YALE
DIVINITY SCHOOL
LIBRARY

Gift of
Professor Benjamin W. Bacon

CRITICAL EXPOSITION

THIRD CHAPTER

PAUL'S EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS.

A MONOGRAPH.

By JAMES MORI SON,! D.D.

LONDON:
HAMILTON, ADAMS, & CO.
GLASGOW: T. D. MOKISON, 6 BATH STEEET.
1866.

Yale Divinity Library

PBEEACE.

" The following Monograph on the Third Chapter of the
Epistle to the Romans is respectfully and diffidently
submitted to the judgement of scholarly students of the
Bible. It has been a "labour of love" to the author, —
a solace to his spirit amid trials which he need not
particularize. He tiring from the dinr and strife and worry
of the outer world, he entered, as by an inner gate, into
the school of the Prophets and Apostles. It was like a
^Spiritual University. It was like a .home too, — a home
for the heart. Having entered, he engaged with ardour
in the studies pursued. He found them soothing. He
found the teachers inspiring as well inspired. But he
felt peculiar attractions drawing him toward Paul. " Quid
_est enim Paulo rarius?" exclaims Melancthon.* Surely
he is a rare man, Paul. He is a rare teacher.
"Nothing" is rarer. Mingling freely with the other
scholars, — patristic, medieval, modern, and more modern,
- — whom the author found clustering around this incom
parable instructor, he listened eagerly to the divine
utterances that fell from his lips. He entered, too, with
zest into the discussions of the pupils, when, in their
.respective groups, they ventilated among themselves the
import of the Master's utterances. In these scholastic
exercises, — prosecuted without noise and wrangling,— -he
* Declamatiunculae duae in Divi Pauli Doctrinam, p. 2, ed. 1522.

vi PREFACE.
found inexpressible delight. The following Monograph
is the result of a little portion of his investigations and
reflections. The Third Chapter of the Epistle to the Romans has,
from a very early period of the Christian era, been a
special study to Paul's students. It has been regarded, —
and with great justice, — as of very peculiar significance
in relation to some of the most important doctrines of
theology. As regards more particularly the vital doctrine
of justification by faith, it is, perhaps, the principal locus
classicus that is to be found in the Bible. At that part
of the Chapter in which we find the culminating point
of the Apostle's exhibition of this great and favourite
theme, Luther, in a marginal note attached to his German
translation, arrests the attention of the reader, saying: —
" Take heed to what is here said. — It is the central and
most important passage of the Epistle, and indeed of
the entire Scripture."* Calvin coincided with Luther in
opinion. " There is probably," he remarks, " no passage
in the whole Bible of greater significance as regards the
justifying righteousness of God." t Corresponding opinions
are expressed by multitudes of other theologians and critics
whose judgements are entitled to consideration. $
It is hence the case that, if there be, in an exposition of
the Third Chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, ^anything
approximating to a thorough investigation of the broader
* Merke dies;— Ist das Hauptstiick und der Mittelplatz dieser Epistel und
der ganzen Sohrift.
f "Nullus est forte in tota Scriptura insignior locus ad vim istius justitiae
illustrandam." His French expression is,— "II n'y a pas paraventure en
toute rEscritnre tin plus excellent passage, pour exprimer la grande efficace
et la vertu magnifique de ceste justice.''
J See an ample list of quotations, inclusive of those from Luther and
Calvin, at pp. 269 — 272 of the present volume.

PREFACE. vii
aspects as well as of the minuter elements of the Apostle's
teaching, there will be the realization of theological results
of no inconsiderable magnitude and moment. The mind
will most probably acquire a very definite conception
of that " article of a standing or a falling church,"—; justifi
cation by faith without ivorks. Such other articles, too, as
are inseparably connected with that doctrine, — the articles
which refer to man's need of a gratuitous method of justi
fication, and to God's provision of propitiation as the
ground or "meritorious cause "of gracious justification,, will
probably be apprehended, and, to a certain extent, even
comprehended. In this Third Chapter of Romans the
Apostle portrays, in a most elaborate manner, man's
need of gratuitous justification. He likewise exhibits, in
some most weighty and far-reaching observations, the
necessity of propitiation, and its relation to justification.
He says something, too, of very great significance regarding
redemption and the pretermission (as well as the remis
sion) of sins.
All these subjects are carefully considered, from a critical
and exegetical point of view, in the following Monograph ;
and there has been at least an honest effort to look at them/
and to see them, in that clearest of all lights, — the light
which the Apostle's own phraseology, when fairly and
adequately analyzed and understood, is fitted to shed upon
them. The author has had in view at once the permanent
interests of Biblical Exegesis, and the present phases of
some great theological controversies. He has the convic
tion that it is matter of special moment that the minds
of theological inquirers in general, and of theological con-
trovertists in particular, should l>e recalled, at frequently
recurring intervals, to the calm investigation of the biblical

viii PREFACE.
ideas as they lie in continuity on the page of inspiration.
If such investigation does not exhaust, — as it does not, — •
the possibilities of doctrinal analysis and synthesis ; if it
leaves indeterminate, — as it does, — the measure of vital
elasticity, as regards form, of which the essential realities
of theology and religion are susceptible in thought; — it
shows nevertheless, — at least when conducted with sufficient
freedom from sectarian prepossession, and with adequate
literary .skill and scientific intuition, — what were the
actual representations of things which were evolved in
the minds of the inspired writers. When these actual
representations are actually ascertained, a touchstone is
got hold of, that is of inestimable value for testing the
legitimacy of the theological conceptions which are either
already current in. the churches, or which are pushing their
way into public notice, and seeking or demanding eccle
siastical recognition. The farther, undoubtedly, that any
doctrines diverge in form from the forms that are explicitly
exhibited on the pages of the Book, the less is the likelihood
of their resolvability, in substrate, into the biblical forms ;
and the farther, consequently, must they be removed,
so far as real authority is concerned, from the sphere of
men's consciences. The more unwieldy, too, must they be
in the matter of adaptability for exerting a wholesome
ethical influence on men's hearts and lives.
It is presumed that scholars will perceive that — what
ever may be the value of the theological results arrived
at in the following Monograph — the critical researches are
the author's own. The learned will be able, by the simplest
application of their diacritical tests, to determine that he
has not dealt in second-hand references. He trusts to the
generosity of his readers to pardon such errata of inad
vertence as are incident to works of the kind.

PREFACE. ix
As the "Work was intended to be a somewhat thorough
and fundamental expiscation of the Apostle's teachings in
the Chapter, the author has aimed at furnishing his
readers with something like a free-and-easy history of the
interpretation that has been given to the various ex
pressions of the Apostle. He could easily, of course, have
pursued another plan. He could easily have confined
himself to the exhibition and confirmation of his own
particular views. But it was a different ideal of exposi
tion on which he. wished to work. He assumed that his
readers would really feel no particular interest in finding
out his particular standpoint. He felt, himself, a genuine
interest in going round among the various standpoints
that have been occupied by other earnest thinkers, — the
thinkers who have respectively endeavoured, in the spirit
of loyal pupils, to catch and exhibit the Pauline shades of
thought. He hence occupied himself, for his special pur
pose in this Monograph, in stepping upon these various
standpoints, and looking at every subject in succession
from those peculiar angles of vision that were determined
by the relative peculiarity of the standpoints occupied.
He has not grudged this labour ; but, on the contrary, he
has taken pleasure in it, under the conviction that, if one
be able, with steady head, sich zu orientiren amid a
multiplicity of standpoints, he is all the more likely to
get deliverance from crotchets, partialities, and ideal pets,
and to acquire breadth and manysidedness of conception.
The author hopes, too, that it may not be uninteresting
to younger theologians to be introduced into the company,
— no inconsiderable circle, — of the chief Expositors of the
Epistle, patristic, medieval, and modern.
While, in the following pages, there are numerous
quotations from foreign expositors, these are nevertheless
b

X PREFACE.
almost always rendered, either literally or freely, into
English. And the original quotations themselves, as well
as Hebrew phrases, and the Apostle's own Greek expres
sions, are in general so interwoven in parentheses that the
thread of English composition runs on continuously. It is
hence the case that even such readers as cannot make free
use of foreign languages will, in all ordinary cases, be able
to follow the line of exposition without any very serious
" let or hindrance." The author does not think that it is
needful, in such expositions, to throw all kinds of observa
tions and quotations chaotically into- a heap. Neither
can he see any good reason for banishing from the domain
of scientific exegesis concinnity of logical thought and
the graces of tolerably well-sustained and classic composi
tion. Neither does he know of any valid reason why
biblical exposition, as such, should be made to run in any
of the peculiar ruts, — grammatical, logical, theological,
historical, or practical, — that have been the favourite
lines of any of his distinguished predecessors.
No special Prolegomena are required. They merge
themselves in the general Prolegomena that belong to the
Epistle as a whole. It would hence be out of place to
disintegrate the literature and literaiy history of the
Chapter from the literary history and the literature of
the entire Epistle.

Florentine Bank House,
Glasgow, Oct. 1, 1866.

ORIGINAL TEXT OF ROMANS III.
{the author's recension)
1 Tt, ovv to Trtpiaaov tov 'lovSaiov ; rj Tig fi uxpiXtca rrjg
2 TreptTOfirig ; EfoAu Kara iravra Tpoirov. WpCorov fxiv jap,
3 on tTriaravSriGav to. Aoyta tov Seov. 3 Tt yup ti riiria-
Ti\aav Tivzg; Mr) 17 amaria avroiv ttiv Ttiariv tov Stov
& Karapyriaei ; 4 Mr) yivoiro. Fiviabio Si 6 Stbg aAjiSfje,
wag oe avSpioirog iptiarrig, naSibg ytypawTai, "Onwg av
SiKaitoSrijg tv rotg \6yoig aov, Kai viicfiaqg ev Ttg
5 KpiveaSai as. 6 Et Se ij aSiKi'a i;/iwv S'soi/ SiKatoo-uiirjv
o-uuio-rr/o-tv, Tt EpoS/USi/ ; Mr; adiKog 6 S'eoc, 6 tiri^ipiov tjjv
6 bpyr\v ; — Kara av3'pto7rov Xlyw. 6 Mr) "ys'iiotro' £7T£t 7rwe
7 KptvsT 6 S'eoc tov icoa/uov ; 7 Ei >yap ri aXf/Stua tov S^oS ev
tuJ tfii^ if/tva/ian tirzpiaatvatv tig rriv So^av avrov, ti iti
8 Kayio ujg apapTuiXbg npivo/iai ; 8 Kai firi — Ka%u>g /3Aacr0jj-
juov/tE&a Kai KaSrtie (paaiv. nvtg r)fiag \iytiv on — woifiaiofitv
Ta KaKa tva ea.v?? ra ayaHa , — wv to Kpijua tvciKov
tariv.
9 9 Tt o3v ; npoE^o/iESa ; Ow Travrwe' Trpo^rtao-a/iE&a yap
'IovSatoue te Kai "EXArjvae iravrae v(f afiapTiav tivai-
10 10 KaSfwg yiypaiTTtti oti ovk 'iaTiv Sitcaiog, ovBt tig-
11 noiiK tarty 6 avviwv' ovk iariv 6 EK^rjrwv tov
12 Seov. 12 IlavTEe I^IkAivov' (ifia rixpeaiSrioav ¦
OVK EffTlV TTOttiiv ^p TJffTOT J)Ta, OVK taTIV t(l)g EVOp.
13 13Ta0oe avtigyfiivog 6 \apvy% avrwv' Tatg yAwa-
aaig avrwv tBoXiovaav. 'log uairicwv vitro ra

xii ORIGINAL TEXT OF ROMANS III.
14 -^tiXri avrwv. 14TQv to OTopa apag Kai iriKplag
15 yifiti. ls 'O^Ety oi iroStg avrwv tK\iai alfia'
16 10 avvrpififia Kai TaXanriopia tv Tatg bSotg avrwv'
1/, koi ooov Eiprjvr/c ovk tyvwaav. kjvk tariv
18 <j>6(3og Srtov airtvavTl rwv dtpSruXfiwv avrwv-
19 19 O'iSa/jLtv Si Sri oaa 6 vofiog Xtyzt, rotg tv ti£ vopw
XaXtt, i'va irav aro/ia <ppayy, Kai vjrdStKoe yiviirai irag 6
20 Koa/wg rtji Stijj- 20 Ston £? Epywv vopov ov SiKaiw&r)atTai
iraaa aapli tvwiriov avrov' Sia yap vopov tnlyvwaig a/xap-
rlag.
21 21 NWi Si XWP'C vo/iov SiKaioavvt) Sitov irt(j>avtpwrai,
22 fiapTvpov/xivr) virb tov vo/iov Kai rwv irpo$r)Twv, 22 SiKaL-
oavvri Si Srtov Sid iriartwg T?jo-ov XpiaroiJ, tig iravrag, Kai
¦£o £!rt 7Tavrae Toup 7rio"T£uovrae ov yap oiaaroAr/ Travrfe
24 ya'p rifxaprov, Kai uarEpovvrat Trje So^rjg row Srtov, 24 SiKai-
oi/xtvoi Swptav tq avrov %apiTi Sid rrje a7roAi)TjO&'o-£ii)e Trig
25 tv Xptanji Tr/o-ov, 2d ov 7rpotS,ETo 6 Sebg tAaarrjpiov, Sia
iriartwg tv rtj5 avrov difian, tig tvSlt^iv Tr)g SiKaioavvijg
avrov Sia. Trjv irapsaiv rwv Trpoysyovorwv af.iapTrifia.Twv
26 ev rrj avoY$ tov Stov, irpbg tijv ivSu%iv Tt)g SiKaioavvrig
avrov tv rip vvv Kain<j~>, tig to tivai avrbv Siaaiov Kai StKat-
oDvra tov ek iriartwg 'Iriaov.
27 27 Uov ovv 1) Kai)(r)aig; 'E^ekAeio-S'ij. Am iroiov vofiov;
Twv tpyojv ; Ob)(i' aXXa Sia vopov iriartwg.
28 28 Ao-yi^ojufiS'a o5v SiKaiovaSai iriarti avStpwirov x°'P^C
spywv vofiov.
29 29 "H 'IouSaiwv 6 Srtbg juovov ; Oi^i Se Kai e'Svuiv ; Nai
OU KOI E# VtoV E7TE17TEP Elf o Utog og oiKaiwati irspiroptiv K
iriartwg, Kai aKpo^variav Siii rrjg iriartwg.
31 31 Nd/zov o3v KarapyoO/iEV Sia rije iriartwg ; Mr) yEvotro-
aAAct vofiov iaravofitv.

TRANSLATION OF ROMANS III.

ENGLISH
AUTHORIZED VERSION.
(Paragraph I
1 WHAT advantage then hath 1
the Jew 1 or what profit is there
of circumcision ?
2 Much every way: chiefly, 2
because that unto them were
committed the oracles of God.
3 For what if some did not 3
believe ? shall their unbelief
make the faith of God- without
effect ?
4 God forbid: yea, let God 4
be true, but every man a liar;
as it is written, That thou
mightest be justified in thy say
ings, and mightest overcome
when thou art judged.
5 But if our unrighteousness
commend the righteousness of 5
God, what shall we say ? 7*
God unrighteous who taketh
vengeance 1 (I speak as a
man) 6 God forbid : for then how 6
shall God judge the world 1
7 For if the truth of God 7
hath more abounded through
my lie unto his glory; why
yet am I also judged as a
sinner ?

AUTHOR'S
REVISED VERSION.
) 1 What then is the preemi
nence of the Jew ? or what
the advantage of circumci
sion ? 2 Much in every re
spect.' For, in the first place,
they were intrusted with the
oracles of God. s For what
although some believed not?
Shall their unbelief make the
faithfulness of God to fail 1
4 Far be it ! Let God on
the contrary turn out to be
true, but every man a liar,
as it has been written, That
thou mightest be justified in
thy words, and overcome when
thou enterest into judgement.
6 But if our unrighteousness
sets off God's righteousness,
what shall we say 1 Is God
unrighteous, who inflicteth
wrath ? — I speak after the
manner of man. 6Far be
it ! Since how shall God
judge the world ? 7 For if
the trueness of God supera-
bounded through my lie, unto
his glory, why notwithstand
ing am even I judged as a

XIV

TRANSLATION OF ROMANS III.

Authorized Version.
8 And not rather, (as we
be slanderously reported, and
as some affirm that we say,)
Let us do evil, that good may
come ? whose damnation is
just.

Revised Version.
8 sinner? 8 and (why) might we
not — as we are slandered and
as some allege that we say
that we might — do evil that
good might come ? — whose
judgement is just.

(Paragraph II.)

9 What then ? are we better
than they 2 No, in no wise : for
we have before proved both Jews
and Gentiles, that they are all
under sin ;
10 As it is written, There is
none righteous, no, not one :
1 1 There is none that under-
standeth, there is none that
seeketh after God.
12 They are all gone out of
the way, they are together be
come unprofitable ; there is none
that doeth good, no, not one..
13 Their throat is an open
sepulchre ; with their tongues
they have used deceit ; the poison
of asps is under their lips :
14 Whose mouth is full of
cursing and bitterness :
15 Their feet are swift to
shed blood :
16 Destruction and misery
are in their ways :
17 And the way of peace have
they not known :
18 There is no fear of God
before their eyes.
19 Now we know that what
things soever the law saith, it
saith to them who are under the
law : that every mouth may be

9 9What then? Do we
put forth pleas in our own
behalf? No certainly; for we
before impeached both Jews
and Greeks of being all under
10 sin : — 10 as it has been writ
ten, There is none righteous,
1 1 not even one : n there is none
who understandeth : there is
none who is seeking out God.
12 12 All turned aside : together
they became corrupt : there is
none doing goodness ; there is
13 not so much as one. 1S Their
throat is a sepulchre opened:
with their tongues they were
using deceit. Asps' venom is un-
1 4 der their lips. u Whose mouth
is full of cursing and bitter-
15 ness. 15 Their feet are swift
16 to shed blood: 16 destruction
and misery are in their ways;
17 17and the way of peace they
18 did not know. 18 There is not
the fear of God before;their eyes.
19 19 But we know that what
soever things the law saith,
it speaketh to them who are
in (the sphere of) the law,
that every mouth might be
stopped, and all the world
become liable to pay pen-

TRANSLATION OF ROMANS III.

XV

Authorized Version.
stopped, and all the world may
become guilty before God.
20 Therefore by the deeds of
the law there shall no flesh be
justified in his sight : for by the
law is the knowledge of sin.

Revised Version.
20 alty to God; 2° because by
works of law shall nobody
be justified before him: for
through law is knowledge
of sin.

(Paragraph
21 But now the righteousness 21
of God without the law is mani
fested, being witnessed by the
law and the prophets ;
22 Even the righteousness of 22
God which is by faith of Jesus
Christ unto all and upon all
them that believe: for there is
no difference : 23
23 For all have sinned, and
come short of the glory of 24
God; 24 Being justified freely by
his grace through the redemp
tion that is in Christ Jesus : 25
25 Whom God hath set forth
to be a propitiation through faith
in his blood, to declare his righ
teousness for the remission of
sins that are past, through the
forbearance of God ; 26
26 To declare, / say, at this
time his righteousness : that he
might be just, and the justi-
fier of him which believeth in
Jesus.

21 But now without law
God's righteousness has been
manifested, being attested
by the law and the prophets,
22 even God's righteousness
through faith in Jesus Christ,
unto all, and upon all the
believing ; for there is no
difference: K for all sinned,
and are fallen short of the
glory of God, 24 being justi-
tified freely by his grace,
through the redemption
which is in Christ Jesus,
25 whom God set (publicly)
forth (as) propitiatory, —
(available) through faith in
his blood, — for demonstration
of his righteousness, because
of the pretermission of the
sins of former times m in the
forbearance of God, — in order
to the demonstration of his
righteousness in the present
time, that he may be righ
teous even in justifying him
who is of faith in Jesus. ¦

(Paragraph /K)
27 Where is boasting then ? 27 -27 Where then is the glo-
It is excluded. By what law ? rying ? Shut out. By what

XVI

TRANSLATION OF ROMANS III.

Authorized Version.
of works ? Nay : but by the
law of faith.
28 Therefore we conclude
that a man is justified by faith
without the deeds of the law.
29 Is lie the God of the Jews
only? is he not also of the
Gentiles ? Yes, of the Gentiles
also: 30 Seeing it is one God, which
shall justify the circumcision by
faith, and uncircumcision through
faith. 31 Do we then make void
the law through faith ? God
forbid: yea, we establish the
law.

Revised Version.
kind of a law ? Of works ?
Nay, but by the law of faith.
28 28We reckon, then, that
a man is justified by faith
without works of law.
29 29Is God (the God) of
Jews only? Is he not, on
the contrary, (the God) of
Gentiles also ? Yes, of Gen-
30 tiles also ; 30 seeing it is one
God who shall justify cir
cumcision by faith, and un
circumcision through faith.
31 31 Do we then abolish
law through faith ? Far be
it ! On the contrary, we
establish law.

RELATION OF ROMANS III TO THE CONTENTS OF
THE EPISTLE IN GENERAL.

The Third Chapter of the Epistle to the Romans is a wheel
within a wheel. This is just what might have been
expected, when we consider that the entire Epistle, of
which it is an integrant part, is a marvellous pile of finely-
adjusted intervolutions of theological argument and religious
exhortation. It is a magnificent specimen of complexity
and unity combined.
The situation of Chapter III,— relatively to the com
plicated mass of the Epistle in general, — is in the special
department of theological argumentation, (Chapters I — XI),
as distinguished from the special department of religious
exhortation, (Chapters XII — XVI). And if we partition
off the special department of theological argumentation
into sections, we find that Chapter III occupies the centre
of that great and important section, (Chapters I — V),
which treats of justification, as distinguished from that
other great and important section, (Chapters VI — VIII),
which treats of sanciification.
In the first twenty verses of the Chapter, the argumenta
tion is linked on to that portion of the Apostle's discussion
in which he shows that all men need some gracious
method of justification, — Chapter- I 18 — Chapter III 20.
In the remaining verses, — 21 to 31, — it 'is linked on to
that other side of the Apostle's discussion on this topic, —
its glory-side, — in which he shows that there is, available

Xviii ANALYSIS OF ROMANS III.
to all men, a gracious method of justification, through a
righteousness provided by* Cod Himself, — Chapter III 21 —
Chapter IV. The meridian line that divides these two
hemispheres of argumentation runs between verses 20 and
21. In what lies on the one side of this line, the Apostle
shows that Jews, privileged though they had been, as
compared with Gentiles, are nevertheless unrighteous, and
therefore need some gracious method of justification. In
what lies on the other side of the line, he shows that, both
for Jews and Gentiles, without distinction, and notwith
standing their sins, justification is a grand possibility.
It is a possibility through the righteousness of God — the
Propitiation of Christ.

ANALYSIS OF ROMANS III.
The Third Chapter of Romans is quadripartite in its
structure. In the first part, — verses 1st — 8th, — the Apostle
meets an objection, that might be suggested by his remarks
at the conclusion of Chapter II in reference to the true
Jew and the true circumcision. In the second part, —
verses 9th — 20th, — he establishes the fact of the unrigh
teousness of both Jews and Gentiles, and their consequent
need of justification by grace. In the third part, — verses
21st — 26th, — he exhibits the gracious method of justifica
tion which God has devised, and which is equally available
to Jews and Gentiles. In the fourth and last part, —
verses 27th — 31st, — he jubilantly crowns his exhibition
of the gracious < plan of justification with a wreath, or
cluster, of doctrinal corollaries, — each of momentous moral
significance.

ANALYSIS OF ROMANS III. xix
The discussion in the first two sections of the Chapter,
— verses 1st — 8th, 9th — 20th, — is a pendant on the great
discussion which is prosecuted throughout the Second
Chapter of the Epistle, — and which has for its aim the
establishment of the fact that the Jews, just as truly as
the Gentiles, need a gracious method of justification. The
evangelical exhibitions of the other two sections of the
Chapter, — verses 21st — 26th, 27th — 31st, — connect them
selves, evolutionary, with the theme of the whole Epistle,
as announced, in brief, in the 16th and 17th verses of
Chapter I.

A TABLE OF REFERENCE
TO A FEW OP THE MORE SALIENT TOPICS CRITICALLY AND EXEGETI-
CALLY ELUCIDATED IN THE FOLLOWING MONOGRAPH.

Paoh
1. " The oracles of God," tu Xoyta tov Seou, what? . 14
2. 'Airiariw, does it mean 'to be unfaithful, or to be unbe
lieving? ........ 22
3. Mr) yivovro not always to be translated, with propriety,
God forbid!  31
4. Hag Si avSpwrrog iptvarrig. Is it the case that every
man is a liar? ....... 35
5. KpivtaSai, in verse 4, middle, not passive; and thus the
Septuagint version vindicated, .... 41
6. Hoir)awptv, in verse 8, how to be construed, . . 80
7. I1P0EX0ME9A, in verse 9, does not mean, Are we
better (than tltey)? but, Do we put forth pleas in our
own behalf? — Do we screen ourselves? . . 93 — 104
8. "Iva, in verse 20, means, in order that, . . . 141
9. 'YiroSiKog r<j> Stij> does not mean guilty before God, but,
liable to pay penalty to God, . . . . .147
10. Works of law, what does the expression mean ? . . 154
11. Law, — the chief references, in the New Testament writ
ings, of this several-sided term, . . . .156
12. JUSTIFICATION.— The meaning of the word, . .163
 Its usage in the New Testament, 165
 Its interpretation in the Patristic
writings, .... 172
_  Its interpretation by the Council
of Trent, . . . .177
_,  Theclassical importof Sikoiow, 179 — 189
 Reason of the peculiar meaning
of SiKaiow in New Testament, 1 89

xxii TABLE OF REFERENCE.

Page

236

JUSTIFICATION.— The Hebrew synonyms of SiKaiow,
and the passages in which
they occur, . . .190
13. God's evangelical righteousness, what is it ? . . • 207
14. Wang 'Iriaov Xpiarov, in verse 22, what does it mean ? 219
15. Unto all, and upon all the believing, in verse 22. The
genuineness of the two clauses vindicated, and
their import discriminated, . . . • ¦ 224
16. Fallen short of the glory of God,— the meaning of the
expression, .....¦••
17. 'AD.0AYTPQ2IS, or REDEMPTION, what is it? 251—266
18. 'IAA2THPI0N, in verse 25,— what does it mean ? 279—305
19. Christ's blood, — in what respect the object of faith, . 312
20. The necessity of the propitiatory blood. It was needed
" for demonstration of God's righteousness," . 314
21. I1APE2IS or PRETERMISSION of sins committed
before the death of Christ, — what is it? . . 323
22. The improper division of verses 25 and 26 by Robert
Stephens, ........ 334
23. "Just and the Justifier," Sitcaiov koi Sikoiovvto. It
should be translated "righteous even in justifying," 341
24. Legitimate and illegitimate " glorying," . . . 354
25. Rationale of the expression " law of faith," . . 361 — 365
26. Whether should we read ovv or yap in verse 28 ? . 368
27. The explicit and implicit object of justifying faith, . 375
28. Luther's "alone "'in verse 28,  377
29. Solafidianism, . . . . . . . .379
30. The rationale of the different prepositions in the expres
sions ek iriartwg and Sia Trig iriartwg, . . 396
31. The particle »}, in verse 29, — should it be translated or,
or should it, as in our English version, remain un
translated ?  400
32. Karap-yEO), one of the Apostle's favourite words, — its
meaning and manifold applications, . . . 404
33. Should we read larwpiv or laravoptv in verse 31? . 41

o

34. The involution of sanctification in justification, . . 414

THE SUM OF
Romans, Chapter III.
INCLTTA JUDMM QUAMVIS SIT GLORIA GENUS,
Criminibus P(ENAS commeruere tamen:
n"on etenim prosunt divinie dogmata legis;
Sola juvat miseros gratia ljeta Dei.
rodolphus grualtherus
(Argumenta).

"Et AMANDA ET MAGNIFACIENDA EST GrHAMMATICA
ENARRATIO VOOABULORUM, QUORUM USUS EST IN PEAE-
OIPUIS LOOIS DOCTRINAE CCELESTIS. ECCLESIA ENIM
INTEBPKETATIONE SUA NON OIGNIT NOVA DOGMATA; SED
QUjE TRADITA ET PATEEACTA SUNT VOCE DIVINA,
SORUTATUR, DISCIT, ET ACOIPIT." — CHEMNITIUS.
{De Justifications, Cap. iii.)

THE THIED CHAPTEE

THE EPISTLE TO THE EOMANS.

Verse 1. — TV ovv to iriaiGaav tov '\ovhulov; % tic %
ditpekeiu Trjg mpiTOfArjg ;
English Authorized Version. What advantage then hath
the Jew? or what profit is there of circumcision?
Revised Version. What then is the preeminence of the
Jew? or what the advantage of circumcision?
§ 1. Koppe thinks that the new chapter should not have
commenced here. {Male hie novi capitis initium consti-
tuitur.) De Brais, long before, had expressed a similar
opinion. These critics would undoubtedly be right in their
idea, if we were to suppose that the division of the Epistle
into chapters must represent the partition of its contents
into exceedingly distinct sections. There is no such parti
tion: and, probably, Hugo de Sancto Caro did not aim at
very great precision in the way of effecting a correspond
ence between his capitular divisions and the logical group
ings of the inspired text. His aim was, predominantly, one
of convenience for purposes of reference.
§ 2. This first verse consists of two affiliated interroga
tions, — the second echoing the first, but substituting a
particular, instead of a general, idea: — What then is the
B

2 ROMANS III. 1.
preeminence of the Jew? or what the advantage of cir
cumcision? In the interrogations there is doubtless the
embodiment of thoughts which would be regarded by
the Apostle as probable objections to the doctrine, which,
toward the conclusion of the second chapter, he had been
engaged in inculcating. And thus, in proposing the in
terrogations, he wisely anticipates the objections to his
doctrine, which some of his readers might be disposed to
start. By anticipating them, he gets the opportunity of
meeting and removing them.
In this anticipation, however, of possible and probable
objections, the Apostle does not formally summon an objec
tor into the arena of dispute; and consequently he does not
formally transfer to the objector's mouth the queries which
he proposes. Ewbank puts the case far too artificially
when he says, — "Here a Jewish objector starts up, and
interrupts the argument." Taylor commits a still greater
exaggeration, when he says of the Apostle, — " Here he
" seasonably introduces a dialogue between himself and
" the Jew, which," he adds, "would amuse, and, at the same
" time, instruct the latter, and possibly cool his resentment:
" especially as the Apostle's answer to the first question is
" much in his favour.'' Taylor accordingly supposes, — and
he is followed by Macknight, Adam Clarke, and others, —
that it is a Jew who speaks in verses 1, 3, 5, 7, and the
1st clause of verse 9, while the Apostle, as he imagines,
replies in verses 2, 4, 6, 8, and the 2nd clause of verse 9.
Others arrange the dialogue in a somewhat different manner.
Some, for instance, suppose that it is the Apostle who
speaks in verse 1, and a Jew who replies in verses 2 and
3 : the Apostle is supposed to speak again in verse 4, the
Jew in verse 5, and the Apostle again in verse 6, &c.
Heumann supposes that the dialogue extends to the close
of verse 22. — With respect to the first verse of the chapter,
in particular, many critics, in addition to those already
specified, have regarded it as spoken in the person of a
Jewish objector, as, for example, Pelagius {ex persona Judcei
interrogantis dicitur), Hunnius, Oertel, Walford. But it is
far more in harmony with the Apostle's standpoint to

ROMANS III. 1. 3
suppose, with Origen, that he anticipatingly proposes the
interrogations to himself, {occurrens, proponit sibi ipsi).'
"He proposes to himself an objection," says (Ecumenius,
{avTiTiSriaiv havTy). "He proposes these things to himself
by way of objection," says the scholiast in Matthsei, (ain-o?
iavT^> Tavra avrtrt&jjiTt). The best modern critics, such as
de Wette, Fritzsche, Meyer, Philippi, Tholuck (in his 4th
and 5th editions), Oltramare, are of the same opinion.
There is no need for a formal refutation of the notion of
Seb. Schmidt,— adopted by Ch. Schmid,— that the interro
gations are proposed in the person of a Gentile zealot, who
felt that he could not let the opportunity pass of glorying
over the Jew, and asking exultingly, "What, then is the
superiority of the Jew? and what the advantage of circum
cision ? " There is nothing whatever to indicate the intrusion
of such an exultatory element.
§ 3. Wltat then is the preeminence — the prerogative — of
the Jew ? (Tt o5v to irepiaabv tov lovSaiov ;) The illa
tive particle then {ovv) connects the interrogation with the
concluding statements of the preceding chapter. It is in
these statements that we find the originating occasion of
the interrogation. It is as if the Apostle were to say, —
But if indeed it be the case that it is the inward Jew
who is the true Jew, and. the inward Circumcision which
is the true Circumcision ; — if it be the case that the out
ward Uncircumcision of the Centiles, who Jceep the statutes
of the law, shall be counted to them for Circumcision, and
that tliey shall condemn the outwardly circumcised trans
gressors of the law; — if all this be the case, then the
question may be forcing itself upon the minds of not a few,
— What is the prerogative of the {ethnological) Jew? —
What is the superior condition of the {ethnological) Jew ?
— Wherein consists the peculiar privilege or preeminence
which we must ascribe to the {ethnological) Jew ? The ex
pression, which, with Calvin, Er. Schmid, H. A. Schott (in
his 3rd and 4th editions), and others, we may freely render
prerogative, {to irtpiaaov), means surplus: — What is the
surplus of the Jew? that is, What is the surplus of privilege

4. ROMANS III. 1.
which belongs to the Jew? (Compare the Hebrew, in*, pip:,
Trfi') The whole expression is well rendered by the
Vulgate, — " What therefore is there over and above to
the Jew ? " {Quid ergo amplius Judaeo est ?) It is trans
lated in the Rhemes,- — " What preeminence then hath the
Jew?" Tyndale gives it, — "What preferment then hath
the Jew?" The ,Eng. Geneva better, "What is then the
preferment of the Jew ? " Not so happily Coverdale, "What
furtheraunce then have the Jewes ? " Erasmus's version is,
" What therefore hath the Jew in which he excels?" {Quid
igitur habet in quo praecellat Judaeus?) Melancthon's,
" In what therefore does the Jew excel ? " {Qua igitur re
antecellit Judaeus ?)
Knight" translates the interrogation thus,-— "What ad
vantage, .or use, then, was there of the Jew?" — that is
— "What was the advantage of their calling?" — "What
was the use of separating them at all as a nation from
the mass of mankind?" He supposes that the question
"points to the object of the calling of the Jews, in con
nection with God's intentions towards mankind, and as
introductory to the proclamation of the Gospel; and not
with reference to the advantage of their calling to the
Jews themselves." He adds, — "St. Chrysostom, Theo
phylact, OEcumenius, and Melancthon, are, I think, the
only commentators who at all adopt this interpretation."
But not one of these commentators really adopts his inter
pretation: although Chrysostom and Melancthon run up
the Apostle's querj'-, very naturally, into this, — What reason
had God for conferring peculiarities of prerogative upor$
the Jews, if these peculiarities involved after all no real
privilege? Theophylact echoes Chrysostom. But Knight
misquotes GScumenius for Theodoret, who is quoted by
(Ecumenius. And he did not know that many other
expositors express exactly the same ideas, as those quoted
by him from Chrysostom and Melancthon; as, for example,
Musculus, Gualther, Grotius, Spener, Klee, Riickert, Gilpin.
It ill became one who knew nothing of the host of German
critics, and nothing of the Dutch and French, and but little
even of others, whether ancient, medieval, or modern, to

ROMANS HI. 2: 5
say that he thinks the four expositors, whom he names,
stand alone in their interpretation. His view, moreover,
of the interpretation of his four precursors, and thus his
view of the import of the Apostle's interrogation* is incon
sistent with the possibilities of the inspired phraseology.
The expression which we have freely rendered, preeminence
or prerogative, {to irtpiaaov), cannot possibly mean " advan
tage or use." It brings into view, as we have seen, the
idea of surplus, or relative abundance. It may denote
relative advantage ; but it cannot denote use.
§ 4. or what the advantage of circumcision? {i) Tig r)
wQiXeia Tr)g irtpiroprjg,) — or what is the benefit of that
ceremonial circumcision which is so distinguishing a char
acteristic of the {ethnological) Jew ? — The Apostle subjoins
to his first and chief interrogation this second and subor
dinate one in reference to circumcision, because circumcision
was regarded as the principal badge of outward Judaism,
and because he had occasion to specify it, in a prominent
manner, in verses 25 — 29 of the preceding chapter. " Cir
cumcision," says he, " verily profiteth {wftXti), if thou keep
the law." (ver. 25.) It is no doubt, however, singled out
and signalised representatively in the interrogation before
us. It is as if the Apostle had said, — What is the benefit
accruing to tlie Jews from all the peculiarities, which con
stitute them a separated people ?

Verse 2. UoXd kolto. nravTo, Tnowov. TlpuTov ffsv yap
or; iTiirTsv^fiffixv tcL ~koyia tov &tov.
Engl. Auth. Vers. Much every way : chiefly, because that
unto them were committed the oracles of God.
Revised Version. Much in every respect. For, in the first
place, they were intrusted with the oracles of God.
§ 1. The Apostle answers his own questions thus: —
Much in every respect, (IloXv Kara iravTa rpoitov). The

(J ROMANS 111. 2.
gender of the adjective translated much is neuter, {iroXv),
and some expositors, such as Meyer and van Hengel,
suppose that, as such, it refers indifferently to the two
objects, which are queried in the preceding verse, — that
is, both to the surplus of privilege belonging to the Jew,
and to the benefit of ceremonial circumcision. Erasmus,
on the other hand, conjectured — {inaniter et intempestive-
Este) — that the word should be written, not as neuter,
but as feminine {iroXXr'i) ; supposing that its reference
is exclusively to the second interrogation, — " What is
the benefit (1/ wtyiXtia) of circumcision?" In this con
jecture he had been anticipated by at least one unim
portant manuscript, viz. 120 ; and he has been followed
by several of the obscurer editors of the text. In Bebelius's
edition, for example, of 1535, and in Platter's of 1540,
and in the Froschouiana edition of 1547, we read 7roXX»j.
According to Calvin, the second interrogation of the fore
going verse explains the meaning of the first : and thus, in
substantial agreement with the exegesis of Erasmus, he
supposes that in the answer, "much in every respect," there
is a predominating reference to the advantage of circum
cision. A wider view, however, of the Apostle's reference
is requisite. The neuter gender of the adjective {iroXv)
naturally leads the thought back to the neuter word in
the first interrogation, (r6 irtpiaaov), the surplus {of privi
lege). And when the Apostle proceeds to disintegrate the
" much," and to say " for, in the first place, they were
intrusted with the oracles of God," we see that his mind
was thinking rather of the Jews, in their personality, than of
their ceremonial circumcision. ' And thus, — as in relation to
the 29th verse of the preceding chapter, — we may legiti
mately conclude that the idea of the second clause, concern
ing circumcision, becomes merged in the idea of the first,
concerning the circumcised Jew. And hence the answer to
the second query is implicitly involved in the explicit
answer to the first : — The surplus of privilege belonging to
the Jew — the preeminence of the Jew — is much.
When the Apostle says that the Jew's surplus of pri
vilege is "much in every respect" (koto 7ravra rpoVov), his

ROMANS III. i. 7:
language should not be measured off as ' by a precisely
scientific foot-rule, and hence pronounced to be a "hyper
bolical" way of denoting "in many respects," {hyperbolisch,
in vielfacher Rucksicht,-Reiche). Neither has the expres
sion, — as Day, followed by Haldane, supposes, — "no other
efficacy than to make a strong asseveration or affirmation,
as if he should say, very much." Neither does it mean
"certainly very much," or, "without doubt much;"— though
such is the interpretation of Luther {zwar fast viel), and
Tyndale {surely very moche), and Calvin . {omnino multa);
of Castellio too {multa omnino); of Koppe also {multum
omnino), and Zinzendorf {gewiss in vielen dingen), and
Flatt {allerdings liaben sie viele Vorzuge), and indeed many
others, — more especially of the older critics. The expression
employed by the Apostle, though idiomatically susceptible,
in certain cases, of this translation, is yet far more com
monly used in its simple and obvious sense. (See Wetstein
and Raphe!) It is just the opposite of "in no respect,"
((car ovSiva rpoTrof, 2 Mace. xi. 31 ; Polyb. Hist. iv. 84. 8).
And there is no reason for departing, in the case before us,
from the natural interpretation. The surplus of privileges1
enjoyed by the Jews, in relation to things moral, spiritual,'
and eternal, over and above the privileges enjoyed by the
Gentiles, was assuredly, and without any exaggeration, "much
in every respect" — "much," that is to say, "in every view
of the case that can be rationally taken." If, for example,
we consider the Jews as susceptible of blissful influence;
in a hereditary manner, from the sires of their race, we see
that they were highly exalted in privilege; for "theirs
were the patriarchal fathers," — Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.
(Eom. ix. 5.) If we consider them as susceptible of bliss
ful influence from ordinances of religion, eminently sig
nificant and sublimely typical, we see again that they
were peculiarly exalted in privilege, for their ritual of
religious "service" (their Xarpsta) was incomparably
superior to that of all surrounding peoples. (Eom. ix. 4.)
If we consider them as susceptible of blissful influence
from a legislative code of preeminent moral purity, we
see again that they were peculiarly privileged, for the

8 ROMANS III. 8.
core of their whole legislative system was a singularly
pure and complete edition of the moral law. (Eom. ix. 4.)
If we consider them as susceptible of blissful influence
from the zealous ministrations of faithful, uncorrupted,
and incorruptible instructors and reformers, we see again
that they were singularly privileged in having had among
them a succession of holy and devoted prophets, "who
spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." If we
consider them as susceptible of blissful influence from
a very special divine providence guiding them, restraining
them, constraining them, hedging them round and round
in the way of shutting them off from evil, and in the way
of shutting them up to good, surely we must see again that
their surplus of privilege was very great. And if we con
sider it a means of peculiarly blissful influence to have
a high ideal presented to the mind, and a lofty aspiration
stirred within the heart; then in the exhibition of the
Messiah to come, as the "Seed " par excellence, that was
germinally enclosed in their distinctively Abrahamic "seed,"
— in this exhibition, as forming indeed the very central
element of the Jewish peculiarities, we see that the Jews
enjoyed a privilege that was altogether unrivalled and
inestimable. In short, view the subject as we may, "the
surplus of privilege belonging to the Jews" is, — both in
tensively and extensively, as logicians speak, — " much in
every respect." They possessed, as Grotius remarks, far
greater facilities, than the Gentiles, for attaining that
inward piety, without which neither Gentile nor Jew can
be fit to be an heir of unending glory. (Eadem in utroque
pietas apud Deum valet; sed ut ad earn perveniat, Israelita
sive circumcisus aliquis faciliores habet aditus.)
§ 2. For, first, they were intrusted with the oracles of
God, {TlpwTov piv yap on lirtaTtvSrriaav ra Xoyta tov SeoD).
There is considerable difficulty in determining whether the
ratiocinative particle for {yap), — straDgely called an illative
by Turner, — really belongs to the text, or is a spurious
addition. Lachmann has dismissed it. It is wanting in
BDEG; and in the Peshito, Italic, and Vulgate versions,

ROMANS III. S. 9
and hence too in Pelagius and Ambrosiaster ; and also in
Chrysostom 's text. Fritzsche suspects that it is apocryphal,
and has enclosed it within brackets. Eiickert too .(2nd ed.)
and Tholuck (5th ed.) hold it for suspected, Burton too
suspects it. And Oltramare rejects it. On the other hand,.
it is found in SAIL, and in the Philoxenian Syriac, and
in Theodoret, Theophylact, and GEcumenius. And it is
retained by Griesbach, Scholz, and Tischendorf. It would
certainly appear to be more difficult to account for its
deliberate intrusion into the text, than for its unintentional
omission, or, even its deliberate extrusion, (for it might seem
to some to embarrass somewhat the subsequent 6Vt) ¦. and
hence we are disposed to regard it as belonging to the
autograph of the Apostle's epistle. For, first. — It is as if
the Apostle had said, I may well use the word much ; the
surplus of privilege enjoyed by the Jews is indeed much ;
for, first, they tuere intrusted with the oracles of God.
¦ (a.) The import of the word first {irpwrov) has been
considerably disputed. It is regarded by some as an adjec
tive, and as having the signification of principal or chief.
This is the view that is taken by Abelard, Beza, Eollock, .
Wolf, Heumann, Michaelis, Bolten, Flatt,, Stuart, Greve, &c.
These expositors supply the substantive verb, to fill up the
construction. They are fairly represented by Beza, who
translated the clause thus : — "For the principal is this, that
they were intrusted with the oracles of God," {primarium
enim illud est quod eis credita sunt eloquia Dei). It is,
however, an objection to this interpretation, that it does
not vindicate the preceding affirmation, — "much, in every
respect." We do not prove anything to be " much," far less
to be "much in every way," when we merely adduce its
" principal " ingredient. That which is little may have its
principal ingredient, as well as that which is much. The
subject, moreover, of which the quality of "principal" would
be predicated, -could not, according to this interpretation,
be some disintegrated ingredient of the much surplus of
privilege enjoyed by the Jews.' It would require, according
to the grammatical interrelations of the passage, to be the
entire surplus itself. But in that; case there would be no

10 ROMANS III. 2.
room left for any secondary ingredients of prerogative. We
must then abandon this interpretation of the word first.
Fritzsche, Eiickert, van Hengel, T. Schott, &c, agree
with the critics whose opinion we have just been consider
ing, in regarding the word as an adjective: but they think
that it means first in the order of enumeration, not chief
in the order of importance. It is obvious, however, that
similar objections lie against this interpretation ; and more
particularly does its incongruity appear, when we consider
that the subject, which would be qualified by the adjectival
term first, must, on the assumption of the correctness of the
interpretation, be the whole surplus of privilege belonging
to the Jews. But if the whole surplus be first in the order
of enumeration, what part of it will remain over to be
second ?
There can be little doubt that we should dismiss the idea
that first is an adjective. It is manifestly an adverb; and
has been so regarded by the majority of critics. This
majority, however, divides itself into two distinct classes.
The one, represented by le Fevre, Calvin, Este, Vitringa,
Koppe, Ernesti, regard the adverb as used qualitatively,
meaning chiefly, or, as Vater gives it, " before all other
things," {ante omnia alia). To this class the authors of the
English Geneva version {chieflye), and the French Geneva
{sur tout), and our English authorized version, belong.
Apparently, too, Theodoret, (ptyiarri yap avrri npri). The
other class, — embracing Erasmus, Luther, Piscator, Grotius,
Cocceius, Boysen, de Wette, Meyer, Baumgarten-Crusius,
Hodge, Krehl, Maier, Ewald, &c, — regard the adverb as
used quantitatively, having its common signification, firstly,
or, in the first place, and indicating an order of enumera
tion. This latter class would doubtless have swallowed up
the greater proportion of the former, had it not been the
case that in the Apostle's discourse there is no prosecution
of the enumeration. (There is no StvTtpov Si or iietiTa Si, or
any similar expression.) And men who think and feel
reverently on the subject of inspiration, shrink and feel
repelled when the idea is thrust in upon them by such
expositors as Fritzsche, that, in the ardour of composition,

ROMANS III. 2. 11
the Apostle forgot to finish his discourse in the way that,
at the outset, he had intended. It is certainly, to say the
least of it, quite unnecessary to assume such forgetfulness.
It' is enough to know that the Apostle was not punctilious
in the matter of rhetorical composition. He made no pre
tension to " wisdom of words." And, wielding as he did a
foreign language, we need not marvel that his extraordinary
vehemence of feeling broke loose from some of the more
symmetrical forms of discourse. It is an objection to the
interpretation of le Fevre, and Calvin, and their followers,
that the particle (jxiv) associated with this adverb, naturally
leads the mind to look out for other particulars, (which
might be introduced by the correlative Si). It is thus the
case, as Piscator technically remarks; that it is impossible
to avoid the admission that there is an anantapodoton.
The Apostle's expression certainly imports, as saj^s Cocceius,
" that there are other prerogatives." And these other pri
vileges must have actually streamed out into view before
the Apostle's thoughts, while he dictated the word first.
The enumeration in chapter ix. 4, 5, is evidence that his
mind was full on the subject. But certainly we need not
suppose, with Grotius, that the Apostle, as it were, deli
berately suspends, till he reaches that advanced portion of
his discussion, the specification of the remaining list of
advantages. {Sermonem autem hunc hie non consummat
apostolus, sed differt in cap. ix. 4.) This would be to turn
the whole intervening part of the epistle into an immense
parenthesis. And yet Hammond did not hesitate to gulp
such an idea: — "An objection," he says, "here diverted
the Apostle's purpose for many chapters together, not per
mitting him to return from that digression till chapter ix.,
where he falls again to the same matter, and enumerates
the remainder of those privileges." This is outre. But we
may imagine that the real state of the Apostle's thoughts
might be thus represented: — I may well aver that the
surplus of privilege belonging to the Jew is much in every
respect; for, in the first place, — and I need not at present
stop to specify the other particulars, — they were intrusted
with the oracles of God.

12 ROMANS III. 2.
{b.) In the original there is a demonstrative particle (Sri)
standing before the verb intrusted {iirtaTtvOriaav):—"that
they were intrusted." It may be advantageously omitted
in English translation. But it is to be accounted for, by
supposing that the fulness of the Apostle's expression wduld
have been something like the following : — for, in the first
place, it is a privilege that tliey were intrusted with the
oracles of God, {irpwrov piv yap wtpiaaov ti kanv on
k. t. X., or, irpwTov piv yap irtpiaaevovaiv on k. t. X.).
It would appear that this demonstrative particle {on) was
either omitted in some ancient copies of the text, or was
overlooked by some ancient expositors, so that the word
first (which was sometimes freely changed into a plural
adjective, 7rp<Jrot,) was construed with the verb intrusted: —
for' they first were intrusted with 'the oracles' of God, — the
Jews first, and Christians afterwards. This, if we may judge
from Eufinus's translation, was the interpretation of Origeri :
and, singular to relate, it has been adopted and defended
by Seb. Schmidt. It cannot, however, be considered for a
moment as a probable interpretation, unless we either
obliterate the demonstrative particle, or make, according to
the suggestion of Hombergk, a "trajection" of it to the
commencement of the clause, {oti yap irpwrov piv, &c), — a
pair of alternatives, for either of which we have no valid
authority whatever.
(c.) The expression which we have rendered, they were
intrusted with the oracles of God, {hiriaTtvSriaav r« Xoyia tov
Sftov), is susceptible of a different construction. The word
oracles may be regarded as the nominative to the verb ; and
the whole clause may be rendered thus, — the oracles of God
were believed. This interpretation is mentioned by Chry
sostom, as one that was approved of by some, at or before
his time. . And Melville hesitates to reject it. Heinfetter
gives it. But, as Chrysostom correctly remarks, the context
does not admit of it, {aXXa. to t&ig ouk afitiat tovto
vopiZtadai). Koppe adopts the same principle of construction, though
he does not attach to the verb the same signification. He
would translate the clause thus, — the promises of God were

ROMANS III. 2. 1 3
'confirmed to them; that is, — as he explains, — The Jews, as
distinguished from the Gentiles, had reliable promises of
God. The ingenious critic invented a meaning for the verb.
And, in appealing to the Septuagint version of Ps.jXcii. 5,
and 1 Kings viii. 21, in support of the * translation, he
actually confounded a totally different verb {tiriaTwSriaav),
with that which is employed by the apostle {ImaTtvSiiaav).
And yet de Dieu, trusting to the use of the word in 2 Thess.
i. 10, gave the same interpretation to the clausule, and was,
indeed, the means, direct or indirect, of misleading Koppe.
Cramer too was similarly misled. Hombergk also was so
far misled, as to think that the expression might be thus
interpreted {non absurde). And . good honest Gottfried
Wichmanh contends strongly for the translation. So too
D. G. Herzog. Wakefield too. And Jones assumes it on
the authority of Wakefield. But nothing is more certain
than that the verb, if not translated were believed, must be
rendered were intrusted.
But while the verb must be rendered were intrusted,
it must not be supposed that the clause might, so far as
structure is concerned, be literally translated, the oracles
of God were intrusted {to them). On the contrary, the
usage of the verb demonstrates, that the word oracles is in
the accusative ; — the nominative to the verb being the un
expressed pronoun, which would have been in the dative,
had the verb been used in the active voice. The verb
{iriaTtvw), when used transitively in reference to a twofold
object {iriar'tvw nvi n) means to intrust, to confide, to com
mit to the custody of. And when it is employed in the
passive, under the same rubric of signification, the object
intrusted is not expressed in the nominative {iriaTtvtTai
Tlvl T t); — as le Fevre assumed, and as Philippi seems to think
it sometimes is, and as the second corrector of the Codex
Boemerianus, or the Manuscript G, assumed, — but it is
specified in the accusative {iriaTtvtTai ng ti). The Apostle,
then, means, — they (i. e. the Jews) were intrusted, — or, as
Brown of Wamphray expresses it, were concredited, — with
the oracles of God. (Compare Gal. ii. 7 ; 1 Cor. ix. 17;
1 Thess. ii. 4 ; lTirn. i. 11 ; Tit. i. 3.) The Apostle, it will

14 ROMANS III. S.
be noted, says they, in the plural, though referring to " the
Jew" spoken of in the singular, in the first verse. He
expands, that is to say, into its natural numerical plurality,
the collective unity which was representatively embodied in
his former expression: — just as in 1 Tim. ii. 15, he says,
"notwithstanding she (?) ywr)) shall be saved in child-
bearing, if they {al ywatKtg) continue in faith."
{d.) The Jews " were intrusted with the oracles of God,"
{tu Xoyia tov Stov). Beza dislikes the word oracles, on
account of its heathenish associations ; and he disuses it
in all his editions, after that of 1556, (substituting eloquia,
the Vulgate rendering, for oracula, the translation of
Erasmus). Oracles is undoubtedly, nevertheless, the best
translation by far, which can be given to the term. And
heathenism has no more right to the exclusive use of the
word, than to the exclusive use of such other terms as
temple, priest, prophet, God. The true God has spoken.
And as his utterances are responsive to the irrepressible
moral longings, and questionings, and aspirations of man,
they are emphatically oracular revelations. They are
oracles. The original term (Xoytoi;) is a diminutive from
a word of much wider conventional reference, meaning a
saying, {Xoyog). And there is thus, in its very idiosyncrasy
or make, an intimation of the pithy condensation, and con
sequent pregnancy of import, which were frequent char
acteristics of oracular utterances in general, and which are,
preeminently, features of the infallible and all-important
oracles of Jehovah.
Both in classical and in Biblical Greek the word (Xoyta)
is set apart to designate divine utterances. There is
nothing, indeed, in its etymology to produce this circum
scription of reference. But usage has ordained it. The
term occurs in only other three passages of the New Testa
ment, viz. Acts vii. 38; Heb. v. 12; 1 Pet. iv. 11. And in
all of these, as well as in the one before us, there is an
exclusive reference to the utterances of God. It occurs
frequently in the Septuagint, and more especially in the
119th Psalm, (= h-tos); and, in every instance, it designates,
not the sayings of men, but the " spekyngis," as Wycliffe

ROMANS III. 2. 15
here translates it, of God. There is but one apparent
exception to this rule. In Ps. xix. 15 (14), the term thus
occurs :— " let the words of my mouth, {tu Xoyia tov oto'-
fiaTog pov, = 'b-TS* , from np), and the meditation of my
heart, be acceptable in thy sight, 0 Lord, my Strength
and my Eedeemer." But even here the term may be fitly
regarded as having its otherwise invariable reference. The
Septuagint translator looked upon the sacred writer as
giving utterance, in his psalm, — the words of his mouth, — to
diviner thoughts than his own, to the thoughts of God
Himself. He regarded him as " moved " in what he said
" by the Holy Ghost." (Hesychius represents the conven
tional usage of the term, both in sacred and in classical
writings, when he explains it thus ; — Xoyia, Siacpara, pavTti-
para, fvTtvparu [7rpo0j]T£i);uara,-Palmer and Suicer], (piipai,
Xpvapoi. Suidas, — copying almost verbatim from the
scholiast on Thucydides ii. 8, — draws a distinction between
Xoyia and the last of its synonyms as given by Hesychius,
viz. xpriapoi, — the former being represented as denoting
oracles in prose, whereas xpriapoi, it is said, properly
means oracles in verse. Aoyta, ra 7rapa Srtov Xtyoptva
KaraXoyaSrjV \priapoii Si, o'invtg ippirpwg XiyovTai S'Eo^opou-
pivwv tu>v Xtyovrwv. Beza indorses this distinction. And
it may have been, to some partial extent, realized. But
certainly-, as Alberti and others have remarked, it does not
rule the usage. See Wetstein also. The two terms are,
indeed, often interchangeably employed, as by Chrysostom,
for example, in his Commentary on the very passage before
us. They correspond to dictiones and responsa, as well as
to oracula, in Latin?)
As to the reference of the term in the passage before us,
there has been, on the whole, considerable unanimity among
expositors. It is often explained as meaning the Scriptures.
But the word, of course, is not absolutely identical with the
word Scriptures, or the expression Holy Scriptures. There
is no reference in it to writing ; although undoubtedly the
particular oracles intended were, as a matter of fact, com
mitted to writing, and constituted the Holy Scriptures.
It was, too, as written oracles that they were committed to

Ig ROMANS III. 2.
the custody of the Jews. Still; it is the oracles themselves
that are referred to in the Apostle's expression,^— the oracles-,
as oracles, not as writings. It would be unadvisable, there
fore, to translate, the expression with Drysen, the divine
Scriptures {de Guddomliga skrifterna. — Pa delta stiille
menas i min tanke sjelfva skrifterna, som innehollo dessa
orakel). But Calvin went farther wrong in considering the
reference of the word. He says, " by oracles is meant the
covenant which was divinely revealed to Abraham and his
posterity, and afterwards recorded and explained in the Law
and the Prophets," {oracula vocat foedus quod Abraham
primo, ejusque posteris divinitus revelatum, postea Lege et
Prophetiis consignatum ac explieatum fuit). This is not
only too arbitrary, it is also too narrow an interpretation.
The word might indeed denote the various revelations of the
covenant. But assuredly it cannot mean the covenant itself.
And yet Beza not only adopts Calvin's notion. He gives it
an additional squeeze, and turns it still more awry. He
represents the word as meaning the legal covenant {legale
foedus), as distinguished from the Gospel; — at which subject,
he says, the Apostle has not yet arrived, {de evangelio
nondum disserens). — These are freaks of exegesis.
Theodoret was more successful. He identifies the term
with the word law {vopog) ; — apparently understanding by
law, the whole supernatural Eevelation of God; as dis
tinguished from the Eevelation which is made in nature.
If this was really his meaning, he hit upon the Apostle's
idea. Chrysostom, before him, gives the same explanation,
— law. So GUcumenius, (Ei'Ev,Etpto-3,r/crav tov vopov' ovrog
yap to. Xoyia too Seou). So Theophylact and Ambrosiaster.
The interpretation of Luther is less ambiguous, though
his translation is circumlocutionary. He renders the phrase,
"what God has spoken" {was Gott geredet hat). Emser
and Dietenberger give the same translation. So Coverdale,
" what God spake." Piscator renders it, " God's word "
{Gottes Wort). So Tyndale, the worde of God; — Heumann
also and Matthias. The plural form of the same version is
given in Cranmer's Bible, and in the Ehemes, the wordes of
God; in the Dutch versions, too, old and new, {de woorden

ROMANS III. 2. 17
Gods); and also in Calvin's French version of 1556, {les
parolhs de Dieu); and in the Peshito, (IctlILj _aio.X&).
Johan Hollybushe, in the English version of" 15387 printed
by Nicolson,— the duplicate of Myles Coverdale's Paris edi
tion of the same year, printed by Eegnault, — renders the
expression, rather grotesquely, the speeches of God. Count
Zinzendorf, on the other hand, translates the phrase freely,
and in the singular number, " the divine revelation" {die
• gottliche Offenbarung), — a translation adopted by Michaelis.
The English Geneva gives the word oracles, putting in the
margin, or luords: Martin retains oracles, and explains
the term as meaning the writings of the Old Testament,
{c'est a dire, .les Ecritures de I'Ancien Testament). Este
agrees with Martin, and, in very explicit terms, explains
the word as comprehending all the contents of Scripture.
{In sacris Uteris vox extenditur ad omne Dei verbum homi-
nibus traditum, cujusmodi est universa Scriptura sacra,
sive prophetica, sive historica, seu quaecunque alia) Este
is undoubtedly right; and with him agree Sadolet {oracula
Dei sunt quaecunque ad docendum, regendum, et, maxi-
marum rerum promissionibus, confirmandum populum
Israeliticum, a Deo prolata sunt); Vitringa too {door dese
woorden Gods in dese plaatse, de gansche openbaringe van
sijne wille moet verstaan worden), and Calov, Seb. Schmidt,
Day, Tur'retin, Wolf, Bohme, Eosenmiiller, de Wette, Hodge,
Glockler, Umbreit, Olshausen, Oltramare, Philippi, T. Schott,
&c. The expression, as used by the Apostle, is general and
indefinite; and there is no good reason for restricting its
import to any particular or specific ingredients of the
revelation contained in "the volume of the book." It would
be wrong, very wrong, we presume, to suppose, with Semler,
that the reference is exclusively to the Decalogue. It would
also, we apprehend, be wrong to suppose, with Mehring,
that the word simply means "prophecies" {Weissagungen).
Oracles in general were, no doubt, from the nature of the
circumstances that almost always led to consultation, pre
dictive. But prediction, nevertheless, is not their differen
tiating essence. Neither would we regard the term, with
perhaps Photius, and, at all events, with Vatable, Bugen-
c

] 8 ROMANS III. 2.
hagen, de Paris, Koppe, Kistemaker, Eeiche, Lossius, Koll-
ner, Fritzsche, Maier, Baumgarten-Crusius, Krehl, Jatho,
&c, as simply denoting promises. And yet, that the Apostle
had a very special reference to the divine promises seems to
be indisputable, (see ver. 3rd), and has been perceived by the
great majority of expositors, such as, — in addition to those
just mentioned,— Zuingli, Melancthon, Bullinger, Aretius,
Melville, Hunnius, Eollock, Grotius, Day, Bbhme, Drysen,
Flatt, Klee, Glockler, Eiickert, Meyer, Oltramare, Haldane, ¦
&c. The "oracles of God," indeed, as contained in "the
volume of the book," are preeminently characterized by
promises. Their essence consists of promises. It is the
alpha and omega of the oracles of the Old Testament, — to
which, of course, the Apostle exclusively referred, — to promise
"the Christ," and light and life and bliss in him. It is
the alpha and omega of the oracles of the New Testament,
— which are but the complement and completion of the
Old, — to promise pardon, justification, glorification, in one
word, eternal life or salvation, along with peace, joy, hope,
consolation, sustentation, and holiness to all who are willing
to avail themselves of "the Christ '' who had been "promised
to the fathers." The " oracles of God," viewed broadly and
as a whole, are God's communications of mercy to men, con
sidered as sinners. And from the necessity of the case,
such communications must very largely partake of a pro
missory element. They must be of the nature of promises
which either already are, or which yet shall be, "yea and
amen in Jesus Christ." All the other details of the oracles
must necessarily be subsidiary and subministrant. {Hie
observabis totam legem, et literam veteris Testamenti, edi-
tam esse potissimum propter revelandas promissiones de
CArisfo-Melancthon, Annot.)
When it is said that the Jews were intrusted with these
oracles, the expression, as Erasmus noted, indicates that it
was not for their own benefit alone that the oracles were
given to them. The revelation with which they were
blessed was intended for wider dissemination. It was a
boon for universal man. And they were therefore trustees,
foT a season, for the behoof of the human race. Nevertheless,

ROMANS III. 2. 19
they were not simply Depositaries in behalf of others, — or
Capsarii nostri, as Augustin playfully calls them {Enarr.
in Ps. xl. 14), — or "our Librarians" {Librarii nostri), as the
same Father elsewhere designates them, {Enarr. in Ps. lvi.
9). They were not even simply " God's library-keepers," as
Trapp expresses it. They themselves were heirs of the
blessing which was confided to their charge. The revela
tion, with all its gracious and glorious promises, was a
divine message to themselves. And in the possession of
it, they enjoyed for themselves an inestimable privilege.
It was the Gospel in anticipation. It was the verbal word,
mirroring the personal Word. It was the impersonal word
of eternal life, mirroring Him who is, preeminently, at once
the personal Word of God and the Eternal Life of man.
It was the glad tidings of salvation through the atonement
that was to be. It was all this, — with an additament, the
additament, namely, of an assurance to the Jews, that, in
consequence of the peculiarly intimate relation which the
future Messiah was to sustain to their race they would
meanwhile be distinguishingly blessed in the enjoyment of
anticipative spiritual advantages, and eventually exalted
into the dignity of being the almoners of God, — the dis
pensers of some of the richest elements of his bounty, to the
world at large. They would hence be emphatically, — in
virtue of such prerogatives,^- God's favoured people, — his
national "son," as well as his national "servant," — his
"peculiar people." In addition to the fundamental promises,
relating to the provision of mercy made for men, as men,
the oracles of the Old Testament are, as a matter of fact,
bestrewed, from beginning to ending, with gems of exceeding
great and precious promises relating to the provision of
favour made for the Jews, as Jews. God "shewed his
word {K'ri, mm, his words, his oracles) unto Jacob; his
STATUTES AND HIS JUDGEMENTS UNTO ISRAEL. HE HATH
NOT DEALT SO WITH ANY NATION ; AND AS FOR HIS JUDGEt-
MENTS, THEY (THE NATIONS IN GENERAL) HAVE NOT KNOWN
THEM."

20 ROMANS III. S.
Ver. 3. T/ yap ei ^iffT^ffuv Tiveg; Mt) h aTiffTicc
ccvtwv Trjv itiSTiv tov 3-eou xccrccpyriffei ;
Eng. Auth. Vers. For what if some did not believe ? shall
their unbelief make the faith of God without effect ?
Revised Version. For what although some believed not?
shall their unbelief make the faithfulness of God to fail ?
§ 1. The Apostle, instead of enumerating other privileges
enjoyed by the Jews, proceeds, in the most energetic and
semi-dramatic manner, to vindicate his first specification of
prerogative. Hence he employs the ratiocinative particle for
(yap). It is as if he had said, — I am justified in specify
ing the possession of the oracles of God as a high privilege
of the Jews, — for, whatsoever may be the actual treatment
which these oracles have received at the hands' of my
countrymen, the possession of them is nevertheless, when
intrinsically considered, an inestimable boon. This vindi
catory relation of the verse to what goes immediately
before, seems abundantly evident ; and when Hodge (ed.
1864) imagines that, instead of establishing such a connec
tion, the Apostle takes into consideration an objection to
his doctrine that runs out abreast with the one that is
referred to in verse 1st, his interpretation is at once entirely
arbitrary and extremely violent.
§ 2. For what if some believed not ? or, For what if
some had no faith? (Ti yap ti niriarriaav nvtg ;) Taylor of
Norwich, and a large proportion of modern critics, place the
interrogation after the first two words, and thus split up
the clause into two: — For what? if some believed not, &c.
Griesbach ultimately approved of this interpunetion : and
so do Knapp, Tittmann, Hahn, Vater, Muralto, Alford,
and Tischendorf. Fritzsche contends for it. Erasmus's
editions, on the other hand, postpone the interrogation
to the close of the clause. They were followed by the
Stephanie editions ; and by Beza in his various editions ;
and by the Elzevir editions. Bengel approves ; and
Scholz; and so does Lachmann. The Peshito translator

• ROMANS III. 8. 21
had been of the same opinion ; and the older critics in
general. So, too, Hilarion, in his modern Greek version,
(Corfu, 1827, Kai av airiarriaav Tivig, rtj) We are dis
posed to think that it is not a matter of much moment
whether of the two methods of interpunction be accepted.
It is but /a little difference in pause while pronouncing
the words. But, with van Hengel, we prefer to keep
the whole clause as a unit : — For what if some believed
not ? . And, unlike van Hengel, we would, with Henry
Stephens and Lachmann, throw out even the comma which
Erasmus and Eobert Stephens inserted after the first
two words.
The expression is evidently elliptical. And the ellipsis
may be variously supplied. Luther, for instance, supplies it
thus,— "What is involved?" (was liegt daranf): and Pisca-
tor thus, — "what shall we say?" (£pou,uEv;) : Fritzsche thus, —
"how stands the case?" (A yap ianv; — denn was giebts?
— denn wie liegt die Sache?): Oltramare thus, — "What
have you to reply ? " (qu' avez-vous a redire ?) It is evi
dently in some such way that we are to fill up mentally the
abrupt breviloquence of the Apostle : — For what signifies
it, . if it : be the case, — as it is, — that some disbelieved ?
(Significat, nullius esse ponderis, hac phrasi, ti yap, sc.
tari.-Bos; Ellipses, p. 421, ed. 1762.)
¦ As already remarked, — (see ver. 1), — some critics, such
as Taylor and Macknight, suppose that the words of this
verse , are not spoken by the Apostle in his own person.
They, imagine that the paragraph is a dialogue, — a dialec
tical debate ; and that in this verse it is a Jewish' objector
who speaks. These expositors are shut up to regard the
ratiocinative participle for (yap) as used in an idiomatic
manner, with almost every element of1 its original ratio
cinative force merged into latency. Taylor translates it
and ; Macknight, but. And Macknight is constrained,
moreover, to give an unnatural import to the interrogative
particle (pr)) which introduces the succeeding clausula
Instead of translating the clausule thus, — shall their un
belief make inefficient the faithfulness of God? he translates
it thus, " will not their unbelief destroy the faithfulness

22 ROMANS III. S.
of God ? " Both of these disadvantages are avoided, and
the additional disadvantage, moreover, of imagining a
formal dialogue, without any formal indication of its intro
duction, — when we take the words in their natural and
unconstrained import, and suppose that they are used by
the Apostle, as speaking in his own person, to confirm what
he had alleged in the preceding verse.
At the same time, it is not to be doubted that the
Apostle's confirmatory remark is given in the particular
prophylactic form in which it occurs, and in its peculiarly
militant attitude, because it was designed to anticipate an
objection which he was aware would be readily started in
some Jewish minds. He knew that some would be dis
posed to say, as it were ; — But if, Paul, vje be so bad as you
represent us; — if we be such unbelievers as you persist in
making us out to be; — if, as according to your doctrine, we
have not believed in the great evangelical revelation con
tained in the Bible; — of what real benefit have the oracles
been to us? — wherein consists the high privilege of being
their depositaries? Such we may conceive to have been
the state of mind which the Apostle had in view when he
appended to the asseveration of the preceding verse the
confirmatory remarks of this.
It has been disputed whether it is the idea of unbelief,
non-belief, no-faith, or the idea of unfaithfulness, which
is the characteristic notion of the verb (riiriarnaav). A
considerable number of critics would translate the clause
thus, — "For what if some were unfaithful?" — that is, says
Alford, "unfaithful to the covenant, the very condition of
which was to walk in the ways of the Lord and observe
his statutes." Alford follows de Wette. And of the same
opinion, as to the translation of the term, are Beza (in the
later editions of his New Testament), Piscator (in his Latin
version and Notes), Er. Schmid, le Cene, Zachari'a, Koppe
Kollner (substantially), Matthias, Mehring, Lange. The
same interpretation is given by a large number of our
English expositors,— in addition to Alford, — such as Sclater,
Wells, Taylor, Belsham, Heberden, Stack, Cox, Terrot, Stuart,
Hodge, Sumner, Bosanquet, Purdue, Conybeare, Wordsworth,

ROMANS III. 3. 23
Vaughan, Colenso, Webster and Wilkinson, Shepherd,
&c. Eiickert, in his first edition, supported, — though
obviously in a labouring manner, indicating the conscious
ness of difficulty, — -the same rendering. Eeiche seeks to
combine the two translations, (vielleicht vereinigt das Wort
beide Begriffe). And, although de Wette has no decisive
ground for adducing Theodoret, OEcumenius and Theophy
lact as of coincident opinion, it is manifest that some of the
ancients had espoused the view, for the Alexandrian manu
script (A) substitutes the verb, which properly means were
disobedient (riirtiOriaav), for the verb which the Apostle
actually employs. The critics who support the translation,
were unfaithful, rely upon the harmonious relation of that
version to the subsequent expression, "the faithfulness of
God." But there can be no doubt that the translation is
unwarrantable. For, (1), the verb in every other passage
in which it occurs in the New Testament means to be
destitute of faith. See Mark xvi. 11, 16; Luke xxiv. 11, 41;
Acts xxviii. 24; and 2 Tim. ii. 13 is no exception. (2),
The cognate noun (airiaTia) means invariably want of faith.
See, besides the other passages, the places in which it is
used by our Apostle, Eom. iv. 20; xi. 20, 23; 1 Tim. i. 13.
(3), The cognate adjective (airiarog) means invariably, as
used by our Apostle, without faith. See 1 Cor. vi. 6;
vii. 12, 13, 14, 15; x. 27; xiv. 22, 23, 24; 2 Cor. iv. 4;
vi. 14, 15; 1 Tim. v. 8: Tit. i. 15. (4), If the expression in
the preceding verse, " the oracles of God," means, not "the
covenant of God," but the promissory and evangelical
revelation of God, that is, the Sum of the Bible, as it
manifestly does, then it is far more natural to refer to the
unbelief or non-faith, than to the faithlessness, of the Jews
in relation to these oracles. In an important sense they
were faithful to their trust. They faithfully preserved the
oracles. But they did not exercise faith in that which is
their grand evangelical import. And, (5), when the Apostle
asks, "shall their amana make void the faithfulness of
God?" it is natural to suppose that God's faithfulness is
referred to in relation to the promissory element of the oracles
of God, and that consequently the airiana refers to the same

24 ROMANS III. 3.
promissory element, and is non-faith, or unbelief, in relation
to the great evangelical blessings exhibited in the volume
of the book, as these blessings are summed up in "the
Christ of God." To object, with Beza and Alford, that it
would be out of place to suppose that the Apostle is speak
ing, at this stage of his epistle, "of faith or want of faith,"
is to forget that he is composing an epistle, free and easy
in its interrelations — and not a stiff, formal, dialectical
dissertation. It is to forget, moreover, that in the passage
before us, he is making a detour from the straight line of his
argument, for the purpose of meeting, and setting aside such
irruptive objections as he deemed it right to anticipate.
And it is, moreover, to forget that it is impossible to under
stand aright such portions of the preceding context as
chapter ii. 4; chapter ii. 13 — 16; and chapter ii. 28, 29,
except in the light that emanates from the assumption of
faith in the Gospel of God's- grace. It is satisfactory,
therefore, . tot find that ' the great body of enlightened
critics support the translation .which we have given to
the verb: — "For what if some had no faith?" It is
the translation ,of the Vulgate (non, crediderunt), and of
Luther (nicht glauben), CEcolampad, Calvin (fuerunt in-
creduli; n'ont point creu),, Castellio (diffiderunt), Diodati
(sono stati increduli), the Dutch versions, old and new,
Grotius, Day,; Este (incrediderunt), Seb. Schmidt; Tho-
liick too, and Schrader, Fritzsche, Eiickert (2nd edit),
Meyer, Baumgarten-Crusius, Olshausen; Krehl also, and
van Hengel, Philippi, Jowett, Mac-Evilly, Oltramare, &c.
The Apostle says, " what if some (rtvig) had no faith ? "
The distinction is not between some and many, but be
tween some and all. For even many are only some, if
they be not all. , The Apostle might have said many
(iroXXoi), — a more sweeping word, which both Photius and
fficumenius insensibly substitute, in the course of their
expositions, for the Apostle's more generous term. But he
was accustomed to speak graciously, says Grotius. (Ita
solet xaPl£VT'l^£lv)- When it was not needful for the
attainment of high moral ends to exhibit the whole
unpleasant reality, the Apostle took pleasure in drawing a

ROMANS III. 3. 25
veil over multitudinous defalcations. Comp. chap. xi. 17;
1 Cor. x. 7. And as, in the present case, his argument
neither demanded nor declined the more unwelcome term,
he contented himself with saying some. It is " a species
of reticence," says Calvin. It is "a euphemism," says
Bengel. But when, the latter of these distinguished critics
insinuates, in addition, that there is a streak of contempt
in the expression, we are not prepared to indorse his
reading of the Apostle's thoughts. ' (Atque infideles, quam-
vis multi, habentur ut quidam indefinite; quod non valde
sub censum veniant.) Philippi, however, catches up the idea,
and blows it into most inflated proportions. " The host of
the unbelieving appears," he says, " over against the truth
fulness of the divine word, as a little contemptible handful."
(Der Wahrhaftiglceit des gottlichen Wortes gegenuber erscheint
die Schaar der Ungldubigen als ein kleiner, verdchtlicher
Haufe.) Lange seems charmed with this inflation. (Der
Gewissheit der Erfullung der gottlichen Verheissung gegenu
ber ist auch die Masse des abfiilligen Volks nur ein armer
Haufe von Einzelnen.) But this is, we conceive, an entire
misapprehension of the Apostle's attitude. He was not
speaking in the character of a rhetorician, or of a rhetorical
chronicler, but in the character of an earnest logician. And
he simply employs an expression which intimates that there
were some who believed, as well as some who believed not.
The relative numerical proportions of the classes did not
affect the case he was handling. He might, indeed, if he
had chosen, have taken another, — a historic standpoint, and
have said, "For what although the great masses believed not?"
Or, he might have occupied a still higher standpoint, and
have said, " For what although not one had believed ? " For,
as Theodoret puts the case; " although all men had proved
ungrateful, their ingratitude would not have lessened in the
least the glory of God," (ko.v yap airavTtg ol avQpwiroi irtp\
aiiTOV axapiaroi yivwvrai, ovk iXaTTwati tov Srtov Tr)v S6%av
i) tovtwv axapiarta.) And although all men had proved to
be unbelieving, their want of faith would not, in the least,
have evacuated or diminished or dimmed the faithfulness of
God. What God had unconditionally promised, that he

26 ROMANS III. S.
would unconditionally fulfil: and what was promised only
conditionally would wait, with untarnished honour, for
its fulfilment on the forthcoming of the condition. For
although, as GEcumenius remarks, "men should not have
been willing (to do their part), it would still be true that
God didthe part that devolved upon him," (ti yap koi aurot
ovk r'i(5ovXr)Sriaav, 6 pivroi Stbg to avrov irttroiriKtv).
It has been queried, whether, when the Apostle says, what
if some believed not ? he referred exclusively to the spiritual
history of the Jews in times then past, or exclusively to
their spiritual characteristics in the time then present; —
whether, in other words, he referred to their prevailing
unbelief under the entire currency of the Old Testament
economy, as Philippi, for example, supposes, or, as Locke
and Meyer, on the other hand, suppose, to their general
rejection of the Messiah after the Messiah's appearance.
The tense of the verb employed by the Apostle shows, as
it appears to us, that the lines of his thought were running
in the plane of the past, — that plane of things which
covered the entire period when the Jews, as distinguished
from the Gentiles, were intrusted with the oracles of God.
But, logically, his reference was not confined to this plane.
His eye swept, indeed, over the past ages; but it ranged
downward through these ages till it rested on what had been,
and was still, transpiring, since "the fulness of the time"
had arrived, and since that illustrious Personage had
appeared, in whom the precious promises of God were " yea
and amen," and who, in his own grand personality, is the
Consummation and the Sum of the oracles of God. What
matters it, says the Apostle, though some believed not? —
that is — What matters it though many, in the bygone ages
have lived and died without faith in the true Import of the
oracles of God, and thus without faith in the Great Pro
pitiator? — And what matters it, though many of their
descendants, now living, are walking in their footsteps,
and have refused to believe that which is the very Sum and
Substance of their own precious Scriptures ? — What sig
nifies all this, so far as the question of prerogative is
concerned?

ROMANS III. S. 27
Van Hengel imagines that when the Apostle says
some, he leaves out of view for the moment the special
case of the Jews, and means some men (indefinitely).
Jones goes farther, and imagines that there is a special
reference, not to Jews, but to Gentile unbelievers. Yet
nothing, surely, can be more obvious to the unprepos
sessed reader, than that the Apostle is speaking of the
Jews alone. It would, however, be erring in the direction
of the contrary extreme, to imagine, narrowingly and
most capriciously, with Bahrdt, that the reference is con
fined to the Jewish leaders and priests. All such imagin
ations are the vagaries of exegesis.
§ 3. Shall their non-faith malce the faithfulness of God to
fail? (pr) r) airiaria avrwv rfjv irianv tov S'eou KaTapynati ;)
The expression which, with our Auth. Eng. Vers., we
render the faithfulness of God, (rf/v iriaTiv tov Seov), has, by
some critics, been regarded as meaning faith in God. They
have regarded, that is to say, the genitive case of the word
God as being the genitive of the object, rather than the
genitive of the subject. Paulus took this view, (uberzeu-
gungstreue Anderer gegen die Gottheit). So did Schrader,
(Glauben an Gott). So did Abelard, (fidem Dei, id est, per
quarn Deo crediderunt). So too Bugenhagen, (fides Dei ea
est qua Deo credimus). Aquinas hesitated ; and also Diony-
sius a Eyckel; and so did Doddridge, who says, "This is an
" ambiguous expression, and may either signify the fidelity of
" God, or that faith of ours which God has pointed out as the
" way of obtaining justification and life: the senses run at
"last into each other: — I have included both." But, (1), the
antithesis of the expression to the preceding one, "their non-
faith" (i/ airiaria avrwv) ; (2), the purport of the reply to the
query, in ver. 4, " let God turn out to be true ;" and, (3), the
import of the parallel expression in ver. 5, " the righteous
ness of God;" — all these relations of the phrase conspire to
make it certain that the genitive of God is to be understood
subjectively, and that the whole phrase therefore means
the good faith, or faithfulness, of God. " God is faithful"
(triaTog). " Even though we refuse to have faith in him, yet

28 ROMANS 111. 3.
he abideth faithful," (2 Tim. ii. 13, — ei attiarovptv, tKtlvog
TTiarbg pivti). By a natural oscillation of import, the word
(iriang), which generally signifies, in the New Testament,
faith or belief, occasionally denotes its counterpart, — that
good faith or faithfulness which elicits reciprocating belief
or faith. (See Gal. v. 22; 2 Tim. ii. 22; Tit. ii. 10; Sec:
and comp. on chap. i. 17.) In the passage before us, it
evidently has reference to the faithfulness of God in fulfil
ling those precious evangelical promises regarding the
Saviour and salvation, which are the prominent feature
and the culminating point of the " oracles of God." (Sumitur
enim hie fides pro fide qua fiunt cfocta,-Cajetan.) Pho-
tius (in GEcumen.) explains correctly, on the whole, the
phrase as meaning "the faithfulness, truth, and immutability
of the divine promises," (to irtarbv twv iiroaxiatwv avrov,
to aXriSig, to dptraStTov). It thus follows, from the nature
of the case, that the Apostle's query is substantially equi
valent to this, — Shall their unbelief nullify the fact of
their high privilege? shall it make that special prerogative
unreal which was conferred on them, when they were set
apart as the peculiar Messianic people, and, as such, were
intrusted with the oracles of God? Their prerogative was
an inestimable blessing, — abuse it as they might. It would
be philologically outr£, were we, with Seb. Schmidt, to regard
the word faith as meaning, objectively, on the' one hand, the
object of justifying faith, and metonymically, on the other,
that gratuitous mercy of God, in which men, needing justi
fication, ought to have faith. '
The interrogation, — Shall their unbelief overturn the
faithfulness of God?— is of such a nature, phraseologically
considered, — (as is indicated by the particle pi)), — that a
negative answer is anticipated. ("Est," says Pareus,
" interrogatio negantis." — " Neque enim," says Franke " un-
quam quisquam particula pi) in interrogando sic usus est,
ut rem ajfirmari voluerit."-De particulis negantibus Com.
I. p. 18.) We find, accordingly, a negative answer in the
following verse. In concurrence with this negative answer
Calvin supposed that the faithfulness of God was not
neutralized by the unbelief of some of the Jews, because there

ROMANS III. 3. 29
was a secretly elected Israel within the ethnological Israel, in
whose blessed experience the promises were realized.
Lange's notion is somewhat similar. (Also iveist der Apostel
den GedanJcen ab, als ob die Tivig die iriang Gottes aufheb-
en (sic), also auch die Verwirklichung des ewigen Gnaden-
bundes in dem Kerne Israels und in einem neutestament-
lichen Gottesvolke vereiteln konnten.) But such an idea is
a superaddition to the Apostle's though t,— a superfcetation.
The oracles to which reference is made were, as we have
seen, the sum and substance of the entire moral revelation of
God. And, as that revelation was addressed to all the Jews
indifferently, and exhibited mercy to the people as a people,
and to all the units composing the people, without dis
tinction or exception, its possession was a veritable and
inestimable privilege to all, whether they believed or not in
the real Import of the Oracles. God was faithful to the
people as a people, and to all the individual units who
composed the whole, whether they chose to avail them
selves of his faithfulness or not. They were blessed in
having the Oracles, and in possessing the multitudinous con
comitant advantages attached to the Oracles, whether they
improved their high privilege, or not. (Valet canon
respectu, tarn promissionum absolutdrum, quam hypo-
theticarum seu conditionalium. Neutro modo infidelitas
hominum fidem Dei cassam reddere potest-Ynremus.)
The exposition of Pareus is an advance on that of Calvin.
He brings into view the condition of faith, on which the
personal enjoyment of the chief blessings exhibited and
promised in the Oracles is suspended. When this faith
was withheld, the blessings referred to could not be
enjoyed; and yet the faithfulness of God in (conditionally)
promising them, and in (unconditionally) promising the
propitiatory ground on which they rested, is unimpeached and
unimpeachable. (Pareus, indeed, — faithful adherent, as he
was, of Calvin's theological system, — puts it somewhat too
strono-ly, — Omnes promissiones tarn, legis quam evangelii
annexam habent conditionem.)
The verb (icarap7T)(T£t) which the Apostle employs inter
rogatively, — and which we may freely translate, shall it

30 ROMANS III. 3.
undo? — shall it overturn ?*^-shall it make to fail? — origin
ally means shall it make inert or idle? (See on verse 31.)
It is rather too interpretatively rendered in our Auth. Eng.
Version, and in the English Geneva, and by Tyndale, shall
it make without effect ? The interpretation assumed in
such a translation,- — that substantially of Calvin, — is too
narrow. The word rather means to make inefficient, than
to make without effect. It negatives the idea of agency or
operation, rather than the idea of result or effect. It is one
of the Apostle's favourite terms ; though his application of
it is so varied that it is difficult to give it anything like
a uniform translation in English. It is rendered destroy
in Eom. vi. 6 ; 1 Cor. vi. 13 ; Heb. ii. 14 ; bring to nought
in 1 Cor. i. 28 ; do away in 1 Cor. xiii. 10, &c; put
away in 1 Cor. xiii. 11 ; put down in 1 Cor. xv. 24; make
void in Eom. iii. 31 ; abolish in 2 Cor. iii. 13 ; Eph, ii. 15 ;
2 Tim. i. 10. Any of these translations, — though all of
them are free, — would suffice in the passage before us : —
"Shall their unbelief do away,- — put away, — put down,—^
bring to nought, — make void— destroy— abolish the faithr
fulness of God?" (aVo7rauw,-Suidas.) The temporal force
of the verb does not, exactly, merge and lose itself, as some
suppose, in the kindred idea of possibility; — although
undoubtedly the future- phase of the temporal import must
be regarded as specified representatively. The meaning is
not, exactly, — Is it possible for the unbelief of some of the
Jews to nullify the faithfulness of God ? The idea is more
concrete: — Has God's faithfulness been nullified? is it
nullified? will it ever be? The Apostle wisely devolves,
however, on the future tense the function of representing
the two other phases of time; — because, in the case sup
posed, the natural sequence of the events is such that the
action of God must be viewed as succeeding the action of
men. It must, that is to say, be viewed as future in
relation to the action of men. God's unfaithfulness to his
promises, if supposed at all, must be supposed as occurring
subsequently to the unbelief of the men who are regarded
as interested in these promises.

ROMANS III. 4. 31
Ver. 4. M?j yivoiTO. riifa&v ie 6 Siog &hfrtjg,
rag Is uvSptvvog -^ivsTng- zo&aig ysypurTcci, "Osrw? av
oizaiaiSrig Iv To7g Xoyoig gov, xxi vixqavs kv
too xpivsffSoti as.
Eng. Auth. Vers. God forbid: yea, let God be true, but
every man a liar; as it is written, That thou mightest be
justified in thy sayings, and mightest overcome when thou
art judged.
Revised Version. Far be it. Let God, on the contrary,
turn out to be true, but every man a liar; as it has been
written, That thou mightest be justified in thy
words, and overcome when thou enterest into
judgement. § 1. Far be it! (Mr) yivoiro). The Apostle repels, with
vehemence, the idea that the faithfulness of God is made to
fail by the unbelief of men. The expression which he
employs is a kind of idiomatic exclamation, which is as
•idiomatically rendered in our Auth. Eng. Trans., and in
most of the English Translations which preceded it, — as,
for instance, in Purvey's Eevision of Wycliffe, in Tyndale,
in the Geneva and the Ehemes, — " God forbid." Literally
it means, — not, as Eobinson renders it, let it not happen,
but, — -let it not be : for the verb is in the past ; and when
opming-to-pass actually comes to pass, —when it has come
to pass, it is. The expression was not uncommon in the
later Greek. It is found frequently, for example, in
Arrian. It corresponds to the Latin absit, which is the
translation of the Vulgate. It is rendered by Luther,
" Das sey feme," — That be far. Piscator, Bengel, Heu-
mann, Schrader, van Ess give the same translation. So did
Wycliffe, Fer be it. De Saci renders it, " Non certes," — No
truly. Castellio ( = Chateillon), more musically, "Nenni-da."
Calvin, " la (ultimately ainsi) n' adviene." A considerable
number of our English translators, such as Mace, Taylor,
Wakefield, Newcome, Scarlett, Cox, Turnbull, render it,
" by no means," — a rather feeble version. The phrase cor
responds to the Hebrew word n$»^n, which means profane !

32 ROMANS III. It.
and which is rendered in the Septuagint, sometimes by pi)
yivoiro, may it not be! — sometimes by priSapwg, by no
means! — sometimes by pfi s'/rj, may it not be! — and some
times by 'iXtwg, (God) be merciful to us (and prevent)!
This last expression is used in Matt. xvi. 22 ; where it is
rendered, be it far. It corresponds to the common expres
sion in Syriac, ..eQjj, which is used by the Peshito trans
lator in the passage before us. The Apostle's phrase is
used by him chiefly in this epistle to the Eomans, in which
it occurs ten times. It occurs thrice in the Epistle to the
Galatians (ii. 17; iii. 21; vi. 14): and once in 1 Corin
thians, (vi. 15). It is found nowhere else in his writings.
In the whole of the rest of the New Testament it is found
only in Luke xx. 16. It indicates a feeling of strong
antagonism and aversion. (Est valde aversantis, says
Grotius : est abominantis sermo, sa37s Erasmus.) It is as if
it were said, Away with the thought ! — Avaunt! De Paris
explains it as meaning here, To say so would be a blas
phemy. Our idiomatic English translation, God forbid!
is, in some cases, rather inapplicable, as, for instance, when
the address is either directly to God (Gen. xviii. 25), or
very directly of God (Job xxxiv. 10, and bere Eom. iii. 3),
or by God (1 Sam. ii. 30). But it is not seriously objec
tionable, as Thomson and others suppose, on the ground
of the introduction of the word God: for the original
expression embodies a desire, which, when uttered by such
a man as the Apostle, may be legitimately regarded as, in
all ordinary cases, rising up to God, and as thus involving
what is tantamount to a prayer.
§ 2. Let God, on the contrary, turn out to be true, but
every man a liar, (yiviaOw S« 6 Stbg aXriSr'ig, irag Si
avSpwn-og iptvaTtig,). The introductory particle (Si), which
we have somewhat freely translated, on the contrary,
indicates a swing, on the part of the Apostle's mind,
toward the antithesis of the idea, which is eschewed in the
preceding exclamation. We would have translated the
particle, but, had it not been for its repetition in the
following clause, — " but every man a liar."

ROMANS III. If. 33
' Let God turn out to be true, or, more literally still, Let
God become true. The employment of the verb to become,
(yivopai), as distinguished from the verb to be, (dpi), has
occasioned perplexity to some critics, expositors, and
translators. The expression seems to have appeared to
some of the old Greeks themselves inappropriate; and
hence, instead of yiviaSw, — " let God become true," we read
in L, and in Chrysostom, ytviaSw, and in G, iarw, — " let
God be true." The Vulgate, again, and the Peshito cut the
knot of the apparent difficulty by extreme freedom of
translation. They render the phrase, " God is true," (est
autem Deus verax: " forsoth God is^trewe or sothfast,"-
Wycliffe:— 1£-»P» ](Tl^7 ;-iu ^ctoAj] for God is true).
In another direction, "again, Ch. F. 'Schmid, uses equal li
berty. He says that yiviaSw is used for iaTai, and thus he
translates the clause, " God will be true." He agrees with
Bengel in supposing that there is a reference to what will
be "in judgement;" although Bengel does not agree with
him in rendering the verb as if it were future. He renders
it fiat,— " may he become." Zinzendorf, however, renders it
" will be," (Gott wird wahrhaftig seyn). Jo. C. Herzog (De
interpunctionum positu in Ep. ad Bomanos) seeks to
escape the difficulty by another expedient. He would
punctuate and explain the Apostle's statement thus : — " Let
this Old Testament testimony become verified, viz. God
is true, and every man a liar," (Hoc fieri debet : — Deus
in veritate sua est idem, homo vero omnis fraudes ex-
cogitat). Koppe gives a similar explanation. He inter
prets the statement thus : — " Eather let it be held that God
is faithful, though every man should be faithless," (yiviaSw
Si interpunctione sejunxi a seqq). It was substantially the
same view that was taken of the construction by Luther
himself :• — " Eather let it remain that God be true, and all
men false," (es bleibe vielmehr also, dass Gott sey wahrhaf
tig, und alle Menschen falsch). So too Coverdale, — " Let
it rather be thus, that God is true, and all men lyers."
Seb. Schmidt approves of the rendering. So does Lange.
De Paris took a similar view, (Reconnoissons au contraire
pour une verite incontestable, Grec yiviaSw, sit, que Dieu
^^rTof^

*\ ?VT»"1T*jr

34 ROMANS III. 4.
est veritable dans ses promesses, est la veritS m6me). — Such
a construction, however, is far too artificial ; though it does
not, it is true, pervert the substantial idea of the Apostle.
The Apostle's expression, let God become true, does not
intimate or insinuate that God has, in times past, been
untrue. Everything the reverse. The word become is used,
not so much objectively in relation to God himself, as sub
jectively in relation to the minds of men. It is only in
the sphere of men's apprehensions of things that the
Apostle's wish can eventuate and realize itself. God,
indeed, may " turn out to be true " in a semi-objective way,
as the wheel of events turns round. His predictions
become verified; and the principles of his procedure become
justified. His words turn out to be true, and he himself,
consequently, as the utterer of the words, is found to be true.
He is found, viz., by his observant moral creatures. He
becomes, viz., to the judgement of such of his moral creatures
as judge aright. The Apostle's expression, therefore, must
be understood logically ; — (non in se, sed in hominum
opinione. -Kussus.) It is thus that Theophylact explains
it, — Let God be shown or demonstrated to be true, (to Si,
yiviaSw 6 Jfoc aXri$r)g, avn tov, (jtavtpouaSiw, airoStiKvva^w).
The worthy father, indeed, puts it perhaps, — at least so far
as pure exegesis is concerned, — rather too strongly. Mat
thias improves the form of representation, — "Let God
become true in our eyes," — "Let him be acknowledged
to be true," (ergdnze 'in unseren Augen.' — TiviaSw in
logischen, nicht in realen Sinne steht, synonym mit
bpoXoytiaSw). Photius comes very near the mark by
simply supplying the personal pronoun, " Let God becoiiie
true to you " (yiviaSw vpiv, in CEcum.).
We have said that the Apostle's language is to be inter
preted in a logical sense: — logical, we mean of course,
as distinguished from real; not logical, as distinguished
from rhetorical. The phraseology is eminently rhetorical.
It is the lively utterance of strong, impulsive, devotional
feeling, rather than the measured diction of philosophical
ratiocination. Hence it takes the shape of an ardent
aspiration or desire, instead of a calm and deliberate affir-

ROMANS III. 4. 35
mation. But if we abstract this accidental shape or form
from the substance of the thought which was lying in
the depth of the Apostle's mind, we may express his
idea in some such way as the Vulgate or Syriac translator
has done, or as Conybeare does, "Yea, be sure that God
is true!' And since God is "true," it follows that he
will "faithfully" fulfil what he promises in his oracles.
(Deus inconcusse servat quae pollicetur.-Zmngli.) He
has ever been, and he will ever be faithful to his evangelical
promises. When the Apostle ascribes truth to God, he uses the
word, not in a narrow or very sharply defined accep
tation. Certainly, he does not simply mean that God
will be found to be true, in the sense of accurately repre
senting realities in his thoughts or in his words. Aquinas,
indeed, with characteristic scholasticism, assumes that the
reference is to the divine intellect, which, unlike the
human intellect, is the archetypal cause and measure
of things, so that things are true and real in the pro
portion of the conformity which they bear to the divine
ideas. The divine intellect is thus in itself infinitely
true. (Secundum seipsum est indeficientur verax, et
unaqueeque res est vera inquantum ei conformatur.)
But the Apostle uses the word in its moral significance.
God ever has been, and is, and ever will be true in his
relation to his great evangelical promises. He is faithful
in this respect. And doubtless he is thus faithful and
true because he is true, throughout, in all the voluntary
outgoings, immanent and transient, of his activity. They
are all harmonious with the dictates of his infinite reason
and his infinite conscience. They are all right and righteous.
Thus the truth or truthfulness of God, as referred to in
verses 4 and 7, is coincident, in the Apostle's mind, with
his faithfulness as specified in verse 3rd, and with his
righteousness as specified in verse 5th.
When the Apostle adds, but every man a liar, (nag
Si avSpwirog \ptvanig), there can be no doubt that Euckert
is right in regarding the addition as being, so far as the
Apostle's main object is concerned, unessential (unwesent-

36 ROMANS III. 4-
lich). The statement is thrown in by the way, and serves
the purpose of a foil, — giving contrastive intensity to the
statement regarding the truthfulness of God. Thus it is
in reality, though not in form, a hypothetical additament: — ¦
"let God turn out true, even though every man should turn
out a liar."' It is not unlikely, indeed, that the idea of
Koppe and van Hengel is correct, that the whole proposi
tion, with the mutual antithesis of the two clauses which
constitute it, was a kind of gnome, or proverbial expression,
circulating, witlTmore or less of currency, among the people;
And hence we cannot think, with Meyer and Fritzsche,
that the clause, but every man a liar, was specially intended,
by the advance of the word every oh the word some, to
amplify the supposition contained in the preceding verse,
what if some believed not ? Still less is it, as Augustin
and many of the subsequent critics, who took the Vulgate
for their text, supposed, a positive affirmation that "every
man is- — as a matter, of fact — a liar." The verb of the
preceding clause (yiviaOw) is undoubtedly to be carried
forward to this : — " but let every man become a liar." And
the substrate of the idea intended is obviously this: — "Let
God turn out true, but every man a liar, — if that should
be necessary to secure the truthfulness of God, which, however,
it happily is not. — Be sure that God is true, even though
every man should prove to be a liar.
There is, indeed, a sense in which "every man is a liar."
He will fail us in the time of our greatest need, if we trust
to him entirely, to the neglect of God. He will "fail," we
say; for see Isai. lviii. 11, (wp:). And in'another and more
active sense every fallen man may be said to be a liar: —
he is not, out and out, true to every dictate of his con^
science. He is not, in every respect, true to his God, true
to his fellow-men, true even to himself. He is not absolutely
faithful 'throughout. There is not an absolute harmony
between the acts of his will and the dictates of his
conscience or reason. And' it was doubtless when the
Psalmist was taking one or other of these views of
human nature, that he said " in his haste," or, in his
agitation, '" &H men are liars," or, as it is in the Sep-

ROMANS III. 4. 37
tuagint "every man (is) a liar," (tt5c avQpwirog ^tiatrig),
— Ps. cxvi. 11. It is impossible to determine whether
or not the Apostle was mentally referring to this , ex
clamation of the Psalmist. And, whether he was or not,
it is manifest, from the relation of the clause to the
preceding one, as a subordinate antithetic additament,
and from the necessity of carrying forward the imperative
verb yivtaOw, "but let every man become a liar," that the
Apostle was not intending a categorical affirmation of , the
actual untruthfulness, unfaithfulness, or unrighteousness,
of every human being. Still less was he intending to
assert that every man, or that any man, is, in everything
which he says and does, untruthful and unrighteous.
Hence we need not start the question, with Origen,
Whether, if every man be a liar, Paul and the Psalmist
themselves were not liars ; and liars, too, when they said
that every man is a liar. Neither need we try to answer
this question, with the hyper-ingenuity of Origen, by ap
pealing to John x. 34, 35, "Jesus answered them, Is it
" not written in your law, I said, Ye are gods? If he
" called them gods, unto whom the word of God came,
" and the scripture cannot be broken," &c. " The word
of God," says Origen, "came to David and Paul;" and
therefore " they were not men, but gods," (sine dubio non
erant homines, sed dei) ; and thus they were not liars
when they said that every man is a liar. Nor need we
start Augustin's question. The martyrs, he said, were
called martyrs because they died for the witness which
they bore to the truth. But how, he asks, can we be
warranted to regard them as having borne witness to the
truth, if the Scripture itself be true, which says that every
man is a liar. If the martyrs, he argues, were not liars, we
seem to make the Scripture to lie ; and if they were liars,
then they were not witnesses for the truth. He tells us
that he will labour (laborabimus) to solve the difficulty.
And, after ringing abundant changes upon escaping from
a lie on the right hand, or a lie on the left, he finds
an end to his labour, and a key to the mystery, in the
words of our Lord, — "When they deliver you up, take

38 ROMANS III. 4-
no thought how or what ye shall speak, for it shall be
given you in that same hour what ye shall speak ; for
it is not ye that speak, but the Spirit of your Father which
speaketh in you." Lo, here, exclaims the delighted casuist,
is the reason why the martyrs were not liars in their testi
mony: — it was not they who spake, it was the Holy Spirit.
(Ecce quare veraces fuerunt; quia non ipsi loquebantur,
sed Spiritus Domini.-Sermo, 328, in Natali Martyrum.)
But the difficulty, though thus adroitly and edifyingly
got rid of, in the particular case of the martyrs, went
forth at large, and roamed far and wide through the ages.
It met Abelard in a peculiar way: — Since, says he, it
is true that every man is a liar, what are we to think
of the man Christ Jesus? Was it possible for him to lie?
He was too reverent to ask, Was he a liar? On such a
subject the subtle Doctor had to pick his steps with
carefulness; for the cry of heresy might have burst out
on the right hand or on the left. So he made, in true
schoolman-style, a distinction, and determined that the
manhood of Christ, considered simpliciter, laboured under
no impossibility of lying or otherwise sinning, else he
would have been destitute of free-will, (libero videtur
privatus arbitrio, et necessitate potius quam vol-untate
peccatum cavere) ; but when we think of the natures of
Christ in their union, or compliciter as we might say,
we must come, he admits, to the conclusion that he was
absolutely impeccable. — Jerome took a different way of
getting out of the difficulty, the way of a grammarian.
The words all and every, he says, do not always denote
absolute universality (non ad universitatem referunt),
and the real meaning of the declaration, "Every man
is a liar," is, he thinks, "a great part of men are liars.''
(Omnes sic accipiendi sunt, quod magna pars hominum
mentiatur.-Com. in Eph. i. 22, 23.) Pelagius agreed
with Jerome. The word "every," he says, is used for
"the greater part," (hie omnes pro maxima parte dicit).
— But all these exegetical expedients, from Origen's onward,
are merely ingenious efforts to cook, for our digestion,
theological chickens which have never been hatched, and

ROMANS III. 4. 39
which have not even existed in embryo within the egg.
The Apostle is not categorically assertiug that every man
is a liar, and a liar too in every thing he says. There
is not, as Krehl remarks, the least approach to hyperbole
in his idea. The man, Krehl justly adds, who agrees
not with the Apostle in his feeling and conviction, is yet
far from the true knowledge of God. (Es ist Jceinesweges
eine Hyperbel; nein, — der Mensch, der nicht dieselbe Emp-
findung und Ueberzeugung hat, ist von der wahren Gottes-
erkenntniss noch fern) He who has just views of God
as the "All in all," will heartily desire that he should
ever turn out true, even although all mankind, if this should
be necessary to establish his truthfulness, should prove to
be false. God's truthfulness in his declarations, and
especially in the fulfilment of his precious promises, — in
other words, his faithfulness (iriang-ver. 3), or, to go
out wider still, his righteousness (Simtoavvri-ver. 5), — is
the ground on which the hopes of the human world,
and indeed of the whole moral universe, repose.
§ 3. The Apostle confirms his own aspiration, or assever
ation, regarding the truthfulness of God, by a quotation
from the Old Testament Scriptures: — As it has been writ
ten, That thou mightest be justified in thy words,
and overcome when thou enterest into judgement,
(KaOwg yiypairrti, "Oirwg a. v SiKaiwOyg iv rotg
Xoyoig aov, Kai viK-tjayg iv t (j» KpivtaOai at.)
The introductory expression, as it has been written,
(KaSiwg yiypairrai), is admirably rendered by Luther, as
it stands written, (wie geschrieben steht). It is not so
literally reproduced in our various English versions ; —
as it is written. The passage quoted occurs in the peni
tential psalm which David wrote "when Nathan the
prophet came unto him, after he had gone in to Bath-
sheba, "-Psalm li. It is the latter part of ver. 4 (Hebrew,
v. 6) which is referred to. But it may be well to quote
the preceding verses. " 1. Have mercy upon me, O God,
"according to thy lovingkindness ; according unto the
"multitude of thy tender mercies blot out my transgres-

40 ROMANS III. 4-
" sions. 2. Wash me throughly from mine iniquity, and
" cleanse me from my sin. 3. For I acknowledge my
" transgressions ; and my sin is ever before me. 4. Against
" thee, thee only, have I sinned, and done this evil in thy
"sight: that thou mightest be justified when thou speakest,
" and be clear when thou judgest," ('^e?'? n?]i? ^.?T3 ps?1? JH? <>).
The Apostle's quotation differs slightly from the literal
import of the Hebrew terms: but it is a precise transcrip
tion of the Septuagint version. And it is only in form,
not in substance, that the Septuagint version, when cor
rectly understood, varies from the original. The expression,
that thou mightest be justified, (oirwg av SiKatwSyg), might
have been translated, that thou inightest be righteous, .(jpa1?
pT»p). . But this could only mean, that thou mightest be
made out to be righteous, that is, that thou mightest be
justified. The expression, when thou speakest, or, in thy
speaking, (literally, iv ?$ Xiytiv at), is really equivalent to,
in thy words, (iv rolg Xoyoig aov), and, so far as Greek is
concerned, it is more idiomatically rendered as the Sep
tuagint translator and the Apostle give it. The conjec
ture of Drusius, that the Septuagint translator read TH7?,
(or rather, as we presume, Tv?1?)> is unnecessary; although,
at the same time, it is to be borne in mind that this is the
only passage in which the kai of the verb occurs, except
in the participle. The expression, again, be clear, (njm), is,
in substance, represented by the Greek idiomatic word
overcome, (viKi)arig), when that word is applied to the
successful party in a judicial cause. ( Verbum Hebraeum et
Graecum non reapse, sed Uteris, diversum esi,-Surenhusius.)
He who overcomes, if he be the defendant in the case, is
cleared, and is presumed to be clear. He is legally clear.
The party thus cleared, or he who gains the suit,
whether defendant or prosecutor, was said to overcome
(viKqv, vincere). See Eisner and Wetstein, in loc. Hence
in Eabbinic Hebrew the verb is freely used, in the sense
of the Hebrew p™, as meaning to be righteous, to be made
out to be righteous, to be justified. (See Buxtorf, in voc.)
And in Syriac the word-Jal -though retaining abundant
remnants of its original signification, to be pure, is cur-

ROMANS III. 4. 41
rently employed to mean to get' the victory, to conquer, to
overcome. (See Castell and Schaaf, in voc) The only
remaining expression is that which is rendered in the
psalm, when thou judgest, d?B»'3, literally ev tw Kpivuv at),
but which is rendered in our authorized English version of
the Septuagint translation, as given by the Apostle (iv t$
KpivtaOai at), "when thou art judged." It is manifest that
our translators had regarded the word employed in the
Septuagint as being in the passive voice. And in this
opinion they are supported by the Vulgate (cum judicaris);
also, apparently, by the Peshito (y^ v i 1 .'; Id — when
they judge thee) ; as well as by Erasmus, " Luther, Calvin,
Camerarius, and many other distinguished critics, inclusive,
in more modern times, of Bos, Eisner, Wetstein, Koppe,
Bohme, Eeiche, Eiickert, de Wette, Alford, Maier, Mehring,
Lange, &c. Calvin says, — "Although the verb KpivtaSai
can be taken either actively or passively, I nevertheless do
not doubt that the Greek translators, contrary to the mind
of the prophet (praeter mentem propfietae), rendered it pas
sively." Beza, however, on reconsideration, differed in this
matter from his illustrious predecessor. We say, recon
sideration ; for, in the 1st edition of his Translation of the
New Testament with Notes (1556), he took Calvin's view,
(quando de te fit judicium). In all his other editions he
maintains that the word is used in the middle voice, and
has the identical signification which attaches to the active.
Calvin and he, we apprehend, are both wrong: Calvin
wholly; and Beza partially Beza is wrong in so far as
he identified the signification of the verb in its middle
and in its active voice. There is no such identity. The
verb in the middle voice does not mean precisely what
it means in the active; though Piscator, Pareus, and the
authors of the new Dutch version (wanneer Gij oordeelt),
agree with Beza in attributing such a signification to it.
(See Dresigius, de verbis mediis, ii. 11; and especially
Kuster, de verb. med. ii. 6.) And yet it has a modified active
import. It means to litigate, to enter a case at law, to go
to law (with any one), to contend (with any one), to enter
into judgement. (See Hesychius, — KpivwptOa, avrl tov pax<I>-

42 ROMANS III. 4-
HtQa r) SiaXtywptQa.) The verb is used in this acceptation
in Matt. v. 40, " if any one will sue thee at the law,"
(SiXovri aoi KpiOr/vai) ; 1 Cor. vi. 6, " brother goeth to law
with brother," (aStX^bg ptTu dStXtyov Kpivtrat) ; see also
1 Cor. vi. 1. In the Septuagint, from which the Apostle
quotes, this medial use of the word is frequent ; sometimes
with a more or less strictly judicial reference, and some
times without it (as meaning to contend extrajudicially).
See Gen. xxvi. 21 ; Judg. viii. 1 ; xxi. 22 ; Job ix. 3 ; xiii.
19; xxxi. 13; Eccles. vi. 10; Isai. xliii. 26; 1. 8; Jer. ii. 9 ;
ii. 35; xxv. 31 ; Hos. ii. 2; Mic. vi. 1. In some of these
passages the corresponding verb in Hebrew is ®z® ; in one
(Eccles. vi. 10) it is p ; and in the most, an .
If we assume that the verb is used medially in Ps. Ii. 4,
then the ideas expressed by the original Hebrew, and by
the Septuagint version, are thoroughly harmonious and
almost coincident. For it is substantially one thing for
God to be clear when he judges sinners, and to overcome
when he contends, or enters into judgement, with them.
There is only an unessential variation in the standpoint
from which his relationship is contemplated. In the one
case he is contemplated as acting the part of a judge; in
the other he is considered as acting the part of a prosecutor.
In the one case he passes sentence against; in the other
he pleads against. But in both relationships he is sure to
be equally right in the utterances to which he gives expres
sion. And his utterances, moreover, will, in either case,
be in substance identical. There would be little wonder,
therefore, if the Septuagint translator should freely substi
tute the expression, that thou mightest overcome when thou
enter estinto judgement, for the expression, that thou mightest
be pure when thou judgest, (especially if the phrase KaOapbg
yivrj iv t$ Kpivtiv at might appear to be unidiomatic to
Greek ears; and if to say, on the other hand, viKi)a-ng iv rip
Kpivtiv at, would be to confound the respective relationships
of prosecutor and judge). We are disposed, then, to come
to the conclusion that the Septuagint translator used the
verb in its medial acceptation : and thus we would regard
the original Hebrew and the Septuagintal Greek as sub-

ROMANS III. 4- 43
stantially accordant. Of the same opinion, apparently,
was Photius, (i'va viKriarj, tig Kpiaiv rotg avdpwiroig KOTaarag,
ut vincat, ubi cum hominibus in judicium congreditur).
And of modern expositors the following approve: — Drusius,
Hammond, Whitby, Bengel, Tholuck (in his 1st, 2nd, 3rd,
and 5th editions, though in his 4th he took the word to be
passive), Meyer (in his 3rd and 4th editions, though he
confounds the functions of prosecutor and judge ; in his
1st and 2nd editions he maintained that the verb is passive),
Philippi, van Hengel, Ewald, Matthias, &c. Fritzsche says
that he is at a loss to determine which of the two inter
pretations he should prefer. Wordsworth too must have
been at a loss, for he leaps over the expression without
touching it at all. Beithmayr acknowledges that "the
medial form gives a good sense." And Klee inclines to it.
It seems certainly better to take this view of the meaning
of the Septuagint translation, — a meaning so harmonious
with the Hebrew phrase and with the scope of the passage
in the psalm, — than to hold, with Eiickert, that " the
Alexandrian translator had made a mistake," which the
Apostle adopts; or to maintain, with Taylor, that the
• Apostle quotes the faulty translation, not so much to adopt
it, as merely to refer to the passage of Scripture. Taylor
adds, — but we think very unwarrantably, — " when the
Hebrew and Greek differ, I cannot find the Apostles ever
argue from the Greek. It is upon this ground," he con
tinues, " that, for my own part, I pay no regard to the
words of the Septuagint, as quoted in the New Testament :
the Hebrew is my standard, because I am persuaded it was
so to the Apostles."
The passage which the Apostle quotes may be considered
both in its relation to its original context in the Psalm,
and in its relation to its context in the Apostle's discussion.
And, firstly, as regards the Psalm: — The teleological
form of the expression, — "that," or, "in order that (]%& =
oirwg av) thou mightest be justified when thou speakest,
and be clear when thou judgest," — has occasioned much
diversity of opinion regarding the logical antecedent on
which the clause is dependent. Hitzig, indeed, says

44 ROMANS III. 4-
nothing on the subject; and Maurer says nothing definite:
Hupfeld, on the other hand, says much, but would not
press a very definitive determination of the relationship.
Of those who have definitive opinions, (1.) Some suppose
that the antecedent is to be found iu the second verse of
the Psalm, — "wash me throughly from mine iniquity,
and cleanse me from my sin, — that thou mayest be justified,
&c." This is the opinion of Munster, Vatable, Ferrand,
de Saci, Day, &c. (2.) Others suppose that the antecedent
is to be found in the third verse, — "For I acknowledge
my transgressions; and my sin is ever before me; — against
thee, thee only have I sinned, and done this evil in thy
sight; — i" make this acknowledgement or confession that
thou mayest be justified when thou speakest, and be
clear when thou judgest." Of this opinion, substantially,
are Tremellius and Junius, Pareus, Taylor, Michaelis,
Fritzsche, &c. (3.) Some, again, imagine that the Psalmist's
idea is, — "Against thee, thee only have I sinned, and
done this evil in thy sight, and this thou hast permitted
or decreed, that thou mightest be justified, &c." Of this
opinion are Abelard, Zuingli, Sclater, Brentano, Hengsten-
berg {under a modification), Alexander, &c. (4.) While
others still, such as Chrysostom, Theodoret, Dionysius a
Eyckel, Campensis, Calvin, Mussus, Geier, Moller, Amyraut,
Green, Venema, Dathe, Phillips, &c, give to the conjunction
an ecbatic or consecutive instead of a telic or causative im
port, and understand the Psalmist as saying, "against thee,
thee only have I sinned, and done this evil in thy sight, so
that thou art righteous in what thou sayest, &c." This
last device, though regarded by Hupfeld as practically
admissible, amounts, we should imagine, to a sacrifice of
philology to theology. The preceding or third interpre
tation intrudes, on merely theological grounds, a supple
mentary idea, which, to say the least of it, is certainly
not expressed by the Psalmist, and which must remain,
therefore, so far as the Psalmist's language is concerned,
entirely conjectural. The first interpretation, on the
other hand, involves the unnatural assumption of a very
long parenthesis: and it necessitates, moreover, the idea

ROMANS III. 4. 45
that when it is said "that thou mayest be justified in
thy words" the reference is to promises; as also that the
last clause of the verse should be understood passively,
"and overcome when thou art judged." It remains, thus,
that we accept the second interpretation as expressive of
the Psalmist's mind. The Psalm is penitential. The
element of confession pervades it. There is explicit expres
sion given to this element in verse 3, — the central verse,
as Thrupp remarks, of the first strophe, vv. 1-5, — " for I
acknowledge .my transgressions ; and my sin is ever before
me." And when the Psalmist continues, in ver. 4, to say,
"to thee, thee only, have I sinned, and done that which
is evil in thy sight," his words prolong the confessional
element, and are, indeed, a confession. He had injured
man, it is true; — grievously; — atrociously. He had been
most cruel and most selfish. But "sin," as sin, can be
relative to God only. The most regardless self-indulgence
and the most atrocious cruelty could never be "sin,"
except in relation to the will of God. Suppose that there
were no will on the part of God in the matter, and there
never could be sin. It was in relation to God, then, —
to God only, — that the Psalmist had sinned. But he had
thus sinned. He had done "what was evil in God's sight,"
(for the expression in thy sight is to be connected, not with
the verb / have done, but with the expression what is evil).
He made this confession. And he made it "in order that
God might be justified (in men's minds) in speaking against
the guilty monarch, — that He might be clear (in the appre
hensions of men) in passing judicial sentence," as when He
said, "Now therefore the sword shall never depart froin
thine house," — "behold I will raise up evil against thee out
of thine own house." (2 Sam. xii. 10, 11.) It thus follows
that the words quoted by the Apostle express the Psalmist's
desire that God should be regarded by men as right, entirely
right, in what he says. The Psalmist was not solicitous
about the opinions which men might entertain regarding
himself. It was his great desire that they should have
high ideas of the righteousness of God, — that they should,
amid all circumstances and eventualities, vindicate God

46 ROMANS III. 4-
as one who is infinitely "true" to all his claims, — to all
that He ought to do and to be.
When we turn now to the quotation, as it lies in the
Apostle's text, we see at once its relevancy to the Apostle's
aim. He had. said, Let God be acknowledged as true,
though every man should be regarded as a liar. And
thus, when he adds, as it has been written, That thou
mightest be justified in thy words, and overcome
when thou enterest into judgement, he, as it were, says :
— " I may well exclaim, Let God be acknowledged to be true,
"though every man should be regarded as a liar; I am
"but echoing, in such an exclamation, the sentiment of
" King David, who was forward to condemn himself in
" what he had done, that he might vindicate God in
"what He had said; and who, accordingly, made public
" confession of his guilt, in order that God might be
"justified in the words (which he had uttered against him),
"and might overcome (in all men's estimation) when he
" entered into judgement (with him)." Eiickert says that
the quotation contains no proof at all of God's truthfulness.
(Einen Beweis fur Gottes Wahrhaftigkeit enthdlt die Stelle
gar nicht) But if we take an enlarged conception of what
is involved in God's truthfulness, — as we are bound to do
when we consider the parallel words faithfulness and right
eousness in verses 3d and 5th, — the statement of David as
suredly proves, (1), that he was profoundly persuaded that
God was to be entirely depended upon in all that he said,
whatever might be the nature of his utterances, and their
bearing upon men's state and prospects; and, (2), that he
was most desirous that men in general should agree with
himself in his view of the character of God. But these
ideas are entirely and to a nicety coincident with the
Apostle's own, when he exclaims, Let God be acknowledged
as true, though every man should be regarded as a liar.
It was surely rash in Eiickert to "enter into judgement"
with Paul in such a matter. He must certainly, when
Enlightened Candour sits on the bench, come out of court
" overcome." The conclusion of the whole matter is, that it must

ROMANS III. 5. 47
be the case that God has ever been, and is, and ever will
be, faithful and true in all that he says and promises in
his lively oracles. And therefore no unbelief of the
Jews, in reference to the evangelical contents of these
oracles, can ever militate against the asseveration, That it
is a very great privilege and prerogative to be intrusted
ivith them.

Ver. 5. E/ de r\ ahtKia rjfjjuv §eov hzcaoavvqv avvio"rrj<ri)i,
ti hpovpjw ; Mjj dhxog 6 §eog 6 Imp'spain rr\v bpyrjv ; xocto,
dvdpaiTov Xiyot).
Eng. Anth. Vers. But if our unrighteousness commend
the righteousness of God, what shall we say? Is God
unrighteous, vjho taketh vengeance ? (I speak as a' man.)
Revised Version. But if our unrighteousness sets off
God's righteousness, what shall we say ? Is God unrigh
teous who inflicteth wrath ? I speak after the manner
of man.
§. 1. The Apostle, instead of now proceeding to detail
other ingredients of the high prerogative enjoyed by the
Jews, runs out still farther on that defensive line of things,
along which he had travelled in verses 3rd and 4th. He
extends his detour, or digressiuncule — as Bullinger styles
it. He anticipates an objection to his justification of the
privilege which he had specified in the latter part of verse
2nd. " Note," says Mussus, " the adversative But; — But if
these things be true, lo a difficulty!" (Notate dictionem
adversativum, Sed, vel Autem :—Si autem haec vera sunt,
ecce difficultas)
§ 2. But if our unrighteousness sets off God's righteous
ness, (ti Si i) aSiKia iipiov Srtov SiKaioavvr/v avviarriaiv).
The verb (avviarriaiv), which we have rendered sets off,
originally means to place together, and is used with very

48 ROMANS III. 5.
various references. Sometimes persons are placed together,
that the one may be introduced to the other. In such cases
the one is often commended to the other. And this word
commend is the translation whieh is most frequently given
to the term in our Authorized English Version. See Eom.
v. 8 ; xvi. 1; 2 Cor. iv. 2; x. 18; xii. 11. Compare 2 Cor.
iii. 1 ; v. 12 ; x. 12. — But things, as well as persons, may be
placed together. And when they are thus brought into
contiguity, it often happens that one appears to advantage
by the side of another, in virtue of the influence of con
trast. It is set off. It is made more striking and con
spicuous. This is the meaning of the term in the passage
before us. It is translated, indeed, " commends " (com-
mendat) by the Vulgate ; and by Wycliffe, . Castellio, and
Beza, and in the Eng. Geneva, and our Auth. Eng. Vers.
A modification of the same rendering, — " recommends," —
is given by Martin, • Wynne, Belsham, &c. ; as also in
some of the Eevisions of the French Geneva, (see, for
instance, the Brussels ed. of 1616; and the Amsterdam
ed. of 1710). Luther's translation is similar, preiset. It
is reproduced by Coverdale, " prayseth." It is retained'
by Bengel. It is certainly much superior to Tyndale's1
version, " makes more excellent." It is given in a modified
form in the French Geneva of 1562, as also in Calvin's
French Translation, — " makes to be praised " (fait que"
soit louee). But neither praiseth, nor makes to be praised,
nor recommends, nor commends, is an altogether satisfac
tory rendering for the passage before us. Still less satis
factory is the translation of Erasmus, — "confirms" (stabilit
ac confirmed fulcitque), — although it is certainly the case
that things are often placed together, that one, or other,
or all of them may be supported, or established and
confirmed. Erasmus's version was given, long -before his
day, by the Syriac translator (sn . nv>) : and it is repro
duced by Turnbull, Conybeare, and The Five Clergymen;
— as also by Worsley, Macknight, Gb'schen, and Eilliet.
Cooper renders the word, analogously, — proves. A much
better rendering is that of Mace, Wakefield and Walford,
— displays. .. Vaughan intensifies it unnecessarily,— f! dis-

ROMANS III. 5. 49
plays strongly." The version of the Bishop's Bible lies
on the same line of representation, — " setteth foorth."
(Grotius's explanation of the word is felicitous and elegant,
spectabiliorem facit. So is Abelard's, maxime laudabilem
_ ostendit. So, indeed, is Stolz's translation, — in's Licht sezt;
and van Ess's, — an's Licht bringt.) The real idea is, —
sets off.
The Apostle's expression, introduced, as it is, with the
hypothetical particle if, is tantamount to a concession.
And hence it is better to translate the verb, sets off, in the
indicative, than set off, in the subjunctive. If the word
commend should be chosen for the translation, it ought
rather to be commends, than, as in our Auth. Eng. Vers.
and in Wycliffe, commend. The meaning of the Apostle is,
— "if,— as I admit to be the case, — the righteousness of
God is actually set off by our unrighteousness."
In introducing such a concession, the Apostle intends to
meet and thrust aside an objection, which might be
apt, in view of what is said in the preceding verse, to
spring up in some Jewish minds. The objection might
be represented thus: — " If God remains faithful to all
"his promises, true to all his declarations, — true in them
" all,— howsoever unbelieving and rebellious we may be :
" if He is always victorious, and justified, or made out to
." be right and righteous, howsoever unfaithfully and falsely
" and wickedly we may act : then, as our unrighteousness
" really serves to set off to advantage His righteousness,
" would it not be too bad if He were to punish us for the
"advantage which he gets? Our unrighteousness is a
"useful foil to his righteousness: — why should He then
" make us suffer for it ?"
This objection assumes, in the Apostle's view of it, a
peculiar phraseological shape, in virtue of the word for
justified, or, made out to be righteous, (SiKaiwSijjg), which
occurs in the passage that is quoted, in the preceding verse,
from the 51st Psalm. It is hence that we are. to account for
the employment of the expression, God's righteousness (SeoS)
SiKaioavvriv), rather than the expression, God's truthfulness,
or God's faithfulness. E

50 ROMANS III. 5.
As to the expression, "our unrighteousness," — the pro
noun our has no relation, as Meyer and Philippi seem
to think, to the statement, every man a liar. And hence
it is not, with Seb. Schmidt, Fritzsche, Baumgarten-
Crusius, and van Hengel, to be interpreted as embracing,
within the sweep of its reference, men in general. Neither
are we to rush to the other extreme, and, with Wetsteini
interpret the plural as standing for the singular, "if mtf^
unrighteousness," (si hoc ipsum, quod ego gentibus iniqui^,
sum). Neither has the Apostle vaulted into the stai|dpl
point of heathens; as Thomson imagines. The reference^
as was seen clearly by Grotius, Bengel, Koppe, Eeiche, de
Wette, Oltramare, is to the Jews exclusively. It is to
them that the Apostle is referring, at once in the preceding
context, and in that which comes after, (see ver. 9). He
has been stripping the unbelieving Jews of their high
assumptions ; and he had found, we presume, in the course
of his actual contact with them, that, when thus stripped,
they felt as if they were spiritually flayed, and were ready,
in their soreness, to give utterance to the most irreverent
and outrageous apologies for their state. It is to be borne
in mind, nevertheless, that such irreverent recklessness is
no peculiarity of Jews ; and that consequently the Apostle's
words, when viewed apart from their strict contextual
relations, are applicable to individuals of all peoples and
climes. The Apostle, associates himself, for a moment, with his
unbelieving countrymen, and says " our," because he was
viewing the subject in hand, not so much historically,
according to actual facts, as hypothetically and logically.
He was treating it as a general principle. And yet, for
aught that any one can tell, he might be all the more
readily led to employ the plural pronoun, as his memory
might instinctively and instantaneously suggest to him,
that once he himself was exactly in the position in which
the great body of his countrymen continued to be.
The expression, "our unrighteousness" (y dSiKla ypwv),
is put in contrast to the antithetic expression, " God's righ
teousness." The word unrighteousness is generic. But

ROMANS III. 5. 51
it was undoubtedly intended, though maintaining its
general import, to be a designation of something specific.
The reference is to the unbelief (dirtoTla) spoken of in
ver. 3rd. That unbelief was not only unbelief ; it was also
unrighteousness. The contrasted expression, God's righteousness (Seou
SiKaioavvrjv), is, in like manner, and notwithstanding its
generic import, employed with a specific reference. It
refers to that phase of God's righteousness which is spoken
of in the 3rd verse, — that phase of his righteousness which
is realized in his faithfulness to the promissory element
of his Oracles. When Ch. F. Schmid, Bosenmuller, and
Brentano translate the word, benignity, they are not only
wrong in their interpretation of the term ; they also con
found the office of interpretation with the office of transla
tion. And when the two former critics aver, in addition,
that Chrysostom and Theodoret ascribe the same import to
the term, their averment is unwarranted by the words
of the fathers appealed to. Mace commits a similar mistake
in criticism and interpretation, when he translates the
word, veracity. And when Seb. Schmidt, Whitby, Dodd
ridge, Adam, Turner (in the main), and van Hengel
suppose that the righteousness of God which is referred to,
is the same that is spoken of in chap. i. 17 as "revealed
in the Gospel," — constituting that Gospel " the power of
God unto salvation," — they lose sight of the relation of the
expression to SiKaio>Qijg in the preceding verse, — "that
thou mightest be made out to be righteous." They over
look, moreover, the parallelism of the word with the term
faithfulness in ver. 3rd, and the terms truth and trueness
in verses 4th and 7th.
§ 3. what shall we say ? (ri Ipovptv ;) This is an expres
sion that indicates a brief voluntary pause in thought. In
using it, the Apostle seems to have stopped for a moment,
that he might reweigh the idea or expression which was
rushing forward for utterance. It is fitted to lead the
reader to collect himself; while it makes him feel his
inquisitiveness whetted, and also brings him abreast with

52 ROMANS III. 5.
the Apostle in the conscious exercise of the logical faculty.
It is worthy of being noted, that the expression occurs
only, so far as the New Testament is concerned, in the
epistle to the Eomans. But there it occurs frequently.
See, — besides chap. iv. 1, — chap. vi. 1 ; vii. 7 ; viii. 31 ; ix.
14, 30. It is used, with great effect, in meeting erroneous
notions or objections, as here, and in chaps, iv. 1; vi. 1; vii.
7; ix. 14.
§ 4. is God unrighteous, who inflicteth wrath ? (pi) uStKog
6 Stbg, 6 tTTi^ipwv rfiv opynv-) A considerable number of
critics, — misunderstanding the Apostle's real relation to
the objection introduced, — render the interrogative particle
pi) by the Latin nonne, — "is not God unrighteous, who
inflicteth wrath ?" Grotius gives this rendering ; and he
has been followed by Day, Locke, Wells, Taylor, Mace,
Knatchbull, Boysen, Macknight, and Ch. F. Schmid; by
Eeiche too ; and even by Eiickert and Philippi ; and by
Jowett and Oltramare ; by Shepherd also. Matthias says
that it is exceedingly difficult (uberaus schwierig) to
account for the pi), which leads us to anticipate a negative
answer to the query. The difficulty grew upon him; so
that, in the 2nd edition of his Exposition, after weighing
anxiously the whole case, he supposes that there must be
a* predominant leaning toward an affirmative reply, and
yet, at the same time, a slight doubt in the direction of the
contrary, (einem leisen zweifel hinsichtlich ihrer Vernei-
nung). We are surprised at all this. It looks like
critical licentiousness. We see not the slightest need for
assuming a departure from the regular import of this
particle. (" Qualem," says Hoogeveen, "particulae py
impetum notare deprehendimus in dehortantibus, pro-
hibentibus, .deprecantibus, et aversantibus ; similem etiam
observamus in sciscitantibus, sed illis, qui rem, quasi
ignari, alium rogant, cum ipsi de contrario satis sint
certi."-De Partic, xxvii. 4. — " Tenendum est enim,"
'says Franke, "in hoc genere loquendi pi) ad metum sive
¦opinionem alius personae, quam quo3 indicativo indicata
est, referri."-De Partic. Neganiibus, i. 16.) The question

ROMANS III. 5. 53
proposed by the Apostle is put from his own standpoint,
although it embodies the objection of his unbelieving and
recalcitrating countrymen. Being put from his own stand
point, and thus proposing the objection, not directly, but
indirectly, it naturally carries in its bosom the prophecy
of his reply. De Wette, therefore, along with Meyer,
Tholuck, Mehring, and van Hengel, have done well in
retaining, in their translations of the interrogation, the
usual and natural force of the particle, as affording a
prognostication of a negative reply.
When it is asked, "is he unrighteous?" (aSiKog), the
word unrighteous drops all reference to the specific phases
of unrighteousness and righteousness which are covertly .
referred to in the preceding part of the verse. It is
employed in its purely generic import : — Is God acting
in a way that is inconsistent with perfect rectitude?
The appended clausule, who bringeth on wrath, who in
flicteth wrath, (o iirifipwv rr)v bpyr)v), is rather misconceived
by some translators. Mace, for example, translates it, " to
inflict punishment," — " is it not injustice in God to inflict
punishment? " — Conybeare similarly renders it, " in sending
the punishment;" — Wakefield and Belsham, "for inflicting
punishment;" — Walford, "if he inflict punishment;"- —
Turnbull, " when he inflicts punishment ; " — Knight, " in
flicting wrath ; " — old My les Coverdale, "that he is angrie
therefore." (Many of the German translators give corre
sponding versions. Thus Luther, "dass er daruber ziirnet" :
— Emser and Dietenberger, "dass er daruber erzornet": —
Piscator, " dass er den Zorn iiber sie bringt": — Heumann,
" dass er iiber uns zurnet " : — Zinzendorf, " dass er strafft " :
— Michaelis, " wenn er Strafen iibt" : — van Ess, " wenn er
straft": — Stolz, "wenn er Strafe auferlegt" : &c) In all
these translations the force of the article before the par
ticiple is not adequately represented; although there is in
some of them a nearer approximation than in others to
the fulness of the import of the original. The idiom cannot
be precisely reproduced in the English language. Our
substitution of the relative with the indicative, for the
article with the participle, brings us as near, as the con-

54 ROMANS III. S.
ventionalisms of our language will admit, to the force of
the original, — who inflicteth wrath. A matter of fact is
asserted. It is the case that God inflicts wrath for unrigh
teousness. The Apostle makes the assertion ; for it is, as we
have said, from the standpoint of his own subjectivity that
he gives utterance to the objection of his unbelieving
countrymen. (Bengel's translation, so far as the power of
the article is concerned, is right, der den zorn auf uns
wirft. So was Felbinger's before him, der den zorn iiber
uns bringet)
Matthias supposes that in this expression, who inflicteth
wrath, there is a retrospective reference to what is said in
ch. i. 18, — " The wrath of God is revealed from heaven
against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who
hold the truth in unrighteousness." It may be so : though
we discern no evidence of the retrospection. In that
asseveration the Apostle had special reference to God's
relation to Gentiles : whereas in this he has reference to
his relation to Jews. And the attribution to God of the
characteristic which is embodied in the clause before us,
was so much in harmony with common conviction and
consent, that there seems to be no occasion for supposing
a specific retrogression in thought to what was expressed
in that initial part of the epistle. There is not the same
objection to the idea of Baumgarten-Crusius and others,
that there is a reference to what is said in chap. ii. 5-9 ; in
which passage there is distinct mention made of that wrath
of God which is impending over impenitent Jews. But
whether there was actual conscious reflection, on the part
of the Apostle, upon what is there said, it seems impossible
to determine. The article which stands in the original
before the word wrath (rrjv opyyv) has no bearing on the
question. It cannot, however, be fitly reproduced in
English. The idiom of our language, so far from demand
ing it, rather rejects it. We cannot, with propriety, say,
in such a connection as is before us, "who inflicteth the
wrath." And' yet the Greek expression is eminently signifi
cant. Fritzsche represents the idea thus, — " who inflicteth
the wrath of which every one is aware, — the wrath to come,"

ROMANS III. 5.

55

(iram nemini ignotam, h. e., poenas quas futuras esse scimus :
Mat. iii. 7.). This is, no doubt, substantially the correct
idea. It might, under a slight variation of aspect, be
represented thus, " who inflicteth the wrath which is gener
ally recognized as the desert of unrighteousness." The
Five Clergymen, and Worsley before them, as also Matthias
and others, translate the clause, " who inflicteth his
wr»th/' The Peshito, indeed, had given the same version
(oil^iOj,) though it is possible that the translator had found
in his copy of the original, as in N, the superaddition of
the pronoun (rr)v dpyyv avrov). The translation of the Greek
article by the possessive pronoun, is not, in our opinion, a
felicity in this instance. For while the article may be
often regarded as, in various respects, tantamount to a
weak possessive pronoun, (steht er oft als schwacheres Pos-
sessw,-Kriiger, Gr. Sprachlehre, 50. 2. 2), yet here it has a
far more decided emphasis, — although that emphasis is
incapable of reproduction in our English idiom.
In place of the word wrath, many critics have substituted
the term, punishment, as a translation of the Greek expres
sion. Beza, for example; who not only makes the sub
stitution in his version, but also criticises the Vulgate and
Erasmus for abiding by the word wrath, — which, says he,
seems more obscure (quod videtur obscurius). It is never
theless the only correct rendering. The other is interpreta-
tional. It intrudes the function of exegesis into the
function of translation. And it robs us, moreover, of that
exceedingly important representation of things, so har
monious with the great realities of the Divine Nature,
which exhibits a certain emotional aversion of the Infinite
Mind, as comprehending or evolving the fundamental
element of the wo with which sin deserves to be visited.
The translation of our English Authorized Version, found
also in the English Geneva of 1557, and introduced by
Tyndale, — " who taketh vengeance," is an unnecessary de
parture from literality. The subsequent Geneva version
follows Beza, and renders the clause, " which punisheth."
It still remains to be mentioned that the expression, who
inflicteth wrath, is slightly elliptical : although it may be

56 ROMANS III. 5.
advantageously left to every reader's mind to supply the
complement. Luther supplies it thus, — "that he is angry
on account of it," (das er daruber ziirnet). So Piscator,
Felbinger and Bengel, again, supply the personal objects on
whom the wrath is assumed to terminate: — " who inflicteth
wrath upon us" (ypiv, or ty' ypag). If we were to abandon
the natural indeterminateness of the original, we should
certainly approve of the supplement of Felbinger and
Bengel. § 5. I speak after the manner of man, (Kara avSpwwov
Xiyw). A large proportion of expositors regard these words
as an avowal, on the part of the Apostle, that in proposing
the question contained in the preceding part of the verse,
he was not giving utterance to his own ideas. Taylor
paraphrases the expression thus: — "here I represent the
reasoning of an unbelieving Jew." Theodoret's explication
is tantamount: — "it is not I who say these things ; I have
but adduced the reasonings of others," (ov yap iyw, <pr\ai,
ravra Xiyw, dXXa rovg twv aXXwv riSniKa Xoyiapovg). Wet-
stein's is similar : — " I speak as men are wont, who, as by
an innate vice, endeavour to roll off from themselves all
blame, and cast it on another," (Loquor, ut solent homines,
qui, insito quasi vitio, culpam omnem a se amoliri, et in
alium conjicere conantur). Bengel, in his usual condensed
manner, represents the same idea thus : — " a man might
thus humanly think," (homo humanitus posset sic cogitare).
Some suppose, in addition, that the expression is designed
to indicate that the Apostle felt shocked in his spirit at
the idea to which he gave utterance. Such is the opinion
of Day, de Wette, Tholuck, Vaughan, &c. And there is no
doubt that the idea would be shocking to his feelings ;
more especially when it presented itself in the form in
which an actual objector would propose it; — " is not God
unjust?" Still, there is no evidence that the parenthetical
clause was inserted for the purpose of giving relief to such
a perturbation of feeling. And in the other passages in
which the expression occurs there is no indication that it
was employed in consequence of realizing a relation of

ROMANS III. 5. 57
shockingness in the idea expressed. See 1 Cor. ix. 8; Gal.
iii. 15; and compare Eom. vi. 19.
Those critics are undoubtedly right, who recognize in the
expression a latent antithesis, — an antithesis between such
modes of conception and speech as are common among
men, and such as would, in a higher plane of things, be
intrinsically worthy of the august subjects referred to
or described. The Apostle was conscious that, in his
thoughts, he was accustomed to rise reverentially toward
spiritual heights. Like a spiritual skylark, it was his
delight to soar, in spirit, into heaven. He mounted to the
neighbourhood of divinit}-. And there, as at the Fountain-
head of truth, he drank in, with eager recipiency, the
thoughts of God. He seemed to hear and understand
unutterable things. When he descended and mingled with
his fellow-men, it was that he might communicate to them
the mind of God, " not in the words which man's wisdom
teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth," (1 Cor. ii.
13). There was thus much of the divine in the Apostle's
utterances. (He spake Kara Stov) But still, "because of
the weakness of man's flesh " (Eom. vi. 19), he had to blend,
with what was divine, not a little of what was human.
The two elements, indeed, were absolutely requisite. In
his own receptivity, and in the receptivity of those to
whom he spake, and in the imperfect plasticity of the
human language which he wielded, at once in thinking and
in speaking, the human was inevitable. And thus the
divine was laid, as it were, under a disadvantage. It could
not be revealed in its own absolute splendour and glory.
And at certain stages of the impenetration of the human by
the divine, the Apostle felt, more keenly than at others,
the inadequacy of the susceptibility of the human. Hence
he had to condescend to illustrations, and other modes of
phraseology, which were the best, indeed, in the circum
stances, but which he could not but intensely feel to be
intrinsically imperfect and inadequate. (Comp. Gal. iii. 15;
and Eom. vi. 19. See also 1 Cor. ix. 8. Such passages as
1 Cor iii. 3; xv. 32, belong to another circle of things, as
not being connected with modes of speech) It is in the

58 ROMANS III. 5.
consciousness of such a feeling that he says here, — / speak
after the manner of man, (more humano loquor), that is,
"When I ask the . question, Is God unjust who inflicteth
" wrath ? I am deeply conscious that I am using language
" which is intrinsically improper when applied to God.
'' But, in condescension to human weakness, I transfer to
"Him language which it is customary for men to employ
" when referring to human relationships." Le Cene, though
by no means reaching the fulness of the idea, wa3 yet
on the line of the right notion when he translated the
expression, " I speak popularly " ( Je parte populairement).
Hilarion was more felicitous, (dvSpwitivwg XaXw). It is, of
course, as Fritzsche perceived, the application of the term
unjust to God which led the Apostle to speak apologiz-
ingly. His idea might be otherwise exhibited, though with
a defalcation of energy : — " Is God, who inflicteth wrath,
unjust (so to speak) ?" — "unjust, (if I might venture to
employ such a form)?" — "unjust, (pardon the inappro
priate word as applied to God, for really, after all, I
cannot, in human speech, find a more suitable term) ?"
It is said in Origen's Commentaries, as translated by
Eufinus, that in some copies of the text there was a. varia
tion of reading, affecting this clause: — "is God unjust,
who inflicteth wrath upon men?" (Kara avSpwirwv, —
instead of Kara avdpwirov, — with the omission of Xiyw).
But as there is no remnant of the variation in existing1
manuscripts or versions, we may conclude that it rested on
no solid foundation.
Paulus reads the expression interrogatively, (Sage etwa
auch Ich, was in diesem Sinn manche Menschen hieriiber
sagen?) But the interrogation destroys the parenthetical
relation of the remark, and would consequently interpose
a barrier between the direct relation of the rejoinder in
ver. 6, to the query in the preceding part of ver. 5.
There are many other vagaries of interpretation pro
posed by critics, more distinguished for ingenuity than
judgement, on which it would be in vain to waste time in
the way of formal refutation. Such is, for example, Jones's
notion, who supposes that there is a reference in the pre-

ROMANS III. 6. 59
ceding context to the authors of the Sibylline Oracles, and
to the measures adopted against them by the Emperor
Tiberius; and who interprets the parenthetical clause thus:
— " I speak in respect to (the punishment inflicted by) a
man, namely Tiberius."
An idea has been entertained by some that the expres
sion has a prospective, instead of a retrospective, reference:
— that it looks to what is to be said in ver. 6, rather than
to what has been said in the preceding part of ver. 5. We
shall consider this opinion in our remarks on ver. 6. But it
may be noticed, meanwhile, that a considerable number of
Critics — inclusive, for instance, of Belsham and Mac-Evilly, —
although not entertaining this opinion concerning the inter
nal relation of the expression, have yet externally transferred
it to the commencement of ver. 6. Such a transference,
however, is an unhappy interference with Eobert Stephens's
versiculation.

Ver. 6. M^ y'evoiTo' lirzi <xa>g scpivii 6 beog tov xoapov ;
Engl. Auth. Vers. God forbid: for then how shall God
judge the world?
Revised Version. Far be it. Since how shall God judge
the world?
§ 1. Theophylact supposes that it is the contents of this
verse in reference to which the Apostle says, at the close of
. the preceding, / speak after the manner of man. That
statement, he says, "has this sense:—/ make reply in
behalf of God, in such a way as it is competent for man to
plead; for God has doubtless secret reasons for his actions,
transcending human reasonings, and not needing human
apologies" (to Si, Kara. avSp wirov Xiyw, toiovtov
EY£t vovv' iyw piv, <j>r)ai, roiavra airoXoyovpai vitip tov Sttov,
Kara avZpwmvov Xoyiapbv, rovrianv, u>g ivi Svvarbv av-
ftp^n-ty Xoyi&oOat SiKaioXoyw. 'Ewti oaa ttoih 6 Srtbg, e'x«

60 ROMANS III. 6.
nvag uiroppyTovg Xoyovg, koi virip roue dvOpwirivovg Xoyia-
povg iari, pi) Stoptva rfjc irap ypwv airoXoyiag). But we do
not see that the argumentation of the 6th verse requires any
special apology. Eiickert, indeed, affirms that it is " weak,
very weak," (das diese Argumentation schwach, sehr schwach
sey, ist zuzugestehn) ; but Eiickert was fond, even to the
length of "very weakness," of finding flaws and failings in
the Apostle ; and he misunderstands, moreover, in the case
before us, the point of the inspired man's argumentation.
This we shall see in course. It is another objection to Theo-
phylact's interpretation, that the expression, I speak after
the manner of man, stands before the exclamation, Far
be it! as well as before the argument, "since how shall
God judge the world?" And assuredly there was no special
necessity for the Apostle apologizing for his own earnest
repudiation of a reflection upon the moral character of the
Infinite One, our Father. In short, if Theophylact's idea had
been correct, we should certainly have expected the clause
to have been introduced at the close of the 6th, rather than
at the close of the 5th verse.
Theodor Schott takes substantially the same view with
Theophylact. He thinks that the statement, / speak after
the manner of man, is prefixed by the Apostle to the
contents of the sixth verse, to indicate that the objection
referred to in the preceding verse can be sufficiently met
and obviated, — without any appeal to Holy Scripture or
history, — by an argument which the human understanding
is perfectly competent to draw immediately from the nature
of the case. (Jenem Schluss des naturlichen menschlichen
Verstandes tritt er eben auch mit einem Schluss entgegen,
der nicht aus heiliger Schrift oder Geschichte entnpmmen,
sondern aus der unmittelbar einleuchtenden Natur der Sache,
so wie Menschen eben schliessen, gezogen ist) But the
position of the statement, — as a kind of avant-coureur
remark, — is unaccountable on this hypothesis, — coming,
more especially, as it does, even before the introductory
exclamation. And then, besides, it is really not the case
that the argument is remarkable, either in its essence or
in its accidents, for any particular infusion of a human

ROMANS III. 6. gl
element of things, as distinguished from what is biblical
or divine.
Mehring, too, contends for the prospective reference of
the clause. But he differs from Theophylact and T. Schott
in his view of the aim of the Apostle. He imagines that
the import of verses 5th and 6th is the following : — " But
" if our unrighteousness sets out the righteousness of God,
" what shall we say ? Is God unjust who inflicteth wrath ?
"that is, Is God, who inflicteth wrath, so unjust as to
" condemn me, whose unrighteousness sets off to advantage
" his righteousness ?— That,— (I speak not my own senti-
" ments), — be far from God ! for how then will he judge the
" world ? " (Gott ist doch nicht ungerecht, welcher das Straf-
gericht verhangt, dass er auch mich richten wird? d. h.
wurde es wohl mit seiner Gerechtigkeit ubereinstimmen,
wenn er in diesem Falle auch mich verurtheilte ?) He
thinks, in other words, that the. contents of verse 6, instead
of being the Apostle's refutation of a blasphemous objection
to his reasoning, such as is generally supposed to be referred
to in verse 5, is an objector's vindication of the idea, that
God will not punish his unrighteousness, if it sets off to
advantage the divine righteousness. The interpretation,
though an ingenious expedient for relieving the succeeding
verse of the difficulties which are "supposed to beget it,
is an evident reversal of the Apostle's idea. For when
the Apostle asks, Is God unjust who inflicteth wrath ? the
internal nature, as well as the external relations of the
query, make it manifest that the idea, at bottom, is this,—
It is not unjust in God to inflict wrath upon those wJwse
unrighteousness illustrates by contrast, and thus magnifies,
his own righteousness.
There is no good reason, then, for coming to the con
clusion that the closing clause of the preceding verse has
any other reference than, what is retrospective.
§ 2. Far be it ! (Mr) yivoiro), that is, Far from us be the
thought that the wrath-inflicting God would be unjust in
inflicting wrath upon the unbelieving Jews, although, by
.their unrighteousness,' they give ciccasion for the display, of

62 ROMANS III. 6.
his own righteousness. (Procul avertat Deus hanc cogita-
tionem a piis aninus.-Erasmus.) See on the phrase, Far
be it, ver. 4. Count Zinzendorf translates it here, "O no," (0
nein). Bugenhagen's explanation is, — " It is a blasphemy.'-
It is of moment to notice that it is not simply and abstractly
the idea which forms the conclusion of the objector's implied
syllogism, — the idea, that God is unjust, — which the Apostle
repels with detestation. It is this conclusion in its relation
to the conceded hypothetical premiss, if God punish the
unrighteous who display his righteousness. And hence
it was natural in the Greek expositors to show that the
unrighteous are not the true and proper Causes of God's
glory or righteousness or justification or victory. If they
were, it would be difficult to vindicate the justice of God
in punishing them. But they merely afford incidental
occasion for the display of the intrinsically glorious attri
butes of the divine nature. (Ovkiti a'inog avrw rr)g v'lK-rig
yiyovag,— Chrysostom. — Oiik tiaiv oi apapravovTtg, obrt
v'lKrig, ovTt Trig dXy&tiag, ovrt rtig SiKaioavvrig, a'lTioi,— PhotlUS
in GCcum. — Ai)Xoi> oti oiiy_' rjjU£?e avrq Trig dXriwtiag
Kai Trig SiKaioavvyg a'inoi, dXX' avrbg iavn^,— Ditto. — Tr)v
irpotyaaiv rr)g v'lKrig irapiaxoptv— 03cum.)
§ 3. Since how shall God judge the world? (iirti iriog Kpivu
6 Seoc tov Koapov ;) The conjunction (inti), which we have
simply rendered since, means, when exegetically considered,
since, if that be the case, — since, if so; that is, since, if it be
¦me case that it is unrighteous in God to inflict wrath upon
those whose unrighteousness sets off his righteousness. The
supplementary idea is not inherent in the word, but is derived
from the logical relation of the clauses. It is expressed,
however, in our authorized English version, " for then" — a
translation which came down from Tyndale. Wycliffe renders
the term similarly, " ellis " (else) ; and the Vulgate, " other
wise" (alioquin). So Luther and Bengel (sonst). In our
Authorized Version the term is rendered " otherwise " in
Eom. xi. 6, 22 ; Heb. ix. 17; and "else" in 1 Cor. vii. 14 ;
xv. 29. It is, however, as a general rule, inexpedient to render
a translation more explicit or determinate than the original.

ROMANS III. 6. 63
:m Bypthe, >^xpression the world (tov Koapov) some critics
- tundeTstand0 the heathen-world, the Gentiles. This is the
Opinion of Cocceius, who seems to have been the father of
fie rfofira. Wittich, de Brais, Venema, accepted the idea.
... Jtaifiga gave in his cordial adhesion, (Ik ben van de waarheit
fj^ser\v^rklaringe ten eenemaal overtuigt). Eeiche strenu
ously contended for the interpretation ; as did Koppe before
him, who says, indeed, that it must be accepted, if we would
not utterly destroy the whole force of the apostle's argument,
(nisi efflcere velis vertendo et inter pretando, ut omnis argu-
menti vis prorsus pereat). Olshausen, too, contends for it.
And it has, besides, been approved of by Ernesti, Cramer,
Stolz, Drys^n (det bfiriga menniskoslagtet), Bockel, Schrader,
&c. Limborch also would be willing to accept it. But it is
questionable whether the term world is ever used as sharply
and precisely equivalent to the Gentile-world. Olshausen
says that " the context imperatively requires this signification
in Eom. xi. 12 and 1 Cor. i. 21." But even in these passages
the word rather denotes, indefinitely, the world of mankind
in general, which no doubt consists, in the main, of Gentile
peoples. And, whatever may be the possible limitations of
the term in certain relationships, there is, assuredly, no
logical or exegetical necessity for assuming these limitations
in the case before us. The Apostle has represented in the
preceding chapter the universal reference of the final judge
ment. And it was not disputed by the Jews that all men
would ultimately stand before the judgement-seat of God, to
have their everlasting award judicially determined. The
Apostle, therefore, assumes that the certainty of the general
judgement was admitted. He regards the admission as
common ground, on which he and his theological antagonists
could meet, and from which, therefore, it was legitimate, as
ex concesso, to derive the material of an argument.
His argument is sufficiently obvious, though it has been
strangely missed by many both of the ancient and of the
modern expositors. It has been supposed, for example, by
Origen, Theophylact, Aquinas, de Lyra, Cajetan, Paciuchelli,
Hemming, as well as by Day, Este, Doddridge, Heumann,
Klee, Kollner, and even Meyer, Eiickert, Jowett, and Colenso,

64 ROMANS III. 6.
that the Apostle simply means that God could- not be the
judge of the world if he were an unjust being; for a judge
should be just, and an infinitely perfect judge will be just.
It was because Eiickert imagined that this was the Apostle's
idea, that he pronounced the argumentation to be " weak,
very weak." And a man who had none of Eiickert's
deficiency of reverence for the Apostle, Sclater, said of the
confutation, — " the manner of answer may in logic seem
absurd; but it is, in Christianity, the best that can be
shaped to deniers of principles." He had evidently thought
the reasoning, when logically viewed, to be " weak."
Glockler, too, says that the apostle's question, as thus under
stood, "may be good enough for children, who cannot
reason, but certainly not for such kind of people as those
to whom the epistle was addressed," (diese Frage passt
einerseits nur filr Kinder, welche die Begriffe noch nicht
recht zusammenfiigen konnen, nicht aber fur seiche Leute,
an welche dieser Brief geschrieben ist). Even Calvin is
perplexed, and admits that the Apostle " does not wholly
clear away the calumny, but only replies to this effect, that
the objection is absurd," (neque enim penitus calumniam
diluit, sed tantum respondet, absurdum illud esse, quod
objicitur). And, as it were to supplement the Apostle's
omission, he says, (in the language of old Eosdell's trans
lation,) — " If thou doest desire a directe refutation, whereby
such blasphemous speeches may be quenched, understande
it thus, That this cometh not to passe throughe the nature of
unrighteousnesse, that the righteousnesse of God should
appeare the more thereby : but our wickednesse is so overcome
of the goodnesse of God that it is rather converted into another
ende, then it doth tende unto," (quodsi directam refuta-
tionem cupis, qua ejusmodi sacrilegia compescantur, sic
accipe : Non hoc fieri injustitim natura, ut Dei justitia
magis eluceat, sed Dei bonitate superari nostram malitiam,
ut in diver sum potius, quam tendat, finem convertatur).
But this supplement to the apostle's argument is altogether
unnecessary; and all low or painful ideas of the irrelevancy
of the reasoning take flight as soon as the real nature of
the argumentation is apprehended. .It is admirably ex-

ROMANS III. 6. 65
hibited by Haldane : — " If the objections were well founded,
" it would entirely divest God of the character of judge of
" the world. The reason of this is manifest, for there is no
" sin that any man can commit, which does not exalt some
" perfection of God, in the way of contrast. If, then, it be
" concluded that because unrighteousness in man illustrates
" the righteousness of God, God is unrighteous when he
" taketh vengeance, it must be farther said, that there is no
"sin that God can justly punish: whence it follows that
" God cannot any longer be the judge of the world. The
" objection, then, is such that, were it admitted, all the
" religion in the world would at once be annihilated. For
" the sin of the world, for which men will be everlastingly
" punished, will no doubt be made to manifest God's glory.
" Such is the force of the apostle's reply." Bengel gives the
idea in one short remark, appended to his German transla
tion: — "the world; — which is full of unrighteousness, and
thus sets off the righteousness of God." The Apostle appeals
to a general principle which was acknowledged by those
who, in their own particular case, pleaded for exemption.
He, as it were, reminds them, that, just as it is true that
they were part and parcel of "the world," — which they
admitted was to be judged according to real character and
not according to incidental and undesigned consequences
of conduct; — so it is true that they could have no just reason
to expect that they would be exempted from punishment,
if their character were bad, although by the side of it the
character of God should appear to be surpassingly glorious.
It is of course assumed, when it is said, "how shall God
judge the world?" that, taking the actual moral condition
of the world into account, the judicial sentence passed, on
the great day of assize, must, in very many cases, be
condemnatory. Glockler, — to avoid apostolic childishness of argumentation,
— supposes that the emphasis of the question rests on the word
how (iriog) : — "for how (i.e., in ivhat manner, quasi rivi
Tpoirw) will God judge the world?" And he imagines,
therefore, though he does not formally admit, a consequent
aposiopesis in the discourse. The Apostle's argument, as he

66 ROMANS III. 6.
understands it, might be represented thus : — "For va. what
manner will God judge the world ? Manifestly in this manner;
— Every man's destiny shall be awarded to him, not accord
ing to the incidental and undesigned consequences of his
actions, but according to their essential and intrinsic moral
quality." The substantive result of this explanation is coin
cident with the interpretation already given. But it is an
objection to the explanation itself, that it throws into aposio-
pesis the whole force of the argument. It divests, moreover,
the particle how of its dialectical force, — a force which leads
us to expect that the word introduces a logical difficulty,
which is presumed to be insurmountable on the hypothesis
implied in the preceding interrogation. And then, thirdly,
it assumes-that the conjunction since is used by the Apostle
as simply equivalent to the usual ratiocinative particle for
(ydp), — a usage of the word which would be entirely unpre
cedented in the Apostle's writings. Compare Eom. xi. 6,
22 ; 1 Cor. v. 10 ; vii. 14 ; xiv. 12, 16; xv. 29; 2 Cor. xi.
18; xiii. 3"; — these are all the passages in which the conjunc
tion occurs.
Some critics assign to the future verb, " since how shall he
judge ?" (Kpivtt), — its idiomatic import of moral possibility :
— " since how could he judge? " Of this opinion areHeumann,
Oertel, de Wette, Oltramare, Matthias, &c. Calvin had
evidently taken the same view; and hence he does not restrict
the "judgement" spoken of, to the general judgement to come.
Luther, too, translates the clause thus : — •" Otherwise how
could God judge the world?" (Wie konnte sonst Gott die Welt
richten ?) It is not a matter of much moment whether we
adopt such an idea of the import of the verb, or retain its
simple reference to futurity. The notions of futurity and
possibility naturally interlace, in such a case as this. But as
the reference is doubtless to a strictly future event, — the final
judgement, — we agree with Meyer in thinking that there is no
reason why we should depart from the common import of the
tense, so far at least as translation is concerned.

ROMANS III. 7. 67
Ver. 7. E* yap q aXfiSetu tov 3-sou h tu IpZ ¦^ivapJa.Ti
Ivspfo-ffevo-iv eig t^v dol-ay uvtov, ti en xccyu tug apapToSkog
xpfi/opjui ;
Eng. Auth. Vers. For if the truth of God hath more
abounded through my lie unto his glory: why yet am I
also judged 'as a sinner ?
Revised Version. For if the trueness of God super-
abounded through my lie to his glory, why notwithstanding
am even I judged as a sinner?
§ 1. The relation of this verse to the preceding context
has been the subject of considerable dispute ; and Cony
beare represents the whole passage as "most difficult.''
Grotius says that the 6th verse, along with the last clause
of the 5th, i" speak after the manner of man, should be
regarded as parenthetical ; and he thus maintains that the
query of the 7th verse follows up continuatively the query
of the 5th. Calvin was of the same opinion. He says,
" I do not doubt that the Apostle, in advancing this objec-
" tion also, is personating the ungodly. For it is, as it
" were, the explanation of the preceding one ; and it would
" have been joined to it, had not the Apostle, moved by the
" dishonour (done to God), broken off in the middle of what
" he was saying," (Non dubito, quin haec quoque objectio in
persona impiorum proferatur. Est enim velut exegesis
superioris; et connectenda fuerat, nisi Apostolus, indig-
nitate permotus, (incorrectly translated by Owen, moved
with indignation; and correspondingly by Krummacher
and Bender aus Unwillen), medium sermonem abru-
pisset). Theophylact took the same view, (ko.1 irdXiv to
avTO iiravaXap^dvti, Sia to aa^iartpov avrb iroir]<jai). So too
did Willet, Day, Turretin, Locke ; Bengel also, and Wolf,
and Taylor,, and many others of the older expositors ; as
also, of more modern critics, Bahrdt, Eiickert, Kollner,
Tholuck, Philippi, Vaughan, Jowett, &c. Bahrdt, in his
Translation, actually transposes verses 6, 7, putting verse
7 before verse 6. Ver. 7, . says Vaughan, is a "repetition, in

68 ROMANS III. 7.
the form of a more direct objection, of the difficulty raised
in ver. 5, and already partially answered." Moses Stuart
is of the same opinion, and rather arbitrarily translates the
ratiocinative particle (yap) at the commencement of the
verse, still : — " still, if the truth of God hath abounded
more unto his glory on account of my false dealing." It is
an insuperable objection to this theory of the connection,
that verse 6 has really nothing in it of a parenthetical
nature. And exegesis must be reduced to extremity before
it can allow that the particle for, at the beginning of verse
7, overleaps, in its reference, the whole of that immediately
preceding verse. We may conclude, then, that the verse
contains what is intended either to establish or to illustrate
the argument of verse 6. Zuingli, with fine exegetical
tact, remarks, that it is subjoined to verse 6 as a sort of
additional or appended apodosis, — a prosapodosis. (Subjici-
untur quasi prosapodosis haec illius quod supra dixit,
Quare Deus possit judicare mundum; et hoc cog-
noscitur ex conjunctione rationali, etenim, ti ydp,
nam si.)
§ 2. For if the trueness of God superabounded by my lie
to his glory, (El yap y dXyStia tov Stov tv ti$ tfuo ip&vapan
iirtpiaatvatv tig rrjv So^av avrov), why nevertheless am
even I judged as a sinner? (n 'in Kayw wg (ipaprwXbg
Kpivopai ;) Thefollowing remarks may suffice for exposition: — ¦
1. The connection of the contents of the verse with what
goes before, as indicated by the ratiocinative particle for
(ydp), may be represented thus ; — " I have asked, how shall
" God judge the world? The question is emphatically to
"the point, on the hypothesis that it would be unjust in
"him to punish our unrighteousness, if it sets off his
" righteousness :— for if the trueness of God superabounded,
" &c." The statement, however, thus introduced, is only
analytically demonstrative. It is explanatory. (The ydp
is thus ydp illustrantis et confirmantis)
2. The Alexandrian MS. reads "but if" (ti Si), instead
of "for if" (d ydp). So does the Sinaitic MS., — though
Scrivener, in his collation, has overlooked the fact. The

ROMANS III. 7. 69
author or authors of the reading had apparently, like
Calvin, Grotius, Philippi, and others, failed to discern the
connection of the contents of the verse with ver. 6th ; and,
supposing that the Apostle was returning to the strain
of ver. 5th, had concluded that the text was corrupt, and
conjecturally sought to bring it into harmony with the
assumed theory of connection.
3. The expression, 17 dXySua tov 3-eou, is to be understood,
not objectively, but subjectively. It denotes the trueness
of God, — that element of his moral character in virtue of
which he is true to all the promises of his grace, as well as
to all the other claims of his infinite reason and infinite
conscience. The phrase is used by the Apostle with an
evident reference to what is said in ver. 4th, " Let God turn
out true (dXySyg), though every man should prove a liar : "
and thus the attributive runs parallel with the word faith
fulness (iriang) in ver. 3rd, and with the word righteousness
(SiKaioavvy) in ver. 5th. It is better, therefore, that it be
translated trueness, or truthfulness, than rendered truth.
And while, at this stage of the Apostle's reasoning, and
more especially after his use of the generic term righteous
ness in ver. 5th, the word is not, perhaps, to be rigidly
and absolutely restricted to God's truthfulness in regard to
his gracious utterances in the lively Oracles ; still, there
cannot be a doubt that it is with a principal reference to
his trueness in relation to the indications, promises, and
protestations of his grace that the term is employed. This
is evident from the obvious scope of the whole paragraph,
verses 1 — 8, and the designed return of thought to what
is stated in ver. 4th.
4. When it is said, "for if the trueness of God super-
abounded" (iirtpiaatvatv), the verb is in the aorist, because
the Apostle is thinking proleptically of what is past rela
tively to the judging, of which he speaks in the apodosis
of the sentence. He had already referred to the final
judgement of the world. His present statement is an ana
lytical confirmation of the argument involved in that
reference. And thus, in imagination, he goes forward to
that day of grand assize ; and thence looking backward,

70 ROMANS III. 7.
he says, "for if the trueness of God superabounded (viz.,
during the period of my terrestrial probation) to his glory,
through my lie, &c." When the Apostle ascribes to the
occasion of his lie, a superabounding of the trueness of
God, he does not refer, of course, to any intrinsic increase
of the subjective moral excellence of God. The notion of
such an increase would be utterly inconsistent with the
inspired man's conceptions of the infinite perfection and
independence of God. The overplus referred to is. entirely
relative to the apprehensions of men and other intelligent
creatures. It is logical, not real : objective relatively to
God, — not subjective: but subjective relatively to men and
angels. The representation is thus identical with what is
contained in the expression, in ver. 4th, "let God become
true." Tyndale's translation, therefore, though not literal,
is exegetically correct : — " Yf the veritie of God appere
moare excellent thorow my lye." De Saci's is corre
spondent, — " si par mon infidelite la fidelite de Dieu a eclate
davantage." 5. The expression, to his glory (tig ri)v S6£av avrov),
evidently means, to the furtherance of his glory. And the
glory referred to must, be his relative glory, or rather, his
intrinsic glory relatively viewed, — his intrinsic glory, as
relatively apprehensible and realizable by men and other
intelligent creatures. Luther, Tyndale, Piscator, Morus,
and others, render the word praise. But this is to change
the standpoint of view; and to confound, moreover, the
function of exegete with that of translator.
6. The words, through my lie (iv t$ ip$ \ptvapan),
literally mean, in (the sphere of) my lie. The term for lie
used by the Apostle is very rarely found in Greek writers,
and is condemned by Thomas Magister, (tptvSog Xtyt, ov
xptvapa). It occurs nowhere else in the New Testament.
It is not found in the Septuagint. It is used, however, by
Symmachus, Aquila, and Theodotion, (see Montfaucon's
Lexicon Graic), and it is found not only in Aristides,
as indicated by Thomas Magister, but also occasionally in
Lucian, and elsewhere. It has descended into current
use in modern Greek. The lie referred to is something

ROMANS III. 7. 71
in antithesis of the trueness ascribed to God. And, as
it reflects back through verse 4th on verse 3rd, it doubtless
denotes that particular phase of untrueness or unfaithful
ness to the claims of conscience and of God which realizes
itself in relation to the dispensation of grace, and the proffer
of salvation through Christ the Saviour. Such untrueness
is unbelief (amaria). He who believes not in God's grace,
God's propitious mercy, God's gospel, not only treats God
as if he were false, — "making him a liar" (^tvaryv), 1 John
v. 10, — he is also himself a "liar." He is not only in
contradiction with God, with whom alone the truth lies;
he is inexcusably and wilfully in contradiction. He chooses
to disobey the divine dictates, which come to him either
directly through his conscience, or at least abreast with it.
Instead of responsively saying Yea to God, as God reveals
Himself in propitiousness, he says Nay. And his Nay is
a lie. 7. The expression, " if the trueness of God superabounded
to his glory by my lie," contains an obvious assumption or
concession ; which, however, is pronounced by Moses Stuart
to be false. He says, — " The nice observer of idiom will note
that the conditional sentence here, beginning with ti, has an
aor. indie, (iirtpiaatvat) in it, and therefore indicates that the
speaker here states a case which he did not believe could
take place." (Com. in loc) And this, Mr Stuart's observation,
has been quoted with approbation by Knight as if it con
tained an important truth, and were an evidence of nice
observation of Greek idioms. It involves, however, a total
inversion of the apostle's idea ; for, as in v. 5, he makes what
is tantamount to a concession in what he conditionally utters.
(Dass Et ist hier particula comcessioms-Eambach). And
whosoever considers the mutually illustrative character of
contraries, must concede that God's trueness is increasingly
realized when put in contrast with man's falseness. That the
use of ei, moreover, with an aorist indicative, does not, of
itself, in any way, or to any degree, denote or suggest
improbability of occurrence, is evident from innumerable
instances. See, for example, in New Testament usage, John
xiii. 32, " if God was glorified in him, (ti 6 Stbg iSo^daOy

72 ROMANS HI. 7.
ivavrif), God shall also glorify him in himself": — Eom. xv.
27, " if the Gentiles were made partakers of their spiritual
things, (ti rdlg irvtvpanKolg avrwv iKOivwvyaav to. tSrvri), their
duty is also to minister unto them in carnal things": — 1
John iv. 11, "if God so loved us, (ti ovrwg 6 %tbg yydiryaiv
ypdg), we ought also to love one another." M. Stuart had
quite misapprehended at once the philosophy and the
philology of conditional sentences. So far as the mere con
ditional particle, in its relation to the indicative of the aorist,
is concerned, there is no indication whatever of the inherent
probability or improbability of the fact assumed. (EL legitwr,
secundo, says C. Ab. Wahl, ea ratione, qua sumimus fieri
aliquid, sed utrum possit fieri velfuturum sit, nee 7iej
nihil curantes. Construitur in talibus cum indicativo om
nium temporum.-Comment. de particulae ti apud N. T
scriptores usu et potestate. p. 12. See also_p. 16.)
8. It has been asked whose person it is which the Apostlq
assumes when he says, "for if the trueness of God super-
abounded through my lie to his glory." The critics who
regard verse 6th as actually or substantially parenthetical;
and who thus suppose either a continuation of the strain of
verse 5th, or a return to it, think, in general, that the Apostlei
speaks in the person of an unbelieving Jew. Those, again,
who suppose that by the word world, at the close of verse
6th, is meant the heathen-world, generally think that he
speaks in the person of a heathen. "The heathen," says
Eeiche, "is introduced as speaking," (Der Heide wird redend
eingefuhrt). The same was the opinion of Bosenmiiller ulti
mately, (Paulus in persona pagani hominis loquitur).
Koppe, Whitby, Flatt, Thomson, Olshausen, &c, coincide.
And in general they interpret the word lie, as meaning
idolatry or idol ; and trueness as meaning the true attributes
of God (Vitringa), or the true majesty of God (Koppe), or the
true religion (Eeiche). But as we found that the world
referred to is not simply the heathens or Gentiles, this inter
pretation of the Apostle's impersonation is without founda
tion. There is, however, an element in it which is right.
There is a reference to the word " world." And the apostle
is evidently speaking just as an individual representative

ROMANS III. 7. 73
of the world at large. We do not think, indeed/with van
Hengel — though with him both Wittich and Vitringa
would agree — that the sentence might have run thus : — " for
if the trueness of God superabounded through the world's lie
to his glory, why yet is the world judged as sinful ? " for the
Apostle's argument does not require him to assume that the
whole world is false, or unbelieving. It only requires him to
hold that some (or many) in it are of this character. When
he makes reference to the final judgement, it is to the judge
ment as it shall actually be, when there shall take place a
separation between the actually justified (the believing) and
the actually condemned (the impenitent). The Apostle, then,
when he says, " in the sphere of my lie," personates for the
moment any given individual of the world who may be
found, on the final day, on the left hand of the Judge. He
(thus ptTaaxnpaT'tZti, 1 Cor., iv. 6, and) as it were says ; —
" I may well ask the question, — How shall God, on the
" principles referred to, judge the world ? For, to descend
"to particulars, let me represent the case of an indi-
" vidual belonging to the vast class of the unbelieving and
" ungodly. Any such individual might say, if the trueness
" of God superabounded to his glory through my lie, why
" still am even I judged as a sinner ? "
¦ 9. In the expression, why still ? (ri in), or why yet ? or why
(nevertheless ? or why notwithstanding ? the adverb points to
the fact of the superabounding of the trueness of God, to His
glory, through the lie of the person condemned. For " the
holiness of the divinity," as Chalmers expresses it, " has
blazed forth, as it were, into brighter conspicuousness on the
dark ground of human guilt and human turpitude." Sharpe
ignores altogether the interrogative element in the expression,
and renders the entire clausule thus, — ivhy, I am yet judged.
as a sinner. But this is really, though in things small, to
ignore the part of Hamlet in Hamlet's play. It is to ignore,
moreover, the force of the Greek tL
10. In the expression, am even I judged as a sinner ?
the phrase even 1 (Kayw) is rendered by many I too, and
interpreted, according to the theory taken of the whole verse,
either I as well as the Gentile, or I as well as the Jew. But

74 ROMANS III. 7.
since the Apostle is dramatically personating neither the Jew
as the Jew, nor even the Gentile as the Gentile, but an indi
vidual, taken as it were at random from the mass of the
world, the Kai, in conjunction with iyw, simply intensifies
the idea which lies on the line of the adverb still (in), and
gathers up into the pronoun the full peculiarity that attaches
to the Being who personally occasions the superabounding of
the divine truthfulness and glory. The phrase is rendered
even I, by both Meyer and Tholuck, as also by Baumgarten-
Crusius. The rendering seems to be the best of which the
phrase is susceptible ; although it is, perhaps, a trifle too
strong. No account is taken at all of the Kai, by Beza, Heu-
mann, the Five Clergymen," &c. "Abundat," says Beza;
and he actually finds fault with the Vulgate and Erasmus
for translating the phrase " et ego."
11. "Why notwithstanding am even I judged as a
sinner ? " The verb is in the present, (Kpivopai), because
the Apostle has, in a sort of dramatic way, sisted himself
anticipatively before the great white throne, and heard,. in
his assumed character of one of the mass of unbelievers, his
sentence of condemnation pronounced. The verb has its
natural and simple meaning, am I judged ? but the nature of
the case, as indicated by the connected phrase as a sinner,
and more remotely by the expression " in the element of my
lie," demonstrates that thejudgement referred to is condemna
tory : why am I condemned in judgement ? When Fritzsche
supposes that the condemnation referred to emanates from
men (cur adhuc ab hominibus culper ?) ; and Sclater,
that it emanates from both " God and man," they entirely
overlook the relation of the argument to the "judgement "
spoken of in verse 6th. The word sinner (dpapTwXog)
is used, as the nature of the case indicates, and as is
remarked by Zacharia, as well as by others, in its intensified
acceptation, as the antithesis of saint or believer. (Comp.
chap, ii., 12.)
12. In order to understand the force of the Apostle's argu
ment, it is necessary to carry out of verses 5th and 6th the
hypothetical assumption of the abhorred idea expressed in
the interrogation, " is God unjust who inflicteth wrath ? "

ROMANS III. 8. 75
The reasoning of the 7th verse might, then, be represented
thus: — "My question — How shall God judge the world? —
" cannot be answered on such principles. For, — to assume for
" the moment the person of one of the unbelieving mass of
"theN world, — I am warranted in asking another question;
" and I may make bold to ask it, in the confidence that it
" cannot be answered. It is this, — If the trueness of God
" hath superabounded to His glory through my lie, why not-
" withstanding am even I, — if it be unjust in God to punish
" those who are the occasion of setting off his righteousness
" and glory, — why, I say, am even I judged as a sinner ? "
The argument, though apagogical, is unanswerable, resting, as
it does, on the common ground which was occupied at once
by the Apostle himself and by the unbelieving Jew, whose
objection he was combating. They both admitted, and
indeed contended, that God will judge the world. And with
the help of that one admission, the Apostle has successfully,
as Oltramare expresses it, " put the Jew in contradiction
with himself," (II met ainsi le Juif en contradiction avec
lui-meme). He has thus most effectually gained his point,
and triumphed in his argument. But he proceeds to rivet
his reasoning in the verse that follows.

VER. 8. Kai prj — xo&wg fiXafftpqpJOvpeSa xai zotStag
<paciv Ting ri{ijaig "kiyeiv oti — iroiTiaup^ev tu xaxa ha eX^rj
to, ayo&u ; a>v to xpip^a 'ivhixov ItTTtv.
Eng. Auth. Vers. And not rather, (as we be slanderously
reported, and as some affirm that we say) Let us do evil,
that good may come ? whose damnation is just.
Revised Version. And (why) might we not — as we be
slandered and as some allege that we say that we might —
do evil that good might come ? — whose judgement is just.
§ 1. This verse has occasioned to expositors still greater
perplexity than the preceding. And many have been the

76 ROMANS III. 8.
expedients devised for extracting its genuine import. " I
know," says Benecke, "of no satisfactory attempt to
elucidate the construction." (Ich gestehe dass alle mir
bekannt gewordenen Versuche die Construction zu erkldren
mir nicht geniigen.) " This passage seems to me," says
Cognatus, " to be one of those to which Peter refers as
hard to be understood." (Videtur et hie sermo obscurus,
et ex his de quibus Petrus ait, ohscnra inveniri in epistolis
Pauli, et difficilia ad intelligendum.) And yet, after one
:|has got to understand clearly the extrinsic relations and
intrinsic import of the preceding verse, there is no reason
;why there should be the least despair of reaching a
¦correct apprehension of the peculiarity and meaning of
«this. The Auth. Eng. Version, however, is a tanglement.
Vater takes a rather singular view. He regards the
'sentence as abruptly broken off after the introductory
conjunction and (Kai), and he looks upon what follows as
a prohibitory silencing of the remark that was about to be
made. He supposes that it is an objector to the Apostle's
doctrine who is represented as speaking in the preceding
verse. This objector, he imagines, after saying — "if the
trueness of God superabounded to his glory through my
lie, why yet am even I judged as a sinner?" wished to
^proceed to something else ; and hence he commenced with
'"and." But before he brings out his blasphemous idea,
the Apostle, as Vater supposes, breaks in and says, "Let
us not — (as we be blasphemed, and as some affirm that we
say) — do evil, that good may come." (rt in Kayw, wg
dpapnoXbg, Kpivopai ; koi ... . Mr) (KaSwg [3Xaa(j>ypovptSa,
Kai KaSwg (j>aaiv nvtg ypdg XiytiV on) iroiyawptv, k. t. X)
This rather violent expedient for introducing order into the
Apostle's phraseology proceeds on the erroneous assumption
that the preceding verse contains, not the apagogical
reasoning of the Apostle in reply to an odious objection,
but the argumentation of the supposed objector himself.
Other critics, agreeing with Vater in regarding the state
ment which follows the introductory conjunction and as
deprecatory and not interrogatory, take other ways of
elucidating the construction. Cocceius, for example, would

ROMANS 111. 8. 77
supplement the expression thus, — "and let it not be, — as
we be blasphemed, and as some affirm that we say — that
we should do evil, that good may come," (koi pi) t'ly or
7E'votro, k. t. X. — oti iroiyawptv k. t. X). D. G. Herzog
proposes the same supplement. Turner, too, suggests a
similar device, (Ka\ py iarw). But, besides other objections
to these supplements, it is fatal to the principle on which
they proceed, as expedients, — and also to Sharpe's transla
tion, and by no means let us do, &c, — that they do not
account for the initial conjunction, which evidently hooks
on, to what goes before, some remark, tending in the same
dialectical direction. On this account we must likewise
reject the supplement of Baumgarten-Crusius, — "And let
us not say or think — as we be blasphemed, and as some
affirm that we say— that we might do evil, that good may
come," (ist aus dem folgenden Xiytiv zu verstehen Xiywptv
oder Xi^optv oder ipovptv. Lasst uns ja nicht sagen oder
denken, &c.) Wolle's expedient, too, is, for the same, as
well as for other reasons, inadmissible. He would put a
colon after the not (py) which follows the introductory and
(kui), and substituting but for and, he would interpret the
whole verse thus : — But no: — (as we be blasphemed, and as
some affirm that we say) — because we should thus be doing
evil, that good might come, of which sort of persons the
condemnation is just. (De Parenthesi Sacra, pp. 42-44.)
We must, indeed, hold it as unquestionable that the
language which follows the conjunction is not deprecative,
but interrogative. Almost all good critics acknowledge
this. And some, such as Bengel (ultimately), Fritzsche,
Meyer, Philippi, van Hengel, putting only a comma at the
close of verse 7, postpone the point of interrogation till
they reach the words "that good? might come,'' (i'va iXSy
rd dyaOd). Matthias does not even interpose a comma.
It is perhaps better, however, with Lachmann and Tischen-
dorf, to repeat the point of interrogation, inasmuch as the
clauses, though running on in one line, are so far distinct
that the Apostle makes a transition in the second from the
singular to the plural. Wave of interrogation succeeds
wave ; and the second wave spreads out wider than the first.

78 ROMANS III. 8.
Of those who have perceived that the interrogation of the
preceding verse carries itself forward into this, some have
proposed to supplement the statement thus : — " and shall we
say, — as we are blasphemed, and as some affirm that we say,
— that we might do evil, that good may come?" (koi py
ipovptv k. t. X.) This is the view of Wittich, Moses Stuart,
Benecke, &c. They regard the particle (pi)) which comes
after the initial conjunction as having a simply interroga
tive import (num). A much larger proportion of critics,
however, suppose that the particle has its usual negative
import: and, while they would supply the same or
some equivalent verb,— shall we say? or, do we say? or,
should we say ? — they would also carry forward, out of the
query at the close of verse 7th, the interrogative " why "
(ri): — "and why should we not say, — as we are blas
phemed, and as some give out that we say — Let us do evil,
that good may come ? " (koi ri jut) ipovptv, or Xi^wutv, or
Xiyoptv, k. t. X.) This is, in substance, the view of Eras
mus (cur non potius ita cogitamus), Calvin (cur non
potius dicitur), Limborch (cur non dicimus), and Wolf,
who adopted it from Limborch, and, rejoicing over it,
says, that, according to it, "the Pauline discourse runs
most beautifully," (hue ratione oratio Paulina bellissime
proeedit). It is also adopted by Bollock, Hammond,
Natalis, Wells, Taylor, Doddridge, Macknight (why not add ?) ;
as likewise by Koppe, Wakefield, Belsham, Boysen ; and by
Walford, Peile, Conybeare, Vaughan, &c. Van Hengel
acquiesces in the view ; only, instead of a plural verb, he
would supply a singular, (koi ti py Xiyw k. t. X). Turretin
and Morus approximate to the same interpretation : only,
instead of carrying forward the interrogative " why " (Tt)
from the preceding versfe, they unwarrantably regard the
particle (py), succeeding the initial conjunction, as equiva
lent to the Latin nonne: — "might we not say?" or " should
we not rather say ? " (nonne dicere possumus ?-Morus : nonne
potius dAcendum esset ?-Turretin). But there is assuredly
the appearance of what is unnatural in deriving, for the
main proposition, a supplemental word (shall we say, Xitiwptv,
Xiyoptv, or Xiyw, &c.) from a proposition which must be

ROMANS III. 8. 79
regarded as either actually or virtually parenthetical,
— "as we are blasphemed, and as some allege that we
say." We cannot, then, adopt any phasis of this inter
pretation. Matthias takes a peculiar view. He supposes that if the
Apostle had carried out the structure of his sentence, as
he began it in the 7th verse, it would have run thus : —
" why, notwithstanding, am even I judged as a sinner,
and not (i. e., and not rather, und nicht vielmehr) as
having done good ? " (Kai pr) wg iroiyaag to. dyaOd ;) He
supposes, however, that before the Apostle had time to
complete his sentence, the idea rushed into his mind that
he himself and his fellow-christians were slanderously
accused of holding that evil may be done in order that
good may ensue; and hence he ruptures the structure
which he had commenced, and lets his sentence go, anaco-
luthically, thus: — "why notwithstanding am even I judged
as a sinner, and not rather according to what we are
blasphemed, and according to what some affirm that we
say, namely, according to that — Let us do evil, in order
that good may come?" (was werde auch ich dann noch
wie ein Sunder gerichtet und nicht vielmehr nach dem
wir verlastert werden und nach dem Etliche sagen, dass
wir sprachen, n'dmlich danach: "Lasset uns Boses thun,
damit Gutes kommeV) It is an objection to this inter
pretation, that it leaves the construction exceedingly per
plexed. It is another objection, that if we suppose that
the suppressed antithesis to the expression, as a sinner
(wg dpaprwXog), is simply, and not as having done good,
(ko.1 pr) wg iroiyaag to. dyaOd), we do not furnish a suffi
ciently full idea to suggest the Apostle's quotation of the
calumny, " let us do evil, that good may come ; " whereas, if
we suppose that the suppressed antithesis is, and not as
having done evil, that good may come, (koi pi) wg woii)aag
to. KOK<i 'iva iXSy tu dyaSd), we destroy the reality of
the antithesis assumed; for to be a sinner, and to do
evil, that good may come, are, though not identical state
ments, yet parallel to one another. It is a third objection
to Matthias's construction, that, it would have required the

80 ROMANS HI. S.
objective negative (ov), instead of the subjective (pi)), after
the initial conjunction.
To pass over other anomalous attempts to explicate the
Apostle's phraseology, such as Herzog's iroiyaw piv, instead
of iroii)awptv, &c, we may simply say that by far the
easiest, by far the most natural, and by far the most
effective disentanglement of the interrogative sentence, is,
just to carry forward mentally the why (ti) of the preceding
querjT, and to regard the verb (iroiyawptv), which we trans
late " we might do," as the angular point in which two
distinct lines of thought meet and blend, — a primary and
interrogative line, and a subordinate and affirmative line.
Thus, — "why still am even I judged as a sinner? and why
might we not — as we be slandered, and as some give out
that we say that we might — do evil that good may come?"
(ri in Kayw wg dpaprwXbg Kpivopai; koi pi) — Ka&wg
f3Xaa<j>ypovp&a ko! KaSwg <j>aaiv nvtg ypctg Xiytiv on —
iroiyawptv to. koko 'iva iXSy to. ay a$d) In English, if
we would remove the appearance of anacoluth, we must
repeat the verb, or at all events its auxiliary. But this is
a necessity arising from the peculiarity of our English
tongue. In Greek there is no auxiliary required ; and the
one word represents, with perfect propriety, the two modi
fications of idea, interrogatory and non-interrogatory, with
which the two lines of thought are respectively wound up.
There is a peculiarity of structure indeed. There is a kind of
grammatical perturbation. The verb must be understood
both interrogatively and non-interrogatively. But this is no
violent anacoluth. There is merely the suspension, for a
moment, of an incomplete line of thought, until another is
picked up, and carried forward convergingly to the point
at which the first was left, and in which, as in an angle,
both meet and blend. So far as the Greek is concerned,
the construction may be indicated by a double pause, or
by what is tantamount to a double hyphen or dash : or, if
brackets be employed, the second should not be put before
cirt, as has been done by E. Stephens (eds. 1550 and 1551),
Beza, the Elzevirs, Wetstein, Griesbach, Knapp, Scholz, &c,
but, as Vater has it, after it.

ROMANS III. 8. 81
The on has been generally regarded as merely recitative,
introducing what follows in the direct form of speech, —
the oratio recta. In that case the particle would not bear
to be translated in English, and the verb following it
would require to be translated let us do. The entire
statement would then need to be rendered in English thus,
— and why might we not do — as we be slandered, and as
some allege that we say Let us do — evil, that good might
come?" It is far more likely, however, that the particle is
to be regarded as introducing, in indirect form, — in oratio
obliqua, — the statement alleged to be made. In that case
it would require to be rendered that, and the verb must
then be translated we might do: — "and why might we not — •
as we be slandered, and as some allege that we say that we
might — do evil, that good may come?" This is undoubtedly
the more likely resolution of the Apostle's expression ; as is
evident, partly, from the fact that it demands a much smaller
amount of grammatical perturbation than must be assumed
on the other hypothesis, and, partly, from the consideration
that it is more likely that slanderers would represent the
Apostle and his compeers as maintaining, by dogmatical
involution of ideas, that they might do evil, that good might
come, than as actually stirring up each other, in a directly
hortatory way, saying to one another, Let us do evil, that
good may come. If this conception of the particle be correct,
then the only difference in the relations of the verb to the
two lines of thought consists in this : — that in the one case
there is amalgamated with its import an element of inter
rogation, in the other, there is amalgamated an element of
affirmation. This method of enucleating the construction is, in sub
stance, that of Luther, Beza, Melville, Pareus, and Bengel ;
of Worsley also, and of Drysen, Eeiche, Lossius, and Winer ;
of Eiickert too, and Fritzsche, Meyer, Philippi, Mehring;
and, among English expositors, of Purdue, Mac-Evilly,
Ornsby, Jowett, &c. We say, in substance ; for there is
considerable diversity in minute details of views, and more
especially as to the amount of grammatical perturbation
which has been occasioned by the attractive influence of the
G

82 ROMANS III. 8.
intervening proposition, as we be slandered, and as some
give out that we say that, (KaSwg fiXaaQypovptOa koi KaSwg
Qaaiv Ttvtg ypag Xiytiv on). Luther, translates thus, — und
nicht vielmehr also thun, wie wir geldstert werden, und
wie etliche sprechen, dass wir sagen sollen : Lasset uns TJebels
thun, auf dass Gutes daraus komme? His translation is
fairly reproduced by Coverdale thus, — "and not rather to
" do thus (as we are evell spoken of, and as some reporte
"that we shulde saye), Let us do evell, that good maye
" come thereof." Beza says that he perceives no ellipsis,
(neque hie quicquam subaudio): only he would regard the
clause, as we be slandered, and as some affirm that we say,
as parenthetical. Melville, on the other hand, perceives
no parenthesis, but admits an ellipsis, (est igitur ellipsis
sine ulla parenthesi legenda). He would explain thus, —
and shall we not do evil, that good may come, as we be
slandered, and as some affirm that we say, Let us do evil,
that good may come? Pareus, again, discards the idea of
ellipsis, and takes Beza's view. Bengel holds an ellipsis,
and supplies it thus, — and why do I not so, as, &c, (subaud.
sic facio), or, and should it not be, (und soils nicht seyn?).
Eeiche says that the first two words of the verse (koi py)
stand anacoluthi cally; (but he supplies from the connection
iroiyawptv or iroiwptv). Winer says (iii. 66, 5), that " the
Apostle had intended to make iroitiv (iroiyawptv ?) koko
dependent on koi py, but, on account of the parenthesis,
appended it to Xiytiv in oratio recta." Eiickert says that
without 6Vt there would have been a parenthesis, but as
oti is introduced, there is no parenthesis, but an anacoluth,
arising out of attraction, (ohne 6Vt hdtten wir eine Paren-
these, jezt aber keine, sonder ein Anacoluth, aus Attraction
entstanden). Had it not, however, been for the intervening
remark, which would otherwise have been a parenthesis,
he thinks that the Apostle would have employed the
singular number of the verb; — and why should I not do
evil, &e. ? Fritzsche thinks that the Apostle would in all
likelihood have used the plural verb, but yet with a
singular reference; and he supposes that, had not the
clause, as we be slandered, &c, suggested itself to the

ROMANS III. 8. 83
Apostle's mind, he would have said, and why do I not do
evil, &c. ? or, and why may I not do evil, &c. ? (koi ri py
iroiovptv ra KaKtt k. t. X. — Utrum Kai ri py iroiovptv rd KaKa
et cur non improbe ago, an koi ti uy iroiwptv ra koko, et cnr
non improbe agam, Paulus dicere constituerit, de eo cum
nemine ambigam) Meyer, while recognizing the inter-
blending of two constructions, holds that there is neither
parenthesis nor ellipsis, (Grade wegen dieser Verschmelzung
ist aber weder etwas zu parenthesiren, noch hinzuzudenken).
Grotius felt apparently that the words should be under
stood in some such way as that indicated; but, not per
ceiving how to reach the goal he wished, he fancied that
prj on stand for 6n py, which he strangely supposes mean,
or may mean, why not ? Yet Vitringa takes up and repeats
his notion. Wall improves on it, — saying, " the sense
would guide one to read koi t\ py ; and why not ? "
Glockler attempts to reach the same result by a more
circuitous route, and thus by an arbitrary supplement.
He would supplement the Apostle's expression thus : —
"and why is it not so, as we be slandered, &c?" (Construirt
aber muss werden, Kai ri pi) ianv ovrwg, KaSwg k. t. X)
Estius, with several others, hesitates between the two
constructions, why do I not rather say, &c, and, why do
we not rather do, &c. Oltramare, without carrying forward
the interrogative why, would render the verse thus : — " and
— (as some persons who calumniate us, give out that we
say) — shall we not do evil, that good may come?" (et
— comme quelques personnes qui nous calomnient, nous
pretent de le dire — ne ferous-nous pas le mal afin qu'il en
arrive du bien ?) But such a translation proceeds on a
misapprehension of the natural import of the particle pi), —
as much so almost, though in another direction, as that of
le Fevre, who regarded the particle as an objective negative,
and rendered the expression, " and it is not the case, &c"
(et non est ut, &c)
§ 2. as we be slandered (Ka&wg fiXaafypovpiSa), that is,
as we be calumniously reported to do. The expression is
brachylogical.— (Fritzsche, Eiickert, Tholuck, Krehl, and

84 ROMANS III. 8.
Mehring would supply iroitiv after (3Xaa<j>ripovptSa. But
such an immediate complement seems, to say the least of it,
to be of doubtful propriety. The idea is exegetically correct.
But the grammatical construction is questionable.) — The
Apostle speaks in the plural number, — re-entering, as it were,
insensibly, into the consciousness of his union, not with
the circle of the Jews, as Michaelis supposed, but with that
extending circle of kindred spirits, Jews and Gentiles, who
looked at the way of salvation from the same standpoint
with himself. The impersonation which he assumed when
he said, why am I judged? is thus only momentary. But
the course of the argument does not deviate. For it is
logically a matter of indifference whether the queries
proposed in verses 7th and 8th be regarded as the utter
ances of a representative individual belonging to the world
of mankind at large, or of a representative party of
individuals. § 3. and as some allege that vje say, (koi naSwg <j>aaiv nvtg
iifidg Xiytiv). Some would blend this clause with the former,
so as to bring out, as the import of both, the follow
ing complex idea, — as some blasphemingly give out that
we say, (KaSwg fiXaa<j>ripovvTtg ipaaiv nvtg ypdg Xiytiv).
This is the idea of van Hengel and Matthias, as also, sub
stantially, of Eeiche. But the Apostle seems to be careful to
cause the clauses to bifurcate ; — " as we be slandered, and as
some affirm that we say." And doubtless he refers to two
distinct allegations which had obtained more or less currency
regarding himself and his Christian brethren. The one was
a charge against their conduct : the other was a charge in
reference to their doctrine. They were, (1), calumniously re
ported to do evil, that good might come ; and, (2), they were
represented as, directly or indirectly, maintaining that it was
a right thing, in certain circumstances at least, to do as they
were reported to do.
It is in vain to ask for very definite answers to the ques
tions, Who were the calumniators ? and, What was the
occasion of the calumnies ? As to the former question, Locke
says, " It is past doubt that these were the Jews." And

ROMANS III. 8. 85
many critics coincide in his opinion. Theophylact, on the
other hand, says it was the Greeks, (koX yup oi "EXXjjvec,
aKOvaavrtg rov IlauXou Xiyovrog, on oirov iirXtovaatv y
upapria, virtptirtpiaatvatv y ^a/oie, tKwpojSovv tovto, Kai
kXE-yov, on ot ~KpiaTiavol XEyoutn, iroiyawptv ra koko 'iva
'iXSy tu dyaSd). The opinion of Locke is probably correct
in the main ; and yet there is no reason for supposing that it
was the Jews alone who took up and rung changes on the
calumnies. As to the occasion of the calumnies, it may per
haps have been partly biographical and historical ; but doubt
less it would be principally doctrinal. When the Apostle
burst through the shackles of Judaism, and associated freely
with the Gentiles, and not only ate with them, but dissuaded
them from judaising ; he might, by some of his wondering
countrymen, be honoured for his motives, while yet they
would call in question, not only the propriety, but also the
morality of his procedure. They might not unlikely say of
him, He is doing evil, that good may come. But when he
enunciated boldly his great doctrine of justification, " by
faith without works," it is probable that the hue and cry
would be raised by his theological opponents, He is disparag
ing good worlcs, — He 'is teaching that they are of no value,
and that, as the more that sin abounds, grace will much more
abound, the more we sin the better. It is natural to suppose
that, as the hearts of men are somewhat alike in all ages,
there would be, on the part of unindoctrinated Jews and
others, a misrepresentation of Paul's idea, somewhat similar
to the caricature of the Protestant doctrine of justification,
which has been more or less current among Eoman Catholics
and others, ever since the time of the Eeformation. (Quod
Paulo contigit, hodie quoque his contingit, qui gratiam et
miserioordiam dei per Christum extollunt, -Zuingli ; — Quod
autem Paulo contigit, id hodie omnibus fere syncerae gratiae
praedicatoribus usuvenit.-Bulling&r). To this caricature,
indeed, and reproach, some handle was sometimes given by
unguarded and imprudent expressions on the part of Luther
and others.
§ 4. we might do evil things, that good things might

86 ROMANS III. 8.
come (iroiyawptv ra Kara "iva 'iXSy ra dyaSd). A Jesuitical
principle, ultimately subversive of all moral distinctions, and
thus, too, of the foundation of confidence between man and
man. It is a principle to be abhorred. It is, says Bullinger,
" a nefarious dogma" (nepharium dogma). And yet, when
aesthetically veiled, and allowed to bear in its hand an
immediate bribe, it too frequently receives entertainment,
where better things might have been expected. Sometimes
it is even unblushingly avowed as a legitimate rule of action.
(Solche plumpe horrible Raisonneurs giebts unter den
Menschen, und findet man noch oft solche Maisonnemens
bey den C/msten-.-Bambach). It is, however, its contradic
tory, — We must not do evil that good may come, that is one
of the chief moral condiments of the incorruptibility of
churches and states. (Famageratissima verba, non sunt
facienda mala ut veniant bona-Paciuchelli). Noble are the
words of Cardinal Cajetan, — " Take note, noviciate, that
according to sound and true doctrine, sins must never be
chosen as means to any end whatsoever. — And, thou learned
reader, take thou note, that since the avoiding of a worse evil
is a kind of good, it must be a principle with us, never to do
a lesser (moral) evil in order to avoid a greater." (Intellige,
novicie, quod secundum sanam veramque doctrinam, peccata
non sunt eligenda ut media ad quemcunque bonum finem-
— Adverte et tu, erudite lector, quod quia vitatio mali pejoris
est quoddam bonum, eadem doctrina qua horremus facere
mala ut'eveniant bona, eadem horrere debemus facere mala
ut evitemur pejora)
When the Apostle runs out his argument thus : —
why yet am even I judged as a sinner ? and why should
we not do evil things, that good things may come ? —
his second as well as his first question draws its logi
cal force from the "nefarious" hypothetical assumption
which he is engaged in carrying out into absurdity, namely,
That it would be unjust in God to punish the unrighteous
ness in men which sets off his righteousness. If this were
unjust, then there would be no solid reason why men should
not do every sort of moral evil, that God's moral goodness
might be contrastingly displayed. The idea, says Calvin, is

ROMANS III. 8. 87
an " impious cavillation " (impia cavillatio). It is further,
as Pareus observes, afallacia accidentis. It assumes a non-
causa pro causa. For God's moral goodness does not require
men's moral evil for its display. Although, instead of being
put into the shade, it is brought out into relief when placed
side by side with, men's moral evil, yet no thanks to men for
the foil. They do not cause, they merely give unwitting,
unwilling, and unintended occasion to the lustre.
§ 5. whose judgement is just, (wv to Kpipa tvSiKov ianv),
wliose judgement is iv Si Ky, in harmony with right. The
word judgement (Kpipa), though strictly denoting only a
judicial sentence is generally used in the New Testament
with the subsumption of an adverse decision. (See chap. ii.
I, 2.) This subsumed idea attaching to the term may not
improbably have arisen from the fact, that, in consequence
of the abounding of moral evil, the great majority of legal
decisions are actually adverse to the parties summoned into
court. This is true of human courts in general ; and it is
true too, — emphatically so, — in reference to the divine
tribunal. The term is frequently translated, in our Author
ized Version, condemnation and damnation. See Luke xxiii.
40; xxiv. 20; 1 Cor. xi. 34; 1 Tim. iii. 6; Jas. iii. 1; Jude 4;
Mat. xxiii. 14 (13); Mark xii. 40; Luke xx. 47; Eom. xiii. 2;
1 Cor. xi. 29; 1 Tim. v. 12; and also the passage before us,
" whose damnation is just." The same translation is given
by Wycliffe, (whos dampnacioun is just) ; by Tyndale, too,
and in the Geneva. It is the reproduction of the Vulgate,
(quorum damnatio justa est). Mace, Wynne, Worsley,
Wakefield, Newcome, Cox, Sharpe, and other English
translators, render the word condemnation. And this,
undoubtedly, is the meaning of the term. The judgement,
or doom, or judicial sentence, is supposed to be condemna
tory. (Indeed, Theophylact, in his Commentary, substitutes,
when quoting the passage, the word KaraKpipa for Kpipa, —
wv to KaraKpipa tvSiKov ian) Nevertheless, the English
word judgement is the exact equivalent of the Greek term ;
and Turnbull, certainly, goes altogether out of the orbit
of a translator when he renders the term punishment.

88 ROMANS III. 8.
It has been disputed, who are the parties referred to,
when it said "whose judgement is right." Many critics
assume that it is they who calumniated the character and
the doctrine of the Christians. This is the opinion of Theo-
doret and Grotius, the latter of whom supposes that in the
Apostle's expression there is a latent prediction of the
destruction of the Jewish city and temple, and the dispersion
of the Jewish people, (Latenter pro&dicit hie Paulus urbis et
Templi excidium etpopuli dissipationem). It is also the
opinion of Abelard, de Lyra, Pareus; and of Day, Locke,
Whitby, le Cene ; as also of Tholuck, Baumgarten-Crusius,
Sumner, Wardlaw, Mehring. But it certainly better ac
cords, (1), with the moral earnestness of the Apostle's spirit;
(2), with the fact that the reference to the slanderers of the
Christians is only incidental and quasi-parenthetical; and,
(3), with our ideas of what is congruous in order to
wind up the Apostle's argumentation in opposition to
the wicked principle referred to in ver. 5th, and brought
out in the query,- — Is God unjust who bringeth wrath
upon the unrighteousness which sets off his righteousness?
— it is more congruous to suppose that the Apostle's
concluding statement refers to those who do evil, that
good may come. And this is the opinion of Aquinas,
Cajetan, Este, Bengel; and likewise of de Wette, Fritzsche,
Meyer; of Hodge, too, and Haldane; and Oltramare, Philippi,
Krehl, Alford, and others. There is not, indeed, so far as
the preceding words are concerned, a precise or sharply
defined personal antecedent, grammatically considered, to
which the relative can refer. But the Apostle was not
fastidious in the structure of his sentences. And the
relative, though thus floating somewhat loosely in relation
to the preceding part of the verse, is clearly equivalent to
some such expression as this, — " of all persons who act on
the principle referred to, the condemnation is right."
Heumann takes a strange view of this closing clause.
He regards the word judgement as used extrajudicially,
and as referring, not to what objectively terminates on
the parties referred to by the relative, but to what sub
jectively emanates from them : — whose judgement (i. e., the

ROMANS III. 8. 89
judgement of which calumniators as to the falsity of the
doctrine that evil may be committed for the sake of good
to come) is entirely right. (Dieser, der JiXden, Urtheil ist
ganz recht, spricht Paulus, dass man nemlich nicht diirfe
boses thun in der Absicht, dadurch etwas gutes zu erlangen.)
But the customary judicial usage both of the word judgement
(Kpipa) and of the word right (tvSiKov) stamps this interpre
tation with tiie utmost improbability. And, moreover, it is
scarcely conceivable that the Apostle would, .in bringing
such an argument to a close, pause to throw a wreath of laud
ation upon the judgement of his calumniators, who were
also the slanderers, not only of the conduct, but likewise
of the principles of all his Brethren in Christ.
D.' G. Herzog regards the relative whose (wv) as neuter,
referring it to the evil things spoken of: — the condem
nation of w'hich evil things is right. The interpretation
involves, theologically, on the one hand, an intolerable
truism, and, philologically, on the other, an intolerable
capriciousness as regards the determination of the relative's
antecedent. § 6. In some of the more dogmatic Commentaries, as in
Willet's for example, and in that of Pareus, the theological
bearing of the Jesuitical principle condemned by the
Apostle is discussed. Willet asks ; — " whether God do not
evil, that good may come thereof, in reprobating (viz.,
unconditionally) the vessels of wrath, to show his power?"
Such is his question. It is pertinent. But he certainly
fails to clear, in the light of his peculiar theology, the
character of God. He says that the action referred to is
not evil: (1.) "Because it is God's will, which is always just
and holy :" (2.) Because "that which tendeth to God's glory
cannot be evil :" (3.) Because " that which is lawfully done
cannot be evil." " God," he adds, " in rejecting some, doth
that which he may do by lawful right, to dispose of his
own as it pleaseth him ; as no man can reprove the potter
in making some vessels of honour, some of dishonour, of
the same piece of clay." (4.) " But," continues he, " seeing
in the end God's rejecting and reprobating of some, viz.,

90 ROMANS III. 9.
such as by their sins deserved eternal death, appeareth to
be most just, it must needs also be good, for that which is1
just is good." In the last of these reasons the critic reverses
his own theory of unconditional reprobation. And in the
former three he only echoingly reiterates the idea, that the
Jesuitical principle may be to God, though not to man, a
legitimate and right glorious rule of conduct. Pareus, a
short time before Willet, had trodden exactly the same
round of apologetic thought ; and thus, so far as we can
judge, Feurborn is correct when he contends that the great
theologian of Heidelberg has violated the Apostle's axiom.
His whole reasoning seems simply to amount to this, that
God is an infinite^ Jesuit.
§ 7. In coming to the conclusion of this verse,! — which is
in fact the conclusion of one of the subordinate paragraphs
of the chapter, — Theodoret pauses, winds up the first Tome
of his Commentary, and says, " here we would unbend a
little, and pray the Lord that we may thoroughly under
stand the meaning of the Apostolical doctrine ; for, assuredly,
he who says, Ask, and ye shall receive ; Seek, and ye shall
find ; Knock, and it shall he opened unto you, will give." (yptig
Si ivrai/Sa t?iv ippyvtiav aryaavrtg, Kai tov vovv Siavairav-
aavrtg, tov StSwKora aropa av&pwirw, Kai iroiyaavra SvaKW<j>ov
Kai Kwcj>bv, awpvyawptv, Kai ryg aVoaToXiKiJe otoao-KaXt'ae tov
vovv KarapaBtlv iKtTtvawptv- Swati ydp irdvrwg 6 tiirwv,
alrtirt k. t. X.) ¦ Surely it is not unbecoming or unbefitting
that the modern critic should go and do likewise.

Ver 9. TV ovv; Upoe-^opjS^a; Ov TavTaig' •xpoyjTia-
<ra(jbe§a yag 'lovbaiovg ti xai "EkXyvoig vruvrug v<p' ufAapTtav
shut. Eng. Auth. Vers. What then ? are we better than they ?
No, in no wise: for we have before proved both Jews and
Gentiles, that they are all under sin ;
Revised Version. What then ? Do we put forth pleas in

ROMANS III. 9. 91
our own behalf ? No, certainly : for we before impeached
both Jews and Greeks of being all under sin;
§ 1. In reference to this verse, as to those which imme
diately precede, there has been diversity and conflict of
opinion among expositors. The dissidence, indeed, — rela
tively to that on the other verses, — has been peculiarly
great. It centres in the interpretation of the verb (irpot-
Xoptda), which is translated in our authorized English
version, are we better (than they) ? Even in ancient times
this verb seems to have occasioned no little difficulty.
Hence the readings of the MSS. are far from being uniform.
Neither are those readings harmonious which are imbedded
in the old expositors, and indicated in the ancient versions.
The dissonance of readings is so great, and the apparent
difficulty of reaching the Apostle's idea so formidable, that
van Hengel, after a most scholarly investigation of the
passage, and of the history of its interpretation, gives way
to despair. He declares his conviction that the text, as
generally presented, is corrupt ; and he avows that it is
quite beyond his ability to suggest its rectification. (Oratio
mihi laborare videtur mendo librariorum : hoc autem quo
modo tollendum sit, acutiores viri judicent) We believe,
however, with Fritzsche, that a minute and comprehensive
examination of all the variations of the text, and the circum-
stantialities connected with these variations, will conduct
us to the conclusion, not only that the received reading
is to be preferred to all the others, but also that it is per
fectly free from corruption. (Dubitari non potest, quin
hie versus sine ullo mendo sit -Fritzsche.)
§ 2. Instead of ri ovv ; irpotxopt^a ; ov trdvrwg' D and
G read ri ovv irpoKarixoptv irtptaaov ; and omit ov irdvnog.
Chrysostom, in explaining the passage, does not cite the
words; but he quotes them at the commencement of his
8th Homily, in explaining the 1st and 2nd verses of chap.
iv.; and he there cites them according to the reading of
D* and G. Theodoret reads the passage in the same way,
with the exception that he gives the simple verb Karixoptv

92 ROMANS III. 9.
instead of the compound irpoKarixoptv. Severus gives the
same reading with Theodoret. The Italic version (as exhi
bited in manuscripts d. e. g.) seems to have been made
from the same reading, (quid ergo tenemus amplius?)
This version is given, moreover, in Eufinus's translation of
Origen. It is given also in some of the MSS. of Ambro-
siaster. The Peshito version seems to correspond. If not
made from Theodoret's reading, it must, we should suppose,
have been based on an interpretation of irpotxoptda that
made it equivalent to Karixoptv irtptaaov. It omits ov
irdvrwg. K-»Aj ^¦l^i— -^>] ^-»-2<fl ti& — what superiority
then do we 'possess ? — infelicitously rendered by Etheridge,
what then, have we attained excellence?
E, again, reads the clause thus, — n ovv irpoKaTtxopt^ra,
and adds ov irdvrwg. This varies from the received text
only to the extent of introducing Kara into the verb,
apparently compounding between the two readings 7rpoEyo-
ptSa and Karixoptv.
A and L give the received text, with the exception of
having the verb in the subjunctive, irpotxoptda. Suidas
must have had this reading in his codex, for, with obvious
reference to the passage before us, he gives the word thus in
his Lexicon, irpoexwp&a, viro£aXXwp&a, y irpo£aXXwp&a.
Valckenaer deemed the reading correct; apparently conjec
turing it indeed, at least in the first instance, on internal
grounds. (Schol. in Luc. xx. 47 ; comp. Schediasma in loc.)
S and B give the Received Text complete : and no doubt
correctly. For, by assuming it as the original reading, we
can account for all the divergencies as its mere deflected
radiations. The reading of A and L — irpotxoptda — may
have been a mere slip, arising from indistinct pronunciation
ou the part of a reader, or from indistinct hearing on the
part of a writer; or it may have been a conjectural emen
dation on some such grounds as approved themselves to
Valckenaer. IlpoKaTEvouEv again would appear to have been
a conjectural emendation on the part of some one who
found it difficult to explain irpotxoptda. Karixoptv irtpiaaov
would appear to have been a gloss explaining 7rpoKar£YO|UEv,
and reflecting back on verse 1st. And when either the

ROMANS III. 9. 93
one reading or the other was adopted, ov irdvrwg required
to be struck out, as being an obvious superfluity and imper
tinence. Starting from any of the readings, besides that
of m B and the Received Text, it is difficult to account
for the divergencies. Starting from the Received Text, we
can see into the genesis of all the variations.
§ 3. What then? Do we defend ourselves ? — Do we screen
ourselves ? that is, Do I, as a Jew, stand on the defensive
in relation to the Jews? — do I, in maintaining the fact of
their prerogative and preeminence, screen them in relation
to the charge of unrighteousness ? — Do I put forward pleas
in their behalf? — It is thus that we would render and
interpret the first three words of the verse, (ri ovv ;
irpotxoptda ;)
The matter of difficulty, and the matter of moment, is to
determine the import of the verb (irpotxoptSia).
The great body of expositors, both ancient and modern,
have supposed that it must mean, do we excel ? This is
the translation of the Vulgate (prwcellimus eos ?). It is
adopted and approved of by Erasmus (who gives as a
synonym praestamus ?). Le Fevre, Calvin, Beza, and
Grotius, accord. Luther's version is similar, Have we an
advantage ? (Haben wir einen Vortheil). The Dutch
versions, old and new, correspond, (old, Hebben wij voor-
deel ? — new, Zijn wij uitnemender ?). Tyndale's is analo
gous, Are we better than they? — a translation which has
descended into our Authorized Version. It corresponds with
Erasmus's paraphrase, — Num potiores sumus ? The English
Geneva version is, Are we more excellent ? The French
Geneva is identical (Sommes nous plus excellens ?) It is
Calvin's version. Diodati's corresponds, (Habbiamo noi
qualche eccellenza?). — It is, however, an insuperable objec
tion to this interpretation of the verb, that it is absolutely
without precedent. The verb in the active voice, (ttooe'^eiv)
does mean, in the neuter branch of its import, to excel.
But it has no such import in the middle voice. The
most learned of those who contend for the interpre
tation make the admission. (Die Sprache steht insofern

94 ROMANS III. 9.
entgegen, als uns nicht nur jedes Beispiel eines dhnlichen
Gebrauches fehlt, sondern auch die Medialform fur diese
Bedeutung der innernWahrscheinlichkeitentbehrt.-R\lc\cert.)
The meaning attached to the term is thus a mere invention,
springing out of a supposed exegetical necessity. Grotius,
feeling that he should say something in defence of it, says
that the middle is used Attically for the active. Wittich and
Boysen, — though as out of their own cathedra, — echo his
affirmation. In the scholia of QScumenius the active voice is
again and again quietly substituted for the middle. And
the mass of the modern critics who support the interpreta
tion vindicate themselves by saying that the exigency of the
passage demands the attribution to the middle of the signi
fication of the active. See Kollner, de Wette, Schrader,
Eiickert (second edit), Baumgarteti-Crusius, Oltramare,
Maier, Philippi, Hodge, Jowett, Wordsworth, &c.
But there is another objection to this interpretation. It
seems to be out of joint with the context. For, in the first
place, if the reference of the term were to privilege, do we
excel (in privilege) ? and if, as is generally assumed by the
expositors who contend for the interpretation, the question
be proposed in the name of the Jews, then it seems to be a
strange question, after what has been asked and answered in
verses 1st and 2nd, — " What then is the superiority of the
Jew ? or what the advantage of circumcision ? Much in
every respect." In this 9th verse the Apostle answers his
question by an expression, (ov irdvrwg), which must either
moan, no, certainly, or not at all, or not in all respects. But
if, in the second place, it be assumed, as is generally the case,
that the question has — as might be expected, it is contended,
from the middle voice — (see Oltramare, Jatho, Lange, &c.) —
a reference to what is subjective, or to character, — do we excel
(in character) ? — then there was really no occasion for the
question on the one hand, and there is no answer to it on the
other, or, at least, no vindication of the answer. (1 ), There
was no occasion for the question : — for, from the Apostle's
standpoint, in relation to the universal necessity of seeking
justification by faith, it was a matter of no significance
whether the Jews in general were better in character than

ROMANS III. 9. 95
the Gentiles in general, or whether the reverse were the
case. The necessity of seeking justification by means of faith
does not spring from any " bad preeminence " in sinfulness.
It springs from the mere fact of sinfulness, without having
any respect whatsoever to the question of degrees. Then,
(2), even although there had been occasion for proposing the
question, yet the Apostle, — in his answer in verses 10-19, does
not, as a matter of fact, show that the Jews in general were
on an equality, as to amount of wickedness, with the Gentiles
in general. He only shows, without instituting any com
parison between the two classes, that they were all exceed
ingly sinful. Moreover, it is difficult to see the connection
of the question with what goes before. When the Apostle
says, what then? the then seems to intimate that he is looking
back over the ground which he had just been traversing.
And when he adds, do we excel (in character) ? we should
have expected that something or other in what precedes was
fitted to suggest the question. But there is certainly noth
ing in verses 3 — 8 that seems to prompt such a query. And
if it be supposed, — as it is by Melancthon, Calvin, Bengel,
and others, — that the Apostle returns from his digression in
verses 3 — 8 to the subject which is introduced in verse 1st,
then we still fail to find anything to suggest the question,
when we assume that it refers to character, rather than to
privilege, to that which is subjective rather than to that
Which is objective. If we should imagine, on the other hand,
that the question refers to privilege rather than to character,
we are confounded by the collision of the answers which
are given by the Apostle in the two places respectively. We
must, then, abandon that interpretation of the verb which
would make it mean, do we excel ?
Some would understand the word as being in the passive
voice, and would translate it, are we excelled ? This interpre
tation is suggested in one of fficumenius's scholia, (yptig
irpotXydtOyptv;). It was revived by Cocceius, (superamur ?).
It is propounded again by Wetstein, (who quotes in support
of it Plutarch, on The Contradictions of the Stoics, p. 1038,
ed. 1599), ovtw rotg dyaZolg rrdai ravra irpoayKti, kot oiiSiv
irpotxopivotg vrrb tov Ato'e, so these things— viz., self-com-

96 ROMANS III. 9.
placency and self-applause — are becoming in all the good,
who are in no wise excelled by Jupiter. It is adopted by
Cramer and Michaelis; by Matthias too; and by Mehring
also. Eiickert, in his first edition, gave in his adhesion
to it ; but in his second he surrendered it as untenable. It
is tenable, indeed, so far as regards the philology of the
word. But it seems to be untenable so far as the exegesis
of the passage is concerned. In 02cumenius the question
is supposed to be proposed by a Gentile in relation to the
Jews. A similar opinion is expressed by Cocceius, (ita erit
questio gentium). It is contended for by Mehring. But there
is certainly nothing in the context to warrant the intrusion
of such a questioner. The other patrons of the translation
regard the question as proposed by the Jews in relation to
the Gentiles. (Si vera sunt, quae dicis, gravius nos pec-
camus, quam gentes aliae, Usque pejores sumus; illaene
ergo nobis praestant, populo Dei electo ?-Wetstein.) And
the answer (ov irdvTwg) is supposed to be, either, not at all,
or, not altogether. But there is really no such distinct
antithesis, in verses 3 — 8, between the Jews and the Gentiles,
as to warrant the supposition that the latter were very
prominently before the Apostle's mind when he commenced
the 9th verse. And if we suppose that he was bridging
over the space covered by verses 3 — 8, and returning to the
subject-matter of verses 1 and 2, then, if the question, are
we excelled? refers to privilege, it has been answered already
in verse 2nd. But if it refer to character, it has really
no relation to verses 1 and 2. Besides, if it refer to
character, as Wetstein supposes, there is, — as Eiickert ac
knowledges, — (1), no occasion in all that goes before for
proposing it. The Apostle had never said anything that was
fitted to suggest that the Gentiles in general are less sinful
than the Jews in general. And, (2), there is nothing in what
comes after to show that the Jews in general were either
superior, or equal, in character, to the Gentiles. The ques
tion, then, — are we Jews excelled (by the Gentiles) ? — seems
to be altogether out of place in such a discussion as the
Apostle has on hand.
Some other critics, believing, with those of the last class,

ROMANS III. 9. 97
that the verb is in the passive, and yet not approving of the
interpretation, are we excelled? — have rendered the word,
in a manner which brings out almost the opposite pole of
idea, are we preferred ? Cocceius propounded this interpre
tation, as an alternative, in his Commentary; and he had,
at an earlier period, decided for it in his Diagrammata.
Eeiche, in his Exposition, repropounded the interpretation,
without any reference to Cocceius; and he explained in
accordance with it the passage which Wetstein adduced from
Plutarch . Moses Stuart, too,gives the same interpretation (and
borrowed, in his second edition, Eeiche's blunder in reference
to the meaning of the term in Plutarch). Olshausen also
accepted it So has Vaughan, and, after him, as is his wont,
Colenso. But, in his Critical Commentary, Eeiche has with
drawn his imprimatur from the interpretation, and acknow
ledges that there are no examples found of such a use of the
word. The reason for the withdrawal is a good one. And
there is this other good reason for it in addition, — though it
is an exegetical one. The answer to the query, as the
query was originally given by Eeiche, — and before him by
Cocceius, — and whether the answer be no certainly, or not
at all, or not altogether, — is to all appearance at variance
with ver. 2nd, in which it is said that the preference given
to the Jews was "muchm every respect." In verses 10 — 19,
moreover, the Apostle does not proceed to show, as we
should have expected if Eeiche's original hypothesis had
been correct, that no preference is accorded to the Jews. He
merely adduces passages to prove that they are exceedingly
sinful. This interpretation too, then, must be renounced.
One other interpretation of the disputed word, — though
branching out into a variety of developments, — remains :
and the Apostle's real idea must, we apprehend, be found
in one of its phases. This interpretation proceeds on the
assumption that the verb is in the middle voice,&nd has,
as distinguished from its use in the active voice on the one
hand, and its use in the passive on the other, a proper
medial import.
This medial import was originally exceedingly simple, —
to have or to hold (something) before oneself. See Homer,
H

98 ROMANS III. 9.
Iliad, xvii. 354, 355,— and they who stood around Patroclus
were protected on every side with shields, and held their
spears before them, i. e., before themselves, (irpb Si Sovpar
ixovro). - See also Horn. Od. iii. 8, — and they had before
them, i. e., before themselves, nine bulls for each bench of
five hundred men, (ko.1 irpovxovTO ek&toSt* ivvia ravpovg).
See also Aristophanes, Nubes, 1388, — and taking thee (a
child) in my hands, I would carry thee out of doors, and
hold thee before me, (Kayw Xafiwv Svpa& i^iftpov civ, ko!
¦n-poiiaxopyv at). — Such then, — to hold before oneself, — was
the primary import of this verb in the middle voice.
Closely allied to the idea of holding (something) before
oneself, is the idea of holding forth something far oneself,
or, in one's own behalf. And hence a second stage in the
development of the meaning of the word, as may be noticed
in that variety of the term, irpoiaxopat. See, for example,
Thucydides, iii. 58, — ye received us when we had voluntarily
submitted, and were holding out our hands, (viz., for mercy
to ourselves) ; and it is a rule with the Greeks not to slay
such, (oti tKovrag Tt eXuj3ete, Kai v^ipae irpo'iaxopivovg, — 6
o^ vopog rolg "EXXjjcti pi) KTtivtiv rovrovg). See also
Thucyd. iii. 66, where the same expression occurs. The
hands were held out, in the behalf of those who held them
out. The action was a dumb pleading in behalf of oneself.
It indicated a desire that the stroke of vengeance should
be arrested. The word irpoixopai hence, and irpo'iaxopai,
came to be used when other things besides hands were put
forth in self-defence. Words, and the things represented
by words, may be thus put forth. Hence Thucydides says,
i. 140, — Let none of you think that we shall go to war for a
trifle, if we do not rescind the decree concerning the
Megareans, — which (rescission) in particular they hold
forth would arrest the war, (oirtp pdXtara 7rpouYovrat, ti
KaSaiptSdy, pi) av yiyvtaSai tov rroXtpov). The Lacede
monians held forth for themselves, — on their side of the case,
— and in defence of the attitude which they had assumed, —
that the abrogation by the Athenians of the decree con
cerning the Megareans would cut off occasion for going to
war. This was their plea. The scholiast explains TrpovxovTai

ROMANS III. 9. 99
here by 7rpoj3aXXoiTa/, and Thomas Magister gives the same
explanation. He says, ou povov 7rpoiaxw koi irpoiaxopai,
to irpofidXXopat, aXXd koi rrpoixopai. He then quotes a
passage of Sophocles, to be afterwards adduced ; and adds
this passage of Thucydides. Suidas quotes the same
passage, and explains the word by n-po/3aXXoi>ra<, irportivovai.
In his third Book, 68th chapter, Thucydides speaks again
of the conditions, which before the siege the Lacedemonians
proposed, or held forth, to the Platceans, tliat they should be
neutral, (a irpb tov irtpiTtixiZtaSrai irpo'iaxovTo avrotg Koivoiig
tivai k. t. tS,i)g). The proposal was that which the Lacede
monians put forth on their part, and thus, in a manner, in
their own cause, and for their own advantage. It was
what they pleaded for. (In this passage, too, the scholiast
explains 7rpoi<rYovTo by 7rpo£j3aXXoi>ro.) So in Book iv.
87, we read again, — from the mouth of Brasides the Lace-
demonian,— ei S' ipov ravra rrpoiaxoptvov, but if when I
propose these things, that is, when I, on my side of the case,
propose these things. Brasides, in making the proposal, was
pleading the cause of his own people, the Lacedemonians.
The idea of putting forth as a plea is involved. This same
idea is very strikingly involved in an expression of Sophocles,
— referred to by Thomas Magister, — Antig. 80. Ismene
had urged that it would be madness to attempt the burial
of their brother's corpse, against the will of the citizens ;
and the chafed Antigone replies, — (ai> piv rdS' av 7rpouYot''
iyw Si Si) rdrj>ov | y/l><J'OU<t' dStX(pi£ (^iXtutw iroptvaopai)—
you may, if you will, bring forward these things as a plea,
— (you may plead these things in defence of yourself if you
please, — you may excuse yourself with these things as you
please), — but I assuredly shall go and bury my darling
brother: (du magst das vorschiitzen- Schneider). — In all
these passages we see the proper medial import of the verb.
It means to hold (something) before oneself, — to put forth
(something) for oneself — to put forth (something) as a plea
in one's own behalf. Hesychius,— as well as the scholiast
on Thucydides, and Thomas Magister, — explains the word
by irpofldXXopai. With undoubted reference to the passage
before us, he says, irpoixoptS^a, irpofiuXXoptSa. And on

100 ROMANS III. 9.
irpofidXXopai the idea is very emphatically impressed of
throwing forward (something) on one's own part, by way
of defence, and, in the case of judicial defence, or of moral
defence in general, by way of plea. Such a defence, whether
material, or juridical, or logical, was a irpoj3Xypa.
This proper medial import of the verb is, under one phase
or another, attached to it, in the passage before us, by
Valckenaer, and Venema ; by Ernesti too, and Morus, Koppe,
Jaspis, D. G. Herzog ; and by Wabl, and Glockler (in the
end), and Benecke, Fritzsche, Meyer, Hofmann (Schriftbeweis,
i. 443) ; by Krehl too, and Naebe, Eeiche (ultimately), and
Ewald, Theodor Schott, Eilliet, &c. It is said by Fritzsche,
Eeiche, and others, that Henry August Schott is also a
patron of the medial interpretation of the verb. And it is
true that at one time he was. In the 1st' edition of his
New Testament (1805) his translation of the verb was,
" Have we an excuse ? " (suppetitne nobis excusatio ?) This
version he repeated in the 1809 issue; and again in the
revised edition of 1811. But in the 3rd and greatly re-revised
edition of 1825, — published long before Fritzsche's Commen
tary, or Eeiche's Exposition, — Schott renounced the medial
rendering, and translated the word, "Do we excel (the
Gentiles)?" (Praestamusne gentilibus?) And this rendering
is retained in the final edition.
Some of the critics named, — such as Koppe and Ewald, —
divide the entire verse into two interrogative clauses, and
drop from the second the ratiocinative particle for (ydp) : —
" What shall we then allege as an excuse ? Have we not
proved already that all the Jews, as well as the Gentiles,
are under sin?" (Wassollenwirnunvorschutzen? Bewiesen
wir nicht uberhaupt schon voraus dass Judder sowohl als
Griectien unter Siinde seien ?-Ewald.) But, besides other
objections to this mode of construing the verse, it is an in
superable obstacle to its admission, that it ignores, and must
ignore, the particle for: — (ejecto ydp post irpoynaaapiSa.-
Koppe. He renders the second clause thus,. Nonne omnino
supra declaravi et demonstravi Judaeos omnes non minus
poenis divinis esse obnoxios, quam Ethnicos ?) Ernesti
agrees with Koppe and Ewald in throwing the first three

ROMAN'S III. S. 101
words into an interrogative clause,—" What pretext— what
excuse — shall we then employ?" (Was wollen wir also
vorwenden ?),— but, as he apparently leaves the remainder of
the verse as it stands in the Received Text, the single query
into which he gathers the first three words would have
required to have been followed by the adjectival expression,
none assuredly, (oiiSiv irdvrwg), instead of the adverbial
one, no certainly, or, not at all, (oi» irdvrwg). Jaspis took
the same view of the construction as Ernesti: — (quanam
igitur excusatione uti possumus?) So Herzog; — out cer
tainly not Meyer and Fritzsche, as is alleged by The Five
Clergymen. Hofmann, however, and Theodor Schott take
the same view, (womit decken wir ions also ?-Hofmann. —
Was halten denn wir vor uns zum Schutz ?-Schott).
Hofmann would represent the relation of the query tb the
following adverbial negation thus, — " With what do we then
defend ourselves ? We do not defend ourselves at all."
Theodor Schott's idea is an echo of Hofmann's, (Paulus
kann um so leichter mit einem blossem ov irdvrwg antworten,
als diese Worte eigentlich gar nicht Antwort sind, sondern
mehr nur eine zu der scho7i in der Frage selbst als einer
rhetorischen liegenden Verneinung hinzutretende Bekrdf-
tigung). But such an expedient in interpretation, — doing
such violence to the natural inter-relations of. clauses,' — is
utterly inadmissible, except at least as the very last resort.
Valckenaer's interpretation so far corresponds with that of
Ernesti, Jaspis, Hofmann, and Schott ; but by throwing the
verb into the subjunctive, (irpotxwptSfa), he introduces still
greater difficulty into the succeeding clause, in as much as
we should have expected, — even if the adverb, instead of
the adjective, were admissible, — that the subjective negative
(pi)) would have been employed, instead of the objective
(ov). Moras translates the expression, — "Have we a pretext?"
(num praetextus nobis est ?). Fritzsche's version still more
exactly represents the force or energy that is expressed by
the verb,' — "Do we use a pretext?" (utimurne praetextu),
that is, "Do we look about for excuses for our sins?" (cir-
cumspicimusne peccatorum excusationes ?). Krehl accords

102 ROMANS III. 9.
with Fritzsche. Eeiche supposes that the Apostle, though
using the plural number, is speaking strictly in his own
individual person, but speaking nevertheless of his action
in reference to his countrymen, — " Dp I throw a shield (over
the sins of the Jews) ?" (Num peccatis Judceo?'um clypeum
quasi praetendo ? — num ea excuso ? — num Judceorum pat-
ronum ago?) Benecke's version is, — "Have we a defence?"
(Haben wir noch einen Vorwand?) Meyer's corresponds,
(Haben wir vorschutz?) But in his 4th edition he has very
decidedly improved the form of his translation, (Schiitzen
wir vorT). — Amid all this variety, there is loyalty to the
medial import of the verb. And this loyalty is something
of moment ; — more especially when we take into considera
tion that some of the critics specified sit on the very highest
bencR of scholarship.
We have expressed our strong dissent from those who
combine the two interrogations into one, — What do we put
forward then as a plea? The adverbial negative expression
(oh irdvrwg) which succeeds, is, as we have said, incon
sistent with the coalition. And yet there is a reason why
so many distinguished critics have proposed the amalgama
tion. Without it the verb is used absolutely. And such
an absolute use of the word has been thought by them to
be unlikely. But we see not why it should be viewed
with philological suspicion. It is true, indeed, that in the
comparatively limited number of passages in which the
word is found in the middle voice, it is, as a matter of fact,
almost always construed with the accusative of the object,
or objects, held forth. Nevertheless, there is nothing in the
nature of the word to render its use in an absolute way,
an a priori improbability. And it is noticeable that the
kindred word 7rpo/3aXXojuat, which is so often employed by
the old scholiasts and lexicographers to explain nrpoixopai,
is, in well-accredited cases, used absolutely. It is so, in
reference to physical self-defence, in Demosthenes, for in
stance, 1st Philip. 51, when, in describing the unscientific
way in which barbarians fight pugilistically, he says of
" one of them," that 7rpo/3aXX£ffS-ui §' fj fiXiirtiv ivavriov
ovt olStv ovr i&iXu, he has neither sloill nor will to defend

ROMANS III. 9. 103
himself, (to forefend himself, viz., by proper fencing), or to
look his antagonist steadily in tha face (viz., so as to watch
the eyes, and thus anticipate the movements of the hands).
Xenophon, in his Cyropaedia, ii. 3. 10, uses the word in
the same manner,— Kal iyw, fy»j, iK iraiSiov tvSvg piv Trpo-
fidXXta^iai ymaTapyv rrpb tovtov 8tw $pyv irXyyyataSai,—
and I, said he, understood from a child how to put myself
at once in a self-defending attitude — to fence — before any
one from whom I anticipated a blow. He acquired this
"accomplishment" without training, he says. For, adds
he, " so far from being trained to it, I was even punished, ei
irpofiaXotpyv, if I fenced." The absolute use, then, of 7rpo-
fidXXopai is indisputable, — to throw forward (the hands or
something else) in self-defence. And it seems to us that
it is probable that irpoixopai is used similarly by Herodotus,
ii. 42, where, in reference to the Egyptian ram-headed
Noum (Num or Chnum) whom he designates Jupiter, fhe.
says that the Thebans allege "that Hercules (Hermes)'
wished exceedingly to see Jupiter, who, however, was
unwilling to show himself; but that at length, on Hercules
insisting, tov Aia pyxavyaaa&at, Kpibv tKSupavTa, irpoixta-
Sai rt ryv Kt<j>aXriv dirorapovra tov Kpiov, Kai, ivSivra to
vaKog, ovto) oX iwvrbv iiriSt^ai, Jupiter contrived, having
flayed a ram, both to screen himself, — having cut off the
head of the ram (and no doubt put it on, like a helmet), —
and, having enveloped himself in the skin, thus to show
himself to him. But, whatever may be made of this
passage of Herodotus,* there can be no reasonable room for
*The passage, — assuming the correctness of the text, — is somewhat
involved, interpret it as we may. It has puzzled considerably commenta
tors and translators. The following are some of the English versions,
which have been given to it : —
"At last, Jupiter, yielding to his importunity, contrived this artifice: —
Having separated the head from the body of a ram, and flayed the whole
carcase, he put on the shin with the wool, and in that form showed himself to
Hercules.'' Littlebury
" In consequence of his repeated importunity, the god, in compliance, used
the following artifice : — he cut off the head of a ram, and, covering himself
with the skin, showed himself in that form to Hercules." Beloe
"At last, in consequence of the earnest entreaties of Hercules, Jupiter
made use of the following artifice .— having skinned a ram, and cut off the

104 ROMANS III. 9.
doubting that the word is used absolutely by the Apostle
Paul in the passage before us, and that it means, Do we
put forth pleas in self-defence? that is, Do we defend
ourselves (before the tribunal of God) ? — Do we stand on the
defensive (as regards our title to glory, honour, and
immortality) 1 — Do we bring forward a plea in bar of a
condemnatory sentence ? — Do I, a Jew, bring forth a plea
in behalf of the Jews ? — Do we, in this way, screen
ourselves ?
head, he placed it before him, and covering himself with tlie fleece, showed
himself in that manner to him." Laurent
"At length, as Hercules persisted in his endeavours, Jupiter adopted the
following device :— flaying a ram, he put the horned scalp of the Jiead he
had severed on his own, and clothed himself with tlie fleece ; thus attired lie
showed himself." Isaac Taylor
"At length, when Hercules persisted, Jove hit on a device — to flay a
ram, and, cutting off the head, hold the head before him, and cover himself
with the fleece. In this guise he showed himself to Hercules." Rawlinson
None of these translations are quite satisfactory. Littlebury and Beloe,
— perplexed no doubt by the word, — take no account of it whatsoever.
Laurent, — overlooking its dependence, as an infinitive, on nnxal"i<ra<rSai,
and the co-relative dependence of the succeeding ktovTov hri&e£cu, — sup
posed that the word means that Jupiter held (the head of the ram) before,
him. Rawlinson, — though seeing the dependence of the first infinitive, at
least, on ixnxa-vriaaaSrai, nevertheless took Laurent's view of its import.
So did Schweighaeuser. So did Larcher. And yet the Egyptian god, to
whom Herodotus is referring, is ram-headed. He does not merely hold
the head of a ram before him; he has it on him, as if it were his own
head. Isaac Taylor understood this, and, feeling persuaded that Herodotus
could not be making any discordant representation, he has expressed the
idea in his translation. But he has dexterously avoided, nevertheless,
any reference to irpocxeaSrau He did not see the relation to /«ix<i>"i-
cratrSrai of the two co-relative infinitives. But yet nothing seems more
certain than that Baehr is right in affirming the conjoint dependence of
these two infinitives, (equidem inflnitivos sequentes ab ipso verbo ^ijxaKiio-ao-^ai
pendere dixerim). Kriiger, too, distinctly perceived the dependence of
¦rrpoexevSai, (-firixuvti(m<rSrcu wpoexea-Srai habe das Mittel, den Ausweg, er-
griffen sich vorzuhalten); but he missed the real import of the word.
Herodotus and Paul mutually illustrate one another. Jupiter really
screened himself. He defended himself (from the gaze of the too prying
Hercules) by having and holding before himself, all round and round Ms
imperial head, the corresponding parts that constituted the head of the ram.
And yet he showed himself, in a sense, — enveloped and screened in the
fleece of the ram.

ROMANS III. 9. 105
We shall now pass on to consider the component parts
of the verse in detail : —
§ 4. What then ? (Tt ovv ;) In the scholia of CEcumenius
there is hesitation expressed whether these words should be
regarded as a distinct interrogation, or as welded with the
following verb into one query. We have seen that not a
few modern critics have adopted the welding plan, — reading
the words in continuance, — iv awtirtiq, as it is expressed
by GScumenius. And we might add to those already
mentioned, Mace, Bolten, Heberden, Cox, Peile, &c. The
fact, however, that the answer is adverbial, not at all, or
not altogether, or no certainly, (ov irdvrwg), and not adjec
tival, none at all, (ovSiv irdvrwg), is, as we have intimated,
decisive reason for the division of the introductory words
into two distinct questions. The question, What then ? is
elliptical, and may be supplemented thus, What is the case
then ? (Ti ovv tariv ; see Acts xxi. 22 ; 1 Cor. xiv. 15,
26), or, as Luther gives it, What shall we say then ? (ri ovv
ipovptv; — see Eom. iv. 1 ; vi. 1 ; ix. 14, 30). The expression
indicates a pause in the Apostle's reasoning, during which he,
as it were, gathers himself up for a new start ; while he is
careful, at the same time, to quicken the intelligence of his
readers into sympathy with himself, so as to carry them
along with him. What tlten ? — How stands the case (viz.,
with us Jews) ? The particle then (ovv) most naturally
refers to the preceding paragraph (verses 1 — 8) as a whole ;
so that the mind is carried back, in its review, to the main
idea of the paragraph, — namely, that the advantage pos
sessed by the Jew, in his peculiar relations and institutions,
is much in every respect. — " What then ? " It is as if the
Apostle were to say, — Since it is the case that the preroga
tives of the Jew, whatever use or abuse may be made of
them, are much in every respect, what then ?
§ 5. Do ive bring forward pleas in behalf of ourselves ? i. e.,
in bar of a sentence of condemnation against ourselves,
(7rpotxoptSa ;). The Apostle, in his pause, has re-entered into
intercommunion of consciousness with his countrymen in

106 ROMANS III. 9.
general. In the preceding verse, in which he says, "as we
be blasphemed," he was realizing his union, not, as Michaelis
supposes, with his fellow-countrymen in general, but with
his fellow-Christians in particular. In the 7th verse, again,
in which he says, " why yet am even I judged as a sinner ? "
— he was throwing himself, in consciousness, into the far
larger community of the mass of the human world, why am
even I, as a unit of the world at large, yet judged as a
sinner ? But in the 5th verse he had, as now again in
the 9th, identified himself, for logical purposes, with the
mass of his countrymen, even although profoundly realizing
their opposition to the Gospel of Christ, — " if our un
righteousness sets off the righteousness of God, (as it really
does), what shall we say ? " The Apostle, thus, in his large-
heartcdness and many-sidedness, finds, as it were, numerous
doors in his own spirit which he can successively open, and
out of which his sympathies can go, now toward his fellow-
Christians of the Gentiles, now towards his fellow-Christians
of the Jews, now toward all his fellow-Christians, whether
Gentiles or Jews, now toward the mass of his countrymen,
though, in general, unbelieving, and now toward the mass of
his fellow-men at large. The rapidity with which he opens
door after door in his spirit, and, communicating outward
for a moment, shuts them again, sometimes occasions to the
expositor a little difficulty in determining the specific atti
tude and direction of his consciousness. The lambent
flame of his ardent spirit turns, flickeringly and rapidly,
hither and thither. But in such a case as the present,
the connection seems to make it evident that he is speaking,
not, as Theodor Schott supposes, in the name of men in
general, (wir Menschen alle), but in the name of Jews in
general. He speaks in their name, and yet, as in verse
5th, he gives utterance rather to his own conception of the
state of their case, than to theirs. He realizes, in conscious
ness, his union with the Jews in general; but he looks at
their position from his own particular standpoint, and in
his own peculiar light. And hence in asking, Do we, in
maintaining that the prerogative of the Jews is much in
every respect, bring forth a plea for the justification of our

ROMANS III. 9. 107
moral state, and in defence of our right to everlasting life
and glory in the kingdom of heaven ? — in asking this ques
tion, and in answering it as he does, (ov mdvrwg), he does
not mean that there would be none among his country
men who would be ready to defend themselves in judgement.
He means that when he himself speaks in reference to them,
and as far as possible in their behalf, and as one of them, he
will not, and does not, and cannot, speak in the way of
defence. He cannot plead, Not Guilty. He was profoundly
convinced that guilt was attaching to himself for his own
unrighteousness. And he was equally sure that it was
attaching to all his countrymen, for theirs. Such is the
significance of the Apostle's identification of himself with
the mass of his countrymen when he says " we." We do
not recognize in the fact, — with Calvin, — any evidence of
what may strictly be called " a holy artifice," (sanctum
artificium). We recognize, on the other hand, a perfectly
unartificial simplicity of spontaneous intercommunion and
sympathy. § 6. No, certainly, (ov irdvrwg). Such, perhaps, may be as
good a translation as is practicable of the original expres
sion. The negative adverb, — the no, — should be betoned in
reading, so that the voice, after pausing upon it, may add,
in an under-toue, and subordinately, the universal adverb,
as an additament that is expressly intended to confirm the
negation :• — No, — by all means no. (See Winer, iii. 61, 4 f.)
There is thus a shade of difference between the expression
and our more peremptory negation, not at all; although
the phrases are in some respects analogous. Oiiy, oXojc and
ov irdw are more precisely coincident with our not at all,
or with the French point du tout. There is reason, indeed,
to believe that the Apostle, reversing the order of the words,
would have said irdvrwg ov, had he intended to bring out
the precise idea which is indicated conventionally by our
expression, not at all, or by no means. (See 1 Cor. xvi. 12;
Horn. II. viii. 450, &c.) Beza has put a comma between
the adverbs, inasmuch as he looks upon them as transposed.
Piscator follows in his wake. They render the expression,

b

108 ROMANS 111. 9.
" by no means," (nullo rnodo). The version of the Vulgate
corresponds, (nequaquam). Theophylact's explanation is
identical, (ov irdvrwg, dvri ovSapwg). Tyndale's version,
followed by the Geneva and our Authorized English Version,
is consentaneous : — no, in no wyse. But such a meaning
of the two adverbs, when they are closely welded together,
and in the order in which they stand in our text, is, to say
the least of it, uncommon. (See, especially, Mehring, in loc)
The passages cited in support of it by Fritzsche, Meyer,
Eeiche, and others, are not quite decisive. (The passage
from Theognis, 305, oi kokoi oil irdvrwg kcikoi ek -yaorpoc
ytyovaaiv, seems simply to mean, " the evil were not, cer
tainly, evil from birth :" and the passage from the Epistle
to Diognetus, 9, ov irdvrwg iipySoptvog rolg dpaprypaaiv
ypwv, a'XX' dvtxoptvog, while undoubtedly susceptible of the
translation, by no means rejoicing in our sins, may with
equal propriety be rendered, not, certainly, rejoicing over our
sins, but enduring them. The ou should be closely con
nected with the participle i<j>r)S6ptvog.) It is, at all events,
the case, that in the overwhelming majority of instances in
which the adverbs are welded together, in the order in
which they stand before us, they mean, not altogether, not
wholly, not in every respect. In other words, the negative
qualifies and limits the universal: the universal does not
(as in irdvrwg ov, and oi irdvv, and oiiy,' HXwg) explain and
intensify the negative, by opening up, as it were, an un
limited field for the scope of the negation. This meaning
of not altogether is apparently attached to the phrase in
1 Cor. v. 10, — the only other passage in the New Testament
in which the combination occurs. The passage, at all
events, cannot admit the translation, not at all. And in
the passage before us, the translation, not altogether, not in
all respects, has been given to the phrase by Grotius,
Wetstein, Whitby, Wittich ; Morus too, and Flatt; Kollner,
also, and van Hengel, Matthias, Umbreit, Mehring, &c.
But this rendering is, of course, inconsistent with the correct
interpretration of the preceding verb.
§ 7. For we before impeached both Jews and Greeks of

ROMANS III. 9. 109
being all under sin, (irpoynaadp&a yap 'lovSatovg rt koi
"EXXyvag irdvrag vtf dpapriav tivai). This clause exhibits
the reason, or at least a reason, why the Apostle, as a
representative of the Jews, did not, and would not, and
could not, put in pleas for them. It would be utter incon
sistency to attempt any such defence: for he had in the
preceding p^rt of this very epistle, — namely, in chap. i.
18 — 32, and in chap. ii. 1 — 29, — "impeached both Jews and
Gentiles of being all under sin," and maintained that they
were without excuse, (dvairoXoyyroi). See chap. i. 20; ii. 1.
The we, involved in the verb, is of course the Apostle himself.
The use of the plural in such a relationship as this, is, in his
case, an instinct of modesty. He partially merges out of
view his individuality. See chap. i. 5.
Erasmus Schmid takes a peculiar view of the verb, which
we have rendered, we before impeached, (irpoynaadptSa).
He regards it as being in the passive ; — We have been already
impeached, namely, by the law, (jam ante-accusati sumus
per legem) : and he adds that he will not criticise, because
he does not understand, Beza's translation, ante criminati
sumus, (we before impeached). Good Homer, we presume,
had been nodding.
Instead of the compound verb, " we before accused,"
(¦n-poynaadptSra), the MSS. D* and G read, we impeached,
(ynaadp&a). The Vulgate version corresponds, (causati
sumus) ; and so the Italic, as represented in the MSS. d. e. g.
Mill approves of the reading (Proleg. 450), and imagines that
some scholiast had added the preposition before (^rpo) to
make the reference to the preceding part of the epistle
more express. But, as the variation occurs in those codices
which present the most corrupt reading of the preceding
clause of the verse, we think that the other critical editors
have done wisely in dissenting from the opinion of Mill, and
retaining the compound verb.
The word is translated in our Authorized Version, we have
before proved. Tyndale, followed by the Geneva, had given
a similar translation, we have already proved. Luther's
version had led the way, "we have proved above," (wir
haben droben bewiesen). Wycliffe's was similar, — we have

HO ROMANS III. 9.
schewid by skile. Goschen's translation corresponds, (anted
enim probavimus). The Peshito is analogous, we have before
determined, or decided, as both Etheridge and Murdock trans
late the term, or concluded, as Eeusch renders it. (yfr)ln
^fim^)- Dionsyius a Eyckel's version corresponds, (ration-
abilitur declaravimus). But such a way of rendering the
word is aside from the precise idea of the original For the
reference is not to logical demonstration, but to forensic
accusation. Calvin noticed this, (verbum a'mdaOai, quod hie
usurpat Paulus, proprie est judiciale : ideoque reddere
placuit Constituimus). And Grotius, too, caught the true
idea, (accusationem praestruximus). So did Vitringa,
(Paulus moeste hier gelijk als een seeker Landsfiscaal of
Procureur aangemerkt worden, welke alle menschen voor
de rechterstoel Gods daagt, en haar proces maakt, en over
wandevoir of eenige misdaad beschuldigt). So did Bengel,
(Paulus agit, cap. 1 et 2, tanquam severus Procurator
justitioz divines). So de Paris, (C'est un terme de plaidoirie).
The simple verb properly means to charge as being the
cause (the alria) of some evil, that is, to accuse, to im
peach, to criminate. The term, as Day remarks, "is a law
term, and is usually said of those which are accusers,
who accuse or charge the defendant with what they have
to say against him." (Hesychius, hence, says, alndrai,
pip<j>trai) The verb has for its objects (and governed in the accus-
sative case) the words both the Jews and the Greeks, (lovSaiovg
n Kai ''EXXrjvae), or, as the Peshito characteristically renders
it, both the Jews and the Aramaeans; that is, both the Jews
and the Gentiles. See chap. i. 16; ii. 9, 10; &c. There
has been much discussion about the import of the con
nective particles {rt Kai), and whether the clause should
be rendered the Jews as well as the Greeks, or, not only the
Jews, but also tlie Greeks. Mehring contends for the former;
Matthias for the latter. But a more comprehensive view
will lead to the conclusion that the expression is absolutely
identical neither with the one translation nor with the other,
(see Acts xv. 9; Eom. x. 12; Heb. xi. 32; &c); though, of
course, it is here, when exegetically viewed, coincident with -

ROMANS III. 9. HI
the former. Compare Eom. i. 14; 1 Cor. i. 2; Acts v. 14;
viii. 12 ; ix. 6; xiv. 5; fcc. It simply means both Jews and
Greeks. The appended clause, of being all under sin, (irdvrag vf'
dpapriav tivai), is epexegetical, and expressive of the matter
of the impeachment. The word all (irdvrag) is the subject
of the epexegetical clause, and, in the Greek, is the accusative
before the infinitive : — that all are under sin. It gathers
up into unity, and spreads out into universality, the con
tents of the two preceding words, Jews and Greeks. The
Apostle had impeached the two classes indifferently, and all
in the two classes, of being under sin. The expression,
under sin, ({><£ dpapriav), is pictorially significant. By a
natural personification, — specially familiar to the mind of
our Apostle, — sin is represented as being the lord of the
sinner. For the moment that a man commits sin he makes
a slave of himself, and is liable for ever afterwards, unless
divine mercy interpose, to be under the lash of retribution.
In this respect, all men indifferently, whether Jews or
'Gentiles, are, as the Gospel finds them, under sin; for, as
Adam correctly remarks, " being under sin, and being con
demned, are equivalent." Thus the phrase, to be under sin,
is not, as Fritzsche would have it, absolutely identical with
to be sinners, (idem valet quod dpaprwXbv tivai sive
upaprdvtiv. Cajetan justly remarks, significantius dicit
sub peccato esse, et non dicit peccatores esse aut peccasse).
Neither does it mean, as Grotius supposes, " to be addicted to
peculiarly heinous vices," (significat, gravibus vitiis addictos
esse). And hence also the word all is not, as the same
great critic and Eosenmiiller suppose, to be interpreted as
meaning the greater part, (de plerisque). Neither is it, as
Oltramare will have it, to be interpreted of "the ideal
persons, the categories, to wit, of Jews and Gentiles," (les
personnes ideales, les categories Juifs et Paiens); but
doubtless of the real, unabstracted individuals who are
objectively referred to when we subjectively classify
into categories the responsible members of the human
family.

12 ROMANS III. 10.
Ver. 10. xcfoai? ysypuTrui on obx, 'iariv h'xuto?, ovhl
Eng. Auth. Vers. As it is written, There is none righteous,
no, not one :
Revised Version. As it has been written, There is none
righteous, not even one :
§ 1. As it has been written, (KaSwg yiypairrai). The
Apostle having mentioned that he had " impeached both
Jews and Gentiles of being all under sin," adduces docu
mentary evidence of the legitimacy of his impeachment,
He appeals to the Volume of the book, — the Law and the
Testimony, — the Old Testament Scriptures ; and shows that
his accusation was in perfect accordance with what stood
written in the record. "And hence," as Calvin remarks,
" ministers of the Gospel may learn what is their duty.
For if Paul is careful to assert no doctrine, without im
mediately confirming it out of Scripture, much less should
the attempt be made by those who have no other commission
than to proclaim the Gospel, which they have received
through the hands of Paul and of others." (Atque hinc
discant ecclesiastici doctores, quale suum sit officium. Nam
si nullum dogma hie asserit Paulus, quod non Scripturae
certo oraculo simul confirmet, multo minus illud ipsum
tentandum est Us, quibus nihil aliud est mandatum, quam
ut evangelium praedicent, quod per Pauli et aliorum
manus acceperunt) This remark of Calvin is but the
condensation of a similar remark by Origen.
§ 2. The Apostle strings together into a cluster a variety
of detached Old Testament statements, which bear, more or
less directly, upon his process of impeachment. The cluster
embraces verses 10 — 18. It was the custom of Jewish
Eabbis to form such clusters of quotations : — (see Suren-
husius, /3i'/3Xoc KaraXXayfje, thesis 7, de Modis) : — and the
same custom, we presume, will prevail more or less among
all who have occasion to make appeal to documents of
authority.

ROMANS III. 10. H3
§ 3. The passages adduced are, as we shall find, generally
quoted from the Septuagint version. But they are not
slavishly or strictly transcribed. They are given in a free
and easy manner ; and bear marks, in the forms they
assume, of the plastic energy of the mind through which
they passed. The substance of thought is invariably given,
as the Apostle found it on the ancient page ; but the
shaping of the substance is, in some cases, considerably
modified during the process of transmission.
§ 4. There is an appreciable method in the arrangement
of the quotations. They are grouped. In verses 10 — 12
the universality of sin is affirmed, and some of its universal
characteristics pointed out. In verses 13, 14, certain preva
lent phases of sin are, representatively, specified: — namely,
social transgressions in words. In verses 15 — 17 certain
other prevalent phases of sin are, also representatively,
specified : — namely, social transgressions in those works
which may be distinguished from words. In verse 18 a
general and God-ward phase of sin is exhibited, — a phase
which consists in a moral privation, and which may be
regarded as being, to a great extent, the source of the social
sins in words and works which are specified in verses
13—17. § 5. Howard Hinton — carrying out into exaggeration an
idea of Taylor — supposes that the whole paragraph which con
tains the quotations, — namely, verses 10 — 18, — is displaced,
and should have been introduced after the 24th verse of the
second chapter. He thinks that in its present position it is
" irrelevant ; " but that, nevertheless, it was the Apostle
himself who stuck it in at the wrong place. He supposes
that the inspired writer was going to quote the passages,
immediately after verse 24 of chap, ii., " but from the actual
quotation, something in the course of his thoughts at the
moment turned him aside." Hence in this critic's transla
tion of the epistle, the passage is transposed to the situation
which, as he conceived, it should have originally occupied. .
This is indeed to turn the epistle into a nose of wax. But
I

114 ROMANS III. 10.
the critical libertinism of the worthy commentator is
baseless. It rests upon a threefold misunderstanding, — a
misunderstanding, (1), of the reference of chap. ii. 24 ; (2),
of the import of chap. iii. 9 ; and, (3), of the contextual
exigencies and congruities of both of these passages.
§ 6. It is noteworthy that the entire cluster of quotations
contained in verses 10 — 18 is found, just as the Apostle gives
it, in the 14th Psalm, — as the Psalm stands in the common
editions of the Vulgate, and in some editions of the Septua
gint, and in the Eoman, Arabic, Ethiopic, and English
Psalters. It is incorporated in the Vatican MS. of the
Septuagint, though omitted in the Alexandrian. (Jowett
incorrectly says that it is " in the Alexandrian MS.") It is
not found in the Chaldee Paraphrase, nor in the Syriac
version. Origen was aware that it was a compilation from
various parts of Scripture. Some of the older advocates of
the superiority of the Vulgate version to the Hebrew text
(Comp. Ferrandus, &c.) contend that the Hebrew text of the
Psalm, — which does not contain verses 13 — 18 of the Epistle
— is mutilated. But this idea has been for long abandoned
by all competent Eoman Catholic critics, such as Dionysius
a Eyckel, Cajetan, Este, Natalis, Klee, Eeithmayr, Maier,
Bisping, &c. It was some ignoramus, says Cardinal Cajetan,
who attached the cluster of passages to the 14th Psalm, (sed
ignorans nescio quis adjunxit haec psalmo decimoquarto).
Jerome, in his preface to the 16th Book of his Commentary
on Isaiah, speaks in a similar manner, — characterizing the
patching of the Psalm as the work of those who did not
understand the Apostle's method of interweaving his Old
Testament testimonies, (qui artem contexendarum inter se
Scripturarum Apostoli nesciebant). He admits, however,
that when the fact of the discrepancy between the Hebrew
Psalm and the Septuagint version then in use, was first
pointed out to him by his favourite pupil, Eustochium, the
daughter of the noble Paula, he felt stunned as if he had
been struck by the hand of a powerful boxer, (quasi a
fortissimo pugile percussus essem, coepi tacitus aestuare, et
stuporem mentis vultus pallore signare). The passages, in

ROMANS III. 10. 115
detail, are actually found elsewhere ; though not all in the
Psalms (as Shepherd alleges).
. § 7. There is none righteous, not even one, (on ovk ianv
SiKaiog, ovSi tig : — there is not a righteous (person), not one :
— a righteous (person) is not, not even one. Wycliffe's
version is, there is not ony man just. — We cannot reproduce,
to an absolute nicety, in our English idiom, the precise phase
of the original.
The introductory particle (on) is untranslatable in English,
if the quotation, as is most probable, be given in the direct
form. In that case the particle is merely recitative, (see
ver. 8 th), and performs the function of a verbal finger-post,
—pointing forward to what is to come. It somewhat corre
sponds, as Philippi remarks, to the quotational colon in
German (:). The analogy, at least, holds good so far as the
relation to the eye is concerned. But the Greek has the
advantage in being equally serviceable to the ear. When
Philippi compares it, still further, to our modern inverted
commas, he unduly stretches his comparison ; for the
inverted commas mark off the ending as well as the
beginning of quotations. (Die Conjunktion on dient zur
Anfuhrung, etwa wie unser Colon oder Anfuhrungszeichen)
The particle is omitted altogether in Chrysostom's text, and
in many of the cursive manuscripts. And Mill has con
demned it, (on perperam insertum est, Proleg. 1204). But
doubtless the great critic judged injudiciously. And when
he appeals to the Syriac version in support of his judge
ment, he mistakes : for the analogue of the demonstrative is
found there (?¦); as also in the Vulgate (quia); and the
particle itself is found in the great manuscriptural authorities.
Some expositors, however, have supposed that the words,
There is none righteous, not even one, are not a quotation
at all, but are intended to be the Apostle's own summation
of the quotations which follow in verses 11 — 18, and thus of
the teaching of the Old Testament Scriptures in general, in
reference to the moral state of men. They would conse
quently regard the introductory particle as having its
ordinary demonstrative import:— "As it is written that

116 ROMANS III. 10.
there is not a righteous person, not one" This is the view
that is taken by Calvin, and Brown of Wamphray ; by
Koppe too, and by Kollner, and Fritzsche; by Hurgronje
too, (De membrorum concinnitate in Pauli ad Rom. epist),
and by Oltramare; and partially by Klee. Tholuck, too,
supported it in his 1st, 2d, and 3d editions; but he sub
sequently renounced it. It is improbable ; inasmuch as the
words, there is not a righteous person, not one, correspond
as nearly and literally to the conclusion of verse 1st of
Psalm xiv. as the words of the 11th verse correspond to the
2d verse of the Psalm. It is probable, therefore, that the
Apostle was giving a free rendering of the concluding clause
of the 1 st verse of the Psalm : — there is none that doeth good.
It is noticeable, moreover, that when the formula, as it-
stands written, (KaSwg yiypairrai), is, in other passages,
prefixed by the Apostle to any remark, that remark is
invariably a quotation in the direct form. (In Eom. ii. 24,
the formula is postfixed ; and there is, besides, no on. The
two passages are in no wise analogous cases.) Oltramare
admits the universality of the rule ; but says that in no
case but the one before us is the formula succeeded by the
demonstrative conjunction (on), and that hence an exception
to the general rule is intended. He is mistaken, however,
in his statement of facts, for the demonstrative conjunction
does follow the formula in Eom. iv. 17; viii. 36. We seem
shut up, then, to regard the words succeeding the demon
strative particle as a direct quotation.
Cocceius supposed that the quotation was taken from
Eccles. vii. 20, — " There is not a righteous man upon earth,
that doeth good, and sinneth not," (dvipwirog ouk tan S'tKaiog
iv ry y(i, og iroiyati ayaSbv ko.\ oiiy/ upapryatTat). Vitringa
adopted Cocceius's opinion. So Wittich. Mussus had had
the same idea: and also Cajetan. But the purely subor
dinate relation of the first clause of the affirmation in
Ecclesiastes to the last, — "who will do good and will not
sin" (nbd; (&1 3ii3--%?: if's) — makes it utterly improbable that
the Apostle's mind could be referring to it. There is
no good reason for doubting that the general opinion
of expositors, both ancient and modern, is correct, — that

ROMANS III. 10. H7
the Apostle is quoting from the first verse of the 14th
Psalm. The passage, as it stands in the psalm, is simply, there is
none that doeth good, (zfcrnVv j<k). But it is rendered,
with reduplicating emphasis, in the Septuagint, there is
none that doeth goodness, there is not so much as one, (ovk
Eo-ri Trbtwv xPVo-roryra, ovk ianv iwg ivog). The redupli
cative element may probably have been suggested by the
third verse, which is quoted by the Apostle in his 12th
verse. It is, however, an element that concerns, not the
substance, but merely the form of the statement; and hence
the Apostle was thoroughly justified in adopting it. He
nevertheless abbreviates it, (ovSl tig). And instead of that
specific aspect of righteousness, which is exhibited in doing
goodness, he generalizes the expression, though he retains
the exact essence of idea, and says, there is none righteous.
We need not here analyze the 14th Psalm as a whole.
Neither need we investigate its aim as a whole. Nor need
we speculate as to the occasion of its composition. Nor
need we consider why it is repeated, with minute variations,
in Psalm liii., (which is regarded by Thrupp as the original
copy). These matters belong to the expositor of the Psalms.
It suffices for us that the quotation made by the Apostle
in this and the two succeeding verses is emphatically to
the point. Grotius holds, indeed, that the asseveration,
there is none righteous, no, not one, is " hyperbolical." And
many critics are puzzled with the expression. D. G. Herzog
imagines that David is speaking of his enemies alone.
Origen supposes that the expression is used comparatively:
compared with God, for example, none is righteous. Day
has recourse to a mystical, as distinguished from the his
torical, sense of the words. Belsham suggests that "possibly
the Psalmist had too bad an opinion" of the persons whom
he describes! De Saci, on the other hand, not content with
the natural comprehensiveness of the phraseology, insists
on jumping into the unoccupied space beyond, and main
tains that there is an intentional description even of the
infant who has just been born, (il n'y en a pas un seul,
non pas meme I'enfant qui ne fait que de naitre). But

118 ROMANS III. 11.
we see no necessity for either leaping into Charybdis or
dashing upon Scylla. As we discover no reference to
infants on the one hand, so we discover no hyperbole
on the other. The Apostle's standpoint, while he was
engaged in echoing the Psalmist's affirmations, seems suf
ficiently obvious. Every man living needs the Gospel;
for, apart from the influence of the Gospel, every man
living is sinful. No man living is, in his moral character,
in all its inward, outward, and upward relations, what he
ought to have been : that is to say, he is not righteous.

Ver. 11. ovk 'io~riv 6 avutSv ovk sgtiv 6 lx.tyiroov rov 3-soy.
Eng. Auth. Vers. There is none that understandeth,
there is none that seeketh after God.
Revised Version, there is none who understandeth : there
is none who is seeking out God.
§ 1. there is none who is understanding, (ovk ianv 6
awiibv) : — literally, the understanding (man) is not, that is,
the understanding man is not to be found. Wycliffe gives it,
— " Ther is not a man undirstondinge." From the stand
ing-point both of the Psalmist and of the Apostle, and
indeed of all the Biblical writers, every man is deficient
in understanding (davvtrog — see Eom. i. 21, 31) who does
not apply his intelligence to the things which concern his
relations to God; — so as to be guided aright in his conduct
in reference to God. "The fear of the Lord is the be
ginning of knowledge " (Prov. i. 7) and " of wisdom," (Prov.
ix. 10). All the finite objects on which the intelligence
may terminate are but intended to be the rounds of a
ladder by which the mind may mount up to God. He
who does not mount by means of these objects, does not
understand, is not wise. He has not grasped the realities
of things, in their true relations. He does not construe
aright the lesson which is spread out before him. (La terre

»

ROMANS III. 11. 119
est pleine de personnes habiles dans toutes les sciences, et
dans tous les arts; de Philosophes, d' Orateurs, &c. Ge.pen-
dant parmi tant de personnes intelligentes aux yeux des
homines, Dieu ne voit que des aveugles, des insenses, des
gens sans lumiere et sans raison; puisqu' ils ne s'occupent
point de la seule chose qui leur est absolument necessaire.-
De Paris.)
The article before the participle is omitted by Lachmann,
(ovk Eo-rii> awiwv). He is supported by ABGr. But as it
is found in SDEKL, as also in Chrysostom, Theodoret,
Theophylact, and CEcumenius ; and as, moreover, A introduces
it before the participle in the second clause of the verse ; and
as, besides, its insertion lends a fine emphasis to the quota
tions; we agree with de Wette, Fritzsche, Scholz, Tischen-
dorf, &c, in approving of its admission. (It may also be
noticed that Lachmann accentuates the participle, as from
awiw, — awiwv. Winer agrees, — ii. 14, 3. But almost all
other editors accentuate it, as from awiiw, — awiwv. Either
accentuation is admissible. See Fritzsche, in loc. Both
forms are equivalent to awitig, from awiypi. The accen
tuation which is found in D*** and which is reproduced
in Hahn, viz., awiwv, is a blunder, as awiwv is from
awtipi) § 2. there is none who is seeking out God, (ovk ianv 6
iK%yrwv tov Sstov): — the diligent seeker for God -is not.
The verb is translated diligently seek, in Heb. xi. 6 ; and
carefully seek, in Heb. xii. 17. (It corresponds to b'tj in
Hebrew, and also to k>'j?3.) The employment of the verb,
in relation to God as its object, proceeds on the assump
tion that God cannot " by searching," be fully " found out."
He stretches out inimitably before the investigating mind ;
and therefore may be more and more discovered in his
essential perfections and infinitely complicated relations.
He is sought out, progressively and continuously, of all who
realize the true end of human life. But there are none
except those whose hearts are touched more or less power
fully by the Gospel of God's grace, who thus know them
selves, and understand the whys and wherefores of their

120 ROMANS III. 1%:
being; — and there are consequently none, but these ex
ceptional persons, who make it their constant business to
seek out God.
This second clause of the verse, in virtue of its paral
lelism with the first, exhibits negatively \ what it is which
constitutes a right condition of the understanding. It is
that attitude or exercise of the intelligence which is realized
in seeking out God.
(Lachmann inserts within brackets the article before the
participle, — [6] ek£iit<I>v. The article is omitted in B E, but
is found in A as well as in k D E K L. See on the first
clause of the verse.)
§ 3. The quotation, as already stated, is taken from Psalm
xiv. 2, (= liii. 2) : but, like the quotation in the preceding
verse, it is given in a free and easy manner, and thus
presents, as to its form, a considerable difference from the
form which it sustains in the Psalm. Its form in the Psalm
is the following: — " The Lord looked down from heaven
upon the children of men, to see if there were any that did
understand, and seek God," (Kvpiog ek tov ovpavov SitKviptv
irri rovg v'toiig twv dvSpwirwv tov iSttv tl ian awiwv y
£k£tjt<uv rbv Stov. — w~F ^?^5 &X1 tntrb a,ro->;.a-^i> s^p^n nwb nip;
.rj'oSs-n^) As, however, the Lord's all-seeing eye discovered
no one who was rightly exercising his understanding,
and seeking out God, the Apostle contents himself with
expressing this result : — " there is none who understandeth,
there is none who searches out God."

Ver. 12. Havreg l^exXwav apce, rrxpedfotiaoui' ovk law
Toim yj^niarorriru, ovk 'iariv 'iag ivdg.
Eng. Auth. Vers. They are all gone out of the way, they
are together become unprofitable; there is none that doeth
good, no, not one.
Revised Version. All turned aside; together they became

ROMANS III. IS. 12l
corrupt; there is none doing goodness, there is not so much
as one.

§ 1. This verse is an exact transcript of the Septuagint
version of the first clause of Ps. xiv. 3. It repeats, inten-
sifyin'gly, the idea of 'the preceding verse; — giving pro
minence, under a variation of aspect, to the universality of
human sinfulness. The Septuagint version is a faithful
reflection of the original Hebrew, (sia-nir'B ]<n ir6w iiit -id ^an
inN-Di ps — The whole have turned aside; they have, together
become corrupt; there is none doing good; there is not
even one. There seems to be an interesting etymological
filament of connection between our English word whole
and the Hebrew hk, as well as between both and the Greek
b'Xog. The substantive use of whole is strikingly coincident
with hi).
§ 2. All turned aside, (irdvrtg e&'kXivov). The expression
is abrupt, and hence the reader is left to supply out of his
own resources, — taking, of course, the context into account, —
what it is from which the deviation or swerving has been
made. " They are all gone out of the way," say our English
translators: "out of the right way," say Maurer, Hupfeld,
de Wette, Meyer, &c. (Similarly Zinzendorf, aus dem
Gleisse.) " Out of the way of true happiness," says de Lyra.
The Chaldee Paraphrast explains the expression thus, — " all
have turned backward" (xrftn&k). Geier again, Seb. Schmidt,
Eiickert, Oltramare, &c, make the supplement thus, — "all
have turned aside from God." The lines of the two inter
pretations meet. But the antithesis to the last clause of
the preceding verse rather favours, upon the whole, the
second of the two views of the relativity. Or, perhaps, we
might express it more precisely thus : — " all turned aside
from the way that leads to God,— the way in which God is to
be sought and found." When Pareus interprets the expres
sion as denoting " apostasy from God, and from his law and
worship, to idolatry," he unnecessarily narrows the reference,
and consequently the application, of the words.
Bengel has a little doctrinal remark in connection with the

122 ROMANS III. IS.
verb, " turned aside." " It supposes," he says, " that all
were formerly right," (omnes antea rectos fuisse). But it
would be more precise to say, that the expression only
implies that there was a time when all began to go wrong.
Men were set down by God in such a position that they
should and might have stepped in the right direction. "Man
once stood," says Origen, " in the right way," (non dicitur
declinasse, nisi is, qui aliquando in via recta stetit). But
he " turned aside." The verb used by the Psalmist (ic) is
most frequently rendered turned- aside in our English
version; but also frequently departed. When used in
reference to moral action, it may denote the turning aside
from evil to good, as well as the turning aside from good, to
evil. See Ps. xxxiv. 14; xxxvii. 27. Here, of course, it is
employed in malam partem.
It is to be noticed that, while in the preceding verse the
present state of men is described, in this, — so far as the first
clause of the verse is concerned, — there is a reference to their
past evil actions, as furnishing the natural antecedents of
their present character. Whithersoever the all-seeing Eye
turned its gaze,— whether to what was still happening in the
moral life of men, or to what had happened before, — the scene
was equally melancholy ; and part sadly corresponded to part.
§ 3. together they became corrupt, — together they became
useless : (lipa yxptwSyaav) The word together (dpa) inten
sifies the adjective all, which runs forward in its influence
from the preceding clause. (Ad lipa e superioribus mente
repete n-avrEc-Fritzsche.) All, in union, became useless:
all, as in concert, became useless; all, as it were unanimously,
became useless. Bengel interprets the adverb as meaning, at
one time, (uno tempore. Compare Hesychius, iv rt£ avrqi
Xpovw). But, instead of viewing it in the light of its current
classical import, it is better to regard it as the analogue. of
the corresponding Hebrew word vjrj: — compare irp, union,
and ins, one). Viewed in this light it is reproduced, almost
to a nicety, in our English together, (Wycliffe, to gidere) ;
which is a much better analogue for the term than the
expression at once.

ROMANS III. IS. 123
The Peshito version connects the adverb with the preced
ing clause : — " all turned aside together, and were repro
bated." But the Hebrew parallelism, as well as the Masoretic
punctuation, demands that it be connected with the verb
that follows.
They became useless, — (yxptwSyaav), — useless, says
Pelagius, " for the work for which they were brought into
being," (inutiles ad opus ad quod fuerunt procreati). " We
call that useless," says Thomas Aquinas, " which does not
answer its end," (hoc enim inutile dicimus, quod non sequi-
tur finem mum). The expression implies that men are
created, in order that they may voluntarily devote them
selves to certain definite activities, which should all point, in
their aim, toward the glory of God. When these activities
are perverted, men are so corrupt as to be useless in the
world, as far, at least, as their voluntary agency is con
cerned. If they be not absolutely useless, no thanks to
them. They are passive in the matter ; and are turned to
account only in virtue of the resources of infinite wisdom
and power. They are gone to waste. They are like meat
or drink that has become rancid or sour, — corrupt. This
is the idea that is suggested by the Hebrew word employed
by the Psalmist, (infe) ; and which is, however, rather
strongly translated filthy in our English version. (See Job
xv. 1 6, as well as Ps. xiv. 3 ; liii. 3.)
¦ (Tischendorf in his 1857 edition reads the verb r/xpEwSijo-av,
on the authority of ABDG. The same is the reading of S.
In his 1849 edition he had read, along with the Textus
Eeceptus, Griesbach, Lachmann, &c, yxptiwSriaav)
4. there is none doing goodness, there is not so much as
one, (ovk tariv iroiwv Yjor/o-rorjjra, ovk 'ianv iwg ivog). There is
a relation in the original between the goodness (xpriaroryg)
which none is doing, and men's consequent uselessness in the
universe, (dxptia). That which is really useful in the
universe is good, and nothing else is good. But the goodness
that is dependent on choice, — as indeed all moral goodness
must ultimately be, — is, in its heart or essence, a modification
of that " love " which, in the case of moral creatures, is " the

124 ROMANS III. IS.
fulfilling of the law." Hence this " goodness" is, in a large
acceptation of the term, " kindness," — the translation which
the word receives in Eph. ii. 7 ; Col. iii. 12 ; Tit. iii. 4 ; 2
Cor. vi. 6. See Eom. ii. 4.
The emphatic additament, " There is not so much as one,"
(ovk 'ianv twg ivog), is somewhat ambiguous in the Greek,
as also in the Latin, (non est usque ad unum, translated by
Wycliffe, ther is not til to oon) ; and hence Augustin, who
was ignorant of Hebrew, supposed that there might be, in
the expression, an exceptidn of one, namely, Christ, (iste est
melior intellectus, ut nemo intelligatur fecisse bonitaten
usque ad Christum. Enarr. in Psalm, in loc.) When Seb.
Schmidt says, however, that Beza made the same mistake,
he unaccountably errs; for Beza expressly, and in all his
editions, points out Augustin's mistake, and adds, " of such
moment is it to draw truth from the fountain," (Tanti est
mornenti ex fontibus ipsis veritatem haurire). There is no
ambiguity in the Hebrew, (ins-D-i j<b — there is not even
one). (It will be noticed that the construction of the clause,
ovk ianv iroiwv xpfOTorrjra, is different from the correspond
ing clauses of verse 11th. There is no article before the
participle, though it is found in H D E. The second ovk ianv
is omitted by B, and in the Syriac version. These are
trifling variations, incident to the imperfections of tran
scribers.)

Ver. 13. Tdpog hnuymvog 6 Xupvy% avrurralg yXwaaoug
abrw tboXtovauv. 'log asTi^uv vto roc XfiXq avraiv.
Eng. Auth. Vers. Their throat is an open sepulchre ; with
their tongues they have used deceit ; the poison of asps is
under their lips.
Revised Version. Their throat is a sepulchre opened ; with
their tongues they were using deceit. The poison of asps is
under their lips.

ROMANS III. 13. 125
§ 1. The quotation contained in verses 10 — 12 is the
evidence proper which establishes the harmony that subsists
between the teaching of the Old Testament Scriptures and
the position of the Apostle — That all men, without excep
tion, are under sin. The evidence is decisive and cumula
tive. And, as Jonathan Edwards remarks, " if the words
which the Apostle uses do not most fully and determinately
signify an universality, no words ever used in the Bible
are sufficient to do it." (Original Sin, ii. 3, 2.) " If," says
Cartwright, " the Prophet and Apostle had laid their heads
together, to have found out the most forcible words, and
most significative, to shut all men, born of the seed of men,
from righteousness, and to shut them under sin, they could
not have used more effectual speeches than these." (Annot.
in loc) Clause is repetitiously piled upon clause, to
the effect that " all have sinned and come short of the
glory of God." The passages which are quoted, in con
tinuation, in verses 13 — 17, are tacked on to the quotation
from the 14th Psalm ; and not as containing additional
Scripture-evidence of the universality of sin, but as ex
hibiting, in graphic touches, — and distributively, as Zwinger
remarks,; — representative specimens of the very varied forms
into which the essential principle of sin has, in its universal
range, developed itself. The reference more particularly is,
as Melancthon observed, to breaches of the second table of
the law. (Annot.)
§ 2. The first two clauses of the 13th verse are quoted
verbatim from the Septuagint version of the 9th (10th)
verse of the 5th Psalm. The third clause is taken from
Psalm exl. 3 (4), and is likewise an exact transcript of the
Septuagint translation.
§ 3. Their throat is a sepulchre opened, (rdfyog dvtwypivog
6 XdpvyZ, avrwv) ; — their throat is a sepulchre that has been
opened, — that is standing open, (dvtwypivog). The formal
notation of comparison is omitted ; but the meaning is, of
course, " their throat is as a sepulchre standing open." In
the expression, their throat, (6 XdpvyZ avrwv), we are not to

126 ROMANS III. IS.
look for a precisely definite, and still less for a precisely
scientific, reference to the special part of the organism,
lying back of the cavity of the mouth, which is appropriated
to the production of voice. The Greek word employed is,
indeed, the term which is now, in the technical language of
anatomists, the designation of that particular portion of
the organism by means of which the production of vocal
sounds takes place. But in ancient times the larynx and
pharynx were not accurately discriminated. (See Aristot.
Hist. An. i. 12. 1; iv. 9. 1; Part. An. iii. 3. 1; see also
Hesychius's Lex., and Suidas. Phavorinus says, XdpvyJZ, koi
(pdpvyZ ravrov) Thomas Magister says that it is by the
larynx that we swallow, and by the pharynx that we
speak, (tan Si <j>dpvy% /niv y Tr)g (pwvtig Sdt,oSog, Xupuys Ss
1/ nw airiwv tlaoSog). But the author of the Etymologicum
Magnum reverses the distinction, and affirms that it is by
the larynx that we speak, and by the pharynx that we
swallow, (XdpvyZ piv, oY ov XaXov^iEV, Kai Siarrvioptv, (j>dpvy£
Si, Si ov iaSioptv koi irivoptv). It is well, therefore, that
the general word throat, which designates the part which
contains both the thoroughfares, should be retained as the
translation of the term employed. Wycliffe gives it; and
the subsequent translators wisely repeat it. The Hebrew
term used by the Psalmist (fna) is at least as indeter
minate as the term employed by the Septuagint translator.
(Compare Ezek. xvi. 11 ; Jer. ii. 25 ; Ps. cxv. 7; Isa. lviii. 1.)
But it certainly embraced, within the indeterminate sweep
of its reference, that part of the organism through which
we breathe, and speak, and groan. And it was because it
fitly suggested the organ of voice, that it was employed by
the Psalmist in the passage quoted by the Apostle.
When their throat is compared to a sepulchre that has
been opened, or that is standing open, the ground of the
comparison may be taken in two ways. Pelagius supposed
that the reference is to the contaminating influence of the
foetid and pestilential effluvia which issue from opened
tombs. (Factor e doctrinae suae, et adulatione (pestilentia?)
contaminans ret interficiens audientes) Origen's idea was
kindred; only he thought that the expression is designed to

ROMANS III. IS. 127
designate the bold impudence of those who make no secret
of their impurity, but expose it to view, (qui immunditias
suas et impuritates in propatulo habent). And the same
notion has been attached to the comparison by a large
proportion of expositors, such as de Lyra, Bullinger,
Hunnius, Vitringa; Seb. Schmidt too, and Spener, Este,
Bengel; Stengel also, and Stuart, Haldane, Sumner,
Wardlaw, Vaughan, Stephen, D. Brown, &c. But when
we consider the context of the psalm from which the
quotation is made, and notice that the reference is, most
probably, not so much to licentious persons, whose conver
sation was corrupt and corrupting, as to malignant enemies
who thirsted for blood, and therefore counselled death : and
when, besides, we take into account the use made of the
same simile by Jeremiah (v. 16), in relation to the Chal
deans, — "their quiver is as an open sepulchre," in which
there can be no reference to tainting or noisome exhalations;
we seem to be shut up to the conclusion that the expression
means, — their throat, like an open sepulchre, is ready to
swallow up and devour. In the use that is made of it, —
as an organ of speech, — it is a pitfall, — a burial-place.
Death and destruction are in it. This is the interpretation
of Ambrosiaster, and of Calvin, (guttur eorum sepulchrum
esse apertum, id est, voraginem ad homines perdendos) ;
of Grotius too, and de Saci; and likewise of Eiickert,
Fritzsche, Meyer, Kollner, Oltramare, &c. The character of
those persons is pourtrayed, who are ready, in what they say
of others, to consign to destruction either their persons,
or their prospects, or their peace, or their reputation. They
are intent, — for the purpose of gratifying their malignity, —
on ingulphing all that is valuable in the objects of their
envy or enmity. " Their tongue," as John Trapp expresses
it, "is as a rapier to run men thorow with, and their
throat a sepulchre to bury them in." The significancy of
the comparison is intensified, as in the case of the quiver,
by a glancing allusion to the peculiar physical conformation
of the object compared to the opened sepulchre. And, as it
is the perfect participle which is employed to express the
opened condition of the sepulchre, (dvtwypivog), the idea

128 ROMANS III. 13.
represented is that of a sepulchre which, for the time
being, is standing open, because it has been opened. It
is thus quite ready to receive the victims which it may
be possible to get consigned to destruction. Such remorse
less malignity — in which the insatiable element of a moral
charnel-house is realized — is an undoubted and wide-spread
feature of the sin that is universal among men.
§ 4. with their tongues they were using deceit, (ralg
yXwaaaig avrwv iSoXiovaav), or, as Wycliffe renders it, "with
her tungis thei diden gilyngly, or trecherously." The
expression in the Hebrew is, they smoothed their tongues,
(jip'Sq'. apvif), that is, they spalce smoothly, that they might
be successful in beguiling, entrapping, and ingulphing.
They had, as Thomas Aquinas expresses it, one thing in
their heart and another thing in their mouth. They
intended unkindness, but hypocritically pretended kindness:
— a too common manifestation of malignity. (The imper
fect tense seems to denote continuance or perseverance
in their hypocritical professions: and the form tSoXiovcrav
for eSoXiouv is common in the Septuagint. It was Alex
andrian, and also Boeotian.)
§ 5. Asps' venom (is) under their lips, ('log dairlSwv iirb
ri xa'X»J avrwv). See Psalm cxl. 3. The reference, in the
Psalm, is to " the evil man," and " the violent man," —
" which imagine mischiefs in their heart ; continually are
they gathered together for war." (See verses 1, 2.) Their
aim in what they say and counsel is to inject some idea
into the minds of those who have power, that will
work to the ruin of the objects of their malice. They wish
to poison, and thus to destroy. And, like asps, they carry
their poison about with them, under their lips, ever ready,
as occasion offers, to fasten upon their victim, and to dart
into his veins the deadly venom. It is of no moment
to determine what kind of viper or serpent is referred
to. Our English word asp is just the anglicism of the
Greek word uo-Tn'e. The Hebrew term (nw'pp) occurs only
in the passage quoted, and is translated adder in our

ROMANS III. 14. 129
English version. In the passage before us, Wycliffe's
version is, "the venym of eddris, that ben clepid aspis,
is undur her lippis." For eddris, Purvey, in his revision
substituted snakis.
§ 6. It may be observed that in the sins of word, repre
sentatively specified in this 13th verse, there is successive
reference to three prominent parts of the organism which has
to do with speech, — the throat, the tongue, and the lips.
In the next verse the entire cavity of the mouth is referred to.

Ver. 14. Civ to sropbot, kpag xui Tixpiag yspbu.
Eng. Auth. Vers. Whose mouth is full of cursing and
bitterness. § 1. The contents of this verse are a free quotation from
the Septuagint version of Psalm x. 7, (ix. 28). In the
Psalm there is reference to some haughty man of violence
who scrupled not to oppress and destroy the "poor," the
" fatherless," and the " innocent." Of this man it is said, —
" his mouth is full of cursing, and deceit, and fraud." The
Apostle enlarges the reference, by substituting a plural for a
singular relative, (wv for ov), and omits one item from
the triplet of wickedness ascribed to the mouth. (The
clause, as it stands in the Septuagint, is, ov dpdg to aropa
avrov yipti koi iriKpiag ko\ SoXov.) By cursing, we are
probably to understand malignant imprecation, such as is
still so fearfully prevalent in society. And by bitterness is
probably meant those other outspurtings of hate which so
often accompany cursings. Words which are intended to
wound and give pain are "amarulent," as Brown of Wamphray
calls them, — " words of bitterness." (In the Hebrew text the
term translated iriKpia is n'in-p, deceits. It is probable that
the Septuagint translator had read either n'n'-up; see Deut.
xxxii. 32 ; or nnno ; see Ezek. xxi. 6. And, perhaps, it is not
very improbable that one or other of these terms was in. the
K

130 ROMANS III. 15, 16.
autograph of the Psalmist.) When it is said that " the mouth
is full of cursing and bitterness," the description is a vivid
representation of what is still lamentably prevalent in,
apparently, all lands, and in none, perhaps, more than in
our own. There are multitudes who can scarcely " ope
their mouth," but " out thereat " fly both curses and bitter
ness. There is upon their lips a total inversion of the law
of reverence and love.

Ver. 15. 'QZfig oi -rob'sg avruv sx%eou ciipjof
Eng. Auth. Vers. Their feet are swift to shed blood :
This is a condensation of the first clause of the 7th verse
of Isai. lix., — " Their feet run to evil, and they make haste
to shed innocent blood," (oi Si iroStg avrwv iirl irovypiav
rpixovat, rax<vot EK^'ai aipa). There is thus unison in the
various members of the body. The feet are in league with
the throat and the tongue and the lips. All the parts of
the living organism are engaged in a confederacy of malig
nity. Such malignity is the natural development of sin ;
for holiness is "love." Even when powerful restraints are
imposed upon the various outward members, the inward
principle, full of machiavellian subtlety, contrives covered
and circuitous ways by which it may prosecute the imagined
interests of self by means of the sacrifice of the interests or
lives of others.

Ver. 16. ovvrpipjpjct, kou rocXuiTtupia h roiig obolg avrw'
Eng. Auth. Vers. Destruction and misery are in their
ways :
This is an exact quotation of the last clause of Isai. lix. 7
as it stands in the Septuagint. The words are a free

ROMANS III. 17. 131
translation of the original Hebrew, (Bryha& -ig»'i -*?), which
might be rendered thus, — desolation and destruction are
in their ways. That is, wherever they go they leave be
hind them destruction and desolation, and consequently
distress and woe. (t* is rendered avvrptupa, destruction,
not here only, but in Isai. xxii. 4, and lx. 18 also. It is
generally, however, rendered raXai7r&jpfo, /misery. And,
conversely, tag is generally rendered awrpippa, and only
here, and in Isai. lx. 18, and Jer. iv. 20, TaXanrwpia.)

Ver. 17. xui obdv iipfjvfig ovk 'iyvuaav.
Eng. Auth. Vers. And the way of peace have they not known:
Revised Version, and the way of peace they did not know.
The words of this verse, — translated by Wycliffe, and
thei knewen not the way of pees, — immediately succeed in
Isaiah the words which form the preceding verse of the
Apostle's catena. See Isai. lix. 8. The quotation is taken
exactly from the Septuagint, as it is exhibited in the
Alexandrine MS. (In the Vatican there is this difference,
that o'lSaai replaces iyvwaav.) The way of peace will simply
be the way in which peace may be maintained and enjoyed,
— peace, namely, between man and man. The antithesis
to what precedes seems to make it certain that this must
be the import of the phrase. And Ambrosiaster therefore
errs in understanding it as meaning the way of inward
tranquillity, by which the soul ascends to God. Bahrdt too
misses the mark when he thus translates the verse, "No
one gives himself any more concern as to the true means
of his bliss," (Keiner bekiimmert sich mehr um die wahren
Mittel seiner Gliickseliglceit). And when Origen says that
" Christ is our peace ; and therefore the way of peace is the
way of Christ," (Pax nostra Christus est: via ergo pads,
via Christi est), he leaps, so far as mere exegesis is con
cerned, — though not, indeed, so far as the philosophy of
both theology and religion is concerned, — to an extreme.

132 ROMANS III. 18.
Abelard followed him. Melancthon takes, however, a far
more erratic leap when he says that the meaning of the
passage is, "that they who seek to be justified by works
never arrive at peace," (declarat nunquam pervenire ad
pacem, qui se operibus justificant. Annot.) " The way of
peace," says Knopken echoingly, "is faith in Christ," (via
pacis est fides in Christum). Dionysius a Eyckel, on the other
hand, is equally extreme in the opposite direction ; — " the
way of peace," says he, " is good works," (id est, opera bona).
The expression, they did not know, or, they knew not, (ovk
tyvwaav), represents an instance of culpable ignorance ;
and it brings into view a state of mind that was chronologi
cally antecedent to the destruction and misery which were
found in their ways. The way of peace they did not know,
because they wilfully took no note of it. They wilfully took
no note of it, most probably because they were determined
to continue in the paths iu which they were already walk
ing and running. Had they known the way of peace, and
how desirable and delightful it is as a way, those lament
able experiences of destruction and misery would not have
followed in their wake.
It is thus noteworthy that sin not only separates man
from God ; it also separates man from man. It breaks up
human harmony. It introduces human antagonisms. It
tends to the dissolution of society. Were it not that it is
checked by gracious influences from above, it would speedily
issue in the superinduction of utter moral chaos and deso
lation.

Ver. 18. Ovk 'ianv pofiog S-sou arivavn ruv otpStxXpjW
avraiv. Eng. Auth. Vers. There is no fear of God before their eyes:
Revised Version. There is not the fear of God before their
eyes. This expression is quoted from the Septuagint version of

ROMANS III. 18. 133
Ps. xxxvi. 1, (xxxv. 2). And it is an exact transcript, with the
trifling exception of the plural pronoun their, (avrwv), which,
for unison's sake, is substituted for the singular his, (avrov).
" The transgression of the wicked," remarks the Psalmist,
" saith within my heart, That there is no fear of God before
his eyes." The absence of this fear sufficiently accounts
for the presence of the outbreaking iniquities which are
referred to in the five preceding verses. And the Apostle,
in mentioning it, returns, in his omega, to the idea con
tained in his alpha, — the idea, namely, which is expanded
in verses 11 — 12. The fear of God, as Spener remarks, is the
only bridle by which the wild horse of our nature can be
restrained and regulated, (Denn da die Furcht Gottes allein
der Zaum ware, welcher soldi ein unbandiges Pferd zuruck-
halten Konnte, 8cc) " It is a grand and magnificent thing,"
says Origen, " always to have before the eyes of the heart the
fear of God." (Opus grande est et magnificurn semper habere
ante oculos cordis timorem Dei.) Such fear is "the beginning
of wisdom ; " and it is not far removed from the end of it-
There is a fear, indeed, which " hath torment," — the fear of
the lash, the dread foreboding of final woe. It is well when
this fear is " cast out," and supplanted by perfect confidence
in the propitious favour of God. And it is ousted from the
soul when the soul is filled with love ; and the soul is filled
with love, when " we have known and believed the love that
God hath to us." (1 John iv. 17 — 19.) Nevertheless, there is
always an element of sensitive fear in man's love to God, and
in man's love to man. There is a fear of doing anything to
offend or to wound. This fear is inseparable from a con
sciousness of imperfection ; and it is at once a self-imposed
rein to restrain, and a self-appointed watch to keep guard.
When it is said that " there is not the fear of God before the
eyes," there is objectivity ascribed to a condition which is,
psychologically, subjective. But the subjective may become
objective when it is made the mark of reflective thought.
The wicked not only do not feel, as a general rule, " the fear
of God;" they do not even think of it as a feeling which
they should cherish. It is not kept in view by them as an
object to be realized in emotion.

134 ROMANS III. 19.
Ver. 1 9. O'thu^v o"s on ma 6 vopbog Xzyii ro7g h ra
v'o\JjO) XccXei, im nav o~r6p*ot, (ppccyrj kcci VTohiKog ykvr\rui Tug 6
Kocpjog ru S^ss/,
Eng. Auth. Vers. Now we knovj, that what things soever
the law saith, it saith to them icho are under the law, that
every mouth may be stopped, and all the world may become
guilty before God.
Revised Version. But we know that whatsoever things the
law saith, it speaketh to them who are in (the sphere of) the
law, that every mouth might be stopped, and all the world
become liable to pay penalty to God,
§ 1. The Apostle has concluded his documentary evidence
in support of the charge, which he had brought against all
mankind, — Jews as well as Gentiles,— that they are under
sin. But lest the Jews, as a spiritually conceited people,
should attempt to evade the force of the evidence adduced,
by shifting the whole burden of it over upon the shoulders
of the Gentiles, he adds the words of this verse. He had
" much greater trouble," as Calvin remarks, " in subjugating
the Jews, than in relation to the Gentiles ; for although the
former were as really destitute as the latter, of true righ
teousness, yet they covered themselves with the cloak of
God's covenant, as if it were holiness sufficient for them to
be separated from the rest of the world by the election of
God," (in quibus subigendis multo plus erat negotii; quod,
vera justitia non minus quam Gentes destituti, praetextu
foederis Dei se tegebant, acsi hoc illis pro sanctitate suffi-
ceret, Dei electione a reliquo mundo fuisse distinctos).
§ 2. But we know, (O'iSaptv Si). The conjunctive particle
(Si) connects what follows with what goes before, in such a
way as to indicate that a new thread of thought is taken
up, to be intertwisted with the preceding threads. The
particle is left untranslated by Tyndale. It is omitted from
the text by Theodoret ; and the omission is approved of by
Mill, § 929. It is also omitted in the Ethiopic version,
and in Matthaei's codex 1. It is rendered now in our

ROMANS III. 19. 135
Authorized English Version. We have certainly no precise
analogue for it ; but the translation which we have given — •
the translation of Myles Coverdale, and corresponding to
that of the Vulgate (autem) and of Luther (aber) — is
perhaps the best that is attainable.
When the Apostle says, " But we know," he seems to be
realizing his union, with his readers, whosoever these
readers might be. He does not refer to himself in par
ticular, as he does, when speaking in the first person plural,
in the second member of the 9th verse. Neither does he
refer to Christians in particular, as he does, when using the
same first person plural, in the 8th verse. Nor does he
refer to Jews in particular, as he does, when using the same
person, in verses 5th and 9th. His reference is, indefinitely,
to all his readers, along with himself — and to all his readers
and himself, not as distinguished, in some precise manner,
from all other men, but as adequately representing all of
mankind who might consider the subject spoken of. Tyn
dale freely and somewhat picturesquely renders the expres
sion, " ye and we knowe ; " Turnbull, still more freely, " it
must be acknowledged;" van Hengel, "it is evident"
(constat) ; Cognatus, " no one doubts " (nemini dubium
est); de Paris, " it is indubitable '' (c'est une chose indubit
able). It is thus the case that the step which the Apostle
is about to take in his reasoning is, as Matthias remarks,
taken ex concessis. His foot is treading on ground which
was undisputed and indisputable. "We know." The verb
denotes a state of subjective certainty, as distinguished from
that condition of the understanding which constitutes mere
opinion as to what is probable.
§ 3. that whatsoever things the law saith, it speaks to
those who are in the law, (on baa 6 vopog Xiyti, rolg iv
njj vopw XoXei). By the law here expositors in general,
both ancient and modern, understand the written Eevelation
as a whole, that is, the Old Testament Scriptures. Their
idea is undoubtedly correct. They suppose that the Apostle,
while employing the indefinite expression, whatsoever things
(oaa), had nevertheless a special subjacent reference to the

136 ROMANS III. 19.
quotations contained in verses 10 — 18 ;— quotations which
are taken, not from the Pentateuch, which was the original
law, that is, the original Authoritative Divine Instruction
(b vopog, rrivn), but from the supplementary and comple
mentary portions of the volume of the Book, the Psalms
and the Prophets. This is the view of Chrysostom (ryv
7raXaiav irao-av), OEcumenius, Theophylact. It was evi
dently the view of Theodoret also, and of Pelagius. Thomas
Aquinas, too, had the same idea; and Abelard, and de Lyra.
So had Sadolet, Calvin, Beza, Willet, Piscator, Grotius.
Day accords, — " the word law here signifieth all the writ
ings of the Old Testament, and that it doth in relation to
the Hebrew word Thorah!' The same view is taken by
Tholuck, Eeiche, Eiickert, de Wette, Meyer, Alford, Words
worth, and, indeed, as we have said, by the great body of
modern expositors.
Some, however, dissent. Amnion, for example, maintains
that there is no reference to the passages quoted in verses
10 — 1 8, but that there is the start of a new train of thought.
He interprets the law as meaning strictly the Mosaic law,
that is, the precepts \pf/tHe Pentateuch. Van Hengel takes
the same view, substantially, and approves of Muralto
indicating in the text that a new paragraph commences
with verse 19. /Glockler, too, opposes the idea that there
is a reference / to the quotations in verses 10 — 18, and
supposes that/ jbe word law denotes what is strictly the
Mosaic law. But he contends that verse 19th is to be closely
connected with verse 9th, and thinks that the expression,
the law, refers not so much to the precepts of the Mosaic
law, or to what it enjoins, as to what it threatens.
(Besonders wird hierbei auf die Strafe gesehen) Wardlaw
takes a somewhat similar view. And so do D. Brown
and Brandes, who, both of them, like Muralto and Peile
(ultimately), suppose that a new section begins with verse
19th. Vaughan, again, admits that there is a reference to the
quotations in verses 10 — -18, but he supposes that the ex
pression, the law, denotes " the Old Testament dispensation
itself, personified as speaking in its Scriptures." And

ROMANS III. 19. 137
Matthias, while contending strenuously that there must
be a reference to the quotations, takes the word as denoting
that aspect of the Old Testament Scriptures which, as
distinguished from the divine promise, exhibits the divine
law as the rule of the divine judgement, (vopog ist hier das
Wort Gottes, insoweit es Gesetz, d. i. Richtschnur des gott
lichen Rechtes ist.) It was by a somewhat similar her-
meneutical device that some of the older Lutheran ex
positors, — represented by Hunnius, Calov, and Seb. Schmidt,
— interpreted the law as that doctrine of the Scriptures
which is the opposite pole of the Gospel. (Lex est doctrina
opera praescribens, et peccata arguens.-S. Schmidt.) And
they have supposed that they who are " in the law " are
to be regarded as opposed to them who are "in Christ."
(Putamus enim opponi to esse in lege t$ esse in Christo.-
S. Schmidt.)
AU these interpretations, however, are unnatural and un-
facile. Those of Ammon, van Hengel, Glockler, Wardlaw,
D. Brown, and Brandes, are inconsistent with the obvious
textual connection of the 19th verse with the immediately
preceding context. Those of Vaughan, Matthias, Hunnius,
Calov, and S. Schmidt impose a meaning on the word law,
which, when the reference to the quotations of verses 10 — 18
is allowed, is unaccounted for and unaccountable. For the
subject-matter of the quotations, is, in the main, didactico-
historical, and not specifically legal or dispensational.
Origen took a different view of the Apostle's reference.
He maintains that the law spoken of is "the law of nature,
which is written on the hearts of men;" and "in which," or
" under which," all men are, as soon as they arrive at the
years of discretion. Olshausen and Oltramare take a similar
view : only, they suppose that the reference is not exclusively
to the law of nature, but equally to the law of nature and
the law of Moses, — the two editions of the one everlasting
law which regulates human duty. Peile takes the same
view ; and hence he interpolates and translates the Apostle's
expression thus, — " Now— be the Law what it may — we know
that, in all that, the Law saith, it is addressing those who
live under such law." (New Transl, 1854.) This inter-

138 ROMANS III. 19.
pretation, however, of the Apostle's expression, though
certainly embodying an important truth, and though wrought
out ingeniously, especially by Origen, is, as truly as that of
Ammon, van Hengel, Glockler, &c, inconsistent with the
natural relation of the verse to what goes immediately
before. There is no interpretation which is simple, facile, and
natural, but that which supposes the word law to have
the same meaning which it bears in the preceding chapter,
in verses 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, 23, 25, 26, 27; and which
it also bears in Matt. v. 18 ; John x. 34; xii. 34 ; xv. 25 ; 1
Cor. xiv. 21. In all these passages it means the Authorita
tive Written Revelation, viewed as a whole. And the
Apostle, referring to the quotations which he had made in
verses 10 — 18, speaks of them as the sayings of the Old
Testament Scriptures : — " But we know that whatsoever
things the law says, it speaks to them who are in the law."
The Apostle uses two distinct verbs in the two clausules
of his remark, — says (Xiyti) and speaks (XaXsT). There is
felicity and nicety in the distinction. The former of the
two (Xiyti) directs attention to the meaning, while the
latter (AoXeT) directs attention to the utterance, of what is
stated in the Scriptures. In the former there is a special
reference to that which is internal in what is spoken; while
in the latter there is a special reference to that which is
external in what is said. What is said is addressed to the
intelligence, though through the ear: what is spoken is
addressed to the ear, though for the intelligence. Compare
John viii. 43. (Melville explains XoXeT thus, — familialiter
et sedulo exponit) It is an imperfection in the Vulgate,
that it makes no distinction between the two terms : it
translates them both "speaks," (loquitur). It is an equal
imperfection in Beza's version, in all its editions after the
first, that he translates them both "says," (dicit). In the
first edition, that of 1556, he contented himself with the
Vulgate ¦ translation. Calvin drew the proper distinction
in his Latin version, though not in his French, (quaecunque
lex dicit, Us qui in lege sunt loquitur). So did Bengel, (was
das Gesetz saget, das redet es zu denen die im Gesetze

ROMANS HI. 19. 13g
stehen). So did Piscator in his German version. And so
Zinzendorf and Felbinger. But Luther missed it; and so
did Tyndale, and Coverdale, and the English Geneva, and
hence also our Authorized English Version.
When the Apostle says that "whatsoever things the law
says, it speaks to them who are in the law" (ro~ig iv rq
vopw), it is unnatural to suppose that the word law has a
different reference from Avhat it bears in the preceding part
of the remark. He manifestly refers to the Jews as such.
And he refers to them as living in the sphere of the written
Revelation. They were within, not without, that sphere
or domain. And hence what was said in the written '
Eevelation was spoken to them. To them, it will be noticed,
is the Apostle's expression : not of them, nor even for them-.
No doubt, what was spoken to them would be intended for ¦
them, and would be calculated and designed to be beneficial
to them, (it would be um derer willen.-Za,cha,ri'&). Never
theless the dative is not the dativus commodi. It merely
indicates the personal objects toward whom the speaking
was directed. Whatsoever things the Old Testament
Scripture said, these it spake to those who were within its
sphere, and not to those who were beyond it. The contents
of the Old Testament Bible were addressed to the Jews;
(quibus quidem solum, non de solis, lex loquitur.-Abel&rd).
And the nature of the case makes it certain that the
instruction of these Jews was aimed at in what was spoken
to them. This seems to be the sum total of the thought
that was present to the Apostle's mind when he made the
observation before us. And hence Grotius is wrong when
he says that the Apostle's observation, though true as a
general rule; was liable to exceptions, as, for example, in
those parts of Scripture in which we read of " the burden
of Egypt, the burden of Damascus, the burden of Edom,
the burden of Nineveh." Even these oracles were recorded
in the Volume of the Book for the special benefit of the
Israelites; and, as thus recorded, were addressed to them.
Kloter is equally wrong when he translates the Apostle's
observation . thus, — "but we know that all which the law
says, it speaks in relation to them who are in the law," (in

140 ROMANS III. 19.
Bezug auf die, die in Gesetze sind). For, assuredly, there
is much in the law which is spoken in relation to the
Egyptians, the Damascenes, the Edomites, the Ninevites,
&c. There is not a little which is spoken in relation to all
mankind. And in the leading statements found in the
quotations in verses 10 — 18 there is, we may assume,
express reference, not merely to the Jews, but to all man
kind, and consequently to Gentiles as well as to Jews, but
also — and this is at present the matter of primary exegetical
moment — to Jews as well as to Gentiles. The Apostle,
then, as it were, says : — " We know that the Scriptures of
"the Old Testament were addressed to the Jews. This
" cannot be doubted. They convey, therefore, in all their
" contents, instruction intended for the Jews. This cannot
" be disputed. And as, in the leading statements which
"are quoted in verses 10 — 18, there is no exception made
" of the Jews, when the sinfulness of all men is asserted and
"reiterated, it must be the case that reference to them is
" expressly involved, and this reference is announced to
" them, that every mouth might be stopped, and the whole
" world be brought in guilty in relation to God."
Count Zinzendorf punctuates and connects the words of
the entire clause in a peculiar way. He translates it
thus : — " But we know that what the law says to them who
are under it, it speaks on this account, that, &c." (Wir
wissen aber, dass, was das Gesetz denen, die drunter seyn,
saget, das sprichts darum, damit, &c) But such an
arrangement fails to give due emphasis to what seems to
have been the immediate aim of the Apostle, his aim,
namely, to lead the Jews to take note that their character
is pourtrayed in the passages which are quoted. It reduces
the distinction between the two verbs says and speaks to
no special significance. It seems, moreover, to be at
variance with the collocation and natural rhythm of the
inspired words. And it rather offensively suggests that the
one aim of the divine Spirit in the written Eevelation of
the Old Testament was "to stop the mouths of men, and
to bring in the whole world guilty before God." It is not,
then, to be marvelled at that the Count has had, in this

ROMANS HI. 19. 141
theory of construction, but very few followers. Yet of
these few Basil Cooper, — though in all likelihood uncon
sciously, — is one. He translates the clause thus, — " But we
know that whatsoever things the Law saith against them
that are within the Law, it uttereth to the end that, &c."
§ 4. that every mouth might be stopped, and all the world
become liable to pay penalty to God, (i'va irdv aropa <j>payy
koi iirobiKog yivrrrai irag 6 Koapog rdg SeijJ). It was debated
in ancient times, — and the debate has descended to our own
day, — whether this clause of the verse expresses design
or result. Haldane affirms that it "must be taken" both
ways. But other critics, in general, are not so accommodating.
Those who suppose that design is expressed have translated
it in some such way as we have done. Those who suppose
that result is denoted would render it thus, — so that every
mouth must be stopped, &c, or, so that every mouth is
stopped, &c. The advocates of design hold, in other words,
— to the telic import of the initial conjunction (i'va), — in
order that: while the advocates of result contend that
the particle has its ecbatic force, — so that. Theodoret gave
the particle this ecbatic or eventual import. And in
modern times it has been maintained by Cognatus, Taylor,
Eambach, Heumann, de Paris, Doddridge; and by Koppe,
Flatt, Wakefield, Bishop Barrington ; as also by Tholuck,
Eeiche, Benecke ; and Geissler, Stengel, Stuart, Bloomfield,
Kollner, &c. Eeiche expresses himself strongly on the
subject, and says that it is "in every point of view absurd
to think that the Old Testament has spoken in order that
every mouth may be stopped," (ergreifen wir gem — hier
die Auskunft, den nach jeder Ansicht und auf jedem
Standpunct absurden Gedanken, als habe das A. T. dess-
wegen gesprochen, damit jeder Mund verstumme, vom
Worte zu entfernen). Tholuck, though modifying in his
4th and 5th editions the decisiveness of his 1st, neverthe
less says that it would be to handle the words of the Apostle
in the spirit of the veriest pedant, if one were to insist
that they teach "that he held, as a definite doctrine,
that there was in the words of the Old Testament a

142 ROMANS III. 19.
divine intention to stop every mouth, and thus the mouth
of the Jew ;" (es schulmeisterlich pedantisch ware, an-
zunehmen, der Ap. habe bei den Worten des alten Bundes
mit dogmatischer Bestimmtheit die gottliche Absicht ange-
nommen, — jeden Mund, also auch den des Juden, zu
stopfen.) But though the announcement of such a divine
intention was certainly not the prominent aim of the
Apostle in the passage before us; and though intention,
as a matter of actual fact, often runs coincidently into
result ; yet we discover no pedantry in holding, what seems
perfectly obvious, that the conjunction in question (i'va)
naturally and conventionally denotes design, and is generally,
if not invariably, so used in the diction of Paul. (Even
2 Cor. vii. 9 is no real exception.) And, as regards Eeiche's
remark, it seems to us to be absurd to allege that it is
" in every point of view absurd to think that the Old
Testament has spoken what it says in order to stop the
mouths of sinners." It would be absurd, indeed, to suppose
that the Old Testament was given for the exclusive purpose
of stopping men's mouths. It would also be absurd to
suppose that this purpose was its principal aim. But we
see no absurdity in supposing that the divine quiver" is
filled with a multiplicity of arrowy aims. And if, as a
matter of fact, the stopping of men's mouths is effected
by the contents of the Old Testament Scriptures, we see
no reason for characterizing either with pedantry or with
absurdity the supposition that this actual result, — which
is not an Evil, but a Good, — was aimed at and designed.
Indeed, we shall never be able to form a broad and compre
hensive view of the teleology of the Bible, or of the
teleology of Providence, if we do not admit that it is one
of the divine aims to convict sinners of the exceeding
sinfulness of sin in general, and of their own sin in par
ticular. Whatever in the Scriptures is fitted to initiate
or to foster and ripen this conviction, was doubtless
deposited there, with an intelligent and far-reaching design,
by the over-ruling Hand of Him whose Hand and Heart
moved the prophets and psalmists of old. If this be
admitted, all difficulty in reference to the conjunction

ROMANS III. 19. 143
vanishes into nonentity ; and there is not the slightest
occasion for having recourse to any such violent expedient
as that of Michaelis, who throws into parenthesis the
whole of verses 10 — 18, along with the first clause of ver.
19th, and thus connects the expression before us, that every
mouth might be stopped, and that all the world might be
brought in guilty before God, with the concluding clause
of verse 9th, we before impeached both Jews and Greeks
of being all under sin. The telic import of the conjunc
tion (i'va) is held not only by Michaelis, but by the great
body of the most enlightened critics and expositors, and,
among those of recent times, by Paulus, Eiickert, Glockler,
Schrader; de Wette too, and Olshausen, Meyer, Fritzsche,
Oltramare; Krehl also, and Philippi, Alford, Wordsworth,
van Hengel, Mehring, &c.
When the Apostle, referring to one of the aims of the Old
Testament Scriptures, says, that every mouth might be
stopped, we are evidently to suppose that, under the general
expression, whatsoever things the law saith, he has special
mental retrospection to such particular things as have been
specified in verses 10 — 18. If the contents of his idea were
analytically exhibited, his statement would be tantamount
to the following : — " But we know that whatsoever things
" the law saith, it speaks to them who are in the law, and
" such things in particular as it says in the passages which
" I have quoted in- verses 10—18, and in similar passages,
" it speaks, that every -mouth might be stopped."
When he refers to the stopping of the mouth, the allusion
seems to be to the. effect of overwhelming evidence upon an
accused person in a court of justice. When such evidence
is adduced, it often happens that the accused is struck
dumb. His conscience silences him. He feels that it
would be an utter absurdity and impossibility to say any
thing in the way of self-justification. " The metaphor,"
says Calvin, "is taken from courts of law, in which the
accused, if he have anything to plead in self-defence,
demands leave to speak, that he may clear himself from the
things laid to his charge: but if his conscience condemn
him, he is silent, and without saying a word-, awaits his

144 ROMANS III. 19.
sentence, being even already condemned by his own silence."
(Metaphora a judiciis petita, ubi reus, si quid habet ad
justam defensionem, vices dicendi postulat, ut quae sibi
imposita sunt purget : si vero conscientia sua premitur,
silet, ac tacitus expectat suam damnationem, suo jam silentio
damnatus) This is a far more likely interpretation than
the notion of Piscator, that there is an allusion to the
violent gagging of the condemned, that they might not have
an opportunity of uttering their complaints, and thus of
inciting the populace. Moses Stuart, however, adopts, in
his 2nd edition, Piscator's idea, though not from Piscator.
He says, — " The phraseology is borrowed from the custom
of gagging criminals, i. e., stopping their mouths in order to
prevent apology or outcry from them, when they were led
out to execution." He adopted the notion, though without
specific acknowledgement, from Gronovius as quoted by
Eeiche. But how should " every mouth be stopped " by what is
written in the law, when the law speaks only to those who
are within its sphere ? How should the mouth of the
Gentile be stopped, as well as the mouth of the Jew ? This
is the difficulty which Origen started, and which is echoed
by Olshausen and Oltramare. It led all three of them to
the conclusion that the law referred to by the Apostle
cannot be the law of the Old Testament Scriptures. (Quod
si velimus de lege Mosis intelligere, — quomodo consequens
videbitur, quod per hanc legem, quae unam tantummodo
institutis suis contimgit gentem, omne os obstruatur?-
Origen). But there is no real difficulty. The Apostle is
not speaking in the precisely jointed terminology of a
formal logician. He leaves scope, in what he says, for the
analytic and synthetic play of the intelligence of his
readers. And his idea seems obvious enough : — " that every
mouth might be stopped," that is, that there may be no
exception, on the part of the Jews, as regards the conviction
of sin. " It is the Jews chiefly who are referred to," says
Bengel, correctly, (Judaei maxime notantur). But the
language does not actually particularize them, that their
assent might be won, as it were, before the force of personal

ROMANS III. 19. 145
prejudice should have time to turn aside their impartial
judgement. (The expression, says Chrysostom, 'tKtivovg
tariv aivtrro^iEvov, ei g| py tpavtpwg avrb riSurai, it is
wart pr) rpaxvrtpov ytviaSlai tov Xoyov) The Apostle,
says Matthias, intends his expression to be specifically
applied to the Jews, through the strong betoning of the
word every before the word mouth. (Der Apostel macht —
durch die starlce Betonung des irdv vor aropa eine Anwen-
dung auf die Juclen.) He means, says Pelagius, " not of
the Gentiles only, but of the Jews also," (non solum gen
tium, sed etiam Judaeorum). The words are employed, as
Owen remarks, "not so much to include the Gentiles, as to
include the Jews, who thought themselves exempted."
It is added, and (that) all the world might become liable
to pay penalty to God, (koi vtto'&koc yivyrai irdg 6 Koapog
n£ %tq). It is a clause, repeating, on the principle of
parallelism, the idea of the preceding clause : only, according
to custom in such cases, the repetition is made under a
variation of aspect.
As in the preceding clause, the adjective is to be betoned :
— " all the world," that is, " all, not excepting the Jews."
For it is at them that the Apostle is still specially aiming.
And it is to make sure of including them that he uses one
of fhe most comprehensive phrases which it was possible for
him to employ. Yet the phrase is not, by one jot, too com
prehensive. It has not an element of the hyperbolical in it.
All of the human family who have arrived at the age of
accountability are guilty. And it is the desire of God that
all, without distinction or exception, should feel conscience-
stricken and divinely condemned. All ought thus to feel.
For in addition to the written law which spake to the Jews,
there is,, wondrously interblending with it, that other law,
unwritten but not unrevealed, of which Origen speaks, of
which, too, our own Apostle speaks in chap. ii. 14, 15, and
which has been published within the bosom of every man,
Gentile as well as Jew. In accordance with this law every
man's conscience, armed with the power of a Procurator or
Prosecutor, authoritatively accuses him of doing what he
ought, not to have done, and of leaving undone what he

146 ROMANS III. 19.
ought to have done. Grotius, assuredly, was labouring under
a great mistake when he says that the expression, " all the
world," means merely " the greater part of men," (maxima
pars hominum). And Eeiche repeats the error, though under
another phase, when he says that the world here can only be
"the whole of mankind that lived at that time." (Hierkann
der Koapog nur die ganze damalige Menschheit sein) It is
another phase of the same error -which is committed by
Taylor when he says that " the Apostle is here speaking of
bodies of people, or of Jews and Gentiles in a collective
capacity." Moses Stuart, too, seems to be looking at the
subject from an unnatural standpoint, when he says that
" the argument of Paul extends only to those who are out of
Christ," and adds, "it seems to me a wrong view of the
Apostle's meaning in verses 10 — 19 which regards him as
labouring to prove directly the universality of men's
depravity, merely by the argument which these texts
afford." The Apostle, indeed, is not " labouring." Neither
is he building up, in a precisely logical way, the doctrine
of universal sinfulness. But most assuredly he is, in a free
and easy epistolary way, maintaining and establishing and
applying the fact of universal sinfulness, that he might
thence lay a basis of necessity for that glorious Gospel
which brings glad tidings " to every creature," by revealing
a Eighteousness which is " unto all."
Wycliffe, misled by the peculiarity of the Vulgate version,
(omnis mundus), gives a strange translation to the expres
sion irdg 6 Koapog. He renders it " ech world," — as if he
supposed that the Apostle had divided mankind into two
worlds, the world of the Jews and the world of the Gentiles.
Purvey, in his revision, retains this translation, — "eche
world." Oertel, again, following the interpretation of
Bahrdt, uses the liberty of translating the expression,
" the whole nation," (die ganze Nation). But such liberty
is downright hermeneutical licentiousness ; and was assumed
in consequence of a desire to make out that there is nothing
in the Old Testament which should give Christians the
slightest concern, or which should be regarded by them as in
any way regulative of the principles of their procedure.

ROMANS III. 19. 147
The whole world of men, Gentile as well as Jewish, is,
according to the Apostle, liable to judicial prosecution,
hence liable to punishment, liable to penalty, liable to pay
penalty ;— liable to pay penalty to God. Such is the import
of the expression, vtto'Sikoc t$ Se$. It is an expression
that has occasioned considerable perplexity to translators
and expositors; and, indeed, it is few comparatively who
have seized with perfect exactitude, and expressed with
clearness and simplicity as well as precision, its import.
The adjective employed by the Apostle (viroSiKog) is rather
unhappily rendered subditus in the Vulgate; and hence it
is translated suget (subject) by Wycliffe ; and subdued, by
Tyndale, and by Coverdale in his New Testament of 1 538.
The English Geneva version, — borrowing from the French
Geneva, and ultimately from Calvin's French version, —
renders it culpable, which is certainly better than the
translation of the Vulgate, but still far too feeble. Luther
translates it " guilty '' (schuldig), — an incomparably better
version. The translation has been adopted in our Author
ized English Version. It was approved of by Willet.
It is approved of by Turnbull. But old Myles Coverdale,
in trying to reproduce it in his Bible, "faithfully translated
out of Douche and Latyn," took hold, as with the left hand,
of the somewhat ambiguous word, and rendered it detter
(debtor), — -detter unto God. Day renders the expression,
guilty of condemnation before God. The idea is on the
right line, theologically ; but the phrase, guilty of condem
nation, though modelled on the Scripture phrase, guilty
of death, is not felicitous, — to our modern ears at least.
It has been cast, moreover, in the mould of a misconception.
God was regarded by Day as the Judge, rather than as the
Injured Party, who has become, or who may become, the
Prosecutor. Sclater renders the adjective, impleadable as
guilty of transgression, — a translation much to be preferred
to Day's. It is, indeed, admirably exact in some respects,
but it is lumbering on the one hand, and incapable of
amalgamation, on the other, with the remainder of the
Apostle's expression, to God (t$ &$. The translation
of Vorstius, "subject to the judgement of God," (judicio Dei

148 ROMANS lit. 19.
subjectus), adroitly winds up within itself the relation of
the adjective to the substantive ; but it is nevertheless
a philological mistake. It veils from view the fact that
God is the Injured Party, who either is, or may become
the Prosecutor. It has been reproduced, however, by Wake
field and Archbishop Newcome ; and it is introduced into
the Unitarian Improved Version. Conybeare's translation
of the entire clause rather intensifies the mistake, — " might
be subjected" to the judgement of God." That of the Five
Clergymen is equally at fault, — " may be brought under the
judgement of God." It is God's rights that are referred to in
the Apostle's expression, not his judgement. — Hence, as well
as for other reasons, Doddridge's version is incorrect
"convicted before God." Doddridge had evidently medi
tated considerably on the expression ; and he conceived
that he had mastered it. He says, in a note, in reference
to his translation, " so viroSiKog tw S'ew seems exactly to sig
nify." Cox, as usual, accepts his version. So did Belsham.
But, though theologically admissible, it proceeds, philolo-
gically, on wrong assumptions, and is far indeed from being
an " exact " reproduction of the idea of the original. The
phrase, as the Apostle employs it, denotes, in the first place,
liability, — a notion that is veiled in Doddridge's version ;
and, in the second place, it certainly does not determinately
denote that judicial conviction has actually taken place.
Budaeus, indeed, in one part of his Commentaries (p.
126, ed. 1548), says that the term is applicable to con
victed persons, (obnoxius e re judicata). He was not per
sistent, however, in this idea. (Seep. 13.) And undoubt
edly tlie word, in current usage, is, as a matter of fact,
applied, not to the judicially convicted, but to those who
are liable to judicial prosecution, liable to become judicially
convicted. Henrjr Stephens supposes that it properly
describes such as have still their causes sub judice,
(viroSiKog potius est de quo injudicio agitur, Reus. -Thesaur.
in voc). Webster and Wilkinson take hold of this idea in
their explanation of the passage before us, and give, as
one of their two translations of the word, " under process."
It is assuredly a better translation than Doddridge's, and

&

RQMANS III. 19. 140
than Owen's,— " condemned," (though Theophylact had
given, freely, long ago the same interpretation, KaraKpiroc,
drrappyaiaarog). In reality, however, the word, of itself,
only determines that the person whom it describes is
exposed to the swoop of justice, and may be compelled,
by judicial action, to pay the penalty of his misdemeanour
or crime.
Such being the import of the word, even Bengel's trans
lation of the expression is a long way from the mark, —
"subject to God in judgement," (Gotte im Gericht unter-
wurfig). In his Gnomon, however, he seizes the right word
in Latin, viz., obnoxius. (Festus says, Obnoxius, poenae
obligatus ob delictum. -De Verb. Signif.) Calvin had seized
the word before him. And Erasmus before Calvin. And
le Fevre before Erasmus, although he missed nevertheless
the correct explanation of the word. Castellio too, with
his fine classic taste, could not miss making use of the same
word. And it was employed, indeed, in very ancient times.
Eufinus mentions it approvingly, and expressly prefers it
to the version given in the Vulgate. (See Origen's Com
ment, in loc.) Beza, with his classic aptitudes, retains the
word ; but, unhappily, he amplifies the expression, making
it, " obnoxious to the condemnation of God," (obnoxius
condemnationi Dei). His idea is, of course, correct, theo
logically. But the amplification has spoiled the philological
interpretation of the phrase. Erasmus Schmid felt inclined
to follow in the wake of Beza; but his exegetical instinct
led him to hesitate, and hence he leaves it "a moot point"
whether the phrase should be translated " obnoxious to
condemnation" or "obnoxious to impeachment," (obnoxius
reatui). The latter interpretation is, of course, greatly
preferable to the former. Grotius seized, as with the hand
of a master, the real idea of the word, debitor poenarum.
The world of men is debitor poenarum ; and it is one of the
desires and aims of God to bring every man living to the
consciousness of his condition as a debitor poenarum.
Every man living is, in consequence of his sins, and until
he be released by grace, liable solvere poenas Deo, — persol-
vere poenas Deo, — dare poenas Deo. He is liable to be

150 ROMANS III. 19.
compelled by judicial action to pay penalty to God. (He
is, as Bretschneider expresses it in his Lexicon, Deo satis-
f actionem debens pro eo quod peccavit.) He is under
obligation, unless mercy interpose, Si'kjjv SiSovai rojj Sei^J, —
to give to God, the injured Party, that which is right in the
circumstances of the case, — to give to God that which will
satisfy him, — that which will suff.ce to repair, as far as
practicable, the injury done by the transgressions com
mitted. — Fritzsche caught the idea of the word. He trans
lates it straffallig (liable to penalty). The same translation
is given by Meyer, Maier, Matthias, Mehring. Eeiche's
translation is analogous, der Strafe verfallen. Olshausen
gives what is equivalent, in his Commentar, (der o7k$
verfallen), although he retrograded in his Uebersetzung,
(Gotte unterworfen). Philippi's translation corresponds,
(strafbar, Strafe schuldend). Theodoret's interpretation is
perfect, (ra7e npwpiatg virtvSwog). Hesychius's explanation,
— copied verbatim by Phavorinus, — is almost all that could
be desired, (uttoSikoc, — virtvSwog, xp^aryg, evoyoc Smctjc).
So far as the simple adjective is concerned, we might,
with Philippi, render it punishable. But when we take
the Apostle's expression in its entirety, we cannot say,
punishable to God. And to say, punishable by God, is to
change, in some respect, the Apostle's standpoint of observa
tion. And it is apt, moreover, to suggest too obtrusively
that God is the executioner of his vengeance. The idea is
right in itself; but it is not suggested by the Apostle's
expression. We are shut up, therefore, to some more
circuitous translation. Liable to punishment from God, is
near the idea. Still nearer, but intolerably operose, is,
liable to punishment in relation to God. Sharpe's version
is too off-hand at the commencement, and altogether aside
from the mark at the end, — " open to punishment before
God." The translation we have given, — liable to pay
penalty to God,— seems to meet, as well, perhaps, as may
be, all the requirements of the case.
The dative expression, to God, (tw SeiJ)), is unhappily
rendered before God in our Authorized English Version,
and by many other translators, — as we have seen in the

ROMANS III. 19. 151
course of our remarks on the phrase as a whole. The
rendering is defended by Matthias, who thinks, indeed,
that the expression belongs equally to both members of
the parallelism, — to the clause, that every mouth might be
stopped, as well as to the clause, and all the world become
liable to punishment. According, however, to the usage of
the language, as the lexicographer Wahl came ultimately to
see, it is the party who has the right to be the prosecutor, —
the party, in all ordinary cases, to whom the penalty is due,
and not the Judge in the cause, — who is specified in the
dative case. (Coinp. Demosthenes, 518, 3, — idv Si ng
tovtwv ti irapafiaivrj, viroSiKog iarw rijJ Tra^ovn, let him be
liable to pay damages to the injured party. Plato de Legib.,
viii., 11, 846, — rwv SnrXaaiwv i-TroSiKog iarw t<£ [3Xa<j>Sivn,
let him be liable to pay to the injured party a penalty of
twice the amount of the loss sustained. Note also those
somewhat numerous passages in Plato's de Legibus, in which
the Prosecutor, as representing the injured State, may be
" Whosoever chooses ; " as for example, ix. 9, 868, — 6 Se
datfiwv Tt 7T£pi ravra koi drrtiSiwv viroSiKog datfitiag yiyviaSw
t£ iSiXovn, let him be liable to whosoever chooses to
prosecute him for his impiety (liable to pay the penalty
of his impiety). It is thus the case that in the Apostle's
representation, God is represented as the injured Party.
It is He who has the right to become Prosecutor. He
has the right to get justice done to him in judgement
against the criminal. As for the criminal, the sword of
justice is suspended over his head. He is " under justice."
It remains to be noticed that when the Apostle says, —
" and that all the world might become (yivyrai) liable to pay
penalty to God," he uses the expression become in a logical
acceptation, as in ver. 4, "let God become true." (yivyrai
logice zu fassen, -Meyer: ¦yE'vrjrai logice, damit es erhelle, esse
cognoscatur,-Reiche) Beza explains it thus, — "may be
found to be guilty," (reus esse comperiatur). The explan
ation is good, theologically considered. But when we
take the parallelism of the clausules into account, and the
relation of the two parallel clausules to the first clause
of the verse, the idea of the Apostle would be more

152 ROMANS III. 20.
accurately represented thus, — "that all the world might
become, — viz., in conscious self-conviction — liable to pay
penalty to God, — liable to divine punishment :" — that is,
"that all the world might realize its liability to the
divine wrath which is to come." Mace was not far from
the real idea of the Apostle, though he was far enough
from a literal translation, when he rendered the words
thus, — "that every one may be silenced, and all the world
plead guilty."
" Let us," says Melancthon, " fix this universal proposition
in our minds, both that we may acknowledge ourselves
to be guilty, and that we may, by means of it, resist
the fiction of Pelagians, monks, and such like, that man
merits forgiveness by his own works, or is righteous by
virtue of his own merits." (Hanc universalem proposi-
tionem infigamus animis, et ut nos ipsos reos esse agnos-
camus, et ut opponamus earn Pelagianis, et monachis, et
similibus, fingentibus hominem mereri remissionem suis
operibus, aut justum esse propriis meritis. - Enarratio.
1556.)

Ver. 20. }>iort h% epyav vopjov ov o~ixtttafoi}o~irut nraaa,
ffdpi; haiTiov avrov' §;a yap vopov ljriyva>o~ig upjotpriag.
Eng. Auth. Vers. Therefore by the deeds of the law there
shall no flesh be justified in his sight : for by the law is the
knowledge of sin.
Revised Version, because by works of lav: shall nobody
be justified before him; for through law is knowledge
of sin.
§ 1. The authors of our English Authorized Version have
undoubtedly erred in rendering the first word of the verse
(the conjunction Sion) as if it were a demonstratively
illative particle, therefore. They followed the Geneva
version, which, in its turn, copied Beza, (propterea). The

ROMANS III. 2.0. 153
same translation is given in the Dutch versions, old and
new, and is accepted by Pareus, Hunnius, Vorstius, de Brais,
Turretin, Baumgarten ; by Morus too, and Macknight, and
Eosenmiiller; by Belsham also, and Bolten, Schrader, Naebe,
Turnbull. It is defended by Willet. Wells, Doddridge,
Worsley, and Cox not only adopt it, but make it, — as does
Schottgen, and also Struensee, — the starting-point of a new
paragraph in the arrangement of the text. Tholuck, too,
" almost prefers " it, (fast mochten wir propterea vorziehen).
It is, however, an entirely illegitimate translation ; at
variance with the otherwise invariable usage of the New
Testament writers, and inconsistent with the intrinsic
nature and classical import of the word. In every other
instance in which it occurs in the New Testament, it is
rendered either for or because, and can bear no other ren
dering. (It is a contraction of the phrase Sid tovto on, on
account of this — that, and thus means propterea quod, for
this reason, that, that is because) And, although in classical
Greek it is sometimes used indirectly as equivalent to
wherefore, it is wherefore as equivalent to why or for what
reason, (Si o,n), and not, illatively and absolutely, for which
reason. Hence the Vulgate correctly renders it here
" because," (quia) : and Oltramare reproduces exactly the
idea of the original by translating it attendu que, vu que,
seeing that, since. The same translation is given by almost
all critics. If the question were asked, therefore, Why is it
that the Written Revelation of God speaks what it says in
verses 10 — 18, and that too, in order that every mouth might
be stopped, and the whole world realize its obnoxiousness to
the wrath of God ?—why is it divinely desired that the whole
world should thus feel ? — the answer is to be found in the
words of this 20th verse, — "because by the deeds of the
law shall no flesh.be justified in his sight." (Patet vers. 20
esse aetiologiam precedentis dicti.-Gocceius)
§ 2. This statement, by works of law shall nobody be
justified, is one of the most pregnant utterances and
apophthegms of the Apostle. It is, indeed, the immovable
substructure, or, as Vitringa expresses it- in his Latin

154 ROMANS III. 20.
dissertation on the verse, "the chief hypothesis" and
" primary foundation " on which is erected the grand dis
tinguishing doctrine of the epistle, — the doctrine, namely, of
justification and consequent salvation through the righteous
ness of God, available to men without distinction through
faith. (See Vitringa's Praecipua Hypotltesis, cui Paulus
superstruxit praecellentia Religionis Christianae dogmata
in Epistola ad Romanos, ex ejusdem illius Epistolae cap.
iii. 20 producitur, et producta illustratur, inquisito demon-
stratoque vero sensu sententiae, — Ex Operibus legis nullam
justificari carnem coram deo. — Observationes, lib. iv., capp.
x. xi.) It is assumed by the Apostle that only two ways
of justification are possible to such beings as men ; — (1), the
way of works of law (that is, personal righteousness), and,
(2), the way of tfte work of Christ (that is, the vicarious
righteousness of God). If, then, justification be unattainable
by the deeds of the law, it is of vital moment that men
betake themselves by faith to that righteousness of God,
which, being revealed iu the Gospel, constitutes it " the
power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth."
(Eom. i. 16, 17.) It will thus be spiritually remunerative
to study, as comprehensively and exactly as practicable,
the apophthegm before us.
§ 3. by works of law, (1% ipywv vopov). It is a matter of
little moment whether we render this anarthrous expression
anarthrously, or translate it, by the works of the law. Our
English idiom is susceptible of either alternative. But as
it is the word works which was intended by the Apostle to
be betoned, and not the word law, we see a reason why the
article was omitted by him from before the latter word,
and thence co-relatively omitted from before the word
works. Our idiom allows of a precise reproduction of the
anarthrous peculiarity of the original; and, therefore, it is
better to adhere to an anarthrous translation.
The idea of the Apostle, however, is not, " by works of
any law," as Wakefield supposed. And yet Beza had the
same opinion, (in hoc versiculo appellations legis sine
articulo, intelligi omnem doctrinam, seu scriptam seu

ROMANS III. 20. 155
non scriptam, quae aliquid aut jubeat aut interdicat).
And so had Macknight, (law, whether natural or revealed,
moral or ceremonial) ; and Middleton, (the works either of the
Jewish law or of any other) ; and Oltramare, (loi, ordre
quelconque) ; and van Hengel, (legis alicujus), &c. We
might as well suppose that the Apostle, by the anarthrous
word works, means " any works," as that by the anarth
rous word law, he means " any law." For the same reason
we must not adopt Belsham's translation, "by the works of
a law," or Vaughan's, " in consequence of works of a law :"
for if the anarthrous word law is to be rendered "a law,"
there is no reason why the anarthrous word works should
not be correspondingly rendered " some works." In short,
the Apostle's expression is anarthrous, because the emphasis
is lying, not on the word law, but on the word works. (See
ver. 27; iv. 2—6 ; xi. 6 ; Eph. ii. 9 ; Tit. iii. 5, &c.)
It is because of the existence of this emphasis, in relation
to the word works, as well as on account of the posteriority
in position of the word law, in relation to the word works,
that we must reject the translation which is given to the
phrase by Paulus, Benecke, Schrader, &c, — law of works.
This translation is an inversion of the Apostle's expression.
It turns it unnaturally into a hysteronproteron. And in the
interpretation which its patrons give to the expression, viz.,
the law that enjoins outward works, as distinguished from
the law that regulates the inner man — the law of love, —
(geht deutlich hervor, dass Paulus in unsrer Stelle das
Gesetz des Handelns dem. Gesetz der Gesinnung, der Liebe,
entgegen stellt,-Benecke), — there is involved the oblivion
that, in the two preceding chapters, the Apostle accuses
both Gentiles and Jews, not only of externally unholy
works, but also of internally unholy choices, acts, or states.
(See i. 18, 21, 25, 28 ; ii. 7, 8, 28, 29 ; iii. 11, 12, 18.) There
is involved, still farther, the oblivion that the law, to
which the Apostle refers, has direct reference, in the
upwinding of its prohibitions, to inward concupiscence, or
inordinate desire. (See chap. vii. 7.) There is, moreover,
this other objection to the interpretation : — it would render
the Apostle's argumentation appropriate only to the Jews,

156 ROMANS III. SO.
or, at all events, to such of mankind as possessed or possess
a verbally written Eevelation : for the law, written in the
heart, which is given to all men, is not simply, or dis
tinctively, a law of outward works. And then, besides, the
exclusion of no other works than those which are external,
from the ground, or meritorious cause of justification, is
entirely inconsistent with the Apostle's doctrine.
When, then, the Apostle says, by tuorks of law, he really
means, so far as regards the substance, though not pre
cisely as regards the form, of his thoughts, " by the works
of tfte law." And the law to which he refers is undoubt
edly just the law to which he has all along throughout the
preceding part of the epistle been referring, — the divine
vopog, looked at in the light of the divine rnw, or, in other
words, that Moral Revelation, which is The Authoritative
Instruction of God. But then it is this Moral Revelation,
or Authoritative Instruction of God, viewed in a particular
aspect. It is obvious that the Moral Revelation, or Authoritative
Instruction of God, — the law — may be viewed in a variety
of aspects. And it is equally obvious to the expositor of
the New Testament writings in general, and of the Pauline
writings in particular, that, as a matter of fact, it is viewed,
TroXvrpo7riue, — in several very distinct though inter-related
respects. ' Without seeking to specify all the aspects of the
word in the Apostle's nomenclature, it is sufficient for the
present to say, that (1.) Sometimes it is viewed simply,
indefinitely, and generally, as the divine Authoritative
Instruction, — the Revelation of God to men. (See Eom. ii.
14, 15 ; &c.) (2.) Sometimes it is viewed more specially as
the divine Authoritative Instruction regarding the duty
which is essentially incumbent on men as men. (See Eom.
vii. 7; Matt. v. 17; xxii. 36, 40; &c.) (3.) Sometimes it is
viewed, also more specially, as the divine Authoritative
Instruction regarding the duty which is incumbent on men
as sinful men, who are, nevertheless, enjoying a dispensa
tion of mercy. (See Eom. ii. 13; &c.) (4.) And sometimes it
is viewed, likewise more specially, as the divine Authoritative
Instruction regarding the duty which devolved on the Jews

ROMANS III. 20. 157
as Jews, in their special circumstances as members of the
provisional terrestrial theocracy, — the great community
that enclosed within itself that Seed of the woman and of
Abraham, in which all the nations of the earth were and
are to be blessed. (See Phil. iii. 6 ; &c.) The Authoritative
Instruction of God contained, as a matter of reality, these
various elements and aspects of Eevelation. It contained
them, both in the original little Volume of the book, the
Pentateuch, and in the larger and more developed Volume,
which embraced, in addition to the Pentateuch, the super
added [but homogeneous writings which were given by
equivalent inspiration. And the word law, ¦ as might
naturally be expected, is sometimes restricted to that
which was the original Revelation in writing, — the con
tents of the little Volume, under whatever aspect these
contents might be viewed. (See Acts xiii. 15.) And
sometimes its reference is extended to the sum total of
the Old Testament Scriptures, whatsoever might be the
particular aspect of their contents, which might happen to
be contemplated. (See John x. 34 ; &c.)
The Apostle Paul varies frequently, and sometimes
suddenly, his standpoint of observation, when speaking of
the law. In the 19th verse he views it as the Authorita
tive Revelation in general, constituting the Old Testament
Scriptures. But in this 20th verse he views it in that
specific aspect which exhibits the divine Authoritative
Instruction regarding the duty which is essentially incum
bent on men as men. He views it as " the law of com
mandments," which enjoins upon us those outer acts and
inner choices and states which lie at the basis, and indeed
constitute the essence, of all true religion. In the back
ground, or focal point, of these commandments, he sees the
decalogue or duologue, which is often theologically desig
nated, by way of preeminence, the moral law, and which
commands us not to covet, (chap. vii. 7,) and is summed
up in one word — love, (chap. xiii. 8, 9). We have no
reason to believe that the Apostle, in his phraseology or
conception, divided off, in an artificial way, or by a sharply
defined line, the moral law from the judicial and ceremonial.

158 ROMANS III. W.
But, as there can be no good reason to doubt that he is
here viewing the entire law, in that particular element
of it which, when seen in its focal point, condenses itself
into what is now technically called the moral law, the ends
of facile exegesis, and at all events of popular exposition,
may be usefully subserved by conceding the employment
of the expression the moral law — as the explication of the
import of the word law as occurring in the apophthegm,
" by works of law shall nobody be justified before God,"
that is, by the works of the moral law, — by doing the worlcs
prescribed in the moral law, — shall nobody be justified in
God's sight.
Some expositors, indeed, both in ancient and in modern
times, have supposed that it is the ceremonial element of
the law, rather than the moral, which is referred to ; — that
element, namely, of the Authoritative Divine Instruction
which exhibited the duty which was provisionally devolv-
' ' ing on the Jews as Jews, rather than the duty whicU is
essentially devolving on men as men. This was the
opinion of Theodoret, of Abelard, of Dionysius a Eyckel,
of Emser, of Michaelis, of Ammon, &c, though certainly
not of Origen, whose name, as is generally and correctly
supposed, is mentioned by Calvin as one of the patrons of
the notion,* as it had been before him by Emser. But it
* Calvin's expression is somewhat puzzling : — " Opera legis quae dican-
tur, ambigitur etiam inter eruditos: dum alii ad universae legis observa-
tionem extendunt, alii restringunt ad solas ceremonias. OhrysostoniUDi,
Originem, et Hieronymum, ut in priorem opinionem concedcrent, movit
adjectum legis vocabulum." So the expression stands in the Geneva
editions of 1551 and 1565, as well as in the Berlin ed. of 1834, &c. Owen,
in his translation, says, " the context clearly shows that priorem is a mis
print for posteriorem." Sibson, as well as Krummacher and Bender, had
been of the same opinion; for Sibson renders the word "last;" Krum
macher and Bender "letstern." Good old Christopher Rosdell adheres,
in his translation, to the Latin text, — "first." Beveridge too adheres to
this text ; but he supposes that the expression, " in priorem opinionem
concederent, " means "concede against," — "unite in opposing the former
opinion." It is a most unlikely interpretation. The old French version of
the Commentary, — Calvin's own,— determines the right reading and the
right interpretation, — " ont este esmeus a suyure la derniere opinion,''
have been induced to follow the latter opinion.. But still there is an awkward
ness ; for Chrysostom and Origen do not maintain that the law referred to

ROMANS III. 20. 159
was judiciously opposed by Augustin, on the ground of what
occurs in the second clause of the verse, " for by the law is
the knowledge of sin." (De Spiritu et Littera, cap. 8.) It
is not, assuredly, by the ceremonial law, alone or chiefly,
that the knowledge of sin is attained. And there is this
other good reason to prove that it cannot be the ceremonial
element of the law which is referred to: — The Apostle is
making a statement which was intended to shut up Gentiles
as well as Jews to the righteousness revealed in the Gospel ;
and we should suppose, therefore, that in the apophthegm
before us, — which is his Praeparatio Evangelica, — he is
opposing the idea that justification is attainable on the
ground of obedience to that absolute law of commandments
which is revealed in all men's consciences. The Gentiles,
as a body, were never under the ceremonial element of the
Authoritative Divine Instruction. That element was not
revealed to them. It must, then, be the moral element of
the law to which the Apostle refers, and this is admitted
by the great body of judicious expositors, Eoman Catholic
as well as Protestant. See Thomas Aquinas, Este, Klee,
Stengel, Eeithmayr, Maier, Bisping, fee.
But even among those who admit that it is the moral
element of the law that is referred to, there are some who
contend that the expression, the works of the law, means,
not the works prescribed by the law, but the works which are
performed under the influence of those motives which the
law involves, works performed in a legal spirit, performed
apart from the gracious influence of the Holy Spirit.
Luther took this view of the expression, (Des Gesetzes Werk
is alles das der Mensch thut oder thun kann am Gesetze,
aus seinem freien Willen und eigenen Kraften.-Vorrede).
He thought that the " works of the law " are " sins." (Ideo
is the law of ceremonies. Chrysostom says nothing on the subject ; but
passes over the clause altogether ; and Origen expressly explains the law
referred to as meaning the law of nature. Pelagius — for it is he whom
Calvin means when he says Jerome — does make mention of the ceremonies
of the Old Testament dispensation. But his note has evidently been
tampered with, and is inextricably confused. The grouping of the three
authors by Calvin, as if they were united in opinion, is, doubtless, a real
mistake.

160 ROMANS III. 20.
necesse est opera legis esse peccata. Com. in Gal. ii. 16.)
Philippi takes a corresponding view, (ipya vopov sind nicht
sowohl Werke, welche das Gesetz befielt, als vielmehr Werke,
wie sie der Mensch auf gesetzlichem Standpunkte vollbringt).
Barclay, of the Society of Friends, contends for a similar
view : he says, " there is a great difference between the
works of the law, and those of grace^ or of the Gospel. The
first are excluded; the second not, but are necessary. The
first are those which are performed in man's own will, and
by his strength, in a conformity to the outward law and
letter." (Apology, Prop. vii. § 10.) Este accords, (No-
tandum est opus legis bifariam sumi ; vel pro opere quod
lex prescribit, quale opus vere bonum est, — de quo cap. ii.
factores legis justificabuntur ; vel pro opere quod fit ex lege,
id est, ex sola legis cognitione, et non ex fide. Quo porteriori
niodo loquitur hie Paulus de operibus legis, ea nimirum
intelligens, quae quis facit sola lege adjutus). So Ferus
(opera, quae lex vel minis vel promissis extorquet). So
Mussus too, and de Paris; and so, in a sense, Peile, — "works
done under felt obligation of law." But this interpretation,
besides proceeding on an erroneous view of the fundamental
nature of law, in its bearing on created moral agents, and
on an equally erroneous view of the relation of divine
agency to creature-holiness, a relation that has nothing in it
of the arbitrary, and that is by no means merely recupera
tive, is based on the exegetically untenable idea that it is
the word law which is to be betoned : whereas it is the
word works, as is evidenced, not only by other and textual
considerations, but also by the fact that the word law is
dropped altogether in such passages as ver. 27 ; iv. 2, 6 ;
xi. 6 ; Tit. iii. 5. Were the interpretations of Luther, Este,
Philippi, fee, correct, it would be impossible for any crea
tures, in any part of God's universe, to be justified, unless
grace, founded on propitiation, or otherwise indissolubly
connected with it, should assist them.
There is no reasonable ground for doubting that the
expression means, (the) works prescribed by (the) law, and
that the law referred to is the Divine- Authoritative
Instruction, in relation to its moral element ; so that the

ROMANS HI. 20. \Q\
works are really, as the old Protestants in general explained
them, good works, or " works of righteousness," (Tit. iii. 5).
The preposition which the Apostle employs, by, or out of,
(ek), refers to the source, or meritorious cause, of justifica
tion. The Apostle avers that the meritorious cause of
justification is not to be found in such works as are pre
scribed in the moral law. It is not to be found, he means,
in man's own personal righteousness. The reason why will
appear when we ascertain the import of the second clause of
the verse, for by law is knowledge of sin.
§ 4. shall nobody be justified, (ov SiKaiw^yatrai irdaa
adpE). There can be little doubt that the Apostle is
mentally referring to the second verse of the cxliii. Psalm, —
"Enter not into judgement with thy servant ; for in thy
sight shall no man living be justified," (on ov SiKaiwSyatrai
ivwiriov aov irdg Zwv). If this mental reference be ad
mitted, as it is by almost all expositors, then the inter
pretation which we have given of the initial conjunction
(Sion) is confirmed : — because that. The Psalmist's word is
equivalent, for (6Vi, = "?). The interpretation, also, which
we have given to the expression, works of law, is confirmed.
The Psalmist does not specify a particular kind of works ;
and the inference, therefore, is natural, that he means that
no living man has done any works which can be the
ground, or meritorious cause, of justification. No living-
man has so fulfilled that law, which enjoins a lifetime of
good works, that he can rationally expect to be justified on
the ground of his own personal righteousness. It follows,
in the third place, that the expression, no flesh, (ov — 7rao-a
o-apl;), which we have rendered idiomatically nobody, is
equivalent to no one living, ('n-^a • ¦ ¦ »h). Not a few ex
positors, indeed, have supposed that the word flesh is
intended by the Apostle to be doctrinally suggestive of the
reason why no one living shall be justified by deeds of law.
The term, it is thought, points to the weak side of man's
nature, and to his consequent incompetency to rise up, in
the life-work devolving on him, to the high demands of the
law. Of those who hold this- opinion, some imagine that.
M

162 ROMANS III. 20.
the term denotes man's moral corruption as well as his
weakness. "The Apostle useth this phrase," says Brown
of Wamphray, " to show what the condition of all without
Christ is, nothing but a lump of flesh and corruption, full
of weakness and sinful infirmities, unfit to do anything that
is good : and so by this term he shows that he speaks only
of man as he is now corrupted since Adam's fall." Of a
similar view, although of more or less elasticity or
intensity of doctrinal significance, are Origen, Abelard,
Bullinger, Musculus, Mussus; Beza too, and de Paris, Eam-
bach, Flatt; and Benecke, and Struensee, and Olshausen ;
Haldane also, and van Hengel, Ewbank, Matthias, fee. It
seems to be more natural, however, to suppose, that the
Apostle, — though not improbably alluding glancingly to
that peculiarity of our complex nature which renders us
specially liable to fall before temptations,- — had, on the
whole, no very fixed doctrinal design in selecting the ex
pression, no flesh. He but availed himself of a common
Hebrew idiom, equivalent to nobody, no human being.
(See Gen. vi. 12; Num. xvi. 22; Ps. lxv. 2; cxlv. 21; Isai.
xl. 5, 6; lxvi. 23, 24; Ezek. xxi. 5; Joel ii. 28. Comp.
Luke iii. 12; John xvii. 2; Acts ii. 17; 1 Pet. i. 24.) He
took the other, and outer, and complemental side of the
expression which he employs in chap. ii. 9, " every soul of
man." This simple view of the phrase is taken by
Ambrosiaster, and by Thomas Aquinas, de Lyra, Calvin,
Cajetan ; Spener too, and S. Schmidt ; Grotius also, and
Vitringa, Cocceius, Day ; Heumann too, and Fritzsche,
Kollner, Baumgarten-Crusius, Krehl, fee. Calvin, indeed,
rightly remarks that the phrase is peculiarly expressive.
And he refers, as Bullinger had done before him, to the
distinction which is drawn in Gellius between the word
man and the word mortal. The reference is legitimate :
for there is, undoubtedly, a peculiar connotation of idea in
saying every mortal, or no mortal, instead of every man, or
no man. And so, as Ambrosiaster remarked, there is a
peculiar connotation of idea in saying no flesh, instead of
no man, or no living one. The peculiarities of our incar
nate condition and of our carnal susceptibilities are glancingly

ROMANS 111.

163

alluded to. Mace, however, renders the phrase simply
no one; Wakefield and Newcome, no man; Purdue, no
human being; Turnbull, no human being whatever; Peile,
no man living ; Zinzendorf, no soul ; Michaelis and Oertel'
no mortal, Wycliffe strangely renders the clause thus,—
" ech fieisch, that is, mankynde, schal not be justifyed before
him." And yet, strange as the version is, Heinfetter
follows in his footsteps: — " every flesh, i.e., every class of
mankind, shall not be justified in the sight of him."
There can be no doubt that Wycliffe is right in con
necting the negative adverb, grammatically, with the verb.
The Apostle does not mean, " by works of law not every
body shall be justified." He affirms of "every body" that
"he shall not be justified by works of law," (i% ipywv
vopov ov SiKaiwSyatrat irdaa adp%). But in our English
idiom, as also in the Latin, German, Dutch, French, Italian,
fee, it is expedient to combine the negation with the
subject of the verb, no flesh, no body. We could not with
propriety adopt Heberden's translation, and say, " all flesh
shall be unjustified."
Shall be justified, (SiKaiwSryatrai). The word is used
forensically, and means, shall be made out to be righteous,
that is, shall be made out to possess that righteousness
which entitles to the immunities and privileges of the king
dom of heaven — to the glory and honour which are coupled
in the kingdom of heaven with immortality. Nobody, says
the Apostle, shall, in virtue of works of law, reach such
righteousness as shall be judged to entitle to everlasting
life. This forensic import of the verb to justify (Sikoiow) has
been, with more or less exactitude, seized by the great
body of Protestant commentators and divines. And, as
regards the passage before us, it is conceded by such
Eoman Catholic expositors as Eeithmayr, (als gerecht aner-
kannt werden), and Maier, (als gerecht gefunden oder
anerkannt werden). But Eoman Catholic expositors and
divines in general maintain that the word is used, not
forensically, but psychologically, or pneumatologically, or

164 ROMANS III. 20.
ethically, as meaning to make (inherently) righteous. They
are accustomed to refer to the etymological import of the
term to justify (justificare) — insisting that it means, — to
make just or righteous, (justum facere). And this ety
mological import of the term they hold to be its meaning
in those passages of Scripture which make mention of
evangelical justification. But, in the first place, there is
no evidence that even the Latin word justificare primarily
meant to make (a person) just or righteous. The term is
not found in classical writers ; and, apart from its usage
among ecclesiastical writers in relation to the doctrine of
evangelical justification, there is no evidence that it ever
was employed as meaning to make (a person) just or
righteous. If the term was a native of the Latin tongue,
it is possible that it may have originally meant to make
(a thing) right; just as, in the technical language of
printers, the term is employed, like the term justiren
in German, to denote the rectification, by special device,
of such letters, or lines, as would otherwise be dispro
portionate or deficient in symmetry. But there is cer
tainly not a vestige of evidence that it originally meant
to make a person righteous. In the second place, it is of
little theological, moment to ascertain the primary or
secondary import of the Latin term to justify, (justificare).
Theology has to do with the meaning of the Greek and
Hebrew words which are employed in the sacred Scrip
tures. And if it should turn out to be the case that the
Latin word, (justified), instead of being a native or autoch
thon of the Latin language, is but an immigrant, or import,
or the artificially constructed homologue of the Greek word
employed in the New Testament, (SiKaiow), then it would
be doubly in vain to attempt to give a meaning to the
doctrine of justification by means of any supposed pecu
liarity, etymological or conventional, of the Latin word.
We must turn, then, to the Greek word, (SiKaiow).
What does it mean ? And, especially, what is its biblical
import? In particular, what is its New Testament im
port? We shall, by and by, consider the classical usage of the

ROMANS III. 20. 165
word. But, as the term occurs with peculiar frequency
in the New Testament, and is found in such a variety
of relationships, as affords abundant scope for ascertaining,
by means of its settings, the import attached to it, — we
shall, first of all, consider its employment by the inspired
writers. It is worthy of being noted, at the outset, that the word
is used in the New Testament in relation to persons
onty; — so that persons only are the objects on which its
action terminates. It is twice used, indeed, in relation
to a quality personified, (Matt. xi. 19; Luke vii. 35).
But a quality personified is just a quality popularly re
garded, for the time being, as a person. In classical
Greek the term has, as we shall see, a wider range of
application, and is frequently employed in reference to
facts or acts as its objects.
To come, then, to the New Testament usage. There is a
large class of passages in which the term is used with pre
cisely the same doctrinal significance as in the passage
before us. These passages we shall not at present appeal
to, inasmuch as the very object of our inquiry is to ascer
tain the meaning which the word should be regarded as
bearing, in this and in all the other portions of the New
Testament in which the doctrine of justification by faith
without the works of the law is referred to. The contents,
indeed, of many of these passages are such, that they would
be of moment to determine the signification of the word.
Nevertheless, ex gratia, we shall refrain from summoning
them, meanwhile, into the court of our inquiry, to give
their evidence in support of the forensic idea which we
have affirmed.
Apart from such passages altogether, there are still abun
dant instances of the use of the word, to suffice for the
determination of its New Testament import, and thus to
decide the great controversy regarding evangelical justifica
tion, — whether it be forensic, or ethical and therapeutic.
" To the law and to the testimony," then, of those por
tions of the New Testament Scriptures. To begin with
our own epistle, the word occurs in chap. ii. 13, — "not the

166 ROMANS III. 20.
hearers of the law are righteous in the presence of God, but
the doers of the law shall be justified," that is, but the doers
of the duties inculcated in the divine Authoritative Reve
lation or Instruction (considered as a revelation of 'mercy
to men as sinners), shall be judicially made out to be righ
teous, (viz., in the clay when God shall judge the secrets of
men by Jesus Christ, ver. 16). They shall be judicially
made out to be possessed of that righteousness which is evan
gelical meetness for the enjoyment of the glory and honour
of the heavenly kingdom'. Here the term is manifestly used
forensically, and not ethically and therapeutically. For,
as Augustin himself remarks, the doers of the law are, —
in virtue of being the doers of the law, — the (inherently)
righteous, (De Spir. et Litt., c. xxvi. 45), and it would be
strange, and utterly out of place to say that the (inher
ently) righteous shall be made (inherently) righteous (in
the day of judgement).
The term occurs again, as we have found, in Eom. iii. 4,
where it is applied to God, " that thou mightest be justified
in thy words, and overcome in thy litigation." Here also
the term must be used forensically, meaning that thou
mightest be made out to be righteous — that thou mightest
be judged to be righteous. The forum of man's intelligence
is referred to. It would be absurd as well as blasphemous
to speak of making God inherently righteous, in a moral,
metaphysical, or therapeutical sense.
In the other passages of the epistle to the Romans in
which the word occurs, (viz., iii. 24, 26, 28, 30 ; iv. 2, 5 ;
v. 1, 9; vi. 7; viii. 30, 33), with perhaps the exception of
chap. viii. 30, the term is used with the same reference
as in the paragraph before us ; and they are therefore, as
being equally sub judice, passed by meanwhile uninter-
rogated. If chap. viii. 30 be an exception to this usage of
the term, it will fall to be considered as parallel to chap. ii.
13, and must be forensic.
In the theologically affiliated epistle to the Galatians,
the term is used only with the same reference as in the
paragraph before us, — a reference, direct or indirect, to the
great doctrine of evangelical justification. See chap. ii.

ROMANS III. 20. 167
16, 17; iii. 8, 11, 24; v. 4. We do not therefore cross-
question its passages.
In the epistles to the Corinthians the term occurs twice,
— 1 Cor. iv. 4; vi. 11. In the former of these passages
the forensic import is manifest: — "with me it is a small
thing that I should be judged of you, or of man's judge
ment; yea, I judge not mine own self. For though I am
not conscious to myself of any delinquency, yet am I
not hereby justified, (ovk ev tovtw StSiKaiwpai) ; but he that
judgeth me is the Lord." It is obviously a matter of
judgement to which the Apostle refers; not a metaphysical or
ethical and therapeutical production of righteousness. In
chap. vi. 11, again, he Says, "but ye are washed, (or rather, but
ye washed yourselves, dirtXovaaa^t), but ye are sanctified,
but ye are justified, in the name of the Lord Jesus, and
by the Spirit of our God." In this passage too, although
it has been surrendered by some Protestant critics to the
Eoman Catholic interpretation, there is an evident reference
to forensic justification. The Apostle had specified certain
immoral classes, and said of them, "they shall, not inherit
the Kingdom of God." (Verses 9th, 10th.) Then he adds,
ver. 11th, "and such were some of you." How, then, shall
they inherit the Kingdom of God? "Ye washed yourselves:
yea, ye were sanctified (by the Spirit of our God); yea, ye
were justified (in the name of the Lord Jesus)," that is;
" yea, . ye were judicially cleared, and acknowledged to
be entitled to the privileges of the Kingdom of God; (namely,
on the ground of the evangelical righteousness of God)."
There is a climax in the expression, not based indeed on
the relation of succession in time, for the forensic justifi
cation referred to precedes sanctification ; but based on
the relation of superiority of degree in the particular case
referred to, the superiority, namely, of legal title to moral
meetness. It is probable that the two-plied expression, —
" in the name of the Lord Jesus, and by the Spirit of our
God," folds back upon the two preceding clauses, on the
principle of inverse parallelism, so that the clause " in the
name of the Lord Jesus" applies to the expression "but
ye were justified," while the clause "and by the Spirit

168 ROMANS III. 20.
of our God" applies to the preceding expression, "but ye
were sanctified." Comp. Eom. ii. 7 — 10. If we were to
suppose that the expression "ye were justified" had refer
ence to the psychologically therapeutical production of in
herent righteousness, meaning ye were made righteous,
there would be tautology in the clausules, and a sup
pression, moreover, of the highest evidence that the blessings
of the Kingdom of God belonged to the Corinthian believers.
The word occurs once in the Epistles to Timothy, and
once in the Epistle to Titus. In 1 Tim. iii. 16, we read of
him who is the Innermost Essence of the Mystery of
Godliness, that he was " manifested in flesh, justified in
spirit," fee. The expression is susceptible of various inter
pretations; but it is certainly unnatural to suppose that
it means made (inherently) righteous in spirit. It is
much more likely to mean, judged to be righteous in spirit;
for he was " Jesus Christ the righteous," and he brought in
his mediatorial righteousness as an " everlasting righ
teousness " for men. It is this " righteousness " which is
" revealed in the Gospel," and which constitutes the Gospel
— "the power of God unto salvation." (Eom. i. 16, 17.)
It has been approved of and accepted by the Father. The
passage in Titus is in chap. iii. 7 : — " not by works of
righteousness which we have done, but according to his
mercy he saved us, (he delivered us, — non re, sed spe, —
from the everlasting woe due to us on account of our
sins, — such sins as are specified in ver. 3), by the washing
of regeneration, and renewing of the Holy Ghost, (by
making us morally meet for the opposite condition of
everlasting glory, — through the influence of the divine
Spirit), which he shed on us abundantly through Jesus
Christ our Saviour; that, being justified, that is, being
previously justified, (SiKaiwSivrtg), by his grace, (being pre
viously cleared as regards our title to everlasting glory,
by his grace), we should be made heirs of eternal life,
according to our hope, (KXypovopoi ytvySwptv kut iXiriSa
Zwijg alwviov)." While it might be possible to explain
the expression here on the Eoman Catholic hypothesis,
it seems to be far more natural, either to regard it as

ROMANS III. 20; 1 69
looking back to the initial forensic justification that pre
ceded the sanctification referred to in the foregoing clauses,
or to interpret it as looking forward to that final forensic
justification which precedes glorification, and immediately
after which, consequently, " the promises," — the things
promised, — are "inherited." (See Heb. vi. 12.)
These are all the passages in which the verb is used
by our Apostle. But the word is also found in the
writings of Matthew, Luke, and James. It occurs, with the
personified application already referred to, in Matt. xi. 19,—
"But wisdom is justified of her children," (koi iStKaiwSy y
aoipia dirb rwv rtKVWv aiiryg), that is, " And the wisdom
(of the arrangement) was vindicated on the part of her
children." It was judged to be real. The judgement or
vindication took place in that little court of judgement —
that forum in miniature — which is established in every
man's consciousness. And thus the justification referred to
lay on the line of forensic adjudication. It had nothing
in it of the nature of the metaphysical or psychological
or therapeutical production of moral rightness, or righteous
ness. The only other passage in Matthew, in which the term
occurs, is chap. xii. 37, — " by thy words shalt thou be
justified, and by thy words shalt thou be condemned."
Here the antithesis to condemnation makes it evident that
the term is used forensically.
In the gospel of Luke the word occurs five times. (1.)
Chap. vii. 29, — " And all the people that heard him, and the
publicans, justified God, being baptized with the baptism
of John." The term cannot have here a moral or meta
physical meaning. The idea cannot be that the people in
general, and the publicans in particular, produced inherent
righteousness in God. It is obviously a term of judgement :
they judged that God had acted right in the mission of
John, and they declared their judgement. They praised
God. (2.) Luke vii. 35, — "Wisdom is justified of all her
children." The personified application. See on Matt. xi. 19.
(3.) Luke x. 29, — " But he, willing- to justify himself, said
unto Jesus, And who is my neighbour?" The expression,
evidently, does not mean that the lawyer was wishful to

170 ROMANS III. 20.
produce inherent righteousness in himself. It means that
he desired to make himself out to be righteous. The term
has a forensical import. It draws at least upon the usage of
courts of judicature. (4.) Luke xvi. 15, — " Ye are they
which justify yourselves before men : but God knoweth
your hearts : for that which is highly esteemed among men
is abomination in the sight of God." The Pharisees did
not produce in themselves, before men, inherent righteous
ness. They only washed the outside of the platter. They
only whitewashed the outside of the sepulchre. They made
themselves out, before men, to be righteous ; they proclaimed
themselves to be righteous ; — while they were abominable in
the sight of God. The term draws the whole of its signifi
cancy from forensic procedure. (5.) Luke xviii. 14, — " I
tell you, this man went down to his house justified rather
than the other ; for every one that exalteth himself shall
be abased ; and he that humbleth himself shall be exalted."
The publican was judged by God to be righteous, evan
gelically righteous. He looked, or bent himself, toward
the typical altar and to the Holy of holies, and, in self-
abasement and brokenness of spirit, he lifted up his heart
toward God. He believed in the inner import of the
temple-symbolism ; and he showed his faith by his works.
The Pharisee, again " trusted in himself that be was
righteous." But God judged the publican to be righteous.
The word is forensic ; though it is used more according to
the platform of James, than according to the model of Paul.
In the Acts of the Apostles the term occurs twice ; but
both instances are in one verse. Chap. xiii. 39, — "And in
him all that believe are justified from all things, from
which ye could not be justified by the law of Moses." In
both instances the term is evidently used pregnantly.
Believers are made out to be righteous in Christ, and are
thus cleared from those penal liabilities, from which they
could not get clearance by the ceremonial ordinances of
the law of Moses, inasmuch as they could not, by the
mere observance of these ceremonial ordinances, be made
out to be righteous. The forensic import of the term is
obvious.

ROMANS III. 20. 171
The only other passages in the New Testament, in which
this term to justify is found, occur in the Epistle of James,
ii. 21, 24, 25,— "Was not Abraham our father justified by
works, when he had offered Isaac his son upon the altar ?"—
" Ye see then how that by works a man is justified, and
not by faith only :"—•' Likewise also was not Eahab the
harlot justified by works, when she had received the
messengers, and had sent them out another way?" It is
evident that in these passages the justification referred to,
whatever it may be, cannot be the psychologically thera
peutical production of inherent righteousness. For such
righteousness develops itself from within outward, and not
from without inward. A man's inherent righteousness
does not grow from the root of outward works. His out
ward works grow from the root of his inherent righteous
ness. The works are the fruit, not the root. What then
is the import of the term in James? It is forensical, as
truly as in Paul. But it lies on the line of things that is
indicated in Eom. ii. 13, rather than on the line of things
that is indicated in Eom. iii. 20. We take James's meaninp;
to be this, — a man is made out to be evangelically righteous
in character, that is, a man is made out to have that per
sonal evangelical righteousness, which is meetness for the
privileges of the kingdom of God, by faith and works com
bined, — by works as the moral complement of faith. In
James's justification there is a reference to the righteousness
which is moral meetness for the privileges of the kingdom
of heaven ; in Paul's there is reference to the righteousness
which is the legal title to these everlasting blessings. In
both, however, the justification is judicial or forensical.
In neither is it genetically metaphysical or psychological,
or specifically therapeutical. It is in the forensic idea alone,
as exhibiting that which is common to both the Apostles,
but which is sufficiently wide to admit of considerable
diversity of relationship, that the nexus of conciliation
between the two representations of justification is to be
found. It is far, we conceive, from being the case, that
we are to effect the conciliation of the two apostles by
interpreting, with Bishop Bull, Paul's faith, in such a

172 ROMANS III. 20,
way as to make it coincident with James's faith and
works. In the Textus Receptus of the New Testament, there is
another passage in which the verb to justify is found, viz.,
Eev. xxii. 11, — "He that is righteous, let him be righteous
still," or, as Wycliffe renders it, " be justified yit," (6 SiKaiog
SiKaiwSryTO) in). And this passage has often been quoted
by Eoman Catholics to support their favourite interpreta
tion of the term. It is quoted triumphantly by Bellarmin.
(De Justification, lib. ii. cap. 3.) It perplexed Protestants.
See, for instance, Chemitz, De Justificatione, cap. 3. But it
seems to be certain that it is a corrupt reading ; and that
the true reading of the passage is, "he that is righteous, let
him do righteousness still," (SiKaioawriv iroiyadro in). This
is supported by M A B, and many other mss., and also by the
best codices of the Vulgate, inclusive of the amiatinus:
and it has been approved of by the chief critical authorities.
Bengel, Griesbach, Lachmann, Scholz, and Tischendorf have
introduced the reading into the text.
And thus it is evident, from a full induction of particulars
regarding the New Testament usage of the term, SiKaiow,
that, in approaching the passage before us, and the kindred
passages in the Epistles to the Eomans and the Galatians,
we have every reason to assume that the word should be
understood forensically. Were it to be otherwise inter
preted, as denoting a psychologically therapeutical pro
duction of inherent righteousness, we should be guilty, we
presume, of treating the term with hermeneutical violence.
It is true that the forensic acceptation of the term, in
relation to the great doctrine of evangelical justification,
seems to have been, to a very large extent, lost sight of in
post-apostolic times, and down through the ages of the
medieval divines and expositors, till the dawn of the Eefor-
mation. The fact is one of a multitude, which demon
strates the early and long continued misconception and
corruption of Christian doctrine. Darkness succeeded the
first marvellous light. Night came after day.
And yet there were stars of brilliancy here and there.

ROMANS III. 20. 173
The author, for example, of the Epistle to Diognetus,
published in the Works of Justin Martyr, speaks beauti
fully and most evangelically of the " sweet interchange "
of our " sins " and Christ's " righteousness," in virtue of
which " it is possible for us, transgressors and ungodly, to
be justified." He says: — "God gave up his own son a
" ransom for us, the holy for the unholy, the innocent for
" the wicked, the righteous for the unrighteous, the incor-
" ruptible for the corruptible, the immortal for the mortal.
" For what else could cover our sins, but his righteousness?
" In whom was it possible for us, the unholy and ungodly,
"to be justified, but in the Son of God alone? Oh sweet
"interchange! Oh unsearchable contrivance! Oh unlooked-
" for blessings ! — that the transgression of many should be
" hidden in a righteous One, and that the righteousness of
" One should justify many transgressors ! " (avrbg tov
\biov vibv diriSoro Xvrpov virip ypwv, tov dyiov virip rwv
avopwv, rbv aKaKOv virip rwv kokojk, tov SiKaiov vtrip rwv
ax>'iKwv, rbv dtySaprov VTrip rwv <j>6aprwv, tov d&dvarov
virip twv S-vijrwv. Ti yap aXXo rag dpapriag ypwv ySwr'ftri
KaXvxLai, y ikiIvov SiKaioavvy ; 'Ev rivi SiKaiw^yvai Swarbv
Toiig dvofjiovg ypag Kai do&tlg, y iv povw tw Yitjj tov Stov ;
"Qi rr)g yXvKtiag avraXXayr/g, w T>\g dvt%ixvidarov Sypiovpyiag,
w twv dTrpoaooKyrwv tvtpytaiwv' "va uvopia piv iroXXwv
iv SiKaiw ivl Kpvkrj, SiKaioavvrj Si ivog iroXXoiig dvopovg
SiKaiway. — Cap. ix.) This a star-like passage. But it
seems to be almost, if not altogether, impossible to find
its " fellow " in the writings of the fathers. There are
multitudes of passages, indeed, in which the Scripture
declaration is echoed and re-echoed that men are not
justified by works of law. There are also abundant pas
sages in which those other Scripture declarations are
echoed and re-echoed, which assert that men are not justi
fied by works. " God," says Theophylact, — uttering the
sentiments of the entire cloud of patristic witnesses, — ¦
"justifies us, although we have not works," (SiKaioT yap
ypdg 6 Stbg, k$v py ipya ixwptv. — Comment, in Eom. iii.
21). It is constantly recognized, and insisted on all down
through the ages, that it is by faith that men are justified.

174 ROMANS III. 20.
But Origen, for example, surmises that it might have been
as legitimately said of love, or piety, or mercy, as of faith,
that it is imputed for righteousness. (Et forte, sicut de
fide dictum est, quia fides reputata est ad justiiiam, ita et
de caritate did potest, quia reputata est caritas ad justiiiam,
aut pietas, aut misericordia. Com. in Eom. iv. 22.) It
would appear, indeed, that both Origen and the fathers in
general were deficient in definitely settled and self-consis
tent views of the meaning of the word, which we render
"justify." At times it is explained forensically; though
even at these times the explanation is not always given with
a decisive hand. (See Origen, for example, in his Com. on
Eom. iii. 25, 26, Deus enim Justus est, et Justus justificare
non poterat injustos: ideo interventum voluit esse propi-
tiatoris, ut per ejus fidem justificarentur, qui per opera
propria justificari non poterant. He says again, on Eom.
iii. 27, 28, Dicit sufflcere solius fidei justificationem, ita ut
credens quis tantummodo justificetur, etiamsi nihil ab eo
operis fuerit expletum. — Fortassis haec aliquis audiens
resolvatur, et bene agendi negligentiam capiat, siquidem
ad justificandum fides sola sufiiciat. Ad quern dicemus,
quia post justificationem si injuste quis agat,sine dubiojus-
tificationis gratiam sprevit. Again on Eom. iv. 23 — 25, he
says, Justificat ergo eos Christus tantummodo, qui novam
vitam exemplo resurrectionis ipsius susceperunt, et vetusta
injustitiae et iniquitatis indumenta velut causam mortis
abjiciunt) These quotations are perhaps not thoroughly self-
consistent; but they seem to assume a judicial or forensic
import of the word justify. (Chrysostom too, in explaining
Eom. viii. 33, 34, says, Qsbg 6 Sikoiwv' rig 6 KaraKpi'vuiv;
— ovk E17TE, Stbg 6 a'^Eie dpaprypara, dXX', o iroXXq
pt7%wv yv, Stog 6 SiKatwv. orav yap y tov StKaarov xpr/Qog
SIkoiov dirocpyvr), Kai SiKaarov toiovtov, rivog L%iog b
Kariryopwv ; Theodoret, also, in his Com. on Eom. viii. 33,
34, explains the expression God who justifieth in the same
forensic way, — tov £eov SiKaiovg arro^yvavrog, rig Kara-
vpivai Swyatrai) At other times the term seems to be
regarded as almost equivalent to forgive, — a meaning
often loosely attached to the word by Protestant writers,

ROMANS HI. 20. I75
and even sometimes by Calvin. (See Theodor et, Com.
on Rom. iii. 24, — where, explaining the expression justi
fied freely by his grace, fee, he says,— irianv yap povyv
EieEVE-yKovrEc, twv upapTypdrwv rr)v aftaiv iS&dp&a)
Chrysostom and Theophjdact, however, constantly insist
that it denotes something which is much greater than
forgiveness. It means, they say, to make righteous. (See
Chrysost. Homil. on Rom. iv. 5, when remarking on the
expression, who justifieth the ungodly, he says, ivvoyaov ydp
t yX'iKOV tan irtiaSyvai koa irXypo<popy$ijvai, on Swarai 6 Srtbg
tov iv aat&tlq fitt-iwTOKa tovtov i^ai^tvyg ovxi KoXao-Ewe eXev-
Sitpwaui povov, aXXu Kai SlKaiov rroiriaai, koX twv dSavdrwv
d^iwaai npwv. See also his observations on Eom. iv. 2 ;
iv. 25. Theophylact, in his Com. on Rom. iv. 25, says on
the expression, who was delivered for our offences, and
raised again for our justification, air&avtv ovv koi aviary,
ivd Kai dpapnwv diraXXd^rj, koi SiKalovg ipydayrai. Origen,
too, sometimes takes this same psychologico-ethical and
therapeutical view, as, for example, in his Com. on Rom.
iv. 1 — 8, p. 240, ed. Lommatzsch, quae fides tanta est, ut
justified etiam eum, qui impius fuerit, ut ultra jam non
sit impius. And certainly the idea turns up again and
again and again in Augustin. In his treatise, De Spiritu
et Litt., c. xxvi. 45, he says, Quid est enim aliud, justificati,
quam justi facti, ab illo scilicet qui justificat impium, ut
ex impio fiat Justus ? — Again, in his Enarrat. in Psal. vii. 5,
he says, Cum enim justificetur impius, ex impio fit Justus,
et ex possessione diaboli migrat in ternplum Dei. — In his
Tracfat. lxxii. in Jo. xiv. 10—14, — he says, impios justi
ficare, quod ita facit in nobis, ut faciamus et nos. In his
Sermo clxix., c. x. 13, he says, — Quid est, propter justifica
tionem nostram? Ut justified nos, — ut justos facial nos.
In his treatise De Perfectione Just., c. xvii. 38, he ex
pounds the psalmist's words thus, "Ne intres in judicium
cum servo tuo, noli me judicare secundum te, qui es sine
peccato: quia non justificabitur in conspectu tuo omnis
vivens; quod de hoc vita dictum sine diffcili quaestione
intelligitur ; et quod ait, non justificabitur, ad illam perfec-
tionem justitiae retulit quae in hoc vita non est." And

176 ROMANS III. 20.
yet, whatever was Augustin's view of the word "justifica
tion," he speaks most delightfully of the thing, when he
represents Christ, for example, as " making our sins his sins,
that he might make his righteousness our righteousness," —
delicta nostra sua delicta fecit, ut justiiiam suam nostram
justiiiam /aceret-Enarrat, in Ps. xxii. v. 2.)
In such passages as those, which we have just been quot
ing, the word justification is evidently regarded as denoting
an ethical and therapeutical change. It is, as Dr. John Owen
expresses it, " taken for justifaction." (Doctrine of Justifi
cation, ch. iv.) And thus the fathers referred to, and the
others who coincide with them, — including almost the whole
galaxy who flourished in the earlier centuries, and the
lesser lights who succeeded, and the great schoolmen too, —
must be regarded as overlooking to a very large extent
the proper forensic import of the term, in its relation to
that great evangelical doctrine, which is the alpha, though
it is not the omega, of the Epistle to the Romans. Faber,
in his Primitive Doctrine of Justification, has certainly
failed to adduce evidence to the contrary. His quotations
suffice to show that the fathers maintained that salvation
is a matter of grace, bestowed on us through Christ ; but
they do not prove that the fathers regarded justification
as being a divinely forensic transaction, judicially recog
nizing the reality and validity of a certain relationship to
everlasting glory and honour in the divine kingdom, rather
than as being a psychologico-therapeutical exertion of
divine power changing the moral character of the soul.
Suicer, too, has accomplished less (in his Thesaurus Eccles.
on Sikuiow), in the way of proving that the fathers are
patrons of the forensic view, than Bishop O'Brien would
seem to attribute to him. (Attempt, to explain the Doct.
of Justif, p. 388.) The very first passage, which he
quotes to show that the fathers are to be regarded as
holding the forensic view of justification, — a passage from
Justin Martyr's Dialogue with Trypho, (p. 267, ed. 1686),
— he somewhat misapplies, as is rendered evident by the
succeeding clause, which, however, he does not give. In
the words quoted, Justin Martyr says, " God holds as righ-

ROMANS III. 20. 177
teous and sinless, him who repents of his sins," (Stbg rbv
ptravoovvra airb twv dpapryparwv, wg SIkoiov koi ai/ajuaprjjrov
l' v«) ; but he adds, — for he is reproducing the idea enun
ciated by Ezekiel in the 33d chapter of his prophecies, —
" and him who turns from godliness or righteousness to un
righteousness and godlessness, He accounts as a sinner, and
unrighteous and ungodly," (koi tov airb tvat^tiag y SiKaio-
irpa^iag ptranSriptvov iiri aSiKiav koi aS-Eorjjra, we dpap-
rcuXov Kai dSiKov Kai aat&y iiriararai). The reference of
the passage is to the effect of ultimate character within
the period of probation. He who deliberately ends his
period of probation holily, will be treated by God as if he
had been always holy. He who deliberately ends it un-
holily, will be treated by God as if Hie had always been
unholy. As the tree falls, so shall it lie. The great
mediatorial realities, which have to do with justification,
are implied, indeed, in this divine treatment. But neither
they, nor the justification which is based upon them, are
directly described or referred to in the passage quoted.
There is, as we shall see in course, a philological reason to
account for the imperfect notions which the Greek and
Latin Fathers entertained on the meaning of the word
justify. The council of Trent, as might have been expected, did
not recognize justification as being a forensic transaction.
They held it to be, either wholly or partially, the sanctifi
cation of the inner man. (Non est sola peccatorum remissio
sed et sanctificatio et renovatio interioris hominis per vol-
untariam susceptionem gratiae et donorum, unde homo ex
injusto fit Justus, et ex inimico amicus, ut sit heres secun
dum spem vitae aeternae, fee." Sess. vi , c. 7.) The justice
or righteousness, from which justification takes its deno
mination, they held to be inherent, originating indeed in
the grace of God, infused by that grace, and sustained
by that grace, but at the same time so chosen by the human
will, as to be really the righteousness of man, as well as the
righteousness of God. (Neque propria nostra justitia,
tanquam ex nobis propria statuitur; neque ignoratur

178 ROMANS III. 20.
aut repudiatur justitia Dei. Quae enim justitia nostra
dicitur, quia per earn nobis inltaerentem justificamur ;
ilia eadem Dei est, quia a Deo nobis infunditur per Christi
meritum. Sess. vi., c. 16.) This is, substantially, the
doctrine of Augustin.
And even within the circle of Protestantism, the same
view, in the main, of justification, — "justification by in
fusion" or some corresponding modality, as distinguished
from what Pemble calls "justification by apology " (Treatise
of Justifi, Sect. 1, ch. 1), or justification in virtue of imputa
tion, — has been occasionally advocated. It was advocated
by And. Osiander among the Lutheran theologians,- — though
under a peculiar phase, — the phase of inhabitation rather
than of infusion. For once, at least, Melancthon himself, as
is remarked by Winzer, (De vocab. SiKaiog, Sikoioo-vvij et
SiKaiow in Paulli ad Romanos epistola, p. xiii.), was unwarily
betrayed into the same notion. (" Hactenus satis copiose
ostendimus, — quod sola fide justificemur, hoc est, ex injustis
justi efficiamur seu regeneremur. "-Apolog. Conf, p. 82.) It
was also advocated by Grotius. (Prolegomena in Romanos.)
It was contended for by Eo. Barclay, of the Society of
Friends. (Apology, Prop, vii.) It was strenuously main
tained by Alex. Knox, of the Church of England, who
had for his friend and theological pupil, Bishop Jebb.
(Remains: — Treatise on Justifi) And it has been upheld
by a variety of other individuals, as well as by entire mystic
sects. Notwithstanding, however, these dissentient voices within
the sphere of Protestantism ; and notwithstanding the fact
that the sum total of consistent Eoman Catholic theologians
are consentient with the Protestant dissentients ; and not
withstanding, too, that the Eoman Catholic doctrine, as
developed and determined by the Council of Trent, is but
the completed reproduction of the prevailing views that
floated down through the patristic cycles, and the succeeding
ages of the schools ; notwithstanding these incidents in the
history of the tentative exegesis of Christian truth, it is
evident, from the particulars of the New Testament usage,

ROMANS III. 20. 179
regarding the word to justify, (SiKaiow),— as these particulars
have been already exhibited, — that we are not only war
ranted, but hermeneutically bound, to approach the great
doctrine of evangelical justification with the proleptic con
viction that the word employed should most probably be
regarded as having a judicial or forensic sense, and not as
referring to a psychological and therapeutical change of char
acter. This conviction will become deepened, when we
have considered the classical usage of the term.
The classical usage of SiKaiow is far from being coincident,
in detail, with the usage of the term in the New Testament.
Nevertheless, the tout ensemble of classical and biblical
usage is, as a philological phenomenon, a unity of sym
metrical phraseological development : and we shall not
find it difficult to account for the specific divergence of
import, which is characteristic of the New Testament.
The verb is a denominative. It is derived from its
homogeneous adjective, (SiKaiog); and, in virtue of its ter-
minative (in — 6w), belongs to a class of verbs, which,
though not invariably denoting the making of a thing into
that which the primitive words signify, (see Xovrpow,
paanyow, &c), yet are generally factitive in import, —
factitive in the sense indicated. (See SovXooj, SyXow,
irXypow, rtXtiow, rvtyXow, <j>avtpow, fee.) Hence we may
reasonably conclude that to make right, or to right, was the
primitive meaning of the verb.
Both things and persons, however, may be made right,
or righted, in different ways. They may be made right, or
righted, intrinsically, or extrinsically; absolutely, or rela
tively ; in the contents, or in the circumstantialities, of their
being; in themselves, or in the minds of those who have to
do with them. It is questionable whether there be any
instance extant, in any classic writer, in which SiKaiow
means to make (intrinsically) right or righteous. Eauwen-
hoff asserts that there is none. (Disquisitio de SiKaiwati,
p. 8.) It is, however, an interesting fact, that there is in
the Alexandrian version of the Hebrew Bible, — the Sep
tuagint,-— one instance of this, the primitive import of the

180 ROMANS III. 20.
verb. It occurs in Psalm lxxiii. 13. In the 12th verse
the Psalmist says, — "Behold, these are the ungodly, who
prosper in the world; they increase in riches." Then he
adds in the 13th verse, — "Verily, I have cleansed my heart
in vain, and washed my hands in innocency." (iSiKaiwaa
r»)v KapSiav pov = '3?^ 'n<?t.) The meaning of the Greek
version of the Psalmist's expression, — as is evidenced at
once by the Hebrew phrase, by the parallelism of the clauses,
and by the nature of the case spoken of, — is, I made right
my heart, i. e. I cultivated rightness and righteousness of
heart. This, however, is the one solitary instance in the
Septuagint in which the word is unquestionably used as
meaning to make (intrinsically) right or righteous. And it
will be noted that the object of the verb is not a person,
but a thing (the heart). It would seem to be the case
that no decisive instance of the same usage of the word
has been found in any classical author. The only passage
known,- — apparently, — that can be considered as exemplify
ing the same import of the word, is a curious and obscure
fragment of Pindar, — often quoted, partially, by ancient
Greek writers. The passage took hold of the minds, of
some of the great thinkers, in consequence of containing
a peculiar representation of law. Law is represented as
the Supreme Sovereign, the king of all mortals and im
mortals, (Nopog b irdvTwv f3aaiXtvg Svarwv Tt koi a^avdrwv).
The passage is adduced by Callicles in Plato's Gorgias, and
is cunningly wielded by him in opposition to the moral
philosophy of Socrates, and in defence of the idea that
might constitutes right. He does not profess, it must be
noted, to quote the words with perfect accuracy. He allows
that he could not charge his memory with the ipsissima
verba, (Xiyti ovtw irwg, to ydp qapa ovk iiriarapai). But
he gives the passage as follows : — Nouoc 6 irdvrwv fiaatXtvg
3-varoJv r£ Kai dSavdnov, dytt SiKatwv to fiiaiorarov virtprdTa.
XfjOi' rtKpaipopai ipyoiaiv 'Hpa/cXiog, iirti airpiarag — . Vict.
Cousin's translation of what is thus ascribed to " Law, king
of all mortals and immortals," is as follows : — " Elle train e
apres elle la violence d'une main puissante, et elle la
legitime. J'en juge par les action d'Hercule, qui, sans les

ROMANS III. 20. 181
avoir achetes — ." Boeckh gives the sense thus :— " Fatalis
lex etiam vim maximam affert, eamque justam efficit, quuru
humana ratione sit injusta." Pindar, according to this
reading of his words, is entirely of one mind with Callicles ;
and hence Socrates opposes both in one breath ; and
Aristides, in his Oration irspl pyropiKyg, 89, launches out
into an elaborate refutation of the poet's idea. The reason
ing of Aristides is, in many respects, truly admirable. But
we are disposed to think with Eeiske, (see Dindorf's
Aristides, ad. loc), that Callicles cunningly and sophistically
misapplied and misquoted Pindar. Whether, indeed, it be
the case that we have, near the close of the 1st Book of the
Stromata of Clemens Alexandrinus, as Eeiske thinks, the
full and correct passage, of Pindar, — (he reads bSoiig
fiiaioryrog iXiyxtt- iraiStlct, vopog, 6 irdvrwv fiaaiXtvg k. t. t%,rig,
instead of bSovg fiioryrog iXiyxti iratStia. Nopog b irdvrwv
k. r. E^ije, and he renders Sikuiwv, punishing, — punit vel
ulciscitur violentiam eminentissima manw), — we feel
satisfied that Callicles quibbled with the word Si/caiwv,
attributing to it, in order to serve his sophistical end, not
its Pindaric and conventional import, but its purely
etymological signification. For, certainly, it is exceedingly
unlikely that the poet should give expression to such an
inverted transcendentalism of speculation as Callicles
ascribes to him, — a transcendentalism that is not only of the
descending order, but that also involves, in its descent, its
own logical annihilation, inasmuch as it merges the notion
of right as distinguished from might, and thus overturns
the assumed supremacy of law, as distinguished from other
forces, impersonated and impersonal. Pindar's real idea,
according to Eeiske, was the following : — " Law, the king of
mortals and immortals, controls violence, even when in
the extreme, (to fiiaioTarov), — controls it in the way of
bringing sooner or later upon it, with overmastering hand,
the punishment which is its due." It is right, however, to
acknowledge that a cloud of uncertainty, yet unpenetrated,
rests over the entire Pindaric fragment. Apart altogether
from the admission of Callicles, that perhaps he did not
quote the words with perfect accuracy, there is doubt

182 ROMANS 111. 20.
regarding the identity of the words which Callicles really
gave. (In some editions the text runs thus, — a-ysi fiialwg to
SitcaioTarov k. t. ifZyg.) And hence we must just leave the
passage, feeling absolutely assured of little regarding it that
could help us to determine the import of Si/caiow.
In all the ordinary cases, in which the word is used by
the classical writers regarding things or acts, as distin
guished from persons,, it has a meaning that lies on a
judicial, forensic, or quasi-forensic line, — the line of making
right in one's judgement, that is, of judging to be right.
Thus, in Thucydides, ii. 6, we read of the Athenians "judg
ing it right to do retaliatingly to the Lacedemonians what
the Lacedemonians had done to them," (SiKaiovvrtg rotg
avrolg dpvvtaStai diairtp koi oi AaKtSaipovioi virr)p%av. The
scholiast explains SiKaiovvrtg by Si'koiov Kpivovrtg). So
again, in Book ii. 61, Pericles says that "men judge it
right equally to blame him who softly yields the glory
that belongs to him, and to hate him who impudently
arrogates a glory that is not his due," (ev 'law ydp oi
dvBpwiroi SiKaiovai ryg Tt vrrapxpiiayg So^yg alndaSai oang
uaXaKiq eXXeittei, koi Tr)g pi) irpoayKovayg piativ tov Spaav-
ryn bptyoptvov). See also Thucyd., iv. 64 ; vi. 89 ; vii.
68 ; as likewise ii. 71 ; v. 105. In all these passages the
judicial import of the word, — judicial so far as the private
forum of the human judgement is concerned, — is indisput
able ; — although, in some of them, the idea of judging to be
right may appropriately shape itself into such diverse
expressions as decide, allow, require, &c. In the same
author, again,- — in Book iv. 122, — the word means to judge
to be the case, rather than to judge to be right, (iixt Se koi r)
dXySrtia irtp) Trjg airoardatwg pdXXov % oi ASyvaToi iSi-
Kaiow). And in v. 26, it means simply to judge, (koi rr)v
Std piaov %vpf3aaiv ting pi) d^iwaai iroXtpov vopi£uv, ovk
opSwg SiKataio-Ei, — "and if an3r one should think that the
intervening time should not be reckoned to the period
of the war, he would not judge correctly "). In these latter
instances, the judicial element in the word's import has
become so dominant, that the etymological idea of right
is almost entirely merged. Such is Thucydides's use of the

ROMANS III. 20. 183
word, as applied to things and acts. His employment of
the term is a fair representation of its general usage
throughout the classics. We need not, for proof, go into
multiplied details. Let it suffice to refer to Herodotus, i.
133, " they judge it right to have their table more plenti
fully furnished than on other days," (ev ravr-g Si irXtw
Salra rwv dXXwv SiKattvai irpoTi&ta&ai). The same use of
the term is very frequent in Herodotus. It latterly
descended into ecclesiastical Greek. The word came to
be employed in reference to what was judged right ov
decided upon in ecclesiastical councils ; as, for instance,
in such expressions as this, — "it has been judged right by
the holy synod," (virb ryg dylag awoSov StSiKaiwrai). In its
meaning of judging (a thing) to be right, Justin Martyr, —
as a fair representation of the ecclesiastical writers, — affords
a beautiful instance in his Cohortatio ad Graecos, p. 11,
ed. 1686, — "when he judged it right that the multitude of
the Hebrews should return to their own country," (biryviKa
airb Tr)g Aiyvmov to twv 'EfBpaiwv irXrj&og eVi tt/v oikei'ov
Xwpav inavtXSftiv iSi/caiwat).
When the word is applied to persons in the classics, its
import is still predominantly judicial, or forensic, or quasi-
forensic. It never means, apparently, to make right
(intrinsically, or metaphysically, or psychologically, or
therapeutically). It means to right one in some extrinsic
and relative manner. Aristotle, indeed, in his Nico-
machean Ethics, (v. 9), uses it in an extra-judicial sense, as
meaning to treat (one) rightly or justly. He employs it in
antithesis to dSi/ciw to injure (one), to wrong (one), to treat
(one) unjustly. And in discussing the relation of will to
the wronging of persons, or, the treatment of them un
justly, he says : — " it is not the same to do unjust things,
and to treat unjustly; neither is it the same to suffer
unjust things, and to be treated unjustly: and a like
distinction is to be made as to acting justly, and being
treated justly, for it is impossible to be treated unjustly,
if there be no one who treats unjustly, or to be treated
justly if there be no one who treats justly," (bpoiwg St Kai iirl
tov SiKaioTrpaytiv koi SiKaiovaOat' d.Svvarov ydp dSiKtiaOai, py

184 ROMANS III. 20.
dSiKovvrog' y SiKaiovaOai, pr) SiKaioirpayovvrog). In this use
of the word by Aristotle there is no reference to intrinsic
righting — or making (one) inherently right, metaphysically,
psychologically, or therapeutically. The righting referred
to is extrinsic and relative. The term, as used by other
classical writers, has, so far as appears, invariably, — when
applied to persons, — an import that is, at least, equally
extrinsic. It seems to denote, prevailingly, if not uni
formly, that relative righting which is realized in a
judicial, forensic, or quasi-forensic way. In the celebrated,
but extremely obscure, passage of the Agamemnon of
Aeschylus, 391 — 393, the word, — however perplexed the
construction of the sentence as a whole may be, and
whatever may be the difficulty of giving an adequate
translation to the term, — must undoubtedly be understood
as referring to such relative righting as is realized in the
judgements of men. The allusion is to Paris, (kokov Si
XoXkov rpoirov | rp&w te Kai irpogtoXaAg \ ptXapirayyg
iriXu | StKaiwStlg). He was not wronged, but only righted
in the judgements of men (SiKaiwSrdg), when he was re
garded as being inveterately black (in character), ptXap
irayyg. His character, when subjected to a moral crucial
process, was like bad brass, when subjected to friction or
other appropriate tests ; — it showed itself to be base. Potter
says that "there are few passages in Aeschylus more obscure
than this antistrophe." Solanus of old gave up the attempt
to interpret it. (Rogabis forte, quid de hoc loco sentiam.
Nescio equidem.-Diss. de stylo Nov. Test, § 41.) But mani
festly tlie word SiKaiwOtig cannot mean either (forensically)
justified, as Deyling dreamed, or made (intrinsically) right.
It must refer only to such a relative righting as is realized
when men see a bad character in its true light, and thus
judge it rightly. A bad character when thus judged or
tested, is detected and detested.
Hence the word SiKaiow came to signify, in classical
Greek, to condemn, — the opposite pole of its New Testa
ment meaning, to justify. Thus we read in Thucydides,
iii. 40, that Cleon said to the Athenians regarding the
Mitylenaeans ; — " if you follow my opinion, you will do

ROMANS III. 20. 185
both what is just to the Mitylenaeans and what is advan
tageous to yourselves ; but if you determine otherwise, you
will not gratify them, but will rather condemn yourselves,
(ipdg Si avToi/g paXXov SiKaiwataSt) ; for if it was right in
them to revolt, it was wrong in you to hold them under
your rule." We need not marvel that the term should have
this import. For he, who is justly condemned, is really
righted (extrinsically). He is put right, — so far as people's
judgements are concerned, — in relation to facts, and to law,
and to his fellow-men in general. But we may well marvel
that Pfochen, in his Diatribe de Ling. Grcec. Nov. Test.
Puritate, § 65, should appeal to the very passage of
Thucydides, which we have just quoted, to prove that
SiKaiow means to justify in classical Greek. He not only
" nodded," like " good Homer," when he wrote that por
tion of his Diatribe ; he was sound asleep and dreaming.
He was contented to quote the passage at second hand.
He quoted it from Camerarius on Matt. xi. 19; and he
misunderstood both Camerarius and Thucydides. The
word obviously means to condemn. It is supposed by
many good critics that the term has the same meaning in
the Heraclides of Euripides, 190. — Iolaus is pleading, be
fore Demophoon at Marathon, the cause of the children of
Hercules, who had been compelled to become refugees from
Argos. He says, —
¦7Tws av SiKalais o>s MuKTji/atous <Lyoi
(58' ovtus fljuas, ot)s &7nj\atre xftavos ;
J£euoL yap etrfiev' tf tov * EMtji/wi/ opov
cpeuyeiv diKatov-r', ogtls &v t "Apyos tyuyri', 1
o&kovv JA0?7J/as y'.
How can he drag us hack again with justice
As subjects of MycenZ, to tha.t realm
Which hath already banished us ? We there
Are only foreigners. But why should he
Whom Argos dooms to exile, by all Greece
Be also exiled? Not by Athens, sure.— Wodhull.
" Or do you condemn whosoever may be a refugee from
Argos to be a refugee from all Greece ? Surely not from
Athens at least."

186 ROMANS 111. 20.
This import of the word is, in some respects, in striking
contrast to the import of the term in the New Testament.
But it had, nevertheless, so impressed itself upon the mind
of Eisner, that he felt disposed to interpret Matt. xi. 19, in
accordance with it, — reading the verse thus, — "The son
of man came eating and drinking ; and they say, Behold
a man gluttonous and a winebibber, — a friend of publicans
and sinners, — and his doctrine is condemned by its disciples."
But such an interpretation is an intolerable squeeze. It is
supposed, however, by the same critic, and apparently on
more plausible grounds, that Luther must have used the
German word for justify (rechtfertigen) in this contrastive
or contrary signification in Acts xii. 19, — "and when Herod
had sought for him, and found him not, Hess er die Hitter
rechtfertigen, he got the keepers condemned, and commanded
that they should be put to death."
Besides meaning to condemn, in classical usage, SiKaiow
bore the kindred meaning to punish. This extension
of import is entirely natural ; for when a guilty being
is justly punished, he is really righted, — so far as people's
judgements are concerned, — in his relations to the political
or moral system, into which his criminal conduct had intro
duced confusion. The term is frequently employed in this
acceptation. A representative example or two will suffice.
Herodotus, (i. 100), in describing ithe government of Deioces;
the Mede, says, that " when he learned that any one had
committed a misdemeanour, he sent for him, and punished
him according to the desert of each offence," (kot' a%(yv
tKaarov dSiKyparog tSiKaitv). In speaking, again, of Cam-
byses, who fancied that the Egyptians were holding rejoicings
over his ill success, he says, (iii. 29) ; — "When the priests led
forth Apis, Cambyses, after the manner of a man demented,
seizing his dagger, and aiming to thrust it into the belly
of Apis, struck the thigh, and then, laughing, said to the
priests, Ye knaves, these gods of yours are flesh and blood,
and are sensible to steel! Truly worthy of Egyptians is
this god ! But it shall be to your cost that you have tried
to mock me. Having thus spoken, he commanded those,
whose office it was to do such things, to seize the priests,

ROMANS 111. 20. 187
and to put to death whomsoever of the rest of the Egyptians
they might catch celebrating the festival. So an end was put
to the sacred festivities, and the priests were punished, (oi Si
ipitg iSiKattwTo), and the wounded Apis pined away and
died." (Compare also the oracle in V. 92. 2.) It is this
meaning of the word which Hesychius signalizes, — to the
entire neglect of the other significations which the term
bears, at once in the classics and in the Scriptures. (He
says, Sikoiovv, paanyow, vovdtTtiv, and again SiKaiovptvov,
KoXaZoptvov, and again StKatwaai, KoXdaai.) It is probable
that in specifying SiKaiovptvov, as meaning punished, he
had reference to Plato's use of the word in the 11th Book
of his Laws, ch. 12. 934. (Compare Tiraaeus's Lexicon
Platonic. — SiKaiovptvog, KoXaZoptvog. It is worthy of
note, also, that in his Phaedrus, § 61, Plato uses the word
SiKaiwrypta to denote places of punishment.) The Cretans,
going in a parallel line of thought, used QtpiZ,w in the
same sense, to punish. (See Hesychius.) Suidas is more
comprehensive than Hesychius. He says that SiKaiow
has two significations, to punish and to judge to be right,
(SiKaioVv Svo SyXoii, to Tt KoXdZtiv, koi to Sikoiov vopi%tiv).
He then, after having cited examples, adds, what amounts
to a statement, that the word also means to condemn,
(SiKaiovaav, KaraSiKaZovaai'). In another place, — reproduced
entire in Phavorinus's Lexicon, — he mentions that the
word means to pronounce to be right, or, to judge to be
right, (iSiKaiov, Sikuiov ilvai iXtytv, — iSiKaiov roivw avri tov
'tKpivt, SUaiov t'lvai ivoptZtv) : and he then specifies its two
contrary poles of import — to justify and to condemn,
(iSiKaiwdriaav, SiKaioi iKpiSyaav" aypaivti Si Kai to ivavriov
KartSiKaaSyaav SiKaiwg). In giving examples of this latter
import of the word — to condemn — he quotes a passage from
Dio Cassius, and then says that " Dio in many other places
uses the word in this signification," (7roXXaxov Si ovrog
K£XP»jrai rrj Xititi Tavrr] tiri rov ttpypivov ayu.aivopivov).
He specifies a passage in confirmation. But the passage
which he quotes really exhibits the use of the word in
its other meaning — to punish, and indeed to punish
(capitally) : — " Ye are all worthy of death. Nevertheless

188 ROMANS III. 20.
I shall not put you all to death : but I shall punish a
few, whom I have already seized, and the rest I dismiss,"
(aXX' bXiyovg piv ovg Kai awtiXyipa »)8jj, SiKaiwaw, rove
Se HXXovg dipiypi). We learn from Cicero that the word
was conventionally used by the Sicilians in the sense of
punishing capitally. (iSiKw%yaav-[i. e., £§iKatoiS-j)o-av]-
— inquit, hoc est, ut Siculi loquuntur, supplicio affecti
ac necati sunt. Lib. v. in Verrem., c. 57.) Aelian uses
the full expression, iSiKaiwaav tw Savdrw, they executed.
(Varia. Hist, lib. v. 18.) It is an interesting coincidence,
that, in the terminology of Scots law, a criminal, who is
executed, is said to be justified. The same expression
occurs, too, among the Germans. (Germani nostri, de
facinoroso, e vivis ex judicis sententia sublato, dicunt, —
er ist justificirt.-Wolf. Eom. vi. 7.)
It has been disputed whether or not SiKaiow is ever used
in classical Greek with its New Testament import — to
justify (a person). Pareus assumes and asserts that this
is its customary import. (Graecis quoque SiKaiovaOai, semper
idem valere quod diroXvtaSai vel SIkoiov vopi^taOai ; raro
idem quod voplZtaOai censeri simpliciter, vel d^iovaOai
dignum censeri, vel KoXdZtaQai poenam lucre, vel ra Sfaaia
irdaxtiv aequum pati seu consequi. Com. in Eom. Dub. vii.
in cap. iii.) He spoke, however, at perfect random, and in
absolute ignorance. We have seen that Pfochen contended
that the word does mean to justify (a person), in classical
as well as in biblical Greek. His theory regarding the
"purity" of the New Testament diction was at stake. He
was animated with literary pique in reference to Cocceius's
Hebrew ; and he aspired to put Hebraisms under ban. But
he had to borrow and to bungle a quotation from Thucy
dides, which he found in Camerarius, ere he could produce
even the appearance of evidence. In the passage referred
to, the word means, as we have seen, to condemn, not to
justify. Georgi is more prudent than Pfochen, for, though
he is equally determined to find no Hebraism in the New
Testament use of the term, he does not cite any passage
from the classics in support of his opinion. He merely
rides off under a cloud of references to Toco Haio van den

ROMANS 111. 20. 189
Honert, Clausingius, Schwartzius, Kirchmaierus, and says
that no other passage occurs to him besides those which
are specified by these distinguished authors, (In quorum
sententiis et nos, cum praeter eos locos, quos summi viri
observarunt, nullus alius succurrat, acquiescimus.-Vindicite,
N. T. ab. Hebraismis, lib. ii. cap. ii. § 10.) This cloud of
references, however, is nothing at all but a cloud of dust.
Deyling too asserts that the word is used in classical Greek
in its New Testament acceptation. (Dissert, de voce SiKaiovv,
§ 4.) But he adduces no instances, and misinterprets
Suidas. There really seems to be no evidence attainable,
or, at least, there is none that has as yet been attained, that
suffices to establish an exact identity of import in the use
of the word in any one passage of the classics, and its
use in the New Testament. (Nihil itaque hactenus, says
Gataker, a quoquam allatum comparet, unde vocis istius
usus Apostolicus a veteri lingua Graecd descendisse com-
probetur.-De Novi Instrumenti Stylo, cap. viii.) The use
of the word in the classics branches out, as we have seen,
in different directions. There are the two main references,
(1), the reference to things or acts, and (2), the reference to
persons. In both of these references the word takes up
into itself, to an emphatically dominant degree, a judicial
element. In its fundamental notion it meant indeed to
make right, or to right. But thence it came conventionally
to signify (1) to right (a thing) in one's judgement, — to judge
it right, — to judge; and (2) to right a person, to treat
a person rightly or justly, to condemn, to punish, to put to
death. The predominantly judicial and forensic or quasi-
forensic import of the word is manifest. And, assuredly,
no instance occurs, — so far as the researches of critics have
hitherto extended, — in which the word signifies, when a
person is the object of its action, to make (inherently,
or intrinsically, or psychologically, or metaphysically, or
physically, or therapeutically) right or righteous.
The reason why the word, when employed in biblical
Greek, in reference to persons, took that particular pole of
judicial, forensic, or quasi-forensic righting, viz., justifying

190 ROMANS III. 20.
or making out to be right, or declaring to be possessed of
righteousness, which is the opposite of the classical pole
of condemning, punishing, and putting to death, is to
be found in the mother-tongue of the Hebrews, — the
language in which it was natural for their thoughts to
take shape. In that language the adjective (p,Tffi), — which
is the analogue, and indeed, as is evidenced by the main
syllable, the etymological relative, though far removed, of
the Greek SiKaiog, (right or righteous), has an all but
exclusive reference to persons, and means morally right,
that is, righteous or just. It is invariably translated in
our English Authorized Version either righteous or just.
With the single exception, apparently, of its use in Deut.
iv. 8, it is, in the scores upon scores of instances in which
it occurs, applied to describe the character of persons. In
Deut. iv. 8, the word is used to characterise the divine
statutes and judgements. Such being the signification of
the adjective, it is not to be wondered at that in those con
jugations of the verb, — the pihel and hiphil, — in which
we have the duplicate analogues of the Greek SiKaiow, —
there should be a phase of reference altogether different
from judging a thing to be right, or condemning a man,
or punishing him. The Hebrew conjugations took, most
decisively, a judicial, forensic, or quasi-forensic direction ;
but it was altogether in reference to persons, and exclu
sively in bonam partem. Hence the peculiarity, or idio-
tismus, of the import of SiKaiow in biblical Greek ; and
hence, too, apparently, the difficulty which the Greek Fathers
experienced in forming an accurate conception of the New
Testament import of the word. They were ignorant of
the fixed shape of the Hebrew vessel, into which the
variable import of the Greek word had been poured.
The forensic import of SiKaiow throughout the New
Testament in general, and in the evangelical passages in par
ticular, — will be confirmed, — if confirmation is needed, — by
an appeal to the usage of the analogous Hebrew verb, (in its
two conjugatives,^7ieZ, pi*; and hiphil, pnjp.) The confirma
tion will be intensified if we take along with us" the Septua-

ROMANS HI. 20. 191
gintal translation of the passages. The Hebrew word occurs
in Pihel five times in all. (1.) Job xxxii. 2, ""against Job
was his wrath kindled, because he justified himself (ipis
W?a) .rather than God," (diri^yvtv s'avrov SIkuiov ivavnov
Kvpiov). The meaning cannot be that Job made himself
inherently righteous. It manifestly is,— he made himself
out to be righteous, he vindicated himself. The idea was
correctly rendered by the Septuagint translator. (2.) Job
xxxiii. 32, — '' If thou hast anything to say, answer me :
speak, for I desire to justify thee," (^pns, SriXw 7ap SiKaiot-
Syvai at). Elihu calls upon Job to speak in his own
defence, in self-vindication, if he was conscientiously able ;
so that he might show himself to be righteous. (Subjekt
ist niet Elihu, sondern Hiob.-Hahn) (3.) Jer. iii. 11, —
" The backsliding Israel hath justified herself more than
treacherous Judah," (~n n£?g npi.x — iSiKaiwat ryv \Lvxnv avrov
— diro), that is, hath shown herself to be more righteous,
hath comparatively (in relation to Judah) righted herself
in the judgement of all who are fit to judge in the case.
(4 and 5.) Ezek. xvi. 51, 52, — "thou hast multiplied thine
abominations more than they, and hast justified thy sisters
(¦spnirerns 'pnsrjii — Kai iSiKaiwaag rag dStXipdg aov) in all thine
abominations which thou hast done," — "they are more
righteous than thou, (-p? nap^1?); yea, De thou confounded
also, and bear thy shame, in that thou hast justified thy
sisters." This twofold passage throws light upon the
preceding. The meaning is not that Jerusalem had made
her sisters, Sodom and Gomorrah, subjectively righteous.
But, by the enormity of her wickedness, she had shown
them to be (comparatively) righteous. She had, as it
were, judicially vindicated them, and declared them to be
righteous.1 The Hiphil (of pis) still more emphatically corresponds
to the Greek verb, (SiKaiow): and there are twelve instances,
— (not six hundred or so, as Deyling most hyperbolically
asserts — Dissertatio de voce SiKaiow, § 5), — in which the
word occurs in this conjugation. (1.) Exod. xxiii. 7, —
" Keep thee from a false matter; and the innocent and
righteous slay thou not : for I will not justify the wicked,"

192 ROMANS III. 20.
Q>&-\ p«isN-&6). On the contrary, God would condemn the
wicked. The forensic import is obvious. (2.) Deut. xxv.
1, — " if there be a controversy between men, and they
come unto judgement, that the judges may judge them ;
then they shall justify the righteous, and condemn the
wicked," (p'^'D-rn* ip'^Cl — koi SiKaiwawai rbv SlKaiov). The
forensic import is evident. It is no more the part of judges,
in justifying the righteous, to make them inherently righ
teous, than it is their part in condemning the wicked, to
make them inherently wicked. The word for condemn,
however, (i>^~p), originally means to malce wicked. When
used forensically, as here, it must mean to make out to be
wicked, to judge to be wicked, to treat in judgement as
wicked, to condemn. (3.) 2 Sam. xv. 4, — "Absalom said
moreover, Oh that I were made judge in the land, that
every man which hath any suit or cause might come unto
me, and I would do him justice," (vnpuvni — koi SiKaiwaw
avrov), that is, and I would right him, in the sense of
pronouncing in his favour, or declaring him righteous.
It is assumed by Absalom that the pursuer, who would
come to his bar, would have good ground of complaint.
The forensic import of the word is indubitable. (4.) 1
Ki. viii. 32, — "Then hear thou in heaven, and do, and
judge thy servants, condemning the wicked, to bring his
way upon his head ; and justifying the righteous, to give
him according to his righteousness," (p'?s p'lsrfr — koi tov
S'tKaiwaai SiKaiov). The judicial reference is explicit, —
"judge thy servants." (5.) 2 Chron. vi. 23. This passage
is the duplicate of the preceding. (6.) Job xxvii. 5, — " God
forbid that I should justify you," (°5PS P'^b-ons ,[? rfybn — py
poi e'i'ij SiKaiovg vpdg airo^rivai). It cannot be supposed that
Job had any reference to the production, in his comforters,
of inherent righteousness. It was in his judgement — the
court of his conscience — that he could not right them. (7.)
Ps. Ixxxii. 3, — " Defend the poor and fatherless : do justice to
the afflicted and needy," (ipnsci trn <ji> — rairuvbv koi irivyra
SiKaiwaan). The meaning is, right the afflicted and needy,
vindicate them, make them out to be righteous (in their
suit), pronounce in their favour. Hence it is added in the

ROMANS III. 20. 193
next verse, — " Deliver the poor and needy ; rid them out of
the hand of the wicked." The forensic import of the word
is unquestionable ; and, if further evidence were requisite,
it would be found in the preceding verse, — " How long will
ye judge unjustly, and accept the persons of the wicked ? "
(8.) Prov. xvii. 15, — " He that justifieth the wicked, and he
that condemneth the just, even they both are abomination
to the Lord," (r?S pnxn— 6c Sikoiov Kpivu tov uSikov). The
Sept. translation, as in Job xxvii. 5, affords an admirable
commentary on the forensic import of the word. The
expression must be forensically interpreted. If it referred
to the therapeutic production of inherent righteousness, the
man who thus justified the wicked would be far from being
an abomination to the Lord. (9.) Isai. v. 23, — ''Woe unto
theni who justify the wicked for reward, and take awTay the
righteousness of the righteous from him," (yf\ 'pnxn — 0i
SiKaiovvrtg tov dat^y). The expression manifestly describes
the corrupt practices of venal and unrighteous judges,
(bestechliche und ungerechte Richter. -Gesenius). It is
altogether forensic in its reference and import. (10.) Isai.
1. 8, — "He is near that justifieth me; who will contend
with me ? let us stand together : who is mine adversary ? let
him come near to me," ('P'lp ai"ig — Jy-vi^Ei 6 SiKaiwaag pt).
The whole scenery is forensic. (11.) Isai. liii. 11, — "By his
knowledge shall my righteous servant justify many," (inyna
crz-h *iag p'iv p'W — StKatwaai SiKaiov tv SovXtvovra 7roXXoTe).
There are considerable difficulties in connection with the
interpretation of the various clauses of the verse ; and much
diversity of opinion has prevailed among critics regarding the
connection of several of the words, and the interrelation of
the clausules. But, notwithstanding all that Bellarmin has
said, there is no good reason whatsoever, on the hypothesis
that the oracle is really Messianic, for supposing that the
word, he shall justify, has any other than a forensic
signification. If, with the majority of modern critics, we
accept the construction of the word which underlies the
Auth. English Version, as also Luther's, then the pronoun,
in the expression "his knowledge," or "the knowledge of
him," (inn?), will be, not subjective, but objective, "the
o

194 ROMANS III. 20.
knowledge which has him for its object" (cognitione sui,
not, as in the Vulg, cognitione sua) : and the meaning of
the phrase, "he will justify many," or "he will justify to
many," (mt^ p'^k), will be, — not quite, perhaps, as Cocceius
puts it,- — he will be the cause and donor of righteousness to
many, (Justificat hie construitur cum dativo, q. d. justitiae
causa et donator fiet multis. — Com. in loc. and Lex. sub.
voc.) ; — but, he will be the occasion of justification to many.
The idea will be, that, as it is God, the divine Father,
with whom it lies to justify or to condemn, so the Messiah,
acting in court as the believer's Advocate or Intercessor,
successfully pleads his cause by putting in, as a plea, or
justificamentum, as Vitringa expresses it, his own righteous
ness. He thus becomes the occasion, or meritorious cause,
of the believer's justification. The representation is strictly
forensic; but it directs the eye rather to the bar, than
to the bench. If, however, it should be deemed more
natural to understand the pronoun subjectively, in the
expression, "by his knowledge;" and if, with Lowth, we
should regard it as unnatural to have in Hebrew the
adjective righteous, (p'-w), before the substantive my ser
vant, ('W), then we may construe the expression, as
Jonathan, Jarchi, the Septuagint, and the Syriac do, —
thus, — by his knowledge shall he justify the righteous, and
leave the remainder of the verse as forming two annexed
clausules, my servant unto many, (or, as my servant unto
many), and he shall bear their iniquities. In this case
the reference of the words, by his knowledge shall he justify
the righteous, would be to the forensic procedure of our
Lord, as it shall be realized in its consummation, on the
great day of judgement. Comp. Eom. ii. 13, 16. The
interpretation of the verb given by Gesenius, and sub
stantially accepted by Knobel, &c, he shall guide to the
true religion, taken in connection with his translation of
the preceding phrase, (inn?), by his wisdom, is certainly
quite aside from the scope of the context, and indeed of the
whole oracle. For the Messiah, throughout, and particularly
in the conclusion of the 11th verse, is represented not
as a teacher, but as a priest. (Nostro loco non de sola

ROMANS III. 20. 195
admonitione et institutione, sed justification sermonem
esse, totum quoque vaticinium docet, quum Messia, in eo,
sacerdos, qui se ipsum sacrificium ad homines expiandos
obtulerit, non vero doctor describitur.-'Reink.e, in loc)
There can be no good reason, then, for doubting that the
term is to be understood, here too, as having a forensic
acceptation. (12.) The last passage, in which the Hiphilic
word occurs, is Dan. xii. 3, — " They that be wise shall shine
as the brightness of the firmament; and they that turn
many to righteousness, (d-^t\ p.'^gi), as the stars for ever
and ever." This, the last passage in which the Hiphilic
word occurs, is the only one in which it seems, prima facie,
to be used otherwise than forensically. Bellarmin makes
capital of it, (De Justifications, ii. 3). And yet, if it be the
case that it would be necessary, — even on the hypothesis
that the term must be rendered in an efficaciously thera
peutical manner, they that make many righteous, — to under
stand the human agency as being only instrumental, they
that are instrumental in sectoring the inherent righteousness
of many; — may we not, by introducing the same idea of
instrumentality, retain the otherwise invariable usage of
the term, — they who are instrumental in securing the
justification of many ? If there be a legitimate sense
in which one man may be said to save another, (James
v. 20), viz., instrumentally, by leading to the saving
Saviour; and if there be a legitimate sense in which one
/man may sanctify another, viz., in a way equally instru
mental; may it not be likewise legitimate to speak of,
one man justifying another, viz., instrumentally, by leading
to that "righteousness of God," which is " unto all, and upon
all them that believe," and which is the ground of justifica
tion. It is on this principle that Cocceius explains the ex
pression, (justificantes multos, h. e. qui operam dederint, ut
multi justificarentur, sive, quorum ministerio multi justifi-
cati erunt.-Lexicon s. voc.) So do many others. Venema
translates the expression, — "they who are justificators of
many," (justificatores multorum), and refers it to rulers — ,
the Maccabees — who vindicated and delivered the people
who were their subjects. But if such interpretations should

196 ROMANS III. 20.
seem strained, it may be worthy of consideration whether
we should not revert to that method of reading the text,
which, before the era of the Masoretic punctuation, was
adopted by Theodotion, whose Greek version of Daniel has
superseded the original Septuagintal translation. He read
the verse thus: — "They that be wise shall shine as the
brightness of the firmament, and apart from (that is, above
and beyond) the multitude of the righteous, as the stars
for ever and ever." (koi oi avviivng Xdfiipovaiv wg y
XapirpOTyg tov aTtptwparog, kcu dirb twv SiKaiwv twv iroXXwv
wg oi aariptg tig rove alwvag ko.1 in) If this reading be
correct, a diversity in the degrees of celestial glory would be
intimated. They who are wise and make others wise,
(doctores, Grotius; — atystets — see chap. xi. 33, 35 ; and
comp. Ps. xxxii. 8; Gen. iii. 6), shall be raised to pre
eminence above the rest, — above the commonalty, as it
were, — of the righteous. (Jerome, in his Commentary on
Daniel, says of the verse: — "Quem locum Theodotio et
vulgata editio ita expressit, — et intelligentes fulgebunt quasi
splendor firmamenti, et de justis plurimi quasi stellae in
aeternum et ultra." He had found, apparently, in his copy
of Theodotion the reading dirb rwv SiKaiwv ol iroXXoi. He
adds, — but not with great exegetical verisimilitude, as we
apprehend, — "juxta Theodotionem dicitur, quod docti simili-
tudinem coeli habeant, et absque doctrina justi stellarum
fulgori comparentur: tantumque sit inter eruditam sancti-
tatem et sanctam rusticitatem, quantum coelutn distat et
stellae." It would appear, — the Masoretic punctuation
apart, — that, instead of Y™> Theodotion had read either
?'P'-np or '(TKB. Compare, for the latter form, ns^g in 2
Sam. xxiii. 8, collating Q<&fysfo in 1 Chron. xii. 18.) — There are
obvious difficulties connected with this reading of Theo
dotion. But it was reproduced, as Jerome remarks, in the
Italic version. It is commented on by Theodoret, though,
apparently, under the same form as Jerome had it, if we
may judge of his text from his comment. And we should
certainly be disposed to revert to this ancient reading,
if there were no other alternative than to attribute to
the Hiphilic Hebrew verb a meaning- which is out of

ROMANS III. 20. 197
unison with its' usage in every other place in which it
occurs. Such is the evidence derivable from the two Hebrew
conjugations. It is confirmatory, to a remarkable degree,
of the presumptive forensic or quasi-forensic import of the
word Sikuiow in its New Testament application to the
great doctrine of evangelical justification. And the con
firmation is all the more considerable, when we take into
account the truth of what John Campensis says of Paul, —
" He uses, indeed, Greek words in writing, but in such a
way, that he never forgets the Hebrew phraseology."
(Graecis namque, uti scis, sic in scribendo usus est voca-
bulis, ut tamen Hebraicae phrasis numquam oblitus esse
videatur. — Commentariolus in Ep. ad Eom., fol. 2.)
But although the passages quoted exhaust all the in
stances in which the Hebrew Pihelic and Hiphilic words
occur ; still, the Greek term itself is found in a considerable
number of additional passages, both in the canonical books
of the Old Testament and in the Apocrypha. In all these,
however, with the one exception of Ps. lxxiii. 13, to which
we have already referred, it is obviously used in a forensic
or quasi-forensic manner. It denotes the righting which
takes place in judgement. It is used, with a strictly
forensic acceptation, in Isai. i. 17; xliii. 9; xliii. 26; xiv. 24;
Ecclesiasticus xxxi. 5 ; xiii. 4 ; Mic. vi. 11 ; vii. 9. It is
used, with a quasi-forensic acceptation, in Gen. xxxviii. 26 ;
xliv. lo; Ps. xix. 10; li. 5 ; Isai. xiii. 21; Ezek. xvi. 52;
xxi. 13; Tob. xii. 13; Ecclesiasticus i. 19; vii. 5; ix. 12; x.
29 ; xiii. 22 ; xviii. 2, 22 ; xxiii. 11 ; xxvi. 29.
The only other passage in which the Greek word occurs
is Ps. cxliii. 2, — the passage which is partially quoted by
the Apostle in Eom. iii. 20. In this passage the forensic
reference is not merely determined by the sum of the
evidence that bears upon the forensic import of the verb in
Eom. iii. 20. It is still farther and conclusively established
by the terminology of the first clause of the verse : — " enter
not into judgement with thy servant ; for in thy sight shall
no man living be justified." The scenery is that of the
tribunal. And since this is indisputably the case, we seem

198 ROMANS III. 20.
to be absolutely shut up to the forensic interpretation of
the word in the verse before us, and thus to its forensic
interpretation in the entire paragraph of which the verse
before us is an integrant part.
And yet the cumulative evidence for the forensic inter
pretation is not exhausted. One item more we specify.
The Apostle says, — " no flesh shall be justified before him,"
(ivwiriov avrov). This expression is a continuation of the
forensic scenery. God is on his judicial throne. Men are
standing at the bar. The justification referred to is the
justification that is realizable in a court of justice.
Thus every branch of evidence bears its appropriate
burden of proof, that it is right to approach the passages,
which treat of evangelical justification, under the influence
of a tolerably settled persuasion that the, word SiKaiow refers
not to the therapeutical production of inherent righteous
ness, but to a judicial declaration of the reality of the
substitutionary righteousness judicially found in the posses
sion of believers, — and judicially found in their possession
because it has been really apprehended and appropriated by
faith in "Jesus Christ the righteous." It is righteousness
that is, strictly speaking, inherent in Christ. It is media
torial righteousness. It is divine righteousness. It is
" God's righteousness." It is communicated, — but of course
only imputatively, — to believers in Christ. It is imputed.
Nevertheless, it is the real possession of believers. It is
their title to everlasting glory.
The therapeutical production of inherent righteousness
in the persons of these same believers is also and amply
provided for. Justification is really in order to sanctifica
tion. It is a stepping-stone to something beyond itself. It
is not the end. It is a means. Nevertheless, it is really and
absolutely indispensable in its own subordinate place. And
it is no disparagement to the greater blessing, which is
realized in the production of inherent righteousness or
holiness, that it is ruled under a different rubric than the
term justification.
The future tense, which the Apostle uses when he says

ROMANS III. 20. 199
" nobody shall be justified by works of law," is not to be
accounted for, with Eeiche, on the supposition that the
reference is to the judgement of the last day. The Apostle
is now entering on the consideration of justification, in its
initial stage, as it takes place during the period of probation.
See verses 21, 24. It is justification, as conditioned simply
on faith. See verses 27, 28, 30. It is thus justification, as it
occurs on the occurrence of faith. See ch. v. 1. Neither are
we to suppose that the future tense, as such, is intended to
express, definitely and sharply, the idea of what is called
moral possibility; as if the Apostle's asseveration were
absolutely equivalent to this, — "nobody can be justified by
works of law." So Newcome, and the Unitarian Improved
version, &c. This idea is doubtless implied; for the ideas of
futurity and possibility run into one another. Still, it is
eventuation in time which was present to the Apostle's
mind when he said shall be justified; and non-eventuation
in time is denied when he affirms, shall not be justified.
The future, as distinguished from the past and the present,
is used representatively. And the substance of the thought,
though of course not its form, is equivalent to this, — as nobody
has been, or is, so nobody will be, justified by works of law.
The future used is, as some grammarians express it, though
not very happily, abstract future; it is future, from which
futurity, as an absolutely differentiating element, has been
abstracted. It is future in which futurity is representatively
expressed. It may, however, have been representatively fixed
upon, in order to cut off, as Eambach says, future expecta
tions, (omnes spes futuras abzuschneiden).
The Apostle, after saying by works of law shall nobody be
justified, adds, as we have already noted, beforehim, (ivwiriov
avrov = ir-zd? = coram ipso). The expression is similarly,
but not with equal felicity, rendered by Tyndale,' and in the
Geneva, in his sight. It is, as we have remarked, un
questionably forensic, (inforo divino, as opposed to in foro
humano), and the scene, which it suggests, points to view
the judge seated on his great white throne of judgement,
with the parties to be judged standing before him. The

200 ROMANS III. SO.
words, as Origen observes, are not to be heedlessly passed by,
"for it is one thing to be justified before God, and another
thing to be justified before man." (Hoc, quod addidit,
coram ipso, non otiose prostereat, quia aliud est coram Deo
justificari, aliud coram hominibus.) "Many," says Paciu-
chelli, " whose character seems to the eye of men to glister in
purity, are seen by the eye of God to be loathsomely
polluted." (Permulti emicant coram hominibus apparenti
virtutum fulgore, qui tamen coram Deo sordescunt.)
§ 5. for through law is knowledge of sin, (Sid ydp vopov
iiriyvwaig dpapnag). The law referred to, is, of course,
the same that is spoken of in the preceding clause, — the
revelation of God, viewed as authoritatively exhibiting the
duty which devolves upon men, as men. Thus viewed, it
exhibits to the eye of the mind, and it is, what is now
technically called, the moral law. (See on the former
clause.) Through this law, says the Apostle, there is
realized in everybody, (when duly self-conscious and self-
cognizant), knowledge of sin; (not precisely "the know
ledge," but certainly not " a knowledge," as Thomson gives
it). The Apostle does not mean, — through tlte law is realized
experience of sin, and that only, inasmuch as through the
law sin is roused up within us; — as Ernesti and others
suppose. (Das Gesetz macht nur das bose in uns rege und
wirksam, und die Macht des Bosen fiihlbar.-Emesti) The
word rendered knowledge, (iiriyvwaig), though occurring fre
quently in the New Testament, is not used in that shade of
meaning. (See Eom. i. 28; x. 2 ; Eph. i. 17; iv. 13; Phil.
i. 9; Col. i. 9, 10; ii. 2; iii. 10; 1 Tim. ii. 4; 2 Tim. ii. 25;
iii. 7; Tit. i. 1; Philem. 6; Heb. x. 26; 2 Pet. i. 2, 3, 8;
ii. 20.) Neither is it the case that the experience of sin
is the " only " effect of the law.
Other commentators have supposed that the Apostle
means, — through the law is the nature of sin made known.
This is the interpretation of Thomas Aquinas, Sadolet, &c.
(Lex enim datur ut homo cognoscat quid debeat agere, quid
TOtare.-Aquinas. Lex nihil seipsa majus demonstrat neque

ROMANS III. 20. 201
altius, sed solam tibi notionem peccati insinuat-Sixdolet)
But that the Apostle had some other idea in his mind is
obvious from the fact, that the clause in which his concep
tion is embodied, exhibits the ground on which the great
doctrinal declaration, which is enunciated in the preceding
clause, rests. Hence the ratiocinative particle for — "for by
law there is knowledge of sin." But to say that law makes
us acquainted with the nature of sin, is no reason why no
one shall be justified by deeds of law. It rather, so far
as it goes, affords a presumption that man might be justified
by deeds of law. There are beings, somewhere, who are
thus justified. To intrude the word "only," is, with
Sadolet as well as Ernesti, an arbitrary addition to the
inspired phraseology. And, moreover, it is not true that
the law gives " only " the notion of sin. It gives us as
really the notion of righteousness. And it imparts various
wholesome influences, besides.
Theodoret takes a view of the expression, somewhat
accordant with that of Thomas Aquinas ; only, he obviously
supposes that the word law has reference to the Mosaic
or Old Testament revelation as such. " The law has given
to men," he says, "a more accurate knowledge of sin,"
(aKpi^taripav b vopog rolg dvSipwiroig iniyvwaiv ryg upapriag
ivTtSrtiKt). He adds, that nevertheless it did not impart
power to work out virtue, (tig Si Trig aptTtjg rrjv KaropSwaiv
iirapKiaai rotg dvSpwiroig ovk 'laxvatv). He thus virtually
intrudes the " only," which Sadolet and Ernesti arbitrarily
supply, and which is furtively interjected, indeed, by many
other critics, such as Seb. Schmidt, Heumann, Kistemaker,
Glockler, Kollner, Eiickert, de Wette, Baumgarten-Crusius,
&c. It was introduced by Luther into the first edition
of his version, (1522) — "for through the law cometh only
the knowledge of sin," (kompt nur erkenntnis der s&nd).
It was retained in all the editions that followed till that
of 1530, when it was thrown out, — Emser having, mean
while, found legitimate fault with the interpolation.
Coverdale, however,, even in 1535, retained the inter
polation, — " For by the lawe commeth but the knowlege of
synne." Theophylact's interpretation is similar to that of

202 ROMANS III. 20.
Theodoret, — at least so far as the first part of Theodoret's
explication is concerned. The interpretation of Wordsworth
and Mac-Evilly corresponds. And so does that of Grotius,
who regards the clause, absurdly enough, as introduced
to show that the law, though unable to justify, is never
theless of some use. (Ne quis putaret legem plane fuisse
inutilem, ostendit ejus usum egregium, nempe quod notitics
illae actionum turpium, quas mali mores in Aegyptiaco
maxime incolatu oblitaverant, manifesta voluntatis Divince
revelatione factae sunt rursus conspicuae.) Melancthon's
interpretation is similar. The clause, he says, anticipates an
objection, (occupatio est); it shows the use of the law. The
use of the law is "to accuse and terrify the conscience,"
(accusare et perterrefacere conscientiam.-Gom. 1540; Enar.
1556). Both Melancthon and Grotius, as also Oecolampad,
Bugenhagen, and Ferus, seem to have altogether overlooked
the power of the ratiocinative particle for, (ydp), which
shows that a reason is rendered for the preceding statement,
not an apology for the existence of the law.
Koppe, in a still more exceptionable manner, limits the
reference of the word law to the Old Testament revelation as
a book: so Bolten. Koppe interprets the clause thus; — "for
in the Old Testament scriptures it is testified that all men
are sinners," (ipsi illi libri divini testantur omnes homines
esse scelestos). He thus understands the knowledge spoken
of as subjective in the readers of the epistle, rather than
as subjective in all men who have become " developed
into moral consciousness : — for by the Old Testament
scriptures is the knowledge communicated to us of all
men's sinfulness. It is, however, an insuperable objection
to this interpretation that the word law, in the preceding
clause, has already sublimated itself into a notion very
different from that of the Old Testament Scriptures in
general. Bahrdt imposes upon the word knowledge an idea still
more remote from the reality than Koppe's. He makes it
mean demonstration or proof; and interprets the whole
clause thus: — "your Mosaic law, (being but a clumsy
system of carnal ordinances), is the greatest proof of your

ROMANS III. 20. 203
corruption," (euer Mosaisches Gesetz ist gerade der grbsste
Beweiss von eurer verdorbenheit). Oertel, borrowing from
Bahrdt's Exposition, still further exaggerates this outre
interpretation, and translates the clause thus : — " for a posi
tive religion is always the characteristic of a rude and savage
nation " ! (denn nach der Erfahrung ist vielmehr positive
Religion selbst allemal der Character einer rohen und
verwilderten Nazion.) Bahrdt and he thus actually make
irriyvwaig equivalent to Merkmal, and they understand
by vopog the positive element of religion, as distinguished
from morality, (im gegensatze der moralischen Tugend-
religion) ! Such interpretations are a burlesque on exegesis.
Olshausen goes much too far in another, though upward,
direction, when he interprets the knowledge of sin referred
to as being equivalent to that repentance into which John
the Baptist baptized. (Die iiriyvwaig apapriag ist also gleich-
bedeutend mit der ptrdvoia, auf dAe Johannes der Tdufer,
als Frucht der alttestamentlichen Oekonomie, taufte) It is
a knowledge, he says, that has within it the germ of faith.
He thus confounds the offices of the law and the gospel,
for it is assuredly a view of the contents of the gospel,
as distinguished from the law, that generates in the soul
that repentance which is animated by faith, and is " unto
life." We need not specify other untenable interpretations of
the Apostle's expression. It evidently means, " for by law
there is knowledge of sin," or, as Wycliffe renders it, —
" forsothe by lawe is knowinge of synne," that is, for by
means of law, — law in its moral element, and howsoever
revealed, — by means, in short, of the moral law, which
prescribes to man his duty as man, and which is thus the
rule of moral life, and the test of moral character, men,
everywhere, who are in the normal state of moral self-
consciousness and self -cognizance, know that they are
sinners. When men compare their actual conduct with the
law, they know that they have violated its sacred precepts.
They feel convicted of guilt. And thus it is impossible
that they can be justified by deeds of law. The law enjoins
absolute obedience from the first moment of moral proba-

204 ROMANS III. 20.
tion, onward. And he who has failed, at any time, to yield
this perfect obedience, can never thenceforward present at
the bar of the Judge of all the earth a perfect righteousness
of his own. A perfect righteousness, on the part of a moral
creature in probation, is a righteousness, which extends,
unbroken, from the commencement to the conclusion of the
probationary career.
The word translated knowledge, (iiriyvwaig, as distin
guished from yvwaig), has an intensification of import,
which cannot be reproduced in English. And, indeed, the
word knowledge, though etymologically identical with the
uncompounded Greek term, is, conventionally, by no
means an absolute synonym. We must call in the aid of
another derivate of the same wide-spread root, in order to
get a nearer approximation to the import of the simple
Greek vocable. The verb to know, — (an older word than
the Greek ytyvwaKw, and from which, under the form
yvo-, parts of the Greek verb are directly derived), —
properly means in Greek to take note of. And the com
pound verb, from which the noun before us is derived,
(iiriyiyvwaKw), properly means to take note of (by fixing the
attention) upon an object, and thus, in reference to certain
objects, to become conscious of, to recognize. The idea of
the Apostle, in the expression before us, is this ;—for by
means of law men fix their attention upon certain acts of
their life, and take note of their sinfulness. When they
view their actions in the light of the law, they recognize
them as sins ; and become conscious of themselves as
sinners. Hence some have translated the expression thus ;
— " for by law is the acknowledgement of sin." It is thus
that Melancthon, Calvin, Beza, Limborch ; and Bengel,
Baumgarten-Crusius, van Hengel, &c, render the words.
And not incorrectly; for knowledge, as we have said, is
not a precise synonym of the original term. It is,
however, nearer than acknowledgement, and better
adapted to the majority of the passages in which the
term occurs.

ROMANS III. 21. 205
Ver. 21. Nvvi Is xagis vopov tuatoavvn. §sou ireQuv-
igorou, potgrvgovpivri vto rou vopov zai rwv <7rgo<p?ir£jv,
Eng. Auth. Vers. But now the righteousness of God
without the law is manifested, being witnessed by tlie law
and the prophets ;
Revised Version. But now without law God's righteous
ness has been manifested, being attested by the law and the
prophets; § 1. Cameron supposes that this verse is to be closely
connected with the 18th of the first chapter! He thinks
that it exhibits that which is the antithesis to the "wrath
of God," .which has been revealed from heaven. And he
regards all of the disquisition that intervenes as paren
thetical. (Haec sunt conjungenda cum vers 1 8 cap. primi;
et quae inter jecta sunt parenthesi sunt includenda)
This is rather an outre conception of the connection. But
there is certainly a return, in the contents of the verse, to the
subject matter of the theme of the epistle, as announced in
the 17th verse of the first chapter. In what is contained in
the intervening discourse, — chap. i. 18— iii. 20, — the Apostle
makes a circuit, having it as his aim to show that men in
general, — indeed all men, — whether Gentiles or Jews, need
that righteousness of God, which is "revealed in the Gospel."
They need it, because they are personally unrighteous, and.
if they are personally unrighteous they never can be pro
nounced righteous, or be justified, on the ground of a
complete righteousness of their own. There is, however,
as the Apostle declares, another righteousness, — God's
righteousness, — which is available to them, which may be
appropriated by them, and on the footing of which they may
be justified and made heirs of everlasting life and glory. Of
this righteousness, the Apostle resumptively speaks in the
verse before us.
§ 2. Such being the relation of the contents of this verse
to the preceding context, it is proper that in a text, which
aims at exhibiting, by. means of paragraphs, the natural-

206 ROMANS III. 21.
groupings of the Apostle's discourse, there should be some
obvious indication that the inspired writer is now crossing
the boundary line of one of his concentric circles of thought.
Such editors, hence, as Bengel, Griesbach, Scholz, Tischen-
dorf, and Knapp, Tittmann, Hahn, Goeschen, Vater, Schott,
Naebe, Muralto, Ornsby, &c, have done well in making here
an interruption in the flow of the text, and indicating by a
break in the continuity of lines, that we have arrived at a
group of ideas, which deserves to be considered in some
measure apart. De Brais contends that a new chapter
should have commenced at this point. D. G. Herzog actually
makes what amounts to a capitular division, and entitles it,
— Commentary on the Vith verse of the first chapter. The
Commentary, he thinks, extends to the close of chapter iv.
§ 3. But now, (Nvvt Si). Some critics have supposed
that this expression has a logical, rather than a temporal,
import. Instead of understanding it as having reference to
that "fulness of the time," which, in the ongoing of the ages,
had just been reached, they suppose that it points, logically,
to the condition of things that is indicated in the imme
diately preceding statements : — but now, that is, but in this
condition of things. The expression is so understood, sub
stantially, by Bullinger (non est nota temporis), Day (but
yet), Koppe (atqui vero), Fritzsche (atqui), de Wette,
Meyer, Alford, Matthias, &c, But it is certainly better to
regard the adverb as having its usual temporal import : —
but now, that is, but in this new era in the divine dis
pensation of things, — "in these last days." The Apostle
intensely realized that, as a preacher of the Gospel, he was
connected with the inauguration of a new epoch. And
hence, at the very commencement of the epistle, he says
that he was " separated unto the Gospel of God, which he
had promised afore by his prophets in the holy Scriptures;"
and in the 25th and 26th verses .of this 3d chapter, he
speaks of' the "propitiation" as emanating from a design
"to declare God's righteousness for the remission of sins
that are past, through the forbearance of God, — to declare,
I say, at this time, (tv ti$ vvv Kaipq), his righteousness."

ROMANS III. 21. 207
Comp. Gal. iv. 4 ff. (Grotius says, — "Nunc vero, id est,
nostris temporibus hoc in parte felicissimis." Mussus
exclaims, — Nunc. 0 seculum aureum ! Seculum gratiae !
Seculum evangelii, hoc est, faustae felicisque annuncia-
tionis !) The great majority of expositors take the same
view of the expression.
(It is perhaps not unworthy of being noticed that vwi,
the lengthened and strengthened form of vvv, is always, in
New Testament usage, followed by Si. The compound
expression occurs some twenty times or so. The instance
in the verse before us is omitted in Schmid's Concordance.
He there reads vvv Si, as also in the text of his posthumous
New Testament. And he is followed by the Englishman's
Greek Concordance, (ed. 1844) : although it is vwl St
that is read by Erasmus, Stephens, Beza, the Elzevirs,
Leusden, Mill, Bengel, Wetstein, Griesbach, Tischendorf,
Lachmann, &c.)
§ 4. apart from law God's righteousness lias been mani
fested, (xojpie vopov SiKUioavvy Seov 1rt(j>avipwTat). By God's
righteousness, (SiKutoavvy Seov), we are to understand, as in
chap. i. 17, the righteousness (for unrighteous men) of
which God is the author, the righteousness provided by
God (for unrighteous men),— -the divinely-originated righ
teousness (which is to unrighteous men who avail them
selves of it, in place of their own righteousness, so far as a,
title to everlasting life is concerned). It -is not Christ
himself, as Zuingli, though somewhat hesitatingly, says, but
the righteousness wrought out and brought in by Christ.
It is, indeed, the work of Christ viewed in a specific aspect,
— viz., as exactly fitted to supply for us, — so far as regards
a title to everlasting life, — the place that should have been
occupied, during our probationary term of existence, by per
fect, and perfectly uninterrupted, righteousness of our own.
This righteousness of God, says the Apostle, has now been
manifested, (vw\ Si . . . iraj>avipwrai). Manifested, how?
It has been made manifest in its actuality or reality. It
has been shown as a thing that really is, — shown, namely, to
such as were in a position to discern it, and as were at the-

208 ROMANS III. 21.
same time willing to take note of it. Shown, where ? In
the innocent lives of believers, says Grotius, (apparet rebus
magnis, ex vita scilicet innocentissima Christianofum).
Fritzsche had a similar idea. God's righteousness, says he,
has been manifested, that is, it has become actual and his
torical through faith in Christ, (die Unstrdfiichkeit vor Gott
ist durch den Glauben an Ghristus, in so fern dieser
seine rechtfertigende Kraft bewdhrt hat und fortdauernd
bewahrt, factisch und historisch geworden). But such an
idea is very far apart from the Apostle,'s, and proceeds
from a total misapprehension of the nature of God's evan
gelical righteousness. We read in chap. i. 17, that God's.
righteousness is revealed in the Gospel. Many critics sup
pose, along with Beza, Melville, Seb. Schmidt, Limborch, and
Bengel, that the Apostle had the same idea present to his
mind in writing chap. iii. 21 ; and that he, consequently,
means that the righteousness " has been manifested " in the
Gospel. So undoubtedly it has, secondarily. But primarily
it was manifested in the facts which are announced in the
Gospel. It was manifested in the career of Christ Jesus ; —
in the events, inner and outer, of his life and death ; — in
what he voluntarily did and voluntarily endured. These
events constitute the subject-matter of the Gospel ; and in
them there was exhibited to view what subserves, so far as
a title to glory is concerned, the place of a perfect righteous
ness of man's own. God's righteousness for unrighteous
men was, in these events, manifested' in actual fact. It
had, indeed, been " promised afore." (See chap. i. 2.) But,
though promised, it Was " a mystery " in some respects,
"kept secret since the world began." It could be only
dimly seen. It was obscure. It was veiled. But "now
it is made manifest." (See chap. xvi. 25, 26. Comp. 2
Tim. i. 10 ; Tit. i. 3.) It " has been manifested " in Him
who was none else than God Himself " manifest in flesh."— -
In our authorized English version the verb is rendered "is'
manifested." A similar rendering is given by Wycliffe,
Tyndale, and the Geneva. But the perfect tense represents
the manifestation as a completed historical fact : and such
an idea is peculiarly appropriate, . when we regard the

ROMANS III. 21. 209
manifestation as accomplished in the life and death of the
Saviour. In the expression, again, "is revealed," (a7roKaXv7r-
tetoi), as occurring in chap. i. 17, the present tense as
appropriately represents the continuous disclosure which is
afforded in the enduring and, indeed, "everlasting" Gospel.
God's righteousness has been manifested, says the Apostle,
apart from law, (x^pig vopov). The expression is rendered
in our authorized English version, as in Wycliffe and the
Geneva, " without the law." And there is, perhaps, no good
reason why we should greatly reprobate such a translation.
Yet, as Origen pointedly remarked even in his day, and
Beza after him, and Pareus after Beza, and Oltramare after
Pareus, the expression in the original is anarthrous, while
in the following clause the same noun is articulated. And
as we can reproduce to a nicety, in our English idiom,
both forms of expression, there is no valid reason for the
introduction of the article in translating the phrase before
us. The law referred to is not merely the law of nature, as
Origen supposed. Nor is it merely the Jewish law, as
Chrysostom and Ambrosiaster; Grotius too, and Wetstein;
and Eiickert, and Fritzsche, and the great body of the
modern German expositors contend. It is that same law
which is spoken of in the preceding verse, — through which
is knowledge of sin, and by obedience to the works of
which no flesh shall be justified. It is that Authoritative
Instruction of God which exhibits the duty of man,
considered simply and genetically as man. It is that
Authoritative Instruction, consequently, whether as ex
plicitly revealed in words to the Jews, or as implicitly
revealed without words to the Gentiles all the world over.
Such appears to be the reference of the Apostle. And such
is substantially the view taken of his reference by Beza
and Pareus; though Oltramare says that "all the commen
tators " have been agreed that the reference is exclusively
to the Mosaic law. (Tous les commentateurs s'accordent
a y voir la loi mosaique.) Oltramare would translate the
phrase, with unnecessary emphasis, and with the unneces
sary assumption of a plurality of laws, — independently

210 ROMANS III. 21.
of all law, (independamment de toute loi, — en dehors de
toute loi) ; and Vaughan, in like manner, would render
it, " apart from any law."
The construction of the phrase has been matter of con
siderable dispute. Augustin connected it with the words,
God's righteousness, supposing that it was the Apostle's
design to indicate that the righteousness specified was
obtained by men, not from the law, but from God; — not by
means of the assistance of the law, but by the Spirit of God.
(Non itaque sine lege manifestata, sed sine lege justitia,
quia justitia Dei est, id est, quia nobis non ex lege sit, sed ex
Deo.-De Gratia Christi, I. 9. Justitia Dei sine lege est,
quam Deus per Spiritum. gratiae credenti confert sine
adjutorio legis, hoc est, non adjuto a lege."-De Spiritu et
Litt. 9.) Klee approves of Augustin's construction; Flatt
too ; and so does Eeiche, (x^pie vopov gehbrt nach der
Stellung und Tendenz der Rede zu SiKaioavvy). So, too,
Winzer. Theophylact, before them, adopted the same con
struction, (ryv SiKaioavvyv tov Seov, Trjv xwP'G vopov). So
did the authors of our Authorized English Version. So,
too, Macknight, Owen, &c, &c. But Erasmus, Beza,
Fritzsche, and others, legitimately object to it on the
ground of the peculiar adjustment of the phraseology.
(We should have expected, if Augustin's idea had been
correct, some such structure as Nvvi Si y xwP1^' vopov
SiKaioavvy k. t. X)
The majority of critics connect the phrase (xwp\g vopov)
with the verb (irt^avipwrai) : — " God's righteousness has
been manifested without law." And this* undoubtedly is
the correct construction, so far as the nexal point of gram
matical coherence is concerned. But it must be borne in
mind (1) that, so far as logical relation is concerned, the
verb, with which the phrase is connected, must be viewed
not as abstracted or reft from the whole concrete affirmation
of which it forms a part, but as completing and bounding it.
And then (2) the position of the phrase, as prefixed, not
affixed, to the affirmation, fits it for overshadowing the
whole, and for thus shedding its logical influence over the
affirmation in its entirety.

ROMANS III. 21. 211
This position of the phrase, in the foreground of the
affirmation, shows, moreover, that it is intended to bear the
burden of a special emphasis. In enunciation it should be
betoned. For there is an antithetic reference to the state
ments of the preceding verse in relation to the moral law : —
"by worlds of law there shall nobody be justified before
God; for through law is recognition of sin." But though it
is thus in vain for unrighteous men to have recourse to law
(the moral law) in order to obtain justification; still their
case is not hopeless. Justification may be attained in
another way. " But now, apart from law, God's righteous
ness has been manifested." The nature of the case thus
led the Apostle to give prominence, in the collocation of his
phraseology, to the idea expressed in the phrase, "apart
from law."
The phrase is exegetically translated by Luther, " without
the aid of the law," (ohne Zuthun des Gesetzes). Campensis
and Calvin explain it in the same manner, (absque ullo
adminiculo legis, - Campensis. Sine legis adminiculo.-
Calvin. Sine adminiculo Ze^is.-Mussus). Augustin had
attached to it the same idea. (Vide supra.) So do
many others, as, for example, de Wette and Eiickert,
(ohne Mitwirkung). But this explication, though correct
so far as it goes, is too narrow. The justifying righteous
ness has been manifested in a sphere of things apart from
law, — so far as methods of justification, available to men, are
concerned. It is true, indeed, that in working out the justifying
righteousness, Christ had respect to the law. He fulfilled
it. He suffered its penalty. He magnified it, and made it
honourable. But, so far as the righteousness is available to
men for justification, it is, in the manifestation that has
been made of it, a thing apart from law. It lies, to
men, in a sphere that is altogether different from the
sphere within which the law is dominant and says — " Do
this and Live." (Sine lege, says Aquinas, scilicet, causante
justiiiam.) It is also true that so far as mere duty is concerned, the
law is for ever a perfect rule of life to man ; and, as such, it

212 ROMANS III. 21.
goes hand in hand with the evangelical righteousness of God.
In this relation of things it is not separated from God's
righteousness for unrighteous men. And, correspondingly,
God's righteousness for unrighteous men has not, in this
relation of things, been manifested apart from law. But
this is not the aspect of the case which the Apostle is at
present contemplating. He is considering what it is which
can furnish unrighteous men with a title to everlasting life-
And he finds it, not in the righteousness which men them
selves can work out by obedience to law, but in the righ
teousness of God, which ha,s been manifested in a sphere of
things altogether apart from this their obedience, and alto
gether apart, consequently, from the law as requiring their
obedience. The phrase was exegetically rendered by Tyndale, without
the fulfillinge of the lawe. It is explained by Pareus as
being equivalent to " without works of law," (absque operi
bus legis). Day gives the same explanation, — "without
the law, that is, without the strict observation of the law."
So does Carpzov, (in phrasi x(t)P'C vopov subintelligitur,
'ex versu 20, ipywv). So Olshausen. And Calvin's inter
pretation is coincident : — he says that the word " law may
be understood as meaning works," (ut lex pro operibus
uccepta intelligatur). Theophylact took the same view; for,
after quoting the expression, without law, he adds, exe
getically, "for God justifies us, although we have not
works," (SiKaioi yap ypdg b Sitbg, Kqv pr) 'ipya ixwptv).
The idea running through all these parallel explanations lies,
manifestly, on the right line ; and the Apostle really means
that, independently of those works which the moral law —
(whether viewed apart, or as underlying, and regulating
ceremonial observances) — independently of all the works
which the law enjoins, and which, if fully performed by
man, would constitute such a righteousness as would entitle
to everlasting life,— God's righteousness, — the righteousness
which God gives as a gift to unrighteous men, — has been
manifested. Haldane admirably expresses the Apostle's
idea by explaining the expression thus, — "without any
Tegard whatever to the obedience of man to the law."

ROMANS III. 21.. 213
§ 5. being attested by the law and the prophets, (uaprv-
povpivy virb tov vopov Kai rwv irpofyyrwv). By the
expression the law and the prophets,— which Carpzov
strangely regards as a Hendiadys for prophetic law, (sine
dubio autem verba tov vopov koi twv irpo^yrwv sunt
hendiadyolv pro vopov irpo^yriKov posita) — we are evi
dently to understand the Old Testament Scriptures. These
Scriptures originally consisted of the Pentateuch ; the
other parts being accretively superadded. The Pentateuch,
consequently, was the original Divine Instruction, autho
ritatively exhibiting the duty of the Jews. (It was the
original mm or vopog) Being such, it was very generally
singled out and signalized, even after the growth of
the volume of the book to its ultimate proportions,
as the law. At other times the expression the law was
extended to the entire body of the written revelations,
inasmuch as the sum total of the ultimate volume was
indeed the culminated or completed Instruction or Teach
ing of God, (mwo), and was of uniform authority through
out, (6 vopog). See Eom. ii. 12; John x. 34; xii. 34; xv.
25; 1 Cor. xiv. 21. Here the Apostle disintegrates, to his
view, the volume of the book into the original law, the
Pentateuch, and the prophets — the additional writings, —
all of which were composed by inspired men (ow??) who
spake in the name of God, and for God, (irpofyriTai). The
same dualism of representation is found in Matt. v. 1 7 ; vii.
12; xxii. 40; Luke xvi. 16; &c. Compare also Luke xvi,
29, 31, in which the parallel expression, Moses and the
prophets, is found. In Luke xxiv. 44, instead of a dualism,
there is a triplicity of groups, corresponding to the triple
sections of the Hebrew Bible, as we at present have it;
— the laiv of Moses, the prophets, and the Psalms, (the
Psalms being specified as the first of the Chethubim). The
general division, however, when the Unity of the volume
was kept in the background of thought, was that which
is reproduced here by the Apostle in the expression, — the
law and the prophets.
Matthias supposes that the Apostle's dual expression is
not intended to be a comprehensive designation of the Old

214 ROMANS III. 21.
Testament " volume of the book," but is meant to point out,
specifically, two constituent elements of the book, (1), " the
word of God so far as it is law" strictly so called ; and
(2), "the word of God so far as it is promise," (Wort Gottes
sofern es Gesetz ist; und Wort Gottes, sofern es Verheis-
sung ist). But such an interpretation proceeds upon an
erroneous view of the meaning of the word law in ver.
19th, to which Matthias refers for a parallel use of the
term, and also upon an arbitrary and erroneous view of
the meaning of the word prophets or prophecy. The
, expression employed by the Apostle manifestly designates
the complex Scriptures of the Old Testament; and we may
rest assured that, when he selected the dual representation,
his mind spread itself delightedly over the varied testi
monies to the evangelical righteousness of God which are,
under appropriate representations, found in both the specified
portions of the volume of the book.
It is, of course, impossible for us to know what were the
particular testimonies which elicited his special attention, as
his mind flashingly traversed the contents of the law and
the prophets. We need not doubt that he thought of
Abraham when he glanced at the law, for he dwells upon
his case, in relation to the evangelical righteousness, in the
fourth chapter of this epistle. We may rest assured too that
in turning to the prophets, he thought of what David says in
the 32nd Psalm, for he quotes from that psalm in the same
4th chapter. He would also think of the testimony from
Habakkuk, which is quoted in chap. i. 17, and which is,
indeed, the Old Testament fountain-head of the Apostle's
phase of the New Testament theology. And we may reason
ably suppose that his mind took a bird's eye view of all the
prominent passages, both in the law and in the prophets, in
which the propitiation, of the Messiah is referred to, or the
salvation that is bound up in that propitiation: for, in all
these passages, the one great and glorious idea is either
explicitly exhibited or implicitly suggested, that justifica
tion, — unattainable, as it is, through the personal righteous
ness of unrighteous men, — is attainable through that work
of the Saviour which is, in one of the most gracious of its

ROMANS III. 21. 215
phases, God's righteousness for the unrighteous. We know
that the Apostle was familiar with such passages, for we read
that, on another occasion, "he expounded" to the Eoman
Jews " and testified the kingdom of God, persuading them
concerning Jesus, both out of the law of Moses, and out of
the prophets, from morning till evening." (Acts xxviii. 23.)
In this matter he looked as through the eyes of Christ him
self, who, "beginning at Moses and all the prophets, ex
pounded unto his disciples in all the Scriptures the things
concerning himself." (Luke xxiv. 27.) "These are the
things," said he, " which I spake unto you, while I was yet
with you, that all things must be. fulfilled, which are written
in the law of Moses, and in the prophets, a'nd in the psalms,
concerning me." (Luke xxiv. 44.) And Peter saw as Paul
saw. " To Christ," says he, " give all the prophets witness,
that through his name whosoever believeth in him shall
receive remission of sins." (Acts x. 43.)
When the apostle represents God's righteousness as attested
(paprvpovpivy) by the law and the prophets, the word is to
be understood in its ordinary acceptation. " The law and
the prophets" bear testimony to the righteousness. They
speak of it; and they speak of it in such a way as to cor
roborate the announcement or proclamation of the New
Testament evangelists. The expression indicates that
evidence of the actual and divine reality of the righteous
ness either was or might be desiderated. Van Hengel would
translate the word celebrated, (quae laudatur a lege et pro-
phetis), instead of attested: Bretschneider renders it
recognized, (cognitus) : Schleusner, predicted and promised,
(quam praedixerunt et promiserunt Moses ceterique pro-
phetae) : Calvin, Beza, Er. Schmid, &c, verified by the testi
mony of, (testimonio comprobata). But the majority of
translators have done well in adhering to the ordinary
import of the original term. The tense of the participle
(paprvpovpivy) indicates that the attestation of the righteous
ness by the law and the prophets was viewed by the Apostle
as a present thing. It had been, indeed; and it would be.
But the idea to which he gives expression, is, that it is. If
the tense had been past, the idea of attestation might have

216 ROMANS HI. 21.
been obscured or complicated, and must have merged in
pure prediction or promise. But even " now " the Old
Testament continues to bear witness to the New. It bears
present witness.
Why did the Apostle specify this fact, — that the Old.
Testament Scriptures bear testimony to the Evangelical
righteousness which is the theme of the great New Testa
ment annunciation? Why did he, as Oltramare strongly
expresses it, " interrupt his proposition," that he might
introduce the idea ? Whatever was the reason, or whatever
were the reasons, we may be sure that it was not to gratify,
merely or at all, a taste for rhetorical antanaclasis or
oxymoron, in setting off the expression by law against the
expression apart from law. His aim might be various.
(1.) He might love the grand idea, — so felicitously expressed
by Augustin, — "the New Testament lies concealed in the
Old ; the Old Testament lies revealed in the New," (Novum
Testamentum in vetere latet, vetus in novo patet, -Quaest.
in Heptateuch., lib. ii. 73 : — Novum Testamentum in veteri
velabatur: vetus Testamentum in novo revelatur,-Serrao
clx. 6.) The Apostle, from the mere largeness of his mind,
and its love of magnificent harmonies, might thus interject
the statement, — attested by the law and the prophets. (2.)
He might, too, as Theodoret suggests, and. as Fritzsche
maintains, desire to hold up to view the dignity, worth,
and glory of that which was the grand theme of his
preaching. It was no crotchet. It was no minute and
unimportant detail. It was the solar centre of divine
revelation, out of which innumerable rays of light and heat
were emanating, and back into which they might all be
traced. The Gospel which he preached, and which ex
hibited the evangelical righteousness, had been " promised
afore by God's prophets in the Holy Scriptures," (chap. i. 2).
It was the mark to which prophetic fingers had pointed in
all preceding times. (3.) And thus, too, as Chrysostom,
Theophylact, and G5cumenius remark, it was no novelty,
though " news." It was no new-fangled and upstart theory.
of things. It was a light that had dawned in the remotest
antiquity, though it had only now reached the zenith of its

ROMANS III. 22. 21 7
effulgent glory. It had advanced with the ages, and grown
with the growth of successive epochs, until " the fulness of
the time." (4.) There can be little doubt that the Apostle
had in view the reconciliation of the minds of his Jewish
brethren to his evangelical teaching. He wished to show
them that he was not overturning the Jewish faith, but
only recalling it to its original purity, simplicity, and divine
intent. This was one of the means that he wisely put
into operation when he tried and plied all means, if, by
any means, he might gain some of their souls. God Himself
had set him the example, for, as G5colampad reminds us,
Moses and Elias were both of them sent to the mount
of transfiguration to bear testimony to the Christ, (Christo
glorificato in monte testimonium perhibebant Moses et
Elias).

Ver. 22. hzatoavvfi Ss 9-sou &/« nriarsug '\yjsov Xpiarov,
eig Trdvrag, zai sir) Tavrug roug Tio-rsvovrocg' ob yap tmaroXri"
Eng. Auth. Vers. Even the righteousness of God which is
by faith of Jesus Christ unto all and upon all them that
believe : for there is no difference :
Revised Version, even God's righteousness through faith
in Jesus Christ, unto all, and upon all the believing ; for
"there is no difference.
§ 1. even God's righteousness through faith in Jesus
Christ, (SiKaioavvy Si Stov Sid iriartwg 'Itjoov Xpiarov).
This clause is annexed to the preceding proposition, in
order to explain, epexegetically, the particular righteousness
of God referred to, which " has been manifested," and which
is "attested by the law and the prophets." The Peshito
detaches it, and erects it into a self-contained proposition,
by supplying the substantive verb : — " But God's righteous
ness by means of faith is of Jesus Christ, &c." Wycliffe's
version is similar, — " Sothli the rightwysnesse of God is bi

218 ROMANS III. 22.
the feith of ihesu crist, &c." Tyndale's version corresponds
with Wycliffe's. So does Worsley's. Turnbull's is similar,
— "and the righteousness of God, through faith in Jesus
Christ, is for all and upon all who believe." Zinzendorfs
translation is substantially the same, (Diese gerechtigkeit
Gottes durch den glauben an Jesum Christum ist vor einen
jeden, &c) So de Saci, &c. It is, however, quite unneces
sary to intrude into the Apostle's phraseology such an
important supplement. The words form a natural addita
ment to the proposition that goes before. The particle (Si),
which is rendered even in our Authorized English Version,
is used in the case of such epexegetical annexes. See, for
example, Eom. ix. 30, — " The Gentiles have attained to
righteousness, even the righteousness which is of faith"
(tSvy KariXa&tv SiKaioavvyv, SiKaioavvyv Si ryv ek iriartwg).
See also 1 Cor. ii. 6. (Winer, iii. 53. 7 b) Though the
translation even is perhaps as good a version as can, in the
case before us, and in similar cases, be given in English
to the Greek particle, yet it is certainly an imperfect
reproduction of the idea of the original. The particle
bears an epexegetically connective and quasi-adversative
import ; for it introduces a clause which is intended, as has
been remarked by de Dieu, Day, Bengel, and others, to
differentiate that particular righteousness of God which has
been referred to. It is only, of course, a certain righteous
ness of God which is meant ; — that, namely, which is
"through faith in Jesus Christ." (Exponitur quaenam sit
ea justitia quam Dei esse dixerat.-De Dieu.) Hence the
idea of the Apostle, in his annexation, might be paraphras-
tically exhibited thus : — " God's righteousness, I have said,
"has been manifested. It is true; and an all-important
"truth. Bid let it be borne in mind that the .righteousness
" of which I speak is not that in the possession of which
"God himself is righteous; but it is that which he has
"provided for unrighteous men, — that which is to them
"through faith in Jesus Christ." Hence Thomson renders
the particle " however," — " the righteousness of God however
through faith of Jesus Christ." Mehring renders it " but,"
(sondern, as if the Apostle's word had been uXXri). The

ROMANS 111. 22. 219
Vulgate translation corresponds, (autem). Beza, on the
other hand, brings out freely the idea of resumption and
epexegesis, by translating it "I say," (inquam): — "God's
righteousness, I say, &c." Castellio's version is the same.
Bullinger, before them both, had given the same version,
(Se enim hoc loco inquam valet). So Ostervald and Martin,
(dis-je). Good old Thomas Wilson's corresponds, — " I mean
the righteousness of God, &c." Tyndale aims at expressing
the same idea, but not very felicitously : — " The righteous
ness no dout which, &c." Luther is paraphrastic: — "But
/ speak of such righteousness as, &c." (Ich sage aber von
solcher Gerechtigkeit vor Gott, die da kommt, &c) The
Geneva version corresponds with our own: — "to wit, the
righteousness of God, &c." And, on the whole, it would be
difficult to find a more appropriate rendering than what
has been given in our Authorized Version. (Winzer renders
the particle by nempe. The German critics often give aber,
as does Meyer ; or und zwar, as do Eiickert and Philippi.)
" Even God's righteousness, through faith in Jesus
Christ!' Fritzsche supposes that we must mentally carry
down from the preceding verse the verb has been mani
fested, and interpose it before the expression, through faith
in Jesus Christ : — " God's righteousness, I say, has been
manifested through faith in Jesus Christ." Noesselt had
the same idea (Vindiciae, Eom. iii. 21 — 28). But this inter
pretation proceeds on a misunderstanding of what it is
which constitutes God's righteousness; and it is objection
able, moreover, on the additional ground that it assumes the
suppression, in the clause before us, of that which, accord
ing to Fritzsche's theory of interpretation, must have been
the principal idea. (We should have expected irtfyavipwrai
Si k- r. i^hg, instead of SiKaioavvy Si k. t. X) Benecke
would supply the same verb, and in the same manner ; but
then he takes a peculiar view of the expression, through
faith in Jesus Christ, (Siu iriartwg 'lyaov Xpiarov). He
adheres, like Paulus, to the literal translation, "through
faith of Jesus Christ," and understands by faith, the "faith
fulness" (treue) of Christ, — the unfailing faithful activity,
which is characteristic of Jesus Christ, (die gbttliche

220 ROMANS III. 22.
Gerechtigkeit offenbart sich durch die Treue Christi, durch
die unablassig treue Wirksamkeit desselben). But Benecke,
too, had a wrong conception of what is meant by the
expression, God's righteousness; and, over and above the
other objection, which is as applicable to his interpretation
as to Fritzsche's, it seems abundantly evident that the
faith here spoken of must be the same that is referred to
in chap. i. 17, and in chap. ix. 30; in which passages there
is no mention of Jesus Christ, and consequently no scope
for the supposition that the faith referred to may be sub
jective in Jesus Christ. Lange's notion corresponds almost
throughout with Benecke's, (he interprets iriang as denoting
Christ's glaubenstreue). Bosveld is at one with Lange, — as
with Fritzsche and Benecke, — in supposing that the verb,
has been manifested, must be mentally carried forward into
this verse. He believes that the Apostle means that it is
through the faith of Jesus Christ that God's righteousness
has been manifested. But he supposes that the word faith
is here to be understood objectively, as denoting the Gospel
and tlie gracious Gospel-economy of Jesus Christ, (Kan ik,
naar mijn oordeel, door het geloof van J. C. te dezer plaatse,
onmogelijk iets anders verstaan, dan het Euangelij of de.
Geloofsleer van J. C. en de daar uit voortvloeijende, of daar
mede gepaard gaande Bediening en Bedeeling der Genade,
welke hij, door de verkondiging van zijn Euangelij, onder
de menschen heeft ingevoerd) It is an inadmissible view
of the faith specified.
There is no need for supplying any verb before the
attributive clause, through faith in Jesus Christ. The
Apostle's style is curt, abrupt, emphatic, and pregnant.
And although, no doubt, he might have filled out his
phraseology in some such way as might have been ren
dered into English thus: — "even God's righteousness, which
is attainable by unrighteous men through faith in Jesus
Christ," or, " which may be appropriated through faith in
Jesus Christ ;" yet, there was no necessity for such explicit
unfolding of his idea. His condensed expression readily
unfolds itself within the thought of the appreciative reader.
And its amplitude of import is none the less realized that

ROMANS III. 22. 221
its form is so characteristically compressed. We have many
instances, in the Apostle's writings, of a similarly abrupt
and pregnant way of using prepositions. (See chap. i. 17;
Gal. i. 1 ; &c.)
The expression, "through faith," (Sid iriartwg), suggests the
mere intermediacy and instrumentality of faith in relation
to the blessing enjoyed in justification. The Efficient Cause
is beyond.The word faith falls to be discussed in connection with
chap. i. 16, 17. Its import is nothing recondite ; otherwise
it would be a term altogether unsuitable for being used in
an exhibition of the duty of universal man, uncultured as
well as cultured. Faith is such a persuasion or convic
tion of the mind, in reference to things unseen, and, so
far as direct intuition is concerned, unknown, as supplies
the place of vision or invisaging. Its moral power, in its
relation to the Gospel of Jesus Christ, is resolvable into
the peculiarity of its object, and not into any peculiarity in
the act. What is needed, consequently, in order to con
tinuous, and continuously increasing, peace, joy, hope,
gratefulness, holiness, and devotedness, is that faith be
continuously, and with continuously increasing breadth and
depth of range, directed to its glorious personal object. He
who " lives by faith " in Jesus, is continuously present with
Jesus in the most exalted way in which presence can be
realized ; he is present dianoetically, — in mind, in thought.
And the power of the presence of Jesus, as dianoetically
and reciprocally realized, is, when the presence becomes to
the inner eye intensely self-evidencing and luminous,
imperial. It is apparently in virtue of this mighty moral
power of faith in Jesus that it has been divinely invested
with what is called its justifying function.
When the Apostle says, " through faith of Jesus Christ,"
('Ij7o-ov Xpiorov), he evidently means, " through faith in
Jesus Christ." The genitive of the Saviour's complex
name is objective, (genitivus object i). See Gal. ii. 16 ; ii.
20; iii. 22 ; Eph. iii. 12; Acts. iii. 16 ; Jas. ii. 1 : and compare
such expressions as Mark xi. 22, " faith in God " (irianv
S-eov); "the faith Of the Gospel" (Phil. i. 27); "faith"

222 ROMANS 111. 22.
or " belief of the truth," (2 Thess. ii. 13). The Apostle
might, indeed, have used a different expression, as, for
example, "through faith which is in Christ Jesus, (Sid
iriartwg rr)g iv Xpio-njJ 'Iijo-ov, the reading of A, but an
evident gloss). See 2 Tim. iii. 15 ; and compare 1 Tim. iii.
13. But that which he employs is sufficiently explicit ;
and when Crell, Oertel, Macknight, Eitchie, &c, imagine
that the peculiarity of the expression is intended to
indicate, not that Christ is the object of faith, but^ that
he is its inculcator, (the faith which Jesus Christ hath
enjoined); and when Eauwenhoff (De SiKaiwatt, p. 88.. ff),
van Hengel, &c, think that it is intended to represent
Christ as the author or Efficient Cause of faith, (faith in
God, of which Jesus Christ is the author, fides cujus
auctor est Christus) ; they seem to forget altogether that
the Apostle is but unfolding, more systematically and
elaborately, that which is the grand burden of the whole
of New Testament theology, and indeed of the whole
Bible, — " Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou
shalt be saved." He is explaining the way of salvation ;
and thus pointing the sinner's faith to Him who is empha
tically the Saviour. It is true, indeed, that Christ, as the
great Teacher, inculcates faith. It is also true that in an
important sense he is its Author. It is likewise true that
faith, in its ultimate issue, ascends to God, as God, and
fixes on Him ; while Jesus is " the Way " of ascent. All
this is indisputable. But it is likewise true, — and empha
tically so " now " — " at this time " — " in these last days," —
that " this is God's commandment, That we should believe
on the name of his Son Jesus Christ " (1 John iii. 23.)
" Neither is there salvation in any other : for there is none
other name under heaven, given among men, whereby we
must be saved." (Acts iv. 12.) It is "Christ" who is "the
end of the law for righteousness to every one that be-
lieveth." (Eom. x. 4.) " For God so loved the world, that
he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth
on him (on God's only begotten Son) should not perish, but
have everlasting life." (John iii. 16.)
"Jesus Christ" being the object of the faith through

ROMANS III. 22. 223
which GodJ 's righteousness for unrighteous men is attainable,
— it must be implied that it is in " Jesus Christ " that the
righteousness is found. Justifying faith must undoubtedly
embrace, at least implicitly, the justifying righteousness.
It does embrace it ; so that the righteousness becomes the
righteousness which is (to the soul) by faith. (Eom. ix. 30 ;
x. 6.) Faith is the hand that receives the gift and uses it.
It is the hand that accepts "the robe of righteousness"
and puts it on as "the garment of salvation." (Compare
the Peshito version, ]Vn l^ri.m rJ_o by the hand of
faith: idiotismus linguae non sine7 emphasi hie acci-
piendus. -Eeusch .)
As righteousness, however, is only one of several aspects of
the work of Jesus Christ, in its relation to the necessities
of unrighteous men, it is possible that it may be often only
implicitly believed in. And, for all popular and practical
purposes, it is better to follow the example of the Apostle,
and to present "Jesus Christ" himself, in the totality of
his living personality, as the explicit object of the sinner's
faith. Lachmann, in his earlier text, omitted the word Jesus,
on the authority of B. But in his later text he re-admitted
it, — a fact overlooked by Tischendorf (1859), — and he thus
acquiesced in the reading of almost all other editors. The
complex designation Jesus Christ or Christ Jesus is a
favourite combination with Paul. He uses it with great
frequency. And no wonder. It is delightfully significant
— bearing, as it does, the most interesting relations, both
man-ward and God-ward. — When the Apostle has occasion,
as in the passage before us, to use the double appellation
in the genitive, he almost invariably collocates the words
as we find them here, Jesus first, and Christ second. We
say "almost," for there are several exceptional passages,
such as Eph. iii. 1; Phil. ii. 21; iii. 8; 1 Tim. i. 1, 2; Philem.
1; though in most of these the reading is more or less
disputed. But when he has occasion to use the appellation
in the dative, he almost invariably collocates the words
in the reverse order, and speaks of Christ Jesus. See
Eom. iii. 24; vi. 11, 23; viii. 1, 2, 39; xv. 17; xvi. 3;

224 ROMANS III. 22.
1 Cor. i. 2, 4, 30; iv. 15 ; xv. 31 ; xvi. 24; Gal. ii. 4; iii. 14,
26, 28 ; v. 6 ; vi. 15 ; &c. We say again, "almost invariably,"
for exceptional passages are found in Eom. xvi. 18 ; 1 Thess.
i. 1 ; 2 Thess. i. 1.
§ 2. unto all, and upon all the believing, (tig irdvrag,
koi iiri irdvrag rovg irtartvovrag). Some expositors suppose
that it is requisite to carry down mentally, from the pre
ceding verse, the verb has been manifested, (irtfyaviowrai),
in order to effect a transition, in thought, to these words.
This is the opinion of Seb. Schmidt, Belsham, de Wette,
Stuart, Dr. Jo. Brown, Krehl, Alford, &c. By this ex
pedient an independent, though elliptical, proposition is
formed. Bos, indeed, would throw the preceding part
of the verse into a parenthesis, in order to get the benefit
of the verb. But there is not the slightest occasion for
such devices ; or for supplying any such participle, even,
as being or coming, (ovaa, ytvopivy, ipxopivy). The
clause is just a farther annex to the expression God's
righteousness. And the prepositions, unto and upon, are
sufficient links of attachment : although it is perfectly
legitimate to unfold and expand, as best we may, the idea
which is underlying the exceedingly condensed phraseology
of the Apostle. In attempting this evolving expansion
we should certainly refrain from having recourse to the
verb has been manifested, for the manifestation referred
to was a completed act long before the righteousness could
come within the sphere of the cognizance of many of those
who ultimately enjoy it. We should content ourselves
with the substantive verb : — " even God's righteousness,
which is attainable through faith in Jesus Christ, and
which is unto all, and upon all who believe."
There is some difficulty in determining the correct reading
of the clause. Griesbach suspected that the words and upon
all (/tax iirl irdvrag) are spurious. Years before him Semler
was positive that the Apostle had only written unto all,
(Paulus scripserat tantum unam phrasin, tig irdvrag.-
Apparatus, &c, p. 34. See also p. 56). Wakefield says that
either the one or the other of the two clauses " is an inter-

ROMANS III. 22. 225
polation." Noesselt is of Semler's opinion. (Vindiciae loci
Rom. iii. 21 — 28.) Greve condemns the second clause. Lach
mann has omitted it from his text. He reads simply unto all
who believe. Belsham, before him, omitted the same clause
from his translation, saying that it "obscures the sense."
The omitted clause is not found in N A B C. It is wanted
in the Coptic, iEthiopic, Armenian, and the Erpen-Arabic
versions. And it is occasionally omitted by some of the
Fathers in quotation. This last circumstance is of little or
no moment. The clause is found in DEIGKL, and in
most cursive nlss. ; in the two Syriac versions, the Vulgate,
the Polyglott- Arabic, and the Slavonic; and it is found in
the texts of Eufinus's Origen, Chrysostom and Theophylact,
and commented on by Theodoret and in GScumenius. Am
brosiaster, too, has the two clauses, though, as his text at
present stands, he strangely connects them thus, — "unto all
or (vel) upon all who believe ! " There are certainly some
very great MS. authorities for the omission of the second
clause; and yet we cannot but feel disposed, along with
Bengel, Tischendorf, Fritzsche, Scholz, Meyer, Oltramare,
&c, to retain it. It seems to be more difficult to account for
its admission into the text, if spurious, than for its omission,
if genuine. It could scarcely have been added as a marginal
gloss to explain the phrase "unto all." That very simple
phrase did not need explanation : and though it had needed
elucidation, it is not likely that the more difficult phrase
" upon all " would have been appended for the purpose. If
therefore the phrase were apocryphal, it would be difficult to
account for its origination and admission. But, on the
hypothesis of its original canonicity, it is not difficult to
account for its accidental or intentional omission. The
principle of bpoioriXtvrov might account for the accidental
omission of the clause: —
XYEI2IIANTA2KAIEmilANTAS
Even though the clauses should not have occupied entire
lines in any of the early codices, nevertheless their identical
termination might mislead the eye. And the eye, if once

226 ROMANS III. 22. '
misled, would not have the benefit of the interpretative
understanding for a check on its misreading, inasmuch as
the sense of the passage remains unembarrassed though the
second clause be omitted. It is possible, besides, that some
transcriber, finding the two clauses in the codex he wq,s
copying, yet not perceiving (with very many modern critics)
any peculiarity in the second, to distinguish it in import
from the first, might come to the conclusion that it had been
unwarrantably intruded by some predecessor, and might
thus omit it. The omission of the clause, says Bengel justly,
might very easily occur. (Facillima omissio) We cannot
hesitate, therefore, to concur with the great body of critics
in retaining the entire expression, as it stands in the received
text. But what then is the distinction between the two clauses?
There is none at all, say many expositors. The one is a mere
repetition of the other, it is maintained; and the repetition
only intensifies the idea that the righteousness is indeed
available to all who believe. "We are not nicely to dis
tinguish between unto and upon," says Koppe, (neque in tig
et iiri est argutandum). " No difference," says Alford, " in
the two prepositions must be sought." " There is no differ
ence," says Kollner, (es ist kein Unterschied). "I see no
difference," says Sclater, "more than betwixt Aaron's beard,
and the beard of Aaron." It is a pleonasm, says Bullinger.
It is an " elegant and emphatic pleonasm," says Stein.
(Dissert, de Dido classico Rom. iii. 22 — 26, p. 10.) It is only,
says Bugenhagen, a redundance of words, (copia tantum est
verborum). "The repetition expresses intensity," says Hodge
in his abridged ed. In his last edition, however, he drops
the remark. But Calvin was of the same opinion, (ad
auxesin diversis loquendi formis idem repetiil). So is
Fritzsche, Eeiche, Eitchie, Terrot, Maier, Hinton, &c. And
yet this idea wears the aspect of extreme unverisimilitude.
The Apostle was fond of using his prepositions distinguish-
ingly. (See Gal. i. 1, and Eom. xi. 36.) And it should
certainly be our very last resort to suppose that his dis
criminative use of the two which are employed in the case
before us is unmeaning. There does seem to be an ascent

ROMANS III.

227

in the thought. And unless it is utterly impossible to work
out this climactic idea, — in consistency with sobriety, and
with the scope of revelation, and with the facts of human
experience, — we should not fall back upon the idea of mere
indiscriminative accumulation.
Theodoret had the notion that by the clause unto all,
the Apostle refers to the Jews ; and that by the clause
upon all, he refers to the Gentiles, (to ydp tig irdvrag,
roiig'lovSaiovg Xiytf iirl iravrag Si, rove i/c rwv dXXwv
iSvwv). His notion has been taken up and echoed by a
considerable number of succeeding expositors; as by Bengel,
for instance, who, with a touch of the whimsical, explains
the unto as meaning into, and represents the Jews as being
the natural vessel for receiving the righteousness ; whereas
the Gentiles, upon whom it is, are, says he, like the
soil that receives the superabundance of the rain of grace,
(in omnes, Judaeos, qui sunt tanquam vas proprium.
Super omnes, Gentiles, qui sunt ut solum, recipiens
pluviam superabundentem gratiae). Wesley echoes Bengel.
Boehme makes the same distinction ; and Ch. Schmid.
Long before, Gennadius (in G5cumenius) set it in a less
artificial light than Bengel. In modern times Jatho has
revived this ancient interpretation. Matthias, too, adopts
it ; but he modifies it so far as to refer the first clause, unto
all, to the Gentiles, and the second, upon all, to the Jews.
He contends at great length, and with great earnestness,
for the interpretation ; and finds, indeed, a reference to the
same twofold distinction in the expression, by faith to faith,
in chap. i. 17; only there he reverses his own order of
reference, and supposes that the Jews are referred to in the
first expression, by faith, while it is the Gentiles that are
aimed at in the second expression, to faith. We cannot
but feel that there is a thoroughly artificial strain in this
method of accounting for the two clauses, and their respec
tive prepositions, and we are sorry that Ernesti had really
too much ground for his too severe remark, when, with
special reference to the exposition of Bengel, he says, —
" These explanations are so utterly absurd that one can
scarcely read them without laughing," (Das sind nun

228 ROMANS III. 22.
freilich alberne Erkldrungen, dass man sie kaum ohne
Lachen lesen kann).
Grotius tries another vein. He thinks that only one
class of persons is referred to in both clauses, but that the
preposition unto or into denotes the fact that the righteous
ness referred to really is in believers, while the preposition
upon indicates the fact that it is so in them as to be
apparent to others, (sie significat justitiam illam esse in
credentibus, iiri etiam apparere). Eauwenhoff echoes the
opinion of Grotius, (De SiKaiwatt, p. 34). Jowett has a some
what similar idea. He says, "of the two prepositions, tig
represents the more internal and spiritual relation of the
Gospel to the individual soul, as eVi its outward connection
with mankind collectively." Aquinas, before them, worked
in the same vein : — he explained the first preposition as
meaning in the heart, and the second as denoting what is
above human power and in excess of human merit, (in omnes,
scilicet in corde, non carnalibus observantiis, — et super
omnes, quia videlicet facultalem humanam ac merita
excedit). Abelard conjures similarly with the second of
the two expressions. He interprets it as meaning, — "in
the higher element of their being, that is, in their soul,"
(supra omnes fideles, id est in superiori eorum parte, id est
in anima). Mussus is more judicious, and improves upon
Aquinas: — Justification and grace, he says, like Christ
himself, come from heaven. Hence the expression upon all.
God sends a plentiful rain of grace upon us, (Super nos
gratias Deus largissimas pluit). Seb. Schmidt, more
naturally, interprets the unto as having reference to the
manifestation of the righteousness, and the upon as having
reference to its application; though he does not doubt that
in both the clauses the all are one and the ¦ same class, —
believers. Meyer is of the same opinion, so far as regards
the assumption that it is one and the same class of persons
who are referred to in the two clauses. But he would
explain the unto as denoting the destination of the righ
teousness, and the upon as denoting its actual collation.
So de Dieu, and Winzer, and Eyke. The same seems to be
the view of Ewald, (bestimmt fur alle und kommcnd iiber

ROMANS III. 22. 229
alle die glaubenden). The same is substantially the view
taken by Philippi and Hofmann, (Schriftbeweis, i. 331).
Philippi seems to think that the idea of a stream underlies
the Apostle's phraseology. The Evangelical Eighteousness,
like a stream, reaches to all believers, and pours itself upon
all, (Sie kommt an Alle heran, und ergiesst sich uber Alle,
wie ein Strom). Olshausen, before him, had the same
idea, and Eambach before Olshausen. From Olshausen
Hodge adopts the idea in his 1864 edition. Basil Cooper,
again, sees in the preposition upon, or over, a reference to
the protection of a shield ; while Baumgarten-Crusius sees
in unto an indication of the commencement of faith, and
in upon an indication of its farther development or increase,
(im tig irdvrag wird der Glaube ausgedriickt, mit welchem
die Menschen herankommen, im «rl irdvrag der, in welchem
sie beharren). But all of these are of opinion that it is
one and the same class of persons who are referred to in
both clauses.
There are obvious gleams of truth in several of these
expositions, — so far as features of distinction are pointed
out in the ideas suggested by the two prepositions. The
notions of Grotius, indeed, and Jowett, and Aquinas, are
obviously off the scent. But Seb. Schmidt, Meyer,
Olshausen, Philippi, and Baumgarten-Crusius, are evidently
snuffing the air in the right direction. So is Oltramare,
who says that unto denotes that the righteousness is " for
all," (pour tous), and upon, that " it rests on all," (elle repose
sur tous). Others of the best critics are of substantially
the same opinion. And, were we shut up to believe that
it is only one class of persons that is referred to in the two
clauses, we should certainly acquiesce, in substance, in the
same view.
But, along with Wetstein, Heumann, Bosveld, Flatt,
Moses Stuart, Haldane, Chalmers, Cox, Knight, Mehring,
Wardlaw, &c, we feel persuaded that the Apostle had
reference, in the two clauses, to two distinct classes of
persons, — distinct, at least, when viewed as classes. And
it is only, we apprehend, when this idea is taken, that we
can account satisfactorily for the two clauses, and explain,

230 ROMANS III. 22.
at once with perfect precision and with fulness of signifi
cance the distinction subsisting between the two preposi
tions. Instead, then, of regarding the attributive expression
the believing (rove 7rio-T£vovrac) as belonging equally to the
two clauses, unto all and upon all, we would regard it as
subjoined to, or rather as merging itself in, the second
of the two, for the very purpose of limiting the reference of
the second all, and thus differentiating its range of applica
tion from the unlimited sweep which is naturally charac
teristic of the first all. We would thus place a comma
after the first clausule, unto all, but would interpose no
comma between the expression upon all and the superadded
expression the believing.
We cannot see or conceive the least objection, of a
grammatical or hermeneutical nature, to this bifurcation of
the clausules. And when we consider the expressions of
absolute universality which the Apostle employs in verses
19, 20, while indicating the need that all men lie under, in
consequence of their personal unrighteousness, of having
recourse to the righteousness revealed in the Gospel; — the
expressions, to wit, the whole world — every mouth — all
flesh: — we see the utmost propriety in exhibiting, — when
he begins to hold up to view the evangelical righteousness
of God in its gracious counterpart-relation to men's neces
sities, — the counter universality, in all its amplitude, of the
provision of grace. Hence the befittingness, we had almost
said the hermeneutical necessity, of the unlimited expression
unto all, as designating, — in the merciful correspondence
and adaptation of the divine plan to the full range of
human wants, — the unfettered freeness of God's evangelical
righteousness to all unrighteous men, without distinction or
exception. The righteousness is for all. It was provided
for all. It was wrought out in behalf of all. It is
tendered unto all. It is free to all. For Christ "gave
himself a ransom for all." (1 Tim. ii. 6.) He "tasted
death for every man." (Heb. ii. 9.) He is " a propitiation
for the sins oi the whole world." (1 John ii. 1, 2.) All these
expressions are but other aspects of the idea that the
Evangelical Eighteousness of God is unto all. The Gospel

ROMANS III. 22. 231
of God's grace, — which equally announces the ransom, the
death-tasting, the propitiation, and the righteousness, — is a,
message of mercy "to every creature." It has relations to
man, as man, in whatever external circumstances, and in
whatever intellectual, social, or moral state he may be found.
But while the divine Eighteousness, — provided for the
unrighteous, — is " unto all " without limitation, it is " upon
all the believing." Upon is the radical and natural import
of the preposition ; and it is emphatically its predominant
import in the New Testament. The Eighteousness has
not only been "brought near" to believers. (Isai. xlvi. 13.)
A farther advance has been made. It has been brought
over upon them. (Comp. Luke v. 36.) And it is thus
on them. (Comp. Matt. xi. 29 ; xxvii. 29 ; Luke ii.
25; iv. 18; Eev. iv. 4.) It rests on them. (Comp. 2 Cor.
xii. 9 ; 1 Pet. iv. 14.) It envelops them. (Comp. John
xx. 7.) It remains on them. (Comp. John i. ' 33 ; iii.
36.) It, as it were, clothes them. (Comp. iirifiXypa in
classical and Septuagintal Greek, and £7rtj3oXaiov in the
Sept.-Coll. Luke xix. 35; 2 Cor. iii. 13, 15.) Melville
approves of this idea, (ea induti vestiuntur, ne eorum
pudenda appareat nuditas). It is to thorn as a "garment
of salvation " thrown over them. When they have it,
they are " covered with the robe of righteousness." (Isai.
lxi. 10.) We do not doubt, indeed, that the Apostle had
Isai. lxi. 10 in his eye when he penned the expression
before us; although he does not reproduce the prophet's
idea in an exactly parallelistic form. Both the prophet
and the Apostle delighted to contemplate and to represent
the saving grace of God in its aspect of Eighteousness ;
and this Eighteousness had evidently, to their eye, some
closer relationship to those who believe on the Messiah
than it has to those who believe not. For, undoubtedly,
the ideas of Eyre, on the one hand, that all the elect are
justified before they believe, (Vindiciae justificationis gra-
tuitae), and of Maurice, on the other, that all men are
justified whether they believe or not, (Essays, pp. 200 — 4),
are, in the most emphatic manner possible, contradictions
of the representations of Scripture.

232 ROMANS III. 22.
The believing, (rove iriartvovrag). The expression, — so
far as regards its tense, — has a reference to the " now "
which is specified in ver. 21st; and it expresses, as Melville
remarks, continuousness of faith, (constantiam fidei, et
in fide ad extremum usque perseverantiam innuens).
For continuousness of faith is necessary in order to the
continuous enjoyment of the blessings which are wrapped
up in the divine evangelical righteousness. The life must
be " a life of faith." Momentary faith may, indeed, suffice
for momentary blessings. More than momentary, and yet
temporary, faith may suffice for more than momentary,
yet temporary, blessings. But perpetual faith, — faith that
is " held fast unto the end," — is needed for perennial life,
for everlasting glory.
§ 3. for there is no . difference, (ov ydp ianv SiaaroXr)).
In both the preceding clausules the primary emphasis rests
upon the word all; though a secondary intonation should
be laid upon the contra-distinguished prepositions. The
point of the emphasis lying on the word all, looks to the
distinction in things religious that was commonly made by
the Jews between themselves and the Gentiles. The Apostle,
carrying along with him the idea of this emphasis, more
especially as it was laid upon the last all, vindicates, in
the expression before us, his use of the indiscriminative
word. " There is no difference," viz., in regard to the
matter on hand, between believing Jews and Gentiles.
They both equally need the evangelical righteousness .of God.
It is equally available for both. And both, as believers
in Jesus Christ, have equally attained it, and equally
enjoy the blessings which it involves. This principle of
indifferentiation in relation to the Eighteousness of God
is applicable to men, not only considered as Jews and
Gentiles, but also considered in all possible diversities of
physical, intellectual, moral, and social condition. There is
no difference, in the matter referred to, between sovereigns,
for instance, and their meanest subjects; between the
cultured and the most uncultured ; between the sage and
savages; no difference between the most punctilious Pha-

ROMANS III. 23. 233
risee who observes every ceremony of the church, and,
gathering up his garments, steps fastidiously aside from
every indecency of social life, and the most reckless offcasts
who " rough it " on the highways of life, or riot and rot
in the lowest of our city dens. As Cardinal Cajetan
remarks, the righteousness of God through faith in Jesus
Christ is, was, and will be upon all who believe.

VEB. 23. Tioivrsg ydp rip^aprov, zai vanpovvrcu rrjg
io^g rov §sov,
Eng. Auth. Vers. For all have sinned, and come short of
the glory of God;
Revised Version. For all sinned, and are fallen short of
the glory of God,^
§ 1. The last clause of the preceding verse forms, in the
common editions of Luther's version, — such, at least, as we
possess, —and in the Geneva, and in Bengel's German ver
sion, the first clause of this. And were the arrangement of
the verses to be re-arranged, this grouping of the clauses, —
a grouping approved of by Calvin, — would perhaps deserve
to be preferred. To admit it now, however, would only be
to embarrass references in dictionaries, concordances, &c.
This embarassment is aggravated by Castellio, by the
editors of the French Geneva, and by Ostervald and
Martin, who, in their respective editions of the Bible,
swallow up the Stephanie 23rd verse altogether in the
22nd, so that they have only 30, instead of 31, verses in
the chapter. But such a departure from the conventional
Stephanie adjustment and enumeration is greatly to be
deprecated. In many cases the actual versicular division
is obviously imperfect. In some it is very infelicitous.
But it would be perplexing in the extreme to interfere
with it now. And almost all the evils arising from the
existing improprieties, either in the capitular or in the

234 ROMANS III. 23.
versicular divisions, may be obviated by printing the text
continuously from paragraph to paragraph, as is done in
the Testaments of Bengel, Griesbach, Lachmann, Tischen-
dorf, &c.
§ 2. for all sinned, (irdvrtg ydp ypaprov). Such is
doubtless the proper translation of the apostle's expression.
He might have used the perfect tense, and said " for ail have
sinned," (ypapryKaai), but then he would have shifted his
standpoint of contemplation. He would have been in the
attitude of one who was making some kind of mensuration
of the rise, progress, and consummation of the sum-total, or
of some part, of the sinning of those to whom he referred.
He chooses, however, to say, "for all sinned," — looking
back simply to the historical fact of the occurrence of sin in
the past life of " the believing." It was a fact that they had
all sinned. It was a fact that they were sinners. They had
failed in their duty. They had violated the law of their
God, — the law that was continually echoed in their hearing
by the voice of their own consciences, within their breasts.
Seb. Schmidt supposes that the leference of the verb
is to the first sin of Adam. (Malumus ypaprov accipere
de peccato omnium hominum in praeterito, quod est pec
catum primum Adami ad omnes pertinens) Olshausen
thinks that there is a principal, though not an exclusive,
reference to that original sin. And Musculus, Aretius, Er.
Schmid, Cocceius, Vitringa, Bengel, Benson, &c, are of opinion
that there is a reference to both original and actual sin.
So Trapp, who says, "the first man defiled the nature,
and ever since the nature defileth the man." Stein main
tains that the reference is, 1st, to originating original sin,
2nd, to originated original sin, and, 3rd, to actual sin so far
as it is involuntary, but by no means so far as it is
elective and voluntary ! (Dissert de Dicto classico Rom.
iii. 22 — 26.) Feurborn thinks that the passage is a decisive
argument against the papistical doctrine of the immaculate
conception of the Virgin, — her freedom, that is, from original
sin! But any phase of such an idea, is entirely out of
joint with the Apostle's argument. His reference is ob-

ROMANS III. 23. 2S5
viously to the fact which he has substantiated from chap.
i. 18 to chap. iii. 20, — the fact that all are guilty of actual
personal transgressions. It is on the ground of such actual
unrighteousness that the Apostle builds his plea for the
evangelical Eighteousness of God.
When he says, "for all sinned," we are to understand
the conjunction as bearing its usual reason-rendering
signification. The clause which it introduces renders a
reason for the affirmation with which the preceding verse
concludes, — "there is no difference," — no difference, namely,
among the believing, so far as regards the relation which
they sustain to the evangelical Eighteousness of God. There
is no difference, — for all of them were guilty of unrigh
teousness ; — the best of them, the best of the Jews as truly
as the worst of the Gentiles. Seb. Schmidt is disposed
to take a different view of the conjunction. He has the
notion that, as the Apostle has stated in verses 21st and
22nd that there is a way of justification for the unrighteous,
so in verses 23rd — 26th he explains, as in a sort of inde
pendent section, what this way is. Hence he would regard
the conjunction as introducing, in some indefinitely ex
planatory way, a new paragraph : — " Indeed all sinned,"
(particula non tarn causalis est, quam explanativa, —
Niniirum omnes peccaverunt). But the Apostle's discourse
is not a formal dissertation, partitioned off into sharply
defined logical heads and particulars. It rolls freely and
unconstrainedly along, wave succeeding wave. And as the
current of thought runs, and indeed rushes on, the phraseo
logy coincidently rushes onward and hither or thither, —
sometimes regurgitating at a particular turn, sometimes
dashing itself impetuously forward as on sunken reefs, or
sweeping irresistibly around some majestic peak of ever
lasting rock. And, moreover, we must not attempt to
lick such a conjunction as for into any shape that may
suit our artificial divisions of things. It certainly just
means for. There can be no doubt that the statement,
"for all sinned," is intended to vindicate the affirmation
at the conclusion of the preceding verse — " for there is no
difference." All "the believing" — of whatever nationality,

236 ROMANS III. 23.
of whatever moral development, — needed to have the righ
teousness of God upon them, " for " it was a historical fact
in their experience that they had sinned.
§ 3. and are fallen short of the glory of God, (koi
vartpowrai ryg So^yg tov Srtov). It is somewhat difficult
to reproduce to a nicety, in our English idiom, the idea
embodied in the verb which we translate they are fallen
short of, (vartpowTat). Were we to say, with our Authorized
Version, "they come short of," a somewhat erroneous idea
would be suggested: — this, to wit, that the Apostle refers
to what happens rather than to what is, (that is, in such
a case, to what has happened). The same objection lies
against the translation of Dr. Peile, and of the "Five Clergy
men," they fall short of. If we should suppose, however,
that the authors of our Authorized Version intended the
auxiliary have, which they have used in translating the
verb sinned ("for all have sinned"), to be carried forward
to the verb come short of, then their version, though appar
ently less precise, would be really more correct. It would
still, however, be somewhat objectionable ; partly because,
by the use of the perfect tense, it seems to be using too great
freedom in reproducing the Greek present, and partly because
it really is something else than an exact reproduction. For
the Greek present does not indicate an accomplished fact.
It only expresses an existing condition. Hence, too, Mace's
version is objectionable; — have forfeited. Turnbull's is
more objectionable still, — have lost ; — though certainly both
of these translations lie on the right line of things. On the
whole, we cannot find a better translation, if we adhere
to literality, than the one we have given, " and are fallen
short of the glory of God," though it is far from being
perfect. The Apostle's idea might be fairly and fully,
though of course very freely, expressed thus, — "and are
unentitled to the glory of God (though they might and
should have been possessed of a title to it, in virtue of
perfect righteousness of their own)."
The verb, by reason of its etymology, graphically re
presents the condition of those who are left behind

ROMANS III. 23. 237
in a race ; (ad verbum sonat posteriorantur.-Erasmus).
They fail to arrive at the goal in time to claim the
proffered prize. They are thus unentitled to the prize.
Such is the condition of sinful men. They have not run
well in the race that was set before them. They have
turned aside "like a deceitful bow." They have loitered.
They have dallied. They have failed to improve their
golden opportunity. And it is now therefore out of the
question for them to entertain the idea of meriting "the
glory of God." They are, by their own fault, unentitled,
now and for ever, — so far at least as their own merit is
concerned, — to " the glory of God."
The import of the verb helps, in a considerable measure,
to determine the reference of the expression, " the glory of
God." That reference has been greatly disputed. Theodoret
explains the expression as meaning the grace of God, that is,
we presume, the glorious grace of God, that grace of God
which is his glory; and he regards, therefore, the verb
as simply meaning, they are in want of, — " they are needful
of the grace of God," (rije x"PlT°G ivStttg). Dionysius a
Eyckel echoes Theodoret's explication. In some codices of
the Vulgate the word grace is substituted for the word
glory : — " they are in need of the grace of God." Aquinas
reads " glory," but he explains it in a way kindred to that
of Theodoret: — "they need justification, which redounds to
the glory of God," (justificatione quae in gloriam Dei cedit).
So de Lyra, (gloria Dei. i. gratia sui per quam apparet
gloriosus). Vatable had a similar idea. He says that the
glory of God means " the gratuitous remission of sins
through Christ," (gloriam Dei vocat gratuitam peccatorwm
remissionem per Christum). CEcolampad and Musculus
are, in substance, of the same opinion. Emser too : he
explains the expression as meaning the grace of God, from
which glory and honour are derived, (Das ist, seiner
gnaden, aus welcher uns eere und glorien volget). Pelagius
had a somewhat similar notion, (egent gloria Dei, quia
non habent suam). All this group of interpretations
clusters around the assumption that the verb simply denotes
need. It is so translated in the Vulgate, (egent). And

238 ROMANS III. 23.
hence the Eheims version of the verse is this, — "for all
have sinned : and doe neede the glorie of God." So
Wycliffe, — " For alle men synneden, and have nede to the
glorie of God." So de Saci, (et ont besoin de la gloire de
Dieu). Such a translation, however, does not express the
precise idea of the original verb. The verb implies, indeed,
the notion of want, but it is of want under the phase of
slwrt-coming, — want, that suggests the idea, not so much of
need and desirability, as of destitution.
Melancthon regards the phrase — the glory of God — as
meaning the glory of which God approves, the glory of
personal righteousness, that righteousness which God judges
to be glory. (Carent ilia gloria quam Deus approbat,
carent ilia justitia, quam Deus judicat esse gloriam.
Comment. 1540.) He would thus look upon the entire
phrase, and are fallen short of the glory of God, as an echo
of the import of the preceding expression, they sinned.
Strigel's view coincides with Melancthon's. So does Sten
gel's, and Bisping's, and Lange's, (die Gerechtigkeit des
Lebens als Lebensruhm oder Glanz von dem Urtheilsspruch
Gottes bezeichnet). Bullinger's interpretation is something
similar: — "the glory of God," says he, "is that glory of
moral perfection which God should have in man, (integritas
quam deus in homine habere debebat, — die eere die Gott an
uns haben soli). Seb. Schmidt's interpretation is just a
particular phase and development of the same fundamental
idea : — he contends for the idea advocated by not a few of
the old Lutheran interpreters, such as Feurborn, that the
glory of God is the image of God in man. Calov maintains
the same view. Alting, too, in substance, (gloria Dei
designat earn partem imaginis Dei, in qua ejus gloria
potissimum elucet). Glassius also, (Phil. Sac. iii. 1, 30
¦ — 1). The same view is taken by Eambach and Carpzov;
Ernesti and Olshausen ; and also, substantially, by Eiickert,
Brandes, &c. Conybeare's translation of the clause is,
" and none have attained the glorious likeness of God." In
support of this interpretation, appeal is sometimes made to
1 Cor. xi. 7, in which man, — as distinguished from woman,
who is "the glory of the man," — is said to be "the image

ROMANS III. 23. 239
and glory of God." But even there the " image " is distin
guished from the " glory : " and, moreover, it is not some
thing in the man, but it is the man himself who is said to
be, and who is, the " glory of God ; " and it is the male, too,
as distinguished from the female. It is- not the case,
besides, that that " glory " has been lost. It remains in the
nature, as distinguished from the moral character. It is an
objection to the interpretation, in all its phases, that it
attaches to the expression, the glory of God, an import which,
without the aid of contextual side lights, must appear to be
arbitrary; — an import, moreover, which is aside from the
ideas that are commonly attached to the phrase in the
terminology of Paul. It is connected, besides, with an
exposition of the whole clause, which, in relation to the
preceding clause, seems to form a redundancy. And, to
crown all, it fails to do justice to the peculiarity of the verb
which is employed, — they are fallen short of (vartpovvrai) :
for the verb naturally indicates, not the loss of a previous
possession, or the destitution which is consequent on that
loss, but a state of apparently hopeless distance from an
unattained prize.
Luther translates the clause thus, — " and want the glory
which they ought to have in God," (und mangeln des
Ruhms, den sie an Gott haben sollten). He seems to mean,
— if we may gather his idea from his marginal remark, —
that sinful men cannot glory in God as their God. (Kbnnen
in der Wahrheit nicht sagen, Du bist mein Gott, ob sie
wohl mit dem Munde viel von ihm riihmen, — they cannot
in truth say, Thou art my God, although they boast much of
him with the mouth) Somewhat analogous to this idea of
Luther is the interpretation of Erasmus (in his Paraphrase),
— "they cannot glory of their righteousness before God."
Hunnius takes the same view, — " They are in want of all
ground and occasion of glorying before God," (carere omni
materia et occasione gloriandi coram Deo). Giinther takes
the same view, and, indeed, quietly substitutes, in his
Comment on Luther's translation, "before God" for "in
God," (Im Papstthum wollen sich wohl viel Mb'nche dessel-
ben riihmen, aber es ist eine liigenhaffte Prahlerey. Denn

240 ROMANS III. 23.
wir mangeln alle des Ruhms, den wir vor Gott haben sollen).
Este gives a preference to the same interpretation, (non
habent unde coram Deo gloriantur). De Paris accepts
the same interpretation ; so Winzer ; and, long before, Cal
vin seems to have accepted it, (non habent unde apud
deum glorientur. — Gloriam Dei accipit pro ea, quae coram
Deo locum habit, — which last clause is strangely mistrans
lated thus by Owen, — "the glory of God I take to mean
the approbation of God "). The same view is taken by
Heumann, Wolf, Zacharia, Koppe, Brentano, &c. It is,
when hermeneutically viewed, a most unlikely interpreta
tion, — attaching, as it does, a difficult, arbitrary, and unna
tural idea to the relation that is expressed by the genitive
in the phrase of God.
The interpretation, which Owen, and Oltramare too, falsely
ascribe to Calvin, — " they came short of the approbation of
God," — is, nevertheless, espoused, in substance, by quite a
considerable group of expositors. Tyndale translates the
expression thus, — "and lacke the prayse that is of valoure
before God." His position in this group of expositors is
ambiguous. But that of Grotius is unequivocal, (appro-
batio hominis quae fi,t a deo) ; and the same interpretation
is adopted by Crell, and Day, and Turretin ; by Macknight
too, and Flatt, and Bosveld, and Bolteh ; by Eosenmiiller
(ultimately, though he does not carry it out consistently);
by Fritzsche also, and Stuart, Alford, Dr. Jo. Brown,
Dr. Da. Brown, &c. Dr. Da. Brown claims for it, —
but on utterly insufficient data, — the patronage of " the
best interpreters." It cannot, we apprehend, represent
correctly the idea of the Apostle. He never, so far as
we can see, uses the noun in question (S6%a) in the
sense of approbation; and indeed the term, as we appre
hend, never bears such a signification in any of the New
Testament writings. There are passages, certainly, which
can be interpreted on the hypothesis that the word has the
meaning contended for. But the meaning is not essential
to their luminous explication, and they are more lucid when
the term receives its common and Hebraizing import of
glory.

ROMANS III. 23. 241
A few critics have imagined that the Apostle's idea is
this : — " They fail to glorify God." Odlcumenius proposes
this interpretation, (ovk i-^S-ao-av tov §o£o£eiv rov Seov) ; and
Origen, long before him, seems to have held it, (Quomodo
enim peccator auderet dare gloriam Deo ?). Chalmers and
Knight espouse it. Doddridge, Haldane, and Webster and
Wilkinson, put it in the foreground of their complex and
therefore compromising explanation. It is evidently a leap
in the dark, and has been suggested, apparently, by the
lexical affinity of the noun glory to the verb to glorify. But
to glorify God is to promote his glory. And since there is
no word equivalent to promote in the Apostle's phrase, the
essential element needed for the authentication of the pro
posed explication is wanting.
When Abelard interpreted the expression as meaning,
" they have need to glorify God," (opus habent- quasi ex
debito Dominum glorificare), he lost hold of the Apostle's
expression at both its ends. He misunderstood both what
is meant by " the glory of God," and also what is meant by
the verb which expresses man's relation to the " glory."
When Meyer and Krehl suppose that the phrase, the
glory of God, must, so far as the substance of thought is
concerned, be tantamount to the righteousness of God, they
seem, like so many others, to be groping in the dark, and
catching at mere possibilities, however arbitrary or indis
tinct. We need not attempt to refute such conjectures.
Neither need we take special note of various other sporadic
interpretations, which have been devised by individual critics,
but have rarely been approved of by any but their inven
tors; — such, for instance, as the theory of Matthias, who
explains the expression as meaning — glory such as Godls,
(Ruhm, wie er Gottes ist) ; and the notion of Palairet, who
imagines the expression to be used by hypallage for the
glorious God; and the notion of Hofmann, who supposes
that the relation of the genitive brings out this idea, "glory
such as is befitting God," (wie sie Gotte selbst eignet ,-Schriit-
beweis, i. 551). Neither need we enumerate the various
indiscriminative explications which have been proposed,
such as that of Ch. Schmid, " the benefits of divine adop-
E

242 ROMANS III. 23.
tion," (beneficia divinae adoptionis), or that of van Hengel,
"the communion of God, and all the blessings thence
arising," (Dei communione omnibusque bonis hinc oriundis
car ere). There is no need for chasing, in their flights, all
the vagaries of men who are ingenious, or who are deter
mined to be ingenious, or who, feeling that they are baffled,
hide their perplexity under the broad shield of a common
place platitude.
The simplest, readiest, and by far the most likely and be
fitting of all the interpretations which have been proposed,
is that which regards the glory of God as that everlasting
state of grandeur and bliss which belongs to God, within
which he dwells, and admission into which he grants to all
such as, during their state of probation, become meet to enjoy
it. It is, in so far as it is available to men, the glory,
which is coupled with honour and immortality. (Eom. ii.
7.) It is the glory which goes hand in hand with honour
and peace. (Eom. ii. 10.) It is eternal life. (Eom. ii. 7.)
It is, in its man-ward relation, the " inheritance, which is
incorruptible, and undefiled, and that fadeth not away,
reserved in heaven." (1 Pet. i. 4.) It comprehends "the
things which God hath prepared for them that love him,"
and which mortal "eye hath not seen, nor ear heard,
neither have entered into the heart of man." (1 Cor. ii. 9.)
We need not attempt, therefore, to describe it, or to conceive
it. We would, in the attempt, only embody our own childish
conceits. It is called "the glory of God," because it belongs
to God. It is his in possession. And it is of his bounty
that he confers it on any of his creatures. Jesus enjoyed it
with Him before the world was. (John xvii. 5.) And of all
who believe in Jesus it may be said, "God hath called them
unto his eternal glory by Christ Jesus." (1 Pet. v. 10.)
They are heirs of it just now; joint heirs with Christ Jesus.
(Eom. viii. 17, 18.) By and by they shall rise up higher,
and entering on its actual possession, they shall be glorified.
(Eom. viii. 30.) But this glorification of believers will be
" to the glory of God's grace, wherein he hath made them
accepted in the Beloved." (Eph. i. 6.) In themselves they
have forfeited all title to such glory. "They sinned, and

ROMANS III. 24- 243
are unentitled to the retributive glory of God." This view
of the expression is that which is taken, apparently, by
Chrysostom and Theophylact, (who contrast the glory which
men have forfeited with the shame which is their due). It
is given by CEcumenius (as an alternative interpretation).
It is the interpretation which is given in the anonymous
Venetian Commentary issued from the Aldine press in 1542,
(carent gloria Dei, id est, felicitate perpetua). It is the
interpretation of Beza, Hemming, Melville ; Piscator, Pareus,
Willet, Sclater; Vorstius also, and Dickson, and Vitringa,
Zwinger ; Locke too, and Varenius, Bengel, Whitby, Boysen ;
and also in more modern times, of Morus, Bohme, Glockler,
Baumgarten-Crusius, Oltramare, Mehring, &c. All men are,
as in themselves, unentitled to celestial glory. Even all
believers, as in themselves, are unentitled to it ; and it is to
them exclusively — though Alford does not see this — that
the Apostle here refers. The fact that all believers — whether
Jews or Gentiles — " are unentitled to the glory of God," is
evidence that there can be no difference or distinction among
them, so far as regards their relation to the evangelical righ
teousness of God, and their entire dependence on it for
justification, and for the consequent attainment and enjoy
ment of everlasting life. "There is no distinction here,"
as Luther, interpretatively, has it, (Denn es ist hier kein
Unterschied).

Ver. 24. hzKiovfisvot }>tvpsa,v rri avrov yppiri ~hio\ rrjg
aToXvrpaias&ig rrjg h Xpttrroi Yrfiov,
Eng. Auth. Vers. Being justified freely by his grace,
through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus :
§ 1. being justified, (SiKaioiptvoi). The grammatical
relation of this participle to what goes before has not been
determined with unanimity by critics. Ostervald and
Ewald, for instance, connect it with ver. 22nd, by throwing
ver. 23rd, along with the last clause of ver. 22nd, for there is

244 ROMANS III. 24.
no difference, into a parenthesis. But this method of con
nection not only renders the composition unnecessarily rugged
and abrupt, it renders the nominative case of the participle
unaccountable in relation to the accusative case of all the
believing in ver. 22nd. It is not easy to avoid the conclu
sion that the participle is in the nominative case, because the
Apostle was conscious of continuity of thought in passing
from ver. 23rd to ver. 24th.
But if there be this continuity of thought, is not the idea,
participially expressed in ver. 24th, rendered subordinate and
ministrant to the idea which is embodied in the affirmation
of ver. 23rd? One would naturally come to this conclusion
when following, unsophisticatedly, the unconstrained lead
ings of the phraseology. And yet such a relation of the
verses has seemed to many critics, who looked at the subject
exegetically and doctrinally, to be almost if not altogether
unaccountable. They are at a loss to comprehend how the
Apostle should adduce the fact that all believers are justified
freely by God's grace as evidence that they all sinned and
are unentitled to the glory of God. Such a relation of ideas
seems to them to be a species of inexplicable topsy-turvy or
bouleversement. Hence, apparently, the Peshito translator
has supplied, before the participle, the conjunction and,
( . r,f-i\<hn). Luther makes the same supplement, and
changes the participial form of the expression into the indi
cative mood, — "and become righteous," (und werden
gerecht). The same change is made by Wycliffe, (and ben
justified), and the Geneva. Erasmus, — noting that the par
ticiple is in the present tense, being justified, whereas in the
Vulgate it is, according to the exigencies of the Latin
language, in the past,- "having been justified," (justificati), —
makes a similar change. He renders the expression but are
justified, (justificantur autem, addita de meo conjunctiuncula,
quo sensum redderem dilucidiorem). Tyndale gives the
same translation. So does Melancthon ; and Limborch and
Koppe approve. Bengel adopts Luther's conjunction, "and
are made righteous," (und werden gerecht gemacht). And
so do Seb. Schmidt, Zinzendorf, Maier, &c. Van Ess inten
sifies the conjunctive idea by rendering the expression thus,

ROMANS III. 2t 245
-^"so they become righteous," (so werden sie gerecht).
Fritzsche does not object to the introduction of the con
junction and, and the transmutation of the participle into
the indicative mood. And Calvin, though not intruding
the conjunction, says that the participle is put for the
verb, (participium loco verbi positummore Graecis usitato).
In accordance with this view, Peter Martyr, omitting the
conjunction, translates the participle, "(they) are justified,"
(justificantur). But such a transformation of the Apostle's expression is
a liberty which, certainly, should not be taken, unless one
is reduced to hermeneutical straits. And there are no such
straits in the case before us; for the Apostle's idea is
sufficiently self-luminous, if we retain the natural sub
ordination of the participial clause to the affirmation that
goes before. At this particular point of his discourse the
Apostle is intent on showing that all believers are equally
unentitled, — considered in themselves, — to the glory of God.
And he adduces the fact of their free justification by GodV
grace as affording decisive evidence of the immeritoriousness
of their character, and of the consequent moral imperfection
that has attached to their probationary career. In other
conjunctures of argumentation the Apostle would no doubt
have, inversely, adduced the fact of men's sinfulness — as
attested by consciousness and conscience — and their con
sequent failure to achieve, by personal worthiness, a title
to everlasting glory, as evidence of the necessity of free
justification by God's grace through the redemption that
is in Christ Jesus. But there is a reciprocity in the rela
tions of the two facts specified ; and in this particular angle
of his reasoning the Apostle views the subject retrogres-
sively. Taking his stand on the fact of gratuitous justifica
tion, he reasons backward to the establishment of his
momentous allegation that all, of whom this gratuitous
justification is predicable, have sinned, and are consequently
unentitled to the glory of God. Beza's ultimate translation
of the participial expression preserves the proper relation
of the clauses, — "ut qui justificentur," &c, — as being such
as are justified, <kc, inasmuch as they are justified, &c.

246 ROMANS III. 84.
Eras. Schmid adopts Beza's version. Piscator defends it.
Kolding contends for it. (Disput. Theol. de Dido classico,
Rom. iii. 24 — 26.) And the idea on which it is founded,
the subordination of the participial clause to the preceding
affirmation, is maintained by Winer, (Gram. iii. 45. 6, b.),
and advocated by Philippi, Matthias, Mehring, &c. It is
adopted too by de Wette and Eeithmayr. It is certainly
the only natural and unconstrained interpretation of the
phraseology. Oltramare would retain for the participle its
usual participial power ; but, instead of linking it, in
subordination, to the preceding affirmation, he supposes
that it forms the commencement of a new sentence, which
finds its irregular apodosis in verse 27th : — "Being justified
freely by his grace, &c, &c, &c, where then is boasting ? "
It is an ingenious interpunction and construction, — which,
unknown to Oltramare, had been suggested by de Paris ;
but it is forced, and it gratuitously introduces anacoluth
into the Apostle's composition. It inverts, too, the natural
relation of the interrogation, where (then) is boasting? —
lifting it up into a primary position, instead of leaving
it as a natural conclusion, lying at the base of what has
been previously established. There is no need for having
recourse to any violent expedient to reduce the Apostle's
words and ideas to symmetry and order. When we under
stand them aright, and look at them as from his own
standpoint, so far as that can be ascertained by the uncon
strained interlinking of the details of his phraseology, there
is already beautiful kosmos and no chaos.
In justice, however, to those translators and expositors
who have sought to merge or transmute that participial
relationship of subordination which is naturally suggested
by the initial expression in ver. 24th, viewed in relation
to the affirmation contained in ver. 23rd; and by way of
apology for those other critics who have thrown ver. 23rd
into a parenthesis ; it should be conceded that in the farther
progress of the Apostle's train of thoughts, from the middle
of the 24th verse onward to the close of the 26th, he
lets go the relation of subordination, and expands, before
his own mind and the minds of his readers, the subject

ROMANS III. 24. s 247
of justification, as really being, in its relation to the evan
gelical righteousness of God, the principal theme of the
entire paragraph that extends from ver. 21st to ver. 31st.
The Apostle, indeed, gives no notice, by any peculiarity in
the grammatical inter-relations of his phraseology, that
he lets go the idea of subordination which is expressed at
the commencement of ver. 24th. And thus his language
is far' from being moulded on the principles of a finely
finished, and still farther from being conformed to the
principles of a fastidiously finical, rhetoric. It rolls on at -
large, spreading out irregularly, now on the right hand and
now on the left, but always sweeping powerfully along.
Yet it is unquestionable that from the middle of the 24th
verse, the current of thought widens out into the great
subject of justification in general, apart from its particular
bearings, in the shape of demonstrative evidence, upon the
sinfulness and consequent immeritoriousness of those who
are the recipients of its blessings.
Basil Cooper, — noticing the intimate relation which sub
sists between the evangelical "righteousness of God," and
what is called justification, and noting at the same time the
affinity, in Greek, of the terms denoting righteousness (SiKai
oavvy) and justified (SiKaiovptvoi), — proposes to coin, as an
equivalent in English for the latter term, the word enrigh
teoused : — " being enrighteoused freely by his own grace."
He would form the verb enrighteous (that is, to render
righteous) after the analogy of the verb enrich, (i. e., to
render rich). It is a bold expedient, — almost a daring
adventure of invention. But, taking the tyranny of usage
into account, it cannot possibly succeed ; the more especially
as it veils from view the judicial element of justification,
which, in the original Greek, is emphatically prominent.
When believers are said, in the passage before us, to be
justified, the meaning is not that they are enrighteoused in
the sense of being made righteous. It is that they are
judicially made out and declared to be possessed of righ
teousness, — righteousness that had just been attained
through faith, — righteousness such as forms an unchallenge
able title to everlasting glory. (Justitia Dei hie nihil

248 ROMANS III. 2'4
aliud est, quam jus ad vitam, quod Deus nobis procuravit
in Christo, dum is obediens est factus usque ad mortem.
Seu est obedientia Christi, qua is, ordinante ita Deo,
meruit nobis jus ad vitam. — Horchius, Apparatus ad"
Epist. ad Eom. § 62.) God, while acting as the Supreme
Magistrate of the Universe, can, even in that capacity,
regard it as a right and befitting thing that, — in considera
tion of the relation of believers to the work of Christ, of
which they avail themselves as if it were their own righ
teousness,— they should be constituted heirs of everlasting
life. § 2. freely, by his grace, (Swptdv ry avrov xdpm). The
word freely (Swptdv) is translated gratis in the Vulgate.
The translation is retained in the Eheims. Bosveld gives
what corresponds to it in Dutch, te geefs, (which he prefers
to the kerkelijke uitdrukking om niet). It is a correct
translation. The term means gratuitously, or after the
manner of a gift, (Geschenkweise, Passow, de Wette,
Meyer, &c.) It is translated for nought in 2 Thess. iii. 8.
(Comp. Din.) And it is for nought to believers themselves,
so far as the ground or meritorious cause of God's action is
concerned, that they are justified. The term is translated
without a cause in John xv. 25. (Comp. mn.) And so far
as believers themselves are concerned, so far as regards merit
on their part, their justification is without a cause. It is
apparently because of this usage of the word that van
Hengel regards it as being here " a word of negation," (voca-
bulum negans), in opposition to the phrase by his grace",
which he regards as " a formula of affirmation," (formula
aiens). Dr. John Brown draws a similar distinction be
tween the two expressions, saying that in " the former of
the two the Apostle looks to the recipient of justification,
and says, It is free, — there is no cause of it in man : in the
second he looks to the author and bestower of justification,
and he says, It is by God's grace, — there is no cause of it in
God but sovereign kindness." But this distinction, if
carried out so very sharply as Dr. Brown proposes, becomes
arbitrary and inexact. For the word rendered freely

ROMANS III. 24. 249
(Swptdv) is eminently fitted to lead us to look away from
man to the giver of the gift, (the giver of the Swptd or
Swpov) ; and in the latter phrase there is a special emphasis,
as we shall see, not upon the word grace, — though a word
of momentous significance in relation to the matter in
hand, — but upon the pronoun his, as specifying the
august Personality whence the "good and perfect gift"
descends. Freely, (Swptdv) ;— the word " excludes merit," says Hem
ming, " not Christ's indeed, but ours," (meritum excludit, non
Christi, sed nostrum). It excludes, says Aquinas, "the
merit of preceding works," (absque merito praecedentium
operum), It excludes more, says Beza; it excludes the
works that come after faith, as well as the works that go
before it, (JSwptdv, i. ex gratuito dono ac mera liberalitate ;
ita ut non modo antecedentia, sed etiam consequentia fidem
opera excludantur). If the justification be gratuitous on
the part of God, it must be to man " without money and
without price." It would no longer be a gift to believers,
if they purchased or deserved it by their merit. Luther
translates the word, " without merit," (ohne Verdienst). So
does Sharpe. Bellarmin explains it admirably, so far as its
theology is concerned, " out of his mere liberality," (ex mera
¦ejus liberalitate). Limborch explains it happily, so far as
its philology is concerned, as meaning donatitie.
By his grace, (ttj avrov xdpm). The position of the pro
noun before the word grace, shows, as Meyer has remarked,
that it is to be betoned. It is from God that the gift
comes down. It is by His favour that believers are
justified. This betonement of the pronoun is acknowledged
by Philippi and van. Hengel, and was noted long ago by
Cardinal Cajetan. The Syriac translator, apparently over
looking the emphatic reference to the author of the gift,
omits the pronoun altogether, and then transposes the two
elements of the Apostle's complex expression, by favour
gratuitously, (^-ur^0 1^-Q.^j-^s). But, as the Apostle
gives it, the entire expression points us at once to the effi
cient, and also to the impulsive cause of the justification of
believers. God is the Causa efficiens, the Efficient Cause:

250 ROMANS III. 24-
the grace that is in Him is the causa impulsiva, the im
pulsive cause.
The grace referred to is, of course, subjective in God. And
when Dionysius a Eyckel, Bellarmin, and others, represent
it as grace subjective in man, infused grace, — " the formal
cause" of justification, as distinguished from the causes that
are efficient, final, and material, — they bring from the re
cesses of polemical theology an intolerable thumbscrew to
apply to the inspired phraseology. It is, certainly, not
grace " infused " into men, and thence " inherent " in them
in the shape of faith, hope, and charity, that is referred to
by the Apostle. Such an idea is an utter inversion of the
Pauline doctrine. God "justifieth the ungodly." (Eom. iv.
5.) He justifieth ; and then, and thence especially, he
sanctifieth. In the passage before us the word grace has
manifestly its common signification, its signification of
favour. It denotes a mode of the divine love. It is the
divine love in its relation to the undeserving : — the divine
love, consequently, in so far as it is free in its outgoings.
It is the same divine love which is still more strongly
represented as mercy (iXtog) when its objects are viewed
in the tout ensemble of their guilt and misery. — The believ
ing, says the Apostle, are justified freely by God's favour —
God's mercy; and, this being the case, it follows that it
must be true that they have all sinned, and are, as
viewed in themselves, unentitled to the glory of God.
"Juniors," says Melancthon, "are to be warned that the
monks are guilty of corrupting the word grace when they
interpret it here of infused qualities, while, without doubt,
it signifies gratuitous compassion." (Hie juniores manendi
sunt de corruptela vocabuli gratiae, quod interpretati sunt
Monachi de qualitatibus infusis, ut ipsi loquuntur, cum
hie sine ulla dubitatione significet gratuitam misericor-
diam.-Enarratio, 1556.) As to the formal cause of justifi
cation, see Davenant's Disputatio de justitia habituali et
actuali. " Freely, by his grace : " — The latter expression, says
Baumgarten-Crusius, explains the former. (Den Begriff des
Swptdv erkldrt das dojueben stehende rjj avrov xdpm) The

ROMANS III. 24. 251
Apostle thus twice declares, says Calvin, that the whole is
of God, (itaque bis expressit totum esse Dei, nihil nostrum).
He " doubles, as it were," says Day, " the same word, that
he might the more exclude debt and merit." For, to use a
favourite idea of Augustin, if grace be grace in any way, it
must be grace or gratuitous in every way. Beza translates
the twofold expression thus, " gratis, that is, by his grace,"
(gratis, id est, ejus gratia). And the best view, apparently,
that can be taken of it, is to regard the latter portion of
it — by his grace — as reduplicating on the- former, — at once
echoing the idea that is expressed by the word Swptdv, and
thus intensifying it, and also pointing out emphatically the
Being from whom the gift descends.
§ 3. through the redemption which is in Christ Jesus,
(Std ryg diroXvrpwatwg rfje *" Xpiorij) 'Ino-ov,). The Peshito
translator introduces this clause with the conjunction and,
— " and through, &c." But the insertion of such a particle
is an intrusion, — an interruption to the continuous flow
of the Apostle's exhibition. Cramer, Eosenmiiller, and
Koppe translate the preposition (Sid) "on account of,"
(propter), as if it had been followed by an accusative,
instead of a genitive. It must, however, be rendered
through, or by means of, and denotes the real objective
medium through which justification is reached: — the objec
tive medium in distinction from the subjective medium,
which is faith in Christ, (see ver. 30th); — the real objective
medium in distinction from the verbal objective medium,
which is the testimony of the Holy Spirit, the Gospel.
The English, or rather the Latin, word redemption is I
not a perfect synonym of the term employed by the Apostle,
(diroXvTpwoig). But it is the nearest approximation to a j
homologue that can be found. The Greek term etymo-
logically means a ransoming off. The Latin and English \
term etjTnologically means a buying again, a buying back.J^
Wycliffe's translation here is " the redemcioun or the agen-
biyng." In the application of the two terms to the
spiritual condition of men, in their relation to the economy
of mercy, the distinguishing idea of each is emphatically

252 ROMANS III. 24.
realized. Men are bought again or bought back ; and they
are ransomed off. They are "bought again" or "bought
back;" for they were not always captives and slaves : their
primitive condition was one of freedom. And they are
"ransomed off:" they are liberated in virtue of the ransom
which has been paid. It is this last idea, of course, which
was in the Apostle's mind; as his thought would be
running in the groove, not of the Latin term "redemption,"
but of the Greek term which he uses, (a7roXvrpo>o-ie), and
which, in virtue of the preposition prefixed to it, is stronger
and more complex in its import than either of the Hebrew
terms which might also be- present within the field of his
consideration, (n$m and nnp).
Wakefield translates the word deliverance: and says,
" This is the meaning of the word in abundance of places
throughout the version of the LXX., without any notion
of an equivalent price or purchase ; so that to bring proof
to this purpose were useless to the unlearned reader, and an
insult to the learned." Bruce and Whitwell give the same
translation. And Locke, though using the word redemp
tion, maintains that it does not import that " there was
any compensation made to God, by paying what was of
equal value, in consideration whereof they were delivered ;
for that," he adds, "is inconsistent with what St. Paul
expressly says here, viz., that sinners are justified by God •
gratis, and of his free bounty." But if any one, he con
tinues, will persist in it that the word " implies an equivalent
price paid, I desire him to consider to whom : and that,
if we will strictly adhere to the metaphor, it must be to
those whom the redeemed are in bondage to, and from
whom we are redeemed, viz., sin and Satan." " Nor could
the price," he says, " be paid to God in strictness of justice ;
unless the same person ought, by that strict justice, to
have both the thing redeemed and the price paid for its
redemption. For it is to God we are redeemed, by the
death of Christ, (Eev. v. 9)." Oltramare, also, strenuously
contends that the word means deliverance only, without
any reference to purchase, (sans aucune idde de rachat).
Now, it must be admitted that the uncompounded term

ROMANS III. 24. 253
for Redeemer (Xvrpwryg) is applied in Acts vii. 35 to Moses.
God sent him to be "a ruler and a redeemer." The word
is translated deliverer in our Authorized Version. And
Moses delivered Israel without paying a ransom. It must
also be admitted that in the Sept. the uncompounded verb
(Xvrpoopai) is frequently employed to express acts of
deliverance unaccompanied with the payment of a price or
ransom. See Exod. vi, 6, " I will redeem you (Xvrpolo-ouai
bpug) with a stretched-out arm, and, with great judgements :"
xv. 13 ; Deut. vii. 8 ; ix. 26, (yv iXvrpwaw iv ry laxvi) ; xiii.
5 ; xv. 15 ; xxi. 8 ; xxiv. 18 ; 2 Sam. iv. 9 ; vii. 23 ; 1 Kings
i. 29 ; 1 Chron. xvii. 21 ; Neh. i. 10, (ovg iXvrpwaw iv ry
cwdpti aou ry ptydXy) ; &c. It must likewise be conceded
that the two Hebrew words (bm and rrjs) corresponding
to the uncompounded Greek verb (Xvrpoopai) do not
embody in their constitutional structure or make a distinct
reference to the idea of a ransom. In this respect they
differ from the Greek term ; and hence, no doubt, we are
to account for the free Septuagintal application of the
word to deliverances which were unaccompanied with the
paj^ment of a ransom.
(The origin of the Hebrew, H«, is hidden in obscurity.
See Fiirst. But it is radically connected, we doubt not,
with hsi, and apparently too, though more remotely, with
^>n. Its primary import was probably some phase of
action, consisting in, or corresponding to, cutting, piercing,
and thus opening, loosening, letting free, setting free, &c.
Hence the conciliation of the two divergent stems of import
which are attached to the word, to release, and to defile.
Compare hhrs in Hiphil and Pihel. The radical import of
nia seems to have been similar, — to divide, to separate,
and hence to let go, to let go free, to set free. The radical
import of the corresponding word in Chaldee, pi?, and'
the Syriac, «_a^2>, is remarkably consentaneous, — to break,
to break off. The Chaldee word, the Syriac, and the
English term break, are etymological relatives. — In none of
the Semitic terms is there any inherent reference to a
ransom)
Nevertheless the Greek word does embody, in its make "7

f

254 ROMANS 111. 24-
or structure, a reference to a ransom, (a Xirpov, something
/ given in order to the release, the X&aig, of an object; or,
more commonly, Xvrpa, in the plural, things given for release).
T!n the active voice, — in which, however, it does not occur in
the New Testament, nor, so far as we have noticed, in the
Septuagint, for Bretschneider is certainly wrong in adducing
Numb, xviii. 15, 17, Dan. iv. 24 (27), as instances, — in the
active voice, we say, the verb properly means to release
on receipt of a ransom. In the middle voice it bears the
same signification; see Numb, xviii. 15, 17: but it more
frequently means to release by giving a ransom. See Lev.
xxv. 25, 33, 48, 49, &c, &c. And even in those passages
in which the distinctive idea of ransom is merged, and the
Hebraistic idea of deliverance is thoroughly predominant,
it is not mere deliverance that is meant. John Locke had
a glimpse of this fact when he says, — •" Eedemption signifies
deliverance, but not deliverance from everything, bid deliv
erance from that to which a man is in subjection or
bondage." This is so far correct, and on the right line of
things. But the deliverance from subjection or bondage that
is legitimately designated i-edemption is something more
still. It is deliverance which is effected in a legitimate way,
and in consistency with the rights and claims of all parties
concerned. Illegitimate deliverance, even from subjection
or bondage, — deliverance effected over the belly, or at the
expense of real and recognized rights, — is deliverance
indeed, but it is no redemption. There is nothing in it
that lies on the line of things that is indicated in the
staple part of the Greek or Latin term, nothing that lies
on the same line of things as ransom ; and hence it cannot
be described as ransoming or redeeming. This idea of a
regard to rights is emphatically imbedded in the New Tes
tament usage of the term in all its branches. It is also
imbedded in the usage of the term in the Septuagint. And
we believe that it will not be found to be wanting in the
usage of the term by any author who was competent to
observe the proprieties of the language which he employed.
It is because of this idea, inherent in the term, that it is
so peculiarly applicable, and so frequently applied, to the

ROMANS III. 24. 255
deliverance of Israel from their Egyptian bondage. See
Exod. vi. 6 ; xv. 13 ; Deut. vii. 8 ; &c, &c.
As to the compound term which is used by the Apostle
in the passage before us, (a-rroXdrpwaig), it is not the case,
as one might be led from Wakefield's remark to suppose,
that it occurs "in abundance of places throughout the
version of the LXX." As it does not occur in the classics
at all, so it does not occur in the Septuagint at all. And
the compound verb from which it is derived occurs only
twice, viz., in Exod. xxi. 8 and Zeph. iii. 3 (1). In the
latter of these passages it is applied by the Septuagint
translator to Jerusalem, the redeemed city, (diroXiXvrpwpivy
n-oXie). In the former it is used in the active voice, and
means to release on receipt of a ransom, (idv py tvaptaSy,
airoXvrpwati avryv. Compare Philip, in Demosthenes, 159,
— oVeXvtpojo-e raXdvTwv ivvia). The noun employed by the
Apostle occurs, however, in other nine passages of the
New Testament : and while in each of them the idea of
deliverance is prominent, there are none of them which
oblige us to merge the reference, explicit or implicit,
to ransom as the ground, or reason, or meritorious cause,
of the deliverance specified. We shall glance at the pas
sages : —
(1.) The first is Luke xxi. 28, — "And when these things
begin to come to pass, then look up, and lift up your heads;
for your redemption draweth nigh." When that "redemption
draweth nigh," then " the kingdom of God is nigh at hand,"
(ver. 31). It is consequently a deliverance intimately con
nected with the work of the Eedeemer, and indeed secured
by it ; — It is thus a deliverance based on something beneath
itself, something that meets and settles all legitimate claims.
It is, in an important sense, purchased.
(2.) The next passage is Eom. viii. 23, — "even we ourselves
groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption, to wit, the
redemption of our body." It is certainly a deliverance that
is here, also, referred to; but as it is "in Christ'' that "all
shall be made alive," (1 Cor. xv. 22), the deliverance is
undoubtedly conditioned on his work as its meritorious
cause. It is purchased.

256 ROMANS. HI. 24.
(3.) 1 Cor. i. 30, — " of him are ye in Christ Jesus, who
of God is made unto us wisdom, and righteousness, and
sanctification, and redemption." The term doubtless de
notes, again, deliverance, — deliverance full and final: but it
is deliverance on the ground of something beneath itself,
and "in Christ Jesus." It is purchased, like the other
deliverances referred to.
(4.) Eph. i. 7, — " In whom we have redemption through
his blood, the forgiveness of sins, according to the riches of
his grace." Here the term is explained for us. It is used
to denote the forgiveness of sins, and is therefore emphati
cally a deliverance : but it is deliverance " through Christ's
blood." It is deliverance conditioned on something beneath
itself. It is purchased deliverance.
(5.) Eph. i. 14, — " which is the earnest of our inheritance,
until the redemption of the purchased possession, unto the
praise of his glory." If "the purchased possession" (y
irtpiiroiyaig) be the acquired and peculiar people who are
the reward of " the travail of Christ's soul," or whatever it
be, it is manifest that its redemption — still future — is a
deliverance : but it is doubtless a deliverance which is pro
cured and secured by what the Eedeemer has done. It is a
purcluised deliverance.
(6.) Eph. iv. 30,—" And grieve not the Holy Spirit of God,
whereby ye are sealed unto the day of redemption." The
term manifestly denotes deliverance, — still future, — and
coincident no doubt with the "redemption of the body."
But it is deliverance secured by something underneath itself;
— something which is its reason, ground, or meritorious
cause. It is purchased deliverance.
(7.) Col. i. 14, — "in whom we have redemption [through
his blood], even the forgiveness of sins." It is a parallel
passage to Eph. i. 7, and is to be similarly explained. It is
manifestly a purchased deliverance.
(8.) Heb. ix. 15,— "for this cause he is the mediator of
the New Testament, that by means of death, for the redemp
tion of the transgressions that were under the first Testament,
they which are called might receive the promise of eternal
inheritance." The term is here used in a manner that is

ROMANS III. S4. 257
grammatically peculiar. (Compare Dan. iv. 24.) But there
can be no doubt that it involves the idea of deliverance,
deliverance from transgressions; and as little, that the
deliverance referred to is in consideration of something
beneath itself. It was deliverance "by means of death."
Christ's death, or the surrender of his life, was the ransom.
(Matt. xx. 28.) The deliverance was thus purchased
deliverance. (9.) Heb. xi. 35, — "Others were tortured, not accepting
deliverance." It would have been better to have retained
Wycliffe's version, "redempcioun." For though it is assuredly
deliverance that is spoken of, it is most probably deliverance
in consideration of a ransom; and it was undoubtedly
deliverance in consideration of something offered as its
condition or price.
So far, then, as we can learn anything from the New
Testament usage of the compound term employed by the
Apostle, we have reason to come to the conclusion that,
in the passage before us, it will not denote, barely and
abstractly, simple deliverance. It will, indeed, denote
deliverance : but the deliverance referred to will be deliver
ance on the ground of something that meets all rightful
claims. It will be, in some legitimate sense, a purchased
deliverance. It will be, in short, deliverance on the ground
of a ransom. J
That this is the case seems to be put beyond the range
of reasonable doubt when we consider that our Lord
himself expressly states that he "came, not to be minis
tered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom
for many" (ko\ Sowai rr/v \pvxi)v avrov Xvrpov avr\
iroXXwv). See Matt. xx. 28 ; Mark x. 45. Paul iterates
the Saviour's idea, — " There is one God, and one Mediator
between God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave
himself a ransom for all," (6 Sovg iavrbv dvriXvrpov virip
irdvrwv), — 1 Tim. i. 5, 6. If Paul, then, understood the
Gospel, and if Christ understood his own mission, there
was a ransom given, — intentionally given. And as the
giving of a ransom is the way for ransoming, and ransom
ing off ; as ifeis the payment of "the price of . redemption,".
s

258 ROMANS III. 24.
(redemptionis pretium); we- may be. sure that the redemp
tion, for which the payment was made, and of which there
is mention in the passage before us, will involve a reference
to the price that was paid. The redemption which is " in
Christ Jesus," will be purchased deliverance. It will be
a ransoming off. It will be a deliverance that is based
upon that ransom which it was the end of our Saviour's
mission to present.
This conclusion is fortified when we look to those pas
sages in the New Testament in which the uncompounded
term is used in relation to the work of Christ; and used
after that work was completed and understood. It is said,
for instance, in Tit. ii. 14, that "our Saviour Jesus Christ
gave himself for us, that he might redeem us from all
iniquity, and purify unto himself a peculiar people, &c."
The redemption ¦ specified rests upon the fact that Christ
"gave himself for us." It is said in 1 Pet. i. 18, — "Ye
know that ye were not redeemed with corruptible things,
as silver and gold, from your vain conversation received by
tradition from your fathers, but with the precious blood of
Christ, as of a lamb without blemish and without spot."
The price of the redemption is expressly specified. And in
Heb. ix. 12, we read, — " Neither by the blood of goats and
calves, but by his own blood, he entered in once into the
holy place, having obtained eternal redemption for us."
The price of the redemption is, again, very obviously indi-
~cated. The other passages in which the uncompounded
term is employed are not of such significance and import
ance, doctrinally considered. They are these, — Luke i. 68,
" Blessed be the Lord God of Israel ; for he hath visited and
redeemed his people ;" — Luke ii. 38, " and spake of him to
all them that looked for redemption in Jerusalem ;" — Luke
xxiv. 21, "We trusted that it had been he which should
have redeemed Israel." But even in these passages, as in
the corresponding Old Testament passages concerning tha
redemption of Israel, it is not bare deliverance that is
referred to, but deliverance that meets all legitimate claims.
It is deliverance that has some relation to what constitutes
a ransom, or to what is equivalent to a ransom.

ROMANS III. 24, 259
That it is a purchased deliverance, or a ransoming off,
that is referred to in the passage before us, is farther con
firmed by all those more or less analogous passages in
which buying, or buying off, is ascribed to Christ : — 1 Cor.
vi. 20, "ye are bought with a price," (yy opdaSyre ydp npyg);
— 1 Cor. vii. 23, "ye are bought with a price," (npyg
yyopdaSyrt); — Gal. iii. 13, " Christ hath redeemed us (bought
us off, i^yyopaatv) from the curse of the law;" — Gal. iv. 5,
He was " made under the law, to redeem them (to buy them
off, 'iva ifZayopday) that were under the law;" — 2 Pet. ii. 1,
"denying the Lord that bought them," (tov ayopdaavja
avrovg Stairoryv) ; — Eev. v. 9, " thou wast slain, and hast
redeemed us to God," (and didst buy us to God, koi yyopaaag
r«p £ti$) ; — Eev. xiv. 3, " which were redeemed," or, " bought,
from the earth," (ot yyopaapivoi dirb ryg yyg) ; Eev. xiv. 4,
" these were redeemed" or, " bought from among men,"
(ovtoi yyopda&yaav dirb twv avSpwirwv).
We regard it, then, as established, that the " redemption "
mentioned by the Apostle in the passage before us is not
mere and bare deliverance ; but deliverance procured by
a price paid, — deliverance by a ransom.
It is no valid objection to this conclusion, that the
Apostle has said, in the preceding part of the verse, that
believers are "justified freely by God's grace." It is to no
purpose that Locke urges this objection ; for the whole
provision of the redemption is, just as truly as the act of
justification, a gift of God, — an outflow from his grace.
Neither need it be objected that the ransom must have
been paid to "sin and Satan." For to whomsoever, or to
whatsoever, it must have been paid, it is a matter of fact
that it has been paid. Men are "bought with a price."
(1 Cor. vi. 20; 2 Pet. ii. 1.) Christ "gave himself a
ransom " for " many,"— for " all." (Matt. xx. 28 ; 1 Tim. ii. 6.)
But there is no difficulty in ascertaining the recipient of
the ransom. Sin is not an Entity separate from the sinner.
To pay, therefore, a price to sin, would be to pay a price
to the sinner himself. That were absurd. And as ior.
Satan, he has no right of property in men, and no right to
use men, or to abuse them. God cannot acknowledge that

260 ROMANS III. 24-
he has any such rights, and hence it could not be to him
that the ransom was paid. Some of the ancients, inclusive
of Origen, stretched metaphors into absurdities when they
excogitated such an idea. And it is unworthy of Liitzel-
berger to have reproduced the idea, (Grundziige des Paul.
Glaubenslehre, p. 81). The price or ransom which Christ
paid was the offering which he made, the sacrifice which
he presented. It was himself. (Gal. i. 4; Tit. ii. 14.) And
we know that he " gave himself for us ; an offering and a
sacrifice to God for a sweet-smelling savour." (Eph. v. 2.)
All the sacrifices that typified him were presented unto
God. It is God who is propitiated in Christ Jesus. (1 John
ii. 1, 2.) It was His claims which required to be satisfied.
This is an idea to which, in interesting contrast to the
frivolous speculations of some of the other fathers,
Athanasius delighted to give prominence, (lavrov virip
ypwv Sid tov Savarov irpoatviyKy rip irarpi. Cont. Arian.
ii., p. 347; &c, &c, ed. 1686.)
Does any one reiterate the idea of Locke, that it would
be incongruous that the price of redemption should be paid
to the Being who, at the same time, receives the persons
redeemed ? - Is it thought to be inconsistent that God should
thus receive both the price and the persons for whom the
price was paid ? Is it contended that men are " redeemed
to God," and that therefore it cannot be supposed that the
price of their redemption was exacted by God? Such
suggestions owe their birth to the attempt to run out, to
their extremity, certain isolated analogies by which the
work of our Lord is represented to us. ; They ignore the
fact that that work is unique ; and that it finds, therefore,
no perfect parallel among human transactions. Finding no
perfect parallel, the language which is borrowed from human
transactions, to represent it, must be inadequate ; and it
should not, therefore, be stretched to its utmost possible
extent. There was, of course, no literal or financial price ;
no literal bargaining and ransom ; no literal or commercial
redemption, or, buying back. There was something far more
sublime and divine. But, in one of its multiform aspects,
the unparalleled and glorious and most gracious reality

ROMANS III. 24. 261
may be faintly, and yet significantly and efficiently, repre
sented and bodied forth under the notion of a price of
redemption or a ransom. It must, however, ever be borne
in mind that it is such a price of redemption or ransom
as is at the same time a manifestation of unparalleled
divine philanthropy, unpurchased and unpurchasable
benevolence ; and yet too, and at the same time, an offering
and a sacrifice; and also a righteousness for the unrighteouSi
When the expressions price of redemption and ransom are
thus limited by the unique peculiarities and glory of the
great reality to which they are applied, there is no difficulty
in meeting Locke's objections. There is no difficulty in
supposing that God may, in one of the manifold suscep
tibilities of his nature, experience anger, while in another
he experiences and cherishes benevolence and grace. Such
a dualism of feeling is possible even to ourselves. It is a
polarity that is, in truth, inevitable, on the supposition of
contrary moral relationships. There is hence also no
difficulty in supposing, that in one line of the multiform
relationship in which God stands to his universe, he may
require to manifest displeasure; while in another line of
the same multiform relationship, he will delight to manifest
compassion and mercy. There is no difficulty in supposing
that these two lines of relationship may exist concurrently,
and may also objectively meet in the same individuals ;
provided the individuals be viewed under different aspects,
and as bearing different rapports. And thus there is no
difficulty in supposing that God, in one respect of his
many-sidedness, may require satisfaction ; while, in another,
he graciously makes provision for the satisfaction which
he requires. It may thus be the case that he requires
a price of redemption for men ; and that at the same time
he provides for its payment ; and that he thus provides for
its payment, that men may be "redeemed to Himself."
The principle of the matter is just this, — God may require
one thing in order to another. If this principle be disputed,
all the elements of moral character and of personal activity
are eliminated from our notion of the Divine Being. Imper
sonality is maintained, and Pantheism, emptied to boot of

262 ROMANS III. 24'.
infinite self-consciousness, is assumed. But if the principle
be admitted, then the whole of the doctrine of redemption,
as exhibited in Scripture, with all its alleged antilogies, but
real harmonies, is transparently self-consistent. Men may
require to be redeemed from exposedness to God's wrath,
his wrath to come, his wrath to the uttermost, that they
may be redeemed to the enjoyment of his everlasting favour
and glory.
The word which the Apostle employs in the passage
before us, (a7roXvrpojo-ie), and which we translate by the
Latin and English term redemption, is, of course, to be
distinguished from the word Xvrpov, or ransom, which is
imbedded in it. The distinction, however, has been often
overlooked. And the oversight has occasioned not a little
confusion in theology. In the Vulgate version the one
word redemptio, or redemption, has, unhappily, been em
ployed as the translation of both the Greek terms : and
hence the work of Christ, as actually accomplished on
Calvary, has often been confounded with its results, as
contingently realized in men. And thus, as well as for
reasons that go deeper, theological battles have been fought
regarding the extent of redemption; some contending for
universal redemption, the redemption of the whole race of
mankind, others for limited redemption, the redemption
of the believing or the ultimately saved. Origen, — as re
presented by Eufinus, — failed to distinguish between the
two terms. (Redemptio dicitur id, quod datur hostibus
pro his, quos in captivitate detinent, ut eos restituant
pristinae libertati) So, in modern times, did Eichard
Baxter ; and hence the title of his posthumous work, —
Universal Redemption of Mankind by the Lord Jesus
Christ. So, too, John Goodwin ; and hence the title of his
incomplete work, — Redemption Redeemed; wherein the
most glorious Work of the Redemption of the World by
Jesus Christ is, by expressness of Scripture, clearness of
argument, countenance of the best authority, as well
ancient as modern, vindicated and asserted, in the just
latitude and extent of it, according to the counsel
and most gracious intentions of God, &c, &c. So, too,

ROMANS III. 24. 263
Jonathan Edwards. In ' his History of the Work of Re
demption, he says that the term redemption "strictly
signifies a purchase of deliverance." He must have been.
thinking, of course, of the Latin term, not of the Greek
word employed in the New Testament. But, though thus
defining, inexactly enough, the " strict signification " of the
Biblical terminology, he unhappily, throughout his book,
gives reins to greater inexactness still, and takes the word
" more largely," as denoting " all God's works that were
properly preparatory to the purchase, and accomplishing
the success of it." Multitudes of others have had their
minds warped by the same confusion. Dr. Adam Clarke,
for example, says, " airoXvTpwaig properly means the price
laid down for the redemption of a captive."
It was, hence, good service to theology, as well as to
exegesis, when Erasmus drew attention, long ago, to the
inaccuracy of the Vulgate in using the word redemption
for ransom. Beza, too, did well in following up the remark
of Erasmus, (Matt. xx. 28.) And all accurate modern critics
are careful to distinguish between the two terms. It is,
hence, altogether inexcusable in Dr. Da. Brown to explain
the word redemption in the passage before us, as meaning
" the payment of a ransom (in Christ's death)." He adds : —
"that this is the sense of the word 'redemption,' when
applied to Christ's death, will appear clear to any impar
tial student of the passages where it occurs." It might,
we reply, if there were any passages at all in which Christ's
death is designated an diroXirpwaig. We have seen, how
ever, in our enumeration and consideration of the passages
in which the term occurs, that there are none such. Christ's
death, as the culmination of his dedicated and devoted life,
is indeed the price of airoXvrpwaig. It is a ransom. The
things wherewith the atonement was made, and in which it
consists, were Xirpa. Their sum-total was Xvrpov.
(The definitions of the term given by Hesychius and
Suidas are admirably adapted to express its genuine and
distinctive import. Hesychius says, Xvrpa, — irdvra rd S1S6-
ptva tig dvaKTyaiv d.v%pwirwv, all things whatever that are
given for the recovery of men, their recovery, to wit, e£

264 ROMANS III. 24.
alxpaXwaiag, from captivity. Suidas says, Xvrpa, — piadog,
y ra iraptxoptva virip iXtvStpiag, a price, or, things given
for freedom. Such was the work of Christ. But the
a7roXvrp<i)o-te itself was, as the word is explained by Hesy
chius and Phavorinus, airofvyy, airoXvaig.)
In all ordinary cases, indeed, deliverance instantly even
tuates when a ransom is paid, — (so that the distinguishing
idea of d7roXvrpojo-ie may be loosely attached to the paying
of the Xvrpov, even as the distinguishing idea of the Xvrpov
clings tenaciously and inherently to diroXvrpaxrie). Never
theless, cases are easily conceivable, in which the ransom
might be paid, while yet the deliverance would not even
tuate. The spiritual case of men is one of them. Their
actual deliverance is wisely conditioned on a subjective
contingency, — the forth-putting of faith. And thus it is of
the greatest moment to distinguish carefully between the
Xvrpov paid for them, and their curoXirpwaig. Olshausen,
hence, misses the mark, so far as precision is . concerned,
both in the first and second of his particulars, when he
specifies, as the three distinguishing representations of the
work of Christ, 1. Redemption, airoXvrpwaig, 2. Reconcil
iation, KaraXXayr), 3. Propitiation, IXaapog.
When Christ paid the price of redemption for men, he
bought them, it is true, with the price. (1 Cor. vi. 20 ; vii.
23 ; 2 Pet. ii. 1.) They are hence his by a new right. He is
entitled anew to all that they are. They are bound to be
his servants, and to do his work, and to make his will the
rule of their activity, and to regard his glory as the end and
pole-star of their being. But as men are free-agents, and
not chattels, the new right that has been acquired over them
by Christ, can issue in their actual consecration to his person
and service and will, only by the intervenience of the free
determination of their own will. Hence, also, the buying of
them (to dyopd^tiv) does not, as a matter of fact, issue in
the buying of them off — (ro i^ayopdZtiv) — from the curse of
the law, which they had broken, (Gal. iii. 13), unless'
scope is made for what is implied in the word "off" by the.
intervenience of faith. Without that intervenience, it is
not fit that the buying should be a buying off. Without

ROMANS III. 24. 265
that same intervenience, moreover, it is impossible that
they can be "bought (and brought) out of every kindred,
and tongue, and people, and nation," (Eev. v. 9), and "from
the earth," (Eev. xiv. 3), and " from among men," (Eev. xiv.
4). And, in like manner, without that intervenience, they
cannot be ransomed off from the evils that are involved in
sin. They are ransomed, indeed, in the sense of being
bought. They might be said to be redeemed, so far as
the mere etymological make of the Latin word suggests
the meaning of the term. They have been bought again.
But they are not ransomed off. They are not redeemed,
when we take the Latin word redemption as a conventional
synonym of the Greek word that is used by the Apostle in
the passage before us.
The redemption which is " in Christ Jesus " is thus more
than the payment of a price. It is deliverance in con
sideration of a price paid. That we must regard as settled.
But what deliverance is it? Is it the entire, full-orbed,
deliverance which is in Christ Jesus for men? Or is it some
special aspect of this entirety ? If it were the entire and
full-orbed deliverance, it would include not only the pardon
of sin, (Eph. i. 7; Col. i. 14), and justification too, and the
sanctification of the soul, (1 Pet. i. 18; Tit. ii. 14), but also
the redemption of the body, (Eom. viii. 23), and indeed the
emancipation of the entire being from all the internal and
external evils of sin. We scarcely think that the term
should be here understood in this, its greatest possible am
plitude of import. It is probable that it was rather one
particular aspect of the great sum-total that was present to
the Apostle's thoughts, when he said of believers, that they
are "justified through the redemption which is in Christ
Jesus." He seems to have been contemplating a certain
specific element of redemption, which requires to be
specially realized in order to justification. And hence we
conclude that he was looking at that prominent side of the
great whole which he specifies and explains in Eph. i. 7, and
Col. i. 14; — in which passages he says, "in whom (i. e., in
Christ) we have redemption, (through his blood), — the for
giveness of sins." It is, apparently, deliverance from the

266 ROMANS III. 24.
penal consequences of sins that is referred to. And Oltra
mare consequently is not very far wrong when he translates
the word pardon: and Philippi is right when he says that
Gal. iii. 13 presents to view a consentaneous idea: for deliver
ance from the penal consequences of sins is deliverance from
the curse of the law. Believers are "justified through this
deliverance," not, as Calvin supposed, because the redemption
constitutes the matter of the justifying righteousness,
(materia nostrae justitiae) ; nor, as Day similarly supposed,
because redemption is justification, — "justified by the
justification which is by Christ Jesus;" but because, in
the very nature of things, as divinely concatenated, a
title to eternal glory cannot possibly be conferred un
til men are released from exposedness to eternal woe.
Sinners, as sinners, stand in a certain positive relation,
— downward or hell- ward; and in a negative relation, — ¦
upward or heaven-ward. It is clear that a positive upward
or heaven- ward relation, of the nature of a title to " glory,
honour, and immortality," could not be conferred until
the actual relation downward and woe-ward be cancelled
or neutralized. Men must be pardoned, that they may
be justified. The one blessing, indeed, includes the other.
Pardon involves justification: and justification involves
pardon. Each is the obverse of the other. Each is the
other's complement. And the two are, in fact, an indis
soluble unity. But, nevertheless, it is a two-sided unity.
And though there is, in general, only a specification of one
of the sides, there is at other times a distinctive and dis
tinguishing reference to each. There seems to be such a
reference here. Believers are "justified through the redemp
tion which is in Christ Jesus." It is in consequence of
the purchased deliverance which they enjoy from the
penalty of their sins, a deliverance which they have "in
Christ Jesus," that they are still further blessed, — "justi
fied," and thus constituted heirs of everlasting life and
glory. The expression, "which is in Christ Jesus," (ryg iv
XpiwTtjJ 'lyaov), is finely significant. It represents Christ
Jesus as containing within himself the fulness of the

ROMANS III.

267

blessing of redemption. Eedemption is " in " him, just as
salvation and eternal life are " in " him. They are " in "
him for men. There is store of them ; enough and to
spare. And men have only to go "to" him, — though go " to "
him they must,— go to him in spirit,— go to him by faith,
— that they may get " out of his fulness," as out of an
inexhaustible treasury, these, and all the other blessings that,
as sinners, they require. The representation is, of course,
metaphorical; but yet simply and sublimely significant:
for it is because of something " in Christ," it is because of
something which was effected by Christ, that believers
are redeemed from the curse of the law, from the penalty
of their sins, and* thus and thence "justified freely by
God's grace." Our English translation, " the redemption
which is in Christ Jesus," is identical with the Vulgate
version. It is approved of by Bengel; and is obviously
the most natural interpretation of the phraseology. (We
may fill out the phraseology thus, — Sid ryg diroXvTpwatwg
ryg ovayg ev Xpiany 'lyaov. It perplexes the idea to supply
ytvopivyg, with Fritzsche and Philippi. And thus) Beza's
translation was far from being an improvement, — "the
redemption made in Christ Jesus," (redemptionem factam
in Jesu Christo). And yet Luther's is similar, (die Erlos-
ung so durch Christum Jesum geschehen ist). Eiickert
concurs with Luther in substituting the preposition
" through " for " in." So J. J. Herzog, (Diss. Exeget. de
loco Paulino, Rom. iii. 21 — 31). Day renders it "by."
So Bullinger, (per). So Crell. But such a substitution or
transmutation is altogether uncalled for, and mars the
simplicity and significance of the representation. Krehl
retains the " in ; " but he awkwardly explains it as denot
ing "union with Christ," (indem sie mit Christus in Verbin-
dung und enge Gemeinschaft treten durch den Qlauben).
It evidently points out to us, and is simply intended thus
to point out, where it is that redemption is in store, and
may be found. " This redemption," says Seb. Schmidt, " is
with the Lord Jesus, because it was he who acquired it,
and acquired it for the very purpose of having it in his
power to possess it, and give it, and apply it to whom-

268 ROMANS III. 25, 26.
soever he pleases." (Haec Redemptio apud " dominum
Jesum est, quod ille eam sic acquisiverit, ut eam
possideat, et det, atque applicet, cui vult.)

Vers. 25, 26. ov trposSsro 6 ,§edt [XourrTJpiov, ha itiariag
h ru avrov affjuan, slg siihsdyv rr)§ mzatoavvrig avrov o*id rrjv
irapiaiv rSv nrpoysyovoruv apjaprri^drav | Iv rri uvoyfft rov
Seov, n-poj rrjv svhsfev rrjg iizaioavvrjg avrov Iv rc!> vvv zaipa,
sig ro eivai avrov h'zatov zai o~izaiovvru rov \z iritrrztvg
'Iriaov. Eng. Auth. Vers. Whom God hath set forth to be a
propitiation through faith- in his blood, to declare his
righteousness for the remission of sins that are past,
through the forbearance of God; to declare, I say, at this
time his righteousness: that he might be just, and the
justifier of him which believeth in Jesus.
Revised Version, whom God set (publicly) forth (as)
propitiatory, — (available) through faith in his blood, — for
demonstration of his righteousness because of the pretermis
sion of the sins of former times in the forbearance of God,
— in order to the demonstration of his righteousness in the
present time, that he may be righteous even in justifying
him who is of faith in Jesus.
§ 1. We connect these two verses together, partly
because they are a unit, whether considered grammatically
or doctrinally, and partly because Eobert Stephens has
fixed upon an awkward point in the unit for his versicular
disjunction. Had he postponed the disjunction to the
close of the clause, in the forbearance of God, (iv ry
dvoxy rov S-eov), the verses might have been considered
apart. This postponement is adopted in our English
Authorized Version ; in the Dutch versions, old and new ;
in the Lutheran ; in Diodati ; in Bengel's German version ;
in Beza's ultimate text (1588 — 9, and 1598); also in Calvin's

¦\ A

ROMANS III. 25, 26. 269
ultimate French translation, and hence in the French
Geneva, and in the English Geneva, and in Ostervald's and
Martin's Bibles, and in Beausobre and Lenfant's New
Testament; &c, &c. In such a case as this, — as distin
guished, for instance, from that of the last clause of the
22nd verse of this chapter, — there is good reason to justify
a departure from the Stephanie arrangement, provided the
verses are to be printed, not in continuous paragraphs,
but, as has been too customary, in detached morsels, like
proverbs. § 2. The two verses, in conjunction with the four which
precede, are among the most important in the Bible. The
entire paragraph, which consists of these six verses, is,
as we have already indicated, an expansion and explanation
of the theme of the epistle, as propounded in chap. i. 16, 17,
and, as such, it is the very " marrow of divinity." It is
eminently and preeminently rich in the distinctively essen
tial elements of that evangelism which constitutes the true
glory of the Bible, as a revelation of mercy from the Infinite
God. And hence every clause in it, every clausule, every
expression, every word, deserves to be carefully scrutinized,
analyzed, weighed, and considered in its varied relations
to the surrounding words, and to the sum-total of the
doctrine of the Apostle, and of the inspired writers in
general. Almost all expositors seem to have realized, with
more or less depth of conviction, and with feelings varying
according to their illumination and the ratio of their evan
gelical sympathy with the Apostle, that they had here to
deal with words of peculiar significance, — and with ideas
which, in the Apostle's own judgement, were of transcendent
moment. Luther draws attention, in the margin of his
Bible, to the importance of the section. He says, over
against ver. 23rd ff, — "This is the chief point, and the
very central place of the epistle, and of the whole Bible,"
(Merke diss, da er saget: — Sie sind allzumal Sunder, &c.
1st das Hauptstiick und der Mittel-Platz dieser Epistel,
und der ganzen Schrift, &c) Calvin, on ver. 24th, and
referring to, the contents at once, of that verse, and of the

270 ROMANS III. 25, 26.
two which follow, says, — " There is probably no passage in
the whole Bible that more exhaustively exhibits the
justifying righteousness of God : for it shows its efficient
cause, the mercy of God; its material cause, Christ with
his blood ; its formal or instrumental cause, faith springing
from the Word ; and its final cause, the glory of the divine
justice and goodness." (Nullus est forte in tota Scriptura
insignior locus ad vim istius justitiae illustrandam.
Ostendit enim Dei misericordiam causam esse ejfieientem :
Christum cum suo sanguine esse materiam : formalem seu
instrumentalem esse fidem e verbo conceptam: finalem
porro divinae et justitiae et bonitatis gloriam.) "There
is no passage," says Matthias, "in Paul's epistles which
exhibits the doctrine of justification in a manner so con
densed, so profound, and so clear." (Keine Stelle der
paulinischen Briefe enthalt die Lehre von der Rechtferti-
gung so kurz und doch die tiefste Wahrheit so klar
enthullend wie v. 24 — 26 dieses Capitels) Melancthon
says, — " This whole period (viz., ver. 24th ff.) contains the
very head and front of Paul's discussion." (Haec tota
periodus, quae sequitur, est principalis propositio et
status in hac disputatione PctitM.-Enarratio, 1556.) " Lo !
here, here," says the classic Mussus, "is the great and
ineffable mystery of all Christian philosophy." (Ecce, Ecce
magnum et ineffabile omnis Christianae Philosophiae
mysterium) "In these verses," (viz., ver. 21 — 26), says
John Jacob Stolz, " is the quintessence of the Pauline doc
trine concerning Christ. Whosoever understands them,
understands the Apostle ; whosoever misunderstands them,
runs the risk of misunderstanding the entire epistle." (In
diesen Versen ist die Quintessenz der Paulinischen Chris-
tus-lehre. Wer hier den Apostel verstehet, der weiss was
derselbe will; Missverstand dieser verse wirld auf das
Verstdndniss der ganzen Epistel). "This passage," says
E. J. Greve, "contains the principal theme of the Epistle;
and this theme is the foundation of the whole evangelical
system." (Deze plaats bevat de voornaame hoofdstelling
van den brief, welke tevens de grondslag van 't gantsche
Euangelisch leerstelsel is.) "There is perhaps," says Dr.

ROMANS III. 25, 26. 271
Chalmers, " no single passage in the Book of inspiration
which reveals, in a way so formal and authoritative as the
one before us, the path of transition by which a sinner
passes from a state of wrath to a state of acceptance. There
is no passage — to which, if we would only bring the
docility and the compliance of childhood — that is more
fitted to guide and to turn an inquiring sinner into the
way of peace." "These six verses," says C. P. Shepherd,
"which contain the first enunciation of the doctrine of
justification in this epistle, — the first overflow, so to speak,
of that matter of which the Apostle's heart and mind were
full, — contain also in a short compass the completest ex
pression of the Christian doctrine." They are emphatically,
to use the language of Nosselt, (in his Interpretatio et
Vindiciae loci classici de justificatione Rom. iii. 21 — 28),
nobilissimus locus. They are preeminently, on the subject
of justification, locus classicus, or, as Kolding, Stein, and
others, in their Dissertations, express it, Dictum classicum
de justificatione. The passage is, as Philippi designates it,
" the proper seat " (sedes propria) of the Pauline doctrine of
justification. " This," says Seb. Schmidt, " is a full exposi
tion of the whole business : wherefore the verses should be
most diligently studied by us." (Sane haec plena est totius
negotii ex'positio : quare hi versus diligentissvme nobis ob-
servandi sunt.) Verses 25th and 26th, in particular, are of
the greatest significance in reference to the nature of the
work of Christ. The " nerve," as Tischendorf expresses it,
of the whole argument in favour of the accredited evan
gelical view is found in them, (in quo loco profecto nervus
inest totius causae nostrae comprobandae. -De vi mortis
Christi satisfactoria, p. 20). And as, therefore, — to borrow
the remark of the great Vitringa, — " this passage is a brief
compend of the divine wisdom, and is, moreover, rich in
meaning and power, it must be doubly deserving of the most
careful consideration possible," (Naardien nu dese plaats
des Apostels een Jcort begrijp van de Goddelijke wijsheit, en
daar te boven rijk in sin en kragt is, soo salse de alder-
naukeurigste overweginge dubbelt waardig zijn). Well
might. Vinke exclaim in reference to it, — " Glorious Gospel !"

272 ROMANS III. 25, 26. \
(Heerlijk Evangelie). It was in the 25th verse that the
poet Cowper found peace to his spirit, after it had well-
nigh drifted into utter despair. " i" flung myself," he says,
"into a chair near the window, and seeing a Bible there,
ventured once more to apply to it for comfort and instruc
tion. The first verse I saw was the 25th of the 3rd of
Romans : — ' whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation,
through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for
the remission of sins that are past, through the forbearance
of God.' Immediately I received strength to believe, and
the full beams of the Sun of Righteousness shone upon me.
I saw the sufficiency of the atonement he had made for my
pardon and complete justification. In a moment I be
lieved, and received the peace of the Gospel."-^" Unless,"
he adds, "the Almighty arm had been under me, I think
I should have been overwhelmed with gratitude and joy,
My eyes filled with tears, and my voice choked with trans
port. I could only look up to heaven in silent fear, over
whelmed with love and wonder. But the work of the Holy
Spirit is best described in his own words; — it is 'joy
unspeakable and full of glory.' "—Taylor's Life . of Cowper,
pp. 37, 38, ed. 1835. It is not, however, astonishing that
Jones, with his entire lack of evangelical insight, should
say of the entire paragraph, ver. 21 — 27, "This passage
must appear to every reader very obscure and involved."
It must, indeed, to every reader whose eye will not look on
Christ Jesus, — Christ Jesus " the crucified," Christ Jesus as
thus the Saviour. But to those who see light in His light,
it must appear to be the very focus of Biblical illumination
on the subject of which it treats. And the multiplicity of
rays which converge in it, and emanate from it, irradiates,
indeed, but neither dazzles nor bewilders. With not one
of them would we dispense. Every word is precious. And
the fulness of the Apostle's phraseology is so emphatic,
so exquisitely intensifying, so genial withal, and fresh, and
warm, that we cannot but pity Gilbert Wakefield, — in many
respects a noble man, though unhappily blinded on one
side of his spiritual being, — when he remarks that " the
author is exceedingly verbose upon this subject." Would

ROMANS III. 25, 26. 273
he have liked that the Apostle had nimbly skipped through
his theme, as with hop, step, and leap ?
§ 3. whom God set (publicly) forth, (ov irpoiSrtro 6 S-£oe)-
It is Jesus Christ who is referred to, — Jesus Christ, "in
whom is redemption." The Apostle is about to explain how
it is that there is " redemption " in Him. It is because God
set him forth, &c. The verb which we translate set
(publicly) forth, (irpoiStTo), has been viewed by expositors
from various standpoints, and has received different explana
tions. It might mean, as a medial verb, to place before one
self, to propose to oneself, that is, to purpose, to determine.
This is the meaning which the word bears in the other two
passages in which it occurs in the New Testament, Eom. i.
13, Eph. i. 9. And, in accordance with this meaning, the
cognate noun (irpoStaig) generally bears, in the New Testa
ment, the signification of purpose or determination. (See
Acts xi. 23; xxvii. 13; Eom. viii. 28; ix. 11 ; Eph. i. 11 ; iii.
11; 2 Tim. i. 9; iii. 10.) This is the meaning which is
attached to the verb in the passage before us by Aquinas,
Wycliffe (purposid), Purvey's revision (ordeynde), Mussus
(definivit, decrevit), Beausobre et Lenfant (avoit ordonne),
Bohme (irpoiStTo scilicet iv eovtoj), Wahl (destinavit vel
voluit) ; so Fritzsche, and Oltramare ; Mace too (ordained),
and Vaughan, &c. All these would understand the expres
sion thus: — "whom God purposed (to be) iXaa-ypiov k. t. X.
(The interpretation of Aquinas is, — "eum Deus ad hoc
ordinaverat secundum suum propositum, quod designat,
cum dicit, quern proposuit Deus propitiatorem.) Many other
expositors have held what is substantially the same view of
the verb : only, with more or less distinctness or indefinite-
ness, they seem to have considered that the word itself
indicates the antiquity, or eternity, of the purpose. They
seem, in short, to have, either decidedly or dimly, regarded
the preposition in composition (the 7rpo) as having a relation
to time. Hence the Peshito version, (ot£q£D JsO,I6j ]idl,
which is translated proposuit by Tremellius, but which
really means foreordained). Chrysostom took the same
view, (SyXwv Si irdXiv oi) vtwrtpov tovto ov, ovSi Kaivov,

274 ROMANS III. 25, 26.
tyyoi irpoiStTo, — but as a proof that it was no novel or new
thing,he says foreordained). CEcumenius echoes it, (irpoi^iTo,
SijXoT waXaiav t?)v 7rfpi rovrov jiovXyv). Theophylact re
echoes it, (irpoiStro Si tlirtv, Iva Sti^y on irdXai irpowpiaro
y Sid tov a'iparog tov Xpiorov aTroXvrpwo-te). Vatable, Mus-
culus, Pareus, and Eisner (praefinivit), Heumann (zuvor
verordnet), Ostervald (a etabli de tout temps), Martin,
Koppe, Schleusner, and others, take substantially the same
view. They all suppose that the Apostle refers to God's
purpose of old, though it is not certain that all of them
regarded the preposition in composition as definitely indicat
ing the relation of antecedence in time. In either of its
phases, whether as simply expressing purpose, or as express
ing purpose of old, the interpretation is an unlikely explica
tion of the Apostle's idea. In the phase that is given by the
Syriac translator the power of the incorporated preposition
is undoubtedly misunderstood, as is evident from the import
of the cognate noun (^poS-so-ie) in such passages as Acts xi.
23; 2 Tim. iii. 10. And if, in accordance with the other
phase, the relation of antecedence in time is obliterated, and
the mere idea oi purpose or design expressed, there is nothing
in the context, or in the nature of the case, to bespeak
special favour for the interpretation. It is not the mere
purpose of God in reference to the propitiation, but the
fulfilment of his purpose in actual fact, that is available
"for the display of his righteousness in the remission of
sins." The position, moreover, of the verb — (its position, to
wit, in relation to the word IXaarfipiov) — shows that it is to
be betoned while we read and interpret; and hence the
subsequently mentioned " demonstration of God's righteous
ness in the remission of sins " is to be regarded as finding its
starting-point in the action indicated by the betoned verb.
And consequently we seem shut up to suppose that the
action indicated, instead of being subjective and immanent,
must be objective and transient. The verb, in other words,
cannot bear the signification, purposed, or designed, or
ordained, or foreordained.
De Dieu, though not speaking very decisively regarding
the word, is inclined to attribute to the preposition in

ROMANS III. 25, 28. 275
composition a temporal import. And, on the whole, he
would interpret the term as referring to the types and
predictions of the Old Testament: — whom God formerly,
— that is, under the Old Testament dispensation, — placed
or revealed as a propitiation, (quem ante — nempe in veteri
Test, per umbras legis, prophetarumque vaticinia — posuit
placamentum: — n-pot'S-Ero non accipiatur de exhibitione
Christi, sed de praecedanea ejus revelatione in V. Test.) It
is a most unlikely explication. Placed, as meaning revealed,
is surely a violent strain of exegetical contrivance.
While some of the expositors referred to above made a
wrong use of the incorporated preposition, Melancthon,
in his latest and best exposition of the Epistle, his Enar-
ratio of 1556, erred in merging it out of view altogether.
He translates the expression thus : — " whom God consti
tuted," (constituit), or "placed," (posuit), "a propitiator."
Tyndale, before him., had given the same interpretation.
He translates the word "hath made:" — "whom God hath
made a seate of mercy." Eilliet's translation is the same,
(dont Dieu a fait une victime expiatoire). But there is
certainly no good reason for annulling the force of the
preposition. Kypke duly recognized the importance of the preposition :
and he fancied, indeed, that he saw in it a very special
significance of evangelical meaning. He thought that it
expressed a substitutionary idea ; so that the verb would
mean "put in place of" (loco alterius substituere) : — "whom
God substituted," or " gave in our room as tXaori7ptov k. r. X,"
(quem Deus nostri loco dedit ut sacrificium expiatorium).
His translation was adopted by Eosenmiiller, and Jo. D.
Michaelis. But it was founded on a misunderstood ex
pression of Euripides in his Iphig. A. 1592, — in which
Calchas, referring to Diana's miraculous substitution of
a hind for Iphigenia, says, opart ryv Si Svaiav yv y Stbg
7rpov$jjK£ [5wu.iav 'iXa(j>av optiSpopov, but see the sacrifice
which the goddess hath set forth — hath placed before* our eyes
— at her altar, — a hind from the hills. The verb does not
bear the signification attributed to it by Kypke. It often
means to prefer, but not to substitute.

276 ROMANS III. 25, 26.
It does bear, however, the signification which is attri
buted to it by Matthias, who renders it published, promul
gated, or proclaimed, (irpoiStro nehme man im Sinne von
6'ffentlich kundthun d. i. predigen liess) : — " whom God
caused to be announced as having the power of propiti
ating." But this signification of the verb is appropriated
to the calling or appointment of assemblies, or the pro
mulgation of laws, and seems to be inapplicable to the case
which the Apostle has in hand. More particularly does
this appear when we consider that it is the actual historical
occurrence of the propitiatory work of Christ Jesus, rather
than its mere promulgation, that is "for the manifestation
of the divine righteousness in the forgiveness of sins."
There is an oddity of interpretation given to the word
by Jatho. He supposes that the Apostle means, — " whom
God exposed (as) for sale a iXao-njptov ; " and he imagines
that " the price," at which we may, as it were, purchase the
commodity, is specified in the following expression, through
faith in his blood, (irporiStaSai, von dem Seinigen. zum.
Verkaufe bffenilich und Jedermann feil bieten. — Da aber
von einem irporiStaSai die Rede ist, so wird hinzugesetzt,
um welchen Preis Christus ein Siihndeckel fur uns wird.
Die Erlosungsthat ist freilich objectiv am Kreuze vollendet;
aber fur uns ist er ein iXaarypiov erst Sid ryg iriartwg iv nj)
avrov a'ipan). This extremely mercantile interpretation is
founded, indeed, on an actual usage of the verb. (See Lucian,
Adv. Indoct. 19.) For one need not marvel that a word
which naturally signifies to place before, or to set forth, should
be employed to denote the forth-putting of a thing for sale.
But the explication, nevertheless, is a remarkable instance
of that perverse species of ingenuity that ransacks possi
bilities for improbabilities, and leaves out of sight, however
precious and appropriate it may be, what is lying on the
surface, and thus obvious to the view of all.
There really seems to be no good reason why we should
seek far and wide for a fitting explication of the term.
Its primary import, as simply applied to the case in hand,
suffices. Its primary import is to place before; and in the

ROMANS III. 25, 26. 277
middle it will, as used in such a connection as the one
before us, naturally mean, either to place before oneself,
to propose to oneself, to purpose, or to place before others
on the part of oneself, or in behalf of oneself. We have
seen that it is not congruous to interpret the term here as
meaning -to purpose. And we therefore at once betake our
selves to the other natural offshoot of its radical import, and
come to the conclusion that the Apostle means, that God,
in his own interest as the Moral Governor of the Universe,
put Christ Jesus (publicly) forth as iXaarypiov. The
action of God in the case was intentionally public. It
was designed for the benefit of the public, and for the
vindication and glory of Himself, as standing at the head
of the public, — the Monarch of the moral universe. God
exhibited Christ. He brought him forth upon this human
stage of things. He put him forth, he put him before the
.public, that the public might have the opportunity of
taking due notice of his appearance, and of observing what
was involved in the marvellous phenomenon. The word is
frequently used with this special reference to the public —
the public viewed more or less expansively. See, for
instance, Herodot. v. 8, — " But the funerals of the wealthy
are conducted in this way, — They expose to (public) view the
corpse for three days, &c," (rpsie piv ypipag irpoT&iaai rbv
vtKpov). Herodot. vi. 21, — "For when Sybaris was taken
by the Crotonians, all the Milesians, from the youth up
ward, shaved their heads, and publicly exhibited great
grief," or " made public demonstration of great grief," (koi
irivOog ptya irpotSyKovro). See also iii. 148. See also
Thuc. ii. 34, — " During this winter the Athenians made a
public funeral (Sypoaiq rafdg iiroiyaavro) of those who
had died first in this war, in the following manner, —
They expose to view for three days the bones of the
departed, Sac," (ra uev bard irpori^ivrai twv diroytvo-
pivwv irporpira). Hence, too, the use of the word with
reference to articles set. forth or exposed for sale ; and
hence too its use to denote proclamations, and other acts
of making publicly known.
It is worthy of note that the cognate noun, (irpoStaig),

278 ROMANS III. 25, 26.
of which we have already spoken, and which, in the
greater number of the. instances in which it occurs in the
New Testament, means purpose, has another meaning in
a minority of passages ; and this a meaning which con
nects itself with that signification of the verb which
we have just been exhibiting. The word is used in
reference to what is called the " shewbrea.d," (=D'JQn Drfe
or naTserj nn,^ — Sept., oi dprot ryg irpoSiatwg, — Vulg.,
panes propositionis). See Matt. xii. 4; Mark ii. 26; Luke
vi. 4. Comp. Heb. ix. 2. The expression is rendered in
the margin of our English Bibles, " the bread of setting
before." It was bread which was set forth. It was set-
forth by men before the Lord. And in some correspond
ing manner was Christ Jesus set forth by God before men.
He was shown to them. The expression for " shewbre&d "
is, of course, Septuagintal. And the cognate verb — the
verb which occurs in our passage — is used in connection
with it in Exod. xl. 4, — " Thou shalt bring in the table,
and set in order the things that are to be set in order
upon it," (Kai irpoSyatig rrjv irpoStaiv avrr)g, and thou
shalt set forth its forth-setting, viz., of loaves). It occurs
with the same application in 2 Mac. i. 8, (irpo&yKaptv rovg
diprovg). And in Ps. liii. 3 ; lxxxv. 13 ; c. 4, it bears the
same signification of setting forth. In these passages of
the Psalms, moreover, it occurs in the middle voice, and
means to set forth in one's own behalf. The word does
not bear the meaning of purpose in the Septuagint.
We think, then, that those critics have seized the
Apostle's idea in the passage before us, who have, along
with the authors of our Authorized English Version, in
terpreted the term which the Apostle employs as meaning
set forth. It was thus that Pelagius interpreted it, (in
promptu ante oculos omnium posuit, ut qui redimi vult,
accedat). It was thus that Luther understood it, (hat
vorgestellt). It is thus that it is rendered in the Geneva,
and in the Bishop's Bible ; and in the Dutch transla
tions, old and new. Thus, too, was it understood by
Cognatus, and Bollock; Bengel too (ante omnium oculos
posuit), and Wetstein (Christus proponitur publice) ;

ROMANS III. 25, 26. 279
Deyling also (proposuit in lucem — omnium oculis viden-
dum exposuit), Bos, Wolf, &c, &c. Thus, too, by Winzer,
among the more modern critics, and Eeiche, Eiickert, de
Wette; Stuart too, and Hodge, Meyer, Baumgarten-
Crusius, Philippi, Bisping, Krehl, Umbreit; and Mehring,
van Hengel, Lange, &c. Christ Jesus was set forth
by God as iXaarypiov. In so far as he was tXao-rijptoe, or
tXao-rJvptov, he was among men by the arrangement and
agency of God. God placed him in our world; — set him
forth before us and before the whole universe. He was
exhibited, though of course not for the mere sake of exhibi
tion, before men and angels.
§ 4. propitiatory, that is, as propitiatory, (iXaaTyptov).
A most important word, in a doctrinal point of view ; and
a word encompassed with no insignificant difficulties when
hermeneutically considered, — though these are happily of
such a nature as not to perplex materially the doctrinal
exegesis. The radical meaning of that class of Latin words which
embraces such terms as propitiatory, propitiation, pro
pitiator, propitiate, propitious, seems to be as yet uncertain.
Vossius supposes that the basis-idea is that of nearness,
(a prope esse propitius, quia, qui propinqui sunt auxilium
ferre possunt ; et presentes pro propitiis Kdici/mus). He
adopted this notion from Alfenus in Gellius vi. 5 ; and
Eichardson accepts from him the etymology. But we doubt
its validity. , In its " letter " it seems to be' all that could
be desired; but in its "spirit" it has little to recommend it.
Some other philologers, retaining the idea of nearness, add,
as a distinct element in the etymology of the word, the idea
of movement, approach, (prope ito, — I go near). The addi
tion is ingenious, but undoubtedly fanciful ; for the primitive
word was evidently an adjective, (propitius), not a verb.
We should suppose that we must go off, altogether, from
this scent of the idea of nearness, (prope), if we would
get to the primitive notion of the word; — for mere nearness
is no guarantee for propitiousness. The hating and the

280 ROMANS III. 25, 26.
hateful — the revengeful — may be near, as well as the for
giving, the compassionate, and the loving.
It has been supposed by some that the idea of petition
is involved in the word, (pro and peto; see Leverett, sub.
voc). It is surely an absurd etymology. A propitious
being is not one who petitions for another. He is one who
may require to be petitioned, but not one who requires
to petition.
Nonius Marcellus supposes that the word etymologically
means exceedingly pious, (prorsus pius, proprie pius, or
porro pius). It is, we presume, a fanciful and inadmissible
explanation of the primary import of the term. And yet
we are not unwilling to think that, so far as the introduc
tion of the word pious into the sphere of our concept is
concerned, there may be a movement in the right direction.
We can suppose that there is between the two words,
"pious" and "propitious," not indeed an immediate or
very near connection, but a real, though perhaps far re
moved, relationship. On the supposition that kindness —
the peculiar feeling of kindred or kinship — is fundamentally
involved in the idea of pious, (pius, conf. »j7rtoe), — then,
assuredly, there is a kind of piety in propitiousness. There
is at least the piety of pity, — a piety which may be
characteristic of a parent in relation to his erring children,
and of God in relation to the erring subjects of his sovereign
rule. In Latin it was legitimate to speak of parents being
pious toward their children, as of children being pious
toward their parents ; and of God being pious toward men,
as well as of men being pious toward God. In English
the word piety has got narrowed in its reference. It
denotes almost exclusively a feeling of the moral creature
toward the Creator, — that feeling that pervades the
character and the conduct of those who realize that God
is their God and their Father. But pity — another phase of
piety — has not been equally turned aside from applicability
to God. The Lord is "very pitiful." And we may with
propriety ask him to pity us in some specific way, or to be
propitious to us. In Latin the worshipper could be repre
sented as piating the Being worshipped. (Tellurem porco,

ROMANS III. 25, 26. 281
Silvanum lacte piabant,-~Kor. Ep. ii. 1. 143.) The human
piety, that is to say, of the worshipper, could be viewed as
rising up and taking effect upon the Being worshipped,
so that divine pity was the result. This same piety could
also be viewed as taking effect upon the sin that had given
offence, (culpam piabunt, -Vixg. Aen. ii. 140). The offering
or sacrifice which was presented by piety took effect in
piating the offended God, and in expiating the offence
that had been committed against him. Propitiation was
realized. We are thus not indisposed to think that there
may be some interlacing, however complicated, between
the word "pious " and the word " propitiation." But still
we wait for light.
The etymological import of the corresponding class of
Greek words is, if possible, still obscurer. Indeed, it is
enveloped in a darkness which is, as yet, utterly unpene-
trated. If the word that signifies propitiated or propitious
(JXaog) be connected, as Eustathius says it is, and as is
admitted by many philologers, with the word that signifies
cheerful or joyful, (iXapog), then one might suppose that
there might be some reference to the joyful light or radiance
that beams from the countenance of the glad and kind.
One naturally remembers that the moon is called iXdtipa,
and one is almost tempted to connect, though remotely,
the fundamental element of the word with the fundamental
element of the word yXiog, the sun, and of the affiliated
words iXy, t'iXy, the light or heat of the sun. It is a
widely diffused element. We find it in German, hell (clear).
We find it in Hebrew, fyn, to be clear. And it seems to
turn up, with its aspiration made sibilant, in o-IXae, light,
brightness, and atXyvy, the moon; and compare, too, the
Gothic sauil, the sun. If there be a filament of affinity
running through this group of terms, and threading them
into etymological unity, then we may suppose that, by
a not unnatural lateral movement of the needle of thought,
there may be some reason, in the affinity of things, for
the connection which is suggested by the Etymologicum
Magnum between the word for propitious (fXtwg = t'Xaoe)

282 ROMANS III. 25, 26.
and the word for mercy, (iXtog). If the connection be real,
then we should have a relationship of things corresponding
to the relationship between "pity" and " propitiousness."
Eustathius has a fancifully operose and utterly imprac
ticable derivation for t'Xaoe- He resolves the word thus, —
"ttpai Xdtiv, I desire to see. But his assertion that 'iXaog
and iXapog are connected is borne out by the fact that
'iXtwg is sometimes used in the signification of iXapog.
(Hence Hesychius, "Xtwg, tvptvyg, iXapog, and hence, vice
versa, Suidas, iXapwrtpog, tvirpoairwrtpog, easier of access.)
But, however obscure the etymological import of the
words we have been considering, their conventional accep
tation is by no means obscure. The verb to propitiate
(iXdaKopai) is always, in Homer, used with a reference to
divine beings, and means to appease, to placate, to win
the favour of, to render propitious. In subsequent writers
its application was, not unnaturally, extended ; and men
were said to propitiate men. The Parians, for instance,
are said by Herodotus to have propitiated Themistoeles by
money, (Ilnpioi Si QtpiaTOKXr)a XPVpaai tXao-auEVOt.-viii.
112). In the New Testament the words are invariably
employed in reference to God. But in the Septuagint an
instance or two occurs in which propitiation is spoken of
as terminating on offended men, — men whose indignation
might be regarded as formidable pr dangerous. In Gen.
xxxii. 20 (21) we read that Jacob said of Esau, "I will
appease him (/ will propitiate him, i^iXdaopai ro 7rpoo-a>7rov
aurou, = i'3D <-n?2s) with the present, and afterward I
will see his face ; peradventure he will accept of me."
In Prov. xvi. 14 we read, "The wrath of a king is as
messengers of death ; but a wise man will pacify it, (will
propitiate him, i^iXdatrai avrov)." It is added, " In the
light of the king's countenance is life ; and his favour is as
a cloud of the latter rain."
The corresponding terms in Hebrew (i??, is'a, ens?, rn=>3)
do not run in exactly parallel lines of import with the
Latin and Greek terms. But their primary import is mani
fest. The verb (is?) means to cover. And, indeed, were it
not the case that the English term cover verifies itself as a

ROMANS III. 25, 26. 283
simple modification of the French couvrir,— which, like
the Spanish cubrir and the Italian coprire, comes from the
Latin cooperire,— one might have been almost tempted to
have imagined that there might be some phraseological
filament of kinship between it and the Hebrew term; —
they are so like one another. Such a connection, however,
— should it really be imagined, — would nevertheless be
entirely imaginary.
There seems to be little reason to doubt that the primary
meaning of nas is to cover. Hence the use of the term
in the one passage in which it is found in Kai, Gen. vi.
14, — "and cover it (viz., the ark) within and without
with pitch," (translated in our version "and pitch it
within and without with pitch"). And thence, in the Pihel
conjugation, — the conjugation in which the term generally
occurs, — it bifurcates in its import, and signifies, either to
pardon, on the one hand, (Ps. lxv. 3 ; lxxvjii. 38 ; Jer.
xviii. 23), or to make propitiation or atonement, on the
other, (Exod. xxix. 36, 37; xxx. 10, 15, 16; xxxii. 30; Lev.
i. 4; iv. 20, 26, 31, 35 ; v. 6, 10, 13, 18, &c, &c.) In both
branches of signification the fundamental idea of covering
is manifest. Sins are covered, and as it were hidden out
of sight, both when they are pardoned and when they are
atoned for or expiated, — when propitiation is made for
them. In consequence of this twofold application of the
Hebrew term, the corresponding Greek verb (tXao-Kouai) is
sometimes anomalously used in the Septuagint, even in
the middle voice, as meaning to pardon. (See 2 Kings v.
18 ; Ps. lxiv. 3.) And, indeed, Symmachus uses the active
voice of the compound verb in the same acceptation, (i%iXd-
okwv dpapnag, Ps. lxxviii. 38). In the New Testament the
compound verb (i^iXdaKopai) does not occur at all, thougli
it is it that is generally used in the Septuagint. And the
simple verb (iXdaKopai) occurs only twice, signifying, in one
of the passages, (Heb. ii. 17), to make atonement or propi
tiation for (= the Septuagintal E^iXao-KOHai), and, in the
other/ (Luke xviii. 13), in which it is used in the passive,
it means to be propitiated so as to forgive, — "God be
merciful (be propitiated, be forgiving) to me a sinner."

284 ROMANS III. 25, 26.
The publican, doubtless, had regard to the typical sacrifice
presented in the temple, where he was when he offered up
his prayer. It was pardon, on the footing of a propitiation,
which he desired.
As to the word which the Apostle employs in the passage
before us, (tXao-rjjpiov), it is evidently intended to exhibit
the ground of the " redemption " which is " in Christ Jesus,"
and of the "justification" which is conditioned on that
" redemption." " Christ Jesus " is characterized by what
is " propitiatory," and has been " set forth publicly " by
God as such : and hence there is redemption for men, and
the possibility of justification. But there is some con
siderable difficulty with the specific hermeneutics of the
term. (1.) Some translators have rendered the word, as if it were
a masculine noun, — propitiator. The Codex Fuldensis of
the Vulgate reads propitiatorem : and so other ancient
codices of the Vulgate. The same reading, too, had doubt
less been found in some of the ante-Hieronymian codices.
Pelagius gives it. And so does Ambrosiaster. Eufinus, in
his translation of Origen, says that Propitiator was the
most frequent translation in the Latin codices. Wycliffe's
translation corresponds : he renders it "an helpere." Pur
vey, in his revision, renders it " forghyver " (forgiver). In
Cranmer's Bible it is rendered "the obtainer of mercy."
Erasmus's version is similar: he renders it "reconciler"
(reconciliatorem) ; but in his Paraphrase and Notes he
adheres, along with le Fevre of Estaples, to the more
literal translation, "propitiatory," (propitiatorium). Vata
ble, while noticing that the Latin codices differ in their
way of translating the term, seems to assume propitiator
as his reading. Cajetan decides for the masculine noun,
rendering the word placator, (procul dubio, redimendo).
Este, too, prefers propitiator. So did Melancthon, both
in his Commentary of 1540, and in his Enarratio of 1556.
In his Annotations of 1522 he assumed the interpretation
which is stereotyped in Luther's version, and to which

ROMANS III. 25, 26. 285
we shall by and by refer. Strigelius and Hunnius fol
low Melancthon's ultimate opinion. Wahl gives the same
translation. So does Bolten. And so does Schrader,
(Versbhner). So, too, Eeithmayr. Jaspis and Goeschen
render it " expiator," (expiatorem). Sender, before them,
had explained it in the same manner. Benecke renders it
a Freer-from-sin, (Entsiindiger). The Peshito version has
been regarded by Tremellius and Schaaf as lending its
authority to the same kind of rendering : but on merely
conjectural and indeed mistaken grounds, for the term
which it employs Q °r rhn t.) is used, both in 1 John ii. 2 ;
iv. 10 ; and in Heb. ix. 9, in which last place, at least, it
cannot mean propitiator.
This translation, as a free and easy rendering, might be
accepted : but only as a free and easy rendering. Doc-
trinally regarded, it doubtless harmonizes with the Apostle's
idea. But the word which he employs is evidently an
adjective, not a substantive. It means propitiatory, not
propitiator. (If propitiator had been the precise idea
which was in the mind of the Apostle, we should have
expected him to use iXaaryg instead of fXao-rijptov.)
(2.) In the common editions of the Vulgate the term is
translated " propitiation," (propitiationem) : — and this ren
dering has been followed in our Authorized English Version ;
as also in the Dutch, (tot eene verzoening). It is approved
of by Er. Schmid, and Boysen, and Jowett, &c. Beza's
translation is in substance the same, placamen in his first
edition, and placamentum in all the subsequent editions, —
a version of the word that has been adopted by Melville,
Piscator, and others. It had, in its ultimate form, been
adopted, we presume, from Castellio, who gives it. (Bollock
improves it by rendering the expression in placamentum)
The Geneva version of 1557 corresponds with Beza's trans
lation, — "a pacification." The subsequent Geneva has it,
" a reconciliation." Diodati's version is similar, " per pur-
gamento," — "for a cleansing or expiation." The interpre
tation of Glockler and Usteri corresponds,— " a means of
propitiation," (Versohnungsmittel,-Glockler ; Siihnungsmit-

286 ROMANS HI. 25, 26.
tel,-\Jstevi). Sharpe translates the word too demonstratively,
" the means of propitiation."
The remark that we made in reference to the other
translation specified is equally applicable to this. As a
free and easy rendering, it is admissible, and useful, and,
in many respects, admirable. But it must be borne in mind
that it is free and easy. For the Apostle's word is not a
substantive, but an adjective. And its adjectival import
would, doubtless, be fully-orbed before his mind when,
passing over a variety of substantives, from among which
he could have made a selection, (iXaapog, i&Xaapog,
iZiXaapa, &c), he chose the term which he actually
employs. (3.) A large number of interpreters suppose that the
Apostle, in using the word, has direct reference to the golden
covering of the ark of the covenant, which was within the
Holy of holies; and they think that he intended to represent
Christ as the antitype of that particular and very special
part of the innermost contents of the temple. This has been
a favourite view of the import of the word, — being founded
on the fact that the term, as it occurs in the Septuagint. is
almost always used as the designation of that golden cover.
(See Exod. xxv. 17, 18, 19, 20, 22; xxx. 6; xxxi. 7; xxxv. 11 ;
xxxvii. 6, 7, 8, 9; xxxix, 35; xl. 18. Lev. xvi. 2, 13, 14, 15;
Numb. vii. 89.) In the only other passage, moreover, in
which the term occurs in the New Testament, viz. Heb. ix.
5, it has its customary Septuagintal reference : — " and over it
(viz., the ark of the covenant) the cherubims of glory
shadowing the mercy-seat," (for such is the translation of
the term in our English Authorized Version). Philo, too,
refers to the lid of the ark as a symbol of propitiatory
power, and as being called iXaorrjptov. (He says, — ryg S' "Xtw
Svvdptwg, to iwiSrtpa Trig ki&wtov. koXei $' aitrb iXaarr)piov.
De Profugis, p. 465, ed. 1691: and again, p. 668, De vita
Mosis, he says, speaking of the ark, i)g iiriStpa waavti irwpa
rb Xtyoptvov tv itpalg (SifiXoig iXaarypiov, — o?r£p eoikev
tivai avp^oXov, (jivalKWTtpov piv, riig "Xtw tov Seov Svvd
ptwg' — he then proceeds to give his "ethical" or mystical

ROMANS III. 25, 26. 287
interpretation of its import.) It is supposed by the
expositors referred to that it was Christ, viewed in his
propitiatory relation, and as the Protector of the honour of
the law, who was typified by the ark's lid, or, the "mercy-
seat." Hence, it is supposed, the cherubim, who were on
either side of it, overshadowing it with their outspread
wings, had their faces toward it, (Exod. xxv. 20), "desiring to
look into " the wonders which were involved in his person
and work (1 Pet. i. 12). And hence, too, the Lord said to
Moses, — " there will I meet with thee, and I will commune
with thee from above the mercy-seat, from between the two
cherubims which are upon the ark of the testimony, of all
things which I will give thee in commandment unto the
children of Israel." (Exod. xxv. 22.) Afterwards, — when
the affairs of the Judaic theocracy were fully set in order, —
it was only once a year, and on the great day of atonement,
that the Holy of holies was entered, and the mercy-seat
approached. Peculiar solemnities were observed on the
occasion. They are particularly described in Lev. xvi. The
high priest, who alone was allowed to enter, had first to
sacrifice a bullock, as a sin-offering for himself and his bouse;
and then, taking incense within the vail, "that the cloud
of incense might cover the mercy-seat (to iXaarypiov) that
was upon the testimony, that he die not," he was to " take
of the blood of the bullock, and sprinkle it with his finger
upon the mercy-seat, (&r\ to tXaorTjpiov), eastward," and
"seven times before the mercy-seat," (Kara irpoawirov tov
iXaarypiov). It is added,—" Then shall he kill the goat of
the sin-offering, that is for the people, and bring his blood
within the vail, and do with that blood as he did with the
blood of the bullock, and sprinkle it upon the mercy-seat,
(iiri to iXaarypiov), and before the mercy-seat, (koto rrpoawirov
rov iXaarypiov). And he shall make an atonement for the
holy place, because, of the uncleanness of the children of
Israel, and because of their transgressions in all their sins;
and so shall he do for the tabernacle of the congregation
that remaineth among them in the midst of their unclean
ness." (Lev. xvi. 11 — 16.)
Christ, it is supposed, is the true " mercy-seat," (the true

288 ROMANS III. 25, 26.
iXaarypiov), and as such, it is contended, is he referred to by
the Apostle in the passage before us. This was the opinion
of Origen, who certainly throws the reins on the neck of his
imagination, and strikes, besides, his sharpest spurs into its
sides, when he sets himself to describe the analogy that sub
sisted between the type and the antitype. He thinks, for
example, that it is said that the cherubim were " in the two
ends," and not said that they were upon the right and left
sides, of the golden cover, because there is nothing but what
is right — nothing sinister (sinistrum nihil) — in the soul of
Christ. Chrysostom took apparently the same view of
the word. Erasmus thinks that he did. It is certain that
Theodoret took it, and GScumenius and Theophylact.
Luther too : He translates the word " throne of grace,"
(welchen Gott hat vorgestellt zu einem Gnadenstuhl,
whom God has set forth as a throne of grace. See Heb.
iv. 16). Tyndale gives the same translation, — a seat of
¦mercy. Calvin leans, upon the whole, to the same inter
pretation. Peter Martyr approves of it, and Musculus.
Mussus thinks it not improbable. Grotius adopts it.
Cocceius decides for it. Vitringa contends earnestly for
it, and is indeed very positive about it. (See his Tractate
De. mysterio aurei arcae operculi, and his Commentary,
in which last he says, Doch daar lean niei aan getwijfelt
worden, omdat de Apostel dit woord gebruikt heeft,
't welke alleen aan de Grieksche Joden bekent was, of
hy neemt het in de self de sin, in welke het by haar. aange-
nomen was) Wolf is of the same opinion. Wetstein, too,
assumes the interpretation, and gives some quotations to
show that the Eabbis recognized some great mystery iu the
furniture of the Holy of holies. Bugenhagen, Ferus, and
Crell, before Wetstein, took the same view ; and Schlichting,
and Felbinger, and John Locke ; — and these were followed
by the moderns of their school, — Taylor, Newcome, Wake
field, Belsham, Jones, &c. Hammond, too, maintains the
same interpretation, (though he errs in saying that the
Hebrew rrps is " indifferently rendered in the Old Testa
ment tAao-rijpiov and Karairiraapa ; " being misled no doubt
by Exod. xxvi. 34 and xxx. 6, in which two passages the

ROMANS III. 25, 26. 289
Septuagint translator had read rvfis instead of n?.'"ie). Dey-
ling contends earnestly and elaborately for it. (See his De
Christo iXaarypiw, in which, however, he strangely maintains
that the blood of atonement was not sprinkled on the
iXaarypiov, but merely before it.) Venema pleads at length
for the same view ; but, in defending it, he says that on the
great day of atonement the typical iXaor?'/ptov " was exposed
before the eyes of all," when the high priest passed through
the vail, (hoc operculum die solennis expiationis, Pontifice
velum quasi removente, sanguine conspersum ante omnium
oculos exponebatur), forgetting that it is expressly said in
Lev. xvi. 17, that "there shall be no man in the tabernacle
of the congregation" when the high priest "goeth in to
make an atonement in the holy place." Lavater supports
and ingeniously unfolds the same view in two Dissertations,
(de Christo Jesu iXaarypiw). Andreae supplements Lava-
ter's labours in another Dissertation, (De Christo tanquam
fidelium propitiatorio). Leichfeldt contends for the same
view. (Disput. Theol. de Christo Propitiatorio.) Seb.
Schmidt takes the same view, and also Wolf, Baumgarten,
Bohme, Wells, Krebsius, Carpzov, Nosselt, &c. Among
more modern interpreters it has been accepted by Bosveld,
Olshausen, Philippi, TJmbreit, Wardlaw, Brandes, Lange, &c.
Tholuck, too, in his 5th edition, settles down into it. In
his 4th edition he wavered. In his three preceding editions
he gave the preference to another interpretation, to which
we shall by and by refer.
In support of this explication of the Apostle's idea it is
sometimes alleged, as, for example, by Taylor, Owen, Knight,
that " in all other places " in which the word occurs in the
Greek Scriptures, whether of the Old Testament or of the
New, its reference is to the " mercy-seat," or golden cover of
the ark. This, however, is not true. For, not to refer to
Amos ix. 1, (where the Septuagint translator had evidently
read, by mistake, rqe? for "*i?3), the term is used five times
in Ezekiel (viz., xliii. 14, 17, 20) as the translation of the
word which is rendered "settle" in our English Version,
(viz., rrtm — a term for a ledge round a large altar). It is
not the case, then, that the word has,, in Biblical Greek, an

290 ROMANS III. 25, 26.
absolute or exclusive or monopolizing reference to the cover
of the ark of the covenant.
And, on the whole, we are disposed to think that the
interpretation, though venerable for its antiquity, and
estimable for its evangelical relationships and aspirations,
is too narrow, too artificial, and too bizarre to be legitimate.
We doubt not, indeed, that the Apostle had in mind the
Septuagintal translation of the word thai; designates the
golden cover. We believe, too, that he would regard that
cover as constituting an important item in the typical
institutions that had relation to Christ Jesus as a pro
pitiator. There is no good reason for supposing with Koppe,
de Wette, Eiickert, Fritzsche, Bleek, and others, that the
Septuagintal translation for the golden cover arose from a
misapprehension of the Hebrew noun on the part of the
translator. It is evidently from the Pihel verb (is?) that
the Hebrew noun (trps) is derived : and that verb, in every
instance in which it is used, has reference to covering that
is connected with propitiation. The covering which it
imports is either propitiatory or propitious. And doubtless
the covering of the tables of the law in the ark of the
covenant was, and was intended to be, in some way
propitiatory; for there are insuperable objections to that
theory of the " Holy of holies " that makes it merely and
absolutely a symbol of Heaven. * It is a symbol of heaven
as specially and propitiatorily prepared for sinners. The
sum-total of the representations in the tabernacle and
temple was assuredly either interpenetrated with, or en
veloped in, a propitiatory element. Doubtless, then, the
cover of the ark was not intended to be simply a cover. It
was intended tp be a cover that covered propitiatorily. And
hence its pihelic name in Hebrew. And hence the transla
tion of that name in Greek; — though the translation, —
in consequence of the total absence of the fundamental
idea of covering in the Greek class of expiatory words, — is
an extremely imperfect reproduction and reflection of the
Hebrew original. The Greek translator, if using only a
single term to render the single term of the original, was
constrained, in consequence of the peculiarity of his Ian-

ROMANS III. 25, 26. 291
guage, either to suppress the idea of covering (iiriStpa or
irwpa) while retaining the idea of propitiatory, (iXaarypiov),
or, vice versa, to suppress, as Josephus does (Ant. iii. 6. 5),
the idea of propitiatory (iXaaTypiov) while retaining the
idea of covering, (iiri&tpa or irwpa). The Septuagintal
translator chose, and chose wisely, the former alternative,
inasmuch as it is the propitiatory idea that is emphatic in
the original word. In Exod. xxv. 17 (16), and in xxxvii. 6,
(ed Comp), the two terms are combined, — "propitiatory
cover," (tXao-rrjpiov iiriStpa). In all other passages the
fragmentary expression, " the propitiatory, — " (to iXaarypiov),
is employed.But while we would thus vindicate the Septuagintal
translation; and while, therefore, we would not lose sight'
of the idea that the antitype of the propitiatory cover is
found in the work of Christ, which has, for the sake of
sinful men, propitiatorily covered, and thus honoured and
magnified, that law on which the throne of the universe
is established; we would still regard that cover as being
only a part of the typical entirety that represented the full
propitiatory element of the work of our Saviour. The
sin-offerings, too, were propitiatory. The shedding of their
blood was emphatically propitiatory. The sprinkling of
the shed blood was propitiatory. The incense, too, was
propitiatory. The whole action of the High Priest in
connection with the sin-offerings was propitiatory. In
order to the fulness of propitiation the life of Christ and
the death of Christ required to be combined. His righteous
ness was indispensable; and so were his sufferings. We
do not regard it, therefore, as natural, to understand the
word propitiatory, in the passage before us, as simply
designating the propitiatory cover of the ark ; and more
especially as there is nothing in the surroundings of the
word to recal the reference to the "ark," or to indicate
the relation of the symbolic cover to the ark's contents.
The interpretation is too narrow.
It is to be borne in mind, moreover, that in Heb. ix. 5,
and in all- the passages of the Septuagint, except that first
one (Exod. xxv. 17) in which the making of the propitiatory

292 ROMANS III. 25, 26.
covering is ordered, the expression is articulated, " the pro
pitiatory — ," (to iXaarypiov). If the reference, in the
passage before us, had been to the propitiatory covering,
we should have expected the definitive article.
And not only so ; for as Christ Jesus was not a real
and literal covering, a real and literal "propitiatory lid,"
we should have expected, if the Apostle were referring
to that lid, that he would have used some such expression
as Theodoret employs when he says that the Apostle
teaches us that our Lord is "the true propitiatory, — "
(SiSdqKti toivvv b 5tiog diroaroXog, wg to dXyOivbv iXaarypiov
6 Atairoryg iari Xpiarog).
And then, besides, it is not natural to lepresent Christ
himself, in the entirety of his personality, as the propitiatory
lid or cover of the ark of the covenant. For that pro
pitiatory lid or cover was the throne of the Shekinah.
And it is no more natural to regard Christ, in the entirety
of his personality, as the throne of the Godhead, or of the
Father, than it would be, with Grotius, to regard the God
head or the Father as constituting the throne of the Son.
(See on Heb. i. 8.) It is the propitiatory work of Christ,
in one of its elements,- — his active obedience to the law, as
we presume, (his gehoorsaamheii— Vitringa), — which is the
natural antitype of the propitiatory cover of the ark ; and
as it is on the ground of that work, — the actual active
righteousness of Christ, as connected with his shed blood, —
that God acts propitiously toward men, the work might be
represented, — but certainly not Christ himself in his entire
personality, — as the mercy-seat. It is no more necessary,
and no more natural, to regard the propitiatory lid as
representing Christ in his entire personality, than it would
be to regard the propitiatory blood as also the type of the
entire personality of our Saviour. The Apostle, however,
in the passage before us, is speaking, not of the work of
Christ as such, but of Christ himself: — "whom God set
forth as propitiatory."
But, whatever may be thought of this reasoning, it is
certain that Luther's translation of our word, "Gnaden-
stuhl," and Tyndale's kindred translation, "a seate of

ROMANS III. 25, 26;_ 293
mercy," are altogether inappropriate. For neither in the
Greek expression,— whether viewed in its fragmentary
or in its complete form, ,(r6 IXaarypiov or to iXaarypiov
iiriZtpa), — nor in the original Hebrew word, (rrps), is there
the shadow of a shade of reference to " stool," or " throne,",
or " seat." This is utterly fatal to the accuracy of the trans
lation. And besides, it is more than either "grace" or
" mercy " that is referred to. It is propitiatoriness. God
was gracious and merciful in sending Christ Jesus: but
now that Christ Jesus has come, and lived, and suffered,
and died, he is propitiated and therefore propitious, willing
and ready to forgive, and to justify, and to glorify.
In conclusion, as regards this interpretation, we would
say, not indeed with Eiickert, that the time is now almost
come when it should be passed by in silent contempt,
or only referred to as an exegetical curiosity, (diese
Ansicht ist sclion Idngst mit so vielen und so haltbaren
Grunden bestritten worden, dass es bald an der Zeit zu
seyn scheint, sie mit Stillschweigen zu bedecken, oder
hochstens als Ballast ihrer Sonderbarkeit wegen mit fort-
zufuhren) ; but that it is certainly too narrow, too artificial,
and too one-sided to satisfy the requirements of the
Apostle's exposition of his great evangelical theme.
(4.) A large proportion of expositors suppose that the
Apostle's word means a propitiatory sacrifice. They would
regard it, — at all events the majority of them, — as having
been originally an elliptical expression, — an adjective,
(having for its understood complement some such word a§
Svpa, hpov, itptlov); but they think that it ultimately
settled itself, in conventional usage, into the independent
status of a noun. (They compare it with such expressions
as KaSapo-iov, or, in the plural, KaSrdpaia, xaPl,JTr)pl0v or
Xapiarypia, awrypia, iiriviKia, Siafiarypia, rtXtarypia, ytviOXia,
tiayyiXia, &c. &c.) Meyer alleges that Chrysostom took
this view of the expression. The " golden-mouthed " father,
at all events, according to him, regarded the Apostle's word
as exhibiting our Saviour in the light of the antitype of the
Mosaic sacrifices, (den Antitypus der Thieropfer). But it ig

294 ROMANS III. 25, 26.
more probable, as we have already indicated, that Chrysos
tom referred to the typical cover of the ark. His expression
is quite indefinite, (sat iXaarypiov Si avrb tovto KaXti,
SttKviig oti £t 6 TV7roe roaavryv tlx£v t°*Xvv> 7r°XX(jJ pdXXov y
dXf)Srtia to avrb iiriSti^tTai, — and he calls him for this same
reason iXaarypiov, showing that if the type had such power,
much more would the reality exhibit the same). Le Clerc
advocates the interpretation. Bos assumes it, (Ellips. sub
Srvpa). Turretin prefers it. Bollock long before assumed it.
Eisner takes the same view. So does Heumann. So
Kypke. Michaelis introduces it into his Translation, (zum
Versohnopfer). It is defended by Koppe, Flatt, Storr,
(Opusc. i. 190 — 1), Klee, de Wette, Eeiche, Stuart. Terrot
renders the expression " an expiatory sacrifice." Stolz gives
a similar rendering, (zum sohnopfer). Kollner decides for
the same interpretation. So does Meyer. So does Fritzsche,
who, in reference to the golden-cover interpretation, exclaims,
" Valeat absurda explicatio ! " Greve, in his Free Transla
tion, coincides with Stolz and Kollner, (zoenoffer). Chalmers
says that the word " rather signifies the offering itself, than
the place in which the blood of the offering was sprinkled."
Van Ess introduces the interpretation into his translation,
(zum Suhnopfer). Krehl, Baumgarten-Crusius, Oltramare,
Bisping, Maier, Turner, decide for the same view. So does
Tischendorf, (De vi mortis Christi Satis factoria, p. 17).
Ewald introduces it into his translation, (zum Suhnopfer).
So does Schott, (tanquam sacrificium quod vim haberet
expiandi). So does Conybeare, (to be a- propitiatory sacrifice).
Schleusner defends it in his Lexicon, though he draws
somewhat on his imagination for authorities. Alford, as so
frequently on Eomans, echoes de Wette. Eilliet translates it
"an expiatory victim," (une victime expiatoire). Many
other critics accord.
It is undoubtedly, in substance at least, and so far as
doctrinal exegesis is concerned, the correct interpretation of
the Apostle's expression. If Christ Jesus was "propitia
tory " at all, he was propitiatory as a sacrifice. His blood
had propitiatory value. All the propitiatory acts of his
theanthropic personality pointed to, and terminated in,

ROMANS III. 25, 26. 295
the shedding of his blood upon "the wooden altar,"— the
surrender of his human life as the consummation of his
atonement for our sins. That such an idea was present
to the Apostle's mind when he dictated the word before us,
is put beyond all reasonable question by the very next
words, " through faith in his blood." And yet there is no
decisive evidence that the term in question was ever used '
substantively to signify a propitiatory victim or sacrifice.)
It may have been thus used. But there is no decisive
evidence that it was.
Many critics, indeed, and some of great name, speak in
such a way as to convey the idea that there is abundance of
evidence for this substantive use of the word. Tholuck, for
instance, speaks confidently; and that not only in his first,
second, and third editions, saying that the word is found
with this signification " in Josephus and Dio Chrysostom,"
but in his fourth also, in which he began to sift as well as
to gather. He there affirms, on the authority of Winzer
and Fritzsche, that the Word occurs " in the classics " with
the signification of propitiatory offering. In his fifth
edition he gives no authorities, either primary or secondary,
but he speaks confidently of the word as currently and
commonly used by the classics in the signification con
tended for. (iXaarypiov fiir Suhnopfer ist im Classischen
ein gangbarer Ausdruk. — Das bei Griechen so gewohnliche
iXaarypiov) Meyer, again, in his first edition, also refers
to Dio Chrysostom, — quoting as his authorities for the
reference, Bos and Kypke. In his succeeding editions he
drops all reference to secondary authorities, and gives the
words. of Dio himself, though not with perfect accuracy.
He added, too, as other primary authorities for the accepta
tion of the word as a substantive, Nonnus, Dionys. 13, p.
382 ; Josephus, de Mace. 17, 20 ; Hesychius ; and the Scho
liast on Apoll. Rhod. 2, 487. Fritzsche had, in the mean
time, appealed to most of the same primary authorities, —
quoting the passage from Dio Chrysost. almost as Meyer
gives it, and exactly as it is given by Bos, and reproduced
by Kypke. De Wette took the same view, as we have
seen. He asserts that the word is a substantive, meaning

296 ROMANS III. 25, 26.
propitiatory offering; and he adds that this is demonstrable
"from Dio Chrysostom, Orat. xi., p. 184, (see Kypke), and
Hesychius." Alford so far follows de Wette as to assert
that the word is itself a substantive, needing no supple
mental substantive, such as sacrifice (SO/ia), to be tacitly-
supplied. And he then adds : — " we have this very word in
Dio Chrysost. Orat. ii., p. 184, (cited by Stuart), where he
says that the Greeks offered an tXaortjpiov ry AOyvq, a pro
pitiatory sacrifice." Turning to Alford's authority, Moses
Stuart, we find him asserting, like the other, critics we
have specified, that iXaarypiov, in "the common Greek
idiom," stood for tXaarjj'piov Svpa, propitiatory sacrifice or
offering : and he then adds : — " So Dio Chrysostom, Orat.
ii. 184, tXao-rrjpiov 'Axatoi ry 'ASryvq, the Greeks (made) a
propitiatory offering to Minerva." He still further adds : —
" So Josephus, tXatrrrjptov pvypa, a propitiatory monument,
Antiq. xvi. 7. 1. So in 4 Mace. xvii. 22, iXaorijpiov Savarov
avrov his propitiatory death. Symmachus in Gen. vi. 14,
lAaffEte ikaarypiov.
It is in this way that many of the modern critics, — and
we might easily have added a troop of other names, such as
Oltramare, Krehl, Maier, &c. — 'dispose of the word iXaa
rypiov, and establish, to the satisfaction of their own minds,
that it is a substantive, signifying a propitiatory sacrifice
or offering. All of them, it will be noticed, make capital,
either at first or at second hand, of Dio Chrysostom. Let
us therefore begin with him.
Bos referred to him, — leading the way. Kypke followed,
and then Eosenmiiller, Koppe, Tholuck, Winzer, Eeiche,
Fritzsche, de Wette, Meyer, Stuart, Tischendorf, Alford, &c.
Alford seems to trust to him as his mainstay, citing Stuart.
He has correctly cited Stuart. But Stuart was unworthy
of his confidence. For, in truth, he had never seen Dio
Chrysostom ; and, merely guessing concerning the passage,
he blundered in his notation of it ; he blundered, too, in
his translation ; and he blundered, in addition, in his inter
pretation of iXaarypiov as occurring in the passage. He
borrowed the quotation, though without acknowledgement ;
— apparently either from Kypke or from Koppe. In bor-

ROMANS III. 25, 26. 297
rowing it, he unhappily borrowed a mistake as to the
notation of the Oration. Kypke acknowledges, — like
Eeiche, and like de Wette in his various editions, and like
Meyer in his first edition, — that he borrowed the quotation.
He borrowed it from Bos. But, by a mistake of his pen or of
his printer, he numbered the Oration referred to as ii. instead
of 11, or xi. Koppe somehow or other committed the same
mistake. Hence, apparently, Stuart's first blunder. Then, in
the second place, he translates the quotation as if it were a
historical remark of Dio in reference to some fact that had
transpired — " the Greeks (made) a propitiatory offering to
Minerva." But Dio is not referring, in the passage, to any
historical event that had occurred, or that was supposed to
have occurred. He does not say that the Greeks made a
propitiatory sacrifice to Minerva. He is merely recording
a scheme or proposal of TJlysses. And, in the third place,
there is not the shadow of a shade of reference to anything
of the nature of a sacrifice or sacrificial victim. Dio re
presents a proposal supposed to be made by the wily
Ulysses to the Trojans, when the Greeks were suing for
peace. The Trojans were for insisting that the Greeks
should make some atonement (Sikjjv nvd viroaxtiv) for
having causelessly waged war. Ulysses denied that the
war was causelessly waged. The Greeks were really insulted
and provoked. But, added he, if some atonement should,
in the circumstances, be really befitting, he himself would
devise one. The Greeks, he was ready to pledge himself,
would leave behind them a large and beautiful- monu
mental offering to Minerva, (KaTaXtiiptiv yap avrovg dvdSypa
KdXXiarov Kai piyiarov ry 'ASi)v£), bearing the inscription,
iXaarypiov 'Axaiol nrf ASyvij. ry 'iXidSi, or thus, —
IAASTHPION PROPITIATORY.
AXAIOI THE GREEKS
TH A9HNA TO THE ILIAN
TH IAIAAI MINERVA.
The terminology of the inscription is, as was common in
such cases, abrupt and elliptical. But the meaning is

298 ROMANS III. 25, 26.
evident: — This monumental structure is propitiatory. The
Greeks have erected it, and dedicate it, to the Guardian Goddess
of Ilium. There is not, as will be at once perceived, any
filament of reference to any victim or sacrificial offering.
It would be nearer the truth to say that there is a reference
to the famous wooden horse. And thus the mainstay of
Stuart, Alford, Tholuck, de Wette, &c, &c, for interpreting
tXatrri-jpiov as in itself meaning propitiatory sacrifice, falls
to the ground. There is nothing, moreover, in the inscription
to establish the idea that iXaorjj'piov is "itself a substantive."
The intended erection, or dvdSypa, which was to bear the
inscription, was the concrete substantive, — the concrete
substance, — which was to be adjectively qualified, or defined,
or explained, by the word propitiatory.
Besides this passage in Dio Chrysostom, appeal is made,
in support of the interpretation of the word which we are
considering, to a passage in the reputed Josephus de Mac-
cabeis, c. xvii., — the Tractate that is sometimes called the
Fourth Book of Maccabees. Tholuck, as we have seen,
couples, in his first, second, and third editions, a reference to
Josephus with his reference to Dio Chrysostom. This is the
passage intended. Eosenmiiller, Koppe, and Meyer quote
it at length. Stuart adduces so much of it as he considered
to be of service. The passage runs thus : — " By the blood of
these pious ones, koi tov iXaarypiov [rov] Savarov avrwv,
divine Providence saved the previously afflicted Israelites."
The clause which we have quoted in Greek is supposed to
mean, and by the propitiatory sacrifice of their death.
Krebs, in his Observations on the New Testament from
Flavins Josephus, thus explains the passage. And it is, as
thus explained, and thus only, that it can be regarded as
lending some countenance to the notice that tXao-rjjpiov is
a substantive, meaning propitiatory sacrifice. Krebs's
explanation of the clause, however, assumes the genuine
ness of the second article, which we have enclosed in
brackets; — an unlikely assumption. The article, indeed,
is found in Hudson's edition, and Havercamp's, and Din-
dorf's ; but it is omitted in Weidmann's, 1691 ; and it is con
demned as spurious even by Eeiche and Oltramare, although

ROMANS III. 25, 26. 299
, by such a sentence of condemnation they deprive them
selves of one of their few authorities for their interpretation
of iXaorrfptov. The genuineness of the article would cer
tainly require to be thoroughly established before we could
accept the interpretation of the expression given by Krebs.
It seems to be an outre stretch of imagination to represent
the death of the worthies referred to as being a propitiatory
victim or sacrifice. Even Mehring's interpretation is in
tolerably violent, philologically, as the other is logically,
— by the propitiatoriness of their death, (to iXaarripiov fur y
iXaarypioryg). It is certainly far more likely that the word
was used as a simple adjective, — and by their propitiatory
death. Moses Stuart, as we have seen, quotes the passage
in support of his interpretation of IXaarripiov. But, in
quoting it, he seems to assume the spuriousness of the
second article, for he omits it. And yet the wonder is,
that, when the passage was thus shorn of its only possible
applicability to the end in view, — the support of his opinion
that iXaarypiov is used substantively, and means a propitia
tory sacrifice, — he should yet adduce it as evidence. But
not only does he adduce it, (though inaccurately ; — tXaer-
rypiov 3-avarov avrov, instead of avrwv), he translates it " his
propitiatory death ; " — .-not observing that in this, his own
translation, he actually excluded altogether the substantival
idea for which he contends, and for the establishment of
which he had quoted the passage. — This second mainstay,
then, of the interpretation we are considering, breaks
down. A third mainstay is a note of the ancient scholiast on an
expression in the 2nd Book of the Argonautics of Apollonius
Ehodius, 1. 487, (XwQyia pi£ai iir' avrw \ itpd). Moses Stuart
does not refer to this scholium. But Eeiche does, and
Fritzsche, and Meyer, and Teschendorf ; and Winzer before
them. Oltramare, too, quotes it from Fritzsche. The
scholiast uses the compound i^iXaarypia to explain Appol-
lonius's Xw(j>yia, and it is supposed that this is evidence that
i^iXaarypiov, and, by consequence, IXaarypiov, are sub
stantives meaning a propitiatory victim or sacrifice. We
feel surprised that the evidence should be deemed satisfactory,

300 ROMANS III. 25, 26.
or as indeed of any weight whatever. A simple inspection
of Apollonius makes it evident that Xw<pyia is an adjective.
The old man counselled Paraebius to make atonement for
the injury his father had done to the nymph. He exhorted
him to rear an altar to her, and to offer on it propitiatory
sacrifices, (Xwtyyia pi%ai iir' avrw hpa). Awipyia is thus a
mere adjective qualifying Upd, sacrifices, and hence when
the scholiast explains the phrase as a whole, and the word
Xw(j>yia in particular, (Xw^uji'a pi^ai. — e^»' ole XwQyatt kuI
iravatrai y ryg Nvpijiyg bpyy' rovrian KarairavariKU ryg
bpyyg. Xw<j>yia, i^iXaarypia, itf ole Xwipyati Kai iravatrai
KaKovptvog), there is no reason to suppose that he ignored
the word hpd, as qualified by the adjective XwQyia, though
he does not expressly quote it. We have nothing here to
do with the twofold explanation given of the adjective.
The first-,-Kara7ravaTiKa rije 6pyr/e — is manifestly the only
legitimate interpretation of the import of the word. — This
third mainstay, then, of the notion that tXao-rij'piov is a
noun signifying a propitiatory sacrifice has also broken down.
Our authorities are like to vanish from our hands the
moment that we touch them. But Fritzsche has one more.
And Meyer reproduces it; and Tischendorf. Oltramare, too,
cites it, but not, like Meyer, as if at first hand. It is one of
the cluster of authorities on which Tholuck rests in his
fourth and fifth editions, reposing in the trustworthiness of
Fritzsche. Wordsworth, too, has had regard to it. He
accepts the interpretation of iXaarypiov " which renders it a
sin-offering or propitiatory victim;" and he says in support
of his choice, — " See the authorities in Fritz, p. 193, and in
Meyer, de Wette, and Alf." Such is his array. But Alford's
one authority, as we have seen, was Dio Chrysostom as
quoted by Stuart. It has vanished. De Wette's main
authority was the same Dio. But he has, in addition, a
little subsidiary authority, which we shall consider forthwith.
Meyer rests on five authorities, — Dio; Josephus de Mace;
Apollonius; the passage we are about to cite; and de
Wette's small subsidiary addendum. Fritzsche overlooks
this small subsidiary addendum; and thus his only remain
ing support is the passage we are about to consider. It is

ROMANS III. 25, 26. 301
from the Dionysiaca of Nonnus, Lib. xiii. p. 382, v. 9 —
iXaarypia Fopyotig. But it was too bad in Fritzsche to
stick down, at perfect random, such a quotation, as having
a bearing on the subject in hand, thus leading, they knew
not well whither, Meyer, Tholuck, Oltramare, Wordsworth,
&c. The expression as given by Fritzsche is a mere con
jectural reading, proposed by Falkenburg, and approved of
by Moser, in lieu of an unintelligible expression in the text.
Cunaeus gives another conjectural reading, — hpa ptipara
Topyovg, and he had as good a right to his conjecture as
Falkenburg had to his. The expression in Nonnus (xiii.
517) is, 'iKaarypta Top-yove. "I know not what it means,"
says Graefe, (quae sint 'tKaarypia Fopyovg plane ignoro).
But to suppose that Nonnus's expression could be the pro
pitiatory victims or sacrifices of the Gorgon is utterly incon
gruous. The author is describing certain localities occupied
by the Phrygians; and after specifying Budias, Temenias,
Dresia, Obrimus, and the land of Doias, he adds the auri
ferous Celaenae, Kai 'tKaarypia Topyove- Whatever be his
meaning, it may certainly be taken for granted that the
Phrygians did not inhabit the propitiatory sacrifices of the
Gorgon. Thus this authority^ too, breaks down.
De Wette, as we have observed, has a small subsidiary
reference in support of his interpretation of iXaarypiov. He
says that the substantival import of the word, as meaning a
propitiatory sacrifice, is demonstrable "from Dio Chrysostom
and Hesychius." Meyer, too, appeals to Hesychius. So did
Koppe before them both. But the appeal is entirely futile.
Hesychius's explanation of iXaarripiov is KaSapo-iov, Svaiaa-
rypiov. With the latter word we have at present nothing to
do. It is puzzling enough. But as to the former, it assuredly
cannot determine anything in the present controversy; for
KaSdpaiov is not only an adjective in its essential nature, it
is used in good Greek adjectively as well as substantively,
and more frequently adjectively. Alberti supposes that
Hesychius is explaining the. meaning of IXaarypiov in its
common Septuagintal application, as a designation of the
golden covering of the ark. Be this as it may, it is
obvious, at all events, that the lexicographer's explanation is

302 ROMANS III. 25; 26.
no proof at all of the substantival import of iXaarypiov.
And yet, in consequence of this word KaSapo-iov, Hesychius
is actually set down by Heumann as holding, along with
" Grotius, Hammond, Clericus, Eisner, Beausobre, Bos,
Turretin," &c, that the Apostle meant by IXaarypiov, propi
tiatory sacrifice. And in Tholuck's first three editions a
corresponding but somewhat more accurate string of
authorities is thus given, — "Hesych., Grotius, Clericus,
Kypke, Eisner, Heumann, &c."
Strangely enough, Moses Stuart has adduced, in support
of his view, another passage still, — a passage from the genuine
Josephus, Antiq. xvi. 7, 1, iXao-rij'piov pvypa, a propitiatory
monument. The expression is a real one. Stuart's trans
lation is a correct one. The reference of the historian is to
Herod, who had got a fright when sacrilegiously attempting
to pillage the tomb of David. In consequence of the check
which he had thus received, he erected, says Josephus, in
white marble, at the mouth of the sepulchre, a propitiatory
monument of his fright, (rov Siovg iXaarypiov pvr)pa), that
is, a monument of his fright, which was intended to be of
atoning value. The passage is an interesting and important
one. But how it could ever have occurred to Stuart to
adduce it to prove that tXao-rrjpiov is used substantively, as
signifying a propitiatory sacrifice, is beyond our power of
imagination to conceive.
In his later editions Stuart adds to his list of testimonies
an expression from Symmacbus's version of Gen. vi. 14.
Winzer had adduced the expression in 1829. It is also
referred to by Eeiche. That phrase in the Hebrew which
is rendered in our version thou shalt pitch with pitch, is, it
seems, rendered by Symmachus iXdatig iXaarypiw. It is,
however, a rendering so outre that nothing can be made of
it, at least for the determination of the import of iXaarypiov
in Eom. iii. 25.
Le Clerc, it would appear, was running in the right
tract when he said that he had not met, in his readings,
with any instance of the substantival use of IXaaTjjpiov,
in the sense which he attached to it in the passage before
us. The only authority that he could think of, that had

ROMANS III. 25, 26. 303
any relevancy, was the interpretation which is given to the
word in the Old Onomasticon, namely propitiabile. He
refers to the ancient Glossary published by Labbeus ;
and he supposed that propitiabile is to be understood
actively, — able to propitiate. But this is nothing to the
point. It affords no evidence whatsoever that iXaarypiov
means a propitiatory sacrifice.
The result of our investigation is, that there is no
passage yet adduced in which our word, iXaarypiov, is used
as a substantive signifying a propitiatory sacrifice. This
is all the more remarkable, as there is no lack of similar
adjectives which are used substantively in the manner
referred to ; — no lack, at all events, of such words in the
plural number. (See KaSdpaia, iiriviKia, tvayyiXia, &c.)
The phraseological relations, moreover, of tXaorjjpiov are so
very intimately connected with what has reference to
atonement or expiation, that one would have expected
abundant instances in the classics of its specific substan
tival employment, if it had really been . made use of to
designate a propitiatory sacrifice.
In these circumstances it would, we apprehend, be
unwise to insist that the term should be translated, sub
stantively, a propitiatory sacrifice. The idea, indeed, that
Underlies this translation, and- that constitutes the whole
pith and marrow of the doctrine that is infolded in it, was,
as we have already indicated, undoubtedly present to the
Apostle's mind. But it would appear that he inwrapped
the idea in the folds of a term that is ampler in its
reference than the proposed translation. He inwrapped it
in the ample folds of an adjective, retaining its primary
adjectival import and force : — " whom he set forth propi
tiatory," that is, "whom he set forth as propitiatory;" — as
propitiatory, namely, in the special and distinctive relations
of his glorious theanthropic personality. That the word
might thus be used adjectivally is beyond a doubt. The
passage quoted from the reputed Josephus is evidence.
The passage quoted from the real Josephus, Antiq. xvi. 7. 1, is
incontestable evidence. The Septuagintal passage, Exod.

304 ROMANS III. 25, 26.
xxv. 17, in which the expression propitiatory cover (iXaa
rypiov iirlStpa) occurs, is also incontestable evidence. So is
the passage which Hase quotes in Stephens's Thesaurus from
Nicephorus, (x£ipae 'iKtrypiovg, ti fiovXti SiiXaarypiovg,iKTtivag
&t$.-Vita Symeon. Stylit. in Actt. SS. Maii t. 5, p. 335,
17). There can thus be no doubt of the actual conventional
usage of the word as employed adjectively. And its simple
adjectival force in the passage before us is really all that
can be desired. It is, in substance, approved of by Winzer,
Matthias, and Mehring. It comprehends, and harmonizes,
indeed, all that is aimed at in all the other interpretations ;
but it embraces them in the ampler folds of that indefinite
applicability that is characteristic of its own peculiar
adjectival import. If Christ Jesus be set forth as pro
pitiatory, then it must be true that he was set forth as a
propitiator, and set forth as a propitiation, and set forth as
a propitiatory sacrifice, and set forth, too, as the antitypical
fulfilment of all the symbols of propitiation that were
divinely instituted under preceding dispensations. It was
Christ himself, in his theanthropic personality, that was
thus propitiatory. He was, in his intermingled satisfactio
and satispassio, the meritorious cause of God's relation of
propitiousness to the human family. It is in consideration
of his propitiation that God, as the Moral Governor of
the universe, is willing and is ready to forgive and to justify
all such of the " ungodly " as will be induced to take up,
by means of faith in the propitiator, that one mental
position that will insure their voluntary reception of such
divine influences as are needed to renew the heart and
assimilate the character to the archetypal character of God.
The work of Christ Jesus, as propitiator, was that " ran
som," (that Xvrpov or dvriXvTpov), which he paid " for
many," "for all," — for the multitudinous all, — and on the
ground of which there is that " redemption " which is
spoken of at the conclusion of the preceding verse. It
is a "ransom," — a "price," — something precious and to be
prized It is prized by God. It is of unspealcable value
in the estimation of God. And in consideration of its
incalculable value in. moral government, as a thing that

ROMAN'S Iii:. 25, 26. 305
is so precious as to be more than an equivalent for the
demands of strict justice in relation to transgressors of law,
God, — even while realizing all the claims that lie upon him
as the Great Moral Governor of the universe, — is willing
to forgive the guiltiest of the guilty, and to render them
heirs of everlasting life. But the word propitiation, — as
comprehended in the word propitiatory, — is more expansive
in its import than the words ransom and price; and it
is better fitted, therefore, to bring into view some of the
wide governmental principles that are involved in the
unique phenomenon of the terrestrial life and violent death
of Him who was both God and man, — " God manifest in
flesh." Propitiation assumes, indeed, that the. Great Moral
Governor, — considered personally, and as distinct from his
abstract Moral Government, — has been displeased. It
assumes that he has been greatly offended. And greatly
offended God has really been ; — offended at rebellion and
with rebels. His infinite heart has been stirred. His
infinite conscience has been aroused. His holy indignation
has sprung up and gone forth. But other feelings and other
principles were at work all the time, and thence arose the
idea and the scheme of propitiation. In the accepted
propitiation the divine anger has been so turned away
that God is now willing, and ready, and eager to forgive
the guiltiest of the guilty, treating them for eternity, as if
they had never sinned. He is willing, ready, and eager, in *
consideration of the propitiation, to render them who had
madly made themselves liable to everlasting death the j
heirs of everlasting life. The propitiatory work of Christ
is thus that great unique fact in the divine moral govern
ment, in consideration of which God, as the Great Moral j
Governor, is willing and ready to forgive. Such is its 1
essential nature. But let it ever be borne in mind that it ,
was in virtue of a self-originated desire in the divine heart, ¦
 a desire to be willing to forgive, — that God Himself j
devised the scheme of propitiation.
§ 5. through faith in his blood, (Sid iriartwg iv rq avrov
a'ipan). The clausule, "through faith," (Sid iriartwg), is

306 ROMANS III. 25, 26.
omitted in the Alexandrian Manuscript (A). And it is not
made use of by Chrysostom in his exposition. It is omitted
also from his text in Matthaei's codices. Mill says that he
does not doubt that it has stealthily crept in from the 22nd
verse, or from other passages of the epistle, (illud Sid iriartwg
irrepsisse hand dubito ex v. 22, aliisve locis hujus epistolae.
-Pro! § 691). Locke thinks that the omission is "con
formable to the sense of the Apostle." Matthaei, too, could
suppose that the clausule had been imported for the sake
of explication : but he would not modify the text in the
face of such overwhelming manuscriptural authority, (Sunt
haec ita comparata, ut facile quis credat, explicandi caussa
illata esse. Sed contra tot Codd. nihil tentandum videtur).
He is right in the conclusion to which he comes. For
assuredly there is no legitimate ground, either internal or
external, for suspecting the genuineness of the clause.
Whitby had good reason for objecting to the soundness of
Mill's judgement in this instance, (judicium hie parvifacio.
-Examen. p. 57). Nevertheless Belsham considered himself
justified in striking out the clause, and saying nothing
about it. The copy of the epistle which Ambrosiaster
must have had before him would seem to have been here
imperfect. The preposition is omitted, though the word
"faith" is retained, (quem proposuit Deus propitiatorem
fidei). This corruption of the integrity of the clausule on
the one hand, and its omission on the other, may be
sufficiently accounted for on the ground either of accident,
or of intentional attempt to relieve the text from a supposed
confusion of ideas or perplexity of structure. In reality,
however, there is neither confusion nor perplexity.
Another remark about the text. In the Stephano-
Elzevirian text the article is inserted between the preposi
tion through and the word faith, (Sid rtig iriartwg). And
this reading is supported by B E K L, and the great majority
of cursive mss. It is also found in the texts of Theodoret
and GLcumenius. But the article is wanting in N C D P G
31, 80, &c, and is omitted by Eusebius, Basil, Cyril, Dam
ascene, and Theophylact, and, what is of special moment, it
is omitted by Origen in the three passages of his extant

ROMANS III. 25, 26. 307
Greek writings in which the passage is quoted. (See Com.
on Matt., Tom. xii. 21 ; on John, Tom. i. 23, 38.) Griesbach
suspected that it was spurious; and it has been omitted
from the text by both Lachmann and Tischendorf. Alford,
too, omits it. On the whole, the evidence is in favour
of its omission : although this is one of the cases in which
there is almost an equipoise of authorities. And, happily,
it is one of the cases in which it is not of the slightest
exegetical or doctrinal moment whether of the two readings
be assumed. If the article be omitted, faith is spoken
of indefinitely, and its specific reference as Christian faith
is to be determined from what follows, or from the nature
of the case. If, again, the article be inserted, the finger of
the Apostle is, as it were, directly pointed to the Christian
faith, of which he had already spoken, (ver. 22 ; chap. i. 1 6,
17), and with which, as was well known, he had specially
to do as an Apostle of Christ Jesus. It was evidently a
matter that lay almost indifferently at the option of the
inspired writer, — to employ either the more or the less
definitive mode of reference. And in other cases he some
times, — and' without any ascertainable doctrinal significance,
— adopts the one mode of reference, and sometimes the
other. See ver. 30. In English, our idiom will not permit
us to make any difference in our translation, whether the
article be present or absent in the original.
We accept, then, the clausule — "through faith;" and we
accept it in its more indefinite reference. But how is it
to be connected with what goes before? Baumgarten,
D. G. Herzog, and Eeiche suppose that the preceding part
of the verse is parenthetical, and that the clausule is there
fore to be added, as in a row, to the clausules of the 24th
verse, being, equally with them, dependent on the participle
"justified:" — "being justified freely by his grace through
the redemption which is in Christ Jesus, — through faith."
But this method of construction is inadmissible, inasmuch
as the second half of the 25th verse, "for the manifestation
of his righteousness, &c," is obviously dependent on the
expression, "whom he set forth as propitiatory;" which
expression, therefore, cannot be parenthetical. Philippi

308 ROMANS HI. '25, 26."
connects the clausule with the verb set forth : — " whom he
set publicly forth — through faith :" — an unlikely inter
linking, though he explains himself as meaning that the
forth-setting is "realized subjectively through faith,"
(realisirt subjectiver Seits durch den Glauben). The
explanation is good ; but the forth-setting itself was cer
tainly altogether independent of human faith. It was a
divine act which historically transpired more than eighteen
hundred years ago. It was nothing but an act, — an act, in
a double sense, transient. And in no legitimate sense or
reference was it conditioned on the intermediacy of the
sinner's faith.
There can be no doubt that the great body of. expositors
are right ih attaching the clausule in question to the word
propitiatory, (IXaarypiov). In attaching it, we say. For
there is rather an adherence of notions than an intimate
inter-knitting of ideas. The Apostle means that the pro-
pitiatoriness of Christ is, so far as its blissful results' are
concerned, realized by the sinner through faith. The Pro
pitiation enters as a power within the precincts of the
sinner's personality, so as to result in redemption or pardon,
and justification, and eternal life, only when it is appre
hended by faith. It is thus the case that Christ Jesus, as
propitiatory, is available to sinners — through faith, and
only through faith. The Apostle's idea might be exhibited
thus : — " whom God set publicly forth as propitiatory, —
available as such, — realizable, — through faith," or, as Day
represents it, " to be enjoyed and made ours through faith."
The attachment of clauses is, both phraseologically and
doctrinally, akin to the expression in ver. 22 — " God's righ
teousness through faith of Jesus Christ." God's evangelical
righteousness is evangelical righteousness whether believed
in or not. It is also evangelical righteousness for sinners,
and free to them all, whether they have faith in it or not.
But it is not " on them," unless they apprehend it by faith.
They are not justified on the ground of it, until they
believe. So the propitiation of Christ is a propitiation,
whether believed in or not. But it issues not in that actual
'pardon of the sinner which, so far as its relation to man is

ROMANS III, 25, 26. 309
concerned, is its normal aim and end, until it be appre
hended by faith, (—faith as the causa apprehendens of the
propitiation, — the opyavov avrtXr}7rriKov). The propitiation
may be regarded as characterized by polarity of aim. At
one of its pples,^-the pole which points in the direction of
the divine readiness to forgive, — it is unconditionally fixed.
At its other pole, — the pole which points in the direction of
the actual eventuation of forgiveness, — it is unfixed, until the
sinner's, receptivity for ulterior and purificatory influences is
secured by the act of faith.
' The Apostle adds to the expression through faith, the
words in his blood, (iv r$ avrov a'lpan). The words are
regarded by not a few critics as forming a distinct co
ordinate clausule, which is to be directly attached either to
the word propitiatory or to the verb set forth. Baum
garten, indeed, and Eeiche, think that it is to be connected
with the participle justified in the preceding verse. Apart
from this extreme view, however, Wetstein says, "these
words are to be separated by a comma, both from those
which succeed and from those which precede," (Haec verba
commate distinguenda sunt a sequentibus et praeceden-
tibus). Crell and Schlichting take the same view. Lim
borch prefers it. Jowett decides for it. Long before them
Erasmus seems to have taken the same view. He trans
lates the expression absolutely, — "his blood intervening,"
(interveniente ipsius sanguine). Vorstius adopts the ren
dering. In Cranmer's Bible there is a comma after " thorow
faith," and then the clausule before us is translated "by
the meanes of hys bloude." In Nb'sselt's edition of Theo
doret, and in the Oxford edition of 1852, a comma is
inserted, in the text, after the word faith. Conybeare, in
his translation, makes a considerable transposition, connect
ing the words in question with the verb set forth : — " Him
hath God set forth, in his blood, to be a propitiatory sac-.
rifice by means of faith." Mehring makes a similar trans
position ; only he connects the words with the adjective
propitiatory, (welchen Gott dargegeben hat als die Kraft,
durch den Glauben zu versohnen, in seinem Blute habend).
With Mehring agree Schrader, Glockler, Kollner, Matthias,

310 ROMANS III. 25, 26.
Vaughan, &c. With Conybeare agrees Meyer. And of
substantially the same opinion are Vitringa, de Wette,
Alford, and the Five Clergymen, who connect the words
in his blood with the whole expression whom God set forth
as propitiatory. In the existing Latin translation of
Origen's Homilies on Leviticus the two clausules are
transposed, — "whom God hath set a propitiator in his
blood through faith," (quem posuit Deus propitiatorem in
sanguine ipsius per fidem. Horn, ix., p. 351, Tom. ix. ed.
Lorn.) Beza is said by de Wette to approve of the separa
tion of the two expressions. He is, on the other hand,
adduced by Meyer as approving of the interblending of the
two. The truth is that he wavered somewhat between the
two interpretations ; but certainly he never decided for the
interblending of the expressions. In his first edition he
spoke decisively in favour of keeping them apart, — connect
ing the second of the expressions with propitiatory, not
with faith. (Haec refero ad iXaarypiov, potius quam ad
irpoiSrtro vel ad iriartwg.) In his second edition he began to
hesitate. In his third his hesitation continued. Never
theless, in both of these editions, he interposes a comma
after faith. In his fourth edition he continued in his state
of hesitation, but he removed the comma. In his fifth and
last edition he still omitted the comma, but continued un
decided, though on the whole he tended somewhat strongly
in the direction of his early determination, (for he says, for
the first time, in this edition, that if we should connect in
his blood with faith, we should render the former expression
in Latin, in sanguinem; whereas he gives it in all his
editions, in sanguine, with the exception of the first, in
which he paraphrastically renders it fuso sanguine suo).
Some critics, such as Day, Wolf, &c, attempt to hook the
expression in his blood by two distinct links, both to the
proximate expression through faith, and to the more remote
propitiatory. It is a clumsy coalition of ideas, and compro
mise of interpretations. Benecke and van Hengel separate
the two expressions, but they regard them both as termin
ating in their reference on him who was propitiatory. He
was propitiatory by means of his faithfulness: He was

ROMANS III. 25, 26. 311
propitiatory by means of his blood. It is an interpretation
that squeezes the Apostle's phraseology as in an iron vice.
There is really no necessity for having recourse to any
hyperbaton or strain. There is no good reason why we
should hesitate, even for a moment, to regard the words in
his blood as pointing out the object on which the faith speci
fied in the preceding expression terminates, and in which
it reposes: — through faith in his blood- It is true, indeed,
that the same expression does not elsewhere occur. But
if we are never to accept an expression unless it be a repe
tition, we shall never get at all to a beginning of expressions.
It is also true that Heumann, Koppe, Flatt, and others are
guilty of critical licentiousness when they say that the
Apostle, in exhibiting the object of faith, uses the preposi
tion in (iv) for unto (tig). They have no right to allege
such a commutation of prepositions; — although it is the case
that, when the act of believing in relation to Christ is
mentioned in the New Testament, it is connected with its
object, generally, by means of the preposition unto (tig): —
for the act of believing is represented as something going
out toward Christ, and reaching to him. But when it
reaches to him, it does not flit from him. It rests. It
reposes on and in him. And hence the use, in the expres
sion before us, of the preposition in. It occurs again in
Eph. i. 15, — "faith in the Lord Jesus Christ;" Col. i. 4;
1 Tim. iii. 13; 2 Tim. iii. 15. Comp. Mark i. 15, (7u<7r£v£rE
ev r<jJ Evay-yEX^). It is likewise true that if the article
before the word faith in the Stephano-Elzevirian text be
genuine, we might have had a repetition of it before the
expression in his blood, (Sid ryg iriartwg ryg iv riji avrov
a'ipan). Comp. ver. 24, (Sid ryg airoXvrpwatwg rfje e'v t<$
Xptary 'Irjo-ov). We might have had this repetition : —
the faith which is in his blood. But we might not; for
the whole expression, instead of being regarded by the
Apostle as two-plied, might have been viewed as a unit : —
the faith in his blood; i. e., the thing, which is faiih-in-his-
blood. Comp. Col. i. 4, (aKovaavng ryv irianv vpiov iv
Xpiary 'lyaov); Eph. i. 15; &c. (And conf. Winer Gram.
iii. 20. 2 : and Fritzsche, in loc.)

312 ROMANS III. 25, 26.
De Wette and Alford say that it is necessary to disconnect
the expression in his blood from the expression through
faith, and to connect it with the preceding expression,
whom he set forth as propitiatory, inasmuch as the suc
ceeding expression, for demonstration of his righteous
ness (tig ivStiS,iv ryg SiKaioavvyg avrov) "directly refers to
it," and hinges on it. De Wette refers to Meyer in confir
mation of this idea. But the reference, in this case, is of no
moment. For Meyer's notion on the subject is not the
result of his hermeneutics or philology, but the outworking
of his theological theory. It is in short a mere opinion,
unsubstantiated by any real , evidence, philological, hermen
eutical, philosophical, theological, or Scriptural.
Pelagius, Luther, and Calvin are obviously right in
regarding the words in question, viz., in his blood, as
designating the object of the faith which issues in justifica
tion. Every other construction is violent. Seb. Schmidt
and Cocceius look at the words in the same light : and so,
among more modern critics, do Winzer, Eiickert, Olshausen,
Tholuck, Tischendorf, Oltramare, Maier, &c. " Faith," as
John Brown of Wamphray says, "looks for acceptance to
nothing in itself, but goes quite out of a man's self, and
rests upon the merits and death of Christ as only satis
factory to justice, and through which it expects to be
accepted of God : — therefore it is faith in his blood." It
is not, indeed, to be supposed that justifying faith fixes
upon the blood of the Propitiator, simply because of the
vital peculiarity or the peculiar vitality of blood, when
viewed physiologically, as an element of the organization of
the human body. There is a substrate of this implied in
justifying faith. But it is not to the blood of Jesus, as
merely running in his human veins, that faith has respect.'
It is to his blood as sacrificially shed. It is, in other words,
to the surrender of his human life as the culmination of his
terrestrial obedience, that faith refers. It is thus to his
" obedience until death," — his obedience subliming itself in
death, or, reversely, to his " death " as instinct with the
sublime moral element of "obedience," — that justifying
faith has respect. Faith looks to our Lord's glorious

ROMANS III. 25, 26.' 313
" passive righteousness," as animated with his perfect
"active righteousness," which perfect active righteousness
alone could sublime the passive righteousness into an atone
ment unspeakably meritorious. The sum-total of the
ingredients of Christ's " passive righteousness," as animated
and sublimed by his "active righteousness," was super
erogatory. Christ was a supererogatory or superinduced
member of the human race. His active and passive righ
teousness, in our human nature, was not for himself. It was
for us. It was substitutionary. " He was wounded for
our transgressions ; he was bruised for our iniquities ; the
chastisement of our peace was upon him ; that with his
stripes we might be healed." (Isai. liii. 5.) He was made
"a curse for us." (Gal. iii. 13.) The surrender of his
life was the consummation of his propitiatory sacrifice.
And hence it is that he is available in so far as he was
propitiatory,— available to us for redemption, for pardon, for
justification, — " through faith in his blood."
Though the same expression does not elsewhere occur,
yet the New Testament is strewn with expressions which
indicate that justifying faith must have either explicit or
implicit reference to Christ's sacrificial oblation of his life.
The glorified sing, " Thou hast redeemed us to God by thy
blood." (Eev. v. 9.) The believing on earth say, "Unto
him that loved us, and washed us from our sins in his own
blood, &'c, be glory and dominion for ever and ever.
Amen." (Eev. i. 5.) They believe that " the blood of Jesus
Christ, God's Son, cleanseth them from all sin." (1 John i.
7.) They are "elect unto the sprinkling of the blood of
Jesus Christ." (1 Pet. i; 2.) Christ, as "an high priest,"
has " entered in once into the holy place, by his own blood,
having obtained eternal redemption for us." (Heb. ix. llj
12.) "We have redemption through his blood, the forgive
ness of sins." (Eph. i. 7.) Of the cup that was given to the
disciples after supper, our Lord himself said, "This cup is
the new testament in my blood, which is shed for you."
(Luke xxii. 20.)
It is only farther to be noticed that in the expression
faith in his blood, the position of the pronoun his, .(avrov))

314 ROMANS III. 25, 26.
as having precedence, in the Greek, of the word blood,
intimates that it is to be betoned : — " through faith in his
blood." The expression thus doubles back upon the word
propitiatory that goes before, and represents faith as scent
ing out the distinctive element in Christ's relation to us,
so far as he was propitiatory. It is the sacrificial element.
He says "his blood," says Musculus, "to exclude the blood
of beasts," (addit ipsius, ut oblatorum pecudum sanguinem
rejiciat). § 6. for demonstration of his righteousness, (tig ivSt&v
rije SiKaioawyg avrov). This clause is omitted in the
Peshito. And Gilbert Wakefield has dropped it out. Vi
tringa, too, in his exposition of the verse, ignores it ; as does
also Calvin : — though neither of • them disputed or doubted
the canonicity of the remark. There can be no doubt that
it was part and parcel of the original text. The symmetry
of the sentence conspires with the overwhelming mass of
external authorities to establish its authenticity.
The word demonstration (ivSti^iv) shows that the Apostle
was contemplating God in the relationship which he sus
tains to the great moral public. In that relationship God
is Himself a public Personage. He stands at the head of
a vast community of Intelligences. He is a Magistrate:
a Moral Governor: King of men and angels. He is a
Law-giver; and a Sovereign Administrator of the laws
which he has enacted. As such, his conduct is not only
an object of cognizance : it is also possible for it to become
an object of deliberative scrutiny. And, as the moral state
of the subjects of his realm cannot but be affected by the
estimate which they form of his public procedure, it is
i natural to suppose that, as becometh an infinitely wise and
benevolent Euler, he should be desirous to point out, for
public observation and consideration, the righteous prin
ciples by which he is regulated. Hence the Ev§Ei£ie, or
demonstration, or forth-showing, here specified. It is, as
Andrew Melville remarks, a pointing out, as with the finger,
(non secus ac si quis digitum intendat, hoc enim est tig
( tvSti%iv).

ROMANS III. 25, 26. 315
When the Apostle says "for demonstration," the preposi
tion (tig) evidently indicates the divine intention or aim.
The entire expression is therefore but another phase of the
expression that is employed in Eph. ii. 7,—" that he might
show," (i'va ivSii^yrat).
As it is intention or aim that is indicated, it is manifest
that it must be some action that is referred to: for aims
are relative only to acts. They are the ends contemplated
in acts. And hence there can be no doubt that the clause
for demonstration of his righteousness links on to the verb
publicly set forth (irpo&tro) at the beginning of the verse.
It is not to that verb, however, nakedly and abstractly
considered ; for the verb does not stand naked or abstract
in the Apostle's phraseology. The act of God was not a
naked and abstract act. It could not be. It had an object;
and an object that was complex or multiform in its rela
tions. " God publicly set forth Christ as propitiatory," and,
as such, "available through faith in his blood." It was this
public forth-setting of Christ, — the forth-setting of him as
propitiatory, — available, as such, through faith in his blood,
— which was intended to be for demonstration of his righ
teousness. There has been much diversity of opinion among inter
preters regarding the righteousness which was intentionally
pointed out by the public forth-setting of Christ as propi
tiatory. Some have supposed that the word means the divine
goodness or benignity or mercy. This was the opinion of
Abelard, (ad ostensionem suae justitiae, id est, charitatis);
of Grotius too, (malim hic de bonitate interpretari) ; of
Cameron too, who holds, indeed, that the word, when
applied to God, has always this meaning, (justitiae vocabu-
lum in Script, semper notat Dei comitatem, miserioordiam,
salutem, et redemptionem, nunquam vero adhibetur ad id
significandum quod vulgo justitiam dicimus). Of the same
opinion were Brentius, Limborch, Hammond, Wetstein (in
the upshot), Semler, Koppe, Mace; Eosenmiiller too, and
Wakefield, Morus, Jaspis, and Eeiche; Heberden also, and
Geissler, Whitwell, &c. But it is not the case that the word
righteousness (SiKaioavvy) means goodness or benignity;

316 ROMANS III. 25, 26.\
although it is doubtless the case that it is oftentimes a
right and righteous thing to be kimd, good, or benignant, and
hence it sometimes happens that the same act is capable of
being represented either under the aspect of righteousness
or under the aspect of kindness. It is because this is the
. case that the Greek word for righteousness (SiKaioavvy) is
sometimes employed in the Septuagint to translate a
Hebrew word (iot) which means kindness, lovingkindness,
or mercy, (see Gen. xix. 19; xx. 13; xxi. 23 ; xxiv. 27;
xxxii 10; Exod. xv. 13; xxxiv. 7; Prov. xx. 28; Isai.
lxiii. 7); and, correspondingly, the Hebrew word for righ
teousness (npT"rc) is sometimes translated by a Greek term
(iXtypoawy) which signifies mercifulness, or goodness, or
alms, (see Deut. vi. -25; xxiv. 13; Ps. xxiii. 5; xxxii. 5;
cii. 6; Isai. i. 27; xxviii. 17; lix. 16; Dan. ix. 16). In
Matt. vi. 1 the word alms (iXtypoaivyv) occurs in the
received text, and in many of the Uncial manuscripts,
inclusive of S ; but, instead of alms, it is righteousness
SiKaioavvyv) that is the reading of'BD,1 supported by the
Vulgate, approved of by Griesbach, and accepted into the
text by Lachmann and Tischendorf. The diversity of
reading arises from the fact that it was possible to view
the thing spoken of under two aspects. It might be
viewed as mercifulness; and it might be viewed as righ
teousness. But still the word righteousness no more means
mercifulness than the word mercifulness means righ
teousness. We cannot, then, accept the translation and
interpretation of Grotius and his confreres in the passage
before us.
Other critics have supposed that the word, as here used,
means truthfulness. This is the view taken of the word by
Ambrosiaster; and that is accepted by Zuingli, Bullinger,
Hyperius (waveringly), Crell, Ferus, Gomarus, Turretin,
Locke, Bohme, &c. It is supposed that the word denotes,
as Turretin expresses it, God's fidelity in keeping his
promises, (fidelitas in implendis promissis). But though
such fidelity is certainly a phase of righteousness, it is
nevertheless the case that the word righteousness does not
denote fidelity or truthfulness. And the ; relation of the

ROMANS' III. 25, 26. 317
word to the cognate adjective and participle in the last
clause of the 26th verse, — "that he might be righteous,
(SiKutov), and the justifier — the adjudger as righteous —
(SiKaiovvra) of him who believeth," — proves that it was not
that particular phase of righteousness which consists of
fidelity or truthfulness that was present to the mind of the
Apostle. A large number of expositors suppose that the word refers
•to God's justifying righteousness, howsoever they may view
that righteousness. This is the opinion of Chrysostom and
Theophylact; also of Aquinas; and of Egidius Delphus;
also of Luther, who translates the expression thus, — "the
righteousness which is of avail before him," (die Gerechtigkeit,
die vor ihm gilt). It is also the opinion of Tyndale, who
translates the expression, — " the rightewesnes which before
hym is of valoure." . It is the opinion, too, of Melancthon
{Com. 1540); and of Calvin, in substance, and of P. Martyr,
Aretius, Bollock, Willet; Zuinger too, and Ferme, Eisner,
Varenius, Heumann, Nosselt; and of Este too, and de Paris,
and Eeithmayr; and of Winzer, Oltramare, van Hengel,
Edwards, Vaughan, Dr. John Brown, Bisping, Colenso, &c.
The same is in substance the view of Baumgarten-Crusius,
who explains the term as meaning sin-forgiving righteous
ness, (Gerechtigkeit welche die Siinden vergiebt). So, too,
Krehl, apparently; for he says that righteousness means
here the forgiveness of sins, (Sik. ist hier = afytaig dp). So,
too, Moses Stuart, who explains the phrase as meaning "the
justification which God proffers, or of which he is author."
So Whitby. So Belsham, (for a declaration of his method
of justification). And so too Terrot, who translates the
clause, ecbatically, thus, — " and thus God exhibits his
method of acquitting sinners." But this interpretation,
under all its phases, is liable to insuperable objections.
Under the phase which it assumes in the hands of Belsham,
Terrot, Moses Stuart, Krehl, Baumgarten-Crusius, &c, the
distinctive import of the word righteousness is merged and
lost sight of. The idea of righteousness, in fact, disappears.
The term loses its identity ; and is transubstantiated. The
phase which the interpretation assumes in the hands of

318 ROMANS III. 25, 26:
Chrysostom and Theophylact is connected with a defective
view of the nature of justification. (See on ver. 20 of this
chap.) The phase which it assumes under the hand of
Calvin is in the main remarkably kindred to. the view of
Chrysostom and Theophylact ;— although, in his case, it is
not associated with such a defective conception of the
nature of justification. He supposes that the righteousness
referred to is both immanent and transient. It is the
righteousness in virtue of which God is Himself righteous,
and by means of which, as communicated through Christ,
he makes believers righteous. The combination, howeve'r,
of these two ideas breeds hermeneutical confusion, by
introducing perplexity into the relation of the clause to the
immediately succeeding clause. And it proceeds on the
erroneous supposition that the participle justifying, at the
conclusion of verse 26th, means making righteous, rather
than pronouncing righteous. We need' not specify all the
other phases of the interpretation under consideration.
Only we may remark that the phase under which it appears
in the hands of Luther, Melancthon, Eisner, Wolf, &c, is out
of harmony with the upwinding of the sentence at the close
of ver. 26, — " that he might be righteous (viz., in the estima
tion of his moral subjects, — the public of the universe)
even in justifying him who believeth." The righteousness
referred to is evidently immanent righteousness. It is,
¦ relatively to Him to whom it is ascribed, subjective. It is,
, in short, a divine attribute, and it is thus to be distinguished
from that righteousness which is conferred in the economy
of mercy, and which is God's great evangelical gift,— that
righteousness which is revealed in the Gospel, and which
was wrought out and brought in by Christ Jesus.x That
righteousness, — God's evangelical or justifying righteous
ness, — is but a special phase of the propitiatory work of our
Saviour; and hence we could not expect the Apostle tauto-
logically to say that " Christ was publicly set forth by God, as
propitiatory, in order that his evangelical righteousness might
be shown." We might have as legitimately expected him to
say that Christ was set forth publicly as the Lord our
Righteousness, for demonstration of God's propitiousness.

ROMANS HI. 25, 26. 319
Flatt, Fritzsche, arid others render the word "holiness,"
(sanctitas). It is a rendering that certainly lies on the
right line of thought. Nevertheless there is a distinction
between righteousness and holiness. And it is uncritical to
ignore it. Schott's translation of the word, — the translation
into which he ultimately settled, — is kindred to that of
Flatt and Fritzsche, but far inferior. It is "probity,"
(probitas). And in explaining the phrase he shows his
perplexity, — a perplexity that had distracted him for many
years, — by combining, after the manner of Calvin, the two
ideas of immanency and transiency, — "the probity which
he has and which he confers," (probitatem quam habet et
quam tribuit).
Schott is not the only one who, in perplexity, has sought
to gather into a knot two or more divergent explanations.
Vorstius long before him explained the phrase as meaning
partly (partim) God's truthfulness, or his goodness; and
partly (partim) our justification, (ilia nostri justificatio, de
qua jam saepius actum est). Day says, — " The word righ
teousness signifieth here both the fidelity or truth and the
goodness or mercy of God." Beza, though contenting him
self in his earlier editions with the notion of faithfulness,
says, in his last edition, that by righteousness we are to
understand at once God's severity in avenging sins, and
his fidelity in fulfilling his promises, and his mercy
in imputing Chrises righteousness to believers. Thus he
twists for himself, very accommodatingly, a threefold cord-
Pareus makes a quadruplicate of it, (see on ver. 26), sup
posing that there is a reference, 1st, to God's universal
rectitude and holiness; 2nd, to his truthfulness or fidelity
in fulfilling his promises ; 3rd, to his goodness and mercy ;
and 4th, and chiefly, to his judicial rectitude or justice, in
virtue of which he renders to every one his due. OEcumenius
long before had flitted, in like manner, from idea to idea, in
reference to the import of the word, — finding no rest for the
sole of his foot. Many others are also hesitant, as Eiickert,
for instance, and before him Baumgarten, who gives, how
ever, the preference to Luther's idea of righteousness for
imputation.

320 ROMANS III. 25, 26.
But, undoubtedly, as already indicated, the word denotes
God's own subjective righteousness, — or that principle in his
infinitely perfect moral character which manifests its ex
istence and energy in an undeviating regulation of all his
voluntary acts, immanent and transient, by the idea of
right. It is obvious that there is such a. principle or ele
ment in the divine moral character ; and it complexions
with its own peculiarity and radiance all the relations in
which God stands to his moral creatures. It complexions,
for instance, his legislative relation, so that all his laws are
right, — right as regards what is preceptive in them, right as
regards whatever of a promissory nature is involved in them,
and right as regards all that is comminatory in their sanctions.
The same righteousness complexions his relation as the
Sovereign Administrator of his moral laws. His admin
istration is right throughout. Such of his laws as were
enacted for perpetuity, he maintains to perpetuity. Such
as were intended to be subservient to the interests of tem
porary dispensations, he maintains while the dispensations
last, — cancelling them, or subliming them into laws higher
and more comprehensive, when the dispensations close. He
upholds the authority of all his enactments. He honours
and magnifies them all.
It was, undoubtedly, this administrative phase of the
essential righteousness of God which was present to the
mind of the Apostle when he said, — for demonstration of
his righteousness. There was, apparently, no other phase
of the divine righteousness that was in danger of being
beclouded by the phenomena of forbearance and the
pretermission or forgiveness of sins. But there was
some danger of men, when not imbruted into moral torpidity,
and especially of the other members of the universal moral
public, starting back, as in puzzled amazement, on finding
that the breach of laws unchallengeably wise and good did
not draw after it the penalty which had been threatened.
How could such an anomaly in moral government, and that
too an infinitely perfect moral government, be accounted
for? The question is natural, and momentous. And Christ
Jesus, as propitiatory, is the only answer that really solves

ROMANS III. 25, m. 321
the difficulty. Hence it is that he was set forth by God for
demonstration of the righteousness of his governmental
procedure. It is this view of the righteousness here referred to that
is, with more or less of accuracy in definition or description,
attached to the term by a very large, if not a preponderant,
body of expositors. Origen aims at it, — though confusedly,
and giving undue prominence to the merely judicial
element: for, certainly, God's judicial righteousness, or
his righteousness as a Judge, is but one ingredient in his
righteousness as Administrator of his vast moral govern
ment. This judicial element is, however, that which is
specified, not by Origen only, but also by Sclater, de Wette,
Alford, and Tholuck, — all of whom look in the right direc
tion for the explication of the term. Others specify, but
also with too great one-sidedness, God's retributive right
eousness, — that phase of the divine administrative righteous
ness in virtue of which he renders blessing to the good and
woe to the wicked. This is the view of Calov. And
Philippi, identifying it with the view that singles out the
judicial element, accepts it as his interpretation, (seine
Gerechtigkeit, namlich seine richterliche, vergeltende Gerech
tigkeit). Others, again,' suppose that it is God's punitive
righteousness that is meant. This is the opinion of S.
Schmidt, Cocceius, Schrader, Meyer, Maier. It is the
opinion, too, of Brown of Wamphray, who calls it "vin
dicative justice." Others call it "vindictive justice." Hal-
dane has the same opinion, and calls it " avenging justice."
The explication lies in the right domain. For undoubtedly
it is God's righteousness in its relation to the penal element
of his administration that is specially in danger of being
beclouded by forbearance and forgiveness. But yet it is
unnecessary to detach or abstract, in thought, this one
relativity from the sum-total of God's rectoral righteousness,
when considering the God-ward end of things that was
contemplated in the setting-forth of Christ as propitiatory.
A cloud over the punitive element would cast its dark
shadow athwart the whole of the divine administrative
righteousness. Wardlaw holds that it is God's public
Y

322 ROMANS III. 25, 26.
justice that is referred to, — his righteousness toward the
great moral public. This idea, too, is in the right domain ;
only it may be regarded as of unnecessary amplitude. For
legislative righteousness, as well as that which is strictly
administrative, is part and parcel of public justice. The
interpretation may thus be regarded as erring somewhat
by way of excess, while the other interpretation of
"punitive righteousness" (Straf-Gerechtiglceif) errs by way
of defect. If, however, the expression public justice be
regarded as limited to the divine administrative righteous
ness, then the interpretation is perfect, with this one
exception, that the word justice is not exactly equivalent
to the original term, (SiKatoo-vvj)). It is righteousness, — as
distinguished at once from truthfulness and goodness on
the one hand, and from mere justice on the other, — that is
the precise English homologue for the Apostle's vocable.
Matthias's explanation of the reference of the word is not
nearly so good as that of Wardlaw. He says that it means
" the perfect agreement of the divine action with the divine
law,'' (die vbllige Uebereinstimmung des gottlichen Han-
delns mit dem gottlichen Gesetz). This would be (mutato
mutando) an excellent definition of the righteousness of
the subject: but it is not a correct representation of the
righteousness of the supreme Governor. The law is not a
rule for regulating the divine procedure : and if the divine
procedure were to be rigidly bounded by its provisions,
atonement and forgiveness would be absolute impossibilities.
We need not, however, consider, in detail, the varied
aspects given to the interpretation under consideration by
its various patrons. It is also approved of, in the substance
of its import, by Melville, Hunnius, Sclater ; Hombergk too,
and Venema ; and Macknight, Michaelis, Wetstein, Klee ;
Kollner also, and Stengel, Chalmers, Olshausen, Hodge,
Tischendorf, Wordsworth, D. Brown, &c, &c. And the
remark of John Brown of Wamphray is truly admirable :
¦ — "Though we be ready to overlook God's justice [his
SiKaioo-vvT)] in the matter of our redemption, yet it is useful
to consider seriously how justice as well as mercy kyths
[shows itself], in it, and how they kiss and embrace each

ROMANS III. 25, 26. 323
other, that the wisdom of God may be the more admired
in the salvation of sinners, who can make justice and
mercy, as it were, lay their shoulders together to help in
our redemption, and mercy gain the day, yet so as justice
should suffer no detriment ; therefore doth he say that one
end of Christ's being a propitiation for sin was to declare
his righteousness." (Expos, in loc)
§ 7. because of the pretermission of the former sins, (Sid
ryv irdptaiv twv irpoytyovorwv dpaprypdnov) ; a clause that
has been found by expositors to be in several respects
perplexing. The word which we have translated preter
mission (irdptaig) is peculiar. It occurs nowhere else in
the New Testament ; and nowhere in the Septuagint. It
had struck the fancy of Chrysostom at a very particular
angle of incidence ; for he regards it as having its patho
logical signification of paralysis. The Apostle, he remarks,
" does not say, because of our sins, but because of our
paralysis, that is, our deadness; for there was no longer
hope of health ; but as the paralytic body needs the hand
from above, so also the dead soul," (ovSi yap eiite, Sia ra
dpaprypara, ciXXct Sia ryv irdptaiv, rovrian, ryv viKpwaiv'
ovketi yap vytiag iXirig %v, dXX' wairtp awpa irapaXvOiv
ri/e avwStv EcVfro X£tpoC° ovtw koi y tpvxv vt/cpwStiaa). He
must, apparently, have construed the expression thus : —
because of the deadness of our souls, resulting from our
former sins. Odlcumenius and Theophylact give the same
interpretation. Theodoret adroitly skips over the word, —
taking no notice of it ; but he seems nevertheless to have
assumed its pathological import, for he winds up his exposi
tion by referring to God's preparation of the medicine of
salvation for sinful men, (tovto 7TjOOKarao-K£va£<i>v avroTe
rije awrypiag to QuppaKov). Photius (in GCcum.) seems to
take a different view of the import of the word ; but yet
he regards it as descriptive of what is subjective in men,
instead of what is attributable to God. He seems to
interpret it as denoting that remissness or negligence
which is one of the characteristic phases of human sinful
ness. He explains the Apostle's idea thus : — " Then when

324 ROMANS III. 25, 26.
we should have been subjected to the punishment of' our
remissness, we experienced forbearance and philanthropy,"
(iira Siov ryg irapiatwg airaiTy&rjvai SiKag, avoxije Kai
QiXavSpwiriag eVvxohev). He would apparently construe
the , expression thus, — because of our remissness in com
mitting our former sins. But neither this interpretation
nor that of Chrysostom, GScurnenius, and Theophylact, has
approved itself to modern expositors : and no wonder.
They are both exceedingly unnatural.
It would appear that in some of the early codices the
word was either accidentally or intentionally altered into 7rpo-
Staig, purpose. For, although this reading is not now found
in any of the extant Greek manuscripts which have been
collated, the corresponding Latin word, propositum, is found
in Ambrosiaster's text and comment, and in Augustin's
quotation of the text in his De Spiritu et Littera, cap. 13,
and in manuscripts d and e. It is also found in Pelagius's
comment, though not in his text. Ambrosiaster seems to
have interpreted the clause thus: — "because of God's
purpose (of mercy) in reference to our former sins," (sciens
d.eus propositum benignitatis suae, quo censuit peccatoribus
subvenire, &c). Pelagius seems to have interpreted it
thus : — because of God's purpose (of justice) in reference
to our sins, — that is, because of God's purpose to punish
our sins. "God set forth Christ a propitiation, that his
purpose to punish our sins might not be carried into fulfil
ment," (Propterea passus est Christus, ut propositum Dei
sedaret, quo tandem punire decreverat peccatores). This
reading of the text, however, is a thorough derangement
of the natural construction of the clause. And the inter
pretations founded on it are at best but ingenuities.
In ms. 46 the word irwpwaiv, hardening, is substituted
for the term in our text. And in Matthaei's ms. f, or 116,
as well as in 69, irapaivtaiv, advice, is found instead. The
latter of these two readings, — if it be not a mistake for
7rap«Xvo-tv, paralysis, — is unaccountable except on the
principle of an almost incredible remissness. The former
seems to be a conjectural emendation, in the direction of the
interpretation of Chrysostom, GScumenius, and Theophylact ;

ROMANS III. 25, 26. 325
though Griesbach is certainly mistaken when he supposes
that it was the reading which was in the text that lay
before these fathers. They are both of them readings
entirely out of the question. Their existence, however,
concurs with the existence of the reading of Ambrosiaster,
&c, and with the interpretations of the Greek fathers,
to show that the Apostle's expression was felt to be
perplexing. In the Peshito version the word is passed by altogether,
as well as the immediately preceding clause, for demonstra
tion of his righteousness. The clause is rendered ; —
" because of our sins which we formerly sinned," (^fe&
^_»4>j iOjjO ,-£b» ^-.oiAjj). This preterition of "the
word seems to be additional evidence that its interpretation
was felt to be perplexing.
And yet there is no reason why we should despair
of reaching the authentic idea of the Apostle.
There can be no doubt that the word is genuine. This
much seems to be indisputable.
There can be no doubt that it denotes some act on the
part of God. This, too, seems certain : and it is almost
universally admitted by modern interpreters.
It is doubtless, too, some merciful act that is represented,
— some act that made it desirable that the divine righteous
ness should be demonstrated by means of the propitiatory
work of Christ Jesus : for, unquestionably, the clause is
hung upon the immediately preceding clause, for demon
stration of his righteousness, and adduces a reason why
that demonstration of the divine righteousness was required.
It is as if the Apostle had said : — " whom God set forth as
propitiatory, &c, for demonstration of his righteousness, —
which demonstration was needed, or was rendered desir
able, because of the pretermission of the former sins."
God's pretermission of former sins might, as an act of
mercy, have been liable to be misunderstood, to the depre
ciation and damage of the moral system of the universe, —
to the unsettling of the minds of moral creatures in general,
as regards the rightness and righteousness of the moral
administration of the great moral Governor, — if means had

326 ROMANS III. 25, 26.
not been devised to demonstrate the perfection of his ad
ministrative righteousness. But these means were devised
and put into execution.
We have translated the word pretermission, — the trans
lation contended for, and established, by Cocceius, both in
his Commentary and in his Monograph on the word,
(Moreh Nebochim. — Utilitas distinctibnis duorum vocabul-
orum scripturae, irapiatwg et atyiatwg). It is adopted and
defended by Vitringa. It is adopted by Momma, whose
life, poor fellow, was sacrificed in his prime on the altar of
Cocceianism. It is accepted by Bengel, Bohme, Fritzsche,
Bretschneider, Wahl, van Hengel, &c, and approved of,
along with the distinction which it is intended to indicate,
by Eiickert, Meyer, de Wette, Tholuck; and by Philippi,
Oltramare, Maier, Alford, Krehl, Mehring, Matthias, Lange ;
and indeed by the great body of modern expositors. It is
certainly the most literal translation of which the word is
susceptible. The verb, from which the noun is derived,
(irapiypi), means — to send aside or pretermit, to let pass,
&c. And when used in reference to faults, transgressions,
or sins, it naturally means to let pass (unpunished). The
word "unpunished," indeed, is complementively supplied
by Xenophon, in his Hipparchicus, vii. 10, (ra ovv roiavra
dpaprypara ov X|°r/ irapiivai aKoXaara). Such being the
meaning of the verb, the noun, (irdptaig), when used in
reference to the same objects, naturally denoted " a letting
pass by," (Vorbeilassung), that is a letting pass by unpun
ished, that is, praetermissio, pretermission. (It occurs in
Dionysius, Hal. Antiq. Eom., vii. 37. — n-oXXa Xiirapyaavrtg
ryv piv 6Xoo-X£p5j ?rap£a-iv ovx tvpovro, rr)v S' tig xpb"vov oaov
yZ'iow avd&oXnv iXd&ov,)^4hough they failed, even after
much importunity, to obtain a complete pretermission (or,
letting-alone, viz., of the case of Coriolanus), yet they got
such a postponement of it as they aslced.
Instead of pretermission, the Vulgate renders the word,
remissio, remission, that is, forgiveness. And this meaning
is accepted by Erasmus, Luther, Tyndale, Calvin, Piscator,
&c. It is keenly defended by Eisner, and by Gebhardi in
his Programma on the verse. -It is supported by Kolding,

ROMANS III. 25, 26. 327
Wolf, Heumann, Winzer, Stuart. It is adopted by Schrader.
And it has got a place in- our Authorized English Version,
and ih the Dutch (old and new) ; and also in Castellio,
Diodati, Ostervald, Martin, Beausobre et Lenfant, &c., &c.
The French Geneva renders the word pardon, and the
English Geneva, forgiveness. The rendering, — whether for
giveness or remission, — is, for all practical purposes, a
sufficiently good translation. For the sins referred to by
the Apostle were indeed really forgiven. And their real
forgiveness is implied in the Apostle's statement. Never
theless, if the precise idea of forgiveness had been that
which was in the Apostle's mind when the expression was
dictated, it. is remarkable that the common and kindred
word for forgiveness (dftaig) should have been passed by,
and a term introduced that is never employed again in the
epistles, and that is never found in any of the other writings
of the New Testament. It is not the case, moreover, that,
according to Greek usage, the word is a perfect synonym
of the common word for remission, (dftaig); although,
doubtless, when pretermission was permanent, it practically
amounted to remission. Thus in some instances preter
mission and remission must have been tantamount. In
some cases offences pretermitted would be virtually offences
remitted. This was the case, as we shall see, in the instance
referred to by the Apostle. But Eisner is assuredly under
a mistake when he says that the word, as it occurs in
Dionys. Hal. vii. 37, means forgiveness. Forgiveness in
that case,— forgiveness properly so called, — was not asked.
When Hesychius explains the word as meaning forgiveness,
(irdptaiv, d<j>taiv, avyx&priaiv), we may regard him as giving
only its approximative import. And we may take the
same view of Suidas's explanation of the verb, (irapdvai,
o-vyxwP"v> afiivat). What Cocceius says of the former of
the two lexicographers is applicable to them both ; — " here,
as frequently, he does not explain the exactitude (or nicety)
of the phrase," (ut saepe, hic non explicat phraseos cKpi-
Ceiov). Instead of either praetermissio or remissio, Seb. Schmidt,
in his Bible, though not in his Commentary, gives trans-

328 ROMANS III. 25, 26.
missio, as the rendering of the Apostle's term. Wittich,
before him, had given the same translation. So Alting
(alternatively). And one Teuber, adopting it, supposed that
the Apostle refers to the transmission or transference of
sins to Christ as the sinner's surety. (See Wolf.) Teuber's
interpretation is a mere excrescence of ingenuity, causing
the Apostle to return, circularly, in his thought, so as to
account for the propitiation by the propitiation. The trans
lation on which the interpretation is founded, — if it be
intended to draw a line of distinction between transmissio
and praetermissio, — is at variance with the characteristic
nature of the term. But if it be intended merely to repre
sent, under a variation of phase, the idea of praetermissio,
it is unimpeachable: only the variation of phase is such
that it cannot be reproduced in English. It was thus that
Grotius used the word in his explication of the clause;
and hence, indeed, Wittich's use of it, and Schmidt's.
Cocceius, too, interchanges transmissio with praetermissio.
Beza, though in his earlier editions accepting the trans
lation remission, saw reason, toward the close of his career,
to alter his mind ; and, in the last two editions of his
Annotations, he contended that the word was altogether
different, in its import, from the common term for remission,
acj>taiv. (Perperam, meo quidem judicio, Vulgata ; et earn
interpretationem ego quoque cum ceteris in superioribus
editionibus secutus: irdptaiv remissionem interpretati sumus,
quasi seriptum sit a<j>taiv. Nam haec duo plurimum inter
se differunt.-'Ed. 1594.) In the 1594 edition of his Anno
tations he rendered the word " overlooking" (dissimulatio),
and, ultimately, in his 1598 edition, he adopted "passing-
by," (pratereundo peccato). He would have employed the
noun preterition had it not been, in his estimation, am
biguous. His pupil Melville, however, accepted preterition.
This ultimate translation of Beza, — with which Hammond's
interpretation coincides, — though doctrinally admissible, is
philological ly inadmissible, as it proceeds on an erroneous
derivation of the term, (from irdptipi, to pass by, instead of
irapinpi, to let pass by,, to send aside: conf. d<j>taig, from
d,(piypi, to send off, to dismiss, to forgive).

ROMANS III. 25, 26. 329
We need not specify other interpretations of the term,
such as that of Pareus, — " relaxation, namely of the bonds
of our sins." It is reproduced by Trapp. The word ob
viously means pretermission, or the act of letting pass by
unpunished. The real distinction between this preter
mission and remission will appear after we have ascertained
the objects of the pretermission.
The Apostle specifies them thus : — " the pretermission of
the former sins," (twv irpoytyovorwv apaprypdrwv), or, as
Wycliffe renders the phrase, " of bifore goynge synnes," or
rather, to use another archaism, "of the fore-gone sins."
Some have conceived that the expression means, of our
previous sins, that is, of the previous sins of us who are
believers. And they have either supposed that the reference
is to the sins of believers committed before conversion, or
thought that there is a pointing as of the finger to the
general principle, that it is past, as distinguished from
future sins, .which are pretermitted or remitted, inasmuch
as sins must be, before they can be remitted or pretermitted.
It is the one or the other of these views, — merging as they
do in the common notion that the Apostle is making
mention of the past sins of believers, — that is entertained by
le Fevre, Erasmus, Bugenhagen, Aretius; and by Piscator,
Hyperius, Calov, and Baxter; and by Wesley, Eeiche,
Barnes, Mehring, Purdue, &c. Wesley's note is, "past sins,
all the sins antecedent to their believing." And the same
phase of interpretation is given to the expression by
Calov, Eeiche, Mehring, Purdue.
It seems manifest, however, that the Apostle intends an
antithesis between the expression " for demonstration of his
righteousness, because of the pretermission of the former
sins," and the expression in the succeeding moiety of the
sentence, "for the demonstration of his righteousness in the
present time, that he might be righteous even in justifying
him who believeth," (ev Tip vvv kaipiji k. t. X) And hence
there seems to be an antithesis intended between two great
cycles of time, as these cycles stand separated from each
other by the meridian line of the fact of the propitiation.
The one cycle comprehended the age or ages that preceded

330 ROMANS III. 25, 26.
the accomplishment of the propitiation. It is past. The
other comprehends the New Testament age that is running
on. The expression, the former sins, will therefore naturally
mean the sins of the former age or ages, (rwv iv t$ irplv
Katptj) •yE-yovorojv dpapTtipdrwv). And this is, in substance,
the view that is generally taken of the expression. It is
undoubtedly the right view.
There is, however, among the expositors, who are thus far
agreed, a difference of opinion as to the particular extent of
the reference. A very considerable number of them, inclu
sive of Grotius, Hammond, Winzer, Meyer, Eiickert, de
Wette, Tischendorf, Alford, Conybeare, Matthias, &c, suppose
that the Apostle refers to the sins of men, indefinitely,
whether Gentiles or Jews, and whether believing or un
believing, who lived under the preceding dispensations.
And of this class of interpreters several interpret the word
pretermission as equivalent to the overlooking that is
spoken of in Acts xvii. 30, — "the times of this ignorance
God winked at." And some identify both the overlooking
and the pretermission with the sufferance or permission
that is mentioned in Acts xiv. 16, — "God in times past
suffered all nations to walk in their own ways."
But it is not likely that the pretermission in the passage
before us is identical with the sufferance, or even with the
winking-at or. overlooking, that are referred to in Paul's
addresses in the Acts of the Apostles. For, (1), the suffer
ance and the overlooking or winking-at express the action
of God in reference to Gentile nations as distinguished from
the Jews. And, (2), they point not so much to God's
sovereign clemency, or to the restraint of his rectoral wrath
in relation to sins that were actually committed, as to the
sovereign withholding of special agencies or instrumentalities,
like those of the Mosaic theocracy, for the prevention of
the actual commission of sins. God suffered Gentile men
to walk in their own sinful ways ; he suffered them, for he
did not specially interpose to hinder them. He " winked at
the times of ignorance;" he no more specially interfered
than if he had not seen what was going on. It is, however,
an entirely different relationship that is indicated in the

ROMANS III. 25, 26. 331
pretermission of which the Apostle here speaks. It is a
relationship of sovereign mercy that is akin to that which
is indicated in the expression that is found at the conclusion
of the second clause of the sentence, — "that he may be*
righteous, even in justifying him who believeth." It is a
relationship akin to that involved in justification.
Philippi supposes that the former sins referred to are the
sins of the Jews, — under the currency of their peculiar
economy, — of the Jeius as distinguished from the Gentiles.
(Comp. Heb. ix. 15.) But this interpretation seems to err
both in the way of being too narrow in one respect, and
too wide in another. It is too narrow, as excluding from
view God's gracious acting in relation to many who lived
and died before the rise of the Jewish theocracy, and in
relation to some, if not many, who lived and died during
the period of its currency, but yet outside of its pale. It
is too wide, as bringing into view an immense multitude
of people who, though Jews, and blessed with the high
privileges of Judaism, were yet by no means the objects of
the pretermission of which the Apostle speaks, the preter
mission that is akin to justification.
We agree with Cocceius and Beza, as well as with the
expositors who regard the Apostle as speaking of remission,
or forgiveness, in supposing that the former rins referred to'
• are those of believers. They are the sins of all those who,
in former dispensations, lived and died in faith, — faith
explicit in the Messiah that was to come, or faith implicit in
the propitiousness of God, — faith, in either case, " working
by love," and thus "purifying the heart," and beautifying
the life. The expression, therefore, " the pretermission of the
former sins," will, in its demonstrative element, fold back
upon itself, so as to convey this idea, — " the pretermission of
those particular former sins which were actually preter
mitted." The Apostle assumes, as an indisputable fact, that
there were sins, in the former ages, which were pretermitted;
and he accounts for their pretermission by pointing to the
propitiatory work of Christ Jesus. By means of this pro
pitiatory work, God's righteousness in relation to the preter
mission is demonstrated and vindicated.

332 ROMANS III. 25, 26.
It is implied in the Apostle's remark that it would not
have been a right and righteous thing to have pretermitted
any of the sins of former ages, had not the propitiation been
"divinely precontemplated. Such pretermission or non-
punishment would have been inconsistent with the divine
righteousness. It is also implied, in the use of the word pretermission in
reference to these former sins, as distinguished from the
word remission, that it is only on account of the propitiatory
work of Christ Jesus that there is an absolute and final
deliverance from the real penalty of sin. Mere pretermission
is mere non-punishment. And it is, besides, mere non-
punishment for the time being. It does not involve any
immunity for the future. So far as mere pretermission is
concerned, there is no security that the penalty of the sins
shall not be by and by inflicted. It is different with remis
sion or forgiveness. When sins are remitted or forgiven,
there is, de jure, immunity for all time to come. The sinner
is no longer liable to the penalty of his sins. His sins are
pretermitted indeed. But they are remitted too. The latter
invariably implies the former ; though the former does not
invariably imply the latter. The sins, however, of the
believers who lived and died in former times were not
¦merely pretermitted, — their souls, at death, Joeing reserved; as
de Lyra supposes, in limbo. They were also really remitted. ¦
And hence God is represented frequently in the Old Testa
ment as forgiving. There was "forgiveness with him." He
not only "passed by transgression." (Mic. vii. 18). He was
" a God of pardons." Olshausen is wrong, we conceive, when
he says that " under the Old Testament there was no real,
but only a symbolical forgiveness of sins," (Im A. T. war
keine reale, sondern nur eine symbolische Siindervergebung).
But yet, as the remission of the former sins was grounded on
a work that was future; and as it was therefore, de facto,
without its meritorious cause, as an ens actually eventuated,
— there was scope for the Apostle, when expressly treating
of the propitiation as the ground of the blessings of salva
tion, to substitute the word pretermission for the word
remission, as being, in a system of philosophic Theology,

ROMANS III. 25, 26. 333
peculiarly suggestive of the indispensability of the work of
our Saviour to render a condition of non-punishment secure
and final. When distinguishing, on the one hand, preter
mission from remission, and when regarding, on the other,
the actions of God and the corresponding states of men in
their strict relation to the category of time, we may say that
the pretermission of the former sins was developed or trans
muted into their remission on the occurrence of the pro
pitiatory work of Christ Jesus. But we can take this view,
and use this language, only when occupying the peculiar
standpoint indicated. And, when occupying other and
more familiar standpoints, from which we see that the
future and the past are alike, as regards certainty, to God,
and that hence the work of Christ, in its relation to the
passing by of iniquities, was, before its accomplishment, as
really available, and as sure, as if it had been actually com
pleted from the foundation of the world, — it is both natural
and right to speak of the remission of the former sins, and
to speak of their remission as having actually happened in
the ages that have gone by. For all popular and practical
purposes, the translation of the term in question, as given in
our Authorized English Version, and in the great majority of
other versions, need not be disturbed.
It is different, however, with the preposition (Sid) which
is rendered for in our Authorized English Version. It
received the same rendering from Wycliffe (for remiscioun)
and in the Eheims. The idea intended was, apparently, the
notation of the end, or aim, or final cause of the " demon
stration of the divine righteousness." Calvin took-the same
view, (Tantundem valet praepositio causalis, acsi dixisset,
remissionis ergo, vel in hunc finem, ut peccata deleret).
The preposition is thus regarded as meaning in order to: —
a most unlikely import. It is translated through by Eeiche,
(Sid bezeichnet hier das, wodurch sich die SiKaioavvy zeigt).
Koppe gives the same rendering. So also Heumann. And
Luther seems to have regarded it in the same light : —
he translates the whole expression freely, — " in this that he
forgives sins," (in dem, dass er Siinde vergiebt), that is,
through the forgiveness of sins. Tyndale follows Luther,—

334 ROMANS III. 25, 26.
" in that he forgeveth the synnes that are passed." So
Cranmer's version, and the English Geneva of 1557, &c.
The English Geneva of 1560 has, similarly, "by the forgive
ness of the sins that are passed." The French Geneva
ultimately settled in the same translation, (par la remis
sion). In the 1562 edition it is "pour la remission."
Macknight's translation is, in substance, accordant: he
renders the preposition "in:" — "in passing by the sins
which were before committed." Many others translate and
interpret in a corresponding manner. But the translation
and interpretation could be warranted only in a case of
extreme hermeneutical perplexity. The idea involved
ignores the peculiar force of the preposition, when govern
ing the accusative case; and it proceeds on an erroneous
view of the reference of the word righteousness. There
can be no reasonable doubt that the ' preposition has its
usual and distinctive import, "on account of," (propter), and
that it brings into view one of the occasions, — or one of the
occasioning or impulsive causes (but certainly not, as
Grotius says, the efficient cause) — of that demonstration
of God's righteousness whichv was purposely made in the
propitiatory work of Christ Jesus. This occasion, or
occasioning cause, was the fact of the pretermission of
sins under former dispensations.
§ 8. in the forbearance of God, (iv ry dvoxy rov Stov).
These words stand, according to the versicular division of
Eobert Stephens, at the commencement of the 26th verse, —
an exceedingly awkward position. The awkwardness is
increased when they are preceded, as in the Elzevir of
1624, and in Mill's edition, and Wetstein's, as well as in
many others of lesser note, by a semicolon at the close of
verse 25. In Henry Stephens's edition of 1587 there is even
a full point. This is repeated in Ornsby's recent edition of
1865. The linking of the words is evidently retrospective,
instead of prospective. They are a pendant to the imme
diately preceding clause, — because of the pretermission of
the previous sins, — and should certainly not have been
versicularly separated from it. Erasmus has a comma

ROMANS III. 25, 26. 335
between the two clauses. Eobert Stephens himself has no
more in his versiculated edition of 1551, and in his grand
folio edition of 1550. Vater, in modern times, contents
himself with a comma. But Bengel, Schoettgen, Griesbach,
Lachmann, Tischendorf, as well as Knapp, Tittmann, Hahn,
Naebe, Alford, Scrivener, Buttmann, &c, have done well in
obliterating every vestige of interpunction. J. C. Herzog
wisely recommends this non-interpunction. (Obs. Phil, de
interpunctionum positn in Epist. ad Rom.) And, what is
somewhat remarkable, Eobert Stephens, in his 1549 edition,
has no point of any kind. Neither has Eobert Stephens
the Second in his 1569 edition. Beza, while retaining the
comma, boldly departed in his fourth, as also in his last,
edition, from the versicular division of Stephens, and re
manded the clausule to its proper position at the conclusion
of the 25th verse. He was followed by the French Geneva,
and the English Geneva, and our Authorized English Version,
and the modern Dutch, and the common editions of Luther's
version ; and also by Diodati, Ostervald, Martin, Beausobre
et Lenfant, &c. ; and by Bengel in his German version, &c.
But, as perplexities in the matter of reference are the
inevitable consequence of disturbing the Stephanie divi
sions, it is doubtless preferable, while adhering to the
arrangement of Eobert Stephens, to take means to avoid
its inaccuracies and infelicities, by printing our Bibles on
the system of continuous paragraphs, after the plan of
Bengel, Lachmann, Tischendorf, &c. The system of arti
ficially setting every verse apart, as if it were a distinct
and detached proverb, and of consequently beginning each
verse with a capital letter, and on a new line, is certainly
as effective a contrivance as could well have been devised
for throwing difficulties in the way of understanding the
Word of God.
The expression, in the forbearance of God, (iv ry dvoxy
tov Stov), has, in general, been regarded as intimately
connected, either with the participle, (irpoytyovorwv),
which we- may freely translate previous, or with the noun,
(irdptaiv), which we have rendered pretermission. GCcu-
nienius takes the former view, (iiriTtivti twv dvSpwirwv ro

336 ROMANS III. 25, 26.
tyKXypa, t$ rug dpapriag ytviaOai iv ry dvoxy rov, vtoii).
So do Luther, Erasmus Schmid, Seb. Schmidt, and Pis
cator; Heumann too, and Eaphel, Eisner, Cai-pzov, &c, and
Eiickert, Baumgarten-Crusius, Tischendorf, Oltramare, and
van Hengel, &c. In the hands of these expositors the ex
pression assumes various modifications of shape, — some more
strained, as that of Er. Schmid (Deo ilia tolerante), and
some more ingeniously adapted to the exigencies of the case,
as that of Oltramare and van Hengel, in the time of the
forbearance of God, — "the sins that previously occurred
during the forbearance of God." This latter view seems
to have been that of the Peshito translator. But it is
more natural to connect the expression with the prominent
idea of the preceding clause, — the idea that culminates in
the word pretermission. The expression will thus denote
the immanent sphere of that divine attribute in which the
transient acts of the divine pretermission took place, —
"because of the pretermission, in the forbearance of God,
of the previous sins." God pretermitted the previous sins,
in the exercise of his forbearance. He, as it were, held
himself up, and thus restrained himself, when provoked
to inflict the punishment that was deserved. (Comp. dvi-
Xopai.) He did not yield in his action to the impulse of
indignation. He bore and forbore. This view of the con
nection of the expression is approved of by Koppe, Glockler,
de Wette, Fritzsche, Meyer, Olshausen, Philippi, Matthias,
Tholuck, Mehring, &c. It is not, perhaps, necessitated, as
Fritzsche thought it was, in virtue of the collocation of the
words. (Fritzsche thinks that if the expression had been
dependent on irpoytyovorwv, it would have run thus, t&jv
ev ry dvoxy tov Seov irpoytyovorwv dpaprypdrwv, or thus,
rwv apaprypdrwv twv iv t^ dvoxy T0" &tov ""po-yE-yovorajv.
But it might, with equal conclusiveness, be argued that if
the expression be dependent on 7rapso-iv, it would have run
thus, — Sid ri)v iv ry dvoxy rov Seov 7rap£o-iv k. t. X., or thus,
Sia ryv irdptaiv twv irpoytyovorwv dpaprypdrwv, ryv iv ry
avoxy k- t. X) Yet it is certainly far more natural to
regard the forbearance of God as the condition of his pre
termission of sins, than as the condition of the commission

ROMANS III. 25, 26. 337
of sins. And, assuredly, when we go up to the first sin,
which must not be excluded from the scope of the divine
pretermission, there is no legitimate sense in which it can
be said of it, that it was committed in the forbearance of
God. God's forbearance, or endurance, or toleration, or
longsuffering, presupposes the existence of sin. Until sin
existed there was no more scope for forbearance than there
was for pretermission or forgiveness.
We need not specify in detail the various outre construc
tions and explanations of the clausule we have been con-.
sidering; such as the construction of Wolle, who would
connect the clausule with the conclusion of ver. 22nd,
throwing all that intervenes into a parenthesis, (De
Parenth., p. 66) ; and such as the interpretation of Gebhardi,
who considers that the clausule means " because the divine
Saviour bore them," i. e., "bore the sins that are remitted,"
(ev ry dvoxy r0" &tov, i. e., Sid to avix^adai avra rbv
3-eov, propterea quod ea non nudus homo, sed verus deus,
exantlavit-Vxogvdcmma, p. 7.) The introduction of the
word " God," instead of the pronoun, need not be regarded,
with Gebhardi, as indicating an extremely great emphasis.
Neither does it explain the case to say, with Eiickert and
Meyer, that the Apostle speaks objectively from his own
standpoint, as distinguished from the divine standpoint ;
for the third personal pronoun would have been, to the
Apostle, as thoroughly objective as the noun. The truth
of the matter is, that in the interchange of the noun and
pronoun there is scope for variation ; and in individual
instances the choice may be determined by stereotyped
prepossessions of taste or by temporary impressions or im
pulses, which it might be in vain for us to attempt to hunt
up or ascertain. Matthias sees in the use of the noun an
intentional antithesis to what is human. (Das nomen
scheint jedoch, dhnlich wie 2 Cor. i. 4; v. 21, wohl absicht-
lich wiederholt, um einen Gegensatz gegen den Begriff
Mensch hervortreten zu lassen) It may be so. We
cannot tell. Or it may be that, in the living inter
course of the Apostle's soul with the Father of lights,
his -thoughts, instead of simply running out into mere
z

338 ROMANS III. 25, 26.
logical sequences, soared into immediate communion with
" God." § 9. in order to the demonstration of his righteousness
in the present time, (irpbg ryv 'ivSti^iv ryg SiKaioavvyg avrov
iv rijj vvv Kaipij)). It is very generally supposed that these
words double back epanaleptically upon the words of the
preceding clause, — " for demonstration of his righteousness
because of the pretermission of the previous sins in the
forbearance of God." They constitute, says de Wette, a
corroborative repetition (verstdrkende Wiederaufnahme) of
the preceding clause. The Apostle, says Grotius, repeats
what he had said, as he often does on other occasions when
he is wishful to fix an idea deeply in our minds, (Repetit
quod dixerat, ut saepe solet, ubi quid altius vult infigere
animis). " He repeats what he had said," says Este, " that
he may add in the present time." Hence Conybeare
translates the clause, interpolatingly, thus ; — " [Him (I say)
hath God set forth] in this present time to manifest his
righteousness." This epanaleptic view of the relation of the clause to the
preceding one is, we cannot doubt, a misapprehension of
the Apostle's idea. It is, at least, in the main, a misap
prehension. We say " in the main," for it is evident
that there is some element of epanalepsis. The expression
in order to the demonstration of his righteousness (irpbg
ryv ivStt%tv -rfje SiKuioawyg avrov) manifestly repeats,
with extremely slight variation, the expression for demon
stration of his righteousness, (tig 'ivSti^tv rije SiKaioawyg
avrov). And if, as is probable, the reading which inserts
the article — "in order to the demonstration," (irpbg t»/v
ivSti%iv) — be correct, there will be embodied in the second
expression a consciously repetitious reference to the first.
The article is found in SABCD, and is approved of by
Fritzsche, and admitted into the text by both Lachmann
and Tischendorf. The Textus Eeceptus omits it, under the
sanction of the great majority of the cursive mss. and of
EKL, and of the text as it stands in Chrysostom,
Theodoret, Theophylact, and 03cumenius. But while there

ROMANS III. 25, 26. 339
is, to the extent indicated, an epanaleptic element in the
expression, we conceive that so far as the clauses, in their
entirety, are concerned, they run out abreast from the
great evangelical apophthegm of the Apostle — whom God
set forth as propitiatory, (3v TrpolS-Ero 6 Stbg iXaarypiov).
The lines of thought do not coalesce; they run parallel.
There is, in .short, a bifurcation of idea In the first clause
the relation of the propitiation to God's merciful dealings
under the ancient dispensations is pointed out ; and in the
second there is reference to its relation to his merciful
dealings under the current dispensation. The propitiation,
as we learn from the first clause, was for demonstration of
God's righteousness in pretermitting sins under the former
dispensations. And the same propitiation, as we learn from
the second clause, was for the demonstration of his righ
teousness in remitting sins under the present dispensation.
The Apostle, indeed, does not attempt to exhibit the anti
thetic harmony of these two relationships of the propitiation
by any studied and fastidiously balanced concinnity of
phraseology. But the antithesis of the two ideas, and their
harmony, were evidently lying in his thought.
In the diversity of prepositions which is employed, (sie
and irpog), — and which we have attempted to reproduce,
though in the second case paraphrastically, by rendering the
one for, and the other in order to, — there is probably mere
phraseological variation. And, for aught that is discernible,
their positions might have been reversed, without affecting
the substantive import of the sentence. If we would dis
tinguish between the two, the first (tig) indicates tendency
toward, the second (7rpoe) direction toward. But as both
are intended to denote purpose or aim, they really coalesce
in import; for the tendency of an aim, is just the direction
of a purpose.
The expression in this present time, or, as Heinfetter has
it, in the now time, (iv rdj vvv Kaipq), is used, not in anti
thesis to the future, as Origen supposed, but in contradis
tinction to the past. It exhibits a pole of thought that is
opposite to that which is indicated in the expression the
previous sins, (twv irpoytyovorwv dpaprypdrwv). There is

3^0 ROMANS III. 25, 26.
hence no reference to a mere point of time, — a mere epoch
in the world's history, such as " the fulness of the time," when
Christ was " set forth as propitiatory." The phrase does not
limit itself, chronologically, to the period of the occurrence
of the Saviour's propitiatory work. It represents an entire
c}rcle of time, — a cycle within which there are enjoyed
peculiar results of the great propitiatory work, — which
peculiar results, as well as the proleptic blessings enjoyed in
preceding ages, — find their vindication in the nature of
the propitiation. If the Apostle had spread out his idea,
it would have been somewhat to the following effect: — "in
order to the demonstration of his righteousness as regards
that treatment of sin in the present time which corresponds
to its pretermission in the past time." The treatment of
sin referred to is remission, more especially as viewed on the
other side of its totality, justification. See the remaining
clause of the verse, (Eie to tivai avrov SiKaiov Kai SiKaiovvra
rbv ek iriartwg).
Some expositors, who felt that the usual epanaleptic
explanation of the clause lacked .lustre and likelihood, and
who yet did not apprehend the fine bifurcation of idea that
is realized in the two clauses, have fallen on various
unnatural expedients to work out into symmetry the
Apostle's thought. Beza, for instance, supposes that the
expression, in order to the demonstration of his righteousness
at the present time, depends on the latter fraction of the
preceding clause, in the forbearance of God, — "forbearance
divinely exercised in order to the demonstration of his
righteousness in the present time." Eiickert, Baumgarten-
Crusius, and Jowett take a similar view of the connection.
Sebastian Schmidt, again, and Maier think that it is a
different righteousness altogether that is referred to in the
second clause. They suppose that in the first clause it is
God's sin-punishing righteousness that is meant, while in
the second the reference is to his sinner-justifying righteous
ness. Olshausen and others take a similar view. ¦ Mehring
Is exceedingly perplexed with the clauses, and thinks that
they constitute one of the most difficult passages of the
epistle, (wir in den Worten dg . ivSti^iv bis ek iriaTtwg

ROMANS III. 25, 26. 341
'Irjo-ov eine der schwierigsten Stellen des Briefes vor uns
haben). He, too, supposes that the word righteousness
means, in the second clause, God's justifying righteousness,
attributable to the believer, although it means in the first
His own essential and ever-immanent attribute of righteous
ness. And he regards the manifestation of God's justifying
righteousness in the present time as that in consideration
of which the manifestation of his rectoral righteousness took
place in the forth-setting pf Christ as propitiatory. Hence
he discriminates strongly between the import of the two
prepositions, (regarding irpog as meaning in Beziehung auf,
in Betracht, oder, wenn man es recht versteht, gegenuber).
In all these efforts, however, at explication, there is "labour"
and " vanity." They are violent and unnatural.
§ 10. that he may be righteous even in justifying him who
is of faith in Jesus, (tig to tivai avrov SiKaiov koi SiKaiovvra
rbv ek 7rio-r£«i)e 'lyaov). It is impossible to give in English a
very felicitous translation of this clause. The paronomasiac
relation between the adjective which we translate righteous
(SiKaiov) and the participle which we translate justifying
(SiKatovvTa) cannot be reproduced. If we were to give the
translation, just, to the adjective, the link of coincident rela
tion to the participle would be exhibited. But just is too
narrow a signification. And were it adopted, we should be
constrained to substitute the noun justice for righteousness,
not only in the immediately preceding clauses, but also in
verses 21st and 22nd, and in chap. i. 17th. In this substitu
tion, however, we should so pinch the great evangelical idea
of the Apostle as to wring from it not a little of its life's
blood. One has, in this emergency, some sympathy with
Basil Cooper, who proposed to maintain the paronomasia by
rendering the clause thus, — "so that he is righteous, and also
the enrighteouser of him which believeth in Jesus." But such
a coinage is, as we have seen, too startling in its violence.
It is too great a leap. And it would not suit, besides, those
cases in which the verb to justify is used to designate the
action of human judges; and those others, also, in which it
is employed to denote the action of tiie divine Judge at the

342 ROMANS III. 25, 26.
summing up of human affairs. Neither, indeed, would it
suit this or any other passage of the New Testament. We
must be content, it would appear, to forego the beautiful
paronomasia of the original.
But not only so. In foregoing the paronomasia, we find
it to be impossible, unless we should darken the inspired
idea by entirely unidiomatic phraseology, to give an ex
tremely literal rendering to the paronomasiac expression.
An extremely literal rendering would be the following: —
" that he may be righteous, and justifying him who is of
faith in Jesus." It is intolerable. And hence more or less
freedom must be used in reproducing the idea. Tyndale
translates thus: — "that he myght be counted juste, and,a
justifiar of him which belevith on Jesus." The Eng.
Geneva corresponds : — " that he might be just, and a
justifier of him which is of the fayth of Jesus." Our
Authorized Version has followed in the wake of these pre
cursors, though not slavishly: — "that he might be just, and
the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus." Substituting,
as we must do, the word righteous for the word just, the
version is justifiable, or, as we should rather say, partially
justifiable, only on one supposition, the supposition that the
righteousness referred to in the preceding clauses is God's
justifying righteousness, imputable to believers, in contradis
tinction to his immanent rectoral righteousness. This sup
position, however, we have seen to be untenable. And even
though it had been tenable, the idea embodied in the version
would still be only partially justified. For it would be
difficult to account for the expression "that he may be righ
teous," — as, by the hypothesis assumed, there is no reference,
in what goes before, to God's own personal righteousness. It
would, too, be specially difficult, and indeed impossible, to
account for the betoned emphasis and prominence that are
assigned, in the collocation of the phraseology, to the word
righteous as distinguished from the word justifying. — On
the supposition, again, that the righteousness spoken of in the
preceding clauses is God's rectoral righteousness, as vindi
cated by the atonement in relation to the pretermission and
remission of sins, — on this supposition, the clausule, that he

ROMANS III. 25, 26. 34,3
may be righteous, is naturally and easily accounted for. But
when it is added, and the justifier, SfC, there seems to be the
intrusion of an idea which, — when taken abreast with the idea
contained in the clausule "that he may be righteous," —
appears to be here out of place ; and peculiarly so when we
remember that the expression the justifier is, in the original,
participial, justifying.
The truth is that the Apostle's expression is a complexity
that culminates, not in duality, but in unity. And it is
only because of its intransferable paronomasia that there is
apparent duality. The culmination takes place in the word
righteous, as is manifest, not only from the purport of the
two preceding clauses, and from the collocation of the ad
jective and the participle, but likewise from the fact that
the substantive verb is used, like the kindred verb yivopai
in verses 4th and 19th, logically, — to denote not what God
is to be absolutely, in his own perfect subjectivity, but what
he is to be relatively, in the minds of the moral creatures
who constitute the vast moral public of the Universe. The
Apostle could not mean that Christ was set forth as propiti
atory, that God may be regarded as justifying the believer
in Jesus. He means that Christ was set forth as propiti
atory, that God may be regarded as righteous even in
justifying the believer in Jesus. The logical import of
the substantive verb makes it manifest that it is the word
righteous which is to be betoned, and that the participial
addition is subordinate and subsidiary. The inspired idea
might be paraphrastically exhibited thus: — that he may be,
in the estimation of the moral public, righteous even in
justifying the believer in Jesus.
The expression which we have rendered even in justi
fying (ku\ SiKaiovvra) is rendered by Turn bull, "while
justifying;" by Scarlett, "even when justifying." Matthias
and Mehring give the same translation, (auch wenn). So
does Purdue. Whitby has, "and yet the justifier;" Cony
beare, " and yet might justify." Hodge intensifies it,
"although the justifier." Archbishop Magee, before him,
had sanctioned the same rendering, (Atonement and Sacrifice,
Diss, xiii., p. 465 of vol. i., ed. 1832). Macknight has it,

344 ROMANS III. 25, 26.
"when justifying;" and Chalmers, without professing to
give a translation, quietly adopts Macknight's idea. He
says, "it is now made manifest that God might be just
while he justifies those who believe in Jesus." So far as the
theology of the passage is concerned, any of the free and
easy translations specified might be accepted. But, as a
matter of exegesis, the rendering, righteous even in justi
fying, undoubtedly hits, as precisely as possible, the nail on
the head. It is far superior to the dualizing interpretation
of de Wette, adopted by Bisping and partially by Alford,
righteous on the one hand and justifying on the other.
And it is certainly nearer the centre of the Apostle's thought
than the idea that is embodied in the version of Luther, —
" that he alone may be righteous, and make righteous him
who believeth in Jesus," (auf dass er allein gerecht sey, und
gerecht mache den, der da ist des Glaubens an Jesu).
Coverdale's rendering is a faithful ¦ transcript of the great
Eeformer's Douche translation : — " that he onely mighte be
righteous, and the righteous maker of him which is of the
faith on Jesus." (Biblia, 1 538.) Calvin seems to have had
the very same idea as Luther. (Definitio est illius justitiae,
quam dato Christo ostensam fuisse dixit; sicuti primo
capite docuerat patefieri in evangelio. Duobus autem
membris eam constare affirmat. Prius est, Deum esse
justum, non quidem ut unum ex multis : sed qui solus in
se omnem justitiae plenitudinem contineat. Neque enim
integra et solida laus, qualis debetur, ei aliter tribuitur,
quam dum solus obtinet justi nomen et honorem, toto
humano genere injustitiae damnato. Alterum deinde
membrum statuit in justitiae communicatione, dum scilicet
suas' divitias Deus apud se minime tenet suppressas, sed in
homines effundit) But the notion suggested by the word
alone is, exegetically, an intrusion. The notion, too,
suggested by the' expression malce righteous is a deviation
from the proper forensic import of the term. And, moreover,
the entire translation and interpretation rest, — however
inconsistently, — upon the assumption that the righteousness
specified in the preceding clauses as the righteousness whose
demonstration was contemplated in the propitiation, is God's

ROMANS III. 25, 26. 345
justifying righteousness, or, as Luther expresses it, the righ
teousness which avails before God, (die Gerechtigkeit die vor
ihm gilt). Bengel did well to throw out, in his German
translation, Luther's alone. And Piscator, too, did well to
substitute, in his German translation, "pronounce righteous"
(gerecht spreche) for Luther's and Bengel's " make righteous,"
(gerecht mache).
We have already indicated that the substantive verb,
" that he may be righteous when justifying," is to be under
stood logically, — as denoting whatit is desirable that God
should be in our apprehension. The two preceding ex
pressions, for demonstration, in order to the demonstra
tion, prepare us for this relativity of the substantive
phrase. And as the Apostle seems, in these two preceding
expressions, to be referring to the righteousness of God's
immanent nature, as distinguished from the righteousness
of his transient acts, it is not likely that he could be sup
posing that, in that inner and ultimate respect, the atone
ment was the condition of the existence of God's righteous
ness. It was rather the case that the essential righteousness
of God was the condition of the existence of the atonement.
Christ was set forth as propitiatory, not that God might be
righteous in his nature, even in justifying the unrighteous,
but that the righteousness of his nature might appear;
— that, in the apprehension of the moral public, he might
be righteous when justifying the unrighteous who believe
in Jesus. (Afin-qu'il soit trouve juste.-Qalvin.) This logical
import of the substantive verb has been generally recog
nized by expositors.
It has not, however, been so generally noticed that the
entire clausule, that he may be righteous even in justifying
him who believeth in Jesus, is epexegetical, not of the
two preceding clauses, (1), for demonstration of his righ
teousness because of the pretermission of the previous sins
in the forbearance of God, (2), in order to the demonstration
of his righteousness in the present time, but only of the
latter of the two. Grotius, Eeiche, and others regard the
clausule as constituting a thirdly in the exhibition of the
divine aim in the propitiatory work of Christ, and as being

346 ROMANS III. 25, 26.
thus a re-repetition of the idea embodied in the first clause.
Eiickert regards it as exhibiting the final result of the
whole, (das Endergebniss des Ganzen). Fritzsche, Meyer,
Philippi, &c, regard it as epexegetical of the two preceding
clauses ; Maier similarly, as exhibiting the final aim of the
two preceding demonstrations. But Matthias is evidently
right in supposing that the Apostle's design is to exhibit,
epexegetically, the peculiar idea of the second clause in its
antithesis to the peculiar idea of the first. Christ was set
forth as propitiatory, not only, (1), for demonstration of
God's righteousness because of the pretermission of sins,
in the forbearance of God, during the former dispensations ;
but, (2), for demonstration of his righteousness at the
present time, that he 'may be apprehended to be righteous
when he justifies those who believe in Jesus. The righteous
ness of justification in the present time, as distinguished
from the righteousness of pretermission in the past time,
is the great idea of the Apostle. The righteousness of both
of these modes of dealing with sinners is demonstrated and
vindicated by the propitiatory work of Jesus.
The clausule is rendered ecbatically by some few ex
positors, such as Eiickert : — so that he is righteous. —
Struensee, Stolz, and Colenso take a similar view. So did
T. Edwards, and Michaelis, (so dass Gott gerecht bleibt, &c)
So Peile, (to the effect that he is righteous). But the obvious
epexegetical relation of the words seems, independently of
the use and wont of the preposition in connection with the
articulated infinitive (see chap. i. 20), to make it certain
that a telic import is intended.
The concluding expression, him who is of faith in Jesus,
(tov ek 'iriartwg 'lyaov), is idiomatic. Felbinger, in attempt
ing to translate it with extreme literality, (den der aus
dem Glauben Jesu ist), yet failed by inserting, as Luther
had done before him, the article before faith, — " out of the
faith of Jesus." The expression suggests derivation, and is
regarded by some as distinctly denoting filiation. Glockler,
for instance, takes this view, (Aus dem Glauben seyn heisst
aber so viel als : — aus dem Glauben abstammen, geboren
seyn, also durch den Glauben wiedergeboren seyn zu einem

ROMANS III. 25, 26. 347
neuen Leben). Conybeare says that the expression means
the child of faith, and in his version he renders it, plurally,
the children of faith. So Wittich, (6 e'k iriartwg, est, quasi
genitus ex fide). But this is to condense into too definite
a shape the natural indefiniteness of the original. There
is rather the suggestion than the assertion of filiation. And
perhaps the idea, as it lay in the Apostle's mind, amounted
to no more than this, — that the individuals referred to
derived their distinguishing peculiarity from faith in
Jesus. Their great spiritual characteristic had its origin
in faith, — faith that terminated on Jesus, and found in Him
the righteousness which God judicially recognizes in justify
ing the ungodly. Sclater explains the expression in a manner
that gives it a grotesquely polemical tinge, — a tinge of
the date of the extremely polemical seventeenth century.
His explanation is this, — "as if he should say, him that,
renouncing the sect of merit-mongers, embraceth the sup
posed heresie of solifidians." The genitive " of Jesus " is,
of course, to be regarded objectively. The entire phrase
denotes the "faith of which Jesus is the object;" not the
"faith of which he was the subject," or "of which he is the
author." (See on ver 21.)
Of Jesus (lyaoii) is omitted from the text by Tischendorf,
so that the expression with which the verse concludes is,
according to his reading, him who is of faith. The word
was condemned, too, by Mill, and suspected by Griesbach.
Fritzsche, Meyer, and Oltramare approve of its omission.
It is wanting in P G 52. f. g. But it is found in S A B C K,
and in the great majority of cursive mss., as also in the
Philoxenian Syriac and Ethiopic versions, and in Chrysos
tom, Theophylact, and GCcumenius. The Vulgate, Coptic,
Theodoret, Pelagius, Ambrosiaster, read, complexly, Jesus
Christ. The Peshito reads our Lord Jesus Christ. The
Erpen-Arabic, our Lord Jesus. These three latter readings
seem to have been supplemented; but they are certainly
confirmatory of the genuineness of the word Jesus. (In D L
and many cursives Tijo-ovv is found instead of 'lyaov, — a
manifest error of negligence, — tv for tv. The same error occurs
in CEcumenius, in the quotation of the "text, though the

348 ROMANS III. 27.
immediately succeeding explanation shows that he really
read Trjcrov. The authorities, then, that have Tijo-ovv are
also confirmatory of the genuineness of 'lyaov) There can
be little doubt that the reading of the received text is
correct. It is wisely approved of by Lachmann, Philippi,
and van Hengel. And we certainly like to find the act of
faith led up to its great and glorious Personal Object, —
Jesus, our Saviour.

Ver. 27, Uov ovv r) zav-fflffig ; ''E%szXsio$ri. Aid toiov
vopjov; Tuv spycuv; Otrfci' aKka, "hm vopjov tfiarsug.
Eng. Auth. Vers. Where is boasting then ? It is ex
cluded. By what law ? of works ? Nay ; but by the law
of faith.
Revised Version. Where then is the glorying ? Shut out.
Through what kind of a law ? Of works ? Nay, but
through the law of faith.
§ 1. The Apostle has finished that grand paragraph
(verses 21 — 26) which explains, in extenso, what it is that
renders the Gospel "the power of God unto salvation."
His explanation had been given, in brief, in chap. i. 17.
But it was befitting to resume it, and expand it in the full
affluence of its details.
The Apostle had evidently felt, in his own spirit, the
intensest interest as he proceeded with the evolution of the
details. Each item, as it turned up, seems to have sent a
thrill through his heart. His ardour grew and glowed. He
could not but admire the divine method of justification.
Its symmetry, its completeness, its exquisite adaptations,
and the might of the moral influences with which it was
charged, charmed his soul. He stood arrested and rapt as
he gazed. At length words came. And he utters forth, in
abrupt and exceedingly condensed bolts of jubilant thought,
some of the corollary-ideas which, in the midst of the conr

ROMANS III. 27. 349
sciousness of his ecstasy, he felt rising up with irrepressible
and almost tumultuating energy within his mind. (Verses
27 — 31.) Foremost among these are references to the un
becoming feelings and incorrect notions, as regards the way
of justification, that were unhappily characteristic of the
great mass of his countrymen. And thus he says : —
" Where then is the glorying ? Shut out. By what kind
of law? Of the works? Nay, but through the law of
faith." § 2. Where then is the glorying? (IIov ovv y Kavxyaig ;)
Such is the most literal, and doubtless the most correct
rendering of this clause. In our English Authorized Ver
sion the article is ignored : — " Where is boasting then ? " — ¦
a translation yielding, indeed, a sense that is far from being
repugnant to the Apostle's idea, but that, nevertheless,
sweeps out into a wider circumference of reference than
he intended. Vaughan says that the article has its generic
force. But it is not glorying in general to which the
Apostle is referring. It is not glorying in general that
is put under ban. It is some particular glorying, — the
glorying of some particular class of persons. The Apostle
does not specify the persons to whom he refers; but his
mind was fixed on them, and hence the article : — Where
then is the glorying ? It is almost, but not altogether,
tantamount to the expression, — Where then is their glory
ing ?
The Vulgate reads, "where is then thy glorying?" or as
Wycliffe gives it, "where is therfore thi gloriynge?" — (ubi
est ergo gloriatio tua ?) The same reading is found in the
pre-Hieronymian codices d. e. f. g. It is hence the reading
of the Latin Fathers. It is found, too, in the Greek Uncials F
and G; but not in the Greek Fathers. It is a mistake to
refer to Theophylact as supporting it, though it is the case
that, in freely explaining the clause, he applies it directly,
and in the second person, to the Jew, (tlKorwg ovv ipwrq
Tbv TovSaiov, irov EO-rtv y Kavx^aig aov, Kai ?j ptyaXoippoavvy;
ov Xiyti Si, irov ianv y dptry; ovSs yap «xov dptryv, dXXd
Kavxn^tv povyv. The clause ov Xiyti Si, irov ianv y dptry;

350 , ROMANS III. 27.
shows that Theophylaet did not read irov ianv y kavxWe
a-ov ;) There can be no doubt that the introduction of the
pronoun thy into the Latin versions, and of the kindred
personal pronoun, of thee, in that single Greek text which is
dually represented by F and G is to be accounted for on the
assumption of an effort to exhibit the force and reference of
the definitive expression — "the glorying." There is no
evidence, however, that the Apostle was sisting, as it were
face to face with himself, a single representative Jew, and
addressing him. He is rather looking at the mass of his
countrymen collectively, as in verses 2nd and 29th. And
his attitude is that of one who is speaking of them, rather
than to them.
The Five Clergymen and Shepherd supply a different
pronoun. They render the clause, " Where is our boasting
then ? " It is not, as we conceive, a felicitous rendering.
The Apostle was not in the mood to transfer to himself, even
in a figure, that particular, and particularly odious, failing
of his countrymen in general, which it was his wish to
reprobate, and which seemed to him to be utterly inconsis
tent with that way of justification which he had just been
exhibiting and expounding. He stands apart, as an inspired
expositor of the Gospel, and, looking upon both Jews and
Gentiles as respectively massed before his mental eye, he does
not seek, for the moment, to realize or identify, or, at all
events, to take into particular account, his own ethnological
relationship. If freely substituting a pronoun for the merely definite
article of the original, — as it would be, perhaps, in some
respects, not undesirable to do, — we would make our selection
not from the sphere of the first person, nor from the sphere
of the second person, but, as already indicated, from the
sphere of the third person, in which we have an English
pronoun akin both etymologically and conventionally, to the
article. We would say, — "where then is their glorying?"
But the fact that both the second and the first persons have
been respectively proposed, is evidence that the definitive-
ness of the expression has been realized, and should not be
ignored.

ROMANS III. 27. 351
It has, indeed, been very generally realized. Luther
inserts the article in his translation, (Wo bleibet nun der
Ruhm ?), and has been followed, among German translators,
by Piscator, Felbinger, Eeitz, Zinzendorf, Heumann, Bengel,
Michaelis, Stolz, &c. The Dutch translators, old and new,
have likewise inserted it. So did the French Geneva of
1562, (Ou est done la vantance? It is Calvin's ultimate
translation. His translation of 1556 was, Ou est done la
gloire?) The English Geneva, too, inserted the article, —
where is then the rejoicing? So did Diodati. Among
critics, too, Fritzsche gives due prominence to the idea
intended by the article, (ubi est igitur hactenus saepe audita
gloriatio?) So does Meyer, (der Artikel bezeichnete die
bewusste, schon mehrerwahnte — ). So does Philippi, (der
Artikel ein belcanntes, oft getriebenes und gehbrtes, oder
bfter schon herborgehobenes und zuriickgewiesenes Riihmen).
Oltramare, too, remarks that the article denotes the notoriety
of the glorying, (Ou est done cette gloriole? L' Article in-
dique qu'il s'agit de quelque chose dont on a conscience, qui
est notoire). These are a fair specimen of the whole body of
good translators and critics.
When duly recognizing the article, an interesting par
ticularity is imparted to the psychological scene that is
pictorially presented to the mind's eye. We see the Apostle
standing, as it were, on some elevated platform, and looking
round and round inquisitively. He seems to be in quest of
some object with which he has been familiar, indeed too
familiar. But he cannot see it in all that plane of things
that is around him. He exclaims, — not in a disappointed,
but in a glad and jubilant tone, — where then is the glory
ing? — that glorying' which is always so obtrusive of itself ? — -
that glorying which is scarcely ever absent when a Jew is
present? Where, I say, is this glorying?
Fritzsche supposes that the Apostle has no particular
reference to what was characteristic of the Jews, as dis
tinguished from other religionists. Mussus supposed that
he makes equal reference to Jews and Gentiles (qui inaniter
alter alteri se invicem preferebant). Krehl echoes Fritzsche's
opinion, (Die Frage ist nicht an die Juden gerichtet, sondern

352 ROMANS III. 27.
ganz allgemein) . And many of the more polemico-theological
expositors, such as Calvin, Sclater, Cocceius, Haldane, never
start the question whether or not there is a particular
reference to the Jews. Hodge thinks that there is1 no such
particular reference. But it is really the case that the
Apostle has had all along, down through the chapter, the
spiritual condition of the Jews in view. He has been
seeking so to lay his subject as to meet their peculiar wants,
and more particularly their peculiar prejudices in favour of
themselves, their religious haughtiness and conceit, — their
glorying in relation to themselves. In the immediately
preceding chapter, moreover, he makes express reference to
their glorying. See verses 17 and 23. And the fact that in
the 29th verse of the present chapter he goes on to ask,7 — " Is
he the God of the Jews only? is he not also of the Gentiles?"
— is evidence that it was the Jews, and the self-glorification
of the Jews, that occupied in particular the attention of his
mind. We need not suppose, indeed, that in asking, Where then
is the glorying ? he allowed his mind to be utterly oblivious
of corresponding tendencies in others. We may reasonably
suppose, on the contrary, that he gives expression to his
thoughts and feelings regarding the glorying of the Jews,
because he realized that this element of the spirit of Judaism
was too apt to be imported into Gentilism, and would be in
danger of infecting and infesting the Christian church as a
whole. Men everywhere are too prone to haughtiness and
self-glorying, — too apt sese jactare. Pride is one of the dis
figurements of humanity in general. And even from behind
a profession of faith in Christ, and of justification by faith
alone, and of the abnegation of glorying in the matter of
justification, the forbidding lineaments of a supercilious spirit
may lower forth. Paul knew this: and hence, we doubt not,
he had an aim that went far beyond the Jews when he
asked, where then is the glorying ?
Nevertheless we cannot doubt that when he said the, he
was thinking of the Jews. Chrysostom was of the same
opinion. So was Origen before him. So were Theodoret,
CEcumenius, and Theophylact, after him ; Ambrosiaster too,

ROMANS III. 27. 353
and Pelagius; — and almost all who read the clause thus,
where then is thy glorying? So also Erasmus, Grotius,
Bengel: Heumann too, and Bohme, Eiickert, Meyer, de
Wette ; Philippi also, and Oltramare, van Hengel, &c, — and
indeed the great majority of expositors.
Some have supposed that the word (Kavx»)o"te) means
here ground of glorying, (materia gloriandi=Kavxnpa)-
Beausobre et Lenfant, for example, (oil est done le sujet de
se glorifier?) Flatt too, and Brentano ; Eeiche also (Kavxnaig
ist hier Gegenstand und Grund des Riihmens) ; and Eilliet
(Que devient done la raison de s'enorgueillir?). De
Wette, too, took the same view in his first edition ; — only
gradually laying it aside. But the interpretation is a
manifest mistake, arising from a natural tendency to con
found the Apostle's rhetorical representation with the
philosophy of things that was underlying it. In that
philosophy the Apostle realized that all legitimate occasion
of glorying was shut out. But in the hieroglyph which
he was engaged in painting on the walls of the chamber
of his mind's imagery he refers to the glorying itself,
as distinguished from its historical occasion or logical
ground. Some have erred in another direction in their attempt
at reproducing the Apostle's idea. They have rendered
his word glory, instead of glorying. So, among the
German translators, Luther, Emser, Ulenberg, Piscator,
Felbinger, Eeitz, Heumann, Bengel, Michaelis, Struensee
(der eigne Ruhm), Kistemaker (Selbstruhm), van Ess ; but
not Zinzendorf, (who renders it properly Riihmen, instead
of Ruhm). De Wette, Matthias, Mehring, are careful to
give the same translation as Zinzendorf; and de Wette
expressly calls attention to the error of the other rendering.
In our English Authorized Version, as in the Eheims,
the word is rendered boasting — a far superior translation to
glory. It is also far superior to rejoicing, — the translation
which is found not only in the Eng. Geneva, but also in
Tyndale. Nevertheless we question whether it be equal to
glorying, ' the translation which is given by Wycliffe, and
whigh not inaptly represents the Vulgate version, gloriatio.
2 A

354 ROMANS III. 27.
The advantage of glorying over boasting arises from the
fact that it has not got so fixed a twist in malam partem.
It more readily adjusts itself to the expression of what is
right and becoming, when such expression is required.
It is often required. There is a befitting, as well as an
unbefitting, glorying. The word that is here employed by
the Apostle is used by him again in chap. xv. 17, "I have
therefore glorying through Jesus Christ in those things
that pertain to God." So in 2 Cor. i. 12, — " For our glory
ing is this, ,the testimonj*- of our conscience, that in sim
plicity and godly sincerity, not with fleshly wisdom, but by
the grace of God, we have had our conversation in the
world, and more abundantly to you-ward." In 2 Cor. vii.
4, too, he says — " Great is my boldness of speech toward
you ; great is my glorying of you." He says again in
1 Thess. ii. 19, — " For what is our hope, or joy, or crown
of glorying ? Are not even ye, in the presence of our Lord
Jesus Christ at his coming?" Indeed, in almost all the
passages in which the noun for glorying (Kaixv^o) is
employed, it is used to denote legitimate and befitting
glorying. The kindred noun (Kavxvp"), — rather denoting
the ground of glorying than the act of glorying, — is also
almost always used in bonam partem. And the affiliated
verb is indeterminate in its moral reference. Sometimes , it
is employed to denote illegitimate glorying. And at other
times we read of glorying in the Lord (1 Cor. i. 31) ;
in Christ Jesus (Phil. iii. 3); in the cross of our Lord Jesus
Christ (Gal. vi. 14) ; in God (Eom. v. 12) ; in tribulations
(Eom. v. 3); in hope of the glory of God (Eom. v. 2). It
is the same word that is employed by the Septuagint
translator in that glorious passage about glorying, — Jer.
ix. 23, 24, — " Thus saith the Lord, Let not the wise man
glory in his wisdom ; neither let the mighty man glory in
his might ; let not the rich man glory in his riches : but
let him that -glorieth glory in this, that he understandeth
and knoweth me, that I am the Lord which exercise
lovingkindness, judgement, and righteousness, in the earth:
for in these things I delight, saith the Lord."
There is, then, a becoming glorying, as well as a glorying

ROMANS III. 27. 355
that is unbecoming. The English word glorying is excel
lently adapted to turn, as needed, either way, to the left
hand or to the right. As a matter of fact, indeed, glorying,
among men, is a state of mind that is generally found
pointing toward the left rather than toward the right. It is
glorying that is, too, glorifying to self, — vain-glorying. It
makes men braggarts either in fact or in spirit. It lies on
one line with overweening self-applause. This is the form
of glorying that is naturally assumed by inordinately sensi
tive self-consciousness ; — by selfishness. But there may also
be the glorying of disinterested admiration. And although
the admiration be not absolutely disinterested, although it
have relation to what has filaments of connection with self,
and is beneficial to self, — nevertheless, if self be kept in its
own little place, at the feet of the Infinite One, and if it
occupy its own appropriate attitude while there, not dis
tending itself as if it were a lord among its fellows, but
bending lowly as a servant of all, — then its glorying is
becoming and good. The word, however, has, as a matter
of fact, a preponderance of association, in human language,
with what is unbeseeming and inordinate. And hence,
when it is employed, in the Bible, to denote what is befitting
and right, there is, as it were, an element of apology accom
panying its application, — there is a consciousness of an effort
to vindicate for the term a sublimer association. It is as if
the Holy Spirit were saying to men, — " If your hearts be
" set on glorying', let it be noble glorying, — glorying that
" has true glory in it. See that ye glory only in really
" glorious objects. Glory, if you please, in the Lord; glory
" in the cross of Jesus. Christ. Glory, too, in whatever gives
" legitimate occasion for advancing the glory of God ; glory
" in your tribulations, glory in your infirmities. And when
" you glory in what turns round to promote your own glory,
" see that, nevertheless, the chief ground of your glorying be
" the glory that accrues to God. Only thus anticipate your
" crown of glorying (1 Thess. ii. 19). Only thus glory in the
" testimony of your purified conscience (2 Cor. i. 12), or in
" any of your acts of self denial (2 Cor. xi. 10)." Men, then,
would require to take heed in glorying. If there be the

356 ROMANS III. 27.
smallest relaxation in the moral tension of the soul, when
glorying is indulged in, one will be apt to become "a fool
in glorying." (2 Cor. xii. 11.)
The peculiarity of the Apostle's word is now evident.
It is a word that had, in general, a bad association connected
with it. That association clings to it in the interrogative
corollary before us, and in some other passages. In these
passages it denotes such glorying as resolves itself into
boasting; and hence the vindication of our Authorized Eng.
Version in the case before us. The only objection to the
translation is the difficulty of subliming, for other occasions,
the word boasting. It is, indeed, sometimes sublimed, as, for
instance, in Ps. xxxiv. 2; xliv. 8. But this exaltation of
the term does not come to it so naturally as to the word
glorying. There is something in the make of the word, as
well as in its conventional associations, that persists in
pointing in malam partem, suggesting not only abundance
of noise (conf. the Latin boo and the Greek fiodw), but also
inflation and emptiness. The term seems to have a filament
of connection with the noun boss, — the inflated or protu
berant part of a shield; and most probably it has a link
of relation to the Scotch adjective boss, which means empty.
A boaster is an empty braggart.
We hold, then, by the translation glorying. And when
the Apostle asks, where then is the glorying ? we assume that
he is using the term with its current ill-omened association
attached to it. Seb. Schmidt, indeed, supposes that it is used
with its sublimer reference. He thinks that the query is an
occupatio, — the anticipation of an objection, on the part of an
opponent, to the Apostle's doctrine of justification by faith.-
Such an opponent would be ready, as S. Schmidt supposes,
to step forward and say to the Apostle, — " If this doctrine of
yours, 0 Paul, be accepted, where is there scope for glory
ing? " " There is none," replies the Apostle ; " for what you
count legitimate glorying, I count illegitimate." S. Schmidt
thus comes round, in the upshot, to the generally received
view. But his notion of a formal dialectical colloquy is too
cumbrous and artificial. It has, however, been reproduced
by Taylor. Day, though on other grounds, takes substan-

ROMANS III. 27, 357
tially the same view with Schmidt of the import of the
word. He says, "Note that the Apostle speaks not here of an
unlawful or unjust or causeless boasting, or of boasting only
before men, (for so any man might boast, and so did the
Jews boast): but he speaks of a lawful, just, and well-
grounded boasting, and a boasting before God, such a
boasting where nothing is to be imputed to the grace and
favour of God, but all to a man's own self." In other words,
Day supposes that when the Apostle asks, where is the
glorying then ? he is inquiring concerning that glorying that
would have been legitimate if Adam had not sinned, and
that is legitimate in heaven among angels who have never
sinned. He did not note the article the, which ties down the
reference to some sort of boasting that was common enough'
too common, on earth. Neither did he take into account
that there are no moral creatures anywhere who could
attain to any moral excellence apart from " the grace and
favour of God." Even in heaven, the angels, wtio have
never fallen, will think but little of their own worthiness
when it is placed side by side with the prevenient loving-
kindness of God. Their glorying will be in God.
The Apostle evidently uses the term in its sinister
reference : — Where then is that self-glorifying glorying of
the Jews that has been sounding abroad so loud and so
long, proclaiming how good and godly they are, and how
eminently entitled, considering the great merit of their
circumcision and other ceremonial observances-, to get to
heaven and eternal glory? Where, says the Apostle, is this
glorying ? It is as standing on the platform of the doctrine
of justification that he puts the question. It would be
wrong, however, to say, with Calvin, Hemming, Musculus,
Melville, and Day, that he speaks " after a kind of insulting
manner." The associations of the word insulting lie on
the line of malignity. For the same reason, we would not
say, with Aretius, that he speaks derisively. But we
would not deny that there is a jubilant tone of logical,
theological, and ethical triumph in the interrogation. (He is,
says Bullinger, veluti iiriviKiov canens. The "where?" says.
Bengel, is particula victoriosa. Compare 1 Cor. i. 20; xv. 55.)

358 ROMANS III. 27.
§ 3. It was shut out, ('E^tKXtiaS,y). This is one of the
cases in which, for all popular purposes, the perfect tense
in English might be advantageously employed to represent
the aoristic Greek: — It has been shut out. The aorist,
however, is more graphic when the 'scene that was present
to the Apostle's mind is vividly reproduced. It might be
conceived of as follows : — The Apostle looks about inquisi
tively od the platform of thought on which he was standing.
But he does not discern the object of which he was in
quest. Then a jubilant flash shoots from his eye; and he
exclaims, Where is the glorying ? He pauses for an answer.
The answer at length comes, — " It was shut out," that is,
"It is not here, because it was shut out." It is in some
such manner that the aorist is to be accounted for. If,
however, the scenic nature of the representation be ignored,
the logical value of the idea will be sufficiently preserved
by translating the verb either in the perfect tense, "It
has beer? shut out," or in the present, " It is excluded," (or,
as Tyndale gave it in 1526, " Hitt is excluded ").
The expression implies that the glorying referred to
had, — so far as scenically viewed, — tried to intrude. It
had, as it were, struggled hard to get a footing. But it
was unsuccessful. It was thrust out; and shut out. An
interdict was laid upon it. It was put under ban.
The logical substrate of the representation is obvious : —
There is no legitimate scope for the glorying of the Jew,
(or of any man). One has but to understand the real
nature of that justification which lies at the basis of
salvation, in order to see that the glorying of the Jew (or of
any man) is an absurdity as well as a sin. It is not the
case that the Jew can find, either in his own worth, or
in the favour of God, any good reason for pride of heart or
superciliousness of spirit. He cannot even find a good
reason for great self-complacency.
The majority of the Greek fathers suppose that the
Apostle's expression assumes. that there was once, to the
Jews, an opportunity for glorying, but that now, since the
appearance of Christ, that opportunity was gone. The time
for it is past, says Chrysostom, (ovkeYi yap e'xei Kaipov).

ROMANS III. 27. 359
There is no longer room for it, says Theodoret, (ovk in
X&pav e'x*0- QScumenius repeats the same idea. The
Apostle's expression, says he, shows that there was once
room for glorying, (StiKvvg brt koi x^Pav £'X^ nore).
Theophylact, too, as is his wont, echoes Chrysostom. But
the idea has no warrant in the inspired text, or in the
nature of the case. If arose from not distinguishing
between the Apostle's rhetorical representation, and its
logical substrate. According to the rhetorical repre
sentation, the vain-glorying was eager to intrude itself.
But according to the logical substrate of the representation,
there never was, and there never can be, any legitimate scope
for the Jewish, or for any, self-applauding glorying, in the
matter of justification and salvation. Michaelis's rendering
of the expression is based on this logical substrate of
thought. But, for this very reason, it obliterates the fine
dramatic representation of the Apostle. It is this : — " all
occasion for it has been cut off," (alle Gelegenheit dazu ist
abgeschnitten). It is an excellent logical explanation ; but
certainly it is no translation at all of the Apostle's
expression. § 4. Through what kind of a law? (Aid 7roiou vopov;)
That is, Through what kind , of a law was the glorying shut
out ? The Apostle keeps up the rhetorical colloquy.
It will be noticed that the question is not, Through
which law? The Apostle does not so much inquire for
the particular law by means of which the glorying had
been shut out, as ask information regarding the nature of
the law. To speak in the language of Aristotle's predica
ments, the inquiry points, not in the direction of the ovaia,
but in the direction of the iroioryg of the law. What kind
of a law is it ?
Chrysostom supposes that the Apostle uses the word
law conciliatingly, — to tone down the appearance of novelty
that attached to his doctrine, (lu^iXoxwpwv roie bvopaaiv,
wart irapapv&tXaSai rrjv SoKOvaav tivai Kaivoropiav). Day,
again, supposes that he uses the word " by a Mimesis," —
"repeating the word law, that he might in a slighting

360 ROMANS III. 27.
manner imitate the Jews, who did crack of the law, and
had it always in their mouths, though they kept it not."
Tholuck, in his 5th edition, takes a somewhat similar view,
(Das Jiidische Pochen auf das Gesetz zu Schanden zu
machen, spricht der Apostel auch von einem Gesetze des
Glaubens). But there was a deeper reason for the employ
ment of the term. When it was said that the glorying
was shut out, the language had reference not so much to
the power of physical force, as to the interposition of
authority. (Quo jure est exelusa ?-Bugenhagen.) The
glorying had no right to be within ; and an interdict had
been laid upon its entrance. What, then, was the tenor of
that interdict? How did the order or ordonnance run?
What was the purport of the legal instrument by which
the ejectment was effected ? What manner of law is it ?
— Such seems to be the Apostle's idea., In the light of it,
the difficulties vanish which have so grievously perplexed
some of the most inquisitive expositors. We shall refer to
these difficulties after we have noticed the remaining
clauses of the verse.
§ 5. Of ivories ? — Wycliffe, Of dedis doyinge ? (Twv ipywv ;)
Literally, Of the works ? There is real significance in the
article, although our idiom will scaicely aidmit of its intro
duction into an easy-going translation. The expression
does not refer to works indefinitely, nor even to good
works indefinitely. The article is not, as Vaughan supposes,
generic. The expression refers, very definitely, to certain
peculiar works, — the works, namely, which were specially
prized and punctiliously performed by the great body of
the religiously inclined among the Jews, and on the ground
of which they thought themselves exceedingly good, and
entitled to be exceedingly sure of the everlasting glory of
God. The Apostle, as it were, says : — Through what sort of
law has the boasting (of the Jews) been shut out? Is it
through a law that ¦ enjoins, as the human condition of
justification, such works as the Jews are scrupulously
careful to perform, such as circumcision, a punctilious
observance of holy days, a careful distinction of meats,

ROMANS III. 27\ 361
a tithing of mint, anise, and cummin, &c, and, in addi
tion, a fair outside compliance with the precepts of the
decalogue? The force of the articulated expression might
be tolerably well exhibited by the introduction of the
pronoun their : — Is it through a law that enjoins their works
that their boasting has been shut out ? The word works is,
of course, objective in relation to the word law. It denotes1
the objects supposed to be authoritatively or legislatively
enjoined. § 6. Nay, but through the law of faith, (Ovx<, dXXd Sid
vopov iriartwg). The Jewish glorying is excluded through
the law that enjoins faith as the human condition of justi
fication and salvation. That is the kind of law by means of
which the glorying was shut out from the platform of divine
things, in the midst of which the Apostle found himself
standing, while he was surveying and exhibiting the won
ders that are in and around the great propitiation. It is
not faith itself that is called a law ; although there is an
important sense in which it is a rule of life. But the
Apostle is speaking of a law that enjoins faith, — a law, or
order, or ordonnance, or commandment, or divine statute,
that, with 'the force of an evangelical Imperative, lays
hearers of the Gospel under obligation to believe and live.
The Greek expression is unarticulated, — "law of faith."
We cannot, in our English idiom, reproduce it. We cannot
say "through law of faith." Neither can we here say
"through faith's law." We must say either, "through a
law of faith," or, " through the law of faith." Either trans
lation is legitimate, though neither is an exact reflection of
the original expression. In such a case as the Apostle had
in hand, "the law of faith" is "a law of faith." For that
kind of law which consists in " a law of faith " is neither
more, nor less, nor else, than the actually enacted, and
therefore the actually existing, law of faith. " This is God's
commandment — (God's law) — that we should believe on the
name of his Son Jesus Christ," (1 John iii. 23).
§ 7. Such is the purport, we apprehend, of the jubilant

362 ROMANS III. 27.
outburst of condensed utterances contained in this 27th verse.
The key to the whole aggregation of expressions is the
idea that there is a particular reference to the great body of
the religiously disposed Jews, — to their glorying on the
one hand, and to their works on the other. . In the light of
this idea most of the difficulties vanish which have caused
perplexity to not a few of the most earnest investigators.
Many have wondered, for example, why the Apostle
should speak both of a law of works and of a law of
faith. The twofold use of the word law has excited their
wonderment. GScumenius wondered, and thought that he
explained the matter when he remarked that the expres
sion law of works is used periphrastically for works, and
the correlative expression law of faith, for faith, (vopov
tpywv, twv ipywv irtpiippaaTiKwg, Kai vopov iriartwg, ryg
iriartwg irtpifpaariKwg). But, of course, his explanation
explains nothing. It gives no reason whatever for the use
of the word law. Theophylact says that faith is called a
law by the Apostle out of respect for the Jews, who
honoured the term, ('iSov ica\ ryv irianv vopov koXei Std
to tov bvoparog irapa 'lovSaiotg ripiov). But, as we have
seen, it is not the case that faith is called a law ; — no more
than works are. Theodore of Mopsuestia speculated on the
subject, and evidently with ingenuity ; but his remarks
have unhappily not come down to us in an uncorrupted
state; neither has the exposition of Pelagius. Theodoret,
again, begins his explanation in a rather unpromising
manner. He says that it is not inconsiderately that faith
is called a law, (ovx a7rXuie Se ryv irianv irpoayyoptvat
vopov), — thus committing the mistake into which Theo
phylact afterwards fell. But ere he ends his exposition
he comes round to a much more accurate view of the
expression, and speaks of faith in Christ as having been
legislatively ordained (as a duty). (He says of the new
covenant, prophesied of by Jeremiah, avrj) Se iriartittv
vopo&tTtt t$ x9taTV-) Aquinas got fairly off the scent on
the subject. He seems, like Theodoret, to have thought of
the New Covenant spoken of by Jeremiah (xxxi. 31 — 34);
and he concluded that by the law of works is meant the law

ROMANS III. 27. 363
of God, viewed as inculcating outward works, while by the
law of faith is meant the same law inwrought into the
heart, and thus regulating the new heart's inner movements,
the first of which, says he, is faith. (Legem autem fidei
vocat legem interius descriptam, per quam non solum
exterior a facta, sed etiam ipsi motus cordium disponuntur,
inter quos primus est motus fidei.) Abelard went still farther
in the same direction, and actually explains the expression
law of faith as meaning love springing from faith, (per legem
fidei, ut dictum est, Jesu Christi, id est, charitatem ex fide
nostrae salvationis per Christum venientem). Melancthon
saw that such explanations of the Apostle's phraseology
were far aside from the mark, and from evangelical truth.
Yet he could not work his way into the Apostle's repre
sentation. In his Annotations (1522) he says that the
expression law of faith just means faith, — the word law
being used abusively, (Lex fidei, abusu vocabuli, ipsam
fidem signal). He thus looked at the expression in the
same light as G5cumenius. But in his Commentary (1540)
and Enarratio (1556) he attributes more significancy to the
word law. He says it means doctrine. The law of faith,
he thus explains as meaning the doctrine concerning faith
(doctrina de fide; doctrina quae concionatur de fide).
In this, his ultimate explication, many succeeding exposi
tors acquiesced, as Hunnius, Balduin, Beza ; Sclater, Calov,
Wittich, Vitringa, &c. ; and in later times Kypke, Nosselt,
Christian Schmid, Koppe, Morus, Weingart ; Bockel too,
and Flatt; Tholuck also, in his 1st and 2nd editions, and
Turner, &c. "Law," says Turner, "is equivalent to a system
of doctrine." There is in such an interpretation of the
phrase a tittle of basis, inasmuch as the Hebrew word (nn'w),
corresponding to the Greek word (vopog), does bear ineradi-
cably in its make the idea of instruction or revelation. Yet
it never means doctrine, in the systematic-theology sense
of the term, — doctrine in the sense of dogma. < And in the
passage before us the scenic nature of the case demands
the retention of the distinctive conventional force of the
Greek ierm,— - law. Peter Martyr accepts the interpretation
of Melancthon; but he improves it a little, saying, "by the

364 ROMANS III. 27.
word law the Apostle means doctrine, since it has the
power of controlling and governing," (Voce autem Legis,
intelligit Apostolus doctrinam; quoniam ea vi/m habet
moderendi ac regendi vires nostras et voluntates ad aliquid
agendum). Aretius gives a similar modification, but more
happily than Martyr, to Melancthon's notion. Bullinger,
however, who wrote before Melancthon's Commentary and
Enarratio appeared, felt fairly puzzled, and proposes several
shifts to account for the use of the word law. Perhaps, he
says, it may mean principle or mode : — or perhaps it is a
catachresis ; or perhaps, he adds, it is a mimesis (as in John
vi. 29). The secret of his perplexity is found in his
erroneous view of the scenic representation. He supposes
glorying to have been thrust out by mere brute-force as it
were, (gloriatio convulsa jacet, convulsa, inquam, fidei non
operum robore). Musculus, too, is puzzled, and could only
come to the conclusion, that whatever the expression may
mean (ut ut accipiamus), the Apostle evidently intended
to discriminate between the law of Moses and the grace
of the New Testament. Melville does not attempt to ex
plain the expression. He simply wondered and adored.
"Here," he says, "the name law is given to faith, won
derfully and qualifiedly, but divinely and significantly " —
(Hic legis nomen mirifice et modificate, sed divinitus et
significanter, fidei tribuitur). Zuingli took much the
same view as CEcumenius. The expression, in his opinion,
is just a peculiarity of Greek speech, (schema Graecanici
sermonis). "By the law of faith?" just means, he thinks,
"by faith?" and' the preceding query, "by what .sort of
law?" just means how? (quomodo?). In more modern times
the difficulty has continued to be felt. Tholuck, as we have
seen, held, in his 1st and 2nd editions, by the notion that
law means doctrine. In his subsequent editions he shifts
his ground, and holds that the word denotes an authori
tative rule of action, (norma, verpfiichtende Richtschnur).
Grotius had taken substantially the same view, (vivendi
regula) ; and indeed Calvin too ; and it has been approved
of by Hodge, Maier, Philippi, Alford, Oltramare, &c. Seb.
Schmidt, on the other hand, supposes that the word law.

ROMANS III. 2>7. 365
means scripture, and is used partitively, as the word scrip
ture sometimes is, as when we speak of a scripture and
another scripture. He Would interpret the verse, in
formal colloquy, as follows : — "Jews: — Where then is glory
ing ? Paul: — It has been excluded. Jews: — Through
what (part of) Scripture? — through that which enjoins
works ? Paul : — Nay, but through that which enjoins faith."
This interpretation of the word law, however, is extremely,
and indeed absolutely, arbitrary. So is that of Eeiche,
Moses Stuart, Eiickert, &c, who understand by it a reli
gious system, dispensation, economy, or order of things,
(Religionsverfassung, Religionsordnung, olKovopia). Cor
respondingly, and correspondingly unsatisfactory, is the
view of Webster and Wilkinson, principle or system, and
of Da. Brown, principle or scheme. And correspond
ingly objectionable is the affiliated view of Dr. Chalmers,
1 — shaped far too much in the mould of the nomenclature
of modern science, — method of succession. "The law of
faith," says he, " is that law by which the event of a man's
justification follows upon the event of his faith, — -just as the
law of gravitation is that law upon which every body above
the surface of the earth, when its ¦ support is taken away,
will fall towards its centre." — We need not detail other
efforts of perplexed and perplexing exegesis. All such
efforts are superseded, and all apology for them, as soon as
the scene is realized, which was psychologically present to
the Apostle When he asked the question — Through what
kind of a law ? That which he calls the glorying had
been thrust out from the scene of things ih the midst of
which he found himself as an expounder of the Gospel ;
and a ban was laid upon it to prevent its entrance. It was
legally shut out. When fully realizing this, the Apostle
asks, — by what kind of a law ? By a law that enjoins the
works (of which the great body of the Jews make so much)?
Nay, but by the law that enjoins faith.
Other difficulties, besides those which circle around the
expression law of faith, have been felt. They centre in the
expression law of works, and have reference to the legitimacy
of the Apostle's argumentation in that direction. Is it not

366 ROMANS III. 27.
the case, it has been asked, that the law of works does really
shut out glorying from the hearts of men, and that most
effectually? Understanding by the law of works the law
that prescribes the outworking of a perfect righteousness as "
the condition of everlasting glory, is it not the case that such
a law, when not kept, shuts out all ground of glorying? Is
it not by it that the knowledge of sin is realized? And as
the knowledge of sin is nothing less and nothing else than
the knowledge of that which humiliates, and which con
sequently makes glorying an absurdity, how is it that the
Apostle says that glorying is excluded, not by the law of
works, but only by the law of faith? Such is the difficulty
that has been felt. Kypke felt it much, and hence could not
persuade himself that, when the Apostle asked by what kind
of law ? he meant by vjhat kind of law is glorying shut out ?
He would understand the verse somewhat as follows: — Where
then is legitimate glorying, — glorying, for instance, in hope
of the glory of God? and how may we attain to that glory
ing? It has been (alas!) shut out, but how may it be
brought in ? — By what kind of law ? Of works ? Nay, but
by the law of faith. (Per qualem legem oritur gloriatio ?)
But such an impenetration and interpretation of the clause
by what kind of law? seems to be an inversion, .rather
than an explication, of what is natural Erasmus, however,
had felt the same difficulty, and hence he interprets the
verse as follows: — Where then is thy glorying, 0 Jew? It
is taken away from thee by that Gospel which puts all the
nations of the earth on a level. Salvation and righteousness
are brought nigh to the Gentiles also. But by what law (are
salvation and righteousness thus brought nigh to the Gen
tiles) ? The Mosaic, which prescribes ceremonies ? Nay, but
by a new law, which exacts nothing but faith in the Son of
God. Here, too, there is the most arbitrary interjection of
an idea not expressed by the Apostle, viz., — Salvation and
righteousness are brought nigh to tlie Gentiles also, (Defertur
et gentibus salus et justitia). And when this intruded
idea is linked into the query by what sort of law ? there
seems to be again a total inversion of what is natural. —
Sender, likewise, was perplexed, and would supplement the

ROMANS III. 27. 367
clause thus: — by vShut kind of law (can the favour of
God be obtained) 1 Utterly arbitrary. Bengel also was
perplexed. John D. Michaelis gives the following trans-"
lation of the clause: — Through what law are we justi
fied? (Durch welches Gesetz werden wir gerecht?) And
Mehring, although not aware of Michaelis's translation,
proposes the very same supplement and interpretation. It
is, of course, utterly arbitrary. Eiickert, in his 1st edition,
proposed a similar interpretation ; but he felt constrained to
abandon it in his 2nd, (nur die gewohnliche Annahme kann
den philologischen Verstand befriedigen; sie muss also
festgehalten werden). De Wette, too, in his earlier editions,
felt extremely perplexed, riot knowing whither to turn
himself. He did not see that it was possible to supplement
and interpret the expression by what sort of law? in any
other way than this : — by what sort of law (is the glorying
shut out) ? and yet, if thus interpreted, it seemed to him that
the Apostle's interrogative introduction into his representa
tion, and his consequent exclusion, of the law of works, was
"a mere rhetorical and almost senseless figure, serving to
give emphasis to the affirmation by the law of- faith,"
(Es ist besser- — Sid — ovxt als eine blosse rhetorische, fast
gedankenlose Figur, zur Hebung der Affirmative Sid —
iriartwg dienend anzusehen). He ultimately, however,
threw out the inconsiderate and gratuitously irreverent
expression, "almost senseless," and attained a somewhat
more satisfactory and sensible view of the passage, by
realizing that the Apostle was picturing a scene, while
building up an argument and establishing a corollary.
But he did not, as we apprehend, get to the Apostle's real
standpoint. When one gets to that : —
It is seen, (1), that it is the idea of the right of self-
glorying, — the right as distinguished from the fact, — to
which the Apostle is referring, — so far as regards the logical
substrate of his representation. Men may in fact glory
when they have no right to do so. The Jews thus gloried.
But it is the right which the Apostle, — so far as regards
the logical substrate of his representation, — disputes and
denies.

368 ROMANS III. 28.
It is seen, (2), that, in the psychologically pictorial scene
which the Apostle pourtrays, he represents glorying as shut
out, and kept out, not so much by a mere exertion of
strength or force, as by a law. And he asks, — By what
manner of law ?
It is seen, (3), that, in his answer to this question, the
Apostle does not suppose the actual existence of two divine
laws, and then give the preference, for his present purpose,
to one of the two. On the contrary, he assumes that there
was only one divine law of ejectment, only one enactment
or ordonnance. And assuming this, he explains, in bis own
vivid and vigorous way, — by negation and affirmation, —
that the quality (the iroiorrjg) of the law was such, that,
instead of enjoining the works which were so highly priced
by the great mass of the Jews, it enjoined faith in the
evangelical righteousness of God.
Hence it is seen, (4), that there is a reason for the
presence of the article in the excluded interrogation, (rwv
ipywv) And hence it is seen, (5), that it is irrelevant to ask the
questions, does not the moral law exclude all undue
glorying as well as tlie law of faith? Do not indeed all
divine laws exclude all undue glorying? They do. But
the Apostle makes no reference to any really existent
divine law but one, — the law of faith.

Ver. 28. A.oyiZppji'&a, ovv hzaiovoSui iciaru uv^pwxov
%wpig 'ipyuv vopov.
Eng. Auth. Ver. Therefore we conclude that a man is
justified by faith without the deeds of the law.
Revised Version. We reckon then that a man is justified
by faith without works of law.
§ 1. The precise relation of this verse to the preceding
context seems to have been the subject of earnest consider-

ROMANS III. 28. 369
ation from the most ancient times. Hence the diversity of
reading as regards the connective particle ; — some thinking
that it is illative, then or therefore, (ovv), — "we reckon then;"
some thinking that it 'is rationative, for, (ydp), — "for we
reckon." If the former, — viz., then, (ovv), — be the correct
reading, the statement of the verse will be of the nature of
an inference or corollary from what goes either immediately
or more remotely before. If the latter, — viz., for, (ydp), — be
the correct reading, the statement of the verse will be con
firmatory of what -goes immediately before — the (Jewish)
glorying is excluded by a law of faith, for we reckon that a
man is justified by faith without works , of law. We are
persuaded that then (oBv) is the correct reading, and that
the statement of the verse is a corollary from what goes
before, viewed generally, whilst there is doubtless a more
particular reference to the peculiarly rich unfolding of
the plan of justification into which the Apostle's discourse
has effloresced in verses 21st — 26th.
The diplomatic authorities in support of for, (yap), in
stead of then, (ovv), are, indeed, very weighty. KADEFG,
besides several cursive manuscripts, have for (ydp) as their
reading. It is, besides, the reading of the Vulgate, (enim):,
and also of the prae-Hieronymian codices d. e. f. g. It is
most likely, therefore, that it was the reading of the Greek
codices from which the original Latin version or versions
were made. It is, of course, the reading of Ambrosiaster
and Pelagius, and also of Augustin.
The inferential then, (ovv), on the other hand, is the
reading of BCKL, and of the great mass of the cursive
manuscripts. It is supported, moreover, by the two
Syriac versions, and also by the texts of Chrysostom,
Theodoret, GScumenius, and Theophylact. The purport,
too, of the comments, of Chrysostom, GEcumenius, and
Theophylact assumes the same reading. (GScumenius,
indeed, explains the ovv by roiyapow.)
In consequence of then (ovv) being the reading of the
o-reat body of the cursive manuscripts, it was reproduced
in the early printed editions. It is the reading of Eras
mus's editions and of Stephens's. Of Beza's too ; and of
2 B

370 ROMANS III. 28.
the Elzevir of 1624, and its successors. It is hence the
reading of the Received Text.
In Eobert Stephens's great edition of 1550, the reading
for (ydp) is mentioned in the margin, under the authority
of two manuscripts, S and i ; and Mill contended that this
reading was the genuine one. He says that some reader,
thinking that the Apostle's statement was an inference
from what goes before, put then (ovv) in the margin, and
that afterwards this reading, as apparently more suitable,
was admitted into the text. He remarks, however, in
opposition to the reading, but certainly with no great
cogency of argumentation, that there is not more reasoning,
in support of justification by faith, in the preceding than in
the subsequent part of the Epistle, (verum non magis
arguit Apostolus justificari nos per ficlem ex superioribus,
quam ex parte maxima reliquae hujus Epistolae). Bengel,
though not absolutely decided, was favourable to the
reading preferred by Mill. Griesbach was quite decided.
He received it into his text ; and he has been followed by
Knapp, Tittmann, Lachmann, Scholz, Alford, &c. Newcome
says, — "The true reading is yap." Eiickert approves of
the reading ; and so do Fritzsche, Meyer, Philippi, Eeith-
mayr, Oltramare, van Hengel, Matthias, Mehring, the Five
Clergymen, T Schott, &c.
Vater is undecided, though he gives then (ovv) in his
text ; (ydp certe aequiparandum fuerit). But Matthaei
decided for then, (ovv). H. A. Schott, too, in his last
edition, decided for it. And Tischendorf gives it both in
his 1849 edition and in that of 1859. It is approved of
by Eeiche, by Stengel, by de Wette, by Krehl, by
Hofmann, by Lange, and with emphasis by Maier.
We think that Maier is right. This is a case in which
Bengel's maxim should rule — proclivi scriptioni praestat
ardua — the more difficult reading is to be preferred to the
easier. It is not easy to see how then (ovv) could ever have
supplanted for (ydp) ; whereas, it is easy to see how a tran
scriber, who was not considering comprehensively both the
warp and woof of Paul's discourse, might be tempted to sub
stitute for in place of then, under the idea that then must

ROMANS III. 28. 371
have been a previous transcriber's mistake. If for be read,
then the verse hooks itself on, closely and readily, to the
immediately preceding verse, and gives a reason why it
was by a law of faith that self-glorying was shut out. Thus
this is an easy-going reading. But if the other reading (ovv)
be adopted, then there is immediately started the question,
whence is the inference drawn? And this is a question
more easily started than laid or answered. It does not
seem natural to regard the corollary as deduced from the
immediately preceding verse ; for in that verse there is no
argumentative basis for a corollary, — there is no attempt
at argumentation. There is merely jubilant interrogation
and asseveration. It would hence be awkward to regard
the corollary as deduced from that verse. But if so, there
seems to be difficulty in accounting for the introduction of
the corollary at all, especially after, and immediately after,
the preceding verse. It seems, therefore, to be almost
incredible that any transcriber should have turned the
easy-going for into the difficult then. But we can per
fectly understand, how the reverse alteration should
have commended itself to some superficially thoughtful
readers. We would abide, then, in this case, by the reading of the
Received Text. And we would regard the verse as forming
an independent corollary to the Apostle's preceding dis
cussion. It stands abreast with the corollary of verse 27th.
And in a paragraphed text it would be well to join Muralto,
and also Tyndale of old, in making use of a new line.
We would go further than Muralto and Tyndale, and begin
the next verse too with a new line, — letting this one stand
by itself as a distinct utterance. Indeed, the entire knot
of verses 27th— 31st is not rightly understood unless it is
regarded as a cluster of distinct and abrupt utterances,
with which the preceding argumentation, — so triumphantly
wrought out, — is jubilantly, as well as logically, crowned,
as with appropriate corollae.
§ 2. There is another matter regarding the reading of
the text which may be advantageously disposed of here;

372 ROMANS III. 28.
though it is by no means of such significance as the con
nective conjunction. In the Received Text we read iriarti
SiKaiovaSai avSpwirov. This is the common order of the
words in the cursive manuscripts ; and it is found also in
K L. But in M A B 0 D E the order is the following, —
SiKaiovaSat iriarti dvStpwirov, and this is the order that has
been followed by Griesbach, Lachmann, Scholz, Tischendorf,
&c. In F G the expression is SiKaiovaSiai dvSrpwirov Sid
iriartwg, — an evidently tinkered reading, yet certainly
favouring that order of the words that gives precedence to
SiKatovaSfai. We accept the reading of KABCDE; and
we are all the more firmly persuaded of its genuineness,
that it accords best with that view of the verse's relations
that is suggested by the connective particle then, (ovv). It
is true, indeed, that several of the authorities that support
this particle are in favour of the reverse order of the words ;
while several of the authorities that support for (ydp) are
in favour of that order of the words which we accept. But
this confusion is of small significance, and need excite but
little marvel, when we take into consideration that it is
not likely that transcribers in general would be men of
exquisitely sensitive exegetical tact. It is not probable that
many of them would make much effort to transfer themselves,
in a matter of minute nicety, to the precise standpoint of
such a peculiar mind as that of Paul. , Hence there was
sufficient scope for the introduction of small incongruities,
when the order of the text seemed confused.
If the arrangement of N A B C D E be accepted, it is in
fine harmony with the idea that the Apostle is referring
to his general discussion regarding justification. The
word justified is the proper term to be betoned ; and hence
its position in advance. But if the Apostle had been
merely confirming the affirmation regarding the "law of
faith," which stands at the conclusion of verse 27th, then
we should have seen a special congruity in reversing the
arrangement of H A B C D E, and giving all the emphasis
possible to the word faith
But this whole subject of emphasis is slippery, and runs
itself up, when considered broadly and profoundly, into

ROMANS III. 28. 373
complexities of vocal as well as logical harmonies, and into
the idiosyncrasies of particular minds.
§ 3. We recJcon then, (AoygoptSa ovv). Such is perhaps
as good a translation of the verb as can in English be
attained ; — although reclcon is a rather inadequate term to
express the inner logical or quasi-logical process suggested
by the original term. The word does not exactly mean,
we logically conclude, we conclude, though this was the
idea of Theophylact (avpirtpaivti tov Xoyov, koi <j>yaiv on
ek rwv tlpypivwv irdvrwv avXXoyiZop&a), as also of Beza,
Melville, and many others. The word denotes, says Calov,
a logical inference, (logicam illationem). It means, says
Heumann, to make a syllogism, (einen Schluss, einen Syllo-
gismum machen), that is, to collect out of premisses a
legitimate conclusion. Hence in the English Geneva of
1557 it is rendered we gather; and in our Authorized
English Version, we conclude. This is not, however, the
Pauline import of the word. It nowhere, in all his writ
ings, — although he very frequently employs it, — bears such
a meaning. Calvin's translation, too, is rather overdrawn, —
ive settle then, (constituimus ergo). Not so the translation
of the Vulgate and Erasmus, — arbitramur. It is, on the
contrary, as Beza remarked, in danger of being viewed on
that side of its usage which makes it merely mean, we are
of the opinion. That, indeed, was Zinzendorf's translation,
(wir sind der Meynung). It was, too, Fritzsche's inter
pretation, — who thought that there was a touch of irony or
"acrimony" in the expression, — (nempe puto). But, un
doubtedly, more is meant than mere opinion. Absolute
certainty is implied ; but it is reasonable certainty — cer
tainty that is the result of that inner discoursing, or
discursive process of the reason, that lays the foundation
of rational conviction. It is certainty that is the result of
that inner reckoning, or counting of the logical votes,
which determines the acceptance of an idea, (Xoyi%opat, ry
XEt/ot tpy^tZo).— Hesychius. Xoyiaopai, dvaipyfiaopai,. dvapiS-
/uJjo-a).-Suidas). Melancthon merged too much this reference
to an inner process, when he translated the word we pro-

374 ROMANS III. 28.
nounce (pronunciamus) in his Commentary of 1540, and
we assert (adseveramus) in his Enarratio of 1556. Luther's
version is better, — we hold, Qudten wir). Tyndale's is far
too weak, — we suppose. Wycliffe's is better, — we demen,
although it goes off upon another line of things, — the in
wardly judicial, as distinguished from the logical. We
reckon is, on the whole, as good a version as our language
will admit of. The idea is not inaptly expressed in a
colloquial Americanism — we calculate; for the notion of
counting or calculation, as Melville noted, is inherent in the
original word.
When the Apostle, then, says, — I reckon, he not only
represents himself as thinking, he realizes that he was
thinking reasonably. And when he says, — " I reckon then,"
he looks back upon the sum of his previous thinkings, as
expressed in his discoursing, more especially as that dis
coursing culminated in the paragraph that concludes with
verse 26th. As he thus looks back, he rests in the result
which he had reached. And he quietly assumes that his
readers had gone with him, and will rest too : — " we reckon
then." He and they were satisfied and sure. About
what? Let us see : —
§ 4. that a man is justified by faith, (SiKaiovaSai iriarti
dvSpwirov). This, with the appended clause, without works
of law, is, says Calvin, the " principal proposition," (princi
palis propositio). It is "the proposition of the whole
epistle," (propositio hujus epistolae), as an ancient owner
of our copy of Stephens's 1549 New Testament has noted
in the margin. It was imperfectly understood in the ages
that preceded the Beformation; and, at the time of the
Eeformation, it became a battlefield of contending the
ologies and theologians. "This passage," says John
Campensis, "has been hitherto misinterpreted, and has
occasioned everywhere tragedies of quarrel, the end of
which is not yet." (Hic locus parum hue usque meo judicio
feliciter intellectus, maximas in toto orbe excitavit tra-
goedias, quorum nondum finem i/-io3em?£s.-Commentario-
lus.) It is the expressed essence of the Apostle's doctrine.

ROMANS III. 28. 375
We need not, however, elaborately expound it, for, as it is
obviously the recapitulation in miniature of the whole
preceding discussion, each element that enters into its
entirety has already been subjected to examination.
As to the word justified (SiKaiovaSai), see on ver. 20th.
A man is evangelically justified, when he is made out to be
in possession of that righteousness which is the title to
eternal life. That righteousness is God's. It belongs to
God. It was manifested in Christ Jesus. It was wrought
out and brought in by Christ Jesus. It is revealed in the
Gospel. It is the gift of God. See chap. i. 17; iii. 21 — 24 ;
Phil. iii. 9; Eom. x. 6—10 ; 2 Cor. v. 21; &c.
It is by, faith (iriarti) that man is justified, — faith that
lays hold of the righteousness of God either explicitly or
implicitly. The righteousness of God is apprehended ex
plicitly when the revelation regarding it is understood and
believed. It is apprehended implicitly when the revelation
of God's propitiousness in general, or of Christ in particular
as the Propitiator, or of Christ as the Saviour, is under
stood and believed, even although the peculiarly Pauline
aspect of the great reality is not realized. Faith in God as
" the Lord-God,-merciful-and-gracious,-longsuffering,-and-
abundant - in - goodness - and - truth, - keeping - mercy-for-thou-
sands,-forgiving-iniquity-and-transgression-and-sin," involves
implicitly faith in Christ as a Saviour. Faith in Christ as
a Saviour involves implicitly faith in Christ as a Propi
tiator. Faith in Christ as a Propitiator involves implicitly
faith in the propitiatory sacrifice of Christ. And faith in
the propitiatory sacrifice of Christ involves implicitly, and
as its obverse, faith in the meritorious righteousness of
God, as wrought out by Christ, and as constituting for man,
in place of his own perfect righteousness, his title to
everlasting life.
The dative expression, by faith, (iriarti, — the dynamic
dative), denotes instrumentality. To speak in the language
of the schools : — Faith is not the efficient cause of justifica
tion. God is that. Faith is not the meritorious cause.
God's righteousness, as wrought out by Christ, is that.
Neither is faith the material cause. The soul of man, as a

376 ROMANS III. 28.
substance, is that. Neither- is it the final cause. Man's
good, — the universe's good, — Christ's glory, — God's glory, —
all these, culminating in' the last, constitute the final cause
of justification. Neither is faith the formal cause. God's
judicial action, his judicial finding, his judicial declaration,
is that. But faith is still, nevertheless, in a certain respect,
a cause. It is an instrumental cause. So is the word of
faith. The two, — the word of faith and the act of faith, —
constitute as it were one complex instrumentality, — the
one pole of which touches the mind of God, whose word the
word of faith is; while the other pole touches the mind of
man, whose is the act of faith. But this stiff scholastic way
of viewing the subject, though possessing advantages in the
direction of distinction and precision, is far from doing
perfect justice to the full realities of the case.
When the Apostle says " that a man is justified by faith,"
his expression means, " that every- man who is justified at
all is justified by faith." Some translators render the
expression, not a man, but man. So Wakefield, Macknight,
Newcome, Scarlett, Thomson, Cox, &c. The translation is
of course legitimate, (corresponding to the I'homme of
the French translators and the der Mensch of the German).
But a man is better: — -for in the use of our indefinite
article we have an advantage even over the Greek language.
The Apostle is not referring to man as a species, or to man
in general: and hence the advantage of the translation, a
man. The species man is not justified. Neither is man in
general. It is some men only. But whensoever a man, be
he who he may, is justified, it is by faith that he is justified.
Beautiful, however, is the remark of Chrysostom, — "He
does not say a Jew, or one who is under the law, but,
expatiating wide, and throwing open the door of salvation to
the world, he says man, using the name that is common to
the race," (ovk ilirtv TovSaTov, ?) rov V7r6 tov vopov ovra, '
dXX' i^ayayibv rbv Xoyov tig Evpvxtwpiav, Kai ry o'lKOvpivn rag
Svpag dvoi^ag ryg awrypiag, <j>yalv dv&pwirov, to koivov rr/g
tjtvatwg bvopa Siig).
§ 5. without works of law, (x^ph tpywv vopov). Such

ROMANS III. 28. 377
is manifestly the correct construction of the expression.
Glb'ckler's hysteron-proteron translation — without the law
of works — is extremely unnatural and violent. It proceeds,
moreover, on the erroneous hypothesis that the Apostle is
referring particularly to ver. 27th; and it is based, besides,
on a misinterpretation of the expression law of works, as
occurring in that verse. When the Apostle says that a
man is justified without worlcs of law, he means that he is
justified without any works whatsoever, performed in
obedience to that law; which, in its wider sphere of relation
ship, exhibited the duty of men as men, and in its narrower
sphere exhibited the duty of Jews as Jews. Man is justified
by faith without any works of law, moral or ceremonial.
Man's good works of every kind, whether simply moral, or
whether having in addition an interpenetrating element of
what is ceremonial, form no part of the meritorious cause
of justification. The meritorious cause, or ground, of
justification is Christ's good work alone, — his righteousness,
— the righteousness of God. It is not hence to be inferred,
indeed, that good works are not good. Neither is it to be
inferred that they are not absolutely indispensable as moral
meetness for heavenly glory. They are absolutely indis
pensable. "Without holiness no man shall see the Lord."
But they form no part of the sinner's title to glory. They
do not enter at all as an element into the ground of his
justification. Justification is thus distinct from sanctifica
tion. But it must ever be borne in mind that it is sub
ordinate too. It is the means; sanctification is the end.
We are justified that we may be sanctified. We are
pardoned that we may be purified. Faith is . enjoined, not
that it may remain idle and alone, but that it may work,
and work by love, and thus result in " the fulfilling of the
law." § 6. Luther introduced into his translation of this verse
the word alone, — "through faith alone," (allein durch den
Glauben). The word does not modify in the least the
doctrinal idea of the Apostle. It simply gives a little more
edge or emphasis to it, — emphasis that was doubtless in

378 ROMANS III. 28.
thorough accordance with the thought and feeling of the
inspired writer. Nevertheless, the additament was un
necessary and uncalled for, and should not have been made.
It is not the business of a translator to make the idea of his
author more emphatic than the author himself has made it.
Its introduction gave, moreover, the enemies of the truth
a handle for saying something about " adding to the words
of the Book." It gave them an opportunity for throwing
dust into the eyes of their dupes. They were not slow to
take advantage of it : — and quite a little library of litera
ture grew up around the intruded word. The apologies for
Luther were in the main triumphant; — and thoroughly
so when considered in relation to the peculiar shape which
the impeachments assumed in the hands of his Eoman
Catholic opponents. In Schleenaker's Disputatio Theologico-
Apologetica pro genuina B. Lutheri versione, Rom. Cap. 3.
versic. 28, we have an excellent summary of the contents
of these Apologies. It was shown: —
(1.) That the Vulgate — the Eeceived Text of Eoman
Catholics — had frequently inserted the same word only for
the sake of emphasis, although there was no corresponding
word in the original; as for example in 1 Sam. x. 19.
(2.) That the Saviour himself, in quoting' Deut. vi. 13, —
as he did when he was tempted (Matt. iv. 10), — had used
the word only, although it does not occur in the original
Hebrew. (3.) That the Septuagint translators had again and
again introduced the same word without any corresponding
Hebrew term ; as for example in Gen. iii. 11.
(4.) That the Peshito translator had used the same
liberty; as for example in Eom. iv. 5.
(5.) That even Eoman Catholic translators who came
after Luther, — such as Emser and Dietenberger, — had used
the same liberty ; as in Mark xiii. 32 for example, where
both the translators specified introduced the word only.
And yet Emser was one of the most zealous in raising a hue
and cry against Luther for his only in the passage before
us. (6.) In the Niirnberg Bible of 1483, the corresponding

ROMANS III. 28. 379
passage in Gal. ii. 16 is translated " only through faith," —
(nur durch den Glauben) ; and the same passage is trans
lated in the Italian Eoman Catholic version, published at
Venice in 1546, ma solo per la fide di Giesu 0hristo.
(7.) Many of the Fathers were accustomed to use the
expression, by faith only, when discoursing on justification.
For example, Ambrosiaster, in commenting on Eom. iv. 5,
uses the expression twice over, (sola fide, per solam fidem).
Such were some of the pleas that were put in, and
appropriately and powerfully urged, in defence of Luther.
Bengel stands true to the German Megalander, and fell on
an ingenious method of vindicating the only. He applies
arithmetic to the case. Two things only are referred to, —
Faith and works, . . 2
Works are excluded, ... .1
Faith remains alone, . ... 1
One being subtracted from two, there remains but one. It
is, says Bengel, an arithmetical demonstration.
Tholuck says that Erasmus (Liber Condon, lib. iii.)
remarks, — vox sola, tot clamoribus lapidata hoc seculo in
Luthero, reverenter in patribus auditur, — " The word alone,
which has been received with such a shower of stones when
uttered in our times by Luther, is yet reverently listened
to when spoken by the Fathers." Hodge repeats the
quotation and the reference. We do not know where
Tholuck picked it up. But while the observation seems
to bespeak, by its peculiar felicity and piquancy, an
Erasmian origin, it is certainly not to be found in that
great repository of felicities, and wisdom, and wit, and
semi-garrulities, — the Liber Concionandi.
Luther and his apologists were taunted as being solifidians
(or rather, sblafidians) and fidesolarians. They accepted
the taunt, so far as the matter of justification is concerned,
and gloried in it. But they ever contended that faith
must not, and does not, remain solitary in the soul. (Non
sola est, eisi sola justificat.) Their maxim was, that " faith
never exists without works, although it justifies without
works," (fides, etsi nunquam sine operibus est, tamen sine

380 ROMANS III. 28.
operibus justificat). And now that the- storm of the old
controversy has subsided, Eeithmayr himself allows that
the little word only, which Luther introduced, is not, as
considered in itself, to be blamed. The genius of the
German language, he says, not only permits, but demands
it, in order to give pointed expression to the opposition.
(Der erkldrende Zusatz ware an sich nicht zu tadeln, da
der Genius der deutschen Sprache es zuldsst, ja es fordert,
um nur den Gegensatz scharf auszudruclcen.) This is
going all the length that Luther himself went in his Self
Defence : and it is a little too far. Yet the eloquent
Mussus, in the midst of the " tragedies " that were enacted
in connection with the controversy, went as far in his
interpretation of the Apostle's words. He says : — " No
works have place in the justification of man before God.
Men are justified by faith alone, without works, moral,
ceremonial, or judicial, of any law whatsoever, whether
natural, mosaical, or evangelical," (unica fide justificantur
universi homines apud Deum, sine operibus moralibus,
ceremonialibus, judicialibusque, eujusvis legis, vel naturae,
vel mosaicae, vel evangelicae. Audis Paulinam senten-
tiam ?-Com. in loc). What Protestant could go farther ?
The language would have delighted Luther. But then the
eloquent expositor had his theological back-door. He held
that the reference is only to "the first justification, which
is obtained in baptismal regeneration." Aquinas and
Estius had another back-door. They held that the reference
is to works preceding faith, and to them only. Many of
their confreres coincide in this view. Abelard and
Dionysius a Eyekel have another back-door. They say
that the reference is to works external and corporeal,— such
is the representation of Abelard, or to works ceremonial
and judicial, — such is the representation of Dionysius. The
back-door of Mac-Evilly, again, is this, — " The Apostle
refers to the works performed by the sole aid of the law
of Moses and the law of nature, without grace and faith,
and he comes to the conclusion that these works have no
share in justification." It is by one of other of these
methods, or by a combination of several of them, that

ROMANS III. 29, 30. 381
Eoman Catholic expositors and theologians in general, and
others who in this matter side with Eoman Catholics, back
out of the natural import of the Apostle's phraseology.
Cardinal Cajetan, however, rose in a great measure superior
to the prejudices which surrounded him, and which too
often, indeed, exerted a warping influence on his own
judgement. He says that the Apostle does not intend to
dissuade from performing the works of the law : he only
intends "to exclude them from having any justificative
power," (non intendit, inquam, excludere ab executione sed a
justificatione, hoc est, a virtute justiflcativa hominis absolute,
quod est dicere a virtute remissiva peccatorum). Nothing
more than this idea of the great Cardinal is required to
satisfy the requirements of enlightened Protestantism :— for
even in the apophthegms of Gregory the Great, that " we
get to works by faith, not to faith by works," — " to virtue
by faith, not to faith by virtue," — (non operibus venitur ad
fidem, sed fide venitur ad opera, — non virtutibus venitur
ad fidem, sed per fidem venitur ad virtutes), — require to be
interpreted as having reference to the highest element in
virtue and good works,; — supreme love to God, or else to be
accepted with a grain of qualification. It is enough to
say that works of law have, — in the case of transgressors of
the law, — no justificative or remissive virtue or meritorious-
ness whatsoever. It is altogether uncalled for to deny that
an unbeliever may be in some, or perhaps in many, respects
a noble man, — noble in honesty, noble in honour, noble in
patriotism, noble in philanthropy. Yet his nobility of
character has no justificative element in it. Perfect nobility
in all relations, God-ward and man-ward, — perfect or full-
orbed righteousness from beginning to ending of the pro
bationary career, — would be requisite, if man were to be
justified by works of law.

Vee. 29. "H 'lovlalm 6 Seog povov; Ovy) l\ zat
ISvw; Na/ zui ISvaV Ver. 30. eowsp ef? 6 Seog og

382 ROMANS III. 29, SO.
hzuitutru Tzpiropjrjv Iz Tiarsag, zat uzpo&vartuv hd rrjg
•ziarioog. Eng. Auth. Ver. Is he the God of the Jews only ? is he
not also of the Gentiles ? Yes, of the Gentiles also : Seeing
it is one God, which shall justify the circumcision by faith ,
and uncircumcision through faith.
Revised Version. Is God (the God) of Jews only? Is
he not, on the contrary, (the God) of Gentiles also ? Yes, of
Gentiles also; seeing it is one God who shall justify cir
cumcision by faith, and uncircumcision through faith.
§ 1. We shall consider the initial particle, y, at the
conclusion of the exposition of the two verses. The reason
of this postponement will then become sufficiently evident.
It is enough, in the meantime, to note that the interrogative
nature of the clause to which y is prefixed is not dependent
on the presence of the particle. Indeed, the particle is
omitted altogether in some few manuscripts, as also in
Theodoret's text. Mill regarded it as spurious, (praefixum
haud dubito e marg. ob majorem emphasin).
§ 2. Is God (the God) of Jews only? ('lovSaiwv 6 Stbg
povov) We say of Jews, rather than of the Jews; for this
is one of the cases in which our English idiom coincides so
far with the Greek as to enable us to preserve the indefinite-
ness of the original. There is a fine and solemn significance
in this indefiniteness : for there is an inner circle of the
divine relationship within which God was peculiarly the
God of such Jews (and Gentiles) as were believers of the
Gospel. The Apostle's query is exceedingly condensed; and has
hence occasioned considerable difference of opinion regarding
its construction. The Authors of our Eng. Auth. Version,
following the English Geneva and Tyndale, have regarded
the articulated word God (6 Stog) as belonging to the pre
dicate of the preposition; and hence they have rendered
the clause thus, — "Is he the God of the Jews only?" Tyn
dale's translation is the same. The English Geneva is

ROMANS III. 29, 30. 383
similar in principle, but more awkward, — "God, is he the God
of the Jews only ? " The French Geneva is ' identical with
the English, — (Dieu est il seulement le Dieu des Juifs?)
The translation is almost identical with Calvin's French
version, — "Dieu est il seulement Dieu des Juifs?" It is
more natural, however, and more in harmony with the
unfolded expression in Matt. xxii. 32, to regard the arti
culated noun as being the subject of the proposition: — "Is
God (the God) of Jews only?" (If both the subject and
the predicate had been expressed, the query would have
run thus, — 6 Sftbg Stbg TouSaiW povov ; See Matt.
xxii. 32.)
Fritzsche supposes that there is the ellipsis only of the
substantive verb. He would render the expression thus, —
" Is God of the Jews only ? " that is, " Does God belong to
the Jews only ? " (An ad Judaeos Deus pertinet tantum
modo?) His authority swayed the judgement and carried
the concurrent votes of de Wette and Meyer, in their second
and subsequent editions, as also of Maier, Oltramare, Philippi,
&c. We rather think, however, that the view taken of the
construction by Luther and Grotius, Baumgarten-Crusius,
Krehl, van Hengel, and Matthias, — the view given in our
translation, — is more correct. It assumes the ellipsis of the
predicate God, as well as of the substantive verb ; — Is God
the God of Jews only ? This view of the construction is
favoured by a comparison of Luke xx. 38 with Matt. xxii.
32, as also by the expressions that occur in 1 Cor. xiv. 33,
and in Eom. ii. 28, 29. Even although Fritzsche's inter
pretation were to be so far accepted, it would still be
requisite, in order to unfold completely the Apostle's idea,
to add, as a secondary supplement, the expression, "as their
God:" — Does God belong to the Jews only, viz., as their
God ? Thus the ellipsis would be enlarged, instead of being
contracted. Tischendorf (1849 and 1859) supposes that, in the correct
reading of the query, the adjective alcne is used, instead of
the adverb only, ('lovSaiwv 6 Stbg povwv; instead of
TovSattuv 6 S£&e mo'vov). He is supported by the Vatican
MS., and a few of the cursives. But the overwhelming

384 ROMANS III. 29, SO.
majority of the cursives, as well as M A 0 F G K L, sustain
the reading of the Received Text. It is supported likewise
by the Vulgate (tantum) and d. e. f. g. There1 can be little
doubt that Lachmann, therefore, was right in abiding by
the received text ; and so Scholz, Griesbach, &c.
The Apostle does not query whether or not God is the
God of Jews. He would be ready to acknowledge that God
was Abraham's God, and the God of Abraham's seed. (Gen.
xvii. 7, 8.) He was the God of Abraham, and of Isaac, and
of Jacob. (Matt. xxii. 32.) He was the God of the
Hebrews. (Lev. xxvi. 45.) The word God in such ex
pressions is used relatively and appellatively. God was
the God of the patriarchs and their seed, in the sense of
being to them the Lord God, merciful and gracious, long-
suffering, and abundant in goodness and truth. All that
is involved in his Godhead was laid under contribution for
the promotion of their weal, so far as promoting that weal
was consistent with their moral state on the one hand, and
his wide oecumenical relations on the other. But within
the circle which embraced the divinely beneficent influences
which were made to converge upon the Jews, there was an
inner circle. And there was also a circle beyond. In the
inner circle God was and is, in an emphatic sense, the God
of Abraham and of Abraham's spiritual seed, — the God of
believers of the Gospel, — the God of the good. These
enjoyed and enjoy his selectest influences — his richest
blessings. (Want wat grooter, wat uitnemender goed lean
'er boven dit genoemt worden, als dat God hem tot een God
zij : want dit moet van even soo veel kragt zijn, als dat God,
al wat dat 'er is en zijn kan, tot voordeel en dienst des son-
daars sal aanwenden.-Vitringd,) In the circle beyond,
God was and is the God of all flesh — of all mankind. He
is "good unto all, and his tender mercies are over all his
works." He is pouring out of the inexhaustible cornucopia
of his fulness all the blessings that are needed to make all
men blessed. If any lack, they are straitened in themselves,
not in God. There is thus, in the moral administration of
the human world, concentric circles of divine efflux and
influence. In one of those circles the Jews were situated.

ROMANS III. 29, 30. 385
And hence the Apostle recognizes, as a fact, that God was
the God of the Jews.
In asking whether " God be the God of the Jews only,"
he makes reference to imaginations of spiritual monopoly
that were too common among his Jewish brethren. They
misunderstood the intention of God regarding their situation
in the divine circle in which they lived, and moved, and
had their being. They erroneously fancied that within the
expanding sphere of blessings in which their lot had been
cast, and in which they enjoyed the presence of God as their
God, there was no room for any but themselves. Hence the
Apostle's query. Hence, too, his next query.
§ 3. Is he not, on the contrary, of Gentiles also? (ovxl
Si koi i&vwv) that is, Is he not, on the contrary, (the God)
of Gentiles also? Is it not the case that, as regards both
the outer and the inner circles of blessings, God is the God
of Gentiles also? Are not the resources of God thrown open
to all Gentiles, and made available, so far as their own moral
receptivity will admit? Are not these same resources
lavished, without stint on the one hand or partiality on
the other, upon all such Gentiles as, through faith, have
their moral receptivity enlarged? Such is the expansion of
idea contained in the Apostle's query, and suggested by the
indefinite form of his expression ; — Gentiles, not the Gentiles.
The Apostle's eye swept, as we conceive, over the outer zone
of gracious relationship, and took cognizance of it. But its
aim was directed toward the inner zone, in which justifica
tion for everlasting life is realized.
The word which we translate Gentiles, though originally
signifying nations, (t%vy), is here, as frequently elsewhere
in the New Testament, employed to designate individuals.
In other words, the collective force of the term is merged;
and the units which constitute the collection or collections
which it originally denoted rise into view. See Matt. xx.
19; Acts xiii. 48; xiv. 2,- 5; xxi. 25; Eom. xi. 13; Gal. ii.
12; &c.
We freely translate Si, on the contrary: — " Is he not, on
the contrary, oi Gentiles also?" (ovxi Se ku\ iSviov) The
2 c

386 ROMANS III. 29, SO.
force of the expression, on the supposition that the Se is
genuine, might be thus represented: — "Is God the God of
Jews only? They are too apt to think so; but is he not also
the God of Gentiles?"
Almost all the critical editors have thrown out the Se.
Mill condemned it. He supposes it to have been spuriously
intruded, (elegantiae cau'sa). Griesbach ejected it from the
text, and has been followed by Knapp, Tittmann, Schott,
Lachmann, Tischendorf, Scholz, as also by Vater, Hahn, &c.
The great body of Uncial MSS. omit it, viz., NABCDEFGK.
It is also omitted in several quotations from the Greek
fathers. And there is nothing to represent it in the Italic
and Vulgate versions. Why, then, should it not be
banished? Fritzsche would approve of its banishment; and
so does Meyer, and Oltramare, and van Hengel, And yet
we hesitate.
The matter is, indeed, of no significance, exegetical or
doctrinal. And hence there need not be anxiety. Never
theless, the overwhelming mass of cursive manuscripts are
on the side of the Eeceived Text ; and there must doubtless
have been older manuscripts from which these cursives
copied their reading. L too has the particle. It is found
also in the texts of Theodoret, Theophylact, and OScumenius.
Tischendorf refers to Chrysostom as also supporting the
particle : but incorrectly, we presume. So far, at least, as our
edition (1723) is concerned, the authority of Chrysostom's
text is in the other scale. The particle is omitted. And
the omission was noticed* by Bengel, Wetstein, Griesbach,
Scholz, &c.
We incline, on the whole, to retain the particle, — -just
because we can scarcely conceive of its arbitrary introduction
into the text, if it was originally absent. Its presence seems
rather to cumber the liveliness of the interrogative phrase
ology. Its absence seems to leave the language tighter and
more nervous. Had the Apostle been fastidious in his use of
words: — had he aimed at that "wisdom of words" which
consists of elegance, and neatness, we can suppose that he
might not have inserted the Se. Had a rhetorician been at
his side, he might perhaps have suggested that the point of his

ROMANS III. 29, 30. 387
query would be sharpened by the omission of the particle;
and mayhap, too, the Apostle would have assented, and added
that he was a stranger and foreigner in that whole region of
things that pertains to the minutiae of the "wisdom of
words." We cannot, hence, conceive of any transcriber
studiously importing the word into the text. We can easily
conceive, on the other hand, of many a transcriber thinking
it an intrusion and an encumbrance, and therefore cancell
ing it. We would hence apply, in this case, Bengel's maxim,
proclivi dictioni praestat ardua.
Mill's idea, that the particle was surreptitiously intro
duced for the sake of elegance, seems to us to be, in its own
little world of things, a turning upside down of the entire
reality of the case. And hence, indeed, as well as on
account of the difficulty of translation, it has happened, as
a matter of fact, that many translators, who never doubted
the canonicity of the particle, have nevertheless ignored
it in their versions : — Erasmus, for instance, and Luther,
and Calvin, and Beza, and Piscator ; as also Tyndale, and
our Authorized English Version, and the old Dutch ; also
Diodati ; and the French Geneva, and Martin, Ostervald,
le Cene, Beausobre et Lenfant, &c. In consequence of the
omission of the particle in these translations, we put little
weight upon the adduction, by Tischendorf and others, of
the Vulgate, and Italic, and other versions, in support of
the reading that omits it. Neither would we, on the other
hand, attribute much significance, in defence of the particle,
to the fact that the Peshito version runs thus, — " for is God
of the Jews only, and not of the Gentiles ?"
Fritzsche says that if the particle be inserted, then we
have simply one interrogation, instead of two, — Is God of
the Jews only, but not of the Gentiles ? His idea on this
matter has been received, and is echoed, by Meyer, Baum
garten-Crusius, Maier, Oltramare, and van Hengel. But
we doubt its accuracy. For, in the first place, the yes
(vai) of the following clause would have been, — in the case
supposed, and especially when the Apostle's use of the
adverb is taken into account, and, indeed, its New Testa
ment use in general, — somewhat inappropriate,— so inap-

388 ROMANS III. 29, SO.
propriate as to have prevented, we should suppose, the
apocryphal intrusion of the connective Se. And, on the
assumption, again, that Se is not apocryphal, it would be
unlikely that the Apostle should have answered the one
complex query, — which Fritzsche puts into his mouth, and
which necessarily shades off into a merely secondary posi
tion the second member of the interrogation, — in such a
manner as to suggest, so far as the affirmative yea or yes
is concerned, that God is the God of Jews only. But,
in the second place, Fritzsche has overlooked the fact that
multitudes of editors of the text, as well as translators,
who never entertained a suspicion of the spuriousness of Si,
have nevertheless recognized the duality of queries; — as
Erasmus, for example, and Eobert Stephens, in their various
editions; and le Fevre, in his Intelligentia; and Luther,
and the other translators specified above. The same double
query is also found in the texts that were issued from
the presses of Henry Stephens (the great), of Eobert
Stephens (the second), and of Platter, and the Elzevirs,
&c, &c.
We accept, then, — though hesitatingly, — the reading of
the Textus Receptus in this case ; and yet we would con
tend for the duality of queries.
§ 4. yes, of Gentiles also, (va\, ku\ iSvwv). The Apostle,
instead of answering his first question, — Is God the God
of Jews only ? runs it on, as we have seen, into its
obverse phase, Is he not, on the contrary, the God of
Gentiles too ? and then he contents himself with answering
this second question: — Yes, yea, certainly, assuredly, — he is
the God of Gentiles also. All that is implied in the God
head of God is, according to the mind of the Apostle, on
the side of Gentiles as really as of Jews, so far as they are
morally susceptible of availing themselves of the fulness of
his essential goodness. Zinzendorf translates the affirmative
particle, without doubt, (ohne zweiffel). It is strongly
affirmative, and turns up in the Latin nae; and yet it is
interestingly connected with the English nay, and the
"Latin and Gothic ne. There is a point of things at which

ROMANS III. 29, SO. 389
affirmation and negation shake hands, as it were. When
we deny a question as a question, — when we deny, that is
to say, that a question needs to be proposed, we affirm that
the thing questioned is unquestionable.
§ 5. seeing il is one God who will justify circumcision
by faith, and uncircumcision [through faith, (iirtiirtp tig 6
Stbg og SiKaiwati irtpiTopyv ek iriartwg, Kai aKpoSvoriav Sid
ryg iriartwg). The literal translation would be, — seeing the
God who will justify circumcision by faith, and uncir
cumcision through faith, is one. The numeral adjective
one (tig) is the predicate of the proposition. The articulated
noun God (6 Stog) is the subject. The clause, who will
justify circumcision by faith, and uncircumcision through
faith, is analytically illustrative or explicative of the sub
ject. The Apostle is rendering a reason for his strong affirma
tion at the conclusion of the preceding verse. But, in
rendering it, he does not aim at a strict logical demonstra
tion. There is, indeed, a genuine syllogistic filament
running through his thoughts and words. But it is not
stiff. It is free and easy. He is taking his breath, as it
were, after his somewhat elaborate discussion, extending
from chap. i. 16 to chap. iii. 26. He is pausing and looking
back on what .he has been exhibiting and establishing.
Hence his corollary of verse 27. Hence, too, his corol
lary of verse 28 ; and hence, too, his corollary of verses
29, 30.
§ 6. It is remarkable that, in many editions of the New
Testament, either a full point or a colon is interposed
between verses,29th and 30th. Before the versicular division
by Eobert Stephens, a full point was inserted by Erasmus.
It is found, too, in Platter's edition of 1540, and in Froben's
of 1545. Eobert Stephens contented himself with a colon in
his 1549 and 1550 editions. But in his versiculated edition
of 1551 he, too, inserts a full point, which is also found
in Henry Stephens's edition of 1587; and in all Beza's
editions ; and in the Elzevirs '; and in Maestricht's editions,

390 ROMANS III. 29, SO.
too, of 1711 and 1735 ; and in the editions of Courcelles; in
Mill also, and Wetstein, Bengel, Schoettgen; Griesbach
too, and Matthaei ; Knapp also, and Tittmann, Naebe,
Goeschen, Vater, Hahn, Muralto, Ornsby, &c. But certainly
there should be only a comma. And this is the point that
Lachmann, Fritzsche, Tischendorf, Alford, Buttmann, have
inserted, and of which- Meyer approves.
§ 7. seeing that, (iirtiirtp), — since at all events. We may
in some such way represent the force of this compound
conjunction. The Apostle's idea is substantially this, since,
as must be admitted; — since, as will be admitted, what
ever else may be denied.
There is some difficulty in determining the proper
reading. Instead of ejteiVep, HABC read t'iirtp, (if at all
events). Griesbach hesitated, — retaining, however, iirtiirtp.
Lachmann accepted eittep, and it was ultimately approved
of by de Wette. Alford, too, has accepted it. So did
Tischendorf in his 1849 edition. In his 1859 edition,
however, he has restored iirtiir Ep, which is the reading of
the Received Text, and of the great body of the cursive
manuscripts ; as also of DEFGKL, and of Chrysostom,
Theodoret, Theophylact, and OEcumenius; as likewise of
the text from which the Vulgate was made, and its
prae-Hieronymian precursors, (quoniam - quidem). The
great body of modern expositors — though Matthias is an
exception — approve of retaining eVeittep. They are right,
we apprehend; as seems to be rendered the more ap
parent when we take into account that iirtiirtp occurs
nowhere else in the New Testament, whereas e'iVep occurs
repeatedly. Some transcribers might stumble at the
unusual word. Others, who were copying at a common
bench, from the dictation of a reader, might lose the slight
initial sound iir-, — made by the simple compression of the
lips. And as that sound would be immediately followed by
the full toned -EiVsp— a familiar acquaintance to the ear of
the New Testament copyist, — we can easily suppose that its
indistinct echo might readily die away, or be altogether
unnoticed.

ROMANS III. 29, 30. 39I
§ 8. God is one, (tig 6 Sre6g).' It is in the admitted idea
of monotheism that the Apostle finds the basis of his con
fident conviction that God is the God of Gentiles as well as
of Jews. The Jews and Judaizers would not be disposed to
challenge the idea. The very first principle of the Mosaic
theocracy is thus expressed :— " Hear, 0 Israel, the Lord our
God is one Lord." (Deut. vi. 4.) "Is there a God beside
me?" asks God himself by the mouth of his prophet Isaiah;
and he answers* his own question thus ; — " Yea, there is no
God; I know not any." (Isai. xliv. 8.)
Koppe has the strange notion that a full point should be
placed after the expression, since God is one, and that the
relative pronoun which follows should be interpreted as
meaning He then. (Post Stog, punctum posui, ut argumen-
tatio finiatur. — 6'e pro ovrog ovv) Tholuck, in his first
edition, acquiesced in Koppe's notion. But such an inter
pretation of the relative is the extreme of arbitrariness ; and
the abscission of the whole relative clause is almost tanta
mount to cutting off a right hand. It involves the sacrifice
of that peculiar aspect of the unity of God which stood out
prominently to the eye of the Apostle.. Some expositors
imagine that, strictly speaking, there is no reference in the
Apostle's expression, to the monotheistic idea. They think
that the word one is " not numeral." So Sclater expresses
it. It has reference, he says, either to the divine unchange-
ableness or to the divine impartiality. Such a notion,
however, altogether fails to sound the depths of the
Apostle's reasoning. If we do not go down to the unity
of the divine substance, relatively at least to mankind,
we shall find no real basis for the impartialities of pro
vidence and propitiation. And, so far as unchangeable-
ness is concerned, — unchangeableness either of essence or of
principles of procedure, — it has nothing to do with the
Apostle's argumentation. The inspired man's thoughts
draw deeper, and have reference to the area, or extent of
sphere, within which the attribute of unchangeableness
finds scope. Is this area bounded off by the limits of the
Jews? — or does it comprehend the whole world of man
kind?

392 ROMANS III. 29, SO.
§ 9. the God who will justify circumcision by faith, and
uncircumcision through faith, (6 Stbg og SiKaiwati irtpiropf/v
ek iriartwg koi aKpo&variav Sid rTig iriartwg). The Apostle
might have said, who justifies. And so, indeed, the Vulgate
has rendered his expression, (qui justificat). Luther, too,
has given the same rendering; and Tyndale; and the authors
of our Authorized English Version; and many others besides.
Grotius defends the translation on the principle that the
future is put for the present, after the Hebrew manner, (more
Hebraeo), when continuous acts are referred to; — the He
brew language having no tense that quite corresponds with
the present in Greek, Latin, English, German, &c. Eiickert,
in his 1st edition, rested in the same explanation. In his 2nd
he interprets the. future as denoting the relation of sequence
that subsists logically between a conclusion and the premisses
from which it is deduced, (since God is one, it follows that he
justifies all in one way). Seb. Schmidt had long before
him entertained the same idea, (justiflcabit, ratione conse-
quentiae). Mehring substantially agrees. Beza, again,
thought that the Apostle was referring to the justification
that will be realized at the last day. Fritszche approved of
this idea. Tholuck, in his 4th edition, adopted the same
interpretation. In his first three editions he took no notice
of the tense. In his 5th he shifts his ground, and supposes
that the future is u,sed potentially, (God is morally able to
justify by faith both Jews and Gentiles). Hodge, again,
says that the future expresses " a permanent purpose."
We question whether any of the explanations specified hit
the nail on the head. That of S. Schmidt and Eiickert is
certainly out of the question, — as is more especially evident
when we notice that the clause in question belongs to the
subject of the proposition, and forms no part of the conclu
sion that is deduced from the unity of God. The interpre
tation of Beza, again, is utterly inadmissible, — and for this
among other reasons, that justification on the last day is
never represented in Scripture as being by faith or through
faith. Men shall then be judged according to their deeds,
" that every one may receive the things done in his body,
according to that he hath done, whether it be good or

ROMANS III. 29, 30. 393
bad." (2 Cor. v. 10; Matt. xxv. 31—46.) It is character
that will then be taken into account. (Eom. ii. 5 —
10, 13, 16.) There is, however, a filament of truth
in the idea of Grotius; and another and kindred filament
in the idea of Hodge. But the real explanation of the
peculiar tense, — the explanation into which 'the specified
filaments enter, though only as filaments that from the
, nature of the case could not well be absent, — seems to be
found in the fact that the Apostle realized that the grand
evangelistic epoch of the world's history had just been
initiated. The Propitiation had just been accomplished.
The mystery that had been from of old had just been
unfolded. The one true crusade had just been inaugurated.
The middle wall of partition had just been broken down.
The heralds of the Gospel, as bearers of good news to every
creature, had just started from the evangelic centre in
Jerusalem, and with their jubilee trumpets they were rushing
forth, radiatingly, to the outlying world. In these cir
cumstances it was natural for the Apostle to be looking
to the future, rather than to the past or to the present, for
the triumphs of the Gospel. All that was past was but pre
liminary to what was to come. And the present was to the
Apostle but the transition-point between the former sowing-
time and the reaping of those fields of the world that were
already white unto the harvest, and ready for the sickle.'
The Apostle had a profound realization of his position in the
ages. And this realization was vivid within his conscious
ness while he was penning the contents of this chapter.
Compare the " now " of verse 21st, and " this time " in verse
26th. It is of course implied in the Apostle's expression
that the series of God's justificative acts will be continuative ;
and thus Grotius's idea is realized. It is also implied that
the series will be continuative, because of God's purpose ;
and thus Hodge's idea is realized. Nevertheless, if the
triumphs of the Gospel had been mainly in the past, the
Apostle would not have employed the future tense. It is in
his conviction that they were to be mainly in the future that
we find the real key to his expression. (Respexit ad eos,
qui adhuc essent in Judaismo, seu paganismo,-Era,snms :—

394 ROMANS HI. 29, SO.
Das futurwm braucht Paulus in Absicht auf die Zeit' des
neuen Testaments, welche damals, zur Zeit Pauli, ihrem
grbssten Theil nach, noch zukiinftig ww.-Bambach.)
The Apostle says, — " who will justify circumcision " (irtpi
ropyv) and "uncircumcision," (aKpoSvort'av). Conybeare
seems to suppose that these nouns are used in their customary
abstract sense. Hence he translates the whole clause thus :
— "he will justify through faith the circumcision of the Jews,
and by their faith will he justify also the uncircumcision
of the Gentiles." So Heinfetter. But certainly the great
body of expositors are right in regarding the terms as used
concretely, — so that circumcision means circumcised (Jews)
— irtpirtrpypivovg, or irtpirpyrovg, while uncircumcision
denotes uncircumcised (Gentiles) = aKpotvarovg. (koXei Se
irtpiropyv piv rovg '\ovSaiovg, «Kpo€voriav Se to E0vr),—
Theodoret.) Comp. Eom. ii. 26; iv. 9; Gal. ii. 9; Eph. ii.
11; &c. It is probable that the abstract nouns are employed
by the Apostle to give prominence to the condition of the
individuals referred to. The circumcision of the one class
would be no recommendation in the matter of justification.
The uncircumcision of the other class would be no dis
qualification. In the sphere of things referred to, circum
cision would be no help, and uncircumcision no hindrance.
Comp. Col. iii. 11. The article is omitted because it is not
the entire circle either of the circumcised on the one hand,
or of the uncircumcised on the other, who are referred to.
In the expression, "who will justify circumcision by
faith," (ek iriartwg), the words by faith are evidently to be
connected, not with the noun circumcision, but with the
verb will justify. Wakefield, indeed, and Belsham, and
Burton, take the other alternative, — supposing that the
Apostle means " the circumcised that have faith " as Wake
field expresses it, or " the Jews who accompany circumcision
with faith," as Burton explains it, (as if the Apostle's
expression had been ryv ek iriartwg irtpiropyv or irtpiropyv
ti)v ek iriaTtwg). Tyndale took the same view of the
construction; — circumcision which is off faith. So the

ROMANS III. 29, 30. 395
English Geneva of 1557. Eosenmiiller, too, originally held
the same opinion; though he ultimately abandoned it.
Basil Cooper espoused it, and so Glockler, and Olshausen.
Mehring, too, though hesitatingly, proposes it, (as de novo).
Jowett, too, inclines toward it. Knight contends strenuously
for it. But it is a violent and utterly improbable interpreta
tion. The antithesis between the two clauses of the Apostle's
expression caps the improbability. For such is the nature
of the second clause, that it is scarcely possible to conceive
of the expression through faith as adjectively qualifying the
noun uncircumcision.
Our English phrase, by faith, is an exceedingly imperfect
rendering of the original expression, (ek iriartwg). And yet
we can scarcely say from faith or of faith, — though the
former version is given by Thomson, and the latter by the
E. Geneva. If we were to say in consequence of faith, we
should approximate very nearly to the force of the Apostle's
preposition, which brings into view outcome or result.
(Eilliet has, en consequence de la fed) But our phrase by
faith has got fixed and idiomatized; and we may hence
abide by it. The Apostle's idea is, that when God justifies
circumcised Jews, his act of justification emerges into
objective realization out of their condition of faith.
It is added — " and uncircumcision through faith," (Sid ryg
iriartwg). The article has puzzled many expositors. Vaughan
and Knight suppose that it objectifies the word faith; —
the faith, that is, the Gospel. Mehring supposes that it is
not so much its presence in the expression before us, as its
absence in the preceding expression, that requires to be
accounted for; and he accounts for that absence in the
manner already noticed; — thinking that the phrase by faith
is to be construed not with the verb will justify, but with
the noun circumcision. It is strange that he did not
perceive that, on such a hypothesis, it is the absence of the
article, in agreement with the noun circumcision, that would
require to be wondered at. The reason of the presence of
the article in the expression before us seems very evidently
to be found in the writer's intentional reference to the faith

396 ROMANS III. 29, 30.
particularized in the preceding expression. It is one of
those delicate shades of inter-relationship which cannot be
reproduced in English. Were we to translate the articulated
phrase, as Beausobre et Lenfant, Michaelis, and Wakefield
have done, through the same faith, we should, indeed, be
running on the right line of thought, as Green has perceived
(Gram. p. 300, ed. 1842), but we should also be greatly
intensifying and exaggerating the article's force. The Apostle
does no more, in his introduction of the article, than simply
turn, as it were, his finger, for a moment, by a slight and
elegant motion, in the direction of the foregoing faith. The
Peshito translator not unhappily reproduces the same
referential effect by a peculiar Syriac idiom, — the pre
liminary introduction of the pronoun, accompanied with
the preposition that is to be repeated with the noun, (Old
IZaiSbjOirD). Knight supposes that the phrase through faith qualifies
the noun uncircumcision, instead of being attributed to
the action of the verb will justify. He imagines that the
phrase uncircumcision through the faith denotes those
whose uncircumcision is " perpetuated by means of the
faith," — who are convinced by the Gospel that a change
from a state of uncircumcision to a state of circumcision is
unnecessary. The idea is good enough. But the construc
tion is like the tearing up of a tree by the root, and then
planting it again, with inverted head.
There has been great speculation among expositors in
reference to the two prepositions employed in the respective
clauses, — " by faith " — " through faith." The great body of
commentators conclude that the diversity is a mere rheto
rical variety. This was the opinion of Augustin, (non ad
aliquam differentiam dictum est, tanquam aliud sit ex
fide, et aliud per fidem ; sed ad varietatem locutionis,-De
Spir. et, Litt. cap. xxix.). It was also the opinion of
Pelagius, (ipsum est ex fide et per fidem). So Abelard,
(diversitas est locutionis, non sententiae). So Beza, Mel
ville, Grotius, Este, Day. So, too, in modern times, Klee,
Eiickert, Meyer, de Wette, Philippi, Krehl, Oltramare,

ROMANS III. 29, 30. ¦ 397
Maier, Turnbull. Hence Beausobre et Lenfant employ in
their translation the same preposition in both clauses, (la
circoncision par la foi, et le prepuce par la meme foi).
Michaelis uses the same liberty, only he gives the preference
to the Apostle's second preposition, whereas Beausobre et
Lenfant give the preference to his first, (die Juden durch
den Glauben, und die Heiden durch eben denselbigen
Glauben). Conybeare uses a greater liberty still. He
retains the two prepositions, but reverses their position: —
he will justify through faith the circumcision of the Jews,
and by their faith will he justify also the uncircumcision of
the Gentiles. Mace, again, throws out altogether the first
of the two : — who will justify both the Jews and the Gentiles
through faith. These are unwarrantable liberties on the
part of translators. They assume far too much. They
assume that there must be no difference intended, since no
difference is by them perceived. Calvin thought that the
difference was in minutiae only, — and the minutiae of form,
not of essence or of substantive thought. He imagined
that there was a touch of irony in the Apostle's remark,-
as if he had said : — If any one will have a distinction
between Gentile and Jew, let him have this, — that the
former is justified through faith and the latter by faith.
(Itaque subesse in verbis ironiam judico, acsi diceret, Si
quis vult habere differentiam Gentilis a Judaeo, hone
habeat, quod ille per fidem, hic vero ex fide, justitiam con-
sequitur) Tholuck, in his 2nd, 3rd, and 4th editions,
approved of Calvin's idea. So Stengel; and so Philippi.
Fritzsche too; — though he does not refer to Calvin, — as,
indeed, neither did Stengel, nor Tholuck in his 2nd and
3rd editions. We rather think, however, that this notion
of irony is out of harmony with the earnestness and
solemnity of the feelings that were, at the time, in a state
of tension within the Apostle's mind.
Is there, then, a distinction intended in the variety of
prepositions ? Van Hengel is certain that there is, although
he candidly confesses that he does not know how to draw'
the line. (Quomodo vero uirumque distinguendum sit,
candide me nescire fateor.) Theodore of. Mopsuestia was

398 • ROMANS III. 29, 30.
convinced that there was a difference. But he fails in
his attempt to explain it, (eVi rwv 'lovSaiwv to e k
7ri0T£fue te'3-hkev, wg dv ixdvrwv piv koi ETEpae d(j>oppag
irpbg SiKaiwaiv, oil Swapivwv Si avryg ptrixtiv irXyv ek
ryg iriartwg). Origen, too, made most ingeniously the
attempt, but failed. Aquinas, too, made the attempt, and
fails. So does Bisping, notwithstanding very considerable
confidence. Matthias is very sure that there is a wide
difference, and he toils, in page after page, to exhibit it ; —
establishing, with all his might, that " by faith '' denotes,
in some sense, the ground of justification, and "through
faith " the means ; — the former phrase being equivalent to
because they believe, (weil sie glauben), and the latter to
when or if they believe, (wenn sie glauben); — the former hav
ing reference to the reward of faithfulness to their peculiar
covenant relationship, (als Lohn ihrer Bundestreue), the
latter having no such reference ; &c. The whole effort, so
far as Matthias's treatment of the case is concerned, leads
into nothing. Manifestly, he has not got hold of the cue.
But Camerarius did get hold of it, and Wetstein, and Er.
Schmid ; and so, too, substantially, Heumann, Baumgarten-
Crusius, and Eeithmayr, and Webster and Wilkinson.
The cue is this, we apprehend : — In the first phrase, — the
one that is used in relation to Jews, — there is a latent
antithesis to the counter phrase, by works, (HZ ipywv) ; while
in the seqond phrase, — the one that is employed in relation
to Gentiles, — the latent antithesis is not unnaturally dropped,
so that room is left for a phrase which, in itself considered,
is simpler and more philosophically appropriate. The dis
tinction, indeed, is not to be too much made of. It is not
to be very much made of. It must not be inflated on the
one hand, or squeezed on the other. The idea must not be
taken up that the Apostle could not have reversed the
position of the prepositions. He evidently could, without
committing any real phraseological or theological impro
priety. Jews are justified through faith just as truly as
Gentiles are. (See Gal. ii. 16.) And Gentiles are justified
by faith, ov in consequence of faith, or out of faith, just as
truly as Jews are. (See Gal. iii. 8.) The. denial of this

ROMANS III. 29, SO. 399
reciprocity of possibility is fatal to Matthias's theory- of
explication, and to that of Bisping. Nevertheless, while*if
would be wrong to make a great deal of the distinction,
or to fancj- that important theological conclusions lie couch
ing in it, — it is easy enough to see that there was propriety
in the variation of phrase, and, in addition, a beautiful
suggestiveness. In speaking of the relation of works to justification, the
Apostle never uses the expression — through works, (Si ipywv).
His expression is invariably by works, out of works, (i% ip
ywv). Comp. Eom. iii. 20 ; iv. 2 ; Gal. ii. 16 ; iii. 10 ; &c.
There is a reason for this fact. Works were regarded by
the Jews as the true meritorious cause or meritorious source
of salvation, and ' not merely as an adjunctive condition.
So deeply was this prejudice rooted in their minds, that
most of them, we presume, would have been ready to admit
that faith in the Messiah might be necessary, as an adjunc
tive condition, provided always that their favourite works
were allowed to be the true meritorious cause or source.
It was, we apprehend, in direct antithesis to this notion
that the Apostle said, by faith, out of faith, in consequence
of faith. Not that he meant that the act of faith is the
meritorious cause of justification. (Jaspis, Goeschen, Schott,
Fritzsche, are unhappy in their translation, when they
render the Apostle's phrase, propter fidem, on account of
faith.) But he meant that the meritorious cause or source
of justification was to be looked for in the direction of faith
as distinguished from works. It was really in faith's object,
— the propitiation of the Messiah. And it was when that
object was apprehended by the act of faith, that the act of
justification emerged into realization. When, therefore, no
direct antithesis is intended to the idea that is expressed by
the phrase by works, or out of works, it is simpler and more
philosophical to say through faith, that is, by the inter-
mediacy, on the part of man, of the act of faith. The
Apostle, hence, having completed in the first clause of his
expression his antithetic representation, drops it in his
second clause, and employs the simplef and more philosophic
expression.

400 ROMANS III. 29, SO.
It is easy to see the reason why the nouns circumcision
'and uncircumcision precede the phrases by faith and
through faith. The emphasis of idea lies on them, and not
vice versa : and hence it was befitting that they should be
betoned. § 10. We are now in a position to turn back to the com
mencement of these two verses, and to consider the force of the
initial y. Luther, and, after him, the German translators, in
general, translate it disjunctively, or (oder). So Piscator,
Eeitz, Heumann, Bengel, Michaelis, Brentano, Stolz,
Schrader, &c. But not Zinzendorf. Cocceius and Vitringa
coincide with Luther, (aut, of). So do the greater portion
of the modern German critics; and, of the Dutch, Greve,
Bosveld, van Hengel, Vinke. So, too, of the French,
Oltramare and Eilliet, (ou). Our English translators, on
the other hand, from Tyndale downward, almost unani
mously, leave the particle untranslated. Worsley, however,
and Dewes are exceptions. Conybeare too. Diodati left it
untranslated. So, too, the French Geneva, following Cal
vin's French version. So Martin, Ostervald", Beausobre et
Lenfant, and le Cene. So, too, the Dutch translators, old
and new. The force of the particle seemed to these trans
lators to be absorbed in the interrogatory essence of the
expression. The same idea seems to have been entertained
by the authors of the old Latin versions, inclusive of
the Vulgate ; for they render the particle by the Latin an.
So, too, in modern times, le Fevre, in his version ; Erasmus,
in his ; Beza, in his ; and Castellio, Arias Montanus, and
Erasmus Schmid, in theirs, &c. Seb. Schmidt gives num in
his. Theodoret, as we have already mentioned (§1), omits
the -particle from his text. And the other Greek expositors
make no use of it as a disjunctive.
We think that the Greek fathers are right ; and that the
Vulgate is right in its translation : and that our English
translators are right too, in allowing the particle's force to
express and exhaust itself in the interrogation. Moses
Stuart was of the sanle opinion ; but when he said that "an
interrogation made by y supposes that the person who is

ROMANS III. 29, SO. 401
addressed will agree in the answer with the person who
puts the question; so nicely are the Greek interrogative
signs adjusted," — -he lost sight entirely of the real func
tion of the particle. The particle is ambidextrous, — and
neither grasping you with the right hand nor repelling you
with the left. It always implies an alternative : and to this
extent the great body of the critics who follow Luther are
justified in assigning to it a disjunctive import. But they
are wrong, we apprehend, when they assume that, in the
case before us, it is the second alternative that is referred to,
and that hence the particle should be rendered or. When
the two alternatives of thought are explicitly specified,
they may be respectively introduced by the repeated
particle, (rj — y) ; and the particle may thus, in the first
instance, be- rendered whether, and in the second, or. Very
often, however^ the one or the other of the alternatives is
implicit only, and not explicit. If it be the first that is
unexpressed, we may then employ or to render the y of the
second. But • if it be the second that is suppressed or
metamorphosed, it would be leading ourselves astray to
render the solitary y by the disjunctive or, as Luther has
done in the case before us. Its force in such cases is infused
entirely into the interrogation as an interrogation, — which
carries, nevertheless, more or less distinctly in its bosom
the notion of an alternative.
The critics who have followed in the wake of Luther's
version have perplexed themselves to discover the first
and latent alternative in the case before us. Some think
that it is wound up and concealed in the word man in verse
28th :— Am I right in saying man, and not Jew ? or is
God the God of Jews only ? Others, and these in greater
numbers, suppose that it is wound up and concealed in the
28th verse viewed as a whole : — Is it the case that it is by
faith, without works of law, that men are justified ? or is
God the God of Jews only ? He is not the God of Jews
only; and hence it cannot be the case that men are justified
by works of law, for the law was given to Jews only: and
thus it follows that it must be by faith that men are
justified. Such is the apagogic argument supposed, Oltra^
2D

402 ROMANS III. 29, 30.
mare, again, imagines that the first alternative is found in
the 27th verse: — Where is boasting then? It is excluded,
is it not ? or is God the God of the Jews only ?
But all of these attempts to bring to light the invisible
alternative fail. For, as to the first, the word man in verse
28th is not the emphatic term of the proposition. As to
the second, the idea that justification might be by works of
law, if God were the God of Jews only, is not consistent
with Pauline theology, or any true theology whatsoever.
The Apostle has shown, most emphatically and convincingly,
that " no flesh can be justified by works of law," (ver. 20).
As to the third, Oltramare has to go too far back for his
alternative; and he has, moreover, in addition to his too
lengthened retrogression, to assume that we must read for
(ydp) instead of then (ovv) in verse 28th.
The alternative in the Apostle's query looks, we appre
hend, forward instead of backward for its complementary
antithesis. It is found in the second clause of the verse : —
Is he not the God of Gentiles also ? Had the antithesis
been stated in regular form, the two queries would have run
thus : — Is God the God of Jews only ? or of Gentiles also ?
(y 'lovSaiwv b Stbg povov ; y koi eS-vwv ;) But the im
petuous Apostle, in handling a subject so very clear, seems,
as it were, to have been impatient of remaining in the
purely deliberative mood for so long a time as was required
to complete the balance of competing alternatives. And
hence, abandoning the merely deliberative appeal, he, in the
second clause, assumes that all needful deliberation is ended,
and that decision has been reached, — " Is he not the God of
Gentiles also?"
In other circumstances still, there might have been no
second query expressed at all. And then, as in Eom. vi. 2 ;
vii. 1 ; &c, we should have been left to our own resources to
supply the implied alternative ; and it could always be
easily supplied in some such way as the following : — Is God
the God of Jews only ? or is he not ?
It does not fall within our scope to theorize regarding
the primary force or radical import of the interrogative
y. The variety of ideas expressed in Greek by this par-

ROMANS III. 31. 403
ticular vowel-sound, in isolation, is proof of a convergence
of lines from a variety of points in that extended circum
ference of speech out of which arose the full and normal
development of Greek. The y of the substantive verb
seems to be far removed in origin from y, the comparative
conjunction. _ And the relation of y, the ' comparative con
junction, to 7i, the adverb, and y, the interrogative conjunc
tion, opens up a wide field for philological speculation on
the inter-relation of the elements (the aroixtia) of language.
So far as the interrogative is concerned, we query with our
selves whether or not it be not a remnant of primitive and
inarticulate speech, such as remains in our kindred English
eh ? — a wide-spread interrogative sound, found in its perfec
tion among the barbarous tribes about Sierra Leone on the
west coast of Africa.
It is more within our sphere to state, or rather to repeat/
that we regard the Apostle to be uttering a succession of
compacted apophthegms in the five concluding verses of the
chapter. Verse 27th is one, and self-contained. The
Apostle pauses when he completes it. He, as it were, takes
his breath ; and then he utters the corollary -apophthegm
of verse 28th. He again takes his breath; and then he
gives expression to the corollary-apophthegm of verses 29th
and 30th. He pauses once more for a moment; and then
gives utterance to the grand corollary-apophthegm of verse
31st. These corollary-apophthegms are all distinct. Yet
they are all closely connected. They are strung, like beads,
together. They form a finely beaded corolla, crowning the
preceding discussion, and sparkling, as with the light of
inestimably precious gems, upon the forehead of apostolic
thought.

Ver. 31. Nof&oj' ovv zarapyovpjsv ha, rrjg wiereag;
M.rj yivoiro' aXXd vopov iardvopjsv.
Eng. Auth. Vers. Do we then make void the law through
faith ? God forbid : yea, we establish the law.

404 ROMANS III. 31.
Revised Version. Do we then abolish law through faith ?
Far be it. On the contrary we establish law.
§1. This is the concluding corollary of the cluster. It
has been all along a favourite with those students of Bible
truth who have been desirous that the element of purity
or sanctification should not be overlaid, in man's representa
tions of God's evangelical scheme, by the element of pardon
or justification. This passage, says Melancthon, teaches us
how to interpret all other passages that speak of works
and law. (Hic locus docet nos interpretari omnia dicta de
operibus et lege. Comment, in loc.)
§ 2. The apophthegm is, as Melancthon and many other
expositors remark, an occupatio. " The words have in
them," says Sclater, " a preoccupation." They anticipate an
objection which many might be ready to start. (Ipse sibi,
quod ab alio aliquo proponi posset, obtendit.-Ovigen)
Jewish and Judaizing critics, especially, would, in many
cases, be forward to insinuate or assert that the Apostle's
doctrine regarding the method of justification amounted to
the abrogation of law.
§ 3. Note the inferential then, (ovv). It " glints " on the
apophthegm in verse 28th, — " We reckon, then, that a man
is justified by faith without works of law; " and thence it
gleams backward on the general scope of the preceding
discussion, alighting more particularly on those hill-tops of
thought that rise conspicuous in verses 22nd and 20th.
The Apostle, as it were, says, Since it is the case that we
do maintain that justification is through faith, without
works of law, does it follow that we do away with laiv
altogether? § 4. Do we abolish law ? (Nopov Karapyovptv ;) The verb
employed by the Apostle, — a favourite with him, though
with no other writer known, — is not easily reproduced in
translation. This difficulty is evidenced by the remarkable
multiplicity of renderings which the word has received

ROMANS III. 31. 405
in our English Authorized Version. It is rendered to make
without effect, to make of none effect, to make void, to bring
to nought, to put down, to do away, to put away, to
maJce to cease, to make to fail, to make to vanish away,
to hose, to deliver, to abolish, to destroy. In addition
to the acknowledged epistles of Paul, it occurs once in
Hebrews ii. 14, where it is translated to destroy. It occurs
in one other passage of the New Testament, Luke xiii. 7,
where it is rendered to cumber. It occurs in the Septua
gint only four times, and all the four instances are found in
one book, in Ezra, (iv. 21, 23 ; v. 5 ; vi. 8). In these Sep
tuagintal passages the word has very nearly its primitive
etymological meaning, to throw idle. It is used in reference
to the rebuilders of Jerusalem. In Luke xiii. 7 the word
has a corresponding meaning, — Why cumbereth it (KarapytT)
the ground? — Why should such a tree be allowed to make the
ground idle (so far as fruit-bearing is concerned)\ In the
Phoenissae of Euripides, 765, —one of the few classical
passages in which the word occurs, — its etymological import
is also preserved, — But I go, thai we may not be idle handed,
(aXX' tip', birwg dv py Karapywptv xipf^r^hat we may not
maJce tlie hand idle. It is well, when considering the very
various branches of application into which the word develops
itself, as it grows and expands in the soil of the Apostle's
mind, to keep in view their connection with the stem-idea.
Even when he prophesies that the time will come when
" prophecies shall fail," the idea is that by and by prophecies
shall have no more work to perform. They shall not require
to utter themselves, in their oWn peculiar way, in the ears of
men. When death is represented by him as abolished by
Christ, the idea really is, that death is thrown idle, — having
got no more work to do. When "the body of sin" is said by
him to be destroyed, the meaning is, that it is rendered
inactive. Even when believers are represented as delivered
from the law, (karypyySyptv d,irb tov vopov), the idea is, that,
so far as concerns the right of the law to set -them to work
for life, they are thrown idle. The law has no more author
ity to say to them, Do this, or die. It does continue to say,
Do this; but it does not say, Do this,or die, — Do this,and live.

406 ROMANS III. 31.
When, in this 3rd chapter of Eomans, verse 3rd, the question
is put,—" shall their unbelief make the faithfulness of God
to fail?" the meaning, at bottom, is, "shall their unbelief
throw idle God's faithfulness," — so that God's faithfulness
to his promises shall have nothing henceforth to do ? And
so, in the passage before us, the question really is, — Do we
throw law idle 2 do we deprive it of its work ? that is, do we
make it a dead letter ? do we nullify it ? do we abolish it ?
— do we upset it? The Vulgate has it rather too strongly,
"Do we destroy?" (destruimus ?), or as Wycliffe gives it,
" distrien we ? "
The Apostle does, not refer to legislative action. His
meaning is not, — Do we, by legislative action, repeal law?
And when, in the 2nd member of the verse, he says, " Far
be it ! — we establish law" his meaning is not, that law is
established by some new legislative enactment. There was
no occasion, in the divine moral government, for additional
legislative action in the sphere of things referred to. And
even though there had been, the Apostle would never, when
speaking of such action, have said, " Do we abrogate law ?
Nay : but we establish it."
The reference of the Apostle's expressions is entirely to
moral influence, as involved in evangelical teaching or
doctrine. Hence it is that his interrogation is introduced
as a corollary from the preceding discussion, — " Do we then
throw law idle ? " — " do we then upset law ? " Hence, too,
the self-consciousness that is expressed in the query ,— self-
consciousness in the direction of efficient agency, — "Do
we then upset law?" — we, who preach and promote the
Gospel of salvation, — the good news of propitiation, and of
the consequent attainability of gratuitous justification by
faith in the Great Propitiator? The force of the Apostle's
query is this: — "Do we, preachers of the Gospel, introduce
" a doctrine which involves a species of moral lawlessness? —
" Do we take off the reins of moral restraint ? — Do we para-
" lyze the moral power of divine law ? — Is it a legitimate
" inference from our doctrine, that law is thrown idle, and has
" got nothing more to do? — Is it involved in the glad tidings
" which we preach, that licentiousness may be indulged in

ROMANS III. 31. 407
" with impunity ? " — Such ideas were supposed by some to
be inseparable from the doctrine of justification by faith
without works of law. Hence the Apostle's subsequent
query — "Shall we continue in sin, that grace may abound?"
(Eom. vi. 1.) Hence, indeed, much of his profound and
glorious discussion in chapters vi., vii., viii. Hence, too,
the theory and the practice that characterized such com
munities of self-deceivers as sprang up sporadically toward
the left hand of Christianity, — under the name of Nicolai-
tanes, &c. Hence, too, the protest which James, in the
second chapter of his epistle, lifts up against the abuse of
the evangelic doctrine, — a protest in which he reminds
the church that there is another phase of justification
besides that which is by faith alone, — a phase which Paul
never intended to deny, or dispute, or ignore. His question
here, indeed, looks entirely in the same direction with the
representations of James: — Do we then upset law (in its
moral influence upon manners within, and manners
without) ?
Law, (vopov). What law? Expositors have differed; and
many have felt perplexed. Theodoret seems to have sup
posed that the word denotes the Old Testament Scriptures.
He explains it, at all events, as meaning the law and the
prophets. Semler, in modern times, takes the same view,
decidedly, (ipsis Judaeorum lih-is). Eosenmiiller began
by awarding the preference to the same view: and he got
confirmed in it as he went on with his subsequent editions.
Koppe, too, decided for it (oracula V. T. quaelibet), and
Bolten (die Schrift), and Morus, and Flatt, and Moses
Stuart. De Wette began his career with the same idea,
(das A. T); but he abandoned the interpretation in his
2nd edition, and persisted in the abandonment. Tholuck,
on the other hand, started from a different standpoint, and
with a different interpretation ; but in his 2nd and 3rd, as
also in his 4th and 5th, editions, he accorded the preference
to this. These critics generally suppose that there is in the
Apostle's query, or at all events in his answer to it, the
echo of the statement that he makes in the 21st verse —
"attested bv the law and the prophets." And they

498 ROMANS III. 31.
suppose, too, that in the succeeding chapter the Apostle
proceeds to unfold his idea, and to show in detail that
his doctrine was really in harmony with the Old Testa
ment Scriptures. The interpretation is, — in its sharply-
outlined definitiveness at least, — untenable. For, — not to
insist that, on the hypothesis of its correctness, we should
have expected the word law to be articulated, — there
is nothing in the preceding discourse which could give a
handle to the objection that is anticipated. Everything
the reverse. The Apostle everywhere grounds his doctrines
on the Old Testament Scriptures, and nowhere uses any
expression that could be construed into apparent opposition
to the Word of God. And, again, he does not proceed in
the 4th chapter to show that his doctrine establishes the Old
Testament Scriptures. It is his aim, on the other hand, to
prove that the Old Testament Scriptures establish his doctrine,
— a very different idea, — the contrary, indeed, of the former.
Other interpreters suppose that the Apostle has in view
what they call the Jewish law, as such. They mean by this
Jewish law that system of ordinances — divinely revealed in
the Old Testament Scriptures — which was binding on the
Jews as Jews, during the currency of their peculiar
dispensation. This was the opinion of Dionysius a Eyckel
and de Lyra, who say that, as the Mosaic law culminated
in the Gospel, it was not abolished or destroyed, but only
developed, fulfilled, perfected, and thus confirmed. Erasmus
took the same view, (Neque enim id aboletur, quod in
meliorem reparatur statum, non magis quam si defluen-
tibus arborum floribus succedat fructus, aut umbrae
succedat corpus). So Michaelis, (Vermuthlich ist seine
Meinung, die Lehre vom Glauben ist nichts anders als der
Sinn des Levitischen Gesetzes). Cardinal Cajetan agreed
in the interpretation, so far as regards the reference of the
word law, though he took a different view of the aim
of the Apostle. He thought that the Apostle was showing
that the doctrine of justification by faith illuminates and
commends the whole Mosaic Institute as a system really
divine ; seeing that the Jewish law was based upon the
Gospel. The same view of the word law is taken by many

ROMANS III. 31. 409
modern expositors, although they differ widely as regards
the Apostle's intention in his query; and although, too,
it is with very varying degrees of definiteness or indefinite-
ness that the word is understood. Fritzsche thus inter
prets it, and de Wette ultimately, and Meyer, and Oltra
mare, and Alford. But it cannot be the case that the
reference of the Apostle is, sharply, to the law, as a system
of peculiar ordinances, or commandments, for the Jews, as
Jews, during the currency of their peculiar dispensation.
For, in the first place, it is not in this narrow sense that he
uses the word law in the preceding context. (Verses 28th,
21st, 20th.) In the second place, the law, in this sense,
was not established in its influence by the Apostle's teach
ing. In the third place, the laws in this sense, was old, and
ready to vanish away. It was really thrown idle, having
little or no farther work to do. And yet, in the fourth
place, it was not by the doctrine of justification through
faith that the law, in this sense, was thrown idle. It was
not by this doctrine that it had become obsolete or obso
lescent. The doctrine of justification by faith had been
one and the same from the very commencement of the
various dispensations of grace ; for,^as Cajetan truly
remarks, — " Every one who, in any age of the world, has
received the forgiveness of sins, has been characterized
either by explicit or by implicit faith in Christ," (Fides
Jesu Christi semper fuit 6xplicite vel implicite in omnibus
qui consecuti sunt remissionem peccatorum ab initio
mundi). Hence, as it was not by the doctrine of justifica
tion through faith that the Jewish law was thrown idle,
but by the advent of Him who fulfilled the prefigurative
peculiarities of the law, and who has always been, explicitly
or implicitly, the Great Object of justifying faith, we should
have expected that if the Apostle saw meet, on technical
grounds, to deny that he and his compeers were throwing
the law idle, he would nevertheless have pointed out what
it was that was really effecting the law's obsolescence.
At all events, we should not have expected that he would
have proceeded, without any reference to this, to say:—
" Far from that : we establish the law."

410 ROMANS III. 31.
A very large proportion of expositors have had no
definitely rounded conception at all of the reference of the
word law. Origen, for instance, thought that it was well
that the Apostle, instead of saying that the law is not
thrown idle, contented himself with asseverating that it was
not he who threw it idle. " The law, he thinks, was thrown
idle, but by a higher hand. Ere, however, he finishes his
exposition, he views the law as the Scriptures. To the eye
of Chrysostom, too, and of Theophylact, and Q5cumenius,
the word ¦ law was floating as in a mist. They did not dis
tinguish what was evanescent from what was permanent.
They did not observe, indeed, — at least for the time being, —
that the law is, as law, many-sided; and hence they did not
seek to find out the particular side of its. reality at which
the Apostle was looking. The same indeterminateness has
prevailed down through the ages to modern times. We find
it in Aquinas, for instance; and in Calvin too. And,
coming down to our own era, we find Baumgarten-
Crusius saying that the word law is here used in a
double sense (im Doppelsinne), as denoting both the
Mosaic law and the Holy Scriptures. Bengel, in his
day, fancied also a double sense. De Wette, and Meyer
too, while protesting that the word means the Mosaic law,
and not the Old Testament Scriptures, yet terminate their
expositions by running up to the virtual assumption that the
word must, after all, mean the Old Testament Revelation.
Bohine says that it means Judaism: Eeiche, that it means,
partly, the moral and religious Revelation underlying the
Old Testament writings, and partly the Economy founded
thereon, (die, in der Urkunde des A. T. niedergelegte, sittlich-
religibse Offenbarung, und die darauf gegrundete Verf as-
sung). ¦ We need not specify other phases of opinion.
The word must be viewed, we apprehend, from a some
what different stand-point. It has reference, we suppose, to
that particular phase of the Divine Instruction, (nninn),
authoritatively vouchsafed to men, (vbpog), which exhibits
the duty of man as man. This is the fundamental element
of the entire body of the various Eevelations that God has
made of Himself in connection with mankind. It is hence,

ROMANS III. 31. 411
and emphatically, the fundamental element of that verbal
Eevelation which God has made of Himself in the Holy
Scriptures. It is hence, too, the fundamental element of that
portion of the verbal Eevelation that constitutes the Old
Testament Eevelation. It is hence, also, the fundamental
element of the oldest portion of the Old Testament Eevela
tion, — the Law of Moses in particular. It is, also, the
fundamental element of all the divine Eevelations that
historically preceded the giving of the law of Moses. It
is, likewise, the fundamental element of that inner law
that is uttering its imperative in every man's reason and
conscience. It is, in short, the law of laws. It is the law,
by way of eminence. It is law " par excellence." Nothing
else can be legitimated as law to man, that does not spring
up from it, or lean down and rest upon it.
It is to law, viewed in this its fundamental element, that
reference is made in verse 20th, verse 21st, and verse 28th.
And it is doubtless to the same fundamental element of law
that reference is here made. The Apostle, in short, looks to
the innermost of the concentric rings of the whole complex
body of divine Eevelations. He looks past that mere ex
ternal and circumferential sphere that exhibited the duty of
Jews as Jews ; and he fixes his attention on the sphere that
exhibits the duty of man as man. This sphere of things he
found in the Jewish Institutions and Books. But not
there only. He found it likewise in all men's minds. He
might have called it, the law. But he chooses to use the
unarticulated expression, law. And, as our English idiom
admits, equally with the Greek, of both phases of represen
tation, there is no reason why we should, with Alford and
others, render the word more definitive than we find it, —
the law. Still less, however, is there good reason to intro
duce, with Vaughan, the indifferently indeterminate, yet
individualizing article, — a law.
The reason why the Apostle makes reference to that
fundamental element of all divine Eevelation toward men,
— the moral law,— is evident. His doctrine of "justification
through faith, without works of law" was liable to be-
misunderstood, as if it involved the idea of a virtual abro-

412 ROMANS III. 31.
gation of the authority of moral law. It has, in fact,— as
witness all the phases of antinomianism, — been frequently
so misunderstood. Hence the occupatio :—' Do we then
make law inoperative ? " — Is moral law deprived of its
proper sphere of operation? — May men, or, at all events,
may believing men, live without regarding the injunctions
of moral law ?
Augustin takes this view of the word law, (De Spir-. et
Litt. cap. xxx.) ; and in full agreement with his view is the
leading element of the interpretations of Melancthon, Mel
ville, Este, Philippi, Krehl, Umbreit, &c. In some of these,
as in the interpretation of Calvin and many others, there is
a want of definiteness and fixity, resulting, we presume, from
a feeling of uncertainty. But the main aim of all the
expositors specified is in the direction stated. Bishop
Middleton, too, aimed in the same direction, when he says
that the word denotes moral obedience. For, though the
form of his thought is, indeed, a strange inversion of the
natural pyramid of idea represented by the term law, yet
the substance of his meaning is theologically and exegeti-
cally correct.
§ 5. through faith ? (Sid ryg iriartwg ;)— through the faith
already referred to : but not, as Vaughan would have it,
through the Gospel. Do we upset law by that peculiarity
of our great evangelical doctrine which consists in the idea
that justification is through faith, without works of law?
The expression through faith does not of itself mean
through tlie doctrine of faith; and yet the Apostle is certainly
referring to the place that faith holds in his doctrine.
§ 6. Far be it, (py yivoiro). That be far from us ! (A
nobis tanta impietas procul /-Mussus.) See on verse 3rd.
He repels the idea with intensity of dislike. He, as it
were, intimates that he could never be a party to the pro
mulgation of any such doctrine. He could not for a
moment engage in preaching and promoting any doctrine
'that had bound up in it, as a legitimate involution, the
subversion of moral law.

ROMANS III. 31. 413
§ 7. On the contrary, we establish law, (dXXd vopov
iardvoptv). There is some diversity of reading, as re
gards the form of the verb. — In the Eeceived Text its
form is iarwptv,— a reading that has the support of E K L
and the great body of cursive manuscripts. It occurs also
in the texts, as we have them, of Chrysostom, Theodoret,
CEcumenius, and Theophylact. 'Io-ravousv, again, is the
reading of N A B C F. It is supported, too, by D, which has
7rEpioravo;U£v ; and by G, which has ardvoptv at the begin
ning of a line. It is found, likewise, in Origen's Commen
tary on John, torn. xiii. 17; as also in Cyril of Alexandria,
and Procopius, and Damascene. It is a matter of no exe
getical significance which of the two readings should be
preferred. Both of them are the indicative plural of un
usual forms of the verb 'iarypt, — the one belonging to iardw,
the other to to-raviu. There is a preponderance of old
diplomatic authority for iardvoptv ; and the employment of
that form, — not in the current text, — so liable to be tin
kered, — but in an incidental quotation, by Origen, lends
very considerable weight to the probability of its canon-
icity. Fritzsche decides for iarwptv, on the ground of
euphoniousness at the conclusion of the sentence, and of
rhythmical relationship to Karapyovptv in the preceding
member of the verse. Oltramare agrees with him. Phi
lippi, too, acquiesces. And Wordsworth regards his opinion
as " entitled to consideration." We rather think, however,
that the obvious euphoniousness of iarCoptv affords pre
sumptive , evidence that Eeaders and Transcribers would
not readily have substituted iardvoptv in its place, if they
had found iarwptv ih their codices. But if, on the other
hand, they found iardvoptv, we can easily conceive that
some would have but little scruple in exchanging it for
the full-toned iarwptv, more especially when they reflected
that they did not thereby introduce a different word,
but only a different and more melodious form of the
word that was before them. Griesbach, Knapp, Schott,
and Scholz, retain iarwptv. Lachmann and Tischendorf,
Hahn and Alford, give iardvoptv. Meyer and van Hengel
approve.

414 ROMANS III. 31.
Bohme, — reading, as he did, iarwptv, — throws out the con
jecture that perhaps the word was the subjunctive of the
common form of the verb ; — let us establish. He adds, how
ever, that he does not know of any author who had taken
that view; and he does not press his conjecture. Fritzsche
misrepresents him in this matter, (Pelagius et Boehme
iarwptv conjunctivum esse putant). Baumgarten-Crusius
misrepresents Paulus in the same matter. He says that
Paulus regarded the verb as being in the subjunctive mood.
But this is not the case. It is, however, the case that in
one of the expositions given under the name of Pelagius
this interpretation of the word is assumed, (stare faciamus).
Of course, it is an untenable interpretation, — being incon
sistent with the reading iardvoptv on the one hand, and
with the mood of mind on the other in which the Apostle
was when composing the paragraph before us. He was not
in the mood of an exhorter, but in that of a systematizer or
system-builder. What does he mean when he says, — we establish law ?
Tyndale translates the verb we mayntayne. It is too feeble
a rendering; unless we were to suppose that the Apostle
was simply discharging the function of an advocate. And
this supposition would be far from the real state of the case.
Matthias proposes to translate the word, we let stand, (lassen
wir stehen). But this is feebler still, and quite aside, at once
from the natural import of the verb and from the grand
moral aim of the Apostle. Zinzendorf translates it, we make
to stand (wir machens stehen), — a far better rendering, and
quite in harmony with the naturally causative import of the
word. It is not, however, sufficiently idiomatic. Luther
renders it, we set up (wir richten das Gezetz auf), — also a
just and good rendering; for, although it does imply, as
Matthias objectingly remarks, that law had fallen, and was
lying prostrate, yet the implication, when properly under
stood, is consonant at once with the matter of fact in the
case assumed, and with the Apostle's representation of the
case. Chrysostom long before had remarked that the
Apostle's expression implies that the law was not standing,
(aiirb ydp to tlirtiv, iarwptv, 'iSti^tv ovx' iarwra). It implies,

ROMANS III. SI. 415
says Theophylact, that the law was lying, (Sid Si' rairyg nig
Xi^twg SuKvvaiv avrov Ktiptvov).
The law, indeed, had not fallen, and was not, lying pros
trate, so far as its legislative validity and authority were con
cerned. In the sphere of legislative validity and authority
its position was the same that it had been from the beginning,
and will be to the end. Tt was stable as the throne of God
Himself. But when the law is contemplated in a lower-
sphere, — the sphere in which it comes into contact with
human volition, — the sphere consequently of its actual or fac
tual moral influence upon the inner and outer life of man,
we see that there is a sense in which it has been, with
awful impiety, not only pushed aside, but overturned and
trampled under foot. It has been upset. It has been over
thrown, and laid prostrate as in the dust. - Nay, it has been
broken. And men, in their infatuation, have danced deliri
ously over its fragments. Such is sin. There is insult iu
it, in reference to the law and the authority of the Lawgiver.
This is solemn matter of fact. And the Apostle was
thinking of it; as is evident from the scope of the entire
preceding part of the Epistle.
Now, his doctrine of justification by faith in the propiti
ation of Christ not only meets the wants of men in the
direction of pardon for the past; it also meets their wants
in the direction of purity for the future. It involves pro
vision for the establishment of the moral influence of moral
law. Into whatever soul it finds an entrance, — in that soul
- it raises up, as from the dust, the prostrate law, and makes
it stand. It sets-up that which was up-set by sin. It
establishes, in the sphere of the soul's inner and outer
activities, an ethical influence, which is really, — when we
let down our line into the depths of the subject,- — nothing
more, nor less, nor else, than the native moral influence of
tjie moral law. There is a point of unity whence both pro
pitiation and legislation respectively start, and whither
they return.
Luther's translation is thus perfectly legitimate. It has
been accepted by Michaelis, and ultimately by Stolz. But
establish — a kindred rendering — is still better. It is

416 ROMANS III. 31,
Wycliffe's version, (we stablischen). . It is given, too, by
Erasmus, (stabilimus) ; and accepted by Calvin, Beza,
Piscator (bestatigen) ; by the English Geneva too, and also
the French Geneva (establissons); by Diodati, likewise,
(stabiliamo) ; and by Felbinger, Eeitz, Bengel, Struensee,
Bolten, Brentano, van Ess, Kistemaker, &c, among the
German translators; also by En Schmid, and Seb. Sehmidt,
and Schott (ultimately). The Dutch translations are
equivalent, (old, — verstercken: new, bevestigen). And so
Schrader, (stelle ich fest). The Apostle's doctrine of justifi-
tion by faith establishes the ethical influence and authority
of law, viz., in the souls of believers.
How? The Apostle explains the how at considerable
length in chapters vi., vii., viii. Here he contents himself
with simply asseverating, as in one intense flash of light, the
fact that the influence of law is established by the influence
of faith. He contents himself with this, — for he was
touching off, in rapid succession, gleams of corollaries; and
he was in haste, when done with them, to carry his readers
into another part of his great discussion on the method of
justification, (chap. iv.).
It is lawful, however, for the expositor to anticipate a
little. How, then, does the doctrine of justification by faith
in Jesus Christ involve the establishment of a right ethical
influence, — the influence of law, — within the believer's soul?
Commentators give manifold answers, — some in lines of
thought that certainly run up to the centre of the reality,
others in lines that diverge and lose themselves in surround
ing chaos or nonentity. There is room for variety and com
plexity of representation. For the Apostle's idea- on the
subject does not confine itself to a single line. It expands
into a sphere, filled with multitudinous lines, — but lines that,
instead of running zigzag into tanglement and confusion, go
in, from every point of the superficies, harmoniously and
convergingly, to the centre of the believer's experience.
In that centre we find the realization of the fundamental
principle of all stable society among moral beings, — love.
It is love that binds man to man, and men to God, — and
God to men. Love is the bond of the moral universe. It is

ROMANS III. SI. 417
in the possibility of the perfection of love, that there is the
possibility of perfect union and communion. It is hence the
case that love is the mightiest of all motive powers in the
sphere of things moral. Eemove love, and thought would
be for ever inert for want of motive power. Suppose the
non-existence of love, and in thought you have annihilated
everything of the nature of motive, not only for activity in
the moral creature, but also for creation by the Creator.
You have done more: — you have annihilated, in thought, the
very central element of infinite perfection in infinite being.
You have thus undermined the idea of God. A being who
is not moral, — a being who is not love in the centre of his
morality, — is not an infinitely perfect being. Such a being
is not, and could not be, God. It is no wonder, then, that
in the word love we find the sum and substance of moral
law. (Deut. vi. 5; Lev. xix. 18; Eom. xiii. 8 — 10; Jas. ii.
8; Matt. xxii. 37 — 40.) It-is no wonder, too, that in the fact
of God's love we find the secret of his moral power over the
hearts of his moral creatures.^ And, in the case of sinful
and prodigal and alienated moral creatures, such as men, it is
still the case that it is love only that can win them. If they
are to be won they must be wooed. It is love only that is
the morally recuperative power, — love in the form of loving-
kindness, benevolence, compassion, mercy, tender-mercy,
tender-mercies. This only is the hammer that can break in
pieces the hard heart. This only is the fire that can fuse its
inductility and obduracy. Love is the power of powers.
And it is simply because the object of justifying faith com
prehends in its bosom the most astonishing manifestation of
divine love, that it has power, when believed in, to subdue
the rebellion of the heart, that is, to re-establish the authority
of moral law within the soul. God overcomes men's evil by
his good — his love. That is the secret of the wonderful invo
lution of sanctification in justification, — of purity in pardon.
Therein, too, we see the reason of the precedence of justifica
tion and pardon in relation to sanctification and purity. "We
love him, because he first loved us," (1 John iv. 19); and
"loving Him," we love all who bear his image, and we
" keep his commandments," (1 John iv. 20 ; v. 2, 3 ; John
2 E

418 ROMANS III. 31.
xiv. 15). John Staupitz, — Luther's early spiritual adviser,
—though enveloped, like his pupil, in no little darkness,
yet saw so far as to notice this ethical sequence of things.
Hence the 10th and 19th chapters of his little book on
Love to God,, which are respectively entitled : — " Our love to
God is born out of the revelation of God's love to us."
— "He who loves God will undoubtedly keep his com
mandments." (Das Liebe in uns zu Gott wird geboren aus
der Offenbdrung der Liebe Gottes zu uns. — Der die wahre
Liebe hat zu Gott, der vollbringt unzweifenlich alle seine
Gebote) God is in Christ. And hence in Christ's love we
have God's love; and thus it is that "the love of Christ
constraineth us to live not unto ourselves, but unto him who
died for us, and who rose again." (2 Cor. v. 14, 15.) The
divine love constraineth us to love in return, and to live in
love. It constraineth us, that is to say, to aim continually
at the fulfilment of the law. There is no power in the
universe equal to love for constraining on the one side,
and restraining on the other, heart and head and hands.
Hence the experience of all Christians. Hence, too, the
marvellous power with which such words as the following
are instinct: — "God so loved the world, that he gave his
only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should
not perish, but have everlasting life." (John iii. 16.) Hence,
too, the key to the amazing devotedness of Paul: — "The
life which I now live in the flesh I live by the faith of the
Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself for me." (Gal. ii.
20.) It is love which is " the fulfilling of the law." And
this love is begotten within us by the love of God, which is
exhibited in the object of justifying faith. Thus are we to
account for the Apostle's statement, — We establish laic by
faith. Obedience to law, on our part, may be set aside, and
is set aside, in the matter of justification, — but it never
can be set aside in the matter of sanctification. It is,
indeed, — to speak scholastically, — the form, or formal cause,
of sanctification.
Augustin caught the Apostle's idea, — though he gave it
a peculiar shape, — and that not the best possible, — in repro
ducing it. "The law," he says, "is established by faith,

ROMANS III. 31. 419
because faith obtains grace whereby the law is fulfilled,"
(Lex statuitur per fidem, quia fides impetrat gratiam, qua
lex impleatur.)-De Spiritu et Litt. cap. xxx. See also his
Enarrat. in Psal. cxviii. 66; and his Sermo clvi. cap. iv.
Zuingli, too, caught the Apostle's idea, — " He," says he,
" who has faith in God through Christ will study the will
of God, and righteousness, though he will not trust to his
works for salvation." (Qui fidit deo per Christum, is
voluntati Dei et innocentiae studebit, sed non fidet suis
operibus, nee salutem aut justitium ex operibus sperabit)
Luther was not; so successful as Augustin or Zuingli. His
gloss is the following : — " Faith fulfils all law ; works fulfil
no fraction of law," (Der Glaube erfiillet alle Gesetze; die
Werke erfullen kein Titul des Gesetzes). His meaning, — if we
may judge of it at once from the gloss itself, and from his
observation on the 3rd Chapter of Eomans in his Golden
Preface, and from the expositions of some of his followers, —
almounts to this, — Faith finds in Christ the fulfilment of all
law, and it thus, by accepting Christ, honours and mag
nifies and establishes the law. " By the righteousness of
faith," says the Lutheran Hunnius, "is the law fulfilled, —
for it involves in itself the perfect fulfilment of the whole
law by Christ," (Hac ipsa justitia fidei impletur lex; cum
includat totius legis impletionem perfectam a Christo
praestitam). "How," says Hemming, "is the law estab
lished ? Christ so heals the corruption of our nature,
that by his righteousness imputed to us through faith, we
obtain the end of the law ; and because he hath fulfilled
the law for us, he is made righteousness to us." (Quomodo
igitur stabilitur lex ? Vitiositati carnis nostrae et corn-
muni corruptioni ita medetur Christus, ut ejus justitia
nobis imputata per fidem, finem legis consequamur, prop
terea quod Christus pro nobis legem implevit, foetus sit
nobis justitia.) " I therefore judge," says Sclater, " with the
best modern interpreters, that the law is thus far estab
lished by the doctrine of faith, — that the righteousness
which it requireth, quod ad materiam, is not abolished,
but rather stablished, inasmuch as what it requires, Do
this, and live, we have it in Christ by believing;— Faith

420 ROMANS III. 31.
finding in him what man cannot find in himself, — the perfect
obedience which the law enjoineth." So, too, Seb. Schmidt,
and Christian Schmid, &c. We do not wonder that such an
interpretation of the passage was not quite satisfactory to
the finer exegetical tact of Melancthon. In his first work on
the Epistle, his Annotations of 1522, he saw in the passage
a reference to the yearning of the believing soul after
newness of heart, so that the law might be obeyed. (Est
ergo Christianismus assiduus gemitus postulantis per
Christum, non imputari delictum, sed adjuvari et innovari
cor ita ut fiat Lex.) Iu his Commentary of 1540, he laid
down the two principles, (1), that without faith obedience
to the law is an impossibility; (2), that with faith obedience
to the law begins. (Teneantur ergo hae duae regulae ; —
sine fide impossibile est legem fieri ; — item, fide fit et placet
lex, fide inchoatur obedientia et placet.) In his Enarratio
of 1556 he has a long dissertation on the verse, in which,
after making some irrelevant reference to the ceremonial
law, he comes to the moral law as what is chiefly referred
to by the Apostle. That law he regards as running itself
up ultimately into identity with the eternal wisdom of
God. It is the eternal rule of righteousness that is inherent
in the nature of God. It has been revealed to rational
creatures in such a way as to demand their conformity in
character to God, and to consign to destruction all such as
will not be conformed. This eternal wisdom of God, he says,
is by no means abolished in the Gospel. How could it? It
is "established" through faith. How? He somewhat wavers
in his answer. But he specifies the three ways following: —
(1.) By the acknowledgement which faith accords of the
justice of the condemnation which the law pronounces on
sinners. (2.) By the acknowledgement, which faith accords,
that it is only through the perfect obedience of the
Mediator to the law that the remission of sins is obtained ;
thus the law, in its threatenings, is recognized as something
very different from an empty murmur, (inane murmur).
(3.) By the hope which faith inspires of perfect personal
obedience to law in heaven,- — the beginnings of which
perfect personal obedience are realized on earth. It is in

ROMANS III. SI. 421
the third of these ideas that his exposition culminates. It
is on it that he dwells. And the good old man waxes
eloquent on the subject. He deplores the imperfections
characteristic of believers on earth, (their obedientia is
valde languida et squalida); he rejoices in the prospect of
perfection in the future, (in that aeterna Academia in
which believers shall be employed for ever in studying-
the love of God and. of Christ) ; and he bursts out into
direct prayer to the Saviour to kindle in us his own light,
and to destroy all the sins and blasphemies of monks and
cynics and ungodly men.
§ 8. In consequence of not understanding the Apostle's
aim in this corollary-apophthegm, a considerable number
of critics have supposed that the 31st verse of chapter iii.,
should have been the 1st of chapter iv. So, more or less
decidedly, Eosenmuller, Bahrdt, Koppe, Oertel, Bohme,
Morus ; Eeiche too, and de Wette, Meyer, Olti-amare,
Cooper, Krehl, Maier, Matthias, Ewald. The mode, how
ever, in which the 1st verse of chapter iv. starts (Tt ovv
ipovptv k.t.X) affords abundant evidence that there was a
considerable pause in the progress of the Apostle's thoughts
just at the point that intervenes between the two chapters.
It is fortunate, therefore, that the capitular division is as
it is.

Omnipotens atque Misericors Deus, Gratias tibi dehinc
habeo, quas possum maximas, pro singulari et paterno tuo
auxilio, quo me in Epistolce hujus Illustratione hactenixs
tam clementer direxisti, adjuvisti, sublevasti. Inprimis
quod telam hanc antehac cceptam potuerim tud fretus et
adjutus gratia pertexere, nonnisi inter catenatos multiplices
labores alios, et morbi scevi ac pertinacis varios impetus
atque remoras. — Affunde e ccelesti tuo Sanctuario benedic-
tionem huic labori meo, ut redundare possit ad Gloriam
Nominis tui, ad Veritatis ceternce illustrationem et propa-
qationem, errorum, quibus Ecclesice hoc seculo ab hominibus

422 ROMANS III. 31.
contentiosis, ambitionis typho inflatis, perturbari solent,
dispulsionem, ad Juventutis studiosce multiplicem cedifica-
tionem, ad patientice in variis tentationibus atque cerumnis
consoliddtionem, vitce denique nostras totius quotidianam
emendationem et reformationem.
Da Domine, ut nos, quamdiu in hoc seculo peregrinamur,
intentos semper oculos et animos habeamus in Cynosuram
et lumen Verbi tui, quod nobis per .Sanctos Prophetas et
Apostolos tuos reliquisti, ut Lumen hoc nobis quotidie
prcelucens, diligamus, dilectum sequamur, et totos nos in
reliquo vitce nostras curricula ad ipsius splendorem et
ductu-m conformemus; donee suo tem,pore a, via ad metam
nobis prop'ositam feliciter progressi, Te non amplius in
speculo aut aenigmate cognoscamus, sed de facie ad faciem
in ccelesii Patrid contemplemur, et cum Filio tuo unigenito
Domino Nostro Jesu Christo et Spiritu Sancto Parac-
leto celebremus, sine fine accinentes myriadum myriadibus
sanctorum Angelorum: — Amen, benedictio, et gloria, et
sapientia, et gratiarum actio, et honor, et potentia, et robur
Deo nostro, in secula seculorum. Amen.
(Theodoras Zuingerus,
Infin. suae Analyt. Recensionis
Epist. ad Romanos)

BBLL AMD BAIN, PRINTERS, GLASGOW.

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