GENERAL WILLIAM HULL'S
MEMOIRS

OF

THE CAMPAIGN

or

THE NORTH WESTERN ARMY,

1812.

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MEMOIRS

OF
THE CAMPAIGN OF
THE NORTH "WESTERN ARMY
OF THE UNITED STATES, A.D. 1812.
JN A SERIES OP LETTERS ADDRESSED TO THE CITIZENS-
OF THE UNITED STATES.

WITH AN APPENDIX,
COHTAINTNG A BRIBF SKETCH OF THE REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES OP
THE.AUTHOR.

BY WILLIAM HULL,
LATE GOVERNOUR OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN, AND BRIG
ADIER GENERAL IN THE SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES.

BOSTON.
PUBLISHED BY TRUE & GREENE.

1824.

MEMOIRS
OF THE CAMPAIGN OF THE
NORTH WESTERN ARMY,
IN THE YEAR 1812.
Addressed to the People of the United Slates.

No. I.
Fellow Citizent,
When my defence before the Court Martial was publish
ed, I stated in a preface addressed to you, that it was not then
in my power to present all the documents and evidence which
related to the subject; that the proceedings were deposited in
the office of the Secretary of the department of War, and by*
law, I was entitled to a copy of them ; and as soon as they were
obtained, they should be published in separate numbers-' Until
the present time, I have not been able to obtain them.
Immediately after the trial, during the administration of Mr.
Madison, I addressed a letter to the Secretary of War, Gen.
Armstrong, requesting a certified copy. He did not think prop
er to comply with my request, or even return an answer to my
application. Lately, under the administration of President
Monroe, they have been prepared and transmitted by Mr. Cal
houn, the present Secretary, with a promptitude and'indepen11
dence becoming the character of that officer.
Although it has been a source of severe regret, that I have ri6t'
been able to make this communication at an earlier period, yet|
under all circumstances, perhaps it ought not to be considered
a misfortune. All who were then actors on the styge, will rt-

taember how violently our country was convulsed by parties,
and political dissentions. Truth itself was so^obscured by prej
udice, that it was almost impossible to make it apparent. All
easily believed what they wished to be true. Fortunately, those
inauspicious days have passed away, and with them the feelings
and prejudices which existed. The time now appears favoura
ble for calm enquiry, and I shall endeavour to redeem the
pledge which I then gave.
Having now passed the 70th year of my age, I am strongly
admonished, that this appeal will, not be prepared in a manner
so satisfactory to myself, or so acceptable to you, as it might
have been, before age had impaired my health, and necessarily
enfeebled the powers of my mind.
I shall however undertake it, with a firm reliance on your
candour, and with a confident expectation, that you will read
without prejudice, and decide with impartiality^ It -will be
written in the style of simplicity, and adorned with nothing
bat truth in its plainest garb. On an occasion so interesting t»
me, I cannot omit to express the satisfaction I feel, in appearing
before a tribunal of enlightened citizens, who in forming their
constitution, have "wisely retained the sovereign jfower, and
whose final opinion can reverse the sentence of all subordinate
authorities. With confidence, therefore, 1 shall make this -ap
peal to your candid and impartiai^judgment. *¦""
In the progress of my following numbers, I am not insensible
of the difficulties with which I have to contend. 1 am not in
sensible of the deep interest which yet exists, that the causes of
the disasters of the campaign of 1812, should remain where the
administration have attempted to place them. I am not insen
sible how hard is the task of removing the weight of oppression.
which I have so long and so unjustly sustained.
In making my statements, and adducing the documents and
evidence in proof of tnem, it will frequently be necessary to
bring into view the officers who composed the administration at
that time, the Court Martial before which I was tried, and other
distinguished characters.
In cases of this kind, fearless of any consequences to myself,
while on the one hand t shall comment with, the most perfect
freedom on their conduct — On the other, I shall endeavour to
suppress any feeling of resentment, for the injustice and per-

secution which I have experienced from them, and shall say
nothing more than is necessary for a fair exemplification of the
facts, which it will be my object to establish.
If, when this mirror is placed before them, they should discern
the truth, and be made sensible, that, by their unfounded repre
sentations, they have been the instruments of injuring an inno
cent individual, and robbing him of the character he had acquir
ed by a long course of public services, both in the cabinet and
in the field, and in this view of the subject, any compunctions
of conscience should be excited, I do not, and cannot wish them
a more thorny pillow, than will be made by their own reflections.
It is possible I deceive myself in the indulgence of the hope
that this subject will even for a moment excite your attention.
You may say, that it has been settled by the administration,'
and that that decision ought to be conclusive and final — that the
character of an individual is of little consequence, when compar
ed, with the character of the administration — and that it is not
expedient to rake open embers which have so long been cover
ed. But when you consider that my character is connected
with the events which took place, and how important it is that
the truth of those events should be preserved and handed down
to posterity, I cannot but hope, that such considerations will
be a sufficient answer to the objections, and induce you to feel
an interest in the narrative I shall present, and the evidence I
shall produce in its support; and that you will believe no means
are so powerful as truth, to. preserve the honour of the nation.
Should these expectations be disappointed, and should the
statements, with the evidence on which they are founded, not
remove the veil of prejudice from the eyes of the present genera
tion, tiie reflection of having preserved materials for the future
historians of our country, will be an ample, reward for my la
bours, and a soothing consolation during the short remnant of my
future life.
- It will be remembered, this was the first war in which our
country was engaged with a civilized nation, after the war of
the revolution, by which our independence was obtained.
It was the first experiment of your constitution, for the pre
servation of those rights, which had been acquired by the valour
and blood of the few who now survive, and of many of your Fa
thers, who rest in their tombs.

Science is increasing with such rapid progress, that there can
be no doubt, but our Country will soon produce an American
Livy or Tacitus, who, rising above the atmosphere of prejudice,
will develope the true causes of our misfortunes, as well as of
our glory_.
The first war in our country, after we became a nation, and
the first military operations in that war, whether prosperous or
disastrous, will be considered as interesting events. All the
evidence, which has any relation to them, will beeome the sub
ject of the research of such an Historian, and viewed by him
with' deep, interest.— -His own fame, as well as his country's
honour, will depend on his. strict adherence to truth, as his stand
ard, and no- motives can be presented, so powerful, as to induce
him to deviate' from it.
To aid you, my fellow citizens, in forming a correct judgment
on this portion of our history,, and to preserve for the use of
such an Historian, evidence which will be useful to him, and to
posterity, are among the objects of the following, memoirs.
They will contain the views of the administration in preparing
a1 force, previously to the declaration of war; my motives in ac
cepting the command ; the operations of the campaign, and the
causes of its disasters.
I now have the happiness to believe, I shall be able to spread
before you such evidence, and principally from the records of
the government, as will satisfy you, that the misfortunes of that
campaign ought not to rest on me.
In recollecting my former relations to my fellow citizens of
the County of Middlesex, I cannot but hope a few observations
addressed particularly to them, will be acceptably received.
Having lived in the midst of you nearly forty years ; having
by your suffrages been elected to important public offices ; hav
ing for nearly twenty years devoted my best exertions, and my
best talents to the discipline, and fame of the Sd Division of
Militia, and having experienced your kindness and friendship,
it is impossible for me to feel indifferent to your opinions.
If the mutual friendly intercourse, which so long subsisted be
tween us, is still remembered by you, and has given me any
claim to your regards ; if the manner in which I discharged the
duties of the> public offices, which I held by your suffrages, en
titled me to your approbation and confidence ; and if the for-

tunes I have since experienced, and the representations which
have been made to you, have made any unfavourable impressions
on your minds, I only ask you to read the statements 1 shall
make, and the evidence on which they are founded, and on
them form an impartial decision.
I presume I need not make an apology, for expressing my
strong desire, that a statement of the facts with the evidence,
contained in the following numbers, may be examined with At
tention, by the small remnant of the surviving officers of the
revolutionary army. — It is impossible for me to call to mind the
scenes and events of that period, without the most interesting
recollections. A remembrance, that I was your companion in
that glorious contest ; that I often fought by your sides, that
you were witnesses of my conduct, in the battles on Long Isl
and, at the White Plains, at Trenton, at Prince Town, at Sara
toga, and Bhemis's Heights, at Monmouth, at Stoney Point,
Morrissania, and on many other memorable occasions, — have
been a source of happiness and support, through all the vicisi-
tudes of fortune, which I have since been called to experience.
A recollection of the motives which animated us in that glori
ous contest-; that it was commenced by less than three millions
of people; that we have lived to see more than ten millions, in
the enjoyment of privileges and blessings, derived from it ; that
we have likewise, lived to see a great part of the civilized world,
desirous of following the example, and wishing to enjoy the
same privileges and blessings ; and that we were the followers
and associates of the illustrious Washington, and under his ban
ners, acted a part, however small, in obtaining such privileges
and blessings, for our fellow citizens ; and producing such an
example to the civilized world, must now inspire us with sensa
tions, which no language can describe, which will cheer the de
cline of life, and console the hour of death.

No. n.
Before I proceed in my narrative, and produce the docu
ments and evidence in its support, I will exhibit to your view a
general outline of the facts, which it will be my object to prove,
and which will be contained in the following numbers.

8
In the first place I shall show, that I accepted a military ap
pointment, and the command of the forces in Ohio, in time of
peace, for the purpose of protecting the inhabitants of the Ter
ritory of which I was Governor, and those ofthe North-western
frontier against the savages ; — That 1 considered the force en
trusted to my command, in time of peace with Great Britain,
when we had the free communication of Lake Erie, to obtain
the necessary supplies, sufficient for that object ; — That these
fortes being ordered nearly four months before the declaration
of war, and there being strong indications that it would take
place, I communicated to the government my views, in an event
of that kind ; — That these official communications were made
both before and after 1 accepted this command ; — That in the
event I have mentioned, I stated in the most explicit manner,.
that a naval force, sufficient to command Lake Erie, would be
indispensably necessary, and essential to success ; — That without
such a force, an army could not be supported at Detroit, and that
that place, Michillimackinack and Chicago, must necessarily fall
into the hands of the enemy. — And if it were the intention of
the Government, that hostilities should be commenced from that
quarter against Upper Canada, it would be indispensably neces
sary, besides the co-operation of a naval force, to provide an
army on the Niagara river to assist and to co-operate with the
Army at Detroit. That these communications, having been re
ceived as official communications, I had every reason to believe,
before a war was declared, that such a navy, and such an army,
would have been provided ; — That with these impressions I pro
ceeded to the state of Ohio, took the command of the forces,
which consisted of 1200 militia and volunteers, and about three
hundred regulars ; — That these militia were badly armed, badly
clothed, and entirely undisciplined ; That my orders were to
march to Detroit, and make the best arrangements in my power
for the protection of the inhabitants against 1 lie Indians ; That*
the country from Urbanna in Ohio, to Detroit, was principally a
¦wilderness, and the distance about 200 miles ; — That I was fur
nished with no field artillery ; — That on the 2d day of July, near
the foot ofthe rapids of the Miama, about fifty-two miles from
Maiden, and seventy from Detroit, I first received information
of war against Great Britain, fourteen days after it had been de- .
clared ; — That the letter from the Adn inistration announcing
this event, was delivered to me by a stranger, who inform«d me

that it was brought by the mail to the. Post Office in Cleaveland,
state of Ohio, and the Post Master of that place had employed
him to deliver it to me, wherever he found me, on my march to
Detroit ; — That the rout it was sent was very circuitous, and if it
had been sent by an express, it might have reached me in four
or five days at farthest ; — That the enemy at Maiden, fifty
miles more distant from Washington than my army, received
the information several days before ; — That by this letter from
the administration,- 1 was not only informed that war was de
clared against Great Britain, but was positively ordered to march
the forces under my command to Detroit, eighteen miles in the
rear ofthe enemy's principal fortress at Maiden ; and there wait
for further orders ; — That on the first day of July, having receiv
ed no information of the declaration of war, and supposing the
navigation of the Lake to be safe, a vessel was employed by the
Quarter-Master, to transport the sick of the army, and .the stores
and baggage, not necessary on the march, to Detroit ; — That
this vessel was taken by the enemy on her passage, and that this
first misfortune was occasioned by the neglect ofthe administra
tion, in not giving me information of the war eight days sooner,
which might easily have been done ; — That I have the strongest
possible ground to declare, that this might have been done, be
cause I shall show, that I received a letter from Washington, on
the 26th of June, and dated also the 1 8th, the same date with
the letter announcing the declaration of war, by express, which
gave no information of the declaration of war.
I shall prove by the records of the government that I stated in
the most explicit terms to the administration, that Detroit, or
some position on the waters of Lake Erie,, would be a suitable
position for troops, in time of peace with Great Britain, design
ed for the protection ofthe Michigan Territory, and the North
western frontier against the savages.; — But jn the event of war
with that nation, it would be impossible to support an army in
that country, without a naval force, sufficient to preserve the
communication) of the Lake, and without a powerful army on the
If iagara strait, to take possession of the enemies posts, on that
strait, and co-operate with such forces, as should make an invar
sion from Detroit, and by the co-operation of such forces take
possession ofthe Province. I shall show that this order of the
administration to march my ar»y to 'Detroit, after the declara-

10
'tion of war, and no navy being provided, to preserve the cont-
-munication of the Lake, and no army on the Niagara strait,
which ever co-operated with me, was contrary to what I had
sufficient grounds to believe was the understanding before I left
Washington ; contrary to the most explicit opinion I had given
on the subject; contrary to all military experience, and the
principles which have been taught by the best military writers •
—That I obeye'd this order because it was positive, and under
the full expectation, that a naval force, and an army would have
been provided to have assisted and co-operated with me, and
that I had sufficient reasons to expect such assistance and co
operation in the event of war, and in the invasion of Canada ; —
That in compliance with these Orders, I passed the enemy's post
at Maiden, and proceeded to Detroit, eighteen miles in the rear
of that post, and both situated on the same river, where I arriv
ed on the 5th of July ; — That notwithstanding my orders were
positive to remain there until I should receive further orders,
the militia and volunteer officers nearly excited a mutiny, be
cause I did not immediately cross the river, and commence of
fensive operations in violation of my orders ; — That on the 9th
of July, I received an unqualified authority, which from the
manner in which it was expressed, could have had no other con
struction, than a positive order to cross the*iver, and invade the
enemy's territory ; and to issue a proclamation to the inhabi
tants, and to pledge the government that they should be protect
ed in their persons, property, and rights ; and in the same let
ter I was only authorized to attack the fortress at Maiden, pro
vided, in my opinion, my forces wenc adequate to the enterprise,
apd it could be done consistently with the safety of my other
posts ; — That I issued a proclamation to the inhabitants, and on
the morning of the 12th of July, crossed the river and took pos
session ofthe opposite bank, in the face ofthe enemy ; — That I
was induced to adopt these measures from the orders I received
from the government, from the impatience of my army, from the
convenience, and even n cessity of collecting supplies from the
enemy's country, from the expectation of co-operation, and from
the hope that a display of the American flag on both sides the
river, would have a favourable effect on the savages and militia
of the province ; — That the authority I received to attack the
enemy's fortress at Maiden, being.di&cretionary, I wrote to the

II
government {he same day I received it, that my force was not-
adequate to the enterprize, and stated as a reason, that the ene
my commanded the Lake and the savages.
That I remained in the enemy's country about a month, un
der the expectation of receiving assistance and co-operation from'
the army under the command of General Dearborn, at Niagara ;
that during this time I received inform i tion that Michillima*. ki-
nack, on the same navigable waters with Detroit and Maiden,
had fallen ; that the forces, with the savages, of all that region,
were descending the waters of the northern lakes against me ;
that I likewise had received certain information, that General
Brock, with all the regulars and militia of Upper Canada, was
proceeding to Maiden ; and that the road I had opened through
the wilderness, from Ohio, was filled with hostile savages,
and that no supplies could be obtained for the army through that
communication ; — That, under these circumstances, I consider
ed that it was my duty to re-cross the river, with the principal
part of my forces, and attempt to open the only communication
I could now possibly have with my country ; — That on the 8th
of August, I re- crossed the river to Detroit, and on the same
day made a detachment of all the regulars, and part of the Ohio
militia, amounting to 600, under the command of Colonel Miller,
with orders to proceed to the river Raisin, for the purpose of
opening that communication ; that on his way to that station, he
was attacked, near Brownstown, by the regulars, militia, and'
savages, from Maiden, and that, after the loss of between eighty
and ninety men on our part, the enemy was compelled to re
treat j that, as it was the opinion of Colonel Miller, that this
detachment could not proceed to the river Raisin, without a
reinforcement of 150 or 2f<0 men, I thought proper to order him
back to Detroit, especially as the troops had been out in a vio
lent storm, were greatly fatigued, and it was necessary to re
move, and provide for the wounded ; — That on the 14th of August,
not having received information, ofthe arrival of General Brock,
and the necessity of opening the communication, for the purpose
of obtaining supplies, becoming more urgent, 1 made another
detachment, of the effective men of Colonels McArthur and'
Cass' regiments, commanded by the two Colonels, for the pur
pose : that as soon as I received information of the arrival of
General Brock, with the forces, from the eastern part of the.

12
province, I immediately sent expresses, with orders to McArthur
' and Cass to return to Detroit That when General Brock,
landed at the Spring Wells, three. miles below Detroit, on the
morning of the 16th of August, I had received no information
from them, and must have supposed they were at the river
Raisin, about fifty miles from Detroit, the route they were or
dered to march. And I pledge myself, fellow citizens, to prove
to the satisfaction of. every unprejudiced mind, that on the morn
ing of the 16th, when General Brock landed, the provisions
were exhausted, that there was no possibility of obtaining a sup
ply from any quarter whatever, and that his effective force was
much more than twice ray number. That my communication,
was entirely cut off, both by land and water ; , that a part of the
Michigan militia deserted, and joined General BrockJs stand
ard, as soon as he landed; that the savages were let loose on-
the inhabitants, whom it was impossible for me to protect ; and,.
that even a victory against his regulars and militia, that mor
ning, would have, been only a useless waste of blood-*-that I
could not have conquered his savages in the wilderness, or his
navy on the Lake, and consequently could not have opened my
communication ; that, under the circumstances my army was
placed by the orders of the government, it could no more exist,
than the human arm can exist when cut off from the body ; and
that the measures I adopted were necessary, from my situation,
and dictated by the highest sense of duty ; that I was forced into
this situation, by the orders of the government, and every avenue
to it was closed by the enemy, in such a manner that there was
not a possibility of escaping. And here I shall»wish to be dis
tinctly understood; I have said, that the order which I received
from the government to march to Detroit, after the declaratioa
of war, and when Lake Erie was in possession of the enemy's
naval force, was contrary to all military experience, and one
fatal cause of the disasters of the campaign. It was the case, as
the result has proved. Had the orders however of the govern
ment been obeyed by General Dearborn, the result probably
would have been very different. I shall show, that he was re
peatedly ordered,, by the letters of the Secretary of War, and by
the command ofthe President, immediately after the declaration
of war, to assemble the forces under his command on the Nia
gara River, to attack the enemy's posts in that part of the prov- „

13 i
ince of Upper Canada, and co-operate with (he forces under my
command ; that during that time he never suffered a man to en
ter the enemy's country, that he neglected to obey the positive
commands of his government ; and without any orders* agreed
to an armistice, or suspension of hostilities, with Sir George
Provost, in which my army was not included ; which will be
shown, enabled General Brock, with all the forces of Upper
Canada, and indeed a large reinforcement from Montreal, to
proceed to Maiden, and attack me : that he established a peace
on the Niagara frontier, and it became only necessary for th*
enemy to leave at their forts in that quarter a few invalids to
guard their barracks, &c. And I shall further show, that after
General Dearborn, the commanding General of the armies, had
thus neglected to obey the orders of the government, and had
been the great cause of the disasters of the campaign, he was
appointed the President of the Court Martial fur my trial ; and
that, although the administration employed, at your expense,
two ofthe first counsellors in our country, Mr. Dallas, and Mr.
Van Buren, to assist the Judge Advocate in the posecution, the
Court would not suffer me to employ any counsel at my own
expense, to open their lips in the Court ; and the opinions of
officers were admitted to prove entire charges and specifications
against me. That the officers, who were selected by the admin
istration to give their opinions respecting my conduct, antf to
testify against me, had been promoted, after the capitulation,
from Lieutenant Colonels in the militia, to the rank of Generals
in the regular army, and others of inferior rank on a similar
scale : that the most outrageous-measures were adopted to ex
cite your prejudices against me ; that the officers who appeared
' as witnesses, were applauded in the public Newspapers for the
manner in which they testified, and pamphlets were printed and
hawked for salei at the very door of the Capitol where I was
tried, filled with the most scandalous falsehoods. That I was
accused by the administration of capital crimes for acts, which
I shall prove by the letters of the Secretary of War, the Presi
dent had before fully approved ; and that the proclamation I is
sued to the Canadians was by order of the President : that as
soon as it was issued it was sent to him ; and after he received,
it, 1 shall produce letters, written by the Secretary of War, byi
bis order, to show that all my conduct, operations, and arrange-

u
ments, were not only approved by him, but viewed with the*
highest satisfaction : that notwithstanding this unqualified ap-'
probation of the proclamation by the President, the Plenipoten
tiaries at the treaty of Ghent, without any instructions from the
administration on that subject, declared to the British Plenipo
tentiaries, and consequently to the British nation and to the
world, that it was unauthorized, and disapproved by the Gov
ernment : that in an interview with the Hon, John Quincy Ad
ams, one of the Plenipotentiaries, in answer to my inquiry, on
what ground that declaration was made, he answered, that they.
had no particular instructions to make the declaration, that they
received the information from Mr. Gallatin, that he wrote the'
paper which contained it, and he being one of the Plenipotentia
ries, the others were induced to give it their signatures.
I have given a very general sketch of the subjects of the fol
lowing memoirs. The facts stated will be proved by the best
evidence of which the nature of the case will admit ; and princi
pally by the records of the government itself. After you are
possessed of the facts and evidence, I shall cheerfully submit
the question to your candid judgment. It is difficult always to
form a correct opinion, in our own case. I can however declare
with safety, that if I have committed errours, they were errours
of the head, and not of the heart.

No. III.
As a desire for military fame and motives of ambition, have
been imputed to me, I consider it a duty which I owe both to
myself and to you, to explain the true reasons, which finally,
and very reluctantly induced me to accept an appointment in
the army, and to satisfy you that the imputations are without
any foundation. It has likewise been represented, and is be
lieved by many, that I urged on the government the expediency.
of a declaration of war against Great Britain, at the time of my
military appointment, and made representations that the Can
adians were dissatisfied with their government, were desirous
of independence, would join the American standard, whenever
it was displayed in their territory, and that the conquest of
those provinces might be easily effected with a small force. So,

IS
ifer from ever expressing or entertaining opinions of this kind,
I shall shew you, from the records of the government, the repre
sentations which I made, both before and after I accepted a
military appointment ; these communications must be consider
ed the best evidence the nature of the case will admit, of the
views I entertained. Before I present them to you, I will ask
your attention to the particular reasons which induced me to
accept a military appointment before the declaration of war, in
June 1312.
Being at Washington in February 1812, and being at that
tiine governour of the Territory of Michigan, and accounts having
been received from that section of the country, that the Indians
were becoming hostile to the defenceless inhabitants of that ex
posed frontier, it was natural for me to feel a solicitude for their
safety. I urged on the officers of the administration, the expe
diency of providing a force for their protection. At this time,
in consequence of the differences which existed between our gov
ernment and Great Britain, Congress had thought it expedient
to augment the army, and was taking measures for the purpose.
These measures were well known to the officers who adminis-
i tered the government in the provinces ofthe Canadas, and the
causes which produced them. In the event of a war with Eng-
land, they were satisfied that the invasion of those provinces
would be the first object. The numerous, and powerful tribes
of savages, which not only inhabited that country, but also the
northern and western territory of the United States, were con
sidered as the allies and friends of England. On them she de
pended for assistance, whenever her dominions were invaded.
The strong indications of war, which were then apparent, in
duced his Brittannic Majesty's officers to adopt measures of
precaution and safety against the impending storm. Messages
were therefore sent to the different tribes, informing them of
the warlike preparations which were making by the United
States, ofthe events which probably would soon take place, and
inviting them to join their standard in such a result. These
messages were accompanied with unusual quantities of presents,
consisting of munitions of war, clothing, and ornaments, gratify
ing to their pride and vanity. The British nation, ever since
her possession ofthe Canadas, has expended immense sums of
money in presents, not only to the Indians, who inhabit her prov-

16
inces, but also to those who reside within the territories of the
United States. On this occasion every effort was made to pre-
" pare them for the approaching crisis.
'Of all employments, war is the most grateful to a savage.
The prospect of it did not fail to produce the excitement, in
tended, by the means made use of by the British agents. It
became apparent, from the manner_they assembled to celebrate
their war feasts, and from the hostile dispositions, they manifest
ed towards the inhabitants of the frontier, and particularly to
wards those of the territory of Michigan, which borders several
hundred miles on the Canadtfs, and is only separated by an
imaginary line, in the middle of the rivers and lakes. The
hostile indications, which were frequently accompanied with
acts of cruelty and murder, excited alarm among the inhabitants,
and were represented both by the civil authorities and command
ing officers of the garrisons, as foreboding evils, against which it
•*was necessary to guard. The-exposed and dangerous situation
©f that section of the country, being thus made known to the ad
ministration J measures were promptly adopted for its safety. The
governor of the state of Ohio, was called on, by the President of
the United States, to detach 1200 militia, and prepare them
for actual service. These militia were to be joined by the 4th
U. S. Regiment, then at Post St. Vincennes.
After these arrangements were made, the Secretary of War
informed me, that it was the desire of the President, that I
should accept the appointment of a brigadier General, in the
army, and take the command of mese forces, and march them
to Detroit, the place of their destination. I observed to the
Secretary, that I was not desirous of anyjhilitary appointment,
and declined it' in the most unqualified manner; Another offi
cer was designated for this command, and ordered to Washing
ton to receive his instructions. On his arrival^he became dis
qualified by sickness. The proposition was again made to me,
and the necessity of a force in the country, fur the purposes
before mentioned, being more urgent, I informed the Secretary,
that I was going to my government at Detroit, and I would ac
cept any military appointment, either the rank of Lieutenant-
Colonel, Colonel, or Brigadier General, which would give me
the command of those forces, and lead them through the wilder
ness to their place of destination. In consequence of this

17
consent, I was immediately nominated and appointed a Briga
dier General. I accepted the appointment, with great reluc
tance, and from no other motive and with no other view,
than to afford my aid in the protection of the frontier inhabi
tants, and those of the Territory of Michigan against the sava
ges. As proof of the principal facts here stated in relation to my
appointment as a Brigadier General in the army, I will state the
testimony of his excellency Governour Eustis, who was then
Secretary of the Department of War ; — the whole of which may
be seen in Lieut. Col.Forbes's report of my trial, pages 3, 4, and
8, of the appendix.
The part relating to the facts referred to, is as follows : —
" The latter part of February 18t2, information had been re
ceived from Mr. Atwater, then Secretary of the Territory of
Michigan, and acting as Govornour, that there were strong ap
pearances of hostility among the Indians, and that the territory
was in danger. That Gen. Hull urged on him, as Secretary
of War, the expediency and necessity of ordering a force there,
for the protection of Detroit,- the territory, and the northern
frontier. That he declined in the first instance accepting the
office of Brigadier General. That Col. Kingsbury was then or
dered to Washington, for the purpose of proceeding to the state
of Ohio to take the command of this force, and on account of
bodily indisposition, was not ordered on the command — and ' af
terwards, when he (Gen. Hull,) was appointed, it was not soli
cited by him — and that he manifested great anxiety for the safe
ty ofthe northern frontier, and the Territory of Michigan."
I have made this statement, and produced this evidence, for
no other purpose, than to satisfy you, that I did not accept this
appointment from the motives which have been unjustly impu
ted to me.
Having for seven years been Governour of the territory, and
being then the Governour, it was impossible forme to feel indif
ferent to the safety of its inhabitants. I consented therefore
to accept any military appointment, which the government
should think proper to give me, for this purpose. And it was
distinctly understood, that this appointment was not incompati
ble with my office as Governour, and that office was to be re
tained by me, As evidence that this was the intention of the
S.

18
administration, I received orders, on my arrival in the ter
ritory, to perform my civil duties, in the same manner, as if no
such appointment had been made— as a further evidence, that
this was the intention, I never asked for, or received a military
commission, in consequence of the appointment. And further,
it was my intention, when the object of safety to the inhabitants
was accomplished, and my military duties in any degree interfer
ed with my duties as Governour, to have resigned the military
appointment. 1 have been thus particular, to satisfy you, my
fellow citizens, what were my motives in accepting a military
appointment, — and to your candid judgment I appeal, whether
they were laudable.
I believed it to be my duty, to make use of every exertion in
my power, for the protection of a people, with whom I was so
nearly connected, against the dangers with which they were
threatened. ....
As the differences, which existed between the United States,
and Great Britain had not been settled by negociation, and as
there appeared indications of war, in my next number, I shall
State the views I communicated to the government, before I left
Washington, in such an even^.

No. IV.

In my former number, I have explained what were the objects
ofthe government, in detaching the Ohio militia in 1812, before
war was declared, and what were my nyrtives in taking the com
mand of them ; viz. the protection of the inhabitants on the
frontier of our country against the savages.
I shall now endeavour to demonstrate, that it was neither the
expectation of the Government, nor my expectation, at the time I
accepted the command, that these forces, in the event of war
with Great Britain, would have been employed in the invasion
of Upper Canada, without a sufficient naval force, to have com
manded Lake Erie, and to have preserved the water communi
cation from ~the states of New- York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio,
which border on the south and east part of said lake; and like
wise, without the co-operation of other forces to the same object.

19
As early as the 3d of April, 1809, being then Governour of the
Territory of Michigan, I addressed an official letter to the Secre
tary of the department of war, in relation to the security and de
fence of the frontier settlement of our country in which, among.
other things, I observed, " I would suggest for consideration
the expediency of building some armed vessels on Lake Erie,
for the purpose of preserving the communication ; consider you
have three military posts, to the north and west of these waters
and no other communication with them." The 16th of June,
181 1, about a year before the declaration of war, against Great
Britain, I addressed another letter to the government, through
the Secretary, from which the following is extracted ; " From
the present state of our foreign relations, particularly with
England, I am induced to believe, there is little prospect of a
continuance of peace. In the event of a war with England,
this part of the United States, (meaning the Michigan Territo
ry) will be particularly situated. The British land forces at
Amherstburg and St. Joseph's, are about equal to those of the
United States, at this place and Michilimackinack. The popu
lation of Upper Canada is more than twenty to one compared
to tiiis. territory.. That province contains about one hundred
thousand inhabitants, while our population does not amount to
five thousand* A wilderness of near two hundred miles sepa
rates this settlement from any of the states. Besides, the In
diana Territory and states of Ohio and Kentucky are thinly in
habited, have extensive frontiers, and their force will be neces
sary for their own defence. With respect to the Indians, their
situation and habits are such, that little dependence can be
placed on them. At present they appear friendly, and was I to
calculate on the profession of their chiefs, I should be satisfied
that they would not become hostile. Their first passion, how
ever, is war. The policy of the British government is to con
sider them, their allies, and in the event of war, to invite them
to join, their, standard. The policy of the American government
has been to advise them, in, the event of war, to remain quiet at
their villages, and take no part in quarrels, in which they have no"
interest. Many of their old Sachems and Chiefs would advise
to his line of conduct. Their authority, however, over the war
riors would not restrain them. They would not listen to their
advice. An Indian is hardly considered as a man, until he has
been engaged in war, and can show trophies. This first, and

20
most ardent of all their passions, will "be excited by presents,
most gratifying to their pride and vanity. Unless strong meas
ures are taken to prevent it, we may consider beyond all doubt,
they will be/influenced to follow theadvice of their British Father.
This then appears to be the plain state of the case ;. the British
have a regular force, equal to ours. The province of Upper Can
ada has on its rolls, a militia of twenty to one against us. In
addition to this, there can be little doubt, but a large proportion
of the savages will join them; what then will be the situation of
this part of the country ? Separated from the states by an exten
sive wilderness, which will be filled with savages, to prevent
any succour, our water communications entirely obstructed by
the British armed vessels on Lake Erie, we shall have no other
resource for defence, but the small garrisons, and feeble popula
tion of the territory. Under these circumstances, it is easy
to foresee what will be the fate of this country.
"It is a principle in na?ure, that the lesser force must give
way to the greater. Since my acquaintance with the situation
of this country, I have been of the opinion that the government
did not sufficiently estimate its value and importance. After
the revolution, and after it was ceded to us by treaty, the blood
and treasure of our country, were expended in a savage war to
obtain it. The post at this place, is the key of the northern
country. By 'holding it the Indians are kept in check, and
peace has been preserved with them to the present time. If we
were once deprived of it, the northern Indians would have no
where to look, but to the British government in Upper Canada.
They would then be entirely influenced by their councils. It
would be easy for them, aided by the councils of the British
agents, to commit depredations on the scattered frontier settle
ments of Ohio, Kentucky, Indiana, &c. They would be collect
ed from the most distant parts of their villages, where the Eng
lish factors have an intertourse with them, and would become
numerous. Under these circumstances, if there is a prospect of
war with England, what measures are most expedient? In my
mind, there can be no doubt. Prepare a naval force on Lake
Erie superiour to the British, and sufficient to preserve your com
munication." I have transcribed so much of this letter, the original of which
may be found on the files of the war office, principally to show,

21
that I considered a naval force on Lake Erie, superiour to the
British, and sufficient to preserve the communication, in the
event of war, essential, even for the preservation of the country ;
and likewise to show how strongly I urged it on the government
a year beforewar was declared.

No. V.
On the sixth of March, 1812, about a.month before I was ap
pointed a General in the army, I addressed another letter to the
government, through the Secretary of the department of war, in
which I stated the situation of the inhabitants on our frontier
settlements^ and particularly those in the Territory of Michi
gan, in which I pointed out the expediency of ordering a force
for their protection, and building a navy on Lake Erie sufficient
to preserve the communication. The following is an extract
from this letter.
" If we cannot command the ocean, we can command the in*
land lakes of our country. I have always been of the opinion,
that we ought to have built as many armed vessels on the lakes,
as would have commanded them ; we have more interest in them, ¦
than the British nation, and can build vessels with more con
venience." The whole of thiB letter is recited in my defence, which has
been published, and it is certified to be correct by the depart
ment of war.
After my appointment as a Brigadier General in the army,
and before I left Washington to take the command of the north
western army, I presented to the administration a letter contain
ing distinctly my views, with respect to the destination, and op
erations of the forces placed under my orders, both in time of
peace with Great Britain^ and likewise in the event of war with
that nation
The circumstances of this communication, with the documents
in proof of them, are fully related in , my defence before the
Court Martial, from page 33, to page 38, inclusive. In this let
ter I repeated the opinions, I had before given, that the force
entrusted to my command, in time of peace with England, was
sufficient for the protection of the northern frontier against the

22
savages; and likewise, that Detroit, or a position on that riverr
or the west end of Lake Erie, was a suitable station for that ob
ject ; and for this obvious reason, that all the necessary sup
plies could be easily furnished through the communication of
the lake. But in the event of war, I stated in the most expli
cit and strongest terms the necessity of having a naval force,
superiour to the enemy on the lakes ; — and that without it, and.
unless the army I was to command, was strengthened by addi
tions to its numbers ; and unless it was followed by detachments,.
to keep open the communication, and insure it supplies from
Ohio; and unless it was supported by co-operations from other
quarters, ifcould not be able to maintain itself at Detroit,, much
less carry. on offensive operations in the enemy's country.
That I wished it farther clearly to be understood by the govern-'
ment, that in the event of war with England, I did not consider this
force in any degree adequate, either to the invasion of Upper
Canada, or for the defence of our own territories. That it was
formed almost entirely of militia, undisciplined, and -who had
never seen any service. I then described the situation of
the country, and observed, that it would be difficult, if not im
possible, to send a force, which would be sufficient, either for
invasion or even defence, in the event of war without the
privilege of a communication through Lake Erie. That as soon
as a declaration of war should be made, that communication
would be entirely obstructed. That in accepting the command,
and leading an army through that wilderness.'it was under the full
expectation that war would not be declared, until such a na
val force was provided, as would preserve that communication.
It was farther stated that from the conversation I had with the
President of the U. S. and the Secretary of the Navy, from the
circumstance of a navy agent having been appointed on Lake
Erie, and Capt- Stewart, of the navy, having been ordered tft
Washington, for the express purpose of giving him the com
mand on the lakes, I had the fullest confidence, that before a
declaration of war was made, measures would be taken for the
security of that communication. That under these circum
stances, I believed the government would consider it a measure,
dictated by true policy, and indeed indispensably necessary  as
it was not at that time accomplished, and as every thing is un
certain, until it is carried into effect, and as I knew I was to be

23
placed in a most critical situation, I observed, if the govern
ment should adopt a different policy, and declare war, leaving
to the British the command of the lakes, it would become in
dispensably necessary, as the next best measure, immi diately
on its declaration to make an invasion of Upper Canada, by cross
ing the Niagra River, with a large army, sufficient to take pos
session of the whole province, and likewise with large detach
ments, to reinforce the army I commanded, in such a manner, as
to preserve the communication by land to the state of Ohio.
By this means the army at Detroit, might co-operate with the
main army, which crossed the Niagara River, and the whole
province be subdued. In such an event, the British naval
force on Lake Erie, would fall into our possession, as it would
have no harbours, and no means of being furnished with necessa
ry supplies.
That, if in the event of war, a naval force should not be provid
ed, or an invasion of Canada should not be made, in the manner
I have stated, by an army from Niagara, the army I commanded
would be led into a situation, from which there would be no es
cape, and that whole country, with all our military posts, would
fall into the hands of the enemy. That his regular force, mili
tia, and savages, with the facilities of the water communication,
for rapid movements, and the transportation of necessary sup
plies, would be fully equal to effect this object.

No. VI.
In my former number I have mentioned, that from a conver
sation I had with the President of the United States, and the
Secretary of the Navy ; from the circumstance of a Navy Agent
having been appointed on Lake Erie, and Commodore Stewart
of the Navy, having been ordered to Washington, for the ex
press purpose of giving him the command on the lakes, I had
the fullest reason to believe, that before a declaration of War,
was made, measures would have been taken for the security of
that communication.
That there may be no question with respect to these facts, I
will now state the evidence on which they are founded-, \Com-
modore Stewart, in his testimony, on my trial before the Court

, 24
Martial, declared, that he received an order from the Secretary
of the Navy to repair to Washington, as it was contemplated by
the Government, to trust him with an important command ; that
in compliance with the order, he arrived in Washington in the
beginning of April, and at his first interview with the Secretary,
he was informed that it was contemplated to give him the com
mand on the lakes ; that the Secretary observed, that a naval
force superiour to the British, on the lakes, had been strongly
urged by General Hull, as essential, and as a certain means of
ensuring success to the! army. He then goes on to state why he
declined the command, &c.
General Peter B. Porter, in his testimony on my trial, said,
about the last of March, or beginning of April, 1 812, he was at
the office of the Secretary of War, with General Hull, after he
had been appointed a Brigadier General, and about the time he
waa to march to Detroit; that he was frequently with the Heads
of Departments, and had conversations, as to the operations of
the army, in case war should be declared, as was in contempla
tion. He said he recollected, that General Hull, recommended
that a navy should be formed on the lakes, to have a superiority
over the British in case of war. General Porter further states,
that a Navy Agent was appointed for lake Erie, and he was
twice at the President's, with the General, when the subject
was talked over.
From the evidence contained in this and the foregoing letters,
I feel a confidence that every candid reader will be satisfied,
that when I accepted the command of the Ohio militia, and the
4th regiment, the motive by which I was influenced was for the
protection of the northern frontiers, and particularly the Territo
ry of Michigan, of which I was Governour, against, the savages;
and that I had not, the most distant idea, in the event of war,
with that force, «of making an invasion of Upper Canada, while
the enemy commanded the lakes, and while no army was pro
vided, with which I might co-operate. Before I proceed to a
relation of the march through the wilderness, and ofthe opera
tions of the army after I took the command, I shall present and
consider One other document, which appears to me singular in
its nature, and very important, on account of the high authority
from whence it is derived.

25
No. VII.
Thk singular, and important document, to which I alluded in
my former letter, is the Message of the President of the United
States to Congress, after the termination of the campaign, of
which in my future letters, it is my intention to give you the
history. Although this is not in the order of time, with the sub
jects, which have been considered, yet as it gives informatii.n of
the motives ofthe government, with respect to the objects of my
command, and has a strong bearing on the considerations, which
I have already presented, it appears to be the proper place for
its introduction.
In this Message, it is stated, " That the force sent to Detroit,
was with a general view to the security of the Michigan Terri
tory ; and in the event of war, to such operations in the upper
most Canada, as would intercept the hostile influence of Great
Britain over the savages ; obtain the command of the lakes on
which that part of Canada borders ; and maintain co-operating
relations with such forces as might be most conveniently em
ployed against other parts. Our expectation of gaining the com
mand of the lake, by the invasion of Canada, from Detroit, hav
ing been disappointed, measures were instantly taken to provide
on them a naval force superiour to that of the enemy. " t-
From this message, it appears, there were four objects for
which the forces were sent to Detroit under my command.
1. With a general view to the security of the Michigan Terri
tory. 2. In the event of war, to make such operations in uppermost
Canada, as would intercept the hostile influence of Great Britain
over the savages.
3. To obtain the command of the lake, on which that part of
Canada borders.
4. To co-operate with other forces in that quarter.
The first object declared by the President, is what I have
stated, the security of the Michigan Territory against the In
dians, as we then had no other enemy.
Being at that time the Governour of the territory, it is natural
to suppose, under the circumstances which existed with respect
to the savages, that I felt a strong solicitude for its safety. It
was indeed that motive alone, which induced me to accept the
command. The troops being composed principally ef undisci-
4

26
plined militia, and without artillery, is conclusive evidence,
that, it was not an aimy designed for invasion and conquest.
Indeed, it was a time of peace, and there was no danger from
any other quarter than from the lawless savages. No power
*but Congress had an authority to declare war, and the President
had no power to order a militia force for any other purpose than
the safety of the country, in the manner which has been men
tioned. That I had no reason to expect there was any other ob
ject than the security of the territory, is evidenl, from every
communication I made to the government, both previously to,
and after accepting the command. In the event of war, it was
perfectly understood to be my opinion, that the command ofthe
lakes was not only essential for a successful invasion ofthe ene
my's country but for the very existence of the army I com
manded. In the next place, the President informed Congress, that in
the event of war it was expected the forces under my command
would make such operations in uppermost Canada, as would in
tercept the hostile influence of Great Britain over the savages.
It was perfectly understood, in the event of war, that the sava
ges who resided in our territory were not to be employed. In
that event I was directed to advise them to remain quiet at their
villages, and take no part in a contest in which they had no in
terest, and to assure them of protection and safety. This was
humane, and, had it been practicable, would have been wise
policy. For a number of years, 1 had not only been Governour
of the territory of Michigan, but superintendant ot Indian af
fairs. The duties of this office rendered a constant intercourse
with them necessary. I had become acquainted with their hab
its, and their ruling passions. From the knowledge which my
situation had thus enabled me to acquire of their characters, I
well knew that as noon as the trumpet of war was sounded, they
would not follow this pacific advice, and remain indifferent
spectators, hy the documents which I have presented, and to
which I have referred in thegc numbers, it will be manifest, tR»t
I repeatedly, and in the most explicit terms, gave this opinion
to the government. Notwithstanding this opinion, I did every
thing in my power, in conformity to my instructions, to induce
them to remain neutral. Before and after the declaration of
war, I sent messages, with interpreters to the different villages.

27
explaining the views of tho government, and enforcing them
with all tlm reasons, I was capable of suggesting, ^likewise
collected the chiefs in council, repeated the views of the govern
ment, and urged (hem to restrain their warriours, and induce
them to follow the advice of their great. Father, the President of
the United Stales. This was all 1 was authorized to do.
Many who joined (he British standard would have joined ours
if the. government would have accepted their services.
There was no probability of preventing a<i intercourse between
thorn and tho British agents. — Upper Canada is separated from
the United States only by an imaginary line, running through
the lakes and rivers, several hundred miles, nnd the prinripol
part of tlie distance on the shores a wilderness. It was well
known to the government that the British had a constant inter
course with those who resided in our territory, ever since it be
came a part ofthe United Slates ; that at an immense expense,
they furnished them with presents, consisting of arms, ammuni
tion, aud clothing, and considered them as their allies and
friends. To have gunnlcd this immense wilderness, and prevented the
hostile influence of the British, was impossible with the army I
commanded. In my next umnbor I shall consider the other objects for which
the 1'resiilent informed Congress, the forces were sent to De
troit, under my command.

. Ill J.XIIWL

No. VIII.

Tun next object of my command, as stated by the President,
was, " To obtain the command of the lake on which that part
of Canada borders."
By this description tho President must have meant lake Erie.
There are two important; facts so well known, that it is unneces
sary to produce any evideuco to prove them. One is, that in the
year 18 1 2, when war was declared, Great Britain had four or
five vessels of war on this lake, some of them carrying twenty
cannon, besides a number of gun-boats, all completely armed and
maimed. The oMior is, that tho United States had not a single
armed vessel, not even a gun-boat or canoe. It was not even

28
intimated to me, in any instruction that I received from the
government, that this was one of the objects of my command.
The first knowledge I ever had of it, was contained in this mes
sage to Congress.
I cannot to the present moment conceive, notwithstanding the
high authority, and the solemn manner in which it was commu
nicated, on what grounds such an expectation was founded. It
certainly must have been impossible to have obtained the com
mand of the lake, without in some way destroying the British
naval force, which was established on it. In what possible way
could the Ohio militia have effected this object ?
Before I left Washington, it will be 6een how repeatedly and
earnestly I recommended the necessity of constructing a navy
on this lake, superiour to that of the enemy, in the event of war.
If that object should be abandoned,' and the government should
not think propeWto listen to this advice, I then suggested, as the
next most expedient measure, immediately on the declaration of
war, to invade Upper Canada, with a powerful army, by cros
sing the Niagara river, with which the troops I commanded
might co-operate, and by this means take possession of the whole
province. Thus being in the possession of all the harbours on the lake,
the navy would be obliged to surrender for the want of necessary
supplies. This. measure not being adopted, and not even an
armeil boat of any description being provided on the lake, I re
peat the question, on what grounds could this expectation have
been formed ? That the President was serious in making this
communication, and at length was satisfied that the opinion I
had so often given was correct, clearly appears ; for in the next
paragraph ofthe message he says, "Our expectation of gaining
the command of the lake, by the invasion of Canada from De
troit, having been disappointed, measures were instantly taken
to provide a naval force superiour to that of the enemy !"
I do think this subject is so plain, that no further commenta
ries on it are necessary ; and that no blame can attach to me for
not fulfilling what Mr. Madison, then President, says was the
expectation of the government, viz. taking possession of lake
Erie, with no other force than a few Ohio militia, when that lake
was commanded by a naval armament, such as I have described.

2d
No. IX.
In addition to all the other evidence, that it was neither the
expectation of the government nor my expectation, that the forces
sent to Detroit under my command were sufficient for the inva
sion of Canada, I here present the declaration of the President,
in his message to Congress, to which I have referred j that they
were sent, in the event of war, to co-operate with other forces in
that quarter.
This appears to be conclusive evidence, that in the event of
war, the government did not consider the forces under my com
mand sufficient for this object.
The President, in this message, did not describe the nature of :
the forces nor the manner they were to be employed. The rea
son undoubtedly was, that none of any description were em
ployed. From the urgency of such provision, however, and the
arrangements which have since been made, for the construction
of a navy on Lake Erie, and for the organization of an army it
must be evident, that he referred to a naval force on that lake
and a powerful army on the eastern border of Upper Canada,
which he has since become convinced, it was indispensable to
provide, to co-operate with the army at Detroit, as the only
means to a successful invasion of Canada.
Had such a navy been prepared, and such an army been em
ployed in the manner 1 have stated, there is no question but tho
conquest of that province would have easily been effected during
that campaign. Had, indeed, either of these measures been car
ried into effect, the results of our military operations would, in
all probability, have been successful and prosperous.
Before I left Washington, to take command of the forces, as
I have before observed, a navy agent had been appointed on the '
lake, and a distinguished naval officer had been ordered to re
pair to the government, to receive his instructions, with respect
to what was considered an important command on the lakes.
Every member of the administration appeared to be impressed
with the necessity of securing that communication, in the event
of war ; General Dearborn, the senior officer ofthe army, was
at Washington, assisting in organizing a large army, to be ready
for service, should a declaration of war become necessary. Be
sides the assurances I received from the administration it result
ed from our relative situation, and the nature of things, that in

30
the event of war, the invasion of Canada would be the first ob
ject. For what other purpose coold so large an army have been
provided? There was no other British territory within our
reach, and no other British forces in a sitaation that we could
approach. Besides, by the conquest of Upper Canada, we
should have had the controul ofthe Indians, and perfect security
would have been given to our extensive and exposed frontiers,
and have prevented the miseries of sava:e barbarity As tiese
memoirs are written, merely for the purpose that the truth may
be known, I shall make no apology, either for prolixity or repe
tition. I shall not, therefore, hesitate to repeat, that from the
documents and circumstances which have been produced, the
following facts have been fully substantiated : —
That in April, 1812, when I accepted the command of the
forces destined for Detroit, it was understood, both by the gov
ernment and myself, that, it being a time of peace, these forces
were designed to protect the northern frontier against the-
depredations ofthe savages, and particularly the territory of Mi
chigan, of which I was Governour ; and in the event of war, to
have co-operated with both naval and land forces in the invasion
of Upper Canada.
In the future numbers, I shall give an account of the opera
tions ofthe army, after I took the command ; how I was disap
pointed in ray expectations ; and how cruelly, both the army
and myself have been sacrificed by the government, and Gener-
eral Dearborn, the commanding General.

No. X.

In leaving Washington, in April, 1812, to take the command
of the forces, assembled in the state of Ohio, I felt a very deep
interest in the object of my mission. The consideration that I
was clothed with the authority, and furnished with the means of
affording safety and security to the frontier inhabitants of the
country ; and particularly to those of the territory of Michigan,
of which I was governour, was soothing to my feelings, and ani
mating to my exertions. Although about thirty years had then
elapsed, since my sword had laid useless in its scabbard, and -
time had necessarily enfeebled my strength and constitution, vet

31
it was impossible for me to see a country, in which, from my
situation, I was so particularly interested, exposed to the fury
of the savages, without raising an arm for its safety. Convinced
that the forces entrusted to my command were sufficient for the
protection of the frontier settlements, and the security of the
territory while we were at peace with Great Britain ; and
knowing that I had communicated what measures in my opin
ion, would be indispensably necessary v in the event of war,
which communications had been received as official documents,
and approved by the government, and (feeling a generous confi
dence in the justice and honour of the administration, I had lit
tle anxiety with respect to any consequences which might have
attended ray command.
If it were to be my fortune to protect the defenceless inhab
itants of our country, against the cruelty of savages, and pros
perity was to attend the exertions of the army, the satisfaction
of having promoted the cause of humanity, would have been an
ample reward . But if, after honestly discharging my duty, in the
best manner I was capable, misfortune was to be my lot, I be
lieved that a generous government, and a generous people would
at least have shielded me from censure and reproach. At that
time, indeed, I considered there was little or no hazard. It
was a time of peace, with England, and while that remained,
there was no danger excepting from the savages. Some excite
ment then existed, through the influence of the British Agents,
in preparing them for events which they anticipated might take
place. In the event of war I considered that such arrangements
would have been made, as would have enabled the army I com
manded to have operated with success against the enemy. As
the government continued me in the command of the north wes
tern army, after the declaration of war, 1 had a right to believe,
that such measures would have been adopted, as I had stated,
were deemed by me, essential to success. The measures to
which I alluded in the event of war, I have mentioned were a
navy on lake Erie, sufficient to preserve that communication,
and an army of sufficient strength, in co-operation with the one
I commanded, to make a conquest of Upper Canada. ¦ In all these
communications, I. gave it as my opinion, that unless we had
the benefit of this co-operation, the posts of Detroit, Michil-

32
limackinack, and Chicago, would inevitably fall into the hands
ofthe enemy.
How I was disappointed in my expectations ; how I was de
ceived by the government; how, after the declaration of war, I
was ordered into a situation, which it was impossible for me to
sustain, and from which there was no retreat; how the officers
of the administration shamefully neglected to redeem the pledge
they had given me ; and how Gen eral Dearborn the senior offi
cer of the army, and afterwards the President of the Court Mar
tial, neglected every duty, incident to his command, and adopt
ed measures, which proved the inevitable destruction of the army
I commanded, will be the subjects of my future numbers.
' Before, however, I close this, I will make one further obser
vation. If, after the declaration of war, the President and other
officers ofthe administration, who directed the military opera
tions, had changed their opinions, and believed that twelve hun
dred Ohio militia, and three hundred regular troops, were suffi
cient without any naval force, to have taken possession of lake
Erie, and without any reinforcements, and without any other
army, with which they might have co-operated, to have invaded
and conquered the province of Upper Canada, they ought to have
appointed an officer to that command, of the same opinions, and
not to have made one responsible, who had repeatedly, decided
ly, and in an official manner, declared, that in the event of war,
without the command of the lake, and without a powerful army
for co-operation, the most disastrous consequences would inev-
ably follow.
That these consequences did follow, in the manner I had
predicted, is well known, and that under the circumstances, it
was not possible for me to have prevented them ; and that they
were occasioned by the neglect of the government, and the mis
conduct of General Dearborn will appear manifest, from the fu
ture statements I shall make, and the documents and other evi
dence I shall produce.
By the documents and evidence which have already been
shown, the objects of the government in detaching the forces
entrusted to my command, must be distinctly understood. I
have produced my communications to the government explanato
ry of my own views : and I likewise have exhibited the Mes
sage of the1 President ,who was at the head ofthe administration,
to prove the views of the government. In my communications,

33
,lioth before and after I was appointed, and accepted the coin
mand of these forces, I stated distinctly my views, that in time
of peace with Great Britain, the forces were competent to the
protection of the frontiers of our country against the savages ;
but in the event of warVithout the co-operation of a naval force
on Lake Erie, and without the co-operation of an army from
Niagara, they were not competent to the invasion of Canada
and not adequate to the protection of that part of our territory.
And it further appears, by the President's Message, that the
forces were sent to Detroit Avith a view to the security of the
Michigan territory against the Indians in time of peace, and in
the event of war to intercept the hostile influence of the British
over the savages ; to obtain the command of. the lake on which
that part of Canada borders ; and to co-operate with other forces
in that quarter.
Upper Canada borders on lake Erie and the navigable lakes
and rivers more than four hundred miles, and, on what grounds
the expectation of the administration were founded, that with
the forces I commanded I should be able to take the command
of the lake, when commanded -by a strong naval force of the en
emy ; and without any co-operation of any other forces, from
any quarter, are questions which will be hereafter considered.
This subject I wish distinctly to be. understood, and I must be
excused if I make use of repetition, in the explanation of it.
I have offered these documents to shew the grounds I had to
expect the co-operation of other forces; and, that the adminis
tration became convinced that a naval force was necessary, and
one was immediately ordered, as soon as it was found that the
possession of the lake could not be obtained by the militia under
my command. -
By,lessons of experience, since that period, we have been
taught how important the command of those waters are to suc
cessful operations against the country.
General Harrison, with a force vastly superiour to the one I
'commanded, was not able, after more than a year, to approach
within fifty miles of Maiden, with the assistance of a large force
at Niagara to co-operate with him ; and was not able to make
any impression on^ the country, until after the command of the
lake was obtained, Ijy Commodore Perry's glorious naval vic
tory. As soon as that was obtained, the enemy immediately
5

34
abandoned Maiden, and the army took possession of fhe coun
try, The territory situated on these navigable waters is so in
sulated, that, the power which commands them will necessarily
command the country.

No. XI.
Ok the 10th of May, I arrived at Cincinnati, in the state of?
Ohio. Here I met Governour Meigs, who had made great ex
ertions in collecting the 1200 militia, which had been ordered
by the President — Their place of rendezvcuswas Dayton. Al
though the officers and soldiers appeared to be animated with
zeal, yet in reviewing' them, and inspecting their equipments,
they were found without discipline, and destitute of arms and
clothing. • necessary for military operations. Their arms were
totally unfit for use, the leather which covered their cartouch
boxes was rotten and no better security to the cartridges than
brown paper ; many of the men were destitute of blankets, and
other necessary clothing ; no armourers were provided to repair
the arms; no means had been adopted to furnish clothing; no
public stores to resort to, either for good arms, -or suitable cloth
ing ; and no powder in any of the magazines, fit for use— and
what is more extraordinary, no contract, or any measures adop
ted,' to supply these troops with the necessary article of provi
sions, during their march through a wilderness of more than two
hundred miles, until they arrived at Detroit, the place of their
destination. On my own responsibility, I sent to powder mills
in Kentucky, and purchased powder, collected a few blankets,
and other necessary articles of clothing from the inhabitants of
Ohio, and employed private armourers, at Cincinnati, and Day
ton, to repair the arms, &c.
These facts have been stated, to shew the neglect of the gov
ernment in equiping and providing for these troops, which in
their situation could not be considered as a force adequate to of
fensive operations, and to the conquest of Canada.
After the junction of the 4th Upited States regiment, which
consisted of 300 effective men, with the 12«>o militia at Urbanna,
I eommenced the march, «arly in June frond that place, a fron-

35
tier town in fhe state of Ohio, for Detroit, the distance of more
than two hundred miles.
After the disposition was made for the march, I was informed;
that a part of the militia, refused to obey the order.
In the first place, I directed their own officers, to give them.
positive orders to march, and inform them, if they did not obey,
the 4th United States regiment would be sent to compel them.
They still refused, and a part of the 4th regiment was marched
to their station, and they obeyed. This fact is proved by the
testimony of Col. Miller of that regiment,and I have stated it,
to shew, when I first took the command of these troops, the
want of discipline, and the mutinous spirit which prevailed, —
and that the authority of their officers, was not sufficient to com
mand their obedience, and that nothing but the bayonets of the
4th regiment could have the effect.
It is not necessary to describe the labours and fatigues, of the
army in the march. It is sufficient to know, that; the country
was a wilderness, and the difficulties in marching an army
through it will be apparent It is, however, a justice due to the
officers and soldiers to say, that all the labours of opening a roadr
building bridges and causeways, and indeed all the fatigues, in
cident to such a march, were borne with patience, and every
possible exertion was made to effect the object of the march.
On the rout the army built four blockhouses, which were garri
soned by the invalids, who were unable to accompany the army.
The object in building these blockhouses, was the convenience
of re-enforcements, and the security of convoys.
On the 2d day of July, I received a letter from the secretary
of war, dated the 18th of June, informing me of the declaration of
war. It was in these words — "Sir, war is declared against
Great Britain. You will be on your guard, proceed to your
post with all possible expedition, make such arrangements for
the defence of the country, as in your judgment may be neces
sary, and wait for further orders. "
The day before this letter was received, the quarter-master,
had been directed to hire a small vessel, at the foot of the Rapids
of the Miami, to transport the invalids, and the baggage, &c. not
Wanted on the march to Detroit. The horses being worn down
on the march, rendered this measure, in my opinion, expedient-
At this time I had received no information of the declaration of

36
war, and did not consider, there was any hazard in the measure!'
On the 24th of June, I received a letter from the war depart
ment, dated in the morning of the 18th June, directing me to
march to Detroit, with all possible expedition, In that letter,
not one word was said respecting a declaration of war. The
British garrison, at- Maiden having a number of days before re
ceived the information, this vessel was taken in passing that for
tress. The court martial could not find any ground to censure me
for employing that vessel, as I had no information of the declar
ation of war, and was obliged to acquit me of the charge growing
out of that event. The circumstances of this transaction, are
particularly related in my defence.
Thus it appears, that I did not receive information of the war,
Until fourteen days after it was declared, that the British garri
son had official knowledge; of it four or five days sooner, that It
is proved to a demonstration, that I might have received it eight
days earlier, as I actually did receive a letter frorn, the secretary
of war, on the 24th of June, dated on the same day (viz.) the
18th of June, in the morning, which gave no information of the
declaration of war.
The person who brought me this letter announcing the war,
informed me he was employed by the post master of Cleveland,
in the state of Ohio, and that it was brought in the mail, to that
post office. In time of peace with England, there could have
been but one opinion, with respect, to engaging this vessel, in
the manner it was employed. Having no information of the
declaration of war, I must necessarily have believed, it was a
time of peace, and consequently no blame could be attached to
me. This was the opinion of the court martial.
If, after a knowledge ofthe war, I had sent this unarmed vessel
to Detroit, with the sick of the army, the medical stores, intrench
ing tools, &c. knowing she must pass the British fortress at Am
herstburg, it would have been treason, for which I ought to have
been punished. The following is the opinion of the court mar
tial on this subject — " The evidence on the subject having been
publicly given, the court deem it proper, in justice to the accus
ed, te say, that they do not believe, from any thing which has
appeared before them, that Brigadier General William Hull has
committed treason against the United States."

37
It appears then by the opinion of the court, founded on the
testimonv ofthe witnesses, in behalf ofthe prosecution, that in
this respect, there was no fault on my part. But here was a
serious public disaster, the first which had happened to the army
I commanded, and occasioned by the fault or neglect of some
officer ofthe government, whose duty it was to give me the ear
liest possible information of the war. , It was well known to the
government, that I "was in a wilderness, filled with hostile sava
ges, and approaching a British garrison, that a previous knowledge
mf'the war, would have given the enemy the greatest possible
advantage, in the situation I was placed. It is impossible that
stronger reasons could have existed, to render it necessary, that
I should have received the earliest' information of the war. What
measures were taken to give me this information ? A letter was
put into the post-office, and sent a circuitous rout to Cleveland
in the state of Ohio, and the post-master at that place was re
quested to send it through a wilderness of abo; t an hundred
miles, to me. This letter, announcing this important event, was
travelling fourteen days before it reached me, when I had re
ceived one in six days from Washington, dated oh the same day.
Who then, I seriously ask, was in fault ? If Iliad received infor
mation of the war, as early as the government might have com
municated it to me, this vessel would not have been employed,
and this misfortune would not have happened. - Every effort was
attempted to make me the guilty cause in the prosecution, but
without success. Could treason have been proved by the opin
ions of witnesses, the case would undoubtedly have been differ
ent ; but that would have been too great an outrage on establish-
.eu principles. Opinions, h'owever, were reserved for another
*harge against me, which will be considered in the course of
these memoirs.
On this subject, I am sure you will acquit me of all censure,,
and place the fault at the door of the administration by whose
neglect, the disaster was occasioned.
I ask you, fellow citizens, what must have been my. feelings,
as the commanding officer of that army, when 1 found that the
enemy had received information of the declaration of war, a
number of days before it had been communicated to me. Espe
cially, as Maiden was about sixty miles farther from Washing
ton, than my situation at the time it was received. Had I not

38
as much cause to declare, there was treason at Washington, as
the administration had to declare there was treason in my camp?
There was no act which I committed, and no duty which I
omitted, which could create the least foundation for the charge.
The administration had omitted giving me the earliest informa
tion ofthe declaration of war, which had been attended with the
most serious consequences to the army. I have been the more
particular on this suhject, on account of the injustice and cruelty
of the government, in charging me with treason, for an unfortu
nate event, which was caused by its own neglect.

No. XII.

It will be perceived, that the letter which I received from the
Secretary of the department of war, on the morning of the 2d of
July 1812, which is transcribed in the former number, contain
ed a positive order to march the army to Detroit, and there
wait for further orders. This order being positive, no other
alternative remained, but obedience. In reflecting on the sub
ject, the following considerations forced themselves on my mind-
I had given it as my opinion, that while we were at peace with
Great Britain, Detroit would be a suitable situation for forces,
designed to protect that territory, and the northern frontier against
the savages, and for this obvious reason, that they could re
ceive all necessary supplies by the communication of the lake.
But in the event of war with Great Britain, I had officially stat-r
ed, that without a navy on Lake Erie, that communication
would be entirely closed against us. I had likewise stated in
that event,, the difficulty, if not the impossibility of obtaining
the necessary supplies in any other way.
Indeed it must be apparent to all who have any knowledge of
the geography of the country, that there would be no other
mode of obtaining supplies, but from the settled parts of the
state of Ohio, through the wilderness which I had passed, and
was passing, of more.than two hundred miles, and filled with
hostile savages. When the important event of the declaration
of war against Great Britain was announced, I received no as
surances from the Government, that any preparation was made

3% '
to preserve the copimunication of the lake. I received no as*
surances that any re-enforcements were in. readiness, to make
such establishments on the road I had opened through the wil
derness, as would give security to convoys, from the state of
Ohio. I received no assurances, that any army was prepared
to co-operate with the forces I commanded, in making offensive
operations. At that moment, I anticipated what must be the
fate of my army, unless the measures I have stated, were
adopted. Notwithstanding these reflections, I knew the first duty of a ,
soldier was to obey orders ; and in obedience to them, I march
ed the army to Detroit with all possible expedition.
In passing a large Indian village, the residence of the Wy-
ondots, nearly opposite the British fort at Maiden, and only
separated from my rout by the Detroit river, it was the inten
tion of the British commanding officer, to have crossed the riv
er and attacked the army on its march through a hideous swamp,
which we entered after passing this , Indian village. At this
time, having been informed of the war, a large.body of the mi
litia of Upper Canada, had re-enforced the British garrison, and
all the surrounding tribes of Indians had been invited to join its •
standard. Every preparation was made for it, on the morning
of the 6th of July. It was only prevented by a communication
the night before, which I caused to be made, by a confidential
inhabitant of Maiden, then in my camp, to a friend of his who
resided in Maiden, and was in the confidence ofthe command
ing officer. The information communicated was,' that it was
not the intention of the army to march to Detroit, that all the
boats had been collected on the west side of the river, that can
non had been sent for, from Detroit, and that my intention was
to cross the river, and attack the fort. This information was
immediately communicated to the commanding officer, which
induced him to abandoned the enterprize, and concentrate all
his forces for the defence of the fort. This manoeuvre I deem
ed necessary, as the forces I commanded had been about a
month in the wilderness, on the hardest fatigue, opening a road
and not in a situation for discipline, or preparation for action.
Besides the ground was well calculated for Indian warfare, and
¦we had no field artillery to oppose to that ofthe enemy, which

. 40
Slight easily have been transported across the river. By this
stratagem the troops passed this fortress without annoyance, and
tha* evening arrived at Detroit. After a march of so much
hardship and fatigue, I thought it was my duty to permit both
officers and soldiers to rest from their labours for a few days.
The time was however employed in washing their clothes,
cleaning and repairing their arms. All the armourers at De
troit were engaged, assisting in this necessary work. The ene
my were directly opposite at this time, erecting fortifications on
the bank of the river. An impatience was excited, and a strong
wish manifested among both officers and men, to cross the riv
er and commence offensive operations. In consequence of this,
I called a council of war, consisting of the field officers, and
communicated to them the instructions I had received from the
government, "that I was to march with all possible expedition
to Detroit and there wait for further orders." I informed them
that I did not consider myself authorized by those instructions
to invade the enemy's territory, and I wished them to give such
explanations, as would allay th^ impatience which had been ex
cited. Notwithstanding this communication, the officers gave
it as their opinion, that it was expedient immediately to cross
and take' possession of the opposite bank. I .then informed
them, as long as I commanded that army, I should obey the or
ders of the Government. The circumstances of this Council,
are proved by the testimony of Colonel Cass, who was a mem ]
ber of it, and are only stated, to shew the temper and inexperi
ence of my officers, and the difficulty of my command. This
was but four days after the arrival of the army at Detroit. On
the evening of the 9th, after the council was dismissed, I receiv
ed a letter from the Secretary ofthe department of war, author
izing me to commence offensive operations. This letter is of so
much importance that I shall here recite the part of it, which
relates to offensive operations. War Department, June 24fA, 1812.
i Sir,
By my letter of the 18th inst. you were informed that war
was declared against Great Britain. Herewith enclosed, you
will receive a copy of the act, and of the President's proclama
tion, and you are,authorized to commence offensive operations
accordingly.

41
Should the force under your command be equal to the enter
prise, consistent with the safety of your own posts, yo>i will
take possession of Maiden, and extend your conquests as cir
cumstances may justify.
(Signed) WILLIAM EUSTIS.
On the same evening this letter was received, the following
answer was given. \
Detroit, 9th July, 1812.
SlK,
I have received your letter of the 24th of June. The army
under my command arrived here on the 5th of July inst Every
effort has been and is still making, by the British to collect, the
Indians under their standard. They have a large number. I am
preparing-boats, and shall pass the river in a few days The
British have established a post, directly opposite this place. — I
have confidence in dislodging him, and being in possession of
the opposite bank. I have little time to write : every thing will
be done that is possible to do.
The British command the water and the savages.
I do not think the force here equal to the' reduction of Am
herstburg (meaning the fort at Maiden ;) you therefore must not
be too sanguine. (Signed) WILLIAM HULL.
Hon. Wm. Eustis.
By the letter which has just been recited from the Secretary
*>f War, of the 24th of June, and received by me at Detroit, the
9th of July, I was authorized,
1st. To commence offensive operations.
2d. Should the force under my command be equal to the en
terprise, consistent with the safety of our own posts, I was to
take possession of Maiden, and extend my conquests, as cir
cumstances might justify.
As soon as I received this letter I determined to cross the
river, and take possession of the bank opposite Detroit. For
this purpose, all the boats and canoes belonging to the inhabi
tants were collected and repaired- There were none belonging
to the public. On the 1 1th of July a sufficient number had been
collected to carry over about four hundred men. As the enemy
was in considerable force on the opposite bank, and as I could
not carry over more than four hundred men at once, I thought

42
it expedient to draw off his attention, as much as possible, from
the point where it was my intention to cross. This point was
at Bloody Bridge, about a mile and a half above Detroit. For
this purpose I ordered all the boats on the 1 lth, towards even
ing, to pass down the river, in sight of the enemy, and to con
tinue Mow the town until dark, and then silently to return to
the station at Bloody Bridge . This movement had the desired
effect. The enemy retreated in the night below Sandwich, and
at day -light in the morning of the 12th, the army passed the
river, and landed without any opposition.

No. XIIL
As the letter ofthe Secretary ofthe department of war. ofthe
24th of June, authorized me to commence offensive operations,
and gives assurances, in behalf of the government, to the inhabi
tants of Canada, of protection, in their persons, property, and
rights ; I shall now state the reasons, which induced me to make
the invasion, and issue the proclamation, when the army landed
on the Canada shore.
The authority given to commence offensive operations, was
absolute. There was no qualifications.— Nothing was left to
m; discretion. The intention of this order is very clearly ex
plained, by another order contained in the same letter.
" Should the force under my command be equal to the enter
prise, consistent with the safety of our other posts, I was order
ed to take possession of Maiden, &c." In this case, the authori
ty was not absolute, but the measure was left to my discretion.
If, therefore, I had not commenced offensive operations, the ex
pectations ofthe government would have been disappointed.
Situated, however, as this army was, there were other very
Strong reasons for the measure. The enemy were erecting for
tifications on the opposite bank, directly opposite to the town of
Detroit. This bank is a little more elevated, than the one on
the American side of the river. Had the enemy, therefore,
been permitted to have finished the fortifications, and armed
them with cannon, the town of Detroit would have been greatly
annoyed, and the situation of the army made uncomfortable.
To dislodge the enemy from this position, I thought both ex-

43
pedient and necessary. The possession of both banks, would
•give us the command ofthe river, and prevent the enemy from
sending supplies to the garrisons on Lake Huron.
There were other objects, under the circumstances I was
placed, which rendered the measure expedient. The delay of
only one or two days, in collecting and repairing the boats, and
in making the necessary preparations increased the impatience,
which had been before manifested and it arose almost to mutiny.
This spirit was fostered, and inflamed generally by the officers
ofthe militia; what the motives were, whether they were an
expectation of plunder, I will not pretend to say. With many
of them, however, they proved to be an unsteady, wayward
spirit ; as about two hundred of them refused to accompany the
army, alledging as a reason, that by law, and by their engage
ments, they were not obliged to march out of the U. States.
Another object, which I considered of great importance, was,
to preserve the neutrality of the inhabitants of Upper Canada,
and the savages, and to prevent them from joining the British
standard. I confidently hoped, when the inhabitants beheld the Ameri
can forces-in the possession of their country, and in a situation
to afford them protection, it would be a strong inducement to
them to remain quietly at their homes, and take no part in the
war. I believed, when the Indians discovered the American stand
ard erected on both sides of the river, it would have a favoura
ble effect, and induce them to return to their villages, and take
no part in a war, in which they had no interest. At this time
there was no information that Michillimackinack had fallen, and
there were some grounds, that these expectations would be
realized. There was another reason, which most powerfully urged me to
take possession of the enemy's country. It was to draw from
it provisions and forage for the support of my army, and to in
tercept, as far as possible, the supplies from the river Le
Trench, to the British garrison at Maiden. In the course of
these memoirs, I shall exhibit the small quantities of provisions,
which were at Detroit, the 5th of July, on my arrival, that none
arrived afterwards, that in the Territory of Michigan, there was
not a sufficiency for the inhabitants, and that the whole stock

• 44
would have been exhausted, long before the capitulation, had
not an additional supply been obtained from the inhabitants of
Canada. The supply indeed was small, but it had a double
operation ; as it increased our stock and diminished that ofthe
enemy. It was taken principally from mills on the river Le
Trench, where it had been prepared for the garrison at Maiden.
I havr stated these reasons, for the invasion of Canada, not that
the government made it one of jthe articles of charges against
me. This indeed, could not have been done, because it was
by its own order ; but I have done it to satisfy some of my fel
low citizens of its expediency, who have attached blame to me
for the measure, under the circumstances, in which 1 was placed.
Had it not been done by the orders of the government, there is
no doubt it would have been one of the first charges against me,
for which I should have been condemned.
These are the reasons, which induced me to commence offen
sive operations, and not with a view to storm the British fort
at Maiden, with undisciplined and mutinous militia. My let
ter to the Secretary of War, which has been recited, is conclu
sive evidence on this subject, I repeat the words. " The Bri
tish command the water and the savages ; I do not think the
force here equal to the reduction of Amherstburg, (the fort at
Maiden,) you therefore must not be too sanguine."

No. XIV.
On the subject of the number which I shall now present to
you, l feel more interest than on any other which has been or
will bediscussed. It is the proclamation which I issued to the
inhabitants of Canada. This was not made an article of charge
against me, because it would have re-acted on the administra
tion. By the letter ofthe Secretary of War, of the 24th June,
and which was received before the proclamation was issued, I
was authorized, when I commenced dffensive operations, to
give assurances of protection to the inhabitants, in their per
sons, property, and rights. This was the foundation ofthe pro
clamation, and the substance of it was authorized in this letter,
and the other parts of it contained reasons to induce the inhabi
tants not to take any part in the contest. I shall endeavour to

46
give it a fair and candid explanation, and state the motives
which induced me to issua it in the form it appeared. What
ever opinion you may form of it — whether it meets with your
approbation or disapprobation — I pledge myself to produce au
thentic testimony, that as soon as it was published, it was sent
to the government, approved by the governirient, and conse
quently became the act of the government ; and that, in publish
ing it, I was influenced by pure and honourable motives.
I feel the more solicitude on this subject, because, many hon
ourable men, who have approved of my conduct generally, dur
ing that campaign, have not been satisfied with every part of
the proclamation. As many of you, perhaps, have not had an
opportunity of seeing it, I shall here transcribe the whole of it ;
after which, I shall give such explanations as in my opinion the
text will justify.
By William IIoll, Governour ofthe Territory of Michigan,
and Commanding, the North Western Army.
A PROCLAMATION.
Inhabitants of Canada,
After thirty years of peace and prosperity, the United States
have been driven to arms. The injuries and aggressions, the
insults and indignities of Great Britain have once more left
them no alternative but manly resistance or unconditional sub
mission. The army under my command has invaded your
country ; tljp standard of the Union now waves over the territo
ry of Canada. To the peaceable, unoffending inhabitants, it
brings neither danger nor difficulty. I come to find enemies,
not to make them. I come to protect, not to. injure you.
Separated by an immense ocean and an extensive wilderness
from Great Britain, youN have no participation in her councils,
no interest in her conduct. You have felt her tyranny, you have
seen her injustice. But I do not ask you to avenge the one or
redress the other. The United States are sufficiently powerful
to afford every security consistent with their rights and your ex
pectations. I tender to 'you the invaluable blessings of civil,
political, and religious liberty, and their necessary result-; iu«-
dividual and general prosperity : that liberty which gave deci
sion to our councils and energy to our conduct, in a struggle for
independence, which conducted us safely and triumphantly
through the stormy period of the revolution— -that liberty which

46
liaised us to an elevated rank among the nations of the world j
and which afforded a greater measure of peace and security, of
wealth and improvement, than ever fell to the lot of any
people. In the name of my country, and the authority of government,
I promise you protection, to your persons, property, and rights.
Remain at your homes, pursue your peaceful and customary
avocations ; raise not your hands against your brethren. Many
of your fathers fought for the freedom and independence we now
enjoy. Being children, therefore, of the same family with us,
and heirs to the same heritage, the arrival of an army of friends
must be hailed by you, with a cordial welcome. You will be
emancipated from tyranny and oppression, and restored to the
dignified station of freemen. Had I any doubt of eventual suc
cess, I might ask your assistance, but I do not, I come prepar
ed for eVery contingency. I have a force which will break
down all opposition, and that force is but the vanguard of a
much greater. If contrary to your own interest, and the just
expectations of my country, you should take a part in the ap
proaching contest, you will be considered as enemies, and the
horrours and calamities of war will stalk before you. If the bar
barous and savage policy of Great Britain be pursued, and the
savages be let loose to murder our citizens and butcher ourwo-
menaneVchildren, this war will be a war of extermination. The
first stroke of the tomahawk, the first attempt with the scalping
knife, will be the signal of one indiscriminate sceife of desola
tion. No white man found fighting by the side of an Indian
will be taken prisoner — instant death will be his lot. If the
dictates of reason, duty, justice, and humanity, cannot prevent
the employment of a force which respects no rights, and knows
no wrong, it will be prevented by a severe and relentless sys
tem of retaliation. I doubt not your courage and firmness, I.
will not doubt your attachment to liberty. If you tender your
services voluntarily, they will be accepted readily. The Unit
ed States offer you peace, liberty, and security. Your choice
lies between these and war, slavery or destruction. Choose
then ; choose wisely, and may He who knows the justice of our
cause, and who holds in his hand the fate of nations, guide you
to the result the most compatible with your rights and interest,
your peace and happiness. WILLIAM HULL.

47
Before I' proceed to any particular explanations, I ask you to
bear in mind the situation in which I was placed by the orders
of the government. I was in an enemy's country, with the com
mand of a small body of militia, and a few regulars, (the num
bers will hereafter be .described) nearly three hundred miles
distant from any magazines of provisions, munitions of war, or
re-enforcements. The enemy with which I had to contend, was
all the British troops in Upper Canada, all the militia of that
province, and all the northern and western Indians, both, in the
territory of Canada and the United States, together with all the
strength and resources of the wealthy and powerful North-west
Company. Placed in this insulated situation,'by the orders, of the gov
ernment ; and surrounded by all the veteran British troops in
Upper Canada, a powerful militia, subject to the command
of the British governour of the province, who was the general of
the army ; with but a small stock of provisions on hand and no
possibility of obtaining a further supply, as the lake was com
manded by a British naval squadron, and the only communica
tion by land, a wilderness of more than two hundred miles,
filled with hostile savages ; I saw no possibility of even sustain
ing my situation, unless the militia could be prevented from
taking a part in the war, and joining the British standard.
A large portion of the population of that province had emi
grated from the- United States. They had been educated with
the principles of freedom and independence ; and some of them,
and many of their fathers, had fought and bled in our revo
lutionary contest. They were situated more than three thous
and miles from the country to which they were subjected, and
had no participation or interest in the measures it adopted.
Having for a number of years lived in their neighbourhood, I
had often heard them express the injustice and oppression they
suffered, and their nutural right, and strong wishes, to partici
pate in the same freedom and independence which their breth
ren of the United States enjoyed, and under which they were
so prosperous and happy. They were informed that the force
I had was but the vanguard of a much greater. I considered
that I had solid grounds to make this declaration.
In the, first place, it will be seen that, I was authorized to
pledge the faith of the government, that they should be protect-

48
ed in their persons, property, and rights. Could I have believ
ed that the government would have authorized me to have made
this pledge, without furnishing the means of redeeming it ? I
beg you, my fellow citizens, to look back, and consider what
took place, before I left Washington, on this subject. In my
official communications to the government, I stated, that in the
event of war with Great Britain, it would be necessary to com
mand thewaters of Lake Erie, by a naval force superiour to that
of the enemy ; to provide re-enforcements, to secure the com
munication through the wilderness I was to penetrate — and a
powerful army, to co-operate, from the States of New York and
Pennsylvania, which border on the east part of the lake : that,
without these measures, it would be impossible for me to sustain
my situation ; and the ports of Detroit, Michillimackanack, and ,
Chicago, would fall into the possession of the enemy. I hope,
and indeed believe, you will be satisfied, there were sufficient
grounds on my part for making this declaration.
I now come to that part of the proclamation which regards the
Indians, and the employment of them in the war by the British
government. It is Well known, that the mode of Indian war
fare is to give no quarter. After torturing their prisoners in
the most inhuman manner,' they put them to death, unless they
believe they will be useful to them as slaves, or they can obtain
an high ransom for them. In their warfare, they have no respect
to age, to women, or children ; wherever their p«wer extends, it
becomes an indiscriminate scene of desolation ; and, on their
part, a war of extermination.
In the former wars, it is well known, that many of the. Cana
dians have joined their bands, and in every respect assumed
their dress, and so /assimilated themselves to them, that it Was
'impossible to make any distinction. If it is the Indian mode of
warfare to give no quarter, it is certainly proper for those
v"against whom they fight to observe the same rule. If white men
paint and disfigure themselves, and assume the dress of Indians,
and fight by their side3 in war, in such a manner that they can
not be distinguished, I ask whether it is not/proper to treat them
in the same manner as Indians. By a reference to General
Brock's proclamation, in answer to mine, it will be seen that he
justified this mode of warfare of his savage allies.

49
It is observed, if the barbarous and savage policy of Great
Britain be pursued, and the savages are let loose to murder
our citizens, and butcher our women and children, this war
will be a war of extermination. It then states, that if the dic
tates of reason, duty, justice, and humanity cannot prevent the
employment of a force, which respects no rights, and knows no
wrongs, it will be prevented by a severe and relentless system
of retaliation.
It will be perceived, that all these declarations are grounded
on the principle of retaliation ; this principle, I have ever been
taught by the high authority of the laws of nations, is well
founded and just. The whole proclamation has been recited >
and I beg it may be particularly observed, that the threatening
declarations are hypothetical ; that, if the enemy pursue this
barbarous policy we must retaliate in our own defence.
On the 13th of July, the day after it was published, a copy of
it was sent to the government. The paragraph of the letter is
in these words : — " Enclosed is a copy of a proclamation to the
inhabitants, which I hope will bfiv approved by the government.
Two hundred copies have been printed and are in circulation."
See Hull's Trial, page 10 ofthe Index. Here follow several
extracts of letters received from the war department, in reply
to my letters about that date. " War Department Aug. 1, 1812.
" Sir: Your letters ofthe 13th and 14th, together with your
proclamation, have been received. Your operations are ap
proved by the President. "
In another letter, dated on the same day the proclamation
was received, the Secretary of war says : " The progress you
have made, and the success which has attended it, are highly
satisfactory to the President."
In another letter from the Secretary of War, dated the 8th
of August, eight days after the receipt of the proclamation, he
says : " Your letters ofthe 21st and 22d of July have been re
ceived and your arrangements are approved by the President."
These letters have lately been obtained from the war office,
and are certified to be true copies.
Thus it appears, from the records of the War office, that my
letter of the 13th of July, enclosing the proclamation, was re
ceived on the 1 st of August ; that on the same day, the Secreta-

50
rf wrote me a letter, acknowledging the receipt of it, and say
ing that my operations were approved by the President.
On the same day, the Secretary wrote me another letter, re
ferring likewise to the one enclosing my proclamation ; in which
he said, " that the progress I had made, and the success which
had attended it was highly satisfactory to the President;" and
in another letter, written eight days after the receipt of the proc
lamation, he says, referring to the same subject, "your ar
rangements are approved by the President." %
After this explanation and state of facts, which has been
proved by the records ofthe goverment, I confidently submit the
subject to your candid decision.
I have been the more particular on this subject for two reasons
which have not been mentioned. One is, although this procla
mation was* not an aricle of charge against me, as I before ob
served, yet it was copied from the records of the government,
and sent to the court martial as evidence against me on my
trial, and published with the other evidence, by Lieut. Col.
Forbes, in his report of my trial. There could have been
no other motive, but to have created unfavourable impres
sions against me. Ifeis with reluctance, that I state the other
reason, because it may in some measure, affect characters, for
whom I have the highest respect, and on whom the future hopes
of our country are placed.
By the journal of the proceedings of the commissioners, at
the treaty of Ghent, it appears, that the commissioners on the
part of Great Britain, stated some improper aggressions, which
our government had committed against the inhabitants of Cana
da. Not having the journal before me, I cannot state. precisely,
and it is not necessary, what they were. The American com
missioners asked them for the evidence. The proclamation,
which has been referred to, was offered as evidence. The
American commissioners declared that it was unauthorized and
disapproved by the government.
On this subject, mv fellow citizens, you have before you the
documents and evidence, giving me an authority to issue this
proclamation," of its being sent to the government, and the Pres
ident's- approbation of it, in three letters, after it had been re
ceived,— my enquiries of the Hon. John Quincy Adams, or

51
what grounds that declaration was made, and his answer, are
contained in my second number.
Thus, it appears, that every wheel, and indeed the whole
machinery of the administration, was put in motion, however
distant from the centre of operation, to exonerate itself, and
place on my shoulders^ all the misfortunes which took place at
the commencement of the war ; a war, however just were the
causes of it, was declared without any preparation; and I can
safely appeal to the public records, to prove, contrary to every
opinion I had given on the subject.
In not less than three official communications made to the
administration, I stated that if war was declared, without
the command of the lake, Detroit, Michillimackanack and
Chicago, must in the nature of things, fall into the hands of the
enemy. *

No. XV.

Having in the former numbers explained the motives which
rendered It expedient, to cross the Detroit river, and take a posi
tion with the principal part of the forces on the opposite bank, I
shall now endeavour to satisfy you of the propriety of the delay
in this situation, and offer the reasons why an attack on the
British fort at Maiden was not made. In the same letter, from
the Secretary of War, which authorized me to commence offen
sive operations, an attempt to take possession of the British fort
at Maiden, was left to my discretion. This letter was received
the 9th of July, in the evening. On the same evening this let
ter was received, I wrote to the Secretary, in answer to it, in
these words: — "The British command the water and the sav
ages. — I do not think the force here, equal to the reduction of
Amherstburg. You therefore, must not be too sanguine. "
As the Secretary's letter only authorized me to make the at
tack on the British fort at .Maiden, provided, I considered my
force adequate to the enterprise, and consistent with the safety
of my other posts ; and as in my answer, I gave it as my opinion
that my force was not equal to the enterprise, and gave my
reasons for the opinion, (vjz.) that the enemy commanded the

52
wafer and the savages. I could not have believed it possible*
after the government had confided this measure to my discretion,
and had fully approved of my conduct, that it could have been
made a charge of capital offence against me. But so it was, and
I therefore, must ask the indulgence of your patience, in stating
the reasons, which governed my conduct.
After having received these discretionary orders, and after
having given this answer and opinion, if I had made the attempt,
and it had been unsuccessful, what would the officers of the ad
ministration have said ? They would have said, and with pro
priety, that I was only authorized to adopt this measure, provi
ded my force was competent to it ; that I had communicated to
them my opinion that it was not competent to it, and therefore
it had been attempted, contrary to the spirit ofthe orders I had
received, and would then nave been a sufficient ground for an
article of charge. In explaining the reasons of my conduct on
this occasion, nothing shall be disguised* nothing shall be kept
back, nothing shall be said, but what is foupded in truth, whe
ther it operates for or against me. Under these impressions,
I wish you to understand, that on the 9th of July, when I wrote
to the Secretary of War, and informed him that my force was
not equal to the reduction of Maiden, it was uncertain, what
part the inhabitants of Upper Canada would take in the war.
They were subjects of the British nation, and liable to the or
ders of its government. Unless in some way they could be pre
vented from taking a part i:i the war, they alone were sufficient
to overwhelm the whole of my army. They were militia, com'-'
posed of the same materials, as the principal part of my army
and more than five times its number. With respect to the sav
ages, many of them at that time had joined the British stand
ard, and no certain calculations could be made, that I should
be able to induce them to return and remain quiet at their vil
lages. It was well known that a great portion of the inhabitants
ofthe Province, felt no very strong attachment to the govern
ment under which they lived. Many of them, as I have before
observed, were born and educated in the United States, had en*
joyed the. blessings of a free government, and were united to
us by ties of friendship and of blood.
They remembered the time when the United States, were
provinces of Great Britain, the history of our revolution, and

53
were not ignorant of the blessing we enjoyed as an independent
nation. I could not but indulge the expectation, that from their
situation and feelings, they would not have been disposed to
have joined in the war against us. For some time every ap
pearance justified this expectation. Large numbers, who had
been called into Maiden for its defence, came to our camp, and
received the protection of our government. Numbers came from
every part of the province, and gave assurances of their friend
ship, and their determination, not to take arms against us. Un
der these circumstances, I considered delay favourable to my
operations, as the force of the enemy was every day diminish
ed. Strong detachments were made to the river Trench, to
collect provisions, and to Maiden, to reconnoitre the situation
of the enemy. All the artificers of the army were employed in
making carriages for twenty-four pounders, for the attack on the
fort at Maiden, and floating batteries were commenced to tran
sport them down the river, if possible, to operate against the
enemy's naval force.
These preparations for an attack on the fort at Maiden, were
made under the expectation, or at least the hope, that the de
sertion of the militia would continue, and other events would
take place, which would render that measure expedient.
During this delay, a clamour was excited in the camp, by the
officers of the militia, because the army was not immediately
marched to the attack of Maiden. In consequence of this im
patience, two days after the invasion of the enemy's territory,
I called a council of war, and proposed the question, whether
it were expedient to attempt, with the bayonet, to storm the fort
at Maiden. The council determined that no attempt ought to
be made on Maiden, until the heavy artillery was prepared.
Although, from the time of the first council, to the 5th of Au
gust, many circumstances had taken place, which will hereafter
be related, to render an attack on Maiden still more inexped
ient, and the heavy artillery had not been completed, yet on ac
count of the great impatience of the officers, I called another
council of war, on the 5th of August.
In this council, I staged that the heavy artillery was not in
readiness, but would be in two or three days. The question
was then submitted to the council, whether it were expedient to
wait for the heavy artillery, in order to make a breach in the

54
works, or immediately to make the attempt with the bayonet
alone P
Before the question was taken, I observed to them, that if it
should be their opinion that it was expedient to make the at
tack immediately, and they would answer for their men, I would
lead them to the enterprise. Colonel Miller, (who commanded
the regulars,) answered, he would be answerable for the men
he commanded. Colonels McArthur, Cass, and Finley, (who
commanded the militia,) said they would not be answerable, but
hoped they would behave well. The council then determined
that it was expedient to wait two days longer for the heavy ar
tillery. Thus it appears, that notwithstanding the impatience and de
sire which was manifested to attack the fort with the bayonet,
yet when it came to the test, and I declared to them that I
would lead them, if in their opinion in council, they thought it
expedient, their impatience and desire subsided, and they
thought it best to be aided in the enterprise by the heavy artil
lery. These facts are proved by the testimony of Colonel Mil
ler, and others, and a more particular detail, will be found in
my defence before the court martial.

No. XVI.
As the measures alluded to in my last number of not attack
ing Maiden, and of recrossing the Detroit river, were made ar
ticles of capital charge against me, by the administration, I
must ask your particular attention to these subjects. However
contrary they were to my feelings and wishes, yet under the
Unexpected circumstances, which had taken place, they were in
my opinion dictated by a sense of imperious duty— had I been
influenced only by a desire of popular fame, and not been gov
erned by the dictates of duty, I should have been unworthy of
the confidence which had been placed in me.— There existed,
however, powerful inducements to a departure from the line of
conduct which I pursued. I well knew the interest which the
progress of the army I commanded had excited, and the expec
tations which were cherished. I well knew the feelings of the

55
officers and soldiers of the Ohio-militia* tfho in a patriotic man
ner had volunteered their services ; and the effect that a retro
grade movement would have on them. I well knew their
anxious desire, when they returned to their homes, after the
fatigues and dangers of the campaign had passed, to be adorn
ed with laurels, and to be hailed by their friends and neighbours
as the conquerors of Maiden. As to myself had I been influ
enced by motives of ambition alone, I was no stranger to the
road which would have conducted me to popular favour, or of
the rewards and honours, which an achievement so anxiously ex
pected, would have bestowed.
In adopting the measures, which I did on this occasion, I
hope to convince you, that I was influenced by the purest mo
tives, that the measures were strictly conformable to establish
ed military principles, and that not even errours of judgment,
much less crimes, ought to have been imputed to me.
The number of effective men, of which my army consisted,
has been greatly exaggerated, both at this time, and at the time
of the capitulation. — In the course of these memoirs, I shall
pregent a more particular detail. At present, I sliall make
such statements and present such documents, as will enable
you to form a satisfactory estimate of my forces in the enemy's
country, at the time I recrossed Detroit river.
By the letter of the Secretary of war, of the 9th of April,
1812, which gave me the command of these forces, their num
bers were stated, and the objects for which they were called
into service. The numbers were 1200 militia from the state of
Ohio, and the 4th United States' Regiment, which consisted of
about 300. I never received any instructions from the Govern
ment to march with a larger force. A few straggling volun
teers, from the novelty of the scene, curiosity, or a desire to
see the country, followed the army, and were included in the
return. On the road which was opened through the wilderness three
_ block houses were built, and garrisoned for the purpose of aid
ing in the security of the communication, and the protection of
convoys of provisions, against the savages. It appears from
Lieut. Furbush's testimony, and other evidence- on ray trial
(Page 146 of Lieut. Col. Forbes' report of the trial,) all the
sick of the army, with a suitable number to take care of them,

56
were made prisoners in the vessel, which sailed from the Mi
ami, on the 1st of July, for Detroit, in passing the Fort at Mai
den before I had received information of the declaration of
war. — This number must have been as many as sixty, as the
Lieut, who was himself on board the vessel, says, it was as
many as she could carry. A number of the sick of the army,
on its march, were left at the river Raisin, and never again
joined it. One hundred and eighty of the Ohio militia refused
to pass the river when I commenced offensive operations, al-
ledging as a reason, that, they were not obliged to serve out of
the United States. The aggregate of these numbers, will
amount to more than three hundred. In addition to this num
ber, a subaltern officer and thirty men, were left at the Miami,
to build a- stockade fort, by orders from the Secretary of war.
Besides this, it was necessary to leave a portion of the troops,
for the security of the fort of Detroit, and the other posts in its
vicinity. In addition to the Ohio militia, and the 4th regiment, there
was a company in the fort of Detroit. Being governour of the
territory, its militia Were under my command. The population
of that territory did not much exceed four thousand, and scat
tered from lake Superior to the Miami of lake Erie, a distance
of about five hundred miles. Little or no advantage could be
derived from this militia. The unfortunate loss of my papers
during the campaign, the circumstances of which will be parti
cularly related in a future number, prevents me from giving,
at present, a more particular detail. But here we. have the
highest authority for the numbers ordered by the government,
and in my trial, will be found conclusive evidence, with respect
to those taken in the vessel, those left in the block houses, and
those who refused to pass the river. — It was now the 6th or 7th
of August ; the troops had endured great fatigue in opening the
road on their march, and the principal part of them had not
¦been inured to a camp life. They were in a country liable to
the ague and fever, and a large number were sick and de
bilitated. At my trial mv prosecutors endeavoured to make the numbers
as large as possible — A return was presented to the Court
Martial made at fort Finlay at the commencement of the
march, and before any detachments were made, and the total

57
number amounted to a few more, than were ordered by the
government. This return included all the volunteers, and fol
lowers of the army, not legally subject to my command, waa;-
onners, packhorse-men, &c. &c. &c. On the data here given
the effective force at Sandwich, could not have been one thou
sand, which will appear evident by mathematical calculation-
In a future number, in which I shall state the reasons why
the capitulation was necessary, I shall explain the manner in
which Gen. Brock made the numbers so much larger. I will
now only state a few facts on that subject. In the first place,
the troops made prisoners at Michillimackanack, were at De
troit on their parole, and were included in the number. Like
wise the Michigan militia were included, which joined the ene
my on their first landing at the. Spring Wells. Major Jessop,
who was one of my most violent prosecutors, and who mani
fested a. desire to augment my force as much as possible, in his
testimony before the Court Martial, says we crossed the river
¦with sixteen or eighteen hundred men. This however was a
mere matter of opinion, because he did not state, or produce
any document or evidence on . which it was grounded. By his
own expressions. he was uncertain, and had no correct data, on
which even to found an opinion. His testimony therefore,
leaves it as uncertain, as if he had said, between a thousand
and eighteen hundred. By the official documents and evidence,
which I have here given, it is impossible in the nature of things,
that his opinion could have been correct. Notwithstanding this
testimony, I think you must be satisfied that at this time, I had
not on the Canada shore, a thousand effective men.
Without giving any weight to my opinion, from the evidence
here exhibited, and an accurate calculation, you will be able to
form an estimate for yourselves. I shall now proceed to state
the situation in which I was placed, and offer my reasons, for
not making an attack on the fortress at Maiden Obedience to
orders, is the first duty of a military officer. I will therefore
again state, the only order I had received on the subject. In
the letter of the Secretary of war, of the 24th of June, I was
only authorized to make the attempt, provided I thought my
force was adequate to the enterprize, and it could be' done con
sistent with the safety of my other posts. Here it was left to
H»y discretion, and if I did not believe it could be done with
8

58
safety, in the manner stated in the order, neither its, letter nor
spirit authorized the enterprise.
The following reasons induced me to believe that it was not
expedient. The few undisciplined forces I commanded, were in an ene
my's country, and surrounded by foes of every description.
The waters and the wilderness were enemies, which in the na
ture of things, could not be controuled by any means' in my
power. I had no communication with my country, excepting
through one or the other of them. The first was obstructed by
the enemy's navy, the other by his savage allies. Thus it ap
pears, my communication was entirely cut off, and distant
about three hundred miles from any part of the country on
which I could depend for re-enforcements, or necessary sup
plies. Information had now baen received, that the fortress at Mich
illimackanack, situated on the navigable waters above me, and
which the enemy commanded, had fallen into the possession of
the British and savage forces, which surrounded it.
The news of this event was accompanied with information
which cast a shade over my prospects, and greatly encouraged
and strengthened the force ofthe enemy opposed to me.
Immediately after the fall of Michillimackanack, messages
were sent by the Indian Chiefs, who attended the British troops
in the reduction of that place, and who inhabited the adjacent
country, to all the villages south, as far as Miami, informing
them that they had joined the British standard, that Michilli
mackanack had fallen into their hands, that Chichago was in
vested, and that they were all preparing to proceed to Maiden ;
that they expected there to meet all their warriours, and assist in
the reduction of Detroit. That an express had likewise been
sent to General Brock, informing him ofthe event, and that the
Canadians and savages were coming to join the army at Mai
den. About the same time, viz. the 4th of August, I received
information, that Major Chambers, of the British army, with a
detachment of regular soldiers and brass field pieces, had land
ed on the, west part of Lake Ontario, had penetrated as far as
the river Le Trench, and was collecting all the Canadian mili
tia and savages of that part of Canada, to lead them against, my
army. At this time I likewise received information, that Colo-

59
nel Proctor, of the Britfsh army, had arrived from fort Erie, by
water, with re-enforcements at Maiden. As their re-enforce
ments were guarded by an armed vessel, I had nothing to op
pose to them, to prevent their junction at Maiden. Indeed the
advantage to the enemy of commanding the lake became every
day more apparent. Both re-enforcements, and supplies, could
be transported with facility from one post to another, whenever
it became necessary.
At this time, I had intercepted a letter from a Mr. McKenzie,
a member of the North-west Company, at fort William, to a
Mr. Mcintosh of Sandwich, the principal agent of that com
pany, in Upper Canada, dated the 19th of July, 1812. The
genuineness of this letter was proved on my trial, and admitted
in evidence. It affords such clear evidence of the force on the
borders of the lakes above1 me, and that it was to be directed
against me, that I shall here recite the following extracts
from it.
" The declaration of war reached us on the 16th inst. [viz.
" 16th July] but we are neither astonished nor alarmed. Our
' ' agents ordered a general muster, which amounted to twelve
"hundred, exclusive of several hundreds of the natives. We
" are equal in all to sixteen or seventeen hundred strong. ' One
"of our gentlemen started on the 17th with several light canoes
" for the interiour country, to rouse the natives to activity,, which
" is not hard to do on the present occasion. We likewise dis-
" patched messengers in all directions with the news. I have not
"the least doubt but our force in ten days hence, will amount to
" five thousand effective men. Our young gentlemen and en -
"gagees, offered most handsomely, to march immediately for
"Michillimackanack. Our Chief, Mr. Shaw, expressed his
"gratitude, and drafted one hundred. They are to proceed
" this evening for St. Joseph's. He takes about as many In-
" dians. Could the vessel contain them, he might have had
"four thousand more. It now depends on what accounts we
"receive from St. Joseph's whether these numerous tribes, from
" the interiour will proceed to St. Joseph's or not."
At the time I intercepted this letter, its contents were con
firmed by the information I received from Lieutenant Hanks,
Doctor Day, and Mr. Stone, who had arrived, at Detroit from
Michillimackanack, prisoners on parole. They stated, that be?

60
fore they left Michillimackanack, a number of boats and ca
noes had arrived* in which several gentlemen came passengers,
who, they were informed, were agents of the North-w.st C om-
pany, and had come from fort William, on Lake Superior af
ter the news of the declaration of war had been received there ;
and that they gave the same account of the Canadian and sav
age force, and its destination, as is contained in Mr. McKen-
zie's letter. They further stated to me, that a large body of
savages were collected at the outlet of lake Superior and that
two thousand savages, according to the best estimate they could
make, were at Michillimackanack, prepared to proceed and
join the British force at Maiden. Lieutenant Hanks was killed
in the fort at Detroit, which deprived me of his testimony.
Doctor Day and Mr. Stone, who were both at Michillimacka
nack, and present, when Lieutenant Hank made the communi
cation to me, in their testimony on my trial, fully confirmed the
statement here made.
In addition to all this combination of force, which was pro
ceeding against me, symptoms appeared in the interiour of my
camp, not less alarming. The spirit of mutiny, which before
hid manifested itself in whispers, increased, and became more
open. It was evident it was now fostered and encouraged by the
principal officers of the militia, and was fast rising into an
avowed conspiracy. I, however, never believed the extent, en
ormity and malignity of it, until it was confessed in Colonel
Cass' letter to the Secretary of War, (which is published in my
trial, page 25 of the appendix) which, in the course of these
memoirs, will be more particularly noticed.
Notwithstanding the fortress of Maiden had been strengthen
ed by British re-enforcements, notwithstanding many of the
militia of Upper Canada had returned to their duty, under a
proclamation of pardon from the commanding officer, notwith
standing, after the fall of Michillimackanack, the Wyondots, and
other tribes of Indians connected with them, had joined the
standard of the enemy, yet, under all the circumstances, I was
determined to make the attempt on the fort on the 8th of Au
gust, and made my arrangements accordingly.
And I now repeat what I stated in my defence, that there is
no part of my conduct, since I have been a soldier, that I reflect
upon with so much self conviction of errour, as I do upon this.

I look back with 'regret upon the moment when Iyielded to the
councils of the inexperienced officers I commanded, and deter
mined to make an attempt, which my own judgment did not ap
prove, which was contrary to all military knowledge, and which
even success might not justify. I thought, however, it was pos
sible, that if I were successful, and should possess myself of the
enemy's fortress, I might possibly maintain myself there, for
some short time ; and in that time, I hoped I might have some
succour and security, from my own country, and her armies,
that I had been led to expect would be operating below me.

No. XVII.

I shall now ask your attention to the reasons which finally in
duced me not to make the movement and attack on the fortress
at Maiden, according to the arrangement I had made, but to re-
cross the river with the principal part of the army, oh the even
ing of the 7th of August. That afternoon I received two letters
from General Hall, who commanded the American troops on
the Niagara Straits, and one from General Porter, from Black
Rock. By these letters I was informed that a large number of
boats, filled with British troops, had passed over Lake Ontario,
to the west part of it, and were directing their course to Mai
den, and likewise, that the British forces, wifh the Canadian
militia, and savages, on the opposite side of the Niagara river,
were moving by water, to the same point; and what was
more decisive still on my operations, by the same letters I was
informed that nothing would be done there to check these move
ments, and that no assistance or co-operation would be afforded
from that quarter, to the army I commanded. It is impossible
for me to express the disappointment which this information oc
casioned — what possible events could have taken place, which
would have authorized General Brock to have withdrawn the
troops from fort George, fort Erie, and the other posts on the
Niagara river, I could not conceive; — especially, as I had
grounds to believe that the whole strength of the American
forces were posted on the opposite" bank — and as the Secretary
•f War had informed General Dearborn of iny situation, and

62
had ordered him to make diversions in the enemy's country, at
those very stations, from which I was informed they were with
drawn, and were bearing on me. The real and true causes'
which enabled the enemy to withdraw his forces from those sta
tions on the Niagara river, and concentrate them, and his other
troops, against the army I commanded, were then unknown to
me. The mystery has since been unfolded, and the causes are
as apparent as the sun at noon -day without a cloud. It was the
armistice, or cessation of hostilities, which General Dearborn,
the senior officer of the army, agreed to the beginning of Au
gust, and which he communicated to the Secretary of War, on
the 8th of the same month, as appears by his letter of that
date, in which the army I commanded was not included, but
which extended to all the other forces on the northern borders.
This convention, or agreement entered into by General Dear
born, and its consequences on my situation, will be fully con
sidered in my future numbers.
It now appeared that the whole war against Canada, was to
be carried on with the 1200 Ohio militia, and three hundred
regulars, which were placed under my command. It will be re
membered before I crossed the river, and took a position in
the enemy's country, I stated to the Secretary of War, in my
letter ofthe 9th of July, which has been before referred to, that
I did not consider my force adequate to the enterprize, and in
a former number, have stated the reasons, which induced me
to cross the river and take possession of Sandwich.
When I received these letters from General Hall and Gener
al Porter, the expectations which I had before entertained of
my communication by the lake being opened by a naval force,
and of assistance and co-operation, from our armies on the Nia
gara river, were at an end. These letters from Generals Hall
and Porter,, were admitted in evidence on my trial, and the time
and circumstances of receiving them proved, by the testimony
of Colonel Miller, to whom I communicated the contents. (See
Col. Miller's testimony, page 1 17, Lieut. Col. Forbes' report of
my trial.)
After this information, and thus situated, I determined to re-
cross the river with the principal part of the army, not with an
intention of relinquishing the object of the reduction of Maiden,
and offensive operations against Canada, but of waiting until

63
more favourable circumstances should present themselves, and
in the meantime of attempting to open my communication
through the wilderness.
I had now, no communication with my country, and it was
not possible to obtain any through any other channel. On the
security of this communication for the purpose of obtaining sup
plies, I considered the very existence of my army depended.
If I had believed that an attack on Maiden, with a probability
of success, would have effected the object of opening this com
munication, or of even giving facility to it, I should cheerfully
have undertaken it.
As I have before observed, my own fame, and the gratification
of my officers, were powerful inducements to the measure.
Situated, however, as I was, it was my opinion that it would
have been a useless waste of blood, and success would have been
attended with no advantage.
The reduction of Maiden could have had no effect on the na
val force of the enemy, unless all the harbours on the Canada
shore, and among the islands, had been in our possession. It
would have been utterly impossible to have maintained the for
tress. It must have fallen for the want of supplies. The wa
ters of the lakes would have remained shut against us. If,
therefore, the road through the wilderness to the settlements of
Ohio could have been opened, still no supplies could have pas
sed into the fort without crossing the water, and that would
have been prevented by the enemy's naval force.
As Michillimackanack had fallen, if we had possessed Mai
den, in a very short time it would have been assailed by all the
Canadians attached to the North-western Company, with the
numerous and powerful hosts of savages of that region, and by
the British force, which had landed on the western part of Lake
Ontario, with the militia and savages of that part of the coun
try. The naval armament would have co-operated with these
forces, the supplies would have been intercepted, and no relief
or assistance could*possibly have been afforded.
If, with the knowledge I had of the forces which were march
ing 'against me, I had made an attack on Maiden, it would
have been as great a crime as any of which I was accused by
the administration, and I certainly should have wanted the con
sciousness of having acted from the purest motives, and accord-

64
ing to my best judgment, Which has been my consolation in all
I have suffered.
Thus it appears, that the little army I commanded was en
tirely cut off from the country, and could receive no more sus
tenance from it than the arm can receive sustenance when cut
off and separated from the human body ; and remaining in this
situation, it must as inevitably have perished as the arm would
perish without receiving sustenance from the source on which it
1 depended for life. As I considered the existence of my army
depended on opening the communication through the road to
Ohio, and as no other possible mode presented of effecting it but
by recrossing the river with the principal part of the army, it
was adopted on the evening of the 7th of August.
These, fellow citizens, as I observed in my defence, were
the grounds on which I made a retrogade movement with a part
ofthe army to Detroit. It was from thence I could open the
only channel, through which it could derive the means of its
existence. If my judgment then misled me, it continues yet to
mislead me ; for every day that I have lived I have become more
confident that I did right to leave the enemy's country. Had I
followed the dictates of my own judgment I should have made
my retreat to the Miami, and there waited for co-operation and
assistance. The distance from thence to the settlements in
Ohio would have been comparatively short ; I should have had
no enemy in my rear but savages, and it might have been possi
ble to have preserved my communication, and obtained supplies.
The day after I recrossed the river, (the 9th of August,) I pro
posed this measure to-some of the principal officers. I will here
give the answer of Colonel Cass. It was, that if I did, under
the existing circumstances, every man of the Ohio volunteers
and militia would leave me. His language was, as he states
it himself, that the militia would retreat with me if they thought
a retreat necessary. But as they undertook to judge that it was
not then necessary, they would leave me, and not a man would
retreat under my command. Colonel Cass's testimony on this
subject is in the following words. "I recollect a conversation,
after the retreat from Canada, and before we went to the rivet-
Raisin, in which General Hull suggested, that as he heard of no
co-operation from below, it might be necessary to take post at
the Miami. I think I told General Hull that, if under existing

65
circumstances, he took such a step, the Ohio militia would da*
sert him to a man. Whether I told General Hull so or not, I
ftm confident it would have been the case." This, among many
other things which might be mentioned, is evidence of the insub
ordination which was among the troops. That this spirit was
encouraged by the principal officers is evident, from the confes
sions of some of them on my trial. The officers were indebted
to the soldiers for their stations ; they were their neighbours,
and were elected by them. They lived together, in camp on
habits of perfect equality, and before this campaign, neither
officers nor soldiers had ever seen any actual service, and had
never been accustomed to any military discipline excepting
company trainings about their doors. It is unnecessary for me
to describe the difficulty of commanding troops of such a char
acter; or of performing any military operations where obedience
to orders is essential to success. No better exemplification can
possibly be given than the conduct which both officers and men
exhibited on thiB occasion.
lt may probably be asked, why did you not arrest the princi
pal officers who had been guilty of this conspiracy, and who had
excited this insubordination ? I answer, by asking another ques
tion. Whether you believe these volunteers from the militia,
who composed more than two thirds of the army, would have
suffered the leaders they had chosen, to be deprived of their
command ? Whether an attempt of the kind would not have
produced a civil war in the camp ? This same spirit had been
manifested from the commencement to the end of the campaign.
It was manifested at Urbanna, by a part of the militia refusing
to march when ordered. It was manifested at Detroit, by one
hundred and eighty refusing to cross the river when order
ed ; it was manifested on the march, by conduct towards some
of their own officers, too ridiculous and too disgraceful to be re
peated. And it finally appeared that a Cataline was in our
camp, who had formed a conspiracy to deprive me of the com
mand, with which I had been entrusted by' the government.
This fact appears by the letter of Colonel Cass to the Secretary
of War, which is published in my trial.
Under the events which had taken place, and which had
come to my knowledge, I should have been wanting in the du
ties which I owed to my station, had I not retreated from
0

66
Canada. I retreated for the purpose of taking the most effecfiv*
measures in my power for opening my communication. Its im
portance I have endeavoured to explain. Indeed it was so ob
vious that the administration was sensible of it, and one of the
articles of charges against me was, for not keeping it open, and
another for withdrawing the army from Canada, the only meas
ure by which it possibly could have been effected, In my let
ters to the Secretary of War, immediately after the retreat, I
stated the same reasons which I have here given. Likewise in
my letters to Governour Meigs, of Ohio, Governour Scott, of
Kentucky, &c. These letters bear date the 8th, 9th, and 11th
of August, and Were in evidence on my trial. All these letters,
'written at the time, shew that I retreated from Canada because
I had ascertained that I should soon be surrounded by an over
whelming force ; because there was no possibility of opening my
communication from that station, and because I found the few
regulars and militia under my command, were to be left to car
ry on, without any assistance or co-operation, the offensive war,
which the United States had declared against one of the most
powerful nations on earth. By a referrence to my trial, it will
appear, that Colonel Cass and others of my officers, were sensi
ble at this time of the difficulties of my situation. In a letter
to Mr. Silliman, of Ohio, the brother-in-law of the Colonel, he
says, " that provisions would become necessary for the exist
ence of the troops. " In a letter to the same, after the fall of
Michillimackanack, he says, "that the impression made by that
event could scarcely be conceived." According to Mr. Silli-
man's testimony in his letters to him, ColonelCass pressed him
to use his influence to procure re-enforcemeh.ts for the army,
and expressed his surprize that we were left without co-opera
tion, by putting to his correspondent the following interrogation,
" Is their nothing to be done in the lower end of the lakes to
make a diversion in our favour ?" In a letter to the same gentle
man on the 12th of August, Colonel Cass says, " think our sit
uation as bad as you may, it is still worse."

67

No. XVIH.
Bkfom I proceed to give an account of the measures I adopt
ed, to open the communication, to Ohio, I will state some gen
eral principles, and will endeavour to show the propriety of ob
serving them in all military movements, and will appl* them
to the situation in which I was placed by the orders of the gov
ernment. And here in the first place, I will ask your atten
tion, to the same principles, which I stated in my defence — that
in modern warfare, the first great object of each contending
party, is the resources af his enemy. — The fate of armies is
found to depend upon the abundance of their resources, on their
security, and the facility of keeping up a communication with
them. It has become a principle to manoeuvre in such a man
ner, as to cover the places from whence supplies may be drawn,
not to go far from them, but with great caution, and never to
eease preserving with them those connections, in which the
strength of an army consists, and on which its success depends.
These principles are te be found in the best military au
thors of modern times, and the soundness of them have been
confirmed by numerous examples . The enemy with which I
had to contend, had strictly observed them. His principal post
was at Maiden, on the east bank of the Detroit river, where if
empties into lake Erie. His magazines, which contained all
necessary supplies, were at fort Erie, and at other places, be
tween Maiden and fort Erie, on the borders of the lake, which
his navy commanded. Having no armed vessels, or boats, it
was impossible for me, in the least degree to interrupt this line
of communication-. The enemy's station, therefore, could be
furnished with all necessary supplies, with the greatest facility,
and with the most perfect safety. I now ask you, my fellow
citizens, to cast your eyes on the map of the country, where I
was placed, not by my own judgment and discretion, after the
declaration of war, but by the positive orders of the government,
and consider on what grounds, such orders could have been
justified. As these fatal orders were, in my opinion, one great
cause of the misfortune, which attended the army I commanded,
I shall ask your particular attention to them. On th© 1 8th of

68
June, after war was declared against Great Britain, the Secreta
ry of War, wrote me a letter, in which, he informed me of the
event, and ordered me to march the army I commanded, to De
troit, with all possible expedition. At the time, this order was
given, the President of the United States, by whose command
it was given, well knew, that no preparation was made to build
a navy on lake Erie, and that the enemy commanded it, with a
number of armed vessels and gun-boats.
When, therefore, these fatal orders were given, those, by
whose authority they were given, well knew that the communi
cation through the lake would be closed against us, and that no
re -enforcements, or supplies of any kind, could be obtained for
the army, through that channel. Those, who gave these fatal or
ders, well knew, that after the declaration of war, the army I
commanded, and the posts of Detroit, Michillimackanack, and
Chicago, which had before, in time of peace, been supplied
through the communication ofthe lakes, could only receive their
supplies by land. They well knew, that the State of Ohio, was the
nearest part of our country, from which the necessary supplies
could be furnished. They well knew, that the distance from
any magazines, where these supplies could be obtained, to the
point where they ordered the army, was more than two hun
dred miles, and to the other posts they had established, was
more than five hundred miles.
They well knew, that this distance, was almost entirely a
wilderness, filled with savages^ who in the event of war, would
probably become hostile. They well knew, that the necessary
supplies, could only be carried through this wilderness, on pack-
horses. They well knew, that the only line of communication,
through which these pack-horses, with supplies, could pass, was
for about seventy miles on the margin of lake Erie, and the De
troit river, both of which were commanded by the enemy's gun
boats and vessels of war. They likewise well knew, that these
supplies must pass by the enemy's principal post at Maiden,
Only separated by the Detroit river. Under the orders the ad
ministration had given, they well knew the impossibility of sup
plying the army, and the posts I have mentioned, with the
means of subsistence. They well- knew, the facility and ease,
with which the enemy could assail the convoys, both by his land
and naval forces, on this long and vulnerable line of communi-

69
cation, and the impossibility of stretching the army back, from
the point they had ordered as my station, for the safety and pro
tection of such convoys.
The administration, likewise well knew, when these fatal or
ders were given, that in three separate statements, which I had
made to the President through the medium of the Secretary of
the department of war, 1 had observed that in the event of a war
against Great Britain, a navy on lake Erie, superiour to the Bri
tish was essential to success ; and, that without preserving the
water communication, an army could not be supported at De
troit, and that Detroit, Michillimackanack, and Chicago, would
inevitably fall into the hands of the enemy.
These statements had been received as official documents,
and no objections had ever been urged against them. The ad
ministration, therefore, knew my opinions on the subject, and
certainly ought not to Tmve continued me 'in command, when a
course was to be pursUed directly contrary to the opinion, I had
repeatedly and officially given. t
On a map of the country, . which was the scene of my opera
tions, you will be able - more distinctly to perceive the natural
obstacles, with which I had to contend. Besides seeing the
positions ofthe British and Canadian forces, and the stations of
the different nations of savages, you can see the manner in
which the waters and the wilderness, were arrayed against me.
At present, I can only ask your attention to the general maps of
our country, which will afford some assistance, in obtaining a
knowledge of my situation.
The necessity and importance of preserving my communica
tion with magazines, for supplying the army, I had learned from
reading the best military authors, and from my observations and
experience, during the war of the revolution.
From books, I had been taught, that when an army moved
towards an enemy, its line or lines of operation must be from its
base, on which are its magazines of necessary supplies. That
a connection should always be preserved between the line or
lines of operation, and the base, or magazines. That an army
never ought to advance so far from, the magazines, as to enable
the enemy, to attack and destroy the convoys of supplies from
the magazines to the army, When the army marched from Ur-
banna in Ohio, this rule did- not apply, because we were at

70
peace with Great Britain, and in the country through which F
inarched, there was no other enemy but, savages. The army,-
therefore, carried on'pack-horses, sufficient supplies, for its sup
port, until it arrived at the lake. On the communication
through the lake on our arrival therer we depended for supplies,
as it was open to us, until after the declaration of war.
Near the Miami ofthe lake, I received the fatal order, which
has so often been referred to, informing me of the declaration of
war, and ordering me, positively, to march to Detroit.
Had I not received this order, and the operations had been
left to my discretion, I should not have marched to Detroit,
eighteen miles in the rear of the enemy, but made my move
ments against the enemy, from a different quarter.
I had served under the banners of General Washington, from
the commencement to the end of the revolutionary war.
I had observed, how cautious he was in all his movements, to
preserve a communication with his magazines. He retreated
from Long Island to New York, because he knew the! enemy
would prevent his communication with a naval force in the East
river. He retreated from New York to the White Plains, be
cause the British navy commanded both the East and North riv
ers, and the army was marching to take possession of the high
grounds, beyond King's Bridge, to intercept his communication
from the country, whence he received his supplies. He retreat
ed through New Jersey and passed the Delaware, to take a pos
ition, where he could receive his supplies. In 1777, when Gen
eral St. Clair commanded at Ticonderoga, and found that the
enemy commanded lake Champlain, and was making move
ments to surround the garrison on all sides, and cut off his com
munication, and supplies, he retreated, and abandoned a post,
which was considered the key of the country.
When General Burgoyne, became sensible that he was to re
ceive no co-operation, from New York, and his communication
was cut off from his magazines in Canada, he surrendered un
der a capitulation.
When General Lincoln, was beseiged at Charleston, by a
British fleet and army, and his communication with his maga
zines was cut off, he surrendered.
When the army commanded by Lord Cornwallis at York-

71
*town, was attacked by a naval and land force, and he had no
communication with his magazines, he surrendered.
At an earlier period, during the war between France and
England,' in 1753, when General Washington, (then Major
Washington) and commandant of a colonial regiment, from Vir
ginia, was surrounded and attacked in a Stockade fort, at a
place called the Little Meadows, by a body of Frenchmen and
-savages, by which means, his communieation was cut off from
any supplies, he made a capitulation with the enemy.
Bonaparte, in his Russian campaign, departed from the prin
ciples of the most celebrated military authors. Moscow, the
object of his attack, was so distant from his magazines, that it
was impossible to preserve any connection with them, so as to
receive the necessary supplies. For the support of his army, he
had nothing to depend on, but supplies from the enemy's coun
try. The conflagration of Moscow, and the Russians rising in
mass against him, rendered it impossible to obtain supplies, and
consequently to sustain his situation, at so remote a post.
In this situation, had he proposed a capitulation, he probably
might have saved the lives of more than four hundred thousand
men, for the future services of his empire. His haughty spirit,
and former triumphs forbid any proposition of the kind. In his
attempt to retreat, his army was destroyed by the force of the
elements, and the Russian bayonet. , It may, at least be made
a question, whether, under the circumstances he was placed, he
would not have exhibited more magnanimity, by an attempt to
save the lives of his army, by negotiation, than by the course
he pursued.
I have cited the examples of these celebrated commanders,
for no other purpose, than to illustrate the principle, that, when
an army-is deprived of its communication with its magazines,
on which it depends for its necessary supplies, and cannot open
that communication, so as to obtain them, its fate is inevitable,
and it becomes the duty of its commander, to accept the best
terms from the enemy, which can be obtained.

n

No. xix.
Before I left the enemy's country, having received informa
tion that some beef cattle had arrived at or near the river Rai
sin, escorted by a company of militia from the State of Ohio, I
made a detachment of two hundred men,- under the command of
Major Van-horn, with orders to proceed to the river Raisin, and
guard these cattle safely to camp.
At Brownstown, this detachment was attacked by a body of
savages, and entirely defeated. According to Major Van-horn's
report, eighteen men were killed, twelve wounded, and about
seventy missing. His opinion was, that three hundred Indians
crossed from Maiden, and that from one hundred and fifty to
two hundred were actually engaged. This report was received
on the 5th of August, two days before the retreat from Sand
wich. This unpropitious event increased the difficulty of my
situation, and more strongly convinced me how impossible it
was to continue offensive operations, and furnish at the same
time a sufficient force to give security to so extensive a com
munication. The war had now become both offensive and de
fensive, and the little army I commanded was alone left to car
ry it on in both characters. This was among the reasons which
induced me to recross the river, that I might be able to detach
a mpre powerful force to open the- communication.
For this purpose, therefore, on the very day the army retreat
ed to Detroit, I ordered a. detachment of six hundred men, un
der the command of Colonel Miller, of the 4th United States'
regiment. This command consisted of all the effective men of
thatrregiment, and a selection of the most effective of the mili
tia. It was likewise accompanied by a field piece and howit
zer, from the fort at Deroit. Colonel Miller met a body of the
enemy, consisting of British troops, Canadian militia, and sav
ages ; which, having received information of his approach, was
formed in the, woods in regular order of battle. A disposition
was immediately made on his part for an attack, and after a
severe contest, honourable to the American arms, the enemy
was compelled to retreat. After pressing on his rear about two
miles, Colonel Miller thought proper to discontinue the pursuit,

73
and the enemy embarked, under cover of his armed vessels, and
recrossed to Maiden. The loss, in killed and wounded, in the
battle, on our part, was about eighty. As soon as I received an
account of the action, a re-enforcement of one hundred men,
with a supplyof provisions, under the command of Colonel Mc-
Arthur, was ordered to join Colonel Miller's detachment at
Maguago. As soon as the detachment had recruited from its
fatigue, my intentions was, that it should have proceeded on the
expedition to the river Raisin. A severe storm of rain inter
vened, and the troops were exposed to it without any covering.
I therefore thought it expedient, on account of their great fa
tigue, to order them back to Detroit, and make an arrangement
by another rout to open the communication.
The road to the river Raisin, which passed through the In
dian village of Brownstown, being principally on the margin of
the Detroit river, both troops and convoys could easily be an
noyed by the. gun boats and armed vessels of the enemy' Be
sides, in its course,, there was only the river which separated it
from the enemy's principal post at Maiden. Being thus situat
ed, it was almost impossible to secure it in .such a manner as
that convoys could pass with any kind of safety. After Colonel
Miller's return to Detroit, therefore, seeing the indispensable
necessity of obtaining the supplies which had arrived at the
river Raisin, and being informed of a • circuitous rout, distant
from the river, I thought it expedient to make the attempt in
that direction. I communicated my intentions to Colonels Mc-
Arthur and Cass, and they not only fully approved of the meas
ure, but offered their services, as volunteers, ou the expedition.
I likewise communicated to them a letter from Captain Brush,
who commanded the escort of provisions, informing me that he
should take the back road, and should have occasion for sup
port. I authorized Colonels McArthur and Cass to select the
most healthy and effective men of their regiments, and directed
the Quarter Master to furnish pack-horses to carry provisions
for them during their march. On the 14th of August, Hhey •
commenced their march, under the command of Colonel McArr
thur, attended by Colonel Cass. The progress they made, and
the circumstances which attended the expedition, will hereafter
be related. ,
Thus will be seen "the measures which were adopted, and the
io

74
efforts which were made to open the communication. I havte
been the more particular on this subject, because it was made
art article of charge against me. What more could have been
done, in my situation, and with the force at my disposal, I know
not, unless I had retreated with my whole force to- the Miami.
The reasons why I did not, have been stated in these memoirs.
By the statement here made, the truth of which will be man
ifest by the evidence and documents in my trial, it appears
that I made three attempts to open my communication — one by
a detachment of two hundred men, under the command of Ma
jor Van-horn ; another by a detachment of six hundred of the
best and most effective part of the army, under the command ot,
Colonel Miller; and the third, by all the healthy and effective
men of McArthur's and Cass' regiments, which the two Colo
nels were authorized to select and command themselves.
I now ask the candid reader, in imagination, to fix himself at
Detroit, and view my situation : I ask him to read the orders of
the government, which positively placed me in this situation,
eighteen miles in the rear of the enemy's principal post in the
province of Upper Canada; to look over the waters of- the lake,
and behold the hostile naval armament which commanded them;
to view not only the enemy's principal post, situated on these
waters, but all his magazines established on them, protected by
this naval armament, and capable of being transported, with the
greatest safety and facility, to any point where they might be
necessary. After viewing the situation of the enemy, and his
resources, I ask you more particularly to look at mine. * You
, must look through a dreary wilderness of more than two hun
dred miles, filled with hostile savages, before you can find a
base on which any magazines were established, by which my
little army could be supplied with the means of subsistence.
Through this wilderness you will see no possible com munica-
tion, excepting by a single road, opened by the labour and fa
tigue of this little army, in penetrating to the position to which
it was ordered. This only and single line of operation, was
liable- to be obstructed by the. savage force, to which the na
ture ofthe country was peculiarly suited ; by the whole force of
the enemy's troops, both British and Canadian ; and between
the Miami and Detroit, seventy miles, by the gun boats and
armed vessels on the lake. To give security to this communi-

75
dition, you will see nothing but two or three solitary block
houses, built by the troops when the road was opened, and
guarded only by a few invalid militia, left in them on the
march. ,
By the foregoing memoirs, and by the evidence on my trial,
you will perceive there was no adequate force, on this long line
of operation, furnished by the government, to give security to
it, for the protection of convoys. And when you consider the
attempts I had made and their consequences, I think you will
be satisfied, that with my whole force I could not have stretch
ed back so great a distance as to have preserved the communi
cation. To illustrate a subject of this kind the best writers on
military movements compare an army's lines of operation to the
muscles ofthe human body, on which the life and motions ofthe
members depend. When the whole moving spring of a mem-,
ber is confined to a single muscle, the loss of which would ren
der it useless, ft is the more important to defend it from every-
hurt. So a single offensive line is,, to an army marching to
wards an object, a part singularly sensible, and cannot be too
carefully guarded from contact wjth the enemy.
From the nature ofthe country from Miami to Detroit, it was
impossible to have more than one line of operation, and it has
been shown how singularly it was exposed to be intercepted and
rendered useless.
Thus I think, from the exposition given of my situation, eve
ry unprejudiced reader will be convinced that, there was no
posibility of obtaining any supplies, from any magazines from
my country. I shall now offer for your consideration, the best
evidence and the best documents the nature of the case will ad-
mit of, to satisfy you of the state of the magazines at Detroit,
and the supplies which could have been obtained from the coun
try around it, 4»
As a true knowledge of this subject is very important in form
ing an opinion of the measures I adopted, and as the grossest
misrepresentations nave been made by my enemies, I shall make-
it a separate article in my next number.

76

No. XX.
That you may clearly understand the situation in which 1 was
placed, with respect to provision, for the army,, it will be neces
sary, that you should be acquainted with the country, audits
resources. At this time the population, of the Michigan terri-,.
tory, of which Detroit was the capital, was between four and
five thousand souls —Their settlements were on the Miami
of lake Erie, the river Raisin, Ecoss, Rouge, and the Detroit
river, lake St. vClair, the river Huron, which empties into lake
St. Clair, the river St. Clair, and the island of Michillimack- .
anack — at that time much the greatest part, indeed almost
the whole, who cultivated the land, were Canadians. — They
were miserable farmers, paid little attention to agriculture, and
depended principally on hunting, fishing, and tiding with the
Indians for support. — The produce of the territory, in the sub
stantial articles of living, was by no means sufficient for the
subsistence ofthe inhabitants.' — They were supplied, with pork,
beef, flour, and corn from the State of Ohio, and the parts of
New York and Pennsylvania, which border on lake Erie — not- ,
withstanding these facts are well known, I will refer to some
testimony, to satisfy those, who are unacquainted with the ter
ritory. Captain Thomson Maxwell, in his evidence on my trial, tes
tified, "that he had lived thirteen years in Ohio, and had been
engaged every year, in driving cattle and hogs, from thence to
Detroit market ; from a thousand to fifteen hundred hogs an
nually, from one hundred and fifty, to two hundred pounds
each — and from an hundred and fifty, to two hundred head of
cattle. — They were generally driven through, the woods, without
any road." — Colonel Kingsbury, of the 1st United States' regi
ment, testified, "that he commanded at Detroit about two years,
and left it in 1811, and .that during the time he commanded
there, there were large droves of hogs, and fat beef cattle, driv
en from Ohio, to that market".
A great variety of other evidence might be adduced to prove
his fact, but 1 deem it,. unnecessary.
lt is only necessary to know the character of the inhabitants
and the situation oi the country, to be satisfied of the. fact  uni-

77
versal experience proves, that nothing but necessity will induce
men to toil and hard labour. They are much better pleased
with the chase, fishing, &c. Without making any further ob
servations on this subject, I believe you will be convinced, af
ter considering how long the army had been among these peo
ple, and how much had been taken from them that there were
no grounds, to calculate on any further supplies from their scan
ty stores.
I shall now endeavour to demonstrate, from the best evidence
which the nature of the case will admit, the state of provisions
at Detroit, at the time of the capitulation.
Augustus Porter, Esq. of the State of New York, was the con
tractor for furnishing this army.— David Beard, Esq. was his
agent, and was present at Detroit.
Before my trial, and pending my trial, I repeatedly request
ed that Davicl Beard who then resided in the State of New York,
might be summoned as a witness to prove the quantity of pro
visions at Detroit before, and at the time of the capitulation.
The Judge advocate assured ine, he should be summoned. Near
the close of the trial, as he did not appear, I wrote him a letter,
informing him how important his testimony was, and requested
his attendance. He arrived in Albany the day the evidence was
closed, and his certificate of the quantity of provisions, was ad
mitted in evidence. It w II appear by the minutes of the trial
that his testimony, was the last before 1 made my defence.
This being the best evidence" which the nature of the case will
admit of, l presume ought to controul all other evidence. Mr.
Beard, was not only the agent, who did all the business at De
troit, but I understood from him, had some share in the profits of
the contract. He could have no motive, to have diminished the '
quantity, because the United States must have paid for all
that was on hand at the time of the capitulation.
By the contractor's agent's certificate, it will appear that on
the ninth of July, 1812, tisere was at Detroit 126,000 rations of
flour, and 70,666 rations of meat; and that on the 28th of July,
there was 70,000 rations of flour, and 21,000 of meat. Mr.
Beard has certified that this statement was handed to me, con
taining the provisions in the contractor's store, and signed by
him as will appear by the proceedings of the Court Martial, on
my trial .

78
By this return, it will appear, what quantity was consumed,,
from the ninth, to the 28th of July, what quantity remained on
hand, the 28th of July, and by observing the same rule of con
sumption, it will appear, what quantity, would have been in
store, on the 16th of August, the, day of the capitulation.
By the data here given it will appear that, if a ration of meat
had been issued, the meat would have been exhausted on the 6th
of August, ten days before the capitulation. And if during
those ten days,* after the meat was exhausted, an additional
quantity of flour had been issued', to make up the ration, as was
the case, the whole of the flour would have been exhausted on
the 16th of August, the day of the capitulation, it appears by-
the return of the contractor, that from the 9th to the 28t.h of July,
that 5,334 rations of flour, more than'of meat, were issued, and
that practice was continued, in about the same proportion, un
til the 16th of August. There is another reason why so much
more flour was issued than meat. — In a former part of these
memoirs, I stated, that tiie old-Indian Chiefs and Sachems con
tinued friendly to the United States, and advised the warriours
not to join the British standard, or to take any part in the con
test. These friendly Chiefs and Sachems, with the women and
children, daily came to Detroit from the villages, in a starving
condition. It had long been the custom, and I was ordered by
the Government, as superintendant of Indian affairs, on their
visit to this post, to furnish them with provisions. At this time,
I directed, on account of the deficiency of meat, that flour alone
should be issued, which they preferred. Every effort was made
to prevent these visits, and no more provisions were issued to
them, than was necessary to preserve life.
Perhaps it may be asked by those unacquainted with my situ
ation, and the practice of armies, why so many more rations
were daily issued, than the number of effective men, which
composed the army ? I will give the true answer to an enquiry
of this kind.
It will appear by the foregoing memoirs, that the officers and
soldiers from Michillamackinack had arrived at Detroit prison*
ers on parole, and they had no other means of subsistence, but
to receive rations. ,
It likewise1 appears, that a large number of old Indian Chiefs
and Sachems, daily visited our camp, and were fed from the pub
lic stores by order .of the Government, as I before stated.

79
It was now the middle of August, and a large number of sick
Were to be provided for, and there being no medical stores it was
necessary to issue meat and flour, for their subsistence.
A number of women, are attached to all armies, and it is a
general custom to furnish them with provisions. All the officers
are entitled to extra rations, from twelve to two. All the quar
ter-masters' department, such as waggoners, pack-horsemen,
boatmen, &c.are entitled to rations. I think this statement will
satisfy any enquiries on this subject.
Although every possible effort was made by the administration
to prove, that the state of the provisions, was no reason for the
¦capitulation ; yet, on a careful examination of all the evidence
on my trial, I can find nothing which ought to have any weight
in any degree to controul, or vary the statement, here made.
It has been said by Cols. M'Arthur and Cass, and other wit
nesses, that they never heard any complaints of the want of pro
vision. Brevet-Major Whistler is the only witness, who has
given any testimony on this subject worthy of notice.
His testimony is in the words following : " I went, some days
before the army re-crossed, with a Mr. Beard, the deputy con
tractor, to a store which held the provisions of the army, and
saw, and helped to count between 2 and 300 barrels of flour, 48
barrels of pork, and 16 or 17 barrels of salt beef." From this
testimony of the Brevet Major, it is impossible to determine, the
quantity, if any, which was in the store on the 1 6th of August.
And for this conclusive reason, that he does not ascertain the
day, that he was in the store, and it is impossible to ascertain it,
from any thing he said. He said, " some days before the army
re- crossed the river." It might have been three or four days be
fore, or it might have been fifteen or twenty. It is unfortunate
for me, that he did not recollect the day, because had it been
only three or four days before the army re -crossed the river, the
quantity, by his testimony, would not have been so great, as it
appears to be by the returns of the deputy contractor. This
can easily be ascertained and reduced to mathematical demon
stration, from the data here given.
I feel confident, that I am not blinded by prejudice, in be
lieving, that every person, who will read this statement, and the
evidence, by which it is proved to be true, will be satisfied, that
the state of the Provisions in the store, and the impossibility of

obtaining a supply, from any other quarter, presented very pow
erful reasons, for the measures, which I adopted on the 16th of
August. In my next number, I shall present to you, my fellow citizens,
documents, from the records of the government, to prove the
assistance, and co-uperation, which the administration instruct
ed General Dearborn, the senior officer of the army, to afford
me, and to convince you, by the most conclusive testimony, that
in violation of his orders, instead of affording any assistance and
co-operation, he adopted measures which were among the fatal
causes of the disasters, which the army- under my command
suffered.

No. XXI.

In redeeming the pledge, which I gave in my last number, I
shall endeavour to suppress the feelings, which a recollection of
the injustice I have experienced, naturally excites. In vindica
tion of my honour, I have no disposition to criminate others.
Age is entitled to respect ; the feelings of near connections have
a claim to our regard, and should never wantonly be violated;
and every day, my fellow citizens, we witness your veneration
and gratitude for revolutionary services. No considerations
ought, however, to prevent the publication of truth, whatever its
operations may be on any individual character.
It is well known, that General Dearborn was the senior officer
of our armies in the year 1812, it is well known that he was the
President of the Court Martial, before which I was tried ; and
it will, and'it must appear, that the defence of his own charac
ter and- fame, depended on the 'event of that trial. The unfor
tunate loss of all my public papers will be particularly stated,
and it will appear that on my trial, I had no other documentary
evidence, excepting what the administration, who were my pro
secutors, thought proper to furnish. Whoever will examine the
proceedings of that Court Martial will find that none of the
letters from the administration to General Dearborn, none of the
instructions which he received, and indeed not a single docu-

81
ment, to prove the manner in which he was ordered to co-ope
rate with my army were produced; although I requested copies
of all the papers from the war office, which had any relation to
the charges the administration had. exhibited against me. It is
too well known, how deeply interested the officers of that admin
istration were in my condemnation, to require any evidence on
the subject. The important crisis of the Presidential election
soon followed the disasters of the campaign, and the fate of
every officer who directed the councils of the cabinet, and the
operations of the field, depended on that event. A general
opinion prevailed that the war had been declared without suit
able preparation, and that its misfortunes had been occasioned
by the ill judged measures ofthe administration, and a storm
seemed to be gathering over the heads of its officers. Its fury
was increasing with so much violence, and its direction was be
coming so pointed, a& to create the most alarming fears. To
divert its force, and to shield themselves from its violence, a
shelter of some kind became necessary for their safety : and as
/had been the unsuccessful General, it was thought more easy
to divert it from themselves, by directing its force against me,
than in any other manner. To effect this, every means in their
power were brought into exercise, and General Dearborn was
selected as the principal instrument to execute their plans.
I have made these observations fo show the efforts of the ad
ministration, in the measures which were adopted, for my de
struction. In proof of the statements which I shall make, the
highest evidence of which the nature of the case will admit, cer
tified documents from the records of the government, will be
produced. The facts which I shall exhibit to your view, are so
necessary to be known, to enable you to form a just estimate of
both his public conduct and mine, and are so connected with the
history of our country and its military operations, that no con
siderations ought to prevent the publication of them.
Satisfactory reasons, I presume, have been given for the long
delay. We are both fast descending the downhill of life, and
rapidly approaching the end of our journey. The truth can bet
ter be made known while we are living, than after our death.
I have deeply regretted his absence from the country at this
time, lest it should be thought that I have taken advantage of
that absence to make communications which would not bear the
11

82
test of his examination. I rejoice, however, to learn by the
public prints that he will soon return, and have an opportunity
of repelling any charges, which he may believe unwarranted by
the evidence in my possession. No one of you can be more
ready than myself to receive, and give due weight to any expla
nations which he may wish to make. But, fellow citizens, should
he avoid such explanations on the ground that the decision of the
Court Martial of which he was President, is conclusive, 1 shall,
with the utmost confidence appeal to my countrymen for a re
vision of the sentence of that tribunal ; knowing that in you I
shall have candid, just, intelligent, and disinterested judges, in
whose hands the honour of the innocent and the injured must
always be safe.
I shall now proceed to produce documents to show, the man
ner in which he discharged the duties of his high office in rela
tion to the detachment of the army entrusted to my command.
In the first place, I will observe, that during the whole cam
paign, I never received a single letter from him.
In the next place I shall prove, that early in the campaign, he
was ordered by the government, to place the troops under his
immediate command, in stations suitable for the invasion of Up
per Canada ; and that when I commenced offensive operations
against that province, he was likewise commanded to co-operate
with me in those operations. <"
In the next place I shall prove, that in violation of the orders
of the government, he never made any co-operations, at the time
here referred to, although he had at his disposal, a sufficient
force for the purpose.
I shall then show, that without any instructions from the gov
ernment, and without any justifiable cause for the measure, he
¦agreed with Sir George Prevost, the commander-in-chief of the
armies in Canada, to an armistice, or suspension of hostilities,
in which the ai my I commanded was not included ; and by that
means, left it in the power of the enemy to march his whole
force with the most perfect safety to his other posts, to the point,
where I had commenced offensive operations. I shall further
show, that he was constantly informed of my situation, and must
have known, if he had any knowledge of his duty, that the meas
ures he adopted, in the nature of things, must have occasioned
the destruction of my army. And I shall further show, that in

83
consequence of this armistice, or cessation of hostilities, that
General Brock, the acting Governour and commander-in-chief of
Upper Canada, marched with all the forces of his province, and
re-enforcements from Montreal to the station at Maiden.
As early as the 26th of June, 1812, ten days before the army
I commanded arrived at Detroit, the Secretary of War, in a
letter to General Dearborn says, "It is altogether uncertain
what time General Hull may deem it expedient to commence
offensive operations. The preparations, (meaning General
Dearborn's preparations) it is presumed, will be made, to move
in a direction for Niagara, Kingston and Montreal." [Record
ed Vol. 5th, p. 458.] This shows, that a few days after the
declaration of war, and while I was on my march, through the
wilderness, that it was not only the intention of the government,
that I should commence offensive operations from Detroit against
Upper Canada, but likewise, that General Dearborn should make
preparations to co-operate with me, as the troops were to move
in a direction for Niagara, &c. In the Secretary's letter to the
same, dated the 9th of July, he says, " You will order all the
recruits not otherwise disposed of, to Albany, or some other sta
tions on Lake Champlain, to be organized for the invasion of
Canada." [Vol. 6th, p 15, 16. Records of the War Office.]
This shows as early as the 9th of July, the object of the admin
istration, was the invasion of Canada.
On the 20th of July, the Secretary wrote to General Dear
born as follows : " I have been in daily expectation of hearing
from General Hull, who probably arrived at Detroit on the 8th
inst. The first intelligence received from him will be commu
nicated to you ; enclosed is a copy of his last orders ; you will
make such arrangments with Governour Thompkins, as will
place the militia detached by him for Niagara, and the other
posts on the Lakes under your controul : and there should be a
communication, and, if practicable, a co operation, throughout
the whole frontier." [Vol. 6, p. 35.] By this letter, the mili
tia of New York were placed under General Dearborn's con
troul, and he was directed to communicate, and co-operate with
the other forces on the frontier. General Dearborn could not
have misunderstood this order, because there were at that time
no other forces on the frontier but those under my command,
and the orders which are alluded to, in the letter enclosed to

him, were the orders to me to commence offensive operations
against Canada.
On the 1st of August, the Secretary wrote to General Dear
born the following letter. " Enclosed herewith, you will receive
a copy of a letter, from Brigadier General Hull, of July 19,. by
express. You will make a diversion in his favour at Niagara,
and at Kingston, as soon as may be practicable, and by such op-
perations as may be within your controul."- [Vol. 6, p. 199.]
Here he was positively ordered to make a diversion al Niagara,
and Kingston, as soon as was practicable ; and by such opera
tions, as were within his controul. It may here be observed,
that he was the senior officer of the army, and all the troops
raised for the invasion of Canada were subject to his immediate
controul, excepting the-few Ohio militia, and the. 4th United
States regiment under my command, and by his rank, he would
have commanded them, if he had obeyed his orders, in making
diversions in the enemy's country, and co-operating with them.
In a number of other letters to General Dearborn from the
Secretary, he was instructed to make diversions, and co-operate
with my army : to prevent being tedious, I will extract the sub
stance of them, with a reference to the record of them in the
War Office. In one, the Secretary informs General Dearborn
that the last letter from General Hull was dated the 29th of
July, and that reports had been received that the militia order
ed by Governour Meigs of Ohio, to secure the road for conveying
provisions to Detroit, had halted at the Miami of the lake, in
consequence of a collection of Indians in their front. He fur
ther informed him, that every thing indicated the necessity of
early and effective co-operation at Niagara, and the posts below.
[Vol. 6, p. 89.]
Indeed all my letters to the Secretary of War, giving an ac
count of my situation, and the necessity of co-operation, were
enclosed by him to General Dearborn, for his information. [See
Vol. 6, p. 68.] The others I will not notice ; they may be found
on record.
In order to make it still more apparent, that General Dear
born knew perfectly my situation, and was ordered to adopt
measures for my support and assistance, I will give extracts of
letters from the Secretary of War to me, on that subject. In
his letter of the 26th of July, he says, "General Dearborn will

85
be apprized of your situation, and directed to keep up a corres
pondence with you, and to take measures to afford the necessary
support." [Vol. 6, p. 126.] Iu another' letter to me of the 1st
of August, he says, "On the ^6th of July, your letters of the
7th and lOih were enclosed to General Dearborn, with a copy
of mine of the 26th, accompanied with a request, that he would
make a diversion in your favour. By the mail of this evening,
youis of the 29th is enclosed to him, with an instruction to make
a diversion at Niagara and Kingston, as soon as practicable."
[Vol. 6, p. 127, 8.] v
Thus it appears, by a number of official letters from the Sec
retary ef the department of war, to General Dearborn, from the
26th of June, 1812, to the 1st of August, and from official let
ters from the Secretary to me, that during that time, he was
constantly apprized of my situation, and ordered by the govern
ment, not only to make diversions against the enemy, but to co
operate with me in the invasion of Canada. And it will like
wise appear by a letter to me from the Secretary of War, which
I shall hereafter have occasion to mention more particularly on
another subject, that the force at Niagara was twenty-four hun
dred. It is in these words, "Orders have been given to Gen
eral Dearborn, to attack the enemy's posts at Niagara and
Kingston, as soon as may be practicable. Our force at Niagara,
according to General Dearborn's account, will amount to twen
ty-four hundred ; and he will notify you of such movements and
operations as he may order, lt is indispensably necessary that
a communication should be kept up between you and the com
mandant, at Niagara." — [Vol. 6, p. 128, 129.]
Notwithstanding the forces which were collected on the Nia
gara river, notwithstanding the militia of the State of New
York, and all the recruits of the army, in the northern section
of the country, were at his disposal, and notwithstanding the in
structions, he had received from the government, not a single
man, crossed the Niagara river, from the time he received those
instructions, from the latter part of June, to the 8th of August,
when he agreed to an armistice, or suspension of hostilities, in
which the army I commanded was not included. This measure
and the effect it had on my situation, will be the subject of my
next number.

86

No. XXII.
It is a subject of regret to me, that in this memoir, I cannot
present to you a certified copy from the records of the war of
fice, of the original armistice or agreement between Sir George
Prevost and General Dearborn, for a suspension of hostilities on
the Niagara frontier ; I am happy at the same time that I have
it in my power, to furnish a satisfactory reason, why it is not
presented, and to offer other documents, to prove its existence
and contents. The following is a copy of a letter, from the
Secretary of War, Mr. Calhoun. War Department, 25th Aug. 1823.
SIR — Conformably to your request, I have had copies made
of all the correspondence, between this department, and your
self; likewise .the correspondence with General Dearborn, Gov
ernour Meigs, and Governour Scott, as far as the same can be
had from the records and files of this office, and' now transmit
them to you. The copy of the armistice to which you refer,
cannot be found on file, in this department.
I am, &c.
(Signed.) J. C. CALHOUN.
Gen. Wm. Hull, Newton, Mass.
After receiving this letter, I applied to Governour Eustis, who
was at that time Secretary of the War Department, and he in
formed me, that it was received at the war office, and placed on
the files of the Department. How a public document of so much
consequence sould be lost, appears in some degree mysterious.
I shall however make no other comment on it, than to observe,
that the high standing and character of Mr. Calhoun, and his
prompt and honourable conduct, in furnishing me, with the
other testimony, which I requested, and which his predecessor
General Armstrong, had neglected to furnishj or even notice
any application, forbids the most distant suspicion, of any un
fair, or improper management on his part. General Armstrong
was the immediate successor of Governour Eustis, who declares
it was left on file in the office, and had the custody of the pub-

87
lie papers of the department. The following is a copy of the
letter to General Armstrong, which was put into the Post Office
in Boston. Newton, (Mass.) May \Gth, 1814.
SIR, — Having been officially informed, by the Adjutant Gen
eral, of the result of the Court Martial by which I have been
tried, and feeling it a duty, which I owe to my country, my
family, and myself, to publish the proceedings of my trial, I re
quest as soon as possible, a copy of the same from the War De
partment; which request is warranted by the 90th article ofthe
rules and articles of war. I am, &c.
(Signed) WILLIAM HULL.
Hon. John Armstrong, Secretary of War,
Washington City.
This armistice had so fatal a bearing on my situation, that I
must be excused, for disclosing every circumstance which had
any relation to it.
To prove that this agreement was made between Sir George
Prevost and General Dearborn, I will in the first place present
a copy of a letter from the Secretary of War to General Dear
born, copied from the records of the war office. — [Vol. 6th,
page 200.] War Department, August \5th, 1812.
SIR, — Your letter ofthe 8th, with that ofthe 9tb inst. enclos
ing a letter from Sir George Prevost, addressed to you, has been
received. A letter addressed to the Secretary of State, cover
ing a dispatch for Mr. Baker, late Secretary of legation of His
Brittanic Majesty, from Sir George Prevost, has also been re
ceived, and the dispatch has been delivered to Mr. Baker.
No communication having been made to this government, by
Mr. Baker, I am commanded by the President to inform you, that
there does not appear to him any justifiable cause to vary or
desist from the arrangements, which are in operation ; and I am
further commanded to instruct you, that from and after the re
ceipt of this letter, and allowing a reasonable time, in which
you' will inform Sir George Prevost thereof, you will proceed
with the utmost vigour in your operations. How far the plan,
•riginally suggested by you of attacking Niagara, Kingston,

88
and Montreal, at the same time can be rendered practicable,
you can best judge. Presuming that not more than a feint, (if
that should be deemed expedient) with the troops on lake Cham
plain, aided by volunteers and militia, can be immediately ef
fected, against Montreal, and considering the urgency of a di
version in favour of General Hull, under the circumstances at
tending his situation, the President thinks it proper, that not a
moment should be lost in gaining possession of the British posts
at Niagara and Kingston, or at least the former, and proceeding
in co-operation with General Hull in securing Upper Canada.
It is expected, that the force assembled at those places, particu
larly at Niagara, will be such as to justify your immediate or
ders for an attack, or if this should not be the case, that the
measures you have taken for rendering it such, will prevent any
material delay. You will of course communicate your views to
General Hull, and direct the commanding officer at Niagara, to
be particular in giving him every information which can be use
ful." - Before I proceed to make any comments on this letter. I will
transcribe another addressed to me by the Secretary of War,
giving" me the information. War Department, August %0th, 1812.
" SIR, — General Dearborn has communicated to this depart
ment, an arrangement by which it was agreed between him and
Sir George Prevost, that offensive operations should be suspend
ed until the determination of the government should'be made
known to him, on certain information presumed by General
Dearborn to be contained in a dispatch, transmitted by Sir
George Prevost to Mr. Baker, late Secretary of legation to His
Brittanic Majesty in this city. It further appears by General
Dearborn's letter, that he made known, and proposed to your
concurrence, in said agreement, so far as your orders, and as
circumstances might permit.
I am now instructed by the President to inform you that no
communication, such as was supposed by General Dearborn
might have been transmitted, has been made to this government,
by Mr. Baker, or by any authorized agent of the British govern
ment, which will justify a delay, or suspension of any military
operations, of which General Dearborn has been duly informed!'
In case therefore, you shall have entered into any stipulation

89
respecting a suspension of offensive operations, with the officer
commanding the forces of His Brittanic Majesty in your vicini
ty, you will conceive it to be made known to him, that such
stipulation, is, after due notice, to cease and determine, and
you will proceed in the same manner as if no such agreement
had been entered into." — See vol. fi. p. 1-28, 1-29.
In the close of the letter, 1 am informed that General Dear
born was ordered to attack the enemy's posts at Niagara and
Kingston, that 2400 men were at Niagara, that he was ordered
to notify me of his movements, &c. which has been cited in a
former memoir.
As I before observed, I never received a letter from General
Dearborn during the campaign ; and it appears by the letter
here recited, that it was twelve days after die armistice was
agreed to. before the administration wrote to me from Washing
ton, giving me information of it.
This letter I never received, and the copy I have here pre
sented has been obtained from die records of the War Office.
Indeed, the first information I received, that General Dearborn
had established a peace on the Niagara frontier was from Gen
eral Brock, immediately after the capitulation was signed.
Neither die administration nor General Dearborn ever gave me
any information of it, which was received. Thus it appears,
that by the neglect of the General, and the delay of the admin
istration. I was kept in ignorance of a measure which so mater
ially effected my situation and had no knowledge of it until
General Brock had time sufficient to collect and march all the
forces of the province against me.
Before I close this number, I will observe, that from docu
ments here produced. I do presume you will be as well satis
fied of the following facts as if a copy of the agreement had been
produced ; viz. mat it was entered into as early as the 8th of
August, and that it provided for a suspension of hostilities, on
the frontiers of Canada, in which the army I commanded was
not included.
Having thus proved, what were the orders of the government to
General Dearborn, and the measures he adopted ; in my next
number, after making some general observations, I shall consid
er the effect they had on my situation.
12

90

No. XXIII.
By the letter of the Secretary of War to General Dearborn,
referred to in the last number, it appears, that the agreement
he had made with Sir George Prevost, for a suspension of hos
tilities, was entirely disapproved by the President, and he was
commanded to cause it to cease, after due notice. It is impos
sible to account for the motives which induced him to adopt the
measure. All my letters, stating my situation in the enemy's
country, had been sent to him by the Secretary of War He
knew that the lake was shut against me; and, by the Secretary's
letter, he was inf. rmed, that a body of Indians had assembled
on the road I had opened through the'wilderness, and had stop
ped a company of Ohio militia, at the Miami, which was escort
ing provisions to Detroit, for the support of my army. He knew
by the same lettos, sent to him by the Secretary of War, that
Michillimackanack had fallen ; that the savages had joined the
British standard, and all the northern and wes'ern tribes were
marching in hostile array against me. Under these circumstan
ces, if his own military experience, and knowledge did not
teach him his duty, viz. the necessity of co operation with the
forces under my command, he had before him the positive or
ders of the government. After making this agreement^ it be
came impossible for- him, during its continuance, to have obeyed
the orders of his government, in making diversions and co-oper
ations, without a violation ofthe faith he had pledged. Had he
the power, by his commission, to make an agreement which
would render him incapable of obeying the orders of those from
whom he received his authority f I ask, then, by what authority
did he make this armistice ? It was not by the authority ofthe
government, because, in my former numbers, I have cited the
letter ofthe government, by which the measure was disapprov
ed, in the most pointed language. But suppose, by his com
mission as the senior Major General in the army, a discretiona
ry power was vested in him to make an armistice ; did he in
this instance, exercise that power properly, by agreeing to a
measure, which totally disqualified him from carrying into effect
fhe orders of his government ? I ask you, then, my fellow citi-

91
zens, on what grounds this measure can be justified ? If it can
not be justified on military principles, permit me again to ask
you, what motives could have induced him to have adopted it ?
I will not even ask the question, whether it was to shield him
self from personal danger, in attacking the enemy's posts, and
co-operating with the forces under my command. I have too
often witnessed his bravery, during the war of the revolution, to
make a suggestion of the kind.
Was it the fear that the forces under my command, having
first made the invasion of Upper Canada, would have shared
some part of the glory, in the event of conquest ?
When he was commanded by the administration to concentrate
his forces at Niagara, and co-operate with me, and only make
a feint againt Montreal, why did he direct the principal part of
them to Plattsburg and Burlington, on lake Champlain ? He
must have foreseen, that by agreeing to the suspension of hos
tilities, in the manner he did, the whole force of the enemy
would be removed for the defence of that part of the province
which was invaded. This he must have perceived, unless he
had become giddy by his elevation, and could not discern his
duty. It is possible, that it was not his expectation that the
government would approve of the measure, and would have or
dered it to have ceased, after giving due notice ; and in such an
event, before the enemy's force could have returned to Mon
treal, he might have advanced his forces from Plattsburg and
Burlington, and taken possession of that capital. In such a.
case he undoubtedly supposed all the glory would be his own,
and that such an achievement would have more than compensat
ed for the sacrifice of my army.
If he were not influenced by any of the motives which have
been here suggested, let me ask you, whether they were not the
same, which induced him, in publishing a narrative of the battle
of Bunker Hill, to open the tomb, and violate the ashes of the
brave General Putnam, more than twenty years after he had
rested from his patriotic labours ? — a chief whose name alone
was a host at the commencement of our revolution, and whose
gallant deeds, are identified with the glory of our country.
Putnam was then a general and Dearborn was a captain.
' If he were capable of making representations intended to
blast the laurels, which had so long flourished around the tombj

92
of this brave commander, does it not in some measure account
for his motives, in attempting to rob me of the little fame, I had
acquired in following the standard of the illustrious Washing
ton, during the war of our revolution. Every man engaged in
that memorable battle is entitled to glory ; and had General
Dearborn been contented with the share to which his rank and
conduct entitled him, no one would have been so ungenerous
twenty years after his death, as to have opened his tomb, violat
ed his ashes, or attempted to blast even the twig of a laurel,
which might have been found, growing around it.
He must have known when he agreed to the armistice, that a
very considerable time must elapse, even, if the government dis
approved of it, before its operation would have ceased. The
despatches must have travelled from his Head Quarters, to
Washington, and from Washington back to Albany ; he then must
have given notice to Sir George Prevost at Quebec or Montreal,
and have waited a reasonable time for this notice to have arriv
ed. As the division of the army I commanded had no partici
pation in the measure, he well knew the advantages he thereby
gave the enemy in concentrating his whole force to the scene
of my operations — he knew that during this period, it would not
be necessary for the enemy to retain a single effective man at
any of the stations, on the Niagara river, Kingston, Montreal,
or any of the posts, in the eastern part of the province  He
well knew, that the whole force of the British army, in that sec
tion of territory, the militia of the Canadas, and the savages of
the wilderness might be employed in opposing the offensive oper
ations, I had commenced, and at that moment was engaged in
prosecuting. He was perfectly acquainted both with my situa
tion, and the situation of the enemy ; that I was surrounded ou
all sides, and had no communication with my country ; that by
the command of lake Erie, and being in the possession of armed
ships, transports, and boats, all the troops from fort Erie, fort
George, with all the militia of that part of the province, might
with the greatest facility, have been moved to any point, where
their services were most necessary. — That two or three days
would only have been required, to have transported them to
Maiden, or any part of the Detroit river-^that by the command
of lake Ontario the forces from Kingston, York, and that part of
the province, with the same facility and despatch, might have

93
been removed to the west part of the lake, and marched to the
same point — all these advantages. General Dearborn must have
well known, would be given to the enemy, when he signed this
agreement, for the suspension of hostilities.
In the course of these memoirs, I shall show, that all these
advantages were made use of; and in consequence of this mea
sure, which was unauthorized and disapproved by the govern
ment, the plan of the British commander succeeded according to
the expectation, which was anticipated.
The measure I am now considering, my fellow citizens, had
such an effect on my situation, that no apology, I presume vill
be necessary, for asking your very particular attention to all the
circumstances, attending it. — It will be recollected from the
copy ofthe letter of the Secretary of war, that he had received
General Dearborn's of the Sth and 9th of August, communicat
ing information of the suspension of hostilities, and the cause of
it. Colonel Haynes, the adjutant-general of the army com
manded by Sir George Prevost, was the officer appointed and
authorized on his part to make this negotiation. — -He must have
arrived at the head-quarters of General Dearborn as early as the
6th or 7th of August ; — consequently he must have left Montreal,
as early as the first of August, the distance being about two
hundred and forty miles — Sir George Prevost, calculating on the
success of this measure, no doubt gave General Brock immediate
information respecting it, as soon, as Colonel Baynes commenc
ed his journey, with directions to proceed with all the forces, to
Maiden. — In addition to this, Major General Sheafe, marched
with the forces from Montreal to Kingston, where a great part
of them embarked, passed to die west part ot Lake Ontario,
there landed, marched to the relief of Maiden, collecting the
militia and savages on their march.
Thus it appears, that eight or nine days before the agreement
was actually signed, all the British forces were put in motion,
and concentrating to the only point where the invasion of the
Upper Province had been made, aud these arrangements must
have been made on the presumption that Colonel Baynes would
obtain a suspension of hostilities.
The inquiry now becomes important. What information had
General Dearborn received by the Adjutant-General, which
could have afforded even a shadow of colour for the measures he

94
adopted? This information was communicated by him, to th»
Secretary of W ar, and in the Secretary's letter to me, has been
recited in the former number ; and it is so important it should
be perfectly understood, that I will "here again repeat the sub
stance of it-He says, that General Dearborn has communicated
an arrangement, by which it was agreed between him and Str
George Prevost, that offensive operations should be suspended*
until the determination of the government should be made known
to him, on certain information, presumed by General Dearborn,
to be contained in a dispatch transmitted by Sir George Prevost,
to Mr. Baker late Secretary of Legation to his Brittanic Ma
jesty in this city.
The Secretary, further says that he was further instructed by
the President to inform me, that no communication, such as was
supposed by General Dearborn, might have been transmitted, has
been made to this government. This letter, which was presumed
to contain the information, was not addressed to General Dear
born, but to Mr. Baker, at Washington, and he had no other
grounds for consenting to a suspension of hostilities, than a bare
presumption, that it might contain something which might ren
der such a measure proper. The groundseven of this presump
tion could have been nothing more, than "his conversation with
the Adjutant-General, and the sight of this sealed despatch to
Mr. Baker, which he was requested to send to the Secretary of
State, to be delivered according to his discretion. I now ask
you to imagine a reason, why he did not wait for the orders of
the government, before he made an agreement, which was so
important in its consequences ?
In my next number I shall consider^the effect, which it had
on my situation.

No. XXIV.

The motives of Sir George Prevost, in sending his Adjutant-
General to the head -quarters of General Dearborn, at this time,
I think, must be evident from the statement of facts in the pre-

95
ceding numbers, and from consideration*, which I shall now of
fer. At this time, no part of the enemy's country was invaded,
excepting by the forces from Detroit, under my command. To
repel this invasion, must have been a desirable object of the
commander-in-chief of flic British army. He could not with
draw his forces from the east part of Upper Canada, consistently
with the safety of hit* posts, fit Fort Erie, r*orf George, Kingston
and Montreal, because he well knew General Dearborn had col
lected, and was collecting, troops, opposite to those station's.
He therefore found it necessary to devise some plan, by which
his troops, on those stations might be withdrawn, and employed
under the command of General lirock, for the support of Mul-
den, and the protection ofthe part ofthe province invaded, and
in a manner consistently with the safety ofthe posts which have
baen mentioned. The stratagem, which has here been describ
ed, was formed by the enemy, and assented to by General Dear
born, and its success was complete. He. was induced to enter
into an agreement that his troops should only act on the defen
sive, at those stations, from which General Brock wished to
withdraw his troops, and indeeil which extended to the whole
frontier, excepting wIkjic the invasion was made.
Iti pursuance of this plan, all the forces were withdrawn from
the, stations 1 have mentioned, excepting a few invalid soldiers
to take caro of the fortifications, cannon, &c. These forces,
with the militia ofthe province, anil all the savages which could
be collected, were immediately transported by water, over the
lakes to Maiden and Sandwich, under the command of General
Brock, as re-enforcements to the enemy's army at those stations.
General Brock arrived at Maiden on the 14th of August, during
tho suspension of hostilities below, and on the 15th marched to
Sandwich opposite to Detroit, from which place I had retreated,
for tho reasons stated in the former numbers of these memoirs.
About 12 o'clock on the 15th, I received a letter from General
Brock, by Lieut. Colonel McDognell, and Major Gregg, ofthe
British army, who came under the sanction of a flag of truce.
"Head Quarters, Sandwich, August 15, 1812.
Sir— Tho force ut my disposal authorizes me to require of
you the immediate surrender of Fort Detroit; it is far from my
inclination, to join in a war of extermination j but you must be

96
aware that the numerous body of Indians, who have attached
themselves to my troops, will be beyond my controul the moment
the contest commences; you will find me disposed to enter into
such conditions as will satisfy the most scrupulous sense of
honour. Lieut. -Colonel McDonnell and Major Gregg, are fully
authorized to conclude any arrangement that may prevent the
unnecessary effusion of blood. I have the honour to be your
obedient servant.
[His Excellency, Brigadier General Hull, commanding at
Fort Detroit. Signed ' ISAAC BROCK, Major General,
commanding his Brittanic Majesty's forces, Upper Canada."
To this letter, I immediately returned the following answer.
"Head Quarters, Detroit, August 15, 1812.
Sir — I have no other reply to make, than to inform you that
I am prepared to meet any force which may be at. your disposal,
and any consequences which may result from an exertion of it,
you may think proper to make. I am, &c.
His Excellency, Major General Brock, commanding his Brit
tanic Majesty's forces, Sandwich, Upper Canada.
Signed WILLIAM HULL, Brig.-General,
commanding the North Western army ofthe United States."
This letter was the first information that I received of the ar
rival of General Brock, with the forces from Fort Erie. Fort
George, and the other stations on the east part of Upper Cana
da. Indeed it was hardly possible for me to have received the
information, as he came by water with his re-enforcements, and
had the exclusive command of the lake.
By my former numbers, it appears, that before I recrossed the
river, I had received letters from Generals Hall and Porter,
who commanded the American forces on the Niagara river, that
the British forces had moved from their stations on that river,
and the east part of the province, and were passing over lakes
Erie and Ontario, towards Maiden. In those numbers, I like
wise stated how mysterious this information was. The arrival
of General Brock, with the forces, still added to the mystery.
It will be remembered, that I had received no information from

97
General Dearborn, or from any other quarter of the suspension
of hostilities ; and I knew that a large American force hail as
sembled, and was assembling on the Niagara river, directly op
posite to the British posts. It was likewise well known to me,
that that part of the province was of much more importance to
the British interest than Maiden, and the territory on the De
troit river and its vicinity. It appeared to me certain, that the
British forces could not have been withdrawn from those stations,
without exposing them to an invasion, and to be taken posses
sion ,of by General Dearborn's forces on the Niagara river, di
rectly opposite to them, and only separated by the river. I ask
you, my follow citizens, to reflect on my situation, and con
sider for a moment, the embarrassments at this time occasioned
to my army.
General Brock was not only the Major General of the army^
but the Acting Governour of the province. Could I Have be
lieved that the Governour of the province would have left the
most important part of it, without the means of defence, expos
ed in the manner I have stated, and liable to be invaded, and
possessed by the American forces P Such an event would have
been the most disastrous of any which could have happened to
him. By possessing both sides of the Niagara river, we should
have commanded the water communication to Maiden, and the
whole country above, which was the only communication on
which that post, St. Joseph's on lake Huron, and indeed the
whole North West Company depended for supplies. Had we
therefore taken possession of Fort Erie, Fort George, and the
other posts on the Niagara river, their communication would
have been obstructed, and they must have perished for the want
of the means of subsistence- I again ask, on what grounds I
could have possibly conceived, that General Brock had left that
vital part of his province, and drawn his troops from situations
dn whose protection their very existence depended. Had it
been possible for tne to have imagined the case, which actually
existed, that General Dearborn had agreed to a suspension of
hostilities, I should have believed it certain, that he would have
stipulated, that all the troops, which were parties to it, should
remain in the same situation, they were, at the time it was made,
and expressly, that none bound by the armistice should be em
ployed, against those which were not included in it. If he. had
IS

9SS
possessed any knowledge of his duty, he would have known
this to have been the invariable practice in similar cases. But
in fact, I did not even imagine, that it was possible a measure
so fraught with the certain destruction of my army eould have
been adopted by him.
But so it was, and almost all the enemy's most important
posts were perfectly safe, when only guarded by a few invalids,
to take care of the barracks. &c. The Secretary of War, it
will be seen by his letter referred to in a former memoir, stated,
that by General Dearborn's letter to him, the General had in
formed me of the measure, and bad proposed a similar one to
my concurrence. If it were sent, it only reached me before the
capitulation from the months of General Brock's cannon ; after
that event, he, (General Brock) informed me that it had taken
place at Niagara, and all the other posts below were embraced
in it Perhaps it may be asked, when I perceived the forces of
the enemy, of all descriptions concentrating Mid bearing upon
me from every quarter, why I did not retreat from Detroit, and
save my army from capture ? as I wish to answer every inquiry,
and, if possible, remove every doubt, with respect to the pro
priety of my conduct, I will here state the reasons. To most
who are unacquainted with the situation of the country, this
would probably be a natural inquiry. In the manner in wbick
these memoirs arc published, I cannot present a map of the coon-
try which was the scene of my operations. I fear it wUl be diffi
cult to describe it in such a way that it will be perfectly under
stood. I must ask you in this case to examine some general
maps of the country, from Detroit to the foot of the rapids of
the Miami of lake- Erie. The distance is about seventy miles.
The only road through which I could have retreated, runs from
Detroit as far as Brownstown, on the banks of the Detroit river,
about twenty miles ; and from Brownstown to the foot of the
rapids, about fifty miles ; in some places on, and in others near
the borders of lake Erie. This road was very difficult to pass,
a great part of it being through a wilderness, and had only beta
opened by mv army, when advancing to Detroit. Its course,
for seventy I es being on the margin of a navigable river, and t
the lake ant General Brock with his army being opposite t«
Df-Toit, with z number of armed vessels, gun-b<u's, and a suf
ficient number of flats to move his troops on the water, wouU

99
have had such an advantage in attacking a retreating army, es
pecially when aided by his numerous tribes of savages, that I
then thought and I now think, that an attempt of the kind would
have resulted in the total destruction of the army. With his
boats, protected by his armed vessels and gun-boats, his troops
might have been moved on those smooth waters with the greatest
celerity, and landed in the front, rear, or on the flank, and har-
rassed my march in such a manner that it would have been im
possible to have effected it ; besides we must have encountered
the difficulty of passing a number of rivers without boats, and
over which there were no bridges. The only places where some
of these rivers could have been crossed, were near the naviga
ble waters commanded by the enemy's naval armament, and no
boats could have been provided for the purpose. There would
have been no other mode of effecting the passage, but by swim
ming or constructing rafts, in the face of the enemy. Situated
as I was, after the arrival of General Brock with the re-enforce
ments, I think you must be satisfied, that nothing could have
justified an attempt of this kind, especially when the nature of
the country, and the character of the enemy, which would have
assailed my army during this long march, is considered. The
reasons which prevented me from retreating and taking a posi
tion at the Miami, immediately after recrossing the Detroit river,
have been stated in a former number of these memoirs. I pre
sume this, will be considered as a satisfactory answer to the in
quiry. '
In my next number, I shaft proceed to a consideration of my
situation at Detroit on the 15th of August, when I received
General Brock's letter, and the position, and numbers of the
enemy; after which I shall state the reasons which induced me
to agree to the capitulation on the 16th.. Before, however, I
Close this number, I must ask your indulgence, my fellow citi
zens, in making such observations and reflections as will natu
rally arise from the facts and documents which have been pre
sented in the last numbers of these memoirs in relation to the
¦conduct of General Dearborn.
After considering the facts and evidence which has been ad
duced to prove them, I ask who has been guilty of the vile and
base charges which have been imputed to me i Who has been
guilty of unofficer-like conduct ? If I had been in General

100
Dearborn's situation, and he had been in mine, and / had re
ceived the 3ame orders from the government which it has been
proved he received, respecting the invasion of Canada, would
you not have had a right to have said that / had been guilty of
unofficer-like conduct? If thus situated, /had received the
same orders he repeatedly received, to make diversions in the
enemy's country, to attack their posts and to co-operate with
him, I had not only neglected to obey these orders, but had
agreed to a suspension of hostilities, from which his army was
excluded, 1 ask you whether / could have complained of the
vile charge of cowardice being imputed to me ? If further, /had
agreed to a suspension of hostilities, in the manner and under
the circumstances General Dearborn did, whether it would not
have afforded some colour to have supposed it was with treason
able views ? I wish it to be distinctly understood, that I im
pute nothing criminal to him, and have made these reflections
with no other view but to exhibit in a strong light, that there
was not the least foundation for criminal charges against me.
For the present, I shall take a farewell of him, and if the
facts and documents which have been presented shall cause any
unpleasant sensations in his mind, I regret that I can offer no
balm to cure the stings and wounds which his own reflections
must inflict.
Before these memoirs are ended, he will again be introduced,
as President of the Court Martial before which I was tried, and
his conduct in that character will be particularly examined.
As you, my fellow citizens, are the legitimate and final tri
bunal, if you are satisfied that the facts which have been here
stated, are proved by the evidence which has been offered, and
that the measures he adopted were the cause of the misfortunes
of the campaign, and the disasters which attended the army I
commanded, it is to be hoped, on account of his age, his respect
able connections, and his revolutionary services, your clemency
will be exercised, and the punishment which would be justly
due to such conduct will be remitted.
For the same reasons here expressed recommending him to
your mercy, in a former number, I stated, that it would have
been a happy consideration, had it been in my power to have
exhibited the truth in vindication of my own honour, without
any impeachment of his character.

101

No. XXV.
A knowledge of the number, and character of the enemy's
forces, at the time of the capitulation, and likewise of those un
der my command, is so important in forming a correct opinion
that I shall ask your very particular attention to an examination
of both these subjects.
Before I proceed to offer you the evidence of them, it is a du
ty which I owe to you, and to myself, to state particularly the
reasons why this evidence was not presented to the Court Mar
tial, and why it has not before been presented to you ; and like
wise, why it will not be in my power, even at this time, to
spread before you, the whole which existed in the case.
The same causes have prevented me from giving a more min
ute detail of the transactions and events of the campaign . The
reasons are the unfortunate loss of my papers, both of a public
and private nature. A part of them were taken in the Cayahoga
packet, the particular circumstances of which have been related
•in my trial.
After the capitulation, I left Detroit, a prisoner, not knowing
my place of destination. One of my daughters was with me,
and expected in a few days to return to my residence in Massa
chusetts. As I should have no occasion for these papers while
a prisoner, I thought it advisable, to pack them in trunks and
commit them to her care, to be carried to my home, at the place
where I now reside.
A short time after, my daughter passed lake Erie in a British
vessel, and arriving near Buffalo in the evening, she was put on
shore at that place, with an assurance from the captain of the
vessel, that her trunks, &c. should be sent to her the next morn
ing. In the course of that night, the vessel was attacked by a
party of our sailors, under the command of Captain Elliot, and
in the contest was burnt. By this event, all these papers were
destroyed. The most material of these documents, were copies of all the
orders I had issued to the army, from the day I took command
of it, to the time of the capitulation. All the returns and daily
reports, which were made to me. The letters which I had re-

102
ceived from the Secretary of War, and the Governours of Ohio
and Kentucky. Copies of all the communications which I had
made to these officers and many others ; likewise a daily journal
of the operations of the army, and the events which took place-
during the period above mentioned; likewise the information I
had received of the numbers and movements of the enemy dur
ing the campaign.
At my trial before the Court Martial, I had no other docu
mentary evidence, excepting what the administration was will
ing to furnish from the records of the government. Some pa
pers which were necessary to exhibit a true state of facts, could
not be found on the files and records of the public offices. After
my trial, as I have before remarked, I applied for a copy of the
proceedings of the Court Martial, and all the documents relat
ing to the compaign, and could not obtain them. Lately, Mr.
Calhoun, as I have before stated, has furnished me with copies
of all the documents which can be found in the War Office.
Many very important papers now, which ought to be on the files
and records of the government, cannot be found ; even one of
so important a nature as the armistice, entered into by General-
Dearborn, cannot be obtained. This fact is certified by the
present Secretary of War, in his letter to me, which has been
published in a former number. My orders to the army, daily
journal, reports, and letteKS, giving me accounts of the numbers;
and movements of the enemy, and many other important docu
ments are irreparable losses.
The destruction of this vessel is a Subject of public notority,
and were it necessary, the testimony of my daughter, and others
who assisted in packing the papers, and who well knew the con
tents of them, might be here added. I will not encumber these
numbers, at present, with this evidence. If the truth of these
facts shall be doubted by any reader, the evidence shall be pub
lished. Some of the Adjutants preserved their orderly books, and I re
quested the Judge Advocate to direct them, when they were
summoned as witnesses, to produce them. They however,
either forgot them, or did not incline to present them to the
Court. I will here recite the circumstances of another important doc
ument which I could not obtain, at the time of my trial, which

103
h«« been referred to in a former number, and I will copy from
my defence, the statement and evidence which I offered to the
court martial, respecting it.
''A few days after I was appointed to the command" of the-
North Western Army, I presented another memorial to the
President, through the war department, in which I was explicit
as to what might be expected from such a force as I was to lead ;
as to the necessity of re enforcements ; of our commanding the
lake; and, of a co-operation in other quarters.
" My draft of this memorial I have lost, in the way I shall
hereafter explain. The existence of the original and its gener
al purport, is proved by Mr. Eustis, who in his answer to the
6th and 7th interrogations addressed to him, says, 'I have a
perfect recollection of your having presented the memorial re
ferred to in the interrogatory.' 'I recollect,' he adds, 'your
attendance by appointment, at the War Office. The memorial
or that part of it which related fo the naval defence of lake Erie,
was referred or communicated, to the Secretary of the Navy,
who was present. The brig Adams, which had been employed
as a transport, under direction of the war department, became
the subject of conversation. Whether she was (being then on
the stocks repairing) actually transferred to the Navy Depart
ment, I do not distinctly recollect. If that was the case, the
evidence is on record.' Yet this memorial, or a copy of it, I
have never been able to obtain.
"I have applied for it to the Secretary of War, he referred
me to the Secretary of the Navy ; the Secretary of the Navy to
Mr. Dallas, [who was then employed by the administration in
the prosecution against me ;] to him I applied, and he referred
me to the present Judge Advocate, who knows nothing of it.
And finally when my trial commenced, I addressed a letter to
the President of the United States, requesting him to interfere
his authority to procure me a document, which I considered so
important in my defence. It was, sir, too much for me to have
expected an answer from the President himself, though the time
has been, when such an answer would not have been considered
as conferring too great an honour. The President referred my
letter to the gentlemen at the head of the War and Navy De
partments. They also would not condescend to_ answer my
letter, but handed it over to their clerks. I ask, would it not

104
have comported with the importance of the occasion, the deco*
rum due an old man and a veteran soldier, not yet convicted of
any crime, for the Secretaries themselves to have addressed
me ? But in answer to my ¦ letter, I received a letter from the
chief clerk in the War Office, dated the 12th of February, 1814;
with a certificate from the chief clerk in the Navy Department,
The letter from the War Office, is in the following words :
" War Office, February 12th, 1814.
SIB,— rYour letter of the 1st inst addressed to the Presi- «
dent of the United States, has been referred to me. In answer
to which I have the honour to state, that" all your communica
tions to the War Department, after you were appointed Briga
dier General in the army, have been transmitted to P. S. Par
ker, Esq. Judge Advocate of the Court Martial, now sitting at
Albany, together with such others as you had required, as far
as they could be found on the files of this office. The public
records of papers of the War Department have been constantly
within my observation and charge for several \ears past, and I
assure you, Sir, I have never seen or heard of a memoir pointing
out the necessity of a navy on lake Erie. Since the receipt of
your letter, I have carefully examined the files, and enquired of
every gentleman attached to the department without being able
to give any information on the subject.
I have the honour to be,
Sir, very respectfully,
Your O'bt. servant,
DANIEL PARKER, C. C.
Brig. Gen. Wm. Hull, Albany.
" It is unaccountable, that a public document of this nature
should be lost. That it did exist, and was on the files of the
war office, is proved beyond controversy, by the deposition of
the late Secretary of War, who'declares that he has a perfect re
collection of it. But a most extraordinary part of this letter
from the War Department, is that which states, that the writer
has had the public records, and papers of the War Department
constantly under his charge and observation for several years
past; yet, that he never knew or heard of a memorial, pointing
out the necessity of a navy on lake Erie. It is a fact hardly to

105
be crcditted, that a copy of the memorial of the 6th of March,
1812, from which I made that copy which I have just read to
the court, is certified as a true copy from the files of the War
Office', by the very gentleman, who writes me the letter of the
12th of February. Let me quote from the memorial of the 6th
of March, or rather from the copy certified as I have mentioned
above, a passage which is in the following words :
' If, sir, we cannot command the ocean, we can command the
inland lakes of our country. I have always been of opinion that
we ought to have built as many armed vessels on the lakes as
would have commanded them. We have more interest in them
than the British nation, and can build vessels with more con
venience.' "When the writer of the letter had certified a copy of this
memorial but a few days before, how could he say, that he^nev-
er knew or heard of a memorial, (from me to the government)
pointing out the necessity of a navy on lake Erie ?"
I shall more particularly feel the loss of the documents which
were destroyed in the vessel, in a future paper, in which I shall
state the number of the effective force, under my controul, at
the time of the capitulation. Perhaps you may think it an in
trusion, and I certainly feel a degree of humiliation, in asking
your attention, one moment to my private losses, and my pri
vate misfortunes, as respects property. This I should not do,
had it not been rumoured, and probably believed by some, that
I had been influenced by the base and grovelling motives of
self-interest, in the measures I agreed to, as the commanding
General of my country's forces. The bare mention ofthe sub
ject excites the most indignant feelings, and I believe no just
and honourable man, who ever knew me, for a moment enter
tained an opinion of the kind. In the-year 1805 when I accept
ed the office of Governour of the territory of Michigan, I dis
posed of all my property in Massachusetts, excepting the farm
on which I now live, which I hold in right of my wife. Af
ter paying my debts, a considerable sum remained This was
transferred to the Michigan territory. Before my arrival, the
town of Detroit was burnt, with all the public buildings, in one of
which I was to have resided. For my accommodation I was oblig
ed to build a house, and engage mechanics in this part of the
country. Under the circumstances of the territory, comfortable
14

106
accommodations were provided at very great expense. All the
property which I possessed, excepting the farm I have mention
ed, was vested in that country. All this property I have since
sold, and the proceeds of it, have not been one third part as
much as I carried to the country.
During my command of the North Western army, no military
chest was furnished, and I never received one dollar from the
government to defray the necessary contingent expenses of the
army. The Secretary of War, placed in the bank of Pittsburg,
ten thousand dollars to my credit, for defraying these expenses,
and gave me notice accordingly. At that time there was little
or no communication between Pittsburg and Detroit, and I could
not obtain money for bills on that Bank. I made use of my
own money and credit to defray those necessary expenses to the
amount of sixteen hundred dollars, on the credit of the ten thou
sand, which was thus deposited. For this sixteen hundred dol
lars, I took regular vouchers, which were with my other papers,
arid were lost in. the vessel, as before stated. As soon as the
administration, received information of the capitulation, the
whole of this ten thousand dollars was withdrawn from the
bank, by the Secretary of War, and I never have received the
sixteen hundred dollars or any part of it, which I disbursed for
the public, to defray these necessary expenses. I have present
ed my account, and evidence to show, the once existence of the
vouchers, and the manner in which they were lost. The ob
jection to an allowance of,the claim, by the auditor is, that as I
am not a public defaulter, and owe the government nothing, he
is not authorized to hear the evidence, with respect to the loss
of thei vouchers, as the government will have money to pay, pro
vided the account were allowed. But if on the other hand I
had been a public defaulter, the auditor in that case would be
authorized to cancel the demand of the government, on being
satisfied with the loss of my vouchers.
I do not now possess more property than is sufficient to pay
my just debts, excepting the farm on which I live', which as I
before observed, I hold in the right of my wife. And I can say
with truth, had I not been so fortunate as to have lived among
friends, and experienced their generosity, it would have been
impossible for me, on my farm, at my age, for twelve years past,
to have supported my family, with common decency.

- 107
I have made this statement to satisfy you how much I have
been injured, and to repel the base and wicked insinuations,
which have been more than rumoured against me. It will be
-easy for me to produce evidence of all these facts, if any one
desires it.
It is only necessary to look at the newspapers of that day, to
prove the pains which were taken to excite your prejudices
against me.
Every skipper of a boat, every unprincipled adventurer, and
follower of the army, who was at Detroit, and every drunken
soldier who was returning home, were placed in requisition, and
taken before magistrates, and oaths were prepared for them,
with respect to the number of my army, and the number of the
enemy, and the boxes of gold, which were carried to my house,
as the consideration for the capitulation. After keeping me
nearly two years in arrest, and during that time, searching for
evidence to prove the charge of treason against me, the Court
Martial was obliged, as not the faintest colour of evidence ap
peared, to acquit me of that charge, and all the specifications
under it. I must be excused, my fellow citizens, for this di
gression, and defer the evidence, with respect to General
Brock's force to my next number.

No. XXVI.

Before I relate the events of the 16th of August, 1812, and
assign the reasons, which induced me to agree to the capitula
tion, I will ask your attention, —
1st. To the position which General Brock had taken, on the
15th, with his army.
2d. To the number and character of the forces, which were
under his authority and controul, which were in suitable situa- '
tions, and might have immediately been ordered to re-enforce
his army, with the most perfect safety to his other posts, before
it would have been possible for me to have received any as
sistance. 3d. To the number and character of the forces, with which

108
he actually invaded our territory on the morning of the 16th of
August. With respect to the position he had taken, it was at Sand
wich, on the opposite bank of the river, more elevated than the
fort of Detroit, and from which, with his cannon and mortars,
he could throw shot and shells into the town and fort.
With respect to the number and character of the forces,
which were under his authority and controul, which were in
suitable situations, immediately to re-enforce his army before I
could have received any aid, it is to be observed, that he was
not only the General of the army, but the acting Governour of
Upper Canada, and had the superintendence and direction not
only of the numerous tribes of Indians, who resided in the Bri
tish dominions, but likewise those who inhabited our territories,
had joined his standard. Consequently all the British troops,
in the different stations, at fort George, York, Kingston, fort
Erie, and Chippewa, with all the militia of the province, and all
the Indian warriours, in the northern and western region, were
subject to his controul and authority.
In addition to these sources of strength, the numerous retain
ers of the wealthy and powerful Northwest Company, were call
ed from their stations, and hunting grounds, and offered their
services, after the fall of Michillimackanack, in the reduction
of Detroit. It is well known, there are more than three thous
and men employed by this company, and that their supplies are
carried over lake Erie, and pass up Detroit river, and that their
existence depended on keeping open that communication. And
it appears by Mr. Mc Kenzie's letter, one of the principal
agents of that company, which has been recited, that they were
prepared, with numerous hosts of savages, to proceed against
Detroit, whenever their services should become necessary. It
further appears, by the letter ofthe Secretary of War to Gener
al Dearborn, which has been recited, that the savages had as
sembled on the road, which I had opened from Ohio, and had
stopped the militia which were escorting provisions to Detroit.
I will here recite an extract of a letter, which I received from
Colonel Anderson, who commanded at the river Raisin, dated
the 4th of August, which was in evidence on my trial, and is to
be found in the 20th page of the appendix.
"I am doubtful if the mail is not taken, but I hope not I do

109
all in my power to keep up the spirits of the inhabitants, which
is all but exhausted. There is forty men on guard and patrole
at this place, and ten at the other Creek, and will continue the
same until further orders. W e are short of ammunition, if at
tacked, please to keep a little for us, if possible. I understand
by good authority, that numbers of Indians, are passing on the
heads of this river (meaning the river Raisin) and river Huron,
on their way to Maiden ; and I think if some plan is not taken
soon, that they will be in thousands at that place before long,
&c. &c. (Signed) JOHN ANDERSON.
P. S. In behalf of the inhabitants, I request you will not or
der aw ay any of the people from this place ; for we are too few
for its defence. If it was possible to be succoured, would be
best (Signed) J. A.
This letter was received after the redaction of Chicago, and
it appeared that the Indians, who had taken that fort, with
those from the western region, were marching to join those at
Maiden. With respect to the British troops, militia, and savages of the
province, they were unnecessary at any other stations, because
the armistice entered into by General Dearborn was then, and
had been for eight days in operation. General Brock left the
vital part of the province, where General Dearborn had estab
lished a peace, and commanded in person the expedition against
Detroit He was a Major General in the British army, and had
a high reputation as a military officer. On the success of this
enterprize, not only his military fame, but the protection and
safety of his province depended. Having these sources, and
the means of augmenting his army, under his controul and au
thority, I ask you whether it is possible for you to believe, that
he did not make use of them, and assemble and order under his
immediate command, before he made the invasion of our terri
tory, a force competent to the object ? At this time, I had re
ceived np^ information of the armistice ; yet I had received in
formation from Generals Hall and Porter, who were in command
on the Niagara river, that all the forces of every description
from the east part of the province, were proceeding to Maiden.
When, therefore, General Brock had the means of augment
ing his army, with perfect safety to the other parts of his pro-

110
vince, to at least ten times the number of those under my com
mand, and when on the 15th he appeared on the bank of the
river at Sandwich, opposite to Detroit, and summoned me to
surrender the Fort of Detroit, and not only declared in his sum
mons, that his force justified him in making the demand, but
that the tribes of savages, which had joined his standard, were
so numerous, that it would he impossible for him to restrain
them, the moment the contest commenced. I ask you, fellow
citizens, whether the facts here stated, did not afford strong
reasons for me to believe, that his forces were much superiour
to mine, and competent to the object, which he had in view ?
To this summons, I however gave a decided answer, that I
should defend the fort ; hoping to be able, before he made the
invasion, to collect at Detroit, the detachment under the com
mand of M'Arthur and Cass, which had marched to the river
Raisin, and other detachments, which were absent on other du
ties. And I now again ask you, whether his landing with his
army the next morning, did not afford additional evidence of
the competency of his force ?
The moment I received information of the arrival of General
Brock, I sent orders to M'Arthur and Cass, immediately to re
turn to Detroit, and stated the reasons. On the morning of the
16th, when the invasion was made, I had received no informa
tion from them. The route they marched, as I have before ob
served, was about fifty miles through a wilderness. They were
seat to procure the means of subsistence, for my army. *To
satisfy, how easy he might have increased his numbers, I refer
you to the testimony of Captain Eastman, of the 4th regiment.
who was a witness in behalf ofthe administration; "that he was
at Detroit and says that fourteen hundred Indian warriours, ar
rived as re-enforcements, a few days after the capitulation, from
two stations only, viz. Saganau and Michillimackanack." The
facts and circumstances here stated, furnish you with solid ma
terials, to form a general estimate of the force, and strength
which General Brock, at this time, had it in his power to have
brought against me ; and I believe you will be satisfied that he
availed himself of the advantages of collecting as large a force>
as he deemed necessary for the object.
* See page 100 of my trial.

Ill
In making your estimate on this subject, you will recollect,
the orders General Dearborn had received, immediately after
the declaration of war, to order the troops under his command
to the Niagara river, and other suitable situations for the inva
sion of Upper Canada, and he was likewise ordered only to
make a feint against Montreal, and not even a feint against
Quebec. Fort George, and all the other British posts, on the
east part of Upper Canada, being thus threatened with invasion,
and Quebec and Montreal, &c. not even being threatened, it re
quires no evidence to prove, that the principal part of the Brit
ish forces were drawn from those lower stations, to re-enforce
and support those which were in danger.
From these facts, it may very fairly be presumed, that the
principal part of the British forces were at these stations on the
Niagara river, directly opposite to General Dearborn's army
and only separated by the river. Let me then in the first place
ask you, after peace was established with General Dearborn, to
make your estimate of the British force, which General Brock
might with the most perfect safety, have carried with him to
Maiden ?
... In the next place, the population of Upper Canada at that
time, was about one hundred thousand inhabitants. If only
every tenth inhabitant was on the militia, the number would
have amounted to ten thousand. I ask you to consider, under
the quiet and peaceable circumstances of the east part of the
province, what number of militia, the British General and Gov
ernour, might have taken with him in his expedition for the de
fence of the only part of his province which was invaded ?
Being the superintendant of Indian affairs, within the British
territories, and the numerous tribes of savages within our own
country, having joined the British standard, I ask you to calcul
ate what number of this description of force, it was in his power
to have assembled, for his assistance ? From knowledge of the
wealth and influence of the Northwest Company, and the nu
merous Engagees in their service, and the deep interest they
had in opening the communication through the Detroit river,
through which channel, they received their supplies, you will
be able to judge what aid, he might have received from that im
portant establishment.
After the fall of Michillimackanack and Chicago, the forces

11?
which reduced those places, could have had no other object, ex
cepting the reduction of Detroit, and those from Michillimack
anack were descending the upper lakes, for the purpose, as ap
pears by Mr. McKenzie's letter, and other testimony, and those
from Chicago, and the western wilderness were marching to the
same place, as appears by the letter of Colonel Anderson, who
commanded at the river Raisin, which has been recited. The
river Raisin, it will be seen by looking on the map, is in the di
rect course from Chicago to Maiden.
I have taken this view of the subject, fellow citizens, to fur
nish you with facts and materials, to assist you in forming a cor
rect judgment of the forces, which the British General, had it
in his power, to have assembled, for the" invasion of our territo
ry, before I could have received any" assistance, from any quar
ter whatever. Perhaps I may be censured by critics, for repe
tition and digression. I have no other object in writing, but to
communicate the truth, and have it distinctly understood by all
classes of my fellow citizens, even by the youngest children
who attend our schools and to correct the erroneous statements
which have been published. It is a fact which will appear evi
dent from the testimony, which has been, and will be present
ed, in the course of these memoirs, that many of the school
books which are made use of for the education of the rising gen
eration, contain the grossest falsehoods on this subject. It is a
misfortune, which every good man will lament, that such books
should be admitted into these most valuable of all our institu
tions, and that any of the rising generation should be taught
errour and indeed falsehood, instead of justice and truth, with
respect to the history of our happy and prosperous republic.
I shall now ask.your attention, to a consideration of the evi
dence, which I shall offer, to satisfy you of the number of the
forces, with which General Brock actually crossed the Detroit
river, and invaded our territory on the morning of the 16th of
August. In addition to the re- enforcements, which attended him, from
the east part of the province ; he had all the forces which were
at Maiden, when he arrived ; to ascertain that number, I will
here offer to you the same evidence, which my prosecutors made
use of at my trial, (viz:) the testimony of Lieutenant Forbush.
Lieutenant Forbush was made a prisoner, in the Cayahoga pack-

113
et, the Ist day of July, and remained at Maiden until the 16th
of August; he was then a Serjeant, and was promoted by the
administration, to the rank of Lieutenant, two grades, before he
gave his testimony. He was selected and examined by the
Judge advocate, to prove the numbers, which were at Maiden,
at the time mentioned, and which had been there, from the 1st
of July. I only examined him to prove the circumstances of
the vessel being taken, and to ascertain the number of Indians,
he counted at Maiden, on the 15th of August. His testimony
was as here follows.
"I was then Sergeant in the 4th regiment of Infantry, and
had charge ofthe sick and of the hospital stores. The enemy
permitted me to go about the works at Maiden, and I was little
restrained. I toofe every opportunity I could of counting them.
The regulars, when I arrived, were from eighty to an hundred.
From two hundred and fifty to three hundred militia. Perhaps
three hundred to three hundred and fifty Indians." This force
amounting to seven hundred and fifty, was at Maiden, on the
1st day of July, when my army was opening a road in the wil
derness, seventy miles from Detroit and before I had received
any information of the declaration of war.
Lieutenant Forbush then, being asked by the Judge Advocate
what number of troops arrived at Maiden afterwards, answered,
"There were in the Hunter thirty regulars, and in the Lady
Prevost from thirty to forty regulars. This was about the 20th
of July ; and after the battle of Brownstown, there were three
hundred arrived in red coats." These regulars, or red coats,
amount to three hundred and seventy, which added to the seven
hundred and fifty which he testifies were at Maiden the 1st of
July, makes the number eleven hundred and twenty. He then
says, "he counted in one body, on the 15th of August, six hun
dred Indian warriours, passing up, (that is from Maiden to
Sandwich) some on horse-back, and some on foot." He further
says, that from the 20th to the 30th of July, many of the militia
went to their farms and returned, making as many as before ;
he then says, nine hundred was the whole force at Maiden, ex
clusive of the red coats. By his former testimony, given in de
tail, the red coats amounted to four hundred and seventy — add
this to the nine hundred, makes thirteen hundred and seventy
—add to this number the six hundred Indian warriours, which;
15

114 *
he counted at one time, and at one place, at Maiden, on the
15th, and it makes the .whole number nineteen hundred and
seventy. I wish this subject, viz. the numbers at Maiden, exclusive.
of the re-enforcements which arrived with General Brock, to be
distinctly understood. General Brock, the latter part of the
night ofthe 14th of August, marched from Maiden to Sandwich,
with the British troops and militia, and arrived early in the
morningof the 15th; and hundreds of witnesses might be pro
duced to prove, that a large body of Indians attended his army,
and arrived at Sandwich at fhe same time. They were seen,
indeed by my whole army on the opposite bank. I have stated
this fact, because it may be possibly said, that the six hundred
Indian warriours which Lieutenant Forbush counted at Maiden
on the 15th, and which on that day marched to Sandwich, wa3
the whole ofthe Indian force. Those which he counted on the
15th at Maiden, could have been no part of those which march
ing with General Brock, and were at Sandwich early in the morn
ing of the same day, the distance being eighteen miles. I have
made this statement, because three hundred and fifty Indians,
by Lieutenant Forbush's testimony, were at Maiden on the 1 st of
July, and were included in the whole number of nineteen hun
dred and seventy, which is made by a calculation on the details
of his evidence. On the facts here stated, the judicious reader
will be able to form a satisfactory estimate.
With respect to the militia at Maiden, there is no fact which
aan be more indisputable as to their number. Between the 20th
and 30th of July, many of them deserted and came to my camp.
Their uniform testimony was that when the approach of our
army was known, one thousand was ordered by the. government
to be detached, and re-enforce the station at Maiden, and that
nine hundred out of the thousand ordered, actually arrived. It
is a well known fact, that about the 30th of July, a proclamation
of pardon was issued ; and by the testimony of Lieutenant For
bush, it appears they all returned. Many copies of this proc
lamation were seen in our camp; and besides the evidence I
have here stated, complete proof of the number /of militia de
tached for the defence of Maiden, may be found on the records
of Upper Canada. Thus it appears, by the the testimony of Lieu
tenant Forbush, when examined by the Judge Advocate, the whofe

fiUjnber at Maiden was nineteen hundred and seventy, before the
arrival of General Brock, with the re-enforcements which attend
ed him from the east part of the province. As 1 have no evi
dence to determine precisely what those numbers were, I must
leave the estimate to your judgment under the circumstances
which have been stated, as it was peace in that quarter, and
there was no occasion for any force whatever for the defence of
that part of the province. In addition to the forces at Maiden,
and those which he brought with him, he had all the sailors and
marines which belonged to his navy, which^j^the 15th of Au
gust, was anchored in the Detroit river, between Sandwich
and the Spring Wells. Having stated the number of vessels,
with the number of cannon mounted on them, and likewise a
number of armed boats, suitable for those waters, and we hav
ing not a single armed boat to annoy them, and as consequent
ly, the whole of their crews might have been, an : actually were,
employed in the land service, I leave it to your judgment to
determine their numbers. The detachment of British troops
which marched across the country, under the command of Ma
jor Chambers, with artillery, collecting the militia and Indians
on his rout, joined General Brock at Sandwich. This number
must have been several hundreds. On the river Le Trench
was a large settlement conveniently situated to join his forces
and the militia of that settlement were seen with the invading
army at the time ofthe capitulation. From the facts here offer
ed, and the evidence produced, you will have the means of
forming for yourselves an opinion, with respect to his numbers
at Sandwich, on the 15th of August.
I will now state the testimony of Colonel Snelling, who was
only a captain in my army, who had been promoted by my pro
secutors, who was depended on as a leading and principal wit
ness in behalf of the prosecution, and had become my most ma
lignant enemy. His testimony of the numbers of General
Brock's army, on the 16th of August, the day ofthe capitula
tion, is as follows. I shall transcribe it, verbatim et literatim,
and it is to be found in the 40th page of my trial. He says,
"that he stood at the corner of the slip leading to the gate of
the fort, and attempted to count the British troops on entering
the fort ; that the troops in advance were the 41st regiment, in
platoons of fourteen files as well as the York volunteers, twen-

116
ty-nine platoons, two deep in red coats ; that the militia pla
toons, which were in the rear, consisted of no more than seven
or eight files, and composed one third part of the whole force,
probably seven hundred and fifty whites ; of which the remain
ing two thirds were regulars and ununiformed militia."
Here Colonel Snelling swears, there were three descriptions
of troops, viz. the British 41st regiment, the York volunteers in
uniform, and the militia, not in uniform. ' He says the 41st regi
ment and the Yflrk volunteers formed twenty-nine platoons
of fourteen firtflfn each platoon, two deep, and in red
coats. He then says, that the militia platoons, which followed
in the rear, consisted of only seven or eight files. He does not
say how many platoons the militia consisted of, but only men
tions the number of files in each ; and then states their whole
number to be seven hundred and fifty, which was one third part
of their whole force. He then says, in these identical words,
that the remaining two thirds were regulars, and uniformed
York volunteers.
By this evidence, it appears, that the regulars and York vol
unteers, in uniform amounted to only, fifteen hundred ; to which
add seven hundred and fifty, which was the number of the
ununiformed militia, and was one third part of the whole
white force, makes the whole force of regulars, uniformed York
volunteers, and militia, two thousand two hundred and fifty.
In this number the Indians are not included ; for, in his fur
ther testimony, he says, he supposed the Indian force was more
than one hundred and fifty, although he only saw that number,
drawn up to fire a salute, as he understood. As he says that he
saw only one hundred and fifty drawn up in a body, to fire a sa
lute, and supposed there were more, no correct estimate can be
formed of the Indian force from his testimony.
As Lieutenant Forbush counted, at one time, and at one
place, in a body, six hundred Indian warriours, on the 15th at
Maiden ; and as it is well known there was a large body at
Sandwich, at the same time, with General Brock, the testimony
is positive that there were six hundred ; for when they were
counted, they were marching to join the General at Sandwich.
What number were before with the General, I cannot give an
exact account,
Only by adding the six hundred, and leaving those who

117
marched up with General Brock out of the estimate, would
make his whole number, on the morning of the 16th, two thou
sand eight hundred and twenty-five. These were the troops
which marched into the fort, excepting the Indians. It is well
known a number were left in the forts on the opposite bank, as
there was an incessant fire from those forts, until the capitula
tion took place, and they were distinctly seen. I have no doc-
mt-nt to show the exact number left on the opposite bank. It
is likewise, well known, that as soon as the capitulation took
place, and before the troops marched into the fort, guards were
placed around the town and fort, to prevent the Indians from
taking the horses into the woods, and likewise to protect the
inhabitants from them. This is the positive testimony of the
witnesses in behalf of my prosecutors, stated in detail, and the
calculation is made on the facts to which they testified. From
examining the whole of the testimony which they gave on the
other charges, it will be seen that they were no friends to me,
and that they wished to make General Brock's force as small
as possible.
Major Jessup and the other witnesses, who were examined
on this subject, said they did not count the enemy's forces, and
did not know their numbers, and could only state their general
impressions. Whatever those impressions were, ought not to
have weight against the positive testimony of those who counted
them. Even any opinions which may have been expressed by
those who counted them, ought not to have influence, if they
vary from the detailed facts to which they testified. It on
ly shows they were not correct mathematicians. I have suf
fered so much by the opinions of interested witnesses, that I
hope correct calculations will now be made on facts, and on
them a judgment will be formed. It was my intention, in this
number, to have stated and given you evidence of my force at
this time, but I find it cannot be contained in one paper. I
must therefore defer it to the next, with the hope that this will
particularly be kept in mind when the next is presented.

1T8

No. XXVII.
I shall exhibit to you from the best evidence which can be ob
tained, the number and quality of the forces under my com
mand, and at my disposal, on the morning of the 16th of August)
When General Brock invaded our territory with the forces which
have been described in the former number. — To avoid repeti
tion, I must ask you to examine number 16, where will be
found a general statement of my force before the army retreat
ed from the Canada shore. It will appear that the original num
ber ordered by the President, and placed under my command
when I commenced my march from Dayton, in the state of
Ohio, was twelve hundred militia, and the 4th United States'
Regiment, consisting of about three hundred, according to Colo*
nel Miller's testimony, who commanded the regiment In ad
dition to these forces there was a small number of volunteers
unauthorized by the President's order to Governor Meigs : they
were the associates and neighbours of Colonel McArthur and
Cass, and I took the responsibility of including them in the
return, that they might draw provisions, as they had no other
mode of obtaining them in marching through the wilderness.
I did not consider them subject to my authority, and they re
fused obedience to orders, when offensive operations were com
menced, as appears by evidence on my trial. Being Governour
of the territory of Michigan, its militia was subject to my au
thority. The number of white inhabitants of all descriptions'
from which a militia could have been drawn, was between four
and five thousand, as appeared on my trial, by the officer wha
took the census, and these were settled on the borders of the
lakes and rivers, an extent of five hundred miles from the
Miama to the sault of St. Mary, the outlet of Lake Superiour.
The few regular troops, which in time of peace consisted of
about fifty, in the garrison at Detroit, were likewise subject to
my command ; I'had no authority to employ the Indians in our
service — Here is exhibited all the forces of which my army con
sisted, when I commenced the march from Ohio, and all the
sources from which any additions could have been drawn. It
was in evidence on my trial, that three block houses were built

119
By the army in its march through the wilderness, and garrisoned!
by the troops ; their situations may be seen on some ofthe maps
of the country recently made ; that a stockade fort was likewise
built on the bank ofthe Miami, and a subaltern officer and thir
ty men were left for its defence, by order of the Secretary of
War. That about sixty were made prisoners in the vessel, on her
passage from Miami to Detroit, under the command ot Lieuten
ant Forbush : as he says there were as many as the vessel could
carry, which must have been at least that number. [See Lieu
tenant Forbush's Testimony, page 145 of my trial.]
A number were left sick at the river Raisin ; having lost my
papers as before mentioned, which contained the daily reports
ofthe sick, and the state of the troops, I cannot ascertain the
exact number ; according to my best recollection it was not less
than twenty-five, and they never afterwards joined the army.
In several rencounters near Maiden, a number were killed and
wounded — the exact number I cannot ascertain for the reason
above stated.
On the 4th of August, according to the testimony of Lieu
tenant Colonel Vanhorn* a detachment under his command was
attacked by the Indians near Brownstown, and eighteen were
killed, twelve wounded, and above seventy missing, a part of
which number afterwards returned to the camp. [See report of
my trial, page 70.]
On the 8th of August, in the action on the bank of the De
troit river, between Maguago and Brownstown, where Colonel
Miller commanded, the killed and wounded on our side was
sighty-one, according to Colonel Miller's testimony. [See page
108, of the report of my trial.]
I will now consider the situation "of the detachment under
the command of Colonels McArthur and Cass at this time. On
the 14th of August, this detachment marched from Detroit, and
as Colonel Miller, with six hundred of the best men of the
army, on the 8th of August, had not been able to open the com
munication to the river Raisin, I directed these two Colonels
to take all the effective men of their regiments, and make an
other attempt. Having received information that there was an
Indian path through the wilderness, to avoid being attacked
from Maiden, in passing that garrison at Brownstown, 1 thought

120
it expedient to direct Colonel McArthur to take that rout. On
this rout the distance from Detroit to the river Raisin was about
fifty miles.
At this lime, not having received information of the arrival of
General Brock, with the re-enforcements from fort Erie, and a
number of cattle having arrived at the river Raisin, for my
army, guarded by a company of militia, I then thought, and
now think, under the circumstances which existed, the measure
of ordering this detachment was expedient On the morning of
the 16th, when General Brock landed at the Spring Wells,
under cover of his naval armament I had received no informa
tion of this detachment ; I had therefore the strongest reasons
to believe, as they had been absent two days, that they were at
that time at the river Raisin, fifty miles from Detroit the rout
they marched, and thirty by the way of Brownstown. As Colo- <
nels McArthur and Cass were going themselves on this hazard
ous enterprize, and as they had an authority to select all the
effective men of their regiments, I ask you whether, under these
circumstances, they would, and did not take all that they
thought would be useful and necessary to effect the object.
There is another reason which is conclusive, in my mind, that
they did. * On the 1 5th of August after I bad received infor
mation of the arrival of General Brock, the remainder of these
two regiments which were left behind, were paraded, and I ex
amined them : the number was very small, and I saw none but
sickly invalids.
I believe the situation of this detachment which must have
amounted to more than four hundred of the most effective men
of the Ohio regiments, will, by every candid reader, be con
sidered such, that in case of an action at Detroit, I could have
had no assistance from thgm.
Colonel Cass, in his letter to the government, stated, that
the number in fhe detachment amounted to three hundred and
fifty. Colonel McArthur, in his testimony before the C^rt
Martial, says, he received an order from me to detach from his
regiment one hundred and fifty. v
I ask why he tii-J not produce the order to prove the fact?
The loss of my papers, in the manner I have stated, is the
reason why I do not produce it
Having thus stated the numbers, which were ordered for

121
my command, by the government, it will be proper in estimat
ing my forces on the 16th of August, to deduct, those which
were left to garrison the block houses ; those who were made
prisoners in the vessel on the 1st of July, those killed, wound
ed, and missing, in the different actions at the river Au-t anard,
and at other places, between Sandwich and Maiden ; and like
wise, those who were killed, wounded, and missing in the two
actions at Maguago and Brownstown, where Colonel Vanhorn
and Colonel Miller commanded.
When you have before you the fact, proved by the testimony
of Colonel Anderson, who commanded the militia at the river
Raisin, that the whole of them were not sufficient for the pro
tection of that settlement, and he requested succour from De
troit, for safety to the inhabitants ; when you likewise consider,
that in addition to the militia at the Miami, I was obliged, by
the orders of the government, to leave an officer and thirty men,
for the protection of that settlement ; when you likewise con
sider the scattered situation of the other inhabitants of the ter
ritory, surrounded by Indian villages, on all sides of them ; and
further that a part of those belonging to the settlement at De
troit, joined the British forces, as soon as they landed ; and the
further information, I received, that the whole would desert
and join them, I cheerfully submit to your judgment, under
these facts and circumstances, whether I had a right to calcu
late on any assistance from these militia ; — and rather, as I had
been informed a part of them had joined the enemy, and their
Colonel gave it, as his opinion that the whole would join them,
whether I had not grounds to believe, that they would add to
the enemy's force.
In making your estimate of my effective force, it will be pro
per, and I am sure you will take into consideration, that as it
was then the middle of August, the sickly season of the year ;
and as, by the capture ofthe vessel, we had lost all our medical
stores, and there was no possibility of obtaining the least supply,
from any quarter whatever, and as the country was liable to
agues and fevers, that a proportion of the troops, must h^ve
been sickly and non-effective.
I have presented this statement, to furnish you with the means
of determining, how much my army must have been reduced,
on the 16th of August, ami of comparing the opinions, you may
16

122
form on the facts thus exhibited, with the other evidence, I shall
now offer.
The evidence, which I shall now offer, is the evidence of
Major Jessup, who then acted as the Adjutant-General of my
army, and is now the Quarter-Master General of the United
States. — With respect to other testimony, I have referred to
the report of my trial. I have done this, because, that book is
in circulation, -and any reader, who is desirous of comparing the
documents, and evidence, which I have stated, can more easily
obtain it, and make the comparison, than from the records, in
the office at Washington, where is to be found only one copy,
and that in manuscript. Colonel Forbes, who published the
Report was one of the members of the Court Martial, and the
documents, as well as my defence, were furnished him, by the
administration, from the records of the government.
As Major Jessup was the acting Adjutant General, it was his
official duty, to make a return to me, when ordered, of the
whole force, under my command — He was ordered at this time,
to do it. In examining his testimony, 1 find there is a variance,
between the report of my trial, and the copy I have obtained
from the Adjutant-General's office, taken from the records, by
an order from Mr. Calhoun, the Secretary of war. I shall
therefore transcribe, precisely from both, that the variance may
be seen, and if one is more favourable to me than the other,
that I have no disposition, to take advantage of it.
In the first place I will transcribe from the report of my trial,
his testimony with respect to my numbers — It will be found in
page 94. " Major Jessup stated, that he had received a report
from different Adjutants of different corps, estimating the men,
fit for action, and thinks that the amount, (as stated in General
Cass' letter) exceeded a thousand men. including the Michigan
militia of four hundred, and the detachments absent with Colo
nels Cass and McArthur ; perhaps, this estimation, includes
the Michigan legion, which on an occasion, when he had two
companies of them under his command, behaved as well as any
troops he ever saw, having formed on an island, where some
fighting was expected, in the most regular manner. — There were
also on the evening, of the 15th about thirty or forty armed
wagonners." Before I make any comments, I will transcribe the same evi-

123
dence precisely, from the copy I received, from] the Adjutant
General's office. It is as follows : —
" On the evening of the 15th, I received an estimate, ofthe
Adjutants of the different corps, of the men, fit for action . The
force, I think, exceeded a thousand. I gave Colonel Cass a
statement of it the next day after the surrender. I subsequent
ly saw a leter published, said to have been written by Colonel
Cass, in which the number was stated, I think, according to the
statement I furnished him. I am not certain whether the Mich
igan legion were included in the estimate, but the militia
were not. It is my impression that the Michigan legion were.
I suppose there were four hundred at least of the Michigan
militia under arms at the time, and I believe theie were
more. I was once out on a detaihment, with a part of
the Michigan legion, — we had to go on to an island, where
we expected to be fired on, the moment we landed. They land
ed and formed with as great regularity as any regular troops I
ever saw." He then mentions the same number of armed
wagonners, as stated in the report of the trial.
You here have before you, fellow citizens, the number of
forces ordered for my command by the President, in the first
instance, and the various casualties by which it was reduced.
You likewise have the testimony of the Adjutant General, the
official officer, whose duty it was to make a return of the whole
number to me.
In the first place, my fellow citizens, as I stand before you as
judges, and I know that I now stand before a candid, impartial,
and intelligent,, tribunal, I ask you to make your calculations,
ofthe numbers of my effective forces at Detroit, on the 16th of
August, on the facts which I have exhibited, viz. the number
and quality of troops ordered by the government ; the few un
authorized volunteers, who joined the army on the march ; the
few regulars, which had been stationed in the fort of Detroit,
in time of peace ; and the militia which could have been drawn
from the whole population of the territory, which population
consisted of little more than four thousand souls. From this
force then deduct the number left in three block houses, and a
stockade fort, at the river Miami, established to assist in pre
serving the communication to Ohio ; those made prisoners in
the Cayahoga packet ; the sick which were left at the rivev

124
Raisin ; the killed and wounded at several rencounters, at the
river Au-Canard, and between Maiden and Sandwich ; the
killed, wounded and missing, in the action at Brownstown, un
der the command of Colonel Vanhorn; likewise the killed and
wounded in the battle between Maguago and Brownstown, un
der the command of Colonel Miller; likewise Colonels McAr
thur and Chss' detachments, which marched on the 14th of
August, to the river Raisin, to open the communication, and
obtain provisions ; and likewise the state of the Michigan mi
litia—that a part of them had joined the enemy's forces, with
their arms in their hands, when they first landed,, and the infor
mation I had received from their Colonel, that the whole num
ber would join them ; likewise the number which at this season
were sick, being without medicine, or even necessary comforts.
Of all these facts, you have evidence, in the course of the fore
going numbers ; and without giving any opinion, I ask you to
form a judgment for yourselves.
I shall now consider the testimony of Major Jessup, the offi*
cial officer, and acting Adjutant General, on the subject of the
numbers of my army at this time.
He says, that on the 15th of August, he had received a report
from the Adjutants of the different corps, and the amount ex
ceeded a thousand men, (as stated in General Cass' letter.)
That letter stated the number, by that report, to be a thousand
and sixty. Colonel Cass' letter, however, ought not to be con
sidered as any evidence. He was not under oath when he
wrote it. As, however, that part of it which relates to my
numbers is confirmed by the testimony of Major Jessup, I am
willing to admit, under the explanation which he afterwards
made, the correctness of it. He says, in these identical
words, "exceeded a thousand men, including the Michigan
militia, of four hundred, and the detachments absent with Color
nels Cass and McArthur." He then says, "perhaps this esti
mate includes the Michigan legion." He afterwards states,
" there were about thirty or forty armed wagonners."
By referring to Colonel Cass' letter* published in the report
of my trial, you will perceive, he says, there were three hun
dred and fifty in the detachment ; and Major Jessup, in his tes»
timony, says, that this detachment was included in the one
thousand; it consequently ought to be deducted, having been

125
absent two days, under orders to march to the river Raisin.
This will reduce my number to seven hundred and ten. He
also says, there were about thirty or forty wagonners armed that
evening ; say thirty-five, which makes the whole number seven
hundred and forty-five.
About half of these, according to his testimony, were Micliir-
gan militia ; and I have produced evidence, that a part of them,
with their arms, joined the enemy the next morning, and that
their Colonel informed me the whole of them would desert.
Therefore they ought not only to be deducted from my numbers,
but added to the enemy's.
This. I believe you will be ofthe opinion, is the ofily fair ex
planation which can be given of the testimony of Major Jessup,
the Adjutant General, as reported in my trial, by Colonel
Forbes, one of the members of the Court Martial, who was fur
nished with my defence, and other documents, by the govern
ment, and published under the auspices of the administration.
By comparing the two statements, both of which have been
literally transcribed, it will be seen, that there is this variance —
In the one, taken from the report of my trial, Major Jessup
says, that the Michigan militia was included, and made part of
the whole force, viz. one thousand and sixty. In the other,
taken from the records furnished by order of Mr. Calhoun, he
says, expressly, that it was his impression, the Michigan legion
was included in the one thousand and sixty, and the militia
(which must have been the other part of the militia) were not.
This legion, as it is called, was a part of the four hundred
Michigan militia, and it is very immaterial whether the men
who composed them were included or not, for the reasons which
have been just stated, as they added to the force of the enemy.
Perhaps the inquiry may be made, in what manner General
Brock, in his official report to his government, made the number
of prisoners so much greater ? Such an inquiry is easily an
swered. AU the prisoners from Michilimackinack were at
Detroit on their parole, and included in the number. All the
militia at the river Raisin, and in every part of the, territory ;
all persons, indeed, of every description, who were found at
Detroit, were in his power, and considered as prisoners. It
was easy for him to make the numbers as large as he pleased.
He had, indeed, a great object in making them as large as pos-

12G
sible. His official communication was to be sent to London,
and presented to his Majesty, the fountain of distinctions and
honours. In proportion as the achievement could be magnified,
he expected distinctions and honours would be conferred. In
this he was not disappointed ; the order of knighthood was con
ferred on him, as soon as his dispatches were received.
From the statement and evidence offered for your considera
tion in this and the former number, I have the happiness to be
lieve you will be satisfied, that the pledge which I gave in my
second number, viz. that I would prove to your satisfaction,
that on the 16th of August, 1812, General Brock invaded our
territory, with more than double the effective force which 1 had
to oppose to it, has more than been redeemed ; and, if I had
pledged myself to have proved that he had at that time more than
three times my effective force, the statement would have been
correct On, the evidence furnished by the administration, my
prosecutors, I could not have carried into the field one third
part of the force with which our territory was invaded ; and as
the suspension of hostilities, was at that time in full operation,
in every other part of Canada, and all the British troops, militia
of the province, and all the savages, were subject to the au
thority of the British General, and were moving in all directions
to the only point where their services were necessary, I again
ask you, whether you are not fully satisfied, that his army might
have been re-enforced to much more than double the numbers
then present, before I could, by any posibility, have received
assistance ?

No. XXVIII.

Pehhaps, after reading the two last numbers, in which were
exhibited evidence of General Brock's forces, and those under
my command, an inquiry may be made, why this statement and
evidence was not presented more particularly in my defence ?
to satisfy you in relation to such an inquiry, it will be perceiv
ed the whole of the evidence now exhibited was not before the
Court Martial, and the part which was, I expected the members
would critically examine, and form their judgments on the facts
which were proved, and not on the opinions of the witnesses.

127
There was another reason, which was the principal one ; viz.
the very short time alio, ed by the Court, to prepare my de
fence. The evidence was closed on Friday, the 1 1th day of Februa
ry, and the Court met again the next Tuesday — a Sabbath in
tervened, winch ought to be devoted to the worship of our God.
Consequently, I had only Saturday and Monday, to arrange all
the evidence, both written and oral, which had occupied thirty-
two days in presenting to the Court, where I had constantly
attended at the bar, in examining witnesses, &c. without any
assistance. This evidence was to be applied to a volume of
charges and specifications ; and the administration, my prosecu
tors, had employed two of the most eminent Counsellors in the
United States, to assist the Judge Advocate in preparing these
charges and in hunting up and examining witnesses, and taking
down minutes of their testimony, long before the trial com
menced. I believe no law can be found, authorizing the employment
of these Counsellors, or the payment of the large sums of public
money, they received for their services.
Until the whole of the testimony was offered it was impossi
ble to make an arrangement of it, and apply it to the numerous
charges. Every day witnesses were examined on all the differ
ent specifications. I have not made this statement to implicate
the conduct ofthe Court in this particular, as I did not urge for
a longer time. The reason why I did not, was. that every ap
plication of any importance, which I had made during the whole
trial, had been denied — I therefore thought it would be a useless
waste of time. I have only stated this fact as a reason, why
my defence was not presented in so clear, particular, and intel
ligible a manner, as it mightfiave been, had more time been al
lowed. It was impossible to arrange such a mass of testimony
in so short a time, as to have the case distinctly understood by
the most attentive readers. These are reasons, why my case
has not been more clearly and fully explained.
In a former number, I referred to the convention of Saratoga,
to show the fatal consequences of an army being ordered into a
situation where its communication with its magazines cannot
be preserved.
As the events of the northern campaign, in 1777, are an im-

128
portant portion of the history of our revolution, and as in many
respects, there appears to be a similarity between the misfor
tunes, which attended the army, commanded by General Bur
goyne and the case which I have presented for your considera-
tioni it may afford some illustrations ofthe subject to describe
them, and trace the similarity.
The invasion of the United States, in the year 1777, from
Canada, was a favourite object of the British administration,
planned in the cabinet of London, and the execution of it com
mitted to General Burgoyne. Early in the spring of that year,
he advanced from Canada with a large army, as distinguished
for character and discipline, as, perhaps, that nation ever fur
nished. Attached to his command were the Canadian militia,
and savages of the northern and western regions. Distinguish
ed, not only by his talents, as a civilian, but by long experience
in the wars of Europe, and having acquired the highest reputa
tion, as a military commander, he was selected for this impor
tant command. Aided by a naval force on lake Champlain, he
passed over those waters, and possessed himself of Tyconderoga.
Calculating on assistance, and co-operation with the army un
der the command of Sir Henry Clinton, in New York, and ex
pecting to form a junction with that army, at Albany, he pene
trated to the Hudson, and crossed that river, at fort Edward.
If his communication should be cut off from his magazines in
Canada, he "expected when a junction was formed with the army
at New York, it would be opened for the supply of his army,
from those below. Not receiving that co-operation, on which
he depended, and his communication between his army, and his
magazines in Canada, being intercepted by the American forces,
he considered it his duty to accept the best terms which could
be obtained, and surrendered his ermy as prisoners of war, un
der a convention, to which the \merican General acceded.
This was occassioned by the want of co-operation on the part
of his superiour officer, from New York. 1 ask you, my fellow
citizens, to compare the two cases, and although it may be said,
it is comparing great things with small, yet they depend on the
same principle, and are offered as an illustration of the subject
under review. I was ordered to make the invasion of Upper
Canada, from Detroit. General i urgoyne was ordered to in
vade the United States, from Canada. After my army invaded

129
Canada, its communication was cut off, by the enemy's naval
force on lake Erie, and his land forces, and savages, on the
road which had been opened from Ohio, and no supplies could
be obtained from any magazines from my country. After Gen
eral Burgoyne's army invaded the United States, and advanc
ed to Saratoga, his communication was intercepted from his
magazines in Canada, and no supplies could be obtained from
that quarter.
•It was a part of the plan ofthe campaign in 1812, that Gen
eral Dearborn should cross the Niagara river and en operate
with me, with an army " sufficient for the conquest of Upper
Canada, by which event, my communication would have been
opened to the magazines, in our country on the Niagara river.
Had Sir Henry Clinton successfully co-operated with General
Burgoyne, his communication would have been opened to his
magazines in New York, from which his army would have re
ceived its supplies. The want of that co-operation alone be
came fatal to Burgoyne. I had no communication with my
country, excepting through lake Erie, and the road I had open
ed through the wilderness to Ohio. After the declaration of
war lake Erie was closed against me, by the enemy, and the
road by the savages. As General Dearborn neglected to assist
and co-operate with me, my communication being entirely in
tercepted, I considered it my duty to negotiate and accept the
best terms which could be obtained.
Thus far there appears to be a similarity between the two
cases. Had General Washington at that time proposed to Sir
William Howe, who commanded the British army, an armistice,
and had it been agreed to, without including General Bur
goyne's army, the similarity would have continued ; — and in an
event of that kind General Washington might have marched his
whole army, or as large a part as he deemed necessary to have.
assisted General Gates with the most perfect safety to the other
parts of the country, and at once overwhelmed General Bur
goyne's army. By a calculation on the subject it will appear,
that General Burgoyne had a larger force, in proportion to Gen
eral Gates' than I had in proportion to General Brock's.
The surrender of General Burgoyne's army, was occasioned
by the want of co-operation, from the army at New York, com-
¦ manded by Sir Henry Clinton ; and I am satisfied, you will be
17

130
fully convinced, that the disasters of my army were caused by
the neglect of General Dearborn, in not assisting and co-operat
ing with me as he was ordered.
I will now ask your indulgence, for a moment, in examining
the conduct of the British administration towards this unfortun
ate General. I do it with a view to contrast it with the treat
ment I have received from the administration under which I serv
ed. This treatment, is so well known to you, that it is unnec
essary to repeat it. Indeed, no language can describe the base
injustice I have experienced, or the vile and disgraceful mo
tives from which such injustice originated.
Let me then ask you whether the officers ofthe British Ad
ministration received and published to the nation and to the
world, an official account of the causes of that surrender, from
a subordinate officer, before that of the commander ofthe army
was received and published ? Were capital charges in the first
instance, exhibited against General Burgoyne; and was Sir
William Howe, whose duty it was to have assisted and co-oper
ated with him, and who was deeply interested in the event of
an inquiry, appointed President of a court martial for his trial ?
Did General Burgoyne's officers, selected as witnesses, receive
the patronage ofthe British administration, by being promoted
two or three grades, to prepare them to give the most unfavour
able testimony against him ? Were the newspapers of England,
by the influence of the administration, filled with false andf
scandalous accounts of his conduct, and the oaths and affirma
tions of every unprincipled adventurer and follower of his army,
taken and circulated to excite the clamour of the nation against
him? No, fellow citizens, the officers of the, administration of the
nation from which you descended, had too much honour and
justice to make use of such dishonourable practices even for
their own preservation in office. As, however, they knew that
an inquiry would produce a re-action on themselves, who form
ed the plan of the campaign, and on Sir William Howe, the
commander in chief of the army, who neglected to co-operate,
or to provide the necessary means of co-operation, with General
Burgoyne, no trial was ordered, and he retired to private life,
with the esteem and affection of his fellow citizens.
He was the unsuccessful general, and as the plan of the cam-

131
paign had been formed by the officers of the administration, and
its want of success, had excited a clamour in the nation, it was
well known, that the public censure would have rested on them,
and the generals who had neglected to co operate with him, had
a trial been ordered. That nation would never have suffered
such an outrage on justice as has been here practised.
By examining the most celebrated historians of the war of
our revolution, it will be seen, that the causes of the disasters
of General Burgoyne's army are attributable to the want of the
co operation which was expected.
In proof of this declaration, I will here transcribe a few sen
tences from Botta's history of the war of our independence,
translated by our countryman G. A. Otis, Esq. ; a work highly
creditable, both to the author and translator, as well as to the
rising literature of our country.
Speaking of Burgoyne's expedition, he remarks, " that its>
success depended on the combined efforts of the generals who
commanded on the lakes, and of those who had the manage
ment of the war in the State of New York. But far from mov
ing in concert, when one advanced, the other retired. When
Carleton had obtained the command of the lakes, Howe, instead
of ascending the Hudson towards Albany, carried his arms in
to New Jersey, and advanced upon the Delaware. When, af
terwards, Burgoyne entered Tyconderoga in triumph, Howe
embarked upon the expedition against Philadelphia; and thus
the army of Canada was deprived of the assistance it expected
from New York."
The author then makes the following reflections: "Perhaps
Howe imagined, that the reduction of such a city as Philadelphia,
would so confound the Americans and so derange their plans,
that they would either easily submit or make but a feeble re
sistance. Perhaps, also, he believed, that by attacking the centre,
and as it were the very heart of the confederation, he effected
the most useful diversion in favour of the army of the north,
thereby depriving the Americans of the ability to oppose it with
a sufficient force upon the Hudson. Finally, it is not impossi
ble, that, listening to his ambition, he had flattered himself, that
with his own means alone, he could acquire the exclusive glory
of having put an end to the war. But whatever might have
been the importance of the acquisition of Philadelphia, every

132
«ne must readily perceive how much greater was that of the
junction at Albany ofthe two armies of Canada and New York.
It was very doubtful, whether the conquest of a single city
would decide the issue ofthe war; whereas the junction of the
armies offered almost an assurance of it." In the next page it
is further observed, "Perhaps, also, (speaking of the British
administration) they erred in this, that having too great confi
dence in the reputation, rank, and military experience of Sir
William Howe, they neglected to send him more minute in
structions. For it appears by the best information we have
found on this subject, that the orders given to that general
in regard to his co-operation with the army of Canada, were
rather discretionary than absolute : but all the ruin of the enter-
prize is clearly attributable to this want of co-operation."
Sir W illiam Howe had taken so large a portion of the army
from New York, in his expedition to Philadelphia, that it pro
bably was not in the power of Sir Henry Clinton, consistent
with the safety of the posts below, to co-operate with General
Burgoyne. After these events took place, Sir WTilliam Howe
was recalled, and the command of the army given to Sir Henry
Clinton. General Howe's conduct was severely censured by
the British • government, for not supporting and co-operating
with General Burgoyne,
Tnus it appears, that Sir William Howe was censured by his
government, and recalled from his command, for not taking
measures to assist and co-operate with General Burgoyne's
army, when, as it appears, his orders were only discretionary
on the subject.
I now ask you to consider the case of General Dearborn. He
retained the confidence of the administration, and was continu
ed in his command ; although he took no measures to co-operate
with my army, although his orders were positive to do it.
Although it appears by the authority of this historian, that Sir
William Howe had not received positive orders to co-operate
with General Burgoyne; and although he had not made an ar
mistice with General Washington, which left all the forces of
the United States at liberty to have marched and joined Gen
eral Gates' army against General Burgoyne, yet I will here ap
ply the same reflections in relaton to the disasters of 1812, and
on General Dearborn's conduct, as the historian has made on

133
de events ofthe campaign of 1777, and on Sir William Howe's
conduct In relation to the events of 1812, it will thus stand.
"That the conquest of Upper Canada depended on the combin
ed efforts of the generals who commanded on the east and west
side of lake Erie. That when I crossed the Detroit river, and
invaded Canada on the west side, General Dearborn advanced
the principal part of his array to Plattsburg and Burlington, in
the direction of Montreal. Perhaps General Dearborn imagin
ed, that even the appearance of the reduction of such a city as
Montreal, would so confound the Canadians and so derange
their plans, that they would either easily submit or make but a
feeble resistance. Perhaps, also, he believed, that by attacking
the centre, and as it were the very heart of the province, he ef
fected the most useful diversion in favour of the northwestern
army, thereby depriving the Canadians of the ability to oppose
it, with sufficient force, on the Detroit river. Finally, (as the
historian observes, only changing names) it is not impossible, that
General Dearborn, listening to his ambition, had flattered him
self, that with his own means alone, he could acquire the ex
clusive glory of having put an end to the war."
I will continue the same reflections as the historian has made
in the other case, and you, my fellow citizens, will judge how
far they are applicable : " But whatever might have been the
importance ofthe acquisition of Montreal, (waving the probabil
ity of obtaining it) every one must readily perceive how much
greater was that ofthe junction ofthe two armies in the centre
of the upper province. It was very doubtful, whether the con
quest of a single city would decide the issue of the war ; where
as the junction of the two armies offered almost an assurance
of it Perhaps they erred (only changing the British for the
American administration) in this, in placing too great confidence
in the reputation, rank and military experience of General
Dearborn. But all the ruin of the enterprize is clearly attribute
able to this want of co-operation."
If the observations made by this celebrated historian, in the
¦ -case which he was reviewing are correct the same observations
will more strongly apply to the case here presented to your
consideration, because General Dearborn had particular instruc
tions which he did not comply with, but agreed to a suspension
of hostilities.

. 134
JF Sir William Howe was thus censured and recalled from his
command, when his orders were only discretionary with respect
to co-operation with General Burgoyne's army, 1 ask, and I
solemnly ask, what would have been his fate, had his orders
from his government been positive to have co-operated with
Burgoyne — and instead of obeying those orders, in imitation of
Dearborn, he had agreed to an armistice with General Wash
ington, without including Burgoyne's army, and without mak
ing any provision that General Washington's army should re
main, during the armistice, in the position it then occupied,
and any part of it, or the whole, with the General at its head,
had marched to the Hudson, and re-enforced Gates' army.
This might have been done, under such circumstances, with
the most perfect safety to every other part of the country dur
ing this suspension of hostilities between Washington and
Howe. I believe you will accord with me in the opinion, that if Howe
had made such an agreement with Washington, it would have
caused the immediate ar.d certain destruction of Burgoyne ; and
nothing could have sheltered him from te vengeance of any
administration which had any regard to character, policy, or
justice.

No. XXIX*
On the return of this joyful anniversary of our independence,
it would be most grateful indeed to me only to indulge in a re
collection ofthe means by which it was produced, and the hon
ours and blessings it has afforded, unmingled with any regrets
for subsequent misfortunes.
Indeed, this event is considered so important that the cele
bration of it is not confined to our own country, but patriots and
sages, throughout the civilized world, hail the example as the
dawn of their freedom.
It affords me happiness, which no language can express, that
I lived at the period when these great events were passing, that
my little bark followed, and sailed attendant, with that of our
* First published, in the American Statesman, Monday, July Sth, 1824.

135
illustrious leader, partook in a small degree of the same auspi
cious gale, and witnessed the same glorious triumph. When
those invaluable privileges, which had been acquired, with so
much success and glory, were assailed, I was willing again to
raise my feeble arm for their support.
To what causes ought to be attributed the misfortunes which
succeeded, is the object of the memoirs which I am now pre
senting for your consideration. I should be wanting in grati
tude, did I not both feel and express my sincere and unfeigned
thanks for the candour with which they have been received,
and the attention with which they have been read. I cannot
omit on this occasion, to make my particular acknowledgements
to the conductors of our free presses, for their liberality, in
giving publicity to my narrative, and for the candour and im
partiality which has appeared in their editorial remarks. As
long as this blessing is maintained, truth will break down the
barriers of falsehood, and overcome all opposition.
This number coming in its regular course, on this auspicious
day, no considerations ought to induce me to deviate from the
system I have adopted. I shall deeply regret the necessity of
stating a single fact, or drawing a single inference, which may
have the least tendency to disturb the repose of His Excellency,
Governour Eustis, both on account of the personal friendship*
which long subsisted between us, and the high esteem I have
entertained for his character, but likewise on account of the
profound respect for the majority of his electors, and my un
shaken attachment, notwithstanding alt I have suffered, to the
principles which have elevated him to the chief magistracy of
the commonwealth. They are principles, which I early im
bibed, for which, in my youth I have often fought, and which I
hope to cherish during the future remnant of my life. Princi
ples are fixed and immutable, and it is no reason to abandon
them because they are sometimes abused and perverted by those
who profess to follow them, or because innocence sometimes
suffers by such abuse, and perversion. I shall therefore now
present to you an official letter from His Excellency, then Se
cretary of War, to General Dearborn, dated after the disasters
ofthe campaign had happened, which, seems very clearly to un
fold the views and intentions^of the administration, in relation
to its misfortunes. [Vol. 6, p. 253.]

136
"War Department, Dec. 18,. 1812.
"•SIR, — Your letter of the 11th inst. is received. Forlu~
lately for you, the want of success which has attended the cam
paign will be attributed to the Secretary of War. So long as
you enjoy the confidence ofthe government, the clamour of the
discontented should not be regarded.
" You are requested to make an exchange of General Hull,
as soon as possible. [Signed,] W. EUSTIS.
"Major General H. Dearborn."
By this letter, it appears, that at the time it was dated, T was
a prisoner, and General Dearborn was requested to make an
arrangement, and effect my exchange, as soon as was possible.
This letter, under the circumstances, speaks in language too
plain to be misunderstood. General Dearborn is informed that
it is fortunate for him, that the want of success which has at
tended the campaign will be attributed to the Secretary of War.
Here His Excellency, then Secretary of War, in a very kind
manner, agrees that all the misfortunes of the campaign, shall
rest upon himself. He informs the General that he ought not
to regard the opinions of those who are dissatisfied, as long as
he retains the confidence of the government.
What is the proper construction to be given to the foregoing
sentence ? Is it not obviously this, that the opinions of the
people ought to be disregarded as Ioog as General Dearborn re
tained the confidence of the administration, the servants of the
people ? Your opinions ought to be held in contempt, while
the opinions of those to whom you have committed a temporary
authority ought to be respected ! Is this the genius and spirit
of the government under which you live ? Can a sentiment
like this receive your approbation, however decorated with titles
and authority the individual may be from whom it proceeds ?
The opinions of the administration, to be respected, and your
opinions, my fellow citizens, to be disregarded ! ! — Here the
Secretary acknowledged, from under his own hand, that the
misfortunes of the campaign would be attributed to him. His
character, therefore, as Secretary of War, by his own confes
sion, was implicated. Did it comport with the dignity of hi*

137
office or the honour of his character, to retire, borne down with
such a load of opprobrium ?
When he voluntarily consented to take these misfortunes
from the shoulders of General Dearborn he knew they would
not evaporate in smoke, and that it would require some power
ful engine to remove them. Thus commenced the plan de
signed for my destruction. By General Dearborn's arrange
ments I was immediately exchanged ; and, at the same time
that I received notice of my exchange, I was arrested, and
called to answer to a volume of charges prepared by Mr. Dal
las, who had been specially 'employed by the administration for
the purpose. He was assisted by a number pf my officers, who
seeing the favour and patronage Colonel Cass had received from
his official letter, were willing to follow his example, and were
not disappointed in their reward. All the prominent acts of the
campaign, in this volume of charges, were made capital offences,
although many of these very acts, had before, been highly ap
proved by the very administration which how exhibited them.
This was the engine which was prepared to relieve the Secre
tary, from the burden, which he had in so generous a manner
taken from the General's shoulders. The success of the p|an
which/ was formed for my destruction, is well known to vou, as
well as the rewards which have been given to those who formed
and executed . it General Dearborn was continued in office,
with all the emoluments of commanding General, to the close
of the war, without any inquiry into his conduct for not obeying
the President's orders, and has since been appointed Ambas
sador to a foreign court, with a compensation of thirty-six thou
sand dollars of your money, for three years' services. The
Secretary of War, Governour Eustis, retired from the war de
partment, with the misfortunes of the campaign upon his shoul
ders, and as soon as he had been relieved by the plan that had been
adopted, was rewarded with the appointment of Ambassador to
Holland, with the same compensation of thirty-six thousand
dollars for three years' services. This letter, which until very
lately has not been, obtained, upfolds the plan of the adminis
tration, and a scene of injustice and oppression which has few-
examples in the annals of the world.
This conduct of his Excellency will probably seem unac
countable and mysterious. Every impartial man must be of
18

138
the opinion the misfortunes of the campaign, ought to have rest
ed on the officer, whose conduct had' produced them — notwith
standing a declaration of war was made before a navy was built
on lake Erie, and before other necessary preparations were
made, yet no fault, on that account ought perhaps to have been
imputed to the Secretary — notwithstanding the delay in giving
me notice of war being declared, and the misfortunes which
arose from that delay; and«notwthstanding the orders I receiv
ed to march the army, I commanded to Detroit, eighteen miles
in the rear of the enemy's principal fortress, and from thence to
commence offensive operations, yet had General Dearborn
obeyed the orders he repeatedly received, from Governour Eus
tis, then Secretary of War, Upper Canada would, without any
doubt have been conquered that campaign, and we being in pos
session of all the harbours, on every side of the lake, the navy
of the enemy must have fallen into our possession1 — 1 here is
the strongest possible grounds for an opinion of this kind, all
fhe regular troops in the northern sections of the country were
placed under General Dearborn's command ; all the militia of
the powerful state of New York, were under his controul and
orders. Indeed he had the means in his power of making the
invasion from the Niagara River, with an army capable of con
quering, as fast as it could have marched, and in his official dis
patches to the government, in imitation of Caesar— three words
only would have been necessary, " Veni, vidi, vici." He was
ordered to place the forces, under his command, in suitable
situations for this purpose, as appears by the Secretary's letters
to him, and to attack the enemy's posts, and to co-operate with
my forces — He did not obey these orders of the President com
municated by the Secretary, but agreed to the armistice, which
has been fully stated — This disobedience of orders was the great
cause of the misfortunes of the campaign — After the Secretary
had given the necessary orders, had they been obeyed, the ob
ject would have been obtained, and the campaign would have
closed with conquest and glory, instead of misfortune. Why
was he willing, to take on himself that misfortune, and inform
General Dearborn that, he was to retain the cor fidence ofthe
administration, and ought to disregard your opinions ?
The Secretary well knew the orders he had given General
Dearborn, to co-operate with my army, and how he had disre*

139
garded them — He knew the manner in which he bad made an
armistice, and how it was disapproved by the President — He
knew that it was done without any authority, and the effects it
had on the operations of the campaign — He must have known
then General Dearborn ought to have been responsible, for the
misfortunes, which he took on himself in his letter, which has
been recited. Why then, I ask you, did he consent to relin
quish his important office, in the midst of a war, and carry with
him disasters, which belonged to another ?
In reflecting on this subject, there certainly is great difficulty
in determining, what possible motives could have induced liis
Excellency to have written this letter. — He must have known
better than any other officer of the government, all the circum
stances attending the campaign — He well knew that I hadohey-
ed every order, which I had received from the government, be
cause he himself as the military organ, had communicated them
— He knew, that in obedience to his orders, I had marched the
army to Detroit, after the, declaration of war, contrary to my
own opinion. — He knew that I had made the invasion of Cana
da, in conformity to the orders I had received from him. — He
knew that an attack on Maiden, and all my other orders ex
cepting those I have mentioned were discretionary. — With res
pect to General Dearborn, he well knew, that he had neglected
to assemble his forces on the Niagara river, and co-operate with
me according to the repeated and positive orders of the Presi
dent, communicated by him. He had a perfect knowledge,
that without any authority, General Dearborn had agreed with
the enemy, to a suspension of hostilities, in which my army was
not included, and that it was disapproved by the President
and the effect which it had on the forces under my command,
and on the fate of the campaign. — Knowing therefore that Gen
eral Dearborn, had heen the cause of the misfortunes of the
campaign, why did he consent, to become not only the agentof
purging him from them, but taking them on himself? If Gene
ral Dearborn had done his duty, these misfortunes would not
have, taken place.
I again repeat the question, what could have been the motives
of his conduct ?
They undoubtedly were, to shelter the administration, and
especially the President, whose re-election was approaching.

346
from any censure, in consequence of these misfortunes. Con
sidering probably, that the safety of the people, is the supreme
law, and how much that safety depended, on the officers of that
administration, as a good patriot, and a dear lover of his country,
he probably thought, that any measures were justifiable, which
were necessary to effect so desirable an object. I was then an
unfortunate prisoner, and the most unprecedented, outrageous,
and wicked measures had been adopted to excite your indigna
tion against me. The Secretary himself, was one of the admin
istration, and by his own confession, in the letter which has
been recited, the misfortunes of the campaign were attributed
to him.
By.General Dearborn's letter of the 11th December, to which
the Secretary's of the 18th was an answer, it appears that he
was trembling on account of discontents, and an opinion that
very generally prevailed, that he was most justly entitled to a
large share of these misfortunes. How unfortunate for His
Excellency, whom we all know to be an honourable man, that
he ever consented to write this letter in behalf of the adminis
tration, and to wipe off every .stain from the commanding Gene
ral. Better for his honour, had his hand been paralized, be
fore he suffered it to do an act, which he must have known was
so evidently unjust. His own letters, written with the same
hand, to General Dearborn, have been recited in these memoirs.
In them it appears, he was commanded to co-operate with my
forces, in the conquest of Upper Canada, and instead of obey
ing those orders, he agreed .to a suspension of hostilities, in
which my army was not included, which measure was disap
proved by the President. When therefore, he wrote this letter,
he perfectly knew, that General Dearborn had not obeyed his
orders, and had done an act which was disapproved by bis mas
ter, which was the final fatal cause of these misfortunes. On
what grounds, then, could he say to General Dearborn, you re
tain the confidence of the government, and ought not to regard the
opinions of the people ! 1 ask whether a greater insult on your
sovereignty and rights, and a more barefaced outrage on justice
was ever committed ? And why was this done ? Perhaps His
Excellency may say, that this was an official letter, and he
wrote it merely as the military organ of the administration?
—Granted. Being however, one of the administration, ought

141
He not to have had more regard to himself, than to have retired
from office with misfortunes which did not belong to him ; and
is there any principle which can justify him in his attempt, to
purify General Dearborn, when he must have been sensible,
how deeply he was infected.
With confidence I submit to your consideration, and I be
lieve, I might now with safety, to the candid judgment of His
Excellency, whether it would not have much better comported
with the importance of the occasion, and the principles of jus
tice, to have instituted an inquiry into the causes of those mis
fortunes, and to have ascertained to whom they ought to have
been attributed, rather than to have determined themselves, my
fate, and only to have appointed a court martial for the mere
ceremony of a trial r The administration, however, did not
consider this a safe mode of proceeding for themselves, and I
having been the unsuccessful General, — it was thought the pub
lic indignation could be transferred from them, and more easily
fixed on me, than on any other officer. Hence, for more than
a year every possible effort was made, to excite this indignation
against me, and all the officers, who could be induced to be
come witnesses against me, were promoted, and patronized be
fore the trial commenced.
I believe, my fellow citizens, you will be astonished, that
General Dearborn should be appointed by the administration
President of the court martial ; or that he accepted, when he
knew how deeply he was interested in the result of the trial ;
your astonishment, however, I have no doubt, will cease when
you read the evidence contained in these memoirs, and perceive,
that neither the administration nor the General, had any other
safety, than by my condemnation.
I have stated, before, generally, fhe reasons why I did not
make objections
In addition to those reasons, I will now answer, that I had
Served with him during the war of the revolution, and that he
then sustained the character of a brave officer. I then could
not entertain the suspicion, that a brave man, could be a dis
honourable man.
Bravery, honour, and impartiality, I considered inseparable
companions. — The old maxim has been confirmed by his con
duct, that there are exceptions to all general rules.

142
At that time I did not know how deeply he was interested in
the event of the trial. Although I requested, that all the let
ters which had any relation to the campaign, might be sent to
the court martial, yet many, which were favourable to me, were
withheld and could not be found in the public offices ; others
were likewise withheld and no reason given. It will appear by
my defence, that when they could not be obtained from the of
ficers of the departments, I applied to the President for his in
terference, but without success .
It will be recollected, that it was then nearly two years after
the events of the campaign had taken place. That during that
time, I had been in arrest and the administration, had exhibit
ed capital charges against me ; that an honourable and inde
pendent court martial had been appointed to assemble at
Philadelphia, the year before, where I voluntarily appeared,
and was ready for my trial ; that that court martial was dis
solved by the President without giving any reason for its dis
solution. That I had been continued another year in arrest
when a new court martial was .selected, of which this interested
officer was appointed President As I had been sincerely de
sirous that all my conduct during that campaign, should be in
vestigated, I feared, had I objected to the organization of ihe
court, it would have occasioned further delay. I felt so con
scious of innocence, and of having faithfully performed my du
ties, that I preferred even a trial by my enemies, rather than a
further procrastination.
I did not believe it was possible, that men, distinguished by
badges of honour, could act a dishonourable part ; I did not be
lieve it possible, that any patronage which could be given them,
by the administration, or indeed any considerations could in
duce them, to deviate from the paths of Justice and Honour,
which in all ages have been the glcry of the military profes-
•sion. When, however, I saw the commander in chief of our armies
at the head, and when I beheld a majority of the members,
young Lieutenant Colonels, very lately promoted to that rank,
and some of whom, I knew had been his Aids-de-Camp, and in
troduced into the army by his patronage, and others, whose
names I never had heard, until they were called on that service,
I thought it a strange organization of a court martial for the

143
trial of a General officer. Especially when invariable custom,
and the articles of war provided, that officers should be tried by
those of at least as high rank as themselves, where such officers
could be obtained.
With respect to the President, it was strange, and indeed
unprecedented, to see the first officer of the army, serving
on a court martial. Some very special reasons, must have
induced the President to have made this appointment, and the
General to have accepted it He was the commanding General
of the armies of the United States. The spring of 1 814, was a
critical period of the war : it was an established principle dur
ing the revolutionary war, that the commander in chief never
served on a court martial ; the reason is, that an officer appoint
ed a member, from the time a court martial is ordered until it is
dissolved, is not called on to perform any other duty. It was
several months after this court was instituted before it was dis
solved. The command of the army therefore, during this time
must have devolved on a junior officer. Unless, therefore, some
very particular reasons»had operated, would General Dearborn
have relinquished the command of the army, and degraded him
self by performing a duty to which the youngest General was
competent ? I believe, my fellow citizens, you will form a cor
rect opinion on this subject and believe, that both the fate of
the administration and the fate of the General depended so
much on this trial, that they were not willing to trust it to other
hands ; and likewise that the first court martial, composed of
honourable and independent characters was dissolved for the
same reasons.
I have thus explained the preparatory plan of the administra
tion that you may compare it with the tyrannical and barbarous
principles the court martial adopted, and. the measures which it
pursued.

144

•No. XXX.
On the 3d of January, 1814, the Court Martial, of which
General Dearborn was President, assembled at Albany. On
receiving notice of the time and place of its meeting, I volun
tarily attended. Although I had been more than a year in ar
rest, on capital charges, yet I had never been for a moment re
strained of my liberty, in the least degree ; and the established
military custom of depriving an officer in arrest of his sword,
had been waved. From a sense of propriety, I resigned it to
the court, with the most well founded expectation, as I firmly
believed, it would have been returned with honour. I cannot
but think you will rightly estimate the motives of these indul
gences, and will be satisfied, they were not granted from any
favourable disposition towards me. The officers of the ad
ministration well knew, that I had obeyed every order which
had been given me, and that I had not been guilty of any crime
unless the honest exercise of my discretion, in which they had
fully confided, was one. I believe every man who obtains a
correct knowledge of the facts, will not entertain a doubt of the
motives of this apparent liberality. It was undoubtedly hoped
that the terrour of the charges would have driven me from my
country, and that such a desertion would have been considered
as an acknowledgment of my guilt, and an absolution of the
faults of the administration.
If any doubts can exist, with respect to the motives of my
prosecutors, in relation to this apparent liberality, I think they
must be removed by the fact which I shall now relate. On the
day the sentence was passed, the 28th of March, 1814, by di
rection of the Court Martial, the President wrote a letter, of
which the following is a copy. Albany, March 28th, 1814.
SIR, — You will please to return to your usual place of resi
dence, in Massachusetts, and there continue, until you shall re
ceive orders from the President of the United States.
Your humble servant,
H. DEARBORN, Major Gen. ?
and President ofthe Court 5
Brig. Gen. Wm. Hull.

• 145
The seat of;the court martial was at Albany, and the seat of
the government at Washington, where the President resided.
The sentence was capital. I ask you, my fellow citizens, on
what grounds the court martial would have dared, thus fo have
left me, by its own order, at perfect liberty after such a sen
tence ? Is not this conclusive evidence in your minds, that there
was a concert, and understanding between the leading members
ofthe court martial and the administration, and that the sen
tence, which was to be pronounced, was determined in the cab
inet at Washington, before I was called to answer, or a witness
was examined ? And whether it was not likewise determined
that the sentence should be remitted ? I ask you to account for
this conduct, on any other principles ? ?
Conscious of innocence, I never asked myself for mercy nor
authorized a friend to intercede in my behalf. Had I been
guilty of the crimes with which I had been charged, I ought in
justice to you, to have made an atonement by my blood. I must
again repeat the question, whether the court martial could have
dared thus to have given me my liberty, by which I might have
avoided the execution of the sentence, unless such a concert
and understanding existed before the trial r Such conduct
would be trifling with the most important duties, which men
can be called to perform ; it would indeed have been making,
not only a mere ceremony, but even a mockery of justice. The
despicable meanness of leaving me in a situation, to avoid the
sentenc'e, of which they were ashamed, no language can de
scribe, and no example can be found, from Adam to the present
moment. Before the trial commenced, I objected to the employment of
other «ounsel than the Judge Advocate in the following lan
guage. [See Lt. Col. Forbes' report of the** trial, page 12.]
" Whatever reasons may be urged, to exclude professional aid
on the part of the prisoner, let me ask with great respect why
they will not equally apply, on the part of the prosecution;
And yet it is most evident, that the Ofijcers of the government
who have instituted this prosecution, have not felt the force of
those reasons : — If they had, they would have left the prosecu
tion, to be conducted by the military prosecutor. And yet it is
seen, to the charges drawn up against me, the name of one of
the most eminent counsel in the United States : and I likewise
19

146
find enlisted against me, in aid of the military Judge Advocate,
a professional gentlemen of this State, not less distinguished
for his talents."
I have made this statement, in order to show to you in the
plainest manner, the" inconsistent, unequal, and tyrannical
principles which were adopted by the court martial in the com
mencement of the trial, to contrast them with the decision,
which at the same'time was made on my application for coun
sel, to assist me in my defence.
I canno^ but here observe, that not only the character, which I
had established in a . life of public services, for near half a cen
tury, and particularly in fighting the battles for your safety,
glory, and independence, was at stake, but that life which Gob
has given me.
I did not ask to be permitted to employ counsel at the ex
pense of the government, but at my own expense.
I will now inform you, what was the decision of the court,
which was rigidly adhered to throughout the whole trial.
Tljat the counsel, employed by the administration, my prose
cutors, should be admitted to examine the witnesses, produce
the documents, speak to all collateral questions, and lastly, to
the final question, and that I should not be permitted to em
ploy counsel, even at my own expense, to open their lips, in
the presence of the court, in examining witnesses, producing';:
documents, or speaking on any collateral questions of law,
' which might arise, in the course of the trial, or on the final
question, whether guilty or not guilty. Here you see, one rule
was established for the prosecution, and another for the prisoner
in his defence. My object will be, now, to prove to you, that
this decision of the court martial, was not only unequal, incon
sistent, and tyrannical, but that it was contrary to the funda
mental principles of our government, and the spirit of the con
stitution of our country. To that constitution which was ob
tained, by the blood of many of your Fathers 1 now appeal,
and if the members of that court martial will read it in the
spirit of candour, they must feel shame and remorse, for the
principle they adopted. »
By this constitution, it is provided, that in all criminal prose
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right, to have the assistance

14?
of counsel for his defence. Here the right is placed on the
broadest foundation.
This right is the property of every individual. No power
can deprive him of it It is the first, and highest law of the
land-^-Congress has no authority to make a law contrary to it —
It is binding on all courts, both civil and military.
Instead of adopting the rational and liberal principles, and
spirit of our constitution, which ought to be engrafted on all our
institutions, the court martial searched the records of that na
tion with which we were then at war, and from which we had
separated, on account of the oppression, and tyranny of its gov
ernment. In those records far back, in the dark ages of arbi
trary and despotic government,. when a prosecution by the
Crown, was in effect, a sentence of death, and when the object
was to guard against every interposition, between the accused,
and the sword of the king. The court martial, with the assis
tance of their unauthorized special Judge Advocate, found some
authorities, on which to ground their decision-
In recurring to the authorities, on which those tyrannical
principles adopted by the court martial were founded, it will be
seen, that the English writers, who have attempted to support
them, finding they were contrary to the fundamental principles
of the British government, were obliged to refer to-the practice
ofthe Egyptians for their support.
As I observed to the court martial, every commentator who
has written on the subject, has blushed for the absurdity and
barbarity ofthe reasons on which, the exclusion of counsel, in
behalf of the prisoner, is founded. Speaking of this rule, Black
stone says, " It is a rule, which however, it may be palliated,
seems not to be of a piece with the rest of the humane treatment
of prisoners, by the English law ; for on what face of reason
can that assistance be denied to save the life of a man, which is
allowed him in every petty trespass."
Christian, in his Notes on Blackstone, says — "It is very ex
traordinary, the assistance of counsel should be denied, where it
is wanted most. That is when it is wanted to defend the life,
the honour, and all the property of an individual. "
Thus we see the light in which the liberal commentators, con
sider this subject. , , .
Shall we, then, who live under the freest government in the

148
world, be governed, by rules, which are derived from such a
source, and have originated in such motives ? Shall we adopt
rules at which the sense, reason, and humanity of mankind,
since the civilization of the world, have revolted ? I ask these
questions -¦ ith a confidence, that when you, my fellow citizens,
have considered them, you will answer them, with the spirit of
freemen, and stamp your indignation on any tribunal, acting un
der your mild constitution, which has adopted such inhuman,
and barbarous principles ; principles so contrary, to the genius
and spirit of the government, under which you live.
If, my fellow citizens, you find such principles, as have here
been exhibited, adopted by the court martial, at the commence
ment of its proceedings, what will be your expectations in the
progress and final issue of the cause. To your candid judg-'.
ment I submit the subject of this memoir, and in my next, shall
consider the conduct ofthe court, in admitting the opinions of
the witnesses to prove the charges against me.

No. XXXI.

I much fear that I shall riot be able to do justice to the sub
ject of this number. ^Each of you, my fellow citizens, as well
as myself, have a deep interest in the principles which will be
considered — not only your characters and all that is dear to
you, but your lives may depend on them. It i3 easy to make
out a string of capital charges against any individual in public
or private life. If the .opinions of witnesses are admitted as
evidence to prove such charges, the witnesses themselves become
the judges, and the necessity of any other judicial tribunal is
superceded. All the proceedings may be summary; it will on
ly be necessary for the accusers, which in this case were the ad
ministration, to call up the witnesses, take their opinions, and
execute the sentence. Such a precedent becomes jaw! and
must govern in future similar cases. Whenever the court ad
mits the opinion of witnesses as evidence of the proof of facts,

149
it yields up its prerogative to the witnesses, and they really ap
pear in the novel character of judges.
In the present depraved state of human nature, the most in
calculable evils would be produced by a system of this kind.
Interest, prejudice, revenge, and malice have so powerful an
influence on human conduct, that the ties of moral obligation
are broken by them, like cobwebs, and lose all their binding in
fluence. By the admission of such a principle, therefore,' the
lives and dearest interests of any individual may easily be, sa-
* crificed on any altar, where such passions are kindled.
Where facts are necessary to prove charges, witnesses are
restrained by the obligations of oaths. Their testimony is lia
ble to be controulled by other testimony, and if it appears they
have testified falsely they are liable to be indicted, and punish
ed for the crime of perjury. The obligation of an oath, for the
proof of facts is the best security that can be afforded. This
security is entirely removed where the opinion of witnesses are
taken. For no man is liable to punishment for his opinion, and
it would be impossible to prove the motives that induced him to
give it. - They remain in his own breast. The Court Martial
was appointed to determine whether certain facts were true
which constituted criminal charges. The -witnesses were per-
' mitted by the court to give their own opinions, without stating
any facts which would be the least foundation for them. The
facts on which the charges against me were founded, were —
1st. For employing a small vessel at the Miami of lake Erie,
to transport the sick and baggage not wanted on the march, to
Detroit, the distance being about seventy miles.
2dly. For not attacking the enemy's fortress at Maiden.
3dly. For retreating to Detroit and there taking a defensive
position. 4thly. For not opening my communication to Ohio ; — an d
5thly, for agreeing to the capitulation.
For the employment of the vessel- a charge of treason was
founded. By the foregoing numbers it will appear, that this
measure would have been highly proper, in time of peace, and
that I had received no knowledge of the war. And this want
of knowledge, was occasioned by the fault of the Secretary of
War, in not giving me as early notice of it as might have
been given, — and the evidence was stronger (if there had been

150
treason) that it was at Washington, than at my camp. If arty
precedents could have been found, where the opinions of wit
nesses had been admitted to have proved overt acts of treason,
this charge might undoubtedly have been proved. To establish
a new precedent, after great deliberation, was thought too open,
and too outrageous an attack on justice. The reaction it would
have on the administration, probably operated more powerfully,
than any other consideration. As I have before observed,
on this charge, and its specifications, I was acquitted, and opin
ions were reserved for those which followed. By a recurrence
to the evidence which has been exhibited, contained in the let
ters of the Secretary of War, it will be seen, that I had no or
ders on any of the subjects, and that all these acts were intrust
ed by the administration to my discretion. The crimes, there
fore, of which the administration accused me, were, for not
exercising this discretion properly ; for not exercising it in the
manner which some of the militia officers of the state of Ohio
thought they would have exercised it, had they commanded the
army, and had it been intrusted to them. If they had been
Generals, (and some of them were so created, immediately af
ter the campaign, by the administration, for their wordy
valour,) they would have attacked Maiden, they would not
have recrossed the Detroit river, they would have opened the
communication to Ohio, they would not have agreed to the ca
pitulation. By an attention to the evidence against me on the four last
charges, it will likewise be seen, that the opinions of these same
inexperienced, and interested officers, were received by the
court martial, to prove my depression of spirits, and the altera
tion of my countenance. For two or three nights, I had little or
no sleep, and had very few officers to assist me, in whom I
could place the least confidence. My nrincipal officer, Colonel
Miller, was sick and unable to perform any duty. With entire
confidence I shall submit to your judgment, whether the fatigues
I had endured, the high responsibility of my situation, and the
want of any kind of assistance, on which I could depend, will
not sufficiently account for a depression of spirits, and a differ
ent appearance of countenance ? Colonel Snelling was promot
ed and selected as a leading witnesvs against me It is a duty
I owe both to myself and to you, to state his situation at that

151
time, and show how deeply interested he was in the result of
my trial.
On the night ofthe 15th of August, he commanded the guard,
stationed at the Spring Wells, and there was attached to his
command a piece of artillery. At this place General Brock
landed with his army the next morning at day-light. Colonel
Snelling was ordered to remain at this post, until he received
orders from me to retreat, or until he was compelled by a supe
riour force of the enemy — and to give me information of any
movements of the enemy. The Spring Wells were opposite to
Sandwich, where General Brock's forces were stationed, and
his vessels of war were ou the river between the two places.
Colonel Snelling without any orders from me left his post, and
marched his men to the fort, with the piece of artillery, a little
before day light on the morning of the 16th. His testimony
before the Court Martial is in these words — " I returned with
ray detachment before day, I think the dawn was perceptible on
my arrival at the fort, but am not certain ; the piece of artille
ry I left at the gate of the citadel — my detachment I marched
into the fort." >>,
When Col. Snelling was giving his testimony, and was in
quired of, from whom he received orders to return from his sta
tion at the Spring Wells at day light, in the morning, he an
swered — " From some person in the General's family, I do not
recollect whom, I believe from Brigade-Major Jessup, but am
not certain." Col. Snelling wished afterwards to alter this
testimony, and then said there was a man called Col. Wallace,
not recognized by the officers. He did not, however, say he
received orders from him.
These facts he acknowledged, and thus he equivocated in his
testimony. Major Jessup was present, when he made this acknowledg
ment in his testimony, of leaving his post and undoubtedly in
formed him that he did not give him the orders, which induced
him to alter his testimony. His mere hint, with respect to
Col. Wallace, was probably intended to make an impression
that he received the orders from him. Although he does not
say it, as Col . Wallace was present, and would have contradict
ed it; and there was this further reason, as he himself declared,
that Colonel Wallace, was not recognized by the officers, as an

152
aid-de-camp, and consequently, had no authority to give such
orders. Knowing the fact, that he had abandoned his post without
orders, he well knew what his fate must have b4een, had I been
acquitted. Nothing but the events of the 1 6th, prevented me
from arresting him at that time. In forming a judgment on his
testimony the fact here related, yon will, undoubtedly, think
ought to be kept in mind. Col. Snelling was not on trial, and
the court did not think proper to investigate the fact, although I
stated I had not authorized any officer, to order him from his
post. As his opinion was relied on to prove the most important
charges, it would have been dangerous to have suffered any
thing to have been said which would have invalidated his testi
mony. These opinions were received to prove entire charges, \
and entire specifications of charges. *By thus receiving thel
opinions of a witness in the whole matter in issue, or on a par
ticular specification, in a charge, is precisely the same, as pre
senting the list of charges, and asking each individual witness,
whether he believes the accused guilty ? If the witness is cred
ited, of what use is it for the court to go farther ? The accused
is found guilty by the opinion of the witness, and the members
of the Court Martial become the mere organs of his opinion.
If, on the contrary, the witness swears to facts, the court is left
to decide, whether the facts are proved, and whether the facts
thus proved constitute the charges. As a fact, a witness can
answer with certainty ; his testimony, if untrue, can be im
peached, circumstances may be introduced, to rebut its infer
ences ; but where is the restraint on opinion ? The witness is
licensed and free ! He roams at large, and if unchecked by any
moral obligation, he finds an easy victim in any individual,
against whom the want of success alone, has excited the public
clamour. To engraft a scion of this kind, on the tree of liberty* which
was not only planted by our forefathers, in this soil of freedom,
but protected by their valour, and nurtured and defended by
their gallant descendants, would produce a branch, whose fruit
would be as dissimilar to that ofthe original stock, as despotism
is dissimilar to freedom,— and the taste of which could never
be relished, by the present or future generations.

153
If the human feelings and passions can be determined by the
appearance of the countenance, and witnesses are admitted to
testify what those feelings and passions are by this standard,
and capital offences are to be proved in this manner, I ask you
to consider to what dreadful consequences such a doctrine
would lead. Allow me here to offer. an illustration. When
Colonel Snelling was on the stand, giving his testimony before
the court martial, I myself, and many others present, observed
a strange and unusual appearance in his countenance ; we were
ofthe opinion that it indicated strong features of prejudice,
malice, and revenge against me, and a fixed determination to
say every thing he could bring to his recollection to injure me,
and prove the high Charges which were exhibited against me.
Suppose Colonel Snelling had been indicted for perjury, for giv
ing this testimony— and suppose we had been called on as wit
nesses, to have proved that he had been guilty of perjury —
wauld our testimony, whatever knowledge we might have pro
fessed to have acquired in physiognomy, have been admitted by
any court, to have proved, by the expression of his countenance,
that he had been guilty of perjury?
It is impossible to conceive the evils which would result from
admitting the opinions of witnesses in proof of charges of this
¦kind. The judgment of the court, distracted amidst the con
flicting opinions of conflicting interests, has no guide? its pow
ers are transferred to another tribunal ; and the unfortunate
prisoner stands convicted, not on facts, but on opinions. The
result of such proceedings must necessarily lead to the most un
heard of abuses. An administration, instead of resorting to the
ordinary modes of criminal proof, would have only to hunt up
¦opinions, to bring to the scaffold the most meritorious charac
ters. The experience, knowledge and characters of the wit
nesses, in the case now under review, will present a striking
illustration of the subject. They were principally militia offi
cers, born and educated in the wilderness of Ohio, who had no
^other knowledge of military movements, excepting what they
had acquired in the training of companies about their doors.
They had been elected as officers by the men they commanded
who considered themselves in every respect as their equals, and
would not submit to the necessary restraints of military disci
pline. If they received any orders from these officers which
20

154
they disapproved, it was their custom to consult together, and
determine what measures should be pursued. It frequently
happened, that these officers were treated with the greatest in
dignity ; and one of the .officers of the 4th regiment testified, on
my trial, (see Lieut. Col. Forbes' report, page 124) "that one
evening,\at Urbanna, there was a noise; when he [witness] ran
out to inquire the cause, and saw some men of his regiment,
who informed him, it was only some of the Ohio militia riding
one of their officers on a rail."
It is with deep regret that I mention circumstances of this
kind, and should not do it, were it not necessary you should
know the character of both officers and soldiers who composed
the army furnished by the administration.
Farther to. illustrate the subject under review; I will here re
peat the same observations which I made before the court mar-
tian in my defence. I recite the words of my defence, because
if I had then made any statement which was not founded in
truth, the court would have corrected me.
" It seems extraordinary, that there has not been a witness
examined on the part of the prosecution, who has not been pro
moted since he was under my cohimand. A great majority of
the young gentlemen who have been called by the Judge Advo
cate, have appeared decorated with their epaulets ; these have
been bestowed, and sometimes with the augmentation of a star,
upon gentlemen who began their military career with my unfor
tunate -campaign.
" By what services many of these gentlemen have merited
such rapid promotion, I have not learned. But if it all arises
out of their achievements while under my command, I must say,
that it appears to me my expedition was more prolific of promo
tion than any other unsuccessful military enterprize I ever
heard of. ; < ¦
"It cannot be that it has been intended to give a weight to
the testimony of these witnesses, by giving them ranks and
honours, which it would not otherwise have had. But when
my military character and measures are to be tested by the
opini ns of gentlemen, with high sounding titles of military
rank, 1 think it necessary to remind the court, that with the ex
ception of a few of the young officers, there are none of them
who have not been promoted to their high stations without hav-

155
mg -had any military experience, and without, as far as I have
heard, ever having discovered any military talent or genius.
"If the opinions of witnesses, on military subjects, ought in
any case to be listened to, (which I conceive ought not to be)
yet I think the opinions of men of these descriptions ought to be
received with the greatest caution."
Without imputing unworthy motives to the administration,
in making these promotions, as inducements to the witnesses to
give a high colouring to their testimony. I endeavoured to
account for it in the following language.
" The extraordinary promotions which the witnesses against
me have generally attained, I think may be accounted for, by a
recurrence to the fact of which this trial has afforded the most
conclusive evidence ; which is, that each of the witnesses, from
the General to the youngest and lowest officer that has been.
called by the Judge Advocate, is himself, in his own opinion, a
hero. " From General McArthur, who thought himself capable of
fighting a whole garrison, down to the lowest rank, every officer
seems to have thought, that if he had been the commanding
General, or if I had taken his advice, all would have gone well.
No doubt they have, in justice to themselves, made these repre
sentations to the government ; and their rank must be consider
ed a reward for the great things which they said they would
have done, rather than to have been acquired by any actual
service. "
Before I close this number, I cannot omit to make some ob
servations on the unprecedented rule which the court adopted
in the examination of the witnesses, which was, to examine each
witness in the presence of the rest And here I will make the
same remarks which I made in my defence.
" Till this court decided that it should be so, I did think it
was a well established rule of martial as well as civil law, that
the witnesses should be examined separately. The justice and
propriety of this rule I have very sensibly felt on this occasion.
In a case where so much may depend upon the language or
phrases in which the witnesses express themselves, it would
have been desirable, that each should have been left to the ne
cessity of selecting his own language to express his meaning.
But according to the course pursued, each witnegs was at Utter-

15fj
fy to adopt the words which had been used by any other wit-
. ness on the same point. — The disposition of several of the wit
nesses to do so, has been very plainly manifested, by their
answering, when interrogated respecting my personal beha
viour, that it was the same as had been represented by a prior
witness." In these courts martial, when the members, among whom
there may be great inequality of grades, are intended to be put
on an equal footing as judges, care has been taken to avoid, as
far as possible, the influence likely to arise from authority. It
is on this account, that the opinion of the youngest is always
first taken. And it was on the same account, as I conceive,
that the rule was established, that witnesses should be examin
ed separately — that the younger might not be influenced in his
testimony by what might be said by his superiour It would be
contrary to experience of the human disposition to suppose, af
ter a subaltern had heard two or three Generals, and officers of
higher rank than himself, testify, to whose authority he is per
haps subservient, or to whose good word he may have owed, or
expects to owe, his promotion, that he will be willing to contra
dict what his superiours have said, or even to make a repre
sentation which will vary from theirs.
If, in any case, the weight of this sort of influence could
be felt on the testimony, the mode which was pursued gave it
the fairest scope.
The witnesses were generally arranged, and produced ac
cording to their rank, commencing with those who had been pro
moted from the rank of Lieutenant Colonels in the Ohio militia,
to the rank of Generals in the standing army, and the principal
one with an additional appointment as Governour of the terri
tory of Michigan, which appointment, for nine years, I had
held, during which time my conduct in that, station had uni
formly received the approbation of the government. When the
trial commenced, the question arose, whether the witnesses
ought to be examined in the presence of each other ; to which
the President, General Dearborn, replied, that it was not ne
cessary, in his judgment, to examine them apart. [See Lieu
tenant Colonel Forbes' report, page 117.] As all the proceed
ings of the court were regulated by his opinion, it would have
been only a useless waste of time to have discussed the ques-

157
tion. — His judgment was pronounced in a positive manner, and
the Court at once acquiesced in it. As the strong barriers of
the constitution had been no security, but had been overleaped,
on other questions ; and objections on this could only have been
drawn from precedent, and the authority of the best writers on
military subjects ; I believe you will be satisfied that any rea
sons I might have offered would have been unavailing — especial
ly after the judgment of so great an authority as the command
er in chief had been pronounced ; especially as the whole plot
which had been concerted might have failed.
Thus have 1 exhibited some of the leading principles by
which the proceedings of the Court Martial were governed, for
the purpose of giving you a knowledge of the manner in which
my trial was conducted.
If this were the conduct of the Court Martial, it may be ask
ed why I addressed them in different language in my defence.
The reason is, my observations were then made according to
the knowledge I possessed. The necessary documents to show
how deeply interested the President of the court was, could not
be obtained. I acknowledged the patience of the court, as it
had been manifested *by a session of more than forty days. In
many instances, the course which was pursued was contrary to
any experience of which I had any knowledge, and to which I
objected. The President and members were constitutional
judges, and if thej' erred, as all men are liable to err, I hoped
they were honest errours. I observed I had confidence in their
honour ; from my youth I had always been taught to confide in
the honour of military characters ; indeed those observations
were made on the ground ^that it is human to err. I objected,
however, and stated my own ideas at the time. It would have
been improper for me then to have imputed other than honoura
ble motives ; although there appeared to me a deviation in the
course, yet, in the end, I expected justice. The pill which had
been made for me had been prepared in secret and it was so
covered that I could not discern the deadly poison which it
contained. Having now obtained and spread before you the
evidence, with respect to the deep interest which both the ad
ministration and the head of the court had in the result of the
trial, I believe the answer I have given to the inquiry 1 have
mentioned, will be satisfactory.

158
Every member of that court martial depended on the admin*
istration for his military existence ; and on you, fellow citizens,
the administration depended for the continuance of power.
The declaration of war, without suitable preparation, and the
misfortunes which had attended its progress, excited your just
resentment The language of discontent, in the first instance,
was pronounced by you, with a freedom becoming your charac
ter, and pointed against those to whom you had committed
your safety. ,The very ground trembled on which the adminis
tration stood. To satisfy your just resentment, it was evident
a sacrifice must be prepared. The plan presented in my last
number was devised, and the execution of it committed to the
the court martial, whose leader had been rendered immaculate,
by the Secretary of War, who retired from office, loaded with
all the misfortunes this leader had occasioned.
Having now, fellow citizens, presented to you a narrative of
the north-western campaign, with the documents and evidences
relating to it ; I shall relieve your patience, after furnishing one
number more, in which will be condensed a summary of the
principal facts, contained in the whole. The object of this sum
mary, is to exhibit to you, at one view the most important facts,
which caused the misfortune, which the Secretary of War, was
ofthe opinion would be attributed to him. This summary will
be published, as soon as I am able to prepare it.

No. XXXII.

Ik the second memoir which I presented for your considera
tion, I exhibited a general outline of the facts which it was my
object to prove in the subsequent numbers. I have endeavour
ed faithfully to redeem the pledge which I then gave. After
having stated the facts and produced the evidence it was my
intention to have relieved your patience and submitted the pro
priety of my conduct to your judgement on the facts and evi
dence contained in those numbers without recapitulating them.
But as some of my readers, from the manner in which they have
been published, have not been able to obtain the whole of them,

159
and preserved the connexion, an opinion has been expressed
that the subject will be more clearly and generally understood
by condensing and bringing into one view the material facts
which they contain. In compliance with this opinion, I will de
vote this number in as concise a manner as possible^to the at
tempt. In the first place, the reasons are stated why this communi
cation has not before been made, and why the evidence and
documents now introduced were not produced in my defence.
The delay, I told you, was occasioned by the loss of my papers
and copies ofthe duplicates having been withheld, though fre
quently applied for until the autumn of 1823, when on applica
tion they were immediately forwarded me by the present Secre
tary of War, Mr. Calhoun. I then disclosed to you the motives
which induced me to accept a military appointment in the
spring of 1812, and take the command ofthe forces which com
posed the north western army. In consequence of an expecta
tion of war with Great Britain, the savages of the north and
west had been excited to hostility by the military officers and
Indian agents of Canada, and it was deemed by our government,
both expedient and necessary to provide a force for the safety
and protection of the defenceless inhabitants of the frontiers.
To effect this purpose, twelve hundred militia from the State of
Ohio and the 4th United States' regiment, then at St. Vincen-
nes, were detached by the President. I was then Governour of
the Michigan territory, and in connexion with that office, I ac
cepted the command of these troops, not by my own wish or re
quest, but at the urgent desire of the administration. About
the middle of April I left Washington and previously to my
departure. I stated to the President in repeated communications
through the Secretary of War, my views with respect to the
command, declared that I considered the force not only suffi
cient in point of numbers, but likewise a of suitable character for
the object for which it was designed. That this object was the
protection of the frontier against the savages, appears from the
instructions I received from the Secretary of War, and in which
letter I was ordered to proceed to Ohio, take the command of
these troops and march them to Detroit, where I must make the
best arrangements in my power, for the safety of, that part of
the country. It was then understood that in time of peace, De-

160
troit or some other position on the west part of lake Erie, was a
suitable station for that purpose because all necessary supplies
could easily be transported over that lake. I not only com
municated to the government my views in time of peace with
Great Britain, but also in the event of war with that nation—
and stated in the most explicit manner, that a navy, on lake
Erie, sufficient to preserve the communication, would be indis
pensably necessary, and that without such a navy, fhe posts of
Detroit, Michillimackanack, and Chicago, could not be main
tained. That likewise, in such an event, all the savage war
riours residing both in the British dominions, and our own ter
ritories, would probably join the British standard. After mak
ing these statements, I took the command ofthe army in Ohio,
and opened a road two hundred miles through a wilderness.
On this road I built a number of block houses, leaving in them
a small force for defence, and made use of the best means in
xay power to preserve my communication.
While I was yet in the wilderness, the government on the
18th of June declared/ war. I received no account of it until
the 2d day of July, while the enemy at Maiden were apprised
of it several days before, although that place was much farther
¦from Washington than my army. If proper measures had been
taken, this important event might have been made known to
me in less than half that time. In consequence of this neglect
of the administration, a vessel was taken by the enemy with the
sick of my army and the hospital stores, while on her passage
from the rapids of the Miami to Detroit, which vessel would
¦not have been employed in this service, had I received intelli
gence ofthe declaration of war even one day sooner. For send
ing this vessel I was accused of the crime of treason by the ve
ry administration by whose neglect alone the misfortune had
heen occasioned. In this letter, giving me information of the de
claration of war, I received positive orders to march the army to
Detroit, eighteen miles in the rear of the enemy's principal for
tress at Maiden, and there wait for further orders. According
ly I proceeded, and on the 5th July, the army arrived at De
troit. I then called a council of war, at the earnest importunity
of my officers, when it was declared expedient to cross the De
troit river, and make the invasion of Canada, notwithstanding
jt was well known that my instructions were to remain there

161
for further orders. Much discontent was excited among som,e
of them by my refusal to comply with their wishes. On the
evening of the 9th of July, I received the letter of the Secreta
ry of War, containing orders to cross the river and invade the^
enemy's territory, and in the same letter was contained a dis
cretionary authority to make an attack on the fortress at Mai
den, if in my opinion, my force was adequate to the enterprise,
and it could be done consistently with the safety of my other
posts. On the same evening I received this letter from the Secreta
ry, I wrote to him, that it was my opinion that my force was not
adequate to the enterprise, and stated my reasons. This letter
was received by the Secretary, and laid before the President,
who fully approved of it, and of all my conduct aud, notwith
standing the measure of attacking Maiden was left to my discre
tion, and notwithstanding I had stated as my opinion that my
force was not equal to the enterprise, and although this opinion
had been approved by the President, yet this very measure was
made a charge of a most serious nature — supported alone
by the opinions of some of my officers, that Maiden might have
been taken.
In the course of my numbers, I stated, as reasons which in
duced me to think it expedient to commence offensive opera
tions in conformity with the orders I received — that I should be
enabled to obtain supplies for my army from the enemy's coun
try—that it would satisfy the apparent impatience of my offi
cers—and that a display of the American flag on both sides of
the river would have a favourable effect, both on the savages and
the militia of Upper Canada — but that the most powerful in
ducement was, to dislodge the enemy from the opposite bank,
where he was erecting batteries, which would have greatly an
noyed the town of Detroit. Immediately after making the in
vasion according to my orders from the administration, I issued
a Proclamation to the inhabitants of Upper Canada, pledging to
them the faith ofthe government, that they should be protected
in their persons, property, and rights, I have stated also the
manner in which this proclamation was received and approved
by the President, as well as the use which was made of it at the
treaty of Ghent.
By an examination ,of the evidence which I have exhibited,,
21

r<52
the objects of the government in ordering the forces under
my command, are fully unfolded. This evidence is the highest
which the nature of the case will admit It is contained in the
message of the President of the United States to Congress, after
the campaign closed. By this message it appears, that these
forces were ordered to Detroit in time of peace, with a view to
the protection of the territory against the savages, and in the
event of war, to take possession of lake Erie, and to co-operate
with other forces in the conquest of Upper Canada. This ob
ject of taking possession of lake Erie against a strong naval
force ofthe enemy, by a small band of Ohio militia, was never
communicated to me by the administration, and the first know
ledge I had of it was from reading this message seven months
after the campaign ended.
The projects of the President, as communicated By his mes
sage, not being realized, such a navy was immediately ordered
to be built as I had at first recommended. With regard to co
operation, I had the fullest reason to suppose that I should be
assisted by the army on the Niagara river, at the east end of
lake Erie. The enemy's principal station was at Maiden,
eighteen miles below Detroit, on the other side of the river.
The number of troops it contained, from the time of the decla-
tion of war to the 16th of August, has been stated, and the
proof furnished. I remained four weeks at Sandwich, on the
.British side of the river; and during that time I called two
councils of war, to consider and determine whether it were ex
pedient to attack the fort at Maiden with the bayonet alone.
No cannon were on carriages suitable to assist in the operation ;
every possible exertion had been made, and was then making,
to prepare them. It was the opinion, of the majority of the first
council, that it was not expedient to make the attack, without
the assistance of cannon. At the second council, I stated, that
the heavy artillery was not in readiness, but would be in two or
three days. The question was then submitted to the council,
whether it were expedient to wait for the heavy artillery, in or
der to make a breach in the works, or immediately to make the
attempt with the bayonet alone. Before the question was tak
en, I observed to the members, that if it should be their opinion
tiiat it was best to make the assault immediately, and they
Would answer for their men, I would lead them to the attack.

163
Colonel Miller, who commanded the regulars, replied that lie
would be answerable for the men he commanded. Colonels
McArthur, Cass, and Findley, who commanded the militia, said
they would not be answerable for their men, but hoped they
would behave well. The council then determined that it was
expedient to wait two days longer for the heavy artillery. In
the afternoon of the 7*th of August, I received letters from Gen
eral Hall and General Porter, who commanded on the Niagara
river, informing me that the principal part of the troops in the
enemy's stations at fort George, fort Erie, and other posts on
the east part of the province, were advancing to Maiden ; and
that a large body of troops had passed over and landed on the
west side of lake Ontario, and were likewise marching against
my army. These letters further stated, that there was no pro
bability that any assistance would be afforded from that quar
ter. Thus it appeared, from the information sent me, that the
whole weight of the war in Canada rested on the few troops un
der my command, and certainly they were not equal both to of
fensive and defensive operations.
Michillimackanack had fallen, and all the forces from that
direction were descending the lakes to operate against me. The
savages from lake Michigan had arrived on the head waters of
the rivers Raisin and Huron in thousands, (as Colonel Ander
son expressed himself in his letter) and were marching to Mai
den. The defeat of Majar Van horn had taken place at Browns
town, in his attempt to open the communication to the river
Raisin ; and indeed, every avenue to my country, both by land
and water, was entirely closed. With this information before
me, and under this unexpected change of circumstances, I con
sidered that it was my duty to abandon the enterprise, and re
cross the river with the principal part of the army, which I did
on the night and morning of the Sth of August The great rea-
son which induced me to adopt this measure, and which indeed
was decisive in my mind, was, that the very existence of my
•army depended on opening the communication to Ohip. — for
though success might have attended my arms in the attack on
Maiden, I should yet have been left under the same embarrass
ment, in having my communication i ith Ohio still closed. In
addition to these reasons, I had received information that Brit
ish troops had arrived in several vessels from fort Erie, as re.-

164
enforcements, and that the militia, which before had left Mai
den, had returned to their duty, on a proclamation of pardon
Trom the commanding officer. On the 8 th of August, the day I
recrossed the river, a detachment was made of six hundred of
the best of my troops, under the command of Colonel Miller,
to open the communication to fhe river Raisin. This detach
ment was met, near Brownstown, by a superiour number of the
enemy, and a severe contest ensued, and terminated with hon
our to the American arms. The loss on our side was between
eighty and ninety kilted and wounded. Nothing however but
glory was acquired by this victory ; the fatigue which had at-
' tended the expedition, the loss of killed and wounded, and a se
vere storm, prevented the detachment from proceeding on the
expedition. On the 14th of Augtist I made another attempt to
open the communication. For this purpose, I Ordered another
detachment, consisting of the effective officers and men of Col
onels McArthur and Cass' regiments. This body was directed
to proceed to the river Raisin, a number of miles west of the De
troit river, by a circuitous Indian path, to avoid further molesta
tion from the enemy i The distance was greater, but it was my
only alternative.
The effort to open the communication, by the detachments
Under Major Van-horn and Colonel Miller, proving abortive^
and before the one under Colonel McArthur marched, I
stated, to some of my principal officers, that from the informa
tion I had received^ it was evident that the whole force of the
enemy, of all descriptions, from the east part of Upper Canada,
Trom Michillimackanack, and from lake Michigan, were pro
ceeding to join the forces at Maiden ; that the lake was closed
against us ; that the road which we had opened from Ohio was
'Obstructed by hostile savages, and that no forces from our coun
try were prepared for its protection ; that the provisions were
nearly exhausted, and a supply could not be obtained from any
quarter ; and that, under these circumstances, I suggested the
expediency of making a movement of the army to the foot of the
rapids of the Miama, and there act as circumstances might re
quire. The answer to this was, as appears by Colonel Cass'
testimony, that the men, or soldiers, did not think such a meas
ure necessary, and if the orders were given, they would not be
•obeyed. TJsis circumstance I have repeated, to show the materials of

165
which my army was composed, and the difficulties which attend
ed my situation. Had this measure, at that time, been carried
into effect, the army probably would have been saved.
On the 15th of August the day after McArthur and Cass
marched to the river Raisin, the British forces, with the militia
and savages, attending them, marched from Maiden to Sand
wich, opposite to Detroit, with General Brock at their head.
His letter, demanding a surrender of Detroit, and my answer,
liave been recited. I immediatly sent an express, strongly es
corted, to. McArthur and Cass, with orders to return with all
possible expedition to Detroit ; stating that General Brock had
arrived, with the re-enforcements from fort George, &c. &c. &c.
My situation had now become most critical. The effective
strength of two of my regiments was absent at the river Raisin,
for the purpose of opening the communication, and guarding
necessary supplies, intended for my camp. The British troops
Which had composed the garrisons on the east end of the lake,
with the re-enforcements from various parts of Upper Canada,
had arrived, and, together with the force at Maiden, were now
encamped at Sandwich, opposite to Detroit. Information was
received, that the Canadian militia were coming upon me from
every quarter. How all this force 'had been brought from so
many necessary points of defence to bear upon my army, I
could not imagine. What possible reasons could have induced
General Brock to draw his troops from the vital part of his pro
vince, and leave his most important posts exposed to be taken
by our troops on the Niagara river, was truly mysterious.
Could I have supposed that a suspension of hostilities had taken
place in that quarter, it seems reasonable tiiat it would have
-been under the condition for the two beligerent parties to have
-been confined to that location in which they were situated at the
commencement of the truce.
By a reference to the preceding numbers, it will appear, by
the letters from the Secretary of War to General Dearborn, that
he was commanded by the President to concentrate his troops
on the Niagara river, invade Upper Canada from that quarter,
¦attack the enemy's posts, and co-operate with the forces under
my command. It will further appear, that he did not carry
these orders into effect but agreed to the armistice which has
&een meetioned, which must have been unauthorized by the

166
President, because it was disapproved in the most pointed lan
guage. My army not being included in the' measure, and, a»
has been observed, no condition having been made, that the
troops should remain in the situation they were, during its con
tinuance, the effect it had on my operations is too evident to be
here repeated ; it must be considered as the principal and im*
mediate fatal cause ofthe disasters ofthe campaign.
After the capitulation, I first learned from the lips of the
British commander, the true state of the case— that the anriin-
tice of General Dearborn had been eight days in operation, and
that that circumstance alone had enabled him to bring such a
force against me.
Early in the morning of the 16th of August, General Brock
landed his force at the Spring Wells, three miles below Detroit
under cover of the guns of his navy. From the date of the facts
contained in the two numbers I have mentioned, I presume you
must be satisfied, that his cflcctive force, was more than three
times greater than mine, and that he might have brought to his
Standard, more than ten times my number, before I could have
received any assistance. This will appear, from the knowledge
of the numbers which originally composed my army, from the
losses by capture, by the killed and wounded in the battles
which.had been fought, by sickness and a variety of other casu
alties ; and likewise from the return of the Adjutant General
Major Jessup, and the testimony of Colonel Cass. Being at
this time, not only the General of the army, but the Governour
of the territory, and without instructions, as to the course I
should pursue, all the measures were entrusted to my discre
tion. Being responsible for the safety of the inhabitants, it be
came my duty, if it was possible, to adopt such measures as
would effect that object My situation was such, that there
was no possibility of affording the inhabitants protection, fur
ther than the balls from the cannon in the fort could be carried.
These inhabitants were scattered over a territory of several
hundred miles. The savages had invaded every part of this ter
ritory, and while the contest lasted, there was nothing which
could restrain their barbarity. The work of desolation and
cruelty had commenced, and nearly half my effective force was
absent, and from the time it had marched and the orders it had
received from me, 1 had reason to believe it was nearly fiity

miles distant from me. With the feeble force under my com
mand, I did not believe there was the most distant pros
pect of success, in the event of a battle ; and had the forces at
Detroit been defeated, the fate ofthe detachment under McAr
thur and Cass would have been inevitable. From the informa
tion I had received, with respect to General Brock's force,
there could have been little hope indeed of victory. What was,
however, decisive on my mind, was my situation, even in a
possible event of success over his white force. I should have-
then been without provisions, as will appear, by the evidence
contained in my twentieth number; and I had no means of ob
taining possession of the enemy's navy, und opening my com
munication over the lake. It would in this case have become a
war with savages, who would have been aided by all the re
maining forceB of Upper Canado, and the navy on the lake. In
addition to the savage force, which was with General Brock,
I have produced evidence to show that several thousands of this
description were descending the lakes from the north and from
the west. Had my army, however, not been divided, and had
the detachment absent with McArthur and Cass, equal to about
one half my effective force, been with ine, or had I received the
teast information,, that it had been in a situation where, by any
possibility, it could have co-operated, I should have risked the-
eonsequences of a battle ; and (hose officers would have had
an opportunity of proving by their deeds the. valour which has-
been only manifested by their words.
Under the circumstances which existed after the enemy land
ed, and no information having been obtained from McArthur
and Cass, I determined to send a flag of truce, open a treaty,.
and accept the best terms which could be obtained. For this
purpose, I authorized two commissioners, Colonels Miller andt
Brush, to negotiate on the subject.
By the articles of capitulation, protection and safety were se
cured to the inhabitants of Michigan in their persons and pro
perty. All the militia, both of Michigan and Ohio, returned1
immediately to their homes, and none were retained as prison-
ttfi, excepting the few regulars, consisting then of little over
two hundred. This measure, under tho circumstances, was
dictated in my opinion by a sense of duty and attended with
W*i public calamity then any other which could have been

16B
adopted, and I was willing to assume, and in my official commu
nication to the government, took the whole responsibility of it on
myself. It required more firmness and independence than any
other act of my life — it was dictated by my best judgment and
a conscientious regard to what I believed to be my duty, and
I now sincerely rejoice, and there never has been a moment that
I have not rejoiced, notwithstanding all I have suffered, that I
dared thus independently to do my duty. Had that contest
continued, every moment would have been attended with great
er disasters', and I availed of the only measure in my power to
put an end to such calamities. In the capitulation I made no
provision for myself, and was ordered to Montreal an uncondi
tional prisoner. A provision was made for all the officers and
soldiers of the militia, and they immediately returned to their
homes. Colonel Cass, faking advantage of my situation after
the indulgence I had procured for him, proceeded directly to
Washington, where he was most graciously received by the ad
ministration, and then presented an account of the campaign,
before it had been possible for me to have made any communi
cation. This letter, written by himself, giving particular de
tails of events, of which he had no knowledge, as he was absent
when they took place, was received by the administration and
published as an official account in all the newspapers through
out the United States. Search, fellow citizens, the annals of
history, and, I am persuaded, such an outrage cannot be found !
While I was a prisoner, my other officers, for whose liberation
I had provided in the treaty, followed Colonel Cass to Wash
ington, and seeing the favours and patronage be had received
by his representation, imitated his example, and were not dis
appointed in their rewards.
From one end of the continent to the other, the same news
papers which had published Cass's letter, were filled with a
series of the most scandalous falsehoods to excite your resent
ment against me, and before I was exchanged, and yet a prison
er, the plot, which is unfolded in my 29th number by the letter
of the Secretary of War to General Dearborn, was sealed for
my final destruction. As soon as General Dearborn could make
arrangements for my exchange, I was arrested, capital charges-
were preferred against me, and a court martial was ordered to
assemble at Philadelphia for my trial, of which Major General

169
Wade Hampton was appointed the President. In conformity to
the orders of the President, I appeared, ready for ray trial. But
without any reason being assigned, this court martial .was dis
solved in the manner I have stated. I was continued by the
administration a prisoner in arrest another year^ that ample
time might be afforded for selecting such a court inartial, and
patronizing and promoting officers, who, in their testimony
would give opinions which would effect the object of the plot,
which had been formed. After thus .remaining a prisoner for
this length of tipe, which I believe is unexampled in military
history, and every preparation being made, I was ordered to
appear at Albany for my trial the beginning of January, 1814.
At this court martial I requested the privilege of being heard by
counsel. The court denied me such aid. In the progress of the
trial, the opinion* of witnesses were admitted as evidence to
prove entire charges against me. The character of these wit
nesses has been fully shewn. They were officers of no mili
tary knowledge or experience, and many of them deeply inter
ested in the event of the trial, and had nothing to recomhiend
them but the patronage and promotion they had received imme
diately after my unfortunate campaign, but previously to their
appearing to testify against me.
The court martial of wfiich General Dearhorn was President,
was selected the 7th day of November, 1813, during the admin
istration of John Armstrong over the Department of War, and
this court was not dissolved until the last of March, or the be
ginning of April, 1814. Thus was established a new military
precedent, and it must be recorded in the hisr/ory of our coun
try, that the commander-iu chief of the American army, at a
most critical period of the war, for about four months, relin
quished his high duties as commanding General, and performed
subordinate duties on a court martial, to which, the youngest
General in the army was competent. The question will natu
rally arise, what motives could have induced so unprecedented
an arrangement ? A constant correspondence was kept up be-*
tween the court martial and the secretary of War, and direc
tions were given respecting the. manner of proceeding. See Ap
pendix to my trial, page 29. In some of the public newspapers,
it is said lam ungrateful for the lenity which Mr. Madison, the
President, has shown me. As I never asked him or the .court

J 70
martial for mercy, but only for justice, I cannot feel under any
obligations to either. The truth is, fellow citizens, the admin
istration well know your independent spirit and sense of right,
and dared not execute that sentence, which injustice had pro
nounced. The Secretary was the same John Armstrong, who
has the reputation of having commenced his career at Newburg,
in 1783, and ended it at Bladensburg, in 1814 ! The two
events here alluded to, are well known, ar.d must make a part
of the history of our country. The one will do the highest cred
it to the virtue and unshaken patriotism of the revolutionary
army, in resisting a most artful and insidious attempt to induce
them to turn those arms against their country which had been
employed in acquiring its independence. The other must stand
as a monument of disgrace to those to whom the protection of
the country was entrusted, and particularly to the officer at the
head of the Department of War, at whose disposal was placed
the forces and means of national safety.
After I received the order to invade the enemy's territory, all
the operations were entrusted to my discretion. This discretion
was exercised according to my best judgment. The dictates of
i duty alone influenced my conduct. Had I consulted my feeU
ings alone, and not been guided by this principle, I should have
pursued a very different course. To perform what I then be
lieved and now believe to have been my duty, it was necessary
to call into exercise more firmness and more energy, than on
any other occasion during my life. If it will be any satisfaction
to my enemies, I am now willing to acknowledge, that I dare
not do that whicR my best judgment and duty forbid. Consid
erations of personal fame, compared to duty, where as a feather
in one scale to a mountain in the other.
My respect, fellow citizens, for your discernment and judg
ment, induces me to leave the application of the facts and evi
dence, contained in the preceding numbers, to your own delib
erations ; with my sincere thanks for the candour which has
been already manifested, I am, With affection and respect,
, Your fellow citizen,
Ifewton, July mh, 1824. \\ U.L1AM HULL.

171

No. XXXIII.
A series of papers published in the " American Statesman,',
&y the son of General Dearborn, in defence of his father, in an
swer to the memoirs I have addressed to you on the subject of
the north western campaign, in 1812, renders it a duty which I
•we to myself, to you and to truth, to make a reply. Filial
affection is justly ranked among the amiable virtues, and when
ever it is properly manifested, excites both esteem and admira
tion. Under feelings properly tempered, the son, would have
reason to expect your sympathies, which would not only have
been enlisted, but deeply interested in favour of fhe attempt
Had cool, dispassionate reason been substituted in the place of
violent declamation, and candid inquiry after truth been evinced,
instead of a spirit of abuse and malignity, he probably would
have realised the feelings I have described.
It is among-the other misfortunes of my life, that I have now
no son on whom to rest for support in my declining years. In
the memorable battle of Bridgewater, in 1814, my only son, in
his ardour to perform his duty, advanced at the head of is
company to the most dangerous part of the sanguinary field,
where he fell, covered with wounds and surrounded by the prin
cipal part of his brave men, bleeding by his side. Alone and
unassisted by any tiling but truth, and the candour and patience
you have manifested to obtain it, I am prepared to meet both
father and son, before the tribunal of my fellow citizens to
which I have made my appeal. The day may arrive, when this
ardent young man will deeply regret the wanton and abusive
language with which he has assailed me, and for the present I
am willing to forgive him on account of his laudable effort to
discharge a filial duty.
My reply will be confined principally to the plan of the cam
paign, as stated in young General Dearborn's defence of his
father — The orders which General Dearborn received, and his
duty to have co-operated with my,army — The armistice to which
he agreed with Sir George Prevost and General Brock's 'etter
to eneral Van Rensalaer respecting it — The forces under my
command and those under the command of General Brocks-

172
The testimony of Colonel Snelling and others, and ray letters
to the Secretary of War. It appears from this defence, that
before General Dearborn left Washington in the spring of 1812,
a plan of the anticipated campaign against the Canadas, was
submitted to the Secretary of War by him, in which he recom
mended, that one army should advance upon Montreal, by the
Way of lake Champlain, while three others should enter upon
Canada from Sackett's Harbour, Niagara and Detroit — Here
fellow citizens, you have for your"qwn information, and for the
use of the future historian, the plan of the campaign of 1812.
Although I was appointed to the command of one of the three
armies, yet this plan" was never communicated to me by the ad
ministration or by General Dearborn, and I received no know
ledge of it until I read the President's message to Congress, af
ter the campaign ended, in which it was partially stated, and
when it was afterwards more fully unfolded by the publication,
in defence of General Dearborn. The plan of the campaign,
being formed by General Dearborn, he must have had a perfect
knowledge of it and he being the commanding General of our
armies, it became his duty to make arrangements for its execu
tion, especially as the troops designed for the formation of two
of the armies, one at Niagara and the other at Sackett's Har
bour were under his controul and subject to his command.
This would have been his duty, even without special orders on
the subject Notwithstanding this, young General Dearborn
states that his father made no arrangements to form these two
divisions of the army at Niagara and Sackett's Harbour, until
the 26th July, and assigns this reason, — that he had not receiv
ed orders for the purpose. I believe you will be satisfied, as
he formed the plan of this campaign — was the commanding
General, and the troops which were to compose these divisions
were subject to his controul and indeed under his command,
that it would have been his duty to have given orders for the
execution of the plan he, had designed. Individuals without
military knowledge and experience, from common observation,
I think must accord with the opinion I have expressed. Among
military men, I am confident there can be but one opinion on
this subject. Whatever opinion may have been formed, I shall
now show that he had orders from the war department on this
subject as early as the 26th June, eight days after war was.de-

173
tkred, and while mv army was labouring in the wilderness anfl
had received no intelligence of its declaration. The following
is a letter from the Secretary of War to General Dearborn,
dated War Department, 26th June, 1812.
SIR, — Having made the necessary arrangements for the de
fence ofthe sea-board, it is the wish of the President, that you
^should repair to Albany and prepare the force to be collected at
that place, for actual service. It is understood, that being pos
sessed of a full view of the intentions of government, and being
also acquainted with the disposition of the force under your
command, you will take your own time and give the necessary
orders to the officers on the sea-coast
It is altogether uncertain at what time General Hull may
deem it expedient to commence offensive operations. The pre
parations, it is presumed will be made, to move in a direction
for Niagara, Kingston, and Montreal. On your arrival at Al
bany, you will be able to form an opinion of the time required
to prepare the troops for action.
Maj. Gen. H. Dearbork. -
By this letter, General Dearborn was directed to repair to
Albany, and prepare the force to be collected at that place for
actual service. What was the actual service for which the force
was to be prepared ? War against Great Britain had been de
clared. The commanding General of our armies had formed a
plan of the campaign which had been approved by the adminis
tration. This plan was, that besides my army, three other*
were to be formed to move against the British posts on the Nia
gara, against Kingston and Montreal — and by this letter the
General was ordered to Albany, to prepare the force for actual
service. Is it possible that General Dearborn could have mis
understood this language ? Could this actual service have been
any other service than the execution of the plan which the Gen
eral himself had planned ? It requires nothing more than com
mon understanding to answer this question. The order must
have been as plain to him, as if an order to this effect had been
given, — " You are commanded to order a sufficient force to the
Niagara and invade that part ¦>* Upper Canada as soon as Gen
eral Hull commences offensive operations from Detroit. You

174
are likewise commanded to order another* force to Sackett's
Harbour to keep in check the troops at Kingston and prevent
them from re-enforcing the posts on the Niagara." The next
sentence of this letter of the 26th June, seems to remove all
doubt with respect to the construction of it
General Dearborn is told that he is possessed of a full view
of the intentions of the government and also that he is acquaint*
ed with the disposition of the force under his command. The
time and manner of executing this part of his duty is then left
to his discretion. Had there been a possibility, of doubt wifh
i'espect to its true meaning and intention, the concluding para
graph rendered it as plain, as though it had been in the words
I have substituted above. The Secretary tells him that it »
uncertain at what time General Hull may deem it expedient to
commence offensive operations. — He then says, that General
Dearborn's preparations will be made to move in a direction for
Niagara, Kingston, and Montreal. Does not this clearly and*
distinctly express to him the intention of the government to
form two of the divisions of the forces under his command, one
for the Niagara and the other for Sackett's Harbour, to move
against Kingston, agreeably to his own plan of the campaign ?
The words of the letter are, " The preparations it is presumed
will be made to move in a direction for Niagara, Kingston, and
Montreal." Thus you see, fellow citizens, that General Dearborn was or
dered by the Secretary of War, to make preparations to move
in a direction for Niagara and Kingston as early as the 26th of
June. I now ask you what authority his son had to say, that
his father had no orders with respect to the troops at Niagara,
for the purpose of co- operating with me, or to move in a direc
tion for Kingston and Montreal until the 26th July, a month af
terwards. Young General Dearborn then recites his father's
letters, written from Albany, to show the manner in which he
obeyed his orders.
One to General Van Rensselaer, dated Sd of August 1812,
directing him to keep up a correspondence with me.
One to Governour Tompkins, dated 6th August — requesting
him to order into service two thousand six hundred of the de
tached militia of the State : — one thousand to join the troops at
Niagara s— eight hundred to join those at Sackett's Harbour.

175
#c. — one ofthe 8th of August to Major Mullany, directing his
to march to Niagara with recruits under his command. One to
Colonel Fenwick, of the 8th of August, directing him to pro
ceed to Niagara with two companies of infantry and there take
the command ofthe artillery, &c.
One to Colonel Macomb to prepare cannon, &c. for Colons!
Fenwick, &c.
One to the Governour of Pennsylvania, dated August 13th,
requesting him to order two thousand militia to be marched to
Niagara. Thus, fellow citizens, you are furnished by the son of Gener
al Dearborn with documents, to show the manner in which his
father obeyed his orders and fulfilled the expectations of gov
ernment. I have only, you perceive, referred to the documents.
They are published in extenso, in the defence prepared by the
son, and which may be seen in the "American Statesman" 29th
July, 1824. By these documents it appears, that General Dear
born did not commence giving orders and making arrangements
for forming an army at Niagara, until the 3d of August. His
orders were continued on the 6th, 8th, and 13th of the same
month, and the principal force was ordered on the 6th, 8th, and
13th. I now ask you to examine the letter of the Secretary of
War of the 26th of June,, above recited, and compare it with
the documents as furnished by the son of General Dearborn, and
you will perceive, that it was nearly forty days from the date
of that letter before he even gave, orders for the preparations at
Niagara, to invade Upper Canada and co-operate with me, and.
a month after I had crossed the Detroit river and commenced.
offensive operations. In my memoirs you will find recited a
number of other letters of the Secretary of War to General
Dearborn from the 26th of June to the time he made the armis
tice, directing him to attack the enemy's posts, co-operate with
my army in the invasion of Upper Canada, and only make a
feint against Montreal.
When, fellow citizens, you consider that this plan of the
campaign of invading Upper Canada from Detroit, Niagara, and
Sackett's Harbour, was made by General Dearborn himself and
approved by the administration. — That as early as the 26th of.
June, only eight days after the declaration of war, the Secretary*
of War wrote to General Dearborn, that he should prepare the

176
force for actual service, and stated that it was understood, that
he was possessed of a full view of the intentions of government^
mnd acquainted with the disposition of the force under his com-
mand; and when he perfectly well knew that I was on my
march to Detroit, and was to commence offensive operations as
soon as possible after my arrival, and that his preparations
would be made to move in a direction for Niagara, Kingston,
&c. I again ask you, whether his remaining idle and inactive,
and not even having given any orders for making preparations'
at Niagara, &c. for so long a time, was not a disobedience of
both the letter and spirit of the orders which were given on the
26th June, and from that time continued, until he agreed to the
armistice, by which he disqualified himself from making use of »
the forces in making diversions in the enemy's country, attack-4
ing their posts, or co-operating with me in any manner what
ever. From General Dearborn's conference with Governour Tomp
kins, and from his letter to the Governour of Pennsylvania, pub
lished by his son, it appears that he was authorized by the Pres-
dent, to call for as many militia as he deemed necessary, to,
form the armies at Niagara and Sackett's Harbour, for the in
vasion of Upper Canada ; and it is well known, being the com
manding General, all the regular troops in the northern part of
the United States were at his disposal, and subject to his com
mand. In cases where General Dearborn's orders were discretiona
ry, he would be governed by his own judgment, and was only
responsible for the manner in which it was exercised. Admit*
ting he had been vested with discretionary powers altogether, I
believe you must be satisfied, that under the circumstances
which existed, nothing could have justified his delay and neglect
in giving orders for the execution for the plan of the campaign
which had been planned by himself. Hut this was not the case ;
and ample proof has been exhibited, both in my memoirs, and *
in this reply, that as early as the 26th of June, and at different
times, to the period wnen he agreed to act only on the defen
sive, he was ordered to prepare an army at Niagara to co-oper
ate with me, as also at the other posts for the conquest of Up
per Canada. '

177
1 think with propriety, fellow citizens, I may now ask yoi^
who has made the rash and unfounded declarations which this
son of General Dearborn has with so much malignity imputed
to me ? All his sensibilities appear to have been excited, and
all the powers of his mind called into exercise with a desire to
make you believe that his fatherhad no connexion with the two
armies, which by his own plan were to be formed, to co-operate
with mine in the invasion of Upper Canada, until the 26th of
July. The investigation I am now considering, is highly im-
portant, both as it respects myself and General Dearborn. Jf
it can be shewn that neither from his rank nor the instructions
he received, it became his duty to have given orders for the
formation of the two armies which were to co-operate with
mine and for the invasion of Upper Canada below, until the
26th July, and that after that period he made use of all the
means with which the administration had furnished him, in
making the necessary preparations, I will very cheerfully say, I
have accused him wrongfully, and will make any acknowledg
ments which the propriety of the case and justice to him may'
require. At present, however, I am satisfied that I have not
and I continue the same accusation against him, that it was his
duty, under his commission and the orders of the 26th of Juner
to have made those preparations, which it fully appears he ne
glected to do. — Again, fellow citizens, I ask you attentively to
read this letter of the 26th June and compare it at the same
time with the plan of the campaign which has been published by
the son of General Dearborn and of which his father had a most
perfect knowledge, as he formed it himself. When you havp
done this, I shall be satisfied with the result pf your inquiry.
There is another point of view, in which justice seems to rer
quire, that this subject should be considered. I will here state
some principles and facts, in which there will be no disagree
ment. Those entrusted with the government of a nation never
ought to declare war, until suitable preparations are made. Al
though in time of peace, a nation ought to be prepared, at least
for defensive war, yet whether prepared ar not, when war is
declared against it, the event must be met. For the declaration,
of war however, without suitable preparation, there can he no
excuse. If General Dearborn can show that the war of 1812
against Great Britain, was declared without suitable prepari»<*
03

178
tion, or that for want of orders, it was not his duty to make the
preparations for co-operation in Upper Canada, or for the want
of means, it was not in his power to make such preparations, in
either of those cases, the blame must jest on the administration.
This must be obvious, because it was the duty of the adminis
tration, who had recommended the declaration of war and had
adopted a plan of operations, to have given timely orders and
to have furnished the' necessary means for making such prepar-
tions. Certainly the fault could not have rested on me, be
cause, by the plan, of the campaign, formed as has before been
described, three armies were-to be provided for the invasion of
Upper Canada and none but mine was ever brought into opera
tion. If my army were . sufficient for this object, it was cer
tainly a great fault in the administration, to order three armies,
when three times the expense would be incurred. My object
is to show, that the disasters of the campaign ought not to be at
tributed to me. No one will believe it was in my power to con
quer, with one army, a country for which the administration
had assigned three. It was then either the fault of the adminis
tration or of General Dearborn. Believing I shall satisfy you
that I faithfully did my duty, it is not material to me, whether
the fault rests on General Dearborn or on the administra
tion. Had this defence of young General Dearborn rested on the
ground, that war was declared without suitable preparation — or
on the neglect of the administration, in not communicating
timely instructions to his father, or had it been shewn that ne
cessary means were not furnished, it is possible the effort which
has been made to shield General Dearborn, would have been
crowned with more success. With a chivalrous spirit the
young General has adventured into the field arid has not only
become the advocate of his father but of the administration. It
is well known, fellow citizens, that the author of this defence
received and has enjoyed for more than twelve years, one of the
m6st lucrative offices in its gift, the salary and emoluments
from which during that time, cannot have been much less than
one hundred thousand dollars. A desire to retain so valuable
an office,*or if he pleases, gratitude to his benefactors, must
have produced a severe and conflicting struggle, with the dis
charge of filial duty. As a large portion of this defence oon:r

179
sfsts of a republication of my trial, and as he has studiously in
troduced the names of the members of the court martial, it must
be evident that he does not consider that you have any right to
examine for yourselves the proceedings of that trial, but that
the sentence of the court martial ought to be considered as final.
Had this not been the case, his defence would have been addres
sed to the same tribunal to which I appealed. The difficulty was,
he well knew, that you would not be willing to appoint General
Dearborn, President of that tribunal, on which you are to sit in
judgment He was doubtless also influenced by similar motives
to those expressed in the letter of the Secretary of War tq his
father, which is recited in the 29th number of my memoirs,
where, in his very emphatic language he says, that "so long as
you (that is General Dearborn) enjoy the confidence of the gov
ernment, the clamours of the discontented should not be rer
garded." In my next number I shall reply to young General Dearborn,
on the subject of the armistice.

No. XXXIV,

It is stated in the defence of General Dearborn* that no troops
or military supplies were sent to the relief of Fort Maiden, dur
ing the temporary armistice — That General Brock had no
knowledge of it until he returned to Fort George, and that so
far from neglecting the situation of General Hull, every precau
tion was taken by General Dearborn, to render the arrange
ment, not only not. injurious, but advantageous to him. It is
very desirable to present to you, a certified copy of the Armis
tice, entered into on the 8th of August by General Dearborn on
one part, and by Sir George Prevost on the other. The son of
General Dearborn says, it was entered into on the 9th of Au
gust — but I find he has published a letter from General Van
Rensselaer to General Dearborn, in which he acknowledges the
receipt of General Dearborn's letter of the 8th of August, en
closing the very agreement for an armistice. The letter re-r.

180
ferred to, is published by young General Dearborn in the " A-
merican Statesman" of the 29th of July, 1824. This proves
that it was made at least as early as the 8th of August. 1 re
ally hoped he would have published a copy of it, in his defence
of his father. I have applied to the offices of the Secretary of
War, and likewise of State, and the original cannot be found on
record or on file in either of those offices. I likewise applied to
Governor Eustis, who was Secretary of War at that time,
who declared that it was received at the War Office and placed
on the file or recorded. Who has taken it from the office, t
know not. The son of General Dearborn has however publish
ed two letters explanatory of it, one to the Secretary of War
and one to me, for which I ought to express my obligations to
him, as the information they contain, will be highly useful in
the investigation of the subject. When I wrote my memoirs, I
only had the explanation of it, as contained in a letter of the
Secretary of War to me, and likewise in another letter from the
Secretary to General Dearborn. I will now copy both of the
letters which the son has been so kind as to furnish, and I should
have been under greater obligations, if he had furnished an au
thenticated copy of the original instrument itself. Were we
possessed of it, the true interest and meaning of the armistice
might be better understood. The letters referred to are as fol
low.
Letter from General Dearborn to tiie Secretary of War, inform
ing him of the temporary armistice.
" Head Quarters, Greenbush, Aug. Sth, 1812.
SIR,— -Colonel Baynes, Adjutant General of the British army
in Canada, has this day arrived at this place, in the character
of a Flag of Truce, with despatches from the British govern
ment, through Mr. Foster,* which I have enclosed to the Sec
retary. Colonel Baynes was likewise the bearer of despatches
from Sir George Prevost, which is herewith enclosed. Although
I do not consider myself authorized to agree to a cessation of
arms, I concluded that I might with perfect safety, agree that
our troops should act merely on the defensive, until I could re
ceive directions from my government; but as I could not in-
*Late Minister of Great Britain, then at Halifax.

181
elude General Hull in such an arrangement, he having received
his orders directly from the department of war, I agreed to
"write to him, and state the proposition made to me, and have
proposed, his confining himself to defensive measures, if his
orders, and the circumstances of affairs with him, would justify
it. Colonel Baynes has Written similar orders to the British
officers in Upper Canada, and I have forwarded them, to our
commanders of posts, to be by them transmitted to the British
commanders. I consider the agreement as favourable at this period, for we
could not act offensively, except at Detroit, for some time, and
there it will not probably have any effect on General Hull or
his movements, and we shall not be prepared to act offensively
in this quarter, before you will have time*to give me orders for
continuing on the defensive or att otherwise.
We shall lose no time, or advantage, by the agreement, but
rather gain time without any risk. It is mutually understood,
that all preparatory measures may proceed, and that no obstruc
tions are to be attempted, on either side, to the passage of
stores, to the frontier posts; but if General Hull should not
think it advisable to confine himself to mere defensive opera
tions, the passage of military stores to Detroit, will not be con
sidered as embraced in the agreement last noticed.
Col. Baynes informs me, that a party of British troops and
Indians, had taken possession of Michilimackanack, and that
our garrison were prisoners. I made no particular inquiry as
to the circumstances, as I entertain some doubts as to the fact.
I have no expectation that the government will consent to a
cessation of hostilities, on the strength of the communication
forwarded by Mr. Foster; but all circumstances considered, it
may be well to avail ourselves of the occasion, uhtil we are bet
ter prepared for acting with effect ; at all events, we can lose
nothing by the arrangement, I have consented to, it being ex
plicitly understood, that my government will not be under any
obligation to agree to if., unless the despatches from the British
government should be Such, as to induce the President to pro
pose an armistice, as preparatory for negotiations for peace. I
informed Colonel Baynes, that our government would readily
meet any such overture from Great Britain, as clearly indicat
ed, a disposition for making peace oh satisfactory terms ; but af

182
ter what had occurred, in relation to the adjustment with Mr.
Erskine, it could not be expected that any other than the most
explicit and authentic directions to their agent in this country,
would produce any change in our measures. It is evident that
a war with the United States is very unpopular in Canada.—
Colonel Baynes arrived at our frontier post, at Plattsburg, and
was conducted to this place by Major Clark, an officer in the
detached militia of this State, he returned this day with the same
officer. I am, Sir, &c.
H. DEARBORN."
Letter from General Dearborn to General Hull, announcing the
temporary armistice.
"Head Quarters, Greenbush, Aug. 9th, 1812.
SIR,— Having received from Sir George Prevost, Governour
General, and commander of the British forces in Upper and
Lower Canada, despatches from the British government, said to
be ofa conciliatory nature, which I have forwarded to Washing
ton, and a letter from Sir George Prevost to me, by his Adju
tant General, Colonel Baynes, proposing a cessation of hostili
ties on the frontiers ; I have so far agreed to his proposals as to
consent that no offensive operations shall be attempted on our
part, until I have received further instructions from our govern
ment ; but as you received your orders directly from the de
partment of war, I could not agree to extend the principle to
your command, but I agreed to write to you, and state the gen
eral facts ; and propose to you, a concurrence in the measures,
if your orders and situation would admit of it ; of course you
will act in conformity with what has been agreed upon, in re
spect to the other posts on the frontiers, if not incompatable
with your orders, or the arrangements made under them, or the
circumstances under which this letter reaches you. Any pre
parations for, offensive operations may be continued, and when
it is agreed to suspend any offensive operations no obstacles
are to be opposed to the transportation of military stores. In
all cases where offensive operations cease, by virtue of the afore
mentioned agreement, four entire days are to be allowed, after
either party shall revoke their orders, before any offensive* oper
ations shall commence. A letter from Colonel Baynes, to the

lflfc
*umtnanding officer at Amherstburg, has been forwarded by me.
to the commanding officer at Niagara, to be by him transmitted
to Detroit. The removal of any troops from Niagara to De
troit, while the present agreement continues, would be impro
per, and incompatible with the true interest of the agreement
I have made no arrangement that should have any effect upon
your command contrary to your own judgment.
I am, &c.
H. DEARBORN."
The publication of the letter above recited addressed to me,
is the first knowledge I ever had of it. It never was received
by me. — Without any other feeling than a desire for truth, I
will examine these letters with all due caution, and give them
no other construction, than such as is obviously to be inferred
from the language with which they are clothed. Here is pre
sented by the son of General Dearborn, his father's own letters,
'/-explanatory of his temporary armistice, as it is called by him. He
. does not present the agreement itself, for reasons which I shall
not pretend to conjecture. If it were as favourable to his father,
as the explanation given of it in these letters, I am sure you will^
believe it would not have been withheld. I will now consider,
what it appears to have been by these letters. Colonel Baynes,
the Adjutant General of the British army, came to General
Dearborn's head quarters, with a proposition from Sir George
Prevost. The General says, in his letter to the Secretary of
War, "although I do not consider myself authorized to agree to
a cessation of arms, I concluded I might with perfect safety
agree, that our troops should act merely on the defensive." —
These are the very words he makes use of. There is not one
word in his letter to the government, by which it can even be in
ferred, that there was any agreement on the part of the British
Adjutant General, that, the British troops opposite to ours, should
llikewise act only on the defensive. General Brock, with all the
forces of Upper Canada, was left at perfect liberty to march of
fensively against the forces I commanded. General Dearborn
agreed to write to me, that I might act on the defensive only, if
I thought proper. And it seems to have been virtually under-
. stood, that the British commander, General Brock, might also
set only on the defensive, if he thought proper. These discre- *

184
tionary powers appear to have been vested both in General
Brock and myself without any special authority, either from the
British Adjutant General or from General Dearborn. Thus it
seems, by General Dearborn's own letters, that General Brock
was at liberty to march all the forces of Upper Canada, and in
vade our country, by his attack on me, while General Dearborn
became pledged, by his armistice, to confine himself to his
pest, where he was then situated, and could not cross the Nia
gara river, to take possession of fort Erie or fort George, al
though fhey were left in a perfectly defenceless condition, with
out violating his own agreement. It must be seen, that so long
as we are deprived of the original agreement for this temporary
armistice, that I have no other mode of explaining it, than by
the infonnation which General Dearborn has given in his letters
explanatory of it If it contains any thing more or anything
different from what has been or may be explained, let a copy of
tiie original instrument be produced. General Dearborn m Ids
letter to the Secretary of War, says, " that he did not consider
himself authorized to agree to a cessation of hostilities,'' and in
another part of his letter he says, "that he has no expectation
--that his government will consent to a cessation of hostilities
on the strength of the communications which he had forwarded
to die Secretary of State on the subject/' But nevertheless, be
agreed to act only on the defensive.
As it does not appear by the above letters, to have been stip
ulated, that the British were to act only on the defensive, I ask
whether surh a construction can be inferred from fhe terms
contained in those letters ? According to the common meaning
and acceptation of language, Jt cannot. It is proper to construe
this instrument as it actually was, and not as it ought to have
been. In the letter which he says he wrote to me, he gives the same
account that he had agreed to act only on the defensive, which
is contained in the one to the Secretary of War. He further
says in his letter to me, that " the removal of any troop s from
Niagaia to Detroit while the agreement continued, would be
improper and incompatible with the true intent of the agree
ment," This is his own construe ,\-r:. but there is nothing con-
•tained in the letters referred to. as far as I can comprehend
&em, which will justify such a construction. It is certain, Sir

185
•George Prevost did not put this construction to the agreement, for
it appears by General Dearborn's letter to General Van Ri nsse-
laer, dated twelve days after it was made, and while it was in
full force, that he refers to detachments which had been sent
from Niagara to Detroit and General Van Rensselaer was or
dered to prepare, to take advantage of their reduced force, as soon
as there should be orders to act offensively. And no evidence
has been offered, to show, that this removal of the troops from
Niagara to Detroit, was ever complained of by General Dear
born, as a violation of the armistice.
This then was the temporary armistice, which General Dear
born agreed to, as appears by his own letters, and although not
authorized to agree to an armistice, and having stated to the
Secretary of War, that " he had no expectation that the govern
ment would consent to a cessation of hostilities, on the strength
of the communication forwarded by Mr. Foster," yet he did
agree that his troops should act only on the defensive, regard
less of my situation, and leaving me to be exposed to the united
forces from Niagara and at Maiden.
Was it possible for him to have made an arrangement more
fatal to me r How long did this temporary armistice continue ?
— A letter from General Van Rensselaer, dated at Lewistown,
to General Dearborn, acknowledges the receipt of General Dear
born's letter of the 8th of August, enclosing the armistice, so
that it must have been as early as the 8th of August This let
ter is published by the son of General Dearborn. By a letter
which he has also published in the same paper, from General
Brock to General Van Rensselaer, dated the 25th August, 1812,
— General Van Rensselaer is informed, that General Brock disr
patched an express to Amherstburg, the day before, giving infor
mation of the armistice. By this letter it appears, that the ar
mistice must have been in operation, at least from the 8th to the
25th of August, when if we suppose the armistice to have end
ed, which was not the case, however, and four days being al
lowed thereafter, for notice to have been given of its termina
tion, the period of its operation would then have amounted to
twenty-one days. During all this period, General Brock had it
in his power, with all his forces of every description, to come
against me, while the whole American forces on the Niagara
o4

106
river, were confined to our territory, under the armistice of
their commanding General.
In answer to young Gen. Dearborn's round assertion, that
at this time, no troops left Niagra for Maiden, I will recite the
letter of his Father to Gen. Van Rensselaer, dated the 20th of
August It is in these words — " as it is believed a detachment
has been made from the British force at Niagra, to re-enforce the
garrison at Maiden, it will be necessary to be as well prepared as
possible, to take advantage of the reduced force in your front, as
soon as there shall be orders to act offensively." — In his let
ter likewise to the Secretary of War of the 7th of August, Gen
eral Dearborn states the movement of the British troops from
Niagara to Detroit. This was one day only, before he agreed
to the armistice, in anticipation of which, there can be no doubt
this detachment of the British, took advantage of the contem
plated temporary cessation of hostilities. This testimony the
young General Dearborn has furnished, as will be found, by re
ference to the defence of his father and expressed, in a letter of
which the following is a copy, of so much as relates to that part
of the subject. Letter to the Secretary of War.
"Head Quarters, Greenbush, August 7, 1812.
SIR, — I have been honoured with your letters of the 26th;
27th and 29th ult. and of 1st and 5th inst. I have been making
arrangements with Governour Tompkins for having re-enforce
ments sent to Niagara, Ogdensburg and Plattsburg. I trust
they will be moved soon ; but too late, I fear, to make the di
version in favour of General Hull, which is so desirable.
" I have ordered Lieutenant Colonel Fenwick, with two com
panies of Simond's regiment, two 18, and two 12 pounders,
to move up the Mohawk to Utica, where the roads part, which
lead to Niagara and Sackett's Harbour.
" I shall order a detachment of light artillery, and the infan
try, with the heavy pieces, a quantity of ammunition, intrench-
, ing tools, at d other articles, to proceed to Niagara. — The whole,
except the light artillery, will go by water from fort Schuyler.
I wrote to the commanding officers at Niagara and Sackett's
Harbour, confidentially, to let it be known they had received

187
intelligence, that large re-enforcements of regulars and militia
were on their march to join them : I enclosed a letter to each of
them to that effect lt is said, that a detachment has been sent
from Nigara, by land, to Detroit ; if so, I should presume, be
fore they can march two hundred and fifty miles, General Hull
will receive notice of their approach, and in season to cut them
off before they reach fort Maiden."
Here then we have the testimony of General Dearborn him
self, that on the 7th of August a detachment of British troops
had marched from Niagara to re-enforce the troops at Maiden ;
-and on the 20th of August General Van Rensselaer was inform
ed, that a detachment had marched from the same place. *
Either then there were two detachments of the British which
moved forward to Detroit as referred to by General Dearborn
on the 7th August to the Secretary of War, and afterwards on
the 20th of the same month in his letter to General Van Rensse
laer, a more minute account of which giving the amount of the
force of one detachment is given by th«» above letter of Colonel
Cass, or General Dearborn was criminally negligent, in suffer
ing thirteen days to elapse, between the 7th and 20th August
before he communicated to General Van Rensselaer, informa
tion of so much importance. The young General may have his
choice of the alternatives, in making out the defence of his
father. There is another consideration which must be irresistible on
this subject Sir George Prevost was the commanding General
of both the Canadas. General Brock was acting governour, and
commanded the troops in Upper Canada, and was under the
command of Sir Georgp Prevost At this time I had invaded
Upper Canada from Detroit No invasion was made from any
other quarter. It was of great importance, to re- enforce the
* In addition to the lettei s of General Dearborn which have been cited, it fur
ther appears by Colonel Cats' letter to the government, dated 10th September,
181 2, which has been published in General Dearborn's defence, that the eneniy
at Maiden, about the 10th August, after the armistice was entered into, re
ceived a re-enforcement from the same place. His words are " about the 10th
August, the enemy received a re-enforeement of about four hundred men." ,
It appears evident, from this statement of Colonel Cass, that the force of four
hundred men, whieh arrived on the 10th August, mast have been an extra force,
besides that of General Brock, which did not reach Maiden, until the 14th af
(he same month.

J8&
troops at Maiden, to repel this invasion- Tfoops could not be
removed with safety to the British posts below, while our troops
at Niagara, had a right to act offensively.
I now ask you, whether you do not believe that this plan was
concerted by Sir George Prevost, solely for the purpose of ena
bling General Brock to carry his troops tore-enforce the troops
at Maiden ? And whether you do not believe, as soon as the
plan was conceived and Sir George Prevost had determined to
send his proposals to General Dearborn, that he immediately
gave General Brock information, that a suspension of hostilities
would probably take place at Niagara, and that he might with
safety to those posts, march his troops to Maiden, which it ap-'
pears by the two letters above recited to the Secretary of War
and to General Van Rensselaer, he actually did.
The facts thus proved by the letters of General Dearborn to
the Secretary of War and to General Van Rensselaer, shewing
that a detachment had moved from Niagara for Maiden, and the
commentaries which have been and will now be made on them,
will give a satisfactory explanation of the letter of General
Brock, which has been published by young General Dearborn.
General Brock had carried his re-enforcements to Maiden, and
during the existence of the armistice, was engaged in offensive
operations. When he wrote his letter of the 25th August to
General Van Rensselaer, disavowing any knowledge of the ar
mistice, at the time of his attack on Detroit he had then return
ed with his re-enforcements to fort George. It is true, the des
patches from the British Adjutant General, communicating
official intelligence of the armistice, and which General Dearborn
had undertaken to transmit to the British commanding officer at
Niagara and to myself may not have been received by General
Brock, as he states, previously to the 25th of August. But I
would ask how it happens that this official intelligence of the
armistice was not received by General Brock, before the 25th
August, seventeen days after it was agreed upon ? And what
became of the despatches, which it is stated General Dear
born had transmitted to me, and which I declare I had never
received. In a letter from General Dearborn to the Secretary of War
of the 7th of August, he says, " I have been making arrange
ments with Governour Tompkins for having re-enforcements

189
sent to Niagara, Ogdensburg, and Plattsburg, I trust they will
move soon, but too late, I fear, to make the diversions in favour
of General Hull which is so desirable." In the same letter of*
the 7th of August, he informs the Secretary "that a detachment
had been sent from Niagara to Detroit." What were the cir
cumstances which induced General Dearborn to express to the
Secretary of War his/ears that the re-enforcements he had or
dered from the State of New York would be too late to make
diversions in favour of General Hull ? Although he says these
re-enforcements would move soon, yet he says he fears they
would be too late. Does he not himself in this very letter give
the reason why it would be too late for these re-enforcements
to co-operate with me? viz. "that a detachment of the British
had been sent from Niagara to Detroit " With the knowledge
before him of the movement of this detachment, I think I may
then ask, what possible reason could have induced him on the
very next day to have paralyzed his own troops on tho Niagara,
bv pledging himself that they should act only on the defensive?
As soon as this temporary armistice was made, on the 8th Aug-
gubt the British Adjutant General delivered a copy of it to
General Dearborn enclosed in a letter to General Brock or the
commanding officer at fort George, to be transmitted by him, as
he had undertaken to have it sent Permit me again to ask,
what could have induced him to have adopted a measure, which
he himself says he was not authorized to agree to, and which
he believed the government would not approve ? If he should
say his object was my relief, I must request you, fellow citizens,
now to consider the measures he adopted to afford that relief.
All the letters containing this important information, were en
trusted to General Dearborn to be communicated. He was the
commanding General of our armies and must have known how
materially this important measure would effect my army, and
having entered into it himself, it evidently became his duty to
have taken the most effectual means regardless of every ex
pense, to have made this communication to me with the greatest
possible expedition.
The distance from Albany to the Niagara river, is about three
hundred miles and thence to Detroit about two hundred and
fifty miles more. It appears then that I was about five hund-
dred and fifty miles from Albany, where General Dearborn

190
was situated at the date of the armistice, and that General
Brock was on his way to Maiden. Intelligence of this armis
tice might have reached me in five days after it was agreed up
on, by an express, travelling less than five miles an hour. Had
this been done, I should have received the armistice three days
before the 16th August the day that General Brock invaded
our territory. By the measures adopted by General Dearborn
to have these important despatches conveyed, it will be seen by
reference to General Van Rensselaer's letter to General Dear
born, as before recited, that he did not receive thern until the
17th of August being nine days in travelling three hundred
miles, and by General Brock's letter to General Van Rensse
laer, it appears he did not receive them until his return to fort
George, after the capitulation at Detroit, and as I have before
stated, the despatches sent to me, I have never received. Had
proper and efficient measures been adopted by General Dear
born, to forward the despatches with such expedition as they
might have been sent, according to his own construction of the
terms of that agreement, General Brock would then have re
ceived the official account in due time to have prevented his in
vading our territory in his attack on me, and I should have had
it in my power to have exercised my discretion in agreeing
likewise to the armistice or to have acted otherwise, as circum
stances might have warranted. General Brock having made
the invasion of our country in his attack on me, during the oper
ation of the armistice, he felt the necessity in justification of
himself, of writing the letter referred to, addressed to General
Van Rensselaer, protesting against any knowledge (meaning
official knowledge) of the existence of such armistice at that
time. It is well known that the Adjutant General is the direct
organ of communication, through whom orders are made known
to an army, and if by other means, a subordinate officer has re
ceived intelligence of such orders unless communicated in an
official verbal or written form, from the commanding officer, he
is not bound and indeed he dare not obey them. The armistice
having been made nearly three weeks before General Brock had
returned from Maiden to his post on the Niagara, I ask you
whether it is probable that it was such a profound secret in Up
per Canada, that General Brock should have received no indirect
information of it, when he was in a situation where it might

191
have been communicated to him in three or four days at mos"t.
Truth is frequently more clearly elicited from circumstances,
than from any other kind of testimony. Records are liable to
be mutilated ; the memory of man is not alwjys correct and re
tentive ; interest, passion, and prejudice frequently have a pow
erful operation on the mind. In. the case under review", the
circumstances which existed speak in terms most convincing
and irresistible.
It is necessary to take a view of the situation of both armies,
and their relation to each other, with the objects of both parties
in the war, to form a proper estimate on the subject. The ar
my I commanded, made the invasion from the Detroit river. I
had no co-operation. This was owing to the neglect of General
Dearborn in the first instance and to his temporary armistice in
the second. This armistice was proposed by Sir George Pre
vost at a time when his provinces were invaded < from no other
quarter but Detroit. I ask you, then, for what purpose this
proposal was made ? To your consideration and judgment I
cheerfully submit the two following inquiries. First, whether
the sole object was not to enable General Brock to march with
the troops from the east part of the province to re-enforce the
troops at Maiden, to repel the invasion I had made? Second,
whether from the evidence and circumstances which have
been related you are uot perfectly satisfied that General Brock had
information of the temporary armistice before he returned from
Maiden, three weeks after it had been made — a sufficient time
for the information to have arrived, had it been sent from Eng
land? In support of this evidence and of these circumstances,
1 do now in the most solemn manner declare, as I before stat
ed, that immediately after the capitulation on the 16th August,
General Brock informed me that the orders in Council had been
repealed, and General Dearborn had agreed to an armistice at
.Niagara and the other posts where he commanded, and he hop
ed and expected it would be the foundation of peace between
the two countries ; or words to that effect You all well know
fellow citizens, with what despatch expresses are sent almost
everyday through the country for the benefit of commercial,
speculation, and that the distance of five or six hundred miles is
frequently travelled over in about three days. With the know
ledge of such facts which the experience of all of you confirm,

192
«an it he considered unreasonable in me to suppose that equal
¦vigilance would have been observed on this occasion, as is prac
tised in a private commercial speculation ? On a great national
occasion, when Che fate of an army and a large section of
country is exposed, was it not the duty of the commanding
General, to whom was confided your safety and the protection
of your property, to have made as great exertions for their pre
servation, as are every day made by individuals, where nothing
is at stake, but pecuniary private interest ? But it is further in
evidence, fellow citizens, that General Dearborn's expresses did
not travel with but little more than one third the speed with
ordinary expresses ; as General Van Rensselaer on the 1 7th of
August nine days after the armistice was agreed upon, which
"was on the 8th of August, and only three hundred miles from
Albany, acknowledges then to have just received'General Dear
born's letter, communicating the intelligence of it So that you
perceive this express travelled at the astonishing rate of not
-quite a mile and an half an hour. With such evidences of the
vigilance and exertions of General Dearborn in carrying into
-execution the plan of a campaign which he himself had formed
and making preparations for conducting an offensive war, de
clared by an administration from which he received his commie -
-sions, I will leaveyou to make your own comments.

No. XXXV.
The temporary armistice made with Sir George Prevost
%y General Dearborn, had so fatal an effect on the division
•of the army I commanded, and was so essentially the cause
-of the misfortunes of the campaign, that I must beg your
further attention to tlrat subject The fact is, that as early as
the 3d and 7th of August, General Dearborn well knew my
critical situation, and how much I stood in need of co-operation
and assistance. In the letter of the 3d to General Van Rensse
laer, he says, " you will please to take measures for keeping up
a correspondence with General Hull, and ascertain his move
ments by expresses or otherwise ; and as he has crossed over

193
into Upper Canada, and taken possession of Maiden, it will bfi
expedient to make every exertion in your power to co-operate
with him ; and if your force will not admit of any strong offen
sive operations, it may be well to make such diversions in his
favour as circumstances will permit, so as to prevent the enemy
from detaching any force from the vicinity of Niagara, to
oppose the movements of General Hull. I trust you will soon
be able to act in a more decisive manner."
In his letter to the Secretary of War, dated the 7th of August,
he says, "I have been making arrangements for having re-en
forcements sent to Niagara, Ogdensburg, and Plattsburg. I
trust they will move soon — but too late I fear, to make the di
version in favour of General Hull, which is so desirable. " — In
the. same letter he informs the Secretary that a detachment of
the British had been sent from Niagara to Detroit.
General Dearborn, as you will perceive, from his letters of
the 3d and 7th of August, knew that troops had marched from
Niagara to re-enforce the post of Maiden*— he was likewise aware
that in making an Armistice, he could not include me — as shewn
try his letter to me on the subject, where he says* " that as you
received your orders directly from the Secretary of War, I could
not agree to extend the principle to your command." With
full and certain knowledge of these facts he makes the armis
tice. The circumstance of some of the troops having marched
to Maiden previous to the armistice, only increased the difficul
ty, for it enabled the enemy to strengthen their posts and be
better prepared for service.
Knowing then, as he did, my critical situation, and that a
'part of the force of Niagara had marched against me, I ask on
what grounds his conduct could be justified?
There is additional evidence to shew, that General Dearborn
was correct in stating that troops had been sent to Maiden, as
found in the letter of Colonel Cass to the government after the
capitulation, which letter was sent to the court martial as evi
dence against me. Colonel Cass says, "that about the 10th of
August, the enemy received a re-enforcement of about four hun
dred men." General Dearborn left it optional with me to act
on the defensive, and it was equally so with the British — for as
a part of their troops had left Niagara previous to the armistice
they were not pledged by it. Now, had I received his letter,
25

194
announcing the armistice, and had I found it expedient, to have
proposed a similar measure the enemy was at full liberty to
do as he pleased, and leave me no choice.
The son ofthe General, in defence of his father, says, "that
so far from neglecting the situation of General Hull, every pre
caution was taken by General Dearborn to render this arrange
ment not only not injurious but advantageous to him!" On what
grounds was this opinion of the son of the General founded ? I
am left to suppose that it was on the letter of his father to the
Secretary of War, in which he observes, "I have no expectation
that the government will consent to a cessation of hostilities,
but all circumstances considered, it may be well to avail our
selves of the occasion, until we are better prepared for acting
with effect ; at all events, we can lose nothing by the arrange
ment I have consented to, it being explicitly understood, that
my government will not be under any obligation to agree to it,
unless the despatches of the British government are such, as to
induce the President to* propose an armistice, as preparatory for
negotiations for peace !"
The only reason given in this letter is, that we might be bet
ter prepared. Whose fault was it that we were not better pre
pared ? In my SSd number, it is proved, that it was the duty of
General Dearborn to have made the preparations at Niagara,
&c. and that he neglected, even to give any orders for the pur
pose, more than forty days, after the Secretary of War, gave
him instructions for the purpose. — No principle is better estab
lished, than, that a man shall not take advantage of his own
wrong. Thus I have proved that he knew I required assistance — that
re-enforcements ofthe enemy had been sent to aid in opposing
me — that he did not include my army in the armistice, and yet
that he made it while possessed of this knowledge. I ask you
to consider what motives could have induced him to have agreed
to a measure, so fatal to my army ?
I will now consider young General Dearborn's remarks as to
my views of the conquest of Canada, without the assistance of a
navy. — The best evidence, I can offer is my official letters to
the government. In a letter addressed to the Secretary of War,
in 1809, I say, "I would likewise suggest for consideration the
expediency of building some armed vessels on lake Erie, for the

195
purpose of preserving the communication. Consider you have
three, military posts to tho north and west of these waters, and
no other communication with them." In the next, dated the
6th of March, 1812, more than two months before the declara
tion of war, I observed, " If we cannot command the ocean, we
can command the inland lakes of our country, I have always
boon ofthe opinion, that we ought to have built as many armed
vessels on the lakes as would have commanded them. We
have more interest in them than the British nation, and can
build vessels with more, convenience." Both these communica
tions were made before I accepted a military appointment.
After this appointment, and before I left Washington, to take
tho command of the northwestern army, I presented another
letter to the Secretary of War, and I here copy from my de
fence before the court martial the contents of it. Page 38—
"It did contain, a representation, in the most explicit and
strongest terms, of the necessity of our liaving a naval force
superiour to the enemy on the lakes, and that without it, and
unless the army I was to command was strengthened by addi
tions to its numbers, and unless it was followed by detachments,
to keep open the communication, and insure it supplies from
Ohio, and unless it was supported by co-operations on other
quarters, my army could not be able to maintain itself at De
troit, much less carry on offensive operations in the enemy's
country." On this subject, I will here state the testimony of Captain
Charles Stewart of the navy, who says that at an interview he
had with the Secretary of the Navy, in the beginning of April,
1812, "the Secretary informed him, that it was contemplated
to give him the command of the lakes ; that a naval force su
periour to tho British on the lakes, had been strongly urged by
General Hull, as essential, and us a certain means of ensuring
to the army success. " This interview of Captain Stewart with
the Secretary ofthe Navy did not take place, until I left Wash
ington for Ohio, to take the command of the army, as he had
not arrived, while I was there.
Young General Dearborn ought to have stated the whole of
General Porter's testimony-— it is to bo found in pages 126 and
127 of my trial.

196
He says, the last of March or the beginning of April, he
was with me at the office of the Secretary of War, and 1 recom
mended that a navy should be formed on the lakes, to have a
superiority over the British in case of war ; that I stated the
strength of the British naval force ; and that I recommended a
sloop of war of twenty guns, and that the brig Adams, then on
the stocks, should be taken into the service ; and the Secretary
of the Navy proposed writing to Captain Stewart at Philadel
phia, to repair to Washington to concert measures. He then
says, that a navy agent was appointed on the lakes ; that he
was twice at the President's with me, when the subject of a na
vy was talked over; at one time, he says, that the President
thought it would be abandoned — at another time, he agreed that
it^hould be done. I have stated here the substance of his tes
timony on this subject in as concise a manner as possible. —
Whoever wishes to see the whole of it, will find it in the book
and pages I have mentioned.
It does not appear that the plan was abandoned before I left
Washington ; because after my departure a navy agent was ap
pointed to build a navy, and Captain Stewart was sent for to
command it.
If the President at any one time suggested to General Porter
that it was abandoned, it must have been mere loose conversa
tion, and not an official determination.
My letters to the government on this subject ought and will
be considered the best evidence of my opinions ; and as they
were received as official communications, I had good reason to
believe that the views of the government accorded with my
own. Every person, therefore, who will read these letters to
the government, on the subject of a navy, the last of which was
written after I was appointed to the command of the northwes
tern army, and a few days only before I left Washington, and
likewise the other testimony I have offered, must be satisfied,
that I had reason to expect a navy ' sufficient to preserve the
communication of the lake, would have been constructed.
It is true, in my official communications, and in ray conver
sation with the members of the administration, that while I urg
ed, in as strong language as I was capable of using, the expe
diency, and indeed necessity, of commanding the upper lakes,
in the event of war with Great Britain, at the same time I

197
stated the only measurea by, which our territory and posts situ
ated on those waters could by any possibility be preserved, pro
vided t navy could not be prepared.
Should not that essential preparation be made, the plan which
I proposed was, as soon as war was declared, to cross the Niag
ara river with a large army, to co-operate with the forces I
commanded. I further stated, that if with these armies we
could make the conquest of Upper Canada, the harbours around
every part of the lake would be in our possession, and the navy
of the enemy could not be supported, and must be destroyed,
or fall into our hands.
If on the alternative, here stated, the administration aban
doned the measure of building a navy in 1812, and adopted the
suggestion I had made, an army ought immediately to have
been assembled on the Niagara river, of sufficient strength, to
have co-operated with mine, to have taken possession of the
province, and especially ofthe harbours on the lake. This not
beina; done, was strong evidence to me, that the alternative was
not adopted, and that a navy would be prepared, which in all
my communications I recommended in conjunction with an ar
my to be preferable. Ever since I have had a knowledge of
that country, I have given the opinion, and that opinion now
seems to be confirmed by experience, that the command of the
lakes, is essential to its preservation.
This opinion was founded on its distant and isolated situa
tion, Detroit being separated from any other settlements, by a
wilderness of more than two hundred miles, Michillimackinack
five hundred, and Chicago eight hundred, and the whole of them
situated on navigable waters.
This must continue to be the case, until they are united to the
states, by the progress of settlement This explanation I have
been called to make in consequence of General Dearborn's as
sertion, and you have now before you both of my views as to the
conquest of the Canadas.
In this defence of General Dearborn, it is very frequently as
serted, that I could have taken the British fort at Maiden, and
my instructions from the Secretary of War are recited, to show
that it was my duty to have done it, indeed, that I was directed
to do it ; as it was made a crime against me for not doing if,
I wilt ask your attention to this part of the subject. On the

198
first column of the defence of General Dearborn, are recited the
only orders I received on this subject They are dated the
24th of June, and were received on the 9th of July; I here copy
them from his defence, with my answer on the same day they
were received.
" Should the force under your command be equal to the en
terprise, consistent with the safety of your own posts, you will
take possession of Maiden, and extend your conquests as cir
cumstances may justify. It is also proper to inform you that
an adequate force cannot soon be relied on for the reduction of
the enemy's posts below."
My answer to this part ofthe Secretary's letter On the sub
ject of taking Maiden, written' on the 9th of July," the same day
it was received, is in these words : " The British command the
water and the savages. I do not think the force here equal to
the reduction of Amherstburg, (meaning Maiden.")
I am much obliged to the author of the defence, for copying
the last paragraph of this letter, which he says I omitted ; it is
a very strong additional reason for the opinion, I gave for not
making an attack on that fortress. , I was informed by it that
the divisions of the army at Niagara, &c. were not ready to co
operate in the invasion of Canada. It now appears by this let
ter of the Secretary of War, that I was ordered to cross the
river, and make the invasion of Upper Canada, and the enter-
prize of attacking Maiden, was left to my discretion, and I was
to make the attempt if in my opinion, it could be done consist
ent with the safety of my other posts ; and it likewise appears,
that I wrote to the Secretary, on the same day that I received
this letter, that it was my opinion, that it could not be done
consistently with the safety of my other posts. Here is present
ed all the orders and facts, which relate to this subject I now
ask you, fellow citizens, and particularly those of you, who
have had military experience, and paid particular attention to
military subjects, whether, under these orders, and the opinion
I had given to the government I could have been justified, in
making the attack? If I had ordered the enterprize, and it
had been unsuccessful, would not the administration have said,
and with propriety, that the measure was left to my discretion,
and I had given my opinion, that it could not be undertaken,
with safety to my other posts ? Indeed, whether the true mean-

199
big and intention of this order, considering the opinions I had
given, in conjunction with it, and the information the letter con
tained, that I should then have no co-operation, was not that I
was not authorized to make the attack ?
Besides, after the Secretary of War had received this letter,
in which I stated that my force was not equal to the enterprize,
I received an answer from him, in which he said, that my con
duct was not only approved, but viewed with the highest satis
faction, by the President. From these facts and documents, it
must be evident, that I strictly obeyed the orders I received
from the government, and that different conduct would have
been a violation of at least the spirit and intention of them.

No. XXXVI.
I will now reply to that part of the defence of young Gener
al Dearborn in protection of his father, in which he accuses me
with attempting .to pervert the testimony of Major Snelling,
and endeavour to satisfy you, that there is not the least found
ation for this accusation. To exhibit it in the plainest possible
manner, I will here copy the testimony on column No. 1. pre
cisely as it is printed in the number of my memoirs, to which
the young General refers, and in which he says it has been
pervfirted, and opposite to it in No. 2, you will see the testimo
ny, as printed in the Report of the trial, with the same punctua
tion, as in each.

No. I.
Witness says, " That he
stood at the corner of the slip
leading to the gate of the fort,
and attempted to count the
British troops on entering the
fort; that the troops in ad
vance were the 41 3t regiment,
in platoons of fourteen files as
well as the York volunteers,
twenty-nine platoons, two
deep in red coats ; that the
militia platoons, which were

No. II.
"That witness stood at the
the corner ofa slip leading to
the gate of the fort, and at
tempted to count the British
troops on entering the fort —
that the troops in advance
were the 41st, in platoons of
.fourteen files, as well as the
York militia volunteers-twen
ty-nine platoons, two deep, in
red coats — that the militia
platoons consisted of no more

200

in the rear, consisted of no
more than seven or eight files,
and composed one third part
of the whole force, probably
seven hundred & fifty whites ;
of which the remaining two-
thirds were regulars and un
uniformed militia."

than seven or eight files, and
composed one third of the
whole force — probably seven
hundred and fifty whites— of
which the remaining two-
thirds were regulars and uni
form militia."

Witness says, agreeably to statement, " That the troops in
advance, were the 41st, (meaning regiment) in platoons of four
teen tiles, as well as the York militia volunteers-rfa* well as,
that is, the 41st regiment with the or as well as the York mili
tia volunteers) (York militia volunteers, militia of course, they
being volunteers) twenty-nine platoons, two deep, in red coats
— that the militia platoons (which were in the rear, certainly, as
the 41st regiment and the York militia volunteers were in ad
vance, as above stated) consisted of no more than seven or eight
files, and composed (what composed, why the militia platoons
composed) one third of the whole force — (one third of what, why
ofthe whole force) probably seven hundred and fifty whites^-
(who do these seven hundred and fifty whites refer to, why, to
one third ofthe whole force) of which the remaining two thirds
were regulars and uniform militia," (what does, of which refer
to, why to whole force) the remaining two thirds (one third
of the whole force, tieing seven hundred and fifty whites) the
other two thirds must of course have amounted to fifteen hun
dred whites, as twice seven hundred and fifty is equal, to fifteen
hundred ; and seven hundred and fifty being added to fifteen
hundred, makes the whole white force amount to two thousand
two hundred and fifty whites, as I have represented in my
memoirs, and now have actually demonstrated. It will there
fore read thus,
" That the troops in advance were the 41st regiment, in pla
toons of fourteen .files, as well as or with the York volunteers—
twenty-nine platoons, two deep, in red coats — that the militia
platoons, which were in the rear, consisted of no more than
seven or eight files, and composed one-third of the whole force,
probably seven hundred and fifty whites, of which the remain
ing two-thirds were regulars and uniform militia." Fron^ these
premises, I make the following calculation, That the number of
militia being seven hundred and fifty whites, which was one-

201
third of the whole while force and the remaining two-thirds,
which were regulars and uniform militia, and consisting of
course of fifteen hundred, inasmuch as the first third seven
hundred and fifty, gives therefore the aggregate white force,
the number of twenty two hundred and fifty men, as I have be
fore stated in my memoirs. Add to this only six hundred In
dians, which it is proved by the testimony of Lieutenant For
bush, before referred to, and which he states to have -counted
the day before the capitulation, and the whole number of the
enemy would amount to two thousand eight hundred and fifty
men. In my defence before the court martial, I merely referred to
that part of Major Snelling's testimony, where he mentioned
seven hundred and fifty whites, without considering it in con
nexion with the other part of it. In my memoirs I stated that
I had only two days allowed me to prepare my defence, and
arrange a mass of testimony which had occupied thirty-two
days in presenting to the court. I observed it was not so full
and intelligible, as it might have been, had more time been al
lowed me. Although however I may have stated the testimony
of Major Snelling, on my trial, as young General Dearborn has
represented I did, yet if any part of it were overlooked by me
at that time, which is susceptible of a construction on a less
hurried examination, to operate in my favour, a candid and lib
eral mind would at once concede, that it was not only my pre
rogative, but that, in justice to myself, it becomes my daty to
avail myself of it
I will now state to you the testimony of Major Jessup, who
was the Adjutant General of my army, as reported in my trial,
page 94, in these words, " Tiiat he had received a report from
different Adjutants of different corps, estimating the men fit for
action, and thinks that the amount exceeded one thousand men,
including the Michigan militia of four hundred, and the detach
ments absent with Colonels Cass and McArthur ; perhaps this
estimation includes the Michigan legion." — He likewise says,
" there were also on the evening of the 15th, about thirty or
forty armed wagonners." Young General Dearborn, in his de
fence, says, the Michigan legion consisted of one hundred.
After deducting these detachments, it will appear, that my
whole effective force on the day of the capitulation, did not
26

202
exceed but about six hundred men, agreeably to this testi
mony. By examining the testimony of Colonel Cass, as contained in
his memorable letter to the government, he states the effective
men fit'for duty on the 16th August at one thousand and sixty,
without including, as he says, a detachment to which he refers,
and the Michigan militia of three hundred, on duty. This
statement, you will perceive, is made thus minutely by a man,
who was absent at the river Raisin with Colonel McArthur on
the 16th, and could therefore only receive his information from
hearsay testimony, whereas the statement of Major Jessup, is
testimony furnished by an individual, the Adjutant General of
the army, and being present on the 16th testified both to what
he saw and heard on that day. The variance of their testimo
ny I will leave with you to reconcile or to discriminate between
them. From the above view, it appears, my force on the day
of the surrender was less than one third of the white force of
the enemy, and not a fourth of his whole force, consisting of
white men and Indians.
The manner in which young General Dearborn has given an
account of the numbers of my army renders it necessary, to
make some explanation of it He has extracted the whole num
ber in each regiment from a return, which was made at fort
Findley on the 17th of June, soon after the army commenced
its march in the wilderness — and has represented it in such a
way, as to induce you to believe, that the number he has men
tioned was present and fit for duty at the time of the surrender.
Young General Dearborn has been a military officer himself, and
must have known, that such a misrepresentation would have
deceived those unacquainted with military forms. He well
knew, when a Colonel makes a return of his regiment, he is
obliged to include in it, every officer and soldier, belonging to
it, whether present or absent, fit for duty or not fit for duty.
He had the rjturns before him, when he made the extract; why
then did he not publish those returns instead ofthe total aggre
gate? It is well known that the fourth regiment had been sta
tioned at post St. Vincennes and joined the militia regiments at
Urbanna a few days only before the army marched. All the
sick and non-effective men of the regiment, were left at that
post and many were debilitated on the march and did not join

203
the regiment at Detroit. When young General Dearborn was
stating a few lines only of Colonel Miller's testimony, ought he
not to have stated the Colonel's account of the numbers that
regiment contained ? If he had stated this account of the num
ber of that regiment, instead of four hundred and eighty-three,
it would have appeared that only two hundred and fifty or two
hundred and sixty were at Detroit and considered effective
men. By reference to page 111, of my trial, it appears that
when asked the strength of the fourth regiment, fit for duty on
the morning of the surrender, says, "There were about two
hundred and fifty or two hundred and sixty, effective for du
ty." General Dearborn then makes it appear, that in the three
Ohio regiments of militia, with the few dragoons there were fif
teen hundred and ninety-two men. This number is three hun
dred and ninety-two more than the President had ordered,
which number as has been stated, was twelve hundred, and I
had no authority to take any surplus under my command. The
Colonels, I presume at that, time, must have included this sur
plus of three hundred and ninety-two men, in their returns, in
order to obtain provisions for them in the wilderness, as it could
not be obtained in any other way. These men were volunteers,
who had joined- us at intervals on our march, and were not un
der my orders — they returned home whenever they pleased.
At the time of the capitulation, on the 16th August, young
General Dearborn includes all the straggling volunteers, all the
men of the fourth regiment'who were left at post St. Vincennes,
all that were left sick on the march, and all the Michigan mili
tia which were then scattered over a territory of five or six hun
dred miles in extent. If he had been desirous of presenting to
you a just statement of my effective force on the day of surren
der, he never could have exhibited the statement which he has
now attempted to impose upon you. MichilHmackinack, which
was a part of the territory and all the militia at that place
and the adjoining country, were in the hands of the enemy.
By a letter I received from Colonel Anderson, which I recited
in a former number, who commanded at the river Raisin, he re
quested me, not to order any militia from that place to Detroit,
but desired I should send re-enforcements and ammunition, for
the preservation of the settlements, against the savages. This
was at that time the largest settlement in the territory,, except-

204
ing the one at the Detroit river. Under the exposed condition
of that settlement, as stated by Colonel Anderson, no men were
ordered from that quarter to Detroit. Indeed, there were no
militia which could have been collected at Detroit, excepting
the few who resided on that river. By ascertaining what popu
lation was on the Detroit river, and the disposition that was
manifested by such of those as were with me on the 16th Au
gust, you will be enabled to form a judgment of their numbers
and what deperadence I could place on them. I was of the opin
ion, and I believe you will agree with me, there could have been
none at all. A part of them had joined the enemy at the Spring
Wells, and their Colonel informed me on the morning of the
16th, that the whole of them would do the same.
In our investigation, we ought always to make use ofthe best
evidence the nature of the case will admit In this case, the
return of the Adjutant General is the best evidence. I have
stated his testimony, given under oath, relative to my force on
the morning of the 16th of August, and he says, " that the num
ber of effective men, was about one thousand, including Mc
Arthur and Cass's detachments— "and by deducting them for
the reasons, which have been fully stated, my force would be
reduced to about six hundred men. Thus you see the mon
strous errours, which this son of General Dearborn has commit
ted in his solicitude to defend his father. To check his impet
uous ardour, the boundaries of truth have been no barrier, but
have been overleaped with as much facility^ as if straws only
had impeded his course.
it is a duty which I owe to myself and to a proper investiga
tion of the subject, to state the situation and inducements of the
witnesses, immediately after the surrender, but before the trial,
the testimony of whom is introduced to you by young General
Dearborn, that you may judge of the degree of credibility to
which each is entitled.
In the first place, I will introduce to you Colonel Cass, who
proceeded to Washington immediately after the capitulation,
and under the eye of the officers of the administration, address
ed a letter to the Seoretary of War, giving such an account of
the events of the campaign, as they, who were my prosecutors,
wished.

20fr
He was the first witness examined by the court Martial. All
the other witnesses were present, and attended to hear the tes
timony he gave. Refore he testified, he had been promoted
from the rank of a lieutenant colonel of militia, which he held
while under my command, to the rank of brigadier general in
the standing army, and by looking at the register of the regular
army at that time, it will be seen how many colonels of that
army were superseded, to make way for his promotion. When
he was on the stand, testifying, he had in his pocket, an addi
tional commission, as governour of the territory of Michigan,
which office, I had held for nine years, and my conduct had re
ceived the fullest approbation of the government If you will
examine the newspapers, devoted to the administration, around
the capital, at Albany, where the court martial was held, you
will there see, immediately after he testified, the manner in
which his testimony was applauded. When the young officers
who were left to follow him, perceived the distinguished favours
he had received, and the manner in which his testimony was
applauded in the newspapers, and being present and hearing
the testimony he had given, I ask you, whether, they did not
expect, that following the paths he had opened, they would
attain by the most direct course, similar favours and distinc
tions ?
Theletter which he had written to the Secretary of War, be
fore I was in a situation to communicate official information of
the event bas since been published by young General Dearborn,
in defence of his father. This letter, giving a minute account
of transactions, a knowledge of which he could only have ac
quired by hearsay, was not only received from a junior officer,
and published by the administration as an official letter, but
was sent by the same administration to the court martial, as
evidence against me, to prove capital charges, and has been re
corded in my trial ! ! By his own testimony, it appears that he
was absent at the time, and all the knowledge he had of the
transactions on the 14th, 15th, and 16th of August, as I before
observed, was mere hearsay evidence. ,
I ask you to compare the statements made in this letter, with
the testimony ofthe witnesses under oath, who were present, and
from whom he must have received his information. In his letter,
he says, after he returned to Detroit Major Jessup, the Adju-

206
tant General, informed him that my force on the morning of the
16th of August, was one thousand and sixty, and further says,
the detachment sent to the river Raisin, was not included in
that return. Major Jessup, the Adjutant General, says, he in
formed Colonel Cass of the return that morning, and that there
was about one thousand, and expressly says, that this detach
ment was included in the number. It would tire your patience
to point out all the variations of this letter from the testimony ;
I therefore leave the comparison with you, as the whole of the
letter, and the testimony of the Adjutant General, from whom
he says he received the information, have been published.
General McArthur, was a lieutenant colonel in my army,
and after the campaign, and before he gave in his testimony,
was appointed a Brigadier General in the regular army, without
having performed any service to entitle him to it, or ever hav
ing had any military experience, excepting while under my
command., The administration could certainly have had no
other motive in superseding all the colonels in the regular army,
in making this appointment, than to prepare him to testify a-
gainst me. Colonel Snelling, was a captain in my army, and
before he appeared as a witness against me, was promoted, and
soon after had a regiment given to him. The administration
never even instituted an inquiry into his conduct, for having
left his post at the Spring Wells, on the night of the 15th Au
gust, 1812, without orders, where General Brock landed the
morning after.
Major Whistler was a captain in my army. This officer was
a soldier in General Burgoyne's army, and deserted from it;
During the Indian war, while General St Clair commanded, he
enlisted in our army. Having been in the British army, he had
acquired some knowledge of the manual exercise, and was ap
pointed a sergeant : afterwards an ensign : and finally advanc
ed to the rank of captain. The President being informed of his
character and situation, refused him further promotion, although
he became entitled to it in regular succession. For a number
of years, younger officers superseded him. He submitted to
this degradation, and did not resign, according to usual custom
in such cases. At my trial his testimony was wanted by the
administration, and he was promoted to the rank of major, and
travelled from Ohio, in the midst of winter, to testify against

20T
me. He was certainly deeply indebted to the administration,
and did not fail in his testimony to make a suitable reward. He
ought, however, to have remembered, what would have been his
fate as a deserter, if I had not made particular provision, in the
capitulation, that all belonging to my army, should be protect
ed in their persons. Major Jessup, was a lieutenant in my
army. I appointed him brigade major, and acting adjutant gen
eral, with the brevet rank of major. After the campaign, but
before he presented himself as a witness against me on my trial,
he was appointed a colonel in the army, and afterwards, quar
ter master general, and is now quarter master general of the
United States. All the other witnesses, part only of whose tes
timony have been cited in the defence of General Dearborn,
who could be induced to testify against me, were patronized
and promoted, and prepared to follow General Cass, the princi
pal and leading character in the mock trial, under which I have
suffered. In considering the testimony of these witnesses, you
will find, that the principal part of it consists merely of their opin
ions, with regard to my declining the attack on Maiden, in re
treating from Sandwich, in not keeping open my communication
to Ohio, and in agreeing to the capitulation. The witnesses
ought not to have been suffered to have stated any thing but
facts, and it was the province of the court to have formed opin
ions, on those facts. By this mode of procedure the witnesses
became the judges, and the court was left in the degraded char
acter of being the organ of their opinions. I will now, fellow
citizens ask your patience a few moments, while I present to
you, from the reports of the trial, from which young General
Dearborn has made his extracts, a small part of the other evi
dence, which was given to the court martial, and will refer you
to the report of my trial for the whole of it. I will begin with
Colonel Miller's testimony. It is to be found in page 115. He
says, "that he saw nothing in my conduct on the 16th of Au
gust, which the fatigues I had undergone, and the responsibility
which was upon me, might not have produced." General Dear
born in defence of his father, has only cited a line or two of
Colonel Miller's testimony. It contains several pages, and I
refer the reader to the whole of it. It will be seen that Colonel
Miller, who was constantly with me, saw nothing in my con
duct, which the fatigue I had undergone, and the responsibility

208
which was upon me, might not have produced. And in his tes.-
timony afterwards, when particularly inquired of, could state
nothing but the surrender, which could have made any other
impressions. Colonel Miller was a witness, and not, a member
ofthe court martial; and it was his province as a witness, only,
to have stated facts. It was known that I had surrendered, and
the manner in which I had surrendered, and it was for the court
to have determined whether it was proper or not. His testimo
ny, therefore, must be considered favourable to me. I have
been the more particular in making these observations, because
they will apply to more than half the witnesses on the trial.
They stated nothing but the naked facts, that I refused to at
tack Maiden, that I retreated from Sandwich, that my commun
ication with Ohio was not kept open, and that I agreed to the
capitulation ; all of which was supported by their opinions only,
to prove that I was influenced by other considerations than a
sense of duty. On an investigation of the causes which led
to these events, the court martial was sitting in judgment, and
the opinion of witnesses ought not to have been admitted. —
Therefore it is unnecessary to be more particular in reciting
them. I will here state the testimony of Captain Bacon, who was
then an officer in the fourth regiment, page 124, report of the
trial. " Witness saw General Hull once on the 15th of August,
on the parapet and once on the 16th. He saw him also, in dif
ferent parts of the fort during the cannonade- General Hull
appeared engaged as iwual, and agitated more than usual on the
morning of the 16th, but witness does not know the (pause. He
had no suspicion that it proceded from personal fear, neither
did he hear any officers at the time express an opinion that it
did." The testimony of this officer was favourable to me ; he
received no favour, no promotion from the government. The
first opportunity that occurred when the army was reorganized.
Captain Bacon, though a valuable officer, was not even retained
in service. In page 131 of my trial, will be seen the testimony
of Major Munson, a major in one of the Ohio regiments. He
Says, "the General's situation was a critical one; he had a
great deal of responsibility and great care on his mind, if he
had any feelings. I saw nothiag in his conduct, but what
might be accounted for, without recurring to personal fear."

209
You will observe, fellow citizens, that the court martial ac
quitted me of the charge of treason, and every specification un
der it. My trial was delayed nearly two years, by the admin
istration, to hunt up testimony on that charge. Not even the
shadow of testimony could De found; not one act could be dis
covered, which afforded even the colour of proof. The clan of
witnesses, who had been patronized and promoted in the man
ner which has been shewn, were as ready to have given opinions
on this charge, as they were as to my personal appearance.
Both the administration, and the court martial thought it
would be too great an outrage, on established precedent, to found
a conviction on the opiitions of -witnesses alone, without proving
a single act in support of this charge. They believed the rea
sons, good sense and justice of mankind, in this enlightened
age, would revolt at such an attempt For this reason alone,
the ground was changed, and all the power of my prosecutors
was collected to a single point, to prove that I was under the
influence of personal fear. In searching the records, far back
in the dhys of ignorance and oppression, when the people were
not allowed even to think, some precedents were found, for the
admission of opinion on this charge. The witnesses therefore
were allowed to state their opinions, that! was under the in
fluence of personal fear, because I did not attack Maiden, be
cause i retreated from Sandwich, because I did not open any
communication with Ohio, because I agreed to the capitulation,
finally, because they tlwught there was the appearance of alter
ation in my countenance. It will be perceived that when I con
sidered it not expedient to attack Maiden; to retreat from
Sandwich, and to take measures for opening my communication
to Ohio, there was no enemy within eighteen miles of me, and
in reality, no appearance of immediate danger. When in the
exercise of my discretion and best judgment, I performed those
acts, was it proper for the court to take the opinions of witnes
ses, with respect to the motives which induced me to adopt
them ? Was it not their province alone to determine the pro
priety of these acts ? I ask, whether the court did not give up
its prerogative to the witnesses, when their opinions on these
military acts were admitted as evidence? for what purpose
were their opinions admitted ? Certainly for no other, than to
prejudice the minds of the cottrt, and induce it to pronounce
97

210
judgment against me. If then the judgment of the court wafl
grounded on the opinions of the witnesses, the witnesses might
as well have been the court, and have themselves pronounced
sentence. I will here present to you some extracts from a cele
brated English historian, who gives an account of the trial of
Lord George Sackville, who was tried for misconduct at the
battle of Minden.
Doctor Smollet, the historian, having stated that some testi
mony was given to prove that when certain orders were deliver
ed to Lord George, he was alarmed to a very great degree, and
seemed in the utmost confusion, subjoins remarks, from which
the following are extracts. "The candid reader will of him
self determine, whether a man's heart is to be judged by any
change of his complexion. Granting such a change to have
happened ; whether it was likely that an officer who had been
more than once in actual service, and behaved without reproach,
so as to attain an eminent rank in the army, should exhibit
symptoms of fear or confusion, when in reality there was no
appearance of danger. With regard to the imputation of cow
ardice levelled at Sir George, by the unthinking multitude, and
circulated with such industry and clamour, we ought to consid
er it as a mob accusation, which the bravest of men, even the
Duke of Marlborough could not escape.. We ought to view it
as a dangerous suspicion, which strikes at the root of character,
and may blast that honour in a moment, which the soldier has
acquired in a long course of painful services, and at the contin
ual hazard of his life. We ought to distrust it as a malignant
charge, altogether inconsistent with the former conduct of the
person accused."
In the application of the observations of this historian to my
situation I hope, without the appearance of vanity, under cir
cumstances which have taken place, I may ask your attention
to the actual service, and the dangers I was called to encounter
during 'he war of the revolution ? From an examination of the
history of that period, from authentic accounts, documents, and
other evidence, which have been' recently published, and from
the knowledge of many of my associates in those memorable
conflicts, who are now living, the manner in which I conducted
may be made known to you ; you may be made acquainted with
the numerous battles in which I was engaged, and the approba*

211
tion of my conduct on every occasion, by the illustrious leader^
of our armies ; on the other hand, there is now presented to
you the events of an after period. The plan of the campaign
of 1812 has been laid before you ; the part which I acted in it
has been fully unfolded. The character of the army I com
manded has been explained ; the orders I received have been
recited, and the object of the government, with regard to the
conquest of Upper Canada, and the manner in which I com
menced offensive operations from Detroit, in conformity to my
orders, have been spread before you. You have likewise before
- you, the orders which General Dearborn received from the gov
ernment dated as early as the 26th June, eight days after the
declaration of war,, to form two armies, to co-operate with me,
in the invasion of Upper Canada, agreeably to his own plan of
the campaign, and the manner in which he obeyed those orders,.
That I was not only left alone and unassisted, but that he a-
greed to an armistice, which enabled General Brock with the
whole force of Canada to march against me ; and that he made
this armistice, when, as appears by his letter of 7th August, to
the Secretary of War, only one day before, he acknowledges
he had been informed that troops were marching to Maiden,
from Niagara, against me. In addition to this force from the
east, Michilimackanack had fallen, and the forces in that quar
ter were bearing upon me ; Chicago had fallen, and the savages
from the west were pressing forward ; the road I had opened
from Ohio was closed by hostile savages, and the lake was shut
against me by the British navy. Being not only the General of
the army but the Governour of the territory, I ask you to re
flect on my situation at the time, when General Brock landed
with a force more than three times superiour to mine, and in
vaded our territory — to consider the scattered situation of the
inhabitants of the country — that it was impossible for me to af
ford them protection ; under these circumstances your views
will no doubt accord with the testimony of Colonel Miller, and
many others of the witnesses on my trial, who stated "that
they saw nothing in my conduct, but what the responsibility of
my situation, and the fatigue I had undergone, might occasion."
And when you further consider, how deeply interested, not on
ly the administration, but the president of the court martial
were in the result^ of my trial, and likewise the manner i)nt

112

which the witnesses had been trained by patronage and promo
tion, before they appeared as witnesses against me, the inform
ality in receiving their testimony in the presence of each other,
the admission of opinions, in lieu of direct testimony as to facts,
I most willingly appeal to your judgment, for an approbation
of my conduct,

No. XXXVII.

Yo^ng General Dearborn has published a number of my let
ters to the Secretary of War, and you will see by the dates of
many of them, they were written while I was in the state of
Ohio, and before I had any knowledge of thedeclaration of war.
In answer to his strictures on those letters, I will observe that
I expressed my honest feelings of the opinion I entertained, of
the character of the citizens of Ohio. That they manifested a
praiseworthy spirit, and had volunteered their services, with a
promptitude and energy which was highly honourable to them.
I further observed, " that the army was in high spirits, and
animated with a laudable zeal," and in another letter observed,
" that the patriotism and perseverance, with which this army
has sustained a march, attended with difficulties, uncommon in
their nature, does honour to themselves and their country."
These expressions of approbation, I then thought, and now think
were due to them. — I knew, and therefore said nothing of their
discipline, military experience, or subordination.
It will be recollected in the letter of the Secretary of War to
me, of the 9th of April, the force, which I was to command, was
described, and the object of my command then stated. The
force was twelve hundred militia, and the fourth United States
regiment — The object was the security of the Michigan terri
tory, and the protection of the exposed frontier settlements from
the Indians. This force I stated to the government, was suffi
cient for this purpose in time of peace. It would, therefore,
have been wrong for me, to have asked for a larger force under
those circumstances.

213
I stated likewise, the amount of my force and the number*
which had joined the army, after I commenced my march
through the wilderness. I have explained to you the manner,
in which this force was formed. I stated that I considered it
sufficient to oppose any force of Indians which could be brought
' against me.
After the declaration of war, and after the desertion of some
of the militia, I wrote to the Secretary, that although I might
take Maiden, yet I thought it would be attended with too great
a sacrifice. In reflecting on the expediency of attacking the
regular constructed fort at Maiden, defended by British troops,
I could not call to my mind a single instance duringthe revolu
tionary war, where militia had successfully marched up to, and
carried regular fortifications. I expressed it as my opinion,
which was also concurred in by a council of war, that we had
better wait until heavy cannon could be provided-^-my calcula
tion was made, and my communications to the government were
founded on the force, which was then at Maiden, and the addi
tions which probably would be made to that force.
Had not the post at Maiden been re-enforced in any other
manner than I had reason to expect, in the common occurren
ces of war, my opinion then was and now is, that I should have
been able to have sustained my situation at Detroit, provided,
I had been assisted from Ohio, in opening my communication,
in such a manner as to have received supplies.
It will, however, be observed, that I stated in one of the let
ters, quoted by young General Dearborn, that the force at Mai
den, in point of numbers, was superiour to mine. And if one
part of my letter is recited to operate against me, the other part
ought certainly to be entitled »to equal credit. There is no
doubt, fellow citizens, that the force ordered for my command,
was sufficient for the protection of the frontier settlements,
against the Indians, in time of peace, under all the excitements
which could have been made, which, as I was informed by the
government, was the object, for which it was ordered. — And
further, in my opinion, it would have been sufficient not only
to have defended our territory, but successfully to have com
menced offensive operations against Upper Canada, had the
communication of the lake been preserved by a navy, and had
fhe commanding General prepared suitable armies from Niaga-

214
ra to have co-operated with it, instead of having, at a critical
moment agreed by an armistice, to act only on the defen
sive, and thereby leave the whole force of the province to ope
rate against it. It will be distinctly remembered, that when I
informed the government that Maiden might be taken with the
forces under my command, I observed in the same letter it
would be attended with too great a sacrifice. After having
made this communication, " that it was my opinion it would be
attended with too great a sacrifice,''' and that opinion having been
approved by the President, I submit to your judgment, whether,
under those circumstances, I could have been authorized to
have made the attempt, without a positive order for the purpose.
The son of General Dearborn has endeavoured to make the
impression, that my complaint ofthe court martial, in not suf
fering counsel to appear in my defence, was without any foun-
' dation. It is true, when I informed the court of the names of
the gentlemen I wished to employ as my counsel, the request
appeared to be granted. When the trial commenced, and the
gentlemen attempted to examine the witnesses, they were in
formed, that they would not be permitted to examine the wit
nesses, speak to any collateral question of law, which might
arise in the trial, or to the final question, whether- by the evi
dence, I was guilty or not At the same time, Mr. Dallas, and
Mr. Van Buren had been employed by my prosecutors (the ad
ministration) to assist the army Judge Advocate, and allowed
to examine the witnesses, speak to all questions of law, and to
the final question, whether I was guilty of the charges or not,
and I was not permitted to reply in any manner whatever, to the
application of the testimony, and the arguments, which were
made use of, to enforce it against me. Of what use was this
apparent candour, in consenting that I might employ counsel ?
Without the permission of the court, I had a : right to ask the
advice of any counsellors, that I chose to employ. It is true,
the court did not post centihels at my door, and prevent me
from consulting with them, neither did they prevent them from
writing any questions, and handing them to me, to be proposed
to the witnesses. All this they certainly would have had a
right to have done, without the permission of the court.
It would have been too great an outrage, for the court to have

215
determined, that no one should be permitted to write for me, m-
advise with me.
There could have been no mode of executing an order of this
kind, but confining me in a dungeon. Throughout the whole
trial, the order of the court, that my counsel should not be per
mitted to speak in its presence, was rigidly adhered to. It fre
quently happened, in the course of the trial, that questions of
law arose, with respect to the admission of testimony, and on
other subjects. Feeling myself incompetent to the discussion
of these legal questions, the law was explained by the Special
Judge Advocate, who was employed and paid by my prosecu
tors, and adopted by the court, according to his explanation.
It must be obvious, that the manner in which it was admitted
could have been of no use to me. As the administration had
employed special counsel to assist the Judge Advocate in the
prosecution, the court was not willing, in direct terms, to deny
my request. It was however granted in a manner, only to save
appearances, but not to be of the least use to me.
I now ask, whether the scales of justice, held by the hand of
General Dearborn, the president of the court martial, were
equally balanced in this case ? My right to employ counsel
was founded on the liberal principles of our government, and.
particularly\m our constitution, which is the highest law of the
land. I need only appeal to your own sense of justice and right,
follow citizens, for you to confirm the reasonableness of a re
quest, to be allowed the same assistance of counsel, in the full
est extent, where not only life, but character, which is dearer
than life, is depending on' the issue of the trial, as is admitted
in the most trifling trespass, or question of property, before any
of the courts in our country. The argument, fellow citizens,
in favour of my right to counsel, to assist me, in showing my
innocence, and defending my life and reputation, is founded
on that constitution, which is the work of your own hands, and
is your unalienable inheritance.
The precedent, by which the arguments urged by young Gen
eral Dearborn are supported, is founded on a practice, estab
lished in the dark ages of tyranny and oppression, when the
people were considered as having no rights, and their lives, lib
erty, reputation and property, were at the disposal of the

21b
'will ofa tyrant. It is for you to judge, on which side is tlnft
¦weight of argument, and on which side the scales of justice pre
ponderate. In the defence of General Dearborn, the testimony of Captain
Whistler is recited, with respect to provisions. In one of my
numbers, I have informed you of the character and situation of
this officer. Admitting however, his testimony to be true, with
yespect to the barrels of provisions in the store, which he says
he counted, if you will only take the trouble of calculating the
number of rations they would make, and the time when he
counted them, and compare it with the issues previous to that
time, which have been stated by the contractor, you will find it
only would have lasted to about the 16th of August, the day of
the capitulation. This statement you will find, is correct by
mathematical calculation. This witness has likewise stated the
the number of cannon, small arms, powder and ball, at the
fort. In reply I will only observe, that a part of these cannon were
left by the British, when the fort was delivered to us, by virtue
of the treaty of peace, being principally without carriages, and
were considered as useless. Others were left with the small
arms and powder, by General Wayne's army which was dis
banded at Detroit after the Indian war, and all the carriages
were rotten, and the small arms ate up with rust and not worth
repairing. The powder remained so long a time in the store
that it had lost all its strength, and was no better than ashes.
I should be wanting in duty to myself, did I not make some re
ply to that part of the defence which relates to the Indians. —
I refer you, fellow citizens, to the 3d* number of my memoirs,
in which I recited a letter, which I wrote to the Secretary of
War on that subject. In that letter the character, habits, and
predominant passions of the Indians are described. I informed
the government that in the event of war, the sachems and chiefs
would advise the warriours to take no part in it but gave it as
my opinion in the most explicit manner, that their authority
over them would not be able to restrain them. The policy of
our government was not to employ them. As soon as I took
the command of the army, I sent messages to their villages and
advised them, in the event of war, to remain quiet in their wig
wams, and take no part in the contest, in which they could

217
h»ve no interest Tlio old sachem chiefs, called in council*,
and advlneil the warriours to this policy. Their advice and au
thority had no effect, and nx I was not authorized Vlo employ
them, they all joined the llritiHh mtandard.
Their conduct wa» precisely Much, n.% I had predicted to the
govern ment, and there whh nothing, which could huve made it
dilibrenl, but nn invitation to them to join our standard, which
I hail no authority to give.
Young General Dearborn has pulil'mhod the names of tho of
ficer* who com pimed the court martini, with his father at the
head,, am president. It required two-thirds only of tho mem-
bci'H, to pronounce the, sentence. It is very certain, that it was
not unnniinouii, as it is said two-thirds of the members agreed
to it. Had it been unanimous it would have been ho stated.
It must bo evident, Hint a purl of the court were opposed to it.
I should bo happy i nil ood, were it in my power, to designate
tho characters, who wore only influenced, by disinterested and
honourable motives.
I have stated tho reason* why I did not object to the presi
dent or any of the members of this court martial. I hod been
much more than a year, a prisoner in arrest, was conicious of
having faithfully done my duty, and in my official communica
tion In the government, requested hii investigation of my con
duct. It had been delayed in an unprecedented manner, dur
ing this long time, and I believed, had I made objections to the
president or any membar* of the court, it would have caused
further dolay. Besides, most of the members of the court wore
strangers to mo; men, whom I never before had soon, and
whose names I had never heard, excepting General Dearborn,
General Hloomlield, Colonel Fenwick, Colonel House, and
Lieutenant Colonel Conner.
By examining the list, published by young Genornl Deurborn
you will perceive, the other members belonged to new raised regi
ments which did not exist, during the campaign of lOl'J. They
were appointed to regiments numbered from thirty-two to forty-
two. They hud no military rank at that, time.
fl. is well known, that officers were selected to form these ad
ditional regimen U, from the most violent partizans of the ad-
miniHiratinii, ami this alone wns a »ufllcieni qualification. Of
ficers of tliii description constituted u majority of the court.

118
They were pledged to any measures, which the administration^
my prosecutors, wished. With respect to General Dearborn,
the president, the deep interest which he had in the issue of
the trial, has been presented to you.
Genenl Bloomfield was a meritorious officer of the revolu-
tion| and served with credit to himself. He was an amiable
and much respected citizen at the termination of the revolution
ary war, and I believe retained the esteem of society to the
•close of his life. He is now numbered among the dead, with
many others, his compatriots in arms — and in the presence of
that Judge, who examines the motives as well as the actions of '
men— and before whose tribunal we must all appear. — May he
rest in peace !
Colonel Fenwitk and Colonel House, I have ever believed were
governed by the purest and most honourable motives, and were
under no other influence, than a sense of duty. Under this in
fluence, whatever may have been their opinions, I shall ever re
spect them as honourable men. Lieutenant Colonel Conner
received his commission about the time that General Dearborn
was appointed the first Major General. It was obtained by his
patronage. He was in his family, and one of his aids de camp.
But a short time before the court martial was ordered he was
promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel by the same patron
age, and selected as a member of the court for my trial. T»
the president of the court martial, he owed both his first ap
pointment, and his sudden promotions.
Any comments from e, appear unnecessary.
When you consider, that the court martial was composed of
a majority of officers selected from the additional regiments,
not in service until after the campaign of 1812, and when you
reflect on the conditions on which officers were appointed at
that time, that they must be zealous supporters of every meas
ure of the administration and subservient to the wishes of its
officers and of its commanding General, as an indispensable
qualification to promotion, and how deeply interested that ad
ministration, who became my prosecutors, were, in fixing the
disasters of the campaign on me, I am persuaded you cannot
be at a loss to declare the motives which prompted the sentence
of two- third- of a court martial, thus selected and thus organ
ised. When you further consider, that this court martial re-

219
ceived the opinions of witnesses on great military operations,
who never had any military experience, and many of whom
from the evidence now presented, you must be satisfied, were
deeply interested in my condemnation, you must be sensible,
that little or no credit ought to be given to their testimony.
From the sentence of such a court martial, whose judgment was
formed on testimony like this — -I have appealed to the highest
tribunal on earth, whose decision I am convinced will be found
ed on impartial justice. In answer to my animadversions on
the proceedings of the court martial and the evidence I have
produced, to show the deep interest which the president and
some of the members had in the issue of the trial, and the mo-
• tives which must have influenced, nearly the whole of them, he
has extracted from ray defence an observation which I then
made, expressive of my confidence in that court martial. ¦ As
this is his last effort and seems to be his dernier resort, in de
fence of his father, it becomes necessary to furnish its true ex
planation. By an examination of the extract, it will be seen,
that it is qualified by this remark, 'that there has been some
departure from accustomed forms.' Nothing is more evident,
for the just construction ofa sentence, than that the whole of it
ought to be taken into one view, with the circumstances under
which it is made. Having stated the manner in which I lost
all my papers which related to the campaign, it is well known,
that I had no documents at my trial, excepting such copies
from the records of the government as my prosecutors thought
proper to furnish. In my repeated applications to the govern
ment, I requested to be furnished with copies of all the docu
ments which had any relation to the campaign. None were furn
ished, excepting such as it was thought would operate most strong
ly against me. In my defence, it may be seen, in what manner I
applied for particular documents, which I shewed were deposit
ed in the War Office, and the reasons which were offered, why
they were not furnished. The letters from the Secretary of
War to General Dearborn, containing the orders to him to co
operate with me, his letters to the Secretary and all the letters
relating to the armistice were withheld, and I was consequently
deprived of the use of their contents. All I then knew, was
that such arrangements had been made, but on what principles,
- by whose authority, and for what reasons, were unknown to me,

220
asTcould give" so explanation, and my prosecutors did not
think proper to present them in evidence, it was impossible for
me to avail of testimony so highly important to me. The evi
dence both with respect to co-operation and the armistice, being
withheld from me, it was impossible for me to know, how deep
ly General Dearborn was interested in the result of my trial. —
It now seems, however, by General Dearborn's own statement
to the Secretary of War, that he entered into the armistice,
when at the same moment, Adjutant General Baynes had in
formed him, that Michillimackanack had fallen into the hands
of the British, and consequently when he must have known that
an additional force of the enemy, with the tribes of Indians from
the north would thereby be spared to act against me. Being
blindfolded and kept in ignorance of the deep designs of my
prosecutors, I expressed what is well understood to be a gener
al custom in similar cases— a generous confidence in a tribunal
of my peeks as I had considered them, from the badges by
which they were distinguished. Since that period, evidence
has been furnished which unfolds circumstances connected with
the campaign, and exhibits in colours, which never can beef-
faced, the causes of its disasters and misfortunes. Those ex
pressions therefore, made under the state of things which then
existed, young General Dearborn is at furf liberty to grasp,
among the many other shadows he so eagerly aims to seize.
It is our duty to respect all the public institutions of our
country, and feel a liberal confidence in characters, elevated to
the seats of justice— we ought to presume they are unspotted,
and free from any undue bias and influence, until the contrary
appears. I will endeavour to illustrate these considerations, by exam
ples in our civil courts which you see every day practised.
What is more common, than for an advocate at the bar, to ex
press his confidence in the justice and integrity ofthe court and
jury, before which a cause is tried, either of a criminal or civil
nature, involving life, reputation or property, to acknowledge
there has been a patient trial, and to express his gratitude for
the impartiality with which it has been conducted ? But when
sentence has been pronounced by the court, if it afterwards
appears that the Chief Justice, or other judges, or the foreman
or any of the jurors* had.a deep interest in the cause, or had

221
been improperly tampered with, I ask, whether on an appeal
from such a sentence, or on a new trial, before another trib nal,
it was ever contended, that the sentence was just and ought not
to be reversed, because, forsooth, the advocate at the first trial
made such acknowledgments and expressed such gratitude, as is
above supposed. I will not insult your understandings, fellow-
citizens, by dwelling further on a point so clear and familiar to
the most inexperienced among you, but will leave this with
many other such strong holds of the young General, for you to
make your own deductions
The prodigal use of epithets too disgusting for repetition,
which adorn the pages of young General Dearborn, in defence
of his father, carry with them their own antidote, and are en
titled to no further notice from me ; such language is the usual
substitute, where a cause is deficient of argument or truth for
its support ; this defence of General Dearborn, with my appeal
to your candour and impartiality, are now submitted by your
fellow citizen, WILLIAM HULL.
Newton, August 30th, 1824.

No. XXXVIII.

&nce the publication of my reply to the attempt of the son
of General Dearborn, to defend the conduct of his father, I
have obtained some new evidence on the subject of the armis
tice, which I shall present for your consideration in this num
ber. This evidence consists of the letters of Sir George Pre
vost to General Brock, a few days before the armistice took
place, during its continuance, and after its operation ceased. It
is contained in a pamphlet, entitled, "Some account of the
Public Life of the late Lieutenant General Sir George Prevost,
Bart, particularly of his services in Canada ; London, publish-
edby Cadell,&c. 1823," and will be found in pages 37, 38, 39,
40, and 41. It is stated in the defence of General Dearborn,
by his son, that " no troops, or military supplies, were sent to
the relief of fort Maiden, from any post below, during the tem
porary armistice, and that General Brock, did not even know-

222
that one had been agreed upon, until he returned to fort Eriey
on the Niagara, after the capture of General Hull and his army,
and that so far from neglecting the situation of General Hullr
every precaution was taken by General Dearborn, to render
the arrangement, not only not injurious, but advantageous to
him." To prove that troops had been sent, from Niagara to
Maiden a few days before the armistice was agreed to, and
while it was in operation, I have produced the letters of Gene
ral Dearborn, to the Secretary of Mar and to General Van
Rensselaer, who commanded on the Niagara river. By these
letters, it appears, that General Dearborn had a perfect know
ledge, that re-enforcements had marched against me, when he
signed the armistice. Although on this point, I believe the
evidence I have offered, is satisfactory to you, yet as this unau
thorized measure was so essentially the cause of the disasters
of my army, it is desirable to remove every doubt, if any exists
in the mind ofa single individual.
• In page 37, of this pamphlet, it is stated, " that Sir George
Prevost, upon the receipt of despatches from Mr. Foster, ac
quainting him, with the proposed repeal of the orders in council,
by the British government, immediately opened a communica
tion with Major General Dearborn, commanding the American
forces, on the frontiers of Lower Canada, for the purpose of
concluding an arioistice, until the Congress should determine
upon the proposals, transmitted to them by Mr. Fosler. An
armistice of about three weeks did accordingly take place."
The advantages are then stated, which this armistice gave to Sir
George Prevost; that a regiment had arrived from the West
Indies ; and after the armistice was concluded, and during the
continuance of it, considerable re-enforcements of men and sup
plies, were forwarded to Upper Canada, where they arrived, be
fore the resuming of hostilities, and materially contributed, to
wards defeating the attempts, which were made by the enemy
to invade that province. It is. then stated, that intelligence
was sent to General Brock, which must have reached him at
Amherstburg, (that is, Maiden,) while he was at that place.
It is then further stated, that " Sir George Prevost despatched
a private letter, to General Brock ofthe 2d of August, 1812,
six days before the proposed armistice was concluded, and upon
the subject of it." In a letter, addressed to General Brock,

223
ef the 30th of August, 1812, he quotes the opinion of his majes
ty's government, on the subject of the defensive system, in
these words :
"The King's Government, having most unequivocally ex
pressed to me, their desire to preserve peace with the United
'States, that they might uninterruptedly pursue, with the whole
disposable force ofthe country, the great interests committed to
them in Europe, I have endeavoured to be instrumental in the
accomplishment of those views. He then says in this same let--
ter, " But I consider it most fortunate, to have been enabled to do
¦so without interfering with your operations on the Detroit, j
have sent you men, money, and stores of every kind." Here are
quoted the identical words of Sir George Prevost to General
Brock, on the subject of the armistice, and the operations on
the Detroit river. Thus fellow citizens, I have not only fur
nished you with the letters of General Dearborn, to the Secre
tary of War, and to General Van Rensselaer, that a few days
before he agreed to the armistice, and during the continuance
of it, that troops had been sent to Maiden, from Niagara, but
have now established the same facts, by the letters of Sir George •
' Prevost, who commanded the British army in the Canadas —
and have likewise established this most important fact, that as
early as the 2d of August, six days before the armistice was
toncluded, that a private letter was sent to General Brock, by
Sir George Prevost, giving him information on the subject of
the armistice. — On the evidence before offered, in addition to
this, I ask you to consider on. what grounds young General
Dearborn could have made the assertion contained is the de
fence of his father ?
The evidence, which I have presented in this and my former
numbers, must exhibit, in the most decided manner, the effects
which this measure had on my operations. It now becomes a
very serious inquiry, what were the motives of General Dear
born's conduct ?
It cannot be presumed that he acted without motives. His
own acknowledgement, that he had no authority to agree to a
cessation of arms, is the best evidence which can be adduced,
that he consented to a measure which his duty did not warrant,
and for which he had no authority; a measure not founded in
nplicy or expediency ; because he says in his letter fo the Se-

»224
wetary of War. that he had no expectation his government
would consent to it.
Genera! Dearborn had formed the plan of the campaign, and
well knew the time and manner in which the invasion of Upper
Canada had been made by the troops under my command. He
likewise knew the progress I had made in the execution of his
own plan, and the manner in which the operations on the De
troit river bad been approved by the President. — Having him
self neglected to make preparations at Niagara, and being hard
pressed by the President to order his troops to attack the ene
my's posts, and co-operate with me ; what does he say ? I ask
you to look at his letter of the 28th of July, to the Secretary of
War, recited by the son in defence of his father ? Yoq will
find, he appeared to be in a state of amazement and the first
sentence of it is, "" Who is to command the operations in Upper
Canada f This was a critical crisis. By the positive com
mands he had received, he must have ordered the troops at Ni
agara to have invaded Upper Canada, and co-operated with my
forces, or made some arrangement for an excuse, for not obey
ing these positive commands In this situation, to prevent the
possibility of co-operating and affording me any assistance, what
did he do ? In a few days after he agreed to the armistice, in
which he pledged himself, that the troops he commanded,
should not make the invasion, and should not co-operate with
my forces. Under these facts, the motives by which he was in
fluenced, I do think must be too plain to be misunderstood ; es
pecially when considered in connection with his conduct as
president of the court martial by which I was tried.
It must be satisfactory evidence, that his measures were re
gulated by what he believed to be his own private interest
whatever might be the sacrifice, regardless of the public good.
By the arrangements he had made, and afterwards by the pro
ceedings of the court martial, of which he was president, he be
lieved that he had supported himself on my ruins : that by this
measure, he had disqualified himself from renderiiig me any
assistance and had left all the forces in Canada in a situation to
march against me.
My object, you will perceive, is to furnish you with evidence
which will remove all doubts from your minds, with resprit to
the motives of his conduct in relation to me ; from the view I

225
nave already taken ofthe subject I may now ask you, with pro
priety, whether he did not consider any means justifiable which
would have a tendency to accomplish the end. Our actions are
influenced by our dispositions; any other part of his conduct
therefore, which will show the disposition of his heart, will not
be considered as irrelevant to the present subject. His account
of the battle of Bunker Hill was written and published in the
year 1818. His object in writing and publishing this account,
must be evident. His conduct during the war, in which he
was nominally considered as the first General, had lowered him
to a scale of degradation, which was mortifying to his own van
ity and pride. The principal achievements which he perform
ed during his command, were the armistice which occasioned
the disasters of my army ; his services as president of the court
martial for my destruction ; and his expedition against York, in
Upper Canada, where he remained in his vessel on the lake be-
, yopd the range of cannon shot, whence he viewed the gal
lant and unfortunate General Pike, land his troops, ascend the
bank, take possession of the town, and perish with many of his
brave troops, by the explosion of a magazine of powder, pre
pared for the purpose. After this explosion he landed in safe
ty, and obtained a scalp, which he preserved as a trophy of vic
tory. For these exploits he was retained .in service, with his
rank and emoluments, until peace was established; but in the
degraded situation of seeing junior Generals appointed to all
the important commands. Not having performed a single act,
while commanding General, which entitled him in your estima
tion to the station he had held, or to the least distinction in so
ciety ; he remembered, that he was in the battle of Bunker Hill,
and that you were disposed to give great credit to those who
acted a part on that important and memorable occasion.
His account of the battle was forty-three years after the event
took place, and essentially different from any other which be
fore had been published. He says, that General Ward, the
commander in chief of the American army, took no interest or
part in the transactions of the day ; and that General Putnam,
who was the senior officer on Bunker Hill, behaved like a
"coward," and was entitled to no credit for his conduct ; that
nothing saved him from trial and censure but his extraordinary
popularity, and it was afterwards thought mysterious why Col-

22C
onel Gerrish Was made the "scape goat." The circumstance*
of this battle are an important part of your history, and it is de
sirable, indeed, that the facts relating to it should be handed
down to posterity as they existed, in truth. It is evident that
his object in publishing this account was to influence you to be
lieve that General Putnam was a coward, and persuade you to
give himself a great share in the glory. Hereafter this subject
will be more fully considered. •
I will now return to the considerations more immediately
connected with the subject ofthe campaign of 1812.
The letters published in the volume, to which I have refer
red, from the British government to Sir George Prevost, and
his letters to General Brock, distinctly show the views of that
government, with respect to the war, which Congress had de-
clared. The instructions to the British commander in Canada were
to act on the defensive. — In these instructions it was stated that
the great interests in Europe, required all the strength and re
sources of the British nation. Under these circumstances, ne
measure would have been so favourable for the defence of Can
ada as delay; nothing could have operated so effectually to
have produced delay, as an armistice. Its advantage to our
enemy are forcibly pointed out in the volume to which I have
referred. Our situation was totally different — to us it was a favourable
moment for active offensive operations. To both belligerents
it could not have been favourable. The acknowledgment -by
the British commander that it was most advantageous to him, is
certainly good evidence that it must have been injurious to us.
His advantages were our losses.
In must be obvious that delay must be advantageous to am
army whose object is defensive operations; and injurious to one
acting on the contrary system. Had the armistice been general,
considering the objects ofthe war, and the circumstances ofthe
armies, it would have given advantages to the enemy, and been
injurious to us. — Under the partial circumstances it was agreed
to, (a part of our army not being included in it,) no measure
Could have been more fatal. The terms of it were such, as ren
dered all the British posts from Quebec to lake Erie perfectly
safe, during its continuance. It is perfectly understood, that

227
the forces I commanded on the Detroit river had no participa
tion in it ; and it is now proved by the letters of Sir George
Prevost, to General Brock, that there were no provisions con
tained in it, which prevented the British commander from send
ing troops, warlike stores, and supplies of every kind, to re-en
force and assist the army operating against me
This fact is so important, fellow citizens, that I must ask
you to permit me to repeat the evidence of it contained in Sir
George Prevost's letter to General Brock. Speaking of his in
structions, and of the defensive system, he says, " I have en
deavoured to be instrumental in accomplishing the views of my
government; but I consider it most fortunate to have been ena
bled to do so, without interfering with your operations on the
Detroit. — I have sent you, men, money, and stores of every kind."
— Thus you have before you, the evidence, not only that Sir
George Prevost considered himself authorized, notwithstanding
the armistice, to send re-enforcements and supplies of every
kind to General Brock, but that he actually did send them to him
cr the lime, and during its continuance.
You likewise have before you, fellow citizens, the letter of
General Dearborn to the Secretary of War, written a few days
before he made the armistice ; and his letter to General Van
Rensselaer, during its continuance, giving information that
troops had been sent from Niagara to re-enforce the garrison at
Maiden ; and also the letter of Colonel Cass, to prove, that
about the 10th of August four hundred regular troops had act
ually arrived at Maiden as a re-enforcement. You likewise
now have the additional proof of Sir George Prevost's letter to
General Brock, that it was most fortunate that his defensive
system had not interfered with his (General Brock's) operations
at Detroit and stating that he had sent him troops, money, and
supplies of every kind, during the continuance ofthe armistice.
On the other hand you have the naked round assertion of the
son of General Dearborn, that no troops were sent at that-time,
as re-enforcements to that place. If the letters of his father
and the British commander are to be believed, his assertion can
not be true. It might be some consolation if he could plead
ignorance. That is impossible, because in the same paper j|n
which he made the assertion that no troops were sent from Nia
gara to re-»»forc# fi« army at Mald#n, be published Jjjs father's

228
letters to the Secretary of War, and General Van Rensselaer,
giving them the information, and advising General Van Rensse
laer to be prepared to take advantage of the reduced situation
of the enemy at Niagara, when the armistice should be over.
Thus he manifested his wishes by furnishing evidence which
proved his assertions to be false ; and something still worse, by
making an assertion, which by the evidence in his possession
he knew was not true — it therefore must be considered as a
wilful misrepresentation.
I make use of no epithets, or abusive language, to excite a
prejudice against him ; I state facts, and produce the evidence
of their truth ; I only ask you to make such inferences, as must
naturally follow from the facts, and to give him such a charac
ter, and such a name as he deserves. No ! I will not even ask
this ! Unfortunate man ! My only request is, that you would
pity and forgive him ! — " Honour your father" is the command
of God. Obedience to this command, he says, has been the
most painful act of his life. He must remember it was his own
act, and however painful, it was caused by his own weakness
and passions. It is hoped, it will be a useful lesson to him in
future life, and teach him the importance of regulating his con
duct, by reason and truth. Having asked your forgiveness for
him, I freely offer him mine, because I believe he was so ex
cited by passions that " he knew not what he did."
Had he come forward in an honourable manner, and attempt
ed to have proved, by evidence and fair argument that his
father had no interest in the event of my trial, and that the pro
ceedings against me were just, I should have met him only with
the same weapons of evidence, and of argument. But since he
has adopted a different course, and has grounded his defence on
the proceedings of a court martial, over which his interested
father presided, and on those proceedings alone, without any
other evidence, has endeavoured to calumniate and continue
your prejudices against me, I feel myself justified, and I have
the pleasure to believe you will be of the opinion, that I am jus
tified, in the few personal remarks, which I have here made.
From the proceedings of that court martial I have now
appealed, to a fair, independent, and impartial tribunal.
My right to this appeal, is founded on the principles of our
government. You are the fountain of all power, and the source

229
whence all authority flows. It follows of course, that your ju
risdiction-is above all tribunals which you have instituted. I
well know the difficulty which attends an individual, in making
his case known to so numerous a body. I have stated it in as
plain, and simple a manner, as it was possible, that it might be
understood by all. It has been published, with great disinter
estedness in many, very many of our newspapers, and as far as
my knowledge extends, has been read not only without preju
dice, but with great candour, and a sincere desire to obtain the
truth. If from a want of evidence before the court martial, or from
any other cause, you should now be satisfied that the proceed
ings against me, were unjust, your opinion will afford happi
ness to the few remaining days of my life, which no language
can express. If, on the contrary, from the difficulty of spread
ing the truth before you, I should not be able, to convince you,
that I acted faithfully, and that my conduct was influenced jjjy
a sense of duty, I shall still respect your opinion, and shall
only have the same consolation, until my death, which has been
my support since the events happened. A consciousness of the
purity of motives, and a belief, that my conduct, as circumstances
were, was the most correct.
I am, with the highest respect,
Your injured fellow citizen,
WILLIAM HULL.
,Newton, Oetober 12th, 1824.

APPENDIX.

A GENERAL SKETCH OF "-THE REVOLUTIONARY SERVICES OF THE
AUTHOR OF THE FOREGOING MEMOIRS.

Fellow Citizens,
As many of you are strangers to the early efforts of my mili
tary life, and as attempts have been made in the latter part of
it, to represent me as unworthy of your confidence, I cannot
but hope, that a general outline of my history (as a soldier of
the revolution) will be received with the same candour, that has
marked your attention in the examination of the foregoing me
moirs. No other consideration, but the injustice I have exper
ienced, could have induced me to have presented it to you.
In the year 1775, at the age of twenty-two, I exchanged the
profession of law, f*r that of arms. I enlisted a company of
infantry, which became attached to a regiment in the State of
Connecticut, commanded by Colonel Charles Webb. This
regiment marched to Cambridge, soon after General Washing
ton took command of the army it "that place. In this station it
remained, until March 1776, when the British army evacuated
Boston. The prinicpal part of the army immediately after this
event, marched from Boston to New York. The above regi
ment was stationed on Long Island, until Sir William Howe
landed, and after the operations on that Island, retreated with
the other forees to New York.
It was likewise with General Washington's army, on its re
treat from York Island, to the White Plains. The British Gen
eral crossed the east river from Long Island, with the principal
part of his army, and landed on Frog's Neck, from which place

APPENDIX. ii
he marched against General Washington. — The position the
American army had taken was on the heights, a small distance
back of the White Plains ; and a division of this army was post
ed on Chatterdon's hill, about a mile in its front. Colonel
Webb's regiment formed a part of this divison. It was attack -
«d by the whole force of the British army, and was obliged to
give way, after sustaining an obstinate and severe conflict, and
the enemy became possessed of this ground. In this action, I
received a slight wound by a musket ball. The strength of the
two armies was now formed within a mile of each other, and it
was believed, that a general battle the next day was only pre
vented by a heavy storm of rain. In the night after this storm,
Sir William Howe left Chatterdon's hill, and moved to York
island, where he attacked and carried fort Washington, with the
loss on our part of killed, wounded and prisoners, of about
three thousand men.
After these events, General Washington crossed the Hudson,
with a part of his army, to oppose the progress of the British
army in New Jersey. His force however was inadequate to the
object, and he was compelled to retreat to the banks of the Del
aware, cross that river, and take a position in Pennsylvania.
In December, 1776, Colonel Webb's regiment, composed a
part of the division of the army, which was ordered to march
from the Hudson, through New Jersey, to re-enforce General
Washington. — During the march, on the right flank of the ene
my, General Lee, who commanded the division, was made
prisoner. A few days after the junction of this division with the main
army, the enterprize against the enemy's post at Trenton, and
his other stations on the right bank of the Delaware, was pro
jected. This division thus united to the army, under General
Washington, aided in the successful attack on Trenton, the
night of the 25th of December, 1776, in which a complete vic
tory was obtained. On the 1st day of January, 1777, the term
of service, for which the army engaged, had expired. General
Washington made an address to the men, in which he acknow
ledged their right, to return to their homes, and thanked them
for the faithful services they had performed. He reminded
them of the victory which had recently been obtained by their
yalour, and invited them to remain six weeks longer in service.

Ill APPENDIX.
During this time he expected his army would be re-enforced,
and expressed a hope to lead them to new victories. After
reading and explaining this address to my company, which con
sisted of sixty men, every one engaged to remain the time,
which was requested.
The last day of December, the strength of the British army
marched against him at Trenton, and being greatly superiour to
his army in numbers, on the night of the 1st of January, 1777,
undiscovered by the enemy, and only separated by a small
creek, he abandoned his camp, and marched to Princetown,
where he obtained another victory no less important, than the
one at Trenton.
At this time General Washington had received an authority
from Congress, to re-organize the army, and make promotions.
I was a young Captain, and not entitled to promotion by regular
succession. By a letter from him to General Heath, which has
lately been published, it will appear that he gave me the ap
pointment of a Major in the Massachusetts'' line, in consequence
of my conduct in these two battles. After these events, the
beginning of January, the army marched to Morristown, in
New Jersey, for its winter quarters.
From this post I was ordered, to join the regiment to which
I was attached, then recruiting in Boston. As fast as the men
were enlisted, they were ordered to Springfield on Connecticut
river, and when about three hundred had rendezvoused at that
place, I was directed to take the command of them, and march
them to Tyconderoga, in the month of April, 1777. Michael
Jackson, who was the Colonel of the regiment, and had been
wounded in an attack on Montrasuer's Island, near New York,
the year before, had not recovered of his wounds, and the late
Governour Brooks who was the Lieutenant Colonel, remained
in Boston, to superintend the recruiting of the residue of the
regiment General St. Clair commanded at Ticonderoga on ray arrival, '
the latter part of April. — My station, with the command of this
regiment, was at the old French lines, which had been repaired
the year before. After the arrival of General Burgoyne's army
these lines were several times attacked, and the assailants as
often repulsed. In the retreat of the army from this post,
through the woods of Vermont, I continued to command the

APPENDIX. IV
regiment, and after a fatiguing march, a junction was formed
with General Schuyler's army, on the Hudson, a tittle below
fort Edward.
As General Burgoyne advanced from lake Champlain, Gen
eral Schuyler retreated, and crossed to the west bank of the
Hudson. The army in its retreat halted at Sarratoga, and in
the evening three hundred men, under my command, were post
ed two' miles above, on the bank of the river, as a rear guard.
In the night a large body of General Burgoyne's army, with the
savages attached to it, crossed to the west bank of the river,
made a circuitous march, and at day light in the morning ap
peared in the front, and on the left flank of the guard, my right
being extended to the river. In this situation, the enemy com
menced the attack, both in my front, and on the left flank,
which was resisted, and the ground maintained, until perceiv
ing they were greatly superiour to me in numbers, and were
pressing around my left flank, and gaining my rear, I ordered a
retreat, which was continued about a mile, under a heavy fire of
regulars and savages. Observing an advantageous height of
ground, the detachment was formed, and held their position,
although hardly pressed, until a strong re-enforcement arrived,
for my support ; the whole body then advanced and compelled
the assailants to retreat in their turn. In this rencounter, our
loss was forty men and three officers, killed and wounded. —
Although, in the first instance, I was obliged to retreat, yet I
received the full approbation and thanks of General Schuyler,
in public orders, for my conduct. At this time Lieutenant Col
onel Brooks had arrived at Albany with the remainder of the
regiment, and was marching up the Mowhawk, with a detach
ment ordered for the relief of fort Stanwix, which was in
vested, by a detachment of the British army, and savages. I
was ordered to join him with the part of the regiment I had com
manded during the campaign, and the junction was made at the
German Flats, which was then the extent of our settlements;
The gallant defence of that fort, with the circumstances of the
siege, and the manner in which it was relieved, are fully re
corded in history. After the siege was raised and the besiegers
compelled to retreat to Canada, the detachment returned, and
joined the army on the Hudson, at the entrance of the Mohawk,
into that river. 30

T APPENDIX.
General Gates had now been appointed to the chief command
in the northern department, and immediately ordered the army
to advance on the enemy. He took a position, and formed his
camp, on Bhemis' heights, about eight miles below Sarratoga,
where his fortifications were erected, with the right extending
to the Hudson. General Burgoyne, crossed the river at fort
Edward, and established his camp, and fortifications, above,
leaving a space of about two miles, between the two armies. —
The two memorable battles, which were fought on this ground
by these two armies, on the 19th of September, and the 7th of
October, previously to the surrender of General Burgoyne, are
also described in the history of the revolutionary war. The
action of the 19th of September, commenced between Colonel
Morgan's riflemen and an advanced corps from the right of
General Burgoyne's encampment, directed towards the left of
General Gate's position. It was about one o'clock in the after
noon. A very short interval succeeded, when Morgan's corps
was re-enforced by General Poor's brigade from New Hamp
shire, and at the same time, with a detachment of three hun
dred volunteers, from the Massachusetts' brigade, to which I
belonged, and the command of which was assigned to me. The
action was obstinate, and severe, and was only interrupted by
the dusk of the evening. General Burgoyne claimed the victo
ry, because his troops lay on the field of battle ; our troops more
desirous of comfort than of etiquette, retired, in the dusk of
the evening to their tents, to prepare for combat the next day,
if called again into the field. By the return, it appeared, that
one hundred and fifty of the three hundred under my command.
were killed and wounded.
On the 7th of October, I likewise commanded another detach
ment from the brigade, of about three hundred men, which be
fore the action commenced, was ordered to the left of our posi
tion, to observe the movements of the enemy, give information,
and check any small parties, which might be advancing. It
was discovered in the afternoon, that the strength of the British
army was moving to occupy elevated ground on the left of our
encampment. Colonel Morgan's riflemen, with a corps of light infantry, un
der the command of Major Dearborn and the principal part of
the left wing of the army, was ordered to attack them. When

APPENDIX. VI
these re-enforcements arrived on the ground where I was posted,
I joined Colonel Weston's regiment with the detachment I
commanded, and after a severe conflict, General Burgoyne was
compelled to retreat to his lines, where he was followed, and
the day was closed by storming his entrenchments, and entire
possession was gained of the right of his position, and encamp
ment. This victory, and the obstinate battle of the 19th of
September, with our success at fort Stanwix, and Bennington,
on his right and left wing, decided the fate of his army. After
the surrender, the regiment to which I belonged, with other de
tachments from General Gates' was ordered to re enforce Gene
ral Washington's army, then at White Marsh, between the
Delaware and Schuylkill, in Pennsylvania, — after this junction
the British army marched out of Philadelphia, reconnoitred, and
viewed every part of General Washington's position, and it was
fully expected a general battle would have been fought, between
thu two armies, on this occasion. Sir William Howe could have
had no other motive in advancing from Philadelphia ; and Gen
eral Washington had taken a strong position, and there is no
doubt, but it was his intention, to have defended it. He had
now with him the strength of General Gates' successful army,
and the army he had commanded during the campaign. The
one would have been animated with a desire to have maintained
the character it had acquired, and the other to have proved,
that it had deserved equal success. The fields between the
two armies, were suitable for military operations, and the
strength of both was collected in compact bodies.
The British commander, declining the combat, probably pre
vented a more general battle than was fought during the war of
the revolution. The British army would have been ambitious
to have retrieved the misfortunes at the north, and the American
army, now united under the standard of its beloved Washing
ton, would have exerted all its energies to have added to the
glory, which had been acquired at Saratoga.
After the retreat of the British army to Philadelphia, General
Washington marched his army to the west bank of the Schuyl
kill, about twenty miles from Philadelphia, in the month of De
cember, where huts were built for winter quarters, with mate
rials taken immediately from the forest, and constructed by the
troops, without any assistance from mechanics. Here, afteV

VH APPENDIX.
the toils of the campaign, the army suffered every distress, which
the want of necessary food, comfortable clothing, and conse
quent disease could occasion. In this situation it remained,
until the British army evacuated Philadelphia, and commenced
its march through New Jersey to New York, by the way of
Amboy. As soon as information was received of this move
ment, General Washington crossed the Schuylkill, and march
ed on the rear of the enemy. At Monmouth, the British army
was overtaken, and a battle ensued, honourable to the Ameri
can arms. In this battle, I commanded the 8th Massachusetts'
regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Brooks acting on the staff as Ad
jutant General to the advanced corps, under the command of
General Lee. After this battle, the army retired to the Hud
son, and the following winter, was stationed at West Point,
and in the high lands.
During the winter, the command of the troops, on the ad
vanced lines of the army, near York Island, was assigned to
me. The objects of the command were, to observe the move
ments ofthe enemy, check any small parties advancing into the
country, and afford protection to the inhabitants of that part of the
state of New York, and the west part of the state of Connecti
cut The line of defence extended from the north river to the
White Plains, and from thence to the east river or sound, a
distance of about ten miles.
This position was about twenty-five miles from any other
part of the American army, and not more than ten miles froth
the enemy, on York Island. My command consisted of about
four hundred men, and the duty was so severe, that all the offi
cers and men, were relieved every fortnight. I however re
mained, at the request of General Washington, from November
until May ; during this time, many attempts were made by the
enemy to surprize my guards, but without success. All my
rest and sleep were taken by day, and my nights were devoted
to incessant duty. In this exposed situation, for five months,
within three hours' march of the whole British army, no part of
my troops was ever surprized, although many attempts were
made for the purpose, and many successful enterprizes were
made against the enemy's out-posts.
In May, 1779, when the British army advanced up the north
river, to take possession of Stoney and Verplank's points, I was

APFRNOIX. VIII
ordered to retire from the linen, and join the army at West
Point Thin corps, compound of light infantry, was continued
under my command, and was ordered to take a position on the
highest: ground, in the rear of Ih.i forfiflcatinns at that place
and which overlooked all that had been constructed between it
and the river. Here, a new fort was erected, by this corps.
General Wayne, at thin time, commanded the light infantry of
the army, and his station was on the west bank of tin-. Hudson,
about three miles below West Point, neur fort Montgomery.
Tha British commander having erected fortifications on both
alden of the Hudson, about fourteen miles below Went Point,
at Stoney Point and Verplank's point, and, leaving about a
thousand men at each of those posts, returned to New York
with the main body of his army, and formed u predatory expe
dition against the towns in Connecticut, which bordered, on the
sea shore, llin object undoubtedly was, to draw General Wash
ington from his strong holds, on the Hudson, and before he
could return for their defence, ascend the Hudson, and possess
himself of West Point, and the positions in the high lands.
Hurler these circumstances, if became necessary, for General
Washington to adopt some measures, to check the desolation
muking mi the sea-board.
Not thinking it safe Io march his army from the Hudson, he
projected an e n I ci prize against Sloney and Verplank's Point.
The execution of the one against .Stoney Point was committed
to General Wayne; I was ordered with the corps I command-
ad to leave the heights I hud fortified, and join him at Handy
Hunch, near fort Montgomery. Before we marched, two com
panies of light infantry, from North Carolina, under tho com
mand of Major Murphy, were ordered to join my corps, and
being the senior officer, my command now consisted of seven
companies. The whole body of light infantry, being thus or-
gani&ed under the command of General Wayne, consisting of
less than two thousand mon, commenced its march ovor the
mountains, and hulled the beginning of tho evening, about o
mile and an half from Nlonoy Point.
Here fhe orders wore, for the first time, communicated.—
At twelve o'clock at night, the attack was made, with unloaded
arms, and with the bayonet alone. Some historians of tho rev
olution have considered that the British garrison was surprized.

IX APPENDIX.
This is not the fact ; as we advanced, the centinels fired on U9
half a mile from the fort, and when we forced the barriers, and
entered the fort, every British soldier was in full uniform, with
his arms in his hands. History has pointed out all the trans
actions relating to this successful enterprize.
In consequence of letters from General Washington to Gene
ral Heath, and from General Washington to the legislature of
Massachusetts, after the enterprize against Stoney Point, 1 was
promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel ; — promotions at
that period, being made by the legislatures ofthe states.
When the army retired to winter quarters, in 1779, the paper
money, in which the officers and soldiers had been paid, had
depreciated to such a degree, that justice and expediency re
quired that some measures should be adopted for their relief.
General Washington approved and consented to an arrange
ment, of sending commissioners, to the different states, to repre
sent the case to the legislatures, and solicit relief.— To this duty
I was appointed, by the officers of the Massachusetts' line, and
this was my first absence from military duty, since I had joined
the army in 1775.
In December, 1780, and January, 1781, mutinies had been
excited in the Pennsylvania and Jersey lines of the army, from
causes, which here it is unnecessary to mention, and it was feared
the excitement would extend to the other parts of the army.
General Washington was desirous of making some offensive
operations against the enemy, to show to his country, and the
British commander, that his whole army was not infected with
this mutinous spirit. For this purpose he ordered a detachment
to march against the mutineers into New Jersey, and another
detachment to attack the enemy's post at Morrisania. The
command of the latter detachment was assigned to me— Mor-
rissania was so insulated, that General Washington considered
that success was very doubtful; but under the circumstances
which existed, as appears in his letter on the subject to General
Heath, he thought it expedient to make the attempt. The re
sult, however, was favourable to the American arms, as com
plete success attended the enterprize.
In the summer of 1783, after preliminary articles of peace
were settled, and a cessation of hostilities had taken place, the
American army remained at West Point, and in the highlands

APPENDIX. X
in its neighbourhood and a corps of light infantry was formed
and stationed very near the British posts at Kingsbridge, the
command of which was assigned to me. Here I remained until
the British army was ready to evacuate New York. At that
time General Washington with many of the principal officers
of the army, attended likewise by the Governour, and a number
of the civil officers of the State were escorted into the city by
the corps I commanded ; and commencing at Kingsbridge, as
the British retired from their posts we advanced and took pos
session of them.
The day General Washington took his final farewell of his
brother officers in New York, this corps which I had so long
commanded, had the honour of escorting him to his barge, and
paying him the last military salutation he received from that
army, which had followed his standard through the trying scenes
of the revolutionary struggle.
Under the circumstances, which have since taken place, and
the attempts which have been made, to destroy my military
character, I have considered it my duty, fellow citizens, to pre
sent to you, this general sketch of my revolutionary services.
In the enterprize against Morrissania, where I commanded, I
refer you to the letter of General Washington to General Heath,
which, has been lately published, to show his opinion ofthe haz
ard, which attended it, and to his public orders to the army, ex
pressing his thanks, for the judicious arrangements, which were
made, and the intrepid manner, in which they were executed.
Likewise to the resolution of Congress, with similar expressions
of approbation.
For my conduct, in storming Stony Point, I refer you to the
public orders of General Wayne, General Washington, and the
resolution of Congress, in which my name will be found associat
ed, with the officers, who distinguished themselves on that oc
casion. On all other occasions where I was called into the field of
danger, I can refer to the letters and orders of General Wash
ington, and the other Generals, under whose immediate com
mand I served, for their approbation.
I am in the possession of these testimonials, and many of
them are on the records of our country. They will be preserv
ed and left with my family, to be made use of hereafter, in such
manner, as they may think proper. WILLIAM HULL.