YALE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY THE LIFE BELISARIUS. (LORD MAHON.) SECOND EDITION. LONDON: JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET. 1848. LONDON : BRADBURY AND .EVANS, PRINTERS, WHITEFBIARS. PREFACE. The events related in the following pages fall within the scope of Gibbon, in his justly celebrated history, and had he treated of them with that fulness of detail wliich distinguishes some other portions of his work, any further attempt to record them would be both unnecessary and presumptuous. But although the space he has allotted to them is well proportioned to his general limits and design, yet he has dwelt so lightly on several important transactions, has omitted so many circumstances, and has merely alluded to so many others not unworthy of attention, that this interesting period may, perhaps, be thought to require a more particular narrative. A careful consideration of the original authorities has also led me in some cases to new conclusions; and thus, for instance, the mendicity and loss of sight of Belisarius, which every writer for the last century and a half has treated as a fable, may, I conceive, be established on firm historical grounds. VI PREFACE. An ancient and authentic testimony to that effect is now brought forward, which, though already printed, has hitherto been overlooked in the examination of this question. I could not discover any fresh historical manu scripts relating to my subject in the Royal libraries of Paris or Madrid. Having some years ago read Joinville's Histoire de St. Louis, with the notes of Ducange, I happened to recollect that an unpublished life of Belisarius is quoted by the latter, and with this clue I found the work at Paris, in a volume containing several other treatises, and marked 2,909 in the Catalogue of Greek Manuscripts. It proved, however, to be a poem of no greater antiquity than the fourteenth century, written in the same metre as the Chiliads of Tzetzes, and nothing more than a professed fiction, merely selecting Belisarius as the hero of some fabulous achievements, and having of course no better claims to credit than Marmontel's romance.* December, 1828. * A fuller account of this Manuscript, which relates a fabulous conquest of England by the Greeks, was communicated by me to the Society of Antiquaries, in November 1832, and will be found printed in the " Archceologia," vol. xxv. NOTE TO THE SECOND EDITION. In sending forth this new edition after an interval of almost twenty years, I have not made either any alteration from, or any addition to, the first. But I am desirous of noticing two most able essays, which, in reference to my work, have proceeded from different quarters, on the much debated question of the mendicity and loss of sight of my hero. The first of these essays is from no less an autho rity than M. von Hammer, the justly celebrated Oriental scholar and historian, and appeared in the Jahrbiicher der Literatur of Vienna, in 1 S3SJ. M. von Hammer, in a most courteous style, and after several unmerited compliments to my work in general, expresses his disbelief of the popular story which I have maintained, founding his disbelief especially on the fact that Marcellinus, whom he blames me for not having consulted on the question,* is wholly silent * " Den Marcellinus hat er (Lord Mahon) gar nicht zu rath gezogen." P. 1S4. via PREFACE. as to the alleged beggary and blindness. In writing to M. von Hammer soon afterwards, I took the liberty to express my surprise at this statement, on the ground that the Chronicle of Marcellinus, as printed in Father Sirmondr's Collection,* has its latest entry under the date of a.d. 558, and could not, therefore, possibly contain any allusion to an event which must have occurred in, or after, a.d. 563. M. von Hammer honoured me with a reply dated July 3, 1832, in which he observes that his state ment had been incorrectly printed, and that, instead of Marcellinus, he intended to say Malala.f In that case, however, his former charge against me, of having failed to consult this author, must surely fall to the ground ; since on reference to the passage in my work (page 454 of the first edition, and page 442 of the present), it will be seen that the case of Malala is very fully discussed. I have there shown that the part of Malala's Chronicle, which, from the date, might be supposed to contain the account o* Belisarius as reduced to want and deprived of sight, has, unfortunately, perished from a failure of the * Vol. ii. p. 269—236. + " Statt Marcellinus sollte Malala gedruckt worden seyn, indem ich von diesem nicht von jenem sprechen wollte." (An Lord Mahon, den 3 Julius, 1832.) PREFACE. IX manuscript, — that it is now impossible to ascertain whether Malala did or 4 CHAPTER II. Kohad, King of Persia . 25 Causes of hostility . . . 26 j Kohad renews the war .... 28 a.d. 525. First expedition of Belisarius . , "29 f He is named Governor of Dara . . ib. Xll CONTENTS. PAGE He chooses Procopius for his secretary . 29 Character and histories of Procopius . . . . 30 a.d. 528 y Skirmish of Mindon 33 * Belisarius is appointed General of the East . . . 34 a.d. 530. The Persians invade Mesopotamia . . 35 Battle of Dara ...... 37 a.d. 531. The Persians invade Syria . . . 40 u' Manoeuvres of Belisarius ... 41 Impatience of his soldiers . 43 April 19. Battle of Callinicum . . .45 ¦ Death of Kobad, and accession of Nushirvan . 47 * Peace concluded ... 48 The WiNTER^Belisarius returns to Constantinople . 49 * He marries Antonina ... ib. a.d. 532. Her Hfe and character . . ib.. Jan. 13. Great rebellion at Constantinople, surnamed Nika 50 Its causes .... ib. Hypatius is proclaimed Emperor . . 55 Danger of Justinian ... ib. He meditates flight . . . ib. Jan. 18. ^The rebellion is suppressed by Belisarius . . 58 CHAPTER III. Conquest of Africa by Genseric, King of the Vandals 61 He extends his kingdom from Tangier to Tripoli 65 His internal government ..... 66 He reduces Sardinia and Corsica ib. His sack of Rome, and naval wars . 67 Expedition of Basiliscus against him 7<> Treaty of peace with the Emperor Zeno 71 Death of Genseric ... ib. Reign of Hunneric . ib. Reign of Gundamund ... 72 Of Thrasimund . .... ib. And of Hilderic . . 73 Usurpation of Gelimer . . 74 a.d. 533. i'' Justinian meditates an expedition to Africa . . 75 Public fear and reluctance at Constantinople . . ib. All the generals, except Belisarius, shrink from the command . ..... 76 CONTENTS. Xlll PAGE Alleged revelation in favour of the war . . 76 Account of the fleet and army . ... 78 June. Departure from the capital . . 80 A halt at Heraclea . . . . . . . 81 Another at Abydos .... ib. Belisarius enforces discipline . . ib. The fleet proceeds to Methone ... 83 Distress of the soldiers at that place . . . ib. The expedition sails for Sicily . . . 84 . Ingenuity of Antonina . . . . . ib. Mission of Procopius to Syracuse .... 86 September. Belisarius reaches the African coast ... 88 ' Great council of war ... ib. Plan of operations proposed by Archelaus . , 89 Opposed by Belisarius .... .91 The army disembarks ... 93 Favourable augury ...... ib. Progress of Belisarius . . 94 Skilful plans of Gelimer to overthrow him . . 98 14. Battle of Decimus 99 16. Belisarius enters Carthage . , . . .105 Singular effects from his rapid success . . , . 107 Preparations of Gelimer at Bulla ... 109 He musters an army of one hundred thousand men . 110 Conspiracy against Belisarius at Carthage . . .111 Dec 16. Battle of Tricamaron . . .113 ; Belisarius pursues Gelimer . . . . .115 ' The Vandal monarch takes shelter on Mount Papua . 118 He is besieged by the Romans . . . ib. Belisarius returns to Carthage . . . . 119 a.d. 534. Conquest of Sardinia and Corsica . . . 120 Claim on Lilybasum ... ib. Internal settlement of Africa . . .122 April. Capitulation of Gelimer .... 128 ] Extinction of the Vandal monarchy ... ib. Cabal against Belisarius . . . . , ib. Suspicions of the Emperor . . . ib. Intercepted letters .... 129 Belisarius determines on returning . . . 130 Honours paid him at Constantinople . 131 His triumph ..... . . ib. Spoils of the temple of Solomon . .132 XIV CONTENTS. page a.d. 535. Sole Consulship of Belisarius . . ... 134 Abolition of that dignity ... ib. Fate of Gelimer . . . . . 1 35 Observations on the effects of the Vandal conquest . 136 CHAPTER IV. Reign of Theodoric the Great, King of the Ostrogoths 138 He is succeeded by his grandson Athalaric . .139 Regency of Queen Amalasontha .... 141 Usurpation of Theodatus . . . . 144 Grounds for war with the Romans . . . ib. Belisarius sails from Constantinople at the head of an armament . . . . . . . .145 Lands at Catania and defeats the Goths . 146 Conquest of Sicily ..... ib. Siege of Palermo . . . ib. Dec. 31. '"^Belisarius enters Syracuse . . 147 a.d. 536. State of Africa . . . 1 49 Invasion of the Moors ...... 151 March 28. Rebellion at Carthage . . . . 153 April. Adventurous expedition of Belisarius to Africa . . 154 Effects of his landing .... ib. He pursues the rebels .... 155 Battle of Membresa . . . . ib. He is recalled to Sicily by a mutiny of his troops 158 Treaty of peace between Justinian and Theodatus . 160 Success of the Goths in Dalmatia . 163 The negotiations are broken off .164 Belisarius crosses over to Reggio . ib. Defection of Prince Ebrimur . . ib. Siege of Naples . .... 165 Speech of Belisarius to the Neapolitan deputies . . 166 The Goths and the Jews urge the citizens to defence . 168 Several assaultsrepulsed . . . 169 Singular stratagem . . . . . 1 70 Forbearance of Belisarius . . . .171 The city is taken and sacked . ... 174 Belisarius protects the Neapolitans . . . . 176 Dethronement and death of Theodatus, and proclama tion of Vitiges . „ 177 CONTENTS. ' XV Dec. 10. Skilful plan of Vitiges for the prosecution of the war . He retreats to Ravenna ..... His treaty with the Franks Zeal of the citizens of Rome .... Belisarius enters that city PAGE 179180181182 183 CHAPTER V. a.d. 537. Active preparations of Belisarius at Rome 185 Several towns and districts declare in his favour . . 18U February. Successful Bkirmish at Perugia . . 188 King Vitiges musters an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men ... . ib. His march from Ravenna . . 189 Skirmish at Narni .... ib. March 11. Adventurous encounter near the Milvian bridge 191 12. Siege of Rome by the Goths commences . . 197 New levies and .other measures of Belisarius . 201 Disposition of the Italians . . 203 Summons from the Goths . . . ib. Their military engines . . . 204 Alleged promise of St. Peter . . . 206 30. General assault at the Salarian gate . . 207 Ib. At the sepulchre of Hadrian . . 208 Ib. And at the Prsenestine gate . . . 210 Ib. Bloody battle beneath the walls of Rome 211 Dispatch to Justinian . . 212 April 2. The Goths take Porto 213 22. Belisarius receives reinforcements . . ib. His sallies 216 June. Enthalius brings him treasure from Constantinople . 219 The Goths intercept all further supplies . . ib. Distress begins to be felt at Rome . . . 220 Singular remains of Paganism . . . ib. Temple of Janus in the Forum . . 221 November. Correspondence of Pope Silverius with the Goths ib. He is deposed and banished by Belisarius . 222 Speech of Belisarius to the Roman citizens . 22-1 Procopius is sent to Naples . . . 226 He is joined by Antonina ..... ib. Reinforcements from Constantinople reach Campania . 227 XVI CONTENTS. PAGE ' !/ Stratagem of Belisarius at Rome . . 228 His conference with Gothic ambassadors 229 Proposal of a truce . . . 230 Arrival of the reinforcements at Ostia . . . 231 Belisarius sallies forth by night to visit them . ib. They reach Rome ....... 232 Dec 21. Truce for three months begins ? . . ib. a.d. 538.1 Some relinquished fortresses are seized by Belisarius . ib. Opinion of Grotius on this proceeding . 233 John the Sanguinary is despatched to Alba . ib. Death of Constantine . . . 234 Vitiges breaks through the truce . . . . 237 His stratagems ...... ib. John the Sanguinary surprises Rimini . . . 240 March 21. The Goths raise the siege of Rome . 241 Ib. Battle near the Milvian bridge . . . 242 Vitiges lays siege to Rimini .... 244 T f The eunuch Narses brings reinforcements from Con- June. < D I s tan tinople . . . . . 2 45 His character ... , ib. Counsel of war at Fermo . . 247 Relief of Rimini .... 249 Factious cabals of Narses ... . 250 Revolt of Milan from the Goths 251 Dec Reduction of Urbino by Belisarius 254 Milan is retaken and sacked . . 256 a.d. 539. -| Feb. or > Narses is recalled by the Emperor . 257 Mar. Belisarius besieges Osimo ... . 258 Invasion of Italy by Theodebert, King of the Franks . 260 He attacks both Goths and Romans . . 263 His distress for provisions . ib. Dreadful famine in Italy at this time . ib. Letter to Theodebert from Belisarius 264 Theodebert retreats , . . . . 265 Capitulation of Osimo .... . 266 Belisarius invests Ravenna . .... 267 Correspondence with Queen Matasontha . . .269 A treaty of partition is signed at Constantinople . 270 Belisarius refuses to ratify it 271 Proposal to him to restore the Western Empire . 272 CONTENTS. His seeming compliance He induces the Goths to capitulate Dec The Roman army enters Ravenna . a.d. 540. Submission of every Italian city but Pavia Recall of Belisarius His prompt obedience Captivity and fate of Vitiges . page 273 ib. 274 275276 277 ib. CHAPTER VI. Chosroes or Nushirvan King of Persia 279 His just grounds for war with the Romans . . . ib. He invades Syria ..... 280' He reduces several cities, and besieges Antioch . ib. The city is taken by storm ... . 284 Magian sacrifice at Seleucia . . . . .286 Nushirvan advances to Apauiea . . . . ib. Fragment of the True Cross, and alleged miracle . ib. Nushirvan passes the Euphrates . 288 Retires to winter quarters . . . . . 291 k.o. 541. Belisarius is appointed general ... ib. He assumes the command at Dara . . . 292 June. He invades Persia .... . ib. Conquest of Colchos by Nushirvan . . 293 Plans of Belisarius for the campaign . . 295 Baffled by the disobedience of his officers . 29o Engagement near Nisibis ..... 299 Belisarius marches onwards . . . . . 300 He sends Arethas to overrun Assyria . .301 Siege of Sisauranum ... . . 302 Perfidy of Arethas 303 Belisarius is compelled to retreat . . . . 304 He is summoned to Constantinople . 305 .n. 542. Opening of the next campaign . . . ib. Nushirvan invades Syria ... . 306 And marches towards Jerusalem . . . ib. Flight of the Roman army . . . 308 Belisarius returns to the East . . . . . ib. His letter to Buzes and to the other chiefs . ib. He fixes his head-quarters at Europus . . . 309 Embassy of Abandanes ..... 310 Stratagem of Belisarius ... ib. XV1U CONTENTS. PAGE Nushirvan is deterred from his enterprise and retreats 312 Belisarius is again recalled . . . 314 Great defeat of the Romans at Dubis . ib. Further hostilities checked by the plague . 315 Intrigues of Antonina ib. - Her lover Theodosius . . . . 316 '¦ Her plot against John of Cappadocia . . . . 318 Discovery of her conduct by Belisarius . . 320 She is imprisoned by his orders . . ib. Protection of the Empress ..... 321 Belisarius is disgraced, and stripped of wealth and honours 323 His life is spared . . . 324 Reconciliation with his wife . . . ib.t. CHAPTER VII. Proceedings in Italy after the departure of Belisarius . 326 Misgovernment of his successors .... 327 Increase of the Gothic forces at Pavia ... ib. They proclaim Totila King of Italy . . . 329 Check of the Romans at Verona . . 331 Battle of Faenza . 332 Skirmish at Mugello . . . .333 Totila advances into southern Italy . 334 And besieges Naples .... ib. The Roman fleet falls into his hands . . 336 a.d. 543. Capitulation of Naples ... . 338 Siege of Otranto by the Goths .... 339 Totila reduces all the open country and several cities of Italy ... . . 340 a.d. 544. Alarm of Justinian . .... 341 Belisarius is again appointed to the chief command . ib. He arrives at Salona ... ib. Relieves Otranto And proceeds to Ravenna . Campaign against Totila Bold enterprise at Pesaro . \.d. 545. Totila repasses the Appennines, and Utter want of troops to oppose him Belisarius sails to Dynachium He obtains reinforcements . . ib. a.d. 546. Defence of Rome by Bessas . . . 348 . . 343 ib. 344 invests Rome 345346347 CONTENTS. XIX Dec 17 a.d. 547. Feb. Ib. 548. page Famine in that city . .... 351 Plans of Belisarius .... . 354 He sends some troops into southern Italy , . ib. Insurrection of those provinces .... 356 Belisarius lands at Porto . . . ib. His attempt to force the Gothic lines . 358 Rome is surprised by Totila . . ... 361 His declaration to the senate ..... 363 He determines to raze the city to the ground . 365 Letter to him from Belisarius ..... i6. Totila marches into Southern Italy . . . 367 And fixes his head-quarters on Mount Gargano . 368 Fortified amphitheatre at Spoleto . . 369 Sharp skirmish of Belisarius with the Gothic troops . 370 Rome is retaken by Belisarius . . . . . 371 His singular design and active preparations ib. He stands a second siege by Totila . . . 372 The Goths are repulsed in two assaults . . ib. Battle beneath the walls of Rome . . . 374 The Goths entrench themselves at Tivoli . 375 Enterprise of John the Sanguinary . . . 376 He is defeated by Totila . . .378 New plans of Belisarius . ib. He sails for Taranto . . . 380 Violent tempest .... . ib. He finds it necessary to land at Cotrone . . ib. His troops are surprised and routed . 381 He escapes to Sicily ..... ib. And proceeds from thence to Otranto . . . 382 Totila besieges Rossano .... ib. Fruitless attempt of Belisarius to relieve that place 383 He solicits either reinforcements or his recall . . 384 And obtains the latter .... . 385 Observations on his five last campaigns . . ib. Proceedings in Italy after his departure 386 Totila again surprises Rome . . - 388 His conquest of Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica . 390 Narses collects an army against him . . . 392 Battle of Tagina 395 Death of Totila 397 Rome retaken by Narses . . . . 398 Teias the last King of the Goths . . 399 Extinction of the Gothic monarchy . . . 401 XX a.d. 559. .563. 564. .565. CONTENTS. CHAPTER VIII. PAGF Conspiracy to murder Justinian and Belisarius . 403 Its motives and planners ..... 404 It is detected .... 407 Clemency of Justinian . . . . 408 Projected marriage of Joannina 409 Interval of eleven years ..... 410 Invasion of the Bulgarians .... 411 They advance within 20 miles of Constantinople . 413 Universal dismay ib. Belisarius is named chief commander 414 He takes the field 415 Skilful manoeuvres ...... ib. Presumption of the veterans .... 416 Battle of Chettos . ... 417 Jealousy of the Imperial Court 419 Belisarius is recalled ..... ib. Conspiracy of Marcellus .... 420 Belisarius is unjustly accused 421 He is brought to trial and condemned ib. 422 He is reduced to beg his bread ib. ib. His character ...... ib. Political and religious results of his victories 428 Critical Inquiry into the real facts of the disgrace of Belisarius , 431 THE LIFE OF BELISARIUS. CHAPTER I. At the beginning of the sixth century of the Christian Era, the Empire of Constantinople was beset with enemies and sinking to decay. The tide of barbarian invasion had lately overwhelmed one half of the ancient provinces of Rome, and these conquests, both by their effect and their example, threatened speedy downfall to the rest. The Emperors became either hated from their reforms, or despised from their incapacity, and in either case their fate was the same. Frequent insurrections wasted the resources of the State, and deprived the Government of all energy and enter- prize ; while the armies, turbulent and feeble, had thrown off the restraints of military discipline. It is the purpose of my narrative, to show how the genius of one man averted these dangers, and corrected these defects ; how the tottering empire was upheld ; 2 THE LIFE OF [chap. s. how the successors of Augustus were enabled, for a time, to resume their former ascendancy, and to wrest from the hands of the Barbarians their most important possessions. Belisarius, as Procopius briefly tells us, was born at Germania, on the confines of Thrace and Hlyria* The name of his birthplace has awakened the patriotic ardour of two learned Germans, who labour with more zeal than success to extort Pan- nonia from the words of the historian, and to claim the hero as their countryman. t Germania is else where mentioned as a city of some importance, and as being in the neighbourhood of Sardica, % but its precise position is unknown. It does not seem improbable that its name may have been derived from the ancient settlement of some German families, and that the forefathers of Belisarius may have been connected in kindred with these strangers. The exact age of Belisarius is not recorded; but in his first military enterprise, which took place about two years before the accession of Justinian, we find him termed, by Procopius, a lately -bearded * Procop. Vandal, lib. i. >.-. 11. His words are merely transcribed by Theophanes (Chronograph, p. 161). t Giphanius (Comment, de Justinian. Imp. p. 125), and his friend Velserus expresses his concurrence in that opinion, (Op. p. 341, ed, 1682). The chief proof of Giphanius is drawn from the Barbaric name of one of the chargers of Belisarius, as if a horse and his rider were always from the same country ! X Procop. de -Edif. lib. iv. c. i. With this passage before me, I am surprised that G ibbon " cannot find Germania in any civil or 'ecclesiastical lists of the province." (Vol. vii. p. 161, ed. 1820.) chap. !.] BELISARIUS. O stripling.* The same expression is applied by the same historian to Photius at his departure for the Gothic war.t Now the mother of Photius was then thirty-six years of age, J and her son could, there fore, hardly have exceeded twenty. If we suppose this to have been the age of Belisarius a.d. 505. at his earliest exploit, and fix his birth twenty years before, we shall, I think, approach as nearly to the truth as our imperfect information will allow. Some modern historians deny Belisarius the advantage of liberal studies, and place his birth amongst the peasants of his province. Yet from two passages in Procopius, which have not hitherto been observed, it may be concluded that he was of noble blood, and inherited a patrimonial fortune. He is mentioned as possessing an estate near Constantinople, in the year before the African expedition, when, having but very lately been appointed to any high or lucrative station, he could hardly have derived from it the means of purchase. § Nor could he have acquired this property by marriage, since his wife's first husband had died poor. || Besides, the Greek word used by Procopius is almost always applied exclusively to that property * Xlpurov im-nvnrns (Pers. lib. i. e. 12). This expression seems to be copied from Homer, (II. xxiv. 348). + Goth. lib. i. c. 5. % Hist. Arcan. c. 4. § Procop. Goth. lib. iii. c. 35. This estate seems to have been called RufinianEe, and to have been of great extent. (Pers. lib. i. c 25.) || Hist. Arcan. c. 2. B 2 4 THE LIFE OF [chap. ,. which descends by hereditary right.* As to the family of Belisarius, we may remark the letter addressed by Pharas, the Herulian prince, to King Gelimer at Papua. " Why should you," writes the former, " consider it disgraceful to be a subject of " Justinian with Belisarius and myself? Though " we also, like you, are of noble birth, we glory in " obeying so magnanimous a sovereign."f Were not these words entirely conclusive, it might be added, that Procopius, in his later hbel, says nothing of the parents of Belisarius, though he gladly comme morates those of his wife, as common charioteers, those of the Emperor as peasants, and those of the Empress as comedians. His animosity would cer tainly not have forgotten or suppressed a circumstance which his prejudices would consider ignominious to the hero. That Belisarius held the Christian faith is ap parent from his spiritual adoption of Theodosius, J and from the religious seal of the Emperor, who strictly excluded all pagans and heretics from office. § The first step of Belisarius in his military career was an appointment in the personal guards of Justinian, while yet heir apparent to the throne. || Since, at this period, these places were usually bestowed as the rewards of long service, or of some * KA?jpos. See Stephanus in Thes. Peculiariter igitur ita vocatur Heereditas ct quasi sors qusedam hsereditaria quse et Ktoipavoiua dicta fuit ; us K\7ipu Siaveinafievri inquit Eustathius. (Vol. ii. p. 240). f Procop. Vandal, lib. ii. c. 6. + Vandal, lib. i. u. 12. § John Malala, vol. ii. p. 184. || Procop. Pers. lib. i. c. 12. chap, i.] BELISARIUS. 5 eminent achievement, we may regard the choice of Belisarius as a proof of his early promise. At Constantinople no opportunities could arise for military fame, and history is silent on his actions, until we find him promoted to the command of a squadron in the Persian -war. But before we follow Belisarius to the banks of the Euphrates, it will be proper to examine the composition of the Byzantine armies, and the frontiers, administration, and resources of the Byzantine empire at this time. Such information, though most essential, is not easily obtained : it is passed over by the contempo rary writers as generally known, and can only be gathered from their short and scattered allusions. After the conquest of Italy by the barbarians and the disuse of its language, it might have been ex pected that the subjects of Constantinople would no longer call themselves Romans. But this title was too glorious to be so readily relinquished. In every succeeding age the rabble of Greek armies still boasted of their kindred with the ancient legions ; and the name of Romania was applied to the varying limits of the Byzantine territory, until it has settled on Thrace, to which they were latterly confined.* At the accession of Justinian, however, the bounda ries of his empire were nearly the same as those of the Ottoman at present. Its northern . frontier in Europe was marked by the Danube; and some castles beyond that river were maintained rather to * See John Malala (vol. ii. p. 114) for the early use of this term. 6 THE LIFE OF [chap. r. secure the passage than with any view of ulterior possessions. From the Save the line of frontier turned inwards to the south, meeting the Adriatic below Epidaurus,* and bounding the Gothic province of Dalmatia. The whole territory between Thermo pylae and the Danube was termed, in its eastern por tion, Thrace, in its western, Illyria, or, more properly, Illyricum;t and the two Moesias, which are seldom mentioned in this age, appear to have become mere subordinate divisions of these provinces. Thus, there fore, both Thrace and Illyria must always be under stood at this period as extending to the Danube.J The northern districts had suffered most severely from barbarian inroads during the preceding century, and their desolation was witnessed by Priscus, when proceeding on his embassy to Attila. " We found," he says, " the city of Naissus nearly subverted by the " enemy, and forsaken by all its inhabitants, except " a few sick wretches, who had crept beneath the " ruins of the churches for shelter. As we travelled " onwards, we saw the banks of the river thickly " strewed with the bones of the slain." § Some relief * That Epidaurus was a Gothic city may be presumed from Procop, Goth. lib. i. c. 7- t This province was called by the ancients sometimes lllyTicum, and sometimes Ulyris ; but Illyria may be used, as more familiar to a modern ear. (D'Anville, Geograph. Ane. vol. i. p. 159.) J This conclusion may be drawn from Goth. lib. iv. u. 18 ; and De ^Edif. lib. iv. c. 7, where the Roman troops in Thrace and Illyria are said to defend the passage of the Danube. See also Wesseling's Itineraria, p. 638. In all the fifteen books of Procopius, I do not beUeve that the name of Mcesia more than once occurs. § Excerpt. Legat. p. 49. chap, i.] BELISARIUS. 7 and repose was, however, afforded to these unhappy provinces when the Emperors yielded their claims on Noricum and Pannonia to Theodoric the Great. The Ostro-Goths thenceforward served as a shield and bulwark to the Thracian and Illyrian fines. But the victories of the Romans in Italy under Belisarius proved fatal to their security on this fron tier. The Goths withdrew their troops for domestic defence, new hordes of barbarians rushed in to occupy their place, and the Romans found it neces sary to fortify the passage of the Danube with numerous intrenchments, and to guard it with unre mitting care. The key of their position was Singi- dunum, or Belgrade, advantageously situated at the confluence of the Danube and the Save ; it had been laid in ashes by the Huns, but was rebuilt and strengthened by Justinian.* From thence to the Euxine, the southern bank was bristled with upwards of sixty fortresses, each was provided with an ade quate garrison, and an officer appointed to the general inspection and control of alLf Such precautions, added to the want of boats, kept the barbarians in check during summer, but the severity of the winters often enabled them to effect their passage on the ice. J Having once crossed the great river, they * Procop. De iEdif. lib. iv. c. '5. This city is called Singedon by the Byzantine writers. The Sclavonic name of Beli-Grad (White City) began to prevail before the year a.d. 959. See a memoir by D'Anville in the Acad, des Inscript. vol. xxviii. p. 414. f Compare Procop. Goth. lib. iii. u. 14, and De yEdif. lib. iv. c. 5, 6, and 7. + Agathias, lib. v. p. 157. X THE LIFE OF [chap, j.- without further hindrance swept over the open country, outstripped the march, or repulsed the attacks of the forces sent against them, and returned homewards, laden with their spoil. It is true that above five hundred forts are pompously set forth as having been constructed or repaired by Justinian; but their very number is the most convincing proof of their weakness, and in most cases they probably consisted of only a single tower. By their means the approach of the enemy might be discerned from afar, and the peasants, crowding within them, might securely await the passage of barbarians, impatient of delay and ignorant of sieges. The inefficiency of these forts in withholding the progress of invaders is also manifested by the need of other special bulwarks for the Grecian provinces and Byzantine capital. The defile of Thermopyla? was carefully fortified; and, in case its intrenchments should be broken through, another line across the isthmus of Corinth defended the Peloponnesus. But the protection of Constantinople was far more costly and laborious, because far less assisted by nature. Besides its immediate ramparts, the Emperor Anastasius built, and Justinian strengthened, the celebrated Makron Teichos, or Long Wall, extending from the Propontis to the Euxine.* Its distance from the capital was forty miles, its length three score; it was flanked with numerous towers, and guarded by a constant * Compare Evagrius, Hist. Eccles. lib. iii. c. 38, and Procopius De Mill lib. iv. e. 9. See also a note of Ducange to the Paschal Chronicle, p. 588. chap, i.] BELISARIUS. 9 garrison** — Such plans for national fortifications have been often tried, yet in no country from Scotland to China, have they ever proved effectual ; they are found either too limited for restraint, or too extensive for defence. From the Bosphorus, the Roman Empire stretched for several hundred miles along the coast of Asia, till the town of Rhizseum, below Trebizond.f Here the line of frontier turned round the wild mountains of the Zani, and proceeded southwards, comprehend ing the cities of Theodosiopolis % and Dara, and following the course of the Nymphaeus till its junc tion with the Tigris,§ and of the Aborrhas, till it met the Euphrates at Circesium. || Beyond the latter river the Persian and Byzantine territories were separated by a wide and inhospitable desert, inhabited only by some roving tribes of Arabs, who declared themselves the allies of either party, whenever they found a favourable opportunity for plundering the other. The Roman provinces of Syria, Palestine, and Egypt, often felt and always feared their rapine ; and even the fear of it proved fatal to industry and cultivation. The rugged and almost inaccessible chain of mountains in the south of Asia Minor bore at this time the name of Isauria, * Est enim magna vis militum eo in loco. (Justinian, Novell. 26). + That Rhizseum was the frontier town appears from Goth. lib. iv. u. 2, and Pers. lib. ii. c. 29. t Procop. Pers. lib. i. c. 10. § Ibid. c. 21. II Ibid. lib. ii. c. 5. We must understand the Aborrhas, instead of the Tigris, in the ancient negotiations of Peter. (Excerpt. Legat. p. 30.) B 3 10 THE LIFE OF [chap.:. which had formerly been applied to only one of its districts. Its inhabitants displayed the common character of mountaineers — impatience of control and recklessness of danger ; and became by turns the most destructive enemies and most valiant soldiers of the Empire. Their flying parties laid waste the open country from Ephesus to Antioch, and made even the inmate of cities tremble within his walls. Often defeated, but never subdued, they enriched themselves either by these predatory visits, or by a yearly tribute of five thousand pounds weight of gold as the price of their tranquillity; and this system had continued for a great number of years when their countryman Zeno ascended the 474II491 Imperial throne.* The great favour and indulgence shown them in this reign natu rally produced their disaffection in the next, and they rose against Anastasius in a general rebellion, which could not be disregarded or forgiven, like their former hasty inroads. The long and bloody war which ensued brought about their thorough subjection ; and under Justinian they formed the flower of the Roman armies. But Asia Minor had suffered from their havoc as severely as the East from the Saracens, or Thrace and Illyria from the barbarians of the Danube ; and when to these we add the frequent expeditions of the Vandals in the iEgean Sea, it will be perceived, that scarcely any Roman district had of late been free from desolation, and that the real strength of the * Evagr. Hist. Eccles. lib. iii. u. 35. See also Ammian. Marcellin. lib. xiv. c. 2, and Marcellin. Chronic, ap Sirmond. Op. vol. ii. p. 370. chap, i.] BELISARIUS. 11 empire at the accession of Justinian by no means cor responded to the number and extent of its provinces. It is remarkable, that as the territory of the Romans in this age nearly approached to that of the Turks at present, so the troops appointed for its defence, under each, were precisely the same. The number of one hundred and fifty thousand men was fixed both by Justinian and by Solyman ; * but in the latter case, this force was real and effective, and in the former little more than an empty sound, which served to please the vanity, or allay the appre hensions, of the people. Not one half the number were certainly ever enlisted ; they were barely suffi cient to garrison the frontiers; and an army of fifteen or twenty thousand men for active operations, could not be mustered without great difficulty and delay. In the annals of this age, we are often astonished at the smallness of the means with which the most mighty wars are undertaken and waged, whilst, in the foregoing century, the Byzantine empire could send forth an expedition of one hun dred thousand men.f The chief root of this evil was the negligence and weakness of Justinian, who often allowed the officers to supply the rations of the army, and the paymasters to levy the taxes for its maintenance. Thus, it manifestly became the interest of both these classes, to keep the number of the soldiers far below their returns to the govern- * Agathias, lib. v. p. 157. Robinson's forty-fifth note to the first volume of Charles V. f Procop. Vandal, lib. i. c. 6. 12 THE LIFE OF [chap, i. ment, and to permit frequent furloughs from the most important posts, and on the most trifling occasions. Justinian endeavoured to restrain these abuses by an edict, but they were inherent to the very nature of his military system.* The Roman troops at this period no longer bore the slightest resemblance to those of Scipio or of Caesar. The very name of legions was disused. From the foolish vanity of commanding a greater number of these squadrons, successive emperors had diminished them in size, until from six or seven thousand men they dwindled to as many hundreds. Thus, in the fourth century, we find the defence of a single city committed to seven legions. In the fifth, that name is applied to a body of twelve hun dred, and to another of only eight hundred men, and in tne time of Belisarius it had altogether dis appeared, f It was not uncommon at this period to divide the troops according to their birth-place or nation ; and thus, for example, the Isaurians, instead of being draughted into the other squadrons of the empire, marched beneath a separate standard. This policy, the first germ of the feudal system in the middle ages, destroyed all unity of feeling among the troops as brother Romans, and all unity of discipline as fellow soldiers, and rendered them more like an assemblage of allies than the army of a single ' Compare Justinian. Cod. lib. i. tit. 27. Procop. Goth. lib. iii. c 1. and Agathias, lib. v. p. 158. t Ammian. Marcellin. lib. xix. e. 2. See a Memoir by Le Beau in the Acad, des Inscript. vol. xxv. p. 492. chap, i.] BELISARIUS. 13 power. The flower of the forces consisted of the Doryphori or guards, who were attached, not merely to the person of the emperor, but to that of every general or officer of distinction, and who, in either case, were highly honoured and carefully selected. This post was conferred on those most distinguished for strength and stature, even from amongst the captives made in war, and was often assigned to veterans as the reward of some eminent exploit.* A larger pay was bestowed on them than on the other soldiers ; Jheif arms were more complete ; and their chargers (they were always horsemen) were equally fitted for close combat or long journeys. The best officers of this century were trained amongst these troops. Besides their general oath of fidelity to the state, they bound themselves by a particular obligation to their chief or patron, f and were termed his household, J a phrase analogous to that of Maison Militaire in modern France. Those of the emperor bore the name of the Schools, and amounted only to three thousand five hundred soldiers, till Justinian added two thousand to their number. Yet they were never so weak as in his reign. Under former governments, when each guardsman was chosen for merit, they formed a band of iron veterans, a last resource against barbarian invaders, and their disci plined valour might have triumphed over tenfold antagonists. It was the emperor Zeno who first broke through the ancient order, by granting this * Procop. Goth. lib. iv. u. 29. Hist. Arcan. c. 24. t Procop. Vandal, lib. ii. c. 8. J Outta. Goth. lib. i. t. 18, &c. 14 THE LIFE OF [chap. i. promotion to many of his Isaurian countrymen, more remarkable for attachment to his person than for their service to the state. But in the latter years of Justinian the tide of corruption overflowed all bounds. Commissions in the schools were exposed to public sale, the highest bidder was esteemed the bravest soldier, and these posts were eagerly pur chased by unwarlike citizens, desirous of exemption from civil duties without incurring military dangers. Thus the hardy veterans, the Armenian and Isau rian mountaineers, were replaced by lazy townsmen unable to wield their own weapons ; and thus it will be seen in the sequel, that when the barbarians had forced the Long Wall and were advancing to the capital, these troops coidd make no effort for its rescue, and scarcely surpassed in courage or exertion the terrified crowd of women and of children.* In the days of the ancient Republic the chief strength of the legion consisted of its foot soldiers, and in comparison with them the cavalry was neglected and despised. In fact, it is to the defi ciency of the Romans in this branch of military service that Polybius ascribes their frequent reverses in the second Punic war.t The barbaiians of the north, on the contrary, considered horsemen the most honourable ; J and the Imperial mercenaries soon spread amongst the Romans a prejudice so * The testimony of Agathias (lib. v. p. 158) confirms that of the secret historian (c. 24). f Hist. lib. iii. .. 117. J See a remarkable instance of this feeling in the Excerpt. Legat. p. 47. chap, i.] 'BELISARIUS. 15 agreeable to the decline of military vigour. Accord ingly, in the reign of Justinian, all the best troops were mounted, and the infantry had dwindled to a small and subordinate band. It is true, that on one occasion (the African expedition) we find them exceed the cavalry in numbers, but this may pro bably be ascribed to the cost and difficulty of trans porting horses on so long a voyage. In most cases the foot soldiers were not merely inferior in number at the outset of each campaign, but, as Procopius tells us, they often diminished during its progress, because the capture of horses from the enemy enabled them to join the more popular and easy service. Their officers seldom condescended to share their fatigues, but looked upon their rank as a pri vilege to ride, and it will readily be imagined how hurtful an effect this example produced upon the subalterns.* Like most men, when unjustly con temned, they soon sunk to the level of their reputa tion ; and it was only by the care of Belisarius, that they in some degree retrieved it. The same principle of indolence and relaxation, which transformed the Byzantine troops to horsemen, also induced them to lay aside the weighty weapons of their forefathers. Their chief reliance in this age was placed upon the bow ; and as archers they were less expert than the Persians,t but more so than the Goths 4 For close combat every soldier was provided with a sword, and this was the only weapon which the guards retained * Procop. Goth, lib.i. v. 28. t Pers. lib. i. c. 18. ± Goth. lib. i. t. 27. 10 THE LIFE OF [chap. t. when stationed in a peaceful city.* In the field the guards appear to have been distinguished by the special use of the lance. Each horseman bore a shield, and his person was still further protected by greaves, a cuirass, and a helmet. f The declining strength and spirit of the Roman soldiers had introduced the use of Barbarian mer cenaries at a very early period ; and it was observed, even in the reign of Tiberius, that the vigour of the armies was drawn from foreigners alone.J But this dangerous resource was at first confined to narrow bounds, most of these levies being compelled to adopt the discipline and follow the ranks of the legions ; and the subsequent error, of permitting them to form in separate squadrons, and to out number the native troops, was glaring and fatal. Under Justinian it was thought prudent to distrust, but necessary to employ, them. These auxiliaries were obtained either by a public treaty with the nation to which they belonged, or by the allurements held out to private ambition. In the former case they served only for a particular period, in the latter they were considered as permanent troops of the empire, and in either they bore the name of Fede rates^ Amongst the foremost of these, were the * Vandal, lib. ii. c. 28. t Compare tlie description of Procopius (in Prtef.) with the com plaints of Vegetius (lib. i. c. 20), which however are applied chiefly to the infantry.— The usual arms, with tlieir half barbarous names, are enumerated in the eighty-fifth novel of Justinian. J Tacit. Annal. lib. iii. c. 40. § See Procop. Vandal, lib. i. u. 11, and the one hundred and six teenth novel of Justinian. chap. i.J BELISARIUS. 17 Massagetes or Huns, dwelling to the northward of the Caucasus : they were remarkable for their skill in horsemanship and archery.* The Heruli were likewise mounted, and, being almost unencumbered with defensive armour, were extremely useful as light cavalry ; but they are represented by Procopius as the most drunken and deceitful of all the barbarian tribes.t A part of the country beyond the Danube was their native seat, they had often desolated the Roman provinces with their incursions, and had rendered tributary to them even the aspiring nations of the Lombards ; but, at the accession of Justinian, their pre-eminence had greatly declined.J Any of these barbarians, when joining a Byzantine army, marched under their own national banner, were com manded by their own officers, and commonly adhered to the military regulations of their countrymen. It was only with great difficulty, and through some severe examples, that Belisarius succeeded in render ing them in some degree amenable to the laws of Roman discipline. The inefficiency of such min gled and discordant forces, and the difficulty of uniting them to one common end, have been felt in every age;§ and nothing tends more strongly to enhance the conquests of Belisarius, than to view * Procop. Pers. lib. i. c. 10. Goth. lib. ii. c. 1 ; lib. iv. u. 5. He seems to adopt the name of Massagetes in imitation of Herodotus. t Vandal, lib. ii. c. 4. J Goth. lib. ii. c. 14. § See the judicious remarks of Polybius, on the jjfti) cvfi/j-iKra Km tJapPapa (lib. i. c. 65). The lawless and undisciplined state of the Roman armies, at this time, is incidentally admitted by Procopius. (Vandal. Mb. i. c. 21.) 1 S THE LIFE OF [chap. i. a structure so extensive raised from such slender materials. In the reign of Constantine the Great, the Roman troops had been ranked in two classes : the Limi- tanei, who guarded the frontiers ; and the Comita- tenses, who attended the sovereign and undertook any military enterprize. But this distinction appears soon to have become nominal and empty; and though some faint trace of it may still be found in the edicts of Justinian, none appear in the records of his wars.* The system of pay at this latter period was founded on judicious policy, and might perhaps be advantageously applied in modern times. A small stipend was allowed to the newly levied soldier, but it gradually increased according to his term of service ; and the veteran was enabled, not merely to live in opulence, but to bequeath some money to his heirs. A gift to each soldier, of five pieces of gold, was also usually made once in as many years ; but Justinian altogether suppressed this indulgence, at the very period when the victories of the Roman army seemed most to deserve his liberahty.f The troops might have borne the loss of their dona tive ; but the avarice and negligence of the Emperor, in withholding their regular pay, loosened the only tie by wliich military obedience can be secured, or even claimed. Such arrears, which we find con stantly recurring in the annals of this reign, counter acted the efforts of Belisarius for the restoration or * Cod. Justinian, lib. i. tit. 27. f Hist. Arcan. c. 24. chap, i.] BELISARIUS. 19 maintenance of discipline, while the disaffection of the soldiers was displayed, sometimes in loud complaints, and sometimes in secret conspiracies. Large bodies of deserters enlisted in the Persian and Gothic ranks, from no other ground ; * and the remainder were reduced to a state of poverty which compelled them to plunder the provincials, and which thereby impaired both their good order and their popularity. Such was the state of the Byzantine Empire at the accession of Justin the First. By birth an J . A.D. 518. Illyrian peasant, by profession a soldier, Justin had distinguished himself in the Isaurian Var, and had gradually attained the post of commander to the Imperial Guards. Already in the dotage of his faculties, he had long survived the military daring to which he owed his reputation and his rise. His education had, of course, been neglected, and his ignorance was such, that his signature could only be obtained by means of a wooden case, which directed his pen through the four first letters of his name.f * Pers. lib. ii. c. 7. Goth. lib. iii. c. 11, &c. -f Hist. Arcan. c. 6, and a cautious but decisive hint in the public history. (Vandal, lib. i. c. 9.) The story of the frame is repeated by the Valesian fragment (p. 513, fol. ed. 1693), but foolishly applied to Theodoric the Great, who was of royal birth, and had received a liberal education at Constantinople, under the care of the Emperor Leo. The panegyric of Ennodius on his studies could never have been addressed to a wholly illiterate monarch ; and Le Beau has shown that a strong collateral proof of his knowledge may be drawn from Cassiodorius (Var. lib. ii. ep. 15). The testimony of Theophanes (p. 112) is positive to the same effect, but his general inaccuracy deprives it of weight. 20 THE LIFE OF [chap, u Unpractised in business, yet jealous of authority, he was equally unable to reign or to resign. From the very first, the chief administration of affairs devolved on Justinian, his nephew and intended heir, whom he was reluctantly compelled to raise up from office to office, and at length to acknowledge as A.D.g527. flis partner on the throne. His death, after a languid reign of nine years, and a life of nearly fourscore, left Justinian sole sovereign in name as well as in fact. In comparing the new Emperor with his illustrious contemporaries at Ravenna and at Ctesiphon, it may be remarked that their very unequal merit has been almost equally rewarded by fame. The memory of Justinian is adored by the civil lawyers, Theodoric yet lives in the rustic songs and legends of his countrymen, and the Eastern historians celebrate Nushirvan as the greatest and most glorious of their sovereigns. By their absolute power, all three pos sessed the means, by the length of their reigns the leisure, for effecting any plans of conquest or reform. Yet it will be found, that while the Kings of Persia and of Italy were indebted to their own achievements for renown, the Roman Emperor only shines as a general or legislator through the borrowed light of Belisarius and Tribonian. His mind was essentially feeble, and bore the appearance of fickle ness and inconsistency, because it could form no opinions of its own, and was compelled to lean on others for direction and support. To him the last adviser always seemed the wisest, and the absent chap, i.] BELISARIUS. 21 always in the wrong. From hence proceeded his fears and suspicions with regard to Belisarius, often checked by the aspect of the hero, but constantly reviving in his absence, and which no length of service, no trial of fidelity, were sufficient to destroy. The religion of Justinian was sincere and fervent, but, as com monly happens to a weak understanding, was less fruitful of virtues than of rites and forms. While he carried his fasts and vigils to the utmost extent of monkish self-denial, he directed the assassination of Vitalian, to whom he had lately sworn upon the Eu charist the friendship of a brother.* His persecu tions of all heretics, all Jews, and even of the small remnant of Pagans, and the desolation of Palestine, by goading the Samaritans into revolt, f may be partly excused by the intolerent spirit of the age, but certainly outstripped it in fierceness, and appear ridiculous as well as hateful, since this scourge of heretics became, in his dotage, a heretic himself. The defect of his judgment in business may be compared to the false colouring of an unskilful painter, by which all the parts of a landscape seem equally removed. In aiming at different objects, he did not consider their relative importance, but pursued the * See Victor Tunnunensis ap. Canis. Antiq. Lect. 1725, vol. i. p. 328 ; and Alemanni Not. Hist. p. 105. Vitalian was a chief of barbarian parentage, and had made himself very popular by a rebel lion against Anastasius, in support of the orthodox faith. He was therefore received with open arms by Justin and Justinian, but it is difficult to forgive a subject who can raise an army of sixty thou sand men. t Eutychius Annal. vol. ii. p. 156. John Malala, vol. ii. p. 181. 22 THE LIFE OF [chap, r. slightest M'ith the same zeal and energy as the most momentous. The building of a church at Constan tinople, or the restoration of the Catholic faith in Africa, the acquisition of a kingdom, or the repairs of a fortress, all occupied precisely the same space in his little mind. Ambitious of uniting the fame of an architect with that of a conqueror, he lavished in splendid fabrics at home the sums by which his foreign armies should have been recruited and main tained. While these favourite edifices wrung from an exhausted people its resources for defence, the distant armies were too often deprived of pay, pinched with want, or from the delay of reinforcements over whelmed by the superior numbers of the enemy. No sooner had the Emperor sent an expedition from Constantinople, than he seemed to have dismissed it likewise from his thoughts. His predecessor, Anas tasius, though diminishing the public burthens, had amassed and bequeathed a sum of no less than three hundred and twenty thousand pounds weight of gold ; * and the accumulated treasures of the Goths and Vandals were poured before the throne of Justinian. But all these resources were insufficient to supply his prodigahty ; heavy taxes were imposed, old arrears were claimed, offices put to sale, charities suppressed, private fortunes seized; in short, every act of rapacity, injustice, and oppression, was prac tised by his ministers, and meanness was called in to support magnificence. f * Hist. Arcan. u. 19. f The rapacious prodigality of Justinian might be proved, even chap, i.] BELISARIUS. 2tt It may be observed, that greater evils commonly result to a state from the weakness than from the vices of its sovereign, since his incapacity rears and fosters a thousand subordinate oppressors whom a more active tyranny restrains. The subjects of Jus tinian, finding themselves injured and impoverished in his reign, viewed him with detestation as the cause of their calamities. Yet their angry invectives should not blind us to his real merits. His private life deserves the praise of temperance, study and devotion; he appeared easy of access, and courteous in de meanour ; and his temper was naturally gentle and forgiving. If he was prone to suspect, he was, how ever, slow in punishing. His earnest desire of fame, though often degenerating into petty vanity, was yet the spring of many noble undertakings ; nor can posterity forget how greatly he promoted and encou raged the compilation of the Roman jurisprudence. His discernment of military merit has been justly praised ; and he might have secured both the attach ment and the welfare of his subjects, had his choice of ministers been equally happy. His principal favourites were Tribonian and John of Cappadocia. The former was a man of commanding talents and deep learning, but he is accused by his contempo raries of the utmost corruption in administering the laws. The latter, dissolute and cruel, a scoffer at from the flatteries addressed to him. Thus, for instance, in one place he is praised for his noble contempt of money xpfyuaTwy inrepo- paaci (Procop. De jEdif. lib. v. c. 5). The testimony of Evagrius is calm and strong (Hist. Eceles. lib. iv. c. 30). 21 THE LIFE OF [chap.,. religion, rapacious for the profit of the Emperor and for his own, crushed the people by the weight of his exactions, and was at length dismissed, not for his notorious plunder, but for an alleged conspiracy. The charges against him may perhaps have been exaggerated, from the usual readiness of mankind to trample on the fallen ; yet they are countenanced hy the strong and universal hatred displayed against him in the sedition of Nika. But it was the Empress Theodora who ruled with the most absolute power over the mind of her husband, and therefore over the administration of the state. Her youth had been spent on the public stage, and in the most unrestrained pursuit of pleasure ; and the first act of Justinian, on ascending the throne, was to contract a marriage which would have disgraced the meanest of his subjects. Dismissing her lovers, the fair comedian was allowed to regulate the faith and to wield the destinies of provinces. Her anger was capricious, her resentment deep and bloody, and her avarice boundless. The character of Theodora formed a singular contrast to that of Justinian ; and it will be seen, in the sequel, how severely Belisarius suf fered from the stern passions of the one and yielding weakness of the other. chap, ii.] BELISARIUS. 25 CHAPTER II. During nearly the whole reign of Anastasius, at Constantinople, the throne of Persia was held by Kobad,* seventeenth of the Sassanides. The war fare which the Emperor waged against him had been most disastrous to the Romans. Amida had been shamefully lost, in spite of the heroic efforts of its citizens, and still more shamefully recovered, by a ransom to the victors. An army of fifty -two thousand men, the greatest ever sent forth in this century by the Byzantine government, had been entrusted to the command of some worthless fa vourites: they were overthrown in several pitched engagements, and still more frequently fled without hazarding a blow.f Thus the name of the Romans, in this quarter, became degraded and despised; their spirit was broken; and they might perhaps have been driven from Asia, had not Kobad, at this juncture, been suddenly called elsewhere by * As usual, this name has been disfigured by the Greeks. Pro copius makes it Cabades, and Count Marcellinus Choades. The name of Cabades was afterwards applied to a sort of military dress in use among the Greeks, and borrowed from the Persians (Tzetzes, chil. xii. v. 793). + The numbers of these troops are given by Josue" Stylites (ap. Assemann. Bibliot. Orient, vol. i. p. 274) and their operations detailed by Procopius (Pers. lib. i. c. 6), and John Malala (vol. ii. p. 114). 26 THE LIFE OF [chap. II. the invasion of some Northern hordes. Embarrassed by these new and formidable enemies, he agreed to a truce with the Romans ; wliich, though concluded at first for only seven years, had been prolonged till the reign of Justin. Some causes of complaint on both sides, had, however, since arisen. An ancient treaty enacted, that neither should build additional fortresses near the common frontier; yet, by order of Anastasius, the open town of Dara* was surrounded with lofty ramparts, and became the strongest bul wark of the Romans in the East. On the other hand, the Gates or defiles of Caucasus, which commanded the passage of these mountains, and restrained the barbarians beyond them, were usurped by the Persians. t Yet these mutual injuries served, in some degree, to balance each other, and might have failed in producing a renewal of the war, had they not been envenomed by a separate and more recent injury. Kobad shared the fate of most monarchs : he hated his natural heir, and was attached to his youngest sons, perhaps only as viewing in them the future enemies of the elder. He had formed the plan * See Procop. De JEiif. lib. ii. t. 1 ; and Assemanni Bibliot. Orient, vol. i. p. 281. In the course of reading, I have found three different derivations for the name of Dara ; the one in Evagrius (Hist. Eccles. lib. iii. c. 37), the second a very absurd one in Aimoin (De Gest. Franc, lib. ii. „. 5), and the last in the Paschal Chronicle (p. 329). t These gates are described by Pliny, Porte Caucasia; magno errore multis Caspian dictas, ingens naturse opus, montibus interroptis repente (Hist. Nat. lib. vi. c. 11). For their present state, see D'Anville (Geograph. Ane. vol. ii. p. 119). chap, n.] BELISARIUS. 27 of breaking through the customary order, and of naming for his successor his third son, afterwards celebrated under the name of Chosroes by the Greeks, and of Khosrou or Nushirvan by the Per sians. As a first step to this exaltation, the King deemed it desirable that Chosroes should be adopted by the Roman Emperor, and, by this high though fictitious kindred, become more distinguished in the public estimation. This proposal, which included an offer of friendship and alhance, was joyfully received by Justin and his nephew ; and they were about to close with it, when Proclus, one of their most trusted ministers, withheld them. He set forth to them, that, by adoption, Chosroes would acquire the rights of a son to Justin, and might therefore urge his claim to the empire, in preference to Justinian. This groundless fear (for what Byzan tine subject would have acknowledged the claim of a Magian ?) prevailed over the considerations of sound policy. Unwilling to grant, and yet afraid to deny, the two Princes endeavoured to elude the difficulty by refusing a civil but offering a military adoption. The last, it seems, was reserved for barbarians, and considered less honourable than the former.* But this answer was heard with indignation by the Per sian ambassador ; the conferences were broken off in mutual displeasure ; and Nushirvan, who, in full * Consult a memoir on the ancient military adoption in the Acad. des Inscript. (vol. xxi. p. 76). An instance of it was given by The odoric the Great, who adopted the King of the Heruli (Cassiod. Var, lib. iv. ep. 2), , c 2 2S THE LIFE OF [chap. n. confidence of a speedy invitation, had already advanced to the banks of the Tigris, returned home wards, brooding over future projects of revenge. It was on these grounds, and in the latter part of Justin's reign, that Kobad renewed the war ; and his first enterprize was the invasion of Iberia. This country was governed by its native princes, but had long been tributary to the Persians. Its inhabitants, zealous Christians since the time of Constantine, had yet never swerved from their allegiance to a Magian, until the persecuting zeal of Kobad, precisely at this time, changed religious into political adversaries. They disclaimed his authority, and besought the protection of the Emperor, who promised them large reinforcements, but sent only a handful of soldiers. Meanwhile Kobad, disabled by old age from leading his troops in person, dispatched a powerful army against the Iberians, headed by a Varisa or Gover nor of a Persian province.* All resistance was over borne by his superior numbers ; the whole country was subdued ; and Gurgenes, its prince, found it necessary to withdraw, as a helpless exile, to Con stantinople. During this more important warfare, some petty hostilities took place on the Armenian frontier, which are only memorable as first raising to historical notice the great captain of that age. Beli sarius, who had now attained the command of a * Procopius tells us only that Varisa was a Persian dignity, but I think that I may infer its identity with tlie Vitaxa of Ammianus Marcellinus.— Sunt autem in omni Perside hse regiones maximse quas Vitaxse id est Magistri equitum curant (lib. xxiii. c. 6). chap, n.] BELISARIUS. 29 squadron, performed his earliest recorded achieve ment, jointly with another Roman officer, named Sittas, by an inroad into Persarmenia. They ravaged a large extent of country, and brought back a con siderable number of prisoners. On a second incur sion, however, they were less fortunate,being suddenly attacked and overthrown by some Persians under Narses.* Yet we may conclude that the personal conduct of Belisarius, on the last occasion, was not only free from blame, but even entitled to praise, since we find him, immediately afterwards, promoted to the post of Governor of Dara, and commander of the forces stationed in that city. The fates of his first antagonist and colleague may also excite some interest. Narses soon afterwards deserted to the Romans, with his two brothers, and served against the Goths in Italy, but must not be confounded with the celebrated eunuch of that name.f Sit tas advanced his fortune by a marriage with a sister of the Empress Theodora,J and was ap pointed to a command in Armenia, where he fell in battle. § / It was at Dara that Belisarius chose for his secre tary Procopius, afterwards the historian of his times. This writer, born at Caesarea, in Palestine, was a lawyer in the early part of his career, and a senator, * The date of these incursions is not given by Procopius, but, as he places the death of Justin so shortly afterwards, they can hardly be fixed earlier than a.d. 525. (Pers. lib. i. c. 12.) t Procop. Pers. lib. i. u. 15. J John Malala, vol. ii. p. 158. § Procop. Pers. lib. ii. e. 3. He must not be confounded with the. Sittas of Theophylact Simocatta. (lib. iv. c. 15.) 30 THE LIFE OF [chap h. or perhaps a prefect at its close.* With regard to his religion, there is strong reason to beheve that he held the Christian faith. f He attended Belisarius throughout his campaigns till his last return from Italy, and declares himself to have been an eye witness of almost every transaction he relates. His narrative happily combines the judgment of a states man with the spirit of a soldier, but its chronology is broken, and its interest impaired by the division of his books, (two Persian, two Vandal, and four Gothic,) according to the countries and wars. As these writings afforded but few opportunities to introduce the name of the unwarlike Emperor with praise, six books of Edifices were added by Proco pius, wherein he pours forth all the flatteries which thirst for promotion can inspire. On considering the value of his testimony as an historian, the only apparent drawback is presumed partiality to his master. But, against this feeling, there are in his case two distinct securities. His work was written at a period when Belisarius- had been recalled from active employment, and had suffered beneath the Imperial suspicion and displeasure, and it was written for presentation, not to the victorious General, but to the jealous Monarch. Secondly, it is evident from the book of Anecdotes, or Secret * The senatorial rank of Procopius appears from Hist. Arcan. c. 12, but his identity with Procopius, Prefect in a.d. 562, is only a conjecture. (Hanckius De Script. B. P. i. c. 5. sect. 1 7.) t Observe his distinct profession of Christianity (Pers. lib. ii. e. 12. De jEdif. lib. v. c. 7-), and weigh the decided opinion of Hanckius (P. i. c. 5, sect. 5), and Fabricius (Bibliot. Grsec. vol. vi. p. 248). chap, ii.] BELISARIUS. 31 History, which Procopius afterwards compiled, that he was, in fact, a private enemy and accuser of Belisarius, having probably been disappointed in the payment for his services. It was, therefore, neither his interest nor his inclination to set forth the achievements of Belisarius in too favourable colours, or to give them higher praise than their recent and well-known merit imperiously demanded.* Several modern critics have doubted whether Procopius be really the writer of the Secret History, and have endeavoured to decry its testimony alto gether, but their judgment appears to be misled by their too partial admiration of Belisarius or Justinian.f Their arguments only tend to show what might have been presumed, that this hbel was not openly acknowledged or generally circulated. The degree of credit which it deserves is, however, allowed on all hands to be small. What reliance can be placed upon an author, who seriously beheved Justinian an incarnate daemon, and asserts of the conqueror of Africa and Italy that he was univer sally despised as a traitor, and scoffed at as a fool ? J Such unmeasured accusations only recoil on the * As to direct panegyric, Procopius hardly bestows so much on Belisarius as on the obscure and now forgotten Chilbudius. Compare Goth. lib. iii. c. 1 and 14. t See a memoir in the Acad, des Inscript. (vol. xxi. p. 73.) Mar- montel, in his preface to Belisaire, and La Mothe Le Vayer. (GHuvres, vol. viii. p. 166.) X Hist. Arcan, c. 5. and 1 2. The expressions respecting Belisarius are still stronger than I have rendered them, la opwuocriieva ovfianT] C)Lt7rc5w(ras airavres e-)(\sva£ov re Sia9pv\\ouvT€s Kai are avoiav ofyMffKavovTi e\oidopovvro. 32 THE LIFE OF [chap. ii. accuser ; and Procopius httle thought, whilst labour ing to blacken the memory of others, how deep a stain he was imprinting on his own. But the want of authentic memoirs forbids us to cast away the lampoon, and in weighing and selecting its asser tions, we should, I think, be mainly guided by their publicity. We may trust those specific charges, which must, if true, have been generally known, and which, therefore, if false, could hardly have been brought forward by a contemporary. According to this test, many very serious accusations against Belisarius may be looked upon as sufficiently esta blished. When, on the other hand, the Secret History relates, for example, a private conversation between Antonina and the Empress, which each had a strong interest in concealing,* or an equally secret, and still more improbable scene, in a subterranean chamber at Carthage, f I have no hesitation in rejecting its authority. Soon after Belisarius had assumed the command at Dara, the death of Justin left his nephew in full possession of the throne. The new Emperor per ceived the importance of strengthening and securing the fortifications which Anastasius had constructed at Dara. The impregnable city of Nisibis, once the bulwark of the Romans in the East, and which had stood three sieges against Sapor, had been surren dered to Persia by the treaty of Jovian.J Being * Hist. Arcan. c. 3. Gibbon, vol. -vii. p. 266. t Hist. Arcan. c. 1. Gibbon, vol. vii. p. 262. X Ammian. Marcellin. lib. xxv. c. 8. Agathias, lib. iv. p. 135. CHAP. II.] BELISARIUS. 33 only fifteen miles from that fortress, Dara served, in some measure, to supply its place and diminish its importance, and, above all, it promised great advantages in case of an invasion, by delaying the progress of the hostile army. Fully impressed with these considerations, Justinian directed Belisarius to build a castle on the frontier, within three miles of Dara, as a defence and bulwark to its ramparts. BeUsarius showed great activity in fulfilling these orders; he selected a convenient site at Mindon,* and by the multitude of workmen the walls had already risen to some height above the ground, when he received a haughty mandate from the Persians, requiring him to stop short in this undertaking, and in case of refusal threatening an attack. It appears that there then existed some agreement between both parties on this frontier to refrain from those petty, yet ruinous incursions, which add nothing either to the advancement or the glory of the war, and are only productive of mutual devastation. The Persians, however, were determined that this interval of quiet should not be employed in preparing fresh obstacles for them to overcome. Their demand was referred to Justinian by the Roman general, and the Emperor, far from allowing the building to be discontinued, sent reinforcements to Belisarius, and desired him to withstand all aggression to the utmost. The * Procop. Pers. lib. i. u. 13. I suspect that, instead of Mindon, we should read Mygdon, wliich was the name of the river on which Nisibis was built, and which might easily be applied to =¦ village near its banks. c 3 34 THE LIFE OF [chap. ii. Byzantine army stationed itself for the defence, the Persian advanced for the destruction, of the castle, and a long and well-contested engagement ensued. It was at last decided against the Romans, many of their bravest soldiers were slain or taken prisoners, and the remainder were driven back within the walls of Dara. The victorious Persians proceeded without further hindrance to raze the unfinished and for saken fortress to the ground, and then returned in triumph to Nisibis, their former station* The conduct of Belisarius in the skirmish of Mindon is not mentioned, but we find the same collateral evidence as in his Persarmenian expedition, to prove that it was not unworthy of his fame. Within a few months from this time, he was named Commander- in-Chief on the whole line of Asiatic frontier, with the high title of general of the East, and these honours never could so closely have followed his defeat had it been in the slightest degree attributable to his want of skill, of courage, or of personal exertion. From this period, the actions of his life assume a national and historical importance, instead of claiming interest only as the first steps of a cele brated man. We have endeavoured to explore the fountain, we may now embark in the stream, and follow the current of the river. In his new appointment, Belisarius continued to * No date is assigned by Procopius for the skirmish of Mindon, but from the series of events between the accession of Justinian and the battle of Dara, of which we know the precise times, it must in all likelihood have taken place in a.d. 528. chap, ii.] BELISARIUS. 35 fix his head-quarters at Dara, and earnestly applied himself to raise and collect an army. For this purpose, he appears to have traversed the neighbour ing provinces in person, and at last succeeded in mustering five and twenty thousand men, but the discipline of these forces was relaxed, and their spirit broken by their former reverses. On returning to Dara, the general was joined by Hermogenes, the Master of the Offices,* who, in some degree, shared his authority, but whose chief object in advancing to the frontier was, if possible, to conclude a peace. The negotiations were resumed, and their lingering progress left Belisarius inactive during many months, without having either to undertake or to repel any mihtary enterprise. It was hoped that the old age of Kobad might incline him to tranquillity, and his ambition be satisfied with the conquest of Iberia. But in the midst of these parleys news suddenly reached the Roman general that an army of forty thousand men was marching against him. These troops comprised the phalanx of ten thousand Immortals,f the flower of the Persian army, and were commanded by Firouz, who held the office of Mirranes, or generalissimo in that country 4 * The Master of the Offices was one of the chief officers of State. He extended his controul over the palace, the posts, the arsenals, and the foreign embassies. See Cod. Justinian, lib. i. tit. 31 , and Cassiod. Var. lib. vi. form. 6. + For the Immortals, see Herodotus (lib. vii. c. 83), and Diodorus Siculus (lib. xi. c. 7). The Emperor Michael Ducas afterwards in stituted a similar body of Immortals in the Roman army. (Nicephor. Bryenn. lib. iv. c. 4). X I think I may venture to assert that the Mirranes of Procopius 36 THE LIFE OF [chap. ii. His confidence of victory was founded as much on his superiority of numbers, as on the recent experience of Roman degeneracy, and he announced his approach by the arrogant message that a bath should be ready next evening for his refreshment at Dara. Behsarius only replied by his preparations for battle. In front of the city, towards the side of Nisibis, he had drawn a deep trench, turning inwards at the sides, and then again extended in lines parallel to the first, nor was it devoid of intervals or bridges at regular distances to afford a passage for the Byzantine soldiers. Behind these fines the troops were marshalled in order, the cavalry at the wings, and the infantry under the personal command of Behsarius, in the centre. It was not long before the Persian army appeared upon the plain, but the Mirranes viewing the advantageous position of the Romans, deferred his attack till the ensuing day. Meanwhile, the two armies were amused by the aspect, and interested by the augury of a single combat, which was challenged by the Persian, but gained by the Roman champion. Next morning, the Persians drew a reinforcement of ten thousand men from the garrison of Nisibis, thus increasing their army to double the number of the Roman. Belisarius, doubtful of victory, determined, if possible, to avoid an engagement. He despatched a letter to the Mirranes, complaining of his aggression at a time when negotiations were in progress, and is the same as the Merenes of Ammianus Marcellinus (lib. xxv. c. 1). In the latter place, Gibbon mistakes the office for the name of the general (vol. iv. p. 194). chap, ii.] BELISARIUS. 37 when hopes of peace might be reasonably entertained . In his answer, Firouz, according to the common practice to excuse by imputing perfidy, complained that no reliance could be placed on the professions or even the oath of a Greek.* Thus disappointed, Behsarius commanded that the letters which had passed between them should be affixed to the standards, and borne in the brunt of battle, as appeals to Heaven, and testimonies of his own pure and peaceful intentions. A similar measure was once resorted to by the Huns of Sogdiana, and by the Turks on the field of Warna,f and it seems well fitted to cheer the soldiers by the expectation of divine support. Nor did Belisarius fail, as was customary in this age, to address his troops in public ; he exhorted them not merely to obtain a present victory, but so effectually to humble the presumption of the Persians that they never again might venture to invade the Roman territories. The Mirranes had delayed his attack till noon, in hopes of finding the Byzantine army, with whose usual hour for meals he was acquainted, faint and exhausted from hunger ,J He stationed the Immortals in his rear as a reserve, and determined to engage with only half the remainder at a time, so that his squadrons might relieve each other by rotation. The battle began by * We may gather from Liberatus, that in this age the " Grsecorum juramenta" were proverbially false. (Breviar. p. 150). t For the instance of the Huns, see Procopius (Pers. lib. i. c. 4), and for the Turks, Tindal's Cantemir (book ii. p. 89). X The Roman soldiers usually dined at mid-day and the Persian in the evening. Compare Procopius Pers. lib. i. c. 14 ; and lib. ii. c. 18. 38 THE LIFE OF [chap. ii. a mutual discharge of arrows, so numerous, says Procopius, as to darken the air. In this distant warfare the Persians were greatly assisted by the constant succession and exchange of reinforcements, which was in some degree counterbalanced by the disadvantage of the wind blowing towards them and diminishing the speed and effect of their missiles. When the quivers were emptied, the two armies came to closer combat, and the encounter was long and obstinate. At length the left wing of the Imperial forces began to yield, and the Persians were already commencing a pursuit, when some Heridian horse, under Pharas,* judiciously stationed by Belisarius behind a hill, rushed forward with so unexpected and vigorous a charge as to turn the tide of victory against the Barbarians. It was in vain that the Mirranes despatched to their succour the whole battalion of Immortals. After a valiant resistance they also became involved in the rout, and the victory of the Romans was complete. Throwing aside their weighty bucklers the vanquished fled in every quarter, but left the royal standard in the hands of the Romans, f and eight thousand men dead upon the field. Their loss would probably have been still more considerable had not their flight been undisturbed from the prudent apprehen- • Pharas or Faras, was a Barbaric word, signifying « generations vel lineas." See Paul Warnefrid (lib. ii. c. 9), and the Lombard Code (hb. iii. tit. 13, ap. Lindenbrogium). As „, name, it seems to imply noble birth. f John Malala, vol. ii.p. 189. chap, ii.] BELISARIUS. 39 sion of Belisarius lest the tumultuous disorder of his troops in pursuit should encourage and enable the enemy to rally. This victory, the first gained over the Persians by the Imperial armies for a long succession of years, produced a great moral effect, and decided the fate of the campaign. The Persians did not dare to encounter the Romans in any pitched engagement, and in the slight skirmishes which sometimes took place, the latter maintained their new and unwonted superiority. The tidings of this battle sunk deep into the mind of Kobad. He beheld himself baffled by a nation which he had hitherto despised as weak, and still hated as hostile. Some of his best troops had fallen, and the remainder were scattered and disbanded. Above all, they had lost that confidence of success, which, in soldiers, is the surest means to its attain ment, whilst, in generals, it is the common fore runner of rashness and defeat. Inflamed with disappointment and anger, Kobad deprived the Mirranes of the golden fillet for his hair, which was worn in Persia as a most distinguished honour by special permission of the king. In this custom we may, perhaps, discover the earliest germ of those orders of knighthood, which now in almost every civilised nation reward the merit of the subject, or the favour of the sovereign. The institution is clearly the same, whether the emblems be worn on the head or on the breast. Should this conjecture be well founded, such orders have undergone a singular vicissitude in returning, as an imitation from the 10 THE LIFE OF [chap. ii. Europeans, to the very country whence they were first derived.* In deliberating on his plans for the next campaign, Kobad was guided by the experience of Almondar, the aged prince of the Arabs at Hira,t who for the last fifty years had carried on a predatory warfare against the Romans with spirit and success. Each of his frequent inroads through the provinces between Egypt and Mesopotamia had been marked by the burning of the houses, and captivity of the inhabitants, yet each remained unpunished from the caution and quickness of his movements. This veteran chieftain advised the Persian monarch to avoid the beaten track of Amida or Nisibis, and to invade the Roman territories for the first time on the side of Syria. Here Ms approach would be unexpected, and there fore his progress easy, and he might hope to reduce the city of Antioch, which its luxury rendered both alluring and defenceless. According to this counsel Kobad dispatched an army consisting of A.D. 531. fifteen thousand chosen Persian horse, headed by Azarethes, and of a larger but less dis ciplined body of troops under Almondar. These two generals began their operations very early in the year. They passed the Euphrates below Mesopotamia, and proceeded along the southern bank through the * The Lion and Sun are said to have been used as the Persian arms, so far back as a.d. 1244, but the order itself is of very recent date. (Malcolm's History of Persia, vol. ii. p. 564.) t See Evagrius Hist. Eccles. lib. iv. c. 12 ; and D'Anville Geograph. Ane. vol. ii. p. 259. An account of the dynasty is given by Herbelot, Bibliot. Orient, p. 451. CHAP. II.] BELISARIUS. 41 vast deserts which divided them from the imperial frontier. To these deserts the Romans had always trusted as to the securest bulwark,* and the aggression of the Persians in this quarter filled them with surprise and dismay. There was no force in readiness to repel or even to delay the barbarians; they continued to advance without difficulty, and were already at Gabbula, within sixteen miles from the city of Chalcis, and little more than one hundred from Antioch, when the promptitude of Belisarius changed the aspect of affairs. He was at Dara when he received the first news of the Persian invasion. For a short time he was doubtful what course to pursue, lest by drawing his troops from his actual station, he should leave it open to the attacks of Kobad with another army. Perceiving, however, how pressing was the danger of Syria, he placed only some slight garrisons in the Mesopotamian cities, and immediately set off at the head of twenty thousand men.f With forced marches he reached the shore of the Euphrates, crossed that river at Barbalissus, and succeeded in arriving at Chalcis before the troops of Azarethes and Almondar. He now presented a firm front against them, and checked their further progress, unless they should hazard a * See the remarks of Montesquieu on the Persian frontier. (Esprit des Loix, lib. ix. c. 4.) t This general number assigned by Procopius, agrees very nearly with the details of John Malala ; eight thousand Romans, under Belisarius in person, five thousand Arabs under Arethas, four thousand reinforcements under Sunica, and four thousand more under Her- mogenes. (Chronograph, vol. ii. p. 1 99.) 42 THE LIFE OF [chap. u. battle. His vanguard, led by Sunica, surprised and attacked some of their small detachments ; it made many prisoners, and sent the remainder headlong to their camp at Gabbula. But as Sunica had acted without orders, Belisarius, who felt the necessity of strengthening and upholding discipline, expressed great displeasure, and would have deprived that officer of his command, had not Hermogenes pleaded in his favour. The Persian generals were astonished and alarmed by the rapidity of Behsarius, and reflected with anxiety on the consequences of a defeat at such a distance from their frontiers, to which not a single fugitive might escape with the melancholy tale. A victory, on the other hand, would by no means he equally decisive, since Belisarius might then collect his broken forces within the ramparts of Chalcis or of Antioch, and firmly stand a siege until succours should arrive. Moved by these considerations, and disheartened by their great overthrow at Dara, they determined to abandon their enterprise, and to retrace their steps. They accordingly marched back to the Euphrates, and were followed by Belisarius, who made, however, no attempt to harass or come up with them. He perceived that a battle could hardly increase, but might easily forfeit, the advantages bestowed by their voluntary flight, and therefore avoided giving them any opportunity for an engage ment. In his pursuit he remained always at one day's distance from them, encamping each night in the station which they had left the morning before. chap, ii.] BELISARIUS. 43 Such prudent caution, of which all great commanders have felt the necessity,* was bitterly reviled as cowardice bythe ignorant and therefore presumptuous soldiery, though no one yet ventured to upbraid him in his presence. Retreating in this manner, the Persians arrived opposite the city of Callinicum, where they intended to alter their route by crossing the Euphrates, and proceeding through the deserts of Mesopotamia to the Tigris. It was not the design of Belisarius to pursue them any further, and he rejoiced in having saved Syria without striking a blow. But the Roman troops, whose confidence had risen from seeing the enemy always give way before them, and whose enthusiasm was kindled bythe approaching festival of Easter, could no longer conceal, or mode rate their desire, of seizing this last occasion for battle. " Whither would you urge me ? " exclaimed the general in a public harangue. " The most " complete and most happy victory is to baffle the " force of an enemy without impairing our own, and " in this favourable situation we are already placed. " Is it not wiser to enjoy the advantages thus easily " acquired, than to hazard them in the pursuit of "more? Is it not enough to have altogether dis- " appointed the arrogant hopes with which the " Persians set out for this campaign, and compelled " them to a speedy and shameful retreat ? Were we " to drive them to a conflict, no further benefits " could attend us as victors beyond those which we • Observe, for instance, the policy of Julius Csesar, in never driving a retreating enemy to despair. (Dion Cassius, lib. xli. c. 22.) 44 THE LIFE OF [chap. h. " now possess, and our utmost achievement would " be putting fugitives to flight. If vanquished, on " the contrary, our rashness might lay open the " defenceless provinces of the East to the havoc of a " new invasion. Remember also that God does not " afford the same protection in unprovoked as in " necessary dangers. Deprived of refuge in case of " defeat, the Persians will fight with all the courage " of despair, whilst we, enfeebled by a rigorous fast,* " wearied with rapid marches, and having by our " speed outstripped several of our slower battalions, " must enter the field with diminished strength and " unequal chances of success." These remonstrances, however just and reason able, failed in their effect. The soldiers were set on by several of their officers; their suppressed murmurs grew into clamorous complaints ; and they openly taunted the general with the twofold offence of wanting courage and of checking it in others. Unable to withstand, Behsarius, as formerly Spu- rinna,t determined to yield with cheerfulness, and assured his troops that his previous denials had merely been intended to try their earnestness and spirit. Having, through this judicious policy, re gained their confidence and good-will, he endea voured to disprove his gloomy forebodings, by his skilful dispositions for the battle. He placed his infantry to the left, near the river ; the Arab auxi liaries on a rising ground, to the right ; and chose * The Romans abstained from food on the day preceding Easter Sunday. (Procop. Pera. lib. i. c 18.) f Tacit. Hist. lib. ii. c. 18. chap, ii.] BELISARIUS. 45 his personal station with the cavalry, in the centre. On their part, the Persians prepared with resolution for the conflict, which they could not avoid. It was fought with great fury, and remained very long undecided. The Persians, as better ^"531! bowmen, far exceeded the Romans in the number of arrows they let fly ; but, from the strong helmets and breastplates of the latter, the darts of the first were less frequently fatal. Several charges of cavalry ensued ; and already had two-thirds of the day elapsed without any material result, when, at length, a chosen squadron of Persians made a gallant onset upon the Saracens to the right. This charge was met by so feeble a resistance, and followed by so thorough a dispersion of the Arabs, that they were afterwards suspected of treachery; and this imputation is countenanced by the presence of Al mondar and their countrymen in the opposite ranks. Thus freed from the right wing, the Persians imme diately surrounded the cavalry in the centre, which, being pressed on all sides, and exhausted with fatigue, was but ill able to offer any effectual opposition. Most of the horsemen, together with a share of the infantry, escaped headlong to some neighbouring islands of the Euphrates ; and it was observed, that those who had been the most forward to arraign the doubts of Belisarius, and to demand a battle, were amongst the least courageous and persevering in maintaining it. Behsarius continued to stand firm at his original post, till the flight or the slaughter of the cavalry around him compelled him to retreat. 46 THE LIFE OF [chap. ii. With the few attendants left him, he joined a small battalion of infantry which still remained unshaken near the river. Dismounting from his horse, and bidding his guards follow his example, he placed himself in the foremost ranks of the foot, and by this intrepid conduct afforded safety to the runaways; since the Persians forthwith stopped short in their pursuit, to overwhelm the small but heroic band of Belisarius. To hinder its being entirely surrounded, he ordered his soldiers to gather close to the shore of the Euphrates, and, turning from its stream, to present, in every other direction, by their helmets and bucklers, an iron barrier to the enemy. Thus defended on one side by their position, and on the other by their intrepidity, this slight detachment sustained, during several hours, a brave and unequal contest against all the hostile cavalry. Repeated attempts to break their line were unavailing; and the alarm of the Persian horses, at the clangour of the shields, saved the Romans from the imminent danger of being trampled down. This stubborn conflict was ended only by the approach of night : the baffled Persians withdrew to their camp ; and Behsarius, having obtained some boats, embarked with the few survivors of the engagement, and reached an island in the river. Next morning, the imperial forces proceeded to Callinicum, on the op posite bank,* from which this memorable battle has Callinicum was called after its founder or rebuilder, Seleucus Callinieus. See a note of Ducange to the Paschal Chronicle (p. 514), and D'Anville, Geograph. Ane. vol. ii. p. 196. chap, ii.] BELISARIUS. 47 derived its name. It was fought on Easter Sunday, the nineteenth of April ; and a superstitious historian does not fail to ascribe the Roman overthrow, on this occasion, to the impiety of polluting so holy a festival with bloodshed.* Had the result been difT ferent, he would, no doubt, have held it forth as a signal and striking manifestation of the Deity on this sacred day. The Persians, on their part, having plundered the corpses of the slain, and deplored the number of their own, found it expedient, in spite of their victory, to continue their retreat. The great ness of their loss in this battle, may be estimated from the resentment of Kobad, and the disgrace both of Azarethes and Almondar. t Nor was it easy to deceive the monarch on this subject ; since it is said, that amongst the ancient Persians, each sol dier, at the commencement of a campaign, was directed to deposit an arrow, which he resumed at its conclusion ; so that, by the number of remaining arrows, the extent of the national disasters might be accurately known. A few months from this time, the illness and death of Kobad, in his eighty-third year,J gave a new turn * Jornandes De Regn. Success, p. 62. ed. Lindenbrogii. For the date of April 1 9, see John Malala, vol. ii. p. 202. Gibbon erroneously places this battle at the end of the summer (vol. vii. p. 163). + The disgrace of Azarethes is mentioned by Procopius (Pers. lib. i. u. 18), and that of Almondar may be found in Herbelot, who seems, however, to mistake the cause. (Bibliot. Orient, p. 451.) X He died on the 13th of September, a.d. 531. See John Malala, vol. ii. p. 211, and Procopius, Pers. lib. i. c. 21. According to Malala, he had ascended the throne ad. 488; but Assemanni prefers the date of a.d. 490. (Bibliot. Orient, vol. i. p. 265.) 48 THE LIFE OF [chap. n. to the posture of affairs. The difficulties which he had apprehended in appointing his favourite son Nushirvan as his successor, were removed by the respect of the Persians for his memory, and their obedience to his last commands. Yet the new monarch was by no means secure upon his throne : he suspected the progress of a conspiracy, which soon afterwards broke forth against him, and he perceived the necessity of leisure to strengthen and confirm his power. He therefore renewed the negotiations with Justinian, and at last concluded a treaty of peace, to which the presumptuous surname of Eternal was applied.* It was stipulated, that the generals of the East should no longer fix their head-quarters at Dara; that the Persians should keep possession of the gates of Caucasus ; and that a subsidy of eleven thousand pounds weight of gold should be contri buted by the Romans, to maintain these defiles against the common inroads of the northern barba rians. The last article may be regarded as nothing but a tribute, under a more specious name. The ratification of these terms was for some time delayed, by the haughtiness of Chosroes and the irresolution of Justinian ; yet, as the principal articles were pro bably agreed upon, the latter was enabled to with draw Behsarius and the greater part of his troops from the Persian frontier. He already me- «. d. 531. ditated an expedition against the Vandals, and secretly intended the young general of the East for this important command. * Evag. Hist. Ecc. 1. iv. u. 13. Justin, in 2nd pref. to Pandects, &c chap, ii.] BELISARIUS. 49 In the interval between the Persian and the Van dal wars, during which Belisarius resided at , ° January, Constantinople, he became the second hus- 532— band of Antonina. His bride was several years older than himself, having been born in the last year of the fifth century,* and was the child of an actress and of a pubhc charioteer. The profession of both was regarded as vile, and the personal character of the former as infamous, yet their fair daughter had contracted an exalted, though not a wealthy, marriage, and became the parent of several children; amongst whom Photius, and the future wife of an officer of distinction, named Hildiger, are particu larly mentioned.f Antonina seems to have filled a high office in the imperial palace,}: and to have thereby enjoyed the rank and honours of Patrician, i Though thus raised above the dangerous profession I of her mother, she still adhered to the morals of the ! stage, and her conjugal infidelities were numerous. ; Her character was bold and decided ; she was care less of peril or fatigue, and equally capable of planning or achieving the most difficult undertakings. Besides her beauty, she was remarkable for a peculiar power of fascination, which she exerted over the Empress Theodora, to whom her office gave her frequent access ; and which was still more useful to * Procop. Hist. Arcan. u. 4. The construction which would make Antonina fifteen years older, seems quite inadmissible. t Procop. Goth. lib. ii. c. 7. Theophanes, inaccurate as usual, | calls him Photinus, son-in-law of Belisarius. (Chronograph, p. 204.) ' X This office was called Zmottj, nearly answering to Lady of the Bedchamber in modern Courts. See Alenianni Not. Hist. p. 90. D 50 THE LIFE OF [chap, ii, her in attracting, and ever afterwards holding, the affections of Belisarius. In fact, his submissive and blind attachment to this woman is the chief blot upon his fame. She repaid his confidence with zealous friendship, she followed him in most of his campaigns, and sometimes even promoted their success by exertions more suitable to her spirit than her sex. But her passions, both of love and aversion, knew no bounds. Her amour with Theodosius can not plead the excuse of youthful frailty, and she persecuted her son with more than the usual hatred of an adulterous mother. By Behsarius she had an only daughter Joannina, who appears to have been born before the departure of her parents to Africa, since we find her on the point of marriage within sixteen years from that time.* Before that emhar- cation, also, Behsarius had an opportunity to prove his gratitude and discharge his obligations to the Emperor, by supporting, nay, even saving, his throne in a most dangerous rebellion. The causes of this extraordinary popular movement will need some previous explanation. The growing fondness of the Romans for the amusements of the Circus had been deplored by the great satirist and the great historian, whose writings reflect such lustre on the first period of the empire.f This passion, which appears to have - Compare Procop. Hist. Arcan. e. 5 ; and Goth. lib. iii. c 30. t Juvenal, Sat. x. 81 ; and Tacitus Annal. lib. xiv. c. 20, lib. xv. c. 36. The Romans viewed even the departure of Nero from their city with regret, dreading an interruption of the public games. chap, ii.] BELISARIUS. 51 outlived so many nobler pursuits, and continued in every vicissitude of government, followed the change of capital to Byzantium, bringing discord and con fusion in its train. It was probably still further increased, in the fifth century, by the final abolition of the gladiatorian combats ;* and the only remain ing games of the Circus were thenceforward frequented with redoubled ardour. The charioteers were distin- ' guished from each other by the various colours of red, white, blue, and green, intended to represent the seasons ;f and each colour, or at least the two latter, possessed numerous and devoted partisans. Their mutual animosity was embittered, both by civil and religious prejudices. The Emperor Anas- tasius had secretly favoured the Greens, Justinian openly protected the Blues; the latter, therefore, became the emblem of loyalty, and the former of disaffection. For some less evident reason, the Blues were looked upon as the party of the established and orthodox Church ; and the convenient imputation of heresy, thrown forth against the others, served as a pretext for every act of rapine or oppression. It was in vain that the laws denounced these dangerous factions, since the disgraceful partiality of Justinian inflamed them by complete impunity to the one, and * There was an edict of Constantine the Great against gladiatorian combats ; but it does not seem to have been observed. (Socrates Hist. Eccles. lib. i. c. 18.) Their abolition is due to the heroic mar tyrdom of St. Telemachus, in the beginning of the fifth century. (Theodoret. Hist. Eccles. lib. v. c. 26.) t Cassiod. Var. lib. iii. ep. 51. Some curious particulars, relative to the ancient games, may be gathered from this letter. D 2 52 THE LIFE OF [chap. ii. excessive rigour to the other.* The results of this policy, at the close of the Persian war, are described as follows, by a discerning eye-witness. f " The " adherents of each party are ready to lavish their " fortunes, to risk their lives, or to brave the severest " sentence of the laws, in support of their darling " colour. They attack their antagonists, as if ani- " mated by some personal and grievous injury, and " though well aware that, if even victorious in the " skirmish, they may not improbably be dragged " to prison, and condemned to an ignominious " punishment. No length of friendship, no close- " ness of kindred, no precept of religion, can withhold " their fury ; and however careless of the national " honour, they are most keenly alive to the advance- " ment and triumph of their faction. Nor do even " women, though debarred from partaking the amuse- " ments, avoid the quarrels of the Circus, and their " separate choice of a colour often fills their famihes " with discord.} Such, in this capital, is the extent " to which pubhc folly, or rather madness, has " arrived. By these factions, the empire has been " shaken as by an earthquake or a deluge. All the " youthful libertines of Constantinople assume the " dress and ape the zeal, in order to share the » In speaking of the partiality of Justinian, Evagrius uses the strongest language e-r/piaSris yuani) ixavia, See. His testimony is con firmed by John Malala (vol. ii. p. 1 39), and the secret historian (c. 7). t I have joined and abridged two passages in Procopius. (Pers. lib. i. c. 24, and Hist. Arcan. c. 7.) X The words of Procopius seem decisive, as to the total exclusion of ladies from tliese games : ou5s es to Bearpa to vapemav tovarat. chap, ii.] BELISARIUS. 54 " privileges of the Blues. To distinguish their " comrades, they adopt a Barbaric garb, the long " hair and loose garments of the Huns, and during " the night they prowl forth in quest of prey. Their " licentious or avaricious passions are then indulged " without restraint, and no peaceful citizen can safely " wear a golden ornament or appear in the streets " after sunset." A state of society like this could not be permanent, and the gloomy clouds soon gathered to a storm. Justinian perceived the necessity of vigorous measures too late, since, beyond a certain period, they serve rather to exasperate than to deter. By his orders, some ringleaders of each party were put to death, and several more imprisoned. At the celebration of the public games, during the month of January, both parties clamorously demanded the libe- A^n's3o' ration of their captives : they received no answer from the Emperor,* and they immediately forgot their mutual animosities to forward their com mon views. That very evening the guards were massacred and the prisons forced, but, as is usual with mobs, the sedition continued to rage long after its first object was attained. The opportunity of * Such is the simple and probable account of Malala. (vol. ii. p. 215.) Theophanes gives a long and incredible conversation in barbarous Greek, which he states to have passed between the Em peror and his subjects by the voice of a crier. (Chronograph, p. 1 55.) Gibbon, who somewhat hastily adopts this fable, admits it however to be " the most singular dialogue that ever passed between a prince and his subjects," (vol. vii. p. 82.) But the authority of Theophanes, till near his own times, is so slight, that we should never trust him more than we can help. 54 THE LIFE OF [chap. ii. unbounded license was too tempting to be so rapidly relinquished, and the strange union between the Blues and Greens was continued from hatred to the ministers Tribonian and John of Cappadocia. The city was fired, the Cathedral of St. Sophia, apart of the Imperial palace, and a great number of other public or private buildings were consumed, and the watchword of Nika, Vanquish ! then used by the seditious, has since given a name to the sedition. Every attempt to withstand the rioters proved unsuc cessful, and some relics of great reputation, which were displayed in this emergency, failed both in draw ing down a miracle from Heaven, and in allaying the fury of the factions. The principal citizens hurried to the opposite shore of the Bosphorus, and the Em peror entrenched himself within his palace. He endeavoured to restore tranquillity by the dismissal of his unpopular ministers, and proceeded in person to the Hippodrome, where, with the Gospels in his hand, he made some of those solemn, but vague pro mises, which seldom miss their effect upon the popu lace. On this occasion, however, he was disregarded. A few amongst the Blues acknowledged the authority of their repentant sovereign, but the other party far surpassed and overpowered them, and Justinian fled back for refuge to his palace. Here he greatly added to the dangers of his situation (nothing is so bhnd as fear) by supplying the rebels with what they had hitherto needed, the name and authority of a leader. The Greens naturally looked with regret to the Emperor Anastasius, their former patron, and with chap, ii.] BELISARIUS. 55 hope to Hypatitis, his nephew, who was invested with the dignities of Senator and Patrician, and had served, though with little distinction, in the Persian wars.* His talents seem to have been of the mean est order, but he deserves the praise of never having suffered his ambition to outrun them. Far from entertaining any views of the throne, to which he might have aspired with some colour of hereditary right, he had, at the very outset of the tumults, hastened to Justinian, and remained in dutiful at tendance with some of his senatorial colleagues. Yet the Emperor, who still continued to suspect him, commanded his departure from the palace, as if a spy were more to be dreaded than a rival, and although Hypatius himself earnestly represented that the people might compel him to an involuntary usurp ation. His honest predictions were fulfilled. Early on the sixth day of the sedition he was hailed with transport by the people, and in spite n'}oA of his own entreaties and the tears of his wife, was led to the Forum of Constantine and pro claimed Emperor. In this hasty ceremony no diadem could be found to crown him, and a gold collar sup plied its place, as formerly with Julian. t These tidings were brought to Justinian when holding a council of his most faithful adherents : he was filled with consternation, he proposed to resign the contest, and to embark with his family and trea sure for some distant retreat. This pusillanimous * See Ducange, Fam. Aug. Byz. p. 86, and Procop. Pers. lib. i. c. 8, 11. f Ammian. Marcellin. lib. xx. <.-. 4. 36 THE LIFE OF [chap. ii. design might perhaps have prevailed had it not been withstood by the noble spirit of the Empress. For the first and last time the comedian Theodora seemed worthy of her throne, and by her exhortations it was determined to prefer the chance of victory or death to the certainty of exile. None of the troops showed zeal or attachment to this cause, and the only hope of Justinian rested on Belisarius and on Mundus, a Barbarian by birth,* who had lately been named Governor of Illyria, but who was then present in the capital. Belisarius undertook to forestall the attack of Hypatius and surprise his adherents, by a sudden sally against his head quarters in the Hippodrome. He advanced to the front gates of the palace, and called on the Imperial guards without to open them. But these troops were unwilling to declare for either party, their secret wishes were perhaps in favour of Hypatius, and they prudently delayed their choice that they might not fail to side with the victorious. Accordingly they turned a deaf ear to the commands of Belisarius, and kept the gates resolutely closed. Dismayed at this defection, Behsarius returned to the hall of audience and announced to the Emperor, that his very guards had left him, and that the passage was blockaded. He next attempted to issue forth by a postern, at the head of some faithful veterans, but the relics of the conflagration almost hindered his * Procop. Goth. lib. i. u. 5. The unpopularity of Justinian, even with his own guards, and his sole dependence on his two generals, are admitted by this historian, though his account of the Nika Sedi tion is extremely cautious and reserved. (Pers. lib. i. c. 24.) For the life and character of Mundus see John Malala. (vol. ii. p. 18G.) chap, n.] BELISARIUS. 57 progress. It was with considerable difficulty and danger that he forced his way through the encum bered streets and tottering ruins, and at length found himself in sight of the Hippodrome and of the rebels before it. Meanwhile a change had taken place in favour of his cause by means of that fickleness of purpose to which all popular assemblies are naturally prone. The Blues had at length perceived, with shame and self-reproach, that their resentment for a slight offence was tending to deprive them of a gracious patron, and to seat an hereditary antagonist upon the throne, and they themselves began to wonder at their own blind folly in leaguing with their bitterest enemies. Such reflections urged them to withdraw from the contest which they had provoked ; one by one they slunk away, and within a few hours from his proclamation Hypatius had lost many of his parti sans.* Still, however, the Greens presented a strong and massy fine. They were dismayed at seeing Beli sarius and his soldiers suddenly issue from amongst the smoking ruins, nor did the general allow them time to recover from their consternation. Drawing his sword and commanding his veterans to follow, he charged them with vigour and success. They very far outnumbered his scanty squadron, but many were destitute of weapons, and none of them could vie in equipment with the complete armour of the soldiers. Behsarius pushed his advantage to the utmost; he * Pascal Chronicle, p. 339. D 3 58 THE LIFE OF [chap. ii. broke open the front gates of the Hippodrome, and Mundus, who had marched from the palace with another division of troops, and was now at no great distance, rushed forward on hearing the clangour of the conflict, and burst into the Circus on the opposite side. The insurgents then gave way and dispersed in every quarter. Hypatius was dragged from the throne which he had ascended but a few hours before, and thrown into a dungeon with his brother Pompey, where next day both were privately put to death by order of the Emperor.* As soon as the victory was decided, it would seem that the Blues emerged from their concealment to glut themselves in safety with the blood of their adversaries, and the rage of the soldiers was almost equally merciless and ungovern able. The lowest computation assigns thirty thousand as the number of the slain, of whom probably nine- tenths were cut down as fugitives or supphants. This ferocious vengeance, so disgraceful to every one engaged in it, would deeply stain the fame of Beh sarius were we to suppose that he did not attempt to check and restrain it by every effort in his power. Of his conduct after completing the victory no account is given, but from his zealous humanity in all like cases, such for instance as the sack of Naples, it does not seem unreasonable to conclude that he was at least as anxious to spare the blood of fellow citizens as of strangers and enemies. This massacre, like all * The order of the Emperor is suppressed by the courtly Proco pius, but is recorded by Evagrius (Hist. Eccles. lib. iv. u. 13.) Jor- nandes (De Regn. Success, p. 63), &c. chap, n.] BELISARIUS. 59 indiscriminate and excessive punishments, produced no moral effect. The games of the Circus were indeed discontinued for several years, but on their renewal the same factions reappeared to distract the peace or endanger the safety of the Empire on many subse quent occasions.* * See for example Theophylaet Simocatta, lib. viii. c. 10 ; and Paul Warnefrid, lib. iv. c. 37. UO THE LIFE OF [chap. hi. CHAPTER III. The northern coast of Africa, known to the Orien tals by the local name of Magreb,* and to us by the merited by-word of Barbary, hardly retains a trace of the most formidable rival and most opulent province of the Romans. After the fall of Jugurtha, it had enjoyed a long period of prosperity and peace, disturbed only by a few petty insurrections, such as that of Tacfarinas in the reign of Tiberius, and afterwards by the schism and persecution of the Donatists. Excepting a short and single attack in the reign of Gallienus, it had escaped the sufferings which almost every other portion of the empire had repeatedly undergone from the northern tribes, and at the beginning of the fifth century, the Africans far exceeded all their fellow-subjects in wealth, population and resources. But though the scourge of invasion had been so long delayed, it fell at length with redoubled violence upon them. During the minority of Valen- tinian the Third, his mother the Empress Placidia, presided in the councils of Ravenna. iEtius and Boniface were then the two chief pillars of the state, their courage was undaunted, and in that degene- * Magreb signifies' it country to the west. (Herbelot. Bibliot. Orient, p. 529.) chap, in.] BELISARIUS. 61 rate age surprising, insomuch that, according to the forcible expression of an ancient historian, the last remains of Roman valour, seemed to have retreated to their breasts.* The former bore with suppressed impatience, the appointment of Boniface as governor of Africa, and availed himself of the weakness of a female reign, to execute a stratagem as disgraceful to himself as pernicious to the empire. By a false charge of disloyalty he obtained the recall of his rival, by secret letters to Africa he represented this recall as the forerunner of disgrace and death, and at length drove Boniface into the very acts of treason of which he had at first unjustly accused him. Boni face refused to obey the orders of Placidia, and wishing to secure himself from the effects of her resentment, concluded a treaty with the Vandals in Southern Spain. It is no small proof of the fertility and flourishing state of Africa at this time, that they should so readily have forsaken a certain pos session for a new and precarious conquest. The Vandals embarked with their families, AD ^9_ from the province whose name of Andalusia still denotes their former residence, t and landed on the opposite cape of Ceuta. Their leader was the far- famed Genseric,} one of the most able but most * Procop. Vandal, lib. i. c. 3. See the observations of Dom. Ruinart. (Hist. Persecut. p. 422.) + Mariana Hist. Hisp. lib. v. c. 3. X This name is very variously written. He is called Gizeric by the Greeks, Procopius, Evagrius, &c. Gaiseric by Idatius, and Geiseric by Victor Vitensis and Prosper. The real Vandal word was probably Geisreich, viribus fortibus pollens. (Grotius Hist. Goth. p. 590.) 62 THE LIFE OF [chap. hi. lawless and bloody monarchs recorded in history. Of a middle stature, and lamed by a fall from his horse, his demeanour was thoughtful and silent, he was contemptuous of luxury, sudden in anger, and boundless in ambition. Yet his impetuosity was always guided and restrained by cunning, he well knew how to tempt the allegiance of a foreign nation, to cast the seeds of future discord, or to rear them to maturity.* The numbers of the barbarians on their passage to Africa, though augmented by an unwarlike crowd of women and children, contained no more than fifty thousand fighting men. Genseric, however, was well aware that the reputation of powerful forces is often equivalent to their presence, and art fully appointed eighty chiliarchs, or nominal chiefs of one thousand soldiers, so as to strike his enemy with greater terror.f His progress through the African province was rapid and unopposed, until Boniface, having discovered the artifices of iEtius, and the favourable disposition of Placidia, bitterly repented the effects of his hasty resentment. He endeavoured by promises and persuasion to with draw his Vandal allies, but he found it far less easy to allay than it had been to raise the storm. His * Jornandes De Reb. Getic. c. 33. This character is quoted by Lord Byron, as a precedent for his Conrad and Lara. (Notes to Corsair, third canto.) f See the Vandal chronicle of Isidore, (p. 176. ed. Lindenbrogii.) Idatius, (ap. Sirmond, vol. ii. p. 299,) and Victor Vitensis. (De Persec. lib. i. c. 1.) Some vague popular rumours are repeated by Gregory of Tours (Hist. Franc, lib. ii. i-. 2), and some valuable historical facts collected by Procopius. (Vandal, lib. i. c. 3.) chap, m.] BELISARIUS. 63 proposals were haughtily rejected, and both parties had recourse to arms. Boniface was defeated, and forced to seek shelter within the walls of Hippo Regius, so called from having formerly been the residence of the Numidian kings,* while the Vandals, spreading over the whole extent of the defenceless country, wreaked upon it the most fearful havoc, and scarcely any cities but those of Carthage and Hippo Regius could escape their fury. The latter was besieged by Genseric in person, but he was at length compelled to retreat by a scarcity of which his own devastations were in all probability the cause. Soon afterwards, Boniface, at the head of some Italian reinforcements and Byzantine auxiliaries, sallied forth from the gates to try the fortune of another battle. It proved as disastrous as the former, and the Roman general, relinquishing all further hope of offensive warfare, and only leaving garrisons in the fortresses, embarked for Ravenna. We may justly feel sur prise at his confidence in returning to the court of his injured sovereign. His fatal rashness had cost the empire its most important province, his delusion was an insufficient excuse, his repentance a poor and barren atonement, and Placidia, though she might be constrained to dissemble, could hardly, as a sove- * Some remains of Hippo may still be traced in the neighbour hood of Bona, and Dr. Shaw was shown the site of the convent of St. Augustine by the Moors, who have, as he remarks, an interest in keeping up this profitable tradition. (Travels in Barbary, p. 97, ed. 1738.) According to his conjecture, the modern name of Bona is a corruption from Hippona, but Marmol explains it as a Latin com pliment to the goodness of the soil. (Vol. ii. p. 434. ed. 1667.) 64 THE LIFE OF [chap. hi. reign or a woman, be expected to forgive. He was, however, received with smiles and professions, but shortly after his return fell in conflict by the spear of his rival. His son-in-law, Count Sebastian, suc ceeded to his power, and the adventures of this brave but unfortunate man, were they less briefly recorded, might furnish singular materials for romance. During several years he ruled in the palace of Ravenna, till iEtius, who had fled to the Huns from the indigna tion of his sovereign, found means to resume his former ascendancy, and forced Sebastian in his turn to become an exile. Attended by a numerous train he proceeded to Constantinople, a retreat which the persevering hatred of his enemy at length compelled him to abandon. He then directed his course to Spain, and seized on the city of Barcelona, which he vainly endeavoured to maintain. Being driven from thence by the King of the Visigoths, he sailed to Africa as a last resource, with the view of offering his services to Genseric. This crafty tyrant suspected his designs, and dreaded his abili ties, and having precipitately returned from a distant expedition, at the news of his landing, very quickly sacrificed him either by fraud or force as a victim to his jealousy.* The retreat of Boniface from Africa seemed to leave that country at the mercy of the Vandals, but they were less fitted for sieges than for battles, * The early part of the history of Sebastian must be gleaned from Idatius (ap. Sirmond, vol. ii. p. 301), and the conclusion chiefly from Prosper, (ap. Canis. Antiq. Lect vol. i. p. 303.) CHAP. III.] BELISARIUS. 65 and Carthage continued to withstand them. That capital, which had risen from its ruins at the com mand of Julius Caesar, and been embellished by Diocletian,* appears to have regained no inconsi derable share of its former opulence and pride, and might be considered at this time as the second city of the West.t Under these circumstances, Gen seric thought it prudent to conclude a treaty with the Emperor Valentinian, by which he yielded a share of his conquests, and pledged himself to a yearly tribute for the rest.} His object was per fidy, and he attained it. He surprised Carthage in the midst of peace, ten years from his first a.d. 439. landing, and the whole Roman province of Africa now acknowledged him as King. He next applied himself to confirm and uphold his power, and rewarded the attachment of his barbarian sol diers by an arbitrary distribution of forfeited estates. The allegiance of the native inhabitants was secured, not by affection but by terror. No fault escaped the vengeance, no treasure the rapacity of Genseric. Born a Catholic, he had afterwards embraced the Arian doctrines, held by the greater part of his followers, and now availed himself of his extensive sway to persecute his former brethren with all the * Dion Cassius, lib. xliii. c. 50 ; Aurelius Victor De Csesaribus, c. 39. + Accusat Carthago Deos jam plena pudoris, Nunc quoque si cedat Romam vix passa priorem, Auson. Be Olar. XJrb. X The tribute is mentioned by Procopius, and the division of territory by Prosper. OU THE LIFE OF [chap. hi. mahgnant zeal of an apostate. In order to prevent the imperial forces in any fresh invasion from again retaining a footing in the country by the number of fortresses, he razed nearly all the African ramparts, except those of the capital and Hippo Regius, which on the contrary he appears to have strengthened and repaired.* It may be remarked, that the same plan was adopted by the great cardinal Ximenes, with regard to- the kingdom of Navarre, and that in the opinion of a most judicious historian, Spain owes her present possession of that province to this singular precaution, f The soundness of this pohcy was allowed and admired by Genseric's contempo raries, but in a succeeding age the rapid progress of Behsarius was thought to be assisted by the want of fortresses to harass and delay his troops. But the prince, who then filled the African throne, was of a very different character from Genseric, and the resources most precious in the hands of an able sovereign, become elements of overthrow and ruin to a weak one. The internal regulation of his kingdom was in sufficient to employ the active roind of Genseric, and he determined to extend his power by the * In his Vandal history (lib. i. c. 5,) Procopius states that the for tifications of all the cities in Africa, except Carthage, were demolished; and he is followed by Gibbon and other modern historians. They have not observed that Hippo Regius is afterwards termed exvPa (lib. ii. c. 4 ;) and that Procopius in his history of Edifices, explains that some other cities besides Carthage were exempted (lib. vi. c. 5.) + Robertson's History of Charles V. (vol. ii. p. 35, ed. 17C9.) See also the remarks of General Foy, (Guerre de la Peninsule, vol. iii. p. 82.) chap, hi.] BELISARIUS. 67 creation of a naval force. With him, project and performance were never far asunder. His ships soon rode in the Mediterranean, and carried terror and destruction in their train. He annexed to his kingdom the Balearic islands, Corsica and Sardinia, the last of wliich was afterwards allotted by the Vandals as a place of exile or imprisonment for captive Moors, and during many years the ports of Africa were what they have again become at present, the abode of fierce and unpunished pirates. With every returning spring the fleet of Genseric ravaged the coasts of Italy and Sicily, or even of Greece and Illyria, sometimes bearing off the inhabitants to slavery, and sometimes levelling their cities to the ground. Emboldened by long impunity he attacked every government alike. On one occasion, when sailing from Carthage, he was asked by the pilot of his vessel to what coast he desired to steer. " Leave " the guidance to God," exclaimed the stern bar barian, " God will doubtless lead us against the " guilty objects of his anger !"* But the a.d. 455. most memorable achievement of Genseric was his sack of Rome, to which he was invited by domestic discontent. Eudoxia, a descendant of Theo- dosius the Great, and widow of the late Emperor Valeiitinian, had become the reluctanlf bride of Maximus, who had murdered and succeeded him, and she fixed upon the King of Africa as her ally and avenger. The character of that reckless Vandal must have been altogether unknown to her, if she * Procop. Vandal. lib. ii. c. 13. OS THE LIFE OF [chap. iii. expected to move him by her arguments on the impiety of suffering an imperial murder to remain unpunished; but the anticipated wealth of Rome held out to him sufficient motives for compliance.* Sailing to Italy at the head of a formidable fleet, he met with no resistance to his enterprize, and the usurper was torn to pieces by the fickle fury of the mob. But Eudoxia, though thus freed from her hated husband, was betrayed by her ungenerous champion, and carried captive to Carthage. She was afterwards restored to liberty at the intercession of the Byzantine court, but one of her daughters was compelled by Genseric to accept his son in mar riage. During his stay (a fortnight) at Rome, he did not neglect to load his vessels with its spoils. From the Capitoline temple of Jupiter, he removed one-half of its roof, composed of the finest bronze, and covered with a profusion of gold,f and the pre servation of such costly materials, is alone sufficient to disprove the loud but vague complaints of the extreme rapacity of Alaric. The same inference may also be drawn from the amount of booty at this time. It does not appear that Genseric, except in this instance, extended his depredation to any object beyond statues, furniture and plate, or inflicted the shghtest injury on public or private buildings. * Victor Tunnunensis, (ap. Canis. Antiq. Lect. vol. i. p. 322 ;) Jornandes, (De Reb. Getic. c. 45 ;) and Procopius, (Vandal, lib. i. c 4.) Consult the critical narrative of Muratori, (Annal. d'ltal. vol. iii. p. 165.) + See Donatus Roma Antiqua, lib. ii. c. 6 ; and Nardini, lib. v. c. 15. chap, hi.] BELISARIUS. 69 From the greater number of the successive western Emperors all equally degenerate, Genseric had no retribution for his hostilities to fear ; but the acces sion of Majorian suddenly raised up against him an enemy worthy of his talents and his power. This brave and accomplished prince determined to equip and lead in person an armament against the Vandals. Desirous of previously observing their resources, we are told that having tinged with black his yellow hair, he ventured to assume the character of his own ambassador, and as such to visit Carthage. The very strangeness of this story, when joined to the general accuracy and discernment of Procopius by whom it is recorded, is a proof of its truth, and I find two centuries later, the same disguise successfully prac tised by a King of the Lombards.* The early death of Majorian in a mutiny of his soldiers, soon afterwards freed Genseric from danger, and enabled him to renew his piracy. Such repeated outrages at length aroused the tardy resentment of the court of Constantinople, and its expedition deserves our peculiar attention as a contrast to that of Belisarius. Leo the First was then nominal Emperor, under the guidance of Aspar, a too power ful subject, who from his attachment to the Arian doctrines, found it easier to bestow than to assume the purple. For the reduction of the Vandals, Aspar mustered an army amounting to nearly one hundred thousand men, and a fleet which flattery might * Paul Warnefrid, lib. iii. c. 30. 70 THE LIFE OF [chap. hi. declare the most formidable ever launched by the Romans. The imperial resources were not spared in the equipment, and by the most lavish a.d. 468. ,.,... , , liberality, it was hoped to animate the future courage of the combatants. " But as," says Procopius, " it had been destined that this mighty " armament should fail, the command of it was " entrusted to the worthless Basiliscus." The choice of such a general might indeed account for the greatest reverses. His only merit consisted in his fraternal relation to the Empress, and his conduct in this enterprise has been variously ascribed to treachery or weakness. His fleet after a prosperous voyage anchored at the ancient promontory of Mercury, the modern Cape Bonn, distant no more than forty miles from Carthage. Had he at once disembarked his troops and marched upon the capital, the Vandals thus suddenly surprised could have made no effectual stand, but this precious opportunity was lost by his fatal hesitation, and by the prudent policy of Genseric. Professing the utmost deference for the imperial pleasure, the Vandal monarch proposed and obtained a truce of five days to settle the terms of his submis sion, and availed himself of this seasonable respite to collect and prepare his forces. At length a breeze favourable to his designs having arisen in the night, he silently manned his galleys with his bravest troops, approached the Roman fleet, and impelled many smaller vessels filled with combustibles into the midst of it. A conflagration speedily ensued, and the Romans starting from their slumbers, found chap, hi.] BELISARIUS. 71 themselves encompassed by fire and the Vandals. The wild shrieks of the perishing multitude, mingled with the crackling of the flames and the roaring of the wind, and the enemy proved as unrelenting as the elements. The greater part of the fleet was destroyed in this memorable night, and Basiliscus, who led back to Constantinople a handful of sru> vivors and a few shattered ships, only escaped the punishment he deserved by taking refuge at the sanctuary of St. Sophia. The powerful resources displayed in this armament induced the Vandals, and its failure the Romans, to desire peace, which was accordingly concluded a few years afterwards in the reign of Zeno, and which continued uninterrupted till that of Justinian. Genseric did not long survive this final ratification of his conquests, and dying in the fulness of years left behind him a new law for the succession to his crown. The most common source of decay and downfal to newly- founded monarchies has always been their partition after the decease of their founder, and to provide against this evil, as well as against that of long minorities, Genseric enjoined that amongst his de scendants the eldest surviving male should, in every case, be the sole rightful heir, so that the son of an elder brother should yield to his uncle. Hunneric, son of the late King, was his first successor, and dis played all his cruelty without any of his talents. The savage Moors, who had refused to own the allegiance, but had been awed by the valour and renown of Genseric, now commenced a destructive, though 1 2 THE LIFE OF [chap. hi. desultory, warfare on the inland frontiers. The per fidy of this people seems to have been as proverbial as the ancient Punic faith, and they made as httle account of their hostages as of their promises.* None amongst them (except the tribes of Tripoli, in the reign of Justinian) were ever converted to Christianity, but persevered in their primitive worship till the con quest of the Saracens. Securely nestled in the fast nesses of Mount Atlas, or roving over the trackless desert they seldom suffered, and were always ready to inflict invasion, and gradually encroached on the limits of the ancient Roman province. During this reign, the peace of Africa was still more cruelly dis turbed by the persecution which the Arian monarch decreed against his Catholic subjects. Many amongst them, rather than forswear their tenets, heroically bore a painful and ignominious death, and the courage of the remainder was upheld by real piety and doubt ful miracles. After the death of Hunneric, 484—496. n^s nephew and successor, Gundamund, pursued the same mistaken policy for twelve years. Thrasimund, brother of Gundamund, then ascended the throne. He judiciously formed an alliance with the great Theodoric, King of Italy, which he cemented by his marriage with Amalafrida, sister of that monarch. As her dower, he obtained the district of Cape Lilybaeum, in Sicily, and the * Procop. Vandal, lib. ii. c. 8 and 17. The base and perfidious character of the wandering Moors is admitted by tlieir countryman, Leo Africanus, with many apologies for his frankness (lib. i. p. 17, ed. 1556.) chap, ui.] BELISARIUS. 73 aid of six thousand warlike Goths, who attended the Queen to Africa. The aversion of Thrasimund to the adherents of the Trinity was not less strong than that of his predecessors, but he employed more mild and effectual measures for conversion. He held out to the Catholics not the terrors of persecution, but the allurements of rewards and dignities ; and if any amongst them became guilty of an offence, his pardon might always be gained by his apostasy. After Thrasimund, who reigned twenty-seven years, Hilderic, son of Hunneric, was proclaimed King, as the eldest of the royal race. Born of an J a.d. 523. orthodox mother, (he was grandson of the Empress Eudoxia), he showed great indulgence to the Catholics, but his advanced age and yielding dis position rendered him wholly unfit for business, and especially for war. Yet, since distrust and cruelty are the common results of weakness, we read without surprise of the close imprisonment and mysterious death of Queen Amalafrida, together with a general massacre of her Gothic guards, on the vague and improbable charge of having conspired against the reigning sovereign.* Had Theodoric the Great still lived he would doubtless have exacted a bloody retri bution, and though the minority of his successor saved the Vandals from hostihties, they must have bitterly deplored their folly when they found them selves on the invasion of Behsarius, unprotected by so useful an alliance. From the incapacity and in- * Compare Cassiodorius (Var, lib. ix. ep. 1,) with Procopius, (Vandal, lib. i. c. 9.) E 74 THE LIFE OF [chap. m. firmities of Hilderic much of his power devolved on Gelimer, his nearest kinsman and destined heir, who was renowned for martial prowess but fierce in dis position, impatient of control and thirsting for supreme authority. The sceptre, which from the age of Hilderic he must very shortly have received by right, he chose rather to seize by usurpation. To the bravest of the Vandals he spoke of the timid and unwarlike temper of their King ; to the most cautious he represented the independence of the African crown as endangered by a late alhance of Hilderic with the Emperor Justin. Strongly moved by these insimi- p Rations, and emboldened by the fears of their King, the Vandals rose in arms and hailed Gelimer as sovereign, while Hilderic and his chief partisans were cast into a dungeon. Meanwhile Justinian had ascended the imperial throne, and whether really pitying the fate of his ally, or whether, as was rftore probably the case, seeking a pretext to attack this mighty monarchy while weakened by internal factions, he dispatched ambassadors to Carthage, soliciting the restoration of Hilderic. There had been a remarkable similarity between the cases of Justinian and of Gelimer, each heir to an imbecile old man, and each controlling and directing the measures of government in his place : but Justinian, unlike the Vandal prince, had been satisfied with the reahty without the trappings of sovereign power, and patiently awaited the death or resignation of his kinsman. " Do not," he wrote to Gelimer, " incur the name of tyrant by too hastily chap, in.] BELISARIUS. 75 " assuming the title of King, and suffer Hilderic at " least to enjoy the honours, if not to exercise the " rights, of royalty." The only effect of this letter on the haughty and suspicious Vandal was an order for the still closer imprisonment of Hilderic, on the plea of an intended escape. The Emperor then requested, that if Gelimer had determined to retain the crown, he would at least grant freedom to his captive, and allow him to spend the remainder of his life in a peaceful retreat at Constantinople. This proposal, also, was refused. Having thus acquired a sufficient ground for hostilities, and being enabled, by his recent peace with Persia, to employ his forces elsewhere, Justinian undertook an expedition against Carthage. He was urged to this design by a considerable number of the Vandal partisans of Hilderic, who had hastened to the Byzantine court in search of refuge and revenge.* The announcement of his project was, however, received with dismay by everyone who contemplated either its expenses or its dangers, and was heard with pleasure only by the thoughtless rabble, which always rejoices in remaining a safe spectator of the perils which others undergo. The failure of the great armament in the reign of Leo had left a deep impres sion, and the losses it had occasioned, both in men and money, were computed with fearful forebodings. The soldiers complained that, scarcely returned from a long and laborious war, and not having for one * This appears from a subsequent passage in Procopius, (Vandal. lib. ii. c. 5.) E 2 76 THE LIFE OF [chap. hi. moment enjoyed the happiness of home, they should again be summoned to arms, engaged in naval enter prises, the very name of which was previously almost unknown to them, and transported from the most distant oriental regions to the utmost limits of the west, in order forthwith to begin a doubtful contest against the Vandals and the Moors. With the exception of Behsarius, the Roman generals shared so strongly in the pubhc terror, that even then ambition yielded to alarm, and that, far from eagerly courting, they dreaded the responsibility, and shrunk from the command of the intended expedition.* On the other hand, the financiers, foreseeing the new demands upon the treasury, and the inquiries into their own fraudulent profits which so costly an undertaking must bring on, concealed their fears of detection and impoverishment under the convenient mask of national economy. The chief of this party, John of Cappadocia, ventured in full council to dissuade the Emperor from his project, on the plea of its uncertainty and danger; and his arguments would have prevailed, had they not been met by supernatural grounds. Justinian was on the point of yielding, when a bishop from the East requested admission to his presence, exhorted him to stand forth as the champion of the Catholic Church, and announced a seasonable vision. These, said the prelate, were the very words of the Lord : " I will " march before him in his battles, and make him f Compare Procopius de /Edif. lib. vi. t. 5 ; and Vandal, lib. i. c. 10. ch»p. m.] BELISARIUS. 77 " sovereign of Africa." It is rarely that men reject any tale, however fantastic or improbable, provided it tends to show that their own sect or country is the pecuhar favourite of heaven. All the doubts of Justinian were removed ; he commanded a fleet and army to be forthwith equipped for this sacred enter prise, and endeavoured still further to insure its success by his austerity in fasts and vigils.* Belisa rius was named supreme commander, still retaining his high titular station as General of the East.f Besides the alleged promise of divine aid, Justinian, at this important juncture, obtained a more solid advantage by the revolt of Tripoli and Sardinia from the Vandals. It is remarkable, that the loss of these very provinces should, in like manner, have preceded the expedition of Basiliscus. Pudentius, a stirring and popular citizen of Tripoli, having set on foot an insurrection, a small detachment of troops was, at his request, dispatched to his assistance. By his exer tions, the town and territory of Tripoli acknowledged the imperial sway ; a circumstance which might have served to show, at the outset, how little the rights of Hilderic were likely to be respected in a war pro fessedly undertaken to defend them. Sardinia, * In one of his laws (Novell. 30,) Justinian himself boasts of having promoted the African war : vigiliis, inediis, ceterisque labo rious ; and Cardinal Baronius does not fail to ascribe the prosperous result to these practices. Ex quibus, he adds, discant Principes cum bellica tractant quibus operibus divinum sibi numen concilient. (Annal. Eccles. a.d. 533, No. 43.) t The letter of Justinian to Belisarius, in the April following, is addressed Magistro Militum per Orientem. (Cod. Justinian, lib. i. tit. 27.) 7S THE LIFE OF [chap. hi. perhaps the only portion of the ancient world which has never, at any recorded period, enjoyed the blessings either of freedom or civilisation, had been entrusted by Gelimer to the government of Godas, whose presumptuous ambition urged him to forswear his allegiance, and assume the ensigns of royalty; but whose prudent sense of weakness besought, and not in vain, some succour from Justinian. Meantime, Belisarius was actively employed in collecting and mustering his forces at Constantinople. The army amounted to less than one-sixth of that which Basiliscus had formerly led so unsuccessfully to the same undertaking, since it did not exceed five thousand cavalry, and ten thousand foot soldiers.* Nor were all these regular and well combined: a share of them consisted of barbarian confederates, more especially of Huns and Heruli. On Behsarius himself, Justinian bestowed the amplest authority by a written patent or commission ; he left him at full liberty to pursue his own plans without restraint, and invested all his future commands with the same sacred character as though they had emanated directly from the sovereign. The fleet was manned by twenty thousand sailors, from Egypt and Asia Minor, and composed of five hundred transports, whose size might vary from thirty to five hundred * Montesquieu (Grand, et Decad. des Rom. c. 20) mistakes the five thousand cavalry for the total numbers of the army ; an error I should not have expected from this excellent writer. He has blindly followed a false translation by Cousin in another passage. (Vandal. lib. ii. c. 7.) chap, in.] BELISARIUS. 79 tons.* To provide against any maritime engagement, the transports were escorted by ninety-two galleys, not remarkable, indeed, for their strength, since each contained but twenty mariners, and a single rank of oars, which was carefully protected from the darts of an enemy by a covering along the rowers. A slight but characteristic incident, which took place shortly before the sailing of the fleet, will set forth in natural colours the superstitious spirit of this age. It had been resolved to dispatch, in advance of the principal forces, a detachment headed by two inferior officers, named Martin and Valerian, to await in the Peloponnesus the arrival of the rest. They had already embarked for this purpose, when Justinian, suddenly remembering some further directions which he had hitherto neglected to give them, sent a messenger, summoning them once more to his presence. On reflection, however, it occurred to him that to delay their departure would form an inauspicious augury; and preferring the avoidance of the omen to the execution of his orders, he hastily, through a second envoy, commanded Martin and Valerian to remain on board. Yet, by this prudent afterthought, he fell into the very evil which he endeavoured to shun. It was universally considered by the people, that no augury could be more unfavourable than for a sovereign to withhold his * I follow Gibbon in this computation of the tonnage. Cousin, always careless, makes the number of ships fifty ; and Montesquieu proves his dependence on the translation by falling into the snare. (Grand, et Decad. des Rom. c. 20.) >S0 THE LIFE OF [chap. m. subjects from landing; and every one felt fully assured that neither of these ill-fated officers would ever again return to Constantinople. When, to the great surprise of the citizens, both Martin and Valerian were, many months afterwards, actually seen to disembark after the African war, the presage even then continued to be trusted and beheved, and was ingeniously applied to Stoza, one of the sub alterns, who had risen in rebellion, and therefore staid abroad. How easy must the office of soothsayer have been amongst a people who thus, as it were, conspired with his predictions, and were determined, at all events, to find or to make a miraculous accom plishment to them ! In the month of June, and the seventh year of the reign of Justinian, the last armament of Rome against her ancient rival became readyfor departure. The general embarked, attended on this occasion by Antonina, and by his secretary, the historian Procopius, who at first had shared in the popular fear and distaste of this enterprise, but had afterwards been induced to join it by a hopeful dream. The galley of Belisarius was moored near the shore, in front of the imperial palace,* where it received a last visit from Justinian, and a solemn blessing from the patriarch of the city. A soldier recently baptised was placed on board, to secure its prosperous voyage ; its sails were then unfurled, and, * This palace was on tlie Propontis, between the cathedral of St. Sophia and the Hippodrome. See- Ducange (Const. Christ, lib. ii. p. 113;) and Gibbon (vol. iii. p. 22.) CHAF. HI.] BELISARIUS. 81 with the other ships in its train, it glided down the straights of the Bosphorus, and gradually disappeared from the lingering gaze of the assembled multitude. The first place where Belisarius anchored was Heraclea, the ancient Perinthus, a city which might boast of having, at one period, held Constantinople beneath its jurisdiction.* Here the fleet remained five days, awaiting a large supply of horses, with which the Emperor had promised to furnish the cavalry from Thrace. It then proceeded to Abydos, where it was again delayed by a calm during four days, an interval which became remarkable from the firmness of Belisarius in upholding military order. Two of the Hunnish confederates had killed a com rade in one of those drunken brawls to which their nation was particularly prone, and by the prompt justice of the general they were executed on the hill above Abydos. Their punishment, which might appear harsh to barbarians, since murder with them is commonly a venial crime,t aroused the pity and * Dion Cassius, lib. lxxiv. c. 14. At present, the harbour of Heraclea is almost choked up with the fragments of ancient edifices. (Grelot, Voyage, p. 52.) t In almost every barbarous state of society, we find that the murder of a citizen might be atoned for by a fine to his nearest kinsmen. That this was the case with the ancient Germans, appears from Tacitus (Germ. c. 12) ; and his testimony is confirmed and illustrated by the provisions in the Codes of the Visigoths, Franks, &e. According to the Salic law, a Frank who killed a Frank paid " deux cent sous," only one hundred when he killed a Roman proprietor, and only forty-five when a Roman vassal. (Esprit des Loix, lib. xxviii. c. 3.) This fine was independent of the fredtjm to the Lord of the soil, which usually amounted to one-third of the former. (Lib. xxx. c. 20.) E 3 •S2 THE LIFE OF [chap. iii. indignation of their countrymen; and even the Byzantine soldiers unwillingly foresaw, from this example, an approaching check to their own hcense and irregularity. The assertion of savage freedom in the confederates, or the impatience of unusual discipline in the Romans, might have grown to a formidable mutiny, had not Behsarius repressed it in a public harangue. " Those," he said, " who allow " a murder to remain unpunished, become accom- " plices to its guilt, and partners in its infamy." He urged that the drunkenness of the criminals was, in fact, an aggravation of their crime; since intempe rance, even when harmless, outruns the bounds of military discipline; and he declared that he would acknowledge no soldier for his comrade, who could not march with pure and unpolluted hands against the enemy. After this wholesome exhortation, he availed himself of a favourable breeze to pursue the voyage. Apprehensive that so many ships might easily be scattered by a storm, and that the pilots would find it difficult in its darkness to recognise and follow his leading galley, he devised several judicious precautions for their guidance. His own and two other chief galleys were distinguished during the day by red streaks on the sails, and at night by lamps from the stern ; and the moment of departure from a harbour was clearly announced to the most distant vessels by the signal of a trumpet. From Abydos, a fair wind wafted the fleet to Cape Malea; and the doubling of that stormy headland, which the multitude of the ships might have rendered dangerous, chap, iii.] BELISARIUS. 83 was accomplished during a fortunate calm. On reaching Methone, now called Modon, in the Pelo ponnesus, the general found Martin and Valerian awaiting his arrival, and allowed a few days of repose to his soldiers, whom the unwonted fatigue of a voyage had already exhausted. They were here exposed to a peril which they had never contemplated, from the unfeeling avarice of John of Cappadocia, who, as minister of the finances, had furnished at Constantinople the provisions of the fleet. It was usual to harden the bread intended for naval or military expeditions, by a two-fold preparation in the oven;* a practice which continued till a recent period, and of which the word biscuit in its derivation still exhibits the trace. On account of the loss of weight which the bread must undergo from this process, a deduction of one-fourth was allowed amongst the Romans ; and with the view of retaining for his private profit not merely this stipulated portion, but also the fuel which the treasury defrayed, John had given orders that the bread might only be slightly baked at the fires of the public baths. No consideration for the health or life of the soldiers appears to have disturbed his projects of emolument ; and he probably trusted to the politic silence of the general for concealing, or to his own influence with the Emperor for overcoming, any complaints that * For an account of this bread or biscuit, see Pliny (Hist. Nat. lib. xxii. c. 25,) where he calls it nauticus panis. Of the panis militaris, he says that it was heavier by one-third than the grain from which it was made. (Lib. xviii. c. 7.) 84 THE LIFE OF [chap. hi. might arise. When the sacks of bread were opened at Methone, their contents had sunk into a moulder ing and offensive paste ; so that greater evils could hardly have resulted from a scarcity of provisions, than their abundance now brought on. The sultri ness of summer conspired with this unwholesome food : five hundred soldiers were swept away by a rapid disease ; and its ravages might have extended still further, had not the activity of Behsarius procured a supply of fresh bread at Methone. Undismayed by the expected enmity of a powerful and vindictive minister, he made" known to Justinian the whole of this shameless fraud ; but though the Emperor was sufficiently candid to praise the honest zeal of his general, he wanted firmness to punish the rapine of his favourite. From Methone, the pilots, before undertaking to cross the Adriatic, thought it prudent to shorten the distance, by steering to the island of Zante, from whence they proceeded on what, in those days, might appear a difficult and dangerous voyage. Another calm (it was now midsummer) delayed the ships for sixteen days, in their passage between Zante and Sicily; and amongst the chief hardships of this tedious navigation, was the tainting effect of the heat on the casks of fresh water. Antonina alone, who had placed glass bottles in a deep recess of the hold, and covered them thickly with sand, still preserved a pure beverage for the table of her husband, and of his principal officers. We may applaud the skill of Antonina in contriving, rather chap, m.] BELISARIUS. 85 than the readiness of Behsarius in accepting this supply; since nothing tends more strongly to the encouragement of an army or to the glory of its leader, than to see him in trying circumstances share the privations as well as the perils of his soldiers. The conduct of Behsarius on this occa sion might be disadvantageously contrasted with that of Cato and Charles the Twelfth, or with the heroic forbearance of our own great countryman, Sir Philip Sydney.* The Roman army landed in Sicily, on one of the rocky ridges of lava, extending from the base of Mount Etna to the sea. This spot was desolate and barren as it still remains, and seemed little in accordance with the proverbial fruitfulness of the island. At this station Belisarius determined to avail Hmself of a compact lately formed with Queen Amalasontha, Regent of the Gothic kingdom, who was desirous of maintaining and strengthening her alliance with the Byzantine empire, by every good office in her power, and had accordingly agreed to permit a free purchase of provisions and horses in Sicily to the armament of Behsarius. f Little did she then foresee how shortly the same forces com- * Lucan relates (Pharsal. ix. 500,) how Cato, during a sultry march in Africa, reproved a soldier for bringing him a helmet full of water, and dashed it to the ground. For the conduct of the Swedish monarch, on his progress to Pultowa, see Voltaire. (Hist. lib. 4.) The anecdote of Sir Philip Sydney, after the battle of Zutphen, is, as it deserves, too well known to need a reference. t The provisions appear from Procopius (Vandal, lib. i. u. 14,) and the horses from another passage. (Goth. lib. i. c. 3.) 86 THE LIFE OF [chap. hi. manded by the same general, would direct against her own countrymen a confidence augmented, and a valour disciplined by the very successes in Africa to which she thus imprudently contributed ! To claim these promised supplies, but above all to obtain authentic tidings for the determination of his fur ther plans, Belisarius now dispatched his secretary on a mission to Syracuse. He was justly alarmed at the apprehensions of his soldiers, whom he had overheard, on the voyage, avowing to each other, that on land, indeed, they would encounter the enemy with boldness, but that if assailed by sea, they must betake themselves to flight, as unable to con tend at once with the Vandals and the waves. The doubts of the general as to the fittest place for land ing in Africa, his uncertainty as to the designs of the barbarians, and the chance of their having pre pared some hidden ambush to surprise his force in this island, combined with the naval terrors of his army to embarrass and disturb him. It was there fore his order, that Procopius should collect informa tion on these points, and rejoin him as speedily as possible at Catania, a few miles below his actual station.* The future historian accordingly em- * The text of Procopius in this place, mentions Caucana a harbour on the southern coast of Sicily, and he is followed by all the modern writers. But the names in his history are so frequently corrupted by copyists, or editors, that very little dependence can be placed upon them. Thus for instance, we find BaxSiAae for BaA/3i5ai<. (Vandal, lib. ii. c. 9 ;) Arboruchi for Armoriei (Goth. lib. i. c. 12 ;) IVrgamus for Bergomus. (Goth. lib. ii. c. 12,) Sc. I am convinced, that in this place the real reading is not Caucana, but Catana, the chap, hi.] BELISARIUS. 87 barked, and on his arrival at Syracuse, had the good fortune of finding in a merchant of the city, one of his oldest and most trusty friends. A servant of this tradesman had returned but three days before from Carthage, and in answer to the inquiries of Procopius, assured him of the careless and confident security of the Vandals. Far from having planned any sudden attack upon the Roman armament in Sicily, Gelimer did not as yet expect its approach, and had in the mean time indulged his vengeance against Godas for the revolt of Sardinia, by dis patching to that island his brother Zazo, at the head of five thousand of his bravest soldiers. Unsuspi cious of the- coming storm, and by no means ready to withstand it, he had left Carthage to spend the summer at the inland city of Hermione. On hearing ancient name of Catania. In the first place, Procopius states, that the spot is distant from Syracuse two hundred stadia, or less than thirty miles, wliich agrees very nearly with the distance from Catania, to the ancient outer wall of Tyche, it being httle more than thirty- one miles, though the modern road is about seven longer from its making a circuit through Lentini. Now Caucana is at least three hundred and fifty or four hundred stadia from Syracuse (Cluver. Sicil. Antiq. p. 191, ap. Gibbon ;) and even further, if I may venture to allege my own local knowledge, and Procopius having travelled the distance, could not possibly be so much mistaken. Secondly, it is to be remembered, that Behsarius was fearful of some ambush or surprise in Sicily from the Vandals, and it was partly to clear up this fact that Procopius was sent to Syracuse. Now if Belisarius had, in the meanwhile, sailed along the eastern and southern coasts to Caucana, he would have been exposing himself to the very danger he apprehended, before he had ascertained whether or not it really existed. Thirdly, if Belisarius had any idea of proceeding to Malta, as he afterwards actually did, he must have foreseen that by his voyage to Caucana he made an unnecessary circuit. 88 THE LIFE OF [chap. hi. these welcome tidings, Procopius wished to confirm them to his patron by the same authentic testimony from which he himself had received them, and hurry ing the domestic along to his bark which was moored near the fountain of Arethusa,* and scarcely taking time to explain to the astonished merchant the motive of this arbitrary seizure, he forthwith steered again towards Catania. No sooner had Belisarius been informed of the absence of Gehmer from Car thage, than he resolved to turn it to his purpose, and availed himself of an eastern breeze which wafted his fleet to Malta, and from thence to the African coast, three months after his departure from Constantinople, The ships drew near the shore at Caput Vada, whose name has been corrupted to Capoudia in modern times. It consists of a level and narrow strip of land jutting out very far into the sea, and was chosen in the latter years of Justinian for the foundation of a city, some remains of which are still to be dis- cerned.f Its distance from Carthage does not exceed one hundred and fifty miles. Here a council of war was convened by Behsarius, to determine the ques- * This classic fountain has retained its ancient name, and with the exception of the fishes, seemed to me, in 1825, still to correspond exactly with Cicero's description. In hac insula extrema est fons aquas duleis, cui nomen Arethusa, ineredibili magnitudine, plenissimus piscium, qui fluctu totus operiretur nisi munitione ao mole lapidum mari disjunctus. (In Verr. iv. c. 53.) It is remarkable, that in the middle ages the ancient fable of the Alpheus survived at Syracuse, in the altered shape of a pious legend. It was asserted that the fountain had a submarine and miraculous communication with the river Jordan. See Marifiotti, (ap. Wilkinson's Magna Grsecia. p. 15.) f Procop. Dc /Edif. lib. vi. c. 6 ; Shaw's Travels, p. 193, ed. 1738. chap, in.] BELISARIUS. S9 tion of landing ; and Procopius, who was undoubtedly present, has recorded the principal speeches then dehvered. The stake seemed full of hazard, the Vandals, it is true, were scattered and unprepared, but they had the advantage of a known and subject country, and the forces which they could bring into the field exceeded in a five-fold proportion the num bers of the Roman army. The Patrician Archelaus, who had filled important offices, both in Illyria and at Constantinople, and was now, as treasurer, second in command, thus opened the discussion. "I cannot, my brother officers, but admire the "moderation of the general, who surpassing us all "so greatly both in talent and experience, and "invested with unlimited power, yet refers to our " common deliberations what his single wisdom " might determine, and his supreme authority com- "mand. How comes it then, that you do not " eagerly avail yourselves of his generous permission "to dissuade him from the perilous project of dis- " embarking at this place ? It is true, that the "office of adviser, in times of difficulty, is barren " and unprofitable, since men too commonly attri- " bute their success to the judgment they exerted, "and their failures, only to the counsel they received. "Yet this selfish consideration shall not check my "zeal, at a juncture so momentous as the present. " Tell me, chieftains — tell me, if you desire to land, "by what harbour can you shelter your fleet, by "what fortress your soldiers? Are you not aware "that the coast, for nine days journey from Car- 90 THE LIFE OF [chap. III. " thage, hardly affords a single harbour, and is open " to every gale,* while on the other hand, Genseric "has stripped every African city of its walls? If "any disaster should befall us, to which from our " human condition, and the uncertainty of fortune, "we must naturally be exposed, on what resources " could we then rely ? Should a storm arise, the " fleet must either be driven to a distance, or dashed "to pieces on the shore. What distress meanwhile "may we not undergo by land, from the want of "provisions, or of fresh water, with which this " region is said to be so scantily supplied ! In such " trying circumstances, let no one look to me as to "the purveyor for assistance, since a public officer, " when bereaved of all means for the fulfilment of " his duties, becomes again levelled and degraded to " the common rank. Where could I place in safety " your magazines of arms and equipments, or where " could you find refuge from the pursuing harba- " rians ? But let me rather turn my thoughts from " such ill-omened forebodings. I propose that we " should sail directly towards Carthage, at the dis- "tance of only six miles from which there is a "spacious haven, unguarded by the Vandals, and "well adapted for the reception of so large a fleet " as ours.f From this convenient station we could * The want of harbours on this coast, was one of the chief objec tions urged by Fabius against tlie proposed expedition of Scipio. (Liv. lib. xxviii. c. 42.) t It will be seen from this circumstantial detail of the proposal of Archelaus, that Gibbon (vol. vii. p. 173) is wrong in representing it as a scheme to sail at once into the port of Carthage. The place chap, m.] BELISARIUS. 91 " assault the capital, and as surely as the loss of the " head is followed by the downfal of the limbs, so " Carthage in all hkelihood would yield to our very " first onset, while thus forsaken by its sovereign. " Consider fully these projects, I entreat you, and " adopt the one which you may deem the wisest and " the best." Several other officers having likewise spoken, Beli sarius replied to them as follows : " My comrades, I trust that you will not, on this " occasion, look upon my words as those of a master, " nor fancy that I have delayed them to the last in " order to close the discussion and compel your " acquiescence. I have now heard your opinions, I " will unfold my own, and then submit it with the " others to our common judgment. In the first " place, it seems to me important to remember how " lately the soldiers expressed before us their terrors " of a naval battle, and their intention, should they " be encountered by the hostile fleet, of seeking " security in flight. All our thoughts, all our " prayers at that time were hmited to the single " wish of finding a safe and unmolested opportunity " to land in Africa, and now that God has vouchsafed " to us the fulfilment of this anxious wish, would it " be wise to neglect and spurn the very favour meant by Archelaus is the present lake of Tunis. See Polybius, lib. i. c. 73. We learn from Dr. Shaw, that this ancient harbour has now become httle more than a morass, with only six or seven feet of water in the deepest parts, being almost choked up by receiving the common sewers of Tunis. (Travels in Barbary, p. 155.) Dr. Shaw then proceeds to extol thejsize and sweetness of its mullets. 92 THE LIFE OF [chap. iii. " which before it was bestowed we so eagerly desired " to obtain ? Should we, as it has been proposed, " sail at once towards Carthage, the fleet of the " Vandals might meet us on our way, and we then " could not justly complain of the cowardly reluct- " ance of our soldiers, since their formal avowal " should have taught us to beware. Even the success " which, notwithstanding their want of spirit, might " by accident be gained, could not clear us from the " disgrace of having unnecessarily exposed them to " the dangers of their own timidity. Amongst all the " arguments that should urge us to disembark, none " appears to me stronger than the one employed to dis- " suade us, I mean the possibility of storms, by which, " as it has been truly stated, our fleet must be either " scattered or destroyed. Which then is best, that " our ships should perish alone, or that our army also " should be submerged with them ? Consider that " by landing now, we shall find unprepared and " unsuspecting enemies, and shall therefore pro- " bably defeat them, since success is always mainly " promoted by surprise. On the other hand, even a " short delay, such as a calm at sea might occasion, " would enable the Vandals to take measures for " active defence, and to collect and marshal all their " forces against us. We might then, perhaps, have " to fight for a landing, and seek in vain that favour- " able opportunity wliich we now possess, but which " its very facility induces us to undervalue. My " opinion is, therefore, that we ought to disembark " forthwith. We will surround our camp with chap, m.] BELISARIUS. 93 " entrenchments, which in case of disaster would afford " us nearly the same shelter and protection as we " could have derived from the ramparts of a fortress, " nor need we doubt of supplies so long as we exhibit " valour. Our security from danger, and our de- " pendence for food, are both equally placed in our " own right hands." These arguments prevailed in the council, the troops were landed that , -, ., , , ¦,• , ¦ September, very day, and a suitable position having £D_ 533 been chosen by the general, the fortifica tion of the camp was begun with alacrity. Great distress was felt for want of water, but in the digging of the ditch and rampart the discovery of a plentiful spring served both to quench the thirst of the soldiers, and to cheer them by its favourable augury.* According to the superstitious tendency of this age, or perhaps of human nature, they appear to have prized the omen still more than the relief. In each ship Behsarius left a guard of five soldiers, and ap pointed the galleys to the outward of the fleet, so as to shield it against any unforeseen attack. Mean while some private soldiers, exulting in their deliver ance from shipboard, had wandered from the camp to gather fruits from the neighbouring fields, and the general, as at Abydos, seized the opportunity of enforcing military discipline. The marauders were severely scourged, and Behsarius in a public harangue, besought his soldiers to be warned by this example. He pointed out to them the importance of soothing and conciliating the native Africans, and * Compare Procopius Vandal, lib. i. c. 15. De iEdif. lib. vi. c. 6. 94 THE LIFE OF [chap. hi. of detaching them from the Vandal cause, to which from religious differences they were already dis affected. He urged that rapine would raise up as enemies against them, not merely the Africans and Vandals, but even God himself, since none who disobey his precepts can venture to expect his pro tection, while on the other hand justice and forbear ance would render the Deity propitious, the Africans friendly, and the Vandals forsaken. The Roman general now commenced his march upon Carthage. He sent a detachment before him to seize the town of Sullecte, at one day's journey from the camp; and, in pursuance of his orders, these soldiers silently entered the place (it was unwalled) before day-break, without any resistance from the sleeping inhabitants. A meeting was then convened, of the bishop and principal citizens, who, wisely professing to do from inclination what neces sity compelled, dispatched to Behsarius the keys of a town which his troops already occupied. AU the horses of the pubhc posts were likewise placed at his disposal, and one of the royal messengers was intercepted, whom his liberality induced to convey several copies of a circular letter from Justinian to the local authorities in Africa. In this document, which Procopius has preserved, it is remarkable that the Emperor puts forth no claim of hereditary right, nor views of personal ambition, and represents his armament as undertaken solely with the object of checking usurpation and restoring the lawful King. He expresses his desire for the peace and happiness BELISARIUS. 95 of the Vandals, and devoutly calls God to witness for the sincerity of his intentions. From Sullecte, the Roman general advanced along the shore, through Leptis and Adrumetum, proceeding at the rate of about twelve miles each day, and never failing to fortify, or at least to guard, his encampments at night. During the march, he appointed to the van, three miles from the main body, a detachment of three hundred horsemen, who might apprize him of the approach of any danger, and whose command was entrusted to John, surnamed, from his country, the Armenian. A double number of Hunnish cavalry, at an equal distance, covered the left wing, and the right was protected by the sea. The rear was led by Belisarius in person, who supposed that Gelimer, hastening from the inland provinces, would probably follow and assail him in this quarter ; and the result afterwards confirmed the truth of his conjecture. The fleet, by his directions, regulated its movements according to those of the troops, so as always to keep them in sight; and for this purpose the mariners, during calms or slight breezes, plied their oars to quicken their progress, while, during boisterous gales, they employed smaller sails than usual to retard it. Advancing in this man ner, without meeting any opposition, the Romans arrived at Grasse, no more than fifty miles from Carthage, where they admired the country palace and dehcious paradise* or garden of the Vandal * In the middle ages the word Paradise was frequently used in its Persian sense of Garden, and sometimes signified a portico before a 96 THE LIFE OF [chap. hi. Kings. Procopius declares that the latter exceeded any other he had ever seen ; he extols its sparkling fountains and shady groves, and tells us that though the Roman army plucked a plentiful supply of its various fruits, yet so great was their abundance, that the diminution thus occasioned could hardly be discerned. The domain of Gelimer was freely sur rendered to the troops by Behsarius ; but with regard to private citizens, the strictest discipline had been established by his salutary rigour ; and the modera tion of his army, joined to his own courteous and friendly manners, entirely gained him the confidence and good-will of the Africans. Far from shunning the presence of the Romans, and concealing or removing property, they crowded to the camp ; they brought ample provisions for sale, and the reception they gave has been compared by a spectator to that which an army might meet with in its native country.* When the intelligence of the landing and progress of the Romans reached Gehmer at Hermione, f his first impulse was revenge. Orders were dispatched to his brother Ammatas, at Carthage, for the instant execution of the captive Hilderic and his chief adherents, and the effects of this barbarous decree afterwards manifested how much less it had pro ceeded from policy than from passion. The death church. See Paul Warnefrid, lib. v. c. 31 ; and Ducange, Gloss. Med. Lat. vol. iii. p. 166. * Procop. Vandal, lib. i. c. 17. + Hermione is not mentioned by D'Anville, but may be found in Ruinart. (Hist. Pers. p. 310.) chap, in.] BELISARIUS. 97 of the rightful sovereign, whose claims had hitherto been the pretext rather than the motive of the war, inflamed with redoubled animosity his Vandal partisans, and freed the Roman invaders from an unwelcome and perplexing obhgation. In the next harangue of Behsarius to his soldiers, we may discern his altered tone, and remark that the ob ject of the contest is represented no longer as the maintenance of a regular succession in the reigning dynasty, but as the restoration of a former province to the empire. Yet Gelimer, though in his first transports of rage he had commanded a crime of which the consequences so speedily recoiled upon himself, appears in the remainder of his conduct to have acted with the soundest judgment, and upheld his reputation for consummate mihtary skill. His forces very far exceeded those of Belisarius, since the Vandals, during the century of their dominion in Africa, had increased from fifty to eighty thousand fighting men.* Of these imposing numbers, however, many were disaffected to Gelimer, and all unpre pared for so sudden an attack; a large share was dispersed along the kingdom, from Tangier to Tripoli, and the flower of the forces was engaged in the useless conquest of Sardinia. Still Gelimer trusted, * MupiaSes oktu. (Hist. Arcan. c. 18.) Alemanni has inadver tently translated this by one hundred and sixty thousand. Cousin, as usual, follows the Latin version ; and Gibbon, by his dependence on the one or on the other, has fallen into the same serious error, (vol. vii. p. 1 75.) In the time of Victor Vitensis (a.d. 488) the Vandal forces did not as yet amount to eighty thousand. (De Persec. lib. i. c. 1.) 98 THE LIFE OF [chap. hi. by rapidity and vigour, to counterbalance these dis advantageous circumstances, and overwhelm the scanty battalions of the enemy before they could reach his capital. For this purpose, he formed his plan with such ability, that even the Roman his torian * owns that it only failed from the imperfect execution of his orders, and the excellent line of march which Behsarius had established. As the place of battle, the king fixed on Decimus, a village whose name indicates the tenth milestone from Carthage, and which lay directly on the route of Belisarius. The narrow defile of its position seemed well fitted to conceal and assist the designs of Gehmer, who hoped that the Roman army might here be surrounded and hemmed in. He had there fore instructed Ammatas to lead forth the garrison of Carthage, and encounter the vanguard of the enemy at Decimus; while his nephew Gibamund, proceeding from the same city in a different direc tion, was, with a chosen squadron, to attack the left wing of the invaders. On his part, collecting round Hermione an army as numerous as the urgent haste of the occasion would admit, the king followed the course of the Romans, in order to close upon and charge them in the rear, at the same time that their outposts were engaging with the other Vandal forces. His approach from behind was unknown to the Romans till they arrived at Grasae, where some stragglers discovered the important secret ; but then * Procop. Vandal, lib. i. c. 18. chap, in.] BELISARIUS. 99 report did not arrest the march of Belisarius, who continued advancing towards Carthage. At Grasse, however, he was compelled to separate from his fleet, which had to double the projecting mountains of Cape Bonn. He entrusted its command to Archelaus, and from the uncertainty of the event directed him not to approach the shore within thirty miles of Carthage, unless he should receive good tidings of the army. After a march of four days from Grasse the Romans reached the village intended for their en counter, and which might probably have been marked by their defeat had not the headlong rashness of Ammatas disconcerted the projects of his brother. He imprudently ventured forth with only a small share of his troops, leaving orders for ^''533' the rest to follow him as speedily as possible, and with this handful of men he attacked the Roman vanguard of three hundred cavalry. The personal valour he displayed was great but unavailing, and after the death, it is said, of twelve antagonists by his single prowess he himself was numbered with the slain. The soldiers, who had been cheered by the courage, were disheartened by the fall of their gallant leader, and retreating in confusion from the field carried along in their flight the scattered rein forcements from Carthage, which were advancing at intervals to join them. They were pursued by John the Armenian to the very gates of Carthage, and their great loss in dead and wounded seemed strangely disproportioned to the numbers of the r 2 100 THE LIFE OF [chap. m. combatants. Meanwhile the attack of Gibamund on the left was equally ill-timed and equally unsuccessful. His troops exceeded two thousand men; the Roman wing consisted of only six hundred Hunnish con federates, but these were amongst the best of the imperial army, and their leader, with chivalrous daring, claimed the hereditary privilege of beginning the conflict by a personal encounter. On this occa sion, the courage of the North prevailed, as usual, over Southern degeneracy. The Vandals were put to flight, and the desolate plain in which they had fought (it was called the Field of Salt) became thickly strewed with their slain. These two skirmishes, however successful, could only be considered as slight preludes to a battle, since but a small number of the Vandals, and less than one thousand Romans had engaged in them. The rugged hills which interposed shut them from the sight of Behsarius, who was still with the main forces in the rear, about five miles from Decimus. Yet before any tidings had reached him he had discovered the intention of the Vandals to assail him, and under these circumstances adopted a decisive measure. He determined to anticipate their project of surprise, and to retort it upon them, hy sallying forth at the head of his horsemen, leaving his infantry and baggage in his camp. Previously, however, he strengthened the retrenchments of the soldiers whom he designed to quit, and aroused the spirit of the others by a public address. He reminded them of their Persian campaigns, he urged chap, m.] BELISARIUS. 101 them to re-conquer an ancient province of the empire, and derived some advantage even from the want of any fortress in his rear, by showing them how entirely they must depend on their own courage for security. On issuing from the camp, Behsarius again subdivided his forces, sending the confederates in front and following with the Roman cavalry, and especially his guards. The confederates soon reached the field where Ammatas had fallen, only one or two hours before, and they obtained from the neigh bouring peasantry the first news of the recent skirmish. While still engaged in contemplating the bloody relics of the fight a cloud of dust suddenly appeared to the southward, which by degrees dis closed to their anxious gaze a large body of horse, the van of Gelimer's army. The number and intri cacy of the hills had misled him in his march, and hidden from his view both the encampment and the sally of the Roman general. Messengers were instantly dispatched from the confederates to Beli sarius, informing him of the presence of the enemy and entreating speedy succour. In the mean time their officers, computing the formidable forces which approached, were divided in opinion, some extolling the honour of a brave resistance, and others of a regular retreat, whilst the delay of this discussion ahke precluded either. Yet a trial of speed was attempted by the Romans in rushing to take pos session of the highest adjacent hill before the troops of Gelimer could reach it ; but disappointed in this enterprise, and already wavering, a single charge 102 THE LIFE OF [chap. hi. from the Vandals was sufficient to disperse them. They hastily fled to meet the squadron of Belisarius, and had Gelimer at this decisive instant either closely pursued them, or fallen unexpectedly on the Roman outposts, which after the defeat of Ammatas had tumultuously followed to the gates of Carthage, it is admitted by his adversaries that he would yet have retrieved the fortune of the day. But on beholding the lifeless body of his brother, the first and only announcement of his death, Gelimer gave way to fraternal fondness, and indulged it by an unseasonable performance of sepulchral rites. He thus lost an opportunity which he was destined never to regain. These precious moments were actively employed by Belisarius in advancing with his guards, and collecting the scattered or rallying the fugitive soldiers, and with all these forces united he charged the army of the Afrian monarch. The general battle which ensued was not long contested, the Vandals were totally defeated, and night alone put a period to the slaughter. Gelimer fled from the field with a few faithful surviving adherents, and being aware that the ruinous walls of Carthage were incapable of sustaining a siege, he unwillingly averted his course from his capital, and turned towards the deserts of Numidia. / On the same evening, the Roman general was rejoined by the two detachments victorious over Gibamund and Ammatas, and on the ensuing day by the infantry and baggage from the camp. The battle of Decimus, however complicated in its plan, chap, m.] BELISARIUS. 103 and disorderly in its operations, was decisive of the fate of Carthage. All idea of resistance was aban doned. The gates were thrown open, and the chains across the entrance of the port removed. The Vandals in the city sought the sanctuary of churches, while the loyal Africans testified their joy by the blaze of innumerable lights. It was the eve of St. Cyprian's festival, which was celebrated each year with extraordinary splendour, and this coinci dence was considered by the exulting Catholics as evidently showing his approval of their doctrines. Several dreams were remembered, in which during their persecutions he had assured them of speedy rescue and revenge, and the miraculous fulfilment of this promise was loudly asserted.* Every prepara tion had been made for solemnizing his anniversary in a stately church upon the shore dedicated to his worship, but at the tidings of the battle of Decimus the Arian priests escaped, and the Catholics joyfully taking their place substituted their own ritual to that of their vanquished antagonists.f Yet Behsarius, in spite of the favourable disposition thus manifested towards him, resolved not to enter the city that * A prophecy, according to Procopius, was also remembered as formerly current, and as then accomplished. It imported that G. should expel B., and afterwards B. expel G. This was applied to Genseric and Boniface, and to Belisarius and Gelimer. + The Arians, says Procopius (Vandal, lib. i. c. 21), had prepared the sacred candles, but the Catholics lighted them. We may gather from thence that this rite of the Roman Catholic Church was then already in common use. Mosheim complains of the " enormous burthen of ceremonies " in this century (Eccles. Hist. vol. ii. p. 55). 104 THE LIFE OF [chap. iii. evening, partly from a suspicion of Vandal stratagem, but principally from a well-founded apprehension lest the convenient darkness of night should tempt his soldiers to pillage and disorder. Whilst thus encamped near the walls of the city he was gladdened by the arrival of his fleet. The naval officers had received intelligence at the town of Hermseum of the good fortune which had attended the arms of their general, and a north-east wind opportunely springing up enabled them within a few hours to anchor safely in the lake of Tunis. They had determined not to steer at once into the harbour of the capital, from a doubt not only whether the iron chains which guarded its entrance had been yet removed, but also whether it was sufficiently ample for the reception of so large an armament. Yet the ships could be discerned from Carthage, and the jailor of some imprisoned merchants of Constan tinople, foreseeing the approaching hberation of his captives, first exacted from their ignorance of the late events a solemn oath of protection in reward for their freedom, and then throwing open the casement of the dungeon displayed to them the advancing galleys of the Romans in full sail.* Belisarius now commanded the greater part of the sailors to disembark and join his troops, resolving at the head of these seemingly formidable numbers to make a solemn entry into Carthage on the mor- * This anecdote might form the subject of a very striking picture, and would probably have been long ago selected for that purpose had it occurred in a more classic age. chap, hi.] BELISARIUS. 105 row, St. Cyprian's day, which, by a reference to the Roman Catholic calendar, I find to be the sixteenth of September.* His soldiers were adorned as for a triumph, to add to the splendour of the scene, and armed as for a battle, to guard against surprise. Anxious to uphold their discipline, he recapitulated to them the advantages which they had already drawn from it in Africa, and stated that its necessity was still more urgent at Carthage than elsewhere. He desired them to recollect that the Africans had formerly been, like them, subjects and citizens of Rome, and that their allegiance was transferred to the Vandals, not through any voluntary rebellion, but through a foreign conquest, from which none had suffered so severely as themselves. It was, added Belisarius, the knowledge of these sufferings which impelled the Emperor to send forth this expe dition, and it would be as absurd as criminal for the Roman soldiers to treat with outrage or oppression the very people for whose deliverance they were dispatched. These remonstrances, enforced by the memory of the rigorous examples which the general had lately made, produced in entering the African capital a degree of order and of discipline, wholly new in that degenerate age, and to which even the * It may be observed that this day is considered by the modem Africans as the autumnal equinox. See Leo Africanus (lib. i. p. 30. ed. 1556). This St. Cyprian, of Carthage, must not be confounded with another of the same name, whose festival is celebrated on the twenty-sixth of the same month, and who, from a Pagan magician, became a martyr under Diocletian. See his curious adventures in Blemur (Vies des Saints, vol. iii. p. 503). 1?3 106 THE LIFE OF [chap. iii. Roman Republic could hardly afford a parallel. The soldiers marched peaceably to the quarters which had been assigned them, all the shops continued open, and, in spite of the change of sovereign, pubhc business was not for one moment interrupted. The supphant Vandals in the churches were assured of protection and security. Not a single instance of tumult or rapacity occurred, with the exception of a captain of the fleet, who, on the foregoing night, had, contrary to the injunctions of Behsarius and to the example of his colleagues, steered into the harbour of Carthage, and plundered some of its inhabitants. He was sternly commanded to restore the spoil, and this was the first public act of Belisa rius on proceeding to the royal palace, and seating himself upon the throne of Gelimer. In the evening a sumptuous banquet was served to himself and to his principal officers, in the same apartment, and with the same household attendants so lately em ployed by the Vandal monarch ; and in admiring on this occasion the strange vicissitudes of fortune the grateful Carthaginians must have acknowledged, that while Behsarius almost rivalled Scipio the Younger in the glory of his conquest, he far surpassed him in clemency and consideration to the vanquished. After the few first hours of his arrival, Behsarius, with his usual activity, applied himself to repair the ruinous fortifications of the city. The ditch was deepened, the breaches were filled, and the ramparts strengthened, and the number of workmen com bined with the largess of the general to hasten the chap, m.] BELISARIUS. 107 completion of the work. It was finished in so short a time as to strike the Vandals with astonishment, and to make Gelimer himself confess that his own previous negligence had been the real cause of his disasters. Envoys from many tributary Moorish chieftains soon arrived at Carthage, disclaiming all allegiance to Gelimer, and as a mark of their sub mission to the authority of Behsarius, requesting him to bestow upon them the ensigns of their dignity.* It was an ancient custom, founded on the former majesty of the Romans, that no Moorish prince, even if disaffected to them, ventured to assume the title till he had received from the Emperor the trappings of sovereign power. Belisarius gladly yielded to their welcome entreaties, and added large presents in money, to attach them more strongly to his interest. Yet these Moors, still doubtful of the final issue of the war, did not proceed further in his favour than by observing a strict neutrality, and, according to a common course of policy, deferred any offer of assistance till the victories of either party should render it superfluous. At this time, also, the rapidity with which Belisarius had succeeded in subduing Carthage, betrayed into his power several of its citizens returning homewards, and wholly unsuspicious of this sudden change of masters. * These ensigns consisted of a sceptre of gilt silver, a, small silver cap with some resemblance to a crown, a white cloak fastened by a gold clasp over the right shoulder, a white tunic adorned with embroidery, and gilt sandals (Procopius Vandal, lib. i. c. 25.) Com pare these with the ensigns of the Lazic kings in Agathias, lib. iii. p. 90, and John Malala, vol. ii. p. 135. 108 THE LIFE OF [chap. in. Before the landing of the Roman army, Gelimer had dispatched an embassy to Theudes, King of the Visigoths, in Spain,* proposing an alhance which might then have been contracted on equal terms. But some merchants who had quitted Car thage at a later period, and travelled with unusual expedition, secretly conveyed to Theudes the impor tant intelligence that they had left that city in possession of the Romans. It will be readily believed that Theudes, after these tidings, showed but httle inclination to attach himself to a state already almost overthrown; and, in answer to the sohcitations of the envoys, he merely desired them to sail back to Africa, and learn the real state of their affairs. The disappointed Vandals accordingly embarked for Car thage, entered in full security the port of their ancient capital, and, to their inexpressible surprise, found themselves, on landing, captives of the Romans. A similar incident occurred in the arrest of a mes senger dispatched to Carthage by Zazo, to inform his brother of his proceedings in Sardinia. He had defeated and killed the rebel Godas ; he had taken Calaris or Cagliari, his capital, and his letters ex pressed a confident expectation that the Roman army, of whose invasion he had just been apprised, had already undergone a similar fate from the victorious arms of Gelimer.f * For the reign and character of Theudes see Mariana (Hist. Hisp. lib. v. c. 8). + By a strange oversight, Gibbon talks of Gelimer reading and answering this letter, as if it had not been intercepted (vol. vii. p.181). chap, m.] BELISARIUS. 109 During this time the Vandal monarch was assem bling a fresh army in the plains of Bulla, near the confines of Numidia, and at the distance of four days' journey from Carthage. Desirous of raising the African peasantry against the invaders, he set a price on the head of every Byzantine soldier ; but this ferocious and desperate offer merely occasioned the death of some scattered stragglers and marauders, and therefore supplied the Romans with further grounds for persevering in their newly-acquired dis cipline. Thus, as in the murder of Hilderic, the cruelty of the tyrant proved advantageous to his enemies, and hurtful chiefly to himself. It was with greater judgment that he dispatched a messenger to Zazo in Sardinia, commanding his immediate return. " It would seem," wrote Gelimer, " as if your expe- " dition had tended less to the conquest of Sardinia " than to our overthrow in Africa. The Vandals " have lost their courage, and with their courage "their prosperity; our magazines, our arms, our " horses, nay, even our capital itself, all are in " possession of the Romans ! Nothing now is left " us but the field of Bulla and the hope which your " valour still inspires. Resign, then, all thoughts of " Sardinia, and join me, where, with united forces, " we may either restore our empire, or at least not " be separated in adversity." The receipt of this letter filled Zazo and his officers with consternation, but showed them the necessity of instant exertion. Concealing this event from the people of Sardinia, in order not to shake their recent and suspicious 110 THE LIFE OF [chap. iii. fidehty, Zazo hastily embarked with his troops at Cagliari, and in three days reached the African coast, at the hmits between Mauritania and Numidia, from whence by forced marches he proceeded to the camp of Gelimer. The first meeting of these armies was such, says the historian,* as might have raised the compassion even of an enemy. The two brothers clung to each other in a long and mute embrace, and tears alone declared the feehngs which they wanted fortitude to speak. Similar silence pervaded both armies. The troops of Gelimer asked no details of a conquest of wliich they felt the inutility, those of Zazo required nothing beyond the scene before them to show the full extent of their misfortunes ; and the absence of their wives and children too clearly an nounced their captivity or death. Yet these mourn ful feehngs soon yielded to the hopes of victory and vengeance. The Vandals had obeyed the summons of Gelimer, several Moorish tribes had gathered round his banners, and his forces, when augmented by those of Zazo, exceeded one hundred thousand men.t But the result of the last battle had shown Gelimer that with Behsarius for an enemy, he could not trust implicitly to numbers. He therefore had * Procop. Vandal. lib. i. c. 25. + Gelimer himself boasted that his army outnumbered the Romans in a tenfold proportion ; but this statement should of course be received with some latitude. Now the army of Behsarius, deducting on the one hand his loss in the battle of Decimus and at Methone, and adding on the other the soldiers whom he had left in his ships, but v ho were now again at his disposal, must have been at least 13,000 men. chap, hi.] BELISARIUS. Ill recourse to the additional aid of treachery, by working upon the Arians and Vandals at Carthage, and tempting the fidehty of the Hunnish confederates in the Roman army. These barbarians lamented their distance from their homes, whence they had been allured to assist an enterprise foreign and indifferent to them, and of which they avowed that they dreaded the success far more than the failure, since they might afterwards be detained for many years in Africa, to guard the country they had conquered. They therefore lent a ready ear to the secret offers of Gelimer, and promised, in the approaching battle, to join his forces and turn their arms against their Roman comrades. But these designs could not escape the vigilant attention of the general. To provide against any treachery in the Carthaginians, he determined not to march with his troops from their city till its fortifi cations were completed ; while on the other hand he terrified and checked the Arian conspirators by the dreadful severity of impaling* one of their number, named Laurus, on a hill before the gates. The necessity of punishing citizens whose only crime is attachment to their lawful sovereign and to their national religion, and whose example every brave man would wish his own countrymen to imitate, is one of * This cruel punishment was not uncommon in this age, and appears to have been borrowed from the barbarian tribes. I find it practised by the Sclavonians, (Procop. Goth. lib. iii. c. 38) ; by the Franks (Greg. Turon. lib. v. u. 40) ; by the Lombards, (Paul Warnefrid, lib. iv. c. 38) ; and by the Huns, (Prise. Excerpt. Legat. p. 53.) 112 THE LIFE OF [chap. hi. the most painful obligations imposed by war. With the Huns Belisarius pursued an opposite course, being well aware that rigour will restore and maintain the discipline, but not the loyalty of soldiers. By frequent gifts and unvaried kindness, by the ascend ant which a strong mind always possesses over the ordinary race of men, he induced them to avow their perfidious designs, he forgave, in order that they might never accomphsh their guilt, and he promised them a speedy return to their native country, and a full participation in the booty of the Romans. Having thus in some degree secured their wavering allegiance, and repaired the ramparts of Carthage, Behsarius resolved to march against Gelimer, without further delay. " Let no one," he said to his soldiers, " dis- " hearten you by an overcharged and fearful com- " putation of the Vandal forces ; Romans should " disdain to count their antagonists. We have now " still greater interests at stake than in the former " battle, Carthage and Africa are already ours, and to " lose possessions is far more intolerable than to fail "in conquest." Thus, in three months from the taking of Carthage, Belisarius led forth his army from its walls, leaving only five hundred men for its gar rison. He could place but little rehance on the fidelity of the Huns, who had, indeed, been persuaded to give up their first project of desertion, but who had privately determined to keep aloof from battle, and afterwards side with the victorious. The command of some chosen cavalry was entrusted by Behsarius to John the Armenian, who was directed to avail chap in.] BELISARIUS. 113 himself of any favourable opportunity for skirmishes. During the first night of their encampment, the soldiers beheld with consternation some flashes of fire play around their lances. They looked on this phe nomenon as a sure omen of defeat ; but the result of the campaign altered their opinion of the presage, and, some years afterwards, they hailed its reappearance in Italy with transport. On the other part, the Vandals, headed by Gelimer and Zazo, had advanced within twenty miles of the capital, and were encamped at the village of Trica- maron, from which the ensuing battle has derived its name. Their neighbourhood to Carthage had been felt by the cessation of all intercourse with the pro vinces, and by the cutting of the aqueduct* which supphed that city with water ; but Gelimer carefully prevented all pillage or devastation of the open coun try, partly from the politic dread of provoking the inhabitants, and partly from the natural wish to spare a country which he still considered as his own. As soon as the Romans had sallied forth from Carthage, he began his dispositions for battle. He confined to his camp all the women and children who had followed in the train of his army, and addressed his soldiers in public, according to the custom of this age. While he bid his followers recollect the danger of their * The beauty of this aqueduct is praised by Procopius, but not, I think, by any other ancient writer. It is now almost the only remain ing relic of Carthage. Several of its arches are still entire, and attract the admiration of Europeans. See Shaw's Travels, p. 153 ¦ and Lady Mary Montague's delightful Letters from the East (vol. ii. p. 62, ed. 1820.) 1 14 THE LIFE OF [chap. hi. families and the glory of Genseric, the troops from Sar dinia were exhorted by his brother Zazo, to renew their late achievements, and outvie their comrades in valour. The King then marched against the Romans, ad° 533' wnom he found preparing for their mid-day meal, but who, by the dihgence of Behsarius, were quickly marshalled along the banks of a small and nameless rivulet, a confluent, as it would seem, of the Mejerda.* On the left were placed the confederates, on the right the cavalry, the guards of Behsarius occupied the front of the centre, while the infantry was drawn out in the rear. The Huns, according to their previous resolution, maintained a separate station, awaiting the event, and ready to declare against the vanquished. The centre of the Vandals was commanded by Zazo, and each wing by Chiliarchs; behind these stood the Moorish auxiliaries ; and Gelimer, without con fining himself to one particular post, could rush towards any quarter of the field which required his presence. The plan of Belisarius was to direct all his endeavours against the Vandal centre, since, if this could once be pierced, the wings would be disunited, and taken in the flank. Accordingly the battle began by a charge from some squadrons of the general's guards, commanded hy John the Armenian. He was repulsed by the barbarians, to whom the King had * The Mejerda is tlie ancient Bagradas, on whose banks was killed the extraordinary serpent which is said to have delayed the march of Regulus. (Plin. Hist. Nat. Ub. viii. c. 14.) See an account of this river in Marmol, (vol. i. p. 23, ed. 1667,) and Shaw, (p. 147.) " It is," says this learned Oxonian, " of the bigness of the Isis, united to the Cherwell." chap, in.] BELISARIUS. 115 enjoined to cast away their spears and javelins in close combat, and employ their swords alone. A second onset, though with more numerous forces, proved equally unsuccessful ; but, in the third, all the guards passed the rivulet with loud shouts, and the standard of Behsarius was unfurled. After an obsti nate resistance the enemy's ranks were broken, Zazo himself was slain, and the consternation at his death, together with the advance of the Roman infantry, completed the rout of the Vandals . The wings, which might have closed around the scanty numbers of the assailants, and retrieved the fortune of the centre, followed its example, and the Huns, now no longer doubtful, turned against them. The Vandals fled to their camp with such headlong speed that their loss amounted only to eight hundred men, and that of the Romans is said not to have exceeded fifty. But Beli sarius unsatisfied with their flight, determined to render their defeat decisive, and marched with all his forces to storm their last retreat. They might still, by their numbers, have hoped to overwhelm the vic torious valour of the Romans, had not Gehmer, in a sudden panic, (cowardice is often attendant on cruelty,) betaken himself to that flight from which he had dissuaded his army.* His absence was soon perceived, and his conduct imitated. The Vandals * Aimoin asserts that only twelve Vandal soldiers escaped with Gehmer, but this ignorant monk is undeserving of the slightest credit. His whole account of this war is a series of ludicrous blunders. (De Gest. Franc, lib. ii. c. 6.) Elsewhere he makes Theodora and An tonina sisters, of the tribe of Amazons, &c. 116 THE LIFE OF [chap, iii- abandoned all thoughts but those of personal safety, and dispersed on every side at the first onset of their enemies.* Even the approach of night could not shield them from pursuit and slaughter, and their camp, with their goods and families, fell into the hands of the Romans. As the first prize of victory, Belisarius seized for his sovereign the royal treasure, more ample, according to Procopius, than any which had ever been amassed before ; nor will this appear unlikely, if indeed it contained, as he tells us, a large share of the hoarded tribute of Africa for one hundred years, and all the piratical spoils of Genseric. Yet the prudent general viewed with regret the vast amount of private booty, which engrossed the atten tion and suspended the disciphne of his army. No commands of their officers, no thoughts even of their own security, could withhold the licentious soldiers, when they beheld the beauty of the women and the richness of the spoil, and they found the nocturnal darkness equally favourable to their designs of plea sure or of pillage. Had but a single squadron of the Vandals kept to its ranks, it might have changed the fate of Africa by falling unexpectedly on these careless freebooters ; and Behsarius, after a vain attempt at restoring disciphne, passed the night of his victory with all the anxiety and alarm of a defeat. At daybreak next morning, the general climbed a * This scene is described with spirit by Procopius, tote 8tj oi re avtipes eBopvfiovv kcu t (Itine'raire, p. 400.) Ignorance is always positive. chap, v.] BELISARIUS. 197 cause of the first Christian Emperor prevailed, and it may not be wholly undeserving of mention, as a singular coincidence, that two of the most distin guished officers of Belisarius, on this occasion, were named Maxentius and Constantine. The morrow of this eventful day was the first of the siege of Rome, which continued for upwards of a year, and which, whether we A™537' consider the importance of the object, the number of the combatants, or the classic asso ciations of the ground, may perhaps vie with any other recorded in history. The Goths appear to have been less delighted at their easy and unexpected passage of the Milvian bridge, than mortified by the inglorious though successful skirmish which ensued. They had to deplore the loss of many of their bravest soldiers, and above all of the standard bearer,* Visandus, who, after a close combat with Behsarius himself, fell from his horse, pierced with thirteen wounds, and was left for dead upon the field. Three days afterwards, however, on the interment of the corpses by the Goths, he was found stiU to breathe, and, by the care of his comrades, survived this conflict many years. On the very evening of the skirmish, Vitiges indulged his angry feelings by dispatching Vaces,t one of his most distinguished * The penetration of Gibbon has discerned that in Procopius, (Goth. Ub. i. c. 18.) BavSa\apios is not, as was formerly thought, another name of Visandus, but a word of barbaric origin for standard bearer. See his note, vol. vu. p. 226, and Ducange, Gloss. Graec. p. 173. t This name is explained by Grotius as Waack-hais, excubitoribus imperans. (Hist. Goth. p. 601.) 198 THE LIFE OF [chap. t. officers, beneath the walls of Rome, to upbraid the citizens for their perfidy and treason to the Goths. " Why should you," said the envoy, " prefer the '¦' dominion of the Greeks to ours ? Far from pro- " tecting you, the feeble forces of that empire are " scarcely sufficient for its own defence, and from " that quarter your great ancestors would never " have acknowledged a master. They only knew " the Greeks as pirates, players, and buffoons." Next day the Goths had recourse to more effectual arguments than words. Expecting, from the vast extent and slender garrison of Rome, to find it an easy conquest, they did not think it requisite to surround the whole circumference of twelve miles, and, in fact, even their multitudes of soldiers appeared inadequate for its complete investment, without exposing themselves to the chance of a sudden and successful sally on some particular point. Yet their army seems to have amounted to full its original number, since any detachments which they may have left before the Tuscan cities, were compensated by the arrival of some fresh troops, which, according to the treaty with the Franks, had ceded the pro vinces between the Alps and the Rhone, and were thus at liberty to act elsewhere. On the scene of the late skirmish, and from the Pincian to the end of the Esquihne hill, the Goths formed six camps, which they fortified with deep ditches, pointed stakes, and intrenchments of earth. Apprehensive, also, that the enemy might destroy the Milvian bridge, and thus interrupt their communication with the chap, v.] BELISARIUS. 199 other side of the Tiber, they commanded this important station by a seventh encampment in the plain of Nero.* Thus, of the fourteenf principal gates of Rome, they only encompassed five on the southern and two on the northern bank, and though their hght troops scoured the adjacent country, they did not altogether stop the intercourse between Rome and Campania. Their next measure was to cut through the aqueducts, which, like the gates, were fourteen in number, built of brick, and with each arch of sufficient . height for the passage of a horseman beneath it. The greater part of these noble monuments has never been repaired, and their scattered ruins, extending at intervals along the dreary Campagna, are finely compared by Poggio to the outstretched and broken limbs of an expiring giant. On this occasion, no immediate injury was suffered by the Romans; the public baths, indeed, were no longer supphed, but the turbid stream of the Tiber, and the wells in the remoter districts of the city, were adequate for every needful object. The city mills, which were placed on the Tuscan side, and turned by the fall of water from an aque duct, were however stopped, nor could horses or oxen for working them be allowed, in prudence, to consume the limited forage of the garrison. The active mind of Belisarius soon devised another expe dient, which may appear more simple to the present * See Donat. Rom. Antiq. lib. iii. c. 23. + Such is the number stated by Procopius. In the time of Poggio there were only thirteen. (Gibbon, vol. xii. p. 398.) 200 THE LIFE OF [chap. v. times than it did to an age when the very use of aqueducts proves the ignorance of hydraulic prin ciples. He perceived that the current of the river was most rapid below the bridge,* its channel being there contracted by the piers, and he therefore moored under the arches some small boats, con taining mills, which the impulse of the stream proved sufficient to turn. No sooner had some deserters apprized the Goths of this contrivance than they attempted to defeat it by throwing into the river large trunks of trees, and even the dead bodies of the Romans slain in the previous skirmish, which, floating down the stream, broke through the cords, and shattered or sunk the machines. But Belisarius found means to guard against such havoc in future. He fastened massy iron chains along the bridge on the outer side, which detained any sohd substances borne along by the current until the neighbouring sentinels could draw them to the shore. By this protection the Roman mills continued to work with out further intermission during the remainder of the siege, and a security was also thus obtained that the Goths might not, by secretly embarking in boats, and trusting themselves to the current at night, penetrate unperceived into the heart of the city. It was on the front of the Pincian hill, the same spot at present occupied by the pubhc walk of Rome, * It appears from this passage of Procopius, as also from another (Goth. Ub. Hi. c. 17,) that only one bridge in Rome at this time remained entire. This was the ancient iElian, opposite the castle of St. Angelo. chap, v.] BELISARIUS. 201 that the head-quarters of the Byzantine general were fixed. This station above all others needed the care of the commander, because the adjacent ramparts were the weakest and most easily accessible, and it was also well chosen as affording an extensive pros pect over all the districts of the city and encampments of the Goths. Warned by his own success at Naples, and anxious to prevent a renewal of his former stratagem, Belisarius carefully walled up the passage of the aqueducts. He likewise closed and intrenched with large stones, the Flaminian gate, lest its near ness to one of the Gothic camps might aid some nightly surprise, yet all this prudence would have proved unavailing, unless Belisarius had devised some means for watching and defending the vast circumference of the walls. His own diminished band of veterans was wholly insufficient for this pur pose, and the expected reinforcements from Constan tinople had never yet arrived. To supply this deficiency he availed himself of the pubhc distress at Rome, where a considerable number of mechanics and workmen had since the siege been dismissed from their daily labours. It would have been dan gerous as well as cruel to leave them thus inactive, since whenever an artizan is either too wretched to find, or too rich to require employment, his leisure is always filled up by disaffection to the state. These men were now enhsted and formed into squadrons ; a stipulated pay, and rotation of service was assigned to each, and some experienced soldiers were mingled amongst them, so that, in case of assault on any k 3 202 THE LIFE OF [chap- v. particular point, Behsarius was enabled to collect in that direction almost all his regular forces, without leaving the circuit of the walls unguarded. Thus, says Procopius, the general provided by the same measure for the security of the city and the relief of the inhabitants. Yet to insure the fidehty of these civic bands was a task of peculiar difficulty. Thrice every month Behsarius altered the keys of all the gates, and still more frequently transferred the station of each detachment. Different officers were commissioned every night to make the circuit of the ramparts, and to call from a muster-roll the names of the sentinels on duty; if one were found missing, another was forthwith appointed in his place, and the hst of the defaulters was transmitted to Behsarius for their punishment or detection. Some soldiers, principally Moors, as least open from their savage manners and language to the seductions of the Goths, were posted by night without the walls, accompanied by dogs, whose trusty baying might announce the coming of an enemy; and the watchfulness of these nightly patroles was still further secured by the animation of military music. The general endeavoured to conci liate the Italians, by avoiding rigorous punishments, even in cases of convicted treason ; and his sentence of banishment against some senators may be favour ably contrasted with the vengeful fury of Vitiges, who had dispatched orders to Ravenna for the instant massacre of all those Roman nobles formerly carried off as hostages. Through his numerous precautions, chap, v.] belisarius. 203 Belisarius succeeded during the whole of the siege in forestalling or discovering the perfidy, but could , not retain the attachment, of the Roman citizens. The close approach of warfare terrified tlieir feeble minds, they bore with unwillingness the fatigue of vigils and the hardships of confinement, their fancy painted the probable devastation of their neigh bouring fields, and they compared the luxurious plenty of peace with the spare and scanty rations of a siege. Their zeal for Belisarius had proceeded from his fortune, and ceased at the first appearance of adversity. Of his ultimately prevailing, they appear to have entertained no expectation, but they looked forward with eagerness to the terms of a capitulation, which they thought would be favourable to them in proportion to its speediness. Accord ingly they assailed the general, sometimes with entreaties, but more frequently with angry clamour. The senate was more disguised, and therefore more dangerous in its discontent. Within a few days from the commencement of the siege, Vitiges became informed of these feehngs in the people, and in order to inflame them still further, and to throw upon the Byzantine invader the whole odium of the war, he dispatched some ambassadors with insidious proposals to Rome. They were received by Beli sarius at a public audience, in presence of the senate and principal officers. They urged him to meet their countrymen fairly in the field, to pity the impending sufferings of Rome, and not to seek from its walls the protection which his arms should afford him. •204 THE LIFE OF [chap. v. As terms of surrender, they offered to his troops a .free retreat, with all their private property. " My " system of warfare," said Belisarius in reply, " shall " be guided, not by your judgment but by my own, " Far from viewing my prospects at present with any " gloomy forebodings, I tell you that the time will " come, when, reduced to your last detachment, and " driven from your furthest village, you shall seek " and scarcely find a refuge in bushes and brambles. " We are engaged in a national and rightful cause. " Tf any one amongst you thinks to enter Rome, " without disputing every foot of ground, and " meeting with the most determined resistance, he " shall find himself grievously mistaken. So long " as Behsarius shall survive expect no surrender."* This answer was received by the ambassadors in silence, by Vitiges, with indignation. The Gothic monarch forthwith issued orders for a general assault, which he fixed for the eighteenth day from the com mencement of the siege, having in the meanwhile made unwearied preparations for it. Square towers of wood had been built, equal in height to the battlements of Rome, and rolling on four wheels. Numerous ladders were at hand to scale the rampart, and in order to make a breach in it, four of the weighty engines called Aries had been constructed. * The literal version of these words (Procop Goth. Ub. i. c. 20.) would be, " Belisarius will never surrender this city while he continues alive" — rather an Hibernian clause. Yet a similar message was once sent by General Muscar, governor of Dunkirk, in the French revolutionary war. See Edgeworth's Essay on Irish BuUs, p. ill. chap, v.] BELISARIUS. 205 This battering-ram of prodigious power, was likewise moved on four wheels, and was wielded by no less than fifty men, securely inclosed A ^537. ' in a covered chamber at the base.* Nor had the Goths forgotten faggots of branches and reeds, with which it was intended to fill up the inter vening ditch, and allow a close approach of these engines against the Roman walls. On the other part, the multitude of precautions and cares which have already been set forth, had not distracted Behsarius from providing mihtary machines for the protection of the city. The towers were lined with Onagri, or large mechanical slings, and with Balistae, powerful cross-bows which discharged an arrow only half as long, but four times as massy as the common ones, and of such force as to cleave without difficulty a tree or a stone. Over each gate was suspended a Lupus, consisting of a beam per forated with holes, through which, on the approach of an enemy, thick iron spikes could be thrust forward, to transfix him. Such were the preparations on both sides, when on the appointed day the Goths marched to the contest, having fixed on the Salarian gate,t as the principal object of attack. The success of Alaric, who had * Compare Ammianus MarceUinus (lib. xxin. u. 4), with Procopius (Goth.Ub. i. c. 21.) t This gate in ancient times bore the name of Collina (Tacit. Hist. lib. iii. c. 82,) but the road was called Salaria, quoniam ilia salem in Sabinos portari convenerat. (Plin. Hist. Nat. lib. xxxi. c. 7.) By an easy transition, the name of the road was afterwards given to the gate. 206 THE LIFE OF [chap. v. entered Rome in this quarter, might seem to them an auspicious augury, and they resolved to leave unattempted the Flaminian gate, since it had been closed and intrenched by Behsarius, and since there would have been also some obstacles to en counter from the steep or rugged nature of the ground.* The spot which appeared to offer the greatest advantages to an assailant, was near the small outlet on the slope of the Pincian hill. Here the city wall was full of crevices and fissures ; it had greatly declined from the perpendicular and over hung the space in front of it, so that in all likelihood a single blow from a battering-ram would have been sufficient to demohsh it. This defect in the ram parts had not escaped the eye of Belisarius, but his intention of repairing it was met by the earnest and repeated remonstrances of the Roman people. They asserted, that as a reward for the pecuhar fervour of their devotion to St. Peter, he had promised them to take this chasm under his apostohc guard. They therefore maintained, that the portion which, to mere human eyes, might seem the least secure, was in reahty the strongest of the ramparts, and that it would be a tempting of Providence, and an impious disregard of revelation, to take means for its defence. These arguments prevailed with Belisarius, either from himself believing their superstitious tale, or from * eirei ey xaP<» Kprifivafiei Ketfievr) ou Aiac etrTiv ev-n-potroSos. (Procop. Goth. lib. i. c. 23.) Donatus and Nardini feel themselves bound by this passage, to move the Flaminian gate to the summit of the neigh bouring hill. But may not the words of Procopius merely imply inequaUties and broken ground in the approach 1 chaf. v.] BELISARIUS. 207 knowing that it was believed by the barbarians. Nor were his expectations disappointed. The Goths reli giously abstained from attacking this consecrated spot, and the same bent in the wall has been suffered to continue till the present time.* It was at day-break that the Roman garrison, drawn out upon the ramparts and under the personal command of Belisarius, saw the innumerable squadrons of the enemy and their lofty engines drawn by teams of oxen, slowly advancing against the Salarian gate. At this formidable sight the new levies were struck with sudden terror, and it was with surprise that they beheld the smile of confidence which played upon the features of the general, and heard his orders to refrain as yet from discharging their arrows. As the assailants came nearer he stepped forwards to the edge of the rampart, seized a bow, and with a deliberate aim transfixed the foremost Gothic chief. His shaft against a second was equally successful, and the Romans, regarding the prowess of their leader as a happy presage of victory, raised a loud shout of hope and exultation. Belisarius now commanded the archers to let fly, taking aim at the oxen only. In a few moments these animals fell lifeless to the ground, and the military engines remained immovable at an useless distance from the walls. In this manner the laborious preparations of Vitiges were baffled, and he now considered it * The devotion of the Goths, or at least of Theodoric to St. Peter, is attested by Anastasius (De Vit. Pontif. S3,) and Anonym. Vales (p. 511.) 20 S THE LIFE OF [chap. t. advisable to alter his original plan. Leaving a large share of his forces under experienced officers, to con tinue the assault on the Salarian gate, and thereby still engage Behsarius in that quarter, he resolved to attempt the city on two other points nearly oppo site to each other, and thus weaken by extending the feeble line of the Roman garrison. For this purpose he undertook the Prsenestine gate for his personal station, and dispatched other troops to the Tuscan bank, to storm the ancient sepulchre of Hadrian, the modern castle of St. Angelo.* This structure, one of the most singular and striking which even Rome can display, and by turns a tomb, a fortress, or a prison, has undergone almost as various vicissitudes of fortune as the surrounding city. From the age of Belisarius to the present, scarcely any domestic tumult at Rome appears to have occurred in which this castle has not borne an important part, and it has often retarded, though rarely prevented, surrender to a pubhc enemy. f In its present condition, the new fortifications at its base, the vast and rugged mass of peperine stone which rises from them, and * Such are the two extreme appellations, but it also bore the intermediate names of Theodoric and of Crescentius, (Donat. Ub. iv. c. 7.) The description of Procopius in the sixth century may be compared with that of Liutprand in the tenth, (Hist. Ub. iii. c. 1 2.) No rehance should be placed on the modern plans. + It saved Pope Gregory tlie Seventh when Rome was taken by tlie Germans, but in a similar case was of no avail to Clement tlie Seventh. (Murat. Annal. d'ltal. vol. vi. p. 280, and vol. x. p. 206.) In 1814, the French captain, when summoned to give up tlie castle, nobly replied that tlie bronze angel on the summit should sheath his sword before bis troops would theirs. He then surrendered. chap v.] BELISARIUS. 209 the unwieldy angel of Flemish origin, by which the whole is surmounted, no longer bear the slightest resemblance to the fabric which Procopius has de scribed. At that time the base was square, and the circular mole above it was cased in large blocks of Parian marble, closely fitted into each other without the assistance of cement. Its breadth is expressed by the vague comparison of a stone's throw, and of its height we are only told that it overtopped the neighbouring ramparts. Its summit appeared peopled with statues of beautiful sculpture and colossal size, some of them equestrian, and all composed of the same white marble which adorned the rest of the building. This monument stood without the walls, but, as it appeared a convenient bulwark, it had formerly (probably in the time of Alaric) been con nected with them by lateral ramparts. Its command on this day had been entrusted by Behsarius to Con stantine, but this officer, apprehending an attack on some other point, had imprudently hastened thither, leaving the sepulchre of Hadrian defended merely by a handful of soldiers. In the meanwhile the Gothic troops advanced against it beneath the arcades and porticoes of the neighbouring church of St. Peter, which held the same site as the present unrivalled basilic, but which, at that time, was not inclosed within the circuit of the waUs. By its useful shade the barbarians were concealed till close at hand, when they were seen rushing forwards, provided with ladders to scale the ramparts, and with large shields to intercept the missiles of the Romans. 210 THE LIFE OF [chap. t. Their unexpected appearance struck the garrison with consternation. Their shields precluded the effect of arrows, their closeness the use of the bahsta. Already had they apphed their ladders to the castle, and were ascending its walls; already were the besieged on the verge of despair and defeat, when the aspect of the statues around them suggested a new resource. They broke these precious monuments of art, now less important from their workmanship than from their materials, and each soldier raising a massy fragment with both hands hurled it on the heads of the assailants.* Overwhelmed with a sculp tured quarry, the Goths gave way, the courage of the Romans revived, and their attempt, amidst loud shouts, to play their military engines, completed the dismay of the barbarians. They fled with precipita tion : Constantine, just returned with his troops, made a vigorous sally, and Rome was rescued on the very point of capture. The citizens may, with a par donable superstition, have regarded this triumph as a last benefit from their ancient heroes, whose very emblems appeared to arise as guardians and preservers of the city. Meanwhile the Gothic monarch, in person, was attacking the Prsenestine gatef with such vigour, that Bessas, who commanded in this station, found it necessary to solicit immediate aid from the general. * In the civil war between VitcUius and Vespasian, the statues of the Capitol were in Uke manner torn down by Flavius Sabinus, to supply the place of a waU. (Tacit. Hist. lib. iii. c. 71.) + Prieneste is the modern Palestrina. The Praenestine gate is supposed to be the present Porta Maggiore. chap, v.] BELISARIUS. 211 On receiving this message, Behsarius redoubled his exertions at the Salarian gate, and having succeeded in driving back the barbarians, was enabled to quit the post which his valour had secured. With the flower of all his forces he hastened to the relief of his lieutenant. On his arrival he found the sol diers much disheartened, and their situation very critical. The Vivarium, which the enemy were bat tering with their smaller engines, was an inclosure serving to confine wild animals for the pubhc games, and consisting of an angle in the ramparts, across which the ancient Romans had built a low bulwark.* Thus, therefore, the walls were double in this place, but they had been less strongly built than in any other quarter, and from some natural defect in the bricks were now full of fissures. Behsarius per ceived that to defend the external wall any longer was impossible, but he devised a scheme to render its loss harmless and even advantageous. Withdrawing the troops from this outwork, he stationed them at the foot of the inner wall, and commanded them to cast aside all arms but their swords for close combat. As soon as the Goths had broken through the feeble barrier, and rushed by tumultuous crowds into the confined space of the Vivarium, they found themselves unexpectedly encountered by a furious charge of the Romans. In such narrow limits their very multitude proved injurious to them, and ren dered them equally incapable of resistance or of flight. Pent in like sheep for slaughter, and over- * Procop. Goth. Ub. i. c. 23. Nardini, Ub. iv. u. 2. 212 THE LIFE OF [chap. ,. whelmed with missiles from above, while closely pressed from below, the greater part were easily dispatched. Not satisfied with this success, Beh sarius forthwith cast open the neighbouring gates, sounded the trumpets, and sallied forth with all the forces around him. The previous disaster of the Goths and their consequent confusion assisted his design, he charged them with vigour, broke their ranks, and gained an entire victory. The consterna tion of their flight was augmented by his firing the machinery with which they had expected to conquer Rome, and the flames rapidly spread through the wood-work of which it was composed. Another sally at this decisive moment was directed by Behsarius from the Salarian gate, the Goths in this quarter also were put to flight, and their engines reduced to ashes. Great numbers of the enemy fell in the battle, still more in the pursuit, and the relentless carnage was continued till the night. By the con fession of their own officers (so at least says Proco pius) thirty thousand Goths were slain in this memor able battle, and the amount of wounded was hardly less considerable. But the Gothic forces were too large to be wholly broken by these heavy losses, and those of the Romans too scanty to follow up their victory. The Byzantine soldiers were now reduced to five thou sand, a number which in the flourishing epoch of the empire was thought inadequate for the defence of a single camp.* In a letter to Justinian, written at * Tacit. Hist. Ub. iv. c. 22. chap, v.] BELISARIUS. 213 this period and still extant, Belisarius strongly urges the necessity of ample reinforcements. He relates his past successes, which he modestly ascribes to bis fortune rather than his merit, and observes that the numerical superiority of the barbarians may at last prevail. He beseeches the Emperor not to forsake and sacrifice the citizens of Rome, who had endan gered their own security to show forth their attach ment to his cause. " For my part," he said, in con clusion, " I know my duty, and am ready to lay " down my life in defence of your empire. So long " as I survive, fear no surrender of Rome. But it is " for you to reflect how far my death in such a situ- " ation could forward or assist your service." These representations had their effect at Constantinople, and orders in compliance with them were issued by Justinian. A squadron of Hunnish and Sclavo nian cavalry had been embarked at the close of the last year, under Martin and Valerian, for the relief of Belisarius ; but the damage or the apprehension of a storm induced them to suspend their voyage and winter quietly in Greece. /^They reached Rome in safety from the Campanian coast twenty- three days after the battle, but amounted ^"537! to no more than sixteen hundred men. A little more diligence on their part would have saved the town and harbour of Porto, of which the great importance to the Romans will be clearly perceived by a reference to the nature of the ground. The Tiber, which at its mouth forms an island about two miles both in length and in breadth, was defended on 211 THE LIFE OF [chap. v. its northern bank by a fortress surnamed the Port of Rome, and on the southern by the town of Ostia.* The former, which now bears the name of Porto, had been fortified with the greatest care, and was connected with Rome by a stately ancient road, which followed the course of the Tiber, and was about eighteen miles in length. As soon as mer chandise and stores were disembarked at Porto, it was customary to load them in boats always ready for that purpose, and to tow them by the labour of oxen against the current of the river. Ostia had formerly been likewise a fortified city,f but it had then dechned into an open village, and its road to Rome of sixteen miles, which passed far from the windings of the Tiber, afforded no assistance in the navigation of transports. Goods could not be con veyed to Rome from Ostia without great difficulty, besides which the want of walls and shallow harbour of this station rendered it almost useless. The fortress on the Tuscan bank was, therefore, of the utmost consequence to Behsarius for his communica tion with the sea, and, according to the opinion of Procopius, three hundred soldiers would have been fully sufficient for its maintenance, but even this handful of men could not be spared from the dimi nished garrison of Rome. On their part the Goths, * Consult an excellent memoir and map by D'Anville, in the Academy of Inscriptions (vol. xxx. p. 198.) t Its former strength is extolled by Procopius, (Goth. Ub. i. c. 26,) yet in the reign of Vitellius, I find only one cohort stationed there, (Tacit. Hist. lib. u. c. 63.) As to the length of the Via Ostiensis, see Wesseling's Itineraria, and Cassiodorms Chronic, p. 355, ed. 1729. chap, v.] BELISARIUS. 215 disappointed in their hopes of carrying the city by assault, had resolved to make famine their auxiliary, and seized Porto on the third day from their defeat. All maritime convoys of provisions were now at an end ; nor were the granaries of the city sufficiently well stored to render this cessation indifferent. The cowardly desertion of the Milvian bridge, which hastened the investment of Rome by twenty days, had baffled the projects of Belisarius for completing his supphes. Foreseeing that in his circumstances Porto could not be maintained, he also perceived the necessity of vigorous measures to anticipate the impending distress. On the last day of March he commanded the immediate departure of a great number of the women and children, for whose recep tion a secure retreat was prepared in Campania. A long procession of melancholy exiles crowded the Appian way, and the consternation of Vitiges at his late defeat allowed them a safe and unmolested pas sage. This banishment may appear a harsh, but it was a necessary measure, as is proved by the after famine of the besieged, notwithstanding these pre cautions. It was also in reahty an act of kindness, to withdraw the weaker share of the people from sufferings which their presence would have aggra vated, and which even men had scarcely sufficient firmness to endure. From the arrival of the reinforcements under Martin and Valerian, though far less than those he had expected, Behsarius was enabled, by frequent attacks, to harass the troops of the enemy, and to 216 THE LIFE OF [chap. v. exercise his own. No deficiencies in the warfare or equipment of the Goths escaped his watchful atten tion, or were left unimproved by his mihtary skill. Their cavalry, armed with swords and lances, was fitted only for close combat ; their archers fought on foot, unprovided with defensive armour, and rarely venturing to quit the ranks of the heavy infantry. In three successive sallies, the loss of the Goths amounted to no less than four thousand of their bravest soldiers ; and the Byzantine troops were so much elated with success, as earnestly to press on their commander a general engagement. Well aware how much the barbarians still outnumbered them, Belisarius could not approve of this rash request, and preferred the slower but more secure expedient of gradually wasting the forces of the enemy by well-timed and repeated skirmishes. Yet, when to the loud clamours of the soldiers was added the impatience of the Roman citizens, eager for a speedy decision of the war in favour of either party, he per ceived the necessity of yielding. To have continued his opposition, must have alienated the respect, the affection, and perhaps the obedience, of his soldiers. It was his object, however, in complying with their request, to render it less hurtful, by carefully pro viding resources for defeat, and enabhng the army to withdraw on the first check, and with little loss, beneath the safe shelter of the walls. He fixed on the Salarian gate as the point from whence to sally witli all his cavalry, leaving his foot soldiers (they were very few in number) to line the ramparts in chap, v.] BELISARIUS. 217 his absence. Some of them, however, entreated and obtained permission to share in the battle, having pleaded the ancient glories of the Roman legion. Since all his forces were thus required for the main attack, Behsarius had no effectual means of restrain ing the Goths encamped on the opposite shore, and had cause for apprehension lest their numerous squadrons should cross the river, and reinforce the remainder of their countrymen. It being of the utmost consequence to prevent this junction, the general stationed without the walls, near the mole of Hadrian, a large multitude of the newly-enlisted Roman artizans and volunteers, who possessed neither the discipline nor the experience, but who might imitate the array of soldiers. This unwarlike rabble, joined to some Moorish horse, was instructed not to advance beyond the foot of the ramparts, in the hope that its formidable aspect from afar might deceive and delay the barbarians. Having thus made his dispositions, Belisarius issued forth against the Goths, whom he found pre pared to receive him. They encountered his army close in front of their encampments, and the conflict which ensued was long and obstinate. The advan tage seemed at first to be on the side of the Romans, and many of the barbarians had fallen, but their place was instantly supphed by a succession of fresh troops, so that their numbers in the field underwent no apparent diminution. On the other side of the Tiber, the stratagem of Belisarius was also successful for a time. The Goths were withheld at a respectful L 218 THE LIFE OF [chap. ». distance, and in momentary expectation of attack from the supposed appearance of a large army mar shalled before them. At length the Roman recruits, emboldened by the hesitation of the enemy, which they foohshly mistook for cowardice, forgot their instructions, and ventured on a charge. The barba rians yielded to the first onset, but soon rallied against such raw and unskilful adversaries, who had wasted the precious moments of surprise in pillage, and who, accordingly, were driven back, with great loss, within the walls. Meanwhile, the forces com manded by Behsarius in person began gradually to yield; then' retreat soon grew into a flight; and, according to the observation of Procopius, the battle, which had commenced before the entrenchments of the besiegers, was concluded beneath the ramparts of the city. The Romans were thrown into the utmost disorder, and only preserved from entire defeat by the prudence of Belisarius, who led back within the gates his army, much dispirited and humbled, but not materially impaired. After this repulse, the Romans, grown wiser by experience, no longer ventured to encounter the barbarians in the field; and, on their part, the besiegers, resigning all immediate thoughts of taking the city by assault, awaited the slow effects of famine. By the prudent banishment of the Roman women and children, all danger of scarcity had been averted for the time; the pubhc granaries afforded regular supplies to the remaining inhabitants, and corn or forage was also sometimes obtained by excursions chap, t.] BELISARIUS. 219 through the neighbouring country. Detachments of Greek or confederate cavalry (Moors were commonly- chosen, from their superior swiftness) often issued forth by night, on the Campanian side of the city ; and if, on these occasions, they obtained no further advantage than that of grazing their horses, the object was still sufficiently important to deserve a sally. The Goths, at first, careless of such petty inroads, overlooked the intercourse thus carried on between Rome and Campania ; but they became alive to its injurious consequences towards the time of the summer solstice, when an officer named Euthalius landed at Terracina from A ^"537 Constantinople, with treasure for the pay ment of the troops. Intelligence of his arrival was forthwith transmitted to Rome ; and Belisarius, by engaging in several skirmishes, and pretending an intention to give a second battle, so skilfully directed the attention of the Goths to another quarter, that he enabled Euthalius and his convoy to enter the city unperceived. Vitiges now determined to cut off all intercourse between Rome and the country. For this purpose, he availed himself of two large aqueducts between the Latin and Appian ways, which, at the distance of seven miles from Rome, surrounded a considerable space, in a double inter section of their high and massy arches. By filling up the open intervals with stones and clay, the Goths changed this inclosure to a fortress, which they garrisoned with no less than seven thousand men. This measure, assisted by extensive outposts, l 2 220 THE LIFE OF [chap, v proved entirely effectual; all further convoys were shut out from Rome ; and, within a few months, Belisarius had to contend with the distress, and, its inevitable consequence, the disaffection, of the citizens. The more harmless malcontents sought rehef from their calamities by the aid of omens, predictions, and fantastic rites. To superstition, the unfortunate are at all times naturally prone ; but it is with regret that we find the Romans still cherish ing some remains of attachment to their ancient fables. The Heathen worship had fingered in this city later than in almost any other place. This fact may be explained by the classic recollections of the ground where every rehc seemed to plead for Paganism, and by rivalry with the new Byzantine capital which boasted of its Christian purity of faith. During the siege of Alaric, some senators had pro posed to renew the sacrifices in the Capitol;* the festival of the Lupercafia could not be abolished till the close of the fifth century ; t and under the com mand of Belisarius the same spirit was displayed. Not merely were the dark revelations of the Sybil ransacked for a prophecy of approaching deliverance,:]; but several heathen zealots secretly endeavoured to appease the Divine displeasure by unbarring, * Sozomen, Hist. Eccles. Ub. ix. c. 6. + Baronius, Annal. Eccles. a.d. 496, No. 28. X Yet the Sybil, from being believed to have foretold the Saviour'9 coming, was not rejected by several Christians. This superstition continued later than is commonly supposed. Bede records some of her prophetic verses (Op. vol. ii. p. 238, ed. Colon. Agripp. 1688,) and some SybiUine books appear to have been consulted till the tenth century. (Liutprand ap. Murat. Script. Italic, vol. ii. p. 484.) chap, v.] BELISARIUS. 221 according to former usage in war, the rusty gates of the temple of Janus. This monument was still stand ing in the Forum, near the Senate House ; it was square in its shape, bronze in its material, and merely of sufficient size to hold the statue of the two -fold deity. The double gates, which corresponded to each aspect of Janus, withstood the superstitious efforts of his votaries, and could not be unclosed, but the very attempt was an offence which might have been actively pursued and severely punished in more tranquil times. It was, however, in the chief of the opposite reli gion, that Behsarius detected a far more dangerous breach of the laws. A letter, which he intercepted from several Romans of distinction and especially the Pope Silverius, promised, at an appointed time, to open the Asinarian gate for the secret admission of the Gothic army. This correspondence might appear to require a speedy, and to deserve a rigorous, punishment. The pontiff was summoned to the quarters of Belisarius in the Pincian palace, but his attendant priests were not allowed A D "^ to pass the antechamber. Silverius found the general seated at the foot of a couch on which Antonina reclined. "Pope Silverius," exclaimed that haughty and imperious woman, " what have we " done to you, that you should betray us to the " Goths V It was in vain that the affrighted bishop attempted a denial, respectable witnesses accused, and his own signature convicted him. The ensigns of his dignity were immediately taken from him, he 222 THE LIFE OF [chap. ». was arrayed in the habit of a monk, and condemned to an exile in the East, for which he embarked without delay; and we may infer from this and other facts, that the Gothic besiegers were almost indifferent to the departures from Rome, and were only anxious to prevent the entrance of supplies. It was announced by Belisarius to the Roman clergy, that Silverius had forfeited his office, and they accord ingly proceeded to a new election, when the deacon Vigilius, by the weight of two hundred pounds of gold, inclined the scale to his side.* In his pubhc history, Procopius glides most rapidly over this deli cate transaction, and we are reduced to gather its details from the angry invectives and conflicting statements of two ecclesiastical writers. f The sacri legious deposition of a Pope has exposed Behsarius to their loud anathema, which is gladly re-echoed by the Roman Catholic annalists of modern times. % Yet * This election took place on the twenty-second of November. (Pagi, Critic, vol. ii. p. 562.) + Anastasius, De Vit. Pontif. 59; and Liberatus, Breviar. p. 149. The latter is the most moderate, and was moreover a contemporary ; yet I can place but Uttle reUauce on his testimony, since he betrays the utmost ignorance of ItaUan affairs, and makes Belisarius take Ravenna before Rome. X Baronius, Annal. Eccles. a.d. 538, No. 4; and 561, No. 7 ; and Muratori, Annal. d'ltal. vol. iii. p. 379. Baronius asserts that Beh sarius afterwards repented of his sacrilege, and in expiation of it built a church at Rome. The Cardinal adds, that the inscription of this church was still extant in his time, and was as fohows : — HANC VIR PATRIC1VS, VILISARIVS VRBIS AMICVS, OB CVLP^E VENIAM C0NDID1T ECCLESIAM ; HANC ICCIRCO PEDEM SACRAM QVI PONIS IX jEDEM, VT MISERETVR EVN S.EPE PRECARE DEVM. But the style of these monkish rhymes seems to belong to a much later period, and I suspect a pious fraud. chap, v.] BELISARIUS. 223 without denying that the sanctity of the papal tiara may entitle the wearer to pecuhar privileges and exemptions, I may observe, that, as to laymen, the mihtary laws, of even the most humane and polished nations, concur in denouncing against such conspi racies the penalty of death. The sentence of Beli sarius can hardly be considered too severe, but though we may approve its matter, we must condemn its announcement and its forms. To give over his authority to a woman, to appear the slave of her displeasure, rather than the minister of justice, to allow her to utter those reproofs which it became only him to speak, were all great infractions of his duty, and must cast a deep blot upon his fame. Much more would that fame be sullied, were we to beheve that he had in reality forged the letter purporting to come from Silverius, in compliance with a request from the Empress Theodora, to find or to make some pretext for removing this obnoxious pontiff. That Theodora possessed great influence over Antonina, and Antonina over Belisarius, is undoubted ; but the heavy charge of forgery is devoid both of proof and probability, and rather seems a later invention to clear the character of Silverius, and to represent him as an unoffending martyr. His ready violation of his oath of fidehty to Vitiges, renders it not unlikely that he might be capable of a two-fold treason, and might anxiously endeavour, by some service before the expected surrender, to deserve a pardon from the Goths. Shortly after this event, the calamities of war 224 THE LIFE OF [chap. ,. began to press so heavily on the besieged, as might almost have justified the treason of any one not bound by solemn engagements to the imperial cause. The inhabitants still received occasional distributions of corn from Behsarius, but were sometimes reduced to herbs and grasses, and to a preparation from the flesh of the mules, wliich had died perhaps from disease. Such tainted and insufficient food was the natural forerunner of a pestilence, which diminished still further the remnant of famine and the sword. In this distress the Romans again besought Beh sarius to suffer the fate of the war to be quickly determined by a battle, and promised that not a single citizen should withhold his aid on this occa sion. " To such a pitch," said they, " has our wretch- " edness proceeded, that it has already even inspired " us with courage, and induced us to take up arms " against the barbarians." Could it have been fore told, or believed, some centuries before, that the citizens of Rome would ever make so degrading an avowal ? To these entreaties, Behsarius could give no satis factory reply. Notwithstanding his earnest sohcita tions, he was still left without adequate reinforce ments from Constantinople ; and in these trying cir cumstances, we may admire the mixture of humanity and firmness which his conduct displayed. When writing to the Emperor, he had warmly pleaded in favour of the citizens of Rome ; but, in his address to themselves, he descanted on the necessity of patience and subordination. " Your proposal," he said, " does chap, v.] BELISARIUS. 225 " not surprise me. I have long expected it. I well " know the character of that senseless monster, the " people, unable either to support the present, or " to foresee the future, always desirous of attempting " the impossible, and of rushing headlong to its ruin. " Yet your unthinking folly shall not induce me " to permit your own destruction, nor to betray the " trust committed to me by my sovereign and yours. " Success in war depends less on intrepidity than on " prudence to await, to distinguish, and to seize the " decisive moment of fortune. You appear to regard " the present contest as a game of hazard, which you " might determine by a single throw of the dice ; " but I, at least, have learnt from experience to prefer " security to speed. But it seems that you offer to " reinforce my troops, and to march with them " against the enemy. Where then have you acquired " your knowledge of war ? And what true soldier " is not aware that the result of a battle must chiefly " rest on the skill and disciphne of the combatants ? " Ours is a real enemy in the field; we march to " a battle, and not to a review. I am, however, " willing to praise your courage, to forgive your " murmurs, and to prove to you that my present " delay is founded on judicious policy. The Emperor " has collected forces from every part of his domi- " nions, and has already dispatched to our succour, " a numerous and formidable army. The ships " already crowd with their multitude the Ionian and " Campanian seas ; a few days more and we shall " behold these reinforcements amongst us. Their l 3 226 THE LIFE OF [chap. v. " supplies of provisions will speedily put an end " to the scarcity, and their valour to the siege." Not satisfied, however, with patiently awaiting succours which a thousand accidents might defeat or delay, Belisarius made every exertion in his power for relief. The historian, Procopius, was sent to Naples, to muster the soldiers arriving from Constantinople, or scattered in Campania, and to find means of intro ducing some convoys of provisions into Rome. He set out by night, through the gate of St. Paul, and passed the Gothic aqueducts without discovery. This facility of departure from the city was not left unem ployed by Belisarius. A few days afterwards he adopted the bold and singular expedient of dis missing a large share of his garrison to seize and maintain some neighbouring strong-holds in flank of the barbarian army, especially Tivoli and Terracina. From this measure, a twofold advantage was antici pated. A larger ration of food might now reheve the wants, and appease the clamours, of the citizens; and, by cutting off the convoys of the Goths, it was expected that they in then.' turn might experience the miseries of famine. The spirits of the Romans were also greatly raised, when they perceived their gar rison resuming the offensive, and, according to the expression of Procopius, from the besieged becoming the besiegers. Antonina left Rome with the detach ment intended for Terracina, having been desired by her husband to proceed to Naples, and there await in tranquillity the uncertain issue of the war ; but scarcely had she reached Campania, before she dis- ch*p. v.] BELISARIUS. 227 played her activity and love of power, by collecting troops, together with Procopius. By their united dihgence five hundred soldiers were assembled, ample supplies of corn were prepared, and they soon derived a more important benefit, from the arrival of the Byzantine reinforcements. Nearly two thousand cavalry, having landed at Otranto, proceeded by rapid marches to Campania, and a fleet, with three thousand Isaurians on board, anchored in the bay of Naples. Amongst the chief commanders of these forces was John, the nephew of Vitalian, whose sur name of Sanguinary * indicates his cruelty, while his avarice and rashness will appear in the sequel. He was, however, an officer of great energy and daring, well fitted to execute though not to plan an enter prise, and his performance was more rapid than the thoughts of common men. It was resolved to attempt the relief of Rome by the side of Ostia, and the Isaurian fleet accordingly steered onwards for that port, while the horsemen from Otranto and the Campanian levies proceeded together along the Ap- pian way. They escorted a large train of waggons, laden with corn and wine, and which they intended, according to the Hunnish custom,f to range round them as intrenchments in case of attack. The approach of this expedition was not unknown * This epithet, which was of course only appUed by his enemies, is omitted by Procopius (Goth. lib. ii. c. 5), but recorded by Anastasius (De Vit. Pontif. e. 60), and copied by Johannes Diacouus (Chronic. c. 22). Narses was in favour when Procopius wrote, and Narses was the intimate friend of John. (Goth. Ub. ii. c. 16.) + Jornandes, De Reb. Getic. c. 40. 228 THE LIFE' OF [chap.,. to the Goths, but Behsarius undertook to employ them by a skirmish, and devised an ingenious strata gem to render it successful. It will be recollected that, at the commencement of the siege, he had closed the Flaminian gate, and the besiegers were therefore quite unsuspicious of any attack from this quarter. By order of Belisarius, the stones piled up against the gate from within, were now removed at night, and he stationed there the flower of his forces. Early the next morning a detachment of one thousand men was directed to issue from the Pincian postern, to insult the camp of the Goths, and, by a pretended flight, allure them to pursuit. This feint produced the desired result. Both the Goths and the Romans rushed towards the ramparts ; the latter with apparent terror, the first with tumultuous triumph. It was then that Belisarius commanded the Flaminian gate to be thrown open, and, sallying forth at the head of his chosen squadron, carried havoc and dismay to the inmost ranks of the barbarians. The imperial troops were hindered from completing their victory, by the smallness of their numbers, and the strength of the enemy's camp ; but the slaughter of the Goths was very great, their consternation kept them for some time confined within their intrench- ments, and they now began also to feel the effect of the Roman garrisons in the neighbouring fortresses. Most of then: convoys were surprised, many of their communications interrupted, and the horrors of scar city were embittered by the progress of disease. Their future prospects seemed to them still more chap, v.] BELISARIUS. 229 gloomy than their actual sufferings. They fully beheved the overcharged accounts of the eastern reinforcements which Belisarius had artfully spread, and imagined that the troops assembhng in Cam pania were but a vanguard to this innumerable army. Under such circumstances, Vitiges thought it politic to attempt negociation, and dispatched three ambas sadors to Rome, whose curious conference with Beli sarius is not unworthy of detail. The Gothic spokes man began by recommending, according to the usual practice of the weaker party, the virtues of modera tion and forbearance. He declared that his sovereign was guided by a sincere wish of ending the mutual miseries of war, and ready to make sacrifices for this desirable end. From thence he somewhat inconsist ently proceeded to enlarge on the justice of the Gothic cause ; he maintained that the troops of Theodoric had been allowed and authorized by the court of Constantinople to expel the Heruli from Italy, and to possess it in their place ; and he concluded by request ing that Belisarius would withdraw his army from their legitimate kingdom. The answer of the Roman general may be easily conjectured. " You promised " to display moderation in your offers, and brevity in " your language ; but, on the contrary, I have heard " a long and presumptuous harangue. Theodoric did " not receive the imperial commission against the " Herufian monarch, with the view of his seizing on " the vacant throne, since how could it matter to " Zeno by what foreign usurper Italy was governed ? " No, it was intended that this country should be 230 THE LIFE OF [chap. v. " entirely freed from barbarian bondage, and re- " annexed to the dominion of the empire. For my " part, I will never resign the territory of my sove- " reign ; if you have any other terms, propose them." The Goths resumed : " Though convinced that even " our enemies must inwardly feel the truth of the " arguments we have urged, yet we are willing to " prove our peaceful intentions, by the cession of " Sicily, that fertile and extensive island, so con- " venient, by its position, for the maintenance of " Africa." " Your generosity," rephed Behsarius, " in yielding a province which you have already lost, " requires, and shall receive from us, an adequate " return. We will resign to the Goths the whole of " Britain, an island much larger than Sicily, and " formerly an appendage of the empire." " But " were we," said the barbarians, " to include Naples " and Campania in our cession, would you not agree " to a treaty ? " " Far from it," said Belisarius, " we are not empowered to make over the least por- " tion of the rightful imperial dominions." " Not " even," asked the ambassadors, " if we submitted to " the payment of a yearly tribute ? " " Not even " then," was the answer. " Allow us at least," rejoined the Goths, "to refer these proposals to the " Emperor himself, and to conclude a truce with " your forces until his pleasure can be known." To this last request Belisarius gladly agreed. Negotia tions for the terms of the truce continued with great activity during several days, and hostages for its conclusion were given on both sides. chap, v.] BELISARIUS. 231 Such was the state of things at Rome, when the forces from Campania arrived, by sea and land, at Ostia, then- appointed place of meeting, where their position was still one of considerable danger, since a cessation of hostilities had not yet been finally settled. In the darkness of the ensuing night, Beli sarius, at the head of only a hundred horse, ventured to sally from Rome, to direct and animate their counsels by his presence. He exhorted them to pursue their march upon the capital, and promised that, in case of any attack from the barbarians, he would advance with his remaining troops to their rescue. The general then remounted, rode back before the dawn to Rome, and had the good fortune, in coming as in going, to pass the Gothic lines un discovered. In the morning, a council was held at Ostia, in which Antonina presided, to deliberate on the best means of transporting the convoy. This under taking appeared to be attended with peculiar diffi culties. No waggons could travel safely along the narrow and dilapidated Ostian way; nor could the boats be towed up the river, since the only road along its stream was on the northern bank, in pos session of the enemy. Besides, the oxen were worn with fatigue by their rapid journey from Campania, and were lying exhausted on the ground, as if inca pable of any further exertion. A new expedient was therefore resorted to : the boats of the Isaurian fleet were filled with the stores of provision, and with rowers, and were then covered by planks, to shield the men from the expected darts of the barbarians. 232 THE LIFE OF LCHAP. v. Awaiting a favourable breeze, these boats sailed up the Tiber, and oars were employed whenever the windings of the river rendered unavailing the assist ance of the wind. All the forces at Ostia marched along the southern bank, to serve as an escort; but this precaution proved needless. No attack was attempted by the Goths, who are said to have imagined that this unusual mode of conveyance up the Tiber must be baffled of itself, without any in terference of theirs.* They were, however, withheld principally by the fear lest an unseasonable skirmish should break off the negociation for a truce, which was then proceeding to their wish. The convoy, therefore, arrived at Rome without hindrance, and, after months of scarcity and weeks of famine, restored ease and plenty to that afflicted city. Some days afterwards, the Goths obtained the reward of their forbearance. A truce was agreed upon, for three months from the winter sol- A.D.e537. s^ce *ul *ne vernai equinox, and the ambas sadors of Vitiges were permitted to proceed to Constantinople; but this interval of tranquillity soon became embittered by jealousy and discord. The Gothic garrison of Porto, debarred from mari time supplies by the presence of the Roman fleet, and reduced to great dearth of provisions, quitted its appointed post, and returned to the main forces under Vitiges. Similar distress caused a similar desertion of Albano and Centumcellse or Civita Vecchia,f and these important stations were imme- * Procop. Goth. lib. ii. c. 7. t WesseUng, Itineraria, p. 291. chap, v.] BELISARIUS. 233 diately occupied by the Romans, so that the Gothic camps before "the city became encompassed on every side by hostile fortresses. No sooner had the loss of these strongholds become irreparable, than their value was perceived by Vitiges, who demanded their restoration from Belisarius, and threatened, if his request were denied him, to enforce it by arms. His menaces were received with contempt, but the Gothic monarch thought it prudent to conceal his displeasure for the time. The grounds on which Belisarius acted are censured by Grotius as paltry chicane,* and this transaction left in the minds of both parties additional seeds of distrust and resentment. The Goths considered themselves as morally released from the obhgations of the truce, and only awaited a favourable moment for attacking the enemy when most secure and unprepared. Their intention did not escape the discernment of the Roman general; and he resolved not to imitate their perfidy, but to provide against it. With this view, he dispatched two thousand horse to Alba, on the lake of Celano, under the command of John the Sanguinary. The instructions of this officer were, to refrain from the slightest aggression, and carefully observe the stipu lated truce. " But if," added Belisarius, " the bar- " barians should be the first to break through this " treaty, then, without a moment's delay, overrun " the province of Picenum with your soldiers, and " precede the news of your arrival by the rapidity of " your movements. Avoid all insult or injury to the * Droit de la Guerre, &c, ed. Barbeyrac, vol. ii. p. 446. 234 THE LIFE OF [chap. t. " Italian inhabitants. Your progress will be easy ; " the Goths have concentrated their whole force " before the walls of Rome, whilst their families and " treasures remain undefended. Endeavour, as much " as possible, to leave no fortresses behind you in the " power of the enemy, and reserve your spoils for a " common and impartial division at Rome. Since " we are toiling to destroy the drones, you must not " claim the sole enjoyment of the honey." During the short and hollow interval of quiet which ensued, the reputation of Behsarius was tarnished by the punishment of one of his a.d. 538. J r most distinguished officers. When, before the siege of Rome, Constantine had been dispatched to occupy Spoleto, he was joined by Presidius, a noble Italian, who, having fallen under the displea sure of the Gothic monarch, had fled in haste from Ravenna. Of all his treasures, he had only been able to save two daggers, whose golden hilts and scabbards were richly studded with jewels. These last relics of his wealth were forcibly seized by Con stantine, although Presidius had taken refuge in a church, whose sanctuary would have shielded even the most atrocious felon from justice. Almost imme diately afterwards, the advance of the Gothic army sent both Presidius and Constantine headlong on to Rome. In the earlier part of the siege, whilst the imperial cause seemed gloomy and hopeless, Presidius continued silent ; but as soon as it began to brighten, he brought forward his complaint. Belisarius re peatedly commanded that his property should be chap, t.] BELISARIUS. 235 restored to him, but these orders were always baffled and eluded; and the Italian found that Constantine added derision to injury. Provoked beyond all bearing, Presidius ventured to seize the bridle of Be hsarius whilst riding through the Roman Forum, and to claim the protection of the laws. In spite of the threats of the guards, he persisted in his grasp, until the general renewed his promise of speedy satisfac tion. Accordingly, on the following day, he convened a council in his palace, and summoned the arrogant and avaricious officer before it. On being once more solemnly required to surrender the stolen daggers, Constantine haughtily rephed, that he would sooner fling them into the Tiber. " Do you then deny my " authority?" said Belisarius. "I do not, on other " points," answered Constantine, " but on this I will " never obey you." Justly incensed at this stubborn refusal and public insult, Behsarius now called for his guards. " No doubt to murder me ! " exclaimed Constantine. "Not so," said the general, "but to " compel the restitution of your spoils." Constan tine, still believing that his life was aimed at, and bhnded by fury and revenge, resolved to signahse his fall by a memorable crime, and to inflict on his com mander the fate which he fancied to be destined for himself. Suddenly drawing his sword, and rushing forwards, he endeavoured to plunge it into the breast of Behsarius. The general avoided the blow, by a rapid movement, and by the interposition of Bessas ; and in the meanwhile the guards, who had entered, in obedience to the former call, seized the undaunted 236 THE LIFE OF [chap. v. assassin. He was dragged into another chamber, and put to death shortly afterwards, by order of his intended victim. Such is the narrative given by Procopius in his public history, and of which he con firms and ratifies the truth in his subsequent hbel.* In the latter, however, he affirms, in addition to these circumstances, that it was the hatred of Antonina against Constantine which chiefly urged her husband to this hasty sentence ; and notwithstanding the just suspicion which always attaches to the Secret History, I am disposed, on this point, to credit its testimony to its full extent. We may, perhaps, judge of this transaction as of the deposition and exile of Silverius, and condemn, not so much the substance as the form. The award on Constantine can hardly be accused of rigour, since a subaltern disobeying the commands and attempting the life of his chief, would, in every age and in every station, have been deemed deserving of death. But this death should have been dehberate and judicial, and not seem to have pro ceeded from the impulse of recent injury, for when the punishment too closely follows the offence, it rather resembles a murder than an execution. Still less should female animosities be allowed weight and influence in a simple question of justice. In this point of view, the affair is most disgraceful to the hero of this narrative, and may serve as an example * See Goth, lib.ii. c. 8; Hist. Arcan. c. i.; and Alemanni, Not. Hist. p. 91. The eontinuator of Count Mareellhius seems strangely ignorant as to this affair, since he represents Behsarius as just returned from Campania, (Chronic, ap. Sirmond. Op. vol. ii. p. 382.) chap, v.] BELISARIUS. 237 how the blandishments of some worthless woman may betray even the most honourable men into the least honourable actions. The King of the Goths had for some time been desirous to violate the truce by a sudden surprise of Rome, and thus at the same moment to commit his perfidy and obtain its reward. For this end, the aqueducts occurred to him, and one* near the Pincian postern was explored at night, by some chosen sol diers provided with torches ; but their progress was stopped by the buttress which Belisarius had formerly constructed. f Detaching a stone from this obstacle, they bore it to the Gothic monarch as a mark of their partial advance, and left him to deliberate by what means their attempt might be more successfully renewed. Yet, in spite of all their precautions, they had not been wholly unobserved by the Romans. A sentinel on duty near the Pincian outlet had per ceived, through a crevice in the wall, a flash of hght from their torches ; but he and his comrades agreed in ascribing it to the eyes of a wolf glaring in the dark. J Such a circumstance was thought too insig- * This was probably the celebrated Aqua Virgo, which now suppUes the fountain of Trevi. Currit aqua virgo sub delectatione purissima, quse adeo sic appeUata creditor quod nulUs sordibus poUuatur, (Cas siod. Var. Ub. vii. form. 6.) It was conveyed by a subterranean channel to the foot of the Pincian hiU. See Pliny, (Hist. Nat. lib. xxxi. c. 3.) and Frontinus Fabretti, (ap. Donatum, Roma Antica, lib. iii. c. 18.) + Look back to p. 201. X The eyes of several animals are supposed to have the property of shining at night. See a curious adventure which befel Bruce with a hyaena. " I saw," he says," large blue eyes glaring at me in the dark," &c. (Travels in Abyssinia, vol. v. p. 109.) 238 THE LIFE OF [chap. v. nificant for a report to Belisarius, and it only reached his ears by some idle conversation it occasioned. Trifling as it seemed, this intelligence was not neglected by the general. He commanded some ex perienced soldiers to search the suspected aqueduct, and by this means were discovered not merely the recent removal of a stone, but the droppings of the torches on the ground. It need scarcely be added, that the numerous guard with which Belisarius thenceforward protected this post compelled Vitiges to abandon all thoughts of his design ; yet it was to the same quarter that the next enterprise of the barbarians was directed. Having observed that, at the time of the mid-day meal, the ramparts were forsaken by the greater number of the sentinels and guards, they at this hour suddenly rushed from their encampments towards the neighbouring wall, in hopes of reaching it before the absent soldiers could return. This project was baffled by the valour of Hildiger, who commanded in this station, and who had lately conducted from Africa some further reinforcements to the relief of Rome. He perceived the approach of the Goths, and steadfastly withstood their attack till the arrival of some fresh troops, whose sally com pleted their discomfiture. By this overt act of hos tility, the truce was mutually considered as dissolved. The fertile invention of Vitiges had now recourse to a third stratagem, more nearly successful than either of the former. In the space between the sepulchre of Hadrian and the Flaminian gate, the limits of Rome were marked bv the course of the chap, v.] BELISARIUS. 239 river ; and the walls along its bank were thought to be sufficiently defended by its stream, without need ing much strength of their own. Their height was therefore inconsiderable ; they were unprotected by towers, and might have been scaled without difficulty, but for the intervention of the Tiber and the vigi lance of the garrison. To overcome the former ob stacle, Vitiges secretly prepared some boats ; against the latter he determined to employ the venal treachery of two Roman citizens, whom he desired to accost the sentinels after dark, to offer them a share of their wine, and, by pouring a strong narcotic into their cups, consign them to profound repose. The two Romans were then to make an appointed signal to the Goths, who hoped to cross the river unobserved, and to climb the defenceless walls with ease. A pro ject so judiciously concerted was disappointed by the fear or remorse of one of the conspirators, who, like most penitents in similar cases, resolved to atone for one act of perfidy by committing another, and re vealed his guilty accomplice. The convicted traitor was sent by Behsarius to the barbarian camp, with his nose slit, his ears cut off, and mounted on an ass; and his appearance announced to Vitiges the ruin of his enterprise. Such repeated reverses broke the spirit of the Goths ; they began utterly to despair of taking Rome, and attributed to the special interfer ence of an irritated Deity what the genius of their adversary is perhaps sufficient to explain. No sooner had the truce been broken through by the Goths before Rome, than a dispatch from Beh- 240 THE LIFE OF [chap, v sarius desired John the Sanguinary to fulfil his instructions. This officer accordingly invaded Pice- num, and easily overthrew the feeble forces which the Goths remaining in that quarter could muster against him. He found the cities of Urbino and of Auximum, or Osimo, weakly garrisoned indeed, but very strongly fortified, and was impelled by military ardour to set at naught the orders of bis general, and to march onwards, leaving only small detachments before the hostile walls. We find it afterwards stated, that the desire of enriching himself by the pillage of further provinces, was also a principal motive in urging him to disobedience.* Fortune, generally propitious to the bold, appeared at first to favour the enterprise of John. On his approach, the garrison of Rimini, only one day's journey from the Gothic capital, fled with precipitation, alarmed at the dis affection of the Itahan inhabitants, and tempted by their neighbourhood to the impregnable ramparts of Ravenna. The Roman officer forthwith took posses sion of this important city, and his progress, thus far, also enabled Matasontha, the unwilling bride of Vitiges, to send a messenger to his camp, and to concert with him the dethronement and death of her husband. It was warily required, on her part, that John should engage, immediately after the murder of Vitiges, to supply his place with his royal widow. The news of the surrender of Rimini filled the mind of the Gothic monarch with alarm. All his projects on Rome had been disappointed, his Adriatic - Procop., Goth. Ub. ii. c. 16. chap, iv.] BELISARIUS. 241 capital was menaced with Byzantine troops, and his army weakened by the sufferings of scarcity. How ever, he remained without taking any decisive measures till the conclusion of the truce, still ex pecting to receive favourable tidings from Constan tinople, and to find the Emperor less inexorable than his lieutenant in Italy. As soon as this period had elapsed without the fulfilment 5J^3|1' of his hopes, Vitiges reluctantly issued orders for a general retreat, and one year and nine days from the first commencement of the siege, the Gothic army, setting fire to the wooden pahsades of its camps, began slowly to repass the Milvian bridge.* For some time Behsarius doubted what course, under such circumstances, it might be proper to pursue. To suffer the barbarians to escape unmo lested seemed inglorious, to encounter them fairly in the field was impossible for a garrison diminished * TiU the last moment of the truce, the Goths stiU trusted that their embassy at Constantinople might prove successful, and that the Romans would send them a treaty of peace. To have raised the siege and begun their retreat under such circumstances, would have been impoUtic, since Behsarius might have thought himself justified in refusing to ratify with fugitive troops the Byzantine compact, sup posed to be concluded with powerful invaders. But when the period fixed for the term of the negotiation was at an end, Vitiges could no longer entertain any hopes of peace. The taking of Rimini, and the danger of Ravenna, then urged them to set off without a moment of unnecessary delay. From these two considerations combined, we may conclude that he raised the siege on the very morning when the term of three months expired, and this is confirmed by the words of Procopius, <5 re tojv rpicav pqvwv XP0V0S ^VKet/ V^V- (Goth. Ub. ii. c. 10.) Now this term expired March 21, and, as the siege lasted one year and nine days, this date gives us March 12, a.d. 537, for its commencement. M 242 THE LIFE OF [chap. v. by such numerous outposts and detachments from it. The general, therefore, had recourse to stratagem; and, waiting till one-half of the Gothic army had reached the Tuscan bank of the Tiber, he suddenly sallied forth against the remainder with all his troops. A battle ensued, as fiercely contested and as hardly won as any of the preceding engagements. The Romans fought with alacrity and confidence, the Goths with all the courage of despair, but, as Beh sarius had expected, the passage of the Milvian bridge soon became encumbered by the runaways from one bank, and the reinforcements from the other, and great numbers were precipitated into the Tiber, whence the weight of their armour prevented them from rising. Thus the troops on the opposite shore could yield but little assistance to their com rades. The victory of Belisarius was complete ; a large share of the Gothic rear was cut to pieces, and those who escaped the double dangers of the river and the enemy, hastily joined the rest of the army in retreat. They marched towards Ravenna, on the left of the Flaminian road ; and, after so many reverses, their numbers were still sufficiently con siderable to allow Vitiges to leave behind him four thousand men for the garrison of Auximum, two thousand for that of Urbino, and above three thou sand scattered amongst some smaller fortresses. While the barbarians thus withdrew, Behsarius dis patched, in the same direction, a thousand horse, commanded by Hildiger and Martin, whose speed might easily outstrip the lingering and impeded chap, v.] BELISARIUS. 243 march of the Gothic squadrons. He instructed them on their way to draw some infantry from Ancona, which had lately been taken, and was still occupied by a fresh reinforcement from Constantinople.* They were then to proceed to John the Sanguinary, at Rimini, and convey to him the orders of Belisarius to quit that fortress with his soldiers, leaving as a garrison the troops they brought him from Ancona. By this means the general expected that the Goths, on arriving before the walls of Rimini, and finding that it contained no commander of note, nor veteran soldiers, might disdain so inglorious a conquest, and march onwards to Ravenna. Should they, on the contrary, undertake the investment, the small num bers of the garrison would be commensurate to the slender store of provisions, and the cavalry of John might, in the meanwhile, be more usefully employed in the field by cutting off the detachments and surrounding the camp of the besiegers. Accord ingly, Hildiger and Martin set out from Rome, suc cessfully avoided the hostile army, and, having forced a passage through the rocky defile of Petra Pertusa,f and drawn the requisite troops from Ancona, made known to John the Sanguinary the instructions with which they were charged. But * Ancona was then regarded only as the port of Auximum, which was the capital of Picenum, and a very considerable place. (Procop. Goth. Ub. ii. c. 13.) How complete is the change ! Ancona has become one of the most flourishing cities in Italy, and Osimo hardly deserves the name of a town. + Compare Procop. Goth. Ub. ii. c. 11. andlib. iv. c. 28. See also a note of Sigonius, (De Occident. Imp. Op. vol. i. p. 726.) M 2 244 THE LIFE OF [chap. v. this presumptuous subaltern, whether unable to com prehend the motives, and therefore reluctant to obey the commands of his general, or whether dreading the fatigues and hardships of the adventurous war fare to which he was summoned, refused to comply with the mandate, and remained immovable at Rimini. The consequences of this stubbornness soon set forth the sagacity of Behsarius. Vitiges, allured by the hope of reducing to captivity two thousand chosen horsemen of the enemy, invested the fortress, and pushed his enterprise with the greater ardour, as trusting to retrieve at Rimini the mihtary fame which he had forfeited at Rome.* It must be owned, in justice to John the Sanguinary, that his resolution was as steadfast against the enemy as it had been against his commander, and that he endeavoured, by his courage, to cure the effects of his imprudence. He repulsed the assaults, he deceived the vigilance, he destroyed the engines of the Goths. Yet it appeared equally necessary, and far more difficult, to withstand the pressure of scarcity, which soon began to be severely felt by the besieged, and John must often have admitted the wiser policy of his general, and regretted as pernicious the very numbers of his famished soldiers. Meanwhile Belisarius was advancing from Rome to carry on hostilities in person. The cities of Tudertia * It appears that Vitiges, in the siege of Rimini, encamped on the banks of tlie Rubicon. (Marcellin. Chron. ap. Sirmond. Op. vol. ii. p. 383.) This passage might, perhaps, be useful in deciding between the four rivers to which that celebrated name has been appUed in modern times. See Forsyth's Italy, p. 442. Geneva ed. chap, v.] BELISARIUS. 245 or Todi, and of Clusium or Chinsi, which he had intended to besiege, surrendered on his first approach, to the terror of his name. He was ^J^l'^ still better pleased on learning the arrival of seven thousand fresh Byzantine troops, which had landed in the March of Ancona, under the command of Narses.* This officer, so renowned in later cam paigns, was an eunuch, and a domestic of the palace ; one of the very few recorded in history who have illustrated either of these characters by mihtary skill. We may justly adrnire and respect the vigour of a mind wliich, under every disadvantage of a feeble and dwarfish body,f after many years of household cares, of thraldom to female caprices, nay, even of employ ment in the female tasks of the loom, was found not unequal to the command of armies. Yet the desire of displaying this remarkable exception to the common rule, has tempted most modern historians to adorn the fame of Narses with a lustre which will be found to diminish and disappear in proportion as it is closely viewed. His talent for war was un doubtedly considerable, but it will be seen in the sequel of this narrative, that his victories were at * Gibbon observes, (Vol. vii. p. 381.) "the country of Narses is " unknown, since he must not be confounded with the Persarmenian." But there were two Persarmenians of the name of Narses, the one who has already been mentioned as deserting to the Romans in the first campaigns of Behsarius, and the other who received that deserter. Now the second is undoubtedly the same as the eunuch, each being called the private imperial treasurer, BamAeas ra/iias. (Procop. Pers. lib. i. c. 15. Goth. Ub. ii. c. 18.) Moreover the deserter is afterwards mentioned as one of the train of the eunuch in Italy. + Agathias, Ub. i. p. 27. 246 THE LIFE OF [chap. v. least as greatly due. to his influence over his imperial master, as to his own superiority of tactics. In some respects he only reaped the harvest which Behsarius had already sown. Reinforcements were necessary at that period to carry on the war ; they were denied to the hero, they were granted to the favourite. Besides, the avarice* and cruelty of Narses were such as would have blackened the most briUiant reputation, and his rapid conquest is nearly out weighed by his harsh and oppressive government. As subalterns, great men have almost always shown themselves as ready to obey as they afterwards proved able to command; but Narses, till invested with supreme authority, was prone to faction, impatient of control, and careless of the pubhc cause. We are told by an historian, partial to his fame, that on one occasion he deeply lamented the success of the imperial arms, because he himself had foretold and expected a reverse. f Nor must we forget, in the consideration of his character, that at the close of his long life he blotted out its glories by treason, and called in the national enemy to avenge his private wrongs.! Even in his proudest moments, in the * According to Paul Wamefrid, (lib. iii. c. 12.) Narses, in his second Italian command, concealed many thousand pounds weight of gold in a private cistern, and then put to death the workmen who had constructed it. The secret was disclosed after his own death by his sole confidant. + Procop. Goth. lib. ii. c. 19. See a warm panegyric on Narses, Ub. iv. c.26. X The invitation to the Lombards by Narses is attested by Paul Warnefrid, (lib. ii. c. 5.) and by Anastasius, (De Vit. Pontif. c. 62.) who are copied by Bede, (Op. vol. ii. p. 115, ed. 1688.) and Aimoin, chap, v.] BELISARIUS. 247 day of victory and triumph, we may still discern the habits of falsehood and the petty artifices of the eastern slave. He imposed on the devotion of his soldiers by pretending to the special favour of the Holy Virgin. He asserted that she never failed to apprize him of the most auspicious time for an engagement, nor would he issue his orders for battle until he had received her appointed signal.* Such a fraud, were it but once attempted, (and that of Narses was continued for several years) cannot be too strongly condemned. Even the great discoverer of a new world has been blamed for availing himself of his foreknowledge of eclipses, to raise the super stitious veneration of the Indians ; but Columbus was then in the most pressing danger .• his liberty and even his life were at stake, and every other expedient for escape had disappeared.f None of these excuses will apply to the Byzantine general. Narses and Behsarius joined their forces near the town of Fermo, and a council of war was immediately convened by the latter, to dehberate on the best means of relieving Rimini. That its garrison should continue to hold out without some succour was impossible, from the want of provisions ; but at the (De Gest. Franc. Ub. Ui. c. 10.) The two last prove at least the popular beUef. Cardinal Baronius takes the favourite of the Virgin under his protection, and denies his treason ; but the weakness of this defence is shown by Muratori, Pagi, &c. * Evagrius, Hist. Eccles. Ub. iv. c. 24. He beUeves in these miracles. f See Robertson's History of America, vol. i. p. 170, ed. 1777, and Mr. Washington Irving's late life of Columbus, (book xvi. c. 3.) a work which does justice to its object and honour to its author. 248 THE LIFE OF [chap. v. same time it appeared very hazardous for the Romans to advance in that direction, since the large Gothic force, shut up in Osimo, might issue forth and intercept them in the rear. The whole council agreed in deploring the rashness and avarice which had misled John the Sanguinary from the prudent instructions of the general, and some officers even wished to leave him to his fate. Narses, who was bound to John by the closest ties of friendship, without attempting to defend his conduct, urged the necessity of marching to his rescue, and his argu ments were enforced by a letter from that chief to Behsarius, announcing that unless relieved before seven days, the pressure of famine must compel him to surrender. At this intelhgence Belisarius hastened to decide and execute his plans. Some troops were left encamped at a short distance from Osimo, in hopes of checking the sallies of its garrison, and the rest proceeded in different divisions to assist their invested comrades. In spite of the new reinforce ments, the Roman army was still far inferior to that of Vitiges, and Behsarius therefore, instead of en countering the barbarians at once, considered it more prudent to employ some stratagem, and to contrive that they should think themselves encom passed by superior squadrons. One detachment was embarked in the Roman fleet, and committed to the command of Hildiger, and another under Martin was instructed to march along the Flaminian way and by kindhng at night the extended fires of a large army, to create an overcharged impression of its chap, v.] BELISARIUS. 249 numbers. Belisarius himself, at the head of the main body, proceeded along the rugged ridge of the Apennines. On his approach to Rimini he routed a foraging party of the Goths, and the affrighted runaways, on returning to their camp, announced and magnified the forces of the Roman general. The Goths eagerly prepared for battle, and cast impatient looks towards the mountains from whence they expected the enemy to issue; but their confidence was changed to dismay in the ensuing night, on observing, from another quarter, the numerous lights of the detachments under Martin, and they con cluded that two large armies were marching against them. When the dawn revealed to them, in addition to these, the approach of a Roman fleet, their alarm grew into a panic; they precipitately raised the siege, and the only contest amongst them, says Pro copius, was who should arrive the soonest at Ravenna. Had the garrison of Rimini sallied forth against them in these moments of confusion, their defeat might have been decisive; but its exhaustion and discouragement rendered it incapable of any such exertion. Hildiger was the first to enter the deserted camp of the barbarians ; he took prisoners the strag glers and the wounded, and seized upon the baggage left behind. The troops of Martin and of Belisarius arrived a few hours later, and the whole of the imperial army was thus reunited beneath the walls of Rimini. Any views which the Roman general may have entertained for improving and extending this success m 3 250 THE LIFE OF [chap. t. were baffled by the selfish jealousy of Narses. The friends of this favourite eunuch never ceased from urging to him that having so lately left the sacred presence, and enjoyed the familiar conversation of the Emperor, he must be better acquainted with his real wishes than a distant and uncourtly general. They entreated him not to yield to Belisarius the whole glory of the war, but to perplex and thwart his measures by a determined opposition. He was reminded that the greater part of the effective forces at that moment were those under his immediate command, since so many of the veterans of Behsarius were scattered through the garrisons of southern Italy. These perfidious counsels were attentively heard and faithfully obeyed by Narses ; he always, on one pretext or another, evaded compliance with the orders of the general, and at length, when com manded to march to the relief of Milan, he openly refused to obey. This orthodox capital of Liguria had borne with impatience the yoke of an Arian monarch, and several of its principal citizens had arrived at Rome towards the end of the siege, requesting some troops from Belisarius to assist their intended revolt.* Amongst these deputies was Darius, the bishop, since canonized by the Cathohc Church for his conspiracy against a heretic sovereign, and his more prosperous but less visible warfare against * From the difficulty of accounting for the peaceable passage of these envoys through the Gothic lines, Muratori supposes that they had been banished from Milan. (Annal. d'ltal. vol. hi- p. 380.) chap, v.] BELISARIUS. 251 daemons.* According to their entreaties, Belisarius, as soon as the Goths had begun to retreat from Rome, ordered a thousand soldiers, together with a small detachment of his guards, to embark at Porto, with Mundilas for their commander. Having landed at Genoa,f these troops advanced rapidly to Milan, and the insurrection both of that city and of the surrounding districts was effected without difficulty. But when Vitiges received these adverse tidings, he dispatched bis nephew, Uraias, at the head of a formidable army, to attempt the reduction of the rebellious province, and on the other side ten thousand Burgundians passed the Alps to uphold the tottering cause of their brother barbarians. These useful auxiliaries came by the secret orders of Theodebert, King of Austrasia, according to the treaty which Vitiges had concluded at the commencement of his reign; and since the Burgundians were the recent and unsettled subjects of Theodebert, he was enabled to disavow all participation in their counsels, and to boast to the Emperor of his scrupulous neutrality. By the united forces of the Franks and Goths the siege of Milan was forthwith undertaken and vigor ously pressed, and the succour of that city became an object of first-rate importance to the Romans. When Belisarius found his private exhortations to * Gregor. Magn. Dial. lib. in. c. 4. ap. Baronium, Annal. Eccles. a.d. 539. No. 20. The day fixed for the worship of St. Datius is the fourteenth of January. (Pagi. Critic, vol. n. p. 567.) t Genoa at this time formed part of the province of Tuscany. (Pro cop. Goth. Ub. ii. c. 12.) 252 THE LIFE OF [chap. v. Narses unavailing, he tried the effects of a pubhc address in full council. He besought the eunnch not to consider the Goths as already vanquished, nor to imagine that the past successes of the Roman army might allow it to relax in its exertions. " Remember," he said, " that Vitiges is still entrenched at Ravenna " with several remaining myriads of soldiers, that " Uraias has recovered Liguria, and is now besieging " Milan ; that a numerous and formidable army " defies us from the ramparts of Osimo, and that a " chain of fortresses, down to Orvieto, almost in " sight of Rome, is defended by barbarian garrisons. " The situation of our troops may be considered as " more critical than ever, while thus hemmed in by " the enemy. Should the report be true that a " horde of Burgundians is also marching against us " in Liguria, these fresh adversaries should likewise " raise our apprehensions. Let us not, therefore, " remain inactive. Let us send a portion of our " troops to the rehef of Milan, and with the rest " commence the investment of Osimo. The result " of these will, of course, determine our further " undertakings." Against self-interest most arguments are power less. Narses declared that he would dispatch no share of the seven thousand men under his personal command, either to Milan or Osimo, and hoping to divide the council, he proposed in opposition to this plan the invasion of the iEmilian province, which nearly corresponds with modern Romagna. To end these mischievous disputes, Behsarius then brought chap. ».] BELISARIUS. '' 253 forward the following letter from the Emperor to the Roman chiefs. " In sending Narses, our private " treasurer, to Italy, we have no intention that he " should, in any degree, control or direct the war ; " we desire that Belisarius should still remain in- " vested with supreme authority, and be imphcitly " obeyed in all his undertakings for the public good." These words appeared clear and decisive, but the subtle mind of Narses had too long been conversant with the intrigues of the palace not to find or to make a flaw. He availed himself of the concluding clause, asserted that the commands of Belisarius in this instance were not really conducive to the pubhc good, and that, therefore, the officers were not required to obey them. It was found impossible to subdue his factious opposition, and Belisarius could only spare from amongst his veterans such slender succours for the rehef of Milan, that, as will presently be seen, they proved wholly inadequate to their object. A third proposal, the siege of Urbino, could not, with any plausibility, be hkewise withstood by Narses, and the whole army was, therefore, united for this enterprise. The garrison, confiding in the lofty situation and well stored granaries of the city, turned a deaf ear to all terms of surrender, and the invest ment was begun. But the jealous spirit of John the Sanguinary could ill brook that others should succeed in reducing a fortress from whence he himself had been repulsed on his march to Rimini. He appears to have persuaded Narses that the idea of taking Urbino was chimerical and hopeless, and to 251 THE LIFE OF [chap. ,. have held out, as far more fruitful both of wealth and of renown, an inroad into the rich province of iEmilia. Accordingly Narses raised his camp at night, and secretly deserted his general, followed by the troops under his peculiar orders, and accom panied by John the Sanguinary. The garrison next morning did not fail to observe and to taunt from the ramparts the diminished number of the be siegers. Yet Behsarius resolved to persevere in his undertaking, and the favour of fortune speedily atoned for the secession of his soldiers. The Goths in Urbino were amply supphed with provi- A.eD.e™38? sions, but possessed only one single spring, and this, from some hidden cause, in spite of the wintry season, began decreasing, until in three days the water oozing from it was merely sufficient to moisten the adjacent ground.* While, therefore, the Romans were drawing, with much labour, a military engine against the almost inaccessible walls, they were pleasingly surprised by a signal of surrender from the garrison. The grief of Narses at Rimini, when in formed of this unexpected success, was only assuaged by the exploits of John the Sanguinary, who had overrun the iEmilian province with his usual valour, and though beaten back from the walls of Cesena, suc ceeded in reducing Imola and several other places. Belisarius next directed his arms against Orvieto, which nature had so strongly fortified as to secure against assault, and which yielded only to the slow * Such changes in springs were not uncommon in ancient times' See Ovid. Met. lib. xv., v. 272. chap, v.] BELISARIUS. ~J5 but irresistible progress of blockade. While this important bulwark continued in the hands of the Goths, the possession of Rome was always considered as precarious. To the detachment which Behsarius had dispatched towards Milan he had appointed Uliaris and Martin as commanders. These officers advanced by rapid marches to the banks of the Po, where their reflec tions on the dangers which awaited them on the northern shore detained them in trembling and irresolute suspense. It was in vain that an emissary' from Mundilas, the governor of Milan, boldly tra versed the hnes of the enemy, and swam the river to urge the necessity of their speedily proceeding. The timid chiefs wrote to Belisarius, excusing their delay, and setting forth the formidable and united numbers of the Burgundians and the Goths, and they besought that he would command John the Sanguinary, then stationed in the neighbouring iEmilian province, to join his forces with theirs. Orders to this effect were instantly dispatched by Behsarius, but John answered by a downright re fusal to obey unless with the consent of Narses. To Narses, therefore, who was then peaceably encamped at Rimini, Belisarius, at that time engaged in block ading Orvieto, sent a pressing letter. In this docu ment he urges that the scattered battalions of an army, hke the limbs of the human frame, should be directed by one pervading spirit, and not attempt various and incompatible movements. " For my " part," he says, " I have not at my disposal any 25(i THE LIFE OF [chap. ,. " troops to spare ; but were my force ever so numer- " ous it would still be impossible for me, at this " distance, to afford any effectual aid to Milan. " Reinforcements from hence would arrive too late, " the decisive moment would be lost, and the horses " jaded by so long a journey could not on their " arrival act with vigour in the field." Thus admo nished, Narses gave the required permis sion, but it was already too late, and an unseasonable illness of John the Sanguinary occa sioned further delay. Milan had long been reduced to the utmost distress for food ; the inhabitants were compelled to subsist on such animals as truth or prejudice represent as loathsome ;* yet their courage was upheld by the dread of Burgundian fierceness and Gothic revenge. After Mundilas had made the bravest resistance, and in vain exhorted his soldiers to attempt a desperate sally, he concluded an advan tageous capitulation for the garrison, but could obtain no terms for the city or the citizens. It is affirmed that Milan was razed to the ground, but as we find it, at no distant period, again commemorated as a flourishing and important city,t we may suspect that the destruction was confined to the ramparts, nor is it improbable that all the churches may have been levelled or defaced, the Cathohc by the Goths and the Arian by the Franks. St. Datius escaped to * Mice, for instance, are mentioned, yet the gUres or dormice were once a favourite dish with the Romans, and even forbidden by an ancient Censorial law as too luxurious. (Plin. Hist. Nat. Ub. xxxvi.c. 1.) f Paul Wamefrid, Ub. ii. c. 15 and 25. chap, v.] BELISARIUS. 257 Constantinople, * but Fidelius, the imperial Prsefect, was less fortunate, he was torn to pieces by the ferocious besiegers, and his mangled limbs were carelessly thrown to the dogs. While the women were put aside, according to their age and beauty, as concubines or as menials, and bestowed on the Burgundians as the price of their alhance, the men were massacred even at the altars, f and the number of the slain has grown in history to three hundred thousand.f Such a calculation must appear incre dible, yet we are assured that of -all the Italian cities at this time, with the exception of Rome, reserved perhaps chiefly from its ancient supremacy, Milan was by far the first in wealth, population, and extent. Its loss deeply afflicted Behsarius, and, on the return of Martin and Uliaris, he showed his indignation by refusing to admit them to his presence. Uharis was the same soldier by whose hand John the Armenian had fallen. At nearly the same time, (the winter was drawing to a close,) the decision of the Emperor con- „ , '' _ r Feb. or firmed the disputed authority of Belisarius Mar. in Italy. Narses was recalled to the intimacy of his sovereign, and the administration of his * See the end of Datius in Victor Tunnunensis, (vol. i. p. 333. ed. Canisn. 1725.) + Marius, Chronic. (Historiens de France, vol. ii. p. 16.) X Procop. Goth. lib. u. c. 21, perhaps a corruption in the text. This number, absurdly too high, is made as absurdly too low by Cousin, who renders the pvpiaSas rpiaKovra trois cent, and the massacre has accordingly been passed over as trifling by some French critics, often apt to depend on translations. 258 THE LIFE OF [chap. v. domestic office ; but the fierce and intractable tribe of the Herufi, under his personal command, and consisting of two thousand soldiers, seized this pretext for revolt. They marched into Liguria, pillaged the open country, and were concluding a separate treaty with the Goths, when they were checked by one of those sudden changes of purpose to which all barbarous nations are prone, as acting rather from the impulse of the moment, than from systematic principle. Their satiety of plunder, they thought moderation; their regret of the lucrative imperial service, they termed repentance for their mutiny; and, marching back to Constantinople under the command of Philimuth, they obtained their pardon. The departure of Narses left to Behsarius the free and undisputed control of the remaining forces, and the unity of power was soon manifest from the vigour of operations. It was resolved by the general to undertake at once the siege of the two important fortresses of Fiesole and Osimo ; the former he com mitted to a strong detachment under Cyprian and Justin, while he himself marched against the capital of Picenum with eleven thousand men. This city was placed on the summit of an almost inaccessible hill, and defended by an experienced and numerous garrison, which, it may be remembered, Vitiges, on his return from Rome, had augmented with four thousand veterans. It was headed by Visandus, the same who had formerly stood forth as the antagonist of Belisarius in single combat, and had been left for dead upon the field. Several slight skirmishes were chap, v.] BELISARIUS. 259 fought, at the commencement of the siege, to check the foraging excursions of the Goths; and some confusion was found to attend the Romans in this petty warfare, because the signal of the trumpet equally denoted a charge and a retreat, and the orders of the officers for the one or the other were drowned in the clangour of arms. It was, therefore, suggested by the historian Procopius, that in future a charge should be made known by the brazen horse- trumpet, and that the trumpet of the infantry, com posed only of wood and leather, should announce a retreat. This judicious proposal was readily adopted by Behsarius, but he found it no easy task to bend the spirit of his soldiers to the supposed ignominy of ever retiring before the beleaguered barbarians. " Remember," he said to them, " that even intre- " pidity must be restrained within certain and " moderate limits, and, when it becomes pernicious, " ceases to be honourable." Through these and similar precautions every stratagem of the Gothic troops was baffled, and they in their turn were soon closely pressed by the Romans. It was in vain that they entreated some succour from Vitiges at Ravenna, and reminded him of his former declara tion, that in committing Osimo to their defence, he had entrusted them with the keys of his capital and kingdom. The Gothic monarch, instead of bestow ing, was reduced to implore protection. In a fruit less embassy, he had solicited the alliance of the Lombards, and he now artfully attempted to divide and overwhelm the Roman forces, by exciting Nus hirvan to attack them. Two priests, preferring the 260 THE LIFE OF [chap. ,. interests of their prince to those of their religion, were induced by large presents to traverse secretly the imperial dominions, to the court of the Magian king; and it will be seen in the sequel, that their eloquence and zeal to direct his arms against their brother-Christians were attended with success. But this diversion, though powerful, was tardy, and served not to prevent, but only to protract, the final extinction of the Gothic monarchy. A stronger and less remote alliance was held out in prospect to the Goths, by a formidable army of Franks, which suddenly descended from the Alps, and overspread the fertile plains of Liguria. To the earher embassies, both of Justinian and Vitiges, Theodebert had given specious promises, but httle real support, unwilling either to exalt the power of a dangerous neighbour, or to favour the imperial pre tensions upon Italy, wliich might at some future time be as justly extended to Gaul. The Bur gundians whom he had permitted to share in the siege of Milan, consisted of no more than ten thou sand men, and returned homewards as soon as this city had surrendered. But when he perceived both parties weakened by their long and bloody warfare, he fancied that it might not be difficult, with his fresh and numerous army, to snatch away the prize for which they were contending. Without declaring his objects, he advanced at the head of forces which have been reckoned at two hundred thousand men, but which more probably amounted to only half the number.* Since the time of Brennus, nine * Jornandes states two hundred thousand (De Regn. Success. chap, v.] BELISARIUS. 261 centuries before, none of the Gallic chieftains had invaded Italy ; but, on the contrary, their territories had been desolated by the arms, and annexed to the dominions of Rome. The retribution for these con quests, so frequently and so fully paid in the middle ages, now began ; and from the days of Theodebert to those of Napoleon the degenerate Italians have often felt, and never withstood but by foreign aid, the attacks of their former province. They have been reduced to deplore the fruitful soil and delicious climate,* which age after age allured the barbarians to cross their mountainous barrier, and, by a singular malediction, they are now devoid both of spirit for freedom and of callousness to slavery. A talent for poetry and music, for painting and sculpture, may afford some compensation for national disgrace ; but it is a singular and striking fact, that of all those illustrious men who have formed the literature, or revived the arts of modern Italy, not one has been a native of Rome, and that nearly all have sprung from barbarian ancestry in the ancient Cisalpine Gaul, f The soil, once so fertile in heroes, seems weary and exhausted with the number. p. 65), but Procopius one hundred thousand (Goth. Ub. n. c. 25.) Almoin merely says, cum maximo suorum equitatu, which is in direct opposition to the assertion of Procopius, that few of the Franks were mounted. (De Gest. Franc. Ub. n. c. 21.) His authority is very shght. * See FiUcaja's celebrated sonnet — Italia, ItaUa, o tu cui feo la sorte, &c. t Guido was of Bologna, Davila of Padua, Tiraboschi of Bergamo, Correggio and Ariosto of Reggio, Bentivoglio of Ferrara, Maffei of Verona, Alfieri of Piedmont, Muratori of Modena, Raphael of Urbino. Fra Paolo, Goldoni, Titian and Canova were Venetians ; 262 THE LIFE OF [chap. ,. In two contemporary Greek historians, we find a very different account of the customs and conduct of the Franks in their invasion. The one extols them as models of uncorrupted virtue; he praises their strict execution of the precepts, and their orthodox adherence to the tenets, of the Cathohc Church.* The other holds them forth as brutal savages, who, with the profession of Christianity, clung to many of their heathen rites, and who showed at once their cruelty and superstition, by the sacrifice of children to idols.f Between such con flicting statements, the truth can hardly be discerned. Yet, if we look to any national chronicle of the Franks, it will appear to turn the balance against them, and to prove that, hke most nations in a rude state of society, they seldom distinguished ferocity from valour, or perfidiousness from stratagem. In its equipments their army bore no resemblance to the Roman. None but the King and his immediate attendants rode on horseback, and were armed with lances ; the others, on foot, were provided only with Petrarch, Guicciardini, Macchiavel, Dante, Michel Angelo, and Boccacio, Florentines. Tasso was born at Sorrento, but his family was from the Milanese. Deduct these, and what remains for southern Italy? * Agathias, lib. i. p. 1 3. + Procop. Goth. Ub. i. c. 25. Cardinal Baronius takes fire at this imputation on the orthodox Franks (Annal. Eccles. a.d. 540, No. 35), and Dom Bouquet endeavours to divert it from his country men to the Alamanni. — Procopius Francis parum sequus, flagitia quae a solis commissa sunt Alamannis, qui sub potestate Regis Theo- deberti degebant, male in universam Francorum nationem refundit. (Historiens de France, vol. U. p. 37.) From the character given to Theodebert by Gregory of Tours, it seems probable that he, at least, did not authorise these outrages. (Hist. Franc. Ub. iii. u. 25.) chap, v.] BELISARIUS. 263 swords and bucklers, or wielded a weighty two-edged battle-axe. At the head of these forces, Theodebert was welcomed by the Goths as an ally, and, through their imprudent confidence, he secured the passage of the Po and Tessino near Pavia. In front of this city were encamped the troops of Uraias, returned from the conquest of Milan; and also an imperial squadron which had been sent by Belisarius to watch their motions, and prevent their advancing into Tuscany. Both these detachments were on the same day surprised and overwhelmed by the attack of Theodebert ; the Goths fled in confusion towards Ravenna, and the Romans to their comrades before Fiesole. The whole of Liguria was thus laid open to the Franks, who, like an Alpine avalanche, carried devastation over its extensive plains. Their progress was unopposed by enemies, but was soon arrested by famine. During the last winter, the tillage of the fields had been neglected amidst the calamities of war, and the scanty crops had withered in the summer, before reaching their full ripeness. In the March of Ancona alone more than fifty thousand persons are stated to have perished from hunger, and the Tuscans were driven to find in acorns an insuffi cient and unwholesome food. Many fell victims to their eagerness in breaking a long fast; and thus supphes of provisions, if too sudden, became as fatal as the former scarcity. This disastrous year is forcibly portrayed by Procopius, a personal witness to its horrors. He saw starving wretches fling them selves down upon herbs and grasses, and make a faint 264 THE LIFE OF [chap. t. attempt to tear them from the ground; but their enfeebled strength often failed them, and they expired in the effort. He saw their bodies left, as they fell, to blacken in the sun, and displaying cor ruption in its most hideous forms. Yet the ghastly aspect of the dead, was exceeded by that of the survivors. Their livid hue is compared to the colour of an extinguished torch, and their skin seemed closely adhering to their bones. Their haggard features were distorted with a wild and fearful expres sion, and a gleam of maniac fury shone forth from their hollow eyes. Sometimes their lips were seen to drip with blood, from devouring the severed limbs of their lifeless companions; yet even the birds of prey turned from the carcasses, after seeking in vain for some nourishment in these dry and wasted remains.* As soon as the Roman general was informed of the hostile progress of Theodebert, he dispatched a letter, from before the walls of Osimo, to deter him from advancing, and to threaten the imperial dis pleasure. " It would surely," he added, " be wiser " to maintain the tranquil and undisputed enjoy- " ment of your hereditary states, than to endanger " their possession in the vain hope of extending their " limits." Such a maxim, which might easily have been retorted on Justinian, would, doubtless, have * This description is abridged from Procopius (Goth. lib. u. c. 20.) See also the testimony of St. Datius in Anastasius (De Vit. Pontif. c. 60.), and in the Historia MisceUa (Ub. xvi. ap. Muratori, Script. Ital. vol. i. p. 107.) chap, v.] BELISARIUS. 265 been disregarded by Theodebert in a season of pros perity, but it derived importance from the sufferings of his soldiers. Their thoughtless rapacity had soon exhausted the slender stores of provisions, and they were reduced for sustenance to the flesh of a few oxen and the waters of the Po. More than one-third of their number was swept away by a disease which unwholesome food and the heat of an Itahan sum mer* brought on, and the complaints of the survivors became importunate and loud. Unable to withstand their desire of returning, the King eagerly availed himself of the letter of Behsarius as a plausible pre text, and led back into France his disheartened and diminished forces. This short episode in the war was attended with no permanent result, and did not interrupt the plans of Belisarius. He had hitherto, with more ardour than success, pushed the siege of Osimo, which was defended by the natural strength of its site, and the disciplined valour of its garrison. When attempting to destroy its cistern for water, the Roman general was baffled by the solidity of ancient architecture,t and during a skirmish which ensued, his life had nearly been lost by the deliberate aim of a Gothic archer. One of his guards alone perceived the coming danger, and rushed forward to shield the body of his general by the interposition of his own. * Greg. Turon. Hist. Franc, lib. iii. c. 32. . + This cistern or reservoir, is called an aqueduct by Gibbon, (vol. vii. p. 254.) but we must distinguish between o^eros and Se^apevr}. 260 THE LIFE OF [chap, v, In this act of devoted fidelity, his hand was trans pierced and disabled, and Unigatus, the name of this brave soldier, is not unworthy of historical record. Finding that he could not divert the stream, the Roman general next determined to render it useless, and accordingly corpses, poisonous herbs, and quick lime were thrown into it by his orders.* Thus the besieged could no longer avail themselves of their usual fountain, and a well which they possessed within the ramparts, afforded them only a scanty supply. Their correspondence with Vitiges, which they had hitherto carried on by the secret aid of a Roman soldier, was also discovered and cut off, and Belisarius having left the punishment of the traitor to the discretion of his comrades, he was burnt alive according to a law of Constantine the Great.t When Fiesole shortly afterwards yielded to the Roman arms, and when the principal officers who had defended that city, were shown to the Goths as captives, they no longer refused to treat of a sur render. It was, however, demanded on their part, * The conduct of Belisarius on this occasion, is quoted and ap proved by Grotius. After explaining, that the law of nations forbids the secret poisoning of fountains ; he thus proceeds : Ce que nous venons de dire n'empeche pas qu'il ne soit permis d'employer quelque autre chose que le poison, pour infeeter les eaux de maniere que l'ennemi n'en puisse boire, comme en y jettant des corps morts ou de la chaux. C'est en effet la meme chose, que si on de'tournoit le cours d'une riviere, ou que Ton coupat les veines d'une source, ce qui est permis et par le droit de nature et par le consentement des homines. (Droit des Gens, cd. Barbeyrac, vol. n. p. 251.) A similar opinion is expressed by Vattel, (vol. ii. p. 71. ed. 1775.) T This law is not mentioned by Procopius, but may be found, Cod. Theodos. lib. vii. tit. 1. chap, v.] belisarius. 267 that they should enjoy a free and unmolested passage to Ravenna, and be allowed to carry with them all their pubhc or private treasure. Such terms were heard with unwillingness by Belisarius, and with indignation by his soldiers. They loudly complained that the well-earned rewards of their valour would thus be taken from them ; they displayed the wounds they had received, and recounted the exploits they had performed during the progress of the siege. It appeared no easy task to reconcile the pretensions of the Gothic with those of the Roman soldiers, but it was at length agreed that an equal partition of the spoil should be made, and that one-half should remain to the Goths, who consented to acknowledge the Emperor as their sovereign. Ravenna, against which Behsarius now directed his whole army, was surrounded by a two-fold bar rier of strong ramparts and impervious morasses. This city had first been chosen by Augustus as a principal station for the fleet, and the harbour of Classis or Classe, which he constructed, denotes that object in its name. It would appear as if the sea were slowly receding from each side of the Itahan peninsula, at least at the mouth of the rivers. The ancient maritime city of Pisa is now at some distance from the shore, and so early as the fifth century, orchards occupied the harbour of Augustus, at Ravenna.* In the time of Procopius, the low sand- * Jornandes, de Reb. Getic. c. 29. He indulges in some frigid conceits on this occasion. The ancient harbour still displayed trees like masts, but they bore fruits instead of sails, &c. The suburb of N 2 268 THE LIFE OF [chap. t. banks near Classe, which have since grown part of the land, were every day left dry and exposed by the ebbing of the tide, though the Mediterranean in general has none; and it is remarkable, that this historian should have observed its regular depen dence on the phases of the moon.* The great strength of Ravenna needs no further proof than the constant residence of the timid Honorius, who first selected this city for the capital. Even Alaric, in the fulness of his power, had never ventured to invest it, and it had vainly been besieged for nearly three years by Theodric the Great. Thus therefore the late victories of Behsarius over the Goths, did not altogether insure him certain, or still less, speedy success before Ravenna. These obstacles were very rapidly surmounted by -the Roman general. On his first approach, he discovered that the spirit of Vitiges was almost broken by repeated failure, and that he might, perhaps, be persuaded to enter into terms. Ambas sadors were therefore dispatched to Ravenna, but in the meanwhile every passage, both by sea and land, was guarded by the prudent care of Behsarius, and his prospects of negotiation never induced him to relax his vigilance. During the progress of these Classe was finafly destroyed by Liutprand, King of the Lombards, (Paul Warnefrid, lib. vi. c. 49,) and its site is now overgrown with the pine forests of Chiassi, which Boccacio, Dryden, and Byron, have immortalized. * Goth. lib. i. c. i. Compare this curious approximation to the truth, with the absurd theories eoUected by Bede. (Op. vol. ii. p. 223, ed. 1688.) chap, v.] BELISARIUS. 269 parleys, he planned and executed a measure, which enabled him to dictate rather than to treat. He opened a correspondence with Queen Matasontha, and by her secret aid, found means of firing the Gothic granaries and magazines, so that Ravenna became almost devoid of provisions, and unable much longer to hold out. The co-operation of their Queen was suspected by some of the Goths, but a greater number imputed the calamity to hghtning, and the first were less terrified by domestic treachery than the latter by so evident a mark of the divine displeasure. All, however, concurred in regarding the immediate downfal of their monarchy as certain and inevitable, either from the rigorous terms of the negotiation, or from the effects of the blockade. But they had not reckoned on their Byzantine allies, the feeble judgment and suspicious temper of Jus tinian. It has already been mentioned, that during the siege of Rome, some ambassadors from Vitiges had embarked for Constantinople, to propose the partition of the Gothic kingdom as the terms of peace. They had been allowed by the imperial court to languish in neglect and contempt, till Nushirvan, roused by Gothic solicitations, and by his own ambitious views, resolved to invade the Roman territories. At this intelligence Justinian trembled, and displayed that inconsiderate rashness, to which the fool-hardy and the pusillanimous are equally prone. Without deigning to inquire from his successful general, whether it might not be almost as easy to render the Goths his subjects as 270 THE LIFE OF [chap. v. his allies, the Emperor concluded with the barbarian ambassadors a disgraceful treaty, which left to Vitiges the title of King, the provinces beyond the Po, and a moiety of the treasures at Ravenna. Accompanied by two Roman senators, the joyful envoys forthwith proceeded to the imperial camp, and from thence to the Gothic capital, which they filled with surprise at their unexpected good fortune. It may well be imagined that Vitiges, who had already thought himself a captive at Constantinople, hastened to ratify a treaty by which his most san guine expectations were surpassed, and which rather resembled the gift of a benefactor than the stipula tions of an enemy. On the other hand, the Roman general heard with indignation of an agreement so pernicious to the pubhc cause, and he called together a council of his principal officers, to consult them on his project of accomphshing the conquest of Italy in spite of the mandate of the Emperor. The men to whom this dehberation was referred, were but little disposed to forward the views of their high-minded leader. Several amongst them were envious of his fame or impatient of his discipline, and a still greater number regretted the pleasures of peace and of home. To a military spirit, the languor of a long blockade is far more hateful than the peril of a siege, and either timidity or weariness might easily be veiled beneath a respectful submission to the imperial com mands. According to the request of Belisarius, who wished to preserve an authentic record of their sen timents, each officer gave in a written opinion, in chap, v.] BELISARIUS. 271 which the reduction of Ravenna was pronounced to be visionary and impracticable, and the treaty of partition judicious and expedient. Undismayed at this unanimous opposition, the general determined to extinguish the Gothic monarchy, and to present before the throne of Justinian the treasures and the person of Vitiges. He refused to ratify the Byzan tine agreement, and his refusal filled the Goths with alarm. ^reading some fraudulent intention on the part of the Romans, they declared that they could place no reliance on the peace proposed to them, unless it were confirmed both by the signature and the oath of Belisarius. The Roman general, how ever, persevered in his noble resolution to incur the merit or the guilt of a patriotic disobedience. The infringement of orders by an officer in war, is glorious to him if successful, but fatal in its failure ; he renders himself answerable for the uncertain issue of events, while a rigid adherence to his instructions would, even in the greatest reverses, have shielded him from blame. It may therefore be doubted, whether it is necessary for the maintenance of dis cipline, that such acts of judicious presumption should be capital offences ; * few men have genius to conceive, and still fewer courage to perform them. By the refusal of Belisarius, the brilliant visions of peace and security which had floated before the eyes * Amongst the Romans, this disobedience was punished by death. (Pandect. Ub. xlix. tit. 16, sect. 3.) With us it is so likewise, subject, however, to a discretionary power. (Coleridge's Blackstone, vol i. p. 418, ed. 1825.) 272 THE LIFE OF [chap. v. of the barbarians, vanished almost as rapidly and unexpectedly as they had arisen. To the pangs of disappointment were added those of approaching famine; and their hopeless situation suggested a project which, however singular, is not unparalleled in history, and which may call to the recollection of the reader the wish of the Egyptian Emirs to choose St. Louis for their king.* The Goths resolved to depose a sovereign whom they had always found unfortunate, and to elect as his successor, an enemy whose valour was attested by their overthrow, and whose virtues had extorted their esteem. Under the auspicious command of Belisarius, they trusted to attain a higher pitch of power than that to which even the great Theodoric had raised them, and it was not the title of Gothic King, but of Western Em peror which they urged him to assume. f It is pro bable that their views of conquest passed the bounds of Italy, and extended to France, Africa, and Spain. Vitiges himself was forced to acquiesce in this extra ordinary scheme, to add his entreaties to those of his subjects, and to place his abdication at the feet of the Roman general. A wider field has rarely been opened to ambition, and it might not have been * This curious fact is established by the authority of JoinviUe, an eye-witness. Les Admiraulx avoient eu grant envie et par conseil de faire le Roy Souldan de Babilonne, (p. 73, ed. 1668.) I need hardly add, that the word Admiral is derived from Emir, and is here syno nymous with it. See on this title, Ducange (Observations sur Joinville, p. 77,) and Gibbon (vol. x. p. 123.) T [\ant\ia T6 Eimepias BeKto-apiov avemziv eyvtaoa.v. (Procop. Goth. lib. ii. c. 29.) To realize this project was reserved for Charlemagne. chap, v.] BELISARIUS. 273 difficult to obtain the approbation and support of the Roman army. Though Behsarius had many enemies amongst the officers, every soldier was his devoted partisan ; since the same qualities and exploits, which provoked the envy of the one, secured the attach ment of the other. For the distant authority of a feeble and unwarlike sovereign, they would have preferred the exaltation of their victorious general, well acquainted with their merit, and by his new dignity enabled to reward it. On the other part, Belisarius could not be ignorant of the dangers which must attend his continued loyalty, of the secret cabals against him in the palace, where his late disobedience might be magnified into mutiny and treason. Narses also was present with Justinian, Narses who had inflicted too many injuries on Beli sarius, to be capable of forgiveness, and who added the merit of a general to the famihar intercourse of a domestic, and the practised cunning of a courtier. But Behsarius was deeply impressed with his oath of allegiance, from which no personal considerations could absolve him, and knew how to despise an usurped and precarious throne. He resolved, how ever, by a seeming comphance, to hasten the surrender of Ravenna and the captivity of Vitiges. It is difficult in war to draw an accurate line, and to distinguish with precision where perfidy commences and strata gem should end, and a question may arise, how far the conduct of Behsarius on this occasion is consistent with good faith. Had he of his own accord tendered this proposal to the Goths with a view of deceiving n 3 274 THE LIFE OF [chap. v. them, his artifice would have been altogether inex cusable, but when an offer was made to him, wliich insulted his loyalty and honour, he might, perhaps, justly employ it for the advantage of his cause. Those who sohcit treachery can hardly complain if treachery be retorted against them. Still, however, though we may excuse, we cannot applaud the du plicity of Behsarius, and it does not appear consistent, either with the integrity of his Roman predecessors, or with the chivalrous spirit which was afterwards kindled in the West. It had been required that Behsarius should so lemnly swear to protect from injury the inhabitants of Ravenna, but with regard to his stipu- adMsT' ^ecl assumption of the imperial dignity, no promise was exacted by the Goths, who thought his own ambition a sufficient security. A fleet laden with provisions was then permitted to steer into the harbour of Classe,* the gates of the Adriatic capital were thrown open to the Romans, and Beh sarius triumphantly t entered an impregnable fortress, which, for more than two hundred years from this time, proved the firmest bulwark of the eastern em pire in Italy. The Goths, who still surpassed their victorious enemy in numbers, viewed his scanty battalions with shame and surprise, and the indignant * It appears, that though the ancient harbour of Augustus was now dry land, another had been constructed to supply its place. (Procop. Goth. lib. ii. u. 29.) + The date of this event is ascertained by an ancient document, produced by Muratori in his thirty-second dissertation. chap, v.] BELISARIUS. 275 females spitting in the faces of their husbands and brothers, pointed with bitter upbraidings to the pigmy stature of the southern soldiers. In com pliance with the oath, and his own maxims of dis ciphne, Behsarius prevented any outrage on the part of his forces, and carefully preserved inviolate the property and persons of the Goths. On the other hand, Vitiges was detained, though with great respect, a close captive in his palace, the engage ment for his safety was renewed in a church,* but his treasures, the accumulated wealth of the great Theodoric, became the spoil of the conqueror. According to the example of the capital, some neigh bouring fortresses which still held out, surrendered to the Roman arms, the example of submission extended to the Cottian Alps, and Pavia f alone shut her gates, until the reign of Belisarius should be publicly made known. Such hopes were quickly disappointed. As soon as the ramparts of Ravenna were secured, and a share of its barbarian garrison dismissed to the tillage of the neighbouring districts, Belisarius proclaimed his unshaken loyalty, and declared that he would remain, and that the Goths must become the faithful subjects of Justinian. The reduction of Ravenna, by Behsarius, inflamed still further the jealous animosity of his enemies and * Hist. MisceU. ap. Murat. Script. Italic, vol. i. p. 107. But this wretched compUation is of very slight authority. f This city is always called Ticinum by Procopius. In the eighth century, the modern name was equally used, (Paul Warnefrid, lib. ii. c. 15,) but in the tenth, it seems to have quite superseded the ancient. (Liutprand, Hist. Ub. iii. c. 1.) 276 THE LIFE OF [chap. t. rivals at Constantinople, well skilled in the arts to blacken the fame of any general, by representing him, if defeated, as unworthy, if successful, as dangerous. In spite of his recent declaration of fidelity and refusal of empire, Belisarius was secretly accused of aspiring to independent power. Perhaps, however, Justinian might have withstood these per fidious insinuations, had not the invasion of the Persians afforded first a specious pretext, and after wards an unexpected necessity for recalling the con queror of Italy.* In the letter which commanded his departure, his services were acknowledged and extolled, and a grateful sovereign seemed only anxi ous to reward his merit, and to employ it on a wider field. Though it was not difficult for Behsarius to discern the suspicion and displeasure which lurked beneath these courtly professions, he without hesita tion determined on obedience. To the Goths, his continued loyalty appeared altogether unaccountable, and the squadron of Uraias at Pavia vainly implored him in another embassy to raise the standard of rebellion, and no longer to prefer the situation of a slave to that of a sovereign. Lamenting his refusal, but encouraged by his absence, the feeble garrison of Pavia resolved to make one further effort for the maintenance of the Gothic monarchy, and it will hereafter be seen how, by the recall of Belisarius, and the imbecility of his successors, this slight spark * That the Persian war was at first a mere pretext on the part of Justinian, is cautiously but clearly stated by Procopius (Goth. Ub. ii. c. 30,) and more openly by Zonaras (Annal. vol. ii. p. 68.) chap, v.] BELISARIUS. 277 of revolt was blown into a formidable flame, which per vaded once more the whole of Italy, which was again repressed by the hero of this history, and finally extinguished by Narses. Belisarius embarked at Ravenna with the Gothic captives and treasure, and arrived at Constantinople, after five years of warfare from the foot of Etna to the banks of the Po, during which he had subdued nearly the same extent of country as the Romans had acquired in the five first centuries, since the foundation of the city. His prompt unhesitating obedience silenced the voice of envy for a time, and Justinian, urged by the increasing dangers of the east, consented to appoint his faithful servant to that important command. Yet he withheld the well-earned honours of a second triumph, and the spoils of the great Theodoric, placed in the imperial palace, were secluded from public curiosity, and rarely displayed to the wonder and flattery of the senate. The Emperor gazed with admiration on the strength and beauty of the Gothic captives, their fair complexions, auburn locks, and lofty stature.* A great number amongst them en listed in the guards of Belisarius, which had already been augmented by his victories over the Vandals and the Moors, and which, after this new addition, amounted to no less than seven thousand men. The captive monarch of the Goths was received by Jus tinian, with all the generous courtesy wliich his dignity and misfortunes demanded. An ample * Compare Procop. Vandal. Ub. i. «. 2, and Goth. Ub. iii. u. 1 . 278 THE LIFE OE [chap. v. estate in Asia, perhaps adjoining to that of Gehmer, was allotted to him, and his abjuration of the Arian doctrines was rewarded by the rank of senator and patrician. During two years he continued to enjoy these honours at Constantinople, and ended his eventful life in tranquillity.* After his death, Mata sontha contracted a second marriage with Germanus the Emperor's nephew, and the offspring of these nuptials, Germanus the younger, was the last of the illustrious fine of the Amah. * Jornandes, De Reb. Getic. c. 60, and Procop. Pers. lib. n. u. 14. chap, vi.] BELISARIUS. 279 CHAPTER VI. The peace with Persia, which Justinian had rashly surnamed the Eternal, was soon, in spite of his concessions, distrusted and broken by his rival. Chosroes viewed the conquest of Africa with secret envy, and sent an embassy to Constantinople to demand a share of the spoils, on the plea that his treaty with the Emperor had granted leisure for obtaining them. So audacious a request, brought forward beneath the veil of pleasantry, was not slighted by Justinian, and the Persian claimants returned with large presents to their court. But the success of the Roman arms in Italy redoubled the jealous feelings of Nushirvan, who feared lest it should prove the prelude to an invasion of the East. His ambition was artfully worked upon by the Gothic envoys, and by deputies from the Armenians, who had been provoked into rebellion by the tyranny of their Roman governor. It was not difficult to persuade Nushirvan ; who was desirous of war, and, according to the usual progress of self-delusion, soon began to consider his wishes as judicious and expedient ; nor was he devoid of just grounds for hostilities. The Byzantine court is admitted to have employed a crooked and insidious policy, in hopes of raising up enemies against him ; it had tempted the 280 THE LIFE OF [chap. ti. fidelity of his vassal Almondar, and urged the bar barians of the north to invade his dominions. To resent such injuries as these can hardly be said to merit the reproach of perfidy and falsehood.* Early in the spring, and in the eighth year since the conclusion of peace, Nushirvan invaded the Roman empire at the head of a formidable army. From the plains of Babylon, where the Persian forces met, they proceeded towards Syria, along the western bank of the Euphrates. Passing onward before the walls of Circesium and Zenobia, the King, in six days march from the frontier, found himself near Sura, of which also he might have neglected the siege had not his stumbhng horse conveyed to the Magian priests a promise of success. It is remarkable that such accidents were likewise looked upon as ominous by the ancient Romans, but interpreted in a manner directly opposite.f For one whole day Sura was vainly assaulted by the Persians, and the approach of night constrained Nushirvan to retire with great loss; but he retired with the evident intention of renewing the attack, and the Roman garrison, disheartened by the fall of their gallant commander, forgot that their resistance had already been sufficient to stir up animosity, and was * Procop. Pers. lib. u. c. 5. We have hardly any Persian materials to check the Greek account of this campaign. See Herbelot, BibUot. Orient, p. 680, and Malcolm's History, vol. i. p. 140. This is the less to be regretted from the extreme inaccuracy with which Oriental historians usually treat of wars. See a very remarkable anecdote on this point in the Acad, des lnscript. vol. xxxv. p. 159. f Tacit. Annal. lib. xv. o. 7. chap, ti.] BELISARIUS. 281 too short to claim respect and generous forbearance. Their bishop was dispatched next morning to treat of terms, the negotiation into which they entered slackened their vigilance, and afforded an oppor tunity to the wily Persian of storming the city by surprise. A great number of the inhabitants was put to the sword, the rest were seized as slaves, and their dwellings committed to the flames. It was then amidst the burning ruins and slaughtered inhabitants of a once flourishing city that Nushirvan dismissed Anastasius, the Roman ambassador, com manding him to set off for Constantinople, and to tell his master where and how he had left the King of Persia. The defence of the eastern frontier had been intrusted by Justinian to a general, named Buzes, who had fixed his head-quarters at Hierapolis with considerable forces. His conduct at this place was very characteristic of a modern Greek. First, in an eloquent harangue, he exhorted the citizens and soldiers to a resolute defence, and then collecting his light cavalry took to flight with the utmost secrecy and speed. Nushirvan was thus enabled to reach Hierapolis without opposition,* and nothing seemed to prevent his further progress against Antioch. This city, though partly overthrown by an earthquake fourteen years before, f had risen * The testimony of Eutychius on this point (Annal. vol. U. p. 180,) must yield to that of Procopius (Pers. Ub. u. c. 6.) f Marcellin. Chron. ap. Sirmond, Op. vol. ii. p. 379, The new city bore the name of TheopoUs. (Procop. De iEdif. lib. u. c. 10.) 282 THE LIFE OF [chap. ti. from its ruins through the munificence of Justinian, and far outvied any Roman city beyond the Bos phorus in splendour, size, and population. On the earliest rumour of hostilities Justinian had dis patched his nephew, Germanus, to the command of this important station. The new governor imme diately surveyed its fortifications, wliich he found to be in good repair, protected on one side by the stream of the Orontes, and on the others by almost inaccessible cliffs. A single point, however, where a steep hill rose nearly to a level with the ramparts,* justly excited his alarm, and he proposed to render it either detached by digging a trench, or defensible by building a tower. Neither design was approved of by the engineers, to whom the subject was referred. They feared that the approach of Nushirvan might be too speedy to allow the completion of the work, and that their unfinished labours at this station would only serve to betray its weakness, and they therefore recommended the miserable pohcy of trust ing to the negligence of their enemies rather than to their own activity. On his part, Germanus plau sibly disguised his regard for his personal safety, and his intention of providing for it in a timely retreat, by observing that the presence at Antioch of one of the imperial family served only to attract the Persians and give them a further inducement to the siege. Such timid counsels, of course, produced gene ral discouragement, and no sooner had Germanus * See an account and a plan of the ancient waUs in Pocock's Description of the East, vol. ii. pt. 1. p. 188. chap, vi.] BELISARIUS. 283 set out for Cilicia* than the garrison and citizens sent to treat with Nushirvan. Their deputy (a bishop) found the monarch employed in the invest ment of Hierapolis and Beroea, and after much sohcitation persuaded him to withdraw from the neighbourhood of Antioch on the payment of one thousand pounds weight of gold. With these terms the prelate joyfully returned to his fellow citizens, but he found their disposition no longer the same. Emboldened by the arrival of six thousand fresh troops, and by the harangues of several factious orators, they had rapidly passed from excessive terror to an equally unreasonable degree of security and arrogance ; and refusing to purchase their safety by a treaty, they sent back the bishop with a haughty message to the King of Persia. This wavering caprice offended Nushirvan far more than a steadfast opposition would have done. At the head of his numerous squadrons he now approached and encompassed the capital of the East ; yet, either deterred by its strength, or unwilling to cause its downfal, he renewed his proposal of a ransom. His offer was received with derision and his ambassador with insult ; the one was proudly rejected, and the other escaped with difficulty from the hands of the irritated populace. Nushirvan now applied himself, in good earnest, to the siege, he soon discerned the accessible point, and it was there that a general assault was given by his bravest troops under his personal command. On the other part, the Roman * Jornandes de Regn. Success, p. 65. 284 THE LIFE OF [chap, vi, soldiers were not deficient in courage or in zeal, and the youth of Antioch, trained to arms by the daily factions of the Circus, forgot then: petty animosities in this pressing danger. The result of the conflict long continued doubtful, until some wooden frames, which had been suspended from the walls to bear a second line of soldiers, gave way as some reinforce ments were descending into them. From the loud crash which this accident occasioned, the Romans at first beheved that the wall itself had fallen, and that everything was lost ; the Persians availed themselves of this moment of confusion and dismay, scahng ladders were applied, and the rampart was sur mounted.* While the Roman garrison escaped through the gate of Daphne, the citizens still main tained, in the streets, a brave but fruitless resistance, which could not repulse, and only served to irritate the enemy. Antioch underwent all the calamities of a city taken by storm. Many of its inhabitants were slaughtered, without distinction of sex or of age ; and history has recorded with praise the heroic resolution of two noble matrons, who preserved their chastity by a voluntary death in the waves of the Orontes.f Entering the city, attended by the Roman ambassa dors, Nushirvan bewailed the unhappy fate of the * Antioch was taken in the month of, June. (John Malala, vol. ii. p. 222.) + In a siege of Apamea by the Persians, during the reign of Justin the Second, the same story is told of two thousand persons — a somewhat startling number. (Assemann. Bibliot. Orient, vol. hi. p. 406.) Paul Warnefrid relates a very curious artifice, through which some ladies of Friuli escaped both violence and martyrdom. (lib. iv. c. 38.) chap, vi.] BELISARIUS. 285 Syrians with real or affected pity, and imputed it not untruly to their own stubborn refusal of his terms. He dispatched speedy and effectual orders to prevent any further bloodshed and to save the surviving citizens, but he gave up their wealth to his soldiers and their dwellings to the flames. In a few hours this opulent and extensive capital was reduced to a shapeless mass of ruins, with the exception of the city walls and of an insulated quarter which the conflagration did not reach. After this unworthy use of his victory, the King granted a solemn audience to the Byzantine ambas sadors, who complained of his invasion, and asserted the upright intentions of their master. In reply, Nushirvan brought forward the intercepted letters from Constantinople to Almondar, and to the Huns ; and the ambassadors, confounded by these docu ments, could only endeavour to throw the blame on the imperial ministers. The conference then turned to the stipulations for a peace. A large yearly pay ment was demanded by Nushirvan, who offered, at the same time, to lay aside the hateful word of tri bute, as if the ignominy consistea not in the deed but in the name. These terms, however degrading, were enforced by his late successes, and a treaty to this effect was reluctantly signed by the ambassadors, but Nushirvan declared that he should not leave the Roman dominions until it had been ratified by the sacred letters of the Emperor,* and accordingly, he * A peace was not considered as finally concluded till the Emperor had sent letters of ratification, called Litterse Sacrsa. (Menander, Excerpt. Legat. p. 136.) 286 THE LIFE OF [chap. ti. continued to act as if no hopes of peace had been entertained. From Antioch he proceeded to Seleu- cia, at the mouth of the Orontes, where, in com pliance with some national prejudice, he bathed alone in the sea, and solemnly sacrificed to the sun, accord ing to the Magian rites.* He next directed his arms against Apamea, to which he marched with all his forces, while the inhabitants, headed by their bishop, Thomas, awaited his approach with undaunted con fidence. Their courage was not derived from the mere natural aid of strong bulwarks, a numerous garrison, or the hope of speedy succour, they had none of these ; but they possessed, as they beheved, a fragment of the True Cross of the Saviour, which was expected to perform some miracle for their deli verance. This relic had been obtained from Jerusa lem by the pious theft of a Syrian ; the devotion of the Apameans had inlaid its case with a profusion of gems and gold, nor was it offered more than once in the year to the adoration of the people. But in the present danger the bishop drew forth this spiritual weapon for the defence of his flock, and carried it in procession through the church, attended by an innu merable concourse of spectators. On this occasion a divine manifestation is asserted to have taken place, which Procopius relates on hearsay, but which an ecclesiastical historian boasts of having witnessed in * The respect of tlie Persians for water is mentioned by Hero dotus (lib. i. c. 138). See Larcher's note, and also Assemanni (Bibliot. Orient, vol. i. p. 264). It is remarkable that a superstitious worship of fountains existed in Italy during the dominion of the Lombards, and King Liutprand enacted a severe law against it. (Muratori, Diss. 59, vol. v. p. 66, ed. 1741.) chap, vi.] BELISARIUS. 287 person.* No sooner had the cross been taken from its case, than a celestial light overspread it, which darted its beams into the furthest recesses of the church, and accompanied the rehc as it was moved along. The people of Apamea acknowledged this favourable augury with tears of joy, and derived from it a certain promise of preservation to their city. Yet when Nushirvan arrived, at the head of his army, no miracle was performed to repel him, and he entered the city with no further opposition than the remon strances of the bishop could afford. Even his sacri lege remained unpunished when he stripped the holy rehc of all its precious ornaments ; but he was easily induced to restore the bare wood to the fervent entreaties of Thomas. The frequency of such occur rences forms, perhaps, the chief argument against the wonders with which Roman Catholics adorn the middle ages. These miracles never take place at the time when we should humbly conceive that they would have been most useful, to confute erroneous or settle wavering opinions, but appear only per formed in the presence, and attested in the writings of stanch behevers, as if they were intended not for proofs but for rewards. Apamea was the term to the progress of Nushirvan. Satisfied with the easy conquest of Syria, and loaded with its spoils, he commenced a retreat towards his own dominions, but selected a different route and unexhausted country. His numerous squadrons surrounded the city of Chalcis, and a peremptory * Procop. Pers. lib. u. c. 11. Evagrius, Hist. Eccles. Ub. iv. c. 26. 2S8 THE LIFE OF [chap. ti. message informed the inhabitants that they could only escape a siege by the payment of a ransom, and by giving up to his power their Roman governor and garrison. The terrified citizens gladly yielded the required subsidy; but with regard to the other stipulation, they dreaded lest Justinian should punish their comphance as much as Chosroes their refusal. In this perplexity they sacrificed their rehgion to thefr fears, and having first concealed the Roman soldiers in their houses, took a solemn oath that there were none remaining in the town. This stra tagem (if so it can be called,) was attended with more success than it deserved, and the King, unsus picious of deceit, pursued his march to the Euphrates, and constructed a temporary bridge near Barbahssms. To prevent the dispersion of his forces and the pillage of the country, he issued an order that the whole army should effect its passage within three days, and, accordingly, on the fourth, the bridge was broken down. His strict maintenance of discipline and justice, during the whole of this campaign, has extorted praise even from his enemies, and it was in vain that the citizens of Apamea pleaded for the life of a soldier who had deeply aggrieved them. Having crossed the Euphrates and entered Meso potamia, Nushirvan advanced against Edessa. Its inhabitants, secure in an alleged promise of celestial aid,* boasted of their city as impregnable, and refused to avoid a siege by payment of a subsidy ; but at length, though fully persuaded of the safety of their * See Mosheim, Eccles. Hist vol. i. p. 58, &c chap, vi.] BELISARIUS. 289 dwellings from any human attack, they agreed to give two hundred pounds weight of gold, on condition that the Persians should withdraw from their gardens and estates. A more generous motive induced them to contribute in favour of the captives of Antioch, whom Nushirvan had brought in his train, and for whose dehverance a ransom was demanded. Towards this benevolent object every citizen of Edessa gave in a share of his gold and silver, and where these were wanting, of his household effects or implements of trade ; all ranks, with different means, showed equal zeal, and the most degraded class of women yielded not only the sums already acquired by their venal charms, but even those jewels and rich dresses, on which their future profits might materially depend. Yet all this compassion was disappointed through the infamous avarice of Buzes, the same whom we have seen basely deserting his post in danger, and who reappears on this occasion in a still more dis honourable light. With a view of appropriating to himself the treasure thus amassed, he contrived to defeat the treaty for its apphcation, and Chosroes was allowed to lead on his prisoners into Persia. Yet the munificence of the great King rendered them fortunate, and perhaps contented in exile. A city was built for their residence, at one day's jour ney from Ctesiphon, whose name of Chosroantioch blended their country with their conqueror.* Regular * This place was afterwards called Romia, (Eutych. Annal. vol. ii. p. 183.) and now bears the name of Almahouza. (Herbelot, Bibhot. Orient, p. 680.) 290 THE LIFE OF [chap. ti. supplies of provisions were assigned for their use by their kind or ostentatious founder, and their new structures of a circus and a pubhc bath were en livened by the skill of charioteers or musicians. While still encamped near Edessa, the King of Persia received from Constantinople the ratification of the peace, but since its signature at Antioch, his views appear to have greatly changed. The defence less state of Syria, and his easy progress without meeting a single Roman soldier in the field, sug gested to his enterprising spirit the facihty of new and more important conquests. He already meditated, in future campaigns, the invasion of both Palestine and Colchos, and might even, without much pre sumption, look forward to the siege of Constantinople and the downfal of the empire as the ultimate aim of his exertions. Accordingly with a perfidious dis regard of treaties which no considerations of pohcy can justify, he marched rapidly to Dara, and com menced its siege. From the neighbourhood of this city to the frontier, its fortifications had always been an object of much consequence to Rome and jealousy to Persia. It was protected by a double wall of great strength, the inner one being no less, than sixty feet in height, with towers of one hundred; and it contained a numerous garrison, headed by Martin, who had served with distinction under Beh sarius in Africa and Italy, and had been dispatched to the East on the first rumour of hostilities. After an unsuccessful attack, the Persians had recourse to stratagem, and laboured at a mine with silent and chap, vi.] BELISARIUS. 291 unsuspected activity, but the important secret was revealed to the garrison by a friend, or, as they beheved, by an angel ; and a counter-mine, which they judiciously began, proved fatal to the Persian pioneers and to the hopes of their monarch. Impatient of further delay, and urged by the approach of winter, he entered into terms with the besieged, and, accord ing to his usual practice in this war, agreed to retire for a stipulated sum. On being informed of this aggression, Justinian, as must have been expected, declared the treaty with the Persians at an end ; and both parties awaited with anxiety the fate of the next campaign.* At this critical juncture, the mind of Justinian was distracted by two-fold apprehensions, since his suspicious temper rendered him almost as „ . . . A-D- 54l- fearful of his generals as of his enemies. Although Behsarius had been hastily recalled from Ravenna, on the ground that his immediate presence was necessary in the East, he was detained the whole summer and ensuing winter at Constantinople, and only dispatched to the frontier late in the spring ; so that httle leisure was allowed him to collect and disciphne his forces. Antonina did not accompany her husband, but he was attended by several of his veteran officers, and by nearly all the Gothic cap tives, who were thus, like the Vandals, condemned * The Persian historians, in tlieir account of this expedition, confound Nushirvan with Sapor. The former is said by them to have made a Roman Emperor prisoner. (Malcolm's Hist. vol. i. p. 140.) O 2 202 THE LIFE OF [chap. ti. in a distant country to march beneath the same banners they had formerly met in battle. On his arrival at Dara, Belisarius, instead of regular forces, found only a confused assemblage of soldiers ; many without arms, still more without the spirit to wield them, and, according to their own national historian, trembling at the very name of Persia.* He was joined by numerous Saracen auxiliaries, under Arethas ; but httle reliance could be placed on the co-operation of these fickle savages, attracted only by the hopes of booty. While busily employed in equipping and distributing his army, and in expectation of a speedy attack from the Persians, the Roman general sent some spies to obtain intel ligence of their movements and designs. By such means, he soon became informed that no invasion was preparing in this quarter, and that Chosroes himself was engaged by a distant expedition of the Huns ; a report which it will presently be seen had been spread by that wily monarch, to conceal his real intentions. A project was then formed by Belisarius, for resuming the offensive and entering the Persian territories ; and having tried the resolu tion of his officers in a pubhc council, he found their opinions favourable to his views. But the leaders of those troops commonly stationed in Syria v uU54i exPressed their apprehensions lest their absence should enable Almondar to desolate their province. In reply, the general reminded them that the time of the summer solstice was at hand, * Procop. Pers. lib. ii. c. 16. chap, vi.] BELISARIUS. 293 when rehgious rites withheld these Arabs from any act of hostility during two months ;* and he promised to dismiss the Syrian soldiers to their post before this term should have expired. Having thus over come tlieir opposition, Belisarius crossed the frontier with all his forces, and marched upon Nisibis. Meanwhile Nushirvan, in another quarter, was aiming a well-directed and successful blow at the Roman power in Asia. It was the remark of Agrippa, that the jealous weakness of most princes leads them to undertake easy objects in person, and to commit those which appear difficult and doubtful to their generals.f Such was not the character of the King of Persia : he was always present where the stake seemed greatest and the throw most hazardous. The ancient Colchos, the modern Min- greha, bore at this period the name of Lazica, from one of its tribes which had usurped a sovereignty above the rest,f and it was governed by monarchs of its own, who continued for a considerable time vassals of Persia, until at last the introduction of Chris tianity throughout their dominions, and their conse quent horror of the Magian rites, induced them to transfer their allegiance to the Romans. Yet they * The total number of these sacred months was four in each year. See the ninth chapter of the Koran, and the seventh section of Sale's Preliminary Discourse. " This is the right reUgion," says Mahomet ; " but attack the idolaters in all the months, as they attack you in all." + Dion Cassius, lib. xlix. c. 4. X This name stiU prevails near Trebizond. (Chardin, Voyages, vol i. p. 149.) According to Mr. Hope, the Lazi are chiefly employed near Constantinople in garden-work. See a note to Anastasius, vol. i. p. 336, third ed. 294 THE LIFE OF [chap. vi. paid no tribute ; the King of Lazica, when invested with the ensigns of his dignity by the Emperor, only stipulated to guard the defiles of Caucasus on his frontier against the inroads of the Huns ; and the two nations derived mutual advantage from a com merce in which the Lazi exchanged their slaves and hides for a supply of salt and of corn. This useful connexion was dissolved through the tyranny and rashness of Justinian, who, while striving to reduce the Colchians to subjects, lost them as allies. A nu merous body of troops had been stationed in their country, headed by a worthless officer named Zibus. Securely nestled in a fortress built by him at Petra, he decreed from this strong hold the most shameless and unbounded exactions, and, above all, a ruinous monopoly of trade. Such treatment was equally galling to the pride or to the poverty of the Lazi, and they resolved in a secret embassy to renounce their Roman masters, and entreat the protection of Chosroes. Their deputies represented to the great King, in glowing colours, all the advantages which Colchos might afford him, that a torrent of barbarians from the Caucasus could at his pleasure be poured upon the empire, that his fleets might command the Euxine, and sail without obstacle to the very palace of his Byzantine enemy.* Had even these grounds not been solid, they would have appeared so to the ambition of Nushirvan. He immediately granted this welcome request ; and having collected a large Sec tlie projects of Chosroes for reaching Constantinople, in Procopius, (Goth. lib. iv. c. 7.) and Agathias, (lib. ii. p. 56.) chap, vi.] BELISARIUS. 295 army on the pretext of a Hunnish war, commenced his march with the Colchian ambassadors for his guides. His path led through a lonely tract of forests and mountains; it was narrow, precipitous, and insecure, but the diligence of his pioneers soon rendered it easy.* On his arrival in Lazica, its King, Gubazes, hastened to make his submission ; the people crowded round the standards of their deliverer, and Zibus found himself encompassed and besieged in Petra. No city could be stronger in position; it crowned the summit of a steep and" insulated cape, and on this occasion withstood several assaults of the Persians, until the death of the governor disheartened the Roman soldiers, and induced them to surrender. All the ill-gotten treasure of Zibus, hoarded in this fortress, fell into the hands of Nushirvan; but he wanted time to complete and consolidate his conquests. Having received intelligence of the invasion of Belisarius and the engagement near Nisibis, he hastily ordered a retreat towards his own dominions, leaving, how ever, a sufficient garrison at Petra. Such was the commencement of the Lazic war, of which the later operations, inconclusive in result, and con fused in narrative, are detailed with most tedious accuracy through many a long page of the Byzantine historians. On crossing the Persian frontier, Belisarius, as was stated before, had directed his course towards * By the new road, even elephants could be brought with an army. (Procop. Goth. Ub. iv. c. 13.) 296 THE LIFE OF [chap. vi. Nisibis; but, at the distance of seven miles from that city, he suddenly turned to the right, and en camped in a spacious plain, supphed, even at that season (it was midsummer), with plentiful fountains. By unremitting exertions, he had brought the dis cordant materials of his army into some degree of discipline and order ; but neither his rank, his merit, nor his fame, could secure the deference of Buzes and the other Eastern officers, as impatient of control as they had shown themselves unfitted for authority. With loud clamours they complained of his apparent caprice, in desisting from his march, and many of them openly refused obedience to his orders. Beli sarius, however unwillingly, found himself compeUed to justify his measures, and thereby diminish the chance of their success. " It was not my intention, he said, "thus publicly to disclose my designs. When ' every chief is imprudently entrusted with the plans ' for a campaign, they soon become whispered through ' the camp, and, even passing its limits, often reach ' the ears of an enemy. But, since I perceive among ' you so wayward and turbulent a spirit, each aspir- ' ing to become the controller and judge of our : military operations, instead of their passive instru- ' ment, I will break through the silence which good ' pohcy enjoins. My views, under .present circum- ' stances, are as follows. I do not beheve that ' Chosroes, though himself employed in repelling ' a barbarian invasion elsewhere, has by any means ' withdrawn all his forces from this frontier, and ' least of all from Nisibis, the first and most im- chap, vi.] BELISARIUS. 297 " portant city in the province, and the bulwark of his " kingdom. On the contrary, I have received certain " information that it contains a body of troops so " considerable in their numbers, and so highly dis- " tinguished for discipline and valour, as to be fully " enabled to meet us in the field. As a further " proof of the strength of this garrison, you may " observe that its command has been committed to " Nabedes, yielding to none but to the King himself " in rank and estimation with the Persians. I am " convinced that this officer will not allow an undis- " puted passage, that he will offer us battle ; and it " is only by defeating him that we shall find our- " selves at liberty to pursue our expedition. Now " if this battle were given close under the walls of " Nisibis, we could not contend with the enemy on " equal terms. Issuing from their strong hold, and " with reinforcements in their rear, they might follow " up any advantages with vigour; and should they, " on the contrary, be worsted, their ramparts would " afford them a secure and speedy refuge. Our " pursuit would be checked by these solid barriers, " against which, while they continue to be manned " by an army not inferior to ours, every effort must " be vain. But if, on the other hand, awaiting the " Persian forces at this spot, we should be victorious, " then, my comrades, I entertain the most confident " hope of reducing the fortress which they are ap- " pointed to defend. By the disorder of their flight, " we may either mingle in their ranks and enter the " gates together, or we may cut off their retreat in o 3 298 THE LIFE OF [chap. vi. " that direction, and, compelling them to escape " elsewhere, may easily overcome the resistance of a " city thus forsaken by its garrison." The pohcy of the Roman general was approved by all the officers to whom it was thus openly revealed, with the exception of two, named Nicetas and Peter, who persisted in their first impatience, and, slighting the orders of Behsarius, marched forward with the troops under their personal command, till only a mile from Nisibis. Behsarius sent them an earnest injunction to hold themselves at least ready for engaging, and to await his signal, and they were also admonished to be particularly on their guard at„ noon, since the Persians, knowing this to be the usual hour for meals in the Roman army, might probably select it as the time of their attack. Such judicious commands were likewise set at nought by these stubborn mutineers. Oppressed with the unwonted glare of an Assyrian sun, the soldiers laid aside the cumbrous weight of their arms at mid day, and dispersed to gather fruit, through the adjoining groves of fig-trees. From the ramparts of Nisibis the Persian governor perceived their care less security, and suddenly sallied forth with the greater part of his garrison, to surprise and over whelm them. On beholding the enemy in full career from the gates, the Roman soldiers, terrified and helpless, ran to their arms, hastily equipped them selves for battle, and formed in mingled and irre gular squadrons, while a messenger was dispatched, beseeching the aid of Behsarius. Even before he chap, vi.] BELISARIUS. 299 received their request, this vigilant general was already on his march, having conjectured, from the cloud of dust which he saw arising in the direction of Nisibis, that the Persians had advanced; but, in spite of his activity, he could not save the detach ments of Peter and Nicetas from the consequences of their own imprudence. The Persians had scattered them on the very first onset, taken their standard, and pursued them with considerable slaughter, till the arrival of Belisarius and his veterans changed the fortune of the day. An iron barrier was pre sented to the enemy by the long lances of the Gothic confederates, and the Byzantine forces vied with them in valour. A pitched engagement ensued, the Romans caught the spirit of their leader, and the troops of Nabedes were entirely defeated; yet, as Belisarius had foreseen, the neighbourhood of Nisibis shielded them against any heavy loss, and no more than one hundred and fifty could be slain in their headlong flight. Next day they displayed, in triumph from the ramparts, the standard they had gained, and, according to Procopius, covered it with sausages as a mark of their contempt. The minds of both Nicetas and Peter were im pressed by their disaster ; they felt their folly, and thenceforth yielded a cheerful obedience to the com mands of Behsarius. But his plan for the campaign was altogether baffled, since the Persians, having found their inferiority in the field, no longer ven tured to sally from Nisibis, and confined themselves to the keep of their impregnable fortifications. As 300 THE LIFE OF [chap, ti it therefore became necessary for the Roman general to devise some other project, he resolved to give up all hopes of Nisibis, and to carry his arms beyond that city into Persia. A march of thirty miles brought the Roman army before the town of Sisau- ranum, defended by the strongest ramparts and most warlike citizens, besides whom it contained a chosen band of eight hundred Persian horsemen, and a governor of tried courage and conduct, named Bles- chanes. Having closely approached the walls, Behsarius gave directions for a general assault, but his troops were beaten back with considerable loss. After this failure, Behsarius, to guard against the danger of fresh misgivings and complaints among his officers, thought it advisable to entrust them with his further designs, and while appearing to consult, in reality to guide their judgment. Having therefore summoned them to his presence, he thus addressed them : " Your long experience of war, my comrades, " must have taught you with how much peril an " army advances through a hostile country, when " leaving behind it, in the power of the enemy, for- " tresses filled with numerous brave and enterprising " soldiers. Such is our present situation. For " should we penetrate any further into Persia, the " garrisons both of Nisibis and Sisauranum would " doubtless hover on our rear, and close upon us on " the first favourable opportunity. Were another " army to encounter us in front, we should have to " contend with two-fold adversaries, in defiles where " success might be hopeless, and valour unavailing. chap vi.] BELISARIUS. 301 " I need not allude to the disastrous results which, " in such circumstances, would attend an overthrow, " nor tell you that our retreat to the Roman frontier " might be utterly and irretrievably cut off . Let us, " therefore, encamp before Sisauranum, and make " every exertion for its capture, while Arethas, with " his cavalry, is dispatched into Assyria. The Sara- " cens are as unfit for sieges as they are well adapted " to inroads through an open country. To these " light troops let us add a body of our bravest sol- " diers. Should they find no army prepared to oppose " them, they may retaliate on the Persians the havoc " of their late invasion ; and if, on the contrary, any " hostile force should appear, let them return, without " hazarding an engagement, and bring us this intelli- " gence, which will serve to direct us' when we " march beyond the Tigris. The Persian garrison at " Nisibis will then be kept in check by ours at Sisau- " ranum, and we shall proceed, secure of resources in " the rear, and apprised by our Saracen detachments " of the real state of the provinces beyond us." The speech of Behsarius convinced his hearers of the soundness of his views, and, in conformity to them, Arethas was ordered to pass the Tigris, accom panied by a detachment of twelve hundred Romans. These were chiefly selected from amongst the guards of Behsarius, and were placed at the full disposal of the Arab chieftain, though under the immediate command of Trajan and another officer. Arethas accepted with pleasure a task so congenial to his temper, and found a wide career for his rapacity in 302 THE LIFE OF [chap.vi. the fertile plains of Assyria, which had long remained untouched by invasion, and were then unprepared to withstand it. Meanwhile Belisarius actively pressed the siege of Sisauranum, cheered by the report of some Persian prisoners that the garrison and citizens possessed but a scanty store of provisions. Not having expected an attack, they had neglected to fill their granaries and magazines, and were only fur nished with such supplies as they could speedily bring together on the news that the enemy was at hand, while the crowd of peasants, who had flocked to their walls for shelter, still further hastened the approach of scarcity. It was not, therefore, very difficult for an envoy of Belisarius to persuade the besieged to surrender, merely stipulating that their lives should be spared. This condition was strictly observed by the Romans, and every kindness was moreover shown to the citizens, whose adherence to Christianity, and whose Roman descent, were natural grounds for friendship and favour : but Bleschanes and his troops were sent as captives to Constantinople, and soon afterwards transferred to Italy, where, according to the practice of the sixth century, they became enrolled as imperial mercenaries, and served against the Goths. Such a system, however singular, appears to have been constantly successful; but its success may be ascribed to the degeneracy of the age. To make a high-minded soldier fight in the ranks of his national enemies is no easy undertaking, and it would certainly have failed with an ancient Roman or a modern Spaniard. chap, vi.] BELISARIUS. 303 The ramparts of Sisauranum were razed to the ground, and Behsarius, having thus far made good his project, impatiently awaited the return of Arethas, in order to pursue his march. The zeal of the Saracen, however, had abated in proportion as his object of pillage was attained, and he dreaded lest, on arriving once more at the Roman encampment, he should be called upon for a partition of the spoils. He resolved not merely to continue alone and unre strained, but even to withhold all tidings of his movements, and, for this purpose, to prevent the junction of Trajan and his colleague with the main army of their countrymen. By his orders some pre tended spies brought them accounts of a formidable Persian army intercepting them from Sisauranum, and the crafty Arab availed himself of this forged intelligence to make them effect their retreat in another direction. They accordingly repassed the Tigris lower down, and returned to the Roman terri tories along the left bank of the Euphrates, so as to be entirely shut out from any further share in this campaign. The prolonged absence of Arethas, and the want of all information respecting him, raised of course to the highest pitch the suspicion and alarm of Behsarius and of his officers, and as it was impos sible to march onwards in this uncertainty, his skilful plans for the prosecution of the war were thus for a second time baffled by the fault of subalterns. During the delay thus occasioned, the burning heat of the climate exhausted the strength and patience of the 304 THE LIFE OF [chap. vi. European soldiers, who were either almost stifled in close and sultry tents, or scorched by the rays of the sun. A contagious fever spread throughout the camp, nearly one-third of the army was disabled from disease, and the remainder were impatient for home. The troops drawn from Syria, above all, disguised their own weariness and timidity under the specious pretext of solicitude for their defenceless province, and they loudly complained that the two months appointed for their service were already at an end. A council of war was summoned by the general, where Nicetas expressed the wishes of the soldiers and his own. He urged, that, thus enfeebled and disheartened, they could undertake no enterprise against the enemy, that a battle might not leave a single Roman survivor to relate the mournful tale, and that nothing but the most effectual means for self-preservation remained to be considered. His arguments were enforced by the clamour of the other officers, who, with tumultuous cries, demanded the signal for retreat. Late experience had taught Belisarius that any opposition to their wishes would be fruitless, and he therefore yielded to necessity. The sick were transported on beasts of burthen, the weary soldiers found their strength revived by the direction of their march, and the Roman domi nions were attained without accident or molestation. Scarcely had Belisarius passed the frontier, before he became informed of the real fate of Arethas, but the distance of this perfidious ally shielded him from the chap, ti.] BELISARIUS. 305 punishment which otherwise would doubtless have followed his detection.* Thus ended a campaign in which, through untoward circumstances and the misconduct of others, Belisarius was debarred from equalling his own former achievements, and fulfilling the expectations of his countrymen. The Byzantine citizens, who had weighed rather the fame and merit of the general than the obstacles with which he had to contend, had already seen him in fancy entering Ctesiphon in triumph, and leading Nushirvan, as Gelimer and Vitiges, a captive, before the throne of Justinian. They therefore beheld, with surprise and disappointment, their favourite hero returning, without any decisive advantage or memorable exploit, to Constantinople, having been recalled by the Em peror as soon as he had stationed the army in its winter quarters. This expedition, though lame and abortive, was, however, attended by one important result, the recall of Nushirvan from the unfinished conquest of Lazica. On his arrival in the Persian dominions, he found that Behsarius had already left them, and the lateness of the season compelled him to defer till another year his schemes of ambition and revenge. Early in the ensuing spring he took the field, at the head of the most numerous and most formidable army which he ever yet had mustered in his wars against the Romans. He chose the same * Yet Arethas was some years afterwards created a patrician, and honourably received at Constantinople. (Hist. MisceU. Ub. xvi. Murat. Script. Ital. vol. i. p. 110, and Zonaras, Annal. vol. ii, p. 71.) 306 THE LIFE OF [chap. ti. course which, in his first invasion, he had so success fully pursued, keeping the Euphrates on his right, and advancing towards Syria by rapid marches. It was his intention from thence to carry his arms into Palestine, and undertake the siege of Jerusalem, which allured his avarice by its treasures, and of which the sanctity, in the eyes of an adverse sect, might inflame his Magian hostility. Since the fall of Antioch, Jerusalem might again be considered, as in the time of Pliny,* the first city of the east, and the pious zeal of successive crowds of pilgrims had enriched its shrine by offerings, and its inhabitants by the purchase of relics.f In his progress, Nushir van prudently left unattempted those towns which had delayed him in his former invasion, and whose wealth was already drained by his demands at that period ; but he made an exception with regard to Sergiopohs. The bishop of that city had failed to discharge a debt then contracted for the ransom of the prisoners of Sura, and, if we may believe the partial evidence of the Greek historians, Nushirvan showed such unrelenting rigour on this occasion, as appears utterly at variance with his Persian surname of The Just. It was in vain that the luckless prelate pleaded the poverty of his diocese, and declared that * Hierosolyma longe clarissima urbium Orientis non Judrese modo. (Plin. Hist. Nat. lib. v. c. 14.) t An active commerce was carried on at Jerusalem in fragments of the True Cross. The monks maintained that this reUc possessed a miraculous power of growth and vegetation, so that the supply in the market never ceased. (Baronius, Annal. Eccles. a.d. 326. No. 50.) chap, vi.] BELISARIUS. 307 he had made a most earnest but fruitless application to the Emperor; he was, nevertheless, imprisoned and put to the torture, until he consented to purchase his freedom, by yielding the consecrated gold of his cathedral. But the people of Sergiopolis shut their gates against the rapacious envoys of Nushirvan; they were immediately invested by a detachment of six thousand Persians, while their walls were manned with no more than two hundred regular soldiers. Reduced to extremity, and hopeless of relief, they had already determined to capitulate, when a friendly Christian, serving in the ranks of the enemy, privately informed them that the besiegers had exhausted their supply of water, and must within two days be com pelled to retire. These joyful tidings were confirmed by the event ; the King of Persia would not suspend or turn aside his march, to reduce an insignificant fortress, and the inhabitants, freed from this immi nent peril, returned their grateful thanks to their patron saint for his seasonable aid. An ecclesias tical historian has not blushed even to affirm, that, at the intercession of Sergius, the city was garri soned during the siege by a legion of angels, pro tected against human assault by shields and armour.* After the recall of Belisarius, the defence of the Roman frontier had been entrusted to several chiefs, amongst whom were Buzes, and a nephew of the Emperor, named Justus ; f but they neither ventured to encounter Nushirvan in the open field, nor deter- * Evagrius, Hist. Eccles. Ub. iv. c. 28. t See Duncange, Fam. Aug. Byz. p. 100. 30S THE LIFE OF [chap. ti. mined upon any combined plan of defensive opera tions. Each of them, with the troops under his per sonal command, hastily betook himself to some fortress or stronghold, which might afford at least a temporary shelter. Such a system would have left the King of Persia at full liberty, either to pursue his march unmolested, or to attack and overwhelm every squadron in its turn. But, in this pressing danger, Justinian, struck with alarm, had summoned once more to his confidence and councils the only man whose genius could avert the impending storm. Beli sarius, unattended by supphes or reinforcements, and with no resources but those of his genius, was re appointed general of the east, and dispatched with post-horses to the scene of action. On his arrival in Syria, Buzes and Justus, who had prudently retreated beyond the reach of present danger to the walls of Hierapolis, and had drawn with them the greater part of the Roman troops, represented to him, in a letter, the doubtful plans and irresistible force of Nushirvan, and urged that Behsarius could not better provide for the public safety and for his own, than by confining himself with them in the fortifica tions they had chosen. The answer of Belisarius has been recorded by his secretary.* " Your advice " might be just and salutary, if the people now at the " mercy of Chosroes were subjects to some foreign " state, instead of living under the dominion of " Rome. Could we, in that case, while continuing " inactive, hope to escape uninjured, it would be folly " Procop. Pers. lib. ii. c. 20. chap, vi.] BELISARIUS. 309 " to rush into needless and voluntary dangers. But " if the Persian monarch now directs his desolating " course through the adjoining provinces of the " empire, whose wealth and whose weakness equally " invite him, I must tell you that it would be far " better for us to perish bravely in their defence, " than to purchase our personal security by remain- " ing cold and indifferent spectators of their ruin. " Such conduct would not deserve the mere name of " timidity — it would be treason. My orders are, " therefore, that you should join me as speedily " as possible at Europus, where it is my intention to " collect all the forces in my power, and where I " trust that God will enable me to strike some " decisive blow at the barbarians." Animated by this resolution of their chief, Buzes and other officers hastened with their troops to the spot he had assigned. Justus, on the other hand, forgetting that one of the noblest privileges of royal birth is to be foremost in the field, preferred the easy and inglorious task of commanding the small detachment left behind for the garrison of Hierapolis. Europus, where the Roman army now encamped, was a small open town on the Euphrates, one of those which Nushirvan had neglected to seize in his rapid march from Assyria. By taking this central and exposed position, Belisarius cut off the commu nication of the invaders with Persia, and displayed an apparent purpose of opposing their return. We cannot but remark, that such was precisely the stratagem attempted by Napoleon at the close of 310 THE LIFE OF [chap. vi. the adventurous and brilliant campaign of Paris, when, finding himself unable with his few remaining veterans to make head against the enemy, he left his capital open to them, and threw himself upon their rear. And though his plan was not attended with success, nor therefore with public praise, it has been considered by tacticians as a bold and masterly manoeuvre. A vague report of the supposed designs of Behsarius filled the mind of Nushirvan with doubts and misgivings, while more accurate inteUi gence would have shown him that his power of marching homewards at his pleasure could never be seriously affected by such scanty battahons as his adversary could bring forward. In the opinion of the Roman commander himself, as stated by Proco pius, an army even of one hundred thousand men would hardly have been sufficient for that object.* The King of Persia ordered his troops to stop short in their progress towards Palestine, while one of his most trusty attendants was dispatched to the imperial camp, with the ostensible mission of com plaining that Justinian had never sent ambassadors to conclude a peace, but with secret instructions to observe and report the real strength of the army, and views of the general. Abandanes (such was the name of the envoy) found Belisarius apprised of his approach, and pre pared to baffle Nushirvan by retorting his own artifice against him. Under the pretence of a hunting excursion, he had advanced to some distance v Procop. Pers. lib. ii. c. 21 . chap, vi.] BELISARIUS. 311 before his camp with six thousand chosen soldiers, remarkable for their mien and stature, who formed a considerable part, but who appeared only a small detachment of his army. On the opposite shore of the Euphrates the watchful envoy might discern a squadron of Armenian cavalry, ready to dispute the passage of the river, and whose unknown numbers were magnified a hundred fold by his startled imagination. The troops around him, as if secure of victory, looked upon him with careless or disdain ful eyes, and seemed only intent on enjoying the pleasures of the chase. They had laid aside their heavy arms, and even their military dress, and each soldier bore only some single weapon, a sword, a bow, or a battle axe. In the first rank around the station of the general, were seen the natives of Thrace and Hlyria, — beyond them stood the Goths and Heruh, while the Vandals and Moors formed the outer circle, and the aspect of so many barbarian captives, now changed into zealous auxiliaries, must have forcibly recalled to the awe-struck Persian the late conquest of Africa and Italy. Behsarius received the ambassador in a tent of the coarsest canvass, not unworthy the ancient simplicity of Rome, his countenance was cheerful, and his answer to the message of Nushirvan haughty and undaunted. " It is not," he said, " by the system which the King " of Persia now pursues, that treaties can be formed " or upheld. Other sovereigns, if any cause of dis- " sension arise between them and some neighbouring " state, first send an embassy to urge their claims, 312 THE LIFE OF [chap. ti. " and only have recourse to arms when their remon- " strances have proved unavaihng. Chosroes on the " contrary, after having carried hostihties into the " very heart of the Roman empire, begins to speak " of conferences and negotiations for a peace." Dismayed by this tone of superiority, and by the confident demeanour wliich the Roman battahons had artfully assumed, Abandanes hastened to assure his royal master that he would have to contend with the most skilful and courageous commander of the age, and with troops of extraordinary discipline and determination. He urged, moreover, that under existing circumstances the Persians could not engage on equal terms. Should the King be victorious, he could hope for no higher renown than that of over coming a subject and slave of Justinian, and must find himself debarred from reaping the common fruits of success, by the neighbourhood of so many fortified cities, which would immediately afford shel ter and protection to the vanquished Romans. If, on the contrary, the event of the battle should prove unfavourable to him, the honour and majesty of Persia would receive a fatal wound, no refuge or resource would await the invading army, and not one of its soldiers might ever reach his country to tell the disaster of the rest. Nushirvan, persuaded by these ai'guments, consented to give up all thoughts of Palestine ; but he foimd even the choice of a route for his return a source of much perplexity. The districts which he had already traversed were ex hausted and destitute of provisions, and should he chap, ti.] BELISARIUS. 313 on the other hand direct his march towards Europus, he feared much opposition to his passage of the river. After having wavered for some time, he selected the latter alternative, and his retreat was hastened by another able manoeuvre of the Roman general. The Armenian auxiliaries who appeared to guard the opposite bank were withdrawn, as if only for some temporary object, so that Nushirvan considered it necessary to employ with unwearied activity the precious moments of their absence. The passage of the troops was soon effected by the labours of the engineers, who were always provided with portable iron clasps to connect and support large wooden beams for the construction of a bridge, and by this means a river seldom delayed the progress of a Persian army. Having entered Mesopotamia, the King protested, in an embassy to Belisarius, that his only motive for retreating was to give a proof of his friendship for the Romans, and to place no obstacles- in the way of reconciliation. The general rephed by a request that, such being the case, he might treat with moderation and forbearance the imperial province, which still lay between him and his own dominions. Thus was the great Nushirvan, the conqueror of the East, driven back towards Persia by the stratagems and the name of Behsarius, who could only muster an army very far inferior in numbers, and wholly incapable of hazarding a battle. Though some unwarlike and ignorant citizens might complain that the invaders had been quietly permitted to escape, it seems that p 314 THE LIFE OF [chap. ti. the reputation of Belisarius amongst statesmen and soldiers was greatly enhanced by this achievement, and they even extolled it as surpassing the glory of the Vandal or Gothic wars.* If, in fact, it be less honourable to conquer with the loss of lives than to gain a bloodless and unpolluted victory, or if the greatest proof of mihtary genius be to carry any fixed object with the smallest exertion and waste of means, then we shall hardly consider these praises as unjust or overcharged. Scarcely was this campaign at an end before Beli sarius was again recalled by the Emperor to Constan tinople, and his departure from the East disclosed how entirely his late success had been due to his own unassisted talents. After the loss of his pervading spirit the Roman army sunk, as it were, into a dull, lifeless, and corrupted mass. Reinforced till it amounted to nearly thirty thousand men, but headed by no less than fifteen generals, of unequal merit and discordant views, it was routed in the valley of Dubis by a squadron of four thousand Persians, and Procopius doubts whether a defeat, so total and decisive, had been undergone by the Romans at any previous period of their annals. The chiefs, who before the day of conflict had allowed and imitated the rapine of the soldiers, now vied with them in quickness of flight, and scattered their useless arms, and (more unwillingly perhaps) the fruits of their pillage, along the encumbered roads. A groundless apprehension of a rally or an ambuscade withheld x Compare Procop. Tors. lib. u. u. 21. Hist. Arcan. c. 3. chap, vi.] BELISARIUS. 315 Nabedes, the Persian general, from following the runaways, but their fears urged them to hurry onwards from a fancied pursuit ; they did not stop till their expiring horses sunk beneath them from fatigue, and this engagement, like that of Guinegate in modern times, might deserve to be called the Battle of the Spurs. So great a disaster might perhaps have decided the fate of all the Roman provinces in Asia, had not a new and unexpected enemy now arisen against both Chosroes and Justi nian, and raged with equal fury at Constantinople and at Ctesiphon. This enemy was the plague. A more destructive and extended pestilence than the world had seen for many centuries carried havoc through the most fertile regions of Asia, while Europe suffered far less severely from this fearful scourge. Through its calamities the forces of the Persians were lessened and their ambitious designs laid aside, and after an obstinate but unsuccessful siege of Edessa they narrowed their views to languid and desultory hostilities in Colchos.* During the two last Persian campaigns the political security, as well as the domestic happiness, of Beli sarius were shaken by the misconduct of his wife. It will be recollected that, on the departure a.d. 533. of the African expedition, a soldier, newly baptized, was embarked as an auspicious omen in * Some fresh materials for the wars between Rome and Persia, in the latter years of Nushirvan, may be found in Joannes Epiphani- ensis, (p. 172, &c.) in the volume published by M. Hase, in 1819. from the inedited MS. of the Royal Library at Paris. r 2 316 THE LIFE OF [CHAr. „. the galley of the general.* This soldier's name was Theodosius, he had been brought up in the Eunomian heresy, wliich he abjured on this occasion, and was, according to a custom of the age, adopted by Behsarius as a spiritual son. This favour was but ill requited. In the progress of the voyage the young proselyte became deeply enamoured of Anto nina, who returned his passion, and their intercourse was seen or suspected by all except the injured husband. The zeal of friends, which usually supphes such defects of vision, and kindly allows no man to remain ignorant of his misfortunes or hi* faults, was withheld in this case by the knowledge of Antonina's influence with the Empress, and of her own vindic tive temper. At length, nearly three years after wards, when Belisarius was wintering at a.d. 536. ' . ° Syracuse, [Macedonia, a female attendant of his wife, stung by some petty injury, revealed the dangerous secret. In his first transport of indig nation the Roman general decreed the death of Theodosius, and the terrified youth only escaped by forthwith embarking for Asia, but Antonina was not so easily detected; she loudly avouched her innocence, and exerted her extraordinary power of fascination, or, according to popular credulity, of witchcraft. Her tears were admitted as arguments, her blandish ments as proofs, and she succeeded in convincing Belisarius 6T her perfect innocence. He delivered over to her mercy INlacedonia, whom he now regarded as a perjured and malignant accuser, and he also * Procop. Vandal, lib. i. c. 12. Hist. Arcan. c. i. CHAP. TI.] BELISARIUS. 317 gave up two witnesses brought forward by that woman; an act which will deserve the severest censure if we believe, with the secret historian, that he had previously pledged an oath for their safety. By order of Antonina their tongues were cut out, tlieir bodies torn limb from limb, and the mangled fragments cast into the sea. Meanwhile a letter of recall was dispatched by Behsarius to his adopted son, but a personal quarrel between Photius and that youth for some time delayed the arrival of the latter in Italy. He was received with fatherly affec tion by Behsarius, by Antonina with passionate love; he took the direction of the household, was employed as one of the envoys to Ravenna,* and found many opportunities of amassing wealth. But on the return of the general to Constantinople, Theodosius per ceived the danger of his situation, and was a.d. 540. tempted to secure the advantages which he had already gained. The busy rumours of a capital, or the unguarded fondness of Antonina, might any moment betray his secret to Belisarius, and expose himself to some summary and dreadful punishment, and he therefore considered it advisable to withdraw to Ephesus, where he shaved his head, and assumed the habit of a monk. The indiscreet despair of Antonina at his departure sufficiently showed its prudence; she wept, she raved, she tore her hair, she appealed to Justinian and Theodora for their intercession, and artfully impelled her unsuspicious * Observe a cursory notice in the public history. (Goth. lib. ii. c. 28.) 318 THE LIFE OF [chap. ti. husband to solicit the return of his son. In reply to these commands or intreaties Theodosius pleaded fervent devotion and taste for the monastic life, but he secretly promised to revisit Constantinople as soon as his fears of discovery should be lessened by the departure of Belisarius for the Persian war. This was the real reason why Antonina did not follow her husband in this as in his earher campaigns, and the precious moments of his absence were devoted to her lover. During this period of pleasure, Antonina, however, found means to strengthen and secure her influence over the Empress, by rendering her an A.D. 541. . . n^t . n -i • 1 important service. This anecdote, which we derive from a far more authentic source than the foregoing,* clearly sets forth the subtle, unprincipled, and daring character of the wife of Behsarius. An open enmity had subsisted for some time between Theodora and John of Cappadocia, the first minister of state, and they mutually balanced and divided the imperial favour, but neither could gain sufficient ascendancy to bring about the downfall of the other. Well knowing how flagitious was the woman with whom he had to deal, John was carefully on his guard against her emissaries, and, above all, bewared of nightly assassination, and it therefore became necessary to employ some stratagem against him. Antonina began by winning the friendship of his daughter, Euphemia, a young and artless girl, and * Procop. Pers. Ub. i. c. 25. He relates this whole transaction with extraordinary freedom. chap, vi.] BELISARIUS. 319 secretly complained to her of the suspicions and injustice which Belisarius had undergone from the Emperor, even whispering some threats of rebellion, which were reported by Euphemia to her father. No intelhgence could have been more welcome to the Prsefect. Like many other sceptics on religion, he was prone to the most childish superstitions, and firmly beheved a prophecy made to him, that he should one day ascend the imperial throne.* As the moment of this exaltation now seemed to him at hand by the co-operation of Behsarius, he entered into negotiation with Antonina, and was easily allured to a treasonable conference in her palace, near Constan tinople. The Emperor, when apprised of this trans action, dispatched the eunuch Narses, and some other officers, to ascertain its truth, and, with orders, should the charge of Antonina be well founded, to kill the Praffect on the spot. They were placed by Antonina in ambush, and were secret witnesses to her interview with John: they heard the minister avow his designs of rebellion, and rushed forwards with drawn swords upon the convicted traitor ; but the valour of his servants (there were several in waiting) allowed John some moments of leisure for escape, and he took shelter in a church at Constan tinople. From the sanctity of this asylum his life was spared, but he was compelled to shave his head * It had been foretold to him that he should be invested with the robe of Augustus. By a singular accident he was, when compelled to assume the priesthood in his degradation, clad in the sacerdotal garments of a priest named Augustus, and thus the people considered the prophecy as fulfuled. (Procop. Pers. lib. ii. c. 30.) 320 THE LIFE OF [chap. vi. and to take the vows as a priest, in order to disable him from holding in future any civil office. He was banished from the capital, and Theodora, thus freed from his presence, reigned without a rival in the councils of the Emperor. It was not long before the wife of Behsarius found it necessary to implore the imperial protection, upon which this intrigue had given her a claim. She had long nourished a bitter hatred against her son, as the enemy of her lover. Photius had accompanied Belisarius to the Persian war ; but, at the distance of a thousand miles, he still felt the effects of her unforgiving resentment, and was encountered by her persecutions at every turn. Provoked beyond bear ing, he at length determined, as the surest means of revenge, to reveal her dishonour to her husband. The Roman general received this disclosure with the utmost surprise and indignation ; he entreated Pho tius to remember his ties of obhgation rather than of kindred, and they cemented their union by a mutual vow of vengeance. At the close of the campaign, Antonina joined Behsarius on the frontier : she was forthwith imprisoned, and threatened with death by her husband, whilst Photius was dispatched towards Ephesus to inflict a still more summary punishment upon her paramour. Apprised of his danger, Theo dosius sought the sanctuary of the altar ; but on a seasonable gift of money from .Photius to the bishop, the suppliant was yielded to his enemy, and Photius bore him away as a captive to Cilicia. But the watchful gratitude of the Empress interfered in chip, vi.] BELISARIUS. 321 behalf of a frailty for which, moreover, her own character and conduct so strongly pleaded. Positive injunctions were sent to Cilicia; both Photius and Theodosius were brought to Constantinople : the one was cast into a dungeon and tortured at the rack, the other was received with distinction in the impe rial palace, where, however, he expired from illness shortly after his arrival. The author of the Anec dotes asserts that Photius, having twice made his escape to a sanctuary, was twice dragged from the altar back to prison ; yet such a violation of religious privileges seems altogether - at variance with the spirit of the age. This spirit was displayed in the belief that the third escape of Photius, some years afterwards, was effected by the aid of the prophet Zachariah.* On this last occasion, Photius pro ceeded to Jerusalem, where he was suffered to reside in the habit of a monk, and where he afterwards attained the rank of abbot. f Such was the long train of calamities which his mother's vices entailed upon this gallant young soldier. At the same time that emissaries had been dis patched to seize Photius in Cilicia, a peremptory mandate had summoned Behsarius and Antonina from the Persian frontier. The Empress commanded the injured husband to refrain from the punishment of his wife : he obeyed the order of his sovereign ; she next required a reconciliation at his hands, but * Zachariah had become a principal object of pubhc devotion, from the supposed discovery of his remains. (Sozomen, Ub. ix. c. 17.) ¦f See Alemanni, Not. Hist. p. 94. r 3 322 THE LIFE OF [chap. ti. he refused a demand which no sovereign had a right to make.* He therefore remained at Constantinople, under the secret displeasure of Theodora and Justi nian, and they only wanted some plausible pretext to accomplish his ruin. The invasion of Nushirvan, in the ensuing spring, impelled the terrified Emperor to lay aside his animosity, and restore to the hero the direction of the eastern armies ; but in this campaign his former offence was aggra- a.d. 542. vated, and the glory of saving the East outweighed by the guilt of frankness. Justinian was recovering from a dangerous illness : a rumour of his death had reached the Roman camp; and Behsarius seems to have given an opinion in favour of the Emperor's nearest kinsman as his successor, instead of acknowledging the pretensions of Theodora to the throne.f This declaration inflamed with equal anger the aspiring wife and the uxorious husband. Buzes, the second in command, who had concurred in these views, was confined in a subterra nean dungeon, so dark that the difference of day or night was never apparent to its inmate. Belisarius himself was recalled, with flattering professions of confidence and friendship, lest resentment should * This refusal, which is overlooked by Gibbon (vol. vii. p. 265), is established by a subsequent passage in the Secret History : Amovim ra /xev avpSi Siaipopos yeyevri)LevTi. (c. 4.) This fact alters the whole complexion of the narrative, and explains the letter of the Empress. t Besides the doubtful authority of the secret historian, the pre tensions of Theodora are apparent from the unusual form of the oath of allegiance, which was jointly to Justinian and to her : nostris dominis Justiniano et Theodorse conjugi ejus. See the eighth novel and Alemanni, Not. Hist. p. 124. chap, vi.] BELISARIUS. 323 urge him to rebellion; but on his arrival at Con stantinople, the mask was thrown aside; he was degraded from the rank of general of the East ; a commission was dispatched into Asia to seize his treasures ; and his personal guards, who had followed his standard through so many battles, were removed from bis command. Even the eunuchs of the palace did not blush to cast lots for the distribution of these valiant veterans. His friends kept aloof, by order of Justinian, or from their own prudent aver sion to the fallen. A statesman in disgrace has often no enemies so dangerous, bitter, and unsparing, as his former friends ; because their friendship has become a crime in the eyes of the ruling powers, and must be atoned for by proportional animosity against him. It was with feehngs of mingled compassion and surprise, that the people beheld the forlorn appear ance of the general as he rode along the streets with a small and squalid train. He was received by the Emperor and Theodora with angry disdain, and was exposed during the whole day, without protection, to the insults and scoffings of the rabble at the gates. The pubhc and himself were persuaded that his death had been resolved upon ; and as he withdrew in the evening to his lonely palace, he frequently turned round, as if expecting the appointed assassins to advance, but the Empress had determined to take this opportunity of rewarding Antonina's services, by clearing her fame, and effecting her reconciliation with her husband. After sunset, a messenger from 324 THE LIFE OF [chap. vi. the palace brought Belisarius the tidings of his fate in a letter from Theodora. She declared that his life was granted him, and that a portion of his fortune should be spared, solely at the intercession of his wife ; and she trusted that his future conduct would show forth his gratitude to his dehverer. The death of Theodosius, and the lapse of a year, had already in some degree calmed his indignation, his former fondness was beginning to revive, and the favourable moments of surprise and gratitude were improved by Antonina with her usual skill. The uxorious hero consented to disbelieve or to forgive her former infidelity, and once more to become her affectionate, confiding, and submissive husband. Such he ever afterwards continued; and on her part, Antonina, who had now attained the ripe age of forty-three, became less abandoned, or at least more cautious, in her conduct. A fine of three thousand pounds weight of gold was levied on the property of Behsarius, and he was suffered for many a.d. 544. , . months to languish in obscurity. At length, however, he was named to the command of the war in Italy, with the title of Count of the Imperial Stables;* yet from the overpowering force of the Goths at that period, and the smallness or rather the nothingness of the means placed at his disposal, this appointment might be considered at least as much an exile as a trust. f It was generally believed, at * On this office see a law of a.d. 413, (Cod. Justinian, lib. xii. tit. 11.) The Comes Stabuli was Ukewise a high office amongst the Franks of this age. (Greg. Turon. Ub. x. c. 5.) t Procop. Goth. lib. iii. c. 10. chap, vi.] BELISARIUS. 325 Constantinople, that Behsarius only accepted this mission as an opportunity of speedy rebellion and revenge ; but his patient loyalty was proof against all personal injuries, and he never allowed the wrongs of the subject to pervert the power or to interrupt the duties of the soldier. If, before his departure, the general made no attempt to draw Photius from his dungeon, and to appease the hatred of his mother, — if he did not strain every nerve to rescue a friend who had suffered solely in his cause, we must deplore, in these transactions, not merely the weakness but the guilt of Behsarius. 326 THE LIFE OF [chap. vii. CHAPTER VII. At the departure of Belisarius from Ravenna, in obedience to the commands of his sovereign, the conquest of Italy might be considered as almost entirely achieved. The Gothic monarchy lay power less and prostrate, and the faint opposition of a handful of soldiers, in Liguria, appeared only, as it were, the last convulsion of its expiring agonies. The single city of Pavia, which still delayed its sub mission, would doubtless soon have followed the example of the rest, when the hopes of its garrison were raised bv the recall of Belisarius, and a.d. 540 still more by the faults of his successors. Justinian had rashly appointed to the vacant com mand eleven generals of equal rank,* neither re spected by the soldiers, nor united amongst them selves, and who seemed only to value their high office as affording superior facilities for spoliation. The administration of the revenue had been entrusted to Alexander, a crafty scribe, who, from a slender patrimony, had risen, by the most nefarious means, to the possession of enormous wealth. Deeply skilled in every refinement of chicane, no pity or remorse ever checked his rapine ; and, from his skill in dimi- * The testimony of Procopius (Goth. lib. ui. c. 3) outweighs that of the continuator of MarcelUnus, who names Constantine as chief general. (Chron. ap. Sirmond. Op. vol. ii. p. 384.) chap, vn.] BELISARIUS. 327 nishing the size without altering the appearance of gold coin, he was commonly known at Constantinople by the bye-word of Psallidion, or the Scissars. "~On his arrival at Ravenna, he found Italy exhausted by the calamities of war ; but this consideration was far from restraining his active ingenuity. Heavy taxes were imposed on all classes, and confiscations levied from the estates of the wealthy, on the plea of pre tended debts to Theodoric and the other Gothic Kings. Under this oppressive yoke, they might derive some consolation from the perfect impartiahty of Alexander, who defrauded the Byzantine soldiers no less than the Italian subjects. Instead of fixed and regular payments, the money for their subsist ence was partly withheld and partly doled out in scanty and uncertain remittances ; and the veterans found no other reward for the perils they had encountered, and the wounds they might display, than neglect and destitution. According to the strong expression of Procopius, the troops were reduced to beggars ; all sense of honour was relaxed, all subordination destroyed ; some forsook their en campments for the pillage of the neighbouring coun try, while others in disgust deserted to the enemy. The Italians, groaning beneath the tyranny of those whom they had hailed as friends and deliverers, turned an eye of regret to the happy reign of Theodoric, and looked with hope and favour to the reviving strength of the Goths at Pavia. This squadron at first could not muster above one thousand men, but was gradually recruited by some 32S THE LIFE OF [chap. vn. scattered detachments. The royal title was offered to Uraias, the brave nephew of Vitiges ; but he con sidered the ill fortune of his kinsman as a sufficient motive for his own exclusion, and generously directed the choice of the council to Hildibald, whose rela tionship to the King of the Visigoths in Spain,* might acquire for his new subjects that powerful alliance. But base minds can still less forgive a favour than an injury. Hildibald nourished a secret hostihty against his benefactor, and yielded to the entreaties of his Queen, whose hatred, like most female enmities, was frivolous in its origin, and dreadful in its vengeance. She had been deeply incensed, on some public occasion, by the richer dress and more numerous attendants of the wife of Uraias, who had moreover aggravated this A.D. 541. offence by her haughty demeanour. Uraias fell a victim to the ingratitude of his friend, and to the wounded vanity of a woman; but his murder roused the anger of the Goths, and soon met with its just reward. A soldier named Vilas, having been bereaved of his bride by Hildibald, gratified the public resentment and his own, by striking off the head of the tyrant, when seated at a solemn banquet in the midst of his nobles. The Rugians, a separate tribe, who had joined the victorious standards of Theodoric, and remained amongst his subjects, de termined the new election in favour of their country man Eraric. This choice was of course unwelcome and * This was Theudes, who was an Ostrogoth by birth, and who reigned till a.d. 548. See Mariana, Hist. Hisp. lib. ». c 8. chap, vii.] BELISARIUS. 329 displeasing to Tidel,* or, as the Greeks have termed him, Totila, nephew of the late king, who commanded a detachment at the small town of Treviso, and he immediately offered to join the Roman standards. A day had already been fixed for the surrender of Treviso, when the Goths became sensible that their Rugian monarch was ill fitted by his talents, or by his courage, to retrieve their ruined affairs. In a secret embassy, they offered the crown to Totila, and the ambitious youth gladly consented to assume that dangerous honour, provided Eraric were dispatched before the time for executing his treaty with the Romans should arrive. The usurper was accord ingly put to death by his discontented subjects, and the nephew of Hildibald triumphantly entered the palace of Pavia.f In the character of Totila, we cannot by any means, as in that of Theodoric, his illustrious predecessor, admire a perfect example of barbarian virtue. His military merit is indeed attested by the confession of his enemies, and still more clearly by the rapid pro gress of his arms. But his temper was fierce, vindic tive, and unsparing ; and though his policy enjoined clemency to the Italians, in hopes of gaining their affection, and a hberal treatment of his captives, in order to allure them to his service, yet, where he had no such object to restrain him, we behold the tyrant * Ludewig, Vit. Justinian, p. 445. Yet Grotius makes the original Tot-las. (Hist. Goth. p. 600.) + This palace had been built by the great Theodoric. Paul War nefrid, Ub. ii. c. 27. and Anonym. Vales, p. 512. 330 THE LIFE OF [chap. vii. unveiled. As an instance of his capricious cruelty, it may be sufficient to mention, that one of his favourite officers, having been wounded in battle by a Roman commander, who was afterwards himself taken prisoner, the Gothic monarch suspended his decision during the lingering illness of his friend, and finding that it ended in death, commanded the immediate execution of his captive.* A more gene rous enemy would have acknowledged that the Roman had only done his duty in the conflict, and that at all events his guilt could never depend on the acci dent whether or not the wound he had inflicted proved ultimately fatal. On the first occasion, when the name of Totila appears in history, we find him a traitor to his countrymen, ready to sacrifice their cause to the gratification of his private animosity; and in the sequel of my narrative it will be seen that, in his conduct, passion frequently triumphed even over interest. Yet in some respects we may applaud his character. His promises were sacred and invio lable, the terms of his stipulations with his adversaries were always observed with fidelity, and the discipline of the victorious army was strictly established and enforced. By his offers he attracted, by his justice he retained, deserters from the Roman army ; and the captives whom he made in battle were often tempted to renounce the thankless service of Jus tinian. No sooner had he been chosen King by his countrymen, than he justified their choice by the vigour of his government; he led his forces, now * Procop. Goth. Ub. iii. c. 19. chap, vn.] BELISARIUS. 331 augmented to five thousand soldiers, through Liguria, and seems to have reduced several important cities, and more especially Verona.* The Byzantine generals remained, at Ravenna, tranquil spectators of these conquests, until the upbraidings of the Emperor awakened their dormant courage. In a council of war,it was resolved by Bessas, John the Sanguinary, and the other chiefs, a.d. 542. first to direct their arms against Verona, and afterwards against Pavia, to crush the last remnant of the Goths. Accordingly they took the field at the head of twelve thousand men, including the Persian gar-' rison of Sisauranum, lately dispatched by Belisarius from the East, and they encamped at nine miles from Verona, where a Goth, appointed to the command of one of the city gates, privately promised to betray his station. The generals determined that, without hazarding the whole army, a detachment should make the doubtful and dangerous attempt, and as every Roman officer shrunk from this command, it devolved on Artabazes, one of the Persian captives. In the dead of night, the gate was opened to him, and to one hundred chosen soldiers ; the city was sur prised, and the affrighted Goths escaped by another outlet. But they rallied on a neighbouring hill ; the break of day, and the high ground which they occu pied, enabled them to discern the small number of the enemy ; and the Roman generals, on their march * This is no where prositively stated ; but the Goths are said by Procopius (Goth. lib. iii. c. 1.) to have possessed no other city than Pavia, and yet (c. 3.) we find Verona in their hands. 332 THE LIFE OF [chap. vii. to the support of Artabazes, had halted, while dis puting with each other the partition of the expected spoil. By their delay, the subject of their quarrel was irrecoverably lost to them. The handful of soldiers in Verona was speedily overpowered by the superior force of the barbarians, and only a few (amongst them Artabazes himself) preserved their life and hberty by leaping from the walls, and breaking through the Gothic ranks. After this inglorious expedition, which served merely to betray their weakness and discord to the enemy, the Roman generals hastened to repass the Po, and fixed their encampment at Faenza. They were followed by the forces of Totila, and it was in vain that Artabazes urged the expe diency of defending against the Goths the passage of the river. On the approach of the hostile army, this brave Persian again signalized himself above his Roman comrades, by accepting a challenge to single combat from a Goth of gigantic stature and expe rienced skill. The valour of Artabazes prevailed; the barbarian was unhorsed and slain, but an acci dental thrust from the lance of his expiring enemy, struck the victor with a mortal wound, and the loss of this distinguished officer was deeply felt by the Romans in the battle which ensued. Animated by an harangue from Totila, the Goths advanced to the charge with all the generous boldness which a national cause inspires, while the Romans displayed the volun tary cowardice of hirelings, whose pay has been with held. The engagement was not long undecided. A squadron of three hundred barbarians, artfully posted chap, vii.] BELISARIUS. 333 by Totila in ambush, suddenly appeared in the rear of the imperial forces, and was magnified by their terrors into a second Gothic army. Chiefs and sub alterns fled in disorder from the field ; many prisoners were made in the pursuit, and all the standards taken, a disgrace which, according to Procopius, had never befallen the Romans on any previous occasion. The result of the battle of Faenza was the total dispersion of the Byzantine troops. Each of the eleven generals led the squadron under his personal command to the shelter of some different fortress, so that the whole of Italy now lay open and exposed to Totila, with many cities to reduce, but no army to encounter. The victorious monarch was not slow in availing him self of the advantages which his merit and good fortune had acquired. While he himself reduced the cities of Pesaro and Fano, a share of his forces was dispatched to form the siege of Florence, and might have succeeded in this enterprise, had not the gar rison received a large reinforcement from Ravenna, headed by John the Sanguinary. These troops, con fiding in their far superior numbers, sallied forth against the barbarians, who retreated towards the Apennine, and intrenched themselves on a hill near Mugello.* Here they repulsed their assailants with loss, and, assisted by a false report that the Byzan tine chief had fallen, produced a panic rout. The Romans of this detachment were scattered, not, as lately, party by party, but man by man, and a great * See Sigonius, De Imp. Occident, lib. xix. p. 693. 334- THE LIFE OF [chap. vii. number who fell into the hands of the enemy were persuaded to enlist in his service. This second victory induced Totila to form a project, bold and adventurous in appearance, but of which the soundness was shown by the event. Had he attempted the regular siege of the neighbouring cities, he would have found them ready for a long, and perhaps successful, resistance; he would have left the open country in possession of the Romans, and given them leisure to recover from their conster nation. He, therefore, meditated to carry his arms into the furthest part of Italy, where no attack was looked for, and no defence prepared. In pursuance of this plan, he marched through ^Emilia andPicenum, and having reduced the forts of Cesena and Petra in his way, passed the Tiber, and advanced into Cam pania. The city of Benevento, though a place of strength, yielded to his unforeseen attack, and he razed its ramparts to the ground. From thence he proceeded to Naples, which, as no danger had been apprehended, was garrisoned by only one thousand soldiers, but which possessed in Conon a firm and faithful governor. The place was invested by the King in person; but considerable detachments of his army were sent into the adjoining provinces, which, from the total want of Roman troops, they overrun with ease. Lucania and Bruttium, the Apuhans and Calabrians, were successively subdued, and almost the whole of southern Italy once more acknowledged the Goths as sovereigns, while, in another quarter, the fort of Cumae enriched them chap. tii.J BELISARIUS. 335 with its hoards of treasure. Some ladies, of sena torial rank, who had been surprised in their Campa- nian villas, were sent back to their husbands without ransom, and the generous or politic forbearance of Totila was rewarded by his growing popularity. The progress of the Gothic monarch filled the Byzantine court with just alarm. Troops were hastily collected and dispatched. The supreme command in Italy, with the title of Praetorian Praefect, were bestowed on Maximinus, a senator, not merely ignorant of war, but deficient in the first and most common requisite for a soldier, personal courage.* He had left Constantinople at the head of a formid able fleet, and a large body of Thracian and Illyrian soldiers, together with some Hunnish horse ; yet, instead of proceeding at once to the object of his expedition, he timidly lingered on the coast of Epirus. Demetrius, one of his officers, landed with a handful of men in Sicily, where he learned that the garrison of Naples was reduced to extreme distress, and required immediate succour. For this purpose he gathered together as many vessels as possible from every port in the island ; and it appears that Totila, apprised of the large number of these ships, and not aware by how few soldiers they were manned, would not, in all likelihood, have ventured to attack them had they steered directly for the bay of Naples. f Instead of such judicious boldness, Demetrius, like most weak men, mistook delay for prudence, and * Compare Procop. Goth. Ub. ii. c. 29, lib. iu. c. 6. t Procop. Goth. Ub. iii. c. 6. 336 THE LIFE OF [chap. vii. sailed first to Porto, at the mouth of the Tiber, where he hoped to obtain some reinforcements. But the imperial troops in Italy were disheartened by their late defeats, they refused to quit the protection of their ramparts, and the Byzantine officer was com pelled to proceed alone when the favourable moment for action had already passed. Totila had discovered the real weakness of the convoy, and suddenly assailed it with some light brigantines as it lay at anchor near the coast. A few soldiers, and Demetrius him self, escaped, by having at the first onset betaken themselves to their boats, but all the ships fell into the hands of the enemy, and all the Romans on board were either killed or made prisoners. Amongst the latter was the Epitrope, or civil governor of Naples, who had secretly travelled to Porto in order to hasten the expected supplies, and who, in the earlier part of the siege, had imprudently manifested his loyalty to the Emperor by taunts and invectives against the Gothic invader. For these he was now destined to undergo a most rigorous punishment. The vindictive barbarian commanded his hands and his tongue to be cut off, and then, in derision, restored the mutilated wretch to freedom. On the return of Demetrius almost alone to Sicily he found Maxiniinus, at length arrived with all his forces, and distracted by the twofold apprehension of either encountering the enemy, or suffering the displeasure of Justinian. To guard equally against these opposite grounds of fear the trembling general resolved to fix his own station at Syracuse, and to chap, til] BELISARIUS. 337 dispatch his ships and soldiers to the relief of Naples, under the command of Demetrius and other officers. But the winter was now so far advanced that a naval expedition could no longer be undertaken with secu rity. A furious tempest assailed the Roman fleet off the coast of Naples, and by a singular fatality the wind drove the ships straight against the Gothic en campment. The imperial troops made no resistance, but the barbarians were not appeased by their ready submission, and did not receive any as captives until they had glutted their animosity by hurling a great number into the sea. Some few ships were enabled to weather the storm and escape to Sicily, but the strength of the Byzantine squadron was thoroughly broken by this second disaster, and Demetrius, less fortunate on this than on the former occasion, was amongst the prisoners. With a rope round his neck he was, by order of Totila, dragged to the foot of the Neapohtan ramparts, and commanded to announce his own ill-fortune, and to exhort the besieged to capitulate. In another age the example of Regulus might perhaps have been remembered and renewed, but Demetrius passively spoke the lesson which his conqueror enjoined, and the Neapolitans were still less strongly moved by his words than by seeing in captivity before them the officer on whom their chief hope of succour had been placed. They entered into parleys with Totila, and it was agreed that the impe rial troops should surrender the city and be honour ably dismissed to Rome if no auxiliaries should arrive before the end of thirty days. To cut short these Q 338 THE LIFE OF [chap. vii. lingering expectations of relief Totila offered to pro long this term from one month to three, and the garrison, dismayed at this apparent security, and urged by famine, opened their gates forthwith. The terms of capitulation were observed by the Gothic monarch with justice, and even ge nerosity. It was in vain that his principal officers pleaded for the life of a soldier whom a Neapohtan citizen accused of the violation of his daughter, and Totila sternly replied to their entreaties that he who could commit so base an outrage must needs be a coward in the field. The imperial troops who had embarked for Rome, but been withheld by contrary winds, received horses and provisions to make the journey by land, and officers were appointed to attend them on their road, and secure them against any insult or delay. Fearing lest a sudden and plentiful supply of food might prove fatal to the famished Neapolitans, Totila adopted the most humane and salutary precautions. Guards were stationed at the gates, none of the inhabitants were permitted to leave the city, and a daily pittance was allotted to them, which small at first and increasing by degrees re stored without oppressing their exhausted strength. The greater part of the ramparts was afterwards levelled to the ground, in order to deprive the Romans in future of this convenient strong-hold, and to save the citizens from the calamities of an other siege. Such was the pohcy pursued by Totila with respect to almost every fortress which fell into his power. chap, vn.] BELISARIUS. 339 On leaving Naples the King divided his army, and having dispatched one share to form the siege of Otranto, marched with the other towards Rome. In a letter to the senators he appealed to their memory of the paternal reign of Theodoric, and, like all new monarchs, abounded in professions for his own. Nor were his efforts fruitless ; several senators, and espe cially their chief Cethegus,* became his secret par tisans. His proclamations were found each morning affixed in the principal streets of Rome ; in these he solemnly promised, and even swore, his forgiveness of all past injuries, and modestly ascribed his vic tories not to any prowess of his own, but to the general indignation which the tyranny of the Romans had aroused. The imperial governors of the city, perplexed and angry at the publication of these ma nifestos, knew not whom to accuse or to punish, and only embittered the public discontent by the exile of all the Arian priests at Rome. That these men were ill-wishers to the established Cathohc Govern ment is sufficiently probable, but there are some enmities which it is wiser to bear than to repel, and this impolitic measure spread over Italy a number of zealous and active ringleaders, who might else * The ancient Cethegi were amongst the first of the noble famiUes (SaUust. BeU. Catil. c. 17.), but it is probable that they had long been extinct. I find one of this name mentioned by Victor Tun- nunensis and others, as Consul for the year a.d. 504. (Chron. ed. Canisu, vol. i. p. 326.) The identity of this Cethegus, with the partizan of Totila, is confidently affirmed by Sigonius, yet there is an interval of almost forty years between the two. (Imp. Occident. lib. xix. p. 701.) Q 2 340 THE LIFE OF [chap. vii. have assisted their party no further than by masses and prayers. The ulterior progress of Totila this year was checked by the havoc of that plague, to which I have already adverted at the close of the Persian war, and which now exerted its baneful influence over western Europe.* In this quarter it was not, however, of very long continuance, and after its ces sation the imperial prospects in Italy seemed more than ever cheerless, declining, and forlorn. The Byzantine armada had been annihilated by the forces of the Goths or the storms of the Mediterranean. All the open country was possessed by Totila. The public revenues were intercepted, and the troops still maintaining some separate cities became every day more turbulent and ungovernable from their increas ing arrears. Under the dominion of an insolent soldiery the Itahan citizens endured rapacity and outrage in every form, their household effects were plundered, then daily food was snatched from them, and their complaints were answered with blows. Accordingly their disaffection to the Romans, and wishes for the restoration of the Gothic monarchy, grew more and more ardent and decided, especially when they observed the generous conduct and fair promises of Totila. In their letters to the Emperor the Roman generals did not dissemble their de spondency, they gave up every thing as lost, and unanimously declared their utter inability to carry on the war. * Sec Muratori, Annal. d'ltal. vol. iii. p. 403. chap, vii.] BELISARIUS. 311 Embarrassed and dismayed by these reports, Jus tinian once more summoned Belisarius to the post of danger, but neglected to supply any suffi- a.d. 544. cient forces, and even withheld the domestic guards of which the general had lately been bereaved. Attended only by a handful of his veterans, Beli sarius traversed Thrace, where, by lavish donatives, he succeeded in mustering four thousand youthful volunteers, and these he forthwith conducted to Salona. With such forces it was clearly impossible to meet the enemy in battle, or even to venture forth from the shelter of fortresses. Belisarius there fore determined, after sailing round the Adriatic, to disembark at Ravenna, there to fix his first Italian head-quarters, and issue his orders to the governors of the inland cities. His earliest care, however, on arriving at Salona was the relief of Otranto, which the barbarians were closely blockading, and whose garrison was reduced to extremity by famine and disease. The general dispatched to its succour a squadron of his fleet, with sufficient provisions for one year, and some troops, commanded by Valentine. Their voyage was favoured by the winds, nor was there any time to lose, since the besieged had agreed to surrender should no supphes arrive before a stipulated period, and the Roman convoy came in sight only four days before this term. Its arrival changed the aspect of affairs. The enfeebled garri son embarked, it was replaced by fresh and vigorous soldiers, new stores filled the public granaries and magazines, and the Goths, in despair, desisted from 342 THE LIFE OF [chap. tii. their enterprise. Thus successful, the Roman ships set sail for Salona, where Behsarius awaited their return to pursue his progress. At Pola, his next station, he remained some time, employed in regu lating the discordant materials of his httle army, and preparing it for immediate service. The news that Behsarius was at hand greatly alarmed the Gothic monarch, who well knew his talents, and was ignorant of the smallness of his force on this occasion. To ascertain the real fact Totila had recourse to an ingenious stratagem. He forged a letter, purporting to come from the Roman governor of Genoa, and dispatched it to the camp at Pola by some trusty messengers, who were enjoined to observe as narrowly as possible the strength and numbers of the enemy. These spies were received by Behsarius without suspicion; they were desired to assure the Genoese of speedy succour, and having found full opportunity for executing the secret object of their mission, they hastened to inform their sovereign that the Byzantine troops were few, and altogether despicable. They found the King engaged in the siege of Tivoli, which was soon afterwards betrayed to him by its inhabitants, but these had reason to repent their perfidy. Totila was desirous of intimidating Rome by some striking example of rigour in its neighbourhood, and accordingly put every citizen of Tivoli to the sword, under circum stances of such barbarity that Procopius forbears to " detail them, lest he should furnish a mischievous example to succeeding ages. His testimony to these chap, vii.] BELISARIUS. 343 cruelties is the more unimpeachable, since on other occasions he loudly extols the character of Totila, and endeavours by its virtues to excuse the defeats or to heighten the achievements of his countrymen.* Meanwhile Behsarius, having arrived at Ravenna, immediately after landing addressed both the Romans and Goths in a pubhc harangue. " The dominion," he said, " of the Emperor in Italy has been endan- " gered by the guilt or imbecihty of his lieutenants. " Anxious to render these provinces tranquil and " contented as before, he has postponed his projects " of conquest against Persia, and has sent me to " redress your wrongs. Let it be your part to assist " the execution of his generous designs. Let those " amongst you who have friends or kinsmen amongst " the rebellious troops of Totila forthwith recall " them from that guilty cause, by announcing to " them the imperial promises and pardon. Spare " me, I beseech you, the painful duty of entering " the field against fellow-countrymen, misled from " their allegiance." These, and many similar exhor tations, proved wholly unavaihng ; not a single soldier was allured from the Gothic ranks, and Behsarius soon perceived that he could trust only to his own resources for success. He was now not far distant from the Gothic army, for the King, after the reduction of Tivoli, had crossed the Appennine and undertaken the siege of Osimo. It was the first object of Behsarius to relieve this important city. * Procop. Goth. lib. in. c. 1 0. As to the motive of Totila, I follow the probable conjecture of Le Beau, (Bas Emp. Ub. xlvii.) 344 THE LIFE OF [chap. vii. One of his outposts surprised a barbarian squadron near Bologna ; another, of a thousand men, succeeded in reaching Osimo; but it was worsted in a sally, and, either from panic or mistaken pohcy, again quitted the city, and was driven back with loss to Rimini. Disappointed in this quarter, Behsarius next planned a bold attempt upon Pesaro, which he considered to be advantageously placed for grazing and forage, and therefore a station useful for his cavalry. When Totila had taken that city, after the battle of Faenza, he had, according to his usual system, torn away the gates and lowered the walls, hoping thus effectually to prevent the enemy from defending them again. But Behsarius dispatched some trusty emissaries to take, by night, the exact measure of the open intervals; and according to their report, strong iron barricades, of the necessary size and number, were constructed at Ravenna, and forwarded in boats to Rimini. By order of the general, some troops, with Thorimuth for their leader, now threw themselves into Pesaro, and, having fixed the new bulwarks brought with them" in the place of gates, unremittingly laboured with the citizens to repair the ruined walls. The Gothic King, at the news of this singular enterprise, has tened with his army to hinder its completion ; but the rising fortifications were already capable of with standing an attack ; and after a long and obstinate blockade, he found it necessary to abandon his undertaking, and return to his camp before Osimo. chap, vii.] BELISARIUS. 345 This capital of Picenum surrendered to him in the course of the winter. Early in the ensuing campaign he again took the field, reduced Ascoli and a,d. 545. Fermo, and finding the Roman forces alto gether unable to oppose him, meditated no less a pro ject than the siege of Rome. Accordingly, he began his march through Tuscany, pausing in his progress to invest Assisi, Perugia, and Spoleto. The former city was defended by Siegfried, a Goth in the imperial service, whose fidelity disdained the offers, and wfiose valour repulsed the assaults, of Totila; nor was it till this intrepid barbarian had fallen, that his terrified garrison consented to surrender. His example may be contrasted with that of Hero- dian, governor of Spoleto, far less devoted to his natural than Siegfried to his adopted country, and who, fearing the punishment of his previous rapine and malversation, gladly availed himself of this opportunity to escape the justice of Behsarius, by yielding to the arms of Totila.* At Perugia, the governor Cyprian turned a deaf ear to all the offers of the Gothic King, who hereupon contrived the assassination of that stubborn and troublesome loyahst. This expedient proved as useless as it was infamous; the garrison persevered in its resistance after the death of its chief; and Totila, impatient of further delay, raised the siege and pursued his march along the Tiber. To the fortresses thus attacked by the barbarians, * Compare Procop. Goth. Ub. iii. c. 12, and Hist. Arcan. c. 5. Q 3 346 THE LIFE OF , [chap. vii. Behsarius found it impossible to afford the shghtest aid. As a last resource, he dispatched John the San guinary with a letter to Justinian, in which his forlorn situation is described with the natural eloquence of truth. " Great prince, I am arrived in Italy, unpro- " vided with men or money, with horses or with arms, " nor can any spirit bear up against such disadvan- " tages as these. In my progress through Thrace " and Illyria, I eoUected, by great exertions, a hand- " ful of raw and undisciplined recruits, whom I can " hardly furnish with weapons, and whom I find unfit " for almost every purpose of war. The troops already " stationed in Italy are deficient both in numbers " and in courage. Their minds have been debased " and enslaved by their frequent defeats; and no " sooner do the barbarians approach, than they relin- " quish their horses, and cast their arms on the " ground. To raise any taxes is impracticable, since " the provinces are in possession of the enemy ; and " the long arrear of pay which our soldiers vainly " claim loosens every tie of discipline and duty. A " debtor is but ill able to command. Be assured, " my sovereign, that the best part of your army has " already gone over to the Goths. Were it sufficient " for success that Belisarius should appear in Italy, " your aim would be accomphshed : I am now in the " midst of the Itahans. But if you desire to conquer, " far greater preparations must be made ; and the " title of general dwindles to a shadow, where there " is no army to uphold it. My own personal guards " and veteran soldiers should, in the first place, be chap, vii.] belisarius. 347 " permitted to rejoin me; and it is only by full and " ready payments, that you can secure the useful " service of the Huns and other barbarian merce- " naries."* Before the departure of John the San guinary with this letter he had bound himself by the most solemn oaths to execute his commission with zeal, and return with promptitude ; yet on his arrival at Constantinople, he neglected the pubhc interests, and prolonged his stay for an advantageous .marriage with the grand-niece of the Emperor. f Much pre cious time was lost; and Behsarius, finding his presence at Ravenna grown fruitless, since the scene of action had been transferred beneath the walls of Rome, resolved to meet the expected reinforcements, and afterwards lead them to the rehef of the capital. Leaving, therefore, merely the necessary garrison in Ravenna, he sailed with his remaining troops to Dyr- rachium on the coast of Epirus, where he impatiently awaited the lingering supplies ; and, in repeated letters, laboured with more zeal than success to awaken the attention and obtain the active inter ference of the Emperor. After a long period of delay, John the Sanguinary and some other chiefs gradually brought up troops collected from different quarters of the empfre; while the eunuch Narses. who had proceeded on a mission to the Herufi, sent * See on this Letter the remarks of the Count de Buat, who thence launches out into a defence of the feudal system. (Hist, des Peuples, vol. x. p. 327.) t Her name was Justina, she was a daughter of Germanus by his first wife Passara. See Hist. Arcan. c. 5. and Ducange, Fam. Aug. Byz.p. 100. 348 THE LIFE OF [chap. vii. some mercenaries from amongst that warlike people. But the slowness and languor of these preparations left Totila at full leisure to accomplish his designs ; and in behalf of the western capital, Behsarius at first could only dispatch to Porto a body of one thou sand men, headed by Valentine and Phocas. Remembering the former failure of Vitiges at the head of one hundred and fifty thousand men, Totila, whose forces 6$! not probably exceed as yet one-fifth of that number, declined the siege of Rome, and appliej^imself to the more easy and promising task of^^lose blockade. No supphes from the neigh bouring country were allowed to enter the gates, and a fleet was stationed at the Lipari islands to intercept the usual convoys of Sicilian corn. The defence of the city had been entrusted to Bessas, the same whose avarice and valour were displayed in the first Italian war; and the garrison, after all its losses from death or desertion, could still muster three thousand sol diers. Besides these, a detachment from the guards of Behsarius had succeeded in safely traversing the country from Ravenna ; and their general had seized this opportunity of transmitting instructions, and expressly desiring Bessas not to hazard his scanty force in skirmishes or sallies, but to confine himself to the protection of the walls. This injunction was transgressed by the thoughtless courage of those very officers who had conveyed it to Rome. In spite of every remonstrance, they attacked the vanguard of Totila, and justified the prudence of their general by their overthrow and death. Bessas was warned by chap, vn.] BELISARIUS. 349 their example ; and through a singular fatality, his too strict and unbending adherence to the commands of Behsarius produced as great an evil as had resulted from rashly disobeying them. On the arrival of Va lentine and Phocas at Porto, they entreated Bessas to second, by a sally, their enterprise against one of the Gothic encampments ; but the Roman garrison remained immoveably fixed on the ramparts, and most of the Byzantine auxiliaries were Accordingly slain or dispersed in their unassisted attack. Some time before the beginning of the sime, Pope Vigilius had been summoned to the presencwa^ the Emperor, and had already arrived in Sicily, on his way to Constantinople, when he learnt that Rome was encompassed by the Goths, and threatened with all the calamities of famine. His generous charity collected a great number of ships, and stored a. u. 546. them with abundant provision ; they suc ceeded in eluding the vigilance of the Gothic fleet, and were already on the very point of reaching Porto, when the approaching squadron was unfortunately discerned by the barbarians on shore. A strong party of the enemy concealed themselves in the out works at the mouth of the harbour, in order to surprise and seize the crews immediately on their landing ; and the Roman garrison, too feeble to sally forth and dislodge these artful adversaries, could only, by waving their cloaks from the rampart, give their friends a signal to beware. But the Sicilians, mistaking these equivocal gestures for marks of exultation at the unexpected arrival of 350 THE LIFE OF [chap. vii. supplies, availed themselves of a favourable breeze, and sailed headlong into the hostile snare. Not a single ship escaped ; all the stores were taken, and the Romans on board were massacred to a man, with the exception of a bishop, reserved for a personal interview with Totila. This prelate, however, had but little cause to rejoice in his reprieve. When the Gothic monarch found his questions with regard to the forces and intentions of the Byzantine army either slrirfully evaded or answered by patriotic false hoods, he in a transport of savage anger ordered his attendants to strike off the hands of his captive. From this time forward no hope of supplies from Sicily could be entertained by the inhabitants or the garrison of Rome, and they began to undergo more and more the hardships of a scarcity. It was therefore resolved to enter into terms with Totila, and to propose a truce with the promise of surren dering the city, should no Byzantine reinforcements speedily arrive. For this important mission they chose the arch-deacon Pelagius, whose talents some years afterwards raised him to the papal throne,* and whose liberality during the prevailing distress had greatly endeared him to the people. The reverend envoy was graciously received by Totila, who even declared himself willing to grant any request he might make, provided it did not relate to the Sicilians. On these ungrateful islanders he * Victor Tunnunensis Chron. ed. Canisu, vol. i. p. 333 ; but his date is faulty, and we must read xxviii. for xxxvni. See Muratori, Script. Ital. vol. in. p. 132. chap, vn.] BELISARIUS. 351 owned himself determined to wreak the severest ven geance for their ready welcome and aid to Belisarius, at the outset of the war. "If such," replied the wary priest, " be your fixed intention with regard to " Sicily, and that your resentment is thus implacable " for injuries neither personal nor recent, what " degree of reliance can the Romans place on your " mercy, after having actually borne arms against " yourself?" With this answer Pelagius left the Gothic camp, and returned to share the sufferings of his fellow-citizens . Their wretchedness was embittered by the unfeeling avarice of Bessas, who hoarded bis supplies of corn until the increasing scarcity enabled him to dole it forth at an extravagant price. Each medimnus* of grain was now commonly sold for seven pieces of gold, an ox (some few were occasionally captured) produced no less than fifty, and the soldiers were tempted, by the prospect of enormous gain, to deny themselves a part of their scanty rations. Thus the fortunes of the wealthy Romans were quickly drained, and they found it necessary to appease the pangs of hunger by yielding their plate and furniture to the rapacious cruelty of Bessas. The poor were happy if they succeeded in obtaining a tasteless mixture, in which one quarter of flour was added to three quarters of bran. Amongst them the possession of a dead horse, or any other carcase, was looked upon as a sort of treasure, and furnished a meal of * The medimnus consisted of six modii, and was equal to about a bushel and a half EngUsh. Cic. in Verr. iii. c. 45. and Adam's Antiquities, p. 505. 352 THE LIFE OF [chap. vii. unusual luxury ; but the greater number of the citizens only sustained existence by the herbs they could collect. In each ruin, which the degenerate Italians had never prized or spared for its own mag nificence, or as a memorial of their forefathers, they now discovered a real value from the abundance of grass and nettles which it bore.* To this miserable food both citizens and soldiers were finally reduced, when no other resource remained, when even dogs, cats, and mice, had already been devoured. The conduct of a Roman father in this utmost need affords a sad example how misfortune may be goaded into madness. His five children were surrounding him with piteous cries for bread ; he veiled his face in silent anguish, and their httle hands then drew his robe to attract his attention to their prayers. At length, rising with all the calmness of despair, he bid them follow, directed his steps to the bridge of Hadrian, and threw himself headlong into the stream below. Day after day a famished crowd encompassed the palace of Bessas, beseeching that he would either unlock his granaries, or permit their departure from Rome, or that if neither alternative were allowed them, he would at least, by a speedy execution, save them from the lingering tortures they endured. His attendants f coolly rephed, that to feed them was * The indifference of the Romans in the fifth century to the works of their ancestors, is apparent from an edict of Majorian, (ad calc. Cod. Theod. p. 624, ed. 1607.) Some degree of pride in these edifices was revived by the respectful care of Theodoric the Great. (Procop. Goth. lib. iv. c. 22.) f Procop. Goth. Ub. iii. c. 17. The Latin version of Maltret chap, vn.] BELISARIUS. 353 impossible, to dismiss them dangerous, and to kill them unlawful. To the rich, however, the avarice of Bessas readily sold the permission of leaving the city, but many found their strength too much broken for the journey, and expired on the road, whilst the fierceness of the Gothic troops proved equally fatal to those who fell into their hands. Such is the gloomy picture which Procopius has drawn of this period. Yet he had not beheld it in person, and there are two circumstances which lead me to believe that the accounts he received of it may have been overcharged, from the silly proneness of mankind to pride themselves on past calamities. In the first place, we find* that at the conclusion of the siege many Roman nobles were still possessed of horses, whereas these would doubtless have been killed for food, if their owners had been urged by such utter famine. Secondly, Procopius, after asserting that nearly all the besieged were at last constrained to subsist entirely on wild herbs, describes the wan and ghost-hke aspect to which this spare diet had reduced them. Now it may be observed, that this wretched resource of hunger is attended with directly opposite effects, rendering the body bloated, with many of the symptoms of dropsy.f Some allowance should ascribes this answer to Bessas himself, and has misled several modern writers. * Procop. Goth. Ub. iii. c. 20. + See for instance De Thou's account of the siege of Paris in 1590, by Henry IV. Les pauvres ne vivoient que de feuiUes, de racines et d'herbes qu'ils allaient arracher d'entre les pierres On voyait ces malheureux enfles et hydropiques. (Histoire, vol. xi . p. 176.) I find in Gregory of Tours the same result from a famine 354 THE LIFE OF [chap. vii. therefore be made in the narrative of the Greek historian, yet enough will remain to prove the deplorable condition to which at this time the ancient capital had fallen. The last hope wliich the wretched inhabitants could entertain of succour or deliverance, was drawn from the well-known skill of Behsarius. We have left that general at Dyrrachium, vainly labouring to hasten the promised reinforcements from Constan tinople. After the tardy junction of all the troops, and when their employment became matter for deliberation, it was proposed by John the Sanguinary to disembark on the opposite coast of Italy, and march straight to Rome ; but several considerations restrained Belisarius from approving this adventu rous design. His forces were still very far inferior to those of Totila, and could not, without the most desperate rashness, run the hazard of a battle. The growing distress of Rome required that not a moment should be lost in affording it rehef, but a journey by land might be retarded by many unforeseen occurrences, and at all events would consume no less than forty days, whilst a favour able wind might waft the fleet in five. The general, therefore, thought it most prudent to pro ceed by sea, with the main part of his army, at the same time dispatching John with his best hght cavalry, to scatter the handful of barbarians which about one thousand years before, where tlie sufferers were likewise obliged to feed on herbs. The people, he says, tumefaeti deficiebant. (Hist. Franc, lib. vii. c. 45.) chap, vn.] BELISARIUS. 355 garrisoned Apulia, and then rejoin him in the neighbourhood of Rome. By this means the same extent of territory would be subdued, as if the whole army had traversed it; and, on the other hand, the squadron of John, free from all incum brances, and protected by its very smallness, might both arrive more speedily at its destination, and more easily elude pursuit. Having left John with sufficient forces and full instructions for this enter prise, Behsarius sailed from Dyrrachium with the remainder of his fleet. It had not been his inten tion to touch on any part of the southern coast of Italy, but a storm constrained the pilots to enter the port of Otranto. This city was now again invested by some Gothic troops, who, on beholding the Roman ships, precipitately raised the siege, and fled towards the unwalled town of Brindisi. They had trembled at the approach of Behsarius, but when they learnt that his fleet had again put to sea, and was steering round the Cape of Leuca, they imagined all personal danger to be past. Their careless security proved advantageous to John the Sanguinary, who had crossed the Straits unperceived, and who was guided by the treachery of a captive to the camp of the barbarians, before they were apprised even of his landing. Being wholly unsus picious of attack, they were ill prepared for resist ance, and the Romans had no other toil than to slaughter the helpless, or pursue the fugitive soldiers. From hence the Byzantine officer proceeded to Canu- sium or Canosa, within four miles of the field of 350 THE LIFE OF [chap. vii. Cannae,* where he found himself welcomed . as a friend and deliverer. The fickle populace thinking as usual the present hardships the most intolerable, had forgot the late tyranny and oppression of their Roman rulers, and were now only alive to the dis grace that they, orthodox Catholics, should obey an Arian monarch. A great part of Apulia, and of the neighbouring provinces, seized this occasion for revolt, and John encountered no opposition what ever, till at Capuaf he found a body of three hundred chosen soldiers, which Totila had sent with instruc tions to hover on the rear of the invaders, and not to close upon them until other forces should assail them in front. John was apprehensive of being surrounded and cut off, and, without attempting to reach the station of Belisarius, undertook the easy enterprise of overwhelming the Gothic bands in Lucania. Behsarius, who, meanwhile, had reached Porto with his armament, and was impatiently await ing the junction of his officer, loudly complained of the cowardice which had withheld the flower of the Roman army from charging and dispersing three * The distance of twenty-five stadia is assigned by Procopius. (Goth. lib. iii. v. 18.) It is singular that Mi-. Keppel Craven, in the journey which he has so ably described, should have failed to see the two most interesting objects in his way, the field of Cannae and the only temple yet standing in Magna Griecia. t This celebrated eity appears in the sixth century as only a small provincial town. In the time of Paul Warnefrid it might again deserve the name of urbs opulentissima. (De Gest. Langobard. lib. ii. u. 17.) The ancient Capua was consumed by fire a.d. 842, and the present city founded three miles from it on the banks of the Volturno. (Wesseling, Itineraria, p. 108.) chap, vn.] BELISARIUS. 357 hundred barbarians. That John was really deficient in bravery, might be presumed from his proposal at Dyrrachium, since the same men commonly unite foolhardiness in council with fears in the field, and endeavour by the one to avert all suspicion of the other. But the practical courage of John had been proved in many hazardous encounters, and we may more justly ascribe his retreat at Capua to his pre ferring the profits and the independence of a separate command. Finding it useless to expect any longer the co-operation of his heutenant, Belisarius applied himself singly to the difficult but necessary task of relieving Rome. In the long and laborious preparations which Totila had made against attack, he had prudently considered the genius rather than the force of his antagonist. He had availed himself of the changes in the channel of the Tiber, which by no means displays a regular and progressive augmentation as it advances towards the sea, but appears, for example, much less broad near the castle of St. Angelo than near the Ponte Molle. At a spot about thirteen miles below the city, where the two banks approach most nearly together, Totila joined them by massy beams in the manner of a bridge, flanked at each end by a sohd wooden tower. The summit of these towers was lined with detachments of his bravest soldiers ; at a certain distance in front a strong iron chain was drawn across the river, and other troops were stationed at the side of this additional de^ fence. Such precautions seemed to render utterly 358 THE LIFE OF [chap. vii. impracticable the navigation of the Tiber, more espe cially against the stream; but as Behsarius could not venture a battle on shore, no other choice remained, and his enterprise against these formidable barriers was one of the boldest of that or indeed of any age. By pretended deserters from his camp, who joined the Goths only to report their proceedings, he ascer tained the precise position and admeasurements of the bulwarks they had raised. In consequence of this information, he fastened two of his largest boats compactly together, and constructed on their united surface a tower surpassing in height those of the hostile bridge, and containing an ample supply of sulphur, bitumen, and other similar combustibles. Two hundred boats were laden with provisions, and manned with chosen soldiers, who were protected by a covering of thick planks from the darts of the enemy, while a great number of small apertures enabled them to discharge their own. At Porto itself Belisarius left only a single squadron, which he entrusted to Isaac, with the strictest injunctions to maintain his appointed station as the last and only fortress still possessed by the Romans on this coast, and not to be drawn from the ramparts by any motive whatever, not even should intelligence arrive that the general had fallen. The remaining troops were posted in strong and well-chosen positions on each bank of the Tiber, to protect the approach of the port and keep the forces of Totila at bay ; and orders were at the same time dispatched to Bessas to second the attack of his countrymen by a vigorous chap, vii.] BELISARIUS. 359 and seasonable sally. Behsarius in person under took the command of this adventurous expedition. By dint of sails and oars the loaded vessels slowly but successfully ascended the adverse stream. With their missiles, which from the decking of the ships the enemy had no effectual means of returning, the Romans slew or scattered the outposts near the iron chain, forced this weighty barrier, and arrived close upon the Gothic bridge. The barbarians in this quarter made a brave and persevering resistance, and new reinforcements were pouring in from the neighbouring camp, when Belisarius directed his floating castle against them. The combustibles he had provided were thrown into the Gothic tower on the northern bank, its wooden materials assisted their effect, it almost instantly appeared in full blaze, and of the two hundred soldiers it contained, every one perished in the flames. Appalled at this sudden and unexpected disaster, the barbarians fled, the bridge was abandoned to the exulting assailants, and no further obstacle seemed to intervene between them and the capital. At this moment of triumph the fruits of victory were snatched from Behsarius by the double disobedience of his officers. The opposite vices of youth and of age appeared to have conspired against him. Bessas had found in the famine of Rome such ample gratification for his avarice that he rejoiced in the continuance of the siege, and was unwilling to see its close until the last remains of wealth had been wrung from the wretched inhabit ants. On the other hand, the martial spirit of Isaac 360 THE LIFE OF [chap. vii. was roused by the news of the success ; he forgot his orders, he advanced with all his troops against a Gothic encampment, and, after a first advantage from surprise, was defeated and taken prisoner with his followers. Some fugitive horsemen announced this overthrow to Belisarius, who trusted too hastily their exaggerated statement, and, believing the ramparts of Porto tq be now utterly defenceless, gave the signal for retreat. On his arrival he found that fear had, as usual, greatly magnified the evil, and that a more steady adherence to his first design might perhaps have saved the capital, in spite of the misconduct of his subalterns. The value of Porto to the Romans would furnish excuses to a panegyrist or a poet ; but the historian will suspect that Belisarius was misled by an instant of dismay, and appeared for once deficient in firmness and decision. A dangerous and almost fatal fever was the result of his grief and dis appointment; and his illness unfortunately prevented any further attempt for the deliverance of Rome. At the time when Bessas had withheld the re quired assistance from the general, he had probably expected that a capitulation might always, at his pleasure, end the siege and secure his riches. By a just retribution, the treachery of some of his soldiers baffled this selfish pohcy. Engrossed by his thirst for gold, he had neglected the discipline of his gar rison, the nightly rounds on the walls were discon tinued, and four Isaurian sentinels availed themselves of the slumber of their comrades and the absence of their chiefs, to reach the hostile encampment unper- chap, vii.] belisarius. 361 ceived. Their offer of opening a gate to the barba rians was received with suspicion or indifference ; thrice they found it necessary to renew their proposal to Totila, and thrice the place was inspected by his officers, before he would consent to hazard the expe riment. By such delay the rumour of their project spread amongst the Gothic army, and some cap tives taken by the Romans in a sally spoke of this conspiracy to Bessas, but the useful warning was despised. At length, in a night of December, almost precisely ten years since Rome had A p0^' first yielded to Belisarius, the treacherous Isaurians assisted four Gothic soldiers in scaling the walls. By their united labour the Asinarian gate was hewed down, and the troops of Totila marched into the city. A prudent fear of ambus cade induced them to await in close and compact order the break of day ; but the Byzantine gar rison attempted no further resistance, and escaped on the opposite side. Some Gothic officers pressed Totila to intercept their retreat. "What event," replied the monarch, " can be more welcome than the " flight of an enemy ? " Many of the Patricians who were still provided with horses followed Bessas from Rome, and the remainder took refuge at St. Peter's shrine. The number of citizens must no doubt have been considerably thinned by the calamities of the siege, as well as by the many cases of voluntary exile it occasioned; but we should surely disregard the corrupted text of Procopius, which tells us that no more than five hundred inhabitants remained. This 362 THE LIFE OF [chap. tu. error, attributable rather to the copyist than to the author, appears the more glaring, since we find the population of Rome, later in the same century, termed a countless multitude by another historian of autho rity.* No sooner were the Goths in full and secure possession of the city, than their monarch hastened to offer thanksgiving at the church of St. Peter; but, during his devotions, twenty-six Byzantine soldiers, and sixty Roman citizens, were slain by his attendants in the porch. Totila was received by Pelagius, who, stretching forth the Gospels in his hand, besought the conqueror to spare him. "Now at length, Pelagius, " you appear before me as a suppliant," said Totila, with a scornful smile. " I am a supphant," rephed the archdeacon, "God has made us your subjects, '' and, as such, we expect your mercy and forbear- '' ance." In comphance with his earnest entreaties, no further bloodshed was allowed, and the wives and daughters of the citizens were saved from the violence of the soldiers, who, on the other hand, obtained an unbounded permission of pillage, as soon as the most precious effects had been reserved for the share of their sovereign. Large treasures were still found amassed in the patrician palaces, and the coffers of Bessas, filled by so much cruelty and rapine, now served to enrich his enemies. Through the spolia tion of the Goths, many of the most illustrious sena torial families were driven to utter ruin, were com pelled in the meanest garb to wander from house to * InEestimabiUs multitude (Paul Warnefrid, Ub. ni. c. 23.) chap, vn.] BELISARIUS. 363 house, imploring often unsuccessfully a morsel of bread; and their noble birth, or hereditary opu lence, afforded them only an additional plea for pity. Amongst them might be observed Rusticiana, the daughter of Symmachus, and widow of Boethius,* whose income had been bountifully lavished on the poor, and who was now reduced to solicit the same charity which she had so often bestowed. Her death was loudly called for by the barbarians, who ac cused her of having overthrown the statues of the great Theodoric, but she was protected by the sea sonable and generous interposition of Totila. On the ensuing day he admonished his troops, in a public harangue, to strengthen and uphold, by mo deration, the conquests which their valour had gained. Yet the King appeared strangely deficient in the virtue which he recommended, when, imme diately afterwards, he convened the Roman Senate, and addressed that assembly, says Procopius, as an angry master might revile his slave. He extolled the paternal reign of Theodoric, descanted on the ingratitude with which the Roman nobles had requited it, and urged them to declare what benefits their treachery had purchased from Justinian. "Have " not you," he said, " been stripped of your rights " and privileges, — have not rapacious accountants in- " suited you with forged and fraudulent demands, — " have not oppressive taxes been claimed with equally " unsparing rigour in peace and in war ? To you I * On Rusticiana see a note of Sigonius, (Imp. Occident, lib. 19. p. 709.) and Muratori, (Annal. d'ltal. vol. iii. p. 340.) 364 THE LIFE OF [chap. vii. " am not indebted even for the smallest spot of desert " ground ; but these men," and here he pointed to the four Isaurian sentinels, and to Herodian, who stood beside him, " these men have admitted me into " Spoleto and Rome. You therefore shall in future " be regarded as the vilest of my slaves, and they, " the friends and allies of the Goths, shall enjoy the " dignities and honours which at present you un- " worthily possess." The senators, terrified and downcast, heard these upbraidings in silence, and did not venture to plead for themselves; but the eloquence of Pelagius was again exerted over the stern barbarian, and wrung from him, if not a pardon, at least a reprieve. The indefatigable archdeacon then set out, by desire of Totila, on an embassy to the Byzantine Court, having first pledged himself, by the most solemn oaths, to return as soon as possible, and to execute his com mission with good faith. He was the bearer of pro posals of peace and alliance on the same terms as had formerly subsisted between Theodoric and Anas tasius; and in case of refusal the Gothic monarch threatened to invade the empire througli Illyria, after putting the whole senate to the sword, and razing the Western capital to the ground. On the arrival of Pelagius at Constantinople, and his delivering the letter entrusted to his care, Justinian only replied that he had given Behsarius an uncontrolled direc tion of the war, and the power of concluding peace whenever it might appear advantageous to the public interest. To him, therefore, the Emperor referred chap, vii.] BELISARIUS. 365 the question ; but before Pelagius could convey this answer, the conditional menace of subverting Rome had nearly been accomplished. Provoked by the success of John the Sanguinary in Southern Italy, Totila resolved to march against him, first wreaking a fearful vengeance on the city which had dared for so many months to withstand and detain his arms. Different parts of the wall, amounting altogether to one third of its cfrcnmference, had already been over thrown by his orders, and several private dwelhngs had been burned,* but now a fierce decree was issued that this birth-place of empire should be levelled to a sheep-walk. Accordingly the Goths were prepar ing to consume by fire, or by violence, the most precious edifices of antiquity, when Belisarius, having been apprised of their mischievous design, dispatched to his antagonist a letter which his secretary has pre served. "The most mighty heroes and the wisest " statesmen have always considered it their pride to " adorn a city with new and stately buildings, while, " on the other hand, to destroy those which already " exist, has been reserved for the dull ferocity of " savages, careless of the sentence which posterity " will pass upon them. Of all the cities which the " sun beholds in his course, none can vie with Rome " in size, splendour, or renown. It has not been " reared by the genius of one man, by the labour " of a single age. The august assembly of the " republican senate, and a long train of munificent t * Marcellin. Chron. ap. Sirmond. Op. vol. ii. p. 385. ; and Procop. Goth. lib. hi. c. 22. 366 THE LIFE OF [chap. vii. " Emperors have, by the progressive and accumulated " toil of centuries, and by the most lavish expendi- " ture of wealth, brought this capital to its pre- " sent high and acknowledged pre-eminence. Every " fberign country has furnished architects for its " construction, artists for its ornament, and the slow " result of their joint exertions has bequeathed to us " the noblest monument of ancient glory. A blow " aimed at these venerable fabrics will resound " equally through past and future ages. It will rob " the illustrious dead of the trophies of their fame, " it will rob unborn generations of the proud and " cheering prospect which these trophies would afford " them. Consider, also, that one of two events must " needs occur. You will in this war either obtain " a final victory over the imperial forces, or yourself " be subdued. Should your cause prevail, you would, " by the havoc which you meditate, overthrow not a " hostile city but your own, while your present for- " bearance would preserve for you the first and fairest " possession of your crown. If, on the contrary, for- " tune should declare against you, your mercy to " Rome will be rewarded by the mercy of the con- " queror to you ; but none could be expected from " Justinian, after the desolation of his ancient capital. " What benefit can, therefore, in any case accrue to " you from so barbarous an outrage ? All mankind " have now their eyes turned towards you : your fame " is in the balance, and will incline to one scale or to " the other, according to your conduct on this deci- " sive occasion ; for such as are the deeds of princes, chap, tu.] belisarius. 367 " such will be their character in history." After long reflection and repeated perusals of this letter, Totila yielded to its arguments, and dismissed the envoys of Behsarius with a promise of forbearance, which from this time forwards he faithfully observed. The next mihtary operation of Totila was to station several squadrons of his army at Mount Algidus, about eighteen miles to the southward of the capital. Around this central camp, he placed outposts at considerable distances, in order to prevent any sally from his enemies at Porto, and keep them as it were imprisoned within their walls. His remaining forces then marched, under his personal command, to attack the Byzantine troops and Itahan insurgents in the southern provinces; and nearly all the citizens of Rome, with their wives and children, were led captive in his train. The lower classes of the Romans were dispersed through the plains of Campania, and those of senatorial rank guarded in the towns whence they were directed to send in secret some of their domestics through Lucania and Calabria, enjoining their vassals to quit the Byzantine standards, and again betake themselves, as usual, to the occupations of husbandry. This order was obeyed by many of the Calabrian peasantry ; but their co-operation had already afforded great advantages to John the San guinary. He had become master of Taranto ; and, finding that city of considerable extent and ill pro vided with bulwarks, he was fearful of defending, yet unwilling to abandon, so important a position. He therefore judiciously insulated by a deep trench, 368 THE LIFE OF [chap. vii. and lined with ramparts, a narrow neck of land wliich projects into the bay, and which by this means answered every purpose of a citadel.* At the time when Totila marched against him, the Roman officer was far northward in Apulia, but did not await the enemy's approach, and precipitately fled to Otranto. Seeing no enemies to encounter in the field, Totila fixed his head-quarters upon Gargano, a mountainous promontory of the Adriatic, chiefly remarkable in modern times for the city founded by Manfred the usurper, and the miracles attributed to Michael the archangel.f From this station the Gothic monarch sent detachments which overrun a great extent of open country, and reduced the fortress of Acherontis, now called Acerenza, the strongest in Lucania. To counterbalance this success, he here received inteUi gence that Spoleto had been surprised by the Romans. It was lost as it had been won, through treachery. A Byzantine officer, one of the followers of Bessas, had, by permission of Belisarius, assumed the part of a deserter, in hopes of recovering his captive family, and afterwards striking some sudden blow in favour of his countrymen. Martian (such was his name) had hastened to Rome, had been favourably received by Totila, and been appointed to a military command * See a plan of the internal harbour in Swinburne's Travels, vol. ii. p. 58. ed. 1790. t For the foundation of Manfredonia, at the foot of Gargano, see Muratori (Annal. d'ltal. vol. vii. p. 371.) The first alleged appari tion of St. Michael was towards the end of the fifth century. (Baro nius Annal. Eccles. a.d. 493. No. 42.) In the middle ages it was a place of frequent pilgrimages, and is so still. (Craven's Tour, p. 72.) chap, vii.] BELISARIUS. 369 in the garrison of Spoleto. The wall of that city had been razed after its capture by the Goths, but they had converted a neighbouring amphitheatre into a strong hold, by closing the lower arches and defend ing the higher as ramparts.* A large share of the troops at Spoleto consisted of Roman deserters, who were urged by the promises and arguments of Mar tian to return to their former standards after redeem ing their treachery by some signal service. This active agent also entered into correspondence with the Byzantine garrison of Perugia; and, by the joint attack of repentant deserters and advancing auxi liaries, easily overpowered the Gothic forces, put the greater number to the sword, and led captive the survivors to the camp of Belisarius. Elated with the capture of Rome and the flight of John the Sanguinary, and justly considering the reduction of Otranto as a secondary object, Totila resolved to turn his arms against Ravenna, the centre and the citadel of the Byzantine force in Italy. He had already begun his march along the Adriatic coast, when a splendid exploit of Belisarius recalled him with precipitation to the banks of the Tiber. So bold and adventurous does this scheme appear in its conception, so unlikely seems the suc cess with which it was attended, that were it not upheld by the most unquestionable testimony, we * This is the earliest example of a practice which became very common in the middle ages. Thus, for instance, the Coloseum at Rome was fortified by the Frangipani, &c. See Mr. Hobhouse's Historical Illustrations, p. 268. sec. ed. R 3 370 THE LIFE OF [chap. vii. might be inclined to rank it with the fabulous achievements of King Agramant or Amadis of Gaul. It was, as Procopius tells us, declared by every one at first to be impracticable and insane; nor does history anywhere display a hke attempt to this of Belisarius, excepting his own former enterprise at Pesaro, which he now repeated on a larger scale and more illustrious scene. He meditated to throw himself into Rome with the few thousand men at his disposal, to repair the demohshed ramparts as much as a few days might allow, and to stand the desperate siege which Totila would doubtless under take. In order to ascertain how far this project might be feasible, and to view in person the state of the Eternal City, Behsarius sallied forth with a chosen squadron of one thousand soldiers. The Gothic officers at Algidus, having been apprised through treachery of this intended excursion, did not fail to station several bodies of troops in ambush on the road, who suddenly assailed the inferior force of Behsarius. The barbarians fought with spirit, but the Romans were animated by the presence and example of their leader, and, after a long and obsti nate engagement repelled the enemy with great slaughter; nor were they any further molested in returning to Porto. So decisive, indeed, was this skirmish, that the barbarian army appears from this time to have confined itself within its camp of Algi dus, and offered no opposition to the Roman general, when shortly afterwards he began to execute his en terprise. He marched to Rome with the greater <=»ap. vn.] BELISARIUS. 371 part of his forces, leaving only one smaU squadron as the garrison of Porto. Since the retreat of Totila, the capital had for forty days remained deso late and lonely, nearly all the inhabitants ^rusa$' had forsaken it, and beasts of prey were seen to prowl round the tenantless dwelhngs. This silent and sohtary scene was animated by the arrival of Behsarius, and by the unwearied activity with which he laboured to fortify and maintain his sta tion. The Sicilian corn and other supplies, which he had amassed at Porto for the relief of Bessas, were now conveyed, without hindrance, by numerous vessels on the Tiber, and served to replenish the pubhc granaries and magazines. Those citizens who had fled to the neighbouring viUages were recalled by the love of their birthplace, and the villagers themselves were attracted to Rome by a liberal dis tribution of food. It was impossible, in so short an interval, to attempt a complete repair of the demo lished portions of the walls ; no material from the quarry was provided for construction, no mortar for cement; but the united and incessant toil of the whole garrison raised in the breaches a rude pfie of broken fragments and irregular stones, resembling less a rampart than a ruin. Even in the present age the practised eye of the antiquarian discerns, or fancies it discerns, in several places of the Roman walls, the hasty repairs of Belisarius and the frag ments of ancient edifices inserted in the structure.* * Nardini, lib. i. c 8. Consult, also, the Memoir of Flaminius Vacca, No. 1 3. 372 THE LIFE OF [chap. vii. To protect these shapeless bulwarks, the ditch which Belisarius had deepened in the former siege was cleared from faUen rubbish, and bristled on every side with pointed stakes. From the absence of work men, the general found himself unable to restore the city gates, which Totila had torn away ; but, employ ing the expedient by which the Spartans had sup phed their want of walls, he carefully selected some of his most undaunted soldiers to line the vacant space. And thus, by a singular revolution of the wheel of fortune, Behsarius, after the lapse of ten years and so many unavailing victories, was again reduced to his former situation, enclosed in Rome with far inferior forces, and awaiting the aggression of a Gothic King. No more than twenty-five days were allowed the general for these various and necessary preparations. On the twenty-sixth, TotUa, who at the first intelh gence of the audacious project of his enemy had hastened by forced marches from the Adriatic, ap peared in sight of Rome, and encamped on the banks of the Tiber. Enraged at the sudden loss of a city so lately and so laboriously subdued, he did not delay the onset beyond the morning after his arrival ; and during the few hours which he alloted for repose, his army was augmented by the Goths from Algidus. At the earliest dawn of day, the barbarians advanced to the charge, and the steadfast resistance of the garrison redoubled the animosity of their attack. Goaded by a sense of shame and disappointment, they displayed the most determined valour ; while, chap, vii.] BELISARIUS. 373 on the other hand, the spirit of the Romans was upheld by the very urgency of the dangers around them. They fought, says Procopius, with far greater resolution than could have been expected from them; and this courageous conduct of troops whom, on so many other occasions, we have seen terrified fugitives or unwarlike mutineers, may show how great is the ascendant which the pervading mind of a hero can exert. Their station on the ramparts enabled them to pour down a thick shower of missiles, which the Goths could not as effectually return, and a great slaughter of the latter accordingly ensued. Yet they did not desist from their assault till night, when the prolonged engagement had rendered both armies alike faint and breathless with fatigue. Returning to their former encampment, the Goths spent the hours of darkness in dressing their wounds and refreshing themselves with food and sleep, but their unwearied antagonist continued watchful against nocturnal surprise, and provident for the next en counter. By his care sentinels were posted on the walls, the guard of the gates was entrusted in rota tion to detachments from the bravest of his soldiers, whUst others rendered each entrance less accessible in future, by fixing a great number of Tribuh or fourfold iron spikes before it* Next day the Gothic monarch led his forces to a second assault ; they were again beaten back ; and Behsarius seized the moment when they appeared with their ranks disordered * For the Tribuli, see Procopius, Goth. lib. iii. c. 24. and a note of Childmead ad Malalam, vol. ii. p. 200. 374 THE LIFE OF [chap. vii. and their strength impaired, to charge them in a vigorous saUy. A great number of the Goths were put to the sword, the remainder fled in con fusion, and the hope of Totila to enclose and cut off the Roman troops in their pursuit was baffled by the prudence of Belisarius in supporting them with fresh reinforcements and securing their return. The result of this double disaster compeUed Totila to remain inactive for a considerable time ; he had lost his bravest warriors, and the rest were disabled with wounds or dispirited by faUure, whUe their shattered armour and broken weapons bore testimony to the fierceness of the combat. After an interval of many days, the barbarians, recruited by repose, once more issued from their camp to renew their enterprise; but the result of this attempt proved still more un favourable to them than either of the former. Even before they reached the ramparts, the troops of Beh sarius came forward to meet them in the field, and an obstinate engagement immediately began. In the course of the conflict, the officer bearing the royal standard of Totila feU from his horse pierced by a mortal wound ; it was with difficulty that the Goths could rescue this precious trophy; and to leave the enemy no cause for exultation, they hastily severed the left arm of the corpse, and secured a massy bracelet of gold with which it was adorned. Later in the day the Goths were completely routed, and, giving up aU hope of storming the city, they commenced their retreat upon Tivoli. Amidst the crowd and confusion of their flight, we are assured chap, vn.] BELISARIUS. 375 that a greater number perished in the river than had fallen in the field.* To prevent pursuit, and inter cept the communication of the Romans, they broke down all the adjacent bridges on the Tiber, except the MUvian, which was protected by its neighbour hood to Rome.f Hence it appears that their en campment must have been upon the Tuscan bank, as otherwise the river would not have interposed between them and their destination. Their depar ture enabled Belisarius to complete and improve his measures for defence; new gates were constructed and affixed, and the keys of Rome were for the second time sent in triumph to Justinian. MeanwhUe the Goths intrenched themselves upon the rugged heights of Tivoli, and in their consterna tion began rebuUding the waUs of that city which they themselves had recently demolished. The late reverses had been most injurious to Totila, not merely from the loss they occasioned, but from the consequent decline of his influence and popu larity. The rapid succession of regicides and usur pers on the Gothic throne had abated the respect of the people for prerogative, and made the power of the sovereign dependent chiefly on the prosperity and splendour of his reign.f While TotUa had been * Jornandes, De Regn. Success, p. 66. f These bridges were afterwards repaired by Narses, and the inscriptions which he placed on the Salarian have been found in modern times. They are transcribed by Giphanius (Comment, p. 93.) X Sumserant enim Gothi hanc detestabilem consuetudinem, ut si quis eis de Regibus non placuisset, gladio eum adpeterent, et qui Ubuisset ammo hunc sibi statuerent Regem. (Greg. Turon. Ub. ui. 376 THE LIFE OF [chap. vii. victorious, the Goths, enriched by piUage and elated with success, had loudly celebrated his genius and mihtary skill, but now with equal eagerness exclaimed against his policy as short-sighted and unreasonable. He ought either, they said, to have leveUed Rome to the ground, according to his original purpose, or taken effectual means to secure its possession to himself. In a long and elaborate harangue, the King endeavoured to regain their esteem and to dissipate the awe and misgivings which the late exploit of Belisarius had struck into their minds.* Being weU aware that discontent is often caused and always increased by inactivity, he did not aUow his soldiers to hnger long at Tivoli, but led them to the siege of Perugia, as to an useful and easy under taking. Scarcely, however, had the city been invested, before Totila received intelhgence of another mis chance, less hurtful to his interests than humiliating to his pride. His hasty march against Behsarius from southern Italy, and the defenceless state of that country, had suggested to John the Sanguinary a project to free the Roman senators and their fami lies from the thraldom to which the Gothic monarch had consigned them. Setting off, accordingly, with a body of chosen horsemen, he proceeded towards Campania with the utmost secrecy and speed. On c. 30.) This remark is as true of the Ostrogoths as of their brethren in Spain. * In his speech, Totila (or Procopius) caUs this exploit Keeiffffoy \oyov Bpacros. (Procop. Goth. lib. iii. <;. 25.) chap, vn.] BELISARIUS. 377 the other hand, Totila, apprehensive of some such scheme, had, before leaving Tivoli, detached a share of his cavalry to secure his captives against rescue. It so chanced that the vanguard of this squadron entered Capua precisely at the same time with the troops of John the Sanguinary ; a conflict ensued ; the barbarians were worsted, and, tumultuously retreating upon their comrades, involved them in their flight. Thus the field was left open to the Byzantine officer. He found in the Campanian cities the wives of nearly aU the Roman senators, but a smaller number of their husbands, since many of the latter had provided for their personal safety by foUowing Bessas from the capital, leaving their fami lies at the mercy of the Goths. These illustrious exiles were respectfully dismissed by John, to await, in the tranquU and luxurious province of Sicily, the final event of the war. In the mean time the Gothic cavalry, continuing their retreat after the skirmish of Capua, appeared in the presence of their King before Perugia, and, hoping to palhate their own cowardly behaviour, brought him false and overcharged accounts of the numbers of the enemy. Their partial statements would probably have been sus pected and disbelieved by the calmer judgment of this wary monarch ; but, inflamed with anger at the disappointment of his scheme and the release of his prisoners, he was not unwilling to regard the forces of John as considerable, in order to justify to himself and to his army his wish of indulging his resentment by a personal expedition against them. With a 378 THE LIFE OF [chap. vii. body of ten thousand men, the best part of his troops, he marched into southern Italy, and, on approaching the station of his enemy, quitted the level road and advanced through a mountainous and almost impassable track ; thus eluding the observa tion of those outposts wliich, as he rightly conjec tured, had been placed by John the Sanguinary to provide against surprise. By such means the Roman squadron, of far inferior strength, was surrounded one evening by the troops of TotUa, before it had received the slightest intelhgence of their progress.* Had the King deferred his attack tiU next day, every Byzantine soldier, at least according to the opinion of Procopius, would have been taken as in a snare ; but his headlong animosity prompted him to give the signal for an immediate onset. The Byzantine troops were overthrown and scattered at the first charge, but the darkness favoured their flight ; and John himself, with the greater part of his foUowers, soon found himself secure within the ramparts of Otranto. The victories of Behsarius at Rome seemed to afford the most favourable prospect of closing this war, hke his first Itahan campaigns, by the thorough subjection of the Goths and the captivity of their sovereign. But his forces, originally small, had gra dually melted away and diminished by success ; and after providing for the necessary garrisons of Rome, * This is the account of Procopius, but the continuator of Count Marceuinus ascribes the surprise to the treachery of some Bulgarian soldiers. (Chron. ap. Sirmond, Op. vol. il p. 386.) chap, vn.] BELISARIUS. 379 Civita Vecchia, and Porto, he found that the troops remaining for active service in the field amounted to no more than two hundred infantry and seven hun dred horsemen. With such a handful of soldiers, it was impossible for the most practised skiU and undaunted courage to achieve, or even to attempt, any decisive undertaking. He received from Con stantinople neither men for the reinforcement nor money for the pay of his troops ; and as the least touch is galling to a wound, so even the smallest taxes on the impoverished Italians proved both un productive and hateful. In urgent and repeated letters, Belisarius besought the Emperor to improve this advantageous opportunity, and, by a short but vigorous effort, to spare himself a long train of languid and fruitless hostihties. But it appeared more easy to overcome the valour of Totila than the indolence and procrastination of Justinian. For a long time he remained deaf to the entreaties of his general, and at length dispatched, in different bands, a small and insufficient force, of which the greater part lingered in Epirus; and which, had it even been united, would not have mustered fifteen hun dred men.* Taranto was fixed upon as the place of general meeting; John the Sanguinary moved thither with his forces, and orders were sent by the Emperor to Behsarius to assume the command of * Observe the remark of Muratori on Justinian's conduct : Ven- nero circa questi tempi in ItaUa alcuni piccioli rinforzi inviati da Giustiniano Augusto cioe sorsi d'acqua a chi pativa gran sete, (Annal. d'ltal. vol. iii. p. 414.) 3S0 THE LIFE OF [chap. vii. this army, and to augment it by all the troops at his disposal. Belisarius accordingly made his pre parations for departure, and having appointed Conon, the late governor of Naples, as chief of above three thousand men, whom he left for the garrison of Rome, bid fareweU to that city for ever. He embarked at Porto, and passed through the Streights of Messina with a favourable breeze, but was assafied by a sudden tempest on the eastern coast of Cala bria. So violent and lasting was the storm, that he found it necessary to steer into the port of Crotona, now Cotrone, the only harbour between Taranto and the Streights of SicUy,* and here he disembarked his forces, untU calmer weather should aUow the prosecution of his voyage. He found at Cotrone neither food to maintain, nor waUs to defend, his foUowers ; the Gothic army was not far distant ; and while these circumstances endangered his stay, an adverse wind continued to oppose his departure. But his genius, fertile in resources, soon devised an expedient to obtain, at the same time, subsistence and security. A rugged chain of mountains forms a natural barrier to the district of Cotrone, interrupted only by two steep and narrow defiles ; of which the one bore the name of Labula, and the other was known by the popular byword of Bloody Rock, either from an unusual colour in the surrounding precipices, or from some traditional tale of slaughter. Retaining only his two hundred foot-soldiers with him, the general dismissed his cavalry to guard these x Keppel Craven's Tour, p. 236. chap, vn.] BELISARIUS. 381 ravines, whose neighbourhood abounded in forage and provisions, and whose watchful maintenance would render Cotrone altogether inaccessible. So advantageous, indeed, did this position appear to Behsarius, that he formed a project to transfer the head-quarters from Taranto, and, instead of proceed ing on his voyage, summon his officers to join him. This scheme was baffled by an unforeseen disaster. The Roman horsemen, whom the presence and authority of their general had kept in exceUent discipline, relaxed from their duty as soon as his piercing eye was no longer fixed upon them : they forsook their aUotted post, they listlessly stroUed through the adjacent fields, and did not even place outposts and sentinels to apprise them of approaching danger. Their careless security proved auspicious to the designs of TotUa, who marched against them at the head of three thousand chosen cavalry, and feU upon them when least prepared for resistance. The generous self-devotion of Phazas, an Iberian confe derate, through the sacrifice of himself and of his gaUant followers, afforded the means of escape to some of his companions; but the flower of the Roman army was put to the sword on this occasion, and a few scared fugitives, closely pressed by the barba rians, brought the first tidings of their defeat to Beli sarius. No time was to be lost, or the captivity of the general and of the surviving soldiers might have completed and adorned the triumph of the enemy. Behsarius gave orders for instant embarkation; the Roman ships set sail, and, committing themselves to 382 THE LIFE OF [chap. vii. the same gale which had withheld their progress towards Taranto, were wafted by its violence in one day to Messina, a distance of one hundred miles. Immediately after his victory, the Gothic monarch proceeded to invest Ruscianum or Rossano, a fortress important from its position in the centre of the Tarentine gulph, and from the presence of many Itahan nobles who have chosen it as their surest place of refuge. On his part, the Roman general avaUed himself of the first fair wind to undertake another voyage with the scanty remnant of his army, and two thousand fresh troops received in Sicily. Having arrived at Otranto without fur ther accident, he from thence dispatched Antonina to Constantinople, to exert her influence with the Empress in obtaining some succours, and aJU548 *° rePreserit his utter inabihty of acting without them. But before Antonina could complete her journey, Theodora had already faUen a victim to a loathsome and incurable disease;* and her death at this juncture proved, perhaps, as unfortunate for Belisarius as her hfe had been before. As soon as the landing of the general was known, John the Sanguinary and the other officers at Taranto hastened to range themselves beneath his banner; and a fleet and army were thus eoUected, which, however inadequate to the conquest of Italy, appeared sufficient to attempt the relief of Rossano. * Theodora Augusta Chalced. Synodi inimica, canceris plaga toto corpore perfusa vitam prodigiose finivit, (Victor Tunnunensis ed. Canis. vol. i. p. 332.) chap, vn.] BELISARIUS. 383 This city was valiantly defended by three hundred IUyrian confederates, who had been left as a garrison by John, and whom Belisarius had reinforced from Cotrone with one hundred additional soldiers; but the want of provisions now began to be severely felt amongst them. Behsarius sailed from Otranto with aU the ships in his power; and they were steering towards Rossano, when they became scat tered by a fearful hurricane, the more dangerous from the want of harbours on this coast. At length the fleet was reunited in the bay of Cotrone, and led by Behsarius within sight of the invested city. But on his approach he beheld the shore lined with the troops of the barbarians, in close and embattled order ; successive ranks of lancers and bowmen were ready to overwhelm their enemy on landing with a shower of darts, and their ardour was directed by the skiU of Totila himself. With deep regret Beli sarius found himself constrained to desist from his hopeless enterprise, and once again return to Cotrone, where he discussed with his officers in councU by what means his few and disheartened soldiers might still become avaUable in this unequal contest.* After due deliberation, it was unanimously declared most advantageous that Behsarius should * All these reverses are ascribed by Cardinal Baronius to the former deposition of the Pope. Ne praetermittas quam disparis exitus a priore posterior hie fuit ipsius in ItaUam adventus et reditus Constantinopolim. Ex quo enim, (quod ssepius ob oculos repraesen- tandum est,) in Romanum Pontificem, Silverium, violentas manus injecit vis omnis ipsius roburque Romanae miUtise coneidit, addita vero fuit hostibus belUca fortitudo, &c. Annal. Eccles. a.d. 549, No. 3. 384 THE LIFE OF [chap. vii. proceed once more to Rome, in order, at aU events, to defend that important station to the last, and sustain the siege which Totila doubtless intended to renew; while John the Sanguinary and another officer should assume the command of two light squadrons of cavalry in the southern provinces, and endeavour, by harassing the rear of Totila, to draw him from the investment of Rossano. To such slender resources and miserable shifts had the want of reinforcements from Constantinople reduced the former conquerors of Italy ! From the dark and cheerless prospect around him, the eyes of Belisarius turned with eager impatience to the negotiations of Antonina at Con stantinople. His first wish was to receive such supplies as might enable him to serve the state with effect, and to maintain his ancient reputation; his second was, to be recaUed from his command if he was designed to continue a passive spectator of barbarian conquests, without the power to dispute or even to delay them. During this interval of suspense, his active spirit appears to have employed itself in rendering Cotrone an useful mihtary station by the budding of ramparts.* It was found im possible to draw from the Emperor the least exertion in support of his general: he was at that time * This construction by Behsarius is nowhere expressly mentioned ; but Cotrone was unwalled at his first arrival, and yet I find it after wards sustaining u, siege. Compare Procop. Goth. Ub. hi. c. 28, lib. iv. t. 26. The present fortifications of Cotrone date no higher than Charles the Fifth. (Swinburne's Travels, vol. ii. p. 185, ed. 1790.) chap, vn.] BELISARIUS. 385 engrossed by religious quarrels, determining some of the most subtle refinements of the schoolmen, and actively persecuting heretics. From this pious occupation no entreaties, no arguments could rouse him; and their voice was almost drowned amidst the din of conflicting theologians. Antonina, there fore, applied herself to obtain the recall of her husband; and this favour, at least, was granted to her prayers. By this measure the defence of Italy was, in fact, tacitly abandoned ; and I cannot but pause for a moment, to reflect on all the misery and bloodshed produced by the fickle temper of Justinian. The fairest regions of the world would not have been exposed, in this age, to constant and unavailing desolation, had either timidity withheld the Emperor from war, or had he been animated with constancy and courage in its progress. As a pretext for the departure of his general from Italy, Justinian ap pears the have alleged the warfare of the Persians on the Lazic frontier ; but it may be doubted whether he reaUy entertained the least intention of dispatching Belisarius to that languid and desultory contest. With feelings such as those which Han nibal must have experienced on embarking from Italy, Belisarius now took an everlasting fareweU of that country which he had first beheld twelve years before, in the strength of his age and the meridian of his glory, which had been the scene of his greatest but least permanent exploits, and which, at his departure, had nearly reverted to the dominion under which he found it. Like the Carthaginian 386 THE LIFE OF [chap. vii. hero, his victories had been due to his own genius and exertions ; while exterior circumstances, over which he possessed no control, were the causes that had snatched away the prize of the combat from his hands. Yet the five last campaigns of Belisarius lowered his military fame in the eyes of his con temporaries. His enemies (and merit always makes many), overlooking the scantiness of the force at his disposal, did not fail to point out that he never once had offered battle nor forced his way inland, but had wandered hke a runaway from harbour to harbour, and from fortress to fortress.* Amidst their undeserved upbraidings and presumptuous ignorance, Belisarius doubtless looked forward with cheering confidence to the judgment of posterity, and posterity has answered his appeal, f After the second departure of Belisarius from Italy, the connexion of his biographer with that country is also at an end ; yet having already traced the war from its first commencement, I shaU briefly pursue its fate till the final extinction of the Goths. The recaU of Belisarius hastened and completed the ruin of the imperial cause in Italy. Rossano and Perugia, which had long been objects of ambition to the barbarian monarch, surrendered without further resistance, and no obstacle appeared to withhold him * Compare Procop. Goth. lib. Ui. c. 35, and Hist. Arcan. c. 5. f " In these campaigns," says Gibbon, " he appears a more con- " summate master of the art of war than in the season of Ms pros- " perity, when he presented two captive Kings before the throne of " Justinian," (vol. vu. p. 373.) See also the opinion of Le Beau, Muratori, &c. chap, vii.] BELISARIUS. 387 from renewing the siege of Rome. That city was now invested by Totila, for the third time, but with feelings very different from those which he had formerly displayed. Having asked a princess of France in marriage, he was stung by the contemp tuous answer, that Italy could not justly be con sidered as the kingdom of him who had shown himself desirous of destroying, and unable to main tain, its capital. TotUa, therefore, resolved in future not merely to observe the forbearance which Beli sarius had enjoined, but to follow the footsteps of the great Theodoric, and apply himself to repeople and protect the Eternal City whenever it should again have yielded to his arms. It has already been mentioned, that the garrison left at Rome by Beli sarius amounted to three thousand men. Soon after he had sailed from the Tiber, these soldiers, in a mutiny, had murdered their governor Conon, and forthwith dispatched some priests to the Byzantine court, not merely to obtain their pardon, but to claim their long arrears of pay. In case either demand should be refused, they threatened instantly to surrender their station, and enlist in the troops of TotUa ; nor did the Emperor find it possible to with stand so persuasive an argument. Their offence was forgiven, some hopes of speedy payment were held out to them, and these concessions induced them to submit with implicit obedience to Diogenes, whom Behsarius had named the second in command. This officer belonged to the personal guard of the general, and had served with credit and distinction in the s 2 388 THE LIFE OF [chap. vii. first Italian war, and on this occasion, Ids conduct equally deserves the praise of prudence and of valour. The reduction of Porto by the barbarians, and the consequent loss of maritime convoys, were supplied by his provident care in having sown an ample harvest within the Roman walls ; and this fact should be precious to the antiquary, as denoting that large tracts of desolate and open ground then existed in the city. Several assaults of the Gothic army were repulsed ; and Rome might have pro longed its defence, however uselessly, for a consi derable time, had not some Isaurian soldiers un fortunately recoUected with how much hberality the former treachery of their comrades was rewarded. At their instigation, Totila, on an appointed night, embarked some Gothic trumpeters in two boats on the Tiber, with orders to approach as closely as pos sible to the Roman waUs, and draw the attention of the garrison by a loud flourish of their instruments. WhUe the soldiers appointed to watch on the ramparts rushed to the quarter where they heard the sound, and where they expected an attack, the gate of St. Paul was opened to the army of Totila by the perfidious Isaurians. Surprised and dismayed, the Byzantine troops fled towards Civita Vecchia, the only fortress which they stiU retained in the neighbouring country; but Totila, having foreseen that their retreat would take place in this direction, had stationed an ambush on the road. The greater part of the garrison fell in the skirmish which ensued; and Diogenes, disabled by a wound, could chap, vn.] BELISARIUS. 389 hardly escape with a handful of survivors. Four hundred other soldiers sought sanctuary in churches, where they were protected by the compassion or the piety of TotUa ; and an equal number headed by Paul the Cilician, a veteran officer of Belisarius, maintained the tomb of Hadrian. This massy pile had, as we have seen, already served as a tower and bulwark to the outward waU ; but this is the earliest of the many instances when it answered the purpose of a citadel, and continued to hold out after the city around it was subdued.* It had been designed for this object by TotUa; and at the time that he demolished a large share of the city wall, he had on the contrary built one along the side where this monument was unprotected by the outer ramparts, so as to render it defensible in every quarter. As, however, the Goths never made the shghtest resist ance in this place when the city was entered by the Romans, it seems probable that the structure had merely been commenced, and that it was afterwards completed by the care of Belisarius. A project whence the inventor had never drawn any advantage or support was now turned against himself. An assault of the victorious Goths was repulsed by Paul of CUicia ; but the want of provisions hindered his troops from sustaining a long blockade, and their horror of horse-flesh urged them to attempt a head long and almost hopeless saUy. Dreading the disastrous effects of their despair, Totila proposed to them either to return to Constantinople, forfeiting * Compare Goth. lib. iii. c. 36, lib. iv. c. 33. 390 THE LIFE OF [chap. vii. the possession of their steeds and weapons, or to retain it by enhsting in his service ; they accepted the first alternative ; but a shame of proceeding homewards unarmed and despoiled, and the tempt ing offer of regular payments, afterwards determined the greater number for the second. In his treatment of the Roman citizens on this occasion, TotUa dis played great clemency and moderation ; the few senators stiU confined in their Campanian prison were reinstated in their former homes, and his con duct towards the whole people has been favourably compared to that of a father with his chUdren.* The private buUdings which his late animosity had levelled to the ground were rapidly restored at his command, and magazines of provisions were appointed for the use of the returning population. The monarch himself presided at the celebration of equestrian games in the amphitheatre, for which the Romans stiU retained their hereditary fondness ; but all these employments could hardly for a moment distract TotUa from the prosecution of the war. Above four hundred vessels were collected to trans port his troops to SicUy ; and while some Gothic detachments entered Taranto and Rimini, the King, at the head of his principal forces, was reducing Reggio. From thence he passed over into SicUy, where the Roman garrisons of Syracuse, Messina, and Palermo appear alone to have withstood his arms ; and he wreaked his long-deferred resentment * Hist. Miscell. ap. Murat. Script. ItaUc. vol. i. p. 107, and Anas tasius, De Vit. Pontif. c. 60. chap, vn.] BELISARIUS. 391 upon the islanders, by piUage of the lesser cities and devastation of the open country. Such success emboldened him to undertake more distant enter prises. A smaU squadron subdued, with great ease, the islands of Corsica and Sardinia, and a fleet of three hundred saU conveyed a barbarian army to lay waste the opposite shores of the Adriatic. But the Goths were unskiUed in maritime warfare, and the growing strength of their navy was checked and broken by a defeat near the Bay of Ancona, when no more than eleven gallies out of forty-seven effected their escape. During these transactions, which occupied a space of four years, Justinian viewed at first the loss of Italy without concern. His zeal against the Arians was, however, artfully inflamed 548^552 by Pope Vigilius, and he consented to renew the Gothic war, yet, as formerly, he provided no sufficient forces ; and his rapid revocation of generals clearly marks his feeble and vacillating judgment. After selecting his nephew Germanus, he suddenly changed in favour of Liberius, a civilian unfitted for so important a command by the infirmities of age and want of experience in the field.* No sooner had the new general sailed for Sicily, than he was supplanted by Artaban, who in his turn yielded to Germanus, appointed for the second time. Great expectations were entertained of the latter, his former * Liberius was extremely old, (Procop. Goth. lib. in. cap. 39.) Yet Gibbon complains of his youth, and Cousin (ad Goth. lib. iv. t. 24,) confounds him with the Pope of that name, who died two centuries before. 392 THE LIFE OF [chap. vii. victories over the Sclavonian invaders and rebels in Africa were remembered, his flight from Antioch was forgotten — (such is the favour shown to princes), and his marriage with Matasontha gave him friends and partizans amongst the Goths themselves. But all these hopes were disappointed by his early death ; and his son Justinian, who, with John the Sanguinary, succeeded him as joint commanders, were soon after wards removed. The Emperor now cast his eyes upon Narses, whose ambition for mihtary honours had not cooled during twelve years of inactivity or of diplomatic employment, but whose judgment was not dazzled by the tempting proposal. The late example of Behsarius clearly showed the inefficiency of the greatest personal exertions, when unsupported by sufficient forces ; and Narses resolutely declined the direction of the war, unless he received such sup plies, both of men and money, as might enable him to conduct it with advantage to his country and glory to himself. This favour, which the hero had soli cited in vain, was granted to the courtier. The pubhc treasury was placed at his disposal ; large sums were laid aside to tempt the fidelity of deserters from the Gothic standards ; and whUe the payment of arrears gratified the ancient soldiers, the hberahty of Narses attracted new. Alboin, King of the Lom bards, was induced by great presents to execute a former treaty with the empire ; and he dispatched as auxiliaries, two thousand five hundred of his bravest soldiers,* besides more than three thousand * This number is stated by Gibbon at two thousand two hundred, chap, vu.] BELISARIUS. 393 of less note. A squadron of Persian refugees was collected, levies were made in Thrace and Illyria, and the Roman standards were joined by three thousand Herulian horsemen, to whom Narses had peculiarly endeared himself by his former largesses in Italy. The total number of the troops assembled is not recorded, but cannot be estimated at less than thirty thousand men ;* and whUe the preceding Byzantine armies in this war, from their extreme inferiority of numbers, had on no occasion been able to encounter TotUa in the open country, and accept the battle which he constantly was offering, we find that the force of Narses greatly exceeded that which his antagonist could muster.f Thus the advantage of numbers was suddenly retorted on the Goths. When acting under Behsarius in the earlier Italian campaigns, we have seen Narses in the most disad vantageous colours, careless of the pubhc interest, strugghng against legitimate authority, and always (vol. vii. p. 382.) He has blindly followed the translation of Maltret bis mule ducentos, while the original Greek says expressly : ireiiTa- koo-iovs re Kai Siirxihiovs (Goth. lib. iv. c. 36.) In like manner, (p. 380) he draws volunteers from Germany, on the authority of Cousin, who in one place (ad Goth. Ub. ni. c. 39) has mistaken Germanus for Germania. Yet, only a few pages further, we find Gibbon loudly condemning the " French and Latin readers of Procopius." * I derive this computation from the numbers at the battle of Tagina, when, however, the army had been reinforced by a detach ment from the garrison of Ravenna. On that day, each of the wings amounted to eight thousand ; there was a squadron, at the left wing, of fifteen hundred ; and the Lombards and Heruli, in the centre, made eight thousand five hundred more. The Persians, the Huns, and other confederates, are mentioned, but not computed. f See, especially, Goth. lib. iv. i-. 30. s 3 394 THE LIFE OF [chap. vii. ready to hinder the prosecution of the war through private jealousies and cabals. But by an unusual transition, the turbulent subaltern had become a skilful, judicious, and discerning general, and ever since he held the supreme command had dihgently recommended and enforced the duties of subordina tion. As soon as his arrangements were completed, he led his troops to Salona, and from thence to the head of the Adriatic Gulf. In order to avoid the Franks, who, during the distracted state of Italy, had usurped several of its northern districts, Narses marched along the morasses and lagoons of the Venetian shore, reached Ravenna without hindrance, and aUowed nine days for the refreshment of his sol diers. In his further progress, some molestation was experienced from the garrison of Rimini, which had cut through the stately marble bridge constructed by Augustus, and still remaining to attest his munifi cence. But Narses effected a passage higher up the stream, and, avoiding the fortress of Petra Pertusa, diverged to the mountains on his right, and rejoined the Flaminian road a few mUes below that dangerous defile. Confiding in his superior force, and doubtful how long he might be able to control and unite the jarring elements of which it was composed, Narses postponed the siege of cities, and was anxious to avaU himself of his advantages in a pitched and decisive battle. On the other hand, the martial and impetuous spirit of Totila rendered him no less impatient for a prompt conclusion of the war ; and having mustered all his chap, til] BELISARIUS. 395 troops at Rome, he led them by hasty marches against the enemy. The two armies came in presence in the field of Tagina, near the modern town of Gualdo, a level space surrounded on almost A D™52 every side by the rugged heights of the Apennine. This spot had already been rendered famous by a defeat of the Gauls, and seemed to present an inauspicious augury to the barbarians.* Totila was not dismayed by the formidable aspect of the hostUe army, and haughtUy dismissed the envoys of Narses, who represented the folly of attempting to contend with such overwhelming numbers, and urged him to anticipate defeat by capitulation. " On the eighth " day," said the wUy monarch, " we wiU meet in " battle," but these words did not deceive his vigUant antagonist; and when, next morning, he suddenly drew out his troops in array, he found the Romans fully prepared for an engagement. Under these circumstances, the onset was delayed by the bar barian, untU two thousand Goths, his last reinforce ments, should arrive ; and he availed himself of the interval to display before both armies his personal activity and strength. Gold shone upon his armour, the royal purple was conspicuous in a streamer from his spear, and his spirited steed was made to prance and curvet in the most skilful evolutions. He hurled his lance into the air, he caught it in its fall, he threw himself backwards on his saddle and suddenly recovered his seat, and, in short, observes * Liv. Ub. x. c. 28. Procop. Goth. lib. iv. c 29. 396 THE LIFE OF [chap, vii, the admiring historian,* it was apparent that from his earhest youth he had been well instructed in the art of dancing. Meanwhile the Roman general rode along the line, exhorting his troops to over whelm the scanty battahons of the Goths, and displaying golden bracelets, coUars, and other pre cious trappings, as the destined rewards of valour. It was late in the afternoon before TotUa received his expected succours, and having then exchanged his glittering cuirass for some less splendid and con spicuous armour, he gave the signal for battle. The engagement was short, but decisive. A headlong charge of the Gothic horsemen was steadfastly encountered by the Roman line, and they were assailed in flank f by distant volleys of arrows; whilst the lance, their only weapon, could neither avert nor retaliate this attack. They were driven back in confusion and dismay, and pressing against the Gothic infantry, broke its ranks and involved it in their flight. The runaways were pursued in all directions by the relentless conquerors; no quarter was given ; and the loss of the barbarians, on this occasion, exceeded six thousand men. Protected by the approach of night, TotUa had fled from the field, followed by only five of his train : he was overtaken by some Roman soldiers, headed by Asbad, of the tribe of the Gepidse ; but they were yet ignorant of * Procop. Goth. lib. iv. «. 31. + This manoeuvre of closing round the flanks of an assailant in battle was, according to Agathias, technically called zKiKapmov eftirpotrdias, (lib. ii. p. 44.) chap, vn.] BELISARIUS. 397 the importance of their prize. The dangerous secret was revealed by the inconsiderate exclamation of a Goth : " Do you dare to strike the King ? " and Asbad, instructed by these words, raised his lance and pierced Totila with a mortal wound. A blow which he himself immediately received from a brave barbarian, disabled him from further conflict or pur suit ; his soldiers remained in attendance on their chief, and the Goths bore off their prince at full speed, in spite of the anguish which he suffered from such rapidity of movement. After a progress of twelve mUes, they halted at the village of Capra. * The expiring monarch was lifted from his horse, and the fidelity of his subjects soothed his latest mo ments, but the humble tomb to which their pious care consigned him was, a few hours afterwards, revealed by Gothic treachery and rifled by Roman curiosity and avarice. The remains of Totila were exposed to the exulting gaze of the soldiery, whilst his bloody garments and hat adorned with jewels were dispatched, as trophies of victory, to the Emperor, and laid before his throne at a solemn meeting of his court, f Such, after reigning eleven years, was the end of Totila, a prince whose death left his countrymen in almost as desperate a con dition as he had found them on his first accession. From the field of Tagina Narses now pursued his * The site of Capra is investigated by Sigonius, but he seems to place it too far to the northward, near Arezzo. (De Occident. Imp. Op. vol. i. p. 729.) f John Malala, vol. ii. p. 231 Theophanes Chronograph, p. 193. 398 THE LIFE OF [chap. vii. march towards the capital ; nor could the towns of Spoleto and Narni, which TotUa had dismantled, offer any obstacle to his progress. The Eternal City yielded to his first assault. The Gothic garrison, intrenching itself on the mole of Hadrian, pro tracted its resistance a few days longer; but Narses was enabled to send once more to Justinian the keys of Rome, wliich had thus been taken and retaken five times in less than twenty years. Each suc cessive capture had been oppressive to the people, but this last was fatal to the senate. The Barbarian confederates in the Byzantine army never faded to represent the wealthy as traitors to the Emperor, and often committed murder as an excuse for robbery, while on the other hand, the senators in SicUy, who had begun to hasten homewards, were intercepted in Campania by the despair and vengeance of the Goths, and three hundred high-born hostages from Rome were butchered to the northward of the Po. The death of so many nobles appears to have occasioned the downfaU and cessation of their order in the state, and thus almost the same epoch, though from very different causes, beheld the Roman senate and the Roman consulship extinguished. From this time forwards, tiU the new institution by Arnold of Brescia, in the twelfth century, the annals of history seldom contain the words of Consul or Senator, and even then these classic titles are only used for Count or Seigneur.* * See Du Cange, Gloss. Med. Lat. vol. i. et iii. sub voc. Consul et chap, vn.] BELISARIUS. 399 After the death of Totila, as after the captivity of Vitiges, the surviving remnant of the Goths assem bled within the ramparts of Pavia, where Teias, one of their principal officers, was unanimously proclaimed their King. That the new monarch was worthy of the throne may be presumed from his accepting it so readily, at a moment when it only promised a career of perU, toil, and probable destruction. On learning that the troops of Narses had invested Cumse, he resolved, without delay, to relieve that important fortress, which was defended by his brother Aligern, and contained the greater part of the treasures of Totila. Putting himself therefore at the head of his slender force, he advanced by hasty marches into Southern Italy, eluded the Roman detachments stationed to arrest his progress, and arrived in safety at the foot of Mount Vesuvius. Here he entrenched himself along the river called Sarnus by the ancient Romans, and Draco in the middle ages, and which at present has again reverted to the name of Sarno. The opposite bank of the stream was occupied by Narses, and, for two whole months, these armies continued in presence, appa rently desirous of exhausting each other's patience, and only engaged by occasional single combats or distant skirmishes of archers. At the end of this period the fleet of Teias, on which he depended for the subsistence of his soldiers, deserted to the Senator, and Gibbon, vol. xn. p. 278. The word senator was used for nobles or principal citizens as early as the time of Gregory of Tours. See his history, especiaUy lib. i. c, 29. 400 THE LIFE OF [chap. vii. Romans, and the barbarians, struck with consterna tion, fled from their advantageous position towards the neighbouring mountain of Lactarius. On this commanding height the Goths might be secure from attack but not from famine, and instead of awaiting its lingering tortures, they resolved to meet a prompt and glorious death in battle. Descending therefore into the plain, they dismissed their horses that no means of escape might aUure them from their pur pose, and charged the Roman army without a hope of victory, but with aU the courage of despair. Hitherto the Gothic monarch had displayed the skill of a chief; he was now remarkable for the personal prowess of a soldier. Conspicuous at the van of his httle army, he expected and parried the blows which were aimed from every quarter at so important a mark, while his weighty lance seldom faded in transfixing his assailants. Neither danger nor fatigue could move him from his station, and he seemed, says Procopius, as if rooted in the ground. At length, when caUing on his armbearer* for a fresh buckler, and laying aside his own, encumbered by the weight of twelve hostile javelins, his breast, un covered by this incautious movement, was struck with a mortal blow. His severed head was raised on a spear by the troops of Narses, but the barba rians were rather animated than disheartened by the example of their leader. They continued the * The name of an armbearer amongst the Northern barbarians, appears to have been Scbilpor, in which we may trace the origin of Schildfiihrer, in modern German. (Paul Warnefrid, Ub. ii. >.-. 28.) chap, tu.] BELISARIUS. 401 engagement tUl the night, they renewed it on the ensuing day with their strength enfeebled, but their spirit unimpaired, and it was only when darkness again divided the combatants that the few survivors proposed, and Narses accepted, a capitulation. It was agreed that the remaining Goths should either wander forth from Italy, or live in future the peace ful and loyal subjects of Justinian.* StUl, however, in spite of this treaty, Aligern, nestled on the lofty rock of Cumae, continued to hold out, and the Roman general was compeUed to employ the most protracted and laborious expedients against him. The Sybil's grotto (no doubt the same which now, returned to its original size, is displayed to the inquiring traveller by Itahan antiquaries) was scooped and widened to an enormous cavern, and drew down in its fall a rampart and gate of Cumse which surmounted it.f Yet the undaunted Goth stiU maintained the summit of the crumbling precipice, nor was it tiU he per ceived the entire dispersion of his countrymen, and hopelessness of his cause, that he consented to sur render. He was received with aU the courtesy and respect which so high-minded an enemy deserved, and forthwith appointed to an honourable post in the Roman army. With this capitulation, the Gothic war may be considered as ended, and the Gothic name as alto gether extinguished. It is true that an embassy * Compare Agathias, Ub. i. p. 11; and Procopius, Goth. lib. iv. c. 35. By supposing an alternative, we can easily reconcile their conflicting statements. f Agath. Ub. i. p. 21. 402 THE LIFE OF [chap. vii. which Teias had previously dispatched to the Franks and Alamanni, obtained from them a promise of assistance, and that next autumn a large horde of these barbarians descended from the Alps. But it arrived too late ; defeat had thinned, and emigration scattered the Goths : they could no longer claim any political importance, and were a pretext rather than a party to the ensuing war. Having thus brought their monarchy to its final overthrow, I shaU now bid fareweU to Itahan history, which I have already carried beyond the strict limits of my subject. chap, viii.] BELISARIUS. 403 CHAPTER VIII. In the first Italian war a precipitate recall had hindered Belisarius from completing and securing his triumphs ; in the second he had been denied any effective means for upholding his ancient reputation. At Constantinople he had suffered the most unjust and ignominious treatment, yet in circumstances where resistance would have been as easy, and perhaps more safe, the loyalty of Belisarius had always patiently submitted. This weU- known loyalty was now destined to expose him to the first brunt of a treasonable enterprise, directed against the person and the empire of Justinian, for on the same prin ciple that the attack of a rampart should be pre ceded by the overthrow of its bulwarks, the con spirators had resolved to aim their earliest blow at Behsarius, as the firmest pillar of the throne. To explain the views and motives of the parties to this plot, some previous detaUs are requisite. A marriage with Prsejecta, the Emperor's niece,* had obtained for the patrician Areobindus the im portant government of Africa. In the eyes of his sovereign, this alliance might supply the want of military skUl and even of personal courage, but the new Exarch found it of little avaU in gaining the * Ducange, Fam. Aug. Byz. p. 98. 404 THE LIFE OF [chap. viii. esteem or commanding the obedience of his subjects. His weakness was speedily discovered and as speedily abused. An artful officer, named Gonthar, who had originally served in the guards of Solomon,* dis cerned, with the keen glance of ambition, an oppor tunity so favourable to a rebel. By his cabals the Moors were excited to hostUities and the Roman troops to mutiny; a conflict arose in the very streets of Carthage, and though a great number of faithful adherents stiU supported the lieutenant of the Emperor, they were disheartened and defeated by his cowardly flight. Areobindus had escaped to the sanctuary of a convent in Car thage, which Solomon had lately buUt and surrounded with strong waUs, for the twofold purpose of monastic seclusion or military strength. The Bishop of Car thage was dispatched by the victorious Gonthar to draw his rival from that sacred retreat, under the most solemn promises of safety, and the trembhng Areobindus returned to the palace, clad in the habit of a slave, and stretching forth in his hands the gospels and an infant newly baptised, yet neither these rehgious restraints, nor his abject entreaties for life, could disarm the vengeance of the tyrant. He was wel comed with smiling courtesy and specious promises, and at supper the highest place was assigned him, but at the close of the entertainment he was niur- dered.f Thus Gonthar became, for awhile, the sovereign of Africa ; and, hoping to aUay the indigna tion of the Emperor, he drew Prsejecta from captivity, * Proeop. Vandal, lib. ii. c. 19. + Ibid. lib. ii. c. 26. chap, tiii.] BELISARIUS. 405 aUotted to her an apartment in the palace, and openly aspired to her hand. But the daring usurper did not enjoy the fruits of his treason beyond thirty days. Amongst the officers who had attended Areo bindus at his departure from Constantinople, was Artaban, an Armenian, of the noble race of the Arsacides, who had lately headed an insurrection of his countrymen against the troops of Justinian, and had transfixed witfi his lance their general Sittas, the colleague of Behsarius, in his first mihtary expedi tion.* His subsequent desertion to the Romans, of which the motive is not explained, was rewarded by an appointment in the Byzantine army, and under his direction a conspiracy was now formed against the African tyrant. The unguarded hour of a ban quet was fixed upon as the fittest for assassination, and Artasires, one of the followers of the Armenian prince, was chosen to strike the first blow. " If my " attempt should faU," said this intrepid soldier to his chief, " kiU me on the spot with my own sword, " to turn aside aU suspicion from yourself, and lest " the rack should wring from me the names of my " accomplices." An enterprise, undertaken with such heroic determination, could hardly prove other wise than successful. Gonthar was slain, and Carthage once more acknowledged the sway of Justinian, who showed his gratitude by naming Artaban Exarch of the province he had saved.f But this recompense, however ample, did not * Procop. Pers. lib. ii. c. 3. + Procop. Vandal. Ub. ii. c. 28. 406 THE LIFE OF [chap. viii. satisfy his aspiring spirit. He had become enamoured of the widow of Areobindus, who, on her part, was not unmindful of the debt due to her deliverer ; nor did she set out for Constantinople until she had bound herself to him by a solemn promise of mar riage. After her departure Africa appeared weari some and tasteless to her lover, who solicited his recaU from Justinian, and hastened to the capital, where it is probable that he might have succeeded in his wishes, had not an unforeseen hindrance inter posed. In his early youth he had contracted a marriage which was afterwards dissolved, according to some of the legal grounds established in that age. As long as Artaban had continued poor and unfor tunate, his wife had cheerfully admitted the legality of the divorce ; but his rise to wealth, prosperity, and power, suddenly awakened her pious scruples and conjugal affection. Quitting her retreat for Con stantinople, she threw herself at the feet of the Empress, and implored her intercession for restoring her beloved and rightful husband. The compassion of Theodora was excited, her devotion was alarmed, she compeUed the unwilling Artaban to take back again his former spouse, and Prsejecta became the bride of another suitor.* It is true that soon after wards the death of the Empress left Artaban at liberty to obtain a second divorce, but his mind stiU brooded deeply over his disappointed passion, and was intent on some project of revenge, and his * Procop. Goth. Ub. ni. u. 31 . chap, viii.] BELISARIUS. 407 resentment was inflamed by the sohcitations of his kinsman Arsaces, lately exasperated against Justinian by detected treachery and ignominious pun- a.d. 548. ishment. It was resolved by these two Arme nians to assassinate the Emperor, and to raise to the throne his nephew Germanus, whose valour and virtue had greatly endeared him to the people. They well knew, however, theinfiexible fidelity of Behsarius, now on his return from Italy, and dreaded lest, instead of patiently acquiescing in the projected usurpation, he should, on the first intelligence of it, collect an army in Thrace, and lead it to punish the conspirators. They therefore considered it more prudent to defer the execution of their design till the arrival of the hero at Constantinople, when a single thrust of a dagger might free them from aU future apprehen sions of his loyalty. Little doubt was entertained by the traitors of the concurrence of Germanus, whose feehngs of attachment to Justinian, both as a subject and as a kinsman, must, in their opinion, long since have yielded to the injustice and neglect which his merit had experienced. But the honest and high-minded prince recoiled with horror from their infamous proposal ; and, far from engaging in their enterprise, was anxious, on the contrary, to disclose it to the Emperor. To obtain, however, more certain evidence than his own unsupported assertion, he employed the stratagem of pretended compliance. A trusty friend concealed beneath a curtain was the witness of a private interview, and his testimony, when brought forward before 408 THE LIFE OF [chap. viii. Justinian, served to arraign the conspirators, and to vindicate Germanus. The plot was revealed to the Emperor at almost the very time when Behsarius was entering the suburbs of Constantinople, and thus a few days of earlier departure from Otranto, or of greater speed in his journey, would probably have cost him his life. Through the warning of Germanus, it was easy to avert the threatened danger; a meeting of the senate was convened for the trial, the persons of Artaban and Arsaces were secured, and the rack extorted from them the confession of their crime. The only remaining question, therefore, was the sen tence to be passed upon them, and on this point we may, according to our various dispositions, either admire the clemency, or deplore the weakness of Justinian, who merely degraded Artaban from his dignities, and confined him in an apartment of the palace.* A readiness to pardon is certainly the more popular and shining quality in princes, yet it may be doubted whether we ought not to prefer a just seve rity wliich shields the innocent by seldom sparing the guilty, and strikes the minds of hesitating rebels with salutary terror. But if the mere forgiveness of Justinian seem rash and inconsiderate, what shaU we say of his once more raising Artaban to a high and honourable trust ? f The convicted conspirator * Procop. Goth. lib. hi. c. 32. t Le principe de Ia monarchic se corrompt lorsque l'honneur a dte mis en contradiction avec les honneurs, et que l'on peut etre a la fois couvert d'infamie et de dignite's. (Esprit des Loix, Ub. viii. c. 7.) chap, vin.] BELISARIUS. 409 was one amongst the many generals whom the caprice of the imperial councils, after the return of Behsa rius, appointed in rapid succession to the supreme authority in the Gothic war. He is afterwards men tioned as obtaining some success against the troops of TotUa in Sicily,* but his further fate is not re corded, and I look in vain for the termination of his singular and adventurous career. Such were the pubhc transactions which attended the return of Belisarius from Italy. Another of a private nature seems to have occurred, which is how ever transmitted to us by a testimony neither as authentic nor as ample .f It had been a favourite object of the late Empress to conclude a marriage between Anastasius, her nephew, or perhaps one of her Ulegitimate descendants, J and Joannina, the only child of Behsarius, and therefore sole heiress of his wealth. Joannina had been left at Constantinople when her parents set out for the Itahan war, and they were far from approving of the proposed alh ance ; but fearful of offending, by an open refusal, a woman of such exalted rank and vindictive temper, they merely deferred their consent tUl their return, probably expecting, from the lingering disease of Theodora, that she might then be no more. The Empress was not however to be so easily baffled. * Procop. Goth. Ub. iv. c. 24. t Hist. Arcan. t. 5. X There is great difficulty as to the precise relationship of Anas tasius to the Empress. Alemanni and Ducange, on the faith of the Historia Arcana, make him her grandson, but the three objections of Gibbon are insurmountable, (vol. vu. p. 375.) T 410 THE LIFE OF [chap. viii. She employed the last few months of her life in ren dering, as she imagined, this marriage necessary, by prevailing on the intended bride to sacrifice her honour, and it was not tiU half a year from this time that Antonina arrived at Constantinople. Regard less of the virtue, the fame, and perhaps the affections of her daughter, she broke off the intended nuptials, and Belisarius, on his return, submitted as usual to the wishes of his wife. Whether Joannina ever con tracted any other marriage, or whether the famUy of Belisarius was extinct at her death, has not been recorded. From this time forwards, during the next eleven years, the hfe of Behsarius affords no re markable occurrence. He remained at Constantino ple in the tranquil enjoyment of opulence 548—559 aim dignities. Besides his ancient post of general of the East, Justinian had named him chief of the imperial guards, and though the older senators and patricians might have claimed superior rank, they unanimously yielded to his pre cedency of merit.* In this weU-earned repose Beh sarius might probably have continued tiU his death, had not the calamities and danger of his country once more summoned the veteran to arms. During the last years of this reign the apparent quiet of the empire was not that healthful repose which a nation expects and requires at the close of a victorious war, but the faintness of utter exhaustion and decay. The glaring faults and the pernicious * Compare Procop. Goth. lib. iii. c. 35. lib. iv. t. 21. We must now bid fareweU to this accurate and judicious historian. chap, viii.] BELISARIUS. 411 consequences of Justinian's military system have already been exposed elsewhere, and the Emperor, who even in his youth had displayed the timidity and vaciUation of old age, daUy became more sus picious of his soldiers and fearful of his enemies.* In order to restrain the one without employing the other, he adopted the dangerous plan of paying yearly subsidies to bribe the peace of the barbarians, and endeavoured, by subtle negotiations, to stir up their separate tribes to mutual war.f Such an expe dient may sometimes be successfully employed but can never be safely rehed on ; yet the Emperor, says Agathias, treated the army as if he expected to have no further occasion for its services. Thus the Roman troops rapidly melted away, the few remaining squa drons were stationed in distant provinces, and nothing was left for the protection of the capital but the corrupt and unwarlike Scholarians. Various tribes beyond the Danube, whose uncouth names may be comprised in the general appellation of Bulgarians, t desolated the European provinces by many a preda tory inroad, each terminated rather by their own satiety of plunder, than by any opposition a.d. 559. they encountered. At length, m the thirty- second winter of the reign of Justinian, a more * Agathias, lib. v. p. 157. His testimony is confirmed by that of Menander. (Excerpt. Legat. p. 100.) t Hist. Arcan. c. 11., and an extract from Joannes Antiochenus ap. Alemann. p. 127. X I must observe that the word Bulgarian does not occur in the narrative of Agathias, but I am induced to employ it by the example and arguments of Gibbon, (vol. vii. p. 277.) T 2 41 2 THE LIFE OF [chap. viii. important and decisive expedition was attempted. Zabergan,* their enterprising and ambitious leader, passed the frozen Danube, at the head of his cavalry, and advanced by rapid marches into the midst of Thrace, where he divided his forces, and having de tached the one share to the conquest or rather the pillage of Greece, led the other against the capitahf Under his personal command Zabergan retained no more than seven thousand horsemen; but their number appeared multiphed by the extent of their devastations, and by the terror of the Greeks. As heathens, they were ignorant or careless of the sanc tity of churches and of convents, and freely despoUed the first of wealth and the second of beauty. Crowds of captives were hurried along in their train, without regard to sickness, pregnancy, or age, and the new born infants were left like corpses on a field of battle to the dogs and birds of prey. The Long WaU of Anastasius might have arrested the progress of Za bergan, but its sohdity had already yielded to time and decay, and it is compared by Agathias, in his usual rhetorical style, to an unprotected sheepfold, where the prowling wolf, far from encountering a bite, is not even threatened by a bark. There were no troops to man it ; no military machines to play upon the enemy, nor any engineers to direct their use, several breaches were open and accessible, and * Agathias caUs this chieftain sometimes Zamergan and sometimes Zabergan, but Menander turns the scale in favour of the latter. (Excerpt. Legat. p. 132.) + For the proceedings of the army in Greece, compare Agathias, lib. v. p. 155. and 169. chap, viii.] BELISARIUS. 413 other parts were demolished by the assailants with as little hindrance, says the historian, as any private dweUing could be razed. Continuing his march from hence, the savage chief pitched his camp at the viUage of Melantias, on the banks of the river Athyras, and no more than twenty miles from the capital. It is remarkable that this was also the spot which, in the reign of Zeno, bounded the progress of Theodoric the Great.* So bold and successful an aggression filled Con stantinople with helpless and despairing terror. The public places were encumbered by a growing multi tude of vUlagers and peasants, some escaped from the actual presence of Zabergan, and others merely from the fear of his approach. The citizens hstened with consternation to their dismal tales, and already be held in fancy the sufferings of a siege, ending only in the conflagration of their dwelhngs, and the mur der of their families ; and their dismay could hardly have been greater had the Bulgarians already pene trated into the midst of the city. Nor were these feelings confined to the populace alone ; the senators and nobles were seen to mingle with it, under the usual levelling influence of fear, and the Emperor himself sat trembhng in his palace. By his orders aU the churches in the European confines of the capital, from the Propontis to the Euxine, were hastUy stripped of their most precious ornaments, and the sea was covered with barges, and each road * MarcelUn. Chron. ap. Sirmond Op. vol n. p. 370. THE LIFE OF [chap. viii. lariots, conveying these and other treasures to ielter of the waUs. Near the Golden Gate,* the attack of the enemy was expected to take place, an useless crowd of officers issued their con tradictory and unheeded orders,f and some of the unwarfike Scholarians seemed (such is the significant expression of Agathias) to guard the neighbouring ramparts. In this general confusion and affright, Justinian and his subjects turned with hope to the iUustrious conqueror of Africa and Italy, whose strength was broken by old age and military labours, but whose heart was still alive to the caU of loyalty and honour. The struggle was no longer for increase of territory or dominion over foreign nations, but for the very existence of the Roman empire, and Behsarius pre pared to crown his glorious life by a last and decisive battle. He resumed his rusty armour, he collected a handful of his scattered veterans, and his contem poraries were astonished at observing, amidst the weakness of decrepitude, aU the martial spirit and buoyancy of youth. J The recklessness of personal danger wliich is recorded of him in this short cam paign, would be less deserving of praise if experience did not show that we chng to life with increasing fondness in proportion as our infirmities render it painful and precarious. The first object of Belisa rius was to find means for mounting his cavalry, and * For the Golden Gate see Ducange, Const. Christ, lib. i. p. 53. + Quod in perditis rebus aecidit, omnes preecipere nemo exsequi. Tacit. Hist Ub. iii. u. 73. J Agathias, lib. v. p. 160. chap, viii.] BELISARIUS. 415 the horses of the imperial stables and of the amphi theatre were added to those which a compulsory requisition obtained from private citizens.* With every exertion he could only muster three hundred effective soldiers; they were veterans who had served under him in his former campaigns, and they were augmented in numbers, not in force, by a multitude of raw recruits, devoid of experience, of valour, and even of weapons, and whom their own countrymen represent as intending to remain spectators, rather than parties in a conflict. The Roman standards were also joined by a crowd of peasants, who sought protection from the rapine and outrage of the enemy, but were both unwilling and unable to encounter him. At the head of this mob of soldiers Belisarius undauntedly advanced from the ramparts to the viUage of Chettos, in front of the barbarians. To deter the enemy from any immediate attack, and thus obtain time for the fortification of his camp, he was desirous of creating an exaggerated impression of his numbers, and therefore dispatched outposts along the plain, to kindle fires and beacons, accord ing to a stratagem of the ancient Lombards. t Dur ing the day the place of fires was supphed by artificial clouds of dust, and Zabergan, deluded by their aspect, refrained from advancing any further against so extended a hne. Meanwhile the Roman general was * Theophanes Chronograph, p. 198. t See Paul Warnefrid, Ub. i. c. 11., with a note of Lindenbrogius. For the practice of estimating the numbers of the enemy by their fires at night, see Caesar's Commentaries. (De Bell. GalUc. lib. n. c. 7.) 416 THE LIFE OF [chap. viii. not inactive; he sent secret spies to ascertain the real strength of the enemy, of which none but vague popular rumours had been hitherto received, and by employing the peasants of his army in an occupation more suitable to their habits than warfare, his en campment was speedily surrounded by a ditch and rampart. He laboured with unremitting assiduity to establish some degree of order in the Roman ranks, but found himself opposed by two different and con flicting obstacles. No courage, as we have already seen, inspired the great mass of his army, whUe on the other hand his three hundred veterans were flushed with arrogant and overweening confidence. Like most soldiers retired from active service, they had probably boasted of their past campaigns, and from imposing upon others had, by a curious but common progress of the human mind, graduaUy imposed upon themselves, so that at length they grew almost invincible in their own opinion, and fancied that no barbarians, however numerous, could withstand their disciplined valour. They were impa tient both of stratagem and of delay, and rendered necessary a pubhc admonition from the general. " In " remembering," he said, " your ancient achieve- " ments, do not forget the calm and cautious demean- " our which secured them. Judgment, and not head- " long courage, is the true arbiter of war. How " else durst I, with my hair already whitened by old " age, and my failing limbs grown unfitted for fatigue, " plunge into the toU and tumult of another cam- " paign, unless I relied on those faculties which con- chap. Tin.] BELISARIUS. 417 " tinue unimpaired amidst bodUy decay ? If, there- " fore, prudence and good council can correct the " infirmities of dechning years, how much more will " they not avaU when you join them to the full " strength and vigour of manhood ? These bar- " barians are accustomed to predatory inroads, like " robbers they know how to rush forth unexpectedly " on their prey, but they are little practised in the " art of disposing a battle with skill or awaiting it " with firmness. Let us only observe the mUitary " discipline of our forefathers, and restrain our rash- " ness, and we shaU teach these invaders how much " a small but well-trained squadron surpasses a newly " levied and tumultuous horde." Having thus endeavoured to curb the impatience of his ancient comrades, Behsarius patiently awaited the attack of the barbarians. His stratagem had succeeded in gaining time for marshalling his forces, but Zabergan soon became aware how smaU a number of effective soldiers was in reality opposed to him. Against three hundred men he did not consider it necessary to lead his whole army at once, but taking with him no more than two thousand horse, he trusted at the first onset to disperse his antagonists and pursue them to the capital. By secret emissaries the Roman general was informed of the approach of the Bulgarians, and enabled to prepare accordingly. He chose an advantageous position behind a thick and extensive wood, and concealed a hundred of his veteran cavalry on each side of the narrow defile through which he expected Zabergan to pass, with t 3 41 S THE LIFE OF [chap. viii. instructions for them to remain in ambush until his appointed signal should be heard. From the peasants and citizens in his army he found it useless to expeet any mihtary aid, but he had provided them with stakes, which, when brandished and struck together, might resemble arms in appearance and in sound, and he directed them by their shouts to animate their countrymen and distract the enemy. Unsuspicious of danger, the Bulgarians pressed forwards with dissonant cries, and in full confidence of victory. They were boldly charged by Belisarius in front, whUe fresh enemies suddenly rose upon their rear, and the dust which clouded the air from the tramphng of the horse concealed the real weakness of the assailants from their view. On every side they heard the voice of multitudes, on every side they felt the arm of valour. Their practice in archery and their rapidity in evolution were rendered unavaihng by their confined position, and they found themselves helpless, encompassed, and cut off. In the first ranks the Roman hero was conspicuous, performing the duties and displaying the prowess of a soldier, and thus, by his united skiU and intrepidity, suc ceeded in vanquishing two thousand with three hundred men. The Bulgarians were driven back in the utmost disorder ; four hundred feU in the battle or the pursuit, and it was with difficulty that Zabergan himself effected his escape. The alarm of the fugi tives spread throughout the army at Melantias with the usual rapid contagion of fear, and the soldiers testified their sorrow and dismay by the savage rite chap, viii.] BELISARIUS. 419 of cutting deep gashes in their cheeks. Raising their camp with precipitation, they began retreating towards the north, and Belisarius prepared, by a close pursuit, to renew and complete his triumph. But this patriotic satisfaction was denied him ; his mUitary enterprises were checked in the midst of their career, and the same causes which had so often already tried his virtue and obedience, again exerted over him their baneful influence. His public services once more received, in the councUs of the Emperor, the customary rewards of slander and suspicion. At the news of his victory and of their deliverance, the citizens of Constantinople had gratefully extolled his merit, and proclaimed Behsarius as the saviour of his country. His intrepid conduct at the head of his three hundred veterans was compared to that of the same number of Spartans at Thermopylae, and his former battles against the Persians, Goths, and Vandals, were declared inferior to this last achieve ment. Such praises were imputed as a crime to Behsarius by an envious multitude of courtiers and domestics, and the general was accused of aiming at popular favour with ambitious and disloyal designs. A sentence of recal was hastily pronounced and submissively obeyed. Behsarius was received at the palace with coldness and disparagement, his late service was buried in silence, and instead of following up his victory against the troops of Zabergan, Justinian preferred the less glorious task of bribing their departure. On learning that Belisarius was recaUed, the Bulgarians had stopped short in their 420 * THE LIFE OF [chap. vii. retreat, and lingered during the whole summer in Thrace, but at length the liberahty of the emperor, and the dread of being intercepted by armed vessels on the Danube, induced them to retire homewards for a stipulated sum. The Byzantine people were loud in their murmurs at this treaty, expressing the strongest indignation that these barbarians, after pillaging the provinces, threatening the capital, and insulting the majesty of the empire, should be after wards paid and rewarded by Justinian for their friendly visit.* On his part the Emperor showed his sense of such ignominy and his desire to avert it in future, by his anxious dihgence in fortifying the Long WaU, and he even stationed himself for some time at Selybria, to superintend and hasten its repairs. With the defeat of the Bulgarians we must bid farewell to contemporary evidence, and the disgrace and death of Belisarius are only to be gathered from the obscure and contradictory records of later ages. An inquiry into the real facts wiU unavoidably lead me into such minute and tedious details, that I shall postpone it tUl the conclusion of my narrative, and merely state, in this place, the general results at which I have arrived. Nearly four years from the battle of Chettos, a conspiracy was formed by Marcellus, Sergius, and some other Ulustrious senators, for the a.d. 563. . . . murder of Justinian. It is no small proof how much the natural faults of Justinian were aggra- ' Agathias, lib. v. p. 1 70. chap, viii.] BELISARIUS. 421 vated by old age, and how intolerable his govern ment had grown, that the disaffected should not have patiently expected the death of an octogenarian. The conspirators were detected, torture was used to wring from them the names of their accomplices, and some domestics of Behsarius ventured to accuse their master.* Since the Bulgarian victory, the hero had remained under the displeasure of Justinian; but it required the very extremity of jealous dotage to believe that he, who, in the fuU vigour of man hood, had refused a crown, and preserved his loyalty amidst the strongest temptations to rebeUion, should now, at the close of life, assume the part of an assassin. Such considerations were overlooked by his sovereign, or suppressed by his enemies. In the month of December, Behsarius was ignominiously deprived of his guards and domestics; his fortunes were sequestered, and he was detained a close pri soner in his palace. The trial of the true and sup posed conspirators took place in the ensuing year, when a sentence of death was probably pronounced on aU and executed on the greater number. The past services of Behsarius, which might have proved his innocence, served at least to mitigate his fate; and, according to a frequent practice of the Byzantine court with eminent state- prisoners, the decree of death was relaxed into one * It must be observed that the Roman laws limited the use of tor ture to slaves, except in cases of treason. Sed omnes omnino in Majestatis crimine quod ad personas Principum attinet, si ad perti- naciam provoeentur, cum res exigit torquentur. See the Pandects, Ub. lxviu. tit. 18. THE LIFE OF [chap. viii. ness, and his eyes were accordingly put out. then that, restored to hberty, but deprived of alT means of subsistence by the preceding confisca tion of his property, Behsarius was reduced to beg his bread before the gates of the convent of Laurus. The platter of wood or earthenware which he held out for charity, and his exclamation, " Give a penny " to Belisarius the General," remained for many years impressed on the recoUection of the people. It would seem that this spectacle of persecuted merit, aroused some dangerous feelings of indigna tion and pity, and was therefore speedUy removed from public view. Behsarius was brought back, most probably as a prisoner, to his former palace, a portion of his treasures was aUotted for his use, and these circumstances may have given some colour for the assertion two or three centuries afterwards, of his having been restored to honours and to freedom. His death, which perhaps was hastened by the grief or the hardships of captivity, ensued in the course of next spring, and Antonina, who survived a.d. 565. him, devoted to the cloister the remains of her life and fortune. Such, in aU likelihood, is the authentic narrative of the fall of Behsarius. In person Belisarius was taU and commanding, and presented a remarkable contrast to the dwarfish and ungainly aspect of his rival Narses.* His fea tures were regular and noble, and his appearance in the streets of Constantinople, after the Vandal and Gothic victories, never failed to attract the admira- * Procop. Goth. Ub. iii. e. 1. Agathias, lib. i. p. 27. chap, tiii.] BELISARIUS. 423 tion of the people. His character may not unaptly be compared to that of Marlborough, whom he equaUed in talents and closely resembled in his faults of uxoriousness and love of money. As a military leader, he was enterprising, firm, and fear less ; his conception was clear, and his judgment rapid and decisive. His conquests were achieved with smaller means than any other of hke extent recorded in history. He frequently experienced reverses in the field, but in no case did he fail with out some strong and sufficient reason for his failure, such as the mutiny of his soldiers, the overwhelming numbers of his antagonists, or his total want of neces sary supplies ; and it may also be observed of him, as of Arminius, that though sometimes beaten in battle, he was never overcome in war.* His superior tactics covered his defeats, retrieved his losses, and prevented his enemies from reaping the fruits of victory ; and it is particularly mentioned, that even in the most desperate emergencies, he never lost his courage or presence of mind. Amongst the circumstances which contributed most strongly to his success, were the kindness which his adversaries met with at his hands, and the strict disciphne which he maintained amongst his soldiers. This moderation of Behsarius appears the more entitled to praise from the fierceness and disorder usual in his age.f It was his first care after every victory to extend mercy and protection to the van- * Tacit. Annal. Ub. U. c. 88. f See, for instance, an incidental remark of Procopius, (Vandal. lib. i. c. 21.) 424 THE LIFE OF [chap. viii. quished, and to shield their persons, and, if possible, their property from injury. During a march the trampling of the corn fields by the cavalry was care fully avoided, and the troops, as Procopius teUs us, seldom ventured even to gather an apple from the trees, while a ready payment to the vUlagers for any provisions they brought, made them bless the name of Behsarius, and secured to the Roman camp a constant and cheerful supply. To the soldiers who transgressed these rules, the general was stern and unforgiving ; no rank could defy, no obscurity elude his justice, and because he punished severely, he had to punish seldom. He knew how to despise those shallow declaimers who cry out against any rigour in the law because they can more easily compute the penalties it inflicts than the crimes it has prevented. But while the hcentious and the turbulent were repressed by the strong arm of Behsarius, his libera lity cheered and animated the deserving. The gift of a golden bracelet or coUar rewarded any achievement in battle, the loss of a horse or weapon was imme diately supplied from his private funds,* and the wounded found in him a father and a friend. To aU he was open and easy of access, and by his courteous demeanour often comforted where he could not reheve. From his generosity, says Procopius, you would have deemed him very rich, from his man ners very poor. His private virtues promoted and confirmed the disciphne of his soldiers ; none in * Compare Procop. Goth. lib. i. c. 28. and Ub. in. c. I. In another passage, the historian alludes to his mildness of manner : emeiKeia iroUi) es iravTas, (lib. ii. u. 8.) chap, viii.] BELISARIUS. 425 all his campaigns ever saw him flushed with wine, and the charms of the fairest captives from the Goths or Vandals could not overcome his conjugal fidelity. But the most striking and peculiar feature in the character of Belisarius, as distinguished from other iUustrious generals, was his enduring and uncon querable loyalty. He was doubtless bound to Jus tinian by many ties of gratitude, and the suspicions entertained of him in Africa may be considered as fully counterbalanced by the triumph and other honours which attended his return. But from the siege of Ravenna tiU his final departure from Italy, he was, almost without intermission, exposed to the most galling and unworthy treatment; he was in sulted, degraded, and despised ; he was even attacked in his fame when restored to an important station, without any means for discharging its duties, and for sustaining his former reputation. It would be diffi cult to produce another instance of such signal and repeated ingratitude, unless in repubhcs, where, from the very nature of the government, no crime is so dangerous or so severely punished, as serving the state too weU. When we consider the frequency, and therefore the ease of revolutions in this age, the want of hereditary right in the imperial family, the strong attachment of the soldiers to their victorious general, while the person of Justinian was hateful even to his own domestic guards, it will, I think, be admitted, that a rebellion by Belisarius must have proved successful and secure. The same conclusion 126 THE LIFE OF [chap. viii. is likewise apparent, from the offer of proclaiming him Emperor of the West at Ravenna,* yet on no one occasion was he roused into the sUghtest mark of disobedience or resentment ; he bore every injury with unchanged submission ; he resisted the feelings of indignation, of revenge, of self-interest, and even the thirst for glory, wliich, according to Tacitus, is of all fraUties the longest retained by the wise.f I say nothing of his subsequent beggary and blindness, because it might fairly be objected that he then had no longer any means of rebelhon in his power ; but his whole previous hfe is still more remarkable for magnanimity in suffering than for exceUence in action. Besides him no more than six generals have been named, by one of our most judicious critics, as having deserved without having worn a crown ;$ and the smallness of this number should display the diffi culty of withstanding this brilliant temptation, and enhance the reputation of those few who have with stood it. The chief fault of Behsarius seems to have been his unbounded deference and submission to his wife, which rendered him first strangely blind, and after wards weakly forgiving, to her infidelity. But its mischievous effects were not confined to private life, and nearly aU the errors which can be charged upon his pubhc career are imputed to this cause. It was * Procop. Goth. lib. u. c 29. f Tacit. Hist. Ub. iv. c. 6. X See Sir WUliam Temple, (Works, vol. U. p. 285. ed. 1705.) The seven chiefs he mentions are as follows : Belisarius, ^Etius, Huniades, Gonsalo of Cordova, Scanderbeg, Alexander Duke of Parma, and the "reat Prince of Orange. chap, viii.] BELISARIUS. 427 Antonina who assumed the principal part in the depo sition of the Pope, who urged the death of Constan tine, who promoted the persecution of Photius, and in his whole conduct with regard to that worthless woman, Behsarius appears alternately the object of censure or of ridicule. His confidence in her must have tended to lower his official character, to fetter and mislead his judgment, and to prevent his justice and impartiahty wherever her passions were con cerned. The second reproach to which the character of Behsarius appears hable, is that of rapacity in the latter part of his career. His unimpeachable inte grity in early hfe is proved by the most undoubted testimony, the silence of the Secret Historian. Pos sessing an ample patrimony, and receiving from the Emperor no small share of the Gothic or Vandal treasures, in addition to the usual emoluments of his office, he was enabled to defray his gifts and largesses to the soldiers of his army, and to maintain a personal guard which, at the close of his first Gothic cam paigns, amounted to no less than seven thousand men. But, after his last command in the East, his wealth had been almost exhausted by an enormous fine ; there was no pubhc booty to share in his second Italian war ; and yet, on his return from it, we find him again in possession of considerable property. This fact is in itself strong presumptive evidence of corruption, and adds weight and certainty to the charge of the author of the Anecdotes, who informs us that Belisarius, in his last Italian campaigns, was 428 THE LIFE OF [chap. viii. compelled, by the total want of supplies from Con stantinople, to levy taxes for the prosecution of the war ; but was, at the same time, meanly solicitous to repair his shattered fortunes.* It is probable that on this, as on other occasions, the submissive hero was influenced by Antonina, in whose breast, through a common succession, the passion of love had been fol lowed by that of avarice. How Ul did Belisarius understand his real interests ! How higMy would his fame have been exalted by an honourable poverty, and how much would the animosity of his enemies at Court have abated, had they seen no spoUs to gather from his fall ! The life of Behsarius produced most important effects on the political and refigious revolutions of the world. I have already endeavoured to show that his reduction of Africa probably contributed to the rapid progress of the Mussulmans, but this and his other victories certainly saved his country from impending ruin. During the fifth century, more than half the provinces of the ancient empire had been usurped by the barbarians, and the rising tide of their conquests must soon have overwhelmed the remainder. The decline of the Byzantine Romans was threatened by the youthful vigour of the Vandal and Ostrogoth kingdoms. Although the founders of these mighty monarchies had been wisely solicitous for peace, they left their successors fully able to undertake any pro jects of invasion; and an alliance of these states against the Romans must have proved fatal to the * Hist. Arcan. c. 5. chap, viii.] BELISARIUS. 429 latter. The strength of the empire had been tried singly against Genseric by Basiliscus, against Theo doric the Great by Sabinian, and both had miserably failed. On the opposite frontier, it required the pre sence or the reputation of a hero to deter the able and ambitious Chosroes from advancing. An attentive consideration of the empire in the reigns of Zeno and Anastasius, wiU display all the symptoms of increasing weakness and approaching dissolution ; while the bar barians were flushed and impeUed by recent victory. Had not Behsarius arisen at this particular juncture, the Vandals, Goths, and Persians would in all like lihood have divided the imperial provinces amongst them. The Arian doctrines, of which the two former were zealous partisans, would then probably have prevaUed in the Christian world, the whole balance of power in Europe would have undergone incalculable changes, and the treasures of Greek and Roman genius would never have enUghtened modern times. Not only did Behsarius rescue his country from immediate downfal, but his conquests gave it resources for the future. The barbarians, who soon filled the vacant interval left by the Ostrogoths from the Danube to the Rhone, were far inferior to them in number, in spirit, and in policy, and the possession of southern Italy, which Belisarius re-annexed to the empire, served for upwards of five centuries as its most impor tant outpost and bulwark. Under the Catapans, or Greek Governors (a title stiU to be traced in the pro vince of Capitanata), the troops were inured to war, and the Lombards or Normans were encountered 430 THE LIFE OF [chap. viii. with little danger from defeat. The battles which might else have been fought beneath the walls of Constantinople, were decided. near those of Bari or Taranto. It now remains for me to explain my grounds for adhering to the original narrative of the bhndness and beggary of Behsarius. The reader may perhaps be inclined to forgive the length and tediousness of this inquiry, when he recoUects that the truth can only be discerned by carefully weighing the authority, and comparing the opposite statements of the testimonies on this subject. I must in the first place maintain that a popular report so confidently stated and so universaUy current as this, is in itself a very strong presumption of truth. Even Gibbon, who in this instance speaks so slight ingly of tradition, has elsewhere expressed great deference for its " honest voice," * and the accurate Niebuhr conceives the recoUection of Tarpeia to have been verbaUy transmitted for twenty centuries, amidst all the manifold vicissitudes of Rorne.t There is perhaps httle danger of the authority of tradition being undervalued in a country where men of sense and judgment on other subjects have seriously beheved that whole epic poems could be preserved by its means for above a thousand years. But with out proceeding to these extravagant lengths, it wiU, I think, be found that local tradition, however ' Vol. xi. p. 86. f Rb'mische Geschichtc, crster Then, 1827, p. 234. chap. Tin.] BELISARIUS. 431 defective in minute or intermediate circumstances, is almost always correct in the general and more striking results. Thus I should not expect, from the memory of the people, any exact account of the campaigns of Behsarius, but it seems weU adapted for retaining the two extreme points of his triumph and his beggary. Let it be considered, also, that in this case there was no interest of national vanity to serve by falsehood, and that his ignominious treat ment contributed neither to his own glory nor to that of the empire. It is surely not presuming too much on the veracity of any man, not even of a modern Greek, to suppose that he may speak the truth when there is no motive for a lie. To explain why so general and positive a tradition should have arisen if unfounded, its antagonists have supposed that it was invented as a strange example of the vicissitudes of fortune.* Such a theory might, perhaps, be admissible if it related to a period of profound peace and regular succession, which afforded no remarkable changes, and where fancy was caUed in to supply the place of extraor dinary facts. But the Byzantine history above all others abounds in revolutions and capricious turns of destiny, where we find the most lowborn indivi duals acknowledged as sovereigns from accident as often as from merit, and the most powerful monarchs overthrown by foreign arms or domestic treason. In the very first century after the death of Justinian, what was the fate of the Emperors Maurice, Phocas, * Gibbon, vol. vn. p. 409. Lebeau, Ub. xlix. c. 65, &c. 432 THE LIFE OF [chap. viii. Heracleonas, and Constans? With us such names may, perhaps, appear obscure or insignificant, but to a Byzantine ear would not the downfal of any one of these monarchs seem more striking than that of any subject, however Ulustrious for his station or his merit ? Or if it was absolutely necessary that this example of vicissitude should be taken from amongst the contemporaries of Justinian, there were surely sufficient real instances to render forgery superfluous. Were not the Kings of the Vandals and the Ostrogoths, perhaps the most powerful sove reigns of the age, led as captives and supphants to kneel before the throne of Justinian ? As an instance of an opposite change from low to high, was not Justinian himself raised from a cottage to the palace? And amongst his subjects we should not overlook the fate of John the Cappadocian, a man at that time of great and widely-extended reputation, who fiUed the place of prime minister for more than ten years, and whose influence and power far exceeded that of Beh sarius, since it spread over the whole empire, whUe that of the victorious general was bounded to the immediate scene of war. This able but worthless statesman was hurled from his dignity, and reduced to such poverty that he found liimself constrained to beg his bread from province to province. Each city which had groaned beneath his oppression, succes sively enjoyed a view of his degradation and distress.* Here then are examples of the strangest and most undoubted vicissitudes, and why should the Greeks, * Procop. Pers. Ub. i. c. 25. chap, viii.] BELISARIUS. 433 with these examples before their eyes, devise a new and groundless legend respecting the end of Behsarius ? Besides, is it so easy to establish a fable ? Could an event be thus imposed upon the people of the very capital where it is stated to have happened? With regard to foreign countries or distant provinces, indeed, the vulgar is always ready to beUeve any tale which may flatter its prejudices, or gratify its love of wonders. A MandevUle or Marco Polo may dazzle our eyes with the wealth of Cipango and Cathay, and European credulity may raise the coffin of Mahomet into the air, or people the coasts of Patagonia with imaginary giants. But when on the other hand our own district is in question, the power of fiction is confined to narrow bounds ; it may sometimes pervert or discolour, but can hardly invent a fact, and though for instance national vanity might transform a doubt ful battle into a victory, it must yield where there was a manifest defeat or no conflict whatever. A great number of examples might be brought forwards to show the length of time and the fidehty with which these domestic traditions are preserved. Our modern annals derive many precious facts from this source, and it is weU known how greatly a most numerous sect (the Roman Cathohc) relies on traditional records of rehgion. On every field of battle, however lonely or remote, the peasant wUl stUl point to the scene of action, and relate what his forefathers beheld. Now the memory of the disgrace of Behsarius is precisely simUar. It was preserved amongst his fellow-citizens, 434 THE LIFE OF [chap. viii. of whom some must have seen him in his degrada tion, and even reheved him by their alms, and it therefore, I conceive, deserves the name and the authority of a local tradition. To put this part of the subject in a still stronger point of view, let any one only consider for a moment by what means he could attempt to deceive his countrymen in a point of their own early history ? Were he to assert, for example, that the Black Prince, the first Earl of Shrewsbury, or any other of our national heroes, had been bhnded and reduced to beg his bread through the streets of London, what credit does he think that this " strange example of the vicissitudes " of fortune " would be likely to receive ? It may be answered, that the superior civilization of modern England to Constantinople renders this paraUel unfair. But the Byzantine empire was never devoid either of literature or learning, although it is true that the one was spiritless and servUe, and the other abstract, barren, and obscure. Not merely were there the voluminous histories which stUl instruct and fatigue posterity, but many others of which the name alone survives, and of wliich the originals have either perished, or he concealed amidst the learned rubbish of some Grecian convent. Having said thus much of the credit to which local traditions are entitled, let us next examine the pro- babUity of the event which they have here trans mitted ; that is, how far it may appear conformable to the general manners of Constantinople, or to the supposed exigencies of this particular case. It is chap, viii.] BELISARIUS. 435 weU known that the Roman Emperors, from Diocle tian downwards, borrowed many institutions and customs from Persia. Not only were Eastern objects introduced, but the Eastern name was also frequently retained, and thus for example a Roman squadron of " immortals " was estabhshed under the reign of Michael Ducas. Thus, also, the Persian Castle of Oblivion was imitated at Constantinople,* and under Justinian we are forcibly reminded of Oriental man ners, when we find a convicted traitor mounted on a camel, and led round the streets of the capital.t Now in Persia a very ancient and regular practice has prevaUed with regard to those persons whom the King may dread as rivals, but whom he still respects for their closeness of kindred or eminence of merit. By depriving them of sight, he reduces them to the same harmlessness and inefficiency as if he sentenced them to death, while at the same time he avoids the more harsh and hateful nature of that punishment. J It seems that this pohcy, amongst others, was adopted by the sovereigns of Constantinople, and the Byzan tine history affords numerous instances of its appli cation. Within twenty years from the bhnding of Behsarius, the same punishment from a similar motive was inflicted by the Emperor Tiberius on a Lombard chief. § It was not of his life but of his * Procop. Pers. Ub. i. c. 6. Theophylaet Simocatta, lib. iv. c. 6., and Gibbon, vol. Ui. p. 6. f Procop. Goth. Ub. iii. c. 32. X Procop. Pers. Ub. i. c. 6. Voyages de Chardin, vol. ti. p. 87, &c. § Ne aUquid maUgnum in regia urbe quia vir fortis erat, moliretur, jussu Imperatoris oculi evnlsi sunt. (Paul Warnefrid, lib. ii. c. 30.) TJ 2 436 THE LIFE OF [chap. viii. eyes that Constantine the Sixth was deprived by his exemplary mother St. Irene ;* the Emperor Romanus Diogenes underwent a simUar fate from his victo rious rival,f and in the reign of Nicephorus Bota- niates, the rebeUion of Bryennius was also thus rewarded. ;f Leo Grammaticus records the instance of Symbatius, son-in-law of Michael the Third, who was condemned to blindness and reduced to beg his bread by the confiscation of his fortune. § Of such examples several others might be added, but these are already, I conceive, more than sufficient to esta blish my position. Now the case of Behsarius was precisely one where the exercise of this Oriental pohcy might be expected. After forty years of faithful service, could the most servUe courtier have advised, or the most angry feeling have impeUed Justinian to command his execution ? WhUe con vinced of his late treacherous enterprise and ambi tious views, and dreading his future vengeance, would the Emperor, whose natural timidity was augmented by old age, have restored him to freedom and power? It must be remembered that we are to consider here not our own opinion of the integrity of Belisarius, but the firm belief which the Emperor entertained at this period, that his general had formed and * Theophanes, Chronograph, p. 399. Near his own times this writer becomes better authority. t Nicephor. Bryenn. Ub. i. c. 25. X This Bryennius was the father of tne historian Nicephorus Bryennius, a fact which, from the dryness of his narrative in this place, would hardly be supposed. See Ub. iv. e. 17. § See Ducange Not. Hist. ad. Zonar. p. 61. chap, viii.] BELISARIUS. 437 directed a dangerous conspiracy against his hfe. In this dUemma can anything be more probable than that Justinian, according to his favourite system, should have steered a middle course, and by blind ing the hero have secured himself against all future fears without incurring unnecessary blame? This sentence, like those to which I have already referred, was no doubt designed and represented as a mitiga tion of the capital punishment inflicted upon the other conspirators, even upon those of senatorial rank. According to our usual error of estimating ancient events by the standard of our principles and feelings in modern times, the bhndness of Behsarius may indeed appear romantic and incredible, but I think that an impartial consideration of the fore going arguments wiU show that it was completely in unison with the temper of Justinian and the customs of the Greeks. From these preliminary observations I now pro ceed to consider the direct historical testimonies on the disgrace of Behsarius. It is not denied in any quarter that he was closely imprisoned for several months by command of the Emperor. TUl the moment of his release there is no disagreement, but from that time the narrative now universally admitted represents him as restored to his former honours, while others confirm the popular account of his beg gary and blindness. Before we draw these opposite statements in array against each other, it will be proper to clear the ground for the conflict, by removing those volumes of vague declamation or 438 THE LIFE OF [chap.viii. servUe copy which, without affording any authority on either side, serve only to clog and embarrass the discussion. In the first place, it is aUowed on all hands that the anonymous chronicle known by the name of the Historia Miscella, and pubhshed by Muratori in the first volume of his useful collection, can claim no weight on this subject, nor is it so much as noticed by Gibbon* This work, which comprehends the whole history of Rome, is a mere transcript from other writers, more especiaUy Eutropius and Theo phanes, and was even supposed by Cardinal Baronius to have been compiled by the latter.f It is valuable only in those cases when the writers whom it copies have been lost, but confers no additional authority on those facts, which we stiU can derive from the fountain head. In the Historia MisceUa the dis grace of Behsarius is merely abridged from Theo phanes, J and we must therefore discard it as any original testimony. The same principle, which is not disputed in the case of the Historia Miscella, may also be applied, and must also be admitted, in that of Cedrenus. Of this author's birth or station, nothing certain is known, although he is supposed to have been a monk, and to have lived in the eleventh century. § His annals extend from the creation tiU the reign of * Vol. vn. p. 408. + Muratori, Prsefat. ad. Hist. Miscell. X Compare Hist. Miscell. Ub. xvi. p. 110, and Theophanes, Chrono graph, p. 202. § Xylandrus in Prsefat. chap, vm.] BELISARIUS. 439 Isaac Comnenus, and are, as might be expected, barren and meagre in proportion to the richness of the subject. During the whole work Cedrenus is the copyist of some other writer for each particular period, and during several centuries his master is Theophanes, to whom he owns his obliga tions at his outset. I have coUated many passages of these two historians, more especiaUy aU those relating to the reign of Justinian, and I can confidently pledge myself to the fact that Cedrenus merely abridges from his predecessor. He often transcribes whole sentences word by word, and imphcitly follows his model, even in the grossest errors and omissions. Thus, for example, Theophanes, from a reason which I shaU afterwards explain, devotes many pages to an account of the African expedition and of the Persian wars, but comprises all the Gothic campaigns of Belisarius in a single sentence, although it is evident that they do not yield in interest or importance to any other transactions of the time; and Cedrenus, having no other guide, does not and cannot supply this deficiency. Not merely does he relate the same facts, but he preserves the same arrangement and the same expressions, and as his object is conciseness, he generally shortens the original narrative, and only in a very few cases enlarges a little on the topics which Theophanes had introduced. It is needless to quote particular instances, since a reference to any parallel passages will confirm this observation. So thorough is the dependence of Cedrenus on Theophanes, that the learned Pagi rejects the former in corroboration 440 THE LIFE OF [chap. vii. of a date.* With regard to my present subject, on which Cedrenus foUows Theophanes as usual, f I must maintain that he has no claim to be regarded as a separate and additional authority, and that the credit due to any statement is no more increased by the number of compUations and abridgments than by the printing of another edition. Did any one ever consider the assertion of a witness, as confirmed by hearing its echoes ? In the twelfth century,! Constantine Manasses wrote, in Greek verse, a history of the world from the time of the Creation. The more recent date of his poem (if, indeed, it deserve that name) is not less apparent from the list of the Emperors whom he records, than from the swelling and empty style in which he writes. Each circumstance, instead of being distinctly expressed, is buried beneath insipid ornaments ; and it is hardly possible, unless through coUateral aid, to distinguish his facts from his metaphors. Thus, without clearly stating the injuries which Behsarius 'underwent, he merely teUs us that this matchless general received the treatment of a fugitive slave, exhausted the goblet of calamity, and was rendered more naked than a pestle. § He then breaks forth into a long and tiresome invective against the envy wliich had brought the hero to this * Critica, vol. U. p. 628. Theophanem ad verbuni exscripsit Cedre nus, observes Vossius, (De Hist. Greee. lib. u. p. 1 50.) See, also, a remark of Gibbon to the same effect, (vol. vtii. p. 114.) f Cedrenus, vol. i. p. 387. X Labbe de Script. Byz. p. 11 and 40. § Constant. Manass. p. 66. chap, vin.] BELISARIUS. 441 state, and which he laboriously compares to almost every hateful and noxious object in the world. It will be observed, that from the strong terms which he employs, and from his making no mention what ever of any restoration of Belisarius to liberty and wealth, he seems to confirm the popular tradition ; yet I think that no reliance can be placed on this rhetorical declaimer, whose vague expressions are not incompatible with either theory, and I would therefore exclude altogether his testimony from this question. The same remark is also applicable to Glycas, whose annals extend forty years further than those of Manasses, but who is supposed to have lived about the same period.* His account of the dis grace of Behsarius seems abridged from that of Manasses, who has expressed it in six hnes, of which three are almost literaUy transcribed by Glycas.f They are therefore of course entitled to no greater weight than the original testimony of that wretched versifier. StUl less can we derive any information on this point from Suidas. In the article " Behsarius " of his * I can find no ground for the conjecture of Fabricius, that the work of Glycas appeared the first, (Bibliot. Grace, vol. vi. p. 157.) f The three Unes are as foUows : — neirTW/ce TTTlcfia Svo-tAtitov eira^iov SaKpvwv EKad7}ro tov Srjfiiov w irados ! irept/j.eiiajv IIoTe toi |i0et tov avTov Tpax^ov irepiKOtf/ei. Here are the words of Glycas : n-raijua TeirraiKev e\eeivov iroWwv SaKpuaiv a%iov, e/caflTyro yap ava/xevuv tov St],uiov awoKoifiai tt]v avrov Kepu£e tovtov tous ofyQaKjious Kai irpocreTGt|e tovtov Ka9- €0-Qi)vai eis to Aavpov Kai eiriSouvai avrto ffKeuos offTpaKivov Kai eirippi-KTetv aura tous Siepxopievovs ofioAov. See Imp. Orient, vol. i. P. 2. p. 7. . t Prsefat. p. 7. 456 THE LIFE OF [chap. viii. from earlier historians. This opinion he maintains on two grounds : first, the inequahties of the style ; and secondly, the coUation of some passages taken from those chronicles which are stUl preserved; so that other extracts may be concluded to have been likewise made from the greater number which have perished. I must remark that the judgment of Ban- duri on this point is entirely unbiassed, since it seems, from a subsequent passage in his writings, that he adhered to the other accounts of the fate of Beh sarius.* He did not consider it his duty, as a com mentator, to investigate the subject for himself, but borrowed his decision from Ducange, as is proved by his blindly foUowing that learned Frenchman in a strange mistake regarding Agathias. Ducange, who on this occasion departs from his usual admir able and unerring accuracy, rests his denial of the popular tradition principally on the ground that Agathias, a contemporary writer, records the impri sonment of Belisarius without mentioning his mendi city and loss of sight. f Now there is not one word of this imprisonment in the Greek historian, nor could we expect to find it in his pages, since it is beheved to have occurred nearly four years after the conclusion of his narrative. J Thus, then, stands the case. The mendicity of Belisarius is contradicted by one original writer of theninth century,§ and asserted by two of the * Imp. Orient, vol. ii. p. 470. + Not. Hist, ad Zonar. p. 61. X Agathias, Ub. v. p. 166, and Pagi, Critic, vol. ii. p. 628. § As the chronicle of Theophanes extends tiU the year 813, it was, not completed, and probably was not begun, till the ninth century, (Hanckius De Script. Byz. part i. c. xi. sect. 60.) chap, viii.] BELISARIUS. 457 eleventh or the twelfth.* It remains for the reader to determine whether the force of tradition, the little dependence that can be placed on the fidelity of the former historian, and the other grounds which have been stated, do not more than counterbalance and outweigh this difference of time. Although on this subject no further original evidence appears to be attainable, there is one other coUateral consideration which may serve to guide and assist our judgment. I have already had occasion to aUude to those Byzantine historians whose works are no longer preserved, but whose names and subjects may stUl be gathered from the casual men tion of other writers. A list of them has been drawn out by Fabricius, with his usual laborious skill ; and, exclusive of such compilers and abridgers as we still possess in Cedrenus and Zonaras, they amount to no less than thirty-three, a number exceeding those extant, f It must likewise be recollected, that at the revival of literature and learning in the fifteenth century, several ancient compositions still existed, of which the present age is unhappUy deprived. Thus, for instance, the treatise of Cicero de Gloria was in the hands of Petrarch ; J and many Grecian manu scripts were brought into the West after the taking of Constantinople by Mahomet the Second. From * That Tzetzes did not copy the anonymous author of the eleventh century, and should therefore be considered a separate authority, is proved by a slight difference between them. The one represents the bowl which Belisarius held out for charity as of wood, and the other as of earthenware. f Bibliot. Griec. vol. vi. p. 135 and 684. J Petrarch. Epist. lib. xv. ep. 1. I am indebted for this quotation to Middleton's Life of Cicero. X 458 THE LIFE OF [chap. viii. hence it seems natural to conclude that the great scholars of that or the succeeding age may have had access to documents which are now denied us, and that their opinion on any point of history should there fore carry considerable weight. At that time, when every branch of science, literature, or legislation was in its infancy, men applied themselves to classic studies with a degree of undivided attention and persevering industry, which has produced the most advantageous consequences, which has cleared away the brambles and the thorns from the path of their successors, and thereby enabled them to pursue it to a greater distance. The present age is doubtless better skilled in the knowledge of antiquity, but we are deeply indebted to their labours for that knowledge ; and, if I may borrow the lively illustration of Crousaz, it is only by climbing on their shoulders that we see further than they.* Now nearly all these eminent scholars, Crinitus, Volaterranus, Pontanus, and Egnatius, concur in their belief of the blindness of Belisarius ; although, according to the classic model, they do not quote the authority which guided them.t To this general agreement there is only one single exception, Alciat dissents from the received opinion respecting Behsarius ; J but Alciat is an author whose own ignorance may be justly presumed from his venturing to charge Tacitus with * Crousaz, Logique, vol. i. p. 187. t See Crinitus, De Houesta Disciplina, Ub. ix. c. 6. Volaterranus, Anthropol. lib. xxiii. p. 710. ed. 1552. Pontanus, De Fortitudine, lib. ii. Op. vol. i. p. 239. ed. 1556, and Egnatius De Exempl. 111. Vir. lib. iv. p. 116. ed. 1554. + Parergon, Ub. iv. c. 24. chap, viii.] BELISARIUS. 459 ignorance of Latin.* He was urged to the defence of Justinian by a blind admiration for the compUer of the Pandects ; f and almost his only argument for denying the aUeged fate of the Byzantine hero is drawn from the silence of Agathius and Procopius, and is grounded on the supposition that their his tories extended sufficiently far to have comprehended this memorable event, had it really taken place. I need not remark, that as they conclude some years before the disgrace of Behsarius, the silence of Thucydides or Livy on the subject would be just as conclusive an objection. Dismissing Alciat, there fore, with merited contempt, I am disposed to place great rehance on the unanimity of his more learned brethren, who, from possessing more full and perfect evidence, could perhaps more justly estimate the merits of the cause. Amongst those who, at a later period, adhered to that opinion, I might mention Baronius and Fiorelh, but the Cardinal is biassed by his wish to inflict a judgment on Belisarius for his arbitrary deposition of a Pope ; J and Fiorelli is only anxious to display his own Italian tinsel eloquence. § Before I conclude, it may be proper to make some mention of a statue which lately formed part of Prince Borghese's coUection at Rome, but wliich at * See La Mothe Le Vayer, C3uvres vol. iii. p. 236. t This motive of Alciat is admitted by Gibbon, (vol. vn. p. 408.) X Sed quis prseterea si sceleris immensitatem consideret, incusare poterit, et non admirari potius divinum judicium juste latum in Beli- sarium 2 (Annal. Eccles. a.d. 561. No. 7.) § Monarch. d'Orient. p. 101. ed. 1679. He is speaking of the glory of Justinian. Ma la cecita causata a gl'occhi di Belisario oscuro le sue grandezze ; quelle pupiUe per invidia aeciecate lo privarono della luce che si gloriosamente l'irradio nel Regno. 460 THE LIFE OF BELISARIUS. [chap. viii. present is placed in the Louvre. It clearly repre sents the act of begging, and, till the middle of the last century, was unanimously ascribed to the Byzan tine general.* By the aid of a passage in Suetonius, Winkelman most ingeniously devised another expla nation, and supposed the figure to represent Augustus propitiating Nemesis, according to his yearly custom. This theory, however, has not proved altogether satisfactory ; the statue has since been attributed to Chrisippus, and is at present inscribed with the name of Posidonius. The original opinion, which called it Belisarius, is in perfect accordance with its attitude, but is attended with two great, and I think decisive, objections. Its skilful sculpture seems incompatible with the decline of the arts in the sixth century, nor is it easy to imagine by what monarch it could have been raised. The immediate successors of Justinian were bound to the memory of that Emperor by ties of family respect and gratitude, and would hardly have insulted it by such a monument as this ; nor would other nations have been desirous to display the image of their conqueror. * See Sandrai't, De Sculpt. Vet. p. 32. THE END. LONDON : BHADUCRV A.VD KVANS, PRINTERS, WHITEFRIARS.