Yale Universi 39002026281890 i HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY HISTORY OP ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY BY DR. W. WINDELBAND PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF STRASSBUEG ^lutfjorijerj SCranslatwn BY HERBERT ERNEST CUSHMAN, Ph.D. INSTRUCTOR IN PHILOSOPHY IN TUFTS COLLEGE FROM THE SECOND GERMAN EDITION NEW YORK CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 1906 Copyright, 1899, By Charles Scribneb's Sons. All rights reserved. SHntbcrsttrj press : John Wilson and Son, Cambridge, TJ. S. A. TO WILLIAM R. SHIPMAN, LL.D. tyrattatat at lEngltaf) in ffufta College, MY FEIEND AND COUNSELLOR. TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE Professor Windelband's G-eschichte der Alien PMlo- sophie is already well known to German philosophical readers as one of the famous Miiller series of hand-books, and yet to that wider circle of English readers it is still a foreign book. In many quarters technical scholars of Greek philosophy have already commended its important innovations, and to these its erudition and scholarship are patent. In its translation, however, under the title of "The History of Ancient Philosophy," it will reach the general reader and serve as an introduction to the beginner in phi losophy. I have personally never been able to see why the approaches to the study of philosophy have been made as difficult and uninviting as possible. In other hard sub jects all sorts of helps and devices are used to allure the beginner within. Into philosophy the beginner has always had to force his way with no indulgent hand to help. In the past the history of thought has too often been entirely separated from the history of affairs, as if the subjec tive historical processes could have been possible with out the objective concrete events. Professor Windelband has gone far to lead the general reader to the history of thought through the history of the affairs of the Greek nation. This is, to my mind, the difficult but absolutely necessary task of the historian of thought, if he wishes to reach any but technical philosophers. This work occu- Vlll PREFACE pies a unique position in this respect, and may mark the beginning of an epoch in the rewriting of the history of philosophy. I am indebted to many friends for help in my transla tion of this work. The reader will allow me to mention in particular Professor George H. Palmer, of Harvard, my friend and former teacher, for introducing me to the work ; and my colleagues, Professor Charles St. Clair Wade for much exceedingly valuable assistance, and especially Pro fessors Charles E. Fay and Leo R. Lewis, whose generous and untiring aid in the discussion of the whole I shall ever remember. Whatever merits the translation may have, are due in no small measure to their help; for whatever defects may appear, I can hold only myself responsible. So complete are the bibliographies here and elsewhere that I have found it necessary to append only a list of such works as are helpful to the English reader of Ancient Philosophy. HERBERT ERNEST CUSHMAN. Tufts College, June, 1899. PREFACE TO THE SECOND GERMAN EDITION Having undertaken to prepare a re'sume* of the history of ancient philosophy for the Handbuch der Klassischen Alter- tumsivissenschaft, it seemed expedient to offer to my trained readers, not an extract from the history of the literature of the Greeks and Romans, which can be found elsewhere ; but rather a short and clear presentation, such as would awaken interest and give an insight into the subject matter and the development of ancient philosophy. The necessity of a new edition gives evidence that this presentation has won itself friends far beyond the circle of those most nearly interested. This, moreover, would not have hap pened had I not abandoned the idea of presenting a col lation from the data usually furnished, and had I not given to the subject the form which my long personal experience as an academic teacher had proved to be most available. As a result I found myself in the somewhat painful posi tion of being compelled to present didactically many very considerable deviations from the previous conception and treatment, without being able in the limitations of this re'sume" to advance for experts my reasons save in short references. I should have been very glad if I could have found time to justify my innovations by accompanying de tailed discussions. But, unfortunately, the execution of my whole purpose has been postponed up to this time through more important and imperative tasks. The new X PREFACE edition, therefore, finds me again in the same position of being compelled to trust more in the force of the general relations of the subject matter and in the emphasis briefly laid upon important moments, than in a leisurely extended polemical presentation, which would otherwise have been usual in this particular field. For the chief matters in which I have gone my own ways — the separation of Pythagoras from the Pythagoreans and the discussion of the latter under " Efforts toward Reconciliation between Heracleitanism and the Theory of Parmenides," the separation of the two phases of Atomism by the Protagorean Sophistic, the juxtaposition of Democ- ritus and Plato, the conception of the Hellenic-Roman phil osophy as a progressive application — first ethical and then religious — of science, to which I have also organically con nected Patristics, — all this the reader finds unchanged in its essentials. My treatment of these questions has found recognition in many quarters, but in many also an expected opposition ; and the reader may be assured that I have always been grateful for this latter, and have given it care ful consideration. This weighing of objections was the more needful since I had occasion in the mean time to deal with the same questions in a larger connection and from a different point of view. The trained eye will not fail to recognize in this second edition the influence of the objec tions of experts, even where these have not convinced me. in the numerous small changes in the presentation, and in the choice of bibliography and citations. Here, again, the revising hand needed to follow many a kindly suggestion in the discussions of this book, and accept many a gratifying explanation in the works that have appeared during the past five years. The only change in the external form of the book is in the very desirable addition of an index to the philosophers discussed. PREFACE XI Then may my brief treatise continue to fulfil its task : to solicit friends appreciative of a noble cause, to preserve alive the consciousness of the imperishable worth which the creations of Greek thought possess for all human culture. WILHELM WINDELBAND. STRASSBUEG, April, 1893. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Translator's Preface vii Author's Preface (to second German edition) ... ix INTRODUCTION 1. Significance of ancient philosophy to European civilization 1 2. Division of ancient philosophy 3 3. Historical methods 5 4-6. Sources and developments of ancient philosophy ... 8 A. — GREEK PHILOSOPHY Introduction: The preliminary conditions of philosophy in the Greek intellectual life of the seventh and sixth cen turies b. c 16-36 7. Geographical survey 16 8. Social and political relations 17 9. The period of ethical reflection : the Seven Wise Men . . 18 10. Practical and special learning 20 11. Religious ideas 26 12. The reformation by Pythagoras 28 13. The first problems of science 33 1. The Milesian Nature Philosophy. Pages 36-45. 14. Thales • . 36 15. Anaximander 39 16. Anaximenes 43 xiv TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 2. The Metaphysical Conflict. — Heracleitus and the Eleatics. Pages 46-71. 17. Xenophanes 46 18. Heracleitus 52 19. Parmenides 59 20. Zeno and Melissus - - 65 3. Efforts toward Reconciliation. Pages 71-100. 21. Empedocles 73 22. Anaxagoras . . 80 23. The beginnings of Atomism : Leucippus 87 24. The Pythagoreans 93 4. The Greek Enlightenment. — The Sophists and Socrates. Pages 100-151. 25. Eclecticism and special research 100 26. The Sophists . . 108 27. Socrates . . .123 28. The Megarian and Elean-Eretriau Schools . . .135 29. The Cynic School . .140 30. The Cyrenaic School .... 145 5. Materialism and Idealism. — Democritus and Plato. Pages 151-223. 31. The life and writings of Democritus 155 32. The theoretic philosophy of Democritus 159 33. The practical philosophy of Democritus .... . 170 34. The life and writings of Plato 174 .35. The theory of Ideas of Plato 189 36. The ethics of Plato 204 37. The nature philosophy of Plato .216 6. Aristotle. Pages 224-292. 38. The Older Academy 224 39. The life and writings of Aristotle 230 40. The logic of Aristotle 247 41. The metaphysics of Aristotle . . . . . . 257 42. The physics of Aristotle . . . ... 268 43. The ethics and poetics of Aristotle . . . . . 282 TABLE OF CONTENTS XV B. — HELLENIC-ROMAN PHILOSOPHY Page 44. Introduction .... ......... 293 1. The Controversies of the Schools. Pages 298-329 45. The Peripatetics 298 46. The Stoics 303 47. The Epicureans 319 2. Skepticism and Syncretism. Pages 329-349. 48. The Skeptics 329 49. Eclecticism 337 50. Mystic Platonism 341 3. Patristics. Pages 349-365. 51. The Apologists 352 52. The Gnostics and their opponents . . 355 53. The Alexandrian School of Catechists : Origen. . . . 361 4. Neo-Platonism. Pages 365-383. 54. The Alexandrian School : Plotinus 366 55. The Syrian School : Jamblichus .... .... 375 56. The Athenian School : Proclus 377 BIBLIOGRAPHY 385 INDEX 389 HISTORY ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY INTRODUCTION 1. Scientific interest in ancient, especially in Greek, philosophy, is not confined to the value that it possesses as a peculiar subject for historical research and for the study of the growth of civilization. But it is also equally con cerned in the permanent significance that the content of ancient thought possesses by reason of its place in the development of the intellectual life of Europe. The emphasis falls primarily upon the lifting of mere knowing to the plane of systematic knowledge, or science. Not content with his storing of practical facts, and with his fantastic speculations born of his religious needs, the Greek sought knowledge for its own sake. Knowledge, like art, was developed as an independent function from its involvement in the other activities of civilization. So, first and foremost, the history of ancient philosophy is an insight into the origin of European science in general. It is, however, at the same time the history of the birth of the separate sciences. For the process of differentia tion, which begins with distinguishing thought from con duct and mythology, was continued within the domain of science itself. With the accumulation and organic ar rangement of its facts, tire early, simple, and unitary science to which the Greeks gave the name <£t\oero<£ia, divided into 1 2 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY the special sciences, the single (f>iXoaoiai, and these then continued to develop on more or less independent lines. Concerning the history and meaning of the name of " phi losophy," see especially R. Haym, in Ersch and Gruber's Ency- klopadie, III. division, vol. 24 ; Ueberweg, Orundriss, I. § 1 ; Windelband, Praeludien, p. 1 ff. The word became a technical term in the Socratic school. It meant there exactly what sci ence means in German. In later time, after the division into the special sciences, the word philosophy had the sense of ethico-religious practical wisdom. See § 2. The beginnings of scientific life that are thus found in ancient philosophy are most influential upon the entire development that follows. With proportionately few data, Greek philosophy produced, with a kind of grand simplicity, conceptual forms for the intellectual elaboration of its facts, and with a remorseless logic it developed every essential point of view for the study of the universe. Therein con sists the peculiar character of ancient thought and the high didactic significance of its history. Our present language and our conception of the world are thoroughly permeated by the results of ancient science. The naive ruggedness with which ancient philosophers followed out single motives of reflection to their most one-sided logical conclusions, brings into clearest relief that practical and psychological necessity which governs not only the evolution of the problems of philosophy, but also the repeated historical tendencies toward the solution of these problems. We may likewise ascribe a typical significance to the universal stages of development of ancient philosophy, in view of the fact that philosophy at first turned with undaunted courage to the study of the outer world ; thwarted there, it turned back to the inner world, and from this point of view, with renewed strength, it attempted to conceive the World-All. Even the manner in which ancient thought placed its entire apparatus of conceptual knowledge at the service of INTRODUCTION 3 social and religious needs has a peculiar and more than historical value. The real significance of ancient philosophy will be much ex aggerated if one tries to draw close analogies between the dif ferent phases of modern philosophy and its exponents, and those of the ancients. Read K. v. Reichlin-Meldegg, D. Paral- lelismus d. alten u. neuen Philosophie, Leipzig and Heidelberg, 1865. A detailed parallelism is impossible, because all the forms of the modern history of civilization have so much more nearly complete presuppositions, and are more complicated than those of the ancient world. The typical character of the latter is valid in so far as they have " writ large " and often nearly grotesquely the simple and elemental forms of mental life, which among moderns are far more complicated in their combinations. 2. The total of that which is usually designated as ancient philosophy falls into two large divisions, which must be distinguished as much in respect to the civilizations that form their background as in respect to the intel lectual principles that move them. These divisions are, (1) Greek philosophy, and (2) Hellenic-Roman philosophy. We may assume the year of the death of Aristotle, 322 b. c, as the historical line of demarcation between the two. Greek philosophy grew out of an exclusive national culture, and is the legitimate offspring of the Greek spirit. The Hellenic-Roman philosophy came, on the other hand, out of much more manifold and contradictory intellectual movements. After the days of Alexander the Great a culture that was so cosmopolitan that it broke down all national barriers, increased in ever-widening circles among the nations upon the Mediterranean Sea. The fulfilment of these intellectual movements was objectively expressed in the Roman Empire, subjectively in Christianity ; and, be it remarked, the Hellenic-Roman philosophy forms one of the mightiest factors in this very process of amalgamation. Moreover, there is a not less important difference in the scientific interest of the two periods. Greek philosophy 4 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY began with an independent desire for knowledge. It was ever concerned in the quest for knowledge that was free from all subordinate purposes. It perfected itself in Aris totle, partly in his logic, which was a universal theory of knowledge, and partly in the scheme of a developed system of sciences. The energy of this purely theoretic interest was gradually extinguished in the following time, and was only partly maintained in unpretentious work upon the objective special sciences. The practical question how the Wise Man should live entered into " philosophy," however, and knowledge was no longer sought on account of itself but as a means of right living. In this way the Hellenic- Roman philosophy fell into dependence upon the general but temporary changes in society, — a thing that never happened in purely Greek philosophy. Then later its original ethical tendency changed entirely into the effort to find by means of science a satisfaction for religious aspira tion. " In Greece, philosophy, therefore, was science that had ripened into independence ; in Hellenism and the Roman Empire, philosophy entered with a full possession of its consciousness into the service of the social and religious mission of man. It is obvious, from the elasticity of all historical divisions, that this antithesis is not absolute, but only relative. The post- Aristotelian philosophy is not entirely lacking in endeavors for the essentially theoretical, nor indeed among the purely Greek thinkers are there wanting those who set for philosophy ultimately practical ends, — ¦ the Socratics for example. How ever, comparison of the different definitions which in the course of antiquity have been given for the problem of philosophy, justifies, on the whole, the division we have chosen, which takes the purpose of philosophy in its entirety as the principium divisionis. These divisions approach most nearly among later writers those of Ch. A. Brandis in his shorter work, Gesch. d. Enhvick. d. griechischen Phil. u. Hirer Xachwirkungen im romischen Reiche (2 vols., Berlin, 1862 and 1864), although he distin guishes formally three periods here, as in his larger work. INTRODUCTION 5 These periods are : (1) pre-Socratic philosophy ; (2) the devel opment from Socrates to Aristotle ; (3) post- Aristotelian phi losophy. Yet he unites the first two divisions as " the first half," and distinctly recognizes their inner relationship in con trast to the third division, which forms "the second half." Zeller and Schwegler also employ these three periods as the basis of their work upon the Greeks, while Ritter puts the Stoics andf Epicureans also in the second period. Hegel, on the other hand, treats the entire Greek philosophy until Aris totle as the first period, to which he adds the Grseco-Roman philosophy as the second and the neo-Platonic philosophy as the third. Ueberweg accepts the divisions of Ritter, with this variation, — he transfers the Sophists from the first period to the second. We purposely desis| from dividing here the two chief periods of philosophy into subordinate periods. The demand for com prehensiveness, which alone would justify further divisions, is satisfied with the simple general divisions, while a comprehen sive view of the steps in development is provided for in another manner by the treatment of individual doctrines. If a completer subdivision should be insisted upon, the following might be adopted : — (a) Greek philosophy into three periods : — (1) The cosmological, which includes the entire pre-Socratic speculation, and reaches down to about 450 b. c. (§§ 1-3) ; (2) The anthropological, to which belong the men of the Greek Enlightenment, i. e., the Sophists, Socrates, and the so- called Socratic schools (§ 4) ; (3) The systematic, which by its uniting the two preceding periods is the flowering period of Greek science. (6) Hellenic-Roman philosophy into two sections : — (1) The school-controversies of the post- Aristotelian time, with the accompanying essential ethical tendency, critical skep ticism, and retrospective erudition (§§ 1 and 2). (2) Eclectic Platonism, with its bifurcation into the rival sys tems of Christian and neo-Platonic religions (§§3 and 4). 3. The scientific treatment of the history of philosophy or of a part of that history, as in this treatise, has a double task. On the one hand it must determine the actual number of those concepts which are claimed to be " philosophic," and must conceive them in their genesis, particularly in their relation to each other. On the other 6 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY hand, it must determine the value "of each individual philosophic doctrine in the development of the scientific consciousness. In the first regard the history of philosophy is purely an historical science. As such, it must without any predilec tion proceed, by a careful examination of the tradition, to establish with philological exactness the content of the philosophic doctrines. It must explain their origin with all the precautionary measures of the historical method. It furthermore must make clear their genetic relations, on the one hand, to the personal life of the philosophers, and, on the other, to civilization as a whole. In this way it will be plain how philosophy has attained to an actual process of development. From this historical point of view, however, there arises for the history of philosophy the critical task of determin ing the results which the various systems of philosophy have yielded for the construction of the human concep tion of the world. The point of view for this critical study need not be the peculiar philosophical attitude of history. Nevertheless it must, on the one hand, be that of inner criticism, which tests the teaching of a philosophical sys tem by logical compatibility and consistency ; it must, on the other hand, be that of historical generalization, which estimates philosophical teaching according to its intellec tual fruitfulness and its practical historical efficacy . The history of ancient philosophy as a science has to meet very great and sometimes insuperable difficulties in the fragmentary character of the literary sources. On the other hand, in its critical problem, it is fortunate in being able, after a development of nearly two thousand years, to judge the value of individual teaching with no personal bias. The different points of view taken in investigating the his tory of philosophy are as follows : — INTRODUCTION 7 (1) The naive point of view of description. According to this the teachings of the different philosophers are supposed to be reported with historical authenticity. So soon, however, as any report is claimed to be of scientific value, the tradition must be criticised ; and this, as all other historical criticism, can be accomplished only by investigating the sources. (2) The genetic point of view of explanation, which has three possible forms, — (a) The psychological explanation. This represents the per sonality and individual relations of the respective philosophers as the actual causes or occasions of their opinions. (6) The pragmatic method. This is an attempt to under stand the teaching of each philosopher by explaining the contra dictions and unsolved problems of his immediate predecessors. (c) The kultur-historisch view. This sees in the philosophical systems the progressive consciousness of the entire ideal de velopment of the human mind. (3) The speculative attitude of criticism. Starting from a systematic conviction, this seeks to characterize the different phases of philosophical development by the contributions thereto which they have severally furnished. (Compare Hegel, in Vbr- lesungen iiber d. Gesch. d. Phil., Complete Works, Vol. XIII. 19 ff. ; Ueberweg, Grandriss, I. § 3 ; Windelband, Gesch. d. Phil, Freiburg i. B., 1892, §§ 1 and 2.) Until within the previous century enumeration of the placita philosophorum, with some little application of the pragmatic method, essentially predomi nated in the history of philosophy. Hegel, with all the exagger ation of this speculative point of view, was the first to raise philosophy from a mere collection of curiosities to a science. His constructive and fundamental idea — that in the historical order of philosophical theories the categories of true philoso phy repeat themselves as progressive achievements of human ity — involved an emphasis upon the kultur-historisch and the pragmatic explanations, and this required only the individual istic psychological supplementation. On account of Hegel's speculative conception, on the other hand, historical criticism fell with the disappearance of faith in the absolute philosophy. By this historical criticism the mere establishment of the facts and their genetic explanation are changed into a complete philo sophical science. Hegel created the science of the history of philosophy according to its ideal purposes, but not until after his day was safe ground presented for achieving such a science by the philological method of getting the data without presupposi tions. Upon no territory has this method since recorded such far-reaching success as upon the field of ancient philosophy. 8 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY 4. The scientific helps to the study of ancient philos ophy fall into three classes : — (a) The Original Sources. Only a very few of the writings of ancient philosophers have been preserved. As to complete single works in the purely Greek philos ophy, they are to be found only in Plato and Aristotle. The original sources, however, are richer in the Hellenic- Roman period. The writings of the ancient Greek think ers are preserved in only a fragmentary way through incidental citations of later literature. The most comprehensive collection not especially mentioned hereafter, is that of F. W. A. Mullach, Fragmenta philosopho rum Grtrcorum (3 vols., Paris, 1860-81). Yet it satisfies to day neither the demands for completeness nor for accuracy. Nevertheless the works that have come down to us are by no means to be accepted in toto and on trust. Not alone unintentionally, but also from its desire to give to its own teaching, so far as possible, the nimbus of ancient wisdom, later antiquity substituted in many instances its own compositions for the writings of the ancients, or in terpolated their texts. The sources of Greek philosophy in particular are not only in a very fragmentary but also in a very uncertain state, and we are still limited to a conjecture of a greater or less degree of probability in regard to many very weighty questions. The philological- historical criticism, which seems indispensable under these circumstances, requires a safe criterion for our guidance, and this criterion we possess in the works of Plato and Aristotle. Opposed to the easy credulity with which in the previous century (according to Buhle) tradition was received, Schleier- macher had the especial merit of having begun and incited a fruitful criticism. Brandis, Trendelenburg, Zeller, and Diels were likewise the leaders in this direction. 5. (6) The Corroborative Testimony of Antiquity. Early (according to Xenophon) in ancient literature we find tes- INTRODUCTION 9 timony on the life and death of notable philosophers. Of importance for us, moreover, are the passages in which Plato and Aristotle — especially in the beginning of his Metaphysics — linked their own teaching to the early phi losophy. At the time of Aristotle there arose a widely spread, partly historical and partly critical literature, con cerning what was then ancient philosophy. Unfortunately, this has been lost, excepting a few fragments. Especially deplorable is the loss of the writings of this character of Aristotle and his immediate disciples, — Theophrastus in particular. Similar works, likewise no longer extant, issued from the Academy, in which, moreover, commentating also had its beginning at an early time. So, also, the historical and critical works of the Stoics have gone forever. This historiography of philosophy, the so-called dox- ography, with its commentating and collating, developed enormously in the Alexandrian literature, and had its three philosophical centres in Pergamus, Rhodes, and Alexandria. These voluminous and numerous works in their original form are in the main lost. Yet with all recognition of the erudition that doubtless permeated them, it must still be maintained that they have exercised a bewildering influence in various ways upon succeeding writers, who took excerpts directly out of them. Besides this almost unavoidable danger of reading later conceptions and theo ries into the old teaching, there appear three chief sources of error, — (1) In the inclination to fix the succession of ancient philoso phers after the manner of the later successions of scholarchs. (2) In the fantastic tendency to dignify ancient Greece with the miraculous and the extraordinary. (3) Finally, in the effort that sprang out of an undefined feel ing of the dependence of Grecian upon Oriental culture. En couraged by a new acquaintance with the East, some scholars have tried to knit every significant fact as closely as possible with Oriental influence. 10 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY Statements at only third or fourth hand are left over to us from the Roman period. The historical notes in the fragments of Varro, in the writings of Cicero (Rud. Hirzel, Untersuch. zu C. philos. Schriften, 3 parts, Leipzig, 1877- 1883), as well as of Seneca, Lucretius, and Plutarch, are valuable, but must be used with care. The philosophical- historical writings of Plutarch are lost. The compila tion preserved under his name, De physicis philosophorum decretis (in Dubner's edition of the Morals, Paris, 1841), is, according to Diels, an abstract of the Placita of Aetius, dating back to Theophrastus, and was made perhaps in the middle of the second century. The spurious book irepl ov loTopia<;, which is falsely ascribed to Galen, is in the main identical with it (published in the nineteenth vol ume of Kiikn'schen Gesamtausgabe}. Many later excerpts of Favorinus are included among the uncritically collected reports ; so, also, those of Apuleius and of Gellius (Nodes atticce, ed. Hertz, Leipzig, 1884-85 ; see also Mercklin, Die Zitiermethode u. Quellenbenutzung des A. G., Leipzig, 1860). Lucian's writings must also be mentioned in this connection. Those numberless historical accounts in the writings of Galen (especially De placitis Hippocraiis et Platonis, separately published by Iwan Miiller, Leipzig, 1874) and of Sextus Empiricus (Op. ed. Bekker, Berlin, 1842 : Trvppcovetoi vTroTUTrdxreK and 77-/36? /j.aBw/J,aTLicov<;) are philosophically more trustworthy. Out of the same period grew the work of Flavius Philostratus, Vitce sophistarum (ed. Westermann, Paris, 1849), and of Athenseus, Deipno- sophistce (ed. Meineke, Leipzig, 1857-69). Finally, there is the book which was regarded for a long time almost as the principal source for a history of ancient philosophy ; viz., that of Diogenes Laertius, Trepl filcov, Soyp,aTcov ko\ dwocftde'yiJ.dTwv twv ev (j)iXo(TO(f>ia evhoicifir)crdvTa>v /3i/3\la heica (ed. Cobet, Paris, 1850). Another kind of secondary sources is furnished by the INTRODUCTION 11 writings of the church fathers, who have polemical, apolo getic, and dogmatic aims in reproducing the Greek phi losophy. This is especially true of Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, Origen (Kara KeXo-ou), Hippolytus (Mefuta- tio omnium hceresmm, ed. Duncker, Gott., 1859, the first book of this being formerly supposed to be a work of Origen under the title (f)t\ocroov/j,eva), JZusebius (Prozp. eva7ig.,ed. Dindorf, Leipzig, 1868), and in certain respects also Tertul- lian and Augustine. The importance of the church fathers as sources for the study of ancient philosophy has attained recently to a completer and more fruitful recognition, especially since the impulse given by Diels to their study. Finally, the activity in commentating and historical re search was carried on in a lively fashion in the neo- Platonic school. The chief work indeed, that of Porphyry, is not preserved ((f>t,\6ao(J3o<; laropia). On the other hand, the writings of the neo-Platonists in general offer numerous historical data ; and, as already the earlier commentaries of Alexander of Aphrodisias (zu Arist. Met., ed. Hayduck, Berlin, 1891, and zu Arist. Top., M. Wallies, Berlin, 1891 ; smaller works by Ivo Bruns, Berlin, 1893), — so the com mentaries of Themistius, and especially Simplicius, contain many carefully and intelligently compiled excerpts from the direct and indirect sources of earlier times. Among the latest writers of ancient literature the collections of Stobseus and Photius, and those also of Hesychius, appear useful for the history of philosophy. Compare Diels, Doxographi Grceci (Berlin, 1879). An ex cellent and, for a beginning, an extraordinarily instructive collection of the most important passages from the primary and secondary sources is that of Ritter and Preller in their Historia philosophic Groeco-romance ex fontium locis contexta (7 ed. is brought out by Schulthess and Wellmann, Gotha, 1888). 6. (c) The Modem Expositions. Scholarly treatment of ancient philosophy was in modern literature con- 12 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY fined at first to a brief criticism of the latest works of antiquity. Thus, the occasional historical collections con cerned with ancient philosophy which we find in the Humanistic literature, in the main led back to neo-Platonic sources. The very first work, the History of Philosophy, by Thomas Stanley (London, 1665), scarcely more than reproduced the reports of Diogenes Laertius. Bayle in his Dictionnaire historique et critique (1 ed., Rotterdam, 1697), gave a powerful impulse to critical treatment.1 Later appeared the writings of Brucker, thoroughgoing, industriously compiled, but in point of fact not equal to the task : Kurze Frag en aus der philosophischen Historie (Ulm, 1731 f.), Historia critica philosophies (Leipzig, 1742 f.), Institutiones historic philosopihice (Leipzig, 1717 ; a compendium for a school manual). With the formation of the great schools of philosophy, particularly in Germany, the history of philosophy began to be treated with reference to its single directions and systems. In the front D. Tiedemann came with his em pirical-sceptical Geist der Philosophic (Marburg, 1791 ff.). Then followed, from the Kantian point of view, J. G. Buhle with Lehrbuch der Geschiohte der Philosophic (Gdtt., 1796 ff.) ; Tennemann, Geschiohte der Philosophic, 1798 ff.) ; then the Grundriss der Geschiohte der Philosophic (5th cd.), Amad. Wendt, Leipzig, 1829, a much used epitome, commending itself by its careful literary data ; and J. F. Fries, Geschiohte der Philosophic (1 vol., Halle, 1837). From the Schellingen point of view, there are Fr. Ast's Grundriss einer Geschiohte der Philosophic (Landshut, 1807) ; E. Reinhold, Geschiohte der Philosophic nach den Hauptpunkten Hirer Entwickclung (Jena, 1858). From the point of view of Schleiermacher, are his own notes for his lectures on the history of philosophy in a collection 1 Upon which a philosophical article of value in part even to-day has been published in German by H. Jacob (1797-98, Halle). INTRODUCTION 13 of three parts, four volumes (Berlin, 1839) : H. Ritter, Die Geschiohte der Philosophic (Hamburg, 1829 ff.) ; F. Ch. Potter, Die Geschiohte der Philosophic in Umriss (Elberfeld, 1873).1 From the Hegelian point of view, are Hegel's lectures upon the history of philosophy in his complete works, XIII. ff. ; J. E. Erdmann, Grundriss der Geschiohte der Philosophic (3 ed., Berlin, 1878). From the Herbartian point of view, is Ch. A. Thilo, Kurze pragmatische Geschiohte der Philosophic (Cdthen, 2 ed., 1880). With especial reference to the factual development of problems and concepts, ancient philosophy has also been treated by W. Windelband, Geschiohte der Philosophic (Freiburg i. Br., 1892). Of the other numerous complete presentations of the history of philosophy, that of J. Berg- mann (Berlin, 1892) may be finally mentioned. Of the presentations in other languages than German which also give valuable contribution to the study of ancient philosophy, may be here mentioned : V. Cousin, Histoire generate de la philosophic (12 ed., Paris, 1884) ; A. Weber, Histoire de philosophic europeenne (Paris, 5 ed., 1892) ; A. Fouille"e, Histoire de la Philosophic (Paris, 3 ed., 1882) ; R. Blakey, History of the Philosophy of Mind (London, 1848) ; G. H. Lewes, A Biographical History of Philosophy (London, 4 ed., 1871, German ed., Berlin, 1871). The completest literary data for the historiography of philos ophy, and particularly ancient philosophy, are found in Ueber- weg, Grundriss d. Philos., a work which presents also in its remarkable continuation by M. Heinze (7 ed. , Berlin, 1886) an indispensable completeness in its annotations. The texts fur nished by Ueberweg himself were at first only superficially systematized by him, and were given an unequal, confused, and, for beginners, untransparent character by his later additions, interpolations, and annotations. 1 An inspiring statement of the development of ancient philosophy is also that of Brandis's Geschiohte der Philos. seit Kant, 1 Part (Breslau, 1842). 14 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY The profounder philological studies at the beginning of the nineteenth century were advantageous to the history of ancient philosophy, since a critical sifting of tradition and a philological and methodical basis for historical- philosophical research was facilitated (compare Zeller, Jahr- biichcr der Gegenwart, 1843). The greatest credit for such a stimulus is due to Schleiermacher, whose translation of Plato was a powerful example, and whose special works upon Heracleitus, Diogenes of Apollonia, Anaximander, and others have been placed in Part III. book 2, of his col lected works. Among the numerous special researches are to be mentioned A. B. Krische's Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der alien Philosophic (Gdtt., 1840) ; also A. Trende lenburg, Historische Beitrdge zur Philosophic (Berlin, 1846 f.), the author of which deserves credit for his stimula tion of Aristotelian studies ; H. Siebeck, Untersuchungen zur Philosophic der Griechen (2 ed., Freiburg i. Br., 1888) ; G. Teichmiiller, Studienzur Geschiohte der Begriffe (Berlin, 1874 ff .) ; 0. Apelt, Beitrdge zur Geschiohte der griechischen Philosophic (Leipzig, 1891) ; E. Norden (the same title), Leipzig, 1892. As the first product of these criti co-philological studies, we may consider the praiseworthy work of Ch. A. Brandis, Handbuch der Geschiohte der griechisch-romischen Philoso phic (Berlin, 1835-60), by the side of which the author placed a shorter and especially finely conceived exposition, Geschiohte der Entwickelungen der griechischen Philosophic und Hirer Naehwirkungen im romischen Reiehe (Berlin, 1862 u. 1864). With less exhaustiveness, but with a peculiar superiority in the development of the problems, Ludw. Strumpell (2d part, Leipzig, 1854, 1861), K. Prantl (Stuttgart, 2 ed., 1863), and A. Schwegler (3 ed., espe cially, by Kdstlin, Freiburg, 1883) treated the same subject. All these valuable works, and with them the numerous synopses, compendiums, and compilations (see Ueberweg, INTRODUCTION 15 above mentioned, pp. 27-29), are overshadowed beside that masterpiece and, for many reasons, final word upon ancient philosophy : E. Zeller, Die Philosophic der Griechen (Tu bingen, 1844 ff. : the first book is published in the fifth edi tion, the second in the fourth edition, the others in the third edition).1 Here, upon the broadest philological-historical foundation and upon original sources, a philosophical, authoritative, and illuminating statement is given of the entire development. Zeller has published a clever sum mary of the whole in Grundriss d. Gesch. der Alten Philos. (4 ed., Leipzig, 1893). The special sides of ancient philosophy have been presented in the following notable works : — Logic : K. Prantl, Gesch. d. Logik im Abendlande (vols. 1 and 2, Leipzig, 1855 and 1861) ; P. Natorp, Forschungen z. Gesch. des Erkenntnissproblems im Altertum (Berlin, 1884) ; Giov. Cesca, La teoria delta conoscenza nella Jilos. greca (Verona, 1887). Psychology : H. Siebeck, Gesch. d. Psy. (vol. 1, Gotha, 1880 and 1884) ; A. E. Chaignet, Histoire de la psy. des grecs (Paris, 1887-92). Ethics : L. v. Henning, D. Prinzipien d. Elhik, etc. (Berlin, 1825) ; E. Feuerlein, D. philos. Sittenlehre in ihren geschicht- lichen Hauptformen (Tubingen, 1857 and 1859) ; Paul Janet, Histoire de la philosophic morale et politique (Paris, 1858) ; J. Mackintosh, The Progress of Ethical Philosophy (London, 1862) ; W. Whewell, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy (London, 1862) ; R. Blakey, History of Moral Science (Edin burgh, 1863) ; L. Schmidt, D. Ethik d. al. Griechen (Berlin, 1881) ; Th. Zeigler, D. Ethik d. Gr. u. Romer (Bonn, 1881) ; C. Kdstlin, Gesch. d. Ethik (1 vol., Tubingen, 1887) ; especially compare R. Eucken, D. Lebensanschauungen d. grossen Denker (Leipzig, 1890). The following particularly treat special topics : M. Heinze, D. Lehre v. Logos (Leipzig, 1872) ; D. Lehre d. Eudaemonismus in griech. Philos. (Leipzig, 1884) ; CI. Baumcker, Das Problem d. Materie in d. griech. Philos. (Munster, 1890) ; J. Walter, Gesch. d. Aesthetik im Altertum, (Leipzig, 1893). 1 Referred to in this work usually as I5., II4., etc. — Tr. 16 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY A. GREEK PHILOSOPHY Introduction The Preliminary Conditions of Philosophy in the Greek Intellectual Life of the Seventh and Sixth Centuries B. C.1 7. The history of the philosophy of the Greeks, like the history of their political development, requires a larger con ception of the geography of the country than the present conception of its political relations would imply. Our usual present idea of ancient Greece is of a country wherein Athens by its literature overshadowed the other portions, and by the brilliancy of its golden age eclipsed its earlier history. Ancient Greece was the Grecian sea with all its coasts from Asia Minor to Sicily and from Cyrene to Thrace. The natural link of the three great continents was this sea, with its islands and coasts occupied by the most gifted of people, which from the earliest historical times had settled all its coasts. (Homer.) Within this circle, the later so-called Motherland, the Greece of the continent of Europe, played at the beginning a very subordinate role. In the development of Greek culture, however, leadership fell to that branch of the race which in its entire history was in closest contact with the Orient, the Ionians. This race laid the foundation of later Greek development, and by its commercial activity established the power of Greece. At first as seafarers and sea-robbers in the train of the Phoenicians, in the ninth and eighth centuries the Ionians won an increasing independence, and in the seventh cen tury they commanded the world's trade between the three continents. Over the entire Mediterranean, from the Black Sea to the Pillars of Hercules, the Greek colonies and trade cen- 1 Reference should be made to corresponding sections in historical parts of this book for details. GREEK PHILOSOPHY 17 tres were extended. Even Egypt opened its treasures to the enterprising Ionian spirit. At the head of these cities of commerce, and at the same time the leader of the Ionian League, Miletus appeared in the seventh century as the most powerful and most notable centre of the Greek genius. It likewise became the cradle of Greek science. For here in Ionia of Asia Minor the riches of the entire world were heaped together ; here Oriental luxury, pomp, material pleasure held their public pageants ; here began to awaken the sense of the beauty of living and the love of higher ideals, while rude customs still ruled upon the continent of Europe. The spirit became free from the pressure of daily need, and in its play created the works of noble leisure, of art, and of science. The cultured man is he who in his leisure does not become a mere idler. 8. Thus, while wealth acquired from trade afforded the basis for the free mental development of the Greek, so, on the other hand, this same wealth led to changes of polit ical and social conditions which were likewise favorable to the development of intellectual life. Originally, aristo cratic families had ruled Ionian cities, and they were probably descended from the warlike bands that in the so- called Ionian migration from the continent of Europe had settled the islands. But in time, through their commerce, there grew up a class of well-conditioned citizens, who re stricted and opposed the power of the aristocracy. On the one hand bold and ambitious, on the other thoughtful and patriotic men took advantage of these democratic ten dencies, and after destroying the power of the oligarchy tried to set up monarchies and equalize, as far as possible, the interests of all classes. The tyranny based on democratic principles is the typical governmental rule of this time, and extended its power, although not without vigorous and often long partisan struggles, from Asia Minor across the islands even to 18 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY European Greece. Thrasybulus in Miletus, Polycrates in Samos, Pittacus in Lesbos, Periander in Corinth, Peisistra- tus in Athens, Gelon and Hiero in Syracuse, — these men had courts that at this time constituted the centres of in tellectual life. They drew poets to them ; they founded libraries ; they supported every movement in art and sci ence. But, on the other hand, this political overthrow drove the aristocrats into gloomy retirement. Discon tented with public affairs, the aristocrats withdrew to pri vate life, which they adorned with the gifts of the Muses. Heracleitus is a conspicuous example of this state of affairs. Thus the reversed relations favored in many ways the unfolding and extending of intellectual interests. This enrichment of consciousness, this increase in a higher culture among the Greeks of the seventh and sixth centuries, showed itself first in the development of lyric poetry, in which the gradual transition from the expression of universal religious and political feeling to that which is personal and individual formed a typical process. In the passion and excitement of internecine political conflict, the individual becomes conscious of his independence and worth, and he " girds up his loins " to assert his rights everywhere. In the course of time satirical poetry grew beside the lyric, as the expression of a keen and cleverly developed individual judgment. There was, moreover, still more characteristic evidence of the spirit of the time in the so-called Gnomic poetry, the content of which is made up of sententious reflections upon moral principles. This sort of moralizing, which appeared also in fable-poetry and in other literature, may be regarded as symptomatic of the deeper stirring of the national spirit. 9. Now, any extended reflection upon maxims of moral judgment shows immediately that the validity of morality has been questioned in some way, that social consciousness has become unsettled, and that the individual in his growing GREEK PHILOSOPHY 19 independence has transcended the bounds authoritatively drawn by the universal consciousness. Therefore it was entirely characteristic of this Gnomic poetry to recommend moderation ; to show how universal standards of life had been endangered by the unbridled careers of single per sons, and how in the presence of threatening or present anarchy the individual must try to re-establish these rules through independent reflection. The end of the seventh and the beginning of the sixth centuries in Greece formed, therefore, an epoch of peculiar ethical reflection, which is usually called, after the manner of the ancients, the Age of the Seven Wise Men. It was an age of reflection. The simple devotion to the conventions of the previous age had ceased, and social consciousness was profoundly disturbed. Individuals began to go their own ways. Notable men appeared, and earnestly exhorted x society to come back to its senses. Rules of life were established. In riddle, in anecdote, in epigram, the moral izing sermon was made palatable, and " winged words " passed from mouth to mouth. But, let it be remembered, these homilies are possible only when the individual op poses the vagaries of the mob, and with independent judg ment brings to consciousness the maxims of right conduct. Tradition selected early seven of such men, to whom it gave the name of the Wise Men. They were not men of erudition, nor of science, but men of practical wisdom, and in the main of remarkable political ability.2 They pointed out the right thing to do in critical moments, and therefore 1 With this conception about the Seven Wise Men, it is conceivable that Plato (Protag., 343 a) should characterize them as forerunners of the old strong Dorian morality in contrast to the innovations of the Ionian movement : £r)\a>Tal kcu ipaaTal Kai jia6r]Tal rfjs AaKeSaijiovlaiv 7raidelas. 2 Dicaiarchus called them ouVf crocpoi/s ovre (f>iXocr6(povs, ovvtrovs hi rivas Kal vojioBeTiKovs. Diog. Laert., I. 40. 20 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY in public and private matters were authorities to their fellow-citizens. The spirit of Gnomic poetry was prom inent in the apothegms, the catchwords, which they are supposed to have uttered. Nothing was repeated by them so often and with so many phrasings as the /xvSev cvyav ! Tradition is not agreed as to the names of " the Seven." Four ' only are mentioned by all : Bias of Priene, who upon the invasion of the Persians recommended to the Ionians a migra tion to Sardinia; Pittacus, who was tyrant of Mitylene, about 600 b. c. ; Solon, the law-giver of Athens and the Gnomic poet ; Thales, founder of the Milesian philosophy, who advised the Ionians to form a federation with a joint council in Teos. The names of the others vary. The later age ascribed to the Seven all kinds of aphorisms, letters, etc. (collected and translated into German, but without critical investigation, by C. Dilthey, Darmstadt, 1835). 2 While in this way, through political and social relations, the independence of individual judgment was educated first on its practical side, and the propensity was formed for expressing such judgment, it was an inevitable con sequence that a similar emancipation of single individuals from the ordinary way of thinking should take place within the domain of theory. Independent judgment naturally ap peared at this point, and formed its own views about the connection of things. Nevertheless this propensity could manifest itself only in a revision and reconstruction of those materials, which the individuals discovered partly in the intellectual treasures accumulated previously in the nation's practical life, and partly in the religious ideas. 10. The practical knowledge of the Greeks had in creased to very remarkable dimensions between the time of Hesiod's Works and Days and the year 600 b. c. The inventive, trade-driving Ionians undoubtedly had learned very much from the Orientals, with whom they had inter- 1 Compare Cic. Rep., I. 12. Also Lael., 7. " Brunco, Ael. Sem.-Erl., III. 299 ff. GREEK PHILOSOPHY 21 course and of whom they were rivals. Among these, especially among the Egyptians, Phoenicians, and Assyrians, there existed knowledge that had been garnered through many centuries, and it is incredible that the Greeks should not have appropriated it wherever opportunity offered. The question how much the Greeks learned from the Orient has passed through many stages. In opposition to the un critical, often fantastic, and untenable statements of the later Greeks, who tried to derive everything important of their own teaching from the honorable antiquity of Oriental tradition, later philology, in its admiration for everything Greek, has persistently espoused the theory of an autochthonic genesis. But the more the similarities with the Oriental civilization, and the relations between the different forms of the old and the Greek culture have been brought to the light by acquaint ance with the ancient Orient, dating from the beginning of this century ; and the more, on the other hand, philosophy understood the continuity of the historical moments of civiliza tion ; so much the more decided became the tendency to refer the beginnings of Greek science to Oriental influences, particu larly in the history of philosophy. With brilliant fancy A. Roth (Gesch. unserer abendliindischen Philos., Mannheim, 1858 f.,) attempted to rehabilitate the accounts of the neo-Platonists, who by interpretation and perversion had read into the mythic narratives, which were introduced from the Orient, Greek philo sophical doctrines ; he then rediscovered these doctrines as prime val wisdom. With a forced construction, Gladisch (D. Religion u. d. Philos. in Hirer weltgesch. Entwick., Breslau, 1852) tried to see in all the beginnings of Greek philosophy direct relations to individual Oriental peoples ; and he so conceived the re lationship that the Greeks are supposed to have appropriated in succession the ripe products of all the other civilizations. This appears from the following titles of his special essays : Die Pythagoreer und die Schinesen (Posen, 1841) ; Die Eleaten und die Indier (Posen, 1844); Empedokles xind die Egypter (Leipzig, 1858) ; Heracleitos und Zoroaster (Leipzig, 1859) ; Anaxagoras und Israeliten (Leipzig, 1864). Besides the fact that they first found many analogies through an artful in terpretation, both Roth and Gladisch fell into the error of transmuting analogies into causal relations, where equally notable disparities might also have been found. Moreover, where, as usual, religion is concerned, that of the Greeks, which 22 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY has influenced the beginnings of science in so many ways, was found to be in genetic and historical relationship with that of the Orient. Such exaggerations are certainly censurable. But, on the other hand, it would be denying the existence of the suu at noontide to refuse to acknowledge that the Greeks in great measure owe their information to contact with the barbarians. It is here even as in the history of art. The Greeks imported a large amount of information out of the Orient. This con sisted in special facts of knowledge, particularly of a mathe matical and astronomical kind, and consisted perhaps besides in certain mythological ideas. But with the recognition of this sit uation, which recognition in the long run is inevitable, one does not rob the Greeks in the least of their true originality. For as they in art derived particular forms and norms from Egyptian and Assyrian tradition, but in the employment and reconstruction of these used their own artistic genius, so there flowed in upon them too from the Orient many kinds of knowledge, arising out of the work and practical needs of many centuries, and various kinds of mythological tales, born of the religious imagination. But nevertheless they were the first to transmute this knowledge into a wisdom sought on account of itself. This spirit of sci ence, like their original activity, resulted from emancipated and independent individual thought, to which Oriental civilization had not attained. Principally in mathematics and astronomy do the Greeks appear as the pupils of the Orientals. Since economic needs compelled the Phoenicians to make an arithmetic, and from early times led the Egyptians to construct a geometry, it is probable that in these things the Greeks were pupils rather than teachers of their neighbors. A proposition like that concerning proportionality and its application to perspective, Thales did not communicate to the Egyptians, but derived from them.1 Although there are further ascribed to him propositions like that concerning the halving of the circle by the diameter, the isosceles triangle, the vertical angles, the equality of triangles having a side and two angles equal, yet it may be safely concluded in every instance that these elementary propositions were generally known to the Greeks 1 See § 24. GREEK PHILOSOPHY 23 of his time. It is likewise a matter of indifference whether Pythagoras himself discovered the theorem named after him or whether his school established it, whether the discovery was the result of pure geometrical reasoning or was an actual measurement with the square and by an arithmetical calcu lation, as Rcith says. Here, again, the reality of such knowl edge at that time is rendered certain, and its suggestion, at least, from the Oriental circle is probable. In any case, however, these studies in Greece soon flourished in a high degree. Anaxagoras was reported, for instance, to have busied himself in prison with the squaring of the circle. Astronomical thought had a similar status, for Thales pre dicted an eclipse of the sun, and it is highly probable that he here availed himself of the Chaldsean Saros. On the other hand, the cosmographical ideas ascribed to the oldest philosophers point to an Egyptian origin, especially that view, authoritative for later time, of concentric spherical shells in which the planets were supposed to move around the earth as a centre. From all reports it appears that the questions concerning the constitution of the world, of the size, distance, form, and rotation of the planets, of the incli nation of the ecliptic, etc., keenly interested every one of the ancient thinkers. The Milesians still thought the earth to be flat, cylindrical, or plate-shaped, floating upon a dark, cold atmosphere and in the middle of a world sphere. The Pythagoreans seem to be the first independently to discover the spherical shape of the earth. In the physics of this time the interest in meteorology is dominant. Every phi losopher felt bound to explain the clouds, air, wind, snow, hail, and ice. Not until later did an interest in biology awaken, and the mysteries of reproduction and propagation called forth a multitude of fantastic hypotheses (Parmeni- des, Empedocles, etc.). Deficiency in physiological and anatomical knowledge obviously delayed for a long time the progress of medical 24 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY science. Therefore we are safe in saying 1 that medical science was inherited in its original tradition entirely inde pendently of all other sciences as the esoteric teaching of certain priestly families ; and that philosophy also hardly had any connection with medicine down to about the time of the Pythagoreans. Medicine consisted simply in empir ical rules, technical facts, and a mass of data accumulated during the experience of centuries. It was not an serological science, but an art practised in the spirit of religion. We have still the oath of the Asclepiades (a priestly order of this sort, which however had also lay brethren), who as well as the gymnasts practised the art of healiug. Such medical orders or schools existed notably in Rhodes, Cyrene, Cro- tona, Cos, and Cnidus. Rules for the treatment of the sick wrere partly codified in documents, and Hippocrates knew two versions of the yva>g,ai KviStat, (Cnidian sentences), the more valuable of which (larpi/cwTepop) came from Euryphon of Cnidus. Likewise the geographical knowledge of the Greeks had reached a high degree of completeness about this time. The broad commercial activity whereby they visited the Mediterranean Sea and all its coasts had essentially trans formed and enriched the Homeric picture of the world. It is stated that Anaximander drew up the first map of the world. The statement of Herodotus " is interesting, that Aris- tagoras, by showing such a chart in Lacedremon, sought to awaken the continental Greeks to a realizing sense of the menaced geographical situation of Greece by the Persian Empire. Historical knowledge too was beginning to be accu mulated at this time, — yet strikingly late for a people like the Greeks. From the old epic had issued the theo- gonic poetry, on the one hand, and the heroic on the other. 1 Haser, Lehrbuch d. Gesch. d. Medizin, 2 ed., §§ 21-25. 2 V. 49. GREEK PHILOSOPHY 25 Collections of saga and of the histories of the founding of cities, as they had been gathered by the logographers, were added to these for the first time in the Ionian cities of Asia Minor. Men, who after long journeys gave to their logog- raphies greater extent and variety of interest, introduced then that form of historical presentation which we may still recognize in Herodotus. At the same time, however, this was pressed into the background by the grouping of all accounts around the important event of the Persian wars. In place of fantastic fables about strange people in the form that Aristeas of Proconnesus related them, we now have the more sober reports of the logographers. Of these there appeared, in the sixth century, Cadmus, Dionysius, and especially Hecateius of Miletus, with his irepirjyvai<;, in which geography and history are closely interwoven. In these men realistic considerations had taken the place of sesthetical, and their writings therefore have the prose rather than the poetic form. About 600 b. c. the intellectual circle of the Greeks was replete with this manifold and important knowledge, and it is clear that there were men, otherwise favorably conditioned in life, who took a direct and immediate interest in knowl edge which had hitherto been employed for the most varied practical ends. They planned how to order, classify, and extend these acquisitions. It is likewise comprehensible liow scientific schools for the same purposes were formed, as it might happen, around distinguished men, and how in these schools by co-operative labor a kind of scholastic order and tradition maintained itself from one generation to another. After the investigations of H. Diels (Philos. Aufsdtze z. Zel- lerjubilaum, Berlin, 1887, p. 241 f.) it can scarcely be doubted that in this very early time the scientific life of the Greeks constituted itself into closed corporations, and that the learned societies already at that time carried all the weight of judicial- religious associations (Oi&q-oC) which v. Wilamowitz-Mollendprf, 26 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY (Antigonos von Karystos, p. 263 f.) has already proved for the later schools. The Pythagoreans were undoubtedly such an association. The schools of physicians were organized on the same principle, — perhaps still more rigorously in the form of the priestly orders. Why, then, should this not be the case with the schools of Miletus, Elea, and Abdera? 11. Likewise, in the religious notions of the Greeks lay certain definite points of departure for the beginnings of their philosophy, especially since those religious notions were in the liveliest fermentation about the time of the seventh and sixth centuries. This is accounted for by the great vitality which from the beginning characterized the religious existence of the Greeks by reason of their unparalleled development. Out of the early differentiation of originally common ideas, out of the capricious formation of local cults within families, tribes, cities, and provinces, incidentally also out of the introduction of distinctive foreign religious ceremonies, there grew up a rich and, as it were, confusingly iridescent variety of religions. Stand ing over against this, epic poetry had already created its Olympus, its poetic purification, and its human ennobling of the original, mythical forms. These products of poetry came to be the national religious property of the Hellenes. But along with the veneration of these products there were the old cults that shut themselves up only the more closely in the Mysteries, in which now as ever the peculiar energy of religious craving expressed itself in a service of expiation and redemption. With the advance of civiliza tion, however, the aesthetic mythology succumbed to a gradual change in two directions which had been blended indistinguishably in the Olympian forms. The first direc tion was toward mythical explanation of nature ; the second was toward ethical idealizing. The first tendency showed itself in the development of the cosmogonic out of the epic poetry. Cosmogonic poetry GREEK PHILOSOPHY 27 shows how the individual poets with their peculiar fancies studied the question of the origin of things, and in addition mythologized the great powers of nature in a traditional or freely creative form. Two groups can be distinguished among them, corresponding to the .different interpreta tions of Homeric poetry. Such of the Orphic theogonies, which go back thus far, belong, with the sole exception of Hesiod, to one group, and Epimenides and Acusilaus are among its better defined historic names. Whether they presuppose only Chaos or Night as the original powers, or whether with these Air, Earth, Heaven, or something else, — they appear reasonably enough in Aristotle as ol Ik. wktos ). He appears to have represented in grotesque images the " five-fold " development of individual things out of the rational principle. 1 Whom some try to identify with Anaxagoras. See Carus, Nach gelassene Werke, 4 vols., 330 f. ; Zeller, I4. 924 f. 2 Xpovos may mean something else. Zeller, I4. 73. 28 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY Sturz (Leipzig, 1834) has published the fragments of Pherecydes. Roth, out of most uncertain data, Gesch. unserer abendlaudischen Philos., II. 161 f., tried to attribute to Phere cydes the introduction into Greece of Egyptian metaphysics and astronomy. J. Conrad (Coblenz, 1X57), R. Zimmermann, Studien u. Kritiken (Vienna, 1870, 1 f.), also treat the " phi losophy " of Pherecydes. See H. Diels, Arch. f. Gesch. d. Philos., I. 11. These later cosmogonies were apparently already under the influence of the ethical movement, which had pressed into the circle of religious ideas, and, as against the nature- mythical interpretation that ascribed aesthetic character to the different gods, sought to embody in them the ideal of moral life. The second tendency comes to light in the Gnomic poetry in particular. Zeus is thus (Solon) honored less as creator of Nature than as ruler of the moral world. The fifth century, in following out this idea, saw the Homeric mythology expressed completely in ethico-alle- gorical terms (especially ascribed to Metrodorus of Lamp- sacus, a pupil of Anaxagoras). Three moments especially in the ethicizing of religious ideas appear : (1) the gradual stripping off of naive anthropomorphism from the gods, which led to a violent opposition to aesthetic mythology on the part of Xenophanes, who was a direct descendant in this respect of the Gnomic poets ; (2) necessarily connected with the above, the development of the monotheistic germs contained in the previous ideas ; (3) the emphasis on the thought of moral retribution in the form of faith in immor tality and transmigration. So far as the last two thoughts belonged with a greater or less degree of clearness also to the Mysteries, they were in some degree the centre of an ethical reaction against the pantheon " constructed by the poets." 12. In this direction tended the great movement which shook the western part of civilized Greece about the end of the sixth century, and in many ways influenced the devel- GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 29 opment of science. This movement is the ethico-religious reformation of Pythagoras. It is absolutely necessary, in the interest of historical clear ness, to distinguish Pythagoras from the Pythagoreans, and the practice of the former from the science of the latter. The in vestigations of modern time have more and more led to this distinction. The accounts of the later ancients (neo-Pythago- rean and neo-Platonic) had gathered so many myths about the personality of Pythagoras, and had so ascribed to him the ripest and highest thoughts of Greek philosophy through direct and indirect falsification, that he became a mysterious and entirely inconceivable form. But the fact that the cloud of myths should thicken from century to century in ancient time around him, makes it necessary1 to go back to the oldest and, at the same time, most authoritative accounts. Therein it ap pears that neither Plato nor Aristotle knew anything about a philosophy of Pythagoras, but simply make mention of a philosophy of the "so-called Pythagoreans." Nowhere is the "number theory" referred to the "Master" himself. It is also to be regarded as highly probable that Pythagoras himself wrote nothing. At any rate, nothing is preserved which can be confidently attributed to him, and neither Plato nor Aristotle knew of anything of the sort. On the other hand, the first philo sophical writing of the school is that of Philolaus,2 the con temporary of Anaxagoras, and therefore of Socrates and Democritus. This philosophic teaching will be set forth in the place which belongs to it chronologically in the develop ment of Greek philosophy (§ 24). Pythagoras himself, how ever, in the light of historical criticism, appears only as a kind of founder of religion, and a man of grand ethical and political efficiency. His work had an important place among the causes and the preliminary conditions of the scientific life in Greece. Concerning the life of Pythagoras little is certain. He came from an old Tyrrhean-Phliasian stock, which had migrated to his home, Samos, at the latest in the time of his grandfather. Here he was born, somewhere between the years 580 and 570, as the son of Mnesarchus, a rich merchant. It is not impos sible that differences that arose between him and Polycrates, or the antipathy of the aristocrat to this tyrant, drove him out of 1 See Zeller, I4. 256 ff., against A. Roth (Gesch. unserer abendlan. Phi los., II. b, 261 f., 48 f.). Zeller shows clearly that Pythagoras had no philosophy. 2 Diojf. Laert.. YIII. 15, 85. 30 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY Samos, where he seems to have entered already upon a careei similar to that of his later life. It is not to be determined with perfect surety, but may be regarded as by no means im probable, that he made a kind of educative journey to investi gate the sanctuaries and cults of Greece. At this time he came to know Pherecydes. This journey may have extended also into foreign lands as far as Egypt.1 About the year 530, however, he settled in Magna Graacia, the region where (at a time when Ionia already was struggling with Persia for existence) were brought together, in the most splendid way, Greek power aud Greek culture. Here was still a more motley mixture of Hellenic stocks, and here between cities, and in the cities between parties, the battle for existence was most passion ately waged. Pythagoras appeared here and preached, founded his new sect, and met with the most decided success. He chose the austere and aristocratic Crotona as the centre of his operations. It appears that his sect co-operated in the decisive battle (510 b. c.) in which Crotona destroyed its democratic rival, the voluptuous Sybaris. But very soon after that event democracy became predominant in Crotona itself and in other cities, and the Pythagoreans were cruelly persecuted. These persecutions were more than once repeated in the first half of the fifth century, and the sect was entirely dispersed. Whether Pythagoras in one of these persecutions, perhaps even in the very first instigated by Cylon in 504, found his end, or whether in another .way, or where, when, and how, is uncertain. His death is surrounded by myths, but we shall have to place it at about 5C0. Jamblichus, De vita Pythagorica, and Porphyry, De vita Pythugorce (ed. Kissling, Leipzig, 1815-16, etc.), H. Ritter, Geschiohte der pythagorischen Philosophie (Hamburg, 1826) ; B. Krische, De societatis a Pythagora in urbe Crotoniatarum con- ditce scopo politico (Gottingen, 1830) ; E. Zeller, Pyth. u. die Pyth.-saga, Vortrag u. Abhdl. I. (Leipzig, 1865) 30 ff. ; Ed. Chaignet, Pythagore et la philosophie pythagoricienne (Paris, 1873) ; L. v. Schroeder, Pyth. u. d. Inder (Leipzig, 1884) ; P. Tannery, Arch. f. Gesch. d. Ph., I. 29 ff. On the one hand, Pythagoras found his purpose in the moral clarification and purification of the world of religious 1 There is scarcely a ground for doubting the testimony of Isocrates (Busir, 11). The circumstances of the second half of the sixth century make it appear as in no wise an exceptional case that the son of a patri cian of Samos should journey to Egypt. GREEK PHILOSOPHY 31 ideas. He stood in this respect entirely in line with the progress and innovation of the time, and he antagonized, as a point of view antiquated or coming to be so, the religion of the poets, in which he missed a moral earnestness. On the other hand, he was inspired by the same ethical impulse against that weakening of the moral bond to which the new methods of Greek social life threatened to lead, and in fact had already led. He called, therefore, for a return to the old institutions and convictions. Especially in politics, he represented a reaction in favor of the aristoc racy as opposed to the growing democratic movement. This opposition determined the peculiar position of the Pythag orean society. The society was, in truth, one of the most important factors in the religious and intellectual advance of the Greek spirit, and at the same time it flung itself against the current of the time as regards ethics and politics.1 As to the latter, the Ionian Pythagoras preferred the more conservative Dorian character, and the "Italian philosophy" founded by him passed among the ancients as an antithesis to the Ionian. The emphasis upon the unity of the divine Being and a purely moral conception of the same was carried no farther by Pythagoras and by the Pythagoreans than by the Gnomic poets. Neither was the conception of the purely spiritual here attained, nor a scientific foundation and presentation given to ethical concepts, nor, finally, a sharp contradiction made to the polytheistic popular religion. (Of course we do not in clude in this 'statement the doctrines of the neo-Pythagorean and neo-Platonic schools.) On the contrary, Pythagoras had the pedagogic acumen to develop these higher conceptions from those existing in the myths and religious ceremonies. He used in this way the Mysteries, especially the Orphic, and he himself appears to have been connected with the cult of Apollo in particular. He laid particular emphasis upon the doctrine of immortality and its application to a theory of moral religious retribution, and this also took the mythic form of the doctrine i Similarly and on a larger scale this is repeated by Plato's work. 32 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY' of metempsychosis. But doubtless the Mysteries themselves contained much in harmony with the doctrine of transmigra tion, especially those Mysteries of the chthonic divinities. But to the ordinary Greeks transmigration was and remained a foreign conception, which in early times they had mocked at,1 aud they were most inclined to lay it at the door of foreign influence. Whatever of the Pythagorean ethical teaching is certainly proved, may be found in the Gnomic teachings. But at all events we see there, in the consciousness of duty, in introspec tion, and in subordination to authority, a greater earnestness and rigor, with at the same time a decided abandonment of sense-pleasure and a powerful tendency to spiritualize life.2 Many ascetic tendencies doubtless were already connected with tins. The pronounced political turn which Pythagoras at the same time gave to his society determined its fate and led it first to victory, then to destruction. Yet this political tendency is not to be regarded as original, but as the natural consequence of the moral-religious ideal of life. In order to attain such a goal, Pythagoras founded at first in Crotona his religious society, which soon spread over a greater part of Magna Graecia. But this sect was, to be sure, at first only a kind of Mysteries, and nearest related to it were the Orpines. It is to be distinguished from these only so far as it expressly determined also the political and in part even the private life of its members by its regulations. It sought to evolve also a general educa tion and an all-round method of life out of its moral- religious principle. Its most commendable feature was, that within the society the external goods of life were relatively little prized, and the common activities were directed toward fostering science and art. Thus, the religious in time became a scientific 6'iaaoq. To Pythago ras himself may be referred the thorough study of music, 1 See Xenophanes' witty distich against it : Diog. Laert. , VIII. 36. - The so-called " golden poem" wherein the Pythagorean rules of life arc laid down was, according to 'Mullach, collated by Lysis. Zeller is certainly right in saying that it was probably earlier handed down in verse form. GREEK PHILOSOPHY 33 and perhaps in the same connection the beginnings of mathematical investigations which therefore, like medicine, have a point of departure equally independent of that of " general philosophy." 1 It is no longer certain how much the society directed by Pythagoras himself was in possession of all of the rules by which, according to later accounts, the community life of the members, their initiation, their education even to the particulars of each day's duties, were provided for. The conception taken from later analogies is scarcely credible, that the Pythagoreans were a secret society in which the novitiate first after a long preparation and after the performance of many symbolical formalities could share in the " mysteries." Roth in particular has tried to re-establish this distinction of the esoteric and ex oteric. Pythagoreanism was certainly no more and no less a secret society than all the other Mysteries, and there is not the slightest ground for assuming a secret science in it. That the stimulus given by Pythagoras to the spiritual community of life was concerned with music and mathematics, may safely be accepted. All else is doubtful, and probably fabulous. So, too, it is impossible to find out anything certain as to the founder's personal familiarity with these subjects. Even the well-known geometrical proposition is not to be attributed to him in entire confidence. He himself belongs rather to the religious and political life. But the spirit in which he founded his school was of such a nature that scientific interest could and actually did flourish in it. 13. In Greek national life such were the essential condi tions for the origin of the philosophy which appeared at the beginning of the sixth century as an independent phenom enon. Its entire course, however, since it was dependent upon the general civilization of the nation, shows a gradual drifting from circumference to centre. The beginnings lie scattered in those circles of Hellenic life where, in friendly as well as in hostile contact with neighboring peoples, it first developed into full independence. Afterwards in the entire Sophistic Enlightenment philosophy centred itself in 1 See G. Cantor, Vorlesungen Uber d. Gesch. d. Math., T. 125 f, 3 34 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY the Athens of Pericles ; and there through the great per sonality of Socrates it became naturalized, it perfected itself, and established its great schools. Subjectively viewed, the development of Greek science is a fully rounded whole. Like all naive and natural think ing, it began with a recognition of the outer world. Its first tendency was entirely cosmological, and it passed through the physical into metaphysical problems. Foundering in these and at the same time troubled by the dialectic of public life, the Spirit made itself an object of reflection. An anthropological period began, in which man appeared as the most worthy object of consideration, and ultimately as the only object of investigation. Finally, science in its perfected strength, acquired in the profound study of the laws of its reason, turned back to the old problems, the conquest of which came to it now in great systematic continuity. See § 2, note. — Hegel, Gesch. der Philos., Complete Works, Vol. XIII. 188. If one strips away the formal from Hegel's terminology, which served him in his systematization of the historical processes, then one meets here, as so often in Hegel, an inspired insight, with which he apprehended the essential features in the development of historical phenomena. The origins of scientific reflection are to be sought in the cities of the seacoast of Ionia, which were in a flourishing condition about 600 b. c. The happy nature of the Ionian race was here accompanied by all the necessary material, social, and intellectual requisitions for science. Its men tal alertness, its frequently dangerous curiosity for the novel, and its creative talent were remarkable. Here, for the first time, mature minds brought their independent judg ment to bear not only upon practical but upon theoretical questions. 1 The idea of the connection of things was no 1 Plutarch Sol., 3 (concerning Thales) : Trepairipai rqs xpfi'n? c8eipeTai TeXevraiov, ttjs psv oto~ias vnopevov- (ttjs, tols Se TrdBeoi peraftaXkovo-Tjs, tovto o-tci^Iov kcu tovttjv dp^rjv (pao-iv elvai rai/ cvtojv. Omitting the deduction of the Aristotelian categories, oxkt'm and Ttddos, this definition of dp^f], which furnishes an immediate suggestion of the transition from the temporal to the conceptual, may be taken as historical in the sense that it existed among the old Ionians. It is of little importance who introduced the term dpx'] in this concep tual way. Simpl. Phys. , 6 recto, 24, 1 3 asserts it to be due to Anaxi mander. The thought was already present in Thales. 2 It is evident that one need not limit the Milesian philosophy to these three well-known men ; but nothing is traditionally certain. For the allusion of Theophrastus, who (Simpl. Phys., 6) speaks of pre decessors of Thales, may also be applied to the cosmogonies ; and the reports of Aristotle, according to which the physicists were those who accepted as dp^ij the intermediaries between air and water (De ccelo, III. 5, 303 b, 12) or between air and fire (Phys., I. 4, 187 a, 14) leave open the possibility and probability that he has in mind the later eclec tic stragglers. Compare § 25. THE MILESIAN NATURE PHILOSOPHY 37 R. Ritter, Gesch. der ionischen Philosophie (Berlin, 1821) ; R. Seydel, Der Fortschritt der Metaphysik unter den dltesten ioni schen Philosophen (Leipzig, 1861) ; P. Tannery, Pour V histoire de la science hellene, I. (Paris, 1887). Thales (about 600 b. c.) answered the question concern ing the substantial constitution of the world (Weltstoff) by declaring it to be water. This is the only assertion that can be attributed to him with perfect certainty. Even Aristotle,1 who could give only traditional reports concern ing Thales, as early as his time had only conjectures about the grounds of this assertion. When Aristotle states that the moist character of the animal seed and animal nutri tion was the occasion for this statement of Thales (and to Aristotle's iuference,2 all later supplementary conjectures appear to refer), we are permitted to attribute this inference to the specific interest in biology, which appealed strongly to the Stagirite, but, for all we know, not at all to Thales. More probable is the conjecture, likewise reported by Aristotle,3 which brings the teaching of Thales into connec tion with ancient cosmological ideas. In these the ocean was considered the oldest and most important thing. It would be exceedingly strange if the Ionian thinker, in an swer to the question as to the constitution of the world, had not decided in favor of the element so important to his people. The thought of its infinite mobility, its transfor mation into earth and air, its all-engulfing violence, could not but have held an important place in the minds of sea faring folk. The reported cosmographical 4 ideas of Thales also agree with this, for ho is said to have thought that the earth floated in water, and to have given, in connection with this, a Neptunian explanation of earthquakes. 1 Met., I. 3, 983 b, 22, hafiav 'iaas rrjv vno\r]\lnv. 2 Pint. Plac.phil., I. 3 (Dox., 276). Compare Zeller, I4. 175, 2. 8 See beyond. 4 Arist. De caelo, TT. 13, 294 n, 28. 38 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY But it makes no difference whether Thales came to his assertion more through organic than inorganic observations. So much is clear, that the chemical composition of water, the pure H20, did not determine his choice of it as the cos mic matter. Rather its fluid state of aggregation and the important role that it played in the mobile life of nature determined his decision, so that in the ancient reports iypov is often substituted for vSoop. The idea of Thales seems to have been to select as the world stuff that form of matter, which promised to make most readily compre hensible, the transformation on the one hand to the solid, on the other to the volatile. More definite data concern ing the modus operandi of these changes do not appear to have been furnished by Thales. It must remain problemat ical whether he, like the later philosophers, conceived this process of change as a condensation and rarefaction. At any rate, Thales represented this fluid cosmic matter as in continuous self-motion. Of a force moving matter and distinguishable from it, he taught nothing.1 In naively considering an event as a thing requiring no further explanation, he advocated, like his followers, the so-called hylozoistic theory, which represents matter as eo ipso moving and on that account animated. With this are compatible his irdvTa ir\rjprj 8eo>v elvai 2 and his ascrip tion of a soul to the magnet.3 The scientific view of the world had obviously at this stage not yet excluded the im aginative view of nature held by Greek mythology. 1 According to the statements of the later writers (Cicero, De nat. dcor., I. 10), Thales placed in antithesis to the cosmic matter the form ing divine spirit. Such statements betray, on the one hand, the termi nology of the Stoics, and on the other lead us to infer a confounding of Thales with Anaxagoras. The hylozoism of all the ancient physicists, including Thales, is affirmed by Aristotle in Met., I. 3. 2 Arist. De anima, I. 5; 411 a, 8. 8 Ibid., I. 2, 405 a, 20. THE MILESIAN NATURE PHILOSOPHY 39 The time in which Thales lived is determined by an eclipse, which he is said to have predicted. In accordance with modern investigations (Zech, Astronomische Untersuchutigen iiber die wichtigsten Finsternisse, Leipzig, 1853), this must be placed in the year 585 b. c. His life falls, at all events, in the flourishing period of Miletus under Thrasybulus. The year of his birth cannot be exactly determined ; his death may be placed directly after the Persian invasion in the middle of the sixth century (Diels, Rhein. Mus., XXXI. 15 f.). He belonged to the old family of the Thelides, which sprang from the Boeotian Cadmians, who migrated into Asia Minor. Hence the state ment that he was of Phoenician derivation (Zeller, I4. 169, 1). See § 9 for his practical and political activity ; § 10, for his knowledge of mathematics and physics. The Egyptian jour neys which later literature reports, are at least doubtful ; although, provided that he was engaged in commerce, they are not impossible. None of the writings of Thales are cited by Aristotle, and it is consequently doubtful if he committed any thing to writing. 15. If Thales is to be regarded as the first physicist, we meet the first metaphysician in the person of his somewhat younger countryman, Anaximander (611-545 b. a). For his answer to the question concerning the constitution of the universe is already to be essentially distinguished, in its content as well as in its fundamentals, from that of Thales. Thales had sought to find the cosmic matter in the empiri cally known, and had seized upon what appears as the most completely mutable. If Anaximander was not content with this theory, it was on account of his pronounced principle 1 that the cosmic matter must be thought as infinite, so that it may not be thought to exhaust itself in its creations. From this it followed immediately that the cosmic matter cannot be found among empirically given forms of matter, all of which are limited. Thus there remained for the definition of the cosmic matter only the quality of its spatial and temporal infinity. Consequently Anaximander said that the dpyf] is the d-rretpov. 1 Arist. Phys., III. 8, 208 a, 8-. see Plut. Plac, I. 3 (Dox., 277), "va rj ytveais p.7] imXelirrj. 40 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY The most important aspect of this dictum is that here, for the first time, is the step taken from the concrete to the abstract, from the anschaulich to the begrijftich. Anaxi mander explained the sensuously given by the concept. The advance consisted in the fact that the aireipov is dis tinguished from all perceptible forms of matter. Anaxi mander thus referred the world of experience to a reality beyond experience, the idea of which arises from a concep tual postulate. He characterized this transcendent reality by all the predicates which his mind conceived as requisite for the cosmic matter. He called it addvarov Kal dvmXe- Opov, dykvvgrov Kal d^Oaprov ; 1 he described it as including all things (irepte^eiv) and as determining their motion (Kvfiepvdv) ; 2 and he designated it in this sense as to Oeiov. But with this first metaphysical concept began then also the difficulty of giving a content to it. That Anaximander conceived the aireipov to be pre-eminently a spatial and temporal infinity, follows from the way in which he arrived at this principle. Concerning his attitude, however, toward the question of the qualitative determination of the aireipov, both antiquity and still more modern investiga tors have apparently had divided opinions. The simplest and the most natural theory to entertain is the following : that Anaximander did not express himself about the quality of this imperceivable cosmic matter, for the ancient ac counts agree that he did not identify it with any one of the known elements. More questionable, certainly, is it whether lie, as Herbart (Complete Works, I. 196) and his school (Striimpell, I. 29) are inclined to accept, expressly denied the qualitative determination of the cosmic matter, which would have anticipated the Platonic-Aristotelian conception i Arist. Phys., III. 4, 203 b, 8. Likewise dtSio' and dyijpa, see Hippol. Ref. hair., I. 6 (Dox., 559). 2 Which expression does not mean, as Roth thinks (Gesch. unserer abendl. Philos., II. 142), " a mental guidance." See Zeller, I4. 204, 1. THE MILESIAN NATURE PHILOSOPHY 41 of matter as an undetermined possibility. But, on the other hand, it is certain that Anaximander thought of the aireipov always as corporeal,1 and only the kind of cor poreality can be subject to controversy. The hypothesis, too, expressed repeatedly in later antiquity, is untenable, viz., that he asserted the cosmic matter to be an inter mediary state between water and air, or air and fire. On the contrary, the combination of the Anaximandrian prin ciple with the pdyp,a of Empedocles and Anaxagoras2 which Aristotle gives, led even in antiquity to the conception of the aireipov as a mixture of all the empirical material elements. If now, also, the adherence of Anaximander to hylozoistic monism is — as Aristotle says it is — so very certain that one cannot make him (with Ritter, op. cit.y the father of mechanical physics, in opposition to Ionian dynamics,3 yet, on the other hand, it is incontrovertible that Anaximander in some conjecturable, obscure way must have stated that the aireipov contains in itself all known material elements, and then differentiates these elements in the cosmic process.4 Doubtless he held an attitude of uncertainty as to the relationship of the aireipov to these particular elements, similar to the mythological primeval idea of Chaos, which idea, to be sure, had already been greatly purified, but not yet thoroughly elaborated and assimilated. Accordingly Anaximander was doubtless content in merely indicating as eKKpiveo-Oai the development of par- 1 Compare Zeller, I4. 186, 1, as against Michelis, De an. infinito (Braunsberg, 1874). 2 Arist. Met., XT. 2, 1069 b, 22 : to which add especially Phys., I. 4, 187 a, 20 : ol d €K tov tvbs ivovvas tcis evavTioTrjras iKKpiveo-Qai, fixmep A.va^ip.avo'pos (fiijoi kt\. Compare § 22. * Brandis, Handbuch, I. 125. 4 Arist. Met., XI. 2, and Theophrastus (Simpl. Phys., 6) interpret this as a hvvapei inclusion. The dwdpov became to them their dopiaros v\tj. 42 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY ticular things from the cosmic matter. Indeed he caused the antithetical Warm and Cold to be differentiated from the aireipov as its first qualitative determinations. Out of the mixture of these two qualities was supposed to be formed then the Fluid, the fundamental material of the finite empirical world. Thus the metaphysical basis to the theory of Thales was complete ; for Anaximander taught that the particular parts of the world had been differentiated out of the Fluid. These were the earth, air, and the fire encircling the whole. The philosopher inserted into this meteorological account of the origin of the world a multitude of single astronom ical ideas (§ 10) which, even if they appear childish to us to-day, nevertheless not only show a many-sided in terest in nature, but also presuppose independent obser vations and conclusions. Anaximander reflected upon the facts of organic life also, and there is preserved one obser vation of his in accord x with the modern evolution theory. This is to the effect that animals appeared when the primi tive liquid earth dried up, and were originally fish in form. Then some of them, adapting themselves to their new envi ronment, became land animals. This process of develop ment, in its naive explanation, includes even man. The single qualitative differentiations are lost again in the perpetual life-process of the cosmic matter, in the same way that they arise out of the aireipov. Anaximander, in the single fragment verbally preserved to us, has described this reabsorption in a poetic 2 manner — reminding us of original Oriental-religious ideas — as a kind of compensation for the injustice of individual existence. e'£ &>v Se ?; yevqa-is ecrn rot? oval, Kai rr;v (fadopdv et? ravra yiveaOai Kara to yjpe&v. 8ib~6vai yap avra hiKnv Kal ricriv [iXA^oi?] rrjs dSiKia? Kara 1 Plut. Plac., V. 19 (Dox., 430) ; Hippol. Ref. hoer., I. 6 (Dox., 560). Compare Teichmuller, Studien, I. 63 f, 2 Simpl. Phys., V, 24, 13. THE MILESIAN NATURE PHILOSOPHY 43 rgv rod xpovov "rdf-tv. To this Anaximander united the theory, also similarly Oriental, that the cosmic matter in perpetual transformation creates out of itself world-systems, and again absorbs them.1 Whether to the view of an end less plurality of successive world-formations was connected also that of a plurality of co-existing worlds, contained in the primitive matter, remains undecided and not probable.2 The determination of the dates of the life of Anaximander rests upon the arbitrary statement of ApoUodorus, that in the second year of the fifty-eighth Olympiad he was sixty-four years old and directly afterwards died. (Diog. Laert., II. 2.) This is not far from the truth. Further of his biography is not known. His work, to which some one gave the title mpi vs yap avp.^aiveiv pr) eivai tovs Beovs irore. 6 Compare Simpl. Phys., 6r, 22, 26 ; ev to ovkcu itav . . . Eevo(j)dvr]v . . , viroTiBeoBni. 48 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY so energetically defended against the polytheism of the myth, is consequently not theistic but entirely pantheistic, as we use the terms. World and God to Xenophanes are identical, and all the single things of perception lose them selves in that one, unchanging, universal essence.1 In con sequence of his religious predilection, however, Xenophanes emphasized the singleness of the divine cosmic principle more decidedly than the Milesians, to whom this is a self- evident principle, owing to their concept of the dpxv- It remains indeed doubtful whether the entire Zeno-like argu ment for this, founded on the superlatives " mightiest " and " best," can be ascribed to him.2 To the quality of singleness, however, Xenophanes further ascribed to the cosmic deity that of unity 3 in the sense of qualitative unity and inner homogeneity. Nevertheless, of what this consists he had as little to say as Anaximander con cerning the qualitative constitution of the aireipov. In his poetry he attributed to the Godhead in an incidental way all possible functions and powers, spiritual i as well as material.5 Yet out of the mass of his utterances Aristotle could obtain6 only an indefinite and obscure assertion of the essential homogeneity of all being. It was of greater importance, however, for future philosophical development that Xenophanes followed to its logical conclusion the con cept of qualitative unity ; and that moreover he extended 1 According to Sext. Emp. Pyrr. hypot., T. 33, the sillograph Timon makes him say ; 07017/ yap epbv voov eipvoaipi Els ev ravro re ndi> dveXvero • irdv 6' ebv ale\ Uuvtv ave\Kopevov plav els (pvoiv eora& bpoiav. 2 De Xen. Zen. Gorgias, 977 a, 23 ; Simpl. Phys., 1. c. 3 In which the ambiguity of the ev played a great role. 4 Sext. Emp. Adv. math., IX. 144 : ovkos Spa. oUXos Se vnel, ovkos he t aKovei. Simpl. Phys., 6r, 23, 18 : dXX dirdvevBe novoio voov 6' Kal ovo~ev g,evei, ho gave at the same time the obverse of the proposition, viz., the denial of the permanent. Here in this is Heracleitus, " the Dark," essentially distinguished from the Milesian philosophers, with whom he, under the name of the " Ionian natural philosophers," is generally classed (§ 16). Heracleitus found nothing permanent in the perceptual world, and he gave up search for it. In the most varied phrase he presented the fundamental truth of the continuous transmutation of all things into one another. From every realm of life he seized ex amples, in order to point out the passage of opposites into each other. He described in bold figures the ceaselessness of change, which was to him the essence of the world, and needed no derivation and explanation. There are no truly existing things, but all things only become and pass away again in the play of perpetual world-movement. The dp^rj is not so much immutable matter in independent motion, as the Milesians had said, but is the motion itself, from which all forms of matter are later derived as products. This thought is stated by Heracleitus by no means with con ceptual clearness, but in sensuous pictures. Already the Milesian investigators had noted that all motion and change are connected with temperature changes (§16), and so Heracleitus thought that the eternal cosmic motion ex pressed itself by fire. Fire is the dpxV: I111* n()* as a stuff identical with itself in all its changes, but rather as the 1 Cratyl. , 402 a. THE METAPHYSICAL CONFLICT 53 ever-uniform process itself, in which all things rise and pass away. It is the world itself, therefore, in its unorigi- nating and unperishing mutability.1 The exceptional difficulty of this relationship was remarked by the ancients, and from it, especially, the Ephesian got his nickname, o-Koread?. Herein appeared the amalgamation of the abstract and the concrete, of the sensuous and the symboli cal, which, in general, characterized the entire thought and habit of expression of Heracleitus. Neither to oracular pride nor to the assumption of mysteriousness (Zeller, l4. 570 f.) is this deficiency to be attributed in his writing, but to inability to find an adequate form for his aspiring abstract thought. Besides this, a priestly ceremoniousness of tone is unmistak able. Hence the wrestling with language which appears in nearly all the fragments ; hence the rhetorical vehemence of expression and a heaping up of metaphors, in which a power ful and sometimes grotesque fancy is displayed. Concerning especially his fundamental teaching, his words seem to show in isolated passages that he had only substituted fire for water or air. But more exact search shows that the dpxj meant quite a different thing to him. He also identified fire and the world-all and fire and the Godhead ; ¦ — ¦ nay, hylozoic pantheism finds in the teaching of Heracleitus its own most perfect expression. Yet he meant that this world principle is only the movement represented in the fire. It is the cosmic process itself. Heracleitus proceeded from the point of view that the fire-motion is originally in itself the final ground of things, and accordingly no permanent Being is fundamental in it. He found fire to be the condition of every change, and therefore the object of scientific knowledge. But he did not only mean this in the sense that " nothing is perma nent save change," but also in the higher sense that this eternal movement completes itself in determined and ever- recurrent forms. From this metaphysical thesis he at tempted to understand the problem of the ever-permanent series of repetitions, the rhythm of movement and the law 1 Fr. 46 (Schust.) Koopov tov avrbv cmavTaiv ovre tis Beav ovre dvBpir lrcov eiroenoev, aXX' rjv del Kal eoriv irvp dei^toov. 54 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY of change. In obscure and undeveloped form originated here the conception of natural law. It appeared in the vesture of the mythical Eip,apg,evv, as an all-determining Fate, or an all-powerful AUv, menacing every deviation with punishment. Since it is to be regarded as the peculiar object of reason, he called it the Aoyos, — the reason that rules the world. In the later presentations of t'i s theory, in which its Stoicism appears, it is difficult to get at what is in itself peculiarly Heracleitan (Zeller, I4. 606 f.). But the fundamental thought of a world-order of natural phenomena cannot be denied to Heracleitus. Compare M. Heinze, Die Lehre vom Logos in der griechischen Philosophie (Leipzig, 1872). The most universal form A the cosmic process was, there fore, for Heracleitus that of opposition and its elimination. From the notion of the " flow of all things," it followed that every single thing in its continuous change unites in itself perpetually opposing determinations. Everything is only a transition, a point of limit between the vanishing and the about-to-be. The life of nature is a continuous pass ing into one another of ill opposites, and out of their strife come the individual things : ir6Xe/j,o<; irdvrwv g,ev irarr\p eari, irdvrwv Be ftaaiXevs.1 But as these antitheses ultimately arise only out of the universal and all-embracing, living, fiery, cosmic force, so they find their adjustment and reconciliation in this same fire. Fire is, in this respect, the " unseen har mony." 2 The world-all is consequently the self-divided 3 and the self-reuniting unity.4 It is at one and the same 1 Fr. 75. - Compare Fr. 8 : dppovlr] yap a^'avns ? By the first Way the original fire changes itself into water and then into earth through condensation ; by the second the earth changes back through liquefac tion to water and then to fire. This double process is true in one respect for the entire world ; for in regularly recurrent periods 4 it develops into individual things from the original fire, and then returns to the initial condition of pure fire. Hence comes the idea of alternating world- formation and world-destruction.5 On the other hand, this tunate figure of the bow and the lyre : irakivrovos [-rpo7ros] yap dppovin Koopov oKao-irep to£ov Kal Xvprjs. As to the meaning, see Zeller, I4. 598 f. 1 Ibid, 641. 2 Fr. 67. From these determinations apparently come veiKos and i\oTns, the different conditions developed by Empedoeles (§ 21). 3 Compare Diog Laert., IX. 8. The designations Kara and ava> are to be understood as first of all spatial, but they appear to have acquired a connotation of value. A thing becomes less valuable, the farther it is from the fiery element. * He has suggested for these the Great Year (18,000 or 10,800 years ?) ; following perhaps the Chaldeans. 5 The" acceptance of successive world-formations and destructions in Heracleitus may be looked upon as assured from the deductions of Zeller, I4. 636-640, 56 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY orderly change of matter verifies itself in every single series in nature. How far Heracleitus, however, applied his view to particular physical objects, we do not know. In cosmogony, he appears to have been satisfied with bring ing the " sea" out of the primitive fire, and then out of the sea the earth on the one hand, and on the other the warm air. The only detail authoritatively attested — one that re minds us of Xenophanes — that the sun is a mass of vapor, taking fire in the morning and becoming extinguished in the evening, reconciles us to the loss of other theories of Heracleitus, in case he had any. For Heracleitus was less a physicist than a metaphysician. He thought out a single fundamental principle with profound reflection and vivid imagination. His interest lay in the most general of principles and in anthropological questions. It can scarcely be accidental that in the preserved fragments of Heracleitus there is little peculiarly physical, but much that is metaphysical and anthropological. If his writing actually had three \6yoi (Diog. Laert., IX. 5), of which one dealt with irepl tov wavro';, and both the others were ttoXltikos and OeoXoyir.6^, this is proof that we have to do with a philosopher who did not, as his Milesian predecessors, accord a merely casual consideration to human life, but made it his prime study. The conflict of the pure fire and the lower elements into which eve rything changes repeats itself in man. The soul as the living principle is fire, and finds itself a captive in a body made out of water and earth, which, on account of its inherent rigidness, is to the soul an abhorrent object. With this theory Heracleitus united ideas of transmigra tion, of retribution after death, and the like ; and he, as Pythagoras, seems to have attached it to certain Mysteries. In general he took a position in religious matters similar to that of Pythagoras. Without breaking entirely with the popular faith, he espoused an interpretation of the myths that inclined toward monotheism and had an ethical import. THE METAPHYSICAL CONFLICT 57 The vitality of the soul, and consequently its perfection in every respect, depends on its deriving its nourishment from the cosmic fire, the universal reason, the A670?. The breath is the physical medium of obtaining this nourish ment, and cessation of the breath stops activity. A further medium of life, however, is sense perception, which is the absorption of the outer through the inner fire; and this accounts for the depression of soul-activity in sleep. The drier and more fiery, the better and wiser is the soul, and the more does it participate in the universal cosmic reason. Since the cosmic reason is cosmic law, the reasonableness of man consists in his conformity to law, and in his con scious subordination to it. On that account Heracleitus regarded the ethical and political tasks of mankind as expressions of the supremacy of law. His entire aristo cratic hate against the democracy, that had attained to power, is revealed in diatribes against the anarchy of the multitudes and their caprice. Only in subordination to order and in the last instance to cosmic law, can man win that serenity which constitutes his happiness. In an apprehension of law, however, and in subordination to the universally valid, Heracleitus found the theoretical goal of mankind. Only the reason and not sense perception guarantees the attainment of this goal, and without the reason eyes and ears are bad witnesses.1 The great mass 1 The well-known Fragment 11 (Sext. Emp. Adv. math., VII. 126), KaK8a\pol Kal ana 8apj3dpovi ¦'j/vxas e\6vTuiv, is usually interpreted as a disdain of sense knowledge. Schuster (p. 19 f.) has made an attempt (confuted by Zeller, I4. 572 f., 656 f.) to stamp Heracleitus as a sensualist on account of his theory of perception. The correct position lies in the mean between these two authorities. Right knowledge indeed arises in sense when the right soul elaborates it. The criterion to which all things are referred is here again conformity to law, which is universally valid and won only through thought. In sleep and through mere individual perception every one has only his own, and therefore a false., world of ideas. The analogy in practical life is 58 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY of mankind in this respect are badly off. They do not reflect, but live on as the deluded victims of sense, whose greatest deception consists in its simulation of permanent Being amid the transitoriness of all the phenomena of perception. Heracleitus of Ephesus, son of Blyson, belonged to the most eminent family of his native city, which traced its origin to Codrus. In this family the dignity of apxpdoais, to yap avrb voeiv eoTiv re Kal eivai. 2 vv. 43-51. Steinhart and Bernays have rightly called attention to the fact that Heracleitus is antagonized here, for he ascribes Being and not-Being alike to the things conceived in the process of Becoming. 60 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY to something being, then is Being everywhere the same. For whatsoever also may be thought as in the particular thing, nevertheless the quality of Being (das Sein) is in all the same. Being is the last product of an abstraction that has compared the particular thought contents. Being alone remains when all difference has been abstracted from the content determinations of actuality.1 From this fol lows the fundamental doctrine of the Eleatics, that only the one abstract Being is. The philosophy of Parmenides would be complete in this brief sentence eanv elvai, if on the one hand there did not follow from this conceptual definition a number of predicates of Being, — predicates primarily negative and susceptible only disjunctively of positive formulation ; and if on the other hand the philosopher did not deviate from the strict logic of his own postulates. In respect to the first, all time and qualitative distinc tions must be denied to Being. Being is unoriginated and imperishable. It was not and will not be, but only is in timeless eternity.2 For time, wherein perhaps any thing that is, first was and suffered change,3 is in no wise different from a thing that is. Being is also unchangeable, entirely homogeneous and unitary in quality. It is also not plural, but is the one unique, indivisible,4 absolute cosmic Being. Compare Zeller, I4. 670. The same dialectic in reference to Being and not-Being is repeated in the dialogue, The Sophist (238), in seeking for the possibility of error. 1 This line of thought is repeated by the Neo-Platonists, by Spinoza et ah, and is unavoidable if Being is valid as the criterion of " things being." Compare Kant, Kr. d. r. Tern., Kehrb., 471 f. 2 v. 59 ff., especially 61 : ovde ttot rjv ovd eorai eVet vvv eorlv opov irav ev £vve%es- 3 v. 96 : ovBe %povos eoriv rj eorat oXXo napeK tov ibvros. This is di rected perhaps against the cosmogonies, perhaps against the chrono logical measure of cosmic development in Heracleitus. 4 v. 78. THE METAPHYSICAL CONFLICT 61 ill plurality, all qualitative difference, all origination, all change or destruction are shut out by true Being. In this respect Parmenides has constructed the concept in perfect clearness and sharpness. But this abstract ontology among the Eleatics nevertheless took another turn through some content definitions obtained from the inner and outer world of experience. This oc curred in the two directions resulting from the way in which Parmenides gained the concept of Being from the identity of thinking and the thing thought. That Being, to which thought refers in its naive conception as if it were its own necessary content, is corporeal actuality. Therefore the Being of Parmenides was identified with the absolutely corporeal. The polemic against the acceptance of not-Being got a new aspect in this way. The ov coin cides with the irXeov, the p.i) ov with the Kevov ; and the Eleatics taught that there is no empty space. There fore Being is indivisible, immovable,1 and excludes not only qualitative change, but also all change of place. This absolute corporeality is therefore not boundless (dreXevrnrov), but is Being2 that is complete in itself, unchangeably determined, self-bounded, like a perfectly rounded, changeless and homogeneous sphere.3 1 vv. 80, 85; to>vt6v t' e v TavTcp re pevov KaB eatvro re Keirai. '* v. 88 f. Doubtless Parmenides antagonized the Milesian teaching of the aireipov in all its possible affiliations. But it is utterly unnecessary to think that the opposition of irepas and aireipov presupposes the num ber investigations of the Pythagoreans. There is not the slightest trace, of this in Parmenides. Inversely it is not impossible that the opposition of the Eleatics against all predecessors made the dual con cept so important that the Pythagoreans inserted this among their fundamental antitheses. Doubtless the purely Greek representation influenced Parmenides, in which the measurable and self-determined and never the measureless and undetermined was regarded as perfect. Melissus seems (§ 20) to have neglected this point, and thus to have approached the theory of Anaximander. 8 v. 102 f. 62 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY On the other hand, however, there was again for Par menides no Being which was not either consciousness or something thought : rwvrbv h' earl voeiv re Kal ovveKev icrri vorgia (v. 94). As for Xenophanes, so also for Parmenides, corporeality and thought perfectly coincide in this cosmic god, this abstract Being : to yap irXeov earl von pa (v. 149). We can designate, therefore, the Eleatic system neither as materialistic nor idealistic, because these terms have mean ing only when corporeality and thought have been previously considered as different fundamental forms of actuality. The Eleatic theory is rather an ontology which in regard to its con tent so completely took its stand at the naive point of view of the identification of corporeality and thought, as really to exalt it to the dignity of a principle. More prominently in the teaching of Parmenides than in that of Xenophanes does the peculiar result appear : that the principle, gained by conceptual reflection out of the need of knowing the real world, proves itself entirely unsuitable for the purpose. This Eleatic concept of Being could explain so little of the empirical world that Parmenides had to deny the existence of that world. All plurality and diversity, all coming into existence, existing and passing out of existence, are only illusory appearance, — false names that mortals have given to true Being.1 The Eleatic found the origin of this appearance in sense-perception, of whose illu sory 2 character he gave warning. He did not seem, however, to realize the circle involved in his reasoning. Although from an entirely opposite principle, he explained in a sharper epigrammatic way than Heracleitus, how the truth can be sought only in conceptual thought but never in the 1 v. 98 f. The conjecture ovap instead of oVo/i (v. 98, Gladisch) is invalidated by, among other things, the circumstance that Sophistry and Eristic, which were developed from Eleaticism, frequently spoke of the plurality of names for the one thing that is (§ 28). 2 v. 54 f. THE METAPHYSICAL CONFLICT 63 senses. His ontology is a perfectly conscious rationalism that shut out all experience and denied all content. Nevertheless Parmenides believed that he could not do without a physical theory, possibly because he felt the de mands of his scientific society in Elea. So the second part J of his didactic poem gave a kind of hypothetical and problematical physics which stands out of logical connec tion with the ontology of the first part. But on the other hand the " Human Opinions " about the many changeable things offered to sensation were not simply reproduced, but were transformed, as they would necessarily have to be, according to his presupposition, if in general plurality motion and change were to be recognized as real. To this belonged first of all the statement that that which is not, is thought 2 as actual side by side that which is ; and that out of the reciprocal action of the two are derived multiplicity and the process of individual Becoming. The physical theory of Parmenides was a dualism, a theory of opposites. Although iii this respect it reminds us strongly of Heracleitus, the agreement with him is still more apparent in the making whatever really is as the equivalent of the light, and whatever really is not as the equivalent of the darkness.3 When therefore this pair of opposites was identified with the thin and thick, the light and the heavy, the fire and the earth, the reference was to Anaximander. Yet, on the other hand, there was full recognition of the Heracleitan teaching, which had set fire over against all the other elements as the forming and determining ele ment. If Parmenides did not herein also point out the relation between these two opposites as that of an active i v. 18-30; 33-7; 110 f. 2 On this point later Atomism, which was more logical than even Parmenides himself in physics, regarded notrBeing, i. e., empty space, as actual. 8 v. 122 f. 64 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY and a passive principle, nevertheless Aristotle was justified (Met., I. 3, 984 b, 1), inasmuch as for Parmenides the fire, which possesses Being, certainly had the value of an ani mating, moving principle over against the darkness as a thing not possessing it. Of the particular theories of Parmenides which have been handed down in a very fragmentary condition, there is not much to remark. With him also the principal stress was laid upon metaphysics. The little information that exists proves that he tried with considerable art to develop the dualism which he derived from his general ontology, and that he even descended to details which he made it his duty * to explain in all their bearings. In some particulars he subjoined existing theories to his own without making any actual advance in physics. His. astronomical ideas agree so thoroughly with those of the Pythagoreans, with whom he doubtless came in contact, that one must admit the dependence of the Eleatics upon the Pythagoreans in astronomy.2 As to the origin of man, he held the same view that Anaximander held before him and that Enipe- docles held after him. Otherwise, excepting some remarks about procreation, etc., only his theory of sensation has come down to us. In this he taught, like Heracleitus, that of the two fundamental elements contained in man, each is susceptible to that which is related to it in the external world. The Warm in a living man senses the fiery connec- tion-in-things (Lebenszusammenhang'), but even also in the corpse, the cold, stiff body feels what is like it in its surroundings. He expressed the opinion that every man's 1 v. 120 f. 2 Compare, for details, Zeller, I. 525 f. That Parmenides here showed not the least knowledge of the so-called number-theory, is another proof of the later origin of this philosophical teaching of the Pythagoreans, whose mathematical and astronomical investigations obviously preceded their metaphysical. See § 24. THE METAPHYSICAL CONFLICT 65 ideas and intuitions are determined by 1 the mixture of these two elements in him. There is no ground for doubting the genuineness of the report of Plato 2 that Parmenides in his old age went to Athens, where the young Socrates saw him. The statements of the dialogue Parmenides, which presents the fiction3 of a conversation be tween Parmenides and Socrates, are not wanting iu probability. According to this, Parmenides was born about 515. He came from a distinguished family, and his intercourse with the Pythagoreans is well attested.4 On the other hand, however, his acquaintance with Xenophanes 5 is also well proved, together with whom he directed the activity of the scientific association in his native city, Elea. Parmenides exercised a decided in fluence on the political life also of this newly founded city,6 and is in general represented as a serious, influential, and morally high character.' His work was written about 470 or somewhat later. It was in answer to that of Heracleitus, and at the same time it inspired the theories developed somewhat later and almost contemporaneously by Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Leu cippus, and Philolaus (Chap. III.). It is in verse, and shows a peculiar amalgamation of abstract thought and plastic poetic fancy. The greater portion of the preserved fragments came from the first and ontological section of the poem, which was perhaps also called -n-epi ^uVetos. Besides Karsten and Mullach, Am. Peyron (Parmenidis et Empedoklis fragmenta, Leipzig, 1810) and Heinr. .Stein (Symb. philologorum Bonnensium in honorem F. Ritschleii, Leipzig, 1864, p. 763 f.) have collected and discussed the fragments. Compare Vatke, Parmenidis Veliensis doctrina, Berlin, 1844; A. Biiumker, Die Einheit des P'schen Seins (Jahrb. f. kl. Mass. Philol., 1886, 541 f.). 20. Whereas Parmenides made a no inconsiderable con cession to the customary idea of the plurality and change of things, at least in his construction of an hypothetical 1 v. 146 f. 2 Thecetetus, 183 e. 3 Parmenides, 127 b ; Sophist, 217 c. 4 Diog. Laert., IX. 2.5; Strabo, 27, 1, 1. 5 Arist. Met., I. 5, 986 b, 22. 6 Diog. Laert., IX. 23, according to Speusippus. 7 Plato, Thecet, 183 e: compare Soph., 237 a; Parm., 127 b. 66 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY physics his friend and pupil Zeno of Elea proceeded to refute even this customary point of view, and thereby to establish directly the teaching of his master concerning the unity and unchangeableness of Being. The habit of abstract thinking, which was raised to a pre-eminence by Parmenides, manifested itself here in the way in which his pupil turned entirely from the earlier physical tendency of science. Zeno was no longer concerned in apprehending or understanding empirical reality.1 He was interested only in the conceptual defence of the paradoxes of his teacher. In seeking to discover, therefore, the contradictions which inhere in ordinary opinions regarding the plurality and mutability of things, he employed in a more partisan spirit than Parmenides arguments not based on subject matter or empirical fact, but only those of formal logic. This appeared primarily in the form of the proof, — first systematically and expertly used, as it seems, by Zeno. By the continuous repetition of contradictory disjunc tives, he sought to deny exhaustively all the possibilities of comprehension and defence of the assailed thought, until it was at last brought into obvious contradictions. On account of this keen application of the apparatus of logic, which lets the entire proof seem to be controlled by the law of contradiction, we may suppose that Zeno first had a clear consciousness of formal logical relations. Aristotle even called him the inventor of dialectic.2 All the difficulties that Zeno by this method found in the ideas of multiplicity and movement refer to the infinity of space and time, and indeed partly to the infinitely large, partly to the infinitely small. These difficulties simply prove in the last instance the impossibility of thinking exclusively of continuous spatial and temporal quantities 1 Zeller, II4. 538, for unimportant and even trivial notes which seem to controvert this, and for the most part rest upon misconceptions. ' Diog. Laert., VIII. 5 7. THE METAPHYSICAL CONFLICT 67 as analyzed into discrete parts, — of thinking of the in finity of the perceptive process. Upon this ground the difficulties of Zeno could find no conclusive solution until the very real and difficult problems resting on them were consid ered from the point of view of the infinitesimal calculus. Compare Aristotle, Physics, in many places with the comments by Simplicius. Bayle, Diet. hist, et crit., article Zenon; Herbart, Einleitung in die Philos., § 139 ; Metaph., § 284 f. ; Hegel, Gesch. d. Phil, Complete Works, Vol. XIII. 312 f. ; Wellmann, Zenon's Beweise gegen die Bewegung und Hire Widerlegungen, Frankfort a. O., 1870 ; C. Dunan, Les arguments de Zenon d'Elee contre le mouvement, Nantes, 1884. The proofs advanced by Zeno against the multiplicity of what really is, were two, and they were concerned in part with magnitude, in part with number. As regards magnitude, whatever possesses Being must, if it be many, be on the one hand infinitely small and on the other infinitely great : infinitely small because the aggregation of ever so many parts, of which every one, being indivisible, has no magnitude, can result also in no magnitude ; infinitely great because the juxtaposition of two parts pre supposes a boundary between the two, which, as something real, must itself likewise have spatial magnitude, but on this account must again be parted by boundaries from the two minor portions of which the same is true, etc., etc. Again, as regards number, whatever possesses Being must, if it be supposed to be many, be thought as both limited and unlimited. It must be limited because it is just as many as it is, no more nor less. It must be unlimited because two different things possessing Being must be separated by a boundary which as a third must itself be different from these, and must be separated from them both by a fourth and fifth, and so ad infinitum." 1 1 The second part of the argument is essentially the same in both proofs, and was called by the ancients the argument £k Si^oTopias, in 68 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY It is probable, and also chronologically quite possible, that these proofs were even at that time directed against the begin nings of Atomism (§ 23). They are intended to show that the world cannot be thought as an aggregation of atoms. Consist ent with this view is the further circumstance that Zeno's polemic was made against the idea of mutability of what pos sesses Being only in the sense of kivyjo-is, not in the sense of aXXoim- o-ts (qualitative change). Atomism affirmed kiV^o-is, and denied qualitative change. There is, in addition, a third argument against the plurality of Being, which Zeno seemed rather to indi cate than to develop. This is the so-called Sorites, according to which it is inconceivable how a bushel of corn could make a noise when the single kernels make none. This argument became effective in the polemic against the atomists, who sought to derive qualitative determinations from the joint motion of atoms. Presumably against atomism there was directed another argument of Zeno, which dealt neither with the plural ity nor the motion of what possesses Being, but with the reality of empty space, which was the presupposition of move ment to the atomists. Zeno showed that if what possesses Being should be thought as in space, this space as an actuality must be thought to be in another space, etc., ad infinitum. On the other hand, the application which Zeno made of the categories of infinity and finiteness, of the unlimited and limited, appears to suggest a relationship to the Pythagoreans, in whose investigations these ideas played a great role. § 19; § 24. The contradiction involved in the conception of motion Zeno tried to prove in four ways : (1) By the impossibility of going through a fixed space. This means that the infinite divisibility of the space to be passed through will not allow the beginning of motion to appear thinkable. (2) By the impossibility of passing through a space that has movable limits. This supposes the goal, which is to be reached in any finite time, to be pushed away, though perhaps ever so little. An example of this is Achilles, who cannot catch the tortoise. (3) By the infinitely small amount of motion at any instant of time, since the body in motion during any which dichotomy is used not in the logical but in the original physical sense. THE METAPHYSICAL CONFLICT 69 individual instant of time is at some definite point, i. e. at rest. He used the resting arrow as an example. (4) By the relativity of the amount of motion. A motion of a carriage appears to differ in amount according as it is measured in its process of separation by a stationary carriage or by one in motion in the opposite direction. Little is known about the life of Zeno. If one holds that the exact chronological reports in the dialogue of Parmenides are fictitious and the statements of the ancients about the 6.Kpr) are doubtful, nevertheless it is certain Zeno can have been scarcely a generation younger than Parmenides. One will not make a mistake if one places the length of his life at sixty years, between 490 and 430. He was, then, the contempo rary of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Leucippus, and Philolaus, and it is easily possible that he held fast to Parmenides' doctrine of Being in its conceptual abstractness in direct contrast to the remodellings of it by these men. His well-attested £\>y- y pa ft pa was composed in prose, and, to suit his formal schema tism, was divided into chapters. In these the single wro#£o-<:i<; fouud their reductio ad absurdum.1 If the presentation of these in accordance with their polemic nature had the form of question and answer,2 then this is probably the beginning of the philosophic dialogue-literature which later developed so richly.3 Of lesser significance4 was Mclissus of Samos. Not a native Eleatic, he was also not a complete and consistent supporter of Parmenides's doctrine of Being. He was somewhat the junior of the Eleatic, and lived on into the time of the eclectic tendency in which the opposing the ories began to fade out (§ 25). In the main, to be sure, he thoroughly defended the Eleatic fundamental principle, and in a manner obviously antagonistic to Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Leucippus, and in part to the Milesian physics. i Plato, Parm., 127 c ff . ; Simpl. Phys., 30 v, 139, 5. 2 Arist. irepl iXoTr]i and j/etKos. From these presuppositions Empedocles derived an ex planation of the cosmic process, not indeed conceiving each individual occurrence as ever and always arising from a universal law of combination and separation, but yet satis fying the demands of the Heracleitan philosophy by the assumption of a perpetual cyclic process of development. He taught, namely, that the four elements, that he assumed as alike in their mass, change out of a state of perfect mingling and equality, separate by the action of the vsiko<;, and become completely sundered ; that then from this state of separation they pass back through the influence of the (piXoTvs to their original absolute intermixture. There re sults from this a cycle of four continuously dissolving cosmic states : (1) that of the unlimited supremacy of Love and of the perfect unification of all the elements, which is called by Empedocles atpo? and also designated as to evov Oeos ; (2) that of the process of successive separation through the constantly growing preponderance of veiKos ; (3) that of the absolute separation of the four elements through the sole supremacy of Hate ; (4) that of the process of succes sive recombination through the increased predominance of ipiXorris. Compare Arist. Phys., VIIT. 1, 250 b, 26. It is clear that a world of individual things can appear only in the second and fourth stages of the cosmic process, and that such a world is characterized every time by the opposition and conflict between the combining and separating principles. Here is the place of the Heracleitan fundamental principle in the Empedoclean conception of the cosmos. On the other EFFORTS TOWARD RECONCILIATION 77 hand, it can be said that the two parts of the Parmenidean didactic poem appear no longer in the opposition of Being and Appearance, but in the relationship of changing cosmic states. The first and third phases are acosmic in the Eleatic sense ; the second and fourth are, on the contrary, full of the Heracleitan 7roAe^09. All that we have of the particulars of the theory of Empe docles seems to teach that he regarded the present state of the world as the fourth phase, in which the elements that have been separated by Hate are reuniting through Love into the Sphairos. At least in reference to the formation of the world he taught that the separated elements have been brought through Love into the whirling motion that is in the process of uniting them. Originally the air en compassed the whole like a sphere, and by virtue of this motion fire broke out from below. The air was pressed below and into the middle, was mixed with the water into mud, and then formed into the earth. The two hemi spheres originated in this way : one was light and fiery ; the other dark, airy, and interspersed with masses of fire, which on account of the rushing of the air in rotatory motion around the earth created day and night. In particular, Empedocles showed — not without dependence on the Pythagoreans — highly developed astronomical ideas concerning the illumination of the moon from the sun, concern ing eclipses, the inclination of the ecliptic, etc., and also many interesting meteorological hypotheses. Empedocles had an especial interest in the organic world. He regarded plants as primary organisms and as having souls like animals. He compared in isolated remarks the formation of fruit with the procreation of animals, their leaves with hair, feathers, and scales ; and so one finds in him the beginnings of a comparative mor phology. Also numerous physiological observations of his are preserved. But especially are there biological reflec- 78 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY tions, iii which he in some measure in the spirit of the present theory of adaptation explained, although with fanci ful naivete, the existence of the present vital organisms by the survival of purposeful forms from things that on the whole were aimlessly created.1 Empedocles did not except man 2 from this purely me chanical origination, and he constructed a large number of interesting single hypotheses in respect to his physiological functions. The blood plays an important role in this theory. It was to him the real carrier of life, and in it he believed he could see the most perfect combination of the four elements. It is of especial interest that he conceived the process of perception and sensation as analogous to his universal theory of the interaction of elements. He ex plained this process as contact of the small parts of the perceived things with the similar parts of the perceiving organs, wherein the former were supposed to press upon the latter, as in hearing ; or the latter upon the former, as in sight. Since then, in general, such interaction was to his mind the more close, the more nearly similar were the emanations and pores, he established the principle, there fore, that all external things are known by that in us which is similar to them. Herein was involved to some degree the idea that man is a microcosm, the finest admix ture of all the elements. Hence it followed for Empedocles that all perceptual knowledge depends upon the combination of elements in the body and especially in the blood, and that the spiritual nature depends on the physical nature. Just on this 1 Aristotle has brought this thought into abstract expression, and it contains the whole modern development theory in nuce. Phys., II. 8, 198 b, 29; oirov pev ovv diravra ovveftr] cooirep Kav el eveKa tov eyevero, ravra pev eoatBn, dnb tov avropdrov ovoravra eiriTodeiais, ooa 8e prj ovtoqs, dnuiXeTO Kal drroXXorai KaBdirep 'EpiredoKXrjs Xeyei, etc. 2 He appears to have made good use of the tales about the centaurs. EFFORTS TOWARD RECONCILIATION 79 account, moreover he could deplore incidentally, as Xeno phanes deplored, the limitation of human knowledge ; and could assert, on the other hand, with Heracleitus and Par menides, that true knowledge does not grow out of sense perception, but only out of reflection (voeiv) and reason (vow).1 Empedocles of Agrigentum, the first Dorian in the history of philosophy, lived probably from 490-430. He came from a rich and respectable family which had been partisans for the democracy in the municipal struggles. Like his father, Meton, Empedocles distinguished himself as a citizen and statesman, but later he fell into the disfavor of the other citizens. In his vocation of physician aud priest, and with the paraphernalia of a magician,2 he then travelled about through Sicily and Magna Graecia. Many stories circulated into later time concerning his death, like that well-known one of his leap into iEtna. In this religions role he taught the doctriue of transmigration and of an apparently purer intuition of God, like that of the Apollo cult. These teachings, which were not consistent in content with his metaphysico-physical theories, show, however, much the greater similarity to the teaching of Pythagoras (§ 12). Pythagorean- ism he certainly knew, and indeed his entire career suggests a copy of that of Pythagoras. When we consider his political affiliations, it is improbable that he had any close connection with the Pythagorean society. Empedocles stood comparatively isolated, — save his acquaintance with the teachings of Hera cleitus aud Parmenides, the latter of whom he presumably knew personally. Nevertheless he seems to have been affili ated with a yet larger body in that he is characterized as one of the first representatives of rhetoric.3 He had even con nections with the so-called Sicilian school of rhetoric (or ora tory) , in which are preserved the names of Tisias and Korax as well as that of Gorgias, whom they antedate.4 Only irepl vo-ew<; and Kadappot are the writings of Empedocles that can be authenticated. The preserved small fragments are especially collated by Sturz (Leipzig, 1805), Karsten (Amsterdam, 1838), and Stein (Bonn, 1852). Compare Bergk, Deprooemio, E.Berl.. 1 Fr. v. 24; 81. 2 Thus he pictured himself in the beginning of the Songs of Purifica- cation (luiBappoi). 3 Diog. Laert., VIII. 57 ; Sext. Emp. Adv. math., VII. 6. 4 See below, § 26. 80 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY 1839 ; Panzerbieter, Beitrdge zur Kritik und Erlduterung des E. (Meiningen, 1844) ; Scklager, E. quatenus Heraclitum secutus sit (Eisenach, 1878). — O. Kern, E. und d. Orphiker (Arch. f. Gesch. d. Ph., I. 498 f.). 22. " Older in years, younger in works than Empedo cles," 1 Anaxagoras brought the movement of thought, which had been begun by Empedocles, to an end in one direction. He, like Empedocles, was convinced that we do not use language correctly when we speak of origination and destruction, since the mass of the world must remain unchangeably the same.2 On this account apparent origi nation and destruction are better designated as combina tion and separation (avyKpiais sive avppi^K). Whatever enters into combination or whatever suffers separation was to him, also, a plurality of original substances which he called yp-gpara or aireppara. Thus far he agreed with his predecessor. But he took decided exception to the arbi trary assumption of Empedocles that there are only four elements, since it is impossible to explain the qualita tive distinctions of empirical things by the union of these four elements. Since the Parmenidean idea of Being excludes the new creation and destruction of qualitative determinations, and demands qualitative unchangeable ness for the totality of primitive materials, Anaxago ras argued that there are as many qualitative ypi]p,ara, different from one another, as there are qualitative deter minations in empirical things. The things of which we are sensible are composite, and they are named according to the primitive material that prevails in them at any par ticular instant.3 Their qualitative change (dXXolcocns) consists in the fact that other primitive materials enter into the combination or some are excluded from it. i Arist. Met., J. 3, 984 a, 11. 2 Fr. 14. s Arist. Phys., I4. 187 b. EFFORTS TOWARD RECONCILIATION 81 The yprjpara must, according to this, be thought as divis ible j1 and in antithesis to the perceived things, which con sist of heterogeneous components, we must designate as ¦Xprjpara all those substances which fall into homogeneous parts, however far they be divided. Therefore Aristotle designated the airepp.ara of Anaxagoras as 6g.oiopepr), and in later literature they go under the name of homoio- meriai. Consequently, what Anaxagoras had here in mind was nothing other than the chemist's idea of the element. The utter inadequacy of data on which Anaxagoras could depend appears in the development of his theory. For since observation had as yet not been directed to chemical, but only to mechanical analysis, the constituents of ani mals, such as bones, flesh, and marrow, as well as metals, were enumerated as elements. Further, because the philosopher possessed no means of fixing upon a deter mined number of elements, he declared them to be num berless and differing in form (iSea), color, and taste. When Aristotle in several places (see Zeller, I4. 875 f.) cites only organic substances in Anaxagoras as examples of the ele ments, he is speaking more out of his preference for this field than of an inclination on the part of Anaxagoras to refer inorganic matter to the organic. There is not the slightest trace to be discovered in Anaxagoras' cosmogony of a qualita tive distinction between the organic and the inorganic. In particular, what wc may call his teleology is not by any means confined to the organic. As regards the motion of these substances, Anaxagoras also separated the principle of Being from that of Becom ing, but in an entirely different way from what we find in Empedocles. The poetical and mythical form of this thought he stripped off ; but at the same time, instead 1 In remarkable dependence on Parmenides, Anaxagoras neverthe less makes a polemic, like Empedocles, against the acceptance of empty space (Arist. Phys., IV., 6, 213 a, 22), and at the same time also against the finite divisibility of matter postulated in the concept of atoms. 6 82 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY of reflecting like Heracleitus upon the antagonistic pro cesses of motion, he emphasized again the unity of the cosmic process. Since Anaxagoras, as is the case with all naive conception, could think of the actual only as material stuff, he had to seek among the numberless yprjpara for one which is the common cause of motion for all the others. This primitive dynamic material or motion-stuff was conceived by him as having life within itself, after the analogy of the Ionian cosmic matter. It moves the others from within itself.1 Its nature, however, was inferred by Anaxagoras from the character of the world of perception that it brought into being. This world presents itself as an ordered, purposeful whole, and the forming force must also be orderly and purposeful. Therefore after an analogy 2 to the principle actively working in living beings, Anaxagoras called it the vow, the reason, or, as it may best be translated, the thought- stuff (Denkstoff). Far from being an immaterial princi ple, the " spirit " is to Anaxagoras corporeal matter, but indeed in a state of exceeding refinement. It is the "lightest," the most -mobile, the only matter that moves itself. It represents the Xoyoi, both in the macrocosm and in the microcosm. As regards the form and move ment of the cosmic process, it has all the functions of the Heracleitan fire. The order (Koo-poi) and purposefulness of the empirical world, on which Anaxagoras depended in his assertion of the i-ors oiaKoo-puw to. ttovto, was not noted by him so much in single terrestrial things as in the great relationships of the universe, in 1 Aristotle in Physics, VIII. 5, 256 b, 24, proved only that Anaxagoras lias called thevovs the diraBrjs and dpiyr/s. The predicate aKivnTos is only an inference of Aristotle. The mobility of the i/ovs and its implications in single things is clearly set forth in passages like Stob. Eel., I. 790 (Dox., 392), and Simpl. Phys., 35 rerlo, 164, 23. 2 Arist. Mel , I. 3, !)S L b, 15, KaBdjrep ev Toif fcoois. EFFORTS TOWARD RECONCILIATION 83 the regular revolutions of the heavenly bodies.1 His monism and the teleological method of his presentation rested on astro nomical considerations. Compare W. Dilthey, Einleitung in d. Geisteswissenscliaften, V. 201 f. He sought in a purely natu ralistic way a physical explanation, and was not in the smallest degree concerned with religious matters. If he, as is very doubtful, called 2 the vols God, yet this would only have been a metaphysical expression, as it had been among the Milesians. The doctrine of the votis was taken by Aristotle very much in the sense of an immaterial spirituality, when in the well-known passage (Met, I. 3, 984 b, 17) Aristotle placed the doctrine of Anaxagoras as that of the only sober philosopher among them all. In the Hegelian interpretation, which even to-day is not outgrown, Anaxagoras is placed at the close of the pre-Sophis- tic development on account of his alleged discovery of the " Spirit." It souuds so fine when in this philosophy of nature the world principle becomes ever more " spiritual" in passing from water through air and fire until finally the " pure Spirit" has been as it were distilled from matter. But this " Spirit " is likewise only living corporealit}', i. e., that which moves itself. Anaxagoras with his voCs is scarcely a step nearer the immate rial than Anaximenes with air, or Heracleitus with fire. On the other hand, we must net fail to recognize that in this character ization of the moving principle Anaxagoras, in a still more em phatic manner than Empedocles, had taken up the factor of a judgment of value into his theoretic explanation. Admiration of the beauty and harmony of the world dictated to him the acceptauce of a thought-stuff arranging the universe according to a principle of order. This vow, therefore, stands over against the other ele ments. It alone is in itself pure and unmixed. It is sim ple, and possesses through its " knowledge" a power over all other material stuff.3 It plays somehow as a stimulus upon the other substances, which are mixed by it. It participates temporarily to a greater or less degree in the particular things thus originating. For, like all matter, it 1 Simpl. 33 rerso, 156, 13; iravra SieKocrpno-e voos Kal ttjv irepLxapnatv ravTTjv, f)V vvv irepixeopei rd re iiarpa, Kal 6 rjXios Kal r/ oeXrjvn Kal 6 drjp Kal 6 alBrjp ol diroKpivopevoi. 2 Cicero, Acad. II. 37, 118 ; Sext. Emp. Adv. math., IX. 6. 3 Fr. 7 and 8. 84 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY also is quantitatively divisible and qualitatively unchange able. Remaining essentially identical with itself, it is dis tributed in different proportions in single things.1 Anaxagoras used this thought-stuff only to explain on the one hand the beginnings of motion, and on the other such single processes which he could not derive from the mechanism of the once for all awakened cosmic motion. What these processes in particular are, we cannot2 ascer tain from the reproaches made against Anaxagoras.3 So far as our knowledge goes, the application that Anaxagoras has made of his vow theory to explain the cosmic process is limited simply to this, — that he ascribed to the "order ing" thought-stuff the beginning of motion, and that he then conceived the motion to go on mechanically by impact aud pressure between the other primitive materials in a manner planned by the vow. Connected with this is the fact that Anaxagoras denied a plurality both of coexisting and successive worlds, and that he aimed to describe only the origin of our present world. Consequently in distinc tion from his predecessors he spoke therefore of a temporal beginning of the world. Preceding this beginning is a state of the most perfect mingling of all substances, reminding us of the Sphairos of Empedocles. In this mingling all ypypara, with the excep tion of the vouf, are so minutely distributed that the whole possesses no particular character. This idea reminds us on the one hand of Chaos, on the other of the aireipov of Anaximander. In his delineation of this idea, we have the fact that he taught that the mixtures of dif fering xpypara let only those qualities come into perception in 1 How misjudged the meaning is, is clear, for Anaxagoras conceived his l/oOr as a divine being. 2 It is highly improbable, according to Theoph. Hist, plant., III. 1, 4, that it concerns the genesis of the organism. 3 Plato, Phaido, 97 b; Arist. Mi-I., I. 4, 985 a, 18. EFFORTS TOWARD RECONCILIATION 85 which the components are all harmonized. He also in this way conceived the four elements of Empedocles as such mix tures of primitive matter.1 Absolute mixture has no quality ; 6/xoC iravra xpVrlaTa Vv ls f'le beginning of the writing of Anaxagoras. In this Chaos the primitive thought-material first created at one point 2 a rotatory motion of great velocity. This, be ing extended in broadening circles, led to the formation of the orderly world, and is further being continued on account of the infinity of matter. By this rotation two great masses are first differentiated which were characterized by the opposi tion of Bright, Warm, Pure-light, and Dry, as against Dark, Cold, Dense-heavy, and Moist, and are designated by Anaxa goras as aWigp and d-gp? The latter is pressed into the centre, and condensed into water, earth, and stones. His ideas of the earth show hiin to have been essentially influenced by the Ionians. He regarded the stars as dissipated frag ments of earth and stone that have become glowing in the fiery circle. He saw in the great meteor of Aegospotamoi a confirmation of this theory and at the same time a proof of the substantial homogeneity of the world. Anaxagoras's astronomical view shows highly developed, many-sided ideas and inferences, which rest in part upon his own studies. He explained eclipses correctly ; and while he allowed to the sun and moon altogether too small dimensions, they were nevertheless very great compared to their perceptual size. Accordingly Anaxagoras was convinced that, as in Chaos, so in all individual things developed from it, the combina- 1 Arist. De gen. et corr., I. 1, 314 a, 24 ; Zeller, I4. 876. 2 Presumably Anaxagoras assumed this point to be the pole star : see H. Martin, Memoires de I'lnstitut, 29, 176 f. ; see Dilthey, op. cit. 3 These antitheses remind us more of the Ionians than of Parmenides. In respect to the manifold of the mixture aud the determination of the qualities, they stand in Anaxagoras obviously between the piypa and the Empedoclean elements. 86 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY tion of the cosmic elements is so fine and intimate that something at least of each one is everywhere. Thus the organic airepp,ara develop as plants and animals on the separation of the water and earth, which separation was caused by the heavenly fire. But the vow, as the vitalizing principle, stands in intimate relations with these, and its in dependent power of motion was doubtless introduced here by Anaxagoras as the cause of functions that are not mechani cally explicable.1 He, too, seems to have given especial attention to sense perception, which, however, he derived, in entire opposition to Empedocles, from the reciprocal action of opposites influenced by the feeling of aversion. Accord ingly perceptual knowledge acquired in this way is only relative.2 In contrast to it, the truth is found solely through the \0709, through the participation of the individual in the world reason. Anaxagoras originated in Clazomeme in the circle of Ionian culture, from which apparently he got his rich scientific knowl edge and his pronounced positive and physical interest. His birth is (Zeller, I4. 865 f., against Hermann) to be placed at about 500. We do not know about his education, particularly how he could have been so powerfully influenced by the Eleat ics. He was of wealthy antecedents, and was regarded as an honorable gentleman, who, far away from all practical and polit ical interests, "declared the heaven to be his fatherland, and the study of the heavenly bodies his life's task," — a statement in which, side by side with the presentation of a purely theo retical ideal of life, is to be noted the astronomical tendency which also characterized his philosophy. About the middle of the century Anaxagoras, then the first among philosophers of renown, removed to Athens, where lie formed a centre of scien tific activity, and appears to have drawn about him the most notable men. He was the friend of Pericles, and became in- 1 To this the objection of Aristotle applies, that Anaxagoras did not distinguish the principle of thought (roO?) from the animating (be- seelenden) principle (V'u^). (De an., I 2, 404 b.) This objection certainly did not arise from immanent criticism. 2 Arist. Met., IV. 5, 1009 b, 25; Sext. Emp., VII. 91. EFFORTS TOWARD RECONCILIATION. 87 volyed under the charge of impiety in the political suit brought against Pericles in 434. He was obliged in consequence of this to leave Athens and go to Lampsacus. Here he founded a scientific association, and while high in honor he died a few years later (about 428). The fragments of the only writing preserved of his (as it appears) irepl <£weus (in prose) have been collected by Schaubach (Leipzig, 1827) and Schorn (with those of Diogenes of Apollonia, Bonn, 1829) ; Panzerbieter, De fragmentorum Anax. ordine (Meiningen, 1836) ; Breier, Die Philosophie des An. nach Aristotles (Berlin, 1840) ; Zevort, Dissert, de la vie et la doctrined'A. (Paris, 1843) ; Alexi, A. u. seine Philosophie (Ncu-Ruppin, 1867) ; M. Heinze, Ueber den vovs des A. (Berichte d. Sachs. Ges. d. W., 1890). Archelaus is called a pupil of Anaxagoras, but appears, nevertheless, to be so much influenced also by other theories that he will be mentioned in a later place. The allegorical interpretation of the Homeric poem, which in part is ascribed to Anaxagoras himself (Diog. Laert., II. 11), in part to his pupil, Metrodorus, has only the slightest relation to his philosophy. 23. The philosopher who desired to abandon the arbitrary theory of the four elements of Empedocles, was obliged, in order to oppose to it a consistent theory, to assert either that the qualitative determinations of things are all pri mary, or that no one of them is. The first way Anaxagoras chose ; the Atomists the second. While in their explana tion of empirical occurrence they also postulated a plurality of unchangeable things having Being, they had the boldness to deduce all qualitative distinctions of the phenomenal world from purely quantitative differentiations of the true essence of things. This is their especial significance in the history of European science. It has been customary in the history of philosophy to treat the theory of the Atomists in inseparable connection with the pre-Sophistic systems. This is explained from the fact that all direct knowledge fails concerning the founder of this theory, Leucippus and his doctrine, and that the teaching of the Atomists lies before us relatively complete only in the form that Democritus developed it. But between Leucippus and Democritus is an interval of certainly forty years, and this lies in that epoch of most strenuous mental labor, — which epoch 88 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. witnessed in Greece the beginnings of Sophism. Leucippus is the contemporary of Zeno, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras, but Democritus is the contemporary of Socrates, and, in the works of his old age, of Plato. It is also consonant with this differ ence of years that the fundamental thought of the Atomists in the form of the metaphysical postulate of Leucippus arose from the Heracleitan-Parmenidean problems ; but also that the development of that postulate, which Democritus gave to these problems, was for the first time possible upon the Sophistic theories as a basis, especially those of Protagoras (§ 32). To these changed temporal conditions there is the further corre spondence in the fact that those theories of the Atomists, which we can refer to Leucippus, remained entirely in the compass of the problems confronting his contemporaries, Empedocles and Anaxagoras. On the other hand, the theory of Democritus gives the impression of being a comprehensive system, like that of Plato. Therefore the reasons from the point of chronology and from that of the subject matter require the beginnings of Atomism in Leucippus to be separated from the system of Democritus, which was conditioned by the subjective turn given to Greek thought. We must make this discrimination, however difficult it may be in details. Accordingly in this place is to be developed only the general metaphysical basis of Atomism, which has grown out of Eleaticism.1 It was therefore on the one hand a complete misconception of the primal motives, but on the other a legitimate feeling — although defended entirely falsely in connection with precon ceived notions — with which Schleiermacher (Gesch. d. Philos., Complete Works, III. 4 a, 73) and Bitter after him ( Gesch. d. Philos., 1. 589 f.) sought to classify the Atomists with the Sophists. In Leucippus Atomism arose as an offshoot of Eleaticism. The theory of Democritus, however, far from being itself Sophistic, presupposed the theory of Protagoras. The suggestion of this relation may be found in Dilthey, Einleitung in die Geistes- ivissenschafteu, I. 200. Leucippus, the first representative of this theory, stands in the most marked dependence on the Eleatic teaching. To his mind also, Being excluded not only all origination and destruction, but all qualitative change. Likewise Being coincides with the corporeal, that is, the ov with the 1 As to the perfect certainty of ascribing this to Leucippus, see Zeller, I4. 843, h. 1. EFFORTS TOWARD RECONCILIATION. 89 7rXeov. By virtue of this coincidence Parmenides had felt compelled to deny the reality of empty space, and therefore also that of plurality and motion. Should now, however, as the interest of physics demanded, plurality and motion be recognized as real, and a scientific apprehension of the actual again be rendered possible, then the simplest and most logical method was to declare x that " Non-Being," the Void (to Kevov), did nevertheless exist. The aim of this assumption, however, is simply this : to make possible plurality and mobility for that which really is. Thereby it becomes possible to create a world of experience from the " Void " and the multiform " Full " moving in the " Void," to construct that world from that which has no Being and from a multiplicity of those things that have Being. A categorical physics thus appears in place of the hypothetical physics of Parmenides, and in place of a problematical appears an assertorical and an apodeictic physics. But while Leucippus departed from the Parmenidean concept of Being only so far as seemed absolutely neces sary to explain plurality and motion, he still clung not only to the characteristic of unchangeableness (un-Becoming and indestructibility), but also to the thoroughgoing qualitative homogeneity of what possess Being. In oppo sition to Empedocles and Anaxagoras, Leucippus therefore taught that all these varieties of what possess Being are homogeneous in quality. He agreed entirely with Par menides that this quality is abstract corporeality (to irXeov) devoid of all specific qualities. According to the Eleatics, all distinctions are due only to the permeation of that which really is not, by that which really is. So, on the one hand, to Leucippus . distinctions between individuals 1 Democritus seems to be the first to have made the pointed remark : /ii) pdXXov to Sev rj to pr;8ev elvai, " das Ichts sei um nichts mehr real als das, Nichts." Plut. Adv. cat. 4, 2 (1109). 90 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. that really possess Being exist only in those qualities due to their limitation through that which really is not; viz., empty space. These are the distinctions of form and motion. On the other hand, each of the changeless sub stances possessing Being must be thought as a corporeality, homogeneous in itself, a continuum and therefore indivisi ble. Being, which is moved in empty space, therefore con sists of innumerable, exceedingly small bodies. Leucippus called these Atoms (dropoi), every one of which is, like the Being of Parmenides, unoriginated, indestructible, un changeable, indivisible, and homogeneous in itself and with all other Being. The single cosmic-Being of Parmenides was broken up into an infinite number of small primitive elements which, were they not separated by empty space, would constitute a single element in the sense of Empe docles, and indeed would be the absolute qualitativeless ev of Parmenides. Of all the transformations of the Eleatic teaching, that of Leucippus is characterized by a striking simplicity, and by keen logical limitation to that which is indispensable to a professed explanation of the phenomenal world. At the same time it is clear that the Atomism which became later so important in the development of scientific theories did not grow out of experi ence, or observations and the conclusions built upon them, but directly out of the abstractest metaphysical concepts and absolutely universal needs for the explanation of actuality. Up to this point the Atomistic theory has been regarded as a variant of the Eleatic metaphysic, arising from an interest in physics. But, on the other hand, Leucippus is so far under the influence of Ionian monism that he does not seek the cause of motion in a force different from the stuff, but he regards spatial motion itself as a quality, immanent in the stuff. The corporeality that is homoge neous in all atoms did not, in his mind, possess the power to change itself qualitatively, that is to say, aXXoiooo-is ; but it did possess Kivgo-i,<;? an original underivable motion that EFFORTS TOWARD RECONCILIATION. 91 is given in its own essence. In fact, Leucippus seems to have understood by this term not so much that of heavi ness, — fall from above downward, — but rather a chaotic primal condition of bodies moving, disorderly, among each other in all directions (§ 32). At all events, the Atom ists held this original state of motion as uncaused and self-evident. So we can see in their view the perfect synthesis of the Heracleitan and Eleatic thought : all homo geneous elements of Being are thought as unchangeable, but at the same time as in a state of motion that is self- originated. This is the extent to which the beginnings of Atomism may with certainty be ascribed to Leucippus. It is an attempt to explain the world by atoms in original motion in empty space. The purely mechanical part of the theory, that the world was formed by collision, lateral and rotatory motion, likewise presented itself to the founder of Atomism in the same form in which Democritus later developed it. It is not so easy to explain, however, how Leucippus solved the more difficult and delicate question regarding the manner in which the various empirical qualities arose from these complexes of atoms ; that is to say, the transformation of quantitative into qualitative differences. Of his answer we know nothing. The sub jective method which Democritus applied to it was not as yet available to the founder of Atomism, since this method grew out of the investigations of Protagoras. Whether Leucippus1 was content with setting up this origination 1 To my mind, there is no foundation for the belief that Leucippus in his doctrine of the aio-BrjTd employed the antithesis of (pioei — vopa ; from its significance and following all tradition, this antithesis is So phistic. The inference rests upon the obviously late and inaccurate note in Stobaeus, Eel., I. 1104 (Dox., 397 b, 9) from which it might also be adduced that Diogenes of Apollonia was an Atomist. It is certain that Leucippus, as an Eleatic, denied sense qualities as real. For some later 92 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. of the qualities out of the quantitative relationships only as a metaphysical postulate ; whether he explained these qualities, like Parmenides, simply as vain show and illu sion ; or whether he in an uncertain manner, like Empedo cles, derived all other material from the four elements and their mixtures, so that he too sought to refer empirical things back to the different form and size of the combining atoms, — how far, in fact, he in general passed from the metaphysical principles to the specific development of the physical theory, — concerning all this it is doubtless too late to determine. From the allusions in his theory, and from the very uncertain reports from the extant literature, it is only safe to say that probably Leucippus was younger than Parmenides, considerably older than Democritus and contemporary with Empedocles and Anaxagoras. It is hardly possible to decide between the differ ent reports, whether his residence was in Miletus, Elea, or Abdera. Since however his pupil (eTalpos) Democritus doubt less was an Abderite, and came from a scientifically active circle which we cannot l possibly suppose to be that of the Magi, alleged to have been left behind by Xerxes, we may assume that a scientific activity was developed in Abdera in the second half of the sixth century, which city attained its highest glory under the influence of the colonists from Teos. Leucippus was its first representative of any significance.2 Protagoras appears to have originated in the school of Abdera at a time between the two great Atomists (§ 26). That Leucippus put his thought in writing is not entirely certain, but is probable. Nothing of his work remains, however. In any event, even early in anti quity, there was uncertainty about the authorship of what had been ascribed to him.3 Theophrastus ascribed 4 to him the /xe'yas SiaKocr/xo? which went under the name of Democritus. It is reporter this denial is identical with the assertion of their subjectivity (vopa). Parmenides himself best teaches us how little this equivalence was possible for a pre-Sophistic thinker. 1 Zeller, I4. 7G3. 2 Diels. Aufsdtze Zeller's Jubiliatim, p. 258 f. 8 De Xen., Zen., Gory., 6, 9S0 a, 7; ev to'is AevKmirov KaXovpevois Xbyois- 4 Diog. Laert., IX. 46. EFFORTS TOWARD RECONCILIATION. 93 strange that in the memory of succeeding times and indeed in modern time (Bacon, Alb. Lange), even as in antiquity (Epicu rus), he has been entirely overshadowed by Democritus.1 24. " Between these and in part already before them," 2 the Pythagoreans sought finally to apply their mathematical studies to the solution of the Heraclcitan-Eleatic problem (§ 12). However in this respect the Pythagoreans form no perfectly homogeneous whole. It appears rather that within the society, corresponding to its geographical extension and its gradual disintegration, the scientific work divided on different lines. " Some Pythagoreans clung to the development of mathematics and astronomy ; others busied themselves partly with medicine, partly with the investigation of different physical theories (con cerning both see § 25) ; others finally espoused the metaphysical theory, which so far as we know was constructed first by Philolaus and is usually designated as the number theory. Philolaus, if not the creator, at least the first literary repre sentative of the " Pythagorean philosophy," was an older con temporary of Socrates and Democritus, and cannot, at any rate, be set farther back than Anaxagoras and Empedocles. Indeed he is presumably somewhat younger than the latter two. Of his life we know nearly nothing, and we are even not sure whether he was a native of Tarentnm or Crotona. Also that he, like other Pythagoreans about the end of the fifth century, lived for a time in Thebes, is inferred with uncertainty from the passage in Plato, Phcedo, 61. Nearly as doubtful is his supposed authorship of the fragments that are preserved under his name. They have been collated and discussed first by Bockh (Berlin, 1819). From the investigations of Fr. Preller (article Philolaos in Ersch und Gruber Encykl, III. 23, 370 f.), V. Rose (De Aristotelis librorum ordine et auctoritate, Berlin, 1854), G. Schaar- schmidt (Bonn, 1864), Zeller (Hermes, 1S75, p. 175 f.), they may be assumed in part to be genuine, but they must be very cau tiously introduced into the discussion of the original number theory. 1 Zeller, I4. 761, 843. Compare E. Rhode, Verhandl. der Trierer Philol.-Versuchungen, 1879, and Jahrbilcher f'tir Philologie u. Padagogik, 1881, 741 f. Diels, Verhandlungen der Stetliner Philologie Vers. 1880. 2 Arist. Met., I. 5 : ev Se tovtois Kal irpb tovtiov oi KaXoipevoi UvBayd- petoi tcov /laBvparaiv atydpevoi ktX . 94 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. Along with Philolaus are mentioned, in Italy Cliniasof Taren- tum,1 in Thebes Lycis the teacher of Epaminondas, and Eurytus the pupil of Philolaus, a citizen of Crotona or Tarentum. Eury tus in turn had as pupils Xenophilus of Thracian Chalcis, the Phliasians Phanto, Echecrates, Diocles, Polymastus.2 From Gyrene Prorus is mentioned. In Athens Plato brought forward the two Pythagoreans, Simmias and Cebes, as witnesses of the death of Socrates. Almost mythical are the Locrian Timseus s and the Lucanian Ocellus. The philosophic teaching of any of these men is not in any way certainly known. With the disso lution of the Pythagorean League in the fourth century the schoof became extinct. The doctrines of the last significant personality in it, Archytus of Tarentum, merged, so far as our knowledge goes, into those of the older Academy (§ 38). A collection of all the Pythagorean fragments is in Mullach ; Ritter, Gesch. der pyth. Philos. (Hamburg, 1826) ; Rothen- biicher, Das System der Pythagoreen nach den Angaben des Aristoteles (Berlin, 1867) ; Alb. Heinze, Diemcta. Grundlehren der dlteren P. (Leipzig, 1871), Chaignet, Pytliagore et la philos. Pythagorienne, 2 vols. (Paris, 1873) ; Sobczyk, Das pyth. Sys tem (Leipzig, 187K) ; A Doering, Wandlungen in der pyth. Lehre (Arch. f. Gesch. d. Philos., v. 503 f.). As to the Pythagorean teaching, only that can be regarded as genuine which Plato and Aristotle report, together with the concurrent portions of the fragments transmitted in such ques tionable shape. In the Pythagorean society mathematical investigations were pursued for the first time quite independently, and were brought to a high degree of perfection. Detailed views concerning the number system, concerning the series of odd and even numbers, of prime numbers, of squares, etc., were early instituted. It is not improbable that. they, applying arithmetic to geometry, came to the conception embodied in the so-called Pythagorean theorem. Herein must they have had a premonition of the real value of number-relations in that they represent number as the ruling i .Iambi. De vita Pyth., 266. 2 Diog. Laert., VIII. 46. ' The writing bearing this name and concerned with the soul of the world, usually published in Plato's works, is certainly a later compendium of Plato's Timoeus. EFFORTS TOWARD RECONCILIATION. 95 principle in space. Their number theory was strengthened by the results attained by them in music. Although later reports include J much that is fabulous and physically impossible, there can nevertheless be no doubt that the Pythagorean harmonic shows an exact knowledge of those simple arithmetical relations (first of all, the string-lengths) out of which musical melody arises. To this may be added that the regular revolution of the stars, — of which they made especially careful observations, and which are indeed the standard for all time measurements, — made the world- order (Koo-g,o<;) likewise appear to them to be numerically determined. From these premises it can be understood how some Pythagoreans came therefore to find in numbers the permanent essence of things, concerning which essence the battle between philosophic theories had taken place. On the' one hand, numbers might be substituted — since they wee supposed to be self-existent, unchangeable, and self-unitary — for the abstract Being of the Eleatics as a principle at least equally available in the explanation of the phenomenal world. On the other hand, since Heracleitus had found that the only permanent in change was in the or derly forms of the nature process, the relationships of num ber ruling the process of change gave an exacter form to this idea. The Pythagorean number-theory attempted to determine numerically the permanent relations of cosmic life. The Pythagoreans said therefore : All is number, and they meant by this that numbers are the determining essence of all things. Since now these same abstract numbers and number-relationships are found in many different things and processes,^ they said also that the numbers are the original forms which are copied by the things. i Zeller, I4. 317. The observations of the Pythagoreans in the har monic or, as it is called, canonic, were apparently empirically made upon the heptachord with strings of different length. That they had no theory of oscillation, goes without saying. 96 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. It is scarcely conceivable that the Pythagoreans came to their predilection for mathematics, music, and astronomy through metaphysics. The inverse is rather true, that they came from such concrete studies, in undertaking to enter upon the solution of universal problems, — as Aristotle (Met., I. 5) also suffi ciently indicated by the dtf/dpevoi. For their treatment of geom etry and stereometry, and their prevailing arithmetical fondness, see Roth (Gesch. iinserer abendl. Philos., II. 2), although he on this territory accredits indeed too much to the old Pythagoreans. Cantor, Varies, iiber d. Gesch. d. Math., I. 124. In order to derive, however, at one and the same time the manifoldness and changeableness of individual things from number relations, the Pythagoreans gave metaphysical meaning to the fundamental opposition which they found in the number theory. They declared that the odd and the even are respectively identical with the limited and the unlimited.1 As all numbers are composed of the even and the odd, all things also combine in themselves fundamental an titheses, and especially that of the limited and the unlim ited. To this Heracleitan fundamental principle there is bound this logical consequence, that everything is the rec onciliation of opposites, or a "harmony," — an expression which in the mouth of the Pythagoreans has always the suggestion of musical investigations. The antithesis, however, acquired among the Pythagore ans in conformity to their later attitude a still more pro nounced value than with Heracleitus. The limited was the better, the more valuable to them, as it was to Parmenides. Odd numbers are more nearly perfect than even. In this way the Pythagorean system got a dualistic cast, which is noticeable in all its parts ; but this was theoretically over come by the fact that since the One, the odd-even primi tive number, creates both series from itself, so also all the 1 The ground of this identification (Simpl. Phys., 105 r. ; compare Zeller, I4. 322) is artificial in that it was obviously made ad hoc, and is no natural product of the number theory. EFFORTS TOWARD RECONCILIATION. 97 antitheses of the cosmic life are in a grand harmonious unity. The later Stoic neo-Platonists, i. e. neo-Pythagoreans, tried to find in this antithesis that of force and stuff, spirit and matter, and they deduced the dyads from the divine monads. Neverthe less, not the slightest suggestion of such a conception can be found in the Plato-Aristotelian reports, which would certainly have been particularly observant of this point. All that we know with any certainty respecting the special doctrine of the Pythagoreans as contrasted with these general principles reveals their effort to construct, in accordance with a scheme of numbers, an harmonic order of things in the various fields. For this there served first the decimal system, in which every one of the first ten num bers is accorded a special significance,1 derived from arith metical considerations. The arithmetical mysticism or symbolism of the Pythagoreans seems to have consisted in bringing into relation with numbers the fundamental ideas of various departments of knowledge, and thereby giving expression to the relative rank, value, and significance of these ideas. There is here the suggestion of the ideal thought of an order of things permanently determined by the number series; but much caprice in oracular symbolizing and parallelizing was obviously developed in details. Beside the number ten of cos mic bodies, the series of elements is about as follows (Jambli- chus) : (1) point, (2) line, (3) surface, (4) solid, (5) quality, (6) soul, (7) reason, etc.; or, on the other hand, (1) reason as located in the brain, (2) sensation in the heart, (3) germination in the navel, (4) procreation in geniialibus, etc. Then the virtues, like justice, were also designated by numbers. At the same time these concepts, which are symbolized by the same number in different series, also suggest and are related to one another. Thus it came about that the soul was called a square or a sphere. Doubtless with this the thought was connected that 1 In a certain sense the Pythagoreans appear to have regarded the development from the One to the Ten as gradual. Arist. Mel., XI. 7, 1072 b. See Zeller, I4. 348. 98 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. different things should be assigned among a decade of gods. If one adds that these determinations were given by different Pythagoreans differently, it is easily understood why this first scheme of a mathematical order of the world ended in an unfruitful confusion. An approximate representation of the division of the different domains to which the Pythagoreans applied, or wished to apply, this number theory shows a collection of pairs of opposites which were arranged in a parallelism, like the original pair. Even here is the sacred number ten completed : (1) limited and unlimited ; (2) odd and even ; (3) one and many ; (4) right and left ; (5) male and female; (6) rest and motion; (7) straight and crooked ; (8) light and darkness ; (9) good and evil ; (10) square and rectangle. This eccentric and in itself principleless arrangement J shows that the Pythagoreans attempted at least an all-round application of their fun damental principle. Alongside their mathematical, meta physical, and physical conceptions, the ethical conceptions theoretically find their place;2 but in the development, nevertheless, the physical interest everywhere outweighs the others. While now this completely ontological number system of concepts satisfied the Eleatic motif, yet the physics of the Pythagoreans was very greatly under the influence of Heracleitus, as was also the physics of Parmenides. In the theory of the formation of the world,8 the Pythagoreans placed fire in the middle as the original condition of things, 1 In which always the first-named number is the more nearly perfect. 2 This beginning of scientific consideration of ethical ideas, of which intimations are at hand in the special doctrines, likewise bespeaks a later position for the Pythagorean philosophy. 8 It must remain uncertain whether they also accepted the theory of periodic world-formation and destruction. They taught " the great year " in the sense that, with the return of the original arrangement of the stars, all individual appearances, persons, and experiences would return. EFFORTS TOWARD RECONCILIATION. 99 as the- self-determining One, the animating and impelling force. Fire drew around itself, however, the unlimited (i. e., empty) space,1 and limited (i. e., formed) it in ever growing dimensions, — a conception which vividly reminds us of the Siv-g of Anaxagoras and Leucippus. The most brilliant achievement of the Pythagoreans was their astronomy, and in this respect they are far in advance of all their contemporaries. They regarded not only the world-all as globular, but also the single stars as luminous globes, which move around the central fire in transparent globular shells, the spheres. Their most important advance here is in the fact that the earth likewise was regarded as a globe, moving around this same central fire. The older Pythagoreans believed that the earth presents always the same side to the central fire, so that mankind on the oppo site side never gets sight of the central fire, nor yet of the counter-earth (dvrixfoiv) that is between the earth and the central fire. The counter-earth was conceived, presumably in order to complete the number ten. However, mankind does get sight of the changing aspects of the moon circling outside the earth, as well as of the sun, five planets, and heaven of fixed stars. The distance of the spheres from the central fire was determined by the Pythagoreans accord ing to simple number relationships. Corresponding to this, they assumed that from the revolution of the spheres there resulted a melodious musical sound, the so-called harmony of the spheres. In this way the orderly revolution of the stars became for them the perfect and divine, while the terrestrial world, the world under the moon, was repre sented as the changing, changeable, and imperfect. Thus the Eleatic static world and the Heracleitan changing world appear to have been apportioned to different regions of the actual world. 1 The assumption of the kcvov is expressly confirmed by Aristotle, Phys., IV. 6, 213 b, 22. fOO HISTORY OF ANCIEN1 PHILOSOPHY. Compare Bockh, De Platonis systemate calestium globorum et de vera indole astronomice Philolaicce (Berlin, 1810) ; Gruppe, Die Kosmischen Systeme der Griechen (Berlin, 1852) ; M. Satorius, Die Entwickelung der Astronomie bei den Griechen bis Anaxagoras und Empedokles (Breslau, 1883) . Furthermore, the shape of the elements among the Pythag oreans is wortliy of note. Just as they reduced the space forms to number relationships, so they referred the different corporeal elements to space forms, by ascribing simple stereometric forms to the ultimate constituents of matter : the tetrahedron to fire, the cube to earth, the octahedron to air, the icosahedron to water, and, finally, the dodecahedron to the aether, which was added by them to the four Empedo- clean elements and conceived as surrounding all the others. If one is able to see in this the result of an interest in crys tallography, nevertheless, on the other hand, also here a fan tastic caprice is only too apparent. Although consequently the augury of a mathematical state ment of natural law is the permanent service of the Pythag orean philosophy, yet the form of the statement that was advanced by them was little suited to further scientific investi gations. Apart from astronomy, this knowledge of the Pythag oreans, to which some value in empirical investigations may be ascribed, stands in no connection with the metaphysical number theory, and has come from such Pythagoreans, who were little, if at all, interested in the number theory (§ 25). 4. The Greek Enlightenment. the sophists and socrates. 25. After the rapid development in which Greek science at the first onset defined a number of valuable and funda mental concepts concerning nature, a kind of reaction began about the middle of the fifth century. The metaphysical tendency of thought declined. Of hypotheses thei'e were THE GREEK ENLIGHTENMENT. 101 already many enough, and it seemed more important to test and verify them in application to special kinds of knowledge. The lively exchange between the different schools led easily to a blending of principles, which thereby lost their harshness, but unfortunately their force as well. The more the circles of scientific activity increased, the more the interest turned to the single problems of science. There began an epoch of eclecticism and detailed investigation. The after-effects of the Milesian researches are met not only among the younger physicists, who regarded the cos mic matter as a compromise between air and water or between fire and air, but also, in a man like Idceus of Himera, who agreed with Anaximenes in maintaining that the air was the dp-^g-1 A full adaptation, however, of the Milesian teaching to the position of science, in its attempts at compromise, appears in by far the most important of these eclectics, Diogenes of Apollonia. Nothing is known about his life. It is even doubtful, on account of the Ionian dialect of his writing, irepl vo-ew; (see G. Geil, Philos. Monatsheften, XXVI. 257 f .), if the place of his birth was the Apollonia in Crete. Schorn and Panzerbieter have collected the fragments, — Schorn (Bonn, 1829, with those of Anaxagoras) and Panzerbieter (Leipzig, 1830, Diog. Apollonia). See Steinhart's article in the Encyklopddie of Ersch and Gruber. Schleiermacher, who in his treatise concerning Diogenes (Com plete Works, III. 2, 149 ff.) at first placed him very high aud chronologically early, came later ( Vorles. iiber Gesch. der Philos., Complete Works, III. 4 a, 77) to view him as a prin- cipleless eclectic. Zeller agrees with this last conception (I4. 248 f.). D. Weygoldt (Arch. f. Gesch. d. Philos., I. 161 f.) has identified some teachings of Diogenes in some pseudo writings of Hippocrates. Diogenes anticipated his later point of view in the desire, expressed in the beginning of his writing, for an unambigu ous starting-point and a simple and worthy investigation. The hylozoistic monism of the Milesians formed for him 1 Sext. Emp. Adv. math., IX. 360. 102 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. this starting-point, which he defended 1 against pluralistic theories (Anaxagoras and Empedocles) by the subtle con ception that the process of Becoming, the change of things into one another and their reciprocal influence, are expli cable only by the presupposition of a common fundamental essence, of which all particular things arc shifting transfor mations (erepoiojaeiii). The constitutive characteristics, however, of the dpyg he regarded on the one hand, like the Ionians, as motion and animation, and on the other, in ap parent agreement with Anaxagoras, as reasonableness and purposiveness which are manifested in the proportionate distribution of matter in the universe. So he accepted in the list of predicates of the Air of Anaximenes those also of the Anaxagorean vow, and called 2 this air-spirit a a&pa pieya Kal layvpbv Kal athiov re Kal dOdvarov Kal iroXXci etSo?. The air, likewise called irvevpia, as being the medium of life and of thought, is the uniform and universal reality, both in the microcosm and in the macrocosm. Through condensa tion and rarefaction, which were respectively (compare § 16) identified with cooling and warming, the cosmic matter changed into individual things. Through the effect of weight, which drove the rarer above and the more con densed below, there were completed the order and motion of the world-all, which was conceived to be in a periodic alter nation of origination and destruction. In the organism the air serves as the soul. The soul is denied to plants, and in animals it is found in the blood (after Empedocles). Life depends upon the blood receiving the air, upon the mixing of which the mental condition of the organism depends. With a just presentiment Diogenes pointed out the distinc tion between the arterial and venous blood. Moreover, his valuable knowledge of the arterial system, his idea of the brain as the seat of thought, his theories of the origin of sense perception, as well as his numerous other physiologi- 1 Simpl. Phys., 32 verso, 151, 30. 2 Ibid., 33 recto, 153, 17. THE GREEK ENLIGHTENMENT. 103 cal and biological observations, show a fine, accurate sense for detailed research in the organic world. Inversely, there is an approximation to Ionian hylozoism • — as it presented itself among the Eleatics to Melissus — in the only pupil of Anaxagoras of whom anything definite is known. This is Archelaus of Athens or Miletus, who identified with the air the original mixture of all the Xpguara of Anaxagoras, and associated the vow essentially with the air (§ 26), similarly to Diogenes, only in a more mechanical way. In Ephesus, on the other hand, a school continued to exist which actively held to the teaching of Heracleitus. It did not lessen the paradoxes of Heracleitus, but appears to have exaggerated them in so enthusiastic and unmethodical a manner that Plato made sport1 of them'. At least it is reported 2 that Cratylus, the most important of these Hera- cleitans and a younger contemporary of Socrates, the teacher of Plato, so subtilized the Heracleitan proposition concern ing the inability of stepping into the same river twice, as to postulate the impossibility of stepping in even once. Antiquity 3 associated with Heracleitus a movement de veloped within the Pythagorean circle, whose leader was Hippasus of Metapontum, approximately a contemporary of Philolaus. He emphasized the Heracleitan moment in the Pythagorean physics so exclusively that fire was for him entirely the dpxn m tne Ionian sense. The old tradition i designated him as the head of the exoteric Acousmatics, who were not initiated into the secrets of the number theory. On the other hand, Ecphantus, and similarly perhaps 1 Thext., 179 e. In the same feeling is the entire dialogue of Cratylus written. 2 Arist. Met., Ill 5, 1010 a, 12. 3 Ibid., I. 3, 984 a, 7. 4 Jamblichus, De vit. Pyth., 81. 104 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. Xuthus,1 joined the Pythagorean teaching to atomism, to which the transition appears to have been made in the ste- reometrical construction of the elements as attempted by the Pythagoreans. Likewise in Ecphantus we find simi larities to the vow theory of Anaxagoras.2 The atoms, differing in size, form, and force, are so moved by the vow that out of them the unitary spherical shape of the world is perfectly formed and maintained. While such adjustments and compromises between the metaphysical theories were being attempted, the special in terest of this period was in detailed investigation. This developed vigorously in all domains, and in its progress spe cial departments of science even then were differentiating themselves from general philosophy. Mathematics 3 was the first to proceed independently ; not only in the Pythag orean school, but among other thinkers (Anaxagoras, and later Plato and Democritus), it found recognition and pro motion. The trisection of an angle, the squaring of the circle, the doubling of the cube, were the pet problems of the time. A certain Hippocrates of Chios wrote the first manual of mathematics, and introduced the method of des ignating figures by letters. There was wanting, it is true, a logical development of the art of demonstration. How ever, a considerable amount of knowledge was accumulated, which was obtained in an empirical way, partly experi mental and partly tentative. Brilliant progress in astronomy i was made in the fifth and in the beginning of the fourth century, particularly by the Pythagoreans. Whether it were experience (the cir cumnavigating of Africa ?) or theoretic reflection upon the 1 Compare Zeller, I*. 405, 1. 2 Details by Zeller, I4. 458 f. 3 Cantor, Vorles. iiber d. Gesch. d. Math., I. 160 f., 171 f. 4 Compare O. Gruppe, Die kosmififi Systeme d. Griechen, Berlin, 1851. THE GREEK ENLIGHTENMENT. 105 problems that led to the hypotheses of the central fire and the counter-earth, gradually the theory of the diurnal movement of the earth around the central fire, which alone could explain the apparent rotation of the heavens, was superseded by the theory of the revolution of the earth upon its axis. Hicetas of Syracuse appears to have been the founder of this theory. He was certainly younger than Philolaus, and perhaps a participant in that last phase of Pythagoreanism, as it merged in the Academy 1 (§ 38). About this time, in other departments of natural science, a richer, more exact treatment of individual facts took the place of ultimate hypotheses. Here appeared a wonderful revolution, when interest in meteorological observations be gan to give place to interest in the investigation of the organic world, and of man in particular. Typical in this respect appears Hippo 2 (of Samos?), a naturalist of the time of Pericles, who, inasmuch as he postulated the moist as dpxv,s is usually mentioned in connection with Thales; so also Cleidemus,4 in whose 1 Here, asfor the following, we may refer once for all to the Geschichle der Mathematik, Nalurwissenschaft und Medizin in Altertum, appearing in this same volume of the German edition. This special treatment allows us to make only a brief sketch of these subjects, and to lay the emphasis upon the distinctively philosophical movement. 2 Compare Schleiermacher, Ueber den Philosophen Hippon, Complete Works, Vol. III. p. 408 f . ; [Jhrig, De Hippon e atheo (Giessen, 1848). 8 With special emphasis upon the moist character of animal seed, Arist. De an., I. 2. This explains the one supposition of Aristotle con cerning the origin of the teaching of Thales (see § 14). If the charge of Atheism which was made against Hippo refers to the fact that he did not recognize anything as imperishable, and declared that nothing exists except phenomena (schol. in Arist., 534 a, 22), he was, in spite of his moist dpxq, a purely positive anti-metaphysician. This explains Aris totle's prejudice against him (T*r\os, De an., I. 2 ; eireXeia ttjs hiavoias, Met., I. 3). 4 Zeller, I4. 927. 106 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. researches into the physiology of sensation we find sug gestions of Anaxagoras. Medicine also could not hold itself apart from the influ ence of the general body of science, and it appeared for a time as if it would be entirely absorbed into the speculations of natural pliilosophy. The impulse thereto arose from the Pythagorean circles, and is principally traced back to Alcmason,1 a physician in Crotona, and perhaps a some what older contemporary of Philolaus. He stood aloof from the number theory, but in common with its adher ents held to the doctrine of antitheses.2 He also believed in the fundamental opposition of the terrestrial imper fection and the celestial perfection, which dualism he, like Philolaus, appears to have developed astronomically. His medical views depended upon the universal Pythago- rean-Heracleitan presuppositions, since he defined health as the harmony of opposing forces. Specifically, there were supposed to be fundamental humors Avhose homo geneous mixing indicated health, while an excess or defi ciency of any one of them led to pathological conditions. Such aetiological theories did not, however, prevent Ale- mason from making careful and valuable investigations. He is said to be the first to make sections ; he appears to have been the first to locate thought in the brain, and to designate the nerves as canals leading thither from the sense-organs. Connected with this — for him as well as later for Democritus and Plato — was the fact that he in an Eleatic-Heracleitan fashion opposed thought to perception. As a type of the temporary amalgamation of medicine and natural philosophy, we may take3 the pseudo-Hippo- 1 Unna, De Alcmaone Crotoniata cjusque fragmentis, found in Peter sen's Phil. hist. Stud. 1832 ; R. Hirzel, Hermes, 1876, p. 240 f. 2 Arist. Met., I. 5, 986 a, 27. 8 Compare Siebrck, Gesch. der Psychol, I. 1, 94 f, THE GREEK ENLIGHTENMENT. 107 cratic work irepl hiairw, which has been proved 1 by Zeller (1. 663 f., against Schuster, Ileraclitus, 99f ., and Teichmiiller, Ncue Studien, I. 249 f., II. 6 f.) to belong to the time after Empedocles and Anaxagoras and before Plato. This writ ing pictures in the microcosm of the human body, as well as in the universe, now a constructive and now a destruc tive battle between fire and water, and it ascribes motion to fire and nourishing power to water. The theory is then carried out in detail, and deviates into a medical psychology which regards the soul as a mixed essence corresponding in miniature to the body. The merit of Hippocrates (460-377) 2 was that he de fended the independence of medicine against such nature- philosophical tendencies, which he contested principally irepl dpx\aivs inrpiKr]t;. He separated medicine as a re^vg from philosophy in a purely Greek fashion as the art of restoring to the body its beauty lost through disease. On the other hand, Hippocrates (irepl hiairw ogeoov) also re jected the purely symptomatic method that was in vogue in the Cnidian school. He urged that the determination of the empirical causes of disease was to be attained by a comprehensive and careful observation of the alriai;3 and in this he found a successor in Diocles of Carystus. He distinguished causes dependent on external events, like cli mate, seasons, etc., from those subject to the human will, like the diet. Remoter causes are distinguished from the more immediate, but always investigation is limited to experience, and only immanent, not transcendent, setiok)- 1 Compare YVeygoldt, Jahrb.f. Id. Philol., 1882, 161 f. 2 The mass of writings passing under the name of Hippocrates are published by Kiihn and by Littre, and the latter has made a French translation. Only a small portion of these writings belongs to Hip pocrates, and this portion contains several very difficult problems of detail. J. Ilberg, Studio Pseudippocralea (Leipzig, 1883). 8 See C. Goring, Ueber den Begriff d. Ursache in d. griech. Philos, (Leipzig, 1874). 108 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. gies are sought. As with Alcmason, the mixture of the four fundamental humors — the blood, phlegm, yellow gall, and black gall — formed likewise the central point of this medical theory. Besides this the school of Hippocrates de veloped an accurate knowledge of anatomy and physiology. In the former branch the knowledge of the brain and ner vous system, and especially, even thus early, of the particu lar sense nerves, is to be particularly noted ; and concerning the latter is the theory of the eg,iCTTiK7) cpawop,evn croifiia ovcra 8' ov • Kal 6 o-o^ictt^s XpijpaTKTTrj'; diro (paivopevn*; &od>ias aXX ovk ovo~gvo-eu><; r) irepl tov p.r) 6Vtos (see below). His con nection with the Sicilian school of oratory (Corax and Tisias), aud therefore also with Empedocles, is undoubted. His con nection with the Eleatics appears equally certain, from the argu- i Arist. Rhet., II. 24; 1402 a, 23. 114 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. mentation in his writings. Compare H. E. Foss, De G. L. (Halle, 1828); H. Diels, Gorgias und Empedocles (Berichte der Berliner Akademic). Alcidamus of Elea, Polus 1 of Agrigentum, Lycophron, and Protarchus 2 are named as pupils of Gorgias. Protagoras, doubtless the most important of the Sophists, was born in Abdera in 480 or somewhat earlier. It can be assumed that he was not distant in his views from the school of Atomists in that city. Considerably younger than Leucippus, and about twenty years older than Democritus, he formed the natural connection between the two (see §§ 23, 31). With keen insight into the needs of the time, and much admired as a teacher of wisdom, he was one of the first to make an extended tour of the Grecian cities. He was in Athens many times. In 411, and during the rule of the four hundred, he was there for the last time, and was accused of atheism. He was con demned, and upon his flight to Sicily was drowned. The titles (Diog. Laert., IX. 55) of his numerous writings, only a very few of which are preserved, prove that he dealt with the most varied subjects in the domain of theory and practice. Com pare J. Frei, Qucestiones Protagorece (Bonn, 1845) ; A. J. Vi- tringa, De Prot. vita et philos. (Groningen, 1851). Lately Th. Gompertz (Vienna Session Reports, 1890) has identified a Sophistic speech with the Apology of Medicine in the pseudo- Hippocratic writing, irepl rixv-q*, and has noted its not fully undoubted connection with the teaching of Protagoras. Antimaerus of Mende, Archagoras, Euathlus,8 Theodorus the mathematician, and in a wider sense Xeniades of Corinth also are to be regarded as pupils of Protagoras. Eminent citizens of Athens, like Critias, probably Callicles, or poets like Evenus of Paros, etc., stood in a less intimate connection with the Sophists. The practical and political aim of their instruction com pelled the Sophists to turn aside from independent nature study and metaphysical speculation, and to content them selves with the presentation, in popular form, of such the ories only when they were called for or appeared effective.4 1 Plato, Gorg. 2 Plato, Phileh. 3 Plato, Thecetetus. 4 Many, like Gorgias, rejected this as perfectly worthless. See Plato, Meno, 95 c. THE GREEK ENLIGHTENMENT. 115 The peculiar task in teaching men how to persuade drove them, on the other hand, to interest themselves more thor oughly in man, especially on his psychological side. Who ever endeavors to influence man by speech must know something of the genesis and development of his ideas and volitions. While earlier science with naive devotion to the outer world had coined fundamental concepts for its knowledge of nature, Sophistry, so far as it adopted the methods of science, turned to inner experience, and com pleted the incomplete earlier philosophy by studying the mental life of man. In this essentially anthropological tendency, sophistry turned philosophy on the road to subjectivism.1 This new kind of work began first with language. The efforts of Prodicus in synonymy, those of Hippias in grammar, were in this direction. Protagoras was especially fruitful in this respect. Persuaded that theory without practice was as little useful as practice 2 without theory, he connected the practical teaching, to which Gorgias seems to have limited himself, with philological investigations. He concerned himself with the right use of words,3 in their genders, tenses, modes,4 etc. Compare Lersch, Die Sprachphilos. deralten, 1. 15 f. ; Alberti, Die Sprachphilos. vor Platon (Philol., 1856) ; Prantl, Gesch. der Logik, I. 14 f . Similar small beginnings in logic appeared, in addition to those in grammar. That teachers of oratory should 1 What Cicero (Tusc., V. 4, 10) said of Socrates, that he called philosophy down from heaven into the cities and houses, is equally true for the entire Greek Enlightenment, for the Sophists as well as for him. 2 Stobteus Florilegium, 29, 80. 8 Plato, Phmdr., 267 c. 4 Diog. Laert., IX. 53, in which he distinguished evx<»Xri, epwTnais, ftrroKpnois, and tVroXij. 116 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. reflect how a thing was to be proved and controverted, is obvious. It is also easily credible (Diog. Laert., IX. 51 f.) that Protagoras had his attention drawn to the nature of contradictory propositions, and was the first to teach the method of proof (to.? irpb<; ra? deaeis iiri-^eiprjaei1;). Appar ently formal logic sprang up here as an art of argumen tation, proof, and contradiction. Of how far it was developed in details by the Sophists, we unfortunately know absolutely nothing.1 We are better informed concerning their general view of human knowledge. The less the Sophist championed earlier metaphysical and physical learning, and the more he entertained his hearers by his clever opposition to it, and the more vividly again instruction presented to the consciousness of the rhetorician the possibility of proving different things of the same object, so much the more con ceivable is it that these men lost faith in any universally valid- truth or in the possibility of any certain knowledge. Their preoccupation with the theory of knowledge led, as things were, by a psychological necessity to skepticism. This skepticism is the theoretical centre of Sophistry. That this degenerated among the younger Sophists into frivolous argumentation should not lead to the misconception of the scientific seriousness with which the negative epistemology was developed, especially by Protagoras. On the other hand, it was an unhistoric interpretation for those in modern time, fol lowing G rote's example, to celebrate Protagoras as the founder of Positivism: E. Laas, Idealism us und Pnsitirismus, I. (Berlin, l.S.so) var. loc. ; W. Halbfass, Die Berichte des Plato n u. Aristolclcs iiber Protagoras (Strassburg, 1882). Opposed to 1 That the Aristotelian logic was not without precedents, literary or in the form of practical exercise, may be taken a priori as extremely probable. How far these precedents reached cannot be determined from the very few indications from extant literature (see particularly Plato's (?) dialogue Sophist). This lack of evidence is one of the most regrettable deficiencies in the history of Greek science. Compare Prantl, Gesch. d. Log., I. 11 f. THE GREEK ENLIGHTENMENT. 117 this is P. Natorp, Forschungen zu Gesch. des Erkcnntnissprob- lems, p. 1 f., 149 f. Compare Fr. Sattig, Der Protagoreische Sensualismus in Zeitschr. f. Philos. (1885 f.). The chief source for the epistemology of Protagoras is Plato's dialogue, Thecetetus. Yet it is a question how far the presentation developed in this may be referred to Protagoras himself. The teaching of Gorgias is in part preserved in the pseudo-Aristo telian De Melisso, Zenone, Gorgia, c. 5 and 6 (§ 17) ; and in part in Sext. Emp. Adv. math., VII. 65. In order to establish his skeptical belief about human knowledge, Protagoras made the eternal flux of Hera cleitus his point of departure. But he emphasized still more than Heracleitus the correlation, in which every single thing does not so much exist, as momentarily come into existence, through its relation to other things. Prom the disavowal of absolute Being it followed that qualities of things arise only out of the temporary effect of things on one another. Quality is the product of motion,1 and in deed, as Protagoras in a purely Heracleitan manner set forth, always of two corresponding motions but in opposite directions. One of these was designated as activity, the other as passivity.2 It follows that in general it can never be said what a thing is, but at most what it becomes in its changing relation to other things,3 and the Protagorean cor- relativeness contained a still greater significance in apply ing this general theory of motion to the theory of human perception. Whenever a thing affects one of our senses, 1 It is not clear from the Thecetetus whether and how Protagoras discussed the substratum of the Kivncris. Even if he did not with Heracleitus deny it, yet he regarded it at any rate as incognizable. It is conceivable that the Abderite Protagoras developed this theory in compliance to the demands of Atomism, in which shape Democritus later received it (§ 32). 2 Thecet., 156 f. 8 Similarly the skeptical statements of Xeniades appear to have been conceived. Compare Zeller, I4. 988. 118 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. in which the motion proceeding1 from the object meets a reacting motion of the organ, there then arises in the sense organ the perceptual image,2 and simultaneously in the thing, the quality corresponding 3 to the image. Therefore every perception teaches only how the thing appears in the moment of perception for the perceiver, and indeed for him alone. Now for Protagoras, sense perception was regarded as the only source of knowledge and of the entire mental life.4 Therefore there was for him no insight into the Being of things over and above those relations ; no idea of what things might be in themselves abstracted from perceptual relations. Rather is everything for each individual 5 just what it appears to him ; but it is such only to that indi vidual, and, more exactly, only for his momentary state of perception. The well-known statement 6 has this meaning : irdvrcov ^pvparcov perpov dvOpwiros, rwv p.ev ovrwv a>? eart,, twv Be p,rj ovrcov oo<; ovic eariv. 1 The ability of the different objects to influence the different sense organs appears already to have led Protagoras to his theory of the different velocities of movements of the objects. See Thecct., 156 c. With this reduction of the qualitative to the quantitative, Protagoras stood entirely in the school of the Atomists (§§ 23 and 32). 2 Under this term the sensations and also the feelings are classified in the Thecetetus (156). 3 That the a'loBnrov in reality arises with the a'to-Boois, is an addition presumably of those who had extended and applied the theory of the Abderite (according to the Thecetetus'). For such an assertion carries one far beyond the bounds of skepticism. This cannot apply to Democritus. 4 Whether and how Protagoras has proved and explained this view (pnhev eivai tt]v ¦tyvxh" irapa ras atoBrjoeis, Diog. Laert., IX. 51) is not known. In the light, of the earlier Rationalism (§§ 18-23) this sensa tionalism seems somewhat unwarranted. It is presaged in the physio logical psychology of the later nature philosophy (§ 25). 6 The explanation of Thecetetus (152 a) does not permit the SvBpairos in this well-known sentence to refer to the genus. See Arist. Met., X. 6, 1062 b, 13. 6 Thecetetus, 152 a; Sext. Emp. Adv. math., VII. 60. THE GREEK ENLIGHTENMENT. 119 As Protagoras based his philosophy upon that of Hera cleitus, so Gorgias founded his upon that of the Eleatics. The former had concluded that to all opinion there is attached a relative, but to none an absolute, truth ; the latter sought to demonstrate in general the impossibility of knowledge. While, however, the practical investiga tions of Protagoras enriched philosophy in the succeeding systems of Plato and Democritus, the argumentation of Gorgias was developed in a captious and sterile dialectic. Gprgias showed : (1) Nothing is. That which is not, can not be, and even as little can that which is. Eor that which is, cannot be thought either as unoriginated and imperish able or as originated and perishable ; neither can it be thought as one or as many, nor indeed finally as moved, without being involved in obvious contradictions. The arguments of Zeno are everywhere re-employed here (§ 20). Moreover, that which is and that which is not to exist simultaneously, is impossible (against Heracleitus ?). (2) Were there something, it would not be knowable ; for that which is and that which is thought must be differ ent, — otherwise error would be impossible.1 (3) If there were knowledge, it could not be communicated, because communication is possible only by means of signs, which are different from the thing itself. There is no warrant that there is a like apprehension of these signs by different individuals.2 Howsoever seriously and scientifically the theories of Skepticism were held, even by Protagoras, they neverthe less led to the demoralization of science, and resulted finally in a frivolous diversion in daily life. Gorgias had found l This dialectic is more finely spun out in the dialogue of the Sophist. 2 One is almost inclined to regard these paradoxes of this anti-philo- sophical rhetorician as a grotesque persiflage of the Eleatic dialectic. At all events, this last is inevitably and fatally involved in its own toils. 120 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. that every predication of a subject is doubtful,1 if indeed there is any difference whatever between subject and pred icate. He therefore called in question synthetic judgments. Protagoras himself doubted the reality of mathematical knowledge.2 Euthydemus, in the spirit of this relativism,3 said that anything is suitable to everything ; one cannot err, for what is spoken exists also as a something thought.4 One cannot contradict himself ; if he appears to, it is only because he is speaking of a different thing, and so on. Since the majority of the Sophists did not take truth seri ously from the beginning, their entire art amounted to a dispute with formal adroitness pro et contra over anything whatsoever, and to equipping their pupils in this facility. Their principal aim'was accordingly to be able to confuse the listener, to drive him into making absurd answers, and to refute one's opponent. Protagoras also wrote dvriXoyiai and KaraBaXXovres ; 5 and the practice of the Sophists, especially in later time, in trying to be sensational, consisted simply in that art, which is called Eristic. Plato's Euthydemus describes with many plaj-ful witticisms the method of Eristic by the example of the two brothers Euthydemus and Dionysidorus, and Aristotle has taken the pains to arrange systematically these witticisms in the last book of the Topics (irepl o-o(J>io-tikwv IXeyx^v). The greater number of these witticisms are puns. The ambiguity of the words, of the endings, of the syntactical forms, etc., are in the main the basis of the witticisms (Prantl, Gesch.- d. Log., I. 20 f.). The great favor with which these jokes were received in Greece, and espe- 1 Sophist, 251 b. 2 Arist. Met., II. 2, 998 a, 3. 8 to>v irpbs ti elvai ttjv dXijBeiav. Sext. Emp. Adv. math., VII. 60. 4 Here the ambiguity of the copula also plays » part. Lycophron proposed to omit the copula. 6 The proposition that " man is the measure of all things " is cited as the beginning of this work, and at the same time as the beginning of a work, called aXr/Beia, which perhaps formed the first part of it. THE GREEK ENLIGHTENMENT. 121 cially in Athens, is explained by the youthful inclination to quibble, by the southron's fondness for talking, and by the awakening of reflective criticism upon familiar things of daily life. However, this facetious method was unpromising for the serious progress of science. On the other hand, the con- victionless attitude of mind that the Sophists designedly or undesignedly encouraged became a direct menace in its application upon that domain in which, as their entire effort showed, they were alone deeply interested, — the ethico-political. Since the time of the Seven Wise Men (§ 9), the content of moral and civil laws and obedience to them had been a common subject for reflection. But the growing individualism, the inspired activity of the Periclean age, and the anarchy of the Athenian democracy for the first time brought into question through the Sophists the justification of these norms. Since here also the individual man with his temporary desires and needs was declared to be the measure of all things, the binding power of the law became as relatively valid as theoretical truth had been. See H. Sidgwick, The Sophists (Journal of Philology, 1872, 1873) ; A. Harpf, Die Ethik des Protagoras (Heidelberg, 1884) ; and the general literature concerning the Sophists and particu larly that concerning Socrates. Of the profounder investigations in which the more important Sophists were largely engaged, almost nothing is preserved save individual remarks and striking asser tions. At most there is the myth of Protagoras in the dialogue of that name (320 f.). Perhaps the first half of the second book of the Republic refers also to something of the same sort. Per haps the Sophists suffer in this domain, as in theory, from the fact that we are instructed concerning them only from their opponents.1 The most important point of view which the Sophists in this respect set up appeared in their contrast of the natural 1 There is also a fragment found by Fr. Blass ( Univers. Schrift. Kiel., 1889) in Jamblichus, Protrepticce orationes a-l philosophiam, ch. 20, who, attributed it to the Sophist Antiphon. 122 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. ind social condition of man. From reflection upon the difference and change not only of legal prescriptions but also of social rules,1 the Sophists concluded that at least a greater part of these had been established by convention through human statute (deaet sive vopco) ; and that only such laws were universally binding as were established in all men equally by nature (cpvcreif The natural therefore appeared to be of the greater worth, — more nearly per manent and more binding than the social. Natural law seemed higher than historic positive law. The more se rious Sophists endeavored then further to strip off from natural morality and natural laws the mass of convention alities: Protagoras2 taught that justice and conscience (SUn and ).i Plato5 has Callicles develop the theory that all laws are created by the stronger, and these laws, on account of need of protection, the weaker accept. He 6 puts into the mouth 1 Compare Hippias in Xen. Mem., IV. 4, 14 f. 2 In his myth reproduced by Plato. 8 Plato, Prot., 337 c. Similarly, but somewhat more brusquely, Cal licles expresses himself in Plato, Gorgias, 482 f. 4 Diog. Laert., II. 16. B Loc. cit. 6 Republic, 1, 338 f, THE CREEK ENLIGHTENMENT. 123 of Thrasymachus of Chalcedon a naturalistic psychology of legislation, according to which the ruler in a natural body politic would establish laws for his own advantage. In this spirit Sophistry contended, in part from the point of view of " natural right," in part from that of absolute anarchy, against many existing institutions : l not only as the democratic Lycophron against every privilege of the nobility, or as Alcidamus against so fundamental a prin ciple of ancient society as was slavery, but finally even against all custom and all tradition.2 The independence of individual judgment, which the Enlightenment pro claimed, shattered the rule of all authority and dissipated the content of social consciousness. In the attacks which already science in its more serious aspects had directed against religious ideas, it is obvious that religious authority also would be swept away with the flood of the Sophistic movement. All shades of religious freethinking are met with in Sophistic literature : — every thing, from the cautious skepticism of Protagoras, who claimed 3 to know nothing of the gods, to the naturalistic and anthropological explanations of Critias 4 and Prodicus 5 as to belief in the gods, and even to the outspoken atheism of a certain Diagoras 6 of Melos. 27. Against the destructive activity of the Sophists ap peared the powerful personality of Socrates, who stood indeed with his opponents upon the common ground of the Enlightenment, and like them raised to a principle the inde- 1 To some extent with positive propositions whose authors, according to Aristotle (Pol., II. 8 & 7), were Hippodamus and a certain Phaleas. 2 Compare Arist. Pol., I. 3, 1253 b, 20. 8 By reason of the vagueness of the object and the brevity of human life; compare Diog. Laert., IX. 51. 4 Compare the verse in Sext. Emp., IX. 54. 6 Cic. De natura deorum, I. 42, 118. « Compare Zeller, I4. 864, 1. 124 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. pendent reflection concerning everything given by tradition and custom. But at the same time he was unshaken in the conviction that through reflection a universally valid truth could certainly be found. The reports of Xenophon,1 Plato, and Aristotle are the chief sources of our knowledge concerning Socrates. The remarkably different light that is cast from such different men upon this great personality makes him stand out in plastic distinctness. Xenophon saw more of the sober, practical, and popular side of the life aud character of the man. Plato, on the contrary, beheld the height of his imagination, the depth of his spiritual being, his elevating influence on youthful and highly gifted minds. .See S. Ribbing, Ueber das Verhdltniss zwischen d. xenophontischen u. d. platonischen Berichten iiber d. Persbnlichkeit u. d. Lehre d. Sokrates (Upsala, 1870). Xenophon's representation, so far as the author's knowledge goes, is one of historic fidelity, but it was strongly under the influence of Cynic party prejudice. Plato's writings, however, place in the mouth of Socrates less often Socrates' teaching's (only in the Apology and the earliest dialogues) than the consequences that Plato has drawn out of them. Aristotle's teaching is everywhere authoritative as re gards the teachings of Socrates ; for, following Socrates by some what of an interval, and uninfluenced by personal relationship, he was able to set in clear light the essential features of Socrates' scientific work. H. Kochly, Sokrates u. sein Volk (in Acad. Vortr. u. Red., I. 219 f.); E. v. Lasaulx, Des Sokrates Leben, Lehre vnd Tod (Munchen, 1857) ; M. Carriere, Sokrates u. seine Stelhing in der Gesch. des menschlichen Geisles (in Wester mann's Monats- heften, 1864) ; E. Alberti, Sokrates, ein Versuch iiber ihn nach den Quellen (Gottingen, 1869); E. Chaignet, Vie de Sokrate (Paris, 1868) ; A. Labriola, La doctrina di Sokrate (Neapel, 1871) ; A. Fonillee, La philos. de Sokrate (Paris, 1873) ; A. Krohn, Sokrate doctrina e Platonis repohlira ill ust rata (Halle, 1875); Windelband, Sokrates (in Praeludien, p. 54 f .) ; K. Joel, Der echte u. der xenophontische Sokrates, I. (Leipzig, 1892). ^ i The Memorabilia are essential for our consideration of this (see A. Krohn, Soc. u. Xen., Halle, 1874). So is the Symposium. The question as to the priority of the Symposium of Xenophon or the Symposium of Plato is not yet fully decided in favor of the former, but is of late accepted. Compare Ch. V. Compare Sander, Bemerkungen zu Xeno- phon's Berichten, etc. (Magdeburg, 1884). THE GREEK ENLIGHTENMENT. 125 Socrates was born in Athens a little before 469,1 the son of Sophroniscus, a sculptor, and Phamarete. He learned the trade2 of his father, and discriminatingly absorbed the various elements of culture of his time, without applying himself to properly erudite studies. Acquaintance with the methods of instruction of the Sophists awoke in him the con viction of the dangerousness of their tendencies. Against them he felt himself called by divine direction3 to a serious examination* of himself and his fellow-citizens, and to un remitting labor in the direction of moral perfection. He was moved by a deep religious spirit and an exalted moral sense in his investigations. He shared with his contem poraries an immediate interest in these investigations; and his own peculiar activity, which began in Athens as early as the commencement of the Peloponnesian war,5 rests upon these. He belonged to no school, and it was foreign to his purpose to found one. With spontaneous feeling, he sought on the broad public field, which Athenian life offered, intellectual intercourse with every one. His extra ordinary exterior,6 his dry humor, his ready and trium phant repartee brought him into universal notice. His geniality, however, and the fine spiritual nature which lay hidden in his astonishing shell,7 the unselfishness which he manifested unstintedly toward his friends, exercised an irresistible charm upon all the remarkable personalities of the time, especially upon the better elements of the Athe- 1 He was at his death (399) over seventy years old. 2 Concerning a piece, later on pointed out as one upon which the young Socrates was said to have wrought, see P. Schuster, Ueber die Portraits der griech. Philos. (Leipzig, 1877). 3 Plato, Apol, 33 c. 4 e£erd£eiv e'pavrbv Kal tovs a"\Xovs '. ibid., 28 e. 5 The production of the Clouds, 423, attests his popularity. 6 The humorous characterization of his own Silenus shape is in Xeno phon 's Symposium, 4, 19 f. 7 Compare the beautiful speech of Alcibiades in Plato, Symposium, 215 f. 126 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. nian youth. While he in this way obeyed higher duty to the neglect : of home cares, in free fellowship a circle of admirers formed itself around him in which especially the aristocratic youth were represented in men like Alcibiades. He held himself as far away from political activity as pos sible, but the unavoidable duties of the citizen of a state he performed with simple integrity.2 At the age of seventy Socrates was accused of " cor rupting the youth and introducing new gods." The charges arose originally from low personal motives,3 but became serious through political complications,4 in that the aristo cratically inclined philosopher, as the most popular and active " Sophist," was to be made answerable for moral degeneration by the democratic reactionary party. Not withstanding he would have been freed with a small pen alty 5 if he himself had not offended 6 the Heliasts by his candid pride in his virtue. The execution of the sentence of death was delayed thirty days by the decopia to Delos, and Socrates disdained in his loyalty 7 to law the flight so easily possible to him. He drank the cup of hemlock in May,8 399. 1 Concerning Xantippe, whose name has become proverbial, see E. Zeller, Zur Ehrenrettung der Xan. (in Vortrag und Abhandlung, I. p. 51 f). 2 He made three campaigns, and showed himself, as prvtanis, just and fearless against the excited minds of the masses (see Plato, A pol., 32 f.). s The accusers Meletns, Anytus, and Lycon acted out of personal animosity, unless they were men of straw (K. F. Hermann, De Soc. accu- satoribus, Gottingen, 1854). 4 See Grote, History of Greece, VIII. 551 f. 6 The verdict of " guilty " was carried only by a majority of three or thirty ; the sentence of death had a much larger majority (more than eighty). 6 The Apology of Plato may be taken as authentic in its essentials. 7 Compare Plato's dialogue, the Crilo. 8 In respect to the external circumstances of the day of his death, Plato's dialogue, the Phcedo, is certainly historical, although Plato in it THE GREEK ENLIGHTENMENT. 127 An instructor in philosophy, in the strict sense of the term, Socrates did not have. He called himself (Xen. Symposium, 1, 5) avrovpyos. But apparently he had become familiar with many of the scientific theories, especially with those of Hera cleitus and Anaxagoras, not only through the discourses of the Sophists but through his own readings. (Compare K. F. Her mann, De S. magistris et disciplina junenili, Marburg, 1837.) The process of development portrayed in the Phaido is scarcely historical, but can be looked upon as a sketch of the Platonic theory of ideas. (Compare Zeller, II4. 51.) Xenophon, as well as Plato, makes Socrates meet persons of every position, calling, and political complexion in his conver sations. His relation to young men was an ethically pedagogical and morally spiritual ennoblement of the Grecian love for boys. Among the men who made his popular philosophical method their own are to be named : Xenophon, who stood very near to the Cynics (compare F. Dummler, Antisthenica, Berl., 1882, and Academica, Giessen, 1889) ; also -ZEschines (not the orator), who wrote dialogues in the same spirit (K. F. Hermann, De ^Esch. Socratici reliquiis (Gottingen, 1850) : and the almost mythical shoemaker Simon (see Bockh, Simonis Socraticis dialogi, Heidelberg, 1810, and E. Heitz in O. Milller's Lit ter aturgeschichte, II2. 2, 25, note 2). The legal measures against Socrates are open to the most different constructions. The old view that the philosopher was ruined through intrigues of the Sophists may be regarded as given up, and also the conception originated by Hegel (Complete Works, II. 560 f.,XIV. 8 1 f.) , according to which, as in a tragedy, Socrates was the champion of the higher Idea, and was ruined by his unavoidable crime of offending the established laws. These great antitheses play no part in the trial. It appears, rather, that through personal and political intrigues Socrates became a sacrifice for the discontent which the democratic reaction fostered against the entire Enlightenment. Although presumably unin tentionally, nevertheless Aristophanes did a decided injury to the philosopher in his caricature of him in the Clouds,1 in that he stamped him in the public mind as a type of precisely those Sophistic excesses which Socrates fought most vigorously. (Compare H. Th. Eotscher, Aristophanes und seine Zeitalter, goes far beyond Socrates in his theory of the immortality of the soul (compare Apol., 40 c) not only in his presentation of evidence, but as to his personal conviction. 1 Compare especially II. Diels, Verh. d. Stelt. Phil. Vers., 1880, i06 f. 128 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. Berlin, 1817; Brandis, in the Rh. Mus., 1828; P. W. Forch- hammer, Die Athener und Soc., Berlin, 1837 ; Bendixen, Ueber den tieferen Schriftsinn, etc. (Husum, 1838.) The theory of knowledge of the Sophists had led in all its parts to a relativism of individual opinions. The effort, on the other hand, for a stable and universally valid knowl edge formed the central point of the activity of Socrates. The emo-rgpn was set in antithesis to the Bo^ai by him ; yet the iiriarrjprj is not a complete, erudite possession to be handed down, but an ideal to be striven for in work in com mon with other men. Fr. Schleiermacher, Ueber d. Wert des Sokrates als Philos. in Ges. Werk, III. 2, 287 ff. Socrates did not try, therefore, to impart knowledge or to give purely formal instruction, but to engage in a mutual seeking for truth. The basis of this was the conviction that such a norm of truth existed paramount to individual opinion. Therefore his activity found its necessary form in the dialogue, the conversation in which, through the exchange of opinions and through mutual criticism of these, that should be found which is recognizable by all. While the Sophists studied the psychological mechanism by which opinions come to be, Socrates had faith in a law of reason that determines the truth. His whole endeavor was only a continuous invitation to his fellow-citizens to help him in this search. His confession of his ignorance 1 signified this, while he also at the same time borein intimated2 his failure to attain his ideal of aocbla. Yet lie demanded the same measure of self-knowledge3 also from others. For i Plato, Apol, 21 f. ; Symp., 216 d. 2 Compare Plato, Symp., 203 f. In this connection the term la wins, as contrasted with the more pretentious uocpia (oodna-T-qs), its pecu liar meaning, "striving for knowledge." See I'cberweg, p. 2. 8 Compare the oracular yvwBi oeavrov, Xen. Mem.. IV. 24 f. ; Plato, Apol., 21 f. THE GREEK ENLIGHTENMENT. 129 nothing more dangerous blocked the way of wisdom than that conceited affectation of wisdom which the Sophistic half-education developed in the majority of minds. There fore his conversation analyzed with exasperating logic the opinion which at the outset he elicited from others, and in this superior manipulation of the dialectic consisted the Socratic irony.1 But after removing this impediment Socrates, in leading the conversation, sought to draw out gradually what was common to the participants. In the persuasion that serious reflection could find such a common thought, he " delivered " the slumbering thought from the mind ; and this art he called his maieutic.2 The method of the Socratic investigation corresponded, in point of content also, to this external schema. He set the concept as the goal 3 of scientific work over against the single ideas given by individual perception. When therefore Socrates in general aimed at definition, he came into contact with the efforts of the Sophists i who had busied themselves in fixing the meanings of words. But he on his part went much deeper, in the hope of grasping the essence of fact and the law governing single cases and relationships by the application of this universal principle. In making the answer to the particular question from which the conversation proceeded depend 5 on the general defini tion to be sought, he was making man conscious of the law of logical dependence of the particulars upon the universal, and exalting that law to the principle of the scientific method. In the search for universal concepts Socrates still i Plato, Rep., I. 337 a. 2 With reference to the profession of his mother ; Plato, Thecet., 149 f. 3 Arist. Met., XII. 4, 1078 b, 17 : to SplCeoBai koBoXov. The tech nical expression for the concept is, in this connection, Xoyos. 4 Particularly with Prodicus, with whom his relations were uniformly friendly. 6 Xen. Mem., IV. 13. 9 130 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. remained strongly fixed in the habits of naive reflection. For the inductive procedure, the introduction of which is accredited to him,1 consisted in the comparison of arbitra rily collated particular cases, by means of which, however, a complete induction could not be guaranteed. But, never theless, the Socratic method was a distinct advance over the entirely unmethodical generalizations, which earlier think ers had drawn from single observations or thought motifs. It began, moreover, to set a methodical treatment in the place of ingenious fancies. P. J. Ditges, Die epagogische Methode des S. (Cologne, 1864) ; J. J. Guttmann, Ueber den u-issenschaftlichen Stand- punkt des S. (Brieg, 1881). Examples of the Socratic method are to be found in the Memorabilia of Xenophon and in most of the dialogues of Plato. Socrates did not advance to a defi nite formulation 'of methodical principles, but his entire activity has given them distinctly the character of an inspired insight. The realm to which Socrates applied this method of the inductive definition of concepts included — as in the case of the Sophists — essentially the problems of human life. For, as his search for conceptual truth was rooted in the strength of his moral conviction, science and moral self- culture were to him in the last instance identical. The universally valid truth, which he said was to be found by means of conversation, is the clearness and certainty of moral consciousness. The limitation of philosophy to ethics, and on the other hand the establishment of scientific ethics, passed even in antiquity as the essential characteristic of the Socratic teaching. (See Zeller, II4. 132 f. ). Neither the poetic license, with which Aristophanes (in the Clouds) made of him a star-gazer, nor the passages in the later Platonic dialogues (Phmdo and Philebus), in which a teleological nature-philosophy is put into his mouth, nor, finally, the very homely utilitarian theory, presumably after ward revised2 by the Stoics, which the Memorabilia makes hitn 1 Arist. Met., 1. c. 2 See A. Krohn, Xen. u. Soc. (Halle, 1874), THE GREEK ENLIGHTENMENT. 131 develop, — none of these can have weight against the very defi nite expressions of Xenophon (Mem., I. 1, 11) and Aristotle (Met., I. 6, 987 b, 2). On the other hand, his aversion to natural science was not in the spirit of Skepticism, but due to the deficiency of science in ethical value. A universal faith in the teleological arrangement of the world and in a Providence over mankind remained side by side with this aversion. See con clusion in Plato's Apology, in Euthyphro, etc. In this specific ethical turn, Socrates followed, however, a psychological principle, which expresses the rationalistic character of the Enlightenment in its purity. It is the formula of the identity of virtue and knowledge} In the complicated relationships of civilized life the habitual ob servance of national conventions had become insufficient. In the confusion of public life, where one thing was com mended here, another there, every one felt that he needed knowledge and judgment for making correct decisions. In the increasing competition in civilization the well-in formed2 man proved himself to be the abler in all depart ments of life. Socrates expressed himself most clearly as to this condition, when he, applying the case to morals, declared that true virtue consists in knowing, and that right knowing leads always of itself to right acting. Thereby to know the Good was elevated to the essence of morality and reflection to the principle of living. Philosophy, as Socrates understood it, was the independent meditation of reasoning man upon that law of goodness valid for all alike. Knowledge is a moral possession, and the common striving for it he designated as a process of mutual help fulness3 under the name epo?. On the other hand, this 1 See Xen. Mem., III. 9, 4. 2 Ibid., 9, 10 ff. 3 This is the Socratic concept of corns, whose extreme importance appears in the fact that not only Plato and Xenophon, but also other friends within the Socratic circle, have written about it. Compare Brandis, Handbuch, II. 1, 64. 132 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. point of view involved a deterministic and intellectual con ception of the will, which makes moral excellence depend ent upon intellectual culture, and in general the decision of will exclusively dependent on the clearness and ripeness of the insight. When he asserted that all evil action pro ceeds only out of a deficient insight,1 this is the same as proclaiming entirely in the spirit of the Enlightenment that knowledge is the ethical ideal. For Socrates all other virtues accord with the fundamental virtue, iiricrr'gpnj,2 and possessing this all the others are attainable and teachable. The process begun at the time of the Seven Wise Men was completed in these definitions of Socrates ; and the norms of universal consciousness, after they had for a time been imperilled by individual criticism, during the wild anarchy of opinions were again found by rational re flection and by the recognition of the universal validity therein involved. The question of the teachableness of virtue is treated in a most engaging dialectic in the dialogue Protagoras, while the other dialogues of Plato's earliest period have for their common theme the reduction of the, single virtues to the fundamental virtue of knowledge. These are Euthyphro, Laches, Charmides, and Lysis. Compare F. Dittrich, De S. senteutia cirtutem esse seieiitiam (Braunsberg, 1868) and particularly T. Wildauer, Die Psychologie des Willens bei Sokrates, Platon und Aris- toteles, Part I. (Innsbruck, 1877). Besides, the determinism of Socrates stands in a close relation to his eudsemonism (see below). For the proposition that no one will freely do wrong is founded upon the same basis with that proposition that if one has recognized what is good for him it would be impossible for him to choose the opposite against his own interest. Com pare Xen. Mem., IV. 6, 6; Arist. Magn. Moral., I. 9, 1187 a, 17. In the realm of ethics, moreover, Socrates stopped at this most general suggestion without developing syste- i Xen. Mem., III. 9. 2 In Xenophon one still finds the word croipla for this ; see Mem., III. 9. THE GREEK ENLIGHTENMENT. 133 matically that kind of knowing ( Wisseii) in which vir tue was said to consist. For the distinctive trait of the activity of Socrates was that he never lost sight of the given conditions. Therefore the question, " What then is the Good ? " always became the question as to what is the Good in a particular respect and for a particular indi vidual;1 and the answer was always found in the suitable, in that which perfectly satisfies the striving of man and makes him happy. According to the grosser2 interpreta tion of Xenophon, Socrates' ethical theory was utilitarian ism, and the value of virtue founded on knowing sank to the prudential cleverness of acting in every case according to correct knowledge (Erkenntnis) of expediency. The finer presentation of Plato refers, however, this wtpiXip,ov, which is assumed as identical with koXov and dyaQbv, to the health of the soul,3 to its furtherance toward a true state of perfection. In both cases, nevertheless, intellectual virtue is identified with happiness.4 Right action, toward which insight guides, makes man happy. The fundamental conception of ethics in Socrates is thoroughly eudsemonis- tic, and ancient philosophy did not pass beyond this point. Compare M. Heinze, Der Euddmonismus in der griech. Philos. (Leipzig, 1883) ; Zeller, II4. 149 f. In all particulars the Socratic morals remained essentially within the compass of Greek social-consciousness.5 It sought to find a basis in the 1 Mem., III. 8. 2 In whose writings, in one passage, it would appear that Socrates agreed in morals with the relativism of the Sophists: Mem., III. 8, iravra dyaBd Kal KaXd e'ern irpbs a av ev e'xn, koko oe Kal alaxpa irpbs a av kokcos. 3 Particularly note the representation of the Phcedo. 4 Xen. Mem., IV. 1, 2. 5 To be excepted is only the prohibition of doing evil to an enemy. If here the contradiction between Plato's and Xenophon's representa tions is irreconcilable, we are inclined to reeavd Plato's report as the true one : for the Crito, which treats this prohibition as one already long 134 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. reverent recognition of divine law and established usage. Par ticularly Socrates himself, the model of noble and pure morals, gave high place to civic virtue, to submission to the laws of the state. In the state, however, he would have not the masses, but the good and intelligent, rule (Xen. Mem., III. 9, 10). Socrates personally supplemented his indifference to metaphysical and physical theories by a deep and religious piety, which led him to believe in the rule of the divine es sence in nature and in human life. He likewise supple mented the rationalistic one-sidedness of his ethics by his unswerving faith in obedience to the divine voice, which he believed he heard in himself as haip,6viov. Likewise in the development of this thought, Xenophon, pro vided the extant form of the Memorabilia comes from him, stood at the point of view of commonplace utility, while Plato's Apology represents faith in Providence in a high ethical light. In Socrates the rejection of nature knowledge comes about from the fact that such knowledge contains trifles that waste our time.1 On the other hand, there was the interest of piety, which led 2 him to require a teleological view of the cosmos. It is im probable that he gave an exhaustive development of it, because (Mem., I. 4, and IV. 3) Socrates usually was most prudently reserved on such questions. Even Monotheism he by no means emphasized sharply. He speaks mostly of " the Gods," both in Xenophon and Plato, and no enemy ever once charged him with disavowing "the Gods."3 Concerning; the oaipovwv, compare Ueberweg, V. 107, and Zeller, II4. 74^ Regarded on the whole, the activity of Socrates, in that he set up the ideal of reason as against relativism, was an attempt to reform the life morally by means of science. The success of his teaching led among the best friends of recognized in the Socratic circle, though indeed at variance with popu lar opinion, clearly belongs to the earliest writings of Plato. 1 Xen. Mem., I. 1, and IV. 7. 2 Ibid., I. 4, and IV. 3. 3 He was reproached with introducing a new divine being, and his enemies appeared to be aiming especially at the baipbviov. THE GREEK ENLIGHTENMENT. 135 the philosopher to the highest achievements of ancient culture. The principle of reflective introspection, however, which was thus victoriously awakened, and the enthusiasm with which Socrates turned his meditations from the charm of external existence to the value of the intellectual life, were in the Grecian world a new and strange thing. At this point of view the philosophy embodied by him detached itself from its background of culture and took other shape. 28. Under the name " Socratics " a number of schools are usually grouped, which, founded by men of more or less close association with Socrates, stepped forth, directly after his death, with opinions that belonged in their direction and content entirely to the Greek Enlightenment. If we look, nevertheless, more closely, we see that these men and their teaching have a much nearer relationship to the Sophists 1 than to Socrates ; and that, especially in the development of these schools, the " Socratic element," which to some degree was still present in Euclid, Antisthenes, and Aris- tippus, vanishes more and more from sight. These so- called " Socratic schools " should rather be viewed as branches of Sophism which were touched by the Socratic spirit. There were four such schools : the Megarian and the Elean-Eretrian, the Cynic and the Cyrenaic. Among these the Cynics stand nearest to Socrates. K. F. Hermann, Die philos. Stellung der dlteren Sokratiker u. ihrer Schulen (in Ges. Abhandl., Gottingen, 1849, p. 227 f.) ; Th. Ziegler, Gesch. d. Ethik, I. 145. The founder of the Megarian school, Euclid, believed in i his ability to give content to the Eleatic concept of Being, ' by identifying it with the Socratic concept of the Good. Yet no victory over the abstract sterility of the Parme- nidean principle was won by this method. For even if 1 Aristotle calls (Met., II. 2, 996 », 33), for example, Aristippus a Sophist, and with justice. 136 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. Euclid defined 1 the Good as the one ever immutable 2 Being, which is given 3 different names by men ; even if he characterized the different virtues only as the changing names of the one unchangeable virtue, that is, of knowing, which was thus identified with Being as among the Eleatics ; even if he thereby refused4 reality to all concepts other than to that of the Good ; — nevertheless all this led neither to the construction of an ethics nor to an enrich ment of theoretical knowledge, but gave evidence of a con tinuation of unfruitful dialectic in the direction of Eleatic Sophistry. The Megarians, therefore, accomplished noth ing in the realm of ethics. The only one of them to whom political teachings arc ascribed was Stelpo, the later head of the school, who, however, in this respect had entirely adopted the views of the Cynics. In metaphysics the Megarians were satisfied with the assertion of the unity of that which possesses Being, and with an indirect proof of that assertion resembling the Eleatic argumentations. In this spirit Diodorus Cronus added 5 to the arguments of Zeno new ones which were indeed less significant and far more captious. In these the impossibility of constructing a continuum out of a sum of discrete quantities again played the chief role. There was a similar tendency mani fested in the investigations of the Megarians concerning the categories of modality. For the assertion that only the actual 6 is possible, and the famous proof (Kvpievwv) 7 of Diodorus Cronus — that the unactual, which has demon- 1 Diog. Laert., VII. 161. - Cicero, Acad., II. 42, 129. 8 Diog. Laert , II. 106. 4 Ibid., compare Euseb. Prcep. ev., XIV. 17. 5 Preserved in Sext. Emp. Adv. math., X. 85 f. 6 Arist. Met., VIII. 3, 1046 b, 29. 7 Compare Cicero, De fato, 6, 12 f. Later philosophers, particularly Chrysippus, have definitely declared their positions with reference to this argument. THE GREEK ENLIGHTENMENT. 137 strated itself through its unactuality to be impossible, may not be called possible — point only in a rather abstract way to the refutation of Becoming and change.1 Compare F. Deycks, Die Megaricvrum doctrina (Bonn, 1827); Henne, Ecole de Megare (Paris, 1843); Mallet, His toire de V ecole de Megare et des ecoles d 'Elis et d'Eretrie (Paris, 1845). We can only speak in general of the dates of the life of Euclid of Megara, one of the oldest and truest friends that Socrates had. He was not much younger than Socrates, yet he considerably outlived him, and opened after the death of the master his hospitable house to his friends. About this time a school formed itself around him, and it appears to have re mained intact through the fourth century. Of the most of those who are mentioned as adherents of this school, we know only the names. Particulars are reported only of Eubulides of Miletus, the teacher of Demosthenes, of Diodorus Cronus, of Iasus in Caria (d. 307), and especially of Stilpo, who was a native of Megara (Diog. Laert., II. 113 f.). Stilpo lived from 380 to 300, and aroused universal admiration by his lectures. He linked the Megarian dialectics to the Cynic ethics, and deci sively influenced thereby his chief pupil, Zeno, the founder of Stoicism. His younger contemporary was Alexinus of Elis. The most important controversial question arising in refer ence to the Megarian school concerns the hypothesis set up by Schleiermacher (in his translation of Plato, V. 2, 140 f.) and opposed by Ritter (Ueber d. Philos. der meg. Schule, Rhein. Mus., 1828) and Mallet (loc. cit. XXXIV. f.), accepted by most others, including Brandis and Prantl, and defended by Zeller (I4. 215 f.). This hypothesis is to the effect that the represen tation of the theory of Ideas in the dialogue, the Sophist (246 b, 248 f.), refers to the Megarians. If one is convinced that this dialogue is genuinely Platonic, it is difficult to provide for this theory of Ideas. For to presuppose any kind of an other wise unknown school (Ritter) as the author of so significant a 1 Since Aristotle cites the proposition as Megarian, that only the actual is the possible, it can scarcely have arisen from the polemic against the Aristotelian categories Svvapis and evepyeia. But possibly the later Megarians, for example Diodorus, developed it in this direction. Compare Hartenstein, Ueber die Bedeutung der megarischen Schule fur die Geschichle der metaphysischen Probleme (in Hist, philos Abhand- lungen, 127 f.). 138 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. system as that of the do-p.aTa ei8rj, is forbidden because Aristotle (Met. ,1.6; Nic. Eth. , I. 4) designated Plato distinctly as the inventor of the same. It is certainly very far from having any place in the Socratic schools. But the teaching is even as little consistent with what has been at other times confidently ascribed to the Megarians as with the teaching of any one of the other schools. In no place is there a single indication of it. It stands in so abrupt opposition especially to the abstract theory of Being of the Megarians, that we do not avoid the difficulty by taking for granted a gradual development within the school.1 On the other hand, it may be shown that the description 2 which the dialogue, the Sophist, gives of this theory of Ideas, agrees completely and even verbally with that phase of the Platonic philosophy expressed in the Symposium* There is, accordingly, nothing left but either accept Plato as opposed to an earlier phase of his own teaching and its <$>iXoi, or to find the author of this criticism of the Platonic philosophy in an Eleatic contemporary of Plato. (For details, see Ch. V.) In neither case can the theoiy of Ideas treated in the passage in the Sophist, nor the developed theory of knowledge connected closely with it and completely Platonic in character, be ascribed to the Megarians. This theory in the Sophist amounts to a sensuous knowledge of yeVeo-ts, or a knowledge of the corporeal world plus a conceptual knowledge of ovo-la, which is a knowl edge of the non-corporeal Ideas. The only remaining feature worthy of comment in regard to the Megarian school is its development of the Sophistic art of Eristic. Its abstract theory of unity involved a skepticism regarding all concrete knowledge and a nega tive trend in its instruction. The prominent fact in re- 1 Zeller seems to believe (II4. 261) that the Euclidean theory of Ideas was given up in the course of the development of the school to satisfy the theory of unity. Since the latter theory had been given from the very beginning in the form of Eleaticism there must then be expected conversely a. gradual division of the Eleatic One into a plural ity of Ideas and this is precisely what Plato accomplished. 2 See E. Appel, Arch. f. Gesch. d. Ph., V. 55 f. 3 In this connection there is hardly an allusion to Ideas as causes of the phenomenal world. Zeller, I4. 316. The ovcria as alria is first intro duced in the Phcedo, Philebus, and the latter parts of the Republic. See Ch. V. THE GREEK ENLIGHTENMENT. 139 spect to Euclid is that he in polemics followed the method : of neglecting proofs and even premises, and leaped directly to the conclusion by means of reductio ad absurdum. Stilpo accepted the Sophistic-Cynic assertion, that according to the law of identity a predicate different from the subject cannot be ascribed to the subject. The younger members, Eubulides and Alexinus,2 got their notoriety by inventing the so-called " catches." These are questions put in such a way that no one of the possible disjunctive answers can be given without involving a contradiction. See Prantl, Gesch. der Logik, I. 33 f. ; Diog. Laert, II. 168, enumerates seven of these "catches," — the Liar, then three practically identical ones, the Concealed, the Disguised, and the Electra, and further the Horned Man, and finally the Heap (Sorites) and the Bald-head, which positively and negatively suggest the acercus of Zeno (§ 20). As was the case with the Sophistic witticisms, these were in the main reducible to verbal ambiguities. The lively interest that antiquity had in them was almost wholly pathological. Still less significant was the Elean-Eretrian school, which was founded by Phasdo, Socrates' favorite scholar, in his native city Elis. Later it was transferred by Menedemus to his home, Eretria, where it died out about the beginning of the third century. It appears to have taken a similar line of development as the Megarian school and Phaedo agreed with Euclid3 in all essentials. Menedemus, who received instruction in the Academy and from Stilpo, co operated with Stilpo in turning the school toward Cynic ethics. Both schools merged finally, like the Cynic, in the Stoa. 1 Diog. Laert., II. 107. 2 Whose name was facetiously perverted into 'EXeyfivos: Diog. Laert., II. 109. 8 Presumably he had received powerful influence from Euclid dur ing his stay in Megara. 140 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. Compare Mallet (see above) ; L. Preller, Phcedon's Lebens- schicksale mid Schriften (Ersch und Gruber, III. 21, 357 f.) ; v. Wilamowitz-Mollenclorf (Hermes, 1879). Phaedo, when very young, was taken into captivity by the Athe nians, and not long before Socrates' death he was, at the insti gation of Socrates, freed from slavery by one of his friends. The genuineness of the dialogues ascribed to him was early very much in doubt. At any rate, as little from the literar}- activity of this school is preserved as from that of the Megarians. Menedemus, who is said to have died soon after 271 at the age of seventj'-four, had (Diog. Laert., II. 125 f.) raised himself from a very low position to one of considerable authority. It is now impossible to determine whether his apparently loose and transitory relation to the Academy was a fact. Only the names of the other members of the school are preserved. 29. Notably more important are the two schools existing immediately after Socrates and not uninfluenced by his ethical doctrine. In these, the Cynic and Cyrenaic, the opposition as to both moral and social conceptions of life took definite form. They had in common an indifference for theoretic science and a desire to concentrate philosophy upon the art of living. Common also was the origin of their philosophy from the Sophistic circle ; and they found partial support in the formulations of Socrates. They were, however, diametrically opposed in their conception of the place of man and his relation to society. This re mained a typical opposition for the whole ancient world. Both theories as the result of the cultural and philosoph ical impulse given by the Sophists reveal the disposition of the Grecian world toward the value which civilization possesses in its control of individual impulses. This com mon problem put the same limits upon their endeavors in spite of their different conclusions. The Cynic school was called into life by Antisthenes of Athens, and maintained its popularity on account of the original character, Diogenes of Sinope. Among its more distant followers may be named Crates of Thebes, his wife Hipparchia, and her brother Metrocles. THE GREEK ENLIGHTENMENT. 141 Antisthenes, born about 440, was not a full-blooded Athenian. He had entered the Sophistic profession of teaching as the pupil of Gorgias, before he came under the influence of Socrates, whose active admirer he became. After the death of Socrates he founded a school in the gymnasium Cynosarges, which he administered for quite a time. Of his numerous writings (Diog. Laert., VI. 15 f.) only a few fragments are preserved, — collected by A. W. Winckelmann (Zurich, 1842). Compare Chappuis, Antisthene (Paris, 1854) ; K. Barlen, Antisthenes u. Platou (Neuwied, 1891) ; K. Urban, Ueber die Erudhnungen der Philos. des Antisthenes hi den platonischen Schriften (Konigsberg, 1882) ; F. Diimmler, Antisthenica (Halle, 1882) and Akademika (Giessen, 1889); E. Norden, Beitrdge z. Gesch. d.gr. PA., 1-4. Diogenes, the SoiKparrjc paivopevos, fled as a counterfeiter from his home to Athens, and ornamented his proletariat and queer existence with the wisdom of Antisthenes. He claimed to put the theory of his teacher consistently into practice. In old age he lived as tutor in the house of Xeniades in Corinth, and died there in 323. Compare K. W. Gottling, Diogenes der Kyniker oder d. Phil, des gr. Proletariats ( Geschich. Abhandl., I. 251 f.) ; K. Steinhart (Ersch u. Gruber, I. 25, 301 f.) Crates of Thebes, nearly contemporary of Stilpo, is said to have given away his property in order to dedicate himself to the Cynic life. His rich and nobly connected wife followed him into a beggar's existence. Anecdotes only are preserved concerning his brother-in-law, Metrocles. Cynicism continued later as a popular moralizing instruction ; for example in Teles, whom v. Wilamowitz-Mollenclorf treats (Philol. Untersuchungen, IV. 292 f. ), and whose fragments have been published by O. Hense (Freiburg, 1889). Later do we find Cynicism in Bion of Borysthenes, whose sermons greatly influenced later literature (Horace),1 as upon the other hand the satires of the Phoenician Menippus, which breathe the Cynic spirit, influenced Varro. See Zeller, II3. 246, 3. As only the Good was Being for the Megarians,* for the Cynics virtue appeared to be the only legitimate con tent and purpose of life. With similar Eleatic one-sided- ness they remained averse to all other ideals and disdain ful of them. They taught indeed, like Socrates, that virtue consists in knowing, and yet they emphasized the practical i Compare R. Heinze, De Horatio Bionis imitatore (Bonn, 1889). 142 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. side, that is, right action, and especially the consistent carrying out of moral principles J in life. They like wise attributed only so much value, therefore, to scien tific investigations as those investigations serve ethical purposes. It is to be added that in its epistemology also this school stood entirely upon the ground of Sophistic skepticism. It indeed sounds to some degree Socratic for Antisthenes to demand 2 the explanation of the permanent essence of tilings by definition. Yet in his development of this pos tulate he fell back upon the opinion of Gorgias that of no subject can an attribute differing in any way from it be predicated. He made it equivalent to the statement that only identical judgments are possible.3 Accordingly only the composite are definable ;4 all simple things, on the other hand, can be indicated 6 only by their peculiar individual names, which, however, do not explain the essence of the fact itself. Thus their theory of knowledge reduced itself to bare skepticism ; and it also manifested itself in Antis thenes adopting the Sophistic teaching that a contradic tion is wholly impossible.6 1 Even in the character of Antisthenes this consistency, this serious and strict adherence to principles, was the central point. Diogenes intended assuredly to outdo him in this respect. 2 To him belongs the definition Aoyos eorlv 6 to t'i r/v ij eon brjXtov. 8 That the place in the Sophist, 251 b, refers to Antisthenes, Aristotle teaches in Metaphysics, IV. 29, 1024 b, 32. 4 Compare Aristotle, ibid., VII. 3, 1043 b, 24. 6. The logically central truth of the Cynic teaching appears in the Platonic statement (Thecet., 201 f.). This truth is that the ultimate terms (to irpmra) by which all else may be defined are themselves not definable or reducible to something else. This opinion is closely joined with that whijh looks upon these last elements of concepts as the crroixeia, by which all things are really constituted. This is a view which in a certain sense sounds like the homoiomeriai of Anaxagoras, and also like the Platonic theory of Ideas. o Arist. Met., IV. 29, 1024 b, 34. THE GREEK ENLIGHTENMENT 143 This purely Sophistic limitation of knowledge to nomenclature had taken on as a most obvious nominalism a distinct polemical tendency against the theory of Ideas. The old tradition placed in the mouths of Antisthenes and Diogenes rough aud coarse ridicule of the Platonic theory (rpdire^ui' bpw, Tpaire^oT-qTa S'ofy 6pu>, Diog. Laert., VI. 53 ; compare Schol. in Arist., 66 b, 45, etc. ; Zeller, IIs. 255) ; for these leaders of the Cynics only single things existed in natura rerum. The class concepts are only names without content. At the same time it is evident that, since the essence of a thing did not seem to them logically determinable, they claimed that it was producible only in sense perception. Thus they fell into the coarse materialism which regards a thing as actual only as the thing can be held in the hand. Presumably this fact is meant in the Sophist, 246 a ; Thecetetus, 155 e, Phiedo, 79 f. Compare Natorp, Forschungen, 198 f. So much the more was the science of these men limited to their theoretically meagre doctrine of virtue. Virtue, and it alone, is sufficient to satisfy all strivings for happi ness. Virtue is not only the highest, but the only good, — the only certain means of being happy. Over against this spiritual and therefore sure possession, which is protected against all the changes of the fateful world, the Cynics despised all that men otherwise held dear. Virtue alone is of worth ; wickedness alone is to be shunned ; all else is indifferent (dSidcbopov).1 From this principle they taught the contempt of riches and luxury, of fame and honor, of sense-pleasure and sense-pain. But with this radical con sistency, which ever grew sharper with them, they also despised all the joy and beauty of life, all shame and con ventionality, family and country. The obtrusive moralization of these philosophical beggars appears mainly in their coarse witticisms ; and very many anec dotes relate to Diogenes. There is very little of serious inves tigation in their moralizing. Antisthenes appears to assert the worthlessness of pleasure, perhaps against Aristippus, and to have sought to demonstrate that man with such a conviction, even if it be not entirely right, would be proof against the 1 Diog. Laert., VI. 105. 144 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY slavery of sense pleasure.1 In Diogenes this disgust of all external goods grew to the philosophical grim humor of a prole tarian, who has staked his cause on nothing. Irrespective of the mental culture to which, so far as it concerns virtue, he ascribed some worth,2 he contended against all the devices of civilization as superfluous, foolish, and dangerous to virtue. Most dubious in all this was the shamelessness of which the Cynics were guilty, and their intentional disregard of all the con ventions of sexual relations ; similar too was their indifference to the family life and to the state.3 For the cosmopolitanism in which Diogenes took pride4 had not the positive content of a universal human ideal, but sought only to free the individual from every limitation imposed upon him by civilization. In particular, the Cynics fought against slavery as unnatural and unjust, just as already the Sophists had fought. On the other hand, it must not remain unnoticed that Antisthenes,5 in defiance of the judgment of Greek society, declared that work is a good. Cynicism finally reckoned also religion among the d&idfopa. All mythical ideas and religious ceremonies fall under the class of the conventional!}' determined, the unnatural, and are excusable only because they may be regarded as allegorical expressions of moral concepts. Positively the Cynics represented an abstract monotheism which finds in virtue the true worship of God. The fundamental purpose of Cynicism in all these deter minations is to make man entirely independent. The wise man to whom virtue, once gained,6 is a permanent7 pos session, stands in his complete self-sufficiency 8 over against 1 See Arist. Eth. Nic, X. 1, 1172 a, 31; on the contrary, Plato (Phileb., 44 b) can hardly be regarded as referring to Antisthenes (Zeller, II4,. 308, 1). It is probable that places like the Republic, 583 f., refer to Democritus. See below, § 33 and § 31. 2 Diog. Laert., VI. 68, and elsewhere. 8 From Diogenes on, the Cynics had wives and children in common. (Ibid., 72.) This is only one of the instances that they manifested of a levelling radicalism (in distinction from Plato). 4 Loc. cil. 63: see ibid., 11, 38, 72, 98. 6 Ibid., 2. 6 It can also be teachable, but more through practice than through scientific instruction. Ibid., 105 f., 70. 7 Xen. Mem., 1, 2, 19. 8 Diog. Laert., VI. 11 f. THE GREEK ENLIGHTENMENT 145 the great mass of fools. His reward is the perfect inde pendence in which he is equal 1 to the undcsiring gods. In order to be as independent of external goods as possible, he reduces his needs to those most external. The less one needs, the happier2 one is. The Cynic Wise Man feels himself free from society also; he sees through its preju dices ; he despises 3 its talk ; its laws and its conventions do not bind him. The independent lordship of the vir tuous Wise Man does not need civilization and casts it aside. The Sophistic opposition of cpvo-is and vogo<; is constructed »into a principle, and all human limitation by statute is unnatural, superfluous, and in part corrupting. From the midst of the fulness and beauty of Greek civiliza tion, the Cynic preaches the return to a state of nature which would avoid all the dangers of civilization indeed, but would forfeit all its blessings. 30. The joyous wisdom of the life of the Cyrenaics formed the completest antithesis to the morose seriousness of the virtue of the Cynics. The leader of this school was Aristippus of Cyrene, a man of the world, who once belonged to the Socratic circle, but at other times led a wandering life as a Sophist. Through his daughter Arete his conception of life passed down to his grandson, the younger Aristippus. Soon after this the school branched out with the special interpretations which men like Theodoras the atheist, Anniceris, and Hegesias gave to the Aristippian principle. Among later representatives Euemerus is to be mentioned. 1 Diog. Laert., VI. 51. 2 See the self-description of Antisthenes in Xenophon's Symposium, 4, 34 f. In this respect Cynicism showed that Eudajmonism is logically absence of need. From the euda3monistic point of view, then, the goal is the renunciation and suppression of all avoidable desire. 3 Thus Diogenes accepted the designation of kvq>v, which was origi nally a witticism in reference to the seat of the school, the gymnasium, Cynosargus. 146 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY The years of the birth and death of Aristippus cannot be very exactly determined ; his life included from thirty to forty years in the fifth and fourth centuries (435-360). When he was young he was influenced to come to Athens by the fame of Socrates, and often during the course of his life did he return to that city. That he for some time lived in Syracuse in the court of the older and younger Dionysius, that he probably met Plato there, cannot well be doubted. The founding of his school in his native city, the rich and luxurious Cyrene, occurred prob ably at the end of his life, since all the known adherents to the school were considerably younger than he. Compare H. v. Stein, De vita Aristippi (Gottingen, 1855), also his Geschiohte des Platonismus, II. 60 f. The technical development of the theory 1 seems. to have been completed by the grandson (p.i]Tpooi&aKTos), of whom nothing further is known. Theodorus was driven out of his home, Cyrene, soon after the death of Alexander the Great. He lived in exile for some time in Athens and at the court of Egypt, but he returned finall}- to Cyrene. Anniceris and Hegesias (tteio-i- Odvaro';) were contemporaries of Ptolemeeus Lagi. Hegesias wrote a treatise the title of which Cicero mentioned as 'AiroKap- Tepwv (Tusc., I. 34, 84). Euemerus, probably of Messene (about 300), set his views forth in what were well known to antiquity as the lepb. dvaypaeji-q. Compare O. Sieroca, De Euemerus (Konigs- berg, 1869). The smaller fragments are in Mullach, II. 397 f. Compare J. F. Thrige, Res Cyrenesium (Copenhagen, 1878); A. Wendt, De philos. Cyrenaica (Gottingen, 1841) ; Wieland (Aristip., 4 vols., Leipzig, 1800 f.) also gives a graceful and expert exposition. In his theory of life, Aristippus followed closely the teaching of Protagoras,2 just as Antisthenes followed the direction of Gorgias. Indeed he developed the relativism of the Protagorean theory of perception to a remarkably valuable psychology of the sense feelings. Sense percep tion instructs us only as to our own states (rrd6n),z and is 1 According to Eusebius, Prcep. ev., XIV. 18, 31. Compare, besides, Zeller, II4 344. 2 Which was communicated to him perhaps by his fellow-citizen, the mathematician Theodorus (compare Plato, Thecetetus). 3 Sext. Emp. Adr. math., VII. 191 f. THE GREEK ENLIGHTENMENT 147 not concerned with the causes of those states (rd ireiroiij- Kora rd irdOrf). The causes are not recognizable ; our knowledge directs itself only to the changes of our own essence, and these alone concern us. Sensations, since they are a consciousness of our own condition, are always true.1 In this spirit the Cyrenaics assumed an attitude of skeptical indifference to natural science. They followed Protagoras in the individualistic turn of this theory when they asserted that the individual knows only his own sensations, and common nomenclature is no guarantee of similarity in the content of the thought. That these epistemological investigations of the school of Aristippus were used for a basis of their ethics but did not evoke their ethics, is proved for the most part by the subordinate posi tion which they received in the later systematizations of the school. According to Sextus Empiricus (Adv. math., VII. 11), the treatment at this time was divided into five parts : concern ing good and evil ; concerning the states of the soul (irdOrj) ; concerning actions ; concerning external causes ; and, finally, concerning the criteria of truth (irio-Teis). However, the fundamental problem of the Cyrenaics (as of the Cynics) was that concerning the real happiness of man, and they emphasized simply the included moment of pleasure or displeasure in those states of mind to which knowledge is limited. As, however, Protagoras had re ferred the theoretic content of perception to differing cor poreal motions, the Cyrenaics sought to derive also the affective tone of the same from the different states of motion of him perceiving.3 Gentle motion (Xeia Kivgo-ii) corresponds to pleasure (gSov-g), violent (rpaxeia) to dis- i Sext. Emp. Adv. math., VII. 191 f. ; farther, Diog. Laert., II. 92. 2 Sext. Emp. op. cit. 195. 3 Eusebius, loc. cit. ; Diog. Laert., II. 86 f. Likewise the exposition in the Philebus, 42 f., which brings this teaching directly into connection with the iravra pel, presumably refers to Aristippus. Compare Zeller, II4. 352 f. 148 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY pleasure (77-0V09), rest from motion to absence of pleasure and pain (dnoovia Kal dirovla). Since now these three possibilities include the whole range of stimuli, there are only two, perhaps three irdOv : pleasant (r)8eaj, unpleasant (dXyeivd), and the states of indifference between them (to. pera^v).1 Since, however, among these three possible states, pleasure alone is worth striving for, -goovg is the only goal of the will (reXo?), and accordingly is happiness or the Good itself. Whatever gives pleasure is good. Whatever creates displeasure is bad. All else is indif ferent. The question concerning the content of the concept of the Good, which was not really answered by Socrates, was answered by these Hedonists, in that they declared pleasure to be this content, and indeed all pleasures, whatever their occasion,2 to be indistinguishable. By this only the single momentary state of pleasure is meant. The highest, the only good, for these Hedonists was the enjoyment of the moment.3 From these presuppositions the Hedonists concluded, with entire correctness, that the distinction of value between single feelings of pleasure is determined not by the content or the cause, but only by the intensity of the feelings. They asserted that the degree of intensity of the bodily feelings is greater than that of the spiritual feelings.4 The later Cyrenaics, "particularly Theodoras,5 came therefore to the conclusion that the Wise Man need not regard himself restricted by law, convention, or indeed religious scruples, but he should so use things as to serve his pleasure best. Here, again, the Sophistic antithesis between v6p.os and u'o-tsr' is repeated, and the natural individual pleasur able feeling is taken as the absolute motive of action. Still more pronounced than in the degenerate phases of Cynicism appeared here the egoistic, naturalistic, and individualistic trait which is basal in the common problem of both theories. On the other 1 Sext. Emp. op. cit. 199. 2 Plato, Philebus, 12 d. 8 See A. Lange, Geseh. des Mater., p. 37, 2 ed. 4 Diog. Laert., II. 90. « Ibid., 99. 6 See ibid., 93. THE GREEK ENLIGHTENMENT 149 hand, Anniceris1 sought later to temper this radicalism, and to ennoble the desire for pleasure by emphasizing the enjoyment of friendship, of family life, and of social organization as more valuable. At the same time he did not lose sight of the egoistic fundamental principle, but only carefully refined it. With this turn in its course, however, the Cyrenaic pliilosophy merged into Epicurean hedonism. Virtue was, accordingly, for Aristippus identical with the ability to enjoy. The utility of science consists in di recting men to the proper satisfaction. Right enjoyment is, however, only possible through reasonable self-control (cppovgcri'i).2 Requisite insight for this frees us from preju dice, and teaches us how to use the goods of life in the most reasonable way. Above all else it gives to the Wise Man that security in himself by which he remains proof against weakly yielding to influences of the outer world. It teaches him, while in enjoyment, to remain master of himself and his surroundings. The problem for both Cynic and Cyrenaic was the attainment of this individual inde pendence of the course of the world. The Cynic school sought independence in renunciation ; the Cyrenaic in lord ship over enjoyment, and Aristippus was right when he said that the latter was more difficult and more valuable than the former.3 In opposition to the Cynic ideal of re nunciation of the world, the Cyrenaic drew, as his picture of the Wise Man, that of the perfected man of the world. He is susceptible to the enjoyment of life, lie knows what animal satisfactions are, and how to prize spiritual joy, riches, and honor. In elevated spirit he scrupulously makes use of men and things, but even then never forgets himself in his enjoyment. He remains lord of his appe tites ; he never wishes the impossible, and even in the few happy days of his existence he knows how to preserve vic toriously the peace and serenity of his soul. 1 Diog. Laert., II. 96; see Clemens Alex. Strom., II. 417. 2 Diog. Laert., II. 91. 3 Ibid., 75. 150 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY With these qualifications (reminding us of Socrates), Aris tippus went beyond the principle of momentary enjoyment of pleasure when he, for example, explained activity as repre hensible if, on the whole, it yields more unpleasurableness than pleasure. He recommended on this same ground that there be universal subordination to custom and law. Theodorus then went still further, and sought 1 to find the tc'A-os of mankind, not in individual satisfaction, but in serene disposition (xapd). This is also already a transition to the Epicurean conception. If the principle that only educated men know how to enjoj' happily verified itself in the temperament and circumstances of Aristippus, his school on the other hand drew another irresistible consequence from the hedonistic principle, viz., pessimism. If pleasure is said to give value to life, the greater part of human ity fails of its purpose, and thus life becomes worthless. It was Hegesias who dissipated the theory of Aristippus with this doc trine. The desire for happiness cannot be satisfied,2 he taught. No insight, no opulence, protects us from the pain which nature imposes on the bod}'. The highest we can reach and even as re'Aos strive for is painlessness, of which death most certainly assures us.3 The particular ethical teachings of Hegesias ap pear more nearly like the precepts of the Cynics than like many of the expressions of Aristippus. The isolation of the individual shows itself in the hedo nistic philosophers in their indifference to public life. Aristippus rejoiced that in his Sophistic wanderings no interest in politics infringed upon his personal freedom.4 Theodoras5 called the world his country, and said that patriotic sacrifice was a folly which the Wise Man is above- These all are sentiments in which the Cynics and Cyre naics agree almost verbally, and in these the decline of Greek civilization was most characteristically expressed. Religious beliefs are among the things which the Hedonists shoved one side with sceptical indifference. Freedom from religious prejudices seemed to them (Diog. Laert.., II. 91) to 1 Diog. Laert., II. 98. " Ibid., 94 f. 8 The lectures of Hegesias ireio-iBdvaros are said to have been for bidden in Alexandria because he spoke too much of voluntary death. Cicero, Tusc, I. 34, 83. 4 Xen. Mem., II. 1, 8 f. 6 Diog. Laert., II. 98. MATERIALISM AND IDEALISM 151 be indispensable for the Wise Man. It is not related, however, that they set up in any way in opposition to positive religion another conception. Theodorus proclaimed his atheism quite openly. Euemerus devised for an explanation of the belief in gods the theory to-day called after him, and often accepted in modern anthropology in many forms. According to this theory, the worship of the gods and heroes is developed from a rever ence of rulers and otherwise remarkable men. (Cicero, Denat. deor., I. 42, 119 ; Sext. Emp. Adv. math., IX. 17.) 5. MATERIALISM AND IDEALISM. DEMOCRITUS AND PLATO. The Greek Enlightenment had impeded the progress of natural science by destroying the naive confidence of the Greek in the validity of human knowledge. Science was being utilized for practical life, and was in danger of losing its dignity and the independence which it had just achieved. On the other hand, the prevailing interest of the period in psychology had widened the circle of scientific work. Logic and ethics had thus been added to physics, — to use the classification of the ancients. Conceptions of the psychical aspects of life now stood side by side with those of its physical aspects. Man had become conscious of his share in the construction of the idea of the world. The essence of scientific research was found to consist in the examination of concepts and the fundamental proposition of science had its formulation in the law of the domina tion of the particular by the universal. At the same time, however, the principle was seen that science could never give satisfaction if it disregarded the connection between human life, as teleologically determined, and the objective world. The subjective moment had been sundered in its devel opment from the objective, and consequently placed in a 152 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY certain opposition to it. In the mutual interpenetration of the two, and in the tendency of these principles to coalesce, did Greek science find the profoundest deepening of its conceptual life and the greatest broadening of its practical life. From the Peloponnesian war until Philip of Mace- don, when the political life of Greece was already approach ing dissolution, science created its comprehensive systems, and perfected itself in its ripest undertakings, which are associated with the three names Democritus, Plato, and Aristotle. In the first place, as preparation for the final synthetic statement of Aristotle, appeared the two metaphysical sys tems which expressed the greatest opposition possible within the realm of Greek thought : the materialism of Democritus and the idealism of Plato. Both appeared at that culmination point of Greek culture when the flood of Greek life was passing over to its ebb ; the Democritan system was about three decades before the Platonic, and in a remarkable degree independent of it. Each system developed its doctrine on a broad episte- mological basis, and each is related both positively and negatively to the Greek Enlightenment. Both were met aphysical systems of outspoken rationalism. Each in complete exposition compassed the entire range of the scientific interest of the time. Finally, in both became defined those opposed philosophical views of the world which have not been reconciled up to the present time. But there are just as many differences as there are simi larities. Although agreeing with Plato as to the Protago- rean theory of perception, Democritus turned back to the old rationalism of the Eleatics, while Plato created a new ideal Eleaticism out of the Socratic theory of the concept. Democritus may therefore appear less progressive and less original in this respect than Plato, but we must remember that as to their general metaphysics the principle of phys- MATERIALISM AND IDEALISM 153 ics dominated the Democritan system, and the principle of ethics the Platonic system. Ethics was incidental in the former system, while in the latter physics was the incident. In every direction the theory of Democritus shows itself to be an attempt to perfect the philosophy of nature by the aid of the anthropological theories of the Enlightenment, while Platonism was developed as an original recreation out of the same problems. The historical fate of both these philosophies was also determined by this relationship, for the materialism of Democritus was pressed into the background from the beginning, while Plato became the determining genius of future philosophy. The great significance, which — in this exposition in distinc tion from all previous ones — is given to Democritus by making him parallel with Plato, is required solely by historical accuracy. A similar view was, for that matter, very common among the writers of antiquity. As a matter of chronology Democritus, who lived between 430 and 360 (§ 31), was about twenty years 3-ounger than Protagoras and ten years younger than Socrates. Although he never came under the direct personal influence of the latter, yet it must be taken for granted that a man to whom in all antiquity Aristotle alone was comparable in learning, had not studied the scientific work of the Sophists in vain. To treat him entirely among the pre-Sophistic thinkers, as is customary,1 would be justified only if no traces of the influence of the En lightenment are seen in him. We hope to show the contrary in the following exposition of his theory. But, however, this ex position will not support the attempt to stamp the Democritan theory as a kind of Sophistry, as Schleiermacher and Ritter have made it. The strong bins of judgment and vagueness of treat ment that has arisen from this interpretation is sufficiently repudiated by Zeller (I4. 842 f.). The points of view and theo ries in Sophistic literature of.which Democritus certainly did make use, were arranged by him synthetically in a unified met- aphysic. but such a metaph'ysic lay far outside the horizon of the Sophists. On the other hand, it is to be entirely admitted that even this materialistic metaphysic played a relatively 1 Most unfortunate in this connection is the arrangement of Schwegler- Kbstlin, where the Atomists (as also Empedocles and Anaxagoras) were treated before the Eleatics. 3 ed. p. 51 f. 154 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY unfruitful part in rejuvenating ancient thought. For ancient thought took a Platonic tendency, and therefore we have been very imperfectly taught concerning the Democritan theory. But the case is entirely different when we consider the whole European history of science. Since the time of Galileo, Bacon, and Gassendi, the Democritan teaching has become the funda mental metaphysical assumption of modern natural science, and however sharply we may criticise this theory, we cannot deny its significance (Lange, Geschichte des Materialismus, 2 ed., I. 9 f.). Just in this, however, consisted its historical equality with Platonism. One of the most striking facts of ancient literature is the apparently perfect silence that Plato maintained concerning Democritus.1 This was discussed many times in antiquity.2 The neglect is not possibly explained as hate or contempt.3 Plato was very much interested in men like the Cynics and Cyrenaics whose manner of thought must have been far less in sympathy with his own than that of Democritus, — with men who must have appeared to him far less significant intellectually. That Plato knew nothing of Democritus is chronologically a matter of greatest improbability. If we also admit that Democritus on account of his long journeys entered4 comparatively late upon his literary activity, yet the amount of his literary work requires that its beginning be set distinctly before Plato's first works, and much the more before Plato's later works : when Plato wrote the Symposium, Democritus was seventy-five years old. The more remarkable is it that Plato, who otherwise refers to, or at least mentions, all the other earl}' philosophers, ignores not only Democritus, but also the Atomic teaching.5 It must therefore 1 The name Democritus occurs nowhere in Plato's writings, and there is nowhere a mention of the Atomic doctrine. When Plato speaks of materialism (compare above), he cannot possibly have Democritus in mind. 2 Diog. Laert., IX. 40. 8 As early as Aristoxenus there appears to have been related the foolish story of the designed burning of the Democritan books by Plato. Diog. Laert, op. cit. 4 The time of the composition of his piKpbs SiaKoopos, Democritus himself (Diog. Laert., IX. 41) places at 730 years after the destruction of Troy (see Zeller, I4. 762), i. e. about 420. 6 It is significant that both the Sophist and the Parmenides — whether they be dialogues written by Plato or originating from the Pla tonic circle — do not mention Atomism, although there were present MATERIALISM AND IDEALISM 155 be concluded, at all events, that Atomism — the writing of Leucippus being doubtful — had found no favor within the circle of Attic culture. It therefore appears conceivable that the Athenians were J entirely indifferent to the essentially scientific nature-investigations of Democritus at the time of the Sophists and Socrates. In Athens one worked at other things, so that Plato even later also made no mention of the writings of the great Atomist in developing his own nature-theories. That he was not really acquainted with them appears to become more and more doubtful. R. Hirzel has pointed out two places (Phil., 43 f. ; Rep., 583 f.) where references are made to Democritan ethics (Untersuchungen zu Cicero's philos. Schriften, I. 141 f.). P. Natorp has assented to this (Forschungen, 201 f.), but he has few results in following up ¦' the traces of Democritus in Plato's writings" (Arch. f. Gesch. d. Philos., I. 515 f.). It would be more satisfactory to seek negative and positive relations to Democritus in Plato's later metaphysic (Philebus) 2 and in his philosophy of nature dependent on it (Timceus). Compare be low the references in the remarks to § 37. 31. Democritus of Abdera, the greatest investigator of nature in antiquity, was born about 460. He was first attracted to scientific research in the school of Leucippus, probably about the time when Protagoras, who was some twenty years his elder, also belonged to that circle. Hav ing the liveliest sense for individual investigation in natu ral sciences, he travelled extensively for many years. This led him through Greece, for a longer time into Egypt, and over a greater part of the Orient. The exact time of his return and the beginning of his literary activity, however, must remain a subject for conjecture, and his death can important occasions for it in the Sophist in the discussion of Being, and equal occasions in the Parmenides in the dialectic over the One and the Many. 1 In any case the expression of Democritus (Diog. Laert., X. 36) is characteristic : rfkBov eh 'A6r)vas Kal ovris pe eyvcoKev. At the time of the Sophists of the Peloponnesian war, no one, not even Socrates, had the spirit for serious investigation into the nature studies of Democritus. 2 H. Usener (Preussisches Jahrbuch, LIII. p. 16) has already given much attention to this (Philebus, 28 f.). 156 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY only be approximately set at 360. He settled in his home in Abdera. Ho became highly honored there, and he lived surrounded by those who prosecuted their researches under his direction. He remained distant and apart from the Attic circle of culture, in which little notice was taken of him, but he may have been in occasional intercourse with the physician Hippocrates, who spent his later years in Larissa. The life of Democritus is fixed by approximately safe data, from his own statement (Diog. Laert., IX. 41) that he was forty years younger than Anaxagoras, and from the statements he made concerning the time of the composition of his /xixpos 8iaKocrp.os (§ 30). The acquaintance of Democritus with the teaching of both his countrymen, Leucippus and Protagoras, is entirely assured by the testimony of antiquit}' and the character of his philosophy. He doubtless knew the Eleatics as well, and one possessed of his great erudition could hardly be ignorant of most of the other physicists. Traces here and there in his system show this. He did not accept the number theory of the Pythagoreans. The friendly relationship to the Pythago reans, attributed to him,1 can have reference only to his mathe matical2 researches, and perhaps in part to his physiological and ethical undertakings. He also appeared to be very familiar with the theories of the younger physicists. But more impor tant for his development of the Atomic theory were, on the one hand, his own very extensive and painstaking researches, and, on the other, Hie theory of perception that he obtained from Protagoras. Whether he gave much attention to the theories of the other Sophists, is still doubtful. The}- were entirely alien to his metaphysical and scientific tendency. But the thorough ness of his anthropology, the significance that he laid on meta- plrysical and ethical questions, and the single points which he found valid in them, prove, nevertheless, that he was not unin fluenced by the spirit of his time from which he was otherwise somewhat isolated. All these circumstances assign to him the place of one who through the subjective period of Greek science was the banner bearer of the cosmological metaphysic ; and in consequence of his partial acceptance of the new elements was 1 Diog. Laert , IX. 38. 2 He prided himself particularly on his mathematical knowledge (Clemens Alex. Strom., 304 a). MATERIALISM AND IDEALISM 157 the finisher of the system. He did not receive the slightest influence from his great contemporary Socrates. The duration of his travels was at all events considerable, and his stay in Egypt alone is given as about five years.1 He certainly came to know the greater part of Asia.2 He got nothing philosophical from his travels, especially since his thought habitually avoided everything mythical. Nevertheless, his gain in breadth of experience and in the results of his col lections was 011I3- the greater. His return to Abdera after his journeys was the beginning of his teaching, anil his literary work may be dated, in view of the extent of these travels, not before 420. 3 Presumably he continued his work into matttra retustas (Lucret. De rer. nat., III. 1039). His fellow-citizens honored liiin with the name o-ola. He seems to have been little interested in public affairs, and he reached the great age 4 of ninety or, according to some, of one hundred and nine years. His intimacy with Hippocrates (§ 39), which is not improbable in itself, has been the occasion for the forgeiy of letters between the two (printed in the works of Hippocrates). Geffers, Qucestiones democritece (Gottingen, 1829) ; Papen- cordt, De atomicorum doctrina (Berlin, 1732) ; B. ten Brink, Verschiedene Abhandlungen in the Philologus, 1851-53, 1870 ; L. Liard, De Democrito philosopho (Paris, 1873) ; A. Lange, Geschiohte des Materialismus, I2. (Iserl., 1873) p. 9 f. The literary activity of Democritus was certainly very great. Even if a part of the works which Thrasyllus had arranged in fifteen tetralogies, whose titles are preserved in Diogenes Laertius (IX. 45 f.), — even if this part was wrongfully ascribed to him (for Diogenes mentions there 1 Diodor., I. 98. 2 Strabo, XV. 1, 38. 3 It is little probable that Democritus appeared publicly with his theory, especially with his discussion of definitions, before the beodnninc of the activity of Socrates (about the time of the beginning of the Peloponnesian war). The passage in Aristotle (De part, anim., I. 1, 642 a, 26), is not to be taken to mean with certainty a chronological rela tionship of the two philosophies, especially when compared with Meta physics, XII. 4, 1078 b, 17. It signifies only that among physicists and metaphysicians Democritus first treated definition, although only ap proximately; while the direction of the scientific thought of Socrates was turned to ethics. 4 In reference to the numerous anecdotes about the " laughing phil osopher," see Zeller, I4. 766. 158 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY titles of spurious writings), yet there remains a magnificent number besides. In the genuine works all departments of philosophy, mathematics, medicine, metaphysics, physics, physiology, psychology, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, and technics are represented. Since the writings themselves do not lie before us, the question of their genuineness must be decided on the score of greatest probability. The ancients were proud of the works of Democritus, — which by the way were written in Ionian dialect, — not only for the wealth of their contents, out of which Aristotle took so much for his scientific writings, but also on account of their highly perfected form. They placed him in these respects by the side of Plato 1 and other great litterateurs.2 They admired the clearness of his exposition3 and the effective power 4 of his buoyant style. The loss of these writings, which appears to have hap pened at some time from the third to the fifth century after Christ, was the most lamentable that has happened to the original documents of ancient philosophy. While the work of Plato has been preserved in its complete beauty, there remains of that of his great antipode only a torso that can never be completed. Compare Fr. Schleiermacher, Ueber das Verzeichnis der Schriften des Dem. bei Diog. Laert., Complete Works, Division III., Vol. III. p. 293 f. ; Fr. Xietsehe, Beitrdge zur Quellenkunde und Kritik des Diog. Laert., p. 22. The Fragments with annotations by Mullach, I. 330 f. (par ticularly Berlin, 1843) ; W. Burchard, Democriti philosophic^ de sensibus fragmenta (Minden, 1830), Frag mente der Moral des Abderiten Democritus (Minden, 1834) ; Lortzing, Ueber d. ethi- schen Fragmente des Democritus (Berlin, 1873) ; W. Karl, Democritus in Cicero's philos. Schriften (Diedenhofen, 1889). The insecurity in early time in reference to the writings of the Atomists can be seen in the fact that while Epicurus seems to have called in question the existence of Leucippus (Diog. Laert., X. 13), the school of Theophrastus ascribed the peyas Sici/ %poig . erefj he dropa Kai kcvov? Thereby to sense experience objective truth is denied.4 Sense experience yields only an obscure view of what is actual. True knowledge5 — viz., of the atoms, which are not perceptible to our senses, and of likewise imperceptible empty space — can be attained only by thought. This rationalism, which in a typical manner stands in contrast to the natural science theory of sense perception, arose out of the metaphysical need of the Protagorean theory of perception, and went beyond it. For a very instructive parallel between 1 Theoph. De sens., 50. 2 The Heracleitan-Protagorean moment of this theory lay in this counter-motion particularly. 3 Sext. Emp., VII. 135. Compare Theoph. De sens., 63. He like wise traced the human nomenclature for things back to Beais. See Zeller, I4. 824, 3. 4 The occasional strictures about the limitations of human knowledge (Diog. Laert., IX. 72 ; see Zeller, I4. 823 f.) are, as also in Empedocles, to be considered only in this relation. It seems all the more true, since Democritus expressly taught that there might also exist for other things other methods of perception than those of man. This was con sistent with his whole theory. See Plutarch, Plac, IV. 10 (Dox., 399). Compare below. 6 Sext. Fmp. Adv. math., VII. 139. 168 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY Plato and Democritus, see Sextus Empiricus, Adv. math., VIII. 56. This rationalism of Democritus corresponds, in fact, entirely to that of the old metaphysic and the nature philosophy. The only difference is that here in Democritus it is not only asserted, but it is also based upon an anthropological doctrine. It is further to be observed, and it is also of value in drawing a parallel with Plato (Natorp, Forschungen, 207), that Democritus yvwp,-n yvno-in refers to space and the mathematical relations pos sible in space. It must remain undecided how far connections with the Pythagoreans are to be supposed. Democritus, at all events, is as far distant as the Pythagoreans and the Academy from a really fruitful application of mathematics to physics in the manner of Galileo. But, finally, thought itself, which grasps the truth of things, is nothing else than a motion of atoms, and in so far is like perception.1 Furthermore, since thought, as all kinds of motion, can arise only from mechanical causes, Democritus saw himself driven to the conclusion that the vono-K as well as the a'ia6nai<; presupposes 2 impressions of e'lScoXa from the outer world upon the body. In view of the documents that lie before us, it is only supposititious 3 how Democritus more exactly represented to himself the process of thought. It is certain 4 that he traced dreams, visions, and hallucinations to eioooXa as their causes. These are also ideas introduced indeed through bodily im pressions, but not by the customary path of perception 1 Although in itself not equivalent on the higher planes. It is like wise dissimilar to all the functions of the fire atoms. 2 Plutarch, Plac, IV. 8 (Dox., 395). 3 Zeller (I4. 821, 2) thinks that Democritus did not attempt such an in vestigation concerning the psychological principle in order to establish the preference of thought to perception. Zeller's view seems improbable, in the first place, on account of Democritus' elaboration elsewhere of his epistemological and psychological doctrine; in the second place, on account of the importance of the matter for his whole system ; finally, because of the traces of such undertakings in his preserved fragments. Compare G. Hart, Zur Seelen- und Erkenntnislehre des Dem., p. 19 f. 4 Plutarch, Qucesl. conv., VIII. 10, 2; Cic. De div., II. 67, 137 f. MATERIALISM AND IDEALISM. 169 through the organs of sense.1 Democritus is so far from holding these images as purely subjective that he ascribes to them rather a kind of prescntient truth.2 He looks upon the process distinctly after the analogy of the sense of sight as the name e'iScoXa shows. e'iocoXa, finer than those influencing the sense, create a correspondingly finer motion of the soul atoms, and thus arises our dream knowledge. If now Democritus regarded thought as the finest motion of the fire atoms, he must have looked upon the finest e'iocoXa also as the stimuli of that motion, viz. those e'iScoXa in which the true atomistic form of things is copied. Thought is accordingly an immediate knowledge 3 of the most minute articulation of actuality, — the theory of atoms. These finest e'iSwXa remain ineffectual to the greater portion of humanity compared to the gross and violent stimulations to the sense organs. The Wise Man, however, is alone sensitive4 to them, but he must avert his attention from the senses5 in order to conceive them. Compare E. Johnson, Der Sensualismus des Demokrit, etc. (Plauen, 1868) ; Natorp, Forschungen, 164 f. To designate De mocritus as a sensualist is only justified by the fact that he thought 1 It does not appear from the preserved passages exactly clear whether Democritus in his explanation of dreams thought that the e'loaXa press in during sleep without the help of the sense organs ; or that they were those that had pressed in during wakefulness, but on account of their weakness had first come into activity during a state of sleep. Perhaps he had both conceptions. 2 According to Plutarch (op. cit.), the dream is able to reveal a strange life of the soul to the dreamer. 3 Thought in analogy to sense of sight; pointed out first by Brandis (Handbuch, I. 333 f.) and abandoned by him (Gesch. d. Entiv., I. 145); analogy revived by Johnson. This analogy is to the effect that thought is an immediate inner perception or the intuitive conception of absolute reality. 4 Compare the somewhat dark passage, Plutarch, Plac, IV. 10: ArjpoKpiTos irXetovs elvai alcrBrjcreis irepl rd u\oya £aa Kal irepl tovs o~o(f)ovs 8e ttot ovSapy ouSa/xw? dXXoicoaiv ovBegiav ivhe^erai? The perceivable individual things, on the contrary, constitute the Heracleitan flux of continuous origination, change, and destruction. The fundamental principle of the metaphysical epistemol ogy of Plato is this : two worlds must be distinguished,4 one of which is and never becomes, the other of which be comes and never is ; one is the object of the reason (vbno-is), the other is the object of sense (a'tadncnf). Since, now, the objects are as completely separated Cxcopk) as the methods of knowing are distinct, the Ideas stand as incor poreal forms (da-mgara e'lSv) in contrast to material things, which are perceived by the senses. The Ideas, which are never to be found5 in space or in matter, which indeed exist purely for themselves (elXiKpives), which are to be grasped 6 not by the senses but only by thought, form an intel ligible world in themselves (r6iro<; votjtos). A rational theory of knowledge requires an immaterialistic meta physics. This immaterialism was the peculiarly original creation of Plato. Where in the earlier systems, not excluding that of Anaxagoras, the discussion turned upon the spiritual as the distinctive principle, nevertheless the principle always appeared as a peculiar kind of corporeal actualitj'. Plato, on the other hand, first discovered a purely spiritual world. The theory of Ideas is, therefore, an entirely new mediation of the Eleatic and the Heracleitan metaphysic, employing the i This view is stated most clearly in Timceus, 27 f., 57 f. Compare Rep., 509 f , 533. 2 Symp., 211. 8 Phmdo, 78. i Tim., 27 d. « Symp., 211. 6 Rep., 507; Tim., 28. 13 194 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY opposition between the Protagorean and Socratic theories of knowledge. Precisely for this reason, in the Theastetus, Plato brought the Sophistic theory of perception into closer relation ship to the irdvra pel than the Sophist himself had brought it. On the other hand, the close relationship of the Socratic episte mology to the Eleatic doctrine of Being had already been recog nized by the Megarians (§ 28). The positive metaphysic of Plato may be characterized, therefore, as immaterialistic Eleati cism.1 Therein consists its ontological character (Deuschle). It cognizes Being in Ideas, and relegates Becoming to a lower form of knowing. The neo-Pythagorean-neo-Platonic conception was an en tire misunderstanding of Plato. According to this concep tion, Ideas possess no independent actuality, but are only thought-forms supposed to exist in the divine mind. Through the neo-Platonism of the Renaissance, and even down to the beginning of this century, this interpretation of Plato obtained. Herbart was of great service in his opposition to it (Einleit. in d. Philos., § 144 f. ; Vol. I. 240 f.). Consistent with the theory of two worlds, as the central point in Platonism, is the manner in which Plato repre sented our cognition of Ideas in particular. The primary function of the Ideas is to set forth the logical character of the class concepts, to reveal the com mon qualities (to koivov) of the particulars which the class concepts comprehend. They are, in the Aristotelian phraseology, the ev eirl iroXXiov.2 But Plato regarded the process of thought, not as analysis, nor as an abstraction by comparison, but as rather a synoptic intuition3 of reality presented in single examples. The Idea cannot be con tained in its perceived phenomenon. It is of another sort, and cannot be found in appearance. In other words, ma terial things do not include the Idea, but are only the 1 The relative pluralistic character of the theory of Ideas is in con trast to original Eleaticism. It did not, as in the earlier attempts at mediation, arise from the need of an explanation of Becoming, but from the circumstance that conceptual knowledge can and must refer to a manifold of independent content-determinations. 2 Mel., I. 9, 990 b, 6. 3 Phcedr., 265; Rep., 537. MATERIALISM AND IDEALISM 195 copies or shadows1 of it. Therefore the perceptions can not include the Ideas as separable integral parts, but are, on the contrary, only the occasions for the apprehension of that Idea that is similar to the perceptions but not identi cal with them. Since the Idea cannot be created by re flection, it must be regarded as an original possession of the soul which the soul remembers when it sees its copy in the sense world. The recognition of the ideas is dvd- p,vgai<;.2 In the mythical representation in the Phcedrus, Plato presupposes that the human soul has gazed upon the Idea with its supersensible faculties, — those related to the world of Ideas, — before its entrance into earthly life, but it remembers them only upon the perception of correspond ing phenomena. Thereby out of the painful feeling of astonishment at the contrast between the Idea and its phenomenon is created the philosophic impulse, the long ing love for the supersensible Idea. This love is the epw?,3 which conducts it back from the transitoriness of sense to the immortality of the ideal world.4 There is an interesting parallel between the intuitive character, which the recognition of Ideas in Plato possesses, and the yvo'tpr/ yvrjo-ir] of Democritus. In Plato also analogies to optical impressions predominate. Both Democritus and Plato have in mind immediate knowledge of the pure forms (loeai), the abso lutely actual 5 which is attained wholly apart from sense percep- i Rep., 514 f. ; Phcedo, 73. 2 Meno, 80 f. ; Phcedr., 249 f. ; Phcedo, 72 f. 3 Phcedr., 250 f., and especially Symp., 200 f. 4 The theory of the i'pas takes on thereby in the Symposium a more uni versal aspect of beholding the living principle of all Becoming (yeveo-is) in the desire for the Idea (ovala), and so prepares the way for the teleo logical interpretation of Ideas. 5 One has the same right to speak of " sensualism " in Plato as in Democritus. Both explain true knowledge of the ovtws ov as the recep tion of the local by the soul, not as an act of sense perception, although as illustrated by the analogy to optical perception. 196 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY tion. The exposition of this teaching appears in Plato (Phcedrus and Symposium) in mythical form. For since it is a question of the time-process of the knowledge of the eternal, of the genesis of the intuition of the Absolute, a dialectic presentation is not possible. Since the Ideas are hypostasized class-concepts, in their first draft there are for Plato as many Ideas as there are class concepts or general names for different perceptual things. There are, therefore, Ideas of all that is in any wise thinkable,1 — Ideas of things, qualities and relations, of products of art and nature, of the good and of the bad, of the high and of the low.2 The later dialogues (Sympo sium, Phcedo, Timceus) speak only of such Ideas as have an inherent value, such as the good and the beautiful ; of such as correspond to nature products, like fire, snow, etc. ; and, finally, of mathematical relations, like great and small, unity and duality. Aristotle reports that Plato in later time did no longer recognize Ideas of artifacts, negations, and relations, and that he held, in place of these, essentially nature class-concepts.3 An exacter determination of the circle within which the philosopher, especially in different periods of his development, extended or wished to extend his theory of Ideas, cannot be made. In general the chronological order of the dialogues indicates that Plato originally constructed a world of Ideas according to his logical and epistemological view of class concepts. In the course of time, however, he came more and more to seek in this supersensible world the highest values and the fundamental onto- logical forms, according to which the sense world of Becoming is modelled. From the world of Ideas there thus arose an 1 Rep., 596. 2 For particular proofs, consult Zeller, II3. 585 f. The dialogue Parmenides proves with fine irony to the " young Socrates " that he must accept also the Ideas of hair, mud, etc. (130 f.). In as late a writing as the middle part of the Republic, Plato used the Ideas of bed, etc , to illustrate his theory. 8 Met., XI. 3, 1070 a, 18. MATERIALISM AND IDEALISM 197 ideal world. The norms of value thus took the place of class concepts. The ethical motive became more and more influen tial in his philosophy, as appears also in what follows. The more thoroughly the theory of Ideas in their first draft distinguished the two worlds from each other, the more difficult it became to determine the relation of the things of sense to their respective Ideas. The characteristic of this relation most frequently given in the dialogues Meno, Thecetetus, Phcedrus, and Symposium, and likewise in the Phcedo, is similarity. This is consistent with the thought which the philosopher developed in those same dialogues concerning the origin of concepts ; for similarity forms the psychological ground through which,1 stimulated by percep tion, the recollection of the Idea is said to come. Similar ity,2 however, is not equivalence. The Idea never appears fully in the things,3 and accordingly Plato designated the relationship of the two- as p,ipnat,<;t. The Idea is thus regarded 5 as the original ( Urbild) (irapdSeiypa) ,t]\e sensed object as the copy (Abbild) (eihcoXov). Exactly herein consists the small amount of reality which the corporeal 1 Now one would say: according to the law of the association of ideas, which moreover Plato enunciated expressly in this respect in the Phmdo, 73 f. 2 In view of the same the Parmenides raises the dialectic pica (131 f.), that it presupposes a tertium comparationis for the Idea and the phenomenon and forms an infinite regress. It is the objection of the Tpiros avBpairos. Compare Aristotle, Met., VI. 113, 1039 a, 2. 3 Plato was probably prompted to emphasize this by the incongruity of actual life with the ethical norm ; primarily, however, from the theo retical point of view by the fact that the mathematical concepts are factors in the consideration, and that these are never the result of per ception. See Phcedo, 73 a; Meno, 85 e. The hypothetical discussion of concepts stands furthermore in most exact connection with this. 4 Whether he thus early adopted this expression from the Pythago rean number theory need not be discussed. 6 See the freely accommodative and relatively early presentation in the Republic, 595 f. 198 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY world possesses in contrast to the ovrcos ov. On the other hand, viewed from its logical side, the Idea is the unitary, the permanent,1 in which the things of sense in their origi nation, change, and destruction have only temporary and occasional part (pere-^eiv).2 This relationship is, again, on tologically so viewed that the change of qualities of sensi ble things is reduced ultimately to a coming and going of Ideas. On account of this change the Idea at one time participates in the particular thing (irapovala),3 and at another leaves it.4 The later phase (Phmdo) of the theory of Ideas has a thought that seems to have been absent from the original statement, viz., that in the Ideas the causes may be some how found for the things of sense appearing as they do appear. The purpose of Plato was originally only to recog nize permanent true Being. The theory of Ideas in the Meno, Thecetetus, Phcedrus, and Symposium docs not attempt to be an explanation of the world of phenomena. The sig nificance of the Sophist is that it proposes this problem. Confronting the theory of Ideas with other metaphysical theories, the Sophist asks how this lower world of sense- appearance and its Becoming can be conceived as deduced from supersensible forms which are removed from all motion 1 The Parmenides (130 f.) makes also at this point some dialectic objections of the Eleatic sort. Plato (Philebus, 14 f.) very curtly deals with these. 2 Symp., 211 b. 3 Phced., 100 d. 4 The way in which the Phmdo develops this (102 f.) shows a re markable analogy to the teaching of Anaxagoras, which teaching is also significant in other respects in this dialogue (see below.) As in Anax agoras, the individuals are said to owe the change of their qualities to the entrance or exit of the qualitatively unchangeable xpvpara (§ 22), so here the Idea is added as giving a quality and as augmenting the thing (irpooylyveoBai) . Or it disappears again when, of mutually exclusive Ideas, the one already inherent in the thing shuts out the other. This explanation is essentially that of the Herbartian conception of Ideas as absolute Qualitateti. MATERIALISM AND IDEALISM 199 and change. It shows that immaterial Eleaticism is as un able as early Eleaticism to explain this problem. For in order to explain the motion of the sense- world, Ideas must themselves be endowed with motion, life, soul, and reason. But the elocbv cpiXoi deny 1 to the Ideas all these qualities, especially the most important quality of motion. The Platonic philosophy reaches its zenith in the solution of this problem. The Phcedo declares that in the Ideas alone is the cause (airia) of the phenomenal world to be found, and however this relationship is to be conceived, the sense object is indebted to the Idea alone for its qualities.2 This is the strongest of Plato's convictions, and to prove it is the greatest problem of the dialectic. There are in troduced in the same dialogue, however, the two elements, Anaxagoreanism and Pythagoreanism,3 through which this new phase of the theory of Ideas took shape in his mind. 1 Soph., 248 f. The author of the Sophist founds this criticism (247 d) upon the definition that the ovtcds ov must be thought as hvvapis, and whatever possesses Being must be thought as power in order to explain Becoming (das Geschehen). Although this expression is not to be explained in the spirit of the Aristotelian terminology (Zeller, II3. 575, 3), still this view lies nowise in the direction in which Plato later solved the problem, dvvapis is active power (see Republic, 477, where hvvapis is used in the sense of a faculty of the soul). Ideas are, how ever, final causes, and not such " faculties " as are definable only through their effects (Rep., loc. cit.). 2 Phcedo, 100 d, where reference seems to be made to the dialogue Sophist. 3 About the time of this change Aristotle entered the Academy; hence his exposition of the genesis of the theory of Ideas (Met., I. 6). The great significance which is ascribed in the Metaphysics to the Pythago rean theory in its bearing on Plato is not consistent with the. content of any of the foundation dialogues, Thecetetus, Phcedrus, and Sympo sium. Practically it begins first with the Philebus. But even the Phcedo shows, in its choice of persons and also in its discussion of the problems, that account is taken of the Pythagorean philosophy. Never theless (Met., XII. 4, 1078 b, 9) Aristotle himself elsewhere remarks 200 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY If the Ideas cannot themselves move and suffer change, they can be the causes of phenomena only in the sense that they are the purposes which are realized in phenomena. The only conception which therefore, from the point of view of the theory of Ideas, appears to be possible as an explanation of phenomena, is the teleological.1 The true relation between the Idea (ovaia) and the phenomenon (yeveaisj is that of purpose. Plato found in the iws-theory of Anaxagoras an attempt to make this point of view valid. But while he subjected the insufficient development of this theory to a sharp criticism,2 he main tained in addition that the establishment as well as the development of a teleological view of the world is possible only to a theory of Ideas.3 The same theory is further developed in the Philebus and in the corresponding part of the Republic. If the Sophist* from a formal and logical point of view called attention to the fact that a similar Koivcovia, a relationship of co-ordination and subordination, exists between Ideas as well as between phenomena and Ideas, so the Republic5 and the Philebus 6 emphasized also the systematic unity of the ovaia, and found it in the Idea of the Good, as including all other Ideas within itself. Thus the pyramid of con cepts reached its apex, not by means of a formally logical process of abstraction, but, as it happens in the entire Pla tonic dialectic, by means of an ontological intuition, express ing here its final and highest virodeo-^.7 For since all that the original conception of the theory of Ideas was independent of the number theory. Phileb., 54 c. : £vp.irao~av yeveoiv ovoias eveKa yiyveoBai £vpirdorjs. 2 Phcedo, 97 f. 3 Ibid., 99 f. He called this the Sevrepos 7rAo0r of philosophy, and the development of philosophy as a theoretical explanation of phenom ena he sketched in 95 c, fi. 4 Soph., 251 f. 5 Repmj 5n h e Phileb., 16 f. i Phcedo, 101 h; Rep., loc. cit. MATERIALISM AND IDEALISM 201 that is, is for some good, the Idea of the Good or of the absolute purpose is that to which all other Ideas are subor dinated, this subordination being teleological rather than logical. The Idea of the Good stands, therefore, even above Being and Knowing, which are the two highest disjunctives.1 It is the sun2 in the realm of Ideas from which everything else gets its value as well as its actuality. It is the World Reason. To it belong the name of ww and that of Godhead. This immaterialistic perfecting of the Anaxagorean thought is set by Plato in the Philebus (28 f.) and stands opposed to the system of irrational necessity of Democritus. In this connection, as a matter of fact, the vovs and the Godhead and the Idea of the Good, so far as it included all the others under it, were identified with the total world of Ideas (ama ; compare Zeller, II3. 577 ff., 593 f.). Neither is there here any suggestion of a personal divine spirit. Compare G. F. Rettig, Ama im Philebus (Bern. 1866) ; K. Stumpf, Verhdltnis des plat. Gottes zur Idee des Guten (Halle, 1869). The teleological cosmology of Plato consisted in his regarding Being or the world of Ideas as both purpose and cause3 of phenomena or the world of matter, and besides these teleological causes he recognized no other causes in the strict meaning of the term. Likewise in the particular relations of phenomena those things which pre sent themselves to sense perception as acting and having effect are valid for him only as secondary 4 causes (%wa'nia). The true cause is purpose. However, the Idea never realizes itself fully in corporeal i Rep., 508 f. 2 Ibid. ; compare 517 b. 3 In Philebus, 26 e, the search for the fourth principle is opened with the expressed explanation that 17 tov iroiovvros dyiiois (the essence of activity) may be distinguished only in name from the cause (ama). If this atria in the purpose is found in the Idea of the Good, then is the concept of the teleological cause attained. 4 Phcedo, 99 b, where the cause is distinguished from the ov avev to airiov ovk av hot ein aeriov. 202 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY things. This thought was peculiar to the first draft of the theory of Ideas, and it got new support and significance in Plato's tendency toward Pythagoreanism which set the perfect and imperfect worlds in opposition to each other. The more, however, the world of Ideas became the ideal world, the perfect Being or the kingdom of Worth, the less could it be viewed as the cause of imperfection in the world of sense. The world of imperfection could rather only be sought in the thing that has no Being. For the sense world as eternally " becoming" has part not only in that which has Being (the Ideas), but also in that which has no Being (pg ov)} Empty space2 was re garded as having no Being by Plato as by the Eleatics. Plato moreover regarded empty space, like the Pythago reans, as in itself formless and unfashioned, and precisely for that reason as pure3 negation (o-repno-isj of Being. But the formless is capable of all possible forms, and retains them by virtue of mathematical determinations. In this sense the Philebus 4 makes the Pythagorean fundamental opposition a part of his teleological metaphysic, in that he defined as the two first principles of the world of experi ence the aireipov (endless formless space) and the ire'pa<; (the mathematical limitation and formation of that space). Out of the union of the two the world of the individual things of sense appears, and the fourth and highest prin ciple forms the basis of this " mixing." This principle is the alria, the Idea of the Good, or the cosmic reason, the voik. 1 Rep., 477 a. 2 That the pi) ov which is designated in the Philebus as the aireipov and in the Timcrus (§ 37) as Se^apevtj, iKpayeiov, etc., is space, Zeller has proved (III3. 605 f . ; sec also H. Siebeck, Untersuchungen, 49 f.). On this account the word " matter " has been avoided, lest it imply its unavoidable subordinate meaning, " unformed stuff." "Unformed stuff," the vXn of Aristotle, had not yet had its meaning determined by Plato. 3 Compare Arist. Phys., I. 9, 192 a, 6. 4 Phileb., 23 f. MATERIALISM AND IDEALISM 203 Mathematics, whose importance for the dialectic has been emphasized above, had an ontological importance also in Plato's system. Mathematical forms are the link by means of which the Idea shapes space teleologically into the sense world.1 Here for the first time is explained the position which the philosopher assigns this science in connection with his epistemology. Mathe matics is a knowledge not of the phenomenal world but of the permanent world. For that reason in the earlier dialogues it seems to have been used only for dialectic 2 purposes. Its objects, however, especially geometrical objects, have still something of sense in them, which distinguishes them from the Ideas in the later evaluation of the Ideas. Therefore mathematics belongs, according to the schema of the Repmblic (509 f., 523 f.) not to the 86£a (the knowledge of yeveao;), but to vo-ncro; (the knowledge of ovcrla). Within oio-ta it is to be distinguished as SidVoia from the peculiar kirio-T^uri, the knowledge of the Idea of the Good. Mathematics appears, then, in the education of the ideal state as the highest preparation for philosophy, but only as preparation. Concerning Plato as a mathematician, his introduction of definitions and the analytic method, see Cantor, Geschichte der Mathematik, I. 183 f. In his latter days Plato borrowed from the Pythagorean number theory the principle by which he hoped for a systematic presentation and articulation of the world of Ideas. Logical investigations3 toward this end were given up as soon as from the teleological principle the Idea of the Good had been placed at the head. The Pythagorean method of developing concepts according to the number series commended itself to him. In adopting this method, Plato 1 A good parallel exists also here between Plato and Democritus, although in the latter's theory in the place of the teleological alria of the Philebus stood the dvdyKrj ( tj tov dXoyov Kal elKrj dvvapis Kal rd 'inrn i'rvxev, Phileb., 28 d), and although the Kevov and the oxhpoTa (the Ibeai of Plato) produce the sense world. In view of this, one can see in the exposition in the Philebus, 23-26, a reference to Demo critus, whose teaching this dialogue appears to have used in other places (§ 33). 2 The Meno shows how we can know Ideas by geometrical examples (Pythagorean doctrine). 3 Sophist, especially 254 f. 204 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY also symbolized single Ideas by ideal numbers. The ele ments of the Ideas are the aireipov aud the irepas in analogy to the principles laid down for the sense world in the Phile bus. The aireipov has here the significance of " intelligible space."1 Out of the ev which he identified2 with the Idea of the Good, he derived all other Ideas, as a graded series of conditioning and conditioned (irporepov Kal iarepov). Traces of this senile attempt are to be found in the Philebus and the Laws. In other respects wc are instructed only by Aristotle concerning these dypama Soypara: Met., I. 6, XII. 4 f. ; compare A. Trendelenburg, Plat, deidris et numeris doc trina e.c Arist. illustrata (Leipzig, 1826), and Zeller, II3. 567 f. 36. Measured by its first motive, Plato's theory of Ideas is an outspoken ethical metaphysic. Consequently Ethics was the philosophical science which he chiefly and most fruitfully built upon. Among the Ideas that the dialectic undertook to develop, social norms had a prominent place. The immaterialism of the double-world theory necessarily involved an ascetic morality that was very uncharacteristic of Greek thought. The Thecetetus? for example, sets up an ideal of retirement from the world for the philosopher who, since earthly life is full of evil, finds refuge as quickly as possible in the divine presence. The Phcedo 4 further develops this negative ethics in all its details. It pictures the whole life of the philosopher as already a dying, a puri fication of the soul from the dross of sense existence. The soul in the body is, as it were, in prison, and it can free itself only by knowledge and virtue. This view, which is particularly like that of the Pythag oreans among the ancient moral theories, took in the metaphysical theory of Ideas a special form, by virtue of which the psychological basis was created also for 1 Compare H Siebeek, thitersuchungen, 97 f. 2 Aristox. Elem. harm., II. 30. 3 172, 176 f. 4 64 f. MATERIALISM AND IDEALISM 205 the positive ethics of Plato. In the theory of the two worlds the soul must take a peculiar intermediary position, — a theory that could be developed not without difficulties and contradictions. On account of its ideal character the soul must be capable of conceiving the Ideas, and on this account must be related to them.1 The soul belongs to the supersensible world, and should have all the qualities of that world, — non-origination, indestructibility, unity, and changelessness. But since it is the carrier of the Idea of life,2 and as cause of motion is itself eternally movable, it is not identical to the Ideas, but very similar to them.3 Therefore for Plato it had pre-existence and lasted beyond the earthly body. Yet in that changeless timelessness of Being which belongs to the Ideas it has likewise only a share, since it also belongs to yevecri<; but it is not identi cal with the Ideas. On the other hand, the Socratic prin ciple required that the soul's goodness and badness must not be attributed to external fate, but to the soul itself.4 Since its essence, related as it is to the world of Ideas, cannot be answerable for a bad decision, its higher nature must be considered as deformed by the temporary incli nations of the senses.5 Hence the theory of the three "parts"6 of the soul. This theory, although represented mythically in the Phcedrus (consistent with its subject matter), became in the Republic an entirely dogmatic basis of ethics. There is the part that is related to the Ideas, the directing, reasoning part CgytpoviKov, XoyiariKuv). Then there are the two passionate (affektvolle) parts. One is the nobler : it is the strong activity of will (Ovpos, 0vp.o- «8eV). The other, less noble, consists of sensuous appetites (eiriOvgnriKov, (piXo-^prjpaTov). These three parts appear in the Phcedrus and the Republic as the Forms (e'iSn) of 1 Phcedo, 78 f. 2 Ibid., 105 d. 8 opoiorarov; ibid., 80 b. 4 Rep., 617 f. 6 Ibid., 611 f. « Phcedrus, 246 f. 206 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY activity of the soul in its unity. Hence in the Phcedrus, also, the soul that is described there as a unity, unites in itself in the next life all the functions that in the dialogues are ascribed to its three parts.1 The myths of the Timceus for the first time expressly speak of the gepg, of which the soul is composed, and treat the parts as separable, in such a way that one part, the pods? is immortal, the others mortal. Jas. Steger, Plat. Studien, III. ; Die plat. Psychologie (Innsbruck, 1872); P. Wildauer, Die Psy. des Willens, II. (Innsbruck, 1879); H. Siebeck, Gesch. der Psy., I. 1, 187 f. ; Schulthess, Plat. Forschungen (Bonn, 1875). Plato's psychology was by no means only a result of his theory of nature, but was a metaphysical presupposition for it, resting upon ethical and epistemological motives. This is shown in the beginning of the myth in the Timceus. Pre- existence is supposed to explain our knowledge about Ideas (by dvdp.vncri%) , and on the other hand to explain our guilt, on account of which the supersensible soul is bound in an earthly body (see myth in Phcedrus). The post-existence of the soul, on the other hand, makes possible not only the striving of the soul to reach beyond earthly life after a completer identification with the world of Ideas, but above all it makes possible moral recompense. Thereupon Plato illuminated this teaching every where by mythical representations of judgment at death, of wanderings of souls, etc. (see Gorgias, Republic, Phcedo). Con sequently, however weak the proofs may be which Plato had adduced for individual immortality, yet his absolute belief in it is one of the chief points of his teaching. Of the arguments on which he founded this belief, the most valuable is that wherein he (Phcedo, 86 f.) contended against the Pythagorean definition of the soul as the harmon}' of the bod}' by the proof of the soul's substantial independence through its control over the body.3 His weakest argument is that in which the Phmdo 1 In the Phcedrus that previous determination of the soul is ascribed to the sense appetites, which explains the errors of earthly life. In the Phcedo, the fortunes of the soul after death are made dependent on the adherence of its sensuality. Pre-cxistence and post-existence are ascribed in both cases to the whole soul. i Tim., 69 f. 3 The Mendelssohn copy of the Phcedo (Bcrl. 1764) especially raises this point in the spirit of the pliilosophy of the Enlightenment. MATERIALISM AND IDEALISM 207 Sums up and crowns all the other arguments : a dialectic sub reption from the double meaning of the word dfldvaros, in which the soul is explained as immortal because it can exist in no other way than as a living thing (Phcedo, 105 f.). Compare K. F. Hermann, De immortalitatis notione in Plat. Phosdone (Marburg, 1835); id. de partibus animce immortalibus (Gott, 1850) ; K. Ph. Fischer, Plat, de immortalitate animce doctrina (Erlangen, 1845) ; P. Zimmermann, Die Unsterblichkeit der Seelein Plat. Phced. (Leipzig, 1869) ; G. Teichmuller, Studien, I. 107 f. The relationship of the three parts to the essence of the soul is very difficult, and is not made perfectly clear. Plato main tains clearly, on the whole, the unity of the soul, but only in a few places particularly emphasizes it. On the one hand, the Phcvdrus makes all the three parts belong to the essence of the individual, in order to make conceivable the fall of the soul in its pre-existence. On the other hand, it appears as if both the lower parts originated in the union of soul and body, and on that account again were stripped off entirely from the true essence of the soul (voCs) after a virtuous life (Rep., 611 ; Phcedo, 83). The abrupt and direct opposition of the two worlds made this troublesome point in his system (Rep., 435 f'.). So also the specific psychological meaning of the three parts, whose origin is made clear by ethical evaluation, is undetermined. In spite of some similarities, this division is in no wise identical with the present-day psychology and its customary triple division into ideas, sensations, and desires. For the alo-drjo-eos did not, according to Plato, belong to the Xoyio-riKw, but must, although he has not expressly stated it, be ascribed to both the other parts. On the other hand, there belong to the voCs not only the knowledge of Ideas, but also the virtuous determination of the will, which, according to Socrates, corresponds to that knowledge. We come nearest to the Platonic thought when we think of the life of the soul as ordered into three different degrees of worth. Each degree has its own theoretic and practical functions in such a way that the lower functions may exist without the higher, but' the higher appear — at least in this life — in con nection with the lower. So plants have eiri6vpyyriKov ( Tim., 11 ; Rep., 441); animals have 6vp.oeiok in addition to iiriOvprrriKov ; and men have, besides these two functions, the Aoyto-TiKoV. The i/oik is localized in the brain, Uvpos in the heart, and eiriOvpla in the liver.1 In the application of this to ethnography, he claimed for the i Aoreeing with Democritus. 208 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY Greeks the excellence of Xojuttikov (Republic, 435 e), allowed to the warlike barbarians of the north the predominance of Ovpos, and to the weak barbarians of the south that of iniOvpia. Upon the basis of this psychological theory, Plato went beyond not only the abstract simplicity of the Socratic theory of virtue, but also the ascetic one-sidedness of his own first negative statements. That moral conduct alone makes man truly blessed 1 in this or the other life,2 is his fundamental conviction. But even if he was inclined to find this true happiness only in the most complete perfec tion of the soul, in which happiness the soul is a sharer in the divine world of Ideas ; and even if therefore he refused3 as unworthy of the soul every utilitarian principle of con ventional ethics, yet he recognized other kinds of happiness as justifiable moments of the highest Good. These kinds of happiness are all which, in the entire sweep of the soul's activities, appear as true and noble joys. The Philebus 4 develops such a graded series of goods. Plato contended also, in this dialogue, against the theory that would find the re'Xo?5 only in sense pleasure. But against the view of those who explain all pleasure as only illusory, he held fast to the reality of a pure and painless sense-pleasure,6 and he contended against the one-sided view that sought true hap piness only in insight.7 But while he on the other hand recognized the legitimacy of intellectual pleasure, he laid claim to it not only for rational knowledge (vow), but also for correct ideas in every science and art.8 Above all this, however, he set the participation in ideal evaluations and 1 Rep., 353 f. 2 Compare entir3 conclusion of Rep., Books IX., X. 3 Rep., 362 ; Thecet., 176 ; Phcedo, 68 f. 4 See Laws, 717 f., 728 f. 6 As already seen in Gorgias. 6 Supposably Democritus. 7 These statements could be aimed just as well against Antisthenes, Euclid, or Democritus (Phileb., 21, 60). 8 Phileb., 62 f. MATERIALISM AND IDEALISM 209 their actualization in individual activity.1 All the beauty and vitality of Greece was amalgamated here in the tran scendental ideal of the philosopher, and a similar union of the two sides of reality was already suggested in the series of objects which the Symposium2 develops as the working of the epcos. A. Trendelenburg, DePlat. Philebus consilio (Berlin, 1837) ; Fr. Susemihl, Ueber die Gutertafel im Philebus (Philol. 1863) ; R. Hirzel, De bonis inftnePhilebi enumeratis (Leipzig, 1868). However, Plato founded the development of his theory of virtue in a still more systematic way upon his triple divisions of the soul. While his first dialogues took pains to reduce the single virtues to the Socratic etSo? of knowl edge, the later dialogues proceeded upon the theory of the distinct independence and the respective limitations of the particular virtues. In so far as the one or the other part of the soul preponderates in different men according to their dispositions,3 are they suited to developing one or another virtue. For every part of the soul has its own perfection, which is called its virtue and is grounded in its essence.4 Accordingly Plato constructed a group of four cardinal virtues which at that time were beginning to be frequently mentioned in literature. There is the virtue of wisdom (aocpia) corresponding to the r)yepovac6v ; that of will-power (dvopia), corresponding to the Ovpoeioes ; that of self-control (acoebpoavvrj), corresponding to the eiriOvpvriKov. Finally, since the perfection of the whole soul consists5 in the right relations of the single parts, in the fulfilment of the soul's particular task through every one of these parts (rd eavrov irpdrreiv), and in the regulative control of 1 Phileb., 66 f. 2 Symp., 208 f. 3 Rep., 410 f. 4 Rep., 441 f. 6 In the entire Republic the ascetic thought of stripping off the lower parts of the soul is entirely put aside. 14 210 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY reason over the two other parts,1 so we have as a fourth virtue that of an equable arrangement of the whole. This last is called by Plato StKaioavvg.2 The last term, which is scarcely understandable from the point of view of individual ethics, arises from the peculiar derivation which Plato has given to these virtues in the Republic. Loyal to the motive of the theory of Ideas, the Platonic ethics sketched not so much the ideal of the individual as that of the species ; it pictured less the perfect man than the perfect society. The Platonic ethics is primarily social ethics. It does not treat of the happi ness of the individuals, but that of the whole,3 and this happiness can be reached only in the perfect state. The ethics of Plato perfected itself in his teaching of the ideal state. K. F. Hermann, Die historischen Elemente des platonischen Idealstaates (Gesch. Abhandl., 132 f.) ; Ed. Zeller, Der plat. Staat in seiner Bedeulung fur die Folgezeit ( Vortrdge und Abhandl., I. 62 f.) ; C. Nohle, Die Staatslehre Plat.'s in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwickelung (Jena, 1880). Whatever4 may be the natural and historical origin of the state, its task is the same everywhere, according to Plato : viz., so to direct the common life of man that all may be happy through virtue. The task can be accom- 1 Since already a-auppoo-vvn is possible only through the right rule of the appetites, craeppoovvrj and SiKaiooivn are not mutually exclusive. Compare Zeller, II3. 749 f. 2 The most usual verbal translation, justice, concerns only the politi cal, not the moral spirit of the case. Righteousness does not fully state the Platonic meaning. 3 Precisely on that account the philosopher must share in public life, even if he would find his happiness only in his turning from the earthly and in his devotion to the divine. See above ; also Rep., 519 f. 4 The first book of the Republic develops critically the views of the Sophists on this point. How far in the representation of the genesis of the state, given in the second book (369 f.), positive and negative analogies appear, cannot be discussed here. MATERIALISM AND IDEALISM 211 plished only by ordering all the relations of society accord ing to the principles of man's moral nature. The perfect state is divided into three distinct parts, like the soul of man. There are the producers, the warriors, and the admin istrators. The great mass of citizens (Egpos; yecopyol Kal Sgpiovpyot), corresponding to the eiriOvpnriKov or cbiXo- X\pr)parov, are entrusted with providing for the material foundation of the life of the state by caring for its daily needs ; and they are prompted to make this provision by their own sensuous appetites. The warriors and officials (iiriKovpoi), corresponding to the Ovpioeioes in the unselfish fulfilment of duty, have to guard the state externally by repelling invasion, internally by executing the laws. The rulers, finally (dp^ovTes), corresponding to Xoyio-rtKov or ¦gyepoviKov, determine, according to their insight, the legis lation and the principles of administration. The perfection however of the entire state — its " virtue " — is justice (hiKaioavvn),1 that every one may get his right. Justice consists in these three classes having their proper distribu tion of power, while at the same time every one fulfils his own peculiar task. Therefore the rulers must have the highest culture and wisdom (aocpia), the warriors an undaunted devotion to duty (dvSpia), and the people an obedience which curbs the appetites (acotp-poavvn). The constitution of the ideal state for Plato is an aristoc racy in the strictest sense of the word. It is a rule of the best, — the wise and virtuous. It places all legislation and the entire direction of society in the hand of the class of the scientifically cultured (cpiXoaocpoi).2 The task of the 1 Therefore the corresponding virtue of the individual, the ethical equilibrium of the parts of his soul, is designated by the same name. 2 Thus must the celebrated sentence (Rep., 473 d) be understood. There will be no end to the sorrow of man until the philosophers (the scientifically cultured) rule or the rulers are philosophers (are scientifi cally cultured). 212 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY second class is to execute practically the orders of the highest class, and to maintain the state and preserve its interests both internally and externally. The mass of mankind have to work and obey. Since, however, the object of the state does not consist in the securing of any merely outward benefit, but in the virtue of all its citizens, Plato demanded that the individ ual should merge himself entirely in the state, and that the state should embrace and determine the entire life of its citizens. Plato thus went beyond the political principle of the Greeks. The development which this idea found in the social organization of the iroXireia was restricted, nevertheless, to the two higher classes, which were taken together under the name of " guardians" (cpvXaKes). For the mass of the Srjgos there is accessible no virtue founded on knowledge, but only the conventional virtue of society, which is enforced by the strict execution of the laws and attained through utilitarian considerations. The Platonic politics leaves therefore the third class to itself. In its desire for acquisition, this class is moved by a fundamen tally sensuous motive ; and it performs its duty when by its labor it furnishes the material foundation for the life of the state, and yields to the guidance of the " guardians." But the prenatal and present life of the "guardians" are to be controlled by the state. Impressed by the importance of the propagation of the species, Plato would not leave marriage to the voluntary action of the individual, but de cided that the rulers of the state should provide for the right constitution of the following generation by a fitting choice of parents.1 Education of the youth in all depart ments belongs to the state, and gives equal attention to bodily and spiritual development. In the latter it pro gresses from folk-lore and myths through elementary instruction to poetry and music, and thence through math- 1 Rep., 416 b. MATERIALISM AND IDEALISM 213 ematical training to interest in philosophy, and, finally, to the knowledge of the Idea of the Good. In the different steps of this education, which is the same for all the chil dren of the two higher classes, those children are pruned out by the state officials that no longer seem to show fitness of disposition and development for the higher tasks. Dif ferent grades of officials and warriors are thus formed from these. This sifting process leaves ultimately the elite, who succeed to the position of archons and dedicate their lives partly to the furthering of science and partly to the admin istration of the state. Herein are the two upper classes a great family ; every form of private possession is renounced,1 and their external wants are cared for by the state support, which is furnished by the third class. The Platonic state was accordingly to be an institution for the education of society. Its highest aim was to pre pare man by the sensible for the supersensible world, by the earthly for the divine life. The social-religious ideal is that which floats before the philosopher in his methodical delineation of the " best " state. As all the higher interests of man will be included by this social community of life, so the philosopher believed that the state should have exclu sive control not only of education and science but also of art and religion. Only that art shall be allowed whose imitative2 activity is directed upon the Ideas, especially the Idea of the Good.3 The Greek KaXoKayaQla consisted in the evaluation of everything beautiful as good. Plato reversed the order of this thought by establishing only the good as the really beautiful. In the same way the ideal state accepts in the main the myths and the culture of the Greek state religion as educational material for the third class of society, and partly also for the second class, espe cially in childhood.4 But the state expunges from the 1 Rep., 416 h. 2 Ibid., 313. 3 Ibid., 376 t. 4 Ibid., 369 f. 214 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY myths all things immoral and ambiguous, and permits their use only as the symbolical representations of ethical truths. The religion of the philosophers, however, consists in sci ence and virtue, of which the highest goal is the attainment of likeness to the Idea of the Good, — the Godhead. Plato did not conceive his city as an imaginary Utopia, but in all earnestness as a practicable ideal. He emplojed therefore in many particulars, especially in social arrangements, numerous features of the then existing Greek states, and he preferred, natu rally enough, the stricter and more aristocratic ordinances of the Doric race. Though he was convinced that out of the existing circumstances his ideal could be realized only through force,1 yet he had none the less faith that if his proposal were tried, he would bestow upon his citizens lasting content, and would make them strong and victorious against all foreign attack. In the incomplete dialogue, Critias, the philosopher tried to develop this thought, — that the state founded on culture should show itself superior to the Atlantis, the state founded on mere ex ternal power. An idealizing of the Persian wars probably floats before him. The description is broken off at the very beginning, and there is wonderful similarity in the picture of the Atlantis to the institutions of former American civilizations. As to details, we should make a comparison of the Republic with all of Plato's other writings. The Politicus offers many similar thoughts, but with the interweaving of much that is foreign, and it has predilection for monarchical forms of govern ment. It deviates from the Republic, especially in its theory of the different kinds of constitutions, contrasting three worse forms with three better.2 The kingdom is contrasted to the tyranny, the aristocracy to the oligarchy, the constitutional to the lawless democracy. Inexact sketches are drawn of the seventh, or best, state in contrast to these. In the Republic,3 Plato used his psychology to show how the worse constitutions come from the deterioration of the ideal states. These are the timocracy in which the ambitious rule, the predominance of the Bvp.oeioh ; the oligarchy in which the avaricious rule, the pre dominance of the iiridvprjnKov ; the democracy or realm of uni versal license ; and, finally, the tyranny or the unfetterino- of the most disgraceful arbitrary power. The aristocratic characteristics of the Platonic state corre spond not only to the personal convictions of Plato and his 1 Rep., 540 d. 2 Polit., 302 f. 3 Rep ; 545 f_ MATERIALISM AND IDEALISM 215 great teacher, but are developed necessarily from the thought that scientific culture can be obtained only by the very few. In scientific culture is the highest virtue of man, and his only title to political administration (Gorgias). Likewise, the exclu sion of all non-intellectual labor from tlie two directing classes is consistent with the universal Greek prejudice against the proletariat. However, it is justified by Plato in the reflection that all true labor presupposes love for its task, or brings love with it ; and accordingly, that all manual work necessarily lowers the soul to the sensuous, and makes distant its supersensible goal. From the same motive came the exclusion of family life and private possessions. It is misleading to speak here of a communism. The community of wives, children, and goods is expressly delimited to the two higher classes. This was not to satisfy a claim for universal equality, as was the case in the naturalistic investigations of radical Cynicism, but, on the contrary, to prevent private interest from interfering in airy- way with the devotion of the " warrior and ruler to the welfare of the state. It is, in a word, a sacrifice made to the Idea of the Good. The peculiar character of the ethics of Plato, and at the same time its tendency to go beyond actual Greek life, consisted in the complete subordination of the individual life to the purpose of the politicalwhole. In contrast to the degenerating Hellenic culture the philosopher held an ideal picture of political society, which could first actually be when the Platonic thought predom inated : that all earthly life has value and meaning only as an education for a higher supersensible existence. To a certain extent the hierarchy of the Middle Ages realized the Platonic state but with the priests in place of the philosophers. Other moments of the Platonic ideal — for example, the control of science by the state — have been realized also to some extent in the public measures of some modern nations. Concerning Plato's theory of education see Alex. Kapp (Minden. 1833); E. Snethlage (Berlin, 1834); Volquardsen (Berlin, 1860) ; K. Benrath (Jena. 1871) ; concerning his atti tude toward art, K. Justi, Die cesth. Elemente in der plat. Phi los. (Marburg, I860); concerning his attitude toward religion, F. Ch. Bauer, Das Christliche des Platonismus (Tubingen, 1873). Compare, also, S. A. Byk, Hellenismus und Platonismus (Leipzig, 1870). Similarly Plato's ethics also experienced as disadvan tageous a later transformation in the Laws as his theoretic 216 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY philosophy in the lectures of his old age. In pessimistic ' despair2 as to the realization of his political ideal, the phi losopher attempted to sketch a morally ordered community without the controlling influence of the theory of Ideas and its devotees. In the place of philosophy, on the one hand religion presented itself in a form much nearer to the national mode of thought, and on the other mathematics with its Pythagorean tendencies to music and astronomy. Philosophical culture was replaced by practical prudence 3 (cpp6vgo-i<;~), and precise conformity to law and the Socratic virtue by a moderate dependence on ancient worthy cus toms. Thus the state in the Republic changed, when it appeared in the later writings, into a mixture of monar- chico-oligarchic and democratic elements, — the ideal power into a compromise with historical conditions. Moreover, all this is set before us in a long-winded, unconcentrated presentation, which seems to be wanting the last finishing touches and the final redaction.4 Just because the Laws give details of contemporaneous life, the}' are of high antiquarian, even if of very little philosophical value. They represent so great a deterioration, not only from the theory of Ideas, but from Plato's entire idealistic thought, that the doubts which have been wisely put aside again as to their genuineness are yet entirely conceivable. Compare Th. Oncken, Staatslehre des Arist., 197 f. ; E. Zeller, II3. 809 f. ; the five essays by Th. Bergk, concerning the History of Greek Philosophy and Astronomy (Leipzig, 1883) ; E. Praetorius, De legibusPlat. (Bonn, 1884). 37. The epistemological dualism of the theory of Ideas allowed and demanded a dogmatic statement concerning ethical norms of human life, but no equivalent recognition 1 Laws, 644. The conviction as to the badness of the world grew up here to the extent of a belief in an evil world-soul, which works against the divine soul. Compare § 37. Sec Laws, 896 f. 2 Ibid., 739 f. 3 Ibid., 712, in exact antithesis to Rep., 473. 4 Ibid., 746 f. MATERIALISM AND IDEALISM 217 of nature phenomena. For although Plato had fully deter mined that the tasks of metaphysics lay in regarding the Ideas and especially the Idea of the Good as the cause of the sense-world, that world nevertheless remained to him as before a realm of Becoming and Destruction. According to the premises of his pliilosophy, this realm could never be the object of dialed ic or true knowledge. The point of view of the theory of Ideas presupposes a teleological view of nature, but it offers no knowledge of nature. In his latter days, complying with the needs of his school, Plato drew natural science also within the realm of his research and theory, — which science he in the spirit of Socrates had earlier entirely avoided. He, nevertheless, remained always true to his earlier conviction, and empha sized it with great clearness and sharpness at the beginning of the Timceus, in which the result of these investigations was set down.1 This was to the effect that there can be no eirio-T-gpn of the Becoming and destruction of things, but only irians: no science, but only .a probable conclusion. He claimed therefore for his theory of nature, not the value of truth, but only of probability. The presentations in the Timceus are only et/coTe? gvOoi, and, however closely related to his theory of Ideas, they nevertheless form no integral part of its metaphysics. Aug. Bockh, De Plcdonica corporis mundani fabrica (Heidel berg, 1809) ; Untersuchungen iiber das kosmische System des Plat. (Berlin, 1852) ; II. Martin. Etudes sur le Timee (2 vols., Paris, 1841). Plato's philosophy of nature stands, then, not in the same, but in a very similar relationship to the metaphysic of his theory of Ideas, as the hypothetical physics of Parmenides to his theory of Being. In both cases it seems to have been a regard for the needs 1 Tim., 28 f; which discussion, 27 d, begins with the recapitulation of the theory of the two worlds. The relation of the philosophy of nature to the theory of Ideas is characterized most exactly by sentence 29 c; on irep irpbs yevetriv ovaia, tovto irpbs irioriv dXnBeia. 218 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY and wishes of the pupils that occasioned their descending from interest in permanent Being to an experimental interest in the changeable. Plato designated expressly this play with the etKorcs pvdoi as the only permissible diversion from his dialectic, which was his life-work (Tim., 59 a). Although a critical and often, indeed, polemical consideration of existing opinions ap peared here, the formal moment of which Diels (Aufs. z: Zeller- ' Jub., 254 f.) made of great importance in Parmenides, Plato took account of the fact that a school that had a school-membership of the organization and range of the Academy could not hold itself indefinitely aloof from natural science, and that such a school would be obliged finally to come to some terms or other.1 While, however, upon the basis of the theory of Ideas a perfect knowledge of the comparative worth of the individual, society, and history could be obtained, jet the determination of the reality of nature through the Idea of the Good was not to be developed with equal certainty as to details. Suppose, then, physics and ethics to be the two wings of the Platonic edifice, the ethical wing is like the maiu portion of the edifice in style and material ; the physics is, however, a lighter, temporary structure, and is merely an imitation of the forms of the other. That which pressed upon the philosopher and was treated by him with careful reserve wras, remarkably enough, made of the greatest importance by his disciples in later centuries. The teleological physics of Plato was regarded through Hellenistic time and the entire Middle Ages as his most important achieve ment, while the theory of Ideas was pressed more or less into the background. Relationships to religious conceptions are chiefly accountable for this, but still more the natural circum stance that the school had an especial fondness for the more tangible and useful part of his teaching. This explains why already Aristotle (De cm., I. 2, 404 b, 16) contended against the myths of the Timceus as though they were serious state ments of doctrine. The basis for the myths of the Timmus is the metaphys ics of the Philebus. The sense world consists of infinite space, and the particular mathematical forms which that space had taken on in order to represent the Ideas. But conceptual knowledge cannot be given of the efficacy of these highest purposes. Consequently the Timmus begins 1 Concerning the influence of Eudoxus, see H. Usener, Preuss. Jahrb., LIII. 15 f. MATERIALISM AND IDEALISM 219 by personifying this efficacy mythologically as the world- forming God, the Sugiovpyos. It is purposeful force ; it is good, and because of its good-will has made the world.1 In the act of creation it had in view the Ideas, those pure unitary forms of which the world is a copy.2 The world is therefore the most perfect, best, and most beautiful,3 and since it is the product of divine reason and goodness, it is the only world. The perfectness of the one world which is reasserted with especial solemnity at the end of the Timceus. is a necessary requisite of the teleological basis of thought. The denial of the opposite proposition, that there are numberless worlds (Tim., 31 a), appears as a polemic against Democritus, especially in connection with what immediately precedes (30 a). According to Democritus' mechanical principle, the vortices arise here and there in the midst of chaotic motion, and out of these the worlds arise. According to Plato, the ordering God forms only one world, and that the most perfect. That, however, this world corresponds not perfectly with the Ideas,4 but only as closely as possible, is due to the second principle of the sense world, to space into which God has built the world. Space is known neither by thought5 nor sense. It is neither a concept nor percept, Idea nor sense object. It is the pr) ov or what possesses no Being, without which the ovtcos ov could not appear, nor the Ideas 6 be copied in sense things. It ' is the gwainov in comparison to the true a'inov; and so also the things formed in it in the individual processes of the world are fjvvairia.8 They form a natural necessity (dvdyKn) 9 beside i Tim., 29 c. 2 Ibid., 30 c. 3 The teleological motive of the teaching of Anaxagoras, which was accepted already in the Phcedo, forms one of the fundamental teachings of the Timceus. 4 Tim., 30 a, 46 c. 5 Ibid., 52. 6 Which are midway between Being and not-Being. Rep., 477 f. 7 Tim., 68 e, meaning a second kind of curia. 8 Ibid , 46 c ; Phcedo, 96 f. » Tim., 48 a, another term used completely in Democritan sense. 220 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY the divine reason, which necessity under certain circum stances stands in the way of the teleological activity of the divine reason. Space 1 C%d>pa, roirof) is that wherein the cosmic process comes to pass (ckc'ivo ev c5 yiyverai) which takes on all bodily forms (eus. de pjrimis rerum princi- piis placita (Paris, 1838) ; M. A. Fischer, De Spiens. vita (Rastadl, 1845). Xenocrates, Plato's companion upon his third Sicilian journe}', who was distinguished for his strong, serious personalit}-, was hardly more significant as a philosopher than Speusippus. Diogenes Laertius (IV. 11 f.) mentions the long list of his writings. R. Heinze, X. (Leipzig, 1892), gives a compre hensive exposition of his theory with the fragments appended. Heracleides came from the Pontic Heraclea, was won over to the Academ}' by Speusippus, and had especially as an astron omer independent importance. Plato passed over to him, dur ing his last journey to Sicily, the leadership of the Academy. When after Speusippus' death Xenocrates was chosen scholarch, 15 226 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY Heracleides went to his home and founded there his own school, which he administered until after 330. He was a maivy-sided, aesthetically inclined, and productive writer, and he was familiar not only with the Platonic and Pythagorean teaching, but also with Aristotelianism. Compare Diog. Laert., V. 86 f. ; Rouler, De vita et scriptis Her. Pon. (Loewen, 1828) ; E. Deswert, De Her. Pon. (Loewen, 1830) ; L. Colin (in Comment, phil. in hon. Rcifferscheid, Breslau, 1884). Philip of Opus probably edited the Lcnos of Plato, and was besides the author of the Epinomis. The renowned astronomer Eudoxus (406-353) joined the Acad emy for some time according to the many different testimonies of the ancients (Zeller, II3. 845 f.), and he developed its astronomical theories. But on other questions, especially ethical ones, he deviated widely from the Academy. A. Bockh, Ueber die Yierjahrigen Sonnenkreise der Alien, besouders den eudoxi- schen (Berlin, 1863). Among the later Pythagoreans, Archytas was pre-eminent. In the first half of the fourth century he plaj'ed a great role in his native city, Tarentum, as scholar, statesman, and general. Whatever has been transmitted with any assurance concerning him and others, shows us that just as the Pj'thagoreans influ enced Plato in various ways, so also Plato on his side influenced to such a degree the Pythagoreans, that the theoiy of numbers in its last phase fused perfectly with the theory of Ideas, which was nominally its rival. The significance of Archytas lay in the realm of mechanics and astronomy. His philosophy agreed throughout with that of the Older Academy. On account of the close personal relationship in which he stood to Plato, the genuineness of those fragments may well be possible in which he gave a Platonic turn to Pythagoreanism. These fragments are collected by Conr. Orelli (Leipzig, 1827) ; see Mullach, II. 16 f. ; G. Hartenstein, De Arch. Tar. frag. p>hilos. (Leipzig, 1833); Petersen (Zeitschr. f. Altertumswisscnschaft, 1836) ; O. Gruppe, Die Frag, des Arch. (Berlin, 1840) ; Fr. Beckmann, De Pythagoreorum religuiis (Berlin, 1844); Zeller, V3 103 f . ; Eggers, De Arch. Tar. etc. (Paris, 1833). Polemo and Crates owe the leadership of the Academy more to their Athenian birth and their own moral worthiness than to their philosophical significance. C ran tor originated in Soli in Cilicia, and was known particularly through his writing, irepl ¦KevOow;. H. E. Meier, Ueber die Schrift, irepl irevOovs (Halle, 1840) ; F. Kayser, De Crantore Aeademico (Heidelberg, 1841). The Older Academy took in general the Laws of Plato as its point of view. It pushed the theory of Ideas aside ARISTOTLE 227 to make way for the number theory. Thus Speusippus on his side ascribed to numbers a reality that is supersensible and separated from the objects of sense, — the same which Plato had given to the Ideas. Similarly Philip of Opus in the Epinomis declared that the highest knowledge upon which the state in the Laws must be built is mathemat ics and astronomy. For these sciences teach men eternal proportions, according to which God has ordered the world and by which he is leading it to a true piety. Besides this mathematical theology Speusippus, accommodating himself to the spirit of his school, recognized to a greater degree than Plato the worth of empirical science. He dilated upon an alaQnat^ iiriarvgoviKg, which participates in con ceptual truth.1 But he had no explanatory theory of this, rather only a collection of facts arranged logically as he pre sented them in his compendium (ogoia ovopara) which was manifestly intended for the use of the school. Xenocrates divided philosophy into dialectics, ethics and physics as a basis for instruction.2 He held firmly to the theory of Ideas, but recognized that mathematical determinations had, in contrast to the sense world, an independent reality similar to that of the Ideas. He distinguished, accordingly, three 3 realms of that which can be known: the supersensible, the mathematically determined forms of the world-all, and the sense objects. To these objects there corresponds, first, the iirio-T-gpn, including dialectics and pure mathematics; secondly, the 86%a, which as an astronomical theory is given both an empirical and a mathematical basis ; thirdly, the aiad-go-ix, which is not false, but exposed to all sorts of delusions. The Platonists seem to have thought that the chief task of their metaphysics was the teleological construction of a graded series of mediatory principles between the i Sext. Emp., VII. 145. 2 Ibid., 16. s Ibid., 147. 228 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY supersensible and the sensible. In the solution of this task, however, two opposing tendencies made themselves felt, which are connected with the names of Speusippus and Xenocrates. If the former abandoned the theory of Ideas, it was essentially because he could regard the Per fect and the Good,1 not as the atria of the more Imper fect, the Sensible, but rather as its highest teleological result. He therefore postulated numbers as the dp^g, and unity and plurality as their elements and next in order geometrical magnitudes and stereometrical forms, to whose fourfold number he added the Pythagorean ether.2 Be sides this, he found the principle of motion in the world- soul (vow), which he seems to have identified with the central fire of the Pythagoreans. The goal of motion is the Good, which as the most perfect belongs at the end. Xenocrates contrasted with this evolution theory the theory of emanation, in that he derived numbers and Ideas from unity and indeterminate duality (dopco-ros Sua'?). Numbers are to him identical with the Ideas, according to the schema of Plato's dypairra Soygara. He also further defined the soul as self-moving number.3 Thus there is a descent from the unity of the Good down to the Sensi ble ; and between the world-soul and corporeal things exists a completely graduated kingdom of good and bad daemons. In this very contrast Plato's pupils showed that they were engaged upon the unsolved problems of Plato's later metaphysics, in that they desired to develop further his teaching on its religions side. The opposition between atria and awairiov, between Idea and space, between the perfect and the imperfect, grew entirely to4 a religious antithesis of the Good and the Bad. They — especially Xenocrates — surrendered the monistic motive 1 Arist., Met., XL 7, 1072 b, 31. 2 See § 24. 3 Plato, Pmcr. nn.. I. 5 (1012); see Arist., Anal, past., ID. 91 a, 38. 4 See R. Heinze, Xenocr., p. 15 f. ARISTOTLE 229 in the teaching of their master to fantastic speculations which turned particularly upon the cause of evil1 in the world. More interesting than the fantastic Pj'thagorizing by the leaders of the school is, on the other hand, the high development of mathematics which arose in the Pythagorean-Platonic circles at this time, even to the solving of the more difficult problems. There was the diorism of Neocleides, the theory of the propor tion in Archytas and Eudoxus, the golden section, the spiral line, the doubling of the cube by the application of parabolas and hyperbolas (see Cantor, Gesch. der Math., I. 202 f.). Then there was the astronomy taught by Hicetas, Ecphantus, and Heracleides, concerned with the stationariness of the fixed heaven of stars and the turning of the axis of the earth. Herakleides thought of Mercury and Venus as satellites of the sun. Sec Ideler, Abhandl. cl Ber'l. Akacl. d. Wiss., 1828 and 1830. On the other hand, however, there is the fact that those men, who were only indirectly related to the school, developed the relationship of certain motives of Platonism with other teachings. Thus Heracleides still held to the Platonic construction of the ele ments when he advocated the synthesis that Ecphantes sought between Atomism and Pythagoreanism (§ 25). Eudoxus like wise conceived the ISeai entirely in the sense of the homoiomerii of Anaxagoras.2With such a mathematical corruption of the theory of Ideas there was conjoined the lapse into popular moraliz ing on the part of the older Academicians. Only in some measure, however, did the energy of their religious spirit compensate for this deterioration. As concerns morals, the school can hardly be made answerable for the hedo nism of Eudoxus,3 especially since Heracleides appears4 tr have openly antagonized it. The theory of goods, however, found in the Philebus 5 was cultivated much more in an ac commodative sense : for Speusippus sought happiness in the 1 See Arist., especially Mel., XIII. 4, 1091 b, 22. 2 Ibid., I. 9, 991 a, 16, with the commentary of Alexander Aphr. (Schol. in Arist, 572 b, 15). 3 Arist. Eth. Nic, I. 12, 1101 b, 27. 4 Athen., XTI. 512 a. 5 Compare above, § 36. 230 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY perfect development of natural gifts ; 1 Xenocrates, though recognizing fully the value of virtue, nevertheless recog nized external goods as also necessary to the attainment of the highest good. He set for the majority of mankind2 the practical cppovnais in place of the eiricrngpn which falls to the lot of the few, and finally, in opposition to the Stoics, described 3 virtue, health, pleasure, and wealth as the various goods, evaluating them in that order. It is especially noteworthy that according to all that we know the social ethical character and the political tendency of the Platonic morals were not further fostered among his pupils. Rather in the Academy the quest after correct rules of living for the individual came more and more into the foreground. Nature philosophy still engaged the at tention of theorists, as can be seen in Grantor's commen tary to the Timceus. Ethical researches, however, took on the individualistic aspect of the period. Polemo taught that virtue, which is the essential condition of happiness, completely gives satisfactory happiness (abrdpK-g irpbs evSaipoviav) only in connection with the goods of the body and life. Virtue cannot be practised in scientific research, but in action.4 Scarcely a step was necessary from such views to those of the Stoa. 89. Beneath these different efforts of the Older Academy would obviously lie a fundamental tendency to adjust Plato's idealism to the practical interests of Greek society and of the empirical sciences. But dependence upon Pythagorean- ism on the one hand and on the other a general lack of philosophical originality always stunted all these under takings. In the mean time the problem was solved by him who had brought with him into the Platonic theory i Clemens, Strom., IT. 21 (500). Compare concerning Polemo, Cicero, Acad., II. 42, 131. 2 Clemens, Strom., II. 5 (141). 3 Sext. Emp. Ado. math., XL 51 f. 4 Diog. Laert., IV. 18. ARISTOTLE 231 an inborn predilection for medicine and the science of nature. This perfecter of Greek philosophy was Aristotle (384-322). Fr. Biese, Die Philos. des Aristoteles (2 vols., Berlin, 1835- 42) ; A. Rosmini-Serbati, Aristote esposto ed, esamiuato (Torino, 1858) ; G. H. Lewes, Aristotle, A Chapter from the History of the Science (Lond. 1864; German, Leipzig, 1865) ; G. Grot'e, Aristotle (incomplete, but published by Bain and Robertson, 2 vols., London, 1872) ; E. Wallace, Outlines of the Philosophy of Aristotle (Oxford, 1883). The home of Aristotle was Stagira,1 a city in the neighborhood of Athos, on that Thracian peninsula which had been colonized 2 chiefly from Chalcis. He came from an old family of physicians. His father, Nicomachus, was body-physician and a close personal friend of the king, Amyntas, of Macedon. Detailed reports about the youth and education of the philosopher arc wanting. His edu cation was in the charge of his guardian, Proxenus of Atarneus, after the death of both his parents. He was only eighteen years old when he entered the Academy in 367, and his connection with it was uninterrupted until Plato's death, so far as we know. He won a prominent place in it very quickly, grew early from the position of a pupil to that of a teacher in the band, was the champion literary spirit of the school through his brilliant writings which at once made him famous, and in public lectures concerning the art of speaking, antagonized Isocrates, to whose anti-scientific rhetoric the Platonic school had never been reconciled.3 Concerning the life of Aristotle, see J. C. Buhle, Vita Arist. per annos digesta, in the Bipontine edition of the works, I. 80 f. ; i Also Stageiros. 2 Aristotle disposed in his will (Diog. Laert., V. 14) of a piece of prop erty in Chalcis, which he perhaps inherited from his mother, Pha?stias. 3 In spite of the advances Plato showed to him in the Phcedrus as always preferable to Lysias. 232 HISTORY OE ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY A. Statu, Aristotelia, Part I., on the life of Aristotle (Halle, 1830). Of the ancient biographies of the philosopher, the more valuable, those of the older Peripatetics, are lost, and only a few of the later remain. It is uncertain whether Aristotle grew up in Stagira or in Pella, the residence of the Macedonian kings. It is as little determinable when his father died, and where he himself lived under the tutelage of Proxenus, — in Stagira or Atarneus.1 We are also entirely restricted to the following suppositions as to his educational training : it is scarcely to be doubted that, according to the family tradition, as the son of the Macedonian court physician, he was destined by his family for medicine and received a training for it ; in the intimate relationship existing between scientific medicine, in which Hippocrates was the leading spirit, and the Democritan studies of nature, it may be supposed that these were the first elements in the early educa tion of our philosopher. At any rate, he grew up in this atmos phere of the science of medicine in northern Greece, and he owed to it his respect for the results of experience, his keen perception of fact, and his carefulness as to details in investi gation, which contrast him with the Attic philosophers. On the other hand, it must be said that one must not magnify too much the reach of knowledge that his seventeen years in the Academy brought to him. ft was certainly later that Aristotle got his immense scientific erudition, — in part, to be sure, during his attachment to the Academy, but chiefly during his stay in Atarneus, Mitylene, and Stagira before he began to teach. It is possible that Aristotle remained true to this scientific incli nation while he was in the Academy, and that he was in part re sponsible for gradually causing more attention to be paid to those matters (§ 37). At first, however, the spirit of the Platonic school must have turned him in other directions, and what wc know of his activity in the twenty j-ears of his study, of the form anrl contents of his writings of that time, the rhetorical lectures, etc. , do not allow us to suppose that such inclinations predominated in him. The malicious school gossip which was circulated in later time about the relations between Aristotle and his great teacher should be passed over with a deserved silence. See particulars in Zeller, III3. 8 f. If one holds himself to that wdiich is safely testified to, especiall}' in the writings of Aristotle, one finds a simple human relationship. The pupil looked upon his teacher 1 The laler references to Atarneus can be explained by the fact that Hermeias was for a long time an auditor of Plato. ARISTOTLE 233 with great reverence.1 But the more mature he became, the more independently did he pass judgment upon Plato's philo sophical positions. He recognized with accurate glance their es sential defects, and he did not conceal his doubts, if his aged master directed his theory upon unfortunate lines. Never theless he remained a member of the fraternity with his own independent circle of activity, and he separated from the school only at the moment when after his master's death perversity was exalted to principle in the choice of an insignificant head of the school. Nothing makes against the conclusion that in these difficult relations Aristotle avoided both extremes, with that worthy tact that always characterized his actions. See below concerning the writings of this period. That his relation to Isocrates was somewhat strained, we see on the one hand from Cicero's reports (De orat., III. 35, 141 ; Orat., 19, 62; compare Quint., III. 114), and on the other from the shameful pamphlet which a pupil of the orator published against the philosopher. Aristotle showed here also his noble self- control, when he later in the Rhetoric did not hesitate to give examples from Isocrates. After Plato's death Aristotle in company with Xenoc rates betook himself to Hermeias, the ruler of Atarneus and Assus, and a true friend to Aristotle. Aristotle married his relative, Pythias, later after the tyrant had met an un happy end, the victim of Persian treachery. Previously he seems to have migrated for a time to Mytilene, and perhaps also for a short time to Athens.2 In 343 he obeyed the summons of Philip of Macedon to undertake the education of the then thirteen-year-old Alexander. Although we are entirely without information concerning what kind of education this was, yet the entire later life of Alexander bore the best witness of its effect. Also later the philosopher remained in the best of relations with his great pupil, although the treatment of the nephew of Aristotle, Callisthenes, by the king may have brought a temporary estrangement. 1 Compare the simple beautiful verses of Aristotle from the elegy to Eudemus: Olympiad, in Gorg., 166. 2 See Th. Bergk, Rhein. Mus., XXXVIT. 359 f. 234 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY The regular instruction of the young prince ceased, at all events, when he was entrusted by his father, after 340, with administrative and military duties. The relation of the philosopher was therefore more independent of the Macedonian court, and the next years he was engaged for the most part in scientific work in his native city, in inti mate companionship with his somewhat younger friend, Theophrastus, who became a real support to him in the following time. For when Alexander entered upon his campaign in Asia and Aristotle saw himself entirely free of immediate further obligation to him, he went with his friend to Athens and founded his own school there. This school, in the universality of its scientific interest, in the orderliness of its methods of study, and in its systematic arrangements for joint inquiry, very soon rose above the Academy, and became the pattern of all the later societies of scholars of antiquity. Its place was the Lyceum, a gymnasium consecrated to the Lycian Apollo, from whose shady walks -1 the school got the name of Peripatetic. Twelve years (335-323) Aristotle administered this school in ceaseless activity. When, however, after the death of Alexander, the Athenians began to rise up against the Macedonian rule in Greece, the position of the philoso pher became dangerous, standing as he did in such close connections with the royal house. He betook himself to Chalcis, and in the following year a disease of the stomach cut short his active and honorable career. Concerning Hermeias2 of Atarneus, see A. Bockh, Kleine Schrift, VI. 185 ff. ; P. C. Engelbrecht, Ueber die Beziehungeu zu Alexander (Eisleben, 1845) ; Rob. Geier (Halle, 1848 and 1856) ; M. Carriere ( Westermann, Monatsh., 1865). Aristotle owed to 1 Probably from the custom of lecturing part of the time ambulando. See Zeller, III3. 29 f. 2 In memory of this friend, Aristotle dedicated his hymn upon virtue: Diog. Laert., V. 7, ARISTOTLE 235 his relations with different courts and to his own easy circum stances the abundance of the scientific expedients which among other things made his extensive collections possible. The reports of the ancients concerning the greatness of the sums placed at his disposal are obviously somewhat overestimated. One cannot doubt, on the whole, from his court relationships, the support which he found for his work. Concerning the relations of the philosopher and his great pupil, gossip has circulated widely, just because there has been wanting any trustworthy information about it. If the friend ship in later years was actually somewhat cooler (as Plutarch also reports, Alexander, 8), yet it was entire foolishness and slan der on the part of later opponents to charge Aristotle with a share in the supposed poisoning of the king (see Zeller, HI3. 36 f.). The favorable relations of the philosopher to the Macedonian court were most clearly confirmed by the events after the death of the king. Doubtful as the single statements here again may be, it is certain that the philosopher left his circle of activity at Athens in order to avoid a political clanger. How great it had become can no longer be determined ; for the reports concern ing the charges of impiety,1 concerning his defence and the' excuse for his escape in the expression that he wished to spare the Athenians a second crime against philosoplry, — all this smacks, especially in its details,2 strongly of an attempt to make Aristotle's end as nearly as possible like that of Socrates. To every depreciation that the character of Aristotle has suffered, his system of science stands as the best contradic tion. It is a creation of such magnificent proportions and of such construction that it can have been only the work of a life filled with the pure love of truth, and even then it is almost beyond our comprehension. For the Aristotelian philosophy includes the entire range of knowledge of that time in such a way that it comprehends all the lines of ear lier development at the same time that it considerably elab orates the most of these lines. It turns upon all territories an equal interest and an equal intellectual appreciation. i See E. Heitz in O. Miiller, Lit. Gesch., IP. 253 f. 2 Compare E. Zeller in Hermes, 1876 ; H. Usener, Die Organisation der wissenschaftlichen Arbeit bei den Allen: Preuss. Jahrb., LIII. If. (1884). 236 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY Aristotle met the demands of the history of science more completely than Plato. Even in his Ethics the purely theo retic and not the practical interest is fundamental. He is the scientific spirit Kar e^o-xfv. In him the process of the in dependence of the spirit of learning completes itself. He is, in the wonderful many-sidedness of his activity, the em bodiment of Greek science, and he has for that reason remained "the philosopher" for two thousand years. Furthermore he became " the philosopher," not as an isolated thinker, but as the head of his school. The most striking char acteristic of his intellectual personality is the administrative ability with which he divided his material, separated and formu lated his problems, ordered and co-ordinated the entire scientific work. This methodizing of scientific activity is his greatest performance. To this end the beginnings already made in the earlier schools, especially in that of Democritus, might well have heen of service. But the universal sketch of a system'of science in the exact statement of methods such as Aristotle gave, first brings these earlier attempts to their complete fruition. His conduct of the Lyceum can be looked upon not only as a care fully arranged and methodically progressive instruction, but also, above all, it must especially be viewed as an impulsion to inde pendent scientific research and organized work.1 The great number of facts and their orderly arrangement are only to be explained through the combined efforts of many forces guided and schooled bj' a common principle. All this appeared and was developed in the Aristotelian writings. The activity of the school, which is itself a work of the master, forms an in tegral constituent of his great life-work and his works. The collections of writings transmitted under the name of Aristotle do not give even an approximately complete picture of the immense literary activity of the man. They apparently include, however, with relatively few exceptions, just that part of his work upon which his philosophical significance rests, viz., his scientific writings. 1 Compare E. Zeller in Hermes, 1876; H. LTsener, Die Organisation der U'issenschaftlichen Arbeit bei den Allen: Preuss. Jahrb., LIII. If. (1884). ARISTOTLE 237 The preserved remainder of the Aristotelian writings forms still a stately pile, even after the genuine have been separated from the doubtful and spurious. But in extent it is manifestly only a smaller part of that which came forth from the literary workshop of the philosopher. From the two lists of his writings that antiquity has preserved (published in the Berlin edition, V. 1463 f.) the one of Diogenes Laertius (V. 22 f.), which was changed by the anonymous Megarian, probably by Hesychius, is supposably based upon a report of the Peripatetic Hermippus (about 200 b. c), concerning the Aristotelian collection in the Alexandrian library. The other list originated with the Peripa tetic, Ptolemaaus, in the second century a. d., and was preserved partly by Arabic writers (Zeller, III3. 54). The traditional collection appears essentially to have come from the published Aristotelian writings, which somewhere in the middle of the first century b. c. were prepared by Andro- nicus of Rhodes with the co-operation of the grammarian Tyrannion. In modern time it was printed first in a Latin translation in 1489, together with the commentaries of Averroes, and in a Greek translation in Venice in 1495 ff. Of tHelater editions ma}' be mentioned the Bipontine, by Biehle (5 vols., incomplete, Biponti et Argentorati, 1791 f.) ; that of the Berlin Academy (text recension by Imm. Becker, annotations by Brandis, fragments by V. Rose, index by Bonitz 5 vols., Berlin, 1831-70); the Didot edition by Dubner, Biissemaker, and Heitz (5 vols., Paris, 1848-74) ; stereotype edition of Tauchnitz (Leipzig, 1843). Concerning a special edition of' his single works, see Ueberweg, I7. 186 f. German translations are in different collections, particularly in J. v. Kirchmann's Philos. Bibliothek. These preserved writings offer problems for solution which differ from those in the Platonic writings, but are no less diffi cult. Indeed, there is but little agreement among the authori ties as to the questions involved. The discussion has been only a little concerned with the chronolog}' of single works ; it has had more concern with the very doubtful genuineness of many of them ; it has found its greatest concern with the liter ary character, the origin and purpose of the single writings and of the collection. J. G. Biihle, De librarian Aristotelis distributione in exoteri- cos et acroamaticos (Bipontine ed., I. 105 f.) ; Titze, De Arist. operurn serie et distinctione (Leipzig, 1826) ; Ch. Brandis (Rhein. Mus., 1827) ; A. Stahr, Aristotelia, Part II., Die Schicksale der Arist. Schriften (Leipzig, 1832); L. Spengel, Abhandl. der bair, Akad. der Wiss., 1837 f. ; V. Rose, De Arist. 238 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY librorum online et auctoritate (Berlin, 1854) ; H. Bonitz, Arist. Studien (Vienna, 1862 f.) ; Jac. Bernays, Die Diuloge des Arist. (Berlin, 1S63) ; E. Heitz, Die verlorenen Schriften des Arist. (Leipzig, 1865j ; the same in O. Milller's Litteratur Geschich., IP. 256 f. ; F. Vahlen, Arist. Aufsdtze (Vienna, 1870 f.); R. Shute (Oxford, It" The writings x of Aristotle are divided with reference to their literary character into three classes : — (1) The Works published by Aristotle himself, and in tended for a wider circle of readers. Of these no single work is complete, and only frag ments are extant. They originated in the main during Aristotle's attendance at the Academy, and showed strongly the influence, even in their titles, of the Platonic philosophy. They were, on the whole, dialogues, and if they did not also possess the artistic fancy with which Plato managed this form, they are striking, nevertheless, in their fresh in tuitions, happy inventions, florid diction, as well as in the richness of their thought. These eKoeSopevoi Xoyoi were counted by Aristotle, in his occa sional mention of them in his didactic writings, as belonging to the general class of i^corepiKol Xoyoi. By this class he seems to have understood the more popular treatment of scientific questions in antithesis to the methodical and scholastic cultiva tion of science. The latter, which centres in the lectures of the head of the school, appeared later as the acroamatic writings. The opposition of the exoteric and the acroamatic teaching does not, then, necessarily signif}- in itself a difference in content of doctrine, but only a difference in form of presentation. There is no word about a secret teaching. It may, however, be ac cepted as true that the exoteric writings originated when he was in the Academy, and the acroamatic, when he was an indepen dent teacher ; and from this fact even essential differences are easily explained. See Zeller, III3. 112 f . ; II. Diels, Sitzungsber. der Bed. Akacl., 1883 ; H. Susemihl, Jahrbuchf. Philol., 1884. Aristotle owed his literary fame in antiquity to his published 1 Excepting the personal writings like the verses, the testament (Dioo\ Laert., V 13 f.), and the letters, of which scarcely anything genuine is - preserved. ARISTOTLE 239 writings, and certainly in all justice if we may judge from the few preserved specimens.1 For if, on account of the "golden flow" of his words, he is classed with Democritus and Plato as a model,2 nevertheless this praise cannot be applied to the writ ings that have been preserved. The " golden flow " is so seldom in these writings that it is more supposable that they are ex cerpts from his dialogues that were made either by Aristotle himself or by some of his pupils.8 The composition of the Aristotelian dialogues is said to have been distinguished from the Platonic by a less vivid treatment of the dramatic setting, and also by the circumstance that the Stagirite himself gave the leading word. In content they were affiliated in part closely to the Platonic dialogues. Thus, the Eudemus especially appears to have been a detailed copy of the Phcedo. Other titles like irepl oiKawo-vv-ns, PpvAAos •>) irepl p^Topi/oJs, aoiA.oo-o<£ias. (See By water, in Jour, of Philol., 1877, 64 f.) (2) The Compilations ; partly critical excerpts from scientific works (virogvggara), partly collections of zoologi cal, literary-historical, and antiquarian data which Aristotle, probably with the help of his pupils, used as material for scientific research and theory. These also have unfortunately been lost except a very few fragments, although it appears that at least a portion of them had been published either by Aristotle himself or by his pupils. 1 See Cicero, De nat. dear., II. 37, 95. 2 See place in Zeller, III3. Ill, 1. 3 See Fr. Blass, Alt. Beredtsamkeit, 427 note; also Rhein. Mus. 1875. 4 Dedicated to Alexander, as also irepl diroiKiav. 240 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY To these last belong the notes of the philosopher concerning the later lectures of Plato : irepl rdyadov and irepl row eiSoV. Com pare Ch. Brandis, De perditis Aristotelis de bono et ideis libris (Bonn, 1823). There are also reports of some extracts from the Laws, the Republic, and the Timceus, the critical notes about Alcmaeon, the Pythagoreans, — especially about Archytas, — Speusippus, and Xenocrates. Also the writings De Melisso Xenopihone Gorgia arose from a like need in the Peripatetic school. The fruits of this comprehensive study of the history of philosophy appear in the numerous historical relations which the Aristotelian didactic writings generally set up in entering upon the treatment of problems. The irpofiXrjpaTa serve similar purposes of instruction and of research, although their present form is a later conception of the school. Compare C. Prantl, Abhand. der Miinchn. Akacl., VI. 341 f. The same holds good for all the definitions and diaereses which antiquity then possessed. In the magnificent collections which Aristotle planned i the Lyceum must first be mentioned the dvaropal, the descrip tive basis for zoology, furnished, it seems, with illustrations. Then there is the collection of the rhetorical theories under the title tc^vojv o-vvayuiy-q. and of the rhetorical models evOvpipara p-nropiKa ; besides the collection relating to the history of trage dies and comedies, and the questions raised about the different poets, Homer, Hesiod, Archilochus, Euripides, and others ; fi nally, the historical miscellanies: the iroXneiai, reports concerning one hundred fifty-eight Greek state constitutions, vopipa plapfia- piKa, SiKaiw/xara Tail' iroXewv, and besides ' OXvpirioviKai, 'irvdioviKal, irepl evpnpdruiv, irepl Oavpacritav aKovo~p.6.Tu}v, irapoipiai, etc. Concerning the character of these scientific materials, which until the present time were apparently entirety lost, some j-ears ago a very surprising disclosure was made, partly by the fortunate discovery of a most important piece, the TJoXireia rCov kOyvaiwv (published by G. Kaibel and U. v. Wilamowitz-Mollcndorf, Berlin, 1892 ; translated into German by G. Kaibel and A. Kiessling, Strassburg, 1891); the literature on it, especially on its genuineness, has, as may be expected, quickly appeared ; a complete review can be found in the English edition of J. E. Sandys (Lond., 1893, p. lxvii). To be sure, the beginning and end are wanting, but by far the greatest part is preserved in nearly a complete continuity. It appears not as a dry collection of facts, but as a ripe historical work clearly and perfectly devel oped. The greatness of conception, the practical simplicity of representation, the accuracy of judgment make it appear a worthy writing of the master in whoso last years its eomposi- ARISTOTLE 241 tion must have occurred. Should this history of the Athenian constitution be the work of 'one of his pupils, then would it indeed be a new honor for the Lyceum. Although many of those collections that are attributed to Aristotle may have come from his pupils, or perhaps even later, and although b}- no means can all those titles refer to writings of the philosopher himself, the}' nevertheless give proof of the versatility and cyclopedic character of the scientific work of the school. Upon all territories, both historical and scien tific, he gave the fruitful impulse to seek out the entire existing material and to place it in order, and thus to make it available for scientific treatment. The Lyceum, in its storing of the treasures of erudition, was, to a higher degree than the Academy, the centre of culture of Greece. (3) The Didactic Writings originating in the school and intended for its use. It is these only that have been pre served, and they together make what is known as the col lection of Aristotle's works. They are not complete, how ever, and in many cases probably not in the original form. They nevertheless exhibit in the highest degree some peculiar characteristics. A sharply impressed, delicately worked out, and consistently developed terminology is com mon to them. On the other hand, complete absence of grace and of aesthetic motive of presentation is to be noted. The scheme of investigation is, on the whole, the same: the precise formulation of the problem, the criticism of opinions which are submitted concerning the problem, the careful discussion of the single points of view as they appear, the comprehensive marshalling of the facts, and the striving for a clear and conclusive result. In all these respects the Aristotelian writings make a complete antithe sis to the Platonic ; the difference being that between sci ence and aesthetics. The Aristotelian writings afford different and therefore less attractive enjoyment. It must not be forgotten that the excellences of the Aristotelian works are qualified in many striking ways. The unequal development, wherein many parts give the impression of 16 242 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY being masterly and final and others of being hasty and sketchy ; the disorder which predominates in the principal writings of the transmitted series of books ; the — in part verbal — repetitions of even lengthy sections ; the unful filled promises, — all these facts forbid the belief that the writings in their present form were intended by Aristotle for publication ; while, on the other hand, in point of form and content the interconnection of the works is evident, and is emphasized by numerous cross references that are often reciprocal. All these characteristics are only explicable and are also fully conceivable upon the hypothesis that Aristotle entertained the purpose of developing into text-books the written notes that he had made the basis of his lectures. These text-books would have been manuals of instruction for the Lyceum, and would have been given into the hands of his pupils. In addition it is supposable that Aristotle undertook this work in direct connection with his lectures, and about the same time with reference to the sciences treated by him. He probably pursued this work during the twelve years of his leadership. Before, however, this giant work came to an end, death had seized him. Except ing the smaller works, which perhaps were waiting to be included in his larger works, only parts of the Logic — the Topics in particular — appear to have been completed. It may also be accepted that the gaps which thus remained were filled in part by the most intimate pupils, probably on the basis of their notes of the Aristotelian lectures. These interpolations were made by different pupils differ ently. Thus in the school many redactions of the text books were handed on, and among such redactions many later productions of the school slipped in. This went on until Andronicus of Rhodes published the first edition (60-50 b. c), which lies at the basis of the present documents. ARISTOTLE 243 The close relationship between the preserved writings of Aristotle and his actual teaching is evident, even if we take no account of such direct evidence as his address to his auditors at the conclusion of the Topics. The question is only as to a clearer determination of the relationship, and it would appear as if all the opinions expressed about the relationship may be justi fied to a certain extent. Undoubtedly the notes of the philoso pher form the body of the discourses ; — not only such sketches as he might use for his lectures, but on the other hand also suck as he had made ready for the text-book.1 The latter set forth in a wonderful manner the clearness and ripeness of the Aris totelian spirit. Other facts, especialty the different redactions of the same book, hardly allow another interpretation than that of Scaliger, that interpolations from the writings of the auditors have taken place. In accordance with this theory the presence of such parts or of entire writings which cannot in form or con tent be ascribed to Aristotle, is most simply explained. A very venturesome but in itself a not incredible theoiy was spread in antiquity concerning the fate of the Aristotelian manu scripts.2 They were supposed to have fallen with the property of Theophrastus to his pupil, Neleus of Scepsis in Troas, and to have been hidden in a cellar by his descendants out of fear of the mania for collecting of the kings of Pergamus. After wards the}- were found and purchased in a much damaged state by the Peripatetic Apellicon of Teos and removed to Athens. When Sulla conquered that city, the writings fell into his hands and were published at Rome by the grammarian Tyrannion, and finally by Andronicus of Rhodes. This story does not explain, of course, the remarkable condition of the transmitted documents. It is indubitabty proved in the case of single writ ings — as is obvious — that the Peripatetic school possessed the scientifically most important writings of its founder from the beginning. On the other hand, it is nevertheless not improb able that the rediscover}' of the original manuscripts afforded 1 In this fact and in the smaller importance of the copies by his auditors consists the chief difference between the character of the corpus Aristolelicum and the somewhat analogous form in which a series oi Hegel's lectures is presented to us. Hegel had not begun a remodelling of his Hefle for text-books, while, on the other hand, we owe the most valuable of the preserved works of Aristotle to the fact that he had begun such a remodelling. 2 Plutarch, Sulla, 26 ; Strab., XIII. 1, 54 ; compare E. Essen, Del Keller zu Skepsis (Stargard, 1886). 244 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY Andronicus not only the occasion but also, as far as the manu scripts reached, the distinct ground for his standard edition in contrast to the school tradition. Since the didactic writings form internally a perfectly con sistent whole, the question about the order of their origination is comparatively unimportant. The question is, moreover, en tirely purposeless, since it may be accepted that work upon the writings was continuously and simultaneously carried on in con nection with the lectures repeatedly given during the twelve years of his activity as a teacher. It nevertheless appears that the Logic was the first to be conceived, and relatively to the others was brought more nearly to completion. Compare with the following Zeller, III3. 67-109. The preserved didactic writings are most simply ar ranged in the following groups : — (a) The Treatises on Logic and Rhetoric — the Cate gories, the very doubtful treatise On the Proposition, the Analytics, and the Topics, including the last and compara tively independent book Concerning the Fallacies; and the Rhetoric. The grouping of the logical works, in the customary series, under tl e name op-ya.i'oy, occurred first in the Byzantine period. A special edition is published by Th. Waitz (2 vols., Leip., 1844-46). The genuineness of the Karayoplai is doubted, espe cially by Prantl (Gesch. d. Log., I. 207 f.). The conclusion of these writings, i. e., concerning post-predicaments, can at all events not be ascribed to Aristotle, and the remainder of the book appears to be based upon his sketch only in essentials. Hepl epp-nveias is subject to stronger suspicions to which even as early a writer as Andronicus gave expression. The Analytics is a masterly logical groundwork, which develops the theory of the conclusion and of proof in two parts (IvaXvTiKd irpdrepa and varepa), each consisting of two books, — the second part being not so completely rounded out as the first. Joined to it, as the most complete of all the works, is the Topics, which treats of the method of probability. In connection with it, as its ninth book (Waitz), there is irepl aodno-nKwv eXeyxwv. There are pre served besides a great number of titles of logical-epistemological theoretical discussions, of which the Aristotelian authorship is more or less doubtful : irepl ei&u>v Kal yevuv, irepl toiv dvriKeipevoiv, wept KaTapdtreu><;, irvXXoyiapoi, 6pio~TiKa, irepl tov irpos ri, irepl Sdfns, irepl eiricrTripnvo-iKa). From the fourteen preserved books the second (a eXarrov) is certainly to be set apart as a school compilation of many parts welded together. Among the other thirteen books the first, second, third, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth books (numbered according to the Berlin edition) form a connected but not a com pleted, and also not a finally edited investigation, to which after a break the ninth book also belongs. The fourth book, which was cited by Aristotle himself, under the title 7repi tov iroo-axZs, is a school manual containing a discussion of terminology. The first eight chapters of the tenth and the first half of the eleventh book are either an Aristotelian sketch or a school- extract from the chief investigation. The second half of the eleventh book is an outline of the teaching of the Godhead. The conclusion of the tenth book is a compilation from the Physics, obviously not by Aristotle. Books twelve and thirteen appear to be an older form of the criticism of the Platonic Ideas. The preserved collection is so much the more unique, since it is the more probable that it was taken in hand soon after the death of Aristotle, perhaps by Eudemus. From the series of mathematical writings only the discussion 246 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY irepl aToy.wv ypappwv is extant, and its transmitted form is probably spurious. Of the eight books of lectures on the science of nature, epvo-iK-r) dKpo'oo-t5, — the modern name would be " philosophy of nature," — books five, six, and eight treat irepl Kivyaew;. The earlier books are concerned with universal principles in the explanation of nature (irepl dpxfov) ; the seventh book gives one the impres sion of being a preliminary sketch. Astronomy and physics proper are included as developments : irepl ovpavov, irepl yevecreiws koi ej>6opds pereuipoXoyiKd. A number of separate treatises are lost, the pr]xaviKa is spurious, and also the irepl Koo-p.iv. See below, § 49. The parallel work to the 7repi to 'Cwa laopia, of which book ten is presumably not genuine, is the irepl a^vrfuv, which is lost. On the other hand, some restorations of the former are preserved : 7repi £<wi' tropeia oVfreXos. But the threeilast are together always contrasted wdth the first. If the threjaare sometimes separated in the realm of particular processes, they form nevertheless more frequently only one principle (especially in the organic development of the individual) in that the essence of the fact (eTSos), as the thing to be realized (reXos), is the mov ing force (kivovv.). In this sense as teleological cause the substance or essence is entelechy. The expressions evepyeia and evreXexeia are gener ally indifferently used in Aristotle, and an exact difference is hardly attempted, certainly not developed, between the two words. See Zeller, III3. 350 f. The etymology of the word reXos is obscure : see R. Hirzel, evreXexeia unci evreXexeia (Rhein. Museum, 1884). The reality, which Aristotle ascribed to matter, appears most significantly in the reciprocal actions that he gave to it in its relation to final cause. It is due to the indeterminateness of i!A?7,2 that the Forms are imperfectly realized. In this respect matter is a principle of obstruction. Hence it follows that for Aristotle nature's laws, which originate in the conceptual forms of things, are not without exceptions, but are valid only eirl rb iroXv.3 In this way he explained unusual phenomena, repara, — abortions, monstrosities, and the like. But furthermore the positive character of matter appears in that it leads to acciden tal results 4 in motion on account of its indeterminate possi bilities, and these accidents are not immediately involved in the essence or purpose.5 Aristotle named these avpBeByKora, accidental ; their appearance he called chance, airoparov ; 6 and, within the region of purposed events, tv^.7 Aristotle's con ception of accident, therefore, is entirely teleological. It is also logical so far as the purpose is identical with the concept. See W. Windelband, Die Lehren vom Zufall (Berlin, 1870) p. 58 f., 69 ff. The application of the name dvdyK-n to the efficiency of the stuff makes us at once see Aristotle's intention of recognizing 1 Met., I. 3, 983 a, 26 ; IV. chap. 2 ; Phys., II. 3, 194 b, 23. 2 De gen. an., IV. 10, 778 a, 6. 3 De part, an., III. 2, 663 b, 28 ; De gen. an., IV. 4, 770 b, 9. 4 Phys., II. 4 ff. 6 These happen irapa cpvaw (Phys., II. 6, 197 b, 34), in which vais = oiaia — eiSos- Compare the expression irapaipvds, Eth. Nic, I. 4, 1096 a, 21. 6 Phys., IT. 6, 197 b, 18. 7 Ibid., 5, 196 b, 23. 266 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY the Democritan principle of mechanism, while at the same time the teleological activity of the Form is manifestly only a de velopment of the Platonic concept of the ama. Democritus thought that an event is determined only through what pre ceded it ; Plato thought an event determined by what shall issue from it. Aristotle sought to reconcile this antagonism, and so he attributed to matter one kind of determination and to form the other kind. His teaching is therefore the last word of Greek philosophy on the problem of Becoming (§ 13). But, however much the philosopher takes account of the Democritan motive, yet in this solution the Platonic thought obviously preponderates. For not only the higher actuality belongs to the final cause in contrast to that of the material cause, but also in their operations they are so distinguished that all results of value come from the final cause, while all that is less important comes from the material cause. Matter is the ground of all imperfection, change, and destruction. To its positive capacity for obstruction and deflection Aristotle ascribed, with a far better right, all those consequences with which Plato overloaded the prj ov. This preference of the Stagi rite for his teacher shows itself also in his introduction of mechanical causes under the names avvainov and ov ovk dvev, which are taken from the Phcedo and the Timceus.1 In this way mechanical causes are characterized directly as causes of the second class, or accidental causes. Matter alone could not move, but if it is moved by the Form, it nevertheless is a deter mining factor in the movement. Matter is, then, in every respect a secondary cause. With this active antagonism the Aristotelian teaching mani fests, in spite of its effort at harmony, an expressly dualistic character which ancient thought could not overcome. For the independence of existence and activity, attributed to matter in the explanation of nature, permeates the entire system along with his fundamental monistic principle, that matter and Form are essentially identical, and matter is only a striving toward the realization of Form. All the oppositions meet finally in Aris totle's conception of God. Every motion in the world has a (relative) dp^g, which is the Form that causes it. Since, however, on account of its connection with matter, this Form is also itself moved, the series of causes would have no end 2 unless there i Phys., II. 9, 200 a, 5 ; Met., IV. 5, 10 15 a, 20. 2 Met., XL 6, 1071 b, 6. ARISTOTLE 267 exists, as an absolute dpyf) of all motion, the pure Form, the sharer of no mere possibility and therefore of no motion, — the Godhead. Itself unmoved, it is the cause of all motion, the irpoirov kivovv.1 Eternal even as motion 2 itself, unitary and single even as the band of the entire system 3 of the universe, and unchangeable,4 it calls all the motions of the world forth, but not by its own activity. That would be a motion in which the Godhead, as without matter, cannot share.5 But it calls forth all the motion of the world through the desire of all things for it, and through the endeavor of all things to actualize Kara rb Bvvarov the Form that is eternally realized in the Godhead. As the object of desire, it is the cause of all motion : Kivel o>? ipoogevov.6 The essence of the Godhead is immateriality,7 perfect in- corporeality, pure spirituality, z>ofj?. It is thought, which has no other content than itself (vovaK z/o^'o-eco?),8 and this self-contemplation (Oetopia) is its eternal blessed life.9 God wishes nothing, God does nothing.10 He is absolute self-consciousness. In the conception of the Godhead as the absolute Spirit who, himself unmoved, moves the universe, Aristotle's theory of nature culminated in such a way that he designated his science of principles as a theology. The scientific establishment of monotheism, which, since Xenophanes, formed a leading theme of Greek philosophy, appeared here completed as its ripest fruit. In its form it is like the so-called cosmological proof; in its content, through its concept of the Godhead as a pure spirit, it is far superior to all the earlier attempts. The funda mental principles of Plato are just at this point, however, i Met., III. 8, 1012 b, 31. 2 Phys., VIII. 6, 258 b, 10. 3 Met., XT. 8, 1074 a, 36. 4 dvaXXolasTos and dira&os : Met., XT. 7, 1073 a, 11. 5 Ibid., 1072 b, 7. 6 Ibid., 1072 a, 26. ' Ibid., 1073 a, 4 : Kexpiapevn to>v alaBtjTwv. » Ibid., 1074 b, 34 9 Ibid., 1072 b, 24. i° Eth. Nic, X. 8, 1178 b, 8 ; De cmlo, II. 12, 292 b, 4. 268 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY decisive for Aristotle. For the Aristotelian doctrine centres1 in God all attributes which Plato had ascribed to the Ideas, and the way in which the Stagirite determined the relation of God to the world is only the exact and sharp definition of the teleo logical principle, which Plato had indicated by the ahia. On this account the Aristotelian Godhead shares with the Platonic Idea the characteristic of transcendence. In his theology, Aristotle is the perfecter of Platonic immaterialism. Thought conceived itself and hypostasized its self-consciousness as the essence of the Godhead. The self-sufficiency of the God of Aristotle, to whose absolute perfection there can be no want,2 whose activity, directed upon himself and upon naught else, can be no activity nor creation in our sense of the word, did not satisfy the later religious need. This idea is, however, the true corner-stone of his system, and at the same time eloquent testimony for the theo retic character of the Aristotelian philosophy. Jul. Simon, De deo Aristotelis (Paris, 1839) ; A. L. Kym, Die Gotteslehre des Aristoteles und das Christentum (Zurich, 1862) ; L. F. Goetz, Der aristotelische Gottesbegriff, mit Bezug auf die christliche Gottesidee (Leipzig, 1871). 42. Aristotle looked upon nature as the organic bond of all individuals, which actualize their Form in their motions, and in their totality are determined by pure Form as their highest purpose. There is, therefore, only this one3 world, and this world is permeated4 in its activity with a purpose both in the motions and relationships of the individual things. The actualizing of the purposes of things, however, occurs always through the motion of matter (KivvaK or peraBoXrj). This motion5 is either change of place (Kara rb irov — cpopd), or change of 1 Therefore, in contrast to Speusippus, the Homeric citation is given in the spirit of monism : ovk dyaBbv iroXvKotpavin • eis Kolpavos eoTas. Met., XL 10, 1076 a, 4. 2 He is airapx-ns. Ibid., XIII. 4, 1091 b, 16. 3 De ccelb, I. 8, 276 a, 18 ; Met., XL 8, 1074 a, 31. 4 Phys., II. 2 and 8; De ccelo, I. 4, 271 a, 33 6 Beds Kal % (piais oiSev pdrnv iroiovotv. Polit., I. 8, 1256 b, 20. 6 Phys., V. 2, 225 b, 18; II. 1, 192 b, 14. ARISTOTLE 269 quality (Kara rb iroiov — aXXolcoais), or change in quan tity (Kara ro iroaov — av^yaK Kal cbOlais). Ch. Leveque, La physique d'Aristote et la science contem- ¦poraine (Paris, 1863). p6vnairaktischen Yernunft in der griechischen Philosophie (Jena, 1874). 43. Furthermore, the practical philosophy of Aristotle I was built up on these universal theoretic principles. The I goal of every human action is a Good, to be realized by activity (vpaKrbv dyaObvf Yet this goal is only a means to the highest goal, Happiness, on account of which all else is desired. To perfect evSaigovia belongs also the possession of the goods of the body, of the outer world, and of success ; but since these are only accessories, their lack will only give a certain limitation2 to the amount of happiness. The essentia] condition of happiness, on the contrary, is activ ity, and indeed, the activity peculiar to man ; that is, it is that of reason.3 Now the state (e£t?) 4 which renders possible to man the 1 Eth. Nic, VI. 2, 1139 a, 11, 2 Ibid., VII. 14, 1153b, 17. * Ibid., I. 6, 1097 b, 24, 4 lUd., II. 4, 1106 b, 11. ARISTOTLE 283 perfect use of his peculiar activity is virtue. Virtue has in certain bodily qualities its natural aptitude, out of which it is developed x only by use of the reason. From the exercise of virtue, pleasure 2 follows as a necessary result of perfect activity. The problem of the reason is twofold : first, it is concerned with knowledge ; secondly, with the direction of desire and action through knowledge. In this way, Aristotle distin guished between the dianoetic and ethical virtues.3 The former are higher. They unfold the pure formal activity of the vom, and give the most noble and perfect pleasure. The human being finds in them his possible participation in the divine blessedness. K. L. Miehelet, Die Ethik des Aristoteles (Berlin, 1827) ; G. Hartenstein, Ueber den wissenschaftlichen Wert der aristotelischen Ethik(m Hist. -philos. Abhandl., Leipzig, 1870); R. Eucken, Ueber die Methode und die Grundlagen der aristotelischen Ethik (Frankfort a. M., 1870); P. Paul, An Analysis of Aristotle's Ethics (London, 1874) ; A. Olle-laprune, De Arislotelece ethices fundamento (Paris, 1880). Concerning the Highest Good, G. Teichmiiller, Die Einheit der aristotelischen Euddmonie (in Bulletin de la classe des sciences hist, etc., de I'academie de St. Petersbourg, XVI. 305 ff.). Concerning dianoetic virtues, see C. Prantl (Mtinchen, 1852, Gliickw.-schr. an Thiersch) and A. Kuhn (Berlin, 1860). The sense for what is actual, the thoroughgoing investigation of facts, and the inclination to bring qualitative distinctions to the same touchstone, are shown in the practical philosophy of Aristotle perhaps more than in his theoretical philosophy. The Nicomachasan ethics definitely refused to take its point of de parture from the abstract Idea of the Good, adopting in its stead the Good so far as it is an object of human activity (I. 1, 1094 a, 19). In the determination of the concept of happiness, also, which to him was obviously the highest good, he included the possession of material wealth and good fortune, although always subordinated to the exercise of the reason, if the reason is to reach complete and untrammelled development. Only this potential value justifies the consideration of earthly good in ethics 1 Eth. Nic, VI. 13, 1144 b, 4. 2 Ibid., X. 4, 1174b, 31. 3 Ibid., I. 13, 1103 a, 2. 284 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY The dialectic that had been developed by Socrates upon the question of the relation of pleasure and virtue was completed with exalted simplicity by Aristotle ; for he taught, in antago- / nism to the one-sided doctrines, that pleasure is never the motive, ( but always the result of virtue. Therefore, also, the activity of the reason unfolding itself in virtue is always the measure of the worth of the different pleasures (Eth. Nic, X. 3. ff.). In respect to the psychological characterization of virtue, Aristotle laid weight upon its conception as a continuous con dition and not as a single state. On the other hand, he found a 8iW/us for it in bodily qualities, such as the characteristics of the natural disposition, temperament, inclination, and feelings. These are also in children and animals, but they are not there under the rule of the reason. The dianoetic virtues are related to theoretical as well as to practical insight. 'The latter is either rexvg as the knowledge of the right, requisite for artistic creation, or rguv) whether we wish to act well or ill. The investigation concerning freedom that Aristotle made (Eth. Nic, III. 1-8) directs itself indeed against the Socratic intellectualism, and views the question essentially from 1 See the polemic against the Socratic doctrine, Eth. Nic, VII. 3 ff. 2 Ibid., II. 1, 1103 a, 24. 3 Ibid., 5, 1106 a, 28. 4 See, nevertheless, F. Hacker, Das Einteilungs- und Anordnungs- prinzip der ¦moralischen Tugendreilie in der nikomacliischen Ethik (Berlin, 1863); Th. Ziegler, Gesch. der Ethik, I. 116. 286 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY the point of responsibility.1 The question is, how far a human being can be regarded as the dpxy of his own activity.2 This freedom is annulled through ignorance of the facts and through external force. The irpoalpeais is essential to it, which is the decision through choice between contemplated possibilities. The dogmatic completeness which characterized the Platonic ethics was not reached by Aristotle's system. Aristotle made amends for it by his deep rational insight into the manifold relations of life. The virtues treated by him are : courage (dvSpeia), as the mean between fear and daring ; temperance (acofypoavvy) , between intemperance and insensibleness ; liberal ity (eXevdepioTys), and in larger relationships magnificence (peyaXoirpeireia) , between stinginess and prodigality; high-mind- edness (ueyaXousvxla) , and in affairs of less importance ambi tion, between vaingloriousness and self-abasement; mildness (irpaoTn^) , between irascibility and indifference; friendliness (also called cfriXla) , between obsequiousness and brusqueness ; candor (dXy6eia), between boastfulness and dissembling ; ur banity (eir pair eXeia), between trifling and moroseness ;3 finally, justice (SiKaioavvn) , which consists in recognizing the rights of men neither too much nor too little. The philosopher gives an exhaustive treatment of justice (Eth. Nic, V.), on the one hand because in a certain sense it comprehends 4 in itself all the virtues in respect to our fellows, on the other because it is the foundation of the political life of society. Its fundamental principle is equality,5 — either the proportional equality of merit or the absolute equality of legal rights. Therefore Aristotle distinguished distributive justice (to ev rais Siavofidis or to oiavep.rrriKov DiKaiov), and commutative justice (rb ev roli; avvaXXdy- fiaai or rb SiopowriKov oiKaiov).6 Both investigations led to inter esting details of political economy and political law. 1 With express reference indeed to criminal law, Eth. Nic, III. 1, 1109 b, 34. Metaphysical aporia from freedom of the will are not yet considered in this connection ; and only once in connection with the law of the excluded third term : De interpr., 9, 18 b, 31. 2 Eth. Nic, III. 5, 1112 b, 31 ; 3, 1111 a, 73. 3 Also shame (albas) and sympathy are mentioned by Aristotle in this series, but they indicate excellences of temperament (Eth. Nic, II. 7, 1108 a, 32); in other words, (frvaiKal dperai. 4 Ibid., V. 3, 1129 b, 17. 5 /i(-,/.; 5> 1130 b> 9_ 6 Wherever the latter legally carried out would not satisfy the ethical need, and where the former takes its place, there reigns the virtue of fair-mindedness (rb enieiKes V ARISTOTLE 287 A principle in this series of virtues is to be found only in its content, since the formal mean (pea6r-n<;) is everywhere the same. The principle consists in the gradual advance from the individual relations toward the social relations and among the latter, from the external to the more spiritual relations of life. At the be ginning stands courage, the virtue of self-preservation of the individual ; at the end justice, the ethical basis of the state. Finally, the beautiful representation of friendship, whose ideal the philosopher found in the common striving for the beautiful and good (fyiXia)1 forms a transition to the treatment of social life. He applied this standard to some similar relations of friendship, to conventional and unconventional social relations, raising the latter from their utilitarian origin to means for ethical ennoblement. The same obtains also in regard to the state. See R. Eueken, Aristoteles' Anschauung von Freund- schaft und Lebensgutern (Berlin, 1884) ; also Aristoteles' Urteil iiber die Menschen (Arch. f. Gesch. d. Ph., III. 541 ff.). Man, however, who is designed by nature (tcgov rroXi- riKov) 2 as an essentially social being, can perfect his activity only in communal life. The natural and funda mental form of society is the family (oIkio) ; the most perfect, however, is the state. Since the ethical virtues of man can develop perfectly 3 only in the life of the state, so also, although the state arose 4 out of the needs of utility, the state is essentially and theoretically the actualization of the highest good of the active man (rdvOpcoircvov dyaOov). This idea seemed so important to Aristotle that in the begin ning of his Ethics he designated the whole of practical philos ophy as iroXiriKrjf which is divided into the theory of the con duct of the individual (Ethics) and the theory of the conduct of the whole (Politics). The relationship is not to be so con ceived as if ethics set up an ideal of perfect individuality, and as if politics then showed how this ideal was developed hy society. But as the whole is more valuable and essentially 1 Eth. Nic, VIII. f. 2 Pol, I. 2, 1253 a, 3. 3 In the treatment of friendship. Aristotle used frequently the ex pression avtfjv. See Eth. Nic, IX. 12, 1171 b, 32. 4 See conclusion of Ethics and beginning of Politics. 5 Which he also called philosophical anthropology (i) irepl ra dvBpamva (piXoaoia) in Eth. Nic , X. 10, 1181 b, 15. 288 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY earlier than the parts, so also a man as an active being attains in social life a more perfect actuality than in isolation (Eth. Nic, I. 1, 1094 b, 7). Aristotle agreed with Plato and the author of the dialogue, Politicus, in the ethico-teleological conception of the life of the state. But he was thinking here, as in general, not of the transcendent, but the immanent teleology. His state is no form of government of superhuman beings, but the perfection of the earthly life, the full actualization of the natural dis position of man. On the other hand, Aristotle was far from letting man be swallowed up in the state, as was the case with Plato. The individual's participation in the divine holiness of the dewpia remains his independent enjoyment, even if he must be guided by social education to dianoetic and ethical virtue. While subordinating the citizen to the community, Aristotle nevertheless gave to him in private life J a very much greater circle of independent activity, since he expressly contended against the Platonic conception 2 of a community of wives, children, and property. So his theory of the state held the happy mean between the socialism of Plato and the individual ism of other schools, and it became thereby the ideal expression of Greek life. Aristotle gave the same relative independence also to the family, the natural community, upon which the state is built. The family is the prototype of the political forms in its relation ships of man to wife, parents to children, and to slaves.3 The conception of marriage reached a height in Aristotle which antiquity did not surpass. He saw in it an ethical relation ship between peers in which only from natural disposition the man is the determining, the wife the determined element. Slavery, which he desired to treat in all humaneness, is an in dispensable groundwork for family and political life. He justi fied it — feeling its practical importance for Greece — because only through it the good of leisure (axoXtj) 4 is made possible for the citizen, and this leisure is a condition necessary to the exer cise of virtue. He also was of the opinion that natural dis position has predetermined one man as slave, another as free citizen. See W. Oncken, Die Staatslehre des Aristoteles (Leipzig, 1 He said emphatically that the state consists in individuals that are in some respects like and in others unlike. Politics, IV. 11, 1295 a, 25. 2 Ibid., IT. 2 ff s Eth. Nic, VIII. 12, 1160 b, 22. 4 Concerning the word "leisure," see Tliid., X. 7, 1177b, 4. ARISTOTLE 289 1870) ; C. Bradley, The Politics of Aristotle ; P. Janet, His toire de la science politique (Paris, 1887), I. 165 ff. The living and perfected virtue of all its citizens is the final purpose of the state. For the realization 1 of this purpose we must take the material at hand ; viz., a natural, historical and concrete society in a particular environment. Although it is impossible to fix upon a valid norm for the constitution of all states, nevertheless under all circum stances the actual constitution must be measured by the general purpose of the state, and its worth will be assessed according to its sufficiency (bpOrf) and deficiency (ggaprv- pevy). The political constitution is an arrangement in which the rule is in the hands of a justly ordained power. Therefore the worth of a state depends on the ruling power keeping the purpose of the state (rb koivov avg- cpepov) in view. Since the rule may be in the hands of the one or the few or the many, there are2 six possible forms of political constitutions, — ¦ three good and three that are deficient. The former three are monarchy ( /3a- aiXeia), aristocracy, and " polity " (iroXirela) ; 3 the latter three are despotism (rvpawiv koivoiv, rb irepl Tas dpxas, to SifcafoD (Ibid., IV. 14, 1297 b, 41). 4 Ibid., VII. 14 f. 6 Im_; vm. 2 f. ARISTOTLE 291 the same way the theory of eduction of Aristotle comes to an abrupt end after a sketch of the elementary principles of educa tion, suggesting many valuable points of view. It put forth in a clear way that all sesthetical training is to bring about the ethical and theoretical unfolding of what is essentially human. With Aristotle's practical philosophy is connected the Poetics, the science of the creative activity of man. But in the preserved writings, this science is developed only on the side of beauty in fine art, and particularly in reference to poetry in the Poetics. J. Bernays, Zwei Abhandlungen iiber die aristotelische Theorie des Dramas (Berlin, 1880) ; A. Doring, Die Kunstlehre des Aristoteles (Jena, 1876) ; the details of a rich bibliography are found in Doling, p. 263 ff. ; Ueberweg-Heinze, V . 225. All art is imitation, and the different arts are to be dis tinguished partly by their media, partly by the objects to be imitated.1 The media of poetry are words, rhythm, and har mony.2 The objects of poetry are men and their conduct, good or bad.3 Tragedy, to whose analysis the preserved fragment on poetry is essentially limited, presents directly to the spectator in beautiful language a significant and complete action through its different characters.4 The purpose of art, however, is to arouse the emotions of man in such a way that he may be freed and purified (Ka- Oapaw) from their power — precisely through their arousal and intensification. This is possible only when art presents, not the empirically actual, but that which could be in itself possible, — so presenting it that it raises the object into universality. i Poet., 1 f. 2 Ibid., 7, 1447 a, 22. 3 Ibid., 2 f. 4 The celebrated and much discussed definition of tragedy is (Ibid., 6, 1449 b, 24) : terra) ovv TpayaSia pipnais irpd^eas a-ircvSalas Kal reXelas, peyeBos exovorjs, r)8vopeva> Xdya, x°PLS eKaarov toiv eloav ev rois popiois, bpwvTav df3ov irepaivovaa rnv rat toiovtiov iraBrjpArav KaBapatv. 292 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY The ethical result of tragedy, the purification of the passions, whether the Kadapais is used in religious, medical, or other analogy, goes accordingly hand in hand with its intellectual significance. Art, like philosophy, presents the actual in its ideal purity (Poetics, 9, 1451 b, 5), and is more than the mere facsimile of individual facts, as the laropia presents them. This conception of the universal significance annuls the emotions of fear and sympathy through which tragedy has to operate. The long strife over the meaning of the Aristotelian definition of tragedy has gradually resolved itself into the belief that the healthiness which this KaBapais brings with it rests upon this idealizing of the aesthetic result, — upon an exaltation to immediate knowledge of the universal. Thus Aristotle fulfilled upon this territory, in contrast to the greatest poetic performances of his nation, the task of its pliilosophy, which is no other than the attainment of the self- consciousness of Hellenic culture. HELLENIC-ROMAN PHILOSOPHY 293 B. HELLENIC-ROMAN PHILOSOPHY 44. If in the philosophy of Aristotle the essence of Greek civilization was reduced to conceptual expression, yet it appeared when the sun of Greece was setting. The philos ophy of Aristotle was the legacy of dying Greece to the following generations of man. The spiritual decay of the Grecian civilization at the time of its Enlightenment had advanced in ever-widening circles, and from then on led to its external destruction. Already, since the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, which de stroyed forever the vitality of Athens, the centre of Greek culture, the influence of the Persian power in the politics of Greece had been dominant. Moreover, out of this lamentable situation Greece got freedom only through subjection to the Macedonian kingdom. Likewise in the succeeding time Greece in intermittent and inconse quential movements could only occasionally stagger to an independence amid the vicissitudes of the Hellenic king doms, especially of Macedonia. Finally, however, it entirely lost its political independence by its being incor porated into the Roman Empire, in order to save here and there a wretched respectability. But precisely through its political decadence Greece ful filled in a higher sense the problems of its civilization. The kingly pupil of the ripest Greek philosopher had borne the victorious Greek spirit into the far East with his conquering arms. In the enormous mingling of the peoples, which was begun by his campaign of conquest and furthered by the varying battles of his successors, did Greek culture become the common possession of the ancient world, and finally the commanding spirit of the Roman Empire, and the eternal possession of humanity. After the creative period of Greek philosophy there fol- 294 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY lowed, therefore, centuries of criticism, appropriation, readjustment, and remodelling. This second section of the history of ancient thought is incomparably much poorer in content, although covering a longer period of time. Every conceptual principle for comprehending and judging reality had been presented by Greek science in its youthful in spiration. There only remained for the epigones to sec their way clearly in their variously animated world, to employ the previously discovered points of view in every possible way, to combine the inherited thought, and to make this combination fruitful for the purposes of the. new situations of life. The very little originality which the Hellenic-Roman philoso phy shows in contrast to Greek philosophy is true even of neo- Platonism, its most significant intellectual phenomenon. In all the independence which its religious principle seemed to give to it, neo-Platonism remained inextricably bound to the thought of Plato and Aristotle. From the critical point of view, which is the authority for the divisions of this survey, Hellenic-Roman philosophy appears to be only a gleaning of Greek philosophy. It is only the "after-effects" (Brandis) of Greek philosophy in the Hellenic and Roman realms. Among these after-effects the great systems of Stoicism and Epicureanism are to be reckoned, not only because they took root and blossomed in those times . when the divisions between Greek and barbarian began to break down, but especially also for these two reasons : (1) be cause they, though with great refinement in details, represented in general only a new distortion of the old principles which the original development of Greek thought, until Aristotle, had gained ; (2) because they made this distortion in a typical manner from the new points of view of individual practical wisdom. On the whole, the second section of this history is less im portant to philosophy than to the history of civilization and literature. This is a natural result of the fact that in this period the literary sources, although very far from pure, are nevertheless very much richer. Therefore on this account this period is extraordinarily rich in interesting, difficult, and various problems still unsolved, although its product of philosophical principles and fundamental concepts is relatively small. HELLENIC-ROMAN PHILOSOPHY 295 With this relative deficiency in originality we note the appearance in the post-Aristotelian philosophy of the great school-associations, with their wholesale scientific produc tions, rather than of single personalities. It is true, detailed research also here betrays individual shadings in the con struction of single theories, although often indeed seen with difficulty and not with full certainty ; yet such varia tions stand in value and significance far behind the great and general antagonisms of the school systems. Moreover, such antagonisms are much less those of scientific theory than those of the conception of life and its conduct. The post-Aristotelian philosophy showed, therefore, the peculiar phenomenon of the practical convictions of differ ent schools existing in sharp conflict, while the peculiar scientific differences became gradually obliterated. Scien tific activity was turned to special researches, and found neutral ground partly in nature studies, partly in history, especially the history of literature. Upon this neutral ground, although with a certain agreement in fundamental conceptions and methods, the representatives of the differ ent schools were in active rivalry. This ardent cultivation of the special sciences had the most universal results of Greek philosophy for its obviously valid fundamental prin ciples, and interest in metaphysical problems passed more and more into the background. Erudition pressed._ou_t . the spirit of speculation. The special sciences became independent. The beginning of this specialization in science already existed in the Abderite, the Platonic, and particularly the Aristotelian schools. In the Hellenic period specialization was, however, the more remarkable because the period was wanting in great determining personalities and organizing fundamental prin ciples. This popular impulse for specialization was limited neither to Athens nor to Greece. Rhodes, Alexandria, Per- gamus, Antioch, Tarsus, etc., became scientific centres, in 296 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY which scholarly work by means of great libraries and collections was being systematically carried on. Later Rome, and finally also Byzantium, entered into the competition. That now, however, the conflict between the schools was no longer waged over theoretical but practical philosophy, was due not only to the fact that Aristotle had given the final word to the speculative movement, but also to the changing character of the times and the changing philo sophical demands. The more the Greek national life and spirit faded through the universal mixing of nations and their destinies, so much the more the individual retired within himself and away from the changing external world. From the great maelstrom of things he sought to save as much as possible of inward peace of mind and sure happiness, and to secure them within the quiet of his in dividual life. This, then, in Hellenic time is what was expected from philosophy : it should be the director of life ; it should teach the individual how to be free from the world and to stand independent by himself. The. deter mining, fundamental point of view of philosophy became that of practical ivisdom. The Greek Enlightenment showed tendencies in this direction in the teachings of Socrates, especially, however, in the teachings of the Cynics and Cyrenaics, which expressed through their atom istic principles the dismemberment of Greek society (see § 29 f.). Opposed to this the great systems of Greek science, especialty Platonism and Aristotelianism, had maintained the higher thought with the essential political tendency of their ethics. The post- Aristotelian philosophy even in the schools of both masters turned to the ethics of the individual. The antagonisms that developed between them concerned fundamentally only their subtleties and the enriched developments of the simple types which Greek life in its bloom had brought forth. While then the essence of Greek philosophy was exclusively directed to a unified conceptual knowledge of the world, the science of the succeeding centuries divided (1) into specializa tion into single branches, for which methodical bases had been established ; and (2) into a philosophy which made all know!- HELLENIC-ROMAN PHILOSOPHY 297 edge an ancillary maiden to the art of living, and was concerned entirely in setting up an ideal of a perfect, free, and happy man. This art of living still retained the name of philosophy, and it is only this side of the scientific life of antiquity which is to be followed out further in this place.1 Individualistic jthigSj .which the post-Aristotelian schools made the burden of their philosophy, was virtually called to restore to the cultured world of antiquity the_j^eljgjqn. lost in the Greek Renaissance. Its fundamental problem 2 was on this account the release of man from the power of the outer world and the vicissitudes of life. But virtue, as the Stoics and Epicureans taught it, did not prove adequate to be the solution of this problem ; thus philosophy also be came drawn into the great religious movement which had possessed the races of the Roman Empire. In that move ment the terrified mind seized upon all kinds of religious forms and cults, and eagerly pressed on to a saving con viction. The more this tendency became predominant in philosophy, and the more philosophical interest passed from j ethics to religion, so much the more did Platonism, the specific religious form of philosophy, come into the fore ground. Its transcendent metaphysics, its separation of the material and immaterial worlds, its teleological prin ciple, which regarded the life of nature and man with reference to a divine cosmic purpose, made it seem called to give scientific form to the amalgamation of religions. Its concept of the world was equal to absorbing the reli gious forms of the Orient. It gave the philosophic material with which Christianity, the new religion, constituted itself into a didactic system. Out of it the Hellenic world tried, finally, to create its own religion as the daughter of science. 1 For the development of the special sciences since Aristotle one should consult the respective parts of this manual. 2 See K. Fischer, Gesch. der neueren Philos., I. (2 ed., Mannheim, 1865), p. 33 f. 298 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY This gradual transmutation of ethics into religion divided the Hellenic-Roman philosophy into two parts (see above, Introduction); in the former of which the ethical interest predominated; in the latter, the religious interest ; Syncretic Platonism made the transition. The controversies between the schools and their adjustment in Skepticism and Eclecti cism, preceded the transition period. Patristics on the one hand, and neo-Platonism on the other came after this transition. 1. The Controversies of the Schools. 45. The development of the Peripatetic school took a similar course to that of the Academy (§ 38). It had in fact, at first, its significant centre in the person of the old friend and coadjutor of its founder; to wit, in Theoplirastus. Theophrastus knew how to direct the activities of the school, how to inspire the development of the sciences in the true spirit of the master, and how to give to the Lyceum an eminent position in the intellectual life of Athens through the brilliancy of his lectures. Yet for him in his recasting and supplementation of the Aristotelian doctrine, and also for the majority of his associates, the empirical outweighed the philosophical interest, and so more and more the school tended to the specialization of scientific work. Thus Theo phrastus developed the science of botany especially ; Aris- toxenus,thc theory of music ; Dicasarchus, historical sciences. History seems to have taken the most space in the scien tific work of the school. Literary-historical and scientific- historical work were especially carried on in this and the succeeding generations of the Peripatetic school, and to such a degree that this school is designated as the unique centre of the above very learned but little creative spirit. The ethical questions, also, were treated by all these men, and especially by Eudemus, more particularly upon their CONTROVERSIES OF THE SCHOOLS 299 empirical side and with reference to popular morality. On the other hand, however, the ethical questions were sub ordinated to a theological interest, in which metaphysical demands seem to have been centred. Influenced doubtless by Platonic and Pythagorean doctrines, Eudemus inclined to emphasize the transcendence of the divine Being, and in a similar manner to maintain the speculative psychology of Aristotle with the transcendence (x\copiag6'i) of the reason. There was another tendency, which, beginning with The- ophrastus, ran counter to the above, and developed the principle of immanence, both metaphysically and psycho logically. This tendency grew to a thoroughgoing pan theism and naturalism in the person of Strato, who from 287 to 269 followed Theophrastus as head of the school. When Strato explained the concept of pure Form meta physically and psychologically as unnecessary and equally as impossible as that of pure matter, he practically identified God and the world on the one hand, and on the other thought and perception. The whole world-system and all particular events therein are only explainable by the quali ties and forces in things under the law of mechanical necessity. Warmth is the most important force among these, both in the macrocosm and in the microcosm. The soul is the unifying reasoning power (gyegoviKov), and it has the senses as its organs. Thus the activity of sensa tion is never complete without thought. Thought, however, on its side is limited to the given perceptual content. The theory of Strato seems to be, on the whole, a victory for the Democritan element that was in the Aristotelian doctrine, although in particular assertions Strato approaches very near the Stoic philosophy. W. Lyngg, Die peripatetische Schule (in Philosophische Studien, Christiania, 1878) ; H. Siebeck, Die Umbildung der peripatetischen Naturphilosophie in die der Stoiker (Unters. z. Philos. d. Gr., 2 ed., 181-252). 300 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY Theophrastus, from Eresus in Lesbos, was about twelve years younger than Aristotle. He probably got acquainted 1 with Aristotle in the Academy, and he remained a lifelong friend to the Stagirite. He shared the residence of Aristotle after the latter bade adieu to the Macedonian court, and was his right- hand man in the administration of the Lyceum. Theophrastus afterwards assumed the conduct of the Lyceum himself, and directed it with the greatest success. An attempt to drive the philosophical schools out of Athens (306 b. c.) seems to have failed solely by reason of the respect in which he was held (F. A. Hoffmann, De lege contra philosophos imprimis The- ophrastum auctore Sophocle Athenis lata, Carlsruhe, 1842). There have been preserved of his numerous works (list in Diog. Laert., V. 42 ff.) the two botanical works, irepl ejnn-wv Jo-Topi'us and irepl cpvrwv alnSiv, — of the greatest importance, since the corresponding works of Aristotle are lost, — certain fragments of his metaphysics, of the history of physics, besides some minor treatises. The i)0ikoI xaPaKT7)p^i a description of moral failings based on many observations, are a selection from the ethical work of this philosopher. These are published by J. G. Schneider (Leipzig, 1818) ; Fr. AVimmer (Breslau, 1842-62) ; a portion of the metaphysics in Chr. Brandis' Separat-ausgabe der aristotelischen (Berlin, 1823), p. 308 ff. ; also newly published by H. Usener (Bonn, 1890) ; Characters, Diibner (Paris, 1842) and E. Petersen (Leip., 1859) ; Philippson, vXtj dvopunrtvn (Berlin, 1831) ; H. Usener, Analecta Theophrastea (Bonn, 1858) ; the same in XVI. volume of Rhein. Mas. ; Jac. Bernays, Th.'s Schrift iiber die Frdmmigkeit (Berlin, 1866) ; H. Diels, Dox. Gr., p. 175 ff. ; E. Meyer, Gesch. der Botanik, p. 164 ff. ; Th. Gomperz, Ueber die Characlere Th.'s (Wiener Sitz.-Ber., Berlin, 1888). The naturalism of Theophrastus seems to be expressed in his subsumption of thought under that of motion (xtV-no-is) , although he did not materialize the concept in the Democritan manner. The dubious consequences, that followed for the Aristotelian concept of God, seem to have been expressly deduced first by Strato. The significance of Theophrastus lies in the realm of science, and it is to be regretted that only few fragments of his history of natural science have been preserved (v aroixeiwv, published by P. Marquardt (Berlin, 1868), translated into German, with annotations by R. Westphal (Leipzig, 1883) ; see W. L. Mahne, De Aristoxeno (Amsterdam, 1793) ; C. v. Jan (Landsberg a. W., 1870). The fragments of the historical works of the Peripatetics in general have been published by C. Mliller, Fragmenta historicorum grcecorum, II. (Paris, 1848). Apostasy from the theoretic ideals of Aristotle began to appear already in Dicsearch of Messene, in his preference for the practical life which was of interest indeed to the historian and political theorist. From his numerous works in political and literary history, among which the Bios 'EAAaoos is the most important, and also from his Tp(,7roAmKo's, only small portions have been preserved. M. Fuhr, Diccearchi quce supersunt (Darmstadt, 1841) ; F. Osann, Beitrdge, II. (Cassel, 1839). The more original genius, Strato of Lampsacus, was called "the physicist," and this shows how actually independent he became of Aristotle. He threw aside all the Platonic imma terialism that Aristotle had retained, — the pure spirituality of God and the supersensible origin and character of the human reason. Even if he thereby threw away the keystone of the Aristotelian teleology, Strato was, on the other hand, opposed to the Democritan mechanical atomism. He found the explanation of the world in the inherent qualities and forces (ovvdp.eii) of particular things. He designated the fundamental forces (dpxai) as heat and cold. Of the two, heat plays the more important and creative role. The renewal of the old Ionic modes of repre- 302 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY sentation is thus completed in the Peripatetic school, and it also at the same time found expression among the Stoics. It was a return characteristic of the time of the epigones. G. Rodier, La physique de Strato d. Lamp. (Paris, 1891). In the following generations the Peripatetic school be came completely absorbed, so far as we know, in the specialized investigations of Alexandrian erudition, in which its champions played an important role. Under Andronicus of Rhodes, the eleventh head of the school after the founder, the school made a great effort for philosophical autonomy. The publications of Andronicus marked the beginning of a systematic reproduction, interpretation, and defence of the original teaching of Aristotle. This activity continued then through the following centuries, and found in Alexander of Aphrodisias (200 a. d.) its most distinguished repre sentative. The activity was maintained to later time, until the Peripatetic school was lost in neo-Platonism. A great number of names of Peripatetic philosophers have come down to us from the company around Theophrastus and Strato, as well as names of some of both the nearer and the more remote pupils of the latter. These latter have in the main no longer significance for us : Clearchus of Soli (M. Weber, Breslau, 1880), Pasicles of Rhodes, who was presum ably the author of the second book of the Metaphysics, Phanias of Eresus (A. Voisin, Gant., 1824), Demetrius of Phalerus (Ch. Ostermann, Hersfeld, 1847, and Fulda, 1857), Hipparchus of Stagira, Duris of Samos, Chamoeleon of Heraclea (Kopke, Berlin, 1846) ; Lyco of Troas, who succeeded Strato (269-226) as head of the school, whose successor was Aristo of Ceos ; Aristo of Cos, Critolaus, who belonged 1 to the embassy to Rome, 155 b. c. ; and, finally, Diodorus of Tyre. From the works of the Peripatetics dealing with the history of literature and the specific history of philosophy, the Btoi of Her mippus and Satyrus (200 b. a), the AtaSoxal tiXoa6cav of Sotion, and the abstract of the last by Heracleides Lembus (about 150) deserve especial mention. The later writers, who form our secondary sources, have drawn upon these works. 1 Cicero, Acad., II. 45, 137 ; see Wiskemann (Hersfeld, 1867). Controversies of the schools 303 The serviceable work of Andronicus was further carried on chiefly by his pupil, Boiithus of Sidon, nevertheless in a spirit akin to that of Strato and the Stoics. The later exegetes, like Nicolaus of Damascus, and later Aspasius, Adrastus, Her- minus, Sosigenes, held rather to the logical writings of Aristotle. A comprehensive, philosophical, and competent appreciation and exposition of his teaching is first found in the commenta ries of Alexander of Aphrodisias, "the exegete." Among his commentaries those upon the Analytics prior I. , Togncs, Mete- reology, De sensu, and especially the Metaphysics have been preserved. The last is in the Bonitz edition (Berlin, 1847). See J. Freudenthal, Abhandl. der Berl. Akad. d. Wiss., 1885. In his Own writings (7repi i/'i'X'/s — irepl eipappevns — cjtvaiKwv Kal rjBiKwv diropiibv Kal Xvaewv, et ah), he defends his naturalistic in terpretation of Aristotle, especially against the Stoics. 46. The most important scientific system that the Greek epigones developed was Stoicism. Its founder was Zeno of Citium, a man perhaps of Semitic or half-Semitic origin. Captivated but not satisfied by the Cynic Crates, he listened in Athens also to the Megarian Stilpo, and the Platonists Xenocrates and Polemo. After long preparation he opened his school in the Srod rroiKiXi] in the last decade of the fourth century, and from this place his society got its name. His countryman, Persaeus, as well as Cleanthes of Assus, who was Zeno's successor as scholarch, Aristo of Chios, Herillus of Carthage, and Sphasrus from the Bosphorus, are named among his pupils. These from a philosophical point of view stand far behind the third head of the school, Chrysij)j)US__of Soli in Cicilia, who was really the chief literary representative of the school. Among his numerous followers there appeared later Zeno of Tarsus, Diogenes of Seleucia, a Babylonian living in Rome in 155, and Antipater of Tarsus. In connection with the Stoic school, Eratosthe nes and ApoUodorus stand among the great scholars of the Alexandrian epoch. For a general history of the Stoa, see Dietr. Tiedemann, Sys. der stoischen philos. (3 vols., Leipzig, 1776); F. Ravaisson, Essai sur le Stoicisme (Paris, 1856) ; R. Hirzel, Untersuchungen zu 304 history of ancient philosophy Cicero's philos. Schriften (2 vols., Leipzig, 1882) ; G. P. Wey- goldt, Die Philos. der Stoa nach ihrem Wesen undihren Schick- salen (Leipzig, 1883) ; P. Ogereau, Essai sur le systeme philos. du Sto'icistne (Paris, 1885). The chief source for the older Stoics, whose original literature is nearly entirely lost, is found in Diog. Laert., VII., who breaks off in the midst of an exposition of Chrysippus. His statements go back in substance to Antigonus- Carystius (see U. v. Wilamowiz-Mollendorff, Berlin, 1881 ) . The Stoa was characterized as the typical philosophy of Hel lenism, from the fact that it was created and developed in Athens on the principles of Attic philosopliy, and by men that originated in the mixed races of the East. Likewise, it was of great moment for the general progress of the world that this particular doctrine was afterwards extended and most vigorously developed in the Roman Empire. Zeno of Cition, the son of Mnaseas, 340-265 — for the diffi cult chronology see E. Rhode and Th. Gomperz, Rhein. Mus., 1878 f. — was a merchant whose residence in Athens was perhaps occasioned by a shipwreck. He entered the different schools, and co-ordinated their teaching with painstaking care. His writings (see list of Diog. Laert., VII. 4) deal with the most varied subjects, yet their form is not remarkable. See Ed. Wellmann, Die Philos. des Sloikers Zeno (Leipzig, 1873) ; C. Wachsmuth, Gommentat tones I., II. de Zeno Citii et Cleanth. Assio (Gottingen, 1874) ; A. C. Pearson, The Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes (London, 1890). N. Saal, De Aristone, Gliio et Herillo Carth. commentatio (Cologne, 1852) ; H. Heinze, Ariston v. Chios bei Plutarch und Horaz, and O. Hense, Ariston n. Chios (Rhein. Mus., 1890, 497 ff. and 541 ff.). Cleanthes, who is said to have performed menial work by night in order to listen to Zeno by day, is in his simplicity, perseverance, and austerity a type of the Cynic Wise Man, but he is insignificant as a philosopher. His hymn to Zeus is preserved and published by Slurz-Merzdorf (Leipzig, 1835). See F. Mohnike, Kleanthes der Stoiker (Greifswald, 1814). The scientific systematizer of the Stoic doctrine is Chrysippus (280-206), a copious writer of great dialectic ability. The titles of his writings are listed in Diog. Laert., VII. 189 ff. See F. N. G. Baguet, De Chris ippi vita doctrina et reliquiis (Loewen, 1822) ; A. Gerckc, Chrysippea (Jahrb. f. Philol., 1885). For further information, see Zeller, IVs. 39, 44, 47 f. A second period of the Stoic philosophy, in which it made a nearer approach to the Peripatetic and Platonic controversies of the schools 305 teaching, began in the middle of the second century B. c. with Panaetius of Rhodes, who introduced Stoicism into Rome. Boethus of Sidon worked beside him, animated by a similar spirit. After him his pupil Posidonius, of Apamea in Syria, directed the school in Rhodes with great success. Pantetius (180-110) won in Rome the friendship of men like Lselius and Scipio Africanus the Younger, and accompanied the latter on his mission as ambassador, in 143 to Alexandria. He became scholarch in Athens later. He brought the Stoa into great repute and made its success assured in Rome. This success was promoted by his forming Stoicism into a kind of philosophy of universal culture for the needs of the Roman Empire. He ameliorated its original severity, he accommodated it to other great systems, he expressed the system itself in a clever and tasteful way. His chief writing, according to Cicero, was irepl rov KaOrJKovro's. See F. G. van Lynden (Leyden, 1802). His contemporary 1 Boethus of Sidon partially followed the doctrine of Strato and Aristotle in theology and psychology. The eclectic tendency appeared still stronger in Posidonius (135-150). He was listened to with delight by the aristocratic Roman youth in Rhodes, where after extended journeys he had settled as head of the school. See J. Bake, Posidonii Rhodii reliquiw doctrinos (Leyden, 1810) ; P. Topelmann, De Posidonio Rh. rerum scriptore (Bonn, 1867) ; R. Scheppig, De Posidonio Apamensi, rerum, gentium, terrarum scriptore (Berlin, 1870) ; P. Corssen, De Posidonio Rhodii. M. T. Ciceronis in libr. I. Tusc auctore (Bonn, 1878). In his comprehensive erudition and many-sided interests, Posidonius is the most successful representative of syncretism, that blending of Stoic, Platonic, and Aristotelian doctrines. He is also the most important of those who prepared the way for the Alexandrian philosophy. A thorough examination of his work in detail seems to be the most important and most difficult desideratum for the history of Hellenic philosophy. For a list of the Stoics of this period, see Zeller, IV3. 585 ff. See A. Schmekel, Die Philos. der mittleren Stoa (Berlin, 1892). During the time of the empire, Stoicism became merely a popular moral philosophy ; but even in this condition it joined together the noblest convictions of antiquity in an 1 Zeller, TV3. 46, 1. 20 306 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY impressive form and manner, and it directed the moral feeling along religious paths. Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius appeared as its chief representatives at this time. Lucius Annseus Seneca, son of the rhetorician M. Annseus Seneca, was born about 4 a. d. in Cordova. He was educated in Rome and called to different offices of state. He was the teacher of Nero, and condemned to death by his pupil in 65 a. d. He has expressed most completely the monitory character of later Stoicism in his sententious writings, — to which the name of scientific researches cannot be unqualifiedly applied. Besides his unimportant Quaestiones natwrales, there are preserved De procidentia, De constantia sapientis, De ira, De consolatione, De brevitale vitce, De otio, De vita beata, De tranquillitate animi, De dementia, De leneficiis, and the Fjristolce morales. Also in his strongly declamatory tragedies there is involved this same conception of life. Complete sets of his works are pub lished by Fickert (3 vols., Leipzig, 1842-45) and Haase (3 vols., Leipzig, 1852 f.) ; German translation by Moser and Pauly (17 vols., Stuttgart, 1828-55), English translation or para phrase by T. Long (London, 1614) ; see Holzherr, Die Philos., L. A. Seneca (Tubingen. 1858 f.) ; Alfr. Martens, De L. A. Senecce vita et de tempore quo scripta eius philosophica- composita sint (Altona, 1871) ; H. Siedler, De L. A. Senecce philosophia morali (Jena, 1878) ; W. Ribbeck, L. A. Seneca der Philosoph u. sein Verhaltniss zu Epicur, Plato u. dem Christenthum (Hannover, 1887). Further in the history of the bibliography, see Ueberweg, 244 f. , especially for the writings cited elsewhere about his relationship to Christianity, of which the most important are edited by F. Chr. Baur, Seneca und Paulas (1858), printed in three dissertations and published by Zeller (Leipzig, 1875). The satirical poet Persaeus, the erudite Heracleitus, and L. Annseus Cornutus, who systematically developed the allegorical significance of myths in a theological writing, are mentioned among the many names of Stoics, and in particular, C. Muso- nius Rufus, who confined himself more closely to the practical teaching of virtue. Compare P. Wendland, Qucesliones niusoni- ame (Berlin, 1886). His pupil is Epictetus, the notable slave of a freedman of Nero. He later became free himself, and lived in Nicopolis in Epirus, when the leaders in philosophy were proscribed by Domitian. His lectures were published by Arrian as AiarpiBai CONTROVERSIES OF THE SCHOOLS 307 and 'Eyxeipi8wv, and in modern times by J. Schweighauser (Leipzig, 1799 ; in the appendix is the commentary of Simplicius to the Encheiridion, 1800). See J. Spangenbcrg, Die Lehre des Epiktet (Hanau, 1849) ; E. M. Schranka, Der Stoiker Epictet u. seine Philos. (Frankfort a. O., 1885) ; R. Asmus, Questiones Fpictetece (Freiburg, 1888) ; H. Schenkl, Die epiktcteischen Fragmente (Vienna, 1888) ; A. Bonhofer, Epictet u. d. Stoa (Stuttgart, 1891). The last significant expression of the Stoic literature is the Meditations (to eh kavrbv) of the noblest of Roman emperors. Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (121-180). These are edited by J, Stich (Leipzig, 1882), and translated into German by A. Witt- stock (Leipzig, 1879) [English translation by G. Long, Bohn's Library, The Thoughts of the Emperor, M. Aurelius Antoninus']. See A. Bach, De M. Aurelio imperatore philosophante (Leipzig, 1826) ; M. E. de Suckau, Etude sur Marc Aurele, sa vie et sa doctrine (Paris, 1858) ; A. Braune, M. Aurel's Meditationen (Altenburg, 1878) ; P. B. Watson, Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (London, 1884). The more Stoicism took to moralizing, the more did its Cynic inheritance begin to preponderate. Thus, in the first and second centuries after Christ, Cynicism revived in the persons of those wandering preachers who went from city to city in the costume of the philosopher with obtrusive inconsiderateness and in affectation of beggary. They were eccentric figures, but are of more interest to the student of history than of science. The chief types are Demetrius, a contemporary of Seneca ; Oinomaus of Gadara ; particularly, however, Demonax, concerning whom we have information in a writing, reported under Lucian's name (see also F. V. Fritsche, Defragm. Demon, philos., Rostock and Leipzig, 1866), and Perigrinus Proteus, whose extraordinary end has been pictured by Lucian. See J. Bernays, Lukian u. die Kyniker (Berlin, 1879). Stoicism, as originally presented, especially by Chrysip pus, was a perfectly well-rounded scientific system, which gradually grew lax in some particular doctrines, and finally vanished into a philosophically colorless moralizing. Yet it must be admitted that from the very beginning it was wanting in such organic coherence of its parts as one finds in the separate Greek philosophical systems. In the teach ing of Zeno and Chrysippus a number of the elements of the earlier sciences are closely interwoven without making 308 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY the texture logically necessary and consistent. The Eclectic development, then, which the Stoic school took, was not a fate that came to it from without, but the necessary conse quence of its inner constitution. However many analogous relations may exist between the different parts of the Stoic teaching, yet one must not make the mistake of thinking that its ethical teaching of submission to natural law might not have been as compatible to an idealistic metaphysic as to its materialism. It is, moreover, equally certain that the Stoics' anthropological principle of the identity of the human soul and the divine reasqn_ might have been placed at the basis of a rationalistic theory of knowledge, just as well as at the basis of their sensualism and nominalism. The theories of the Stoa are not an organic creation, but woven together with care and cleverness. They make a well-connected system, but are not homogeneous. They could afterwards, therefore, be separated with relative ease. The scholastic division of philosophy into logic, physics, and ethics was likewise especially distinct among the Stoics. The main point in their teaching lies in their ethics. To teach virtue as the art of living was for them the entire purpose and essence of philosophy. Virtue was conceived by them entirely in its practical meaning of right action. Only so far as this definition of virtue was identical with the Socratic " correct knowledge," did the first division, ethics, need the other two divisions, logic and physics, for its basis. The development of special sciences corresponded so little with the originally established general relationship of the three divisions, and the Stoic logic and physics stood in such loose connection with its ethics, that it is perfectly conceivable how Aristo, a member of the school standing at first close to pure Cynicism, should estimate these collateral subjects of ethics as useless. Ft is not remarkable, either, that the physical and logical doctrines of the old Stoa were changed for others and then laid entirely aside. The care with which physics and logic were pursued in the old Stoa in contrast with ethics shows rather that the scientific interest of the school had not been fully lost. To this interest, which was expressed in the numer ous special works — particularly the historical — Herillus com- CONTROVERSIES OF THE SCHOOLS 309 mitted himself, when he declared science in the Aristotelian sense to be the highest good. G. J. Diehl, Zur Ethik des Stoikers Zeno (Mainz, 1877) ; F. Ravaisson, De la morale du Stoicisme (Paris, 1850) ; M. Heinze, Stoica ethica ad origines suas relata (Naumburg, 1862) ; Kiis- ter, Grundzuge der stoischen Tugendlehre (Berlin, 1864) ; Th. Ziegler, Gesch. der Ethik., I. 167 ff. The central point in Stoicism is the Ideal of the Wise Man. Stoicism drew its picture of the normal man after the model of Socrates and Antisthenes. It was its funda mental motive to picture the perfect man in absolute free dom from the changes of this world. This ideal was consequently first defined negatively as the independence of will and conduct from the passions (Affekte). This apathy (emotionlessness) of the Wise Man consists in his refusal to submit (avyKarddeaK) to the excess of natural im pulse, from which excess the passion springs. This re fusal makes up the judgment of worth and the functioning of the will. The Wise Man feels impulse, but he does not let it grow into a passion, and he regards the exciting object as neither a good nor an evil. For to him virtue is not only the highest but the only good, and in this he is a true Cynic. M. Heinze, Stoicorum de ajfectibus doctrina (Berlin, 1861) ; O. Apelt, Die stoischen Definitionen der Affekte und Poseido- nius (Jahrb. f. Philol. 1885). One must regard it as a result of the ethical psychology of Aristotle, that the Stoics so turned the Cynic unity of virtue and knowledge that they found the essence of passion in the judgment of worth, inasmuch as this judgment is immediately identical with feeling and willing. To desire, and to regard something as a good, are two expressions for the same thing. The excess of impulse (bpp-y irXeovd&vaa) leads the powers of the soul (rjyepoviKov) into false judgment, and at the same time to a reasonless and unnatural excitement (aAoyos Kal irapd tpvaiv ifrvxys Kiv-nais), and in this very thing consists the excitement, irdOo's (per- turbatio). The Stoa distinguished four fundamental kinds of unnatural excitement : pleasure, trouble, desire, and fear. They and their subordinate classes were treated as diseases from which the Wise Man is free, for he has true health. 310 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY Since the passions consist in false judgments and men tal disturbance, so the virtue of the Wise Man, positively defined, consists in reasonable insight and the resulting power of will. Virtue is the reason determining itself theoretically and practically (recta ratio). Whether man will let loose this or that passion in himself, depends on him. That is to say, the matter is not determined by external events, but through his own inner nature. " Nature " (vai<;, — at all events, according to Chrysippus, with reference to its unity with the world reason. On the other hand, the purely formal charac ter of the consistency and of the harmony of the reason was accentuated (simply bpoXoyovp-evur;). In this sense, suggestive of the " categorical imperative," was Stoicism accepted by the iron statesmen of Rome. Nevertheless, in the Stoic metaphys ics, the formula of subjection to the world reason remained an empty form which found its living content first in the Christian doctrine of love. The Stoics were little able to make theoretically clear their antithesis of the reasonable and the unnatural, yet they rendered the service of introducing into moral philosophy the principle of duty by the accentuation of this antithesis, and by defining vir tue as subjection to cosmic law ; and furthermore of having laid a greater stress upon the antithesis between that which is and that which ought to be. Wholly consonant with this is the pessimism which they for the most part held concerning the great mass of mankind and the circumstances of life. The Socratic concept of virtue, that the Stoa held, concentrated into practical insight (cfrpovnais) the whole of moral life, and allowed the existence of a plurality of virtues only in the sense of the application to many objects of this single fundamental virtue of in sight. In this way, for instance, the four Platonic cardinal virtues were derived. Yet herein the Stoic clung to the thought of the unity of virtue to such a degree that all the particular forms of virtue exist in inseparable union. They form not only the en during characteristic (Siddeais) of the Wise Man, but they also animate his every action. . The unity and perfectness, which the Stoics like the Me garians and Cynics regarded as essential in the concept of virtue, and in the ideal of the Wise Man, led them in the first thoroughgoing statement of their system to say that this ideal is reached either entirely or not at all. In neither goodness nor badness are there degrees of ethical value. 312 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY Men arc either good (airov&aloi), or bad (cpavXoif, and to the latter belong all who do not attain the ideal of wisdom. It makes no difference whether they be near to it or far from it. They are all fools, — spiritually sick. Thus for the older Stoics all virtuous actions (KaropQwgard) were ethically of equal value, and likewise all sins (dgaprggara). With the same rigorism the Stoics declared virtue as the only good, vice as the only evil, and all between as (aSt- debopa) indifferent things. The last definition led to many serious consequences in ap plied ethics in which the Stoics agreed with the Cynics, although, it must be said, in theory more than in practice. Since the Stoics assessed the disposition ethically, they therefore made the Wise Man indifferent in principle to external conventional forms of performance or non-performance. In their theory of goods, they made a polemic attack, especially against the Peripatetic recognition of the importance which the goods of fortune were supposed to have for perfect happiness. Especially prominent is their treatment of life as an doidcj>opov, which theoretically and practically represented suicide as permissible for the Wise Man. This rigoristic dualism could not last long, and so the school gradually inserted the striving, earnest man (irpoKoirraiv) between the Wise Man and the fool, and the fitting action (rb KaOiJKov) between virtue and sin. The school distinguished in the great interval which lies between the highest good and the evil, the rrponygeva from the uiroirpoyypeva. On the whole, the Stoics are the most outspoken doctrinaires that antiquity witnessed. The Stoa was a school of character building and "also a school in reckless stubbornness (Cato). In the development of the school there entered with the different individuals many varieties and compromises of doctrine accord ing to impending practical needs. These changes kept pace with the approach of the school to the teaching of the Lyceum and the Academy. Thereupon the perfectly unpedagogical character was gradually stripped off, which the representation of the ideal of "the Wise Man originally had, and in its place in later times came the reverse and admonitory teaching, how one should become a Wise Man. CONTROVERSIES OF THE SCHOOLS 313 Karopdwpa, the conduct of a Wise Man, coming from a good dis position, and KaOrJKov, the activity of the ordinary ambitious man adjusted to external requirements, stand somewhat in the rela tionship which modern ethics marks between morality and legality. The setting up of this distinction shows how the realized ideal of the Wise Man was making way to the more modest ambition of approximating that ideal. The individualistic tendency expressed in the ideal of the self-sufficient Wise Man, is counterbalanced by the concept of the subordination of the individual to the cosmic law and the society of rational beings. The Stoics recognized, therefore, the social needs of man as natural and reasonable. They saw the realization of those needs simply on the one side in the friendship of individual Wise Men, and on the other in the rational communion of all men. Whatever lies between — that is, the national life in its different political forms — passed for them more or less as of historical indifference (aDtdcpopov). The Wise Man bows to this as a temporal necessity, but he holds aloof from it as far as possible. Historico-national distinctions vanish before that reason, which gives equal laws and equal rights to all. The point of view of the Stoic Wise Man was that of the cosmopolitan. For the remarkable synthesis of individualism and univer- salism which characterized the Stoa, it is to be noted that the school soon passed in its social theory from individualism to the most general principle of association. The later Eclectic Stoics in particular were concerned with the theory of the state, and followed Aristotle in many things. But the ideal of the school remained still the citizenship of the world, the fraternity of all men, the ethico-legal equalization of all distinctions of condition and race. From this thought proceeded the begin nings of the idea of natural or reasonable right, which later were laid as fundamental in the scientific theory of Roman right.1 They reflect in theoretical form the levelling of those i See M. Voigt, Die Lehre vom jus nalurale, etc. bei den Romern, (Leipzig, 1856) to p. 81 ff. 314 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY historical distinctions, which was completed for antiquity about the beginning of this era, and thus show Stoicism to be the ideal philosophy of the Roman Empire.1 To this ethical teaching there was joined in a most re markable manner an outspoken materialistic metaphysics. The monistic tendency, expressed in the metaphysics, was united with the ethical principle, and was developed in ah open polemic against the Aristotelian dualism. Uncreative themselves, the Stoics accepted the naive materialism of the pre-Socratic philosophy in the form of Heracleitanism. They expressly taught that nothing is real except the corporeal. They, however, recognized, in regard to the relationships of individual things, the Aristotelian duality of a passive and an active principle, a moved matter and a moving force (irda-^ov and iroiovv). They give to the uni fying cosmic force all the characteristics of the Heracleitan X070? and the Anaxagorean vov<;. But they emphasize particularly the materiality of this reasonable cosmic force. In their confessed materialism, the Stoics went nearly to the childish consequence of looking upon all qualities, forces, and activities of bodies as again themselves bodies which were supposed to inhere spatially in the first bodies (Kpdaus Si' oXwv). This reminds us in some measure of the homoiomeriai of Anaxagoras. The Stoics also regarded time quanta and the like, as bodies — assertions that show nothing more than the doctrinaire wilfulness of the authors. See H. Siebeck on the subject. The Stoics, like Heracleitus, found in fire the unifying cosmic force, which is God, — which is changed by its own inner rational law into the world. They conceived fully that fire was the identity of the corporeal primeval matter and the rational spirit, and in this way they fell back from 1 Cicero especially (De rep. and De leg.) developed the Stoic thought of the cbvaei SiKaiov as the lex natural born in all men ; but also he has attempted to be just to the historical moments of jurisprudence. See K. Hildenbrand, Gesch. u. System der Redds- u. Staalsphilos., 1. 523 ff. CONTROVERSIES OF THE SCHOOLS 315 the dualism of the time of the epigones to the naively vague monism of the previous time. Fire is therefore on the one hand the original corporeal substrate, the dpxji of the Milesians. On the other it is the primeval spirit, the world-soul, the reason moving and forming all things, permeating and governing, like a divine living breath (irvevga), the entire world of phenomena proceeding from it. It is indeed the creative world-reason, the A.0709 arrepp,ariKO<;. Fire has differentiated air, water, and earth from itself at the beginning of things, so that the two more volatile elements stand as the active and forming principle, in contrast to the two heavier as matter. In the cosmic devel opment the primitive fire is destined gradually to reabsorb the world of variety into itself, and will finally consume it in a universal catastrophe (eKirvpcoais). The complete cosmic cycle is so perfectly determined in all particulars by the divine Being that it is exactly repeated periodically. In so far as the Godhead acts like a body under the law of mechanical necessity, is this absolute determination of the movements of all individuals Fate (eigappevy). In so far as it acts as a purposeful spirit it takes on the garb of Providence (irpbvoiaf, and the Stoic evidently means by this that nature can yield only perfect and teleological forms and relationships. In all this we do not meet new concepts or new ways of stating facts. The Heracleitan principle is combined with the Platonic and Aristotelian concepts without being scientifically more serviceable. No scientific contribution worthy of the name can be found among the Stoics. In particular cases, as in astronomy, the Stoics join themselves in essentials with the Peripatetics. On the whole, in their treatment of these questions, they show a relapse from the inductive science of Aristotle to the old metaphysics. The pantheistic character of this conception of nature led the Stoic to a nature religion, which at the same time is a religion of reason. A characteristic monument to this is the hymn tg 316 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY Zeus of Cleanthes (preserved in Stob. Eel., I. 30). In the same spirit the}' made the most comprehensive use of the alle gorical interpretation of myths. Teleology was so connected with this interpretation, and was so attenuated to a small an thropomorphic spirit in praise of the arrangements useful for human needs, that it anticipated to a great degree the tasteless philosophy of the eighteenth century. The great ethical prin ciples of the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy diminished in the hands of the Stoics to a miserable utilitarian theory, which was the more characteristic the less it found a point of suppoit in the Stoic doctrine of goods. It is of particular interest to note how the Stoics began to work a positive religion into their natural religion ; for they treated, by the use of the nature-myth interpretation, the gods and daemons of the popular faith as special forms of the original divine force. They came in this way to a systematic theology of polytheism, and they subjoined to it their widely accepted theory of divination, based on the principle of a universal teleology. The pantheism and determinism in Stoicism stood finally in absolute contradiction with its ethical dualism. The former was as optimistic as the latter was pessimistic. That everything bad happens 7rapa cpvoiv was treated as ethically fundamental, although according to their metaphysical principle it was impos sible. This contradiction seems to have come in some measure to the consciousness of some of the Stoics. In response to the sharp attacks of their opponents, particularly of Carneades, it was the occasion for evasions tending toward such questions as the reconciliation of evil with a divine omnipotence, which we have later designated as theodicy. On the one hand, the Stoics attempted to disclaim the reality of evil, and then on the other to make sin and suffering the teleologically indispensable parts of the good and perfectly organized universe. The anthropology of Stoicism was consistent with its uni versal physical postulates. The body, teleologically put together out of crass elements, is permeated through and through, and in all its functions ruled by the soul. The soul is the warm breath (irvevga evOepgov), which, as an emanation of the divine soul of the world, forms the uni tary, living guiding force of man (rb rjyep.oviKov'). It con stitutes his reason ; it is the cause of his physiological functions, of bis speech, of his imagination and desires ; and it has its seat in the breast. CONTROVERSIES OF THE SCHOOLS 317 Ludw. Stein, Die Psychologie der Stoa (2 vols., Berlin, 1886-88). The essential identity of the human and divine soul (taught also by the pre-Socratics) was carried out by the Stoics, espe cially on ethical and religious lines. The analogy seemed suitably drawn between the relation of the human soul to its body, and the divine reason to the universe. The Stoics consistently ascribed to the soul of man no abso lute immortality. At the most they gave to it a permanence until the iKTrvpiao-ii, the absorption of all things in the divine. Yet some Stoics reserved this last privilege only for the souls of the Wise, while the avXoi were dissipated both in soul and body. In the Stoic anthropology, as in their entire system, the fun damental contradiction was this : their theoretic doctrine allowed to appear as mechanically necessary that very rationality which according to their ethical postulate was requisite to the formation of the ideal, so that the actual incompleteness of the ideal is incon ceivable. From this is explained the fact that the whole theoretic philosophy of the Stoa was subjected to the point of view of that insight which guides the perfectly Wise Man in his con duct. The same contradiction showed itself in the Stoic episte mology, where the emanation from God (epefrvrov irvevpd) was represented as a tabula, rasa. The tabula rasa does not already possess its rational content, as one would expect from this teaching, but wins its content gradually by the action of the senses.1 We must go back to the Cynic opposition to the Academy to understand how the Stoics can combine a sensualistic and nominalistic theory of knowledge with their doctrine of a cosmic reason. The Stoics sought in their nominalism, even as extrinsically as in their ethics, to give to their funda mental principle of individuality the concept of universal validity, — a validity from which they could in neither situ ation escape. The soul is originally like a tablet of wax, on which nothing is written, and in which ideas (cpavraalai) i There was therefore an easy union possible with Stoic metaphysics, when the later eclectic popular philosophy (Cicero) said that knowledge, particularly that of practical truths, was God-implanted, universal to humanity, and equally innate. 318 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY appear through the influence of things. Every original idea is an impression (rvirioais) on the soul, or a change in it — as Chrysippus said, in order to refine this crude materi alism. On that account this idea always refers to par ticular things or conditions. Concepts (evvoiai) are, however, pictures aroused by memory and the reasoning faculty rendered possible by the memory. They are purely sub jective, and, therefore, nothing actual corresponds to them, as in the case of the perceptions. Yet the Stoa vaguely tried to find in them the essence of all scientific knowledge.1 Concepts originate in perception, in part involuntarily from the very necessity of the mental mechanism, in part with conscious premeditation. The former are a natural production, and are common to all alike (koivoX ewoiai). This class is therefore to be regarded as the norm of ra tional knowledge, and as the valid presupposition (irpoXw-vsis). In this sense the consensus gentium plays a great role in Stoic argumentation, especially in ethics and religion. For the coiisensus gentium is a common property of concepts existing for all men with equal necessity. As regards the scientific construction of concepts, the Stoics busied themselves with great, and, for the most part, very unfruitful formalism in their detailed study of the Aristotelian logic. They combined this study with that of grammar. In treating of the hypothetical character of logical truth, which they emphasized especially in their theory of the syllogism, they needed a criterion of truth for those original Ideas, from which the logical work of thought is supposed to proceed. They found such an one only in immediate evidence, according to which single Ideas force themselves upon the soul and compel its assent (avyKard- OeaKf An idea of this sort they called cpavraaia KaraXg- 1 See Zeller, IV*. 77 ff. CONTROVERSIES OF THE SCHOOLS 319 ¦jttikt].1 They found it either in clear and certain percep tions or in the Koival evvoiat. R. Hirzel, De logica Stoicorum (Berlin, 1879) ; V. Brochard, Sur la logique clu Stotcisme (Arch. f. Gesch. d. Philos., V. 449 ff.). Under the collective name of logic, which they first employed in the study of terms, the Stoics grouped grammatical and rhe torical studies. They — especially Chrysippus — investigated many grammatical problems, and decided a great many of the questions of fact and terminology for more than for antiquity. Compare Lersch, Die Sprachphilosophie d. Alten (Bonn, 1841) ; Sehomann, Die Lehre von den Redeteilen, nach den Alten dar- gestellt u. beurteilt (Berlin, 1863) ; Steinthal, Gesch. d. Sprach- wiss. bei d. Griechen und Romcrn (Berlin, 1863). Concerning the formal logic of the Stoics, see C. Prantl, Gesch. d. Log., I. 401 ff. When the Stoics distinguished studies concerned with the criterion of truth from those concerned with correct syllogistic method, they transmuted the Aristotelian logic into a purely formal science. They were stranded, however, in empty sophistry, which was unavoidable in such a limited con ception. The Aristotelian analytic always is the frame on which they stretch out their artificial system with its unnecessary ter minological changes. They have added nothing significant. Even in their simplification of the theory of the categories Aris totle himself had preceded them. The}' recognized only the fol lowing four categories : iiroKeip.evov, iroiov, 7rd)5 exov, irpoi ti 7rais exov : substratum, quality, condition and relation. See A. Tren delenburg, Gesch. der Kategorienlehre (Berlin, 1846), p. 217 ff. The distinction of involuntary, universal ideas that enter the mechanism of representation, from those formed with scientific consciousness (Lotze, Logik, 1874, § 14), has psychological and logical value, but its epistemological use by the Stoics is an unhappy one. They also, however, according to their ethical principle, first ascribed full certainty to science as a system of fully developed concepts: Diog. Laert., VII. 47; Stob. Eel., II. 128. See W. Luthe, Die Erkenntnisslehre der Stoiker (Leipzig, 1890). 47. With less philosophical originality, but with a greater degree of unity and compactness, Epicureanism was the l Of the difficulty with this term, — the comprehension of the actual from the side of the spirit, or the comprehensibility of the spirit from the side of what is actual, see Bonnhdfer, Epiktet und die Stoa, p. 288 ff. 320 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY form in which the Cyrenaic conception of life found devel opment just as Stoicism was the development of Cynicism. In contrast, however, to the multiform eclecticism which characterized the Stoa in the persons of many of its active scientific champions through the centuries, Epicureanism was born mature in its founder as a complete method of living. Its numberless disciples in all antiquity changed it scarcely more than in its uncssentials. Consequently,. apart from Epicurus himself, who founded the school in his garden in Athens in 306, there are no independent thinkers of the school to be named. We may name some literary representatives : Metrodorus of Lamp- sacus, the friend of the founder ; Colotes of the same city ; Zeno of Sidon (100 B. c.) ; Phasdrus, whom Cicero heard in Rome about 90 b. c. ; Philodemns of Gadara and more especially the Roman poet Titus Lucretius Cams. See P. Gassendi, De vita, moribvs et doctrina Epicuri (Leyden, 1647) ; G. Prezza, Epicuro e VEpicureismo (Florence, 1877) ; M. Guyau, La morale d'Epncnre (Paris, 1878) ; P. v. Gizycki, Ueber das Leben und die Moralplulosophie des Epikur (Halle, 1879); W. Wallace, Epicureanism (London, 1880) ; R. Schwen, Ueber griech. u. rom. Epicureismus (Tarnowitz, 1881). As original sources, besides what is left by Epicurus, there are the didactic poem of Lucretius, De rerum natura (edited by Lachmann, Berlin, 1850, and Jac. Bernays, Leipzig, 1852), and the writings found in Herculaneum, particularly of Philodemus: Herculanensium voluminum qnie svpersunt (first series, Naples, 1793-1855, second since 1861). Compare D. Comparetti, La villa ilei Pisoni (Naples, 187'.)) ; Th. Gomperz, Herkulanen- sische Studien (Leipzig, 1865 f. , Wien..- Sitzungsberichte, 1876, 1879). Secondary antique sources are Cicero (De finibus and De natura deorum), Seneca, and Diogenes Laertius, B. 10. Epicurus was born 341 in Samos of an Athenian of the deme- Gargettos. His fatlTeT~seems to have been a school-teacher. Epicurus grew up in simple circumstances. He had read some philosophers, especially Democritus, and perhaps also listened to some of his older contemporaries in Athens. But he had not at any rate enjoyed a thorough education, when, having tried his hand as a teacher in Mytilene and Lampsacus, he afterwards CONTROVERSIES OF THE SCHOOLS 321 founded his school in Athens, which was later named after the garden in which it was held (ot dirb tov Krprmv ; horti). His teaching was opportune, easily understood, popular, and in har mony with the spirit of the time. It is thus explicable how he found wide acceptance equally with the more serious schools of science. Owing to his personal charm, and because he did not make so high and strict demands either upon the life or thought of his auditors as others made, he became greatly esteemed as the head of the school. As such he worked until his death in 270. He wrote much,1 only a little of which has been preserved. Of the thirty-seven books of irepl cpvaecas only two were found in the Herculanean library ; (published by Orelli, Leipzig, 1818.) In addition three didactic letters and the Kvpiai 86£ai, besides many more or less extensive fragments, have been found. H. Usener has published a notably complete and orderly collection, excepting the two books irepl cfrvaeios by the name Epicurea (Leipzig, 1887). Epicurus' confidant and celebrated colleague, Metrodorus, died before him. See A. Duening, De M. Epicurei vita et scriptis, cum fragm., Leipzig, 1870, Alfr. Korte, Metrodori fragm., Leipzig, 1890). The headship of the school passed directly then from Epicurus to Hermarchus. From that time on, numerous pupils and heads of the school are mentioned (see Zeller, IV8. 368- 378), but seldom in such a way as to lead us to know their dis tinction as philosophers. We know Colotes from the treatise which Plutarch aims against him, as the champion of the school ; Zeno and Phsedrus from the reports of Cicero ; also Philodemus, whose works in part were found in Herculaneum. See the liter ature in Ueberweg-Heinze, I7. 264 f. , especially H. v. Arnim, Philodemea (Halle, 1888). Especially at Rome, where C. Amafinius (middle of second cen tury, b. c.) had first naturalized Epicureanism to a considerable degree, the theory found many supporters, and most of all in its poetical presentation in Lucretius (97-54). See H. Lotze, Qucestiones Lucretianm (Philol., 1852) ; C. Martha, Le poeme de Lucrece (Paris, 1873) : J. Woltjer, L. philosophia cumfontibus comparata (Groningen, 1877). Concerning the development of the school, see R. Hirzel, Unters. zu Cicero's philosophischen Schriften, I. 98 ff. The ethics of Epicurus was a reproduction of hedonism (§ 30) in a form riper in so far as the more youthful fresh ness of the Aristippan doctrine of sense-pleasure made way i See Diog. Laert., X. 26 ff, 21 322 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY for deeper reflection, such as already existed among the later Cyrenaics. The limitation of philosophy to a search for the means of attaining individual happiness was most boldly expressed by Epicurus, and was developed utterly regardless of every other interest, especially of science. Science and virtue are nothing that should be prized in themselves. They have worth only as indispensable means for the attainment of pleasure, and pleasure is the natural and obvious goal of every desire. Pleasure is not only positive pleasure in the narrower sense which arises out of a motion that satisfies the need (rjBovr) ev Kivgaei). It is the more valuable pleasure of /painlessness, which goes with the state of more nearly per fect rest 1 (rjSovr) KaraarygariKg) , a state consequent upon the satisfaction of wants. The latter affords doubtless a certain pleasure, but perfect happiness (gaKapiw; tjgv) can be found only in a state in which every want is absent. Happiness is health to the body and repose (drapa^ia) of the soul : SiKaioavvy; Kapirbs peyiaros drapa^ia.2 Epicurus showed his deficiency in scientific training in the ambiguity of his expressions, and in his lack of logical clearness. His deficiency also appears in his disdain of all theoretical occu pations. He had no appreciation of scientific iuvestigations which serve no use. Mathematics, history, the special natural sciences were closed to him. The theory of pleasure that he called ethics, strictly included his entire philosophy. Physics, which had a determined ethical task to perform, and was pur sued only so far as it performed it, was only ancillary ; and as a help in preparation for this, a little logic was deemed necessary. It has given rise to much confusion, because Epicurus con sidered ¦rjo'ovr] sometimes as a positive pleasure arising from the satisfaction of all want, and because he sometimes used the word in the more general sense when he meant the more valued ataraxy (drapa^ia). The introduction of the latter idea probably can be traced back to Democritus. When the irady are designated as i Olymp. in Plato's Phileb., 274 (also Fr. 416). * Clem. Strom., VI. 2 (also Fr. 519). CONTROVERSIES OF THE SCHOOLS 323 storms, and yaA^vio-jtids as tranquillity (Diog. Laert., X. 83), we are reminded of the manner of expression of the great Abderite. This Epicurean drapa^ia has only an outward resemblance to the Stoic apathy. The former is the virtue of ethical indifference to all passions ; the latter is passionlessness, which is based upon the perfect satisfaction of all desire. On this account it was looked upon, both by Epicureans and Cynics, as acquired only through a limitation of desire. Therefore Epicurus distinguished formally three classes of wants: natural and indispensable; natural and perhaps dispen sable ; and finally, imaginary, which are neither natural nor in dispensable. Without satisfying the first, man .cannot live ; without satisfying the second, he cannot bejbappy; the third are to be disregarded. Thus "the opposition which the Cyrenaics urged between the natural and the conventional was taken up. Its strenuousness was diminished, however, in so far as the Epi cureans gave a place to much in the second category, which the Cyrenaics were compelled to discard, because they recognized only the first category. Feeling (irdOoi) can only decide as to what exists in any particular pleasure. We need, in order to counteract this, to reflect upon the course of life, and to assess the different pleasures so as to bring out also their conse quences.1 Such an estimate is possible only through the rational insight, the fundamental virtue of the Wise Man (cbpovyais). This virtue was developed into different single virtues, according to the different problems to be assessed. Through it the Wise Man is able to estimate the different impulses according to their value for perfect satisfaction. He is able to appreciate expectations and fears at their true value, to free himself from illusionary ideas, feelings, and desires, and to find in the proper balance of enjoyment that serenity of soul which is allotted only to him. The Epicurean ideal of the Wise Man is represented in nearly the same particulars as the Stoical Wise Man. The Wise Man is to the Epicureans also as free as the gods. By his reflective insight, rising superior to the course of 1 Eus. Prcep. ev., 14, 21 (also Fr. 442). 324 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY the world and of external fate, he finds happiness only in himself and in his virtue, which once acquired can never be lost. Yet the Epicurean description is made in some what brighter colors than the Stoic, rather more pleasing and more joyous. But even if they avoided the sombreness of the Stoics, they were, on the other hand, rather lacking in vigor : the Stoic feeling of duty was wanting, as were both the submission of the individual to universal law and the consciousness of responsibility. Epicurus prized, it is true, spiritual above bodily satisfactions, because they are better qualified to lead to the ideal of rest to the soul. In deed, he recommended what he himself to a high degree possessed, — a pure and noble morality, social refinement, benevolence, and consideration toward all. But all this is commended to us, because every kind of roughness of deport ment must appear to an educated Greek as inharmonious with the aesthetic enjoyment of existence, which had become to him a natural want. The wisdom of life of the Epi- | cureans was aesthetic self-enjoyment. Their egoism became delicate and refined, but nevertheless it was still egoism. The concept of ct>p6vyai<; appeared in Epicurus's theory almost exactly as it appeared in that of Aristippus, only the matter of measuring the consequences of particular pleasures is rather more emphasized than in Epicurus. Merely upon this distinction of consequences Epicurus founded bis preference for spiritual pleas ures over bodily pleasures, and not upon an original distinction of worth. He insisted, in accordance with his sensualistic psy chology, that the spiritual pleasures reduce in their simplest terms to bodily (aap£) 1 pleasures. The fundamental characteristics of the ethical atomism of Epicurus are shown most clearly in .his treatment of social relations. He recognized no natural community of man kind, but he treated all the mutual relations of individuals (1) as those which depend upon the will of the individuals, and (2) those which depend upon a rational consider- 1 Athen., XII. 546 (also Fr. 409). CONTROVERSIES OF THE SCHOOLS 325 ation of useful consequences. He regarded these human relations not as higher powers, but only as self-chosen means for individual happiness. In this spirit he dissuaded the Wise Man from entering upon marriage, because it threatens him with care and responsibility. So also he recommended avoidance of public life. He regarded the state as a union 1 that has arisen out of the need of mutual protection, and created by the rational reflection of the individuals. The functions of the state are conditioned in their entirety by the point of view of general utility. This purpose of law brings about certain universal principles as everywhere necessary, but law takes a variety of forms of single laws under different circumstances. Friendship is the only social relationship worthy of the Wise Man. It rests indeed, too, upon the calculation of mutual usefulness. Among wise and virtuous men, how ever, it rises to a disinterested communion, and in it the happiness of the individual reaches its zenith. It is thoroughly characteristic of the Epicurean conception of life, for its social ideal to be a purely individual relationship, viz., friendship. Friendship was particularly cultivated in this school, and in connection with its view of the Wise Man friendship easily got an insipid character of mutual admiration. The Xdde Biwaas is the reverse side of it, wherein indifference to political interest and responsibility, the selfish isolation of the individual, decay of national loyalty, is raised to a principle. With this egoistic withdrawal into private life, Epicureanism be came the " common sense " philosophy of the Roman world. For the strongest basis of despotism is that desire for enjoy ment with which every individual seeks in the quiet of his own life to save as much individual comfort as possible out of the universal confusion. The utilitarian politics of Epicurus has also its germ in that of the Sophists. Yet Epicurus seems to have been the first to carry politics out consistently, and thus also to have developed 1 Diog. Laert., X. 150 (from the Kvpiai 8o£oi) : to ttjs (pvaeas oUaidv eon ciipftoXov tov avpejiepovros els to pi) fiXdirreiv dXXijXovs /U7)Se jiXd- irreaBai. 326 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY the leading principle of political compact (avvOyK-rj). It was by the use of this theory that the Enlightenment of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries tried to conceive the state as the pro duct of the selfish reason of individuals who were without a state. There was, therefore, for Epicurus such a thing as right and wrong only where this sort of agreement about universal utility takes place between individuals.1 Lucretius has repre sented in a typical manner this supposed transition of man from a state of savagery to a state of society (V. 922 ff). If the insight of the reason shall afford peace of soul to the Wise Man, it accomplishes this principally by freeing him through correct knowledge from all superstition, erro neous representations of the nature of things, and therefore from all related idle fears and hopes which could falsely determine the will. In so far the insight is this cppbvnaK, being not only practical but theoretical in its purpose. To this end we need a physical view of the world which ex cludes all myths and miracles, all transcendent, religious, supersensible, and teleological aspects. Epicurus finds such a view in Democritus. Compare Alb. Lang;e, Gesch. des Materialismus, (2 ed. Iser- lohn, 1873, I. 74 ff.,"97 ff.). Familiarity with the theory of Democritus is said to have been made possible to Epicurus through Nausiphanes. At any rate, it is the most significant scientific influence which he experienced. Yet he is far from understanding and taking up into himself the body of thought of the Democritan system. He selected from the cosmology of Democritus what appeared useful for his shallow pseudo-enlight enment, and he left untouched what was really philosophically significant. The identification of his physical and metaphysical theory with that of Democritus has undoubtedly done the most to hinder an earlier recognition of the scientific greatness of Democritus. The renewal of Atomism by Epicurus is betrayed in the theory that nothing is real except the void and the atoms, and that every event consists merely of the motion of the atoms in empty space. Epicurus refused, however, to ac- 1 Kvpiai So^ai, 32 f . ; Diog. Laert., X. 150. CONTROVERSIES OF THE SCHOOLS 327 cept the fundamental thought of Democritus of the pure mechanical necessity of all motion. He replaced the origi nally irregular motion of the atoms in the absolutely direc tionless and boundless space, such as Democritus taught, by an originally uniform motion from above downward, which the senses appeared * to represent to him as absolutely given. This is the rain of atoms.2 Since the intermingling of the atoms could not in this way, however, be explained, he asserted that single atoms arbitrarily deviated in a very slight degree from the direct fall. In consequence, collis ions and vortices arose, from which the atom-complexes and finally the worlds came. Thus the cosmic theory of Epicurus again blended with that of Democritus and ser vilely followed it from this point on. Yet he depended on the theory of Democritus only in its most general characteristics of anti-teleology and anti-spiritualism. He took pains to explain that it is a matter of indifference how one answers particular scientific questions.3 That this gross representation of an absolute fall of the atoms is not of Democritan origin, but a new theory of Epicurus, can be safely accepted after the researches of Brieger and Liep- mann ; so also, Lewes, Hist, of Philos., I. 101 ; Guyau, Morale d'Epicure, p. 74 ; Plutarch, Plac, I. 3, 26 (Dox., 285) ; Cicero, De fin., I. 6, 17 ff. ; De fato, 20, 46 ff. When Lucretius (II. 225 ff.) made a polemic against the view that earlier was held as Democritan, which alleged that the collision of the atoms could be explained by the quicker fall of the heavier ones, he had in mind supposably the hypothesis of other Epicureans. These latter wished to proceed as determinists guided by the funda mental principle of the master, and this seems to have been at one time the inclination in the school. It is not, indeed, im possible that Epicurus in part used also this more mechanical method of explanation side by side with the acceptance of in finitesimal (eXdxiarov) declinations. (Cicero, De fato, 10, 22.) Arbitrary self-deviation from the perpendicular fall — a theory with which Epicurus destroyed entirely the theory of Democ- 1 Diog. Laert., X. 60. 2 Lucre., De rer. nat., II. 222. 8 Diog. Laert., X. 87 ff. 328 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY ritus — is only the solution of a self-created difficulty. That Epicurus prepared for himself this difficulty is to be explained from his anxious adherence to the truth of the senses. The way in which he explained it was suited to his ethical conception of the metaphysical independence of the individual. He made the deviation of the atoms from the perpendicular fall analogous to the voluntary activity of man. He showed himself to be in both cases the opponent of Democritus' leading idea of the elfi.app.evrj. (Cicero, De fato, 10, 23.) This anti-teleological conception, which Lucretius especially developed in details, and extended in an Empedoclean fashion to the apparently teleological organic forms, seemed to the Epicureans to be absolute deliverance from superstition. They spoke as little of natural religion as of positive religion. On the other hand, Epicurus developed a Democritan thought in order to imagine blissful gods in the intermundia, the empty space between the numberless worlds. These gods, undisturbed as they are in these worlds, appear in the eternal enjoyment of their self-satisfying peace as a glorified actualization of the ideal of the Wise Man who does not reach a state of perfection on earth. A gross sensualistic epistemology was joined to the materialistic metaphysics of Epicurus. The soul, whose materiality and mortality he especially emphasized, receives all the content of its ideas from sense perception. Sense, therefore, with its immediate evidence (ivapyetaj is the only criterion of truth. If concepts (irpoXgyfreK) arise through the aggregation of similar perceptions, and if out of these upon reflection concerning the causes of phenom ena, opinions (Sofat) and accepted views (viroXy^recf) are developed, the only criterion of their truth is in their re peated confirmation by perception. The Logic of Epicurus, or, as he called it, the Canonic, is lim ited to such meagre definitions. See Th. Tohte, Epikur's Krite- rien der Wahrheit (Clausthal, 1874). He purposely avoided the theories of concepts and syllogisms. In his school Philodemus accomplished something in the scientific construction of the hypothesis and the inductive method : see Fr. Bahnsch, Des EpicureerS Phil Sell rift, irepl ar)p.eiojv Kal arjpeiwaeoir, Lyck, 1879) ; K. Philippson, Dephil. libro, irepl arjpetwv Kal anp.eiaecov et Epi- SKEPTICISM AND SYNCRETISM 329 cureorum doctrina, logica (Berlin, 1881); P. Natorp, Forschungen, 209 ff. In the interest of this methodology which aimed at a theory of empirical knowledge, the later Epicureans merged with the younger Skeptics (§ 48). But in contrast to the out spoken positivism of the latter, the Epicureans held to the con viction that scientific concepts were formed to give us on the one side the probabilities of the imperceptible causes of phe nomena (dSyXov), and on the other the expectations about the future (irpoapevov) through the comparison of facts. 2. Skepticism and Syncretism. The strife concerning philosophical truth which waged fiercely between the four great schools, not only in Athens, but also in other intellectual centres, especially in Alexandria and Rome, necessarily presented to unprejudiced minds the skeptical question about the possibility and limits of human knowledge. This would certainly have happened, even if the question had not already come up in the earlier development of Greek philosophy, and if it had not re mained a current opinion since the time of the Sophists. It is perfectly comprehensible that the skeptical way of thinking should be consolidated during these school- controversies, and in contrast with them should become more and more systematic. At the same time, however, skepticism succumbed to the universal spirit of the time, when it was brought into most intimate relations with the question of the wise way of living. K. F. Staudlin, Geschichte. u. Geist des Skepticismus (Leipzig, 1794-95) ; N. Maccoli, The Greek Skeptics from Pyrrho to Sextus (London and Cambridge, 1869) ; V. Brochard, Les sceptiques Grecs (Paris, 1887). 48. The first to perfect the system and ethics of Skepti cism was Pyrrho of Elis, whose working years were con temporaneous with the origin of the Stoic and Epicurean schools. He seems to have confined himself essentially to personal instruction, while the literary champion of his 330 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY thought seems to have been his pupil, Timon of Phlius. The doctrine of skepticism was of such a nature that no school could form around it, and so it vanished with the next generation from the field of literature. Ch. Waddington, Pyrrhon et le Pyrrhonisme (Paris, 1877) ; R. Hirzel, Untersuchuncjen zu Cicero's philos. Schriften, III. 1 ff. ; P. Natorp, Forschungen, 127 ff. Concerning Pyrrho's life little is known. He lived from 365 to 275 approximately. That he was acquainted in his home with the Elean-Eretriau school, the Megarian Sophism (§ 28), is probable. It is very doubtful whether or not this happened through the medium of Bryso, said to be the son of Stilpo. A safer datum is that he joined the Alexandrian campaign with the Democritan, Anaxarchus. He later lived and taught at his home. No writings of his are known. When one speaks of the school of Skeptics, it lies in the na ture of the case that one does not mean an organized society for scientific work, like the four others. Although moreover the Greek historians here also speak of diadochi, yet for this as for later time it must be remembered that only the most distin guished representatives of the skeptical manner of thought (dywyrj) are meant. Among these Timon is of the first rank, while the other names in the time succeeding Pyrrho (Zeller, IV3- 483) are of no importance. Timon lived between 320 and 230 in Athens in his last years, and from his rich literary activity are preserved particularly fragments of his aiXXoi, in which he derides the philosophers. See C. Waehsmuth, De Timone Phliasio cete risque sillographis Grcecis with the frag ments (Leipzig, 1859). The direct derivation of Pyrrhonism from Sophistry shows itself partly in its reliance on Protagorean relativism, and partly in its reproduction of the Skeptical arguments found in the Cynic and Megarian teaching. As regards the relativity of all perceptions and opinions, Pyrrho as serted that if sense and reason were deceptive singly, no truth could be expected from the two in combination. Perception does not give us things as they are, but as they appear in accidental relations. All opinions, not excepting the ethical, are conventional (vogtoj, and not SKEPTICISM AND SYNCRETISM 331 of natural necessity. Therefore any assertion can be maintained against the opposite. Of contradictory propo sitions one is not more valid (oi pdXXov) than the other. We should on this account express nothing, but should withhold (iirexetv) our judgment. Since we know nothing of things, things are also indifferent (doidcpopa) to us. He that abstains from judgment is secure against a disturbed condition of mind resulting from mistaken views. The moral worth of the abstinence of judgment (eiro'xf]) consists in the fact that it alone can produce equanimity (drapa^ia), which is likewise the moral ideal of the Skeptics. The equal emphasis on drapa^ia by Epicurus and Pyrrho, ac companied by a most distinct disinclination to science, coincides with the idea of a common source of the two theories in the younger Democritans, Anaxarchus and Nausiphanes. But nothing is certain about it. That the Democritan view of the world rather than that of the teleological systems would neces sarily further an ethical quietism, is plain. But the hedonistic tendency and the one-sided emphasis of the Protagorean relativ ism — which was subordinated in Democritus — may be charac terized as a falling away from Democritus and a relapse into Sophism. Even if the so-called ten tropes in which later Skepticism formu lated its relativity of perception, should not be stated in this form in Pyrrho, nevertheless the Protagorean principle involved is current throughout his teaching. That he took pains to bring Skepticism into some sort of a system is to be seen from the division which Timon made, to wit, that there is a distinction between the constitution of things, our right relation to them, and the profit that we have to expect from them. That the last is the proper goal of the entire teaching is self-evident. The .) came from one of the most influential Jewish families in Alexandria. He headed the embassy in 39 and 40 that the Alexandrian Jews sent to Caligula. His writings, among which there is much that is doubtful and spurious, have been published by Th. Man- gey (London, 1742), C. E.. Richter (Leipzig, 1838 ff.), and stereotyped by Tauchnitz (Leipzig, 1851 ff.). See Ch. G. L. Grossman, Qucestiones Philonem (Leipzig, 1829, and other edi tions) ; Jac. Bernays, Die unter Philo's Werken stehende Schrift iiber die Ewigheit der Welt (published by Berlin Academy, 1877) ; Concerning the writing irepl rov iravra airovodiov elvai eXev- Oepov, see K. Ausfeld (Gottingen, 1887) and P. Wendland, Arch. f. Gesch. d. Philos., I. 509 ff. ; H. v. Arnim, Quellen- Studien zu Philo (Berlin, 1889) ; J. Drummond, Philo Judceus (London, 1888) ; M. Freudenthal, Die Erkenntnistheorie Philo's (Berlin, 1891). As early as the middle of the second century before this era there can be seen influences of Greek philosophy, especially Platonic, Stoic, and Aristotelian theories, at work iu the inter pretation of the Jewish scriptures ( Aristo bulus, Aristeas, etc.). All doctrines of any essential importance are included by Philo. In the philosophy of Philo, the theory of the transcen dence of God is more distinct than in any other form of Alexandrian thought. God is so far beyond all finiteness that he can be defined only negatively through the denial of every empirical quality (diroiof), and wholly abstractly, as an absolute Being (rb ov, — according to the Platonic principle also to yewiKiorarov). This absolute Being is beyond all human ideas of perfectness, even beyond virtue and wisdom. Nevertheless the divine Being is the force that forms the universe by his goodness and rules it with his might.1 Since God cannot enter into direct relations with impure and evil matter which in contrast to him is passive, potencies (ovvdgeti) go out from him with which 1 The references here are similar to those in the writing irepl Koapov 348 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY he forms and directs the world. These (Stoical) potencies were identified on the one hand with the Platonic Ideas, and, on the other, with the angels of the Jewish religion. Their unity, however, is the Logos,, the second God, the con tent, on the one hand, of all original Ideas (Xoyo<; iv8id0ero<; = aocbia), and, on the other, of the teleological formative forces (A070? irpocpopiKO'ij that reveal God's presence in the world. In man, as the microcosm, the spirit (vovia of an unknown author from the circle of Valentinians (published by Petermann, Berlin, 1851). As for the rest, the knowledge we have of the doctrine of these men is limited to what their op ponents say about them, especially Irenaeus (eAey^os koI dva- rpoirr) rrji vjevSoivvpov yvu>aeu>ta, falls on account of its unbridled longing for the Father and creates the sense world * through the demiurge. There was here at tempted for the first time in entirely mythical form the conquest of Greek dualism and the establishment of an idealistic mon ism, which was a fantastic precreation of neo-Platonism. In their teaching and their cult the Gnostic mysteries were so far distant from the Christian Church which had been continuously developing its organization, that Gnosti cism was placed under the ban as heresy. Its bold phi losophy of religion called forth on the one hand an ex treme reaction against turning faith into a science, and on the other a polemical limitation of dogma to the simplest content of the regula fidei. Tatian and Tertul- lian are to be named here : the one as the radical cham pion of Orientalism, which beheld in all Greek culture the work of the Devil ; the other as the ingenious and narrow- minded opponent of rationalism. Tertullian pushed the anthropological dualism so far as to maintain that the truth in the Gospel is confirmed just because it contradicts human reason. Credo quia absurdum. Contemporaneously with Tertullian and Tatian, Irenaeus (140-200) and his pupil Hippolytus combated the anti-Judaic philosophy of history of the Gnostics with the Pauline theory of a divine method of education. According to this theory the Judaic Law was " our schoolmaster to bring us to Christ." They also formulated a religious philosophy of history in that [! Windelband, History of Philosophy, 251, n. 2. — Tr.] 360 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY they conceived the historical process as a teleological series of acts of divine redemption, which expresses in the con ception of the church (eKKXyaiaj the ideal community of mankind. This anti-Gnosticism was not able to maintain itself without help from Greek philosophy (Stoicism in Tertullian, Philonism in Irenaeus and Hippolytus) and even from Gnosticism itself, especially in Tatian, who later went over entirely to Valentinian Gnosticism. Tatian was an Assyrian. His treatise, Trpos'EAA^i/as, which used the Justinian reflections for a polemic against all phi losophy and set up against the Greek pretended wisdom the faith of the barbarians, is to be found iu Otto's collection, Vol. VI. (Jena, 1851), printed lately by E. Schwartz (Leipzig, 1888). See Daniel, Tertullian der Apologet (Halle, 1837). Tertullian (160-220), in his last years champion of the Mon- tanists, is the Christian Stoic. His strict, relentless morality and his abrupt contrast of sensationalism and morality is con joined wdth a fantastic materialism aud sensualism. His numerous writings, partly apologetic, partly polemic, partly hor tatory, are published by F. Oehler (Leipzig, 1853 ff.). Compare A. W. Neander, Antignosticus ; Geist des Tertullian und Ein- leitung in dessen Schriften (2 ed., Berlin, 1849) ; A. Hauck, Tertullian' s Leben und Schriften (Erlangen, 1877) ; G. R. Hauschild, Tertullian's Psychologie und Erkenntniss-Theorie (Leipzig, 1880). This same spirit, but without the paradoxical originality of Tertullian, occurred later in the African Rhetorician, Arnobius, who wrote his thesis Aclversus gentes about 300 (published by A. Reifferscheid in the Corpus scriptorum cccl. Int., Vienna, 1875). He and Tertullian uphold in a typical way the theory that orthodoxy, intending to demonstrate authority, grace, and revelation to be absolutely necessary for men, suppresses the natural intelligence as far as possible, and makes com mon cause with sensualism and its skeptical consequences. Excepting some fragments, the writings of Irenaeus exist only in Latin translations. See Bohringer, Die Kirchc Christi (Zurich, 1861), I. 271 ff. ; H. Ziegler, Irenaeus, der Bischof von Lyon (Berlin, 1871) ; A. Gouilloud, St. Iremrus et son temps (Lyon, 1876). The work of Hippolytus, whose first book was earlier than the ejuXoao^ovpeva of Origen, is published by Duncker aud Schneidewin (Gottingen, 1859). See Bunsen, Hippolytus und seine Zcit (2 vols., Leipzig, 1852 f.). PATRISTICS 361 53. The scientific statement of the religion of the Chris tian church likewise took final form in Alexandria in the use of the Gnostic and the Apologetic theories by the School of Catechists. Clement of Alexandria (about 200) and Origen, the founder of Christian theology, were the leaders of this school. Guerike, De schola, quce Alexandria} floruit calechetica (Halle, 1824 f.) ; C. W. Hasselbach, De schola, quce Alexandria: floruit catechetica (Stettin, 1826) ; further the writings of E. Matter, J. Simon, I. Vacherot. The three chief writings that are preserved of Clement are Aoyos irporpeirriKos irpby6<; and arpuiparei's. The last has especial significance in the history of philosophy. Clement's dependence on Philo appears clearly in his teaching. It is mutatis mutandis the application of the principles of Philo to Christendom, and it is related to Christendom in exactly the same way as Philo's teaching to Judaism. Although there fore not throughout philosophically independent, Clement has the great significance that through him and the more orig inal form of his theory in Origen, eclectic Platonism, strongly mixed as it was with Stoical elements, was definitely crystal lized into Christian dogma. See Dahne, De yvwaei dementis Alex, et de vestigiis neoplatonicce philosophies in ea obviis (Leip zig, 1831) ; J. Rcinkens, De fide et yvdiaei dementis (Breslau, 1850) and De Clementc presbytero Alexandrino (Breslau, 1851) ; Lammer, Clement Alex, de Xoyw doctrina (Leipzig, 1855) ; Hebert-Duperron, Essai sur la polemique et la philosophie de Clement (Paris, 1855) ; J. Cognat, Clement d' Alexandrie sa doctrine et sa polemique (Paris, 1858) ; H. Treische, De yvdiaei Clementis Alex. (Jena, 1871). Origen (185-254), whose surname was the Adamantine, appeared early as teacher in the School of Catechists that had been directed by Clement. He attended afterward the lectures of Ammonius Saccus (§ 54). He had to endure much persecu tion on account of his teaching, and, driven from Alexandria, he spent his old age in Caesarea and Tyre. The most important philosophical writings of his are 7repi apx^v and Kara KeXaov. Celsus, a Platonic philosopher, wrote between 170 and 180 his dXr)8r)v : ov, ardavs, Kivrjai';, ravror-q'S, ereporrji)o-£9-d;cmons out of itself. In the mysterious NEO-PLATONISM 373 co-operation of the whole is the individual sympathetically bound and prophetically to be foreseen. All investigation of nature was here annulled, but the door to all forms of faith and superstition was opened. This comprehensive view of nature, however, was under these premises cleft in two. The entrance of the soul into the matter created by it is its fall into the darkness, its alienation from the divine source of light. The world of sense is bad and irrational. Yet, on the other hand, the world of sense is formed by the soul which enters into it as Xoyo? aireppariKos, and to that extent is it reasonable and beautiful. In this respect Plotinus, in spite of the dualistic point of departure made necessary by his religious problem, held distinctly to the Greek conception of the beauty of the world of sense, and he knew how to connect it in the most happy way with the fundamental outlines of his picture of the world. When he enthusiastically praised, in opposition particularly to the Gnostic disdain of nature, the harmony, soulfulness and perfection of the world, and proved this out of his idealistic construction of the world, he gave us a metaphysical aesthetic. Beautiful is the object of sense when it makes its A070?, its ideal form, its eloos, appear in a perceptible form. Beautiful is the world because down to the lowest deeps it is permeated and illuminated by the divine essence. Like a last farewell to the Grecian world was this theory of the beautiful which Plotinus brought into close connection with the ultimate principles of his system, and which he used for the first time as an integral part of a system of philosophy. To be sure, he strongly used Platonic and Aristotelian thoughts in it. But even the theory of the beautiful was not so fully developed by Plato, nor was it so essential a moment of Plato's as of Plotinus's system. The celebrated Ennead, I. 6, is doubtless the most original scientific achievement of Plotinus. The dis tinction of bodily and spiritual beauty, the contrast between the beauty of nature and of art, the organic insertion of aesthet ics partly into his metaphysical system and partly into the de- 374 HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. velopment of his ethics and psychology — all these are great points of view which Plotinus is the first conceptually to define. See Ed. Midler, Gesch. der Theorie der Kunst bei den Alten, II. 285 ff. (Berlin, 1837) ; R. Zimmermann, Gesch. der JEsthetik (Vienna, 1858), 122 ff. ; R. Volkmaun, Die Hbhe der antiken ^Esthetik oder Plolin's Abhandl. vom Schonen (Stettin, 1860) ; E. Brenning, Die Lehre vom Schonen bei Plolin (Gottingen, 1864) ; A. J. Vitringa, De egregio, quod in rebus corporeis con- slituil Plotinus pidcri principio (Amsterdam, 1864) ; J. Walter, Gesch. der ^.Esthetik in Alterthum (Leipzig, 1893), pp. 736- 786. Plotinus set out from the opposite point of view in his ethics, when he designated the share that men have in the divine life and their independence of the world as their goal ; and also when he conceived of the freeing of the soul from the body and its purification from sense — in a word, the turning away from the material — as the fun damental ethical task. There is not lacking a positive sup plement to this negative morality although only in small measure did the philosopher indeed find such positive siq - plementation in ethical or, as he called it, political virtues. Conduct was of little value to him, for it binds the soul to the material world. Social and political integrity is only a preparation by which the soul learns how to become free from the power of sense. Therefore the teaching of Plo tinus was also without significance for political life. His attempt to realize the Platonic Republic seemed to be not a political experiment but the realizing of a condition in which chosen men could live their true lives of " contem plation." The return of the soul to God consists in its soaring to the vovs from which it came. Pure sense-perception offers little help to the soul for this return; reflection affords rather more. The most potent incentive is found in love for the beautiful, the Platonic epco?, when the soul turns from sense impressions to the illuminating Idea. He who has an immediate recognition of the pure Idea, is pressing NEO-PLATONISM 375 on to higher perfection. Yet true blessedness is neverthe less attained only when man in an ecstasy (eKaraais) tran scending thought for a more complete contact and union (dtpr), airXcoaisj with the divine unity, forgets himself and the objective world and becomes one with the Godhead in such moments of consecration. Plotinus regarded this highest holiness as a grace which comes only to few, and to these but seldom. He granted that the culture of positive religion is a help to the attainment of this ecstatic condition, although in other respects he opposed posi tive religion. This help, however, had earlier seemed essential to Porphyry, and among the later members of the school it be came the all-important thing. 55. A pupil of Porphyry, the Syrian Jamblichus, used the philosophy of Plotinus as the groundwork of a speculative theology of polytheism, which co-ordinated all the cults of ancient religions in a systematic whole, and while exclud ing Christianity attempted to consider the religious move ment as complete. Among the enthusiastic supporters of this speculative theology are Theodorus of Asine, Maximus of Ephesus, the Emperor Julian, his friend Sallustius, and the martyr Hypatia. Jamblichus came from Chalcis in Coele-Syria, and listened to Porphyry and his pupil Anatolius in Rome. He himself went to Syria as a teacher and religious reformer, and had very soon a numerous school, which exalted him as a worker of miracles. Nothing further is known of his life, and his death also is only approximately set about 330. His literary activity was limited almost entirely to commentaries on Plato and Aristotle, as well as on the theological works of the Orpines, Chaldaeans, and the Pythagoreans. Portions of his exposition of Pythagoreanism are preserved : ireplrov UvOayopiKov J3lov (published by Kiessling, Leipzig, 1815 f., and Westermann, Paris, 1850) ; Ao'yos irporpeir- tikos eh tpiXoaov (published by J. Kapp, Frankfort on the Main, 1826, with details of his personality), and also the conclusion of his commentary on the Parmenides. This commentary shows markedly the influence of Proclus. See Ch. E. Ruelle, Le Philosophe Damascius (Paris, 1861, and also in Arch. f. Gesch. d. Ph. 1890) ; E. Heitz; (particularly), Der Philos. Damascius (in Strassburger Abhandl. zur Philos., Freiburg i. B. uud Tu bingen, 1884). Among the commentators who occupied a position of greater independence toward the neo-Platonic theory was Themistius, called 6 evtj>pa8rj?; and aidov are com bined in so multifarious a relationship, and with so many interchangeable meanings that a whole army of gods re sults. This same play repeats itself in the second sphere, and in part with the same categories. In the third sphere there are the seven Hebdoiuades of intellectual gods, among which, for example, the Olympians appear. This entire construction, which in accordance with the same scheme is carried in the psychical world to gods, daemons, and heroes, has no real intellectual motive at its basis. It is a kind of philosophical "mummification" of NEO-PLATONISM 383 Hellenism. This is partly due to the dialectic architectonic, and partly to the need of giving to every form of poly theism its place in the hierarchy of mythological formulae into which Proclus had translated the Greek conceptual world. The physics and ethics of Proclus show little individuality. He stood far off from the first, and adduced only this new thought that the material is not derived from the psychical, but directly from the aireipov of the first intelligible triad, and that it is fancifully formed by the lower world-soul, the foal's. His attempt in ethics is to lower the metaphysical dignity of the human soul and to make it appear thereby the more needy of the help of positive religious exercise and of divine and daemonic grace. Proclus thinks, therefore, that the characteristic of the soul is its freedom, and therefore its guilt. The steps of its redemption are here also "political" virtue, scientific knowl edge, divine illumination, faith, and finally ecstasy (pavia) for which a peculiar power of the soul is presupposed. The two great streams of theosophy which burst forth from Alexandria, on the one hand, into Christian theology, on the other into neo-Platonism, were not long separate from each other. Although neo-Platonism was destroyed by scholasticism, it sent its thought through a thousand channels into the orthodox as well as the heterodox de velopment of Christian thought after Origen. Both systems of thought found their perfect reconciliation in an original thinker, who was the philosopher of Christianity, — Augus tine. The doctrine of Augustine, however, was much more than a receptacle for the confluent streams of Hellenic- Roman philosophy. It was rather the living fountain of the thought of the future. His was an initiating rather than a consummating work, and therefore he does not belong to the history of ancient philosophy. BIBLIOGRAPHY (A list of works on Ancient Philosophy for English readers.) [Histories of Philosophy: by Stanley, London, 1655; Tenne- mann, Grundriss der Geschiohte der Philosophie, English tr. in Bohn Library, 1833, 1852; Ueberweg, 3 vols., 8th ed., tr. by G. S. Morris, New York, 1872-74 ; Hegel, Vorlesungen 'iiber die Geschiohte der Philosophie (vols. XIII. -XV. of the Complete Works), tr. by E. S. Haldane, 3 vols., London, 1892-96; Schwegler, tr. by Seelye, New York, 1856 ff., and by J. H. Sterling, 7th ed., Edinburgh, 1879; Cousin, tr. by 0. W. Wight, 2 vols., New York, 1889; Lange, Geschiohte des Ma- terialismus, 3 vols., tr. by E. C. Thomas, London, 1878-81; Erdmann, 3 vols., tr. edited by W. S. Hough, London, 1890; Lewes, 2 vols., 3d ed., London, 1863; Windelband, tr. by J. H. Tufts, London and New York, 1893 ; Weber, tr. by F. Thilly, New York, 1898. 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Histories of Greece, Greek Literature, etc. : Grote, History of Greece, 6th ed., 10 vols., London, 1888; Mahaffy, History of Classical Greek Literature, 2d ed., 3 vols., London, 1892; Laurie, Historical Survey of pre- Christian Education, London, 1895; Sidgwick, History of Ethics, London and New York, 1892; Flint, History of the Philosophy of History, New York, 1894; Bosanquet, History of JEsthetics, London and New York, 1892; Wundt, Ethics, vol. II., tr. by M. F. Washburn, New York, 1897 ; Cushmau, History of the Idea of Cause, Har vard College Doctorate Thesis, Harvard Library; Botsford, History of Greece, New York, 1899; Holm, History of Greece, English tr., 4 vols., Boston, 1894; How and Leigh, History of Rome to the Death of Ccesar, New York, 1896; Bury, History of the Roman Empire, New York, 1893; Mommsen, History of Rome, 5 vols., New York, 1869-70; Peter-Chawner, Chronolog ical Tables of Greek History, New York ; Kiepert, Atlas Antiquus, Berlin and Boston, 1892 ; Kiepert, Manual of Ancient Geography, New York, 1881 ; Teuffel, Geschichte der romischen Literatur, tr. by G. C. W. Warr, New l'ork, 1891; Jebb, Primer of Greek Literature, New York, 1878; A. S. Wilkins, Primer of Roman Literature, New York, 1890; Ma haffy, History of Classical Greek Literature, 2 vols., New York, 1891; Cruttwell, History of Roman Literature, New York, 1878; Middleton and Mills, The Student's Companion to Latin Authors, New York, 1896; J. W. Mackail, Latin Literature, New York, 1895. The pre-Socratic Greeks : Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy with translations, London and Edinburgh, 1892 ; Patrick, Heracleitus on Nature, Baltimore, 1889 ; Bonn's Classical Li brary, translations ; Encyclopaedia Britannica, especially article by H. Jackson on Sophists ; Davidson, The Fragments of Par menides, in Jour, of Spec. Phil. IV., 1, St. Louis, Jan. 1870. Works on Socrates : Plato, Apology, Crito, and Phcedo, Phce drus, Meno, Thecetetus, etc. ; Xenophon, Memorabilia and Sym posium; Aristotle, Metaphysics, I., 6 ff . ; Grote, History oj BIBLIOGRAPHY 387 Greece, vol. VTIL, ch. 68 ; Potter, Characteristics of the Greek Philosophers, Socrates and Plato, London, 1845; R. D. Hamp den, The Fathers of Greek Philosophy, Edinburgh, 1869 ; see also articles in Encyclopaedia Britannica. Works on Plato : Jowett, Translation of the Dialogues, with introductions and analyses, in 5 vols., 3d ed., New York and London, 1892; Grote, Plato and Other Companions of Socrates, 3 vols., London, 1865 ; Pater, Plato and Platonism, New York and London, 1893; Van Oordt, Plato and His Times, Oxford and the Hague, 1895 ; Bosanquet, A Companion to Plato's Re public, New York, 1895; Hartmann, Philosophy of the Uncon scious, tr. by E. C. Thomas of the chapter On the Unconscious in Mysticism ; Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, London and New York, 1886 ; see also Essays ; Campbell, in Encyclo paedia Britannica, article Plato ; Nettleship, in Hellenica, The Theory of Education in Plato's Republic ; Mill, J. S., Essays and Discussions. Works on Aristotle, Translations : Psychology in Greek and English, page for page, with introduction and notes, by E. Wallace, Cambridge, 1882 ; Nicomaclman Ethics, tr. with analysis and notes by J. E. C. Welldon, New York and London, 1892 ; also by Williams, 1876, Chase, 1877, Hatch, 1879, Peters, 1881, Gillies, 1892 ; Politics, tr. by Welldon, Cambridge, 1888, also by Jowett, 2 vols. 1885-88, Ellis, with introduction by Morley, 1892 ; On the Constitution of Athens, tr. with notes by Kenyon, London, 1891; Politics, tr. by Wharton, Cambridge, 1883 ; Rhetoric, tr. by Welldon, London and New York, 1886 ; Metaphysics, Organon, and History of Animals, tr. in the Bohn Library ; Lewes, Aristotle, London, 1864 ; Grote, Aristotle, 2 vols., incomplete, 3d ed., London, 1884; E. Wallace, Outlines of the Philosophy of Aristotle, 3d ed., Oxford, 1883; A. Grant, Aristotle, in Ancient Classics for English Readers, Edinburgh and London, 1878 ; Davidson, Aristotle and Ancient Educational Ideals, New York, 1892 ; Th. H. Green, Works ; Bradley, in Hellenica, on Aristotle's Theory of the State ; Taylor, Disserta tion on the Philosophy of Aristotle, London, 1813; Bain, Senses and Intellect, suj>plement by Grote, London, 1869. 3»8 BIBLIOGRAPHY The post-Aristotelian period: W. Wallace, Epicureanism, London, 1880; Grote, Aristotle (see Aristotle) ; Jackson, Seneca and Kant, 1881; Bryant, The Mutual Influence of Christianity and the Stoic School, London, 1866; Capes, Stoicism, London, 1880; Lightfoot, St. Paul's Epistle to the Philippians, 4th ed., London, 1878. For Epictetus, the Aiarpiflai and 'E-y^eiptSioj/, tr. by T. W. Higginson, Boston, 1865; for Marcus Aurelius, tol ek iavrov, tr. by G. Long; Watson, Life of Marcus Aurelius, London, 1884; Drummond, Philo Judosus, London, 1888; Schiirer, His tory of the Jewish People, 5 vols., New York, 1891 ; Munro, tr. of Lucretius' poem, De Natura Rerum, London, 1886; Masson, TJie Atomic Theory of Lucretius, London, 1884; Courtney, in Hellenica, subject, Epicureanism; Maccoll, The Greek Sceptics, London, 1869; Owen, Evenings with the Sceptics, London, 1881; A. Seth, in Encyclopaedia Britannica, article Scepticism ; Cicero, Translations of, in the Bohn Library; Tredwell, Life of Apollonius of Tyana, New York, 1886; Pater, Marius the Epicurean, London and New York, 1888 ; Yonge, tr. of Philo, 4 vols., Bohn Library, London. Works on neo-Platonism and Patristics: Plotinus, tr. of parts of works of, by Th. Taylor, London, 1787, 1794, 1817; Harnack, Neo-Platonism in Encyclopaedia Britannica; St. Paul, Epistle to Corinthians, I., XV. ; ibid., Philippians, I. ; Gale, Life of Protagoras, of Plotinus, and Epistle to Anebo, by Porphyry, Oxford, 1678 ; Taylor, Life of Pythagoras, London, 1818; Chiswick, Egyptian Mysteries, 1821, also by Taylor; Schaff and Wace, Library of Nicene and post-Nicene Fathers, New York, 1890 ; Mansel, The Gnostic Heresies, London, 1875 ; Allen, Continuity of Christian Thought, Boston, 1884 ; Donaldson, Critical History of Christian Literature and Doc trine ; Neander, Expositions of the Gnostic Systems, tr. by Torrey, Boston, 1865; ibid., Antignosticus, tr. in Bohn Li brary; Bigg, Christian Platonists of Alexandria, Oxford, 1887; Harnack, Encyclopaedia Britannica, article Origen; Taylor, tr. of works of Proclus. INDEX Academy (see also under names of its representatives). Older, 224 ff ., 249. Middle, 224, 332. New, 224. Acusilaus, 27. Adrastus, 303. iEdesius, 376. iEnesidemus, 33 ff. JEschines, 127. iEschylus, 109. Alcidamus, 114, 123. Alcmaeon, 106, 108. Alexander of Aphrodisias, 303 f., 380. Alexandrian philosophy, 342. Alexinus, 137, 139. Amafinius, 321. Amelius, 367. Ammonias Saccus, 362 ff., 366. Ammonias, 379. Anatolius, 375. Anaxagoras, 80-87, 88 f., 93 1, 102 f., 110 f., 165 f., 175 f., 199 f., 229, 314. Anaxarchus, 173, 331. Anaximander, 36, 39-43, 49, 70. Anaximenes, 36, 43-45. Andronicus, 237 f., 243. Anniceris, 145 f., 149. Antimaerus, 114. Antiochus, 224 f., 338 f. Antipater, 303. Anytns, 126 n. Antisthenes, 140-145, 135. Apellicon, 243. Apelles, 357. Apollinaris, 353. ApoUodorus, 43, 303. Apollonius (mathematician), 343. Apologists, 352 ff. Apuleius, 349. Arcesilaus, 224, 332 ff . Archagoras, 114. Archelaus, 87, 103 f., 123. Archytas (philosopher and mathema tician), 94, 225 f., 229. Aristeas, 25, 347. Aristides, 352. Aristippus, 145-151, 135. Aristobulus, 347. Aristo of Chios, 302 f. Aristo of Ceos, 302. Aristo of Cos, 302. Aristophanes, 113, 127, 130. Aristotle, 224 f., 36 n., 37, 74, 81, 83, 124, 152 f., 160, 188, 230-292, 314 ff. Aristagoras, 24. Aristoxenus, 298 f., 301 ff. Arius Didymus, 339. Arnobius, 360. Arrian, 306. Asclepiades (The), 24. Asclepiodotus (philosopher), 379. Asclepius, 380. Aspasins, 303. Athenagoras, 352 f. Athenian (embassy), 340. Atomists, 68, 73, 87-93, 151-174, 104, 229. Augustine, 228, 356, 383. Ayerroes, 237. Bacon, 154. Bardesanes, 355 f. 390 INDEX Basileides, 355 f., 358 f. Bias, 20. Bibliography concerning philosophy, 7-15. Bion, 141. Boethius, 380. Boiithus (Peripatetic), 303. Boethus (Stoic), 305. Cadmus, 25. Callicles, 114, 122. Callippus, 272. Carneades, 224 f ., 332 ff., 339. Carpocrates, 355 f. Catechists (school of), 352. Cebes, 94. Celsus, 361. Cerdon, 357. Cerinthus, 357. Chamaileon, 302. Chrysanthius, 376. Chrysippus (philosopher), 303 f. Cicero, 338 ff. Clean thus, 303 f., 316. Clearchus, 302. Cleidemus, 105. Clement of Alexandria, 356, 359 ff. Clinias, 94. Clitomachus, 332. Cnidian Sentences, 24. Colotes, 320 f. Cornutus, 306. Crantor, 225 f., 230. Crates of Athens, 225 f., 303, 332. Crates the Cynic, 140. Cratinus, 109. Cratylus, 103, 110, 175. Critias, 114, 123. Critolaus, 302, 339. Cynics, 140, 145, 135, 296 f. Cynics (later), 307 f. Cyrenaics, 145-151, 135, 171, 296 f., 320 f. Damascius, 378 ff. Demetrius of Phalerus, 302. Demetrius, Cynic, 307. Democritus, 151-173, 87 ff., 195, 207 n., 263 ff., 322, 326 f. Demonax, 307. Dexippus, 376. Diagoras, 123. Dicasarch, 298, 301 f. Diodes, 94, 107. Diodorus Cronus, 136 f. Diodorus of Tyre, 302. Diogenes of Apollonia, 101 f. Diogenes of Sinope, 140-144. Diogenes the Babylonian, 303 i., 340. Diogenes Laertius, 157, 237 f. Dionysius (logographer), 25. Dionysius of Syracuse, 146. Dionysiodorus, 120. Duris, 302. Echecrates, 94. Ecphantes, 103, 229. Elean-Eretrian school, 139. Eleatics, 46-52, 59-65, 152, 1 75, 1 93 ff ., 260 f. Empedocles, 2.3, 69, 73-80, 81 ff., 88 f., 102 f., 113 f., 164. Epicharmus, 109. Epictetus, 306 f. Epicurus and Epicureans, 319-329, 1 64 ff., 297,331 f. Epimenides, 27. Eratosthenes, 303. Erennius, 367 f. Eristic, 138. Euathlus, 114. Eubulides, 137, 139, Euclid (philosopher), 125 f., 170. Eudemus, 298-301, 239, 245 f. Eudorus, 339. Eudoxus, 225 f ., 229, 272. Euernus of Paros, 114. Euemerus, 145 f., 150. Eupolis, 109. Eurytus, 94. Euryphon, 24. Eusebius, 356, 376. Euthedemus, 120. Galenus, 341. Galileo, 154. Gassendi, 154. Gelon, 18. INDEX 391 Gnomic poets, 26, 28, 32, 50, 109. liorgias, 113 f., 119, 79, 142. Greeks, the early, 16 ff. ; and the Orient, 21 ff. ; poetry, 18, 24, 26 f.; later poetry, 109. Hecateius, 25. Hegel, 243 n. Hegesias, 145 f., 150. Hegias, 379. Hellenic-Roman philosophy, 293 ff. Heracleides of Pontus, 220 f ., 229. Heracleides Lembus, 302. Heracleitus, 46, 52, 59-63, 70 ff., 76, 82 f., 88 f., 93 ff., 110 f., 117 f., 159 f., 175, 193 f., 260 1, 310 ff. Heracleitus (Stoic), 306. Heracleiteans, 103. Herbart, 194. Herennius, see Erennius. Herillus, 303, 308. Hermarchus, 321. Hermeius (Academician), 233 f. Hermeius (Neo-Platonist). 379. Hermes Trismegistus, 349. Hermias, 378. Herminus, 303. Hermippus, 302. Hermodorus, 176. Hermotimus, 27. Herodotus, 108, 24. Hesychius, 237. Hesiod, 20. Hicetas, 105. Hiero, 18. Hipparchia, 140 f. Hipparchus, 302. Hippasns, 103. Hippias, 112, 122. Hippodamus, 123 n. Hippocrates of Cos, 107, 24, 101, 156. Hippolytus, 356 f., 359. Hippo, 105. Homer, 28. Hypatia, 375 f. Id^us, 101. Irenajus, 356, 359 ff. Isiodorus, 379. Isocrates, 30 n., 231 f. Jamblichus, 366 f., 375-377. Jewish Alexandrian philosophy, 346 ff. Julian, 375 f. Justin, 353 ff . Justinian, Emperor, 378. Lactantius, 352 f. Lacydes, 332. Leucippus, 69, 87-93, 159 f, Logographers, The, 25. Longinus, 367. Lucretius, 320 f. Lycis, 94. Lyco, 126 n., 302. Lycophron, 114, 123. MANICHiEISM, 358. Marcion, 357. Marcus Aurelius, 306 f., 337, 353. Marinus, 378. Martyr, Justin, 352 f. Maximus, 376 f. Megarians, 135-140, 194. Meletus, 126 n. Melissus, 69. Melito, 353. Menedemus, 140. Metrodorus of Lumpsacus, 28, 87 320 f. Metrodorus of Chios, 173. Metrocles, 140 f. Minucius Felix, 352 f. Moderatus, 343. Musonius, 306. Mysteries, The, 26, 31 f., 47 56. Nausiphanes, 173, 326, 331. Neleus, 243. Neocleides, 229. Neo-Platonists, The, 365-383. Neo-Pythagoreans, The, 97, 342 ff. Nicolaus, 303. Nicomachus, 343 f. Numenius, 343 f. 392 INDEX Ocellus, 94, Oinomaus, 307. Olympiodorus, 367, 378. Origen (Christian), 356, 361 ff., 367. Origen (Neo-Platonist), 367. Orphics, 32. Panaetius, 305, 337. Parmenides, 23, 46, 59-65, 69 ff. 73 f., 80, 88 ff ., 93 f ., 110f., 135 f. Pasicles, 34, 302. Peisistratus, 18. Periander, 18. Pericles, 87. Peregrinus Proteus, 307. Peripatetics, The, 298 ff . Persaeus, 303, 306. Phaedo, 140. Phasdrus, 320 f. Phaleas, 123 n. Phanias, 302. Phanto, 94. Pherecydes, 27, 30. Philip of Opus, 189, 225 f. Philodemus, 320. Philolaus, 93-100. Philo of Larissa, 224 f., 338. Philo the Jew, 343-349. Philopomus, 378 ff. Photius, 379. Pindar, 109. Pittacus, 18, 20. Plato, 174-224, 124 ff., 146, 151, 232 ff ., 250 ff ., 260 f . Platonism, Eclectic, 339 ff. Plotinus, 366-375. Plutarch of Chasronea, 349. Plutarch of Athens, 376 f. Points of view regarding philosophy, 6 f . Poetry, Early, 18. Potamo, 339. Polemo, 225, 303. Polycrates, 18. Polymnastus, 94. Porphyry, 367 ff. Posidonius, 305, 337, 345. Positivism, 116. Priscianus, 380. Priscus, 376. Proclus, 366 f., 377-383. Prodicus, 112, 115, 123. Prorus, 94. Protagoras, 114-123, 146 f., 152f., 1591, 175, 190 ff. Protarchus, 114. Pyrrho, 173, 329 ff. Pythagoras, 28 ff., 23, 56, 79, 171, 344 ff. Ptolemseus, 237. Pythagoreans, The, 23, 24, 26, 64 ff., 72, 77, 79, 93, 100, 175 ff., 199 ff., 229 f. Eufus, C. Musonius, 306. Sallustius, 375 f. Saturninus, 355 f. Satyrus, 302. Seneca, 305 f. Sextians, The, 341 f. Sextus Empiricus, 333 f . Seven Wise Men, 19, 132. SicOian school of rhetoric, 7, 9, 113. Simmias, 94. Simon, 127. Simonides, 109. Simplicius, 379 f. Skeptics, The, 329-337. Socrates, 123-135, 152, 172, 296 f. Socratics, The, 135 f. Solon, 20, 28. Sopater, 376. Sophists, The, 34, 108-123, 128 f., 159. Sophocles, 109. Sosigenes, 303. Sotion (Peripatetic), 302. Sotion (Neo-Pythagorean), 341, 343. Speusippus, 224 f. Sphajrus, 303. Stilpo, 136, 139, 303 f. Stoics, The, 303-319, 230, 299. Strato, 299-302. Synesius, 376. Syrianus, 377 f. INDEX 393 Tatian, 359. Teles, 141. Tertullian, 356, 359 f . Thales, 20, 22, 36-39, 105. Themistius, 378 f. Theodorus (mathematician), 114. Theodorus (Cynic), 145-151. Theodorus (of Asine), 375. Theophilus, 353. Theophrastus,243f.,298f.,300ff.,332. Theosebius, 378. Thrasymachus, 123. Thrasybulus, 39. Thrasylms, 157. Thucydides, 108. Timaeus, 94. Timon, 330 f. Tubero, 335. Valentinus, 355 ff. Varro, 339 ff. Xantippe, 126 n. Xeneniades, 114, 141. Xenocrates, 225 f., 230 f., 233, 303. Xenophanes, 28, 46-52, 56, 62, 267. Xenophon, 124, 127 ff., 183f. Xuthus, 104. Zeno of Elea, 51, 65-69, 119, 136 ff. Zeno of Cition, 137, 303 ff. Zeno of Tarsus, 303. Zeno of Sidon, 320. Zenodotus, 379. YALE UNIVERISTY LIBRARY 3 9002 02628 1890 Judaica and Hebraica from the Library of Arthur A. Cohen ¦na?nrrnm YALE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY