which differ. Dr. Edwards and others have also argued the ne cessity of the sacrifice of Christ from the ancient sacrifices of the Jews. But as there was no absolute * See pp. xxiv, xxv. INTRODUCTION. XXXIX necessity for these sacrifices of animals, — as they were of human origin, and only tolerated, or at most sanctioned, by the Deity, — of course there could be no absolute necessity for the sacrifice of Christ; though when it was made, its good effects might be pointed out by the Apostle glancing his eye of faith over the events which took place under the government of God. As to the verse, " Without shedding of blood, there was no remission," the meaning is, that under the actual dispensation of the Jewish law, as per mitted or appointed by God, there was no remission without a sacrifice.* The remark has no relation to the nature of things, or to the absolute necessity of the Divine government, but only to a usage which had passed away. Some passages from the New Testament have also been adduced for the purpose of proving that the sacrifice of Christ was absolutely necessary, as the ground of Divine forgiveness, in the nature of things, or of the Divine government ; such as Luke xxiv. 26, " Ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and to enter into his glory ? " Also verse 46, " It behoved Christ to suffer," &c. But it is evident that the neces sity here referred to by Christ arises simply from that of the fulfilment of prophecy. That he did not con sider them absolutely necessary, is evident from his prayer to have the cup pass from him. See New- come's remarks, pages 207, 210 of this volume. Allowing, as we have done, that the sacrifice of Christ incidentally illustrates the righteousness as well as the love of God, its absolute necessity as a ground of Divine forgiveness is not more evident from * On the subject of the Jewish sacrifices, in their bearing on the work of Christ, see Christian Examiner for September, 1855. xl INTRODUCTION. any language of Scripture, than the absolute necessity of such a tyrant and oppressor- as Pharaoh. For the Apostle adopts similar language respecting Pharaoh : " Even for this same purpose have I raised thee up, that I might show my power in thee, and that my name might be declared throughout all the earth." Will it be pretended that the power and the name of Jehovah could not have been made known except by raising up just such a tyrant as Pharaoh ? The Apos tle is quite as explicit in declaring the design of the exaltation of Pharaoh to be that of manifesting the power of God, as in declaring the design of the sacri fice of Christ to be that of manifesting the righteous ness of God. My general conclusion is, that the Apostle Paul considers the death of Christ under two aspects : — 1. He regards it as an event taking place under the prov idence of God, and according to the Divine will, and in some sense a sacrifice incidentally manifesting the righteousness of God in connection with the exercise of his mercy. See Rom. iii. 21 - 26. 2. He regards it in its immediate moral and religious influence upon the heart and life of the believer. See Rom. vi., vii., &c. He does not appear to regard it as an indispen sable evidence of the Divine righteousness, without which it could not be seen, but only as a new and signal illustration of it in connection with his mercy. The latter view is the most prevalent. The first view relates to the enlightening influence of Christ's death ; the second to its sanctifying influence. In both cases the influence of it is upon God's sub jects, not upon God himself. Perhaps both views are united in the text, " He made him who knew no sin to suffer as a sinner in pur behalf,, that we through INTRODUCTION. xii him might attain the righteousness which God will accept." * I have preferred, for obvious considerations, to dis cuss the subject in the light of Scripture rather than of mere reason. But in regard to the sufficiency of the governmental theory to satisfy the reason, I cannot forbear quoting a few lines from a recent Orthodox writer, the author of the Sermon on the Atonement in the Monthly Religious Magazine, which has re ceived some attention among us. " How could the suffering of one human being, either in amount, or as an expression of God's feelings towards his law, sin, and holiness, be equivalent to the eternal punishment of the wicked, to the smoke of their torment ascend ing for ever ? The suffering of one created being for a few days or years would be, in comparison, as a drop to an ocean We are quite familiar with the answer which is made to reasoning of this kind, — with the argument, that the union of the Divine na ture with the human gave a boundless dignity and worth to the sufferings of that human nature, though having no part in them. But we are constrained to say, that it never commended itself to our judg ment, or gave us the least satisfaction. We cannot see how the Divine nature had, we think we see that it had not, any share in the atonement, if it had no share in the sacrifice which constituted it ; nor how it could give dignity and worth to sufferings by which it was entirely unaffected. We have heard illustration after illustration upon this point ; but to our mind it is like sailing in the face of the wind." f These re marks are the plain dictates of common sense. I have * 2 Cor. v. 21. t See the New Englander for July, 1847, p. 432. d* xiii INTRODUCTION. no doubt that the time will come when the doctrine that a clear perception of the righteousness of God absolutely depended on the sufferings " of the man Christ Jesus during only thirty years, or rather during the last three years of his life," * will be regarded with greater wonder than the doctrine of Luther and Fla- vel and John Norton now is. There are some other differences of opinion among New England theologians, which it will be sufficient only to mention. Thus, while some limit the suffer ings necessary for the atonement to the death of Christ, others take in those of his whole life. Again, while some suppose his sufferings to have been only such as were inflicted by the instrumentality of man, and arose naturally out of his peculiar circumstances and character, others regard his chief sufferings as miraculous, inflicted by the immediate hand of God, independent of those inflicted by human instrumen tality. There is also a great difference of opinion among the New England theologians as to what constituted the atonement. Even among those who have rejected the doctrine of the imputed righteousness of Christ, some make the perfect obedience of Christ a constitii- ent part of it ; others not. Dr. Dwight and some recent writers have maintained, with much earnest ness, that the obedience of Christ is an essential part of it. But Dr. Jonathan Edwards the younger, who seems to be followed by the majority, writes : " I venture to say further, that not only did not the atone ment of Christ consist essentially in his active obe dience, but that his active obedience was no part of his atonement, properly so called, nor essential to it." f * Edwards the younger. See Works, Vol. II. p. 43. 7 t Works, Vol. n. p. 41. INTRODUCTION. xliii On the other hand, the most distinguished New England writer in the Baptist denomination, Dr. Way- land, has expressed the opinion, that -the perfect obe dience of Christ was all that was essential to the atonement. " In what manner did Christ's appearing on earth have any effect upon our moral relations ? To this various replies have been presented. It has been said that his unparalleled humiliation, or his lowly and painful life, his bitter death, were of the nature of a suffering of the penalty of the law. I, however, apprehend that this explanation has not al ways been satisfactory to those who have borne in mind the character of the law which we have violated, and the awful holiness of the Being against whom we have sinned. Besides, the sufferings of Christ, considered by themselves, were not severer, nor was his death itself more excruciating, than that of many martyrs, confessors, and missionaries His obe dience had been so transcendent in virtue, he had so triumphantly vanquished all our spiritual enemies, and put to shame all the powers of darkness, that I know not whether anything more was demanded. ' The Lord was well pleased for his righteousness' sake ' [his obedience], for he had magnified the law and made it honorable. That this was the case would seem prob able, because there is no reference in the Scriptures to his Suffering after death." * There is also a difference of opinion among New England theologians as to the question whether the Divine, or only the human, nature of Jesus suffered and died. Thus a recent writer, the Rev. Mr. Dutton, whose Sermon on the Atonement has been thought worthy of being republished in the Boston Monthly * Wayland's University Sermons, pp. 147, 160. xliv INTRODUCTION. Religious Magazine, maintains the former opinion, — an opinion which strikes me as not only unchristian, but atheistic in its tendency. I have no more fear of its prevalence than of the prevalence of atheism, and therefore shall offer nothing in refutation of it. It is but just to say, however, that this view has found very few advocates. All the distinguished New England theologians, such as Hopkins, Edwards the younger, Dwight, Emmons, Woods, and others, limit the sufferings of Christ to his human nature* Nor has a different opinion ever found its way, so far as I know, into the confession of faith of any church in Christendom. John Norton undoubtedly gave the orthodox or generally received opinion on this point when he wrote, " The second person of the Trinity, together with the Father and the Holy Ghost, did inflict the torments of hell upon the human na ture." f The dissertations selected from the Commentary on St. Paul's Epistles by Mr. Jowett are those which were thought to be most suitable for publication in this volume. I should have been glad to insert two other dissertations from the same work ; namely, that on Natural Religion, and that on the Compar ison of St. Paul with Philo. But the former, in set ting aside some of the usual proofs of the existence of the Deity, did not appear to me to contain such explanations and qualifications as might make it useful to readers unacquainted with the writer's philosophy. The latter was omitted because, though learned and valuable, it was not likely to be useful to persons un acquainted with the Greek language. * See page xxv. t Norton's Answer to Pynchon, p. 122. INTRODUCTION. xiv Several valuable Essays have been selected from the recent Commentary on the Epistles to the Corin thians, in two octavo volumes, by the Rev. Arthur P. Stanley, Canon of Canterbury, who is somewhat known in this country by his Life of Dr. Arnold. His work on the Epistles to the Corinthians manifests the same scholarship and independence, united with rev erence, which distinguish the Commentary by Pro fessor Jowett. The closing Essay on the Credibility of Miracles, by Dr. Thomas Brown, the distinguished author of the well-known Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, has been for some time out of print. It appears to me to meet the objections of Mr. Hume in a far more satisfactory manner than they have been met by most writers on the subject. It cannot escape the notice of the reader, that very few of the Essays in this volume were written by pro fessed Unitarians. Most of them are by eminent divines and scholars of the Church of England. But in the circulation of books the great question should be whether they contain true and just views, and not by whom they were written. That we have been able to select so large a volume of Essays on very important subjects from writers of the Established Church of England in harmony with the views of Unitarians, is a fact highly encouraging in regard to the progress of truth, and at the same time highly creditable, not only to the independence of the writers, but to the practical freedom which at present prevails in that church. No one of them, I believe, has yet incurred any higher penalty on account of his publica tions than that of rewriting his name. It is to be xlvi INTRODUCTION. hoped that the results to which several of the learned writers have arrived, notwithstanding the natural bias arising from their ecclesiastical connections, will se cure for them, from different classes of readers, that candid and attentive consideration which their impor tance demands. The voice which comes from this volume is the united utterance of Episcopalians, Lu therans, and Unitarians. Cambridge, May 7, 1856. ES SAYS FAITH AND SCIENCE* Bt M. GTJIZOT. One of the questions which, theology has oftenest debated, — the foremost, perhaps, at least in the sense that it serves for a prologue to all others, — is the eternal antithesis of rea son and faith. From the powerlessness of reason and the necessity of faith, certain writers make the point of departure and the termination of their works. The same idea at this time inspires and fills almost entirely a multitude of religious writings, whose object is to invoke faith, not to regulate, but to oppress, the reason. I shall not pretend to treat this ques tion in all its extent, as it involves the entire problem of hu man nature and knowledge. I wish, in fact, rather to investi gate the real and natural acceptation of the word faith, so powerful and so mysterious, and exercising such a different empire over the soul of man, sometimes illuminating, and sometimes misleading it ; — here, the source of the most won derful actions ; there, the veil thrown over the basest designs. I wish to ascertain if, according to plain language and the common thought of mankind, there is, in reality, that oppo sition and incompatibility which certain writers endeavor to institute between faith and reason, between science and faith. Such an examination is, perhaps, the best means of solving * Translated in Kitto's Journal of Sacred Literature, Vol. V., New Series, from. Meditations et Etudes Morales, par M. Guizot. 2de edition. Paris. t A FAITH AND SCIENCE. the question which lies concealed under these terms, — of ob taining from them, at least, glimpses of the solution. No one can doubt that the word faith (foi) has an especial meaning, which is not properly represented by belief (croy- ance), conviction (conviction), or certitude (certitude). Cus tom and universal opinion confirm this view. There are many simple and customary phrases in which the word faith (foi) could not be replaced by any other. Almost all lan guages have a specially appropriated word * to express that which in French is expressed by foi, and which is essentially different from all analogous words. This word, then, corresponds to a certain state of the hu man soul; — it expresses a moral fact which has rendered such a word necessary. We commonly understand by faith (foi) a certain belief of facts and dogmas, — religious facts and dogmas. In fact, the word has no other sense when, employing it absolutely and by itself, we speak of the faith. That is not, however, its unique, nor even its fundamental sense ; it has one more extensive, and from which the relig ious sense is derived. We say : " I have full faith in your words ; this man has faith in himself, in his power," &c. This employment of the word in civil matters, so to speak, has become more frequent in our days : it is not, however, of modern invention; nor have religious ideas ever been an exclusive sphere, out of which the notion, and the word, faith, were without application. It is, then, proved by the testimony of language and com mon opinion, first, that the word faith designates a certain interior state of him who believes, and not merely a certain kind of belief; that it proceeds from the very nature of con viction, and not from its object. Secondly, that it is, however, to a certain species of belief — religious belief — that it has been at first, and most generally, applied. * In Greek vop.t£ei.v, mcrreieiv ; in Latin, sententia, fides ; in Italian, credenzq, fede ; in English, faith, belief; in German (if I mistake not), glauben. FAITH AND SCIENCE. 3 Thus, the sense of the word has been special, in fact and in its origin, although it is not fundamentally so ; or rather, the occasion of the employment of the word has been special, although its sense is not so. It would but be a fact without importance, and sufficiently common in the history of the formation of languages and ideas, if the true and general sense of the word faith was reproduced entire in its special employment ; but it has been otherwise. The specialty of the usual acceptation of the word has profoundly obscured the general sense; the true notion of faith has undergone an alteration under the notion of religious faith. And from this disagreement between the historical senses, so to speak, and the philosophical sense of the term, have resulted the obscurity of the moral fact which it expresses, and the greater part of the errors to which it has given place. In truth, the words which express an interior disposition, a certain state of the human soul, have almost always a fixed and identical sense, which is independent of the interior object to which the disposition refers, and of the external cause which produced it. Thus, men love different objects ; — they have contrary certitudes ; — but the words love, certitude, in ordinary language and common life, do not less preserve, always and for all, the same sense ; their general acceptation remains and prevails, whatever be the specialty of their em ployment ; and the passions, interests, and errors of those who make use of them do not want, nor have they the power, to alter it. The destiny of the word faith has been different. Almost exclusively applied to religious subjects, what changes its sense has undergone, and still undergoes every day ! Men who teach and preach a religion, a doctrine, or a re ligious reformation, in making their appeal with all the energy of the freed human spirit, produce in their followers an en tire, profound, and powerful conviction of the truth of their doctrine. This conviction is called faith ; neither masters nor disciples, nor even enemies, refuse it this appellation. 4 FAITH AND SCIENCE. Faith, then, is but a profound and imperious conviction of a rehgious dogma ; it matters but little whether it has come in the way of reasoning, or controversy, or of free and liberal investigation : that which characterizes it, and gives it a claim to be called faith, is its energy, and the dominion it exercises, by this title, over the entire man. Such has been at all times — in the sixteenth century for example — the faith of great reformers and their most illustrious disciples, Calvin after Luther, and Knox after. Calvin, &c. The same men have presented the same doctrine to persons . whom they were not able to convince by methods of reason ing, examination, or science, — to women and to multitudes in capable of long reflection : they have made their appeals to the imagination, to the moral affections, and to the suscepti bility of being moved and of believing through emotion. And they have given the name of faith to the result of this work, as to that of a work essentially intellectual," of which I spake just now. Faith has become a rehgious conviction which was not acquired by reasoning, and which took its rise in the sensuous faculties of man. This is the idea which mystic sects attach to faith. The appeal to man's sensuous nature, and the resulting emotion, have not always sufficed to bring forth this faith. Other sources have then been appealed to. They have en joined practices, and imposed habits. It is absolutely neces sary that a man should, sooner or later, attach ideas to his actions, and that he should attribute a certain meaning to that which produces in him a certain effect. The practices and habits have conducted the mind to the beliefs from which they themselves were derived. A new faith has appeared, which has had for its principal and dominant characteristic submission of the mind to an authority invested with a right to regulate the thoughts whilst governing the lips. In short, neither the free exercise of the intelligence, nor the sentiment, nor practices, have elsewhere succeeded in producing faith. We have said that it is not communicated, and that it is not in the power of man to give it, nor to ac- FAITH AND SCIENCE. 5 quire it by his own pecuhar endeavors ; that it demands the interposition of God, — the action of grace ; — grace has become the preliminary condition, and the definitive charac teristic of faith. Thus by turns the word faith expresses : — lstly. A conviction acquired by the free labor of the hu man mind. 2dly. A conviction obtained by means of the sensitivity (sensibilitc), and without the concurrence, often even against the authority, of the reason. 3dly. A conviction acquired by the very submission of the man to a power which has received from on high the right to command. 4thly. A conviction wrought by superhuman means, — by divine grace. And according as the one or the other of these different faiths, if we may so speak, has prevailed, religion, philosophy, government, and the whole of society have been observed to vary, simultaneously and by a necessary correspondence. How has the same word been able to subserve so many different, and even contradictory acceptations ? What is that mysterious fact which presents itself to minds under such different aspects ? Has the necessity of legitimating the fun damental principle, and the system of the government of dif ferent rehgious beliefs, alone caused the variation of the notion of faith ? or rather, do all these definitions correspond, on some one side, with that state of the human soul; and have they no other irregularity than that of being partial and exclusive ? These are questions which cannot be solved, so long as men persist, as they have done to this day, in characterizing faith by^its causes, or its external effects. It is in itself that the fact must be considered ; we must search out what is the state of mind where faith reigns, independently of its origin and its object. Two kinds of beliefs co-exist in man : • — the one, which I will not call innate, — an inexact and justly-debated expres- 1* b FAITH AND SCIENCE. sion, — but natural and spontaneous, which germinate and establish themselves in his mind, if not without his knowl edge, at least without the co-operation of his reflection and will, by the development solely of his nature, and the in fluence of that external world in the midst of which his life is spent. The others, laborious and learned, the fruit of voluntary study, and of the power which a man has, whether to direct all his faculties towards an especial object with the design of knowing it, or of reflecting upon himself, and of perceiving that which passes within him, and of giving himself an account of it, and thus of acquiring, by an act of the will and reflection, a science which he possessed not before, although the facts which it has for its object subsist equally under his eyes, or within him. That there is moral good and evil, and that man is bound to avoid the evil, and to fulfil the good, — this is a natural, prim itive, and universal belief. Man is so constituted that it de velops itself in him spontaneously, by the course merely of his life, from the first appearance of the facts to which it must apply itself, very long before he could know himself, and could be able to know that he believed. Once originated, this belief acts on the soul of man almost as the blood circulates in his veins, without his willing it, and without his thinking of it. The greater part of mankind have never given it a name, nor formed for themselves a general and distinct idea of it : it does not, however, the less subsist in them, revealing itself every time that the occasion presents itself, by an action, a judgment, or a simple emotion. Human morality is a fact which does not stand in need of human science to throw light upon it. Like every other fact, this also can become a matter of science. The moral being beholds itself, and studies itself: it renders account to itself of the principle of its actions, judg ments, and moral sentiments : it assists at' the spectacle of its own nature, and pretends not only to know, but to govern it, according to its acquired knowledge. Naturally and sponta neously, belief in the distinction of moral good and evil thus FAITH AND SCIENCE. 7 becomes reflective and scientific. Man remains the same ; but he was self-ignorant, and acted simply according to his nature ; nevertheless he knows himself, and his science pre sides over his action. This is but an example ; I could cite a thousand others of the same kind. Man carries within himself a multitude of beliefs of which he has the consciousness, but not the science ; which external facts awaken in him, though they have never been the chosen objects and the special aim of his thoughts. It is by beliefs of this kmd that the human race is enlightened and guided ; they abound in the spirit of the most meditative philosophy, and direct it oftener than the reflective convictions to which it has arrived. Divine wisdom has not delivered over the soul and life of man to the hazards of human science ; it has not condemned it to expect all its intellectual riches from its own proper work. It is, — it lives ; that is enough : by this sole title, and by the progressive development of this fact alone, it will possess lights indispensable for guiding its life, and for the accomplishment of its destiny. It can aspire higher ; it can elevate itself to the science of the world, and of itself; and, by the aid of science, can exercise over the world, and itself a power analogous to creative power. But then it will be required that it should only build on the prim itive foundation which it has received from Providence ; for just as all natural and spontaneous belief can become scien tific, so all scientific conviction received its source and its point of support in natural belief. Of these two kinds of belief, which merits the name of faith ? It appears, at first sight, that this name agrees perfectly with natural and spontaneous beliefs ; they are exempt from doubts and disquietude ; they direct man in his judgments and actions with an imperial authority which he does not dream of eluding or contesting ; they are natural, sure, practical, and sovereign. Who does not recognize in all this the character istics of faith ? Faith has in effect these characteristics; but it has also 8 FAITH AND SCIENCE. others which are wanting to natural beliefs. Almost unknown by the very man whom they direct, they are for him, in a certain way, as external laws, which he has received, but not appropriated, and which he obeys by instinct, but without having given to them an intimate and personal assent. They suffice for the wants of his life ; they guide, warn, urge on, or restrain him, but without, so to speak, his own concurrence with them, and without awakening within him the sentiment of an interior, energetic, and powerful activity ; and without procuring for him the profound joy of contemplating, loving, and adoring the truth which reigns over him. Faith has this power. It is not science, still less is it ignorance. The mind which is penetrated by it has never, perhaps, rendered, and perhaps never will render, an account of the idea which has obtained its faith ; but it knows that it believes it ; it is before it, present and living ; it is no longer a general belief, a law of human nature, which governs the moral man, as the laws of gravity govern bodies ; it is a personal conviction, a truth which the moral individual has appropriated to himself by contemplation, by free obedience and love. From that time this truth does much more than suffice for his life ; it satisfies his soul ; and stiU more than directing, it enlightens it. It is surprising how men live under the dominion of this natural belief that there is moral good or evil, without our being able to say that it has their faith ! It is in them as a master to whom they belong and whom they obey, but without seeing him, and without loving or rendering him homage. That any cause whatever, revealing, so to speak, the consciousness to itself, should draw and fix their regards upon this law of their nature ; that they acknowledge and accept it, as their legiti mate sovereign ; that their understanding should honor itself in contemplating it, and their liberty in obeying it ; that they should conceive of their soul, if I may so speak, as a hearth where truth concentrates itself to spread from thence its light, or as the sanctuary where God deigns to dwell ; all this is more than simple and natural belief, — it is faith. The difference between these two states of the soul is so FAITH AND SCIENCE. 9 real and so profound, that it has been at all times, and still is, one of the principal sources of the diversity of religions and the division of churches. The one is principally applied to spread, or to maintain, general beliefs, fixed and incorporated, in some way, in the habits and practices of life : in short, analogous, by the mode of their influence, to those irreflective and almost instinctive behefs whereof God has made the moral condition of the human race. The others have had, above all, to awaken for the heart and in the soul of each individual, a personal and intimate belief, which should give him a lively feeling of his own intellectual activity and liber ty, and which he might consider as his own peculiar treasure. The former have marched, so to speak, torch in hand, at the head of nations ; the latter have sought to place within each man movement and light. Neither the one nor the other tendency ever could become exclusive ; there have been facts, behefs profoundly individual in religions, which least of all provoke their development ; there are, also, men governed by general and legal behefs, external, in some sense, to their soul, in religions the most favorable to the interior life of the individual. It is not the less true, that, at all times, one or the other of these tendencies has ruled in various religions ; and not only in various religions, but, by turns, in the same religion at various epochs of its existence ; so that the differ ence of the two corresponding states of the soul, and the character of that to which truly the name of faith belongs, are clearly imprinted in the history of humanity. Eeflective and scientific beliefs, on the contrary, have this in common with faith, that they are profoundly individual, and give a lively feeling of interior and voluntary activity. Nothing belongs more to the individual than his science ; he knows where it commenced, and how it has become enlarged, and what means and efforts have been used to acquire it ; and what it has added, so to speak, to his intellectual worth, and to the extent of his existence. But if, by that means, scientific behefs are nearer to faith than natural and irreflec tive behefs, yet, on other sides, they remain much farther 10 FAITH AND SCIENCE. removed from them, and from the first they are confined to doubt and uncertainty. They measure, "and almost admit, various degrees of probability ; and even when they are con fident of their legitimacy, they do not deny that they can be modified, and even overturned, by a wider and more exact science ; — whilst the most entire and immovable certitude is the fundamental characteristic of faith. All science is felt to be bounded and incomplete ; every man who studies, what ever be the object of his study, however advanced and as sured he himself may be of his own knowledge, knows that he has not reached the boundary of his career, and that for him, as for every other, fresh efforts will lead to fresh progress. Faith, on the contrary, is in its own eyes a complete and finished behef; and if it should appear that something yet remains for it to acquire, it would not be faith. It has noth ing progressive, — it excludes all idea that anything is want ing, and judges itself to be in full possession of the truth which is its object. From thence proceeds a vast inequality of power between the different kinds of conviction ; faith, freed from all intellectual labor and from all study, (since, so far as knowledge is concerned, it is complete,) turns all the force of. its possessor towards action. As soon as he becomes penetrated by it, only one task remains for his accomplish ment, — that of causing the idea which has taken possession of his faith to reign and to be realized without. The history of religions — of all religions — proves, at each step, this ex pansive and practical energy of behef, with which the char acters of faith have been converted. It displays itself even on occasions when in no way it appears provoked or sustained by the moral importance or the visible grandeur of results. . I could cite a singular example of it. In the course of our Eevolution, the theoretical and actual superiority of the new system of weights and measures quickly became for some men, who were the subordinate servants of an administration charged with establishing it, a complete and imperious truth, to which nothing could be objected, added, or refused. They pursued from that time its triumphs with an ardor, an obsti- FAITH AND SCIENCE. 11 nacy, and sometimes a prodigious devotion. I have known a public officer, who, more than twenty years after the birth of the system, and when no one scarcely dreamed of disturb ing himself a"ny more about it, gave himself up, day and night, to extraordinary labors, letters, instructions, and verifi cations, which his superiors did not demand, and which he had often great trouble in causing to be adopted, in order to accelerate its extension and strength. The new system of weights and measures was for this man the object of a true faith ; he would reproach himself for his repose, whilst any thing remained to be done for its success. Scientific behefs, even when they would admit of immediate application, rarely carry a man so to struggle against the outer world as to re duce it under his dominion. When the human mind is, above all, preoccupied with the design or the pleasure of knowledge, it there concentrates, and, so to speak, exhausts itself; and there remain for it neither desires nor powers to be otherwise employed. Scientific behefs, accustomed to doubts, to groping in darkness, and to contempts, hesitate to command : without efforts and without anger, they make their appeals to igno rance, uncertainty, and even error, and scarcely know how to propagate themselves, or to act, but by methods which con duct to science ; that is to say, by inciting to meditation and study, they proceed too slowly to be able to exercise outward ly an extensive and actual power. Perhaps, also, the very origin of scientific behefs might be counted amongst the causes which deprive them of that em pire, and that confidence in, action and command, which is the general characteristic of faith. It is to himself that man owes his science ; it is his own work, the fruit of his own labor, and the reward of his own merit. Perhaps, even in the midst of the pride which such a conquest often inspires, a secret warning feehng comes over him, that, in claiming and exercising authority in the name of his science, it is to the reason and the understanding of one man that he pretends to subjugate men, — a feeble and doubtful title to great power ; and which, at the moment of action, can certainly, without 12 FAITH AND SCIENCE. their own consciousness, cast into the soul of the proudest some timidity. Nothing hke this is met with in faith. How ever profoundly individual it is, from the time it has entered into the heart of man, it signifies not by what means, it ban ishes all idea of a conquest which can be his own, or of a discovery the glory of which he can attribute to himself. He is no longer occupied with himself; wholly absorbed by the truth which he believes, no personal sentiment any longer raises itself with his knowledge, excepting the sentiment of the happiness it procures for him, and of the mission it im poses upon him. The learned man is the conqueror and the inventor of his science ; the believer is the agent and the servant of his faith. It is not in the name of his own su periority, but in the name of that truth to which he has yielded himself, that the behever claims obedience. Charged to procure for it sovereignty, he bears himself, in reference to it, with a passionate disinterestedness ; and this persuasion impresses upon his language and upon his acts a confidence and authority, with which the proudest science would in vain endeavor to invest itself. Let us consider how different is the pride which is produced by science, from that which accom panies faith : the one is scornful and full of personality ; the other is imperious and full of blindness. The learned man isolates himself from those who do not comprehend what he knows ; the believer pursues with his indignation or his pity those who do not yield themselves to what he believes. The first desires personal distinction ; the other desires that all should unite themselves under the law of the master whom he serves. What can this variety of the same fault import, excepting that the learned man beholds himself, and reckons himself, in his science, whilst the believing man forgets and abdicates himself in favor of his faith ? It is further necessary to explain how the same idea, the same doctrine, can remain cold and inactive in the hands of the learned man, and with out any practical use even in men whose understanding it has illuminated ; whilst, in the hands of the believer, it can be come communicative, expansive, and an energetic principle of action and power. FAITH AND SCIENCE. 13 Faith does. not, then, enter exclusively either into the one or the other of these two kinds of beliefs, which, at first sight, appear to share the soul of man. It partakes of, and at the same time differs from, natural and scientific beliefs. It is, like the latter, individual and particular : like the former, it is firm, complete, active, and sovereign. Considered in itself, and independent of all comparison with this or that analogous condition, faith is the full security of the man in the possession of his belief; a possession freed as much from labor as from doubt ; in the midst of which every thought of the path by which it has been reached disappears, and leaves no other sentiment but that of the natural and pre-established harmony between the human mind and truth. As soon as faith exists, all search after truth ceases ; man considers himself to have arrived at his object ; his behef is no longer for him anything but a source of enjoyments and precepts ; it satisfies his un derstanding and governs his life, bestows upon him repose, and regulates and absorbs, without extinguishing, his intellect ual activity ; and directs his liberty without destroying it. Is he disposed to contemplation ? his faith opens an ilhmitable field for his thoughts ; they can run over it in all directions, and without fatigue, for he is no longer vexed by the ne cessity of reaching the object, and discovering the path to it; he has touched the boundary, and has nothing more to do but to cultivate, at his leisure, a world which belongs to him. Is he called to action ? He throws himself wholly into it, sure of never wanting impulse and guidance, tranquil and animated, urged on and sustained by the double force of duty and passion. For the man, in short, being penetrated by faith, and within the sphere which is its object, the under standing and the will have no more problems to solve, and no more interior obstacles to surmount : he feels himself to be in the full possession of the truth for enlightening and guiding him, and of himself for acting according to the truth. But if such is the state of the human soul, if faith differs essentially from other kinds of behef, it is evident at the same time that neither natural nor scientific beliefs have anything 2 14 FAITH AND SCIENCE. which excludes faith ; that both one and the other can invest their characters with it ; and, further still, that either one or the other is always the foundation on which faith supports itself, or the path which leads to it. See a man in whom the idea of God has been nothing but a vague and spontaneous behef, the simple result of a course of life and of external circumstances, — an idea which holds a place in his mind and conduct, but on which he has never fallen back and fixed his intellectual regards, and which he has never appropriated to himself by an act of voluntary and briefly-sustained reflection. Let any cause whatsoever — as a great danger or sorrow — strike him with a powerful emo tion, and present to riim the misery of his condition and the weakness of his nature, and awaken within him this need of superior succor, — this instinct of prayer, often lulled to sleep, but never extinguished in the heart of man. All at once the idea of God, till then abstract, cold, and proud, will appear to this man, living, urgent, and particular ; it has attached itself to him with ardor, — it will penetrate into all his thoughts, — his behef will become faith ; and Pascal will be borne out when he said, " Faith is God sensibly realized by the heart." Another has lived in submission to religious practices, with out having associated with them any truly personal convic tion; as an infant, others might make a law for him; as master of himself, he has retained the habit of obedience, docile to a fact rather than attached to a duty, and not dream ing of penetrating farther into the sense of the rule than to verify its authority. A time has arrived when occasions and temptations to offend against this law have presented them selves ; a contest has arisen between the habits and tastes, between the desires, and, perhaps, the passions. What this person could practise without thought has now become a sub ject of reflection, anxiety, and inward sorrow. To preserve its empire, it becomes necessary that the rule, until then mis tress only of the exterior life of the man, should penetrate and establish itself within his soul. It has succeeded in that ; FAITH AND SCIENCE. 15 and to remain true to his practices, he has been required to make sacrifices for them ; and he has made them. The state of his soul is changed : habit is converted into conviction ; practice into duty ; and observance into moral want. In the day of trial, the long submission to a general rule, and to a power clothed with the right to prescribe, has brought forth a particular and individual adhesion of thought and will, — that is to say, what was wantmg to faith. For scientific behefs this transition to the state of faith is more difficult and more rare. Even when, by meditation, rea soning, and study, any one has attained to conviction, he re mains nearly always occupied with the labor which has con ducted to it, his long uncertainties, the deviations by which he has been misled, and the false steps he has made. He has arrived at his object, but the remembrance of the route is present to him, with all its embarrassments, accidents, and chances. He has come into the presence of light, but the impression of the darkness, and the dubious lights he has crossed, are yet present to his thoughts. In vain his convic tion is entire ; there are yet to be discovered traces of the labor which has presided over its formation. It wants sim plicity and confidence. There is a certain fatigue connected with it, which enervates its practical virtue and fruitfulness. He finds trouble in forgetting and overthrowing the scaffold ing of the science, in order that the truth, of which it is the object, may wholly belong to his nature. We might say, the butterfly is restrained by the shell in which it was born, and from which it is not fully disengaged. Nevertheless, although the difficulty is great, it is not in surmountable. More than once, for the glory of humanity, man, by the force of his intelhgence and scientific meditations, has reached to behefs, to which there has been wanting none of the characteristics of faith, — neither fulness nor certainty of conviction, nor the forgetfulness of personahty, nor expan- siveness and practical power, nor the pure and profound enjoyments of contemplation. Who would refuse to recognize in the behef of the most illustrious Stoics in the sovereignty 16 FAITH AND SCIENCE. of moral good, — in Cleanthes, Epictetus, and Marcus Aure lius, — a true faith ? And was not the rehgious faith of the principal Reformers, or Reformed, of the sixteenth century, Zwingle, Melancthon, Duplessis Mornay, the fruit of study and science, as weU as the philosophical doctrines of Descartes and Leibnitz ? And lately, under the idea that falsehood is the source of all the vices of man, and that at no price, in no moment,, and for no cause, can it be necessary to swerve from the truth, did not Kant arrive, by a long series of medi tations, to a conviction perfectly analogous to faith? The analogy was such, that the day when his certainty of the prin- ple became complete and definite constituted an epoch in his memory and life, as others call to mind the event or the emo tion which has changed the condition of the soul ; so that, dating from that day, according to his own testimony, he lived constantly in the presence, and under the empire, of this idea ; just as a Christian hves in the presence, and under the em pire, of the faith from which he expects salvation. Reflective and scientific beliefs can be converted into faith : the difficulties of the transformation are much greater, and the success much more rare, than when natural and spontar neous behefs are concerned. Nevertheless, the transforma tion of science into faith can be, and sometimes is, accom plished ; and if more frequently science stops far short of faith, it is not because there exists something opposed and irreconcilable in their nature, but because faith is placed at the boundary of that course which science is not in a con dition wholly, and of itself, to accomphsh. Nevertheless, it is easy, if. I mistake not, to observe the fault of these theories which I enumerated at the commence ment, and which men and the world so ardently dispute. It is their fundamental error, that they have not regarded faith in itself, and as a special state of the human mind, but in the mode of its formation. They have been thus induced to assign for its essential and exclusive characteristic such and such origins, from which it is possible that faith may be de rived, not admitting it as legitimate, however, or even real, FAITH AND SCIENCE. 17 but when it had a certain especial power ; and rejecting and denying all faith when derived from a different source, al though it should place the soul of man in the same disposition, and produce the same effects. It is true that faith often re ceives its origin from an emotion, as the mystics contend ; but it is also produced by submission to authority, as the Roman Catholic doctors with reason say ; and also from reflection, science, and a full and free exercise of the human under standing, although both the one and the other refuse their assent to this. In his liberal wisdom, God has offered more than one way for arriving at that happy state when, tranquil at length in the possession of his behef, man dreams of noth ing but of enjoying and obeying what he regards as the truth. There is faith in knowledge, since it has truth for its object ; and man can reach it by the faculties which he has received for knowing. There is also love in faith ; for man cannot see the fulness of truth without loving it. The sensuous faculties and the emotions of the soul are sufficient to engender faith. In short, in faith there are respect and submission ; for truth commands, at the same time that it charms and enlightens. Faith can be. the sincere and pure submission to a power which" is regarded as the depository of truth. Thus the va riety of the origins of faith, of which human pride would make a principle of exclusion and privilege, is a benefit be stowed by the Divine will, which, so to speak, has placed faith within reach of all, in permitting it to take its origin from each of the moral elements which constitute faith, — namely, knowledge, submission, and love. As for those who, rejecting every kind of explanation and origin of faith merely human, will see nothing in it but the direct and actual interposition of God and especial grace, their notion, if apparently more strange, is at bottom more natural ; for it touches the problems which do not belong to man to solve. In the external and material world, when a powerful, sudden, and unexpected phenomenon appears, which, at a stroke, changes the face of things, and seems not to at tach itself to their ordinary course, nor to explain itself by 2# 18 FAITH AND SCIENCE. their anterior state, man instantly refers it to a real and par ticular act of the will of the Master of the World. The presence of God can alone explain for man that which strikes his imagination and escapes his reason ; and where science and experience cannot reach, there he assigns an especial and immediate act of God. Thus the thunderbolt, the tempest, earthquakes, vast floods, concussions, and extraordinary revo lutions of the globe, have been taken for signs and effects of the direct action of God, up to the time when man has dis covered for them a place and an explanation in the general course, of facts and their laws. The same want and the same inclination rule man in the ideas he has formed about the in terior world, and the phenomena of which he himself is the theatre and the witness. When a great change and moral revolution have been accomplished in his soul, when he per ceives himself to be illuminated by a light, and warmed by a fire, hitherto unknown, — he has taken no notice of the myste rious progress, the slow and concealed action, of ideas, senti ments, and influences which were probably for a long time preparing him for this state. He cannot attribute it to an act of his own will ; and he knows not how, so to speak, to trace back the course of his interior hfe for the purpose of discov ering its origin. He refers it, therefore, to a divine will, special and actual. Grace alone could have produced this revolution in his soul, for he himself did not make it, nor does he know how it was produced. The birth of faith, above all when it proceeds from natural and irreflective beliefs which pass, without the intervention of science, to this new state, often bears this character of a sudden revolution, unforeseen and obscure for him who undergoes it. It is, then, very plain that the idea of the direct interposition of God has been in voked on this occasion. In the sense which people have com monly attributed to this idea, it withdraws itself and retires, here as elsewhere, before a more attentive study and a more complete knowledge of facts, their connection, and their laws. We are led to acknowledge that this state of the soul, which is called faith, is the development — differently conducted, FAITH AND SCIENCE. 19 sometimes sudden and sometimes progressive, but always natural — of certain anterior facts, with which, although essen tially distinct, it is connected by an intimate and necessary tie. But supposing this recognized, and faith thus conducted to the place which belongs to it in the general and regular course of moral phenomena, a grand question always remains, the question lying hid at the bottom of the doctrine of grace, and which indirectly this doctrine attempts to solve. In ceasing to see God in the tempest and thunder, narrow and weak minds figure to themselves that they shall no more meet with him, and that they shall nowhere any more have need of him. But the First Cause hovers over all second causes, and over all facts and their laws. When ah the secrets of the universe shall have unveiled themselves to human science, the universe wiU yet be a secret to it ; and God appears to withdraw himself from before it, only to invite and constrain it to elevate itself more and more towards himself. In the science of the moral world the same thing happens. When people shall have ceased every moment to invoke grace, and grace alone, to explain faith, it will always remain to be learnt what power presides over the life of the soul ; how truth reveals itself to man, who is un able either to seize or reject it, according to his own will ; from whence comes that fire whose hearth is evidently ex ternal to himself; what relations and communications^ exist between God and man ; what, in short, in the interior hfe of the human soul, is the share of its own activity and freedom, and what it must attribute to that action which proceeds from without, and to that influence from on high which the pride or the levity of the human mind endeavors not to know. This is the grand problem, the problem that presents itself the moment we touch that point where the things of earth and man are joined to that higher order on which man and the earth so clearly depend. The doctrine of grace is one of the attempts of the human mind to solve it. The solution, at least in my opinion, is beyond the limits assigned to human knowledge. I have endeavored to determine with precision what faith 20 FAITH AND SCIENCE. is in itself, independently of its object ; I have laid down the characteristics of this state of the soul, and the different paths by which man can be conducted to it, whatever may be, so to speak, its materials. By this means we may be able to suc ceed in ascertaining the true nature of faith, and in bringing it into clearer hght, disengaging from every foreign element the moral fact concealed under this name. I hasten to add, nevertheless, that this moral fact is not produced indifferently in all cases ; that all human behefs, whether natural or scien tific, are not equally susceptible of passing from the condition of faith ; and that, in the vast field where human thought is exercised, there are objects especially calculated to awaken a conviction of this kind, to become materials for faith. This is a fact which is attested even by the history of the word, and which I noticed at the beginning ; its common ac ceptation is also special. At first sight, it seems to be exclu sively consecrated to religious behef; and although it lends itself to other uses, and although, even in our own days, its sphere seems to be enlarged, it is evident that, in a multitude of cases where it is concerned (for example, with geography, botany, technology, &c), the word faith is out of place ; that is to say, the moral state to which this word corresponds is not produced by such subjects. As faith has its pecuhar interior characteristics, so it has also its exterior necessary conditions ; and it is distinguished from other modes of belief of man, not only by its nature, but by its object. But what are the conditions, and what is the external sphere, of faith ? Up to a certain point we can determine and catch glimpses of them, from the very nature of this state of the soul, and its effects. A behef so complete, so accomplished, that all intel lectual labor seems to have reached its termination, and that man, wholly united with the truth of which he thinks himself to be in possession, loses all thought of the path which has conducted him to it, — so powerful, that it takes possession of the exterior activity, as weU as of the human mind, and makes FAITH AND SCIENCE. 21 submission to its empire in all things a passionate necessity, as well as a duty, — an intellectual state, which can be the fruit, not only of the exercise of the reason, but also of a powerful emotion, and of a long submission to certain prac tices, and in the midst of which, when it has been once de veloped, the three grand human faculties are actively em ployed, and at the same time satisfied, — the sensibility, the intelligence, and the will ; — such a condition of soul, and such a behef, demand in some sort occasions worthy of it, and must be produced by subjects which embrace the entire man, and put into play all his faculties, and answer to aU the demands of his moral nature, and have a right, in turn, to his devoted- ness. Intellectual beauty, and practical importance, appear then, a priori, to be the characteristics of the ideas proper for becoming the materials of faith. An idea which should pre sent itself as true, but at the same time without arresting by the extent and the gravity of its consequences, would produce certitude ; \>ut faith would not spring from it. And so prac tical merit — the usefulness of an idea — would not suffice for begetting faith ; it must also draw attention by the pure beauty of truth. In other words, in order that a simple behef, natural or scientific, should become faith, it is necessary that its ob ject should be able to procure the pleasures of activity, as well as of contemplation, that it may awaken within the double sentiment of its high origin and power ; in short, that it should present itself before man's eyes as the mediator between the moral and the ideal world, — as the missionary charged with modelling the one on the other, and of uniting them. Facts fully confirm these inductions, drawn from the mere nature of the moral phenomenon I am studying. Whether we regard the history of the human race, or whether we penetrate into the soul of the individual, we see faith through out applying itself to objects in which the two aforesaid con ditions are united. And if sometimes the one or the other of these conditions is wanting, — if, on some occasions, the 22 FAITH AND SCIENCE. object of faith should appear in itself denuded of ideal beauty or practical importance, — we may hold it for certain, that it is not so in the thought of the behever. He will have soon discovered, from the truth which is the object of his faith, consequences and applications which for others are obscure and distant, but for him clear and infallible. Before long his ideas, which appear to have but one aim and one useful merit, will be elevated in his mind to the rank of a disinterested theory, and will possess in his eyes all the dignity and all the charm of truth. It is possible that the believer is deceived, and that he exaggerates the practical worth or intellectual beauty of his idea ; but even his error, agreeing in this with the reason and experience of the whole human race, is but a new proof of the necessity of these two conditions for the production of faith. We can understand, however, why the name of faith is almost the exclusive privilege of rehgious behefs : these are, in fact, those whose object possesses in the highest degree the two characters which excite the development of faith. Many scientific notions are beautiful and fruitful in their applica tion ; pohtical theories may forcibly strike the mind by the purity of their principles and the grandeur of their results ; moral doctrines are yet more surely and generally invested with this twofold power ; and either has often awoke faith in the soul of man. Nevertheless, in order to receive a clear and lively impression, sometimes of their intellectual beauty and sometimes of their practical importance, there is almost always required a certain amount of science, or sagacity, or, at aU events, a certain turn of public manners and the social state, which are not the portion of all men, nor of all times. Rehgious behefs have no need of any such aids ; they carry with themselves, and in their simple nature, their infallible means for effect. As soon as they penetrate into the heart of man, however bounded in other respects may be the develop ment of his intelligence, however rude and inferior may be his condition, they will appear to him as truths at once sub lime and common, which are apphcable to all the details of FAITH AND SCIENCE. 23 his earthly existence, and open for him those high regions, and those treasures of intellectual life, which, without their hght, he would never have known. They exercise over him the charm of truth the most pure, and the empire of interest the most powerful. Can we be astonished that, as soon as they exist, their passage to the state of faith should be so rapid, and so general ? There is yet another reason more hidden, but not less decisive, and which I regret I can only refer to ; — the object of rehgious behefs is, in a certain and large measure, inacces sible to human science. It can verify their reality; it can reach even to the limits of this mysterious world, and assure itself that there are facts to which the destiny of man infallibly attaches itself; but it is not permitted to reach these facts themselves, so as to submit them to its examination. Struck by this impossibility, more than one philosopher has concluded that there was nothing in them, since reason could perceive nothing, and that rehgious behefs address themselves but to the fancy. Others, bhnded by their impotence, have tardily sprung forward towards the sphere of superhuman things, and, as though they had succeeded in penetrating into it, have described facts, solved problems, and assigned laws. It is difficult to say which mind is the most foolishly proud, that which maintains that what it cannot know is not, or that which pretends to be capable of knowing all that is. What ever may be the case, neither the one nor the other assertion has ever obtained for a single day the avowal of the human race ; its instinct and practices have constantly disavowed the nothing of the incredulous, and the confidence of theologians. In spite of the first, it has persisted in believing in the exist ence of an unknown world, and in the reality of those rela tions which hold mankind united to it ; and notwithstanding the power of the second, it has refused to admit that they have attained the object, and lifted the veil ; and it has con tinued to agitate the same problems, and to pursue the same truths, as ardently and laboriously as at the first day, and as if nothing had yet been done. 24 FAITH AND SCIENCE. See, then, what, in this respect, is the situation of man. Natural and spontaneous rehgious beliefs are produced in him, which, by reason of their object," tend at once towards the state of faith. They can arrive at it by means foreign to reasoning and science, — by the emotions and by practices ; and the transition is often thus actually brought about. One other way appears open before man. Rehgious behefs natu rally awaken within him the want of science, which not only desires to render an account of them, but aspires to go much farther than they can conduct it, to know truly this world of mysteries, of which they afford it glimpses. Oftentimes, though, if I mistake not, wrongly, it flatters itself it has suc ceeded ; and thus theology, or the science of divine things, is formed, which is the origin of that rational and learned faith, of which so many illustrious examples do not permit us to contest the reality. Often, also, man, by his own confession, fails in his enterprise ; the science which he has pursued after resists his most skilful endeavors, and then he falls into doubt and confusion, — he sees those natural and irreflective behefs darkened, which served him for his starting-point ; or, in fact, despairing of the variety of his attempts, and always tor mented by the want of that faith which he has promised him self to establish by science, he returns to his early behefs, and requires of them to conduct him to faith, without the help of science ; that is to say, by the exaltation of his sensuous faculties, or by submission to a legal power, the depository of the truth which his reason cannot seize. Theology itself, from the moment when it announces itself as a science of the relations of God with man and the world, and presents to the human mind its solutions of the rehgious problems which besiege it, proclaims nothing less than that these problems are impenetrable mysteries, and that this science is interdicted to human reason ; and that faith, born of love, submission, or grace, is alone able to open the under standing to truths, which, however, theologians undertake to reduce to systematic doctrine, in order to be able to teach or demonstrate them to the reason. To such an extent does a FAITH AND SCIENCE. 25 feeling of the powerlessness of human science, in this matter, remain imprinted upon him in fact; although everywhere man appears to boast himself of having escaped it. Thus, also, is explained that obscure physiognomy, if I may so express myself, which appears to be inherent in the word faith, and which has so often made it an object of a kind of distrust and dislike to strict and free minds. Frequent above all within the rehgious domain, and there oftentimes invoked by the powerful and learned, sometimes for the purpose of making up for the silence of the reason, and sometimes for the purpose of constraining the reason to be silent, faith has been considered only under this point of view, and judged only after the employment to which it lends itself on this occa sion. People have concluded that this behef was essentially irrational, blind, and the fruit of ungoverned imaginations ; or else imposed by force, or fraud, on the weakness or ser vility of the mind. If I have truly observed and described the nature of that which bears the name of faith, the error is evident. On the contrary, faith is the aim and boundary of human knowledge, the definite state to which man aspires in his progress towards truth. He begins his intellectual career with spontaneous and irreflective behefs ; at its termi nation is faith. There is more than one way — but none certain — for leaping over this interval ; but it is only when it has been leaped over, and when behef has become faith, that man feels his nature to be fully satisfied, and gives him self up wholly to his mission. Legitimate faith, that is to say, that which is not mistaken in its object, and addresses itself really to the truth, is then the most elevated and most perfect state to which, in its actual condition, the human mind can arrive. But faith may be illegitimate ; it may be the state of mind which error has produced. The chance of error (experience at every step proves it) is here even much greater, as the paths which lead to it are more multiphed, and its effects more powerful. Man may be misled in his faith by feehngs, habits, and the empire of the moral affections, or of external circumstances, as well as by the insufficiency or 3 26 FAITH AND SCIENCE. the bad employment of his intellectual faculties ; for faith can take its origin from these different sources. And, neverthe less, from the time of its existence, faith is hardy and am bitious ; it aspires passionately to expand itself, to invade, to rule, and to become the law both of minds and facts. And not only is it ambitious, but bold ; it possesses and displays, for the support of its pretensions and designs, an energy, address, and perseverance, which are wanting to almost all scientific opinions. So that there is in this mode of behef, far more than in any other, chance of error for the individual, and chance of oppression for society. For these perils there is but one remedy, — liberty. Whether man believes, or acts, his nature is the same ; and to avoid becoming absurd or guilty, his thought stands in need of constant opposition and constraint, as well as his will. Where faith is wanting, there power and moral dignity are equally wanting ; where liberty is wanting, faith usurps, then misleads, and at length is lost. Let human behefs pass into the state of faith ; it is their natural progress and their glory ; and in their effort towards this object, and when they have reached it, let them constant ly continue under the control of the free intellect ; it is the guaranty of society against tyranny, and the condition of their own legitimacy. In the coexistence and mutual respect of these two forces reside the beauty and the security of social order. THE LAW AND THE GOSPEL. By the Eev. BADEN POWELL, M. A., F. E. S., E. G. S., BATIIJAN PROFESSOR OP GEOMBTRT IN THE UNIVERSITY OP OXFORD. 'O yap Xpianavia-fios ovk els 'IouSaJtr/ioi' imorevs, k. t. X. 2 Tim. iii. 16. — Te. t 2 Cor. xi. 17. Also comp. 1 Cor. vii. 40. X 1 Cor. iv. 17. 4 2 Tim. iii. 11. |[ In Johann., Tom. I. p. 4, ed. 1668. 1 Ibid., Tom. I. p. 183. — Te. ** De Consensu Evangel., I. 35. ft Ibid., II. 12. XX " Ut quisque meminerat, et ut cuique cordi erat." §§ De Consensu Evangel., II. 28. " Quae cum ita sint per hujusmodi evangelistarum locutiones varias, sed non contrarias, rem plane utilissi- rnam. discimus et pernecessariam, nihil in cujusque verbis nos debere in- spicere, nisi voluntatcm, cui dcbent verba servire, nee mentiri quemquam, si aliis verbis dixerit quid ille voluerit, cujus verba non dicit : ne miseri aucupes vocum apicibus quodammodo literarum putent ligandam esse veritatem, cum utique non in verbis tantum, sed etiam in cajteris omni bus signis animorum non sit nisi ipse animus inquirendus." 7 74 THE DOCTRINE OP INSPIRATION. of the Evangehsts might be ever so contradictory, provided only that their thoughts were the same. Jerome, who was an accomplished grammarian, so fully recognized the diversities incident to the style of the Apostles, that he often imputes solecisms to their language, and writes of Paul that he had used " sermone trivii," street language.* The great bishop and expositor, Chrysostom, who declared such confidence in the Scripture as to say that aU the contra dictions (enantiophonien) found there are, after all, only ap parent contradictions (enantiophanien),f has nevertheless taken the liberty to remark upon the words of Paul in Acts xxvi. 6 : " He speaks humanly, and does not throughout enjoy grace, but it is permitted him even to intermix his own materials." % We see, then, that even amongst the ancient Church Fa thers, although they had a general impression of the divinely inspired character of Scripture, the opinion that its language was human and imperfect was held to be unmistakable ; that verbal contradictions, nay, contradictions even in matters of fact, were ascribed to it without hesitation ; and that the au thority of the Apostohcal writings was regarded as secondary to those which were said to have proceeded immediately from God himself. Sect. 4. — Views of Inspiration in the Roman Catholic Church. — The Scholastics. The Cathohc Church, since the time when the dogma of the infalhbihty of ecclesiastical tradition as the interpreter of * Ad. Eol., 3. 1. " Jerome, when commenting on the passage Gal v. 12, finds no difficulty in supposing that St. Paul, in the choice of an expression, is governed by the vehemence of an emotion, arising how ever, out of a pure temper of heart. ¦ Nee minim esse, si Apostolus ut homo, et adhuc vasculo clausus infirmo, vidensque aliam legem in cor pore suo captivantem se et ducentem in lege peccati, semel fuerit hoc loquutus, in quod frequenter sanctos viros cadere perspicimus ' " Nean der, Church Hist., IV. p. 12, ed. Clark. — Te. f Opera, Tom. VH. p. 5. * X Ibid., Tom. X. p. 364. 'AirfpomW SmXeyerm Kal ov navraXov ¦ns xapiros d„o\ain, d\\a Kal nap' iavrov t\ avyx