MR GHAMBERLAIN

HIS HFE 6 WELIC CAREER

"Igiveihefe Books
\-ftir. the fimndinjtf a- ColUgt- in this Colonff

^^^^^^&a^^^^^

BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME
OF THE
PERKINS FUND
190-^

MR CHAMBERLAIN : HIS LIFE AND
PUBLIC CAREER

MR CHAMBERLAIN
HIS LIFE AND
PUBLIC CAREER

S. H. J EYES

^

SANDS & CO.
LONDON: ii HENRIETTA STREET, STRAND
EDINBURGH : 13 BANK STREET
1903

YALE

3y ^4. !t4

CONTENTS

PAGE

Introduction ..... xvii
CHAPTER I
Early Life ..... i
Parentage and Early Training — Reminiscences of University
College School — Views on Education — Unitarian Associa
tions — Life in Birmingham — Business Career — Debating
Society — First Marriage — Political Opinions — National
Education League — Mr Forster's Bill — Birmingham
School Board — Discontent with Liberal Policy — Second
Marriage — Municipal Activity — Social Reforin — Limits of
Municipal Administration — Career as Mayor.
CHAPTER II
From Free Lance to Minister . . 49
Republican Theories— Reception of the Prince of Wales — " The
Next Page of the Liberal Programme" — Retirement from
Business — Member for Birmingham — Work in the House
of Commons — Visit to Sweden — The Gothenburg System —
Temperance and Compensation — Views on Foreign Policy
— Beginnings of the "Caucus" — Mr Gladstone and the
Radicals — Mr Bright and Mr Chamberlain — The 1880
General Election — The Alliance of Radicals and Liberals
— A Joint Victory — Work of the Caucus.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER III
PAGE
The Radicals and Ireland . . -83
Mr Gladstone's Second Administration — Mr Chamberlain in the
Cabinet — The Radical Influence — Antagonism to Mr
Forster — The Land League — Mr Parnell and the Physical
Force Party — The Compensation for Disturbance Bill — Mr
Chamberlain on the House of Lords — Lord Salisbury on
Mr Chamberlain — Disorder and Coercion — The Radicals
thrown over by Mr Gladstone — Mr Chamberlain and the
Nationalists — Irish Obstruction — The Land Bill of i88i —
Mr Chamberlain on Parnellite Ingratitude — Home Rule
or Separation — The Treaty of Kilmainham — Criticism in
Parliament — Mr Forster's Resignation — The Murders in
Phoenix Park — -Mr Chamberlain's attitude to the Irish
Party — Coercion renewed — " Qualified Peace " — Hopes for
the Future.

CHAPTER IV
Foreign Affairs, 1880-1885 . . .126
The Entanglement in Egypt — Mr Bright's Resignation — Sir
Charles Dilke in the Cabinet — Mr Chamberlain on the
French Alliance — The Boer Rebellion — Retrocession of
the Transvaal — Mr Chamberlain's Defence — The Evacua
tion of Candahar — The Bechuanaland Expedition — The
Mahdist Rising — Gordon's Mission — Failure to relieve Him
— The Penjdeh Complication — War in View — Mr Chamber-
Iain on Egyptian Developments.
CHAPTER V
At the Board of Trade

IS3

Mr Chamberlain's Success as an Administrator — His Pertinacity
in the Cabinet— His first Bills— Grand Committees— The
Bankruptcy Act, 1883- Charges of Favouritism— Patent

CONTENTS

Legislation — The Merchant Shipping Agitation — Mr Plim-
soU's Methods — Mr Chamberlain's Inquiries — Protest
against his Bill — The Measure Withdrawn — Mr Chamber
lain offers to Resign — Interview with Mr Gladstone — Subse
quent Shipping Legislation.

CHAPTER VI
The Franchise Agitation, 1883-1885 . . 174
The Demand for a New Reform Bill — Mr Chamberlain and Lord
Salisbury — " They toil not, neither do they spin '' — The
Conservative Attitude — Prayer for the Peers — A Redistri
bution Bill insisted on — A Political Impasse — Mr Chamber
lain on Lord Randolph Churchill — The Blank Cheque for
Two Millions — Mr Gladstone's Warning to the House of
Lords — Attempts at Negotiation — Lord Salisbury on
Popular Demonstrations — Mr Chamberlain's Retort —
The Record of the Peers — The Doctrine of Ransom — Lord
Hartington's Hint of a Compromise — Mr Chamberlain's
Declaration— An Unexpected Disclosure — Terms arranged.
CHAPTER VII
The Radical Policy ..... 209
The Unauthorised Programme — " The Radical Programme "—
The "Three F.'s" for England — Mr Chamberlain on the
Whigs— The Skeleton at the Feast— A Political Rip Van
Winkle — The "Stop-gap Ministry" — Not a Communist —
" Three Acres and a Cow "— " Myself and Mr John Cade "—
Controversies with Lord Salisbury — Views on Ireland — A
Radical Ultimatum — Tory Democrats and Whigs.
CHAPTER VIII
As a Home Ruler .... 234
Conservatives Coquetting with Home Rule — Lord Randolph
Churchill and Lord Carnarvon — Coercion Suspended —

CONTENTS

Lord Salisbury at Newport — Mr Chamberlain's Position —
A Scheme of National Councils — Mr Parnell raises his
Terms — Mr Chamberlain's Reply — Mr Gladstone's Appeal
to Great Britain — Home Rule Feelers — Overtures to Lord
Salisbury — The New Parliament — Coercion to be renewed
— The Conservative Ministry defeated — The Home Rule
Ministry — Mr Chamberlain offered a Place — Provisional
Acceptance — Mr Gladstone's Policy — Mr Chamberlain's
Resignation — Hopes of Liberal Reunion — Mr Gladstone's
Concessions— The " Caucus " Captured — Mr Chamberlain's
Conditions — Dissentient Liberals — A New Combination
suggested — Position of the Unionist Radicals — The Bill
thrown out — Mr Gladstone's Appeal to the Country.

CHAPTER IX
As a Unionist ..... 272
The National Radical Union — Lord Salisbury's Understanding
with the Liberal and Radical Unionists — Different Attitudes
of Lord Hartington and Mr Chamberlain — Resignation of
Lord Randolph Churchill — Mr Chamberlain's Distrust of
the Conservative Ministry — The Round Table Conference
— Mr Chamberlain's Article in The Baptist — The Confer
ence discharged — The Plan of Campaign — The Crimes
Act — Mr Chamberlain on Coercion — The " Parnell Letters "
— Mr Chamberlain's Final Rupture with the Liberals — His
Diplomatic Mission to America — A Visit to Ulster —
Exasperation of the Irish Americans — Rejection of his
Fisheries Convention — Marriage to Miss Endicott — Speech
on the Parnell Commission — Animosity of the Nationa
lists.
CHAPTER X
Conservative-Radical Legislation, 1886- 1892 301
Relations between the Unionist Parties — Strong Position of the
Liberal Unionists — Mr Chamberlain's Demands on the
Government — Minor Social Legislation — Allotments and

CONTENTS xi

PAGE

Cottage Gardens — Small Holdings — Irish Tenants' Relief
— A Small Party Crisis — Reduction of Licences — Mr
Goschen's Proposals — Land Purchase in Ireland— Irish
Local Government Bill — The Creation of County Councils
in England and Wales — Free Education — Mr Chamber
lain and the Voluntary System — An " Act of Apostasy " —
Understanding with the Conservatives on Education —
The General Election of 1892 — Defeat of Ministers— The
Liberal-Unionist Position.

CHAPTER XI
The Home Rule Administration . 324
Meeting ofthe New Parliament- — The Vote of Want of Confi
dence — Mr Chamberlain's Speech — A Programme for the
Unionists — The Social Legislation of Conservatives — Mr
Chamberlain on New Trade Unionism — A General Attack
on Liberal Policy — The Queen's Speech — ¦" Filling up the
Cup" — The Second Home Rule Bill — Mr Chamberlain's
Criticisims — Slow Progress in Committee — Closure by
Compartment — Mr Gladstone and Mr Chamberlain —
Disorder in the House — Unionist Dispute at Leamington
— Welsh Disestablishment — Employers' Liability Bits —
Lord Dudley's Amendment — Parish Councils — The House
of Lords and Betterment — Mr Gladstone's Last Speech in
Parliament — Lord Rosebery Prime Minister — Mr Chamber
lain the Guest of a Conservative Club — Unionist Coalition
— A National Party — An Imperialist Speech — Attack
on the New Radicalism — Lord Rosebery on Home Rule —
Mr Chamberlain's Criticisms — Replies and Rejoinders — Mr
Chamberlain on Democratic Imperialism — On the Mani
festo against the Peers — ^What the Unionists could do — On
"Filling up the Cup" — A Tottering Government — On
London Government — Scheme for Municipal Boroughs —
Mr Balfour and Mr Chamberlain — Lord Salisbury's Tribute
— Mr Chamberlain on Conservative Co-operation — Relief
for the Farmers— The Cordite Vote— Defeat ofthe Liberal
Government.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER XII

The Unionist Administration, 1895-1900 . 378
The Allocation of Offices — Mr Chamberlain's Choice — His
Qualifications — Colonial Office Traditions — Undeveloped
Estates — A Business-like Circular — A Dream of Feder
ation — Relief for Voluntary Schools — The Misunderstand
ing with the United States — Commerce and Politics —
Denouncing the German and Belgian Treaties — Compen
sation for Workmen — Address to Glasgow University —
Controversy with Sir William Harcourt — West Indian
Questions— Irish Local Government Bill — The " Long
Spoon" Speech — The Effect Abroad — Advice to the Paris
Press — A Suggested Alliance — Foreign Repudiations —
London Boroughs — Old Age Pensions — Attacks and
Reply — Mr Chaplin's Committee — Optimism about the
War — Relations with Mr Balfour — Correspondence of
Radical Members with Boers — The " Khaki Election."

CHAPTER XIII

The Unionist Administration, 1900-1903 . 436
Appeals of Party Leaders — -The Heywood Telegram — Changes
in the Ministry — Mr Chamberlain's Investments — A Wider
Basis of Taxation — Factory Legislation — Royal Titles Act
— The Corn Duty — Conduct of the British Army — A
Comparison with German Troops — Indignation in Berlin —
German Chancellor's Remarks — Mr Chamberlain's Retort
— Opinion in the Colonies — The Education Bill — Mr
Chamberlain's Constituents — A Liberal-Unionist Con
ference — Closure by Compartment — The Theory of
Obstruction — Altercations in Parliament — The South
African Mission— General Confidence — The Birmingham
" Send-off " — Legislation in 1903— Chamberlain's Return
—His Startling Declaration— The Corn Duty— Unnatural
Position of Parties.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER XIV
PAOE
From the Raid to the War . . . 482
The " Jumping-off Ground" — Chartered Company and Colonial
Office — The Charges against Mr Chamberlain — Evidence
on both sides — Report of the Committee — Mr Labouchere's
Views — Discussion in Parliament — Mr Chamberlain on Mr
Rhodes — The " Missing Telegrams " — Retrospect of
Relations between the British Government and the South
African Republic — The Raid and its Consequences — Sir
Hercules Robinson — Mr Rhodes in England — Alliance of
Transvaal and Orange Free State — The Bill for Damages
— The Law Aliens — The High Commissioner — Demands
of the Uitlanders — Bloemfontein Conference — Schreiner
Ministry at the Cape — Proposals and Counter-pro
posals — Mr Steyn's Attitude — Boer Ultimatum — Pacific
Efforts of Mr Chamberlain — " The Sand is running down
in the Glass " — Colonial Secretary and High Commissioner
— The Boers put in the Wrong — Defenceless Natal —
Middelburg Negotiations — Plans for Reconstruction — Sir
D. Barbour's Commission — Treaty of Vereeniging —
Responsible Government in Cape Colony.

CHAPTER XV

The West Indian Colonies . . -555
Chronic Distress — Permanent and Removable Causes —
Commission appointed — Remedies suggested — Sugar
Bounty Question — Brussels Conferences — Gratitude of the
Planters — Economic Reforms — Grants in Aid — Great
Hurricane — Volcanic Eruption — Mismanagement in
Jamaica — Mr Chamberlain's Action — Encouragement of
the Fruit Trade — Colonial Loans Act — Malaria
Problem.

xiv CONTENTS
CHAPTER XVI
PAGE
West African Possessions . . .580
Insubordination of Prempeh — Kumasi Occupied — Develop
ment of the Territory — The Ashanti Rising — The
Willcocks Expedition — Trouble in Sierra Leone — The
Hut Tax — Benin Massacre — The Niger Company-—
Convention with France — Reorganisation of Nigeria —
Lagos — Bornu — Capture of Sokoto — Industrial Develop
ment of West Africa.
CHAPTER XVII
Downing Street Problems . . . 609
Australian Federation — Delegates in Downing Street — The
Commonwealth Bill — Controversy on Clause 74 — The
Compromise — The Newfoundland Ministers and Mr Reid
—. French Treaty Rights — Behring-sea Dispute — Mr
Chamberlain and Mr Sherman — The Alaska Boundary —
Agitation in Malta — Deputation to the Colonial Office —
Interview with Mr Chamberlain — The Language Question
— Official Despatches — Obstruction in the Council —
Decisive Action of the Colonial Office — Mediation of
Italy — The Language Proclamation Withdrawn — Mr
Chamberlain's Speech — Hong-Kong — Samoa — Norfolk
1 sland — Ceylon — -Cyprus.
CHAPTER XVIII
The South African Settlement . . 646
The Boer Generals in Europe — Their Appeal to the Civilised
World — Interview with the Colonial Secretary — Mr Kriiger
and Dr Leyds— Mediation offered by the Dutch Govern
ment — Mr Chamberlain proposes to visit South Africa —
Cairo — Mombasa — Pietermaritzburg — Ladysmith —
Arrival at Pretoria — The Boer Leaders — The Johannes
burg Mine-owners — The Development Loan and the War

CONTENTS

Contribution — The Labour Question — " The Future is with
the Great Empires" — Boer Farmers — Visit to Mafeking
— Sir J. Gordon Sprigg^'s Reception at Kimberley —
Discontent in the Orange River Colony — Appeal at
Grahamstown for Mutual Toleration — Disaffected Dutch
at Graaf-Reinet — Arrival at Cape Town — Mr Hofmeyr's
Promise — The Afrikander Bond — The Dutch Loyalists'
Complaint — Homeward Voyage — Reception in London.

CHAPTER XIX
Steps towards Federation . . . 692
The Colonial Conference of 1897 — Imperial Federation in the
Air — A Great Council of the Empire — The Liabilities of
Partnership — Naval Contributions — Common Military
Training — The Admiralty and the Australian Squadron — •
Mr Chamberlain on Commercial Relations — The German
and Belgian Treaties — A General Resolution as to
Preferential Terms — The Conferences to become an
Institution — Foreign Policy of the Empire — "Call us
to your Councils" — Mr Chamberlain on Colonial Repre
sentation — On Imperial Defence — Attitude of the Premiers
— "We rule nothing out of order" — Free Trade within
the Empire — Effects of the Canadian Preference —
Proposals for other Colonies — Canadian Memorandum —
Miscellaneous Business — Mr Chamberlain's Declaration at
Birmingham — A New Era — The Offer of Preferential
Terms — Reciprocity Essential — Foreign Interference —
Effect of the Speech — Reciprocity to pay for Old Age
Pensions — Opposition Challenge to the Government —
The Prime Minister and the Colonial Secretary —
Declarations in Parliament — Nature of the Scheme
— Retaliation and Preference distinct Proposals — Mr
Chamberlain's Fiscal Record — A Letter of Explanation —
Inadvertencies of Debate — An Amended Statement — "The
Cost of Living" — Unionist Leader's Attitude — Points
raised in the House of Lords — Germany and Canada —
Official Correspondence — Effect on English Opinion — The
Duke of Devonshire and Sir Wilfrid Laurier — Lord Salis
bury's Warning.

CONTENTS

APPENDICES

I. Magazine Articles .
II. Official Publications
III. Chartered Company's Correspondence
IV. The "Missing Telegrams"
V. The Boer Generals' Appeal

755 756 761 770 776

INTRODUCTION
il/oo? TO Trapov avriKa.
If any excuse were required for publishing the
biography of a living Statesman it would be found
in the fact that, from its outset to its latest
development, it has invariably been interesting.
Since Mr Chamberlain entered the House of
Commons in 1876 he has never stood in the
background of the Parliamentary picture. Over
shadowed by the historic forms of Disraeli and
Gladstone, of Bright and Salisbury, and competing,
as it were, with the equally independent, equally
anomalous, figures of Randolph Churchill and
Parnell, Mr Chamberlain was recognised from the
first as a coming man — one who would not be long
in coming. Denounced and praised, feared and
admired by all Parties in turn, he has also, in less
than thirty years, known a period in which he was
simultaneously distrusted on both sides, and, by
way of compensation, has gone through a great
crisis in which he enjoyed the unqualified confidence
of practically the whole nation. But hardly had he
digested the eulogies which he received from all
quarters for his work of conciliation in South Africa
than, as if he were weary of general commendation,
xvii ^

xviii INTRODUCTION
he suddenly started a policy which would at least
have the merit of dividing public opinion.
One reason why some of Mr Chamberlain's
critics complain that he springs surprises on the
country, and others charge him with sheer want of
principle, is that they do not realise how absolutely
independent he is, and always has been, of any
school of political theory. He collects and examines
all the accessible facts and probabilities which
together make up a "question of the day." On
them, and apparently on them alone, he forms his
opinion. This he will fortify with such general
principles as happen to accord with it. Show him
that the data were wrong or incomplete, and
he will reverse his own judgment. The usual
and hitherto approved method among English
Statesmen is to start with a set of more or less
abstract doctrines, to concentrate attention on the
facts that fit into them, and explain away the
others. The sound Liberal or the consistent Con
servative thinks he has proved his case if he shows
that the course which he intends to follow harmon
ises with the historic axioms of the one Party or
the other — as though the government of a Nation
were a game of Logic, and the division of Parties
corresponded with some eternal Dichotomy in
Things. For Mr Chamberlain, neither political
philosophy nor philosophical history has any
attractions or terrors ; and his unaffected indiffer
ence has been proved by his career. He has never,
apparently, asked himself, on any practical question,
"Which is the Liberal, which the Conservative,
policy ? " What he has wanted to know has been

INTRODUCTION xix
whether the Liberals or the Conservatives were, on
this or that issue, right or nearer to being right.
Thus, in his early days he acted with the Radicals
because they were bent on destroying institutions
which he regarded as mischievous in practice, and
he flouted the official Liberalism of the day because
it would not take part in the crusade he was preach
ing. A few years later he was found working in
partnership with the very men whom he had recently
denounced, because in the meantime they had
adopted several articles in his Programme and
towards the others were observing a benevolent
form of neutrality. Even more striking is the con
trast between his attacks on the Church of Eng
land or the House of Lords and his subsequent
defence of both. He was eager to disestablish the
Church so long as he considered that its privileges
were oppressive to the Nonconformists ; he is now
ready to protect it from aggression because the
grievances under which the Dissenters were
labouring have, he thinks, approached vanishing
point. He scoffed and scolded at the Peers,
none more bitterly, when they resisted the ex
tension of the Franchise, because they were
perpetuating what seemed to him an injustice.
He supported and praised them when they
threw out the first Home Rule Bill because he
thought that on this occasion they interpreted the
true opinion and served the real interests of the
country. He had been a Home Ruler himself so
long as he believed that the Nationalists would
be satisfied with what he regarded as safe and
reasonable concessions. He became a Unionist

XX INTRODUCTION
when they stretched their demand beyond the
limits which he had marked down as impassable.
It is conceivable, though highly improbable,
that he might be reconverted to Home Rule if
its advocates would reduce their claims to the
original proportions, or if some wider scheme
could be realised that would not incur the grave
perils which he still apprehends. So, too, with
regard to pledging the Imperial credit on a
large scale for Land Purchase in Ireland, he
opposed Mr Gladstone's Bill because it was con
nected with and meant to facilitate Home Rule.
But he supported Mr Balfour's Bill, and was in
duced, if somewhat reluctantly, to assent to Mr
Wyndham's proposals, because they were simply in
tended to mitigate agrarian discontent. Similarly,
he attacked the Imperial policy of Disraeli, not
because he sympathised with Non-intervention
principles or loved to ensure Peace at any price, but
because he believed that the British Government
were, in Lord Salisbury's phrase, " backing the
wrong horse." He had no faith in the self-reforma
tion of Turkey, while he did cherish hopes of the
Greek and other Christian communities in South-
Eastern Europe. In order to counteract a foreign
policy which he disliked, and promote the domestic
legislation to which he was pledged, he associated
himself with a Ministry whose misfortunes or mis
management extinguished, for a time, what came
to be known as the Little England school. He
acquiesced in, and publicly justified, the retrocession
of the Transvaal, and, openly at least, made no
protest against the traditional policy of leaving the

INTRODUCTION xxi
Colonies, so far as possible, to look after themselves.
This, again, was an instance of his life-long habit
of attending only to the pressing facts of the day and
ignoring problems which he does not think ripe for
settlement. Twenty years ago the general opinion of
English politicians about South Africa was that
nothing mattered very much so long as we held the
Cape, and that no part of that Sub-Continent was
less important than the Transvaal — unless it were
Delagoa Bay !
But circumstances alter cases, and they also
alter Mr Chamberlain's opinions. Since the time
when he was contented — or permitted himself to be
identified — with Mr Gladstone's external policy, both
Colonial and Foreign, an entirely new situation has
arisen. The Protectionism practised by the Euro
pean Powers and by the United States had always
been a hindrance and inconvenience to British
enterprise, yet, in one way or another, our manu
facturers and traders had generally managed, though
with varying success, to hold their best markets —
partly through the sufferance of communities which
could not altogether dispense with our products.
Within the last decade, however, we have had to
face something more than subsidised competition.
The American policy of High Protection, which has
been developed into a science at Washington, and
the Commercial Treaties among the Central Powers
of the Continent constitute — in effect, if not in
purpose — a standing warfare against our industrial
position. One way of meeting the difficulty is, as
Mr Chamberlain has frequently pointed out during
the last fifteen years, to keep our grip on the trade

xxii INTRODUCTION
with those Dependencies which have not the power
of directing fiscal legislation against us, and to
develop new markets within our more or less recog
nised Spheres of Influence.
The other plan — supplementary not alternative
— would be to enter Into an arrangement with our
Self- Governing Colonies under which we might,
in the first instance, exercise the right of Retali
ation against any country that closed its ports
against the trade of the British Empire, and thus
induce it to adopt a less exclusive policy. This
marked the furthest point to which Mr Cham
berlain had, until last May, signified his willing
ness to proceed. It is true that, in almost every
speech which he had made on Imperial Federation,
he had spoken of a Customs Union as a vital part
of the general scheme^ but he had almost ostenta
tiously refrained from pressing this view either on
Great Britain or the Colonies. It was generally
regarded as a pious and strictly personal opinion —
not intended to bind his colleagues in the Ministry
any more than Mr Balfour's equally well-known
views about Bimetallism and the establishment of
a Roman Catholic University in Ireland.
It was, therefore, with universal astonishment
that his speech on Preferential Tariffs at Birming
ham on 15 th May 1903 was received in the
country. Still disclaiming the name of Protec
tionist, he repudiated that interpretation of Free
Trade, which lays down that "our only duty is to
buy in the cheapest market without regard to
whether we can sell." We must resume the
"power of free negotiation and, if necessary, of

INTRODUCTION xxiii
retaliation." This was no abstract declaration.
He desired, he said, that a discussion should be
opened on this question, and, though the time had
not yet come for a settlement, he clearly intimated
that this issue would be laid before the people at
the next General Election. In spite of this plain
speaking, many people still doubted whether Mr
Chamberlain had any more serious intention than
to divert public attention from Ministers' recent
mismanagement of their London Education Bill.
He was "dragging a red-herring across the scent,"
he was " flying a kite," and Reciprocity was only
" out for an airing." In an age of fluid opinions and
merging creeds, there are still many well-informed
and thoughtful persons who honestly believe that
no Statesman, not obviously demented, would
venture to lay his hand on the ark of Free
Trade — even to steady it. Critics who were quite
ready to impute any kind of political iniquity to
Mr Chamberlain shrank from charging him with
what they considered tactical insanity. We should
hear no more of Reciprocity, they prophesied, than
we were likely to hear of Old Age Pensions !
Mr Chamberlain accepted the omen. Within
the week it happened that the question of Old Age
Pensions was brought up in Parliament. Quite
unexpectedly, he intervened in the Debate, and
declared that both his derided policies could be
carried out together. The funds to provide for the
wants of the aged and deserving poor might be
supplied by the Duties levied on foreign imports.
He had put his foot forward and evidently did
not mean to draw it back.

xxiv INTRODUCTION
Naturally, the Opposition Leaders demanded an
explanation. How far did the view put forward
by the Colonial Secretary represent the collective
opinion of the Cabinet ? That is a question which
has not yet been answered ; but on 28th May Mr
Balfour, in the House of Commons, announced a
general concurrence with his colleague, while he
intimated that the question was not immediate,
and laid down that politicians acting together
in the same Ministry are not to be debarred
from "taking an independent line on subjects
which are not part of the momentary policy of
the Government." When Mr Chamberlain rose,
so far from seeking to minimise his previous
declaration, he went further than he had gone before,
because he described the practical measures by
which he proposed that his policy should be carried
out. The first thing would be to get a Mandate
from the people of the United Kingdom ; the
second, to summon a Conference of representatives
of the Self-Governing Colonies ; the third, to
negotiate a satisfactory arrangement under which
the Colonies would give us as much as we gave
them. To make his case complete, he indicated the
arguments by which he would try to obtain the
necessary Mandate. He admitted it would be
necessary to tax food, and, for the sake of argument,
estimated that three-fourths of the Duty would be
paid by the working classes. But the whole of
the proceeds should go back to them, and the other
quarter be given them as well. They should have
Old Age Pensions, they would earn increased wages,
and they would be protected against the unfair com-

INTRODUCTION xxv
petition of goods sold below cost price by the great
foreign Trusts and Combinations.
Such is the programme by which Mr Chamber
lain has decided to stand or to fall. There can be
no going back, nor is there much room for further
advance. But it should be pointed out that, how
ever he may have changed his attitude towards
other questions, on this subject the opinions that
he holds to-day are but the logical development of
those which he has long maintained. It is true
that in 1881 he declared that a tax on food meant
a fall in wages. Obviously, it would involve a
decline in the purchasing power of a fixed number
of weekly shillings. But it is his contention
and belief that a general rise in the price of
commodities must be accompanied by an equally
general augmentation of wages. This, of course,
is one of the propositions which he has promised
to establish to the satisfaction of the country.
Again, in 1885 he denounced as "quackery" the
proposal to encourage agriculture by imposing a
duty of five, ten, or even fifteen shillings a quarter
on foreign wheat. Though he used similar
language on several other occasions, it will
be found that he was always opposing a plan
for assisting one class in the United Kingdom
at the expense of another class. What he is now
advocating is, we are told, to benefit all classes
together, and all countries alike within the Empire.
His arguments may be sound or unsound, his
policy may be mischievous or prudent, but he
cannot in this respect be charged with serious
inconsistency. It is easy to label a public man who has changed

xxvi INTRODUCTION
sides on more than one question of the day as an
Opportunist, a Realpolitiker, and to suggest that
he has been influenced by ambition, love of applause,
self-conceit, or resentment. But in dealing with a
contemporary politician it is more mannerly and
far safer to abstain from moral judgments — neither
imputing the lower motives nor claiming the higher
virtues. In the following pages no attempt will be
made to go behind the facts and considerations
which evidently have operated on Mr Chamber
lain's mind, and which explain his conduct at every
crisis, whether we accept or repudiate the conclu
sion at which he has arrived. But in one sense it
must be admitted that he always has been, and
probably will remain to the end, an Opportunist.
What line he will take on any new question, or
one which has been materially modified by recent
events, it is impossible to conjecture, since, as
we have seen, he is guided not at all by abstract
principles or political formulas. He applies to
Statecraft the rule which the late Lord Russell of
Killowen so successfully observed at the Bar —
if only you will get up all the facts of a case,
it is ten to one you need not trouble yourself about
the law. That is why Mr Chamberlain's career, like
Mr Gladstone's, has been puzzling to commentators
who have been trained in the political philosophy of
the Schools, and naturally expect their contempo
raries to conform to one or another of the types
exemplified by the somewhat abstract figures pre
sented in standard histories of England.
Because Mr Chamberlain is a man of business
it is sometimes assumed that his political judgment

INTRODUCTION xxvii
is decided by a mere calculation of the material
results to be expected from this or that course of
action — what does the Country, or the Party, or
the Statesman, stand to gain or lose.'* As a
matter of fact, Mr Chamberlain is, perhaps, the
most sentimental, the most emotional, of the lead
ing public men in England. Quick to anger and
indignation, he is equally capable of enthusiasm
and admiration, and in expressing either kind of
feeling he is liable to exceed the ordinary reserve
of public life in this country. His attacks and
retorts on adversaries in the House of Commons
have not been more scornful and exasperating than
his criticisms on politicians and publicists in foreign
countries who have assailed the interests or the repu
tation of England. Never has any public man more
utterly disregarded the old maxim about treating
enemies as if they might one day become friends, and
regarding friends as if they might in future turn
enemies. Mr Chamberlain, on the contrary, has
always been equally warm as ally and antagonist,
and, before he starts on a new campaign, makes
his advance certain by burning his boats behind
him. If he were, as he has often been repre
sented, a cool and scheming politician, playing
for the first place in the State, he would have long
ago taught himself not to excite those personal
animosities in Parliament which would make it
impossible for him to manage the House of
Commons, and he would have been especially
careful not to put himself forward in Europe
as the very exemplar of what our candid friends
abroad regard as British insolence and aggres-

xxviii INTRODUCTION
siveness. As Leader of the House of Commons,
he would have to contend with many personal
adversaries who would do their best to wreck
all his schemes, while a Government in which he
were Prime Minister would have few friends among
foreign Statesmen. All this Mr Chamberlain quite
understands. But his governing passion, one that
no consideration of self-interest or even of public
advantage can control, is what may be called a
graduated patriotism — devotion to the City which
he has helped to construct and adorn, and which has
always supported him throughout the vicissitudes
of his career ; devotion to the Country which he
believes to be incomparably the best and finest in
the world ; devotion to the Empire which he hopes
to consolidate, and with which he desires that his
name shall be imperishably associated.
Although in domestic affairs Mr Chamberlain's
policy has been more or less limited by the circum
stances of the day and the probabilities of the
immediate future, it will be conceded by those
who most sincerely deprecate his action, that in
regard to the Colonies he takes long views. The
fault charged against him is that he seeks to reach
at once what would be more safely regarded as the
goal of a distant endeavour — that he wishes to
impose as a task for the next Parliament, or the one
after, what should be treated as a vision for the
optimists of another generation. Whatever may
be the verdict of the electors on the issue which
he has raised, it is undeniable that this " man
with the mayoral mind" has thrown a ray of
Idealism on what had long been the most arid

INTRODUCTION xxix
department of public life in England. The methods
he proposes may be abjured by his countrymen,
but they will give him credit for developing a
noble conception, for bringing back into "practical
politics " a project which had been abandoned as
hopelessly Utopian by the men who originated
it. Whatever may be the judgment of posterity
on Mr Chamberlain's work at the Colonial Office,
he has rendered it impossible for his successors
to acquiesce in the theory laid down, less than
twenty years ago, by that capable and accom
plished administrator, the late Lord Blachford, that
the duty of Downing Street was to secure that the
connection between the Mother Country and the
Colonies, "while it lasted, should be as profit
able to both parties, and the separation, when
it should come, as amicable as possible." That
paralysing doctrine has been blown away for ever.
Other Statesmen may think it prudent to move
more slowly, or to move in a different direction,
than the Minister who hoped in a few years to
reorganise and revivify every part of the British
Empire at once — nil actum credens dum quid
superesset agendum. But none, it is safe to say,
will venture to proclaim a creed of temporising dis-
pondency. Probably it would not be going too far to suggest
that Mr Chamberlain, while still a lad in Birming
ham, had already formed the purpose of making a
name for himself in Parliament. He may have
dreamed, perhaps, of attaining even a higher
position than he has yet reached. All his studies
and most of his amusements, consciously or un-

xxx INTRODUCTION
consciously, were directed towards public life, and
his interest in questions of the day was as keen
and controversial when he was speaking on a
Motion in the Edgbaston Debating Society as
it is when he is called on to justify his policy in
the House of Commons. The political activity
which was the relaxation of his early manhood
did not become drudgery after he had made it
the serious business of his life. He is seldom tired,
because he is never bored, by public life. More
over, he has retained his faith in Representative
Institutions, and keeps his youthful admiration
for the House of Commons as the greatest Free
Assembly in the world. It has become the fashion
amongst some of those superior amateurs who
oblige the country by taking part in public business
— and claiming their share in all the good things that
may be going — to affect an indulgent contempt for
the machinery by which our liberties are main
tained. The British Constitution would be very
well, we are told, if only there was no House of
Commons ! This facile cynicism has never touched
Mr Chamberlain. He was speaking from his heart
when he declared, at a Mansion- House Banquet
held on 15th October 1902, that he felt a profound
reverence for " the venerable Mother of Parlia
ments." He never approached it, he said, without
a consciousness of apprehension and nervousness.
" To me the House of Commons is (he said) a
great and an august personality. No doubt it is
composed of very various elements — made up of
Parties and sections and individuals — with many of
whom I differ, and some of whom I agree with

INTRODUCTION xxxi
you in finding it very difficult to respect ; but the
House of Commons, in its corporate capacity, towers
above them all, and justifies the respect and the
affection in which, I believe, it is still regarded. I
for one do not object to any criticism of any of the
individuals who constitute the House of Commons,
and, indeed, I think that I myself have sometimes
indulged in that kind of criticism ; but I am inclined,
with my right honourable friend, Mr Balfour, to
resent the attacks which are sometimes made upon
the House of Commons as a whole. The House of
Commons is, in my opinion, the greatest of human
Institutions, and it would not be that if it did not
contain some human weaknesses, and among them
I am disposed to count a certain over-confidence in
its own great resources, which causes it to undertake
occasionally more than it can perform. And, per
haps, also, I should add, a want occasionally of a
due sense of proportion, which induces it to pay less
attention to essentials, and more to trivial details,
than would be absolutely wise. I have heard the
House of Commons compared to an elephant, which
can rend an oak and pick up a pin, and I have
sometimes thought that the House of Commons
devotes too much time to filling its pin-cushion. But,
my Lords and Gentlemen, these are the spots on the
sun. If there are defects, they are only the foil to
its virtues. The House of Commons, as I under
stand, is the natural personification of the national
qualities that have made us great, of justice and
generosity. Its industry is unequalled, its know
ledge is almost universal. By its undying love of
freedom, coupled as it has been with its deep

xxxii INTRODUCTION
attachment to orderly government, the House of
Commons has made us what we are, and has kept
for us our place among the nations ofthe world."
Opinions differ sharply as to Mr Chamberlain's
public character and policy, even as to his motives
and methods, but there can be no doubt that, like
the famous Statesman on whose cardinal policy
he has now proposed to make a formidable inroad,
he is a "great Member of Parliament."

August 1903.

CHAPTER I
early life
The father of the future Statesman was Mr
Joseph Chamberlain, a wholesale boot-and-shoe
manufacturer in the City of London, and his
mother was the daughter of Mr Henry Harben,
and sister of Sir Henry Harben, of Warn-
ham Lodge, in Sussex. The business was
carried on in the same premises (36 Milk
Street) and under the same name for nearly 150
years. The Chamberlain family are descended
from a Daniel Chamberlain, a maltster at Lay-
cock, in Wiltshire, where he died in 1760. His
son William set up in business in London as a
cordwainer, and became Master of the Cord-
wainers' Company— a position which was after
wards held by two of his sons and three grand
sons, including Mr Joseph Chamberlain, senior.
The association of the family with this ancient
Company was commemorated in 1896, when the
Colonial Secretary received an address in which
a graceful reference was made to the old-standing
connection ; in reply, he spoke with pride of
the part his ancestors had taken in the pro
ceedings of the Company, and the interest they

2 EARLY LIFE
had felt in upholding its rights and privi
leges. Mr Chamberlain's parents were married in
1834. Mr Joseph Chamberlain, the eldest son,
was born on 8th July 1836. The second, Mr
Richard Chamberlain, died only a few years ago.
There are three other brothers living (Arthur,
Herbert, and Walter), besides three married
sisters. At the time of Joseph Chamberlain's
birth, and for some years afterwards, the family
lived at 3 Grove Hill Terrace, Camberwell.
At the age of eight, the lad was sent to a pre
paratory school, kept by Miss Pace, at 122
Camberwell Grove, and some of her remini
scences of her distinguished pupil have been
recorded by Miss N. Murrell Marris,* in The
Right Honourable Joseph Chamberlain, the Man
and the Statesman.
Miss Pace, who died at the age of eighty-six
in March of the present year (1903), was often
revisited by her old pupil after he had become a
distinguished man. According to her recollec
tion, he did not, even as a boy, care much for
games ; though sociable enough, he was almost
too anxious about his lessons, and, on his
mother's testimony, had already developed the
habit of asking questions which it was not easy
to answer. In 1845 the family removed to 25 Highbury
Place, Islington (where they remained for many
years), and the eldest son was placed under the
charge ofthe Rev. Arthur Johnson, whom his pupil
* For many of the personal details here given, the writer
is indebted to this book, recently published by Messrs
Hutchinson & Co. Others are reproduced from his own
Joseph Chamberlain., published in 1896, by Messrs Bliss,
Sands, & Foster,

SCHOOL DAYS IN LONDON 3
remembers as a good scholar and excellent teacher.
It was not till he was fourteen years old that the
boy was sent to University College School, where
he was taught Greek and Latin, but showed most
proficiency in Mathematics, Natural Philosophy,
and French — subjects in which he gained prizes.
Though he was thought clever by his masters,
and showed great earnestness and industry in his
work, there is no tradition that he was singled out
by the judgment of his contemporaries as destined
for future distinction. Indeed, his qualities were
not those which appeal to the admiration of
schoolboys. Though the serious and somewhat
sombre institution in Gower Street was by no
means given over to the worship of Muscular
Christianity — ofiicially, it recognised neither
aspect of that educational deity — it would have
been difficult probably for a boy to become a
"school hero" unless he distinguished himself
in some form of athletic sport, and played an
active part in the social life of the place.
Mr Chamberlain has never made any direct
attack on the excessive modern devotion to
.sport and out-door games. Indeed, the other
day, in his voyage home from South Africa, he
distributed the prizes for the customary matches
on board ship, and went so far as to observe,
half humorously, that athletics were not alto
gether without their uses ! His life-long abstin
ence from such pursuits, even from the exercise
which many sedentary workers believe to be
essential to health, has probably been due less
to principle than to inclination. It has always
amused him more to work his mind than his
body, and, if he sacrificed something by shutting
himself from the cameraderie of the playing fields,
the loss was more than compensated by the

4 EARLY LIFE
intellectual start which he gained over many of
his contemporaries. There was no time to
waste in his school life : he was taken away
from Gower Street at the age of sixteen, having
only stayed sufficiently long to lay the founda
tions for self-education in the future, and to form
a few friendships that have survived a strenuous
and pre-occupied career. But his recollections of
his schooldays are by no means unpleasant, and
not long ago he paid a visit to Gower Street,
and spoke of his early days quite in the accepted
style of the typical " Old Boy " who has come
down to a School festivity.
He had been invited to unveil on 5 th
November 1902, a tablet erected to the
memory of twelve former pupils of the school
who had lost their lives in the South African
War, It was, he said, fifty years almost to a
day since he last entered that building to receive
certain prizes from the Lord Mayor, which with
the inscription of the old school motto, still rested
on his library shelves and were not the least
interesting of the memorials of his boyhood : —
" When that Lord Mayor, long since passed
away, spoke to me words of congratulation and
encouragement," Mr Chamberlain continued, " I
little thought that at a later time I should receive
from his eminent successor the highest honour
which the City of London is able to give. But
although I have got to bridge over half a century
in order to recall those long past days, I can still
sympathise with the boys who are now repeating
my experience at the outset of their careers, which
I sincerely hope will be honourable to them, and
useful to their country, I can remember many of
the incidents of my school life, and I entertain
always a most kindly sentiment and regard for

SCHOOL REMINISCENCES 5
my old schoolfellows and my old teachers, I can
call up to-day, as if it was yesterday, the portly
form of Professor Key, most kindly of Head
masters, marching solemnly to call to order a
somewhat unruly class. I can recall my dear old
friend Professor Cook enforcing his mathematical
instruction with the oft-repeated assertion that
' Never in the whole course of his life had he met
boys so bad as we were ' and that ' to attempt to
get into our heads the mysteries of algebra was
like firing a cannon-ball into a mountain of mud.'
Yet, this terrible comparison did not prevent him
from exhibiting on many occasions the greatest
pride and delight in the proficiency of his scholars.
I remember also Professor Merlet, that quaint
and genial Frenchman, endeavouring to instil
into our British understandings the beauties of
Moliere, and, in the excitement of his recital,
acting the parts he read as if he had just come
from the Frangaise. I remember all this, and
more ; and I remember my school mates, and
rejoice that so many of them have subsequently
achieved distinction. There were the late Pro
fessor Jevons, Sir Arthur Charles, Sir Ralph
Littler, K.C., who is present to-day, Mr Prevost,
the Governor of the Bank of England, who is
also present. Sir Edwin Lawrence, also present,
and my friend and old schoolfellow Sir Michael
Foster, one of the most distinguished of our men
of science. Although I have in some measure
lost touch with your work, yet I could not resist
the call which was made upon me, even in the
midst of exceptional pressure to come once more
amongst you, to show how proud I am that, in a
great crisis of our national history, our old school
should have done its duty.

6 EARLY LIFE
" I think we may all join in thankfulness that
at no previous time have our soldiers exhibited
more courage, more endurance, more cheerful
ness in almost unexampled hardships, that never
was a War carried on with greater humanity,
with a more complete absence of wilful outrage
and unnecessary severity, and that never did the
people of this country manifest greater calmness
in reverses, less vindictiveness in the hour of
victory, and greater tenacity and resolution in
the pursuit of the objects which they believed to
be right and just. Surely, then, we are glad that
in this great drama which we have been enacting
our school should have had its part. As the
Headmaster has said, it is not a military institu
tion. It cannot appeal to those traditions which,
in other cases, stimulate men to seek their share
of danger and exertion ; but, in spite of that, no
small contingent of our old scholars went to the
front to share in all respects the hardships of the
campaign ; and we rejoice to know that they did
well — we rejoice in that many of them have been
honoured by their King, and won the gratitude of
their country. But death has claimed its tribute
also — a proportion far too large having perished
on the field of battle, or died in other ways for
their country. It is to commemorate these
men — their heroism and devotion — that to-day
we dedicate a tablet upon the walls of the school
in which so much of their boyhood was passed.
It is good for a school like this to have its tradi
tions of self-sacrifice. This memorial, which I
am proud to unveil, is even more a lesson and an
example to the living than it is a tribute to the
dead. I hope also that it may, as the Head
master has suggested, afford some consolation to
the relatives and friends of those whom we have

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE SCHOOL 7
lost to know that their memory will be kept green
by their old school, their names enshrined for
ever in its annals, and the school itself will always
be proud of the record which they have left behind
them." In his time, Mr Chamberlain said, the school
had been a good school. The education, so far as it
went, was excellent and thorough, and he had many
times felt gratitude to it. Incidentally, though
without any specially apparent sense of regret,
he referred to his lack of an academic training.
Possibly he is conscious, as well he may be, that
what he has lost in the way of intellectual discip
line is more than made up to him by never
having had the edge taken from his natural keen
ness, by having always struck out his own line of
thought and never being, more or less, compelled
to conform to an average standard. However
admirable or exalted may be the genius loci, it is
difficult for a man to absorb it without giving up
something of his own nature.
But though Mr Chamberlain has remained,
through his career, vigorously and almost defiantly
individual he has never disparaged the influence
of the old Universities, while in the establishment
and support of similar institutions of a more
modern type, at Birmingham especially, he has
taken an active part. On this occasion he spoke
with approval of the greater liberality shown by
the Governments in our Colonies, as well as in
Germany and the United States, in bringing the
Higher Education within reach of the people.
He would like to see the time when, in this country,
the higher places in factories, work-shops, and
counting-houses should be reserved for men who
could show, by their University careers, that they
deserved the positions which were offered to them.

8 EARLY LIFE
On the other hand, as was natural in a man who
has raised himself to the chief places in the
State by sheer force of will and intellect, he seems
to attach less value to a general elevation of the
national average of mental attainment than to
giving exceptional talent the best opportunities
of development. "What is it," he asked, "that
makes a country ? " Of course you may say " the
general qualities of the people — their resolution,
their intelligence, their pertinacity, and many
other good qualities ! Yes, but that is not all,
and it is not the main creative feature of a great
nation. The greatness of a nation is made by its
greatest men. It is those we want to educate."
This view was more fully expounded in an
Address which Mr Chamberlain delivered on 17th
January 1901, as Chancellor of the New Birming
ham University : —
", , , He thought it was the duty of the
nation, it was necessary to the welfare and
happiness of the nation, that every child should
have the simple means of recreation which
even elementary education afforded, and the
means of self-improvement ; but we should make
a great mistake if we thought that as a commer
cial investment this expenditure was likely to
bring a great return. Its return was the general
happiness of the nation ; but it did not secure our
commercial position. He should like to make
that perfectly clear, and he would remind them
that all history showed that progress, national
progress, of every kind depended upon certain
individuals rather than upon the mass. Whether
they took religion or literature, or political
government, or art, or commerce, in all these
cases of new ideas, the great steps had been made
by individuals of superior quality and genius, who

OPENINGS FOR TALENT 9
had, as it were, dragged the mass of the nation
up one step to a higher level. And so it must be
in regard to material progress. The position of
the nation to-day was due to the efforts of men
like Watt, Arkwright, or in our own time to the
Armstrongs, the Whitworths, the Kelvins, and
the Siemenses. These were the men who, by
their discoveries, by their remarkable genius, had
produced the ideas upon which others had acted,
and which had permeated the whole mass of the
nation and the whole of its proceedings. There
fore, what we had to do — and that was their
special task and object — was to produce more of
these great men. He admitted this might be
impossible. It might be said, very likely truly,
that genius was born and not made ; but this, at
least, they could do. They could, at least,
multiply tenfold the number of those who were
qualified to be the assistants and the interpreters
of these men, who could take their ideas and
carry them into practical operation, and give to
them practical application in connection with the
different walks of life to which they must devote
themselves. That was the object, that was the
task, to which he thought the University of Bir
mingham must, so far as its distinctive and
special work was concerned, deliberately set itself
They had made a little progress, although they
were still at the beginning of things."
The Chamberlains were Unitarians, and Uni
tarians of the stricter order. There are some
members of that thoughtful community whose
opinions it would be difficult to distinguish from
those of Churchmen who do not go to church.
They are Agnostics in all but name, and only
to be reckoned as Nonconformists because they
do not belong to the Establishment, But there

10 EARLY LIFE
was none of this doctrinal laxity in the con
gregations of which Mr Chamberlain's father
was a well-known and highly-respected rnember.
When he died at Birmingham in 1874, a tablet
was erected at Unity Church, in Upper Street,
Islington, to commemorate one who "for more
than fifty years was a consistent worshipper
in Carter Lane Chapel, City, and afterwards in
this Church, and a generous supporter of their
connected institutions." There was, perhaps, no
body of Nonconformists more eager than the
practising Unitarians of this period to assert
the essential principles of dissent from Church
of England dogma, keener in upholding the
claims of Religious Equality, more persistent in
the attempt to separate Elementary Education
from doctrinal influence. Le Clericalism,e, voila
Vennem-i !
If with zeal in this direction there was com
bined a certain narrowness of view, if the assail
ants of Orthodoxy were not themselves exempt
from bigotry, it must be remembered that the atti
tude of Churchmen at this time — of all but an
enlightened minority who had scarcely yet been
enabled to make their teaching and example felt in
the country at large — was somewhat provocative
and contemptuous. Between Church and Chapel a
sharp line was drawn — social as well as political.
The two factions maintained, in almost every
town, a standing controversy, practically unmiti
gated by personal friendships or even by business
relationships. The Church people patronised the
orthodox butcher and grocer, nor would the Dis
senters buy their meat or sugar except from a
Nonconformist brother. In some of the larger
villages and smaller towns this sectarian bitter
ness still exists, but it is gradually passing away.

NONCONFORMIST INFLUENCES 11
and the temporary revival of it, caused by the
controversies over the 1902 Education Act, has
surprised many tolerant, easy-going Londoners
whose memories do not stretch back more than
thirty or forty years.
The feud was at its height during Mr Chamber
lain's boyhood and early manhood, and he threw
himself into the fight with all the ardour of a
keen, practical intellect to which the combat
was not less attractive than the cause. It has
been said of Mr Chamberlain that he works in
blinkers — sees everything in front of him, but
nothing behind or on either side. With a cer
tain reservation, the verdict is, perhaps, correct.
Once he has made up his mind as to the point
he wishes to reach, he goes straight at it : he
has none of the Academical dubiety, the moral
misgiving, which puzzle and annoy the earnest,
purblind partisan. Never in his career has Mr
Chamberlain been more decided in his opinions,
or more energetic in advocating them, than he
was when, almost as a lad, he first began to feel
an interest in public affairs. For this intellectual
certainty and practical vigour he is, of course,
chiefly indebted to his natural qualities ; but so
eminently impressionable and receptive a mind
must also have been greatly influenced by his
surroundings. These, as we have seen, were
those of a prosperous. Nonconformist household
in what is sometimes called the /Upper Middle
Class — a vile phrase, but intelligible.
Mentally, this class was the very antithesis of
what is connoted by bourgeoisie. Nowhere in the
England of the first half of last century was there
a brighter alertness of the intellect, or more
serious study of the great problems of Life and
Thought, than among the cultivated Radicals of

12 EARLY LIFE
that era. If the doctrines of Bentham and the
two Mills, and other propagators of French
Revolutionism, adapted and deodorised for
British consumption, were accepted at their
face value, if their rotundity served to conceal
the inner vacuum, they yet stimulated the interest
which they purported to satisfy ; they made
young men think, and prompted them to live
and work for the greater diffusion of happi
ness among mankind. If they are largely
obsolete, it is because they have, in this
country at least, accomplished most of their
work. They created the demand for Reform,
and carried it into effect. We see them simmer
ing to-day, scarcely changed in their type, among
peoples whose institutions have developed less
rapidly than our own. The passive form of
Nihilism is little more than our Philosophic
Radicalism translated into Russian ; possibly, it
would not be more dangerous to the State, or
to honest Authority, if it were allowed equal
liberty of expression. If we now realise that the
teachings that inspired the Liberalism of a
generation which has mostly passed away were
both one-sided and incomplete, we must also
admit that they were instruments of almost un
mixed good — which is much the same as saying
that they were true for their own time. And
they had the pre-eminent merit of being based,
not on Sentiment, but purely on Reason, so that
they could be — as, in fact, they have been — modi
fied to fit altered circumstances.
There are many good Conservatives, in Parlia
ment and outside it, who, for a considerable number
of their thinking years, believed that Monarchy
was a useless and expensive anachronism, the
House of Lords a relic and stronghold of Feudal

PHILOSOPHIC RADICALISM 13
oppression, and the Church of England an embodi
ment of Priestcraft. Nor, in changing their practi
cal opinions, have they consciously abandoned the
principles from which they had drawn their original
inferences. They have simply absorbed a new
set of facts. This is very often the explanation
of what is called inconsistency in politicians.
In some cases, the Statesman moves while the
Party stands still ; in others, it is the Party that
advances and the old Leader who is stationary.
It is easy to be cynical about public life ; but
in modern times, since legislators have become
"like bees working in a glass hive," the oppro
brium that would be incurred by treachery to
one's Party may, as a rule, be trusted to
counterbalance the mere inducements of Place.
It is as ridiculous for Mr Chamberlain's detrac
tors to suggest that he has changed his views
in order to gratify his ambition, as it would be
for any panegyrist to argue that his opinions
at the present day are identical with those which
he maintained when he entered Parliament. No
attempt of either sort will be made in these
pages, which are intended to be mainly a record
of his public career, and an account of the con
ditions and circumstances in which it has been
passed. At the age of sixteen he began life : his educa
tion was then complete, so far as education consists
in being taught by schoolmasters. He was put
into his father's business in the City, and kept to it
for a couple of years, though he managed to find
time to attend scientific lectures at the Poly
technic, and amused himself with taking part in
private theatricals. He even wrote a farce in one
act, and performed in it. But, in 1854, a change
took place in his prospects. His family were

14 EARLY LIFE
connected by marriage with Mr John Nettle-
fold, a member of the well-known firm of
wood-screw makers at Birmingham. They had
purchased the English rights in an American
patent for improved machinery, and they deter
mined to reorganise their business on a broader
basis, building new works, bringing in more
capital, and introducing fresh blood. Mr
Chamberlain, senior, obtained an interest in the
concern, and the son, then eighteen years old,
was sent as his representative in that already
rising city. He threw himself into trade with all
his energy, and it is stated — nor is it difficult to
believe — that the rapid success of the firm was
due in no slight degree to his hard work and com
mercial aptitude. After a period of some anxiety
and struggle, Nettlefolds succeeded in turning out
a better article at a lower price than their com
petitors, and in time they acquired almost a
monopoly in their line of business. For some
years past the trade had been carried on almost
at a loss, so severe were the "cutting rates"
set up by the double competition of foreign rivals
and small firms at home working for a bare sub
sistence. In order to place affairs on a more
remunerative footing, Nettlefolds bought out two
of their chief rivals and all the smaller men who
were willing to accept a reasonable offer. The
others had to look after themselves — it is the way
of the business world, as it always will be — until
the country turns Socialist. Then, probably,
we should try to starve out other nations.
There were ten years (1875- 1885) in Mr
Chamberlain's life during which he was even
more bitterly assailed by Conservatives than
by Liberals from 1886 to 1900, and in the
former period some of his adversaries did not

BUSINESS IN BIRMINGHAM 15
scruple to represent him as having taken the
leading part in an organised system of com
mercial oppression. His firm, of course, made
enemies, and its success could not be achieved
without doing injury to less enterprising rivals ;
but when the evidence against Nettlefolds came
to be sifted it showed that their behaviour
had been somewhat exceptionally liberal. The
member of Parliament who had repeated these
vague charges was so satisfied of his mistake that,
without any menace of legal proceedings, he with
drew them altogether, and added a very handsome
apology. An important firm in the same way of
business, of very old standing in Birmingham,
which had enjoyed every opportunity of knowing
the details of the transactions impugned, declared
that " Mr Chamberlain's actions were highly
beneficial to those connected with the trade, and
beneficent to those whose businesses were pur
chased on such liberal terms ; also to those
who, like ourselves, rem.ained in the trade, as
well as to his own firm." The negotiations,
they said, had been conducted in an honourable
and courteous manner, and they denounced, as
" false and absurd," the report that threats had
been made to crush out the smaller makers. Here
the question may be left for those who care to
investigate it further. Clearly, it should never
have been raised, except on direct and unassail
able proof Such foundation as may ever have
existed for these imputations against Mr
Chamberlain lies in the probability that in these
transactions, as in all others, he acted like a
man who means to have his own way, and that
on this occasion he got it. But this sort of
victory has to be paid for. The "other man,"
not unnaturally, thinks he has been ill-treated.

16 EARLY LIFE
and goes through life grumbling over his griev
ance. It is simpler to attribute one's failures
to the sharp practice of a rival than to confess
inferiority. The Birmingham of fifty years ago was a
very different place from the present " Capital
of the Midlands," — owning, as it does, some
of the finest Municipal libraries and scien
tific collections in the United Kingdom, the
home of a vigorous young University, and con
stantly visited by the best actors and musicians
of the day. For a young man living in lodgings,
the evenings, unless he spent them in the vulgar
pleasures which are everywhere easy of access,
Birmingham, when Mr Chamberlain first took up
his residence there, would have been a dull place,
though he had many friends and connections, if he
had not discovered resources within himself He
was always a reader, and in his evenings he
carried on his study of English and French litera
ture, of which he acquired a considerable know
ledge, though it must be admitted that his
speeches and Magazine articles contain no direct
proof of any wide range of subjects. But the
same may be said of many other public men (of
Lord Salisbury, for instance), whose high cultiva
tion has never been called into question. Mr
Chamberlain's speeches and writings have been
practically confined to politics, and he seldom or
never permits himself the luxury of digression.
The influence of his reading is to be seen chiefly
in his style, which, without any especial claim to
polish or purity, is noticeably free from super
fluous ornamentation. The short, vigorous
sentences go straight to the mark, and long
practice has made him so correct that a faithful
verbatim report would reveal very few slips in

SELF-EDUCATION 17
grammar, and not many repetitions or loose ex
pressions. This, it may be mentioned, is a quality
very rarely attained by English orators, except
those who write out their words beforehand, and
either learn them by heart or read them off with
out variation from the prepared text — generally
a very ineffective method, especially in the House
of Commons, where a speech is expected to bear
close relation to the preceding Debate. Even on
the platform, an orator who relies entirely on his
preparation is apt to be disconcerted by unforeseen
incidents or hostile interruptions. Mr Chamber
lain, on the other hand, delights in throwing off
impromptu remarks — a habit which has sometimes
got him into serious difficulties — and positively
courts interruptions, to which he never fails to
make a neat and telling rejoinder. But this
readiness has only been acquired by assiduous
training, and it is said that his early speeches
were as laboriously "got up" as those of orators
who never gain the power of improvisation.
He began early. He had not lived long in
Birmingham before he established a Club for the
working-men employed by his firm, and in the
Night School attached to this institution he gave
lessons and lectures. At the Sunday School for
young men and women connected with the Uni
tarian community he was a regular teacher, and
was first President of the Young Men's Mutual
Improvement Society, His first speech at
the Birmingham and Edgbaston Debating
Society was delivered against the Motion that
" the character and conduct of Oliver Cromwell
do not entitle him to the admiration of pos
terity," Four years later, Miss Marris records,
he brought forward, on his own account, a
Vote of Censure on a series of speeches in which
B

18 EARLY LIFE
Mr Bright had been expounding the views of
his Radical colleagues on Foreign Policy. With
the memories ofthe Crimea and the Indian Mutiny
fresh in the minds of his countrymen, Mr Bright
insisted that the Empire was large enough — too
large — already. The Colonies were a burden on
the Mother Country — none of them paid their way
except Australia. This was the accepted theory
of the Radical Party, nor, to tell the truth, did
Conservatives, as a rule, venture to oppose it.
It is interesting, therefore, to find the
future Imperialist, at twenty-two years of age,
convinced that it was always necessary for a
nation to be prepared for self-defence, denying
that the Aristocracy had always been respon
sible for war, and asserting that since 1688 we
had been engaged in no foreign struggle not
demanded by the People, In this year (1858)
he was elected Treasurer of the Debating
Society, In 1859 he became Secretary, and
asked the Lord- Lieutenant of the County for
permission to form from its members a com
pany of Rifle Volunteers, On this request
being refused, he wrote to assure his Lordship
that the service of a very fine company of men
had been lost! In 1861 he became Vice-
president of the Society, and President in 1863,
The last honour was renewed in 1896, when he
delivered a brief Address, in which he recalled
humorous recollections of the Society thirty-
three years before. It was, he said, "rather a
Radical body," and, on an unexpected surplus
of £,>] being disclosed, it was proposed by the
Secretary, and unanimously carried, that the
money should be spent in buying a Tory !
In 1863 Mr Chamberlain was already a pros
perous and well-known man in Birmingham, with

POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 19
an assured future in its commercial and Municipal
life. His energy was increased rather than dimin
ished by a bereavement which he experienced
in that year. In 1861 he had married Miss
Harriet Kenrick, the sister of an intimate
friend, Mr William Kenrick (who afterwards
married Miss Mary Chamberlain) ; but the
union was dissolved by the death of Mrs
Chamberlain, on the birth of her second child
(Mr Austen Chamberlain).
These were the days of the Reform agitation
in which Mr Bright played so conspicuous a part,
and Mr Chamberlain was a regular and enthusi
astic, if also a critical, attendant at the Radical
meetings. In 1865 the Liberal Association was
formed in Birmingham, and Mr Chamberlain was
one of the earliest members; but in 1868 (Mr
Disraeli's Reform Bill having passed in the mean
time) it was reorganised on a new basis, so as to
include representatives of the newly enfranchised
working-men householders. It was this local body
which afterwards developed into the " Caucus."
The original plan was for every Ward in Birming
ham to elect a Ward Committee, three repre
sentatives of which were put on the Executive
Committee, and twenty-four on the General Com
mittee — a body which expanded gradually from
hundreds to thousands. The real power, there
fore, lay in the hands, first, of the Executive Com
mittee, and, when this in turn became unwieldy
from size, in those of the Management Committee,
which prepared the agenda for the Executive
Committee. Gradually, but surely, the guid
ance of the whole association was absorbed by
the very capable and energetic Secretary, Mr
Francis Schnadhorst, who ultimately became
Chief Manager for the Liberal Party (in which

20 EARLY LIFE
capacity he rendered most efficient service), and
was afterwards allowed to advise its Leaders on
matters of high policy. Here he was venturing
on matters he did not understand, and it is no
secret that he was largely responsible for Mr
Gladstone's famous miscalculation in 1886. But
in 1868 he was a comparatively modest and highly
useful person. It was due in no slight degree to
his excellent arrangements that, at the General
Election of that year, all the members for Birming
ham were Liberals, though the Conservatives had
been reasonably hopeful of capturing one of the
three "corners" of the new Constituency. In
this contest Mr Chamberlain took an active
part, and made frequent platform speeches.
Almost the first use that Mr Gladstone had
made of his majority in the new Parliament
was to pass through the House of Commons a
Bill for the Disestablishment of the Irish Church,
and it was considered advisable to "get up
steam in the country " in order to induce the
Lords not to reject the Measure. The General
Election had been avowedly fought on this
issue — the Upper House having rejected in the
previous Parliament the Suspensory Bill for
preventing fresh appointments being made, and
new interests created, in the Irish Church,
There was no doubt that the great majority
of the Peers were strongly opposed to Mr
Gladstone's scheme. On the other hand, it was
more or less known that the "very highest in
fluence" was being exercised to avert a conflict
between the two Houses. The Radicals, how
ever, were eager for the fray, and Mr Bright
was ready to agitate for a root-and-branch reform
ofthe Upper Chamber. He did not care for any
"childish tinkering about Life Peerages." The

DISESTABLISHMENT IN IRELAND 21
Lords must bring themselves on a line with the
opinion and necessities of the day, or they might
" meet with accidents not pleasant for them to
think of" Mr Chamberlain spoke at a great
meeting in the Town Hall.
" It is only just," he said, " that those who
have to discuss the Bill should have full oppor
tunity of judging what is the national will on this
question. When, however, they are in full posses
sion of the conclusion to which the great majority
of their fellow-countrymen have come, if they
should see fit, in contradiction to those conclu
sions, to try again at this time — and it will be
a final attempt — to stem the tide of popular
opinion, the people of Birmingham will have to
consider, in the next great meeting within these
walls, whether an institution which again blocks
the way to progress is entitled to their continuous
respect. " It is scarcely likely that we shall sit tamely
by and see our efforts frustrated by the obstinacy
or bigotry of one hundred or two hundred persons,
however highly placed they may be. The major
ity in the Commons of 114 represents the wishes
of 6,000,000 people. The 60 Peers opposed to
them in the Lords represent three things.
Some of them represent the oppression of
Feudal lords in times gone by, when people
were expected to be grateful for being ruled
by the Aristocracy, In the second place, some
of them represent the great wealth acquired by
the possession of land in the vicinity of large
towns — e.g., Manchester and Birmingham — which
land enriched its proprietors without care or
labour on their part. And, lastly, they represent,
and very imperfectly too in many cases, the
brains, the intelligence, and the acquirements of

22 EARLY LIFE
ancestors long since dead, who unfortunately have
been unable to transmit to their descendants the
talents by which they rose. It was of such men
as these that the greatest member of the House
of Lords who ever sat in that body. Lord Bacon,
related that it was customary to say in his time
that they were like potatoes — the best part was
underground. One may respect the Peerage
very much and have an esteem for certain members
of it; but, when it comes to estimating the opinion
of one unknown nobleman as equivalent to the
opinion of hundreds of thousands of his fellow-
subjects, it is an estimate impossible for the
people to hold while they retain any vestige of
self-respect. It is impossible that the House of
Lords will not see in the history of the last few
months proof that the House of Commons is in
accord with the People. It reminds me of an
anecdote of a farmer and his barometer. It was
somewhat out of order, and it perpetually stood
at ' Set Fair,' though it rained incessantly for
three days. But then even the patience of the
farmer was exhausted, and he took the barometer
and beat it against the steps of his house, and
said to it, ' Now won't you believe your own
eyes ? ' All over the country the people have
approved Mr Gladstone's Irish policy ; yet the
Peers are waiting, and their Conservative friends
profess themselves dissatisfied. In the words of
that great Statesman, Mr Gladstone, after the
time has come and the case is proved, action is
still to be deferred, though in this case justice
deferred is justice denied. I venture to hope that
the effect of this and similar meetings will be
that the House of Lords will be advised in time,
will take counsel of the most intelligent and most
able of the Tory Peers, and avert, for this time at

"THK PEERS AND THE PEOPLE" 23
least, the spectacle of a conflict between the Peers
and People."
This was good politics in 1869. It was
generally believed at that time, by Conservatives
as well as by Liberals, that the House of
Lords existed only on sufferance, and that if the
trumpet were blown loud enough the garrison must
capitulate. The policy of menace has been many
times repeated since 1869 — by no politician more
vigorously than by Mr Chamberlain — and only
of late years has it been realised that the prac
tical difficulties in making a fundamental amend
ment of the British Constitution are as great as,
if not greater than, in that of the United States
or the French Republic. When put to the proof,
the Radicals discovered in 1884- 1885 that their
only means of carrying their point was getting
up a strong current of public opinion against the
Peers. In that instance they happened to fail,
so the experiment has yet to be tried whether —
in cases of a direct issue between Peers and
People — the former could be compelled to give
way to the latter. In 1869, it must be admitted
that the Peers had already exercised what their
more cautious supporters had hitherto defined as
the limit of their Constitutional powers. They
had forced the Prime Minister to dissolve Parlia
ment on the very question on which they had
disagreed with him ; the country had been con
sulted, and had given its verdict in favour of the
Government policy. It was not, therefore, very
likely — at an epoch when Liberalism was con
scious of growing strength, and Conservatism
scarcely concealed its misgivings — that the Peers
would persist, on the main issue at least, in
their struggle with the Commons. In getting
up Indignation Meetings, therefore, and in

24 EARLY LIFE
organising Monster Demonstrations and talking
at large about Abolition of the House of Lords,
the Radicals were doing useful service to the
Gladstone Administration.
The most important epoch in the earlier part
of Mr Chamberlain's public career had begun in
1868, when he was elected Chairman of the
National Education League, the active and
aggressive body which was to play so prominent
a part in the conflict that ended two years
later in the establishment of Board Schools,
side by side with Voluntary Schools, through
out England and Wales. In its beginnings,
the League was almost Undenominational. It
was the child of the Birmingham Education
Society, the first meetings of which had been
attended by the late Archbishop Temple, then
Headmaster of Rugby, as well as by ministers
of almost every Nonconformist community. At
that time, however, Dr Temple was considered an
advanced Liberal, and his close association with
some of the more latitudinarian contributors to
Essays and Reviews had thrown him somewhat out
of touch with average sentiment in the Church of
England. Still, the main purpose of the Birming
ham Education Society was not yet anti-clerical.
Its founders, Mr Chamberlain among them, desired,
in the first place, to call attention to the defective
provision for Elementary Education, to raise funds
for the payment of the school fees for children
whose parents could not or would not afford
to find the money, and to agitate for these
charges being placed on the Rates. Meantime,
the Birmingham Education Society did a good
deal of work in the way of whipping-up attend
ance at the National Schools and paying the
fees. From this origin sprang the National

THE EDUCATION LEAGUE 25
Education League, whose objects were formally
defined as to provide school accommodation
through the Local Authorities, and to institute
and maintain schools by means of Local Rates
and Government Grants. Such schools were to
be managed by the Local Authorities subject
to Government inspection. They were to be
free, attendance was to be compulsory, and the
teaching was to be unsectarian. Moreover, the
education was to be " so graduated that the child
of the poorest artisan shall have it in his power
to fit himself for any position capable of being
obtained by a citizen ofthe United Kingdom."
To this work (we read) the League had set
themselves with a serious conviction of its vital
importance, and under a sense of personal respon
sibility and public duty, and to that work they
intended to devote themselves until it should be
accomplished, and " the reproach and curse of
ignorance wiped away from the land." The
rotundity of the language may bring a smile in
these less earnest days, but the promoters of the
League proved their practical sincerity by opening
their purses. Ten of the leading Birmingham
manufacturers, including Mr Dixon and Mr
Chamberlain, gave ^looo each, and the organi
sation was very soon established on what may be
called a war footing. At a great Conference held
in Birmingham, a speech was delivered by Mr
Chamberlain, in which he showed that the question
was one which especially appealed to working-men.
Nor does he seem to have considered it necessary
to argue that the benefits which compulsory educa
tion would confer on the children would more than
counterbalance any hardships inflicted on their
parents. He took it for granted that on this text
no sermon was required by his fellow-townsmen.

26 EARLY LIFE
Probably he would have followed a diff(^rent line if
he had been addressing a rural audience. Though
he was already a vehement advocate of unsectarian
teaching, and on many occasions has permitted
himself to use very strong expressions about the
educational claims of the Church of England, he
did not commit the cardinal error of ignoring his
opponents' case. The following passage from his
speech is instructive : —
" I should be the last to deny or depreciate
the enormous sacrifices which have been made by
many of the Clergy to establish and maintain
schools. But I say that on their own confession
their motive has been, not the education of the
people as a thing which is good in itself, but the
maintenance of the doctrines of the Church of
England, I say that, even if they had been a
great deal more successful than they have really
been, it is the worst kind of Conservatism to say
that because a thing is good of its kind it shall
not be supplanted by something which is better
and more complete.
"If Denominational education is to be ex
tended in England, how can you in justice refuse
Denominational education in Ireland {i.e., Roman
Catholic education) ? And then you will have this
glorious anomaly in our splendid Constitutional
system ; you will have the State spending money
on mutually destructive objects ; and the patient
people will be called upon in one breath to swallow
the poison and the antidote, and to pay the bill
for both ! "
There was no doubt that the Government
would so far comply with the views of the League
as to make education universal and compulsory.
On this point the Liberal Party were practically
agreed, nor could any serious opposition be offered

LIBERAL.^ AND EDUCATION 27
except by those extreme Conservatives, neither
numerous nor influential, who objected to anything
that would make people "discontented with their
station in life." It was understood that, having
extended the Franchise, the State must also open
the schools. In fact, "we must educate our
masters." But it remained to be seen whether
Ministers would — from the Radical point of view —
be "strong" enough to abolish fees and insist on
the teaching being absolutely secular, or, as the
phrase ran, unsectarian. On both points the
League was urgent, and its leaders omitted no
opportunity of placing their opinions before the
country and pressing them on the Government.
As for " Free Education," that was soon seen to
be, for the present at least, quite outside the sphere
of practical politics, and, though the League were
dissatisfied, they could not reasonably attack
Ministers for not adopting a proposal which
the House of Commons undoubtedly would have
rejected. Nor did the Government propose to
establish a uniform system of public elementary
schools. Briefly, Mr Forster's Bill supplemented,
without seeking to destroy, the Voluntary system.
It had not broken down, but it was inadequate.
England and Wales, therefore, were divided into
a number of School Districts, every Municipal
borough and most parishes being treated as
separate Districts, and London being made a
unit. Where the teaching system already in
existence was "sufficient, efficient, and suitable"
(by which it was meant that no conscientious objec
tion could be taken to the character of the religious
instruction), no interference was contemplated.
But in localities where the Voluntary school did
not satisfy this triple standard the contemplated
Act would be brought into force. The expense

28 EARLY LIFE
was to be divided, in approximately equal propor
tions, between a local Rate, a Parliamentary Grant,
and Fees paid by parents. The only concession
made under this head to the Radical demands
was that in very poor districts the Fees might be
remitted when the parents were known to be in
indigent circumstances. The Authority in each
district to carry out the Act was to be a School
Board elected by the ratepayers, which would be
empowered either to build and maintain new
schools, or assist old ones in which a proper Con
science Clause was observed. Finally, the School
Board was required to insist on the attendance of
all children within school age.
Education, then, was to be universal and com
pulsory ; in case of necessity, it might even be
free. So far the League had little to com
plain of While the leaders did not disguise
their disappointment at the retention of Fees,
they were not prepared (as Mr Chamberlain
announced, at a meeting held in the Birming
ham Town Hall in March) to declare war on
Ministers — or even on Mr Forster individually.
"I have great faith," he said, "in the fairness
of the Ministry." By this, probably, he meant
that judicious pressure applied to Mr Gladstone
might result in further concession. Meantime,
there could be no harm in denouncing the im
perfections of the Bill. "The League," he
said, "would far rather the whole Measure
were postponed than that half-measures should
be thrust upon them, which would satisfy no
Party, but delay the proper solution of the
matter, perhaps, for another decade."
It was, therefore, with bitter disappointment
that the League received Mr Forster's authori
tative announcement in Parliament, that the

MR FORSTER'S BILL 29
Government would not forbid Religious Teach
ing in the Board Schools. That, he said,
would have meant excluding the Bible from
Education — a proposal which the overwhelm
ing majority of Englishmen, not to mention
Englishwomen, would not tolerate or dream of
tolerating. On the other hand, it was provided
that no child should be excluded from the full
advantages of school because he attended, or
abstained from attending, any Sunday School or
place of Religious Worship ; or should be com
pelled to learn any Catechism or Religious formu
lary ; or be required to be present at any lesson, in
struction, or observance, to which his parents had,
on Religious grounds, made objection. " Surely,"
exclaimed Mr Forster, "the time will come when
we shall find out how we can better agree on
these matters, when men will find that in the
main questions of Religion they agree, and can
teach them to their children. Shall we cut off
from the future all hopes of such agreement, and
may not all those questions which regulate our own
conduct in life, and animate our hopes for the
future after death, which form for us our standard
of Right and Wrong — shall we say that these are
wholly to be excluded from our schools ? . . . I
confess I have still in my veins the blood of my
Puritan forefathers, and I wonder to hear descend
ants of the Puritans now talk of Religion as if it
were the property of any class or condition of
men. , , , The English people cling to the Bible,
and no Measure will be more unpopular than one
which declares by Act of Parliament that the
Bible shall be excluded from the schools. . . .
What do the League want ? Wherever the
majority are of their views, they can carry
them ! "

30 EARLY LIFE
Mr Forster's words were intended and taken
as a direct reply to the Birmingham Radicals,
It is equally clear that he was faithfully inter
preting the dominant sense of the country, though
defying a vigorous and determined Party,
Where the advocates of Secular Education were
not in a majority — i.e. in nine districts out of
ten — all children would have to attend instruc
tion that might be disliked by the parents of
some. The magnitude of the grievance might
be a matter of opinion, but, such as it was, it
was not met by Mr Forster, and the League
never forgave him. Their claim was expressed
with sufficient clearness by Mr Winterbotham
in his reply. His language, though strong,
was moderate by comparison with the indignant
demonstrations of some of the Noncomformist
spokesmen. The Bill, he said, would be a curse
rather than a blessing — it was an ill-omened
messenger of strife and bitterness. He did not
desire the downfall of the Church of England,
" Though it has been a cruel stepmother to some
of us, it is a venerable institution ; it has done,
and is doing, good work," But what the Radicals
demanded was such a system of purely Secular
instruction as was provided in the National
Schools in Ireland, Religion should be left
entirely to the Pastor, the Home, and the Sunday
School, The storm was so violent that further conces
sions were subsequently announced by the Prime
Minister, As the Conscience Clause proposed
by Mr Forster was not considered adequate pro
tection, the Religious should be distinctly separated
from the Secular instruction, and a time-table
should be instituted to prevent the two subjects
from overlapping. The Cowper-Temple Clause was

THE COWPER-TEMPLE CLAUSE 31
accepted in Committee, and by this compromise
(which was intended to bring peace) every cate
chism and formulary distinctive of any Denomina
tion was expressly excluded from any school
receiving aid from the Rates ; the Board schools
and the Voluntary schools were placed in two
separate classes, and the latter were deprived of
any aid from the Rates, though, to compensate
them partially for this loss, the proportion which
they might receive from the Treasury was raised
from one-third to one-half of the total expenditure.
Although any School Board was given the right
to exclude every form of religious teaching, it
was seen that the general rule would be — and in
fact it was — that the master would read the
Bible and expound it, though without reference
to any catechism or creed.
Thus was founded what Lord Salisbury once
scoffingly called the School Board Religion, The
proposal was equally disliked by extreme men on
both sides, but at the moment the fiercer explosion
of wrath came from the Nonconformists. They
had been thrown overboard, said Mr Richard,
whose hostile Amendment was rejected by 421
votes against 60, A memorable scene took place,
when Mr Miall threatened Ministers with the
withdrawal of Nonconformist support, Mr Glad
stone suddenly flamed into wrath : " I hope that
my honourable friend," he said, "will not extend
that support to the Government one hour longer
than he deems it consistent with his sense of duty
and right. For God's sake, sir, let him withdraw
it the moment he thinks it better for the cause
he has at heart that he should do so ! " Mr Miall,
a highly respected but not very impressive person,
was crushed for the time. In the House of
Commons, Ministers had things their own way;

32 EARLY LIFE
but the defiance thrown out to the League was
bitterly resented.
Two years later Mr Chamberlain, speaking
at Manchester, complained that for years the
Nonconformists had served the Liberal Party
as hewers of wood and drawers of water. They
had been patient under contemptuous toleration
which was very hard to bear. They had
accepted every act of justice as a favour, and
every instalment of rights as a singular and
almost unmerited grace. They had waited for
the convenience and the pleasure of the Liberal
Party. " But now, when we might fairly expect
an accelerated speed, when we might justly
demand a larger share of attention and relief,
suddenly the great Liberal Party falters and the
Liberal Leaders hesitate ; under the guidance
of a man who boasts his Puritan ancestors
while he is indifferent to their principles and to
their cause, we see ourselves drifting back into
the darkness, when we thought we were emerg
ing into the light of perfect day. Concessions
which are made to threats of Irish disaffection,
which are wrung from the Government by the
terrors of a priesthood which takes its inspira
tion from a foreign source, are curtly refused
to Nonconformist loyalty. While Conservative
support is angled for, and clerical opposition is
bribed into silence with a great price, we are told
to take our support elsewhere by the Leader of a
Ministry that we contributed mainly to bring into
power." It would not be consistent, he supposed, with
" the pacific habits" of Nonconformists, to break
Mr Forster's windows or pull down any Park
railings — though these measures had been referred
to as " marvellous stimulants to modern States-

FIRST ATTACK ON MR FORSTER 33
manship." No, but the Nonconformists must
withdraw their support at elections from Liberals
" until they had learned the Liberal alphabet and
could spell the first words of the Liberal creed.
The parson and the publican had joined hands ;
Roman Catholics and Churchmen had embraced ;
the lion lay down with the lamb, to secure from
the School Boards support for Denominational
education." On the next day (24th January 1872), Mr
Chamberlain summed up succinctly what the
League would be content with — and they would
not accept less. The representatives of the rate
payer must have absolute control of all national
funds applied to Secular Education ; all Grants
for this purpose made to Denominational bodies
must be withdrawn ; Religious Teaching should be
relegated to religious bodies, each at its own time
and in its own buildings ; but if Board Schools
were used for such a purpose all Denominations
must be treated alike ; and similar concessions
must be made with regard to the Training
Colleges. Nonconformists would not submit to
toleration — they insisted on equality.
Though Mr Chamberlain had opposed Mr
Forster's Bill before it became law, and denounced
it afterwards, he took an active part in administer
ing it. He was one of the six Radical members of
the first Birmingham School Board, the others
being Mr George Dixon (President ofthe League),
Mr R. W. Dale, Mr J. S. Wright, Mr George
Dawson, and Mr Charles Vince. This minority
of " stalwart " Radicals waged unrelenting warfare
against the policy of the majority, and, it would
seem, against the spirit, if not against the letter, of
the Act. After three years' incessant struggle,
Mr Dixon's and Mr Chamberlain's group were
c

34 EARLY LIFE
reinforced by the election of Mr Jesse Collings
and Miss Sturge. On the School Board, as on
the Town Council, the Progressive party in Bir
mingham were now installed in power, and took
every possible advantage of their position to pro
mote the cause for which they were agitating
on every platform where they could get a hearing.
Locally, their success was beyond question,
but it may be doubted whether the Non
conformists were well advised in organising
a campaign of vengeance against a Liberal
Government which had made them, the utmost
concessions that the country was ready to sanc
tion. It is true that in 1874 they punished Mr
Gladstone and Mr Forster for "betraying" the
cause of Religious Equality ; but the only result
was that Mr Disraeli came into office, and held
it until 1880, and that Mr Gladstone never, in
any of his three future Administrations, found
an opportunity of making the reparation which
they considered their due, and which he would,
perhaps, have conceded, if his lease of power
had been extended in 1874. It is true that Mr
Forster would have resisted any interference
with the settlement of 1870, and that Mr Glad
stone had apparently nailed his colours to the
mast. But Mr Forster might be thrown over,
and Mr Gladstone would easily have found an
honourable excuse for a practical surrender.
At this time (1869-1873) the Nonconformists
made the mistake, Mr Chamberlain among
them, of driving Mr Gladstone too hard. On
questions of policy and expediency he was pliable
— even on matters of principle his enemies said
that he was, at least, open to argument — but
when his personal authority had been challenged
there is no recorded instance of his having given

PRESSING MR GLADSTONE 35
way. Mr Chamberlain, as we shall see, already
had some appreciation of this quality in the great
popular Statesman. In his later electioneering
speeches, when the general issue between the
Liberals and Conservatives was laid before the
country, he refused to take up an attitude of
definite hostility towards the Liberals, or even
towards official Liberalism ; but till nearly the
end of Mr Gladstone's First Administration he
had been a prime leader in organised rebellion.
The malcontents did not, .indeed, wish to depose
Mr Gladstone, but they did mean either to con
vince or coerce him into shedding his Whig
associations, and coming before the country as
a Radical pure and simple. How far they
succeeded, and wherein they failed, will be seen
hereafter. Meantime, Mr Chamberlain, though his eye
had from the first been directed to the House of
Commons, devoted himself, with singular pru
dence to consolidating his local influence. His
work on the Birmingham School Board in
association with Mr George Dixon, his connec
tion with Mr Schnadhorst in creating and work
ing the " Caucus," his platform speeches in the
Midlands, and occasionally in Scotland and other
districts remote from the Midland Capital — all
this was polemical and controversial. If it made
friends and admirers, it also made enemies and
detractors. He was, it is true, becoming a well-
known man outside his own neighbourhood, but
it is hardly too much to say that he was, at this
time, very generally hated — by moderate Liberals
as well as by old-fashioned Conservatives. If he
had relied simply on his political record, his entry
into Parliament might have been delayed, and
even when he had been returned his claims to

36 EARLY LIFE
Office might not have been so promptly recog
nised as they were.
Like a careful strategist, Mr Chamberlain,
therefore, strengthened himself at the base, and
throughout his career has kept his communications
unassailable. No matter how widely his popu
larity in Parliament, or in the country at large, has
fluctuated, he has always found Birmingham true
to him, and he has always been true to Birming
ham. Yet from the first the Conservatives in that
city have been a strong and active body, and the
sharpest attacks upon him, those that were not
merely personal, have emanated from his fellow-
townsmen. The foundations of his enduring local
power were laid, not by his success in political
contests, but by his excellent work as a Municipal
administrator. His connection with the locality
was already established by the ever-extending
ramifications of a highly prosperous business ; it
may have been strengthened, perhaps, by his
marriage, in 1869, to his second wife, Miss
Florence Kenrick, a cousin of the lady who had
died in 1867. His activity on the School Board,
his frequent appearances on the platform, his
growing reputation as a speaker among a popula
tion whom Mr Bright had taught to appreciate
good oratory, and the munificent gifts of himself
and his nearest associates to objects of general
utility, had marked him out for civic office. In
1873 he was elected Mayor, and the honour was
repeated in 1874 and 1875. So dominant had
his influence become, that on the last occasion it
was good-humouredly complained by an opponent,
that he was " not only Mayor but Town Council
also." Birmingham had long been a rapidly
increasing city — indeed it had somewhat out
grown its methods of Self-Government. Mr

LOCAL WORK AND INFLUENCE 37
Chamberlain, in close co-operation with Mr
Jesse Collings, inaugurated, and carried out, on
a small scale, what has been described as "a
policy of State Socialism."
" Fifty years ago," he has said in a review of
his own work, " the population of the town was
1 80,000, or about 40 per cent, of what it is now.
The rateable value was less than one-third of what
it is at present. In those days, there were, with
the exception of the Town Hall and Market Hall,
no public edifices of any magnitude or importance.
There were no Parks, there were no Free Libraries,
there were no Baths ; there was no Art Gallery or
Art Museum ; there were no Board Schools ; there
was no School of Art, no Midland Institute, no
Mason College ; there was no Corporation Street.
The great area which is covered by that thorough
fare, and the streets depending upon it, was one of
the worst districts in the town, both socially and
considered from a sanitary point of view. In fact,
at the period of which I am speaking, the era of
street improvements had not begun. The streets
themselves were badly paved ; they were imper
fectly lighted, they were only partially drained.
The foot-walks were worse than the streets. You
had to proceed either in several inches of mud, or
in favoured localities you might go upon cobble
stones, on which it was a penance to walk. The
gas and the water belonged to private monopolies.
Gas was supplied at an average rate of about 5s.
per 1000 cubic feet. The water was supplied by
the Company on three days in the week ; on other
days you must either go without, or you must
take advantage of the perambulating carts which
went round the town, and which supplied water
from polluted wells at los. the thousand gallons.
You will not be surprised, under these circum-

38 EARLY LIFE
Stances, to know that, in 1848, the annual mortality
of Birmingham was thirty in the thousand ; now
it is twenty in the thousand. The only wonder is
that it was not much greater ; because we read of
whole streets from which typhus and scarlet fever,
and diphtheria and diarrhoea in its worst forms,
were never absent. We read of thousands of
courts which were not paved, which were not
drained, which were covered with pools of stagnant
filth, and in which the ash-pits and the middens
were in a state of indescribable nastiness. The
sewerage of the town was very partial ; and, in fact,
to sum up the description, it may truly be said
that, when this Society was born, Birmingham,
although it was no worse than any of the other
great cities of the United Kingdom, was a town
in which scarcely anything had been done, either
for the instruction, or for the health, or for the
recreation, or for the comfort, or for the con
venience, of the artisan population."
Early in his first year's tenure of the civic Chair,
Mr Chamberlain admitted — or boasted rather —
that he was inclined to "magnify his office*" He
wished to increase the duties and responsibilities
of the Local Authority, which ought, to be "a
local Parliament, supreme in its special jurisdic
tion." In embarking upon the schemes of Muni
cipal Reform which he was about to urge on his
colleagues, he was aware that the patronage and
influence of the Council would be enormously in
creased. Already he had in mind the extension of
Local Self-Government, not merely as an abstract
doctrine, but as an item in a practical programme
that would be promoted by the example of his own
Town Council. He began with a scheme for
buying up the two Companies which were supply
ing Birmingham with Gas, and the outlay involved

MAYOR OF BIRMINGHAM 39
no less a sum than ;if2, 000,000 sterling. We
should not be startled by these figures nowadays,
but a generation ago it was, what Mr Chamber
lain called it, "a momentous proposition." There
was no great risk in the undertaking (as the result
showed), and the Council agreed to the Mayor's
plan by 54 votes against 2. There was more
difference of opinion at the ratepayers' meeting
which was called to ratify or repudiate the action
of the Corporation. Asked whether he would
himself give the price which the Corporation
had been asked to pay, Mr Chamberlain replied
that if that body would conclude the purchase,
and farm the business out to him, he would pay
them ;^20,ooo a year for the privilege, and at the
end of fourteen years he would realise a snug
little fortune of ^180,000 or ;^200,ooo. In the
end, the proposal was approved by a majority
of nearly three to one. Within a few years two
reductions had been made in the charge to con
sumers, and a yearly profit had been gained in
addition, which worked out between _;^ 40,000 and
;^50,ooo a year.
The municipalisation of the Gas business was
followed by the acquisition of the Water Supply.
A considerable part of the population had to
rely on wells, and many of these were so un
sanitary that the Council would soon have to
close them. This would mean extra profit to
the Companies. Why not buy them out before
the action of the Corporation should increase the
value of their property? The Companies, of
course, opened their mouths wide, and, to com
pel them to sell at a reasonable price, it was
necessary to get a Bill through Parliament. Mr
Chamberlain's view was that they should not be
allowed to reckon, in the price to be given, such

40 EARLY LIFE
future profits as might be due to the increase of
the town. These, he argued, belonged to the
ratepayers. For the Companies to claim them
was to demand "unearned increment." The
Corporation, he said, did not wish to make a
profit, only to increase the comfort and promote
the health of the town. When the Bill passed,
and the authorities got to work, it was soon
found that an abundant supply of good water
could be provided (though it has since had to
be supplemented from Wales), and that the charge
could be reduced. At first some discontent was
caused by closing the old wells, but the benefits
of the scheme were generally recognised, and the
example of Birmingham was frequently quoted
by Progressive spirits in other ambitious Muni
cipalities. A still bolder adventure was the clearance of
the slum district in the very centre of the town,
and the construction of what is now Corporation
Street on the site. To carry out this public
improvement, a sum of ;^ 1,600,000 must be
raised, and, before the Statutory powers had
been obtained, no public money was available for
the purchase of land that might come into the
market. For this purpose, Mr Chamberlain
advanced ;^i 0,000, and his example was followed
by a number of his fellow-citizens. In due course
the Corporation was enabled to take advantage
of Cross's Act, and the whole area was laid out,
and let on building leases that will fall in about
the middle of the present century, when the city
of Birmingham will become the possessor of a
highly valuable property.
This, undoubtedly, was good business, but,
in this undertaking Mr Chamberlain and his
associates, not for the first time, manifested

"MUNICIPAL SOCIALISM" 41
traces of that innovating philanthropy which is
always liable to be suspected as " dangerous "
and "savouring of Socialism." Yet there was
nothing exceptionable in any of the sentiments
which he expressed. In proposing to clear away
the rookeries, he dwelt on the unwholesome con
dition of the area, and the misery of the inhabi
tants : —
"We want to make these people healthier and
better ; I want to make them happier also. Let
us consider for a moment the forlorn and desolate
lives the best of these people must live, in courts
like those described. It made my heart bleed
when I heard the descriptions, of Mr White and
others, of the dreariness — -the intense dreariness —
and the lack of everything which would add interest
or pleasure to the life which obtains among that
class. ... I know for a fact that there are people
there almost as ignorant of what is going on
around them as if they lived in a lonely and savage
island. . . . Some would even lose themselves in
New Street. There are people who do not know
that there is an existence on the other side of the
Town Hall ; people who are as ignorant of all
that goes to make the pleasure, the interest, the
activity, and the merit of our lives, as if they were
savages in Ceylon, instead of being Englishmen
and Englishwomen in the Nineteenth Century,
enjoying all the blessings of civilisation."
Brought up in those dreary and filthy sur
roundings, surrounded by noxious influences of
every kind, what was likely to be their conduct ?
It was said that the position of these people was
their own fault! "Yes, it is legally their fault"
(Mr Chamberlain went on), "and when they
steal we send them to gaol, and when they
commit murder we hang them. But if the

42 EARLY LIFE
members of this Council had been placed under
similar conditions — if from infancy we had grown
up in the same way — does any one of us believe
that we would have run no risk of the gaoler or
the hangman ? For my own part, I have not suffi
cient confidence in my own inherent goodness to
believe that anything can make headway against
such frightful conditions as I have described. The
fact is, that it is no more the fault of these people
that they are vicious and intemperate, than that
they are stunted, deformed, debilitated, and
diseased. The one is due to the physical atmos
phere — the moral atmosphere as necessarily and
as surely produces the other."
Commonplaces in 1903! But thirty, even
twenty, years ago, when the Poor Law was held
to cover the State's duty to the People, they were
dreaded and denounced by conscientious and
kindly persons who honestly believed that they
were acting for the best when they resisted every
proposal that could be regarded as " unsettling."
The Birmingham Town Council were less timid.
It was resolved to use the powers conferred by
Cross's Act (philanthropically stretched, with
the approval of the author, beyond its original
scope), and made themselves the proprietors of
forty acres of freehold land within the city.
There is, however, one objection to improve
ments of this kind, which is apt to be over
looked by those who promote them. The site
is cleared : poverty and vice are banished from
the scene. But what becomes of the dis
possessed persons ? They are not reformed ;
for they are not provided for. They simply
migrate to the nearest slum, and, if possible,
intensify the congestion and increase the sum
of local wretchedness.

HOUSING THE POOR 43
Moreover, it is undoubtedly true that, while
Chancellors of the Exchequer have been labouring
year by year to reduce the collective liability of
the nation, the civic authorities have been still
more rapidly increasing the local debts. In some
instances they have even embarked on purely
speculative undertakings, and entered into com
petition with private firms and commercial com
panies. This is clearly an unwarrantable method
of employing money raised by a compulsory levy,
even when it has been sanctioned by a strong
majority of the ratepayers' representatives — as, in
most cases, it has been. It is not always easy to
draw the line between what a Municipality should
attempt, and what it should abstain from. Mr
Chamberlain — who was regarded at one time as a
daring innovator — afterwards laid down the rule
that Municipal activity should be limited to those
things which the community can do better than
the private individual. The main drainage and
sewering of a town can only be properly under
taken by representatives of the whole town : it
cannot safely be left to individual citizens ; when
ever there is need of concerted action, or where a
monopoly of any kind has been set up. Municipal
control should be invoked.
The authors of the Municipal Reform Act
of 1835 — Ml" Chamberlain wrote in The New
Review in 1894 — did not realise the future
development of the system they had initiated.
All they intended was to reorganise the Municipal
administration of finance, judicature, and police.
The powers of the Corporation were not greatly
enlarged — what was done was to establish a
popular Constituency, and to make the Adminis
tration strictly responsible to it. The additional

44 EARLY LIFE
powers which had since been acquired by Local
Authorities were conferred by degrees, so that
Parliament might relieve itself of tasks too multi
farious for its control by remitting local matters
more and more to local administrators.
A modern Corporation is expected to control
police and maintain public order ; to supervise, if
not to undertake, the sewerage, drainage, and light
ing of the town ; to be responsible for precautions
against fire and for sanitary inspection ; to regulate
the condition of the streets, and, perhaps, to con
struct docks, wharfs, and bridges ; to provide
hospitals for infectious diseases, and lunatic
asylums ; it may establish public baths and
washhouses, lay out parks and recreation grounds,
and found libraries, museums, and picture galleries.
It is appointed to watch over the administration
of certain Acts of Parliament, and to assist in the
administration of charities, and, as we have seen,
it may be empowered to acquire certain mono
polies for public purposes, such as the supply of
gas, electricity, and water, and the management
of tramways. The complexity of our system of
Local Government has been greatly increased by
the erection of County Councils, District Councils,
and also by the Education Acts of 1902 and 1903,
which, by the abolition of School Boards, have
considerably added to the responsibilities of the
County Councils and the County Borough
Councils. When Mr Chamberlain was a local adminis
trator in Birmingham (he did not quite sever his
connection with the Town Council till 1880), and
even when he commented on Local Government
in the Magazine article just summarised, the
duties of a Municipal politician were compara
tively light and simple, and it is largely to the

MUNICIPAL LIMITATIONS 45
example of Birmingham and Mr Chamberlain's
personal initiative that the movement of recent
years owes its origin. Though he did not dis
cover the idea — it is as old as the British Con
stitution — undoubtedly he gave a powerful
impetus to its development.
Yet he was not unaware of certain dangers
that may attend the exercise of almost undefined
powers by a body not answerable to the general
opinion of the whole country. He has been
strongly opposed to what he considers the exorbi
tant claims of the Progressives in the London
County Council, and in 1894 he threw out hints
that its power should be clipped by creating a
number of Metropolitan Boroughs and assigning
to each some of the functions then vested in the
central body. Quite as strongly as the most old-
fashioned Conservative, he disliked the idea of
a London Council attaining such powers as
would make it a sort of rival to the Imperial
Parliament. As he said, success in Local
Government depends upon effective decentralisa
tion, and there can be no decentralisation when
a single body has to look after the affairs of
5,000,000 persons — the population of an entire
State. Mr Chamberlain has always been a careful
student of Republican Institutions ; in his younger
days, perhaps, as a somewhat ardent admirer ;
afterwards, when he had been brought into closer
personal contact, as a favourable but discriminat
ing observer. What he saw with his own eyes
on his visits to America convinced him that, if
we are to avoid the corruption which, though
far from universal, is by no means rare in the
United States, we must not allow Municipal
posts to be made the rewards of political service.

46 EARLY LIFE
and must especially beware of the system under
which the tenure of administrative officials is
terminated by the fall of the Party that gave
them their appointments. The average expendi
ture on Local Government in the United States
was, he calculated, four or five times as heavy
as in the United Kingdom. Having gained their
places by corruption, or something very like it,
and knowing that their salaries will come to an
end with the next turn in the Party machine, the
officials, naturally, make hay while the sun shines.
That is to say, they recoup themselves by extor
tion for what they have spent on bribery. If we
are to have honest and efficient administration,
public officers must be paid reasonable salaries,
and be guaranteed in their positions so long as
they discharge the duties efficiently.
The limitations on Local Government which
were to be recommended to Mr Chamberlain's
mind by subsequent and wider experience had
not, perhaps, been very scrupulously observed
by the Town Council of Birmingham, when he
was its Mayor and, as people said, its Dictator.
But the movement was then young and its
leaders — who thought that the eye of the whole
country was upon them — were, naturally, enthu
siasts. The Birmingham Progressives did seek
to make the Council a local Parliament ; did
treat Statutory restrictions as obstacles to be
broken down or circumvented ; and, to a certain
extent, though in no very gross manner, they
did give appointments to men who had helped
them in Municipal contests. On the other
hand, they did not confine their patronage to
their partisans, nor was it ever charged against
them that they parted with a good servant
because he was not "sound" in politics. Looked

EFFICIENCY IN BIRMINGHAM 47
at from a distance, and without political favour
or prejudice, the administration of pubhc affairs
at Birmingham was during these years — as it
has been since — a wonderful example of civic
enterprise and efficiency. Nor can it be denied that,
though others worked quite as hard, the impetus
and initiative were, in the main, supplied by the
Mayor. He startled a good many steady-going
citizens by his bold schemes, but they had to
admit, when the various proposals had been got
fairly into working order, that he never led the
Corporation into making a bad bargain, and
that every benefit which he had promised was
in due course realised. The result was that,
when he laid down office at the end of his third
year, he was, if not personally the most popular,
undoubtedly the most influential, citizen of Bir
mingham. Nothing annoys him less — though he is un
duly sensitive to personal attacks — than the taunt
that he has a " Mayoral mind." He knows very
well that those three years of Municipal office,
followed as they have been by nearly thirty years
of political devotion to the town and neighbour
hood, have given him a position distinct from
that of any other Statesman — almost as powerful
as that of a great territorial magnate in the days
before the Reform Act. The Constituencies
around Birmingham are not Mr Chamberlain's
pocket-boroughs, nor are the electors in that
area men who will be driven. But they can be
led by a man whom they trust and admire. If
there is equal intelligence in the Metropolitan
Divisions, and equal shrewdness in the Scottish
and North of England Constituencies, there is
more political enthusiasm in the Midlands than
in any part of Great Britain. The basis of Mr

48 EARLY LIFE
Chamberlain's ascendancy was, as we have seen,
established in the days when he was looking after
the gas and water and laying out the new streets
of Birmingham. " I will confess to you," he said
in 1880, "that I am so parochially minded that
I look with greater satisfaction to our annexa
tion of the gas and water, to our scientific frontier
in the Improvement Area, than I do to the result
of that Imperial policy which has given us Cyprus
and the Transvaal ; and I am prouder of having
been engaged with you in warring against ignor
ance, and disease, and crime, in Birmingham,
than if I had been author of the Zulu War, or
had instigated the invasion of Afghanistan."

CHAPTER II
from free lance to minister
Though Mr Chamberlain has laid down that an
energetic Mayor has little time for other duties, he
found plenty of leisure during his term of office for
political agitation. His bitter resentment of the
treatment of the Nonconformists in the Education
Act of 1870 has already been described, and he was
known chiefly for his uncompromising hostility to
official Liberalism. In other respects also, he re
presented the extreme section of the Radical party.
In theory he was, no doubt, a Republican — as in
those days most of the Advanced Radicals were.
His views were expressed with sufficient candour
at the end of 1872, when he was proposing the
Queen's health at a dinner in Birmingham : —
" I have been taxed with professing Republic
anism. I hold, and very few intelligent men do
not now hold, that the best form of Government
for a free and enlightened people is that of a
Republic, and that is a form of Government to
which the nations of Europe are surely and not
very slowly tending. But, at the same time, I am
not at all prepared to enter into an agitation in
order to upset the existing state of things, to
destroy Monarchy, and to change the name of the
titular Ruler of this country. I do not consider
that name a matter of the slightest importance,
49 jj

50 FROM FREE LANCE TO MINISTER
What is of real importance is the spread of a real
Republican spirit among the people. The idea, to
my mind, that underlies Republicanism is this :
that in all cases merit should have a fair chance,
that it should not be handicapped in the race by
any accident of birth or privilege ; that all men
should have equal rights before the Law, equal
chances of serving their country," In honouring
the toast which he proposed, the company would
be honouring the popular authority, the popular
will, and the supremacy of Law and Order repre
sented by the Head of the State, and they were
also honouring the personal virtues of the dis
tinguished Lady who then occupied the Throne,
and had endeared herself to the hearts of her
People. Never, he said, either in public or
private, had he advocated Republicanism for
this country, " We may be tending in that
direction, but I hold the time has not yet
arrived, if it ever does arrive, and I hold also
that Radicals and Liberals have quite enough
practical reforms to strive after, without wasting
their time on what seems to me a very remote
speculation." What this amounts to is that in the abstract
the speaker would have preferred a Republican
system to a Monarchy — a sentiment that a
courtier might avow to a King. But it must be
admitted that Mr Chamberlain had lent some
colour to the imputation of Republican senti
ment. At an Electoral Reform Congress, held
the previous month in London, he had been
described as the Delegate from a Birmingham
Republican Club, as well as from the Birming
ham Liberal Association and the Central Non
conformist Association. But his attendance,
as he afterwards explained, had been on behalf

THEORETICAL REPUBLICANISM 51
of the Liberal Association : he had not been a
member of the Republican Club, and the pro
posal that he should appear as its Delegate had
been made without his knowledge. A still earlier
incident, however, has often been brought up
against him. On the fall of the Third Empire,
he publicly congratulated the French Re
publicans on having got rid of a system
"founded on murder and continued in fraud,"
which had "perished in corruption," Yet the
sting of this declaration was, at least, modified by
the addition that there was "really no practical
difference between a free Constitutional Mon
archy, such as ours, and a free Republic. Never
theless, it was an ill-advised utterance, for the
methods by which the throne of Napoleon III.
had just been upset were far more cruel, and
hardly more honest, than those by which it had
been established and maintained. Many crimes
in history have been more or less whitewashed,
but a plausible vindication of the French Com
mune has yet to be written. To ordinary
Englishmen the name was anathema, and still
is. But at this time, and for some years after
wards, Mr Chamberlain, as youthful in mind as
in appearance, delighted in shocking the senti
ment of average men, and sometimes seems to
have deliberately set himself to make their flesh
creep. In 1874, again, he almost claimed the
name of Communist, though he admitted that
events in Paris had lent it an ugly connotation.
But the leaders of the Commune, he declared
at a civic festivity, had fought for the same
principles of Self-Government as themselves.
It was not surprising, therefore, that some
misgivings should be expressed when it became
his duty, in that year, as Mayor of Birmingham,

52 FROM FREE LANCE TO MINISTER
to give an official welcome to the Prince of Wales,
who was visiting the town to open the new Muni
cipal buildings. How would Mr Chamberlain
square what were supposed to be his Republican
principles with paying loyal respect to the Heir to
the Throne ? The theme was tempting to the
comic journals ; but when the ceremony was over
it was generally admitted that the Mayor had dis
charged his task with grace and tact. He even
expressed the opinion that the Royal visit would
" draw closer the ties between the Throne and the
People," and increase the popularity of the members
ofthe Royal House^ — a popularity which was based
quite as much on their hearty sympathy and frank
appreciation of the wishes of the nation as on their
high position and exalted rank.
It will be seen, then, though Mr Chamberlain
shared the prevailing views of the Radicals of that
time — that the Church of England, the House of
Lords, and the Monarchy, were alike doomed insti
tutions — his chief purpose was to promote such
social reforms as he believed would increase the
comfort and happiness ofthe people. His practical
creed was expounded (in a series of articles in
the Fortnightly Review), and summed up as
Free Labour, Free Land, Free Church, and Free
Schools. He believed that the artisans, enfran
chised in 1867, would demand, and be right in
demanding, a greater share in the rewards of in
dustry, something more than bare wages ; that the
Land Laws must be so modified, by the abolition
of the rules as to primogeniture and entail, that
small properties should be made easy and cheap
in transfer, while the cultivator should have his
property recognised in "unexhausted improve
ments " ; that the Church should be disestablished ;
that Education, having been made compulsory,

CANDIDATE FOR SHEFFIELD 53
should be given without any kind of payment from
the parents of those who received it. If the Liberals
would unite on this programme, they would satisfy
the "just expectations " of Labour, and conciliate
the Nonconformists who had been "driven into
rebellion." On any other terms, he believed,
the Liberals would stand no chance of success
at the coming General Election.
He acted on his opinions. The General
Election was held in January 1874, and he
was invited to stand at Sheffield as an Advanced
Liberal against Mr Roebuck, a veteran Liberal
who had not quite kept up even with the Party
Leaders whom Mr Chamberlain regarded as
laggards. The experiment was not encouraging.
He was beaten by a thousand votes, though not
convinced of error. Indeed, the result of the
General Election, when Mr Disraeli took office
with a majority of fifty-two, was a strong argu
ment that the official Liberal Programme had
been insufficient. In the Autumn, Mr Cham.ber-
lain developed and strengthened his contention
in another article {Fortnightly Review, October),
called " The Next Page of the Liberal Pro
gramme," which gave deep umbrage to the
Whigs, while it afforded the exulting Tories a
convenient illustration of the dangerous measures
which would be the logical result of Liberal
principles. Denounced as he was on every
Conservative platform, Mr Chamberlain became
almost a favourite with his adversaries : his
speeches and his articles provided very useful
missiles for pelting Mr Gladstone.
In 1874, Mr Chamberlain retired from business
with an ample fortune, and in the following year
he suffered the misfortune of losing his second wife.
He was not, however, a man either to live in

54 FROM FREE LANCE TO MINISTER
Opulent idleness or brood over a personal sorrow.
He did, indeed, tender his resignation of the office
of Mayor, as he would not be able to discharge the
social duties of the post, but the offer was not
accepted by the Corporation, who undertook to
relieve him of the ceremonial functions if he would
consent to carry on " the Parliamentary business
to which the Borough stood committed."
After a brief absence in the South of France
Mr Chamberlain returned to Birmingham, and
threw himself, with increased energy, into politics.
From that time, almost to the present, he has
lived in an incessant whirl of controversy, attack
ing the policy of others, and defending his own,
giving hard knocks and getting them back, but
never wearied or worried with the perpetual strife,
and always ready to renew the combat. It must
have been almost a disappointment to him that
he should be returned for the first time to the
House of Commons without a contest. On the
retirement of his friend and leader on the
National Education League, Mr George Dixon,
in June 1876, he was elected to the vacant seat in
Birmingham without opposition, having resigned
the Mayoralty and Chairmanship of the School
Board. But his connection with civic administra
tion was not terminated till 1880 (when he took
office in Mr Gladstone's Administration). It was
something of a wrench, he admitted, to withdraw
from the position of Chief Magistrate in his
adopted town. " Local Government," he said in
his first address to his constituents, " is increasing
in importance, and Imperial is diminishing." Nor
was that a time, in his opinion, when following the
fortunes of the Liberal Party in Parliament was
likely to bring opportunities of personal distinction.
His animosity to the Church of England as an

MEMBER FOR BIRMINGHAM 55
established institution was unabated, though he
had never questioned its religious value or the
personal worth of those who preached its doc
trines. But union between Church and State
meant separation between Church and People.
One reason why working-men did not go to
Church was that they saw in it an opponent of
the political reforms which they desired. As for
the practical programme which he would advocate,
it included better representation of the people,
promotion of Temperance, and removal of the
great causes of social discord and the obstacles
to political progress. England was said to be
the Paradise of the rich ; let it not become the
Purgatory of the poor ! But these reforms, funda
mental as they were, must only be pursued by
Constitutional methods. While he regretted
that personal bitterness should be mixed up in
political controversy, no fear of obloquy would
cause him to abate his convictions, or moderate
the expression of his views. He went to Parlia
ment, not as a representative of Middle-class
Liberalism ; he claimed to speak in behalf of the
working-men who represented four-fifths of this
Constituency. This demonstration of Radicalism had a special
meaning with reference to the condition of the
Liberal Party in the House of Commons. Dis
gusted by his failure at the General Election in
1874, and apprehensive of faiHng strength, Mr
Gladstone in 1875 had announced, in whatappeared
to be final language, his withdrawal from the Party
Leadership. For the succession to his place,
at least in the House of Commons, the only
serious candidates were Lord Hartington and
Mr Forster, Though the former was by his
family connections associated with Whig rather

56 FROM FREE LANCE TO MINISTER
than Radical opinions, he was a comparatively
young man, and generally believed to cherish
the highest ambition. It was, therefore,
assumed and hoped that he would prove fairly
malleable, and "move with the times," whilst his
reputation for cautiousness would be useful as
tending to reassure timid politicians. Mr Forster,
on the other hand, though in some respects far
more advanced In views, was essentially a stubborn
man, who could neither be cajoled nor coerced
into going beyond the limits he had marked out
for himself Moreover, he had been the Minister
responsible for the Education Act, and it was due
to his personal insistence that Mr Gladstone's
Cabinet accepted and carried the religious com
promise which had given mortal offence to the
National Education League. The selection of
Lord Hartington In Mr Gladstone's place, there
fore, was largely due to Nonconformist influence,
and, in part at least. It was an act of vengeance
on the Statesman who had defied that body.
Routed as the Liberals had been at the General
Election, the Radical group had gained in political
prestige : they had foretold the defeat of Mr Glad
stone, and, by refusing in some cases to support
his candidates, they had contributed to the result.
They had acted on their threats, and the Conser
vatives, who had profited by the revolt, naturally
looked with Interest, and not without a certain left-
handed favour, on the men who had done them
this good turn. Mr Chamberlain was one of the
new members who specially attracted their curious
regard. He was sure to get a good hearing In the
House of Commons If he chose his opportunity
with discretion. He waited till nearly the end of
the Session before he Intervened in Debate, and
the subject chosen for his Maiden Speech, Lord

MAIDEN SPEECH IN PARLIAMENT .07
Sandon's Education Bill, was one on which he
was well-informed. In the course of the discus
sion some reference had been made to the
Birmingham School Board, and its action de
scribed as a disgrace to the town. Mr Chamber
lain denied that he and his colleagues had evaded
the Intention of Mr Forster's Act, and set up a
system of purely Secular Education. They had
endeavoured to make attendance compulsory
before the new Board Schools were built, and
therefore they had found it necessary to provide
the fees for poor children at certain Denomina
tional Schools. But this expedient had broken
down, simply because hundreds of persons flatly
refused to pay this " new Church Rate "¦ — they
would rather be distrained upon. The plan was,
therefore, abandoned ; even the Denominational
members of the Board declined to enforce the
claim, and provision was made to meet the case
by voluntary subscription. Ultimately, It was
decided to institute complete separation of the
Religious from the Secular Teaching, and never
had the former been so efficient as it then became.
It was not till after the meeting of Parliament
In the following year (1877), that Mr Chamberlain
addressed the House again. This time it was
against the proposal of the Home Secretary (Mr
Cross) to substitute Imperial for Local adminis
tration of Prisons. A humorous account of the
scene was written at the time by Mr H. W.
Lucy : —
"It would be Interesting to know exactly
what opinion Sir Walter Barttelot formed of Mr
Chamberlain's probable appearance, before he had
the pleasure of meeting him face to face in the
House of Commons. He had evidently evolved
some fancy picture, for his surprise at seeing the

58 FROM FREE LANCE TO MINISTER
junior member for Birmingham in a coat, and even
a waistcoat, and in hearing him speak very good
English in a quiet and undemonstrative manner,
was undisguised. . . . When, therefore, there
arose, from a bench below the gangway opposite,
a slightly-made, youthful, almost boyish-looking
person, with a black coat fearlessly unbuttoned
to display the waistcoat and disclose the shirt-
collar and necktie. Sir Walter began to stare, and
cast side-glances at that other great legislator.
Colonel Corbett, In the startled endeavour to know
what he thought of this. Moreover, the Radical
wore, not spectacles with tin or brass rims, as
Felix Holt would undoubtedly have done If his
sight had been impaired, but — an eye-glass.
Positively an eye-glass, framed in precisely the
same style as that which Colonel Corbett himself
wears, when his good-humoured face is turned
towards a distant object. Surprise deepened when
the Radical, in a low, clear, and admirably-pitched
voice, and with a manner self-possessed without
being self-assertive, proceeded to discuss the
Prisons Bill, opposing it on the very lines which
Sir Walter had made his Torres- Vedras when he
besieged the Bill last session. This was very
remarkable ; but there was only one thing for an
English gentleman to do, and that Sir Walter
promptly did."
When Mr Chamberlain had finished. Sir Walter
walked across the House and shook hands with
him. As to the Measure itself. It was not likely
that Mr Chamberlain would support any scheme
for increasing Central at the expense of Local
authority — that the representative of so self-
reliant a town as Birmingham would consent
to see its power diminished. There is little
doubt that the change in administration which

A VISIT TO SWEDEN 5!)
Mr Chamberlain denounced has been generally
beneficial, but it was not difficult to bring for
ward plausible arguments on the other side.
Any little saving made on the Rates would be
counter-balanced by a double burden on the
Taxes. As for Government contracts, the
officials he had always found very civil, but no
system was less adapted to obtaining a good
article at a fair price. If the Government were
taking over the Prisons, why did they not also
take over the Industrial Schools and Refor
matories ? Finally — as a stroke of Parliamen
tary wit — he protested against the proceedings of
the Conservative Government as being Radical
and Revolutionary !
Mr Chamberlain's first Parliamentary Vacation
was spent on a visit. In the company of Mr Jesse
Collings, to Sweden and Lapland. If their chief
object was recreation, the tour (described In the
Fortnightly Review for December 1876) was also
utilised for a public purpose. On several occasions
Mr Chamberlain had insisted on the need for
legislation to reduce the evils of Intemperance,
and the system which he favoured was neither
penal nor confiscatory. As it was clearly the in
terest of publicans, or the brewers for whom they
were agents, to push the sale of intoxicating liquors,
he believed that the traffic should be gradually
removed from their hands, and taken over by
the Local Authority. Municipal officers em
ployed for the retail business would have no object
in attracting customers, nor would they be tempted
to supply liquor of a bad quality, or to adulterate
it with stimulating ingredients. This, substan
tially, was the system which had been established
in various Swedish towns, especiallyat Gothenburg,
from which Its name is taken ; and Mr Chamber-

60 FROM FREE LANCE TO MINISTER
lain was anxious to find out, from personal obser
vation and Inquiries on the spot, how the principle
— which had commended Itself to his own mind
before he had heard of Its application In Sweden —
worked out In practice. The favourable accounts
which he had received were, it seems, confirmed
by what he saw (and was taken to see), though
it should be mentioned that other observers have
since arrived at a very different opinion on the
merits of the Gothenburg system. Mr Chamber
lain, perhaps, made more allowance than was
necessary for the fact that the Swedish regula
tions did not apply to the sale of beer (which
was practically unrestricted), and thought, not
unnaturally, that the Municipal control would
have been more efficient If it had been made
complete. He was at least convinced that it
embodied a valuable reform, and would much
Improve the existing state of things. Radical
as he was, he was never one of those "logical"
politicians who repudiate a partial reform because
they cannot carry the whole of their programme.
Soon after his return to Birmingham he placed
his views before the Liberal Six Hundred, and in
the following January (1877) he induced the Town
Council, by 40 votes against i, to apply to Parlia
ment for powers to adopt a similar Licensing
system. By way of keeping the subject alive,
he published another Magazine article on it,
and gave notice of a Resolution in the House
of Commons. On that assembly, though he
obtained a good hearing, having already " got
the ear of the House," his scheme made no
definite impression. Nor did it receive any
warm support from the Temperance Party, who
then, as now, cared but little for any scheme
that started by offering compensation to the

THE GOTHENBURG SYSTEM 61
licensed victuallers who were to be dispossessed.
They had not realised (perhaps they are now
just beginning to understand) that the country
will never consent to any scheme of general
expropriation unless a fair solatium, is given
to the interests affected — whether they are or
are not "vested" in the eye of the Law. Mr
Chamberlain was aware of this In 1876, and
earnestly pressed his point on the root-and-branch
reformers. They were not converted ; and In 1894
he admitted that they had kept his scheme In abey
ance. He entreated the members of the United
Kingdom Alliance to reconsider their position ;
and until wiser counsels should prevail he feared
that the history of Temperance agitation would
continue to be "a dismal record of the wrecks of
well-meant efforts and promising experiments."
Only last year he repeated this opinion, and
renewed his expressions of confidence in the
scheme that was shelved by Parliament In 1877,
though the House of Lords Committee, before
which he appeared as witness that year, reported
in favour of giving a trial to this among other
expedients. As for the moral argument, that
the traffic In strong drink is an accursed thing
in which no public body should take part, he
made short work of it. By drawing Revenue
from the trade, the State was already Impli
cated In any evil there might be. Already It
assumed responsibility for the control and regu
lation of the trade — the only question was
whether the duty was efficiently discharged.
Mr Spurgeon had said — or been reported to
say^ — that if he could save souls by standing on
his head he would always preach In that position !
"Well," Mr Chamberlain went on, "If I could
save half the drunkards In Birmingham, if I

62 FROM FREE LANCE TO MINISTER
could relieve them from the consequences of
the vice to which they are a prey, if I could
increase to that extent the happiness and pros
perity of the community by turning publican, I
would put on an apron and serve behind a bar
to-morrow, and I should say I could not possibly
engage In a nobler or more religious work." At
the same time. It must not be forgotten that the
existing Licensing System has been attacked by
nobody more unsparingly than by Mr Chamber
lain, and, though he has always stood out for
what he considers fair treatment for the publi
cans, he was at one time lampooned and carica
tured as bitterly as any Prohibitionist orator,
while the Teetotallers have denounced him as a
Friend of the Trade. His position on the
Temperance question remains what It was in
1887. Only the other day, at Johannesburg,
he suggested the adoption of a modified Gothen
burg system, and one of his first political utter
ances on his return to this country, was to
condemn the withdrawal of licences from well-
conducted houses without compensation to the
tenants. Other subjects in which he intervened In Debate
during the early years of his Parliamentary career
related chiefly to Local Government, the state of
Endowed Schools in Ireland, the prevention of
Cattle Disease, and various legal reforms con
nected with Patents, Bankruptcy, and Merchant
Shipping. On these, and similar subjects, he
spoke with the authority of a practical man of
business, and with the lucidity that pleases an
assembly which likes to be instructed easily.
The reclame of a slashing platform orator had
preceded him at Westminster : but he had
established, before Parliament was dissolved In

PARLIAMENTARY TRAINING 63
1880, the more useful reputation of a man who
does not shrink from the trouble of getting up a
host of complicated facts, while his controversial
sallies on such matters as Flogging In the Army,
and on the Eastern Question — which had then
reached an acute state — showed him to be as effec
tive in ex-tempore discussion as In set speeches.
He was, in fact, engaged, whether intentionally
or not, In moulding himself to the accepted type
of Parliamentary Statesmanship.
Though cautiousness of speech has never been
accounted one of his qualities, and though he
employed on foreign politics some of the strong
language which he used so freely in regard to
domestic affairs, he managed not to commit
himself to propositions which a few years later
might prove embarrassing. He remembered in
Opposition that he might hereafter become a
responsible Minister of State. From his first
entry into the House of Commons, there can
be no doubt that Mr Chamberlain regarded
himself as member of some future, and not very
distant. Administration. Though a vigorous
assailant of Mr Disraeli's policy In the East,
he spoke without enthusiasm of Russia, and
kept his Invectives against Turkey within the
bounds of moderation. He dwelt on the advisa
bility of strengthening the Greek Kingdom —
the enfant gdtd of English Radicalism — as a
bulwark against Muscovite aggression in
Europe ; suggested that Great Britain might
arrive at an amicable understanding with the
Czar's Government ; and did not believe that
Russia had any desire to possess herself of
India. No nation could covet so onerous a
dominion !
It has often been said of Mr Chamberlain,

64 FROM FREE LANCE TO MINISTER
that he was at this time one of the " Little Eng-
landers " — a name not then invented — nor can it
be denied that he accepted and generally approved
the lines laid down by Mr Gladstone at this, the
most passionate, epoch of an animated career.
No Liberal politician of the time spoke more
scornfully than Mr Chamberlain of "the noisy
Imperialism of the music-halls," or sought more
eagerly to depreciate the Peace with Honour
which Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury
brought back from Berlin in 1878. It cannot
be pretended that he had realised the future
importance of our Possessions in South Africa,
or the necessity for extending and consolidat
ing our Empire in that part of the world. He
disparaged the Annexation of the Transvaal in
1877, as in 1 88 1 he became a party to the Retro
cession ; he denounced the conduct of Sir Bartle
Frere in Zululand in 1879, just as in 1880 he
became a party to the recall of that energetic
High Commissioner.
Nor can It properly be urged, by those
who seek to credit a Statesman whom they
admire with life-long consistency of opinion,
that he may have dissented in private from
the collective attitude of the Ministry to
which he belonged. This plea may or may not
apply to anything that happened between 1880
and 1885 ; but from 1876 to 1880 he was a "free
lance," and made a demonstrative use of his
liberty. If he had disagreed with the views of the
Liberal Leaders on South African affairs, there
was nothing to prevent him from proclaiming the
difference. Nor would he have scrupled to do so.
On other subjects, he did not hesitate to flout his
official leaders. In the discussion, for instance, on
Flogging in the Army, the Conservative Ministers

GLADSTONIAN FOREIGN POLICY 65
had practically conceded the Radical demand, but,
on a Conservative revolt being led by Sir Walter
Barttelot, they withdrew from a compromise which
had been almost arranged. There was great
indignation on the Radical benches, but Lord
Hartington, coming down late, and not being
informed ofthe latest development of affairs, got up
and deprecated a continuance of the discussion !
It was on this provocation that Mr Chamber
lain renounced his allegiance to "the late Leader
of the Liberal Party." The Insubordinate phrase
created the impression which had been Intended,
and showed, if further evidence was required, that
the author meant to strike out a course of his own at
Westminster. It was, therefore, from no sense of
Party obligations — indeed, he had never enrolled
himself as a Liberal — that he abstained from
expressing disapproval of the policy with regard
to South Africa which was then in favour with
official Liberalism.
Although this is a charge of which Mr Cham
berlain cannot be absolved, it Is a reproach that
he shares with all the Statesmen of his day — on
both sides of the House. The prescience of Sir
Bartle Frere has been vindicated by subsequent
events, but it was not then appreciated. We
know now that the Zulu power had to be
crushed, and that the operation could not have
been postponed. If we meant to save the sparse
British population of Natal from the horrors of
an invasion by Cetywayo's barbarian horde ; that
in precipitating the collision, as Frere undoubtedly
did, he showed the best form of prudence. But
It is also true that he acted in excess of his
instructions from the Home Government, and,
in fact, forced the hand of the Colonial Office.
For this official indiscretion the Empire owes
e

66 FROM FREE LANCE TO MINISTER
him no slight debt of gratitude ; but at the time
it was deeply resented, and he received a sharp
reprimand from the Conservative Minister (Sir
Michael Hicks- Beach) who was then Secretary of
State for the Colonies,
It was argued by Liberals — by none more
strongly than Mr Chamberlain — that If Ministers
did not approve Frere's action they were bound
to recall him. But this was at present impos
sible without bringing disgrace on the British
name, and without exposing the loyal natives to
the vengeance of the rebels. The Colonists be
lieved In Frere, and to order him home, when they
were fighting for very life, would have been a heavy
strain on their loyalty. For the present, therefore,
it was essential that he should remain at his post,
and the Conservative Ministers, though they re
gretted what they thought his headstrong action,
had no course but to accept responsibility for what
had been done. Naturally, the Opposition took full
advantage of their dilemma, and much political
capital was made out of a thoroughly unpopular,
and by no means glorious, little war by politicians
who believed — with excusable fervour — that the
first essential of the hour was to throw the Con
servatives out of office, and climb Into power.
Having committed themselves to wholesale de
nunciation of Frere's policy, they had no option,
when they became responsible for affairs, but to
relieve him of his post. It was equally natural that
the displaced Conservatives, who had borne the
odium of his proceedings, should seek such com
pensation as they could then obtain by treating
him as a martyr sacrificed to gratify the factious
spirit of the victors.
As we have seen, Frere had received but
grudging support from the Conservatives when

AFFAIRS IN SOUTH AFRICA 67
they could have backed him effectively, but, like
every other Administration of either Party, their
chief desire with regard to the Colonies was to
hear as little as possible about them, and to be
spared every expense that might be avoided. In
this political Indifference to the Empire, and in
this desire to keep down the cost of the Army,
English Statesmen did but reflect the general
feeling of the country. A few voices were raised,
once or twice a year, crying In the wilderness of
the House of Commons on the Colonial Office
Vote ; but they were not listened to, and a
perfunctory reply from the Treasury Bench wasJ
considered to dispose of the whole complaint. The
affairs of South Africa were treated with especial
neglect. The general belief was that nothing in
that region was of much consequence to us, so
long as we could hold the Cape, and thus protect
our alternative route to India ; and as to the power
of our Navy In this respect no reasonable mis
givings had yet been expressed in any quarter
regarded as authoritative. The inner politics of
that vast but thinly-Inhabited region were dis
missed as no concern of ours. Nor was public
interest reawakened until the extraordinary mis
management of our relations with the Boers of
the Transvaal had brought ignominy on the
British name, and provided the Conservative
Opposition with a useful battle-cry.
For his full share in the blame that was
visited on his Party for their conduct after
they took office In 1880, Mr Chamberlain has
never attempted to disclaim responsibility, though
it has been said by some of his more Intimate
friends that he was never quite easy in his mind
about the policy of the Government. Jokingly,
but not by way of praise, Mr Bright declared

68 FROM FREE LANCE TO MINISTER
that Mr Chamberlain was "the only Jingo in
Mr Gladstone's Cabinet." However that may
have been, he was no "Jingo," not even a mode
rate Imperialist, when he was helping (from
1876 to 1880) to overthrow the Conservative
Government. His speeches on South Africa do,
indeed, prove that he had, unlike most States
men of the day, taken the trouble to master the
details of Colonial history, and he made out a strong
case In Parliament for a general inquiry into the
manner in which we had found ourselves involved
in a series of embarrassing, fruitless, and costly
operations. On the other hand, one does not dis
cover any adequate appreciation of the future
value of our South African Possessions, or — with
an exception that will be noted hereafter — any
desire to forestall other Powers In the acquisition
of unappropriated territory. The truth Is, that
Mr Chamberlain, like the majority of his country
men, was converted to a bolder policy, first, perhaps,
by the revelation that Ministers had played an un
popular part in their dealings with the Boers, but
chiefly, though not for some years to come, by the
sudden Increase of the English-speaking popula
tion in the gold-bearing districts of the Transvaal.
For the time, Mr Chamberlain had thrown
in his lot with Mr Gladstone, and stood by him
in his South African as well as in his Eastern
policy. The titular headship of the Party did,
indeed, still remain with Lord Hartington, and
Mr Chamberlain, we know, had supported his
election to that office in preference to Mr
Forster. But, as we have seen, he had publicly
withdrawn his allegiance, and it was perfectly
obvious, after the famous speeches delivered by
Mr Gladstone In the " Midlothian Campaign,"
that no other Liberal Statesman could command

MR GLADSTONE AND THE RADICALS 69
the obedience of the Party. It was on those
celebrated orations that the General Election of
1880 was fought and won, but, before the Issue
had been declared, and while It was even yet
doubtful, the Radical member for Birmingham
had definitely identified himself with Mr Glad
stone. Nor was he contented with giving his
personal adherence. He brought with him the
great political machine which he had been
chiefly instrumental in creating. As the ad
mitted controller of the Caucus, which then had
its headquarters at Birmingham, and which still
held aloof from the Party Whips, he held the
power of either uniting or breaking - up the
Opposition. He did not hesitate about his
course. The Radicals had their causes of
quarrel with the Whigs : between the two
groups there were questions which would have to
be settled In the future ; but Mr Chamberlain had
no mind to fight them out in the face of the
common adversary. Moreover, though he felt
much confidence in the local strength of the
new political organisation, it was as yet almost
untried, and it was, perhaps, premature to throw
down a challenge. The word was given for the
Caucus to work on behalf of Liberal candidates,
whether Whig or Radical. It was "sheer non
sense," Mr Chamberlain declared, to say that
they could not co-operate. The differences
between Liberals and Conservatives were far
greater than between Whigs and Radicals.
It was in 1877 that Mr Gladstone had first,
as It were, been adopted by the still inchoate
Caucus. He paid his first visit to Birmingham
on 31st May, and delivered one of his customary
Philippics against Turkey. Mr Chamberlain
confined himself to advocating domestic reforms

70 FROM FREE LANCE TO MINISTER
(Free Church, Free Schools, and Free Land),
and to arguing for the establishment of a
Federation of "all Liberal Associations founded
on the principle of popular election." In com
menting on the event In the Fortnightly Reviezv,
he pointed out that no attempt had been made
at Birmingham to commit Mr Gladstone to a
definite programme. On the other hand, " the
most popular Statesman of our time " had
expressed his sympathy with the efforts of those
who were seeking to restore the fortunes of the
Party, and had admitted the claims of the
Radicals to recognition and fair consideration
In the Party councils. The meaning of these
politic ambiguities was sufficiently clear. The
Radicals had declared for Mr Gladstone as
Prime Minister, and he had Intimated that
they would be represented In his next Cabinet.
There was no formal pledge on either side,
but It was agreed that an active policy of
attack should be Initiated without delay, and
the country was to be roused against Ministers
by a systematic agitation. Those Leaders who
held back should be gently incited to the display
of a fighting spirit, and the Federation was to
keep them up to the mark ! They must be per
suaded to "move a little quicker and go a little
further ! " There was no sort of hostility to Lord
Hartington ; except Mr Gladstone, no Liberal
commanded so much confidence and support !
" Surely the Federation might Impress him with
the necessity for giving direction to the labours
of the Liberals, without having Imputed to them
disloyalty to their Chief in a reckless eagerness
to break up the Party."
The personal relations between Mr Bright and
Mr Chamberlain had always been, and they always

MR BRIGHT AND MR CHAMBERLAIN 71
remained, something more than friendly. The
younger man — though, ;is we have seen, he dis
sented, even as a lad, from the Peace Principles
advocated by the elder — had missed no oppor
tunity of hearing the great orator. In their
joint representation of Birmingham there was
the most complete accord, yet It would be diffi
cult to quote a case of two politicians, so closely
associated, who disagreed so profoundly on Impor
tant questions of the day, or approached politics
from more widely different points of view. Just at
this time — the latter years of the Disraeli Govern
ment — they were, for all practical purposes. In sub
stantial harmony, and Mr Chamberlain advised
the Liberal Leaders to follow the example of the
most earnest, honest, and popular member of the
Party — they would never have to complain of
ingratitude or Indifference.
In their dislike of Clerical influence In the
Schools, and In their support of the Nonconformist
demand for purely Secular Education, there was
no difference between the Quaker and the Uni
tarian. In the agitation for wide-reaching reforms
of our Land System, they could warmly co-operate ;
both were members of that manufacturing class
which, since the days of Free Trade, had nursed
a traditional quarrel with the landed interest, and
both were animated with a genuine desire to
improve the condition and win the support of the
agricultural labourers — who were to be made the
beneficiaries of the next great Reform Bill.
Here, perhaps, the agreement came to an end.
Mr Bright, confident In his unsurpassed qualities
of oratory, believed In moving the people by moral
suasion and by constant appeals to the nobler
passions of man. He knew nothing, and cared
nothing, about organising victory and forming

72 FROM FREE LANCE TO MINISTER
popular opinion. Mr Chamberlain worked by
political machinery and by Programmes. On the
occasion of Mr Gladstone's visit to Birmingham,
Mr Bright had bantered Mr Chamberlain on his
energy and Impatience. " I can see he is looking
at me," he said, "through his glass, only waiting
till I have finished, to get up and protest against
what I have said." Nevertheless, though Mr
Bright hated Programmes and ignored the
Caucus, he did not object to making lise of the
facilities provided by the organisers, while Mr
Chamberlain and his associates did not under
estimate the political value of their alliance with
the great emotional Statesman. Nor was the
elder man forgetful of his obligations to the
younger. On the conclusion of one of Mr
Chamberlain's speeches at Rochdale (November
1877), Mr Bright said: —
" He has done great service In his own town.
There, where he is best known, he Is best appreci
ated. To-night you will give him the warm and
cordial and enthusiastic welcome which we owe to
every man who in a public position earnestly and
consistently endeavours, so far as lies In his power,
to give good government to the population of this
great Empire. This speech will have large in
fluence amongst you, and wherever It is read. I
hope every one of us will feel that we have had a
great treat, and that we have been taught a great
lesson, and it is our duty to follow the advice he
has given us, and to join with the Liberal Party In
every part of the kingdom in Impressing on the
Liberal Leaders that there are yet great things to
be done." The political faith of Mr Bright was clear and
concise : it was comprised in and bounded by the
elements of Political Economy as interpreted by the

THE MANCHESTER SCHOOL 73
"Manchester School." He was content to expound
the doctrines of Cobden : — " Freedom of trade," it
has been said, " freedom of contract, the right
of every individual to all liberty which did not
Interfere with the equal liberty of some other
Individual, the duty of the State to Interfere as
little as possible In the private affairs of its citizens,
and only to preserve public order, and keep the
field open for unrestricted competition — these were
the axioms, clear and rigid, by which the old
Radicals stood, and which in their time did
much to Improve the condition and elevate the
character of the English people. The cold
ness and the hardness of the creed, that devil-
take - the - hindmost spirit which animated the
whole body of doctrine, were for a time dis
guised by the emotional character of some of the
men who professed it. John Mill, for instance,
while pressing these views to their utmost extreme
in his Political Econo7ny, Inserted In that famous
work many passages — quite inconsistent with its
main thesis — which breathed the warmest sym
pathy with those who, by no fault of their own,
came off second-best In the struggle for existence.
Bright, again, though he could argue logically
when he chose, appealed less to the reason than
to the heart, and the underlying harshness, not of
his own nature, but of the principles he had
adopted, only came out when he opposed tooth-
and-nail the humane Factory Legislation proposed
by the Conservatives. It was a violation, he be
lieved, and rightly believed, of his cardinal doctrine,
that the State should not interfere with the liberty
and discretion of private individuals. And the
manufacturing class to which he belonged regarded
such paternal innovations as inspired, not by any
sympathy with the working-classes, but by a desire

74 FROM FREE LANCE TO MINISTER
on the part of the country gentlemen to revenge
themselves on the mercantile philanthropists who
had abolished the Protective Duties which made
farming profitable enough to support high rents.
But even at this date the full meaning and real con
sequences ofthe old-fashioned Economy had not yet
Impressed themselves on the mind even of thought
ful politicians. Mr Chamberlain never seems to
have pinned his faith to theories on which, uncon
sciously, he had made so extensive an Inroad by the
example of State, or, more correctly, of Municipal
Socialism, which he had set by his administrative
work in Birmingham."
It would be impossible to quote any passage
from his early speeches or writings which hinted
any doubtfulness as to the beneficial effects of
Free Trade in the past, or any suggestion that
the time might come when It should be ex
changed for a system of Reciprocal Treaties of
Commerce. The first approach to an open
mind on the subject was seen In the discussions
with the Colonial Premiers in 1897. But In then
advocating an Imperial Zollverein, he was not,
he evidently thought, departing from the funda
mental doctrines of Free Trade, since the pro
posal, so far as it had taken definite shape, rested
on the condition that all the necessaries of life,
and most of Its luxuries, could be supplied Inside
the British Empire.
Nevertheless, though there was yet no ground
for attacking Mr Chamberlain's Economic Ortho
doxy, he had always worn his faith more lightly
than the abstract doctrinaires whose principles Mr
Bright interpreted and softened with his golden
eloquence. There was, perhaps, nothing in Mr
Chamberlain's expressed opinions to prevent him
from favouring retaliation against hostile tariffs —

SOCIAL THEORIES 75
an expedient which Mr Bright, so far as we can tell,
would under no circumstances have contemplated.
Again, Mr Bright's outlook on politics was
purely English. Mr Chamberlain's mind was
largely influenced (as was that of hl§ friend Mr
John Morley) by the sentimental aspects of French
Revolution philosophers. He spoke out bravely
about the "Rights of Man," as If the "Social
Contract " theory on which they were based
had not long ago been exploded, and, though
kindly enlightened by instructors on the Press,
blandly persisted In error. Though, as has
been shown already, he had no sympathy with
the violent forms of Communism, and more than
once repudiated the theory that any legislation
could make and keep men equal, or that such
a state of things would be desirable, he was not
afraid of the name of Socialist. Some of the
phrases which he flung out In controversy — not
ably, his declaration about "Ransom" — showed
that he was no unconditional believer In the
sanctity of Private Property, and held that Pre
scription could only be justified if it were accom
panied by a genuine sense of Obligation, In
adopting such theories as these — from which he
was prepared to deduce practical proposals — he
stood at almost the opposite pole to the Political
Economists who provided Mr Bright with his
working Gospel,
Nor was this the only point of contrast between
the two members for Birmingham, Mr Bright
was a rigid and, within his limits, an exact thinker,
whose opinions flowed directly from such data as
his mind had assimilated. It was In expression
only that he gave way to sentiment, imagination,
and a certain vein of poetry. He used human
passion as a sort of hammer to drive In the nails

76 FROM FREE LANCE TO MINISTER
of his logic. But he was almost inaccessible to
new ideas, and, though not consciously uncandid
with himself, found It very difficult to appreciate
facts not in accord with his preconceived general
views. Mr Chamberlain, on the other hand, has
always been ready, unless engaged in an active
personal controversy, to look at both sides of a
question, and his views have never been so solid
that they might not be modified by fresh evidence
or changed by a new current of feeling. His politi
cal theories and public career have been determined
quite as much by sentiment — by sympathy, by in
dignation, even by personal affection or resentment
— as by reason and calculation. Yet, in expound
ing the opinions which for the time he holds with
almost passionate conviction, he seldom attempts to
touch men's deeper feelings. He sets out his facts
In lucid sequence ; his humour Is chiefly displayed
in exposing the sophistries or inconsistencies of
an opponent ; he appears always as the advocate,
never as the evangelist.
The natural differences between the two Bir
mingham Statesmen made them especially formid
able In combination. Nor could Radicals in
Opposition have desired a better object to attack
than the Imperialist policy of Lord Beaconsfield.
Looking back on that Statesman's work from the
distance of a quarter of a century, though we can
see that much In it was solid and enduring, we
need not be surprised that, in 1880, it was con
demned by the country. True, he had purchased
the Suez Canal shares, he had occupied Cyprus,
and annexed the Transvaal. But it was not at
the time foreseen what an excellent investment
we had made in Egypt ; Cyprus was repre
sented chiefly as a burden ; the Transvaal was
considered a worthless tract. On the other side of

LORD BEACONSFIELD'S IMPERIALISM 77
the account was the considerable outlay of money
(;^6,ooo,ooo sterling) on military precautions : the
Zulu War had never been popular ; the im
broglio In Afghanistan, which began with the
murder of Sir Louis Cavagnari, had only been
saved by the genius of Stewart and Roberts from
resulting in sheer disaster ; we had given mortal
offence to Russia, and had associated ourselves
with support of Turkish misrule. We had done
nothing to strengthen the Greek Kingdom, and
had helped to cripple the Bulgarian Principality —
two small Powers which for the time were in great
favour with English Liberalism. To Increase
the general discontent, the Chancellor of the
Exchequer had to impose fresh burdens on the
taxpayer at a time when trade was languishing
and agriculture suffering under a depression that
seemed likely to be permanent.
The one great and lasting benefit which
Lord Beaconsfield had conferred on the country
was not generally recognised, and its genuine
value was, it must be admitted, not a little obscured
by the tawdry forms In which It was manifested.
When he took office, and for a good many years
before, the general feeling of Englishmen was that
their country could no longer play a great part
in the world ; the Non-intervention theory which
had so long guided our policy, useful as it had
been in its day, had bred a spirit of habitual
long-suffering which caused us to be Ignored in
the Councils of Europe. The Imperialism of
Lord Beaconsfield, though It brought us to the
brink of acute conflict, and though music-hall
braggadocio gave it sometimes an offensive ex
pression, did brace the national spirit and revive
the old self-reliance of the English people. It
is true that during the ensuing five years (1880-

78 FROM FREE LANCE TO MINISTER
1885) we received more affronts, and suffered
more reverses, than in any corresponding period
of our recent history ; but a growing proportion
of the nation did resent the indignities placed
upon it, and, though Mr Gladstone managed to
secure a majority on his next appeal to the
country, his English support had fallen away.
This was due neither to any failure of his own
marvellous powers as a leader of opinion, nor to
any growth of capacity among the Conserva
tives, but simply to the seed which Lord Beacons
field had sown. It had to force its way through
the tares — planted, some will say, by his own hand
— but It did struggle up, though he did not live to
reap the harvest.
When the weary Statesman announced, on
8th March 1880, that Parliament would shortly
be dissolved, and issued his famous Letter to
the Duke of Marlborough, Lord- Lieutenant of
Ireland, he based his claim to a renewal of power
on a direct appeal to the Imperial instinct of
Englishmen. During the previous six years, he
declared that Ministers had devoted much atten
tion to the interests of Ireland. Yet the arts of
agitators had counteracted the liberal and
prudent measures of the Legislature. That
country was distracted by a danger "scarcely
less disastrous in its ultimate results than pestil
ence and famine." A portion of its population
were endeavouring to sever its Constitutional tie
to Great Britain. Men of "light and leading"
were implored to resist that "destructive doc
trine " ; the strength of the nation depended on
the unity of feeling that should pervade the
United Kingdom and its widespread Depend
encies. Yet there were some who challenged
the expediency of the Imperial character of

THE GENERAL ELECTION OF 1880 79
the Realm. Having attempted, and failed, to
enfeeble the Colonies by their "policy of decom
position," they might recognise In the " disintegra
tion of the United Kingdom " a method by which
they would "not only accomplish but precipitate
their purpose." Rarely had there been an occasion
more critical. The power of England and the
Peace of Europe would largely depend on the
verdict of the country. " Ministers have hitherto
been enabled to secure that Peace, so necessary
to the welfare of all civilised countries, and so
peculiarly the Interest of our own. But this in
effable blessing cannot be obtained by the passive
principle of Non-interference. Peace rests on the
presence, not to say the ascendancy, of England
in the Councils of Europe."
The vague and grandiloquent language of this
Manifesto was eagerly fastened on by the Oppo
sition. They pointed out, not without plausi
bility, that the continuance of a Conservative
Administration meant a prolonged period of
foreign complications. The country was tired'
of anxiety, of wars and rumours of war, and
it stood In need of many important domestic
reforms, both social and political. As for Lord
Beaconsfield's dark sayings about Ireland, they
were only derided as mere charlatanerie. Home
Rule, as it was then known in Parliament, was
but the Impracticable and almost Academical
demand of a small group at Westminster, and
there was no apparent likelihood of its ever
being adopted by the Liberal Party. As for
the secret conspiracies with which Ireland was
said to be honey-combed, they were. It was
thought, but a figment of Lord Beaconsfield's
romancing genius. Not for some months to
come was It realised that below his mysterious

80 FROM FREE LANCE TO MINISTER
phrases was concealed a knowledge of hard
facts and a prescient understanding of influences
actually in operation.
It was an unequal battle. The Conservatives
had no popular Leader outside the House of
Commons. Sir Stafford Northcote was gener
ally respected, but his was no name to conjure
with. Lord Beaconsfield was evidently a failing
man ; Lord Salisbury was still considered a
dangerous politician ; nor could either of them
take any personal part In the electoral struggle.
It was left for Mr Gladstone, then at the height
of his controversial powers, to sweep the board,
assisted as he was by a very remarkable group of
Statesmen, all distinguished for intellectual vigour
in their different ways, who had not yet revealed
that their mental powers were far superior
to their administrative capa!city. Lord Harting
ton, Lord Granville, Mr Bright, and Sir William
Harcourt appealed each to separate elements of
Liberal opinion, and, to quote an expressive
vulgarism, they all "went In solid for the Grand
Old Man." It is impossible to say what the
result would have been if Mr Chamberlain and
his following in the Midlands had held aloof— how
far the Liberal majority of 1880 might have been
reduced. But, as we have seen, he had under
taken to support Mr Gladstone, and, in pursu
ance of the friendly arrangement which had
been thus informally concluded, he placed the
services of the Radical Caucus at the disposal
of the Liberal Party. The net result was that
349 Liberals were returned against 243 Con
servatives and 60 Home Rulers.
In seven only of the sixty-seven Constituencies
In which the Caucus had been fairly established
was the candidate rejected who had received its

THE VALUE OF THE CAUCUS 81
support. Naturally, Mr Chamberlain claimed and
received credit for its work. It was only to be ex
pected, on the other hand, that this very efficient
organisation should be denounced by the Con
servatives. They were eloquent on the mischief
of "machine poHtics " and the introduction of de
grading American institutions into the public life
of England. It was In reply to such criticisms
that Mr Chamberlain used the following expres
sions in 1883 : —
"I know," he said, "that there are some who
express alarm at the recent development of our
Liberal organisations. They denounce it as the
Caucus ; they describe It as a machine. I am not
surprised that the Tories should dislike It. I do
not wonder that they feel so painfully what they
unsuccessfully tried to imitate. These great,
open, popular Representative Associations are not
at all in their line. They are alien to the spirit of
Toryism. The ' Primrose League ' Is more in
their way, with Its silly, sentimental title. I con
fess I am surprised when I find these organisations
objected to and criticised by many who profess
themselves In sympathy with the Democratic
movement. Why, the Democratic movement
would lose all Its force without organisation.
The difficulty of Radicalism in times past has
always been that there was no cohesion among the
people. Napoleon III. told Mr Cobden, In conver
sation, that private Interests were like a disciplined
regiment, while the public good was defended by
a disorganised mob. The force of Democracy,
to be strong, must be concentrated. It must not
be frittered away into numberless units, each of
them so preciously independent that no one of them
can unite with another even for a single day."
In 1885, again, Mr Chamberlain declared that
F

82 FROM FREE LANCE TO MINISTER
the Caucus was the servant of the People, not
its master : it was an engine for concentrating
popular opinion, and securing Its effectual repre
sentation. It was the medium for keeping the
Leaders of a Party In touch with, or, if neces
sary, under the control of, their supporters.
Nor should it be forgotten that, when it turned
against him in 1886, he maintained the same
view of Its rights and limitations.
But the best flattery Is imitation, and all the
essential features of the National Liberal Federa
tion were reproduced In the National Union
of Conservative and Constitutional Associations,
though that body never acquired the same
dominating Influence which was for a time exer
cised by its original. It has always been regarded
more as an arena for discussion than as a director
of policy, and " Independent members " have been
encouraged to air their private theories quite with
out prejudice to the Party as a whole. Its practi
cal activity, like that of the Primrose League, has
been limited to Election times, and it has been pre
served by its moderation. The National Liberal
Federation, though still an energetic association,
has been crippled by attempting too much. The
removal of Its headquarters from Birmingham to
London, where it was placed In the same building
as the Liberal Central Association, and more or
less controlled by the Party Whips, deprived It of
that contact with outside opinion which its founders
had claimed as Its chief merit. But In 1880 it was
still young, and It was absolutely unofficial. As its
Chief, Mr Chamberlain would have been entitled
almost to ask his own terms from the Statesman
whom he had so materially helped to power. It
was inevitable that the Free Lance leader should
be offered a command in the Regular forces.

CHAPTER III
THE RADICALS AND IRELAND
The condemnation of the Conservative Adminis
tration by the country was so unmistakable that
Lord Beaconsfield saw no use in waiting for the
meeting of Parliament, and being ejected by a
formal vote. On i8th April he went down to
Windsor and offered his resignation, which the
Queen accepted "with much regret," Observ
ing the strict Constitutional etiquette, he recom
mended as his successor the nominal Leader of
the Opposition, For five years Lord Harting
ton had carried on the somewhat thankless
work, and nobody could have blamed him if he
had claimed the natural reward. But, even if
he had wished to stand on his rights. It would
have been impossible for him to keep a majority
together in the House of Commons, The
Radicals meant to have Mr Gladstone, and
nobody but Mr Gladstone would they accept.
They did not wish to drive Lord Hartington
from the Party, nor could they have afforded to
do so. They would work with him, but not under
him. The point was never raised, because his
loyalty to his old Chief forbade him to enter
into such a competition. On his declining the
office of Prime Minister, it was considered necessary
to offer the reversion to Lord Granville. This was
83

84 THE RADICALS AND IRELAND
merely absurd. Clever and genial as the Liberal
Peer was, he possessed none of the qualifications
for command. Like Lord Hartington, he stood
aside for Mr Gladstone, who was then "sent for"
by the Queen, and commanded to form an Admin
istration. With the office of Prime Minister he
combined the Chancellorship of the Exchequer.
Lord Granville went to the Foreign and Lord
Hartington to the India Office, Mr Childers
became Secretary of State of War, and Lord
Northbrook First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir
William Harcourt was Home Secretary ; the Duke
of Argyll, Privy Seal ; Mr Forster, Chief Secretary
for Ireland ; Mr Adam, First Commissioner of
Works ; Lord Kimberley was given the then
secondary post of Colonial Secretary, and Lord
Selborne was made Lord Chancellor, All these
appointments were what might have been antici
pated ; the Ministers were men of official experi
ence, and belonged to the more cautious section of
the Party, Mr Fawcett, who was given the Post
Office, and Mr Mundella, the Vice-President of
the Council, were more "advanced" in their
views, but neither of them represented the
Birmingham type of Radicalism, while the ad
mission of Mr Forster to the Cabinet, though
thoroughly justified by his position in the country,
his services to the Party, and his administrative
experience, was eminently distasteful to the mili
tant Nonconformists, who had by no manner of
means laid aside their grudge against the author
ofthe Education Act of 1870,
What, then, was to be done for the Radicals ?
Mr Gladstone had declared in public that the " men
who were in earnest " should be admitted to the
Councils of the Party — i.e., there should be a
Radical element In his new Cabinet. There was

RADICALS AND THE CABINET 85
no personal bargain with Mr Chamberlain — no
pledge, given or implied, that he should be the
selected representative of the Forward Group.
But it was no fulfilment of the Birmingham
understanding to make Mr Bright Chancellor
of the Duchy of Lancaster. In the first place,
he could not have been left out of Mr Glad
stone's Cabinet — his popular Influence was too
Important. In the second place, his Radical
ism was in 1880 already becoming antiquated.
Finally, though he could always make a great
impression in the country when he braced him
self for a special effort, he had no taste for the
routine of daily detail, no head for business, and
his aptitudes had been nicely fitted In the dignified
sinecure allotted to him by the Prime Minister.
It would be going too far to say that he was the
"sleeping partner' In the Government, because
he would on occasion arouse himself with very
signal effect, but he could not be regarded as an
efficient and vigilant representative of the Radical
interest. That duty and distinction lay between two
men, closely associated in political views and
personal friendship — Sir Charles Dilke and Mr
Chamberlain. Both were men of extreme views,
rising influence, and untiring Industry. Each con
sidered himself entitled to a place in the Cabinet
— each was assured of some position in the
Government. But they were too shrewd, and too
closely united in mutual regard, to run against
each other. They had agreed that neither would
accept any office unless one or other should be
taken into the Cabinet. By this loyal and judicious
arrangement they defeated certain old-fashioned
colleagues of Mr Gladstone who objected to the
admission of either, and hoped, by playing off one

86 THE RADICALS AND IRELAND
against the other, to secure the exclusion of both
from the charmed circle. Eventually an arrange
ment was made which was equally satisfactory to
Sir Charles Dilke and Mr Chamberlain. The
former had an unrivalled knowledge of Continental
politics, and was offered the Under- Secretaryship
of State for Foreign Affairs. Since his Chief, Lord
Granville, was a member of the Upper House, Sir
Charles became the mouthpiece of the Government
in the Commons, and obtained a position which Is
practically more Important than that of a second-
class Cabinet Minister. This cleared the way for
Mr Chamberlain, who was made President of the
Board of Trade, an office for which he was
specially designated by his career as a business
man in Birmingham.
If the new Minister was to do justice to
himself in a busy and exacting Department, it
was necessary to claim release from his remain
ing Municipal obligations. The retiring Alder
man was accorded by the Mayor. (Mr Richard
Chamberlain) and Corporation a public vote of
thanks for his past work in Birmingham. More
over, his services were commemorated by the pre
sentation to the town of a fountain, with his
medallion, which stands in Chamberlain Square,
between statues of George Dawson, the well-
known preacher, and Sir Joslah Mason, founder
of the College that bears his name and has since
been incorporated In the new Birmingham Uni
versity. In the same year Mr Chamberlain gave
up his house at Edgbaston, and went to live at
" Highbury," which had been built for him near
Moor Green, and stood in large grounds, where he
set up glass-houses for the cultivation of orchids
— which was now almost his only relaxation from
public activity.

MR CHAMBERLAIN IN THE CABINET 87
His influence in the Cabinet was felt almost
at once. On the other hand, It must not be
supposed that he always, or generally, got his
own way. Almost from the beginning the Cabinet
was a scene of conflict between the Whig and the
Radical elements, the balance being swayed, first
one way and then the other, by those members who
had not definitely committed themselves to either
side, though a certain outward harmony was main
tained by the strong personal authority ofthe Prime
Minister. It was not likely that Mr Chamberlain,
who had only been four years In Parliament, would
already venture to beard Mr Gladstone. More
over, that would have been to invite defeat.
The Prime Minister was receptive of new Ideas,
accessible to fresh advisers, amenable to pres
sure if judiciously applied, but he never allowed
his personal authority to be challenged. Some of
his colleagues had studied the various ways of
"getting the measure of his foot," and had raised
their pursuit almost to the dignity of a fine art.
In that kind of diplomacy Mr Chamberlain has
never excelled, and his methods, when he was still
young to Imperial politics, were much less accom
modating than they have since been rendered by
long years of administrative experience. But
when he was overborne he never fell into the
blunder that Lord Randolph Churchill com
mitted once too often — that of considering him
self indispensable, and offering his resignation In
the belief that It would not be accepted. On
one occasion, as we shall see, Mr Chamberlain
did express a wish to retire from the Govern-
rrtent, but that was for a very special reason.
In a general way, he relied chiefly on his
singular powers of persuasion.
Those who only know Mr Chamberlain on

88 THE RADICALS AND IRELAND
the platform, or from his place in Parliament,
may be unable to account for his remarkable
success In bringing men round to his views. In
public, especially when he has been attacked, he
seems to feel a boyish delight in saying just the
thing that will goad his opponents to fury. Pro
bably he does not always intend to give mortal
offence, but the surprise which their resentment
gives him soon passes away, and on the next
occasion he is quite likely to repeat the Indis
cretion. But that is a failing which he seldom
exhibits in private deliberation, even when there
is an acute difference of opinion. He argues his
case with excellent temper ; he listens carefully
to the other side ; he will even modify his view
on some point of detail, or agree to a reasonable
compromise, and he leaves persons who at the out
set may have distrusted him with an absolute belief
in his sincerity. All these qualities he employed
with effect In the first Cabinet of which he was a
member, and with the Prime Minister he was
eminently fortunate. It was In this way, perhaps,
that Mr Gladstone's Second Administration was
led into some of the inconsistencies which did It
so much harm In public opinion. Sometimes the
Old Whigs had their will, sometimes the Radicals,
and the result was the Government, collectively,
appeared to be a vacillating body, and were
taunted, not without justice, by Lord Salisbury
on the " sharp curves " which they so frequently
executed. There was no secret made — though Cabinet
etiquette forbade any formal disclosure — of the
differences that agitated Mr Gladstone's Govern
ment. With all the frankness that the subject
permitted, Mr Chamberlain, after little more than
a year's apprenticeship, explained his methods

CONFLICTING INFLUENCES 89
to his constituents. A Liberal Government which
was representative of the Party must Include men
of different shades of opinion. They would all be
animated with substantially the same principle, but,
though all would be moving In the same direction,
the order and rate, even the means and instru
ments, of progress would be capable of great
variety. No single man, therefore, was entitled to
expect always to carry his own personal view.
They must all be ready to make concessions, and,
when the decision of the majority had been formed
after full discussion, they must all be ready to put
it into force.
Excellent official sentiments ! No placeman
could have spoken better ! But the value lay in
the application. What did Mr Chamberlain mean
by " full discussion " ? And how often did he think
that a question might be reopened ? The truth
was, though he could not say as much In public,
that he never accepted an adverse decision as final.
For the time he might be, and often was, beaten,
but on the first opportunity he would begin the
fight all over again. Indeed, though never dis
loyal, he was, in the first Cabinet to which he
belonged, a somewhat uncomfortable colleague ;
and it happened that among those with whom
he had to co-operate were several men with wills
as firm as his own, and of much longer experi
ence in public affairs — men not predisposed to
favour any proposal that savoured of Birming
ham Radicalism. Often, then, he was over
borne by the weight of numbers and authority,
and for the time he would give way, but only to
wait for a favourable opportunity of renewing the
struggle. This persistency of purpose, confirmed
by several years of almost unchallenged domina
tion in his Town Council, had not yet been modi-

90 THE RADICALS AND IRELAND
fied by the larger transactions and wider con
siderations of national statecraft ; he does not
seem to have appreciated the value of Com
promise until the rupture of the Liberal Party in
1886 compelled him to arrange a modus vivendi
with his old adversaries. With them, however,
it was comparatively easy to arrive at a general
understanding that might on both sides be faith
fully observed. But with his associates In a
Liberal Administration it was not possible to
strike a definitive bargain. Towards them the
only duty he recognised was to lead them, one by
one, and step by step, towards the Advanced
Programme which he kept steadily in view. It
was too early to talk about secession. He might
have been taken at his word — some of his col
leagues would have jumped at the chance of
getting rid of him. A well-established States
man may strengthen his position by a timely
resignation : for the probationer it is only a con
fession of failure. Mr Chamberlain followed the
more prudent, and In the long run more effective,
method : he "kept on pegging away."
The results of his tactics, alternately aggressive
and yielding, were especially shown In the curiously
inconstant policy of the Government with regard
to Ireland. On other grounds, as we have seen,
no love was lost between Mr Chamberlain and Mr
Forster. But the antagonism which had arisen
over the Education Act of 1870 was revived and
intensified on the question of Coercion. Personal
rancour there was none on either side, but before
the controversy had been long In progress each
was doing his best to drive the other out of the
Cabinet. Neither man could see any good in the
policy of the other, and there was, besides, a
certain incompatibility of temper. In the personal

THE CONDITION OF IRELAND 91
Struggle Mr Chamberlain was successful. It was
Mr Forster's posthumous revenge that the victor
was before long advocating the very Measures
which he had so strongly disapproved, and was. In
his turn, denounced by the same adversaries — and
almost In identical languasfe. Rich as was the
vocabulary of Nationalist abuse, it contained few
distinctive maledictions for " Buckshot Forster "
and "Judas Chamberlain."
The note of warning sounded by Lord Beacons
field as to the condition of Ireland had been
derided by the Liberals as mere electioneering
blague, and the "air of Asiatic mystery" in which
the prophecy was enveloped prevented It from
being taken quite seriously by Conservatives. Yet,
to careful observers on the spot, the state of the
country, when Mr Gladstone obtained Office in
1880, was giving the gravest disquietude. Out
wardly, the appearance was somewhat more pacific
than it had been for a few years before. The two
distinct movements — one for political separation,
the other for confiscation of the landlords' property
— had. assumed a colourable moderation in the
shape of Home Rule and Land Reform. As pre
sented for discussion in England, there was little in
either demand that might not fairly be considered
by any Advanced Radical. The two agitations,
which had hitherto been worked for separate
objects and largely by distinct sets of persons,
were now brought together by "that genius
Parnell," as Lord Salisbury called him.
The mere combination of the two Pro
grammes was, however, no great feat of leader
ship. As the landlords were, practically, the
English garrison in Ireland, the Fenian and the
Farmer obviously had an equal interest in niaklng
the country too hot to hold them. And it was

92 THE RADICALS AND IRELAND
but rudimentary deception for the Irish Party
to pretend in England that they were only asking
for Local Self-Government and an extension
of Tenants' Right. If Mr Parnell had done
no more than this he would not have earned
Lord Salisbury's sinister commendation. His
original and audacious project was to associate
these "open," and more or less Constitutional,
movements with the treasonable conspiracy of the
Physical Force Party in Ireland and America.
To carry out his purpose — partly ambitious but
chiefly patriotic — he must have command of votes
at home and plenty of money from abroad. The
votes he got from the Irish farmers, by promis
ing them the freehold of the soil (or something
very like it) and persuading them that he was
really working for the enfranchisement of the
land. The money of the Clan-na-Gael was
extracted by denouncing British rule on
American platforms, and by promising to destroy
the Union between Great Britain and Ireland.
This double game Mr Parnell played for some
years, and with astonishing success, when it
is remembered that he had to play it in
public. His American speeches were read in
Ireland, his Irish speeches In America, and both
in England. Yet not only did he manage to
humour both elements in his own following, but
he also contrived to find believers and allies in this
country — not exclusively among the Radicals.
The first Important step was taken In June
1879, when he appeared at Westport on the same
platform as Mr Davitt, the Fenian, who had
recently been released on ticket-of-leave. The
Land Act of 1870 had been a failure, he said, since
it left landlords the power of eviction in cases of
non-payment of rent. They must ultimately be

FORM.-VTION OF THE LAND LEAGUE 93
bought out. Meantime, the tenants should pay no
more than fair rents, and keep a firm grip of
their homesteads and farms. They must not rely
entirely on their Parliamentary Representatives —
God helped those who helped themselves.
In October, the Land League was formally
brought into operation. The objects announced
were, on the face of them, approximately legiti
mate : to reduce rack rents and enable cultivators
to become owners of the soil ; to defend tenants
threatened with eviction ; to work the Bright
Clauses in the Land Act ; and to invest the
tenant with the freehold, after payment of a fair
rent for a certain term of years. In view of the
agricultural depression then prevailing in Ireland,
it was resolved that Mr Parnell should visit the
United States, and solicit subscriptions for the
starving peasantry. It was soon found that a
merely philanthropic appeal would not bring in
the dollars, and Mr Parnell explained that the
Land League, of which he was the moving spirit,
did not conflict with "any higher national aspira
tion for the complete redemption of Ireland."
This was good, so far as it went. But some
thing more was necessary. Mr Parnell, as a
Member of Parliament, and leader of a Consti
tutional agitation, was open to suspicion. Early
in 1880 he repudiated the charge of undue
legality, and pointed out that a successful revolu
tionary movement must have both an open and
a secret side. He would not himself belong to
an unlawful association, but would co-operate
with one. On 20th February he declared, on
behalf of his Party at Westminster, that none
of them would be satisfied until they had broken
the last link that bound Ireland to England.
On his return home a banquet was held in his

94 THE RADICALS AND IRELAND
honour, nor did he offer any protest when Mr
Biggar expressed the belief, if Constitutional
measures should fail to win the rights of Ireland,
that she would "produce another Hartmann, and
probably with better results " — Hartmann having
just been arrested on the charge of attempting
to blow up the Czar in the Winter Palace.
The new Parliament had scarcely assembled,
in 1880, when the Irish Party started on the policy
— in which they had the active support of a
Radical group at Westminster — of "squeezing"
Mr Gladstone. It had been understood that the
Session of 1881 should be set apart for an Irish
Land Bill, but the Nationalists insisted upon an
immediate instalment. Ministers must find time
for a Bill to suspend evictions. Clearly this would
derange the Government Programme ; besides, as
Mr Forster bluntly declared. It would mean a Bill
to suspend the Payment of Rent. Nevertheless,
the Irish Party in the end had their way : partly
through their own capacity for making themselves
a nuisance in Parliament, and partly through the
support of Mr Bright and Mr Chamberlain within
the Cabinet. Ministers announced, just before
Midsummer, that they had accepted the principle
of the Nationalist proposal, and had Incorporated
it In their scheme for the relief of distress in
Ireland. The operation of the " Compensation
for Disturbance " Bill was to be limited to the end
of 1 88 1, by which date it was hoped that the con
templated Land Bill would come into force.
Its object was, almost avowedly, to smooth
the way for the comprehensive Measure of the
ensuing Session, and to keep the Nationalists
quiet in the House of Commons. There might
be excellent reasons why the Liberals should
vote for it. But these had no influence with the

"COMPENSATION FOR DISTURBANCE" 95
Peers. Irish landlords dreaded, and English
landlords disliked, what they knew would be
the leading features of Mr Gladstone's promised
legislation ; nor had they any desire to make
things easy for him at Westminster. Accord
ingly, the House of Lords rejected the Bill by a
majority of 5 to i (252 against 51). On the
surface, the Bill was not unfair. It gave relief
only to tenants who had been prevented from
paying their rent by the badness of the seasons,
who were willing to continue their occupation on
reasonable terms, and whose landlords had re
fused such terms. Granted that the legislation
which Ministers were known to intend was
necessary, the preliminary Measure would not
be inequitable. But as the Peers refused to
accept that hypothesis they might well be
excused for rejecting the deduction. If a pitched
battle had to be fought in 1881, why should
they abandon their outpost In 1880?
The Radicals, of course, made the most of
this opening. Both at the time and afterwards,
when a state of something like Civil War had
arisen In Ireland, they attributed all the trouble
to the rejection of the Compensation for Dis
turbance Bill. They forgot that the Land Bill
afterwards presented contained limitations which
destroyed its virtue in the eyes of the Irish
Agrarians, and that when It came up for Third
Reading In the Commons Mr Parnell and his
immediate following had walked out of the House.
Mr Gladstone, no doubt, had attached Importance
to the Land Bill, and so had Mr Chamber
lain. Probably they believed that, though it
did not satisfy the Irish members, it would,
nevertheless, placate the tenants : —
"You will recollect," said Mr Chamberlain,

96 THE RADICALS AND IRELAND
"the solemn warning which Mr Gladstone
addressed to us in reference to the state of
affairs. He said, ' Ireland stands within measur
able distance of Civil War,' and he urged that
this Bill (Compensation for Disturbance) should
be accepted as, in the opinion of the Govern
ment, necessary to strengthen their hands, and
to enable them to secure obedience to Law and
Order. The warning was neglected — the House
of Lords rejected the Bill, and I say, never in
the history of that House has it committed
a more unwise and a more unpatriotic act.
If that Bill had been passed, we have the
assurance of the Leaders of the Irish Land
League themselves that they could not have
successfully continued their agitation. The Bill
was rejected, and Civil War has begun. Class
is arrayed against class In social strife, and now
30,000 soldiers and 12,000 policemen are barely
sufficient to enable the Government to protect
the lives and the property of the Queen's subjects
In Ireland." Whether the Bill, if passed, would have done
good in Ireland, It is Impossible to say. Certainly
the rejection of It was not the cause of the dis
order. This had begun before the Bill was pro
posed or thought of Months before, the agitation
against rent had been started, the Land League
had been organised, and the Fenians had been at
work — witness the raid on the Juno, when forty
cases of fire-arms were carried off. This enter
prise had been formally condemned by the Cork
Branch of the Land League, whereupon Mr
Brennan and Mr Dillon had suggested that it
would be well if the Cork people were to mind
their own business. The rebuke was dutifully
taken to heart, and the offending Resolution was

THE BOYCOTT SYSTEM 97
cancelled. The practice of Boycotting had not
merely been condoned, It had been expounded and
enjoined, by Mr Parnell : —
"What," he asked, "are you to do with a
tenant who bids for a farm from which his neigh
bour has been evicted? ('Kill him!' 'Shoot
him ! ') Now, I think I heard somebody say,
'Shoot him!' ('Shoot him!') I wish to point
out a very much better way — a more Christian
and charitable way — which will give the lost sinner
an opportunity of repenting. (' Hear, hear ! ')
When a man takes a farm from which another
has been evicted, you must show him on the road
side when you meet him, you must show him in
the streets of the town, you must show him at the
shop-counter, you must show him In the fair and
In the market-place, and even in the place of
worship — by leaving him severely alone, by putting
him Into a moral Coventry, by isolating him from
his kind as a leper of old — you must show him
your detestation of the crime he has committed ;
and you may depend upon It, if the population of
a county In Ireland carry out this doctrine, that
there will be no man so full of avarice, so lost to
sense of shame, as to dare the public opinion of
all right-thinking men within the county, and to
transgress your unwritten code of laws."
The truth was that Mr Gladstone was growing
tired of Mr Parnell and his Incessant Parliamentary
menace — convinced, also, that the agitation in
rural Ireland could only be controlled by strong
measures. There was little doubt that the
Coercionists In the Government were getting the
upper hand, and the " Birmingham Members of
the Cabinet," as Lord Salisbury pleasantly called
them, had to make their choice between resign
ing and acquiescing In exceptional action against
G

98 THE RADICALS AND IRELAND
disorder. It was even rumoured that Mr Bright
was weakening in his belief that " Force was no
remedy." As Lord Salisbury pointed out, that
was not the opinion of the Land League. Every
day it was bringing new districts under its con
trol — if necessary, by assassination, but more
generally by torment and torture, cruelty, and
destruction of property. Mr Chamberlain had
asked why it was that Order had been main
tained under a Conservative regime, but Anarchy
had broken out as soon as the Liberals came
into office. Lord Salisbury's reply was that
the Irish were demoralised by " the electioneer
ing habits of the Liberal Party."
"Crime and outrage," he had said on another
occasion, "though very disagreeable to those who
live in the midst of them, have a Parliamentary
value. A Land Bill, especially if it contained
confiscatory clauses, would fall very flat if there
were no disturbances in Ireland. The longer the
disturbance continues, the fiercer it becomes, and
the more cause there would seem to be for excep
tional legislation next Session ; and if there are
members of the Government — as I suspect there
are — who have some pet project, some darling
theory, to promote, they will wish for that state
of things which will furnish the argument that
will best establish their theories. On the other
hand, if the landlords are delivered over for the
winter to the tender mercies of the Land League,
it may be hoped they will be more pliable next
Spring, and will offer their fleeces more readily to
the shearer who may desire to shear them. In
other words, the present state of Ireland, all the
Anarchy, and all the crime committed In that
country, are so many arguments for future legis
lation. Every person who is shot, or wounded.

THE RADICALS THROWN OVER 99
or carded, or tarred and feathered, contributes to
bring revolutionary principles with regard to the
land of Ireland within the range of practical
politics. He will act on Mr Gladstone's mind
with the same effect as the Clerkenwell outrage."
Though these taunts and others like them,
bitter and effective as they were, would not have
moved the Radicals from their policy If Mr Glad
stone had stood firm, he perceived that the opinion
of the country — already irritated by events abroad
— was turning against him : he had, besides, a
strong hatred of the more violent forms of ille
gality. On 25th September matters were
brought pretty well to a head by the murder of
Lord Mountmorres — not the worst instance in a
series of deliberate assassinations. Not only were
such crimes frequent, but they were committed
with the sympathy, probably with the complicity,
of the people amongst whom the victims resided.
It was impossible to obtain convictions, or even
to collect evidence. Before the end of October,
criminal informations had been filed against Mr
Parnell, Mr Dillon, Mr Biggar, and other leaders
of the Land League, and in the following month
It was announced in the City by Mr Gladstone
— amid general applause — that the Law must
be enforced in Ireland before any relief could be
granted to the farmers. To this he made the
significant addition that, if the existing facilities
at the disposal of the authorities were not suffi
cient. Parliament would be asked to entrust the
Government with fresh powers.
This was an absolute repudiation of the whole
Radical position. Naturally, It was resisted in the
Cabinet by Mr Chamberlain — who was on fairly
intimate terms with Mr Justin M'Carthy and
other moderate members of the Home Rule

100 THE RADICALS AND IRELAND
Party. The meetings of the Cabinet in Novem
ber — the usual time for settling the business
of the ensuing Session — were so numerous
and protracted that rumours went about that
a Ministerial crisis was impending. Mr Cham
berlain, however, gave way. Had he at this
time withdrawn from the Cabinet on such a
question, he would probably have received little
support in the country, except, perhaps. In his own
district. The Nationalists made it very difficult
for an English politician to stand by them. Such
order as was kept in Ireland was kept by military
force. It required 7000 men to overawe the rioters
while a party of friendly Orangemen, imported from
Ulster, were engaged in getting the harvest on
Captain Boycott's estate.
The Coerclonist proposals of the Government,
explained on the meeting of Pariiament, 7th
January 1881, were embodied in two Measures.
The Preservation of Peace Bill rendered the pos
session of arms within any " Proclaimed District"
a punishable offence. The Protection of Life and
Property claimed the most arbitrary power ever
demanded by a modern English Ministry. It
authorised the Lord- Lieutenant to issue a warrant
for the arrest of any person whom he might
"reasonably suspect" of any treasonable or agra
rian offence. Such a person must be treated as an
unconvicted person, but might be kept in custody
till 30th September of 1882, without being brought
to trial. It was in this way that Mr Forster hoped
to lay his hand on those "village tyrants" who
practised outrage and Intimidation with impunity,
because they knew that nobody dared to give
evidence against them. " If I had thought," he
said, "that this duty would devolve on an Irish
Secretary, I would never have held the office ; if I

COERCION AND OBSTRUCTION 101
could have foreseen that this would be the end of
twenty years of Parliamentary Hfe, I would have
left Parliament rather than undertake It." If Mr
Forster showed so much repugnance in making
this proposal, what must have been the feelings of
his Radical colleagues in acceding to it ? It was
noticed that the hostile Amendment to the Address,
which was moved by Mr Parnell, was supported in
the lobby by eight of the English Radicals
most closely associated with Mr Chamberlain
and Sir Charles Dilke. Neither of them spoke
on the Bill, but Mr Bright surprised the
House by delivering an impassioned defence
of it. He had always voted against coercive
Measures In the past, because he did not believe
them to be necessary. This Measure he did
consider necessary — he trusted Mr Forster, and
the law of the Land League had superseded the
law of Parliament. Other coercive Bills had not
been accompanied by remedial measures : this was
to be followed by a wide scheme of agrarian
reform. The difficulty of accepting the Bill may have
been mitigated to Mr Chamberlain by the unpre
cedented Obstruction practised by the Irish
members In opposing it, A Debate of forty-one
hours was only brought to an end by Speaker
Brand resorting to a coup of somewhat doubtful
legality, Mr Chamberlain has always attached
a possibly exaggerated Importance to the effi
ciency of Parliamentary Institutions, and regards
it as almost a sacred principle that the will of
the majority shall prevail. He was especially
irritated by the Nationalist tactics, because they
prolonged a controversy which placed him in a
very awkward position, and postponed the dis
cussion of the Land Bill which, along with many

102 THE RADICALS AND IRELAND
Other Liberals, he considered a Message of Peace
to Ireland, Not unnaturally, the exasperated
Conservatives declared that the Irish deserved
no favour from the Parliament which they had
defied and insulted. Why not drop the Land
Bill, and have done with them ? Mr Chamber
lain repudiated such counsels : —
"What is to be done now? Well, the Tories
have no doubt whatever as to the course which
we ought to pursue. By the mouths of their
Leaders, by their organs In the Press, they urge
upon the Government to put aside at once the
Land Bill, to give up any attempt at remedial
legislation, and to go to Parliament for more an-^
more Coercion, for the abolition of trial by jury,
for the suppression of the Land League, and for
other stringent and arbitrary Measures, Well
now, for my part, I hate Coercion, I hate the
name and I hate the thing. I am bound to say
that I believe there Is not one of my colleagues
who does not hate It as I do. But then we hate
disorder more. It seems to me that the Issue is
now with the Irish people and those who lead
them. They can have no doubt any longer. It
might have been possible before ; they can have
no doubt any longer as to the intentions of the
Government, We have brought in a Land Bill.
We have offered our Message of Peace to the
Irish people,
" I do not say that It may not be susceptible
of amendment, but I say that, as it stands, and,
speaking generally of its main provisions, it has
been welcomed by the majority of the Irish Press,
It has been frankly accepted as satisfactory by
the whole of Ulster, It has been approved — I
am always speaking of its main proposals — it

THE 1881 1,AND BILL 103
has been approved by the Roman Catholic
clergy." Virtually, the Measure of which Mr Gladstone
and his colleagues had formed such high hopes
was an enactment of the " Three F's " (Fair Rent,
Fixity of Tenure, and Free Sale), and was based,
in some respects, on the Reports of the Richmond
and Bessborough Commissions. Briefly, the Fair
Rents were to be settled by a special tribunal,
the Land Commission — the argument put forward
being that in Ireland there was no such thing
as free contract between landlord and tenant.
Fixity of Tenure was defended as a necessary
consequence — It would be no good to settle a Fair
Rent if the landlord were able to determine the
tenancy at pleasure. The tenant, therefore, was
to be secured for a period of fifteen years, during
which his rent could not be raised, nor could he
be evicted except for nonpayment of rent, or the
breach of certain specified covenants. The Free
Sale was based on the custom of Tenant Right,
which already existed in certain parts of the
country : it was now legalised, rendered uni
versal, and considerably enlarged. It was made
to consist of two elements — the value of the
tenant's "unexhausted improvements" and of
the "goodwill of the farm." Besides these
three essential features, the Bill contained a
number of clauses dealing with Compensation
for Disturbance, the Reclamation of Waste
Lands, Emigration, and Land Purchase.
A generous measure of Reform, said the com
placent Liberals ! A policy of sheer confiscation,
cried the landlords indignantly ! A miserable
dole, grumbled Mr Parnell! It must be radically
altered before it could be accepted by his Party.
As it stood, he would not compromise himself by

104 THE RADICALS AND IRELAND
voting for the Third Reading: The Liberals
were equally astonished and disgusted by the
attitude of the Nationalists, and nobody was
more Incensed than Mr Chamberlain. They were
not in earnest about social reform, he declared
In a platform speech : —
" There is no secret about what I am going to
say. There is no dispute about it. Mr Parnell
and those who follow him have never concealed
the fact that their chief object is not the removal
of grievances In Ireland, but the separation of
Ireland from England. Why, only a few months
ago Mr Parnell, speaking In Ireland, said that he
would never have joined the Land League, he
would have taken no part in this great agitation
which has been called into existence to redeem
the Irish people from the consequences of centuries
of wrong — he would have taken no part in that
agitation if he had not thought it would have
helped him in the Nationalist and Separatist
movement in which he chiefly takes an interest.
How can we satisfy these men ? Our object Is
not the same as theirs ; we want to remove every
just cause of grievance. They want to magnify
grievances and to Intensify differences. We want
to unite the Irish people and the English and the
Scotch in bonds of amity. We want, I say, to
bind the Irish people to this country In bonds of
amity and cordial union, just as much as Scotland
is united to England — although the time was when
Scotchmen felt as bitter a hostility to the Union
as Irishmen now profess to feel. Well, under
these circumstances, I find that the gentlemen to
whom I have referred do not openly oppose the
Land Bill, because, I believe, they are well aware
that their constituents would not justify them in
such a course. But they are not unwilling to put

MR PARNELL'S INGRATITUDE 105
obstacles in its way. They are not unwilling to
raise Motions for Adjournment, or to put questions
which lead to Debate, and which take up the
precious time of the House, which ought to be
expended solely in the promotion of this Measure ;
and, above all, they try by agitation to force upon
the Government impossible concessions, the effect
of which, If only we were to accept them, they
know would be that the Bill would very likely be
rejected by the House of Commons, and would
certainly be rejected by the House of Peers."
Mr Chamberlain went further than this. He
admitted there might be dishonest tenants as well
as grasping landlords, that the right to receive a
fair and moderate rent was "as much his property
as a man's coat or his money," and that the power
of eviction must be retained as the only means of
exacting a just debt.
In spite of Nationalist Ingratitude, and Con
servative opposition, Mr Gladstone's Bill was
passed without any fundamental alteration in
either House of Parliament. If the Government
still hoped to pacify Ireland, they had made a great
miscalculation. No sooner had Parliament risen
than the Nationalist members set themselves to
foment disorder. The South and West of Ireland
were given over to a No Rent agitation. Mr
Gladstone delivered at Leeds a dignified rebuke
to the Irish Leader. Mr Parnell desired to
stand, as Aaron stood, between the living and
the dead ; but to stand, not, as Aaron stood,
to arrest, but to spread, the plague ! Mr Parnell
replied, at Wexford, that Mr Gladstone's language
was unscrupulous and dishonest ! Evidently, It
was no good to argue any longer with a poli
tician so lost to all sense of decency. He was
" reasonably suspected " of treasonable practices.

106 THE RADICALS AND IRELAND
and taken to Kilmainham Prison, where he was
presently joined by most of his chief colleagues.
The reply of the Land League was issued on
1 8th October, In the shape of a Manifesto en
joining the tenants to pay no rent until the
prisoners should be released. On the 20th the
Land League itself was proclaimed as an illegal
body. In theory It ceased to exist, but for
financial purposes It survived in the Ladies Land
League, and for all practical purposes the Pro
clamation was a dead letter.
So far, it must be confessed, the Irish policy
of the Government had been a failure. They had.
Indeed, carried their Bills, but the Law was openly
defied over the greater part of the country, and
the leaders of the people were only kept in order
by being placed under lock and key. It was
under these dispiriting circumstances that Mr
Chamberlain went to Liverpool at the end of
October, and attempted a general defence of
Ministers' treatment of Ireland. It was too much,
he said, to expect that "the tardy and incomplete
reparation of later years " would at once efface the
bitter memories lingering in thousands of Irish
cabins. The Peers were once again reminded of
their mischievous action In rejecting the Com
pensation for Disturbance Bill. But the Nation
alist Leaders were much to blame because. If they
did not countenance, they did at least permit, a
system of terrorism which no civilised Government
could tolerate. It had been necessary to suppress
the Land League — though its ostensible object,
the reform of unjust laws, was approved by the
Government, But, Instead of seeldng to remove
grievances, It was inflaming them. It was doing
its best to make the Land Act a failure. The
real object of the agrarian movement was to

HOME RULE AND SEPARATION 107
promote the cause of Irish Independence. The
Government were bound to interfere unless they
were ready to face the prospect of Separation.
He could not himself contemplate the establish
ment of a hostile Power within striking distance
of England. Probably it would lead to Civil
War. At the best, the two countries would be a
standing menace to each other : the Naval and
Military expenditure would become Intolerable.
In the end Ireland would have to be reconquered,
or England would be ruined. He said to Ireland
what the Northern States in America had said to
the Southern — "The Union must be preserved."
If that condition were observed there was nothing
which Irishmen might not ask and hope to obtain
— equal laws, equal justice, and equal prosperity.
Their Interests and even their prejudices should
be respected. But Nature had forged indis
soluble links, which could not be sundered without
causing misery and ruin to both countries. To
keep them intact, all the resources of the Empire
would be put into force.
The speech is important because it marks
distinctly the point beyond which Mr Chamberlain
was resolved not to advance in his extreme con
cession to Irish opinion. He was unalterably
opposed to Separation of the two Kingdoms —
and, presumably, to the Institution of an Inde
pendent Parliament in Dublin. But there was,
on the other hand, no repudiation, express or
Implied, of any Home Rule demand that stopped
short of Separation.
As for Coercion — which was the one urgent
topic of the day — though Mr Chamberlain spoke
of it as necessary, it is by no means clear that
in his own mind he was convinced of Its virtue.
On so essential a question of policy he could

108 THE RADICALS AND IRELAND
not separate himself from his colleagues, but his
apology, though It may have been sincere, was
not very spirited. Evidently he had no heart
In a system which his brother Radical, Mr Joseph
Cowen, described as " a despotism as remorseless
as was operating In Moscow,"
But how was It working ? When Parliament
met In February 1882, the Government alluded.
In the Queen's Speech, to certain "signs of im
provement," and for some months longer they
adhered to their policy. Yet moonlighting, in
timidation, and Boycotting were practised all over
the South and West ; arms were imported without
much apparent difficulty ; murders were not In
frequent, attempts at murder were everyday occur
rences ; the Land League was at work under a
new name, though seven hundred persons were
being kept In prison without trial. Presumably
they had been selected as the most formidable
agents of disorder. Yet while they were In
seclusion the mischief went on as merrily as if
they were still at large. The legal power under
which they were detained would expire at the
end of September. As for putting the "sus
pects " on their trial, there would be no chance
of getting a conviction. Such were some of the
arguments that Mr Chamberlain was urging
against the Coerclonist system with which he
was unwillingly associated. Why not try what
could be done by way of bargain and arrange
ment? It was known that to Mr Parnell person
ally confinement was specially Irksome, and in order
to hasten his release by a few months he might be
willing to yield some substantial consideration.
Persistently pressed, not only by Mr Chamber
lain, these views at length prevailed with Mr
Gladstone. This was the origin of the negotia-

MR PARNELL'S OVERTURES 109
tions that resulted In the " Treaty of Kilmainham."
Mr Forster had no alternative to suggest except
that of going to Parliament for still more stringent
powers of repression — a course which the Prime
Minister disliked, and which, he thought, might
involve the resignation of Mr Bright as well as
Mr Chamberlain. Apart from their own disbelief
in coercive legislation, they had to contend against
the incessant pressure applied by their Radical
supporters and associates, and their position was
becoming both anomalous and uncomfortable.
It is said, and probably it is true, that the
first overtures proceeded from Mr Parnell. How
ever that may have been, it is certain that for
some little time the go-betweens had been busy,
and the political quidnuncs wagged their heads
sagaciously when It was announced that Mr
Parnell had been released from prison. The ex
planation offered was that he had suffered a family
bereavement, and had been allowed to go out on
parole, in order to attend the funeral of his relative
In Paris, That he had other business to transact
in that Capital has since been ascertained, but
the parole part of the story was confirmed by
his return to Kilmainham on the 24th, That
Mr Forster altogether disapproved of the nego
tiations then in progress is as certain as that
he was informed beforehand that they would be
commenced. His consent as Chief Secretary
was necessary, in order that the prisoner might
in the first Instance be set at large. Again, a
confidential letter to Mr Gladstone, quoted by
Sir T, Wemyss Reid,* shows that he agreed,
though only on certain conditions, to the
release of the prisoners, " They must give an
assurance that they would not, in any way,
* Life ofthe Rt. Hon. W. E. Forster.

no THE RADICALS AND IRELAND
attempt to intimidate men Into obedience to
their unwritten law." Without such an under
taking, matters would only be made worse —
unless the country became so quiet that
" Parnell and Co." could do no harm, or unless
an Act were passed so strong that it would be
possible to govern the country in defiance of
them. It is also clear, from Mr Forster's sub
sequent intervention in the debate on the
"Treaty of Kilmainham," that he had been
kept informed of the various stages In the
transaction. It is still impossible to give a full account of
the transactions, as Mr Gladstone objected in the
House of Commons to the production of docu
mentary evidence. But the general course of the
dealings Is pretty clear from certain letters which
have been published. Three days after his re
lease Mr Parnell Instructed Captain O'Shea, a
member of his Party, and husband of the lady
who afterwards became Mrs Parnell, to address
Mr Gladstone and Mr Chamberlain on the sub
ject of legislation as to Rent Arrears, Captain
O'Shea's story was that Mr Parnell expressed In
difference about the treatment of himself and the
other suspects. The important thing was to get
Ministers to take up the Arrears question. This
Is not improbable, since, if they adopted Mr Par-
nell's policy, and brought in a Bill on his lines, they
would be bound to let him and his colleagues out
of prison. Captain O'Shea also said that he im
plored his friend and Leader to use his personal
influence for restoring order In Ireland. If this
also was true, we get the basis of a bargain —
Captain O'Shea acting as the " honest broker " for
both parties. The Government were to be Invited
to satisfy Mr Parnell on the Arrears question, and

KILMAINHAM CORRESPONDENCE 111
Mr Parnell to oblige the Government by giving
the word for disorder to come to an end. How
ever that may have been, Captain O'Shea did
write both to Mr Gladstone and Mr Chamberlain
on 13th April. The Prime Minister's reply was
dated two days later : —
" I have received your letter of the 13th, and I will com
municate with Mr Forster on the important and varied
matter which it contains. I will not now enter upon
any portion of that matter, but will simply say that no
apology can be required either for the length or the freedom
of your letter. On the contrary, both demand my acknow
ledgments. I am very sensible of the spirit in which you
write, but I think you assume the existence of a spirit on my
part with which you can sympathise. Whether there be any
agreement as to the means, the end in view is of vast moment,
and assuredly no resentment, personal prejudice, or false
shame, or other impediment extraneous to the matter it
self, will prevent the Government from treading in that
path which may most safely lead to the pacification of
Ireland."

Mr Chamberlain's answer was dated the 17th :
" I am really very much obliged to you for your letter,
and especially for the copy of your very important and
interesting communication to Mr Gladstone. I am not in
a position, as you will understand, to write you fully
on the subject, but I think I may say that there appears
to me nothing in your proposal which does not deserve con
sideration. I entirely agree in your view that it is the duty
of the Government to lose no opportunity of acquainting
themselves with representative opinion in Ireland, and for
that purpose that we ought to welcome suggestion and criti
cism from every quarter and from all sections and classes of
Irishmen, provided that they are animated by a desire for
good government, and not by a blind hatred of all govern
ment whatever. There is one thing must be borne in mind
— that if the Government and the Liberal Party generally
are bound to show greater consideration than they have
hitherto done for Irish opinion, on the other hand the leaders
of the Irish Party must pay some attention to public opinion

112 THE RADICALS AND IRELAND
in England and in Scotland. Since the present Government
have been in office they have not had the slightest assistance
in this direction. On the contrary, some of the Irish mem
bers have acted as if their object were to embitter and pre
judice the English nation. The result is, that nothing would
be easier than at the present moment to get up in every large
town an anti-Irish agitation, almost as formidable as the
anti-Jewish agitation in Russia. I fail to see how Irishmen
or Ireland can profit by such policy, and I ^hall rejoice when
ever the time comes that a more hopeful spirit is manifested
on both sides."

Captain O'Shea was less successful in his
dealings with Mr Forster. Though numerous
interviews were held, the Chief Secretary held to
his opinion that no terms could be arranged, but he
gave him practically free access to the "suspects"
in Kilmainham. It should here be mentioned that separate
negotiations were being conducted, though with
the same object, through Mr Justin M'Carthy,
who acted as intermediary between Mr Chamber
lain and Mr Parnell. In this case also a definite
understanding was arrived at, and was embodied
in a letter from Mr Parnell to Mr M'Carthy, dated
30th April. This letter (which for some reason
Mr Gladstone was unwilling to produce) lays
down practically the same stipulations on the
Arrears and other Agrarian questions as Mr Par-
nell's letter of the 30th, which was read out in the
House of Commons. The difference is that the
earlier letter does not contain that undertaking by
Mr Parnell (to co operate cordially with the
Liberal Party) which caused and invited so much
unfavourable comment. If it be granted that
Mr Gladstone was justified in coming to terms
with Mr Parnell, and that it was becoming to
barter an Arrears Bill for Nationalist help in
stopping outrages, the arrangement outlined in

THK SUPPRESSED CLAUSE 11.?
the letter to Mr M'Carthy was perfectly unexcep
tionable. The offensive element In the bargain
was that Ministers should have sought to buy
over the Irish vote — only a few I months after the
Nationalist Party had formally resolved to take
their places on the Opposition side of the House.
Naturally, the Conservatives made the most of
this "corrupt" understanding, and their advan
tage was increased by the absurd attempts to
conceal the arrangement. The text of this
letter Is given below, and it will be seen that
the opening sentence refers to the document
which is In Mr M'Carthy 's possession. The
clause printed in italics is the one that gave
rise to most of the controversy.
" I was very sorry that you had left Albert Man
sions before I reached London from Eltham, as I
had wished to tell you that, after our conversation,
I had made up my mind that It would be proper
for me to put Mr M'Carthy in possession of the
views which I had previously comrrkmlcated to
you. I desire to impress upon you the absolute
necessity of a settlement of the Arrears question
which will leave no recurring sore connected with
It behind, and which will enable us to show the
smaller tenantry that they have been treated with
justice and some generosity. The proposal you
have described to me, as suggested in some
quarters, of making a Loan, over however many
years the payment might be spread, should be
absolutely rejected, for reasons which I have
already fully explained to you. If the Arrears
question be settled upon the lines indicated by
us, I have every confidence — a confidence shared
by my colleagues — that the exertions which we
should be able to make strenuously, and unremit
tingly, would be effective in stopping outrages and
H

114 THE RADICALS AND IRELAND
intimidation of all kinds. As regards permanent
legislation of an ameliorative character, I may
say that the views which you always shared with
me, as to the admission of leaseholders to the
Fair- Rent Clauses of the Act, are more confirmed
than ever. So long as the flower of the Irish
peasantry are kept outside the Act, there cannot
be any permanent settlement of the Land ques
tion, which we all so much desire. I should also
strongly hope that some compromise might be
arrived at, this Session, with regard to the
amendment of the tenure clauses. It Is unneces
sary for me to dwell upon the enormous advantage
to be derived from the full extension of the Pur
chase Clauses, which now seem practically to have
been adopted by all parties. The accomplishment
of the programme I have sketched out to you
would, in my judgment, be regarded by the
country as a practical settlement of the Land
Question, and would, I feel sure, enable us to co
operate cordially for the future with the Liberal
Party in forwarding Liberal principles and
measures of general reform; and I believe that
the Government at the end of this Session would,
from the state of the country, feel themselves
thoroughly justified In dispensing with further
coercive measures."
On the same day as this letter was, or pur
ported to be, written. Captain O'Shea saw Mr
Forster, who made a memorandum of the conver
sation, of which he gave the following account In
the House of Commons.
" After telling me that he had been from
eleven to five yesterday with Parnell, O'Shea gave
me his letter to him, saying that he hoped it would
be a satisfactory expression of union with the
Liberal Party. After carefully reading it, I said

"A DISGRACEFUL COMPROMISE" 115
to him, ' Is that all, do you think, that Parnell
would be inclined to say ? ' He said, ' What more
do you want ? Doubtless, I could supplement.' I
said, ' It comes to this — that upon our doing certain
things, he will help us to prevent outrages,' or
words to that effect. He again said, ' How can I
supplement It ? ' referring, I imagine, to different
measures, I did not feel justified in giving him my
own opinion, which might be interpreted to be that
of the Cabinet, so I said I had better show the
letter to Mr Gladstone, and one or two others.
He said, ' Well, there may be faults In expression,
but the thing is done ; if these words will not do,
I must get others ; but what Is obtained is ' (and
here he used most remarkable words) ' that the
conspiracy, which has been used to get up Boy
cotting and outrages, will now be used to put
them down, and that there will be a union in the
Liberal Party,' And as an illustration of how
the first of these results was to be obtained, he
said that Parnell hoped to make use of a certain
person [Sheridan], and get him back from abroad,
as he would be able to help him to put down
conspiracy or agitation — I am not sure which word
was used — as he knew all its details in the West.
He was a released suspect, against whom we have
for some time had a fresh warrant, and who, under
disguises, had hitherto eluded the police, coming
backwards and forwards from Egan to the out
rage-mongers in the West, I did not feel myself
sufficiently master of the situation to let him see
what I thought of this confidence, but I again
told him that I could not do more at present
than tell others what he had told me,"
It was this arrangement which Mr Forster
branded as a "disgraceful compromise," and
which it is so difficult to reconcile with Mr Glad-

116 THE RADICALS AND IRELAND
Stone's explicit declaration that " Mr Parnell had
asked nothing from the Government, and the
Government sought nothing from him," In
writing to Mr Forster privately, Mr Gladstone
had referred to Mr Parnell's promise of support
to the Liberal Party as "a hors d'oeuvre which we
had no right to expect," The rough-and-ready
explanation, much favoured at the time by
indignant Conservatives, is that the Prime
Minister told a falsehood ! That may be dis
missed. The probability is that he really did
regard the arrangement as to an Arrears Bill, on
the one hand, and the cessation of outrages, on
the other, as the substantial part of the " Treaty "
— the only part embodied in the letter to Mr
M'Carthy— and that the promise of Nationalist co
operation at Westminster was, what he called it,
simply a hors d'cxuvre, an agreeable supplement,
not demanded on his authority, but thoroughly
acceptable as a voluntary offering, Mr Gladstone
was, it may be added with all respect to his
memory, constitutionally Incapable of seeing that
there could be anything at all shady in a promise
to support his own policy. That was not the
sort of thing which, to his mind, required apology
or explanation. Why, then, was the concealment attempted ?
When Mr Parnell on 1 5th May rose In the House
of Commons to make an explanation, he was
supplied by Captain O'Shea with a copy of the
letter which he had addressed to that gentleman.
This he read from beginning to end. But In
this no reference was made to the Nationalist
promise of co-operation with the Liberals. There
upon Mr Forster produced another document
which he Insisted that Captain O'Shea should
communicate to the House. Mr Chamberlain's

MR FORSTER'S RESIGNATION 117
explanation was that Captain O'Shea had jDrlvately
asked leave to withdraw that particular clause,
and that he had agreed. The incident, however,
was unimportant, and had left, he said, but little
impression on his mind.
Naturally, Mr Chamberlain sought to make
light of the whole affair. There can be little
doubt that Mr Parnell, when he gave the pledge,
did not Intend that it should become public
property. The reason was obvious. He had
been preaching on a hundred platforms that the
Nationalists must be independent of English
politicians, and ready to accept from either Party
all they could extort, but should give thanks to
neither. How would he keep the Republican
Brotherhood under control if they could say that
his Parliamentary followers were but so many
Items in Mr Gladstone's majority. Already the
Fenians were becoming restive under the good
behaviour which he had induced them to practise
by pretending that he too was working for Re
bellion, and only waiting for the right moment ?
What would be the attitude of the Clan-na-
Gael when he paid his next visit to America ?
How could he ask for a subsidy from the
" Skirmishing Fund " when he was proved to
be no more of a rebel than Mr Butt had been,
or Mr Shaw?
The letter which had been submitted to the
Cabinet was never intended for general publication.
Probably it would never have seen the light but
for the action of Mr Forster. The whole bargain
— not merely this private clause — was one to
which he could not assent. Two days after the
date of this letter it was announced that the Chief
Secretary had resigned, and that the Lord
Lieutenant (Lord Cowper) had gone with him.

118 THE RADICALS AND IRELAND
It was clear that an arrangement which had cost
the Government the services of the titular as well
as the acting Chief of the Irish Executive would be
narrowly scrutinised by Parliament. Mr Forster
was a man of strong feelings, and it was known
that, on personal and public grounds, he warmly
resented the treatment which he had received
from his colleagues. His policy had been dis
cussed at length, it had been adopted, and, before
a fair trial had been given it, he was thrown over.
Against Mr Chamberlain, as the author of his
downfall, and as the exponent of a dangerous
policy, he was especially incensed. It was not,
therefore, likely that he would give quarter when
battle should be joined on the floor of the House.
If Ministers had only had themselves to consider,
they would probably, as sensible men, have made
a clean breast of the whole business. It was no
such terrible matter — this purchase of Irish votes
— provided that the Bill which they promised in
return were a fair and reasonable measure. Both
Parties had done such things before, and would
do them again. It was the puerile deception that
did so much damage to Ministers. Either they
lost their heads entirely, or they considered them
selves bound not to reveal what Mr Parnell wished
to keep secret.
He had, indeed, excellent reason — as he had
learned on his recent visit to Paris — ^for feeling
nervous about the Fenians. They had been kept
long enough, they thought, at the heel of a
Parliamentary Leader. They cared nothing for
Land Bills and Arrears Bills ; nothing for the
progress of the Home Rule cause. So far as
they had any feeling on such subjects, they dis
liked every Measure that would promote con
tentment In Ireland. With an irrational, but

THE PHCENIX PARK MURDERS 119
absolutely genuine, hatred of the English race,
the Irish National Invincibles, a small group
working mostly In the dark, but having their
connections with the chiefs of the "open move
ment," were resolved to strike a blow at the
Enghsh Government. It is untrue to suggest
that Mr Parnell, Mr Dillon, or any of the other
Parliamentary leaders were aware beforehand of
the plot which was successfully carried out on
Saturday evening, 6th May, In the Phoenix
Park. Mr Parnell had been warned — as the
Government also had been Informed ¦ — that
mischief was brewing. The murder of Lord
Frederick Cavendish and Mr Burke, hacked to
death by surgical knives within sight of the
Castle, was but the sequel to a series of pro
jected attempts on Mr Forster which had been
frustrated only by accident.
The chief purpose of this daring crime was
to force Mr Parnell's hand and to prevent the
Irish people from being led further astray Into
the paths of Constitutional agitation. Against
this kind of outrage Mr Parnell and his Land
Leaguers were powerless. They could raise
their fingers, and landlord-shooting, rick-burn
ing, boycotting, cattle-maiming, would come to
an end. But they had no control over the
wilder spirits which they had hoped to use as
their agents and Instruments. Mr Parnell was
not a truthful man : he felt and professed no
scruple about deceiving the " English Parlia
ment," but he spoke from his heart when he
expressed. In the House of Commons, his "un
qualified detestation " of the crime committed
two days before. It had been perpetrated, he
said, by men who "absolutely detested the cause
with which he had been associated," That crim e

120 THE RADICALS AND IRELAND
had been devised and carried out as the " deadliest
blow which they had it in their power to deal
•against the hopes of his Party in connection with
the new career on which the Government had just
entered." The "new career" which had been contem
plated by the Government, but from which they
were diverted by the Phoenix Park murders,
was, of course, the abandonment of Coercion,
signalised by the retirement of Lord Cowper
and Mr Forster. Who was to be the new Chief
Secretary ? The natural course would, perhaps,
have been to select as Mr Forster's successor
the Minister who had been chiefly Instrumental
in reversing his policy. Mr Chamberlain did
expect- — though he declared that he did not
desire ^ — that the post would be offered him.
Certainly he could not have refused it. If a
policy of conciliation was to be recommended,
who more suitable for the work than the friend
of Mr Parnell, the intimate associate of several
Nationalist members, and (for good or evil) the
author of the Treaty of Kilmainham ? On the
resignation of Mr Forster he went so far — Mr
Justin M'Carthy has recorded — as to send for
some of the leading members of the Irish Party,
and ask for their advice. Presumably their reply
was not unfavourable. But the chance of test
ing their assurances was never given to Mr
Chamberlain. The post was offered to Sir
Charies Dilke, but without a seat on the
Cabinet, and on that ground was declined. By
Mr Chamberlain, who was already a member
of that body, it would, no doubt, have been
accepted. In a few days, the vacancy was renewed by
the murder of Lord Frederick Cavendish — but

COERCION RENEWED 121
under what altered circumstances ! Generously
enough, Mr Forster volunteered to discharge the
duties during any Interval that might elapse, but
Mr (now Sir) George Trevelyan was ready to
accept the post. There was no more talk of
dropping Coercion. On the day of Lord
Frederick Cavendish's funeral his successor in
troduced the Prevention of Crimes Bill. Amongst
other stringent provisions It enabled the Lord
Lieutenant to order trials for treason, murder,
or attempted murder, aggravated violence, and
attacks on dwelling-houses to be held before
three Judges and without a Jury, though with
an appeal to the Court for Criminal Cases Re
served. Another Important power was that of
holding an Inquiry into a crime though the
accused had made his escape, and of levying
compensation in the district where a murder or
maiming had taken place. The only qualifying
element in the Bill was that the duration was
limited to three years. It was no consolation
to the Nationalists that such a Measure — which
struck at the very heart of their influence — was
accompanied by the promised Arrears Bill. Mr
Dillon repudiated the gift in what Mr Gladstone
called a heart-breaking speech. The idea of co
operation between Liberals and Nationalists was
given up as completely as If the " Treaty of
Kilmainham " had never been drafted. The
Irish set themselves with the best of their will
to obstruct the proceedings of the House of
Commons, and it must be confessed that they
achieved no slight success, ,
But in Ireland itself the new Executive was
working with vigorous efficiency. The exceptional
powers given to Lord Spencer and Mr Trevelyan
were administered without fear or favour, and In

122 THE RADICALS AND IRELAND
February 1883, Mr Chamberlain, though he never
seems to have modified his opinions, bore no
grudging testimony to the good work of his
colleagues. A " qualified peace," he said at Swan
sea, had been established In Ireland : —
" Peace and order have been restored ; crime
and outrage have almost ceased. In the mean
time, the black conspiracies of murder and violence,
which had gathered round the outskirts of the
agitation, have been exposed and unmasked, and
their authors are being brought to punishment.
I say we have the right to claim credit for this
success. We have the right to ask that fair-
minded opponents shall acknowledge It. But I
say that success is due to the fact that, while we
have firmly administered the law, we have also
recognised the substantial grievances of the Irish
people — on which their discontent was founded ;
and we have made extraordinary efforts to remove
those grievances. Without the Land Act, which
is the mark of Lord SaHsbury's scorn, you would
have had no peace, even the qualified peace we
have at present in Ireland. Lord Salisbury's
moral, which he wished you to draw, is that force
is the only remedy. Force is no remedy for dis
content — and force alone has never removed the
causes of discontent, of which the crime and out
rage that we deplore are the extreme and unjusti
fiable expression."
Not In that way was the Irish problem to be
solved. After " eighty years of stormy union " the
country was still hostile and unreconciled : —
" Coercion has failed to extort submission.
Concession has been powerless to soften her
animosity. I do not wonder sometimes that dis
appointment and even despair should fill the minds
of men when they see the efforts, the unexampled

"A QUALIFIED PEACE" 123
and unremitting efforts, which were made in the
last two Sessions by the English Parliament to do
justice to Ireland, met by words of menace and
insult, and followed by worse than words, by deeds
— by disorder, by crimes of violence, and by
cowardly assassinations. Every nerve should be
strained to detect and to punish the authors of
those crimes. But we should blind ourselves to
the teachings of our history, and to the experience
of every other country. If we did not recognise In
the existence of these crimes, and in the unfortu
nate fact that a large proportion of the population
sympathise with those who commit them, an indi
cation of a social condition altogether rotten, which
It Is the bounden duty of Statesmen to investigate
and to reform. There are only two other courses
open to you. You may, as some truculent writers
have urged, abandon altogether the idea of the
Constitutional government of Ireland, and rule
the country as a conquered Dependency. How
long do you suppose such a state of things would
last ? How long do you suppose that Englishmen
with their free institutions would tolerate the
existence of an Irish Poland so near to our own
shores ? It Is too late to speak of such a scheme.
" The other alternative is Separation, which I
believe would jeopardise the security of this
country, and which I am sure would be fatal to the
prosperity and the happiness of Ireland. Well, I
reject both alternatives. I contend that both are
equally Impossible and equally intolerable ; but it
is to these conclusions that you are Inevitably
driven if you accept the arguments of those public
writers and speakers who have been urging you to
abandon hereafter all further conciliation, and have
been protesting against, as they say, truckling any
more to Irish discontent. I say that as long as

124 THE RADICALS AND IRELAND
there Is any just cause for discontent in Ireland,
there is still scope for our remedies. Not until we
have removed every just cause for discontent, until
we have abolished every grievance, are we entitled
to say that, If Irishmen are still dissatisfied, we
have at least done our part — the resources of
Statesmanship are exhausted. Gentlemen, the
present crisis is a test of our faith in Liberal prin
ciples. Do not let us be too soon cast down.
Centuries of wrong and of oppression have made
Ireland what she is. We have no right to expect
that a few months, or even a few years, of benefi
cent legislation will undo the mischief We can
not take our hands from the plough. Let us go
on steadfastly In the path which our great Leader
has marked out for us, unmoved by clamour and
unshaken by panic. Let us keep on in the even
tenor of our way, dictated to us as it is by Liberal
principles, and commended to our acceptance by
every consideration of justice and of expediency."
Neither In this nor any other speech delivered
In that dark and gloomy period is there any
suggestion that Mr Chamberlain — incurably
optimistic — -had given up the hope of reconciling
Irishmen to the connection with Great Britain.
He was prepared to relax the bond — even by
conceding what was then known as Home Rule,
which, however, would not include an independent
Parliament or a separate Executive. But on this
subject it was necessary for a Cabinet Minister to
keep his mouth closed, lest he should be considered
to be expressing the opinion of his colleagues,
though Mr Chamberlain never made any secret
of his abstract views on this question, and his
remarks, just quoted, on Separation were chiefly
Intended to mark the point at which he would
draw a sharp and impassable line.

EQUAL TREATMENT FOR IRELAND 125
Much the same note ran through a speech
which he delivered nearly a year later at Newcastle.
The policy of the Government, he said, was what
it always had been. They would turn neither to
the right nor the left : they would not think their
work completed till they had won for Irishmen every
right and privilege enjoyed by Englishmen and
Scotchmen. Until that had been done, it would
be premature to despair of a cordial union between
the two countries and of the disappearance of the
bitter memories that years of oppression and
injustice had stamped on the hearts of the Irish
race. The way to promote Separation — which
must on no account be contemplated — was to rely
on Coercion as the only remedy for Irish dis
content. But in 1884 Englishmen had other things
to occupy their minds than the rights and wrongs
of Ireland. For a time, though not for long, the
Irish question was in abeyance.

CHAPTER IV
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1880-1885
There are few defenders left of the Foreign Policy
of Mr Gladstone's Second Administration. The
motives, no doubt, have been misrepresented by
excited partisans, but the methods were, ad
mittedly, as unfortunate as the results were
deplorable. By the irony of fortune it has
turned out that what Ministers themselves re
garded as an unhappy entanglement, the British
Occupation of Egypt, is their strongest title
to favourable remembrance, while their best-
Intended adventures were most prolific of
embarrassment to the country. Nor is it less
remarkable that two of Mr Gladstone's col
leagues, the Duke of Devonshire and Mr
Chamberlain, should have been largely instru
mental in undoing the errors for which they
shared full responsibility with their Chief
Having been brought into power mainly on
their denunciation of J^ord Beaconsfield's Eastern
policy, the new Ministry were expected to reverse
it, so far as that could be done without a
breach of our national obligations. They took
their stand on the Berlin Treaty, and, ignoring
the particulars in which Russia was evading
that instrument, they demanded a strict fulfil
ment on the part of Turkey, Lord Granville
126

TROUBLi: IN EGYPT 127
issued a Circular Note to the Powers, Inviting
them to unite with Great Britain in putting
pressure on the Porte to execute its covenants
with regard to Montenegro, Greece, and Armenia.
A sort of European Concert was arranged, a
series of Collective Notes were addressed to
Constantinople, and a Joint Naval Demonstra
tion was held off Dulcigno, In the end a
certain delimitation of frontiers was agreed upon,
Montenegro was satisfied, though not without an
outbreak of local hostilities : and Greece was put
off with a small Instalment of Its demands, which
it was coerced by Its patrons Into accepting — as
something on account.
Just as Russia had taken Its revenge upon us,
for having arrested its advance on Constanti
nople, by embroiling us in Afghanistan, so did
the Sultan retaliate on the Gladstone Ministry,
for the further dismemberment of his Empire,
by making trouble for us in Egypt, Lord
Salisbury has since confessed that. In backing
Turkey against Russia in 1878, we had "put
our money on the wrong horse," The mischief
was completed In 1880, when we made an enemy
of the Sultan. By alternately offending Russia
and Turkey we so arranged our international
"book" that In any event we must be losers.
It would be an exaggeration to say that the
Porte originated the rebellion of Arabi ; but the
Khedive, Tewfik Pasha, was well aware that his
Suzerain favoured the so-called "Nationalist
rising " which aimed at releasing Egypt from the
uncertain hold ofthe Anglo-French Condominium.
At that time the Egyptian Viceroy stood In some
what close relations with the Sultan, and his
authority was largely dependent on Turkish
Pashas. When the Arabi movement first

128 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1880-1885
showed its head, the behaviour of Tewfik was
something more than vacillating. Nor can his
hesitation be made' a matter of censure. He had
no reason for believing that the Condominium
would interfere by* force to protect him from his
Army — he believed, as Prince Bismarck believed,
that England and France would either paralyse
each other's action by , mutual jealousy, or else
come into open conflict. By one of the accidents
which have ,built up the British Empire, it
happened at ihe critical moment that M. Garn-
betta resigned office, and France was deprived
of a Statesman who (undoubtedly would have,
maintained its position 'In thgValley of the Nile.
His successor, M. de Freycinet, was an
•equally able but less confident politician. He
was ready to join in a Naval' Demonstration, but
the^French ironclad? ,>yere' on no account to go
-intOv'actlon ! For this timidity of purpose he has
*beeh much blamed by his countrymen, but he
rhay have had excellent reasons for not relying
on the apparent benevolence of Germany, and
was by no means anxious to lock up a good
part of the French fleet In operations of secon
dary importance. The hesitation of the two
Powers was, of course, an "'encouragement to
Arabi. He proceeded to excesses that called
for prompt action, and engaged himself in fortify
ing Alexandria against the British fleet lying off
the shore. On being ordered by Sir Beauchamp
Seymour (Lord Alcester) to desist, he fired the
first shot by way of defiance. Thus, on nth
July 1882, began the bombardment of Alex
andria, and it was continued next day until
Arabi took to flight. That the British Govern
ment had never contemplated operations on any
large scale was shown by the fact that Seymour's

ALEXANDRIA BOMBARDED 129
ammunition had been exhausted In silencing the
Egyptian forts, and that he had no force available
for a sufficient landing party. But for this happy
improvidence, the Incident might have terminated
in the summary occupation of Alexandria, and in
the restoration of the Condominium. It became
necessary, however, to follow up the naval opera
tions with a military expedition, and on 24th July
the Prime Minister moved a vote of credit for
^2,300,000, and Sir Garnet Wolseley was sent
out on the momentous little war that ended in
the victory of Tel-el- Kebir.
This, however, was more than Mr Bright
could stand. The Prime Minister had tried to
make things easy for the conscience of his Quaker
colleague by speaking of "mihtary operations" i
for the "restoration of civil order," but the kindly,
subterfuge was unavailing, and Mr Bright resigned.
He was succeeded at the Duchy of Lancaster by
Mr Dodson (Lord Monk Bretton), a Liberal of
the official type, whose translation from the Local
Government Board made room for Sir Charles
Dilke within the Cabinet. Mr Gladstone's loss
was Mr Chamberlain's gain. Undoubtedly, the
Cabinet was weakened, especially among the Non
conformists, by the retirement of Mr Bright, who
was not less remarkable for his moral Influence
than for his unrivalled oratory. But as a
practising Radical his strength was almost
spent. His political doctrines were mainly
negative — Free Trade, Laissez-faire, and Force
no Remedy. Within the Cabinet, he was rather
a "brake" on Social Reform than an active
propeller. Sir Charles Dilke, on the other
hand, though his main Interest lay in foreign
affairs, had begun life as a man of the most
extreme opinions ; and his Republicanism, though

130 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1880-1885
it never passed beyond the theoretical stage, was
combined with the most advanced views on prac
tical legislation.
It was not possible that two men of such
distinct training and different natures as Mr
Chamberlain and Sir Charles Dilke should see
eye-to-eye on every question of the day, but
their point of view was generally the same, and
there were few political schemes in which, by
help of some slight compromise, they could not
heartily co-operate. They were still an incon
siderable minority in the Cabinet, but they
always worked together and played Into each
other's hands. Neither of them had that abstract
horror of War which rendered Mr Bright an
almost impossible Minister for a Power which
has enemies In every quarter of the world. Sir
Charles Dilke has never believed In the pacific
intentions of our Continental neighbours. On
the contrary, he has always preached the duty
of making our Navy and Army stronger ; if he
has denounced wasteful expenditure in one direc
tion. It has been because the money was wanted
In another. Though, like most other Liberals
and many Conservatives, he regretted the Occu
pation, and has advocated the Evacuation, of
Egypt, it was because he thought that the offence
given to France by our presence at Cairo more
than outweighed the advantage of protecting the
Suez Canal, if indeed we were thus enabled to pro
tect it. Both Sir Charles Dilke and Mr Chamber
lain have always cherished a sort of sentimental
tenderness towards France — partly because they
are well-read In Its literature, partly because it is
the only great Continental State which maintains
Liberal Institutions.
Speaking for himself and his colleagues In

"FRENCH JEALOUSY' 131
March 1883, Mr Chamberlain assured his con
stituents that the whole Cabinet deeply regretted
what they had thought to be the necessity for
Interference in Egypt. In 1885, again, at Bir
mingham, he alluded gently to the " natural
sensitiveness " on the part of Frenchmen, and
deprecated the strong language used by " irre
sponsible writers in the Press " on both sides
of the Channel. He attached, he said, the
greatest possible importance to " the French
Alliance." Near neighbours as the two countries
were, their continued and cordial friendship was
the best guarantee for the happiness of both.
He could understand people thinking it would
have been better not to go into Egypt at all.
Yet it must be remembered that it was the
highway to our Indian and Colonial posses
sions. We could not permit any other Power
to step In and annex Egypt — as it would have
been annexed if It had been left unoccupied.
But, having gone in, should we have proclaimed
a Protectorate, or should we have forthwith In
corporated it within the British Empire ? The
Government had shrunk from that course In 1882
because they did not wish to risk the friendship of
France. The only thing to do, then, was to
remain there until we had restored order, and to
come away when that task was accomplished —
without having sought or obtained any territorial
aggrandisement. Unfortunately, that date was
being postponed by French jealousy. After the
sacrifices .we had made, we could not tolerate the
Idea of making way for another Power to take up
a preponderating position there.
The same line of thought was followed five
years later — though with a somewhat different
moral. In the Interval a good many things had

132 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1880-1885
happened. " I am going to make a confession "
(Mr Chamberlain said at Birmingham on 14th
March 1890). " I admit I was one of those —
I think my views were shared by the whole
Cabinet of Mr Gladstone — who regretted the
necessity for the Occupation of Egypt. I
thought that England had so much to do,
such enormous obligations and responsibilities,
that we might well escape. If we could, this
addition to them ; and, when the Occupation
was forced upon us, I looked forward with
anxiety to an early, it might be even to an
immediate, Evacuation. The confession I have
to make Is that, having seen what are the re
sults of this Occupation, having seen what is
the nature of the task we have undertaken, and
what progress we have already made towards its
accomplishment, I have changed my mind. I
say It would be unworthy of this great nation
if we did not rise to the full height of our
duty, and complete our work before we left the
country. We have no right to abandon the
duty which has been cast upon us, and the
work which already shows so much promise
for the advantage of the people with whose
destinies we have become involved."
Mr Bright, then, was by no means singular
among Liberals in his condemnation of our Egyp
tian policy in 1882. But if his objection was
merely to the commencement of military opera
tions, how was it that he stayed in the Cabinet
while we were fighting the Boers the year be
fore? In that quarter of the world we were
engaged in a war of attempted subjugation.
Technically, no doubt, we were putting down a
rebellion ; that, perhaps, is what made the differ
ence to Mr Bright's mind. Legally, the enemy

THE BOER REBELLION 13.3
were British subjects. The Annexation of the
Transvaal by Sir Theophllus Shepstone In 1877
had been denounced by most Liberals at the
time, by Mr Chamberlain as well as by Mr
Gladstone, and the latter had expressed sym
pathy with a nation struggling for its freedom.
On such expressions as this — though Mr Glad
stone was, in theory, no longer Leader of the
Opposition — the Boer Leaders had formed the
expectation that if he came into power he
would restore their Independence. It is impos
sible to say whether such a project was contem
plated by Mr Gladstone ; certainly he had never
given any pledge on the subject. Anyhow, he
had been led to believe that the Boers would
be contented with the gift of the "Targe and
liberal " institutions of Self-Government which
were promised In the Queen's Speech In 1880.
Retrocession, Lord Kimberley explained in the
Upper House, was not to be thought of It
was impossible to say in what calamities It would
involve the native races.
That was the crux of the whole position.
Having smashed the Zulu power (this, Mr
Chamberlain had always maintained, was a mis
take), we left the coloured population at the mercy
of the " European settlers." It was necessary,
therefore, to retain the natives under the direct
government ofthe Crown, while we gave the Boers
full control over their domestic concerns. But
they had no mind for a qualified Independence
which prevented them from settling the " Native
question " in their own way. The Boer Leaders
raised the standard of open revolt, and on 30th
December the South African Republic was pro
claimed by the Triumvirate, Kriiger, Joubert,
and Pretorius. British troops had been ordered

134 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1880-1885
to Natal to crush the Insurrection. The Boers,
however, decided on aggressive tactics, broke
into British territory, and occupied Laing's
Nek. Sir George Colley thought it inadvisable
to await the relnforcem.ents then on their way,
and made an ineffectual attempt on the Boer
position. Having occupied Majuba Hill, he was
driven from it, and his force cut to pieces. These
were "regrettable incidents," though not of first-
rate military importance, but they caused Indig
nation and a sense of national shame at home.
This, for some reason. Ministers did not realise ;
they had grown so accustomed to mocking at
the extravagances of "Jingo" sentiment — which
were, no doubt, sufficiently irritating to respon
sible Statesmen — that they Ignored a genuine out
burst of patriotic sensibility. The damage to their
reputation, however, might have been repaired if
they had allowed Sir Evelyn Wood, who was on
the spot with sufficient forces, to restore the situa
tion. In the Queen's Speech of 1881 they had
referred to "military measures" for "prompt
vindication of Her Majesty's authority." In
January, therefore, they meant to fight. But on
8th February Ministers had altered their minds.
If the Boers would desist from armed opposi
tion they should receive guarantees for a friendly
settlement. On the 21st, it was arranged that
Mr Brand, President of the Orange Free State,
should act as intermediary. So elated were the
Boers by their victories at Laing's Nek and
Majuba that they dechned Lord Kimberley's
proposals, and offered us an armistice ! This
was accepted by the British Government, and a
Conference was fixed for 21st March. By the
Convention of Pretoria we conceded almost

THE CONVENTION OF PRETORIA 135
everything which the Boers had demanded,
except, fortunately, that we stipulated for
recognition of the Suzerainty of the Crown,
and retained a right of Veto on any Treaty
which the South African Republic might
arrange with a foreign Power. These reserva
tions, small as they were, did afterwards prove
to be of substantial Diplomatic value. At the
time, however, they appeared quite derisory ;
and when the terms were explained in Parliament
they were received with general astonishment —
and something like disgust. It was the greatest
and the most damaging of the mistakes made
by the Gladstone Ministry. Mr Chamberlain's
defence was as good as any other. It did, at
least, go into detail, and avoided mere moral
platitudes. "This settlement" (he said at Birmingham on
7th June 1881) "has been the object of violent
attack In the House of Peers, You have been
told that It constitutes a dismemberment of the
Empire, that it is a national surrender \ you have
been told for the hundredth time that It has
destroyed the prestige of England, and it has
caused Earl Cairns to blush, who never blushed
before. Well, sir, these are terrible calamities,
especially the last ; but before we consider how
far these accusations can be sustained, let me ask
you to think seriously what Is the alternative
which it Is said we ought to have adopted. We
are accused of dismembering the Empire, and
to avoid this, we ought. In the opinion of our
opponents, to have maintained the Annexation of
the Transvaal, That Annexation was made by
the Conservative Government upon two distinct
assurances. They declared, in the first place,
upon information which was supplied to them,

136 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1880-1885
tha<t the majority of the white inhabitants in the
Transvaal desired the transfer ; and they declared
that unless it were effected we should infallibly be
involved in a Native War which would endanger
our South African possessions.
"Well, you all know that after that transfer
was effected we found ourselves, in spite of it,
immediately Involved in two Native Wars — one
with Cetywayo and the Zulu people, and the
other with Secocoeni ; and you know, and they
know now, if they did not know before, that the
great majority of the Boer inhabitants of the
Transvaal are bitterly hostile to the English
rule : and yet we are told that we ought to
have persevered In wrong - doing, after it was
proved that the two grounds upon which the
Annexation was defended were fallacious, and
rested on no solid foundation — that we should
still force our rule on an unwilling people,
whose Independence we had solemnly engaged
by Treaty to respect. And this we were to do
in order to spare Lord Cairns the unwonted
blush with which he graced his peroration, and
alarmed his brother Peers. I will not at this
moment stop to question the morality of such a
step as that, but I want you to think for a
moment of the expediency of it, of the wisdom
of those Statesmen who recommend such a
course to Her Majesty's Government. It has
been proved to us that the Boers are at all
events brave soldiers, that they are skilled in
the use of arms, that they are physically, at
least, a match even for English soldiers. The
Transvaal is a country as large as France — a
wild and difficult country — and it Is perfectly
evident to every one that If we are to hold It
down by force we must permanently maintain a

MR CHAMBERLAINS DEFENCE 137
number of troops at least equal to the number
of our possible opponents. Well, we know
also that the Orange Free State, which Is a
neighbouring territory, would make common
cause with their co-religionists and men of the
same nationality In the Transvaal ; and there
fore I say that It is perfectly certain that not less
than from 15,000 to 20,000 English troops must
be permanently stationed there. If we are to hold
that country by force and against the will of the
inhabitants. " And to what end are we to do this ? To pre
vent the dismemberment of the Empire. Why,
the Annexation was only reluctantly accepted
by Lord Carnarvon three years ago. The terri
tory has only been in our hands for a short three
years, and It came Into our possession upon infor
mation which we now know to be Incorrect. And
if we let them go, this population of 40,000 — a
population less than that contained in any one of
the sixteen Wards of this town In which I am
speaking — why, this dismembered Empire of ours
will still contain 250,000,000 of subjects to the
Queen, to rule whom well and wisely Is a duty
and a responsibihty which I think Is sufficient
even for the wildest ambition.
" Well, but we are told that there is another
course which has recommended itself to some of
our critics, and that is, that we should have used
the overwhelming forces which we placed at the
disposal of Sir Evelyn Wood in order to attack
the Boers, and that then, after we had defeated
them in a bloody encounter — military honour being
satisfied — we might have retired from the Trans
vaal, which we should have rendered desolate by
the slaughter of many of Its brave defenders.
Before such a recommendation as that should

138 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1880-1885
com;nend Itself to your minds, and to mine, let
us consider for a moment what sort of people
these are whom we are asked to treat In this
revengeful way. The Boers are not naturally a
warlike race. They are a homely. Industrious,
but somewhat rude and uncivilised nation of
farmers, living on the produce of the soil. They
are animated by a deep and even stern religious
sentiment, and they Inherit from their ancestors
— the men who won the Independence of Holland
from the oppressive rule of Philip II. of Spain —
they inherit from them their unconquerable love
of freedom and of liberty. Are not these qualities
which commend themselves to men of the English
race ? Are they not virtues which we are proud
to believe form the best characteristics of the Eng
lish people ? Is it against such a nation that we
are to be called upon to exercise the dread arbitra
ment of arms ? These men settled In the Trans
vaal in order to escape foreign rule. They had
had many quarrels with the British. They left
their homes in Natal, as the English Puritans left
England and went to the United States, and they
founded a little Republic of their own in the heart
of Africa. In 1852 we made a Treaty with them;
they agreed to give up slavery, which had hitherto
prevailed in their midst, and we agreed to respect
and to guarantee their Independence."
Mr Chamberlain was less plausible when he
ventured on the "magnanimity" Hne of argu
ment : —
"When the terms of Peace were arranged"
(he said), "when the Boers accepted our offer, as
we had originally made It, we rejoiced In the pros
pect of a settlement without further effusion of
blood, whether of Englishmen or Dutchmen ; and
we did not think the English people would feel

THE MAGNANIMITY ARGUMENT 139
themselves to be humiliated because their Govern
ment had refused knowingly to persist In a course of
oppression and wrong-doing, and we had accepted,
without a victory, terms which were the best we
could reasonably expect that even the greatest
victory would give to us. We are a great and
powerful nation. What is the use of being great
and powerful, if we are afraid to admit an error
when we are conscious of it ? Shame is not In
the confession of a mistake. Shame lies only In
persistency In wilful wrong-doing."
Much may be forgiven to a peroration. But,
as a matter of fact, we know now another reason
why Mr Gladstone agreed to an ignominious
Peace. It was no sudden awakening to a sense
of natural wrong-doing, no unexpected revelation
of unknown facts, which changed Mr Gladstone's
purpose. This was caused, as the late Lord
Kimberley recently explained, by a communica
tion from President Brand. Briefly, this was to
the effect that unless the British restored Inde
pendence to the Boers of the Transvaal they
would also have to fight the Boers of the
Orange Free State. This would mean a war
of races in South Africa, and from that danger
the British Government shrank. It was not a
sufficient reason, but at least It was a solid and
sensible one — far preferable to professions of
magnanimity which never imposed on the Eng
lish people. It .was generally believed In Eng
land that Mr Brand was our very good friend.
Mr Chamberlain — who, by the way, has more
than once repudiated Lord Kimberley's account
of Mr Gladstone's motives — gave much credit to
the President of the Free State for his action
as an intermediary, and for having prevented
his own people from going into the War, All

140 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1880-1885
this confidence may have been thoroughly justi
fied, but It is possible that Mr Brand exagger
ated the warlike impulse of his fellow-citizens,
and his own difficulty in keeping them under
control. His sympathies, no doubt, were with
his own race, and it would have been a clever
stroke of policy to get the British Government
out of the Transvaal without striking a blow,
and at the same time earn their gratitude for
saving them from ^n expensive conflict for which
they had no heart.
Even if we were^nenaced with a war of races
— which is not so certain as Mr Gladstone and
his colleagues honestly believed — what future could
they think there would be for Englishmen In
South Africa if we gave way before a threat?
The Boer never lived who believed that we
yielded for any reason but because we had been
beaten, and were afraid to try conclusions again.
The struggle was only postponed : it could not be
averted. What might have been accomplished In
1 88 1 with a comparatively slight effort had to be
completed twenty years afterwards at the cost of
tens of thousands of lives and hundreds of millions
of money. There is no need here to do more than refer
to the Evacuation of Candahar, The strategical
arguments — in relation to the existing situation
in 1 88 1 — were not, perhaps, so one-sided as Op
position critics seemed to think. On the assump
tion, however, that the withdrawal of the British
was justified by military considerations, the decision
was regrettable because it strengthened the belief
on the Continent that there was no stability In
British policy— that a Foreign Chancellerie had
to deal with one England when the Conservatives
were in power, another when Mr Gladstone became

BRITISH VACILLATION 141
Prime Minister, The point was forcibly put In
a memorable speech by Lord Beaconsfield, the
last he addressed to the Hou^e of Lords : — "In
every manner and on eve^ <!»tcasion It was an
nounced that the change of Gov^ernment meant a
change not merely in every p^t and portion of the
Government, but that everything we considered
concluded was to be re-operted, and everything
that had been consummated^was to be reversed ;
and that on the most important questions — either
on Foreign relations, on Coloni&.l situations, or
on domestic position with reference to Ireland —
on all these questions the utmos^'^h'ange was to be
rapidly and immediately accomplished. Perpetual
and complete reversal of all that has occurred
was the order that was given, and the profession
of faith that was announced," The result was
that, with the highest moral purpose, Mr Glad
stone's Ministry hardened the general belief of the
world in the "bad faith" of Great Britain.
This perpetual vacillation Lord Salisbury
naturally, though not quite justly, attributed
(when he was speaking In Birmingham at Easter-
time In 1883) to the conflict between the Moderate
Liberals and the Radicals within the Cabinet,
There Was, he said, a movement of perpetual zig
zag, "It is rather like one of those old Dutch
clocks which we used to see In our infancy, when
an old woman came out at one time and an old
man at another, I would not for one moment
attempt to instance who Is the old man, and who
is the old woman, but we may safely say that the
mechanism of our political system is this — when
it is going to he fine weather Lord Hartington
appears, and when Mr Joseph Chamberlain
appears you may look out for squalls,"
So /ar as home politics were concerned, the

142 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1880.1865
suggestion was, perhaps, not wide of the mark,
but it had less bearing on foreign affairs. The
personnel of the Cabinet had been further modi
fied than by the retirement of Mr Bright and
the admission of Sir Charles Dilke, Mr Glad
stone's health had been severely strained by the
fierce Parliamentary struggles (which included
the equally trivial and vexatious Bradlaugh
episode) of 1881 and 1882, and he felt no longer
equal to the double duties of First Lord of the
Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer, The
latter office was assigned to Mr Childers, who
was succeeded at the .War Office by Lord Hart
ington, The vacancy thus created at the Indian
Office was filled by Lord Kimberley, whose place
at the Colonial Office was taken by Lord Derby
— the Conservative Minister who had parted
company with Lord Beaconsfield on the Eastern
Question as soon as the British Government
proceeded from words to deeds.
With a Cabinet thus composed, it Is not diffi
cult to see that counsels of timidity in Foreign
and Colonial affairs would not emanate exclusively
from the Radical element. As a matter of fact,
though Mr^M^hamberlaln and Sir Charles Dilke
concurred, Ofcour JeJ' in the cojlectlve action of the
Governmenf, 'thd^Were advocates of a compara
tively bold policy. The cTOandonment of the
Bechuanas to the tender mercies of the Boers,
which Mr Forster t^d condemned in a stinging
speech in the Hou^ of Commons, lay uneasily
on their conscience. Though they did not pre
vent Lord Derby from allowing Mr Kriiger to
whittle the Pretoria Convention (1881) down to
the still more exiguous Convention of London
(1884), they did urge, and urged successfully,
that Sir Charles Warren should J)e sent on the

CABINET DISSENSIONS 143
Expedition which rescued Bechuanaland from
Boer domination, and reserved an Important
territory for British occupation.
Injurious to the reputation of the Government
as had been their Ineffective interposition in the
affairs of Eastern Europe, their withdrawal from
Candahar, the unpopularity of Lord Ripon's
administration of India, and their weak attitude
towards the Boers, they were, from the election
eering point of view, still more unhappy in their
dealings with the Soudan. The death of General
Gordon was their crowning misfortune. The
restoration of order at Cairo and Alexandria, and
the establishment of Tewfik Pasha in the position
where he afterwards proved himself a loyal and
staunch friend of Great Britain, was not the end
of the responsibilities involved by our action in
Egypt, The rapid growth of the military power
of Mohammed Ahmed — the Mahdi — and his
alliance with the Baggaras had enabled him to
overrun the province of Kordofan, and constituted
a formidable menace to the outposts of Egyptian
civilisation maintained in the provinces of Dar-
fur, Bahr-el-Ghazal, and Equatoria, by Slatin,
Lupton, and Emin.
The whole country was, in fact, in open revolt.
The Egyptian Government made an attempt to
relieve their officers. At the head of 10,000 un
disciplined troops. Hicks was sent to occupy
Khartoum, which had been abandoned by the
Mahdi. After a halt of six months, for the
purpose of getting his army Into shape, he ad
vanced to the relief of Kordofan. He was ntet
by the Mahdi at Shekan, and his whole army
destroyed. Neither he nor any of his European
officers escaped to tell the tale. Meantime, the
Eastern portion of the Soudan was being overrun

144 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1880-1885
by Osman DIgna, the Mahdi's very capable
lieutenant. The garrisons at Suakim, Tokar, and
Sinkat were completely isolated. Though it had
been decided to abandon the Soudan, the Egyptian
Government was at least bound to rescue its out
posts ; but the force which General Baker led with
that object was cut to pieces at El Teb, and he
had to fall back with the remnants on Trinkitat.
Elsewhere things were no better. Kassala was
closely invested by the enemy ; Slatin capitulated
at Darra ; and the Mahdi was advancing (July
1883) to the famous siege of Khartoum.
What was the British Government to do?
The Occupation of Egypt Proper had been very
unwelcome to that section of their Liberal sup
porters who adhered to the Non-intervention
doctrines of Mr Bright. Nor was It commended,
except in a left-handed manner, by those Con
servatives who were never tired ofi exalting the
late Lord Beaconsfield's ImperlaHsm. Whether
Ministers ventured on a bold policy, or followed
a cautious one, they would Incur cri|icism and
lose popularity. Their majority was shaken In
the House of Commons, in spite of the demora
lised condition of the Opposition. >At a Cabinet
Council held in January 1884, It was decided
to adopt a middle course. The limits of the
Khedive's authority should be fixed at Wady
Haifa ; Khartoum should be abandoned, and
the troops withdrawn. They could get no
assistance, however, from the Ministry of Nubar
at Cairo : they must act on their own responsi
bility. It so happened that General Gordon
was on the point of starting for the Congo
Free State in the service of the King of the
Belgians. They Induced him to give up that
mission, and assist them in their embarrassment.

GORDON'S MISSION 145
He told them that their programme could not be
executed. The Western Soudan, Kordofan, and
Darfur should be abandoned, but Khartoum must
be held ; and with It the provinces between the
White Nile and the Red Sea, north of Sennar.
They accepted this extension of their scheme,
and on i8th January Gordon went forth to
" rescue and retire." In the East, General
Graham was sent out to deal with Osman
DIgna. This plan of the Government was, of
course, sharply criticised in both Houses of
Parliament — they were doing too little, they
were doing too much, and what they were
attempting had been begun too late.
In all these charges there was something
more than an element of justice ; but the most
reassuring statement was made by Sir Charles
Dilke, who said that at the three most critical
positions they were served by three of the
ablest men who ever served the country — Sir
Evelyn Baring (Lord Cromer) at Cairo, Admiral
Hewett a.t Suakim, and General Gordon at Khar
toum. "We ask," he said, "and we follow the
advice which these men give us." As a matter
of fact, they,did not follow Gordon's advice. He
proposed to place Khartoum under Zubehr Pasha
as Governor, "a quiet, far-seeing, thoughtful man
of iron will, and a born ruler of men." He had
conquered Darfur, and was a powerful influence in
the Soudan. But the Government at home would
not employ him — he had been engaged in the slave
trade! In April, Lord Hartington announced that
the project of withdrawing the garrison from Khar
toum had been given up — Gordon must settle down
to a prolonged siege. But there was no question
of abandoning him, no fear as to his safety. Yet,
they knew — and jt was made public — that his

146 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1880-1885
troops had been routed, his Bashi-Bazouks had
mutinied, and practically he had to rely for defence
on the townspeople of Khartoum. Ministers,
no doubt, trusted to the remarkable influence
and resourcefulness of Gordon, and hoped that
he would find some way out of the difficulty.
Meanwhile, the country was growing im
patient. Gordon was a popular hero, and it
was known that they would have to pay a
severe penalty "if a hair of his head were
harmed." He declared that if the millionaires
of England and America would equip a force of
2000 or 3000 Turks he would "smash the Mahdi
at Khartoum." In reply to Lord Granville's
suggestion that he should use his discretion as to
holding on where he was or retiring by any avail
able route, he retorted that it would be an " indelible
disgrace" to abandon the garrisons at Sennar,
Kassala, Berber, and Dongola. He was, it must
be confessed. In spite of his genius and loyalty, a
somewhat uncomfortable agent for embarrassed
Ministers to deal with. When the time comes for
the full story of that period to be told, it will be
found, perhaps, that the vacillations and procrasti
nations of the Home authorities, though they
can never be justified, were not without some
sort of explanation. Gordon's communications to
them were not altogether consistent, nor was
he always of the same mind. Their fault was
not indifference to his fate, but unwillingness to
realise the steadily Increasing seriousness of the
military situation.
The Relief Expedition under Lord Wolseley
was ordered too late, and It was too slow in
starting. It is true that on 29th December
1884, Gordon had sent word that he could hold
Khartoum for another year. But he did not

THE FALL OF KHARTOUM 147
reckon against treachery. The town was
captured, and the garrison massacred before the
rescuers had come up. The general feeling of
the country was fairly expressed in the Vote of
Censure moved by Lord Salisbury in the House
of Lords — that the deplorable failure of the
Relief Expedition had been due to the indecision
and culpable delay of the Government in com
mencing operations. There was, no doubt, more
difference of opinion with regard to the further
declaration that the abandonment of the Soudan
was "dangerous to the peace of Egypt and in
consistent with the interests of the Empire."
Still, no serious exception could be taken to
Lord Salisbury's epigram, that there had been
alternate periods of "slumber and rush," and
the rush had been "too unprepared and too
unintelligent to repair the damage done by the
slumber." The good faith — and the simplicity — of the in
tentions of the Gladstone Ministry with regard to
Egypt were illustrated by the Special Mission
which had been entrusted to the late Lord Dufferin.
That shrewd and subtle Statesman saw at once
that the Dual Control was gone beyond any pos
sible means of recall. It had worked without any
Intolerable hitch so long as the Sultan was willing
to accept the Anglo-French control of Egyptian
finance. But Mr Gladstone's policy with regard
to South Eastern Europe had so irritated him that
no form of co-operation was possible In the future.
He had hoped that the Arabi Rebellion, promoted
by his agents, would lead to the expulsion of
English and French influence from Egypt. Much
to his annoyance, though the Condominium had
been destroyed. It was replaced by the single and
undisputed authority of Great Britain, and his

148 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1880-1885
Sovereign rights were reduced to a mere titular
recognition. The Sultan, then, having been
thrust on one side, and the Khedive being
prepared to act under English advice. It only
remained, since we had renounced the idea of
governing Egypt as a Dependency, to grant
it some form of nominal Self-Government. The
Report prepared by Lord Dufferin, and pub
lished early In 1883, sketched out a complete
system of reforms, which were to be carried out
under the benevolent protection and supervision
of the British Government.
Those who are curious in State Papers will
be repaid by the perusal of this very clever but
absolutely futile document. The views of the
Gladstone Government were expressed by Mr
Chamberlain, with his usual lucidity, in a speech
which he delivered on 15th January 1884, at
Newcastle. " There Is a great Party in this country which
seems to have learnt nothing by experience, but
which is always eager for an extension of an Empire
already, I should think, vast enough to satisfy the
most inordinate ambition, and which taxes our
resources to the utmost in the attempt to govern
it well and wisely. If we were to accept the advice
which is so freely tendered to us, I predict that the
temporary difficulties we have to face would become
permanent dangers. What has happened ? These
unforeseen events may have delayed the execution
of our policy, but they have not proved it to be in
itself unwise or impossible. The defeat of the
Egyptian forces in the Soudan is not necessarily
an evil. There have been many similar disasters
in the course of the great campaign in the centre
of Africa, and there are many parts of the wild
country which extends over hundreds of miles into

MR CHAMBERLAIN ON EGYPT 149
the interior which are whitened with the bones of
the Egyptian soldiers who have been torn from
their homes In order to carry on the projects of
their rulers, and all through the Occupation has
been a continuous strain upon the resources of a
poor country. It has increased the burdens upon
the peasantry of Egypt ; and now that they are
likely to be relieved of this strain upon their re
sources, they may well be — probably will be^ — freer
to undertake measures of Internal Improvement, and
the Egyptian Government will be able to develop,
into a prosperous and self-working institution, the
organisation which has already been commenced
in that country with fair prospects of success.
" I confess that it surprises me to see that the
success of this institution is doubted in quarters
in which I should not have expected such a
scepticism. I was reading an eloquent speech
by your senior member the other day, in which
he spoke with scorn of the attempt to engraft
Constitutional Government upon Egypt. Egypt,
he said, was the product of centuries of enslave
ment. Well, I am more sanguine than Mr
Cowen. I do not believe that any nation Is so
degraded and so hopeless that it may not be
led forward In the work of Self-Government. I
think that the problem which he declares so
hopeless has been solved within the last few
years, almost before our very eyes. It has been
solved in the case of Bulgaria, which is making
rapid progress under the free institutions with
which it has been endowed. These free institu
tions did not grow up spontaneously, as Mr
Cowen says they should do. They were im
planted into the country, and Bulgaria had
suffered oppression as cruel, and tyranny even
greater than the Egyptians, and at the hands

150 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1880-1885
of the same people — ^the Turks. In any case,
I say that the duty of the Government is clear.
We have assumed a duty which we cannot
neglect. We have set our hands to the plough,
and we ought not to go back. We cannot leave
Egypt to anarchy ; but, on the other hand, we
do not, and we ought not to, withdraw from
any of the assurances we have given. The
task is likely to be more difficult than was sup
posed. It will take a longer time than was antici
pated. There is nothing in what has happened
which makes me think that it will not ultimately,
with time, patience, and discretion, succeed, and
be completely accomplished."
This sanguine utterance was delivered within
a few days of the fall of Khartoum.
As If to complete their unhappiness in Diplo
matic relations, the Government, who had been
accused of persistently truckling to Russia, were
brought, by no fault of theirs, to the very verge
of declaring War against the Czar. It had been
agreed between Lord Granville and M. de Glers
that a Joint Boundary Commission should be
appointed by the two Powers. We had warned
the Ameer that trouble would ensue If he moved
troops up to Penjdeh, and that he must not look
for help from us ; but he was resolved that the
Russians should not take "a piece of a fragment
from the ruins of his frontier." Before Sir Peter
Lumsden arrived, the Russians and Afghans had
exchanged defiances, and on 26th March a conflict
broke out, in which the Afghans were completely
routed. Though they had acted against our
advice, the discomfiture of our allies reflected
on us, and in any case we were bound by our In
terest to prevent the Russians from getting a foot
ing in the Ameer's territory. There was no saying

THE MINISTRY DEFEATED 151
where the matter would end. The Indian Govern
ment commenced to mobilise Its forces. At home.
Ministers in both Houses declared, on 26th March,
that a "time of emergency" had arisen, and the
Reserves were to be called out.
Fortunately, Parliament was on the point of
separating for the Easter Recess, but, on 8th
April, when it met again, Mr Gladstone, speak
ing, as he said. In " circumstances of great
gravity," declared that an "unprovoked aggres
sion" had been committed. It was not then
known in England that the Afghans had been
at least as much to blame as the Russians, and
for several weeks most Englishmen were con
vinced that War with Russia was practically
Inevitable. On 21st April Mr Gladstone
announced in the House of Commons that he
would ask for a Vote of Credit for ^^i 1,000,000
— as it had become necessary to review our
military position. Of this sum, he explained
that less than half would be required for opera
tions in the Soudan ! Quite unexpectedly the
storm cleared away. Fuller accounts were re
ceived from the scene of disturbance, and the
Ameer himself who was paying a visit to Lord
Dufferin, Lord Ripon's successor as Viceroy,
declared that he attached little Importance to
the incident, and was not prepared to Insist that
Penjdeh was within his territory. The truth
was that he found he could not depend on the
loyalty of the tribesmen at that point, and was
ready to accept some more defensible position,
to be arranged between the Indian and
Russian Governments.
Though the specific alarm had passed away, the
general sense of disquietude remained, and a feeling
had arisen that Ministers had generally mismanaged

152 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1880-1885
the business of the country. In the House of
Commons their majority had gradually gone to
pieces, and the Nationalists were actively hostile.
When the Budget was introduced on 8th June
1885, ^ri Amendment, moved by Sir Michael Hicks-
Beach, was carried by 12 votes, 39 of the Irish
having voted against the Government. In a few
days the formalities of resignation were completed,
and the end was reached of what Mr Bright had
once called the best House of Commons that had
ever been elected.

CHAPTER V
AT THE BOARD OF TRADE
The office assigned to Mr Chamberlain in 1880,
though, in the ninety-four years of Its existence, it
had been held by several men who afterwards
reached distinction, was but of secondary import
ance. Neither in salary nor authority does the
President of the Board of Trade (reconstituted
from Cromwell's Board of Trade and Plantations)
rank among the leading members of an Adminis
tration. Such influence as he may exercise Is
derived from his personal qualities — chiefly, per
haps, in his power of forcing his way through the
inner group that surrounds most Prime Ministers,
and getting the ear of his Chief Unless the Head
of a minor Department possesses this practical
quality, he may expect to be told, when the
materials are being selected for the Speech from
the Throne, that his special proposals must be
postponed to another Session. Even if one or two
of his Bills have been mentioned In the Govern
ment Programme, or advanced as far as Second
Reading, they are more than likely to be sacrificed
in the " Massacre of Innocents " which is held with
almost canonical regularity — on the earliest
possible date after Midsummer — when it is found
that the "business ofthe country" has reached a
state of hopeless congestion, i.e., when Ministers
153

154 AT THE BOARD OF TRADE
are forced to confess that they have undertaken
more than they can perform. It is the amiable
way of a Premier to begin the Session by making
things pleasant all round, and promising each of
his earnest colleagues full opportunity of legisla
tion for his own Department. Later on— when
the Opposition have once again displayed their
customary, but always absolutely unexpected,
perversity in crossing the plans of a long-
suffering Government — he begins to make terms
with his Ministers. That is to say, he throws
over those who will not make themselves trouble
some. These being the- principles on which the
affairs of the British Empire are conducted, it
behoves every young Administrator who aims
at getting personal credit In Parliament, or
serving his country faithfully in that Depart
ment to which he has been called, to establish
a reputation for pertinacity. This useful char
acter Mr Chamberlain had acquired at Birming
ham ; he Improved It In Whitehall. If it had
been thought that this "pushing Mayor from
the Provinces" would soon "find his level" when
he got among "real Statesmen in London," the
anticipation was not fulfilled. It will be seen from
the record of his work at the Board of Trade In
1880-5, that he managed to press upon a pre
occupied Administration, and to extract from a
neglected and ramshackle Department, a solid
amount of useful legislation. His disappointment
over the Merchant Shipping Bill had been com
pensated beforehand by his achievements in Patent
and Bankruptcy legislation.
The secret of his success need be no mystery
— he always worked full time. Most of our pro
minent public men belong to that comfortable

ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY 155
class which has no tradition of day-by-day and
all-day work, and, though a few ambitious young
men of good birth make politics a regular pro
fession, they are, as a rule, not capable of steady
and sustained exertion — the few exceptions prov
ing the rule by rapidly attaining high Office.
The other class of politicians who help to fill
Ministries are men, more or less advanced in
years, who have made their positions in some
engrossing profession or business, and can spare
for Parliament only a portion of their days and
the fag-end of their careers. They are valued
rather for their experience of men and affairs,
their trained judgment, their reputation and
Influence, than for any driving force contributed
to the political mechanism.
Mr Chamberlain, when he entered Parliament
at forty years of age, possessed the advantages
of both classes without the disabilities of either.
The almost abnormal youthfulness of his appear
ance was but an accurate expression of unimpaired
energies, while with the unfettered leisure of a
man of fortune he combined the habits of a man
of business. Whether in agitating on public
platforms or directing Party organisation, he
laboured as industriously as an official whose salary
is regulated by the results he achieves. When
he was grappling with administrative problems in
Whitehall, he was as keen about the efficiency
of his Department as If he were building up a
private business. The permanent officials found
at once that they had to deal — not with an in
dolent or amateur Chief, who relied on them to
coach him for answering Questions in the House
of Commons, or for explaining the Departmental
Measures that might be demanded by public
opinion — but with a Managing Director who

156 AT THE BOARD OF TRADE
meant to keep his subordinates up to the mark,
and was always on the look-out to encourage and
promote those who gave him loyal assistance.
Men who have opposed Mr Chamberlain, jhose
who have tried to thwart him, have many hard
things to say of him ; but those who have worked
in concert with him all agree that he never forgets
efficient service, and (like Mr Gladstone) has the
very useful power of picking out those who can
render it. When he went to the Board of Trade,
it was not a specially inefficient Department, but
its chief officials had been permitted to go their
own various ways, and do pretty much as they
pleased. Before he left It In 1885, he had
animated it with a brief sense of corporate
existence, and brought the loosely-compacted
organism under the control of a guiding
brain. His beginnings were sufficiently modest. His
first Parliamentary Session resulted only in a
couple of useful, but not generally Important,
Measures, relating to the Payment of Seamen's
Wages and to Grain Cargoes. In the following
year, preoccupied as Parliament was with exciting
disputes, and hampered by organised Obstruction,
he passed a Measure under which Municipalities
that desired to adopt Electric Lighting were
relieved from the heavy expense of promoting a
special Bill in each case, and could obtain the
necessary powers under a Provisional Order from
the Board of Trade.
This was a period in our Parliamentary
annals when Ministers had to be thankful for
small mercies. None of Mr Gladstone's col
leagues fretted more Impatiently under the legis
lative impotence of the House of Commons than
his President of the Board of Trade, who had

PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURE 157
pledged himself to ;l number of wide-reaching
political changes, as well as to various Depart
mental Measures. His attempt to reduce the
scandalous extravagance of Bankruptcy procedure,
and to foil the devices of unscrupulous insolvents,
had fallen to the ground, simply because there was
no time to discuss the Clauses. It had been In
troduced before Faster, but It offered so many
opportunities alike for legitimate and colourable
Debate that It had to be abandoned. The mere
sacrifice of this, or any other. Departmental Bill —
which was likely to make at least as many enemies
as friends — would not, by itself, have stimulated
Mr Gladstone to attempt the task of reforming
Procedure in the House of Commons. But
it had become almost impossible — so resourceful
were the Irish members In the art of Obstruction
— for Ministers to carry the political Measures in
which their collective credit was involved ; and
the "paralysis of necessary social legislation"
came in as a useful argument for strengthen
ing the powers of the majority.
A special Session was convened in the Autumn
of 1 88 1 for considering the New Rules of Pro
cedure, and it was known that Mr Chamber
lain, comparatively fresh as he was to work at
Westminster, had suggested some of the altera
tions which were then considered almost alarm
ingly stringent, but which a very short experi
ence showed to be too weak for their purpose,
and which had to be enlarged and strengthei^ed
by a subsequent Administration.
More efficient, and less controversial, than any
attempt to deal with Obstruction on the floor of
the House, was the plan, specially favoured by
Mr Chamberlain, for transferring the discussion
of the details of complicated Bills from a Com-

158 AT THE BOARD OF TRADE
mittee of the whole House to one of the two
Grand Committees (on Trade and on Law)
which were now instituted, and to which a
Measure might be referred after the principle
had been accepted at the Second Reading.
Each Committee was to consist of not less
than sixty and not more than eighty members ;
twenty made a quorum ; the proceedings were to
be public ; and when a Bill had passed the Report
stage in one of these Committees it occupied the
same position as If it had been "reported" to a
Committee of the whole House.
As Mr Chamberlain had been largely respon
sible for the introduction of this sensible reform,
so he was one of the first Ministers to profit by it.
In the 1883 Session he reintroduced his Bank
ruptcy Bill. It was read a second time on 19th
March, and then referred to the Grand Committee
on Trade. Though it contained about a hundred
and fifty Clauses and a number of Schedules, and
though it embodied some more or less contentious
proposals, it was reported to the House before the
end of June, and ultimately became law.
Under the previous system, based on the Act
of 1869 — a good Measure in its time, but long
antiquated — the facilities offered to fraud under the
name of Liquidations by Arrangement and Com
positions had long been recognised and denounced,
but nothing was done to remove the abuses which
had grown up, until Mr Chamberlain's first Bill
was introduced. He proposed to put an end
to such proceedings — collusive, as they frequently
were — between the debtor and certain favoured
creditors, and recognised no liquidation except in
Bankruptcy, For the legal supervision, honest
but ineffective, commercial supervision was substi
tuted, and, even If the debtor was himself the peti*-

BANKRUPTCY REFORM 159
tioner, he would, ipso facto, deprive himself of the
control over his estate. This would pass Into the
hands of the Official Receiver, It was made
necessary for a meeting of creditors to be held
within seven days of the petition ; the acceptance
of Compositions was to be strictly controlled ; no
discharge could be granted except by the Court ;
the trustees were to be paid a fixed remuneration,
and the accounts audited by a public authority.
These principles, which were reproduced in the
1883 Bill, had been approved by that excel
lent Conservative lawyer. Sir John Holker ; but a
sharp controversy arose on the proposal that all
money received by the trustee should be paid
Into the Bank of England, and Mr Chamberlain
agreed that the Board of Trade should be em
powered, on application being made, to employ a
local Bank, It was calculated, however, that the
use of the large balances that would lie from time
to time at the disposal of the Government would
amount to about .;^8o,ooo a year, which would
make the new official machinery practically self-
supporting. It was acknowledged by practical men of busi
ness, and by all lawyers except those who were
interested In maintaining the old system, or felt
indisposed to adapt themselves to a novel pro
cedure, that the new Act marked a great improve
ment. If it has not altogether excluded the
possibility of fraudulent evasion, and If the ex
penses of Bankruptcy administration are still
ridiculously disproportionate to the sums in
volved, the explanation is that habitual Insol
vents, and the legal advisers whom they
employ, are a resourceful race with whose inven
tions it is not easy for legislation to keep pace.
Moreover, it Is not the business of lawyers to

160 AT THE BOARD OF TRADE
reduce expenses, while the dialectical ingenuity
of Judges in the interpretation of Statutes, in
this as In many other Instances, does much to
defeat the well-understood, though sometimes
ambiguously expressed, intentions of Parliament,
Nevertheless, the 1883 Act has stood the test of
time fairly well, and, in spite of slight modifica
tions which have been introduced In one way or
another, and although further legislation is now
desirable, the existing Law of Bankruptcy Is
pretty much what Mr Chamberlain made It
more than twenty years ago.
In the following Session, It should be mentioned
that some of the Conservatives in Parliament —
Irritated by his vehement agitation for Electoral
Reform, and eager to find a handle against him —
charged him with having made an unfair use of
his patronage under the Act, It was said that
of the sixty-seven Official Receivers appointed, no
fewer than fifty-one were Liberal in politics, and
nineteen had been electioneering agents. His
reply was, that the nominations had not been made
by himself, but by a Departmental Committee, and
that he was personally acquainted with only five
of the new officials. Two of them he knew to
be Liberals, and one to be a Conservative, while
he was ignorant of the views of the others. It is
possible, of course, that the Committee to whom the
selection had been entrusted may have favoured
candidates who professed the same views as the
Chief of the Department ; but It was not alleged
that any of the gentlemen nominated were in any
way unfit for the work, or that applicants of
conspicuous merit had been passed over merely
because they were connected with the Conserva
tive Party,
The Patent Act, which was also passed in

PATENT LAW AMENDMENT 161
1883, was intended to assist poor Inventors — a
class of men very much at the mercy of unscrupu
lous exploiters — to profit by their discoveries.
The Provisional Fee was reduced from ^5 to
^i, and the "first payment" from ;^20 to ^3.
For the sum of ^4, therefore, the full rights In a
new idea were protected for four years. By that
time it should in any likely case be possible to
see whether the scheme was worth any serious
outlay. For a complete patent it was necessary
to pay about ^^150 — not an extravagant charge
for a monopoly of fourteen years.
By practical measures of this kind Mr
Chamberlain was making a solid reputation In
the House of Commons, and, if he had never
spoken outside Westminster, it Is probable that a
different fate might have attended the Merchant
Shipping Bill which he Introduced in 1884. But,
as we shall presently see, his platform activity. In
view of the approaching Dissolution of Parlia
ment, had rendered him an equal object of dread
and detestation to the Conservatives. Naturally,
they set themselves to damage his position In
the House of Commons, nor can It be denied
that some of the circumstances connected with
his Merchant Shipping Bill gave them an open
ing of which it would have hardly been human
not to take advantage. Well-meant as were the
proposals with which the President of the Board
of Trade now associated the Government, the
cause had been prejudiced by the vituperative
extravagances of Mr Samuel Pllmsoll. The Con
servative Government had recognised in 1875 that
certain British firms were more or less indifferent
to the safety of the crews whom they employed.
It paid them better, they thought, to sacrifice a
vessel now and then (especially as they would be
L

162 AT THE BOARD OF TRADE
recouped by the insurance) than to spend money
every year on keeping It seaworthy. In a few
instances, no doubt — though the number was
much exaggerated by sensational politicians and
novelists in search of a plot — there had been
something worse than mere negligence. Vessels
had been insured far beyond their value, and
sent out to sea for the purpose of being lost
or scuttled. The outcry about these "coffin-ships" had
caught the popular imagination, and Sir Charles
Adderley (Lord Norton), who was then President
of the Board of Trade, had brought in a Bill to
check such criminal malpractices. In the course
of the Session it was considered necessary or
advisable to abandon this Measure. Thereupon
Mr Pllmsoll, who had made himself the champion
of the seamen, worked himself Into a state of
benevolent excitement. He implored the Govern
ment "not to consign some thousands of living
human beings to undeserved and miserable
death." Turning on certain ship-owning members
of the House who had resisted the Bill, he
described them as villains whom he was resolved
to unmask! Naturally, there was an angry
scene, and a few days afterwards, being a
generous-hearted man, he made a very hand
some apology for the quite unfounded charges he
had brought against persons as honourable as
himself But this experience did not Induce him
to modify his style of advocacy. Nor was public
sentiment altogether against him, since his phil
anthropic intentions were as evident as his per
versity. A temporary Measure was passed before the
end of the Session, followed by another in 1876.
In 1880 he brought In a Bill which provided

MR PLIMSOLL'S OUTBURSTS 163
that all grain cargoes must be loaded in sacks
or bags — a sensible and practical proposal, which
would materially reduce the risks of navigation.
But when it was opposed by the members for
Westminster and Guildford, he put up placards
In their Constituencies, denouncing their conduct
as inhuman and degrading. On being called to
account, he began by attempting to justify his con
duct ; but, on being threatened with the penalties
of Breach of Privilege, he made another apology.
Here, however, the matter could not be allowed to
rest ; and Sir Stafford Northcote, as Leader of the
House, prepared and carried a formal Motion that
the honourable member for Derby had committed a
Breach of Privilege, but that, as he had withdrawn
the offensive expressions he had employed, the
House thought that no further action was neces
sary. Although nobody believed that Mr Pllm
soll had been actuated by personal malice against
the gentlemen whom he traduced, it was felt that
these successive slanders and retractations had
brought discredit on the cause as well as on the
champion. Though further amending legislation
was carried in 1882 and 1883, neither the House
of Commons nor the country was disposed to look
very favourably on a comprehensive scheme which
was believed to be more or less inspired by Mr
Pllmsoll, Nor can it be said that Mr Chamber
lain's method of promoting legislation was either
conciliatory to the shipowners or advantageous to
a Government which was already losing its popu
larity. In the first place, he had previously associated
himself with Mr Plimsoll's outrageous methods.
He was Mayor of Birmingham in 1875, ^.nd pre
sided at a meeting in that city, held to protest
against the action of the Government in abandon-

164 AT THE BOARD OF TRADE
ing Sir Charles Adderley's Bill, and to give Mr
Pllmsoll an assurance of sympathy and support.
He had then referred to Mr Plimsoll's wild
charges as the expression of a "natural indigna
tion." It is true that as President of the Board
of Trade he had begun by soliciting the assist
ance of the leading shipowners. In reply to
a Deputation from the Associated Chambers
of Shipping in March 1883, he had offered,
before introducing his Bill, to send it round
to the chief shipping organisations, and to
invite advice, assistance, and suggestions. He
had implored them not to meet him with a non
possumus, and reminded them it was their interest
as well as their duty to remedy abuses. He con
sulted underwriters, and shipmasters — anybody
who was able to give information. But though
there was some difference of opinion as to the
cause of the mischief there was no difference as
to Its extent. Nevertheless, he found that " the
best men in the trade, men who were conducting
their business In a way which could not possibly
be criticised, and were doing everything they
could for the safety and comfort of their seamen;
men who would not be touched by any legisla
tion that anybody could possibly introduce," were
nevertheless so "Influenced by esprit de corps"
that they would not move to help him. He
was left, therefore, to his own resources.
This, no doubt, was correct, so far as it
went. But the respectable shipowners, the over
whelming majority, were influenced by something
more than esprit de corps. They would only have
been too glad to see every black sheep driven out
of their business. But they felt, not without
reason, that it would be impossible to devise

MERCHANT SHIPPING REFORMS 165
restrictions that would control the disreputable
firms, which would not also Inconvenience and
even injure those who enjoyed the highest char
acter. Nothing is more vexatious to an honest
man than the constant supervision of officials who
insist on treating him as a potential rogue. The
most Intelligent and elastic administration of
Government regulations means waste of time and
strain on the temper. Moreover, the British ship
owners were already beginning to suffer from
foreign competition, and could not afford to give
away any points to their rivals. Indeed, whether
rightly or wrongly. It is now alleged — by many
shipowners who have no sympathy with any kind of
dishonesty or Inhumanity — that British firms are
seriously handicapped by having to conform to rules
which are not imposed In foreign ports. However
that may be, it was inevitable — though Mr
Chamberlain was surprised — that the trade as a
whole should resist the legislation which he pro
posed. Nor were their suspicions allayed, or their
apprehensions modified, by knowing that the
Minister was In frequent conference and uncon
cealed sympathy with the man who had defamed
them as a body. They had brought Mr Pllmsoll to
book : they would give Mr Chamberlain a fall.
Yet they could not deny that he had a strong
case. There had been not only a terrible loss of
life at sea, but much of it was preventlble. These
were the facts as related by himself: —
" I found, in the first place, every year more
than 3000 lives were lost at sea ; that in some
years this total amounted to 3500 and even more.
Consider for a moment under what circumstances
these lives were lost. Death Is always a pathetic
thing ; but death, when it comes under circum
stances of such horror, and when it comes In the

166 AT THE BOARD OF TRADE
shape of a violent end to existence. Is still more
tragic and pathetic. And It is not only the men
whose lives are lost, whose fate you have to con
sider. What Is the fate of their families, who are
left without resource, struggling against destitu
tion, when the bread-winner Is removed ? The
next point which struck me was this, that the
proportion of this loss of life to the men employed
was something extravagant and almost horrible,
I stated, the first time I had an occasion of speak
ing about this subject to the shipowners them
selves, that it amounted to i in 60 of the men
employed In a single year, I have since had more
careful calculations made. I have examined the
subject from every side, and I say that I under
stated the facts, and that the loss of life in a single
year In the British Mercantile Marine has been
actually i in 56. But what does It matter whether
it Is I in 56, or i In 60, or i in 100? It Is a loss
of life absolutely unparalleled In any other trade,
and a loss of life which is deplorable in itself, and
which ought not to be endured by a civilised people,
" Then I went on naturally to the next point of
the Inquiry. I tried to discover how far this loss
of life was preventlble, I am sorry to say I found
too many men inclined to look upon It as a neces
sary Incident in the prosecution of a great com
mercial enterprise, I say. If this loss of life is a
necessary incident, no commercial enterprise which
involves It is justifiable. But I do not believe that
It is necessary, I have never found any one, im
partial and experienced, who denied for a moment
that there was not a large proportion of this loss
that might be prevented If full and proper pre
cautions were taken in connection with the
management of this great business, I found, and
this concluded my inquiry, that connected with

OBJECTIONS TO THE BILL 167
this loss was the extraordinary fact that in a great
number of cases, I am not certain that it might
not be so In the majority of cases, the owners
whose vessels went to the bottom, the bones of
"whose crews whitened the sands — these men
suffered no loss, and might even In some cases
make a profit, I thought this was a state of
things which loudly called for a remedy. I for
one was not prepared to take the responsibility of
standing by with folded hands, doing nothing to
remove a source of so much misery and suffering
to so many of my countrymen."
The Bill, as Introduced into the House of
Commons In the Session 1884, did not, Mr
Chamberlain confessed, go so far as he desired,
but he used the concessions — which he had made,
he said, "under pressure," — as arguments why the
shipowners should meet him in an amicable spirit.
It was not very probable that they would respond
to such an appeal. Why should they consent to
any compromise with a Government which they had
already proved themselves able to influence by open
menace ? The leading principles of the Bill were
reasonable, but the proposed machinery, though
not intended to be vexatious, was such as no
trade would accept unless It were impossible to
offer resistance. The main causes of the unneces
sary loss of life at sea, Mr Chamberlain explained
at the Second Reading Debate, were under-man
ning, over-loading, and over-Insurance. With the
last of these he proposed to deal by formally enact
ing that a marine insurance was in any case to be
no more than a contract for Indemnity, so that no
shipowner could make a profit by exposing his
crew to danger. But if the vessel had been
rendered unseaworthy by any neglect on his part
he should be disabled from recovering any compen-

168 AT THE BOARD OF TRADE
sation under his policy. This, of course, aimed
only at the few disreputable firms which were sus
pected of absolute foul play, but it might place
honourable men in the disagreeable position of
being called upon to establish their good faith.
The contract with officers and seamen was to
imply an undertaking that the vessel had been
seaworthy when she left port, and that all reason
able means would be employed to keep her In that
condition. The owner was brought within the
general scope of the Employers' Liability Act
(except that he was not responsible for proved
errors in navigation), nor was he permitted to
contract himself out of his liabilities, either to his
crew or the owners of property carried on board.
Districts were to be marked out by the Board of
Trade, each with a local marine court, consisting
of the detaining officer, a shipowners' representa
tive, and an officers' representative. Though the
Government official would not be able to detain
a vessel against the consent of the shipowners'
representative, unless under an order of the
Admiralty Court, he was entitled to Issue a warn
ing to the owner, the master, and the crew, that
the ship was unseaworthy. This would relieve
the officers and seamen from the penalties which
they would otherwise incur by breaking their con
tract of service. Fair as this proposal seemed,
necessary as it may have been. It put every ship
owner more or less under the thumb of Govern
ment officials.
The general principles of the Bill were sup
ported by a strong body of philanthropic senti
ment, not only on the Radical side of the
House. But the shipowners had something more
than class-interest to rely on. As to the statements
of fact on which the Measure was based, there

VICTORY OF THE SHIPOWNERS 169
was a strong conflict of evidence. A great part
of Mr Chamberlain's case rested on the alleged
prevalence of over-insurance. Yet it was asserted
by one of the greatest Companies, one that did a
business of fifteen millions a year, that it could not
trace a single instance of a vessel being voluntarily
sacrificed for the sake of getting the Insurance
money. This Is but one example of the many
contradictory statements between which the out
side public had to choose. It was afterwards
established by the Royal Commission appointed
in 1885 that, in point of fact, many lives were
every year lost at sea through preventlble risks,
and that the need did exist for drastic legislation.
We may also take it that these facts had already
been proved to Mr Chamberlain's satisfaction
when he drafted his Bill, but at the time when it
came before the House of Commons there was no
general conviction that such strong measures were
required or could be justified. Nor did the reputa
tion either of the Government as a body, or the
President of the Board of Trade as an individual,
stand so high In point of impartiality that
their word would be accepted as sufficient
evidence of fact. Justly or unjustly, they were
accused of wanton interference with trade
interests, and of disregard for the rights of
property, and this proposal was plausibly repre
sented as one more instance of a mischievous
general propensity.
The storm was too strong for Mr Gladstone,
and he gave way. The Bill was withdrawn, and
the retreat covered by the appointment of a Royal
Commission to conduct an Inquiry and issue a
Report on the whole subject. Mr Chamberlain
was bitterly mortified by the most serious rebuff
which he had encountered in public life. He did

170 AT THE BOARD OF TRADE
not relish having to confess himself beaten,
especially as he was honestly convinced that his
remedies were not more violent than the case
demanded, and that he had only been defeated by
a coalition between Party spirit and Class selfish
ness. In a private interview with Mr Gladstone,
he expressed his desire to resign office, and, being
released from responsibility for the decision of the
Government, to fight the whole question out on a
public platform, and obtain an Informal verdict
from the country.
Obviously, this suggestion would not suit the
Prime Minister. So long as Mr Chamberlain
remained a Member of the Administration, he
was, as it were, a hostage given by the Radicals
to official Liberalism. A General Election could
not be far distant ; the majority in Parliament
were getting out of hand, the Conservatives, so
long a disorganised and almost negligible force
at Westminster, were becoming confident and
aggressive under Lord Randolph Churchill's
Irregular leadership ; the Nationalists were openly
and bitterly hostile. If the Radical vote were
lost, or merely weakened. Ministers might any
evening be defeated in the Lobbies. Even
If that peril were avoided, how could Mr
Chamberlain's place be filled In the Cabinet ?
To appoint a Moderate Liberal would be to give
umbrage to the Radicals. Yet, which of them
would venture to join an Administration that
two of their Leaders deserted — and deserted on
questions of principle? Mr Bright gone, Mr
Chamberlain gone, was It certain that Sir
Charles Dilke would remain ?
At all costs, Mr Chamberlain must be re
tained. It is true, that if his resignation had
been accepted, he would not have come forward

AN OFFER OF RESIGNATION 171
as a declared opponent of his late colleagues. That
would have been an act of ingratitude towards
Mr Gladstone of which he was incapable. Yet It
would have been impossible for him to justify
his Bill before the country without passing
something more than indirect censure on the
Government which had thrown it aside. The
great body of electors do not care for fine dis
tinctions — -a man is either for the Government
or against it. Mr Chamberlain might offer ex
planations and plead excuses for his late colleagues ;
but there was no way of vindicating himself with
out showing that the Government had, at least,
been guilty of culpable weakness. To let him
loose as a free lance, however friendly he might
be in his general Intentions, was to Invite defeat
at the polls. Moreover, he was more than a skil
ful administrator ; more than a vigorous speaker ;
more than an Influential leader of opinion In the
Midlands — he was also the moving spirit in the
National Liberal Federation, the chief engineer
of the Party machinery.
These, of course, were not the arguments
which Mr Gladstone addressed to his hesitating
colleague, nor were they the only ones that weighed
In his mind. He had the highest appreciation of
Mr Chamberlain's political capacity, and was
personally grateful for the staunch and effective
help which he had received from the Radicals,
chiefly through Mr Chamberlain's adherence.
There were, he said, more important matters in
hand than the Merchant Shipping Bill. There
was, for instance, the question of the Franchise.
Liberals were at that time in the very midst of this
agitation, and the best chance of doing justice to
the seamen lay through a Reformed Parliament.
To this movement no man was more deeply

172 AT THE BOARD OF TRADE
pledged than Mr Chamberlain, and this, no doubt,
was the lure that caught him, when. In "deference
to Mr Gladstone's judgment," he withdrew his
resignation. At the same time, he was allowed to
"save his face." He was not asked, nor would he
have consented, to abandon the object aimed at,
even If he had to give up the means proposed.
Mr Gladstone showed him the "most kind and
generous consideration," as he explained in a
speech delivered at Hull in August of the follow
ing year (1885) : —
" Mr Gladstone did the best he could under
the circumstances. When the Bill was with
drawn. It was decided to appoint a Royal Com
mission to Inquire into the whole subject. I
endeavoured to make that Commission as repre
sentative and impartial as possible : the shipowners
were again dissatisfied. They claimed — what was
absolutely unusual and unprecedented In the for
mation of such a Commission — that the special
Interest concerned should be represented by five
delegate representatives in addition to those I had
already appointed. I say that the demand was
absolutely unusual. At the same time, I did not
offer opposition to it, and I did not object to it,
except so far as I feared the delay which the exten
sion of the numbers of the Commission would
cause in Its proceedings. It was to me a matter
of no consequence at all whether there were five
shipowners, or fifty, on the Commission. I have
always believed that when the Report is published
the public will look to the opinion of the impartial
members of the Commission, and not to those
who sit as the delegates of the Interest chiefly
concerned. The Commission was appointed ; it
has sat and taken a great deal of evidence ; and
now it has decided that, although its labours are

MR GLADSTONE'S TACT 173
not nearly completed, the evidence, so far as It
has gone, shall be made public."
Nor did Mr Chamberlain intend that the
promise of future legislation on Merchant Ship
ping should be a mere formality. Though the
Report issued by this Commission in November
1885 could not be acted upon, another Commis
sion — practically the same, though under another
name — was appointed in 1886 (while Mr Chamber
lain was still a member of Mr Gladstone's Third
Administration), which published Its recommenda
tions In August 1887, when Lord Salisbury had
been Prime Minister rather more than a year.
In 1888 an Act was passed which was largely
based on this Report, and carried through Parlia
ment, at Mr Chamberlain's instance, as part of
the general Unionist understanding. It required
that every merchant vessel should be provided with
such boats, belts, and other life-saving apparatus
as might best be adapted to securing the safety of
passengers and crew. This was followed In 1892
by another Act, declaring that every ship with a
submerged load-line was to be deemed "unsafe"
within the meaning of the Act of 1876, and that
such submersion should be reasonable and prob
able cause for detaining the vessel. It was also
required that proper inspection should be held of
the stores and water provided for the crews of
British vessels. Two years later a general Act was
carried, which consolidated previous legislation,
and consisted of no fewer than 748 sections. It
will be seen, therefore, th^t eventually Mr
Chamberlain succeeded In fulfilling no inconsider
able part of the task which he had set himself —
more, perhaps, than he could have accomplished
had he Insisted, in 1884, on Mr Gladstone accept
ing his offer of resignation.

CHAPTER VI
THE FRANCHISE AGITATION, 1 883- 1 885
When Mr Chamberlain was given office, the Con
servatives in his Constituency hoped — or pre
tended to hope — that his Departmental labour
would diminish his platform activity, and a car
toon of the period represented him as Too Busy to
Talk. But no sooner had he got his work at the
Board of Trade fairly in hand than he started on
an energetic agitation for the enfranchisement of
the agricultural labourer. This was a measure
which had long figured in the list of future Liberal
Reforms, but nothing had been done to carry it
into effect. It was adopted by Mr Gladstone as
part of his understanding with the Birmingham
Radicals, and in 1880 he made It an essential ele
ment in the Government programme. Indeed, It
had been on this ground that Mr Goschen, though
not formally seceding from the Party, declined to
join the new Administration. Naturally, however,
it had been reserved for the closing years of the
Parliament. Whether the scheme should succeed
or fail, it would provide an equally good cry for
the coming General Election. If the Bill were
carried, the new voters might be expected to show
some gratitude to the Party which had enfran
chised them. If it should be lost, a vehement
domestic agitation would help to cover the mis-

EXTENSION OF THE FRANCHISE 175
takes committed by Ministers in their Foreign
policy. In the House of Commons the course of
the new Reform Bill would be reasonably smooth.
The possible defection of a few old-fashioned
Whigs, like Mr Goschen, would be more than
compensated by the accession of the "Tory
Democrats " and of trimming Conservatives who
thought more about the safety of their seats
than consistency with their principles. The diffi
culty would lie with the House of Lords ; and
even In 1883, a year before the Bill was to be
introduced, the Radicals set themselves, by
anticipation, to denounce the natural sin of heredi
tary legislators. Mr Chamberlain was foremost
in the movement. Under his guidance the agita
tion for the enfranchisement of the agricultural
labourer speedily became a campaign against the
Landed Interest and the House of Lords. It
was at Swansea on ist February 1883, that he
struck off one of those phrases which cling to his
name — his denunciation of the class " who toil not,
neither do they spin " : —
" Lord Salisbury cares nothing for the bulk of
the Irish nation. He calls for vengeance upon
the criminals who have been guilty of outrage and
violence, and so far I am with him. But then he
stops there. He has no sympathy — at least he
expresses none — for the great mass of the popula
tion, whether of loyal Ulster or the three other
Provinces of Ireland, who have been subjected to
undeniable tyranny and oppression, and whose
wrongs cry aloud for redress. He can express to
you in eloquent terms his sympathy for the Irish
landlords, who have had to submit to a reduction
of 25 per cent, in their rents, but I find nowhere
any expression of sympathy for poor tenants,
who, for years, uiider the threat of eviction, and

176 THE FRANCHISE AGITATION, 1883-1885
the pressure of starvation, have paid those unjust
rents levied on their own improvements, and ex
torted from their desperate toil and hopeless
poverty. I say that in this matter, as in so many
others. Lord Salisbury constitutes himself the
spokesman of a class — of the class to which he
himself belongs — ' who toil not, neither do they
spin ' — whose fortunes, as in his case, have origin
ated in grants made long ago, for such services as
courtiers render Kings — and have since grown and
Increased while their owners slept, by the levy of
an unearned share on all that other men have done
by toil and labour to add to the general wealth
and prosperity of the country of which they form
a part." Nothing, of course, would have been more
convenient to the Radicals than for the Con
servative Party to offer direct opposition to Fran
chise Reform. But it had been decided, under
the guidance of Lord Salisbury, not to deliver a
frontal attack, but to demand that the extension
of Household Suffrage to the Counties should be
accompanied by an equitable Redistribution of
Seats. The two measures must proceed pari
passu, and become law together. Otherwise, the
Lords would throw out the Franchise Bill. On
this Constitutional ground, the Conservative
Party and the House of Commons would rest
their case. It was no good. Lord Salisbury
said, to talk about sweeping away the Peers.
Mr Bright had admitted that they could not
be "swept away" except by their own consent.
It might be possible to induce them to pass
other Measures by threatening to abolish their
power, but no threat could induce the House of
Lords to vote Its own abolition. " Fear of death
will Induce men to do other things, but It has never

PRESSURE ON THE PEERS 177
yet induced any man to commit suicide." The
logical force of the argument could not be
questioned. But Mr Chamberlain did not believe
— nor did the country generally think — that the
Peers would stand by it. Nor did he agree with
Mr Bright, that the only method of getting rid of
the Upper House was to obtain Its formal consent
to its own extinction. He would, no doubt, have
sanctioned any method short of an appeal to force.
He believed in moral pressure and public demon
strations. But he began with some show of
moderation. "We are engaged in a great contest," he
said at Bristol in the course of the same
year. "The battle will be hot, and every man
will have an opportunity to win his spurs, and
to prove his mettle. We are told that we must
be prepared for the worst. The House of Lords
will at the last moment exercise its Constitutional
prerogative, and will force a Dissolution. We
are told that Lord Salisbury has determined
on a Plebiscite. Well, I should like to point
out to Lord Salisbury that an appeal to three-
eighths of the nation — three-eighths of the
adult males of the nation — against the claims
and the rights of the remaining five-eighths is
not an appeal to a Plebiscite ; it Is an appeal to
a minority against a majority, and It has nothing
in common with the French contrivance. But,
passing that by, I am not afraid of an appeal
even to the present limited electorate. No doubt,
if Lord Salisbury chooses, he may take their
opinion and yours upon the Issue which he him
self will have raised — the issue between the Peers
and the People — between the privileges of the few
and the rights of the many. The responsibility
will be his ; the results, I believe, will not be un-
M

178 THE FRANCHISE AGITATION, 1883-1885
satisfactory to us. I am inclined to hope, in the
words of the beautiful Church Litany which is
read every Sunday, that the nobility may be
'endued with grace, wisdom, and understanding.'
I trust that the House of Lords will have the
' wisdom and the understanding ' to appreciate the
iustice of the claim which will be preferred to them,
and I hope that Lord Salisbury will have the
' grace ' to yield without provoking a conflict in
which he cannot possibly be victorious."
Mr Chamberlain's prayer for the House of
Lords was an audacious sally which delighted
his fellow Radicals, but It did not help them to
dislodge the Conservatives from the strong posi
tion in which they had entrenched themselves.
In the earlier part of the same speech, he had
argued the question on general grounds : —
" Now, we are told by some of their leaders
that the Tories have no objection to the extension
of the Franchise In the abstract. They never have
any objection to anything in the abstract ! But
that does not mean that they will give any par
ticular support to it In the concrete. At the
present moment they are chiefly curious to know
what is our scheme of Redistribution. This thirst
for information Is very creditable to their political
sagacity. In the question of the Franchise you
have a simple question which raises very few
points of principle, and those are points which can
be easily and quickly decided. It Is a question
on which you may say practically the whole
Liberal Party are agreed. If you can only con
trive to tack to it another question, very com
plicated and difficult, on the details of which
difference of opinion may very naturally arise,
then there Is a chance that both questions may
be got rid of together. We have had some painful

CONSERVATIVE TACTICS 179
experience in reference to this particular question.
In 1866, under Lord John Russell, the Liberal
Government brought in a simple Extension of the
Franchise Bill, and the same question arose. A
' cave ' was formed in the Liberal ranks, and a
Resolution was brought forward demanding that
the Government should disclose their scheme of
Redistribution. That Resolution was very nearly
carried ; the Government only obtained a majority
of five. Accordingly, their hands were forced, and
they were compelled to bring in a Redistribution
Bill, The moment they brought in that Bill their
majority of five was changed to a minority of
eleven. They were beaten on an important
amendment, they resigned, and the Tories came
Into office,
"You know what followed ; Mr DisraeH edu
cated his Party, and gave us, with the assistance
of Liberals In Parliament, Household Suffrage in
the Boroughs and a great extension of the Fran
chise in the Counties ; but the scheme of Redistribu
tion was miserably inadequate — a perfect fraud on
the Constituencies, It was accompanied by that
three-cornered vote which has already destroyed
political life In many of our counties and nullified
the popular voice in some of our greatest towns.
That experience is not encouraging for a repeti
tion of It, For my own part, I am not credulous
enough to believe that the Tory Opposition will
be conciliated by any proposals for Redistribution
which we can bring forward. On the other hand,
it would enormously strengthen their hands If we
gave them all the opportunities for discussion and
obstruction which a Redistribution Bill would
involve. The two questions are, to my mind,
independent and distinct. There are two benefits
to be conferred on the people of this country, two

180 THE FRANCHISE AGITATION, 1883-1885
wrongs to be redressed. The first is an injustice
which is done to many of our fellow-countrymen
who have no votes at all ; the second is an injustice
done to those who have votes and whose political
influence Is nullified by the excessive weight and
power given to the smaller Constituencies.
"It may, and probably would, be impossible to
carry both these Reforms in a single Session ; but
why not carry one of them ? Why should we delay
giving a vote to men who are absolutely at the
present moment outside the pale of the Constitu
tion, because we have not yet agreed among our
selves as to the machinery by which we will
endeavour to estimate the proportionate weight
and value of the vote which should be given?
There Is another argument In favour of separa
tion. It is a practical argument ; until you have
given the vote, and until you have got the new
register, it Is absolutely impossible — there are no
means at our disposal for knowing — what the
numbers in the new Constituencies will be, and
until we have that essential information how Is it
possible that any really satisfactory scheme of
Redistribution can be prepared ? Altogether, I
would venture to submit that this is a matter, not
in any sense of principle, but a matter of Parlia
mentary tactics. Those who are honestly anxious
for Reform should do all they can to secure it step
by step. Those who are opposed to Reform in
any shape, but are afraid of saying so, will no
doubt be very wise if they can contrive to jumble
the two questions up together, so that the one
that is plain and simple may be overlaid and stifled
in the embraces of the one that is difficult and
complex. " But suppose that we have decided to introduce
the Franchise Bill alone, and to introduce it at

"NO FEAR OF THE PEOPLE" 181
the beginning of the Session, there still remain
one or two important matters upon which it is
right that the people of this country should make
up their minds. In the first place, what is the
extension to be ? I observed the other day that
Lord Salisbury said that for his part he was
opposed to this perpetual tinkering with the Con
stitution. Well, I agree entirely with Lord Salis
bury, and that is such a rare pleasure that I am
inclined to make the most of it. But I believe
that, unfortunately, although we are agreed upon
the principle, we differ altogether as to the appli
cation of It. Lord Salisbury, I suppose, would
avoid tinkering with the Constitution by letting
the Constitution alone until It falls to pieces. I, on
the contrary, would deal with the Constitution so
effectually that it would never again require amend
ing. I have never concealed my opInlon^ — I have
expressed It on many occasions • — - In favour of
absolute Manhood Suffrage. As the basis of our
electoral system, it would be of immense advantage
in getting rid of difficulties about registration
which have practically nullified the Lodger Vote In
many large towns, and I believe it would be Con
servative in the best and truest sense. The wider
you lay the foundations of your liberties and
institutions, the more stable those liberties and
institutions will be. I have no fear of the people.
I would desire to call in the largest possible
number of them in order to share In the work
and responsibilities of Government.
" But while I say this I am perfectly ready to
admit that public opinion generally is not in favour
of so considerable a change. In the large towns
we are prepared for it. No doubt we see a good
deal more of the people, and, seeing them closer,
we are not afraid of them. But in smaller places.

182 THE FRANCHISE AGITATION, 1883-1885
and among a different class of people, prejudices
exist which time alone can remove. If I am right
in my opinion, time and experience will bring con
viction to all those who now doubt. Every suc
cessive alteration of the Franchise has been justi
fied by its results ; the next alteration, I doubt
not, will also be justified in turn, and then it will
lead naturally, and with common consent, to the
change which I desire. But In the meantime I
stand with the rest of the Liberal Party upon the
question to which all are pledged, upon which
all are agreed ; and I will accept gratefully the
extension of Household Suffrage to the Counties."
As the time approached for the Introduction
of the Bill, the controversy became more heated.
On 1 6th January 1884, Lord Sahsbury defined
his attitude towards the Government Bill. Its
text had not been published, but Its general pro
visions were matter of public knowledge. Ministers
had decided not to couple Extension of the Fran
chise with Redistribution of Seats. Therefore,
he should oppose the Bill, and — he added — he did
not think it would become law that year. As he
had the power of making his threat good, the
announcement of his purpose would have pointed
to a stormy Session even if affairs in Egypt and
the Soudan had not provided matter for acri
monious debate. It was not till the last day of
February that the Prime Minister found an oppor
tunity of explaining the proposals of the Govern
ment. "It was based on the broad principle laid
down by Mr Gladstone that the enfranchisement
of capable citizens, be they few or many — and
if they be many, so much the better — Is an addition
to the strength of the State."
This was unexceptionable ; but In reducing
one anomaly It increased another. It altered

"NO REDISTRIBUTION BILL" 183
the balance of Parties in every County, yet did
not attempt to re-arrange the Divisions in
proportion to the population. This was ad
mitted by Ministers, but they argued, plausibly
enough, that one great Measure of this kind
was enough for a single Session, The Redistribu
tion Bill they promised for 1885. The reply
of the Opposition was that, If the Franchise Bill
were passed by the Lords in 1884, they would
have no voice in deciding the nature of the Re
distribution Bill in 1885, Should they throw out
the latter Measure when the former had become
law. Parliament might be at once dissolved,
and the appeal made to Constituencies flooded
with electors who owed their enfranchisement to
Mr Gladstone's Government. It cannot be denied
that each side, from its own point of view, had a
plausible case. There was no principle involved
in the dispute — merely a question of tactics.
Neither Party, It seemed, could afford to give
way to the other. The more or less abstract
arguments delivered in Parliament and elsewhere
had little influence on men's minds,
Mr Chamberlain's speech In the House of
Commons on 27th March was chiefly Interesting
for the references to Lord Randolph Churchill, a
politician who had then, perhaps, attained the
height of his reputation, and for whom, in spite
of many personal conflicts In the Hou9e of
Commons and at Birmingham, he entertained
a warm admiration : —
" I should like to quote the opinion of a States
man who lived fifty years ago, and who took a
great Interest in the subject of Reform — the first
Lord Durham, In 1836 he said: — 'It is the
duty of a wise Statesman to examine the objects
the people have in view and have determined to

184 THE FRANCHISE AGITATION, 1883-1885
obtain, and when he is satisfied of their justice
he should not wait to be forced to the adoption
of such measures ; he should not do it upon ex
pediency or upon compulsion ; but he should
grant them freely and cordially, for a boon granted
on compulsion loses half its grace and half its
value,' I have quoted that opinion of one of the
elder generation of Statesmen because I want to
contrast it with the opinion of one of our modern
Statesmen- — the latest product and most satis
factory development of that Tory Democracy of
which we shall hear a good deal In the future,
which is represented in this House by the
noble lord the member for Woodstock (Lord R,
Churchill), It is an utterance of the noble lord
to which I propose to direct attention, I pay the
greatest attention to everything he says, for two
reasons — first, because I believe he always says
what he means, and means what he says ; and
secondly, because I find that what he says to-day
his Leaders say to-morrow ; they follow with halt
ing steps, somewhat unwillingly, but they always
follow him ; they may not like the prescription he
makes up for them, but they always swallow it.
Speaking at Edinburgh on 19th December 1883,
he said : —
" ' If I saw the agricultural labourers of Great
Britain in a great state of excitement over this
question, if I saw them holding vast meetings,
collecting together from all parts of England,
neglecting their work, contributing from their
scanty funds, marching on London, tearing down
the railings of Hyde Park, engaging the police,
and even the military, I should say to myself : these
men have great grievances which have not been
represented in Parliament, or which have been
neglected by Parliament, and they know that if

LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL 185
they had the Franchise these grievances would be
no longer neglected, but they would be represented
and remedied. They have made up their minds
to have the vote ; they have shown pretty well they
will know how to use It ; and if we wish for peace,
order, and stability, we must give it them. On
these grounds only I consent to equalise the posi
tion of the agricultural labourer and the town
artisan.' " I must say that this is a very remarkable utter
ance, and It appears to me to be a direct incitement
to outrage. If it had been made in Ireland by an
Irish member, I feel certain that it would have
been denounced from those benches as a direct
provocation to crime and disorder, I am not quite
certain whether the Government might not have
found it necessary to prosecute. But all I can say
is, that I protest absolutely and entirely against
language of that kind, and I think It is a fatal
lesson to teach the people of this country, or any
class in this country, that the only way by which
they can obtain redress of their grievances is by
violence, pulling down railings, and engaging the
police. Although there has been no riot up to this
time — nothing to satisfy the noble lord — yet I
think there have been ample signs of the opinion
of the country and of the interest taken in the
question. The last Recess was distinguished above
most Recesses by the activity of debate, and I must
say that our opponents were more active than we
were. I am not going to lay stress upon our
meetings. You say they arose from a mere
mechanical agitation. Meetings of thousands of
representatives from all parts of the country, and
meetings equally numerous in localities, are regarded
as the creatures of the Caucus, while the meetings
of the Constitutional Committee held in public-

186 THE FRANCHISE AGITATION, 1883-1885
houses are recognised as the free and full expres
sion of public opinion. They are the expression
of public-house opinion, I have no doubt. But at
these meetings, whether held In the open air or In
public-houses, in not a single instance throughout
the whole of the Recess has there been a solitary
resolution passed condemning the Extension of the
Franchise. " Why, if the country cared nothing about
the measure, do you not propound a Resolu
tion calling upon Parliament to discharge this
question and attend to other business ? If honour
able gentlemen are In doubt as to the feeling of
the country upon this Measure, it will probably be
removed before this discussion closes. We do not
get up outrages to order, as the right honourable
gentleman, the member for Cambridge University,
amiably imputed to us. That is not to our interest.
It has never been to our interest to do so, nor has
It ever been our policy. At the time of the late
Government I am not aware that any eminent
member of the Conservative Party was ever
molested or even Insulted by his political opponents.
It was not the Prime Minister's windows that were
smashed by the mob, but the windows of the right
honourable gentleman who is now the Prime
Minister of this country. I do not suppose that
they were broken by any Liberal organisation.
I have no doubt we shall be able to show the
noble lord, the member for Woodstock, and the
right honourable gentleman, the member for Cam
bridge University, that the opinion of the country
is made up In reference to this matter.
" The noble lord spoke of a blank cheque drawn
for ' two millions.' That cheque is not drawn to
my order. I am flattered by the good opinion

"A BLANK CHEQUE FOR TWO MILLIONS" 187
the noble lord expresses of my Influence ; but his
argument comes to this — he refuses to give the
Franchise to any one who he is not certain will
support the Conservative Party. The noble lord
referred to the Influence the honourable member
for Cork would obtain. Now, I do not think the
noble lord is serious In what he says with regard
to me, but I have no doubt he is sincerely afraid
of the honourable member for Cork. He described
the honourable member for Cork as likely to
become by this Bill the great electoral authority
over four-fifths of Ireland. I confess this hardly
describes the present position. Nobody denied
the great Influence the honourable member for
Cork exercises over the Constituencies of Ireland,
but I am certain that this Bill will make no
material change In that Influence. But, whether
It does or not, unless the House is prepared to
abandon all idea of a Constitutional treatment of
the Irish question, and all idea of a Representative
system in Ireland, it is better that the Representa
tive system there should be a reality and not a
mere imposition. Many of us do not like the
opinions held by the majority of the Irish people,
but we cannot suppress those opinions ; and under
these circumstances It is to our Interest that those
opinions, however unpopular, should at least be
represented in this House, and we should permit
the people of Ireland to bring their grievances to
a Constitutional test, and not force them to modes
of redress to which we are most seriously opposed.
" Agitation is always legitimate so long as there
are grievances to be redressed, and the grievances
of Ireland are great and urgent In this matter. In
Great Britain, excluding Ireland, one-tenth of the
population have votes — In Ireland only one in every
twenty-five ; there are therefore two and a half

188 THE FRANCHISE AGITATION, 1883-1885
times as many electors in Great Britain as there
are in Ireland. The result Is that the position of
Ireland at the present moment with regard to the
Franchise Is worse now than was the position of
England and Scotland before the Act of 1867.
Ever since 1867 we have complained of the In
adequacy of that Act for our purpose, but the
Irish people have had to put up with a representa
tion worse than that which existed before that
measure became law. It is the merest folly to
perpetuate Inequalities of this kind, and those who
attempt to maintain them are really the best
friends the Irish agitators have. Our intention
is clear ; we have declared it in our speeches and
in our Bill. Any one who looks at the Bill will
see It would be very difficult to take Ireland out
of it without reconstructing the Bill altogether,
and that is an indication of our Intention to stand
by the Bill as it now appears. The honourable
member for North Leicestershire referred to the
demand made on the occasion of the Reform Bill
of 1832. We also demand 'the Bill, the whole
Bill, and nothing but the Bill,' and we will not
accept a position which would further increase
the anomalies and inequalities which now exist
between the three Kingdoms, or which would
maintain and perpetuate them."
Animated as the discussion appeared to be,
from the beginning it was hollow. No objections
that might be brought against the Bill by Con
servatives in the House of Commons would shake
the Liberal majority, and it was equally certain
that the Measure would be rejected by the Peers.
Still, the formalities of Parliament were duly ob
served. On the Second Reading Debate In the
Lower House an Amendment was proposed by
Lord John Manners that the Bill should not be

MR GLADSTONE'S HESITANCY 189
further proceeded with until the Government had
explained the full details of their Parliamentary
scheme. This was, of course, defeated, the normal
majority of Ministers being Increased by the
Nationalist vote. They had decided at the last
moment to include Ireland In the Bill, and, as
Lord Sahsbury pohtely put it, had thus "squared
the Irish." But this success In the Lobby (340
against 210) did not alter the real state of the
case, and in Committee the Prime Minister made
no attempt to conciliate opposition — in any
case the Bill could not pass that Session. "We
must go straight to our point," he said, "and we
decline to deviate either to the right or the left for
the sake of introducing theoretical Improvements."
A simulacrum of interest was created when
the Third Reading Stage was reached, and
Mr Gladstone referred in significant terms to
the impending conflict between the two Houses.
He had no fear of the result, but trusted that
the Peers would not bring about a collision
which might have grave consequences. The
attitude of Ministers was expressed in the words,
" Beware of entrance to a quarrel, but, being in,
bear't that the opposed may beware of thee."
Impressive as the language was in form, and
much as it gained from his delivery. It did not con
vey the idea that he was really braced up for an
assault on the Upper House. It Is no secret that
his attitude caused dissatisfaction among the more
combative Radicals represented by Mr Chamber
lain. They were "spoiling for a fight," and Mr
Gladstone was determined to hold them back as long
as he could. The Conservatives treated his vague
menaces with open contempt, and Mr Arthur
Balfour remarked that it would not be worth while
to lift a finger in defence of the House of Lords

190 THE FRANCHISE AGITATION, 1883-1885
If It were not considered capable of giving its
opinion on a great Constitutional question.
When the Bill reached the Peers they made
short work of It. An Amendment, identical
in substance with that which had been defeated
In the Lower House, was moved by Lord
Cairns and carried by 205 against 146 votes.
The minority represented a practically full
muster of the Liberal Peers, while the Con
servatives, If they had cared, might have almost
doubled their majority. It was suggested by
some of the Peers who had parted company
with Mr Gladstone, but had not broken with
their Party — like the late Duke of Argyll
and Lord Cowper — that the principle of the
Government Bill should be accepted by the Lords
lest that House might get the reputation of being
hostile to Reform, or should seem to claim the
right of forcing a Dissolution. Their arguments
were supported by Lord Rosebery and Archbishop
Tait, who remarked that the Church trusted the
people. Lord Salisbury- — on whom an amiable
platitude always acted as a red rag on a bull
— retorted that the Church had no monopoly
either of admiration for the working man or of
the desire to secure his political advancement.
He declined to recognise the existence of a Con
stitutional crisis, ignored the menaces directed
against the House of Lords, and Insisted on dis
cussing the Bill as if It were quite an ordinary
Measure. As for the promise of the Government
to Introduce a Redistribution Bill In the following
Session, that would not meet the views of the
Conservative Party. They wanted not a Bill,
but the power of modifying an unjust one. The
whole controversy could be terminated If the
Government wished. They need only Insert in

A POLITICAL IMPASSE 191
their Franchise Bill a Clause providing that It
should not come into operation until a Redistribu
tion Bill had been passed. He wound up with a
characteristic scoff at the high-falutin' language
of the Radicals. There was a legend, he said,
that the Houses of Parliament had been built
by the water so that the Conservatives might
escape In penny steamboats If the people should
rise against them. As for the solemn warning
administered by Dr Tait, he mentioned that, in
the agitation of fifty years before, the Archbishop
of Canterbury had been obliged to depart by a
back door, because he had voted against Reform
— a fact which might, perhaps, account for the
alacrity with which his successor had supported
the present Measure.
The mockery of the Conservative Leader —
"very Ill-judged it was," said the wiseacres
on both sides, " in the presence of a great
national crisis " — was especially irritating to
Liberals who were at all behind the scenes.
So much had been threatened, so little could
be done. With admirable tactical skill, the
two Parties had been manoeuvred Into inex
pugnable positions. Neither could be dislodged,
but neither could advance. They were like the
two goats meeting on a plank too narrow for
either to pass the other. This suited the Con
servatives very well : they were content to remain
on the defensive, and defy their enemies to "come
on." But for the Liberals Inaction was defeat.
The only way out of an awkward position, urged
the Radicals, was to give the word for an attack
in force on the House of Lords. This, however,
was a movement of which it was understood that
Mr Gladstone was not prepared to be the leader,
and without him it was hopeless.

192 THE FRANCHISE AGITATION, 1883-1885
A meeting of the Liberal Party was convened
at the Foreign Office on loth July, and Mr Glad
stone announced that while the Bill was still
under discussion in the House of Lords an offer
of compromise had been made to the Conservative
Leaders. The Government had privately inti
mated that they were willing to propose an
identical Resolution, both Houses declaring that
"each House had passed the Bill in reliance on
the promise of the Government to Introduce a
Redistribution Bill next Session, and to embody
this Resolution In an Address to the Crown, so
that all three elements of the Legislature would
be in possession of this pledge." This had been
refused by Lord Salisbury, who had declined, Mr
Gladstone said, to "discuss the Redistribution
Bill with a rope round his neck." What had
happened — as appeared from the personal contro
versy which subsequently arose — was that Lord
Granville had been sent with this proposal to
Lord Cairns, who had asked him to put it into
writing. When this had been done, the Con
servative Leader's reply was that he would accept,
not a Resolution of both Houses, but an Amend
ment forming part of the Bill, either to the effect
that the Bill should come Into operation (i) on a
day to be named in a subsequent Act of Parliament,
or (2) on 1st January 1886, unless an earlier date
were named in an Act of Parliament to be passed
next Session. This reply Mr Gladstone and Lord
Granville had Interpreted as a refusal of their offer,
and in this view they were, no doubt, justified,
though the answer left it open to them to resume
negotiations. No reference to this affair had been made in
the Debate in the House of Lords, and the Con
servative Leaders complained bitterly that Mr

FUTILE NEGOTIATIONS 193
Gladstone had made a public disclosure of what
they had understood to be confidential communi
cations. Lord Cairns protested that he would
" sooner have cut off his hand " than speak of them
without permission, and Lord Salisbury said that
the fight was being conducted with "poisoned
weapons." Moreover, It was an "utter fabrica
tion " to say that he had used such language as
Mr Gladstone had put into his mouth, and in this
repudiation he was borne out by the recollection
of Lord Cairns. It must be confessed, however,
that the picturesque phrase accurately represented
the position which on more than one or two occa
sions he had taken up and defended.
The personal issue was not very import
ant. The significant point was that not only
had Mr Gladstone been anxious to arrange a
peaceful compromise with the Conservatives, but
also wished It to be known that such had been
his disposition. At the risk of giving offence to
the Radicals, who were clamouring to be led
against the Peers, he decided that the better
policy was to exhibit himself to the country as a
moderate-minded Statesman who, before all things,
desired to avoid Interference with our ancient insti
tutions. Nor was this attitude — which did, indeed,
correspond with his real feeling — altogether
unsuccessful. Believing that the Prime Minister's
overtures had been rejected without sufficient
reason, and not unwilling to undermine the
authority of Lord Salisbury in the Conservative
Party, Lord Wemyss arranged a small "cave"
in the Upper House, and proposed at a Party
Meeting, held on 15th July, that the Bill should
be reconsidered by the Peers In a special
Autumn Session. Lord Salisbury, of course,
fought against this compromise, and when Lord
N

194 THE FRANCHISE AGITATION, 1883-1885
Wemyss's Resolution was brought forward on the
17th, It was defeated by a large majority. This
was the end of Mr Gladstone's attempt to settle
the dispute by private or semi-private negotiations.
He stood aside, therefore, and let the Radicals
"go in."
On 2 ist July, a Grand Reform Demonstration
was held in London ; a large number of men,
estimated by different observers at any number
between 25,000 and 250,000 — sorne of them agri
cultural labourers brought up from the country-
assembled on the Thames embankment, and
marched along Parliament Street, Whitehall,
Charing Cross, Pall Mall, and Piccadilly, to Hyde
Park — hooting the Enemies of Liberty whom they
saw sniggering from the Club windows on the line
of route. Lord Salisbury was not the man to
spare his ridicule. Speaking at Sheffield next day,
he declared that the Lords had only done their
duty in preventing Ministers from manipulating
the Constituencies for their own advantage. The
existing House of Commons was the most servile
ever assembled at Westminster — servile to Mr
Gladstone, and servile to the Caucus. Ministers
dared not appeal to the country on their quarrel
with the Lords, because they would have to face a
reckoning for all their mismanagement of affairs
both at home and abroad — deluded hopes, broken
promises, unnecessary bloodshed, injury to national
power and prestige, a distracted Empire, and a
discontented Ireland. Now they were descending
to the streets and asking for processions. They
imagined that 30,000 Radicals going to amuse
themselves in London would be taken as the
opinion of the country. A Party might speak by
processions and demonstrations : a nation could
only speak at the polling booths. Any attempt

MR CHAMBERLAIN AND LORD SALISBURY 195
to substitute a counterfeit voice manufactured by
the Caucus would be indignantly repudiated when
the people had an opportunity of using their real
voice. Lord Salisbury's references to the Caucus were
meant and accepted as a direct challenge to Mr
Chamberlain, who was now the recognised Leader
of the agitation, the fighting General, more or less
under the orders of the Prime Minister. He was
the Osman DIgna, it was said, to Mr Gladstone's
Mahdi. He lost no time in making his reply to
Lord Salisbury's attack. At the Devonshire Club,
on the following evening, he delivered one of his
most characteristic speeches : —
"Lord Salisbury," he said, "devoted himself
last night to explaining his contempt for the great
demonstration which filed past these windows last
Monday — the most remarkable demonstration, I
believe, which has been known in the history of
Europe. What is his complaint of it ? He says
it was so orderly, so good-tempered, so good-
humoured. Does he wish that future demon
strations should be otherwise ? I wish, when he
next speaks, that he would be a little more explicit,
and tell us what kind and what amount of violent
pressure he requires, and what is the nature of
the demonstration that will convince him of the
unwisdom of further resistance. Speaking as he
did at a great Party Meeting at Sheffield, limited
by ticketed invitations, as all such Meetings are,
he thought fit to denounce the opinion of the
streets, and to declare that it was manufactured
by the Caucus. I expect Lord Salisbury would
be very glad to know the secret of the manu
facture. Lord Salisbury denouncing the Caucus
— Lord Salisbury, who is the chief and patron of
the Conservative organisation of whose Internal

196 THE FRANCHISE AGITATION, 1883-1885
proceedings we have had so much information
lately, owing to Party dissensions — Lord Salisbury
denouncing the machinery by which he does not
scruple to profit — that is a spectacle more edifying
than anything since Satan was seen denouncing
sin. " You have all seen, no doubt, the amusing
Circular which proceeded a few days ago from the
Central Conservative Association, over which I
believe Lord Salisbury presides, and In connection
with which, at all events, he Is a leading spirit.
In this Circular the secretary of the Centra*! Con
servative Association urges all local Centres and
local Clubs not to hold public meetings — he is too
wise for that — but to meet in cam,erd, and to pass
one or other of a batch of Resolutions which this
universal provider of machine-made agitation and
opinion offers to their choice. His stock is of the
most varied character, to suit all tastes and circum
stances, and adequate for every contingency. He
has Resolutions which express cordial appreciation
of the extension of the Franchise, and others which
avoid all mention of that delicate subject. He has
Resolutions emphatically approving the patriotic
action of the House of Lords, and other Resolu
tions indignantly condemning the perfidy and
misgovernment of Her Majesty's Government.
All this cordiality and emphasis of indignation is
sent out wholesale from the stores at St Stephen's
Chambers, to be returned by the halfpenny post
as the free expression of an uncontrollable mani
festation of popular emotion.
" I want to call your attention to the fact, that
not only has the Franchise Bill been rejected, but
Lord Salisbury, who is the author of that great
blow to popular representation, adds Insult to
injury. He insults our Intelligence by asking us

THE DEMAND FOR DISSOLUTION 197
to beheve that his action is really dictated by his
friendship to the principle of the Measure. We
are asked seriously to accept from him the assur
ance that this chastening process to which we
have to submit Is really the result of an unalloyed
love which the Tories have for popular representa
tion, and that If the Bill has been stifled in the
House of Lords, this has been due to the embraces
of its too ardent admirers.
" Well, gentlemen, there Is another argument
which, to my mind. Is conclusive against our
acceptance of Lord Salisbury's protestations of
his desire for the extension of the Franchise. He
says that he Insists upon an appeal to the country.
What country does he want to appeal to? If he
trusts the people, and, above all. If he trusts those
two millions of capable citizens who are now wait
ing for their enfranchisement, why does he seek to
exclude them from the appeal which he wishes ?
Their capacity is no longer in question. All
Parties acknowledge that they are entitled to their
political rights. Why, then, should they not be
allowed to take their proper place in the tribunal
to which in the last resort an appeal is to be made ?
Lord Salisbury desires, for reasons which every
one can understand, to appeal to a limited elector
ate. He wants to appeal to the three millions who
have the vote against the two millions who have It
not — to the twelve-pounder in the counties against
their less fortunate fellow-citizens — to the farmers
against the labourers, to the residents in the villas
against the population who dwell In the suburbs.
He wants the three millions of the present voters to
be allowed to decide In what way, and to what ex
tent, and under what conditions, the new voters shall
come into their Constitutional rights. 'Oh, but,'

198 THE FRANCHISE AGITATION, 1883-1885
he says, ' I do not object to the Franchise ; I only
object to the Franchise without Redistribution.'
Well, he suspects us, it appears, of a desire so to
manipulate the Constituencies as to gain a great
Party advantage. I dare say his own experience
suggests a foundation for such a suspicion. I do
not complain of it ; I heartily reciprocate it. I
think we have better reason for suspecting the
Party which gave us the sham and fraudulent
Redistribution of 1867 than the country has for
suspecting the Party which gave the great and
generous Measure of 1832.
" But assume for a moment that he is
right — assume that the Government is animated
by the motives which he does not hesitate
to ascribe to us — even then, I ask, why does
he fear to allow those two millions of capable
citizens to have a voice in the settlement of
this question ? But no ; he shows his trust in
the People by refusing to allow them any voice
whatever In a matter which is of the greatest con
cern to them. He will not trust them with the
Vote unless he can be assured beforehand that
they will only exercise it under conditions which
will leave unweakened the existing sources of
authority and power. He will delay this great
boon, if he is allowed to do so, until he can nullify
its advantage and minimise Its value. I do not
think it is necessary to press the argument any
further. One great advantage from this agita
tion upon which we are entering is that we shall
educate the new voters before they are called upon
to exercise their poHtical rights. They will learn
to distinguish their friends from their foes. They
will not be slow to see the difference between Tory
professions and Liberal performances."
Not for many years had platform oratory been

• A PICTURESQUE INSTITUTION" 199
so copious and truculent as it was in the early
autumn of 1884. If Lord Salisbury was the
most exasperating speaker on his own side, Mr
Chamberlain on the other was most menacing
In tone. One of his best-known utterances
was delivered at Denbigh on 20th October. It
was not merely an indictment of the Peers : it
was also Interpreted as an attack on Landed
Property, and it contained the often-quoted and
frequently misquoted " Doctrine of Ransom " :- —
"Are the Lords to dictate to us, the People of
England ? Are the Lords to dictate to us the
laws which we shall make and the way in which
we shall bring them in ? Are you going to be
governed by yourselves ? Or will you submit to
an Oligarchy which is a mere accident of birth ?
Your ancestors resisted Kings and abated the
pride of Monarchs, and It is inconceivable that
you should be so careless of your great heritage
as to submit your liberties to this miserable minor
ity of individuals who rest their claims upon
privilege and upon accident. I saw the other day
that Sir Stafford Northcote, when speaking In the
North, said that I never spoke about the House of
Lords without showing that I was animated by
spite against that Assembly. I must say I think
that a very unnecessary observation, and if I had
not great respect for Sir Stafford Northcote I
should say it was a very silly one. Why should
I have any spite against the House of Lords ?
I have always thought that it was a very pictur
esque institution, attractive from its connection
with the history of our country. I have no desire
to see dull uniformity in social life ; and I am rather
thankful than otherwise to gentlemen who will fake
the trouble of wearing robes and coronets, and
who will keep up a certain state and splendour

200 THE FRANCHISE AGITATION, 1883-1885
which is very pleasing to look upon. They are
ancient monuments, and I, for one, should be
very sorry to deface them ; but, gentlemen, I do
not admit that we can build upon these interesting
ruins the foundations of our Government. I can
not allow that these antiquities should control the
destinies of a free Empire ; and when they press
their claims without discretion and without moder
ation, when they press them to an extreme which
their predecessors never contemplated, I say they
provoke Inquiry and controversy which cannot but
end in their humiliation. I have read somewhere
the saying of a certain Rumbold, who was a
Puritan soldier In the time of the Stuarts, to the
effect that he would believe in hereditary legislators
when he found that men were born into the world,
some of them with saddles on their backs, and
others with bits and spurs ready to ride them.
That Is a condition which has not yet been ful
filled, and I do not think that the men who desire
to preserve the authority of the Peers are wise if
they push that authority so far as to set people
thinking what grounds we have for giving them
any authority at all, and how they have used the
authority they at present possess.
" Now, the American Senate does not rest upon
hereditary privileges. It is an elected assembly
and, therefore, it is evident that Lord Salisbury
In his secret heart — for I cannot help thinking this
expression dropped out from him unawares — is
willing at once to abandon hereditary rights as a
condition for the formation of a Second Chamber.
Then, gentlemen, he and I are at one. The Tory
Peer and the Radical Commoner are agreed,
although I think we should differ seriously when
we came to consider what substitute should be

THE RECORD OF THK PEERS 201
found for an Assembly which Lord Salisbury is
willing to abolish. But it follows from this, that
If Lord Salisbury Is leading the Peers to their
ruin he Is doing it with his eyes open. He is, I
suppose, so powerful a man that he feels ashamed
to rest his claims to public influence upon Inherited
accident. I admire that tone of mind. I am
glad to see that if he be pulling the House of
Lords about his ears he has no regard of the
consequences. I wonder what his fellow Peers
think of this. They are not all of them so well
able to take care of themselves as Lord Salisbury
is. And I wonder whether they will find compen
sation for their extinction in the fact that their
Leader will appear In the disguise of an American
Senator. I hear a gentleman say, ' That Is their
affair, not ours.' Our business, gentlemen, is, in
view of the pretensions which have been put
forward in their name, to examine how they have
fulfilled the trust which has been reposed in them
up to the present time.
" I have asked again and again In the
course of this controversy, and I have never
been able to get an answer, what single contri
bution the Peers have made to the national pro
gress and liberty. The only reply I have had
was from an Irish Peer, and he referred me
to Magna Charta. That Is a long way back
to go for a character. I think we may call
for some later testimonials. We, however,
call in vain. The chronicles of the House of
Lords are one long record of concessions delayed
until they have lost their grace, of rights denied
until extorted from their fears. It has been a
history of one long contest between the repre
sentatives of Privilege and the representatives of
Popular Rights, and during this time the Lords

202 THE FRANCHISE AGITATION, 1883-1885
have perverted, delayed, and denied justice until
at last they gave grudgingly and churlishly what
they could no longer withhold. In the meantime
what mischief has been wrought, what evils have
been developed that might have been stayed In
their inceptions, what wrongs have been Inflicted
and endured that ought long ago to have been
remedied ! We are told that the object of the
Second Chamber is to stay the gusts of popular
agitation and to give the nation time for reflection.
I defy any student of history to point to one single
case In which the House of Lords has ever stayed
the gust of pubhc passion, or checked a foolish
popular impulse. They have given us time for
reflection often enough, and the only result of
that reflection has been to excite feelings of regret
and Indignation at the waste of time, and at the
obstacles which have been unnecessarily inter
posed between the nation and some great and
useful public reform.
" Now, gentlemen, I turn to the last point upon
which I propose to address you. What is to be
the nature ofthe domestic legislation ofthe future ?
I cannot help thinking that it will be more directed
to what are called social subjects than has hitherto
been the case. How to promote the greater
happiness of the masses of the people, how to
increase their enjoyment of life, that is the pro
blem of the future ; and just as there are politicians
who would occupy all the world and leave nothing
for the ambition of anybody else, so we have their
counterpart at home in the men who, having
already annexed everything that is worth having,
expect everybody else to be content with the
crumbs that fall from their table. If you will go
back to the early history of our social system you

THE DOCTRINF. OF RANSOM 2():',
will find that when our social arrangements first
began to shape themselves, every man was born
into the world with Natural Rights, with a right
to a share in the great inheritance of the com
munity, with a right to a part of the land of his
birth. But all those rights have passed away.
The common rights of ownership have disappeared.
Some of them have been sold ; some of them have
been given away by people who had no right to
dispose of them ; some of them have been lost
through apathy and ignorance ; some have been
destroyed by fraud ; and some have been acquired
by violence. Private ownership has taken the
place of these communal rights, and this system
has become so Interwoven with our habits and
usages. It has been so sanctioned by Law and
protected by custom, that it might be very difficult
and perhaps Impossible to reverse it. But then,
I ask, what ransom will Property pay for the
security which It enjoys ? What substitute will
it find for the Natural Rights which have ceased
to be recognised ? Society Is banded together in
order to protect itself against the Instincts of
those of its members who would make very short
work of private ownership if they were left alone.
That is all very well, but I maintain that society
owes to these men something more than mere
toleration in return for the restrictions which It
places upon their liberty of action,
" There is a doctrine in m.any men's mouths,
and in few men's practice, that Property has
obligations as well as rights, I think in the
future we shall hear a great deal more about the
obligations of Property, and we shall not hear
quite so much about its rights,"
These and similar phrases which Mr Chamber
lain threw off — sometimes In the heat of contro-

204 THE FRANCHISE AGITATION, 1883-1885
versy, but more often as the expression of
deliberate opinions — were greeted with delight
by the Conservatives, who pointed to them as
the reductio ad absurdum of Radical principles.
Moreover, they awakened a corresponding dis
quietude among Moderate Liberals, who did
not care to be associated with such theories
as those which Mr Chamberlain was promulgat
ing. Nor did they see that any progress was
being made in bringing the House of Lords
to a more accommodating temper. The Prime
Minister himself, who leaned towards compro
mise if he could but escape confession of defeat,
was coming round to their way of thinking.
It was, no doubt, with his authority that
Lord Hartington, speaking at Rawtenstall on
4th October, had thrown out the first hint of
an altered pohcy. It was, he said, "not
impossible" that the Franchise Bill should be
associated with a Redistribution Bill if the
Peers— on seeing the draft of the latter Measure
and being satisfied that it was reasonable — would
reconsider the former. It was in accordance with
Party etiquette that Lord Hartington should add
that his suggestion was "quite unofficial," though
he thought that In his opinion it contained "some
of the elements of a compromise."
But this was not compromise. It was sur
render. What Lord Hartington was now offering
was exactly what Lord Salisbury had demanded —
exactly what the Radicals had declared should
never be conceded. They had been agitating
up and down the country against making any
terms with the Conservatives, and declaring that,
rather than give way, they would destroy the
House of Lords — either mend it or end it. But,
humiliating as the position was, there seemed to

HINTS OF COMPROMISE 205
be no way out of it. Unless something quite
unforeseen were to occur, there was nothing to be
done but to disguise, so far as possible, the com
pleteness of the defeat — to raise a cloud of dust,
and retire with all convenient despatch. It was
not very glorious strategy, but, to all appearance,
there was no alternative, Mr Chamberlain,
therefore, speaking at Hanley on 7th October,
protested that it was impossible to yield to
" Lord Salisbury's arrogant proposals " — so long
as he maintained his present attitude. It was
Impossible to have any transactions with a States
man whose attitude was so overbearing. But
there were moderate men among the Tories who
would follow him no longer If they were satisfied
that the Redistribution Bill to be proposed by the
Government was an equitable scheme. Every
attention should be paid to such men : they would
be given every information and assurance which
they could fairly require. Ministers, however,
must not jeopardise the Franchise Bill. " The
prime condition must be — the Franchise Bill shall
be passed. We cannot play with the rights of
two millions of people. We cannot tamper with
the hopes that have been excited. It Is said that
the Lords will not give way. Then, I say, neither
will the People submit."
As a matter of fact, the concession which was
to be made to the " moderate Tories " could not be
made without also making it to Lord Salisbury,
and the favour to be accorded to them was the
very limit of his demands. Nor was it likely that
the Lords would refuse to "give way " — they were
to get their own way ! Of this nobody was more
painfully aware than Mr Chamberlain himself Yet
it was only natural that, as "a first-class fighting
man " — who detested the surrender that seemed

206 THE FRANCHISE AGITATION, 1883-1885
inevitable — he should try to veil the real nature
of the intended operation. The speech was an
ingenious display of rhetoric. Probably it satisfied
himself no more than It comforted his followers.
Just when It seemed that the Radicals would
have to confess defeat, they were enabled, by a
curious and unexplained accident, to escape
from an open discomfiture. The Bill never
was communicated either to Lord Salisbury
or to the Moderate Tories. It was published
to the whole country. On the very morning
after Mr Chamberlain's defiant declaration. The
Standard printed the full text of the Govern
ment measure. Technically, it was not the Bill :
it was only the draft which had been framed by
the small Committee ¦ — Lord Hartington, Sir
Charles Dilke, and Mr Shaw Lefevre — to whom
the Cabinet had entrusted the task. That the
document was absolutely authentic was at once
made plain by the guarded terms of the official
disclaimer. It was, in fact, the text of the scheme
which the Government intended to propose to
Parliament, though it had not yet received the
formal and collective approval of the Cabinet.
Everybody was satisfied. Lord Salisbury and
the Conservatives had obtained all they desired,
and they had obtained it without the Liberals
having been obliged to concede it formally. How
the Information came to light was a question that
excited much curious speculation, but both Parties
were rejoiced that the crisis had been amicably
disposed of.
The new controversy which arose on the merits
of the Bill Itself, sharp as It became, was com
paratively unembarrassing. 1 1 merged seventy-two
small Boroughs into County Divisions ; reduced
Boroughs below 40,000 population from double

THE CRISIS EVADED 207
to single representation ; gave 54 new members
to the Counties, and 47 to various large towns.
Including 25 to London ; extinguished the three-
cornered Constituencies except the City of London,
and broke up some of the great Constituencies
Into several Divisions.
Lord Salisbury said that the scheme aimed
at reducing the power of rural districts, which
already were insufficiently represented, and
renewed his declaration that the Lords would
not pass the Franchise Bill unless the Re
distribution Bill were largely amended. This,
of course, was the signal for renewed strife, the
principal speakers being Sir William Harcourt,
Mr Chamberlain, and Sir Charles Dilke, on one
side, against Sir Stafford Northcote and Lord
Randolph Churchill on the other. Lord Salisbury
remarked that Ministers asked for a blank cheque,
and in return offered an unsigned one. Lord
Hartington replied that the Opposition refused to
pass an equitable Franchise Bill unless they could
get a Redistribution Bill that would suit their
convenience. But, In spite of these and similar
polemical exercises, it was clear, when Parliament
met on 23rd October, that the fighting was
practically over. Mr Arthur Balfour had been
commissioned to arrange terms with Lord Hart
ington, and the Government agreed to take the
Opposition Into consultation with them on the
Redistribution Bill. Upon this understanding.
Lord Salisbury promised to support the Franchise
Bill In the House of Lords.
The independent Radicals did not disguise
their chagrin at the arrangement which had been
concluded. Mr Labouchere, In the House of
Commons, taunted the Prime Minister with
having submitted to the dictates of the Peers,

208 THE FRANCHISE AGITATION, 1883-1885
and moved a Resolution which aimed at read
justing the relations between the two Houses
of Pariiament. In effect and intention, though
not in form, this was a censure on the Govern
ment, and it was remarked that Mr Chamber
lain and Sir Charles Dilke, though Members
of the Cabinet, walked out of the House
Instead of voting with their colleagues.
The victory of Lord Salisbury had, indeed, been
almost unqualified. It is true that he had given
up his original demand that the two Bills should be
proceeded ^\^ pari passu, but, on the other hand,
he had contrived — what Ministers had opposed
with equal obstinacy — that the one Measure should
not be passed until a definite undertaking had
been given as to the other. Speaking on the
subject in Essex on 19th November, he admitted
that the Conservatives had to rely on the good
faith of the Government, but on this point they
felt no misgivings — they were dealing with English
gentlemen who were quite incapable of paltering
with their pledged word. On ist December the
Redistribution Bill, which had been settled between
delegates of the two Front Benches, was intro
duced Into the House of Commons, and four days
later the Franchise Bill was read for the third
time by the Peers. For various reasons which
need not be recalled In this connection — the foreign
complications In which Ministers were involved,
and the factious quarrels that sprang up among
some of the Opposition Leaders — the progress
of the Redistribution Bill was delayed In the
House of Commons, and did not receive the
Royal Assent till 25th June 1885 — nearly a fort
night after the resignation of Mr Gladstone and
his colleagues.

CHAPTER VII
THE RADICAL POLICY
In order to understand the anomalous position
which the Liberal Unionists came to occupy
between 1886 and 1892 — supporters of Lord
Salisbury but not represented In his Administra
tion — it is necessary to explain at some length
the course followed by Mr Chamberlain in
1884 and 1885. At the very time when
he was, unconsciously, making progress towards
an offensive and defensive alliance with the
Conservative Party, he was most actively en
gaged in denouncing their principles and derid
ing their traditions. When the speeches have
been examined which he delivered in this period, the
wonder will be, not that it was impossible for him
to become a member of a Coalition Government,
but that he was able to arrange and observe a
practicable modus Vivendi. Never was he more
enthusiastic, or more aggressive, in his Radicalism
than within a few months of the time when he was
to part company with most of his old associates.
No excuse is required for the copious quotations
that will be made In this chapter. Mr Chamber
lain's speeches are always "good reading" —
especially for those who are able for the time to lay
aside their political prepossessions. Those which
he made while Mr Gladstone's Second Administra-

210 THE RADICAL POLICY
tion was tottering towards its final collapse, and
during the brief and precarious rule of Lord Salis
bury's first Cabinet, were almost as much dreaded
by Liberals as they were denounced by Conserva
tives. But they were universally read, they were
written about and talked about, and, if they raised
him to what many regarded as a "bad eminence,"
they gave him an assured place in public life.
Henceforth Mr Chamberlain might be reprobated,
but he could no longer be ignored — even by the
most autocratic of Party Leaders. It would be
untrue to say that he filled the same place in the
popular mind as Mr Gladstone — who, for good or
evil, stood quite apart from the other politicians of
the day—but on the Liberal side there was no
man who attracted the same attention as Mr
Chamberlain. Lord Hartington, Mr Goschen,
and the rest derived no little of their Importance
from the belief that they might save the country
and the Party from the Radical excesses threatened
by the member for Birmingham ; they were com
mended and supported, not because they lent
active force to the Liberal movement, but because
it was hoped that they might act as a drag on
the collective pace. It was Mr Chamberlain whom
Lord Salisbury, in the vigorous campaign on which
he now entered, singled out for attack. The
struggle of Parties outside Parliament became
something like a duel between these two equally
incisive, and, in their different ways, equally effec
tive antagonists : the controversy at one point
became so acute that, although both evidently
enjoyed the fray, it was almost impossible that
their political hostility should not be sharpened by
some personal feeling.
The right to lay down a Programme for the
Liberal Party was ostentatiously disclaimed by

"THE UNAUTHORISED PROGRAMME ' 211
Mr Chamberlain — at Ipswich, for Instance, on
14th January 1885. But, though still a member
of Mr Gladstone's Government, he was entitled, he
thought, to define the terms on which he would con
tinue to co-operate with the Party. There were
certain social reforms which must not be excluded
from consideration. He did not demand that any
or all should be immediately adopted, but he did
stipulate that no adverse decision should be
dehvered. This was the origin and explanation
of what came to be known, later in the year, as
the " Unauthorised Programme." It included
Free Education, Graduated Taxation, the estab
lishment of Local Self-Government In the Counties,
and the extension of facilities for acquiring Allot
ments and Small Holdings. He would not act.
It was implied, with colleagues who refused to
accept, at least, the principle of these Measures.
Either the Whigs must advance to this point, or
the Radicals would break away from them.
But the four demands of the Unauthorised Pro
gramme did not exhaust Mr Chamberlain's aspira
tions. So far as these have ever been defined, they
will be found in "The Radical Programme" — a
collection of unsigned articles which were collected
and republished with a Preface by Mr Chamber
lain. They included Manhood Suffrage ; Equal
Electoral Districts ; the Payment of Members of
Parliament ; the Disestablishment and Disendow-
ment of the Church of England on terms less
indulgent than had been conceded to the Church
of Ireland ; the creation of National Councils,
though not separate Parliaments, for Scotland.
Ireland, and Wales, for the management of Internal
affairs ; the Progressive Taxation both of incomes
and of realised property ; sweeping reforms in Land
Tenure ; the " Restoration " of illegally enclosed

212 THE RADICAL POLICY
lands to the community ; the Improvement of
Labourers' Cottages, Reconstruction of Insanitary
Areas, and the Compulsory Purchase of Land for
Cottages, and Free Education. It should be
stated that the articles were not from Mr Chamber-
Iain's pen, but, on the whole, they represented
his opinions, and he welcomed their appearance.
While he expressly abstained from pledging him
self to all the proposals contained In the book, he
commended them to the "careful and impartial
judgment " of his fellow Radicals — whom he
described as " the most numerous section of the
Liberal Party outside the House of Commons,"
and whom he expected to become "a powerful
factor inside the walls of the popular Chamber."
Nor was this compilation of "a definite and
practical Programme for the Radical Party "
intended to be a mere demonstration. " The
stage of agitation has passed," he declared, "and
the time for action has come." New conceptions
of public duty, new developments of social enter
prise, new estimates of the natural obligations of
the members of the community to one another,
had come into view and demanded consideration.
In short, "The Radical Programme" was
intended to be a direct Manifesto against the
Old Whigs and Moderate Liberals, who still
exercised, Mr Chamberlain thought, an excessive
influence on the councils of the Party. He had
waited to issue it (July 1885) till he was released
from Ministerial reticence by the defeat and resig
nation of the Gladstone Government, and had thus
acquired a position of greater freedom and less
responsibility. If he stood on official etiquette with regard to
" The Radical Programme," he had observed no
such punctilio with regard to the Unauthorised

FREE EDUCATION 213
Programme. Early In the year (14th January)
he had made a definite demand for Free Educa
tion : —
" I think that we shall have to give a good deal
more attention to what is called social legislation.
We have a good deal to guide us, and much
experience in that direction. Social legislation Is
not new. The Poor Law, for instance, is social
legislation. It recognises that right to live which
The Times now denies, and in itself is an
endeavour on the part of a community to save
themselves from the shame and the disgrace of
allowing any of Its members to starve. There
are many people who propose to carry It further.
We shall hear in these times of depression, I
imagine, a good deal about State-aided emigra
tion. For my own part, I do not look on this
proposal with much favour. I hope it may be
possible to find work and employment for our
artisans at home without expatriating them
against their will. The Education Act is a
second Instance of social legislation, and one of
the most beneficent and useful. It Is an endeavour
to put in the hands of all an instrument whereby
alone advance in life has become possible. But
we have not gone far enough. We have made
education compulsory, but we have omitted to
make it free. And I hope that this great and
necessary change will be one of the first matters
to which reformers will direct their attention.
On what ground do we now levy a fee ? Educa
tion is given, because it is of advantage to the
child, and because It Is of advantage to the com
munity, and the community ought to pay for it,
and not the individual. We force a parent to
give up the labour of his child at a time, perhaps,
when it is almost necessary to the subsistence of

214 THE RADICAL POLICY
the family. We ought not to go further and
impose upon him a tax which Is unfair, a tax pro
portioned not according to the a.bility of the
parent to pay, but according to his necessities
and wants. I cannot doubt that the example in
this respect which has been set in the United
States, In France, and almost throughout the
Continent, will soon be imitated in our own
country also."
More pointed and provocative was his refer
ence to the newly enfranchised voters. Hitherto,
he said, the great towns had exercised the chief
influence on legislation. Now, the agricultural
labourer had appeared on the political scene.
What course he would follow, Mr Chamberlain
refused to prophesy :• —
" The labourer is a sealed book even to those
who live in his midst, but it does not appear to
me that his lot is so happy that he is likely to be
contented with it without trying for some improve
ment. The agricultural labourer Is the most
pathetic figure In our whole social system. He is
condemned by apparently inexorable conditions to
a life of unremitting and hopeless toil, with the
prospect of the Poor House as Its only or probable
termination. For generations he has been
oppressed, ignored, defrauded, and now he will
have to be reckoned with. The inarticulate voice
will find expression, and we shall learn from his
own lips, or from those of his representatives,
what are his wants, and how he thinks to supply
them. I have read somewhere of an incident on
board a great passenger steamer. When the
vessel was a few days out a man came to the
captain and said, ' Captain, I want a berth.'
'Why,' said the captain, 'want a berth now?
Where have you been all this time?' 'Oh,'

AGRARIAN REFORM 215
said the man, ' I have been lying on a sick man,
but he will not stand it any longer. He Is
getting well, and I have got to find another
place.' The squire and the farmer, and some
times the parson, have all been lying on the
agricultural labourer ; but he is getting well, and
they will have to find some new position."
Some of the Conservatives had a remedy for
Agricultural Depression — Mr James Lowther and
his friends thought they could put everything
right by a five-shilling Duty on Corn — though
it might occasionally be raised to ten shillings, and
even sometimes to fifteen ! Protection was. In fact,
one of those quack medicines the failure of which
was always attributed to the insufficiency of the
dose. No, the farmers would not follow that will-
o'-the-wisp. The time would come when they
would demand — as the Scotch crofters had already
demanded — the application to England and Scot
land of the principles of the Irish Land Act.
" I fconfess that for myself I do not regard that
prospect with alarm. I am not afraid of the three
' F.'s ' in England, Scotland, or Ireland. But
the main obstacle seems to me to be in the
farmers themselves. It consists. In the first place,
in the way in which they play into the hands of
their landlords and give them their support In
propositions which would not be of the slightest
advantage to the farmers themselves ; and. In
the second place, It is owing to the condition of
existing tenancies. Most of our English farmers
hold rather large farms. They have not sufficient
capital, and they are dependent upon their land
lords, sometimes as poor as themselves, for any
improvements which it may be necessary to effect.
As long as that is the case, fixity of tenure would
not be of the slightest use to the farmer, who

216 THE RADICAL POLICY
would find himself unable to fulfil the obligations
which Independence of his landlord would entail."
After referring (at Birmingham, 29th January)
to the example of Lord ToUemache, who had
divided an estate into a number of small farms
with appropriate buildings and residences, and
had found the experiment prove remunerative, he
dealt with the objection that all landlords might
not have the necessary capital for establishing
such a system. " Well, then," he replied, " they
must give place to those who have. That is why
I have been anxious to call In the Local Authorities
in every district, and to give them authority to
take land at Its fair value, and to incur expendi
ture in the pursuit of this enterprise. I do not
think the Local Authorities would go too fast in
the matter, and I do not think they would be
likely to VIsk any considerable expenditure ; but
I believe that experiments would be made in many
districts and under very many conditions, and that,
at all events, the best of the labourers, the most
active and the most energetic of the labourers,
would find that natural craving which is implanted
in all who have been connected with the land —
that natural longing — gratified ; and if the experi
ment were successful, it could easily have a larger
development. In any case, I say that some ex
periment of this kind is a duty which the State
owes to those who have been ousted by the action
of the State or of individuals from their ancient
right, and degraded to a condition which is so
miserable that they fly from it on the first oppor
tunity. I do not think that the landlords would
themselves be losers by these experiments. Their
chief interest in the matter is in connection with
the value that would be paid for their property.
I have said a fair value, and I admit that I do

NATURAL RIGHTS 217
not think they have any right to e.xpect to obtain
for their land, either on sale or as rent, the extra
vagant sums that prevailed ten or fifteen years
ago. But if they are unable to develop their
property to the best advantage. If they cannot
perform the obligations which attach to it, then
I say they must be taught that their ownership
is a trust which is limited by the supreme neces
sities of the nation, and they must give place to
others who will do full justice to the capabilities
of the land."
These principles — which, in a modified shape,
have since been adopted by Conservative legis
lators, though without conspicuous success in
the direction contemplated by Mr Chamberlain
— were considered in 1885 something more than
advanced. If they were associated with Ideas of
confiscation, the fault lay with Mr Chamberlain.
How could he expect that moderate men, whether
Conservatives or Liberals, would give a patient
hearing even to his more practicable proposals,
when they were connected with the assertion of his
" Doctrine of Ransom "¦ — a theory which he derived
from the " Natural Rights of Man " — a fallacy
derived from a fiction ? Jack Cade had come
back to life, cried the scandalised Tories ! Tom
Paine was preaching again !
"When our social arrangements first began
to shape themselves," said Mr Chamberlain, with
the calm air of a lecturer instructing his class in
the rudiments of knowledge, "every man was
born into the world with natural rights — with a
right to share In the great inheritance of the com
munity, with a right to a part of the land of
his birth." For these utterances he was mis
represented, he said, by The Times, denounced
by Lord Salisbury, lectured by Mr Goschen,

218 THE RADICAL POLICY
scolded by the Duke of Argyll, and preached at
by The Spectator. One of Mr Goschen's phrases
— he had called the Radical Party the " Salvation
Army of Politics " — stuck for a time, and drew a
well-known retort : —
"To scent out difficulties in the way of every
reform—that is the congenial task of a man of
the world, who coldly recognises the evils from
which he does not suffer himself, and reserves his
chief enthusiasm for the critical examination of
every proposal for their redress, and for a scathing
denunciation of the poor enthusiast who will not
let well alone, and who cannot preserve the serene
equanimity of superior persons.
" ' Well ! well, it's a mercy we have men to tell us
The rights and the wrongs of these things, anyhow,
And that Providence sends us oracular fellows,
To sit on the fence and slang those at the plough.'
"Mr Goschen says that he has been told to
stand aside. I do not know by whom — not by
me. We cannot spare him. He performs in the
Liberal Party the useful part of the skeleton at
Egyptian feasts. He Is there to repress our
enthusiasm and to moderate our joy. But when
he adopts another metaphor, and says he will
swim against the stream, I admire his courage,
but I have no confidence in his success ; and I
say he may as well attempt to swim up the Falls
of Niagara as to stay the progress of the Demo
cratic movement which he has already vainly
resisted." The Moderate Liberals were the especial
object of Mr Chamberlain's political animosity.
These rather than the Conservatives he recog
nised as the enemy. Lord Hartington had de
hvered a formal attack on the Radical Programme.

ATTACKS ON THE WHIGS 219
" I know something of the Midland Counties
In my own district " (said Mr Chamberlain).
" There is not a single Liberal candidate who has
not accepted some one or more points of the
Radical Programme. It is, therefore, perfectly
futile and ridiculous for any political Rip Van
Winkle to come down from the mountain on which
he has been slumbering, and to tell us that these
things are to be excluded from the Liberal Pro
gramme. The world has moved on while these
dreamers have been sleeping, and it would be
absurd to ignore the growth of public opinion
and the change in the situation which the Reform
Acts have produced."
At the banquet of the Eighty Club (28th
April) he expressed unmeasured contempt for the
"candid friends" who, as educated and thinking
persons, reserved for themselves the duty of
criticising the work In which their culture and
refinement prevented them from taking part !
" To hear some people talk, one would suppose
that this is the best of all possible worlds, and
that the only thing for a Liberal to do is to
cultivate his own garden for himself I do not
think that the circumstances justify the optimism
of Candide." Political Economy, it was true, had
every reason to be satisfied with Itself The
aggregate wealth of the country had increased
beyond every possible expectation. Capital had
accumulated. Trade had advanced with giant
strides. " That is one side of the picture. But con
tinuously and concurrently with that there are
always one million, or very nearly a million, of
persons in receipt of Parish relief There are
more than one million others on the verge of
pauperism, who, in times of depression like these.

220 THE RADICAL POLICY
and at any moment of bad trade, are subject to
the most desperate privations. The whole class
of the agricultural labourers of this country is
never able to do more than make both ends meet,
and they have to look forward in the time of
illness or on the approach of old age to the work
house as the one inevitable refuge against starva
tion. Tens of thousands of households do not
know the luxury of milk. Children are stunted
in their growth and dulled In their Intellects for
want of proper nourishment and proper food, and
the houses of the poor are so scanty and insuffi
cient that grievous immorality prevails, which
seldom comes to the surface, but which is known
to all those who move among the poor. The
ordinary conditions of life among a large propor
tion of the population are such that common
decency is absolutely impossible ; and all this goes
on in sight of the mansions of the rich, where
undoubtedly there are people who would gladly
remedy it If they could. It goes on In presence
of wasteful extravagance and luxury, which bring
but little pleasure to those who indulge in them,
and private charity Is powerless, religious organi
sations can do nothing, to remedy the evils which
are so deep-seated in our social system."
If Mr Chamberlain was bitter in his references
to the Moderate Liberals, he was contemptuous
of the new Conservative Government — the " Stop
gap Ministry" of Lord Salisbury — who were
believed to be following, unwillingly enough, the
lead of Lord Randolph Churchill, and who
certainly were adopting and considering Measures
which it would be difficult to reconcile with the
principles they had previously professed.
" The consistency of our public life " (he said at
Hackney on 24th July), "the honour of political

THE TORY DEMOCRATS 221
controversy, the patriotism of Statesmen, which
should be set above all Party considerations — these
are things which in the last few weeks have been
profaned, desecrated, and trampled in the mire by
this crowd of hungry office-seekers who are now
doing Radical work in the uniform of Tory
Ministers. There is one man, at least, whom we
are bound to except from this general condemna
tion, and that is Lord Randolph Churchill. You
may approve, or you may disapprove, of his policy,
but you cannot deny that at least he has been
pretty consistent. He was a Tory-Democrat in
Opposition, and he is a Tory- Democrat in office ;
and, gentlemen, I will tell you that, while I see
' Democrat ' writ large in his policy, the Tory ap
pears to me to be in infinitesimal characters. Why,
this man is doing, in the heart of the Tory citadel,
with the rarest audacity and courage, the work we
have vainly attempted to do from outside. I admire
and I am amazed at his courage and at his success.
I am amazed, but I have no admiration at all when
I turn to his colleagues. Lord Salisbury, Lord Car
narvon, Sir M. Hicks-Beach, Sir Richard Cross,
Mr W. H. Smith, and all the rest of them, who
are being dragged at the tail of Lord Randolph
Churchill's policy. Meanwhile, the time-honoured
traditions and principles of the Tory Party are
trampled under foot and forgotten In the dust. I
will say frankly that I do not like to win with such
instruments as these. A Democratic Revolution is
not to be accomplished by Aristocratic perverts,
and I believe that what the People desire will be
best carried into effect by those who can do so con
scientiously and honestly, and not by those who
yield their assent from purely personal or Party
motives." Mr Chamberlain had gone so far — and the

222 THE RADICAL POLICY
meaning of his words, extensive as it was, had
been so stretched by angry commentators — that a
few days later, speaking at Hull, he thought it wise
to repeat a formal disclaimer which he had made
several times before. " I am not a Communist,"
he said, "though some people will have it that
I am. Considering the difference In the character
and the capacity of men, I do not believe that
there can ever be an absolute equality of conditions,
and I think that nothing would be more undesir
able than that we should remove the stimulus to
Industry and thrift and exertion which is afforded
by the security given to every man in the enjoy
ment of the fruits of his own individual exertions.
I am opposed to confiscation in every shape or
form, because I believe that it would destroy that
security, and lessen that stimulus. But, on the
other hand, I am In favour of accompanying the
protection which is afforded to Property with a
large and stringent Interpretation of the obliga
tions of Property."
How far he would go in Land Reform, he pro
ceeded to define. He advocated the registration
of titles, the abolition of settlements and entails,
and of the custom of primogeniture in cases of in
testacy. These made up what he called Free Trade
in Land, and would do something to bring estates
into the open market. But the farmer must also
be entitled to have a Fair Rent fixed by an im
partial tribunal, must be given Fixity of Tenure,
and the Free Sale of his goodwill — "just like any
other trader." If it was said that the English
farmers did not ask for such advantages nobody
would seek to impose on them benefits they did
not want. But the labourers did know what they
wished for. They required decent cottages and fair
Allotments on equitable terms. There was no

"THREE ACRES AND A COW" 22'.
reason why a landlord should not be forced to meet
these demands in the case of all the men required
for the cultivation of his estate. The supervision
of this duty should be left to the Local Authority,
which should be empowered, in case of need, to
acquire the land and let it out In Allotments and
Small Holdings.
Such was the outline of the pohcy that soon
became notorious under the name of " Three Acres
and a Cow." Other items of the Agrarian Scheme
were the expropriation of landlords who did not do
their duty by the land, and restoring it to " produc
tion " (this was especially aimed at the owners of
deer forests in the Scottish Highlands) ; unoccu
pied and sporting land should be " taxed at its full
value " ; finally, land which had been unjustly
enclosed and appropriated, and endowments
which had been diverted to Improper uses, should
be reclaimed for public purposes, and against this
demand of the State It should not be lawful to .set
up the plea of Prescription.
Into the Crofter agitation Mr Chamberlain
threw all his energy, speaking at Inverness on 15th
September. On this subject his language was even
less guarded and more liable to misconstruction
than while he was engaged in the task — which he
had recognised as practically hopeless — of whip
ping up the English farmers to a sense of
Injustice. " Let us look this fetish In the face," he
said; "let us examine these sacred Rights of
Property ; let us see on what they are founded ;
and let us see whether there ought not to be some
limitation to the exorbitant pretensions with which
they are accompanied. ... I have sometimes
speculated on what would have happened in this
country if it had been possible to establish private
property in air. I have no doubt that one of our

224 THE RADICAL POLICY
Kings would have conferred a monopoly upon his
favourites, and there would have been slaves willing
to admit this monstrous pretension, and to submit
their lives and the existence of their families to the
caprice of a few privileged individuals. Lawyers
would have lent their skill to weave a network and
to forge a chain for the human race, and there would
have been some pious and devout men who would
have brought the sanction of Religion in aid of these
monstrous pretensions. ... I think that the time
has arrived when it behoves us to see whether we
cannot prevent the abuse of Property, and whether
we cannot strictly define its Rights. I have said
before, and I say to-night, that I am averse to
all confiscation. I do not see why a sufficient
remedy should not be found without any proceed
ings which can fairly be described as dishonest ;
but when I speak of confiscation I do wish the
landlords would exercise a little reciprocity."
The extortion of exorbitant rents, taxing a
tenant for his own improvements, invasion of
public rights of way in the interest of sport —
these were acts of confiscation committed by
the landlords. Were the public also to be
robbed with Impunity ?
It did not trouble Mr Chamberlain that his
Programme shocked and alarmed the steady-
going politicians. He dehghted in the Indignation
he provoked !
" Lord Iddesleigh " (he said at the Victoria
Hall on 24th September) "is so good-tempered,
and he Is such a courteous opponent, that I take
In very good part the comparison he has en
deavoured to institute between myself and Mr
John Cade. Gentlemen, knowing as I do of
what Tory misrepresentation is capable, I am
inclined to think that Jack Cade was an ill-

CONTROVERSY WITH LORD SALISBURY 225
used and much misunderstood gentleman, who
happened to have a sympathy with the poor and
the oppressed, and who therefore was made the
mark for the malignant hatred of the Aristocratic
and land-owning classes, who combined to bur
lesque his opinions and to put him out of the way."
The altercations between Lord Salisbury and
Mr Chamberlain were frequent and spirited —
especially, as we have seen, on the Franchise
agitation. The only point on which they were In
agreement was mentioned by the member for
Birmingham in June 1883. Both were inclined to
think that social reform — though they meant very
different things by that conveniently vague phrase
— was more urgent than political legislation, and,
even at the most Radical period In his career,
Mr Chamberlain admitted that in some respects
the Conservatives had done more than the
Liberals for the material welfare of the working
classes, though their good intentions had been
frustrated by their fatal regard for the Rights of
Property. On every other question Mr Chamber
lain and Lord Salisbury were at direct Issue. Mr
Chamberlain, for Instance, had attacked the
Egyptian policy of Lord Salisbury, and remarked
that as Prime Minister he had carried out a
financial agreement which in Opposition he des
cribed as muddled and inadequate. Lord Salis
bury scornfully retorted that It was an agreement
to which England had set her hand, and she
could not tear it up because there had been a
change of Government. " I do not like to say,"
he went on, " what name would be applied to
such a proceeding in private life." No term of
contempt would be too strong for a man who
backed out of a bargain because he had changed
his agent. As for the doctrines of Ransom and

226 THE RADICAL POLICY
Restitution, Lord Salisbury said that they were
the unique possession of this country — they would
not be tolerated in any other civilised land ! They
were not even new — they were the common pro
perty of every barbarous and uncivilised Govern
ment !
It had always been understood — and Mr
Chamberlain had never denied- — -that he was in
general sympathy with the demand for Home
Rule. His Intimate personal relations with some
of the Nationalists In Parliament were somewhat
impaired when he took an active part In strength
ening the Rules of the House of Commons,
so as to control the Obstruction which they
had reduced to a system. On that point, and
probably on that alone, he was strongly against
them, but they were grateful to him for his
long fight In the Cabinet against Coercion,
for the part he had taken In obtaining the
release of Mr Parnell, and for his advocacy of
such measures as the Compensation for Disturb
ance and the Arrears Bills. Speaking at Swansea
on 1st February 1883 — when Lord Spencer and
Mr Trevelyan had been sent out specially to
uphold Law and Order — he expressed, as In
duty bound, his confidence In their firmness,
discretion, and impartiality. " But," he added,
"we must not deceive ourselves." Our task in
Ireland would never be completed until we had
"enlisted, on the side of the English Government
and People, the interest and Influence of the
bulk of the Irish nation." Read twenty years
after they were spoken, the words are almost an
empty platitude. In 1883 they amounted to a
defiance of public opinion and an imphed criticism
of the "strong" poli9y recently adopted by
Ministers.

ATTITUDE TOWARDS HOME RULE 227
The Obstruction in Parhament, from which he
had suffered as a Minister, was, he thought, an
argument In favour of Home Rule. This point
he brought out — a few days before the defeat of
Mr Gladstone's Government — In a speech delivered
to the Cobden Club : —
" We have to deal with the system under which
the greatest legislative assemblage in the world
has begun to lose Its usefulness, and In conse
quence lose Its influence. And that result can
never be accomplished so long as the Imperial
Parliament is burdened with an ever-increasing
amount of petty detail with which It is incompetent
to deal, and which ought to be referred to other
bodies. We have also to recognise and to satisfy
the national sentiment, which is In itself a praise
worthy and a patriotic and an inspiring feeling,
and which both in Scotland and Ireland has led
to a demand for a local control of purely domestic
affairs. And these objects can only be secured,
I believe, by some great measure of Devolution,
by which the Imperial Parliament shall maintain Its
supremacy, but shall nevertheless relegate to sub
ordinate authorities the control and administra
tion of their local business. I believe, gentlemen,
that in this way only is there any chance of our
being able to remove the deeply-rooted discontent
which follows as a natural consequence from the
attempt of one nation to control and interfere with
the domestic and the social economy of another,
whose genius it does not understand, whose pres
sing necessities It Is not in a position to appreciate,
whose business it has not time to attend to, and
whose prejudices and whose preferences it is
impossible, even with the very best Intentions, to
avoid sometimes Ignoring or offending. I look
forward with confidence to the opportunity which

228 THE RADICAL POLICY
will be afforded in the new Parliament for the
consideration of this most momentous question,
and I believe that in the successful accomplish
ment of its solution lies the only hope of the
pacification of Ireland and of the maintenance of
the strength and integrity of the Empire, which
are in danger, which are gravely compromised, so
long as an integral portion of Her Majesty's
dominions can only be governed by exceptional
legislation, and so long as it in consequence con
tinues to be discontented and estranged."
About a fortnight later he declared at Hollo-
way that the existing system of administering
Irish affairs could not be long continued : —
"The pacification of Ireland at this moment
depends, I believe, on the concession to Ireland
of the right to govern itself in the matter of its
purely domestic business. What is the alter
native ? Are you content, after nearly eighty
years of failure, to renew once more the dreary
experience of repressive legislation ? It is not
discreditable to us that even now it is only by
unconstitutional means that we are able to secure
peace and order in one portion of Her Majesty's
dominions ? I do not believe that the great
majority of Englishmen have the slightest con
ception of the system under which this free nation
attempts to rule the sister country. It Is a
system which is founded on the bayonets of
30,000 soldiers encamped permanently as in a
hostile country. It is a system as completely
centralised and bureaucratic as that with which
Russia governs Poland, or as that which prevailed
in Venice under the Austrian rule. An Irishman
at this moment cannot move a step — he cannot
lift a finger In any parochial, municipal, or educa
tional work, without being confronted with, inter-

A SCHEME OF NATIONAL COUNCILS 229
fered with, controlled, by an English official,
appointed by a foreign Government, and without
a shade or shadow of representative authority.
" I say the time has come to reform altogether
the absurd and Irritating anachronism which is
known as Dublin Castle. That is the work to
which the new Parliament will be called, and I
believe that by its successful accomplishment It
will do more to secure the strength, the character,
and the influence ofthe nation, than by the addition
of any amount, however large, to the expenditure
of the nation for Naval or Military purposes — that
It will go further to maintain our weight In the
Councils of Europe than any amount of bluster
In our relations with foreign countries, and that
it will do more to promote the true interests of
the People of the United Kingdom than any
extension of the Empire, which It Is our business
to govern well and wisely before we seek to
multiply our responsibilities, or enlarge our obli
gations." What Mr Chamberlain meant by Home Rule,
and what was his attitude towards the progressive
demands of Mr Parnell, are questions for a separ
ate Chapter. It Is enough to mention here that
Home Rule was part of his programme for the
future, and that he had actually submitted to the
Cabinet a scheme for the establishment of National
Councils (not only in Ireland) which he withdrew
in face of the opposition offered by the Moderate
Liberals. It was quite understood that, in addition
to the other items ofthe Unauthorised Programme,
he intended. In any Government of which he
might hereafter become a member, to press the
claims of Ireland to some sort of National Self-
Government — that he was, in effect, a Home
Ruler, as Home Rule was then Interpreted. The

230 THE RADICAL POLICY
only other well-known English Members of Par
liament who shared his opinion on this subject
were Sir Charles Dilke, Mr John Morley, and Sir
Charies Russell (the late Lord Russell of Kil
lowen). But though he had explained with
sufficient clearness his views on the Irish question,
he did not at this time bring them prominently to
the front. The points which he regarded as
essential were contained In the Unauthorised Pro
gramme, and if they were not conceded he an
nounced that it would be his duty to stand aside
from official Liberalism. His position was clearly
stated In a speech at Bradford (ist October
1885):- " Gentlemen, these are the proposals, simple,
moderate, and practical, which I have recently
been propounding In the country, and which have
earned for me from Lord Iddesleigh the title of
'Jack Cade,' and from less scrupulous oppon
ents unmeasured abuse and misrepresentation.
Whether they will be Included In the programme
of the Liberal Party or not does not depend upon
me. It does not depend upon any Individual
Leader, however influential and highly-placed he
may be. It rests with the Constituencies them
selves and their representatives. As far as I have
been able to understand public opinion both in
England and Scotland, there is a great and grow
ing determination that the Primary Schools shall
be free to all, and that the hindrances which stand
in the way of Education shall be swept away —
Education, the chief and essential instrument to all
moral and material progress.
"In those country districts with which I am
best acquainted, there is also a strong desire that
encouragement should be given through the Local
Authorities for the creation once more of that

MANIFESTO AGAINST THE WHIGS 231
class of small tenants and yeomen farmers which
has contributed so much to the prosperity of other
lands, and which in our own at one time formed
the most contented and most prosperous part of
the population.
" If I am right these views will find adequate
expression, and they will receive due weight and
attention from the Party Leaders. If I am disap
pointed then my course Is clear. I cannot press
the views of the minority against the conclusions of
the majority of the Party ; but It would be, on the
other hand, dlshpnourable in me, and lowering the
high tone which ought to prevail In public life, if
I, having committed myself personally, as I have
done, to the expediency of these proposals, were
to *take my place in any Government which
excluded them from Its programme. In that case
it will be my duty to stand aside, and to lend a
loyal support to those who are carrying out reforms
with which I agree, although they are unable to
go with me a little further. The sacrifice will not
be one of very great merit, for I have not found
official life so free from care that I should be
unwilling to fall back once more Into the ranks,
and, in a humbler position, to lend what support
I can to the common cause."
The development which as a Radical he
especially dreaded, and which many speculative
politicians regarded as not Improbable, was the
formation of a strong Centre Party, It was
thought that the old-fashioned Liberals, under
the guidance of Lord Hartington, might be
induced to co-operate with the more progressive
Conservatives led by Lord Randolph Churchill,
Thus it was believed — not only by outsiders —
that Mr Gladstone and Mr Chamberlain might
be shelved on one side, and, on the other, that Lord

232 THE RADICAL POLICY
Salisbury might be given his choice between being
sent about his business and acting as warming-
pan for Lord Randolph Churchill, A good mariy
feelers had been thrown out in this direction, and
various Intrigues had been set on foot — not with
out some apparent prospect of success. It would
have been a development not more distasteful to
the official Conservative Leaders than to Mr
Chamberlain, and he did his best to avert It. Of
the rank and file of the Conservatives he could
believe anything evil : —
He said, " The old Tory Party with its historic
traditions has disappeared. It has repudiated Its
name, and it has become Conservative. The
Conservatives, in turn, unhappy and discontented,
have been seeking for another designation, and
sometimes they come before you as ' Constitu
tionalists,' and then they break out in a new place
as ' Liberal- Conservatives.' Even this does not
exhaust their kaleidoscopic changes, for many of
them now, under the erratic guidance of Lord
Randolph Churchill, are masquerading as Tory
Democrats. What is the meaning and the object
of all these numerous changes ? I dare say you
have heard of that immoral person who was
brought up before the magistrate for having
married seven wives, and who, when he was
called upon for his defence, impudently said, ' It
Is all right ; I was only trying to get a good one.'
If the Tories are trying to get a good name they
have been singularly unsuccessful. When a
private individual assumes a number of aliases, it
is not unfair to suppose that he is ashamed of his
identity, and that his past life is open to suspicion.
Of course it may be a sign of repentance and of
grace, and we ought to be willing to give him the
benefit of the doubt. It may, but it may be only

A CENTRAL PARTY 23.]
a prelude to further misdoing. Now, the Tories
have many previous convictions recorded against
them. What proof Is there that recent adversity
has had a chastening effect ? "
The danger which for the moment seemed to
threaten the Radical Party from this visionary
Coalition Induced Mr Chamberlain to pay his first
compliment to the Whigs,
" In a speech which was recently delivered at
Sheffield, I observe" (he said) "that Lord Ran
dolph Churchill devoted considerable ingenuity
to pointing out the irreconcilable divergencies In
the Liberal Party, and after an exhaustive criticism
upon a recent speech of Lord Hartington's at
Waterfoot, and after proving the incapacity and
the ineptitude of the noble lord. Lord Randolph
Churchill conveyed to him and to his friends a
patronising invitation to leave the Party with
which, by their history and their traditions, by
their past services and their past sacrifices, the
Whigs have been identified in order to join the
Party of union, moderation, of consistency, and
of patriotism, of which Lord Randolph Churchill
is the most conspicuous member ! "
That the manoeuvres of the Tory Democrats
ended In signal discomfiture was partly due to
the frigid decision with which their overtures were
declined by Lord Hartington and his associates.
So far as the Whigs could distinguish their poli
tical antipathies. It would probably be correct to say
that if they had more fear of Mr Chamberlain they
had less faith In Lord Randolph Churchill, The
Unauthorised Programme, even the Radical Pro
gramme, they could understand — they knew what
they had to face and oppose. But what might be
the next proposal of the Democratic Tories It was
beyond the power of Political Man to divine.

CHAPTER VIII*
AS A HOME RULER
The Conservative Leaders, both before they came
into office in June 1885, and for some little time
afterwards, were charged by the Liberals with
having arrived at a secret understanding with Mr
Parnell. The support which some of them had
given — much to the disgust of many members of
the Party — to the Nationalist demand for an
inquiry into certain details of Lord Spencer's
administration of Ireland lent colour to the im
putation, and thoroughly earned the censure
passed by Mr Chamberlain In a speech delivered
In Hackney on 24th July, He was, as we know,
no apologist for Coercion, even when carried out
by his own colleagues.
" I know," he said, " that Lord Spencer himself,
as strongly as any man, desires to reform that
system ; but I say there is no difference of opinion
among honourable and honest men as to the
great qualities of Lord Spencer, and as to the
self-sacrifice and courage with which he assumed
his dangerous and thankless office, and as to the
impartiality and ability, and the honesty with
* A considerable part of this and the following Chapter
have been taken from Joseph Chamberlain, a volume by the
same author, in the International Series, published in 1896
by Messrs Bliss, Sands, & Foster.

CONSERVATIVES AND HOME RULE 235
which he endeavoured to give effect to his mission.
Well, until the last few days the Tories defended
Lord Spencer and Lord Spencer's administration,
and they defended it most strongly on those points
upon which he was supposed to be at variance
with his Radical colleagues. But now all that Is
changed. In pursuance of the compact that they
have made with the Parnellite Party — I won't call
It a treaty, it is a surrender — in pursuance of this
bargain, for which they were called upon to pay
the price, their Leaders got up in the House of
Commons the other day and separated themselves
ostentatiously from Lord Spencer, from any
approval of his administration, and they granted
an inquiry which In itself Implies a condemnation
of his justice and fair play, and which brings into
question the whole course of the administration of
justice in Ireland. I say that by this one act the
Tories have done more to lessen the authority of
the Law in I reland than all that the Radicals have
said and done during the past five years- — -I may
almost say than all that the Nationalist members
themselves have said."
Later in the year. In the course of a general
attack on " the men in possession," he returned
to this particular charge : —
" They have been placed in their present situa
tion by a combination which is still shrouded In
impenetrable mystery. We have been solemnly
assured that it is not the result of an alliance ; It
Is not a compact ; It is not a bargain which has
secured for them the support of the Irish National
Party in the House of Commons and in the
country. No, Gentlemen, It is a fortuitous coin
cidence that, just on the eve of a Vote of Censure,
the whole Tory Party became suddenly converted,
from the policy of Repression and Coercion which

236 AS A HOME RULER
up to that moment they had consistently advocated,
to a policy of Conciliation which had previously
only received the support of a few Radical
members like your Chairman to-night.
" I am wllhng to accept the explanation, im
probable as It appears at first sight, and I do so
all the more willingly because their surrender to
Mr Parnell is not more remarkable than their
submission to English Radicals on many points
of Home and Foreign Policy."
Lord Randolph Churchill, the most influential
member of the Cabinet In the House of Com
mons, had not disguised his close relations with
the Home Rulers. Rumours of the absurdly
mysterious interview which — probably, at his
instance — was held in London In July 1885,
between Lord Carnarvon and Mr Parnell, had
gained currency long before the story was
related, with characteristic inaccuracy, by the Irish
Leader. Of course, it had come to the ears of
Mr Gladstone, and led him to believe that the
other side were making a bid for the Nationalist
vote. Lord Carnarvon's subsequent explanation
was to the effect that his conversation with Mr
Parnell was entered on with a mere desire to
learn the opinions of the Irishman best entitled
to speak for the majority of his countrymen ;
that he had expressly guarded himself against
being supposed even to entertain the idea of a
Statutory Parliament in Dublin, whether with or
without the power of protecting Irish industries
against British competition ; and that Mr Parnell
indulged In deliberate fabrication when he gave
a contrary impression. Lord Carnarvon had, no
doubt, made these formal stipulations, protesting
that he spoke, as it were, "without prejudice."
But it Is known now that he and Lord Randolph

LIBERALS SUSPICIOUS 237
Churchill led Mr Parnell to believe that they
would support a moderate form of Home Rule,
and press it on their colleagues. Lord Carnarvon
did indeed take up the task of persuasion, but
Lord Salisbury declined to consider the sugges
tion. But, even after the failure of the self-imposed
mission to Hatfield, Lord Carnarvon expressed
in writing his confident hope that in a few months
he would make a convert of Lord Salisbury, The
Liberal Leaders meantime — Mr Gladstone and
Mr Chamberlain, In particular — were kept au
courant with the various versions that It suited Mr
Parnell to give out. They did not believe that
Lord Carnarvon had been acting only for himself,
or only for himself and Lord Randolph ; the
"Churchill legend" was then in full strength, and
anything which that brilliant genius took up for
the moment was supposed to represent the future
policy of a docile Party ; in short, it seemed that
unless Mr Gladstone and his colleagues made
up their minds at once they would find the
Irish vote anticipated. Needless to add, this
idea was carefully fostered by the half-truths and
semi-confidences which Mr Parnell doled out in
artfully prepared instalments.
They were confirmed in this suspicion by the
first acts of the Conservative Government, Lord
Spencer and Mr Trevelyan had demanded the
renewal of repressive powers if they were to
remain responsible for Law and Order In Ireland,
Mr Gladstone's Cabinet had decided — according
to the account given by the Prime Minister,
"with the Queen's permission"^ — -to abandon the
Coercive Clauses of the Act, but to invest the
Viceroy, by Statute, with powers to enforce,
whenever and wherever necessary, the " Procedure
Clauses" which "related to changes of venue.

238 AS A HOME RULER
Special Juries, and Boycotting." They proposed.
In fact, to dispense with the name, and maintain
the reality of Coercion. It was because they had
come to this determination that the Irish Party
voted against them on 8th June, and drove them
from office.
In striking contrast with this policy, the
new Irish Executive, Lord Carnarvon and Sir
William Hart Dyke, proposed to dispense with
exceptional legislation. Various excuses were
put forward for the new departure. It was but
an experiment. Lord Carnarvon explained, and
if it proved a failure it would be replaced by a
permanent measure of repression. Nor could It
be urged on the other side that Coercion, though
administered with unflinching courage and un
swerving firmness by Lord Spencer and Mr
Trevelyan, had succeeded in Its objects. Another
argument — adapted for platform use — was that,
having just "trusted the people of Ireland" In
admitting them to the privileges of an extended
franchise, it would be absurd for Parliament to
impose new restrictions on their personal liberties.
A more substantial apology was urged by Lord
Salisbury, who pointed out that, at so advanced
a period of the Session as that at which the
Conservatives had succeeded to office, and without
a majority in the House of Commons, it was by
no means certain — it was, indeed, improbable —
that they would succeed in carrying an adequate
scheme. This, no doubt, was one, and would
have been by itself a sufficient, reason. The
other, equally cogent, was that Lord Randolph
and his group were for the time indispensable,
and could not be retained on any other terms.
It may be replied, of course, that the Con
servative Leaders ought not to have assumed

COERCION ABANDONED 239
responsibility without power, or undertaken the
government of the United Kingdom when
they could not do their duty by Ireland. But
the rejoinder would be that everything else
might justly be sacrificed to the object of
getting rid of an Administration which had
concluded with the victorious Boers of the Trans
vaal the humiliating Convention of Pretoria ; had
thrown away, by the Evacuation of Candahar,
what many experts thought the most solid result
of the Afghan War ; had involved us in vague
and increasing liabilities in Egypt, without any
compensating opportunity of making it an integral
part of the Empire ; had wasted English treasure
in the Soudan, sent Gordon on a hopeless mission,
and left him to his fate until rescue was impossible ;
had affronted Austria, estranged Germany, estab
lished with France a standing occasion of ani
mosity, and brought us — through the Penjdeh
bungle — to the brink of a war with Russia over a
quarrel In which it was at least doubtful whether we
were even in the right. This Is the way In which
the case might naturahy present itself to the eyes of
the Conservative Party, and they would have been
slow to forgive their Leaders If (for the sake of a
comparatively unimportant question of Irish ad
ministration) they had neglected the long-awaited
moment when Mr Gladstone should be driven
from power. A distinct pledge had, moreover,
been given by Lord Salisbury, at the commence
ment of the Session, that. In the event of the
Liberal Government being defeated, he and his
friends would be prepared to take office.
The growing suspicion of the Liberal Leaders,
that the Conservatives were acting In collusion
with the Nationalists, was increased by a speech
which Lord Salisbury delivered at Newport on

240 AS A HOME RULER
7 th October. There was not, in fact, a word or a
phrase which could fairly be held to imply that
the speaker favoured, or would even consider, any
scheme of Home Rule. But it did contain an
elaborate apology for the abandonment of Coercion,
and the tone throughout was more conciliatory
than he had recently used with regard to Irish
questions. Nor is there any reason why his
supporters should refuse to admit that he was
anxious, at the now imminent General Election,
not to have the Nationalist vote In the English
Constituencies given solid to the other side. That
his speech was likely to succeed in that respect
was clear to the exasperated managers of the
Liberal Party. They were righteously shocked
at such "trafficking with disorder and disloyalty."
This, of course. But the more practical question
was, how should they defeat the Tory Intrigue ?
It was thought that in Mr Chamberlain a
middle term might be found between official
Liberalism and Irish Nationalism. He was not,
and never had been, what would now be called a
Home Ruler — i.e., a politician who demands as a
minimum the establishment of a separate Parlia
ment and a separate Executive for Ireland, whether
subject or not subject to a control exercised by the
Sovereign under the advice of his Ministers. In
1885 the term was more fluid, and covered every
politician ready to support the institution of any
system of National Self-Government with regard
to purely Irish affairs. Mr Chamberlain fell easily
within this definition, and had given practical
proof of his sympathy with this limited form of
Home Rule.
In 1884, as we have seen, he had brought
forward in the Cabinet a scheme which was very
much more comprehensive than anything gener-

NATIONAL COUNCILS 241
ally understood by the name of Local Government.
It was, in fact, a proposal to sweep away Dublin
Castle, and to vest all the powers exercised by
its various Departments, with others retained by
Departments in London, in a National Elective
Council — a body which would be regulated by
Irish opinion, and would possess every power
short of independent legislation. Subsidiary to
this representative Council was to be a network of
local elective bodies, charged with the adminis
tration of their several districts. Mr Chamberlain
has declared that, at the time, he had reason to
believe that these proposals would have found
acceptance with the Leaders of the Nationalist
Party. On this point, however, he has been sub
sequently contradicted by the persons to whom he
referred. The truth, probably. Is that such assur
ances had been given to him, but given without
any intention of observing them. The National
ist has yet to be born — In any country under the
sun — -who will confess that the time has come when
he may rest and be thankful.
" No doubt," Mr Chamberlain admitted, " there
would have remained the national sentiment in
favour of the establishment of a separate Legis
lature, but if such Councils as I had suggested
had been established and put in full working
order. If the perpetual interference of foreign
authorities had been abolished, I believe that the
old sense of grievance would have gradually died
out, and that a new generation would have arisen
which would have been glad and willing to accept
the obligation as well as the advantage which the
union ofthe Three Kingdoms for Imperial interests
is calculated to secure."
It was not likely that such a scheme would be
taken up by a Cabinet half composed of Moderate Q

242 AS A HOME RULER
Liberals, and depending upon a declining majority
in an expiring Parliament. The proposal was
rejected, and nothing would ever have been heard
of It had not Mr Chamberlain himself made the
disclosure. It Is possible also- — and more than
possible — that Mr Parnell helped to wreck the
plan. No sooner did he gather that something
might be conceded than he raised his terms.
At a complimentary banquet, held In Dublin
on 24th August, he had declared that the question
of the legislative Independence of Ireland was on
the point of solution. Speaking of the Dubhn
Parliament as established, he defined the powers
which It would claim. They included a free hand
with regard to the Land, the right of building up
Irish industries (which meant Protection as against
England), and control of public education (which
might Involve a sort of endowment of the Roman
Catholic Religion). The Legislature would, Mr
Parnell hoped, consist of a single Chamber ; he
did not want a House of Lords.
To this extended and apparently unexpected
demand, Mr Chamberlain had replied in a speech
at Warrington on 8th September : " Speaking for
myself I say that If these, and these alone, are the
terms on which Mr Parnell's support is to be
obtained, I will not enter into competition for It.
This new programme of Mr Parnell's Involves a
great extension of anything that we have hitherto
understood by ' Home Rule.' The powers he
claims for his separate Parliament are altogether
beyond anything which exists in the case of the
State Legislatures of the American Union, which
has hitherto been the type and model of the Irish
demands ; and if this claim were conceded, we
might as well for ever abandon all hope of main
taining a United Kingdom. We should estabhsh

MR PARNELL'S INCREASED DEMAND 243
within less than thirty miles of our shores a new
foreign country, animated from the outset with
unfriendly intentions towards ourselves. A policy
like that, I firmly believe, would be disastrous and
ruinous to Ireland herself It would be dangerous
to the security of this country, and under these
circumstances I hold that we are bound to take
every step in our power to avert so great a
calamity." He could not admit that 5,000,000 Irishmen
had any more right to govern themselves without
regard to the rest ofthe United Kingdom than the
5,000,000 inhabitants of the Metropolis. " God
had made us neighbours, and I would to Heaven
our Rulers had made us friends. But as neigh
bours neither one nor the other has any right so
to rule his own household as to be a source of
annoyance or danger to the other. Subject to
that Hmltatlon, I for my part would concede the
greatest possible measure of Local Government to
the Irish people, as I would concede It also to the
English and the Scotch."
Mr Chamberlain still believed, as he explained
at Glasgow a few weeks later, that If his scheme
of a National Council for Ireland — which might
be applied, if necessary, to Scotland, Wales, and
even to England — had been sanctioned by Pariia
ment it would have been thankfully accepted by
Mr Parnell. " It is quite true," he added, "that
Mr Parnell asks now for a great deal more, and
we know who has encouraged him. But it does
not follow that he would not have taken a great
deal less." The sudden unreasonableness of Mr
Parnell was due, Mr Chamberlain suggested,
to Conservative intrigue. No sooner did they
get wind of a possible concession from the
Liberals than they set themselves to outbid it.

244 AS A HOME RULER
It was a neat rejoinder, though not very
convincing. Explicit as was the Warrington speech, it was
not, and was not meant to be, a definite rejection
of the whole Nationalist programme- — still less, to
lead to an open quarrel with the Irish Leader.
Mr Chamberlain congratulated him on having
dwelt on "the folly, as well as the wickedness," of
the cowardly crimes which had so greatly dis
credited the Irish cause. That fact the speaker
regarded as one of "good augury," and he re
affirmed his readiness to give Ireland — as he
would give England and Scotland — the "greatest
possible measure of Local Government " — a
phrase almost Identical with that previously used
by Mr Gladstone, and approvingly quoted by Mr
Chamberlain (3rd June) at Birmingham — " the
widest possible Self-Government " consistent with
maintaining the " Integrity of the Empire."
Nevertheless, the difference between what Mr
Parnell would accept and what Mr Gladstone or
Mr Chamberlain would grant was so sharp and
clear that there seemed no chance of an arrange
ment being made. On the eve of the General
Election, the Liberal Leader asked, at Edinburgh,
for such a majority as would maintain the inde
pendence of the House of Commons, as a whole,
in dealing with the Irish Question. He expressed
his fervent hope that "from one end of Great
Britain to the other " not a single representative
would be returned who, "for one moment, would
listen to any proposition tending to impair the
visible and sensible Empire." Mr Parnell's reply
(Liverpool, loth November) was that English
legislation should not be advanced until the Irish
Question had been disposed of He invited Mr
Gladstone to formulate his offer of Limited Self-

THE 1885 GENERAL ELECTION 245
Government by drawing up a Constitution for
Ireland — subject to the conditions and limitations
for which he had stipulated to safeguard the
supremacy of the Crown and the integrity of the
Empire. Mr Gladstone (17th November) noticed, but
hardly answered, the challenge. Till Ireland had
chosen her representatives there could not, he
said, be any authoritative statement of her wishes,
and without that knowledge any proposal would
be made in the dark. Besides, he was not himself
in an official position, and could not assume a
function that properly belonged to Ministers.
The meaning of all this was that Mr Gladstone
refused to be "drawn." The physician would not
prescribe until he had been called In. As no
definite offer could be got from Mr Gladstone,
Mr Parnell Issued his Manifesto urging his
countrymen in Great Britain to vote against the
"man who coerced Ireland, deluged Egypt with
blood, menaces religious liberty In the school, the
freedom of speech in Parliament, and promises to
the country generally a repetition of the crimes
and follies of the last Liberal Administration."
The result of the General Election was just
that which Mr Gladstone had deprecated. The
Conservatives (249) and the Home Rulers (86)
amounted to 335 — the exact strength of the
Liberals. It would, no doubt, be easy enough to
defeat the Conservative Ministry, but Mr Glad
stone could not maintain himself in power if the
Parnellites were to remain hostile. The Irish were
practically masters of the Imperial Parliament.
On 1 2th December, a feeler had been thrown out
by the Daily News. It was suggested that a
small committee should be formed of the leaders of
both Parties, including Mr Parnell and some of

246 AS A HOME RULER
his friends, which should consider what sort of
Legislature it would be wise and safe to set up in
Dublin. It was at once evident that the Con
servatives would not take part in such a Confer
ence, and on 17 th December the whole situation
was suddenly changed. It was announced in The
Standard that Mr Gladstone was prepared to
deal with the Home Rule Question on the follow
ing lines : —
The unity of the Empire, the authority of the
Crown, and the supremacy of Imperial
Parliament, were to be maintained.
An Irish Parliament was to be created, and
entrusted with administrative and legis
lative powers.
There was to be security for the representa
tion of m.inorltles and the partition of
Imperial charges.
A certain number of Irish members were to
be nominated by the Crown.
A prompt, though ambiguous, denial was
telegraphed by Mr Gladstone. The statement
was not, he said, an accurate representation of
his views, but was, he presumed, a speculation
upon them. It had not been published with his
knowledge or authority ; nor was any other,
beyond his own public declarations. This very
qualified repudiation made it clear that the state
ment was substantiahy correct, and everybody
took It for granted that Mr Gladstone had at last
been converted to Home Rule.
That impression was confirmed by the state
ment made, the same evening, by Mr Chamber
lain, at the Birmingham Reform Club : —
" I have hoped — I have expressed publicly the
desire — that the two Democracies, the English and
the Irish, moved by common aspiration and sym-

HOME RULE FEELERS 247
pathetic appreciation, should march shoulder to
shoulder along the paths of political freedom and
progress. Mr Parnell, indeed, has alienated and
embittered all sections of the Liberal Party ; but
national questions of grave importance must not
be prejudiced by personal considerations. We
are face to face with a very remarkable demonstra
tion of the Irish people. They have shown that,
so far as regards the great majority of them, they
are earnestly in favour of a change in the adminis
tration of their Government, and of some system
which would give them a larger control of their
domestic affairs. Well, we ourselves, by our
public declarations and by our Liberal principles,
are pledged to acknowledge the substantial justice
of the claim. I see in the papers some account
of negotiations which are reported to have been
proceeding between the leaders of the Liberal
Party in England and Mr Parnell. I have had
no part In any negotiations. I have expressed no
approval of any scheme, and I think it very likely
that the rumours which affect other prominent
members of the Liberal Party may be equally
groundless. "As to Mr Gladstone," he continued, "we
know what his opinion is from his public utter
ances. He has again and again said that the
first duty of Liberal statesmen Is to maintain the
integrity of the Empire and the supremacy of the
Crown ; but that, subject to that, he was prepared
to give the largest possible measure of Local
Government that could be conceived or proposed.
Well, I entirely agree with those principles, and I
have so much faith In the experience and patriotism
of Mr Gladstone, that I cannot doubt that, if he
should ever see his way to propose any scheme of
arrangement, I shall be able conscientiously to

248 AS A HOME RULER
give it my humble support. But It is right. It is
due to the Irish people, to say that all sections of
the Liberal Party, Radicals as much as Whigs,
are determined that the integrity of the Empire
shall be a reality, and not an empty phrase."
Mr Chamberlain once again referred to the
American example, when the Northern States
poured out their blood and treasure like water to
preserve the Union, and " fought and won the
grandest contest of our time." If Englishmen
retained the courage and stubborn determination of
their race, they would allow nothing to impair the
effective union of the Three Kingdoms that owed
allegiance to the Sovereign. But the real point of
the speech came at the end. Personally, he did not
think the time had arrived when the Liberals could
usefully Interpose. "Mr Parnell has appealed to
the Tories. Let him settle accounts with his new
friends. Let him test their sincerity and good
will ; and if he finds he has been deceived, be will
approach the Liberal Party In a spirit of reason
and conciliation."
The policy of Mr Chamberlain, then, was. If
possible, to throw on the Tories the odium of
considering. If not conceding. Home Rule. It
would draw their fangs if it could be shown
that between their proposals and those of
Mr Gladstone there was not a distinction of
principle, but only a difference In degree. Even
Mr John Morley — not an expert in the tactical
side of public life, and a keen Home Ruler by
sentiment and conviction — had his misgivings
about its results as a practical policy. "It will
stir deep passions," he said at Newcastle (21st
December); "it wiU perhaps destroy a great
Party." Clearly, it was an adventure which should
either be left to Conservatives, or one in which

OVERTURES TO LORD SALISBURY 249
they should be Invited to take part. It was in
pursuance of this idea that Mr Gladstone subse
quently bethought him of certain Informal discus
sions on the Irish question which he had held
with Mr Balfour when they were both on a visit
to the Duke of Westminster, at Eaton Hall.
The result was the amusingly diplomatic corre
spondence * In which the astute Leader of the
Opposition tried to entice the equally wary
Prime Minister into an arrangement for settling
the Home Rule question without reference to
Party politics. There is no reason to suppose
that In making this off'er^ — politely but decisively
rejected by Lord Salisbury — he was not acting In
good faith. Of course, he was thinking first of
his own Party, but the Conservatives also would
profit If the Irish Question were cleared out of the
way — especially If the House of Commons at the
same time got rid of the Irish members !
There was, however, a consideration on the
other side which Mr Gladstone may have over
looked. So long as Mr Parnell and his Obstruc
tionists blocked the way. It would be Impossible
for Mr Gladstone and Mr Chamberlain, when
next they came into office, to make much pro
gress with a political programme that moderate
men on both sides regarded with the most
serious apprehensions. Against any compre
hensive scheme of Radical legislation the Irish
members were a more effective barrier than
the House of Lords, since it was always easy to
get up demonstrations against the Peers, and
sometimes they would have to give way. Clearly,
therefore, the Conservative Leaders — except those
whom Lord Randolph had entangled in his negotia
tions with Mr Parnell — had no object to serve In
* P. W. Clay den's England under the Coalition.

250 AS A HOME RULER
entertaining Mr Gladstone's proposal, especially
as they believed that a "strong and resolute
Government" was best for Ireland.
Before the meeting of Parliament in 1886, It
was realised that the experiment of dispensing
with Coercion had resulted In disastrous failure.
The resignation of Lord Carnarvon and Sir
William Hart Dyke, who had, for the time,
identified themselves as Lord- Lieutenant and Chief
Secretary with that policy, was accepted. Though
the former office was, for the time, left In com
mission, Mr W. H. Smith was at once appointed
to the latter, and, after a flying visit to Ireland,
reported that the Executive must be armed with
further powers. An Intimation to that effect was
inserted in the Queen's Speech, along with an
unequivocal declaration against Home Rule. On
26th January the Chancellor of the Exchequer
announced that, on the 28th, Mr Smith would
introduce, first, a Coercion Bill, for which pre
cedence would be demanded, and then a Bill for
extending the Ashbourne (or Land Purchase)
Act of the previous Session. This meant, of
course, that Lord Salisbury's Government would
be thrown out by the joint vote of the National
ists and Liberals as soon as a Resolution could
be framed which would give the two Parties an
excuse for combination. It was provided in an
Amendment to the Address proposed by Mr Jesse
Collings, which embodied the policy of "Three
Acres and a Cow." Ministers did their best to post
pone the Division, which they knew would go
against them, until they had expounded their Irish
policy, and had some opportunity of forcing their
opponents into an explanation of their Programme.
But they failed to carry their point, and an
animated Debate ensued, in the course of which

SALISBURY MINISTRY DEFEATED 251
Mr Chamberlain attacked the Ministers. "We
support," he said, " a hostile Amendment, In
the first place, because the condition and claims
of the agricultural labourers constitute one of the
great questions raised at the last Election, and
because it is our bounden duty to uphold those
claims in Pariiament ; and In the second place,
because we have no confidence that the Govern
ment will either do justice to the agricultural
labourers or to any other question they may have
to deal with."
Mr Balfour had, indeed, announced that the
Government were prepared to Invest the Local
Authorities, constituted under their proposed
Local Government Act, with the power of
acquiring land for Allotments, but he expressed
his doubt of the value of SmaU Holdings. Nor,
again, did he make any suggestion — Indeed, Sir
Michael Hicks- Beach expressly disclaimed the idea
— that their proposals would satisfy the demands
of the extreme Land Reformers ; the Radicals,
therefore, felt that they might with a good con
science vote for Mr Colllngs's Amendment to the
Address, expressing the regret of the House that
no measures had been announced for affording
facilities to agricultural labourers and others in
the rural districts to obtain Allotments and Small
Holdings "on equitable terms as to rent and
security of tenure." This was carried by 331
votes against 252, and the Government were
defeated on a question of Confidence, In the
adverse majority were included 74 Nationalists,
while in the minority were 18 Liberals, among
them being Lord Hartington, Mr Goschen, Sir
Henry James (Lord James of Hereford), Mr
Courtney, and Sir John Lubbock (Lord Ave-
bury). Apart from any objection they might feel

252 AS A HOME RULER
to the particular proposition before the House,
these representatives of Moderate Liberalism
refused to assist Mr Gladstone in returning to
power now that he was pledged to some form of
Home Rule, They repudiated the principle, and
felt no curiosity about the details. More un
certain was the attitude of about 70 other
Liberals, of all shades of opinion, who had
absented themselves from the Division,
The defeat of Lord Salisbury's Government
was due to the initiative of the Radicals who
had been acting under the direct Influence of Mr
Chamberlain. On him, then, rests the responsi
bility — nor has he ever sought to repudiate It — of
bringing the first Home Rule Administration into
power. On 28th January, Lord Salisbury's
resignation was accepted by the Queen, and on
the following evening Mr Gladstone received the
expected summons to London.
Amongst his old colleagues who declined, or
were not invited, to associate themselves with a
Home Rule policy, were Lord Hartington, Mr
Forster, Mr Goschen, Sir Henry James, Mr
Courtney, Lord Selborne, Lord Derby, and Lord
Northbrook. The new Cabinet was constituted
as follows : Mr Gladstone, First Lord of the
Treasury and Lord Privy Seal ; Lord Herschell,
Lord chancellor ; Lord Spencer, Lord President ;
Sir William Harcourt, Chancellor of the Ex
chequer ; Mr Childers, Home Secretary ; Lord
Rosebery, Foreign Secretary ; Lord Granville,
Secretary for the Colonies ; Mr Campbell-Banner
man, Secretary for War ; Lord Kimberley,
Secretary for India ; Mr George Trevelyan,
Secretary for Scotland ; Lord Ripon, First Lord
of the Admiralty ; Mr John Morley, Chief
Secretary for Ireland ; Mr Mundella, President of

MR GLADSTONE IN OFFICE 253
the Board of Trade ; and Mr Chamberlain,
President of the Local Government Board.
Ministers outside the Cabinet were Lord Aber
deen, Viceroy of Ireland ; Lord Wolverton,
Postmaster-General ; Sir Lyon Playfair, Vice-
President of the Committee of Council on
Education ; Mr Heneage, Chancellor of the
Duchy of Lancaster. Mr John Mellor became
Judge Advocate General ; Sir Charles Russell,
Attorney General ; and Sir Horace Davey,
Solicitor General. The Under Secretaries were
Mr Broadhurst, Home Office ; Mr Bryce, Foreign
Office ; Mr Osborne Morgan, Colonial Office ;
Sir Ughtred Kay-Shuttleworth, India Office ;
Lord Sandhurst, War Office ; Mr Acland, Board
of Trade ; and Mr Jesse Collings, Local Govern
ment Board.
In this list It will be seen that no less than
four names are included of Liberals who subse
quently declared themselves Unionists — Mr
Chamberlain and Mr Trevelyan In the Cabinet,
and Mr Jesse Collings and Mr (now Lord)
Heneage outside. The letter in which Mr
Chamberlain accepted office was subsequently
read out In the House of Commons, but this Is,
perhaps, the best place to reproduce It :- —

"40 Princes Gardens, S.W.,
^January yith, 1886.
" My dear Mr Gladstone, — I have availed myself of
the opportunity you have kindly afforded me to consider
further your oiler of a seat in your Government. I recog
nised the justice of your view that the question of Ireland is
paramount to all others, and must first engage your atten
tion. The statement of your intention to examine whether
it is practicable to comply with the wishes of the majority
of the Irish people, as testified by the return of eighty-five
representatives of the Nationalist Party, does not go beyond
your previous public declarations, while the conditions

254 AS A HOME RULER
which you attach to the possibility of such compliance seem
to me adequate, and are also in accordance with your
repeated public utterances. But I have already thought it
due to you to say that, according to my present judgment,
it will not be found possible to reconcile these conditions
with the establishment of a National Legislative Body
sitting in Dublin, and I have explained my own preference
for an attempt to come to terms with the Irish members on
a basis of a more limited scheme of Local Government,
coupled with proposals for a settlement of the Land, and,
perhaps, also of the Education question. You have been
kind enough, after hearing these opinions, to repeat your
request that I should join your Government, and you have
explained that, in this case, I shall retain ' unlimited liberty
of judgment and rejection ' on any scheme that may ulti
mately be proposed, and that the full consideration of such
minor proposals as I have referred to as an alternative to
any larger arrangement will not be excluded by you. On
the other hand, I have uo difficulty in assuring you of my
readiness to give an unprejudiced examination to any more
extensive proposals that may be made, with an anxious
desire that the results may be more favourable than I am at
present able to anticipate. In the circumstances, and with
the most earnest hope that I may be able in any way to
assist you in your difficult work, I beg to accept the ofTer
you have made to submit my name to her Majesty for a
post in the new Government. — I am, my dear Mr Glad
stone, yours sincerely,
"J. Chamberlain."

This letter was, it must be admitted by those
who take the least favourable view of Mr
Chamberlain's sub.sequent actions, a clear intima
tion that his acceptance of office in a Home
Rule Administration was merely provisional.
The charge that he had only joined the Govern
ment with a view of wrecking It, that he went
on board to scuttle the ship, hardly required
the Indignant denial which he gave It when he
explained his subsequent resignation ; and Mr
Gladstone, who on a personal question was
never wanting In magnanimity towards his

MR CHAMBERLAIN'S POSITION 255
Opponents, cheered the repudiation. There was,
indeed, little hope, if Mr Chamberlain really meant
to stand out for the safeguards which he had
postulated, that he would be able to concur in the
scheme which Mr Gladstone, with the assistance
of Mr John Morley, Sir Robert Hamilton, and.
It has been said, of the late Lord Acton, was
now preparing. It was known. In the first place,
that the new Chief Secretary was chiefly bent on
satisfying the aspirations of the Nationalist
members, and desired, above everything else, to
make the concession, not a grudging instalment,
but a settlement in full.
The letter of provisional adherence was written
on 30th January 1886, and It was not till i6th
March that the first reasonably circumstantial
rumour was circulated that Mr Chamberlain
would not accept the now matured scheme. In
spite of the mystery that surrounds Ministerial
deliberations, it Is known that the majority of
the Cabinet were not consulted by the Prime
Minister, except when they were invited, from
time to time, to approve the successive proposals
adopted by Mr Gladstone ; that Individual mem
bers were now and then asked their opinion on
this or that point, but there was no attempt,
hardly a pretence, to thresh out the scheme in full
Council ; * that, from the beginning, so marked
an incompatibility had shown itself between the
objects of Mr Morley and Mr Chamberlain, close
personal friends as they still were, that Mr Glad
stone abandoned the hope of bringing them into
accordance ; that he gave a deliberate prefer
ence to the adviser whose opinions more closely
approached his own, and, after a time, paid little
* Vide Sir George Trevelyan's explanation in Parliament
of his reasons for resigning oflSce.

256 AS A HOME RULER
more than a polite attention to the arguments of
the other.
Mr Gladstone was, it must be confessed, in a
difficult position. The faith of the Irish members
was, at this time, pinned to Mr Morley ; and if
he were to leave the Government It was certain
they would repudiate the Bill, It was also known
that he must retire rather than make himself
responsible for an Incomplete Measure, Home
Rule was the chief reason for his being called
within the Cabinet, Mr Chamberlain, on the
other hand, was identified with several causes
all of which he was equally anxious to promote.
There was, therefore, a chance — so it seemed to
Mr Gladstone — that at the last moment his
President of the Local Government Board might
be Induced, by some colourable concessions, to
sink his objections to this particular Measure,
rather than break with the Party to which he
looked for the future accomplishment of an exten
sive Programme, It must also be borne in mind
that Mr Gladstone was honestly convinced that the
Bill was the best that could be framed — as, per
haps, it was — and that, on further consideration,
so acute and reasonable a Statesman as Mr
Chamberlain would be compelled to acknowledge
its merits. It is not easy to say- — perhaps Mr Chamber
lain himself would not assert with absolute con
fidence — whether there ever was any ground for
such expectations ; whether any further safeguards,
such as Mr Gladstone might have been persuaded
to Incorporate in the Bill, or any limitations
devised for cbntroHIng the proposed Irish Legisla
ture, might have constituted the basis of a work
ing compromise. We should say No if we
judged simply by the speech that Mr Chamberlain

LETTER OF RESIGNATION 257
made at the First Reading Debate, so essential
seem the points of difference between what he
would accept and what Ministers proposed. But
it must be remembered that he stated, on this occa
sion, that he had resigned, not only on the Home
Rule Bill, but also on the Land Purchase Bill ;
and, though he was checked by the Prime Minister
when he touched on a Measure not yet presented to
Parliament, he subsequently found an opportunity
of stating his objections to the double scheme.
The letter in which Mr Chamberlain's decision to
leave the Government was given — a decision
which he had been Invited to reconsider but would
not change — was dated 15th March : —
" My DE-'iR Mr Gladstone, — I have carefully considered
the results of the discussion on Saturday, and I have come,
with the deepest reluctance, to the conclusion that I shall
not be justified in attending the meeting of the Cabinet on
Tuesday, and that I must ask you to lay my resignation
before the Queen. You wfll remember that, in accepting
ofHce, I expressed grave doubts as to the probability of my
being able to support your Irish policy. Up to that time,
however, no definite proposals had been formulated by you,
and it was only on Saturday last that you were able to make
a communication to the Cabinet on the subject. Without
entering on unnecessary details, I may say that you pro
posed a scheme of Irish land-purchase which involved an
enormous and unprecedented use of British credit, ' in
order,' in your own words, ' to afford to the Irish landlord
refuge and defence from a possible mode of government in
Ireland which he regards as fatal to him.' This scheme,
which contemplates only a trifling reduction of the judicial
rents fixed before the recent fall in prices, would commit the
British taxpayer to tremendous obligations, accompanied, in
my opinion, with serious risk of ultimate loss. The greater
part of the land of Ireland would be handed over to a new
Irish elective authority, who would thus be at once the land
lords and the delegates of the Irish tenants. I fear that
these capacities would be found inconsistent ; and that the
tenants, unable or unwilling to pay the rents demanded,
would speedily elect an authority pledged to give them
R

258 AS A HOME RULER
relief, and to seek to recoup itself by an early repudiation of
what would be described as the English tribute. With
these anticipations, I was naturally anxious to know what
was the object for which this risk was to be incurred, and
for what form of Irish Government it was intended to pave
the way. I gathered from your statements that, although
your plans are not finally matured, yet you have come to
the conclusion that any extension of Local Government on
exclusive lines, including even the creation of a National
Council or Councils, for purely Irish business, would now
be entirely inadequate, and that you are convinced of the
necessity for conceding a separate Legislative Assembly for
Ireland, with full powers to deal with all Irish affairs. I
understood that you would exclude from their competence
the control of the Army and Navy, and the direction of
Foreign and Colonial policy ; but that you would allow
them to arrange their own Customs tariff, to have entire
control of the Civil Forces of the country, and even, if they
thought fit, to establish a Volunteer Army. It appears to
me that a proposal of this kind must be regarded as tanta
mount to a proposal for Separation. I think it is even
worse, because it would set up an unstable and temporary
form of government, which would be a source of perpetual
irritation and agitation until the full demands of the
Nationalist Party were conceded. The Irish Parliament
would be called upon to pay three or four millions a year
as its contribution to the National Debt and the Army and
Navy, and it would be required in addition to pay nearly
five millions a year for interest and sinking fund on the
cost of Irish land. These charges would be felt to be so
heavy a burden on a poor country that persistent contro
versy would arise thereupon, and the due fulfilment of their
obligations by the new Irish authority could only be
enforced by a military intervention, which would be under
taken with every disadvantage, and after all the resources
of the country and the civil executive power had been
surrendered to the Irish national Government. I conclude,
therefore, that the policy which you propose to recommend
to Parliament and the country practically amounts to a
proposal that Great Britain should burden itself with an
enormous addition to the National Debt, and probably also
to an immediate increase of taxation, not in order to secure
the closer and more effective union of the Three Kingdoms,
but, on the contrary, to purchase the repeal of the Union
and the practical Separation of Ireland from England and
Scotland, My public utterances and my conscientious con-

MEETING AT THE OPERA HOUSE 259
victions are absolutely opposed to such a policy, and I feel
that the differences which have now been disclosed are so
vital that I can no longer entertain the hope of being of
service in the Government. I must, therefore, respectfully
request you to take the necessary steps for relieving me of
the office I have the honour to hold. — I am, yours very
truly, "J. Chamberlain."

The date originally fixed for the introduction
ofthe Home Rule BIU was 22nd March ; then It
was shifted to ist April ; and, finally, to 8th April,
Up to the last moment negotiations had been
kept open, and it was stated that Mr Chamberlain
had submitted a counter-scheme for the establish
ment of a National Assembly In Dublin — free to
make Bye-laws, but always subject to the Imperial
Parliament ; allowed to levy Rates but not Taxes ;
with power to manage Irish affairs, only limited
by control from Westminster, Mr Gladstone,
however, had gone too far to recede to such
lengths as were required, and, after the letter
printed above, no serious hope remained of chang
ing the position either of the Prime Minister or
his seceding colleague.
But at this time Mr Chamberlain had no
thought of entering on active opposition to thp
Government. He was not one of the Liberals
who attended the famous meeting, on 14th April,
at the Opera House, organised by the Loyal and
Patriotic Union. Lord Hartington was there, and
Mr Goschen, and they made common cause with
Lord Salisbury and Mr Smith. When the Land
Bill was introduced, two days later, and Mr
Chamberlain led the attack on that Measure, he
admitted that since he had been a member of the
Government great changes had been introduced
into the Home Rule Bill. " In these changes,"

260 AS A HOME RULER
he said, "and in the prospect of still greater
changes yet to come, I rejoice to see an approxi
mation between the views of my right honourable
friend and myself, which I did not dare to hope
for at the time I left the Cabinet." His objections
to the Land Bill (which had also been modified in
the interval) still remained In force, because,
though many objectionable features had been
removed, the whole policy of the Bill seemed of
doubtful expediency. It was unwise to grant to
Irish peasants what would not be conceded to
Scotch crofters or English labourers. But, hostile
as Mr Chamberlain's speech was to the actual
proposal before Parliament, the general tone was
one of conciliation. The conclusion was greeted
with cordial cheering from the Gladstonians.
" For my own part," he said, " I recognise the
spirit of conciliation with which the Government
has tried to meet some of the objections which
have already been taken to their scheme. I know
I need not assure my right honourable friend, or
my friends around me, that the differences which,
unfortunately, for a time — I hope it may be only
a short time — have separated me from my right
honourable friend have not impaired my respect
or regard for his character and abilities. I am not
an irreconcilable opponent. My right honour
able friend has made very considerable modifica
tions in his Bill. All I can say is, if that
movement continues, as I hope It will, I shall be
delighted to be relieved from an attitude which I
only assumed with the greatest reluctance, and
which I can only maintain with the deepest pain
and regret."
That he was not using an empty form of
words, Mr Chamberlain proved by his subsequent
action. He went down to his constituents in the

OPPOSITION CONDITIONAL 261
Easter Recess, and delivered a searching, but not
a violent, criticism of the two Bills now awaiting
their fate in the House of Commons. His main
purpose was, of course, to justify his action in the
eyes of those who had so recently elected him as
a supporter of Mr Gladstone. The conclusion
of his speech was very significant. To the Land
Bill he could not assent. It was, he thought, a
bad Bill.
" I would sooner," he said, "go out of politics
altogether than give my vote to pledge the capital
of the country, and the future earnings of every
man and woman In the United Kingdom, in order
to modify the opposition of a small class of Irish
proprietors to a scheme which, if It remains in Its
present form, will, I believe. Infallibly lead to the
separation of Ireland from England. I object. In
this case, to the risk which we are asked to incur.
I object, also, to the object for which we are asked
to Incur that risk. But, as regards the Home
Rule Bill — the Bill for the Better Government of
Ireland — my opposition Is only conditional. I
regret very much that this great Measure, involv
ing so vast a change, such enormous risks — so
vitally affecting the welfare of the Kingdom —
should have been brought before Parliament with
out more consultation with the other Leaders of
the Liberal Party, and with the members of the
Liberal Party generally. I think the Bill would
have benefited a good deal by fuller consideration,
both In the Cabinet and in the country. But at
the same time I admit that, having been Intro
duced by so eminent a man as the Prime Minister,
the question cannot be allowed to fall, the problem
cannot be disregarded. The only question is as
to the form which the Bill shall assume, and I
think I can show you. In a few words, that. If

262 AS A HOME RULER
certain alterations were made, ah the anomalies
which I have described to you, most of the objec
tions which I have taken, would disappear. If,
to begin with, the representation of Ireland at
Westminster were maintained on its present foot
ing, if Irishmen were allowed to vote and to
speak on all subjects which were not specially
referred to them at Dublin, then they would
remain an integral part of this Imperial realm ;
they would have their share In its privileges, and
their responsibility for Its burdens. In that case
the Imperial Parliament would be able to main
tain Its control over Imperial taxation in Ireland,
and, for all Imperial purposes, the- Parliament at
Westminster would speak for a United Kingdom.
I should like to see the case of Ulster met in some
form or other. I would be glad if it were found
possible to concede to Ulster — having regard to
the great distinctions which I have pointed out of
race, and religion, and politics — I would be glad
if there could be conceded to Ulster a separate
Assembly," Mr Chamberlain was, in fact, looking forward,
as he had said, when the present time of trial
should be over, to a future Liberal Reunion, with
out embittered memories or unkind reflections, so
that the great work in which the Party had
been unanimous might be resumed. The spirit
he displayed, not less than the arguments he
brought forward, obtained from his constituents a
vote of unabated confidence, which was opposed
by only two dissentients. Lord Hartington, it
should be noticed, had been less successful. He
was invited by the Liberal Council of the Rossen-
dale Division of Lancashire to explain his conduct
In voting against Mr Jesse Colllngs's Amendment,
as well as his attendance at the meeting held at

MR GLADSTONE'S CONCESSIONS 263
Her Majesty's Theatre. After hearing his very
able and temperate arguments, his constituents
declined either to censure him or express approval
of his course. They contented themselves with
thanking him for his speech, and hoping that
" such measures would be passed as would tend
to the peace and prosperity of Great Britain and
Ireland," The difference between the two cases
was that Lord Hartington had Identified himself
with the Opposition, while Mr Chamberlain had
only separated himself from the Government.
There was still a belief that Mr Chamberlain
and his immediate followers might be induced to
vote for the Second Reading of the Home Rule
Bill, the Debate on which had been fixed to begin
at so distant a date as loth May, In order to give
time for the Liberal Associations throughout the
country to bring pressure to bear on hesitating
representatives. A Manifesto was issued by Mr
Gladstone, on 3rd May, in which he practically
Intimated that the Land Bill was no longer to be
an essential article of the Liberal faith, and that
in the Home Rule Bill all questions of detail were
subsidiary. The only important thing was to
support the principle of establishing a Legislative
Body in Dublin "empowered to make laws for
Irish as distinguished from Imperial affairs,"
The effect of this declaration was instan
taneous. The obvious Inference was that, to
avert the threatened split In the Party, and
obtain a nominal concurrence in his proposals, the
Prime Minister was prepared to abandon his
Measure for the Session, on condition that its
principle should be accepted, and to bring forward
something different on another occasion. At this
moment Mr Chamberlain was nearly converted,
not Indeed to Home Rule as outlinecl In the Bill,

264 AS A HOME RULER
but to allowing the scheme to be peacefully
withdrawn after the Second Reading, He be
lieved that Its successor, if any were brought
forward, would be of a comparatively innocuous
and conciliatory character. At this moment, how
ever, an attack was made on his own stronghold,
the National Liberal Federation, That powerful
instrument of influencing opinion and organising
action had hitherto been almost in his hands.
No little part of his reputation among the Liberals,
and of the alarm with which he was regarded by
the Conservatives, rested, we know, on his being
the almost omnipotent " boss " of what was called
the " Birmingham Caucus," Two days after the
Prime Minister's astute Manifesto, Mr Chamber
lain's Influence in that body was rashly, if success
fully, attacked by the official Gladstonians at a
special meeting (held in London), when Mr J, E,
Ellis moved, and carried by an overwhelming
majority, a series of Resolutions promising un
conditional support to the Government,
Mr Chamberlain was menaced at the same
moment with a raid on Birmingham, but there at
least he was sure of his footing. To assault him
on his own ground — as has been discovered by
those who have tried to undermine his authority
in the Mldlands^ — Is not the way to bring him
round. Still, he was above all things anxious to
avert a definite rupture In the Liberal Party. At
this time, and for many months to come, his
object was to keep close touch with the Liberals
and Radicals throughout the country, and to
induce them to realise the danger of the scheme
which had been so suddenly sprung upon them.
If a sudden disruption of existing ties had taken
place. It seemed probable that Home Rule would
have become an entirely Party question, the vast

CAPTURE OF THE CAUCUS 265
bulk of the Liberals going one way, and the Con
servatives the other ; and In this case, sooner or
later, the Home Rulers would have had a majority,
whereas, he believed that, so long as a consider
able section of the Liberal Party could be pre
vented from accepting the scheme in its now
crystallised form, there was no chance that It
would pass into law. On 6th May he wrote a
letter to Mr T. H. Bolton, In which he said that
" the key of the position " was to maintain the
representation of Ireland In the Imperial Parlia
ment, and her full responsibility for all Imperial
affairs. This was not a detail that could be left
to " the hazards of Committee." It was a point
of " supreme importance," which must be " decided
on the threshold of discussion." But if this con
cession were made Mr Chamberlain expressed a
hope that the "present imminent danger of a
fatal breach In the ranks of the Liberal Party
might be happily averted." Though it is certain
that this — the nearest approach that Mr Chamber
lain ever made to giving way — was not brought
about by what had happened In the Caucus, it Is
equally clear that the deceptive success of Mr
John Ellis had stiffened the backs of Mr Glad
stone's advisers, who Induced him to refuse a
demand not more exigent than several others to
which he was quite ready to agree. They were
possessed by the notion that they might safely defy
Mr Chamberlain's influence in the country and in
Pariiament. They had previously reckoned his
following In the House of Commons at more
than fifty ; now, they reduced their estimate to
half-a-dozen. The last overture made by Mr Chamberlain
having been ignored, on 12th May he convened a
meeting of Liberals favourable to the " Home

266 AS A HOME RULER
Rule principle," but opposed to anything like the
present Bill. It was attended by fifty -two members
of the House of Commons ; and on the 14th an
Independent meeting was summoned by Lord
Hartington. Of the sixty-four who assembled
at Devonshire House, thirty-two, amongst whom
was Mr Chamberlain himself had been present at
the previous gathering. To the eighty - four
members thus accounted for nine others had to
be added, who had sent letters of sympathy ; and
the probability was that, eventually, the total of
"Dissentient Liberals" would mount Into three
figures. But the important thing was that Mr
Chamberlain and Lord Hartington agreed, for
the time, to act together, and vote against the
Second Reading. This result had been finally
brought about by the long-delayed response to
the demand for the retention of the Irish members
at Westminster. The night before, Mr Camp
bell-Bannerman had been put up to say that
the Government would give their most friendly
consideration to any suggestion for "enabling
the Irish members to take part In our discus
sions." But this foreshadowing of the famous
"in-and-out" proposal did not meet Mr Cham
berlain's objections, and when Mr Campbell-
Bannerman had finished, he " put up his notes in
his pocket," Mr Clayden records, "with an air of
disappointment and disgust, and glancing at Mr
Caine, shook his head and went away."
It has been suggested that at this time Mr
Chamberlain was playing to drive Mr Gladstone
into retirement, by defeating the Measure to
which he had pledged himself, and to rally the
bulk of the Liberals — who were by no means
enamoured of Home Rule for its own sake —
to the support of a Coalition Ministry of which

( ONSERVATI\'ES AND DISSENTIENT LIBERALS 267
Lord Hartington and himself would be the leading
members. There is this much, but no more,
ground for the imputation, that the possibility
of a Liberal-Unionist Ministry was openly dis
cussed In the newspapers ; and as members of
that imaginary Cabinet were mentioned, in addi
tion to Lord Hartington and Mr Chamberlain,
Mr Goschen, Sir Henry James, Mr Trevelyan,
Mr Courtney, Lord Selborne, the Duke of
Argyll, Lord Northbrook, Lord Carlingford, and
Lord Derby. Undeniably it would have been, so
far as ability goes, a strong Administration ; but
the project, so far as It had assumed definite shape,
had to be abandoned after Lord Salisbury's speech
on 15th May. He distinctly reminded the Con
servatives that theirs would be the greater part of
the votes to which the victory In the coming Divi
sion would be due, and plainly Intimated that the
responsibility of assuming office would belong to
themselves, not to the allies whose help they
received with a hearty welcome, and whom. In
turn, they were willing to assist so far as agree
ment might be possible.
Even without this unmistakable hint, both
Lord Hartington and Mr Chamberlain must
have realised that It would hardly be pleasant
for them, just at present, to work together
In the same Administration. The memory
of their previous differences In the Cabinet,
of their open controversies on the platform, was
still too fresh. It did not prevent them from co
operating against a common danger. No doubt
they could have struck out a modus vivendi;
but there must always have remained a certain
sense of insecurity In an alliance between the
typical representative of Whig principles and the
exponent of the Unauthorised Programme.

268 AS A HOME RULER
Besides, Lord Hartington was a declared
Unionist ; Mr Chamberlain was still. In principle,
a Home Ruler, and even on the last day of May
stated the case, at a Liberal- Unionist Conference,
in favour of abstaining from the Division. But
he accepted and endorsed, without reserve, the
general opinion of the meeting, and next day
pledged himself to vote against the Bill. From
the speech which he delivered that evening, in
pursuance of this decision, it may be interesting
to extract the passage in which he defended his
own action : —
" I have been assailed with extraordinary
bitterness because I have exercised an independent
judgment in a matter which I believe to be vital
to the Interests of the country. I have been told
that I am animated by personal spite and private
spleen. Yes ; I do not complain of hon. members
from Ireland taking that view and expressing it-
it is their habit of controversy. No one has ever
been opposed to them in politics but he has been
covered with virulent abuse and misrepresentation,
and none more conspicuously than Lord Spencer
and the Prime Minister, whom they are now load
ing with fulsome adulation. But I address myself
to my hon. friends round me, from whom I have
the misfortune to differ. I ask them to consider
whether it is really necessary to impute the basest
motives to public men at a time when there are,
on the surface, reasons perfectly honourable which
may sufficiently account for their conduct. Do
you say — do you dare to say — that my right hon.
friend and colleague in the representation of
Birmingham is animated by personal spleen and
spite ? He takes the same course as I do ; he is
going into the lobby against this Bill and against
the friend, the associate, and the Leader, whom he

FINAL DECLARATION 269
has followed with loyal devotion for many years of
his life. My right hon. friend has done us great
services, he has lived almost as long in public life,
as the Prime Minister himself, and no one has
doubted his honour.
" But you say that I am in a different
position. And why do you say that ? What
I am saying now I expressed In public — It is
in print — before the General Election, before I
was a member of the Government, before I had
the slightest conception that any idea of this kind
was fermenting then — if it were fermenting — In the
mind of the Prime Minister. I spoke at Warring
ton in September 1885, and, referring to the
demands of the hon. member for Cork, I said then
that if there were any party or any man who was
willing to yield to those demands in order to pur
chase his support, I would have no part in the
competition. And then many of my friends whom
I see around me thanked me In public for what
they thought that frank, plain, and courageous
declaration. And now, forsooth ! for having
made the same declaration some three months
later, when the occasion has arisen, they accuse
me of personal and unworthy motives. Sir, the
charge Is unjust ; the charge is ridiculous. For
there is not a man here who does not know that
every personal and political Interest would lead me
to cast in my lot with the Prime Minister. Why,
sir, not a day passes in which I do not receive
dozens or scores of letters urging me, for my own
sake, to vote for the Bill, and dish the Whigs !
Well, sir, the temptation is no doubt a great one,
but, after all, I am not base enough to serve my
personal ambition by betraying my country ; and
I am convinced, when the heat of this discussion
is passed. Liberals will not judge harshly those

270 AS A HOME RULER
who have pursued what they honestly believe to
be the path of duty, even though It may lead to
the disruption of Party ties, and to the loss of the
influence and power which it is the ambition of
every man to seek among his political friends and
associates." It was evident that none of the Liberals
who now formally separated themselves from Mr
Gladstone stood to lose so much by that step as
Mr Chamberlain : not Mr Bright, whose resigna
tion in 1882 had practically put him outside the
pale of candidates for office ; not Lord Hartington,
or Lord Selborne, or Mr Goschen, whose distrust
of the new elements in Liberalism had been
growing every year more pronounced, quite apart
from Home Rule ; not even Sir Henry James,
who refused the highest prize of his profession,
and showed that, even to an ambitious lawyer,
there are higher objects than the Woolsack. But
Mr Chamberlain gave up — when a httle paltering
with his conscience, a slight stretching of his
convictions, would have enabled him to retain —
not only his position as a member of the Cabinet,
but also a reasonably - assured reversion of the
Liberal Leadership. He turned away from
this briniant and alluring prospect at a time
when he was at equally open discord with Con
servatives and Moderate Liberals, and there
was little probability of his being admitted into
partnership with the adversaries of his late allies.
The long-deferred Division, after a Debate
spread out over a month, was taken on 7th June,
and Mr Gladstone was defeated by 30 votes —
343 against 313, 94 Liberals having gone into
the Opposition Lobby. The Prime Minister at
once realised that he must either abandon Home
Rule for the remaining Parliamentary term, or

THE BILL DEFEATED 271
appeal to the country. It is certain that he
entered on the General Election of 1886 In a
very sanguine spirit. Undoubtedly, he had come
to beheve with all his heart In the cause which
he had somewhat reluctantly taken up, and
he was advised by Mr Schnadhorst (the Caucus
secretary), who was admitted to a special meet
ing of the Cabinet, that the Irish vote in the
English Constituencies would be enough to out-
weisfh Liberal-Unionist Influence. If it had not
been for the ill-starred confidence with which Mr
Gladstone was inspired by Mr Morley 's enthusiasm
and Mr Schnadhorst's calculations, he might,
perhaps, even at the last moment, have patched
up a sort of peace In the Liberal Party.

CHAPTER IX
AS A UNIONIST
From the Election Address which Mr Chamber
lain issued to his supporters In Birmingham, It
win be seen that, even after having so largely con
tributed to Mr Gladstone's defeat, he still regarded
himself as a Home Ruler, though opposed to a
separate Irish Parliament. His co-operation with
Whigs and Conservatives was. In his own mind,
limited to resisting a particular scheme which they
disliked In common. " Liberal Unionists," he said,
" while determined in their opposition to a separate
Parliament for Ireland, are, nevertheless, anxious to
meet, as far as possible, the legitimate aspirations
of the I rish people, shared, as they believe them to
be, by Scotland and by Wales, for greater Inde
pendence in the management of their local affairs."
There were four points to be observed. First, the
relief of the Imperial Parliament by the devolution
of Irish local business ; second, the full representa
tion of Irish opinion on matters of local Irish
concern ; third, to give Irishmen a fair field for
legitimate local ambition and patriotism ; fourth,
by removing all unnecessary interference with Irish
government on the part of Great Britain, to
diminish the causes of irritation and the oppor
tunity of cohlslon. It would be necessary to
establish a complete system of Local Government

QUALIFIED HOME RULE 273
for the Three Kingdoms ; but, beyond and above
a purely Municipal arrangement of this kind, a
larger arrangement would be found safe and desir
able, under which, subject to the concurrent and
supreme authority of the Imperial Parliament, the
various portions of the United Kingdom should
be enabled to exercise greater influence over local
administration and over legislation for their special
needs and requirements. The Address concluded
with a spirited protest against the attempts made
to excommunicate all who were unable to repudiate
in a few months the opinions and convictions of a
lifetime. Mr Chamberlain believed, not only that such a
scheme might be acceptable in Great Britain, but
also that, though not accepted by the Nationalist
politicians, a full settlement on the above lines
would put an end to the general agitation in Ire
land. He declined, therefore, to join either in a
common propaganda, or in a temporary fighting
organisation, either with the Whig or Conserva
tive Unionists. The improvised National Radical
Union supplied all the machinery required by Mr
Chamberlain and his Immediate followers ; and In
the Birmingham district, from which his most
active colleagues were drawn, the question hardly
arose whether the Conservative vote should be
solicited or accepted. Mr Chamberlain himself,
Mr Bright, Mr George Dixon, Mr Powell
Williams, and Mr W. Kenrick were returned un
opposed ; and in Bordesley, where Mr Jesse Coll
ings had to fight for his seat, the majority was in
the proportion of four to one. But the Liberals
whose views were more nearly represented by
Lord Hartington or Mr Goschen assisted, and
were assisted by, the Conservatives all over the
country. There was practically no conflict, hardly
s

274 AS A UNIONIST
any competition, between the two Parties in the
Unionist combination. The result of the General
Election was that the English Gladstonians (194),
with the Nationalists (85), were In a minority of
-ii'] as compared with the Conservatives (316),
without counting on either side the 75 Dissentient
Liberals who followed either Lord Hartington or
Mr Chamberlain. The latter, therefore, if they
acted all together, were in a position either to give
the Conservatives a commanding majority, or to
turn them out of office at a moment's notlge.
On receiving the Queen's commands to form a
Ministry, Lord Salisbury's first care was to bind
the Liberal Unionists to a firm alliance with the
Conservatives. He carried this pohcy so far
that, with her Majesty's permission, he offered to
stand aside for Lord Hartington, and even to
serve in the same Ministry. There were several
reasons why Lord Hartington could not accept
the offer ; one was that the Conservatives, who
would constitute so large a portion of the pro
posed Coalition, evidently would not relish the
command being given to a Liberal Unionist ;
another was that If the Whig Unionists were
represented in the Cabinet the Radical Unionists
would not consent to be left out. Differing as
they did on many points. Lord Hartington and
Mr Chamberlain were agreed In the wish to use
a Conservative majority to promote Liberal
measures, and both believed that for the present
they would exercise more influence outside the
Ministry than if they gave a sort of security for
allegiance by taking office with Lord Salis
bury. Their own divergencies of opinion did
not matter so long as they each occupied the
position of an independent adviser to the Ministry.
But if they were Included In the same Cabinet

POWER WITHOUT OFFICE 275
they would have been forced either to sink or
settle their by no means unimportant differences.
It was right that the offer should be made by
Lord Salisbury, and equally right that it should
be declined. Only a few months had passed since
Lord Salisbury and Lord Hartington, Lord
Salisbury and Mr Chamberlain, Lord Hartington
and Mr Chamberlain, had been engaged In hold
ing each other up to the scorn or ridicule of excited
Party meetings. The betrayal of Gordon, the
doctrine of Ransom, the Unauthorised Programme
— these are ancient matters now ; but In 1886 they
were fresh in the minds of men who had been
exchanging charge and counter-charge, sneers
and epigrams. With the best wish in the world
to let bygones be bygones, some of the barbs
were still rankling ; the old rivalries would soon
have broken out again. The wiser thing was for
each Party to make trial of the other, and
afterwards. If possible — when they should have
settled down to harness together — to convert
their alliance into a Coalition.
The different attitudes assumed by Lord
Hartington and Mr Chamberlain were defined at
a meeting held at Devonshire House on the day
of the meeting ofthe new Pariiament (5th August).
A formal hope was expressed by the former that
the Liberal Party would again be united, but
that could only be done if Home Rule were
thrown over — a course which he seemed to regard
as within the range of probability. Meantime,
Liberal Unionists must support Lord Salisbury's
Government ; otherwise, they would defeat the
very object for which they had fought at the
General Election. Mr Chamberlain concurred
with Lord Hartington as to the immediate duty
of Liberal Unionists, but dwelt with considerable

276 AS A UNIONIST
emphasis on the prospects of a Liberal reconcilia
tion. He thought a basis of agreement might be
found with regard to the Irish Question. As a
sign that the Liberal Unionists did not consider
that they had ceased to be Liberals, they should
sit on the Opposition benches, alongside the Glad
stonians. There was not precisely a contrast
between the two speeches, but a certain difference
in tone showed that one ofthe Dissentient Leaders
was beyond negotiation, while the other was still
open to compromise.
But in the Debate on the Address, whatever
might be his feelings towards Mr Gladstone, Mr
Chamberlain now found himself at open Issue with
Mr Parnell — who had moved an Amendment
which was practically a vote of Censure on
Ministers — and was charged by Mr Sexton with
having proved more Tory than the Tories. The
extravagant abuse with which he was henceforth
assailed by the Nationalists was very useful to Mr
Chamberlain. It made him popular with just
that class of his countrymen who loathed his
general opinions. There must, it was felt, be
something good in a man who was so heartily
abused by the Irish members. The Nationahst
cause was at this time at a considerable discount
In England. Many of those who sympathised
with the demand for Home Rule were estranged
by the Plan of Campaign. Invented by Mr
Harrington, it had been taken up by Mr Dillon
and Mr O'Brien — much to the disgust of Mr
Parnell and some of his more cautious Irish
supporters. The undisguised dishonesty of the
object, and the cruel methods by which It was
pursued, had shocked not a few Gladstonians
who had been able to extenuate or ignore the
methods by which the Land League and the

LORD R. CHURCHILL'S RESIGNATION 277
National League had maintained their Illicit
authority. It is believed that some of the
English Home-Rulers In Parliament might have
been found In a "coming-on disposition" if they
had been approached at this time by the Liberal
Unionists. But the bulk of that Party were not
disposed to make such overtures. A meeting was
held in Wilhs's Rooms, at which Lord Harting
ton Insisted that the alliance with the Con
servatives must still be kept up ; and a somewhat
chilly reception was given to the advice, tele
graphed by Mr Chamberlain from abroad, that a
Conference should be proposed between the two
sections of the Liberal Party with regard to con
cessions to Ireland.
Almost at the end of the year, the question of
a formal Unionist Coalition was once again raised
In a practical form. Lord Randolph Churchill
had at last been taken at his word by Lord Salis
bury, and his resignation was accepted. Fot us,
who are wise after the event, it Is easy to see that
the Ministry were weh rid of that disturbing
genius. Lord Randolph hoped — what half the
Conservatives In the House of Commons believed
— that Lord Salisbury's Ministry were now on the
point of breaking up, and that If they did not take
him back on his own terms they would not survive
their second Session. In spite of his remarkable
ablHtles, and his power of getting good work from
his subordinates, he was not successful as a
Departmental Minister ; in the Cabinet he was
Intractable, but the general public, who judged
him purely on his public performances, knew him
only as the most effective platform speaker in
England and a singularly promising Leader of the
House of Commons.
In order to abate a quite irrational scare, and

278 AS A UNIONIST
restore the confidence of his demoralised followers.
Lord Salisbury once again invited the co-opera
tion of the Liberal Unionists, once again offered
to serve under Lord Hartington, and once again
was met with a refusal, though it was accompanied
with something like a pledge of general support.
The decision of Lord Hartington not to take
office was warmly approved by Mr Chamberlain,
whose confidence in Lord Salisbury's Adminis
tration had been severely shaken by the retire
ment of a politician for whom he had a warm
admiration ; with whom, in spite of occa
sional quarrels, he kept up a cordial friendship,
and whom he considered easily accessible to
Progressive influences. But by obtaining the
assistance of Mr Goschen, who accepted the
Chancellorship of the Exchequer, Lord Salis
bury recruited a Statesman who was but
nominally a Liberal Unionist — who was, in
fact, more cautious In his policy than some who
called themselves Tories. It was for his personal
qualities, his political sincerity, and his financial
reputation, that Mr Goschen — the man whom
Lord Randolph confessed he had forgotten — was
so important an accession to the strength of Lord
Salisbury's Government. But his acceptance of
office, though it made a sort of personal tie
between Conservative Ministers and Liberal
Unionists hke Sir Henry James, did nothing
to increase the confidence of the advanced
Reformers who followed Mr Chamberlain, or
even of those equahy positive, though less im
patient, Liberals who looked for guidance to Lord
Hartington. At the outset of Lord Salisbury's Second
Administration, It Is not unfair to say that the
Radical and the Liberal Unionist Leaders made

KEEPING AN EYE ON MINISTERS 279
It their chief business to keep an eye on the
Conservatives. They expected and Insisted that.
In return for the vote of their respective contin
gents in the House of Commons, they should be
taken into consultation, and given as much
voice in the settlement of policy as If they had
been actually admitted into the Cabinet. After a
time, both sides grew accustomed to a somewhat
anomalous arrangement, and It worked with un
expected smoothness. But In passing judgment,
whether favourable or depreciatory, on the con
duct of the 1 886- 1 892 Ministry, it is not right to
say, " The Conservatives did this," or " The Con
servatives refused to do that." Sometimes there
was a concession by the minority, e.g., when Lord
Salisbury had his way about Tithes ; sometimes —
and this was, as a rule, on the more important
matters — the yielding was done by the majority,
as In the instance of Free Education. But, in a
general way, the common policy was determined,
not by surrender on either side, but by fair give-
and-take. Meantime — i.e., before this understanding had
been tested In practice — Mr Chamberlain con
fessed, at Birmingham, that Lord Randolph's
resignation had weakened his faith in the
Government. That politician, he considered,
had risen superior to the old Tory traditions,
and, now that he was gone, Mr Chamberlain
feared a recourse to reactionary policy. It
was this feeling which, In part, at least, made
him throw out the strong hint that resulted
In the Round Table Conference. The Liberals,
he said, were agreed on ninety-nine parts of
their programme ; they disagreed only on one.
Even on the Land Question they were not far
apart.

280 AS A UNIONIST
"There Is the real grievance of Ireland, there
is the real problem we have to solve, and, believe
me, gentlemen," he said, "without solving this
Land Question, Home Rule Is impossible ; and I
believe that, if you solve it. Home Rule will be
unnecessary. Are we," he asked, " far apart upon
the principles which ought to guide a settlement
of the Land Question ? I think not. ... I am
convinced that, sitting round a table, and coming
together in a spirit of compromise and conciliation,
almost any three men — leaders of the Liberal
Party — although they may hold opposite views
upon another branch of the question, would yet be
able to arrange some scheme."
Mr (now Sir) H. H. Fowler declared that this
offer provided the basis of a reasonable com
promise ; and on 3rd January 1887, a letter from
Mr Gladstone to Sir William Harcourt was pub
lished in the Daily News, in which It was practi
cally accepted. Ten days later the Conference
met at Sir Wilham Harcourt's house — Sir William
Harcourt and Mr Morley for the Gladstonians,
Mr Chamberlain and Mr Trevelyan for the Radical
Unionists, and Lord Herschell to represent the
Open Mind. There is no need to go into the
history of those abortive negotiations. While
they were In progress — and they proceeded
smoothly at first — Mr Chamberlain was as un
reasonably eulogised by expectant Gladstonians as
he was denounced without cause by perfervid
Unionists. He had never pledged himself uncon
ditionally to either side, and he was logically and
morally quite at liberty to express — as he did — his
eager hope that a reunion might be effected.
That he was mistaken is sufficiently clear. He
had over-rated the importance of Lord Randolph's
secession from the Ministry, and under-estimated

THE ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE 281
the points of difference between the Home Rule
and Unionist faiths, even when each had been
rationalised down to the lowest working minimum.
Already, some rash Gladstonians had begun to
rejoice over his Impending recantation, and he had
to reply with some candid remarks about " political
mischief-makers " who were trying to Intimidate
Liberal Unionists with " threats of political ex
tinction." " Let there be no mistake," he said ; "we are
anxious, we are eager, for reunion. We are willing
to go a long way to meet our former friends. We
have laid ourselves open to much misconception
by making the first advance, but there are limits
to the concessions which can be made, which can
be demanded of us, and unless there Is an equal
reasonableness on the part of our former friends,
upon their shoulders must rest the responsibility
of the further disaster and confusion which will
fall upon the Liberal Party."
Lord Hartington and Sir Henry James were
not deceived, as Mr Chamberlain was — as he
never would have been but for his sudden alarm
for that Social Programme which has never
ranked second in his mind to any other cause,
except, perhaps, to that of maintaining the Union.
This was, in fact, Mr Chamberlain's last effort
to rejoin the Party which he had hitherto con
sidered the one better adapted, and more dis
posed, to carry Progressive legislation.
It is admitted on all hands now that the pur
pose of this Conference was, from the beginning,
an amiable mistake. It would be Impossible to
reconcile Sir William Harcourt's account of the
understanding on which the Conference met with
that given by Mr Chamberlain. Sir William's
view is that the establishment of a Dublin Parlia-

282 AS A UNIONIST
ment with an Executive dependent on it had been
taken as common ground, while Mr Chamberlain
contends that "not one word was said" about
such a scheme. The plans discussed were very
different ; e.g., a proposal to establish some system
of Provincial Authorities (on the model of the
Provincial Constitution of Canada) subordinate
to Imperial Parliament, and dealing only with
subjects specially referred to them, the Imperial
Parliament retaining a concurrent power of
making laws and levying taxes. Sir William
afterwards said that the negotiations broke down
because Mr Chamberlain was opposed, not to
Home Rule, but to Mr Gladstone ; Mr Chamber
lain accounted for the collapse by saying that be
hind the Liberal Leaders was " a power they dared
not face." Though the negotiations ended in an
exchange of recriminations, they seem to have
been commenced on both sides in perfectly good
faith. But how was compromise possible when
the delegates were pledged to contradictory
opinions on such essential points as whether
Imperial Parliament should be invested with an
effective Veto on the legislation of an Irish
Assembly? This power Mr Chamberlain was
bound, by ah his past expressions and present
convictions, to Insist upon ; and Mr Morley was
equally compelled, by his own genuine conversion
to Home Rule, and by the demands of his
Nationalist allies, to refuse.
On some other points that presented difficulty
— such as the separate treatment of Ulster and
the control of the Royal Irish Constabulary — a
working arrangement might conceivably have
been arrived at. But when a fundamental prin
ciple is involved, when both sides are sincere, and
neither can be Imposed upon by verbal shams,

FAILURE OF THE CONFERENCE 28,'.
this kind of palaver is but waste both of time and
temper. Of the former, not much was expended
— a great deal of the latter. After two or three
friendly meetings in January, an adjournment was
made till the middle of February, at which date
Sir George Trevelyan still believed that reunion
might be attainable. The fact was that Sir
George had been talked over, and Mr Chamber
lain had not.
A few days later, the Baptist published an
article by Mr Chamberlain, in which he showed
that Home Rule was leading to the Indefinite
adjournment of " all Liberal reform," Including the
Welsh Nonconformists' demand for Disestablish
ment, a Measure with which he expressed the
strongest sympathy. If the Welsh people, by
returning twenty-three out of their thirty members
to support Mr Gladstone, meant to express ap
proval of his Irish policy, they had " no right what
ever to complain of the delay of their hopes, and
they must wait patiently until the country has
changed Its mind, and is prepared to hand over the
minority in Ireland to the tender mercies of Mr
Parnell and the Irish League. Nor would they
be the only disappointed persons. The crofters
of Scotland and the agricultural labourers of
England will keep them company. Thirty-two
millions of people must go without much-needed
legislation because three millions are disloyal,
while nearly six hundred members of the Imperial
Pariiament will be reduced to forced Inactivity
because some eighty delegates, representing the
policy and receiving the pay of the Chicago
Convention, are determined to obstruct all busi
ness until their demands have been conceded."
If any hope still remained of Inducing Mr
Chamberlain to rejoin the official Liberals by

284 AS A UNIONIST
offering him terms that he could conscientiously
accept, it would have been dissipated by this
utterance, which gave them a pretext for saying
that he was impracticable.
Though friendly expressions were still used on
both sides, and though there really was a temporary
abatement of hostilities between the Home Rule
and the Unionist Liberals, it was by Mr Glad
stone's directions that Sir William Harcourt
wrote to Mr Chamberlain and suggested that the
Conference should be suspended for a time. The
reason assigned was that the Baptist article had
raised a storm which ought to be allowed to blow
over. The facts were that the points of difference
revealed were so radical that nothing could be
accomplished by further discussion ; and that Mr
Gladstone, knowing how sincere was Mr Chamber
lain's Radicalism, hoped that he would soon be
tired of co-operating with Conservatives.
Mr Chamberlain, naturally, accepted Sir
William's letter as an informal discharge of the
Conference, and told Sir George Trevelyan that
he should not go on with It. There was no longer
any hesitation about his attitude on Irish questions.
He voted against Mr Parnell's hostile Amendment
to the Address at the opening of the 1887 Session,
and against the Tenants' Relief Bill, and he sup
ported Mr Balfour's demand for "urgency" for
the Crimes Bill. Though never converted to
Coercion " as a policy," and always regarding it
as a " hateful incident," he realised that there could
be no order or liberty In Ireland so long as the
Plan of Campaign was allowed to continue ; and he
was particularly disgusted by the covert menaces
which Mr Parneh had ventured to throw out.
Never, in recent times, has Party spirit in England
worked more hotly, more savagely, than about

REUNION DESPAIRED OF 285
Eastertide of 1887. The Nationahsts realised
that they would be beaten, unless they could
intimidate the Government Into dropping the
repressive Measure which was being hurried for
ward by the Chief Secretary — which Mr Glad
stone, throwing himself heart and soul into the
agitation, described as "the worst, the most in
sulting, the most causeless Coercion Bill ever sub
mitted to Parliament." The sting of It was that
it was not limited in duration, and that, being
once armed with the powers they demanded,
Ministers would not again be put to the trouble
and odium of forcing a similar Bill through the
House of Commons. On the other hand, the
Coercion could be suspended — on the discretion
of the Executive— in any district where it seemed
no longer necessary ; and before Mr Balfour had
ceased to be Chief Secretary he was to have the
pleasure of announcing that it was dormant
throughout Ireland, except In a few neighbour
hoods still liable to agrarian disturbance. Granted
that the need for exceptional measures had been
established, It must be admitted that no more
elastic or more effective scheme could have been
proposed. Mr Chamberlain's views are defined with suffi
cient accuracy In the speeches which he delivered
In Birmingham and Edinburgh ; the one on 29th
January 1887, before the introduction of the
Crimes Bill ; the other, on 15th April, after it had
been passed. To his constituents he remarked,
"that certain Radicals lately had been preaching
a doctrine which was inconsistent with true
Radical principles — e.g., that it was a duty, as
well as a right, to disobey a bad law. There
were cases, no doubt, in which a man would be
justified In offering passive resistance, taking all

286 AS A UNIONIST
the consequences and making all the sacrifices
involved. For Instance, If Church rates were
reimposed, he would himself refuse to pay them :
he would allow his goods to be taken into execu
tion. But he would not barricade his house,
would not throw hot water on the police, would
not shoot the parson from behind a hedge, would
not denounce the ministers of the law who were
simply doing their duty, and would not hold them
up to vengeance if he came into power. To
justify a violent resistance to any law that one
disapproves is destructive of all law. No law
was ever passed which the law-breakers did not
consider bad. Such a theory made every man
judge in his own case — -free to do what was right
in his own eyes. No, a bad law should be amended,
but while it was law It must be respected— as
being the collective expression of society, the one
security of the weak against the strong, the safe
guard of the few against the many."
"If (he said) you destroy the law, which Is
the highest expression of the Democratic idea of
Equality, you will have to take your choice between
Anarchy on the one hand and Despotism on the
other, and to my mind It is a suicidal course for
any Radical to lay sacrilegious hands on this great
edifice of our freedom. What Is the state of
things in Ireland ? In Ireland the law is violently
resisted and openly abused. It is not the law of
rent or the law of evictions which Is In question.
Those are the laws which may be, which I think
ought to be, amended, in order that they may be
made less stringent and more merciful, but it Is
the law against assassination, the law against
intimidation, the law against theft which is habitu
ally violated. For this violation there is no
excuse. I am not prepared, even In this state of

ON LAW AND ORDER 287
things, to support what can properly be described
as coercive legislation — that is to say, such
measures as the establishment of Martial Law or
the suspension of Habeas Corpus, or any legisla
tion generally restricting the liberty of the subject.
But if it be necessary, in order that the law should
be respected, to amend and strengthen the ordi
nary law of the country, I am prepared to give
fair and full consideration to any proposal which
may be made to that effect. And I will fortify
myself by a quotation from an authority that
cannot be suspected of any tenderness to coercive
measures or of any lack of sympathy with Ireland.
'Murder and outrage,' says this gentleman, 'are
not to be allowed In Ireland, any more than they
are to be allowed anywhere else. If there is a
general attack on property all along the line it
must be resisted. The question is how you are
to suppress and punish murder and outrage, and
how the Government is to deal with an organised
attack on property. The answer is, by a vigorous
execution of the law as It stands and by a regular
and formal alteration of the law If it demands
alteration.' That is a quotation from the writings
of my friend Mr John Morley — -the late Chief
Secretary of Ireland — and in the spirit of that
quotation I am, as I always have been, prepared
to act," The speech at Edinburgh marked Mr
Chamberlain's assent, reluctant though it was, to
the proposals of the Government : —
" In Ireland at the present time there are two
Governments, two systems of criminal law and
procedure, two codes of crime and punishment.
You have on the one hand the Government
of the Queen, which Is the security for law and
order and the protection of the lives and property

288 AS A UNIONIST
of all classes of Her Majesty's subjects. You
have on the other hand the government of the
League, subsidised and guided by the money of
the Convention of Chicago, You have on the
one hand a law of the land, under which this
country has developed its liberties and secured
Its great position as the first nation In the world.
On the other hand, you have the unwritten law,
which has never been publicly discussed, and
which is so contrived as to lend itself to the objects
of private vengeance and of rebellious faction.
Lastly, you have on the one hand the official,
the judicial tribunal of the United Kingdom, with
its system, which has been built up by generations
of intelligent and patriotic men, and which Is so
contrived as to afford protection In all cases to
the innocent ; and on the other hand you have
a secret tribunal executing their judgments by
masked assassins, and meeting out without appeal
the punishment of fine and torture and death.
You will either have to suppress and put down
this illegal combination or this Illegal com
bination will suppress your Government."
In spite of the efforts, described In the next
Chapter, which Mr Chamberlain, at the risk of
irritating his Conservative allies, made for the relief
of Irish tenants' grievances, he was at this time
more disliked and reviled by the Nationalists than
any other Unionist in Parliament Nor was he
sparing of taunts in reply. Peculiar exasperation
was caused by his account, given at Inverness, of
a "scene" in the House of Commons, In the
course of which Colonel Saunderson accused the
Irish members of being friendly with murderers —
and, Mr Chamberlain said, accused them truly.
The point of that remark lay in the fact that the
first "Parnell Letter" (about the Phcenix Park

THE TURNING-POINT 289
murders) had recently been published by The
Times, and at this time both Parties seem to
have lost their heads. Many Unionists, reason
able men In ordinary times, said and believed that
most of the Irish members were little better than
assassins, and the Parnellites retorted by charging
their accusers with forgery and wilful slander.
The violence of pubUc feeling on both sides
would have made it difficult. If any desire had
still existed in Mr Chamberlain's mind, to return
to his old associates. The final breach, so he
regarded It, was caused by a speech of his old
friend, Mr Morley. " How can we. In the midst
of the heat of protest against this disastrous and
shameful pohcy of Coercion," Mr Morley asked,
"hurry forward to reconcile ourselves with our
Dissentient friends, who are In the main respon
sible for fastening this policy on Ireland? How
can we hurry forward to unite with Statesmen who
not only support the general policy of Coercion,
but doggedly, defiantly, and steadfastly go into the
Division Lobby against any modifications of It,
and In favour of making the Bill as drastic as
they can ? "
This, Mr Chamberlain replied, was "the
turning-point." The cleavage, he said on ist
June, had become Irreparable, and he was driven
to the conclusion that on the Gladstonian side
there was no longer any desire for reunion. It
was in this speech that he used an expression
which has been so often thrown In his teeth — as
though it showed that his Unionist policy had been
influenced by social ambition. But the context
shows that the offending phrase, " English gentle
men," was only used by way of antithesis : " We
shall be taunted, I suppose, with an alliance with
the Tories. At least, our allies will be English
T

290 AS A UNIONIST
gentlemen, and not the subsidised agents of a
foreign conspiracy. I look beyond mere Party
considerations. The Government may be Tory,
but, if its measures are Liberal, I am prepared to
discuss them on their merits, and without regard
to past controversies."
On 14th June a meeting of Radical Unionists
was held at Willis's Rooms, in which Mr Chamber
lain attempted to define their political position.
They did not want, he said, to be absorbed In
the Old Toryism, which was a dying creed ; they
did not intend to surrender to the New Radicalism,
which was an English imitation of Nihilism,
whose only dogma was opposition to all Govern
ment and all Authority. When they had
secured their position they would be ready to ally
themselves with any persons — whether they called,
or had hitherto called, themselves Conservatives
or Liberals or Radicals — who accepted the same
principles as their own, and were prepared to
carry out the same objects by Constitutional
objects. As to Mr Gladstone's latest offer to Lord
Hartington, Mr Chamberlain felt some dehcacy
in alluding to it. He was not himself included in
the invitation. Indeed, he was glad to be
relieved from all responsibility for further negotia
tions. But he had perfect confidence in Lord
Hartington, "In relation to that matter," both in
his consistency and firmness. He was not likely
to compromise Unionist principles. If Lord
Hartington saw his way to any agreement, the
Radical Unionists would have no difficulty in
following him. Personally, however, he was no
longer sanguine about reconciliation with the
Gladstonian Party.
The position now occupied by Mr Chamber-

A MISSION TO AMERICA 291
lain was both anomalous and uncomfortable. He
was at open issue with the Gladstonians, he was
out of harmony with the Conservatives, and he
was by no means at one with the Hartingtonian
Unionists except on the single great question. Nor
could he always reconcile himself to the various
applications of the Crimes Act demanded by the
Irish Executive. It had been decided to proclaim
the National League ; and Mr Chamberlain,
beheving there was "no emergency In Ireland,"
not only abstained from supporting Ministers,
when the question was brought up by Mr Glad
stone, but, with a few other Unionists, voted with
the Opposition. It was in every way desirable. If
the opportunity offered Itself that he should with
draw, for a time, from the personal controversies
in which he had been so warmly engaged on one
side, without having finally attached himself to
the other.
It was at this juncture that a tiresome, old-
standing dispute between Great Britain and the
United States, with regard to the North American
Fisheries, suggested to Lord Salisbury that the
assistance of a Statesman who was also a man
of business would be especially welcome. The
Washington Government had agreed to the
appointment of a new Commission, and Mr
Chamberlain was asked, and agreed, to represent
Great Britain. Invested with this modern equiva
lent for the old Libera Legatio, it was hoped that
he would be removed, in a complimentary fashion,
from the embarrassments of his political situation,
and that, when he returned. It would be easier
for him to drop into what now was coming to
appear his more natural place as one of the
Liberal Unionist Leaders, but in definite alliance
with the Conservative Ministry.

292 AS A UNIONIST
Before starting on his Important Mission, he
naturally paid a visit to his constituents in Bir
mingham, where he delivered a vigorous speech
in defence of the Government policy. This he
followed up with a pohtical tour in Ulster.
Though Mr Chamberlain had never declared
that the Ulstermen would be justified in taking up
arms against a Nationalist Parliament in Dublin
— a course which many of the Orangemen declared
that they would follow — he had always, even in
his Home Rule days, recognised the importance
of their claims. He was prepared, it was well
known, to remove Ulster from the jurisdiction of
the Irish National Council which he had proposed
in Mr Gladstone's Cabinet. Now, as a Unionist,
he regarded their objections to Home Rule as a
fatal argument against it. In the House of
Commons in June 1886, it was remembered
that he had defended the Protestants of
Ulster from the charge of being "unpatriotic
and unsympathetic." Why were such epithets
applied to them ? " Because they are proud
to belong to a greater country ; because
they take their share in the autonomy of the
United Kingdom in which they have a part ;
because they cling to the traditions and the history
of the United Kingdom, which is just as much
their possession and heritage as It is ours ; because
they refuse to be cast adrift and cut away from the
hopes and associations which they have hitherto
cherished. I suppose if my right honourable
friend had been a Frenchman he would have
denounced the people of Alsace and Lorraine as
unsympathetic and unpatriotic, when they refused
to be reunited to Germany and when their hearts
turned towards the great country from which they
were forcibly separated. I suppose if he had been

THE VISIT TO ULSTER 293
an Italian he would have denounced those members
ofthe Savoyard community who did their utmost
to prevent the transfer of their country to France ;
and loyalty must indeed be at a discount when a
passionate allegiance to the unity of the kingdom
Is made a moral offence and crime by a Minister
of the Crown. . . . Now, is it a fact that the
Ulster Protestants do fear for their material and
their religious interests ? There is no doubt
whatever about it in the mind of any man who
reads the papers or attends public meetings or
knows anything at all about the state and condition
of Protestant Ulster. But was I right to say they
had some reason for it ? Well, I belong to an
extreme section of the Liberal Party, who have,
all my political life, joined with those who would
destroy every shred of religious ascendancy, by
whatever sect it may be claimed. But then I
think that gives me, and those who think with me,
the right to protest against the substitution of one
form of religious ascendancy for another, and I
say that the Catholic Church, by Its tenets and by
its faith, is bound not to be content with equality,
but to demand predominance."
The men of Ulster gave, of course, a warm
welcome to so thorough-going and effective a
champion. As a hard-headed race they were
especially pleased with his statistical demonstra
tion (Belfast, nth October 1887) that Loyalists
were not fairly represented in Parliament — only
by 17 members against 86 who represented
" Sedition." Even in Ulster the Loyalists had
only gained 16 out of 33 seats. Yet at the
General Election no more than 73,000 votes had
been recorded for Parnellites, while 89,000 had
been given to Unionists. Under a system which
treated Ulster like the other three Provinces, it

294 AS A UNIONIST
would have 38 members, of whom 21 would be
Loyalists and only 17 would be Home Rulers.
This argument, pointing as It did to a more
equitable distribution of political power in the
future, was even more gratifying to the Ulster-
men than the general compliments which their
visitor paid them. The Irisih population, he said,
was divided into a majority of 3,000,000 or
perhaps 3,500,000, who desired a great experi
ment, while the minority of 1,500,000 or 2,000,000,
who resisted it, comprised ah the cultivated intel
ligence of the country, the greatest part of its
enterprise, and a large proportion of its wealth.
Again, at Coleralne, on 13th October, he
declared in unequivocal terms against any form
of Home Rule. It would only lead to Separation.
It was no good for those who supported the
former to say that they did not intend the latter.
"I do not care a brass button," he said, "what
the intentions of these gentlemen are. What I
know is what will be the result of their pohcy ;
and whether they like it, or whether they mean It
or not- — -as to which we may have grave doubts —
I am perfectly certain that the creation of a
practically independent Parliament in Dublin
would be followed within a few months by the
absolute independence of Ireland and the absolute
severance of Ireland from Great Britain. That,
therefore, is the issue that we have to discuss.
We need not consider plans of Home Rule which
are accepted as instalments by the Nationalist
Party. We have to consider what would be the
result, upon your interests and our interests, of
absolute separation between the Three Kingdoms.
Well, the first reflection which presents itself to
our minds is that what Ireland most wants at the
present time is capital to develop its resources.

THE NEEDS OF IRELAND 295
It wants capital to complete Its communications,
to enable the industrious farmers of Ireland to
bring their produce to market under the most
favourable circumstances. In Great Britain you
have capital and to spare ; millions and millions
of money would be constantly seeking investment
which frequently find very bad investments in
foreign countries— whose Interests English capital
has done so much to promote. If Ireland were
peaceable and settled, if there were a certainty of
permanent order and security, this capital would
be poured into Ireland, and would Immediately lead
to a great Improvement In all the industries of the
country, and especially in the agricultural Interest,
upon which so many of you depend. But do you
believe, do you think, that capitahsts, who are the
most timid of men, are going to send their money
into Ireland, to unbutton their pockets at a time
when the persons who claim the future govern
ment of Ireland, and declare that It will be in
their hands In the course of a few months, are
doing everything in their power to show that the
law is only made to be broken, and that no con
tract is sacred? I say, then, that this agitation,
and stin more any practical result of the agitation,
is doing much to destroy the credit of Ireland,
and thereby to injure every one of you."
The visit to Ulster had an excellent effect in
that Province. It helped to calm the exaspera
tion of the Orange Party against what they
considered the callous indifference of ordinary
Enghsh pohticlans, and It brought home to
people of this country the practical impossibility
of establishing an Irish Government to which
one-third of the population would be bitterly
hostile and openly disobedient. On the other
hand, it did not assist Mr Chamberlain's

296 AS A UNIONIST
mission to Washington. The animosity of the
Nationalists was roused to fury by his openly
fraternising with their sworn foes ; and the word
went forth that the American Irishmen were to
thwart his Diplomatic undertaking at Washing
ton. Unwisely, perhaps — Mr Chamberlain does,
occasionally, let his temper betray him into telling
truths that were better unspoken — he referred to
this vindictive plot. The publicity thus attracted
to the threat compelled the persons thus exposed
to make their word good.
It is unnecessary here to go into the history
of the North American Fisheries question. In
1887 it was already more than a century old.
Although the United States Government had
pressed to an extreme the rights which they
possessed under various Treaties, and sometimes
strained them beyond any rational interpretation
of the terms, it cannot be pretended that the
Dominion Parliament had proved accommodating.
After a careful Inquiry into all the facts, and
a study of the whole situation, extended over
some three months, Mr Chamberlain arranged
with the American and Canadian representa
tives a fairly equitable compromise. Nor was
it without difficulty that Mr Chamberlain in
duced the Dominion Government to make the
concessions necessary to give the Americans a
motive for coming to an agreement.
The proposals were, briefly, to reckon the
Three-mile Limit in bays and creeks, not from
headland to headland, but by an imaginary line
drawn across the entrance at the first point when
the width did not exceed ten miles. American
fishermen were allowed to enter Canadian ports
and harbours for the purpose of loading, reload
ing, and obtaining supplies — rights which had

FISHERIES CONVENTION WRECKED 297
been very severely restricted in the 1818 Treaty.
They were even permitted to buy bait In Canada,
but only on condition that the taxes on Canadian
fish products were abandoned by the United
States. The draft Treaty was signed at Wash
ington, but the Republican majority in the Senate,
partly to keep the I rish- American vote, and partly
to harass Mr Cleveland's Administration, refused
to ratify it.
No practical harm was done by this perversity.
Fortunately, the Commission had arranged a
modus vivendi which averted all friction, and
which has remained In force to the present time.
The rejection of the Treaty was, however,
represented as a personal rebuff to Mr Cham
berlain, and made a subject of exultation by his
adversaries. But Lord Salisbury, who appre
ciated the difficulties with which our Envoy
had to contend, was much Impressed with the
Diplomatic ability he had displayed, and it
was, no doubt, on his advice that the Queen
offered to reward Mr Chamberlain's services
with a high titular distinction — an honour
which was gratefully declined. But the per
sonal importance of this prolonged American
visit was not limited to the objects for which
It had been undertaken. Mr Chamberlain,
who had been a widower since 1875, '^^'^ became
engaged to Miss Mary Endicott, daughter of
Hon. W. Endicott, Secretary of War in Mr
Cleveland's Administration, to whom he was
married on 15th November 1888.
With regard to the Special Commission
appointed in 1888 to investigate and report on
the charges brought by The Times against Mr
ParneU and the Nationalist Party in general, Mr
Chamberlain — though he held that the authenticity

298 AS A UNIONIST
ofthe letters attributed to the Irish Leader ought
to be strictly Investigated — was also of opinion
that the Inquiry should not be limited to that topic,
but should cover the whole ground of the general
Indictment. Although Sir William Harcourt, and
other Gladstonians, went far beyond the mark
when they declared that he was the main instigator
of the action taken by the majority of the House
of Commons, there is no doubt that he sincerely
believed in at least the great bulk ofthe accusations.
That the documents relating to Mr Parneh In
particular had been published In good faith was
sufficiently clear ; but It was difficult to understand,
if he were a maligned man, why he was so obsti
nately reluctant to take the ordinary legal measures
for his own vindication. Though he was to
be exonerated by the dramatic exposure of
Richard PIgott, little blame can be attached
to Unionists — and many English Home Rulers —
who had previously believed that Mr Parnell was
the author of the incrlrninating letters.
The momentary and strictly personal triumph
which the Irish Leader achieved before the
Commission did not, however, relieve him from
his full share of the cohectlve guilt proved
against his Party. Nor had Mr Chamberlain
any difficulty in showing, when the Report
of the three Judges was under discussion
in the House of Commons In 1890, that the
Nationalists were unable to claim an acquittal.
There could be no " picking and choosing " among
the findings of the Tribunal ; and he dwelt effec
tively on the intimate connection which had been
established between some members of the Irish
Parliamentary Party and the Physical Force con
spirators In America, whose object was to assassi
nate public men in this country and lay the chief

THE IRISH A KEPT PARTY 299
cities of Great Britain in ruins. Hitherto such
charges had been brought igainst the Nationalists
only by their opponents, and might on that
account carry less general authority. The case
was now altered when those allegations had been
proved before a Judicial Tribunal, and put on
record by the Judges,
After an utterance like this. It was clear that
there could no longer be any peace or truce
between Mr Chamberlain and the Parnellites.
They had long regarded him with a personal vin
dictiveness which they did not extend to other
Unionists, nor has he been slow to retort upon
them. No phrase, perhaps, has given deeper
offence than the one In which he described them
as a " Kept Party," But, In spite of the bitter
recriminations exchanged In Parliament and on
the platform. It Is to Mr Chamberlain's credit
that, during the hottest period of controversy, he
always sought to modify the rigours of imprison
ment in the case of adversaries who had brought
themselves within the grasp of the Law. It
was with his hearty approval that Mr Balfour
decided, in 1889, to sanction certain relaxations of
gaol discipline in favour of political prisoners as
distinguished from ordinary offenders. Those
who know Mr Chamberlain best. Including those
who have quarrelled with him, admit that, however
sharply he may use his tongue, he does not hug
his resentments. Otherwise, it would have been
Impossible for him to work in harmony either
with Lord Salisbury or Lord Hartington, and, on
the testimony of both of these old adversaries, he
was a good colleague, both In Opposition and in
Office. As for the Irish members, he is, probably,
surprised that they bear him any ill-will. He had
worked hard and made no slight sacrifices before

300 AS A UNIONIST
1885 in the Home Rule cause, and even after the
split in the Liberal Party he had steadily advocated
all Measures calculated to advance the material
prosperity of Ireland. Quite recently it came on
him as something like a moral shock when he
learned that a very prominent member of the
Nationalist Party had used language about him
in America which would have been criminally
punishable in England. He took it very much
amiss that one of the Colonial Premiers, dis
tinguished for his Imperiahst oratory, shortly
afterwards sat down to dinner with the author
of that brutal expression. For himself, Mr
Chamberlain is conscious towards Ireland of
nothing but good intentions and services ren
dered. As for personal disputes with the
Nationalist members of Parliament, he has long
ago forgotten them, and wonders that they have
not forgiven him.

CHAPTER X
CONSERVATIVE-RADICAL LEGISLATION, 1 886- 1 892
Rigid and consistent Tories who, as we have
seen, resented and even rebelled against some
of the Measures proposed by the Second Salis
bury Administration, were apt to forget that
the Government were not answerable only to
the Conservative Party. The General Election
of 1886 had, Indeed, resulted in a signal defeat of
Mr Gladstone, but the position was not without
embarrassment for the victors. Lord Salisbury
had no choice but to take office without a
majority In the House of Commons. Though
the Conservatives outnumbered by 40 the com
bined Gladstonians and Parnellites, the balance
might at any moment be turned against Ministers
by the vote of the Dissentient Liberals. Some
of them, we have seen, attached themselves
without reserve to Lord Hartington, some adhered
to Mr Chamberlain, while others professed a
double allegiance, and attended the conferences
held by either of the Leaders. Anomalous as
the position of this last group was in some
respects, it was these rather fluid politicians who
eventually brought about the formation of a
solid Liberal Unionist Party, and enabled their
Chief to treat on almost equal terms with the
Conservative Prime Minister. But for their
301

302 CONSERVATIVE-RADICAL LEGISLATION
restraining influence, the Radical Unionists might
have drifted away from the Whig Unionists. It
is true that Mr Chamberlain had made haste to
declare that he should regard Lord Hartington as
his own Leader. Though no doubt was enter
tained as to the good faith of this promise, it was
only understood to apply to the question of Home
Rule, and to mean that he would not personally
assent to any compromise on that issue without
taking his Unionist colleague into confidence and
consultation. But a limited co-operation of this
character was by no means the same thing as
a fusion of Parliamentary forces.
Not many months had passed since Mr
Chamberlain had been engaged in disputes
with Lord Hartington as acute as with Lord
Salisbury. Practically, the only object as to
which they were In hearty accord was that
nothing should be done by either that might
restore Mr Gladstone to power. Even on this
point, though there was no misunderstanding,
there was not absolute agreement. Though
Lord Hartington had not formally shut the door
against negotiations with his late Chief, his
attitude on Home Rule was so uncompromising
that no arrangement was practicable. But,
as has already been shown. It was not until the
year 1887 was well advanced that Mr Chamberlain
openly renounced his last hope of a compromise
and reconciliation, Even after he had thus
burnt his boats, it was felt that matters would
work more smoothly In Parliament, both for
himself and his allies, if he were to with
draw for a time from the scene of almost
daily conflict. The vehement animus which he
throws Into controversy, and the answering
passion he excites, did not help the Government

MR CHAMBERLAIN'S DEMANDS 303
to pass or administer the exceptional legislation
which they considered necessary for Ireland.
Nor amongst the Conservatives themselves
was there harmony- — -or the semblance of it. The
extraordinary aptitude which Lord Randolph
Churchill displayed as Leader of the House of
Commons, and the readiness with which he
adapted his experience as a guerrilla to the
requirements of official generalship, by no
means made up for the disturbing influence he
exercised in the councils of the Party. Not
until Lord Randolph had retired was Lord Salis
bury master in his own Administration, and he
had already been compelled to part with Lord
Iddesleigh — the representative of that Moderate
Conservatism which the Tory Democrats had
set themselves to extinguish. If after several
months of hardly concealed strife, the Prime
Minister had rid his Cabinet of an intolerable
incubus, he had yet to reckon with Lord
Randolph's following in the House of Commons.
In some respects their ideas of domestic policy
were as advanced as those of the Birmingham
Radicals. Indeed, Mr Chamberlain had confessed
that his hopes of Progressive legislation under a
Conservative Government were seriously shaken
by Lord Randolph's resignation.
It was on this account, perhaps, that during
the early period of the Unionist aUIance he was far
more difficult to deal with than when a few years'
experience of the modus vivendi had convinced
him that the main body of the Conservatives, some
times at the sacrifice of their own principles, were
resolved to carry out their part of the political
bargain. It was, of course, a quite Informal under
standing, and might be renounced on either side at
the shortest notice. What was called the Unionist

304 CONSERVATIVE-RADICAL LEGISLATION
Compact — a definite arrangement, so far as it
went — did not relate to general policy. It was
simply an agreement that the Conservatives and
Liberal Unionists should work together in any
Constituency where a vacancy might occur, and
that no member of either Party should be
accepted as candidate for a seat which had
hitherto been represented by a member of the
other Party.
It was, therefore, only to be expected while the
relations between the Radical Unionists and the
Conservative Party were still undefined, and while
Mr Chamberlain himself occupied an anomalous
position which he had to justify to his own follow
ing, that he would be somewhat exacting In his
demands on the Government. To tell the truth,
he drove a number of rather hard bargains with
Lord Salisbury, whose regular supporters hinted,
not obscurely, that they were paying too high a
price for the Midlands vote. No complaint was
made as to the Instalment of Merchant Shipping
legislation which enabled Mr Chamberlain to
carry out a part of the proposals that had
miscarried In 1884 when he Was President of
the Board of Trade. Nor did the stoutest Tory
object to the salutary and reasonable provisions
of the Mines Regulation Act of 1887, or to the
Measure, passed in the same Session, for facili
tating the acquisition of Allotments and Cottage
Gardens. Indeed, many Conservatives were
actively in favour of a scheme that might
possibly help in some slight degree to counteract
the steadily growing exodus from Village to
Town, and which under no conceivable circum
stances could do harm either to landlords or
farmers. This first, and far the most modest,
portion of Mr Chamberlain's formidable agrarian

SMALL HOLDINGS BILL 305
programme the Conservatives accepted almost
with acclamation, nor did they hesitate to claim
as much credit for the Measure as if they had
been the authors of It. The Sanitary Authori
ties were henceforth empowered to acquire land
for the purpose of making Allotments and
Cottage Gardens, and, when the machinery pro
vided was proved by experience to be more
cumbrous and costly than had been expected,
an Amending Act was passed (1890), which
simplified some of the formalities, and consider
ably reduced the expense.
There was more diversity of opinion expressed,
though no serious opposition was offered, with
regard to the Small Holdings Act of 1892 —
passed, almost undlsguisedly, in view of the
General Election. Conservatives would have
good reason to rejoice In the establishment of a
thriving class of yeomen-farmers, but, even In the
North of England, where the "statesmen" have
lingered on, they are, as a rule, only drawing a
meagre subsistence from the soil. The attempt
to revive a languishing form of industrial life was
not regarded as hopeful by country gentlemen
who enjoyed practical acquaintance with the
conditions of modern, and more or less scientific,
agriculture. The experts openly prophesied
failure, and politicians with memories that ran a
few years back did not forget that Lord Salisbury
had described the proposal as characteristic of
"an Inveterate Cockney"- — a phrase which Mr
Chamberlain had very warmly resented. More
over, there was danger that the value of large
farms might be materially diminished If the land
most easily accessible from a village were cut off
for the benefit of small proprietors. The experi
ment was not to Lord Salisbury's taste, and, when
u

306 CONSERVATIVE-RADICAL LEGISLATION
he yielded to the representations of his Radical
supporters. It was not with the best of graces,
though, naturally, he would have welcomed any
proposal which he thought at all likely to lead to
the establishment in this country of such an
element of Constitutional stability as Is provided
In Republican France by the existence of a large
class of peasant-proprietors. But the crops
which lend themselves easily to la petite culture
are not found profitable in the climate of England,
wiiile the demand here for land, in the neighbour
hood of towns large enough to offer a fair market,
is so strong that, as a rule, the rent can only be
paid by a farmer who has some knowledge of
scientific agriculture and is able to use expensive
machinery. Conservatives, therefore, had excellent reasons
for looking coldly on the political arguments
employed in favour of the Small Holdings Bill,
though they might have spared themselves
the apprehension which they entertained as
to its prejudicial effect on large estates. It has
done neither harm nor good because, practically,
it has been Ignored. A different result might
perhaps have been recorded but for a long series
of more or less unfavourable seasons, and the
increasing competition with cheap foreign pro
ducts. Since the Act came Into operation, the
farmers in almost every part of England have
been struggling for a bare livelihood, while the
vihage labourers and small tradesmen or artisans
have felt no temptation to risk their savings in so
unpromising a business. Even the Allotment
system has not made as much progress as was ex
pected. At one time the villagers were eager
enough to take up small parcels of land, and
ijianaged to pay good rents, but as soon as they

RELIEF OF IRISH TENANTS :307
discovered that It was unprofitable to grow corn
their interest in Allotments began to wane ; and
though the movement has not been absolutely a
failure, and in some counties even shows signs of
possible development, the general results have been
confessedly disappointing. Nothing has been
accomplished towards checking the increasing
exodus from the villages. All the most capable
young men, either because they desire to Im
prove their position, or simply because they wish
to get more bustle and gaiety out of life, seize
the first chance of employment in the towns.
The prospect of acquiring Small Holdings tempts
them not at all, and on the Allotments and
Cottage Gardens it is not common to find able-
bodied men at work. The cultivation is left to
women, children home from school, and old men
past earning regular wages. So far as it helps
to keep the veterans off "the parish," the exten
sion of Allotments has been beneficial, but It has
done little, if anything, to enlist recruits for rural
industry. The attempts which have been made
to cheapen and simplify the transference of real
property have been so half-hearted, and the
demand for such reform on the part of those
who would seem to be most interested in obtain
ing it has been so ineffective against the covert
opposition of the conveyancers, that it is impos
sible to say whether this part of the agrarian
policy of the Birmingham Radicals might not,
under more favourable conditions, have resulted
in general benefit. But the other heads of their
scheme, not being supported by any strong
opinion on either side of the House of Commons,
have been quietly dropped, and, for the present at
least, do not seem likely to be revived.
The Bill proposed by the Government in

308 CONSERVATIVE-RADICAL LEGISLATION
1887 for the Relief of Irish Tenants, by permit
ting them to bring up their rents for revision,
though cordially adopted by many of the Mod
erate Conservatives, had been especially demanded
by the Radical Unionists as a set-off against
the Coerclonist legislation in which they had
loyally, though reluctantly, concurred. On the
Second Reading Debate the Bill had been accepted
by Mr Chamberlain with some effusion. It was, he
said, an honest attempt by Ministers to redeem
their pledges. It was generous to a degree, and
the Government had gone further than any
previous Government. At the same time, he
pointed out various points on which he desired
further concession to the tenants. His attitude
on this question is interesting, since it Ihustrates
the ambiguous position which he still occupied.
Had he been taken Into formal consultation with
Ministers before the Bill was drafted, he would not
afterwards have been at liberty to suggest Amend
ments in the House of Commons. That he claimed
this right, and that it was not disputed, shows that
Lord Salisbury had only assured himself of the
general approval of the Radical Unionists.
Nevertheless, the incident led to a small political
crisis ; and the Prime Minister convoked a special
meeting of his Party, at which he dwelt on the
necessity of maintaining the existing understand
ing as to Home Rule. The new proposals ofthe
Radical Unionists were, it should be mentioned,
still more strongly urged by the Loyalist tenants
in Ulster, and it was decided that a further sacri
fice must be made of Conservative principle.
What was demanded was that all tenants who
were not leaseholders In perpetuity should be
included in the Bill, that the Bankruptcy Clauses
should be given up, that creditors should be

MR GOSCHEN'S LICENSING SCHEME 309
restrained from employing fi-fa against Tenant
Right and agricultural produce, and that Judicial
Rents should be rendered liable to revision, the
reduction being calculated on the price of local
produce, and only operating for three years —
until a Purchase Bill should be introduced.
From the tactical point of view. It was thought
undesirable to bring about a double misunder
standing with the Radical Unionists and the
Ulster Conservatives. The proposed Amend
ments were accepted, incorporated in the Bill,
and carried through Parliament.
The subsequent Irish Land Legislation of the
1 886- 1 892 Administration, though acceptable to
the Radical Unionists, and framed in accord with
their views and principles, was. In Its main features,
the work of the Chief Secretary, Mr Arthur Bal
four. Among the Measures promised in the Queen's
Speech of January 1890, was a Land Purchase Bill
on an extensive scale. ' But the better part of the
effective period of the Session was spent in dis
cussing the Parnell Report, and, when this con
troversy was cleared away It was succeeded by
another, not so prolonged, but nearly as em
bittered, on the Licensing Proposals which Mr
Goschen had included in his Budget. His plan
— approved by Mr Chamberlain and other
advocates of Temperance legislation who are
opposed to the confiscation of licence-holders'
Interests — was to provide for the easy and
almost voluntary extinction of superfluous public-
houses. This was to be done by Imposing a
special Spirit Duty, which should be set apart
for the compensation of dispossessed licence-
holders — the Trade buying out the Trade, and
those finding the money who gained the
advantage. But the scheme, though supported

310 CONSERVATIVE-RADICAL LEGISLATION
by the Church of England Temperance Society,
was hotly opposed by the United Kingdom
Alliance, and by the bulk of the Liberal
Party. It was described as a scheme for the
"endowment of pubhcans," and had to be with
drawn by a Government which had already lost
confidence in its hold on the country, and the
"whisky money" was allocated to the County
Councils for the purposes of Technical Education.
This somewhat ignominious failure of
Ministers had to be redeemed, but evidently it
would be useless to persist in any ambitious
scheme of Irish Land legislation during that
Session. Mr Balfour's proposals were deferred
to the Autumn, when two Bills were introduced.
The less important of these Measures, which
established a Land Department and amended the
law as to Land Purchase, was advanced through
its preliminary stages before Christmas ; but in
the Summer of 1891 it was decided to incorporate
with it the Turbary and Redemption of Rent
Bills (which became law on 5th August 1891).
The other Bill, which was the substantial
Measure of the Session, dealt not only with the
promotion of Land Purchase, but also with
establishing systematic relief for Congested
Districts. In the result the latter portion, as
developed, has been more successful than the
former. The elaborate and ingenious system
of checks and counter-checks, recommended by
the Chancellor of the Exchequer in order to
guard the Imperial Treasury from the risk of
loss, tended, no doubt, to hamper the operation
of the Act, while the Nationalist Party, exas
perated by the charges, both false and true, which
they had recently been compelled to answer be
fore the Parnell Commission did nothing — much

IRISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT BILL 311
less than nothing — to promote the success of
Unionist Legislation, In fact, though they were,
as a body, equally desirous of agrarian and
political concessions, they did not wish the Land
Question to be settled before Home Rule had
been granted. The one agitation kept up steam
for the other. But it would be unfair to lay on
Irish pohticlans the whole blame for the slow and
partial operation of Mr Balfour's Act. It was,
indeed, a disappointment rather than a failure.
It was successfully employed wherever the owner
was wining to sell his land, and the tenant ready
to buy it on reasonable terms. But, like subse
quent legislation with the same object, it was
found to be practically inoperative where either of
the parties was too exacting. It held out no
special inducement either to vendor or purchaser.
It did not offer that "little bit of sugar" which,
as City men know, has an effect quite dispropor
tionate to its intrinsic value in getting people
to "do business." Against this comparative In
efficiency of the Purchase provisions in Mr
Balfour's Act may, however, be set the solid and
progressively beneficial results under the Sections
relating to the Congested Districts. These, by
themselves, would be a sufficient justification of
the time spent by Parliament on the whole
Measure. If such credit as was earned by this Act is
chiefly due to the Conservative Ministry, the
blame for the abortive Bill for establishing
Local Government in Ireland must be distributed
between the Radical Unionists and Democratic
Tories, who had combined to Insist on deferring
the General Election until this scheme should
have been laid before Parliament. Both Mr
Chamberlain and Lord Randolph Churchill, in

312 CONSERVATIVE-RADICAL LEGISLATION
the days when they held more or less intimate
relations with the Parnellites, had pledged them
selves to a qualified form of Home Rule. If they
cared to preserve their reputation for consistency,
the least they could do was to bring forward
some scheme of Local Government. Possibly, if
they had been asked, both or either of them, to
draft the Ministerial plan, they might have pro
duced a Bill that would not have been re
ceived, by Liberals and Nationalists alike, with
contumely and derision. But on this point the
Ministerialists were by no means inclined to make
large concessions to their allies on either side.
They believed — and the state of Ireland justified
them in believing — that the country was unfit for
real administrative liberty. The establishment of
local elective bodies would be placing a legal
weapon in the hands of tyrannical majorities. In
short, the concession of Local Government, if made
at all, must be qualified with a series of safeguards
and limitations.
The argument was sound enough, but It
should have been pressed to its logical con
clusion — that the gift should be withheld until it
could be offered without reserve. To invite men to
manage their own affairs, and at the same time to
hold out penalties for misbehaviour, Is to exas
perate them, not to conciliate. The derision
with which the Parnellites received the " Put-'em-
in-the-Dock" Clause was, no doubt, overdone.
Punishment would have fallen only on bodies
that deserved it. But that such a provision
should be necessary was a sufficient condemnation
of the whole scheme. Though Ministers carried
the Second Reading by a substantial majority,
they dropped the Bill ; they had done enough
to satisfy their allies, and to conform to the

LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN ENGLAND ;513
Unionist doctrine that no measure of reform
which had been accorded to Great Britain should
be withheld from Ireland.
Very different was the fate of two other im
portant articles, taken from the Radical Pro
gramme, which Mr Chamberlain successfuUy
pressed on Lord Salisbury's Government — the
creation of County Councils throughout England
and Wales and the establishment of Free Educa
tion. To the former Measure the Conservative
Party had long professed an honourable If dila
tory affection. They were quickly brought to the
point by their Radical friends. Though it might
be objected that the administration of county
business by the Magistrates and other Local
Authorities was generally both efficient and
economical, there was no pretence of system
and little semblance of Representative control.
On these grounds it was decided that county
administration must forthwith be assimilated
to the principles adopted, about half a cen
tury before, for the self-government of the
boroughs. The Conservatives were induced to
support this scheme because, if they did not
undertake it, the Liberals had threatened, when
next they came into power, to carry out a root-
and-branch reform which, so far as possible,
would destroy the influence of country gentlemen
in local affairs. By anticipating them, the Con
servatives hoped to give the landed Interest a
chance of preserving, at least, a part of its
power, and that, either as elected Councillors
or nominated Aldermen, " the Squire and the
Parson " would retain some of the importance
which they had hitherto enjoyed as Magistrates.
This object, it may here be mentioned, has
been attained except in those counties — in

314 CONSERVATIVE-RADICAL LEGISLATION
Wales, more particularly — where the popu
lation is predominantly Radical. There the
country gentlemen have no authority left except
what pertains to their judicial functions. But
the Measure framed by Mr Ritchie — a Conserva
tive more Progressive than ordinary Radicals- —
contained two excrescences. One of these was the
creation of purely artificial Counties or County-
boroughs, like those of Birmingham and London.
This became law. The other miscarried. The
Institution of District Councils was defeated,
because with It Mr Ritchie had linked a plan
of Licensing Reform which aroused the ani
mosity of the Temperance Party. The Liberals
were willing enough that the control of the
Liquor Trade should be taken from the
Licensing Justices, but they fought hard against
a scheme that would only enable the District
Committees of a County Council to close a public
house on paying compensation to the tenant.
This recognition of a claim, whether legal or
moral, on the part of the licence-holders was so
vigorously resisted that the Government aban
doned their proposal. Their general plan having
been thus truncated, they did not think it worth
while to persist in the clauses for the establish
ment of District Councils, to which they had
intended to transfer all the confused and over
lapping functions of the various Local Author
ities except the administration of the Poor Law.
This they had always held to be too invidious a
duty to be entrusted to an elective body answer
able only to a small constituency of neighbours.
If the Independent Conservatives had been
somewhat lukewarm in dealing with County
Government, and decidedly suspicious of the pro
visions that applied to the Metropolis, they felt no

FREE EDUCATION 315
dislike for the general object aimed at. As the
Measure gradually shaped itself In Pariiament, they
took to it more kindly and co-operated heartily
with their Leaders in making it into a substantial
and permanent example of constructive legislation.
It was very different with Free Education. This
they had denounced in Opposition, and were not
more ready to support after they had taken their
seats on the Government side ofthe House. They
repudiated Lord Salisbury's attempt to gild the
pill by calling it Assisted Education — as though he
were only contemplating a somewhat wide exten
sion of the powers already existing for the remis
sion of school fees in necessitous areas. It was
true, as Lord Salisbury had pointed out in 1885,
that in compelling a man to send his children regu
larly to school the State had assumed an obligation
to render the burden as light as possible. But this
was a very different thing, the Conservatives argued,
from paying for persons who could well afford to
pay for themselves. A satisfactory reply to that
objection was not discovered — none, certainly, that
carried conviction to the malcontents.
The best reason, perhaps, was, that the task of
discriminating between parents who deserved and
those who did not deserve relief would be both
tedious and invidious, and that. If remission became
at all general, the machinery for collecting the re
mainder of the fees would be unduly expensive in
proportion to the receipts. Moreover, having gone
so far in the direction of Free Education, it would
be as well to proceed the whole distance. By adopt
ing the proposal of Mr Chamberlain, the Govern
ment would gratify the Radicals who were on their
own side, and deprive those who were opposed to
them of a promising cry at the General Election.
The demand had been formally put forward by

316 CONSERVATIVE-RADICAL LEGISLATION
the Birmingham Unionists in the early part of
1 889, and their position would be very embarrass
ing If they continued to support a Ministry that
refused to meet their views on this question. In
a speech delivered at Birmingham in November of
that year Lord Salisbury had hinted that the
Government were ready to consider the point —
on condition that nothing should be done to
injure the Voluntary Schools, and thus diminish
the opportunities ofthe working classes for obtain
ing Religious Teaching for their children. If the
Denominational Schools were to be destroyed
through Free Education, it would be " not a bless
ing, but a curse."
That, of course, was not Mr Chamberlain's
view. He had always contended, and still
believes, that the best arrangement, in an ideal
community, would be for the instruction in all
State schools to be confined to secular subjects,
and that the Religious Teaching should be left to
private and voluntary agencies. Nor was this
merely an abstract opinion. He had steadily
worked for depriving the Denominational schools
of any assistance from the Rates or Taxes —
although without such a subsidy they could
not long be carried on. Nor did he relax this
attitude until his informal association with the
Conservative Party had hardened into an offensive
and defensive alliance — until it was informally
understood that he would be ready, when called
upon, to take office in a Coalition Ministry. In
1 89 1 we find him saying, at Birmingham, that he
should shrink from doing anything to destroy
Denominational Education. Under that system
provision was made for the teaching of two-thirds
of the children in England and Wales, and to
get rid of it would involve a capital outlay of

PROTECTION FOR VOLUNTARY SCHOOLS 317
;^50,ooo,ooo sterling* and an increased annual
expenditure of ^5,000,000. His public recog
nition of this financial fact was the concession
which he made to the Conservatives In return
for their adopting Free Education. The scheme
in which he co-operated was framed with the
intention of compensating the Voluntary Schools
for the loss which they would suffer from the
abolition of fees. Briefly, it was to give all
schools alike a grant of los. per annum on the
average attendance of children between the ages
of five and fourteen — limits which were subse
quently extended to three and fifteen respectively.
This, it was reckoned, would make good the loss
of " school pence," estimated at 3d. a week a head.
Another Clause, however, enabled the Educa
tion Department to institute a School Board in any
district where the accommodation without fees was
reported as insufficient. This provision placed
almost indefinite powers in the hands of Whitehall,
and, as a matter of fact. It was subsequently
worked in such a way as to excite general alarm
among the supporters of Denominational Schools.
This, however, had not been the purpose of the
Act of 1 89 1, which was drafted on what was
beheved at the time to embody a fair com
promise between the views of Lord Salisbury
and Mr Chamberlain. When it afterwards
became evident that the arrangement had a
prejudicial effect on the Voluntary System, Mr
Chamberlain made no difficulty about supporting
the amendments required by the Church of
England and the Roman Catholics. He has
interpreted the bargain of 1891 in a liberal spirit,
though not without serious risk to his popularity
* This estimate, which was generally accepted at the time,
has since been reduced about 50 per cent.

318 CONSERVATIVE-RADICAL LEGISLATION
even amongst his own supporters in Birmlpigham.
This is not the place to describe the furious con
troversy of last year (1902), but it may be
mentioned that his concurrence in the latest
Education Act marks no deviation from the line
which he laid down eleven years before. He had
abandoned the strict Nonconformist Ideal of Com
pulsory Secular Education, not because his faith
had weakened in its abstract merits, but because
he regarded it as under the circumstances un
attainable. He could not insist upon it without
breaking his alliance with the Conservatives, and
it was more important, he thought, to keep the
Home Rule Party out of power than to put an
end to the Denominational system.
This was the leading and determining motive of
what many Nonconformists call an act of apostasy.
The other explanation, on which he has laid almost
equal weight, is that no Ministry with which he
can co-operate will agree to such a capital outlay
and such an increase of yearly expenditure as
would be entailed by setting up a complete
apparatus of National Secular Instruction. But
nothing that Mr Chamberlain has ever said or
done, no understanding into which he has entered,
could, logically, prevent him from reverting to his
original position — if the country should ever be
willing to find the necessary millions, and if the
Home Rule question were got fairly out of the
way. Yet' it cannot be denied that on this point
he has — practically, if not in principle — dug a wide
gulf between himself and his old Nonconformist
associates, nor can It be matter of surprise that,
opposed to him as most of them were on every
point, they should select this as the special object
of their attack.
With the majority of Political Dissenters,

TIIE NONCONFORMIST POSITION 319
though not with all, the question of " Religious
Equality " ranks above any other issue in
politics ; and it is not the least of Mr Cham
berlain's services to the Unionist cause that
he has helped to induce a certain appreciable
number of them to concede a temporary pre
eminence to the duty of preserving the existing
connection between Great Britain and Ireland.
It is necessary to dwell on the sacrifice which Mr
Chamberlain made on this question, the personal
price which he paid, because it has often been said
that he had things ah his own way with Lord
Salisbury between 1886 and 1892. As a matter
of fact, the Prime Minister only assented to
Free Education on condition that the Denomina
tional Schools should not be placed in a worse
position than they held before. Which side
got the better of the bargain is for those to
decide who are ready to estimate things in
commensurate. On the principle that Political
Reason lies somewhere between opposite enthu
siasms, it would seem probable that neither States
man deserved either the censure passed on his
morals by the extremists of his own Party, or
the compliments paid to his sagacity by the
out-and-out people on the other side.
On Church questions generally there was no
hard-and-fast compact between the Conservatives
and Radical Unionists. Mr Chamberlain offered
no opposition to the Tithes Bills proposed by Lord
Salisbury, and It was with his concurrence that
the Act of 1 89 1 was passed. As to Disestablish
ment, he was not expected, and certainly would
not have consented, to modify or suppress his
opinions. But, as a matter alike of good feeling
and political expediency, it was clearly incum
bent on him to abstain from aggressive action

320 CONSERVATIVE-RADICAL LEGISLATION
against those institutions which Conservatives are
especially pledged to defend. Nor did this tacit
understanding impose any serious restrictions.
Between 1886 and 1892 the public mind was
nearly always fixed on one or other of the various
phases of the Irish question. The struggle over
the Crimes Act, the exciting incidents that accom
panied the administration of it by Mr Balfour,
the publication of the " Parnell Letters," the
proceedings of the Commission, the revelations
of Major Le Caron, the exposure of PIgott, the
partial exculpation of the Irish Leader, followed
by his romantic ruin and tragical death, and the
unseemly but always amusing quarrels in his
Party — these and a number of other piquant
Irish episodes made all other matters seem dull
and unimportant.
Yet It was a period in which no little
history was In the making, both at home and
abroad. Besides the matters which have already
found mention, warm if passing controversy was
excited by such Incidents as the involuntary with
drawal of Sir Stafford Northcote from the House
of Commons ; the disputes and final agreements
with Portugal, Germany, and France as to
" spheres of influence " in Africa ; the misunder
standing with the United States about the
Behring Sea Fisheries, and with France about
its shore rights in Newfoundland ; the abortive
Sugar Bounty Convention ; the British proposals
for the evacuation of Egypt ; and the disaster In
Manipur. There was much for Unionists to
defend or explain, and the Opposition, who had
never lost heart, were eagerly pressing every
point against the Government. The alliance
between the Gladstonians and Parnellites was
never so cordial as In 1890 and 1891, and.

DEFEAT OF THE UNIONISTS 321
though Ministers were only winding up business
for an appeal to the country on their general policy,
they seemed unable to find a favourable moment.
It has generally been said that it was on Mr
Chamberlain's strong representation that Lord
Salisbury gave up the idea of dissolving Parlia
ment in 1 89 1. It would be better, it was argued,
to carry a scheme of Local Government for Ireland
than to meet the demand for Home Rule with a
mere negative. The ignominious collapse of the
Measure that Ministers brought forward in 1892
served to increase the discredit in which they had
been Involved, partly by their own somewhat
careless management in the House of Commons,
partly through the unsparing resistance which
they had to encounter. Whether they would
have fared better if they had gone before the
electors In 1891, it is impossible to say, but when
the writs for a General Election were issued at
the end of the following June It was the almost
universal opinion that they had been beaten be
fore a single poll was recorded. The only doubt
was to the number of Mr Gladstone's majority.
When the returns were finally adjusted it
was found that, with the help ofthe Irish Nation
alists (81), the English Gladstonians (274) had a
majority of 40 over the . Conservatives (268) and
the Liberal Unionists (47). The group which had
suffered most heavily In the struggle was the
Liberal Unionists. Before the General Election of
1886 they had been 90 strong; they came back
only ']'] ; and. In the course of the by-elections
which had taken place in the six years since, had
been reduced to 65. Now they numbered only
47, and, although the politicians who looked
chiefly to the Duke of Devonshire (Lord
Hartington) had been even less fortunate than
X

322 CONSERVATIVE-RADICAL LEGISLATION
Mr Chamberlain's followers, the position of
the former was less inconvenient because his
political opinions on almost every question of
the day were so close to Lord Salisbury's that
a complete amalgamation would have been
comparatively easy, nor would it anywhere
have been resented except in a few of the
Scottish and Metropolitan constituencies. By
maintaining the solidity of the Liberal Unionist
Party as he did, the Duke of Devonshire at this
time gave more than he got, since he had to bear
a part of the resentment inspired among the
Conservatives by the Free Education policy
forced on them by Mr Chamberlain. But the
course followed was as prudent in the long run
as it was loyal at the moment. Standing by Mr
Chamberlain in the hour of a common adversity,
he established the right to partake fully in the
rewards of future victory.
It said much for the political prescience
of the two Statesmen, and their faith in their
cause, that they adhered firmly to their plan
— warmly criticised as It was by some of their
own supporters as well as by the Conservatives
— of keeping up a Party organisation and retain
ing a Party name distinct from those of their
allies. Although, probably, they had no local
majority outside certain Midland districts, they
could in many places rely on a compact little
body of voters sufficient to turn the scale at
an election. The Midlands Liberal Unionist
Association was founded by Mr Chamberlain In
the Summer of 1892 — immediately after Mr
Gladstone's success — and was composed almost
entirely, he declared, of men who had never
belonged to a Conservative Association, and
would never agree to "sink themselves in such

MR AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN :i2:i
an organisation," They were thus enabled to
maintain a distinctive position and to fight
Gladstonian Liberalism on its own ground.
The defeat of the Unionist Party, even the
comparative failure of his own section, may have
been partly compensated to Mr Chamberlain by a
personal triumph. His own victory over a Glad
stonian candidate (by more than 4000 votes) was
almost a matter of course. But he felt the
warmest pleasure and pride in the return of Mr
Austen Chamberlain for East Worcestershire.
It is no secret that Mr Chamberlain is a warm
admirer of his son's political ability, and especially
of the tact and address with which he grasps that
somewhat Incalculable element, " the sense of the
House." The elder man has even said in private
— when the question had been raised of promot
ing the younger one to Cabinet rank — that if he
felt he were standing in his son's way he would
be willing to retire from public life. In the
Debate which was soon to be held in the
Commons on the second Home Rule BIU, It
was one of the pleasant features that Mr Glad
stone — who never failed in gracious magnanimity
— broke off his argument to pay a compliment
to the speech delivered by the son of the poli
tician whom he regarded as his most formidable
adversary.

CHAPTER XI
THE HOME RULE ADMINISTRATION
The majority of 40 with which Mr Gladstone
came out of the General Election of 1892 was
by no means solid and trustworthy. The
split between the seventy-two Anti-Parnellites,
who had Insisted on the retirement of their
Leader from public life, and the nine " Parnel
lites " who adhered to Mr Redmond, was not
purely a personal quarrel. The more numerous
group had established an effective alliance
with the Enghsh Home Rulers, and were
prepared to trust Mr Gladstone and to accept
any Bill which he might offer them, though on
the tacit understanding that if the terms were
deemed insufficient they should be treated as only
an instalment of the Irish claim — something paid
on account. Mr Redmond's little group posed as
intransigents, and would take, they said, nothing
but an immediate settlement in full. It was
evident, therefore, even before the meeting of the
new Parliament, that on some critical Division
they might either withdraw their support from
Mr Gladstone or even transfer it to the Unionist
Party. But it was equahy certain that they
would not venture on either course at the very
beginning of the Session, or express dissatisfaction
until they had seen the Bill which the English

THE CONFIDENCE DEBATE 325
Home Rulers would propose. They must bide
their time.
In deciding to meet Parliament, instead of
offering to resign on the result of the General
Election, Lord Salisbury followed the more usual
though not invariable custom. The Unionists had
everything to gain by contesting every inch of
fairly tenable ground. The general Debate on
the policy of the outgoing Government was in
several ways Interesting : not least, because Mr
Asquith, who had lately been asking certain Incon
venient questions about his Leader's scheme of
Home Rule, had been put up to move a Vote of
Want of Confidence. Incidentally, he taunted
the Conservatives with having abandoned the
traditions of their Party and entered on a course
of "advanced" legislation in order to conciliate
"a small and dwindling band of Dissentient
Liberals." This was a taunt that Mr Chamberlain was
not likely to overlook. He delivered one of
his best fighting speeches. First he dealt with
Mr Healy, who had endeavoured, on technical
grounds, to exclude him from the discussion,
by remarking that whenever it was desired to
exhibit personal discourtesy towards any man —
or (after a significant pause) any woman —
the honourable and learned member always pre
sented himself to accomplish it ! This rasping
allusion to the controversy about Mr Parnell's
private conduct put the Unionists into high good
humour, and in an equal degree exasperated the
Nationalists. Referring to the reserve which Mr
Gladstone had practised with regard to his new
Home Rule plan, Mr Chamberlain argued that, now
the Opposition Leaders had obtained a majority,
they were bound to set out their policy. As it

326 THE HOME RULE ADMINISTRATION
was, they proposed to take office without one word
of explanation of their domestic programme. As
to Foreign Affairs, he trusted that they would be
placed In Lord Rosebery's hands, for the country
had confidence in him. Otherwise we might
wake up some fine morning to find that pre
parations had been made to evacuate Egypt with
out consulting the House of Commons. The
Democracy were not in favour of "a policy of
scuttle." What sort of agreement, he asked, was there
In domestic matters among the supporters of Mr
Gladstone ? What about the Welsh members,
and the Labour members? As for the Indepen
dent Labour Party, he would believe in it when
he saw it ! Even on Home Rule, Mr Labouchere
had declared that It ought to be shelved for
an indefinite period, while Sir George Trevelyan
had once said that he would never consent to
it until every Constitutional method had been
exhausted ! As for Mr Labouchere himself, he
had indeed been somewhat sobered by the pros
pect of approaching responsibility. (This was a
peculiarly disagreeable remark, since it was already
known by those behind the scenes that the member
for Northampton would not be included in Mr
Gladstone's Ministry.) But, Mr Chamberlain
went on, how reconcile the interests of the Cabinet
with those of Truth ? And how did the Irish
Party like the idea of two Cabinet Ministers who
would do their best to prevent the Liberal Party
from^becoming a Home Rule Party?
He produced, as his habit was, a small but
well - assorted collection of extracts from the
speeches and writings of the chief men on the
other side, and showed that the demands made
by Mr Redmond were absolutely inconsistent

MR GLADSTONE IN OFFICE 327
with declarations made even by such thorough
going Home Rulers as Sir William Harcourt,
Mr John Morley, and Mr Gladstone himself
If the new Government kept faith with England
they must quarrel with the Nationalists. Under
such circumstances how could a Ministry retain
any stable existence. How long was all British
Legislation to be "made ducks and drakes of"
by the Irish Party? Finally, he urged the
wisest and most sensible members of the
Opposition to reconsider their position — they
would find it Impossible to carry out the policy to
which they were pledged.
This appeal to the moderation of the Glad
stonians may have been made in good faith, but,
even if any of them had come to Westminster
with open minds, words like these were not
likely to exercise a calming Influence on the
House — the speaker had jeered in turn at every
group of the composite majority, and irritated
such moderate men as may have been sitting
on the Opposition benches. Nothing Is less
calculated to turn the vote of a hesitating
politician than a public warning that he Is being
duped by his Leaders. It Is the way of Members
of Parliament to think well of themselves, and the
least influential Items like to fancy that they are
pulhng the Party strings. To tell the truth, Mr
Chamberlain does not possess the power of
conciliating those whom he despises — he does
not suffer fools gladly. He treats them as If
they had no more Importance than they really
possess, and lacks the grave urbanity with which
Mr Gladstone would, if necessary, listen to advice
and remonstrances to which he had no intention
of paying any practical attention. But if Mr
Chamberlain's speech on this occasion failed in its

328 THE HOME RULE ADMINISTRATION
ostensible object, it accomplished what was quite
as useful to the Unionists — it put them into good
heart, and, though the Division showed that every
member on both sides had "voted straight," the
defeat in the Lobby was compensated by the
honours of Debate.
The transference of power which was accom
plished In the course of a few days by the resigna
tion of Lord Salisbury (15th August) and the
acceptance of office by Mr Gladstone, left Mr
Chamberlain and the Radical Unionists in a posi
tion of comparative irresponsibility. Though
they had arrived at a fairly complete understand
ing with the Conservatives, as to the course which
they would follow when the Gladstonians should be
ejected from office, they were free, for the present,
to play for their own hand. Mr Chamberlain had,
perhaps, somewhat anticipated this enfranchise
ment by his adumbration of a scheme for Old Age
Pensions (which will be dealt with subsequently),
and by the promulgation of other less sweeping
proposals. His new programme was conveniently
summed up in an Article which he published in
The Nineteenth Century (November 1892). The
chief items were, (i) statutory control of the hours
of work in mining and other especially dangerous
or laborious callings ; (2) local regulation of the
hours of employment In shops ; (3) the establish
ment of arbitration tribunals for trade disputes ;
(4) compensation to workmen or their legal repre
sentatives for injury or death not caused by the
fault of the sufferer ; (5) old-age pensions for
deserving poor persons ; (6) control over the
immigration of foreign paupers ; (7) increasing
the power of Local Authorities to carry out
improvements and provide for the better housing
of the poor ; and (8) enabling them to advance

SOCIAL REFORM /'. SOCIALISM 329
money to working men who desired to purchase
their dwelling-houses.
The writer was not unaware that certain
members of the Conservative Party would look
askant upon some of his proposals. They did
not conceal their dislike of the Progressive
policy adopted by their Leaders, and declared
that Lord Salisbury and Mr Balfour had
already made too great concessions to Liberal
Unionist pressure. This, he said, was a com
plaint that should be considered in connection
with the common accusation that the Liberal
Unionists had become more reactionary than the
most extreme of the Tories. But he did not feel
much misgiving as to the attitude of the bulk of
the Party. Once again he pointed out, what he
had admitted In his Pre- Unionist days, that "In
social questions the Conservatives have always
been more progressive than the Liberals, and in
their latest legislation have only returned to the
old Tory traditions." Almost all the reforms
relating to Labour questions had been initiated by
Tory Statesmen, and most of them had been
passed by Tory Governments. The Factory and
Workshop Acts, the Mines Regulation Act,
Merchant Shipping Legislation, the Acts relating
to Sanitation, Artisan's Dwellings, Land Purchase,
Allotments, Small Holdings, and Free Education,
were all Conservative, and it was therefore histori
cally inaccurate to represent the Tory Party
as opposed to social legislation. He did not
add — it would have been indecorous and impolitic
to mention — that a good portion of the list of
Measures which he had quoted had been pressed
by himself and his allies on the not alto
gether gracious acceptance of the Conservative
Party.

330 THE HOME RULE ADMINISTRATION
The compliment was adroit, and proved use
ful to Conservative candidates at by-elections;
but It was not quite to the taste of hard
shell Tories to be told, with an air of patronage,
that they had been practising Socialism without
knowing it ! The name was alarming, although
the doctrines attributed to them were not Social
ism at all, but only that State Socialism which in
practical Germany had been adopted by so Con
servative a Statesman as Bismarck — adopted with
the very purpose of strengthening the existing
order of things. From the real and more
dangerous Socialism, so far as he had ever
favoured it, Mr Chamberlain had now cut himself
adrift. He expressly disclaimed sympathy with
those International developments which aimed at
a general disorganisation of the industrial system
and preached a political crusade of Labour against
Capital. The condition of the working classes,
he believed, was better than It had been half a
century before, and it was steadily being improved.
He had no patience with "self-constituted repre
sentatives of Labour," who asserted that work
ing men were "still in a state of misery and
servitude," It was not true that discontent was
seething in their breasts, that a " stupendous
awakening was to come " ; that all past efforts for
their intellectual emancipation and material welfare
had been "mere tinkering and empiricism," It
was absurd to suppose that " the New Unionism
— or the New Collectivism — or some brand-new
device of Continental philosophers, or of hitherto
unappreciated geniuses of home manufacture" — •
would elevate them to "heights of co-operative
prosperity and collective enjoyment of which, in
their dull acceptance of the existing order, they
had not yet dreamed,"

CHALLENGE TO MR GLADSTONE 331
Mr Chamberlain was especially distrustful of
the New Unionism which, for the time, seemed
to have fascinated the imagination of the
working classes, and whose exponents had
captured many of the old-fashioned Trade organi
sations. It seemed to him to go beyond
what was reasonably attainable when it advo
cated large schemes of social reconstruction
which it proposed to carry by national and
even by international action. It welcomed the
assistance of Continental associations, some of
which were reasonably suspected of leanings
towards Anarchism. The central idea of the
New Unionism — that the Interests of Labour
were opposed to those of Capital — was incon
sistent with that school of Political Economy to
v^ich Mr Chamberlain had, hitherto, more or less
adhered. He had consistently asserted, and in the
most uncompromising terms, that Labour was
entitled to a larger share in profits than it had ever
yet received, but he looked on Master and Man as
partners, not as antagonists. He especially dis
liked the intolerance displayed by the New
Unionism towards those who remained outside
It — an intolerance which sometimes took the form
of actual oppression. Nor was It certain some of
the demands made in the name of Labour would
be endorsed by the general opinion of the working
classes. There was nothing to show that the
majority in the different trades would vote for
limiting the hours of work to eight In the day,
though he was willing to see the experiment tried
in the case of the mining industry.
The new Parhament having been prorogued
almost as soon as the change of Ministry had
been effected, no definite announcement of Mr
Gladstone's policy could be expected before the

332 THE HOME RULE ADMINISTRATION
opening of the 1893 Session (which was fixed for
31st January) and the only important Adminis
trative act of the Government was the nomina
tion of a small Commission, with Mr Justice
Mathew as Chairman, to report what steps should
be taken for reinstating the Evicted Tenants in
their holdings. Nevertheless, it had become
known that, in order to satisfy as many as
possible of the combined groups who composed
the majority, mention would be made in the
Queen's Speech of ah the leading articles in the
Newcastle Programme.
A week before the meeting of Parliament,
Mr Chamberlain felt himself justified in criti
cising the position of Ministers. Referring
to their exercise of patronage, he remarked
that they were " stuffing " the provincial benches
and crowding the Local Boards in Ireland with
their own "partisan nominees." It did not
look, he said, as if they expected to stay
where they were ! As for the Home Rule Bill,
no one had been consulted except the Anti-
Parnellites — the motto of the Government was
"Only Irish need apply." After six months'
tenure of power, a Ministry which had promised
an all-round Revolution could only point to
having allowed public meetings in Trafalgar
Square, and appointed a few women to inspect
Workshops. It was almost pathetic! In Egypt
the Government had very wisely thrown over the
policy which Mr Gladstone and Mr Morley had
led Europe to expect, but in Uganda they
appeared once more to be following the fatal
policy of "drifting." Mr Gladstone, it was
known, had determined to retain the Irish
members at Westminster, and this, it was sug
gested, should prevent Mr Chamberlain from con-

HOME RULE AND IMPERIALISM 33:'>
demning the principle of the forthcoming Home
Rule Bill, since this was what he had himself urged
in 1886 and 1887. That view he could not accept.
Compromises which had seemed feasible then
would now be sheer madness. There was no
sign that the supremacy of the Imperial Parlia
ment would be "seriously and practically main
tained." No, the Unionists could make no terms
with the Gladstonians. They would meet Parlia
ment determined to resist a policy which began
by betraying the interests of the Loyalists in
Ireland, and would end in betraying the interests
of Great Britain.
The speech was important not only because it
separated Mr Chamberlain by an Impassable gulf
from any probable scheme of Home Rule, but
also because it contained, though not the first, yet
the most emphatic assertion of that Imperialism
of which Mr Chamberlain has since been recog
nised as the chief exponent. Until the proposal to
dismember the United Kingdom had been raised
in an acute form, his Imperial sentiment, though
never quite dormant even in the unfortunate
period between 1880 and 1885, had been kept
subordinate to what he considered the far more
urgent need for domestic reform. The relative
importance of the internal and external affairs of
the country had been inverted by the imminent
danger of a Government being established on our
flank which certainly would not be friendly, and
might become actively hostile — on which we could
not rely, even for neutrality, if we were engaged
in war with any foreign Power. It was this
consideration — more strongly, perhaps, than the
rights of the Ulstermen — which had turned Mr
Chamberlain's thoughts in the direction of
National Defence, and for the time to shut

334 THE HOME RULE ADMINISTRATION
out every other object for which he had been
working. The one duty of an English Statesman, he now
felt, was to protect this country from foreign
aggression, and it was an essential part of this
policy to keep Ireland beyond the reach of Con
tinental intrigue. The mere alarm, the possibly
unfounded apprehension, of such a risk, would
be sufficient to paralyse industrial progress by
constantly recurrent panic. Everything else
must be sacrificed for the sake of maintaining
the sense of national security. From this
opinion, which henceforth became his domin
ating sentiment, it was an easy and almost
inevitable transition to that Imperial patriotism
which he has since set himself to organise and
develop. Without our Foreign and Colonial
trade, and all that it involves, the British Isles
must rapidly sink to the level of a second-rate
Power. We should be unable to support our
population except on a bare subsistence, and we
should have no outlet for the energies of those
who required a wider career. We should have to
settle down tamely to cultivate our petty cabbage-
garden — and the soil would be worse than
Candide's. The idea that our commerce and
manufactures should be ahowed to dwindle was
unthinkable to one who had pushed his way to
the front in the bustling, competitive world of
Birmingham, and who embodied in his own
nature not a little of the self-confidence and
aggressive energy that distinguish his fellow-
citizens. They are unalterably convinced that
England is the greatest country in the world, and
that Birmingham is the centre and source of its
political vigour.
The Queen's Speech verified alike the

"TO FILL UP THE CUP" .335
hopes and fears expressed a week before by
Mr Chamberlain. The determined action taken
by Lord Cromer In Egypt, supported by the
resolute attitude of Lord Rosebery at home,
had demolished any expectation that we should
withdraw from the Nile Valley, and the
Government announced that our garrison
there would be strengthened, though they formally
renewed the old futile assurances that the
Occupation was but temporary. In Uganda,
however, the " policy of drifting '' was barely
concealed by the appointment of a Commissioner
to draw up a Report on the state of affairs in that
region. The state of Ireland was declared to be
satisfactory, and the Home Rule Bill was described
as intended to afford contentment to the Irish
people, relief to Parliament, and additional
securities for the strength and union of the
Empire, Other subjects proposed for legislation
were the Registration Law, the Duration of
Parliaments, One-man One-vote, Employers'
Liability, Hours of Labour for Railway Servants,
the Conspiracy Law in Trade Disputes, Enlarge
ment of the Powers of the London County Council,
and the Suspension of Appointments in the Welsh
and Scottish Churches, Even this list does not
exhaust the " measures of public utility " which the
Government had adopted from the Newcastle
Programme, To set down such an agenda paper for
Parliament was to invite that sort of organ
ised opposition which the Government of the day
always regard as wilful Obstruction, If Mr Glad
stone had sought to conciliate every group of his
supporters by giving to each a promise of taking
up its own pet reform, he had also Irritated every
section of a vigorous and powerful minority.

336 THE HOME RULE ADMINISTRATION
To tell the truth, however, the resistance would
have been equally prolonged If no other Measure
had been brought before Parliament than the
Home Rule Bill which Mr Gladstone intended,
at all costs, to force through the House of
Commons, A scheme so intricate and com
prehensive contained so many proposals which
offered ground for fair discussion that no ordinary
Session would have sufficed to dispose of it.
Nor can it be denied that the Leaders of the
Opposition insisted to the utmost on their rights,
and, especially in Committee, took no pains to
prevent their followers from adopting dilatory
tactics, There was, indeed, some basis for the
charge of Obstruction — enough, at least, to
justify Ministers in the summary course to which
they were eventually compelled to resort. It was
their main object to get the Bill through the
Commons and throw on the Lords the odium of
rejecting it. They would thus establish their
good faith towards their Irish ahles, and provide
themselves, when necessary, with a popular cry
for the next General Election. The policy which
was most in favour with the Party Managers was
to follow up the Home Rule Bill with other
Measures — such as Welsh Disestablishment and
One-man One-vote — which the Peers would be
equally certain to reject, and thus force them,
according to an old phrase used by Mr Chamber
lain, to "fill up the cup" of their iniquities.
This being accomplished, the Gladstonians
could go to the country on a series of questions on
which the two Houses had been in conflict, and
ask for a general declaration in favour of the
Popular as against the Hereditary Chamber. It
was not a course to which Mr Gladstone was
personally inclined — he had always avoided raising

THE SECOND HOME RULE BILL 337
that issue in its most direct form — but he made no
objection to his followers holding it out as a
menace to the Opposition. The combined
Unionist Party were, of course, bent on thwarting
It — the Conservatives and Moderate Liberals,
because they disliked the imputation of relying
solely on the Peers ; the Radicals because they
might find It somewhat Inconvenient to be engaged
in the active defence of those hereditary privileges
which a few years before they had so vigorously
impugned. Moreover, with so small a majority
as Mr Gladstone had at command, there was
always the possibility, especially as the Red-
mondlte vote was notoriously uncertain, that the
Government might one evening be caught at
a disadvantage and beaten In the Lobby. It
was known that a certain number of the Glad
stonians were but lukewarm in their support of
Home Rule, and it was hoped that a few of them,
enough to turn the scale, might find an excuse for
failing the Government on some important Division,
and thus quietly getting rid of the Measure, — cer
tainly for that Session, and perhaps for the rest of
a Parliament which. In any case, could not be long-
lived. No such accident was allowed to happen.
Mr Gladstone was too consummate a tactician,
he was too well served by his lieutenants, and his
Party were too vigilantly kept up to the mark
by their Irish associates. But If the Unionists
could not destroy the Bill, at least they might
delay it ; and it would be something to the
good if they could exhaust their antagonists by
a prolonged struggle. This Is the explanation
of tactics which did not altogether conform to a
correct Parliam.entary standard. But though
they set a bad precedent — which was certain to
be followed, and bettered, by their adversaries on
Y

338 THE HOME RULE ADMINISTRATION
the next convenient occasion — their action was,
at least, extenuated by the grave importance of
the issue at stake. If the Unionists did unduly
strain the forms of Parliamentary procedure they
were fighting, they thought, in defence of the
unity of Parliament itself
Whatever complaint was to be made subse
quently as to the conduct of the Unionist minority
in Committee, the Debates on the First and
Second Reading Debates were admirably con
ducted on both sides of the House, and at the
time were highly interesting. The outline which
Mr Gladstone presented (13th February 1893)
of his revised scheme was, briefly : —
(i) The establishment of an Irish Legislature, consisting
of a Council and an Assembly, with power to make
laws on exclusively Irish affairs.
(2) The supreme authority of the Imperial Parliament
was not to be impaired or restricted.
(3) Certain subjects were reserved from the Irish Legis
lature — especially matters relating to the Crown.
Peace and War, Dignities and Titles, the law
relating to Treason and to Aliens, and everything
relating to external trade.
(4) The Irish Legislature was prohibited from interfering
with religious or personal freedom.
(S) The Viceroy would be nominated by the Crown for
six years, and the office would be subject to no
religious disabilities.
(6) He would have a Cabinet — an Executive Committee
of the Irish Privy Council.
(7) He would veto Bills on the advice of that Cabinet,
and subject to the instructions of the Crown.
(8) The Council would consist of 48 members elected by
persons rated above ;^20 a year, and members
would sit for eight years.
(9) The Assembly would contain 103 members returned
by the existing Constituencies for five years.
(10) The validity of an Irish Act might be questioned
by the Viceroy or the Secretary of State, and would
be determined by the Privy Council.

SPEECH ON THE FIRST READING 339
(ii) The Royal Irish Constabulary was to be gradually
reduced, and eventually superseded by a local
police.
(12) Irish members would be retained at Westminster,
but would be forbidden to vote on any question
relating solely to Great Britain or any taxation not
levied in Ireland.
(13) A financial settlement was proposed, by which
nearly ^^2, 500,000 was claimed for Ireland's con
tribution to Imperial purposes, while on the credit
side there were rather more than ;^5, 500,000.
When the expenditure on Civil Government had
been deducted from the latter amount, the Irish
Exchequer would start with a balance of about
/Soo,ooo.
It is unnecessary to recapitulate the main
points in the discussion that followed Mr Glad
stone's remarkable exposition of this famous
Bill, except so far as to indicate Mr Chamberlain's
position. He reasserted his belief In the Prime
Minister's cardinal principle, that the widest
measure of Local Government should be given
to Ireland that would be consistent with the
unity of the Empire, the supremacy of Parlia
ment, and the protection of minorities. He
objected to this Bill because it did not satisfy
those conditions. If Ireland had a separate
Parliament, there would be no Imperial supremacy
—she would be a standing danger to the Empire
— her political condition was controlled by her
geographical situation. But Mr Gladstone's
scheme, though it went too far, would not
satisfy the Irish people. They were prohibited
from dealing with Religion or Education, and from
controlling their own trade. This was sowing
the seed of future discontent, which would assert
itself in the "time of England's emergency and
Ireland's opportunity." Even If the present
Nationalist Leaders expressed contentment, they

340 THE HOME RULE ADMINISTRATION
could not bind their successors. If we were en
gaged in war with a great Power, and if the Irish
Pariiament refused its contribution to Imperial
taxation, how could the money be collected ? The
police, the civil servants, the judiciary, would be
In the hands of the Irish Assembly. How pre
vent the drilling and arming of a people peculi
arly apt in military affairs ? The lives of land
owners, " land-grabbers," and bailiffs would not
be worth a moment's purchase. What could the
Imperial Parliament do when the whole Executive
was in the hands of the Irish Legislature ? Sup
pose it had been resolved In Dublin to endow the
Roman Catholic Church? If the Veto of the
Crown were to be exercised, the Irish Ministry
would resign en bloc, and there would be none to
take its place. The plan for the partial retention
of the Irish members at Westminster would not
work. They would be kept dangling about the
Lobby, and never know when they would be
required In the House. The only feasible form
of Home Rule was either the establishment of " an
enlarged London County Council " or the institu
tion of four separate Parliaments for England,
Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, with one Imperial
Parliament supreme over all. Moreover, the Bill
gave no protection to minorities, none to Ulster.
If Ulster made up her mind to fight, no Liberal
Government would be strong enough to coerce
her into subjection. Finally, it was idle to say
that If the new Constitution were found to
work badly It might be withdrawn. That could
not be done without provoking Ireland to the
verge of insurrection. It was an irrevocable
step which Parliament was asked to take, but
never in the history of the world had a risk
so tremendous been encountered with so

"THE UNION OF HEARTS" 341. I
light - hearted an indifference to its possible
results. In the Second Reading Debate, which was not
comm.enced (6th April) until after the brief Easter
Recess, Mr Chamberlain dwelt chiefly on those
points over which he had passed somewhat lightly
in the previous discussion. Mr Gladstone, he
said, had enlarged on the evil effects of the old
misrule of Ireland by England. But in 1869, in
1870, and again in 1881, he had expressed faith In
the great reforms which he proposed and carried
out. The country was told that they would
have a conciliatory effect — on each occasion
there was a promise of "a union of hearts."
Had these reforms, then, been failures ? Had
these predictions been falsified ? That, certainly,
was not Mr Gladstone's view ! Then, if concilia
tion had produced great results, why not give it a
longer trial ? Indeed, it was true that a marvellous
improvement had taken place In the state of
Ireland — and even in its relations with England —
during the last twenty, thirty, and fifty years.
In spite of the faults in Mr Gladstone's Bill,
Mr Chamberlain suggested that the English
people — so sick were they of the Irish ques
tion — might accept the settlement proposed if
they believed it would be final. But how could It
be final when It was rejected by one-third of the
nation, by the vast majority of the propertied and
educated classes ? As for the professions of the
Nationalist Leaders, Mr Chamberlain reminded
the House that Mr Parnell had declared in public
that he regarded the first Home Rule Bill as
"closing the great controversy." A few days
afterwards he told his colleagues that he only
accepted it pro tanto, and it was nothing but a
" Parliamentary BIU," Nor, in fact, did this

342 THE HOME RULE ADMINISTRATION
second Bill contain the elements of finality. Would
the Nationalists avow that they accepted the pro
posed Veto of the Crown, exercised on the advice
of a British Minister, in the same sense as the
English and Scotch supporters of the Government
accepted it ? After pointing out the various limita
tions on Self-Government contained in the Bill,
limitations in which an Irish Legislature was most
unlikely to acquiesce, Mr Chamberlain passed
on to examine the financial provisions, which, he
said, were too liberal. Generosity to Ireland as
long as she remained a part of the United
Kingdom was proper enough, but no excep
tional consideration would be due to an
independent nation. Most of her taxation
going back to her for local purposes, she only
contributed about one twenty-fifth part of the
Imperial expenditure, whereas she ought to pay
one- twelfth — yet already the Irish members were
calculating that she should not pay more than one
thirty-fifth. As for War expenditure, a Nationalist
organ had just declared that Ireland ought to con
tribute nothing, as she could have no interest in
any War waged by Great Britain. A pretty look
out for the Union of Hearts !
The safeguards suggested in the Bill were
worthless—they could only be enforced by Civil
War. Without the good- will of the Irish people,
they were not worth the paper they were written
on ! Referring to an Article which he had
recently published in the Nineteenth Century,
Mr Chamberlain said that Mr Gladstone's criti
cism was a monstrous travesty of his opinions.
His censure on Irish methods had applied not to
the whole people out of Ulster, but to the Leaders
of the Nationalist Party — who threw away all
principle, abused all power, and had no sympathy

OPPOSITION IN COMMITTEE 'SV.i
with England, or sense of justice. He did not
attribute to the Irish people any "double dose of
original sin." It was Mr Gladstone who gifted
them with a double dose of " very original virtue."
Mr Chamberlain admired Mr Gladstone's "almost
boundless faith." Parliament was Invited to trust
to their good Intentions for the defence of the
lives and property of the Loyalists ; to their
gratitude, for assistance in the hour of necessity.
Mr Chamberlain did not believe In the miracles
promised by Mr Gladstone, which could change
the hearts of men and alter the springs of human
action. " The possible danger," he said, "is too
great, and the possible gain is too small. If this
Bill were passed, and we were to escape- — by a
good fortune which would be as unexampled as It
would be undeserved — from disaster and disgrace
which we had rashly provoked, still you have not
been able to give us even a plausible expectation
of any advantage corresponding to the risks which
you wish us to incur."
The Second Reading having been carried on
2 ist April by 43 votes (347 against 304),
on 8th May the Committee stage was com
menced. Mr Chamberlain opened for the Oppo
sition by moving that the first Eight Clauses
should be postponed until the Ninth — on which
the question of Imperial supremacy turned — had
been settled. This, after all. Was the fundamental
provision in the Bill. The suggestion was not
unreasonable, and, had It been accepted, the
subsequent course of the discussion might, con
ceivably, have been accelerated. Naturally, how
ever, Mr Gladstone objected to having his Bill
turned inside out at the bidding of the Opposition.
Besides, he had tactical reasons for not showing
his hand on this question until the last possible

344 THE HOME RULE ADMINISTRATION
moment. The hot Debate which fohowed was
but the first of many almost disorderly discus
sions, and on 28th June the Fifth Clause was
still unfinished. On that evening Mr Gladstone
stated, with his usual Parliamentary euphem
ism, that "avoidable delays" had occurred in
the taking of Divisions, and that next day he
would move a Resolution which would expedite
the course of business. This was for the
"Closure by Compartment," or procedure by
"Guillotine," which has since been Invoked by a
Unionist Government, and which, for good or
evil, seems to have become an established part of
our Parliamentary system.
Curiously enough, it was adopted at the
instigation of that Nationalist Party which had
invented and perfected the art of Obstruction,
and which now devised the one absolutely effec
tive remedy for the mischief which It had intro
duced into the House of Commons. At the
time it was denounced as a tyrannical innova
tion — far more drastic, as Mr Balfour pointed out,
than Mr Gladstone's action in 1881, when he
closured everybody who differed with him, and
suspended the Irish members so as to pass the
Clauses of his Crimes Act during their absence.
That was a case of urgent necessity : there was
no urgency for the Home Rule Bill. In order to
shorten the discussion, the word had been passed
to the Gladstonians not to make speeches that
would justify replies. But Mr Chamberlain was
not going to lose his opportunity. Never has he
been more Incisive and irritating than when he
got up to "compassionate" Mr Gladstone on the
position in which he was placed. Nobody
believed that he was willingly doing his present
work !

THE JUDGMENT OF THE COUNTRY 345
" There sit the men," he exclaimed, as he
pointed to the Irish members, "who pull the
strings of the Prime Minister of England. Under
the threats of his Irish masters, under the pres
sure of his least experienced supporters, he comes
down here to move a Resolution which is contrary
to ah the principles of his public life." It was
one more surrender to revolt. The Government
were taking advantage of their brief tenure of
office, of their casual majority, to betray the
Interests of the country, sacrificing them to men
who have been convicted of conspiracy against
those interests. The defects of the Bill had been
concealed from the country, and the concealment
was almost fraudulent. The Government dared
not submit the details to the people. Their
tactics were not the tactics of Statesmen, but the
tactics of Tammany Hall. Nevertheless, he was
glad they had played their last card. The British
Empire was being sold by private treaty, and it
was natural that the Irish Party, on completing
this underhand bargain, should say, " Why debate
any more ? We are satisfied — pro tanto ! "
In spite of Unionist denunciation, and some
misgivings among the English Home Rulers, the
Closure by Compartment was carried by a majority
(32) only shghtly below the normal strength
of the Government. The result was to hasten
the end, but not to soften the asperities, of
Debate. A characteristic "scene" arose when
Mr Dillon attempted to justify his threats of
revenge on the Irish minority by saying that
his words had been spoken under a sense of
indignation at the " MItchelstown Massacre."
Mr Chamberlain — always ready with his dates
and "cuttings" — blandly pointed out that Mr
Dillon's speech had been delivered about nine

346 THE HOME RULE ADMINISTRATION
months before the incident said to have pro
voked it !
On 1 2th July Mr Gladstone confessed, what
had long been felt, that the " in-and-out " arrange
ment proposed for Irish members at Westminster
was not one that could be carried. The only
practicable alternative was to leave them the right
to vote on all questions, though it was a method
not without "Its inconveniences." This conces
sion to the Irish Party was resented by many of
the English Home Rulers ; and, of course, it
was attacked by the Conservatives. It was a
change of front, Mr Balfour said, made on no
better ground than that the Whips said it would
pay in the Division Lobby. A Government
which had no convictions, or, at any rate, did not
act upon its convictions — which rather prided
itself on Indicating that its convictions were
opposed to Its pohcy — was not worth attacking!
Mr Gladstone retorted that Ministers did not
care whether Mr Balfour attacked them or not.
The position of the Irish members at West
minster was not vital to the Home Rule Question,
and therefore It was a matter on which the
Government thought that the "judgment of the
country ' should prevail. This gave Mr Cham
berlain one of those chances which he never
misses. Did the Government want to know " the
judgment of the country " ? Let them consult it.
He challenged them to dissolve Parliament on
that issue. This was a question on which the
Prime Minister said the British people were to
have a determining voice ! Here Mr Gladstone
remarked that Great Britain already had such a
voice, since It possessed a majority of the House.
Mr Chamberlain retorted that in the vital Division
on the Bill the vote of Great Britain — as distinct

A SCENE OF DISORDER 347
from that of Ireland — had been cast against
Ministers. He did not conclude without remark
ing that the real question was whether the interests
of Great Britain were to be controlled by " dele
gates from Ireland nominated by Priests, elected
by Illiterates, and subsidised by enemies of the
country ! "
This was by no means the warmest encounter
between Mr Gladstone and Mr Chamberlain. It
happened, on the day appointed for the final Act
of Closure, that Mr Chamberlain had moved an
Amendment which led Mr Gladstone to charge
him with playing the part of Devil's Advocate.
The vague, inoffensive phrase delighted the more
ignorant members of the House, — who believed
that something very terrible had been uttered, —
and Mr Gladstone, warmed with applause, deviated
from his usual courtesy to accuse Mr Chamberlain
of constantly and deliberately attributing to men
who had a right to stand on a level with him,
and who had been at one time his colleagues, and
believed themselves to be his friends, motives
which were directly contrary to their professions,
and which they indignantly disclaimed.
Mr Chamberlain described this as a "ferocious
speech," and it must be remembered that Mr
Gladstone's impressive manner lent a force to the
spoken rebuke which does not appear in the printed
words. It led to a memorable retort, and a dis
graceful scene. Mr Chamberlain taunted the
majority with regarding the Bill as perfect and un
improvable. Even when a change was made, they
applauded the alteration. After referring to the
numerous and important modifications which had
been introduced in Committee, he said that the Bill
had been changed in its most vital features, yet it
had always been found perfect by honourable mem-

348 THE HOME RULE ADMINISTRATION
bers behind the Treasury Bench. "The Prime
Minister cahs ' Black,' and they say ' It Is good ' :
the Prime Minister calls ' White,' and they say ' It
is better.' It is always the voice of a God ! Never
since the time of Herod has there been such slavish
adulation ! " As the name of Herod was pro
nounced, the Irish broke out with cries of " Judas."
At ordinary times the Chairman would have inter
vened with a formal rebuke, somebody would have
apologised, and the incident would have been over.
But Mr Chamberlain's taunt was uttered, and the
reply given, almost at the moment when the final
Closure was to operate. The Irish were exultant,
the younger Tories exasperated, and on both sides,
perhaps, some were not rigidly sober. The pent-
up feelings and the undigested liquor asserted
themselves together, and a trifling altercation
between two members led to a free-fight on the
floor of the House between Conservatives and
Nationalists, the confusion being much increased by
certain amiable gentlemen who mingled in the fray
with the purpose of drawing off the fighting con
tingents. If the riot was disgraceful, the conclusion
was ridiculous. The Speaker was sent for, and on
his appearance the members slunk back to their
seats like so many schoolboys caught playing In
their lesson hour.
It is unnecessary to follow the subsequent
course of the Home Rule Bill, though Mr
Chamberlain opposed it at every stage, as
actively as if it had some chance of escaping a
summary extinction in the House of Lords.
Though his elaborate arguments and pungent
phrases did nothing to delay its formal progress,
they caused him to be recognised, more fully
even than Lord Salisbury and Mr Balfour, as
the Champion of Unionism, and first won him

MR CHAMBERLAIN AND THE TORIES 349
his place in the affections of the rank-and-file of
the Conservative Party.
The sentiment was to be strained hereafter, —
and severely strained, — but it never ceased to
operate. Even when sharp misunderstandings
arose, the thought of a rupture was not
entertained. Now and again, it is true, he
taxed the patience of his allies somewhat
heavily — e.g., when he gave his support,
though not In any active manner, to Dis
establishment of the Church In Wales. In
1895, ^gs-ii^i there was a brisk dispute over the
vacancy at Leamington, created by the retirement
of Speaker Peel from the House of Commons.
The right of contesting the succession was
promptly claimed by the Liberal Unionists, on the
ground that Mr Peel had belonged to their Party.
But it was shown that he had never severed —
indeed, he had maintained by subscriptions — his
connection with the local Gladstonian organisa
tion, and the Conservatives, who had a local
candidate in the field, and possessed nearly all
the voting weight in the Constituency, argued
that they were entitled to treat It as an open seat.
Equitably, their position was unassailable. The
Liberal Unionist contention as to the politics of
the late Speaker was by no means established,
and under these circumstances, especially as the
Conservative representative had been at work for
some time and was generally acceptable to the
electors, it was felt that the appeal to the
Unionist Compact was to interpret the letter
rather than the spirit of that arrangement. So
much soreness was caused that a compromise had
to be arranged. The Conservatives consented to
give up the seat to the Liberal Unionists, but
only on condition that the candidate put forward

350 THE HOME RULE ADMINISTRATION
by their allies should be withdrawn in favour of
one whose views were but nominally distinguished
from their own. It would have been the height
of folly if either of these grounds of controversy
had been allowed to break up the union between
the Conservative and Radical Unionists. It
would have been impossible for Mr Chamberlain
to abandon, or even to sink, his opinions with
regard to Disestablishment, and, if he had been
unconciliatory in regard to Leamington, it must
be remembered that the Constituency lay almost
within that Midland region which was the strong
hold of his political power, and also that the
Liberal Unionists, having suffered so heavily at the
General Election, could not well afford to have
their list of members diminished.
So far as Mr Chamberlain found himself com
pelled to advocate, or not to oppose, measures
introduced by the Gladstonians, it was admitted
by the Conservatives that he did what he believed
to be his duty in the manner least injurious to his
alhes. In February 1893, Mr Asquith brought in
his Bill for suspending the creation of new clerical
Interests with regard to the Church of England in
Wales and Monmouthshire. This was an avowed
preparation for a future Disestablishment Bill,
but Mr Chamberlain and fifteen other Liberal
Unionists abstained from voting in favour of a
Measure which, under other circumstances, they
must have supported. He went even further, and
in the House of Commons remarked on what he
considered the insincerity of Ministers in proposing
Il In a general denunciation of "political log
rolling," there was, he said, no genuine majority
for any one Item in the Government programme.
The Welsh voted for Home Rule because they
wanted Disestablishment: the Teetotallers for Dis-

AS MEDIATOR 351
establishment, because they wanted Local Veto ;
and the Labour Party for everything, because they
wanted the Eight Hours Day. Again, on the
Employers' Liability Bill, to the main principles of
which he was deeply committed, he gave a cordial
support to the Amendment, Introduced by Lord
Dudley, which preserved to men and masters the
liberty of contracting themselves out of the new
law in the case of existing voluntary arrangements
that provided both parties with a more advan
tageous manner of settling claims for injury or
death. This Mr Chamberlain did at the risk of
giving offence to the Trade Unions, whose
Leaders strongly opposed the modification
demanded, and in the main carried by the
House of Lords. Indeed, he pointed out that the
Bill, as proposed by the Government, did both
less and more than It ought to do. It would
not materially reduce the number of accidents
because every prudent employer would at once
insure himself against the claims that might
be made against him. Though the Bill would
provide compensation In a number of cases not
covered by the existing law, the Government
might have given it a much more general scope,
and Included practically all cases of accident.
This could have been done by the establishment
and development of voluntary Institutions for pro
viding compensation, and it was in this direction
that public opinion was tending. Under these cir
cumstances it was a " strong order " to destroy the
existing Institutions of this character, and to dis
courage them In the future. No answer had been
given to the demand of "hundreds of thousands
of working men who simply wanted to be left
alone." It was said they had been coerced into

352 THE HOME RULE ADMINISTRATION
making this demand. It was a libel on " the very
flower of the working classes." In fact, the
pressure had been exercised In the other direction.
It would be tedious to trace the minute and
somewhat futile discussions in the House of
Commons, and its dispute with the Peers, on
some of the Clauses in the Parish Councils Bill.
At the time these points were considered suf
ficiently serious, since it was hoped by the
Liberals and feared by the Conservatives that
this latest extension of Local Government would
revolutionise village life and dethrone "the
Squire and the Parson," from their traditional
Influence. In a few parishes It has, no doubt,
had that result, but in the vast majority
of cases the new representative machinery
has, practically, been administered by the same
persons who had previously made themselves
active in rural business. On this question Mr
Chamberlain's attitude was rather that of a
moderator than a combatant, and, if In the
various recommendations which he pressed on
his allies he was Inclined to favour concessions
to the Government, there was no case in which
he could be charged with breaking loose from the
Conservatives. Certainly he got no thanks from
the other side for what he did.
Again, on the question of Betterment, Mr
Chamberlain appeared once more in his new
character of mediator, and risked a quarrel
with his Progressive supporters. An Improve
ments Bill, promoted by the London County
Council, had contained a Clause giving effect to
the principle that the persons whose property
would be rendered more valuable by the proposed
constructions should be forced to contribute
towards the expense. The proposal had been

MR GLADSTONE'S RESIGNATION 353
struck out by the Peers as invoking a novel
doctrine which should not be sanctioned except
as part of a general policy deliberately adopted.
This Amendment the Commons declined to accept,
and at this point the whole Bill was hung up. In
order to reach an amicable arrangement, or at
least a definite understanding. It was moved in
the House of Lords, and carried, that the House
of Commons should be Invited to join In the
appointment of a Select Committee to report on
the whole subject.
This offer was declined by the Prime
Minister, though Mr Chamberlain, and several
other Liberal Unionist members, urged that
the offer had been made by the Peers In
good faith. It would enable them to retrieve
what he regarded as their errors. Why should
Ministers refuse them a locus poenitentice ? But
the policy of conciliation was exactly what Mr
Gladstone's supporters were unwilling that he
should adopt. They were eager to make
the Peers "fill up the cup." The more dis
agreements between Lords and Commons, the
better for the General Election. The eventual
failure of these tactics does not prove that any
more sagacious course was then open to the
Liberal Party. That the policy was regarded
with some apprehension by the other side was
shown by the efforts made by the leading
Unionists, and especiahy by Mr Chamberlain, to
reduce the occasions of conflict between the two
Houses of Parliament. But, whether prudent or
imprudent, the policy had one immediate draw
back — It involved the loss of all the Important
Government Bills. Though the Session had
opened In January 1893, it dragged along over
Christmas, and was not wound up till March 1894.
z

354 THE HOME RULE ADMINISTRATION
The Employers' Liability Bill had to be withdrawn,
and the Parish Councils Act was only passed in
a somewhat mutilated condition. Nothing else
of consequence had been accomplished.
But this was not the greatest of the misfortunes
that fell upon the Liberal Party. It had long
been evident that Mr Gladstone had neither
the health nor the spirit required for the con
tentious tasks on which he had entered. The
rumour of his approaching resignation published
by the Pall Mall Gazette on 31st January had
been officially contradicted. It was, however,
only premature and unauthorised. It proved to
be correct. His last speech In the House of
Commons was delivered on ist March 1894,
when he announced that, rather than wreck the
whole work of the Session, the Government would
withdraw their opposition to the Amendments
finally proposed by the Lords to the Parish
Councils Bill. This he accompanied with a
"sorrowful declaration" that the recent differ
ences between the two Houses — -not merely on
that Bill— had been of no casual or temporary
nature. They were differences of conviction, of
prepossession, of mental habit, and fundamental
tendency. The developments of that year had
led to a state of things which could not long
continue. The Issue between the two Houses
had long been postponed — partly through the
discretion, circumspection, and reserve which had
been shown by the Peers, in the days of the
Duke of Wellington, Lord Aberdeen, and others,
in the exercise of their "enormous privileges."
But Mr Gladstone feared that the spirit of
reserve and circumspection had gone by.
The House of Commons could not be a judge
in its own case. The appeal must be to

UNIONIST COALITION 355
a higher authority. The time at which the
judgment of the nation should be invited
was for the Executive Government to decide.
"My duty terminates," he said, "by cahlng
the attention of the House to the fact, which
it Is really Impossible to set aside, that in con
sidering these Amendments, limited as their scope
may seem to some to be, we are considering a
part, an essential part, of a question enormously
large, a question which has become profoundly
acute, which will demand a settlement, and must
receive at an early date that settlement from the
highest authority."
The dignified language of this unspoken fare
well from the aged Statesman to the Assembly In
which, for two generations, he had been Incom
parably the greatest figure, which he could still
dominate when he chose to strain his failing
powers, was the more pathetic because he had
already placed his resignation in the hands of his
Sovereign, and because this, his last, utterance
from his place in Parliament marked his loyal
adherence to a policy which he could not carry
on, and which had been adopted, if not against
his will, yet without his hearty concurrence. He
had never gone cheerfully into a campaign
against the House of Lords, and he now gave
his consent to it chiefly because he felt that the
question was less for himself than his colleagues.
By an arrangement rapidly carried out, which
need not be examined here, the succession was
given to Lord Rosebery, and a new split was
made In the already riven body of the Liberal
Party — between the advocates of Home Rule who
put that Measure last in their list and those who
insisted on keeping It in the first place.
Meantime, the Unionists had been closing up

356 THE HOME RULE ADMINISTRATION
their ranks. It was something more than an act
of political courtesy, it was a symptom of the
approaching Coalition, that Mr Chamberlain had
been invited to become the guest of a Conser
vative Club in Birmingham. The day before he
took part in this significant ceremony he delivered
a rattling attack on the Government, and scorn
fully repudiated the claims of the Liberal Party
to be considered the real authors of the Free
Education policy — Mr Gladstone had never sup
ported the Birmingham League, and the Act of
1870 had been passed by his Ministry in defiance
of that body. Even in 1885 he had spoken of
the remission of school fees as remote from
practical politics. How, then, could his Party
claim credit for a Measure which was proposed
and carried a few years later by his adversaries ?
The blame for this last barren Session lay with
Ministers themselves, who had won the support
of the electors by lavish promises of British
reforms, ah of which had been postponed for a
scheme of Home Rule. All they had done was
to set up a feeble agitation against the Peers, and
to issue a Circular which excited nothing but
ridicule. Thus, to all intents and purposes, though
not in express terms, Mr Chamberlain had
entered into partnership with the Conserva
tives, He associated them with the Radical
Unionists in the credit gained by the Free Edu
cation Act, and joined them in defence of the
House of Lords. It was an auspicious prelude
to his declaration of political faith at Edgbaston.
The assembled Conservatives of his own city,
against whom he had fought so many stiff battles,
were informed that, in his belief, the combination
of the various Unionist groups was not a mere

ATTACK ON THE NEW RADICALS 357
temporary arrangement. He looked to the crea
tion of a new National Party above all sectional
aims — to preserve the welfare, even the safety, of
the United Kingdom. It should be "sensible of
the responsibilities of Empire, mindful of the
traditions of a great governing race, and deter
mined to hand down to future generations the
great inheritance of a world-wide dominion."
These words, spoken on 30th January 1894,
are a sufficient answer to critics who suggest that
Mr Chamberlain's Imperialism was suddenly
adopted when he found himself at the Colonial
Office in 1895, ^^^ only then adopted because It
gave him a chance of making a figure in that De
partment. As a matter of fact. It had for some
years past been the post on which he had set his
pohtical ambition. When there was some talk,
though, perhaps, never any definite intention, in
1887, of replacing the Conservative Ministry with a
Unionist Coalition, it was the office which he
now holds that Mr Chamberlain would then have
been ready to accept — which, indeed, he preferred
to any other that was available. The belief In our
Imperial destinies, to which he has frequently, in
recent years, given eloquent and precise expres
sion, was no new growth In his mind. He had
begun his political life with some rudiments of
that faith, and. If they had been obscured by his
association from 1880 to 1885 with Statesmen
who cared so much for internal affairs that they
almost ignored our interests In other Continents,
the instinct had never been quite suppressed. It
was roughly awakened by the threatened dis
memberment of the United Kingdom ; stimulated
by co-operation with a Party which thought too
much, rather than too little, of our rights and
duties outside these Islands ; and it has been con-

358 THE HOME RULE ADMINISTRATION
firmed by a close acquaintance with the magni
tude and complexity of the problems that confront
a State which has to conduct the hegemony of
a loosely-compacted confederation of races who
present, in their various stages of development, a
continuous History of Civilisation — from almost
primitive barbarism to the very verge of democratic
extravagance. In addressing the practical politicians of
the Edgbaston Junior Conservative Club, Mr
Chamberlain was not content to sketch the out
line of that new Party which he asked then to
discern in the future. The promise of a rich
banquet at some distant date will not satisfy
present hunger. The appetite of the day was
best satisfied by solid invective against the other
side. Mr Chamberlain provided it with all the
air of a cheerful giver. He began by pointing to
the gulf that parted him from his old associates.
But it was they, not he, who had abandoned their
common principles. " The New Radicals," he
said, "are never satisfied with making anybody
happy unless they can make somebody else
unhappy. Their love for Home Rule is only
surpassed by their hatred of the Protestant and
British minority in Ulster. Their interest In
Temperance is conditional on their being able to
ruin the publicans. Their advocacy of Compen
sation for workmen is tempered by their desire to
do some injury to the employer. Even their love,
their affection, for Parish Councils is conditional
on their hostility to the Church."
This utterance sensibly cleared the air. Con
servatives could no longer feel distrust of an
ally who had made this fierce onslaught on the
enemy. There could be no more talk of forget
ting and forgiving between Gladstonians and

" IT IS NEVER JAM TO-DAY " 359
Radical Unionists. The quarrel was no longer
confined to the Irish Question — It included
the whole policy of the Ministerialist Party.
Nothing, therefore, that was likely to happen
within the next few years — as long a period as
practical politicians can consider — could modify
the position. It was not altered by the retire
ment of Mr Gladstone, or by the vacillating
professions made by his successor on the subject
of Home Rule. At the meeting of the Liberal
Party on 12th March, Lord Rosebery said there
was no need for a declaration of policy on his
part. "We stand where we did. There is no
change of measures — only a most disastrous
change in men." As to the steadiness of the
Cabinet on the Irish Question, it was a suffi
cient pledge that Mr John Morley not only
remained a member, but also refused a higher
office than that of Chief Secretary, because he
would not sever his career from the cause of
Ireland. But only a few hours intervened
between this apparently definite assurance from
the new Prime Minister and an utterance of quite
a different colour.
In the Debate on the Address, Lord Rosebery
explained why no new Bill would be brought
in that Session. It was not the function of
the House of Commons to prepare Bills simply
to furnish sport for the House of Lords. As
for appeahng to the country, the Government
would do that when the time was ripe, but would
never concede the right of the House of Lords to
force a Dissolution of Parliament. Lord Salisbury
had declared that, before Home Rule could be
given to Ireland, England, as " the predominant
member in the partnership of the three King
doms, must be convinced of Its justice." To this

360 THE HOME RULE ADMINISTRATION
Lord Rosebery agreed, though he was aware
that it was a "considerable admission," and he
qualified it by expressing his belief that English
men would soon be converted if Irishmen
remained on good behaviour. But he did not
mend matters by the suggestion that Home Rule
for Ireland must be accompanied by similar, if
not equal, decentralising proposals in favour of
Wales and Scotland. This was to postpone the
Nationalist demand to an indefinite date, while
even in principle It was hardly to be distinguished
from the position assumed by Mr Chamberlain.
It produced Indignation among the Irish, and con
sternation among the English, Home Rulers.
Mr John Morley did what he could to soothe
the irritation of the Nationalists, and to explain
that his new Chief had no intention of hanging
up Home Rule. But Mr Redmond broke
Into open revolt, and almost from that time
it was understood by the Conservative Whips
that they might count on the " Parnelhte "
votes for any Division in which there was a
chance of defeating the Government. Mr Cham
berlain, of course, took advantage of his adver
saries' embarrassment. It was perfectly plain, he
said, that Home Rule was to be shelved for the
remainder of that Parliament. They were told it
would be brought forward again when circum
stances would allow. But, as with Alice in
Wonderland, it was jam yesterday, and jam to
morrow, but never jam to-day. Meantime, the
"predominant partner" was to be drugged with
the Newcastle Programme, so that he might
afterwards be induced to swallow Home Rule !
Evidently, it was necessary for Lord Rosebery
to make some further statement. The majority
of the Nationalist Party were willing to be per-

ATTACKS ON LORD ROSEBERY 361
suaded of his good faith, but formal overtures
must be made, nor should any time be lost. On
17th March he exhibited that dexterity in gliding
out of trouble which almost makes up for the
careless ease with which he slips into it. By his
language in the House of Lords he had only
meant (it appeared) that It was necessary to carry
conviction to the hearts of the people of England.
By these words he would stand. They were
a truism, a platitude. But he had never meant
that the Government would wait on an English
majority for every reform. At that rate they
would never get any reform at all. As a Scotch
man he repudiated such a suggestion ! This
was excellent, since it put him on good terms
with the Scottish Liberals to whose support
he owed much of his political importance. But
his more pressing purpose was to conciliate the
Irish Nationalists. This he did by renewing
his Home Rule professions, and by promising
to bring in another Bill if the Liberals should
get a clear majority of 100, no matter of what
nationalities it might be composed. As for the
threatened opposition of the Ulstermen, Lord
Rosebery derided such a menace — they would sub
mit, unless they had England behind their back !
This went straight to the heart of the Nationalists,
and Mr Dillon hastened to declare that in Lord
Rosebery the cause of Ireland had an honest and
honourable champion. The Parnellite intran
sigents, however, remained sceptical.
Speaking within a few days in the same city
Mr Chamberlain asked what had been the mean
ing of Lord Rosebery's Edinburgh declaration.
" We have a Prime Minister " he said, " who is
willing to support Home Rule though he has no
belief in its early success. He is willing to dis-

362 THE HOME RULE ADMINISTRATION
establish one Church, or to establish three, as may
be most convenient. He is willing to abolish the
House of Lords, even at the cost of Revolution,
though he believes in a Second Chamber. There
is no change, then. In policy. But there is a
change. There is a change In the attitude of the
Prime Minister. In Mr Gladstone we had, at
any rate, a man who succeeded In convincing him
self the more he tried to convince others. But
Lord Rosebery is not convinced, and he does not
seem to think that anyone needs conviction."
This attack on the new Prime Minister was the
more significant because, personally, it was unpro
voked. It showed that any hopes of a Liberal
Reunion which had been based on the change
of Premiership were quite unfounded — that the
Radical Unionists would be as firm against a
Prime Minister who was lukewarm on Home
Rule as against his enthusiastic predecessor.
Nor was this inference weakened by the con
fessedly awkward position In which Mr Chamber
lain was placed when Mr Asqulth's Bill was
introduced (26th April) for the Disestablishment
of the Church in the twelve Welsh counties
and in Monmouthshire. He could not honestly
oppose this Measure, yet politically, in view of the
issues involved, which were far greater than any
contained in the scheme itself, it was inexpedient
to support Ministers. But for any inconveni
ence which he felt on this question he found com
pensation in the Registration Bill which adopted
the principle of "One-man One- vote" without
satisfying the other catch-cry of " One-vote One-
value." Though the state of the Register was a
scandal which it was the duty of the Government
to deal with, this scheme " raised the manipulation
of Elections into a fine art." By abolishing the

THE LEEDS MANIFESTO 363
rate-paying qualification Ministers "favoured the
wastrel, the ne'er-do-well, the profligate, and the
drunkard." No attempt was made to redress the
over- representation of Ireland — that would have
been for the Government to commit political
suicide. In fact, it was a purely partisan measure,
and an attempt to pack the National Jury.
Mr Chamberlain's recent Invasion of Edin
burgh and attack upon the Prime Minister were
warmly resented. On May 23rd Lord Rosebery
retaliated by a political visit to Birmingham,
the headquarters of Radical Unionism. On the
five leading questions of the day — on the Church,
the House of Lords, the Budget, the Registration
Bill, and Local Veto — he charged Mr Chamberlain
with inconsistency. In fact, his Liberalism was
rapidly vanishing. A few days later, at Bradford,
Mr Chamberlain replied by pointing out that the
most important charges which Lord Rosebery
had made were based on quotations from "The
Radical Programme," a book to which he had
contributed nothing but the Preface, while he had
expressly disclaimed responsibility for the views
which it put forward. It was true, of course, that
he had attacked the House of Lords : and it might
happen in the future that he would again contest
the right of an hereditary Chamber to resist the
declared will of the great m.ajority of the people.
At present, however, the Peers were, he thought,
defending the rights of the majority.
More interesting was his appearance at
Liverpool In the Autumn (5 th September) when
he laboured to show that there was nothing
incompatible between Conservatism and his own
type of Radicalism. Both schools of thought
might consistently co-operate for social reform.
Here he ventured on the delicate topic of

364 THE HOME RULE ADMINISTRATION
making provision for the claims of the aged and
deserving poor. He was on safer ground when
he advanced the argument which lies at the root
of Democratic Imperialism in this country — that
the population of these small islands cannot sub
sist in their present comfort and prosperity except
by maintaining the power of the Empire. For
this reason it was necessary for the working
classes to feel an active interest In foreign ques
tions. From the Liberal Party, as then con
stituted, there was nothing they could look for.
Later In the month Mr Chamberlain delivered a
series of speeches at Leeds, by way of counter
blast to the recent proceedings of the National
Liberal Federation in that City, and the Manifesto
Issued against the House of Lords. He began
by insisting on the familiar theme that Home
Rule was unpopular In England, and could only
be carried by the Government if they made an
appeal to the country on a number of false issues,
raised merely to divert public attention from the
real object. Social reform would have to go to the
wall because it offered no opportunity for picking
a fresh quarrel with the Peers.
As for the Leeds Manifesto, Mr Chamber
lain argued that some Second Chamber was
necessary. If the Lords were deprived of their
suspensive Veto the country would lie at the
mercy of a chance majority in the Commons
— not, perhaps, a British majority! Was the
balance of power to lie in the hands of men
whose character and proceedings were alien
to the British spirit, who were subsidised
with foreign gold, and might be nominated by
a foreign organisation ? Contrasting the Old
Radicalism with the New, he declared that the
object of the former had been to raise and

PROGRAMME FOR UNIONISTS 365
emancipate the individual ; the latter aimed at
bringing about a dead level of uniformity, in
which the idle, thriftless, and improvident would
be treated alike with the honest, Industrious, and
capable. No Conservative could have been more
direct than was Mr Chamberlain in denouncing
the mischief of Collectivism. It meant, he said,
Confiscation — neither the capital of the rich nor
the savings of the poor would be spared. He did
not believe, however, that the bulk of the working
classes favoured the doctrines of the New Trade
Unionism. But the Unionists, if they would
combat revolutionary and Impracticable schemes,
must be prepared with an alternative policy — a
policy of that social reform which had been so
completely neglected by the present Parliament.
What the articles in that Programme were to
be, he afterwards explained at West Birmingham.
He had opposed the Local Veto Bill, but admitted
that Temperance legislation was required. What
he still advocated was an adaptation of the
Gothenburg system — which took the trade into
Municipal hands, and thus removed the induce
ments either for pressing the traffic or supplying
bad liquor. But it was an essential part of his
scheme that the licensed victualler should receive
fair compensation.
Another proposal was a considerable extension
of the Artisans' Dwellings Act. In theory he had
been disposed to favour the Betterment scheme
adopted by the London County Council, but in
practice the difficulty of working it equitably had
proved almost insuperable. It would be found
more useful to enable the Local Authority to
acquire, at a reasonable price, a portion of the
ground surrounding the insanitary area which was
to be reconstructed. The enhanced value of the

366 THE HOME RULE ADMINISTRATION
whole site would thus become public property.
The same result would be achieved as by laying a
Betterment charge on individuals while no person
would have any reason for complaint.
Workmen should be assisted by loans on easy
terms to purchase their dwelling-houses. The
repayment might be spread over a term of years,
and the State might make a slight profit in the
transaction. With regard to Old Age Pensions, he pro
tested against the recognition of any universal
claim. Only those persons should be helped who
were willing to help themselves. He expressly
repudiated the demand of the National Old Age
Pensions League — that so much a week should be
paid to every person over sixty years of age who
applied for it, the money being taken from other
Charities and from the Church of England. To
begin with, the funds suggested would be quite
inadequate. In the second place, the proposal
was made by persons more anxious to disestablish
the Church than to set up Old Age Pensions.
It was dishonest to put forward a branch of the
Liberation Society as though it were an Old Age
Pension League — it was drawing the trail of a
red-herring across the path.
Arbitration In Trade disputes might be pro
vided by means of a Tribunal In every district, and
consisting of a Judge with Assessors specially
appointed in each case. Though the decisions of
such a Court would have no legal force they
would have great moral influence — no Strike was
ever successful unless It were backed up by public
opinion. Mr Chamberlain did not countenance
the Idea of a Universal and Compulsory Eight
Hours Day, but there might be a system of Local
Option with regard to Mines, and the hours of

THE CASE FOR THE UNIONISTS 367
shopkeepers and their assistants might be reduced
in the same way. As to Employers' Liability he
favoured an arrangement by which compensation
should be secured, without expense or htlgation,
for all kinds of injuries. Finally, he was prepared
to restrict the immigration of Pauper Aliens.
At Durham a little later (i6th October), he
defined more precisely his position with regard to
the Church of England. He should vote for Mr
Asqulth's Bill for Welsh Disestablishment, though
he disliked the spirit In which the " principle of
Voluntaryism " was being carried into effect. The
question should have been approached in Wales
as it had been in Ireland — as one of national
and religious importance, not as one of jealousy
and competing sects. If the Church In Wales
were to be disestablished he would claim that the
terms accorded to it should not be less generous
than those granted to the Church of Ireland.
After this promise It was clear that the Con
servatives would have no solid reason to complain
of the abstract support which he might give to a
Bin that could by no human possibility pass into
law. They were delighted, and a little surprised,
by his declaration about the House of Lords. He
was, he said, no defender of an hereditary legisla
ture. But he was a strong upholder of a Second
Chamber. Until a better could be found, he
should "stick to the House of Lords." On the
one hand, it was not strong enough to resist the
clearly expressed will of the people : on the other,
it could "secure a period of delay, and considera
tion, discussion, and an appeal to the country."
And an appeal to the country ! This was not in
so many words an admission of the Peers' claim
to force a Dissolution of Parliament. Indeed, no
such claim had ever been asserted by any judicious

368 THE HOME RULE ADMINISTRATION
supporter of the House of Lords, though the pre
tension had often been imputed to the Peers — by
Mr Chamberlain himself, as well as by other
Radicals. But his words on this occasion carry a
clear admission that in his opinion the House of
Lords would be entitled, on any great question of
the day, to insist on the Bill which they had
rejected either being dropped or submitted as the
test question at a General Election.
On 22nd November, Mr Chamberlain summed
up, at Heywood, the case for the Unionists
against the Government. " You may, if you like,
try to disestablish and disendow the Church in
Wales ; and, if you succeed. In my opinion —
though I sympathise with the object as a matter
of abstract principle — nobody will be one penny
the better for it. You may, as I have said, try
to disestablish the Welsh Church, or, you may,
on the other hand, try to become the owners of
your own lands. You may attempt to pass an
Irish Land Bill, or you may attempt to get Old
Age Pensions for yourselves. You may try to
put down drinking, to prevent any man getting
a glass of beer ; or you may try, with me, to pre
vent drunkenness and to restrict the vice of
drinking. Lastly, you may enter into a campaign
against the House of Lords which will last, as
Lord Rosebery himself has warned you, for years,
and, it may be, for generations ; or you may
prefer what I believe to be the wiser course, you
may enter on a campaign against want and
misery, and you may try to add something to the
sum of human happiness. You cannot have both
these policies at the same time."
It was universally believed at the end of 1894
that an appeal to the country would be made in
the following year. By-elections had not been

A TOTTERING ADMINISTRATION 369
favourable to the Government, and In the House
of Commons their majority was notoriously un
steady. When Parliament met on 5th February
the chief Measures mentioned in the Queen's
Speech related to Irish Land, the restoration
of^ Evicted Tenants, Welsh Disestablishment,
Local Veto, Plural Voting, and Trade Con
ciliation. The length of the list was its
sufficient condemnation, and this was, in effect,
what Mr Chamberlain declared in his Amend
ment to the Address. The primary policy of the
Government, he said, was to pass a Home Rule
Bill for Ireland. This had been admitted in the
speeches of Sir William Harcourt and Mr John
Morley. But in that policy they were out of
harmony with the opinion ofthe country. Indeed,
if they did not know this to be the case, they
would have dissolved Parliament when the Peers
rejected Mr Gladstone's BIU In 1893. If they
had done so, and if the country had supported
them, the House of Lords would have given way.
But on their own confession " the predominant
partner " was against them. As had been said
of a previous Administration, though they had
forgotten how to govern they had not learned
how to resign. To cover their failure, they raised
the good old cry " Down with the House of
Lords ! " They had brought out this favourite
piece which had never failed to draw, but on this
occasion it had not "taken." Why? Because It
had never before been mounted with such shabby
accessories and acted by so weak a company.
The secondary policy of Ministers having fared
no better than the primary, they were now engaged
in the tertiary policy of "filling up the cup."
They were bringing in a number of Measures,
not intended to pass, in the hope that one amongst
2 A

370 THE HOME RULE ADMINISTRATION
them would help them to pick a plausible quarrel
with the Peers. An attempt had been made to
damage himself by the publication of a private
letter.* He was prepared to stand by what he
had written on the subject of Disestablishment.
But he had expressed only his personal opinions
— so far as he knew, they were not shared by any
other member of the Unionist Party.
When the Division was taken on Mr Cham
berlain's Amendment the majority for Ministers
was only 14 (297 against 283), the followers of
Mr Redmond having voted with the Opposition.
Evidently, as Mr Chamberlain had declared, " the
Government were tottering." It would have been
no surprise if they had made up their minds at
once to take the " inevitable plunge." They
decided, however, to stay on until they should be
defeated in the House of Commons, and, as
things turned out, they had some justification for
hoping to get safely through the Session. On
the Welsh Disestablishment Bill they obtained a
majority of 44 for the Second Reading. Their
Irish Land BIH reached the same stage without a
Division being challenged, though not without an
* '' Disestablishment in Wales must come," he observed,
" and the only question is whether it shall be accompanied
by a just "treatment of the Church in regard to its funds.
This can be secured now by the Unionist Party, and
Churchmen would be wise if they were to urge their leaders
to devote themselves to this part of the subject. If, on
the contrary, they meet the present agitation with an
absolute non possumus, they may probably find that when
it is next brought forward, the opportunity of a compromise
Willi have been lost. The Welsh Church is entitled to
liberal, and even generous, terms ; and if, under these
circumstances, it is freed from the connection with the
State, it will, in Mr Chamberlain's belief, rise to a position
of influence and usefulness that it has never yet enjoyed." —
Aberysiwith Obsener.

LONDON POLITICS 371
interesting Debate. After a sharp passage of
arms with Mr Dillon (whose conciliatory language
in the House Mr Chamberlain contrasted with his
advice to the Irish tenants) he declared that he
had himself long been In favour of transferring the
ownership from the landlord to the cultivator.
This he had learned from Mr Bright and it had
been confirmed by Mr Parnell. The Bill of 1881
had only been a temporary Measure, but all the
safeguards it created would be destroyed by this
new proposal. The value of land would not be
diminished but destroyed. The one true solu
tion of the agrarian question was Land Purchase,
and this would be Impeded rather than assisted
by the Bill. The Government were Introduc
ing uncertainty over matters which had been
settled. The Irish tenant was too shrewd to go
into court to buy his holding so long as this
uncertainty existed. Nevertheless, the Bill had
good points, and he should support it if Ministers
would accept reasonable Amendments in Com
mittee. In London politics, apart from his abstract
leaning to the Betterment principle, Mr Chamber
lain has given his support to the Moderates, who,
for all practical purposes, are Identical with the
Conservatives. He never was enamoured of the
Municipal system as it is worked in most, though
not all, the great cities in the United States, and
the closer acquaintance which he has gained by
his visits to that country convinced him that the
English boroughs are more efficiently and much
more cheaply administered. Here there is no
corruption — or none of which serious account
need be taken — and the expenditure, in proportion
to the population, he estimates at one-fifth, or at
most one-fourth, of the cost in America. He

372 THE HOME RULE ADMINISTRATION
has laid down, as essential conditions of Muni
cipal efficiency, first, that the permanent officials
shall be so well remunerated as not to be exposed
to the temptation of indirect profits, and that
men should be obtained for the public service as
well qualified as these employed by the best private
firms ; and, secondly, that the Constituency shall
not be too large for the member to be in reason
ably close touch with the electors. The former
condition had been almost ignored by the Pro
gressive majority In the London County Council,
though recently there has been an improvement
in this respect. The second condition was
rendered impossible by the constitution of the
Council itself ; the fault lies with Parliament,
or rather with the Conservative Government in
1888. "A population of 500,000," Mr Chamberlain
has written, " is practically the largest number
that can be governed from one centre with the
individual attention and constant assiduity that
have contributed so much to the usefulness and
popularity of corporate work. Many observers,
friendly to the work and careful of the reputation
of the London County Council, regret that the
establishment of a central authority did not
follow, rather than precede, the creation of
Local Councils dealing with more moderate
areas, and fear that the possible outcome may
be, when the first flush of public interest has
passed way, the permanent institution of a great
centralised bureaucratic administration, jealous of
its authority, wedded to its own methods, and
gradually losing touch with the people for whose
benefit it exists. Decentralisation is one of the
secrets of successful Local Government, and it
is an empty name in connection with a Local
Authority which professes to look after the

THE UNIONIST LEADERS 373
health, the comfort, and the domestic arrange
ments of nearly 5,000,000 of people."
In this Article, published in the Nineteenth
Century, Mr Cha^mberlain clearly foreshadowed
the creation of the new London Boroughs which
was to be carried out by the future Unionist
Government. Though he does not appear
to have made any express declaration as to
the absorption, once proposed by London Radi
cals, of the City within the Administrative
County of London, such a scheme would have
been quite alien to the principle of decentralisa
tion by which he sets, perhaps, an excessive
store. On 6th February 1895, he defined his posi
tion with regard to London politics, in a speech
delivered in Stepney, in view of the approaching
General Election for the County Council. He
denounced the idea of setting up a great central
body which would take all the credit over and above
a number of Local Boards which were to do all
the drudgery — a great Municipal planet at Spring
Gardens with several little satellites revolving
round it, and shining with a pale and reflected
light. The two great questions of local life in
London were, he said, the Housing of the Poor
and the treatment of the Unemployed. The
solution of both lay in the reconstruction of in
sanitary areas. But the London County Council
had done little In this direction, because the
Progressives would not accept a form of Better
ment which had satisfied the Manchester Cor
poration. The proposal to establish Municipal
workshops he would not countenance — it must
lead to jobbery. Had the Council done for
their employes more than an honourable and just
private employer would have done ? An incau-

374 THE HOME RULE ADMINISTRATION
tious enthusiast cried out " Yes ! " That, retorted
Mr Chamberlain, was a charge of bribery and cor
ruption ! But he did not make it, did not believe
it. If, however, the Council had done no more
than a fair private employer would do, what on
earth had they to boast about ? They were a
public body, trusted with public money, and they
had no right to be "generous" at the expense of
their constituents. That was the beginning of
the " Tammany Hall " rdgime, under which public
officials were paid extravagant salaries, and
rendered political services in return. " We are
not going to descend to that level in England,"
he said. Not many of Mr Chamberlain's speeches
have provoked more adverse comment from his
opponents. Here, they said, was the Leader of
"Municipal Socialism" in Birmingham turning his
back on the creed that gave him his first promotion
in public life ! The reply was that the distinction
which he drew between the cases of London and
Birmingham was based upon the difference of size
between the two places — the one was within, the
other was without, the limits of efficient self-
administration. Reference has already been made to the
Leamington incident and Mr Chamberlain's atti
tude with regard to the Welsh Church. These
matters had caused just enough dissatisfaction
among a group of the Conservatives for the
Liberals to suggest that a quarrel had broken
out between the Unionist Parties. It was
thought advisable, therefore, to dispose of this
exaggeration. Speaking to the Primrose League
(26th April), Mr Balfour declared that it was
not worth while to repudiate the statement that
personal differences had arisen between himself
and Mr Chamberlain. Never had a man received

THE CORDITE VOTE 375
more generous support, he declared, than he had
received from the Leader of the Liberal Unionist
Party in the House of Commons. Never had
their friendship been more cordial than at that
moment. The attacks on Mr Chamberlain had
only proceeded from a fraction of the Conserva
tive Party. The Compacts of 1886 and 1888
were artificial and temporary arrangements —
necessary for a period of transition. That period
would soon pass away, and be followed, he hoped,
by a fusion of the two Unionist Parties. He
afterwards read a letter from Lord Salisbury.
It was untrue that the Conservatives, so their
Leader wrote, were no longer sensible of the
services rendered to the common cause by the
Liberal Unionists, and especially by Mr Chamber
lain. They had always recognised "most grate
fully " the " disinterested and straightforward
loyalty with which Mr Chamberlain had devoted
his great authority and his splendid powers " to
the defence of the Union. Lord Salisbury felt
sure that members of the Primrose League would
let it be seen that the bonds which held the
Unionist Party together were not weakened, and
that their combined efforts would not be relaxed.
At St James's Hall (22nd May) Mr Chamber
lain made a suitable reply. It had been feared at
one time, he said, that by joining forces with the
Conservative Party the Liberal Unionists would
retard the progress of Reform. Had this appre
hension been fulfilled, the sacrifice would have
been justified. It would have been better to give
up Reform for a time — until the enemy had been
driven outside the gates. Happily, however, the
Liberal Unionists found that they were not lending
any support to Reaction. The Measures passed
by the Conservatives in 1886-1892, with the "help

376 THE HOME RULE ADMINISTRATION
ofthe Liberal Unionists,'' compared favourably. In
their material results, with those of any previous
Administration. The friendliness and loyalty of
the Conservative Leaders had been beyond ques
tion. The alliance was destined to last and bear
rich fruit. To this general profession he gave a
special point, by making an announcement which
went to the heart of the Conservative County
Members — amongst whom were found the chief
murmurers against his recent actions. He pro
mised his concurrence In a scheme for reducing
the burdens on land. Something beyond bare
sympathy was due to the depressed agricultural
Industry. It might be found possible to relieve
the farmers of part of the excessive rates which
they were then paying, and something might be
done to attach the labourer to the soil, and
counteract the attractions of the towns.
This was definite and satisfactory, the County
Tories thought, and the passing cloud was
quickly cleared away. The two Parties worked
together with a will, as though the Government
had already been beaten, and Parliament dis
solved, Stin, however. Ministers succeeded,
thanks to the excellent services of their Whips, in
staving off the evil day. Looking at the question
from the other point of view, Mr Chamberlain,
somewhat brutally, compared them with the con
demned criminal who was not In great haste that
the show should begin, and who
" Now fitted the halter, now traversed the cart,
And often took leave, but was loth to depart."
This speech was made on 28 th May, but It was not
tin 2 ist June that the bolt fell. The adverse vote
on the Army Estimates — brought about by what
the Liberals called a dirty trick, and the Union-

DEFEAT OF THE GOVERNMENT 377
ists applauded as a smart manoeuvre — might
have been reversed by a strong or sanguine
Administration. Indeed, some supporters of
the Government advised them to take that course
and carry on public business to the normal end
of the Session. The decision to resign office was,
however, rendered necessary by the attitude of
the Minister for War, who flatly refused to remain
at his post, and his retirement would have in
volved a general reconstruction of the Cabinet.
This was an operation too dangerous to be
undertaken by a Prime Minister with a small
and precarious minority. On 24th June, the
Queen sent for Lord Salisbury, whom she
commanded to form a new Administration.

CHAPTER XII
THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1895-I9OO
On receiving the Queen's summons. Lord Salis
bury held a brief consultation with the Duke of
Devonshire and Mr Chamberlain, as well as with
some of his old Conservative coheagues. At first
he was disposed to stipulate, as in 1885, that the
outgoing Government should promise to co
operate in winding-up the business of the Session.
Meantime, however, the ground had been cut away
under his feet by Ministers in both Houses having
announced their resignation. It was necessary,
therefore, that Lord Salisbury should accept the
succession without delay, nor was it less in
evitable to invite the Liberal Unionists to share
the responsibility. It had been on this under
standing that the new Prime Minister went down
to Windsor, and after his second journey on the
following day it was made known that the chief
Offices of State had been filled. With the duties
of Prime Minister Lord Salisbury combined those
of Foreign Secretary ; the Duke of Devonshire
became Lord President of the Council ; Mr
Balfour, First Lord of the Treasury and Leader
of the House of Commons ; the Chancellorship
of the Exchequer was given to Sir Michael
Hicks- Beach. Mr Goschen was made First Lord
878

ALLOCATION OF OFFICES 379
of the Admiralty, and Mr Chamberlain went to
the Colonial Office.
The difficulty of allocating these Departments
had been modified by two paramount considera
tions. In the first place, there could be no doubt
that the new Leader of the House of Commons
must be Mr Balfour. His claim could not be,
and in fact was not, disputed. No other man
would have been accepted by the Conservatives,
nor did Mr Chamberlain ask for or desire that
position. Had he asked for the Chancellorship
of the Exchequer his personal services to the
Unionist cause would have entitled him to the
second place, in point of dignity, in the House
of Commons ; but to elevate him, as It were,
over the head of Mr Goschen might have
seemed like putting a slight on the very able
and unselfish Statesman who in 1887 had helped
Lord Salisbury out of what seemed an awkward
position. So far as capacity was in question,
either Mr Goschen or Mr Chamberlain was,
by general consent, admirably competent for
control of the national finances, but Mr
Goschen declined the post when it was offered
him, and it was decided to confer it upon
a Conservative politician who, in spite of
his considerable attainments, could not be re
garded as a rival of either of those to whom
he had been preferred. At the Admiralty Mr
Goschen was well suited, and there was no
Department so acceptable to Mr Chamberlain
as the Colonial Office. It was, as we have seen,
the one to which he had been destined eight
years before, in what then seemed the possible
event of a Ministerial reconstruction, and many
of his recent utterances in Opposition suggested
that he had already discerned, and was anxious

380 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1895-1900
to obtain, in the administration of Imperial busi
ness, an opening for constructive Statesmanship.
To the public, however, the appointment was
something of a surprise. The office had generally
been held by second-rate men or by those whose
star was on the decline. It was suggested by
candid friends in the Liberal Party that he
had been sent to the Colonial Office In order
that he might be kept too hard at Depart
mental work for taking any active part in
Cabinet business, or for making speeches up
and down the country. But, whatever may have
been the opinion of outsiders, neither then nor
afterwards, neither in public nor private, did Mr
Chamberlain express dissatisfaction. Now It is one
of his faults, or merits, that he cannot long suppress
his feelings. If he had cherished any resent
ment, it was bound, sooner or later, to come
out — and come out in the most unmistakable
manner. Had he thought In June 1895 that
his merits had been insufficiently recognised,
he would have considered that the discredit
lay, not with himself, but with the Prime Minister,
and he would have felt no scruple about placing
the blame on the proper shoulders. The
politician for whom an adversary has invented
the word "pushful" would not have quietly
acquiesced, when he was in a position to make
his own terms, in what he regarded as derogatory
treatment. The truth was that the new Colonial Secre
tary had realised that, for the present at least.
Home politics were practically played out.
The Constitutional reforms which he had once
advocated he could no longer take any active
part in promoting, except at a sacrifice of
principle which he was not prepared even to

CHOICE OF THE COLONIAL OFFICE 381
contemplate. For a Radical who would not
accept Home Rule there was no longer any
place in the Liberal Party, In an attack on
certain ancient institutions which In Mr Cham
berlain's eyes were either useless or harmful
he could find no partners except among those
who had become his irreconcilable enemies. In
the tasks of constructive Statesmanship, on the
other hand, the Conservatives would, he believed,
be more useful and more docile associates, and
as Lord Salisbury's official colleague he might
hope to make an even better record than
he had achieved as an irresponsible adviser.
But neither the Home Office nor the Exchequer
— certainly none of the other Departments —
offered so much scope for individual energy as
the one which he had chosen.
By training and association, if not by de
liberate intellectual choice, he had always been
a strong supporter of Free Trade, and on many
occasions he had denounced the fallacies of the Pro
tectionism that prevailed sixty years ago. He had
never wavered in his support of the doctrine which
Cobden and Bright and Charles VlUIers Incorpo
rated into our fiscal system. But he has not been
willing to keep his eyes closed to the changes which
have recently occurred In the economical position of
the country. Little by httle, we are being edged
out of foreign markets, until at the present time
there are few — except in those Dependencies to
which we have not yet accorded Self-Government
— where we can do business except at a greater or
less disadvantage. This is a tendency of which
Statesmanship is bound to take serious account,
Mr Chamberlain's views on Preferential Trade with
the Colonies, and his less definite aspirations after
an Imperial Zollverein, will be described In a later

382 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1895-1900
Chapter, It might not be difficult to quote
passages from his speeches which would suggest
that the opinions he has since expressed had
long existed, though in a latent form, within
his mind. At present, however, they had not
been developed. They were the outcome of
subsequent and unforeseen events.
In 1895, certainly, they had not taken definite
shape. Then, as now, the volume of our Trade
outside the Empire was so vastly in excess of the
transactions between Mother Country and
Colonies that no consideration of Imperial senti
ment could be allowed to turn the scale. But
already the area of our commercial liberty was
being seriously diminished. The M'Kinley Tariff
was aimed by the United States more directly
against this than any other European country,
while the rigid Treaties of Commerce between
the various central Powers of the Continent
were scarcely less hostile than the fiscal legis
lation of the French Republic, Our Foreign
Trade — part even of our Colonial Trade — was
existing merely on sufferance, a sufferance that
would not be extended one year longer than might
suit the convenience of our rivals. If we meant to
improve, or maintain, our commercial position, we
must do one of two things. Either we should be
compelled to use the same weapons of pacific
compulsion as our competitors — i.e., we must turn
Protectionist like the rest of the world — or we must
exert ourselves to retain ah the existing neutral
markets, and create fresh outlets for British
enterprise. It was to the latter alternative that
Mr Chamberlain at this time inclined. In our
Colonies and Protectorates — extended as they had
recently been by the series of delimitations carried
out by Lord Salisbury in Africa — might, perhaps,

THE 1895 ELECTION 383
be found an escape from the growing, if not yet
formulated, demand for a modification of our fiscal
system. Sanguine, therefore, as to the possibilities of
his position, and confident of a great victory In the
General Election of 1895, Mr Chamberlain had
flung himself heartily into the political fight. The
chief articles In his Programme were unchanged —
Better Housing for the Working-classes, a compre
hensive scheme of Compensation for Injuries, and
some form of Provision for Old Age. These were
practically the same inducements as were held out
by Conservative candidates, though on the last
head many of them were reticent or significntly
silent. But Liberal Unionists and Conservatives
alike dwelt chiefly on the shortcomings of the
Liberal Government. This, indeed, was their
strongest card. The Gladstone-Rosebery Ad
ministration had attacked many interests, alarmed
almost every class, and had not inspired com
plete confidence amongst its thick-and-thin sup
porters. Its defeat was a certainty, admitted
by its own prophets, though the extent of
the coming collapse had not been foreseen by
the most sanguine of its opponents. Although
the total turn-over of votes in Great Britain
was estimated at less than a quarter of a million,
the successes of the Unionists were so luckily
distributed that they obtained a majority of 152
in the new House of Commons. This dispro
portionate advantage was, no doubt, partly due
to the existence, in many Constituencies, of a
compact Liberal Unionist body, not large
enough to make any show, but sufficient to
carry a seat. In every district the new Party
had proved its importance, but in its recognised
centres — in London and Scotland as well as in

384 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1895-1900
the Midlands — it had almost regained the
original strength of 1886. Then they had been
between 70 and 80; in 1892 they were reduced
to 45 ; now they were over 70 again. Nor
in the allocation of " spheres of influence "
under the compact had there been any friction
between the two Coalition Parties. Of the
five Constituencies as to which reasonable ques
tion might arise, three had been conceded by
Liberal Unionists to Conservatives, and two by
Conservatives to Liberal Unionists. Mr Cham
berlain, therefore, was justified in his boast at the
Birmingham Conservative Club, that the Govern
ment of which he was a member had " the largest
and most homogeneous majority of our time."
Naturally, he gave special credit to his own
supporters in Birmingham and the neighbouring
Constituencies — a solid wedge of Unionist
representation. In the final distribution of offices under Lord
Salisbury, the Liberal Unionists obtained their
proportionate share of the Prime Minister's
patronage. Besides the Duke of Devonshire,
Mr Chamberlain, and Mr Goschen, they were
represented within the Cabinet by Lord James
of Hereford (Duchy of Lancaster) and the
Marquess of Lansdowne (War Office) ; and out
side that privileged, if unduly enlarged, body, by
Mr Austen Chamberlain (Civil Lord, Admiralty),
Lord Selborne (Under Secretary, Colonial Office),
Mr Jesse Collings (Under Secretary, Home
Office), Mr T. W. Russell (Secretary, Local
Government Board), and Mr Powell Williams
(Financial Secretary, War Office). But though
it was complained by disappointed Conservative
aspirants that Mr Chamberlain had carried to a
fault the recognised political virtue of rewarding

FOREIGN COMPLICATIONS 385
one's friends, no personal exception could fairly
be taken to the previous record of those Liberal
Unionists who directly owed their promotion
to his support of their claims. Several very
capable young Conservatives had for the time to
stand aside — this was part of the price paid for
the Liberal Unionist alliance — but on the first
opportunity room was made for them, and
such murmuring as was subsequently heard has
not been directed against any exercise of undue
influence by the Colonial Secretary.
It was an instance of political irony that the
Government which was placed in power chiefly
that the country might have a quiet time, after
the ineffective agitations of the previous three
years, should, within a few months of taking
Office, be called upon to face the most serious,
because the most prolonged and complicated,
crisis within the memory of living Englishmen.
In the Crimean War we were engaged with a
single enemy, but we had powerful allies ; the
Indian Mutiny was an agony of sentiment rather
than a menace to our place in the world. In
1878, and again in 1885, we had been brought
within close view of War with Russia, but never
till the end of 1895 ^.nd the opening of 1896 had
we been confronted with undisguised hostility by
several Great Powers at once. Our relations
with the French Republic had not recovered from
the strain caused by the quarrel over Slam ;
Russia was irritated by our refusal to assist In
coercing Japan into giving up the fruits of her
victory over China ; President Cleveland, playing
for the vote of the Anti- British Democrats of the
Southern and Western States, issued his Vene
zuelan Message, which was almost tantamount to
a threat of War ; finally, the Jameson Raid had
2 B

386 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1895-1900
complicated our already tangled relations with
the Transvaal, and led to a message from the
German Emperor to Mr Kriiger which English
men resented as a public insult to themselves.
For some weeks it seemed possible that the
opinion of the country would insist on active
steps being taken to wipe out this affront. The
danger was, not that we should be attacked, but
that, in spite of other entanglements, we should
ourselves be the aggressors. All this happened
within a few weeks of the day on which Mr George
Curzon, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs,
declared, not without apparent justification, that
we might look forward to a period of tranqulhity
under the prudent and sagacious administration
of our Foreign Affairs by Lord Salisbury. The
optimistic forecast was derided at the time by
unfriendly critics — though they little guessed how
prompt and signal would be their justification.
Mr Chamberlain, like the rest of his
colleagues, believed when he took office that he
had before him several years of quiet administra
tive work. He found at the Colonial Office a
Staff of public servants at least as efficient as
those in any other Department. It was often
said in the Colonies that the permanent officials
in Downing Street were not more remarkable for
the preciseness of their acquaintance with local
affairs than for the courtesy with which they
listened to every reasonable suggestion. The pre
liminaries were always smooth and satisfactory :
the hitch was only felt when something had to be
done. Everything was made ready, but nothing
was accomplished. The efficiency ended as soon
as the business passed from the hands of the
permanent officials to those of the political Chief
Then began the delays and excuses, ending In the

DOWNING STREET AND THE COLONIES 387
usual decision to leave things as they were. The
bad reputation of the Colonial Office— in spite of
its capable and reasonably vigorous Staff — had
been earned by a succession of Secretaries of State
who either wished to do nothing, or were discour
aged by their colleagues from entering on any
course that might entail increased expenditure and
involve the Government in new responsibilities.
Since every Colonial question more or less Im
pinged on matters with' which the Foreign Office
was or might be concerned, a tradition had grown
up that the former should be managed as if it were
an unimportant annexe to the latter.
In order to maintain a state of things which
saved trouble at home, if it bred discontent in the
Empire, it had been the custom to send politicians
to the Colonial Office who combined a reason
able aptitude for Departmental routine with a
natural dislike for taking the initiative, and who
would allow their trained subordinates to con
duct business along the traditional lines. The
old regime was abruptly upset as soon as Mr
Chamberlain entered the Office. It Is much to
the credit alike of Minister and Staff that
the new order of things was set going without
personal friction. It is one of Mr Chamber
lain's most useful qualities that he can get good
work out of capable men. Any energetic Chief
can manage a corps of industrious clerks, but it
requires a higher sort of power to appeal success
fully to the brains and zeal of able and, possibly,
self-sufficient experts — especially when they have
for years been allowed to go their own irre
proachable way. But it was not long before Mr
Chamberlain had established a thoroughly good
understanding — not based entirely on the expecta
tion of future favours. It is, however, true that

388 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1895-1900
he never forgets those who have rendered him
useful services, nor will anything tempt him to
throw over a subordinate who has honestly
been doing his best under difficult circum
stances. On more than one occasion he has
been involved in an awkward position through
the faulty judgment of a distant agent. Privately
he has visited the mistake with the sharpest rebuke,
but in pubhc he has assumed full responsibility,
and put the best aspect on a policy which he has
quietly set himself to reverse. That easy sort of
candour which shows itself in giving away other
people may have its public uses, but it does not
promote esprit de corps in a public Department.
Between the Foreign Office and the Colonial
Office it was certain that a good understanding
would be maintained so long as Lord Salisbury
should remain Chief of the one and Mr Cham
berlain of the other. The war of words which
had been so fiercely waged between them in the
early Eighties had cleared the air, and resulted
in a mutual sense of intellectual respect. Their
long association in the work of keeping Mr Glad
stone out of power — or, at least, out of what they
considered mischief — had led to as close an in
timacy as the Conservative Statesman permitted
himself to enjoy with any of those colleagues who
were not members of his own family. In spite of
the confident prophecies which had been [uttered
by adversaries who hoped for sharp dissensions
in the new Cabinet, it is well known that the
personal relations of Lord Salisbury and Mr
Chamberlain were, from this point, so uniformly
harmonious that no difficulty was experienced
in adjusting any political differences that may
have arisen on various questions of the day.
In subsequent Chapters a detailed account will

"OUR UNDEVELOPED ESTATES" 389
be given of Mr Chamberlain's administration of
the different Colonies where history has shown
itself in the making. Here it will be sufficient to
review his general attitude with regard to Imperial
and domestic politics during the last seven or eight
years. One of his first pronouncements on taking
Office was a promise not to neglect the interest
of our "undeveloped estates" in the more back
ward Dependencies of West Africa and the West
Indies — especiaUy in the improvement of the
means of communication. On this point he
explained his views to a Deputation of influential
merchants : —
"As to the general principle," he said, " I go
certainly as far as the farthest of you go ; and I
am very anxious that my fellow-countrymen should
understand that we hope to develop the resources
of such Colonies as those of which you have been
speaking to the fuhest extent. It is only in such
developments that I see any solution of those
social problems by which we are surrounded.
Plenty of employment and a contented people
go together, and there is no way of securing
plenty of employment except by creating new
markets and developing the old ones. The only
dominion which In any way compared with the
British dominion was that of the Romans, and
it was to the credit of the Romans that they left
behind them, wherever they went, traces of their
passage and their civilisation in the form of
admirable public works. I am sorry to say
that Great Britain has largely neglected its duty
in that respect in the countries under her care.
I admit to you, as I did to the House of
Commons last night, that it is in a certain sense
a new policy. It is a great policy. It is one, no
doubt, open to criticism and to the fullest con-

390 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1895-1900
sideratlon. You cannot undertake a policy of
this kind without a certain amount of risk ; but
if the people of this country, out of their super
fluous wealth, are not willing to invest some
of it In the development of what I have called
their great estate, then I see no future for these
countries, and I think it would probably have
been better if they had never come under our
rule. I hope that you, who have more than a
mere general interest in these countries, will do
what you can to popularise the subject.
"If that is the general pohcy the Government
have In view, undoubtedly there is no more
favourable Instance on which to try it than the
West African Colonies. There was a time when
there was a feeling adverse to these Colonies,
and when we should have been very well pleased
to be rid of them for the benefit of any other
Power ; but that feeling has now, I believe, quite
disappeared. There is no doubt that hardly any
part of her Majesty's dominions presents such
opportunities for a rapidly increasing trade as
these Gold Coast Colonies. You may rest
assured that every assistance that we can give
win be given to promote and assist better com
munication with the Interior. A great deal has
been done, as you are aware. The Lagos Rail
way may be said to have almost commenced —
that is, we have authorised the building of the
bridges, and we shah authorise the building of
the railways as soon as the surveys are com
pleted, and push them on as rapidly as possible.
The Gold Coast Railway has been surveyed, and
will be begun as soon as the point of commence
ment has been arranged. In Sierra Leone
the survey has been completed for 150 miles.
We have, however, a suggestion from Colonel

BELIEF IN THE BRITISH RACE 391
Cardew for some modification of the line of
route, and these are details which will require
some little consideration ; but we wih not waste
time." Mr Chamberlain's qualifications for the post
which he had assumed he has himself defined as his
"belief In the British Empire," and "belief in the
British race" — which is, he thinks, "the greatest
of the governing races that the world has ever
seen." On this point he deprecates the self-criticism
in which Englishmen are apt to indulge. Though
it does no harm at home it leads to misinter
pretation abroad, where, not unnaturally, we are
taken at our own valuation — if It happens to
be unfavourable. In the selection of Governors for those
Colonies which possess Democratic Constitu
tions, he has been careful to ascertain before
hand that his nomination would not be un
acceptable to the local politicians. His experi
ence in Municipal administration at Birmingham
has enabled him to understand and sympathise
with the susceptibilities of public men who
are very great persons at home, and fret under
the semblance of external control. It would
be absurd to suggest that Mr Chamberlain
Is specially gifted with the indefinable quality
of tact, but, in his dealings with the somewhat
aggressively Independent Statesmen of Aus
tralasia, he has avoided unpleasant friction
more successfully than predecessors who scrupu
lously observed and rigorously exacted all the
courtesies of Diplomatic etiquette. When he
has talked with the Colonial Premiers it has
been "as man to man," not as a great per
sonage of State granting an audience to a pro
vincial Mayor. He has seemed to be, because

392 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1895-1900
he really has been, more anxious to learn than
to instruct ; to accept suggestions rather than
to lay down the law. Colonial visitors to
Downing Street, not merely Ministers and
official delegates, have experienced a friendly
greeting and cordial attention from the Chief of
a Department in which they had expected to be
met with distant affability and polite excuses for
procrastination. An excehent impression was produced in the
opinion of the more progressive Colonies, which
are chiefly concerned with commercial interests,
by the Circular which the new Minister issued in
November 1895 : —
" I. I am impressed with the extreme import
ance of securing as large a share as possible of
the mutual trade of the United Kingdom and the
Colonies for British producers and manufacturers,
whether located in the Colonies or in the United
Kingdom. "2. In the first place, therefore, I wish to in
vestigate thoroughly the extent to which, in each
of the Colonies, foreign imports of any kind have
displaced, or are displacing, similar British goods,
and the causes of such displacement.
" 3. With this object, I take this opportunity
of inviting the assistance of your Government in
obtaining a Return which will show for the years
1884, 1889, and 1894 —
" (a) The value (if any) of ah articles, specified
in the classification annexed, imported into the
Colony under your Government from any foreign
country, or countries, whenever (and only when)
the value of any article so imported from any
foreign country, or countries, was 5 per cent, or
upwards of the total value of that article imported
into the Colony from all sources, whether within

CIRCULAR TO THE COLONIES 393
or without the British Empire, and when the
total value of that article imported was not less
than ;i^500.
" (b) The reasons which may have in each case
induced the Colonial importer to prefer a foreign
article to similar goods of foreign manufacture.
" 4. These reasons (which should take the
shape of a Report on each article separately, of
which the foreign import exceeded 5 per cent, of
the whole import, and of which the total value
imported was not less than ;i^500, as defined above)
should be classified and discussed under one or
other of the following heads : —
" (a) Price (delivered in the Colony) of the
foreign article as compared with the British.
"The term 'price' is not intended to include
the Duty (If any) levied in a Colony ; it is the
ordinary price in bond, and this should be clearly
understood In making the Report.
" But where it is found Impossible to give any
except the wholesale price (Duty paid), this should
be stated, and the exact amount of Duty entering
into the price should be given.
"In treating of price, regard should be had to
cost of transport, facility of communication with
any given country, subsidies to shipping, special
railway rates. Bounties on export, terms of credit
or payment given by British or foreign exporters,
rates of discount, etc.
"{b) Quality and finish, as to which full
particulars should be given.
" {c) Suitability of the goods for the market,
their style or pattern.
" In connection with this, and in illustration of
the reasons for the displacement of British goods
of any class, it is important that patterns or
specimens of the goods preferred should be sent

f
394 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION^, 1895-1900
home, unless the bulk is very great. This will
be necessary chiefly In those cases where the
difference cannot be fairly described in writing.
" (d) Difference of making-up or packing, as
to which fuH particulars should be given.
" (e) False marking, such as piracy of trade
marks, false indications of origin, or false indica
tions of weight, measure, size, or number.
" (y) Any other cause which may exist should,
of course, be stated.
"It sometimes happens that imports which
actually came from foreign countries pass through
Great Britain, and are included in Colonial
statistics as British. Where this is a matter of
common knowledge, I shall be obliged to you if
you will treat of these Imports under the headings
embraced in this paragraph, notwithstanding the
fact that they are not distinguished in the
returns. " 5. With a view to facilitating the return, I
annex to this despatch a draft of the form under
which the particulars above requested may be
returned ; a list of commodities which is intended,
as far as possible, to secure uniformity in making
the return ; and a schedule of instructions as to
fining up the return, which I would beg you to
commend to the attention of those on whom the
preparation of the return may fall.
"6. To select the best classification to guide
your advisers in their investigations has been a
task of some difficulty. Most Colonies have
classifications of their own, usually admirable
of their kind ; but as they have been mainly
compiled for the special Tariff purposes of each
Colony, they differ considerably from one another,
and do not afford a basis of classification generally
applicable to all Colonies. I have, therefore, on

TRADE WITHIN THE EMPIRE 395
the whole, thought it best to adopt the condensed
classification used by the Board of Trade in the
annual Statistical Abstract for the exports of the
United Kingdom. At the same time, I suggest
that those responsible In each Colony for furnish
ing the returns foS» which I am asking should
expand their Return under each chief heading by
such detailed sub-heads as may be suggested
either by the ordinary Colonial Returns, or by
the course of trade in the particular Colony ; and
in this connection I append a schedule of sub
divisions suggested by various Chambers of Com
merce in this country.
"7. I am further desirous of receiving from
you a Return of any products ofthe Colony under
your Government which might advantageously
be exported to the United Kingdom, or other
parts of the British Empire, but do not at present
find a sufficient market there, with any informa
tion in regard to quality, price, or freight which
may be useful to British importers. I mention
the matter here that you may be prepared with
Information ; but I am contemplating the pre
paration of a further and fuher Despatch on this
branch of the subject.
"8. I am well aware how much has been, and
is being, done In this direction by the Self-Govern
ing Colonies through the High Commissioner for
Canada, and through the Agents General, and
also by the Imperial Institute, the Royal Colonial
Institute, and other public bodies.
" I am glad to have this opportunity of ex
pressing my admiration for the excellence of this
work ; but on a matter of such importance no
additional efforts or opportunities of acquiring
Information can be superfluous.
"9. I shah be glad to have these returns as

396 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1895-1900
soon as possible, and shall greatly appreciate your
expedition in the matter."
At the time when the South African trouble
was coming to a head, the Colonial Secretary
attended a Banquet held to celebrate the com
pletion of the railway betv^n Natal and the
Transvaal. He made a brief reference to the pos
sibility of a future Customs Union embracing the
whole Empire : —
"It is a dream which has vividly impressed
itself on the mind of the Enghsh-speaking race,
and who does not admit that dreams of that kind,
which have so powerful an Influence upon the
imagination of men, have, somehow or another,
an unaccountable way of being realised In their
own time? If it be a dream, it is a dream that
appeals to the highest sentiments of patriotism,
and even of our material interests. It is a dream
which is calculated to stimulate and to inspire
every one who cares for the future of the Anglo-
Saxon people. I think, myself, that the spirit
of the time is, at aU events, in the direction of
such a movement. How far it will carry us, no
man can tell ; but, believe me, upon the temper
and the tone in which we approach the solution
of the problems which are now coming upon us,
depend the security and the maintenance of that
world-wide dominion, that edifice of Imperial
rule, which has been solely built up for us by
those who have gone before."
He was aware, he said, that a critical moment
was approaching in the history of that world-wide
dominion to which no Englishman could allude
without a thrill of enthusiasm and patriotism,
and which had been the admiration and perhaps
the envy of foreign nations. Yet it was hung
together by a thread so slender that even a breath,

THE IMPERIAL TIE 397
it might seem, would sever it. After a brief
reference to those "despairing" Statesmen who
had believed that the Colonies, when they had
grown strong and independent, would demand en
tire separation from the parent stem, he said that
the time had come, the conditions had been ful
filled, yet the anticipated result had not occurred.
As the possibility of Separation had become
greater the desire for Separation had become less.
The Colonists had begun to realise that no
separate existence, "however splendid," could
compare with that which they enjoyed, equally
with ourselves, as co-heirs of ah the traditions of
the past and as joint-partakers In all the influence,
resources, and power of the British Empire.
In venturing on this review and forecast of
Colonial feeling, Mr Chamberlain, of course, had
no idea that the sentiment of Imperial patriotism
would within a few years receive a powerful, if,
perhaps, a temporary impulse — not so much from
our military undertakings in South Africa as from
the malicious slanders with which English and
Colonial soldiers were alike assailed. At any time
it is probable that a similar provocation would be
followed by a like response, since the British, for
all its bickerings, is a clannish race, and may always
be trusted to unite against outsiders. But when
these words were uttered Mr Chamberlain had
no such convincing evidence that the prevailing
sentiment in the Colonies was one of loyal, if loose,
attachment to the Mother Country. That was the
subsequent and absolutely unforeseen corrobora
tion — not the basis — of his declaration of faith.
How far it was well-founded, it is impossible to
say. Mr Chamberlain, no doubt, is well aware
that, in every Colony, there is a strong section
of opinion — it may even attain the dignity of a

398 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1895-1900
Party — which is almost avowedly Anti- English.
In ordinary times It is more or less manipulated
by politicians of Irish birth or descent, or by
Labour Leaders bent on excluding commercial
and industrial competition, and laying steady
pressure on the local Ministry to thwart any
policy that may appear to be inspired from
London or prove advantageous to the people of
Great Britain. The exponents of this acrid
patriotism have to withdraw to the background
when a common danger threatens, or some single
cause engages, the whole British race ; but, so
soon as the hour of emergency has passed away,
they are at work again — stealthily or noisily, as
the case may be. But though their action must
be understood by Mr Chamberlain, he has never
taken public note of It. To refer to it except in
terms of implied or expressed censure would be
impossible, and for an Imperial Statesman to
volunteer an opinion on the internal affairs of a
Colony would be a very unwise departure from
that neutrality which is both expedient and
Constitutional. Now and again questions must
arise — especially in connection with our foreign
relations — when it may be Impossible to avoid use
of the Veto residing in the Governors, but it has
been as much the object of Mr Chamberlain as
of his less energetic predecessors to rely only in
the last resort on that undesirable expedient.
Even in 1895, when the new Government had
only been installed a few months in power, the
survivors of the old Education League at Bir
mingham had shown signs of restlveness. They
were uneasy about the understanding. Into which
the Liberal Unionist Leaders had entered, as to
giving assistance to the Voluntary Schools in
their competition with the Board Schools. Mr

EDUCATION POLICY 399
George Dixon had introduced a Deputation to
the Duke of Devonshire as Lord President of the
Council, protesting by anticipation against any
scheme for giving a subvention from the Rates to
any institutions that maintained doctrinal teach
ing. Next year (1896) the question was raised In
a more acute form when the Government BUI was
Introduced. It Is unnecessary here to describe a
Measure which never passed into law or to
examine the reasons for its miscarriage — especi
ally as it was a scheme which Mr Chamberlain
supported rather as part of his bargain with the
Conservatives than as an expression of his per
sonal views.
His position was. In fact, analogous, mutatis
m-utandis, to that held by Lord Salisbury
In 1 89 1 with regard to the abolition of School
Fees. Each Leader in turn found himself at
issue with the extreme men of his own Party.
Mr Chamberlain, however, expressed no
hesitating concurrence in the common policy
of the Government. While he admitted
that in certain respects the Government Bill
might be improved — e.g., he would favour
the introduction of a Conscience Clause in
Denominational Training Colleges, and would
increase the relief proposed for necessitous
Board Schools — he approved of the leading
principles of the Measure. He preferred the
suggested Education Authority elected on
ordinary representative lines to a School Board
resting on a Cumulative Franchise (Invented
chiefly to give Roman Catholic minorities a
chance of representation). He also praised
the arrangements under which each Local
Authority would be enabled to adapt the teach
ing to the needs and tastes of the neighbour-

400 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1895-1900
hood. At the same time he admitted that he
still retained his abstract preference for Universal
Secular Instruction in all National Elementary
Schools, though that, he pointed out, was an ideal
too expensive to realise, and unattainable in the
present or any probable condition of English
Parties. When the Bill had to be withdrawn in
July, owing to a wrecking Amendment which Mr
Balfour had incautiously accepted, loud complaints
were made of his management of the Measure in
the House of Commons. Mr Chamberlain
promptly came forward to defend him. " No
thing," he said, "could be 'more ungenerous'
than to blame the Leader of the House for the
faults of a system which made legislation so diffi
cult. No Party could desire a Leader more
skilful in debate, more courageous in action, more
loyal to his colleagues, more courteous tp his
opponents, more mindful of the high and honour
able traditions of the House of Commons." A
similar tribute was paid by Sir Michael Hicks-
Beach. This, he said, should dispose of the
legend that Mr Goschen, Mr Chamberlain, and
himself were all burning to obtain the succession
to Mr Balfour.
At the beginning of 1896 (25th January),
before the echoes of the Venezuelan storm had died
away, Mr Chamberlain had delivered his views
on a position which might have become awkward
if the Washington Government, as soon as we
were brought face to face with German enmity,
had not so far moderated its tone as to make it
possible for us to enter into friendly negotiations.
There had been misapprehension, said Mr
Chamberlain, on both sides. This, no doubt,
was true. But only on one side had there
been rudeness and menace. Still, this was not

AMERICAN SYMPATHIES 401
a time to stand on Diplomatic punctilio. Mr
Chamberlain, whose early sympathy with
American institutions had been increased by
his wife's connection with the most attractive
and cultured circle In Boston society, was
especiahy qualified to assume the part of
mediator. On the British side, he explained,
it had been thought that the Americans wished
to pick a quarrel. At Washington it was believed
that we meant to impugn the Monroe Doctrine.
Fortunately, however, there had been time for
reflection. All that was best in the United
States, he said, would regard with horror a War
with this country, and he was sure that President
Cleveland was "incapable of the wickedness of
inciting two kindred nations to strife." In point of
fact, what he had done was to angle for the
Democratic Vote by insulting Great Britain, but,
unscrupulous as he was in domestic politics, he
had never meant to bring about a Naval War
for which his country was absolutely unprepared.
To these facts, however, Mr Chamberlain did not
refer. He confined himself to stating such truths
as were inoffensive — that we had never disputed a
Doctrine which was originated by a British
Statesman, and that we did not covet another
inch of territory on American soil.
In the House of Commons, on the Vote of
Censure moved at the opening of the Session,
Mr Chamberlain entered on a defence of the
Government policy in Egypt — especially of the
proposed Expedition up the Nile, and empha
sised his separation, which he had on more
than one previous occasion announced, from
the diminishing band of politicians who
thought that our only duty towards the
Khedive was to prepare for leaving him to
2 c

402 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1895-1900
deal as best he might with his difficulties
in the Soudan. Mr Chamberlain avowed his
pride in the work accomplished in Egypt by
British officers and administrators. But all
the good they had carried out would be
undone if we were to withdraw. As for the
proposed advance beyond the boundary of
Egypt proper, he pointed out that, though
the intervening desert was a barrier against in
vasion, Wady Haifa was a screen for raids and
incursions. The recent defeat of the Italians at
Adowa had created a ferment among the Dervishes
and created a new situation. In undertaking
this Expedition we were acting with the cordial
concurrence of Italy, and with the approval of
Germany and Austria ; nor was there any need
to apprehend any different expression of opinion
from France and Russia. The Government did
not contemplate any "gigantic military enter
prise " — their policy was confined to the immediate
needs of Egypt.
Mr Chamberlain, like the rest of his colleagues,
was not yet aware that only a stiU bolder policy
would avail to keep Mahdism in check, and the
conditional pledge which he gave as to the limited
nature of the Expedition, if not accepted as alto
gether wise by military experts, was a faithful
representation of the views of the Government.
Wady Haifa was then believed to be the utmost
point to which advance was reasonably practic
able, nor was public opinion — either at home or
abroad — yet ripe for a complete reconquest of the
Soudan. During the whole of 1896, and for many
months afterwards, the time and energy of the
Colonial Secretary were almost absorbed by South
African affairs, but early in November he delivered

COMMERCE AND POLITICS 403
an address at Birmingham on the text that
Commerce is the greatest of political interests —
a point of view which was forced upon him by
his Departmental position. " All the great Offices
of States," he said, " are occupied with commercial
affairs. The Foreign Office and the Colonial
Office are engaged in getting new markets and
defending old ones. The War Office and the
Admiralty are mostly occupied in preparations
for the defence of those markets, and for the
protection of our commerce. The Boards of
Agriculture and Trade are entirely concerned
with those two great branches of industry. Even
the Education Department bases its claim for
public money upon the necessity of keeping our
people well to the front in the competition — the
commercial competition — which they have to
sustain ; and the Home Office finds the largest
scope for its activity in the protection of the life,
the health, and the comfort of the vast army of
manual labourers engaged in those industries."
The Government, therefore, which did most to
increase our trade and establish it on a firm basis
was most deserving of popular approval. This
test was one from which the existing Ministry need
not shrink. It had endeavoured not unsuccessfully
to increase and develop free markets. While the
Colonial Possessions of France and Germany
were but an increasing burden to the Mother
Countries, the British Colonies soon became self-
supporting. Such results justified the continuous
extensions of our territories, and, though the
pessimistic accounts of British trade would not
bear examination, it was necessary for us to be
watchful of our commercial interests.
Apart from the incessant controversy about
South African affairs, 1897 was to Mr Chamber-

404 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1895-1900
lain an exceptionally busy year. The origin and
development of Australian Confederation are
sketched In another Chapter, but the ordinary
work in Downing Street was largely increased by
the long conferences and private conversations
held with the Colonial Premiers who had come to
London for the Jubilee. It was largely owing to
Mr Chamberlain's insistence that the Govern
ment resolved to denounce our Commercial
Treaties with Germany and Belgium, and risk the
outcry that would certainly be raised by the more
nervous disciples of Free Trade. They had taken
alarm at the Foreign Prison-made Goods Bill,
and were in the mood to charge Ministers with
every kind of financial enormity. But it was with
no intention of tampering with our fiscal system
that the Government at last consented to free the
Empire from the restraints imposed on the legis
lative and commercial independence of the
Colonies. Some of these had plainly refused to
submit any longer to limitations imposed without
their consent being obtained or asked. Sir
Wilfrid Laurier, the Dominion Premier, had
pressed the Canadian demand with unusual vigour.
The Colonies at this time were so much in favour
with Englishmen, and Germany had fahen into
such bad odour, that a policy on which no
Ministry would have ventured four or five years
before was accepted in Parliament with little more
than formal protest, leading to an interesting if
almost abstract discussion.
The Voluntary Schools Act passed in 1897,
was a temporary expedient rendered necessary by
the abandonment of the more comprehensive
Measure proposed In 1896, and was only brought
forward as part of a still more general scheme of
Educational Reform to which Ministers were

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 405
pledged. It provided for the payment from Im
perial funds of a Grant-in- Aid not exceeding a sum
that would work out at 5s. a head for every child
attending the Voluntary Schools. Large discre
tionary powers in the distribution of -this Grant
were left to the Education Department, and by
recognising the principle of Association among
neighbouring schools It was rendered possible to
proportion the assistance given to the special
needs of a locality. The scheme was one about
which Mr Chamberlain affected no enthusiasm,
though he supported It as part of his arrangement
with the Conservatives. As a set-off they agreed
to the Necessitous Board Schools Bill, which
authorised rehef on a scale that Ministers
believed to be sufficient, while the Opposition,
of course, complained that Church institutions
had been unduly favoured. The whole arrange
ment being avowedly temporary, not much Interest
was felt in the Parliamentary discussion.
Keener excitement was provoked by the Work
men's Compensation BID, which did not become
law without strong opposition from a section of the
Conservative Party — led by Lord Londonderry.
As an ex- Minister who had not been offered a
sufficiently dignified office in the new Cabinet,
and as a generous employer of labour who
resented legal interference between himself and
his men, he considered himself entitled to
resist a Measure which was known to be Inspired
by the Radical members of the Unionist Govern
ment. Though it was piloted through the
House of Commons by the Conservative Home
Secretary (Sir Matthew White Ridley) it had been
practically drafted, and throughout its course
was vigilantly watched, by Mr Chamberlain.
With certain important exceptions — agricultural

406 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1895-1900
labourers, seamen, domestic servants, and persons
employed in workshops where no machinery was in
use — it provided the working classes as a whole
with what was hoped would be a cheap and eaSy
means of compensation in case of all accidents
suffered in the course of their employment. In
case of death the sum payable to a workman's
representatives would be, according to his rate of
wages, between ;^i 50 and ;^30o : in case of disable
ment, a weekly allowance not exceeding half his
weekly earnings or more than 20s. If the amount
could not be settled by agreement reference was to
be made to arbitration. " Contracting out " was
permitted. If the Registrar of Friendly Societies
should certify that the workman was entitled to
receive under a voluntary arrangement benefits
not less than those offered by the Act. In refus
ing to extend the Measure to seamen, Mr Cham
berlain explained that provision must be made for
them under a future Act, but he refused to
except miners from the present one. The most
important Amendments to which he consented
were (i) that where the voluntary fund had proved
insufficient the injured person might claim for the
balance under the Act ; and (2) that when the
weekly ahowance had been paid for more than
twelve months either party should be entitled to
have the total liability commuted In a lump sum.
In nearly every instance, the Government pro
posals were carried by large majorities in the
House of Commons, and the slight Amendments
introduced by the Peers were, Mr Chamberlain
said, not of such a character as to diminish the
benefits offered to the working classes.
In one respect the working of the Act has some
what disappointed its authors. The contentious
disposition of some employers on the one hand,

LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS 407
and of certain Trade Union Leaders on the other,
assisted by the perversely conscientious ingenuity
of the lawyers, has subsequently thrown an
element of doubt and obscurity over an Act
which to the lay mind had been perfectly clear
and consistent. It has, therefore, given rise to
a certain amount of expensive litigation. But
by sweeping away the legal technicalities which
had gathered round the doctrines of " Common
Employment," and the various forms of " Negli
gence," as well as by promoting the private
settlement of disputes, and by encouraging the
operation of voluntary institutions such as that
maintained on the London and North-Western
Railway, and in Lord Dudley's collieries, the
Act is universally admitted to have given more
practical assistance to the working men than any
previous legislation as to the Liability of Ern-
ployers. One thing, of course, it has not accomplished.
Radical critics complained that it placed no direct
pressure on a careless employer to observe such
precautions as would reduce the risks of employ
ment and prevent many so-called accidents. He
would take out a general policy with an Insur
ance Society, and it would be no concern of his
how much money, not his own, he had to pay to
his workpeople. The answer is that an employer
who had acquired a bad name in this respect
would not find a Company to accept his insurance
except at a greatly enhanced rate— if at all. This
consideration would operate on the mind of the
most callous employer ; but to get rid altogether
of the danger — not, indeed, quite imaginary — is
practically impossible. If the law were to forbid
insurance against an employer's liability the
result in many cases would be that the work-

408 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1895-1900
man would have no remedy. Unless the em
ployer were a very substantial man a bad accident
in his mine or factory might bring him to bank
ruptcy, and the preferential claims of his work
people would be worth little or nothing.
Although Lord Londonderry had not resisted
the Second Reading in the Upper House, but con
fined himself to moving Amendments (most of
which were rejected), he did not pretend to accept
the principle of the Measure. He went so far as
to offer his resignation of the chairmanship of the
Northern Union of Conservative Associations, on
the ground that the Act had been passed through
" the dominating wih of the Colonial Secretary,
whose radical views on Home politics we have
always regarded with disapproval, however much
we may admire him as an Imperialist." The
fact that Lord Londonderry has since accepted
office in the same Administration as Mr Cham
berlain — first as Postmaster-General, and after
wards as Minister of Education — shows that the
types of Conservatism and Social Radicalism
which they respectively represent have been
found, on trial, to be separated by no funda
mental incompatibility of temper.
On 3rd November Mr Chamberlain, who had
been elected Lord Rector of Glasgow University
on a "strict Party vote," delivered an Address on
Patriotism. Having pointed out that the word
" patriot " was not to be found in Shakespeare, he
went on to quote Bolingbroke's use of the term.
The object of a "patriot prince" was, he said,
to " give ease and encouragement to manufactories
at home, to assist and protect trade abroad, to
improve and keep in heart the national Colonies
like so many farms of the Mother Country" —
a strangely modern view, except for the theory

ON PATRIOTISM 409
of Imperial exploitation implied in the last
metaphor. This exercise In abstract rhetoric — a form
of composition to which Mr Chamberlain had
devoted little attention since his Debating Society
days — was also notable for the admission that
his political outlook had been considerably modi
fied by changing times and altered circumstances,
but he asked his audience of young enthusiasts
to believe that through all vicissitudes he had
always sought — It might be with faltering steps
and by mistaken roads — the greatness of the
Empire and the welfare of the people at large.
A vague attachment to the whole human race
was, he said, a poor substitute for the perform
ance of the duties of a citizen. Professions of
universal philanthrophy afforded no excuse for
neglecting the interests of one's own country.
He believed that our special mission in the
world was to colonise and civilise. It was
untrue that we had not the strength to Sustain
the burden of Empire — that the "weary Titan
was staggering under the too vast orb of his
fate." " We do not lack efficient Instruments for our
great purpose, and we can still count on the
energy and devotion of our countrymen, and on
their ability to win the confidence and respect of
the people they are sent to govern for their good.
On the bleak mountains of the Indian frontier,
amidst the sands of the Soudan, in the swamps
and forests of Western Africa — wherever the
British flag floats — Enghshmen, Scotsmen, and
Irishmen are to-day fronting every danger and
enduring every hardship — living as brave men
and dying as heroes. In the faithful performance
of duty and the passionate love of their country.

410 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1895-1900
They ask from us that their sacrifices shall not
be in vain.
"If such is stin the spirit of our people why
should we shrink from our task, or allow the
sceptre of Empire to fall from our hands —
' Thro' craven fears of being great ? '
" I have faith in our race and our nation. I
believe that, with all the force and enthusiasm of
which Democracy alone is capable, they will
complete and maintain that splendid edifice of
our greatness, which, commenced under aristo
cratic auspices, has received in these later times
its greatest extension ; and that the fixity of
purpose and strength of will which are necessary
to this end will be supplied by that National
Patriotism which sustains the most strenuous
efforts and makes possible the greatest sacri
fices." This elevated appeal may be contrasted with
the speech made before the Birmingham Chamber
of Commerce in which he had explained that the
chief function of Statesmanship was to develop
Trade. To die for one's country and to push
one's business — this was the double mission of
the patriot. A truly British combination of
duties, which gave our French critics much
good-humoured amusement.
A change from these amiable generalities was
afforded by a sharp encounter between Mr
Chamberlain and Sir William Harcourt — the
two Statesmen were never more happy than
when girding at each other. A succession of
favourable by-elections (Middleton, Liverpool, and
Deptford) had put heart into the Liberals. Mr
Chamberlain had professed to feel no surprise.
The successes of the Unionists at the General

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT 411
Election had been due not so much to their own
merits as to the faults and defects ofthe other side.
It was, he pleasantly remarked, largely a "penal
operation." Having been punished, it was only
likely that " the criminals " would be again taken
into favour by some of those who had assisted at
" the execution." The metaphors were resented
by Sir William, who declared, In a letter written
for publication, that Mr Chamberlain was what
was called at cards a "bad loser." "When the
odd trick as well as the honours were marked
against him he lost his temper as well as the
game." Quoting Mr Chamberlain's words. Sir
Wihiam exclaimed, "what an agreeable and
graceful style of political criticism ! Its venom
is that of a serpent gnawing the file. Did he
not discern the ' boomerang ' character of this
effusion of bile ? The old game of dishing the
Whigs had broken down, and Mr Chamberlain
bade fair to become a Disraeli manqud. He had
tempted the Tories to seh their souls for votes.
They had not got their votes, and their souls were
lost. Mr Chamberlain perishing by his own virtue
was a spectacle for men and angels 1 How sharper
than a serpent's tooth it was to have a thankless
Democracy, the last refuge of Patriotism ! "
Mr Chamberlain retorted by calling attention
to the profusion of mixed metaphors in which Sir
William had indulged. What exquisite humour
to say that he had tempted the Tories to sell their
souls for votes ! What delicate innuendo ! What
sweet reasonableness ! It was said that Sir
William, at "one time in his varied career," had
considered Mr Disraeli a model to be imitated.
Mr Chamberlain preferred to compare him to
the Statesman of whom Mr Lecky had written :
" Lord Thurlow, though he had a strong natural

412 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1895-1900
bias towards harsh and despotic measures, seems
to have taken his politics much as he took his
briefs, and he had that air of cynical, brutal,
and almost reckless candour which is sometimes
the best veil of a time-serving and highly-calcu:-
lating nature."
The passage in the Queen's Speech in which
Mr Chamberlain had most concern (8th Feb. 1899)
again called attention to the distress caused in the
West Indies by the fall in the price of sugar ;
expressed a hope that the artificial causes of
that distress might be modified by the negotia
tions proceeding for a general conference with
the Bounty-giving Governments ; but announced
that before such relief could become effectual it
would be necessary to vote a subsidy to the
struggling Colonies so that they might tide over
the crisis. This proposal had been foreshadowed
by the Colonial Secretary in a speech at Liver
pool. On this occasion, he explained that the
Imperialism in which he believed aimed less at
acquiring new territory than at preserving free
markets, though he expressed his approval of
Lord Rosebery's picturesque phrase that it was
our duty to "peg out claims for posterity." It
was a matter of course, that the West Indian
policy which Mr Chamberlain announced should
be attacked by economic thinkers like Mr John
Morley, who declared that this subvention to the
Sugar Colonies was very like a Bounty though
"wrapped up in paper of a different colour and
bearing a different label."
In the domestic legislation of the year Mr
Chamberlain was believed to have had more
than a hand in the Bills for Irish Local Govern
ment and for creating Municipal Boroughs in
the County of London. Both were in absolute

IRISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT 413
harmony with his own life-long belief In Decen
tralised Self-Government, but, while the former
was almost forced upon the Conservatives of
the rank and file, they adopted the latter with
alacrity. The system now established in Ireland
differed from that existing in England and
Scotland, in that no Parish Councils were set
up. The local administration was given over to
County Councils, District Councils (Urban or
Rural), and Boards of Guardians — the franchise
adopted being the Parliamentary one except that
Peers and women ratepayers were not excluded.
To the County Councils were given the financial
and administrative powers hitherto exercised by
Grand Juries and by County Presentment Sessions,
and the levying of such Poor Rate as did not fah
within the Urban County District. The ques
tion of compensation for malicious Injuries was,
however, left for the County Courts — with
appeal to the Judge of Assize. The Rural
District Councils acquired the powers of the
Baronial Presentment Sessions and the Rural
Sanitary Authorities, but on various heads of
expenditure a veto could be laid by the County
Council, and In certain cases an alternate appeal
lies to the Local Government Board. The Urban
District Councils became the road authorities and
were to levy all the rates.
Such were some of the privileges which the
Unionist Government entrusted to the elected
representatives of a country in which two-thirds
of the population were more or less disaffected
to the " English connection." In spite of the ad
ministrative limitations and financial safeguards
imposed, the Act has, no doubt, taken away most
of the authority that still remained to the Loyalist
and landlord class, and it should be no matter for

414 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1895-1900
wonder that it was disliked by many of those
who were compehed by Party ties to give it their
support. Yet it is difficult to see how the Con
servatives any more than the Radical Unionists
could further postpone a Measure to the prin
ciple of which they were so deeply committed.
One of the favourite arguments against Home
Rule had been that except in the matter of Local
Government the Irishman stood at no political
disadvantage as compared with the Englishman
or Scotchman, and this remaining inequality
the Unionists had proved, by their abortive Bill
in 1892, that they Intended to remove.
The London Bih, though the creation of a
number of Municipalities to which important
powers were reserved was not intended to
curtail the existing authority of the County
Council, awakened such keen hostility, even
before the text had been seen, that Mr Balfour
had to announce in June that the scheme
would be postponed to another Session.
Though Mr Chamberlain, in 1898, made
frequent appearances in Parliament, and took an
active part in the discussions, especiahy on South
African policy, his most important and character
istic utterances were delivered out of doors. The
speech which he made at Birmingham on 13th
May, was, in its form, somewhat embarrassing
to the Government. Since the days of the
Crimean War, he said. Great Britain had main
tained a policy of isolation. This had been all
very weU so long as each of the Great Powers
worked only for its own hand. Now, however,
a new situation had arisen. The Great Powers
had made alliances, and, so long as we remained
outside these alliances, we were liable to
be attacked by an overwhelming combination.

SUPPING WITH THE DEVIL 415
Obviously, it was our first duty to consolidate the
internal strength of the Empire. Our next duty
was to establish and maintain bonds of unity
with our kinsmen across the Atlantic. Even war
might be worth the sacrifice if the Stars and Stripes
and the Union Jack were to wave together over
an Anglo-American alliance on behalf of some
great and noble cause ! When he turned to the
position of affairs in China, he remarked that it
had been foreseen that Russia would, before long,
extend her dominion to the South, so as to obtain
a port and harbour free from Ice. This is what
had happened. Russia had taken Port Arthur
and Talienwan. Then followed a passage
which startled the Diplomatic world. " As to the
methods in which Russia secured that occupation,
as to the representations which were made, and
repudiated as soon as they were, as to the
representations which were given, and broken a
fortnight afterwards, I had better say 'Who
sups with the Devil must have a long spoon.'"
If the phrase was extemporised the argument
had been carefuhy elaborated. The casual
expression harmonised with the whole context.
Once again Mr Chamberlain dwelt on the
dangers of our policy of isolation. If it were to
be persisted in, the future of China, he said,
would be settled without consulting us or con
sidering our interests. If, on the other hand,
we intended to enforce the policy of the Open
Door, we must not allow the Jingoes to drive us
into a quarrel with all the world at once. We
must not reject the idea of alliance with those
Powers whose interest most nearly coincided with
our own.
It was only natural that the Liberals should
ask for an explanation of this remarkable utterance,

416 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1895-1900
and, in the Upper House, Lord Kimberley put a
Question to the Prime Minister which he associ
ated with the Birmingham utterance. Lord Salis
bury, however, refused to be drawn. He could
not discuss his colleague's speech — not having
the text in his hand ! Passing away from a topic
which, by his silence, he admitted to be somewhat
delicate, he explained the action of the Govern
ment in taking possession of Wei-hai-wei. On
the attack being renewed in the Lower House,
Mr Chamberlain made a vigorous reply. To the
Radicals, exulting in his having been thrown over,
they said, by his Chief and his colleagues, he
pointed out that the sufficient answer was that he
had not resigned! If a Cabinet Minister differed
from the Prime Minister on a broad question of
policy he was bound to retire — though it was
absurd to suppose that every member of a Cabinet
was responsible for every word and ev6ry phrase
used by another member. What he had meant
was that if this country insisted on remaining
Isolated it must take the consequences. He did
not advise ahlances or seek for them, but
he did say, for himself, that he earnestly desired
close, cordial, and intimate relations with the
United States.
In the future it is possible that Mr Chamber
lain's sanguine utterance may be justified, but when
it was published it did, no doubt, do something
to defeat the very object at which he was aiming.
Even the politicians who are best affected to us
at Washington are shy of giving offence to the
Irish, whose influence is quite out of proportion
to their number — any political candidate who is
reasonably suspected of British leanings, having
a black mark made against him by the Party
managers. Nor is this anti-English sentiment

AMERICAN SENTIMENT 417
confined to Americans of Irish birth or extrac
tion. It is equally strong among the farmers of
the Western and Southern States. This is
a fact of which Mr Chamberlain must have been
weh aware, though his personal impressions of
American thought and feeling are chiefly drawn
from the East. This, though it typifies what
is most effective and progressive in the life of
America, no more represents the collective senti
ment of the Union than London or Oxford and
Cambridge reflect the opinions of the British
electorate. No special harm has been done by
Mr Chamberlain's defiance of Russia, whose un
friendly action had already stopped short of actual
war. But the premature bid for an American
alliance had for the time damaged rather than
improved the Diplomatic relations between the
two Anglo-Saxon peoples.
At the Mansion-house on 9th November, and
in a series of speeches delivered a few days later
at Manchester, Mr Chamberlain, without retiring
from the position he had taken up earlier in the
year, showed more of the restraint advisable in deal
ing with Foreign Affairs. He scrupulously avoided
any air of triumph in his reference to the dramatic
incident which had been so wounding to French
pride. " Fashoda," he said, was "but a symbol."
The great issue was the control of the whole
Valley of the Nile. On that question there could
be no compromise — it was for Egypt a question
of life or death. His references to the Convention
recently concluded with France as to our West
African Colonies and Spheres of Influence, were
studiously moderate, and he avoided any sugges
tion that we had made an advantageous bargain,
though as a matter of fact he was fairly well
satisfied with the result of the negotiations 2 D

418 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1895-1900
conducted by the Foreign Office. He was on
more treacherous ground when he entered on a
general defence of the Government's dealings
with Chinese affairs. Their guiding policy, he
said, had been to do nothing to assist in breaking
up that ancient Empire, to guarantee our naval
position, and to maintain an Open Door for the
commerce of all nations. The difficulty was to
prevent its being slammed in our face. As to
making an agreement with Russia, we had made
agreements before ! An agreement might not be
impossible, and certainly it would be desirable.
But the main effect of an agreement was to
explain the objects and intentions of the parties.
It would not be permanently valid — such was the
teaching of experience — unless It were for the
interest of both parties to maintain it, or one of
them were strong enough to enforce it.
The political cynicism of this avowal was
quite alien to Mr Chamberlain's character. It
expressed the disgusted acquiescence of a man of
business on discovering that the code of honour
which prevails amongst ordinary tradesmen is too
exalted for International politics. He could
understand that the other party to a bargain
would try to get the best of it, and might
employ underhand tricks to effect that object —
ah this would be regarded, more or less, as
part of the game. But that a promise once
given should be broken without any shadow
of excuse, repudiated almost as soon as it had
been offered, was, perhaps, something of a revela
tion to Mr Chamberlain. His previous dealings,
in commerce as in politics, had been with men
who professed at least that their word was as
good as their bond, and if they acted shabbily
would have the grace to be ashamed of it. His

"MEND YOUR MANNERS" 419
anger at the Russian Chancellor's breach of faith
— which an experienced Diplomatist would have
noted in a bland Memorandum — had led to the
outburst on which Lord Salisbury preferred not to
offer any comment. But it had given way to a
somewhat exaggerated sense of dlslhuslonment.
It was unfortunate that the milder mood dis
played at Manchester did not last many months.
The indignant rebuke which he had administered
to the Russian Government in October 1898, was
followed in November 1899, by an expression
which, quite unfairly though not unplausibly,
was represented as an affront to the French
people. For the actual words used there was,
indeed, even more moral justification than for the
attack on Russian bad faith. The Colonial
Secretary's temper, meantime, had been sorely
tried by the shufflings and procrastinations
of the Transvaal Government. He had been
working day and night to arrange a pacific settle
ment of the various disputes between the British
and the Boers, and, almost to the end, he was hope
ful that Mr Kriiger would consent to make the
reasonable concessions demanded in London.
All the time he believed — not without reason —
that his efforts were being frustrated through
the encouragement given to Mr Kriiger by the
anti-English Press on the Continent, and especi
ahy in France. In point of spite and scurrility,
there was not, perhaps, much to choose amongst
the libehous products of the various Capitals, but
for sheer filthiness a certain French caricaturist
easily took the palm. This cartoon so far suc
ceeded in its purpose that it irritated every
Englishman who saw it, and Mr Chamberlain
was but expressing the general feeling of his
countrymen when, in a speech delivered at

420 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1895-1900
Leicester, he advised Frenchmen to " mend their
manners." It is true that the rebuke was intended merely
for the Parisian Press, but it was taken as of
general application, and raised no little indigna
tion amongst a people who, before everything, pride
themselves on their politeness. They were still
smarting under the Fashoda incident, and this
added grievance produced for some weeks a state
of feeling that might have endangered the rela
tions between the two countries, but for the studi
ously correct attitude of their Governments.
The display of ill-will was naturally taken by the
Boers to indicate that if they pushed their dispute
with Great Britain to an extreme they might
count on the intervention of France with certainty,
and probably also on that of Russia. This, at
least, was the tale told to Mr Kriiger by his
Hollander agents in Europe.
But the ebullition of enmity in France — which
was but a passing mood — was not the worst
result of Mr Chamberlain's speech. It happened
that the German Emperor had just paid a visit
to Queen Victoria — for no other purpose, it was
believed, than to make It known that he felt no
sympathy with the malevolence towards England
exhibited by the Berlin Press. He held a long
and friendly conversation with the Colonial
Secretary, and, in that hearty downright manner
which is the best screen for Diplomatic craft,
he conveyed a general Impression of personal
friendliness towards this country, and dispelled
the idea that Germany entertained sinister or
aggressive designs in South Africa. His assur
ances may have been perfectly sincere as to the
intentions in his own mind, nor would so shrewd
a man as Mr Chamberlain have been deceived

A NEW TRIPLE ALLIANCE 421
by sham professions of good-will towards Great
Britain. But it is a not uncommon mistake with
Englishmen to believe that so autocratic and
able a Ruler as William II. is omnipotent In
his own country. Relying on the cordial atti
tude of the Kaiser, Mr Chamberlain (at
Leicester, 30th November 1899) made an over
ture of something more than friendship to the
German nation. The main character of the Teu
tonic race differed, he said, very slightly from that
of the Anglo-Saxon race. The same sentiments
that brought us into close sympathy with the
United States might also bring us into closer
"sympathy and alliance" with Germany. If the
"union between England and America" was a
powerful factor In the cause of Peace, a new " Triple
Alliance between the Teutonic and the two great
branches of the Anglo-Saxon race " would be " a
still more potent influence in the future of the
world." It is true that Mr Chamberlain qualified
these remarks by explaining that he did not con
template any written instrument. Indeed, an
"understanding" might be better than "an alh
ance, which might stereotype arrangements that
could not be accepted as permanent in view of the
changing circumstances from day to day."
The annoyance caused by this speech in
France was exceeded by the contemptuous
indignation expressed in Germany. Not only
irresponsible newspapers but Ministers them
selves repudiated the interpretation which,
somewhat unfairly, had been placed on the opti
mistic language of the Colonial Secretary. In
the United States the disclaimer, if less offen
sive, was equahy distinct Though the soli
darity of "Anglo-Saxon feehng" had, no doubt,
been increased by the recent action of Great

422 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1895-1900
Britain in refusing to support, and threatening
to resist, the attempted European intervention
between the United States and Spain — though
it was generally felt that, at a real pinch, Eng
land and America might each rely on the other
for help — the memory of a Democracy is
short and its gratitude not long-enduring. Any
talk of ahiance — so alien to American traditions
— was alarming to steady going politicians,
while it gave a fresh opening to the anti-
British party. It was even considered necessary
for the President to incorporate, in his Message to
Congress (5th December), a statement that his
Government would remain faithful to the precept
of avoiding "entangling alliances," while in the
"unfortunate contest in South Africa" it would
remain neutral.
The legislation of the year (1899) was chiefly
important from the fact that the Government
were enabled to redeem the pledge given in
the previous Session for establishing Municipal
Boroughs in London. The Bill was officially
resisted by the Opposition, but it was found to
be so moderate in its provisions that no excuse
was provided for representing it as an attack on
the County Council, though the magnitude and
richness of the area assigned to the Corporation
of the City of Westminster created certain appre
hensions, which, however, have not yet been
justified. Another Bill in which Mr Chamber
lain was so much interested that he was placed
in charge of it was to enable the occupiers of
small houses to become owners of them. The
limit of value was fixed at ;^30o, and the amount
which the Local Authority was empowered to
advance at ;^240. Those who had least faith in
the advantages of the Bill could raise no objec-

THE NIGER COMPANY 423
tions to its principle — it only offered to artisans
throughout the kingdom the same privileges as
were enjoyed by Irish farmers, and while compul
sion was to be exercised by the Local Authority on
an unwilling vendor. Obviously, it was not a
Measure which any member of Parliament with an
eye to his constituents would venture to oppose.
An Amendment, proposed by a Radical member,
to vest the freehold of houses thus acquired
in the Local Authority, not in the purchasing
occupier, was defeated by 249 votes against 62,
and the subsequent course of the Measure was
practically unopposed.
The incorporation of the territories hitherto
governed by the Royal Niger Company within
the British Dominion is described In another
Chapter. It is sufficient to mention that in
regard to this transaction certain personal and
absolutely unfounded imputations were made on
the Colonial Secretary. More embarrassing,
because it was supported by opponents who felt
no personal animus against him, was the charge
that he had failed to execute his pledges with
regard to Old Age Pensions. Though poli
ticians on both sides of the House had given
inconsiderate promises under this head, there
could be no doubt that the expectation of some
thing practical being done rested chiefly on Mr
Chamberlain. It was necessary to show that
at least the intention had been sincere.
On 24th April one of the Government Whips
moved the appointment of a Select Committee
to report on the whole question of provid
ing for the Aged and Deserving Poor. Mr
Asquith seized the occasion to taunt Mr
Chamberlain with his unredeemed pledge, and,
on his explaining that he had only invited dis-

424 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1895-1900
cussion, and made a proposal purely on his own
account, wittily retorted that the proposal was
good enough to found an action for breach of pro
mise on ! Before the Report of this Committee,
over which Mr Henry ChapUn presided, could be
issued, the taunts to which Mr Chamberlain was
exposed led him to offer an explicit defence of
his position.*
On 24th May, in reply to a Deputation from
the Oddfellows' Conference then sitting at Bir
mingham, he stated that he would not support
any general scheme for giving weekly pensions (say
5s. a week) to every man or woman over sixty
years of age. It would cost ;^34,ooo,ooo a year.
But even if such a sum could be raised by
taxation the result would be mischievous. A
gigantic scheme of Outdoor Relief for everybody
would discourage thrift and encourage idleness
and vice. There must be some test, and the
test which he had always advocated was that
the pensioner should have contributed through
his working life to some Friendly Society.
"Rome," he said, "was not built in a day: We
shall not get Old Age Pensions in a week." But
he had always believed, and still believed, that the
principle was right, and might be so worked out
as to contribute to thrift and not to discourage it.
He even expressed a hope that before the end ofthe
present Parliament "something considerable might
be done in the direction of which he had spoken."
The report of Mr Chaplin's Committee pre
sented at the close of the Session concluded with
the following recommendations : —
"(i) That a Pension Authority should be
estabhshed in each Union of the country, to
* Further reference to this subject will be made in the
last Chapter.

OLD AGE PENSIONS 426
receive and to determine applications for pen
sions ; (2) That the authority for this purpose
should be a Committee of not less than six or
more than twelve members appointed by the
Guardians from their own number in the first
instance ; (3) That the Committee, when so
appointed, should be Independent of the Board
of Guardians, and that other members should
be added to it, subject to regulations to be made
by the Local Government Board, and that it Is
desirable that other public bodies within the
area should be represented on the Committee,
and that a majority of the Committee shall be
members of the Board of Guardians ; (4) That
the cost of the pensions should be borne by
the common fund of the Union, and that a
contribution, from Imperial sources, should be
made to that fund in aid of the general cost of
the Poor Law administration, such contribution to
be allocated, not in proportion to the amount
distributed in each Union in respect of pensions,
but on the basis of population, not to exceed one-
half of the estimated cost of the pensions ; (5)
That the amount of the pensions In each district
should be fixed at not less than 5s. or more than
7s. a week, at the discretion of the Committee,
according to the cost of living in the locality, and
that it should be paid through the medium of the
Post Office ; (6) That the pension should be
awarded for a period of not less than three years,
to be renewed at the end of that period, but
subject to withdrawal at any time by the Pension
Authority, if in their opinion the circumstances
should demand it. In order to facilitate the
inquiries of the Pension Authority, and to prevent
as far as possible attempts at fraudulent misrepre
sentation, we think that applications for a pension

426 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1895-1900
should be made on a prescribed form, and should
be signed before a Justice of the Peace on oath,
without fee. The machinery which we propose
for the administration of a pension scheme in
England and Wales may not, in some respects,
be possible or equally suitable for Ireland and
Scotland, and our recommendations are subject
to such modifications as to machinery as may
be necessary or desirable in the case of either of
these countries."
Finally, the Committee considered the main
objections which have been put forward against
the above and similar pension proposals, and
said: — "We are very sensible of the grave
Importance of the inquiry which has been
committed to our care, and of the difficulties of
the problem which it has been our duty to
examine. We have given to the subject, within
the time at our disposal, the best attention in
our power, and we make our proposals with the
deference which is due to the opinions of others
on a difficult and highly complicated question.
But we believe that if they are adopted they will
add to the comfort and improve the position, of
the aged and deserving poor."
Throughout the War period the hostility
shown to Mr Chamberlain proceeded less from
the regular Chiefs of the Opposition than from a
small group of Radicals who represented the
antiquated doctrines of the Non-intervention
and Peace-at-any-price School, who honestly
believed that Great Britain had ah along been in
the wrong, but whose convictions on this point
were obviously strengthened by their personal
dislike of the Statesman whom they considered a
renegade. When the new Session opened (30th
January 1900), the chief Amendment to the Address

SPEECH ON THE WAR 427
was moved in the House of Commons by Lord
Edmond Fitzmaurice, and expressed a general
censure on the policy on the Government both in
their conduct of the South African War and in
their defective preparations for it. In his reply
Mr Chamberlain assumed the tone of a Statesman
speaking rather for the whole country than for
any Party, and, except for a few flings at Sir
William Harcourt, was careful to avoid any
semblance of aggression. After defending the
policy which had preceded the War, he admitted
that Ministers must expect to be criticised for
any mistakes made and any checks encountered.
At the proper time blame should be apportioned
among those responsible, but the Important thing
at present was to retrieve such errors as had been
committed. Speaking while the memory of the "black
week" in December 1899, was stih fresh in
men's minds, he declared that the spirit of the
nation was unbroken, and that the country would
shrink from no sacrifice demanded by the Govern
ment. He ridiculed the exultant declaration of
certain foreign critics that the British Empire was
bleeding to death and our prestige lost. Against
the defects which had been disclosed in our military
system must be set the pride we felt in the
gallant deeds performed by our troops from this
country and the Colonies. There must be no
second Majuba — never again should a citadel and
centre of disaffection and race animosity be raised
in South Africa. Never again should the Boers
be allowed to threaten our supremacy or treat an
Englishman as if he belonged to an Inferior race.
It was not true that gloom had settled down on
the nation ; the assistance given by the Colonies
was a fact the importance of which could not be

428 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1895-1900
exaggerated. Never before had the Empire so
fully realised its strength and unity. In this
Federation of Race we found compensation for the
evils of War !
From the tactical point of view, it was, un
doubtedly, convenient to divert the attention of the
House from the management of the War to the
position of the country, and Mr Chamberlain took
full advantage of the latitude allowed by a Debate
on the Address. But the resolute and cheerful
air with which his words were spoken was the
more useful since evidently it had not been
assumed for Parliamentary purposes. Deeply
involved as his reputation was in the fortunes of
the War, discredited as he would have been if his
"forward" policy in South Africa had resulted in
an ignominious withdrawal, he was never tempted
to exaggerate the magnitude of the "crisis" — he
looked steadily at the facts and saw them in
their real proportions. In this respect he faith
fully interpreted and reproduced the feeling of
the nation as a whole. The public gloom
and despondency — of which so much was
heard at the Clubs and the tea tables — never
touched the English people. It was highly dis
creditable that so many public speakers and
writers for the Press did their best to create
a panic by suggesting that it had already set in.
Looking back at the behaviour of our countrymen
at the end of 1899 and the beginning of 1900,
we are able now to realise that the great
multitude of them went about their daily busi
ness just as if nothing particular were happening
in South Africa. They were happily unconscious
that the nation was passing through a "period
of trial" — that we were "struggling for honour,
nay, for our very Imperial existence."

THE CRISIS IN ITS BEARINGS 429
On the contrary, the ordinary Englishman
regarded the War chiefly as the source of
rather more exciting news than usual — it was
specially interesting if he happened to have kins
men or personal friends at the front. In fact he
exhibited the same " British phlegm " and stolid
fortitude which had carried his ancestors through
life-and-death conflicts with nations as great as
his own. We were "saved" from a "national
peril,' not because " our youth leapt to arms " or
because "our sons over-sea" sailed across to
rescue us, but because, as a people, we knew very
weh that we should win in the end, that somehow
we should " muddle through," and that, mean
time, we were in no kind of danger. The only
contingency that might have been formidable
would have been the armed intervention of one
or more of the Great Powers. But it very soon
became apparent that, however sincere they
might be in their expressions of malevolence,
there was no combination of them that cared to
start business by trying issues with the British
Navy. That being so, the only question for this
country was how many millions of money
it was prepared to spend, and how many lives
it would risk, for a task which had proved to
be even more formidable than tbe least sanguine
of the experts had predicted.
For bringing the "crisis" to its proper bear
ings, Mr Chamberlain deserved more gratitude
than he has ever received. His reasoned optim
ism was the more effective because he always
"had the ear of the public." It produced a
better immediate result than the cool insouciance
of Mr Balfour or the mitis sapientia of the Prime
Minister. They were solemnly lectured because
they preached the equanimity which they practised^

430 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1895-1900
whereas the more rhetorical, though equahy sane,
exhortations delivered by Mr Chamberlain gave
much comfort to a number of nervous persons
who had set up as leaders of public opinion.
The short list of Measures promised in the
Queen's Speech was too long for a Session
which was almost entirely spent on matters
relating to or arising from the War. The
Bill for regulating Secondary and Technical
Education in England and Wales only reached
a Second Reading in the Upper House, and
the substantive legislation consisted mainly of
the Australian Commonwealth Act and certain
minor Statutes relating to Tenants' Right in
Great Britain, Limited Liability Companies, and
Railway Accidents.
On II th May Mr Chamberlain once more took
occasion to insist on the political importance of the
Liberal Unionist Party, and Incidentally remarked
that he could see little difference between that and
the Liberal Imperialist Party (recently founded by
Lord Rosebery), except that they had separate
Leaders. But his speech was not meant or inter
preted as holding out any overtures for reunion.
Its purpose was rather to expose the ihoglcal
position of a group of politicians who maintained
a distinction which, it was argued, rested on no
difference of principles. On the other hand, cer
tain political gossips, hearing that Mr Chamber
lain's relations in the Cabinet with a leading
Conservative colleague were not altogether har
monious, had busily put it about that a split was
likely to occur in the Unionist Administration.
The rumour was so persistent that the Party
Managers thought proper to get up a public
demonstration of amity. Mr Balfour was Invited
to a Banquet (i6th May) by the Liberal Unionist

RELATIONS WITH MR BALFOUR 431
Club, at which the Colonial Secretary paid a
graceful compliment to the personal qualities and
political loyalty of the First Lord of the Treasury.
Mr Balfour, in reply, declared that any differences
which had asserted themselves between the two
Parties during their fourteen years of co-opera
tion had run across both sections of the alliance,
and had caused no gulf between the Conservatives
and Liberal Unionists. It was said that their
alliance had finally " destroyed any disintegrating
Influence in the future." But while there were
eighty votes in the House of Commons going
a-begging, so long as Home Rule was not aban
doned by the Liberal Party, so long would it be
necessary to maintain the present Coalition. It
showed. Indeed, every sign of having acquired a
permanent character, and might develop into an
organisation fruitful of great results in the
future. These demonstrations, and others of the same
kind, pointed to the sufficiently open secret that,
unless something quite unexpected were to happen,
this was to be the last Session of the existing
Pariiament. As to the policy of appealing to the
country before the War had been brought to an
end there was some division of opinion among the
Unionists, but as a body they were inclined to
favour Mr Chamberlain's view that no time could
be better than the present. The end of active
operations had not yet been reached, but it was
unlversahy believed to be almost within sight.
What could be more correct than for the
Government which had carried out the An
nexation of the Boer Republics to ask the
country for a Mandate as to the settlement of
the new Provinces ? On the other hand, the
Liberals, who had recently been demanding the

432 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1895-1900
Dissolution of Parliament, began to complain,
when that step was imminent, that Ministers
were playing for a Khaki Election, and
hoped thus to obtain a majority which they
might afterwards use in furtherance of their
domestic policy. The unconcealed reluctance of
the Radicals to go to the polls may have been the
determining factor in Lord Salisbury's mind. An
interesting though almost barren Session was
wound up on 8th August, and on i8th September
the Dissolution was announced.
Meantime, Mr Chamberlain had prepared a
bomb shell for the Radical group who had so
bitterly attacked his South African policy.
Among the Papers discovered at Pretoria and
Bloemfontein were a number of letters from Sir
Henry de Villiers and other important persons in
Cape Colony, which proved how stubbornly Mr
Kriiger had defied the advice given him by the
best representatives of Afrikander opinion, and
which went a long way to show that the offers
repeatedly made by Mr Chamberlain and Sir
Alfred Milner were such as the President might
and should have accepted. But it was not, one
may fairly assume, only or mainly for the purpose
of justifying the Government policy in South
Africa on Afrikander testimony that Mr Chamber
lain caused this Correspondence to be published,
almost on the eve of the General Election.
The letters written by three Radical members
of the Imperial Parliament made it clear that
up to the time when War was in sight two of
them had been on intimate terms with agents
of the Pretoria Government — one advising
them how to evade the demands of the Colonial
Secretary without proceeding to hostilities, and
the other recommending the best manner for

CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE BOERS 433
commencing military operations. The other
Radical implicated In these documents had only
asked to be supplied, after the War had begun,
with a series of statements establishing the
alleged inhumanity of British soldiers and
officials. As the avowed object of one at least of
the writers was to "give Joe a fall," it was
but natural that the object of this amiable
Intrigue should retaliate with the weapon thus
opportunely placed in his hand. They had
shown him no quarter. Why should he spare
them? Moreover it was Important that the
country should be informed, on documentary
evidence, what exactly had been the course
followed by a certain small section of the
Radical Party. No doubt, the exposure of these
tactics was highly convenient to the Unionists ;
but to refrain, on that ground, from performing
a political duty would have been an excess of
political self-sacrifice to which Mr Chamberlain
never made pretences. It was by the choice of
the Radicals themselves that what was con
veniently, if not quite fairly, called the pro- Boer
policy had been made to turn on a personal
indictment of himself He had never sought to
separate his own action from that of his coheagues
in the Cabinet ; indeed, he had always sheltered
himself, as was his right, under their cohectlve
responsibility, and claimed for them, as was his
duty, a share in the credit for his success. Since
his assailants insisted on raising a personal issue,
what wonder that he should carry the war into
their country, and deliver his assault just at the
moment most advantageous to the Government ?
If Ministers were tacticahy wrong in chal
lenging the opinion of the country while the War
2 E

434 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1895-1900
was still in progress, the blame must largely lie
with Mr Chamberlain who strongly advised that
course. It was, as we know, justified by the
immediate results. But it has since been open
for the defeated Party to say that this " Khaki
Election " did not represent the real opinion of
the country, and that the "Mandate" then given
to Ministers only applied to South African affairs.
The doctrine implied has been repudiated by some
of their own Leaders. Certainly the electors
knew, when they cast their votes, that they were
supporting a Ministry which might conceivably
hold office for seven years, nor could they imagine
that the principles of the South African settle
ment would occupy Parliament for the whole of
that period. They were quite aware of the general
policy, domestic and foreign, of the Party which
was appealing for their verdict, and, if they had
felt distrust, they should not have expressed con
fidence. It cannot be denied, however, that it would
have been wiser to defer the Dissolution if it
had been possible to estimate the date at which
Peace would be concluded. But, as things
turned out. If Ministers had held on tih the War
was brought to an end, they would certainly
have been accused of shrinking from the popular
judgment and prolonging their tenure of office
beyond the usual term. Between the two
courses — equahy Constitutional — there was
nothing very decisive to turn the scale. Ministers
may well have thought that the paramount con
sideration was that, when the time should come for
settling terms with the enemy, the negotiations
should be conducted by a Government armed
with full authority. It was weU known that the
Boer Leaders were spinning out the campaign

APPEAL TO THE COUNTRY 435
with guerrilla operations simply in the hope that
the War might thus be made to outlast the life
of the existing Parliament. Rightly or wrongly,
they believed — were led by their correspondents
on the Continent to believe — that the Liberals
would grant far more favourable terms than could
be expected while Mr Chamberlain was Colonial
Secretary. They also believed — were also led
to believe — that the defeat of the Unionists was
practically certain. On this account, if for no
other. Lord Salisbury was justified in acting on
Mr Chamberlain's advice, and challenging the
electors to give him and his colleagues a renewed
Vote of Confidence. It was equally pedantic for
his critics to suggest that he should have hesi
tated about taking this step just because it
seemed convenient to his Party, and for his
supporters to pretend that no political considera
tions entered into his mind.

CHAPTER XIII
THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 19OO-I903
The appeal of Ministers to the country, as
put forward in a letter from Lord Salisbury,
was by no means confined to the South African
Settlement, though it was mentioned as one of
the main issues before the country. He referred
also to Army Reform and the maintenance of
British interests In the Far East, and he asked
the electors to remember, whichever Party
should be victorious, that unless that Party
were armed with a strong majority in the
House of Commons it would lack the authority
at home and abroad which was essential to
its task. Mr Balfour insisted more strongly
on the position of South African affairs, and
declared that from a Radical Administration
neither firmness of purpose nor consistency of
policy could be anticipated in the face of Boer
resistance. Though Individual members of the
Opposition were in practical agreement with the
Unionists on South African policy, some of the
Liberal Leaders held very different views, and
among the rank and file every shade of doctrine
was represented, "from an ardent and resolute
patriotism to something not very easy to dis
tinguish from treasonable sympathy with the
enemy." Mr Chamberlain pressed the same
436

ELECTION ADDRESSES 437
point in his Election Address — declaring that the
Liberals, if placed in power, would "reverse,
or at least alter, the policy which had secured
the enthusiastic approval of our kinsmen in all
parts ofthe world."
The fierce energy which he threw into the
General Election of 1900 was exasperated by
a new personal question. Some of the Radicals,
by way of taking vengeance for his exposure
of the Correspondence with the Boers, pub
lished a list of pecuniary investments held by
himself and some of his near relatives with the
object of casting a slight on his Integrity. These
attacks for the time he ignored — they did him
good rather than harm. On the other hand, he
pressed the most unfavourable interpretation upon
the somewhat vague utterances of Sir Henry
Campbell-Bannerman, and other Leaders of the
Party, made before the outbreak of the War and
even during its progress. He accused them of
being willing to consent to a surrender to the
Boers, and to leave British subjects to the mercy
of President Kriiger. Like Pontius Pilate they
would wash their hands of the whole affair, and
say It was no business of theirs !
The climax of invective, so it seemed, was
reached in a telegram which he despatched In
support of the Unionist candidate in the Hey
wood Division of Lancashire. " Every seat lost
to the Government," the message ran, "Is a seat
gained by the Boers." This was, in effect, what he
had previously said on a score of platforms ; and,
whether fair or unfair, it was no more than Mr
Balfour and a hundred other Unionists had
implied in their Addresses and speeches. But
by an error, which was subsequently explained,
the message as delivered was " Every seat lost

438 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1900-1903
by the Government is a seat sold to the Boers."
The mistake — which was afterwards acknow
ledged to be entirely due to a telegraph clerk
— was not cleared up tiU a certain amount of
misconception had arisen, and many persons
who had no sympathy with "pro- Boer" policy
regretted that such an imputation should be made
against politicians who might be unpatriotic but
certainly were not corrupt. A slight reaction
In favour of the Opposition was caused by this
blunder, but, on the whole, the result of the
General Election was a triumphant vindication
of Mr Chamberlain's policy in asking for an
immediate appeal to the people. Though the
Unionist majority had been appreciably reduced,
it was still overwhelming. The Conservatives
(334) and the Liberal Unionists (68) outnumbered
by 1 34 the combined Liberal and Labour Parties
(186) and the Irish Nationalists (82).
It was not probable that, even after so great
a victory, the old Government would go on just
as before. Lord Salisbury himself was known to
desire an early release from his too arduous duties,
but, having appealed to the country as Prime
Minister, he felt himself bound, after the renewal
of public confidence, to retain that position. Nor
was it considered advisable, at that time, to raise
the question of succession. Though there was
no fear of personal rivalry between Mr Balfour
and Mr Chamberlain, whose mutual understand
ing was quite complete, indiscreet partisans on
either side might have rendered the position some
what uncomfortable. Nor would it have been con
sidered expedient, either by Conservatives or
Liberal Unionists, to compromise the question
by the selection of the Duke of Devonshire.
The solution of what hardly amounted to a

MINISTERIAL CHANGES 439
difficulty was found in Lord Salisbury remain
ing Prime Minister and taking the office of
Privy Seal, but retiring from the Foreign
Office — where he made room for Lord Lans
downe, who had been far from comfortable at
the War Office. He was succeeded In the
latter position by Mr Brodrick, and Mr Gerald
Balfour was sent to the Board of Trade, giving
up the office of Chief Secretary for Ireland
to Mr George Wyndham, whose promotion was
marked by admission within the Cabinet. Mr
Ritchie succeeded Sir Matthew White Ridley as
Home Secretary ; Lord Selborne took the place of
Mr Goschen at the Admiralty, and Mr Chaphn
vacated the Local Government Board in favour
of Mr Walter Long ; Mr Hanbury became
Minister of Agriculture, and Lord Londonderry
Postmaster General.
Neither the changes within the Cabinet
nor those in the minor offices of the Govern
ment altered the balance of power between
Conservatives and Liberal Unionists. Indeed,
the reconstruction of the Ministry, which
brought little fresh blood to it, testified to the
undiminished personal influence of Lord Salis
bury. The retirement of Mr T. W. Russell,
nominally a Liberal Unionist, from the office
of Parliamentary Secretary to the Local Govern
ment Board, where he was succeeded by
a Conservative, Mr Grant Lawson, was compen
sated by the appointment of Mr Arnold-Forster
as Secretary of the Admiralty. So far as Mr
Chamberlain's hand could be traced in the exer
cise of patronage it was shown in the promotion
of Lord Selborne, Under Secretary for the
Colonies, to a position of Cabinet rank.
The brief Winter Session of 1 900 was opened

440 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1900-1903
on 3rd December, and the Queen's speech
announced that the only business for Parlia
ment was to make the necessary provisions for
the expenses of the War. It was inevitable, how
ever, that the conduct of Ministers should be
criticised in the Debate on the Address, and Mr
Chamberlain, in particular, was singled out for
attack — especially for his publication of the Cor
respondence with the Boers. He explained that
no objections had been made by the Dutch poli
ticians whose letters had been printed. The lan
guage used by Dr Clark and Mr Labouchere, he
said, amounted to "moral treason," and the infor
mation which Mr John Ehls had requested from
a Boer lady was not to be the whole truth, but "a
stream of facts " which he might use in Parliament
to damage his opponents. Sir Henry Campbeh-
Bannerman had declared that the person who
published these letters was unworthy of his
society. Weh, the act was the act of the whole
Government — a statement to which Mr Balfour
heartily assented. Mr Chamberlain added that,
though some of his phrases might have led to
misconception, he had never attacked any
man's private character, while there had been a
"perfect conspiracy of Insinuations and charges
against himself and those nearest to him."
The attacks to which he referred were
renewed in Parliament by Mr Lloyd-George,
who moved an Amendment to the effect that
Ministers of the Crown and members holding
subordinate office in the Government should
hold no interest, direct or Indirect, in any firm
or Company competing for contracts with the
Crown, unless the nature and extent of the
interest had first been declared. This was
directly aimed against the Colonial Secretary

PERSONAL ATTACKS 441
and his son the Financial Secretary to the
Treasury. The Debate was piquant, but it
was generally felt, by members who had least
regard for Mr Chamberlain, that the question
should not have been raised in this shape,
even if the general principle asserted was in
itself worthy of support. Mr Chamberlain had
no difficulty in showing that for any indis
creet use which had been made of his name he
had no shadow of responsibility, and that in only
two from the list of Companies mentioned did he
hold any interest. For the Investments of his
relatives he could not be answerable, nor had
any of them ever asked him to use his influence
on their behalf The discussion had lowered the
dignity of the House of Commons, and given
pain to his relatives, but done no injury to him
self Those members who supported Mr Lloyd-
George's Amendment dissociated themselves from
the personal issues which had been raised, and Mr
Balfour declared that, so far as the Motion was
an attack on the Colonial Secretary, it was
without a shadow of foundation. It had not been
brought forward In the Interest of purity — but only
to damage Mr Chamberlain. Because he had
made his power felt in the country they regarded
him with special aversion. But they had failed in
their attack that evening as they had failed at
the General Election.
Though the year 1901 was, in many respects,
a memorable one in Mr Chamberlain's career,
the Session was more remarkable for the pro
posals than for the achievements of the Govern
ment of which he was a leading member. The
bold and comprehensive plan, more or less framed
by Sir John Gorst, for the reconstruction of the
educational system. Elementary, Secondary, and

442 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1900-1903
Technical, throughout England and Wales was
not introduced till 7th May — much too late for
so complicated and contentious a scheme of
reform. The reasons for delay were explained, by
way of tacit apology, in the King's Speech on
the Prorogation (17th August). "Unusual
demands," it was said, "had been made upon
the time at the disposal of Parliament by the
Demise of the Crown, by the continuance of an
arduous War, and the necessity of providing
fresh Revenue by a wider range of taxation."
In other words, the Opposition, though weak in
point of number, had made such effective use of
their opportunities for lengthy discussion given by
the various questions arising out of the War,
the Budget, and the state of the Army, that
Ministers could make little progress with their
legislative programme. On 28th June, Mr
Balfour announced that the Education BIH must
be abandoned. But a temporary Measure
would be introduced, and pressed through Parlia
ment, which would meet the emergency caused
by the " Cockerton Judgment," and enable the
School Boards to carry on, for the ensuing twelve
months, the work of Higher Education from
funds which. It was now decided, they had no
legal right to apply to that purpose. Even this
proposal met with keen resistance, and on one
occasion the Government majority fell to 17,
but on 30th July, the Third Reading was carried
in the House of Commons ; the Bih passed
quietly through the House of Lords, and on 9th
August received the Royal Assent.
Among the minor Measures carried by the
Government, was one for amending and consoli
dating the existing laws as to Factories and
Workshops, and another for mitigating the penal-

THE ROYAL TITLES ACT 443
ties that might be inflicted upon Youthful
Offenders. Both these Acts feh within the
scope of that social legislation which Mr
Chamberlain has so steadily advocated, but,
as Colonial Secretary, he naturally felt a more
personal interest in the Royal Titles Act, which
made the first formal recognition of the Crown
as the connecting link between the United
Kingdom and the " British Dominions beyond
the Seas." No Constitutional innovation was
disguised under this official declaration of Im
perial Unity. It was Intended simply as a com
pliment to the Colonies, and a graceful inaugura
tion of the new Reign. If It was made at the
instance of the King, it was also understood to
be welcome to the Premiers of the Self-Governing
Communities, with whom Mr Chamberlain was
to hold conference in the ensuing year.
Frequent as were Mr Chamberlain's inter
ventions in Parliamentary Debate during the
1 90 1 Session, they related chiefly to South
African affairs, and such reference to them as
is necessary wih be found In another Chapter.
But of the warm discussions provoked by the
Budget proposals he was something more than
an interested spectator. The Increase of the
Income Tax from one shilling to fourteen pence
in the pound was an impost sufficiently excused
by its absolute necessity in a year of active war
fare — unwelcome as it must have been to a
Statesman who still believed In the possibility
of setting up some system of Old Age Pensions
for the Deserving Poor.
There was more difficulty about the Chancellor
of the Exchequer's scheme for expanding the
Revenue by resort to Indirect Taxation. It was
almost an axiom of " The Radical Programme "

444 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1900-1903
that "direct taxes are preferable to indirect
taxes," and for many years successive Govern
ments had acted on this principle. Certainly,
it was an anomalous position for one of
Mr Gladstone's old coheagues to make himself
responsible for the Sugar Tax and the Duty
on exported coal. On the other hand, it must
be remembered that Mr Chamberlain had always
maintained that every class should make a fair
contribution to the cost of Government, and had
even countenanced, if he had not personally
advocated, the Imposition of a Poll Tax. There
was, therefore, no inconsistency with his past
declarations in his consenting to lay some part
of the national burden on the working classes,
and, as the experts seemed to be agreed that
for the present Direct Taxation had reached
its limit, there was nothing for it but to support
some such Budget as Sir Michael Hicks- Beach
had brought forward.
In financial policy Mr Chamberlain had not yet
committed himself to any definite creed. Logical
or illogical, his position was that of an eclectic.
He has denounced as heartily as Mr Bright, and
would denounce again to-morrow, such a Pro
tectionist system as prevailed before the repeal
of the Corn Laws. He objected to it in the
past because it aimed at bolstering up the Landed
Interest at the cost of the commerce and manu
facturing industry of the country. He would
protest against the revival of It because the
enormous increase of our population forbids us
even to contemplate any Measure that might
diminish the supply of food. But there his
Free Trade doctrine, so far as he has formally
expounded it, begins and ends. As will be seen
from his remarks at the Conferences with the

FINANCE AND POLITICS 445
Colonial Premiers, and in numerous public
speeches, he had for some years been disposed
to confine the application of Free Trade to
the limits of the British Empire, and to
institute a modified system of Protection as
against the outside world. Since, therefore, he
has never belonged to the stricter sect of the
"Manchester School," he was committing no
act of economic apostasy when he took his share
of responsibility for a Budget which some of its
critics denounced as an inroad on our traditional
pohcy of Free Trade. His quite recent advocacy
of a Preferential system between the Mother
Country and the Self-Governing Colonies is
dealt with in the last Chapter.
His attitude towards the Registration Duty
on imported corn, etc., was explicitly defined
in his defence of the Budget of the following
year. In a speech delivered at Birmingham on
1 6th May 1902, he pointed out that of the 228
millions which the War had cost, 150 mihions
were to be raised by loan, and that the remaining
78 millions were to be distributed between 40
mihions laid upon the payers of Income Tax and
38 millions raised by Indirect Taxation. Broadly,
that was a fair division. But of that 38 millions
about 2^ mihions were to be drawn from a Duty
of threepence a hundredweight on imported
Corn and fivepence on imported Flour, about
half of which might be called a Bread Tax. It
amounted, he said, to less than one-eighth of a
penny on the four-pound loaf, yet the Opposition
called it a tax on the poor.
" They appeal," he said, " to passion and pre
judices, and they recaU all the evil traditions of a
time when the Bread Tax was indeed a serious
burden, when the Bread Tax was not threepence

446 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1900-1903
per hundredweight, but 20s. a quarter, and even
more ; at a time when the wages of the working
classes were, on an average, only half what they
are at present, and at a time when they were paying
not only this 20s. a quarter, but they were paying
also very much more, in many cases many times
more on other articles of common consumption.
Well, let the tax be considered upon its merits by
all means, but it Is treated with gross exaggera
tion, and it Is ridiculous and unfair and dishonest
to attempt to make any kind of comparison
between a tax of this kind and the state of things
which existed fifty or sixty years ago when the
Corn Laws pressed so heavily upon the working
classes of this country. The economists who
have dealt with this question tell us that there
is grave reason to doubt whether we shall pay
it at ah, whether it wIU not fall upon the pro
ducers in other countries, and they quote as a
proof of this that the tax on sugar has not raised
the price of sugar, but that it has been borne by the
growers of beet on the Continent of Europe. I am
sure I hope they are true. I confess I think there
is a certain humour in the thought that those who
have denounced us, who have calumniated us In
connection with this War, will have themselves
partly to pay for it. But I have not come down
here to my own people to defend this tax on the
ground that you will not pay any of it. I will
assume that you wih pay, every one of you, an
average of one-eighth of a penny per four-pound
loaf more than you paid before. Now, what is
the argument In favour of this tax? It is raised
for a War. The War is a just War, a necessary
War, a righteous War. It is a War which interests
every portion of the population, not one class
alone, the working class at least as much as

THE EDINBURGH SPEECH 447
every other class — a War to which the whole
nation, rich and poor alike, should each contri
bute and be proud to contribute In turn. And
when Sir Wihiam Harcourt, In the House of
Commons, tells us that the working classes of
this country are ready enough to cheer the War,
but are unwilling to pay for it, I repudiate the
sneer. When he says that they wi!l only support
the War as long as it costs them nothing, I say
it Is a libel on the working classes of this country.
If it were true, you would be pretty representatives
of your ancestors, who a century ago supported
the burden of a twenty years' war against almost
all the world, and supported a burden infinitely
greater than any that is laid upon you, at a time
when they were Infinitely less able to support it."
It will be observed that this defence of the
Corn Duty was based on the supposition that
the impost would be temporary — that it was a
special provision for an exceptional emergency
in the national finances. There was no suggestion
that it should be treated as a precedent, or as
establishing a new departure In fiscal policy. Mr
Chamberlain had not yet commenced his confer
ence with the Colonial Premiers.
To return to 1901, his most notable utterance
in that year related neither to domestic affairs nor,
except indirectly, to South Africa. It was one of
those sudden incursions into foreign politics. In
which, as we have seen, his zeal sometimes runs
away with his discretion. On this occasion,
however, he won the unqualified applause of his
countrymen. Irritated as all Englishmen were by
baseless calumnies, both against the conduct of
our troops in the field, and the measures taken
by our Generals in dealing with treason and
rebellion, no official protest had been presented by

448 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1900-1903
our Government except when Queen Victoria was
made the subject of an exceptionally filthy cartoon
in Paris. We had plenty of trouble on our hands
just then, and it was considered advisable to pre
tend that Foreign Governments had no power
to suppress these offensive publications. Nor was
it, apparently, with any Intention of departing from
this politic reserve that Mr Chamberlain used
the phrase which brought him into sharp personal
conflict with Count von Billow, the German Im
perial Chancellor.
In the course of a political speech delivered at
Edinburgh on 25th October (1901), he remarked
that Ministers had been blamed in some quarters
for not taking stronger measures against Rebels
and Guerrillas. For that leniency, which had been
pursued after most serious consideration, they
accepted full responsibility. But the time had
come — or was coming — when measures of greater
severity might be necessary. "If that time
comes," Mr Chamberlain remarked, "we can find
precedents for anything that we may do In the
action of these nations who now criticise our
'barbarity' and 'cruelty,' but whose example
in Poland, in the Caucasus, in Algeria, in Tong-
king, in Bosnia, in the Franco-German War, we
have never even approached."
It was a natural. If not an altogether advisable,
retort. But while it passed almost unheeded in
France and Russia it aroused fury in Germany
and German Austria. Although the Kaiser was
almost ostentatiously friendly to King Edward,
and although In Diplomatic matters his Govern
ment were acting in complete harmony with ours,
anti- English demonstrations were held in Berlin
and other great cities, and the most virulent attacks
were printed and freely circulated. It was wanton

IRRITATION IN GERMANY 449
audacity, we were told, that an English Minister
should compare the conduct of German conscripts
with the cowardly mercenaries who had placed old
men and women in front of their ranks to protect
themselves from the bullets of the Boers ! This
was one of the fictions most Industriously put
about by the Hollander Agency in Europe, and,
for the credit of Germans, we must take it that
they honestly believed the lies that were circulated
on what purported to be the evidence of eye
witnesses. At heart, though no friends of ours
at present, they are an amiable and placable race.
For nearly the life-time of a generation their only
acquaintance with War had been drawn from the
parade-ground and annual Manoeuvres. Most
of them had forgotten the stern realities of 1870-
187 1, and they were shocked by bloodshed not
perpetrated by their own countrymen, and in a
cause which they reprobated. Though a whole
nation may be demented for a time with patriotic
rage or sentimental enthusiasm — Englishmen have
fallen into similar excitements — it will not carry on
a campaign of wilful defamation. If the Germans
had known that the atrocities charged against our
Generals and soldiers were simply inventions of
the enemy they would have displayed less Irrita
tion at Mr Chamberlain's speech. They would
have realised, on consideration, that his suggested
comparison of our treatment of the Cape traitors
and Boer guerrillas with the punishment which had
been meted out by their Commanders to the French
Irregulars was absolutely fair and just.* As a
matter of fact, they regarded his words as an affront
* What that treatment was may be seen from the Ger
man Army Order issued in August 1870. It was trans
lated by Dr T. Miller Maguire, and quoted in his lecture at
2 F

450 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1900-1903
to the nation ; the agitation became so violent
throughout the latter months of the year that
Count von Biilow — a time-serving placeman who
pretends to be a Bismarck, and keeps himself in
office by trimming an even balance between the
orders of the Kaiser and the favour of a pre
carious majority In the Reichstag — thought it
would pay him to read Mr Chamberlain a public
lecture. On 8th January 1902, he made the following
reference to the Edinburgh speech : — " I believe
we shall all be agreed, and I think all sensible
the Royal United Service Institution on 18th February
1903 :—
" I. — Military jurisdiction is established by this decree.
It will be extended to all the territory occupied by German
troops, to every action tending to endanger the security of
those troops, to causing them injury, or lending assistance
to the enemy. Military jurisdiction will be considered as in
force and proclaimed through all the extent of a canton as
soon as it is posted in any locality forming part of it.
" II. — All persons not forming part of the French Army,
and not proving their quality as soldiers by outward signs,
and who
" {a) Shall serve the enemies as spies ;
" (3) Shall mislead the German troops when charged to
act for them as guides ;
" (c) Shall kill, wound, or rob persons belonging to the
German troops, or making part of their suite ;
" (d) Shall destroy bridges or canals, damage telegraphic
lines or railways, render roads impassable, set fire
to munitions and provisions of war, or troops'
quarters ;
" (e) Shall take up arms against the German troops; will
be punished by death. In each case the ofl&cer in com
mand will institute a council of war, with authority to try
the matter and pronounce sentence. These councils can
only condemn to death. Their sentences will be executed
immediately. "III. — The communes to which the culprits belong, as
well as those whose territory may have been the scene of

COUNT VON BULOW'S SPEECH 451
people in England, too, will agree with us, that
when a Minister considers himself called on to
justify his policy — and such a thing may happen
— he does well to leave foreign countries out of
the discussion. Should he, however, wish to
adduce examples from abroad, it is advisable
that he should proceed with great caution, for
otherwise he runs the risk not only of being mis
understood, but also of hurting foreign feelings,
even though It be — as I am ready to assume was
the case In the present instance, and as, indeed,
after the assurances made to me from the other
the offence, will be condemned in a penalty for each case
equalling the amount of their taxes.
"IV. — The inhabitants will have to supply all necessaries
for the support of the troops. Each soldier will receive
daily 750 grammes of bread, 500 grammes of meat, 250
grammes of lard, 30 grammes of coffee, 60 grammes of
tobacco or 5 cigars, ^ litre of wine, or 1 litre of beer, or o.i
of brandy. The rations to be furnished daily for each horse
will be 6 kilogrammes of oats, 2 kilogrammes of hay, and i J
kilogrammes of straw. In case of the inhabitants preferring
an indemnity in coin to one in kind, it will be fixed at 2
francs each soldier daily.
" V. — AU commanders of detached corps will have the
right to order a requisition of provisions needful to the
support of their troops. The requisition of other articles
judged indispensable to the army can only be ordered by
generals and officers acting as such. In all cases, nothing
will be demanded of the inhabitants except what is necessary
for the support of the troops ; and official receipts will be
given for everything supplied. We hope, therefore, that the
inhabitants will not offer any obstacles to the requisitions
which may be deemed necessary.
" VI. — With regard to individual bargains between the
troops and the inhabitants, we fix as an equivalent for i
franc, 8 silbergros or 28 kreutzers.
"The General Commanding-in-Chief the Third
German Army,"Frederic William,
" Prince Royal of Prussia."

452 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1900-1903
side, I must assume — without any intention of
doing so. This is, however, all the more regret
table when It happens in the case of a Minister,
and with reference to a country which, as the
previous speaker has rightly pointed out, has
always entertained with his own good and friendly
relations, the undisturbed continuance of which
is equally to the interests of both parties. It is
quite comprehensible that in a people which has
become so thoroughly part and parcel of its glori
ous Army as the German people has — and the
previous speaker very rightly emphasised this
point — the general feeling of the nation should
revolt against any appearance of the heroic char
acter and moral basis of our national struggle for
Unity being subject to misrepresentation. But
the German Army stands much too high, and its
escutcheon is too bright for them to be affected
by warped judgments. Anything of the kind Is
well answered by the reply which Frederic the
Great gave when he was told that somebody
had been attacking him and the Prussian Army,
'Let the man alone,' said the great king, 'and
do not excite yourselves. He is biting at
granite,' "
It appeared afterwards that in the version of
Mr Chamberlain's words which was telegraphed
to the Continent the sense had been considerably
distorted, and conveyed a more offensive imputa
tion than the speaker had in his mind. But as
for " the assurances from the other side " to which
the Count referred, and which some of the German
newspapers represented as a sort of apology, they
simply took the form of explaining to the German
Ambassador what had been actually said. This
was made clear by Mr Balfour's statement in the
House of Commons (17th January) that " nothing

MR CHAMBERLAIN'S RETORT 453
In the opinion of His Majesty's Government
required to be said in the direction of either
qualifying or retracting the speech of his right
honourable friend," Moreover, at Manchester,
on the loth, Mr Balfour himself spoke with con
tempt of the "disgusting tide of calumny " which
was poured out ceaselessly from the Continental
Press, On the following day, at Birmingham,
Mr Chamberlain was evidently in no repentant
mood. The language he used was not that of
a Minister whose conduct had been apologised
for. If he had committed any offence on loth
October 1901, he aggravated it on nth January
1902, by making a direct attack on the German
Chancellor, He began by holding up to repro
bation these English partisans of the Boer cause
who fouled their own nests, encouraged the
enemies of this country, and furnished material
to foreign countries for the malignant libels which
they uttered against us,
" I understand," he said, " a good Party fight.
I myself am a Party man. When I am struck I
try to strike back again. But I cannot appreciate
the position of those who are influenced by Party
passion, and not content with fighting the battle
here at home on fair and reasonable lines, must
go out of their way to Impute methods of bar
barism to our soldiers in the field, to imply that
His Majesty's Ministers, who are Britons like
themselves, can, by any possibility, be guilty of
deliberate cruelty and inhumanity, and who
laud the Boers while they slander the Britons,
and then profess to be astonished and surprised
at the growing hostility of foreign nations.
They have helped to create the animosity
which we ah deplore, I am well aware that
in some quarters this animosity is attributed

454 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1900-1903
to another cause. It is said to be due to the
indiscreet oratory of the Colonial Secretary.
Gentlemen, what I have said I have said. I
withdraw nothing. I qualify nothing. I defend
nothing. As I read history, no British Minister
has ever served his country faithfuhy and at the
same time enjoyed popularity abroad.
" I make allowance, therefore, for foreign
criticism. I wih not follow an example that has
been set to me. I do not want to give lessons
to a foreign Minister, and I wih not accept
any at his hands. I am responsible only to
my own Sovereign and to my own country
men. But I am ready to meet that form of
criticism which Is made at home, which is manu
factured here for export by the friends of every
country but their own ; and in reference to these
I would ask you, gentlemen, how can it be due
to a few words in a speech that was delivered
only a few weeks ago that for months and for
years, from the very beginning of this War, the
foreign Press has teemed with abuse of this
country? How can the Colonial Secretary be
made responsible for what Sir Edward Grey has
called the ' foul and filthy lies,' for what Lord
Rosebery has described as the ' vile and infamous
defamations,' which have been disseminated in
foreign countries without a syllable of protest,
without the slightest interference by the respon
sible authorities ? No, gentlemen, my opponents
must look for some other scapegoat. They must
look further for the causes of that feeling of hos
tility, which I do not think that we have deserved,
but which has existed more or less for a century,
at least, which always comes to the surface when
we are in any difficulty, but which, I am glad to
say, has never done us any serious harm."

CLEARING THE AIR 456
It was, Mr Chamberlain continued, a travesty
of history to say that when the Unionists took
office in 1895 they found Peace with Honour. Six
burning questions of International importance had
been left them as an evil legacy by their prede
cessors. The Siamese imbroglio, the Venezuelan
boundary, the Hinterland delimitations with
Germany and with France in West Africa, the
Samoan dispute, and the position of the French
on the Nile — with all these questions the
Unionist Government had grappled successfully,
and reached an honourable and satisfactory settle
ment. Besides this, they had maintained British
interests in the Far East, and in agreeing to the
immediate construction of an inter-oceanic canal
had disposed of a long-standing cause of difference
with the United States. These, Mr Chamberlain
declared, were solid achievements in the cause
of Peace. But there was something more valu
able even than the goodwill of foreign nations.
That was the affection and confidence of our
kinsfolk across the seas. The losses and
sacrifices of the War had been more than
compensated. It had enabled the British
Empire to "find itself," and united the British
race throughout the world. It had shown to all
whom it might concern that, if ever we had to
fight, as we had fought in the past, for our
very existence against a world in arms, we should
not stand alone.
This is a point which, before the War broke
out, was overlooked by Continental Statesmen
who were in the habit of measuring our strength
in Europe by the number of our Army. In
rubbing this consideration into their minds with
as much frankness as he would have employed
in dealing with an adversary in the House

456 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1900-1903
of Commons, Mr Chamberlain, if he exceeded
the limits of Diplomatic propriety, rendered
a service to his country which could not have
been performed by a Prime Minister or a Foreign
Secretary. Speaking as the representative of
Colonial feeling he could use language which in
their mouths would have seemed almost menac
ing. But, as he declared, a new factor had
entered into the politics of the country. In future
we must take into account the opinion of the
Colonies. We shall have to consult them, and,
if we wished them to stand by us, we must be
guided, to some extent, by their wishes and
aspirations. Undoubtedly, this speech cleared the air. It
was, we were told, a " naked and brutal assertion
of British Imperialism," It was a " repetition of
the first insult," It was an " adroit piece of personal
advertisement." The wrangle came to an end,
and some of the more reasonable critics pointed
out that Mr Chamberlain could never have
Intended to insult the German troops by com
paring their conduct with that of the British,
since to charge the former with misconduct
would have been to confess the equal guilt of
the latter. It was universally recognised, more
over, that In taking up this resolute and almost
defiant attitude, he had correctly interpreted the
temper of his countrymen, and that, unless
Germany wished to force a quarrel upon us, it
might be weh to place some limit on public
expressions of dislike or disapproval. The un
concealed amusement of the French newspapers,
and the ostentatious indifference of Russian
opinion while the dispute was in progress,
reminded the most irresponsible Anglophobes
in Berlin and Vienna that the German race

THE EDUCATION CONTROVERSY 457
would be well advised not to fall out with the
only European State which does not regard it
with open enmity. Besides, they ceased to be
shocked at what we were doing In South Africa,
when it became evident that we should be
successful. In spite of the difficulties on which the pohti
cal and military pessimists were still enlarging,
the opening of 1902 marked the beginning of
the end of the War. The Colonial Secretary,
whose administrative functions in regard to South
Africa had been partially suspended while the
whole region was more or less under Martial
Law, became almost absorbed In thoughts of
the Settlement that would follow the approaching
restoration of Peace. Except on matters per
taining to his Department, he took no very
active part in the Debates of a Session which
began on i6th January, and, after an adjourn
ment from 8th August to i6th October, was
not closed till i8th December. But with regard
to the new Education Bih, which was under keen
discussion during the whole of that period, and
did not become law before the day of Prorogation,
it was necessary for Mr Chamberlain to make
a formal defence of his well-understood position.
So far from producing accord between Parties,
the Debates in Parliament had only exaggerated
the points of difference, and it naturally devolved
on Mr Chamberlain to conciliate. If possible,
the opposition of those Radical Nonconformists
who on other questions had hitherto supported
the Government. Amongst his own constituents
there was a sharp controversy. Indeed the Bih
had been formally condemned at a meeting of
Liberal Unionists convoked by certain influential
Birmingham politicians. It was in the hope

458 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1900-1903
of appeasing this discord that on loth October
he summoned a conference of the Liberal
Unionist Party In the city — ^just before the
commencement of the Autumn Sittings of the
House of Commons. Whatever charges may
be brought against him, he has never been
accused of political timidity. Anxious as he
was to avert a split In his Party, he spoke with
perfect frankness. No amount of agitation, he
said, would induce Ministers to withdraw this
Bill. They would persist with it, and should
it be defeated they would resign Office. As for
his personal responsibility in connection with
the Bih, he had taken part in discussing it
both before and after it was introduced. Subse
quently, he admitted, he had not followed it so
closely as he could have wished. His preoccu
pation with South African affairs had prevented
him from sitting by Mr Balfour's side and giving
such help as he might be able to afford. Nor
must it be supposed that the Government ever
expected their Party or the country to accept the
text of the Bill, line by line and word by word,
just as it stood in the first instance. He had
already explained the necessity for some such
Measure as the one now brought forward. As
an old member of the Birmingham Education
League, he adhered to the opinion that State
Education should be purely secular, but had
long ago reahsed that on this point he had
no chance of persuading the majority of his
fellow-countrymen. Therefore he accepted an
arrangement which preserved the main interest
of the nation and did justice to all classes,
though it did not carry out his personal views.
While he recognised that a certain number
of Churchmen and Conservatives, as well as

A BIRMINGHAM CONFERENCE 459
Nonconformist Liberal Unionists, conscientiously
objected to the Bill, there were others whose
opposition took the form of "wild threats" and
" blatant criticism " and was entitled to no sort of
consideration. They were talking about " quarrels
in the Liberal Unionist Party " and a " mutiny
against Mr Chamberlain — prophesying that he
would be stoned in his own city, and that his
political extinction was imminent."
" I beg you," he said, " to pay no attention
whatever. In the discussion in which we are about
to engage, to my personal position. I have been
threatened many times. I have not been made
afraid. The time is coming when the question of
whether or not I continue in political life Is a
matter of absolute indifference to me. But what
is of consequence — at least what I venture to
think Is of consequence — is that the cause and the
object to which I have given my life should con
tinue, as they are, strong in the hearts and deter
mination of the British people. If long after I
am forgotten, these principles — for which I take
no credit, since, indeed, I have no pretence to
have initiated them — -but those principles which
combine us together as a great Imperial nation —
If they remain, it matters nothing about myself or
about any individual who has been concerned in
promoting them. I hope the differences — if
differences there be — between us at the present
time may be composed, but If not, if we are unable,
if we find it Impossible to agree — which I do not
believe — then, at least, let us agree to differ upon
this contested and complicated point, upon which,
indeed, differences may exist, with mutual respect
and mutual regard. Let us consent to that, but
let us never consent to do anything that would
assist the Intrigues of those who, if they were

460 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1900-1903
successful, would hand over Ireland to the Home
Rulers, would transfer the settlement of the great
and important problems arising in South Africa —
the War In which we have been engaged — to the
discretion and the patriotism of the pro- Boers,
would leave our interests in the hands of the Little
Englanders, who would depend for our reforms
upon the framers of the Newcastle Programme."
What was wanted, Mr Chamberlain continued,
was "more facts and fewer phrases." They all
approved of Religious Equality. But what was
meant by the expression ? How far would they go
to secure it ? Would they force Churchmen,
Dissenters, Roman Catholics, Jews, Unitarians,
to pay rates for a religious education that either
omitted something which one sect or the other
regarded as essential or included something
which they disbelieved ? and would they at the
same time withhold from these different creeds
the right of obtaining such religious education
as they did approve ? Would that be Religious
Equality ? Though cor^current endowment might
be justified nothing could be said for the endow
ment of a particular form of religion and the
exclusion of all others. The only logical alterna
tive was the absolute secularisation of State
Education. That, however, the majority would
not accept. Nor would the Nonconformists pro
fit by an arrangement that left each sect to provide
religious teaching at its own expense. Being less
rich than the Church of England and the Roman
Catholics, and having no machinery provided,
they would be at a distinct disadvantage. An
other system was that prevailing in Canada,
where every ratepayer was entitled to say to what
class of school his rates should be allotted ?
None of these plans commended themselves to

TAXATION AND REPRESENTATION 461
Mr Chamberlain's mind. Was there any other
alternative than the one suggested by the Govern
ment ?
It was said, again, that Taxation and Repre
sentation should go together. He agreed with
the principle — " speaking generally and as far as
possible " — though It was by no means unlversahy
observed in any Constitution, Well, the Govern
ment Bill did provide for Representation, Pos
sibly it might not be thought adequate — that was
a question of degree — but the intention was to
institute absolute popular control of the whole
secular instruction. If this object was not suffi
ciently attained. Ministers would be bound to
amend the Measure. Here was the crux of the
situation. " Suppose (he asked) that by Amendments,
perhaps suggested by ourselves, but at any rate
absolutely satisfactory to you, we make it per
fectly clear beyond contention that the whole of
the secular education of those Denominational
schools is for the first time brought under popular
representative control, will that satisfy you ?
That Is the question. If we do that, wih you be
satisfied to leave the religious education in these
schools as It has been for thirty years and a great
deal more past ? Will you leave that untouched
in the hands of the Denominational Managers or
Trustees who have provided the schools ? What
is the alternative ? The alternative would be that
you would claim that the Government, like the
extreme sectarians who have recently been addres
sing the country, should engage in a crusade
against Denominational schools — that they should
force on them an undenominational system, and,
that If they refuse to adopt the undenominational
system, they should force upon the ratepayers

462 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1900-1903
the cost, the enormous cost, of providing sub
stantial buildings and educating half of the
whole of the children in this country. There is
no eluding — there is no evading — that point, and
ah I ask you is to say which it is you want. Are
you wihing that a system which has continued so
long should remain, the only change being, and
that is entirely in our direction, that the whole of
the secular instruction should for the first time be
taken out of the hands of those Denominational
and religious persons ; or do you say that you
insist that the opportunity of this Bih, that the
necessity which was imposed upon the Govern
ment in view of the miserable condition of educa
tion in the great number of districts, should be
taken advantage of by sectarians in order to
destroy Denominational education ?
"Well, that is a question upon which I wish
your answer. But then I am bound to teh you, if
the last of these two alternatives is your policy, if
you are satisfied with nothing short of the destruc
tion of the system which was generally admitted in
1870, so far as the Denominational schools are
concerned — there was no question then about the
destruction of the Denominational schools — if you
desire that this opportunity should be seized in
order to make a revolutionary change of that kind,
you are going altogether beyond any compact
between the Unionist Parties, and you are putting
yourselves in a position In which no arrangement
of any kind is possible. It will be no use our
proposing concessions which we know beforehand
wih be rejected. We will be glad to meet you in
any reasonable form or direction, but if you ask
that we should go so far from our original direc
tion as to take up and to carry through a policy
which no Radical Government has ever dared to

NECESSITY FOR COMPROMISE 463
suggest — then I say you are going beyond what
is reasonable, and you must face the position in
that case. If there are such persons who take
such extreme views in our ranks, all I would say
to them is that I would, most earnestly and
sincerely appeal to them, I say we must agree to
differ. We cannot go altogether upon those lines,
but I would ask them whether they think that, on
account of this one difference in so many, they
would be justified in breaking up the Unionist
Party, or In trying to break It up, not because the
Government is doing something new, to which
they have a right to object, not because we are
reactionary in our proposals, but simply because,
at the dictation of what, after ah, is a very smah
minority of the country, we refuse to undertake an
entirely new departure, adopt a policy which was
disclaimed altogether by everybody who was con
cerned in the agitation of 1870, which was no part
whatever of the programme either of the Central
Nonconformists Committee or of the National
Education League. I cannot impress upon you
too strongly the importance of settling this vital
point. Do you complain of the Government
because they have gone backwards? In that
case, your complaint ought to be considered. It
ought to be fully answered ; and. If it cannot be
answered, we ought to amend the Bill, so as to
satisfy you. But, on the other hand, if you com
plain that we do not undertake something entirely
new, something altogether beyond anything to
which any of us were ever pledged, then I venture
to say you are unreasonable. You will not get
it from the Unionist Government — and let me add
you certainly wih not get it from the Radical
Government who would succeed the Unionist
Government — but you will get a great deal that

464 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1900-1903
you win not like. I do not believe that there
is any appreciable proportion of men, in our
ranks who take a view so unreasonable as
that." The remainder of the speech dealt with points
of detail, and, after a prolonged private discussion,
Mr Chamberlain invited the meeting to vote Yes
or No to a series of questions which he had pre
pared. First. — Are you or are you not in favour of
popular control of secular instruction, whilst safe
guarding the religious instruction, in accordance
with the views of the founders ? — This was
answered in the affirmative by a large majority,
the Noes numbering ten.
Second. — With the view of safeguarding this
instruction, are you ready to leave the election of
the head teacher in the hands of the managers ?
— Answered in the affirmative by a large majority,
the Noes numbering sixteen.
Third. — Are you in favour of the abolition of
the Cowper-Temple Clause ?— Answered in the
negative, the Ayes numbering four.
Fourth. — Should the Council appoint a
majority of the Education Committee from its
own body ? — Answered in the affirmative, the
Noes numbering one.
The " special verdict " was, thus, in favour of
the Government Bill, but its effect was, no doubt,
somewhat discounted by the almost unanimous
declaration, elicited by the two leading dissen
tients, that " the majority of the Management
Committee of each of the Voluntary Schools, so
far as secular instruction was concerned, should
be popularly elected."
What exactly was the effect produced by Mr
Chamberlain's address was, even at the time, a

"CLOSURE BY COMPARTMENT" 465
matter of conjecture. But the broad results were
at once apparent. He had failed, on the one
hand, to convince his leading opponents : on the
other. It was clear that no split would occur in
the Liberal Unionist Party, and that those who
most strongly disapproved of the Government
Bill would continue their general support of
the Unionist Administration. This much Mr
Chamberlain had attained, and probably this was
all he had looked for. He knows Birmingham
men too well to think that prominent citizens
who had taken a strong line on any question
of the day would be converted by an adroit
public speech, or would not have considered any
arguments that he could produce to them in a
private conference. The most to which they
could be expected to assent was not to play Into
the hands of the common adversary.
In the Debate on Mr Balfour's Motion (nth
November) to apply the " Closure by Compart
ment " to those clauses of the Education Bill
which had not passed through Committee, Mr
Chamberlain was in an awkward position. In
resisting a similar proposal, nine years before, with
regard to the Home Rule Bill, he had described it
a precedent which would " cloud the honour of the
House of Commons," and "risk the free liberties
of Parliament." That he had said "quite apart
from the circumstances of the merits or demerits
of that particular Bih or the proceedings under It."
This had been quoted against him, beforehand,
by Sir Henry Canipbeh- Bannerman, and the
House was naturahy anxious to see how he
would set up a sufficient distinguo. Moreover,
some of the ground had been cut away under his
feet by Mr Balfour who, in a conciliatory speech,
had exonerated the Opposition as a body from
2 G

466 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1900-1903
the charge of Obstruction. It was impossible
for Mr Chamberlain to express, on this point, an
opinion different from his Chief's, though he
hinted that Mr Balfour's courteous admission
had been somewhat too general. But, though Mr
Chamberlain might not accuse the other side of
Obstruction, he did assert that they had done all
they could to prevent the Bih passing. They had
tried to smother it by Amendments. If that was
not Obstruction, he should like to know how they
would define the term ? Nor did he blame them.
He himself had obstructed Bills which he thought
obnoxious. They said that their object was to
"improve" the Education Bih. He believed that
they wished to destroy It — as he had wished to
destroy the Home Rule Bill. But how far the
Rules of the House should permit such a course
was another question, but so long as they did
permit it that course would be followed. The
best justification for the decision of Ministers to
force the Bill through the House was that on
almost every Division they had gained a majority
of neariy two to one — indeed, the average was
three to one !
As for the argument that Ministers had no
" mandate " to pass an Education Bhl, because
the General Election of 1900 had turned on the
War, he retorted that, on such reasoning, Mr
Gladstone had received no "mandate" for the
Home Rule Bill of 1893, since the General
Election of 1892 had turned on the Newcastle
Programme, every candidate using just that part
of it which he thought most popular in his own
Constituency. Except the Irish members, and
a few English Radicals like Mr John Morley,
who were personally identified with the cause,
very few had insisted strongly on Home Rule,

"THE SPLIT AT BIRMINGHAM" 4G7
and Mr Gladstone himself though plied with
numberless inquiries, had refused even to give an
outhne of his plan. The Opposition had not the
faintest Idea what sort of a Bill he was going to
produce. Thus far, Mr Chamberlain had carried the
majority of the House with him, but in the heat
of discussion he feh into one of those mistakes
which beset a speaker who relies too much on his
readiness. Mr Lloyd-George, he said, had intro
duced an entirely new Idea.
" He says that the object of this closure is
that we are afraid of a split in our Party, and he
gave as evidence of this approaching revolt or
revolution a certain meeting in Birmingham. I
do not want to say much about the meeting in
Birmingham, except that if it was satisfactory to
him, I can assure him, from the bottom of my
heart, it was eminently satisfactory to me. I
may say that I am told that in Birmingham,
where this revolt or revolution, as described in
some of the Opposition papers, is to take place,
I am shortly to receive from my friends and
fellow-citizens an exceptional welcome. Do you
object to that ? I do not want to be ungenerous.
In what way is it ungenerous? I will not
include in what I have to say any of the Liberals
of Birmingham ; but, as regards the Liberal
Unionists and Conservatives, who are the only
people whom you profess to beheve to be in revolt,
I speak with confidence, and I know that I have
not lost their support. That is my point. The
idea that, because a great Party on a complicated
Bill has displayed certain differences of opinion,
there is the commencement of a revolt or mutiny,
or that those who take a different view of the
Bill than themselves are about to join the Radical

468 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1900-1903
Party, is utterly absurd to those who know the
pohtical life of Birmingham."
Undoubtedly, Mr Chamberlain had not in
tended to suggest that the part which his political
opponents were about to take in the public
ceremony at Birmingham signified approval of
his Education policy, but his im.prom,ptu reference
to their action was so worded that it gave the
Opposition moralists an opportunity for lecturing
him in a breach of etiquette.* All he had in
tended to say — as he explained directly after
wards — was that the friendliness accorded to him
by his own people in Birmingham showed that
what was called the revolt had not gone very
far. A more acute controversy — one that recahed
old days — had arisen earlier in the Session. In the
course of a general defence of the Government
policy in South Africa, the Colonial Secretary had
referred to the vain persistence of the Boer guer
rillas in prolonging the state of war, and quoted
* The invitation to take part in the public banquet to
Mr Chamberlain had been accepted by the Birmingham
Liberal Association on the understanding that the honour
was to be paid to him by his fellow-citizens as to the
" accredited representative of the nation " who was going
out to South Africa " with the object of solving, in a
generous spirit, the complicated problems that await solu
tion." It was resolved on 3rd November by the Manage
ment Committee of the Association as follows : —
" I, There was a unanimous feeling that Mr Chamber
lain's journey was wisely conceived in the interests of future
peace, "2. There was a unanimous opinion that every Liberal
anxious for the fusion of parties and races in South Africa
would do his best to make Mr Chamberlain's mission a
success, " 3, That Mr Chamberlain was more likely to be success
ful, if it was clearly understood that he came, not in any
narrow political capacity, but as representing all classes and

SCENE WITH MR DILLON 469
the language of the Boer General Vilonel who had
declared that the enemies of his country were those
who continued a hopeles% struggle, " Vilonel is a
traitor!" ejaculated Mr Dillon, "No, sir, he is
not," retorted Mr Chamberlain ; " the hon, gentle
man is a good judge of traitors," — here a scene of
uproar broke out, and when Mr Dillon at last got a
hearing he said, " I desire to say, Mr Speaker, that
the right hon, gentleman Is a damned liar." As he
refused to withdraw that expression there was
nothing for it but for Mr Balfour to move that he
should be suspended. The 1 rish members thought
that Mr Dihon had been unfairly treated, because
Mr Chamberlain's expression had not been rebuked
by the Speaker, and on 7th May they brought for
ward what was virtually a Vote of Censure on the
Chair. In this, of course, they were defeated by an
overwhelming majority. By raising this issue they
prevented any authoritative declaratlAn being made
as to whether Mr Chamberlain had exceeded the
limits of Parliamentary order. Probably he had
parties in England who desire South Africa (torn with war
and racked with internal dissensions) to settle down into a
peaceful, self-governing, law-abiding community.
" 4. It was also clearly understood that the presence of
representatives from the Birmingham Liberal Association
did not in any way commit them or the Association to any
approval of Mr Chamberlain's action or language respecting
any other matter than the mission in hand.
" 5. The Committee received official assurance that Mr
Chamberlain clearly understood the nature of the gathering,
and had definitely declared his intention of not making a
Party political speech.
" 6. Under these circumstances the Committee felt they
ought not to allow their strong disapproval of much of Mr
Chamberlain's Party strategy, and their indignation on
account of what they think his unjust criticisms of their
opinions, to prevent their support of him in a policy which
may be fraught with lasting consequences to the peace and
prosperity of South Africa."

470 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1900-1903
done so, but, as the Speaker pointed out at the time,
the original provocation had come from Mr Dillon,
and if hon. members did not interrupt they would
not be subject to retorts.
Throughout the Session of 1902 the Irish
members were in an unusually explosive temper.
Openly sympathising, as many of them did, with
the Boers in their struggle for Independence, they
were embittered by the constantly accumulating
evidence that the already proclaimed Annexation
of the two Repubhcs would very soon be rendered
effective. They rejoiced without disguise in any
Incident that seemed likely to delay the final
triumph of the British arms, and some of them,
when the news of the defeat and capture of Lord
Methuen on 7th March was read out In the House
of Commons, were so imprudent as to greet it with
a cheer — a puerile and unmannerly display which
disgusted most of their Liberal friends.
Their animosity was especiahy directed against
the Statesman whom they regarded as chiefly
responsible for an oppressive policy, nor was
their attitude towards the Government generahy
modified by the comprehensive Measure for assist
ing Land Purchase in Ireland, introduced by Mr
George Wyndham on 25th March. Their recep
tion of that Bih was so cold and contemptuous
(on the ground that it did not provide for Com
pulsory Sale), that the Chief Secretary In the
Autumn Session announced that it would be
withdrawn. Apart from his relations towards Mr Red
mond's fohowers, and from occasional brushes
with Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, Mr
Asquith, and other Opposition Leaders, the
Session of 1902 was for Mr Chamberlain un-
usuahy pacific. It was generally recognised.

THE VISIT TO SOUTH AFRICA 471
even by those who blamed his Diplomacy before
and during the War, that he was honestly de
sirous of arranging a fair and permanent settle
ment of South African problems. When it was
announced on 27th October that he was about to
make a visit to the scene of the late War, he was
universally complimented and congratulated on so
bold a departure from Downing Street precedent.
The hopes with which his mission was contemplated
before he started were faithfuhy recalled after his
return by Mr John Morley in a speech (13th April
1903) at Montrose. Though It was stih too soon
to estimate the results achieved, the old friend
and never ungenerous opponent declared that all
Parties agreed in recognising " the manful and
Intrepid spirit which induced Mr Chamberlain to
go and watch the working of his own policy on
the spot, and to endeavour to produce from it the
fruits of a real conclhatlon."
The slight misunderstanding caused by Mr
Chamberlain's reference In the House of Commons
to the honour about to be paid him in Birmingham
soon passed away. When he went down on 1 7th
November to be the guest of the City it was
clear that all Parties had joined cordlahy in the
popular reception. John Bright himself, the
greatest of modern English orators, and, with all
his limitations, one of the noblest figures in the
pubhc life of the Nineteenth Century, had not
appealed more closely to the civic pride of his
fellow-townsmen than the Minister who, after
thirty years spent in unceasing strife, was
acclaimed by the universal voice as the one man
who might, perchance, heal the wounds left by a
bitter and desolating War, because he could be
trusted to do equal justice between discordant
races, clashing factions, and intriguing politicians.

472 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1900-1903
His industry in mastering facts, his skih In manag
ing men, had been generahy recognised ever
since he became prominent in politics ; his
sincerity In following out what he regarded as
the patriotic policy had for many years been
admitted by most of his political adversaries ; but
it must be confessed that the public faith in his
impartiality was, at the end of 1902, a growth of
only a few months, and the expectations of his
success In the character of Conciliator were based
chiefly on public speeches and administrative acts
subsequent to the Peace of Vereeniging. What
ever may prove to be the results of his mission to
South Africa, there was not at the end of 1902,
and will not be hereafter, any question either as
to the motives with which he started or the hopes
he inspired. The decorations of the public
buildings In his own City, the crowds assembled
in the streets to greet his arrival and departure,
the bonfires, the torchlight processions, the
complimentary speeches at the Banquet, where
the tributes paid by his friends hardly went beyond
what his adversaries would have conceded — all
these popular demonstrations did but add the%
emphasis of local enthusiasm to the general ex
pression of national confidence.
The task on which he was about to engage was,
he believed, not an Impossible one. The first
duty of the country was to deal wisely and
generously with those who had stood by us —
the second duty was to Induce those who had
recently been in arms against us to accept the
new situation. "This," he said, "is our task.
Why should we despair of it ? Have we not
much in our past to justify optimism In such a
case. Why, In our own history, there were times
when Royalists and Puritans, or Jacobites and

TRIBUTE TO LORD MILNER 473
Hanoverians, even Scotchmen and Englishmen
were separated much more widely than are British
and Boers to-day. And, on the other side of the
Atlantic, in America, the terrible wounds that
were left by the greatest of Civil Wars have
been healed over, and now we have, in the most
powerful and the most numerous of English-
speaking peoples, an absolutely united nation.
And in our own Colonies have we not had an
equal difficulty to deal with ? Do we not now
see the descendants of the men who fought at
Montcalm against Wolfe in Canada — do we not
see their descendants — now sending to be Prime
Minister of the Dominion one of themselves, a man
universally respected and popular with both races ?
I hold that these are examples which show us that
if the task Is difficult it is not Impossible, and If
it is not impossible Englishmen — Britons — will
accomplish it.
"The burden of this task has fahen, and
will continue to fall, mainly on the shoulders
of Lord Milner. It Is to his policy of firm
ness and moderation combined that we look
for a successful result. We have placed upon
him a great responsibility. We have given him
our fuh confidence, and, if I now go out to South
Africa with his cordial approval, one of my chief
objects is that I may be better able, when I return,
to support his policy, when I have gained a wider
knowledge and a clearer understanding of It. I
shall see on the spot all the difficulties with which
he has been confronted. I shall gain a better
conception of the colossal task that he has under
taken, and I believe that in this way, and by that
frank interchange which will take place of views
and opinions, we shall be able to preserve a
harmonious co-operation between the Home and

474 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1900-1903
Colonial Government, which is an essential con
dition of success in every case of Colonial
Administration. But I do not go to South
Africa to see Lord Milner only, I go to see every
representative of every class and race and section
who may desire to see me. My ears will be open
to all that they have to say to me, my eyes to aU
that they will show me, and in this way I cannot
help thinking that, though my stay must neces
sarily be short, I shall learn more in a few days of
this intimate acquaintance with the people of the
country than I could possibly gain by months of
study of Blue Books and official Despatches."
It was not unfitting that this profession of faith
should be made in the Liberal and Progressive
city which has hitherto followed him faithfuhy —
though not always without hesitation and search-
ings of heart — in each new phrase of a varied
career. The tribute he paid to his fellow-towns
men had been amply earned. He spoke of their
public spirit and energy, their independence and
broad-minded toleration as the qualities which
had made Birmingham a city great in the eyes
of men !
" But (he continued) if I go on to say why I
love it, then I am touched with more than a personal
note. How should I do otherwise than love it?
Here is my home, here is my family life, and no
man owes more than I do for the blessings of a
family life. Here I have sorrowed, and here I
have rejoiced, and through good and evil, through
all the vicissitudes of my career, the sympathy
and the goodwih of the people of Birmingham
have followed it and bound me to it by links of
steel. The great share which you have had in
the precious memories of my life, and — now that
I am starting on a new experiment, that I am

THE SEND-OFF FROM BIRMINGHAM 475
attempting a great adventure, of which I know
as well as anyone that there are connected with
it great risks of failure — the fact that you have
given me a proof of your continued kindness, of
your goodwih and your interest, which will follow
me on every stage of that arduous work, are the
best augury for my success."
The legislation of 1903 cahs for no more than
a brief summary in these pages, since most of the
Government Measures had been prepared during
Mr Chamberlain's absence, and much of the rough
preliminary work in Parliament was transacted
before his return. The chief Act of the Session,
perhaps the greatest accomplishment of the
Unionist Administration, was carried by Mr
George Wyndham. His great scheme of State-
aided Land Purchase in Ireland was largely,
though not entirely, based on the recommenda
tion of a Conference which Lord Dunraven
had convened between representative landlords
and tenants ; and the Bill, as subsequently
modified In Committee, gave satisfaction to ail-
but a few extreme men on either side. Roughly,
it provides for the gradual advance, within the
next fifteen years, of a sum estimated at 100
millions, on very easy terms as to interest and
repayment by the purchasing tenants. But the
distinctive feature of Mr Wyndham's scheme is
the bonus of 1 2 millions which Is to be distributed
among the landlords who consent to part with
their estates, and which works out as an addition
of 12 per cent, to the agreed price. By this
inducement he hopes to achieve practically the
same results as by the compulsory expropriation
on which some of the Nationalist Party had
threatened to insist, but which no Conservative
Minister could have countenanced. In spite of

476 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1900-1903
prolonged debate on the almost innumerable
minor issues presented by a complicated Bill,
it was clear from the first that neither landlords
nor tenants meant to wreck the proposal, as they
knew that many years would pass before they
would obtain so favourable an offer. When the
"Zone" question had been settled by mutual
accommodation, and the proposal to retain one-
eighth of the purchase annuity in the hands of
the State had been abandoned, no serious opposi
tion was encountered from any Irish quarter.
The only important criticism proceeded from
English members who distrusted the security on
which the advance was to be made. In case the
tenants should make default, the only remedy of
the Government would be to withhold the grants
for local administration. Such a remedy would,
no doubt, prove Illusory, but Mr Wyndham con
vinced Parliament that the danger apprehended
was also imaginary. It is, however, no secret
that Mr Chamberlain was by no means ena
moured of the Measure, and, on his return from
South Africa, sought to modify considerably.
Gratitude for the Land Bill was not the only
reason why the Nationalist Members gave Minis
ters an almost unwavering support throughout
the Session. Being as a body Roman Catholics,
they were anxious for the success of the London
Education Bill, which aimed at extending to the
Metropolis the same principles as had been ap
plied by the Act of 1902 to the other parts of
England and Wales. They felt no interest in the
dispute over the conflicting claims of the County
Council and the Borough Councils to representa
tion on the Education Authority. All they cared
about was that schools in which a distinctive reli
gious teaching Is administered should be assured

THE BUDGET SURPRISE 477
of a subvention from the Rates. With this main
purpose in view, they stood by Ministers in several
critical Divisions, and ensured the success of a
Measure which, neither in its original form nor in
any of its subsequent modifications, had obtained
the general approval of the Unionist Party, while
the controversies in Parliament added fresh fuel
to a fierce agitation which had been got up out-
of-doors by Dr Chfford and other promoters of
" Passive Resistance."
The Port of London Bhl (which had to be
dropped) and the Motor Car Bill (which became
law) were, with Army Reform and the Vene
zuelan disturbance, the only topics that for the
time drew pubhc attention from the issues directly
or indirectly raised by Mr Chamberlain.
Though it was known that the Chancehor of
the Exchequer would be able to make a substan
tial reduction in the burdens of the country, the
proposals for the coming Budget had been kept
scrupulously secret. This reserve was the less
surprising, because when they were made public
it was clear that they had only been settled at the
last moment, and, so it was shrewdly conjectured,
not without keen discussion among Ministers.
Mr Ritchie, in a public speech, had spoken in a
sanguine spirit about his hope of giving relief to
the payers of Income Tax, but he had also ex
pressed his approval of the indirect taxes which
had been recently adopted. It was, therefore,
with universal astonishment that the country
heard not only that fourpence would be taken
from the fifteen-penny Income Tax, but that the
Corn Duty would also be abandoned. Various
were the explanations offered by Ministers. It
was said that the surplus (which considerably
exceeded lo millions) had turned out to be much

478 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1900-1903
larger than was anticipated at the Treasury, and
that Ministers had always intended to give up
the Corn Duty, because, as Mr Ritchie confessed,
it lent itself so easily to misrepresentation. That
is to say. It was denounced by Cobdenite
Radicals as the thin end of the Protectionist
wedge. There is no authority for 'stating, but
plenty of reasons have since appeared for guess
ing, the feelings with which Mr Chamberlain
would regard both the decision at which the
Cabinet had arrived, and the reasons put forward
by way of explanation.
At first there was no clue to the mystery.
Unionists who had defended the Corn Duty both
in Parliament and before their constituents were
undlsguisedly puzzled what line to follow. If the
Government had been right in 1902, it fohowed
that they must be wrong in 1903 ; and those
Conservative Members, who have always cher
ished hopes of the country reverting to Pro
tective legislation in favour of British Agriculture
were openly indignant. Mr Chaplin, as their
representative, gave notice of a hostile Amend
ment to the Second Reading of the Finance
Bill, and an animated Debate was expected.
Meantime, the whole situation was suddenly
changed. Before the discussion came on, Mr
Chamberlain had gone down to Birmingham and
shown his hand. His declaration in favour of a
Preferential system between the Mother Country
and the Colonies, and of Retaliation against
oppressive foreign Tariffs (see last Chapter),
while it committed no other Member of the
Cabinet to the opinions he expressed, did but
deepen the obscurity as to the motives for the
abandonment of the Corn Duty. Special men
tion was made • of Canada in regard to the

THE BIRMINGHAM DECLARATION 479
proposed policy of Preference, and if that were
to be adopted the first thing to do would be to
reimpose, in some form, the tax now thrown
aside. Clearly, the division in the Cabinet had
cut deep, and It was asserted that Mr Chamber
lain had taken this new departure without asking
the opinion of his colleagues as a body. This, It
was said, was his reply to the abandonment of
the Corn Duty.
However that may have been, he set himself
at once to define his position. On the Friday fol
lowing (22nd May), he unexpectedly Intervened in
a discussion (from which he might have absented
himself without comment) on the Aged Pensioners
Bill. Taunted with his failure to redeem his
pledges in regard to Old Age Pensions, he declared
that the scheme was by no means dead. He
still hoped to carry it if the money could be
provided, and provided it might be If a Duty
were levied on foreign Imports. This was
interpreted not merely as a re-affirmation of
his previous declaration, but also as indicat
ing roughly the scale on which he hoped that
his scheme of combined Preference and Retalia
tion would be carried out.
The later developments of Mr Chamberlain's
new policy, and the reception given to It on both
sides in Parliament, must be reserved for a later
Chapter. Here it Is sufficient to point out the
anomalous position In which it placed both Minis
terialists and the Opposition with regard to the
Finance Bill. On loth June, the Amendment
moved by Mr Chaplin to the Second Reading
was defeated by 424 votes against 28, the
minority consisting almost exclusively of con
vinced Protectionists. The Liberals, of course,
were unable to support what they treated as a

480 THE UNIONIST ADMINISTRATION, 1900-1903
Protectionist Resolution, while the great bulk
of the Unionist Party saw no reason for opposing
Ministers on a direct Vote of Confidence, especi
ahy as Mr Balfour made it clear that any differ
ence of opinion as to Mr Chamberlain's policy
was not to be considered as "striking at the
root of Party unity or loyalty." On this under
standing. Ministers secured an overwhelming
triumph In the Division Lobbies ; the remaining
stages of the Finance Bih were passed without
serious difficulty, and the Third Reading was
taken on 24th June. But, though Mr Balfour's
tactfulness had arranged a truce, nobody believed
or pretended that there was peace within the
Party. If harmony was to be restored, and a basis
laid for continued co-operation between the two
groups within the Cabinet, it was evidently
advisable that nothing should be said or done
which would exasperate personal feeling on either
side, or widen the existing differences of opinion.
This was recognised by the members of the
Government. Those who inclined to Free
Trade were ready that a fuh "Inquiry" should
be held into the results of a system which had
been on trial for more than half a century, while
the advocates of " Tariff Reform " disclaimed the
imputation that they were seeking to drive out of
Office the colleagues who looked unfavourably or
sceptlcahy on the new Programme. But if the
responsible Statesmen practised reserve and
mutual forbearance, if they hoped, by post
poning controversy, to avert conflict, the irre
sponsible agitators, the local organisers, and the
pamphleteers were impatient to begin — they
started without waiting for the flag. A Session
which had resulted in at least an average amount

CLOSE OF THE SESSION 481
of good legislative work was thus brought to a
somewhat indecorous close. While Ministers and
their supporters were acting together at West
minster, the Constituencies were being flooded
with contentious leaflets, expounding and applaud
ing, criticising and denouncing, what both sides
agreed to call " Mr Chamberlain's policy."

2 H

CHAPTER XIV
FROM THE RAID TO THE WAR
Before Mr Chamberlain took office at Mid
summer 1895, t'is predecessor. Lord Ripon, had
promised to transfer the Bechuanaland Pro
tectorate to the control of the Chartered
Company. It was to protest against the com
pletion of this arrangement that the three Chiefs
Khama, Sebele, and Bathoen, had been advised
to make their fateful journey to England. They
arrived early in the Autumn. Mr Rhodes and
his associates had long desired, for commercial
as well as strategical reasons, to absorb Bechu
analand ; but the Chiefs feared and disliked the
Company, and, under the leadership of Khama
— an able man of pronounced religious views
and influential here in Missionary circles —
induced the new Secretary of State to re-open
their case. To hand Bechuanaland over to the
Company might, it was represented, lead to a
native rising, and certainly it would affront a
powerful section of opinion in England, where
there was a growing suspicion that the interests
of the native races in South Africa were being
needlessly sacrificed to gratify Mr Rhodes's
ambitions. On the other hand, it had already
(i.e., in August) been urged by representatives
of the Company (Dr Rutherfoord Harris and

THE JUMPING-OFF GROUND 483
Earl Grey) that it should forthwith be given
facilities for carrying the Cape railway north
ward to Buluwayo over the Eastern part of
the Bechuanaland Protectorate. The Company
tried to "rush" this point, but Mr Chamber-
Iain saw no reason for hurry.
Eventually, after a close examination of the
facts and arguments on both sides, Mr Chamber
lain decided that each of the three Chiefs
should cede the Company a strip of country,
six miles wide, marching with the Transvaal
border, and with this transfer of territory went
the control of the Police. This, Mr Chamber-
Iain afterwards explained, was to his mind a
natural consequence, which aroused no suspicion.
The Company thus gained the railway facihties
which its agents professed to be working for,
and the strategical point on which Mr Rhodes
had set his heart, although the Protectorate
was withheld. Khama and his two colleagues
were thus made secure in their rights, but
certain minor Chiefs, Ikaneng of the Bamalili,
and Montsioa of the Bora-Tsile Baralong tribes,
had already made direct concessions to the
Company. Proclamations were issued carrying
out these arrangements ; and in November the
Police of the Chartered Company were moved
into the strip — much to the alarm of Khama,
who still feared that the Company would
seize his territory. The High Commissioner
(Sir Hercules Robinson, afterwards Lord
Rosmead) withdrew the Bechuanaland Border
Police to Mafeking, and arranged for their
transference to the Company. Dr Jameson,
Administrator of the Territories of the Com
pany, came down South, denuding Matabeleland
and Mashonaland of troops, and organised the

484 FROM THE RAID TO THE WAR
forces anew for his intended Raid on the
Transvaal. A glance at a map will show that, for the
purposes of an invasion of the South African
Republic, with Pretoria or Johannesburg for its
objective, the best "jumping-off place" was
the identical strip comprised in the territory
ceded by Montsioa. This was so clear after the
event that Mr Chamberlain's enemies, at home
and abroad, declared that he must have been
aware beforehand of the purpose to which his con
cessions would be apphed — that he was privy to
the Raid, an accessory before the fact.
That such a charge should be brought, and
believed in, by Mr Kriiger (see his Memoirs
published by Fisher Unwin), is not surprising.
But the same imputation was also made by Enghsh
friends of the Boer Cause. Nor can it be denied
that many patriots of the more random sort,
both here and in South Africa, still consider
the accusation true — and regard it as a compli
ment ! Before dealing with the probabhitles of
the case, it may be as well to see what light Is
thrown upon it by the testimony of the persons
chiefly concerned. These were Mr Chamberlain,
Lord Selborne, then Under Secretary of State for
the Colonies, the late Mr Fairfield, then Assistant
Colonial Secretary, and Dr Harris. According
to the evidence of the latter gentleman, given
before the Select Committee appointed to Inquire
into the origin and circumstances of the Raid,
he informed Mr Chamberlain that the Chartered
Company, if the strip were ceded, would not stand
by and see the people of Johannesburg tightly
pressed if a rising were to take place there.
Mr Chamberlain, however, had no recollection
whatever of such words being used to him, but he

DOWNING STREET CONVERSATIONS 485
remembered that Dr Harris had wished to give
him some confidential information. " I stopped
him at once," said Mr Chamberlain, in his evidence
before the Committee. " I said, ' I do not want to
hear any confidential information. I am here in
an official capacity. I can only hear information
of which I can make official use,' and I added, ' I
have Sir Hercules Robinson In South Africa.'"
Lord Selborne, who was present at this interview,
did not hear Dr Harris say what he told the Com
mittee he had said to Mr Chamberlain, but clearly
recollected that Dr Harris endeavoured to impart
some information of a personal character, and that
he was stopped in the manner which Mr Chamber
lain had described to the Committee.
Dr Harris further claimed, both in cablegrams
to Mr Rhodes and in his evidence before the Com
mittee, that he had made Mr Fairfield acquainted
with what was being contemplated. " I mentioned
to Mr Fairfield that one of the reasons why
Mr Rhodes was anxious to get the Protec
torate was that he considered it imperative to
have a British force on the borders, so that in
the event of disturbances taking place at Johannes
burg he could be in a position, if he deemed It
right, to use that force in connection with It."
But Mr Fairfield's letter to Mr Chamberlain
describing this interview contained nothing to
that effect. If Dr Harris's mernory was correct,
the natural inference as to Mr Fairfield is that,
either he had not caught the words (he was
somewhat deaf), or that they left no Impression
on his mind. There was nothing startling In
them. The likelihood of trouble arising in
Johannesburg had long been a matter of common
conversation in London, and, if an outbreak
should occur, it would obviously be proper

486 FROM THE RAID TO THE WAR
that a British force of police should be available
for protecting the lives and property of British
subjects, until the Pretoria Government could
step in and restore order. This, of course, was
recognised as a not improbable contingency.
But nobody who was aware of the scale on which
the Boers had already begun to prepare for self-
defence — and the Colonial Office authorities knew
quite weh what was being done in Pretoria —
would have dreamt that any reasonable person
would attempt to occupy and hold Pretoria with
a few hundred Irregular Horse. A force that
might be useful in dealing with a town riot —
which was all that a "Johannesburg Revolution"
was ever likely to be — would not naturally
present itself, to the official mind in Downing
Street, as an invading expedition, armed and
equipped for Instant action !
The question was put to the Committee —
Had the Colonial Office officials at home re
ceived information that could be assumed to
convey a warning of the contemplated incur
sion ? The answer of the Committee was de
cisively in the negarive. " Nothing in the course
of the Inquiry Indicating that the Colonial Office
had received, either directly or indirectly, any
information on the subject of the Jameson plan
was forthcoming until Dr R. Harris, while giving
in his evidence a description of an interview he
had hadat the Colonial Office on the subject of
the transfer of the Bechuanaland Protectorate to
the Company, said : 'It was present to my mind
that, in the event of a rising at Johannesburg,
Mr Rhodes wished to be in a position to render
assistance with the police forces of the British
South Africa Company, should certain eventu
alities arise. I made no explicit statement to that

DR HARRIS'S EVIDENCE 487
effect, but I referred to the unrest at Johannes
burg, and added a guarded allusion to the desir
ability of there being a police force near the border.
Mr Chamberlain at once demurred to the turn
the conversation had taken. I never referred to
the subject again at that or at either of two sub
sequent interviews I had with Mr Chamberlain.'
" Immediately after hearing this evidence of
Dr Harris, the Secretary of State for the Colonies
tendered himself as a witness, and stated what
took place at the interview in question between
himself, certain officials of the Colonial Office,
and representatives of the British South Africa
Company, with reference to the proposed transfer
of the Protectorate, and concluded by stating :
' I desire to say In the most explicit manner that
I had not then, and that I never had, any know
ledge, or, until, I think it was, the day before the
actual raid took place, the slightest suspicion of
anything in the nature of a hostile or armed
invasion of the Transvaal. The gentlemen who
were my colleagues in office. Lord Selborne, the
Under Secretary of State, and Sir Robert Meade,
wih be ready to speak for themselves. Mr Fair
field is dead, and the public service has lost a
most honourable, loyal, devoted, and able public
servant ; but I say, from communications which I
have had with Mr Fairfield, and with the other
gentlemen named, I am convinced that they had
no more suspicion than I had myself
" Dr Harris was subsequently further exam
ined, and In the course of his evidence allusions
were made to certain telegrams which had passed
between himself, when in England, and Mr
Rhodes in South . Africa, and vice versd, from
July to November 1895. Dr Harris declined
either to put in these telegrams or to authorise

488 FROM THE RAID TO THE WAR
the Eastern Telegraph Company to produce them.
The Eastern Telegraph Company, over whose
cables the telegrams in question had passed, were
thereupon ordered by the Committee to produce
copies of any telegrams In their possession pass
ing between Mr Rhodes and Dr Harris, between
the 27th July and the 30th November 1895.
" On being served with this order, the Manager
of the Telegraph Company attended the Com
mittee, and declined to produce any telegrams
which were in their possession, upon the ground
that, by the terms of the International Conven
tion, by which the Company were bound, the
Company were prohibited from producing the
copies of any telegrams, except with the consent
of the senders or receivers. The Committee,
after hearing counsel on behalf of the Telegraph
Company in support of this objection, decided
that the order of the Committee must be obeyed,
and the telegrams produced.
" At a subsequent meeting of the Committee,
the telegrams which had passed between the
parties from the ist November onwards were
produced, the telegrams prior to that date having
been destroyed in the ordinary course of business.
" It was given in evidence by Mr Hawksley
that in February 1896 he went, after obtaining
the authority of Mr Rhodes, to see Mr Fairfield
at the Colonial Office, and Informed him that
communications by telegraph had passed between
London and Cape Town, which had been used to
support Mr Rhodes' action in South Africa.
" On receipt of this communication, Mr Fair
field, at the request of Mr Chamberlain, asked
Mr Hawksley for copies, but the request was not
complied with at the time, and the matter dropped.
" But in June 1896, in compliance with a further

THE PRIVATE TELEGRAMS 489
request from Mr Chamberlain, a copy was sent
to the Colonial Office ' for confidential perusal
and return,' and was accordingly returned to Mr
Hawksley, who admitted that he retained it in
his possession.
" The Committee called upon him to produce
the telegrams, but he declined to do so, and relied
upon Mr Rhodes's objection to their production
when under examination. The Committee in
formed Mr Hawksley that their order must be
obeyed ; he persisted, however, in declining to
produce the copy of the telegrams, and said, ' Mr
Rhodes adheres to the decision he maintained
when he was before the Committee in the early
part of this year ; and, with very great respect, I
need not say I still feel that my duty compels me
to act upon the instructions I have received from
Mr Rhodes.'
" Thereupon Mr Chamberlain made a further
statement with reference to the production of the
telegrams and their general purport.
"With regard to the number of the telegrams
produced to the Colonial Office by Mr Hawksley,
Mr Chamberlain said : ' I know for instance that
most, I do not think all, but most of the tele
grams which have been already published were
included in them, and there were, I know, some
telegrams which were sent before the time with
which these telegrams deal ; but I do not think
there could have been very many of them, because
I was away abroad the greater part of the time,
and no interviews of any sort were taking place,
except between the Chartered Company and the
Chiefs (they were negotiating in my absence), and
it was not until I returned that the negotiations
began again.'
"It would seem, therefore, that most of the

490 FROM THE RAID TO THE WAR
telegrams included in the copy sent to the
Colonial Office have been obtained by your Com
mittee from the Eastern Telegraph Company.
With regard to the contents of the telegrams sent
to the Colonial Office, but not produced by the
Eastern Telegraph Company, Mr Chamberlain
said : ' Generally . . . those that were not pro
duced are very similar in character to those that
have been produced.'
" In this further statement Mr Chamberlain
intimated that there was nothing in the evidence
which he had heard since he first appeared as a
witness, nor in the telegrams produced to the
Committee, nor in those which he had seen at the
Colonial Office, which caused him in any way to
modify or qualify the statement he made that he
had no foreknowledge of the Raid nor of the pre
parations for the Raid, and had given no approval
to it. "The Earl of Selborne (Under Secretary of
State for the Colonies) also attended the Com
mittee and gave similar evidence. He said, ' The
fact remains that from no quarter did the Colonial
Office receive any warning ' ; and with reference
to Mr Fairfield he added, ' I have spoken of my
constant communications with him (Mr Fairfield)
in the autumn of 1895 prior to the Raid; after
the Raid, and unth he was seized with his fatal
illness in the autumn of 1896, we repeatedly dis
cussed together the events of the previous year,
sometimes alone, but very often with Sir Robert
Meade, and I am absolutely convinced of the fact
that he had no suspicion of the plan of Dr
Jameson.' "Your Committee fully accept the statements
of the Secretary of State for the Colonies and of
the Under Secretary, and entirely exonerate the

SIR GRAHAM BOWER 491
officials of the Colonial Office of having been, in
any sense, cognisant of the plans which led up to
the incursion of Dr Jameson's force into the
South African Republic.
" It is clear from the evidence of Mr Hawksley,
and his letter of 5 th February 1896, that the tele
grams in question conveyed the impression that
the action of Mr Rhodes was known and approved
at the Colonial Office.
"The fact that Mr Rhodes (after having
authorised that they should be shown to Mr Cham
berlain) has refused to allow them to be produced
before the Committee, leads to the conclusion that
he is aware that any statements purporting to
imphcate the Colonial Office contained in them
were unfounded, and the use made of them in
support of his action in South Africa was not
justified." Unfortunately, though the Committee were
able to clear the reputation of Downing Street,
they had to bring in a different verdict with re
gard to two high officials in the service of the
Department in South Africa — Mr Newton, Resi
dent Commissioner In the Bechuanaland Protec
torate, and Sir Graham Bower, Imperial Secre
tary to the High Commissioner at Cape Town.
Mr Newton visited Cape Town at a time when
he knew of Mr Rhodes's intention and of the
real object of Dr Jameson in massing the forces
of the Company on the Transvaal border. Yet
he appears to have made no disclosure to Sir
Hercules Robinson. Though he felt uneasiness
at the possible consequences of his reticence, and
discussed the question with Mr Rhodes and Sir
Graham Bower, he allowed himself to be per
suaded to keep silence, partly because it was
"very doubtful whether anything was going to

492 FROM THE RAID TO THE WAR
happen," and partly because Mr Rhodes "led him
to believe that the Imperial authorities would not
be averse to any movement in Johannesburg."
Sir Graham Bower excused himself for making
no disclosure to his Chief on the ground that Mr
Rhodes had made the communication to him in
confidence, and that he felt bound in honour not
to inform the High Commissioner, especially as
he "understood that before those troops [Dr
Jameson's] were used, or any action was taken,
Mr Rhodes would himself make some communi
cation to the High Commissioner."
The value of Sir Graham's plea is for the
casuists to determine. Most plain men wih admit
that his position was very awkward. Whether
he spoke out or held his tongue he would equahy
be violating a clear moral law, and he had to
choose which he should disregard. Obviously it
was no good trying to steer a middle course
by laying pressure on Mr Rhodes to abandon
the project. As for the High Commissioner
himself, the state of his health prevented him
from giving evidence before the Select ComT
mittee, but he sent an absolute denial of any
knowledge of the conspiracy. It is in the
physical enfeeblement under which he appears
to have been labouring at this critical time that
we must find the best explanation of his not
seeing or not understanding the very things for
which It was his duty to be on the look-out. It
is true that he may have trusted the Imperial
Secretary to be his "eyes and ears." The fact
is, that his appointment as High Commissioner
in March 1895 had been a mistake. He was
already past his days of usefulness. But Mr
Rhodes had strongly urged his claims, and Lord
Ripon was properly anxious to be represented at

SIR HERCULES ROBINSON 493
the Cape by an administrator in whom the Dutch
felt confidence. It Is possible, therefore, that
Sir Hercules Robinson's sense of personal
obligation to Mr Rhodes, combined with faihng
energy, rendered him too unsuspicious an
observer of that Statesman's occasionally cryptic
methods. Though Sir Hercules Robinson was absolutely
exonerated by the Committee, and though, for a
brief period after the Raid, he roused himself to
do strenuous and valuable work for the Crown,
he cannot be relieved from the censure that
attaches to any man, placed in supreme
authority, who ahows himself to be misled by
his agents. Mr Chamberlain, we have seen,
had declined to receive the private communi
cations of Dr Harris. " I have Sir Hercules
Robinson at the Cape," he said — believing, not
without reason, that he might rely on his High
Commissioner to keep him posted In the latest
developments of South African politics. But it
says much for the personal influence and reputa
tion of Sir Hercules that even after the Raid,
when every English person was more or less
suspect to the Boers, he was still able to keep
President Kriiger's ear, and, in some degree,
to guide his policy. In the false position into
which the Imperial Government had been
brought by Dr Jameson It Is probable that no
other Englishman in South Africa could have
rendered such prompt and acceptable service as
Sir Hercules Robinson. If he had failed to avert
the trouble, he did, at least, succeed In reducing it
to manageable proportions. The Boers remem
bered gratefuhy that in his previous term he had
helped to negotiate the London Convention of
1884, and his unhesitating action, as soon as he

494 FROM THE RAID TO THE WAR
was formahy notified that Dr Jameson had
crossed the frontier, was taken as proof
that the chief representative of the Imperial
Government was above the suspicion of com
plicity. The general conclusions of the Select Com
mittee were summed up in seven paragraphs : —
"I. Great discontent had, for some time pre
vious to the incursion, existed in Johannesburg,
arising from the grievances of the Uitlanders.
"II. Mr Rhodes occupied a great position in
South Africa ; he was Prime Minister of the Cape
Colony, and, beyond ah other persons, should
have been careful to abstain from such a course
of action as that which he adopted. As Manag
ing Director of the British South Africa Company,
as Director of the De Beers Consolidated Mines
and the Gold Fields of South Africa, Mr Rhodes
controlled a great combination of interests ; he
used his position and those interests to promote
and assist his policy.
" Whatever justification there might have been
for action on the part of the people of Johannes
burg, there was none for the conduct of a person
in Mr Rhodes's position, in subsidising, organising,
and stimulating an armed insurrection against the
Government of the South African Republic, and
employing the forces and resources of the
Chartered Company to support such a revolution.
He seriously embarrassed both the Imperial and
Colonial Governments, and his proceedings re
sulted in the invasion of the territory of a State
which was in friendly relations with Her Majesty,
in breach of the obligation to respect the right to
Self-Government of the South African Republic
under the Conventions between Her Majesty and
that State. Although Dr Jameson 'went in'

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE 495
without Mr Rhodes's authority, it was always part
of the plan that these forces should be used in the
Transvaal in support of an insurrection. Nothing
could justify such a use of such a force, and Mr
Rhodes's heavy responsibility remains, although
Dr Jameson at the last moment invaded the
Transvaal without his direct sanction.
"III. Such a policy once embarked upon in
evitably involved Mr Rhodes in grave breaches
of duty to those to whom he owed allegiance.
He deceived the High Commissioner repre
senting the Imperial Government, he concealed
his views from his coheagues in the Colonial
Ministry, and from the Board of the British South
Africa Company, and led his subordinates to
believe that his plans were approved by his
superiors. "IV. Your Committee have heard the evidence
of all the Directors of the British South Africa
Company, with the exception of Lord Grey. Of
those who were examined, Mr Beit and Mr
Maguire alone had cognisance of Mr Rhodes's
plans. Mr Beit played a prominent part in the
negotiations with the Reform Union ; he con
tributed large sums of money to the revolutionary
movement, and must share fuh responsibihty for
the consequences.
" V. There is not the slightest evidence that the
late High Commissioner in South Africa, Lord
Rosmead, was made acquainted with Mr Rhodes's
plans. The evidence, on the contrary, shows that
there was a conspiracy to keep all information on
the subject from him. The Committee must,
however, express a strong opinion upon the con
duct of Sir Graham Bower, who was guilty of a
grave dereliction of duty in not communicating to
the High Commissioner the information which

496 FROM THE RAID TO THE WAR
had come to his knowledge. Mr Newton failed
in his duty in a like manner.
" VI. Neither the Secretary of State for the
Colonies nor any of the officials of the Colonial
Office received any information which made them,
or should have made them or any of them, aware
of the plot during its development.
"VII. Finally, your Committee desire put on to
record an absolute and unqualified condemnation
of the Raid and of the plans which made it pos
sible. The result caused for the time being grave
injury to British influence in South Africa.
Public confidence was shaken, race feeling em
bittered, and serious difficulties were created with
neighbouring States."
The Committee consisted of Sir Richard
Webster (now Lord Alverstone), Mr Bigham (Mr
Justice Bigham), Mr Blake, Mr Sydney Buxton,
Sir Henry Campbeh- Bannerman, Mr Chamber
lain, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, Mr Cripps,
Sir Wilham Hart Dyke, Mr John Ehis, Sir
Williani Harcourt, Mr Jackson, Mr Labouchere,
Mr Wharton, and Mr George Wyndham. Mr
Jackson (now Lord Aherton) was chairman.
Mr Labouchere presented a separate Report,
for which he alone voted. After an exhaustive
analysis of the evidence, which gives a lucid,
though biassed, account of the conspiracy,
the raid, and the Johannesburg rising, he
formulated twenty-six elaborate conclusions.
Shortly put, his view was that, though the
grievances of the Uitlanders had a certain basis,
they were greatly exaggerated ; that Mr Rhodes
deceived the Johannesburghers by leading them
to believe that the High Commissioner was
cognisant of his plans ; that the object of the
conspiracy was a sordid one — that the chief

MR LABOUCHERE'S REPORT 497
conspirators, from Mr Rhodes downwards, were
strongly influenced by financial considerations of
a personal character ; and that Mr Rhodes and
Mr Beit deserved severe punishment. The last
three paragraphs of Mr Labouchere's conclusions
should, perhaps, be quoted, because, though
unsupported by any other member of the
Committee, they show that even Mr Labouchere
did not, on the evidence before the Committee,
suggest that Mr Chamberlain had any fore
knowledge of the conspiracy : —
" Sir John Willoughby, and other officers of
Her Majesty's Army serving under him as Com
mander of the forces of the Chartered Company,
took part in the Raid. For this they have
suffered imprisonment, and have been deprived
of their commissions. It would appear by the
evidence submitted to your Committee, that
these gentlemen had grounds for their belief In
the statement made to them that the Raid was
undertaken with the knowledge and approval of
the Imperial authorities. Under these circum
stances, your Committee is of opinion that their
punishment has exceeded their fault, and that it
would be only consistent with justice that their
commissions, which have been taken from them,
should be restored to them.
"This win be ah the more proper, if Mr
Rhodes and Mr Beit, who were the originators,
the financiers, and the most active promoters of
the Jameson plan, are to escape ah criminal
proceedings. Your Committee, however, is of,
opinion that they merit severe punishment. Mr
Rhodes is a Privy Councillor, he was Cape
Premier, and he was the autocrat of Rhodesia,
when the conspiracy that your Committee has
investigated was in preparation, and when it was
2 I

498 FROM THE RAID TO THE WAR
sought to carry it out. He deceived his Sove
reign, the Secretary of State for the Colonies,
the High Commissioner of South Africa, the
Governor of the Cape Colony, his colleagues in
the Cape Cabinet, the board of the Chartered
Company, and the very persons whom he used as
his instruments in his nefarious designs ; and he
abused the high positions which he held by
engaging in a conspiracy, in the success of which
his own pecuniary interests were largely involved ;
thus inflicting a slur on the hitherto unblemished
honour of our public men at home and In our
Colonies. Mr Beit is a German subject. In
conjunction with Mr Rhodes, he fomented a
revolution in a State in amity with us, and
promoted an invasion of that State from British
territory. These two men, the one a British
Statesman, the other a financier of German
nationality, disgraced the good name of Eng
land, which it ought to be the object of all
Englishmen to maintain pure and undefiled.
One of the witnesses compared the Jameson
plan to the expedition of William of Orange,
when he landed in England. Another witness
compared It to the recent uprising of the Cretans
against the sovereignty of the Sultan of Turkey
in their island. With these It had no analogy.
It was one of the most disgraceful episodes in
our country's history, and your Committee em
phatically declares that it deserves the severest
reprobation. "Whilst your Committee is of opinion that
the evidence placed before it in no way shows
that the Colonial Office, when ceding to the
Chartered Company a strip of the Bechuanaland
Protectorate abutting on the Transvaal frontier,
and handing over to the Company the police of

CHARGES AGAINST MR RHODES 499
the Bechuanaland Crown Colony, on that Colony
being made over to the Cape Colony, was aware
that Mr Rhodes contemplated under any con
tingencies using this strip and these police to
invade the Transvaal, in order to afford aid to
the Johannesburghers in any revolutionary out
break, it regrets that the alleged complicity of the
Colonial Office has not been probed to the
bottom, because the slightest appearance of any
indisposition to do this by your Committee may
lead some persons erroneously to suppose that
there may be some truth in the statements of
witnesses connected with the Jameson plan, that
the secret aims of Mr Rhodes were more or less
clearly revealed to Mr Chamberlain and to Mr
Fairfield, and that Mr Pope, Q.C., when addressing
your Committee as counsel for Mr Rhodes, was
justified in suggesting in the following passage of
his speech, that, for State reasons, either Mr
Rhodes had rightly kept back information In
regard to this alleged complicity, or that your
Committee had rightly not wished to obtain it :
' He dared say that the instincts of pohtical
sport might lead one to desire that somewhat
mysterious scent should be followed up, and
something unearthed which had not reached the
Committee. He did not know whether such
things existed or not ; but supposing the policy
were pursued, and they were to hunt where they
could, what would happen ? Suppose it turned
out that the suspicions were true? Would it
tend to the interests of Her Majesty's services
or to the reputation of the country ? There
might be something that was even beyond Party
spirit. There might be a desire to see the
services of his country maintained with honour
and integrity, and there might be a desire that

500 FROM THE RAID TO THE WAR
the reputation of this country should not suffer
by idle and unnecessary calumnies being circu
lated against any one.' "
The Report of the Committee was published
on 13th July 1897. On the 15th, Mr Balfour was
asked to set apart a day for discussing it. He
replied that he saw no useful purpose to be served
by Debate ; and as the official Opposition offered
no protest it was inferred that an understanding
on the subject had been reached between the
two Front Benches. The Radicals, however,
were not to be thwarted in their purpose. On
the 1 6th, Sir Whfrid Lawson asked whether the
Government meant to take any action on the
Report. Mr Balfour replied that the Govern
ment were considering the future administration
of Rhodesia. Then Mr Labouchere raised a
question of Privilege in connection with Mr
Hawksley's refusal to produce the telegrams
to the Committee, and wished to move that
he be brought up to the Bar of the House.
The Speaker, however, ruled that it was not
a case of Privilege, Inasmuch as the Committee
had not made a Special Report with a view
to action being taken by the House. When
the Colonial Office vote came up for dis
cussion on the 19th, a Unionist member, who
has since joined the Administration (Mr Arnold-
Forster), took occasion to condemn the conduct
of Mr Rhodes and the Chartered Company.
Mr Balfour, in his reply, indignantly denied
that there was "a conspiracy of silence" for the
purpose of burking discussion on the Report,
and sharply criticised Mr Arnold-Forster for a
speech which he regarded as full of insinuations,
innuendoes, and half-developed accusations. A
day would, he said, certainly have been given

DEBATE IN PARLIAMENT 501
had a demand been made by the front Opposi
tion bench or by any considerable section of the
House. Thereupon, Sir William Harcourt — who
seems to have thought it imprudent to allow the
Radical wing of his party to pursue any longer
an independent course that might lead to an
open rupture in his Party — suggested that Mr
Balfour should agree to a discussion. On 26th
July, accordingly, Mr Philip Stanhope brought
forward the following Resolution : —
"That the House regrets the inconclusive
action and Report of the Select Committee in
British South Africa, and especially the failure of
that Committee to recommend specific steps with
regard to Mr Rhodes, and to immediately report
to the House the refusal of Mr Hawksley to obey
the order of the Committee to produce copies of
certain telegrams which he admitted were in his
possession, and which he had already submitted
to the Secretary of State for the Colonies at his
request in July 1896; that Mr Hawksley be
ordered to attend at the Bar of the House upon
a day appointed for the purpose, and then and
there produce the aforesaid telegrams."
This invitation to Sir Wihiam Harcourt and
Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman to condemn a
Report of which they were part authors and co
signatories produced a piquant situation. Mr
Stanhope's speech was directed against what he
regarded as a compact of silence in influential
quarters. Mr Labouchere delivered a strong attack
upon Mr Rhodes and the Colonial Office, though,
as appears in his Draft Report, he had to acquit
Mr Chamberlain of foreknowledge of the Raid.
Sir M. Hicks-Beach made a vigorous reply to
Mr Labouchere, offered as good a defence of
Mr Rhodes as the circumstances permitted.

502 FROM THE RAID TO THE WAR
and resented the blowing of gigantic bubbles
on the subject of the alleged complicity of
the Colonial Office. Sir Wihiam Harcourt
followed the lead of the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, defending the findings of the Com
mittee on all points, upholding Mr Chamber
lain's denial of foreknowledge, and, generally,
repudiating the terms of the Resolution. The
Radicals — who regarded this as evidence that
the Front Bench Liberals intended to assist
the Ministry in screening Mr Rhodes and the
Colonial Office from further investigation — then
offered to eliminate from the Resolution the pro
posed censure on the Committee, and confine it to
ordering the attendance of Mr Hawksley at
the Bar.
Mr Balfour, however, insisted that the House
should decide upon the Resolution as it stood.
Sir H. Campbeh- Bannerman minimised the im
portance of the missing telegrams, and then
Mr Chamberlain made the speech of the night. .
He was in excehent debating form, rejoicing in
the opportunity to deal with the rumours and
insinuations with which he had been assailed
during the preceding eighteen months. His
answer to them was, he contended, to be found
in his action as soon as the Raid became
known. He dismissed as ridiculous the attempt
to delude the public into the belief that there
was some damnatory secret in the missing
telegrams. They had been sent to him confi
dentially ; he had read them, and he had returned
them, taking good care to say that, so far as
he was concerned, he had no objection whatever
to their being published. Coming to the question
of Mr Rhodes's conduct, he asserted that, while
the fault of Mr Rhodes was about as great a fault

MR RHODES'S CONDUCT 503
as a politician or Statesman could commit, there
existed nothing which affected his personal char
acter as a man of honour. This bold and
unexpected declaration raised a strong protest
among the Radicals, in which some of the
Unionists joined, but the House was in no
mood for further discussion. On a Division
being taken the Resolution was defeated by 304
votes to 77.
The certificate of character, as it was called,
which Mr Chamberlain thus gave to Mr Rhodes
was not, perhaps, very happily worded, since it
proved liable to misconstruction. Yet in view of
the circumstances under which the expression
was used it was no more than was due to Mr
Rhodes. It must be remembered that at this
time one of the most frequent imputations against
him was that his political plot against the South
African Republic had been formed for the purpose
of putting money into the pockets of himself and
his commercial associates. It was alleged, quite
plainly — as, e.g., by Mr Labouchere in his Draft
Report — that Mr Rhodes had abused his
position as Premier of Cape Colony to promote
the interest of the Chartered Company and
other speculative undertakings in which he
was concerned — that his crime was, in fact,
a selfish and sordid one. This was the charge
that Mr Chamberlain repudiated, though he
condemned both the object which Mr Rhodes
had aimed at and the curiously tortuous methods
by which he sought to attain It.
How far it is logically possible, or morally
defensible, to exclude ordinary ethical rules
from the estimate of a man's public conduct
is a point on which the most philosophical
historians are by no means in accord. The

504 FROM THE RAID TO THE WAR
prevailing tendency is towards judgment by
results. The men who succeed — Sulla, Caesar,
Charlemagne, Bismarck — are labelled white,
and their faults are explained away. Those
who fail — the first and the third Napoleon — are
marked black. Those whose triumph is incom
plete or posthumous — Parnell and Rhodes — go
down piebald to posterity, and their admirers
must be content if strict justice is done to their
careers. But it was justice, and no more, that
Mr Rhodes should be vindicated in public from
a sin of which he had not been guilty, and it
was appropriate that the acquittal should be pro
nounced by the Statesman who condemned his
other faults. That Mr Chamberlain used such
strong language in exculpation was due, in part,
to the virulence of the accusations which he
repehed, and partly to the vivid colours in which
he always presents the impression or feeling of
the moment.
It was used against him, of course — perhaps,
he knew it would be. But it is not in his nature
to avoid attack, so confident is he in his power of
giving a good account of his adversaries. It is
not so easy to say why he and his colleagues on
the Committee exposed themselves to needless
and very damaging misrepresentations in the
matter of the "missing telegrams." When in the
end they were published in a Belgian newspaper
they contained nothing that was In the least
degree compromising either to the Colonial Secre
tary or his assistants in Downing Street. What
they proved was, not that the Imperial Govern
ment had been privy to the conspiracy, but
that Mr Rhodes and some of those who were
working with him wished it to be given out —
confidentiahy — to their subordinate agents that

"MISSING TELEGRAMS" 505
this was the case. Connu ! As much as this was
put in record in the Committee's Report. But
if the text of the documents be examined {see
Appendix V.) it will be equally clear that the
agents of the plot in England represented — and
perhaps believed — that no difficulty would be
made by the Colonial Office, and that they
had no kind of warrant for the suggestion,
whether they made it recklessly or in good
faith. To use a man's statement against
himself is an accepted practice in English law,
but to treat as evidence the veiled and uncor
roborated suggestions of somebody else, who has
an obvious motive for making the Imputation,
is absolutely unheard-of There are, it is true
— or were — other " missing telegrams " besides
those which were eventually published through
Dr Leyds. What has become of them? If
there had been anything at all damning in
them they would have been produced long ago
— unless " the mice have eaten them ! "
Why was it, then, that the Committee, almost
unanimously, gave up their demand for the pro
duction of documents to which so much import
ance was attached ? The " missing telegrams "
had nothing to do with it. The truth was
that, rightly or wrongly, the Committee, at a
certain point, became convinced that the inquiry
was going too far. They must not drive Mr
Rhodes and his associates into a corner from
which they could only escape by a full statement
of their defence. The Committee, however, were
not influenced by any fear of the Imperial Govern
ment or the Colonial Office being Implicated in
possible revelations. Sir Wihiam Harcourt and
Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman are not un
generous politicians, but they could not, humanly.

506 FROM THE RAID TO THE WAR
be expected to throw away the chance of dis
crediting a Government and disgracing a Minister
whose principles they honestly detested. Stih
less would they have displayed this singular
magnanimity — which, on public grounds, would
have been highly culpable — when they were
well aware that by limiting the Inquiry they
were offending many of their most active
supporters, and damaging their personal influ
ence In the Party. Their motives were very
different. Though Sir Wihiam Harcourt and Sir
Henry Campbell-Bannerman are not men who
would throw away a legitimate advantage, the
severest critic of some of their public speeches
will cheerfully admit that, in their hearts, and
according to their views of public policy, they
are as patriotic as any Unionist or Imperialist
in Parliament. They agreed to cut the investiga
tion short, because they accepted Mr Rhodes's
statement that he had been " greatly influenced "
by his belief that the policy of the Transvaal
Government was to " introduce the influence
of another Foreign Power into the already
complicated system of South Africa, and thereby
render more difficult in the future the closer
union of the different States." That was, in
fact, the key of the whole position — the long
intrigue between Boers and Germans. It is no
secret now that Mr Kriiger and his Hollander
advisers hoped to obtain the active assistance of
Germany in driving the British out of South
Africa, and that Germany had held out expecta
tions which were only prevented from being carried
into effect by the tact and prudence of the British
Government and the wholesome respect inspired
by the British Navy. All this Mr Rhodes knew,

"ANOTHER FOREIGN POWER" 507
and he was quite capable, if pressed too hard, of
blurting out the naked truth.
Nothing could have been more inconvenient
for us than to have these foreign Intrigues ex
posed before an authoritative English tribunal.
To fasten a public charge of treachery on a
"friendly" Government is to stir up angry
feeling between the two peoples even if it does
not lead to a declaration of War. In the
middle of the year 1897 our hands were still
full of unsettled questions. Lord Salisbury's
patient Diplomacy had not yet succeeded In
clearing the ground and isolating the Transvaal
difficulty, so that when the time should come we
might deal finally and effectively with the trouble
that was slowly but quite surely coming to a head
In South Africa.
The charge of complicity in the Raid —
though revived against Mr Chamberlain after the
publication of the " missing telegrams" in January
1900 — has been dropt by those who were most
strenuous in bringing it forward. In its place,
we are told that Mr Chamberlain, Mr Rhodes,
and Dr Jameson calculated " that a very little
extraneous support would enable the Liberal
Party in the Transvaal, aided by the Uitlanders,
to overturn the Government of Paul Kriiger,
when the intervention of the High Commissioner
would be invoked, and a plebiscite would be taken
which would transfer the control of the Transvaal
Republic from the hands of the Tories of the
Kriiger school to those of the Liberals, who
were quite prepared to march with the times and
readjust the institutions of the Transvaal to the
necessities of the Modern State. Everything
miscarried owing to the unfortunate invasion of
Dr Jameson, but if that had never taken place

508 FROM THE RAID TO THE WAR
there was a good prospect of a beneficient
Revolution being carried through in the Trans
vaal, which would have had the enormous
advantage of placing the control of the South
African Republic in the hands of the majority of
the adult male population of the country." The
plan failed, we are told, because Mr Chamberlain
forced the Union Jack upon the promoters of the
intended Revolution, and because Dr Jameson's
advance was precipitated by "messages from
people in communication with the Colonial Office."
The drawback to this theory is that ah the
evidence in support of it would also support the
charge of complicity in the Raid — and this has
been given up. The negotiations with Dr
Harris, the interviews with a lady journalist, the
exchange of telegrams between these agents and
their principal in South Africa — these are the
only proved facts. But we are told "that in the
engineering of the Revolutionary Campaign the
introduction of the Flag was the one fatal
mistake." This, it is said, was due to pressure
brought to bear on Mr Rhodes — brought to bear
on him by his emissaries, who had been in
communication with Mr Chamberlain ! Therefore
it was Mr Chamberlain who applied the pressure !
But why? What would be gained by mixing
up the British authorities in a dangerous and
shady plot when the Kriiger regime might as
eashy be upset by a movement under the
Transvaal Flag? With what sort of face could
the British Government have intervened if they
were known to have taken part in a conspiracy
against the legitimate authority at Pretoria? If
they had acknowledged their complicity, their
moral case — their justification before public
opinion in this country and abroad — would be

USE OF THE BRITISH FLAG 509
gone. If, on the other hand, they disowned
their confederates, and repudiated the employ
ment of the Union Jack, what would be the
good of having secretly sanctioned its use ?
On either alternative the British Government
would be placed at a gratuitous disadvan
tage. Mr Chamberlain is not the man to
play pitch-and-toss on the principle of "heads
you win and tails I lose."
The fact was — and the Correspondence pro
duced before the Committee suggests it — that
the use of the British Flag was recommended by
Mr Rhodes's agents. On 26th November, Dr
Harris telegraphed as follows : " Great danger
Phillips Leonard can or may be doing business
without assistance British South African Com
pany and also independently British flag it would
have serious effect your position here. I say
this very confidential." This is sufficiently
explicit. The conspirators acting with Mr
Rhodes did not trust the conspirators in
Johannesburg. This was subsequently shown
by the recriminations which broke out after the
failure of the Raid, but which were so promptly
and discreetly cut short. Already, as we see,
Dr Harris had his doubts of the Reform Leaders,
many of whom had other interests than those of
the Chartered Company, and some of whom were
either not Englishmen at all or Englishmen of
that cosmopolitan financial order which has no
special affection for the British or any other Flag.
It was to force their hand that Dr Harris so
strongly recommended the use of the Union
Jack, and added that this expedient might
influence English opinion in favour of Mr
Rhodes. A plot in the interests of the Chartered
Company would not speciahy commend itself to

510 FROM THE RAID TO THE WAR
patriotic sentiment. But a bold stroke for the
British Flag — at worst, it would be a noble error.
It was shrewd advice, but we cannot say
what effect It had on Mr Rhodes's mind. He
may have preferred to believe In the Reform
Party at Johannesburg, with some of whom he
was intimately associated, and he may not have
thought it worth while to arrange for conchiating
public opinion at home. He was, we know,
somewhat contemptuous of the " unctuous recti
tude " of the British public. However that may
have been, it was considered advisable to
strengthen the case for using the British Flag.
Accordingly, Miss Flora Shaw (Lady Lugard)
telegraphed on 17 th December, that she had
recently had an interview with the Secretary of
the Transvaal, who had just left for The Hague,
Paris, and Berlin, and she feared that he was
" in negotiation with these parties." This would
appeal to what Mr Rhodes admitted was his
governing motive — his apprehension that the
influence of "another Foreign Power" might be
introduced into South African politics. This
danger he attempted to forestall by insisting in
the British Flag. Hence the misunderstanding
between the two sets of conspirators, the Rhodes
Party and the Raid Party, and hence one of the
many causes of the failure of the Jameson Raid.
The last sentences of Miss Shaw's telegram
of 17 th December, that " Mr Chamberlain was
sound in the case of interference by European
Powers," and that she had special reasons for
believing that he "wishes you must do it immedi
ately," were, the one a natural inference from Mr
Chamberlain's known characteristics, and the
other a diplomatic incentive to the course which
she was recommending.

MR CHAMBERLAIN'S POSITION 511
There were, then, plenty of strong reasons
why Mr Rhodes should take the course which
he actuahy followed — none why Mr Chamber
lain should lend himself to such an adventure.
His attempt to recall Dr Jameson, his condem
nation of the Raid, and his concurrence in
the punishment of the chief agents — these official
actions might, conceivably, have been acquiesced
in by confederates who had to pay the penalty
for their blunder. It might have been part
of the arrangement that the chief conspirator
should not be unmasked. But even that
fantastic theory would not explain how he
should be permitted, not merely to protect him
self, but to initiate and carry out the strong
measures which were afterwards adopted with
regard to the Chartered Company.
We may take It, then, as established, by the
overwhelming balance of probabilities on one side,
and by the complete absence of direct evidence on
the other, that Mr Chamberlain was privy neither
to the Jameson Raid nor the "Jameson Plan."
This inference is borne out by the fact that on
his first assumption of office he was animated by
friendly feelings towards Mr Kriiger. He hoped
and believed that with proper handling the
hitherto intractable President might be brought
to a reasonable frame of mind. The trouble that
was brewing In the Transvaal was not made by
Mr Chamberlain. His original purpose was to
calm the existing irritation, and reach an equit
able compromise. How bad the state of affairs
was at Midsummer 1895 ^^Y be seen from a
brief retrospect.
The contest for the Presidency of the South
African Republic, In 1893, had turned chiefly on
the policy to be fohowed with regard to the

512 FROM THfi RAID TO THE WAR
foreign settlers In the Rand ; and the election of
Mr Kriiger by a narrow majority (the figures
being keenly challenged by General Joubert's
supporters), marked the success of the anti- British
Party. The "commandeering" of Englishmen
for service in the Boer Militia led to the interven
tion of the High Commissioner, Sir Henry (the
late Lord) Loch. The law enforcing Military
service was modified by the Volksraad, but on his
paying a visit to the President at Pretoria, in 1894,
"the English behaved in the most disorderly
fashion." "As soon as the Governor and I were
seated in the carriage," so the ex- President
records in his Memoirs, "the Jingoes took out
the horses and drew us to the Transvaal Hotel,
singing the usual English satirical ditties as they
did so. One of the ringleaders jumped on the
box waving a great Union Jack. On arriving in
front of the Transvaal Hotel they stopped the
carriage and read an Address to Sir Henry
Loch. A number of Transvaal Burghers, seeing
what was going on, drew the carriage, on which
I had remained seated alone, to the Government
Buildings. I need not say that the incident
made a very bad impression on the minds of the
Burghers, and added new fuel to the already
existing dislike of the English." The Volksraad
asked the Government why so offensive an
exhibition had not been prevented, and in order
that such Insults should not be repeated a
number of Burghers assembled in the town.
But the National Union, we are informed on
the same authority, thought it would be easier to
provoke a riot in Johannesburg, and invited Sir
Henry to visit them there. This proposal, at
Mr Kriiger's request, he declined. "His whole
public attitude was, in fact, perfectly correct.

PAST RELATIONS WITH THE BOERS 513
But how did he act in secret?" The Address
of the National Union was sent to Johannes
burg, and it contained " the most insulting
accusations " against the Transvaal authorities.
"In public. Sir Henry advised the Deputation
to carry their complaints quietly before the
Volksraad. In secret, he asked them how many
rifles and how much ammunition they had in
Johannesburg, and how long they could hold out
against the Government until he was able to come
to their assistance with troops from outside."
How typically English, the ex-President ex
claims, was this conduct on the part of a high-
placed British official. It was characteristic of the
entire English policy In South Africa ! His
account of this affair is substantially accurate,
except, no doubt, in the gloss he puts upon the
High Commissioner's confidential advice to the
Reform Leaders, which, as Lord Loch explained
subsequently in the House of Lords, was Intended
to make them realise that their military position
was quite untenable. This, apparently, was not the
impression left on the mind of Mr Lionel Phlhips.
But there is no need here to discuss the merits or
demerits of the Reform Leaders or the real signi
ficance of Lord Loch's Inquiry. The only purpose
of this reference to the affair is to show that the
quarrel between British and Boers was one of old
standing and gradually increasing bitterness.
Whether it might have been mitigated if the con
trol of Transvaal affairs had fallen into the hands
of General Joubert, it is impossible to say. But
the grievances of the Uitlanders, practical and
sentimental, had engaged the attention of the
Colonial Office long before the Jameson Raid.
They were not discovered and exploited by Mr
Chamberlain. 2 K

514 FROM THE RAID TO THE WAR
Redress was demanded by Lord Ripon in
language quite as strong as Mr Chamberlain
afterwards employed, and by the irony of
politics it happened that the least aggressive of
Liberal Statesmen gave deeper offence than any
of his predecessors to Mr Kriiger. The cession
of Swaziland to the South African Republic,
resisted by the natives, had been carried out in
deference to the general opinion of the Party then
in power here, and, it should be added, in the hope
of showing our goodwill to the Boers. "We
had hardly time to breathe," President Kriiger
remarks, "after these difficulties about the native
territories when England suddenly annexed Sam-
baanland and Umbigesaland." It had always
been intended, he explains, to claim these tracts
as soon as the Swaziland question had been
settled. " The object of this proceeding," he goes
on, "can only have been to vex and harass the
Republic ; for by acting as she did, England
cut off the Transvaal's last outlet to the sea, an
outlet which England did not require. It goes
without saying that the Republic protested against
the annexation ; but England did not trouble
herself about it."
This little masterpiece of Imperial policy,
so quietly executed by the Colonial Office,
practicahy wiped out the worst effects of the
Swaziland Convention. It was never forgiven by
the Boers, though at the time it attracted little
notice at home. By keeping the Boers away
from the sea, and cutting them off from foreign
reinforcements, it saved South Africa for the
British, or, at least, saved us from having to
employ a large naval force In watching the
enemy's coast. It is, however, not necessary to
quote further passages from Mr Kriiger's book.

THE UITLANDERS* CLAIMS 515
or to dwell at length on the bad feeling that pre
vailed between 1893 and 1895. ''t is no secret
that matters had reached so serious a pass, that
not only was the possibility of war considered by
Lord Rosebery's Cabinet, but a distinguished
General was invited to attend a special meeting
of Ministers, and explain his views as to the
force that would be required, and the strategy
that should be followed, in attempting the recon
quest of the Transvaal.
The policy, then, that Mr Chamberlain
pursued with regard to the Transvaal was not a
new departure invented by himself. He simply
followed the lines laid down by his predecessor,
though, of course, he threw fresh spirit and
energy into the never-ending never-advancing
negotiations. His object and firm intention was
to obtain a tolerable status for the Uitlanders in
the Transvaal — hoping to succeed where Lord
Ripon had failed, and determined not to be put
off with Diplomatic excuses and sham concessions.
So far as he had yet shaped in his mind a
further policy — he had only been in office a few
weeks when the crisis began — it was to work
gradually for a Federation of ah South African
States, under the British Flag, but each to
retain absolute Independence in all internal
matters — a Federation that would, by common
agreement, bring the Customs and Railways into
a single system, but lead to no other change
in existing institutions, whether British or
Dutch. Even this ideal he was in no hurry
to realise, and would have been well con
tent to leave the development of his scheme
to the natural operation of political and
commercial influences, if only President Kriiger
would deal in a conciliatory spirit with the

516 FROM THE RAID TO THE WAR
more urgent claims of the British in the
Transvaal. Almost the first official act of the new
Colonial Secretary In regard to South Africa
was to congratulate the President of the
Transvaal upon the opening of the railway
from Pretoria to Delagoa Bay — which, Mr
Kriiger tehs us, had been one of his fondest
wishes — and to express, on behalf of Her
Majesty's Government, the most friendly feel
ings towards the Government and people of
the South African Republic. This was no mere
verbal courtesy, but the statement of a policy and
the declaration of a hope for the future. Unfor
tunately, Mr Kriiger acted as though he did not
care a pin's point whether friendly feelings con
tinued or not. In order to develop the traffic on
the Eastern line, he entered upon a war of rates
with the Cape line to Pretoria, imposing prohibi
tory tariffs upon the fifty-mile section from the
Vaal River to Johannesburg. The Cape Govern
ment was thus checked in developing the carrying
trade to the mines, but, as the distance from the
Vaal River drifts by road was only about thirty
miles, goods were unloaded on the Orange side
of the river, and thence forwarded across the
Transvaal by ox-waggon. Mr Kriiger, thereupon
(August 1895), issued a Proclamation closing the
Drifts — a clear breach of the London Convention
which gave all persons, other than natives, full
liberty to enter and carry on commerce within the
Republic. The Proclamation brought about a crisis
which Mr Chamberlain handled with equal
vigour and caution. First he assured himself
of support from the Cape Government. He
was willing to remonstrate with Mr Kriiger, pro-

CLOSING THE DRIFTS 517
vided they would not draw back — and remon
strance might mean War. If Her Majesty's
Government insisted on the withdrawal of the
Proclamation, they could not drop their de
mand "until they have obtained a compliance
. . . even If it should be necessary to under
take an Expedition." Hence he required a
"most exphcit undertaking in writing" that
the Cape Government would bear half the gross
cost, furnish a fair contingent of the fighting
force, and give the free use of the railways and
rohing stock for military purposes. The Cape
Government accepted these terms, which were
kept secret from the public at the time, and Mr
chamberlain, thereupon, launched an Ultimatum,
describing the closing of the Drifts as an " un
friendly action " which called for the " gravest
remonstrances," and asking for the Proclamation
to be cancelled.
Mr Kriiger considered that the time was
not ripe for fighting. Mr Rhodes, then Premier
of Cape Colony, had the Bond Party with him
at the Cape ; and the Dutch there were as
deeply Interested as the British in the question
of free commercial access to the Transvaal. To
provoke a quarrel on this Issue would have
alienated the Afrikander population by whose
aid, as events were to prove, Mr Kriiger hoped
to establish Dutch supremacy throughout South
Africa. He, therefore, gave way, and the Drifts
were re-opened on 5th November. Not until
two years later was it known outside official
circles how near we had been to War — how
resolutely Mr Chamberlain, within three months
of taking charge of Colonial affairs, had grasped
the South African nettle.
Mr Kriiger's failure entailed disastrous con-

518 FROM THE RAID TO THE WAR
sequences on the Uitlanders, upon whom his
hand was now laid with ever-increasing heaviness.
The Raid and its immediate consequences had
more or less hampered Mr Chamberlain's policy,
though he did his best to repair the mischief
No sooner did he learn that Dr Jameson had
crossed the border than, without waiting to
consult his colleagues, he sent peremptory tele
grams to Sir Hercules Robinson, Mr Rhodes,
and Dr Jameson, ordering the expedition to
turn back. This was ignored. The surrender
at Dornkoop had been conditional upon the
lives of the Raiders being spared, but, as ah
the prisoners were in gaol, this part of the
arrangement was concealed by Mr Kriiger,
who — cleverly enough — used it to secure the
submission of Johannesburg, whose inhabi
tants were given to understand that the lives
of Dr Jameson and his associates depended
upon the unconditional capitulation of the
town. Sir Hercules Robinson arrived at Pretoria on
4th January 1896, and was instructed by Mr
Chamberlain to secure the release of the Raiders
on the pledge that the leaders would be brought
to trial in England. Mr Kriiger played with this
question, insisting that all the Raiders should be
tried, and not the officers alone, and threatening,
if this demand were not complied with, that he
would have the whole body tried In Pretoria.
Mr Chamberlain, however, pressed his claim,
and the prisoners were handed over to Great
Britain. Thereupon, Mr Chamberlain telegraphed
to Mr Kriiger : " This act will redound to the
credit of your Honour, and wih conduce to the
peace of South Africa, and to the harmonious
co-operation of the British and Dutch races,

AFTER THE RAID 519
which is necessary for Its future development
and prosperity."
But much blood had to be spilt before such
co-operation became even tentatively possible.
Mr Kriiger was determined to use the Raid as a
means by which to secure the abrogation of the
London Convention ; and the famous telegram
from the German Emperor naturally led him to
believe, the British flying squadron notwithstand
ing, that if War were to ensue Germany would
intervene to prevent the extinction of the
Republic. Mr Chamberlain was equahy deter
mined to obtain a settlement upon equitable and
honourable lines. In this course, however, he
was not seconded by Sir Hercules Robinson.
When, on 7th January, he suggested that
Sir Hercules should send immediately "a
large force, Including cavalry and artillery, to
the Cape to provide for all eventualities," the
High Commissioner objected. He thought
President Kriiger had behaved very weh, public
excitement was now allayed, and the despatch
of troops would but revive it. Nor was this
the only point upon which he thwarted the
Colonial Secretary. He took no effective steps
to bring Mr Kriiger to reason upon the
fundamental grievance of which the Raid and
the Johannesburg Insurrection had been but
the outward symptoms. At any rate, he
contented himself with accepting Mr Kriiger's
assurances. Meanwhile Mr Chamberlain was bombard
ing him with telegrams urging him to obtain
radical reforms. Sir Hercules, it has been ex
plained, was in indifferent health, and on that
account alone, unfit to grapple with so strong a
man as Mr Kriiger. He left Pretoria as soon

520 FROM THE RAID TO THE WAR
as he could, satisfied apparently with the trans
ference of the Raiders to the British authorities.
In vain Mr Chamberlain inquired what was
being done on the larger political matters which
were at the root of the trouble. He did not agree
with Sir Hercules that the time was inopportune
to thresh them out, nor did he see much practical
value In the President's general assurances. " The
people of Johannesburg," he telegraphed, "laid
down their arms in the behef that reasonable con
cessions would be arranged by your intervention ;
and until these are granted, or are definitely pro
mised to you by the President, the root causes of
the recent troubles wih remain. The President
has again and again promised reform, and espe
cially on 30th December last, when he promised
reforms in education and the franchise ; and grave
dissatisfaction will be excited if you leave Pretoria
without a clear understanding on these points.
" Her Majesty's Government invite President
Kriiger, in the interests of the South African
Republic and of Peace, to make a clear declaration
on these matters. ... It will be your duty to use
firm language, and to teh the President that
neglect to meet the admitted grievances of the
Uitlanders, by giving a definite promise to propose
reasonable concessions, will have a disastrous
effect upon the prospects of a lasting and satis
factory settlement."
Sir Hercules put that instruction in his pocket,
and while on his way back to Capetown acquainted
Mr Chamberlain with his excuses for disregarding
it. The time was not opportune to acquaint the
President with its terms. The leading men in
Johannesburg were in gaol on a charge of
treason ; there were rumours of a long-standing
and widespread conspiracy to overturn the Pre-

SIR HERCULE^S ROBINSON 521
sident's Government and Incorporate the Trans
vaal In the territory of the British South Africa
Company ; these stories would be tested in the
Boer Courts ; "and, meanwhile, to urge claims for
extended political privileges for the very men so
charged would be ineffectual and impolitic." Mr
Chamberlain dealt with these excuses as tenderly
as regard for Sir Hercules Robinson's distin
guished past services and present difficulties per
mitted, and instructed him to resume discussions
with the President. But with an unwihing agent
he found himself powerless. Pending the trials
of the Johannesburg Reformers, Sir Hercules,
though not directly refusing to act, showed that
his heart was no longer in his task. He would
act later, he said, but "the present moment is
most inopportune, as the strongest feeling of
irritation and Indignation against the Uitlanders
exists. . . . Any attempt to dictate In regard to
the internal affairs of the South African Republic
at this moment would be resisted by all Parties
in South Africa, and would do great harm."
For the time Mr Chamberlain was checked,
not beaten. Throughout the crisis he was equally
rapid in action and cool in deliberation. The
opinion of foreign countries troubled him not at
all. At a banquet given to the new Governor of
Queensland on 21st January, he minimised the
importance of recent "sensational occurrences"
which would leave little trace behind them. Taking
up the phrase " splendid isolation," he declared
that the attitude of Great Britain had attracted
instead of repehing the loyalty of the Great
Colonies, whatever offence it might have given
to the Continental Powers, On the 24th, at
Birmingham, he devoted the greater part of a
speech to his constituents to other topics than

522 FROM THE RAID TO THE WAR
South Africa, though he expressed his hope that
matters were settling down in the Transvaal,
and intimated that the just demands of the
Uitlanders would not be forgotten. Their dis
content could be removed, he said, without
danger to the Independence of the Repubhc.
But it was an anomaly which could not endure
that the majority in the population, the con
tributors of nine-tenths of the Revenue, should
have no voice in the government of the State.
On 4th February 1896, Mr Rhodes arrived
in London to carry out his intention of "facing
the music." He had one interview with Mr
Chamberlain at the Colonial Office, and on the
9th sailed for South Africa. His abrupt
departure was accepted as a clear intimation that
the Imperial Government did not require, and
would not accept, his advice or assistance, and
intended to deal in its own manner with the
political and military privileges of the Chartered
Company. On 7th February, the eve of the meeting of
Parliament, Mr Chamberlain published in the
London Gazette a Despatch to Mr Kriiger-r-
before it could have reached Pretoria. In
this document he disposed of the suspicions
that the British Government had any fore
knowledge of the conspiracy and the Raid, and
made it clear that he had been misled by the
Chartered Company into granting the Bechu
analand strip. Drawing a distinction between
the mass of Johannesburghers and the few
then in Boer prisons awaiting trial for high
treason, he defined the relations of the Boer
Republic to the Suzerain Power under the
Conventions, recapitulated the grievances of the
Uitlanders, and suggested for a settlement that the

"THE NEW DIPLOMACY" 523
President should give a modified local autonomy
to the Rand, with powers of legislation and
taxation subject to the President's Veto and to
the payment of an annual tribute to the Republic ;
and he concluded by saying he would be glad to
have an opportunity of discussing the subject
with Mr Kriiger " if it suited his convenience,
and if he were agreeable to come to this country
for the purpose."
The " New Diplomacy " — the unconvention-
ality of publishing a Despatch in London before it
could reach the person to whom it was addressed
— displeased Mr Kriiger, who loftily rebuked Mr
Chamberlain for his disregard of etiquette. But
he inquired whether, if he should visit England,
the question of Article 4 of the Convention —
the Article reserving to Great Britain the control
of the Foreign relations of the Republic — would
be included in the topics for discussion. On
being firmly but politely told that it would not,
he found a variety of reasons for staying in
Pretoria and declining to discuss that or any
other question in London. Mr Chamberlain
exhausted the arts of solicitude for the personal
health and welfare of the President and Mrs
Kriiger (who was ailing at the time), but the
stolid old Dutchman was not to be moved.
Astute Diplomatist as he was, he affected an air of
moderation, and appointed a Commission to inquire
into the condition of the mining industry. Mr
Chamberlain could do nothing but impress on him
the wisdom of taking measures to avert any renewal
of the late troubles. Mr Kriiger, however, was
unwihing to accept advice from the Colonial
Office, which he firmly believed to have been in
complicity with Mr Rhodes and the Reformers,
and naturally regarded as a tainted source.

524 FROM THE RAID TO THE WAR
In these circumstances Mr Chamberlain bided
his time, replacing Sir Jacobus de Wet, who had
not been successful as British Resident at Pre
toria, with an experienced Diplomatist, Mr (now
Sir) Conyngham Greene. Sir Hercules Robinson
was not destined long to remain in South Africa
as a passive obstacle to Mr Chamberlain's pohcy
of continuous, though pacific, pressure upon Mr
Kriiger. His health unhappily grew worse,
and at the close of 1896 he came home. Mr
Chamberlain found in Sir Alfred Milner a
younger and stronger man, who was destined as
High Commissioner to discharge successfuUy
responsibilities which had outgrown the strength
and capacity of his predecessor.
Every month the situation became more
serious. An offensive and defensive alliance was
concluded between the South African Republic
and the Orange Free State, and within the
Transvaal money was being lavishly spent on
armaments and munitions. Whether the Presi
dent wanted War or did not, it must be admitted
that he went the right way to work to
pick a quarrel with the Suzerain Power. He
passed an Aliens Bill, which was a distinct
breach of the Conventions, inasmuch as it
restricted the right of free entry and residence of
British subjects, and he boldly contended that
the Republic had the same power of exclusion as
any other State. He showed his contempt for
the Conventions by neglecting to inform the
Imperial Government of his Treaty negotiations
with Foreign Powers, and he presented an absurd
bill for damages, on account of the Raid, which
was in itself a sufficient revelation of his provo
cative temper. He demanded ^^667, 938, 3s. 3d.
for "material damages," and ;^ 1,000, 000 for the

SITUATION GROWING WORSE 525
"intellectual and moral damages," which the
Republic was supposed to have suffered. Even
Lord Rosmead (Sir Hercules Robinson) was
astounded at His Honour's effrontery. Mr
Chamberlain dealt coolly with the claim, re
marking that he did not feel justified in pre
senting the demand for a million to the South
African Company (which, by the way, had been
divested, immediately after the Raid, of its control
of any military force), and asking for full particu
lars as to the Items for specific damage.
In an earlier Despatch he had protested
against the Aliens Law of 1896 as a breach
of the Convention, and for nearly three years
conducted an epistolary duel with Mr Kriiger,
who found most able dialecticians In Mr T. W.
Reltz and Dr Leyds. It wih be sufficient
to give an outline of the Diplomatic contro
versy. It should be noted that the Boer repre
sentatives professed scrupulous respect for the
Conventions, and that Mr Chamberlain, on his
side, was most careful, during 1897 ^^^ 1898,
to ask for nothing which he was not entitled
to demand under those Instruments.
The interpretation given to the clauses by
the Boer argument was so vague as to make
them practicahy inoperative, while Mr Chamber
lain Insisted upon a reading that would ensure
real protection to British subjects and their
interests. The Boer Diplomatists made It plain
that they would not accept a compromise, and
they refused to revoke or suspend the Aliens
Law, though they were prepared to concert
with other South African States measures for
the exclusion of "undesirables." As for the
conclusion of Treaties, such as the Convention
of Geneva, and the Extradition Treaty with the

526 FROM THE RAID TO THE WAR
Netherlands, they refused to see, despite the plain
language of the London Convention, that the
British Government had any grievance because it
had been kept in ignorance of these transactions.
They defended the Expulsion Law as reasonable
and politic, and sought to justify their oppressive
treatment of Johannesburg newspapers. They
complained of the action of the British Govern
ment on account of the Raid, suggesting that
the whole case on both sides should be referred
to the President of the Swiss Republic for
Arbitration. Mr Chamberlain (i6th October 1897) replied
in an elaborate Despatch on the whole contro
versy. He agreed that a Conference on the
subject of keeping out undesirable persons from
South Africa as a whole might be expedient, but
upheld his claim to be consulted about any Trans
vaal legislation derogatory to the rights of British
subjects under the Conventions. Article 14 ofthe
London Convention (the right of free entry, etc.)
"contains one of the essential conditions upon
which complete Self-Government was accorded by
Her Majesty to the South African Republic."
As for the breaches of Article 4, governing
Foreign relations, the Republic was bound to
adhere strictly to its terms. Mr Chamberlain
protested against the implication that the Jameson
Raid was a breach of the Convention by Her
Majesty's Government, or could be treated as a
grievance against Great Britain. It was the
act of private individuals, repudiated by the
Government immediately it became known.
As to the Arbitration proposal, the Boer
Government, Mr Chamberlain pointed out, had-
forgotten that the Conventions did not constitute
a Treaty between two independent States, but,

ARBITRATION PROPOSALS 527
under certain terms and conditions in the Pre
amble of the 1 88 1 Convention and the sub
stituted Articles of the 1884 Convention, only
gave Self-Government to the Transvaal subject to
the Suzerainty of the Queen and her successors.
" Under these Conventions Her Majesty's Govern
ment held towards the South African Republic
the relation of a Suzerain who has accorded to the
people of that Repubhc Self-Government upon
certain conditions, and It would be incompatible
with that position to submit to Arbitration the
construction of the conditions on which she
accorded Self-Government to the Republic. One
of the main objects which Her Majesty's Govern
ment had in view was the prevention of the
interference of any Foreign Power between
Her Majesty and the South African Republic — a
matter which they then held, and which Her
Majesty's present Government still hold, to be
essential to British interests ; and this object
would be defeated by the course now proposed."
Whhe Mr Reitz kept the paper controversy
alive — showing, it must be admitted, no slight
resourcefulness and Diplomatic ability — the Boer
Executive made matters worse for the Uit
landers, whose condition became increasingly
unpleasant as the Government relaxed its efforts
to preserve order on the Rand, where complaints,
some of which may have been exaggerated, as
to outrage on person and property were not
infrequent. The worst of these instances resulted
in the death of a British subject named Edgar at
the hands of the Boer police. On the most
lenient interpretation, this was an act of unjusti
fiable brutality, and the Uitlanders, on 23rd
December 1898, feeling that they must no longer
submit to official tyranny, addressed to the Crown,

528 FROM THE RAID TO THE WAR
through the British Vice-consul, the Petition that
recounts their grievances.
Sir A. Milner, who had paid a brief visit to
England at the end of this year, and held close
conference with the Colonial Secretary, supported
the Petition in a remarkable Despatch. He
defended the Uitlanders from the charge of
being a mere crowd of money-grabbers, care
less of political rights or personal dignity so
long as they could fih their purses with sufficient
rapidity. In a further telegraphic Despatch
of May 1899, reviewing the whole position,
he informed Mr Chamberlain that what the
Imperial authority had to deal with was a
popular movement of a like kind with that of
1894-95 before It was ruined by a conspiracy of
which the mass of the Uitlanders were Ignorant.
None of the grievances then complained of had
been remedied ; others had been added. It was
a wilful perversion of the truth to represent the
movement as artificial — the work of scheming
capitalists or professional agitators. The bulk of
the population were not birds of passage, but men
who contemplated making a permanent home in
the country, and would become excellent citizens
If they had the chance.
" I may sometimes have abstained," Sir Alfred
said, "when I ought to have protested, from
my great dislike of ineffectual nagging. But I
feel that the attempt to remedy the hundred and
one wrongs springing from a hopeless system by
taking up isolated cases is perfectly vain. It may
easily lead to War, but wih never lead to real
improvement." The true remedy was to strike
at the root — the political impotence of the injured.
What Diplomatic protests would never accomphsh,
a fair measure of Uitlander representation would

SIR ALFRED MILNER 529
gradually but surely bring about. " The case for
intervention is overwhelming." "The spectacle
of thousands of British subjects kept permanently
in the position of Helots, constantly chafing under
undoubted grievances, and calling vainly to Her
Majesty's Government for redress, does steadily
undermine the influence of Great Britain and the
respect for the British Government within the
Queen's Dominions. ... I see nothing which will
put a stop to this mischievous propaganda but
some striking proof of the intention of Her
Majesty's Government not to be ousted from its
position in South Africa. And the best proof
alike of Its power and its justice would be to
obtain for the Uitlanders in the Transvaal a fair
share In the Government of the country which
owes everything to their exertions."
With this Petition and these Despatches
before him, Mr Chamberlain had to decide — and
to carry the Cabinet with him — whether to let
matters drift, with the likelihood, in the long run,
of Great Britain losing her ascendancy in South
Africa, or to Intervene vigorously and run the
risk of War. The Government resolved to act
in the spirit of Sir A. Milner's recommendations.
In a long Despatch of loth May 1899, Mr
Chamberlain reviewed the position of the Uit
landers, and showed how they had striven in
vain to improve their lot by Constitutional
action. When they took up arms in 1895,
the President had promised them reforms. But,
so far from any substantial remedy having
been granted, the new legislation had, on the
whole, had the effect of increasing the causes of
complaint. After a summary of their grievances
in detail — legislative, financial, judicial, and ad
ministrative — he came to the conclusion that,
2 L

530 FROM THE RAID TO THE WAR
under the conditions that had grown up since the
Convention of 1884 was signed, the Uitlanders
were deprived of that equality of treatment which
the Instrument was designed to secure for them.
Her Majesty's Government had been anxious
to extend every consideration to a weaker State
which in recent years had had just reason to com
plain of the action of British subjects.
Recognising the exceptional circumstances of
the case, they had refrained, since the Despatch of
4th February 1896 (suggesting autonomy for the
Rand), from pressure upon the Republic, except
in cases where there had been a distinct breach of
the Conventions ; and they had held back in the
hope that the Government of the Republic would
voluntarily meet the expectations raised by the
President. They were most unwilling to depart
from this attitude of reserve and expectation, but,
"having regard to the position of Great Britain
as the Paramount Power in South Africa, and
the duty incumbent upon them to protect ah
British subjects residing in a foreign country,
they cannot permanently ignore the exceptional
and arbitrary treatment to which their fellow-
countrymen and others are exposed, and the
absolute indifference of the Government of the
Republic to the friendly representations which
had been made to them on the subject."
Earnestly solicitous as Her Majesty's Govern
ment were for the prosperity of the Republic, and
anxious as they were to avoid any intervention in
its internal concerns, Mr Chamberlain concluded
by suggesting that a meeting should be arranged
between Mr Kriiger and Sir A. Milner " for the
purpose of discussing the situation in a concilia
tory spirit." This suggestion Mr Chamberlain
offered as proof that no design was entertained

BLOEMFONTEIN CONFERENCE 531
against the Independence of the Republic,
and expressed his hope that the proposal
would result in reasonable concessions to the
just demands of the Uitlanders and in a
" settlement of the difficulties which have
threatened the good relations which Her
Majesty's Government desire should constantly
exist between themselves and the Government
of the South African Republic."
So reasonable a suggestion, coming at the
close of a courteous and dignified Despatch, could
not be altogether set aside, especially as the idea
of a Conference had arisen independently in the
mind of Mr Hofmeyer, the Leader of the Bond,
whose influence on the side of Peace Mr Cham
berlain had sought to enhst at the time of the
Raid. The Schreiner Ministry — who had come
into power on the temporary withdrawal of Mr
Rhodes from public life — also urged a Confer
ence upon Mr Kriiger. Yielding to the solicita
tions of his well-wishers at the Cape, and, either
because he honestly wished to avert War, or merely
sought to gain time, the President telegraphed
that he would gladly discuss with Sir A. Milner
"every proposal in a friendly way that could
conduce to a good understanding . . . provided
that the Independence of the Republic is not
impugned." Thereupon President Steyn, of the
Orange Free State, issued invitations to a
Conference at Bloemfontein. Mr Chamberlain's
instructions to Sir A. Milner were simple. He
wished to leave the High Commissioner as
free a hand as possible, but the Franchise
question was to stand first. Even at this late
stage Mr Chamberlain was ready to accept
full Municipal rights for the Rand as a feasible
solution "if the President fears that Independence

532 FROM THE RAID TO THE WAR
will be endangered by the concession of a general
franchise." Mr Kriiger and Sir A. Mhner met at Bloem
fontein on 31st May 1899, but in order to show
with what Ideas his Honour went into the Con
ference, brief reference must be made to the
long-standing dispute as to the Suzerainty. Dr
Leyds, an even more ingenious and voluminous
Diplomatist than Mr Reitz, was serving as
State Secretary in 1898, and had sought to ex
plain away the Sovereign rights of Great Britain.
His arguments were highly technical, and suffi
ciently plausible to satisfy those who wished to
be convinced. But he weakened rather than
strengthened his strictly legal case by importing
into it a travesty of recent historical events, on
which he exposed himself to confutation. His
technical contention was that the Suzerainty
was affirmed only in the Preamble to the Conven
tion of 1 88 1, that it was not reproduced in the
Convention of 1884, and that the latter Conven
tion was in substitution of the previous one, and
should be Interpreted by itself Acting on this
argumentative elimination of the Suzerainty, Dr
Leyds again put forward a proposal for foreign
Arbitration. Mr Chamberlain (15th December
1898) declined to accept the suggested repudia
tion of the Suzerainty, and maintained that the
Preamble of the 1881 Convention was not re
pealed in 1884, the Articles only of the 1884
Instrument being substituted for the Articles
only of that of 188 1. In pursuance of this view,
he again informed the Boer Government that
Her Majesty's Government declined to sanction
any Treaty or Engagement with a foreign State
which was not submitted for approval before its
conclusion. Nor would he consent to refer any

MR KRUGER'S PROPOSALS 533
question to the Arbitration of a foreign Power.
There were replies and counter-replies to these
Despatches, and thus the wrangle had gone on
until May 1899, when Mr Reitz — who had again
taken up the duties of State Secretary, in order
that Dr Leyds might be set free for his Diplo
matic business in Europe — made a vigorous
attack upon Mr Chamberlain's whole position,
and boldly advanced the contention that the
Transvaal had the "Inherent" rights of "a
Sovereign International State."
Sir A. Milner fastened upon these words, and
so did Mr Chamberlain. "The way in which
the State Secretary juggles with the Convention
of 1884," wrote the High Commissioner, " is rather
irritating to a plain man. But the importance
of the matter does not consist in his arguments.
It consists in the assertion that the South
African Republic Is 'a Sovereign International
State.' This appears to me to be contradictory
of the position consistently maintained by us,
and in fact in the nature of a defiance of Her
Majesty's Government ! " Mr Chamberlain con
curred in these views, but his Despatch was not
written until after the Bloemfontein Conference,
and, interesting as it Is as an historical review,
going back to the Sand River Convention of
1852, and as an assertion of legal right, it need
not be further dealt with. It has been made
sufficiently clear that Mr Kriiger went into
the Conference, In his own view, as the head
of "a Sovereign International State" — a State
over which no Suzerainty had existed since the
signature of the 1884 Convention.
At the Conference Sir A. Milner proposed
the fuh franchise for every Uitlander who —
I, had been resident for five years in the

534 FROM THE RAID TO THE WAR
Republic ; 2, declared his intention to reside
permanently there ; 3, took an oath to obey the
laws and defend the Independence of the country,
and discharge other obligations of citizenship.
This Mr Kriiger described as tantamount to
handing over his country to foreigners. He
made, however, counter -proposals for facilitat
ing naturalisation, and for giving the franchise
on a property qualification, though hedged about
with various stringent conditions. This offer
was so different from what Sir A. Mhner
had expected, that he feh back on the Idea
of local autonomy for the Rand, with which,
however, the President would have nothing
to do. After much controversy, Mr Kriiger
suggested a franchise scheme in exchange for
foreign Arbitration upon the Convention, and this
proved to be the breaking-point of the Conference.
The question of Arbitration must. Sir Alfred
argued, be considered on its merits, and on no
point would Her Majesty's Government agree
to reference to any Foreign Government. The
Conference therefore closed, and nothing further
need be said of It except that Mr Kriiger had
endeavoured to utilise it for obtaining payment
of the bill of damages, on account of the Raid,
and for gaining final and complete control over
Swaziland. It was for Mr Chamberlain to consider
whether anything could be done with Mr
Kriiger's counter-proposals as to the franchise.
The Schreiner Ministry at the Cape, though
admitting that the suggested concessions were
open to amendment, thought they represented
a great advance on anything that Mr Kriiger
had previously offered, and Informed Mr Cham
berlain that in their judgment the state of things

FRANCHISE PROPOSALS 535
in the Transvaal did not justify active interven
tion in the internal affairs of the Republic.
" To this I strongly demurred," wrote Sir A.
Milner to Mr Chamberlain, who instructed him
to tell the Cape Ministry that the Imperial
Government were most anxious to avoid active
interference, and trusted that Mr Schreiner and
his colleagues would use their influence with Mr
Kriiger to take such action as would avert inter
vention. From this point, matters became inex
tricably tangled. A Franchise Bill was produced
and submitted to the Volksraad, and the Cape
Ministry (which, meanwhile, was doing nothing
to check the active importation of arms and
ammunition into the Transvaal through ports in
the Colony) informed Mr Chamberlain that
it thought the scheme "adequate, satisfactory,
and such as should secure a peaceful settlement."
During June and July Mr Chamberlain watched
and waited. On the 23rd of the latter month the
Volksraad passed the Bill, the main feature of
which was that it would give the franchise on a
seven years' residential qualification, with natu
ralisation. Apparently, therefore, there was only a two
years' difference between the Milner proposals
at Bloemfontein and the Law as passed ; but,
as a matter of fact, the concession was en
cumbered with conditions that made it unwork
able and ridiculous as a remedy for Uitlander
grievances. Meanwhile, the Boer Government,
adroitly taking advantage of a phrase somewhat
incautiously dropt by Sir A. Milner at the
Conference, chose to assume that Mr Chamberlain
might admit the principle of foreign Arbitration
" on differences arising out of the various interpre
tations " of the London Convention, and presented

536 FROM THE RAID TO THE WAR
a cut-and-dried scheme for an Arbitration Tri
bunal consisting of a Boer, a British subject,
and a foreigner chosen by the two as President.
Sir A. Milner pointed out that this proposal
was absolutely inconsistent with the principle
that Her Majesty's Government would ahow
no foreign interference whatever on questions
between itself and the Republic. Mr Chamberlain
also would have none of it. On 27th July he
summed up the position in a Despatch in which
he allowed himself greater freedom of utterance
than he had previously indulged In, charging the
Boer Government with having deliberately placed
one ofthe two white races in a position of pohtical
inferiority ; complaining of its not having made
adequate proposals at Bloemfontein, of having
declined the demand for Municipal Government
for the Rand, and of having since passed a Fran
chise Law which was obviously unacceptable —
though he suggested that this should nevertheless
be subjected to technical examination by a Com
mission consisting of representatives of the two
Governments. As for the Boer plan of Arbitration, Mr Cham
berlain swept it aside. Her Majesty's Govern
ment felt "compehed to declare emphaticahy that
under no circumstances whatever will they admit
the intervention of any Foreign Power in regard
to their interpretations of the Convention." If,
however, the Boer Government was prepared to
agree to the exclusion of any foreign element from
the Tribunal, Her Majesty's Government would
consider by what methods such questions of inter
pretation could be judicially decided. He re
commended that, after the technical points of
the Franchise Law had been threshed out, there
should be a further personal conference between

FINAL EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN PEACE 537
Mr Kriiger and Sir A. Milner to discuss Arbi
tration and other matters than the Franchise.
But these efforts to find a way out of the diffi
culties had little effect. Mr Conyngham Greene
however, was actively at work at Pretoria, and, as
a result of his negotiations, the Boer Government,
in the middle of August made new proposals
relating to the Franchise — yielding a five years'
residential qualification. But they attached to
this certain unreasonable conditions, the chief
being that the assertion of the Suzerainty
should not be insisted upon, and that the
claim should be dropped, that there should at
no future time be any interference with the
internal affairs of the Republic, and that as
soon as the amended Franchise Law were passed
there should be Arbitration on other matters in
dispute under the Convention by a Tribunal, the
President of which should be a citizen of the
Orange Free State.
Mr Chamberlain gave a qualified acceptance
of the Five Years' Franchise proposal, but rejected
the conditions with which it was coupled, for
reasons which will have been gathered from
his preceding Despatches. But he did not
exclude the idea of Arbitration, and urged a
further Conference between Sir A. Milner and
Mr Kriiger. By this time, however, the Boers
had amassed so enormous a quantity of arms
and ammunition — thanks, partly, to the inaction
of the Schreiner Ministry at the Cape — that
they had become intolerant of discussion. On
the 2nd September they withdrew their amended
Franchise proposals, and disposed with almost
contemptuous brevity of Mr Chamberlain's
reasons for rejecting the conditions attached
to the Five Years' offer. A few days later, how-

538 FROM THE RAID TO THE WAR
ever, they intimated their readiness to renew
the conference between the President and Sir A.
Milner. But this proposal was sent on the very
day on which the British Cabinet answered the
Boer Note of the 2nd in a Despatch declaring a
willingness to accept the Five Years' offer uncon
ditionally, and reserving the right " to reconsider
the situation de novo, and to formulate their own
proposals for a final settlement." The Boer
Government would not, however, withdraw the
conditions, and awaited these final proposals.
As a result of a further meeting of the Cabinet,
Mr Chamberlain (22nd September) sent a De
spatch to the Boer Government expressing pro
found regret at its attitude, and closing thus : —
" The refusal of the Government of the South
African Republic to entertain the offer thus made,
coming as it does at the end of nearly four
months' protracted negotiations, themselves the
climax of an agitation extending over a period of
more than five years, makes it useless to further
pursue a discussion on the lines hitherto fohowed,
and Her Majesty's Government are now com
pelled to consider the situation afresh, and to
formulate their own proposals for a final settlement
of the issues which have been created in South
Africa by the policy constantly followed for many
years by the Government of the South African
Republic. They will communicate to you the
result of their deliberations in a later Despatch."
That Despatch was never sent. Space need
not be occupied with an account of the efforts of
the Boer Government to obscure the Issues by
bringing a charge of breach of faith against Mr
Conyngham Greene, who was alleged to have
induced the offer of the Five Years' Franchise
by giving the Boer Government to understand

MR STEYN'S ATTITUDE 539
that the conditions would be acceptable in
London. Nor is it necessary to make more
than a passing reference to the lengthy com
munications in which Mr Steyn sought to justify
Mr Kriiger's attitude. How far the President of
the Orange Free State was sincere in assuming
the rSle of peacemaker at the eleventh hour,
it is difficult to say.
The more moderate Transvaalers believe,
or profess to believe, that Mr Steyn was
desirous of averting conflict, nor is It incon
sistent with their view of his motives that
when War had broken out he was strenuous
in waging it and obstinate in prolonging it.
Whatever may have been his real purpose in
the Summer of 1899, it is certain that his
pacific intervention came too late. The Pretoria
Government, confident of military strength, and
trusting to the deceptive assurances of help
from Europe, were In no temper to listen to
reason, even from their kinsmen in the Free
State. Mr Chamberlain, however, replied to
Mr Steyn, by referring him to recent Despatches,
defining the situation and the views of Her
Majesty's Government, and, with regard to his
complaints of " the enormous and ever-increasing
military preparations of Her Majesty's Govern
ment," reminded him that these had been forced
upon the Ministry by " the policy of the South
African Republic, which has transformed the
Transvaal into a permanent armed camp,
threatening the peace of the whole of South
Africa and the position of Great Britain as the
Paramount State." The interval between 22nd
September and 9th October, the date of the
Boer Ultimatum, was occupied by this contro
versy with Mr Steyn. The time limit fixed

540 FROM THE RAID TO THE WAR
in the Boer Ultimatum expired at five o'clock
on Wednesday, nth October. The Boer Govern
ment was informed on that day that Her Majesty's
Government had received with great regret the
peremptory demands in the telegram of the 9th,
and that they were such that they deemed it
impossible to discuss them. Mr Steyn was
invited to state whether the Transvaal Ultimatum
had his concurrence and support. His reply
linked the destinies of the Free State with those
of the Transvaal.
It was characteristic of Mr Chamberlain's
belief in his own persuasive powers, and in the
ultimate reasonableness of other men, that almost
to the end he had entertained some hope of averting
a rupture. Though events proved him to be
mistaken in his estimate of Mr Kriiger's personal
character and political influence over his country
men, there were some solid grounds for this faith.
As he pointed out in a speech at Birmingham
on 26th June, this was by no means the first
occasion on which Peace had been imperilled.
The trouble in 1885 caused by the Warren
Expedition, which had rescued Bechuanaland
from the clutch of the Transvaal ; the comman
deering of British subjects in 1894; the closing
of the Drifts in 1895 '< the Alien Immigration
Law of 1897 — each of these crises had brought
us within view of War. On each of these four
occasions pressure had been applied to Mr
Kriiger, and every time he had ''given way.
The not unnatural inference — though Mr
Chamberlain did not define his expectation —
was that Mr Kriiger would ultimately yield on
the question of Reform. Meantime, it seemed
to Mr Chamberlain — whose Diplomatic policy
is to play with all his cards on the table — that

WAR OR PEACE? 541
the essential thing was to convince Pretoria that
the Colonial Office was again in earnest. Speak
ing as much to the Boers as to his own country
men, he declared that the root of all the trouble
was the misgovernment of the Transvaal. What,
then, was the duty of the British Government ?
In the first place, to secure. If possible, a peaceful
settlement. But they would not be thwarted.
Ministers, he said, were absolutely unanimous.
They would neither be hurried nor held back.
They had entered on the business, and they meant
to "see it through." He added an appeal to
Mr Hofmeyer, whose influence with the Cape
Dutch he fuUy recognised, and to the Schreiner
Ministry, to help in bringing the Boers to reason.
It' is a necessary incident of a Democratic
system, but one which does not always make
for Peace, that Diplomatic controversies cannot
altogether be withdrawn from public comment.
The result is that partially-informed bystanders
are tempted to interfere in the game. It would
be monstrous to suggest that the Liberal Leaders
were actuated by any motive but an honest
desire to avert War. Unhappily, they did not
realise, not having access to full information,
how grave the crisis was. The only means of
avoiding a rupture was to convince the Boers that
Englishmen as a nation believed In the justice of
the claim put forward by the Government, and
were prepared, if necessary, to enforce it. It was
this impression that Mr Chamberlain had been
trying to work into the minds of the Pretoria
authorities. It is just conceivable — though,
perhaps, it hardly amounts to a probability
— that he might have been successful if the chief
Liberal Statesmen had either supported him or
remained silent. But it happened, unfortunately.

542 FROM THE RAID TO THE WAR
that Sir Henry Campbeh- Bannerman, speaking
in absolute good faith, had asserted that in his
opinion nothing had occurred to justify War, and
with this declaration Lord Kimberley, on 28th
July in the House of Lords, expressed his com
plete concurrence. Naturally, the Boers in the
Transvaal — relying on the reports transmitted to
them by their agents in Europe, who were them
selves misled by English enthusiasts — beheved
that the two great Parties in this country were
divided on the South African Question, and that.
In Mr Kriiger's words, it was good policy to
"wait for the Opposition."
Though the uncompromising language used
by Mr Chamberlain was backed up by an
equally explicit statement from Lord Salis
bury — "we have put our hands to the plough,"
he said, "and we do not intend to turn back"
— it was not believed in Pretoria that the
British Government would press matters to an
extremity. There would have been some basis
for this scepticism if the dispute had been merely
about the Transvaal Franchise, or the conditions
that should attend it. The issue, however, was a
much broader one. This was plainly stated by Mr
Chamberlain in the House of Commons. To talk
of " race antagonism " as the result of a future War
was, he said, misleading. That race antagonism
was already In existence. British subjects in the
Transvaal were kept in a position of " humiliating
inferiority." They were subject to injury and
outrage, and the remonstrances of the Suzerain
Power were treated with contempt. The question
between Great Britain and the Transvaal was not
one of some petty reform. " It Is nothing of the
kind," he said. "It is the power and authority
of the British Empire. It is the position of

THE REAL ISSUE 543
Great Britain in South Africa. It is the question
of our predominance, and how it is to be inter
preted, and it is the question of Peace throughout
South Africa."
His detailed vindication of the negotiations
conducted by the Colonial Office need not
be recapitulated. His conclusion was resolute,
but not unconciliatory. The reason why, for
three years, no exceptional pressure had been
applied to President Kriiger to give a reply to
Lord Ripon's 1894 Despatch was that everything
had been thrown back by the Raid. During those
years the Colonial Office had practised "excessive
patience and forbearance." It had waited in the
hope that concessions would be made. But things
had gone from bad to worse. There was no
desire or Intention of annexing a country which
had been voluntarily given its Independence. On
the contrary, the policy of Great Britain was to
strengthen the South African Republic by "turn
ing its discontented aliens into loyal fellow-citizens
of the Dutch." But the Government of the
Transvaal must "accept in principle, and make
some approach in practice to, that equality of
conditions between the two white races which was
intended to be provided by the Convention, and
was certainly promised in the interviews and con
ference before the Convention was signed."
Otherwise the Transvaal would remain what it
then was — a source of unrest, disturbance, and
danger. Though the situation was anxious Mr
Chamberlain declared himself stih hopeful —
hopeful because he believed that Mr Kriiger
understood the Government were in earnest, and
because the great mass of the English people
were prepared to support them in any measures

544 FROM THE RAID TO THE WAR
which they might think necessary to take. This
was at the end of July. On 9th August, on the
winding-up of the Session, Mr Chamberlain spoke
with equal firmness, though less hopefully. On
26th August he made at Highbury a speech
which, while it left the door open for arrange
ment, showed that in his opinion the preceding
negotiations had not materially improved the
situation. Some little progress had been made,
but the crisis had by no means passed. " Mr
Kriiger procrastinates in his replies, he dribbles
out reforms like water from a squeezed sponge."
The demands made at the Bloemfontein Con
ference were so moderate that many persons
thought they verged on weakness. Less could
not be asked, less would not be taken. These
emphatic words were followed by more minatory
language than Mr Chamberlain had hitherto
employed. The issues of Peace and War lay
with President Kriiger. Would he speak the
necessary words ? The sand was running down
in the glass ! The situation was too dangerous
and too strained to permit of indefinite postpone
ment. To show that he was speaking for his
colleagues as well as for the Colonial Office, he
cited Mr Balfour's remark that the knot must
be loosened, or we should have to find other ways
of untying it. He also quoted Lord Salisbury's
warning that if the present delay were much pro
longed we should not hold ourselves bound by
the offers we had already made, but should take
measures to prove once for ah which was the
Paramount Power in South Africa, and to secure
to the British at least those rights and privileges
which were promised them when Independence
was restored to the Transvaal. If, Mr Cham
berlain added, a rupture were forced on the

THAT "LOST MIND" 545
British Government, they would, he was sure,
have the support of the vast majority of the
people of the United Kingdom — of the British
Empire. Nevertheless, his subsequent Despatches were
the reverse of provocative. The one written on
8th September was made the object of special
laudation at a meeting of Radicals called by the
" Transvaal Committee," a body which had been
formed to maintain the Independence of the
South African Republic, and to protest against
War being declared. Even Mr Leonard Courtney
expressed a hope that Mr Kriiger might induce
the Boers to accept the proposals of a document
which, he said, was a "rebuke to the fire-eaters,"
and especially to that "lost mind" — Sir Alfred
Milner. It was, it will be remembered, one of the
latest theories of this political group that the
hand of the Secretary of State was being forced
by the High Commissioner ; that Mr Chamber
lain was working for Peace while Sir Alfred
Milner was bent on making War. There was
no shadow of foundation for this suggestion.
Neither officially nor morally could the Chief
separate himself from his Representative. It is
not likely, on this question or any other, that two
men of powerful and original minds could see
exactly eye to eye, but in every instance of dis
agreement in detail the action taken by the High
Commissioner was the action of the Secretary of
State, and for every success or failure of the
former the latter was exclusively responsible —
not merely in a technical and Parliamentary
sense. Not only were both pursuing the same
object, but, so far as was possible at a distance
of 6000 miles, their methods were adopted in
2 M

546 FROM THE RAID TO THE WAR
concert and after consultation. They were equally
anxious to reach a satisfactory settlement, and
equally determined, if Peace could not be pre
served, that the final provocation should not be
given by Great Britain.
Morally, when two nations are going to fight,
it does not matter which of them says the last
word or strikes the first blow. Practicahy,
however, in a country governed by public opinion,
it is important, when a serious War is In view,
that the enemy shall be made to put himself in
the wrong. It was, therefore, a Diplomatic
success — which must be scored to the joint
credit of Mr Chamberlain and Sir Alfred Milner
— that they so conducted the negotiations that
the Ultimatum which began the War was issued
by the Boers, who fohowed up that Initial blunder
by an immediate invasion of British soil. Strate
gically, no doubt, they had no other course open
than to start without delay on their long-con
templated inroad on Natal. But it turned many
wavering minds In England. The language of
menace and the act of aggression killed any
lingering sympathy with the Boers, and many
Radicals who had preached forbearance and
magnanimity before hostilities broke out agreed,
on nth October, that nothing could be done
except avenge a wanton insult. Even the
Continental advocates of the Boer cause, except
those on the subsidised Press, admitted that
their protdgdes, by this blunder, had compelled
the British Government to enter on a war of
subjugation. That we should fail In the under
taking our candid friends hoped and believed,
but that we must make the attempt, or with
draw from South Africa and see our Colonial
Empire break up by degrees, was universally

THE CONDITION OF NATAL 547
admitted. For this initial advantage — that we
could say without fear of contradiction that we
were fighting in self-defence — the country was
Indebted to the much-criticised Diplomacy of Mr
Chamberlain and Sir Alfred Milner.
Once the War had begun the Immediate
responsibility of Mr Chamberlain for the greater
part of South Africa was partially suspended, and
his activity was chiefly displayed in such matters
as supervising the administration of the Concen
tration Camps and place of refuge provided for
Boers who had "come in" voluntarily. In the
management of these humanely Intended insti
tutions, he was able, when the first difficulties
had been surmounted, to suggest certain im
provements and, with characteristic disregard
for official procrastination, to see that they were
promptly carried into effect. His vigour In this
respect was warmly applauded by generally
hostile critics, especially as it gave them a chance
of having a fling at other servants of the Crown
whose intentions, no doubt, were not less benevolent
than those of the Colonial Secretary, but who
were not equally gifted with the indefinable power
of "getting things done." The praise given on
such terms has been contemptuously repudiated
by Mr Chamberlain.
The defenceless condition of Natal when the
War broke out was due to no neglect on the
part of Mr Chamberlain or his predecessors in
Downing Street — it was the result of a too early
concession of Self-Government to that very loyal
and progressive Colony. The problem of de
fence had not been properly concerted between
the War Office, which was well acquainted
with the strategical difficulties, and the local
Ministry, which had not troubled Itself about a

548 FROM THE RAID TO THE WAR
danger that appeared too remote for "practical
politicians." Mr Chamberlain had at an early
stage pledged himself to the Natal Government
that the Colony would be defended with the
whole force of the Empire, and on this they
relied. This promise, not unnaturahy, was literally
interpreted, and taken to bind us to defensive
operations within British territory. Though
the Commander-in-Chief in South Africa was, so
far as the Imperial Government were concerned,
absolutely unfettered in discretion, it was im
possible to resist the pressure apphed by the
Colonial Ministry. In passing judgment on the
initial misfortunes of the War, it should be remem
bered that the British officers considered that
their first duty was to save Natal from being
overrun by the enemy. In that object the
"Ladysmith Entanglement" was at least suc
cessful. Whether the result was too dearly pur
chased, is a question that need not be discussed
here. During the War Mr Chamberlain kept a
close watch upon the political situation at the
Cape ; but during the earlier stages of the con
flict, the separate responsibility of the Colonial
Secretary was in suspense. We may pass to
December 1900 when, the two Colonies having
been formally annexed, he Interested himself in
the question of Peace, and prepared for the
still greater problems of the approaching Settle
ment. A strong note of friendliness to the
Boer people now reappears in his communica
tions to the High Commissioner, who paid a
brief visit to England and was raised to the
Peerage in the following year. The negotia
tions between Lord Kitchener and Commandant
Botha at Middelburg In February 1901 were

THE TREATY OF VEREENIGING 549
unsuccessful. Our terms were refused, and Mr
Chamberlain had to announce that they were
withdrawn. Nevertheless, he set to work actively upon
the task of reconstruction, defining in a Despatch
of 2nd August 1 90 1, the lines on which the
future Government of the two Colonies should be
administered. Lord Milner was relieved of the
Governorship of Cape Colony, and appointed
Administrator of the Orange River and Transvaal
Colonies. Sir David Barbour was sent to inquire
into the finances and prospects of the newly
acquired territories. Other Commissions were
instituted to report on the prospects of Land
Settlement, and to investigate the validity of the
Transvaal Railway and other Concessions. By
these and similar methods a vast mass of know
ledge and instructed opinion was cohected in
view of the expected Peace. From the sum
mary, given below, of the terms of the Treaty
of Vereeniging, ist June 1902, it will be seen
that, although the submission of the enemy was
fairly complete, the obligations assumed by the
British Government were by no means incon
siderable. It was agreed — (i) that all Burghers in the
field should forthwith lay down their arms and
recognise King Edward VII, as their lawful
Sovereign ; (2) that ah Burghers outside the
Transvaal and Orange River Colony, and all
prisoners of war should, on formally accepting
their position as British subjects, be restored as
soon as practicable to their homes, and (3) should
not be deprived of their personal liberty or their
property ; (4) that no civil or criminal proceedings
should be instituted against any of the surrender
ing or returning Burghers for acts arising from

550 FROM THE RAID TO THE WAR
the prosecution of the War (except certain acts
contrary to the usages of war) ; (5) that the
Dutch language should be taught In all public
schools in the two Colonies If the parents of the
children should desire it, and should be permis
sible In Courts of Law ; (6) that the possession
of rifles should be allowed to persons who required
them for self-protection, and who took out licences ;
(7) that Military Government should be succeeded
as soon as possible by Civil Government, and
that Representative Institutions, leading to Self-
Government, should be Introduced as soon as
circumstances should permit ; (8) that the question
of giving the franchise to natives should not be
settled unth after the introduction of Self-Govern
ment ; (9) that no special War tax should be laid
on the two Colonies; (10) that a Commission,
in which the local inhabitants were represented,
should be appointed in each district to assist the
restoration of the people to their homes, and
supply their immediate and other wants : that the
British Government should grant ,1^3,000,000 for
this purpose, and should allow notes issued and
receipts given by officers of the late Republics to
be presented to a Judicial Commission appointed
by the Government, and, if it were found that
valuable consideration had been received, they
should be treated as evidence of War losses ; that,
in addition to the free grant of ,^3,000,000 the
Government should make advances on loan, free
of interest for two years, and afterwards at 3
per cent, — but not to any foreigner or rebel.
As to rebels from Cape Colony and Natal,
Lord Milner undertook that any who surrendered
at once, would, on their return to their homes, be
dealt with according to the laws of the Colony to
which they belonged. The Cape Government

THE CAPE CONSTITUTION 5r,l
had decided that rebels of the rank-and-file should
be disqualified for ever from the exercise of
political rights, but that Justices of the Peace,
Field Cornets, and other officials of the Cape
Government should be tried for high treason and
punished according to the discretion of the Court
except that in no case should the penalty of death
be inflicted. Roughly, no doubt, that Instrument repre
sented Mr Chamberlain's view of an equitable
arrangement, though personally, perhaps, he
would have been inclined to insist upon a capitu
lation absolutely unqualified. While whllng to
treat the Boers with even greater hberahty than
was promised them, he believed that every
concession on the part of the British Government
should be made as a matter of grace. This, of
course, was sound in Itself but financial con
siderations and military advice were against it.
If the Boer Leaders had chosen to break off
negotiations they could, undoubtedly, have delayed
for some months the final subjugation of the
country, and each month of guerriha operations
would mean several millions of money. The
price was too high to pay for the vindication
of abstract principle, and this was realised as
fuhy by the Colonial Secretary as by any of his
colleagues. He felt, too, that his reputation in
the annals of the British Colonies as a construc
tive Statesman would rest not upon the text of
the Treaty — which was a matter for the whole
Cabinet- — but In the use to be made of the great
opportunity thus placed in his hands.
No point In Mr Chamberlain's South African
pohcy has been viewed with more serious mis
givings by his Imperialist supporters than his
refusal, last year, to ask for the suspension of

552 FROM THE RAID TO THE WAR
Constitutional Government in Cape Colony, It
was pointed out that the Premier, Sir J, Gordon
Sprigg, could only maintain himself in office by
co-operation with the Afrikander Bond, and,
though his personal loyalty was never called
into question, he was denounced as a trimmer
by nature as well as in virtue of his admittedly
precarious position. Nor could it be denied that
many of those whom he sought to conciliate
were more than suspected of complicity with the
Cape rebels, while others, though taking no
overt part In the actual conspiracy, had scarcely
attempted to conceal their sympathy with con
structive sedition.
These were arguments not to be lightly over
ruled at a time when the Ink was hardly dry
on the Treaty of Peace, while there were still
a considerable number of " stalwarts " in every
South African Colony not unwihing to renew
the guerrilla operations, and while the Dutch
Party as a whole were already clamouring for
an enlargement of the concessions made in the
Vereeniging Convention, The position of the
Loyalists in Cape Colony had been no more
than tolerable even while they were protected by
the operation of Martial Law ; and persecution
would be commenced in every district where the
Dutch held a majority if Representative Institu
tions were at once revived. These considera
tions did for a time prevail with Lord Milner,
In that view the Colonial Secretary did not
concur. It was essential, in his opinion, that the
Imperial Government should not be chargeable
with taking sides between the two Parties at
the Cape, and that the Dutch should have_ no
excuse for saying that they did not get fair
play. This was a more urgent need than the

RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 553
avoidance of Parliamentary friction at Capetown,
while It would always be possible, at short notice,
to prevent — by force if necessary- — the execution
of any dangerous measures that might be pro
posed by a Bond majority.
Two minor influences tended in the same
direction. In the first place, the legal term of
the Cape Parliament's life was nearly at hand,
and it would be time enough to interfere with
Constitutional Government should the result of
the General Election bring the Bond Extremists
into power. Secondly, to suspend the Cape Con
stitution it would be necessary, if not to pass
an Act of the Imperial Parliament, at least to
obtain the sanction of the House of Commons,
and this would involve a renewal of political
strife at Westminster just when all Parties had
more or less agreed to assist Ministers in
their development of a policy of conciliation
and reconstruction. On the whole, then, the
balance of advantage pointed to the temporary
and provisional maintenance of Constitutional
procedure, and to giving the moderate men in
the Dutch and British Parties a chance of work
ing out a m-odus vivendi. The success of the
scheme remains to be tested by events, but,
against any possible drawbacks that may ensue,
must be set the certainty that, had the opposite
policy been followed, the division between Parties
in the Colony would have been more sharply
accentuated than before — the Moderates on each
side being forced to support the Extremists.
Though it would have been comparatively easy,
for a term of years, to administer the Colony
from Downing Street, through the High Com
missioner, and under the bayonets of a strong
British garrison, the Dutch malcontents, if they

554 FROM THE RAID TO THE WAR
had been excluded from the right of open agita
tion, would have been driven Into secret con
spiracy, and every month during which an
autocratic regime was kept up would defer
the date at which the old Democratic system
could safely be restored. Moreover, it was a
policy that would certainly be reversed as soon
as the Unionist Party here should have been
thrown out of power. For these reasons, if
for none others, it was decided to give another
chance to Representative Government in the
most turbulent Colony within the British Empire.

CHAPTER XV*
the west INDIAN COLONIES
Though Mr Chamberlain has as yet been un
able to accomplish great results in the West
Indies, It can at least be said that he has pre
pared the way for important developments in the
future. His time and energy, since he became
Colonial Secretary, have been heavily taxed by
vaster and more urgent problems than those
which claim the attention of Statesmen in the
Caribbean. But he has initiated a new era, and
quickened the stagnant populations, by his force of
wih, his power of direction, his sympathetic under
standing of their needs and difficulties. Years must
pass before these beautiful but unfortunate Colonies
show an appreciable advance in material prosperity
and social evolution. But an impetus has been
given to the Island and mainland communities,
which Is felt not less by the black labourer at the
base of the social pyramid than by the white
planter with his uncertain foothold on the summit.
Mr Chamberlain has Impressed his personality
upon the minds of the mixed races who inhabit
the Archipelago and the ferthe mud flats leading
to the terraced uplands of Raleigh's "magnifi-
* For this and the following Chapter, as well as for much
valuable help on South African and Colonial topics gener
ally, the author is indebted to Mr H. Whates, editor of
The Politician's Handbook.
555

556 THE WEST INDIAN COLONIES
cent province." They know him to be a thinking,
contriving, operating force, not an official abstrac
tion, not an automatic figure-head of a great
bureaucratic system, as so many of his pre
decessors at the Colonial Office had been to
them. By the policy he has thought out for
them, and successfully recommended to Parlia
ment, and by the measures he has thus far
taken to give it practical effect, he has turned
the mood of the West Indian peoples from
despondency and fear to hope and courage.
But, except for this change of temper and
outlook, they are as blighted by poverty and as
incapable of self-help as they were before he went
to Downing Street. No Statesman wields a
magician's wand. That Mr Chamberlain has
been unable to perform a miracle, and convert
the West Indies from a state of chronic distress
into rich and progressive communities, is due
partly to conditions rooted in an unhappy past,
partly to climatic, racial, and other natural
factors which will persist to the end of time.
It is these historical causes and natural pheno
mena which make the work of the Statesman
who would restore the lost glories of the West
Indies so arduous and so slow to bear fruit. In
order to show the nature of the problem that Mr
Chamberlain had to handle, it is desirable, before
describing what he has done, briefly to suggest
such broad generalisations as will suffice to create
a mental picture of the British West Indies. They
lie in the Tropics, under a sun so fierce that the
white man will not labour in the open. Seen from
the Atlantic, the islands are, for the most part,
of rare beauty. The mainland Colony of Guiana,
as approached from the ocean, is, however, almost
repellent — the sea discoloured with alluvial, the

CONDITIONS OF THE PROBLEM 557
land showing only an Interminable line of courida
bush : not until the 40-mile belt of mud flats is
crossed do the successive elevations stretching
backwards and upwards begin. The area of the
entire group is something under 1 1 7,000 square
miles. The islands range in size from Jamaica
with more than 4000 square miles to a cluster
of islets scarcely worth separate identification.
Except for Barbados, every inch of which is
cultivated, and where the negro population is
so dense that the eye rests nowhere without
seeing human forms, there are but few signs of
occupation beyond the harbours and the eashy
accessible coast lands. The whole group of
Colonies contains less than 1,750,000 in
habitants, of whom only a few thousand are
whites. The negro is In overwhelming preponderance,
and, despite all that is said of his sloth, he does
the bulk of the work of the Colonies, though in
Guiana, and in a lesser degree in Trinidad, the
mainstay ofthe sugar industry is in the East Indian
immigrants. Negroes, people of every shade from
the mulatto to the Creole with but the faintest
" touch of the tarbrush," indentured immigrants
from Central and Southern India, Chinese, Portu
guese, originally from Madeira and the Cape de
Verde Islands, red men from the primeval forests
— now a dying race — and a sprinkling of whites,
make a kaleidoscopic picture in a West Indian
street. Though the conditions of each Colony
vary as to population and pursuits, they are all
broadly alike in their dependence upon agricul
ture — in other words, save for certain field indus
tries in Jamaica and Trinidad, and for the nascent
gold and diamond workings of Guiana, upon
sugar. There are no manufactures. The trade

558 THE WEST INDIAN COLONIES
of the whole group is, in round figures, of the
annual value of ,^14,000,000 sterling.
Politicahy, tbe Colonies are ruled from Down
ing Street. The Crown Colony system, or a
modification of it, prevails. The official and
representative elements are almost wholly white,
and the sugar planters have hitherto been
predominant in the Legislative Councils and
with the Colonial Office. The owners of the
sugar properties are chiefly absentees. The
white population, therefore, in the main, con
sists of officials and European agents of pro
prietors who pay flying visits to their estates.
Broadly speaking, there is no permanent white
element — no aristocratic class which has any
other social Ideal in the West Indies beyond
that of extracting sufficient wealth to enable
them to return to England. Beneath this section
is the great mass of native labour — the Creoles
and negroes who must remain where they are
and live on the soh somehow, and the East
Indians, who are entitled to a return passage
to their homes, at the expense, if needs be, of
the Imperial Government. Apart from this latter
race, the few thousand Chinese, the Portuguese,
and the Aborigines — who are not a factor In the
problem, except in so far as the presence of hand-
fuls of nomads in the primeval silence of Guiana
may be thus regarded — the black and coloured
populations constitute the chief care of the
Government. Without them the West Indies are almost value
less to the Empire ; the future of the Colonies and
the future of the negro Inhabitants are one and
the same question. Now the West Indian negro
has reached a singular stage in the process of
evolution. His character has been profoundly

THE EMANCIPATED NEGRO 559
modified by exemption from slavery, by the
Infusion of white blood, and by the crude assimila
tion of Christianity and the social ideas of the
white race. But he has been grossly mismanaged.
Statesmanship set him free, but did nothing to
teach him how to use his liberty. It allowed
him to squat for half a century in the neighbour
hood of the sugar estates ; and the planters took
care that he should stih be economically dependent
upon them, and should be prevented from obtain
ing his own terms in the Labour market. This
they compassed by a policy of shutting him off
from the Crown Lands, by Importing coolies and
making the negro bear a disproportionate burden
of taxation. They aimed only at keeping their
estates In profitable cultivation.
Successive Home Governments took the
planter's limited view of West Indian problems.
Statesmanship subordinated itself to commer
cialism — a commercialism so narrow that the
structure of civilisation in the West Indies was
based on the shifting foundations provided by an
Industry whose extinction, under the combined Influ
ence of science and hostile tariffs, was always being
threatened. Danger was foreseen, but ignored.
Meanwhile, the negro, with the memory of slavery
tinging every thought, held himself aloof from the
white planter, except so far as sheer necessity
obliged him to work in the cane-fields ; and the
planter, naturally perhaps, had scant concern for
the black man, putting every difficulty in the way
of any policy other than that of stereotyping the
economic dependence of the negro upon the estates.
As for the intermediate class of coloured persons
— a class steadily being increased by unrestricted
miscegenation — they refused to work on the plan
tations at all, or to use such limited opportunities

560 THE WEST INDIAN COLONIES
as were open to them for tilling the soil on their
own account. They despised the black man and
aped the white, taking chiefly to clerical and
light occupations, and cherishing a sense of
grievance because the minor Government posts
were filled from Home. So long as the sugar
industry continued to be profitable, affairs drifted
on without disaster, the black and coloured popu
lation subsisting at a low level — economically
worse, in many respects, than that maintained in
the days of Slavery — but orderly and law-abiding,
though stirred by vague ambitions and discontents.
The whites deteriorated in wealth and vigour,
successive Governors finding themselves almost
powerless, because of the dead weight of planter
obstruction and of Colonial Office apathy, to carry
out any other policy than that which the sugar
owners thought — often shortsightedly — would
serve their exclusive interests.
These being the conditions of life in the West
Indies, it whl not be difficult to imagine what the
consequences of a collapse in the sugar industry
would be. The white population would withdraw ;
the Revenue would fail ; each Colony would become
bankrupt ; and the Imperial Government would be
left with a group of Possessions of unbounded
natural fertility, with nearly two million blacks and
coloured persons unable from ignorance and help
lessness to become self-reliant, and almost certain
to relapse into barbarism as gross as that from
which their Pagan progenitors were taken In the
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries.
It was with this prospect before him that Mr
Chamberlain took office in 1 895. These were the
conditions on which he had to act in the West
Indies, complicated, as events were to show, by
disastrous hurricanes, and, in St Vincent, by de-

THE SUGAR INDUSTRY 561
vastating volcanic eruptions. He was deluged
with clamorous representations of present distress
and Impending ruin. A vigorous agitation was
set on foot throughout the West Indies in the hope
of obtaining assistance from the Mother Country —
the help to take the form of countervailing Duties
on imported Bounty-fed sugar. Mr Chamberlain
received these petitions with tactful sympathy ;
but before devising any machinery for relief he
determined to get at the facts of the matter by a
thorough and Impartial investigation. The result
was the appointment of the Royal Commission,
of which General Sir H. W. Norman — a former
and distinguished West Indian Governor — was
Chairman, his colleagues being Sir David
Barbour, an ex- Indian official of great financial
and administrative experience, and Sir Edward
Grey. The Commissioners were instructed to ascer
tain whether, as a fact, the sugar industry was in
danger of extinction ; if so, they were to define the
causes, and say whether, if these were removed,
the business could be carried on profitably not
withstanding the Bounty system. They were to
report whether. In the event of the discontinuance
of sugar cultivation, other industries could be
established — a branch of the question upon which
they were to look for guidance to Dr Morris, of
Kew, who was attached to the Commission as
botanical expert. They were also to consider
what effect the total or partial extinction of the
sugar industry would have upon the community
in the West Indies, and what subventions by way
of relief would be necessary.
The Commissioners spent the spring of 1897
in the Caribbean Sea, and their Report was
promptly published. They found that the siigar
2 N

562 THE WEST INDIAN COLONIES
industry was In danger of great reduction,
and, in some of the islands, of extinction.
This was due principally to the competition
of Bounty-aided beet sugar. The abandonment
of estates was going on, and. If continued, would
cause distress among the labouring population,
and render the greater number of the Colonies
unable to provide without external help for
their own government and administration. In
Barbados, Antigua, and St Kitts, there were
no industries that could completely replace
sugar. In Jamaica, Trinidad, British Guiana,
St Lucia, and St Vincent, other industries might
In time, and at the cost of much displacement
of labour and consequent suffering, be substituted
for sugar. As to losses of Revenue from the cessation of
sugar cultivation, only Jamaica, Trinidad, and
Grenada could be expected to meet from their own
resources the expenditure likely to fall on them.
The Commissioners thought the best immediate
remedy would be the abandonment of the Bounty
system by Continental nations ; but, in view of
possible Tariff changes and the cheapening of
the cost of the products of beet sugar, they
were not sure that, even if Bounties were
abolished, another crisis of a similar character
might not arise hereafter. For a variety of
reasons they were unable (Sir H. W. Norm.an
dissenting) to recommend the imposition of
countervailing Duties on Bounty-fed sugar
imported into England. As to special remedies
or measures of relief, they recommended the
following :—
( I ) The settlement of the labouring population
on smah plots of land as peasant proprietors ; (2)
the establishment of minor agricultural industries,

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 563
and the improvement of the system of cultivation,
especially in the case of smah proprietors ; (3)
the improvement of the means of communication
between the different islands ; (4) the encourage
ment of a trade in fruit with New York, and, pos
sibly, at a future time, with London ; (5) the
grant of a Loan from the Imperial Exchequer for
the establishment of central factories in Barbados.
The subject of emigration from the distressed
tracts (they reported) also required the careful
attention of the various Governments, though
they did not find themselves In a position to make
recommendations in detaU. They calculated the
cost of the special remedies recommended In (2),
(3), and (4), at ;i^2 7,000 a year for ten years, the
expenditure to be borne by the Mother Country.
They estimated the amount of the Loan to Bar
bados for the erection of central factories at
;^i 20,000. This measure, no doubt, involved a
risk of loss. Grants would be required in
Dominica and St Vincent for roads, and to enable
the settlement of the labouring population on the
land to be carried out, and the amount might
be taken at ;^30,ooo. A further Grant of about
^60,000 was required to clear off the floating debt
in some of the smaller islands — which should,
in addition, receive Grants to enable them to
meet their ordinary expenditure of an obligatory
nature. The amount might be placed at ;^20,ooo
a year for five years, and possibly a reduced
amount for a further period of five years. The
expenditure which the Commissioners were able
to estimate might be summarised as follows : —
(i) A Grant of ;^27,ooo a year for ten years.
(2) A Grant of ;^20,ooo a year for five years.
(3) Immediate Grants of ;^6o,ooo and ;^30,ooo,
or j^go.ooo in ah. (4) A Loan of ;^i 20,000 to

564 THE WEST INDIAN COLONIES
Barbados for the establishment of central factories.
As to the amount of expenditure which It might be
necessary to incur in relieving distress (especially
in British Guiana and Barbados) in promoting
emigration, and in supporting and repatriating
East Indian immigrants, they were unable at
present to form any estimate, but it might be
very great if there occurred a sudden and general
fahure of the sugar industry In Barbados and
British Guiana, where the population was com
paratively large, and the people so dependent
upon the cultivation of the sugar-cane. In such
a contingency neither British Guiana nor Bar
bados would be able to meet the necessary cost
of administration, for, probably, a considerable
number of years.
A little exercise of the faculty of imagination
will enable the reader to judge the magnitude as
weh as the complexity of Mr Chamberlain's task.
Essentially it was this : how best, by timely politi
cal action and financial help, to prevent the West
Indies from becoming a group of pauper com
munities and a permanent drain upon the Imperial
Exchequer. He set to work on two parallel lines
— first, the removal of the element of unfair com
petition created by Bounty-giving Powers, and,
secondly, the utilisation of the natural resources of
the Colonies by the population.
Mr Chamberlain used the Report of the Com
mission as an unanswerable argument with the
Treasury — which would have to provide the funds
In the event of a collapse in the West Indies — for
summoning yet another International Conference
on the Bounty System. Lord Salisbury took the
lead in getting a Conference together, and it met
at Brussels in June 1898. The Cabinet, however,
with an excess of caution due to fears of Free

THE BRUSSELS CONFERENCE 565
Trade agitation, which certainly were not enter
tained by the Colonial Secretary, dechned to arm
our Delegates with the one weapon by which the
Bounty-giving countries could be brought to reason
— a threat that If the Bounties were continued
retaliatory action by the British Government would
follow. Sir F. Plunkett, Sir H. Bergne, Lord
Ampthlh, and Mr E. C. Ozanne (with whom Sir
Neville Lubbock and Mr G. Martlneau were
associated as expert advisers) were instructed to
maintain "an attitude of reserve" on this point.
There was some fencing at the Conference, but
the other States declined to be impressed by an
attitude so feeble and mysterious, and did not
believe that the British Government was or
would be in earnest in "prosecuting any ulterior
measures," the Conference came to nothing. Our
Delegates returned empty-handed. But when Mr
Chamberlain cannot carry a position by a frontal
attack he does not rest until he has found an
opening on the flank.
The condition of Mauritius supplied him with
an opportunity. The sugar industry of that island
was languishing because Its product had been
excluded from India — its chief market — by imports
of Bounty-fed sugar from Europe. The dangers
there were similar to those in the West Indies.
Mr Chamberlain represented them to the Indian
Office, and Lord George Hamilton referred the
matter to Lord Elgin. The Viceroy's answer
was that, though the Indian Government was
prepared to join an International Conference
on Bounties, it did not see its way to levy
countervaihng Duties in the Interests of Mauritius.
Again Mr Chamberlain had to wait, but when
Lord Curzon of Kedleston became Viceroy, in
1898, and the Brussels Conference had proved

566 THE WEST INDIAN COLONIES
abortive, he attacked the subject vigorously,
plying the India Office with representations as
to the critical condition of Mauritius and the
West Indies — the latter, be it noted, a profitable
labour market under the indenture system for
some of the surplus population of the East.
The new Viceroy boldly reversed the policy of
his predecessor, and, in March 1899, passed a
Bih through the Council imposing countervailing
Duties forthwith.
Mr Chamberlain had thus done a good stroke
of business for Mauritius (and incidentally for the
native sugar producers of India) and had made
it clear to the Bounty-giving Powers that he did
not mean to ahow our Colonies to be further
injured by an indefensible system of competition.
Having thus inserted a tolerably thick wedge,
he proceeded to drive it home, finding Incon
trovertible arguments against inac-tion in the
increasing financial straits of the West Indies,
which were undoubtedly going from bad to worse
— a fact the planters did not permit either the
Colonial Office or the pubhc to forget. Reinforced
by further facts, by sheaves of Resolutions from
the West Indies, Anti- Bounty Leagues and the
like, Mr Chamberlain again concerted with his
coheagues, with the object of obtaining a resump
tion of the Brussels Conference on such conditions
as were likely to render failure improbable. The
Delegates were reassembled early in 1902, the
British representatives on this occasion being
empowered to announce that retaliation against
the Bounty system would be adopted by our
Government. In consequence of this action an
agreement was reached with Germany, Austria-
Hungary, Belgium, Spain, France, Italy, the
Netherlands, and Sweden for the suppression of

BOUNTIES AND RETALIATION 567
Bounties on exported sugar from ist September
1903. A Convention embodying this result was
signed on 5th March, and a Bill to carry its pro
visions Into effect was passed last Session (1903).*
The Convention has been sharply criticised in
ah the countries which are parties to it (Russia
and the United States, It will be observed, did
not attend the Conference), and in no country
has it been more sharply attacked than in England,
not so much because of any Infringement of the
principles of Free Trade, as because its critics
consider it as being badly drafted and more pro
vocative of mischief than conducive to the com
mercial advantage of the Empire. Mr Gibson
Bowles has been the most Ingenious of Its assail
ants, and it must be admitted that the holes he has
picked in it are not easily to be mended. Be that
as It may, Mr Chamberlain had succeeded, so
far as Diplomacy could succeed in such a task. In
removing from the West Indies a crushing dis
ability. He had secured the abolition of Bounties
In Europe, thus uprooting what the sugar interest
regarded as the primary. If not the sole, cause of
its troubles. The gratitude of the planters did not deter
them from claiming further assistance, on the
plea that it was impossible for them to live without
help until September 1903. This was afforded
them In 1902, when Mr Chamberlain obtained
from Parliament a subvention of ^250,000 to be
used in making advances to enable the cultivators
to keep their estates going until they should
receive the expected benefits from the Conven-
* Mr Chamberlain took an active part in the discussions.
The Measure, it should be mentioned, was attacked as an
infringement of Free Trade principles and defended as a
practical vindication of them — as helping to bring about the
sale of sugar at its natural value.

568 THE WEST INDIAN COLONIES
tion. Telegrams of thanks and congratulation
poured in upon Mr Chamberlain from the West
Indies. The Convention was everywhere recog
nised as his work — as the result of his personal
grasp of West Indian problems, his sympathetic
comprehension of the needs of the islands.
" Accept grateful thanks, results Brussels Confer
ence," " Thanks for persistent efforts to obtain
fair play for the sugar industry of British
Colonies," " High appreciation and thanks . . .
for untiring efforts and strong interest evinced
in promoting general welfare," " Congratulations
and thanks for your good services," "Grateful
thanks for your services," " High appreciation
and gratitude " — these, and many more hke them,
were the messages from legislative bodies and
pubhc meetings. Never had a Colonial Minister
been so popular — certainly not in the West Indies,
where it had long been the fashion to think bitterly,
and speak and write sneeringly, of the Colonial
Office. Never had these Colonies been in so
grateful and pleasant a mood ; never so less
mindful had the sugar interest been of its grudge
against the Parent State for having liberated the
slaves — at a fancy valuation from the standpoint
of an Imperial taxpayer, but with contemptible
niggardhness from that of the " old time " sugar
lords. Within the Colonies themselves, the chief
problem of Statesmanship is, if possible, to make
the negro populations self-supporting in the event
of further restriction ofthe area of sugar cultivation.
The Commissioners had recommended the creation
of a negro peasant proprietary — the throwing open
of the Crown lands, the systematic settlement of
the people under conditions in which they could at
least grow their own food, and produce for ex-

INDUSTRIAL PROSPECTS 569
port. To a limited extent, and in Jamaica to a
liberal degree, there was a peasant proprietary
in each of the Colonies already ; but the negro
peasant had, generahy speaking, been left to find a
way to prosperity for himself; and this the West
Indian negro, in the mass, is unable to do, for he
is a child both in character and Intellect, and must
be guided and even pushed along the path of pro
gress. It was little good putting him on the land
without teaching him how to make use of it.
Dr Morris, the technical adviser of the Com
mission, had mapped out a scheme for the estab
lishment of a Department of Economic Botany
and for Agricultural Instruction. Mr Chamber
lain put this into operation, and placed Dr Morris
at its head. That gentleman has since been at
work with a competent staff, extending the useful
ness of the existing botanic stations — alike for the
sugar planters and fohowers of the minor industries
— establishing new stations, encouraging in a
variety of ways the theoretical and practical study
of agriculture, and endeavouring, through the
elementary schools, to raise up a generation of
Creoles who shall not consider It derogatory to till
the soil. It was a vital part of the scheme that it
should be In operation for ten years : it wih be
time enough to talk about results when It has been
at work for thrice that period. But something has
already been done in remodehing the system of
education, and in the practical teaching of Tropical
agriculture. Should the sugar industry at any
future time fah, the foundations will have been laid
for industries by which the negro can at least
avert starvation. If he does not do so he will
suffer by his own fault ; and nothing could be
worse for the negro than to be relieved from
economic compulsion to labour.

570 THE WEST INDIAN COLONIES
Having set the new Department at work, Mr
Chamberlain stirred up the stagnant waters of
West Indian officialdom, directing economies, ex
penditure on roads, and means of communication,
and, generally, breathing new life and vigour into
the Administrations. He tried to interest British
capitalists in the starting of central factories, to
which the peasant should sell the crops of the cane
farms ; but the time was not ripe. Capital was
shy, the owners of it preferring to wait until the
Bounty system should have fallen. In like manner,
Mr Chamberlain had endeavoured to encourage
the flow of capital for the exploitation of the
mineral and other resources of British Guiana ;
but though a company was locally formed with
the object of obtaining a charter from the Crown,
the matter fell Into abeyance.
Though with these larger projects ever in view,
Mr Chamberlain worked steadily at practical and
immediate reforms, helping the more distressed
Colonies by Grants in aid of Revenue, establishing
an Inter-Colonial steamer service, and, while keep
ing a tight hand on local expenditure, pushing
forward such public works as were likely to facili
tate settlement in the Crown lands. His labours
were complicated In 1898 by a severe hurricane
which devastated part of Barbados, St Vincent,
and St Lucia, and caused heavy financial loss
and acute distress. Relief measures were
promptly put in action, a Mansion House Fund
opened, and the Islands thus enabled to tide over
the crisis. Ordinances were passed for granting
loans to assist the sufferers to re-start cultivation ;
and on this matter Mr Chamberlain's business
instincts acted as a wholesome check upon the
fondness of the West Indian for putting his hand
into the public purse without giving sufficient

THE FORCES OF NATURE 571
security for repayment. Nearly ,2^45,000 was
sent to thc islands from the Mansion House, and
in the following year Mr Chamberlain Introduced
and carried through the House of Commons a
Colonial Loans Bih by which, inter alia, ,3^100,000
was advanced to Barbados and St Vincent under
the provisions of the local ordinances. Unhappily,
this hurricane was not the only disaster which
hampered Mr Chamberlain in his attempts to
promote the welfare of the West Indies. In
May, 1902, there occurred the terrible eruption of
Mont Pelee — destroying the town of St Pierre,
and reducing the French Colony of Martinique
to a volcanic ruin — and the scarcely less violent
outburst of the Soufrlere of St Vincent, a disaster
in which 2000 British subjects, mostly negro
settlers, lost their lives. Again, Mr Chamberlain
had to organise Relief measures, and once more
the Lord Mayor opened a Fund to enable the
survivors to repair the losses they had suffered.
The details of the Colonial Secretary's action need
not be entered into : it is enough to say that his
measures were energetic, and that his sympathy
was not only verbal, but also practical and effec
tive. Further eruptions occurred during the year,
and the Northern portion of the island of St
Vincent was rendered uninhabitable.
Mr Chamberlain has thus had to reckon not
only with economic depression but also with havoc
wrought by the violence of nature. Cataclysms,
such as certain parts of the West Indies have
experienced, re-act to the disadvantage of the
whole group of Colonies. Capital draws no fine
distinctions between the regions which are volcanic
or lie in the path of cyclones and those which are
exempt from such, risks. Guiana, Jamaica,
Trinidad, and other Colonies where nature is

572 THE WEST INDIAN COLONIES
pacific, are liable to remain unfertilised by British
gold because others in those latitudes are subject
to catastrophe. This fact, no doubt, has had
much to do with Mr Chamberlain's comparative
failure to stimulate the flow of fresh capital to
these "undeveloped estates."
Another factor is to be found in distrust of the
vigour and competence of the local Administrations.
Mr Chamberlain has done a great deal to remove
this feeling by showing that Colonial Office con
trol is a reality — that the local Councils are not to
be allowed to mismanage their affairs at their
own pleasure. Jamaica furnishes the most con
spicuous case in point. Its finances when he
came into office were in deplorable confusion, and
bankruptcy was impending. After the Royal
Commission had done Its work, and, incidentally,
had revealed the fact that some of the misfortunes
of the island were self-inflicted, he sent Sir David
Barbour to discover what retrenchments were
advisable. Sir David's report was, in effect, an Indict
ment of the Government of the island, which. It
should be said, has a majority of Elective members
on the Legislative Council, and hankers after a
restoration of Representative Institutions, for which
the population had been, and stih is, quite unfitted.
The island Government was blamed for taking
over the Railway, and entering into a contract for
its extension, and it was shown that the official
element had been unable to prevent a bad bargain
being made, drastic recommendations were made
for reorganising the Revenue and Expenditure,
and more vigilant Imperial control was suggested.
To the disgust of the Elective members, Mr
Chamberlain acted upon this Report, directing
fresh Revenue legislation, and plainly informing

POLITICS IN JAMAICA 573
the people that henceforth he would exercise
control over their finances. To enable him to do
this, he instructed the Governor (Sir Augustus
Hemming) to nominate members of the Legis
lature, and keep them there to pass such Votes
and Measures as the Colonial Office might regard
as of paramount importance. The Elective
members talked of resigning in a body. Mr
Chamberlain took no heed of the outcry beyond
controverting the arguments submitted to him by
local pohtical associations. When the Elective
members made difficulties about passing the new
Tariff Bill which he had required of them, four
unofficial ¦ members were nominated, so as to
enable the Government to outvote the Electlves.
Thereupon the agitation came to an end. Pledges
of reasonable behaviour were forthcoming, and on
the strength of these the Nominated members
were, on the initiative of the Governor, withdrawn,
and the Bill was passed.
For a time the situation was disagreeable, for
the amour propre of the Jamaicans was wounded,
and there is a good deal of latent political
feeling in the Colony which excitable persons might
have turned to mischievous account. The Gover
nor became very uneasy as to the consequences of
a prolongation of the dispute. A weaker man
than Mr Chamberlain might have given way, and
let the islanders blunder on from bad to worse.
Not only their interests, however, but also those
of the Imperial taxpayer, were at stake, for actual
insolvency would have meant heavier drafts upon
the Home Exchequer ; and Mr Chamberlain was
not the sort of man to temporise with such a
sltiiatlon. " Let It be clearly understood," he
telegraphed, " that it is my Instruction that
Government Measures, when fully considered and

574 THE WEST INDIAN COLONIES
judged of paramount Importance, must be passed."
He was not pleased that Sir Augustus Hemming
had arranged matters with the Electlves and
withdrawn the Nominated members without his
sanction ; both then and later he threatened that
Constitutional changes would be made if the
Elective members were again obstructive. Since
then affairs have quieted down. Jamaica has
paid the price of Imperial assistance in the form
of political obedience. Under the rigorous control
of the Colonial Office, financial stability is
once more in sight. The Island, indeed, has a
tolerably safe future, even if her sugar mills
should cease to crush the cane.
It is the fault of her own people that her
fortunes are not more secure than they are. By
their indolence they have done much to bring dis
credit upon their fruit industry. If it had not
been for American enterprise, the fruit trade of
Jamaica would be of smah account ; and the
trouble that the Americans have had to drive
into the Jamaican brain the fact that fruit for
export must be skilfuhy selected, and carefully
picked and handled, would scarcely be credited in
any ordinary white commercial community. This
is not, however, the place to enter into that
question : what we are concerned with is Mr
Chamberlain's policy of encouraging a direct
fruit trade between Jamaica and England, where
the people have acquired a taste for the banana,
and would be far greater consumers of the
fruit but for the rapacity of the urban shop
keeper, who, particularly in the West End of
London, has made "a dead set" against the
Jamaican product.
The story of the Colonial Secretary's efforts is
summarised in the contract made in April 1900,

THE TRADE IN FRUIT 575
between the Crown Agents for the Colonies and
Messrs Elder, Dempster, & Co. of Liverpool. In
return for a subsidy of ;^40,ooo for the first year,
and ^30,000 a year subsequently, the con
tractors undertook to provide and maintain for
ten years a fortnightly service of British steamers
for the carriage of fruit, passengers, and mails,
between Jamaica and the United Kingdom, the
vessels to be of a fine type and equipment, with
accommodation for a hundred first-class, and fifty
second-class passengers, and special suitability for
the carriage of perishable produce.
The contract is an elaborate document which
need not be analysed In detail. It is a good
example, however, of Mr Chamberlain's method
of pressing business principles into the service
of Statesmanship. He saw that there were
various ways in which Jamaica could be assisted
— that what she needed was direct fast steamship
communication with England, for the double
purpose of finding a market here for her fruit,
and of stimulating the tourist traffic to the island,
and that she required more skih in the choice and
shipment of the fruit, and better hotels In which
to lodge the tourists. The contract provides for
all these things. The shipowners, for example, are
bound by stringent conditions as to the purchase
and freight rates of fruit, and manner of carriage ;
and they have to provide, for the duration of the
contract, not less than six experienced agents for
the instruction of fruit growers, in cultivation,
harvesting, and packing. Should the Colonial
Government enter into the business of hotel
ownership, the contractors are to pay one-fourth
of the outlay on hotels, provided that their liability
does not exceed ,^10, odd. The transaction was
with the Imperial Government, and the subsidy

576 THE WEST INDIAN COLONIES
is paid in equal shares by Great Britain and
by the Colony.
The services were inaugurated in February
1 90 1, the shipowners being, it should be said,
under the obligation of carrying 20,000 bunches
of bananas — a bunch as cut from the main stem
of the plant — every fortnight. During the twelve
months of 1 901 -1902, the Direct Line carried
643,846 bunches, of the value of ;^48,288, and
over five and a half million of oranges, of the value
of ;^7294. The total value of the fruit carried in
the holds of these vessels in the period under
review was ;^59,074, ids. The Royal Mah Line
carried, in the same time, fruit to the value of
;^5524. The fohowing passage is taken from
Mr Sydney Olivier's last published Report on
Jamaica : —
" So far as the actual addition made to the
volume of the fruit trade is concerned, the effect
of this experiment might not appear considerable.
The quantity of bananas carried is less than one
quarter of the mere increase in the export of that
staple for the year, and had the fruit not been sent
to England it would doubtless have gone, though
possibly at some loss of price, to the United States.
Important results have, however, been achieved,
in regard to the development and prospects of the
fruit-growing industry. It has been proved that
bananas can be carried to England in a marketable
condition. It has been proved that a large demand
for them may be expected at a paying price, and
an independent Company has been formed to run
without a subsidy, a second fortnightly service for
the purchase of from 30,000 to 40,000 bunches
each trip. It is recognised by ah concerned that
if such ventures are to be successful the volume
of the trade must be multiplied by a large factor.

LOANS AND SUBSIDIES 577
and those who have invested large capital in the
enterprise are well qualified and determined to
effect this. As yet, however, the value of the fruit
exported to England is little more than 6 per cent.
of the total. For the sale of the balance we have
stih to rely entirely on the American market." *
Tbe English market, however, should be able
to take as much West Indian fruit as the American.
That depends on three factors — the degree of intel
ligence that the Jamaican growers, packers, and
shippers put into their business, the growth of
the taste for tropical fruit in England, and the
facihties for distribution to the consumer at a
cheap rate ; and in this last matter the coster-
monger with a barrow-load of bananas is a better
friend to the West Indies than the West End
shopkeeper, who endeavours to restrict trade to
such fruit as he can handle at a large profit.
Nor was it only by pledging Imperial resources
to the development of the fruit trade and tourist
traffic that Mr Chamberlain sought to benefit
Jamaica. The Colonial Loans Act of 1899 bore
an item of ;^65,ooo for public works, such as the
sewering and street reconstruction of Kingston ;
another of ;i^i 50,000 in aid of Revenue; another
of ;^ 1 98,000 for the completion of the railway and
payment of Interest on debentures of the line, and
yet another of ;^40,ooo for waterworks and irriga
tion services. People who are disposed to sym
pathise with the agitation in Jamaica for the
restoration of fuh Representative Government wih
* Since this Report was published the prospects of the
Island have been ruined, for, at least, another year, by a
terrible hurricane in August 1903. In order to provide
against such disasters it has been proposed to set up, with
Government guarantee, a system of public insurance —
the planters who refuse to contribute being disentitled to
relief.
2 O

578 THE WEST INDIAN COLONIES
doubtless, when reflecting upon these figures and
the extent to which the British taxpayer has come
to the assistance of the Colony, agree with Mr
Chamberlain that Colonial Office control Is just
and necessary. That the Imperial investment wih
be remunerative in the long run there is good
reason to believe. The £i 10,000 advanced to
Trinidad under the Colonial Loans Bih for rail
ways and public works is, for example, as sound a
business transaction as any entered into on behalf
of Jamaica. As for the Imperial assistance granted to the
West Indies on account of the failure of Revenue
and special circumstances such as hurricanes and
eruptions, the money has been spent with the
object of averting the necessity for stih greater
disbursements In the future, for the Imperial
Government, even if it wished, cannot escape
from Its responsibilities in the West Indies. Their
condition is due in some measure to past neglect
in Downing Street, as well as to the want of
self-reliance. Initiative, and energy in their popu
lation. The whites had been brought to poverty
partly through the fahure of the Home Govern
ment to redress the injustice caused by the
bounty system ; the negroes were wrenched from
their West African homes under the sanction of
the Imperial Government, and freed by the
Government against the will of the class which
by ownership of them had become responsible for
their welfare. After emancipation they had been
left to get on as best they could without the
care and guidance which their condition and
prospects called for. It was with the approval
of the Imperial Government that the Asiatic
element was Imported into the region, and with
the connivance of the Home authorities that

AN IMPROVED FEELING 579
the entire group of Colonies was administered
primarily in the interests of a single industry.
Imperial responsibility is written In large letters
from Jamaica to Guiana, and what this would mean
— in cash to be taken from the pockets of the
English taxpayer — In the event of further retro
gression in the West Indies it is not easy to
estimate. It has been Mr Chamberlain's task
to avert that obligation, to bring Parliament to
realise the possible liability, and to act with large,
but yet prudent and business-like, liberality.
He has succeeded so weh that no one whose
judgment is worth considering Is any longer
content to let the West Indies drift into ruin
and anarchy — and that is what would have
happened in time, for the negro, bereft of the
capital and guidance of the white man, would
relapse into barbarism almost as rapidly as an
abandoned cane-field becomes covered with the
rank undergrowth of the Tropics. Mr Chamber
lain's work has been attended by such good
result In the Colonies themselves that the
whites are no longer thinking of abandoning
their properties, but, on the contrary, are looking
forward to a new era of comparative prosperity ;
and the negroes, the coloured people, and the
Asiatics have the prospect of a certain livelihood,
either as labourers for wages or as independent
peasant cultivators. Though it is yet too early
to say that the sugar Industry in the West Indies
is permanently saved, and that the economic and
social dangers attending its extinction may not
even yet confront some future Government,
these Colonies are no longer travehing full speed
astern, as they were when Mr Chamberlain
assumed the direction of their course in 1895.

CHAPTER XVI
west AFRICAN POSSESSIONS
When Mr Chamberlain took office he found
that the barbarous rule of King Prempeh con
stituted a barrier which had to be broken down
before the Gold Coast Colony could be regarded
as safe from savage aggression. The martial and
valiant Ashantis had forgotten the lesson taught
them by Sir Garnet Wolseley a score of years
before, and, not content with repudiating their
Indemnity obligations, had again blocked the
trade with the interior upon which the prosperity
of the Coast Colony was dependent. Remon
strances were useless, and the then Governor, Sir
W. E. Maxwell, urged the necessity, on defensive
grounds, of bringing the Ashanti Confederacy to
reason. There was also a broader reason for a forward
pohcy. The French Government were actively
at work, extending their West African Empire
from Senegal behind the British Colonies, and it
was only a question of time for Ashantiland to
fah into their hands. The question was not
merely whether we should allow Prempeh to
cripple the trade of the Gold Coast, and en
deavour to sweep the white race into the sea
from the North, but also whether we should
permit such conditions to continue as would favour
680

ASHANTILAND TROUBLES 581
French ambitions at our expense — if, Indeed, these
would not, in the long run, make it obligatory
upon France to deal with Prempeh, and add his
territories to the French domain. While these
difficulties were coming to a head, the Rosebery
Government had temporised with them, sending an
Ultimatum which Prempeh insolently defied, but
taking no decisive action.
Mr Chamberlain made up his mind that
Ashanti truculence should be tolerated no
longer, and that the French policy — a perfectly
legitimate one — of hemming in the Gold Coast,
should be counteracted by a seizure of the
Hinterland. To give Prempeh one more chance,
he sent a Mission requesting him to accept
a British Protectorate and receive a British Resi
dent at Kumasi. He was ahowed until 31st
October 1895 to comply with this demand. Act
ing under the advice of two Coast negroes, " Prince
John " and " Prince Ansah " — two products of
missionary schools who had intrigued themselves
into Prempeh's confidence, and placed their brains
and knowledge of civilisation at his service —
Prempeh turned the Mission back. Meanwhile,
these two negroes came to London in the hope
of turning Mr Chamberlain from- his purpose.
Sir William Maxwell had, however, kept Mr
Chamberlain informed of the true status and
character of the sable envoys, and the Colonial
Secretary shut the door of Downing Street upon
them. No answer being forthcoming to the Ulti
matum, an Expedition was prepared by the end
of the year, and on 5th January 1896, Sir Francis
Scott led it into Ashantiland. To the astonish
ment of every one, he had a peaceful promenade
to Kumasi, which was entered on 17th January.

582 WEST AFRICAN POSSESSIONS
The King was found In a drunken state, and it
was probably due to his cowardice and lack of
the vigorous qualities which had distinguished
his predecessors on the Stool, as weh as to dissen
sions among feudatories who rejected his authority,
that opposition had not been offered to Sir Francis
Scott's little army. The wariike spirit of the
Ashantis seemed to have evaporated. The King
was compelled to make his submission amid
circumstances of humiliation such as would im
press the imagination of his people. For the
first time in the history of this fierce con
federacy, the head of an Ashanti Ruler was
placed beneath the foot of the European. The
scene in the market-place of Kumasi, and the
mihtary spectacle by which the lesson of British
mastery was enforced, the reeking Fetish
slaughter grove, where the Pagan gods of the
Ashantis had been lavishly propitiated with
human flesh, in the vain hope of averting the
downfah of the Kingdom, need not be described.
It is enough to say that the King and his wives
were deported to the coast and exiled, a British
resident seated in his Capital, a Protectorate
proclaimed, and troops sent out Northward to
make it effective over the tributary Chiefs of
Ashanti. France, meanwhile, was pushing down from
the North, and there was a race between the
British and Senegalese forces to estabhsh effec
tive occupation over as large an area of Hinter
land as each could traverse. The chief obstacle
to both was a powerful Arab slave-trader named
Samory, who raided and plundered In the spheres
of both Powers impartiahy. Our occupation
of Wa led to a dramatic incident. Lieut.
Henderson and Mr Ferguson, a civilian official,

THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES 583
went out from that station to visit certain distant
tribes with whom Treaties had been made,
and were attacked in overwhelming strength by
Samory. They fell back upon Wa, and were
besieged there. Lieut. Henderson went alone
into Samory's camp to treat for peace — one of
the pluckiest of many courageous acts in the
obscure story of West African extension. Samory
kept him a prisoner for a month, and sent him
with an escort down to the coast. Wa had, how
ever, to be abandoned, and Mr Ferguson, who
unfortunately had been wounded, was dropped
and left by his carriers during the retreat, and
decapitated by the enemy. An Expedition under
Col. Northcote was sent later on, but Samory
was in trouble with the French, and had moved
away. The overthrow of King Prempeh was followed
by the inclusion of Ashanti in the British Empire,
and of the Northern regions beyond the King
dom, now known as the Northern Territories.
The result of Mr Chamberlain's "forward"
policy was to expand the Gold Coast Colony
and Hinterland by more than 100,000 square
miles, with a population of over 2,000,000. Un
fortunately, the Golden Stool of Ashanti remained
secreted among the tribes, and the inabhity to
discover it led later on to serious difficulties.
Before, however, these developments are described,
it wih be weh to see what Mr Chamberlain did
to consohdate British authority In the region,
and prepare the way for its commercial develop
ment. Colonel Northcote, who subsequently lost
his life in the South African War, was made
Commissioner and Commandant General of the
Northern Territories, and, pending the frontier
arrangements with France, pushed out columns

584 WEST AFRICAN POSSESSIONS
in aU directions to make our occupation effective
among the recalcitrant feudatory tribes of Ashanti,
and against the ever active Senegalese who were
carrying the French flag into the British sphere.
District Commissioners were stationed through
out the Protectorates, and stringent legislation
passed for the suppression of traffic In arms, and
of native assemblies that menaced the pre
servation of Peace. Coincident with this mihtary
and executive activity, surveys were undertaken
for the construction of railways through the
mining and timber districts, and on to Kumasi.
Government stores were established to Inculcate
in the people of the interior a taste for merchan
dise (spirits, by the way, were excluded from the
Protectorates), encouragement given to traders
and prospectors, and a Land Bih passed for
regulating cessions of territory for mining.
Some of this work meant heavy Imperial grants,
which Mr Chamberlain had to justify in the House
of Commons, but the results were satisfactory.
The mining industry of the Gold Coast Colony
received a remarkable impetus — such an impetus,
in fact, that it attracted certain speculators on
the Coast, and in the City of London, against
whom Mr Chamberlain eventually found it desir
able to warn the Investing public. Trade also
increased, and, with the settlement of the political
difficulties with France, an era of peace and pro
gress seemed to have set in for the Colony.
Amid these circumstances, the railway projects
were steadily prosecuted, and in the Colonial
Loans Act of 1899, a sum of ;!^578,ooo was
allotted to the line from Sekondi to the gold-
mining district of Tarquah, and for preliminary
work in connection with lines from Tarquah to
Kumasi, from Appam to Kumasi, and from

THE GOLDEN STOOL 585
Accra to the Volta ; and a further sum of ;^98,ooo
for improving the harbour at Accra.
The prospects of the Colony were, however,
suddenly overshadowed by a formidable Ashanti
rising in the Spring of 1900. The Governor,
Sir F. M. Hodgson, whose administrative
experience had been solely with negroes of a
pacific type, seems to have conceived the idea
that valuable service would be done to the
Empire If he could unearth the sacrosanct Ashanti
Stool. He does not appear to have been kept
adequately informed of the true state of feeling
among the Ashanti Chiefs and people, who had
various grievances, and, more or less secretly, were
burning to obliterate the disgrace they conceived
themselves to have incurred by yielding to the
British power in 1896 without resistance. In
this state of ignorance and optimism, he went to
Kumasi, accompanied by Lady Hodgson and a
smah body-guard. The grievances were to be
disposed of, the Stool brought to the Coast, and
the Ashantis, deprived of their renowned symbol,
reduced for ever to childhke submission.
There was a great assemblage of native Chiefs
at Kumasi on 28th March, when Sir F. Hodgson
lectured them in the imperious style which It is
safe to employ towards the negro only when he
knows that you possess the power to crush
him. In language picturesque enough for
comic opera. Sir F. M. Hodgson demanded an
instalment of the 50,000 ounces of gold that a
former generation of Chiefs had undertaken to pay
after the Wolseley Expedition, and the delivery
of the Golden Stool. "Where is the Golden
Stool ? " asked the Governor. " Why am I not
sitting on the Golden Stool at this moment ? I
am the representative of the Paramount Power ;

586 WEST AFRICAN POSSESSIONS
why have you relegated me to this chair ? Why
did you not take the opportunity of my coming
to Kumasi to bring the Golden Stool and give it
to me to sit upon ? "
The Chiefs, who had long been secreting arms
and ammunition, were not In a mood to be cowed.
When, therefore. Sir F. M. Hodgson, acting
upon information which seems to have been in
vented for the purpose, sent a detachment to
find the Stool in one of two villages supposed
to contain it, the Ashantis intercepted the troops
and they only found their way back to Kumasi
after severe fighting and with heavy loss. The
whole country rose in revolt. Sir F. M. Hodgson
endeavoured to negotiate with the Chiefs, but
they would have nothing to say to him, and
besieged Kumasi. Fortunately, a body of 700
native troops were able to get into the place before
the investment was completed, and thus the risk
of Kumasi being rushed was reduced ; but the
situation Mr Chamberlain had to deal with was
humhiating as weh as critical. The Governor had
placed his head in the jaws of the Ashanti
monster. Mr Chamberlain acted with his characteristic
promptitude, pouring troops Into the Gold Coast
from ah parts of South Africa. He entrusted
Colonel (now Sir James) Willcocks with the
command. But it was not until 26th May that
the Colonel could arrive at the coast, and June
passed before relief operations could be undertaken.
Meanwhile the Kumasi garrison were enduring
terrible straits with no hope of speedy alleviation,
and the Governor courageously determined that
their only chance was to break out of the place
or perish in the attempt. They had borne a close
siege for two months, and death was preferable

THE WILLCOCKS EXPEDITION 587
to starvation amid the horrors and stenches of
Kumasi. Leaving a garrison in the Fort with
provisions for twenty-four days, they filed out
on the night of 22nd June, and almost miracu
lously got through the enemy's stockade without
being annihilated. A few days' marching and
fighting through the bush brought the column
to the friendly King of N'Kwanta, and thence,
after a rest, they reached the Offin River, which
they crossed in flood and obtained comparative
safety in the Gold Coast Colony.
When the news of the Governor's escape
reached Colonel Wihcocks at Fumsu on 4th July
— whither he had had to fight his way amid terrible
difficulties — he telegraphed to Mr Chamberlain
that, under any circumstances, he would relieve
Kumasi by 15th July, at which date the provisions
would all have been consumed by the garrison.
He kept his word, fighting ah the way, rushing
stockade after stockade, and successfully accom
plishing as arduous and dangerous bit of work
as had ever fallen to a West African Commander.
He found the garrison reduced to the last
straits : nor did the re-establishment of British
authority at Kumasi end the War. Almost the
entire Northern territories had to be conquered
as weh as Ashantiland proper, and not unth the
end of the year, and then only after very severe
fighting, in which the Ashantis showed their
traditional courage and skih, and in which several
British and native officers brilhantly distinguished
themselves, was the rising quelled.
In a mhltary sense the work was thoroughly
and, so far as can be foreseen, finahy done. The
Ashantis had never before been soundly beaten.
The Wolseley Expedition had burned the Capital
and hastened back to the coast ; dissension among

588 WEST AFRICAN POSSESSIONS
the Chiefs and the inebriate cowardice of
Prempeh had reduced the Scott Expedition to a
promenade ; but this time the Ashantis were hit
so hard that — so, at least, it seemed and stih
seems — we need never fear another Ashanti
revolt on a grand scale. When Sir F. M. Hodg
son returned to England on leave, he wrote
an interesting Despatch in defence of his action,
the point of it being that the Ashanti Chiefs had
long premeditated and prepared for revolt, and that
he had not known of it.
In Sierra Leone also Mr Chamberlain had to
grapple with an alarming rebellion. An agree
ment with France in 1895 bad secured for the
Colony a Hinterland about as large as Ireland,
and swarming with negroes of an independent
type of character. The problem before the
Colonial Office was twofold — that of pohcing
and administering the region, and getting out
of it at least some proportion of the cost of
Government. The tribes, in fact, were to pay
for their own police. As they had no very
ardent desire for white protection, the problem
of taxation was not easy.
The Governor of the Colony was Sir
Frederick Cardew, a military man with a clear
appreciation of hard facts, and a somewhat heavy
hand. He and Mr Chamberlain devised a Pro
tectorate Ordinance under which each hut was
to pay a tax of five shiUings a year, and the huts
of Chiefs ten shilhngs. The Frontier Police were
employed as tax-collectors, and trouble broke out,
the natives finding a capable leader in a chief
named Bai Burch. There is the usual conflict of
evidence as to whether the rebehion was really
due to the Hut Tax, or whether it was not an
attempt to expel the British from the interior

TROUBLE IN SIERRA LEONE 589
because of the official suppression of slave-raiding
and other practices inconsistent with European
ideas. Bai Burch's supporters murdered ah the
white missionaries upon whom they could lay
hands, and massacred friendly natives without
compunction. Punitive operations fohowed, and
there was much inglorious fighting, extending
over many months before Bai Burch was cap
tured and the country subdued.
Meanwhile, people in England loudly com
plained that the Hut Tax was an injustice, and
that Mr Chamberlain and Sir F. Cardew had
blundered into bloodshed. Before the War was
over Mr Chamberlain so far yielded to the
criticisms on his policy as to appoint the late
Sir David P. Chalmers to inquire into the cause
of the insurrection, and to recommend what
should be done In the future. Sir David
Chalmers had seen many years' judicial service
in a part of the Empire where the negro has for
gotten how to fight. He took a philosophic
rather than a practical view of his mission, and
produced a Report crowded with irreproachable
sentiments. It was, in effect, a condemnation,
on broad principles of abstract justice, of the
pohcy of the Colonial Office. He did not
believe that interference with the Slave Trade
was a factor in the rising. He attributed
the troubles to Sir F. Cardew's high-handed
treatment of the Chiefs, and the imposition
and not always tactful enforcement of the Hut
Tax ; and as to the injustice and inexpediency
of that impost, he took a view which Bai Burch
himself could hardly have improved upon.
Sir David suggested that punitive operations
should cease, that a general Amnesty should be
proclaimed, that the edifice of administration by

590 WEST AFRICAN POSSESSIONS
District Commissioners should be razed, that
the Chiefs should be restored to authority, that
the Frontier Pohce should be withdrawn — that,
in short, the Hinterland should be left to itself
except for such missionaries as might be en
couraged to settle in it, who were to be sub
sidised by Government, if they would add the
teaching of simple handicrafts and the growing
of vegetables to the theological instruction which
they gave to the negroes. It was a charming
Report, Instinct with the warm-hearted humani-
tarianism of a pious Scotch gentleman, who
had won the respect and admiration of all who
knew him in the course of his long and dis
tinguished career In the service of the Crown ;
but it was out of harmony with certain ugly
facts. The reasons on which this criticism is
based, may in part be found in an elaborate
controversial analysis of the Report by Sir F.
Cardew. It is enough to say that, had Sir
David's recommendations been acted upon, the
British power would have become a negligible
quantity In the Hinterland.
With such a Report before him, Mr Chamber
lain had to make up his mind whether Sir F.
Cardew should be removed, the Hut Tax revoked,
and the interior left almost to itself, or whether
Sir David Chalmers' Report should be disre
garded. He decided upon the latter course, and
set forth his reasons in a Despatch of unwonted
vigour. Its general argument was that the obliga
tions of Great Britain under the General Act of
the Berlin Conference made it incumbent upon us
to police and administer the interior ; that what
the natives needed was firm and direct control, that
the rising had shown the necessity for that control
being strengthened rather than weakened, that the

THE HUT TAX QUESTION 591
Hut Tax was equitable and well within the tax
able capacity of the people, and that the policy and
conduct of Sir F. Cardew had on the whole been
just, and such as the circumstances demanded,
A decision such as this is best judged by its fruits,
and the only comment which need here be made
is that the Hut Tax has since been cohected with
out trouble. The country was pacified without
very great difficulty after Bai Burch fell into
British hands, and events have since justified Mr
Chamberlain's policy.
The War, no doubt, might have been averted
if we had disregarded our obhgations under the
Berlin Act, as weh as our political and commercial
interests in this part of West Africa : most
quarrels can be avoided if one of the parties wih
meekly suffer self-effacement. But Mr Chamber
lain is remarkable for the readiness with which
he incurs rather than evades responslbhity ; with
such a man at the Colonial Office, the estabhshment
of a permanent British administration in the
Hinterland was inevitable, be the local risks small
or great. They were faced, and they were over
come. Mr Chamberlain had the necessary faith in
himself to pursue his policy to its logical conclusion,
notwithstanding the arguments of his own Com
missioner and the attacks upon the Colonial Office
to which that document gave official sanction. And
the result is that our authority in the interior is
unlikely to be seriously contested in future, and
that the natives are themselves contributing about
;^30,ooo a year in Hut Taxes to the maintenance
of the Protectorate.
The trade of the Colony naturahy suffered
from the War, and recuperation has been slower
than was hoped ; but Mr Chamberlain has done
what he could to help the country on the path

592 WEST AFRICAN POSSESSIONS
of progress. Under the Colonial Loans Act,
Sierra Leone obtained ;^3 10,000 for the exten
sion of the railway from Freetown vid Rotofunk
to Moyamba. This line is now open for a length
of over fifty miles, and a further extension of
eighty miles is in course of construction. From
first to last the Imperial Government has author
ised Loans amounting to over ,^^900,000 for this
railway, which is expected not only to facilitate
trade with the interior, but also to simplify the
work of administration there. As the mihtary
expenditure on the Protectorate has been over
;^20,ooo a year since 1898, and the civil expendi
ture has increased from about ,j^io,ooo to ;^24,ooo,
some years must elapse before the Protectorate can
pay its way. But the Revenue has risen from
nearly ^8000 in 1898 to over ,^38,000 in 1901,
and, given a continuance of Peace, Sierra Leone
and the Protectorate may be expected to attain a
satisfactory level of prosperity, though, in the
most favourable circumstances, it is not so promis
ing a field for development as some neighbouring
estates of Empire. No Colonial Minister can,
however, alter the geographical and racial con
ditions in which he has to work. He can but
make the best of them.
Wherever one turns in West Africa, it will
be found that Mr Chamberlain has had to sup
press turbulence and savagery. The rifle, the
bayonet, and the Maxim have been the necessary
precursors of the civil administrator. Peaceful
development has not been possible. Where
Mr Chamberlain's hand has not been forced by
native truculence, he has been led into conflict
by the ardour of his subordinates. The massacre
near Benin is a case In point. That an unarmed
party, without escort, should have proceeded

THE BENIN MASSACRE 593
to that Ju-ju stronghold was a rashness such
as Englishmen often commit. Phihips, Maling,
Cawford, Campbell, Ehiot, Powis, and Gordon paid
for their error with their hves ; only Boisragon and
Locke escaped the slaughter which overtook the
leaders and the little column of carriers. A puni
tive expedition was, of course, necessary, and this
was brihiantly carried through by Rear-Admiral
Harry Rawson, who found the city of Benin little
better than a shambles. A wide district was
relieved from the terrorism exercised from Benin.
The Chiefs from the surrounding districts seemed
only too glad to make their submission ; but two
notorious headsmen — Ologbosherl and Abohun —
who had been directly implicated In the massacre
remained in the fastnesses of the Delta swamps.
It was at this stage that Mr Chamberlain, by
the transfer of the Niger Coast Protectorate from
the Foreign to the Colonial Office, became per
sonally responsible for the administration. He
authorised a further Expedition, which this time
went out from Benin city ; and this, in 1899, broke
up the camps of the Chiefs, and pacified a wide
area which It had not been safe for the white
man to enter. Ologbosherl was captured, and,
after trial, in which his personal responsibihty
for the massacre of the Phihips party was de
monstrated, he was executed.
Here we may trace the course of events
which led to an area of 500,000 square miles,
and a population of about 30,000,000, being
added to Mr Chamberlain's charge. France had
sought to assert sovereignty on the Niger within
the British limits as defined by the Anglo-French
Agreements of 1889 and 1890 — that is to say,
within the Say-Barua hne from the Niger to
Lake Chad, and within the Hinterland of Lagos.
2 p

594 WEST AFRICAN POSSESSIONS
The Royal Niger Company had — from no fault
of its own — failed to make good its Treaties
with native potentates by planting its flag and
establishing residents in the Sultanates ; and
ambitious French officers, working with aggres
sive energy for the creation of a vast North
African Empire for France, flew the tricolour
within the British sphere, disregarding prior
Treaties with the Niger Company because they
had not been followed up by "effective occu
pation." The question brought the two nations into
sharp controversy. Into the detahs of the diplo
matic dispute which ended In the Convention of
June 1898, we need not enter. Mr Chamberlain
took a strong and definite line. In various speeches
In the House and outside he described how our
West Coast possessions had been limited by the
lateral French advance from Senegambia, how
the Gold Coast and Lagos were threatened by
the French intrusion into their Hinterlands, and
how necessary it was to make a stand against the
aggression of our neighbours in that region. He
denied that there was dissension in the Cabinet ;
but, rightly or wrongly, the public believed that,
but for Mr Chamberlain's insistence upon Colonial
interests, an arrangement might have been made
less advantageous to Great Britain than the
Convention which Lord Salisbury was eventually
able to conclude. Under this instrument France
evacuated Boussa and all places on the lower
Niger up to and including Ilo, but retained
Nikki, in what we had claimed to be the Lagos
Hinterland, and was given access to the right bank
of the Niger by bonded warehouses in strips of
territory leased to her. A compromise was also
made as to the Gold Coast Hinterland, and it was

ROYAL NIGER COMPANY 595
arranged with France that for thirty years we
should have equality of tariff treatment with her
subjects East of Sierra Leone.
The credit of this settlement, which is
described only in broad outline, belongs not less
to Mr Chamberlain than to Lord Salisbury. Its
effect was to complete the enclaves which the
French advance had made of our West African
Possessions, and to define their boundaries
subject to expert delimitation. This being done,
it became desirable, for the better avoidance of
future disputes, to establish direct Imperial ad
ministration over the vast area in which the
Royal Niger Company had made Treaties, and
in which It had, to a certain extent, established
jurisdiction — its latest achievement in this direc
tion being the overthrow of the hostile Fulah
power in the Emirates of Nup6 and Illorin.
The Charter of the Royal Niger Company was
therefore cancelled in 1899, and on ist January
in the fohowing year the administration was
transferred to the Crown, the Company hence
forth confining itself to trading operations. The
Niger Coast Protectorate lost its official existence,
and Nigeria was mapped out into two Protector
ates — the Southern, from the Coast up to, roughly,
the 7th parallel of N. lat., and the Northern,
from that line to the curved Soudanese hne from
Ilo to Lake Chad. These were placed under the
Colonial Office, and Mr Chamberlain found a
vast additional area placed under his hands,
with one of the most remarkable aggregate of
populations that the world contains. "The debased
Pagans of the Delta live in the lowest depths of
savagery, while the Fulah Empire in the North,
resting on the broad superstructure of Hausa
dochlty, represents a level of civilisation which

596 WEST AFRICAN POSSESSIONS
is one of the surprises of modern African
history. On the one hand. Ju-ju terrorism in the
South had to be suppressed, as we have seen was
the case within the Benin region. In the North,
the Hausa population had to be freed from such
Fulanl oppression as was inconsistent with British
ideas of equitable government. But this must
be done without coming into disastrous conflict
with the Fulah power, which had its centre in
Sokoto City, and was then a factor of unknown
strength. The Slave Trade had to be ended,
without touching the question of domestic institu
tion, and thus producing a violent upheaval.
Vast regions from the left bank of the Niger to
Lake Chad were to be brought within the actual
as distinct from the nominal administrative area.
The Colonial Office has seldom had imposed
upon It a group of questions of greater danger
and delicacy than those thus accepted by Mr
Chamberlain. He obtained the advice of the best
experts — Sir George Taubman-Goldle, the ex-
chairman of the Niger Company, and the maker
of British Nigeria, who was taken into close
consultation, and Colonel (now Sir) F. Lugard,
who was sent out to organise the mhltary forces
on the Niger during the troubles with France,
and was now made Commissioner of the Northern
Protectorate. Mr W. Wallace, C.M.G., who
had been Sir George Taubman-Goldie's right-
hand man in the days of the Chartered Company,
and possessed an unrivalled knowledge of the
politics and high Fulah personages of the
country, was retained as political officer. Sir
Ralph Moor, who had successfuhy administered
the Delta strip was made Commissioner for
Southern Nigeria. In Lagos, whose affairs may

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 597
be grouped with those of Nigeria, Mr Chamber
lain had the help of Sir William Macgregor as
Governor; and in the Hinterland of this Colony,
between the Dahomey boundary and the Illorin
Emirate, there was much work to be done in
setting up the machinery of British administra
tion. The necessity here, as throughout Nigeria,
was to open out the trade routes to the Interior,
and in pursuance of this policy Mr Chamberlain
found it necessary in 1897 to authorise an expe
dition against the Jebus, which was success
fuhy carried through. A more effective method
was found in pushing forward a railway from
Lagos to Abeokuta, thence to Ibadan, and
thus towards the Niger. For this purpose Mr
Chamberlain included the sum of ,2^792,500
in the Colonial Loans Act, 1 899. On this project
— on bridges from Lagos island to the mainland
and on a tramway from Lagos to Iddo — the
Colony has incurred an indebtedness with the
Imperial authorities of ,1^1,053,700, which wih not
cover the entire cost of the hne to Ibadan and
of the surveys beyond, but this expenditure is
expected to be reproductive not only from com
mercial causes, but also from the lessened cost
and greater security of interior administration.
Leaving the Colony of Lagos with an inci
dental allusion to an Imperial loan of ,^43,500
which Mr Chamberlain secured for Harbour
Works at Old Calabar, we come to the work
done under the Colonial Secretary's direction
in the two Nigerian Protectorates. Where civi-
hsation and trade could not be pushed forward by
Diplomacy, progress was necessarily conditioned
by the amount of force locally available. In the
South the West African Frontier force numbered

598 WEST AFRICAN POSSESSIONS
I COO men, with artillery, and in the North about
2500, with three batteries of artillery. The
figures seem ludicrously smah when the extent
of the area for which we had become responsible
is taken into account. But within little more
than two years remarkable results have been
accomplished through its agency. Fulani
sovereignty is at an end, and the Fulah aristo
cracy is now an instrument instead of an
opponent of British policy.
In Southern Nigeria the untractable Aros,
who had held a wide stretch of country between
the Opobo and Cross rivers inviolate against the
trader and the administrator alike, were subdued
in igoi, after a brihiant and difficult campaign.
Humanitarian rather than commercial motives
were at the bottom of these operations, for Aro-
Chuku, the chief town, was a pestiferous strong
hold of Ju-Juism comparable with that which
had been cleared out at Benin. The natives
were thus finally freed from a system of
terrorism which it was Impossible to tolerate In
any region under the British flag. In the
Northern Protectorate administrative districts
were carved out on the hues of the existing
native States, and steady efforts made to extend
the administrative system Into the backlands
from the rivers. Yola, the capital of Adamawa,
a Kingdom lying on the left bank of the Benud,
between the river and the German Cameroons,
was the first important objective.
The only trade of the place was in slaves, in
which the Emir did a large traffic on his own
account, besides paying a tribute of (it was
reported) 10,000 slaves yearly to the head of the
Fulah Empire at Sokoto. Though he had made
a Treaty years before with Mr Wallace, he would

FRENCH ACTIVITY 599
have nothing to do with the European interlopers.
To the remonstrances of Sir F. Lugard he paid
no heed, and in 1901 an expedition was sent up
the river to bring him to reason. He fought
gallantly outside his town, and again within it,
but when the day was lost made good his escape.
A Resident and a strong garrison were quartered
in Yola, and slave-raiding In that region came
to an end, an Emir amenable to British control
being placed in nominal authority.
Across the river, in the very heart of Nigeria,
similar results were achieved, the slave-dealing
Emir of BautshI being deposed, and a new Emir
with a British Resident and garrison installed.
Farther to the West lay the great province of
Zaria, with a town second only in importance to
Kaii5, and here also a garrison was stationed.
The outposts of British authority had been
placed on the main lines of communication
with the cities of the North and were within
150 miles of Kano, the historic emporium of
the Western Soudan.
Meantime, however, the French had not
observed the Northern frontier line with
scrupulous care. Sir F. Lugard had found it
impossible to get on good terms with the Hausa
States there, and our rivals acted just as they
chose, without regard to British sovereignty.
They had, no doubt, serious difficulties to over
come, but that did not justify them in overriding
their Treaty arrangements with us. The situation
In brief was as follows : For some years Rabeh,
a western Soudanese marauder of the type of
Samory, had roamed about the neighbourhood of
Lake Chad, raiding both in the French sphere
and in Bornu. In 1900 he feh in action with
the French, and his dying command to his

600 WEST AFRICAN POSSESSIONS
son and successor, Fad-el-Ahah, was that the
protection of the British should be sought, and
that henceforth he should act under Sir F.
Lugard's administration. Fad - el - Allah, hard
pressed by the French, took refuge in Bornu,
and made overtures to Sir F. Lugard — overtures
cautiously received because of the inadvisabillty of
allying ourselves with the enemy of a friendly
Power. The matter was committed to Mr Wallace,
who sent Major M'Clintock to see Fad-el- Allah,
and report on the situation. Somewhat in
cautiously. Major M'Chntock, who was most
favourably impressed by Fad-el-Allah, presented
that Sovereign with a shot-gun, and this incident
was magnified to the French as a liberal present
of arms to be used against them. When, there
fore. Major M'Clintock returned to headquarters
in order to represent that Fad-el-Ahah should be
recognised as Emir of Bornu, the French forces
fell upon Fad-el-Ahah at Gujba, 150 miles within
the British border, and annlhhated his little army.
Fad-el-Ahah suffered the fate of hjs father, and,
instead of the British finding themselves with a
friendly Emir in Bornu, they learned that the
French were in victorious occupation of that Pro
vince, which to us was almost a terra incognita.
An international situation of some gravity had
thus been created by the local French officials.
Their action was known to be in accord with the
desires of the extreme Colonial party in France,
who sought such a rectification of the frontier
under the Convention as would give France the
Sultanate of Bornu and the whole of the Western
shores of Lake Chad. This claim was not, how
ever, sanctioned by the Quai d'Orsay, nor was
it one that we could admit, particularly after

SIR FREDERICK LUGARD 601
the invasion of our Sphere, for which the only
possible excuse was that we had not effectively
occupied it, and had left it as an asylum for a
redoubtable enemy of France.
The precise part Mr Chamberlain played when
these facts became known does not appear ; the
Foreign Office and the Colonial Office have been
singularly silent upon the subject, as indeed they
always have been upon Nigerian questions ; but
his views and action may be inferred from the
fact that arrangements were pushed forward
with France for the dispatch of a Joint Com
mission for the formal delimitation of the frontier
as defined by the Convention of 1898. Colonel
G. S. Elliott was the chief British member of the
Commission and Captain Mohl — a distinguished
name in West Africa — of the French. But in
order to secure the safety of the Commission on
its way to the scene of Its labours and while it
was at work, it was necessary that forces should
be moved from Zaria, and that the vast region
North, West, and East of that town should be
rendered British in fact as well as in name.
Mr Chamberlain, engrossed in South African
affairs, and being on the point of sailing for
Durban, necessarily had to leave the matter, so
far as the Colonial Office was concerned, in the
hands of Lord Onslow, as acting Secretary of
State for the Colonies. Sir F. Lugard failed
to take the Colonial Office sufficiently into his
confidence. He acted, apparently, on the
assumption that previous Despatches of his had
convinced his superiors that the Emir of Kano
at least would have to be deposed, and he
believed that he had a free hand to accomplish
this purpose and take whatever other steps he
thought to be prudent for the incorporation of

602 WEST AFRICAN POSSESSIONS
Sokoto and its feudatory Emirates into the
administrative system of Northern Nigeria. He
left the Government to learn from the newspapers
that the manner in which he Intended to secure
the safety of the frontier Commissioners was, in
the first place, to overturn the hostile Emir of
Kano, and that he had massed the Protectorate
forces at Zaria for that purpose.
When Lord Onslow asked whether this news
was true. Sir F. Lugard had to admit that It was ;
but he made out so strong a case for offensive
action — and there seems no doubt that the Emir
had long prepared for aggression on his own
account — that Lord Onslow could not but autho
rise the Expedition, though he strongly deprecated
warfare in West Africa if it could, by any
measures of Diplomacy, be avoided, and he
complained, not without good reason, that Sir
F. Lugard had not kept the Government more
fully Informed. As the Despatch formulating
British policy and rebuking the High Com
missioner was not Mr Chamberlain's production,
we may leave the controversial aspects of the
subject at this point. The Expedition under
the leadership of Colonel Moriand marched upon
Kano at the end of January 1903 and on 3rd
February, stormed the city, which was held
by 5000 foot and 500 horsemen. The Emir,
with 1000 cavalry, had withdrawn and made his
way to Sokoto, there, no doubt, to make common
cause with the new Sultan. Once the walls
were carried by the assault, there was little
fighting ; and Sir F. Lugard's forecast that
the Hausas in the city would desert their Fulani
masters and welcome the British advent was
justified by events.
Thus the great commercial city of the Western

SOKOTO OCCUPIED 603
Soudan — the starting point of the caravan routes
across the Continent to the north and east
— fell under British control. An Emir favourable
to the new administration was installed, a residence
and garrison stationed in the city, and authority
exercised therefrom over a wide area hitherto
closed against us. Colonel Moriand then led the
column against Sokoto, which was occupied on
15th March after a feeble resistance. The Ex
pedition thus broke down the last Important
barrier to British ascendancy from the coast to
the French desert area. With a force of less
than 1000 strong Sir F. Lugard had done much
more than it was expected he would be able
to do. In spite of occasional disorders, the fear
of a Mohammedan movement which would sweep
back the whites into the Delta need no longer
be entertained. Mr Chamberlain, who never
stints his subordinates of praise, spoke of this
achievement in terms of fitting generosity, and
the messages sent from the Colonial Office
doubtless made amends for the public remon
strance which Lord Onslow had administered
to the High Commissioner.
If this record does not include minor events
in West Africa, such as Sir George Denton's
disposal of the chief Fodi-Kabbah in conjunc
tion with the French in the Gambia River region,
and the countless administrative questions which
have arisen In the various West Coast Colonies,
enough has doubtless been said to indicate the
magnitude of Mr Chamberlain's work in this part
of the Empire, the vigour, the strength of wih,
and the liberal ideas which have characterised his
pohcy. The survey should not, however, be closed
without a reference to his efforts to improve the
sanitary and other conditions of life for Europeans.

604 WEST AFRICAN POSSESSIONS
The slow progress of these Colonies, as, indeed,
of those in every Tropical region, is attributable to
a climate which takes a heavy toll of European
life, and, where it does not kill, saps the intel
lectual vigour of those who brave its dangers.
The problem of Government is essentiahy one of
health, and to Mr Chamberlain credit is due for
having realised that the sanitary conditions
must be improved if development is to be hastened
in administrative and in commercial affairs. The
degree of progress depends upon the number and
quality of the white men, whether officials or
private adventurers, who can be attracted to the
region ; and this is a factor of even more import
ance than the influx of British capital. As a
rule, men who can make a good career elsewhere
avoid those parts of the Empire where disease and
premature death are probable contingencies.
There have been, and are, many brilliant excep
tions to the rule — exceptions due to ambition
for fame or gain, to the fascination that Tropical
Africa possesses for a certain type of mind, and
to an overmastering intellectual interest in the
problems of race and government which West
Africa presents for solution to the European.
Apart from purely administrative action, the
Colonial Secretary has accorded warm support to
the investigation of the causes of malaria. To
exterminate the mosquito is a formidable under
taking, and whoever has suffered from the pest in
the primeval swamps of the Tropics may well de
spair of success, and doubt whether, even if the last
mosquito were destroyed, malaria would cease ; for
to turn over the soil may alone bring on an attack.
But Major Ross seems to have demonstrated
beyond doubt that it is possible to diminish the
plague by protective measures against the par-

SANITARY MEASURES 605
tlcular variety of insect {Anopheles) proved guilty
of disseminating malaria ; and his work and that of
the Tropical School of Medicine in Liverpool have
had no more sympathetic and helpful supporter
than the Colonial Secretary. In connection with
the Seaman's Hospital at Greenwich also Mr
Chamberlain has been instrumental in establishing
a school for the study of Tropical Diseases, and in
conjunction with Mrs Chamberlain has alhed him
self with the scheme of Mrs Francis PIgott which
has grown into the Colonial Nursing Association.
These measures, however, touch but the fringe
of the great problem of health in West Africa.
In the future, Mr Chamberlain may have time
and energy to deal with it on a comprehensive
scale, perhaps as an essential part of a scheme of
administrative consolidation, whereby our West
African Possessions may be placed under a
Governor- General, with a Sanitary Commissioner
authorised to exact from each Colony conformity
with hygienic principles. Of one thing we may
be reasonably certain : we shah not henceforth
stand still In West Africa. Though Mr Chamber
lain has given a marked impetus to civilisation
there, and has accepted territorial and other
burdens which are tenfold what the Colonial
Office had to bear before he went to Downing
Street, he has, nevertheless, a greater task
before him than he has thus far been able to
accomplish — the task of consolidating Peace
within frontiers now definitively settled and
of justifying his optimism as to the future
of these vast estates. Hereafter it may be
necessary to reorganise the Governments of the
region on the lines of the Indian system, with a
Governor- General who shah impose upon each
Possession principles common to ah, and shall

606 WEST AFRICAN POSSESSIONS
control local administrative expenditure. That,
however, may or may not be. What is self-
evident, in view of the growing financial obllga^
tions of the Empire, is that West Africa must be
made to pay its way.
The cardinal point of Mr Chamberlain's
policy is that the neglected estates of the
Empire are worth developing as a matter of
Imperial business, apart from responsibilities of
ownership and political sentiment. So far as West
Africa is concerned, his work may thus far be
described as clearing the ground. Develop
ment has been made practicable by the estab
lishment of the Pax Britannica throughout our
West African domain. Cultivation has begun,
and it is now for Mr Chamberlain and his suc
cessors to proceed with it until the policy is
justified by its fruits. If there is good cause for
optimism, there is also some excuse for despond
ency. Tropical Colonies are ever alternating
between uncertain prosperity and almost hopeless
depression. It may even be doubted whether
the English people, in spite of their belief that
no other race is comparable with them in the
art of Government in climates and amid peoples
where the white man deteriorates and dies, have
quite mastered the right way in which Tropi
cal Possessions should be managed so as to
become continuously self-supporting. Though
the lesson has been learned in India, it certainly
has not been applied in other regions of the
Empire. At present the outlook is promising ;
and that anything so novel can truthfuhy be said
about West Africa is perhaps the best comment
upon Mr Chamberlain's labours In that region.
It should be added that some interesting and
instructive figures are contained in the second

THE COURSE OF TRADE 607
volume of the Annual Statement of the Trade of
the United Kingdom with Foreign Countries
and British Possessions, in which the results of
the year 1902 are compared with those of 1898,
1899, 1900, and 1901.
Gambia. — The value of our Imports in 1898
was ^54,229 ; in 1899 it was .^30,597 ; in 1900 it
was ;^2 2,372 ; in 1901 it was ,11^24,624; and in
1902 it was ;;^ 1 8, 589. The value of our Exports
in 1898 was ^69,510; in 1899 it was /^7o,ig4.;
in 1900 it was ,2^77,798 ; in 1901 it was ,^^58,294 ;
and in 1902 it was ^^93,865.
Sierra Leone. — The value of our Imports in
1898 was ;^I24,523; in 1899 it was ,7^150,960;
in 1900 it was ;i^i 38,258 ; in 1901 it was .1^127,909 ;
and in 1902 it was ^129,426. The value of our
Exports in 1898 was ,^258,818; in 1899 it was
^336,705; In 1900 It was ;i^282,568 ; in 1901 it
was ;^3o8,7i9 ; and in 1902 It was ^349,402.
Gold Coast. — The value of our Imports in
1898 was ,;^666,455 ; in 1899 it was ,1^706,047 ; In
1900 it was ^621,045 ; in 1901 it was ,1^373,168 ;
and in 1902 it was if 298, 387. The value of our
Exports in 1898 was ;if^487,456 ; in 1899 it was
;^6i5,738; in 1900 it was ^576,456; in 1901 it
was ^855,438; and in 1902 it was ;^i, 029,236.
Lagos. — The value of our Imports in 1898
was ;^i, 129,533; in 1899 it was ,^1,333,646 ; in
1900 it was ^367,631 ; in 1901 It was ,1^264,257 ;
and in 1902 It was ;^38o,866. The value of our
Exports in 1898 was ,1^528,586; in 1899 It was
£4^5,577' in 1900 it was ,1^530,166; In 1901 it
was ^473.447; in 1902 it was ,^574,263.
Niger Protectorate. — The value of our
Imports in 1898 was ;^377,545 ; in 1899 it was
;^4o6,696 ; In 1900 it was £987,717; in 1901 it
was ;^i, 164,622 ; and in 1902 it was ,1^1,164,303.

608 WEST AFRICAN POSSESSIONS
The value of our Exports in 1898 was ;^628,o75 ;
in 1899 it was ^607,866; in 1900 it was
;^68i,i6i ; in 1901 it was ,i^65i,42i ; and in 1902
it was ;^690,720.
The value of the Exports to these Colonies
from other countries than the United Kingdom
in 1902 was as follows: — Gambia, ,^6,813;
Sierra Leone, ,^25,242; Gold Coast, ,;^i45,ooo;
Lagos, ;^37, 468 ; Niger Protectorate, ;^i38,784.
To appreciate the significance of these statistics
it is, of course, necessary to compare the varia
tions in the Trade totals with the pohtical and
military conditions which were, in the course of
development, between 1898 and 1902.

CHAPTER XVII
downing street problems
A century hence, the historian of the British
Empire, conforming to the perspective of
accomplished facts, will, perhaps, devote as
much space to the pacific struggle that resulted
in the Australian Commonwealth Act of 1900
as to the sanguinary scramblings of the South
African War. The idea of Federation was half a
century old before Mr Chamberlain helped to
give it practical shape. It was embodied by Earl
Grey in the abortive Constitution Bih of 1850;
but neither then, nor for many years after, was
Australian or Enghsh opinion ripe for so bold a
proposal. Though the project was never dropped,
it lay practically dormant till 1889, when Sir
Henry Parkes, Premier of New South Wales,
convoked a National Convention to discuss a
scheme of Federal Government. In the following
year an Inter-colonial Conference was held at
Melbourne, which approved the principle : in 189 1
a similar body, meeting at Sydney, framed a draft
Constitution. But not till 1894 was any definite
progress achieved. In that year a Conference of
Australian Premiers, summoned by Mr Reid of
New South Wales, and held at Hobart, adopted
an " Enabling Bih " which gave New Zealand
the option of joining the movement. Even-
eo9 2 Q

610 DOWNING STREET PROBLEMS
tuahy, a Bih was framed which was submitted
to the popular vote in New South Wales,
Victoria, Tasmania, and South Australia, and
in each of these States obtained a majority —
though it was only a narrow one in the very Colony
whose Statesmen had been most active in pro
moting the cause. In 1899 an amended Bih
was put to a similar test. Though opinion was
stih divided in New South Wales, the majority
had largely increased, but in Queensland the
two Parties were nearly equal, while in Victoria,
Queensland, and Tasmania the adverse minority
was inconsiderable.
The question had now come within the range
of practical politics, nor is it necessary to discuss
the Inter-colonial rivalries and the fiscal difficulties
which had previously delayed its progress. It
was in obedience to a clear mandate from the
Australian States (New Zealand still stood out,
but Western Austraha came in) that Mr
Chamberlain introduced his Commonwealth Bih
on 14th May 1900. "We have got (he said) to
a point in our relations with our Self-Governing
Colonies when, I think, we recognise once
for all that our relations with them depend
entirely upon their free-will and absolute consent.
The links between us at the present time are
very slender ; almost a touch might snap
them ; but slender and slight as they are —
although we hope they will become stronger —
stih, if they are felt irksome by any one of our
great Colonies, we shah not attempt to force them
to wear them."
Mr Chamberlain's faith in personal inter
course as the best means of reconciling conflicts
of opinion was once more exemplified. When the
text of the Bill, as endorsed by the Referendum in

AUSTRALIAN FEDERATION 611
Australia, was sent to England, with the Addresses
praying the Crown to enact a measure of Federa
tion, Mr Chamberlain had requested that Delegates
should be authorised to visit this country and con
fer with himself and the Law Officers ofthe Crown.
In accordance with this suggestion the repre
sentatives appointed by the Colonies — Mr (now
Sir) E. Barton by New South Wales, Mr
Kingston by South Australia, Mr Deakin by
Victoria, Dr Dickson by Queensland, and Sir
Philip Fysh by Tasmania — threshed out all
preliminary matters in Downing Street ; and
when the Bih came before the House of Commons
there was but one important point remaining un
settled. This was Clause 74, which provided that
"no appeal shall be permitted to the Queen in
Council on any matter involving the interpretation
of the Constitution or of a Constitution of a State
unless the public interest of some part of Her
Majesty's Dominions other than the Common
wealth or a State are involved." Save as thus
provided, the prerogative to hear appeals as of
grace was to be unimpaired, but the Parliament
of the Commonwealth might make laws limiting
the matters in which special leave could be
asked. The point is concisely stated by Professor
Harrison Moore in The Commonwealth of
Australia (John Murray) : —
" The objections to these provisions were
obvious. The questions withdrawn from the
Queen in Council were precisely those on which,
in the words of the Law Officers, ' the Queen in
Council has been able to render most valuable
service to the administration of law in the
Colonies, and questions of this kind, which may
sometimes involve a good deal of local feeling,

612 DOWNING STREET PROBLEMS
are the last that should be withdrawn from a
Tribunal of Appeal, with regard to which there
could not be even a suspicion of prepossession.
The provisions of the section safeguarding the
Appeal where the ' public interests ' of other
parts of Her Majesty's dominions were con
cerned, were vague and uncertain ; and the
Commonwealth was receiving extended powers
of legislation which might well affect places and
interests outside Australia. Finahy, the Law
Officers urged that ' the retention of the pre
rogative to allow an Appeal to Her Majesty in
Council would accomplish the great desire of
Her Majesty's subjects both in England and in
Australia, that the bonds which now unite them
may be strengthened rather than severed, and
by ensuring uniform interpretation of the law
throughout the Empire, facilitate that unity of
action for the common Interests which will lead
to a real federation of the Empire.' The Dele
gates held that the Clause was part of the
Federal Agreement which had twice received the
approval of the people of the Colonies ; that an
Amendment would make the Constitution no
longer the very instrument which the people
had accepted, and cited the declaration of Mr
Reid that ' there wih be no safety or security for
Australian Union until it is known that the BIU
that Australia has drafted for the Imperial Par
liament to pass word for word is passed by that
august Tribunal word for word.' Finahy they
urged that while the real links of Empire were
the consciousness of kinship and a common sense
of duty, the pride of race and history, the cause
of Imperial Unity would not be aided by putting
in apparent conflict the Federation of Australia
and Imperial Federation."

THE APPEAL QUESTION 613
This passage brings into clear relief the rock
upon which it was feared that the Bill might
be wrecked. Mr Chamberlain was unable to
accept the view of the case put forward by
Mr Reid, or to agree that, in assenting to
the Bih on the Referendum, the voters of Australia
wished to prevent the Imperial Legislature from
amending the Clauses. One of the links of the
chain which held the Colonies to the Mother
Country was the right of appeal to the Queen in
Council, and in the larger interests of Australia
and the Empire he felt bound to propose a modifi
cation of Clause 74. As it stood it would
lead to conflict between the Privy Council and
the High Court of Austraha ; nothing could be
worse than to have concurrent Courts giving con
tradictory decisions within the Empire. There
was danger also that decisions of a Colonial
Court might bring about complications with
Foreign Powers, and on such a matter the
Imperial Court of Appeal ought to have some
thing to say.
Mr Chamberlain's way out of the difficulty,
pending the amalgamation of the Judicial Com
mittee of the Privy Council with the appel
late jurisdiction of the House of Lords, was
to appoint representatives from Austraha,
Canada, India, and South Africa, on the Privy
Council for a term of seven years, which might
be renewable. These four Judges would act also
as Lords of Appeal, and would enjoy life peer
ages. A Bill to this effect would be introduced
into the Upper House. In spite of the objec
tion that this Amendment to Clause 74 would
be considered an open rebuff to the Australian
people, Mr Chamberlain, on moving the Second
Reading of the Bill on 21st May, was able to

614 DOWNING STREET PROBLEMS
announce, amid the loud cheers of the House,
that an absolute settlement had been reached
with the Delegates. He had not altered
his views, but, "in accordance with the prin
ciples to which we are committed, we cannot
interfere where exclusively Australian Interests
are concerned." It had been agreed with the
Delegates that, in all cases in which other than
Australian questions were concerned, the right
of appeal to the Crown should be fuhy maintained,
while purely Australian questions, such as differ
ences between two States or a State and the
Federal Parliament arising out of the interpreta
tion of the Measure, would be decided by the
Australian High Court unless both parties
agreed to refer the point in dispute to the Privy
Council. The terms of this Amendment turned Clause
74 inside out. As it had stood, there was to be no
appeal to the Privy Council, except in cases where
the public interests of some portion of the
Dominions of the Crown outside Australia were
concerned, while the new Clause allowed appeal in
every case except where Australian interests alone
were affected ; and there was a provision that any
legislation by the Commonwealth restricting the
right to appeal should be subject to ratification
by the Crown. The Colonial Laws Validity Act
was still to apply to the enactments of the
Federated Colonies. It is true that the previous
right of appeal to the Crown has been in some
degree impaired, and that, on that account, the'
Act has been unfavourably criticised by high
Constitutional authorities ; but the dangers they
foretold have not yet been experienced. It
may be admitted that the existing compromise
cannot be permanently maintained. Already its

THE COMPROMISE 615
defects have been revealed (and magnified, of
course, by judicial pedantry), but it has served its
immediate political purpose. Had it not been
for the concession with which Mr Chamberlain
purchased the assent of the Delegates they would
certainly have insisted on the original Clause,
and the Bill would have been lost — perhaps
shelved for an indefinite period. As modified,
it was found to be in harmony with the
prevailing body of opinion at home and in
the Colonies, and it passed its Third Reading
in the House of Commons on 25th June. In
the House of Lords Lord Carrington, who had
been Governor of New South Wales, attacked
Mr Chamberlain's Amendment as a surrender to
uninstructed opinion, but the Bill passed through
its stages and received the Royal Assent without
further difficulty.
In the words of the Colonial Secretary —
who had combined a reasonable amount of
firmness with a readiness to compromise on
what was non-essential — the Commonwealth
Act marked " a great and important step in
the organisation of the British Empire." The
Commonwealth, with the Earl of Hopetoun as
the first Governor-General, was inaugurated by
the Duke of York, now Prince of Wales, on
the first day of the new century. So far, it must
be confessed, the most visible result of the Act
has been to develop friction. That, however, is the
way of all Democracy — to clamour for Reform,
and, when it has been granted, to pick holes in
the gift. But that is also the manner in which
defective Constitutions are graduahy improved.
We may call it, as we please. Popular Ingratitude,
or, more amiably. Progressive Desire. But the
grumblings which have been heard since the

616 DOWNING STREET PROBLEMS
Act came into force show how wise Mr Chamber-
Iain was to take occasion by the forelock, and
get the Bill passed at once. If a few months
later public opinion had veered in New South
Wales the whole scheme would have been killed ;
even if Queensland had turned restive the
chances of the Measure might have been
imperhled. Having been passed, it is not likely
to be reversed. But it is by no means so certain
that it would be carried this year or next year
if it were brought up in Australia as a new
proposal. The controversy* which has already
arisen between the Federal Government and the
South Australian Ministry — on little more than a
point of public etiquette — illustrates the difficulty
of Constitution-making. The only practicable
method is to lay down the general lines, and
leave the details to be supplied afterwards by
accumulating experience and — in this instance —
by the self-adapting genius of the British race,
which has always and everywhere been tolerant
of anomahes that are not seriously inconveni
ent. A brief reference must be made to Mr
Chamberlain's efforts to improve the political
and social conditions of Newfoundland. Here he
soon found himself in conflict with the local poli
ticians. The Island is a Self-Governing Colony,
* See "Correspondence respecting Constitutional Rela
tions of the Australian Commonwealth and States in regard
to External Affairs," published by the Colonial Office,
May 1903. Another difficulty has since arisen in con
nection with the employment of Lascars on vessels carrying
the Australian mails. The Federal Government were too
weak to resist the dictation of the Labour Party, and
attempted to influence the arrangements made by the
Imperial Government. Mr Chamberlain made very short
work of this inordinate pretension.

NEWFOUNDLAND POLITICS 617
and, acting on its undoubted rights, the Assembly,
in the hope of averting public bankruptcy, had
made a contract with Mr Reid, of Montreal, by
which he took over the railway lines and held the
resources of Newfoundland in pawn, obtaining vast
land concessions upon easy terms. The Governor,
Sir H. H. Murray, declined to sign the contract,
and asked Mr Chamberlain what he should do.
Mr Chamberlain objected to the arrangement, and
disclaimed any responsibility for it. He wrote
a Despatch which exposed the improvidence of
the bargain, but he was not prepared to dis-
ahow it. The Measure was not so " radically
vicious as to reflect discredit on the Empire ; "
if the Colony insisted upon having it, it must
be given its own way and put up with the conse
quences. Never had a Self-Governing Colony
been so soundly rated, and there was a lively
quarrel in the Island, in which the advocates of
the contract used heated language about the
Colonial Secretary.
When they afterwards asked him to send
a Royal Commission to investigate the causes
of the distress in the Island, which they attri
buted to the strained interpretation that the
French laid on their Treaty rights — and when
they showed a desire for rehef from the Imperial
Exchequer — Mr Chamberlain pointed out that
they had alienated the assets of the Colony,
and their request for a Royal Commission was
nothing but an appeal for financial aid.
" Such an application cannot for a moment be
entertained, and I request that you [Sir H. H;
Murray] wih at once inform your Ministers that it
is impossible for the Imperial Government to
take any responsibility, or accord any financial
assistance, in the case of a Self-Governing Colony

618 DOWNING STREET PROBLEMS
which has had full control of its finance, and is
solely responsible for its mismanagement."
This was in 1897. The Colonists, however,
rushed the contract through, and still pressed for
the Commission. Having recovered from his
annoyance at the Ministry's disregard of business
principles, and having looked more deeply into the
condition of the Island, he sent out Sir John
Bramston and Sir James Erskine in 1898 as
Royal Commissioners. Their Report has not
been published ; but, speaking at Wolverhampton
shortly after their return, Mr Chamberlain
denounced the French pohcy in regard to the
Treaty rights as "mischievous and deplorable,"
and as "contrived to combine the maximum of
annoyance and injury with the least possible
advantages to its authors." These remarks, it
should be explained, were made at the time when
France was indulging In that pohcy of "pin
pricks " which she has since abandoned.
" If France intends to continue to ignore the
solemn obligations of an Agreement which was
come to only eight years ago, I think, after ah,
she is the wrong party to put forward the
sanctity of the obsolete provisions of an anti
quated Treaty which is now something like
two hundred years old. However, I put that
aside, because, for the present, at any rate,
nobody occupying a position of responsibility
ever expressed an intention, or even a wish, to
evade or ignore In the slightest degree any
provision of any Treaty to which we have set
our hand. But we do claim, we do desire, that
the rights which are conferred upon France by
this Treaty should be strictly interpreted by her,
and that they should not be extended and abused
to the injury of our own pocket. Then, when

FRENCH TREATY RIGHTS 619
these rights are reviewed with due and proper
precautions, if they are found to have any value
whatever to France — about which I think there
is considerable doubt — or if the French think
they have any value — then we should be perfectly
willing either to observe them as they are, and
to the letter, or else, if France is willing, to
remove a constant source of irritation and
arrange for their extinction on fair and reason
able terms of compensation."
Since these words were spoken the grievance
has become less acute, chiefly because of the
decline of French fishing interests from economic
causes. The Reid Contract has also been radi
cally modified, and the Island is now fairly pros
perous. In the international aspect of certain Canadian
questions, Mr Chamberlain's influence has been
felt by his Colleagues in the Cabinet, and by the
Dominion Ministry rather than seen by the public.
He took a leading part in the personal and
private interchange of views which ended the
Venezuela- Guiana crisis of 1895, ^.nd has
always kept in close touch with American Dip
lomatists here. They have good reason to know
that, eager as he is to promote something
more than good feeling between the United
States and ourselves, he is as keen a man at a
bargain as they are themselves, and as stout
a champion of Canadian rights as they would be
if they stood in his place. The part he has
played in relation to Anglo-American contro
versies has, of course, been informal and unofficial.
It Is known, however, that he cordially sympathised
with Lord Salisbury's efforts, after the Venezuelan
trouble had been tided over, to arrange a Treaty
of General Arbitration with the United States,

620 DOWNING STREET PROBLEMS
and that he shared to the full the disappointment
of the ex- Prime Minister and Lord Pauncefote
when the Washington Senate wrecked the
scheme. In spite of his somewhat effusive friendliness
towards the United States, he has not stood upon
ceremony in dealing with what he considered exorbi
tant pretensions. When, for example, the late Mr
Sherman, who was Foreign Secretary in the earlier
part of the M'Kinley Administration, took ad
vantage of a recrudescence of anti- British feeling
in the States, to make a vigorous attack upon
the Canadian sealing industry in the Behring
Sea, Mr Chamberlain handled the American
arguments In a Despatch of remarkable energy
and directness. The point of Mr Sherman's
complaint, urged in very unmannerly language,
was that the British Government were evading
the regulations of the Paris Arbitration Court
as to pelagic sealing. Resenting the implied
charge of bad faith. Lord Salisbury declined to
reopen the question, whereupon Mr Sherman
arranged a Conference with Russia and Japan,
which the British Government refused to join.
His argument was that the herds were being
destroyed by the Canadian sealers, but Mr
Chamberlain had little difficulty in showing that
Mr Sherman's real object was, not to prevent the
extinction of the seal by Canadian fishers, but
to destroy the Canadian industry in the interests
of an American Company which aimed at
getting a monopoly on the Pribyloff breeding
grounds. The vigour of the communication
addressed by the Colonial Secretary to the
Foreign Office (1897) was sufficiently excused
by the tone of the document to which it
was a reply. Nor was it without a wholesome

RELATIONS WITH WASHINGTON 621
effect at Washington. Mr Sherman, who was
suffering from an illness that produced an un
fortunate condition of irritability, was after
wards found to be somewhat deficient in the
qualities that a Foreign Secretary should possess,
and his retirement was arranged.
The relations between the two countries have
been gradually improving — the exultation with
which Continental nations watched the absurd
quarrel about Venezuela had opened the eyes of
Washington as weh as of London. When
certain European States proposed to intervene
on behalf of Spain, and require the Americans to
desist from warlike preparations, not only did the
British Government refuse to join in this action,
but they also intimated that, if coercion were
attempted, our Navy would be used in de
fence of the United States. Though gratitude
has nowhere been a characteristic of Democracy,
American Statesmen were so far mindful of the
service rendered to them that, in May 1898, it
became possible to arrange for the appointment
ofthe Joint High Commission of which the late
Lord Herschell was Chairman.
It was hoped that this body might be able to
dispose of the various Canadian questions referred
to it. Nothing, however, was accomplished. A
modus vivendi was afterwards drawn up with re
gard to the Alaskan boundary, and that subject
has recently (February 1903) been committed to
a mixed Commission of Jurists. Whether that
tribunal will relieve the Colonial Office of an
awkward, if not urgent question, remains to
be seen.The political affairs of Malta have occupied
an amount of the Colonial Secretary's time
absurdly out of proportion to their intrinsic im-

622 DOWNING STREET PROBLEMS
portance. But the story is worth tehing at
some length, because it is amusing, and also
because it illustrates the number and complexity
of the duties which have to be performed by a
Colonial Scjcretary who has his heart in his
work. The Island is administered by a Legis
lative Council consisting of six Official and
thirteen Elected Members — subject to the
Governor's Veto. The Italian or semi- Italian
element in a very mixed population have deve
loped a marked aptitude for the methods of
advanced Democracy, and have long clamoured
for complete Self-Government — an indulgence
which it is quite impossible to concede to a
Colony which is only retained as a Military
Fortress. In 1898 the Council refused to sanction
the use ofthe English language in the Courts of
Law. In order to carry out this necessary
Measure, it was decided in 1899 to issue an Order
In Council, and to proclaim that after 19 14
English would be substituted for Italian in all
legal proceedings. This would inflict no practical
grievance, since almost unlversahy the Italian-
speaking inhabitants were weh acquainted with
Enghsh. But it was made the lever for quite a
serious little agitation.
Dr F. Mizzi and Mr S. Cachia Zammit
were sent over to London to urge the "claims
and grievances of the Maltese." The account
of their interview with Mr Chamberlain, given.
in a Blue-book published in July 1901, is
very quaint reading. The Delegates com
plained that It was difficult to turn their state
ment from Italian into English. "It is so
different to our mode of expression because we
are expansive and coloured ! " Nevertheless, Mr
Chamberlain assured them that they had put their

THE MALTESE AGITATION 623
views quite clearly. As to the proposed substitu
tion of Enghsh for Italian In 1914, he told them
that the decision would only be carried into effect
if it should turn out, as he believed it would, that
by that time Enghsh had become the language of
the great majority of the people. The demand,
that the Council should have complete authority in
legislation, taxation, and expenditure was, he re
marked, " a good deal to ask for In a Fortress ! "
With reference to the action of the Council in
refusing to undertake certain necessary drainage
works — ^which had, therefore, to be done under an
Order in Council — he hoped that under no circum
stances would he be again compehed to send
Orders in Council, " I do not want to do it," he
said, Mr Cachia Zamm-it. — You said it yourself
"with regret " ; I have read It : that is so,
Dr Mizzi. — But, sir, why do not the officials
put before your eyes the true state of these
things? Why did they not tell you that our
question was not of raising the taxes, but was
only to get a few weeks to have the honest consent
of the electors ? They should have done it. You
mentioned about the electorate. Sir, I wish to
be clear about that, I do not propose that those
who have already a vote should be deprived of the
vote, but for the future no one should have the
vote if he is illiterate, with the intention of com
pelling fathers indirectly, if not obligingly, to send
their children to school, I think that if to the
ihiterate electors you say, " You have a vote by
chance, but your children will not have it if they
are ihiterate," it will oblige them indirectly to
send their children to school. It is In that sense
I have spoken, and I think it is not a bad thing.
You mentioned some other things, but not to take

624 DOWNING STREET PROBLEMS
up too much time, perhaps, you would allow me to
make a response in writing,
Mr Chamberlain. — Yes.
Dr Mizzi. — I will not trouble you too much
now, but there are so many details, sir, that
change altogether the circumstances. I must add
to you that this distinct question of the drainage
has been spoken of for ten years, and in these
ten years there was money available, and the
Governor did not do the drainage works. He is
compelled now only for a political purpose, and
they succeeded to a certain degree because we have
an Order in Council for what we would have done
ourselves. But never mind — only they did not
succeed in this — they thought they would have
compromised us with our constituents ; they acted
as if the Maltese were sheep, but the Maltese are
most intehigent.
Mr Chamberlain. — The Maltese are not sheep
at all. Mr Cachia Zammit. — I have only to add this,
that our exchequer has been overloaded with
money for the last twenty years, and the Govern
ment had ample to come with a drainage scheme
ten years ago. Now, as you said the other day,
it is much easier to control expenditure than to
raise public money. I have read it in one of your
Despatches. So it was with us. We did find
some difficulty in raising money, because we had
a programme which bound us to the electors, and
we asked for time, and that time would have been
given by any officials but those officials we have.
Dr Mizzi. — After ten years of this Govern
ment —
Mr Cachia Zammit. — Besides that, there is
the money which has been wasted on the electric
light, and about the railway. Unfortunately the

DELEGATES AT DOWNING STREET 625
railway does not improve, and the Government of
a Colony ought not to play the part of a
merchant. What business had the Government
to instal the electric light ? There were so many
merchants who came forward, and I can assure
you it is a total failure. Money has been wasted,
and it wih go wasted. Besides, Malta is over
stocked with clerks and writers of all descriptions,
Mr Chamberlain. — I think I must not go
more Into detail,
Dr Mizzi. — You will allow us to make it in
writing ?
Mr Chamberlain. — Yes, anything further you
have to say, and If you do that I will keep back
any reply until I receive those further statements
from you,
Dr Mizzi. — But some of them will not come
until I go back to Malta,
Mr Chamberlain. — It is just as you please,
but I wish to have all the facts before me,
Dr Mizzi. — I am satisfied with that, because
so you will see the better,
Mr Cachia Zammit. — Thank you very much
for your kindness and courtesy,
Dr Mizzi. — We hope that our explanations
will show that we are not so wrong as we are
thought to be,
Mr Chamberlain. — What I should like to say
would be, let ah bygones be bygones, and do let
us work together in the future. That is what I
should like to say.
The further statements were duly sent to
the Colonial Secretary on ist August, and con
tained an appropriately " expansive and coloured "
appeal : —
" Addressing an Englishman, and especially an
Englishman in your high position, who possesses
2 r

626 DOWNING STREET PROBLEMS
such brihiant personal qualities, our language is
plain. England has been the Apostle of freedom
and progress to the whole world, and, yet, we,
who are under the British Flag, only know of ah
these grand things as a matter of theory and
doctrine. Our condition in reference to freedom
and progress is equal to the condition of an
Esquimaux who hears the description of a
magnificent summer day in a Southern country.
The description exhilarates him, but he does
not feel the beneficial action of the sun he hears
of, and his blood does not get warm in his
veins. " The local officials, who urge the Government
to compel us to change our language of educa
tion, are those same men who suggest and in
sinuate that the Maltese should be governed by
Orders in Council, and be taxed also by similar
Orders, in spite of their opposition !
" Why ?
" Sir, may we point out that the drainage
question and the taxes have in reality been used
by the local officials as a political move to com
promise the elected members with their con
stituents, for, if they opposed the taxes they
would have been held as responsible for the
odious measures that the Imperial Government
might enforce, and if they passed them, they
would have been accused of betraying their
promise. But the electors have seen through
this game of the officials, who cannot get the
support of the people by legitimate and Constitu
tional means."
Referring to the police measures adopted ten
years before in dealing with a disorderly meeting,
they described it as "an unglorious plot," and
said that the "forbearance displayed by the

MR CHAMBERLAIN'S DEMEANOUR 627
Maltese" was "providential!" Had they retali
ated, the consequences would have been disastrous
and deplorable !
A report of their interview with Mr Chamber
lain was sent by the Delegates to the Maltese
Press : —
" The reception was a courteous one ; Mr
Chamberlain made a sign to us to take our seats,
and he took his. His look was rather a stern
one, but he was polite In his deportment.
"He made a sign to us to submit our griev
ances, and we avahed ourselves of his permission
to speak, in the first place, with reference to the
Constitution, and in the second place, on the
Language Question.
"With reference to' our remarks on the subject
of the Constitution, Mr Chamberlain deplored
the conduct of the elected members of the Council
of Government, and used some strong language.
He afterwards said that he did not intend to
decide then the questions laid before him, but he
wished to say what in that moment it seemed to
him he could say with reference to the Constitu
tion and to the Language Question ; and, after
stating his views, he said that that was not a
definite reply, but that he would give us a reply
later on through the Governor.
" We asked him to permit us to give some
explanations in regard to the points to which he
had referred, and he allowed us to do so. We
submitted to him several remarks ; seeing, how
ever, that we were detaining him too much, and
as we had still much to say, we concluded more
or less in these terms : — ' Sir, we know very
well how precious your time is, and we would
not abuse of your kindness. We have, how
ever, many things to say on the different

628 DOWNING STREET PROBLEMS
questions which have been touched upon, and, in
order not to detain you any longer, we would
request to be allowed to submit our reasons in
writing. We have already two Reports to present
to you, and, with your permission, we shah
present them to-morrow. But we have other
matters to refer to, and later on we shall send in
another Report.'
" He kindly complied with our request, and
added : — ' I shah make it a point not to reply to
your first Reports before receiving the other
Report, because I do not wish to come to a
decision before I have before me ah the required
information.' "We thanked him and expressed to him our
satisfaction. At the same time we told him that
we would have prepared the other Report after our
return to Malta, and so we would have delayed
its transmission a little. He replied that that did
not matter.
" And we took our leave.
" Having mentioned the stern mien of the
Secretary of State, we feel bound to add that this
sternness did not continue to the end of the con
versation." They pointed out to their friends that the
Maltese cause was persistently misrepresented in
the English Press : —
"It has been said, amongst other things, that
the higher classes of the Maltese do not want the
English language because they fear lest the
English should show the people that they are
paying the tax on wheat to the benefit of the
well-to-do, who pay no taxes. It has been said
that the Priests and the Church, who are very
rich, are against the English language for the
same reason, because they wish to keep the

DESPATCH TO THE GOVERNOR 629
people In ignorance. It has been said that the
Magistrates are ferocious in passing sentence on
Englishmen and very mild in passing sentence on
Maltese. Similar statements, and others, still
worse, are often published and pass uncontra
dicted, as if they were truth itself; in this way
public opinion has been formed, and to alter that
opinion immense efforts are to be made.
" Meanwhile, It is absolutely necessary to keep
an eye on the English Press, and answer all Its
attacks for another reason ; that Is, when it
becomes necessary to take action, as in the case
of the present mission. Immense difficulties have
to be encountered in trying to answer at one time
the attacks of many years, for the papers will not
accept long articles, and when such articles are
accepted, nobody will read them. We must write
briefly, but we must write every time we are
calumniated ; it is in this way that we shall
smash the teeth of this viper, so often used by
our enemies."
In a long Despatch of 19th June 1900, Mr
Chamberlain explained to Governor Sir F. W.
Grenfeh his views on the whole position. It wih
be sufficient to quote the final paragraphs deahng
with the Language Question. Having pointed
out that the Order in Council of March 1899,
which permitted the use of Enghsh in the Courts
of Law, had been rendered necessary by a gross
miscarriage of justice, and was itself In accord
ance with the principles of common sense, he
showed that the use of Italian as the official
language rested merely on a declaration made in
the reign of William IV., that it was not learned
with any special ease by the great body of the
Maltese (who speak an Arabic patois), and that a
steadily increasing number of the inhabitants of

630 DOWNING STREET PROBLEMS
the Island wished, as was proved by the Educa
tion Returns, that their children should be taught
Enghsh : —
" Her Majesty's Government accordingly ar
rived at the conclusion that the time was not far
distant when the English language should be defi
nitely adopted as the language of the Courts in
Malta, and the period of fifteen years was fixed
in order that those whose interests might be
affected (such as the members of the legal pro
fession), might know that the change was
impending and might have ample time to
prepare themselves for it.
" I may also observe that the diminishing popu
larity of the Italian language in Malta is due not
to any arbitrary measure of suppression on the
part of the Government, but to the operation of
natural causes, namely, the fact that the Maltese
find it to their commercial and material advantage
to possess a knowledge of the English language,
and consequently desire to acquire that knowledge
before taking up the study of Italian. Her
Majesty's Government have, in fact, fallen in with
the desire of the population of Malta ; but, by
fixing the date of the official substitution of the
English for the Italian language at a distant date,
have taken reasonable precaution to prevent the
change which they regard as inevitable from caus
ing inconvenience.
" Dr Mizzi and Mr Zammit further make a
special complaint of the changes which have been
recently effected in the Elementary Schools of
Malta. As in regard to the Courts, so in this
case, they allege that the English language is being
imposed upon the Maltese, and that the interests
of the latter suffer by the substitution of that
language for Italian.

THE LANGUAGE QUESTION 631
" Prior to the changes in question the children
in the schools were taught at the same time the
two foreign languages, English and Italian, and
also the native Maltese language ; but as a rule,
they were not kept at school long enough to
learn even the elements of either the English or
the Italian sufficiently for any practical purpose.
The new regulations provide that children are to
be taught Maltese only, and other subjects
through the medium of Maltese, for the first two
years ; and that, at the end of that period, parents
are to choose between English and Italian as the
only other language to be taught in the higher
classes of the Elementary Schools. The language
chosen is also taught through the medium of the
Maltese language. The educational returns for
1898 show that parents in Malta and Gozo, hav
ing the choice before them whether their children
should be instructed in English or in Italian, have
to the extent of from 79 to 100 per cent, of their
number elected for their instruction in the English
language. " Thus the ahegation that the English lan
guage is being forcibly imposed upon the people of
Malta completely fails. An overwhelming number
of the parents or guardians select the English
language for their children, in preference to Italian,
at the end of the first two years ; and this choice
is made of their own free will, and, doubtless,
because they find it to the advantage of the
children. The educational reform just indicated
is based on principles of liberty. It appears to
be strongly approved of by the parents or
guardians of the children, to be acceptable to the
pupils themselves, and to be calculated to promote
the welfare of the population. In these circum
stances Her Majesty's Government see no ground

632 DOWNING STREET PROBLEMS
for modifying in any way the present arrange
ments. The last paragraphs of the Despatch contained
a few observations on the general situation : —
" Malta is a large fortress where naval and
military interests and the rights of the non-
Maltese inhabitants require careful adjustment
with local requirements, and it might well have
been argued in 1887, when a new Constitution
was given, that it was undesirable to grant to the
population more than the control of Municipal
affairs. However, a Constitution was granted to
the Island in that year, which, while giving a
large measure of political freedom to the Maltese,
was not intended to diminish the ultimate respon
sibility of the Governor. This Constitution was
given in deference to the assurance that it would
be thoroughly satisfactory to the Maltese, and
that proper advantage would be taken of it,
whereas, as a matter of fact, no real advantage
has been taken of it at all. The Maltese, gener
ally, take no interest in it. They do not come
forward in the elections, and the gentlemen, who
are elected by a very smah number, when they
become Members of the Legislative body, instead
of assisting business by legitimate criticism, too
often delay business and prevent useful Legisla
tion from being carried out.
"Her Majesty's Government, therefore, cannot
consent to extend a Constitution which, in view
of the special circumstances of the Island, appears
to them to be sufficiently liberal. Elected Mem-'
bers who possess administrative ability can, by
accepting seats in the Executive Council, exercise
great influence in local affairs, and can, by their
advice and criticism, render valuable assistance
to the Government, though the Government alone

THE COUNCIL DISSOLVED 633
is responsible for the action which is ultimately
taken. I trust that Elected Members of this type
will be found ready to take their seats in the
Executive Council, and that they and their
colleagues will cordially co-operate with the
Governor and Official Members in promoting the
welfare of the Maltese which Is earnestly desired
by Her Majesty's Government."
The obstructive action of the Elected Mem
bers having continued, on 8th August the
Governor dissolved the Council. On the i8th
they addressed a protest to the Colonial Secretary
— expressing their disappointment that "the
Maltese population should not indulge in any
future hope of change " : —
" We most respectfully entreat you to consider
that Malta belongs to the Maltese, and if Great
Britain has now the benefit of so Important a
fortress and naval station, it is because the
Maltese have placed themselves under her protec
tion, giving her the use of them ; so it cannot but
seem to us very strange that just because Malta
is very precious to England the Maltese must be
deprived of that political freedom which they most
eagerly and earnestly have endeavoured to secure.
The more precious is our country to the British
Empire, the greater should be England's grati
tude, and still greater its bounden duty to adhere
strictly to those obligations which were explicitly
and implicitly assumed towards the people of
Malta. We therefore appeal to you once more,
soliciting the grant of a Constitution more con
sonant with the principles of self-government ; no
such concession, limited to our local and domestic
affairs, can in any manner encroach on the legiti
mate interests of the fortress and the naval
station."

634 DOWNING STREET PROBLEMS
The proposed substitution of the English for
the Italian language was "an act of tyranny un
becoming to the Government that perpetrated
It : —
" You state that the Commission of King
William IV. about the language of the Maltese
laws cannot be regarded as an irrevocable pledge
that the Italian language was to remain the official
language of Malta; why, sir, that Commission was
most positively a pledge, and as irrevocable as a
pledge of an English King should be. On that
occasion an attempt was made by the Government
to change the official language of Malta. The
Maltese, you must be aware, protested strongly
and solemnly, and the Commission of Her
Majesty's predecessor came as an assurance
that the rights of the Maltese would be ever
respected. " Now we beg you to observe that no pledges
were or are necessary. If England had conquered
Malta, it would have been inhuman to carry the
rights of conquest so far as to change the official
language of the Maltese. But Malta was not
conquered by Great Britain ; the Maltese placed
themselves under the British protection of their
own free will, with the assurance that their rights
would be maintained and upheld, such as that of
the language, which, after religion, is paramount.
It is, therefore, only an abuse of power and a grave
injustice not to let them perfectly at liberty on this
question. " As to our assertion that the Maltese dialect is
full of Italian words, and learning Italian from the
Maltese is, for this reason, rendered easier, your
officials dared to inform you that such assertion is
not correct. At section four of our letter of the
28th October 1899, we informed you that Com-

ANTI-ENGLISH MANIFESTO 635
missioner Keenan suggested that the Maltese
dialect should be purified of all Italian words, with
which it abounds, and that, in order to make the
study of the I talian difficult. Such whimsical ordeal
was to be performed by substituting Arabic words
for Italo-Maltese ones. Now, this proposal,
besides being pernicious in itself, thoroughly proves
the correctness of our assertion.
" The bad faith of the Government to compel
children in the Primary Schools to lose their time
in studying Maltese, is shown by a comparison of
this policy with that of the British Government
towards Ireland and Wales. Great efforts are
being made to persuade the Irish and the Welsh
not to lose time in learning their languages, which
are ' a wall of words against civilisation.' Now
the Irish and the Welsh are counted by millions,
and the Maltese only number 180,000, so that the
Maltese dialect is much more ' a wall of words '
against the civilisation of the Maltese people than
the Irish language in Ireland, and the Welsh
language in Wales."
The political character ofthe Italian agitators
may be judged from the concluding words of Dr
Mizzi's address to the electors, issued 30th Octo
ber 1900: —
"Up to about eighteen months ago the Govern
ment had not in the matter of taxation forced their
authority on the population ; now, it is clear, they
intend to do so, and if the representatives of the
people will yield, the Government will strangle the
population through the Maltese themselves ; but it
is foolish of those who beheve that by giving them
a little they whl have satisfied their hunger and
secured something for the people. No ! after the
repast they will be more hungry than before.
" Now my coheagues and myself do not want to

636 DOWNING STREET PROBLEMS
be the executioners of our brothers, and we declare,
clearly and without circumlocutions, that we want
no taxes. We present ourselves as candidates
to-day with this programme ; if the population
wants to ahow themselves to be imposed upon,
let them choose others instead of us. We know
very well what use the Government make of
the people's money, and until the country Is
governed by the representatives of the taxpayers,
by persons responsible to the people, by persons
worthy of the people's confidence, we cannot
promise to sanction any taxes, not even in the
slightest amount. Let the Government change
their nefarious policy towards the Maltese, to
whom it is expressly said that the Government
must have a greater regard to the interests of the
few resident Englishmen than to those of the
natives, as we learn from the last barefaced
Despatch of the Secretary of State for the Colo
nies, and it will then be seen that without the
necessity of further taxes the country can resume
its florid condition."
Again, on 12 th March 1901, the same poh-
tician issued an Appeal to the Maltese : " The
language question (he wrote) is not only a ques
tion of sentiment and of freedom, it is also a
question of bread. The English Government
wants to provide an opening for Englishmen
here. England has many Colonies, and she
also has a vast Indian Empire ; but her Empire
and her Colonies are too distant, and their
climate is very unfavourable, whilst to English
men the climate of Malta is delicious.
" As soon as the English language shah be
instahed as the official language you will see the
highest posts filled by Englishmen. But what
do I say, the 'highest posts?' Ah the posts.

MENDACIOUS STATEMENTS 637
big and small, shall be occupied by Englishmen ;
and if you have eyes to see you must perceive
that even In our Police there are already several
English faces, and there would have been many
more if Englishmen did not get drunk so often.
The Government Is already preparing the posts
for Englishmen by augmenting salaries. The
salary of the Chief Secretary has been increased
by ;^300, that of the Judges by ,;^ioo each, and
several heads of Departments have had various
offices merged Into one.
" Besides, the Government endeavours to ob
tain increases of salary by the vote of the Elected
Members. All this wealth squeezed out of
Maltese blood, in the form of present and future
taxes, is not meant for you, poor Maltese. ' Sic
vos non vobis nidificatis, aves.' All this wealth,
squeezed out of your blood, is intended to nourish
your masters, if you allow your masters to be
your masters beyond what is right. Your sons
are to be relegated to the lowest offices in the
service of these masters ; they will only get the
bread of abasement, and they will curse you in
your graves if you do not, no matter at what
sacrifice, prevent the Government from substitut
ing the English for the Italian language.
" So far, it has been the Italian language that
has prevented Englishmen from eating up the
morsel of black bread which is all that is left to
us. " Because, you must weh understand that when
the English language shall become the official
language for the. whole Island, Englishmen wih
always speak their own tongue better than any
Maltese, and they shah enjoy all the sympathy of
the Government In preference to any Maltese.
Let this barrier be knocked down, and you will

638 DOWNING STREET PROBLEMS
see that the Maltese, already sufficiently despised
in their own house, wih only get the crumbs that
will fall from English tables.
" And do not believe that England is too rich
to require anything from Malta ; owing to the
wretched distribution of wealth in that country,
her middle classes are as poor as her lowest classes.
About twelve years ago we copied from the
English papers the news that for a post of ;^6o
a year there were 160,000 applicants!! The
English population has since augmented, and so
have its needs."
If the Maltese persevered, the orator con
tinued, the British Government in the end
must give way. " Chamberlain and his prin
cipal satellite, Strickland, are compromised
because their amour propre compels them to sup
port their own decisions as far as they can, but
Chamberlain will not be for all eternity Secretary
of State for the Colonies, nor Strickland Chief
Secretary to Government per omnia secula secu-
lorum." But the concluding words were the best !
" Our cause is a just one : God is with us. We
have, therefore, excellent reasons to hope for a
victory." At a meeting of Italians held on Easter Sun
day (1901), one speaker suggested imitation of the
Boers — a handful of men who were holding out
against England — though he hastened to add
"we cannot take up arms as the Boers did."
They must rely on logic ! Other arts of the weak
were called into requisition, and on 27th May the
Governor found it necessary to meet organised
mendacity with the following Proclamation : —
" Whereas it has come to the knowledge of His
Excellency the Governor that panic has been
caused and children have been suddenly withdrawn

THE GOVERNOR'S PROCLAMATION 639
from school by their parents because rumours
have been maliciously put in circulation to the
effect that the Government is promoting the
teaching of English in the Government Element
ary Schools in order that the boys may be forced
to proceed to the war in South Africa, and the
girls pressed into the service as washerwomen and
attendants on the British Army.
" His Excellency the Governor trusts that ah
persons in the employment of the Government, in
whatsoever capacity, and all loyal subjects of His
Majesty, will use their best endeavours to contra
dict the false reports above-mentioned, and the
misleading statement that the Government is
promoting the teaching of reading and writing
through the medium of the Maltese language
and the spread of the English language, in order
that British Subjects domiciled in Malta may be
forced to emigrate, or caused to lose their means
of livelihood in these Islands."
From the Return issued on i8th June 1901,
by the Inspector of Elementary Schools, it ap
pears that the parents of more than 82 per
cent, of the children attending the Third Standard
that year had chosen for them to be taught
English, and less than 18 per cent, had pre
ferred Italian. Nevei"theless, as Mr Chamber
lain pointed out in another Despatch of 30th
July, the agitators had openly announced as
their policy the refusal of all taxation and public
improvements, even those most necessary to
the health and comfort of the poor, until they
should secure their ends. This was an abuse
of Constitutional powers justifying an amend
ment of the Constitution. He preferred to adopt
a temporary alternative — in the hope that the
Elected Members of the Council would before long

640 DOWNING STREET PROBLEMS
be induced to follow a wiser and more patriotic
course. It was, therefore, decided that the neces
sary legislation should be carried by Orders in
Council. The subjects to be thus dealt with were
the construction of new schools, the extension of
drainage and water works,, certain additions to
hospitals and asylums, various street improve
ments, and similar administrative business —
all of which had been obstructed in the Council.
The total extra expenditure was about ;^38o,ooo,
and to raise this sum the necessary legislation
would be recommended to His Majesty in
Council. Their objects exposed and their arguments
refuted, these Indefatigable agitators were by no
means defeated. They persuaded the Italian
Government to take up their case and make repre
sentations to our Foreign Office, as if some slight
were being placed by the British on the Italian
race. The moment was cleverly chosen. It so
happened that the old cordial understanding
between the Courts of St James's and Rome had
been slightly clouded by what was represented as
our disregard of Italian interests in South Africa,
and the Language Question in . Malta was seized
upon as an opportunity for proving our friendly
feehng. On 28th January 1902, Mr Chamberlain
had to announce in the House of Commons that
the Proclamation would be withdrawn as to
the substitution of English for Italian as the
official language. In making the concession,
however, he explained, in a neat and concise
argument, that no grievance had ever existed
in Malta or would have been created if the
Proclamation had been maintained. But he
did not wish any kind of misunderstanding
with regard to Italy to prevail, and, therefore,

MEDIATION OF ITALY 641
if he could believe that, by the offer of a com
promise in this matter, he would remove any feel
ing which existed among our good allies, the
Italians, and at the same time remove any feeling
of a similar kind which existed among a certain
class in Malta, then he would without hesitation
formahy withdraw the Proclamation at once. He
would withdraw it at once, without any con
ditions, and was perfectly willing to trust to the
future. "He was perfectly ready to withdraw the
Proclamation, and he thought that was, at all
events, an intelligible concession. He hoped it
would be regarded as such by the persons to
whom he had referred, and he hoped that they
would now look at those questions of taxation as
the Government should expect them to do in any
ordinary time. He did not deny their right to
criticise the proposals of the Government, and to
control them in the last resort, but to refuse
absolutely necessary Votes of money, for purposes
from which their own Constituences would derive
benefits, whether it was to show spite to the
Government or was done in order to affect the
decision of the Government in regard to some
other question, was not in accord with Parlia
mentary institutions, and he sincerely trusted that
that course of action would be abandoned. If,
however, the state of things prevailing at present
were to continue, the Elected Members of the
Maltese Council would be guilty of suicide. They
could not expect a Government which was respon
sible for a great Imperial Fortress to allow this
childish game to proceed indefinitely, and it would
clearly be the duty of any Government under
these circumstances to go back to the conditions
which existed before 1847, or to make suchmodi- 2 s

642 DOWNING STREET PROBLEMS
fications of the Constitution as would be necessary
to give the Government a controlling voice In the
administration. He made no threat, but had
endeavoured to treat this question in a concilia
tory way, and he hoped no drastic process might
be necessary." In Italy itself this act of friendliness was
accepted in the spirit in which it had been offered.
But the Maltese Italians, not without reason,
plumed themselves on having beaten the British
Government, and at once renewed their agitation
for further concessions. Within the Colony it
cannot be denied that the action forced on Mr
Chamberlain was an unfortunate precedent,
though it was, perhaps, excused by the Inter
national object which it was meant to serve.
Although it is extremely probable that by
19 14 English will have become the common
language in Malta, and may, by that time, have
been adopted for official purposes, it was,
perhaps, a mistake to announce the change so
long in advance. But this was not the real
crux of the controversy. The Italian Party in
the Island wished to preserve their language
artificially, by making it a compulsory subject
in the Elementary Public Schools. The Colonial
Office did not propose to make English com
pulsory, but insisted that the parents of the
children should be permitted to choose between
the two languages, and on this point the authori
ties refused to give way. It was further inti
mated, and was quite understood in the Island,
that If the Italian Party should persist in refusing
the necessary Votes for Supply, the Constitution
would be so altered that the Official Members
of the Council would be made a permanent
majority. The warning, however, was soon dis-

THE DOWNING STREET STAFF 643
regarded, and it has recently been found necessary
to carry out the threatened changes.
A passing reference must also be made to
the enlargement, for defensive purposes, of the
Colony of Hong-Kong by the Chinese cession of
the Kowloon and Mirs Bay ; the cession of
the islands of Choiseul and Isabel in the Solomon
group under the Samoan Treaty with Germany ;
the question of the transfer of Norfolk Island
to the Government of New South Wales ; the
controversy on Land Legislation in Ceylon ;
the agitation in Cyprus for union with Greece ;
and the rioting at Port of Spain, Trinidad,
which had to be suppressed by force, and was
afterwards made the subject of a Commission of
Inquiry. Nothing even of local importance seems
to have passed through the Colonial Office without
the Secretary of State having given it a share
of his individual attention. Whoever will take
a map of the British Empire wih be unable
to place a finger upon any portion of it —
outside the Foreign Office Protectorates — where
Mr Chamberlain, in one way or another,
has not made himself felt. His power of direc
tion and control has been exercised In small affairs
as well as in great, and in the islands of the
Pacific, the Straits Settlements, New Guinea, and
other Possessions of which the British public
hears but little, his strong personality is as fuhy
recognised as in South Africa and the Self-
Governing Colonies.
It would be absurd for his admirers to give
him the whole credit for all the administrative
reforms which have been carried out in his name.
Many of them have been suggested to him, and
the execution superintended, by members of the
official staff in Downing Street ; many others are

644 DOWNING STREET PROBLEMS
due to the enterprise and energy of men on the
spot. But It is astonishing how closely he has
watched the work of his subordinates In every
outlying corner of the British Empire, and how
unmistakably his inspiration may be traced, how
clearly his thoughts and even his language have
been reproduced, in dealing with the numberless
questions that go through his Department. It
is pointed out elsewhere that he spares no pains
in selecting and encouraging good men, but, like
every other English administrator, he is some
times hampered by the difficulty of getting rid of
inefficient, though personally blameless, public
servants. As soon as a second-class man has
got into a first-rate position, the cheapest thing
to do with him — if only the country would see
it — is to make him a K.C. B. and retire him on
his full salary.
It is not fair, perhaps, to place an absolutely
literal Interpretation on the words which a
Statesman uses at a complimentary dinner. But
at the Corona Club Banquet held last June, the
Colonial Secretary seemed to be speaking from
his heart. "I never felt," he said, "so proud of my
country or of my countrymen as when I saw
them at work in these distant lands. My Lords
and gentlemen, I had another opportunity which
I greatly prized, and that was an opportunity of
seeing Downing Street from outside and from
a distance. Seen near, its architecture leaves
much to be desired, but the further you go from
it, believe me, the greater it appears. And yet
ihe experience, which I have had enables me, as,
perhaps, never before, to put myself in the
position of those who are working out our policy
abroad, and who find themselves controlled and

"THE MAN ON THE SPOT " 645
praised — and it may be blamed — by the central
organisation. I can see perfectly well how a
man, filled as he should be with the local
aspect of the question with which he has to deal,
may be discouraged when he finds that his pro
posals, submitted after the greatest care in their
preparation, are criticised and, as he thinks,
curtly dismissed by the clerks in Downing Street,
and, on the other hand, I know my Downing
Street also, and they sometimes must be dis
appointed that, in spite of all they do, of the
pains that they take to make themselves
understood, they find that those abroad mis
understand their instructions, ignore the great
traditions, which are not founded upon pedantry
or red tape, but which are the historic product
of centuries almost of continuous administration
- — when they find those traditions ignored, and
the cherished principles upon which our policy
depends more or less disregarded."

CHAPTER XVIII
the south AFRICAN SETTLEMENT
When the Delegates at Vereeniging "stood at
the grave of the two Republics " they appointed
a Committee to raise funds on behalf of Boer
sufferers from the War, and detached Generals
De Wet, Louis Botha, and Delarey from that body
to collect subscriptions in Europe. Almost at
once, however, this inoffensive enterprise assumed
the proportions of a political mission — the real
or, at least, the main object of the Generals being
to modify the terms of the Treaty to which they
had just put their hands. They arrived at
Southampton just as a great Naval Review was
being held by the newly-crowned Sovereign,
which it was hoped they would witness. It was
not unnatural, though it may have been impolitic,
that the sore-hearted men should display no
enthusiasm over the friendly greetings they
received, but preserve an attitude of chilly
reserve. Their presence at this demonstration
of the naval power of Great Britain, even
though they would have come as popular guests
and honoured subjects of the King, might to
their minds suggest an unpleasant resemblance
to captives gracing the Triumph of a Roman
conqueror. In a brief interview with Mr
Chamberlain they declined the invitation, urging
646

BOER GENERALS IN EUROPE 647
personal reasons which called for their Immediate
departure. But, after a flying visit to London,
where they were received with gushing adulation
by the politicians of the pavement, they returned
to Southampton, and on i8th August were pre
sented to the King on board the Royal Yacht,
and taken for a trip round the Fleet at Spithead.
A visit was paid to The Hague, and after hold
ing conference with Mr Kriiger, Dr Leyds, and
other Boer representatives, they telegraphed to
Mr Chamberlain from Brussels, requesting an
opportunity to " submit and discuss questions
of the greatest importance and interest to our
country and people."
Mr Chamberlain replied, through our Minister
at Brussels, that he had hoped to have a pre
liminary discussion with them on the Solent,
but he would come up to London to meet them
on 2nd September. He would, however, like
to know beforehand the subjects on which the
Generals wished to see him, and asked for a list
to be sent to the Colonial Office. The invita
tion for the 2nd was accepted, and the list sub
mitted covered eleven points. The chief were a
complete Amnesty for British subjects who had
assisted the Boers In the War, and pardon for all
persons convicted of acts committed during its con
tinuance ; a sufficient allowance for the widows and
orphans of Burghers, and for maimed Burghers;
equality of the English and Dutch languages in
schools and law courts ; equal rights for Burghers
and British subjects, including the return of all
Burghers to South Africa, whether prisoners of
war or self-exiled politicians in Europe ; reinstate
ment of Boer officials, or compensation for loss
of office ; compensation for loss of private property
during the War ; reinstatement of Burghers in the

648 THE SOUTH AFRICAN SETTLEMENT
ownership of farms confiscated under the Pro
clamation of 7th August 1901 ; payment of the
obligations of the late Republics, including those
incurred during the War, and rescission of the
determination to give Natal a new boundary
covering a portion of the Transvaal. The
Generals also proposed to discuss the execution
of the terms of surrender, objecting in particular
to the Oath of Ahegiance being demanded as
a condition precedent to the repatriation of
prisoners of war.
Mr Chamberlain (25th August) expressed
his unaffected surprise at the number and
character of these proposals. He reminded the
Generals of the history of the Peace negotiations,
since March 1901, and, in regard to the terms of
surrender, said there was no parallel in history
for conditions so generous being granted by a
victorious belligerent. He was willing to discuss
the Interpretation of those terms, but the eleven
points put forward constituted a suggestion for
an entirely new Agreement, inconsistent with
and even contradictory to the Vereeniging com
pact. It was not his duty to enter upon any
discussion of such proposals. Both parties
were bound by the conditions arranged, and he
had no power to reopen any of the points then
settled as to the repatriation of prisoners. Amnesty
to rebels, the use of the Dutch language, and the
grants of money and loans to the people of the
new Colonies. The Generals sent a temporising
reply, resting their plea for an interview on the
broad grounds of clemency and the interests of
the people, and assuring Mr Chamberlain that
they did not seek to meet him as parties claiming
the right to make a fresh contract or substitute a
modified agreement for that already in existence.

INTERVIEW WITH MR CHAMBERLAIN 649
But they did not explicitly accept the condi
tion which he had imposed, that there should
be no attempt to reopen the terms of sur
render. These conditions were insisted on by
Mr Chamberlain, and finally the Boer Generals,
" forced by the circumstances in which we are
placed," gave the required formal assurance, and
on 5 th September an interview was held at the
Colonial Office. The Generals were accompanied
by Mr J. H. de Villiers as interpreter, and
Mr Chamberlain had the assistance of the
presence of Lord Onslow, Under-Secretary for
the Colonies, Lord Kitchener, and Mr F.
Graham, Assistant Under-Secretary.
At the outset the Boers denied that it was
their intention to alter the terms of surrender
in any way. Mr Chamberlain having drily
remarked that he was very glad to hear it,
they raised the question of Amnesty, and urged
that everything on behalf of the persons affected
should be brought before the Commission which
the Government had sent out to deal with the
subject. Mr Chamberlain then shortly explained
what were the duties of the Commission in
examining the sentences on rebels. The Boers
complained that Lord Kitchener had given a
promise at Pretoria that he would recommend an
Amnesty at the time of the Coronation, and that
the rebels had not been pardoned. Mr Chamber
lain pointed out that the only undertaking was
that Natal, being a Self-Governing Colony, should
deal with her own rebels — and she had amnestied
them liberally. Lord Kitchener did not admit
making any such promise as the Boers alleged ;
the statement about Natal was the final and
definitive statement. The conversation then
dealt with the return of the prisoners, and it

650 THE SOUTH AFRICAN SETTLEMENT
was explained to them that every one could not
be sent at once, and that repatriation would
proceed with ah possible expedition. The
Generals had been misinformed when they were
told that there had been any refusal to return
prisoners who had either taken the Oath of
Allegiance or made a Declaration — the latter
had been in the nature of a concession to those
who declined to swear, the form of it having
been agreed upon, between Lord Milner and
Boer leaders, before the Generals left South
Africa. Passing to another subject, Mr Cham
berlain had to correct a misapprehension, on the
part of the Boer Generals, that Burghers had
been, or would be, deprived of their farms : the
only power taken by the State was that of
acquiring land for public purposes on the pay
ment of full compensation.
On Article X. complaint was made of the
composition of the Commissions appointed to
regulate the distribution of the ,^3,000,000
for restarting the Boers in their occupations,
and strong exception was taken to the inclusion
in those bodies of Boers who had fought on
the British side in the latter stages of the War.
Mr Chamberlain, however, made a spirited
defence of the employment of National Scouts
on the Commissions, offering, however, to make
inquiries into any specific instances of alleged
unfitness or wrong-doing. The Generals next
complained of the extension of the Natal border,
and said the Boers would leave the Vryheid and
Utrecht districts if this were persisted in. Mr
Chamberlain reminded them that this was a closed
question, and suggested that they should advise the
Boer inhabitants to remain : it was not credible,
their numbers being what they were, that they

REPLY TO DEMANDS 651
would be down-trodden, or in any way unfairly
treated. The conversation then branched off into
the question of the status of foreigners who had
become Burghers of the Republics. Mr Chamber
lain roundly declared that he had no sympathy
with foreigners who had meddled with a quarrel
which was not their own — foreigners who had been
given Burgher rights as a reward for taking part
in a conflict in which they were not concerned.
Naturalisation had been granted them in order
that they should fight against Great Britain. They
were not required to forswear ahegiance to their
parent State. The British Government would
treat them as foreigners : such of them as were
prisoners of war had accordingly been sent back
to their own countries. " We decline altogether,"
said Mr Chamberlain, "to recognise them as
Burghers in South Africa."
There were other subjects, the Generals
hinted, which they would like to discuss in
writing. The ,;^3, 000,000, for example, they
did not think at all adequate for the purposes
to which it was being applied. Something might
be done for the widows and orphans. " You have
got so many assets in the country," was the in
genuous suggestion of General Botha. Mr
Chamberlain's reply may be quoted : —
" Well, I think we had better not enter upon
discussion in detail upon points of that kind. I
would only remind the General that we have
undertaken many obligations already, more than
has ever been undertaken before in similar circum
stances. I do not wish to enter into any dis
cussion, any elaborate discussion, but I will take
one case. The General suggests that we might
make provision for the widows and orphans of
those who have been killed — of those who have

652 THE SOUTH AFRICAN SETTLEMENT
fought against us. Well, in my time I recollect
very weh the great Civil War in America, and I
appeal to that, because that stands out as a case
in which more than ever before, or indeed ever
since, the victor, the conqueror, showed a magna
nimous and generous feeling to the conquered.
There was good reason for it, because they were
brothers, of the same race, the same religion, the
same everything. It was a Civil War, but even
in that case the Northern side, that is to say the
victorious side, made no provision whatever, either
by way of grant or pension or allowances, to
people who had been wounded — to the side that
had been conquered. They gave them their lives,
they gave them their liberties, and after a period
of about ten years they gave them their votes,
but they did not give them any money compensa
tion. But we have gone one step beyond that,
because we have contributed, in addition to ah
our own enormous expenses, a very large sum to
relieve those who are really destitute in our new
Colonies. We have done more than, I think, was
expected of us, and we have done all that we can
afford to do, and I think it would be undesirable
that the General should press us any further in
the matter either now or in writing.
"As regards the general statement which he has
made, I desire to reciprocate it. We want, in this
country at any rate, to forget and to forgive,
because if you think, as you weh may, that you
have something to forgive, we also think that we
have a great deal to forgive ; but we want to put
all that on one side. The War is over. We each
of us fought as well as we knew how during the
War. Now there is Peace. All we want is to
recognise you as fellow-subjects with ourselves,
working, as we shah work, for the prosperity and

APPEAL TO THE CIVILISED WORLD 653
the liberty of South Africa, How great that
liberty is, how soon complete Self-Government is
extended to South Africa, depends entirely upon
the rapidity with which the old animosities die
out. Anything In the nature of recrimination
nowadays would be an injury, and would tend to
delay the complete pacification which I think we
both desire. We shall certainly show trust in you
whenever you will show trust in us. We shah be
very glad of your co-operation, and of the co
operation of men like yourselves who have loyally
accepted the new situation in securing that your
special views and Ideas are, at ah events, repre
sented in the Government, as well as those of
other sections of the population. We want South
Africa to be a happy abiding place for all who
live in it, not for one class alone, not for one
section, for one race, or for one political Party,
but for all, and our duty is to regard the Interest
of ah, and we desire that no section should be
entirely unrepresented. I am sure that if you
meet us half way you will find us to be in the
future quite as good friends as we have been, I
hope, loyal enemies In the past."
That statement closed the Conference. It
will be seen that Mr Chamberlain refused to
be drawn into any controversy that might have
the effect of modifying the terms of surrender,
though he cleared away certain misapprehensions
that may have existed in the mind of the Generals.
By the immediate publication of the Corre
spondence leading to the Conference, and of the
report ofthe deliberations, he enabled the Generals
to see that neither Inside nor outside the Colonial
Office were they likely to obtain favourable con
sideration for proposals calculated to undermine
the Vereeniging arrangement. In these circum-

654 THE SOUTH AFRICAN SETTLEMENT
stances the Generals turned to Europe for
sympathy and financial help, and issued from
Amsterdam an " Appeal to the Civilised World." *
The cash contributions which they obtained from
their tour were pitifully disproportionate to the
"sympathy" of the Continent, and In November
they made up their minds to return to South
Africa, there to resume their conferences with
Mr Chamberlain in the hope of obtaining further
financial assistance from the Imperial Government.
It is needless here to retrace the various nego
tiations attempted, directly or indirectly, by the
other Boer politicians who had taken up their
residence at Brussels, The Hague, or elsewhere in
Europe. It was, no doubt, largely due to their
advice and encouragement that the War had
been prolonged nearly half-way through the year
1902. Owing to their obdurate belief that some
thing might happen which would save the
two Republics from extinction, the Burghers
stih under arms were kept on fighting — wih-
ingly enough, many of them — long after success,
from the military point of view, had been
proved Impossible. For this persistence in a
lost cause severe blame has been thrown on the
ex-President, on Dr Leyds, and their colleagues
— especiahy as they shared personally none of the
hardships which they imposed on their country
men. They were mistaken, we know, and in
the result they did nothing but mischief, yet it
cannot be denied, by those who try to judge their
conduct impartially, that in playing against time
they played the game with extraordinary skih and
indomitable moral courage. Even to the last, it
is to be feared, they were supported in their
blind faith by English sympathisers. But
* See Appendix VI.

THE MISSION TO SOUTH AFRICA 655
whether they were patriots or egotists, or a little
of both, the British Government were entitled
to ignore them. The sole Boer representatives
of the people whom we could recognise were
the men who had continued in the field and
had signed the Treaty of submission. The
only form taken by that European interven
tion from which so much had been hoped was a
courteous offer of mediation put forward by the
Dutch Premier. This, of course, was politely
declined by our Foreign Office.
But neither then nor at any other period
would it have been possible for an external Power,
however friendly and impartial, to assist in pacify
ing the old feud between the British and Dutch
stocks in South Africa. In making Peace, as in
waging War, we asked for no help and would
accept no mediation. The settlement must
proceed from within. But how was the move
ment for conclhatlon to be started ? The passions
raised by War had by no means passed away
when Peace was signed. Between the fighting
Boers and the British soldiers a mutual feeling
of sportsmanlike respect had, no doubt, grown up.
Lord Kitchener who had organised the unrelenting
machinery through which victory was slowly
achieved was by no means unpopular among the
men whom he had vanquished. But the Cape
Dutch who had waited in vain for a chance of
taking part in the struggle — the politicians who
had hoped to profit by a War in which they did
not join and by an insurrection that they dared
not openly foment — were never more disaffected
than when the Treaty of Vereeniging had just
been signed.
By Constitutional theory, of course, and also by
personal inclination, the High Commissioner was

656 THE SOUTH AFRICAN SETTLEMENT
neutral between British and Dutch — in the newly
annexed territories as weh as in the two old
Colonies. But in the course of the War he had,
inevitably, been so closely identified with one side
that he was regarded with natural, if undeserved,
suspicion by the other. The case was somewhat
different with the Colonial Secretary. The very
fact that he operated from a distance Invested
him with an impartiality which it was less easy to
discern in his local representative. This was
thoroughly realised by Lord Milner, and it was,
therefore, in full accordance with his wishes that
Mr Chamberlain decided to visit South Africa
and make acquaintance with the leaders of every
Party and representatives of every interest. It
was at once made clear that he would start with
no preconceived policy, and that his journey
would be undertaken with the object of acquiring
local information and receiving suggestions from
any and every quarter.
On 25th November 1902, Mr and Mrs Cham
berlain bade farewell at Victoria Station to the
Prime Minister, Lord Roberts, and other high
officials, and embarked at Portsmouth in the
cruiser Good Hope. At Cairo his journey was
broken by a short visit to Lord Cromer, where
he paid an interesting tribute to young Enghsh
men of the type selected and trained for Imperial
work by great administrators like his host.
At Mombasa he disembarked, and was taken
for a trip on the new Uganda Railway — the
subject of so many Parliamentary discussions,
in some of which he had taken part. At
a banquet given to him by the British in
Zanzibar he regretted that so much of the trade
with that Protectorate had fahen into the hands
of foreigners, and reaffirmed his hope — his belief

ARRIVAL IN NATAL 657
— that the British Government would always be
ready to protect the interests of the outlying
portions of the Empire. Nor did he leave
East Africa without Inquiring into the possibility
of Native Labour being recruited in that region
for mines in the Rand. The Good Hope arrived
at Durban on 26th December, and, after saying
a few words of thanks for the enthusiastic
greeting received from the inhabitants of the
Colony which had borne the worst heat and
burden of the War, he settled down to business.
The operation of Sugar Bounties, the restrictions
imposed on the immigration of Hindoo coolies,
and the disloyal propaganda carried on by negro
" missionaries " from America, were among the
local questions which he was Invited to consider.
His first public words were intended to breathe
the spirit of his mission : —
" The issue," he said, " has been decided. The
British flag Is, and wih be, and must be, para
mount throughout South Africa. The losses
we have suffered, the sacrifices we have made,
must not be thrown away. Reconciliation
should be easy. We hold out our hand, and
we ask the Dutch to take it frankly, and in the
spirit in which it Is tendered. There is no
cause to despair. The differences are not greater
than those that once divided the Scotch and
English, or the French and English In Canada.
I come in the spirit of conciliation ; but I come
also in the spirit of firmness. Federation is a
great aim, but it would be a greater mistake to
hasten its conclusion prematurely."
At Pietermaritzburg he was confronted with
what he considered exorbitant claims for com
pensation on account of losses suffered during
the War — some of the Boer delegates who
2 T

658 THE SOUTH AFRICAN SETTLEMENT
addressed him evidently considering that they
should all be fully reimbursed for any depreciation
in their properties. His interview with the Natal
Ministers was, of course, confidential, but, in reply
to a deputation of Native Christians, he said quite
plainly that while the coloured population would
be scrupulously protected in their personal rights
they must not cherish any hope of political equality.
Mr Chamberlain has not studied American life for
nothing! At a public banquet, on the 25th, he
dwelt on the advantage of personal Intercourse
between Imperial and Colonial Statesmen, and
declared that his recent Conference with the
Colonial Premiers had been very valuable. The
War, he added, was not without its compensa
tions : it had proved the strength of Great Britain,
her determination to protect her Colonies and
their loyalty to the Imperial connection. On the
next evening he gave an outline of the present
intentions ofthe Imperial Government with regard
to the new Colonies. He was, he said, perfectly
aware that sooner or later South Africa would
follow the example of Canada and Australia.
Such a consummation could not be imposed by
the Imperial Government, but, while the Mother
Country would not interfere in such a matter, it
would heartily rejoice when the new Constitution
for a Federated South Africa were demanded. It
would add strength and prosperity to the country ;
but, in order to secure those blessings, they would
have to make sacrifices, and not Natal alone.
There must be a pohcy of give-and-take. If the
projected Conference was to secure substantial
results, each Colony must enter It with a deter
mination to contribute its full share. If Canada
and Australia had found it necessary to federate,
there were special reasons for South Africa doing

REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS 659
the same thing, for there was there a small white
population in the presence of many times more
numerous blacks. Under civilised government the
blacks would multiply rapidly, and it behoved the
white population to be strong and united if the
problem was to be dealt with effectively. They
must not decide how the problem was to be solved
until they had satisfied themselves what was the
best way.
Although he was favourable, he said, to Federa
tion in the abstract, it must never be forgotten
that accompanying Federation there must be the
concession of Responsible Government to the new
Colonies. It was perfectly clear that this con
cession could not be made immediately. The
populations of the new Colonies were In an
abnormal state. Industry had not yet recovered
from the effects of the War, and it was ridiculous
to assume that a body now elected would be
fairly representative of the people of the Trans
vaal and Orange River Colonies. Again, they
had the right, before the question of granting
Self-Government was considered, to ask their Boer
friends to furnish them with some evidence of
active loyalty. It would be a grave dereliction of
Imperial duty for His Majesty's Government to
put into power any individuals or Party who
might seek to undo by political agitation the work
that had been so painfully accomplished by force
of arms. A visit to the memorable field of Colenso
preceded the entry into Ladysmith, where Mr
Chamberlain promised that the Government
would recognise any receipt given by a British
officer for goods supplied in the War, and
generahy would satisfy all legitimate claims —
but, he added, it would be a bad day for the

660 THE SOUTH AFRICAN SETTLEMENT
Empire when people began to reckon loyalty in
a ledger account.
From Ladysmith he passed to Standerton,
and it was not until he crossed the frontier at
Charlestown on 3rd January 1903, that he met
the High Commissioner and Sir Arthur Lawley,
the Lieutenant-Governor of the Transvaal. At
Pretoria on the 5th General Cronje and Dr
Smuts were presented to him, and he renewed
his acquaintance with General Botha and
General Delarey. In reference to the contri
bution towards the expenses of the War, which
he hoped to obtain from the owners of the
gold mines, he remarked that " if they sent him
away empty-handed he would bow to their
decision." As a matter of fact, he had no
intention of failing altogether in so important
an object, but he considered it both more
graceful and more diplomatic to regard any
sum that he might induce them to grant as
a free offering, not as a forced requisition.
He hoped, for one thing, that an appeal to
the good feeling of the Rand millionaires would
be more fruitful than any demand made as of
right, which would have to be supported by
statistical arguments to which their unrivalled
financial dexterity might set up a specious reply.
He was unwilling, in the second place, to give
foreign critics, or, political adversaries at home, a
pretext for saying that the British Government
were exacting a harsh indemnity from the con
quered territory. How far his reliance on the
patriotism of the Rand was justified will be seen
hereafter. At a banquet on the 5th, both Lord Milner
and Mr Chamberlain were surprised and annoyed
at being confronted by a local lawyer, with a

THE BOER LEADERS 661
demand for the speedy restoration of Represen
tative Government. For the present, the
speaker said he would be content with Crown
Colony Government provided there were "a little
less Crown and a little more Colony." The High
Commissioner gave a bantering reply, and the
Colonial Secretary took the same tone, but
both quite decidedly refused even to discuss the
subject on an occasion when they had not
expected to be plied with controversial inquiries.
The incident was piquant but unimportant, except
as showing that Mr Chamberlain did not mean
to have his decision "rushed" by any political
group, whether British or Dutch — nor would he
modify the administration established by Lord
Milner until he had thoroughly examined its
operation. But his more immediate duty was to explain
himself to the Boer Leaders. The policy of the
Government was one of conciliation. But It
would not be conciliation to satisfy opponents
and alienate friends. Though it was the duty of
the British to work for the alliance and fusion of
the two white races in South Africa, there was a
reciprocal duty with the Boers — especiahy with
their Leaders.
"I rejoice," he said, "to see them at this
board. The leaders ofthe Boers accepted, in terms
as frank as any one can desire, the result of the
War and the terms of settlement. I absolutely
accept their assurances, which I believe to be
a matter of perfect sincerity. We are going to
carry out the terms of that settlement in the
spirit and in the letter, and we expect that they
will do the same. Henceforth we are one
nation under one flag. We have left the past
behind. I know it is said that the past carries

662 THE SOUTH AFRICAN SETTLEMENT
with it bitter memories So it does, but not
for one side alone. What we both have to do ' is
to forget the past, and look forward to the
future." It was a broad hint, but the Boer Leaders
ignored it — they had to consider and play up to
the expectations of their countrymen. On being
joined by General De Wet, they held a meeting
at which, while employing the most loyal expres
sions towards "our Government," they formu
lated demands that only stopped short of
claiming Independence. And even on that
point General De Wet declared that he was
not without hope. The Boers would behave so
nicely that the British would say "You are a
good and brave people, take your country back."
How far they expected to carry the requests
which they put forward, it is impossible to say.
Any hope of success in talking over Mr Cham
berlain was given up on 8th January when
they received his reply to their Memorial.
He told them plainly that their constant and
repeated claims were regarded with growing
impatience. They were excellent at making a
bargain, but did not understand that when made
it should be adhered to. They had accepted the
Treaty of Vereeniging, and must abide by it.
No promise of Amnesty for the Rebels was con
tained in the terms — they were left to be dealt
with by the laws of the Colonies to which they
belonged. As a matter of fact, hundreds of
sentences had been remitted, and others had
been largely reduced. And how had the Boers
treated their own Rebels ? They shot, im
prisoned, and sjamboked them ! Though the
Imperial Government did not close the door to
further clemency, nothing would be yielded to

RECEPTION AT JOHANNESBURG 663
pressure. With regard to permitting the return of
the Boers who had been engaged on European
missions, no terms had been agreed to. Let them
give some proof of their good disposition — by
explaining, for instance, how they had expended
the large sums of money sent out for their use,
and by handing over any balance to a Committee
for the relief of distress. As for the extension of
the Natal boundary, that was fixed and irrevoc
able, and Mr Chamberlain pointed out that the
inhabitants of Vryheid and Utrecht would be
at once Invested with full civic rights. On
the Language question, the Government would
adhere to the terms of the Treaty but always be
willing to listen to any complaints on this subject.
On the same day he travehed to Johannes
burg, and at once entered into negotiation with
the chief representatives of the mining industry.
In thanking them for the Addresses of Wel
come, he said that he had come to strengthen
the hand of the High Commissioner in the
gigantic task to which he had directed such
conspicuous ability. Lord Milner had come as a
friend to that community. When they were
oppressed and insulted, he had supported their
appeal to the Imperial Government. He had
never joined in the calumnies uttered against
them — he had constantly denounced the men who
had always found their own country in the wrong.
"There was yet another calumny!" he
remarked. "It is said that you are prepared to
repudiate your share of the expenditure. I will
wait and see. I do not believe that men who
have faced such dangers wih show more care for
their purses than for their lives."
That the Johannesburghers would consent to
make some substantial contribution towards the

664 THE SOUTH AFRICAN SETTLEMENT
expenses of the War, was from the beginning
assumed. But the amount of the taxation that
the mines would bear was for several days a
matter of keen debate between the Colonial
Secretary and the chief representatives of the gold
industry — though one important financier and his
associates refused to take part in the informal
conference. Mr Chamberlain might reasonably
have expected to obtain a much larger sum than
was eventuahy conceded. Although nearly
the whole of any taxation to be imposed on
the Transvaal Colony must be paid by the
mine-owners, he pointed out that the interests
of Town and Country, of British and Boer,
were not altogether distinct. While prosperity in
Johannesburg would bring custom to the farmers
on the Veldt, the encouragement of agriculture
would stimulate production, and tend to reduce
the exorbitant expenses of living in that city.
This was undeniable, but the spokesmen of the
Rand made clever and effective use of the difficulty
which had been found since the War in recruiting
Kaffirs for the mines. The natives, never fond of
work, had earned large wages during the War,
and were not disposed to take employment except
at rates much heavier than the mine-owners were
ready to pay. It was represented, therefore, that
the industry had been brought almost to a stand-
stih, and that the prospects of recovery were
somewhat uncertain. Things might improve, the
mine-owners suggested, if the Government of the
Colony would lay direct or indirect pressure on
the Kaffirs, or if the Imperial Government would
sanction the importation of Asiatic labour. But
on neither of these points, which were certain
to lead to sharp controversy in England, was
it possible for the Colonial Secretary to give a

THE RAND CONTRIBUTION 665
definite assurance. He was, therefore, compelled
to accept the terms which he announced on
1 6th January.
Briefly, the Imperial Government would pro
pose a Bih In Parliament to guarantee a loan of
;^35,ooo,ooo secured on the assets (united for that
purpose) of the Transvaal and the Orange River
Colony — a Development Loan, which could be
devoted to paying off the public liabilities, buying
up the railways, and constructing new lines. It
would also provide for Public Works (such as
irrigation) and the Land Settlement. In the
second place, another Loan of ;^30,ooo,ooo would
be issued in annual Instalments of ,;^io,ooo,ooo —
a War Debt, secured on the assets of the Trans
vaal, the first ;^io,ooo,ooo to be taken up by the
group of financiers with whom Mr Chamber
lain had been engaged In conference. Having
agreed to these terms, he made the best of the
bargain, and declared that It would be accepted by
the people of the Mother Country as an adequate
and liberal recognition on the part of the Colony
of its duty to the Empire at large, and of the
gratitude which it had so frequently expressed,
and which he believed it sincerely felt, towards
the Mother Nation which had come to its assist
ance in the time of need. It was subsequently
proposed by the Johannesburghers to raise
the Development Loan from ;^35,ooo,ooo to
;^40,ooo,ooo, and Mr Chamberlain's reasons for
dissent are given in an official account of the
interview, pubhshed (April 1903) in " Papers
relating to the Finances of the Transvaal and
Orange River Colony."
It is impossible here even to summarise
the other contents of that very interesting
Blue-book, but in fairness to the Rand repre-

666 THE SOUTH AFRICAN SETTLEMENT
sentatives it should be said that their estimate
of their own taxable capacity has been accepted
by the High Commissioner. Probably, there
fore, it does not err so much as was at first
believed on the side of fiscal modesty. At the
same time, they may safely be credited with hav
ing exercised, in their negotiations with Mr
Chamberlain, the same commercial acumen as
they had previously displayed In building up their
Industrial undertakings. On the other hand, in
accepting what he had studiously represented as
a voluntary contribution, it was not open for the
representative of the Imperial Government to
complain that the amount was insufficient. Nor
has he, since his . return, complained that the
contribution was lacking in generosity. He
followed generally in his speech in May in the
House of Commons the statements and inferences
contained in the Blue Book, and also pointed out
that about ;^6,ooo,ooo of the .;^35,ooo,ooo to be
raised as a Development Loan would be used in
the repayment of advances which had been made
by the British Government, so that the fuh relief
given to our Exchequer would be not ;^30,ooo,ooo,
but ;i^3 6, 000,000. As his highest estimate before
going to South Africa of the total amount to
be gained from the mines had not exceeded
;^ 1 00, 000, 000, and as that amount was to spread
over a long period, each instalment to be received
only when It could most conveniently be afforded
by the gold industry, the Immediate payment of
^^36,000,000 was a not inadequate substitute.
Moreover, it had never been contemplated that
the whole ^100,000,000 would be handed over
to the Chancellor of Exchequer, some part would
have to go back to South Africa, and this was
fairly represented by the Development Loan of

THE LABOUR QUESTION 667
.^35,000,000. The net result of his negotiations
was, then, that instead of ,1^100,000,000 spread
over a number of years, he accepted, on behalf
of Great Britain, a War contribution of
;^30,ooo,ooo {plus ;^6,ooo,ooo, repayment of
debt), and £29,0(y:>,ooo to be spent in the
purchase of railways and other forms of industrial
development In South Africa.
On the Labour question it was necessary for
the Colonial Secretary to practise a certain
amount of reserve. The white working-men
throughout South Africa are hotly opposed to
the licensed Immigration of Asiatic coolies, and
already were declaring that it was to obtain this
favour that the mine-owners were subscribing
to the cost of the War. The problem appeared
to Mr Chamberlain to be one which should be
left to the Colony to settle for itself It was
not a case in which the Imperial Government
should interfere on either side.* Meantime, Mr
Chamberlain's brief visit to the East Coast had
convinced him that no great stock of natives
could be drawn from the regions North of the
Zambesi, and the officials had impressed on him
the danger of importing the "sleeping sickness"
into South Africa. Nor could any great amount
of white labour be hired, since Europeans of the
better type refuse to work alongside Kaffirs
— moreover, they are so expensive that only the
more thriving mines can support them. It
* To the decision not to interfere in a matter which
concerns the Colonists themselves he has firmly adhered
since his return from South Africa. If the general sense of
the Colony were in favour of admitting Asiatic labour he
should not oppose it, but he should require reasonable
proof that it was a policy which the Transvaal would
approve if it were a Self-Governing Colony (House of
Commons, July 28, 1903).

668 THE SOUTH AFRICAN SETTLEMENT
would be desirable, no doubt, if it were possible,
to establish a strong class of white working-men
— if only as a counterpoise to the black element
which Is so rapidly increasing in the population
of the towns. But this the mine-owners do not
regard as practicable nor, in fact, do they wish it
to be done. Nothing would be more inconvenient
to the Directors and Shareholders than for the
wages and conditions of labour in the mines to be
controlled by a powerful Trade Union run on
English lines.
Whatever may be the ultimate solution of this
problem, it appeared, or was made to appear, that
there was but one expedient in the early months
of 1903 — to seek to induce the coloured
population to return to underground work.
Mr Chamberlain expressed himself as not un
alterably opposed to some method of indirect
compulsion, as, e.g., by imposing a tax which they
could only pay by working for wages. He had
seen with his own eyes the black idlers in the
streets of Pretoria and Johannesburg ; naturally,
he regarded them as somewhat unfavourable
exemplars of unrestrained personal liberty — nor
was he yet aware how far these town loafers are
from representing either the typical vices or virtues
of their race. " We have abolished slavery," he
said, " in theory ; but philanthropists at home
would be astonished to learn that we were encour
aging It in another form. The Kaffir works long
enough to enable him to live in idleness for the
rest of his days. He buys a wife — or, if he is un
usually energetic and ambitious, two or three —
and these women are, to all intents and purposes,
his slaves." Mr Chamberlain, however, did not
propose a measure of industrial coercion. It
might very weh lead to a Kaffir rebellion.

"THE DAY OF SMALL KINGDOMS" 669
As a temporary and partial relief, however,
he arranged with the Foreign Office that the
Nyassaland region should be opened for the
voluntary enlistment of a limited number of
miners, whose payment and conditions of labour
were to be regulated under strict official super
vision. Lord Milner has recently declared that
"there are simply not enough natives in South
Africa, If they all worked, for our growing
requirements." He favours, therefore, the impor
tation of Indian coolies for the railways, so as
to set more Kaffirs free for the mines and
agriculture. If the visit to Johannesburg had resulted in
a substantial, rather than a generous, contribution
to the expenses of the War, broadly it had
been successful. Mr Chamberlain had brought
the Rand into hearty accord with himself
personally, and with Colonial Office administra
tion generally. There was no more demand
for an immediate grant of local Self-Govern
ment, and there was much less grumbling, for
the time at least, against the young officials
whom Lord Milner had appointed to carry out his
policy. Mr Chamberlain carried his audience
with him when he indulged in a characteristic
fling at the group of financiers who had not
taken part in guaranteeing the War Loan.
"We must go to London," he said, "to hear
that the Transvaal is anxious to throw off the
yoke of Downing Street at once ! Downing
Street Is ready to abdicate, but you do not desire
that your political opponents should secure by
political agitation what they have failed to secure
by the sword : you do not desire to reproduce
here the position in Cape Colony, where the
majority of the British pray to be relieved of

670 THE SOUTH AFRICAN SETTLEMENT
privileges which they believe to have been abused
by others. Neither British nor Boer desires to
be rid of Downing Street and to substitute Park
Lane ! Continue your confidence in Lord
Milner." His final words were an appeal to the
broader conceptions of Patriotism.
" The day of smaU Kingdoms with petty
jealousies," he said, " is past. The future is with
the great Empires. There is no greater Empire
than the British Empire. The Mother Country
has set the example. She has thrown off the
apathy and indifference of past generations. No
longer do we hear of Statesmen to whom separa
tion from the Colonies is almost an object of
desire. The Colonies, on their part, have recipro
cated that feeling. They have abandoned Pro
vincialism, and are agreed to claim their part in
the glorious Empire which is theirs as weh as
ours. They are ready to undertake the obliga
tions which go with privileges. That is the spirit
which exists and which I desire shall continue.
" ' Unite the Empire, make it stand compact,
Shoulder to shoulder ; let its members feel
The touch of human brotherhood, and act
As one great nation, true and strong as steel.' "
Before starting for Potchefstrom Mr Chamber
lain interviewed a Deputation of National Scouts
to whom he made a promise that they should
be protected against the " Wild " Boers who
threatened to persecute them, and should be held
entitled to priority in the settlement of claims
arising from the War. They should have no
excuse for saying that it was a bad thing to have
stood by the British Government. At Potchef
strom he paid a visit to General Cronje, a party of
Burghers taking the horses out of his carriage,
and drawing it in triumph to the veteran soldier's

FRIENDLY BOERS 671
house. Before leaving Potchefstrom he visited
the settlements of Boer and British farmers
in the neighbourhood, and at the Kaffir location
he found a crowd of natives assembled around
an arch bearing the words "Welcome Moatlodi "
("the man who puts things straight"). At
Ventersdorp he was greeted in the most friendly
way by General Delarey, who accompanied
him on the trek to Lichtenburg. Here he
had the opportunity of coming into close con
tact with the old-fashioned Boer farmers, of
whom he had made the remark that "the more
he saw of them the better he liked them." In
reply to the Reception Committee he delivered a
warm appeal for harmony between the two races.
To the friendly Boers assembled in the Market
Square, he said : —
" As I have travelled in your country, I have
seen the graves of British soldiers in many places,
and very often these were side by side with those
of Boers who had fought against them. Now
both lie together in peace. Let us, who live, live
also in peace. Your sufferings are perhaps
greater than ours, since they have fallen on
a smaller population. You have lost your
property, and everything which you hold dear.
Now let us see if what the War has left
behind, that is Peace, shah be a lasting Peace.
Let us ah join together to repair the ravages
of the War, which was brought about, I
believe, by a misunderstanding. You were
suspicious of us, and we of you. Now let us
trust each other. If there comes among you any
mischief-maker from outside, tell him to mind his
own business. Tell him you are grown men able
to take care of yourselves. I want you to under
stand that the new Government will do everything

672 THE SOUTH AFRICAN SETTLEMENT
in its power to secure greater prosperity even than
was enjoyed by many of you under the old
Government, which was called Progressive. Now
you will have a really Progressive Government.
Nations, like individuals, cannot stand still, but
must go either backward or forward. We are
going forward. In the first place, our business is
to get you back to your lands. I hope you will
understand that the Government has done every
thing in its power. It was an enormous business
to bring back nearly a hundred thousand people,
place them on their farms, and feed them so long
as was necessary. At the same time, we had to
consider the claims under the Peace terms for
assistance and for goods taken by the Military.
This was also a very great task. We have
received more than a hundred thousand claims.
These must be examined. Some are not honest
claims ; we must separate the true from the false ;
if the false were allowed, there would be so much
less for the true.
" Lord Milner is about to issue a new notice
stating exactly what whl be done. We hope in a
few months to close the business altogether. If
there is anything in the notice that is not under
stood, you must make inquiries of the Magistrate,
who wUl explain the point. When this is settled,
we shall begin a new chapter in the history of the
Transvaal. I am sure the Boers, who are an
independent people, wih be very glad when they
no longer require Government assistance, and a
good many will be able to go on with their busi
ness, and bring back the prosperity of former
days. When the Government has finished with
direct assistance, it will be able to do much
indirectly. The country is very rich, but at
present it is not properly developed. It wants

CAPE COLONY 673
men, railways, water, and trees. Large stretches of
land wih be more cultivated, and you will be able to
bring your produce to the nearest and best market.
" The British Government has agreed to lend
^35,000,000 to the Transvaal, in order to
carry out your works. When these are finished,
in a few years for the first time the land whl have
a real chance. Nature has done much, the
Government will do more. There is only one
thing wanting ; you must not look backvrard but
forward, and be a united people, not only at
unity with the British but among yourselves.
\ou must not carry forward the old feelings
caused by the War, but must remember that the
land needs the help of ever\- son. If you adopt
the principle of union, it Is certain that you will
soon rejjair the losses of the War, and your
children will enjoy a prosperity such as the
countn,- has never seen before."
In a cordial speech General Delarey advised
his countrymen to serve the new Government as
faithluhy as they had served the old. " I want
you to understand," he added, " that Mr Chamber-
Iain is a strong man. He holds the keys, and
can lock and unlock."
At Mafekincr Mr Chamberlain was welcomed
by the Governor and the Premier of Cape Colony,
and on entering a district where secret sedition
was sthl rife his language became less con
ciliator}- than when he had been addressing a
brave people who had never professed ahegiance
to the Crown, but had frankly accepted the
resxilts of their vain struggle for Independence.
Inspired, too, by recoUections of the memorable
siege he declared that the War, then happily
over, was an undertaking which no other nation
would have successfiilly carried out. 2 u

674 THE SOUTH AFRICAN SETTLEMENT
" The War is over, and I hope it has
done much to show the strength and power of
the Empire, but it has done more to show its
cohesion and union. From the four great
Continents men of British race poured in to join
the Mother Country in the time of stress, and
prove that blood was thicker than water. It was
a white man's War. For reasons of policy, it
was considered undesirable that men other than
Europeans should take part in it. Had it been
otherwise, the great Empire of India could have
poured in tens of thousands of valiant, stalwart
troops. There is not a Colony, from the smahest
to the greatest, over which I have the honour to
preside, that would not have poured in troops to
show that it was prepared to share in the sacrifices
as weh as in the privileges of the Empire. The
link which bound it might appear thin as
gossamer ; but let an enemy try to break
through — he would find It as strong as tempered
steel." In reply to a " Voice," which said that he
was trying to "coax the Boers," he retorted that
he had not come to flatter them, but to teh them
the truth. It was only the truth that they had
good, strong qualities. We should like to hold
the country with the Boers — we could hold it
without them !
After a short halt at Vryburg where he spoke
of the mischief-makers who were retarding the
gift of Self-Government to the new Colonies, Mr
Chamberlain drove into Kimberley, where he was
enthusiastically received by the loyal inhabitants
of the Diamond City. Here, having dwelt at
length on the theme which he had touched at
Vryburg, he passed on to the prospects of South
African Federation. In that great movement the
Premier Colony should take the lead. "A free

ORANGE RIVER COLONY 675
nation is springing up," he said. "You are
co-heirs with us In an Empire of greater extent
than the world has ever known — partners in its
privileges and its glories. Are you going to be
content to be sleeping partners ? You must claim
a share In all that the Empire represents — claim
it, as an honour and a privilege, to share our
burdens and obligations." The patriotic note
was taken up by the company. Unfortunately,
however. Sir J. Gordon Sprigg — who, pluckily
enough, had accompanied Mr Chamberlain to
this stronghold of British loyalism — met with a
very unfavourable reception. The cheers drawn
by the Colonial Secretary's ringing appeal were
mixed with hisses for the Cape Premier.
A brief visit to Bloemfontein showed that the
leading inhabitants of the old Free State remained
less reconciled to the results of the War than
were the Boers of the Transvaal A Deputation
headed by General De Wet presented a Memorial
complaining that the Terms of Peace had not been
faithfully executed by the British authorities, and,
amongst other things, demanding an Amnesty for
Rebels, the immediate restoration of ah Free State
Burghers, compensation for losses arising from
the War, and a cheaper Administration. In
reply, Mr Chamberlain showed that no Amnesty
had been promised for Rebels though many had
been pardoned ; that, according to the Treaty,
all Burghers in the Field, and ah prisoners of war,
had been brought back ; that the system under
which compensation for losses was being ad
ministered had been fuhy explained ; and, finahy,
that in spite of no fresh taxes having been
imposed more was being done for the people
than under any previous Administration.
The tone of the Memorial was not satis-

676 THE SOUTH AFRICAN SETTLEMENT
factory, he remarked. If the Government were
troubled with imaginary grievances he should
advise it to hold its hand. It was useless to
confer benefits on a people who received them
without thanks and only made concession a
basis for further demands. On General De
Wet rising to speak, Mr Chamberlain motioned
him to sit down, on which the General expressed
regret that a speech from him was unwelcome
— it would come like mustard after meat. There
upon, Judge Hertzog entered upon an argument
to show that the Boer Delegates in Europe were
entitled under the Treaty to claim restoration.
Before the interview came to an end, however,
he explained that he had not intended to
charge the British Government with bad faith,
and General De Wet pointed out that the agita
tion which he threatened to conduct against the
Government would be confined within strict
Constitutional lines !
Before departing from Bloemfontein Mr Cham
berlain complained that the National Scouts were
still being persecuted by some of General De Wet's
adherents, and that in this mischievous work the
pastors of the Dutch Church were foremost, while
one of them who had advocated conciliation
had been visited with ecclesiastical penalties.
Nevertheless, on going away, the Colonial Secre
tary expressed a hope that Representative Institu
tions would not long be withheld.
Returning from Bloemfontein to Cape Colony
on 9th February, Mr Chamberlain received at
Grahamstown such a welcome as might have
been expected in "a city which for nearly a
hundred years had kept untarnished its name
for loyalty and patriotism." He was especially
gratified, he said, that in the Address presented

COLONIAL CONTRIBUTIONS 677
by the citizens the name of Lord Milner had
been associated with his own. Incidentally,
though not in express terms, he disposed of
the recently revived rumour that the High
Commissioner was about to be superseded, by
declaring that Lord Milner enjoyed the full con
fidence of the Government, and if his health
were preserved would remain in South Africa
to complete the great trust he had undertaken.
Speaking to a Loyalist and mainly British
audience, he addressed a significant appeal
to the Dutch. The "chimerical idea" of
a great Dutch Republic in South Africa had
been dissipated for ever by the failure of the
plot to expel the British authority. If such a
State had ever come into existence it could not
have protected itself against the ambition of the
great European Powers. But the loyal British
must show tolerance for fehow- Colonists who
had been "rushed by men who should have
known better." Finally, he asked them to
remember that, while Great Britain had to pay
heavily for the War, the people of Cape Colony
had made a large profit out of it. The normal
defence of the Empire cost the taxpayers of the
United Kingdom ;^6o,ooo,ooo a year, and the
recent hostilities had involved an outlay of nearly
;^2 50,000,000. We were able to bear the change,
but there must be a limit. The cost of the
South African Squadron was ;^400,ooo a year,
and the annual contribution of Cape Colony was
no more than ,^^50,000. At Port Elizabeth he
spoke in much the same strain, but expressed his
regret that, while animosities were dying out in the
Transvaal, they appeared to be growing more
intense in the old Colony. Race feeling ran very
high at this time in Port Elizabeth, and Mr

678 THE SOUTH AFRICAN SETTLEMENT
Chamberlain was somewhat reserved in his utter
ances, because he was anxious to say nothing
that would excite the Loyalists against Sir J.
Gordon Sprigg. The British, he said, could
protect themselves. He was more anxious about
the loyal Dutch, who were marked down for a
persecution which it was our business to suppress.
He had also been in districts where recon
ciliation was delayed by the overbearing attitude
of the British. " That ought not to be. What
was keeping us apart ? (cries of ' The Bond ! '
' Sprigg ! ') I prefer to answer my own questions
(laughter). Suspicion ! We suspect the Dutch
of want of loyalty ; they suspect us of a desire
to undermine their liberties and change their
customs. There is no real ground of distrust.
If the Dutch renounced for ever the aspirations
of a separate Republic, would you not meet them
half way ? I accept the assurance ; but we are
entitled to ask for proof There must be no
persecution of loyalty."
At Graaf Reinet on 13th February, Mr
Chamberlain visited a weh-known hot-bed of dis
affection. The Dutch inhabitants took no part
in the public reception. Rebel badges were dis
played in the streets, and even the more influential
Dutchmen showed no sign of disapproval. These
demonstrations were too open to be ignored, and
the Colonial Secretary spoke in very plain terms
about the disloyalty of the district, and intimated
that if the Dutch wished to retain Self-Govern
ment they must show that liberty would not pass
into licence. The rebehion had been absolutely
without excuse. Let those who had been guilty
be content that their crime had been forgiven —
and not add to it. To the assurances of loyalty
which he had received, he replied that they

THE BOND SECRETARY 679
should give proof of it. His experiences at
Middelburg were less unpleasant. Mr De Waal,
the Secretary of the Africander Bond, declared
that the Dutch as a body did not intend to
ostracise or boycott Loyalists, but would co
operate with them for the common welfare. Mr
Chamberlain had laid his hand on the sore of the
body politic. This was distrust between the two
races, and Mr De Waal would personally help
to remove it. At Paarl, however, the Dutch
inhabitants ostentatiously refrained from any
show of welcome, and Mr Chamberlain again
referred to the tenure on which the Constitution
of the Colony was held.
" Who can say " (he remarked), " that the wants
of the Paarl and the Eastern Province are the
same as those of the Western districts, or the
wants of Kimberley the same as those of the
country districts of the Cape? The change of
the political atmosphere is remarkable. Middel
burg differs materially from Graaf Reinet, while
Victoria West seems of a different complexion
from both. I do not know yet if I can say
of the Paarl whether it is loyal to the British
flag, or whether — but it may be well not to put
the alternative. I only note that you appreciate
my refusal to suspend the Constitution. The
danger to your liberties did not come from the
Imperial Government or from the large minority
who signed the Petition for suspension. They
used arguments similar to those of the Boer
Generals against an even moderately representa
tive Government. They urged that what the
country wants is peace and freedom from political
agitation. The danger comes from those who
fought against the Constitution, and showed
themselves unworthy of the liberties conceded

680 THE SOUTH AFRICAN SETTLEMENT
them. The Constitution must be a panacea for
loyalty, not an instrument for displacing the Flag
which protects you."
It was on 17th February that Mr Chamber
lain entered Cape Town, where he speedhy held
interviews, private and public, with ah the leading
politicians with whom he had not previoiisly been
acquainted. His first public utterance was un
compromising. Racial antagonism, he said, had
become chronic in Cape Colony, and rebellion was
exalted into heroism by men in authority.
Loyalty was discountenanced and estranged, and
a propaganda was being carried on, in Press and
in Pulpit, which tended to widen the existing
separation between the races.
A Deputation from the Afrikander Bond pre
sented an Address which was intended to justify
their action in the past and explain their future
policy. They had worked to prevent the Dutch
in Cape Colony from acting on their " not un
natural sympathy " with the Boers, and they now
accepted the Peace of Vereeniging as the begin
ning of a new era. On the other hand, they
denounced the action of the Progressives in
demanding a suspension of the Constitution.
Before a " piratical raid " had been made on the
Transvaal little had been heard of racial
division, and the selection of the prime mover
in that rebehious enterprise (Dr Jameson),
as the head of a political Party was singu
larly unfortunate. The Colonial Secretary was
asked to grant an Inquiry into the adminis
tration of Martial Law, which had too often
been entrusted to violent and ignorant men,
who had been misled by "local intelligence agents
of strong political opinions, who used their oppor
tunities of paying off old scores with deplorable

MR HOFMEYR'S ASSURANCES 681
results." In conclusion, the Bond deprecated the
proposals for compelling the Kaffirs to work at
the mines, and hoped that at no distant date
South Africa would be federated on the Australian
or Canadian model.
The Address was supplemented by a remark
able speech from Mr Jan Hofmeyr, whose
influence over the Cape Dutch far transcends
that of any other local politician — a subtle,
inscrutable Statesman, who prefers to work
in the background, but is absolutely sincere
in his patriotism, always open to new argu
ments, and ready to adopt fresh expedients.
Mr Chamberlain had already held long and con
fidential intercourse with him, and had so far
succeeded in bringing him over to co-operate in
the policy of conciliation that he had under
taken to issue a loyal Circular to his Dutch
supporters. It was his desire, Mr Hofmeyr said, to remove
misunderstandings and promote friendly feelings.
The accounts of ostracism and Boycotting prac
tised against Loyalists were, however, much
exaggerated. The leaders of the Bond repro
bated all offensive acts such as wearing badges of
the late Republics or singing disloyal songs.
The Appeal which they would address to the
people would exhort them to promote a good
understanding and to work for the happiness and
prosperity of the two great European Nations
under the one Flag.
Accepting Mr Hofmeyr's statement that the
accounts of Dutch oppressiveness had been over-
coloured, Mr Chamberlain expressed his belief
that the promised Circular would produce excehent
results, especially in the country districts, where
feehng was most bitter. In more direct reply

682 THE SOUTH AFRICAN SETTLEMENT
to the Bond Address, he asked, " What good could
be served by raking up old questions which they
ah agreed ought to be allowed to die down ? It
would be much better if the whole country were
prepared to accept the Declaration of Peace as
the commencement of a new era. But, while
agreeing with the Bond Leaders in principle, he
was afraid that their practice was not entirely in
accordance with it."
Again, the Bond had made too light of
Rebellion. " I admit (he said) that the ties
of race and kinship were calculated to mislead
men, and on the whole it is in their favour
that few of the Rebels crossed the border till
they were forced by the invaders to do so.
Still, ten thousand revolted — which is a large
proportion when estimated on the basis of
ties of kinship — and more would have joined
the enemy but for Martial Law. You complain
that suspicion exists, but you ought to admit
that as reasonable men we have some cause for
suspicion. Having granted Self-Government
to the Colony for a Generation, we had some
right to hope and to believe that few would
join in active resistance to the Government."
Nor was it historicahy true to say that the
feud between races dated only from the Raid. It
had begun twenty-five years ago, about the time
of the first Annexation. As for the complaints
about Martial Law, he vindicated British officers
from the charge of violence and ignorance, and
quoted the favourable opinion of Lord Alverstone
and his coheagues on the Commission. Nor
would he reopen the whole Inquiry. War and
Rebellion always involved misery and suffering :
the innocent had to suffer with the guhty. With
those who had suffered unjustly he expressed

APPEAL FOR MODERATION 683
his sympathy. If it were possible to redress
such grievances there might be reason for the
inquiry demanded by the Bond, But it was
not possible, and it would "open a lion's mouth,
as in ancient Venice, into which every charge
would be poured for the satisfaction of every
private vengeance,"
" I should like to see Federation," he said. " I
will go one step further and say I should like to see
you reunited in one great Parliament of an Imperial
race. But undue hurry would be fatal. Now is
the time for discussion. Nothing would please me
better than to know that Federation would come
within the lifetime of this generation. I make a
last appeal. I have come to South Africa at some
inconvenience to myself. I have no personal
motives and no pohtical ambition to gratify. I am
older than most of those present, and my time of
active service Is necessarily coming to a close. I
have tried to fulfil my great misson in an impartial
spirit. I have spoken frankly and without reserve.
I shall go away hopeful and confident regarding
the rest of South Africa, and I am sanguine even
here. Upon you a great responsibility lies. You
are engaged in building up a new nation. What
that nation shall be depends largely upon what you
do now, not on the past. You have a clean slate,
and I ask you to give up all kinds of animosity
which can prevent co-operation for the common
good, and also for that Imperial dominion which is
yours as weh as ours," At a banquet given on
24th February, which was attended by the
leading Dutch politicians, he dwelt on the same
theme, but added the Intimation that a large
measure of clemency might shortly be extended to
the Rebels, But it must be accepted as an act of
grace, not a concession to pressure.

684 THE SOUTH AFRICAN SETTLEMENT
The other side ofthe case was also presented to
Mr Chamberlain by a deputation of Dutch Loyal
ists, introduced by Sir Henry Juta. He proffered
a "living mass of proof" Because a lot of men
remained loyal, it was no sign of improvement.
Ostracism was too real to admit of doubt. He had
direct proof that the opinon was gaining ground
that once more the Loyalists were going to be
deserted. They were in a worse position as
regards compensation, because they had been
driven from their homes without obtaining receipts
during the War, whereas the disloyal were undis
turbed. The Government had not redeemed its
promise to put the Loyalists on an equal footing
with the pro- Boers in the matter of the return
of arms. The Memorial also gave examples of
persecution in the churches and schools, and
threw doubts on Mr De Waal's protestations of
loyalty. Mr Chamberlain, in reply, said he was sorry to
hear so unsatisfactory an account of the situation.
While he advocated conciliation, he did not ask
that it should be purchased at the sacrifice of con
viction, or by the desertion of friends. One
could not legislate against an insidious form of
persecution ; one could only endeavour to remove
the poisonous atmosphere which makes such a
condition possible. He would advise them not to
lose heart, and to stand firm in loyalty to the
Government, and firm to one another. They
should wait for the process of compensation to be
complete before they believed themselves left in
the cold. As regards the "first invasion" losses,
there was a clear distinction between those who
were loyal and those who actuahy took part in
the rebehion. The compensation would be on a
generous scale to the loyal, but there would be

ADDRESS TO THE LOYALISTS 685
none for the rebels. The " second invasion " losses
were a matter entirely for the Self-Governing
Colony. The Acts of Parliament draw a clear
distinction in favour of Loyalists. The money at
the disposal of the Commission was not more
than sufficient to meet the claims of the Loyalists,
and, therefore, the rebels would have nothing.
Mr De Waal's speech was a distinct reproba
tion of ostracism. After the even more striking
declaration by Mr Hofmeyr, it was not good
pohcy or generous to accept these assurances in a
grudging spirit ; if the Loyahsts were sincere in
their desire to forget the past, they must put sus
picion aside. " You want to see proofs. So do I.
We must both wait." Mr Chamberlain said he did
not believe that there was any difference of opinion
as to the importance of a Dissolution. The exist
ing situation was confessedly anomalous. He was
assured that a Dissolution was impossible till a
late period in the year. As soon as registration
was complete, and the forms of the Constitution
permitted, a new Parliament would speak authori
tatively the opinion of the Colony. He could
hold out no hope of interference by the Imperial
authorities. It would be unconstitutional, and
rake up old animosities.
That there was some truth in the statements
of the Dutch Loyalists and some justice in their
demands was as clear as that the former were
exaggerated and the latter excessive. It was Mr
Chamberlain's business to hold, so far as pos
sible, an even balance between the extremists on
both sides ; and the feat, difficult as it was, he
seems, by general admission, to have successfully
performed. On the evening of the 25th he bade fareweh to
Sir Walter Hely- Hutchinson, and started on the

686 THE SOUTH AFRICAN SETTLEMENT
homeward voyage in the Norman Castle. Mr
and Mrs Chamberlain arrived at Southampton on
14th March, where they were welcomed by a
deputation from the Colonial Secretary's consti
tuents in West Birmingham. " I am very glad,"
said Mr Chamberlain in reply, " that you have
mentioned my wife In your Address, for her com
panionship and help have been of the greatest
help to me. I do not know how I should have
got through my work without her assistance
and co-operation." To the Mayor and Corpora
tion of Southampton he declared that he returned
in a spirit of hopefulness, even of confidence,
though they must not over-rate the results
already achieved by his mission.
His arrival in London, though Intended to be
private, was made the occasion of a popular demon
stration, and on the next day he was summoned
by the King to Buckingham Palace. On the
fohowing Saturday (20th March) he was received
at the Guildhah, and entertained at a public
luncheon by the Lord Mayor at the Mansion
House. After a general review of his work in
South Africa, and of the views he had formed and
the prospects he entertained, he pointed out that
the Imperial idea had only recently taken root in
this country : —
" We have only to look back in the lifetime of
many of us to remember a period of apathy and
indifference in which our Statesmen were eager
chiefly to rid themselves of responslbhity, and
felt that home affairs were as much as they could
properly be cahed upon to attempt. At that time
our Colonies were crying in vain for our sympathy.
And now we have gone ahead ; now, I think,
perhaps, we are even in advance of our Colonies.
Not, indeed, that there Is on their part — as I have

THE WORK OF PACIFICATION 687
had sufficient testimony — any indifference to the
common Interest, or any want of feeling or affection,
but that their own local affairs have become so
important and absorbing that, perhaps, they have
failed to appreciate adequately all that is due from
them as members of the Empire to which they are
proud to belong."
It is too soon to form an opinion on the
progress of pacification in South Africa. The
machinery of Government has been working
smoothly enough, but that may only be because
the Imperial authorities have an assured majority
in the Councils. Some disappointment has been
expressed because General Botha and other
recognised Boer Leaders would not co-operate
in the Administration. But if they had asso
ciated themselves with the British so closely, and
so soon after the War, they would have been
cahed traitors by their own people. It was,
however, unfortunate that General Botha, who
had been one of the Moderate Party in the
old Raad at Pretoria, should, as Mr Chamberlain
said in the House of Commons on 30th July,
put himself forward as a leader of the Irre-
concllables. The letter which he had sent to
Mr Leonard Courtney for publication in England
was, no doubt, a mischievous document, because
it dwelt only on the shortcomings of the Govern
ment of the Colony, and made no allowance for
difficulties, while it did not give a faithful record
of the mere facts. But neither this misleading
document nor the speech which he delivered at
the great Boer meeting at Heidelburg, on 2nd
July, contained anything absolutely disloyal.
There was no sentence in either that could be
construed as even a veiled incitement to sedition
— nothing which passed the licence claimed in

688 THE SOUTH AFRICAN SETTLEMENT
this country by an Opposition orator in dealing
with the Cabinet of the day. That such criticism
could be tolerated, and that no evil results have
ensued, is the best evidence that the country is
settling down, and that racial animosity in
the new Colonies is certainly not more dangerous
than at the Cape. Indeed, General Botha ad
mitted that the misgovernment of which he com
plained pressed as hardly on the British as on
the Boers : " You must not infer," he wrote,
" that the Boers are seething with discontent.
There is a wonderful calm everywhere observable."
All their energies were engaged, he added, in
rebuilding their homes and repairing the losses
of the war. In his speech, made nearly three
weeks later, he declared that the Boers were
not going against the Government. They wished
to stand shoulder to shoulder with it, and help
it through any trouble in the country. But they
wanted " these big questions " — Amnesty for
Rebels, more of the Dutch language in the schools,
the admission of the Asiatic labour, the Black
Vote, and the War Debt — to be settled by Boer
opinion, and with Boer approval.
In opposition to the old maxim. Divide et
impera, the British have set themselves to miti
gate sectional jealousies and racial feuds by
working gradually towards the Federation of the
various Colonies. The first step in this direction
was taken by the Bloemfontein Conference, con
vened for the purpose of establishing a Customs
Union. A further development of the Move
ment is the Order In Council forming an Inter-
Colonial Council for the Transvaal and Orange
River Colony. The object was thus explained
by Lord Milner : —
" The important work before the Legislatures

THE INTER-COLONIAL COUNCIL 689
of both Colonies is great. Indeed, in the case
of the Transvaal it might almost be said to be
appalling. They will both be better able to
cope adequately with the enormous amount of
work before them, if they are not cahed upon to
deal, in addition, with the matters which it is
now proposed to reserve for an Inter- Colonial
Council. . . . The Council, which is constituted
by the enclosed draft, would be one of high
authority, representing, as It would, the Execu
tive and Legislative Councils of each of the two
Colonies concerned. It could not be open to the
charge of being unrepresentative, and its influence
would be such that neither of the local Legisla
tures would be likely to cavil at its decisions, which
they would in any case be unable to alter."
As regards the policy of the proposed Measure,
Lord Milner added that the more he considered
it the more convinced he was of its desirability
and importance. " I see great possibilities of
development in it, affecting much more than the
two Colonies. So far, the policy of linking the
two Colonies more closely together in regard to
their common interests has proved the greatest
possible success. I could not have believed six
weeks ago that we should have got through the
numerous difficult and conflicting questions which
presented themselves to the Railway Extension
Conference, and subsequently to the Bloemfontein
Conference, as smoothly and satisfactorily as we
have done. The result is largely, if not entirely,
due to the fact that at the former Conference we
eliminated the idea of any conflicting interest
between the Transvaal and the Orange River
Colony in railway matters, and thereby we suc
ceeded at the latter Conference in getting the
two Colonies to work absolutely as one. Though
2 X

690 THE SOUTH AFRICAN SETTLEMENT
six months ago no one dreamt of unifying the
two Colonies in any respect, now that the thing
has been done, or rather started, the advantages
are so obvious that apparently no one is seriously
opposed to it, while the great body of public
opinion seems cordially in favour of it. No
doubt the position would be very different if any
attempt were made to amalgamate the two
Colonies altogether. ... In the proposed Con
stitution, ah matters into which local sentiment
and tradition enter, and in which diversity of
action would be harmless, and perhaps even
useful, are left to the Local Governments. I
would only say, in conclusion, that the basis on
which I propose that any contribution to the
Common Budget should be levied, and also the
basis on which it is suggested that any surplus
should be divided, though they may appear some
what arbitrary, have really been carefully thought
out, and discussed with good financial authorities.
The Customs duties, especiahy when the Customs
Union is introduced, will be the best measure
(a better measure than the sum of taxation) of
the comparative resources of the two Colonies ;
and, therefore, of their comparative ability to
contribute towards the common burden."
On 23rd May, Mr Chamberlain transmitted
to Lord Milner an Order in Counch estabhshing
the new Council founded on the draft of the
High Commissioner. Mr Chamberlain added :
"In view of the considerations advanced in
your Despatch of i6th February, the present
Measure is to be regarded as a financial necessity
for securing efficient control and harmonious
administration in regard to certain matters of
common interest, whilst leaving to the two
Colonies perfect freedom as to their individual

A STEP TOWARDS CLOSER UNION 691
necessities and aspirations. It is mainly by
these considerations that I have been actuated
in submitting the Measure for the approval of
His Majesty in Council ; but, judging from
the spirit which prevailed at the recent Customs
and Railway Conferences, I am led to believe
that it wih also be welcomed as a step towards
the closer union of British South Africa."
The Order was brought into force in both
Colonies on 15th June.

CHAPTER XIX
STEPS TOWARDS FEDERATION
Early in 1897, Mr Chamberlain took advantage
of the approaching celebration of the late Queen's
second Jubilee to invite the Premiers of the Self-
Governing Colonies to attend a Conference in
Downing Street.* The proceedings, as he ex
plained in his opening speech on 24th June, were
to be of a somewhat informal nature, i.e., the
Resolutions arrived at were not to be binding on
any of the communities represented, and it was
the desire of the Colonial Office rather to elicit
expressions of opinion from the visitors than to
* This was by no means the first occasion on which the
Premiers of the Self-Governing Colonies had assembled.
But the first important meeting was convened in London
under the auspices of the Imperial Federation League. It
was addressed by Lord Salisbury who pointed out the
difficulties interposed in the way of a Customs Union by
the different fiscal policies of the various parts of the
Empire, but regarded such an arrangement in the future
as by no means impossible. The first business, however,
was union for defence. Mr Chamberlain, speaking of the
Conference after it had been dissolved, expressed his belief
that the existing tie between Mother Country and Colonies
was essentially a temporary one ; it must be strengthened by
Federation or it would be loosened altogether. Ten points
were set down for discussion, and, practically, they covered
the whole ground of Imperial Federation. Subsequently,

COLONIAL CONFERENCE, 1897 693
put forward any views or proposals of Its own.
The subjects proposed for consideration were :
(i) The Political Relations between the Mother
Country and the Self-governing Colonies ; (2)
Imperial Defence ; (3) Commercial Relations ; (4)
The construction of a Pacific Cable passing
through exclusively British territory ; and a
number of minor questions, which included the
establishment of an Imperial Penny Postage, and
imposing restrictions on Alien Immigration.
With regard to establishing a closer political
connection between the Mother Country and the
Colonies, Mr Chamberlain declared that here, at
least, the Idea of an Imperial Federation was
" in the air," but he plainly intimated that Colonial
opinion, so far as he could tell, was not yet ripe
for any practical proposals in that direction. If
It was ever to be accomplished, it would be
after the lapse of a considerable time, and only by
gradual steps. One ofthe surest advances towards
that end would consist in the grouping of the
Colonies. Canada had shown the way, Australia
was fohowing, and in South Africa the idea had
however, the movement languished, but it was revived in
1894 at the Ottawa Conference, at which three Resolutions
were passed (i) in support of a Customs Arrangement
between Great Britain and the Colonies under which trade
within the Empire might be placed on a more favourable
footing than that on which trade is carried on with foreign
countries ; (2) that until this could be settled Great Britain
and the Colonies should place each other's products on a
more favoured basis than those of foreign countries, and (3)
that all clauses in existing Treaties which prevented the
Colonies from making arrangement for reciprocity between
themselves or with Great Britain should be removed, and
power should be given to the Colonies for making such
agreements. But nothing was done in pursuance of these
suggestions until the Conference of 1897, as Germany and
Belgium both declined to modify the existing Treaties.

694 STEPS TOWARDS FEDERATION
bulked largely in the past, and would probably
come to the front again. There was, however,
one suggestion — merely a personal one — which Mr
Chamberlain wished to place before the Premiers.
This was for setting up some " better machinery
of consultation " between the Mother Country
and the Self-Governing Colonies. It might be
possible to establish "a great Council of the
Empire " to which they would send representative
plenipotentiaries, not mere delegates unable to act
without reference to their respective Governments,
but " persons who by their position in the Colonies,
and by their close touch with Colonial feeling,
would be able, upon ah subjects submitted to
them, to give [reahy effective and valuable
advice." If such a Council were to be created,
it would at once assume immense importance,
and might develop into something still greater ;
indeed, it might grow into a Federal Council.
The opinion of such a body would be taken
by the Legislatures of the Mother Country
and the Colonies alike, and would weigh most
materially, on " all minor matters of common
interest." " There is," Mr Chamberlain proceeded, " only
one point in reference to this which it is absolutely
necessary that we all should bear in mind. It
may be that the time has come — and, if not, I
believe it will come — when the Colonies wIU
desire to substitute, for the slight relationship
which at present exists, a true partnership, and
in that case they whl want their share in the
management of the Empire — which we hke to
think is as much theirs as it is ours. But, of
course, with the privilege of management and
of control, will also come the obligation and the
responsibility. There will come some form of

IMPERIAL DEFENCE 695
contribution towards the expense for objects
which we shall have in common."
This was the difficulty which led to the
temporary failure of the scheme. The majority
of the Premiers were not prepared to recommend
any proportionate contribution in -aid of Imperial
expenditure — at least for the present, though
Mr Seddon (New Zealand) and Sir E. N. C.
Braddon (Tasmania) thought that the time had
already come for strengthening the ties between
the United Kingdom and the Colonies. The
other Premiers, or most of them, agreed that
the present relations could not continue in
definitely, and that some means must be devised
for giving the Colonies a voice and control in
matters of Imperial interest. But as this would
involve the voting of Colonial money, the whole
matter must be postponed, and the idea of any
radical reform was shelved by the collective
declaration that " the present relations between
the United Kingdom and the Self-governing
Colonies are generally satisfactory under the
existing condition of things."
On the question of Imperial Defence, Mr
Chamberlain pointed out that the Army and
Navy were being maintained, " not exclusively
or even mainly," for the benefit of the United
Kingdom. During the reign of Queen Victoria,
it would be found that every War, great or small,
in which we had been engaged, "had at the
bottom a Colonial interest — the interest of a Colony
or a great Dependency like India." If we had no
Empire it would not be necessary to spend any
thing like what we were spending either on the
Army or Navy. Here Mr Chamberlain adverted
gently to the position which the Colonies would
occupy if they were separated from Great Britain.

696 STEPS TOWARDS FEDERATION
Canada had 3000 miles of frontier exposed to a
powerful neighbour, and might be brought into
conflict with the rising power of Japan or even
with the great Russian Empire. The interests of
Australia had been threatened on more than one
occasion by the two greatest military nations of
Europe, each the possessor of a powerful fleet.
In South Africa the British settlers were confronted
with domestic rivals, heavily armed and prepared
both for offence and defence — not to mention the
ambitions of Foreign Powers.
"What" (Mr Chamberlain said) "I want to urge
upon you is — and In doing so I think I am speak
ing to those who are already converted — that we
have a common interest in this matter, and
certainly it has been a great pleasure to us, a
great pride to us, that Australia, in the first in
stance, offered voluntarily a contribution in aid of
the British Navy, besides taking her full share of
her own military defences. Now we have to
recognise that the Cape Colony has followed in
that patriotic course. I do not know upon what
conditions these gifts may be offered or continued,
but, at ah events, the spirit in which they have
been made is most heartily reciprocated in this
country. The amount, of course, is at the present
time absolutely trifling, but that is not the point.
We are looking to the Colonies as stih children,
but rapidly approaching manhood. In the life
time, perhaps, of some of us we shall see the
population doubled, and certainly in the lifetime
of our descendants there wih be great nations
where now there are comparatively sparse popula
tions ; and to establish in the early days this
principle of mutual support, and of a truly Imperial
patriotism, is a great thing of which our Colonial
Statesmen may well be proud."

MILITARY SUGGESTIONS 697
Now, though a committee of experts had done
something for Colonial Defence, the military pre
parations were still behindhand. If War broke
out it would be sudden : there would be no time
then for preparation. We ought to have before
hand a common scheme of defence against any
possible or, at least, any probable enemy. Some
of the Colonies had already presented schemes —
others had not done so. Mr Chamberlain believed
— with more justification than, perhaps, he knew —
that it was "most desirable that this omission
should be repaired."
After dwehing on the necessity of uniformity
in arms and equipment, the provision of central
stores, and the military training of the local forces,
he said he was looking forward to something much
greater than the interchangeabllity of the several
groups of Colonial contingents. He would unify,
to some extent, the whole military strength of the
Empire : —
" That is a matter which also can be arranged,
and to which we shah bring, at all events, the
utmost good will. If you have, as Canada has at
Kingston, an important Military College, it may be
possible for us to offer occasionally, to the cadets
of that College, commissions in the British Army.
But a stih more important matter which has sug
gested itself to my mind, and which now I desire
to commend to your earnest attention. Is a pro
posal which may be described as the interchange-
abihty of military duties. To put it into plain
English it means this : that, for instance, a Can
adian regiment should come to this country, take
up its quarters for a period of time, at least twelve
months, with the British Army, and form, during
the whole time that it is in this country, a part of
the British Army, and that in return a similar

698 STEPS TOWARDS FEDERATION
regiment of British troops, or a brigade of artillery
or cavalry, should go to Canada and should reside
and exercise with the Canadian Army, and form a
part of that Army. The idea is that this should
be chiefly for the purpose of drill and instruction,
and I cannot doubt that it will be of enormous
advantage to the Canadian troops, and to the
troops of the Colonies, to measure themselves
against the Regular Army, and to learn the disci
pline and the manoeuvres which are practised on a
large scale in this country.
" But my imagination goes even further. It
seems to me possible that, although in the first in
stance the idea is that such a regiment coming to
this country would come solely for that purpose,
and would not be engaged in military operations,
yet, if it were their wish to share in the dangers and
the glories of the British Army, and take their part
in expeditions in which the British Army might
be engaged, I see no reason why these Colonial
troops should not, from time to time, fight side by
side with their British colleagues. That, however,
is a matter which, like everything else which I am
putting before you, is not a recommendation which
has any pressure behind it ; it is merely a sugges
tion to be taken up by you voluntarily, if it com
mend itself to your minds. What I have suggested
might take place with regard to Canada, I believe,
might equally take place with regard to such fine
forces as those of which we have seen representa
tives from some of the Colonies of Australia, and
might take place also with regard to the South
African Colonies."
On the military question, practically nothing
was done by the Premiers : they listened to a state
ment from Captain Nathan, Secretary of the Colo
nial Defence Committee, and promised to refer

NAVAL POLICY 699
the suggestions they had heard to their respective
Governments. In a general way they approved
the proposal for an occasional exchange of military
units, and were Informed that the War Office would
make an offer for the exchange (or conversion) of
the Martini- Henry rifles for those of smaller calibre
employed in the Imperial forces.
But a more definite understanding was needed
as to naval matters. The First Lord of the
Admiralty (Mr Goschen) removed a misunder
standing which had gained currency as to the
wishes of Whitehall. The Government highly
valued the principle of a Colonial contribution to
the Navy, though the present amount was "in
considerable." " From the strategical point of view," said Mr
Goschen, "we should be glad that the Admiralty
should have a free hand. I was glad to see that
it has been acknowledged by the Premiers that
the operations of the Australian squadron in the
Solomon Islands, and generally in the Pacific
groups, have a distinct Colonial as well as an
Imperial interest, and that no complaint could be
raised against the employment of ships on the
Australasian station for purposes so distinctly
Colonial as many of these purposes are, though
such employment might carry the ships to a con
siderable distance from the Continent of Australia.
But, apart from this, the object for which we want
a free hand is to be able to conduct the defence
of Australia on the same principles as those which
we should fohow in the defence of our English,
Scotch, and Irish ports, principles which exclude
our undertaking to detach ships to particular ports.
For instance, we could not undertake to post one
ship at Sydney, another at Adelaide, and another
at Melbourne. We must rely upon the localities

700 STEPS TOWARDS FEDERATION
themselves for the defence of these ports, while,
on our part, we undertake that no organised
Expedition should be directed against any part of
Australia. No organised Expedition could be sent
either from Japan, or from the United States, or
from France, without the full knowledge of the
Admiralty. That I assume. We are too ubiqui
tous for any such Expedition to be secretly organ
ised. If It were organised, our whole strength
would be directed to defeating such a movement.
I see it has been suggested in a previous discus
sion that possibly we might, under stress, take
away the ships which may be on the Australian
Station, and for which you have partly paid and
on which you rely, in order to send them to some
distant quarter. But I cannot conceive any case,
unless we lost actually our sea power, when we
should think it our duty not to defend so valuable
a portion of our Empire as Australia, New Zealand,
and Tasmania, for the safety of which we hold
ourselves responsible in the same way as we hold
ourselves responsible for the safety of the British
Islands. I put this very strongly, so that there
may be no apprehension. In all our strategical
combinations we have never conceived the possi
bility that we should expose such Possessions as
the Australian Colonies."
The "misunderstanding" had arisen from a
speech In which the Duke of Devonshire had
protested against the policy of "hugging the
shore." The proper tactics for the Navy were
aggressive ; hunting down the enemy's ships
and attacking his Possessions — by Australian
vessels, e.g., being directed against his ships
and Possessions within the Australian zone.
"Hence" — Mr Goschen -.continued — "the duty
of the Colonies to look after their shore de-

COMMERCIAL RELATIONS 701
fences. I do not say that we should not
prefer contributions without any tie whatever,
but I do not make such a demand, and,
so far as the policy of the present Board of
Admiralty is concerned, I am prepared to stand
by the existing Agreement." It is not difficult
to read between the lines. Mr Goschen was,
in fact, arguing against the restrictions imposed
by the Australian Colonies ; and the " misunder
standing" which he desired to remove was a
direct disagreement as to policy. His " ex
planation," however, was, politely but decidedly,
set aside by the Premiers, who resolved "that
the statement of the First Lord of the Ad
miralty with reference to the Australian Squad
ron is most satisfactory " — indeed, it conceded
the point in issue — and "the Premiers favour
the continuance of the Australian Squadron
under the terms of the existing agreement."
More encouraging was the announcement, by the
Premier of Cape Colony, that his Legislature
was prepared to offer an "unconditional contribu
tion of the cost of a first-class battleship."
In approaching the commercial relations be
tween the United Kingdom and the Colonies, Mr
Chamberlain was well aware that he was treading
on doubtful ground. He began with a cautious
reference to the German Zollverein, which had com
menced entirely as a commercial convention, deal
ing at first only partially with the trade of the
Empire, but was afterwards extended to the whole
of that trade, and finally "made possible and en
couraged the ultimate union of the Empire."
But, before anything practical could be done,
Mr Chamberlain reminded the Premiers that
Great Britain would have to disentangle her
self from various Treaty obligations — notably

702 STEPS TOWARDS FEDERATION
those with Germany and Belgium. To denounce
our Treaties with these Powers would be a serious
affair, since our trade with these two alone was
larger than with all the Colonies combined. The
question, however, was about to be brought to an
issue by the Canadian offer to extend Preferential
terms to the Mother Country ; already Germany
and Belgium had protested and claimed similar
terms, as the Treaties still in force bound the
Colonies as weh as Great Britain. Did the
Colonies desire that an end should be put to
those Treaties ? If the answer should be in the
affirmative, the request would be earnestly con
sidered by the Imperial Government.
This was the official way of saying that Mr
Chamberlain would bring their demand before his
colleagues, and do his best to get it conceded.
There was no hesitation in the response of the
Premiers, and Mr Chamberlain was as good as
his word. Notwithstanding the criticism which
was certain to be directed — and, in fact, was
afterwards directed — against any action in favour
of Preferential arrangements within the Empire,
as being inconsistent with the accepted interpreta
tion of Free Trade doctrine, the Foreign Office
at once gave notice to terminate the Commercial
Treaties with Germany and Belgium. This took
effect from 30th July 1898.
As the Premiers had further resolved to confer
with their respective Cabinets on the possibility
of improving trade relations with the United
Kingdom by giving a Preference to its products,
Mr Chamberlain pointed out that such an offer
must be confined to the Mother Country nomi-
natim, and not made to any foreign country.
Otherwise, under the "most-favoured-nation"
clause, which exists in most of our Commercial

FOREIGN TRADE TREATIES 703
Treaties, other foreign countries would be entitled
to claim a similar advantage.
Other matters discussed were the Treaties be
tween the British Government and Japan and as to
Tunisian trade with the French Government (to
both of which most of the Colonial representatives
declined to adhere) ; the restrictions upon the
immigration of coloured persons (as to which
nothing more definite than an exchange of views
took place) ; the establishment of an Imperial
Penny Post (which was rejected by ah the
Premiers except those of Cape Colony and Natal) ;
and the construction of a Pacific Cable through
British territory (which was postponed). On the
other hand, the Premiers passed a Resolution
declaring that the time had arrived when ah re
strictions that prevent the investment of Trust
Funds in Colonial Stocks should be removed.
This request Mr Chamberlain promised to con
sider, and, at his instance, no doubt, the Colonial
Stocks Act was passed — not without opposition
from certain financial experts who believed that
some of the Colonies had been decidedly im
provident in phing up their indebtedness beyond
their probable means of repayment.
It will be seen that, in this first Conference with
the Premiers, Mr Chamberlain handled them very
gently, and that on almost every point they gained
their own way. Yet the meeting was by no
means a failure ; there was a general feeling that
something had been done to bring about a closer
understanding between Imperial and Colonial
Statesmanship, and to remove the impression
that Downing Street was careless of Colonial
opinion, and ignorant of the difficulties with
which Australian and other politicians have to
deal. Nor was there any hesitation as to the

704 STEPS TOWARDS FEDERATION
advisability of convoking similar Conferences in
the future.
Though Mr Chamberlain's second Conference
with the Colonial Premiers (June to August 1902)
was interrupted by a somewhat serious cab acci
dent in Whitehah — just by the " Canadian Arch "
— which confined him to the house for several
weeks, it was more fruitful than the first in direct
and practical results. Between 1897 and 1902
many things had happened to foster the growing
sentiment of a common patriotism within the
Empire — the reverses, the anxieties, and the
successful conclusion of the War in South Africa ;
the general mourning on the death of Queen
Victoria, and the painful suspense which attended
the Coronation of King Edward ; the Federation
of the Australian Colonies ; the Canadian experi
ment In a Preferential policy towards the
United Kingdom ; last, but not least, the daily
insults and mendacious accusations which had
been levehed by the Press of nearly every country
in Europe against the Statesmen and Soldiers of
the Empire, and which were even more warmly
resented by the Colonials than by Englishmen,
It was, therefore, in a more accommodating
temper, and with a stronger sense of Imperial
Unity, that the representatives of the Self-
Governing Colonies met the spokesman of the
Imperial Government in 1902.*
In the first place, it was decided to raise these
* It must be borne in mind that official account of the
Conference does not profess to be complete. It was settled
at the outset that the discussions, if they were to be free,
must also be confidential, and only such reports as were
agreed upon should be published. The suggestion, made at
the instance of Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, that the verbatim
note should be issued has recently been negatived by
Canada, Newfoundland, and (partially) by New Zealand.

THE CONFERENCE OF 1902 705
Conferences to the rank of a recognised insti
tution, and it was resolved that " it would be
to the advantage of the Empire if triennial
Conferences were held, at which questions
affecting the political and commercial relations
of the Mother Country and His Majesty's
Dominions over the Seas could be discussed
and considered, as between the Secretary of
State for the Colonies and the Premiers of
the Self-Governing Colonies. In case of any
emergency arising upon which a special Con
ference may have been deemed necessary, the
next ordinary Conference to be held not sooner
than three years thereafter."
Another Resolution, of more doubtful policy,
though expressed in guarded terms, was that "so
far as inight be consistent with the confidential
negotiation of Treaties with Foreign Powers,"
tbe views of the Colonies affected should be
obtained, in order th'at they might be in a " better
position to give adhesion to such Treaties."
It may be fe:,>rid practicable, in regard to com
mercial ar^ngements with foreign countries, to
act on this Informal understanding, and it was,
no douJAt/thls class of negotiations which the
Colonial Premiers had chiefly in view. We have
seen already how jeaJous they are of every Im
perial undertaking which may, directly or Indi
rectly, affect their fiscal poi!:cy. Nor Is their atti
tude in this respect unreasonabAs, since in most of
the Colonies the balance between Revenue and
Expenditure is a matter of somewhat nice adjust
ment. But, obviously, in question.s of high
policy, it wih be impossible for the Foreign
Minister in London to wait for mailed Des;patches,
carrying the possibly divergent opinions of States
men in every quarter of the world ; and to tele-
2 V

706 STEPS TOWARDS FEDERATION
graph elaborate arguments, even in the most
ingenious cipher, would often be to give away
what should be a carefully preserved secret. In
this respect the Colonies — unless a Standing
Council of the Empire is ever established — must,
it is clear, be content with no more privileged posi
tion than that occupied by the Imperial Parlia
ment ; they must submit to the same restrictions,
and repose the same confidence in the Imperial
Ministers of the day, as our own Parliament
concedes to the judgment of the Imperial Govern
ment. Indeed, it has grown up to be a custom
to exclude all but a very few members of the
Cabinet from any knowledge of Diplomatic trans
actions until the object has been attained. It is
on these terms only that we can have dealings
with European ChancellerI,iS.3 Imagine Lord
Lansdowne conducting a discussion with Count
Lamsdorff or Herr von Bulow, and having '\.o
obtain, as he went on, the concurrent approval of
Sir Edmund Barton, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, and
Mr Seddon! By comparison, the Concert of
Europe would run on wheels. Nevi.ortheless, it
was excusable that the principle of Colonial par
ticipation should thus be asserted — ou c*ondItion
that the application should be, left to the dis
cretion ofthe Imperial Goverv.ment. , " If you want
our aid," Sir Wilfrid La,"arier has said, "cah us
to your Councils." , -
"We do requfire your assistance," said Mr
Chamberlain in-nis opening address, "in the ad
ministration of the vast Empire which is yours
as well as ours. The weary Titan staggers under
the too vdst orb of its fate. We have borne the
burden fi^r many years. We think it is time that
our children should assist us to support it, and,
whenever yoil make the request to us, be very

"CALL US TO YOUR COUNCILS" 707
sure that we shah hasten gladly to cah you to our
Councils. If you are prepared at any time to take
any share, any proportionate share, in the burdens
of the Empire, we are prepared to meet you with
any proposal for giving to you a corresponding
voice in the policy of the Empire, And the object,
if I may point out to you, may be achieved In
various ways. Suggestions have been made that
representation should be given to the Colonies in
either, or in both. Houses of Parliament, There Is
no objection in principle to any such proposal. If
It comes to us, it is a proposal which His Majesty's
Government would certainly feel justified in favour
ably considering ; but I have always felt myself that
the most practical form ''n which we could achieve
our object would be -fhe establishment or the
creai'^ion of a real (T-uncil of the Empire to which
all que^tbni^ of Imperial interest might be referred ;
and if it were\desirp-'i to proceed gradually, as prob
ably would be s^u' course — we are all accustomed
to the slow wav'^ in which our Constitutions have
been worker" ( ut — If It be desired to proceed gradu
ally, the G^^unch might in the first instance be
merely an Advisory Council, It would resemble,
in some respects, the Advisory Council which was
established\in Au.siralia, and which, although it
was not whdJly successful, did nevertheless pave
¦the way for the'~-C3mplete-Federation upon which
we now congratulate them. . But although that
would be a preliminary step, it is clear that the
object would not be completely secured until there
had been conferred upon such a Council executive
functions, and perhaps also legislative powers, and
it is for you to say, gentlemen, whether you think
the time has come when any progress whatever can
be made in this direction,"
Dealing with Imperial Defence, Mr Chamber-

708 STEPS TOWARDS FEDERATION
lain pointed out that the Naval and Military
Expenditure in the United Kingdom worked out
at ^i, 9s, 3d, per head per annum; in Canada,
at 2S, ; in New South Wales, 3s, 5d, ; in Victoria,
3s, 3d, ; in New Zealand, 3s, 4d, ; iri the Cape and
Natal, between 2s, and 3s, On this point, happily,
the Premiers were able to notify an important
advance of Colonial opinion. The Austrahan
Commonwealth and New Zealand agreed to raise
their contribution from ;^i 26,000 to ;^240,ooo a
year (^200,000 and ;^40,ooo respectively), for an
improved Australasian squadron and the establish
ment of a branch of the Royal Naval Reserve ;
the Cape Colony gave ;^5o,ooo and Natal ;^35,ooo
a year, as an unconditloi^^"^^ contribution to the
maintenance of the Royal N'ayy, and Newfound
land undertook to pay .^36b-si a yean tow/ards
the branch of the Royal Naval Rese^rvehj-thert^
maintained there from Im|krial funds.' The,
Memorandum presented by Sir Jo^in Forrest, the'.
Australian Commonwealth Minis. ter of Defence, \
was in some respects a very renvrfA-kable and
enlightened document, (Needless Uj add, it
has already brought him into trouble at home
with the advocates of an exclusively Australian
patriotism,) Having shown that tho estabhsh
ment of even a smah .A^dstralian z' Navy — two
first-class and six secohd-clasa^ruisers — would
cost about j^3, 600,000 in capital outlay, and
involve a yearly expenditure of ^1,000,000, he
added that sueh a force "would not be able to
meet on equal terms the powerful cruisers with
highly-trained crews that would be certain to
be used against us," Besides the enormous
cost of replacing obsolete with modern ships,
there would be no change for the officers and
crews. They would go on from year to year

PROPOSALS FOR DEFENCE 709
in the same ships, " subject to the same influences,
and, I fear, 'deteriorating effects,'" He ended
by proposing that there should be one Navy for
the whole Empire, each part contributing on some
ratio to be settled hereafter — possibly on that of
comparative trade, " I cannot think that for
Canada and Australia to each have a few war
ships, and the Cape and New Zealand a few
also, is a plan suited to the Empire," But to
establish an Imperial Navy, it would be necessary
for the contributory States to be represented at
the Admiralty, This, Sir John thought, could be
arranged without difficulty. Perhaps the task
would not be quite so simple as he suggested, but
there is no denying that " in time of War there
could not be any division of responsibility, and
until a more extended Federation of the Emp're
is established, responsibility must rest with the
Imperial Government,"
The Dominion Government held alcof from
the naval policy of the other Colonies, and Sir
Wilfrid Laurier stated that it was in contemplation
to set up a local naval force in -*he waters of
, Canada, The objection of the Pomlnion to co
operating in a general scheme prose, not from the
expense involved, but because it would be "an
important departure rfrom tAe principle of Colonial
Self-Government." NeAV^rtheless, the Canadian
Ministers were, they ststed In a formal Memor
andum, fully conscious that tbe Dominion, as it
advanced In population and \«ealth, would be
bound to make "more liberal ou\tlay for those
necessary provisions of self-defence .which every
country has to assume and bear." T^hey pointed
also to the annual ojtlay on the Mflltia system of
Canada ($2,000,000), and the efficiency of that
Service had been proved in South Africa. Though

710 STEPS TOWARDS FEDERATION
the expenditure for defence was at present limited
to the military side, the Government were also
prepared to consider the naval side. On the sea-
coast of Canada there were a large number of men
admirably qualified to form a Naval Reserve.
Ministers were hopeful of being able to relieve the
taxpayer in the Mother Country of some part of
his burden, and had the strongest desire to carry
out their Defence schemes in co-operation with the
Imperial authorities, and under the advice of
experienced Imperial officers, so far as this was
consistent with the principle of local Self-Govern
ment, which had proved so great a factor in the
promotion of Imperial Unity.
On the question of Military Defence, nothing
yas decided at the Conference, though au interest-
in^ discussion was commenced by Mr Brodb'ick,
Secretary of State for War, on Mr Seddon's
motio\i for the creation of "an Imperial Reserve
Force, firmed in each of His Majesty's dominions
over the s^s, for service in case of emergency out
side the Doixinlon or Colony in which such Reserve
is formed. T\ie limits within which such Reserve
force may be em^jloyed outside the Colony wiierdn
it is raised to be defined by the Imperial and
Colonial GovernmetK^ at the time such Reserve is
formed, and to be in ar.cordrance wth any law in
force for the time being inspecting the same. The
cost of maintaining a;?id equipping such Imperial
Reserve Force to be defrayed in such proportion
and manner as miay be agreed upon between the
Imperial and Colonial Governments."
The representatives of Cape Colony and
Natal favoured this proposal, but those of
Canada and Australia were of opinion that "the
best course to pursue was to endeavour to raise
the standard of training for the general body of

AN IMPERIAL RESERVE 711
their forces, to organise the departmental services
and equipment required for the mobilisation of a
field force, leaving it to the Colony, when the need
arose, to determine how and to what extent it
should render assistance. The Imperial senti
ment in the Colonies was steadily growing, and
their action In the late War left no room for
doubt that such assistance would be given readily
and effectively, and to the utmost of their ability,
in any future emergency. To establish a special
force, set apart for general Imperial service, and
practically under the absolute control of the Im
perial Government, was objectionable In principle,
as derogating from the powers of Self-Government
enjoyed by them, and would be calculated to Im
pede the general improvement in training and
organisation of their defence forces, and, conse
quently, their ability to render effective help, if it
should be required."
It was settled, therefore, that if the Imperial
Government wished to press Mr Brodrick's scheme
further in the case of those Colonies that-regarded
it favourably. It would be best to do so through
"the usual channel of official correspondence."
That is to say, the Conference washed its hands
of the question.
Some progress was made — though nothing
was definitely settled — under what had appeared
to be the least practicable head of the Conference
Agenda. Mr Chamberlain, in his opening
remarks on Commercial Relations within the
Empire, had done little more than invite fuh and
free discussion. " We rule nothing out of order."
Having pointed out that the Empire could be self-
sustaining, and could provide itself within its own
limits with every necessity and almost every luxury,
he showed, on the other hand, that the Empire

712 STEPS TOWARDS FEDERATION
did, as a matter of fact, draw the greatest part of
its supplies from outside, and exported the bulk of
its surplus produce to foreign countries. Ah this
trade might be trade within the Empire. But
how could the interchange of commodities be
tween different parts of the Empire be promoted
by Statesmanship ?
" Our first object, then, as I say, is Free Trade
within the Empire. We feel confident — we think
that it is a matter which demands no evidence or
proof — that if such a result were feasible It would
enormously increase our I nter-imperial trade ; that
it would hasten the development of our Colonies ;
that it would fill up the spare places in your
lands with an active, intelligent, industrious, and,
above all, a British, population ; that it would
make the Mother Country entirely independent of
foreign food and raw material. But when I speak
of Free Trade it must be understood that I do
not mean by that the total abolition of Customs
Duties as between different parts of the Empire.
I recognise fully the exigencies of all new countries,
and especially of our Self-Governing Colonies. I
see that your Revenue must always, probably, and
certainly for a long while to come, depend chiefly
upon indirect taxation. Even if public opinion
were to justify you in levying direct taxation, the
cost of collecting It in countries sparsely populated
might be so large as to make it impossible. But
in my mind, whenever Customs duties are balanced
by Excise duties, or whenever they are levied on
articles which are not produced at home, the
enforcement of such Duties is no derogation what
ever from the principles of Free Trade as I under
stand it. If, then, even with this limitation, which
is a very important one, which would leave it
open to all Colonies to collect their Revenues by

THE QUESTION OF PREFERENCES 713
Customs Duties and indirect taxation, even If
the proposal were accepted with that limitation,
I think it would be impossible to over-estimate
the mutual advantage which would be derived
from it, the stimulus to our common trade, and
the binding force of such a link which such a
trade would certainly create."
Up to that time, however, no adequate pro
posal had been made by any of the Colonies,
though In the 1897 Conference the Premiers had
undertaken to consider whether a Preference might
not be given to Imports from the United Kingdom
(without any reciprocal obligation) since it was
the best and most open market in the world for
ah the products of the Colonies. The failure to
act on this Resolution Mr Chamberlain attributed
partly to the Federation of Australia, partly to
the South African War. Canada, however, had
in 1898 given a Preference of 25 per cent,, which
was in 1900 Increased to ^^^ per cent. It had,
therefore, anticipated the general proposal of the
Colonial Premiers, and, valuable as the action ofthe
Dominion had been as a proof of goodwill to the
Mother Country, the commercial results had been
"altogether disappointing" on a comparison of
the import trade of British goods into Canada in
the year 1896-97 with that in 1900-01, The
total imports of Canada increased ;^ 14, 500, 000
— i.e., at the rate of 62 per cent. The part on
which no Duty was levied — and in which, therefore,
no Preference was given to British goods — in
creased ^6,250,000, i.e., at 67 per cent. The
general trade from foreign countries, which came
under the general tariff, also increased ;^6, 250,000
— i.e., at 62 per cent. But the Preferential trade
had only increased ^2,000,000—2,^,, 55 per cent.
That is to say, the rate of Increase under the

714 STEPS TOWARDS FEDERATION
Preferential tariff was actually less than under
the general tariff and also under the free tariff.
Again, the total increase of trade with foreign
countries was 69 per cent,, but with the United
Kingdom only 48,
Now what was the cause of this ? "Up to 1885
British exports steadily increased to the Dominion
of Canada, Then the Government of that day
adopted a very severe Protective tariff which, by
the nature of things, perhaps specially affected
British goods. We are not the exporters, as a
rule, of raw materials, or of food. We, therefore,
do not export the articles which Canada freely
imports. We export manufactured goods, and it
was against manufactured goods that the tariff
was intentionahy, I suppose, directed. The result
of that was, that there immediately set in a con
tinuous and rapid decline in the importation of
British goods into Canada, Now, the Preference
which was given in 1897 has checked the dechne,
but there is very little increase, Practicahy, the
checking of that decline is the whole result which
we can recognise as having followed the generous
intentions of the Canadian Government, Foreign
produce at the present time in Canada has stih a
lower average tariff than British produce, no doubt
due to the fact that the foreign produce is, as I
have said, as a rule, of a character upon which
lower Duties are ordinarily levied ; but the result
is, that while foreign imports have largely increased,
the British imports have largely decreased. But
now I want to point out another thing which I think
will be of great importance, and which, I am sure,
the Government of Canada must have taken into
their serious consideration. What return has been
made to them by the foreigner for the advantage
which the foreigner has derived from their tariff?

EFFECTS OF THE PREFERENCE 715
The exports from Canada to foreigners have
decreased 40 per cent,, while the exports from
foreigners to Canada have, as I have said, largely
increased. On the other hand, in spite of the
tariff, in spite of everything in the natural course of
trade and communication, the exports to the United
Kingdom have increased 85 per cent, in fifteen
years, and the net result, which I desire to Impress
upon you, is that in spite of the Preference which
Canada has given us, their tariff has pressed, and
still presses, with the greatest severity, upon Its
best customer, and has favoured the foreigner,
who is constantly doing his best to shut out her
goods. " Now, what Is the present position ? I believe
it is true of Canada— it is true, I believe, of every
Colony — we take already, by far, the largest pro
portion of Colonial exports, but there is not the
least doubt that we might double or treble the
amount that we take, but we cannot do so until
we have the reciprocal advantage, and until you
take In exchange a larger proportion of our goods,
and so enable us to pay for the imports which we
should receive from you. And I think the very
valuable experience — somewhat disappointing and
discouraging as I have already pointed out, but
the very valuable experience which we have derived
from the history of the Canadian tariff — shows
that while we may most readily and most gratefully
accept from you any Preference which you may be
whllng voluntarily to accord to us, we cannot
bargain with you for it ; we cannot pay for it unless
you go much further and enable us to enter your
home market on terms of greater equality. I
am making that statement as a general statement,
but I am well aware that the conditions of the
Colonies vary immensely, and that a good deal

716 STEPS TOWARDS FEDERATION
of what I have said does not apply to the Colony
of the Cape or the Colony of Natal. But so long
as a Preferential tariff, even a munificent Prefer
ence, Is still sufficiently Protective to exclude us
altogether, or nearly so, from your markets, it is
no satisfaction to us that you have imposed
even greater disability upon the same goods if
they come from foreign markets, especially if the
articles in which the foreigners are interested
come in under more favourable conditions."
Mr Seddon brought forward a Motion to the
effect that Preferential Tariffs, in Colonies where
they did not already exist, should be established
by way of rebate on Duties on British manu
factured goods carried in British-owned ships,
and that in the Mother Country rebate of Duty
on Colonial products should be conceded. It
was not likely that so sweeping a scheme would
be carried off-hand ; not, perhaps, probable that
the representatives of other Colonies would
concur in the proposal of an individual Minister.
It was decided, therefore, that the several Premiers
should confer privately with Mr Gerald Balfour,
President of the Board of Trade, and, when the
results of these meetings had been reported, the
Conference should hold a general discussion.
The arrangements made at the Board of Trade
were that Canada, as before, should give a
Preference of 33^ per cent, (and an additional
Preference on lists of selected articles) ; New
Zealand, an ah-round Preference of 10 per cent.,
or its equivalent in respect of lists of selected
articles ; Australia, a Preferential treatment not
yet determined in amount ; Cape Colony and
Natal, a Preference of 25 per cent., or its equiva
lent on dutiable goods, other than speciahy rated
articles. Finahy, a Resolution was adopted to

A GENERAL SCHEME 717
cover the general principle of the particular
arrangements : —
That Preferential Trade between the United
Kingdom and Colonies would stimulate com
mercial intercourse and strengthen the Empire ;
That, under existing conditions in the Colonies,
it is not practicable to establish Free Trade
between them and the Mother Country ;
That it is desirable that such Colonies as have
not already given a substantial Preference to the
products and manufactures of the United King
dom should adopt that policy "as far as their
circumstances permit " ;
That the Imperial Government should be
Invited to consider the expediency of giving a
Preferential treatment to the products and manu
factures of the Colonies ;
That the Colonial Premiers will, at the earliest
opportunity, submit to their respective Govern
ments the principle of this Resolution, and request
them to take such measures as may be necessary
to give effect to it.
A separate Memorandum was handed in by
the Canadian Ministers, who had asked that, in
return for the Preference given to products of
the Mother Country, the food products from the
Dominion should be exempted frorr. the Duty
recently imposed by Parliament. Mr Chamber
lain, however, had been unable to recommend
this course to his colleagues. The results of the
Preference had not been so great as the Canadian
Ministers claimed, and such a change as they re
quested would be an important departure from
the fiscal policy of the United Kingdom, which
could not be contemplated unless the Dominion
could offer some further material concessions ; the
substance of the Canadian Minister's reply was

718 STEPS TOWARDS FEDERATION
that, if the Imperial Government would seriously
consider the principle of Preferential Trade, and
would exempt the food products of the Dominion
from present and fiiture Duties, they would en
deavour to give the British manufacturer some
increased advantage over his foreign competitors.
Among other matters dealt with at the Con
ference, were a proposed modification of the
Navigation Laws within the Empire, and the ad
visability of withdrawing the privileges of Coast
wise Trade (including trade between Mother
Country and Colonies, and between different
Colonies) from countries which confine the cor
responding trade to ships of their own nationality :
as to Mail Services and Shipping Subsidies, a
Resolution was passed that the whole question
should be generally considered, and that in aU
new contracts clauses should be inserted to pre
vent excessive freight charges and undue prefer
ence to foreigners, and to ensure that such
steamers as might be suitable should be at the
service of the Imperial Government in time of
War as cruisers or transports.

A startling sequel to these discussions was
provided on 15th May 1903, when Mr Chamber
lain paid his first political visit to his constituents
after his return from South Africa. The announce
ment which he made — that he was personaUy in
favour of establishing Preferential tariffs between
the Mother Country and the various Colonies — ^he
represented not as any sudden Impulse, but rather
as a result of what he humorously called " the
calm with which the solitude of the ilhmitable
Veldt had affected his constitution." He led up
very carefully to his new declaration of policy.

THE BIRMINGHAM DECLARATION 719
After dwehing on the results of his mission, and
the hopes which he had formed as to the birth of
a "new nation" compacted of the "two strong
races who are bound to live together in South
Africa," he declared that on what we might do
within " the next few years " would depend the
enormous issue "whether this great Empire of
ours is to stand together as one free nation —
if necessary, against ah the world — or whether
it is to fall apart into separate States, each
selfishly seeking its own interest alone, losing
sight of the common weal, and losing also
ah the advantages which union can give,"
The present, he said, was a " creative " period.
We were standing at the beginning of a new
era. Though this was an old country and an
old Kingdom, the Empire was not old. At pre
sent the population of Great Britain and Ireland
outnumbered four times the white Inhabitants of
the Colonies, But how long would that propor
tion be maintained? It was not Impossible that
by the end of the present century our fellow-
subjects beyond the Seas would be as numerous
as ourselves. Hitherto, their rate of increase had
been retarded by various causes that no longer
existed^ — by Imperial neglect of Colonial interests,
and by the superior attractions which the United
States had offered to emigrants. But Great
Britain had awakened to her responsibilities, and
the United States were filling up. There was
stih time to consohdate the Empire.
The Colonies had proved that in a time of
danger they would come forward in defence of
the Empire, In the late War they had sent
in at least 50,000 soldiers to fight alongside
British troops. At present it was true that the
Colonial Governments had not made any ade-

720 STEPS TOWARDS FEDERATION
quate recognition of their duty to contribute
towards the expenses of Imperial Defence,
but it must be remembered that the idea of a
common responsibility was still new, and we had
done nothing to encourage it. Yet they had
recently shown themselves wihing to respond
to his appeal. The people of Natal had taken on
themselves no slight burden in connection with
the War, and in the Transvaal all classes had
agreed in assuming a liability which amounted to
;^8o a head of the white population. Neverthe
less, it was Incumbent on the Colonies, if they
valued the privileges of Empire, to accept a greater
share of its obligations. He would speak on this
point In Australia or in Canada as strongly as he
had spoken in South Africa, nor did he fear that
such frankness would give offence.
But the question of trade and commerce was
one ofthe greatest importance. How were we to
keep the trade of the Colonies, to increase it, and
promote it — even at the risk of lessening the
trade with our foreign competitors? It was
true that our Colonial Trade was much less than
our Foreign Trade, and the inference of " Little
Englanders " was that while we should foster
the latter we might safely disregard the former,
Mr Chamberlain's conclusion was "exactly the
opposite," Every advance which the Colonies
made we should reciprocate. Though some
what slack in contributing towards military
expenditure, they were doing a great deal to
promote the Union of the Empire — doing it in
their own way and by their own means.
First among those means was the offer of
Preferential tariffs. Immediately after Mr
Chamberlain's departure for South Africa a
Conference had commenced work at Bloemfontein,

THE CANADIAN POSITION 721
attended by representatives of all the South
African Colonies, and a recommendation had
been made that the various States should offer a
Preference of 25 per cent, on all dutiable goods
from the Mother Country, Canada had given us
the same advantage In 1898, and in 1900 she had
increased it to 33J per cent, ; and, though the
results had been " somewhat disappointing," the
tendency towards a diminution of trade between
the Dominion and the United Kingdom had
been arrested, and a sensible increase had been
realised, "But," (he continued) "the Ministers of
Canada, when they were over here last year,
made me a further definite offer. They said,
' We have done for you as much as we can do,
voluntarily and freely and without return. If
you are willing to reciprocate in any way, we are
prepared to reconsider our Tariff with a view of
seeing whether we cannot give you further reduc
tions, especially in regard to those goods in which
you come into competition with foreigners ; and
we will do this if you will meet us by giving us
a drawback on the small tax of is, per quarter
which you have put upon corn,' Well, that was
the offer, which we had to refuse, I must say
that, if I could treat matters of this kind solely
in regard to my position as Secretary of State for
the Colonies, I should have said, ' That is a fair
offer, that is a generous offer, from your point of
view, and it is an offer which we might ask our
people to accept,' But speaking for the Govern
ment as a whole, not In the interests of the
Colonies, I am obliged to say that it is contrary
to the established fiscal policy of this country,
and that we hold ourselves bound to keep open
market for all the world, even if they close their
2 z

722 STEPS TOWARDS FEDERATION
markets to us, and that, therefore, so long as
that is the mandate of the British public, we are
not in a position to offer any Preference or favour
whatever, even to our own children. We cannot
make any difference between those who treat us
well and those who treat us badly,
" Yes, but that is the doctrine which I am
told is the accepted doctrine of the Free trader,
and we are all Free traders. Well, I am, I
have considerable doubt whether the interpreta
tion of Free Trade which is current amongst
a certain limited section is the true interpreta
tion, I am perfectly certain that I am not a
Protectionist, but I want to find out whether
the interpretation is that our only duty is to
buy In the cheapest market without regard
to whether we can sell. If that is the theory of
Free Trade that finds acceptance here and else
where, then, in pursuance of that policy, you wih
lose the advantage of a reduction, a further
reduction. In Duties, which your great Colony of
Canada offers to the manufacturers of this
country, and you may lose a great deal more,
because in the speech which the Chancellor of
the Exchequer — Minister of Finance, as he is
called in Canada' — made to the Canadian Parlia
ment the other day, which he has just sent me,
I find he says that ' If we are told definitely that
Great Britain, the Mother Country, can do
nothing for us in the way of Reciprocity, we must
reconsider our position and reconsider the Pre
ference that we have already given,' "
Nor was this attitude unreasonable, Mr
Chamberlain suggested, since the Dominion had
been penalised by Germany for the Preference
given to British goods, and an extra Duty had
been imposed on imports from Canada, Was

" AN ABSOLUTELY NEW SITUATION " 723
the United Kingdom to leave Canada alone to
fight its own battle ? This was an absolutely
new situation, one never contemplated by Mr
Cobden and Mr Bright, There vrere two alter
natives before us. Either we could maintain what
Mr Chamberlain believed to be a " purely technical
interpretation of Free Trade," or we should resume
the power of free negotiation, and, if necessary,
of retaliation — so that we might be able to protect
our own interests, and safeguard our relations
between ourselves and our Colonies,
It wih be observed that, great as was the
curiosity which this speech excited, it contained
no doctrine which the Colonial Secretary had not
advocated on many previous occasions — no ex
pression of opinion in which he had not been
anticipated by Lord Salisbury, who frequently
complained, both In Office and In Opposition,
that the Foreign Secretary was powerless to
assist British or Colonial trade, since he was not
ahowed to practise, or able to threaten, retalia
tion against hostile tariffs. The reason for the
effect produced on the public mind by Mr Cham
berlain's declaration was that — while putting it
forward as a matter for future consideration, and
treating it as a personal suggestion rather than
a statement of Ministerial policy — he gave it a
distinct air of practical urgency, " I desire," he
said, "that a discussion on this subject shah be
opened. The time has not yet come to settle it,
but it seems to me that, for good or for evil, this
is an issue much greater in its consequences than
any of our local disputes, , , , I do not think myself
that a General Election is very near ; but, whether
it is near or distant, I think our opponents may,
perhaps, find that the issues which they propose
to raise are not the issues on which we shall take

724 STEPS TOWARDS FEDERATION
the opinion of the country. If we raise an issue
of this kind, the answer will depend not upon
petty personal considerations, not upon temporary
interests, but upon whether the people of this
country really have it in their hearts to do all
that is necessary, even if it occaslonahy goes
against their own prejudices, to consolidate an
Empire which can only be maintained by rela
tions of interest as well as by relations of senti
ment," This very definite utterance was followed
up on May 22nd by a speech in the House of
Commons, Challenged to explain his position
with regard to Old Age Pensions for the
Deserving Poor, he declared that the question
was by no means "dead," The funds might be
provided, he said, if such a review of our fiscal
policy as he believed to be desirable at an early
date were to be adopted by the country.
Hardly had Mr Chamberlain made his declara
tion as to Imperial Reciprocity than Sir Charles
Dilke, an early and at one time an intimate
associate, pointed out that there was nothing in
the views now proclaimed which was inconsistent
with many previous utterances. He forestalled
the regular Leaders of the Opposition in asking
Ministers to explain, in the House of Commons,
how far they agreed with the opinions of the
Colonial Secretary, In certain quarters it had
been suggested that the Birmingham speech was
a bid for power — that Mr Chamberlain wished to
raise an issue on which he could part company
with an Administration that seemed to be losing
popularity, and create a new Party with himself
as the Leader, Mr Balfour's reply disposed of
that theory. He ridiculed the attempt to make
mischief between his colleague and himself, and

MR BALFOUR'S STATEMENT 725
showed that, in principle at least, there was little
difference in their positions. It was, he said, a
fair question for debate whether the time had
not come when we should give up the theory
that Revenue should only be raised to meet
the national expenditure. He reproduced the
familiar complaint as to the difficulty of negotia
ting a Commercial Treaty without the power of
fiscal retaliation. There was also another reason
why a Preferential system should be considered.
It would bind the Empire more closely together.
Nobody could deny that this would be a " very
good object " — the only question was whether the
price would not be too high. He put aside the
idea, which had not been proposed, of taxing the
raw materials for our manufactures. But he
would not dogmatise on the question of taxing
the food of the people.
"You wih (he went on), in my opinion, never
have a tax on the food of the people in this
country, except as part of a big policy which
they heartily and conscientiously accept. With
that you can do it. Without that you cannot
do it. Nor do I think that you could go back
to the old Protective days, and in the interests
of this industry or that industry, be the
industry what it may, ask the people of this
country to tax their food. I do not think that is
within the range of practical politics. But if you
could, by means of a tax on food, put the whole
of the fiscal and Imperial position on a different
and better footing. Is it so certain that the work
ing classes of this country would repudiate the
suggestion ? I do not know. But, supposing
that, by means of a general tax upon food-stuffs,
it were possible to stop this process by which,
not merely in foreign countries, but in our own

726 STEPS TOWARDS FEDERATION
Colonies, there was being created a system of
protection of an enormous number of manufac
turing interests ; supposing it were possible, not,
indeed, to obtain full Free Trade — that, I think, is
beyond the power of any conceivable combination
— but to obtain a large measure of Free Trade in
the manufactured goods of the Colonies, I am not
sure that would not be worth while." There were
two great difficulties, Mr Balfour admitted, in the
way of Mr Chamberlain's scheme — the traditional
dislike of the English people for a tax on food,
and the traditional affection of the Colonies for
Protectionism. Unless both these could be over
come, the plan was not practicable.
There was no contradiction, the Prime
Minister said, between his own views and Mr
Chamberlain's. But even if there were some
difference of degree it would not imply discord.
He himself, as on the Irish University Question,
held and had proclaimed opinions not shared by
his colleagues, and Mr Chamberlain was entitled
to an equal liberty. Moreover, as Colonial
Secretary, he was more or less bound to demand
a hearing for the policy which had been formahy
adopted and approved by the Premiers of the
Self-Governing Colonies at their recent Confer
ence. Could he have permitted the Resolution
in favour of Preferential Trade between the
Mother Country and the Colonies to remain
slumbering in the pages of a Blue-book?
The only point on which any difference
could be detected between the Prime Minister's
and the Colonial Secretary's attitude was that
Mr Balfour treated the proposal as somewhat
remote — not a question for this Session or the
next or the one after — whereas Mr Chamberlain's
tone, the energy which he throws into every

THE METHOD TO BE FOLLOWED 727
argument, pointed to an urgent and immediate
propaganda. That impression was not modified when he
made a supplementary explanation. He began
with some considerable admissions. Nothing
could be done without a Mandate from the people
of the United Kingdom, and following that must
be a Mandate from the Colonies. " Nothing (he
said), can be worse than to negotiate with a
Colony, and probably come to an agreement, and
then at the next General Election find that the
whole idea was repudiated by the country. I can
conceive nothing more dangerous to Union than
that. Before we begin to negotiate with a
Colony we must have some knowledge what the
opinion of the country is in regard to the principle
at stake. If we had this Mandate, the first thing
I should do to carry it out would be to consult
the Colonies. I should call. In that case, another
Conference of the representatives of the Self-
Governing Colonies, and I have not the slightest
doubt myself that, as a result, arrangements which
we should consider were perfectly fair between
the two countries — arrangements, that is to say,
which would give us as much as we gave them —
could be completed with the Colonies."

"There is another thing that we have to find
out in order that a Conference of this kind may
discuss the matter. We shah have to know from
our own people, not only what they will give, but
what they want in return. I want to know from
every manufacturing district in this country — and
I hope I shall learn before long. I hope the
Chambers of Commerce, who I see everywhere

728 STEPS TOWARDS FEDERATION
are taking this matter up, will give their assist
ance to a conclusion being arrived at by saying
what particular article or articles of manufactured
produce in their districts could be much more
largely sold if Preferential rates were given by the
Colonies upon it or them, and what the amount
of that Preferential rate ought to be to give them
any substantial advantage. The House will see
that ah this will necessarily take time, and that
the claim that we without this information should
beforehand, and before we have got anything in
the nature of an expression of general agreement
on the part of the people of this country, put a
plan before the House — I suppose a sort of draft
Treaty with our Colonies — seems to me to be an
absolute absurdity."
" Without binding myself for all time, or
shutting my eyes to further or fresh information,
I was going to say that I do not see that it will
be desirable to put any tax at all upon raw
material, for the reason that it would be very
difficult to find raw material which would be suit
able for this purpose, and if it were to be imposed
it would have to be accompanied by drawbacks
on finished exports ; and, though we know that is
not at all impossible, because every other country
in the world does it, it is a complicated way of
doing that which may be done in a more simple
way. Therefore we come to this : that if you are
to give a Preference to your Colonies — I do not say
you are — you must put a tax upon food. I make
honourable members a present of that, and I am
prepared to go into any workman's or labourer's
house in this country and address a meeting of
workmen or labourers and make certain calcula
tions. Assuming that the duty be is. or 2s. on
corn, I am prepared to go to them and say,

" YOU MUST PUT A TAX ON FOOD " 729
' This policy, if carried out, will cost you so
much a week more than you are paying to-day
for your food,' putting aside any economic
question as to whether they would or would not
pay the whole of any Duty imposed. My argu
ment would be this : — ' I assume that you will
pay every penny of the cost. I wih tell you what
you consume, and I will give you a table by
which you can tell for yourself how much extra
wages you must get in order to cover the extra
expense of living to which you will be put.'
There is an argument to which honourable
members opposite would have to give their serious
attention. If they can show that the whole
result of this business will be greater cost of
living to the working classes, and no increase of
income, then I have no doubt whatever ah their
most pessimistic prophecies will come true. But if
I can show that, in return for what I ask, I will give
more than I take — well, then, I think that, poorly
as they may think of my judgment, I may stih
have a chance. That also suggests another con
sideration. Suppose you put on a Duty, and pro
duce a very large Revenue, we do not want that
Revenue for expenditure, which is at present
normal. Therefore, we have a large sum at our
disposal. To whom shall we give that sum ? In
the first place I ask, who is going to pay this
tax? The working classes are going to pay
three-fourths, because it is the calculation that of
ah taxes on consumption the poorer classes pay
three-fourths, and the well-to-do one-fourth^
That being so, to my mind it is a mere matter of
justice that the working classes are entitled to
every penny of the three-fourths. But I would,
without the slightest hesitation, give them the
other fourth, because I have always held — it is

730 STEPS TOWARDS FEDERATION
part of my speeches on this subject of social
reform — that while it would be absolute confisca
tion to put the cost of social reform whohy on the
shoulders of one class, and that the richer class,
the minority, yet, on the other hand, It was
perfectly fair that they should make a contribu
tion in return for the indirect advantages which
they get from the prosperity and contentment of
the country."

" Of one thing I am certain, and that is that,
in spite of any decision which may be come to
when this matter is raised, if there should be
depression in some of our greatest industries, and
this result which I predict should follow, nothing
would prevent the people of this country from
imposing a Duty which would defend them against
such unfair competition. I have indicated, at ah
events, the lines of the movement, and I have
indicated the discussion which I wish to raise — a
discussion which I promise I will raise before the
country." Such is the issue which Mr Chamberlain has
undertaken to place before the electors, and on
the result he has staked his political fortunes.
It is important to understand what exactly
he is advocating, and what he has not included
in his scheme. He does not propose to estab
lish Free Trade within the British Empire,
though from previous utterances it is clear that
he would welcome it. Again, he is not working
for such a Zollverein as exists within the German
Empire. He does not seek to influence, even
Indirectly, the commercial relations between the
various British Colonies and Dependencies. He

PREFERENCES AND RETALIATION 731
believes in and hopes for such an arrangement
in the future, but it is not a part of the plan
which he desires to lay before the electors of the
United Kingdom and the peoples of the Self-
Governing Colonies. Ah that he aims at for
the present is to bring about a series of fiscal
bargains between the Mother Country and each
of her Colonies — each to be considered on its
own merits. So much for the Preferential side
of his declaration.
His views as to Retaliation, so far as they have
been developed, are confined to exercising pres
sure on Foreign Governments which have estab
lished prohibitive or oppressive Tariffs against
imports from the United Kingdom or its
Colonies. He would provide our Foreign Office
with the means for making a reasonable bargain,
with a weapon for extorting equitable treatment
from countries which have hitherto granted only
such concessions as suited their temporary con
venience — at other times hitting us because they
knew that we should not hit them back. Nor
has he suggested that we should ever become
the aggressors, and, for the sake of encouraging
some native industry, practise exclusion against
foreign producers or manufacturers of the same
commodity. It is clear that the Preference policy and the
Retaliation pohcy are essentially distinct, and
that each rests upon its own merits or is liable to
separate objections. The two principles might
even come into conflict. If It is advisable for
the British Empire to retaliate against an out
side nation which excludes its products, it might
also be advisable for the United Kingdom
to exercise similar pressure on those Colonies
which laid heavy duties on its products, until they

732 STEPS TOWARDS FEDERATION
were brought to a more Imperial frame of mind.
That, however, is not contemplated by Mr
Chamberlain, nor can it fairly be used as an
argument against his policy, that it would logi
cally sanction such a development.
Although he has hitherto demanded only an
inquiry into our fiscal system, and though his
more judicious supporters have pledged them
selves to nothing further, and although he has
refused to produce a definite plan with all the
details worked out, it may be assumed that, on the
main points, his own mind is made up. He
invites his countrymen to make an inquiry — but
he Is not himself inquiring. He is quite decided
as to Imperial Preferences and as to Retaliation.
What, then, is his fiscal record ?
It has already been pointed out that his
principles with regard to Political Economy have
always been somewhat " fluid " — he has never
accepted the whole Cobdenite doctrine as conclu
sively established and beyond criticism. A speech
which he delivered on 12th August 1881, when
he was President of the Board of Trade, has
recently been cited against him as evidence of
tergiversation. He was arguing in the House of
Commons against a proposal to retaliate against
the Bounties which the French Government had
established on beet-sugar. His words were, no
doubt, sufficiently explicit : " He could conceive it
just possible," he said, "that under the sting of
great suffering, strange remedies might be tried,
and some time or other people might be found
foolish enough to tax the food of the country.
If that were done the recurrence of depression
would be the sequel for such a state of things as
we had never seen since the repeal of the Corn
Laws. . . . The tax on food would mean a

MR CHAMBERLAIN'S RECORD 733
decline in the value of wages, certainly In their
proportionate value — wages would purchase less.
It would mean an increase in the price of every
article produced In this country, and the loss of
our foreign trade which was so valuable."
But in justice to Mr Chamberlain, though
he does not greatly value the virtue of con
sistency, another passage from the same speech
should also be quoted : —
"What," he asked, "did the advocate of
Reciprocity mean ? It was said to be the duty
of the working classes to make some sacrifices
in order to reacquire the free and fair trade we
had lost. He did not say that view was entirely
without justification. We were to retaliate on
foreign countries by putting on Protective duties
in order to induce them to take off duties. How
long was that retaliation to last ? For, say, five
years? But suppose the foreign country did
not give way. Then, what duties should be put
on ? That was a question which every advocate
of Reciprocity was bound to answer."
It will be seen, then, that twenty-two years
ago, when he was a rising Radical Minister, the
colleague of Mr Bright at Birmingham, he con
templated without absolute scorn, though cer
tainly he did not embrace, the view that the
working classes should be asked to submit to
some sacrifice for the sake of " free and fair
trade," and that sacrifice was already defined as
a tax on food.
On the other hand, speaking at Birmingham
not two years later (30th March 1883), he used
the following very uncompromising language : —
" Lord Sahsbury would, if he had the power
. . . impose duties on food and clothing, and on
the raw materials coming to us from America, and

734 STEPS TOWARDS FEDERATION
from our Colonies . . . any such scheme if it
should be carried out means that every work
man in Birmingham and throughout the country
should pay more for his loaf, and more for his
clothes, and more for every other necessary of
his life in order that great manufacturers might
keep up their profits, and in order, above all, that
great landlords might maintain and raise their
rents." Another utterance ofthe same tenour was made
at Birmingham, 5th May 1885 — in the days of
the Doctrine of Ransom. Fair Trade, he said, was
the cry under which the demand for Protection
was covered. Property, he added, could not pay
its debt to Labour by taxing its means of sub
sistence. His denunciations of the Corn Laws
and of recent suggestions for restoring them
(as e.g. in a speech delivered at Ipswich in the
same year) are less to the point, since neither
he nor anybody else in his senses dreamt of
laying such a Duty on imported corn as would
make It profitable for the British farmer to grow
wheat on a large scale. Against Protection
that would raise the price to 60 shillings or
even 120 shillings a quarter, Mr Chamberlain
would fight as hard as any of the Cobdenites
with whom he was once associated.
How far has he modified or explained his
declarations of 15th May, 22nd May, and 28th
May ? On 3rd June he wrote a somewhat
elaborate letter to a correspondent (published on
the 8 th), in which he declared the condemnation
of his plan by Trade Union Leaders was not an
index to the general opinion of the working
classes : —
"It wih be impossible," he went on, "to
secure preferential treatment with the Colonies

" REAL FREE TRADE " 735
without some duty on corn as well as on other
articles of food, because these are the chief
articles of Colonial produce. Whether this will
raise the cost of living, is a matter of opinion,
and there is no doubt that in many cases a duty
of this kind is paid by the exporter, and it really
depends on the extent of competition among
the exporting countries. For instance, I think
it is established that the shilling duty recently
imposed on corn was met by a reduction of price
and of freights in the United States of America,
and that the tax did not, therefore, fall in any
way on the consumers here. But even if the
price of food is raised, the rate of wages will
certainly be raised In greater proportion. This
has been the case both in the United States and
in Germany. In the former country the avail
able balance left to the working man, after he
has paid for necessaries. Is much larger than here.
These are facts which we have to bring to the
notice of the working man generahy.
" There is another side of the question which
also requires discussion. At present we go into
negotiations with foreign countries empty-handed.
We have nothing to give, and we have to take
what they are good enough to leave for us. If
we were able to bargain on equal terms, I
believe that the duties now imposed on our pro
duce would be generally reduced. There would
be a competition among foreign nations for our
markets, which would bring us nearer to real
Free Trade than we have ever been.
"As regards Old Age Pensions, I would
not myself look at the matter unless I felt
able to promise that a large scheme for the
provision of such pensions to all who have
been thrifty and weh-conducted would be

736 STEPS TOWARDS FEDERATION
assured by a revision of our system of import
duties." On 26th June he was the guest of the Con
stitutional Club at a luncheon given in honour
of his work in South Africa. In his speech he
repeated with emphasis his previous declaration
that a system of Preferential Tariffs was the
only system by which the British Empire could
be kept together. Incidentahy, he exposed him
self to criticism by two of the inadvertencies into
which he is sometimes betrayed by his dialectical
method. He represented that "over 10 million
kinsmen " buy goods from us every year at the
rate of ;^io a head, while 300 million foreigners
only take a few shillings worth a head. The
point of the contrast was spoiled when it was
remarked next day that in estimating the average
commercial value of each of the King's subjects
he had forgotten to reckon the Inhabitants of
India and the other natives of our numerous
Dependencies. When they are counted in, the
comparison is by no means so flattering to the
value of Imperial Trade. Nor is it very striking
when the total amount of our exports to the
Self-Governing Colonies only is divided by the
number of white inhabitants. Again, in seeking
to emphasise the drawbacks of an "existing
system of free imports " (he would not call it
Free Trade), he quoted, " on the high authority of
Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman " the statement
that "12 millions of our people are always on
the verge of starvation." This absurd statement
would not have imposed on Mr Chamberlain,
nor would he have repeated it as a serious argu
ment, if he had given it a few minutes thought.
It appears to have originated in an estimate,
misunderstood and misquoted, by Mr Charles

THE POOR MAN'S FOOD 737
Booth, of the number of persons who subsist on
precarious employment. Mr Chamberlain, how
ever, found that it had been adopted by a
political opponent, and thought it good enough
to use against him. But these were the mere
flourishes of debate. And a stolid people which
has just begun to puzzle its brains again about
fiscal problems does not like to be trifled with
when It is trying to "inquire." Mr Chamber
lain was cautious enough when he approached
the subject of "taxing the food of the
people " : —
" I come to the critical point. I am told ' It
is a main feature of your plan to increase the
cost of the poor man's food.' Is it true? If It
were it would be serious. I am not going to
enter upon any economical discussion. I leave
that to the experts, especiahy to the modern
school of political economy, which does not
invariably accept the positions which were
laid down with so much confidence by the
economists of an older school. I leave it to
them whether a tax upon any article of con
sumption wih in the long run inevitably be
paid by the consumer, or whether it may not
possibly be paid in part or in whole by the
producer of the article. But I put that aside.
I say — as I have said before — I am wihing
to assume for the sake of argument — although
I do not believe it myself — that the whole cost
of the tax wih fall upon the consumer ; but even
then, suppose that the tax upon corn increases
the price of bread, does that necessarily increase
the cost of living ? ' Man does not live by bread
alone.' If the increased cost of bread has made
a proportionate decrease on some other articles,
either of consumption or that are necessary to
3 A

738 STEPS TOWARDS FEDERATION
the comfort of life, then, in that case, although
the price of a particular article may be raised,
the cost of living wih not be increased in the
slightest degree. Weh, you know that I have
suggested — it is my own suggestion, nobody
else is answerable for it — that inasmuch as
any alteration of our fiscal system must largely
increase the sums received in the shape of
indirect taxation, that a portion of those sums,
at any rate, should be applied in order to provide
old-age pensions for the poor. Thereupon I
am told that this is a most immoral proposition ;
that it is a discreditable attempt to bribe the
working classes of this country. That criticism
is hasty, and it is harsh. Those who make it
have altogether forgotten my past in this matter.
I entered upon an investigation of the subject
many years ago. It is always near my heart.
I believe that such a system would be of immense
advantage to the people. I have earnestly
desired to make it successful, and up to the
present time I have failed, because it was
impossible to see any source from which the
money which would be requisite could fairly and
justly come. As long as we depend so much
upon our direct taxation, as long as there is
an inclination to put every increased expense
upon this direct taxation, I say it would be
very unfair to think even of old-age pensions,
as the result would be an enormously increased
burden upon the payers of Income-tax, many
of whom are already sufficiently straitened in the
condition of life in which they find themselves.
That has been my difficulty.
" Was it not natural when, in connection with
this new subject, I thought that it was probable
large sums might be at the disposal of any

THE COST OF LIVING 739
future Chancehor of the Exchequer, that I should
put In a word for my favourite hobby, if you like
to cah it so, and that I should ask the working
classes^ — for it is to them that I look for the
answer — to consider whether it would not be
better for them to take the money which Is
theirs in the shape of a deferred payment and
a provision for old age rather than in the shape
of an immediate advantage ? That is all that
I have done, but it has no part whatever in the
question of a reform in our fiscal policy. That
is a matter which wih come later. When we
have got the money, then will be the time to
say what we shall do with It, and if the working
classes refuse to take my advice, if they prefer
this immediate advantage, why, it stands to
reason that if, for instance, they are called upon
to pay threepence a week additional In the cost
of their bread, they may be entirely relieved
by a reduction to a similar amount in the cost
of their tea or their sugar or even of their tobacco.
If what is taken out of one pocket can be put
into the other, there is no working man In the
Kingdom, no man, however poor, who need
fear under the system I propose that without
his goodwill the cost of living will be increased
by a single farthing. I think that I might try to
make this clear, I think there never was a grosser
imposture than the cry of the dear loaf We
know what is Intended by it ; but I say again
that the course which is indicated in that expres
sion is one which there is not the slightest chance
that any Government wih follow, unless, indeed,
as I have said before, it should become evident
that it was the desire of the working men them
selves in this way to insure themselves against
old age, unless it was perfectly clear that they

740 STEPS TOWARDS FEDERATION
preferred that to any reduction in the general
cost of living."
The meaning of this declaration was not ob
scure. Mr Chamberlain no longer Intended to
insist that the revenue raised on foreign imports
should be devoted to Old Age Pensions, and he
was convinced that the working classes would
not agree to a general increase in the cost of
living. They did not believe that it would be
compensated by a rise in wages. If they were
to agree to a tax on bread it would only be
because they were promised a reduction in regard
to other articles of almost equal necessity.
Acting on this interpretation of his latest utter
ance, various persons, more or less qualified to
divine his latest opinion, put forward different
schemes by which it might be given effect. But
it was thought advisable by the Tariff Reform
League to draw an explicit statement from Mr
Chamberlain himself His reply, dated 15th
August, was published on the i8th : —
"I had hoped," he wrote to Mr Griffith-
Bosawen, "that the statements which I have
already publicly made on the questions referred
to in your letter were so definite that they could
not be misunderstood nor misrepresented. As,
however, you say that this is not the case, I have
no hesitation in repeating them.
" I have never suggested any tax whatever on
raw materials, such as wool or cotton, and I
believe that such a tax is entirely unnecessary
for the purposes which I have in view — that is,
for a mutual preference with our Colonies, and
for enabling us to bargain for better terms with
our foreign competitors.
" As regards food, there is nothing in the
policy of Tariff reform which I have put before

CABINET DISSENSIONS 741
the country which need increase in the slightest
degree the cost of living of any family in this
country." There, for the present, the matter stands.
Unless something unexpected happens, Mr
Chamberlain is engaged to state his "case for
the inquiry " in a series of public meetings which
he whl address in the Autumn, and he has also
promised, in January, to summarise in "the
Metropolis of the Empire and the centre of the
commerce of the world " the conclusions at which
he has arrived, and which he desires to submit to
the consideration of his countrymen.
No attempt Is made here to pronounce judg
ment on his policy, so far as he has explained it.
Wisely or unwisely, the Prime Minister has
refused, in the House of Commons, to permit a
discussion — for which, ex hypothesi, the material
was lacking — unless the Leader of the Opposition
would challenge the Government by proposing a
formal Vote of Censure. Nevertheless, in the
Debate on the Corn Duty (9th June), both the
present and the late Chancehor of the Exchequer
expressed their strong dissent from the policy of
Mr Chamberlain. Mr Ritchie had no objection
to an inquiry being held, but he would be sur
prised if it were to show them any practical
means of carrying out a system of Preferential
Tariffs. He was a convinced Free Trader, and,
as at present advised, could not be a party to a
policy which, in his opinion, would be detri
mental both to this country and the Colonies.
Sir Michael Hicks- Beach declared that it would
be deeply injurious to this country, and would do
more to disunite than to unite the Empire.
Much as he disapproved of the repeal of the
Corn Duty, he accepted it as "the alternative

742 STEPS TOWARDS FEDERATION
policy to a much greater evil." He was opposed
to the principle of using our Tariff for purposes
of Retaliation and Preference. It could only be
adopted, and only be maintained, with the general
consent of the country. What chance had the
Prime Minister and the Colonial Secretary of
obtaining such a general assent ? The promulga
tion of this new policy had performed something
akin to a miracle — It had united the Opposition.
If persisted in it would, in his opinion, "destroy
the Unionist Party as an instrument of good."
In the Upper House (15th June), it was
denounced In even stronger terms by Lord
Goschen, another Unionist ex-Chancellor of the
Exchequer, as "a gamble in food." He would
not countenance the suggestion that a rise in
prices would mean an increase of wages. Lord
Lansdowne's speech was taken to Indicate a
general agreement with Mr Chamberlain's policy,
but the Duke of Devonshire and Lord Balfour
of Burleigh, while supporting an inquiry, indicated
quite unmistakably that they did not believe It
would result in establishing the need for reversing
our fiscal policy.
An important side-issue was also raised in
the Upper House, on loth July, by Lord North
brook, who wished to know how a Preferential
System would be applied to India. Was India
to be left out ? and how could it be included ?
To this Lord Lansdowne replied that no plan
had yet been formulated, but that India would
certainly not be excluded from the scope of the
Government inquiry.
It wih be observed that most of the hostile
criticism of Mr Chamberlain's new departure has
been directed against the Preferential Scheme,
while his proposal that the Imperial Government

RETALIATION 743
should be armed with powers to retaliate on
tariffs directed against the trade of the United
Kingdom or any of its Colonies, though not
universally accepted, has almost escaped attack,
except from the thorough-going adherents of
Cobdenism. This is not because Englishmen as
a rule are insensible to the advantages of develop
ing trade within the Empire, because they fail to
see that a Preferential System would be a firm
bond of union, or because they are doubtful of
the motives with which Mr Chamberlain has
propounded the policy. They are waiting for
him to show how it can be carried out — i.e.,
without exposing the United Kingdom to a loss
quite disproportionate to any advantage expected
for the Colonies,*
If the verdict on this point goes against him,
he still has Retaliation to fah back upon. But
that, it may be said, would have little bearing on
the Colonial policy with which he desires to
associate his name. Yet it is not altogether un
connected. There can be no doubt that a strong
impression was produced in the country by the
Correspondence (published 13th July) between
Germany and Great Britain in regard to Canada,
Both Germany and Belgium took strong
exception to the action of the Dominion in con
ferring a Tariff advantage on goods imported
from the Mother Country, It was Inconsistent,
they said, with the Commercial Treaties then in
force, which applied to British Colonies as well
as to Great Britain, and they claimed to share
the Preferential treatment accorded to Great
* He has left himself one way of retreat, and one only.
He depends, he wrote on June 3, on Colonial opinion.
If that were " hostile or even apathetic " he would feel
"justified in abandoning the struggle."

744 STEPS TOWARDS FEDERATION
Britain. After some correspondence, the Foreign
Minister in Berlin demanded that we should put
an end to the violation of the Treaty involved in
the action of the Canadian Government. Legally,
there was no reply so long as the Treaties
remained in existence, and, as we have seen,
notice of "denunciation" was forthwith given by
our Government. In the course of the pro
longed negotiations for a new arrangement with
Germany, it was pointed out by Lord Salisbury
that the French Colonies gave a Preference to
the Republic, yet were admitted by Germans to
the most-favoured-nation treatment. Why should
Canada be placed in a worse position ? Lord
Salisbury refused, "under any circumstances,"
to acquiesce in the previous restrictions on the
action of our Colonies. In consequence of this,
in the temporary arrangement which was arrived
at, Canada was excluded from most-favoured
nation treatment. So the matter dragged on
till June, 1899, when Lord Salisbury again
pressed his comparison of the British with the
French Colonies. Baron von Richthofen replied
that German commercial relations with France
and French Colonies were regulated by the
Treaty of Frankfort.
"Canada," he added, "has deprived Germany
of a valuable right, of which we retained posses
sion for more than thirty years under the Anglo-
German Commercial Treaty which has come to
an end. It cannot be expected of Germany, that
upon a change being made by one party in the
state of affairs which has hitherto prevailed she
should accept the change without more ado ; it
is the less to be expected, as it is in the interests
of the development of the commerce of the world,
and of the mutual relations of trade and navi-

GERMANY AND CANADA 745
gation between Germany and the British Mother
Country, that, in the British Colonies, equal
treatment should be given to the products of
Germany and of Great Britain."
Nothing further of importance happened unth
1 8th March 1903, when Lord Lansdowne inquired
from Sir Frank Lascelles what steps, if any,
were being taken by the German Government
with regard to the law empowering them to give
most-favoured-nation treatment to this country
after 31st December next, on which date the
temporary arrangements made under the law of
29th May 1 90 1 come to an end. By this time
it was known that the South African Colonies
had decided to give Preferential treatment to
British goods, and Baron von Richthofen was
doubtful whether the desire of the German
Government to prolong the arrangement could
be realised if Germany were differentiated against
in important parts of the British Empire, and if,
in particular, the report were confirmed that
German goods would in the future be less
favourably treated than British, not only in
Canada, but also in British South Africa. He
told Sir F. Lascelles verbahy that if other British
Colonies followed Canada's example, and large
portions of the British Empire were to give
Preferential treatment to Great Britain, it would
be very difficult to obtain the consent of the
Reichstag to the prolongation of most-favoured
nation treatment to Great Britain herself
That was on 23rd April, and on 20th June
Lord Lansdowne wrote an Important Despatch
to the Berlin Embassy, in which, after recapitu
lating the history of the affair, he said, referring to
Baron von Richthofen's statement, just quoted : —
" This communication has greatly increased

746 STEPS TOWARDS FEDERATION
the difficulty of the situation, and I have now to
give you the following instructions as to the
language which you should hold with regard to
this most important question. You should, in
the first place, remind the German Government
that the Treaty of 1865 between the United
Kingdom and Germany was terminated by His
Majesty's Government, in order that this country
and her Colonies might be at liberty to make
such arrangements as might be considered
desirable in respect of their mutual trade. To
this policy His Majesty's Government adhere.
As regards Canada, the action of the Dominion
was taken only after every effort had been made
to secure fair treatment for Canadian produce in
Germany. It was only after these efforts had
failed, and Germany had persistently refused to
accord to Canadian produce the same most
favoured-nation treatment that Canada accorded
to German produce, that Canada was driven in
self-defence to measures of retaliation. If
Germany will restore Canadian produce to the
most - favoured nation terms. His Majesty's
Government have not the least doubt that the
increased duties which have just been imposed on
German goods wih be at once removed. Should
the German Government, however, persist in the
attitude which they have taken up on this matter,
and, further, extend to the products of other
British Colonies, and even to those of the United
Kingdom, whose Tariff Is at the present moment
based upon the most liberal principles, the dis
crimination which they have enforced against
Canada, a very wide and serious issue must
inevitably be raised, involving the fiscal relations
of this country and the German Empire."
Baron von Richthofen's reply is dated 27th

THE GERMAN POSITION 747
June last. He takes credit for Germany having
exhibited "a special desire to meet the wishes of
Great Britain, for which there Is no example in
German legislation, either before or since." He
goes on : —
"The application of the German General
Tariff to Canada entails no unjustifiable dis
crimination, stih less any penalising of that
Colony, as has often been asserted ; the Measure
is merely a consequence of the expiry of the
Anglo-German Commercial Treaty, and Is neces
sitated by German law. No penal Measures or
additional duties have, so far— and this must be
expressly emphasised— been applied by Germany
to Canada. Moreover, there Is in the German
procedure — for we wish also to correct this sup
position, which has been often repeated — no
interference in the relations between Mother
Country and Colony. After the expiry of the
Anglo-German Commercial Treaty, Germany
could only choose whether she would apply her
General Tariff to Great Britain and all her
Colonies, as according to German law would
have been necessary In the ordinary course, or
whether she would limit the apphcation of the
General Tariff to those parts of the British
Empire in which there had been an alteration of
the status quo affecting Imports from Germany.
The choice of the latter alternative, which is
much more favourable to Great Britain and her
Colonies, is considered by Germany to be
requisite in the Interests of mutual commercial
policy, and to be practically justified, because
Great Britain had declared on the most diverse
occasions, that her Colonies formed independent
territories for Customs purposes, and were inde
pendent as regards their decisions respecting

748 STEPS TOWARDS FEDERATION
the regulation of their relations with foreign
countries." "If, however," declares the German Minister,
"the Enghsh Colonies are to be in a position to
fohow out their own Customs policy, other
countries must be allowed to treat them as
separate Customs territories."
He saw also that his threat to Great Britain
had been a mistake in tactics as well as a breach
of good manners, and expressed his hope that a
practical solution of the difficulty might still be
found. To this Lord Lansdowne gave a notably
polite reply, but could not accept the explanation
which Baron von Richthofen had offered with
regard to the menace.
" Baron von Richthofen apparently desires
to treat this intimation, which he describes as
having been confidentially made to Sir F.
Lascelles, as an obiter dictum of no great import
ance. It was, however, impossible for His
Majesty's Government so to regard it. The
announcement made In Baron von Richthofen's
Note, which was not marked ' Confidential,' and
was of the most authoritative character, seemed
to them at the time, and stih seems to them,
capable of no other interpretation than this —
that if other British Self-Governing Colonies
should fohow the example of Canada and accord
national treatment to British imports, the
German Government might find themselves
compelled to refuse, not only to those Colonies,
but to Great Britain herself, the treatment which,
in view of the liberal terms upon which German
imports are admitted to this country, we are
entitled to expect upon the most ordinary grounds
of reciprocity. Such retaliation on the part of
the German Government would, in our opinion,

THE BRITISH REPLY 749
not be justifiable in Itself, and would be incon
sistent with the attitude which, as we understand
Baron von Richthofen's argument, the German
Government desire to assume towards the
British Self-Governing Colonies. If it be true,
as stated in the Note, that those Colonies are
regarded by the German Government as 'inde
pendent customs districts ' which foreign Powers
are at liberty to treat as such, it would fohow
that no responsibility would attach to the
Mother Countr)- for their external Tariff arrange
ments, and that it would be whohy Inequitable
and illogical to retaliate upon the Mother Country
in consequence of the manner in which the
Colonies had made use of their opportunities.
This argument, however, although it appears
to His Majesty's Government a legitimate
rejoinder to that of Baron von Richthofen, is
not one on which they desire to lay stress, for
so far as the present controversy is concerned,
thev have no intention of drawing a distinction
between their own interests and those of the
Self-Governing Colonies."
The terms and the tone of Lord Lansdowne's
reply were approved even by Englishmen who
understood the Berlin point of view — that Ger
many was entitled to ask that Canada should
be treated either as an independent State or
as a Colonv, and should not at the same time
claim the privileges of both conditions. But
any legal case which the Germans could set up
was spoiled by the brutality of the methods
employed to assert it.
But as it stands, the case suggests a prob
lem on which the Duke of Devonshire has
insisted. If a solid scheme of partnership is to
be instituted between the Mother Country and

750 STEPS TOWARDS FEDERATION
each of her Colonies, if every Treaty that confers
an advantage or imposes a responsibility on
the one does the same things to the other, it
follows, as Mr Chamberlain has by implication
admitted, that the British Government must
have some voice in the commercial policy of her
Colonies. Or, as Mr Chamberlain and Sir
Wilfrid Laurier would prefer to put it, we must
cah the Colonies to our Councils. This cannot
be done without our giving up some of the inde
pendence of the Imperial Government or without
demanding a corresponding sacrifice from the
Colonies. But on this point Sir Wilfrid Laurier
would be obdurate. Speaking at Montreal on
2 ist August, he declared that the price would be
too heavy for any advantages to be expected.
" If we are to obtain from the people of Great
Britain a concession for which we would be pre
pared to give an equivalent, and if we are to
obtain it also at the expense of the surrender of
some of our political rights, for my part I would
simply say, let us go no further, for already we
have come to the parting of the ways. Canada
values too highly the system which made her
what she is to consent willingly to part with any
portion of it for whatever consideration ; and,
even for the maintenance of the British Empire,
I think It would be a most evil thing if any of
our Colonies were to consent to part with any
of their legislative Independence. Nor do I
believe that, in order to make such an arrange
ment of a commercial nature as I have spoken
of a moment ago, we should be called upon to
make any sacrifice of dignity and independence."
These and other difficulties were so firmly
impressed on Lord Salisbury's mind that, fre
quently as he had expressed in public his regret

LORD SALISBURY'S WARNING 751
that he had no means of obtaining fair treatment
for British traders at foreign ports, he never
took a step towards either a Retaliation or a
Preference policy. The last words he uttered on
a public platform, before he withdrew from the
service of his country, were an eloquent warning,
not at the time understood In their fuh signifi
cance, against premature attempts to bring about
Imperial Federation. Speaking at the Albert
Hah on 8th May 1902, he said : —
" Though I believe it is true that we are
at the commencement of a movement of causes,
of opinions, and of feelings which whl end in
changes which will modify the present distribu
tion of power, and the present distribution, I
may say, of ahegiance, I do not, therefore, on
that account, advocate any impatient handling of
the phenomena which we have to deal with.
There are many men of great intellect and
authority who think that the moment has come
for some legislative action on our part which
should federate the Colonies. But I exhort them,
before they do so, to carefully consider what
steps they are going to take, and what results
they expect to come from them. We have no
power by legislation to affect the flow of opinion
and of affection which has arisen so largely
between the Mother Country and her Daughter
States. Those will go on in their own power —
in their own irresistible power — and I have no
doubt they will leave combinations behind them
which will cast into the shade all the glories
the British Empire has hitherto displayed. But
we cannot safely interfere by legislative action
with the natural development of our relations
with our Daughter countries. All kinds of
difficulties are there before us — difficulties as to

752 STEPS TOWARDS FEDERATION
the burden of finance, difficulties as to the duty
of defence, difficulties as to the rights of decision
which the Mother Country should retain, and,
unless feeling is running very strong and we
have a great force behind us, I look with some
apprehension upon any attempt to anticipate the
events or to foreclose the results — the precious
results — which, if we are only patient and careful,
the future has in store for the Empire. . . . There
is nothing more dangerous than to force a
decision before a decision Is ready, and, there
fore, to produce feelings of discontent, feelings
of difficulty, which, if we will only wait, wih of
themselves bring about the results that we desire.
There is no danger that appears to be more
serious for the time that lies before us than
an attempt to force the various parts of the
Empire into a mutual arrangement and sub
ordination for which they are not ready, and
which may only produce a reaction in favour of
the old state of things."
To Lord Salisbury it was already clear in
what direction Mr Chamberlain was about to
move ; and it is also evident that he was gravely
distrustful of the policy which was then ferment
ing In the mind of a colleague with whom, and
against whom, he had fought so many battles
in the past, and whose influence in the Cabinet
was to be so greatly strengthened by his own
retirement.

APPENDICES

753 ^ jj

APPENDIX I
MR CHAMBERLAIN'S MAGAZINE ARTICLES
The most important of Mr Chamberlain's early writ
ings appeared in The Fortnightly Review. The following
is a complete list : —
"The Liberal Party and its Leaders" (1874); "The Next
Page of the Liberal Programme " (1874) ; " The Right Method
with the Publicans" (1876); "Lapland Notes and Swedish
Licencing" (1876) ; " Free Schools " (1877) ; " Municipal Public
Houses" (1877); "The New Political Organisation" (1877);
"The Caucus" (1879) ; "Labourers' and Artisans' Dwellings"
(1883). Three articles have been published in TTie Nineteenth
Century : in December 1890, " Shall we Americanise our
Institutions?"; in November 1892, "The Labour Question" ;
and in April 1893, "A Bill for the Weakening of Great
Britain." Besides the above, an article on " Municipal Reform " was
contributed in 1894 to the defunct New Review.

756

APPENDIX II
OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS
The following list includes most of the official publications
relating to subjects mentioned in this book : —
1896
Correspondence relating to Transfer of Bechuanaland to
Cape Colony.
Correspondence relating to Boundaries of British Guiana.
Correspondence re visit of Bechuanaland Chiefs to this
country. Report from H.M. Colonial Possessions — on Bounties other
than Shipping and Navigation.
Return — Amount of Sugar produced in Sugar-Producing
Colonies 1889 to 1894 inclusive.
Newfoundland Annual Report for 1894.
Matabeleland : Report of Land Commission and Corre
spondence. Copy of Messages of Loyalty from Canada, Australia, and
New Zealand.
Papers relating to Commandeering of British Subjects in
South African Republic 1894, ^'^^ Visit of High Commissioner
to Pretoria. South African Republic : Copy of Letter from Sir J. de
Wet re his Retirement and Correspondence.
Report from Select Committee British South Africa, and
Proceedings and Report from Select Committee Cape of Good
Hope on Jameson Raid. 1897
Papers relating to Imprisonment at Pretoria of W. H.
Davis and Captain W. Sampson.
Correspondence relating to Transfer of Norfolk Island to
Government of New South Wales.
South African Republic : Papers relating to closing of Vaal
756

APPENDICES 757
River Drifts by Government of South African Republic in
October 1895.
Papers relating to Liquor Trade in West Africa.
Second Report Select Committee British South Africa.
Papers relating to Benin Massacre.
Proceedings of a Conference between Secretary of State for
Colonies and Premiers of Self-Governing Colonies at Colonial
Office, June-July 1897.
Trade of British Empire and Foreign Competition, and
Despatch from Mr Chamberlain to Governors of Colonies
and High Commissioner of Cyprus, and Reply thereto ;
Turks and Caicos Island Annual Reports for 1896.
1898
Correspondence relating to proposed changes in the ad
ministration of the British South African Company.
British South African Company's Territories — Copies of
Charter of 29th October 1889, and Orders in Council.
Cape of Good Hope Correspondence relating to Disturb
ances in Bechuanaland.
Africa, No. 4 Despatch from H.M. Ambassador at Paris,
enclosing copy of Convention between Great Britain and
France. Sierra Leone — Copy of Communication and Instruction to
Sir D. P. Chalmers.
Correspondence re Agreement between Government of
British New Guinea and British New Guinea Syndicate.
Return Colonial Import Duties. 1899
Newfoundland : Papers relating to Contract for Sale of
Government Railway, and for other purposes.
Jamaica : Papers relating to the Financial Resources of
Island. Further Correspondence relating to Affairs in Swaziland.
Bechuanaland Railway Correspondence with Mr Rhodes.
South African Republic : Papers relating to Complaints of
British Subjects.
Nigeria.
Bloemfontein : Conference ; Political Condition ; Despatch
to Secretary of State.
Malta: Report.
South African Republic : Correspondence relating to
Political Reforms.
Report : Finances of Jamaica ; Financial Returns as to
Colonies to which it is proposed to advance Loans under the
Colonial Loans Bill, 1899.

758 APPENDICES
Colonial Loans : Explanatory Note as to proposed Loans
under Loans Bill, 1899.
South African Republic : Further Correspondence ; Poli
tical Reforms.
Jamaica : Further Correspondence.
South Africa : Further Correspondence ; Political Affairs.
South African Republic : Further Correspondence relating
to Affairs. Nigeria: Correspondence relating to Benin Territories
Expedition. West Indies : Further Correspondence relating to Hurri
cane. South African Republic : Correspondence relating to
Despatch of Colonial Contingents to South Africa.
1900
Further Correspondence ; Aifairs of South Africa.
South Australian Constitution Amendment Act, 1899.
Basutoland Report.
Correspondence with Presidents of South African Republic
and Orange Free State respecting the War.
Papers relating to Federation of Australian Colonies.
Papers relating to Federated Australian Colonies.
West Indies : Jamaica Contract between Crown Agents for
Colonies and Messrs Elder, Dempster, & Company for Steam
ship service between Jamaica and United Kingdom.
Malta : Law relating to Public Meetings.
Australian Federation : Extract from a Memorandum on
Draft Australian Commonwealth Bill.
Further Correspondence : Correspondence ; Affairs of South
Africa. Return South Africa Transports ; Cape Colony Corre
spondence ; Affairs of.
Report : Recent Political Situation in South Africa.
West Indies : Correspondence re Hurricane and Relief of
Distress. Further Correspondence ; Affairs of South Africa.
1901
Correspondence : Ashanti War, 1900.
South Africa : Papers relating to Negotiations between
Botha and Lord Kitchener.
South Africa : Papers relating to Negotiations between
Botha and Lord Kitchener.
Statement : Colonial Loans Act.
Further Correspondence : Affairs of South Africa.

APPENDICES 759
Africa : Correspondence relating to murder of Mr Jenner
and Ogaden Punitive Expedition.
Gold Coast : Laws and Regulations affecting Lands and
Mines. South Africa : Papers relating to Negotiations between
Botha and Lord Kitchener.
South Africa : Number of Persons in Concentration Camps,
June 1901.
Colonies : Correspondence relating to Proposed Alteration
in Royal Style and Titles of Crown.
South Africa : Papers relating to certain Legislation in late
South African Republic affecting Natives.
Further Correspondence relating to Political Condition of
Malta. British South African Company : Financial Statement
1899-1900, and Estimates for 1901-1902.
South Africa : Correspondence relating to Hostilities in
South Africa.
South Africa : Return of Number of Persons in Concentra
tion Camps, July 1901.
South Africa — Proclamation issued by Lord Kitchener as
Administrator of Transvaal in July 1901 respecting Payments
in Contracts to Purchase or Lease Land or Mining Rights.
South Africa : Correspondence Number of Persons in Con
centration Camps, August 1901.
South Africa : Number of Persons in Concentration Camps,
September 1901.
South Africa : Correspondence relative to Treatment of
Natives by Boers.
South Africa : Further Papers relating to Working of
Refugee Camps. 190Z
South Africa : Further Correspondence relating to Affairs.
South Africa : Despatches from Lord Kitchener ; Papers
relating to Working of Refugee Camps.
South Africa : Despatches to 8th December 1901.
South Africa : Petition from Boer Prisoners in Bermuda.
Transvaal : Papers relating to Legislation affecting Natives
in. Africa : Correspondence with Netherlands Government
regarding War in South Africa ; Letter from General Smuts
to General Botha.
South Africa : Further Correspondence re Treatment of
Natives by Boers.
South Africa : Further Correspondence ; Work of Refugee
Camps.

760 APPENDICES
South Africa : Correspondence re proposed Additions of
Territory in Natal.
South Africa : Correspondence re Terms of Surrender of
Boers in field.
South Africa : Despatches to 8th April 1902.
Further Correspondence re Affairs in South Africa.
South Africa : Papers relating Interview between Secretary
for Colonies and Boer Generals.
South Africa : Correspondence re Appeal by Boer Generals
to Civilised World. 1903
Convention for Adjustment of Boundary between Canada
and Alaska.
Correspondence relating to Kano.
South Africa : Further Correspondence, June 1902 to Feb.
1903. Africa : Recruitment of Labour in British Central Africa
Protectorate. Progress of Administration in the Transvaal and Orange
River Colony.
South Africa : Further Papers as to Administration in the
Transvaal. Queensland : Correspondence as to Kanaka Labour.
South Africa : Estimated Financial Position of the Trans
vaal and Orange River Colony.
Australia : Constitutional Relations between Australian
Commonwealth and States in regard to External Affairs.
South Africa : Draft Union Customs Convention.
South Africa : Correspondence to Inter-Colonial Council.
South Africa : Correspondence re Indian Coolies.
Transvaal : Position of British Indians.
Trinidad : Report of Commission on Disturbances at Port
of Spain. Correspondence with Belgium and Germany as to their
Commercial Relations with Great Britain and British Colonies.
Sugar Convention : Findings of the Permanent Commission
and Report of the British Delegate.

APPENDIX III
CHARTERED COMPANY'S CORRESPONDENCE
The following are the telegrams quoted by Mr Stead
and others to show that Mr Chamberlain was a party in
189s to the conspiracy against the independence of the
South African Republic : —
Dr Harris, London, to Charter, Capetown.
y.st December 1895.
Inform Dr Jameson your telegram received, doing our
utmost, do not think I shall fail.
Harris to Rhodes.
Very Confidential. 2nd November 1895.
If you cannot carry out the plan of Dr Jameson, have every
reason to believe J. Chamberlain intends active policy Imperial
with intention to federation British sphere of influence in his
way, and he will expect you to adopt his views. 2nd November 1895.
Earl Grey held an interview with J. Chamberlain. We
have seen Native chiefs decline our proposal, but we hope
they will make counter proposal J. Chamberlain will put
pressure upon them to settle. Fear we must increase Khama's
boundary. Large breakfast to be given Khama 4th November,
London. Fear speeches will damage British South Africa
Company. But R. Maguire Dr Harris hold an interview
with speakers to-morrow, hoping to influence these. Country
press very much in favour of Khama. 2nd November 1895.
Willoughby and Khama state you had promised them land
up to Panda Ma Tenka. I have been trying for Sir Charles
Warren may position. Telegraph authoritative denial.
761

762 APPENDICES

Harris to Charter, Capetown. 2nd November 1895.
Communicate the following to Dr Jameson. I have obtained
you Ikanning, and will probably get Protectorate. Can you
carry out your plan or not ?
Harris to Rhodes. 2nd November 1895.
Registered address of Earl Grey is Gothical, London. You
must register this on your side at once. /^th November 1895.
Your telegram of 3rd received E. Fairfield we shall see him
and explain in return for transfer at once Protectorate the
police are prepared to deal liberally land we have offered
already if they grant now police and balance Protectorate we
will leave native reserves entirely under Imperial rule for a
period of years. They are native chief's wishes more than
more land. Will you agree to ? Have telegraphed Earl Grey
must come London. You have not chosen best man to
arrange with J. Chamberlain. I have already sent Flora to
convince J. Chamberlain support Times newspaper and if you
can telegraph course you wish Times to adopt now with regard
to Transvaal Flora will act. \th November 1895.
J. Chamberlain he does not return London until to-morrow.
I have spoken open E. Fairfield, and I have accepted, if Colonial
Office (they) will transfer to us balance Protectorate with police
7th November ?we will agree to any liberal native reserves for
native chiefs also remain under Imperial rule for a period of
years, and we give up railway subsidy two hundred thousand
pounds last bargain E. Fairfield he does press if you cannot
approve let us know about this as soon as possible by tele
gram. We believe E. Fairfield will carry out promises.
Regret to inform you that J. Chamberlain he does continue
punching Consul General Transvaal with regard to drifts: E.
Fairfield he is anxious Johannesburg if they take steps in
precedence of. tith November 1895.
We have seen E. Fairfield, Hon. R. H. Meade, Colonel
Gould Adams, and we have agreed to what land we give
native chiefs. Secretary of State for Colonies holds an inter
view with us to-morrow afternoon three, and after native chiefs
if they are satisfied and they will be present. Secretary of

APPENDICES 763
State for Colonies he will grant British South Africa Company
balance Protectorate with police. We reported your letter to
A. Beit during the month of August to these and Flora we
have these solid. Rhodes to Harris. (>th November 1895.
As to English flag they must very much misunderstand me
at home. I of course would not risk everything as I am doing
excepting for British flag. iik November 1895.
I warmly thank you for your work.
Harris to Rhodes. %tk November 1895.
See cable to acting High Commissioner from E. Fairfield
releasing police and giving us balance of Protectorate are you
satisfied with .'' Rhodes to Harris. iik November 1895.
Do we get ownership on ten mile strip ? I suppose we shall
get land as far as to Transvaal border up to Palla, as it would
be absurd to have few miles native territory between us and
border. Harris to Rhodes. Zih November 1895.
Thanks, they do not misunderstand you, but feared if you
should have power insist upon it. 11th November 1895.
Private native chiefs sailing intermediate steamer 23rd
November. I am returning with Bailey and others 29th
November, will it be in time reply by telegraph. Native chiefs
and Willoughby acted like pigs. 11/^ November 1895.
Held an inter^-iew with E. Fairfield.
Telegram continues to give details as to the adminis
tration of strip of Transvaal border.
E. Fairfield he will advise any natives resident must remove
to reserve in the usual way in South East Africa, therefore
leaving British South Africa Company ownership clear except

764 APPENDICES
in case of foreign natives it does not affect your arrangement
Linchwe Ikanning and Montsioa therefore no native adminis
tration between you and Transvaal and you are border authority.
After more details, chiefly geographical, the telegram
concludes as follows : —
After consultation with E. Fairfield we have made an offer
verbally as follows that we will give up _^200,ooo in exchange
for ownership strip and ownership j balance Protectorate as far
as regards three native chiefs and with the addition of public
buildings and lines at Gaberones as in case of British Bechuana
land to Cape Colony, but we will pay for horses and equipment
Bechuanaland Border Police at valuation not at cost price.
Rhodes to Harris. i2th November 1895.
29th November will be in time. 12^^ November 1895.
I note your verbal offer, _^20o,ooo you must have owner
ship land in return otherwise besides saving British Govern
ment ^50,000 a year we shall have got nothing you must
consider shareholders. It is humiliating to be utterly beaten
by these niggers, they think more of one native at home than
the whole of South Africa. Harris to Rhodes. \2,th November 1895.
Native chiefs with Lord Loch and Temperance carried
England with them and your repeated instructions to acquire
police by 7th November crippled British South Africa Company
terribly. Referring to your recent telegram to grant ^^200,000
and more if necessary to secure date of course we might have
done better if we had been given more time.
Rhodes to Harris. i^th November 1895.
High Commissioner in South Africa received this morning
boundary reserve from Colonial Office you have got nothing and
you have given Matabeleland to Khama. . . . There is nothing
got for _^200,ooo excepting worthless strip along German
border. Settlement is a scandal.

APPENDICES 766
Harris to Rhodes.
litk November 1895.
Your telegram of i6th received referring to your telegram
of 26th October referring to your telegram of 3rd November
referring to your telegram of 5th November, we believed you
considered immediate settlement securing administration rail
way strip with Bechuanaland Police of the utmost importance,
and to be secured at any sacrifice. Referring to your telegram
of Sth as to final boundary Khama reserve from which we are
trying hard to exclude everything within our customs line.
Do you know that Colonial Office have never yet brought our
administrative line down to customs line ? 19/;^ November 1895.
In consequence of your telegram i6th November I shall
withhold for the present any definite offer of ^^200,000 and
endeavour to drift and we presume that railway strip and police
sufficient for Dr Jameson plan which you telegraphed was
principal object. Rhodes to Harris. 20*^ November 1895.
Your telegram of 19th received. Quite understand your
difficulty but you must fight for retention country between
customs line and the newly proposed boundary. . . .
22nd November 1895.
I want customs line as to ;^20o,ooo you can take high tone
and let them have it Sir Hercules Robinson recommended
;^20o,ooo in the belief we would obtain whole Protectorate
Bechuanaland border police . . . been handed over but they
are coming down to Mafeking from different stations.
(After ¦' police " there is a word undecipherable.)
Harris to Rhodes. 22nd November 1895.
Held an interview with the Colonial Office will have no
difficulty as to our ownership and administration of uninter
rupted railway strip. . . . Having agreed to all this and given
you Bechuanaland Border Police and Gaberones by date fixed
by you is essential to your policy Secretary of State for the
Colonies claims indemnity for subsidy forthwith and says our
not doing so is breach of faith. We are writing therefore

766 APPENDICES
Secretary of State for the Colonies letter giving the ;^2oo,ooo
but subject to our conditions. Do you approve ? Reply
immediately by telegram. Rhodes to Harris. 2yd November 1895.
Yes you can give ;^20o,ooo we would sooner not have it as
I do not wish English people to think we have made pecuniary
bargain which is unfair to them I never objected to this part of
agreement but I do object to being beaten by three canting
natives especially on score temperance when two of them Sebele
Bathoen they are known to be utter drunkards the whole thing
makes me ashamed of my own people you must take legal
opinion whether surrender of ;|'200,ooo affects prospectus
Bechuanaland Railway Company Limited you could meet
difficulty by putting ^^200,000 B. S. A. Company fund in
English consols in the name of trustees. 2yd November 1895.
Confidential Mr Rhodes says if you like you can read to-day's
cable to J. Chamberlain. Harris to Rhodes. 2yd November 1895.
Our long cable of 22nd November and yours 22nd November
crossed. We are forwarding letter to Colonial Office accord
ingly. Rhodes to Harris. 24M November 1895.
Dr Jameson back from Johannesburg everything right my
judgment is it is certainty we think A. Beit (he) must come
with you 29th November on score of health you will be just in
time. A. Beit to stay with me here and go up with us and the
Governor. A. Beit must not consult Phillips who is all right
but anxious to do everything himself and he does not wish to
play second fiddle inform A. Beit he must come.
Harris to Rhodes. 2lth November 1895.
This, although marked " very confidential," solely relates to
the settlement of the natives.

APPENDICES 767

Rhodes to Harris.

2<,tk November 1895.
See Flora and get some one to review book Three Great
African Chiefs by Missionary Lloyd just published by Fisher
Unwin. 2(ith November 1895.
Very confidential of course it is great pleasure to read your
cable to J. Chamberlain I as near as possible warned C. J.
Rhodes last week from information received know there is
great danger Phillips Leonard they can or may be doing business
without assistance from British South Africa Company and also
independently British flag it would have serious effect on your
position here I say this very confidential. You must telegraph
present reply Dr Harris, Monomotapa only Dr Harris will leave
30 of this month without fail. Flora suggest i6th December
celebrate Pretoria district 1880. I will try make best possible
terms J. Chamberlain for ;^200,ooo which I was compelled
abandon thus could only secure English position. 2()tk November 1895.
We have given British South Africa Company code to Flora.
She has been registered Telemones, London. Register on your
side this address telegrams go direct. Keep her well informed.
Miss Shaw to Rhodes. 10/.^ December 1895.
Can you advise when will you commence the plans, we wish
to send at earliest opportunity sealed instructions representa
tive of the London Times European capitals ; it is most
important using their influence in your favour. 12/^ December 1895.
Delay dangerous sympathy now complete but will depend
very much upon action before European Powers given time
(to) enter a protest which as European situation considered
serious might paralyze Government : general feeling in the
Stock Market very suspicious. 17/^ December 1895.
Held an interview with Secretary Transvaal, left here on
Saturday for Hague Berlin Paris fear in negotiation with these
parties. Chamberlain sound in case of interference European
Powers but have special reason to believe wishes you must do
it immediately.

768 APPENDICES
Harris to Shaw.
2oth December 1895.
Thanks. Are doing our best, but these things take time.
Do not alarm Pretoria from London. 27^^ December 1895.
Everything is postponed until after 6th January. We are
ready, but divisions at Johannesburg.
Strictly Confidential. y>tk December 1895.
Dr Jameson moved to assist English in Johannesburg
because he received strong letter begging Dr Jameson to come
signed by leading inhabitants. This letter will be telegraphed
to you verbatim to-morrow. Meantime do not refer in Press.
We are confident of success. Johannesburg united and strong
on our side. Dissensions (they) have been stop(ped) except
two or three Germans. ¦^oth December 1895.
Following letter was received by Dr Jameson before he
decided to go but if you must not use letter for Press until we
cable authority, it is signed by leading inhabitants of Johannes
burg. E. Seccull or Secretary to Shaw.
y.st December 1895.
You can publish letter. Rhodes to Shaw. 30^.^ December 1895.
Inform Chamberlain that I shall get through all right if he
supports me, but he must not send cable like he sent to High
Commissioner in South Africa. To-day the crux is, I will win,
and South Africa will belong to England.
Signature of sender, F. R. Harris for C. J. Rhodes, Premier.
y.si December 1895.
Unless you can make Chamberlain instruct the High Com
missioner to proceed at once to Johannesburg the whole
position is lost. High Commissioner would receive splendid
reception, and still turn position to England advantage, but
must be instructed by cable immediately. The instructions
must be specific as he is weak and will take no responsibility.
Mr Stead further cites as " still more significant " a telegram

APPENDICES 769
from Mr Garrett, sent on New Year's day, to the Editor of
Johannesburg Star, "You must expect and not misunderstand
a Proclamation putting Jameson formally in the wrong. Don't
let this weaken or divide you. This is merely for your infor
mation." The argument founded on these documents is developed in
" Joseph Chamberlain, Conspirator or Statesman?" — {Review
of Reviews office).

3 c

APPENDIX IV
THE "MISSING TELEGRAMS"
The following is the text of the " missing telegrams "
published in the Independance Beige : —
Fairfield to Hawksley. Colonial Office,
6fA May 1896.
I can't find Mead's draft of the private assurance about
the Charter, but there is Lord Selborne's version of it, and
it seems to me the same thing. " The assurance is strictly
private. Nothing is intended versus the Charter pending an
enquiry (if any) after judicial proceedings." You are aware
that Chamberlain intends to enlarge in his speech, on the
advantage of development by Company to development by
Government, in countries like Matabeleland. You are aware
that Chamberlain wishes the announcement of an acceptance
to be made by the Company, and before Friday's debate.
Labby evidently does not intend to press his questions to
morrow. I don't know about John Ellis, but he will probably
also not press. — ^Yours truly, E. Fairfield.
7th May 1896.
Dear Hawksley, — Referring to my other letter of to-day,
I have to say that if the Board arrives at any other
decision than that of immediate acceptance of resignations
and immediate publications, thereupon my letter of yesterday
in which I quote the minute of Lord Selborne, is withdrawn.
It is simply nid et non avenu. It related to a supposed state
of facts which, in the event contemplated, will be non
existent. — Yours truly, E. Fairfield.
770

.APPENDICES 771

Hawksley to Fairfield.

30 Mincing Lane, E.G.,
22nd July 1896.
My dear Fairfield, — Is the rumour true that I hear to the
effect that the Government have decided the appointment of a
Select Committee of the House of Commons to enquire into
the circumstances of Jameson's action in December last ?
If so, I suppose it will be possible for the views of the
directors to be to some extent considered in appointing some
of the members ? In this case may I suggest the names of
Carson, Q.C., Cripps, Q.C., George Wyndham ? Will it be
possible to have an opportunity of discussing with you the
terms of reference to the Select Committee ?
Bourchier Hawksley.
(Tel.) Hawksley to Beit.
2'jthjicly 1896.
To Beit, Prince's Chambers, Pall Mall.
Just come in and find your tel.
Have seen Bourke, Wyndham, and Fairfield. Doing all
possible to secure Wyndham as well as chartered nominee.
Regret impossible to call before dinner, but shall be at
Burlington between eleven and twelve. Hawksley.
(Tel.) Hawksley to Fairfield. \st August 1896.
To Fairfield, 7 Park Place, St James.
Best thanks for note and all your trouble. Let me
know any difficulties or change as to constitution of
Committee. Could call this afternoon if desired.
Hawksley.
(Letter) Hawksley to Jackson. 30 Mincing Lane,
2nd April 1897.
Dear Sir, — I send you memo, about Sir J. Willoughby.
Will you put the points in this memo, to him, and also first
paragraphs in the enclosed print. With regard to the
official report, it does not seem necessary that this should
be read through, but Sir John will mark certain paragraphs
and read them. I am giving Mr Nicholson further prints
for circulation among the Committee. Bourchier F. Hawksley.
To the Right Hon. W. Laiwes Jackson, M.P.

772 APPENDICES

Bigham to Hawksley.
Goldsmith's Buildings, Temple,
Tth August 1897.
Dear Mr Hawksley, — Can Mr C. Leonard come down to the
House of Commons to-morrow, at five o'clock ? The Com
mittee meets (privately) at half-past four in Colonel Legge's
room, and I could see Leonard immediately after the meeting
breaks up. — Yours truly, John C. Bigham.
Hawksley to Fairfield. 30 Mincing Lane, E.G.,
i^th June 1896.
My dear Fairfield, — Referring to your letter of the 9th, you
will remember my letter to you of the 6th covering the copies
of cablegrams stated. These copies were sent for confidential
perusal and return. I do not think I am at liberty to assent
to any use being made of the copies until I have had the
opportunity of communicating with Rhodes. Shall I cable
him ? — Believe me, Bourchier F. Hawksley.
Hawksley to Maguire.
30 Mincing Lane, E.G.,
19/^ February 1897.
My dear Maguire, — As far as I can trace to-night, but
without exhaustive search, you and Harris cabled Rhodes
13th August 1895. Harris and Beit on 17th August. Beit
cabled 26th and 28th November, and of course you will
remember your telegrams 20th and 21st December. I think,
but cannot be certain, that Grey and Harris both sent cable
2nd August 189s; and you remember on 4th November
189S Grey registered his cable address "Gothical," and it was
cabled to Capetown. I do not know whether, after the receipt of
this cable advice, Rhodes did at any time cable direct to Grey.
I need not say that very many of the cables, although sent by
Harris, were settled in consultation, even if ultimately sent in
the name of Harris alone. I will consider this position further
against Monday. Bourchier F. Hawksley.
Hawksley to Earl Grey.
30 Mincing Lane,
20th February 1897.
My dear Grey, — Thanks for your letter of the 9th, which I
read with great interest. You will, of course, have heard that

APPENDICES 773
the Committee was re-appointed, and has got to work. I send
you official prints of the evidence already taken. Rhodes has
done very well, and I think he will come out on top. He was
nervous the first day, though his evidence was good even then.
Yesterday he was simply splendid. I do not think we are by
any means out of the wood, but there does seem an off-chance
of the plea of public interest being recognised, and the cables
of the last half of 1895, or rather the negotiations of that period,
not being disclosed, though I am bound to say that, personally,
I think the balance of probability is that they will have to come
out. If they do Mr Chamberlain will have no one but himself
to thank. I am very sorry that I have been such a bad corres
pondent, but really the work and anxiety of the last fifteen
months or nearly two years, that is since Harris came to
England on the subject of the Protectorate in July 1895, has
been most trying, and I sometimes think that even my constitu
tion will not stand it much longer, though happily I am still
very well. I will try and write you more fully next time. —
Believe me, Bourchier F. Hawksley.
P.S. — Rhodes has received your letter and cable about
Lowley (? Lawley).
To the Rt. Hon. Eari Grey.

(Tel.) Hawksley to Harris. 16th February 1897.
Dr Harris, Adelphi Hotel, Liverpool.
Just received your wire, which I do not understand. You
and I understand and appreciate Jim better than any one else.
We must not increase but allay any feeling. We can talk of
this when we meet J and R this afternoon. Hawksley.

(Tel.) Jameson to Hawksley. Margate,
2-]th March 1897.
Handed in at West Post Office at 9.21 p.m. Received here
9.36 p.m.
To Hawksley, Cliftonville Hotel, Margate.
Had an hour with Johnny. He will be all right. Wyndham
promises not to leave it till he succeeds. I shall be back on
Tuesday morning. Jameson.

774 APPENDICES
(Tel.) Hawksley to Willoughby.
Wednesday morning, eleven o'clock,
•jth April 1897.
To Sir J. Willoughby, 2 Down Street, Piccadilly.
I think you said you were coming to the city to-day. Could
you and the Doctor come to me here at or after four? We
ought, in anticipation of consultation to-morrow, to have strict
business talk without interruption by others. I think I see
way out. Please wire if you cannot both come. Shall I find
you both in and alone at eleven o'clock to-night ?
Hawksley.
Tel. to Hawksley. FUNCHAL,
Tth April 1897.
To Hawksley, London.
As to Frank's letter, all I know is that in Matabeleland he
told me that in his letter to Jameson he never told him he
would meet him at Krugersdorp. He said they all in Johans-
berg thought Jameson would get in without opposition. I
sometimes think dispatch may have been tampered with, as it
was everything to delay Jameson at Krugersdorp. Show this
to Frank and Phillips.
Mrs R. J. Chamberlain to Hawksley.
[Private.] 39 Cadogan Square, London, S.W.,
No date.
Dear Mr Hawksley, — So many thanks for yours, I knew you
would feel as I do, we owe Allingham a great deal, and must
give the brother any (or every) help we could. I will tell him to
make an appointment to come and see you one morning. He
sails at the beginning of next month.
I quite agree with you that very little good, if any, can be
done with J. C. now. He knows what he has to expect, and
will have had plenty of time to think it over by the time C. J. R.
arrives. As long as you make it impossible for C. J. R. to give away
Jameson, he will be loyal to him, but I am sure, from what I
have said, that at one time Rhodes contemplated sacrificing the
Doctor. The Doctor must never know this, and if any one
can keep Rhodes up to the mark you can.
I want a talk with you one day about the Doctor's future to
see what you think of my plan, which he already has taken
kindly to.

APPENDICES 775
You do not know how grateful I am to you for all you have
done for him, but I think perhaps you can partly understand
how much it means to me to feel he has got a friend like you.
Can I come and see you one morning about half-past one ? —
Vours ever sincerely, R. J. Chamberlain,
(Colonial Secretary's sister-in-law).
Sir M.vtthew White Ridley to Georgina, Lady Dudley.
[Private.] Cassiobury, Watford, Herts,
\bth December 1896.
Dear Lady Dudley, — The task of refusing to advise the
release of these officers is one ofthe most distasteful ones I have
had. But I have got more than my personal feelings to con
sider, and, of course, I hear both sides ofthe question, and there
is another side I can assure you, hard though you may think it
to realise. It would have made my Christmas happier had I
seen my way to advise the release of the only two who remain
after it ; but I am sorry to say that I do not feel that I can do
it, nor do I believe I should have the support of my colleagues
if I brought the proposal before them. I have been very
anxious to take this line if I could, but this is the conclusion
to which I have felt myself forced. I can only ask you to
believe that if I cannot comply with the wishes of yourself and
other friends of theirs, it is not owing to hardness of heart, but
to the belief that duty compels me otherwise. But it is very
hateful to me. — Very truly, M. W. Ridley.

APPENDIX V
THE BOER GENERALS' APPEAL
The following is the text of the Appeal issued in the
Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant on 25 th September 1902
by the Boer Generals : —
(Translation.)
It will be fresh in the recollection of the World how, after
an anxious struggle for their independence, lasting more than
two and a half years, the Boers were at last obliged to accept
the terms of surrender placed before them through the inter
medium of their delegates at Vereeniging by the Government
of His Britannic Majesty King Edward the Seventh.
At the same time we were deputed by these Representa
tives to proceed to England in order, in the first place, to make
an appeal to our new Government to alleviate the awful dis
tress which exists throughout the length and breadth of the
new Colonies. Should we not be successful in this, then we
were to make an appeal to the Civilised World's humanity for
charitable contributions.
As we have up to the present not succeeded in inducing
the British Government to grant further assistance to our
people, and as the needs are indescribably great, no other
course is open to us but to apply to the peoples of Europe and
America. During the critical days of struggle it was sweet to us and
ours to receive continually marks of sympathy from all quarters.
The financial and other aids for our wives and our children in
the Concentration Camps and for the prisoners of war in all
parts of the World contributed immeasurably to lighten the
lot of these unhappy ones ; and we take this opportunity to
express our heartfelt thanks, in the name of the people of the
late Republics, to all those who have so charitably assisted in
the past. The small Boer people can never forget the help
extended to them in the dark hour of their trial.
770

APPENDICES 777
The people of the two Republics were prepared to sacrifice
everything for their independence ; and now that the struggle
is over they stand totally ruined. Although we have not had
the opportunity of making up an exact statement of the
devastation brought about in the two Republics, we are con
vinced from personal knowledge that during the war at least
thirty thousand houses on the Boer farms, and, further, a
number of villages, were burned or destroyed by the British.
Our dwellings, with the furniture, have been burned or
destroyed, our orchards felled, all agricultural implements
broken up, mills destroyed, every living animal driven off or
killed — nothing, alas ! was left to us. The land is a desert.
Besides, the war has claimed many victims, and the land
resounds with the weeping of helpless widows and orphans.
Moreover, we need not remind you of how much will be
necessary in future for the education of the children of our
Burghers. In this great distress we now turn to the World with our
appeal to help, with charitable contributions, our widows and
orphans, our maimed and destitute, and to have our children
properly educated.
We point to the terrible consequences of the war in order
to bring our great needs to the knowledge of the World, and
in no wise for the purpose of stirring up feeling again. The
sword now rests in its scabbard, and all disputes are silent in
the presence of such great misery.
The damage caused by the war is indescribably great, so
that the small amount which England will contribute, accord
ing to the terms of surrender, would, even if multiplied ten
fold, be totally insufficient to cover even the war losses.
The widows and orphans, the maimed and destitute, and
our children, for whom alone we make this appeal, will, there
fore, receive little, and in the most cases nothing, from this
source. All contributions will be placed to a fund to be called " The
General Boer Relief Fund " ; and this fund will be used
exclusively now, and in the future, for the needs of those
persons for whom it is collected.
We kindly request the cordial co-operation of the existing
Committees in the various countries of Europe and America ;
and we are now on the point of visiting these countries suc
cessively in order to organise this matter properly.
Louis Botha.
C. R. DE Wet.
J. H. de la Rey.

INDEX

Aberdeen, Lord, Lord-Lieut, of Ire
land, 253
Aberdeen, Lord (4th Earl), 354
Acland, Arthur H. D., 253
Acton, Lord, 255
Adam, Mr, 84
Adderley, Sir Charles (see Lord Norton)
Adowa, Italian defeat at, 402
Afghanistan, C. on invasion of, 48,
77, 150-1. 239
Africa, spheres of influence in, disputes
and agreements with Portugal, Ger
many, and France, 320, 417
Afrikander Bond, deputation to C,
680-3
Aged and Deserving Poor, Select Com
mittee on, 423-6
Aged Pensioners Bill (1903), 479
Agricultural depression, C.'s disapproval
of Protection as remedy for, 215
Agricultural labourer, the, C.'s agitation
for enfranchisement of, 174-8, 195-
206, 214-5, 220, 222 ; C. supports
Mr Jesse Collings' amendment re
garding, 251
Alaskan Boundary Commission, 621
Alcester, Lord (Sir Beauchamp Sey
mour), 128
Alexandria, bombardment of, 128, 129
Allotments, extended facilities for, part
of C.'s " Unauthorised Programme,"
211, 222, 223 ; Mr Balfour and,
251 ; the Measure of 1887, 304-5,
329
Alverstone, Lord, 682
American Civil War, C. on, 652
Ampthill, Lord, 565
Antigua, 562
Anti-Parnellites, alliance with English
Home Rulers, 324
Arabi Pasha, 127-8, 147
Arbitration in trade disputes, advocated
by C, 328, 366
779

Argyll, Duke of (Sth), as Privy Seal,
84 ; on Lords' attitude to Franchise
Bill (1884), 190 ; on C.'s doctrine of
" Natural Rights," 218
Aristocracy and war, C. on, 18
Armenia, the Porte's obligations towards,
127
Army Estimates, adverse vote on, causes
resignation of Rosebery Government,
376-7
Army Reform, 436, 477
Arnold-Forster, H. O., 439, 500
Arrears Bill (Ireland), 121, 226
Articles by C, Appendix I
Artisan's Dwellings Acts, passed by
Conservatives, 329 ; proposed exten
sion of, 365
Ashantiland, rising of 1900, 585-7 ;
search for the Golden Stool, 583,
585-6
Ashbourne Act (Ireland), Bill for ex
tension of, 250
Asiatic Labour in S. Africa, C.'s atti
tude towards, 667
Asquith, Herbert Henry, 325, 350, 362,
470 ; taunts C. regarding Old Age
Pensions, 423
Australia, 404, 693, 708, 716 ; the
Commonwealth Act, 430, 609-16
Austria, 239
Austria and Venice, C.'s comparison
with Ireland, 228
Avebury, Lord (Sir John Lubbock),
251
Baker, General, at El Teb, 144
Balfour, Right Hon. A. ]., on Radicals
and House of Lords, 189 ; negotiates
with Liberals regarding Franchise
Bill (1884), 207 ; his correspondence
with Mr Gladstone on a non-party
settlement of Irish question, 249 ;
demands " urgency " for the Crimes

780

INDEX

Bill, 284 ; as Chief Secretary for
Ireland, 309 ; on the Closure (1893),
344 ; on the retention of Irish mem
bers, 346 ; repudiates report of differ
ences with C, 374-5 ; Leader of the
House (1895), 378 ; on Conservative
and Unionist agreement, 430-I ; on
Radicals and S. Africa, 436 ; on
calumnies of Continental press, 453 ;
Education Bill (1902), 465-6 ; on
party differences as to C.'s Tariff
policy, 480, 725-6; refuses facilities
for discussing C.'s Tariff proposals,
741 ; 400, 429, 437, 438
Balfour, Gerald, 439, 716
Bankruptcy Reform, C.'s advocacy of,
62, 154, 157; I16 carries Bankruptcy
Bill, 158, its provisions, 158-60;
C. charged with unfair patronage
under the Act, 160, and his refuta
tion, 160
Baptist, The, article by C, 283, 284
Barbados, 557, 562, 564, 570
Barbour, Sir David, his inquiry into
the prospects of Transvaal and
Orange River Colonies, 549 ; mem
ber of Royal Commission on West
Indies, 561, 572
Barton, Sir E., 611
Barttelot, Sir Walter, 57-58, 65
Beaconsfield, Lord (Benjamin Disraeli),
assumption of office by (1874), 34,
53 ; his Eastern policy opposed by
C., 63 ; his " Peace with Honour "
depreciated by C, 64 ; his Imperialist
policy attacked by Radicals, 76 ; his
purchase of Suez Canal shares, 76,
occupation of Cyprus, 76, and annexa
tion of Transvaal, 76 ; influence of
his Imperialism on national self-
reliance, 77 ; asks renewal of power
(1880), 78-79, criticised by Opposi
tion, 79 ; on conspiracies in Ireland,
79, 91 ; resigns, 83, recommends
Lord Hartington as his successor, 83 ;
his Eastern policyreversed by Liberals,
126 ; on evil results of Liberal foreign
policy, 141 ; C. on his Franchise
Bill, 179
Bechuanas, Boer treatment of, 142 ;
Sir C. Warren's expedition to relieve,
142-3, 540 ; proposed transference of
Protectorate to Chartered Co., 482-3 ;
visit of chiefs to England, 482 ; the
cession of a strip of territory, 483, 498
Behring Sea Fisheries, misunderstand
ing with United States regarding,
320, 620

Beit, Alfred, and the S. African Com
mittee, 495, 497, Appendices III and
IV
Belgium, denunciation of commercial
treaties with, 404, 702
Bentham, Jeremy, 12
Bergne, Sir H., 565
Berlin, Treaty of, C.'s view of, 64 ;
attitude of Mr Gladstone's ministry
towards, 126
Betterment, the House of Lords and,
352-3 ; C. and the Lords' proposal,
.353 ; C. and, 365, 373
Bible in Board Schools (see Board
Schools)
Biggar, Mr, 94, 99
Birmingham : C. settles in, 14 ; the
city 50 years ago, 16, 37 ; C.'s posi
tion in its commercial and municipal
life, 18-19, 36, 47 ; the city's fidelity
to C, 35 ; C. elected mayor, 36, on
the city's progress, 47-48 ; gas and
water purchase, 39-40, 48, clearance
of slum property, 40 ; takes advan
tage of Cross's Act, 42 ; severance of
C.'s municipal connection with, 44 ;
declines C.'s resignation of mayoralty,
54 ; C. elected unopposed as member
for, 54, and resigns mayoralty, 54 ;
administration of Education Act
(1870) in, 57 ; attempted introduc
tion of modified Gothenburg System,
60 ; accords public vote of thanks to
C, 86 ; citizens' pride in, 334 ; ban
quet to C. before his visit to S.
Africa, 471-5
Birmingham Central Nonconformist
Association, 50
Birmingham Education Society, parent
of National Education League, 24
Birmingham Liberal Association, for
mation of, 19 ; C. an early member
of, 19, and delegate to Electoral Re
form Congress, 50
Birmingham Liberal Association, 468-9
Birmingham School Board, the first, C.
a member of, 33 ; Progressive party
on, 34, 35, 36 ; C. resigns chairman
ship of, 54 ; its action criticised in
Commons, 57, and defended by C, 57
Birmingham University, 7 ; C.'s view
of its purpose, 9, 86
Bloemfontein Conference, 1899 (see
South African Republic)
Bloemfontein Conference (1903) for
formation of Customs Union, 688-9,
720-1
Bloemfontein, C. at, 673-7

INDEX

781

Board of Trade, C, as President of, 86,
153-73 ; influence of its President,
153
Board Schools, religious teaching in,
-9i 33i 57 I distinction made between
them and Voluntary Schools in Act
of 1870, 31 ; the religious question
under Free Education Act, 316-9
Board Schools Bill, Necessitous, 405
Boer Generals, The (Botha, Delarey,
and De Wet), their Committee on
behalf of Boer sufferers, 646 ; visit to
Europe, 646, et seq.\ efforts to modify
Terms of Peace, 646 et seq.; C.'s in
terview with, 649-53 ; their " Appeal
to the Civilised World," 654, Appen
dix V
Bolton, T. H., C.'s letter to, on the re
presentation of Ireland in the Imperial
Parliament, 265
Booth, Charles, 736-7
Borough Councils (London), C. fore
shadows creation of, 373 ; the Bill,
414, passed, 422
Botha, Commandant, negotiates with
Lord Kitchener at Middelburg, 518-
9 ; his attitude during the S. African
settlement, 646 et seq. ; his letter to
Mr Courtney, 687-8. (See also Boer
Generals)
Bower, Sir Graham, censured by Select
Committee (S. Africa), 491-2, 495
Bowles, Gibson, 567
Boycott, Captain, 100
Boycotting, practice of by Churchmen
and Dissenters, 10 ; Mr Parnell's
condonation of, 97
Braddon, Sir E. N. C, 695
Bramston, Sir John, 618
Brand, Mr, President of Orange Free
State, 134
Bread Tax, C. on, 445-7
Brennan, Mr, 96
Bright, John, his exposition of Radical
foreign policy criticised by C, 18 ; on
Empire and the burden of the Colo
nies, 18 ; his part in Reform agita
tion, 19; on reform of House of
Lords, 20, 176; declares C. "the
only Jingo in Mr Gladstone's cabi
net," 68 ; his cordial relations with
C, 70-71, their different political
standpoints, 71, 75, 76, common dis
like of Clericalism in education, 71,
agreement regarding Land Reform,
7 1, and improvement of condition of
agricultural labourers, 71; his tribute
to C. at Rochdale, 72 ; his faith in

the Manchester School, 72-3, 381 ; his
opposition to Conservative Factory
Reform, 73 ; his opposition to com
mercial retaliation, 75 ; his inaccessi
bility to new ideas, 76 ; supports
Mr Gladstone in campaign of
1880, 80 ; as Chancellor of the
Duchy of Lancaster, 85 ; decline
of his Radicalism, 85 ; his belief in
the inefficacy of force weakens, 98 ;
his defence of coercive measures of
18S1, loi ; his resignation in con
sequence of Egyptian Expedition,
129, 142, 270 ; his doctrines and
their influence on Reform, 129 ; his
sanction of Boer War of 1 881, 132 ;
opposition to Home Rule Bill, 268 ;
returned unopposed for Birmingham
(1886), 273, 381, 444, 471
British South Africa Company, The,
its part in the Jameson Raid, 482-
511 ; correspondence of, relating to
the Raid, Appendix III
Brodrick, W. St John F., at War Office,
439 ; on an Imperial Reserve Force,
710-11
Broadhurst, Henry, 253
Bryce, James, 253
Bulgaria, C. on success of self-govern
ment in, 149
Burke, Mr, murder of, 119
Biilow, Count von, C.'s conflict with,
448-54
Butt, Mr, 117
Caine, W. S., 266
Cairns, Earl, and Peace of Pretoria,
C. on, 135, 136 ; moves amendment
to Franchise Bill (1884), 190, 192,
193
Camberwell, Chamberlain family in, 2
Camberwell Grove, C. attends Miss
Pace's school at, 2
Campbell-Bannerman, Sir Henry (Mr),
as Secretary for War, 252 ; his state
ment regarding retention of Irish
members, 266 ; declines to remain in
office after adverse vote on Army
Estimates, 377 ; C. on his attitude
during S. African War, 437 ; on C.'s
publication of Radical letters, 440 ;
on C. and Education Bill (1902),
465, 470 ; and Jameson Raid Com
mittee, 496, 501, 505-6 ; on the
Hawksley telegrams, 502 ; on the S.
African War, 542 ; quoted by C. in
connection with his Tariff policy,
736

782

INDEX

Canada, education in, 460 ; C.'s influ
ence upon, 619 ; United States and,
621 ; and Imperial Federation, 693 ;
offers preferential terms, 702, 713-4 ;
attitude on Imperial Defence, 709 ;
asks exemption from Corn Duty,
717-8, 721 ; trade difficulties with
Germany, 722-3, 743-9
Candahar, evacuation of, 140, 143, 239
Cape Colony, 708, 710, 716 ; C.'s
refusal to suspend the Constitution,
551-3 ; position of the loyalists in,
552 ; British and Dutch in, 553 ; C.
on the profits of the War to, 677
Cape Town, C.'s visit to, 680-5
Capital and Labour, C.'s disclaimer of
sympathy with antagonism between,
330
Cardew, Colonel Sir Frederick, 391,
588-91
Carlingford, Lord, 267
Carnarvon, Lord, C. on his attitude to
Annexation of Transvaal, 137 ; in
Lord Salisbury's Ministry, 221 ; his
mysterious interview with Mr Par
nell, 236-7 ; his hopes of converting
Lord Salisbury to modified form of
Home Rule, 237 ; proposal to dis
pense with exceptional coercive legis
lation, 238 ; his resignation, 250
Carrington, Lord, attacks C.'s amend
ment to Australian Commonwealth
Act, 615
Carter Lane Chapel, City, C.'s father a
member of, 10
Cattle Disease, Prevention of, C. on, 62
Cavagnari, Sir Louis, 77
Cavendish, Lord F., murder of, 119,
120
"Caucus,"' The, its development from
Birmingham Liberal Association, 19 ;
devoted to service of Liberalism by
C, 69, 80; Mr Gladstone first adopted
by, 69 ; its methods defended by C,
81-82, 195-6; removal of headquarters
to London, 82 ; its altered control,
82, and impaired political power,
82 ; attacked by Lord Salisbury,
194-5. (See also National Liberal
Federation)
Central Conservative Association, C.'s
criticism of, 196
Cetewayo, in Zulu War, 5
Ceylon, 643
Chalmers, Sir David P., 589
Chamberlain, Daniel, of Laycock, Wilts,
ancestor of Chamberlain family, i
 William (cordwainer), grandfather
of Statesman, I

Chamberlain, Joseph, father of States
man, I ; marriage, 2 ; a leading Uni
tarian, 10 ; his death (1874), "o
 Arthur, brother of Statesman, 2
 Herbert, „ 2
 Richard, „ 2
 as Mayor of Birmingham, 86
 Walter, brother of Statesman, 2
 Miss Mary, 19
 Austen, son of Statesman, 19 ; re
turned for East Worcestershire, 323 ;
complimented by Mr Gladstone, 323 ;
384, 441
Chamberlain (The Right Hon. Joseph),
his parentage, i ; birth, 2 ; early life,
1-48 ; recollections of his school-days,
4-5, 7 ; begins life, 13, in the City, 13 ;
enters business in Birmingham, 14 ;
employment of his leisure, 16-18; his
influence on commercial and political
life of Birmingham, 19 ; marriage, 19 ;
attendance at Radical meetings, 1 9 ;
member of Birmingham Liberal
Association, 19 ; formation of the
" Caucus," 19 ; as chairman of
National Education League, 24, 33 ;
as member of first Birmingham
School Board, 33 ; his hostility
to official Liberalism, 35, 49 ; con
solidates his local influence, 35-
36 ; his work as municipal admini
strator, 36 ; second marriage, 36 ;
thrice elected Mayor of Birming
ham, 36 ; his co-operation with Mr
Jesse Collings, 37 ; his policy of
" State Socialism," 37 ; his schemes
of Municipal Reform, 38-44 ; his
influence on modern municipal
development, 45 ; on the relative
importance of municipal and Im
perial affairs, 48, 54 ; as an extreme
Radical, 49 ; his Republicanism,
49-51 ; welcomes the Prince of
Wales, 52 ; stands as Parlia
mentary candidate for Sheffield,
53, and is defeated, 53 ; formulates
" the Next Page of the Liberal Pro
gramme," 53 ; retires from business,
53 ; is elected M.P. for Birming
ham, 54 ; resigns Mayoralty, 54,
and chairmanship of School Board,
54 ; his maiden speech in the
Commons, 56 ; visits Sweden and
Lapland, 59> and studies the Gothen
burg system, 59 ; early activities
and reputation in Parliament, 62-63 i
his hostility towards Imperialism,
64, early indifference to South
African affairs, 68, and causes of his

INDEX

783

conversion, 68 ; renounces allegiance
to Mr Gladstone, 65 ; his respon
sibility for Liberal policy, 1880-1885,
67, 126 ; supports Mr Gl.-idstone's
South African and Eastern ^wlicy, 68 ;
again identifies himself with Mr Glad
stone, 69, and brings the Caucus to
aid of Liberalism, 69, 80 ; advocates
domestic reform, 69 ; urges formation
of a National Liberal Federation, 70 ;
his friendly relations with Bright,
70-71, their political and mental
differences, 71-76; nature of his
faith in Free Trade, 74 ; in
fluenced by French Revolution philo
sophers, 75 ; his attitude to Com
munism, 75, Socialism, 75, and
private property, 75 ; his accessibility
to new ideas, 76 ; his understanding
with Mr Gladstone in view of Gen
eral Election (1880), 80 ; urges con
centration of Democracy, 81 ; his
assodation with Sir C. Dilke, 85,
130 ; made President of the Board
of Trade, 86; his immediate influence
in the Cabinet, 87, 88 ; his antagon
ism to Mr Forster, 90 ; facilitates
Irish Party's policy of "squeezing"
Mr Gladstone, 94 ; condemns Lords'
rejection of Compensation for Distur
bance (Ireland) Bill, 95-96 ; resists Mr
Gladstone's Coercion policy, 99, but
gives way, 100 ; his association with
Radical supporters of Mr Parnell's
.Amendment to the Address, lOi ;
accepts Preservation of Peace (Ire
land) Bill, loi, and defends it, 102-3 ;
criticises Mr Parnell's tactics, 104,
and distingmshes between Liberal
and Nationalist aims, 104-5 > defends
the Government's Irish policy at
Liverpool, 106 ; on Separation, 107,
and necessity for preserving the
Union, 107, but does not repudiate a
Home Rule stopping short of Sepa
ration, 107, 124, 240 ; advocates an
arrangement with Mr Parnell to stop
outrages, 108 ; his part in arranging,
and attitude towards, the " Treaty of
Kilmainham," 108-17 ; his part in Mr
Forster's downfall, 118 ; his expecta
tions of the Chief Secretaryship,
120 ; rejects coercion and separation,
122-3, and supports Mr Gladstone's
remedial policy, 124 ; his attitude on
Egyptian question, lil-2, 148-150,
and on the Boer War of 1882, 132-
142 ; successfully urges Bechuanaland

expedition, 142-3 ; his activity at the
Board of Trade, 154-173 ; his part
in carrying shipping legislation, 173 ;
begins agitation for agricultural en
franchisement, 174, which he trans
forms into campaign against the
landed interest and llouse of Lords,
175-6, 178, 199-202, 205 ; replies to
Lord Salisbury's attack on Caucus,
195-8 ; on need for social legislation,
202, natural rights of man, 203, 217,
private ownership, 203, the obliga
tions of property, 203, and the
doctrine of " Ransom," 203, 217 ;
his resignation with Mr Gladstone's
Government, 208 ; his political course
in 1884-85, 209-33 ; defines terms of
his co-operation with the Liberal
Party, 211 ; originates the "Un
authorised Programme," 211 ; his
manifesto against Moderate Liberals
— the "Radical Programme," 211;
demands free education, 213-4, ^3° i
on need of legislation for agri
cultural labourers, 214-5 ; scouts
corn duty as remedy for depression,
215, and condemns protection as a
quack medicine, 215 ; on defects
of English farm - tenure, 215;
suggests compulsory purchase of
land for small holdings by local
authorities, 216-7 I is likened to Jack
Cade and Tom Paine, 217; his animo
sity against Moderate Liberals, 218-
20 ; on growth of domestic poverty
and privation, 220 ; his contempt for
Lord Salisbury's " Stop-gap Minis
try," 220-1 ; exempts Lord Churchill
from charge of inconsistency, 221 ;
disclaims title of communist, 222,
but insists on the obligations of pro
perty, 222 ; his scheme of land reform,
222-4 ; admits Conservative services to
working classes, 225 ; attacks Lord
Salisbury's Egyptian policy, 225 ;
forecasts devolution in Great Britain,
228 ; advocates reform of Dub
lin Castle, 229 ; his scheme for
National Councils, 229, 240-1, 243 ;
on the Conservative compact with
the Irish Party, 234-6 ; discoun
tenances Mr Parnell's increased
demands, 242-3 ; his hopes of sup
porting Mr Gladstone's Irish policy,
247-8 ; his responsibility for bringing
the first Home Rule Administration
into power, 252 ; his letter to Mr
Gladstone accepting office, 253-4 ; his

784

INDEX

differences with Mr Gladstone and
Mr Morley, 255-6; his letter resign
ing office, 257 ; justifies his action,
254, 260-2, 268-9 ; his influence
in the Caucus overthrown, 264 ; con
venes meeting of Liberals opposed
to Home Rule Bill, 265-6, and
agrees with Lord Hartington to
oppose second reading, 266 ; his
election address, 272 ; defines aims and
policy of Liberal-Unionists, 272 ;
advocates local government for the
three kingdoms, 273 ; is returned
unopposed for Birmingham, 273 ; de
clines office under Lord Salisbury,
274-5, ^^ attitude compared with
Lord Hartington's, 275 ; at issue with
Mr Parnell, 276, and Mr Sexton, 276 ;
proposes Liberal conference regard
ing concessions to Ireland, 277 ;
approves Lord Hartington's refusal
of office, 278 ; suggests the Round
Table conference, 280-3 ; his concern
for his social programme, 281 ; his last
effort to rejoin the Liberal Party, 281 ;
attributes postponement of all reform
to Home Rule, 283 ; supports
" urgency " for Mr Balfour's Crimes
Bill, 284 ; represents Great Britain
in America on Fisheries question,
291, 296, 297 ; third marriage, 297 ;
attitude towards the Parnell Commis
sion, 298-9 ; his support of measures
affecting Ireland's prosperity, 300 ;
his understanding with Lord Har
tington, 302 ; obtains progressive
legislation under Lord Salisbury,
304-7 ; accepts Relief of Irish Ten
ants Bill (1887), 308-9 ; supports Mr
Goschen's licensing proposals, 309,
and the Irish Local Government Bill,
31 1-2 ; obtains establishment of
County Councils, 313-4, and free
education, 313, 315-9. 322; his
attitude towards voluntary schools,
316-9, and support of Education Act
of 1902, 318 ; concurs in Tithes Bill
of 1891, 319 ; his representations as
to Dissolution in 1891, 321 ; founds
the Midlands Liberal-Unionist Asso
ciation, 322 ; is re-elected by a ma
jority of over 4000, 323 ; opposes
Mr Asqulth's no-confidence vote,
325-6 ; promulgates programme of
social legislation for the Unionists,
328-31 ; criticises Mr Gladstone's
home and foreign policy, 332, and
asserts his later Imperialism, 333 ;

on the necessity of safeguarding
the country from foreign aggres
sion, 334 ; his opposition to the
second Home Rule Bill, 340-8 ;
supports Lord Dudley's contracting-
out Amendment to Employers' Lia
bility Bill, 351 ; his attitude to
Parish Councils Bill, 352 ; tries
conciliation between Peers and
Commons on question of better
ment (L.C.C. Improvements Bill),
352-3 ; forecasts creation of a new
National Party, 357 ; his Imperial
ism in 1894, 357 i criticises Lord
Rosebery on Home Rule, 361-2 ;
his attitude to Mr Asquith's Welsh
Disestablishment Bill, 362, 367-8,
37°, 374: and the Registration Bill,
362-3 ; charged by Lord Rosebery
with inconsistency on leading ques
tions, 363 ; reconciles Conservatism
with his own Radicalism, 363,
and presses foreign questions on
interest of working classes, 364 ;
on the necessity of a Second
Chamber, 365, 367, the old and
new Radicalism, 364-5, and the
mischief of Collectivism, 365 ; on
the rights of the House of Lords,
368, and temperance question, 368 ;
advocates a " campaign against
want and misery," 368 ; condemns
the Government s programme (Feb.
1895), 369-370 ; promises quahfied
support of Irish Land Bill, 371, and
urges land purchase as solution, 371 ;
foreshadows creation of new London
boroughs, 373 ; censures progressive
(L.C.C.) policy regarding unem
ployed and housing of the poor,
373-4 ; advocates reduction of bur
dens on land, 376 ; accepts office
as Colonial Secretary under Lord
Salisbury, 379 ; realises that home
politics are played out, 380-1 ;
his support of free trade, 381, 444,
perception of changed economic con
ditions, 381, 445, his later views on
preferential trade and an Imperial zoll
verein latent, but undeveloped, 381-2;
recognises necessity for fresh outlets
for British enterprise, 382, 403 ; his
general election programme (1895),
383 ; his administration of the
Colonial Office, 386-96 ; on possi
bility of an Imperial Customs
Union, 396 ; his part in the Work
men's Compensation Bill, 405 - 6,

INDEX

785

408 ; elected Lord Rector ot Glas
gow University, 40S-10 ; his West
Indian Sugar Subvention, 412 ; his
part in promoting the Irish Local
Government Bill, 412, and the
Municipal Boroughs (London) Bill,
412, 414; advocates an Anglo-
American Alliance, 415, his "long
spoon" speech, 415-6; defines prin
ciples of Ministerial responsibility,
416 ; his difficulties with the Trans
vaal, 419-20, 519-47 ; his interview
with the German Emperor, 420 ; sug
gests closer " sympathy and alliance"
with Germany, 421 ; Radical hos
tility to him during the war, 426,
hisreassuringinfluence in the "crisis,"
429-30 ; testifies to Mr Balfour's
loyalty in Coalition, 431 ; advises
appeal to the country, 432, 434, his
policy vindicated, 438 ; publishes cor
respondence inculpating certain Radi
cals, 432-3, 440 ; his election address
(1900), 437 ; Radical attacks regard
ing his family's investments, 437, his
defence, 440-1 ; criticises " surren
der " policy of Liberal Leaders, 437 ;
on the registration duty on imported
com, 446, and the sugar tax, 446 ;
justifies conduct of our troops in
the field, 447 ; his allusion to
German military procedure in 1870,
448-52 ; on the compensations
of the war, 455 ; on the Colonies as
a new factor in international politics,
456 ; his attitude on Education Bill
of 1902, 457-68 ; defends Government
policy in S. Africa, 468 ; as the guest
of Birmingham, 471, on conciliation
in S. Africa, 471-5, praises Lord Mil
ner's work, 473-4 ; his alleged fore
knowledge of, and complicity in, the
Jameson Raid, 484-511 ; is exoner
ated by the Committee, 490, 496,
511 ; Transvaal difficulties antece
dent to Raid, 511-18 ; his activity
during the war, 547, effects improve
ments in concentration camps, 547 I
his pledge to defend Natal, 548 ; faces
problem of settlement and recon
struction, 548-9, 646-91 ; refuses sus
pension of Cape constitution, 551-4,
679 ; his remedial measures in West
Indian colonies, 555-79 ; his policy in
West African possessions, 580-608 ;
his promotion of the Australian Com
monwealth Act, 609-16 ; his ad
ministration in regard to New

foundland, 616-9 ; his part in the
Venezuelan crisis, 619; the Behring
Sea dispute, 620-1 ; his admini
stration in regard to Malta, 621-42 ;
his miscellaneous work at Colonial
Office, 642-5 ; visits South Africa,
657-91 ; invites Colonial Premiers
to first conference in London, 692 ;
his efforts towards Federation, 692-8 ;
on our commercial relations with the
Colonies, preferential tariffs, retalia
tion, 701-52 ; his writings, 755
(App. I) ; documents relating
to his alleged complicity in the
Jameson Raid, 761-9 (App. Ill) ;
cited in the " missing Hawksley tele
grams," 770-5 (App. IV)
Chamberlain, Mrs R. J., Appendix IV
Chaplin, Henry, 424, 478, 479
Charles, Sir Arthur, 5
Chartered Company (see British South
Africa Company)
Childers, Hugh, 84, 142, 252
China, 415, 418
Church and State, Union of, C. on,
55
Church of England, its attitude towards
Nonconformists, 10 ; Conservative
views of, 1 3 ; Radical views regarding,
52 ; C. advocates disestabUshment of,
52, 70 ; his animosity against, 54-5 ;
and Old Age Pensions, 366 ; C.'s
position regarding, 367
Church of England Temperance Society,
supports Mr Goschen's licensing pro
posals, 310
Church-going, working classes and,
C. on, 55
Church Rate in Birmingham, Noncon
formist refusal to pay, 57
Church Rates, C. on non-payment of,
286
Churchill, Lord Randolph, his irregular
leadersiup of Conservatives, 170 ;
C.'s criticism of his Edinburgh speech
(1883), 183-6 ; his part in Franchise
controversy, 207 ; Lord Salisbury's
Ministry and, 220, 221 ; C. on his
consistency, 221 ; hopes of his co
operation with Lord Hartington,
231-2 ; his invitation to Lord Hart
ington to leave the Liberal Party,
C. on, 233 ; his willingness to support
a modified form of Home Rule, 236-7;
influence of his group on Lord Salis
bury's coercion policy, 238 ; his
resignation, 87 ; accepted by Lord
Salisbury, 277, which weakens C.'s
3D

786

INDEX

faith in the Government, 279, 303 ;
as Leader of the House, 303
City of Ll ndon, C. receives freedom
of, 4
Clan-na-Gael, 92, 117
Clark, Dr G. B., 440
Clayden, P. W., his " England under
the Coalition," 249, 266
Clerkenwell outrage, the, 99
Clei eland. President, his Venezuelan
message, 385
Clifford, Dr John, and Education Acts
(1902 and 1903), 477
Closure, The, its employment in
debates on the second Home Rule
Bill, 344
Coal Duty, C. and, 444
Cobden Club, C. on devolution, at,
227
Cobden, Richard, Mr Bright's exposi
tion of his doctrine, 73 ; Napoleon
II I. 's conversation with him on
Democracy, 81 ; 381
Cockerton Judgment, The, temporary
Education Bill necessitated by, 442
Coercion, Nationalist gratitude to C.
for resisting, 226
Colenso, C.'s visit to, 659
Collectivism, denounced by C, 365
Collings, Jesse, on Birmingham School
Board, 34 ; municipal co-operation
with C, 37 ; visits Sweden and Lap
land with C, 59 ; proposes Amend
ment ("three acres and a cow") to
Address, 2 50 ; as Under-Secretary of
the Local Government Board, 253 ;
his majority at Bordesley (1886), 273 ;
becomes Under Secretary at the
Home Office, 384
Colonial Laws Validity Act, 614
Colonial Loans Bill, 571, 584, 592,
597.
Colonial Nursing Association, The,
605
Colonial Office, and the Zulu War, 65 ;
C. assumes office at (1895), 379 ; his
work at, 386-398
Colonial Premiers, The, C.'s first con
ference with (1897), 692-703; the
second conference (1902), 704-18
Colonial Stocks, investment of Trust
Funds in, 703
Colonial Trade, C.'s circular (1895) to
Colonies regarding, 393-6
Colonies, Conservative attitude towards,
67
Colonies and Preferential Trade, 381,
445. 693, 702, 713

Colonies and Higher Education, 7
Commercial relations with Colonies,
693, 701-2,711-2
Communism, C. disclaims sympathy
with violent forms of, 75, 222
Compensation for Disturbance (Ireland)
Bill, 94, 95 ; C. on Lords' responsi
bility for rejecting, 95-96, 106 ;
Nationalist gratitude to C. for sup
porting, 226
Compensation to the Liquor Trade,
C.'s attitude on, 60, 6 F, 62 ; defeat of
Mr Ritchie's proposals, 314
Compromise, Religious, of 1870 (see
Forster)
Concentration camps (S.A. War), C.
effects improvements in, 547
Confiscation, C.'s opposition to, 222,
224
Congested Districts (Ireland), 310, 311
Conscience Clause, in Education Bill of
1870, 30
Conservatives, C.'s business methods
attacked by, 14 ; they apologise for
unjust charges, 14 ; their dislike of
C, 35 ; their denunciation of Caucus,
81 ; their feeling regarding Irish
obstruction, 102 ; and the Kilmain
ham Treaty, 113, 116; C.'s uncon
scious progress towards alliance with,
209, 329 ; C.'s admission of their ser
vices to working classes, 225 ; their
alleged understanding with Mr Par
nell, 234-6, 239 ; their regard for C.
as champion of Unionism, 348-9 ; C.
enters into partnership with, 356
Conspiracy in irade disputes, in Liberal
Programme (1S93), 335
Constabulary, Royal Irish, 282
Constitutional changes in Britain,
difficulty of, 23
Contracting out, C. supports in Em
ployers' Liability Bill, 351 ; Trade
Unionist opposition to, 351
Contrat Social of J. J. Rousseau, C.'s
belief in, 75
Convention of London (1884), 142, 493
Convention of Pretoria, 239
Cook, Professor, of University College
School, 5
Corbett, Colonel, 58
Cordwainers' Company, association of
C.'s family with, i ; C.'s reply to
address from (1896), 1-2
Corn Duty, C.'s attitude towards, 445-7 ;
its withdrawal, 447, 477-9 ; Canada's
request for exemption from, 717-8,
721

INDEX

1S7

Corona Club, banquet to C, 644
Cottages, compulsory purchase of land
for, advocated in " The Radical Pro
gramme," 212, .2:2
County Councils (England and Wales)
Bill, J13. 314
Courtney, Leonard, ;;i, 545; General
Botha s letter to, 687
Cowan, Joseph, loS, 149
Cowper, Lord, Lord-Lieutenant of Ire
land, 117, 120, 190
Cowper-Temple Clause (see Forster)
Crime in Ireland, C. on, 287-8
Crimean War, 3S5
Crimes Bill (iSJ;), the, C. supports
Mr Balfour's " urgency " demand,
2S4 ; denounced bv Mr Gladstone,
2S;
Crof-.ers, Scotch, their demand for re
medial legislation, 215; C.'s partici
pation in the aeration, 223
Cromer, Lord (Sir Evelyn Baring), at
Cairo, 145 ; his vigorous action in
Egypt, 3-; ; C.'s visit to. in Cairo,
656
Cromwell, C.'s defence of. 17
Cromwell's Board of Trade and Planta-
rions, 153
Cronje, General, 660, 670
Cross, Lord (Sir Richard), 57, 221
Cross's Act. Birmingham's adoption of,
40,42
Curzon, Lord, 386, 565
Customs L^nion, Imperial, C.'s desire
for, 74, 381, 701-2
Cyprus, 643
Bai.'v .Vra:j, The, 2^—6, 280
Dale, R. W., 33
Davey, Lord (Sir Horace), 253
Da-j-in, Michael, 92
Dawson, George, preacher, 33. 85
Deakin, .\lfred (Viaoria), 611
Debating Society, Birmingham and
Edgbaston, C.'s first speech at, 17 ;
his successive offices in, 18 ; his
recollections of the Society, 18
Decentralisation in Local Government,
C. on necessitv of, 45
Deer forests in Scotland, restoration of
land to production, advocated by C ..
Delarey, General, his attitude in the
S. African settlement, 646 et seq. (see
also Boer Generals)
Democracy, Napoleon III. on disorgaci-
sation of. Si
Denton, Sir (Jeorge, 603

Derby, Lord, 142, 26;
Devolution (see Home Rule, Scotland,
Wales)
Devonshire, Duke of (Lord Hartington),
as candidate for Mr Gladstone's
succession, 55-56 ; on Flogging in the
Army, 65 ; C. supports his election to
Leadership, 58 ; supports Mr Glad
stone in campaign of 1880, 80 ;
recommended by Lord Beaconsfield
as his successor, 83 ; as Leader of
Opposition, S3 ; as Secretary of
Si.te for Inoia, 84 ; his responsibility
for errors of Mr Gladstone's foreign
policy, 126; as Secretary for War,
142 ; announces project to with
draw Khartoum garrison. 145 ; on
compromise regarding Franchise Bill
(1884), 204 ; his part in drafting
Redistribution scheme, 2o5, and in
Franchise controversy, 207 ; regarded
as a safeguard from Radical excesses,
210 ; his attack on Radical Pro
gramme, 219 ; hopes of his co
operation with Lord R. Churchill,
231 ; declines Sir R. Churchill's
overtures, 233 ; supports Lord Sal
isbury's government against Xo-con-
fidence vote, 251 ; makes common
cause with Lord Salisbury in oppos
ing Home Rule, 259, and defends
his action before his constituents,
262-3 ; summons meeting of Dis
sentient Liberals, 265 ; agrees with
C. to act against Home Rule Bill,
266 ; insists on necessity of main
taining the Conservative aUiance,
277 ; his decision not to take office,
27S ; C. expresses confidence in,
290 ; their agreement regarding Mr
Gladstone, 302 ; his services to the
Liberal-Unionist Party, 322 ; Lord
President of the Council tmder Lord
Salisbury, 378 ; 399, 438 ; on naval
policy in Imperial Defence, 700
Devonshire Club, C.'s speech at, in
reply to Lord Salisbury on Reform
Demonstration, and Caucus, 195-8
De Waal, W., 679, 684, 685
De Wet, General, his attitude in the
S. African settlement, 646 et Si^. (see
also Boer Generals)
De Wet, Sir Jacobus, 524
Dickson, Mr (Queensland), 611
Dilke, Sir Charles, his earlj' association
with C, 85 ; their agreement as to
taking office under Mr Gladstone,
85 ; as Under-Secretary for Foreign

788

INDEX

Affairs, 86 ; is offered Chief-Secretary
ship, I20, but declines, 120 ; enters
Cabinet as President of Local Govern
ment Board, 142 ; on foreign politics,
129-130 ; on the Government's action
in Egypt, 145 ; Mr Gladstone's fear of
his resignation, 170 ; helps to draft
Redistribution scheme, 206, and
participates in ensuing Franchise
controversy, 207, 208 ; shares C.'s
views (1885) on Home Rule, 230 ;
on C.'s Tariff proposals, 724
Dillon, John, 96, 99, 119, 276, 345, 361,
371, 469
Disestablishment of the Church of
England, a part of " The Radical
Programme," 211
Disestablishment in Wales, postponed
by Home Rule, 283 ; Liberals and,
336 ; C.'s support of Mr Asquith's
preliminary measure, 350 ; Mr
Asquith's Disestablishment Bill, 362,
which C. promises to support, 367,
374, its second reading, 370
Disraeli, Benjamin (see Beaconsfield)
Dissentient Liberals (see Liberal-Union
ists)
District Councils, 314
Dixon, George, 25, 33, 35, 54, 273, 399
Domestic and Social Legislation, C. on
future course of, 202-3
Dominica, 563
Dublin Castle, C. on necessity of
reforming, 229, 241
Dudley, Lady, Appendix IV
Dudley, Lord, his contracting-out
amendment to Employers' Liability
Bill, 351 ; his collieries, 407
Dulcigno, naval demonstration at, 127
Dunraven, Lord, 475
Durban, C. at, 657
Durham, Lord, on Reform, quoted by
C, 183
Dutch language in South Africa, 647,
648
Dyke, Sir William Hart, 238, 250
East Africa, native labour recruiting in,
C. and, 657
Eastern Question, C. on, 63
Eastern Telegraph Company, the, and
the S. African Select Committee, 488,
490
Edgbaston, C. removes from to High
bury, 86 ; C. asserts permanent nature
of Conservative-Unionist combination
(at Junior Conservative Club), 356-7
Education Act of 1870 (see Forster)

Education Act (1902), bitter feelings
excited by, 11, 44 ; C.'s attitude
towards and action regarding, 457-
68
Education Act (London, 1903), 476-7
Education and National Welfare, C.
on, 8
" Education, Assisted " (see Education,
Free)
Education, Compulsory, C. on benefits
of, 25 ; established by Mr Forster's
Act, 28
 Denominational, in Ireland, C.
on, 26
 Elementary, agitation for im
provement in, 24-31 ; Voluntary
Schools in Free Education Act of
1901, 316; compensation given them
for loss of fees, 317 ; 398-9, 400 ; Sir
John Gorst's measure, 441-2
¦  Free, agitation for, 25, 27, 28 ;
advocated by C, 52-53, 70 ; part
of C.'s "Unauthorised Programme,"
211 ; definite demand for by C, 213,
230 ; Conservative Bill of 1901,
315-19 ; C. repudiates Liberal claims
regarding, 356
 Higher, the position abroad, 7 ;
C.'s views on, 7-8
 Secondary, 430 ; Sir John Gorst's
measure, 441-2
 Secular, 30, 33, 57 ; C.'s theo
retical approval of, 316 ; C.'s con
tinued abstract preference for, 40a,
458
 Technical, "whisky money" de
voted to, 310 ; 430 ; Sir John Gorst's
measure, 441-2
 Unsectarian, National Education
League's demand for, 25, 316-9
Edward VII., summons C, to Bucking
ham Palace on his return from S.
Africa, 686 ; coronation of, 704
Egan, Fenian, his relations with Sheri
dan, 115
Egypt. 76, 126 - 32, 143 - 50 ; C.
on Egyptian affairs, 148-50 ; C.'s
attack on Lord Salisbury's policy,
225, 239, 320 ; C. on Liberal change
of policy in, 332 ; Liberal policy in,
335; C. defends Government's policy
in (1895), 401-2 ; 455
Eight Hours' Day, universal and com
pulsory, not advocated by C, 366
Eighty Club, C. on Radical Programme
at, 219-20
Electoral Districts, Equal, an item in
"The Radical Programme," 211

INDEX

789

Electoral Reform, C.'s agitation for,
1 60
Electoral Reform Congress, London, C.
a delegate at, 50-51
Electric Lighting (Municipalities) Bill,
155
Elgin, Lord, 565
Elliott, Colonel G. S., 601
Ellis, J. E., his resolutions committing
the National Liberal Federation to
unconditional support of Mr Glad
stone's first Home Rule Government,
264, 265 ; 440
Emigration, State - aided, C.'s dis
approval of, 214
Emin Pasha, 143
Employers' Liability, in Liberal Pro
gramme (1893), 335 ; C.'s support of
Lord Dudley's amendment to Liberal
BUI, 351 ; withdrawal of Bill, 354 ;
C.'s views on, 367
Endicott, The Hon. W., Secretary of
War, U.S.A., 297
 Miss Mary, C.'s marriage with,
297
" English Gentlemen," C.'s use of the
phrase, 289
Erskine, Sir James, 5l8
" Essays and Reviews,'' 24
Evicted Tenants Commission (Ireland),
332
F's, the Four (Free Labour, Free Land,
Free Church, Free Schools), part of
C.'s programme, 52
Factories, Conservative Act, 329 ; Act
amending and consolidating existing
_ laws, 442
tair Rent (see Land Laws)
Fairfield, Mr, Assistant Colonial Secre
tary at time of Jameson Raid, 484-8,
499 ; Appendices III and IV
Far East, British interests in, 436, 455
Farm Tentu-e in England, C. on defects
of, 215-6
Fashoda, C. on, 417, 420
Fawcett, Mr, as Postmaster-General, 74
Fenianism, 91, 92, 96
Ferguson, Mr, 582-3
" FUling up the Cup," C.'s phrase, 336;
Liberals and, 353 ; C.'s criticism of
the policy, 369
Fisheries, North American, C.'s Mission
to Washington, 291, 296-7
Fixity of Tenure (see Land Laws)
Flogging in the Army, C. on, 63, 65
Forrest, Sir John, 708-9
Forster, W. E., his Education Bill of

1870, 27-34; C. on its imperfections,
28 ; his decision to retain religious
teaching, 29, and defence of the Bible
in Education, 29 ; replies to criti
cism of Birmingham Radicals, 30 ;
proposes Conscience Clause, 30 ;
Cowper-Temple Clause accepted, 31 ;
his candidature for Liberal leader
ship, 55, 56, not supported by C,
68 ; his appointment as Chief Secre
tary for Ireland, 84, and Noncon
formist disapproval, 84 ; C.'s renewed
antagonism, 90 ; reluctantly sanctions
Coercion (1881), 100; IVfr Bright's
trust in him, loi ; his alternative to
understanding with Mr Parnell, 109,
disapproval of Treaty of Kilmainham,
109, 1 15-6, and letter to Mr Gladstone
regarding Mr Parnell's release, 109-
10 ; Sir T. Wemyss Reid's " Life "
of, 109 ; Capt. O'Shea's unsuccessful
negotiations with, iii, and their
interview as to suppression of out
rage, II 4-6 ; Mr Gladstone's letter
to him as to Mr Parnell's promised
support, Ii5 ; his criticism of the
O'Shea documents, 116 ; his respon
sibility for publication of Mr Parnell's
pledge, 117 ; his resignation, 117, 120;
his resentment of treatment by col
leagues, 118, and anger with C. as
author of his downfall, 118; Fenian
attempts on his life, 119 ; question of
appointing his successor, 120-1 ; on
abandonment of Bechuanas to Boers,
142
Fortnightly Review, The, articles by C.
in, 52-3, 70
Foster, Sir Michael, 5
France, C.'s congratulations on fall of
third Empire, 51 • cruelties of the
Commune, 51; C.'s visit to, 54;
policy in Egypt, 127-8; C. on Free
Education in, 214; Mr Gladstone's
Ministry and, 239 ; her fiscal legisla-
lation, 382 ; in West Africa, 580-3,
593-5, 599-600 ; her treaty rights in
Newfoundland, 617-19 ; 402-3, 419-
20 ; 447-8, 455
Franchise, agitation for extension of
(18S3-5), 174-208 ; Mr Gladstone's
Bill of 1884, 182-208, rejected by
Lords, 190 ; understanding with
Conservatives as to Redistribution,
207 ; passed by Lords, 208
Frederic the Great, 452
Free Trade, beneficial effects of in the
past, 74; C.'s support of, 381 ; his

790

INDEX

disposition to confine its application
to the Empire, 445, 712 ; Sugar Con
vention of 1602 attacked as infringe
ment of, 567 ; C. claims to be a
free-trader (1903), 722
Free Trade in Land, advocated by C,
222
French Language and Literature, C.'s
early proficiency in, 3, 16
French Revolution, its influence on
English Reform, 12
Frere, Sir Bartle, 64, 65, 66
Freycinet, M., his Egyptian policy,
128
Fruit Trade of West Indies, C.'s en
couragement of, 574-7
Fysh, Sir Philip, 611

GambetTA, Leon, his resignation and
French policy in Egypt, 128
Gambia, imports and exports of, 607-8
General Election (1874), 53 ; Liberal
rout at, 56 ; (1880), 69 ; C.'s part in
securing Liberal triumph, 80-81 ;
(1885), 245 ; (1886), 271, 274, 300 ;
(1892), 321 ; (1892), 324 ; (1895),
383-4 ; (1900), 431-2, 437-8
Germany, Mr Gladstone's Ministry and,
239 ; commercial treaties with, de
nounced, 404, 702 ; C. suggests
alliance with, 421-2 ; his remarks on
conduct of German Army, 448-54 ;
Canada's tariff difficulties with, 722-3,
743-9 ; 455 . .
Gladstone, William Ewart, his Irish
Disestablishment Bill, 20 ; his part in
Education Bill of 1870, 28, 31, 34; C.'s
utterances used as missiles against, 53 ;
withdraws from leadership, 55 ; C.'s
support of his S. African and Eastern
policy, 68 ; C. withdraws his alle
giance to, 65, 68, but again identifies
himself with, 69, 80 ; the Midlothian
Campaign of 1880, 68 ; his Philippics
against Turkey, 69 ; his admission
of Radical claims, 70, and promise of
representation in Cabinet, 70 ; foreign
affronts to Britain during his admini
stration, 78 ; his friendly arrange
ment with C. in 1880, 80, which
secures him support of Caucus, 80 ;
Radical insistence upon him as Pre
mier, 83 ; accepts power (1880), 84 ;
as Prime Minister and Chancellor of
the Exchequer, 84 ; inconsistencies of
his second Administration, 88 ; is
" squeezed " by the Irish Party, 94 ;

tires of Mr Parnell's menace, 97 ;
perceives public disapproval of his
Coercion policy, 99 ; his Irish
policy a failure, 106 ; his antipathy
to further coercion, 109, and fear of
Mr Bright and C. resigning, 109 ;
objects to production of Kilmainham
documents, no ; his reply to Captain
O'Shea's overtures, III ; his declara
tion regarding the agreement with
Mr Parnell, 116; on Mr Dillon's
speech on Irish Arrears Bill, 121 ;
his Foreign policy (1880-85), 126-
152 ; his Ministry's troubles in Af
ghanistan, 127, and Egypt, 127 ;
moves vote of credit for Egyptian
Expedition, 129 ; Boer expectations
on his assumption of power, 133 ;
his mistake in regard to the Trans
vaal, 135, his motives, 139-40 ; effect
of his Foreign policy abroad, 141 ;
abandons Chancellorship of Ex
chequer, 142 ; his policy in Egypt,
143-50 ; on the Afghan frontier in
cident, 151 ; his Ministry defeated,
152 ; his withdrawal of Merchant
Shipping BiU (1884), 169;, induces
C. to withdraw resignation, 170-2 ;
asks for Liberal majority independent
of Irish members, 244 ; his Home
Rule scheme outlined in the
Standard, 246 ; his effort to
obtain a non-party settlement of
Irish Question, 249 ; his Home Rule
Ministry, 252 ; C.'s letter to him
accepting office, 253 ; his acceptance
of C.'s repudiation of unworthy mo
tives in taking office, 254-5 ; his
inability to secure accordance be
tween Mr Morley and C, 255 ; his
expectations of C. supporting Home
Rule Bill, 256 ; C.'s letter to, re
signing office, 257 ; his manifesto
regarding Land Bill and Home Rule
Bill, 263 ; his first Home Rule Bill
defeated, 270 ; accepts C.'s proposal
for Round Table Conference, 280 ;
Radical nature of C.'s differences
with, 284 ; denounces Conservative
Crimes Bill (1887), 285 ; his over
tures to Lord Hartington, 290 ; his
defeat at General Election of 1886,
301 ; his victory at General Election
of 1892, 321 ; accepts office, 328 ; his
second Home Rule Bill, 338-4S, C.'s
criticism of, 339-48 ; declines Lords'
proposal for Select Committee on
Betterment (L.C.C), 353 ; his fail-

INDEX

791

ing health, 354, rumoured resigna
tion, 354, last speech in Commons,
354-5, and resignation, 355
Glasgow University, C. elected Lord
Rector of, 408
Gold Coast Colony, 580, 584 ; imports
and exports of, 607-8
Gordon, General, 143, 144-50, 239
Gorst, Sir John, his plan for reconstruc
tion of educational system, 441
Goschen, Lord (Mr), declines to join
Mr Gladstone's Administration, 174,
175 i regarded as a safeguard from
Radical excesses, 210; criticises
C.'s doctrine of "Natural Rights,"
217, 218 ; supports Lord Salis
bury's government against No-
confidence vote, 251 ; supports Lord
Salisbury in opposing Home Rule,
259 ; his growing distrust of new
elements in Liberalism, 270 ; becomes
Chancellor of the Exchequer under
Lord Salisbury, 278 ; his licensing
proposals, 309-10 ; First Lord of the
Admiralty (1S95), 378 ; on principles
of Imperial Defence (naval), 699-
700 ; denounces C.'s 'Tariff policy,
742 ; 400
Gothenburg system, C.'s study and
advocacy of, 59-61, 365 ; recom
mended for trial by House of Lords'
Committee, 61
Graaf Reinet, C.'s hostile reception at,
678
Graham, F., 649
Graham, General, 145
Grahamstown, C.'s welcome at, 676
Grain Cargoes Bill, 156
Granville, Lord, 80, 83-84, 84, 86, 127,
146, 252
Greece, C. on advisability of strengthen
ing, 63 ; the Porte's obligations to
wards, 127
Greene, Sir Conyngham (Mr), 524,
538
Grenada (W. Indies), 562
Grenfell, Sir F. W., 629
Grey, Earl, his Constitution Bill of
1850, 609
Grey, Earl, and the Jameson Raid, 483,
495 ; Appendices III and IV
Grey, Sir Edward, 454, 561
Guiana, British, 556, 562, 571
Guildhall, The, C.'s reception on his
return from S. Africa, 686
Hamilton, Lord George, 565
Hamilton, Sir Robert, 255

Hanbury, Robert W., 439
Harben, Mr Henry, father of C.'s
mother, 1
Harben, Sir Henry, brother of C.'s
mother, I
Harcourt, Sir William, in campaign of
1880, 80 ; becomes Home Secretary,
84 ; in Franchise controversy, 207 ;
as Chancellor of the Exchequer, 252 ;
his part in the Round Table Con
ference, 280-4, 327, 369, 410-11, 427,
447 ; suggests discussion of Select
Committee's Report, 501, and de
fends its findings, 502, 505-6
Harrington, Mr, inventor of the Plan
of Campaign, 276
Harris, Dr Rutherford, 482, 484, 485,
486, 493 ; declines to produce tele
grams before the Select Committee,
487-8 ; Appendices III and IV
Hartington, L'rd (see Devonshire)
Hartmann, Nihilist, 94
Hawksley, Bourchier F., 488, 489, 501,
502
" Hawksley Telegrams, The,'' published
by the Indipendence Beige, 504,
Appendix IV
Healy, Timothy, C.'s allusion to his
part in the ParneU controversy, 325
Hely-Hutchinson, Sir Walter, 685
Hemming, Sir Augustus, 573, 574
Heneage, Lord (Mr), 253
Henderson, Lieutenant, 582-3
Herschell, Lord, 252, 280, 621
Hertzog, Judge, 676
Hewett, Admiral, at Suakim, 145
Heywood Election (1900), C.'s message
to Unionist candidate, 437
Hicks-Beach, Sir Michael, as Colonial
Secretary, 66 ; his Budget amend
ment causes resignation of Mr Glad
stone's government, 152, 221 ; on
the Government's Land Reform
scheme, 251 ; Chancellor of the Ex
chequer (1895), 378 ; his resort to
indirect taxation, 443 - 4 ; defends
Mr Rhodes, 501 ; disapproval of C.'s
Tariff proposals, 741 ; 400, 704
Hicks Pasha, 143
Hodgson, Sir F. M., 585-6, 588
Hofmeyer, Mr, Leader of South African
Bond, 531,. 541, 685; his speech
accompanying Bond address to C,
681
Holker, Sir John, and C.'s Bankruptcy
Bill (1883), 159
Holland, offer of mediation by Premier,
655

792

INDEX

Home Rule, 79 ; C.'s attitude towards,
107, and definition of, 124 ; C.'s
general sympathy with, 226-9, 244 ;
change in meaning of since 1885,
240 ; Mr Parnell's expectations re
garding, 242, and C.'s criticism in
reply, 242-3 ; publication of outlines
of Mr Gladstone's plan, 246 ; C. con
venes meeting of Liberals favourable
to Home Rule principle, 265-6 ; C.'s
attitude towards (1893), 333, 339 ;
C. on the only feasible form of, 340 ;
Lord Rosebery's declaration on, 359-
361, and C.'s criticism of them, 362
Home Rule Bill (1886), C.'s objections
to, 257-8, and resignation, 259; his
criticisms of, 259-63 ; its defeat, 270
Home Rule Bill, the Second (1893), C.
and the retention of Irish memljers,
333 ; outline of the scheme, 338-9 ;
C.'s attitude towards and criticism of,
339-348 ; 335
Hong-Kong, 643
Hopetoun, Earl of, Governor-General of
the Commonwealth of Australia, 615
House of Lords, Conservative views of,
12 ; attitude to Irish Disestablish
ment Bill, 20 ; general opinion of
(1869), 23 ; agitation for abolition
of, 24, 175 et seq ; Radical opinion
regarding, 52 ; rejects Compensation
for Disturbance (Ireland) Bill, 95 ;
C.'s denunciations of, 176, 178, 199-
202, 205 ; easiness of getting up
demonstrations against, 249 ; Liberal
policy regarding (1893), 336-7 ; Mr
Gladstone's last speech in the Com
mons, 352-3 ; C. on need for a
Second Chamber, 364, 367
Housing ofthe Poor, in C.'s Programme
(1892), 328, 373
Hut Tax, in Sierra Leone, 588-91
Iddesleigh, Lord (Sir Stafford North
cote), his position in Conservative
Party, 80 ; carries motion of Breach
of Privilege against Mr Parnell, 163 ;
C.'s reply to, regarding House of
Lords, 199-200; his part in Franchise
controversy, 207 ; compares C. with
Jack Cade, 224, 230 ; his retirement,
303, 320
Imperial defence, 693 ; C. on, 695-8,
70S-9 ; Mr Goschen and the Duke of
Devonshire on naval tactics in rela
tion to, 699 - 701 ; the Colonial
governments and, 709-11
Imperial Federation, C's labours to

promote, 692-752 ; C. on necessity
of, 692 ; cause of temporary failure of
C.'s scheme, 695 ; C.'s conferences
with Premiers, 692-718
Imperial Federation League, 692
Imperial Government, C. on decreasing
importance of, 48, 54
Imperialism, emphatic assertion of by
C, 333-4 ; his speech at Edgbaston,
356-7
Imperialism of the Music Halls, C.'s
denunciation of, 64
Income Tax, Progressive, advocated in
"The Radical Programme," 211
Inconsistency, Political, an explanation
of, 13
Independent Labour Party, C.'s scepti
cism as to its existence, 326
India, C.'s disbelief in Russia's alleged
designs upon, 63
Indian Mutiny, The, 385
Industrial Schools, C. on administration
of, 54
Inter-Colonial Council (Transvaal and
Orange River Colonies), Lord Milner
on, 688-90 ; C.'s approval of, 690-1
Insanitary Areas, Reconstruction of,
advocated in " The Radical Pro
gramme," 212
Invincibles, their connection with the
"open" Nationalist movement, 119
Ireland (see also Home Rule, Land
Bill, Land League, Kilmainham,
Parnell, etc.), C. on endowed
schools in, 62 ; Lord Beaconsfield's
government and, 78, 79 ; inconstancy
of Liberal policy in, 90 ; condition of
in 1880, 91 ; C.'s support of Irish
policy of " squeezing " Mr Gladstone,
94 ; crime in, 91, 93, 96, 97, 98-99,
108, 114-16 ; Mr Gladstone's Coercion
policy (1881) a failure, 106 ; Irish
leaders censured by C, 106-7 ; aban
donment of idea of Liberal-Nationalist
co-operation, 121 ; national council for,
advocated in " The Radical Pro
gramme," 211, 227, 229; C. on
necessity of self-government for, 228,
241
Irish Members, Partial Retention of at
Westminster, C.'s objection to, 332,
340 ; Mr Gladstone's change of front
regarding, 346
Islington, Chamberlain family in, 2
Jack Cade, C. likened to by Tories,
217, 224, 230 ; defended by C, 225
Jamaica, 557, 562, 571, 573, 574, 577

INDEX

793

James, Lord, of Hereford (Sir Henryj,
supports Lord Salisbury's govern
ment against No -confidence vote,
2;i ; his personal sacrifice, 270 ; at
Ehichy of Lancaster, 384
Jameson, Dr L. S., 493, 494, 518; his
preparations for the Raid, 483-4,
.Appendices III and IV
Jameson Raid, The, 385, 482-511 ;
acquisition of the "jumping-off
ground " by Chartered Co., 482-4 ;
Select Committee exculpates C. and
Colonial Office from foreknowledge
of or participation in, 486, 496 ; the
Committee's general conclusions re
garding, 494-6 ; Mr Labouchere's
separate report od, 496-501 ; ex
amination of charges against C,
507-11 ; Appendices UI and IV
Jaoan, 385, 703
Jevons, Professor, 5
Jeyes, S. H., "Joseph Chamberlain"
(1896), 2
Johannesburg, C. advocates modified
Gothenburg System at, 62 : possibility
of a rising at, 485-6 ; Mr Kriiger
obtains submission of, 518 ; C.'s
visit to, 663-70
Johnson, Rev. Arthur, tutor of C, 2 ;
reminiscences of his pupil, 3
"Judas," incident during Home Rule
debates, 348
Juno, the, Fenian raid on, 96
Juta, Sir Henry, 684
Kaffir Labour in S Africa, C. and, 664,
667-g ; Afrikander Bond and, 680
Kano. 595, 601, 602
Kay-Shuttleworth, Sir U. J., 253
Kenrick, Miss Harriet, C.'s marriage
with, 19 ; her death, 19
 William, brother-in-law of C,
19,273
 Miss Florence, C.'s marriage with,
36 ; her death, 53
Key, Professor, of University College
School, 5
Khartoum, 144
Kilmainham, Mr Parnell and colleagues
imprisoned at, 106 ; his temporary
release from, 109
"Kilmainham, Treaty of," suggested
by C, 108-9, 120 ; correspondence
relating to, 1 10-7 ; Conservative
feeling regarding, 113; idea imder-
lying it almndoned by Liberals, 121
Kimbo-Iey, C. at, 674
Kimberley, Lord, as Colonial Secretary.

84 ; declares retrocession of Transvaal
impossible, 133 ; his account of Mr
Gladstone's motives in making peace
with Boers, 139, repudiated by C,
139 ; at India Office, 1 42 ; as Secre
tary for India, 252 ; 416. 542
Kingston, C. C, Premier of S. Aus
tralia, 611
Kitchener, Lord, his negotiations with
Botha at Middelburg, ^48-9 ; 649,
655
Kriiger, Paul, proclamation of S.A.
Republic, 144 ; and the Continental
press, 419, 420 ; his " Memoirs," 484,
512 ; his Proclamation closing the
Drifts, 516 ; hb liberation of the
Raiders, 518 ; bis Aliens Bi 1, 524 ;
his claim of damages for the Jameson
Raid, 524 ; 512, 514, 515, 540, 542-3,
647, 654
Labouchere, Henry, 208 ; C. on his
suggested postponement of Home
Rule ; C. on his language during S..A.
War, 440 ; his separate Report on tr.e
Jameson Raid, 496-501 ; raises ques
tion of privilege as to Hawksley
telegrams, 500
Labour Question, C. advocates greater
share for workman in rewards of
industry, 52, 331 ; C.'s claim to repre
sent labour, 55 ; control of hours
advocated by C, 328
Labourers' Cottages, Improvement of,
advocated in • The Radical Pro
gramme," 212
Ladysmith, C.'s visit to, 659
Lagos, 596-6 ; imports and exports of,
607-8
Laing's Nek, Boer occupation of (1881),
134
Land Act (Ireland, 1 870), 92
Land Bill (Ireland, 1881), unsatisfac
tory to Irish agrarians, 95 ; C.'s
views on, 102-3, 104-5 ; its provi
sions, 103 ; becomes law, 105 ; C. on
good results of, 122
Land Bill (Ireland, 1891), Mr BaUour's,
310-1
Land, burdens on, C. promises to sup
port scheme for reduction of, 376
Land, illegally enclosed, restoration
advocated in " The Radical Pro
gramme," 211
Land Laws, C. advocates reform of,
52 ; reforms advocated in " The
Radical Programme," 211, 222
Land League, its inauguration and

794

INDEX

organisation, 93, 96 ; criminal infor
mation filed against leaders, 99 ; its
"No Rent" manifesto, 106 ; is pro
claimed illegal, 106 ; its continued
operations, 108
Land League, the Ladies', survival
of Land League when proclaimed,
106, 276, 288
Land Purchase Act, passed by Conser
vatives, 329
Land Purchase Bill (Ireland, 1886),
C.'s objection to, 257, 260, 261 ;
Mr Gladstone intimates unessential
nature of, 263
Land Purchase Bill (Ireland, 1902),
withdrawal of, 470
Land Purchase Bill (Ireland, 1903),
Mr Wyndham's measure, 475-6
Land Purchase by Local Authorities,
advocated by C, 216-7, 223, 234
Lansdowne, Lord, Secretary for War,
384 ; at Foreign Office, 439 ; 749
Lapland, C.'s visit to, 59
Lascars, employment of, on vessels
carrying Australian mails, 616
Lascelles, Sir Frank, 745
Laurier, Sir Wilfrid, 404, 750
Lawley, Sir Arthur, 660
Lawrence, Sir Edwin, 5
Lawson, Grant, 439
Lawson, Sir Wilfrid, 500
Leamington, vacancy at, dispute be
tween Conservatives and Liberal-
Unionists regarding, 349-50, 374
Le Caron, Major, his revelations, 320
Leeds Manifesto, by C, 364-5
Leonard, Phillips, 509
Leyds, Dr, 505, 525, 654
Liberal-Imperialist Party, C. on, 430
Liberal Party, Nonconformity and,
32-33 ; Moderate Liberals' dislike of
C, 35
Liberal Programme, C. disclaims right
to lay down a, 210
" Liberal Programme, The Next Page
of the " (article by C, 1874), 53
Liberalism, early, its merit of being
based on reason, 12
Liberals, Moderate, C.'s animosity
against, 218, 220
Liberal - Unionists, their anomalous
position in 1886-1892, 209, 301 ;
meetings of, summoned by C., 265,
and by Lord Hartington, 266 ; the
possibility of a Liberal- Unionist
Ministry, 267 ; C. on their desire to
increase independence in management
of local affairs, 272 ; their heavy

losses in Election of 1892, 3.2 1 1
323 ; C's conference on Education
Bill (1902) at Birmingham, 457-65
Licensing System (see Temperance
Legislation)
Limited Liability Companies Bill, 430
" Little Englandism," C. formerly
charged with, 64
Littler, Sir Ralph, K.C, 5
Lloyd-George, David, 440, 44 1, 467
Local Government, C.'s activity in, 38 ;
C. on increasing importance of, 54 ;
participates in debate on, 62 ; C. and
the nececessity of Decentralisation in,
372
Local Government, County, part of C.'s
" Unauthorised Programme," 211
Local Government for the three King
doms, advocated by C, 273
Local Government (Ireland), Bill intro
duced, 311, dropped after Second
Reading, 312, 321 ; C.'s advocacy
of the widest possible measure, 339
Local Government Bill (Ireland, 1899),
412-4
Local Veto Bill, opposed by C, 365
Loch, Lord (Sir Henry), and affairs of
S. African Republic, 512, 513
London County Council, C.'s view ot
Progressive claims, 45 ; he suggests
curtailment of its power, 45 ; enlarge
ment of powers of, in Liberal Pro
gramme (1893), 335 ; the Improve
ment Bill and Betterment, 352-3 ;
C. on the necessity for Decentralisa-
of its work, 372-3
Londonderry, Lord, 405, 408, 439
Long, W. H., 439
Lowther, James, 215
Loyal and Patriotic Union, meeting of,
at which Lord Hartington and Mr
Goschen make common cause with
Lord Salisbury, 259
Lubbock, Sir Neville, 565
Lucy, H. W., his humorous account of
C.'s second speech in Commons, 58
Lugard, Sir F., 596, 598, 600, 601
Lumsden, Sir Peter, 150
Lupton Bey, in Egypt, 143
M'Carthy, Justin, his intimacy with C,
99 ; acts as intermediary between Mr
Parnell and C, 112 ; Mr Parnell's
letter to, 113-4, 116
M'Clintock, Major, 600
Macgregor, Sir William, 597
M'Kinley Tariff, The, and British
trade, 382

INDEX

795

Mafeking, C. at, 673-4
Maguire, Dr T. Millar, 449
Maguire, R., and Select S.A. Com
mittee, 495, Appendices III and IV
Mail services, 718
Majuba, British defeat at, 134
Malta, the language question in, 621-42
Manhood Suffrage, C.'s advocacy of,
181 ; included in " The Radical Pro
gramme," 211
Manipur, British disaster in, 320
Manners, Lord John (Duke of Rut
land), 188
Mansion House, The, public luncheon
to C. on his return from S. Africa,
686
Marlborough, Duke of, Lord-Lieutenant
of Ireland, 78 ; Lord Beaconsfield's
letter (March, 1880) to him, 78-79
Marris, Miss N. Murrell, her " Life " of
C, 2, 17
Martial law in S. Africa, C. and com
plaints of, 58o-2
Martineau, G., 565
Mason, Sir Jonah, 86
Mathematics, C.'s early proficiency in,
3
Mathew, Justice, Chairman of Evicted
Tenants Commission, 332
Mauritius, 565, 566
Maxwell, Sir 'William, 581
Meade, Sir Robert, 487, 490
Mellor, John, 253
Merchant Shipping Legislation, tem
porary Measures passed, 162 ; Bill
introduced by C. (1884), 161, 167-
8, shipowners' opposition to, 165, its
withdrawal, 169 ; Royal Commis
sion's recommendations, 169, 173 ;
Act of 188S carried at C.'s instance,
173; further Acts of 1892 and 1894,
173, 304 ; C.'s Bill cited, 62, 154
Merlet, Professor, of University College
School, 5
Methuen, Lord, his defeat and capture,
470
Metropolitan Boroughs (London), C.
forecasts creation of, 45
Miall, Mr, 31
Middelburg, C.'s reception at, 679
Midlands Liberal-Unionist Association,
founded by C, 322
Mill, James and John Stuart, influence
of their doctrines in Reform, 12, 73
Milner, Lord (Sir Alfred), C.'s praise of,
473-4 ; as High Commissioner of S.
Africa, 524; his defence of the Uit
landers, 528-9 ; at Bloemfontein Con

ference, 531-4 ; his return to England,
548; recommends Inter- Colonial
Council for the new Colonies, 688-90 ;
650, 655-6, 660, 672
Mines, hours of labour in, local option
suggested by C, 366
Mines Regulation Act (1887), 304
Mines Regulation Act, passed by Con
servatives, 329
Mizzi, Dr F., Maltese delegate to Lon
don, 622 et seq.
Mohl, Captain, 601
Monarchy, Conservative views of, 12 ;
C.'s early attitude towards, 49-52
Monk Bretton, Lord (Mr Dodson), 129
Monroe Doctrine, The, 401
Montenegro, the Porte's obligations
towards, 127
Moor, Sir Ralph, 596
Moore, Professor Harrison, " The
Commonwealth of Australia," 611
Morgan, Osborne, 253
Moriand, Colonel, 602, 603
Morley, John, shares C.'s views (1885)
on Home Rule, 230, his misgivings
as to its results as a practical policy,
248 ; as Chief Secretary for Ireland,
252 ; his part in preparing the first
Home Rule Bill, 255 ; differences
with C, 255 ; takes part in Round
Table Conference, 280, 282 ; his
speech causing final breach with C. ,
289 ; C. on his Egyptian policy, 332 ;
at Irish Office under Lord Rosebery,
359) 360 ; opposes W. Indian sub
vention, 412 ; tribute to C. 471 ; 327,
369
Morris, Dr, botanical expert, 561, 569
Motor Car Bill (1903), 477
Mountmorres, Lord, murder of, 99
Mundella, Mr, 84, 252
Municipal Improvements, certain objec
tions to, 42, 43, 45
 Reform, C.'s schemes of, 38 ; C.
on Act of 1835, 43
 Socialism, C. and, 41
 Trading, evils of, 43
Murray, Sir H. H., 617
Mutual Improvement Society (Birming
ham), C. first President of, 17
Napoleon III., 51, 81
Natal, 65 ; C.'s promise as to defence
of, 548 ; amnesty question in, 649 ;
Boer Generals and extension of
border, 650, 663 ; C.'s visit to, 657-
9, 710, 716
Natal and Transvaal Railway, 396

796

INDEX

Nathan, Captain, 698
National Assembly in Dublin, C.'s
counter-scheme to Mr Gladstone's
first Home Rule Bill, 259
National Councils, advocated in " The
Radical Programme," 211, 243; C.
proposes scheme for Ireland, 241, and
alludes to in letter accepting office
under Mr Gladstone, 254; 340
National Defence, C. on need for, 18 ;
his Interest in, 333
National Education League, its origin,
organisation, and activity, 24, 25 ;
C. elected chairman of, 24 ; its insist
ence on free and secular education,
27 ; its minimum demands, 33 ; its
resentment against Mr Forster, 30,
56 ; 356, 398, 458
National League, The, 277, 291
National Liberal Federation, its forma
tion urged by C, 70 ; its organisation
imitated by Conservatives, 82 ; C.
its moving spirit, 171 ; its capture
for Gladstonian Liberalism, 264, 265
National Radical Union, 273
National Scouts, 650, 670, 676
National Union of Conservative Asso
ciations, 82
Nationalists, their abuse of C, 276
Native Christians in S. Africa, C. on
impossibility of political equality for,
658
Natural Philosophy, C.'s early pro
ficiency in, 3
Navigation Laws, discussed at Colonial
Premiers' Conference with C, 718
Nettlefolds, The, the Chamberlain
family's relationship to, 14 ; C.
enters their firm, 14 ; charges brought
against, 15, and their withdrawal,
15
Newcastle Programme, The, and the
Queen's Speech (1893), 332, 335
Newfoundland, controversy with France
as to shore rights, 320 ; C.'s action
regarding, 616-9
New Guinea, 643
New Review, The, article on Local
Government by C. in, 43-44
New South Wales, 609, 6x6, 643
Newton, Francis J., censured by Select
Committee (South Africa), 491, 496
New Zealand, 609, 610, 716
Niger Coast Protectorate, 593, 597, 598,
602 ; imports and exports of, 607-8
Niger Company, The Royal, 594-6
Night School (Birmingham), C. teaches
in, 17

Nihilism, the New Radicalism an imita
tion of, 290
Nineteenth Century, The, C.'s Pro
gramme (1892) published in, 328 ; C.
on article by Mr Gladstone in, 342 ;
his article foreshadowing creation of
London Borough Councils, 373
Non-churchgoing (see Churchgoing)
Nonconformists, their objections to
Education Bill of 1870, 31 ; services
to Liberal Party, 32 ; their demand
for equality, 33 ; their punishment
of Mr Gladstone and Mr Forster
(1874), 34 ; C.'s resentment of their
treatment in Act of 1870, 49, 53 ;
their part in selection of Lord
Hartington as Liberal Leader, 56 ;
their disapproval of Mr Forster's
appointment as Chief Secretary in
1880, 84 ; attitude to Free Education
Act, 318-9 ; opposition to Education
Act of 1902, 457
Nonconformity, early influences of on
C, II
Norfolk Island, 643
Norman, General Sir H. W., 561, 562
Northbrook, Lord, 84
Northcote, Colonel, in W. Africa, 583
Northcote, Sir Stafford (see Iddesleigh)
Norton, Lord (Sir Charles Adderley),
his Bill dealing with unseaworthy
ships, 162, 164
Nubar Pasha, 144
O'Brien, Mr, and the Plan of Cam
paign, 276
Obstruction, Irish, possible influence
of on C. (1881), 101 ; furnishes
motive for new Rules of Procedure,
157-8; C.'s part in introducing new
Rules to control, 226 ; used by C. as
argument for Home Rule, 227
Obstruction, in the Home Rule Parlia
ment, 335-6, 337
Official publications (1896-1903), Ap
pendix II
Old Age Pensions, C.'s scheme for, 328,
366 ; in his Programme (1895), 383 ;
charged with failure to redeem his
pledges, 423, and defends his posi
tion, 424 ; Report of Mr Chaplin's
Committee regarding, 424-6 ; C.
indicates means of realising, 479, 724,
735
One Man One Vote, in Liberal Pro
gramme (1893), 335, 336, 362
One Vote One Value, 362
Onslow, Lord, 601-3, 649

INDEX

797

"Open Door, The," Policy of, 415, 418
Orange Free State, alliance with S..^.
Republic, 524 ; joins the Republic in
the War, 540
Orange River Colony, Lord Milner
appointed Administrator of, 549 ;
British Loan to, 665-7 ; Inter-Colo
nial Council formed, 688-90
O'Shea, Captain, his part in the Kil
mainham negotiations, 110-7
Osman Digna, lieutenant of Mahdi, 144
Ottawa Conference (1894), resolutions
regarding Preferential Trading passed
at, 693
Ozanne, E. C, 565
Pace, Miss, schoolmistress, her remini
scences of C. as her pupil, 2 ; visited
by C, 2 ; her death (1903), 2
Pacific Cable, all British, 693, 703
Pacific Islands, 643
Paine, Tom, C. likened to by Tories,
217
Pall Mall Gazette, The, publishes
announcement of Mr Gladstone's
intended resignation, 354
Parish Councils Bill, C.'s moderating
attitude towards, 352 ; Mr Gladstone
agrees to the Lords' amendments,
354 ; the Bill passed, 354 ; C. on the
" New Radicals' " advocacy of, 358
Parkes, Sir Henry, 609
Parliaments, duration of, in Liberal
Programme (1893), 335
Parnell, Charles Stuart, his unification
of Nationalist and Agrarian agita
tions, 91, 92 ; alleges failure of Land
Act of 1870, 92 ; his attitude to
Separation, 93, and physical force,
94 ; his dissatisfaction with Land Bill
of 1 88 1, 95 ; on Boycotting, 97 ;
criminal information filed against, 99 ;
moves hostile Amendment to Address
(1881), lOl ; regards Land Bill of
1 88 1 as a dole, 103 ; rebuked by Mr
Gladstone, 105 ; is lodged with col
leagues in Kilmainham Prison, 106 ;
C. presses for Liberal understanding
with, 108 ; his overtures to Liberals,
109 ; his release from Kilmainham,
109, 226, and return, 109 ; instructs
Capt. O'Shea to discuss Rent Arrears
with Mr Gladstone and C, 110, 116 ;
the Government's bargain with him
to obtain cessation of disorder, iio-i ;
his negotiations with C. through Mr
J. M'Carthy, 112 ; his letter under
taking to co-operate with Liberals,

112, 113-4, "6; his reasons for
secrecy as to his pledge, 117 ; his
relations with Fenians, Ii8 ; his inno
cence and detestation of Phcenix Park
Plot, 119; C.'s attitude towards his
demands, 229 ; Conservatives charged
with secret understanding with, 234-6 ;
his interview with Lord Carnarvon,
236-7 ; his part in wrecking C.'s plan
for a National Elective Council, 242 ;
his forecast of Liberal Home Rule
Measure, 242, repudiated by C, 242-
3 ; his differences with Mr Gladstone,
244-5 ; liis Manifesto against Mr
Gladstone, 245 ; his Obstructive
tactics, 249 ; moves Amendment on
Address, 276 ; the Times' charges
against, 297-9; the Anti-Parnellites
insist on his retirement, 324
Parnell Commission, its investigations
and Report, 297-8 ; C.'s view of its
findings, 298 ; discussion of Report
in Parliament, 309
Parnellites, C. describes as a " Kept
Party," 299
"Parnell Letters,'' published by the
Times, 289, 320
Patent Reform, C.'s advocacy of, 62,
154; his Bill (1883), 161
Patronage, C. on Liberal use of (1893),
332
Pauncefote, Lord, 620
Pauper Immigration, control of, an
item in C.'s Programme (1892), 328
Pauperism in Britain, 219-20
Payment of Members part of " The
Radical Programme," 211
" Peace with Honour," C.'s depreciation
of, 64
Peel, Lord (Mr Arthur Wellesley Peel),
dispute occasioned by his retirement
from the Speakership, 349
Penjdeh Incident, The, 150-1, 239
Penny Postage, Imperial, 693, 703
Phoenix Park Murders, 119, 120
Pietermaritzburg, C. at, 657
Pigott, Mrs Francis, 605
Pigott, Richard, exposure of in Parnell
Commission, 298, 320
Plan of Campaign, The, its estrange
ment of Home Rule sympathisers,
276 ; C.'s feeling regarding, 284
Playfair, Lord (Sir Lyon), 253
PlimsoU, Samuel, his agitation against
unseaworthy vessels, 161-5 ; apolo
gises for unfounded charges against
owners and M.P.'s, 162, 163 ; motion
of Breach of Privilege carried against.

798

INDEX

163 ; C.'s former association with his
agitation, 163
Plunkett, Sir F., 565
Poor Law, The, 42 ; C.'s views on, 213
Pope, Mr, Q.C., 499
Port Arthur, 415
Port Elizabeth, C. at, 677
Port of London Bill (1903), abandoned,
477
" Predominant Partner, The,'' speech by
Lord Rosebery, 359-60 ; C. on, 369
Preferential Tariffs, C.'s view of their
consistency with Free Trade, 74 ; the
Colonies and, 381, 445 ; circum
stances influencing C.'s desire for,
382-3 ; as a means of realising Old
Age Pensions, 479 ; favoured by
Ottawa Conference (1894), 693 ; the
Canadian offer of Preference to
Britain, 702, 713 ; C.'s declaration
in favour of (1903), 718, and argu
ments for, 719 «/ seq.; examination of
C.'s proposals, 730-1 ; effect on food,
728, 737
Prempeh, King, 580-3
Preservation of Peace (Ireland) Bill
(1881), 100; C. defends his accept
ance of, 101-2
Pretoria, C.'s visit to, 65o
Pretoria, Convention of (1888), pro
visions of, 134-5
Pretoria to Delagoa Bay Railway, 516
Prevost, Mr, 5
Prevention of Crimes (Ireland) Bill, 121
Primrose League, criticism of by C,
81 ; its political activity, 82
Prince of 'Wales, inaugurates (as Duke
of York) the Commonwealth of
Australia, 615
Prison-made Goods Bill, Foreign, 404
Prisons, C. on Local v. Imperial con
trol of, 57-59
Procedure, New Rules of, C.'s sugges
tions regarding, I57"8
Progress dependent upon individuals.
Property, Private, C. on obligations of,
75, 203
Property Tax, Progressive, advocated
in ""rhe Radical Programme," 211
Protection described, by C. as a quack
medicine, 215 ; his denunciation of
its fallacies, 381 ; his leaning towards
modification of, 445 ; C. disclaims
(1903), 722
Protection in Ireland, 242
Queensland, 610, 616

" Radical Programme," The, a mani
festo against Moderate Liberalism,
211-2 ; C. on the need for, 219-20
Radical Unionists, meeting, 290
Radicalism, Philosophic, its defects
and uses, 11-12 ; relation to Nihilism,
12
Radicalism, the New, an imitation of
Nihilism, 290
Radicals, prediction by, of Mr Glad
stone's defeat (1874), 56 ; their pre
ference for Mr Gladstone to Lord
Hartington as Premier, 83 ; their dis
like of Liberal compromise with
Lords, 207 ; and the S. African War,
426, 423, 546
Railway Accidents Bill, 430
Railway servants, hours of labour for,
in Liberal Programme (1893), 335
Raleigh, Sir Walter, 555
Rand, The, C. and the mining indus
try's contribution to the war, 663-
70 ; the native labour question, 664,
667-9
"Ransom," C.'s doctrine of, 75, 199,
203, 217
Rawson, Rear-Admiral H., 593
Reciprocity (see Preferential Tariffs)
Redemption of Rent (Ireland) Bill
(1891), 310
Redistribution Scheme, demanded by
Conservatives, 176 et seq. ; C.'s view
of question, 178-80; Ministers'
decision not to include with Fran
chise Bill, 182, their promise regard
ing, 190, and projected compromise
with Conservatives, 204-6 ; draft of
Measure published in Standard, 206 ;
understanding with Lords regarding,
207 ; Bill passed, 208
Redmond, William, leader of Parnellites,
324 ; C. on inconsistency of his de
mands with declarations of English
Home Rulers, 327 ; danger to Lib
erals of his party's vote, 337 ; revolts
in consequence of Lord Rosebery's
Home Rule declarations, 260-I ; his
party vote against the Liberals, 370
Reform, early influences towards de
mand for, 12 ; agitation for, 19 ; C.'s
early interest in, 19
 Act (1832), 47
 Bill, Disraeli's, 19
 Demonstration in London (1884),
ridiculed by Lord Salisbury, 194
 Social, C.'s desire to promote, 52
 Liberal, C. on postponement of
in consequence of Home Rule, 283

INDEX

799

Reformatories, C. on administration of,
59
Registration Law, in Liberal Pro
gramme (1893), 335, 362-3
Reid, George H., 609, 612, 613
Reid, Mr (Montreal), 617
Reid, Sir T. Wemyss, his "Life'" of
Mr Forster, 109
Reitz, T. W., 525, 527
Religious Equality and Education Bill
(1902), C. on, 460
Religious Teaching in Board Schools
(see Board Schools)
Republicanism, C.'s study of, 45, and
theoretical adherence to, 49-52
Retaliation, Commercial (see Preferen
tial Tariffs)
Rhodes, Cecil J., his responsibility for
the Jameson Raid, 482-506 ; censured
by the S. .African Select Committee,
494-5 ; his character defended by C,
502-3 ; 518, 532, Appendices III and
IV
Richard, Mr, 31
Richthofen, Baron von, 744, 745, 746,
748
Ridley, Sir Matthew White, Home
Secretary, 405, Appendix IV
" Rights of Man," The, C.'s belief in,
75, 203, and exposition of, 217
" Rights of Property," C.'s criticism of,
.223-4
Ripon, Lord, his administration as
Viceroy of India, 143, 151 ; as First
Lord of the Admiralty, 252 ; his
proposed transference of Bechuana
land Protectorate to the Chartered
Co., 482, 515, 543
Ritchie, Mr, frames County Council
Bill, 314 ; defeat of his Licensing
Reform Scheme, 314, 477-8 ; dis
approves C.'s tariff proposals, 741
Roberts, Lord (Sir Frederick), averts
disaster in Afghanistan, 77 ; 656
Roebuck, Mr, defeats C. at Sheffield,
53
Roman Catholics and Churchmen,
alliance of, 33
Roman Catholics, and Free Education
Act, 317
Roman Catholicism in Ireland, Mr
Parnell on the endowment of, 242
Rosebery, Lord, and Franchise Bill
(1884), 190; as Foreign Secretary,
252 ; C.'s trust in him as Foreign
Secretary, 326 ; his resolute action
regarding Egypt, 335 ; becomes Prime
Minister, succeeding Mr Gladstone,

355 ; on the Government's policy,
359 ; charges C. with inconsistency,
363 ; resignation of his government,
377 ; on Continental calumnies,
454
Rosmead, Lord (Sir Hercules Robin
son), 483, 4S5, 491, 492-3; exonerated
by S. African Select Committee, 495 ;
his reluctance to press Mr Kriiger for
reforms, 520-1 ; 518, 519, 525,
Appendix III
Ross, Major, investigation into causes
of malaria, 604-5
Round Table Conference, C.'s sugges
tion for, 279 ; its meetings and
failure, 279-84
Royal Titles Act, 443
Russell, Lord (Sir C. Russell), shares
C.'s early views on Home Rule,
230 ; as Attorney-General, 253
Russell, Lord John, his Franchise Bill
of 1866, 179
Russell, T. W., 3S4, 439
Russia, C.'s early attitude towards, 63 ;
he advocates an understanding with,
regarding Greece, 63 ; his disbelief
in her alleged designs on India, 63 ;
offended by Lord Beaconsfield's
Eastern policy, 77 ; attitude of Mr
Gladstone's Ministry towards, 126 ;
embroils us in Afghanistan, 127 ; the
Afghan frontier difficulty, 150-1 ; Mr
Gladstone's Ministry and, 239, 385 ;
402, 415, 417, 418-9, 567
Russia and Poland, C.'s comparison
with Ireland, 228
Salisbury, Lord (3rd Marquis) ;
on School Board religion, 31 ; on
the Treaty of Berlin, 64 ; his reputa
tion as a dangerous politician, 80 ;
criticises Mr Gladstone's second
Administration, 88; on the '* Bir
mingham Members " of the Cabinet,
97 ; on the Land League, 98 ; on
demoralisation of the Irish by Liberal
electioneering, 98 ; on Mr Gladstone
and the Clerkenwell outrage, 99 ;
C.'s criticism of his policy of force in
Ireland, 122, 175-6 ; on wrong policy
regarding Turkey in 1878, 127 ; on
Liberal vacillation in foreign policy,
141 : moves vote of censure on
Government's Soudan policy, 147 ;
demands Redistribution Bill as con
dition of Lords' passing Franchise
Bill (1884), 176, 192 ; on means of
abolishing House of Lords, 176 ; on

800

INDEX

inclusion of Ireland in Franchise
Bill, 189 ; his retort to Archbishop
Tait, 190 ; attitude to Liberal offer of
compromise, 192 ; ridicules Reform
demonstration in London, 194, and
attacks Caucus, 1 94 ; C. criticises
his attitude towards Reform, 196-8,
205 ; criticises Liberal Redistribution
scheme, 207 ; promises to support
Franchise Bill, 207-8 ; his first
Cabinet, 210 ; singles C. out for
attack, 210 ; denounces C.'s doctrine
of "Natural Rights," 217; his
ministry and Lord R. Churchill, 220-
I ; denounces Ransom and Restitu
tion, 225-6 ; declines Lord Carnar
von's Home Rule proposals, 237 ;
his apology for dropping Coercion,
238, 240; his pledge as to eventual
defeat of Liberal Government, 239 ;
defeat of his ministry, 251-2 ; defines
basis of agreement with Liberal-
Unionists, 267, and obtains under
standing with them before forming a
Ministry, 274 ; Unionist meeting at
Devonshire House which resolves to
support his government, 275 ; his
offers to serve under Lord Harting
ton, 274, 278 ; is impressed by
C.'s diplomatic ability (N. American
Fisheries question), 297 ; Free Edu
cation Bill, 315-9; follows C.'s
advice in not dissolving Parliament
in 1891, 321 ; meets Parliament after
his defeat (1892), 325 ; resignation,
328 ; his tribute to C, 375 ; assumes
office (1895), 377-8, 386, 399, 416,
419, 429, 432, 436 ; his wish to retire,
438 ; relinquishes Foreign Office,
439, 507, 542, 544, 620; on possi
bility of a Customs Union, 692 ; on
German - Canadian tariff question,
744
" Salvation Army of Politics, The '' Mr
Goschen's description of the Radical
Party, 218
Sambaanland, British annexation of, 514
Samoan Treaty with Germany, 643
Sandhurst, Lord, 253
Sandon, Lord, his Education Bill, 57
Sanitation Acts, passed by Conserva
tives, 329
Saunderson, Colonel, 288
Schnadhorst, Francis, 19; responsibility
for Mr Gladstone's policy of 1886,
20 ; association with C. in working
Caucus, 35 ; his advice previous to
General Election of 1886, 271

School Boards, established by Mr
Forster's Act, 28 ; virtual abolition
of by Act of 1902, 44
Schreiner Ministry, and Bloemfontein
Conference, 531, 534 ; 537, 541
Scotland, national council for, advocated
in "The Radical Programme," 211,
227, 243 ; restoration of deer forest
land in Highlands, 223
Scott, Sir Francis, 581-2
Scottish Church, suspension of appoint
ments in, item in Liberal Programme
(1893), 335
Seaman's Hospital, Greenwich, C. in
strumental in establishing School of
Tropical Diseases, 605
Seamen's Wages Bill, 156
Secular Education (see Education,
Secular)
Seddon, Mr, 695, 716
Selborne, Lord, as Lord Chancellor,
84 ; as Colonial Under-Secretary,
384, 484, 485, 487 ; at Admiralty,
439 ; his evidence before the S.
African Select Committee, 490
Select Committee (British S. Africa),
its composition, 496 ; its conclusions
regarding the Jameson Raid, 494-6 ;
Mr Labouchere's separate report,
496-501
Shaw, Miss Flora (Lady Lingard),
508, 510, Appendix III
Shaw-Lefevre, Geo. J., 2o5
Shaw, Mr, 117
Sheffield, C. stands as advanced Liberal
for, 53, and is defeated by Mr
Roebuck, 53
Sheridan, released Irish suspect, 115
Shipping Legislation (see Merchant
Shipping Legislation)
Shipping subsidies, 718
Shops, hours of employment in, control
of, advocated by C, 328
Sherman, Mr, 620-1
Siam, 385, 455
Sierra Leone, rebellion in, 5S8-9 ; 592 ;
imports and exports, 607-8
Slatin Pasha, 143, 144
Small Holdings, extended facilities for,
part of C.'s " Unauthorised Pro
gramme," 211, 223; Mr Balfour's
doubt as to value of, 251 ; Act of
1892, 305-7
Smith, Mr W. H., 221, 250
Smuts, Dr, 660
Socialism, C. and, 75, 330 (see also
Ransom)
Solomon Islands, 699

INDEX

801

Soudan, Liberal dealings with, 143
South Africa, C.'s voyage home from,
3 ; C.'s early attitude towards, 64,
65-68 ; C.'s responsibility for Liberal
policy in (1880-1885), 67, and failure
to appreciate the future value of, 68 ;
C.'s visit to, 470-5, 656-86 ; C.'s
scheme of Federation for, 515, pro
gress of the idea in, 694 ; 402, 403
South African Repubhc, proclaimed by
Messrs Kriiger, Joubert, and Pre
torius, 133 ; British difficulties with,
512-46 ; C.'s pohcy towards, 5^5 ! ^is
treatment of the Drifts question,
516-7, 540 ; his action on news of
Jameson Raid, 518 ; he presses for
reforms, 520, but is not seconded by
Sir H. Robinson, 520-1 ; he suggests
autonomy for the Rand, 522-3 ; its
alliance with Orange Free State, 524;
C. protests against Aliens Law, 525,
540 ; the question of suzerainty, 527,
532-3, 537 ; the Edgar incident,
527 ; the Uitlanders' Petition, 527-9 ;
the Bloemfontein Conference between
Sir A. Milner and Mr Kriiger, 531-4,
544 ; further Franchise negotiations,
535-8; the Boer Ultimatum, 539.
(See South African War, and Orange
River and Transvaal Colonies)
South African War (1899-1902), C. on
humanity of British troops in, 6; C.'s
conduct during, 426-30, 443, 457,
468-75, 547-8 ; Radicals and, 426,
432-4, 440 ; the Peace of Vereenig
ing, 549-51 ; C.'s part in the settle
ment, 646-92 ; C. on the compen
sations of, 658
Southampton, C.'s welcome home from
S. Africa at, 686
Spain and the United States, 422, 621
Spectator, The, criticises C.'s doctrine
of "Natural Rights," 218
Spencer, Lord, as Lord-Lieutenant of
Ireland, 121 ; C.'s confidence in, 226 ;
Nationalist demand for inquiry into
his Administration, 234 ; Conserva
tive attitude towards, 235 ; his de
mand for renewal of repressive
powers in Ireland, 237 ; as Lord
President, 252 ; C. on changed
attitude of Nationalists towards, 268
Sprigg, Sir Gordon, Premier of Cape
Colony, 552, 675, 678
Spurgeon, Mr, cited by C, 61
St Kitts, 562
St Lucia, 562, 570
St Vincent, 562, 563, 570, 571

Stanaard, The, draft of Redistribution
scheme published in, 206 ; publishes
outhnes of Mr Gladstone s Home
Rule policy, 246
Slanhope, Philip, 501
Stead, W. T., telegrams relating to the
Jameson Raid, quoted by. Appendix
III.
Stewart, Sir Donald, 77
Steyn, President, arranges Bloemfon
tein Conference, 531 ; 539, 540
Straits Settlements, 643
Strickland, Sir Gerald, 638
Sturge, Miss, 34
Suez Canal, Lord Beaconsfield's pur
chase of shares, 76
Sugar Bounties, failure of convention,
320 ; Brussels Conference of 1898,
564, failure of, 565 ! convention
arranged with Continental countries
for suppression of 566-7 ; C. and
the question in S. Africa, 657
Sugar, bounty-fed, and depression in
the West Indies, 562, 565 ; counter
vailing duties on, imposed in India,
566
Sugar Tax, C. and, 444, 446
Sunday School (Birmingham), C.
teaches in, 17
Suspensory Bill (Irish Church), Lords'
rejection of, 20
Suzerainty, British, in Transvaal (see
Transvaal)
Swaziland, 514
Sweden, C.'s visit to, 59
Tait, Archbishop, 190
Talienwan, 415
Tammany Hall, and Liberal tactics
(1893), C. on, 345 ; Con the L.C.C.
and, 374
Tasmania, 610
Taubmann-Goldie, Sir George, 596
Taxation, Graduated, part of C.'s " Un
authorised Programme,"2il
Temperance Legislation, C. on, 55-59,
60, 61, 62 ; his attacks on licensing
system, 62 ; Mr Goschen's Licensing
proposals, 309-10 ; Mr Ritchie's
Licensing Reform scheme, 314 ; C.
opposes Local Veto Bill, 365
Temperance Party, opposition to Gothen
burg System, 60 ; denunciation of C.
as friend of the Trade, 62 ; defeats
Mr Ritchie's Licensing proposals,
314
Temperance, the " New Radicals " and
C. on, 358
3 E

802

INDEX

Temple, Archbishop, 24
Tenant Right (Great Britain) Bill, 430
Tenants' Relief Bill, Irish (1887),
opposed by C, 284 ; accepted by
him on second reading, 308 ; Radical
Amendments to be accepted, 309
Tewfik Pasha, Khedive of Egypt, the
Arab rebellion, 127-8, 143
" Three Acres and a Cow," C.'s scheme
of Land Reform so nicknamed, 223 ;
embodied in Amendment to Address
by Mr Jesse Collings, 250
Times, The, on C.'s doctrine of
" Natural Rights," 217 ; publishes
first " Parnell Letter," 289 ; Special
Commission's investigation of its
charges against Irish members,
297-8
Tithes Bill (1891), supported by C,
319
ToUemache, Lord, his experiment in
division of an estate, 216
Tory Democracy, C. on, 232, 233
Trade Unions, C.'s distrust of the New
Unionism, 331, 365
Trafalgar Square, C. on meetings in,
332
Training Colleges, C, and Conscience
Clause in, 399
Transvaal, annexation of, by Lord
Beaconsfield, 76, and Liberal con
demnation of, 133; C. compares its
acquisition with Birmingham's muni
cipal progress, 48, and further dis
parages it, 64 ; the Retrocession of,
C. a party to, 64 ; influence of in
creasing population in gold-bearing
districts on C, 68 ; Boer revolt, 133,
and proclamation of S.A. Republic,
133 ; the War of 18S1, 134 ; recog
nition of British suzerainty stipulated
for, 135 ; C.'s defence of the Retro
cession, 135-9; Lord Rosebery's
Cabinet and possible reconquest of,
5 1 5 (see also South African Republic)
Transvaal Colony Lord Milner ap
pointed Administrator of, 549 ; British
Loan to, 665-7 ; Inter - Colonial
Council formed, 688-90
Trevelyan, Sir George, succeeds Mr
Forster as Chief Secretary for Ire
land, 121 ; introduces Prevention of
Crimes (Ireland) Bill, 102 ; C.'s con
fidence in, 226 ; his demand for re
newal of repressive powers in Ireland,
237 ; as Secretary for Scotland, 252 ;
his explanation of his resignation,
255 ; takes part in Round Table

Conference, 280; C. on his opposi
tion to Home Rule, 326
Trinidad, 557, 562, 571
Tropical School of Medicine, Liverpool,
605
Truth, Mr Labouchere and, C. on, 326
Tunis, trade with, 703
Turbary Bill (Ireland, 1891), 310
Turkey, C.'s early moderation towards,
63 ; British support of misrule in,
77 ; pressure by Liberal Ministry
upon, 126-7 ; cause of trouble in
Egypt, 127
Uganda, C. on Liberal policy in, 332 ;
Commissioner appointed to report
on, 335 ; C. travels over new railway
in, 656
Uitlanders (see South African Republic)
Ulster, its approval of Mr Gladstone's
Land Bill of 1881,102; C.'s desire
for separate treatment of, 262, 292-
3 ; considered at Round Table Con
ference, 282 ; C.'s political tour in,
292-5 ; C. on its position under the
Second Home Rule Bill, 340 ; Lord
Rosebery derides its threatened
resistance to Home Rule, 361
Umbigesaland, British annexation of,
514
" Unauthorised Programme," The,
origin and explanation of, 211, 230
Unearned increment, C. on, 40
Unemployed, C. on treatment of, 373
Union with Ireland, The, C. on neces
sity of maintaining, 107
Unionist Compact, The (1886-92), its
application to Parliamentary vacan
cies, 304 ; the Leamington vacancy
and, 349 ; Mr Balfour on, 375
Unitarianism, the Chamberlain family's
connection with, 9 ; its advocacy of
Religious Equality and Unsectarian
Education, 10
United Kingdom AUiance, its antagon
ism to compensation, 61, implored
by C. to reconsider its position, 61 ;
opposes Mr Goschen's licensing pro
posals, 310
United States, The, Higher Education
in, 7 ; C.'s visit to, 45 ; corruption
in, 45 ; cost of Local Government
in, 46 ; C. on Senate, 200 ; C. on
Free Education in, 214 ; C. and the
Municipal System in, 371 ; anti-
English sentiment in, 416-7, and
Anglo-American Alliance favoured
by C, 415, 416; Lord Salisbury's

INDEX

803

efforts to arrange Arbitration Treaty
with, 619-20 ; improved relations
with Britain, 621 ; 400-1, 422, 455,
567
Unity Church, Islington, memorial to
C. s father in, IO
Universities, C. on influence of, 7
University College School, London, C.
a pupil at, 3, his recollections of, 4 ;
unveils tablet to memory of former
pupils (1902), 4.
University of Birmingham, 7
Venezuela, 385, 400, 455, 477, 619,
621
Vereeniging, Peace of, terms of, 549-5 1 ;
653, 662, 680
Victoria, 5l0
Villiers, Charles, and Free Trade, 381
Villiers, Sir Henry de, 432
Villiers, J. H. de, 649
Vince, Charles, 33
Voluntary Schools Act (1897), 404-5
Voluntary Schools Bill (l 896), abandon
ment of, 400
Voluntary Schools (see Education, Ele
mentary)
Volunteers, C.'s desire to form a com
pany of, 1 8
Vryburg, C. at, 674
Wales, national council for, advo
cated in " The Radical Programme,"
211, 243; C. on position of Welsh
members (1892), 326
WaUace, W., C.M.G., 596, 598, 600
War, aristocracy and, 18 ; people's
responsibility for, 18
Warren, Sir Charles, 142-3, 540
Wei-hai-wei, 416
Wellington, Duke of, 354
Welsh Church, suspension of appoint
ments in, item in Liberal Programme
(1893), 335 ; C.'s support of Mr
Asquith's Bill, 350
Welsh support of Mr Gladstone, C. on
evil results on Liberal reform of,
283
Wemyss, Lord, 193, 194
West Africa, C.'s policy in, 390-1, 580-
608 ; Convention with France regard
ing, 417, 455 ; C.'s influence on the
administrative, sanitary, and economic
improvement of the Colonies, 604-8 ;
imports and exports of, 607-8

West Indies, The, subvention to, 412 ;
C.'s measures to relieve chronic dis
tress in, 549-79 ; the sugar question
in, 561 et seq. ; recommendations of
Royal Commission, 562-3 ; planters'
gratitude for Sugar Bounties Con
vention (1902), 567-8 ; economic
improvements in, 569-79 ; disasters
in, 570-1 ; C.'s encouragement of
fruit trade in, 574-7
Westminster, Duke of, visit of Mr Glad
stone and Mr Balfour to, and in
formal discussion of Irish question,
249
Whates, W., "The Politician's Hand
book," 555
Willcocks, Sir James (Colonel), 586-7
William, Emperor of Germany, his
message to Mr Kriiger, 386, 519
Williams, Powell, 273, 384
Willis's Rooms, Liberal-Unionist meet
ing at, 277 ; Radical-Unionist meet
ing at, 290
Willoughby, Sir John, 497
Winterbotham, Mr, 30
Wolseley, Lord, 129, 146, 580, 587
Wolverton, Lord, 253
Wood, Sir Evelyn, 134, 137
Working Men's Club, Birmingham,
C.'s connection with, 17
Workmen's Compensation, an item in
C.'s Programme (1892), 328; C. on
the " New Radicals' " advocacy of,
358 ; in his Programme (1895), 3S3 ;
Bill passed, 405-8
Workmen's Dwellings, C. on assisted
purchase of, 366 ; in his Programme
(1895), 383 ; Bill passed, 422-3
Workshop Act, passed by Conserva
tives, 329 ; Act amending, 442
Workshops, Women Inspectors for, 332
Wright, J. S., 33
Wyndham, George, 439, 470, 475-6
Youthful Offenders Act, 443
Zammit, S. Cachia, Maltese delegate to
London, 622 et seq.
Zanzibar, C. on trade of, 656
Zollverein, Imperial (see Customs
Union)
Zubeir Pasha, 145
Zululand, Sir Bartle Frere's conduct
criticised by C, 64; necessity of
crushing Zulu power, 65
Zulu War, C. on, 48 ; 77