Cb78 21

YALE UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

Ri; ill ARKS

SAMUEL HOAR, OF MASSACHUSETTS,

THE RESOI^UTIONS INTBOCUCEB

MR. JARVIS, OF MAINE, AND MR. WISE, OF VIRGINIA,

'Bi:Lirii^i.ts

JN THE 'HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

THunsDAy., Jantiaut 21, '1836. *

WASHINGTON:
N&l'ION.^l, INTETXIOEN't'ER OFFICE.

REMARKS.

The House having under consideration the following resolution, offered by
Mr. Jarvis, of Maine:
Resolved, That, in the opinion oFtVis House, the subject of the abolition of slavery in
flie District of Columbia, ought not to be entertained by Congress, ^nd be it further
resolved. That, in case any petition praying the abolition of slavery in the District of
•Columbia be hereafter presented, it is the deliberate opinion of the House that the same
«ug'ht to be laid on the table, without being referred or printed.
And the following resolutiofi, submitted by Mr. WasE, as aji» amendment
thereto, viz:
"Resolved," and insert. That there is no power of legislation granted by the consti
tution to the Congress of the United States to abolish slavery in the District of Colum-
bisi and that any attempt by Congress to legislate upon the subject of slavery will be
not only unauthorized, but dangerous to the union of the States.
Mr. Hoar addressed the House as follows:
Mr. Speaker: The resolutions on your table present for the considera
tion of the House a dry constitutional question. Not only has this question
been discussed by several gentlemen who have addressed the House, but the
subject of slavery, as it exists in the States, its bearing on the union of the
iStates, the relation which the several States and the General Government
J)ear to each otfaer, as far as this subject is concerned, have been freely and
warmly debated. I propose to offer some remarks on the constitutional
question, and to answer some of the observations respecting the conduct of
the Governments of the Northern States, which have been made in the course
of the discussion of these resolutions.
Before I enter on the consideration of the question whether Congress can
constitutionally abolish slavery in the District of -Columbia, I wish to express
my views on the subject which seems to have caused the principal alarm and
apprehension in the minds of gentlemen from the Southern portion of the
Union. It has been observed, by a number of the members from that part
of the country, that the abolition of slavery in this District is an " entering
wedge" to the abolition of slavery in the States in which it exists. This
seems to be a very favorite expression with many of the gentlemen who have
addressed the House against these petitions. Notwithstanding the very high
authority in its favor, the figure does not seem to me in the least degree
appropriate. By an " entering wedge," gentlemen are understood to mean,
in this case, a method of passing the boundary between right and wrong, in a
manner almost imperceptible at first, and advancing gradually to the comple
tion of the wrongful purpose. It is difficult to imagine a more clearly defined
limitation of power than is afforded by the constitittion on this subject. The
" hitherto shalt thou come, and no further," is as clearly marked here as in
.any other part of that instrument. If the wedge shall ever be used, it will
ibe introduced head foremost.
There is no section, clause, nor expression in the constitution which would
seem to suggest or countenance the idea, that it was intended by its framers
to give to Congress the power to abolish slavery in the States. If the exist-

ence of slavery is recognised, the control of it is left, by the framers of the
General Government where they found it, with the States, where it exists^
Among the numerous political heresies started in different parts of the coun-*
try, I may have heard the doctrine that the General Government does pos
sess the power to abolish .slavery in the States, alluded to as one entertained
by " some people," and " somewhere;" but, as far as I can recollect, / have
never heard any person, from any part of the country, assert or pretend
that Congress possesses this power. Whether slavery be right or wrong, in
itself, the subject is exclusively for the consideration of the State Gov
ernments within the limits of the States where it exists. The Southern!
States cannot, therefore, for a moment, admit the power fn the Generaf
Government to interfere with this subject in the States, without yielding
their claim to independence. No Northern State can wish them to make
this admission; because, by parity of reasoning, their own State powers would
be merged in the power of the General Government.
Far different are the provisions of the constitution in regard to this Dis
trict. To Congress is given the power " to exercise exclusive legislation, in
all cases whatsoever, over" this District.
This language is as comprehensive, as plain, as unambiguous, as any which
could have been used to confer the power in question. If gentlemeti^ deny.*
ing the existence of this power, were called on for proof of the existence of
any other power in Congress, they would find it difficult, as far as the mere
form of expression is concerned, to name one more indisputably conferred. It
then is incumbent on those who deny the existence of this power to show
that, notwithstanding the universaKty of this expression, it was the intention of
the framers of the constitution to except from the grant the power in ques
tion. This seems to be conceded. It is not pretended, and indeed cannot
be pretended rationally, that the language used is not sufficient to convey
the power. It is said, however, that though the language used would, by itic
usual import, convey all po-wer of legislation, or rather exclusive power of
legislation, yet it cannot be supposed that it was intended to confer on Con
gress unlinMted power over the inhabitants and property within the District.
It is said that this is not "an unlimited, absolute, despotic power of legis
lation over this District"— fMr. Leigh.) " That private property cannot be'
taken for public use, and much less for private use, without compensation" — -
(Mr. Pickens.) That " the local Legislature of this District can pass no law
which the States are, by the constitution,, prohibited from passing;- that there
are great leading principles in the nature of society, and' of government, whicln-
prescribe limits to our legislation; and that, fortunately, here the constitutiot*
speaks too plainly to be misunderstood, declaring that private property shal?
twt be taken for public use, without just compensation"^ — (Mr. Wise.)
Comprehensive and strong as is the fenguage of the constitution above
cited, I do not contend, Mr. Speaker, that it was its design to confer unlimit
ed and despotrc power on Congress over this District. I have not very cri'
ticatly examined' alt the exceptions which have been mentioned in the course
of this debate, because most of them are irrelevant to the present question,.
Those which have been orged as having a bearing oiv the present question,.
will be carefully examined.
If slavery cannot be abolished m this District, without violating the princi
ple which prohibits Government from- taking private property for public
use, without compensation, slavery here must remain undisturbed. In deter-
inining the question, however, whether this great rule of legislation would be-
violated by gratJting the prayer of these petitions, it wiil be well to advert tc

a rule which seems almost a mere truism, viz: " That the intention of the
parties to a contract, or of the Legislature in passing a law, is to govern the
construction." The intention, then, of the framers of the constitution is here
the object of inquiry. The authors of this instrument knew well the force of
the language they employed. They were exceedingly cautious in guarding
all points where danger was apprehended. It will not be said that there is
any more direct expression, used in any part of the constitution, declaring the
sense of the parties to this instrument, and indicating an intended exception
to the general grant, than has been above mentioned.
I shall not much insist on the proposition that though slaves beproperty, they
are also jfersons, and, as persons, their rights may be abridged or enlarged,
as justice and the good of the whole may seem to require. It might be urged
that the Government of any State, consistently with all the rights of indivi
duals, might extend the property of a free parent, in the labor of his child,
one year, or five years, beyond the common-law age of freedom; or abridge,
to the same extent, that property in the parent, and give it to the child.
It is to be observed that these resolutions equally embrace all other modes of
abolishing slavery, as well as the immediate and universal emancipation of the
slaves. Some of the arguments also are founded on the supposed embarass-
ment to Southern members of the Government, coming to this District, with
their families, while resident here for the discharge of public duties. It is
very apparent that all these difficulties may be easily avoided.
In order to solve the question, then, " how did the parties to this instrument
regard the point now in issue, when the constitution was made?" inquiry
should be made, what was the practice of the several Governments with which
the parties recently had been, or then were, connected.
That the Government of Great Britain possessed this power, probably will
not be doubted. That Government has recently exercised the power in re
lation to her West India possessions. But I do not rely on this, except to
show that the stretch of power which Parliament had exercised towards the
colonies induced the framers of the constitution to guard vigilantly against
conferring dangerous powers on Congress. A more important inquiry is,
what was in fact the understanding and the practice of the parties themselves on
this subject at this time? The answer to this inquiry, it is believed, must
settle this question.
Several years before the United States' constitution was made, (as early as
1780,) one State in the Confederacy had wholly abolished slavery witliiu its
limits. Several others had passed laws by which the same end has since that
time been gradually attained. Each of these States adopted such means as,
to its own Legislature, seemed advisable. No special power was granted to
any one of the State Legislatures by the people, nor was such power ever
asked. The language used in the State constitutions, or charters, neither was,
nor could be, more clear or explicit in conferring the power under which they
acted, than tliat above quoted from the constitution of^ the United States.
It is said that the constitutions of the present slaveholding States give no
power to their respective Legislatures to abolish slavery in those Slates, and
that now power must be given to enable these Legislatures to accomplish that
purpose. Conceding that the gentlemen who have made this remark are belter quali •
fied to give a true construction of the constitutions of their respective Stales
than I am, and that these constitutions, in fact, give to the Legislatures of
those States no such power, I still contend that the fact (if it be such) has but
little effect on the present question. It is perfectly undeniable that the South-

ern members of the United States' convention who framed the constitution,
knew as well, when that instrument was formed, as any one now knows, what
the views and what the practice were in the Northern States of the Confed
eracy on this subject. They then knew that, in the Northern part of the
country, it was clearly and fully believed, and indeed was doubted by no one,
that language no more plain and explicit than the clause now under consider
ation did confer the power on the several Legislatures to abolish slavery,
without any other consent of the owners of the slaves than that which they
gave as members of the community, when they formed their respective con
stitutions, or when they entered into their respective societies. Having this
knowledge of the views and the practice of the Northern States, the Southern
members at that time did not disagree with the Northern in opinion on this
subject; or, if they in fact entertained a different opinion, they gave no notice
of this difference, which, as far as the present question is affected, would be
the same thing.
It probably will not be denied by any one, that the result of this inquiry will
be the same, whether it is supposed that the same opinion was entertained by
the members from the North and the South on the construction then given to
the State constitutions at the North, or that there was a difference of opinion
on this point at that time, and the difference was concealed, or not expressly
notified by the Southern members of the Confederacy.
Suppose, for the sake of stating clearly the argument, (what no person would
seriously impute to the sages who represented the Southern portion of the
country in the convention, on account of its disingenuousness,) that, having-
assembled for conference apart from their Northern associates, they should
have held this language: " It is understood at the North, that the power to
" abolish slavery is vested in their State Legislatures, and given them by
" language no more comprehensive or strong than that by which this consti-
-" tution gives the power intended to be conferred on Congress over the future
" seat of Government. At the South, this is understood differently. We
" believe that the people of the respective States must give the power of
" abolishing slavery in so many words, or by other and more precise language;
" or we believe that the liberation of the slaves would be a violation of the
" great rule, that private property cannot be taken for public use without
" compensation. It is not necessary for us to state our opinion on this sub-
" ject to them. It is not necessary for us to state to the people of the North,
" that we think their ideas of justice and propriety on this subject too much'
" resemble the principles and the practice of the British Government, which
" we unitedly condemn. When they shall attempt to act in the government
" of the district to be ceded on the same principles on which they now act
" in their respective State Governments, we may then ut-ge our objections
" to their principles and their measures."
This is as favorable a statement of the case as the history of the transac
tions in question will warrant. On this statement, considering the North and
the South as two parties to the constitutional compact, the South are bound to
adopt the Northern exposition by every system of law which men hold sacred,
whether moral, honorary, municipal, or international.
It IS believed that no part of this statement of facts is questionable. The
views of the Northern States on the subject of slavery, and the power to con
trol it by the State Legislatures, were as well known at the South then as
now — as well known as that there were Northern States in existence. If the
difference of opinion on this subject then existed, as no limitation to this com
prehensive language was introduced into the constitution, certainly the limita-

tion cannot now be introduced by implication. But it is not easy to perceive
any good reason for believing that such a difference of opinion did then exist.
The idea of this implied limitation of power comesnearly halfa century too late.
An objection to the existence of the power in Congress to legislate on this
subject has been mentioned by several gentlemen in the course of this debate
in this House, founded on the construction of the constitutions of the States
of Virginia and Maryland.
It is thus stated by a gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. Pickens.)
That gentleman observes: " I take higher ground, and contend that, accord-
" ing to the biU of rights of Maryland, and the constitution of Virginia, these
" States themselves could not have ceded absolute and unrestrained power
" over private property of any kind in this District." " If Virginia and Mary-
" land had attempted to cede absolute power over this subject, they would
" havo violated the rights of their own citizens."
A gentleman (Mr. Leigh) whose high intellectual and moral worth tends
strongly to give a currency to his opinions, even on questions of doubt and dif
ficulty, in an argument published in the newspapers, observes: " The argu-
" ment for the power of Congress I understand to be this: that the grant to
" Congress of the power of exclusive legislation, in all cases whatsoever, over
" the District, vests in Congress all powers which the Legislatures of Virgi-
" nia and Maryland may rightly exercise within their respective jurisdictions."
Undoubtedly, sir, Virginia and Maryland neither did cede, nor could cede,
absolute power, nor any power o\er persons of any description, nor priv-ate
property of any description, in this District. If they could do this, the ab
surdity stated by the gentleman from South Carolina would follow. A State
Government might cut up its territory, and sell that and its citizens, to any
Government, savage or civilized, on earth. This proposition rests on a prin
ciple no less clear and certain than that Government is a trust not transfer-
rible — an agency without power of substitution. Precisely so far as either
of these States should attempt to convey any power of legislation of any kind '
to the General Government, so far would that State Government attempt to
alienate its trust or agency. So, sir, with great deference, I contend that the
power which Virginia and Maryland might have exercised over this District
is not the measure of the power which Congress may exercise here. All that
Virginia and Maryland could do, and all they professed to do, as to power
over the District, was to relinquish each its own power. Most manifest it is,
that no State in the Unioir-could transfer any portion of its power to the
United States, or to any other Government. Unless it be true that a relessor
of property, after a release, made without condition or reservation in the in
strument of release, still retains dominion over the property released, no more
reference is to be made to the constitutions, or laws, or usages of Virginia or
Maryland, than to the constitutions, laws, and usages of any other State in
the Union. AH the power which Congress possesses is derived through the
constitution of the United States, from the people of the United States —
equally, and no more than equally, with the rest, from the people of Virginia
and Maryland. It is a contradiction to say that Congress shall exercise ex
clusive legislation, and yet that the laws or constitutions of either of these
States limit that power of legislation, or are in any way binding on Congress.
The above cited provision of the constitution of the United States, it is con
tended, is " the only source," if not " the only measure," of the power of
Congress. ,The act of cession of Virginia contains this proviso: " Provided, That
" nothing herein contained shall be construed to vest in the United States any

8
" right of property in the soil, or to affect the rights of individuals therein."
The author of the argument above cited (Mr. Leigh) contends that the' word
" therein" refers to both members of the sentence, and that the sense is jhe
same as if it had been written " any, right of property in the soil therein, or
to affect the rights of individuals therein."
If this be the true construction, the citizens of Alexandria have still the
right to be represented in the Legislature of Virginia, and have still all the
rights which they ever enjoyed as citizens of that State. If nothing in the
act of cession affects the rights of any individual in the ceded territorj', those
rights remain wholly unchanged by the act, and Congress for many years has
been exercising an unwarranted power in every act of legislation over this
District. The resolutions under consideration deny all power in Congress to interfere
with slavery in this District.
It has been said, " if we are deprived of the free use. of our property, we
are, in effect, deprived of our property."
The South claims to hold its slaves as property, with all the incidents and
rights pertaining to other property. Be it so: what is the power of Congress
over the trade of the country in all sections of the Union? Not a bale of
broadcloth, not a hogshead of sugar, not a cask of wine, no article of neces
sity nor of luxury, can be introduced into the country, but by observance of the
rules prescribed by Congress. An excise is imposed and collected on the sale
of such articles of domestic growth, and at such times and places as Congress
chooses to prescribe. Acts of Congress have long since been passed to facil
itate the sale and transfer of slaves within this District; and yet it is contended
that Congress has not the constitutional power to prohibit the making this ten
miles square the factory of slave-dealers from the Southern and Western sec
tions of the Union. Heretofore Congress has , legislated on the subject of
the transportation of slaves from one State to another, prohibiting with much
particularity certain proceedings with them, considered injurious to the com
munity. [Act 1807, ch. 77, (or 67,) sees. 8, 9, 10; act of 1820.]
Mr. Speater, the Northern States are required to interpose, by legislative
enactments, to suppress the efforts of the abolitionists, and to deliver up to
the officers and Governments of the South, for trial and punishment at the
South, Northern citizens, who have never left the limits of their respective
States, for a violation of a law enacted by a Southern Legislature. Charges
of a grave character are made against the whole Northern section of the
Union, collectively, imputing to that portion of the country insincerity in their
professions of regard for the jpeace and the welfare of the South, because
they have not complied with these requests.
A case is brought into notice by a gentleman from Tennessee, (Mr. Pey
ton,) which he considers and urges as a case supporting this heavy accusa
tion against the North, and as a violation of the law of comity, which every
independent State or nation is bound to ob$erve towards a neighboring State.
The case stated is this: A grand jury of Alabama prefers an indictment
against a citizen of New York, who has never entered the limits of the terri
tory of Alabama, for the commission of an alleged crime in violating a law of
the last-mentioned State. The Governor of Alabama demands of the Gov
ernor of New York the surrender of the supposed culprit to the Government
of Alabama, to be tried by the courts of the last named State, by the laws of the
same State, and for a violation of a law enacted by a State into whose terri
tory the offender never entered until transported there for trial and punishment.
The bare statement of such a claim would seem to be sufficient to place it in

its true light, bfit for the cliaracter and standing of those who thus come for
ward in its support. It is because the Chief Magistrate of one of the States in
the Union and an honorable member of this House urge this claim on the
North, and especially because a refusal by one Northern Governor to comply
with this request is made a ground of criminating the whole Northern section
of the country, that gives it a claim to notice.
What is the great fundamental principle of our Governments? Is it not
that the people shall govern themselves? In the case above stated, the law
is enacted by a Legislature wholly foreign to him who is claimed as its sub
ject. The legislator is in no way nor degree amenable to him, or to those
who are said to be subject to the law; nor have the latter, in any way or
degree, given to the former any authority or power to control their conduct.
To allow this principle would indeed introduce a strange slate of things.
The highest judicial tribunals of the State of JVew York cannot officially
understand the laws of another State, until they are proved as facts in the
particular case in which they are to be applied; and yet the most uneducated
adult person in the State of New York would be exposed to be seized, trans
ported a thousand miles from his home, tried for a breach of one of those
laws, which the judges of his own State cannot know, and, it may be, con
demned to fine, imprisonment, or death, for doing an act which, if judged
by the laws of his own State, is perfectly innocent. Mr. Speaker, if this
be not slavery, I will acknowledge the obligation to any one who will inform
me what slavery is.
There are many provisions of the constitution manifestly repugnant to the
claim set up in this case, but it cannot be necessary further to examine the
subject. It is said that the abolitionists wish to abolish slavery in this District, in
order that they may have a proximate and convenient position in which to
carry on their future operations against the South. The petitioners are
represented as saying, " give us whereon to stand, and we will move the
[southern] world." Any person casting his eye on a map of the country,
and noticing the length of line by which Virginia and Maryland are now
bounded by non-slavehoiding States, will probably think they must be mis
erable engineers to suppose this little spot often miles square can afford much
aid to the accomplishment of their plans. The abolition of slavery in this
District would probably have very little effect on the slaves, or on slavery, in
any of the States.
Another ground of complaint, urged by several gentlemen in the course of
the debate, is this: It is said that the essays of the abolitionists have for their
object the excitement of uneasiness and discontent among the slaves, and
that their tendency is to produce insurrection and servile war. They fur
ther allege that the writing and printing of the essays, being carried on with
in the limits of independent States, and being injurious to the slaveholding
communities, the latter communities have a right to complain of the pro
ceeding, and to demand the suppression of those publications, as libellous
and seditious in their nature, by the punishment of their authors.
This complaint deserves serious attention. It presents for consideration
questions of great and acknowledged difficulty. That a person standing on
one side(' of the line between two States, may, in various ways, inflict an
injury on a person on the other side of the line, and that the guilty party is
justly punishable; that, in many cases which may be imagined, he ought not
to be protected, and would not be protected, in any well-ordered State,
would seem not to be questionable. Although this case has been stated in the

10
course of the debate, to prove the propriety of the complaint and demand
above stated, it does not seem to accomplish the purpose. It remains still
necessary to inquire how far the publications above alluded to are wrong in
their nature or tendency, and how far, if wrong, it is practicable to correct
the wrong. I trust, sir, that the Northern Legislatures, and people gene
rally, desire faithfully to observe the federal compact, and as faithfully to per
form all the duties of good neighborhood. Gentlemen from the South, I
suppose, will admit the impropriety of asking from Northern Legislatures
the enactment of laws such as, under like circumstances, the Southern Legis
latures would refuse to sanction. Obligations of the kind in question, if they
exist, are reciprocal. It is said that the principles of international law re
quire this interposition on the part of the Northern States. There, doubt
less, are precedents in great abundance for indictments, and punishments of
real or supposed seditious, . fanatical, and treasonable publications. The
eminent scholar and philanthro^iist. Dr. Channing, the pride and the boast
of his countrymen, one of the great lights of the age, who has been so pe
culiarly noticed by the gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. Pickens,) has
heretofore written several essays, any one of which would, under the reign
of Henry VIII. or of either of his daughters, have carried him to the
stake. The pioneer of truth, he who, in advance of his coteraporaries, dis
covers and fearlessly advocates the cause of truth, will often find that, like a
soldier in an enemy's country in advance of his corps, he is concentrating on
himself the missiles of the foe. It is not enough, however, to cite precedents
in distant ages, or in countries where principles of government, essentially
different from our own, are in operation. Authorities, to avail as authori
ties, must be generally approved in our own age and country. One case,
and one case only, has been cited to prove this law and practice. It is the
case of the indictment, in England, of Peltier, on the complaint of Bona
parte's minister. The gentleman who cites this case (Mr. Hammond) says,
" If England, where more battles have been fought for the liberty of speech
" and the press than in any portion of the world, felt bound to indict a jour-
" nalist for libelling her greatest enemy — the enemy of the whole human race —
" is it unreasonable to ask you to extend the same justice to the grossly slan-.
" dered and deeply injured people of the South?" It would be very easy to
adduce almost any number of precedents of indictments and punishments,
found and inflicted for libels on Governments, or for seditious writings. That
such precedents exist, by no means proves what must be proved, to lay a
just foundation for the complaint in question, which is, that, at the present
day, the Southern States would themselves prescribe to their own citizens.
such laws as they require to be enacted at the North. In the above cited
case of Peltier it ought to appear that his punishment (if sentence had been
awarded and punishment inflicted) was approved by the public voice of the
citizens of free States. The gentleman did not state whether, after a delibe
rate consideration of the argument of Peltier's counsel, he thinks his punish
ment would have been approved by the gentleman, who cited the case, himself.
Suppose the language above cited from the gentleman's speech had been
used, not in public debate, but had been printed by him in the reign of
Bonaparte, and application had been made by Bonaparte's minister to the
Government of the United States, or of South Carolina, to institute a prosecu
tion against him for the words as libellous: who can believe that the applica
tion would have been successful? Yet what could have been said of that ty
rant worse than'that " he was the enemy of the whole human race?" I do not
mean to say or to intimate that this language is unjust. Far from it. Lan-

11
guage of like import was used concerning him by persons, and in instances
innumerable, in every State of the Union, and probably in every month from
his accession to the throne to the day of his departure for St. Helena. A
similar statement might be made concerning each of the successive Govern
ments of France, for many years subsequent to 1789. What remarks have
we heard in this debate concerning the treatment of Ireland by the English
Government? Charges of tyranny, of oppression, of unrelenting cruelty,
have been uttered, repeated, and reiterated, in the public prints of our country,
with all the force and in all the forms which the English language can sup
ply. While this language has here been used, numerous insurrections and
rebellions have broken out and been suppressed, with more or less bloodshed,
in Ireland. Yet who has heard of an indictment in this country for a libel
of the British Government? Would Southern juries consent to indict and
convict their fellow-citizens for this liberty of speech or of the press, as an
offence at common law, or by the law of nattpns? Would Southern legisla
tors prohibit the utterance, with perfect freedom, of any opinion concerning
any Government on earth? The members of the Holy Alliance have not
always been spoken of as perfectly " holy" by Americans. Probably no
one here has been very apprehensive of punishment on this account.
The present Chief Magistrate of South Carolina, a gentleman who has
often instructed and delighted not only his auditors in this hall, but the peo
ple of this nation, has recently, in an official communication to the Legisla
ture of his State, given utterance to sentiments which, carried to their
legitimate, practical consequences, would produce great and radical changes
in the Government of every Northern State, and, if received as true, would
produce as much discontent among the inhabitants of the North as any thing
which has been uttered by any northern abolitionist could produce at the
South. Now, should a northern man ask for an indictment against any citi
zen of South Carolina for uttering similar sentiments, either orally or in
print, he would be thought insane. Yet the difference between the two
cases is this: In one case, those on whom the unfavorable influence is to be
exerted cannot generally read any thing which is written, whether good or
bad. In the other case, those who are to be affected can read, and do habit
ually read, whatever is written on public affairs. In the one case, liberty
and its institutions are brought in question; in the other, slavery and its
concomitants are the subjects of discussion.
An instance of legislation on the subject of seditious writings has occurred
in the Government of the United Slates. What was the opinion of that law
generally at the South need not be slated. It certainly was not such as to
render it probable that any statute regulation of the press, as far as expres
sion of opinions on subjects of public interest should be concerned, would
soon be attempted.
. Could any Legislature of the State of Virginia, for instance, be induced to
prohibit, by statute, the most full and free expression of opinion on any sub
ject, either of politics, morals, or religion? Could the Legislature of that
State, by any act of legislation, succeed in preventing the citizens of that
State from a full and free expression of opinion; or deter them from a fear
less discussion of any subject pertaining to the public welfare; or hinder their
advocating any plan for the advancement of the greatest good of the greatest
number, however wild or heretical? It may be presumptuous in an inhabit
ant of another State to express an opinion on the subject; but it is believed
they could as easily, by legislation, exclude the tide' waters from their own
Chesapeake.

12
I have thus far, Mr. Speaker, proceeded on the supposition that the abo-
itionists are wholly in error in their theory; and I do not intend at present
to discuss the question, whether slavery is a blessing or a curse, nor whether
the abolitionists be fanatical or rational. Suppose, then, that there is an
opaque body at the North, " radiating darkness" on the regions of the South,
and producing unreasonable discontent in a portion of the inhabitants: what
ought to be done? A band of furies in Paris, in the reign of Robespierre, were
hurrying a victim to their common gallows, (the lantern post,) and were about
to execute on him what (in some sections of our country) is called Lynch law,
on account of some real or supposed heretical opinion on the subject of govern
ment, when the object of their rage saved his life by proposing the pertinent
question to those who held him in custody, whether they expected to see any
better, after they should have suspended him at the lantern post, than before?
What, Mr. Speaker, is the antagonist principle, or the appropriate corrective
of speculative error? Is it physical force? Will you enact a bill of pains
and penalties for absurd reasoning, or hypocritical cant? Will you punish,
as criminal, false inferences in regard to facts, in newspapers or pamphlets?
The practice would be new in this country. A late King of France tried an
experiment there, within a few years, on the freedom of the press; the result
need not be staled. It is universally admitted that, in this country, there are
newspapers in great numbers so conducted that their statements scarcely
afford the slightest presumption in favor of their truth; yet, for the sake of the
incalculable benefit to be derived on the whole from a free press, the im
mense evil is tolerated, and probably will be tolerated. The slander of in
dividuals depends on different principles, and will be punished by grand juries
and traverse juries. Seldom, however, I believe, will an attempt be success
fully made to punish, by indictment, any one for any writing professing to
have in view the advancement of the public good*, on account of its seditious
nature or tendency. I do not mean to assert that a case never has occurred
in which this has been judiciously done, nor that it can never be done here
after; but it does seem that a careful examination of the cases in which this
has been attempted will not lead to a conclusion very favorable to them.
What, then, is to be done? It is asked, when was fanaticism put down by
reasoning? I answer, that it has, probably, been put down by reasoning as
often as 'by force. If honest but mistaken men are to be opposed, let the
sword lie still in the scabbard, and take up the pen. Southern gentlemen will
not distrust their own power to meet argument with argument, when truth is
on their side. I am quite sure that some of the Southern gentlemen will ad
mit the inexpediency and injustice of sending a man to become cool within
the walls of a prison, merely because he has been a little too much heated in
debate. If mere fanaticism is in question, the most effectual antidote is neglect.
If, in two centuries, there has been but one insurrection among the slaves of
the South, it is difficult to believe that gentlemen have not overestimated the
danger to be apprehended from that source, in consequence of any essays to
be sent from the North. The Southern States can make such provision, as
to them shall seem expedient, for the punishment of any person, from what
ever quarter of the worid he may come, who shall be found attempting to
instigate their slaves to insurrection and rebellion. If any such person shall
suffer, having been fairly tried for his offence, he will probably suffer with
little more sympathy than others excite who suffer for their crimes.
1 have no more of an inclination than I have of a right to dogmatize on
this threadbare subject. Perhaps my views are wholly wrong. It may ap
pear, within some few months, that Northern legislators will find no difficulty

13
in accomplishing what is required of them; or, if they should meet difficulties,
some Southern statesman may suggest a method of obtaining their object,
w])ich, upon examination, will be approved by the public voice. If so, all
freemen will rejoice that, at length, that great desideratum in legislation is
supplied — a method of effectually suppressing the licentiousness of the press,
without infringing its liberty.
It is readily granted that it is scarcely possible for man (o inflict a greater
evil on his fellow-man than is inflicted by the malicious or thoughtless dis
semination of falsehood. But can human tribunals so distinguish between
the different classes of writers, as to send one class to the penitentiary, and
give due rewards to (he other? That this can in no instance be done, is not
affirmed. The experience of the world thus far, however, would seem to apply
to this case generally the mandate — "let both grow together until the harvest."

' LIBRARY