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DIVINITY SCHOOL
TROWBRIDGE LIBRARY

ST. PAUL'S USE OP THE TERMS
PLESH AND SPIRIT.

PUBLISHED BY
JAMES MACLEHOSE AND SONS, GLASGOW.
MACMILLAN AND CO., LONDON.
London, . Hamilton, Adams and Co.
Cambridge., . Macmillan and Bowes.
Edinburgh, . . Douglas and Foulis.
MDCCCLXXXIII.

ST. PAUL'S

USE OF THE TERMS

FLESH AISTD SPIRIT

THE BAIBD LECTURE FOB 1888

BY
WILLIAM P. DICKSON, D.D.
PROFESSOR OF DIVINITY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW

GLASGOW
JAMES MACLEHOSE & SONS, ST. VINCENT ST.
flttbiissheis to th* aJnttaaitn

PEEEATOEY NOTE.

This volume contains, in a revised form, six
Lectures given by me last winter upon the founda
tion of the late Mr. Baird of Auchmedden and Cam-
busdoon, along with various additions, which were not
delivered but are necessary to complete the design
of the course.
My aim has been not to treat the subject from a
doctrinal or a speculative point of view, or yet from
that of popular exposition, but to conduct a purely
exegetical inquiry bearing on recent discussions.
In pursuing it I have made large use of the labours
of earlier inquirers ; and, as my task has been mainly
that of sifting and selection, the result is necessarily
a mosaic, in which it would hardly be possible to
single out and assign to each contributor his own.
But I have drawn so freely and fully on the recent
^monograph of Dr. Wendt of G-ottingen, that I owe it
alike to him and to myself to explain the circum
stances under which I have done so. I had already
read the chief works accessible to me on the points
concerned, had reached my general conclusions re
garding them, and had formed my plan of treatment,

VI PREFATORY NOTE.
before the work of Dr. Wendt came into my hands.
But, when it reached me, I found his discussion of
the subject in various respects so fresh, suggestive,
and thorough, as to necessitate frequent reference to
his views, and to make me desirous of placing before
my hearers and readers the main results of a book
not much known in this country, and from its
special character little likely to be translated. I
have therefore deemed it but just towards Dr. Wendt,
that I should present them — and, where necessary,
the process by which they are reached or vindicated
— for the most part in his own words.
I have thought it fair also to the writers whose
views I have ventured to combat, to subjoin in the
Appendix — even at the risk of some repetition — a
fuller statement of their positions couched mainly in
their own language.
My thanks are especially due to my colleagues,
Dr. Stewart, and Dr. Robertson, for valuable sugges
tions as the volume was passing through the press.

Glasgow College,
22nd October, 1883.

CONTENTS. I. PAGE
EARLIER VIEWS  BAUR  HOLSTEN 1
II.
SCHMIDT  LUDEMANN  PFLEIDERER, 29
III.
CRITICISM OF METHODS, 63
IV.
PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION, - 94
V.
OLD TESTAMENT USAGE, 108
VI.
THE DIVINE PNEUMA, 130
VII.
THE HUMAN PNEUMA, 169
VIII.
COLLATERAL QUESTIONS, 198
IX.
THE FLESH, 244
X.
EXAMINATION OF OTHER INTERPRETATIONS, 272

309

Vlll CONTENTS. XI. PAGE
RELATION BETWEEN THE FLESH AND SIX: — CON
CLUSION,

APPENDIX.
A.  VIEWS OF HOLSTEN, SCHMIDT, AND LUDE
MANN,

345

B.  DR. WENDT ON THE OLD TESTAMENT
USAGE, 404
C.  CONSPECTUS OF THE FACTS OF PAULINE
USAGE, 425
D.  DR. WENDT ON THE ARGUMENT IN 1 COR
INTHIANS XV. 35 AND 44, - 432
E.  ON THE MEANING OF EPHESIANS IV. 23, 441
F.  DR. EZRA P. GOULD ON THE NEW TESTA
MENT USE OF ' SARX,' 445
G.  SPECIAL LITERATURE, 449
INDEX, 453

ST. PAUL'S USE OF
THE TERMS FLESH AND SPIRIT.
I.
EAELIEE VIEWS— BAUR— HOLSTEN.
No reader of the letters of St. Paul can fail to mark,
as a striking feature, the frequent recurrence of
certain antithetic parallels on which the Apostle
delights to dwell. We are constantly meeting one
or another of those great polar contrasts on which
his thoughts turn — each of them in his hands so
fraught with meaning that all his teaching might
seem gathered up into it or disposed around it.
Law and gospel — sin and grace — death and life —
faith and works — Adam and Christ — the old man
and the new — such are some of his most important
and far-reaching antinomies. But none comes be
fore us more frequently, or tinges more deeply the
whole current of his thought, than the contrast
which we are now to consider — that of " flesh " and
A

2 IMPORTANCE AND INTEREST.
" spirit." It holds a central place ; and from what
ever point of view we regard it — in its bearing on
the constitution of hmnan nature, on the doctrine of
sin, or on the genesis and growth of the new life in
Christ — its importance can hardly be overestimated.
It appeals to a variety of interests. While the
theologian hopes to find here some light shed on
the mystery of sin, and the philosopher to discover
fresh materials for his speculation on the origin
of evil, and the moralist to obtain at least fit counsel
for the conduct of life amidst prevailing temptation,
the psychologist desires to learn how St. Paul con
ceived of the nature and workings of the human
mind, and the student of language, as it reflects the
changing hues of thought, delights to analyse the use
of that plastic instrument in the hands of a master
who turns its resources to new account. Above all
stands the deeper interest of the study of a religious
experience, that sheds an unequalled light on man's
state of sin and on the power which generates and
sustains his new life of consecration to God.
But, in proportion to the range of the subject and
to the manifold and momentous issues involved in it,
is the diversity of opinion to which it has given rise.
Each of the terms entering into the contrast has
been the theme of prolonged discussion and not
seldom of vehement controversy ; and further ques
tions have emerged as to the relations subsisting

DIFFICULTIES. o
between them and the influence exercised by the one
upon the other. It is admitted on all hands that, if
the Apostle has not coined new words, he has
stamped on those adopted by him an impress of his
own ; and that, in his employment of them, they
carry a significance to which there is nothing at all
akin in the usage of classical Greek, and nothing
altogether corresponding even in Hebrew or Hellen
istic use. His language is not merely peculiar; it
is in a sense unique ; and the key to its right
interpretation is to be found in the comparison of
his own utterances throwing light on each other
rather than in anything that may be adduced by
way of apparent analogy from without.
The difficulty, moreover, is increased by certain
circumstances which so complicate the problem as to
have led not a few to despair of its satisfactory
solution. Not only does the Apostle often make
use of the same word in different senses, or shades
of meaning ; but he has also a habit of rapidly
interchanging cognate ideas, and the result at the
first glance is a certain aspect of confusion or of
apparent conflict. The term " spirit " (irvevna) is
used to denote at one time the divine Spirit given to
man or dwelling in man, at another time man's own
spirit receptive of, and bearing witness to, the divine.
In Eom. viii. the Apostle within the compass of a
few verses passes from " the Spirit of God " to " the

4 VARIETIES OF MEANING.
Spirit of Christ," then to " Christ " himself, then to
"the Spirit of Him that raised up" Jesus, and there
after to " the spirit of adoption." At one time we
find him speaking of his " living or abiding in the
flesh" as a present and continuing state (Phil. i. 22,
24) ; at another of the " being in the flesh " as for
himself and his readers a state belonging to the past,
which could be affirmed of them no longer (Eom.
vii. 5, " when we were in the flesh ; " viii. 9, " but
ye are not in the flesh "). At Gal. v. 24, " they that
are Christ's have crucified the flesh," while at 2 Cor.
vii. 1 they are exhorted to " cleanse themselves from
all defilement " of it. In various passages it might
seem as if, without practically affecting the sense to
be conveyed, the " body " (aru>/j.a) might take the
place of the "flesh" (adp£), but every one feels that the
adjective "bodily" or "corporeal" (aw/xariKos) could
not by any means take the place of the significant
epithet "fleshly" or "carnal" (o-apicucos). Sometimes
" spirit " (-Trveufxa) seems interchangeable with the
correlative " soul " (^v)(ij) or " mind " (vovs:) : but so
far is Trvev/iaTucos from being identified with or con
vertible into ylrv^ucos, that the one is expressly placed
in direct contrast to the other (1 Cor. ii. 14, 15 ;
xv. 44, 45). There is the "body of flesh" (Col. ii.
11) ; but there is also the "mind of flesh" (Col. ii. 18) ;
while, in the Eevised version at least, the " mind of
the spirit" (Eom. viii. 6) has as its alliterative

OPPOSITE EXTREMES. 5
correlate the "spirit of the mind" (Eph. iv. 23).
And, while "flesh" and "spirit" are in many instances
definitely contrasted, and are even directly affirmed
to be " contrary the one to the other " (Gal. v. 1 7),
we find that the Apostle at times expresses his own
personality in terms of either — under circumstances,
in fact, where the one would seem to cover or in
clude the other, as in 2 Cor. ii. 12, "I had no relief
for my spirit," and 2 Cor. vii. 5, " our flesh had
no relief."
It is no matter of surprise — however much of
regret — that amidst these and the like complications
many should have been inclined to forego the quest
after a definite and consistent solution of the pro
blem, content to rest in the belief that the Apostle
used such terms as came to his hand in popular
language with a certain popular laxity and vague
ness, and that it might be sufficient for them to
seize his distinctions in a rough and general way.
In the scholasticism of the Middle Ages and in the
revised scholasticism of the seventeenth century—
when there was no lack of subtlety, but little per
ception of the true principles of exegesis — the lan
guage of St. Paul was fitted into the framework, if not
translated into the technical terms, of the prevailing
philosophy and theology. During the eighteenth
century it was well-nigh emptied of all special
significance in the hands of a vapid and unsympa-

b OPPOSITE EXTREMES.
thetic Rationalism. Some expositors in more recent
times have not scrupled to impute to the Apostle's
indistinctness or confusion of thought their own in
ability to see clearly, have gently upbraided him
with falling short of the precision of later theological
formuhe, or have pitied his comparative ignorance of
modern psychological distinctions.1 If he had but
expressed himself in terms of the objective and the
subjective, the immanent and the transcendent, the
sensible and the supersensible, the Ego and the non-
Ego, how much clearer would have been his meaning,
and how much trouble would have been saved to his
expositors ! With others, and especially with certain
writers on Biblical psychology, there has been a
tendency to the opposite extreme of building on
the Apostolic foundation elaborate systematisings
and speculative constructions out of all proportion
to the scanty data on which they rest. If the ideas
of St. Paul have been to some extent more clearly
apprehended in the light of distinctions with which
1 Fritzsche remarks : " Tametsi Paulus omnium peccatorum
incitamenta e corpore repetiisset, hsec tamen opinio, ut multa
in antiquis scriptoribus, aequo animo ferenda esset. Nam ut
veteribus scriptoribus nihil placuerit, nisi quod nobis verum
esse videatur, ne postulandum quidem est " (ad Eom. vi. 6).
"The language of the New Testament," says Dr. Jowett,
"does not conform to any received views of psychology"
(Epistles of St. Paul, ii. p. 216); "neither did the age iu
which St. Paul lived admit of any great accuracy in speaking
of the human soul " (i. p. 104).

GERMAN THEORIES. 7
modern philosophy has made expositors familiar,
there can be little doubt that confusion has arisen
from the attempt to apply the categories of modern
thought, as a -priori postulates, to this inquiry, and
to fit the Apostle's teaching into them, or to find it
already there — at the risk, if not of associating with
it ideas foreign to his modes of thought, at any rate
of assigning to his words a misleading connotation
which may unduly extend or restrict their import.
We have been led to choose this antithesis of
Plesh and Spirit as the subject of these lectures not
only because of the importance and interest of the
questions at stake, but also because — although par
ticular points have received more or less adequate
discussion — it has not, so far as I know, been dealt
with of late years in any monograph specially devoted
to it in this country, while it has been recently sub
jected to formal and elaborate treatment by vari
ous German theologians in connection with the
theory of a supposed influence of Greek philo
sophical ideas in moulding the Apostle's thought.
These discussions have not attracted in this country
the notice which they merit, partly perhaps because
of the ex facie improbability of the position which
they strive to uphold, partly because of their being
for the most part accessible only in the original
German, partly because of what seems at first sight
the repellent character of their contents — made up of

8 SCOPE OF PROPOSED INQUIRY.
minute exegetical details and dry psychological or
metaphysical disquisitions in varying proportions.
But they have contributed in no small degree to the
elucidation of the questions at issue, and they serve
as signal illustrations at once of the excellencies and
the defects of the methods followed by German
scholars. It is not less instructive to compare their
processes than to mark their results. They show
wonderful fertility of resource, depth and thorough
ness of research, skill in combination ; but they
display also much of the license of conjecture,
arbitrariness of procedure, and eager quest of novelty
that characterise our German neighbours — whose
ingenuity can rear an imposing structure of theory
on very slender data, and find fresh support for its
discoveries in quarters where the ordinary reader
would see nothing at all to suggest them.
As the field on which we enter is a wide one, it
is desirable that we should indicate at the outset
the scope and limits of our inquiry. It will not be
possible to avoid incidental reference to the great
issues that are bound up with it — to the bearing of
its results on doctrine or life — or to leave wholly out
of account its relations to psychology and philosophi
cal speculation ; but we do not propose to deal
with the subject primarily or mainly from the stand
point either of the dogmatic theologian or of the
psychological inquirer. Our task belongs essentially

AIM AND LIMITS. 9
to the domain of exegesis, or of Biblical Theology in
the strict sense. Our object is to ascertain, by
applying the recognised principles of grammatico-
historical interpretation, the import of the terms
" flesh " and " spirit " in the writings of St. Paul,
and to examine in the light of these principles the
exegetical results reached, and the conclusions based
on them, by the writers of whom we have spoken.
We do not intend to discuss the place and charac
teristics of the flesh or the nature and offices of the
Spirit, in St. Paul's teaching, as questions of theology
proper ; but rather to seek at least an approximate
answer to the necessarily prior question, What does
he mean when he uses the terms "flesh" and "spirit"
either by themselves, or in relation to each other ?
And we may reasonably ask to be judged in the
light of this express limitation — with respect to what
we announce it as our design to attempt, and not
with respect to what we may leave unattempted.
It may help to a clearer apprehension of the
points on which our inquiry is to bear, if we
prefix to it a brief indication of the views held
regarding the subject by the chief earlier masters of
exegesis, and a summary of the main conclusions
arrived at by its more recent expositors. Although
we shall encounter, as we proceed, various differences
as to the interpretation of irvev/xa, the main question
lias related to the Pauline use of o-dp£.

10 FIRST LINE OF INTERPRETATION.
The first great line of interpretation is that
which, under various modifications of statement,
regards o-dp£ as denoting human nature as a whole
in its condition under sin and apart from Clirist.
Clement of Alexandria gives it as his opinion, with
respect to Gal. v. 1 9, that the " flesh " meant sinners
[_and the " spirit " the righteous.1 Augustine2 ad
duces various passages in proof of his general pro
position that it is the custom of the sacred books
to use the word "flesh" so as to comprehend under it
all kinds of human sins both of body and of spirit,
and the " living according to the flesh " is equivalent
in meaning to the " living according to one's self,"
" according to man," not according to God, because
the part is put for the whole in such a way that not
the "flesh" only, but also the other part of human na
ture, the " soul," is employed for the whole man and
his nature as such. Thomas Aquinas8 agrees with
Augustine : " All kinds of sins are carnal (Gal. v.).
The flesh is taken for man, who, when living accord
ing to himself, is said to live according to the flesh,
as Augustine remarks in his Fourteenth book," but on
his own part he adds : " And the reason of this is
that every defect of human reason has somehow its
beginning out of carnal sense." Luther4 after his
1 Strom, iv. 8, 61. 2 De Civ. Dei, xiv. 2-4.
3 Snmma, Prim. Sec. ii. qusest. Ixxii. art. ii.
4 Preface to the Epistle to the Romans.

LUTHER  CALVIN. 1 1
pithy fashion says : " You must not understand flesh
and spirit here as if flesh were concerned only
with unchaste desires, and spirit only with the
interior of the heart ; but flesh with Paul, as with
Christ at John iii. 6, means everything that is born
of flesh, the whole man, with body and soul, with
reason and all thought (in the Latin form : totam
rationem cum summis et optimis suis virions), because
everything in him inclines after the flesh." Zwingli
(on Eom. vii. 18) says: "Flesh is here put for
the soul and body of which man is composed, that
is, for the whole man." Calvin, as might be expected
from his character as an exegete, is more precise in
his definition : " Under the term flesh the Apostle
always comprehends all endowments of human nature,
whatever is in man, except the sanctification of the
Spirit. . . . Either term, namely, as well flesh as
spirit, is . competently applied to the mind ; but the
one, so far as it is regenerated ; the other, so far as
it still retains its natural state."1 He is peremptory
in denouncing the less comprehensive interpretation :
" It is evident that the word flesh is not restricted -
only to the lower desires, which have their seat in
what is called sensuousness, according to the fiction
of the sophists (the Schoolmen), but is predicated of
all human nature."2 " It is frigid and foolish to
restrict the corruption, which has emanated from the/
1 On Rom. vii. 18. 2 On 1 Cor. iii. 3.

12 RECENT THEOLOGIANS.
very citadel of the mind and the inmost heart, only
to what are called the motions of sense."1
Among the more recent theologians who, in their
definition of the Pauline adp£, follow the example of
Luther and Calvin, it may be enough to mention
the view of Neander:2 "The notions <rdp£, icoa-pos,
irvev/xa tov Kocr/xov correspond to one another, and so
<rdp£ denotes human nature generally in its state
of estrangement from the divine life"; that of
Tholuck:3 " What is human with the accessory notion
of weakness and sinfulness — human weakness";
that of Julius Mulier:4 cdp^ denotes a tendency —
that tendency which turns towards the things of the
world in desire and lust, and is thereby carried
away from God," or, as it is otherwise put by him :5
" Man's habit of life and conduct in this present
world"; that of Lutz:6 "The disinclination of the
will towards the divine"; that of Philippi: "What
is left of man after deduction of the -n-vevfxa" or
more recently,7 " human nature in its present consti
tution, as corrupt"; and that of Delitzsch:8 "It is
the whole sinful and mortal nature of man that is
1 Inst. Rel. Christ, ii. 1. 9.
2 Pflanzung und Leit. d. chr. Kirche, 1841, p. 575.
3 Studien u. Krit. 1855, iii. p. 488.
4 Doctrine of Sin, i. p. 326, Eng. translation.
8 P. 337. 6 Biblische Dogm., p. 121.
7 Kirchl. Glaubenslehre, iii. (1867), p. 207.
8 Bibl. Psychol., p. 373.

SECOND LINE OF INTERPRETATION. 1 3
called o-dpjZ," or again:1 "The whole natural man is
termed o-dp£, because it has fallen entirely into
the power of the bad influences (Potenzen) of its nature-
basis, which the first sin has let loose."
By the side of this there has subsisted, and at
times predominated, another line of interpretation,
which regards the <rdp£ as having in general a more
limited sense, as denoting the sensuous or animal
nature of man with its instincts and inclinations.
Chrysostom (on Gal. v. 16) says : "What Paul here
calls the flesh is not the bodily nature, but the
wicked will {irpoalpeo-iv), the earthly mind, slothful
and careless (\oyi<r[x.6v yewSr; pa6v/xov Kal r}/j.e\t]/u.evov).
And this is not an impeachment of the body, but a
charge against the slothful soul. For the flesh is an
instrument, and one does not feel aversion or hatred
toward an instrument, but toward him who makes a
bad use of it." Theodoret:2 "He calls the bent of
the mind to the worse things flesh." Cyril:3 "Paul
grounds his view in strictness on the nature of the
body, and now looks closely into the power of
the physical infirmities that are implanted in it.
For the appetites that carry us away towards every
sort of passion and the crimes of a life that is fond
of pleasure have the flesh as their source." Le Clerc_
gives more definite expression and support to this
1 Bibl. Psychol., p. 374. 2 In Ep. ad Gal. v. 17.
3 On Rom. vii. 18, in Cramer's Catenae Graec. Patrum.

14 LE CLERC.  USTERI.
view when he says (on Rom. vi. 6) : " The body of
sin, or subject to sin, is here so called reduplicative, to
use a scholastic term, in as far as it is such. What
the Apostle has in view is not the substance itself of
the body, but the quality of it, in respect of which
it is the origin, fuel (fomes) and instrument of sin.
.... The things of sense, indeed, lead our mind
to sin only by striking at the body, whereby the
mind itself comes to be affected. And if we should
say that almost all sins arise from the unlawful love
of the things of sense, we should say nothing but
what would readily be granted by all." And again
(on Rom. vii. 18) : " By the word 'flesh' we must
here understand not only the body, but also the bad
habits which the mind has contracted from it."
Several modern definitions reproduce this view of
Le Clerc. Usteri, e.g., holds that "y crdp£ is the entice
ment (Beiz) of sensuousness";1 and Ruckert (on Rom.
vii. 18) that it is "that portion of the whole being
termed Ego, which is bodily or sensuous, the lower
nature exercising sensuous desire."2
The two lines of interpretation, of which we have
spoken, partially meet in the view of Dr. Albert
1 Paulinischer Lehrbegriff, 5th ed., p. 43.
2 M. Reuss, on the other hand, remarks : " What we call
sensuality answers but very imperfectly to the idea of the
flesh,'' which he defines as "the aggregate of all that is in
opposition to the being and will of God," Histoire de la
Theol. Chretienne, ii. p. 27.

VIEW OF RITSCHL. 15
Ritschl, who in earlier years was a zealous disciple of
the Tubingen school, but on further reflection took up
an attitude of opposition to it in the second edition of
his suggestive work on the " Rise of the Ancient
Catholic Church," published in 1857. In his com
pact and vigorous outline of the doctrinal system of
Paul he states that the term " flesh" occurs in various
phases of meaning, for the explanation of which
we must have recourse to Old Testament usage.
In the Old Testament " flesh" denotes not only man's
body as contrasted with his spirit, but in many cases
the whole man as contrasted with God — a mode of
conception springing naturally from the fact that the
body is the obvious mark of the distinction of man
from God, and carrying with it special reference to
man's weakness and frailty, but not definitely in any
passage of the Old Testament to his sinfulness. St.
Paul follows both forms of this Old Testament use.
He employs o-dp£ sometimes to denote tlie body in
no other sense than that of o-a>/j.a, sometimes to denote
the whole man under the aspect of human weakness
confronting divine power, but without any necessary
association with the term of a reference to sin and
guilt going beyond the limits of sure Old Testament
precedent. In a number of other passages, however,
the crdp% is presented by Paul as the seat (Trager)
and source of sin. Often it may seem as if Paul
looked on man's sensuousness as the seat of sin.

10 VIEW OF RITSCHL.
But; — Ritschl observes — where a-dp£ is associated
with the thought of sin, the contrast to it is never
the human spirit, but always the divine. Now, if the
<rdp£ is not placed in opposition to the human spirit,
it cannot be taken as sensuousness ; if, on the other
hand, it is put in opposition to the divine spirit, it
>rinnst denote the whole man^— a view, which is con
firmed by the conception of the sinful o-dp^ being
interchanged with that of the TraXatos avQpwiros,
and by the ascription to the ordpP^ of mental functions
— not merely eTriOvfila, but (ppovq/jia, 6e\rj/j.a, vovs.
The question arises — How does St. Paul come to
use the term sometimes with, sometimes without, the
connotation of sinfulness ? Ritschl conceives that,
when the word, in itself neutral, takes on this accessory
meaning, it gets it from direct indications of such a
reference in the context ; as in the Epistle to the
Romans, where for the first six chapters the meaning
does not go beyond the line of Old Testament use,
but in the seventh chapter special adjuncts mark the
specific sense there attaching to it. The circum
stance that the expression only relates to sinfulness
when accompanied by direct indications of this sort
prevents our employing it in support of the conjec
ture that St. Paul would account for the fact of sin by
man's fleshly nature. It does not occur to the Apostle
either to explain sin by means of sensuousness, or to
explain human weakness by means of sin ; he merely

VIEW OF RITSCHL. 17
assumes the sinfulness and weakness of man as
equivalent in quite positive and well-defined cases.
But it is still incumbent on us to explain in what
sense Paul could designate the body and the members
as seat of sin and of desire, if he did not incline
towards the sensuous theory. The key to these
passages (Rom. vi. 6, 12 ; vii. 5, 23, 24 ; viii. 13 ;
Col. ii. 11 ; iii. 5) lies in the correct demarcation
of the standpoint from which Paul makes the state
ments in question. A review of the chief features
of the well-known passage Rom. vii. 14-25 — which
Ritschl conceives to describe not the experiences of
the regenerate and redeemed man, nor yet those of
the sinner generally, but those of the sinner who
under the law has reached a definite stage of moral
development— leads him to the conclusion that, so far
as concerns those who are not yet redeemed, o-dp^
signifies the whole man ; but that, in the case of the
redeemed, the flesh which resists the Holy Spirit
appears restricted to the body and its members.
This does not imply that sensuousness as such is, for
the believer at least, the only source of sin, but that
sin in the believer — who, properly speaking, lives in
the Holy Spirit — finds in the element of the body
simply points on which it may seize.1
We find in the view of Ritschl, which we have
thus summarized, a fair statement of the facts on
1 Entstehung der altkath. Kirche, pp. 69 ff.
B

18 THIRD LINE OF INTERPRETATION.
which the two chief lines of interpretation rest — facts
which he is content duly to acknowledge and to co
ordinate without merging the one in the other, or
seeking to explain the transition from the one sense
to the other by reference to any common ground or
underlying principle of unity. This attempt has
been made, on the other hand, more or less explicitly
and elaborately by the supporters of a third line of
interpretation which has recently come into promi
nence. They find the key to the Apostle's use of °~a/>£
in its primary meaning as the substance or material
of the earthly body, and in the association with it
of the idea — derived consciously or unconsciously
from Hellenic philosophy — that matter is the princi
ple of evil, or is essentially evil. Here we can but
briefly indicate the leading positions taken up by the
successive exponents of this theory ; but, as several
of the works in which they are set forth are not
accessible to the English reader, we shall present,
in an Appendix, a fuller abstract couched for the
most part in their own language, by which the
reader may be enabled to trace the general tenor
and sequence of arguments that from the nature of
the case run much into detail.
Dr. Ferdinand Christian Baur, the illustrious
founder' and chief of what is commonly called the
Tubingen School, has embodied his views on this
subject — apart from earlier essays and minor inci-

baur's earlier view. 19
dental references — in two different works ; first, in
his treatise on the " Life and Teaching of the Apostle
Paul" originally published in 1845 and issued in a
second edition (but without change, so far as the
section dealing with the Apostle's doctrine is con
cerned), after his death by Dr. Zeller, and secondly
in the " Lectures on New Testament Theology " de
livered by him between 1852 and 1860, and post
humously published by his son. The latter book con
tains the most recent, and at the same time the
fullest, expression of his opinion.
As to the earlier work we may note that, while he '
says1 that " man is not spirit merely, but, as regards
at least the one side of his nature, flesh," and that
" the o-apP^ is in one word the seat and the organ of
sin (a/uLapTia) " he goes on to declare2 that, "in order
to understand rightly the resistance which the law
encounters in the flesh of man, we must not take the
idea of the flesh in too narrow a sense," and to
add : " Man is not merely flesh according to the one
side of his being ; but, viewed in respect of his
natural constitution (Beschaffenheit), he is flesh
according to his whole being (Wesen). The spirit,
which is the contrast to the flesh, is in fact imparted _
to man only through the grace bestowed in Christ ;
how could man therefore be by nature anything else
than flesh ? Hence the flesh is not merely the bodyj
iii. p. 151. 2 ii. p. 152.

20 baur's later view.
with its corporeal impulses (Triebe) : it is the sen
suous principle ruling the whole man as to soul and
body, out of which springs sin, as it expresses itself
in the most diversified ways in human life and
does not consist simply in the satisfying of bodily
idesires. .: Man in himself, as he is by nature, is
merely a o-apKiicos or ^v^ikos ; he becomes irvev/j.-
citikos only when through faith in the grace of God
in Christ he has received the Spirit as the principle
of his Christian consciousness and life."
In the later " Lectures," after referring to Tho-
luck's admission that he had more than once changed
his mind about the meaning of the term o-apP^, and
pointing to the various shades of import ascribed to
it, he asks, " What is the view underlying all this
variety of usage ? If we say that adpP^ is essenti
ally human weakness, we must know which is the
proper subject of the weakness — the spirit or the
body in man. If it is the spirit, we need an ex
planation why it is that the Apostle designates
the spiritual principle by an expression relating
to the body ; if it is the body, we are at a loss to
know how there comes to be predicated of it so
much, that can only be attributed to a spiritual
subject." His answer is : The crdp% is the material
body, which forms, so far as man is crdp£, his proper
substantial being ( Wesen). But the Apostle speaks
of it as a subject having a mind (geistiges) ; which

PAULINE ANTHROPOLOGY. 21
may naturally be explained by the fact — constituting
the special characteristic of the idea of the crdp£
— that the body is not a dead mass, but a being
having life and a soul. It is not surprising that
the Apostle should share the view of the ancients,
who conceived of matter not as something dead and
lifeless, but as a congeries (Inbegriff) of powers in
living operation moving in a definite direction.
Around this root-idea of the o-dpP^ as material body
may be directly gathered the various marks by which
the human is distinguished from, and put in contrast
with, the divine. What man is as a weak, mortal^
finite being has its ground in his being o;dpPs — that
is, a sensuous material corporeal being with the
impulses and powers that dwell in the material
body. 2oi|o£ and avQpw-wos are in various instancesj
quite identical ideas, as when Kara crap/co, is used as
equivalent to Kara avQpwirov.
The mental life and soul ascribed to man as a-dpP^
are so embraced in the same unity of substance with
the °rdpj~ that -^rvyiKos and crap/cucds are synonymous ;
comp. 1 Cor. ii. 11 and iii. 1. While the ~^v)(?i, the
more closely it is associated with the vdpP^, shares
the more its . impulses and motions of will, out of
the -^vyy itself — out of its mental element— there
emerges the vovs, which, as a purely intellectual
faculty, distinguishes itself from the ^v)0, and de
taches itself, in a higher degree than is possible for

22 PAULINE ANTHROPOLOGY.
the latter, from the material nature-basis of the crdpP^.
The vovs is the principle of thinking and knowing,
of clear intelligent thinking, of immanent self-con
sciousness. It is itself the ecroo avQpunros of Rom.
vii. 22, which, in the conflict there described, knows
itself no longer one with the a-dpP^, but, in spite of
its attempts to become emancipated from what it now
recognises as a material principle opposed to its own
better Ego, cannot release itself from the dominant
power, and remains accordingly in the last resort a
mere accident to the substance of the a-dpP^.
In the vovs the Pauline anthropology reaches its
highest point. The radical (prinzipiell) contrast to
the material o-dpP^ does not lie in the sphere of the
human, but only in the divine Trvev/xa, which stands
in a relation of absolute transcendence to the vovs.
It is by this divine Trvev/ma that man is enabled
to resist the power of the o-dpp^ and overcome all that
issues from it. The Apostle places the psychic and
pneumatic in so decided opposition to one another
(at 1 Cor. xv. 45) as to show clearly how little we
can ascribe to human nature any pneumatic principle
immanent in itself. Though he speaks of a human
Trvevfia, the fact has no ulterior significance for his
proper idea of irvevpa. That he ascribed to man
a irveOfxa belonging to his nature, is clear from
1 Cor. ii. 11, where he speaks expressly of irvev/M
tov dvOpcoTTov. It is the principle of knowledge and

DR. CARL HOLSTEN. 23
self-consciousness, the same which he elsewhere
terms vovs, but here designates as -rrvev/xa in order
to draw a parallel between the -n-vevna tov Qeou and
the 7rvevfx.a tov dvOpunrov. But he ascribes withal
to the latter none of the effects, of which he regards
the divine -n-vev/xa as alone the source. "How
many unnecessary discussions," Dr. Baur well
remarks, " people might have spared themselves as to
Rom. vii. 14 ff, if they had but more closely
attended to the distinction between vovs and
¦wvei /xa ! "
In the year 1855 Dr. Carl Holsten, now a pro
fessor at Heidelberg, published a dissertation on the
" Significance of the word o-dpP^ in the doctrinal
system of Paul," which he re-issued, with the
addition of a few notes, in a collection of
papers entitled " Zum Evangelium des Paulus und
des Petrus — Altes und Neues " in 1868. This essay
has been recognised on all hands as the work of a
fresh, acute and original thinker, bearing an unmis
takable impress of power, and conducting its
criticism with incisive energy, but often with a
contemptuous tone bordering on intolerance. He
states it as his aim to reduce, with greater precision
than hitherto, the manifold relations in which the
word is used to the radical signification underlying
them, and to demonstrate more definitely the de
cisive place held by the idea in the Apostle's religious

24 LEADING POSITIONS.
thought. He derives his materials only from the
four great Epistles admitted by all as genuine.
The following are the leading propositions, which
he has sought to establish. While awfia denotes the
body as an organism under the category of form,
o-dpP^ has as its constant and definite characteristic
the idea of substance. It is the earthly-material
substance of the o-wixa, distinguished from other forms
of matter by the element of life. The cause of this
life is the "^x^, and, as it has its expression through
the senses, man as o-dpP^ is sensuous-living matter,
that is, flesh. The o-dpP^ is thus the distinctive
mark of man as contradistinguished from God, who
is the subject of the Trvevfxa. But irvevij.a also be
longs to the category of substance, invisible, incor
ruptible — transcending earth and the earthly —
immaterial, at least relatively speaking, as the
negative of cosmic matter, It has specially associated
with it the conception of power, and is regarded as the
principle of absolute truth and of holiness. Man, in
respect of his nature-basis o-dpP^, is the direct an
tithesis to God as Tvvevixa; nor has he anything akin
to the. nature of God in the -^-v^, which, though it
may be pneumatic in the most general sense, is, in
virtue of its relation to matter as the vital power
thereof, purely opposed to the irved/xa. There is
nothing akin to the divine nature even in what is
called the eaw avQpwwos or vovs, which — it is inferred

CONTRAST METAPHYSICAL. 25
from a review of the chief passages — is merely the
subjective consciousness, the form in which the sub
jective mind gets to know what is given to it as
contents. But what is to be said of the passages
that are commonly taken to affirm the existence of a
further element, of a human-creaturelyirvevfjia, in man?
After an ingenious explanation of these, Holsten
comes to the conclusion that there is no such human
Tvvedfxa recognised by St. Paul. The only elements of
human nature in itself are the ordpP^, the ^vxf), and
the vovs ; everything higher is the divine -wvevp-a.
As there is thus nothing in man akin to the divine
nature, the Pauhne contrast of nrvedfia and o-dpP^ is
not anthropological, but metaphysical; and, in the reli
gious domain, the notion of the o-dpP^ is that of the
finite overagainst the infinite. Now, the finite in con
crete definiteness for Paul is the sensuous. Man in
himself as a-dpP^ is a purely sensuous being ; for
the consciousness gets its contents only through
sense-perception from the world of sensuous appear
ance, and the will its contents only from the sen
suous impulse to sensuous pleasure. Overagainst
the absolute life of the Trvevfia the vdpP^ is the
principle of perishableness; overagainst the Trvev/j.a
as the principle of absolute truth, the <rdp£ is the
principle of error, and its wisdom folly. But the
contrast reveals itself above all in the domain of the
will. The eTriOvjula, sensuous impulse, is the power

26 OBJECTIVE SIN.
— the law — immanent in the flesh, the necessary
manifestation of the fleshly substance and, in St. Paul's
view, the most especial (eigenste) self of man. All
evil has its principle in the adp%, and all sins are
derived from it ; man, in presence of the divine
will, is of necessity the sinful — the non-righteous.
The o-dpP^ is essentially ordpP^ d/j-apTias; and man of
himself is already, as such, in his substantial nature
d/uapTia, that is, sin in the objective sense, which
is to be distinguished from irapd^aa-is, subjective sin,
the consciousness of guilt, that only arises through
the revelation of God's holy will in the vdfxos. In
order to a righteousness based on works of the
pneumatic law the will would need to be impelled
by a pneumatic power. But power is the expres
sion or outcome of substance, and to the sensuous
man the pneumatic substance is wanting. So
righteousness can come only from God out of his
free grace, which redeems man from the curse and
power of sin, and confers on him such a substantial
pneumatic power.
Dr. Holsten comes accordingly to the conclusion
that in St. Paul's view man of himself stands purely
in contradistinction to God, and that this is only one
of the forms of a dualism pervading St. Paul's doctrinal
system. The ground of this dualism is the contrast
in which the Apostle conceives the infinite and the
finite. For ' finitum non est capax inftniti ' is the basis

DUALISM. 27
of the Pauline system. Metaphysically this dualism
would present itself as that of spirit and matter.
But from this Gnostic dualism St. Paul has continued
free, much as there is that approximately suggests it.
Predominantly moved by the one interest of what
had a direct bearing on religion, he has kept that
dualism of spirit and matter within the limits of
the religious sphere, and has merely in the contrast of
God and man expressed it as the dualism of spirit
and sensuousness without transferring it to the
purely metaphysical domain. In his thinking the
Jewish idea of God exercised too powerful an
influence to admit of such an independent self-sub
sistence (Selbststandigkeit) of matter as was re
quired for the Gnostic dualism.
We need not at present follow Holsten into the
apphcation of his views farther than to say, that he
conceives St. Paul to have set aside the ritual elements
of the law as purely external and non-pneumatic ;
that he holds the Epistle to the Romans as viewing the
religious development of humanity from a double stand
point, that of objective necessity based on the idea
and will of God (in the first section, ch. i.-v. 11),
and that of free subjectivity turning on the nature
of man (in ch. vi.-xii.) — the two forms of view running
side by side and separate from each other, and the
Apostle uttering the contradictory positions equally
as truth ; that at Rom. i. 3 he discovers a compliance

28 APPLICATION OF HIS VIEWS.
on the Apostle's part with the standpoint of the
Jewish Christians at Rome not at all in keeping
with his teaching elsewhere, where we find that he
starts with a heavenly person sent by God and be
coming man, whereas here he starts with a human
person who by an act of God's will becomes His
Son in power ; that on the basis of Rom. viii. 3 and
2 Cor. vi. 21 he represents the incarnation — the
assumption of the o-dpP^ — on the part of Christ to
have taken place in such a way that He, who in a
a-w/xa -wvevixaTiKov was the fiy yvovs d/xapTLav, in a
aS>ixa uapKos became withal d/xapTia, so as to con
demn sin in the flesh. He applies here the distinc
tion already mentioned between dfxapTia and irapd-
ftaais. Christ assumes the o-dpP^ and, in immediate
connection with it, the objective principle of d/xapTia
opposed to the nature and will of God ; but the
objective does not become either subjective con- .
sciousness, or subjective deed, in this pneumatic
personality ; Xpia-Tos remains without (subjective)
sin of his own. The cross of Christ was objectively
the death of sin in the <rdpP^ ; in theory at least for
the believer the o-dpj~ is put to death, for what took
place in the case of Christ took place objectively in
the case of all ; and all that believers have to do is
subjectively to realize for themselves this objective
effect in the power of the Spirit.

DR. RICHARD SCHMIDT 29

II.
SCHMIDT— LtJDEMANN— PFLEIDERER.
In 1870 Dr. Richard Schmidt published an import
ant treatise on "the Pauline Christology as connected
with the Apostle's doctrine of salvation." The first
chapter of this work deals with "the contrast of flesh
and spirit as the presupposition on which that
doctrine rests," inasmuch as the walking according to
flesh or spirit implies a prior state of being in the
flesh or in the spirit. While agreeing in the main
with Holsten as to the general definition of the
ideas, Schmidt deems it not superfluous to discuss
the subject afresh with special reference to the
critical examination of other views, which Holsten
had not attempted, but which is called for by the
very variety of divergent interpretations. He is, as
it seems to us, much more successful in ingenious
criticism of the results reached by others than in
any new contributions of his own.
Dr. Schmidt sets out by calling attention to the
heterogeneous character of the senses assigned to
cdpP^ by those who enlarge or change its original

30 VIEW OF SCHMIDT.
import, and urges that we may not without arbitrari
ness discard the idea of an unity underlying that
use, but may, on the contrary, with reason demand
that each signification assumed shall make good its
connection with the original contents of the conception
always to be presumed as somehow present, whatever
element may from the context preponderate. He
examines the explanations given by Julius Mulier,
Hofmann, Weiss, and others in the light of their
relation to this point of view, and comes to the
conclusion that they are either vague in themselves
or that they deviate from that primary sense to
an extent not warranted by anything to be found
either in the Old Testament or in the writings of the
New other than those of St. Paul. He then reviews
the chief passages adduced from St. Paul himself
in support of the enlargement of the meaning, and
maintains that in some of these there is no necessity
for enlarging the conception beyond its original
limits ; while in others it is of the utmost importance
to distinguish clearly between what is on each occa
sion involved in the contextual thought and what is
implied in the idea of the flesh itself. Even where
the proper idea may seem indefinitely enlarged (as
in the apparent equivalence of o-dpjz to koct/ulos), we
must bear in mind that o-dpp^ denotes not so much
the body as the material substance of this body ; that
this substance is, in keeping with the Old Testament

ORIGINAL MEANING. 31
view, essentially identical with that of the earthly
world generally, sharing its character of materiality ;
that flesh is the medium of all man's relations with
this world ; and that it may therefore denote as well
the sphere within which the purely natural being and
action of man are carried on, as that which determines
the peculiar character of such being and action, with
out abandoning the category of substance originally
underlying it. He contends that this original mean
ing is to be retained, even where the term appears in
distinctly ethical relations; quotes what he conceives
to be positive indications to that effect ; and con
cludes that crdpP^ with St. Paul is neither the whole
undivided human nature, nor is it one side thereof in
distinction from another ; it never means anything
else than the material substance of the animal,
inclusively of the human, body.
Dr. Schmidt holds that the idea of a-dpP^ is not
simply synonymous with "that which is human," nor
can the divine as such form the direct contrast to it.
Even where the Spirit of God stands definitely over
against the flesh, the emphasis rests, he says, not so
much on the genitive of more precise definition as
on the chief idea which is thereby more precisely
defined. In other words the cardinal point is the
contrast of flesh and spirit, not immediately that of
God and man (as the latter is empirically viewed).
The distinction thus made, which Schmidt considers

32 GENERAL IDEA OF SPIRIT.
it of decisive moment to bear in mind, leads us to
discriminate between the general idea of " spirit "
and the reality presented in irvevfxa Oeov, even
if we should suppose St. Paul not to know any
other spiritual reality at all. In various cases
where irvev/xa stands in an antithetic relation, we
could not supply the more precise definition " divine "
without altering in some measure the sharpness of
the contrast ; and in all such instances the expres
sions are to be left entirely general. In this light
we might dispose of the question so much debated,
Whether in these cases we have to think of the
divine or the human irvev/xa, as having no longer an
object ; it concerns an idea which " is meant to be left
(belassen sein will) quite general." But we may not
escape the question, Whether the divine Spirit is the
sole reahty? or whether there is also a -rrvev/xa as a
constituent part of man's nature ? The number of
passages which seem to favour the latter view is far
from inconsiderable, and the mode in which they are
explained by those who do not accept it is pronounced
" not very happy." The view of Holsten, that the
passages apply to the Spirit of God as having
become subjective, is examined with the result that
his positions are pronounced " mere groundless asser
tion," "inadmissible," "impossible," "a denial of
what is exegetically natural at the bidding of theory,"
while the thought which Holsten gains by his mode

CRITICISM OF HOLSTEN AND WEISS. 33
of apprehending Rom. viii. 1 6 is declared " beyond
doubt too modern an abstraction to commend itself
much as Pauline." And the suggestion by Weiss -
that the reference is to a spiritual life of higher
origin produced by the divine Spirit, while not open
to the same objections, is declared to be the less
natural by reason of its very position intermediate
between the ordinary conception and that of Holsten,
and by reason of its seeming to require the assumption
" of a twofold communicated Trvev/xa in the redeemed."
Schmidt holds it as exegetically scarce open to doubt
that it is not unusual for St. Paul to speak of the
spirit as a constituent part of man's nature, and falls
back upon the position that the idea of spirit is op
posed, " as we have convinced ourselves," in quite a
general sense to that of flesh. While the latter finds
its essential character in the element of " the mate
rial," the former on the other hand denotes primarily
the " non-material " conceived of at the same time
under a positive aspect as moving power (bewegende
Kraft) just as with the idea of material substance is
associated that of quiescence (ruhenden Sein). He
grants that this contrast is essentially a metaphysical
one, but maintains that this does not exclude its
being in a definite sense anthropological, since it
evidently underlies the Biblical view of man. By
way of explaining why the contrast is not put more
specifically with reference to the human spirit he

34 HUMAN PNEUMA.
says that it is not difficult to discover the reason.
Experience showed the ardp% to be the dominant prin
ciple in man, imparting a fleshly character even to
the inner hfe ; and so the radical contrast to it could
not but be sought outside of man. It is not as if the
human ¦wvevixa ceased to come under the general con
ception, as opposed to the o-dpP^ ; but having no longer
the significance of an independent principle, it became
degraded to a mere organ, which continued to have,
doubtless,in a purely formal aspect a determining power,
and yetwas essentially determined in its own operation
by the flesh. If we should therefore refer the formula
KaTa Trvevfxa TrepnraTetv to the human spirit as it is
found conditioned in experience, the conduct thereby
designated would not really differ from a " walking
according to the flesh," seeing that the de facto deter
mining principle would be not so much the spirit
itself as the flesh. For even where the vovs of man
relatively withdraws from and opposes itself to the
power of the flesh, its utter impotence shows
how far it is from being an opposite operative life-
principle. And he says, by way of summing up,
without affirming that the thoughts are formally or
consciously so carried out by the Apostle : " The
general contrast which dominates the Apostle's view
may certainly, from quite an abstract standpoint of
moral contemplation, be defined as one between the
material body and the immaterial life-spirit of man

ROM. V. 12. , 35
— in so far, namely, as the two are apprehended
abstractly, that is, apart from any relation to one
another already existing in reality. On the other
hand, looked at in actual experience, it shapes itself
into a contrast between the flesh, which conditions
the collective character of empiric humanity, and
the divine Spirit, transcending this humanity as
such. Or, in other words, in the former view we
should be dealing with a general formula for the
moral conduct, in the latter with the empiric reality
— and the two find their unity in the general idea
of the spirit in contrast to the flesh."
Schmidt cannot agree with Holsten in holding
this contrast to coincide with that between man and
God, or in accounting the <rdp£, as sensuousness,
necessarily evil. This thought is open to well-
founded objection in view of the Old Testament
Theism, which the Apostle has never renounced ;
and in fact, as Rom. v. 1 2 ff. shows, St. Paul seeks to
explain the origin of sin in quite a different way.
For the statement that " through one man sin has
entered into the world " cannot without violence be
resolved intoi the thought that in Adam's transgres
sion there had only come into actual reality, or into
manifestation, the sinful principle immanent in man
from the beginning ; in that case we must either
attribute to the eia-ep-)(e(r6ai a meaning foreign to it
in reality, or narrow the quite general notion of

36 FLESH AS OPERATIVE PRINCIPLE.
d/xaprla without demonstrable warrant to the more
special sense of irapdfiao-is. For only of the latter
could a historical entrance into the Koa-fxos be
really affirmed ; while the d/xapria, conceived as
principle, would have been originally existent in the
ko<tixos, and would simply have become manifest
through the first transgression. Certainly, he says,
the later theory of original sin is nowhere expressly
developed by St. Paul ; but this may serve merely to
prove that the Apostle's thinking was directed not so
much to the explanation of the origin of sin as to a
psychological knowledge of its nature. Schmidt
asks us to distinguish between the materiality of hu
man nature viewed in itself and its empirical signifi
cance as an operative life-principle, the source and
ground of all sinful conduct in the individual. St.
Paul does not say — as Holsten affirms — that the crapP^
itself is enmity against God, but that the cppovij/xa t>js
a-apKos is so ; and he distinguishes from that elvai iv
a-apd (Rom. viii. 8 f.), which coincides with the ehai
KaTa adpKa (verse 5), another, which subsists along
with the being governed by the principle of the Spirit
(2 Cor. x. 3 ; Gal. ii. 20). This warrants the dis
tinction between the flesh as operative principle and
the flesh in itself, even as regards its quality of
life {Lebendigkeit) ; and we shall no longer be able
to say that it is essential to the latter to be a crapP,
duapTias. "It may be granted," he concludes,

DR. LUDEMANN. 37
" that such a view as is here presented must from its
nature always incline in some measure towards a
completed dualism between spirit and sensuousness ;
nevertheless we must adhere to the definite distinc
tion of the two all the more, that the abstract conse
quences of a theory not seldom leave its author's
own thought far behind."
The subject received fresh, and yet more minute
and elaborate investigation at the hands of Dr.
Hermann Liidemann of Kiel, who published in
1872 an exhaustive treatise, entitled " The Anthro
pology of the Apostle Paul and its place in his
doctrinal system, exhibited on the basis of the four
chief Epistles." In the Preface he asks that his
work may be viewed in its connection as a whole,
and deprecates a partial reading or a hasty judgment
of its contents. What he calls the " Heuristic "
course of his inquiry — in which he, as it were, feels
his way towards a solution through all sorts of
exegetical and philosophical difficulties, questionings,
and polemics — renders his book somewhat tortuous
and cumbrous ; and it is no easy matter to draw
forth his results from the controversial network in
which he has enwrapped them, and to present them
in such a way as to do justice to his views. Re
serving a fuller abstract for the Appendix, I content
myself with stating his chief positions under the
headings which he has himself chosen.

38 OUTER AND INNER MAN.
Under the first head of " Physical Anthropology,"
Dr. Ludemann starts from the division of human na
ture into an epw dvQpunros and an k'crooOev avdpwwos
found at 2 Cor. iv. 16 and Rom. vii. 22. To the
former belong the o-dp% as the material substance of
the earthly body, and the ^x^ as tne life animat
ing it. St. Paul uses <rS>/xa not as identical with
a-dpP^, but as denoting the form by the assumption
of which the crdpP^ constitutes the body, and as con
veying the idea of unity in multiplicity — an organism.
To the inner man belongs vovs, which denotes self-
consciousness and the mental activities that we call
" understanding " ( Verstand) — a purely formal
activity of the thinking mind operating on any
given contents. Under this category comes also
the KapSla, the seat of subjective feeling and sus
ceptibility, which appears with St. Paul under
various aspects akin to the variety of its use in
the Old Testament. By many the vovs is assigned
to the KapSla as its organ and classed under it ;
but it would rather seem as if the more indefinite
Old Testament expression no longer sufficed for St.
Paul, and the conception of the vovs grew up along
side of it and gained independent significance.
It has been pointed out by Fritzsche and Meyer
that these expressions, " the outer and the inner man,"
were current in the Platonic schools ; and it seems
scarcely possible to avoid the admission that St. Paul

MEANING OF CONTRAST. 39
has appropriated language which he found in contem
porary use. But this does not decide the question
whether he employs it in the spirit of its authors.
We have to consider the relations of the inner and
outer man to each other ; and this leads to an
inquiry into the contrast of the o-dpP^ and the
¦Kvev/xa. That contrast undeniably emerges at Gal.
vi. 8, and still more clearly at 1 Cor. xv. 40-53 in
the various attributes assigned to them. In Rom.
viii. 9, 10 the Trvev/ua is more precisely defined as
Trvevfia Oeov or 'Xpia-Tov. To its nature belong
power and might. And there is assigned to it also
an outward nature — a 86Pa, or finer luminous matter
pertaining to it, of which the awjxaTa enrovpdvia
consist. " The -rrvev/xa is consequently expressive of
a higher materiality — a circumstance by no means
without importance for the understanding of St.
Paul amidst his age."
When we ask, What this contrast means? those,
who on the basis of the Old Testament use of irda-a
crapP^ and -wacra -^vyfi for " mankind " identify the
flesh with human nature, answer that it is essen
tially the contrast between man and God, while
from Holsten we get the answer that it is the con
trast of material and spiritual substance. The
former represents the Jewish-religious point of view;
the latter that of Hellenistic dualism. In examining
Holsten's position, Ltidemann enters into the ques-

40 DUALISTIC VIEW.
tion, What constitutes dualism from a logical point
of view; and after giving illustrations of its Hellenic
forms from Plato and Philo, shows that there was
nothing corresponding to it in the Jewish religious
consciousness, which, with its conception of the
supreme power and sovereignty of God, could not
oppose to Him any coordinate principle or contrary
opposite.1 The Hebrew contrast of infinite and finite
and the Hellenistic contrast of spirit and matter do not,
and cannot, coincide. Holsten's view of the °"a/>£
is pronounced to be neither Jewish nor Hellenistic —
not Jewish, for the Old Testament basar may never
be taken so literally as to denote man as a purely
material unity; not Hellenistic, for the Hellenistic
category of o-dpP^ does not profess at all to denote
the whole of human nature, but confines itself
merely to the body, man's material element.
But, while Ludemann cannot accept Holsten's
view, he suggests that in the case of a Judaism
brought but slightly into contact with Hellenism
we may conceive of a third solution, under which
Hellenistic dualism may have so penetrated into a
consciousness at first purely Jewish, as within the
framework of its Jewish conceptions to shape out a
really contrary contrast, and so to give a dualistic
1 The argument on this point will be found well summarised
by Dr. Laidlaw in the Appendix to his valuable Cunningham
Lecture on the Bible Doctrine of Man. Edin., 1879.

ludemann's solution. 41
form to the rehgious contrast of the finite and
infinite, along with which there would necessarily
emerge also a dualistic element in the anthropo
logy. This is what he conceives to have been the
case with St. Paul. After adducing — as indications of
an approach to the Hellenistic mode of conception —
the privative character of the predicates at 1 Cor.
xv. 34 ff., the carrying out of the contrast there
through all its elements, the stress laid on the differ
ences of matter, the passage Gal. v. 13-17, where crappy
is represented as an independent principle actively op
posed to irvev/xa, and various instances of a restricted
use not covering the whole man; and after showing
that St. Paul's view is not to be identified either with
the Platonising Hellenism of Philo, or with the stand
point of the Palestinian Jews, he comes to the conclu
sion that St. Paul does not, as Holsten holds, simply
share the view of his time, but occupies a peculiar
position ranging him on the side of Hellenism
rather than on that of Judaism. While Paul keeps
on Jewish ground in his use of irvevpa, he employs
a-dpjZ sometimes in the wider Jewish sense as
equivalent to " man," sometimes in the narrower
Greek sense of the matter of man's body.
He next takes up the question, What is the
subject-proper of the inner man? Now and KapSla
are organs and functions rather than parts of the
mind. According to St. Paul's way of conceiving

42 ' HUMAN PNEUMA NEUTRAL.
the matter, we must ask after a real subject of the
inner man, which acts in and through these. And
after discarding the ^v^v — which has been sug
gested for this purpose — as inadequate from its indis
soluble connection with the crappy, he finds the
substance of the earoo avOpcoTros in that to irvevfxa
tov dvQpuirov which the Apostle brings forward
clearly enough at 1 Cor. ii. 1 1. He takes exception to
the view of Krumm, who makes the irvev/xa a faculty
similar to Schleiermacher's " feeling " or " immediate
self-consciousness," and to the view of Delitzsch, who
coordinates it with vovs and \6yos into a psychologi
cal triad, and thereafter acutely criticises the sugges
tions of Holsten as to the relation of the vovs to the
¦yrvevjxa, and as to the alleged equivalence of the n-vev/xa
tov dvOpanrov in 1 Cor. ii. 11 to the -wvevfxa tov
k6(7/xov of verse 12. He infers from 1 Cor. v. 5 : <W
to Trvevfxa <T<a6{i, that it is not to be identified with
the Divine irvev/xa, for d<pdapo-ia does not belong to
it in virtue of its nature — if it needs to be saved, it
¦nmy also perish; nor yet is it to be associated as
respects its nature with cpOopd — for it may be
saved. Out of twenty-two passages that may be
adduced as bearing on this question, eleven are, in
his judgment, to be decidedly referred to the irvevixa
Oeov, and eleven to the Trvev fia tov dvOpooTrov, whiGh
is the proper subject of human nature. To the
question whether this -Kvevfxa belongs to the side of

ETHICAL CONTRAST. 43
the crapP^ or of the irvev/xa Oeov, he replies, in respect
of its nature, to neither. It must itself be a sub
stance capable of being variously affected and differ
ently determined. Only on this supposition are we
able to vindicate for man in St. Paul's system of
thought a spiritual {geistiges) character, and yet withal
(1) to leave the irvev/xa Oeov, an absolute spiritual sub
stance, in its transcendence ; (2) to take the o-dpP^, in
contradistinction from it, quite according to its hteral
sense as bodily matter; and (3) really to uphold the
categories of cr&i/xa, vovs, KapSla, as forms for different
contents not essentially bound to the aapp. Such
an idea is directly required by the system, and if not
given to us in it, would need to be hypothetically im
ported. It goes to constitute — with its human -wvevfxa,
needing and capable of redemption, in a aw/xa
aapKos — an anthropology which is out and out
dichotomous, and thereby no longer Jewish, but not
yet dualistic, and so not Hellenic.
Dr. Liidemann then passes to the ethical domain,
where the conceptions irvev/xa and adpP^ take upon them
the marks of good and evil, the latter being closely
associated with d/xapTia, which dwells in the flesh
with a necessity of natural law, " the law of sin in the
members" (Rom. vii. 21, 23, 25). The views of
Ernesti, Mulier, and Weiss (whom he recognises as
a more formidable opponent) are subjected to review;
and it is held that the dvQpa>iros aapKiKos — the

44 THE SIN-PRINCIPLE.
saturation of human nature with the quality of the
(rdpP^ — is the actual result of the operation of the
spontaneous sin-principle, but not, as Holsten would
have it, an essential constituent of the idea. The
" inner man " is a domain simply occupied by sin,
and to be taken from it again. Man determined by
the " flesh " is a-apKiKos, ^sv-^ikos ', and the notion
" man " may be interchanged simply with " flesh,"
although at times it may be open to doubt whether
the predominant idea may be the Old Testament one
of "passive weakness," or the Hellenistic one of
" sinful energy." The idea of d/xapTia is to be
understood not subjectively of a tendency of the
human will, but objectively of a quahty of man's
earthly nature. It does not signify either " sin" in
our sense of the word, or " sinfulness " as the poten
tial ground of sin, but corresponds most nearly to
our idea of " evil." The maintenance of the pure
objectivity of d/xapTia is held to be the key to Rom.
vii., and also to Rom. v. 12. The vo/xos is, as it were,
a wedge driven into the joints of human nature and
breaking up the unity of the avQpwn-os aapKiKos.
Man comes to know sin, so soon as it has through
the €vto\->i come to consciousness, and by reaction
against the commandment presented itself as
¦7rapd/3ao-is. The vdfios as wev/xaTiKos possessed the
power, and had the task, of awakening the vovs,
estranging it from the crdp^ and filling it with

THE DIVINE PNEUMA. 45
hatred of its bondage. But it could go no farther ;
it was weak through the flesh ; and deliverance could
only come by means of the divine Trvev/xa, which the
human irvev/xa was, in virtue of its neutral formal
nature on the one hand, and of its belonging to the
genus irvev/xa on the other, capable of receiving.
How does this divine Trvev/xa enter into the de
velopment of man's history? By the vision at
Damascus Paul was led to speculate on the person,
death, resurrection, and existence in glory of Christ.
In His mission a heavenly factor came into human
history, — the pneumatic principle concentrated in a
person, who had already as such pre-existed in
heaven, with God, from the beginning of the ages.
He is the immediate image of God (2 Cor. iv. 4), for,
like God, he too is Trvev/xa (Rom. viii. 9, 10). This
dvOpwTros e-wovpdvLos, being in virtue of his essential
equality with God the vlbs Oeov (Gal. ii. 2 0 al), organ
of the creation for God (1 Cor. viii. 6), who had taken
part in the gracious guidance of Israel (1 Cor. x. 1),
came from heaven to become " man " and introduce
the new epoch of the irvev/xaTiKov. He had a
a-w/xa o-apKos with its accompaniment the -^vxfi, but
instead of the Trvev/xa avQpunrov extant in other
men, the Trvev/xa Oeov formed the proper subject of
His personality. With the flesh of Christ was asso
ciated d/xapTia as an objective quahty of the flesh-
substance ; but it encountered in the Trvev/xa Oeov

46 EFFECT OF CHRIST'S DEATH.
a principle which was a match for it, and during
His earthly life, as it were, paralysed it. 'O/ioido/xa
(Rom. viii. 3) means a "copy" or "imitation"
(Nachbildung). The blow which was to hght on
the a-dpP^, and, by fatally striking it at one point of the *
complex unity to paralyse it in all, would have fallen
beside the mark, if Christ had not had a real and
true crdpP^ d/xapTias. The great object of His death
was to cancel the d/xapTia in and with the crdpP^, and
so to liberate the vovs. The continued existence of
the -wvev/xa enclosed in the trappy so cancelled, and its
victory over the latter, were made manifest by the
Besurrection, which is fundamentally important as
the necessary correlate to Christ's death. The
objective result of Christ's death takes effect in the
individual human subject by baptism, in which the
union of the baptized with Christ is so close as
hardly to fall short of a real identification. What
has taken place in Christ is eo ipso accomplished in the
baptized. The old man partakes in the crucifixion,
and the aSifxa d/xapTias is done away. By baptism
we become one with Christ as the Trvev/xa Xusottoiovv,
which accordingly enters into believers and supplies
them with the dyeadai — the impulse needed for the
new hfe. The indwelling Trvev/xa is now the element
" in which " all takes place ; man is irvev/xaTiKos
and therewith SIkuios, aytos ; and the more precise
result is specified at Rom. viii. 10, where to aw/m

THE INDWELLING PNEUMA. 47
veKpov is taken to indicate the putting to death of
the trappy, for crw/xa stands here as including the
latter ; and to irvev/xa ^anj indicates the putting of
life into the Trvev/xa dvdpunrov, which is conceived to
be here meant, partly because of the hypothetical char
acter of the predicate Xwr/, partly because of the
correlative c-w/xa.
The effect of the immanence of the divine in
the human irvev/xa is a gradual elevation of the
powers of the latter, which, although held by
faith as already accomplished, is but slowly realised.
The position of the o-dpP^ as continuing to subsist in
the Trvev/xaTiKos can only be regarded in the light of
an "interim arrangement" pending the approach of
the Parousia. The crw/xa becomes capable of emancipa
tion from the o-dpP^, the matter of which it still in this
life shares, and of serving as an instrument for the
divine Spirit (1 Cor. vi. 13-19) ; and its diroXv-
Tpaxris is completed when the earthly body has been
taken away and the spiritual body bestowed. Paul
knows no resurrection of the flesh or of the un
redeemed ; nor does he use the verb dvaa-Tijvai.
While the crw/xa of the redeemed is at the resur
rection emptied of its o-<fy>£-substance and filled
with the weS^a-substance, the cdpP^ is cpOopd and
abides in death. " The dualism is cancelled not by
conciliation of its parts, but by violent destruction of
the principle that succumbs."

48 COURSE OF THOUGHT IN ROM. I.-VIII.
In the third part, which treats of the place of
anthropology in the doctrine of salvation, Dr. Liide-
mann sets himself to discuss specially the problem
presented in the first eight chapters of the Epistle
to the Romans, where he finds that the first four
chapters rest on an anthropological basis, and em
body ideas altogether different from those which we
encounter in the sequel from ch. v. 2 (where the
transition from the one to the other is held to begin)
to the end of ch. viii. He compares and contrasts
the two courses of thought which are here brought
into juxtaposition, the religious or subjective-ideal,
and the ethical or objectively-real one. Going back
upon the earlier Epistles, he finds the idea of the
crappy turned to ethical and pneumatic account in the
Epistle to the Galatians, and doctrinally elaborated on
its physical side in the Epistles to the Corinthians ;
while in the Epistle to the Romans the physical and
ethical elements are put together, but in such a way
that, if we give full effect to the leading principle of
either line of thought, we shall find it incompatible
with the maintenance of the other. It is main
tained, therefore, that the earlier section of the
Epistle which works out the notion of ideal or
imputed righteousness, represents a view which is
no longer St. Paul's own. He places himself inten
tionally at the standpoint of the Jewish conscious
ness, which he desired to win over; and the

POINT OE TRANSITION. 49
argument of the first four chapters is merely intended
as preliminary to the exhibition of his own view,
which is really introduced at v. 2 ; " through whom,"
namely Jesus Christ, "also we have had our access
by faith into this grace, wherein we stand, and
rejoice in hope of the glory of God." The kcu,
which introduces something new, the perfect ea-yfi-
Ka/xev, and the presents ea-Tr/Ka/xev and Kav^w/xeQa
show that Paul closes the juridical course of thought
with v. 1, and makes the transition at verse 2 to the
real. Faith and the juridical righteousness acquired
by it simply procure access to the grace, whereby
we become partakers of the real new creation, whose
end is the glory of God. The Apostle's own de
finitive view of salvation is to be found in chapters
vi.-viii., to which ch. v. gradually leads over. The
elements of Christ's vicarious satisfaction and justi
fication by faith, which are often regarded as the
very Palladium of Paulinism, are but the Propylaea
through which the Christian coming from Judaism
must have his " access " to the real saving blessings
of the gospel ; and in the four chief Epistles what
we have is not any self-consistent doctrine, but the
stages of a process of thought going forward in the
Apostle's mind amidst his incessant conflicts with
Judaism. In 1873 Dr. Otto Pfleiderer, now a distinguished
professor of Theology at Berlin, pubhshed his treatise
D

50 VIEW OF DR. PFLEIDERER.
entitled " Paulinism," which has been translated into
English by Mr. Edward Peters. This monograph forms
beyond doubt the most thorough exposition of the
Pauline doctrine dealt with by itself. It is marked
by great clearness and vigour of grasp, but it is
unhappily vitiated — from the standpoint of a purely
Biblical Theology — by its pervading tendency to re
cast the Apostle's thoughts in the mould of a modern
philosophical terminology sufficiently alien from them.
Dr. Pfleiderer, in his discussion of " the flesh," starts
from Rom. vii. 1 8 : " I know that in me, that is, in
my flesh, dwelleth nothing good," as proving (1)
that the flesh is not sin itself, and (2) that the flesh
is not tlie whole man. The flesh is that side of man,
which stands in contrast to the " inner man," and
which with the members forms the seat of sin. The
relation between crap^ and rrw/xa, which are inter
changed promiscuously as materially identical, is
this : The crdpP^ is the matter of the {earthly) body,
but the body is the organised form, in which this
matter exists as a concrete earthly individual. So far
as the body has flesh for its substance, it may share
the predicates of the flesh, and may be designated as
the body of sin and death ; so far as it is the organ of
an Ego destined to be governed by spirit, it may be
the temple of the Holy Spirit. The sense of the
" flesh " as (animated) matter is most obvious in
many passages, where Paul expresses incidents,

ENLARGED SENSE OF "FLESH." 51
states, relations of the bodily life by the adjective
" fleshly " or by the substantive with a preposition.
Further, the animated matter of the body is but
part of the general matter which forms the substance
of the earthly world, and has the character of what
is sensuously visible, and thereby weak, perishable,
and null (2 Cor. iv. 18: Ta fiXeiro/xeva Trpoa-Katpa).
Thus the conception of a-dpP^ becomes enlarged so as
to embrace all that is " worldly " in contrast to what
is supersensible, eternal, divine (to aapuKa, Rom.
xv. 27; ot KaTa crdpKa Kvpioi, aocpia crapKiK?/, and the
like). In such cases as these there is nothing beyond
the usual Hebrew conception, as implying non-
spiritual, but not necessarily anti-spiritual, weak, but
not positively bad, material substance. So St. Paul
uses flesh of " man " generally. But it was withal
already of itself natural {es lag nun doch sclwn an
sich nahe) to raise the impurity and corruptibleness
of the flesh (1 Cor. xv. 50) into sinfulness proper, as
the two ideas coincide in expressing something dis
pleasing to God, repugnant to His holy nature. In
reahty the Old Testament has already taken this
further step in various passagesjthat refer the sinful
ness of man to his fleshly origin and fleshly nature
(Ps. li. 7; ciii. 10, comp. 14 ff; Is. xlviii. 8, and
especially numerous passages in Job) ; and it sug
gested itself the more readily to St. Paul, as with him
the Messianic Trvev/xa had become converted from a

52 DUALISM OF PRINCIPLES.
principle of transcendent physical life into a principle
of morally good life. Its opposite, the crdpP^, must also
have a moral spontaneity, which can of course only
be evil. Thus from being mere non-spiritual sub
stance it became an anti-spiritual causality, from
its mere passive mortality it became an active
striving {trachten) after death or working death (to
cppdvrj/xa Ttjs crapKos, Rom. viii. 5). And, when this
change has taken place, its peculiar activity can
only consist in an e-TriOv/xelv KaTa irvev/xaTOS, the
result of which cannot but be of a sinful nature.
Thus (so wird) the contrast of physically different
substances, as presented in 1 Cor. xv., becomes the
dualism of morally conflicting principles (Gal. v. 17).
In reference to the more spiritual sins embraced hi
Gal. v. 19-21, it is laid down as a cardinal point for
the understanding of the Pauline anthropology, that,
when the matter, which the flesh from the outset and
always is, becomes converted from a mere non-
spiritual substance into a principle antagonistic to
spirit, its activity no longer remains restricted to the
sphere of the sensuous body, but seizes on the whole
man, so that he becomes a crapKiKos dvOpwiros — not
merely having the a-dpP^ as Ms physical basis, but
having the , einQv/xelv peculiar to the crdp^ as the
law of his life. The a-apKiKos accordingly is in his
whole personal life antagonistic to spirit and God;
and he is so by nature just because he is crdpKivos ;

THE CARNAL MAN. • 53
in his being physically flesh lies the inevitable
ground of his moral fleshliness {crapKiKov elvai). The
relation of the two ideas is clear from Rom. vii. 14 ;
1 Cor. iii. 1-3.
Pfleiderer defines the eiriOv/xeiv as at bottom nothing
else than the nature-will directed to the finite natural
self-life {Mgenleben), manifesting itself partly as
sensuous, partly as selfish, with only this difference,
that St. Paul makes the subject of this nature-will
to be the animated matter of the body, while modern
psychology makes it the individual (psychic) spirit
inhabiting the body — a distinction pronounced not
to be of essential moment for the practical side of
the case. He objects to the view of Ernesti, Schmidt,
and Biedermann — who make the idea that of the
passiveness of spirit overagainst matter, or the tenden
cy to be determined by what is material — as incom
patible with such phrases as KaTa crdpKa etvat, which
would in that case be a pleonasm, cppdvr\/xa t>js crapKos,
and the like ; and he objects also to the view which
resolves it into human nature determined by sense
or the world, as incompatible with Paul's distinction
between the Ego and the flesh, with the interchange
of ev ttj crdpKi, verse 18, and ev tois /xehecriv, verse
23, as well as with the reference to the vw/xa tov
OavaTov and to the irpdpeis tov crw/xaTos at viii. 13.
The undeniable consequence of this view — and
the chief reason why it meets with so much opposi-

54 IMPERSONAL SIN-PRINCIPLE.
tion — is that it makes sin inevitable and mankind
naturally sinful. We escape this result certainly, if
we hold that the ground of sin is not matter in
itself, but merely the self-surrender of the Ego tu
it, or empiric hmnan nature in so far as in its case spirit
allows itself to be determined by matter. But this
is not at all St. Paul's opinion ; it is the very oppo
site of his. For the cardinal point of the whole of
Rom. vii. is just this, that all personal sinning is
preceded by an impersonal sin-principle lying in
human nature and, as ultimate ground, infallibly
producing all sinful manifestations. According to
verse 7 ff. sin is already in man, before the law comes
to him and brings it to consciousness ; at the bottom
of conscious sinning hes an unconscious d/xapTia as
purely objective power, which being dead, that is,
latently and potentially existent, is awakened
(avefyo-ev) on occasion of the law, that is, comes to
consciousness ; whereupon the Ego may ideally dis
tinguish itself from the sin dwelling in it and from
the flesh as its principle and seat, and may then also
really turn with its personal will to the law, but
only in inward reactions, which have not the power
of practically vanquishing sin in the members. This
view, he asserts, has the merit not only of simplicity
but of adhering to the radical signification of the
word. The context must decide the meaning in such
cases ; in various passages the moral seems to blend

ANTINOMY. 5 5
almost indistinguishably with the physical sense, as
in the " fleshly wisdom " of the Corinthian Epistles.
In the notion of the crappy thus defined sin appears
— as at Rom. v. 1 2 — an original, objective, necessary
element presupposed a priori to the will of the
individual. The difference between that passage and
the o-ajo^-doctrine is, that in the former the origin
of this general principle is found historically in the
first sin of Adam, and in the latter psychologically
in the nature of man or matter of his body. It
has often been attempted to make the sinful quality
{Beschaffenheit) of the flesh appear a consequence
of Adam's sin, whereby human nature became al
tered. But with St. Paul there is no trace of
such a doctrine. If the udpP^ is by its nature and
from the beginning the principle of sin, we are here
certainly brought face to face with an antinomy,
the deeper resolution of which does not pertain
to exegesis.
But, while St. Paul regards man as by virtue of
his flesh-nature essentially sinful, it is not his
opinion that man is merely sinful, with no better
power belonging to his nature. Holsten's view,
which makes the crdpt; the whole man and the
latter as " in his substantial nature d/xapTia," is an
exaggeration of a Manichaeo-Flacian character, de
cidedly un-Pauline. Rom. vii. distinguishes from
the crape; an essentially other part of man, the ecrui

56 THE NOUS.
dvOpwiros or vovs — an idea most akin to our
" reason " ( Vernunft) theoretical and practical. It
is not substance, like Trvev/xa, but faculty, formal
capacity of the Ego to exert itself in thinking and
willing. Formally it may take up opposite contents.
But according to St. Paul it is no mere empty
mental form, indifferent towards that contents ; on
the contrary it has the vo/xos Oeov dwelling in it, and
has it not simply as an object of consciousness, but as
its own immanent impulse towards the good {vo/xos
tov voos /xov, vii. 23), which contends with the sin-
impulse in the members, and that so successfully
that the Ego at last internally turns with assent and
sympathy towards the law of God. This not in
operative element akin to God in the vovs is what
becomes manifest even in the heathen as the con
sciousness of God (the voelv, discerning God in
creation, Rom. i. 20) and as the law of conscience
(Rom. ii. 14 f.); and constitutes in man an element of
preparation for his Christian redemption. St. Paul
in his estimate of man's religious and moral nature
is thus equally remote from a Pelagian overvaluing
and from an Augustinian undervaluing of it.
The question, whether the natural man has a
Trvev/xa, is regarded as concerning only the Apostle's
general Jewish- vulgar, and not his distinctively
Christian, anthropology. It is to be answered roundly
in the affirmative, on the ground of various passages

THE HUMAN PNEUMA. 57
quite unambiguous (such as 1 Cor. ii. 11; v. 4 ;
vi. 20 ; vii. 34; Rom. viii. 16). These passages also
give us significant hints as to its nature. It is speci
fically distinguished from the divine Trvev/xa, as il
needs comfort and rest (2 Cor. ii. 12 ; vii. 13) ; it
may be defiled and require purification (2 Cor. vii. 1) ;
it is assumed that it needs to be sanctified and pre
served (1 Thess. v. 23); and the possibility of its not
being saved is plainly implied (in 1 Cor. v. 5). It is
thus marked off from the specifically Christian Trvev/xa,
which cannot be exposed to those affections, and from
the anti-pneumatic crdpP^, which must fall a prey
to cpQopa. The natural irvev/xa thus holds between
those two opposite principles a place of indifference
in the middle, as the neutral substratum of the
personal life, having as little in common with the
supernatural Trvev/xa given in baptism, as the general
life-spirit, animating all creatures and man according
to the Old Testament view, has with the super
natural spirit of revelation coming at times on the
prophets. And just as that life-spirit is essentially
identical with the soul, in the New Testament
usage — to which St. Paul in this forms no exception
— the (natural) irvev/xa is substantially nothing else
than the ^v-^ri (comp. their juxtaposition at Luke
i. 46f. where the parallel makes clear their identity).
The higher side of man in affinity with God is not
his irvev/xa, but his vovs. If the question be asked

58 RELATION OF NOUS AND PNEUMA..
how it is possible to assume in man such a faculty
akin to God as the vovs, if its substratum, the
subject of the personal life, is only such an indif
ferent irvev/xa as has been described, Dr. Pfleiderer
answers that a solution of this question may not at
all be expected from St. Paul, with whom, obviously,
such purely anthropological questions lay quite out
of his way (ganz fern lagen), and who accordingly in
this case simply followed throughout the popular
unreflecting (unreflektirten) mode of conception of
those around him ; and adds that exegesis has to
content itself with indicating this difficulty, which
has an existence only from our point of view.1
1 Pfleiderer, Paulinismus, pp. 47-68. He adds, in a note, that
of the two alternatives required by our logical consistency of
thought — either that, because of the indifferent human -n-vev/xa,
we should deny to man any higher God-related element, or that,
because of the God-related element present in the vovs, we should
ascribe to the -rrvev/ia therein manifesting itself a character at
least potentially Christian — the former, defended by Holsten,
is decidedly opposed to the Pauline doctrine of the vovs, and
presents a Flacian exaggeration of his doctrine of sin ; and
the latter, which he himself had formerly supported (in a paper
published in Hilgenf eld's Zeitschrift, 1871, 2nd part), is, in
its mode of starting from the basis of the vovs to make
the natural -n-vev/xa a potential form of the divine-Christian,
not accordant with the immediate form of the Pauline teaching,
and a reflection of modern rather than of ancient thought.
He accordingly pronounces that earlier disquisition a dogmatic
attempt to solve with categories of modern thought a difficulty,
which exegesis has simply to indicate as such and to leave
alone.

THE DIVINE PNEUMA. 59
With respect to the divine irvev/xa Pfleiderer l re
presents St. Paul as having set out from the tradi
tional conception of the Messianic irvev/xa received by
the Christian in baptism. Under this the Christian
Church understood substantially nothing else than
the Old Testament prophetic spirit of revelation,
which Joel had predicted as to be generally dif
fused in the last time, and which was conceived
as supra-sensuous substance of the higher divine
world, that had come upon men (by outpouring),
and produced in them supernatural gifts and effects
of a miraculous kind. St. Paul set out from this ; but
it was not the only or the essential element in the
Christian irvev/xa, which was for him the constantly
operative principle of the whole Christian life. That
the Pauline Trvev/xa was conceived in itself as a
transcendent-physical essence, is regarded as proved
by the antitheses at 1 Cor. xv. 42-50. It can only
be termed relatively immaterial, in so far as it has
not earthy and sensuous, but heavenly and supra-
sensuous matter ; hence its close affinity with the
air, and with light, whose brightness (SoP^a) is to be
regarded as its standing form of manifestation.
This supra-sensuous substance belongs originally to
God and, moreover, to his Son Christ, as constitut
ing their divine nature ; but it does not form a
separate {besondere) personahty by the side of the
1 Paulinismus, pp. 179-214.

60 NOT A DISTINCT PERSON.
two.1 No doubt the Spirit often appears as an acting
subject with consciousness and will ; He distributes
gifts as He will (1 Cor. xii. 1 1), searches the depths
of the Godhead (Cor. ii. 10), is our intercessor before
God (Rom. viii. 26), and bears witness to our spirit
(Rom. viii. 16). But though it may be conceded that
this personification is more than a verbal one, that
it has a place in the very conception ol' the Apostle,
this is still far removed from the definite thought
of a Person distinct from God and Christ.2 As a
concrete hypostasis, the divine Trvev/xa subsists (ex
cepting in God himself) only in the exalted Christ,
for 6 Kvptos to irvev/xa ecrTiv (2 Cor. iii. 17).
In all these definitions, so far as they concern
the nature of the irvev/xa in itself, there is nothing
peculiar to St. Paul. But the transition to his distinc
tive doctrine of the irvev/xa is found in his funda
mental view of faith and baptism as a real union
with the crucified and risen Christ, as it is set
forth in Rom. vi. If faith, completing itself in
baptism, is a self-surrender of man to the dead and
risen Christ so as to belong to llim and to have close
fellowship of life with Him, and if this risen Christ
is substantially heavenly Trvev/xa, it is a simple
1 Not, as in the English translation : " a separate personality
in each of them."
2 Not, as in the English translation : " a separate personality
of God and of Christ."

TWO SOURCES OF THE PAULINE DOCTRINK. 61
inference that the Christian thus obtains a share in
the heavenly irvev/xa through faith and baptism ; and
as this Trvev/xa in Christ is the person-forming prin
ciple of life, so must it necessarily also become in
the Christian — who KoWw/xevos tco Kvplw ev
irvev/xd eo-Tiv (1 Cor. vi. 17) — the not less constantly
immanent principle of the new personal life, of the
Kawos dvOpwiros. Accordingly we have to explain
the peculiarly Pauline doctrine of the irvev/xa from
the confluence of two sources — on the one hand, the
traditional doctrine that in baptism there is obtained
the (wonder-working) Messianic irvev/xa; and on the
other hand, the originally Pauline doctrine of faith
as the heart's act of trustful-loving union with Christ;
from the former came the dogmatic form, from the
latter the religious-moral contents. How much
more readily the second mode of view suggested
itself to the Apostle, and was for him more essential
than the first, may be inferred from the fact that he
places the reception of the Spirit thrice in direct con
nection with faith (Gal. iii. 2, 5, 14), but brings it
into relation with baptism only by a single, and that
an indirect, hint (1 Cor. xii. 13 : ev evi irvev/xaTi
r/fxeis els ev crw/xa efiairTicrQri/xev). On the basis of
this state of matters we are doubtless entitled to
assume that Paul on his part accepted the tradi
tional doctrine of the reception of the Spirit in
baptism, but we must lie ware of assigning to this

62 RELATION IN THE CHRISTIAN.
point so central a significance for the Paulme
soteriology, as is usually done, when baptism as
the communication of the Spirit is placed alongside
of justification by faith quite as a second saving
principle. Had this been the Apostle's meaning, he
must have expressed it, and must have made the
reception of the Spirit as dependent on baptism as
he makes justification and adoption dependent on
faith. As to the question of the relation of the Christian
irvev/xa to the natural irvev/xa of man, Dr. Pfleiderer
first notices the passages which seem to point to
their co-existence and operation alongside of, or in,
each other, and those on the other hand which do
not suggest, or do not admit, such a distinction; and
comes to the conclusion that, according to the mind
of the Apostle, the divine irvev/xa and the naturally
human irvev/xa unite in the Christian to form the unity
of a new subject, of a Kaivos or irvev/xaTiKOS dvOpwiros.
Yet this union is not one absolutely complete from
the beginning, but one always in course of forma
tion merely (nur iverdende) and consequently still in
part non-existent; whence the two substances are
still in another respect twofold, and are related to
one another as the active and giving to the passive
and receiving.

POINTS OF AGREEMENT AND DIFFERENCE.

III.
CRITICISM OF METHODS.
The works to which we have called attention are
marked by no small skill in the combining and in
terpreting of the facts ; and the reader who peruses
any one of them will be apt at first sight to carry
away the impression of an argument as successful as
it is ingenious and elaborate. But a more careful
examination of their methods, and a comparison of
their several results, will do much to dispel the
illusion. There are two points as to which they seem
agreed, namely, in the quest of a fundamental mean
ing to which the Apostle's varied use of crdpP^ may
be referred, and in the disposition to trace in that
use a certain influence of Hellenistic philosophy.
But, though they start from common ground, they
reach very diverse and even opposite conclusions.
While they are not quite at one even as to the
basis of the idea, they differ widely in their views as
to the relation of the Jewish and Hellenic elements
that are conceived to have moulded the Apostle's

64 DIVERGENCE OF CONCLUSIONS.
thought. Baur points to an apparently indirect
influence of ancient Greek philosophic ideas (p.
144). Holsten finds directly and throughout the
speculative categories of Hellenism. Schmidt re
gards the Hellenic modes of thought as materially
modified in their direction and application by the
Apostle's Old Testament training. Ludemann dis
covers the two lines of thought running side by
side, the Apostle expressing himself sometimes in
terms of the one, sometimes in terms of the other,
without any attempt to combine or to reconcile
them. Pfleiderer contrives a bridge of his own to
facilitate the Apostle's passing from the one to the
other. Not less divergent are their anthropological con
clusions. With Baur the ^v^f/ is almost merged in
the crapP^, but is " at all events non-material, and so
far pneumatic in the widest sense of the term" ; the
vovs is its spiritual element. With Holsten not
only the ^v^, but also the vovs and KapSla belong
to the side of the o-dpP^. With Ludemann the crdpP^
and \^i/x>7 go to form the outer, the vovs and KapSla
to constitute the inner, man. As to the human irvev/xa
Baur holds that although spoken of, it has no real signi
ficance. Holsten cannot recognise it as an element
of man at all. Ludemann holds it to be the in
different subject of personal life, the substance of the
inner man. Pfleiderer affirms it to be in substance

JUDGING ONE ANOTHER. 65
equivalent to ^x^, the higher principle being in his
view the vovs. Schmidt resolves it into the general
notion of " spirit," and leaves it without more
precise definition.
It need not surprise us, if under such circum
stances each writer, who advances his own solution
of the problem with considerable confidence and, in
some cases, strength of self-assertion, should not be at
all disposed to acquiesce in the vahdity of the con
clusions arrived at by the others. And it may be
well, before we proceed, just to note a few of the
judgments thus passed by one on another, and to
observe how each paves the way for his own struc
ture by more or less demolishing those of his
predecessors. Dr. Baur1 had affirmed — and not un
reasonably, as we shall see by and by — that in
place of his own simple concrete view (viz. that
crapP^ is just the body) Holsten "has put abstract
definitions, which, however correct, take already for
granted the fundamental assumptions on which they
rest." Holsten retaliates by asserting that Baur's
" definition of the idea is erroneous," that he has
" confounded crappy and to arw/xa tjJc crapKos," and that,
while accepting individual points from Holsten's
investigation, he has ignored, set aside, or rejected
what Holsten himself considers his " decisive re-
^heologisches Literaturblatt, 1857, No. 42, as quoted by
Holsten at p. 369. E

66 LUDEMANN ON HOLSTEN AND SCHMIDT.
suits " as to the categories of matter, substance, and
the finite. Schmidt, besides effectually showing the
utterly forced and unnatural character of the exe
gesis applied by Holsten to the passages where a
human irvev/xa seems referred to, declares himself at
variance with Holsten's leading conclusions as to
the contrast of flesh and spirit being convertible into
that of finite and infinite, as to the identification of
crappy with evil, and as to the introduction of the
doctrine of objective d/xapTia at Rom. v. 12.
Ludemann refuses in numerous instances to accept
Holsten's interpretations, and has conclusively proved
that no such dualism as Holsten posits is charge
able against St. Paul, and that Holsten's own
" Jewish-Hellenistic" view is neither Jewish nor
Hellenistic. Pfleiderer repudiates Holsten's car
dinal doctrine of the crappy embracing the whole
man as a " decidedly un-Pauhne, Manichaeo-Flacian
exaggeration." As regards Schmidt, Ludemann pronounces his
main view — which reduces the Apostle's doctrine of
redemption to annihilation of the crdpP^ — as "artificial,
scholastic, and utterly void of inner consistency";1
and Pfleiderer says of his position as to Rom. viii. 3
that, " ignoring (under pretext of being scientific !)
the Pauline mysticism of faith, it cuts through the
religious roots of the Pauline soteriology, and ulti-
1 Anthropologic des Apostel Paulus, p. 123, note.

PFLEIDERER ON LUDEMANN. 67
mately retains a mere dry scholastic theorem, leaving
it inexplicable how such a thought should ever have
made an impression on religious humanity."1 And —
mutato nomine de tefabula narratur — Ludemann him
self is destined to experience similar treatment at the
hands of Pfleiderer, who says of his singular attempt
to make out the standpoint of Rom. i. — iv. as
incompatible with that of Rom. vi. — viii. : " This
opinion of Ludemann I can only hold to be a fantas
tic blunder {einen wunderlichen Fehlgriff)," and in
opposition to it lays down thus clearly the true
state of the case: "The view given in the second
portion (of the Epistle, vi. — viii.) is simply introduced
in addition to, and not instead of, the first; and it
is far from being brought in, as if here and now the
earlier doctrine of the righteousness of faith were
to be annulled, and a bran-new doctrine of moral
righteousness were to be substituted for it. On the
contrary, the real Tri/eu/xa-righteousness and the ideal
righteousness of faith stand in the position of a
new rehgious relation to God and a new moral
life, neither of which can take the place of the
other, but which are necessarily required as recipro
cally complementary, and that, moreover, in such a
way that the religious idea always remains the founda
tion and — for the Apostle, as for the religious point
of view at all times — the main thing." 2
1 Paulinismu3, p. 113, note. - Paulinismus, p. 210, note.

68 THEORIES EX FACIE IMPROBABLE.
It is obvious that theories, which issue in results
so incongruous and conflicting, cannot together or
equally present to us the thought of St. Paul. And,
when we consider their bearing on the character
and teaching of the Apostle, we can hardly regard
them as carrying antecedent probability or as other
wise than on the face of them open to grave suspi
cion. Is it at all feasible, for example, to suppose
that one, whose whole later life turned on the fact of
redemption and was spent in the effort to persuade
men to receive it, should have based his teaching on
positions that, logically applied, preclude its possi
bility ? on the positions, that d/xapTia is of itself
essential to the crdp^, and tha.tfinU-n.vi non est capax
infiniti — which would seem to postulate in the
strictest sense a new creation ? If man is nothing
but o-apP^, and Christ came to do away with the
crappy, what is left to be redeemed or to lay hold of
redemption ? This is the natural question that
arises for one who consistently follows out Holsten's
theory. In point of fact, Holsten is not thus con
sistent; sometimes man is identified by him with
the "flesh"; sometimes he is spoken of as a subject
distinguishable from it. Ludemann well asks, "But
what is man, in Holsten's view, apart from the
flesh?" Holsten has, at least, no right to insist that
St. Paul shall be involved in the inconsistencies of
his expositor.

PRESUMPTIONS AGAINST THEM. 69
Can anyone, again, think it likely that St. Paul
knew so little what he meant to say as frequently
to use irvev/xa in a more general sense, to which no
definite idea can be attached, or to leave it in
many cases uncertain whether he was speaking
from an abstract ideal point of view of the contrast
between the material body and the immaterial life-
spirit of man, or from an empirico-real point of view
of the contrast between the flesh that conditions
the character of existing humanity, and the divine
Spirit transcending it ? Can we suppose the
Apostle to have taken refuge in the indefiniteness
which Schmidt woidd impute to him ? Turning
to the choice that Ludemann gives us, is it conceiv
able that the mind of the Apostle should have
oscillated, as it is alleged to have done, between
the wider Jewish and the narrower Hellenic use of
crdpP^i. that it should have passed under the dom
ination now of the one, now of the other? and that
the alternating currents should have succeeded each
other so rapidly as to be repeatedly reflected — to
the perplexity of the expositor — in the course of a
single letter ? Has Dr. Ludemann persuaded any
one else than himself of the possibility — to say
nothing of the probability — of the explanation which
he gives of the structure of the Epistle to the
Romans ? Lastly, coming to Pfleiderer, apart from all
else, can we deem it at all likely that the Apostle

70 ALLEGED INFLUENCE OF PHILOSOPHY
should have given an historical explanation of the
origin of sin in Rom. v. and a psychological explana
tion of its origin in chapter vii., which constitute a
formal contradiction, without being aware of, or
concerning himself about, the " unreconciled anti
nomy" ? One is tempted, in presence of such a
suggestion, to apply the pointed remark of Holsten,
in reference to a similar " unresolved antinomy " to
which Baur has recourse : " To assume really an
antinomy at the very centre of religious thought {der
Weltanschauung) in the case of a mind like St. Paul's
is simply a proof of our being ourselves in error." J
Above all, the supposition, which more or less
underlies all these theoretical constructions of the
Apostle's doctrine — that it contains elements or
reflects influences of Greek philosophy — is, in view
of what we otherwise know of him, I shall not say,
utterly incredible — for there can be no doubt of his
having had some measure of Greek culture, and " he
who became all things to all men that he might
gain some," might possibly find in it elements
which he could, consistently with his " being under
the law to Christ," turn to account for his ends —
but is at any rate in the last degree improbable. Can
it be thought a likely thing that one, who was
constantly placing his aims and his methods in
direct contrast to those of the world's wisdom,
'Zum Evangelium des Paulus und des Petrus, p. 442.

INCONSISTENT WITH ST. PAUL'S DECLARATIONS. 71
should array himself in its clothing, borrow its
ideas, or imitate its language ? If he did not pour
contempt on all its pride, he denounced it as folly,
when put into the balance with that higher wisdom
which he was commissioned to impart.
We do not lay stress merely on the emphatic
assertion of the Apostle that he determined "to
know nothing save Jesus Christ and Him crucified,"
or his disclaimer of glorying save in the cross of
Christ, though it is difficult to conceive language of
stronger or more unqualified negation. Nor do we
think it necessary to adduce the vehement denuncia
tions of misleading and unhealthful teaching in the
Pastoral Epistles, or the special warnings directed against
philosophy associated with vain deceit in the Epistle to
the Colossians — however forcibly they are expressed,
and however powerfully they may seem to tell in favour
of our argument — partly because they may be taken
to point to some special and abnormal condition of
the period or church referred to, and partly because
I am aware that most of those with whom we are
dealing would not grant the validity of an appeal to
works, in their judgment, of doubtful genuineness.
Let us take the First Epistle to the Corinthians,
where it is admitted on all hands that the recurring
expressions, "wisdom of words " (i. 17), " wisdom of
the world" (i. 21), "wise after the flesh" (i. 26),
"man's wisdom" (ii. 13), "wisdom of this world"

72 EXPLICIT DISCLAIMERS.
(ih. 19), "reasonings of the wise" (iii. 20), which
are of the most general character and unrestricted in
reference, can only point to the philosophy, dialectic,
and rhetoric of the current Greek schools. Can it
be thought that the Apostle, who declared that
" God chose the foolish things of the world, to put
to shame them that are wise," that he himself
" came not with excellency of speech or wisdom,"
that the wisdom spoken by him among the full-
grown was " a wisdom not of this world, nor of the
rulers of this world"; that he who issued the solemn
warning : " Let no man deceive himself ; if any
man thinketh that he is wise among you in this
world, let him become a fool that he may become
wise : for the wisdom of this world is foolishness
with God," would betake himself to the world's wis
dom which he had thus pronounced incompatible
with the simplicity of the gospel ? His words seem
to indicate not a mere abstinence for local or tem
porary reasons from a course otherwise or elsewhere
admissible, but a fundamental antagonism resting on
the belief that the " faith " of the church should not
stand in the " wisdom of men but in the power of
God," and that by a resort to those expedients of
fleshly wisdom the " cross of Christ would be made
void." In the face of such explicit statements as to
the principles that guided him as a wise master

CHOICE OF ALTERNATIVES. 73
builder, who felt himself entitled to bid others take
heed how they built on the one foundation and
pointed them to the fiery trial awaiting each man's
work, how can we suppose him to have nevertheless
drawn his thoughts from, and moulded his language
on, Hellenic philosophy ? Are we to assume that,
while he was assuring his readers that he had
" renounced the hidden things of dishonesty, not
walking in craftiness nor handling the word of God
deceitfully," he was consciously sitting as a partial
disciple at the feet of the very men whose reason
ings he had just pronounced to be, in the language
of Scripture, vain ? Or are we to conceive of the
matter, as if he had become a philosopher, so to
speak, in spite of himself, and had cast his ideas
into a philosophic mould without knowing it or
meaning it ? The former alternative is incredible
on ethical grounds ; the latter can hardly be deemed
possible in the case of the clear and penetrating
intellect that asks : " Who among men knoweth the
things of a man, save the spirit of the man, which
is in him ? " We prefer to accept St. Paul's own
assurance that he had not received the spirit of the
world, and that he did not speak in words taught to
him by man's wisdom.
But, if we are thus compelled by a due regard to
St. Paul's own language to hold such an influence of
Greek philosophy, as is assumed, to be either ex-

74 CATEGORIES OF PHILOSOPHY
eluded or reduced to an indirect and unconscious
minimum, we may fairly demur to the relevancy, at
least in the first instance, of the categories and
methods of philosophy as guides to the apprehension
of his meaning.
And this brings us to the first objection which
we are disposed to take to the method of the works
before us. With considerable difference of degree
certainly, but all of them to some extent, they im
port into their exegesis the canons, processes, and
nomenclature of philosophy. It is no part of our
present purpose to inquire what are the relations
that ought to subsist between philosophy and theo
logy; nor shall we presume to take exception to an
application of philosophical categories and methods
to the results of exegesis, if those who so apply
them are persuaded that they can thereby under
stand the results better, or explain them more
clearly. Let exegesis fulfil its function and com
plete its task ; and let the product then be handed
over to whom it may concern. What we here take
exception to is not the separate and independent
handling of theological topics by appropriate
philosophical methods, but the intermingling of the
philosophical and exegetical processes, to the confu
sion and detriment of both. It is difficult in such
a case to determine how much belongs to the one
factor, and how much to the other; how far the

IMPORTED INTO EXEGESIS. 75
theory is the outcome of pure and unbiassed inter
pretation ; how far the exegesis on the other hand
may have been moulded and warped by the
exigencies of the preconceived theory. The risk of
this confusion is especially great when, as in several
of the works before us, the writer attempts to
engraft on his exposition of the facts an explanation
of their genesis. If we come with our ready-made
categories of system, we shall be but too apt to find
what we expect, and to make the facts fit into
them, or to pronounce it so much the worse for the
facts. Of the latter we meet a very striking illustration
furnished by Holsten. His theory requires him
throughout to interpret irvev/xa of the divine Spirit,
and, on finding it impossible to attach that sense to
it in 2 Cor. vii. 1 without assuming the divine
Spirit to be capable of defilement, he has no scruple
in suggesting that the passage should be set aside as
a spurious addition to the text, although there is
not the slightest vestige of other ground for im
peaching its genuineness. As St. Paul himself does
not make use of the terms " matter," or " sub
stance," or "the finite," — although, had he wished to
do so, he could easily have found the needful words
— it may well be conceived that the terms which he
does employ do not lend themselves very readily to
the scientific fetters imposed on them ; and the con-

76 ELASTICITY OF THE CATEGORIES.
sequence is that the categories, to which they are
referred with an affectation of great precision, ex
hibit under the exigencies of practical manipulation a
wonderful elasticity. We are told ever so often
that the crappy is nothing but the body, the material
body ; but soon we find the admission extorted by
the necessities of exegesis that the crdpP^ is equiva
lent to, if not synonymous with, " man." Nothing
can exceed the iteration with which we are assured
that the crdpP^ is throughout the matter or substance
of the earthly body ; but we have not proceeded far
before we find it filled with life, instinct with
emotion, putting forth energies of desire and thought
and will, exhibiting, in fact, all the activities that
are more especially associated with the idea of
" spirit " — the suggestion of which, however, is dis
missed with the assurance that it is at bottom mere
bodily matter and nothing more !
Pfleiderer holds that in many instances crdpP^
denotes simply non-pneumatic (geistlose) substance,
but he meets with other cases where it is needful to
take it as " anti -pneumatic " (geistwidrige) substance ;
and he apparently reckons the transition from the
one sense to the other so easy that it needs — as it
certainly receives — no explanation. He vouchsafes
nothing more than the assertion : " It was withal
already in itself natural " {es lag doch schon an sich
italic ; on such occasions with our German friends

MATTER AND MIND. 77
schon plays a large part for so modest a particle) ;
and, after repeating the assertion two or three times
that it may produce its effect non vi sed saepe
caclendo, he tells us to our no small astonishment :
" Thus we know in fact already how {so wissen wir
ja, schon, wie—schon reinforced this time by ja) the
non-pneumatic passive becomes immediately at the
same time the anti-pneumatic active matter." 1
Dr. Pfleiderer, who is fond of throwing bridges
over psychological chasms, and seems even at times
to make the chasm for the pleasure of bridging it
over, might have helped us to conceive how the pas
sive becomes thus immediately active, and the non-
pneumatic thus at the same time anti-pneumatic.
I confess that to my mind a slight infusion of a
pneumatic element in the form of a perverse
human will would make the transition more readily
intelligible. So much for the category of adpP^,
which must be rigidly defined as " matter of the
body," but may elastically include, and exercise, all
the functions of mind !
Let us now glance for a moment at the correlative
term aw/xa, which is assigned to the category of
" form," and stands, as such, contrasted with crdp^
" substance." Holsten insists that aw/xa has, through-
1 " So wissen wir ja schon wie dem Paulus die geistlos
passive Materie unmittelbar zugleich die geistwidrig aktive
ist." — Paulinismus, p. 62.

78 FORM AND SUBSTANCE.
out, its qualitative characteristic in the conception of
" form " ; and he has an elaborate note,1 in which he
ingeniously attaches to this conception of " form "
the further qualifications of " organic," " living,"
" material," " outward," " apparent," " dead," accord
ing as they seem to be requisite from the context of the
several passages. But he comes to the case of Col. ii.
17: " which are the shadow of things to come, but the
body is of Christ," where, if aw/xa means anything,
it means the very substance, the real and essential,
in contrast to the idea of mere form, of shadow
without substance. He admits that there is here
what he calls " an interesting transition " to the
idea of substance ; but, in order to keep by his de
finition, he betakes himself to a novel category of
" substantial form," whatever that may mean. When
the category of " form " will obviously not suffice,
he tells us that the idea of aw/xa on such occasions
" shares the definite quality {Bestimmtheit) of its
substance " ; but what is this but borrowing at
pleasure from the one category as much as he happens
to wish to import into the other? and what in that
case is the use of insisting on the distinction ? The
passage Rom. viii. 13, as to "mortifying the deeds
of the body :" Tas irpapeis tov aw/xaTos OavaTovTe,
is plainly, as it stands, out of keeping with Holsten's
definition ; but he gets over the difficulty by in-
1 Zum. Evang. d. Paulus u. d. Petrus, pp. 376, 377.

MATERIALITY AND IMMATERIALITY. 79
serting, on each occasion when he adduces the
passage, the words " Trjs aapKos " in brackets after
aw/xaTos, as if St. Paul had inadvertently omitted
them, or as if there were a necessity, in the light of
the context, that we should insert them — which is
simply an avoidance of the question raised by the
presence of aw/xaTos where we should expect
aapKos. Let us turn next to the other side of the con
trast. We naturally expect that, if the " flesh " is
" matter," the irvev/xa opposed to it will be defined as
" non-matter," as something immaterial. And so it
is after a fashion. We learn from Holsten * that
"the irvev/xa is an dopaTov" (Rom. i. 20, where,
however, nothing is said of the irvev/xa, but the
Apostle has himself specified the dopaTa as God's
" eternal power and OeioTr/s ") ; and " on this imma
teriality rests the freedom from all that is material,
primarily the dcpOapTov and al'Siov." But it is
conceived that this immateriality is " not freedom
from all substantiality," because of the passages
that present the communication of the Spirit as
an efflux of something substantial, combined with
a real effect. " In this way a certain materiality
slips again into the conception, and the immateriality
of the Trvev/xa becomes at bottom merely the negative
of 'cosmic' earthly matter." "The Trvev/xa" says
1 Zum. Evang. d. Paulus n. d. Petrus, p. 378.

8 0 THE " RELATIVELY IMMATERIAL."
Liidemann, " is at the same time expressive of a
higher materiality " ; x and Pfleiderer says, " It can
only be called relatively immaterial, as it is not
earthly sensuous, but heavenly supra-sensuous
matter (Stofflichkcit)." 2 The irvev/xa as well as the
crappy is referred to the category of substance ; and
when we come to speak of matter, the irvev/xa is
in a sense material also — only higher, finer, trans
cendent, celestial. In this way the philosophic ex
positor finds himself at liberty to interpret irvev/xa
either in the sense of the " relatively immaterial " or
of the " relatively material " as it may best suit him.
One cannot help suspecting that the same standard
is not always apphed to the Apostle's language ;
sometimes it is weighed in the scales of modern
psychological distinctions ; sometimes it is tried by
the standard of the Greek ideas of the time ; some
times the Apostle is credited with the nicest and
most delicate discrimination in the use of terms;
at others he is held to have contented himself with
the " Jewish-vulgar " anthropology.
In keeping with the tendency to lay down
stringent categories, which are subsequently widened
or relaxed as the case may require, all the writers
except Ludemann deem it necessary to start from
and constantly return to the assumption, in the case
1 Anthropologie d. Ap. Paulus, p. 22.
2 Paulinismus, p. 200.

" FUNDAMENTAL SIGNIFICATION." 8 1
of adpP^ at least, of a fundamental signification
underlying its use, although they do not clearly
explain what they mean by this. Baur postulates
a "fundamental notion" {Grundbegriff); Holsten a
" cardinal signification " (prinzipielle Bedeutung —
that from which, assumed as a principle, the others
maybe derived); Schmidt an "original contents" {ur-
sprunglicher Inhalt); Pfleiderer a " fundamental signi
fication" {Grundbedeutung). One would be glad to
know what is the precise idea attached to these
words. They can hardly be employed in the purely
etymological or lexical sense. A lexicographer, such
as Grimm or Littre, recording the history of a word,
traces it back to its root and earliest mode of use,
and evolves thence the succession of the several
meanings or shades of meaning gradually associated
with it. But in this case we are concerned not
with the historical genesis of the word, or the record
of its earlier applications, which might possibly
throw httle more light on existing usage than an
inquiry into the origin of the terms "idiocy" or
"lunacy" would shed on a modern medical treatise
dealing with these subjects. Such researches have at
most a very subordinate place and value as compared
with the investigation of that actual usage — usus,
quern penes arbitrium est et jus et norma loquendi; and
they only contribute indirectly to the solution of
the problem in so far as they help us to trace the
F

82 SPECIMENS OF EXEGETICAL METHODS.
growth of that usage. The meaning of a word as
used by St. Paul can only be got from his own
writings. We take it therefore that, when the
" fundamental signification " is spoken of, it is the
fundamental signification that is conceived to govern
Pauline usage. But this leads us to ask how, in
that case, it is arrived at. Is it drawn from the
standpoint of the expositor, and does it reflect his
pecuhar theory ? If so, it may be httle better than
an arbitrary assumption — a mere begging of the
question. Does it profess to be taken from St.
Paul and to give his own key to his meaning ? In
that case it would seem to be most naturally reached
at the close of the inquiry, rather than laid down
at the beginning ; or, if assumed at the outset, it
should be merely treated as a working hypothesis to
be verified in the sequel. I do not find any indica
tion of its being thus reached or so treated ; but
there are signs not a few that the fundamental view
is quite as much imported as educed — with the
result of controlling the exegesis or hampering its
free play, preventing the acceptance of its natural
results, or straining it in support of conclusions
brought from another domain.
And this leads me to present some specimens of
the methods and processes by which exegesis is
made to yield the desired results. Holsten and
Ludemann especially insist that d/xapTia as used

EXEGESIS OF ROM. V. 12. 8 3
by St. Paul denotes what they call objective d/xapTia
— that is, not sin regarded collectively or generically
as a principle at work in man, but sin regarded as a
necessity inherent in man's constitution as such —
in other words not what we call " sin," but what we
call " evil." And they adduce especially two pas
sages as warranting this position. At Rom. v. 12
St. Paul says : " Si evos dvOpwirov r/ d/xapTia els tov
Koa/xov elarjXOe." Baur remarks that the irapaKor/
and Trapdftaais of Adam can only be understood of
the sin-principle, which was from the beginning
immanent in the flesh, emerging into actuality in
Adam.1 Holsten renders or paraphrases the pas
sage : " through one man (objective) sin (manifesting
itself in his irapdjSaais) entered (as a real thing)
into the world (of the visible) ; " 2 and Ludemann
comes to a substantially similar conclusion.3 But,
as is sufficiently obvious, the words inserted by
way of explicating the meaning contain the very
thought on which Holsten's position entirely de
pends ; and there is in the passage itself not the
shghtest hint of them. St. Paul says : " sin entered
into the world " ; Holsten makes him say : " objective
1 Vorlesungen ttber Neutest. Theol., p. 191.
2 Zum Evang. d. Petrus u. d. Paulus, p. 413.
3 Anthropologie d. Ap. Paulus, p. 88 : " Beim Stammvater
war seine a/iapTia keine straftallige Einzelthat, Trapa/iWts,
sondern, wie bei den Nachkommen, eine objective Beschaffen-
heit seiner Natur.''

84 EXEGESIS OF RUM. Y. 12.
sili entered into the world of the A'isible, that is,
came into manifestation as a reality." But this is
not all. According to the doctrine thus ascribed to
St. Paul the a/xapTia conceived as objective sin was
already in existence from the very first as a reality
in the Koa/xos — was already, before the emergence of
Adam's transgression, immanent in man's sensuous
nature. It could not therefore be said elaep-^eadai
els tov Koa/xov without imposing on that phrase a
meaning entirely foreign to it. When we say that
a thing enters into the world, we must certainly be
held to mean that something comes in which was
not there before; and not merely that something,
which had already been long in the world, had at
length become manifest in it. Besides, according to
the very definition of the difference between d/xapTia
and irapdfiaais given by those writers, we should
have expected the latter term rather than the former
to have been used with elarjXOe, for it was the trans
gression that came in, the d/xaprla was there , ab
initio. Then it is difficult to account for the pre
position Std under Holsten's exegesis ; it is not said
merely : in Adam or with Adam sin became mani
fested or actual ; but expressly through him, by
means of his instrumentality or agency, which would
seem to point at sin's having become present or
operative in him in the first instance not as an
outcome of necessity, but as the result of his per-

INTERPRETATION OF ROM. VII. 9. 85
sonal action. We can scarcely conceive the laws of
language subjected to a more violent strain ; and we
can hardly be surprised that Schmidt should here
decline to follow his leaders,1 and that Pfleiderer
should declare Liidemann's interpretation of the pas
sage, which is an elaborate expansion of Holsten's,
to betray itself mistaken by its very want of clearness.
Pfleiderer condemns the attempt to bring in the
doctrine of the adpP^ as the natural principle of sin
at a passage which simply deals with its historic
origin, as tending only to confusion; acknowledges
that Ernesti is here in the right ; and admits that the
immediate sense of the passage and of the context is
opposed to the conception of an objective sin-princi
ple preceding the first sin of Adam, " for the words
' sin entered into the world ' undeniably imply the
coming in of a new thing, which consequently was
not there at all previously." 2
The other passage on which this doctrine is
engrafted is Rom. vii. 9 : xwP19 7"i° v°tJI-ov a/xapTiu
veKpd . . . eXOovar/s Se Trjs evToXrjs, y a/xapTia dve-
Xpaev— .-which is explained to mean that objective sin
previously to the action of the law is latent, potential,
but at the presence of the commandment comes to
consciousness as what it is, becomes subjectively
realised as transgression. But this interpretation
imports its essential elements into the passage only
1 Paulinische Christologie, p. 43. 2 Paulinismus, p. 45.

86 LUDEMANN ON ROM. V. 2.
by disregarding the proper import of veKpa and the
force of the preposition in dvifyaev ; and Hilgenfeld
deserves at least the credit of superior consistency
when he holds that sin which is described as dead
and is said to revive must have had a previous life,
and accordingly interprets it of sin in a pre-existent
state. This view of his can hardly be entertained,
for there is no trace of anything analogous to it
in the Apostle's writings elsewhere ; but whatever
may be the precise meaning of the figure — which it
is not our object now to discuss — this much is
clear, that by no ordinary canons of exegesis can
veKpa mean " potential," which is a modern philoso
phical phrase, constructed as a sort of tertium quid
between possibility and necessity.
Ludemann finds an exegetic support for his.
peculiar theory — that the first portion of the Epistle
to the Romans as to justification by faith represents
a Jewish standpoint, which the Apostle no longer
accepts as his own — in Rom. v. 2, where St. Paul,
after having said in verse 1 : " Therefore having been
justified by faith, we have peace (or, let us have
peace) with God through our Lord Jesus Christ," is
supposed to make the transition to the opposite view
of ethical righteousness, which is really his own, in
the words : Si ov koi t^v Trpoaaywyr/v ea-^/Ka/xev
ttj iriaTei eis Tt/v yapiv TavTr\v ev y ean/Ka/xev,
ko.1 Kav^w/xeda eir eXiriSi tj/c SoPr/s tov Oeov.

OBJECTIONS TO HIS EXEGESIS. 87
After laying by means of spaced type a stress on the
words " have had access by means of the faith into
this grace" which there is nothing in the original
to warrant, he says : " It is evident that the faith
and the juridical justification acquired by it only
first procures access to the grace [nur erst den Zutritt
verschafft zu der Gnade] whereby we become par
takers of the real new creation." And he adds :
" Only thus is explained the ko.1, which indicates a
new thing, only thus the perfect ea-^Ka/xev, and the
presents eaTr/Ka/xev and Kav-^w/xeQa." 1 The sugges
tion is, that the faith in juridical justification as set
forth up to this point, but not recurring afterwards
in the three following chapters, is simply the means
of bringing men from a Jewish standpoint to the
real benefits of grace and new hfe to be got through
union with Christ, and that, having served its pur
pose, it may now be discarded as having no further
value. Upon this we remark, 1st, that the hinge of
the whole argument turns upon the presence of the
words t% irlaTei, on which Dr. Ludemann has im
posed so peculiar a sense ; but it is very doubtful
whether they form a genuine part of the text.
They do not occur in BDEFG, are omitted by Gries-
bach and Lachmann, and are bracketed by Westcott
and Hort ; and they have all the appearance of a
gloss. But, 2nd, assuming them to be genuine, they
1 Anthropologic d. A p. Paulus, pp. 208, 209.

88 EXEGESIS OF ROM. V. 2.
cannot without forcing bear the emphasis laid on
them. There is no statement that faith procures
the access, and still less is there warrant for the
" only first procures " which Ludemann inserts.
The stress lies on the access and on Clirist as procur
ing it. 3rd. His position requires that we take
the ydpiv TavTr/v as referring not, as one should
naturally expect, to the grace experienced in justifi
cation, which had been specially referred to at iii.
25, was resumed in part by the SiKaiwOevTes in v. 1,
and is now pointed to in the tooty/v ev fj eaTi/m/xev
with a certain triumphant sense of present posses
sion, but to a X"/0'5'' the real nature of which was
only to be developed in the sequel. 4th, He
attaches the clause Kai Kav^w/xeQa to eaTr/Ka/xev
which is a mere adjunct to x^-Plv Ta^>rrlv> whereas
the great majority of expositors place it with far
more probability in connection either with the ea-)(f/-
Ka/xev or, better still, with the principal sentence
elpr/vr/v e-^o/xev in verse 1. 5th, The ko.1 is said to
indicate something new, which is true in a sense,
but not in such a sense as to constitute a basis for
Liidemann's inference from it. It might denote
something added to what goes before, or might even
be construed as carrying a certain climactic force ;
but it is most probably to be taken, as it is taken by
Meyer, of the " also " of the corresponding relation,
bringing out more definitely and prominently the

ALLEGED SOCRATIC IRONY. 89
significance of the mediation of Christ as the ground
of our having our peace through Him. In any case
it must introduce something in the same line or
direction with what precedes ; and not aught op
posed to, contrasting with, or superseding it, as on
Liidemann's theory we would expect. If Liide-
mann's view is correct, the Apostle must have
so effectually disguised his meaning that it has
utterly escaped the notice of all that have sought to
reach it for eighteen hundred years.
Akin to Liidemann's discovery here is his curious
suggestion as to the Apostle's use of the phrase /xl]
yevoiTo. He regards this expression as used by the
Apostle, in what he terms truly Socratic irony, to
effect under cover of the same word a change of
the ideas denoted by it, or to pass from the one to
the other, whereby the Apostle, after making an
apparent concession, is enabled to neutralise it or
turn it against an opponent.1 This solution, under
which the Apostle escapes from the consequences
of an argument by deprecating the result but withal
shifting his ground, is more creditable to the in
genuity of the expositor than to the ingenuousness
of the Apostle ; and, although the phrase may not
have the deprecatory strength which is conveyed by
its unfortunate rendering in the Authorised Version,
we see no reason to doubt that the Apostle is speak-
1 Anthropologic d. Ap. Paulus, pp. 158, 167, 169 al.

90 ALLEGED PARALLELISM.
ing in earnest, and that, had he been made aware of
the ironical equivocation which was to be imputed to
him, he would have repelled it with a /xr/ yevoiTo.
Holsten, who does not hesitate to charge St. Paul with
" dialectic sophistry," is in this case more just, when
he describes it as the object of the formula to repel
with a certain emotion an inference drawn from a
true and real presupposition — an inference which is
logically possible, but in reality untrue and violating
the religious consciousness}
An instance of a different character may be sub
joined, where Dr. Ludemann builds an important
negative inference on an alleged parallelism of ex
pression. He argues that St. Paul, who at 2 Cor.
xi. 3 brings Eve, but not Adam, into contact with
the serpent, must have declined to accept the inter
vention of the devil in the fall of man, because Rom.
v. 1 2 is evidently written under reminiscence of, and
with reference to, the Book of Wisdom ii. 24. Tlie
words of the latter are : cpOovw Se SiaftoXov OdvaTOS
elarjXOev els tov Koa/xov, while at Rom. v. 12 the
words run : Si evos avOpwirov r/ d/xapTia els tov
Koa/xov elatjXOe, Kal Sid Trjs d/xapTias 6 OdvaTOS.
Here, we are told that the " sound of the words is in
part so similar that the variation {Abweichung) can
only be intentional " ;2 and it is suggested that St.
1 Zum Evang. d. Petrus u. d. Paulus, p. 433, note.
2 Anthropologic des Ap. Paulus, p. 93.

INTERPRETATION OF DIFFICULT TEXTS. 91
Paul made the change to ignore the reference to the
devil. But the resemblance extends only to the
common use of the phrase " entered into the world,"
which might have been employed by any two
writers desirous of giving expression to the same
idea, without the slightest influence of the one on
the other. Most people would deem the case one of
accidental and unconscious coincidence almost un
avoidable under the circumstances. The suggestion
as to the variation being intentional is simply
gratuitous, for in the parallelism between the death
that had come through Adam and the life that had
come through Christ there was no occasion to intro
duce mention of the tempter, and the omission can
not reasonably be construed into an indication of St.
Paul's opinion on the subject.
Before leaving this question of exegetical methods,
we may simply call attention to the disposition which
appears more or less in all of the expositors we have
named, to rest important conclusions on their own
interpretation of texts confessedly among the most
difficult, and of the most controverted character, to
be found in Scripture — such as that in 2 Cor.
iii. 17 : 6 Se Kvpios rd Trvev/xa eaTiv, or that in
Rom. viii. 10 : to /xev aw/xa veKpov Si d/xapTiav,
to Se Trvev/xa ?wrj Sid SiKaioavvt/v, or, as a source
of light for the ordinary use of Trvev/xa in the first
instance, the eschatological statements of St. Paul

92 MONOGRAPH OF WENDT.
in 1 Cor. xv. — with the result, as it seems to me, of
substituting problematic and theoretical construc
tions for the surer conclusions which may be drawn
from passages that are admittedly more clear, and
that have more immediate relation to the Christian
life on earth.
Very different in character, methods, and results
is the most recent contribution to the literature of
the subject — a monograph pubhshed by Dr. Wendt
of Gottingen in the year 1878, entitled, " The Ideas
of Flesh and Spirit in Biblical usage investigated." 1
In this treatise, which had been preceded by a par
tial discussion of the question, as regards the Old
Testament, in an academic dissertation,2 he enters
upon a careful and unbiassed study of the Biblical
facts, and reaches conclusions similar in general
character to those of Ritschl and of Weiss, but
based on a fuller and closer examination of the Old
Testament, the extra-Pauline, and the Pauline usage.
It is a work of much exegetical skill, acute criticism,
and sobriety of judgment, temperate in tone, and, so
far as it is polemic, a model of courteous contro
versy. We shall have frequent occasion to refer to
its researches and their results in the sequel.
^ieBegriffeFleisch uud Geist im biblischen Sprachgebrauch
untersucht von Lie. Dr. H. H. Wendt, 8vo, Gotha, 1878.
2 Entitled: " Notiones carnis et spiritus, quomodo in Vetere
Testamento adhibeantur, exponantur," printed, but not pub
lished, at Gottingen in 1877.

REUSS  WEISS  SABATIER. 93
As a matter of course the subject falls to be
handled, though necessarily after a less full and min
ute fashion, in the various works dealing with
Biblical Theology in general, with the teaching of the
Apostles, or with the doctrinal teaching of St. Paul
in particular. The most important of the general
treatises are the classic works of Edouard Reuss of
Strassburg1 and of Dr. Bernhard Weiss of Berlin.2
A minor but far from inconsiderable value belongs
to the book of M. Sabatier on " The Apostle Paul," 3
and to various smaller monographs that have been
at different times devoted to sections of the subject.4
1 Histoire de la Theologie Chr6tienne au sie"cle apostolique,
troisie"me Edition, 1864. It seems strange that nearly twenty
years should have elapsed without a new edition of this mas
terpiece of the venerable author, who unites in his own person
the most characteristic qualities of the two nations to which,
in virtue of his border abode in Strassburg and of his bilingual
literary activity, he may be said to belong — the accuracy and
depth of German research, the order and clearness of French
exposition. 2Biblische Theologie des Neuen Testamentes, 3rd edition,
Berlin, 1880, by far the best book on the subject. A transla
tion, in two volumes, by the Rev. David Eaton, and the Rev.
James E. Duguid, has recently been issued in the Foreign
Theological Library of Messrs. Clark, Edinburgh.
3 L'Ap6tre Paul. 12° Paris, 1879.
4 See Appendix for a brief notice of the literature bearing
on the points in question.

94 PRESUPPOSITIONS OF EXEGESIS.

IV.
PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION.
In endeavouring to ascertain the meaning of St.
Paul, it may be well to state explicitly at the out
set the two assumptions — or presuppositions, as the
Germans would call them — on the basis of which
such an inquiry must proceed. We take for
granted, 1st, That St. Paul had a meaning which
he wished to convey ; and, 2nd, That he had in
each instance only one meaning. It might seem
unnecessary to express thus formally the circum
stances under which exegesis is called for and is
possible, if experience did not show that they are
apt to be practically overlooked or disregarded. It
cannot be too constantly borne in mind that St. Paul
wrote for, and intended his meaning to be under
stood by, the readers whom he primarily addressed ;
and that he would necessarily use, as the vehicle of
his thoughts, language which was already familiar to
them, or, if not so, was at least such as they might
reasonably be expected to put a like meaning into
with himself. The character of his writing must

CHARACTER OF ORIGINAL READERS. 95
have been, to a great extent, determined by the
position and circumstances of the readers ; must
have been in accordance with their need, and
adapted to their capacity of receiving it.
What, then, was the standing of those original
readers? Not that certainly of modern German philo
sophers or exegetes of the nineteenth century, nor that
even of the Asiatic, Greek, or Roman "wise men" of
the first century — for the Apostle has himself told
us that not many of the wise or the powerful or the
high-born of the world were among the partakers of
the Christian calling — but that of men for the most
part probably of humble rank and limited culture,
who had been either themselves Jews by birth and
training, or Hellenic proselytes who had frequented
the synagogue and become familiar with Jewish
ideas, or converts to Christianity who, in the very
act of coming to Christ, had learned that " salvation
is of the Jews," and had been brought into close
contact with Jewish thought. It is to these — to
readers of Jewish race or at least deeply imbued
with interests and sympathies akin to those of the
Jews — that the Apostle addresses himself; and as
what he has written must be read by us in the hght
of its destination for, and of its adaptation to, those
original recipients, we are naturally led to expect
that under the exigencies of the case his thoughts
and his language will bear a Hebrew rather than a

96 ONLY ONE MEANING.
Hellenic complexion, and will be such, moreover, as
to be, in broad outline at least, readily intelligible
by a reader of average Jewish culture. It is a
priori improbable that they should be pervaded
either by a recondite philosophy or by a dreamy
mysticism. And this leads us to our second assumption as
a basis for a clear and sure exegesis — that the
Apostle must be taken to have on any single occa
sion of using a word only one meaning, and not two
or more meanings. Whatever may be said of special
cases where a double sense has been recognised, as
in those of allegory, or of parable, or of prophecy
having a double reference — and in each of these
cases the literal and the figurative, the primary and
the secondary, the proximate and the more remote,
can hardly perhaps be in strictness termed double-
it will readily be granted that the ordinary use of
language rests on the footing of each word being
conceived to represent a single definite idea, and
not more. But expositors, who have been unable to
determine to their own satisfaction which of two
possible meanings is to be assigned to a word in a
given place, have not seldom allowed themselves
to attribute their own indecision to the Apostle's
mind, and have expressed themselves as though he
might have meant either the one or the other, or
both at once. And Dr. Jowett, in his thoughtful

VIEW OF DR. JOWETT. 97
and suggestive, but often vague and hazy commen
tary1 — a singular mixture of refining and refusing to
refine — has not only exhibited various instances of
hesitation in his choice, but has expressed theoretical
doubts as to the Apostle's having only one meaning.
Often we find him setting down two possible con
structions side by side without indicating a prefer
ence for either ; and not unfrequently we find liirn
suggesting that they may be blended, or that the
one may pass over into or be lost in the other.
Bishop Ellicott seems at times inclined to a similar
view — as when he says, in language strangely combin
ing definiteness and doubt, on Phil. i. 2 7 : "In most
cases in the New Testament it may be said that in
every mention of the human Trvev/xa some reference
to the eternal Spirit may always be recognised " —
and even Bishop Lightfoot on one occasion at least
gives his countenance to the same idea, when at
Phil. i. 19 he asks, " Must the genitive be con
sidered subjective or objective ? Is the Spirit
the giver or the gift ? Ought we not to say,
in answer to this question, that the language
of the original suggests no limitation, that it will
bear both meanings equally well, and that there
fore any such restriction is arbitrary. The Sphit
is both the giver and the gift."
1 The Epistles of St. Paul to the Thessalonians, Galatians,
Romans, with critical notes, 8vo, Lond., 1855.
G

98 DOUBLE MEANING.
Dr. Jowett has devoted an Essay1 to the
discussion of the question, " Is it possible for the
same word to have two meanings in the same pas
sage?" In the very title of this characteristic Essay,
which is a good specimen of the play on words of
which it professes to treat, the author has unconsci
ously illustrated the double meaning of which he
speaks by using the word "passage" in an ambigu
ous sense. For, when we turn to the Essay itself, we
find the word applied sometimes to a single clause in
which a word occurs, sometimes to a paragraph or
section in which it more or less frequently recurs.
There is an obvious difference between the two cases
which Dr. Jowett has run together, namely, whether
a word may have two meanings simultaneously im
posed on it when it stands singly, and whether it
may have different shades of meaning associated
with it on successive occasions of its use; between
the examples adduced by him, on the one hand, of
aywv in 1 Thess. ii. 2 which, he contends, may mean
at once inward conflict and outward persecution, or
of TrapaKXr/ais in the following verse, which, he con
ceives, may denote at once consolation and exhorta
tion, and those of the different occasions on which
vo/xos recurs in Rom. vii., or irvev/xa in Rom. viii.
Not a few of the topics, interesting enough in
themselves, that are introduced into this celebrated
1 Vol. I. p. 125-135.

REAL QUESTION AT ISSUE. 99
Essay, seem to me quite irrelevant to the subject as
proposed, and tending by their very irrelevancy to
confuse the issue. For example, the discussion of the
variation in the meaning of words from age to age,
of the growth of language, of the transition from
fluctuation to fixity of usage ; the inquiry how far
the hearers may have been able to put at once all
the Apostle's meaning into his words ; the question
how far one language lends itself to the exact repro
duction of the words of another ; the question,
above all, whether Dr. Jowett is entitled to look for
the fulfilment of his own expectations at the hands
of St. Paul, or to impute his own unconsciousness of
distinctions to the Apostle's inability to make them
clear, or to say that the Apostle " blends in one the
acts of the Spirit and the acts of man" when he
does his best to distinguish them, or to hope that
people will be content with the "general" or "the
substantial " meaning of a whole passage, when they
can get nothing definite as to its details— all these
points seem to me utterly beside the simple question
with which from the title of his Essay we should
have expected him to deal, namely, whether a
writer such as St. Paul can, consistently with the
known laws of thought and language, be conceived
to have used a word in two senses at one and the
same time without consciously knowing, or specially
willing, the predominance of one of them.

100 dr. jowett's illustration.
Dr. Jowett illustrates his meaning by the case of
dywv. " If a statesman were to say, in writing to a
friend, of some political measure which was the
crisis of his fate, that ' it was a great struggle,' he
might mean a great struggle to himself and to his
own feelings, or a great struggle of parties or
opinions ; it might have been also a struggle in
which violence had been resorted to. It is possible
that all these three associations were passing through
his mind at the time that he wrote down the word.
Some light might be thrown by the context of the
sentence, or by other parts of the letter, on the true
sense. But language is not always used with the
degree of exactness necessary in such cases to enable
us to determine the meaning or associations of
meaning which the writer had in his mind. Prob
ably a critical analysis of the words would only
lead to the conviction that the person who used
them was not distinctly conscious of theh' import to
himself." In this passage there is an apparent con
fusion of the process in the interpreter's mind with
the process in the writer's mind ; and it is suggested
that, because we have not precise means of deter
mining what the writer exactly meant, we may
reasonably infer that he did not himself know his
meaning exactly. But we are not entitled thus
summarily to make our inability to discern which of
three meanings an author wished to express a

CONFUSION OF TWO PROCESSES. 101
ground for asserting either that he meant in some
confused fashion each or all of the three, or that he
was not himself conscious of what he really
purposed to say. Because in a given case Dr.
Jowett does not understand St. Paul, does it neces
sarily follow that St. Paill cannot have exactly
understood himself ? In point of fact Dr. Jowett's
illustration imputes the attitude of the expositor,
hesitating amidst possibilities, to the writer who has
in reality no such difficulty or hesitancy. It is not
possible that all the three associations were passing
through his mind at the time he wrote down the
word. If the writer in the case supposed was in
earnest and not merely constructing an ingenious
play on a word to puzzle his friend, he cannot have
had the three thoughts simultaneously present to
him ; one alone must have been present, or at any
rate dominant ; and assuredly he meant that and
nothing else, whatever his friend might take him to
mean. For the latter there might be doubt as to
what he may have meant ; for himself there could
be none as to what he did mean, and for himself it
could not be for a moment uncertain whether the
struggle of which he spoke was inward, outward, or
accompanied by a resort to violence. Exegesis can
only address itself to its task with any hope or con
fidence of a successful result on the assumption that
the author whom it seeks to interpret has not thus

102 PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION.
played fast and loose with language, but has
attached to it in each instance a definite meaning,
not manifold, but one.
And how are we to get at that meaning ? Simply
by applying the recognised principles and methods
of exegesis. One of its first canons is that an author
is his own best interpreter ; and, in the case of a
thinker so original and unique as St. Paul, our light
must be sought mainly from himself. If he does
not define formally his terms, we must seek to
supply the want by examining them in the light of
the context, by comparing their use in parallel or
analogous passages, by invoking the aid of predicates
or of contrasts to elucidate their import. On the
basis of these materials we must start a provisional
hypothesis, which may be applied as a means of
grouping, correlating, and explaining them, and which
may gather increasing probability in proportion to
the success with which it connects and holds them
together. We must presume that the passages which are
less clear are to be interpreted in the light of those
that are more definite, explicit, and salient ; and
we must not permit the value or validity of the
results obtained from the latter to be neutrahsed
by the element of uncertainty clinging to the
former. If the problem is complicated to some
\ extent by the variety of apparent uses to be taken

WHAT EPISTLES MAY BE USED ? 103
into account, its solution is aided on the other
hand by the facilities of comparison afforded by the
numerous writings of the Apostle, issued at different
dates and under different circumstances, but shown
by their common characteristics, as well as vouched
by tradition, to have come alike from him.
In this inquiry all the Epistles that bear the
name of St. Paul may legitimately, as it appears to
us, be used ; for the doubts that have been expressed
by German critics, more especially of the Tubingen
school, as to the genuineness of several or even most
of them, are, generally speaking, of so subjective and
arbitrary a character as to carry little weight in
opposition to the solid grounds on which the Church
has accepted them.1 Indeed it has been pointed
out that the same process of begging the question,
under which the Tubingen school have first consti
tuted a Pauline doctrine by excluding the disputed
Epistles, and then applied it as a test to warrant the
elimination of the latter as containing un-Pauline
elements, would, if simply reversed, necessitate the
exclusion of the Epistles now admitted on all hands
to be genuine. The assumption that an author,
having once formulated a doctrine, must continue in
1 A specimen of these arguments as applied to the Epistles
to the Thessalonians, and a searching exposure of their irrele
vancy and worthlessness, may be seen in Dr. Jowett's dis
quisitions on the genuineness of the Epistles.

104 DOUBTS OF TUBINGEN SCHOOL.
season and out of season to insist on it, and must
be held bound to reproduce it in every case under
penalty of having his identity denied; or, that,
having once expressed himself in one set of terms,
he could not under altered circumstances resort to
another, will never, it may confidently be asserted,
commend itself to any calm and dispassionate judg
ment. But while we do not find any sufficient
reason for setting aside any of the Pauline Epistles
from bearing on this inquiry, the question is really,
so far as this matter is concerned, of minor moment,
for the most important materials in relation to it
are actually embraced within the range of the Four
Epistles acknowledged as genuine by all ; and it is
in them that we are enabled to recognise the most
distinctive characters of Pauline usage.
But this question of the Apostle's personal usus
loquendi leads me to recall the fact that, while he
has impressed on the terms used by him a stamp of
his own, he did not create those terms, but found
them already existing and turned them to account,
building on foundations previously laid and on an
usage inherited or acquired. None of the expres
sions employed by him are absolutely new. Whence,
then, did he derive them ? and in what form did
they he ready to his hand ? What, in other words,
was the usage that he found current and made the
basis of his own peculiar structure ? To these ques-

st. paul's Jewish culture. 105
tions we can be httle at a loss to return at least
a general answer. We have already spoken of the
character of the readers chiefly addressed as neces
sarily conditioning to some extent the nature and
form of the Epistles sent to them ; we have now to
bear in mind above all that the writer was — not
less certainly than his readers — of Jewish birth,
training, and sympathies. We have no means of
knowing what may have been the extent or depth
of his Hellenic culture, or what influence was exer
cised by early or later contact with Greek hfe over
his modes of thought or habits of expression. But
his Hebraic culture is beyond all doubt, and has left
its deep and abiding impress on all that bears his
name. He who could speak of himself hi his letters
as " an Israelite, of the seed of Abraham, of the
tribe of Benjamin," as " circumcised the eighth day,
an Hebrew of the Hebrews, as touching the law a
Pharisee ; " who could say : " I advanced in the
Jews' religion beyond many of mine own age among
my countrymen, being more exceedingly zealous for
the traditions of my fathers ; " who could before the
Sanhedrim describe himself as " a Jew brought up
in Jerusalem at the feet of Gamahel, instructed
according to the strict manner of the law of our
fathers," and who could subsequently, in presence of
Agrippa, declare of himself : " My manner of life

106 st. paul's old testament basis.
from my youth up, which was from the beginning
among mine own nation at Jerusalem, know all the
Jews ; having knowledge of me from the first, if
they be willing to testify, how that after the strait-
est sect of our religion I lived a Pharisee ; " he
whose zeal on behalf of his nation continued
such as to lead him with solemn adjuration to de
clare : " I could wish that I myself were anathema
from Christ for my brethren's sake, my kinsmen
according to the flesh " — must — whatever else he
may have had — have been imbued with the highest
and best of Jewish culture, and must have been
accustomed above all to think in the forms, and to
clothe his thoughts in the language, of the race to
which he was proud to belong. And as all Jewish
learning started from, and ever stood in close rela
tion to, the Scriptures of the Old Testament that
were entrusted as a sacred deposit to the nation ; as
all Jewish study centred in " the law, the prophets,
and the Psalms ; " St. Paul must have been especially
familiar with the Biblical usus loquendi as well as
with the current speech of his countrymen. It
is on the Old Testament and Septuagint usage that
we may fall back with absolute certainty as the
primary basis on which he began to build.
It is difficult on the other hand to say how far
he may have had access to, or been influenced by, any
of the writings that are now in the New Testament

OTHER INFLUENCES. 107
associated with his own, such as the records of the
teaching of Christ that have now come to us in
Synoptic form, or the Epistle of James, or the First
Epistle of Peter, which Weiss seems to be right in
referring to a comparatively early date. On the
whole, looking to the Apostle's own testimony as to
his independence, so far as the gospel went, on man
or on human teaching, it seems better to abstain
from assuming any such influence of Christian litera
ture, and to confine our inquiry to the usage which
St. Paul certainly found existing, and must certainly
have known, in the Old Testament and Septuagint.

108 OLD TESTAMENT AND LXX.

V.
OLD TESTAMENT USAGE.
It is admitted on all hands that St. Paul bases his
employment of the terms " flesh " and " spirit " not
on the usage of Greek writers, which presents
nothing similar to it, but on that of the Old Testa
ment, with which he was most familiar, and with
which his most cherished and hallowed associations
were bound up. The words came to St. Paul
through the Septuagint as Greek renderings of the
Hebrew terms basar and ruach; and it is by falling
back on that earher use, which he had inherited as
a Jew, that we gain the starting-point of his Chris
tian thought — the factors made ready to his hand,
which he could take up and turn to further and
, fresh account.;' The subject of this Old Testament
usus loquendi has been more or less fully discussed,
as regards the terms separately, in various mono
graphs. One of the most recent and interesting of
these is a dissertation composed by M. Sabatier in
honour of the illustrious veteran Edouard Reuss of
Strassburg on occasion of his jubilee in 1879, and

VIEW OF DR. WENDT. 109
entitled" Memoir e sur la notion hebraique de l'esprit ; "
but, as regards both sides of the inquiry, the subject
has received the fullest and most careful investigation
at the hands of Dr. Wendt, of whose work we have
previously spoken, and whose general results have
commended themselves to the judgment of compet
ent scholars.1 This discussion, which necessarily runs
much into detail, is so important in itself and has
so essential a bearing on the question before us, that
we shall present an abstract of its more important
arguments in the Appendix. Here we shall endea
vour to give a summary view of the leading con
clusions which he seems to us to have satisfactorily
established. ... "1
As regards the word basar, Wendt distinguishes
three different ways in which the term is employed :
the first, that in which it bears its original and
strict meaning, denoting the flesh proper, that is,
the muscular or fleshy constituent parts of the
body as contra-distinguished from other elements of
it such as skin, bones, blood ; the second, that in
which it denotes the whole human body ; and the
third, that in which it is applied to signify earthly
creatures generally, with the connotation of the absolute
weakness of their nature in contrast to the power of J
1See Diestel, Jahrbitcher fur Deutsche Theologie, 1878, p.
496; Guthe, Theologische Litteraturzeitung, 1877, No. 18;
Weiss, Theologische Litteraturzeitung, 1878, No. 9.

110 FIRST AND SECOND USES OF "FLESH."
^God. In the first and literal sense of the word it is
used both of the flesh of the living body, and of
that which is dead, especially, in the latter case, of
what is employed for food or in sacrificial meals, but
partly also of what is regarded as unclean. The second
sense is not so much a change of meaning, as an
extension of use, whereby the part is put for the
whole. Wendt finds a link of transition to this
second and extended use in the special employment
of the term to express relations of kindred conceived
as based on community of. bodily substance — consan
guinity — most fully in the form " bone of my bone
and flesh of my flesh," more briefly in that r of " thy
bone and thy flesh," or simply in that of "our flesh."
The synecdoche, by which the flesh is put for the
whole body, does not rest on basar having the sense
of animate matter generally (of which no instance
can be pointed out), but on the simple circumstance
that the flesh forms the most apparent and conspicu
ous characteristic of the body, or, as it is pithily put
in the Latin form of his dissertation, "caro corpori dat
nomen, quia corpori conciliat formam, speciem, colo-
rem " (p. 7). When the body is spoken of as basar,
it is mainly in passages where it comes to view as
regards its surface or organised outward form, and
not as regards its material substance. In this sense
it is often placed in contradistinction to the nephesh
or lebh (soul or heart), the inner elements of man

THIRD USE  "ALL FLESH 111
that do not come under the cognisance of the senses,
or belong to his outward aspect.
The third and still more extended use of the term
meets ulTspeciaily in the oft recurring phrase kol-
basar {" all flesh "), which obviously in most cases
denotes something more than either the flesh on the
body or the whole body named after the flesh.
When it is said, for example, that " all flesh " has
corrupted its way on the earth (Gen. vi. 12), or
that "all flesh" is to know God as the Saviour
(Is. xlix. 26), or that " all flesh " is to come to wor
ship before God (Is. lxvi. 23), it plainly applies to
living beings generally and includes their mental
nature, just as the correlative phrase kol-nephesh is
employed under circumstances where it must simi
larly be held to include or cover the bodily nature.
In this case, as before, the part is put for the whole;
and living beings are spoken of under that aspect
which most strikes the eye. When we ask why the
flesh is chosen as the most fitting part for such a
synecdochic use, we find, on comparing all the pas
sages where this usage occurs, that throughout a
clear contrast with God is expressed or implied ;
and we can scarcely doubt that the usage has its
main motive in the purpose of indicating such a con
tradistinction — a purpose, which would be most readily
attained by designating the living beings in terms of
that wherein the contrast was most directly apparent.

112 CONTRAST OF THE CREATURE WITH GOD.
Wendt finds a key to the nature of this contrast
between God and hving beings on earth in Is. xxxi. 3 :
" Egypt is man and not God, and their horses are
basar and not ruach, flesh and not spirit," where the
parallelism of structure shows that the idea of basar
stands in the same relation to that of man as the
idea of ruach to that of God. But, as will appear
in the sequel, the ruach of God denotes throughout
the Old Testament the power or powerful working
of God ; and so here and elsewhere, where the con
trast appears, the basar denotes the relative or
rather the absolute powerlessness of man. It is on
the side of the bodily nature — where the flesh so
easily falls a prey to corruption — that the perishable-
ness and nothingness of man come most clearly to
hght, and make him stand forth in most absolute
contrast to God. The word thus signifies living
beings with the accessory notion of the absolute weak
ness and transitoriness of their nature overagainst
the power and living operation of God. It is, in a
word, the sense which we often express by the word
" creature." Wendt has given numerous illustra
tions of its employment, where the object is to
express the dependence of the creature on God, the
reverence of the creature in presence of the Divine
sovereignty, the folly of trusting in the creature;
and especially of its frequent occurrence where the
Divine judgments are spoken of.

DOES IT IMPLY SINFULNESS? 113
In answer to the question, Whether, in addition to
this undoubted accessory sense of natural weakness,
the term does not include an element of moral
blame, of sinfulness, Wendt examines several of
the passages adduced in support of this view — such
as Gen. vi. 3, where he controverts the view of
Dillmann, as it seems to us, with some success, but
the uncertainty as to the punctuation of the text
and the obscurity of the whole passage, which wears
an isolated aspect, preclude much stress being laid
on it; Psalm Ixxviii. 38, 39, where he rightly
opposes the view of Tholuck ; and various statements
in the book of Job that assert man's inability to jus
tify himself before God, as to which his explanation
is more ingenious than sufficient — and he comes to
the conclusion that in the Old Testament the idea
of " flesh " has no accessory sense of moral blame.
But, while we think that he has sufficiently made
good his main positive results, we conceive that in
coming to this negative conclusion he has not taken
adequate account of the facts even as regards the
passages in the book of Job, and that he has failed
to attach due weight to the early assertion of the
corruption of all flesh at Gen. vi. 12, 13. When
we call to mind the reference at Job xxv. 3 to the
pervading and searching character of the divine
hght on the one hand, and the prominence given on
the other to man's want of purity (where it might
H

114 PASSAGES APPEALED TO.
seem enough, from Wendt's point of view, to have
urged man's want of power), and when we find the
distinct recognition of the moral impurity of the
race as conditioned by descent from non-pure pa
rents (e.g. xiv. 4 : " Who can bring a clean thing out
of an unclean ?" and xv. 14 : " What is man that
he should be clean ? and he which is born of a
woman that he should be righteous ? ") the sugges
tion of Wendt that the general impurity of man
here spoken of has nothing in common with what
we call sinfulness, but is simply an indication of the
absolute gulf between the human nature and the
divine, looks very like a begging of the question,
and falls short, at any rate, of an adequate ex
planation. Still more difficult is it to reconcile his position
as to the absence of all reference to sin with the
existence, at so early a stage in the record of human
history, of the great generalisation from experience
presented at Gen. vi. 12, 13: " And God looked
upon the earth, and, behold, it was corrupt ; for all
flesh had corrupted its way upon the earth. And
God said unto Noah : The end of all flesh is come
before me [that is, determined on by me], for the
earth is filled with violence through them, and,
behold, I will destroy them with the earth." It is
true that this corruption is not referred to the flesh
i itself in virtue of any necessity inherent in its

CONNOTATION OF SIN. 115
nature, for such a reference would be at variance
with the explicit statement of Gen. i. 31 that God
at .the close of his creative work " saw everything
that he had made, and behold it was very good " ;
in point of fact the passage we have quoted charges
the corruption of " the way " on the personal
action of those concerned ; but none the less does it
present the reality of that corruption as a fact of
experience holding true of " all flesh," and giving
special point, as is remarked by Cremer,1 to the. con
trast between the Spirit of God and the flesh spoken
of a verse or two before (Gen. vi. 3). Can we
doubt that under such circumstances the expression
thus passing into general currency would carry
along with it some connotation of the sin which was
throughout its actual accompaniment ? That it had
this connotation seems evident from the very fact
which Wendt himself had already pointed out,
that the phrase " all flesh " occurs with especial
frequency in connection with the mention of the
Divine judgments — judgments proceeding essentially
on moral grounds — the consciousness of which leads
the people to say unto Moses : " For what is all
flesh that it might hear the voice of the living God
speaking out of the midst of the fire and live 1 "

1 In Herzog's Real-Encyklopadie fiir Protestantische Theol
ogie, 2nd edition, article " Fleisch " ; and in the BibL-Theol.
Worterbuch der Neutest. Gracitat, 3rd edition, 1883, p. 690.

116 SENSES OF RUACH.
r (Deut. v. 23), and prompts the prophet in presence of
the vision in the temple to exclaim: "Woe is me for
I am undone ; because I am a man of unclean lips,
and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean
hps. For mine eyes have seen the King, the Lord
of Hosts" (Isaiah vi. 5).
Passing now to the conception of ruach, the applica
tions of which are far more varied and complicated,
Wendt considers that we may find their common
source in the original sense of " wind," while others
have preferred to take the primary sense as " breath."
The chief characteristics of wind are motion and
invisibihty. Under the former point of view, as
moved and moving, it is mainly conceived of as
destructive ; under the latter, as invisible, it may be
regarded either as unsearchable in its origin, or as
immaterial in its nature. Notwithstanding the close
relationship of these ideas, they give occasion to two
very divergent chains of thought. The wind, not being
an object of experience as regards its origin, is in
numerous passages referred directly to God, who
creates it, sends it forth, directs it, makes it His
messenger. Lacking in virtue of its invisible char
acter the usual marks by which reality is tested, it
becomes the symbol and expression for what is
empty, null, unreal; and in this sense it may mean
precisely the opposite of what is meant by it when
looked at on the side of its divine origin.

LIFE-SPIRIT. 117 — 1
With the signification of wind is immediately
associated that of breath, presenting itself as wind
in man, just as conversely the wind is apprehended
as the breath of God ; and a further step makes the
breath of man appear directly as the breath of God
¦ — the ruach belonging to man, in so far as it stirs or
works in man ; and belonging to God, in so far as
He has sent it or breathed it forth.
From these combinations between the wind, the
breath of God and the human breath, result manifold
and even opposite references for the ruach. As the
stormy wind brings destruction, so the breath in im
petuous movement furnishes the expression of anger;
and the blast of the divine wrath in this sense is
conceived as destructive of life. On the other hand,
where the element of stormy motion is in abeyance,
the process of breathing is felt to be the proper
mark of all that lives, and the ruach obtains the
opposite significance of the creating and preserving
life-breath, which is altogether of divine origin.
The communication of the divine life-spirit to the
creature forms the ground of all possibility and
power of creaturely existence. God forms it in, or
gives it to, men ; and as at first it came from Him,
to Him at death it returns. To it are referred the
various states and manifestations of vital power.
Under impressions of surprise or terror it seems
as though it would depart ; under opposite influences j

118 RUACH AND NEPHESH
T it revives; the failure of the breath is the proper
designation for the decay of the vital power.
Wendt next inquires what is the relation! of this
ruach to the nephesh. There is undoubtedly gTeat
likeness between them. The soul, too, is treated as
seat and centre of the powers of life ; all things that
further or liinder the life are placed in relation to it;
and the like predicates are used of it as of the rvm-h,
when the restoration or dying-away of the life is
spoken of. But there are also indications of no in
considerable difference. First, the nephesh i.s the
seat of individuality, of personahty, of self-con
sciousness, while the ruach. is a common mark of
hving beings, of like character and working in all.
Secondly, they stand in a different relation to God.
The ruach is viewed as an immediate outbreathing
of God ; it is but part of the general divine ruach
which creates and preserves life everywhere, and it
does not lose its character as such, even when at
work in an individual earthly nature. The sold, on
the other hand, is never regarded as an efflux of the
divine. Tlie soul depends on God, because it is
given by God ; but the hfe-spirit depends on God,
because it is itself divine. Thirdly, thev are dissimi
lar as respects their fate after death. The spirit
returns to God who gave it, but we nowhere in the Old
Testament read of the souls of the dead coining to God.
[The nephesh is by death absolutely severed from God.

MARKING DIFFERENT POINTS OF VIEW. 119 n
When on the basis of these distinctions we ask
what is the relation between them, it is plain that
they are not simply co-ordinate elements placed side
by side, different in contents and mode of operation.
The two terms represent one and the same quantity, but
estimate it from different points of view. The nature of
living beings may be estimated in two ways, either
by comparison with God, or by comparison with in
animate nature : in the former, from the religious
point of view, which distinguishes what in the
creatures is earthly and what is divine; in the latter,
from the physical or anthropological point of view,
which distinguishes what in them is of material
bodily nature and what is of an immaterial spiritual
nature. The powers of spiritual or mental life are
called ruach, in so far as they connect the creatures
with God and place them in dependence on Him ;
they are called nephesh, in so far as they separate
the creatures as animate individuals from one
another and from the lifeless impersonal world of
sense. Wendt finds a clear confirmation of this
distinction furnished by Job xii. 10: "in whose
hand is the soul of every living thing and the spirit
of all flesh of man." The parallelism of the halves
of this verse shows that the conceptions " soul " and
"spirit" are related to one another just as the
phrases "every living thing" and "all flesh of man."
Now, as the two latter expressions denote quite the

120 RUACH AND LEBH.
same thing in point of contents, but denote it from
different pohits of view — in the one case that of
living beings in contrast to inanimate nature, in the
other that of the creatures in contrast to God — it is
clear that we must assume for the conception of
" soul " and " spirit " a diversity not of the contents,
but simply of the point of view, or, as it is put in the
Lathi form, a " discrimcn non rei d.esignatae, sed
rutionis dcsignandi."
A similar inquiry is instituted as to the relations
of the ruach to the lebh. We find the word ruach
very often joined with some designation of quality,
when, generally speaking, a definite mental state is
to be characterised ; but for most of these designa
tions we find parallels formed with lebh, while wc
elsewhere meet with the two expressions side by
side, each accompanied by such an indication of
quahty; and in two cases they stand together with
the same attribution — a clear proof that, while they
are kindred, they are not exactly synonymous. An
examination of the uses of the term lebh, as the seat
of the conscious mental activities of living beings,
leads Wendt to conclude that it is not so well ren
dered by the word " heart," which makes us think of
the seat of the feelings, and for which we are
inclined to assume a favourable connotation, as by
the German word Sinn (mind), which defines the
different kinds of mental activity and indirectly of

DISTINCTION BETWEEN THEM. 121
outward action as regards contents; while ruach has
its import best indicated by the older German use of
Muth — still recognisable in its compounds, such as
Schwermuth, Freimuth, hochmilthig, demiithig — and
denotes the energy which, partly as disposition, partly
as character, stamps on all the individual expres
sions of the life of feeling, as of the activity of
thinking and willing, their definite form. The two
sides, the natural disposition and the moral character,
are for the Hebrew consciousness not yet separated ;
it is only our later reflection that separates them.
There prevails no distinction in the strict sense
between the designations formed with ruach and
those formed with lebh so far as the thing itself
is concerned, because the contents of the mental
action given in the " mind " is always conditioned
throughout by the peculiar form of the ruling
natural or moral disposition. As between ruach and
nephesh, so between ruach and lebh there subsists a
distinction not so much of the object designated, as of
the point of view of the designation.
A new and last signification of the ruach presents
to some extent a blending of the most essential
marks of the two that have already been mentioned.
Here we encounter in the foreground the mark
of divine origin, but in special connection with the
unusual and extraordinary manifestations of the
divine operation on man. This ¦ ruach is usually

122 TRANSCENDENTAL RUACH
designated simply as the prophetic, but not quite
with strict justice ; the prophetic ruach which
expresses itself in prophetic speech or act is in
reality only one species, though perhaps the most
important, of a far more comprehensive class of
phenomena. In all spheres of human action, achieve
ments which in a conspicuous and significant way
transcend the measure of ordinary human ability,
are referred to the divine ruach. So it is with the
proofs of Samson's strength, with the feats of the
successful chief, especially in war, with the skill
of the artificer or of the poet, with special powers of
judgment and understanding, and particularly, in the
religious domain, with the characteristic gifts of the
prophets. This extraordinary divine ruach Wendt
proposes to distinguish from the other senses of the
term by designating it as the transcendental.
After enumerating various predicates of this ruach,
he derives from them two leading marks as
characterising it. First, it is constantly conceived of
as a higher power, which comes on man as its organ,
not dependent on his will and ability, nay even
in some cases impelling him against his will (Num.
xxiv. 5). But it nowhere appears as a substance of
a supernatural heavenly kind ; for that the expres
sions borrowed from material things, such as sha-
phakh and labhasli- — to shed or to put on— are merely
figurative, is obvious from the very diversity of the

POWER, NOT SUBSTANCE. 123
material conceptions with which they are linked.
And he adds that an illustration of the almost
accidental way in which such expressions may
originate may be clearly recognised in the prophecy
of Joel, where the prophet has (at ii. 23) promised
for the fields devastated by the locusts the fertilising
rain, and, when to this natural gift of God there
is added in the hoped-for time of blessing the gift of
the Spirit, its communication is likewise presented
under the figure of the pouring out of a rain (iii. 2 ;
comp. Is. xliv. 3 : "I will pour water upon him
that is thirsty, and floods upon the dry ground ;
I will pour my Spirit upon thy seed, and my bless
ing upon thine offspring"). Secondly, it is to be
noted that this transcendental spirit-power is always
conceived of as a moving power revealing itself
outwardly, and not as a quiescent possession of the
individual or as a mere capacity, which he might
have but need not put forth. Even the prophet has
the ruach only when he is prophetically active ; his
noiseless piety or his inner rehgious speculation is
nowhere termed ruach.
If we ask how we are to conceive of the nature
and quality of this transcendental ruach, we shall
proceed most surely by following as far as possible
the analogy of the other forms of its use already dealt
with. Wendt holds that here too we may think first
of a natural life-poiver, only not of that which

124 (UALITIES OF THIS RUACH
is normal and common to all creatures, but of a
special heightening (besondere Stcigcrvng) of the same,
from which springs in each case the capacity for
extraordinary achievement ; but, on the whole, it
may be said that the ruach in this sense belongs to
the great ideal figures of early times — as in the Book
of Judges — or is held forth in prospect for the last
time (Is. xliv. 3 ; xi. 2 : " spirit of might"). Else
where this element of heightened natural power
falls into the background before that of the higher
religious and moral working of God, which is com
municated partly to the prophets of the present,
partly to tlie king and people of the latter times.
It is analogous to the ruach previously mentioned,
which, as disposition and character, gives its ruling
form to all man's mental activity. The transcen
dental ruach also is such a mental movement {Gemuths-
bewegung) ; which, however, is accounted not as a pro
duct of natural influences, but as a higher God-sent
power that determines the form of all man's thinking
and willing (" animi motio et affectio, qu.ee divinitus
data omnibus mentis voluntatisque actis divinam suam,
conciliat formam "). Especially, Wendt conceives,
is this 'sense to be retained in the case of the pro
phetic ruach. It is far from being a contents com
municated to the prophets, whether of any sort
of spirit-substance, or of any kind of ready-made
knowledge, but is a form of thinking and looking

PROMISED TO ISRAEL. 125
at things {eine Benk- und Anschauungsform) ; namely,
the religiously elevated tone of mind {Stimmung),
which apprehends and judges of the given relations
according to the supreme principle of the religious
covenant-relation between Jehovah and his people.
The communication of this transcendental ruach
is promised by the prophets to the collective Israel
of the hoped-for last time. Joel presents it as the
prophetic ruach, in which all members of the nation
attain the highest stage of religious knowledge
(iii. 1) : Zechariah as " a spirit of grace and suppli
cation," that is, as the "prayerful disposition" which
turns in believing and penitent trust to the pre
viously despised and forsaken God of salvation
(xii. 10) ; Ezekiel speaks of the " new spirit," which
as renewed life-principle has as its effect the walking
after the commandments and ordinances of God (xi.
lOf. ; xviii. 31; xxxvi. 26f.); Isaiah and the
Deutero-Isaiah conceive it specially as " spirit of
judgment," that is, as the attitude of purified moral
life, which is in keeping with the unique relation of
the people to God (iv. 4; xxxii. 15f. ; xiii. 1).
And the individual pious man may, as Psahn li.
shows, express his longing after a deletion of his
consciousness of guilt and after a strengthening
of his life and walk before God In the prayer for
renewal and preservation of this divine ruach,
namely, the steadfast, candid, and humble character

126 ".SPIRIT OF THE HOLINESS OF GOD."
(verse 12, ruach nakhon ; verse 14, ruach nedhibhah ;
verse 19, ruach nishberah), which, together with the
pure and unselfish mind (verse 12, lebh tahor ;
verse 10, lebh nishbar), is the mark of true piety
and morality.
Lastly, at two passages there occurs the ex
pression " spirit of the holiness of God " (Ps. li. 13 ;
Is. lxiii. lOf.) where the more precise definition
< if the ruach in the attribute of holiness is placed by
means of the suffix directly in relation to God.
But the difficulty apparently herein involved is
removed when we recollect, as Diestel has well
pointed out, that the holiness of God is throughout
not a simple idea of quality, but an idea of
relation, which denotes the belonging in covenant to
God. In this case the attribute indicates not the
nature and peculiarity which the ruach itself has,
but the relation brought about and established by
it. The "spirit of God's holiness" is that spirit, which
is the expression of belonging in covenant to God,
and the departure of which is linked with the
destruction that results from the withdrawal and
alienation of God.
Exception may, perhaps, be taken to some of
these views of Wendt, such as his assumption of
" wind " as the original meaning of ruach, rather
than "breath"; his conception of the mode in which
the several senses are correlated to the different

WENDT'S MAIN POSITION MADE GOOD. 127
elements involved in that prhnary meaning ; his
apparent exclusion of special gifts of knowledge
from the sphere of the prophetic ruach, which is
hardly consistent with his own statement that the
ruach communicates " auctas sapientis, cthici, religiosi
ingenii virtutes;" and individual details of his ex
egesis may be open to question. But it seems to us
that he has fully made good his main position that
ruach conveys especially the notion of efficacious
power, whether it is applied to the life-spirit consti
tuting and upholding the life of man in general, or
to the dispositions and character that mould his
thoughts and his action, or to the higher and
more extraordinary Divine influence that empowers
and impels men to the special work given to them
to do.
When we turn to the Septuagint, which was the
medium through which the Greek-speaking Jews
received the Old Testament, we find that the word
ruach is almost invariably rendered by irvev/xa ;
while basar is differently rendered according to the
different modifications of its use. In its original
import of flesh pertaining to the body it is trans
lated by al adpKes when the reference is to the parts
of the body as still hving, and by Ta Kpea or KpeaTa
as regards the parts of animals slain. When the
word denotes by synecdoche the whole body, the
word is rendered sometimes by to aw/xa, sometimes

128 USAGE OF SEPTUAGINT.
1 >y the singular y crdpP^; but it is not easy to discover
on what principle the choice proceeds. Wendt
remarks that "as the word aw/xa, according to
general Greek usage, denotes the organism, it is
found in the Septuagint only at passages where the
body comes mainly into view as respects form,
especially as to its surface (Lev. vi. 3 (10) ; xv. 13,
16, 19 ; xxii. 6 ; Num. viii. 7 ; 1 Kings xxi. 27;
Job vii. 5); but there is no reason at all for extend
ing the rule to the effect that aw/xa stands everywhere,
where the body as organised is meant, and crappy
only, where the body was to be designated as
material substance." And he adds: "The comparison
of the two passages, 1 Kings xx. (xxi.) 27, and 2 Kings
vi. 30, where the same expression saq- al-besaro is
rendered in the former case by vcikkos eirl to aw/xa
avrov, in the latter by aaKKOs eiri tT/s aapKos avTov,
shows plainly that adpP^ is employed quite synony
mously with aw/xa. And a specially clear proof of
this usage is furnished by the passage Wisd. Sol. vii.
2: ev koiXm /xr/Tpos eyXvcpr/v aapP, 'in my mother's
womb I was formed into a body,' where o-dpp^ there
fore denotes the body precisely as organised." It is
to be borne in mind, moreover, that the translators
have not always been careful as to the accuracy of
their renderings, e.g., at Gen. xxxvi. 6, where our
version has, " And Esau took all the persons of his
house," the Hebrew has naphshoth, " souls," but the

OTHER NEW TESTAMENT WRITERS. 129
Septuagint has aw/xaTa, " bodies." It is especially
important to observe that, wherever basar is used
in the signification of " creature," it is always ren
dered by the singular adpP^, and the phrase kol-basar
by irdaa adp£, the only exception noted by Wendt
being Job v. 4, where the expression /UpoTos is used
as a more free rendering.
We may add, before leaving Wendt at this point,
that his investigation embraces an interesting review
of the various passages in the New Testament writers
other than St. Paul, where the terms adpP^ or irvev/xa
are used, and shows with skill and success how closely
they follow the lines, and scarcely pass beyond the
limits, of Old Testament precedent.

130 PAULINE USAGE.

VI.

THE DIVINE PNEUMA.
Let us now turn to St. Paul, and first let us note
the facts, or rather classes of facts, of which we
have to take account. The facts themselves, scat
tered, though in unequal measure, throughout the
letters of the Apostle, are most conveniently col
lected and marshalled for reference in the admirable
Concordance of Bruder, or, for the English reader, by
a necessarily more circuitous process in the English
man's Concordance, or in the valuable work of Dr.
Young. They are to be found gathered into groups
and classified with the utmost care and precision
in the Lexicons of Grimm and Cremer, each excellent
in its kind, and both indispensable to the student of
the Greek New Testament. With these helps I have
drawn up a conspectus of the different shades of
meaning or of use as regards the terms with which
we are here concerned, which will be found in the
Appendix, and to which we must refer the reader
for details that could not be well introduced here.
Suffice it now to say that lexicographers recog-

THE facts classified. 131
nise the following uses of adp£ in St. Paul's
Epistles : — A: the flesh proper — the soft substance
covering the bones — at any rate at 1 Cor. xv. 39,
where the flesh of man is distinguished from that of
beasts, fishes, and birds. B: by synecdoche of the
part for the whole, the body designated from its
main component element, or from that which lends
to it its appearance. C: the medium of family or
national relationship among men. D: human nature
designated from its visible manifestation, or accord
ing to community of physical conditions and aspect,
as in the case of the phrase — imitated from kol-basar
— 7r«o-a adpP^ for "all men." E: the wider sense of an
ethico-religious conception, in which it most fre
quently appears, and which forms the special pecu
liarity of Pauline usage now under investigation.
Hvev/aa appears in a still greater variety of uses :
— A: as the breath of the nostrils (2 Thess. ii. 8),
but not with St. Paul as the life-spirit, the principle
of life, in what is termed the physiological sense.
B: as the mind or spirit of man, when contradis
tinguished from aw/xa or accompanied by a personal
pronoun in the genitive. C: as the spiritual nature
of Christ. D: as a divine power or influence be
longing to God and communicated by Him in Christ
— variously termed the Spirit of God or of Christ,
or the Holy Spirit, or the Spirit — which is by far
the most frequent use. E: as a power or influence,

132 COURSE OF INQUIRY.
the more precise character, manifestations or results
of which are expressed by accompanying geni
tives of quality, such as irvev/xa Trpaorr/Tos, irvev/xa
vloOealas, or are, in the absence of any such
adjunct, left to be gathered from express or imphed
contrast, as is the case with the special antithesis
now before us. F: the plural irvev/xaTa employed
of the ^apia/xaTa or spiritual gifts. G: Powers or
influences ahen from, or adverse to, the Trvev/xa are
expressed by the same term with some qualifying
adjunct, such as Trvev/xa tov Koa/xov, Trvev/xa SovXeias.
Considerable light is thrown on the import of
adp£ by the use of the double adjectives formed
from it, adpKivos " fleshy, made of flesh," and
aapKiKos " fleshly, belonging to, or determined by,
the adpP^-" and on that of Trvev/xa by the correspond
ing adjective -wvev/xaTiKos " belonging to, or deter
mined by the Trvev/xa." We shall note also in the
Appendix the chief uses of aw/xa, ¦^v-^f/, vovs, and
KapSla, as we shall have occasion to refer to their
points of contact or contrast with the expressions
more especially under our consideration.
We have already stated that in examining into
the usage of a term by a particular writer it does
not seem to us necessary to follow the process by
which we trace the successive modifications under
gone by it in the historical evolution of the language.
We may get at the result by a shorter and not less

MOST COMMON USE OF PNEUMA. 133
certain path. With the facts before us we may
pass at once in medias res, and take our starting-point
from what appears on the face of them to be the
most prominent, definite, and frequently recurring of
those facts, and apply it, at least provisionally, as a
key to the grouping and explanation of the rest.
Now it is beyond all doubt that the first and
most marked feature in the Pauline Epistles is the
place assigned to Trvev/xa — the presence and action of
the irvev/xa in the Christian life. Let us endeavour,
first, to ascertain what is the Apostle's most com
mon and salient— and presumably therefore most
characteristic — use of this expression. Now there
can be as little doubt that the sense in which it
oftenest recurs is that of the distinctive power or
influence emanating from God and communicated to
such as are Christ's, in virtue of which they become
Trvev/xaTiKOi — recipients and organs of the Trvev/xa
(Gal. vi. 1 ; 1 Cor. ii. 13 ; iii. 1). At Rom. viii.
9, St. Paul says to his Christian readers in Rome :
" Ye are not in the flesh, but in the spirit, if so- be
that {eiirep) the Spirit of God dwelleth in you."
The state described as ev irvev/xaTi is contingent on,
and is evidently constituted by, the indwelling of
the irvev/xa Oeov ; while the words that immediately
follow imply that the possession of the irvev/xa
XpiaTov is a necessary and indispensable mark of
such as are Christ's : " If any man have not the

134 EFFECT OF THE ARTICLE.
Spirit of Christ, he is none of his." At 1 Thess.
iv. 8, God is spoken of as "having given unto us (or
"giving to you") his Holy Spirit," and at Gal. iv. 6 it
is said : " God sent forth the Spirit of his Son into
our hearts." It is admitted on all hands that the
designations " Spirit of God," " Spirit of Christ," and
" Holy Spirit," though primarily expressing different
aspects or relations of the Trvev/xa, are practically
interchangeable and in operation identical.
The expression irvev/xa Oeov (or more explicitly
to eK tov Oeov in 1 Cor. ii. 12) occurs at least four-
) teen times ; Trvev/xa ~X.piaTov, or Wvplov, five times ;
' irvev/xa dyiov seventeen times; and, in addition to
/ tliese, there are at least thirty other passages where
the presence of the definite article with Trvev/xa or,
in its absence, the tenor of the context clearly
indicates that the expression likewise refers to the
irvev/xa Oeov or irvev/xa dyiov.
Considerable discussion, no doubt, has arisen as to
the effect of the presence or absence of the article
with irvev/xa. Bishop Middleton maintains that,
while the use of the article kut epo^i'/v points to the
unique dignity and personahty of the Spirit — a
question with which we are not now concerned — the
anarthrous irvev/j.a must be held to relate to His in
fluence "or operation; and he lays down the rule that
" in the acceptation of the ' Holy Spirit ' irvev/xa
or irvev/xa dyiov is never anarthrous, except indeed

THE DIVINE PNEUMA. 135
in cases where other terms confessedly the most
definite lose the article," 1 that is to say, according
to his view, after a preposition or an anarthrous noun.
And Harless, following in the wake of an earlier
view of Winer, takes up the ground that to irvev/xa
denotes "naturam divinam ipsam" irvev/xa " divinum
spiritunl quern possideas, aut divinae aurae particu-
lam, quam intus habeas." 2 But Winer has, in the
later editions of his Grammar, referred to various
instances of irvev/xa as falling under the category
of the omission of the article before words, " which
denote objects of which there is but one in existence,
and which therefore are nearly equivalent to proper
names."3 In this view Fritzsche, Meyer, and Elhcott
concur, and it seems the more probable; but for our
present inquiry it is of little moment whether
certain passages adduced refer to the objective
Personal Spirit or to the manifestations of His power
in man. It is enough that they are acknowledged
on all hands to point to a new element which
is distinctive of the Christian — which does not
spring from himself, or belong to him in himself,
but comes to him from God and abides in him as a
divine gift and power. It is regarded throughout
1 Doctrine of the Greek Article in the New Testament.
1841, p. 125 f. -
2 In his Commentary on Ephes. ii. 22.
3 Grammar of New Testament Greek, translated by Dr.
Moulton, p. 148.

136 A POWER BELONGING TO GOD
by St. Paul as, even when indwelling in man and
constituthig the spring and sustaining force of the
new life in him, a power conferred, communicated
— not self-evolved or self-sustained.
To see that this is so, we have but to recall some
of the Apostle's statements regarding it. 1st. That
it is conceived of as objectively and essentially
belongingto God, is obvious from the very modes of
its designation which we have just enumerated,
irvev/xa Oeov or tov Oeov, to irvev/xa to dyiov tov
Oeov, and — in the case of the shorter and most fre
quent name — at once by the epithet dyiov, which
places it in a category by itself, and by the definite
article, which posits it as objective and treats it as
well known. 2nd. It is represented as issuing from
God (1 Cor. ii. 12) ; as sent forth by Him (Gal. iv.
6); given (1 Thess. iv. 8; 2 Cor. i. 22, v. 5 ; Rom. v.
5); furnished (Gal. iii. 5); and correlatively men are
said to receive it (1 Cor. ii. 1 2 ; Gal. iii. 2 ; Rom.
viii. 15) ; to have it (1 Cor. vii. 40 ; Rom. viii. 9) ;
to be filled with it (Eph. v. 18) ; to be led or im
pelled by it (Rom.. viii. 14 ; Gal. v. 18) ; to live and
walk in it, or by it (Gal. v. 16, 25); to grieve
it (Eph. iv. 30). 3rd. It is represented as dwelling
in men (Rom. viii. 9, 11 ; 1 Cor. iii. 16 ; vi. 19 ;
2 Tim. i. 14); as making intercession for them
(Rom. viii. 26, 27); and as bearing conjoint witness
with their spirits (Rom. viii. 16).

ACTING ON OR IN MAN. 137
We do not now inquire how far these passages
warrant, as they certainly seem to warrant, the
inferences which the Church has drawn from them
and from others of a like kind as to the nature and
personality of the Holy Spirit ; we adduce them
simply as indicating, as clearly as language can
indicate, the recognition of a divine element or
factor in the Christian life — of a power acting'
on or in man, which God gives and jnan simply
receives. And we are content to cite M. Reuss
as a witness to the import of the facts, without
accepting his attempt to explain what he calls
the " duplication of the spiritual nature of man " in
the last passage to which we have referred (Rom.
viii. 16, 26) when he remarks: "It will hardly pre
sent any difficulty, when we consider it as the
consequence of the principle that all the movements!
of the soul which tend to its salvation come to it
directly from God, and that the spirit is nothing
else than the organ of this communication, or rather,
the communication itself personified. It is in order,,
therefore, to affirm the divine origin of all the
salutary aspirations of the Christian that these are
ascribed to an agent, distinguished at once from the
active faculties of human nature and from the
person of God."1
1 La Bible: Ifpttres Pauliniennes, ii. p. 82. It is a duplica
tion, " by means of which certain psychical facts, which result

138 EXEGETICAL CAPRICES
If any one on the other hand desires to see what
exegetical caprice may attempt in dealing with the
plainest words of Scripture, let him take a specimen
from an elaborate commentary lately issued on the
Epistle to the Romans by Professor Oltramare l of
Geneva. On Rom. v. 5 : Sid irvev/xaTos dyiov tov
SoOevTos y/xiv he remarks that "irvev/xa dyiov must
be looked at here as something subjective, since it is
said that ' it has been given ' to the Christian ;
it has become his possession, it is in him." On
viii. 14 : oaoi irvev/xaTi Oeov dyovTai he observes:
" dyeaOai — to be guided, 'moved, directed by, is said
(sc dit) of the inner sentiments, which are the deter
minants and motives of our conduct. If Paul had
said simply irvev/xaTi dyovTai, irvev/xa would have
denoted the mind (esprit) of the Christian as op
posed to adpP^ or to aw/xa ; and not only might Paul
have expressed himself thus, but moreover this
expression would fit in (cndra.it) very well with tho
preceding proposition. . . . Paul has pre
ferred to say ' the Spirit of God ' because this
manner of speaking gives more clearness to his
affirmation. Ylvev/xa Oeov, 'the Spirit of God,' which
nevertheless from man's natural dispositions, are ascribed to a
distinct and foreign personality"! But, if M. Reuss is correct
in his assumption as to the facts resulting from man's natural
dispositions, why should the Apostle have had recourse to a
duplication, which appears to imply the very opposite ?
1 Commentaire sur l'Epitre aux Bomains, Geneve, 1881-2.

OF PROFESSOR OLTRAMARE. 139
belongs to God and animates Him, is looked at here in
a subjective manner as possessed by the Christian."
While on the following verse : " for ye received not
the spirit of bondage . . . but ye received the
spirit of adoption," he says that " some" {les uns —
being the great majority of commentators!) "take the
genitives as genitives of the effect — the spirit
which gives, procures, slavery or adoption. But in
that case it would need oti ' because,' rather than
ydp; and moreover (etpuis) Paul must {devrait) have
remained at the objective point of view and have
said : ' because the Spirit which has been given
to you,' or ' which God has given to you ' is a spirit,
. . . rather than have passed to the subjective
point of view of possession by saying : ' because the
spirit which you have received' . . . for in this
point of view the gift takes precedence of the posses
sion, this it is which makes sons of God " ! " Paul
speaks here from a subjective point of view {eXd/3eTe),
and irvev/xa is subjective." Now — to say nothing
of the peculiar and misleading use of the term
subjective as applied to statements which in their
very terms imply an objective correlate, or of the
gratuitous suggestions as to what it might have well
or better beseemed the Apostle to say, or of the
singular sense assigned to the " Spirit of God " as
the inner sentiments that animate man, or of the
inconsistency between the view taken at v. 5 and

140 "POWER" OF THE SPIRIT.
that held at viii. 1 5 ; the expression " which has
been given " being treated as subjective where it
actually stands, and postulated as objective where it
does not stand, in the text — it is obvious that St,
Paul's assertion that his readers had received the
Spirit must be held to imply, 1st, the existence of
such a spirit apart from, and prior to, its reception,
and, 2nd, a giving, which was the counterpart of the
receiving ; and that the Apostle's language would
not only be emptied of any real meaning, but would
be calculated to confuse and mislead the reader, if
all that he wished to say was that his Christian
readers were in possession of, and were being guided
by, their own inner sentiments ! It is not at all
probable that the Apostle would have felt himself
moved to write his letter, if he had had nothing better
worth saying than such a truism as this.
When we come to ask more specially the nature
and action of this Trvev/xa, we cannot but be struck
by its close and frequent association with the idea
of power. Thus we find it at Rom. i. 4 : " with
power, according to the Spirit of holiness " ; xv. 13:
" through the power of the Holy Spirit"; xv. 19: "by
the power of the Spirit of God " ; 1 Cor. ii. 4 : "in
demonstration of the Spirit and of power"; Gal. hi. 5 :
" he that ministereth {eiri)(opriywv) to you the Spirit,
and worketh miracles (Swd/xeis) among you " ; Eph.
hi. 16: " to be strengthened with might {Svvd/xei)

EFFICACIOUS ACTION. 141
by his Spirit in the inner man " ; 1 Thess. i. 5 :
" our gospel came to you .... in power and in
the Holy Spirit " ; 2 Tim. i. 7 : " For God hath not
given to us the spirit of fear, but of power." And
not only are the words thus closely associated ; they
are, it would seem, even interchanged. At 1 Cor.
vi. 14 : " God will also raise up us by his own
power," and 2 Cor. xiii. 4 : "we shall live with him
by the power of God toward you," the resurrection
and quickening of life are represented as accom
plished by the power of God alone ; while at Rom.
viii. 1 1 we find the same results attributed to " the
Spirit " ; and there can be little doubt that at 1 Cor.
v. 4, as Wendt has pointed out, the expression,.
" with the power of our Lord Jesus Christ," is em
ployed to designate the Spirit of God simply because
of the word irvev/xa being already twice used immedi
ately before (in verses 3 and 4) of the human spirit.
It is to be noted, further, that the word chosen by
St. Paul to designate the special operation of the Spirit
— evepyelv — denotes distinctly activj^power, power
at work, as Cremer has well put it : not mere
ability to accomplish anything, but efficacious action,
power in active exercise. " Inward working " is the
great function, if we may so speak, of the Spirit,
1 Cor. xii. 11: " but all these worketh (evepyei)
the one and the same Spirit." Compare the state
ment immediately before at verse 6 with reference to^

1 42 ASSOCIATION WITH " LIFE.
(rod's operative agency in spiritual gifts: "And
there are chversities of workings (Siaipeaeis evepyij-
/xutwv), but the same God, who worketh all things
in all " ; and the more general proposition at Phil.
ii. 14 : "For it is God that worketh in you both to
will and to work " (6 evepywv ev v/xiv Kal to OeXetv
ko.1 to evepyeiv). We find repeated reference to the
same pneumatic energy in the kindred expressions,
Eph. iii. 20 : KaTa ty/v Svva/xiv Tt\v evepyov/xevr/v
ev ti/xiv (comp. with verse 6, noted above) ; Col.
i. 29 : kutu Tr/v evepyeiav avTov Tr/v evepyov/xevrjv
ev e/xol ev Svvd/xei ; 2 Thess. i. 1 1 : irXr/pwar/ . . .
epyov iriaTews ev Svva/xei (mightily). In this con
nection Wendt calls special attention to the passages
where the " spirit " is opposed to the " letter "
(Rom. ii. 29 ; vii. 6 ; 2 Cor. iii. 6); for in these
the irvev/xa conies into view simply as effective
power in contradistinction to the of itself ineffective
letter. Along with the idea of power we find that of
Hfe brought into frequent and close relation to the
irvev/xa; at Rom. viii. 2 : " the law of the Spirit of
life in Christ Jesus " ; viii. 6 : " the mind of the
Spirit is life and peace " ; viii. 11:" the Spirit is
life " ; 1 3 : " he that raised up Jesus . . . shall
quicken (^woironjaei) your mortal bodies by his Spirit
that dwelleth in you " ; 1 Cor. xv. 45 : "the last
\ Adam became a life-giving Spirit " ; 2 Cor. iii. 6 :

A COMMON POSSESSION. 143
"the Spirit giveth life"; Gal. v. 25 : "If we live
in the Spirit " ; Gal. vi. 8 : "He that soweth to the
Spirit shall of the Spirit reap life everlasting."
A further characteristic of this irvev/xa is, that it
is the common possession of the_ Church and the
members of the Church. It is not -a gift partially
or occasionally distributed, but an essential element
and mark of the Christian life. It is not, from St.
Paul's point of view, chiefly an ecstatic-apocalyptic
illapse, but the main-spring and motive power of all
Christian action. At Rom. viii. 9 he says abso
lutely : " If any man hath not the Spirit of Christ,
he is none of his ; " at 1 Cor. iii. 1 6 he asks his
readers : " Know ye not that ye are the temple of
God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you ? "
At vi. 11, contrasting their present Christian posi
tion with their former state of vice, he says : " And
such were some of you ; but ye were washed, were
sanctified, were justified in the name of the Lord
Jesus Christ, and in the Spirit of our God " ; and
still more explicitly does he bring all into common
relation to the Spirit, when at xiii. 3 he affirms :
" In one Spirit were we all baptised into one body,
whether Jews or Greeks, whether bond or free ; and
were all made to drink of one Spirit." So too in
writing to the Ephesians he describes all his Chris
tian readers as " sealed with the Holy Spirit of
promise" (i. 13 ; iv. 30). And not only are all

144 DIVERSITY OF OPERATION
represented as partaking of the Spirit, but it is re
peatedly stated that it is one and the same Spirit
that manifests itself under divers forms. The same
ness, the unity of the Spirit is the point specially
emphasized in the section of the First Epistle to the
Corinthians, where the Apostle discusses the -^apla-
/xaTa (xii. 4-13). He enforces his entreaty that the
Ephesians should " give diligence to keep the unity
of the Spirit in the bond of peace " by the distinct
affirmation : " There is one body and one Spirit "
(iv. 3, 4) ; and the same thought of necessity under
lies " the fellowship of the Spirit," which the Apostle
presupposes at Phil. ii. 1, and " the communion of
the Holy Spirit," which he desires may be " with
all," at 2 Cor. xiii. 13.
But while the identity of the Spirit operative in
all is thus strongly affirmed, not less is the diversity
of_ the forms and modes of operation explicitly
recognised. This diversity appears under two main
aspects — that of a difference of gifts bearing on the
edification of the Church in the different members on
whom they are bestowed ; and that of a difference
of functions, bearing on the formation and growth
of the Christian hfe in the individual. In the organic
unity of the Church the various members have not
the same office ; and St. Paul, in the great section
which he has devoted to the treatment of this sub
ject with special relation to the state of things

IN THE CHURCH AND IN THE INDIVIDUAL. 145
in the Corinthian Church, clearly proclaims the
principle that the variety of the gifts and the
diversity of their distribution have reference to the
needs of the Church, and that their use is to be
governed by a regard to the ends to which they are
thus subservient (xii. 7 : "To each one is given the
manifestation of the Spirit to profit withal "). But
while he enumerates in 1 Cor. xii. 4-12 the several
kinds of gifts that thus cooperate for the service of
the Church, he points out in the fourteenth chapter
that even the most important among them — the
speaking with tongues — is of little value unless
associated with other gifts of a more practical kind.
In the case of the individual believer, on the
other hand, the agency of the Spirit is presented as
the means of carrying out the divine purpose and
realising the aim of the Christian calling. It is the
Spirit that enables him to confess the divine mission
of Christ (1 Cor. xii. 3 : "No one can say, Jesus is
Lord, but in the Holy Spirit ") ; to call upon God as
Father (Gal. iv. 6 : " God hath sent forth the Spirit
of his Son into our hearts, crying, Abba, Father" ;
Rom. viii. 15); to have the consciousness of sonship
(Rom. viii. 16 : "The Spirit beareth witness with
our spirits that we are children of God") ; to know
the love of God shed abroad in our hearts (Rom-
v. 5), the peace and joy thence resulting (Rom.
xiv. 17 ; 1 Thess. i. 6), and the hope that putteth

146 AFFINITY TO OLD TESTAMENT.
not to shame (Rom. v. 5 ; Rom. xv. 13: " Now the
God of hope fill you with all joy and peace in
believing, that ye may abound in hope in the power
of the Holy Spirit " ; Gal. v. 5 : " For we through
the Spirit of faith wait for the hope of righteous
ness "). The Spirit is the new motive principle of
Christian action, whereby believers are led (Rom.
viii. 14 ; Gal. v. 18) ; so that, renewed in the spirit
of their mind (Eph. iv. 23), and become new crea
tures in Christ Jesus (2 Cor. v. 17), they are enabled
to serve in newness of the Spirit (Rom. vii. 6), and
their hfe is described as a walking after, or accord
ing to, the Spirit (Rom. viii. 4, 5 ; Gal. v. 16-25).
Sanctification is especially associated with the Spirit
(2 Thess. ii. 13 : " God chose you from the begin
ning unto salvation in sanctification of the Spirit " ;
Rom. xv. 16: " that the offering of the Gentiles
might be made acceptable, being sanctified by the
Holy Spirit ") ; and the fruit of the Spirit is de
clared to be " love, joy, peace, long-suffering, kind
ness, goodness, faithfulness, meekness, temperance "
(Gal. v. 22).
Such are the chief characteristics of the Spirit's
influence and operation as set forth by St. Paul.
Who can fail to see in them a close and striking
affinity to the leading features of Old Testament
usage ? It is obvious at a glance that St. Paul pro
ceeds on the great lines which the Old Testament

POINTS OF AGREEMENT AND OF DIFFERENCE. 147
had laid down. The two most conspicuous marks
of the ruach — supernatural power and God-given
life — are reproduced in the Pauline irvev/xa, but in
such a form as might naturally be expected under
the altered circumstances, with adaptation, in other
words, to the more comprehensive range and fuller
contents of the Christian conception. When we
speak of St. Paul having followed in the line of Old
Testament precedent, we do not, of course, mean
that he has simply taken up and echoed its
language with all the limitations or peculiarities of its
original use. This would hardly have been possible
for any one writing after an interval of several cen
turies, and least of all for a man of such fertility of
resource and force of character as St. Paul — to say
nothing of what he has himself told us as to the
source whence he received his gospel. What the
Apostle actually exhibits is such a use of the
language already consecrated in the Old Testament
to the expression of kindred ideas as unmistakably
indicates its community of origin and affinity of im
port, and at the same time bespeaks the difference
as well as the resemblance of the standpoint from
which it is applied.
The Trvev/xa of St. Paul is the ruach of the Old
Testament, conceived as manifesting itself after a
manner analogous to, but transcending, its earlier
forms. It bears the same characteristic marks of

148 RESEMBLANCE AND DIFFERENCE.
divine origin, of supernatural power, of motive
energy in active exercise — standing in intimate rela
tion to the fuller religious life and distinctive
character and action of its recipients. But, while
in the Old Testament it is partial, occasional, inter
mittent, here it is general, constant, pervading.
While in the Old Testament, as well as in the New,
its forms of manifestation are diverse, they are ex
pressly referred under the New to one and the same
Spirit. While in the Old Testament they contem
plate mainly the official equipment of men for
special work given to them to perform, they include
under the New the inward energy of moral action
in the individual no less than the gifts requisite for
the edification of the Church ; they embrace the
whole domain of the religious hfe in the believer
and in the community to which he belongs. The
irvev/xa of the Apostle is not the life-breath of man
as originally constituted a creature of God ; but it
is the life-spirit of the Kaivt] KTiais, in which all
things have become new.
But we are disposed to go farther and to say that
not only did the Apostle find in the Old Testament
the language which he could thus appropriate and
employ in an ampler usage and fuller meaning ; but
he found there also his warrant and encouragement
to give to it this wider scope, to put into it this new
and richer significance. For the prophets had,

OLD TESTAMENT FORESHADOWING THE NEW. 149
under the influence of their ruach, not merely
announced the larger effusion of the Spirit as a
special characteristic of the Messianic period, but
had also not obscurely foreshadowed some of the
marks that it was to bear. Whatever of outward
extension or of inward transformation the idea has
undergone in St. Paul's hands was to some extent an
ticipated, and had its way prepared, in various utter
ances that could not but be familiar to him. A glance
at some of these may suffice at once to make good our
statement, and at the same time to show how little
there is either need of, or foundation for, Pfleiderer's
attempt to explain the transition in St. Paul's mind
from the irvev/xa viewed as an " ecstatic-apocalyptic
principle " to the irvev/xa viewed as the " immanent
religious-moral life-principle of renewed humanity."
We have already stated that Pfleiderer has recourse
to this suggestion in order to account for the speci
ally ethical character of the work of the Spirit as
conceived by St. Paul ; but that, while he repeatedly
puts it forward, he has not given either sufficient
grounds for assuming such a transmutation to have
taken place, or an adequate rationale of the logical or
psychological process by which it has been brought
about. The true nature of St. Paul's doctrine as to the Spirit
is to be got from an induction of his teaching as a
whole, and not from mere occasional allusions to one

150 APOCALYPTIC CONCEPTION TOO NARROW.
aspect of it, or even from an isolated section of a
single Epistle handling that aspect, which are gra
tuitously assumed to represent its earlier form.
Pfleiderer takes for granted that there was a tradi
tional doctrine whence St. Paul might have got his
original conception of the Messianic irvev/xa received
in baptism as being simply a source of miraculous
gifts ; but neither he nor any one else— such as
Weiss, who throughout lays undue stress on the
irvev/xa in the prhnitive Church as the medium of
official endowment — has adduced adequate warrant
for so narrow a conception of the Spirit's office.
No doubt the passage in the prophecy of Joel which
is quoted by St. Peter as finding its fulfilment in
the special manifestations of the day of Pentecost,
contemplates the effusion of the Spirit as accom
panied by numerous and varied expressions of an
ecstatic and apocalyptic type ; but even in its case
we may hardly assume that the specified phenomena
of vision and prophecy were meant to be either the
universal or the exclusive forms of the Spirit's
action. They were marks of the presence and
operation of the Spirit, by which it might be con
spicuously signalised ; but they were not necessarily
the essential or the sole marks of that presence.
The universahty of the promise at the beginning :
" I will pour out of my Spirit upon all flesh," and
of the assurance at the end that " whosoever shall

"GIFTS" of primitive church. 151
call on the name of the Lord shall be saved," can
hardly be conceived as having its import exhausted
by such visible and audible tokens of ecstatic power —
to say nothing of the argument that, from the very
nature of the case, the bestowal of such powers on
all would seem to deprive them of distinctive value
or special significance.
Besides, it appears plain from the accounts in the
Book of Acts that these gifts were not regarded as
pertaining to all the members of the Church as such.
For, if so, why are they singled out for specification
and brought into prominence as distinctive charac
teristics of their possessors ? If all had the spiritual
gift of wisdom, why should the choice of the Seven
have been based on the recognition of that gift ? If
all might prophecy, why was there a special category
of TrpocprjTat ? The prayer of the assembled Church
(Acts iv. 30) asks for freedom of utterance in the
preaching of the word, and for an accompaniment of
that preaching with miraculous gifts of healing. If
these gifts had been the common possession of the
Church, why should they have been made the object
of special prayer ? The next verse, which records
the answer to that prayer, tells us that all were
filled with the Holy Spirit and spake the word
with boldness ; but it does not say anything of all
being furnished with the power of authenticating
their word by signs and wonders.

152 ETHICO-RELIGIOUS CHARACTER.
But, whatever may be said of the import of the pas
sage in Joel, it has, as Wendt has urged, simply the value
of a single characteristic trait in the far more richly
detailed picture which is drawn of the Spirit of God
in the future. He calls attention to the fact that
it is really in the older historical books, especially
in the book of Judges, that the divine Spirit is
chiefly conceived of in this ecstatic form; that in the
prophetic books there appear but slight traces of
such a conception at passages quite isolated ; and
that here the prophetic effects of the Spirit in the
narrower sense of the term, which are by no means
always of an ecstatic-apocalyptic character, fall very
much into the shade as compared with other purely
ethico -religious effects, which are specially ascribed
to the Messianic King and to the Church of the
expected last time. " As the picture of the Messi
anic King assumes different shapes in different pro
phets, and as special traits are woven into it by each
according to the different circumstances under which
he writes, so is the thought of a future Messianic
communication of the Spirit differently presented by
the leading prophets, as different operations of that
Spirit are contemplated. For St. Paul Old Testa
ment prophecy could only come into account as a
closed whole ; " and the impression made on him
must have been the effect of the whole rather than
of any single passage.

THE SPIRIT BRINGING FORTH "JUDGMENT." 153
Wendt is disposed to lay some stress on the
"spirit of judgment" more than once mentioned in
Isaiah (iv. 4; xxviii. 26) as such an ethical con
ception ; but, however this may be, there can be
little doubt as to the ethical character of the con
nection in the well-known passage as to the Servant
of Jehovah, the Mediator and organ of Israel's re
storation, Is. xhi. 1 : "Behold my servant whom I
uphold, mine elect hi whom my soul delighteth ; I
have put my Spirit upon him ; he shall bring forth
judgment to the Gentiles," where most expositors
are disposed to take the word mishpat, rendered
"judgment," as equivalent to "religion as God's
ordinance." Delitzsch paraphrases the clauses thus:
"I have endowed him with my Spirit, in virtue of
which he will bring forth far beyond the circle in which
he finds himself placed, even unto the Gentiles, the
absolute divine law {Becht). So the true rehgion
is here designated, taken on its practical side as rule
and standard for life in all its relations — religion as
an ordinance of life, vo/xos." M. Reuss, who trans
lates : " I put my Spirit in him in order that he
may impart to the peoples what is just," remarks :
" the expression ' what is just ' would be translated
in modern language by ' that which is true and good',
the unity and sovereignty of God and His holy will."
"He shall bring forth," it is added, "judgment (re
hgion) according to truth ; he shall not fail nor be

154 PROMISES IN ISAIAH
discouraged till he have set judgment (religion) in
the earth, and the isles shall wait for his law
(teaching)." In this prophetic announcement, the
application of which to Christ is expressly vouched
to us by the Evangelist Matthew (xii. 18-20), the
special end for which the Servant of Jehovah re
ceives the Spirit is to promote the diffusion through
out the world, outside of Israel, of the true rehgion
as a rule of hfe. The same ideas of righteousness
and peace are associated with the Spirit at Is. xxxii.
15-17: "Until the Spirit be poured upon us from
on high. . . . Then judgment shall dwell in the
wilderness, and righteousness [or justice] remain in
the fruitful field. And the work of righteousness
shall be peace ; and the effect of righteousness quiet
ness and assurance for ever." And — to say nothing of
the form of the promise in Zech. xii. 10:" And I
will pour upon the house of David, and upon the
inhabitants of Jerusalem, the Spirit of grace [or of
prayer] and of supplication," as pointing to that action
of the Spirit in prayer to which St. Paul more than
once makes reference (Rom. viii. 15, 26 ; Gal. iv. 6)
—what can more definitely or explicitly describe the
very character and functions of Paul's ethical Trvev/xa
renewing and consecrating the life than the two
memorable passages of Ezekiel, xi. 19, 20: "And
I will give them one heart, and I will put a new
spirit within you ; and I will take the stony heart

AND EZEKIEL. 155
out of their flesh, and will give them an heart of
flesh ; that they may walk in my statutes, and keep
mine ordinances and do them, and they shall be my
people, and I will be their God," and xxxvi. 26, 27:
" A new heart also will I give you, and a new spirit
will I put within you ; and I will take away the
stony heart out of your flesh, and I will give you an
heart of flesh. And I will put my Spirit within
you, and cause you to walk in my statutes ; and ye
shall keep my judgments and do them." All these
passages relate, quite as much as that of Joel, to
the communication of the Spirit that was to take
place in the Messianic time ; and why should they
not equally have tended to mould the conception of
the Spirit which St. Paul could not but regard as
their fulfilment ? The Apostle had no need or
occasion to remodel the idea of Spirit which he tra
ditionally inherited, or to alter its contents while he
gave to it a wider application ; and Pfleiderer's hypo
thetical process of accounting for the transition from
the one phase of the Spirit's efficacy to the other
must be pronounced ingenious, but at the same time
quite unnecessary.
We have thus found from an induction of the
leading facts presented in the Apostle's letters that
the chief sense in which the term Trvev/xa is used by
him is that of the divine power or influence given
to man or dwelling in him, whereby he is enabled to

156 ST. PAULS PRECEDENT AND WARRANT.
live unto God or specially qualified for God's service;
and we have seen that for this use the Old Testa
ment furnished both precedent and warrant. This
divine life-principle may be conceived of in some
cases objectively as an influence operating on
man, and in others subjectively as an energy
operating in man, while in yet other passages it
seems clearly to point to a Personal Source whence
the power emanates and by which it is directed; but
in all instances it denotes an element or factor not
belonging to man as such, but originating apart
from hini, coming to him, and maintained in him
as a divine gift. Now this predominant use, in
keeping with that which St. Paul inherited in the
Old Testament, may be most naturally assumed to
have been uppermost in his thoughts, and to have
imparted its prevailing colour to Iris language, even
where it is not so exphcitly and directly marked.
The presumption is that other passages, where Trvev/xa
occurs apart from more precise indication of its
character as divine, wiU reflect the influence of
the same ruling idea and bear the impress of
the same Old Testament mould ; and the burden
of showing that the Apostle has in these cases
deviated from the prevailing usage must rest on
those who assume such a deviation.
Now, we can have httle hesitation in holding that
this presumption ought to govern the interpretation

PRESUMPTION FROM PREVAILING USAGE. 157
of the passages that fall under class E, where Trvev/xa
is accompanied by genitives of quality, defining more
precisely the character, manifestations, or results of
the power or influence so designated, such as Rom.
viii. 2 : vo/xos tov irvev/xaTOS Trjs ¥wrjs ev HipiaTw,
Rom. viii. 15 : eXafieTe Trvev/xa vloOeaias, 2 Cor.
iv. 13: e'xpvTes to ovto Trvev/xa Trjs Tr'iaTews, 1 Cor.
iv. 2 1 and Gal. vi. 1 : irvev/xaTi TrpaoTtrros, Eph. i. 1 7 :
irvev/xa aocpias Kal aTroKaXv-^ews, 2 Tim. i. 7 : irvev/xa
Svva/xews Kal aydirr/s Kal awcppovia/xov. It may be
that in most of these passages the Trvev/xa is con
ceived as a possession of the Christian ; but it is a
possession that presupposes a reception and that
rests on a bestowal ; and its real character as a
gift is not thereby affected.
No doubt, if we had simply encountered such an
expression as Trvev/xa TrpaoTr/Tos apart from the
others that have genitival adjuncts, we might have
probably regarded it as equivalent to irvev/xa irpav
Kal T/av-^iov — a " meek disposition or temper " as an
attribute of man. But, when we find the Apostle
speaking of " the law of the Spirit of life in Christ,"
and of "the Spirit of wisdom and revelation," we
cannot hesitate to recognise that we have to do with
something other than a mere periphrasis for a faculty
or a disposition of man ; and we cannot share the
surprise expressed by M. Oltramare when, in refer
ence to the former phrase, he declares his astonish-

158 (iENITIVAL ADJUNCTS.  CONTEXT.
ment that all commentators ancient and modern,
" except Koellner and Glockler," should have without
any proof and a priori given it "the sense of the
Holy Spirit instead of referring it to man." No
proof is needed of a use in entire keeping with the
Apostle's ruling thought ; but, if we needed any, we
should find it in the fact that here too the Apostle
follows the analogy of the Old Testament, where we
often encounter the like expressions, such as "the
spirit of wisdom " (Ex. xxviii. 3 ; xxxi. 3 of Beza-
leel : " And I have filled him with the Spirit of God
in wisdom and in understanding;" xxxv. 31; Is.
xi. 2 : " And the Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon
him, the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the
sphit of counsel and might, the spirit of knowledge
and of the fear of the Lord,") and find them brought,
as in the two passages we have quoted, into direct
relation to the Spirit of God.
There are not a few cases in which irvev/xa is
used without a genitive of origin, or property, or
specific character on the one hand, and without any
possessive or adjective pronoun attached to it on the
other, where its import is left to be gathered in the
light of its more definite employment elsewhere.
At Gal. v. 25 : et tw/xev irvev/xaTi, irvev/xaTi Kal
aTOiyw/xev, 2 Cor. xii. 18 : ov tod avTu irvev/xaTi
irepieiraTr/aa/xev ; 1 Cor. xii. 13: ev evi irvev/xaTi,
and other similar cases, there is a strong, nay, an

ADVERSE INFLUENCES SIMILARLY DESIGNATED. 159
overwhelming probability that the Apostle employs
the word in the same sense, as he had already
stamped upon it sufficiently to place it beyond risk
of being misapprehended, and beyond need of further
definition. Accordingly Grimm has expressed the
judgment of a calm and dispassionate exegesis, when
he says, with reference to both sets of passages of
which we have been speaking : " quibus omnibus
locis etsi de spiritu gcneratim dicatur, tamen e con-
textis facile patet, intelligi spiritum a divino spiritu
genitum aut ab ipso divino spiritu nihil diversum."1
We have thus shown the source and import of
the expression Trvev/xa, so far as the principal use of
it by the Apostle is concerned. Before passing on
to consider its further application, it may be well to
advert to two questions that have a collateral bear
ing on that which we have been discussing. And
the first of these relates to the import of the pass
ages which we have placed under group G, where
powers or influences alien from, or adverse to, the
divine irvev/xa are designated by the same term with
some qualifying adjunct, after a fashion which might
seem to favour the view that irvev/xa is a neutral
generic term, dependent for its more precise defini
tion — its good or evil connotation — on the context.
There are seven or eight such passages : — 1 Cor. ii.
12 : r/fxels Se ov to irvev/xa tov Koa/xov eXafio/xev, 2
1 Lexicon Grseco-Lat. in Nov. Test. s. v. Trvev/xa, p. 359.

160 NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE STATEMENTS.
Cor. xi. 4 : 1/ irvev/xa eTepov Xa/x/3dvere ; Rom. viii.
15 : ov yap eXd/3ere irvev/xa SovXeias, 1 Tim. iv. 1 :
irpoaeyovTes irvev/xaai irXavots, 2 Tim. i. / : ov yap
eSwKev r)/xiv 6 Oeos Trvev/xa SeiXias, Eph. ii. 2 : tov
irvev/xaTOS tov vvv evepyovvTOS ev Tois vtois Trjs
direiOelas, Eph. vi. 12 : irpos Ta irvev/xaTlKa Trjs
irovr/plas ev tois eirovpaviois, Rom. xi. 8 : Trvev/xa
KaTavvPews, where we meet, at least hypothetically,
the idea of influences opposed to that of God. But
it is to be observed with regard to the first four of
these instances that the statements are couched in
the negative form. The Apostle tells his readers that
they had not received a irvev/xa of the nature indi
cated; and it is obvious that the conceptions negatived
are simply formed after the analogy of the positive
counterpart with which they are placed in contrast.
The Apostle makes no affirmation as to the real
existence of that which Christians have not received.
It is otherwise with the remaining passages, where
he speaks of powers now at work in the children of
disobedience, and of the " spiritual powers of wicked
ness in heavenly places," in such a way that he
must be taken to affirm their existence. But, as
Wendt points out, this conception of supernatural
spirits of evil at work in the world stands likewise
in immediate relation to the Old Testament usage.
We find various instances of a ruach of this sort
conceived even as issuing from, or dependent on,

ALLEGED CONCEPTION OF SUBSTANCE. 161
God, in so far as He permits its operation and
thereby makes men subservient to his ends (Judges,
ix. 23; 1 Sam. xvi. 14-16, 23; xviii. 10; 1 Kings
xxii. 21 ff; Is. xix. 14; and xxix. 10 — the passage
quoted at Rom. xi. 8) ; and we may very well hold
that " both in the Old Testament, and with St. Paul,
the conception of such a spirit opposed to the divine
Spirit is only formed in analogy to, and dependence
on, the latter idea," just as throughout the Old Testa
ment all evil is subordinate to the divine sovereignty
and works out the divine purposes.
The other question has reference to the value of
the grounds assigned by Holsten and Pfleiderer for
their position that the Pauline use of Trvev/xa implies a
conception of material substance, of a non-earthly, finer,
luminous or lustrous substance, which is given forth
by God to men, and which, when so communicated,
produces in them pneumatic effects. No such con
ception seems to attach to the Old Testament ruach,
which is essentially a principle of power and life.
Is there any reason for assuming its presence in the
case of St Paul ?
The following are the passages adduced in support
of their view : — 1 Cor. xv. 40 ff; ii. 12 ; Gal. iv. 6 ;
Rom. v. 5 ; 2 Cor. ih. 18 ; iv. 6. Wendt appears
to us to have effectually disposed of the arguments
based on them. As regards the section of the First
Corinthian Epistle dealing with the question of the

162 PASSAGES ADDUCED
future or resurrection body, he has shown1 that, ac
cording to the connection, aw/xa irvev/xaTiKov denotes
not a body which consists of pneumatic substance, but
a body which contains and is animated by a divine
irvev/xa. At 1 Cor. ii. 12, and Gal. iv. 6, the irvev/xa
is said to be "received" and "sent forth" respectively;
but there is nothing to indicate that what was com
municated or received was anything material ; and,
as Wendt remarks, if the Apostle desired to speak
of non-material power, there were no words at his
disposal except those which, under other circum
stances, might be used of the communication of
that which is material. At Rom. v. 5 : " the love of
God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Spirit
which is given to us," it may be allowed that the
expression l-KKeyyTai — although used strictly of the
love of God, while the Spirit is said to be given — is
really applicable to the idea of irvev/xa ; but the
conception comes from the Old Testament, as in the
case of the prophecy of Joel (iii. 1 f.) and of that of
Isaiah liv. 3 : " I will pour water upon him that is
thirsty, and floods upon the dry ground ; I will pour
my spirit upon thy seed, and my blessing upon thine
offspring." At the former passage Wendt is of
opinion, as we saw, that the metaphor was suggested
to the prophet by the previous mention of rain (ii.
23); and at the latter, if "spirit" is held to he a
1 See a summary of his discussion in the Appendix.

AS IMPLYING SUBSTANCE. 163
substance, " blessing " in the parallel clause must
also be deemed a substance, for it too is poured forth.
And, in answer to the objection that the Spirit must
be conceived of substantially in order to be appre
hended under the figure of substantial water, Wendt
adduces the repeated use of the same verb to denote
the effusion of the Divine anger (Is. xiii. 2 5 ; Jer.
x. 25; Ezek. xxii. 22; Hos. v. 10; Ps. Ixix. 24)
where there will hardly be any disposition to main
tain that the wrath of God is conceived of as a
definite supernatural substance.
As regards the other two texts brought forward,
namely, 2 Cor. iii. 18, and iv. 6, the second : " God,
who commanded the light to shine out of darkness,
hath shined in our hearts to give the light of the
knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus
Christ," does not make any mention of the Spirit ;
and it is relevant only in so far as it seems to con
tinue or resume the reference to the SoP^a presented
in the former : " But we all with unveiled face re
flecting as a mirror (or beholding as in a mirror) the
glory of the Lord, are transformed into the same
image from glory to glory." Here the S6£a is con
ceived as the radiance of light which forms the
substance of the irvev/xa. But Wendt has shown
that this passage can only be rightly understood in
the light of the connection to which it belongs ; and
he gives the following exposition of its import.

164 wendt's EXPOSITION
" The Apostle finds himself compelled, by the per
sonal attacks made upon hhn, to explain on what he
founds his authority as Apostle (ih. 1). He first
remarks that the Church in Corinth had httle need
of other proof of this authority, seeing that its own
existence was the best evidence thereof (iii. 2, 3).
But thereupon he chooses a yet higher point of view ;
and bases all his authority not on his person, but on
his divine calling (4, 5). He points to the incom
parable dignity of the contents of his calhng (verse
6), in order thence to deduce, in the sequel of his
exposition (iii. 7 — iv. 6) the greatness of the autho
rity, which belongs to this caUing as such. The
dignity of the contents of his New Testament calling
is established by a comparison of the New Testament
with the Old. The one consists in the ypd/x/xa,
having no power dwelhng in it of itself, and so leading
to death ; the other consists in the irvev/xa, which is
in itself power, and leads to life. And now he proves
the greater authority of the New Testament calling
by an inference a minori ad ma jus ; if the calling in
the case of the Old Testament, which had reference
to a mere death-bringing ypd/x/xa, possessed a high
authority, how much higher must be the authority of
the calling in the case of the New, which had reference
to a power of God ! The authority of the Old is
symbolised in the brightness, the SoPa, which shone
from the face of Moses (Exod. xxxiv. 29 ff.) ; and

of 2 cor. iii. 1 — iv. 6. 165
tins suggests [im Anschlusse daran] the describing
the authority of the New Testament calling also as a
SoPa — a brightness, which shines forth from the
organs of the New Testament revelation.
The whole detailed illustration that follows down
to iv. 6 is controlled in its figurative mode of expression
by the retrospective reference to that Old Testament
account. The Apostle sees a mark of the lower
value of the SoPa of the Old Testament in the fact
that this SoPa needed a veil, which had merely the
object of concealing from the eyes of the Israelites
the null and finite character of the Old Testament,
based on its nature as ypd/x/xa (verses 13-15). But
the SdP^a of the New Testament — that is, figure apart,
the authority and value which that revelation of God
has as such — needed no such veil, because there were
no limits of the SoPa to be here concealed ; for Christ,
the bearer of the New Testament revelation, is — in
contrast to the ypd/x/xa — the life-creating irvev/xa, the
constantly operative power of God (verse 17). If
then the lustre of the SoP^a of Christ is free from all
veil, it can throw its light unhindered on all who
look at it, and be reflected by these in equal clear
ness. From the SoP^a of Christ — which is the expres
sion of his irvev/xa, of his divine power — there arises
consequently a SoP^a of the Apostles of Christ ; both
present {gewcihren) the same appearance {tt)v av-ri/v
eiKova), for both are bearers of the same pneumatic

166 wendt's exposition
power (verse 18), and, as Christ himself puts forth
Ids SoPa unveiled, so may the Apostles put forth the
like Sd£a — that is, the divine authority of their
calling — unveiled in presence of the churches (iv.
1-6). If we take iii. 18 rightly as a link in this chain
of thought, there can be no doubt that there is no
sufficient reason here for assumhig a materiality of
the irvev/xa. It comes into view only as efficacious
2'owcr of God overagahist the dead letter ; and the
SoP^a is simply the figurative expression — originating
in a clearly recognisable occasion — for the apparent
ralue of this divine power. Of a substantiality in
any respect there is no mention ; in particular, the
transformation which is mentioned, is indicated by
express addition as a transformation, not of matter,
but of aspect (des Aussehens). Even if we should
assume that the SoP^a of the face of Moses were ori
ginally conceived of as a luminous matter, from which
issues a radiant effect, in the transference to Christ
and the Apostles the Sop^a is to be held a figure, not
for an analogous matter which exists in these, but
for the analogous effect which issues from them. But
we need not even at all concede that the Sdj^a signi
fies in general luminous matter ; for this hypothesis
would only rest on a reasoning in a circle, of which
Liidemann has made himself guilty, when he says
(p. 2 1 f.) that " frequently SoP^a seems to denote a finer

of 2 cor. iii. 18. 167
luminous matter, which belongs to the irvev/xa'' and
when he simply from this semblance draws the con
clusion that " consequently irvev/xa is at the same time
expressive of a higher materiality." The semblance
that SoP^a is a luminous substance, arises simply from
the fact that there is an inclination a priori to ascribe
to the irvev/xa, whose SoPa is in question, a substantial
nature ; for other reasons cannot give rise to such a
semblance, seeing that the conception of SoPa nowhere
else betrays a material sense. We cannot therefore,
at anyrate, well deduce from this semblance of mate
riality of the SoPa the materiality hi its turn of the
irvev/xa. Whether we may or may not assent to this inge
nious interpretation of Wendt, it is obvious that we
cannot lay stress on an alleged import of an ambiguous
and apparently metaphorical expression as warranting
a view for which nothing more substantial can be
adduced.

168 PASSAGES IMPLYING A HUMAN PNEUMA.

VII.
THE HUMAN PNEUMA.
We have still to consider another set of passages, in
which irvev/xa appears to be used of the mind or spirit
of man, of the inward self-conscious power which
feels, thinks, and wills. There is, first, the passage
1 Cor. ii. 11, where the knowledge which the Spirit
of God has of the deep things of God is illustrated
by the analogous knowledge which man's spirit has
of what pertains to man : " for who among men
knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of tlie
man which is in him." Then at Rom. viii. 16 the
spirit of man seems expressly contradistinguished
from the Spirit of God, which is represented as
bearing witness with, or to, our spirit. In ten
other passages irvev/xa is accompanied by a personal
pronoun in the genitive, or an adjectival persanal
pronoun : " my spirit, thy spirit, your spirit,"
whereby it is marked as a possession or property of
man, which he may fairly speak of as his own
(Rom. i. 9 ; 1 Cor. v. 4 ; xvi. 18 ; 2 Cor. vii. 13 ;
xi. 13; 1 Thess. v. 23). In four of these the

HOLSTEN S EXPLANATION. 169
personal spirit is placed in the relation of the object
or recipient of the divine grace in Christ (Gal. vi.
15:" The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ be
with your spirit;" Phil. iv. 23; Philem. 23;
2 Tim. iv. 22). At 1 Thess. v. 23 the irvev/xa is
not only accompanied by the personal pronoun v/xwv,
but is correlated with the ^vyf/ and aw/xa of man ;
" may your spirit, and soul, and body be preserved
entire, without blame at the coming of our Lord
Jesus Christ." Lastly, in four or five passages irvev/xa
is placed in contrast with acio/xa (or with <rdpPj
under circumstances which most naturally suggest
the other side of human nature proper — something
which equally with man's body may be said to belong-
to him (1 Cor. v. 3 ; vii. 34 ; 2 Cor. vii. 1 ; Col. ii. 5 ;
Rom. viii. 10).
How are these passages to be explained ? Hol
sten, in keeping with his view as to the Pauline
conception of irvev/xa as a divine element that only
becomes immanent in man with and through Christ,
maintains — notwithstanding the adjuncts that appear
to pohit to something belonging to man in virtue of
his nature — that in all these instances the irvev/xa
spoken of is not a " human-creaturely spirit," or an
organ in man corresponding to, and receptive of, the
divine Spirit, but the divine irvev/xa itself regarded
as immanent in man and, as it were, subjectively
appropriated. This view has the merit of con-

170 VIEW GIVEN BY WEISS.
sistency ; but it rests on a forced exegesis, which has
failed to commend itself to any of the writers who
have succeeded' him. That at 1 Cor. ii. 11 the irvev/xa
tov dvOpwirov is to be identified with the irvev/xa
to? Koa/xov of the 12th verse, notwithstanding the
circumstance that the Apostle says of the latter that
he had not received it ; or that at Rom. viii. 1 6 the
irvev/xa r//xwv is to be identified with the irvev/xa
vioOeaias, the transcendent divine Spirit of ver. 15,
so that the witness is borne by the divine Spirit
objective along with, or to, the same divine Spirit
subjective : or that at Gal. vi. 18 and elsewhere the
spirit for which the Apostle wishes the presence of
Christ's grace is the divine Spirit already indwelling
in the believer — are suggestions not only at variance
with the most obvious and natural construction
of the words, but of a far-fetched and artificial
character, under which the Apostle's meaning is
reduced to a minimum, if not to a mere play on
words. Nor does it seem to us that the view of Weiss —
though not liable to so strong objections as that of
Holsten — meets adequately the circumstances of all
the cases. He conceives that " irvev/xa in the
specific sense has no place in the Pauline psycho
logy," although he grants that at some places (such
as 1 Cor. v. 5 ; Col. ii. 5) St. Paul follows a popular
usus loquendi, according to which Trvev/xa would

ITS DIFFICULTIES. 171
be substantially synonymous with ^v^i'i ; but he
holds that Trvev/xa is only ascribed to regenerate
Christians, and that, where to Trvev/xa r)/xwv is used,
what is meant is the new spiritual life wrought in
us by the Spirit. He maintains that at several
of the passages to which Schmidt and Wendt appeal
as proofs of the ordinary anthropological sense of
irvev/xa (such as 1 Cor. xvi. 18: " they refreshed
my spirit and yours," 2 Cor. vii. 13: " his spirit
(that of Titus) hath been refreshed by you all,"
2 Cor. ii. 1 3 : "I had no relief for my spirit ") the
reference is to religious relations — not by any means
to states and moods of the natural mental life, but
to such as pertain to the persons in question simply
and solely in the sphere of their Christian life as
such, and that the same explanation applies to Gal.
vi. 18, to Rom. i. 9 : " whom I serve in spirit," and
several other passages.
But while it may be granted that this view
is exegetically allowable — in so far as it is to a
certain extent in keeping with what is the general
and dominant usage of the term by the Apostle, and
in so far as it strives to preserve a certain unity of
conception throughout — it encounters, as it seems to
us, two considerable difficulties arising out of that
very prevailing usage to which it seeks to conform.
1st. Elsewhere irvev/xa denotes the divine energy
operating on, or acting in, man — a causal principle

172 INDUBITABLE INSTANCES.
or agency, whereas in the cases with which we are
now concerned it must denote the effect or result
thereby produced. It is not a question merely
of the term signifying now the giver, now the gift ;
but of its signifying now that gift as the principle
and motive power of the new life, and now the life
itself thence resulting as its fruit. It is improbable
that the Apostle should thus use the word in both
tliese senses. And 2nd. the very constant associa
tion of the term elsewhere with what is distinctively
divine, its attribution to God and to Christ, its pre
dicates of power and life, the recognition of it
as objective and as, even when immanent, a divine
gift; — which we are ever meeting elsewhere— render it
unlikely that the Apostle should have designated it
thus directly and unqualifiedly as a personal posses
sion. It seems to us better, accordingly, to regard
the Apostle as speaking of something that he may
with more warrant call his own ; and we are con
firmed in this view, when we find that, even after
applying Weiss's explanation of the new spiritual
life to the cases in which the personal pronoun is
used, there remain various instances of an indubit
able reference to a human Trvev/xa, such as 2 Cor. ii.
11 and 1 Thess. v. 23. Seeing that beyond all
question Paul thus had the conception of a Trvev/xa
belonging to man as such, it is most natural to take
this as the conception present to his mind, wherever

BIBLICAL PSYCHOLOGY. 173
he speaks of " my spirit " or " your spirit," or
employs it as a counterpart to " body " (except,
possibly, at Rom. viii. 10, of which more hereafter).
But what is this human Trvev/xa ? Proceeding
chiefly on the basis of the passage hi the earhest of
the Pauline epistles, 1 Thess. v. 23, where Trvev/xa,
¦dmy/?, and aw/xa are brought together as if constituent
elements of human nature, various expositors and
Bibhcal psychologists have worked out in different
forms the theory of a trichotomous division of man
as having the sanction of St. Paul's name ; and
elaborate treatises have been written, partly in vindi
cation of its title to rest on Biblical ground, partly
in apphcation of its alleged results to the elucidation
of Christian doctrine, e.g., the well-known work of
Dr. Heard on the Tripartite Nature of Man.
Apart from this book, which is of the nature of a
special pleading, the view of a trichotomy has been
more or less supported by Usteri, Neander, Lunemann
(on 1 Thess. v. 23), Auberlen, Beck, and Delitzsch.
The two latter may be regarded as the chief exposi
tors of what is called Bibhcal psychology ; but,
interesting and valuable as are their treatises, neither
of them has succeeded in placing the subject on a
proper exegetico-historical basis. It is with some
difficulty that the Bibhcal facts lend themselves to
be handled in the sense of modern psychological
distinctions foreign to Jewish modes of thought ;

174 BECK  DELITZSCH.
and the result too often is that they lose under the
process their Biblical impress, without acquiring any
valid title to pass current in their philosophical
guise. The meaning of Scripture, which is tolerably
clear to the ordinary reader who takes its language
in the sense of popular usage, becomes darkened
rather than elucidated by the attempt to impose on
it the distinctions — in themselves often obscure,
precarious, or even baseless — of modern speculation.
The book of Dr. Beck,1 which was some years ago
translated into English probably as well and as far
as its uncouth form and unmanageable phraseology
would allow, contains, like everything that has come
from him, much that is fresh and suggestive ; but its
value is greatly impaired by the utter absence of a
historical method of treatment. Scripture is dealt
with as a whole with little regard to the difference
•or succession of its parts ; as if, to use Dr.
Laidlaw's words, " the whole had been written con
temporaneously, and as if every text bore with equal
directness on the nature of the soul." The fuller
and more elaborate treatise of Dr. Delitzsch, 2 trans
lated into English with care and success, though not
1 TJmriss der Biblischen Seelenlehre : ein Versuch. 3rd
edition, Stuttgart, 1871. Translated under the title " Outlines
of Biblical Psychology," Edin. 1877.
2 System der Biblischen Psychologie, 2nd edition, Leipzig,
1861. Translated by Rev. Robert E. Wallis, Ph.D. in Messrs.
Clark's Foreign Theological Library, Edin. 1869.

SUGGESTED DISTINCTIONS. 175
always with adequate precision, by Dr. WaUis, takes
more account of the processes of exegesis, and of the
distinctions of age and authorship in Scripture ; but
instead of starting from an exegetical inquiry and
resting its more general conclusions on a careful
induction of the Biblical statements bearing on an
thropology, it sets out from the a priori basis of what
are called "the eternal presuppositions," which include
not merely the ideal — but also real — preexistence of
man, and the Trinity as the divine archetype, but
•also the divine Sd^a, wherein God, threefold in per
sons, reveals Himself as sevenfold in powers and
manifestations. The result is an ingenious mosaic of
Bibhcal facts, psychological explanations, and theo-
sophic speculation, as to which it is no easy matter in
the long run to distinguish how much really belongs
to the Scriptural foundation, and how much to the
superstructure raised on it by the varied erudition
and versatile fancy of the illustrious writer.1
So far as the question now before us is concerned,
the human irvev/xa is, by those who differentiate it
from ^vyy, variously conceived, according as the
difference is held to be a difference of nature, or of
faculties and functions. The more extreme view
1 A brief discussion of the trichotomous theories will be
found in Dr. Laidlaw's Cunningham Lectures on the Bible
Doctrine of Man, p. 60 ff., and a fuller account in his Appendix,
notes F. and G., p. 306-329.

176 TRICHOTOMY.
assumes that man consists of aw/xa, the material
element, which forms the physical basis of his being ;
the "J'i'Yty' which is the principle of animal life ; and
the irvev/xa, as the higher principle of the intel
lectual nature, of reason. Others have preferred to
speak of the ^v)qj and irvev/xa as different sides or
functions of the one Ego or inner man ; the former
being generally held to include the feelings and appe
tites, the latter to embrace the higher powers that
are more specially distinctive of man. Thus Liine-
mann says (on 1 Thess. v. 23): "irvev/xa denotes the
higher and purely spiritual side of the inner life,
what is elsewhere called by Paul vovs (reason) ;
•J^Y^ is the lower side, which comes in contact with
the region of the senses." Beck gives the following
oracular utterance : " The spirit forms for the indi-
\idual hfe the principle and the power in which it
subsists ; the soul forms the seat of the same, its
vehicle and conductor (Trager unci Lciter); the body,
the vessel, and organ, so that each is peculiar in its
kind, but only in connection with the others (Matth.
x. 28; 1 Thess. v. 23)."1 Delitzsch, after saying that
" spirit and soul are of one nature ( Wesen), but
different substances," proceeds : " But if the form of
expression be preferred that the soul is a tertium quid
not substantially but potentially self-subsistent be
tween spirit and body, belonging as regards its nature
1 TJmriss der Bibl. Seelenlehre, p. 35.

VIEW OF ZEZSCHWITZ. 177
to the side of the spirit, we are not opposed to putting
it so. The matter of more moment is that the soul,
whether it be named substance or potency, is not the
spirit itself, but another thing conditioned by it,
although standing very much closer to it than the
body." 1 And he adds, at intervals, the following
1 System der Bibl. Psychologie, p. 96. In a note he refers
to the view of Dr. von Zezschwitz, who, at p. 37 'of his
suggestive lecture entitled " Profangracitat und Biblischer
Sprachgeist," with entire correctness according to Dr. Delitzsch,
defines the rrvevfia in man as " the supreme spirit-power (Geistes-
macht), holding together, governing, penetrating all powers
(Krafte) of the soul and of the body in virtue of its own con
nection with God." This looks like a mixing up of the human.
and divine aspects of the 7rvei!//,a ; and it is but fair to Dr. von
Zezschwitz to add that he has just before described the Trvtv/xu
as " the psychological organ for the intercourse ( Wechsel-
verkehr) of man with God," and that his definition quoted above
is expressly qualified by the clause " where it subsists in
fulness of life and in its just position." He states, moreover,
clearly enough the difficulties that beset the attempt to exhibit
a Biblical psychology : namely, the need, so far as concerns
irvev/xa., of separating in our conception elements that Scrip
ture presents as de facto blended, the working of the divine
Spirit and the subsistence of the human spirit ; and the fact
that it has to deal, not with the presentation of a fixed spiritual
state always alike, but with a state of flux and development
that changes with the changed relations of the two factors.
But it does not seem to us that with all his ingenuity he has
successfully surmounted those difficulties. His practical con
clusion is thus announced (at p. 50) : " Any one who does not
force on Scripture a dogmatic system must acknowledge that
it speaks dichotomously of the parts viewed in themselves,
trichotomously of the living reality, but everywhere in such
M

178 ILLUSTRATIONS GIVEN BY DELITZSCH.
illustrations of his meaning : " The human soul is
related to the human spirit as the divine Doxa is
related to the triune divine nature. That is a com
parison which is certainly not carried out exactly so
in Scripture, but for which it affords all the needful
premisses." x " The spirit is spiritus spiratus, and
animates the body as spiritus spii-ans. The spirit is
(let it be well marked !) the inner of the soul, the
soul the outer of the spirit ; for there is no inner
without an outer, and no outer without an inner." 2
It is scarcely necessary to quote other definitions,
such as that which takes the irvev/xa as immediate
self - consciousness — as it were, the " feeling " of
Schleiermacher — which knows only " intuition is
ratione " (Krumm), or that of a " more exalted life-
potency," referred to by Holsten. Distinctions of
this nature do not in reality throw much light
on the subject. All such refining is simply misap
plied ingenuity without adequate Scriptural basis ;
a manner as to preserve the unity in the original plan of
human nature [mit WaArung des principiell auf Einheit
ange'egten Menschenwesens}."
1 Bibl. Psychol., p. 97.
- Bibl. Psychol., p. 98. He illustrates this relation between
centre and circumference by a reference to Philo's comparison of
the voi«s in the xpv-xf/ to the pupil in the eye ; and to a passage
in the Constitutioues Apostolicae, which describes the vovs
as the charioteer of the soul (vii. 34. 3 : voCs 6 t«s v/'uvrk
K]vio)(os reus dio-Oi'jo-eo-iv kit lO-Tijcras).

1 THESSALONIANS V. 23. 179
the grounds on which the distinctions are sought
to be established are too slight and narrow to
sustain so weighty an inference.
The main argument, as we have already indicated,
that is adduced in favour of a trichotomous scheme is
based on 1 Thess. v. 23. Now we do not think it
necessary to dwell on the fact that this passage,
which is supposed to give the key to St. Paul's
anthropology, occurs in the earliest of his Epistles — in
which there is no mention withal of that term
which plays so important a part in the later Epistles,
the crap^ — or on the circumstance that the com
bination nowhere recurs. Nor shall we argue with
Weiss that we can hardly infer the Apostle's position
as respects the constituent elements of human nature
regarded in itself from a passage which speaks of
Christians, who are distinguished from other men
by the possession of the Spirit of God. Nor yet do
we attach much weight to the ingenious suggestion
of Wendt, although it carries a certain plausibility.
He calls attention to a peculiarity in the use of Trvev/xa
by St. Paul, which he would designate as liturgical,
where in the benediction at the close of certain
Epistles (Gal. vi. 18 ; Philemon 25 ; 2 Tim. iv. 22),
to Trvev/xa v/xwv is put for the simpler v/xeis — the
spirit by synecdoche for man as a whole — and which,
as only occurring in the solemn style of these con
cluding formulas of blessing, he conceives may have

180 INTERPRETATION SUGGESTED BY WENDT.
been adopted by St. Paul from a liturgic mode of
expression then current. He throws out the con
jecture that, as the Apostle was approaching the
close of his letter with the benediction already, as
i% were, in view, the expression v/xwv to irvev/xa
occurred to hhn as a fuller designation instead of
It/xeis, and that then to this as the leading thought
there was added the partitive specification ; Kal r) \|>vy_>/
kcu to aw/xa. Iii a linguistic point of view he
finds this mode of apprehending the passage con
firmed by the circumstance that both the preceding
oXoKXr/pov and the subsequent predicate Tt/pr/Oeit]
strictly refer only to to irvev/xa (although, it is
true, this would not exclude another explanation).
And in pomt of fact the mode of expression, which
at first seems surprising, is accounted for by our
recalling the special interest with which St. Paul
1 >rings into prominence the truth that the aw/xa is not
excluded from sanctification (1 Cor. vii. 34 ; 2 Cor.
vii. 1). Sanctification is the very essence of his
wish here ; he desires that God may sanctify the
Thessalonians in all that constitutes their nature
(dyidaai i/xas oXoTeXeis) and may preserve them
irreproachable (d/xe/xirTws) — i. e. furnished with all
virtues. If on this occasion he used the solemn
formula v/xwv to Trvev/xa, it was not immaterial for
him specially to bring out that this expression was
to be rightly understood in the synecdochic sense,

SIMPLER EXPLANATION. 181
because the whole man, including his aw/xa, was to
be sanctified. For that reason he appended the
appositional words : " as well the soul as the body."1
This is an apt and adequate exegesis ; but it is also
conjectural ; and we deem it better to take the simple
explanation of Pfleiderer, that just as in the Gospel
of St. Luke, at i. 46, 47 (in the Magnificat, which
has been preserved for us, we may add, by one who
was closely associated with St. Paul and has given to
us, according to tradition, the Pauline gospel) : " My
soul doth magnify the Lord, and my spirit hath re
joiced in God my Saviour," the two conceptions are
placed side by side under conditions of Hebrew
parallelism that make them in substance synonymous,
" so St. Paul, when he would strongly emphasise the
completeness of human nature, may place side by
side the different expressions of popular terminology,
without wishing withal to teach a philosophical
trichotomy, of which no trace is found elsewhere, or
could well be found on Hebrew soil." 2 St. Paul,
says Dr. Jowett {in loc), "is not writing a treatise on
the soul, but pouring forth from the fulness of his
heart a prayer for his converts. The words may be
compared to similar expressions among ourselves ;
e.g., ' with my heart and soul.' " " It is," says M.
1 Wendt, Die Begriffe Fleisch und Geist im Bibl.
Sprachgebrauch untersucht, p. 123 f.
2 Paulinismus, p. 67, note.

182 PLACE OF PSYCHE.
Reuss, " to exhaust the idea of this totality, and not
to give theoretical teaching as to human nature, that
St. Paul names three elements, spirit, soul, and body,
in place of limiting himself to two, as he does else
where (Rom. viii. 10 ff. ;1. Cor. vii. 34; 2. Cor. vii. 1)."
But he seems to us not quite consistently to add :
" Distinguished from the spirit, the soul, in St. Paul's
language, comprehends the inferior faculties, the in
stinctive affections, the animal vitality." 1
In support of this statement M. Reuss refers to
1 Cor. xv. 44 ff; Phil. i. 27 ; 1 Cor. xi. 14. We find
Bishop Lightfoot (on Phil. i. 28) saying: "The
spirit, the principle of the higher life, is distinguished
from the soul, the seat of the affections, passions, &c,"
and referring for this distinction of irvev/xa and
¦v/'i'X'/ to the notes on 1 Thess. v. 23. These notes
have unfortunately not yet been given to the world,
mid will now, it is to be feared, be too long with
held from the expectation of scholars by the
pressure of other work. The terms " higher "
and "lower" life are not very clear ; and
probably no two writers would exactly agree in
defining them. But let us examine St. Paul's us
age of the word y^v^i in the light of the Old Testa
ment precedent on which he built.
It may be remarked that the word has undergone
a certain disparagement or derogation in consequence
1 La Bible, Epltres Pauliuiennes, i. p. 61.

NOT MERE ANIMATING PRINCIPLE. 183
of its being habitually associated by Baur, Liide
mann, and others with their conception of adpP^.
The adpp^, they tell us, is animated matter ; the
y\rvxfi is essentially bound up with it, cannot emanci
pate itself from it, must partake its character, and the
hke. But, as Wendt well points out, from the fact
that the conception <rdp£ is never employed except
where there is a ^vyf/ as animating principle, the
converse propositions by no means follow, that with
the y\rvxf/ there is everywhere associated adpP^, and
that the meaning of ^vyp, where it is associated
with adpP^, is exhausted by its being animating
principle for that crdpP^; and he calls attention to
the fact that in the other New Testament writers
the ^vyy is so far from being in idea bound up with
the adpP^, that, on the contrary, it is regarded as the
proper object for the future awTr/pla, which lies as far
remote as possible from the adpP^.
But the question now before us relates to Pauhne
usage, and is to be determined in the light of the
several passages where the expression occurs. We
find, first, the Old Testament precedent followed
in the employment on two occasions of iraaa
vJ/wy^ (Rom. ii. 9 ; xiii. 1) to denote "all individuals"
from the point of view of their individual life,
whereby they are marked off from inanimate nature.
In this case, as in the parallel one of wdaa
adpP^, the part is put for the whole, and, though the

184 SEAT OF THE EGO.
designation is taken from a part, the phrase really
means the whole man. Rom. xi. 3 is expressly a
quotation from the Old Testament (Kal "Qrrovai
Tr)v yjrvxfiv /xov) ; and at several other passages
(Rom. xvi. 4 : virep Tr)s ^v-^rjs /xov, 2 Cor. i. 23 :
eirucaXov/xai e—l Tr)v e/xr)v \Wy_'/>\ 2 Cor. xii. 15 :
virep Ttoi' \!/vywv v/xwv, Pliil. ii. 3,0 : irapa/3ovXevaa-
/xevos t/i ~bv-xp, 1 Thess. ii. 8 : aXXa kui hk
exv-fl-v \^v)(ds) we meet with precisely the same
Old Testament use, according to which, as Wendt
puts it, the soul forms especially the seat of the per
sonal Ego, and is therefore emphatically employed
instead of the simple personal pronoun, when the
object is to name oneself or another not merely
simpAiciter, but with the special indication of value
as individual personahty. It will hardly be
maintained that in the one, for example, of these
passages where the Apostle says: "I will most gladly
-pend and be spent (out) for your souls," it was in
respect of any partial or lower elements of his
readers' personahty, or of any value other than that
of the hfe or of the man as a whole, that he ex
pressed this willingness to spend himself. Nor can
it reasonably be contended that there is any sugges
tion of limitation, or any note of inferiority, when
the Apostle at the parallel passages, Eph. vi. 6, and
Col. hi. 23, exhorts slaves to discharge their duties
to their earthly masters not as a matter of eve-

ITS VALUE AS SUCH. 185
service, but e/c -J-^)??,1 the distinctive import of which
Wendt finds in the idea thereby suggested that they
are to take a personal interest in it, as accounting it
a religious duty in the service of Christ. There are
several passages in the Epistle to the Philippians,
where the word occurs as an element in compounds
(ii. 2: av/x-^vyoi, ii. 20: ovSeva ydp e'-^w lad-^vyov) ,
and even in the simple form (i. 27 : /xia \I/-uyJ?
avvaOXovvTes) to denote entire accord of feeling and
sentiment, and where it signifies in one case the
comfort to be derived by the Apostle from the re
ceipt of good news (ii. 19 : wa Kayw ev\l/v)(w) .
What warrant is there for taking the language here
as restricted to the lower functions of a mere animal
life-principle? Were the joint striving for the faith
of the Gospel, of which the Apostle hoped to hear,
or the harmony of sentiment which he asked for in
order to the fulfilment of his joy, or the gratification
which he hoped to get from the mission of Titus,
or the sympathy of the latter with the Apostle's
feelings and aims, matters belonging merely to a
certain "lower" sphere of the mental life of those
1 Here the Revisers of the Authorised Version have
strangely thought it right to retain the rendering "heartily,"
"from the heart," and have thereby concealed from the English
reader the fact that the Apostle emphasises his injunction
by expressing it under different aspects in terms both of
"heart" aud "soul," and, indeed, iu Eph. vi. 7, of a third
form vovs, when he adds /xtr evvoias.

186 1 CORINTHIANS II. 14
concerned, in which the " higher " side of their
nature might not, or need not, partake ?
There remain only two other passages which bear
on the question, and form in fact the mainstay of
the position that ^x^ carries of necessity this lower
meaning. They are 1 Cor. ii. 14, and xv. '44 ff,
where, in each case, the adjective -^v^ikos stands
contrasted with irvev/xaTiKos, and certainly denotes a
state or stage of man far inferior to the pneumatic,
but from which it has been somewhat hastily inferred
that, because irvev/xa stands often in contrast with
crappy and here appears similarly set overagainst
~^rvyf), \\rvyiKos must be practically treated as syno
nymous with aapKiKos. Wendt has conclusively, as
it seems to us, shown the real nature of the distinc
tion ; and we give an abstract of his exposition,
from which it will be apparent that the passages do
not warrant the inferences drawn from them.
We need hardly say at the outset that the ques
tion is not as to the distinction between a human
irvev/xa and the y^vy^/, but as to the contrast between
a man determined or governed by the divine irvev/xa,
and one from whom that Trvev/xa is absent. It is
generally admitted that in irvev/xaTiKos the divine
Trvev/xa is, in keeping with Paul's prevailing usage,
referred to ; but it is argued that, because crdpP^ is
often opposed to irvev/xa, the "^vyfi here opposed to
it must be closely associated with the adp£. At 1

IN THE LIGHT OF THE CONTEXT. 187
Cor. ii. 1 4 we read : " Now the natural [-^sv^ikos]
man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God,
for they are foolishness unto him ; and he cannot
know them because they are spiritually judged
[or rather, judged of]. But he that is spiritual
[irvev/xaTiKos] judgeth of all things, but he himself
is judged of by no one." 1 " The theme of the dis
cussion in the previous section from i. 17 onward is
the distinction of the Christian gospel from human or
cosmic aocpia — that is, from human scientific specula
tion. Paul shows in i. 1 7 ff. that so far from Chris
tianity having the value of a merely scientific
knowledge, it appears from the standpoint of Jewish
or Hellenic science absolute folly. Christianity be
longs, as to its nature and value, to quite another
domain; it is in the first line a Svva/xis Oeov (verse
18; comp. Rom. i. 16), a divine saving power for re
demption; and the aocpia, which is coupled with this
power of God (verse 24) is a aocpia Oeov, a religious
view of the world, which has nothing to do with the
scientific knowledge of it. Of this general thought the
Apostle, in the second chapter, gives a special appli
cation to the mode in which he himself preaches the
1 This passage is greatly marred by its rendering in the
Authorised Version where the same word is, in one case,
rendered "discerned," and in another, "judged ";and is not so
carefully amended as it might have been in the Revised, where
the marginal "examine," or, perhaps, the idiomatic "judge
of," is preferable to the ambiguous "judge."

188 HUMAN WISDOM AND REVELATION.
gospel. He has brought forward the gospel among
the Corinthians in the first line as God's power,
without applying withal the means of human science
(ii. 1-5) ; in the second, line doubtless — namely, in
presence of the TeXeloi, the more mature Christians —
the preaching of the gospel becomes with him too a
aocpia (verse 6), yet even then not an earthly
aocpia, but a religious speculation, whose object is
the divine plan of salvation (verses 7-9). Such a
religious view of the world is distinguished in prin
ciple from an}"' earthly wisdom by the fact that it
proceeds entirely from a revelation of the Spirit of
God, because only this Spirit is able to see through
the depths of the divine saving plan (verses 10-13).
Thus as the contents of Christian aoqbla are not of an
earthly but of a divine kind, so its origin is to be
found not in human cognition but in revelation of
the divine Spirit.
Now, to these thouglits the words of verse 14
are immediately annexed. The whole connection
treats, as we have seen, only of human cognition,
in contradistinction to what is religious, divine ;
there is no mention either of the physical or of the
moral weakness of man in relation to the Spirit of
God, but only of the distance intervening between
human cognition and divine wisdom. Accord
ingly the connection indicates that in the case of the
words before us, in which there is described

HUMAN COGNITIVE FACULTY. 189
negatively and positively the organ for the appre
hension of divine wisdom, we have to think of an
organ of cognition, and to take the yp-v-^rj of the
dvOpwiros \|/-uy_«co'? as the organ of human cognition,
which, as such, is not in a position to comprehend
the religious view of the world, and the place of
which therefore the Spirit of God itself must take as
the organ of understanding. The object of the
Apostle in these words is, as is confirmed by the
beginning of ch. iii., to give an explanation of the
thought already expressed in ii. 6, that the com
municating of the religious speculation of Christianity
in preaching the gospel stands only in the second line,
and is only destined for the more inature Christians ;
for it presumes that the recipients have already
experienced the gospel as divine Svva/xis, that they
have already become irvev/xaTiKol. This way of ap
prehending Christianity as speculation is the only
one possible, because here only is the religious organ
for apprehending it in existence ; the converse way
is not possible, whereby men might apprehend the
gospel merely as new philosophy without having
previously experienced the saving power which forms
the proper essence of Christianity. On this thought
alone the Apostle laid stress, and therefore he
characterises the man who is not yet capable of
understanding divine aocpia as ^v-^ikos, i.e., as
one who possesses in his ^vyf/ simply the

190 HIGH VALUE OF THE PSYCHE.
organ of purely human cognition, but has not yet
the organ of religious cognition in the irvev/xa.
It is only when we take the ^X'/ m 'his waJ as
the seat of the human cognitive faculty, and that in
the highest sense, according to which it is the organ
for all science and philosophy, that our passage
obtains its proper force and significance. But how
colourless would be the thought, if the ^X'/ of the
dvOpwiros -*\rvyj.Kos really signified merely the ani
mating principle of his bodily matter, in which case
the existence of a human irvev/xa as a higher cogni
tive faculty would remain a reserved point ! The
Apostle would then have expressed his thought after
a very imperfect fashion ; for the question would
still remain whether man of himself did not possess
in this higher pneuma-fa,culty an appropriate organ
for the reception of divine wisdom. Everything de
pended precisely on the answer to this question
being in the negative. It may seem strange that
the Apostle should immediately afterwards, in
applying this thought specially to the Corinthians,
use the expression aapKiKos and no longer ^v-^ikos
as a contrast to irvev/xaTiKos ; but this will find its
explanation when we come to consider his use of
adp£. The -dri'x'Ko? then is one in whom there dwells an
earthly ^vyf/ as mental power ; the irvev/xaTiKos one
in whom dwells the divine Spirit. Wendt applies

1 CORINTHIANS XV. 44. 191
this distinction to the explanation of the other lead
ing passage (1 Cor. xv. 44 ff). His view as to the
exegesis of the passage as a whole, will be subjoined
in the Appendix. Instead of making the discussion
in this case turn on the idea of substance and on the
substantial diversity between earthly and heavenly
bodies, so that aw/xa irvev/xaTiKov would mean a body
composed of celestial luminous matter and aw/xa
\\fvyiKov a body composed of earthly psychico-sarkic
matter, Wendt holds that the latter expression de
notes simply a body which encloses an earthly ^vyf/,
and the former a body, in which the divine Trvev/xa
fills the place of the earthly \\rvyj]. The adjectives
denote the power — in the one case creaturely, in the
other divinely spiritual — that animates the bodily
organism ; and the y\rvyr/ is here a brief designation
for the whole compass of the non-corporeal side of
the earthly man.
But if there is thus no foundation for the dis
tinction between ^vyf\ and Trvev/xa as that between
a lower and a higher element, faculty, or function
in man, wherein lies the difference between them ?
Wendt holds that, in analogy with the dis
tinction which he recognises between aw/xa and
adpP^, the former denoting body in general, the latter
the earthly body in particular (when it is used by
synecdoche for the body), "with St. Paul irvev/xa is
the general term for tlie conception of spirit, and may

192 DISTINCTION BETWEEN PNEUMA AND PSYCHE.
be used as well of the earthly as of the non-earthly
sphit; while \r'ux'' *s the designation for a special kind
of spirit, namely, for the carthly-crcaturdy spirit. As
aw/xa without further addition may be simply said of
the earthly bod}', when from the connection it is
clear that this and no other kind of body is in ques
tion, so is the term irvev/xa used without more precise
designation as expression for the human spirit, when
the anthropological contrast of aw/xa or the connec
tion otherwise already suggests the specialising of
the general idea. As, again, the word adp£ is em
phatically employed instead of the more general aw/xa,
when the object is definitely to distinguish the earthly
body as such from a supra-terrestrial bod}-, so we saw
at the two passages, 1 Cor. ii. 1 4, and xv. 44 ff'., the
term y\n>x>j emphatically employed to place the crea-
turely-earthly spirit in sharp contrast to the divine
Spirit. In this respect, therefore, but only in this, are
adpP^ and "J^'x*? homogeneous ; they are akin to each
other not as respects the notion conveyed by them,
but as respects their value, inasmuch as they both
stand at the same stage of event urclincss in contra
distinction to Cod."
But, while this view of Wendt may be regarded
as correct so far as it goes, it does not account for the
selection of the term Trvev/xa, nor does it explain the
point of view from which that term comes to ha pin -
dominant!// employed. For the explanation of that

PECULIAR POSITION OF WENDT. 193
choice we must fall back on the Old Testament, where
we meet with the distinction between nephesh and
ruach very marked, as resting on a difference not of
contents but of the point of view from which the
same contents are regarded. Nephesh is used of the
soul looked at as an individual possession distinguish
ing the holder from other men and from inanimate
nature ; ruach is used where it is conceived as pro
ceeding directly from God and returning to him.
The former indicates the life-principle simply as
subsistent ; the latter marks its relation to God, or,
as Wendt expresses it, its religious value. Why may
we not suppose St. Paul to have made choice of, or to
have preferred, the word irvev/xa for the simple human
spirit precisely on account of this connotation— be
cause of his regarding it, and valuing it, as thus
primarily related to God ?
We cannot quite agree with the peculiar position
that Wendt takes up as regards this specialty of Paul
ine usage. He conceives that the Trvev/xa, as used by
St. Paul of the human spirit, no longer in any way
betrays the Old Testament religious mode of looking
at it ; that it has simply the value of a second part
of human nature, which may be co-ordinated with
the body ; and he goes so far as to say : " People
are for the most part inclined to see in this anthro
pological application of the Trvev/xa an essential link
connecting the Pauline usage with the ' popular '

194 OBJECTIONS TO WENDT'S VIEW.
Old Testament use, while they beheve that they
discern a peculiar new conception of Paul in the
mode in which the divine irvev/xa is brought forward.
I would rather, on the other hand, call attention to
the fact that it is just this simple use of irvev/xa in
anthropological contrast to the body, that belongs to
Paul alone, and does not find analogues either in the
Old Testament vsus loquendi or in that of the other
New Testament writers."
In thus putting the case, Wendt seems to me to as
sume — and to assume without necessity or warrant
— the very point that St. Paul has here abandoned
the Old Testament line of use, that in so employing
irvev/xa he has eliminated from it the religious element,
and has treated it as a purely anthropological con
ception precisely equivalent to ^v-^r/. Granting that
it designates a part of human nature overagainst
another part, the body — and it is to be observed that,
while it may be co-ordinated with it, it is also from
the very nature of the case differentiated and con
trasted — does it follow that the designation must have
all its distinctive significance discharged from it, and
maycarrynoconnotationof animport at all distinguish
ing it from ^x»? ? In that case it must be held
that St. Paul's employment of the expression in this
sense is not only left without adequate explanation,
but is, in view of all the circumstances as set forth by
Wendt, almost inexplicable. If its connotation is in

CHOICE OF ALTERNATIVES. 195
nothing different from that of ^vyf/, wny has the
Apostle employed it ? Why has he gone, if we may
so speak, out of his way to take up a term which he
had already, after Old Testament example, turned to
account for other purposes, and which in its new
application could hardly fail to run a risk of — as it
has in point of fact given rise to — no small misunder
standing and confusion ? Why has he placed a
human irvev/xa alongside of the divine, when he could
easily have avoided doing so, and when he had a
familiar word at hand which would have precisely
expressed what he meant without incurring a sus
picion of being intended to convey anything more ?
And not only may we reasonably ask Dr. Wendt
to explain why St. Paul should in this case have
betaken himself to such a term ; but we may also ask
from the other side why a writer, who in other
respects follows, as we have seen, so closely Old
Testament precedent, should be held in this instance
to have gratuitously departed from it or set it aside ?
Why should he have thrown off its distinctive char
acter ? Why should he have taken the word without
adopting the idea associated with it ? In a word,
we are reduced to a choice of the alternatives : either,
that he did not get the term in this use from the
Old Testament at all, which nobody will maintain,
seeing that its presence there is beyond all doubt,
and its absence in a psychological sense from profane

196 RELATION TO GOD.
( Jreek writers is equally indubitable ; or that he did
get it from the Old Testament, in which case the
presumption is that his use of it would be analogous,
and the burden of showing that it no longer carries
any estimate of religious value must rest on those
who assert the negative. It is certain that in this
case as well as in others the term came to him from
the Old Testament ; and the only ground on which
we can conceive him to have preferred it to ^vxfj is
just that it carried with it something of that aspect
of relation to God which it had been wont to convey.
We may not have the means of precisely determin
ing what was the special idea present to the Apostle's
mind on each occasion when he so chose it as thus
expressive^— whether that of origin from God, or of
affinity with Him, or of destination for him, or of
return to Him ; but that the term designates the
soul on- its God-related side, and connotes it as so
related, can hardly be questioned by any one who
bears in mind whence the designation came and with
what sanctions the Apostle received it.
There is no need, in order to bring out this mean
ing, either that we should identify the human irvev/xa
with the physiological life-breath, or that we should
mix it up with the action of the divine irvev/xa, as
Bishop Ellicott appears to do in his strangely-ex
pressed note on Phil. i. 2, already quoted ; 1 or that
1 See page 97, where the passage is quoted from the first

RELIGIOUS VALUE. 197
we should engraft on it dubious theories as to the
relation in which it stands to the pneumatic influence
superinduced on it in the Christian. It is enough
to recognise the fact that, when St. Paul has occa
sion to speak of the inner side of man's nature as
the correlate of body, as the sphere of the rehgious
life, or as the recipient of grace, he prefers to desig
nate it by a name that indicated something of its
religious value, that told how it had come forth from
God, and thereby suggested it as the sphere of a
divine renewal, the vehicle of a higher life, the abid
ing temple of the Holy Spirit. Here, too, as in other
matters, the Apostle faithfully keeps by the lines that
Jewish usage had laid down ; and we find the use
extended, enlarged, generalised, but not substantially
altered or transformed.
edition of his Commentary (1857). In the third edition
it runs, "in. the mention of the human irvev/jia.," instead of
'' in every mention."

198 THE "HEART.'

VIII.
COLLATERAL QUESTIONS.
Before leaving the subject of the human irvev/xa
and its correlation with ^v^p, it may be well to
glance at the Apostle's use of two other terms
of frequent occurrence that partake of a psychologi-
eal character, as denoting, in whole or in part, the
inner man — KapSla and vovs. A brief examination
of the facts regarding them will at once enable us to
complete our view of the several aspects in which
St. Paul conceived the mind and its action, and
show how far he moulded his language on, and how
far he advanced beyond, Old Testament precedent.
The word KapSla is employed by him fifty-two
times, in one or two instances as part of a quota
tion, but in most cases as his spontaneous choice ;
and it is, in point of fact, of more frequent occur
rence than either ^vjq'/ or irvev/xa (in the psycho
logical sense). Its position in the cycle of the
Apostle's thoughts is, relatively speaking, clear and
definite. It is never used, like ^vyf/, of the sub
ject to whom the individual life belongs, in such a

ITS COMPREHENSIVE IMPORT. 199
sense as to be interchanged with the personal pro
noun ; nor is it employed, like irvev/xa, to denote
the principle of that life as divinely given. It
signifies throughout the central seat and organ of the
personal life of man regarded in and by himself.
Hence it is almost constantly accompanied by the
genitive of the possessive pronouns /xov, aov, avrov,
f//xwv, v/xwv (e/xrjs in Rom. x. 1 : evSoKia Trjs e/xrjs
KapSias). The term is adopted and apphed after the
analogy of the Hebrew lebh, the meaning of which
is, as we have seen, more comprehensive than in our
modern use of " heart." The latter word indeed
serves perfectly to bring out the hidden, inner,
central nature of the seat of hfe ; but, as we use it,
it denotes predominantly, if not exclusively, the
emotional side of that life. It is for us the seat
and organ of feeling rather than of intelligence or of
counsel. When we speak of thoughts, ideas, or
purposes in reference to a local centre, we refer
them to the head or to the brain rather than to the
heart. If we use the latter term, therefore, as we
cannot but continue to do, as the rendering of lebh
or KapSla, we must carefully dissociate it from the
restricted import of its ordinary use, and treat it as
like the Homeric KpaSlrj, Krjp, or cppeves, the inner
organ to which all the functions of the mind are re
ferred — the seat of all mental action, feeling,

200 SEAT OF INTELLIGENCE
thinking, willing.1 There are a few passages, no
doubt, where it points mainly to the seat of the
feelings and emotions, such as 2 Cor. ii. 4 : " anguish
of heart " ; Rom. ix. 2 : " pain in my heart " ; Rom.
x. 1 : " my heart's desire " [literally good pleasure,
evSoKia] ; 2 Cor. vi. 11: " our heart is enlarged " ;
Phil. i. 7 : "I have you in my heart " [or " ye have
me in your heart "] ; but even in these cases tlie
special does not exclude the more general sense
that would be best expressed by our word " mind,"
if it had carried along with it anything of a local
reference. In the great majority of passages, it is absolutely
necessary to give to the term the wider mean
ing, which is obviously implied in the cardinal
counsel of Prov. iv. 23 : " Keep thy heart with all
diligence [literally : above all that is kept — prae
omni re custodienda], for out of it are the issues [or
sources] of life." It is not merely the receptacle of
impressions and the seat of emotion, but the labora-
1 This comprehensive sense of the term is well illustrated by
Cicero, Tusc. Disp. i. 9 : " Aliis cor ipsum animus videtur, ex
quo excordes, vecordes, concordesqae dicuntur, et Nasica ille
prudens, bis consul, Corculum ["corculum a corde dicebant
antiqui sollertem et acutum," Festus] et
Egregie cordatut homo, Catut Aelius Sextm " —
a verse of Ennius, which Cicero is fond of quoting. And the
same thought is pithily expressed by Lactantius (De Opif.
Dei, 10) : " Cor domicilium sapientiae."

AND OF VOLITION. 201
tory of thought and the fountainhead of purpose.
Sometimes it appears as pre-eminently the organ of
intelligence, as at Rom. i. 2 1 : " their foolish (davve-
tos) heart was darkened " ; 2 Cor. iii. 15: "a veil
lieth upon their heart " ; 2 Cor. iv. 6 : " God . . .
shined in our hearts " ', Eph. i. 1 8 : " having the
eyes of your heart enlightened " [rrjs KapSias instead
of Siavolas] ; sometimes as the seat of moral choice
and volition, 1 Cor. vii. 37 : eSpaios ev t# KapSla
. . . KeKpUev ev Tfl KapSla avTov ; 2 Cor. ix. 7 :
" according as he hath purposed in his heart " ;
Rom. ii. 5 : " impenitent heart." Actions spring
out of, and take their character from, the KapSla, as in
Rom. vi. 17: " ye obeyed from the heart " ; 1 Tim.
i. 5 : " love out of a pure heart " ; 2 Tim. ii. 22 ;
Eph. vi. 5 and Col. ih. 24 : " in singleness of heart."
It is in the heart that the work of the law is writ
ten (Rom. ii. 15) ; and it is on hearts of flesh and
not on tablets of stone that the Corinthian Church
is inscribed as an epistle of Christ (2 Cor. iii. 2, and
3, where the best text runs, ovk ev irXaPiv XiQlvais,
dXX' ev irXaPiv KapSiats aapKivais, " not in tablets of
stone, but in tablets that are hearts of flesh " ; but
Drs. Westcott and Hort suggest that as " the ap
position is harsh and strange, it is not unlikely
that the repetition of irXaPiv was a clerical error
suggested by the line above ").
The KapSla in this sense is accordingly set forth

202 RECIPIENT OF THE DIVINE PNEUMA.
with special frequency as the recipient of the divine
irvev/xa, as at Gal. iv. 6 : " God hath sent forth the
Spirit of his Son into your hearts " ; Rom. v. 5 :
" the love of God hath been shed abroad in our
hearts through the Holy Spirit which was given
unto us " ; 2 Cor. i. 22: " God who . . . gave us
the earnest of the Spirit in our hearts." It is the
sphere of the Spirit's various operations and influ
ences, so as to be thereby comforted (2 Thess. ii. 17,
Eph. vi. 22, Col. ii. 22), stablished (1 Thess. iii. 13,
2 Thess. ii. 17), directed (KaTevQvvai, 2 Thess.
iii. 5), guarded (Phil. iv. 7). It is the seat of
faith (Rom. x. 9 : "if thou shalt believe in thine
heart "), and the inward organ of spiritual praise
(Eph. v. 19: " singing and making melody [\|>-dAX-
ovTes] with your heart to the Lord " ; so too at Col.
iii. 17). At Eph. iii. 16, 17 the Apostle presents it
as the special object of his prayer for the Church
that God would grant " that ye may be strengthened
with power through his Spirit in [«? = with refer
ence to] the inward man, that Christ may dwell in
your hearts by faith." Here the KapSla is clearly
indicated by the parallelism of the clauses as equi
valent to the eaw dvOpwiros. " Its characteristic
mark is," as Wendt observes, "its being hidden, secret
(Rom. ii. 28, 29, where the TrepiTo/xr) KapSias ev
irvev/xaTi is contrasted with *) ev tcS cpavepw ev
aapKi irepiTo/xr), 1 Cor. xiv. 25:' the secrets of his

CHARACTERISTICS AND CONTRASTS. 203
heart are made manifest ').1 The knowledge of the
KapSla is a special attribute of God (Rom. viii. 27 ;
comp. 1 Thess. ii. 4) ; and the manifestation of its
secret counsels forms a main feature of the future
judgment (1 Cor. iv. 5 : 'the Lord will both bring
to light the hidden things of darkness, and make
manifest the counsels of the hearts '). In contrast
to the KapSla, therefore, we find not the body gene
rally, but sometimes the face {irpoawirov, 1 Thess.
ii. 17: 'in presence [face], not in heart ' ; 2 Cor.
v. 1 2 : ' that ye may have wherewith to answer
them that glory in appearance [ev irpoawirw= exter
nal aspect] and not in heart ') ;• sometimes the mouth
(Rom. x. 8 ff. : 'If thou shalt confess with thy
mouth . . . and shalt believe in thy heart '), be
cause these are the organs for the expression of
what is within." Here too it is evident that the
Apostle proceeds on the lines of traditional usage,
and employs the term " heart " in all the compass
of its Old Testament significance as embracing the
whole region of man's inner life, and especially the
domain of conscious thought and purpose.
But, while St. Paul stands thus far, in his use of
adpP^, irvev/xa, and KapSla, on Old Testament ground,
1 So, he adds, the Hebrew speaks poetically of " the heart "
of the sea, to designate the deepest recesses (Ex. xv. 8 ;
Ps. xlvi. 3 : " though the mountains be carried into the
midst [lit. heart] of the sea ").

204 THE NOUS.
it is not so with the remaining term which plays a
part, though a less prominent one, in his psychologi
cal vocabulary — the vovs. Here he has recourse to
a word not unknown indeed to the Septuagint, but
for a definite use of which it afforded but little pre
cedent ; and he turns it to peculiar and fruitful
account, as yielding for him a special significance
which those other terms were, in virtue of their very
generality and comprehensiveness, less fitted to con
vey. They designate, as we have seen, the inner
life regarded on different sides or aspects, but they
deal with it as a whole rather than single out any
faculty or function. The KapSla doubtless embraced
in a general way the functions of reflective intelli
gence, and moral judgment ; but, when the Apostle
desired to bring these into particular relief, he chose
a word more restricted in its original compass and
in its popular use, and stamped upon it an impress
of his own. The KapSla is the more general, tlie
vovs the more special term.
" We have no reason," as Wendt well puts
the case, " to separate in analysis the two con
ceptions, so that the KapSla might not as such
exercise also the functions which are elsewhere
ascribed to the vovs ; we may rather see in the vovs
simply the specialising of an individual faculty of the
KapSla — a faculty which might even be placed as
an independent factor alongside of it. Such a

ITS RELATION TO THE "HEART." 205
specialising naturally arises in the usus loquendi,
when psychological observation has gradually become
finer, and when the more general expressions of
popular speech no longer correspond to the author's
need for a more precise embodiment of his thoughts.
Then a special conception detaches itself from the
more general one, without its being necessary for the
latter to be curtailed in its general significance.
There was such a need in the case of St. Paul, and
this explains the fact that, while the use of the word
vovs itself is not in the New Testament absolutely
confined to him (for it occurs at Luke xxiv. 45,
Rev. xiii. 18, and xvii. 9), its frequent and pregnant
employment is distinctively characteristic of him.
The Apostle had learned from the psychological
experience and self-observation which he So strikingly
describes in the seventh chapter of the Epistle to the
Romans, that there exists in the human mind an
organ, the significance of which consists in the fact
that it can make itself independent of the general
mental bias of man, but the weakness of which lies
in the fact that on account of this very independence
it cannot exercise any effective influence over -that
mas. This faculty is the vovs, namely, the power of
discursive judgment."
The word occurs in the Septuagint some six
times as the rendering of lebh or lebhabh, " heart,"
and once as a rendering of ruach in the passage

206 DISTINCTIVE SENSE
Is. xl. 13, which is quoted or alluded to by St. Paul
at Rom. xi. 34 and 1 Cor. ii. 16 : tis yap e-yi/a)
vow Kvpiov. Here it is applied, after human
analogy, to the divine understanding or the thoughts
and counsels thence issuing ; and it is doubtless in
accordance with this general, rather than in Iris own
more specific, sense that St. Paul employs it in the
words which he personally subjoins to the passage of
Isaiah he had quoted (1 Cor. ii. 16): r//xeis Se vovv
XpiaTov ey^o/xev. The key to its distinctive Pauline
use is found in the express contrast in which the
Apostle presents it at 1 Cor. xiv. There, in discus
sing the subject of spiritual gifts as exhibited in the
meetings of the Church, he indicates repeatedly his
preference for the irpocpr/Teveiv over the yXwaaais or
yXwaarj XaXeiv ; and he assigns as a reason for the
preference that, while the latter is intelligible only
to the speaker, and cannot without being interpre
ted conduce to the common edification, the former
is inteUigible to other members of the Church and
may edify, comfort, or console them. At verse 19
the Apostle declares that, notwithstanding his grate
ful consciousness of excelling all in the measure of
his glossolalic powers, he would " rather speak five
words with his understanding (t<3 vol' /xov), that he
might instruct others, than ten thousand words in a
tongue." And what he means by XaXeiv tw vo'i is
made clearer by the contrast which he had just

IN 1 CORINTHIANS XIV. 14. 207
drawn at verse 14 between to Trvev/xa /xov and
6 vovs /xov : " Wherefore let him that speaketh in a
tongue pray that he may interpret. For if I pray
in a tongue, to irvev/xa /xov irpoaevyeTai, 6 Se vovs
/xov aKapirds eaTi. What is it then ? I will pray
with the spirit, and I will pray with the under
standing also ; I will sing with the spirit, and I will
sing with the understanding also."
To find the distinctive sense here pertaining to
vovs, it does not seem very material to deter
mine the question what is the precise import of
the irvev/xa ; whether it is to be taken — with various
expositors following Chrysostom's interpretation
(" the spiritual gift given to me and moving the
tongue,") — of the Spirit of God as having laid hold of
the man and moving him to utterance, or of the human
spirit which becomes the recipient of the divine
influence. In accordance with what we have already
said as to the use of irvev/xa with the genitive of the
personal pronoun, the latter would appear the more
probable. In that case there is distinguished from
the spirit in man that is filled and moved by the
Spirit of God in the glossolalia, and that yields itself
immediately to the divine impulse, a power or faculty
called vovs, the active participation of which the
Apostle desires and commends. This is commonly
and rightly held to denote the faculty of reflective
intelligence, which apprehends, works upon, and re-

208 NOT SIMPLY CONSCIOUSNESS,
produces in its own forms the contents given to it,
and is thereby enabled to make others similarly
constituted partakers of its acquisitions. Liidemann
and Pfleiderer restrict its meaning unduly to the
formal sense of " consciousness," or " self-conscious
ness." The former says (p. 6:!): "Whatever may
be our view of the nature and mode of working of
the irvev/xa here mentioned, this much appears cer
tain, that the XaXwv yXwaay has not a clear
consciousness of what he says. In his case, as the
Apostle says, the vovs is aKapiros; by which St. Paul
merely indicates that the XaXwv yXwaau does not
give his words as the expression of a conviction
gained in the way of self-acting consciousness."
But what Dr. Ludemann is sure of has hardly
seemed to others equally certain. There is nothing
to intimate such an absence of consciousness on the
part of the speaker, which, on the contrary, seems
hardly consistent with the Apostle's distinct asser
tion in verse 4 : " He that speaketh in a tongue
edifieth himself," for " edification," — building up in
the Christian life — cannot well, in keeping with the
tenor of the Apostle's teaching elsewhere, be con
ceived as in progress apart from consciousness.
Wendt, moreover, has well pointed out that " the
two conceptions ' to speak without consciousness,'
and ' to speak intelligibly for others,' do not form an
exact antithesis. One may speak with the fullest

BUT DISCURSIVE JUDGMENT. 209
consciousness on his own part, and yet not be intel
ligible to others on account of a defective mode of
expression ; and, on the other hand, something that
is spoken unconsciously may quite well be intelligible
to others." And ih substantial agreement with the
view of Meyer, who renders : "my understanding fur
nishes nothing, contributes nothing to edify the
Church," and interprets the vovs of the discursive re
flecting faculty, he adds : " The peculiarity of the
glossolalia, which caused it to lack value for the
common worship of the Church, is rather to be
conceived as consisting in its being the expression of"
a merely intuitive conception, of an internal percep
tion in feeling {einer gefuhlsmdssigen Anschauung) ,
and not proceeding in the forms of discursive
thought. The speaker himself must have been well
aware of what took place, as it formed the object of
his feehng and his internal perception; but it could
not be understood by others so long as that intuition
was not interpreted by the speaker, or others, in
the forms of discursive thought (verses 26 ff). The
irpocpr/Teveiv, on the other hand, is the expression of
a conception already apprehended in itself by means
of the discursive faculty of judgment, and for that
reason needed no special interpretation for others.
And this view that the discussion turns not on the
distinction between unconscious and conscious speak
ing, but on the distinction between what is presented
o

210 FACULTY OF JUDGMENT.
in non-analysed intuition and what is apprehended
successively in individual concepts and judgments, is
confirmed by the example of the pipe and harp
(verse 7 ff.), in which St. Paul brings out that it
depends on the SiaaToXrj — that is, on the separation
of the individual sounds, in contradistinction to their
blending and crossing — whether a clear melody shall
be heard."
The special character of vovs as the faculty of
judgment appears at 1 Cor. i. 10 in its association
with yvw/xr/ as the opinion resulting from its exer
cise: ev tS avrw voi Kat ev tu ovt}i yvw/xr/, and at 2
Thess. ii. 2 : " that ye be not quickly shaken from
your mind {voos)," where the construction seems to
be pregnant and the vovs to denote the mental atti
tude of sober considerate judgment. So too at Rom.
xiv. 5, immediately after the statement that " one
man judgeth (Kplvei) one day above another, another
judgeth every day alike," it is added with reference
to the mind exercising this judgment: "let each man
be fully assured in his own mind" (ev tu ISlw voi).
As might naturally be expected, its field of exercise
with St. Paul is especiaUy ethical; its functions bear
pre-eminently on the moral side of life, on the judg
ment of action. In the seventh chapter of the Epistle
to the Romans, to which we shall presently recur,
the Apostle affirms at once its theoretical position,
and its practical incapacity to effect the change from

ITS FIELD SPECIALLY ETHICAL. 211
the servitude of sin to the service of the law of God.
And at Rom. xii. 2 he sets forth a renewal of the
vovs as the means of that transformation on the part
of his readers which he urges, and the necessary
prehminary to a correct judgment of right action :
" and be not fashioned according to this age, but be
ye transformed by the renewing of your mind (t#
avaKatvwaei tov voos v/xwv), that ye may prove
{SoKi/xd^eiv, i.e., in the exercise of moral judgment
ascertain) what is the good and acceptable and per
fect will of God." " The pecuhar activity of the vovs
in this reference," Wendt remarks, "is the SoKi/xd^etv,
that is, the exercise of judgment as to duty, as
to how, in the special position of one's calling the
individual conduct is to be brought into its due
place under {zu subsumiren ist) the general rule of
the moral law in relation to the kingdom of God.
The vovs, which does not correctly exercise this
judgment, so that action takes an unbefitting course,
is a vovs dSoKt/xos (Rom. i. 28), comp. 2 Tim. iii. 8 :
KaTecpOap/xevoi tov vovv, dSoKi/xot irepl ttjv irlaTiv, and
Tit. i. 15, where the vovs is associated with the con
science, and it is said of the unbelieving that " both
their mind and their conscience are defiled."
At Eph. iv. 1 7, the Gentiles are described as walk
ing in the vanity of their mind {/xaTatoTr/Ti tov voos
avrwv), the import of which is explained by the
addition " being darkened in their understanding "

212 "THE SPIRIT OF THE MIND."
(tu Siavola, where the preposition serves to bring
out the element of reflection — of subjection to
thorough handling in thought) ; and on the other
hand it is set forth as part of the " having learned
Clirist " that the readers " be renewed in the spirit of
their mind " — an expression without any precise
parallel, which it would seem most hi keeping with the
analogy of St. Paul's teaching elsewhere to understand
not directly of the divine agent of the renewal — for the
Spirit is not elsewhere spoken of as belonging to man
as subject — nor yet of a special inner sphere of the
human mind that is the seat of the renewal — for
there is no warrant elsewhere for the distinction thus
sought to be established — but simply as a dative of
reference, defining more precisely the nature and
character of the renewal as furnishing a new motive
power : " as regards the spirit — the principle of new
power and life — by which the vovs is thenceforth
possessed and governed." 1 The point, the essence^
of the change lies in the new divinely-given influ
ence under which the vovs thinks and acts, and
which empowers it to effective action.
This relation of the irvev/xa as efficient power in
the Christian, standing in contrast to the vovs as the
faculty of moral judgment theoretically active but
practically impotent in the natural man under the
1 See note as to the interpretation of this difficult passage in
the Appendix.

ROMANS VII. 14-25. 213
discipline of positive law, is most strikingly exhibited
in the two remarkable chapters of the Epistle to the
Romans, where the Apostle first presents us — in the
seventh chapter — with the typical picture of his own
experience as illustrating the state of men under
the light of the law but not yet enfranchised by
grace, and then passes on — in the eighth chapter — to
describe the contrasted experience of those who are
redeemed in Christ and are led by His Spirit. The
question, long and keenly debated, whether in vii.
14-25 the Apostle is to be held as speaking from
the standpoint of the regenerate or of the unregene
rate man, may now be regarded as determined by
the almost unanimous judgment of modern exposi
tors, based on adequate exegetical grounds. Hardly
any recent exegete of mark, except Philippi and
Delitzsch, lends countenance to the view — to which
Augustine was eventually led to resort in opposition to
Pelagianism, and which was supported by the chief
Reformers following in his wake, and by many sub
sequent theologians — that St. Paul is depicting the
experiences of the believer under grace in conflict
with sin. The great body of modern expositors who
have had occasion to deal with the question — in
cluding Neander, Julius Miiller, Nitzsch, Tholuck,
Hahn, van Hengel, Ewald, Schmid, Gess, Ernesti,
Messner, Baur, Mangold, Lechler, Meyer, Kahnis,
Weiss, Godet — have held — although with minor

214 STANDPOINT IN CHAPTER Vll.
shades of difference as respects the personal or
typical, real or ideal, character of the picture — that
it relates to the earlier not yet regenerate state.
It is not necessary for our present purpose that we
should enter hito the detailed exposition of the
passage, or even into the grounds on which the
question of its reference has been so generally
decided of late in a sense different from the view
of the Reformers.1 It is enough that we take note
of the striking contrast in the use of terms pre
sented by the seventh and eighth chapters. In the
former, from the point at which St. Paul enters on the
1 These will be found well put in brief compass by Immer,
Neutest. Theologie, p. 278 f., and stated with care by Meyer
(in his Commentary, Eng. translation, vol. II. p. 1-5, 16 ff. ;
Meyer- Weiss, Komm., p. 335 ff.), and by Godet (Commen-
taire, tome II, pp. 92-95, 115-118, and 142-146), who states
that he cannot put his own conclusion into better shape than
in the words of M. Bonnet (Comment, p. 85) : " The Apostle
does not speak here either of the natural man in his state of
ignorance and of voluntary sin, or of the child of God, born
anew, emancipated by grace, and animated by the Spirit of
Christ, but of the man, whose conscience, awakened by the
law, has entered with sincerity, with fear and trembling, but
still with his own proper powers, upon the desperate struggle of
opposition to sin (contra le mat)" simply adding that " in our
present (actuelles) circumstances the law which thus awakens
the conscience and calLs it to the struggle with sin, is the law
under the form of the Gospel and of the example of Jesus
Christ, taken apart from (isolement de) justification in Him
and sanctificatiou by Him." Dr. Laidlaw (Bible Doctrine of
Man, p. 201 ff.) has an interesting discussion of the subject, as
to which he holds that " that there are almost equal difficulties

CONTRAST IN USE OF TERMS. 215
new question raised at verse 7, there is no mention
of, or reference whatever to, the irvev/xa which is
distinctive of the Christian, and which as such
forms the theme whereon he delights to dwell from
the very outset of the eighth chapter, proclaim
ing in the second verse the great characteristic
privilege of his state "in Christ Jesus": "the law
of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus made me free" —
in joyful contradistinction to the previous cry of
despair, at vii. 24, "Who shall dehver me? " — "from
the law of sin and death." While in the Christian
subject, as depicted in chapter viii., the irvev/xa
in affirming the experience described to be that either of a
wholly unregenerate or of a fully regenerate man,'' and recog
nises " such mixed elements in both delineations [chapters vii.
and viii.] that no application of them to distinct stages in con
version and spiritual life is quite satisfactory." His own
solution is that the Apostle is presenting two ideal conceptions
of the relations to law and grace respectively of a man in
Christ aiming at the attainment of holiness. In the first,
given in chapter vii., he looks simply at himself and the law."
But, with every allowance for the " ideal " conception, and for
Dr. Laidlaw's distinction that the Apostle is not merely " de
scribing an experience, but is conducting an argument," his
suggestion of a man in Christ looking simply at himself and
the law seems liable to the. remark made by Godet on Dr.
Hodge's idea that the Apostle is speaking of a believer under
the point of view of his relation to the law apart from his
faith (abstraction faite de safoi) : "Mais un croyant, abstrac
tion faite de sa foi . . . . cela ressemble bien aun non-eroyant."
How can a man in Christ lay aside his faith 1 or why should
he be supposed to do so ?

216 THE NOUS IN ROMANS VII.
stands forth in triumphant antithesis to the o-dpp^,
in the special discussion of chapter vii. St. Paul em
ploys only terms pertaining to the natural faculties of
the human mind, and especially places in the fore
ground the vovs. It is impossible to doubt that the
distinction is made designedly ; and that those who
choose to overlook it, or to explain it away, thereby
deprive themselves of the main key to the under
standing of the Apostle's utterances. Well might
Dr. Baur comment on the amount of unnecessary
discussion which people might here have spared
themselves, if they had but attended to the distinc
tion between vovs and irvev/xa !
The vovs throughout this chapter is the faculty of
moral judgment, which perceives and approves what
is good, but has not the power of practically con
trolling the life in conformity to its theoretical
requirements; and the use of the term here is quite
in keeping with its employment by the Apostle
elsewhere. Wendt well disposes of an objection to
this view based on the ascription in Rom. vii. 15 ff.
of a " willing" (OeXeiv) to the vovs. " It would
seem indeed," he says, " from this passage as if the
work of the vovs went beyond this mere judging ;
for there can be no doubt that the OeXeiv, which at
this passage is set overagainst the KUTepyd^eaOat
or irpaaaetv, is an action of the vovs mentioned in
verse 23 ff, which in the state standing in need of

ASCRIPTION TO IT OF "WILLING." 217
redemption has already before Christian regeneration
turned itself away from sin. But here I am dis
posed to agree with the view of Holsten (p. 383)
that the OeXeiv in the vovs signifies merely the
intention, the direction of the mind towards willing
(nur die Absicht, den auf das Wollen gerichteten Sinn),
that the vovs denotes the practical conduct only in
so far as * every willing is preceded by a knowing,
by the conception of willing.' The verb OeXeiv in
all Pauline passages signifies not the willing of
resolve, but the willing of wish (Rom. i. 13 ; ix. 16,
18 ; xi. 25 ; 1 Cor. iv. 19 ; x. 1 ; xii. 1 ; 2 Cor. i.
8; v. 4; xh. 20; Col. ii. 18; 1 Thess. iv. 13;
1 Tim. ii. 4). A question could only arise as to
the few passages, where with the OeXeiv, just as in
Rom. vii, there is contrasted a KaTepydXeaOat,
evepyeiv, or iroietv (1 Cor. vii. 36 ; 2 Cor. viii. 10 f. ;
Gal. v. 17; Phil. ii. 13). But in these cases we
have to seek for the willing of resolve throughout
on the side of the evepyeiv or KaTepyaXeaQat, while
OeXeiv merely signifies the "thinking it good" {fur gut
Ealten), to which the resolve, and thereupon the
action, may correspond or run counter. In inter
preting these passages we allow ourselves to be too
easily influenced by the familiar translation of
Luther 'Wollen und Vollbringen' [willing and
accomplishing] ; but the words KaTepydXeaOai and
evepyeiv signify not properly to 'accomplish,' but

218 INOPERATIVE "WILLING."
rather to ' operate ' (bcwirkcn), or ' be operating ,
{KaTepydXeaOai : Rom. i. 27 ; ii. 9 ; iv. 15 ; v. 3 ;
vii. 8, 13 ; xv. 15 ; 1 Cor. v. 3 ; 2 Cor. iv. 17 ; v.
5 ; vii. 10 f.; ix. 11 ; xii. 12 ; — evepyeiv: Rom. vii.
5 ; 1 Cor. xii. 6, 11 ; 2 Cor. i. 6 ; iv. 12 ; Gal. ii.
8 ; hi. 5 ; v. 6). That in our section of Rom. vii.
OeXeiv has merely the sense of the intellectual think
ing it good (des crkenntnissmassigen fur gut LTaltens),
is confirmed on the one hand by the expressions
av/xcpr//xi and avvrjSo/xai (verses 16 and 22), which
are interchanged with OeXeiv, as it is, on the other,
required by the whole context. The state of the
man in need of redemption, before regeneration takes
place, is distinguished morally from the state of the
regenerate, not in such a manner, that in both alike
there is present the willing of the good, and only in
the latter is there wanting the execution of what is
willed ; but rather conversely in such a manner, that
in the former the positive direction of the will
towards the good is, in spite even of better know
ing and wishing, not attained, while in the latter
the transforming of the whole direction of the will is
accomplished, but withal the execution of the good
may possibly be still very defective. For in this
case sin is in principle overcome and done away by
the Spirit of God, although in individual cases the
new direction cannot always effectually assert itself,
because the former still makes its influence felt;

MEANING OF ROMANS VIII. 10. 219
but for such an overcoming in principle of sin, the
vovs with its OeXeiv, that is, with all its good pur
poses and wishes, is not of itself able." The same
conclusion practically is reached by Godet (on verse
15): "This will which puts itself on the side of the
law is only a desire, a velleity, a simple I should
wish, which miscarries in practice" ; and again (on
verse 18) : "the verb designates a simple desire, an
intention, rather than a fixed and dehberate decision
{decision arrestee et reflechie)" as well as by Weiss,
who says on verse 15 i1 "In the regenerate the
Spirit works the OeXeiv and the evepyeiv (Phil. ii. 1 3),
as Meyer justly brings into prominence in opposition
to Phihppi, but here the discussion turns, if not on
the mere velleitas of the Schoolmen (Tholuck), at any
rate on a willing that remains constantly inoperative,
that continues accordingly mere theory and never
determines practice."
At ROm. viii. 10 we meet with a remarkable
passage, which is admitted to be one of the most
difficult of interpretation in connection with the
Pauline use of irvei/xa, and as to which we cannot
but think that the exegetical instinct of Chrysostom,
Calvin, and Grotius reached a more probable con
clusion than that which has commended itself to
the majority of more recent expositors. There is a
xIn the sixth edition (1881), revised by him, of "Meyer's
Commentary," ad loc.

220 VIEW OF MEYER AND GODET.
general agreement among expositors - that in the
earlier portion of chapter viii, from verse 2 onwards,
the irvev/xa spoken of is the divine Spirit, the source
or the principle of the new life in the Christian
(although M.Oltramare forms an exception, who thinks
that he elucidates St. Paul's meaning by practically
identifying vd/xos tov Oeov, vd/xos tov voos and vd/xos
tov irvev/xaTos, and expresses his surprise that so few
should agree with him in regarding irvev/xa as the
superior spiritual part of man raised above the
senses), while in the verses succeeding the tenth
(13, 14, 15, 16) the import of irvev/xa is usually
accounted the same. But in verse 10 the contrast
to aw/xa tends at first sight to suggest the taking of
irvev/xa in the corresponding sense of "the human
spirit " : " el Se X/hctto? ev v/xiv, to /xev aw/xa veKpov
ci d/xapTlav, to Se irvev/xa Zwr) Std SiKaioavvr/v. Meyer,
for instance, says : "to irvev/xa, namely in contrast to
the aw/xa, is necessarily not the transcendent (Hol
sten) or the Holy Spirit (Chrysostom and others) ;
nor yet, as Hofmann turns the conception, the
spirit which we now have when Christ is in us and
His righteousness is ours; but simply our human
spirit, i.e., the substratum of the personal self-
consciousness. That the spirit of those who are here
spoken of is filled with the Holy Spirit, is in itself a
correct inference from the presupposition el XptaTos
iv v/xiv, but is not imphed in the word to irvev/xa, as

OBJECTIONS TO THE VIEW OF WEISS. 221
if this meant (Theodoret and De Wette) the human
spirit pervaded by the divine Spirit, the pneumatic
essence of the regenerate man." And Godet takes
it of "the spiritual element in the believer, the
characteristic organ in man for the perception and
appropriation of the divine, by which the Spirit of
God can penetrate into the soul and by it rule the
body." But it cannot mean the human spirit per se,
or "the natural spirit of man," as Schmidt would
take it, because, as Weiss remarks, the passage
speaks only of those in whom Christ is. And the
latter scholar has preferred 1 to understand irvev/xa
as " the new spirit-life produced hi us by the divine
irvev/xa (or the Christ in us) and pervaded by it, con
sequently the pneumatic essence (Wesenheit) of the
regenerate." This exegesis of Weiss is clearly more in keep
ing with the context and with the general tenor
of the Apostle's teaching; but it is to be observed
(1) that, while it professes to rest on the paraUehsm
with aw/xa, it really departs from it, for, while to
aw/xa represents literally the one side of human
nature proper, to irvev/xa is not the other side of
that nature taken in and by itself, but a new ele
ment superinduced on it ; (2) that, as thus put, it
seems almost a pleonasm to say: "the new spirit-life
LIn his Biblische Theologie d. N. T., p. 397, note, and in
his new edition of Meyer's Commentary in loc.

222 hofmann's interpretation.
is hfe"; and (3) that, as we formerly remarked in
regard to this special sense of Trvev/xa for which Weiss
contends, it seems an unnecessary and confusing
course to assume that Trvev/xa may mean not merely
the power or cause of the new hfe wrought in man,
but also the effect or result — the new life itself.
It appears to us, therefore, still better to adhere with
Hofmann to the sense suggested by all the other uses
of Trvev/xa in the preceding and following context —
from which it is cl priori improbable that St. Paul
should thus suddenly perplex his readers by deviat
ing — and to understand him as saying that in the
Christian the divine Spirit — the Spirit of God and
of Christ mentioned in viii. 9, and the indwelling
Spirit spoken of immediately after — is the source and
vehicle of life.
In fact the very deviation from strict paral
lelism of structure (which would have required
overagainst the veKpov of the one clause the simple
adjective Xwv, or, as in the reading of one or two
MSS., the verb 'Q) and the change to the wider,
higher, more absolute predicate Xwrj, seem clearly to
indicate that something more than such a mere
parallelism was intended, and to make the reader
at once fall back on the Trvev/xa, of which he had
already learned so much. Nor can we attach any
such importance as Weiss is disposed to concede to
the argument against Hofmann's view, based by

GROUNDS FOR PREFERRING IT. 223
Schmidt on the words Sta SiKatoavvr/v: "The Spirit of
God is always in itself life, so that in its case the
question wherefore or whereby it is so cannot at all
arise, and the words Sid SiKaioavvr/v would form
an addition as superfluous {miissigen) as singular
{seltsamen)."1 What is superfluous is rather this excep
tion taken to the words ; for the Apostle is specifying
not a reason why the Spirit is "life" in itself, but a
reason why, or a ground in connection with which,
the Spirit is life for the persons addressed, if they are
Christ's, or conversely if Christ is in them. He
had previously discussed the close connection of
death with sin, and of life with SiKaioavvr/, especially
in chapter v. ; and he had but a few verses before,
at the beginning of the chapter, brought significantly
side by side the exemption of believers from condemna
tion and their dehverance by the law of the Spirit
of life from the law of sin and death. And, if he
was not of opinion with Ludemann that his earlier
chapters as to the righteousness bestowed for Christ's
sake and received by faith were merely ad captandum
arguments not reflecting his own view, what was
more natural than that he should in this way
associate the quickening power of the gift of the
" Spirit with that other gift of righteousness which he
had already gratefully commemorated.2
1 Paulinische Christologie, p. 36.
2 Calvin in loc. says : "Porro ante admoniti sunt lectores, ne

224 INTERCHANGE OF EXPRESSIONS
The circumstance that in this passage St. Taul
uses the expression " if Christ be in you " when he
had just before spoken of the " Spirit of God," and
then of the " Spirit of Christ," has been held to
indicate that he treated these ideas as quite inter
changeable ; and this conclusion is assumed to be
confirmed by the apparently still more explicit state
ment at 2 Cor. ih. 17 : 6 Se Kvptos to irvev/xd eaTtv,
Holsten tells us that "to irvev/xa is in St. Paul's con
ception first the substantial essence ( Wescn) of the
Divine subject and of the transcendent Xpo-ToV, the
Kvptos tov irvev/xaTos, and then is sent by God and
from God into the hearts of believers" (p. 384).
And Pfleiderer states that at Rom. viii. 16, 26, " the
indwelling Spirit of God or Christ is not different
from the indwelhng Christ himself (verse 9, comp.
10)" — although there is nothing said in either of
these passages to identify the Spirit with Christ, and
the use of them for that purpose proceeds simply on
the assumption that the identification is already
proved by verses 9 and 10 — and he adds, a little
further on : "As a concrete hypostasis, the divine
per vocabulum Spiritus animam nostram intelligant, sed re-
generationis Spiritum ; quern Vitam appellat Paulus, non
modo quia vivit ac viget in nobis, sed quia vivificat nos suo
vigore, donee exstincta mortali came perfecte demum
renovet." It is not necessary that, along with Calvin's view of
Trvev/xa we should take his fanciful interpretation of aut/xa
as crassior massa.

AT ROMANS VIII. 9-11. 225
irvev/xa subsists (except in God himself) only in the
exalted Christ, for 6 Kvpios to rrvev/xd eaTiv (2 Cor.
hi. 17)."
Now we might reasonably maintain that, even
assuming our inability to give any satisfactory
explanation of the passages thus adduced, such
an author as St. Paul was hardly likely to use
language after so loose and indefinite a fashion as to
employ different terms for one and the same idea ;
that he must be conceived to have chosen on each
occasion the words fittest for the expression of his
thought : and that his more concise and obscure
utterances must be interpreted in the light of those
that are more numerous, full, and explicit, rather
than the converse. Even if one or two passages
should seem to indicate the identity in some sense
of the Trvev/xa with Christ, this cannot legitimately
neutralise the effect of the great mass of expres
sions, which clearly imply a distinction. But in
point of fact there is no sufficient reason for resting
so important a conclusion on the passages in ques
tion. At Rom. viii, 9-11, it is obvious that the
Apostle designedly varies his form of expression.
He speaks of " the Spirit of God " dwehing in his
readers, then of the "having the Spirit of Christ" as a
necessary mark of belonging to him, then of the
spiritual effect of " Christ " being in them, and lastly

226 REASON FOR THE VARIATION.
of the result, as regards the eventual quickening of
the mortal body, of the indwelling of " the Spirit of
him that raised up Jesus from the dead." Are we
to suppose that the Apostle varied his expressions
without any reason, or simply in order to pursue a
play on words ? If not, then we must seek a reason
for the transition, and it is not difficult to find it.
He frequently uses other language that betokens a close
union of believers with Christ — a presence of Christ
and of His life in them — in respect of which they are,
as it were, a part of Christ (as in Gal. ii. 20 : "I
live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me;" Col. i. 27)
and elsewhere he indicates that this presence of
Christ is in and through the Spirit. The Spirit is
His, is sent forth by Him, is the principle and organ
of His presence, and the effect of the Spirit's action
is to make Christ live in us. Wherever there is the
presence of the Spirit of Christ, there, according to
the Apostle's teaching, Christ himself may be said to
be. But in this case St. Paul substitutes the
" Clirist is in you " for " Christ's Spirit is in you,"
because he desired specially to mark—" to bring
more forcibly into relief," as Godet puts it (ressortir
plus energiquement la solidarity — the closeness of the
tie connecting His person and ours, and so to prepare
the way for verse 11, where the resurrection of
( 'hrist is presented as the pledge of ours.
As to the other passage, 2 Cor. iii. 17, we may

MEANING OF 2 CORINTHIANS III. 17. 227
remark, first, that hardly any verse of the New
Testament has been subjected to a greater variety of
interpretations, and yet it is chosen with as much
confidence as a foundation for important inferences
as though its meaning were entirely clear and ad
mitted on all hands. Baur, for instance, Holsten,
and Pfleiderer find here a simple affirmation that
Christ is an immaterial substance formed of light !
Some have explained the passage by suggesting that
irvev/xa is to be taken in quite a different sense from
what it usually bears, while others have sought to
change the meaning of Kvpios ; and there have been
many attempts to weaken or explain away its appar
ent tenor on the ordinary interpretation. Secondly,
assuming it to apply to the actual personal Christ as
Kvpios, and to mean, as Meyer explains it: "the Lord,
to whom the heart is converted, is not different from
the {Holy) Spirit, who is received, namely, in con
version, and is the divine life-power that makes free,"
we might be content to accept also Meyer's view of
its significance : " That this was meant, not of hypo-
statical identity, but according to the dynamical
economic point of view that the fellowship of Christ,
into which we enter through conversion, is the
fellowship of the Holy Spirit, was obvious of itself
to the beheving consciousness of the readers, and is
also put beyond doubt by the following to Trvev/xa
Kvpiov." But, thirdly, it seems to us that the explana-

22 S "THE LORD IS THE SPIRIT."
tion of the passage is to be sought from the more
immediate context, and that the key to it is given
in the language of Calvin in loc. : " Praesens sen-
tentia nihil ad Christi essentiam, sed ofncium
duntaxat exprimit. Cohaeret enim cum superioribus,
ubi habuimus Legis doctrinam esse literalem, nee
mortuam solum, sed etiam materiam mortis. E
converso nunc Christum vocat ejus spiritum, quo
significat, tunc demum vivam et vivificam fore, si a
( 'hristo inspiretur. Accedat aninia ad corpus, et fit
vivus homo." St. Paul had, at the 6th verse, de
scribed himself as a " minister of the new covenant,
not of the letter but of the spirit ; for the letter
killeth, but the spirit (to Trvev/xa) giveth life." He
bail contrasted the ministration of death in tbe law
with the ministration of righteousness ; and after
referring to the veil on the heart of the Israelites
when the law was read, had said that on turning to
the Lord the veil should be taken away. He
adds : " Now the Lord is tbe spirit "- — the spirit
previously mentioned (such is the force of the article)
— the spirit that vivifies the law and makes it
minister to freedom. This contextual explanation
has commended itself with minor differences of detail
to Erasmus, Olshausen, Neander, Ewald and Klopper.
We cannot see much force in the exception taken
to this interpretation by Meyer on the score of the
Apostle's subsequently and naturally reverting to the

CONJECTURE OF DR. HORT. 229
usual expression Trvev/xa Kvpiov ; while it derives
support rather than the reverse from the peculiar
expression at the close of verse 18 : KaOdirep dird
Kvpiov irvev/xaTos, whether we take it as meaning
"even as from the Lord the Spirit," or, as seems more
probable, " the Lord of the Spirit." But it would
unquestionably obtain greatly increased probability,
if we felt ourselves at hberty to accept the ingenious
and, as I venture to think, singularly felicitous con
jectural emendation of Dr. Hort, by which he at once
disposes of the irvev/xa Kvpiov here that forms Meyer's
difficulty, gets rid of the perplexity of construing the
Kvpiov irvev/xaTos in verse 18, and accounts for the
origin of the remarkable predicate to Kvpiov attached
to the Spirit in the Creed of Constantinople.1
We have thus seen that St. Paul employs the
term Trvev/xa on various occasions to denote the
human mind alongside of what we have recognised
1 The following is Dr. Hort's most interesting note on 2 Cor.
iii. 17 : "ov Se to wviv/xa Kvpiov, ZXevdepta.] These words
contain no obvious difficulty ; yet it may be suspected that
Kvpiov is a primitive error for Kvpiov (Y for N). First, the
former clause of the verse does not in sense lead naturally up
to this clause, whether the emphasis be laid on irvevpa. or on
Kvpiov (or Kvpiov). Secondly, iu dm-o Kvptov Trvevp.aTO's
at the end of verse 18 neither principal word can naturally be
taken as a substantive dependent on the other, nor both as
substantives in apposition. The simplest construction is to
take Kvpiov as an adjective ('a Spirit exercising lordship,' or,
by a paraphrase, ' a Spirit which is Lord ') ; and apparently

230 RELATION BETWEEN HUMAN AND DIVINE PNEUMA.
as his predominant use of the term to signify the
new spiritual power given to men in Christ. What,
it may be asked, is the relation between the two ?
To this question as it stands exegesis does not
furnish any direct reply; but it must not be sup
posed on that account to have no voice or function
as regards the attempts of speculation to provide an
answer. Its function is simply to present fairly
and fully the Scriptural data, to ask that the}- shall
aU be taken into account, and to urge that, in any
case, a clear line shall be drawn between the facts as
Scripturally vouched for, and the speculative efforts
to systematise or harmonise them.
When we find Usteri, e.g., "readily conceding that
St. Paul has not conceived to himself the notions of
vovs, rrlaTis, and irvev/xa in the logical definiteness "
which they gain in Usteri's hands, but holding it
" indisputable that the germ of the latter lies in the
the Scriptural source of the remarkable adjectival phrase to
Kvpiov in the (so-called) Constantinopolitan creed (to Trvev/xa
to ayiov to Kvpiov to £idottoi6v) can be only verse 18 construed
in this manner, the third iu the triad of epithets being likewise
virtually found in this chapter (verse 6) as well as elsewhere.
This adjectival use of Kvpiov in the genitive would, however,
be so liable to be misunderstood, or even overlooked altogether,
that St. Paul could hardly use it without some further indica
tion of his meaning. If he wrote ou Se to wvtv/xa Kvpiov,
IXfvdipta, not only do the two clauses of verse 17 fall into
natural sequence, but a clue is given which conducts at once
to the true sense of airo Kvpiov irvtv/jiaTos."

SPECULATIONS OF USTERI. 231
Pauline conception, which it is our task to place on
a deeper basis and to justify in logic ;" when
we learn that the distinction thus germinally present
to St. Paul takes "vovs as the principle of abstract
understanding thinking on a being objectively con
fronting it ; TriaTis as the principle of immediate
knowing, of experience, of feeling, where the object
ive being has become a subjective ; irvev/xa, the
cancelling of the distinction between understanding
and faith, and the gathering of them up {Zusammen-
fassung) into a higher concrete unity. . . . The third
and highest stage, embracing under it the two
others, is the consciousness of the spirit, which
knows itself existing out of, or rather in, God;" or
again, when we are told, as to the trilogy in 1 Thess. v.
23, that, while " aw/xa is the animal body with all
its functions, and -^vyf/ — the soul — is the animal
life-principle of the body, including the functions
of thinking, feeling, wilhng, which constitute the
individual human life {vovs, KapSla) " — a view of
TrWXP> DY the way, not coinciding in its terms with
any of those we have formerly touched on ! — " the
irvev/xa is the spirit issuing from God and uniting
man with the being ( Wesen) of God, a self-conscious
power {Kraft), in which the intellectual and the
moral principle are identical as in a higher, the
essential nature (Wesenheit) of God, which indivi
dualises itself in the Christian, but is in all alike ;"

232 OPINION OF REUSS.
we may be of ophiion that we have here the germ
of a philosophy rightly reading the mystery of the
relation between the divine and the human, or a
mere play of dialectics deftly ringing the changes on
words and ready to make or cancel distinctions at
pleasure, but a candid exegesis tells us that St.
Paul is not to be charged with either the merit
or demerit of such speculations ingeniously read
into bis words.
Again, when we find M. Reuss, after, as is usual
with him, a very clear and fair statement of the two
different ways in which the Spirit of Cod is presented
by St. Paul as related to the spirit of man in the,
" mystic communication " — as existing and acting in
us by the side of the human spirit, or as having
taken the place of our spirit, identifying itself with
it, or, as it were, absorbing it — proceeding to say
that the formulas expressing the latter view " are
more in keeping with the system as a whole (con-
formes a- Vensemble du systcme), more adequate to its
generative thought than those which are associated
with the other point of view," we must point out
that, whatever may be the value of the judgment
thus expressed, it does not rest on the ground of
exegesis, which establishes both sets of facts, and
requires that, on the principle of an author being
supposed to know his own mind and to be consistent
with himself, room must be found for both within

SOLUTION BY DR. PFLEIDERER. 233
the system as a whole, and the one be explained in
terms of the other.
Dr. Pfleiderer goes still farther. Speaking of
the two sorts of expressions used by St. Paul, he
describes the second as " admitting no distinction
between the divine and the human," and subsequently
as " not suggesting, relatively not admitting " such
a distinction ; and, after quoting some instances,
especially such expressions as Trvev/xa Trjs -wlaTews
(2 Cor. iv. 9), Trvev/xa irpaoTriTos (1 Cor. iv. 21),
ayairr/ tov irvev/xaTos (Rom. xv. 30), in which he
conceives it much more natural {es liegt viel niiher)
to take the Trvev/xa simply as the subject of these
virtues than (according to the usual view) to separate
it from the Christian subject as the cause of the
virtues in question, he adds, " In all these and
similar passages the distinction between objective
irvev/xa dyiov and subjective Christian spirit is not so
much exegetical precision {Funktlichkeit) as rather
scholastic abstraction, which certainly misses the
meaning of the Apostle (den Sinn des Apostel s
gewiss verfehlt). This meaning we shall have to see
rather in the view that the divine Trvev/xa and the
natural-human become united {sich einigen) in the
Christian into the unity of a new subject, of a koivos
or irvev/xaTiKos dvOpwiros (thus substantially ; comp.
1 Cor. vi. 17), but so, that this union is not one
absolutely complete {fertige) from the outset, but one

234 EXAMINATION OF
always in the mere course of being carried out, conse
quently still always one that subsists only partially ;
hence the two substances are still always in another
aspect of two kinds (zuxierlei), and are related to
one another as the active and giving to the passive
and receiving."
Now it is to be observed, first, that Dr. Pfleiderer
deals with several distinctions which are not precisely
equivalent. He had set himself to discuss the relation
"between the new Christian irvev/xa and the natural
irvev/xa of man," or, as he otherwise expresses it,
" between the divine and human irvev/xa " ; but at
the outset of this passage he introduces a third
distinction which is not coincident with either
of these, viz., that " between objective Trvev/xa
dyiov and subjective Christian spirit." Even
assuming the latter kind of distinction to be alien
to St. Paul's mode of conception, we still leave
the question to be answered — What is the relation
between the divine and the human elements,
both of which are unquestionably recognised — or
between the natural and the specifically Christian
irvev/xa in man ? Further, it may be remarked that,
while the distinction between the objective and sub
jective may be scholastic as regards the terms in
which we find it convenient to express it, it has only
arisen out of the facts given to exegesis by St. Paul,
and is simply the result of its dealing precisely with

DR. PFLEIDERER S SOLUTION. 235
these facts in accordance with its laws — a treatment,
which, so far from being reproached as " punctilious
ness," is but legitimately due to any author who is
presumed to have had a meaning to express, and to
have known how to express it. St. Paul unquestion
ably speaks of the irvev/xa now as a power acting on
man, now as an energy acting in him; and to ignore
that distinction, or to refuse to apply it, as undoubt
edly given in some passages, to the interpretation of
others where it may not be so explicitly set forth,
on the pretext of its being a scholastic abstraction,
is just to deny to exegesis the means of effectually
doing its work. But, thirdly, we have to observe
that Dr Pfieiderer's mode of getting out of the diffi
culty, and of discovering the meaning of St. Paul
without resorting to scholastic subtleties, is a mere
cutting and not an untying of the knot. He tells
us that the divine irvev/xa and the natural human
irvev/xa join themselves in the Christian to form the
unity of a new subject, of a Katvos or irvev/xaTiKos
dvOpwiros ; but it is obvious that, even granting this
to be a correct account of the matter, it does not at
all explain how this unity is brought about. There
are admittedly two factors at the outset : how do
they come to be blended into the unity of the new
subject ? Dr. Pfleiderer, who is skilful in resolving
unity into difference and difference into unity, should
hardly have been content with simply affirming the

236 AMBIGUITY OF EXPRESSION.
substantial synthesis. Fourthly, he has no sooner
propounded this "unity of a new subject" than he is
dissatisfied with it. It is not complete, but only in
course of growth ; it exists, and yet it is partially
non-existent; the two substances that form a junction
insist on being differentiated ; and the explanation,
thus admitted by its author to lie inadequate, savours
more of dialectic subtlety than of exegetical candour.
Lastly, we may be allowed to point out that a
slight ambiguity underlies Dr. Pfleiderer 's use of the
expression a new subject. Does it mean, as one
would naturally take it to mean, that a new Ego
lias taken the place of the former, and that the Ego,
which is able to call itself kuivos, has no conscious
ness of identity with that which is characterised as
iraXaids ? This, of course, cannot be; for there is a
continuous chain of consciousness identifying tlie
Christian Ego that is new with that which
existed anterior to the renewal ; and it is only in
virtue of this conscious identity that he is able to
distinguish tbe new state from the old. There
is therefore not a new subject in this, the strict and
legitimate, sense of the term ; and, whatever strong
expressions St. Paul may use to denote the entire-
ness of the change, he cannot have meant to
obliterate the continuous sense of personal identity
as between the new and the old. But, if so, the
natural human consciousness at any rate is carried

ANSWER OF EXEGESIS. 237
forward into the Christian subject; and the question
still remains where Dr. Pfleiderer found it : " How-
is the divine element, superinduced on the human,
related to the latter ? "
To that question St. Paul does not give any
direct answer ; but the principles of rational exe
gesis require that, in any attempt to deal with the
question, we should take all his statements into
account, that we should correlate the results of our
interpretation, and that, instead of assuming him to
have indulged in meaningless duplication, or unre
conciled antinomies, or mere vague mysticism, we
should accept his utterances according to the limit
ations which they necessarily impose on each other.
It is beyond doubt that St. Paul ascribes the new
life of the believer in its inception and in its
growth to the divine irvev/xa acting on and in man
as a motive power ; but it is also true that he
addresses to believers appeals and exhortations
which presuppose a subject distinguishable from,
and receptive of, that Trvev/xa, summoned to a walk
accordant with it, and privileged to bear witness
along with it. St. Paul recognises both a divine
and a human factor ; and in any attempt to system
atise his teaching, both must have a place without
the one excluding or yet absorbing the other.
It is no partof our present aim to pursuethis inquiry
from a theological or from a speculative point of

238 STATEMENT OF THE CORRELATION.
view, although, if we did so, it might not be difficult
to show that the Hebrew conception of power and
life is more fruitful of light and help in pursuing it
than the imported Greek concept of substance.
And we shall only, before leaving it, quote the
words of Immer, as giving, in brief compass, a fair
account of that remarkable correlation, on which so
much of the Apostle's teaching turns : — " The prin
ciple of the new life is the irvev/xa, which is at
decisive passages distinguished from the human
irvev/xa (1 Cor. ii. 11 ; Rom. viii. 16), and is con
ceived as an objective and supernatural principle.
The relation between the two is partly one of homo
geneity, since otherwise they would not both be
designated by the same expression, and since both —
in distinction from the vovs as the reflective under
standing (1 Cor. xiv. 14, 15, 19 ; Rom. viii. 2,
comp. vii. 23, 25) — denote the immediateness [Unmit-
telbarkeit, i.e., the absence of mediate agency] of spirit-
life ; partly one of difference, since according to St.
Paul the divine and the human irvev/xa are related
as upper and lower [Obcn und Untcu= literally,
above and below]. Yet it is a relation of corres
pondence ; otherwise the human irvev/xa could not
av/x/xapTvpeiv that we are God's children."
The distinction thus recognised by exegesis be
tween the divine and the human irvev/xa has natur
ally led translators to facihtate its apprehension by

MODE OF MARKING THE DISTINCTION. 239
employing an initial capital to mark the former,
wherever they conceive it to be clearly referred to,
and more especially where the Spirit appears to be
regarded as the objective Personal Source of the
new life. Whether the introduction of such a note
of distinction falls within a translator's province,
may be a question open to debate on hermeneutical
grounds ; but, if it is legitimate in any case, it must
be so in that of a disthiction which has been on all
hands — for Dr. Holsten's extreme view on the one
hand, and that of M. Oltramare on the other, do
not count for much in presence of such a consensus
of expositors — admitted, and the hnportance of
which is obvious on the face of it. That very
importance, however, makes it essential that, if it is
acted on, it should be regulated by some definite
principle — whether the line be drawn as between the
divine and the human, or as between the objective
Personal power and its subjective manifestation in
the Christian — and should be uniformly applied.
In this respect the Revisers of the Authorised Ver
sion do not seem to me to have had, or to have been
successful in always applying, a definite rule. It is
difficult to see, for instance, why at Gal. v. 17 we
find : " the flesh lusteth against the Spirit and the
Spirit against the flesh," while at Rom. viii. 6 we
find : " the mind of the flesh is death, but the
mind of the spirit is life and peace." If the eiri-

240 THE REVISED VERSION.
Ov/xla appears to require personification in the one
rase, the (ppdvrj/xa might fairly claim it in the
other. And, if it should be maintained that the
rendering of (Jal. v. 17 by " Spirit'' is required by the
immediately preceding " Walk by the Spirit " of
verse 16, that of Rom. viii. 2, "the law of the
Spirit of life in Christ Jesus " might fairly be taken
to govern the import of the irvev/xa in the immediate
sequel : " walk after the spirit " (verse 4). Indeed,
as regards the whole section — Rom. viii. 1-17 — 1
venture to think that the exegetical consistency of
the Authorised Version in this particular stands
out in advantageous contrast to the alternation of
the Revisers.
Still more is it to be regretted that, while thus
failing to give full effect to a distinction which
exegesis warrants, and the bringing out of which
obviously facilitates the apprehension of the Apos
tle's meaning, the Revisers should on the other
hand have continued to maintain a distinction of
rendering, for which exegesis certainly furnishes no
warrant, and which cannot but be for the English
reader perplexing, if not misleading. The primary
requisite of accurate translation — uniformity of
rendering — has been signally disregarded in the
case of irvev/xa, where not only has the antiquated
term " ghost" — which no longer carries for the
Enghsh reader the significance that still fully per-

TWOFOLD RENDERING  GHOST AND SPIRIT. 241
tains to its German form "Geist" — been retained by
the side of "spirit" to suggest to the reader a differ
ence which does not exist in the original ; but, even
in the case of the Third Person of the Trinity, the
identity apparent in the Greek has been obscured by
the use now of " Holy Ghost," and anon of " Holy
Spirit." ' The rectifying of such an anomaly as this
would seem one of the first and most obvious of the
duties to which the Revisers were called ; and if, as
is clear, they could not have substituted the word
" Ghost " for " Spirit " in the case of such expres
sions as " walking by or after the Spirit" (Gal. v.
16 ; Rom. viii. 4), " fellowship of the Spirit" (Phil.
ii. 1), "grieve not the Holy Spirit of God" (Eph.
iv. 30), to say nothing of the cases where the
reference is to the " sphit " of man, they had no
alternative but to adopt the converse course, and to
employ throughout the rendering — to which there
could be no rational objection either on exegetical or
other grounds — "the Holy Spirit." It seems strange
that they should not have made this change of their
own motion ; but more strange that they should have
declined to comply with it when suggested by their
American associates, who had the candour and the
courage to say : "For 'Holy Ghost ' adopt uniformly
the rendering 'Holy Spirit.""1 That a great oppor-
1 It is difficult to see on what principle the Revisers ab
stained from accepting most of the suggestions of the Ameri-
Q

242 AMERICAN REVISION
tunity of redressing an imperfection and of repro
ducing for the English reader the irvev/xa of the
original was thus missed, can only be accounted for
by supposing that the reverence for a liturgical
formula and its hallowed associations outweighed
can Company, especiaUy those applying to " classes of
passages." I ventured to comment on some of these cases in
a letter to the Editor of the Academy, July 9, 1881. Few who
have an opportunity of looking into the American Revised
"Version will fail to see in it a great improvement as com
pared with its English prototype ; and nothing can better
indicate the mistaken course pursued in the latter, than the
form in which the Americans in their Appendix record "the
readings and renderings preferred by the English Revisers."
I subjoin one or two instances : —
" For ' try,' or 'make trial of ('trial'), where enticement to
what is wrong is not meant, substitute 'tempt' ('tempta
tion ').
For ' demon ' (' demons ') representing the Greek words
Saiptav, Sai/iovtov, substitute 'devil' ('devils').
For 'know' in Acts iii. 17 ; vii. 40 ; Rom. xi. 2 ; Phil. i.
22, substitute ' wist.'
In many passages, too numerous to specify, substitute
' which ' for ' who ' or ' that ' when used of persons."
And, as to the question with which we are here concerned,
the following is their note : —
" For ' Holy Spirit ' (which occurs more than 90 times) adopt
the rendering ' Holy Ghost,' except in Matt. xii. 32 ; Mark
iii. 29 ; xii. 36 ; Luke ii. 25, 26 ; iv. 1 ; x. 21 ; xi. 13 ; xii.
10, 12 ; John i. 33 ; xiv. 26 ; Acts ii. 4 ; vi. 5 ; 1 Cor. xii.
3 ; Eph. i. 13 ; iv. 30 ; 1 Thes. iv. 8 ; Jude 20.
In Luke xi. 13 ; Eph. i. 13 ; iv. 30 ; 1 Thess. iv. 8, ' Holy
Spirit' is the rendering of the Authorised Version, as it is in
the Old Testament (Ps. li. 11 ; Is. lxiii. 10, 11)."

MORE CONSISTENT. 243
what was due to the truth and unity of the Scrip
tures whence that formula came, and to which it
traced its sacred significance. It is scarcely matter
for surprise that a Revision, which amidst its un
doubted excellence hi many respects fails to deal
with this and other matters of real importance,
while it introduces numerous minor changes of
dubious value, should not be accepted by scholars
as adequate or final.

244 THE FLESH

IX.
THE FLESH.
Let us turn to the other branch of our inquiry,
the significance of adp£. Applying here the
same method as before, and seizing iipon what on
the face of the Apostle's writhigs is the most salient
and characteristic use of the expression, we cannot
but perceive that, as his thought on the one side
centres in the dnine irvev/xa, it centres on the other
in that which forms the contrast to it— the sense of
adpP in which it is contradistinguished from, or
placed in opposition to, what is pneumatic. And
just as in that case the investigation of the Old Testa
ment use threw light on that of St. Paul which it
helped largely to mould, so we may here recall the
results of our inquiry as regards the use of basar,
and see how far the Old Testament conceptions are
reproduced in the categories of Pauline thought.
Let us begin with the simplest use — that of the
flesh proper, the soft muscidar covering of the bones.
We saw that the Septuagint rendered basar in this
sense by ra Kpea, where the reference was to the
parts of animals slain, and by al adpKes, where the

AS DENOTING " KINDRED." 245
reference was to the flesh clothing the living body.
In accordance with this usage St. Paul designates
the flesh of animals offered in sacrifice Kpea (Rom.
xiv. 21 ; 1 Cor. viii. 13) ; while he makes use of the
adjective adpKivos to denote that which is composed
of flesh, fleshy, as in 2 Cor. hi. 3, where the fleshy
tablets of the heart are opposed to stony tablets
in verbal accordance with two passages of Ezekiel
xi. 19 and xxxvi. 26 : ko.1 eKairdaw [dcpeXw]
Tr/v KapSlav Tt/v XiOlvr/v eK Trjs aapKos ovtwv
\j)/xwv\ Kal Swaw avTois \v/xiv\ KapSlav aapKivr/v. Here,
Wendt points out, the flesh of which the heart is to
consist is to be taken in the strictest sense, and not
in the more general sense of animated matter ; and
the connotation here associated with the term is not
only not a bad one, but, on the contrary, expressly
a good one. Whether 1 Cor. xv. 39:" There is one
flesh of men, another of beasts, another of birds, and
another of fishes " (according to the order in the
best critical text), is to be taken of the flesh proper,
or of the body as such, will fall to be discussed along
with the interpretation of that important passage.
Not less distinctly is the precedent of the Old
Testament followed in the use of crdpP^ to denote kin
dred or family relationship, at Rom. xi. 14 : "If
by any means I may provoke to jealousy them that
are my flesh, and may save some of them" {irapaXr/-
Xwaw /xov Tr)v adpKa), where crappy is obviously

246 FLESH PUT FOR THE BODY.
equivalent to the fuller virep tw^ dSeXcpwv /xov,
twv avyyevwv /xov KaTa adpKa in ix. 3 (comp. Gen.
xxxvii. 27). At Eph. v. 30 the words appended
to the statement " We are members of his body" e/c
Trjs aapKos avTov Kal e/c tow oaTewv avrov, which
convey the same sense of affinity, are of doubtful
genuineness. In the case of several other passages,
such as 1 Cor. x. 18: fiXeireTe tov 'lapar/X KaTa
adpKa, Gal. iv. 23. : /ccitu adpKa yeyevvr/Tat, Eph. ii.
1 1 : Ta e'Ovr/ ev aapKi and others, the same principle of
explanation may be applied ; but some of them at
least may be interpreted in the wider sense of the
term which we shall encounter in the sequel.1
The next chief use of basar is that in which the
flesh, as forming the most prominent characteristic
of the body, and lending to it its outward appearance,
is put for the whole body, in keeping with a well
known and oft-recurring synecdoche ; and here we
find that in the Septuagint sometimes the word aapP^
and sometimes the word aw/xa is used to render it, with
out its being always possible to tell on what ground
the one is chosen rather than the other. This usage
reappears in St. Paul ; and it seems doubtful
whether the two terms are not employed by him, in
some instances at least, as practically synonymous
1 In connection with this special use of adp£ Dr. Ezra Gould
has propounded an ingenious explanation, of which some
account will be found in the Appendix.

THE TERMS INTERCHANGEABLE. 247
and interchangeable. At 1 Cor. vi. 16, 17, the
proposition oti o KoXXw/xevos tu iropvr/ ev aw/xa
eaTiv is proved by appeal to the Scriptural passage :
eaovTat ol Svo els adpKa /xlav; and at Eph. v. 28-31
the positions of the Apostle seem to rest on the inter-
changeableness of the conceptions aS>/xa and aapp.
At 2 Cor. iv. 10 we find the expression 'iva /cat r]
Xwr/ tov lr/aov ev to) aw/xaTi r//xwv cpavepwOu ex
changed at the close of the following verse for "iva Kal
r) Xwr/ tov 'lr/aov CpavepwOu ^v TU Ovr/Tr aapKt t)fxwv.
At 1 Cor. v. 3, the Apostle presenting the contrast
between bodily absence and spiritual presence uses
dirwv T6t aw/xaTt, while at Col. ii. 5 he says : et yap
/cat tu aapKi direi/xt. In such cases as these it is
difficult to draw any clear line of distinction.
But, as we have formerly seen, the greatest im
portance is attached by Holsten and his successors
to the establishment of the position for which they
contend, and some of their chief conclusions are
dependent entirely on its validity. They maintain
that aw/xa, as used by St. Paul, represents the
conception oi form, and erdpP^ the conception of sub
stance ; aw/xa is the form of the bodily organism,
adpP^ is the matter of the earthly body. We for
merly gave a couple of illustrations of the shifts to
which Holsten has recourse in the effort to apply
throughout these categories of form and substance
— in the case of the contrast of aw/xa with aKta in

248 DISTINCTION NOT OF FORM AND SUBSTANCE.
Col. ii. 17, where he imports substance into the
form, and of Rom. viii. 13 : Trpdpeis tov aw/xaTos,
where he arbitrarily appends Trjs aapKos to make
the expression square with his view. M. Reuss has
not, apparently, been much impressed by the value
of the distinction so drawn, for at 1 Cor. xv. 39 he
renders ov irdaa adpP^ r) avTr) aapp^ by " tout organ-
isme n'est pas le meme organisme," adding: "Literally
the flesh; but it is evident that the Apostle does not
wish to speak of muscles alone."
It might be sufficient to adduce — as a proof that,
whatever the distinction may be, it is not at any
rate strictly that between form and substance — the
language of the Apostle at 1 Cor. ix. 27, where,
comparing himself to an athlete, he says : " so fight
[or box] I, as not beating the air," as aiming my
blows at empty space, aXX' inrwrnd'^w /xov to aw/xa,
Kal SovXaywyw, " but I buffet or bruise my body,
and bring it into bondage." Here it is evident that
the contrast to beating the air requires something
more substantial to be buffeted and enslaved than
mere form ; and, assuming Holsten's account of the
apostohc usage to be correct, we should rather ex
pect the material adpP^, with its bad connotation as
the seat of sin, to be the object of the buffeting.
" The idea of aw/xa " says Heinrici, a recent com
mentator on tins Epistle, " would be cancelled, if it
were to be conceived as pure form ; " and Holsten

HOLSTEN'S " SUBSTANTIAL FORM." 249
in his most recent book thus comments on the
passage: "At ix. 27, aw/xa denotes quite correctly
the body as the outward (material and substantial)
manifestation-form of the inner Ego — the outer man
which is combated .and kept in discipline by the
inner man. ... Of course the idea of aw/xa would
be cancelled, if it were to be conceived as pure form.
For this ' pure form ' is only an empty abstraction
of the understanding. The hving conception of aw/xa
is that of a substantial form. Nevertheless, even in
the physical domain, aw/xa always remains for the
consciousness of Paul the form of the substance, the
body of the flesh ; adpj~ the substance of the form,
the flesh of the body."1 Here again we encounter
the new category of " substantial form," which is
just a means of associating the conception of substance
with aw/xa whenever it is convenient so to interpret
it, or, in other words, a virtual abandonment of the
distinction as originally laid down.
And thus we might leave the question, having
shown that the words are used at times interchange
ably without obvious difference of meaning, and
that, whatever be the difference, it is not uniformly
that between matter and form as alleged by Holsten;
but we are enabled to go farther and not only to
maintain with considerable assurance that the dis-
1 Holsten, Das Evangelium des Paulus dargestellt, I., p. 427,
note.

250 wendt's view of the DISTINCTION.
tinction is not such as has been asserted, but to
indicate positively what it really is. For the ques
tion has been subjected to elaborate investigation at
the hands of Dr. Wendt, and his results are both
interesting in themselves and important in their
consequences. His discussion, of which we shall
present an abstract in the Appendix, necessarily
runs much into detail ; here we must content our
selves with indicating his chief conclusions.
After pointing out that the sense assumed for aw/xa
as used by St. Paul has no analogies in other Hellenic
usage, seeing that everywhere else aw/xa denotes the
organism, in which the conception of form is an
essential constituent element, but nowhere constitutes
the whole contents ; and that in the non-Pauline
books of the New Testament the word is throughout
employed in its usual sense as organised body with
constant inclusion of the bodily substance, he pro
ceeds to examine the argument based on the passage
in 1 Cor. xv. 35ff, which he recognises with Holsten,
Ludemann, and Pfleiderer, as of decisive importance
for this inquiry. He subjects to an acute criticism
the theory of Holsten, and of the other two writers
whom we have mentioned, that Paul's argument
here turns upon the conception of substance, and
shows that not only are some of the main links
purely imported, but also that in that case Paul
would not at all have touched the real difficulties of

GENERAL AND SPECIAL TERMS. 251
his opponents. He then proposes to apply to the
explanation of the passage the signification of adpP^,
for which we find warrant in the Old Testament,
Septuagint, and other New Testament writers, whereby
it is employed synecdochically to denote the whole
body, and that not merely in so far as it is material,
but in so far also as it is organised ; and he reaches
in this way a clear sense, whereby the desiderated
correspondence between the starting-point of the
opponents and the goal at which the Apostle arrives
is fully secured. He points out that adpP^ in this
synecdochic use is not quite equivalent to aw/xa.
Just -because it is put as part for the whole, it can
only denote a whole of which it is really part, that
is, it can only signify the organism of an earthly
living being consisting of flesh and bones, but cannot
denote either an earthly organism that is not living,
or a living organism that is non-earthly. The con
ception of aw/xa is not bound to any such limits ; it
denotes the organism of the plant; it denotes like
wise bodies celestial. He comes accordingly to the
result that at 1 Cor. xv. 3 5 ff. the two conceptions
aw/xa and adpP^ are related to each other, not as a
conception of form to a conception of substance, but
as a general to a special; aw/xa denotes the material
organism apart from any definite matter (but not, as
he points out in opposition to Ludemann, form apart
from any sort of matter) ; adpP^ denotes a quite

252 ILLUSTRATIONS.
definite material organism, namely, the earthly-ani
mal one; the two words are synonymous, when
aw/xa from the context is used of an earthly-animal
body." He finds the same use of o-dpP^ at various passages
of the minor Epistles. At Col. ii. 1, Paul speaks of
such as have not seen his irpdawTrov ev aapKi — his
bodily face; and at ii. 5 contrasts his bodily ab
sence — d-weivai ev aapKi — with his spiritual presence,
to which an illustrative parallel occurs in the con
trast between the irapovaia tov aw/xaTos pronounced
weak, and the eiriaToXal declared to be weighty and
strong at 2 Cor. x. 10. At Phil. i. 22 ff. Wendt
states that the Apostle uses Xfiv ev aapKi, e-wi/xeveiv
ev tu aapKi, when speaking specially of the earthly
body, from which he might wish to be set free on
his own account, but does not wish it for the sake of
the Church ; and remarks that the word aw/xa might
here have been misunderstood, seeing that the
Apostle contemplates the being clothed upon with a
new organism, and so does not wish to be altogether
free from aw/xa (2 Cor. v. 1 ff). But Wendt
apparently overlooks the fact that in the sequel of
that passage (verse 8) the Apostle uses the expression
aw/xa of that which was his present place of sojourn,
but which he preferred to leave — evSrt/xovvTes ev tb
aw/xaTt — eKSr/fxr/aai e/c tov aw/xaTos — SO that there
does not seem any practical difference between the

BODY IN THE METAPHORICAL SENSE. 253
em/xeveiv ev aapKt of the one passage and the evSrj/xeiv
ev tw aw/xaTt of the other.
Wendt points out, on the other hand, that aw/xa
can only be employed where the reference is to an
organism in the metaphorical sense, as in the many
passages where the Church is termed the " body " of
Christ, and Christians are described as its members
(Rom. xii. 4 ff; 1 Cor. x. 16 f.; xii. 12-27 ; Eph. i.
23 ; ii. 16 ; iv. 4, 12, 16 ; v. 25, 30 ; Col. i. 18,
24; ii. 19; ih. 15). It is also used with special
frequency, alternately with /xeXr/, when the body is
to be brought into prominence as the organ of
human feeling and willing. In this case there was
no occasion for employing adpP^, because the object
was to designate the body not definitely as earthly,
but generally as organic. Thus sin rules and
works in the aw/xa (Rom. vi. 12 ; vii. 5) ; and the
/xeXr/ are instruments or slaves of unrighteousness
(Rom. vi. 13-19). The thought of the body as organ
of the will is clearly expressed at 2 Cor. v. 10 :
" That each one may receive [literally : carry off
with him] the things attained through [or by means
of, where the Revisers have unaccountably retained
in] the body according to what he hath done."
The passage 2 Cor. iv. 10 ff. has a special interest
in so far as the aw/xa not only is interchanged with
adp£, but has the double significance of a receptive
as well as an active organ. "The body is a receptive

254 CHARACTER OF THE SARX.
organ for the sufferings which befal the Apostle and
bring about his resemblance to the death of Clirist ;
but it is also an active organ for the power of divine
life which exhibits itself in his official activity and
proves his resemblance to the life of Christ ; in the
former case therefore the Apostle is himself the object
of the effect which completes itself by means of the
body, in the latter the Apostle is the subject, and
the members of the Church are the object, of the
divine effect accomplished through the body as
organ." A similar double reference, with a like
apphcation, occurs at Phil. i. 20: "As always, so
now also Christ shall be magnified in my body,
whether by life or by death " ; and a kindred one
at Col. i. 24 ; "I fill up that which is lacking of
the afflictions of Christ in my flesh for his body's sake,
which is the Church," where the adpp^ is employed
definitely to distinguish the Apostle's earthly body
from the metaphorically used heavenly body of
Christ. When next we inquire what quahties are predi
cated of the earthly body thus designated, we find
that the crdpP^ is characterised as mortal (2 Cor. iv.
11) and as subject to disease and weakness (Gal. iv.
13 ; 2 Cor. xii. 7), as locally limited (Col. ii. 1, 5),
and as an object not of hatred, but of being nourished
and cherished by man (Eph. v. 29); but alongside
of the physical weakness thus clearly brought out

ETHICAL CONNECTION OF SOMA. 255
there is no mention of ethical weakness. The case
is somewhat different as respects the aw/xa : it, too,
is described as mortal (Rom. viii. 11), weak (2 Cor.
x. 10), capable of life (1 Cor. xiii. 3 ; 2 Cor. iv. 10) ;
but, in addition, at many significant passages it is
brought into immediate relation, on the one hand, to
the sin which is found in man and never utterly
leaves even the Christian, on the other hand, to
the sanctification which forms the aim of his
moral -rehgious life. The connection of aw/xa
(or /xeXr/) with sin appears at the following passages :
Rom. i. 24 ; vi. 6 ; vii. 5, 23 f. ; viii. 13 ; Col. ih. 5 ;
its connection with sanctification at the following:
Rom. xii. 1 ; 1 Cor. vi. 19 f. ; vii. 14 ; comp. 1 Thess.
iv. 4 ; v. 2 3 ; while there are yet a few other passages
at which the relation to sin is just as possible as the
relation to sanctification (Rom. vi. 12 f., 19 ; 1 Cor.
vi. 13, 15; 2 Cor. v. 10). The aw/xa has thus a
close connection with moral activity in general,
whether good or bad of its kind.
Here lies the chief motive leading the supporters
of a Hellenistic explanation of the Pauline idea of
the aapp^ to lay so much stress on distinguishing the
aw/xa, as a mere conception of form, most rigorously
from the adpP^. If adpP^, forsooth, signify the mate
rial substance of the earthly animal organism, and
this substance is in itself the objective ground of all
sin, it is clear that a sanctifying of this bodily sub-

256 THE BODY AS "FORM."
stance is utterly out of the question ; and so, when
St. Paul requires of believers the complete sanctifying
of the aw/xa, and the presentation of it as a well-
pleasing sacrifice to God, it follows that this aw/xa
cannot comprehend hi it the adp£, but must, on the
contrary, denote the— in itself morally indifferent —
bodily form. He quotes the words of Liidemann (p.
57): "Far more frequently is the aw/xa mentioned
by St. Paul, without any respect whatever to the
flesh of which it consists, simply as the teleologicaUy
determined form of the organism which as instru
ment is associated with the spirit of man in whatever
region of the universe it may find itself. The
Apostle often exhorts to the right use of this organism
and its employment only in the service of God. It
is this aw/xa of which it is said at 1 Cor. vi. 13 that
' it is for the Lord, and the Lord for the body,' be
cause this organism must always remain associated
with the spirit, seeing that man will continue to wear
it even after the resurrection. In this case, however,
all consideration of the substances, which form its
basis in this life or the other, must necessarily be
laid aside, for these are not identical but opposite."
Upon this Wendt observes, in the first place, that,
while in thought nothing is easier than to abstract
the form from the substance of the body, there ap
pears to be very much greater, and indeed utterly
insuperable, difficulty in the way of executing the

wendt's EXAMINATION OF THIS VIEW. 257
same abstraction in the case of moral action. " I
am not well able to see," he says, " how a man is to
set about making his mere bodily form, apart from
the matter of the body, the object of ethico-religious
sanctification; and his bodily form, indeed, in the quite
general signification in which it falls to be retained
even with a complete change of bodily substance.
No amount of theoretical reflection on the possibi
lity of effecting the separation in ideal thought really
contributes anything at all to the solution of this
ethico-practical problem. And we may not impute
it to St. Paul that in an often-repeated chief
point of his exhortation — placed in the Epistle to the
Romans at the very head of his moral injunctions —
he has expressed a thought logically indisputable,
but practically quite worthless and empty."
Turning to the view expressed by Pfleiderer (p. 49) :
" So far as the body is the organ of an Ego which has
the destination to be ruled not by the flesh but by the
spirit and, as Christian Ego, is also determined by
the Spirit (of God), in so far the body may and
ought to be instrument and temple of the Holy
Spirit," Wendt observes upon it : " To this it is to
be replied that the body, which forms the organ for
the Ego, is always just the substantial body, never a
mere body-form without substance ; and if it is a
fact that the Ego of man as Christian is ruled by the
Spirit, it yet by no means thence follows that the

258 pfleiderer's view examined.
substantial body as organ of the Ego can become in
strument of the Spirit, when this very substance is
by its nature sinful and opposed to the Spirit. On
the contrary, there would only remain admissible the
inference that, although the Ego may be already
sanctified during the earthly life, the organs withal
of this Ego must during the earthly hfe remain con
stantly unholy, and only become adequate organs of
the Ego in another world, where they obtain a new
substance no longer antagonistic to the Spirit. At
the utmost, Paul could only institute as a practical
demand this one thing, that men should render the
body in its sinful nature as far as possible inopera
tive, that they should not allow the sin objectively
grounded in them to become subjective, but this nega
tive exhortation he could never convert into a positive
demand for the sanctifying of the body ; because, for the
body, including the matter thereof, the demand would
be illogical ; and for the form of the body, apart
from the bodily matter, it would have been utterly
unpractical." Moreover, the assumption that aw/xa is only to
be apprehended as a conception of form has been
framed mainly for the purpose of facilitating the
exclusion of bodily matter as in itself sinful from
the required sanctification of the aw/xa, and has
been framed under the supposition that the concep
tion of adpj*, denoting the substance of the body,

2 CORINTHIANS VII. 1 DECISIVE. 259
could in no case be exchanged with that of aw/xa.
But this supposition is not confirmed by an examin
ation of the facts, and the whole assumption thereby
becomes aimless. It is not unimportant to note
that at 2 Cor. iv. 10-12, where the conceptions aw/xa
and crappy are interchanged, the thought that the life^
power of Christ revealing itself in the mortal body
of the Apostle may exercise its effect on the mem
bers of the Church, can only have the meaning that
the body of the Apostle — his adp£ — is an organ well
adapted for the power of the Spirit of Christ approv
ing itself in the apostohc calling. How could this
thought be expressed in this form, if the flesh in
itself sinful really stood in the most abrupt contrast
to the divine Trvev/xa ?
But far more decisive is the other passage, 2 Cor.
vii. 1 : " Having therefore these promises, let us
cleanse ourselves from all defilement (/xoXva/xov) of
flesh and spirit, perfecting holiness in the fear of
God." As the genitives aapKos and irvev/xaTos can
only be genitives of the object, we see that crappy is
viewed not as the seat and objective ground, but as
the object, of sinful defilement, and the resulting
tenor of the exhortation is that this pollution is in
the Christian to be discontinued and the crdp^ is
to become, just as is elsewhere required of the
aw/xa, an object of sanctification. The passage
would be quite incomprehensible, if adpp^ in

260 RELATION OF THE SOMA TO SIN
reahty denoted with Paul merely bodily matter
in itself sinful. Holsten accordingly rejects the
passage as not genuine, and Liidemann thinks
this very probable. But for its non-genuineness no
other reason can be adduced than that the words do
not suit the hypothesis of the adp£ as sinful bodily
matter — a ground which hi reahty brings suspicion
not so much on the passage to be explained, as on
the hypothesis which proves insufficient to explain it.
But, if the aw/xa, that is to be made the object
of sanctification, always denotes the whole body in
cluding the bodily matter, and this matter may
accordingly not be conceived as in itself sinful,
what is to be made of the passages in which aw/xa
is brought into closest relation to d/xapTia ? After
setting aside the assumption of Holsten and others
that in aU these passages the aw/xa is to be taken as
aw/xa Trjs aapKos, that is, to be explained as body
including bodily substance, which latter conditions
its sinfulness ; and after taking exception to the at
first sight plausible view of Ritschl that the passages,
where sin is referred to the body and the members,
relate to regenerate men, in whom sin has no longer
a central place, Wendt abides by his previous sug
gestion that the aw/xa, wherever it is brought by
St. Paul into relation to human action — that is, either
to sin or to sanctification — comes into view merely as
the outward organ for the execution of the good or

AS OUTWARD EXECUTIVE ORGAN. 261
bad resolve of the will. In some passages this
instrumental significance of aw/xa is expressly
brought out (Rom. vi. 13, 19: 2 Cor. v. 10); in
other passages the expression gets a more local turn,
so that the body and the members appear as the
place or seat at which the tendency of the will comes
to be displayed (Rom. vii. 5, 23 ; 1 Cor. vi. 20),
without change in the thought proper. A number
of other passages are certainly, as they stand, of so
indefinite and general a tenor that other explanations
might be possible (Rom. vi. 6 ; viii. 10, 13 ; 1 Cor.
vi. 13 ; Col. hi. 5) ; but to these passages we have
to apply the tried principle of hermeneutics, that the
more obscure expressions of an author are to be in
terpreted by the help of those that are more clear.
If, then, in the sixth chapter of the Epistle to the
Romans at different passages the thought is clearly
expressed that the body as a ministering organ is
ruled by sin (verse 12), that its members render
service to sin or to righteousness as implements
{verse 13) or as slaves (verse 19), nothing is cer
tainly more natural than in the sixth verse also to
understand the words to aw/xa tjjs d/xapTias in
such a way, that the genitive h/xapTlas is in the
strictest sense genitivus possessoris, that is, that sin
is conceived as the master, to whom the body as
slave belongs and is obedient to execute its will.
As the slave must perform his definite functions,

262 PROMINENCE GIVEN TO THE SOMA.
not because he in himself can perform no others, but
because on account of his actually subsistent rela
tionship of service he may perform no others, while
of himself he might belong as well to another master
and render other services ; so the earthly aw/xa be
longs not of itself to the d/xapTia, but may just as well
belong tw Kvplw (1 Cor. vi. 13), and doubtless it is
dc facto enslaved to sin, so long as a redemption
from this state has not set in by virtue of the
Divine Spirit (Rom. vii. 24)." And, by way of ac
counting for the prominence thus given to aw/xa,
and for the fact that St. Paul summons us not
directly to annihilate the sinful tendency of will,
but indirectly to render inoperative the organs of
that tendency, he points out the cardinal position of
dyiaa/xds as embracing and gathering up into a com
pact unity all the individual virtues, not leaving
untouched or throwing into the shade any single
side of human nature, but embracing all, and extend
ing its effect as to the spirit, so also to the body.
See 1 Cor. vii. 34 : " that she may be holy (ct^ta)
both in body and in spirit," and 1 Cor. vi. 20 :
" Glorify God therefore in your body." The words
which are here added in the Received text: "and in
your spirit, which are God's," are set aside by the
later critical editors as without adequate attestation,
and have probably owed their insertion to a mar
ginal gloss or glosses.

ALL FLESH  FLESH AND BLOOD. 263
We found, in the case of the Old Testament, that
the word basar had, in addition to its proper and
primary sense, and to its extended apphcation to the
whole body, a third and still wider range of use,
under which it denoted hving creatures on earth, and
man in particular, with the accessory idea of their
weakness and perishableness as standing in contrast
to God. Is there any trace of an analogous usage in
the case of St. Paul ?
Now we meet on several occasions the very phrase
which so often recurs in the Old Testament, iraaa
adp£. At two passages Paul adopts, or rather
adapts, words which were taken from the Old Testa
ment, Psalm cxlii. (cxliii.) 2 : OTt ov SiKaiwOr/aerai
evwiriov aov iras ^wv, inserting instead of this latter
the equivalent iraaa adp£ (Rom. ih. 20; Gal. ii. 16).
At a third passage (1 Cor. i. 29) he employs it on
his own part: oirws /xr) Kavyparrrai iraaa aapP^ evwiriov
tov Oeov. That in all these cases the phrase
means not merely all men as such, but aU men as
standing in contrast to God, is evident from the
express addition evwiriov tov Oeov. Akin to this is
the use of the similar but fuller expression — not so
occurring in the Old Testament but found in later
Jewish literature — crappy ko.1 aT/xa in Gal. i. 16: "I
conferred not with flesh and blood," where it carries
a hke connotation : "I did not consult or derive any
official authority from those who shared the common

264 man's creaturely nature.
character of weak and dependent humanity" ; at 1
Cor. xv. 50 : " flesh and blood cannot inherit the
kingdom of God," that is, men as creatures in their
own power merely, without having received the
power of a divine life in the Spirit ; and at Eph. vi.
12:" our wrestling is not against flesh and blood,"
that is, against weak men with whom conflict might
be waged on no unequal terms, as compared with
those powers that are termed irvev/xaTrnd, wielding
more than earthly resources, and so only to be over
come by the divine help.
This third usage, frequent and familiar in the Old
Testament, and as such weU known to the Apostle,
supphes a fitting key to the interpretation of the
numerous passages where St. Paul employs crappy in
a sense obviously wider than that of the mere body
or bodily matter. It will, we think, be found that,
wherever the Apostle speaks of " flesh " in this more
comprehensive use, he means either " man as a crea
ture in his natural state apart from Christ," or " the
creaturely side or aspect of man in Christ." Weiss
objects to the terms " creature " and " creaturely " as
not quite apphcable, inasmuch as they would include
the angels or higher spiritual bemgs that are not adpP^,
and his objection is, to some extent, well founded ;
but the expressions "man merely as such," or "the mere
natural man," are somewhat restrictive of the compre
hensiveness of the conception, which embraces hving

OBJECTION OF SCHMIDT. 265
beings on earth, and there is no convenient adjective
corresponding to them. On the whole, perhaps, the
word " creature " is that which is best fitted to indi
cate the essential element of contrast to the Creator,
as the "creaturely nature" is contradistinguished
from the new pneumatic life.
Exception has, however, been taken, especially by
Richard Schmidt, to the idea of the Apostle's having
here followed the Old Testament on the ground that
the expression " flesh " in the Old Testament denotes
"the concrete man," whereas with St. Paul it
denotes the abstract notion of "human nature"
or of " what is human " in a general sense,
which is, he contends, practically an abandonment
of the original meaning, because the general
conception of substance or matter, which the
word involves, is exchanged for the entirely hetero
geneous notion of " nature " or " kind." To this
Wendt replies by granting that "the transition with
out any intermediate link from the conception of
substance to that of human nature, would be impos
sible ; but we are not here called on to assume
such an immediate transition. For the transition is
made by starting, not from the original signification
of the word as denoting the muscular constituents of
the body, but from the synecdochic signification,
according to which, the part being put for the whole,
" flesh " denotes the whole man or, more correctly

266 wendt's reply to schmidt.
speaking, the creature. And such a transition is
not even difficult, to say nothing of impossible.
Such exchanges of concrete and abstract meaning are
frequent in all languages, especially in Hebrew."1
"The word cra^denotes in Hebraising usage the con
crete man, but not in so far as he is simply such, but in
so far as he belongs to the more general class of crea
turely beings, wdiose nature is at an infinite distance
from the divine nature. In this there is already
implied a clear abstraction, which, however, only comes
fuhy into prominence when the concrete human indi
vidual can no longer be placed as regards all that he
consists of under that more general class of creaturely
beings, because in addition to the creaturely nature
which had formerly constituted all that belonged to
him he has now received another — a divine — side of
his nature. So soon as this latter state has set in,
the word adpP^ must, just in order to retain its
original meaning unchanged, cease to denote the
concrete man, and can only henceforth signify in an
abstract way his creaturely nature. It is not the
contents of the conception crappy that is changed or
narrowed, but the contents of the concrete man that
is extended ; and for this reason the conception of
o-dp£, which has remained unchanged, can now no
1 "Nagelsbach gives a number of examples in his Hebraische
Grammatik, 2nd edition, 1862, § 59 ; comp. Gesenius, Heb
raische Grammatik, 21st edition, 1872, § 83, note."

" FLESH " INTERCHANGED WITH " MAN." 267
longer be applied simplieiter to that concrete. The
crapP^ now denotes the concrete individual, not because
he is only creature, but in so far as he is merely
creature." Let us note some of the more prominent
features of this Pauhne use of adpP^. And, first, let
us mark the fact of its correlation with dvOpwiros.
At 1 Cor. hi. 3, the Apostle asks : ov-%1 aapKiKoi
eare, Kai KaTa avOpwirov irepiiraTeiTe ; and at
the 4th verse, where the Received text has ovyj
aapKiKoi eaTe, the reading approved by the
chief critical editors presents as the paraUel ex
pression ovk dvQpwirol eaTe. At Rom. vi. 19 :
dvOpwirivov Aeyaj Sid Tr)v daOeveiav Trjs aapms v/xwv,
it is likewise evident that erdpP^ is used in a sense
interchangeable with dvOpwiros, if not coincident
with it. At any rate the readers might be charac
terised in terms of either. At 2 Cor. v. 17, the
Apostle announces, e"i tis ev X.ptaTw, Kaivr) KTiats' to
ap^aia irapr/XQev, after having just before declared
that now he no longer knew any one /caTa adpKa.
The adpP^ is therefore something apart from, and
anterior to, this Kaivr) KTiais — an earher and older
KTlaiS. At Rom. vi. 6 St. Paul speaks of 6 iraXatds r)/xwv
dvOpwiros as having been crucified, while at Eph. iv.
22 ff. he puts forward, as the distinctive mark of his
teaching and of his converts' learning, diroOeaOai v/xds

268 THE OLD MAN.
. . . tov iraXatdv dvOpwirov . . . Kal evSvaaaOat tov
Kaivdv dvOpwirov, just as at Col. hi. 9, as having
" put off the old man with his deeds {avv Tate
irpdPeatv uvtov) and having put on the new {tov
veov)." But at Gal. v. 24 the object of crucifixion
on the part of those that are Christ's is represented
as being the adp£ : " They that are Christ's have
crucified the flesh." The crdpP^ would seem there
fore to be interchangeable with " the old man." In
keeping with tliese indications that it denotes " man
such as he exists in experience," " pre-Christian,
non-renewed man," we find that it has ascribed to
it powers, activities, functions, that are more fitly
predicated of man as a whole than either of the
material substance of his body or of the body as
such. The adp£ has not only iraOrj/xaTa and
eiriOv/xlai (Gal. V. 24), but also OeXrj/xaTa (Eph. ii.
3 : rroiovvTes tu QeXr//xaTa Trjs aapKos), a cppdvrgxa
(Rom. viii. 6, 7), a vovs (Col. ii. 18, wo tov voos
Trjs aapKos), as well as a aw/xa (Col. ii. 11 ; ev tu
direKSvaei tov aw/xaTos Trjs aapKos, according to the
best critical text, omitting twv d/xapTiwv).
But, while such passages mark its correlation with,
or equivalence to, dvOpwiros, we get a further
and more exact measure of its import, when we look
at it under the foil of contrast to irvev/xa. Not only
do we meet with such sharp antithetic utterances as
Gal. hi. 3 : " Having begun in the Spirit, are ye

CONTRAST TO PNEUMA. 269
now perfected in the flesh ?" ; Gal. vi. 8 ; "He that
soweth unto his own flesh shall of the flesh reap
corruption ; but he that soweth unto the Spirit shall
of the Sphit reap eternal life;" but in two passages
more especially the Apostle carries out a lengthened
juxtaposition and contrast of the states or effects
produced under the ascendancy of the crappy or
irvev/xa respectively.
At Gal. v. 16 ff. we find the words: "Walk
by the Spirit, and ye shall not fulfil the lust
of the flesh. For the flesh lusteth against the
Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh ; for these
are contrary the one to the other ; that ye may not
do the things that ye would. But, if ye are led by
the Sphit, ye are not under the law." And then
follows the well-known contrast carried out in
detail between the works of the flesh and the fruit
of the Spirit (Gal. v. 19-25). And at Rom. viii. 4,
he describes Christians as those "who walk not after
the flesh, but after the Spirit," and proceeds to draw
out and illustrate the contrast. We quote the passage
from the Revised Version, but without accepting
the distinction, as compared with the Authorised
Version, which the Revisers have sought to mark
between " spirit " and " Spirit". " For they that
are after the flesh do mind the things of the flesh;
but they that are after the Spirit the things of the
Spirit. For the mind of the flesh is death ; but the

270 FLESH AND SPIRIT ANTAGONISTIC.
mind of the Spirit is life and peace ; because the
mind of the flesh is enmity against God ; for it is
not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can it
be ; and they that are in the flesh cannot please
God. But ye are not in the flesh, but in the
Spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God dwelleth in
you. But if any man hath not the Spirit of Christ,
he is none of his. And if Christ is in you, the
body is dead because of sin ; but the Spirit is hfe
because of righteousness. But if the Spirit of him
that raised up Jesus from the dead dwelleth in you,
' he that raised up Clirist Jesus from the dead shall
quicken also your mortal bodies through his Spirit
that dwelleth in you. So then, brethren, we are
debtors, not to the flesh, to hve after the flesh ; for,
if ye hve after the flesh, ye must die ; but, if by the
Spirit ye mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall
hve." From this passage we learn that the presence
of the irvev/xa is the distinctive mark of the Christ
ian, and that those who have this irvev/xa are no
longer in the flesh ; while the previous passage still
more exphcitly describes the adp£ and irvev/xa as
antagonistic in man. We are warranted therefore
in concluding that, as the irvev/xa constitutes the
new differential characteristic of the Christian, the
adp£ must be human nature without the irvev/xa —
the creaturely state of man prior to, or in contrast

CONCLUSION. 271
with, his reception of the divine element whereby
he is constituted a new creature. It is not confined
to the bodily, external, or animal nature of man, but
embraces his whole being as it exists and acts apart
from the influence of the irvev/xa.
Practically, when applied to the unregenerate, it
denotes, as Ritschl has rightly recognised, the whole
man ; while, in reference to those who have become
regenerate in Christ, it must be restricted not to the
body as Ritschl holds, but to the side or aspect of man
which is creaturely as contrasted with that which is
pneumatic. Just as we found that, in the case of
irvev/xa, the predominant element in St. Paul's
thought was the divine power issuing from God and
operative in the believer, so we find in the case of
adpP^ the predominant thought of man standing by
himself or left to himself overagainst God — in other
words, the natural man conceived as not having
yet received grace, or as not yet wholly under its
influence. As this meaning clearly appears wherever the
contrast is exphcitly set forth, it may reasonably be
assumed to be apphcable in other cases where the
term occurs without any indication from the con
text of its bearing a more restricted import.

272 OTHER THEORIES EXAMINED.

X.

EXAMINATION OF OTHER INTERPRE
TATIONS.
We have now passed under review the leading facts
of Pauline usage, and have arrived at the conclusion
that, while irvev/xa has its paramount place in the
teaching of St. Paul as the divine power which
originates and sustains the new hfe distinctive of the
Christian, adpp^ in its most characteristic use denotes
the creaturely nature of man, or the creaturely side
of his nature, in contrast to the new life which he so
receives. This conclusion, when apphed as a work
ing hypothesis, will, we venture to think, be found
adequate to embrace and to connect the facts, and
will thereby vindicate its title to be accepted as
solving the exegetical problem before us. It has
not been imported from without, but has been sug
gested by the examination and comparison of the
Apostle's own statements ; and, wliile its ultimate
justification must he in the success with which it
fits, binds together, and explains his utterances, it
cannot but carry an cl priori feasibleness on the face

THEORY OF BODILY SUBSTANCE. 273
of it, inasmuch as it is in strict keeping with the
Apostle's historical position and with the influences
by which he was moulded. His language in this
case rests throughout on the precedent of Old Testa
ment usage, and finds at once the warrant for its
being employed and the key to the course of its
development in the Scriptures of his own nation.
We find no occasion to go beyond the resources of
that rich treasury, and the common stock of current
speech as wielded by a masterhand with new
spiritual power, in order to put adequate meaning
into the Apostle's words; and we cannot, under such
circumstances, see the need, or the advantage, of
calling in the aid of psychological theories or meta
physical speculations to elucidate utterances that
proceed directly from, and address themselves mainly
to, a religious interest.
But the value of the conclusion to which we have
come — a conclusion coincident in substance, though
not in form of expression, with the line of interpre
tation followed by Augustine and by the leaders of
the Reformation — and the special significance of the
more precise expression here given to it wiU be the
more apparent, if we now, in the light of our exe
getical inquiry, briefly examine the warrant or
adequacy of the other leading interpretations on
which we touched at the outset.
I. Let us take, first, that which, as the more
s

274 holsten's view.
recent, has especially engaged our attention, and
induced us, indeed, to enter on this inquiry — the
explanation which regards adpPas the earthly sub
stance or bodily material side of man, and which
discovers in the Apostle's use of it an element akin
to certain positions of Hellenic philosophy regarding
matter as essentially evil. Of this view Holsten is,
beyond doubt, the ablest and most thorough repre
sentative ; and we cannot but admire the skill with
which he supports it, and the clear-cut precision of
his exegesis in applying it. No one has more subtlety
of insight or lucid force in expressing his thoughts,
as no one withal has less tolerance for what he deems
a lack of these gifts. But in this case he has not
succeeded in convincing even those most disposed to
sympathy with his views. Baur anti Schmidt, Liide
mann and Pfleiderer, decline to follow whither he
would lead them, and dissent from his more stringent
conclusions. We have already indicated some of
the grounds on which such a borrowing of ideas
from Greek philosophy as Holsten assumes is, from
the general point of view of St. Paul's relations and
statements, intrinsically improbable in the highest
degree ; and we have shown that, in the judgment
of the theologians whose names we have associated
with his, he has failed in point of fact to make good
his main positions. There is no warrant in St. Paul's
utterances for converting his contrast of the adpP^

OBJECTIONS TO IT. 275
and irvev/xa into the metaphysical contrast of finite
and infinite, or for identifying the adpP^ with matter
necessarily evil. Ludemann has shown that St. Paul
is not chargeable with dualism in Holsten's sense;
and Pfleiderer has affirmed that Holsten's view as to
the adp£ is " decidedly un-Pauline."
It is not surprising that a theory should have found
few supporters, which takes its one postulate from a
strictly monotheistic Judaism subordinating all
things to God, and its other from a system positing
xm eternal matter inherently antagonistic to the
divine wilh— a theory which assumes the Apostle to
have held these contrary opposites side by side, and
which, by its denial of a human Trvev/xa, its resolu
tion of the whole man into adpP^, and its making
Christ's work to consist in the destruction of this
adpP^, leaves no logical place for redemption. It not
only makes the Apostle half Jew and half Greek,
notwithstanding what he may have himself said to
the contrary, but it places these halves on a foot
ing of irreconcilable antagonism, and constitutes the
Christian, not by superinducing a new element of
power which is capable of transforming the old, but
by a process of destruction and of substitution which
amounts to the formation of another rather than to a
renewal of the same man.
It is obvious, however, that the very frankness with
which Holsten throughout acknowledges the Jewish

276 holsten's admission.
type of St. Paul's thought as regards the transcend
ent character of the irvev/xa may be claimed by us as
an emphatic witness to the truth of the position that
we have sought to establish, so far as the pneumatic
side is concerned. He has effectively shown, even
wliile carrying his principle to the unwarranted
extent of denying any other use, that the distinctive
sense of irvev/xa with St. Paul is that of a new divine
factor supervening on a prior non-pneumatic state of
man. But, while he thus freely owns the correct
ness of the exegetical instinct which has guided the
Church in the apprehension of the Apostle's teach
ing as to the irvev/xa, he thereby furnishes a very
strong presumption, to say the least, against the
relevancy or the feasibleness of his resort to another
and an ahen source for the explanation of its-
correlate — the adpP^. If the Apostle takes his stand,
as is admitted, on purely Jewish ground as regards
one side of his antithesis, how can it be reasonably
supposed that he should not occupy the same
ground as regards the other side, the meaning of
which could, under the circumstances, be only con
ceived by him, and could only be understood by his
readers, as sustaining a definite correlation to what
was thus recognised as fixed ? If Holsten rightly
sought and found the import of irvev/xa on Jewish
soil, why should he go elsewhere in quest of the
import to be attached to what is here opposed to it ?

PRESUMPTION BASED ON IT. 277
If the " sphit " is Jewish, surely the " flesh " must,
hi the necessity of the case, be Jewish also ! It
could hardly have occurred to anyone, other than a
German philosopher in search of novelty, to pro
pound or to defend a theory that thus hnks St. Paul
simultaneously to two different and incongruous
spheres of thought ; and it is no matter of wonder
that even the ingenuity of Dr. Holsten has striven
in vain to give unity or consistency to his associa
tion of the elements thus unequally yoked. Such a
semblance of success as he presents he has achieved
simply by reading hito the use of the terms by St.
Paul extensions or restrictions of their import which
there is nothing in his language to warrant, and
which the ordinary canons of exegesis supply no
means of justifying.
But, while the objections which we venture to take
apply most strongly to the positions of Holsten, they
are apphcable, in greater or less measure, to all the
explanations which turn on the dominant conception
of the adpP^ as the material bodily substance of man.
1. If this definition is to be taken in the ordinary
literal import of the words that are chosen to express
it, it is seen, upon even a cursory glance at the Pauhne
use of the term, to be manifestly inadequate to cover
the range of the conception. Dr. Grimm, in his
admirable Lexicon, must be regarded as a thoroughly
competent and impartial exponent of the facts ; and

27S DEFINITION INADEQUATE
we find him defining crdpP^, at such a passage as Rom.
viii. 3, as " humana natura, incluso etiam animo" and
remarking in regard to its explicit or tacit opposition
to irvev/xa (tov Oeov) that it denotes " natura mor
humana," so as to comprehend " quidquid est iu
animo inolle, huniile, deniissum, ad profana et prava
tendens." We have formerly referred to various
cases in which the crappy is associated with attri
butes and functions of mind, that can only be
predicated of it on the assumption that it embraces
far more than the mere body or bodily matter ; so
that, if we are to explain them in terms of Holsten's
definition, we can only do so by understanding that
definition in a non-natural sense, and giving to the
conception of bodily substance a range inclusive of
these mental activities. But such a course does
violence to the laws of language, and substitutes
confusion for clearness of thought. What can be
more confusing than to insist on retaining through
out the prhnary or fundamental signification of
" material bodily substance," and at the same time
to make that category so elastic as to embrace what
ever function of mind one chooses to bring under it ?
To say that St. Paul never departs from the radical
sense of " matter of the body," and to assert withal
that what he means by " bodily matter " is a good
deal less or a great deal more than most people who
are not materialists understand by it, is simply to

TO COVER ACTUAL CONTENTS. 279
play fast and loose with language. Surely it were
much more reasonable to derive our definition of the
word from observing St. Paul's own use of it, and to
render its import by some such expression as " crea
ture " answering to its real contents, than to force
all that variety of contents into the concept of "bodily
substance." In point of fact, much of the forced
exegesis to which Holsten and his (partial) followers
have recourse springs from their preferring to deduce
the Apostle's meaning from an assumed "fundamen
tal signification " {Grundbedcutung), rather than to
gather it from a sober induction of the facts. We
have seen that the Hebrew usage, to which St. Paul
attaches himself, stands directly related not to the
primary and literal, but to a synccdochic and trans
ferred sense, that it is, as it were, twice removed from
that primary one, and that it turns much less on the
idea of substance than on that oi form, appearance, or
aspect, as Grimni well puts it, " homo, qualis in con-
spectum cadit, qualem oculis se spectandum praebet."
2. As regards the suggestion that St. Paul has
conformed to, or borrowed from, the Greek concep
tion of matter viewed as evil, we remark that there
is no trace in St. Paul either of the terms or of the
ideas associated with that conception in Greek or
Jewish-Greek philosophy. St. Paul neither adopts
its language nor expresses its sentiments. In that
philosophy the well-known vox signata for " matter"

280 NO MENTION OF MATTER IN ITSELF,
was vXr/, x and the cognate adjective vXikos supphed
a definite designation for what consisted of, or belonged
to, matter ; and it might fairly be presumed that, if
St. Paul was conversant with that philosophy and
more or less imbued with its conceptions, he would
naturally have recourse to its language, or, if not,
would at times almost unconsciously reproduce it.
But he makes no use whatever of the word, 2 and
lrrhe currency of the word as a philosophical term subse
quent to the time of Plato, who did not use the word itself in
this sense but spoke of the thing, is well indicated by the
passage in Plutarch, De Defectu Oraculorum, 10, where it is
affirmed that Plato delivered philosophers from many diffi
culties by finding out for them this subject-basis for the
qualities of things : eS Xeyovtri Kal ol Xtyovres on HXdriov
to Tat? yevvw/ievai*; ttoiottjo-iv viroKeiptvov VTOi-^dov
e^evpwv, 6 vv v vXr/v Kal cf>vo-iv KaXovo-iv, TroXXZv a7rryAAa£c
Kai /xeyaAcov a-rropiZv Tori's <j>iXoo-6(bo\>s. It might have been
added that, if by this means he extricated them from some
perplexities, he involved them iu others.
2 It is not used at all in the New Testament, except in the
Epistle of James iii. 6 : ISov -t/XIkov [according to the best
text] Trip f/XiKT/v vXtjv dvamei, where it is to be taken as
denoting " wood " rather thau " matter" generally, as in the
Revised Version : "Behold how much wood is kindled by how
small a fire ! " It occurs thrice in the LXX., ou two occasions
(Job xxxviii. 40 ; Is. x. 17) in a similar literal sense, on the
third (Job. xix. 29 : tote yviuvovrai irov i(TTiv avriov r)
vXr/), under circumstances where it is very difficult to tell
what is the true text of the original or the meaning of the
Septuagint translation. On the other hand, the more general
idea of " matter" seems to underlie the peculiar use of the
adjective vXdSr/s in Job. xxix. 5, where the words : ore rj/x-nv
vXtiSr/s Xiav, literally, " when I was very full of matter,

OR AS EVIL. 281
— we may therefore infer — had no occasion to ex
press the thought, of which it had become the
recognised vehicle. He does, on the other
hand, employ the word yo'tKos, which has no
special currency as a term of philosophy, and which
he evidently borrowed from the y_oC? of the LXX. at
Gen. ii. 7.
But not only have we to call attention to the ab
sence of the word Hyle ; we have to note also the
yet more significant absence of any indication that
matter was regarded as evil or as in itself polluting.
There is nothing in the Apostle's writings analogous
to the irecpvp/xevrj vXri of Philo, which God in crea
tion " might not Himself come into contact with, but
employed incorporeal powers, whose true name is
ideas, to put into fitting shape " ; nor is there any
thing akin to the idea of the body as a burden
bearing heavily on the soul, such as we find in the
Book of Wisdom erroneously named from Solomon,
which bears various marks 1 of the influence of that
materiosus,'' are given as the rendering of the Hebrew, which
simply means : " when the Almighty was yet with me." And
the philosophical idea appears in the Book of Wisdom, xi. 18 :
Kriaaaa tov Koapov Z£ dpopcbov vXr/'s. See Grimm's interest
ing note on the passage in his E'xegetisches Handbuch zu den
Apohryphen. 1 As to the tone and tendency of this Book there can be
little doubt. See Grimm's Commentary on it, and Zeller
(Philosophie der Griechen, iii. 2, p. 230 ff., 2nd edition), who

282 DUALISM OF BOOK OF WISDOM.
Jewish-Alexandrian philosophy that subsequently
found its chief representative in Philo, and which
distinctly reflects the dualistic spirit of that philo
sophy at ix. 13:" The corruptible body oppresses
the soul, and the earthly tabernacle weighs down the
meditative mind " (cpOapTov ydp aw/xa fiapvvei
•drvW/v, Kal /3pl6ei to yewSes aKevos vovv iroXvcppov-
tiSu). The very circumstance that this striking
utterance occurs in a book admitted on all hands to
have been composed long before St. Paul's time
(variously placed between 150 and 50 B.C.), and
supposed by Ludemann and others on the score of
several assonances of expression to have been
has at the same time pointed out some of the extravagances
into which the search for early traces of this Jewish-Greek
philosophy has led Gfrorer and Dahue. The latter for in
stance, he tells u.-=, is disposed to regard the expression irapa-
Tm'ipaTos loiov in x. 1, as deuoting the descent of the soul
from a higher pre-existent state into the body, whereas the
first clause of the verse as to TrporoTrXao-Tov -irarkpa kov-
jxov clearly betokens that the reference is to the account in
Genesis of the fall, and the predicate iSiov denotes that the
fall was self-incurred (selbstverschuldete) in contrast to the di
vine agency. Zeller has, we may add, effectually disposed of
the slight and inadequate grounds on which Gfrorer and
Dahne, the latter more especially, have held the Septuagint
translators to exhibit traces of having been influenced in their
work by their philosophical leanings ; and he comes to the
conclusion that, " putting all things together, we have no
reason to assume in the case of the authors of the Septuagint
version more than a superficial and isolated contact with Greek
ideas" (Philos. d. Griechen, iii. 2, p. 215 ff.)

ST. PAUL'S VIEW OF THE BODY. 283
well-known to the Apostle, 1 serves to bring
into fuller relief the entirely independent standpoint
of the latter, who, so far from depreciating the body,
contemplates it throughout as the fitting organ of the
soul's activity, claims it for the Lord (1 Cor. vi. 14),
declares it the temple of the Holy Spirit (1 Cor. vi.
19, 20), calls for its presentation as a hving sacrifice
(Rom. xii. 1), and indicates the due function of its
/xeXr/ as that of instruments of righteousness unto
God (Rom. vi. 13, 19).
It is, however, most natural that the teaching of
St. Paul should be compared with that of the nearly
contemporary Philo, whose writings present the
fullest elaboration of the Jewish Alexandrian philo
sophy ; and no small efforts have accordingly been
made to adduce evidence of points of agreement. To
any one, indeed, who takes the trouble to compare
the masterly outline of the Philonian system given
by Dr. Zeller, with a similar outline of the doctrinal
system of St. Paul, as presented by M. Reuss, or by
Dr. Pfleiderer, it must soon be obvious that such an
1 We have already referred to the slight correspondence of
expression (eioTjA^ev ets tov Koarpov) on which Liidemann
bases his suggestion of St. Paul's having imitated the Book of
Wisdom in Bom. v. 12, but at the same time ignored the
reference to the agency of the devil (<^86vc) Sia/36Xov) there
found. If anything was needed to show the absurdity of this
line of argument, it would be found in the converse use made
of the reference to the devil by Gratz to prove that the pas
sage was a Christian addition. See Zeller, I.e., p. 231, note 2.

284 ST. PAUL AND PHILO.
enterprise is far from a hopeful one. Beyond the
fact that they start from the common basis of
Judaism, they have little hi common ; and the
collation will not proceed far, before the collator
will feel the significance of the caveat which Dr.
Carl Siegfried more than once appends to his notice
of traits of resemblance between the writings of
Philo and those of St. Paul : " Our purpose here is
to investigate the similarities, and not the differ
ences." 1 The differences are manifold and far
reaching ; the resemblances are merely such as may
be readily accounted for by the dealing with kindred
topics under the influence of a common background
of Old Testament tradition and faith. It appears
to us, indeed, that hi judgments of this nature
traces of resemblance between two writers are often
set down to unconscious imitation, or to borrowing
from a common source, while they may really be
due to the quite independent action of two minds
exercising the like faculties on kindred subjects.
The wonder is that parallels under such circum
stances should be met with so seldom rather than
that they should occur at all ; and the question
remains how far those that are verbal are also
real. As regards a general comparison — with which
1 In his elaborate work : "Philo von Alexandria als Ausleger
des Alten Testaments," p. 306, 308.

POINTS OF AGREEMENT AND DIFFERENCE. 285
we are not here concerned — it may suffice to refer to
the interesting essay of Dr. Jowett on " St. Paul
and Philo " subjoined to his exposition of the Epistle
to the Galatians, and to quote the words in which
Siegfried has fairly, as it seems to us, summed up
the main points of agreement and difference between
the doctrine of Philo and the Christian teaching.
" Common to both is the effort to bring about a
higher union of Jew and Gentile. Both have the
important idea of an intermediate being {Mittel-
wesen), connecting God and the world, God and
man. Both have the like view of the utter sinful
ness of the human race, and of the ethical problem
set before it, how to become pure from sin. But
by the side of these features of resemblance there
subsist deep and far-reaching distinctions. Philo's
idea of God is more Gentile-philosophic than
Bibhcal, while that of the New Testament exhibits
the traits of the living God of Israel. The Logos-
doctrine of Philo leans towards the Pantheistic
conception, while that of the New Testament abides
throughout on the soil of Theism. In respect to
ethics, the view which places evil exclusively in the
bodily nature is altogether alien to the New
Testament."1 It is with this last question that we have now to
do ; and in support of the opinion thus distinctly
1 Siegfried, Philo von Alexandria, p. 304.

286 PHILO'S TEACHING AS TO THE BODY.
expressed by the most recent and distinguished
student of Philo — as tu the utter absence from the
Xew Testament of that exclusive reference of sin to
the bodily or sensuous nature, which is characteristic
of Philo's teaching — it might be enough to contrast
the place and functions assigned to the aw/xa by St.
Paul, in such passages as those we have just referred
to, with the statements of Philo, that " the earthly
part enveloping each of us is the cause of the sorest
evils of the vovs,"1 that the mind, " so long as it is
contained in the city of the body and the mortal
life is contracted and kept down, and confined as it
were in a prison, openly < >wns it.self unable to inhale
a freer air,"2 that the body is "a corpse which the
soul drags along with it from birth to death,"3 that
it is " an urn, or a tomb, or whatever name it may
1 >e called 1 >y, in which one is buried," i and that " so
long as one lives in it, fellowship with God is not
possible."5 1 Quod deter, pot. insid. p. 210. The references are to the
pages of Mangey's edition. It seems strange that the zeal
expended of late years on Philonian studies should not have
addressed itself in any case to a new edition of the text.
- De ebrietate, p. 372. See also Leg. alleg., p. 95, and de
raigr. Abrah., p. 437, where the body is called to irappiapov
oW/zoiTiJ piov.
3De agricult., p. 304, d-^Oo'i tovovtov veKpocbopovcra. See
also De gigantibus, p. 264.
4De migr. Abrah. 438 f., Leg. alleg. p. 65.
5 Leg. alleg. p. 95.

ALLEGED DEFINITE PARALLEL. 287
But, as Liidemann has sought to support his
peculiar half-and-half theory — -as to St. Paul's having
engrafted a Greek dualistic conception of the adpP^
on the stock of his original Judaism — by the assertion
that the use of adp£ in Rom. vii. has its exact
parallel in Philo, and has thus brought forward a
definite allegation of resemblance, it may be well to
note the mode in which he reaches his conclusion.
His position is, that adpP^ is used in Rom. vii. in the
sense of the Hellenistic dualism of the intellectual
and the sensuous elements in man, and that the
double function there assigned to the adpP^ by
St. Paul — that of repressing and blunting the
powers of the vovs, and that of stifling and corrupting
its moral consciousness — has its counterpart in the
language of Philo. It is not at all necessary for us
to discuss how far Liidemann's interpretation of
Rom. vh. is itself correct ; were we to do so, we
might fairly take exception to some of the ideas,
such as that of objective d/xapTla, which he imputes
to the Apostle ; it is sufficient for our present pur
pose to point out that, even granting Liidemann's
own statements, the differences between St. Paul and
Philo are, on his own showing, far more marked
than the resemblances.
He tells us that " one cannot conceal from
himself that the course of thought, though tending
in the same direction, is by no means coincident "

288 LUDEMANS ADMISSIONS
(p. 104), that "St. Paul is not acquainted with the
idea of the human mind" on which Philo proceeds,
and that " accordingly the ethical process does not
pursue quite the same course as with Philo "
(p. 104), that "up to a certain degree an
analogy doubtless cannot be mistaken," but " a dis
tinction nevertheless separates the Apostle from the
theosoph" (p. 105). He holds that, wliile according to
the Platonic Hellenism of Philo it was not absolutely
impossible for man to attain true wisdom and accom
phsh the good in spite of the adpP^, if only he
should be willing to control and repress it, and to
give free play to his original affinity with God,1 the
extremity of despair in which the Apostle finds him
self in presence of the aw/xa tov OavaTov at Rom.
vii. 24 is due to his combining with the Jewish
view of the absolute weakness and inferiority of the
finite mind the Hellenistic conception of the cdp^
as a principle of spontaneous enmity to God. With
out pausing to inquire whether this is an altogether
correct account of the matter, we find him further
putting the distinction in this way : " that the
Platonist constructs a priori by means of his philo
sophic anthropology what the Apostle gets done
only in the history of redemption " — in other
words, that, wliile " Philo makes man from the outset
1 De mundi opificio, p. 35 : i) Se o-vyyevua tis ; 7ras dvOpor-
7ros KaTa i-iji/ Sidvotav ajKeiioTai delio Xoyia.

AS TO POINTS OF DISTINCTION. 289
have a share in the irvev/xa Oeiov, Paul reserves the
idea of the irvev/xa Oeiov entirely for the Christo
logy, thereby making it clear how thoroughly his
thoughts mould themselves on the central idea of
redemption." This is certainly a very considerable
and a very real difference ; and it would seem to
presuppose, as its necessary correlate, a difference in
the conception of the state of human nature, accord
ing as it may deliver itself or may stand in need of
a divine deliverance.
Ludemann, from his own point of view, goes on
to notice other distinctions. Philo asserts expressly
freedom of choice, which Paul in substance at Rom.
vii. excludes. Philo draws a distinction between
sinning knowingly and sinning in ignorance, and
holds the responsibility of the vovs only for the for
mer, while in a passage, which presents a superficial
resemblance to Rom. vii.,1 he describes man, in the
state when without knowing it he is wholly aban
doned to the corporeo-sinful, as pure; and only
when the divine word has come to the soul does man
become deserving of condemnation. With St. Paul,
on the other hand, the sense of guilt awakened by
the law extends backward over the time of purely
objective alienation from God. Por the Hellenist
sin acquires the rehgious character of guilt only by
the conscious and free self-surrender of the vovs to
1 In his treatise Quod Deus sit immutabilis, p. 292 f .
T

290 philo's use of the term OCCASIONAL
the evil quality of what is corporeal. The Jew, on
the other hand — and Paul shares this Jewish view
— is acquainted with a guilt in a religious sense
attaching to him (cine ihn religibs verhaftende Schuld),
which arises without participation of his knowing or
willing. But, if in all these respects, according to Liide
mann's own account, there is marked difference,
wherein consists the affinity ? It consists simply,
so far as we can see, in the fact that Philo occasion
ally makes use of the word crdpP^ to denote the
element that is fundamentaUy opposed to the wm
and the Sidvoia. But Ludemann frankly confesses
that Philo has no special predilection for the word.
On the contrary, he for the most part calls the ele
ment in question aw/xa, or ret irdOr/, r)Sova'i, eTrtOv/xiat
and r/Soval tov aw/xaTos ; and, so far as I can
judge from the context of the few passages to which
Ludemann refers, the word <rdp£ is not used in any
sense practically different from that in which else
where aw/xa occurs ; in one passage expressly quoted
by him the one is translated without ceremony into
the other.1 In point of fact, as Liidemann admits,
it is comparatively seldom that Philo makes use of
o-dpP^ of his own initiative ; he employs it, because it
has been suggested to him by the Old Testament
1 In the fanciful interpretation of Lev. xviii. 6 given in the
tract De gigant., p. 267.

AND INDEFINITE.  ZELLER'S SUGGESTION. 291
text on which he hangs the thread of his discourse,
and so strongly is he possessed by the ruling con
ception of a material evil principle that he reads it
into many passages of Scripture in which the ordi
nary reader would suspect nothing of the kind. In
the few instances where he has himself apparently
chosen the word, it may perhaps be employed after
a manner similar to that which governs its occasional
use by Greek philosophers, to which Zeller has
drawn attention,1 {as conveying the gross material
nature of the " body " somewhat more strongly
than the latter term in itself imphes. But there is
nothing here really akin to St. Paul's use, in which
1 In a paper in the Theologische Jahrbiicher for 1852, XL, p.
293 f., entitled " Illustration of some theological subjects from
the doctrine and usus loquendi of the later Greek philosophers.''
Even if we grant Zeller to have made good his statement
that the word aap^ occasionally in Greek philosophers bears
this sense of body with a gross, contemptuous connotation, it
would by no means follow that St. Paul's use of it could be
more probably or effectively elucidated from this source than
from the Old Testament. See, moreover, the remarks which
Cremer has inserted in the new edition of his Biblisch-Theo-
logisches Worterbuch der N.T. Gracitat (1883), p. 697, on the
mode in which Plutarch has, after the precedent of Epicurus,
occasionally used the word vdp£ — where, after stating the
marked differences underlying the superficial semblance of
affinity, he ends by saying : " We must abide by the observa
tion of Wyttenbach ad Plut. Mor., p. 126 C. : " Epicurea
consuetudo loquendi manavit ex colluvione vulgi ; ecclesi
asticus aapKos usus latissime ille patens ex Hebraeo fonte
fluxit."

292 PHILOSOPHIC ATMOSPHERE OF PHILO
Liidemann and the other writers of whom we have
spoken insist upon our noting the distinction main
tained between aw/xa and adp£. The truth is that,
while Philo seldom uses crdpP^ and, when he does so,
employs it interchangeably with aw/xa and attaches
to it similar predicates, St. Paul reverses the state
of the case, using crappy most frequently and using it,
according at least to Dr. Liidemann's account of his
practice, after a manner sufficiently distinct from his
employment of aw/xa.
And we have only to glance at the turn given to
the matter in the two chief passages quoted by
Ludemann to see at once how different is the
philosophic atmosphere in which Philo lives and
moves from the practical religious interest that
animates St. Paul. In the discussion de Gigantibus
based on Gen. vi. 1 ff. the expression " Sid to elvai
avTolis aapKas " gives occasion to Philo to write thus :
" But the greatest cause of ignorance {aveTriaTri-
/xoavvr/s) is the flesh, and relationship (oheiwats) with
the flesh." " Nothing is so much a hindrance to the
increase of wisdom as the nature (cpvats) of the
flesh. For it underhes all things that are built on
it, as it were, as a first and greatest foundation of
ignorance and incapacity (KaOdrrep tis Oe/xeXios
ayvoias Kal a/xaOlas TrpwTOS /cat /xiytaTOs). The
souls that are without flesh and without body (^xat
daapKot Kal daw/xaToi), passing the whole day in

COMPARED WITH ST. PAUL'S RELIGIOUS INTEREST. 293
the theatre of the universe (tov ituvtos), enjoy,
without any one causing hindrance, divine sights
and sounds (Oea/xaTwv /cat ciKova/xaTwv Oelwv), for
which they are filled with an insatiable desire. But
as many souls as bear the heavy burden of the
flesh (tov aapKwv cpopTov h-)(0ocpopovai), weighed
down and straitened, are unable to look up to the
celestial circuits {ireptdSovs), but, dragged down for
cibly by the neck hke quadrupeds, are rooted to
the ground." And in the treatise on the Unchange-
ableness of God (p. 293 f.) the passage in Gen.
vi. 12 as to aU flesh having corrupted its way on
the earth is made to mean : " All flesh has corrupted
the perfect way of the eternal and incorruptible, that
leadeth unto God. Know that this is wisdom ; for
by this path, straight and smooth, the mind being
conducted arrives at its destined goals (d-^pi twv
Tep/xaTwv), and the goals are the knowledge and
understanding of God. This path every one who is a
friend of the flesh (6 aapKwv eTaipos) hates and
endeavours to corrupt {cpOelpeiv), for no one thing is so
antagonistic to another as knowledge {eirtaTrj/xr/) to
pleasure of the flesh."
In these passages, which we have just quoted a httle
more fully than Dr. Ludemann has done, the main
stress is laid, as might be expected, on the value of
knowledge as opposed to the pleasures of sense; and
their whole tone and tenor stand contrasted with,

294 PHILO A FOIL TO ST. PAUL.
rather than akin to, those of the Seventh chapter of
the Epistle to the Romans, where the misery de
picted by the Apostle springs not so much from
want of knowledge or even to some extent of wish,
as from want of power, of effective controlling will,
of such energy capable of initiating and regulating
action as that of which chapter Eighth proclaims the
triumphant possession. There does not seem any
other relation between Philo and St. Paul except
that the dreamy speculation of the Alexandrian
theosoph serves as an admirable foil to the vivid
sense of reahty and of assurance, with which the
Apostle grasps the problem of the grave conflict
before men and announces the at length revealed
mystery of its successful solution, whereby — apart
from all vain philosophy, apart from all human
wisdom — he is enabled to say : " I can do all things
in Him that strengtheneth me," and at the same time
to add: "I count all things to be loss for the excellency
of the knowledge of Christ Jesus my Lord."
II. Having thus shown the inadequacy of the ex
planation of crdpP^ that turns on the mere bodily or
material side of human nature, and that assumes
any reflection of an influence of Greek philosophy in
such a use of the term, let us now turn to the other
earher and more current interpretation, wherein crdpP^
was deemed equivalent not to the mere " body," but
to the sensuous nature of man — the lower or sensuous

THEORY OF SENSUOUSNESS. 295
as opposed to the higher or intellectual side of man's
being. The terms that are employed to convey this
explanation are not always alike, nor is it always
clear what precisely is meant to be denoted by them:
but, whatever may be the shades of meaning, they
find a common meeting-point in this respect that
they regard the adpP^ as one side or aspect of man's
constitution hi contrast to another side or aspect of
the same. And, although the use of such an expres
sion as sensuousness (the German Sinnlichkcit 1) in
room of the aapKiKov elvai of St. Paul may lead to
a confusing interchange of the Bibhcal language with
that of philosophy, it may serve conveniently to
denote the special feature of the theories with
which we are now concerned — man's dependence on
his psychico-corporeal organisation, whereby he is
placed in relation to, and brought into close con
nection with, the outward sensible world, receives
its impressions, and undergoes its influences.
1 Liidemann calls attention to the ambiguity which attaches
to this expression in the German language, as it may signify
"on the one hand the bodily, earthly-material existence, on the
other a direction of the will and dispositions to sense and its
wants," and he points out that Julius Mulier and Ernesti have
not always used the word with the same meaning. But,
whatever may be the worth of his special polemic as directed
against them on this ground, it does not seem of much
moment as respects the general question of the reference of
adp£ to sensuous nature. At the same time we have sought
to avoid ambiguity by employing " sensuousness " instead of
" sensuality."

296 INADEQUACY OF SENSUOUS THEORY.

The inadequacy of this explanation — which
really differs from the previous one more in
form than in substance — has been pointed out
by Neander, Tholuck, Julius Midler, Delitzsch and
others on the strength of various arguments, the
weight of which cannot be questioned. It may be
enough to mention some of these grounds. 1. In
Gal. v. 19-21 the Apostle states that "the works
of the flesh (epya Trjs aapKos) are manifest, which
are these, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness,
idolatry, sorcery, enmities, strife, jealousies, wrath,
factions, divisions, heresies [or parties], drunkenness,
revelhngs, and such like." Now, whatever may
have been the principle guiding his choice as tu
the several elements or modes of sin that enter into
this enumeration — and various schemes of classifying
them have been suggested by Meyer, Bishop Light
foot and others — it is obvious that all that variety
of " works " cannot be without straining reduced to
the one category of sensuous origin and manifesta
tion. The vices no doubt that are named first have,
as well as those with which the list closes, a
specially sensuous character ; but it is otherwise
with the " enmities, strife, jealousies, factions,
divisions, heresies " that intervene, and which have
a much more direct relation to the mental than to
the bodily or physical life of those concerned. In
like manner, when at Rom. xiii. 14 St. Paul calls on

LUDEMANN'S SUGGESTION SET ASIDE. 297
his readers to " put on the Lord Jesus Christ, and
not to make provision for the flesh (Trjs aapKos
irpovotav) to fulfil the lusts thereof" he had just before
(verse 13) made mention not merely of different forms
of sensual indulgence, but of " strife and j ealousy ." 1 2 .
In the second and third chapters of the First Epistle
to the Corinthians the Apostle describes his readers
as aapKiKoi, in so far as they were disposed to range
themselves into parties taking the names of different
leaders ; but there is nothing to suggest that this
tendency to alpeaeis, and the disputes and dis
cords to which it led (1 Cor. ih. 3-4), had their
origin in, or reference to, the life of sense rather
than of intellect. 3. In the same Epistle the
special pursuit of the Greek schools of philo
sophy is characterised as aocpia KaTa aapKa (aocpia
aapKiKr/, 2 Cor. i. 12), but there is no reason to
suppose that their philosophy concerned itself
1 The suggestion of Ludemann (pp. 72, 73) as to the mode
in which we are to conceive the " sarkic principle at work, and
the wide sphere of operation which we have to assign to it"
really amounts to a superseding of the distinction on which
the theory is based. He says, " The impulses of the crdp£
make their way throughout the vovs and Kap&la, and it is obvi
ous (es versteht sich) that the co-operation of the o-dp£ with the
one or other of those factors may have the most diversified sins
as its result." But St. Paul says nothing here of such co-operat
ing factors ; he mentions the works as works of the adp£;
and that term defined as " the sensuous " must have the vovs
at least contrasted with it — if not opposed to it, as it is in
fact by St. Paul in Bom. vii.

298 EXAMINATION OF OTHER DEFINITIONS.
merely with the sensuous side or sensuous wants
of human nature, or, in fact, that it did not address
itself mainly to matters pertaining to the inner
or supra-sensible life. 4. In Col ii. 18 the Apostle
characterises the type of person against whom
he bids his readers be on their guard as eUrj
cpvaiov/xevos virb tov voos Ttjs aapms avrov ; while
it is evident from the references to Tarretvo-
cppoavvr/, eOeXoOpr/aKela and dcpeiSla aw/xaTOS in the
context, that the peculiarity by which this vovs
Trjs aapKos was puffed up was a rigid asceticism, prac
tising — it may be, in spiritual pride — a thorough
self-denial as regards the hfe of sense. In this case
the adp£ manifests its vovs in an abstinence from
those very forms of bodily indulgence which are
elsewhere prominent among its characteristics ; and
it is plain that the explanation which resolves
it into the latter can no longer apply.
III. Setting aside then,on these and like grounds, the
view which limits adp£ to the physical or lower side
of man and makes it equivalent to " sensuousness,"
we cannot say that the attempts at definition on
the part of those who have seen the insufficiency of
the materialistic or the sensuous explanation are
altogether satisfactory. Some of them read into the
word itself a meaning which is largely derived from
the predicates or statements that are found in asso
ciation with it, while others unduly restrict its

EXPLANATION GIVEN BY NEANDER. 299
import by limitations for which Scripture furnishes
no warrant. Neander, for instance, has rightly
recognised the affinity of the conceptions erdpP^
and Koa/xos, but, when he goes on to say that
" crappy denotes human nature generally in the state
of its estrangement from the divine hfe, the tendency
towards the world as dissociated from the tendency
towards God," he does not sufficiently distinguish
the thing itself from what is affirmed of it — the
" nature " of man as creaturely from its empirical
condition of estrangement, that in which the tend
ency is manifested from the tendency itself. More
over, when he proceeds with some truth to assign
reasons for the predominant reference of sin to the
bodily element — " partly in so far as in the present
state of human nature the power of the sinful prin
ciple displays itself speciaUy in the antagonism of
sensuous impulses to the law recognised by the
mind, partly in so far as Christianity first diffused
itself among the classes in whom it had most to contend
with the power of rude sensuousness (der sinnlichen
Bohheit), partly in so far as the body serves as organ
for the sinful tendency governing the soul, and the
power of sinful custom with the independence
attained by it continues longer at work in the body
after the soul has become partaker of a higher hfe" —
he uses language hable to grave misapprehension in
adding : " in all these relations it happens that St.

300 tholuck's view.
Paul frequently puts the body subservient to sinful
habit for the whole nature (das gauze Wescn) of sin."
Does it not appear as though Neander had here
overlooked, partly, the distinction between crdpP^ and
aw/xa, and, partly, the distinction between the
nature liable to sin and the sin or, as Principal
Tulloch calls it, " all the evil activity " affecting it.
Tholuck, again, in his disquisition on this subject
contributed to the Studicn und Kritikcn in 1855,
has well pointed out the necessity of reverting to the
Old Testament basis of the Apostle's language, and
f recognising the accessory conception of weakness;
but, wdien he selects as his summary definition of it
" human weakness," he does not sufficiently dis
tinguish the subject of the weakness from the quality
associated with it. Under such a definition expres
sions like daOeveia Trjs aapKos, rjaQevei Sid Trjs
aapKos, would be reduced very much to tautology.
And, when he goes on to speak of the " reason for
weak sinful humanity being termed basar, adpP^, as
lying in the very fact that it is invested (umldcidet)
with the impotent organism that incites to sin," to
refer the incitement of sin to " the material nature-
organism," and to tell us that "according to the
doctrine of the Apostle the soliciting impulses to
evil fall on the side of the body," 1 he reintroduces
the confusion, of which he had seemed at the outset
1 Studien u. Krit., 1855, iii. p. 497.

DISTINCTION DRAWN BY JULIUS MULLEK. 301
to get rid, between the use of the term " flesh " by
synecdoche for " the body," and the wider and more
speciaUy characteristic use of it for " the creature."
Julius Mulier, in his treatise on tlie Christian
Doctrine of Sin, has likewise acknowledged the
importance of the Old Testament as the main factor
in moulding the Apostle's language ; and has found
the term adp£ employed by St. Paul to denote the
outward side of human existence, discernible by the
senses ; whence by a natural progress it gains the
signification of " man's earthly existence in general —
of human nature itself in its present earthly stage of
development, and the individual beings belonging to
it, especially when conceived of as a whole." But
he conceives that the New Testament goes beyond
the Old Testament stage in using the word to denote
" a general tendency, which turns with desire towards
the things of the world, and is thereby turned away
from God." He holds that the term specially im
plies love of the world, devotion to the goods of the
Koa/xos, while the principle of selfishness faUs into
the background in the Pauhne conception. As
regards this latter distinction, it would seem enough
to point to the enumeration of " the works of the
flesh" already referred to (in Gal. v. 19 f.) as show
ing its untenableness, for what but the principle
of selfishness or self-love underlies the " enmities,
strife, jealousies, wrath," exphcitly included in that

302 OBJECTION OF PLEONASM.
category? On the other hand, his definition of
adp% as "a tendency towards the things of the
world," as well as the wider definition given by
Schmid:1 "the adpP^ is sinful inclination gener
ally," and the more precise one given by Ernesti :2
the adp£ is " that direction of the will, in virtue
of which man allows his mind to be determined
by the sensuousness of the body" — are obviously
liable to the objection taken to them by Ludemann
and Pfleiderer, that they impute to the Apostle an
unmeaning pleonasm in such expressions as kotu
adpKa irepiiraTeiv. Pfleiderer points to the absurd
ity that would be implied in rendering Rom. vii. 18
in terms of such a definition : " In me, that is, in
my sinful inclination in general, or in my love of the
world, dweUeth no good thing"; and Ludemann —
while maintaining that he can with perfect propriety
from his own point of view as to the import of adpP^,
speak of KaTa adpKa irepuraTeiv or of etVat ev
aapKi as " a tendency of hfe "——justly affirms that " to
take the word adp£ itself in this sense is to impute
to the Apostle at least a singular pleonasm. For as
the crdpP^ on account of KaTa is here just that
according to which man directs himself, to which he
accommodates himself, the adpP^ cannot withal be
this same direction, this accommodation itself; and,
1 Neutest. Theol., IL, 268.
2 Ursprung der Siinde, IT., p. 52 ff.

CHOICE OF TERM UNEXPLAINED. '303
• further as the elvai ev tiv'i, even if taken in a mere
local sense, already in itself denotes a position, con
ditio, or state, it follows that Ernesti's explanation
of such expressions (comp. p. 83: 'the being in
spmtuality, the being in carnality,') would strictly
and literally have to run thus : elvai ev aapKi, ' to
be in the state of a state,' and /ca-7-a adpKa
ireptiraTeiv, " to be walking according to {KaTa) the
life-according-to-the-flesh {adpKa)," or ' to take the
direction of a direction.' " " If flesh," asks Dr.
Laidlaw,1 " be a designation for sinfully-conditioned
human nature, whence comes it that the term is
appropriate?" This question aptly applies to several
of the other definitions that we formerly quoted (at
p. 12), such as that of Lutz: "the disinchnation of
the wiU towards the divine," that of Philippi, in its
later form : " human nature in its present constitu
tion as corrupt," and that of Delitzsch : " the whole
sinful and mortal nature of man." In each of these
cases adpl~ gets the specific elements of its definition
from certain predicates more or less closely associ
ated with the term where it occurs ; but the choice
of the term itself is left unexplained.
Nor is the mystery quite cleared up, when we
pass to the further remark of Dehtzsch: "The whole
natural man is termed adpP^, because it has faUen
entirely into the power of the bad. influences of its
1 Bible Doctrine of Man, p. 32 f.

304 "NATURE-BASIS" OF DELITZSCH.
nature-basis (Xaturgrumlcs) which the first sin has let
loose " (p. 3 7 3). He had previously said by way of
explaining the nature of the first sin : " The world,
crowned with the creation of man, was very good.
But it was brought out of chaos into this state, and
even this very good state of man rested on the
chaotic basis that was made the substratum of his
life. The powers {Potcnzen) of this basis, for them
selves alone powers of wrath and death, were through
the spirit of hfe made serviceable to life, and this
hfe was in the personal man for the whole earthly
world linked to the living God, and was to maintain
and progressively strengthen itself in communion
with Hhn. When man fell from his life subsisting
in God's love {seincm in Gottes Ziebc wesenden Leben
cntfiel), therewithal the nature-basis of his life became
the abyss {zum Abgrund) of death" (p. 125 f.).
Here one is tempted to ask, What is meant by this
" nature-basis " ? What is its relation to the
" chaotic state " out of which it was brought ?
Why were the " powers " of this nature-basis for
themselves powers of wrath and death ? One does
not see in what respect this "right ultimate answer"
to the question propounded by Hengstenberg,
namely, how it comes that nature is called aap^,
differs, except in increased obscurity, from what
Delitzsch elsewhere calls " a materiality opposed to
God " (cine widergottlichc Materialitat), or from

MORE COMPREHENSIVE DEFINITION. 305
Hengstenberg's own phrase of "the material nature,"
or from Tholuck's " material nature-organism." In
such utterances as these there is no shght approxi
mation to the language which we have found to be
employed by the upholders of the materialistic or
sensuous explanations ; and Delitzsch seems not so
far removed from Holsten, when he thus defines
the conception of adp£ in the ethical sense :
" aapp^ in this sense is the tangible material flesh,
inclusive of the psychico-mental inner hfe (seelisch-
geistigen Innerlichkeit) homogeneous and standing in
reciprocal relation with it from the beginning of hu
man existence, and inclusive even of the Ego which
allows itself to be determined by this inborn fleshly
nature, and, in yielding to the sinful dispositions
(Anlagen), hindrances and incitements of this nature,
increases its inborn corruption." Surely the large
extent of the field here covered by the two-fold
"inclusive of" might have suggested a definition
more in keeping with the ethical character of the
conception than that which thus puts into the
foreground, and even emphasises by " tangible "
{tastbare), the " material flesh." And thus from the
point of view of comprehensive fitness to embrace
what is admittedly contained in the conception, not
less than from that of linguistic precedent, we may
urge the superiority of an explanation which does not
confine itself to one side or part of human nature
U

306 RECOGNITION OF COMPREHENSIVE SENSE.
but includes the whole creaturely condition, as it
subsists in experience, in contradistinction to what
comes to it anew, or afresh, from God.
This comprehensive sense of the term is more or
less fully recognised by writers of different schools
in tlieir exposition of individual passages ; as, for
instance, by Holsten on 1 Cor. i. 26: "crapP^ denotes
the whole domain of the human, in so far as it is
conceived in distinction from, and in contrast to, the
divine " ; and by Reuss on 2 C< >r. vii. 5 : " flesh
comprehends all that belongs to the natural exist
ence," and on Pom. vii. 5 : "that natural life which
precedes in all men the moment of regeneration";1
as well as by Godet on Rom. ix. 5 : "the term flesh
comprehends human nature in its totality," on Rom.
iv. 1 : " the flesh indicates here human activity in
its isolation from the divine Spirit (souffle divin),"
and on Rom. vii. 5 : " the entire natural man." He
adds, however, the qualification, "in so far as governed
by the love of enjoyment or fear of pain, that is, by
the tendency to the satisfaction of self," and subjoins
the remark : " La complaisance naturelle' de moi en
lui-meme, voila I'idde du mot chair" in the moral
sense. 'The freedom, at times, with which M. Reuss allows him
self to translate the language of Scripture into that of the
present is well illustrated by his rendering of 1 Cor. vii. 28 :
OXtyiv T-rj crapKi e£ovcriv as eprouveront des difficultes dom.es-
ti'ques !

MEYER AND WEISS. 307
The advance towards a more exact conception of
the import of the term is especially well illustrated
by the difference of its definition by Meyer and
Weiss respectively in leading passages of the Epistle
to the Romans. Meyer, e.g., says on Rom. iv. 1 :
" the aapp^ on its ethical side is the material-psychic
human nature as the life-sphere of moral weakness
and of sin's power in man," on Rom. vi. 19: " the
crappy, material human nature psychically determined,"
and on Rom. vii. 5 : " the adpP^, the materially human
element in us in its psychically determined antagon
ism to the divine Spirit and will." In these, and in
numerous other instances — for Meyer has, of course,
striven after consistency in his interpretation — we
find a constantly recurring use of the word
"material," which shows that Meyer was still largely
influenced by the original physical sense of the word,
as indeed he distinctly indicates at Rom. xhi. 14
where he describes " the adpP^ — that which composes
the material substance of man — as the source and
seat of sensuous and sinful desires." Weiss, on the
other hand, in his revision of Meyer's work * has
1 1 readily grant the value of much in this revision ; but
further use of it has only strengthened the conviction which I
ventured to express pretty strongly iu the Preface to the
English translation of Meyer's Commentary on Mark and
Luke as to the unfairness of the plan adopted in this Xeubear-
beitung of Meyer's work. While the book continues to be
named from Meyer, it no longer presents his work as he left it.

308 PREFERABLE DEFINITION.
been careful to eliminate this reference to the
material element, for he recognises that " all reflection
on the original physical sense of the word is aban
doned." : Thus at Rom. iv. 1 the adpP^ is " the
naturally human in itself," at Pom. vi. 19 and vii.
7 : " the natural human existence ( Wcsen) as our
life-element in contrast to the new element of
spiritual-divine life," or, as he otherwise expresses
it, " in its specific distinction from God." 2 This
definition, which is even more briefly expressed in
the form familiar to the older divines of " the
natural man," has, as we have already said, the
advantage of specific reference to man; but it re
quires, in order to explicate its import, the addition
of words conveying the contrast to God or the divine
- — a contrast which is already implied in what we
have for that very reason deemed the preferable
definition of " creature " or " creaturely nature."
His judgments are set aside and superseded by others in the
text itself ; and the reader who buys the remodelled work gets
only so much of Meyer's as the editor has deemed it fitting to
retain. It would have been more consistent with the honour
due to Meyer and would have more fairly met the demands
alike of historical truth and of scientific progress, had Dr.
Weiss and his fellow-editors kept their own additions or
alterations — whether for better or for worse — distinct from
the work of "the master,'' which it was their duty to reproduce
iu its integrity, if it was still to carry the passport of hia name.
1 Bibl. Theol. d. X. T., p. 246 f.
2 Bibl. Theol. d. N. T I.e.

THE FLESH AND SIN. 309

XI.
RELATION BETWEEN THE FLESH AND
SIN.— CONCLUSION.
We have thus endeavoured to ascertain, and to
vindicate in opposition to other views, the distinctive
sense of adp£ in Pauline usage, and have thereby
completed the task which we proposed to ourselves
in these Lectures. We disclaimed at the outset the
intention of pursuing the subject in its theological
bearings; but we stated that it was hardly possible
to avoid incidental reference to the great issues
bound up with it. So close, in particular, is the
connection between the Apostle's conception of
" the flesh " and his doctrine of "sin" that we
cannot but briefly touch on it, simply in order
to indicate the conclusions which our investigation
directly or collaterally suggests as regards that
momentous and much discussed question, and more
especially with reference to certain views urged in
the works that we have been discussing. These
conclusions are chiefly negative, but not the less
important in the light of the stress that has been

310 THE FLESH NOT IDENTIFIED WITH SIN,
laid on the positive propositions to which they are
opposed. 1. There is no just ground for the allegation that
the Apostle identifies o-dpP^ with d/xapTia. The very
expression adpP^ d/xapTias, which brings the two
terms into so close a relation, precludes their equival
ence, for, if the term adpP^ had of itself necessarily
implied the conception of sin, there would have been
no need of, or meaning in, the explicit addition of
d/xapTias. The Apostle, who has at Rom. vii. 17, 18,
20 spoken so strongly of the power of indwelling
sin, has at the same time distinguished it not only
from the Ego, but also from the adp£ in which it
dwells. So far from the conceptions of sin and the
flesh being identical, they are most explicitly separated
in the exhortation of 2 Cor. vii. 1 : " Let us cleanse
ourselves from all defilement of flesh (/xoXva/xov
aapKos) and spirit." The flesh is not in itself defil
ing, although it has undergone defilement; and while
it needs, it also admits of, cleansing. The Apostle's
own statement, as regards his Christian life, at Gal.
ii. 20 : "The life that I now live in the flesh, I live
by the faith of the Son of God," sufficiently shows
that he does not regard the flesh as essentially and
always associated with ap-apTia.
2. The Apostle does not identify adp£ with the
material body or outward bodily substance of man.
We have seen that the attempts to apply this view ol'

OR WITH THE MATERIAL BODY. 311
the facts of Pauline usage utterly fail to explain them
otherwise than by postulating an extension of the
conception of matter coined for the occasion, which
makes it embrace the whole man and thereby cease
to be mere corporeal matter. The adp£ with which
the Apostle deals is the o-dpP^ of the living man,
animated by the ^vyf/ as its principle of life — a fact
which would, to the ordinary mind, seem enough to
preclude the idea of mere materiality. And not
only so, but it is distinctly used as co-ordinate, or
practically synonymous, with dvOpwiros. Of course,
where it stands expressly contrasted with other ele
ments pertaining to man, such as the human irvev/xa
or the vovs, this contrast necessarily limits its com
prehensiveness ; but where it stands without any
such restriction, or in contrast to the divine, it must
be held to follow the precedent of the Old Testament
basar, on which it was undoubtedly moulded, and of
which Ludemann himself affirms that " the basar is
everywhere not a material unity, but embraces in an
emphatic manner the nature of man mental and
corporeal {das geist-leibliche Mcnschenwesen) with its
internal distinctions."1
3. The Apostle does not identify matter, or the
material side of man, with evil. He makes no
reference to matter as such {vXr/) at all, nor does he
present anything at all resembling either the
1 Anthropologic des Apostels Paulus, p. 28.

312 MATTER NOT IDENTIFIED WITH EVIL.
language or the conceptions of that philosophic
dualism which meets us with so persistent and
tedious an iteration in Philo. We may certainly
apply to the forced attempts of some recent writers to
discover traces of Philonian thought in St. Paul the re
mark of Ludemann in regard to Philo finding his own
ideas in the Old Testament : " Alexandrian Hellen
ism has imported its own dualism into the Old
Testament when interpreting it (hinciugedi utet), but
the Old Testament itself withal has not said a word
on the subject,"2 St. Paul preserves through
out the standpoint of Jewish monotheism. He
recognises all created things as called into existence
by God, as subsisting for Him, and as subservient to
His purposes (Rom. xi. 3 6 : " From Him, and
through Him, and to Him are all things " ; 1 Cor.
viii. 6 ; Eph. iv. 6 ; Col. i. 1 6 f.) ; and he has ex
plicitly declared that " every created thing (irdv
KTia/xa) of God is good, and not to be rejected" (1
Tim. iv. 4). And, while it is evident that the view
which regards matter as necessarily evil is inconsis
tent with the Apostle's recognition of the sovereign
supremacy of God, it is also clear that it is logically
incompatible with the recognition of any real service
of God whUe the material organism remains. But
the Apostle has no hesitation in exhorting his readers
(Rom. xii. 1) "to present their bodies a living sacri-
2 Anthropologic des Ap. Paulus, p. 27.

RELATION BETWEEN THE BODY AND SIN. 313
fice, holy, well-pleasing unto God," and in designating
this as their " reasonable service " (Tr)v XoyiKr)v
XaTpeiav v/xwv).
4. St. Paul does not associate sin exclusively or
predominantly with the body or with the sensuous
nature of man, although he sees in these its instru
ments or manifestations. He summons his readers
in the passage quoted above (2 Cor. vii. 1) " to
cleanse themselves from all defilement of flesh and
spirit," as though the spirit as well as the flesh
might undergo defilement and stand in need of
cleansing ; and at 1 Cor. vii. 34 it is set forth as
the aim of her who cares for the things of the
Lord, that " she may be holy in body and spirit " ;
while at Rom. xii. 2 he posits as the essential
foundation of the Christian life a transformation "by
renewal of the mind," and at Eph. iv. 23 defines
more precisely the sphere of that renewal as "the
spirit (the motive governing power) of the mind."
The eiriOv/xlai have their seat in the heart (Rom. i. 24).
The frequent and prominent mention of the
body is due, not to its being regarded as the source
of sin, but to its being the seat or scene of sin's mani
festation, the organ in and through which it shows
itself. The counsels of the heart, the resolves of
the will in which sin has its origin, are for the
present hidden (1 Cor. iv. 5 : " The Lord will bring
to light the hidden things of darkness, and will

314 THE BODY AS ORGAN OF SIN.
make manifest the counsels of the heart"); but they
find expression, and execution, in the aw/xa and its
/xeXr/. This function of the aw/xa as the instrument
of man's action is very apparent in such a passage
as 2 Cor. v. 10: 'Iva KO/xlar/Tat eKaaros Ta Sta
tov aw/xaros, irpbs « eirpaPev, e'lre ayaOov, e'rre
kukov. It is in this way that sins come to be
termed irpdpeis tov aw/xaros, as accomplished by its
agency ; and the body itself may even be spoken of as
aw/xa d/xaprlus — the body that is subject to the rule
of shi (Rom. vi. 6). Thus, too, we may account for
the recurring mention of the /xeXr/ as the organs by
means of which what is in man becomes outwardly
visible, and what is inwardly resolved on becomes
carried into effect (Rom. vi. 12, 13 : /xr/Se Traptard-
vere rd /xeXr/ v/xwv drrXa uSikIus k.t.X., vi. 19 : irape-
amjaare ra /xeXr/ v/xwv SovXa k.t.X.). Tbe function of
the aw/xa or /xeXr/ is indicated as that of practical
activity by the presence of such words as irpdaaetv,
KarepyaXe&Qai, evepyeiv (e.g., Rom. vii. 5 : tu
iraOij/xara rwv d/xapriwv rd Std rov vo/xov evr/pyeiro
ev rois p-eXeatv r)/xwv) ; and, as is well remarked by
Wendt, the statement in Rum. vii. 23, that the law of
sin rules in the /xeXr/ and wars against the law of the
vovs, has its special significance in the contrast
between the merely theoretienl ineffective attitude of
the vovs and the practical controlling influence of sin
which knows how to carry its wishes into e.recution.

PSYCHOLOGICAL ORIGIN NOT EXPLAINED. 315
" It is," says Weiss, " such expressions as these that
have given a handle to the erroneous view that Paul
conceives of sin as dwelling in the body and its
members, while it is in these that the dominion of
sin only comes to manifestation, because the vovs, in
which hes the only reaction against this dominion of
sin, belongs entirely to the inner hidden life of man,
and on account of its powerlessness never determines
the outer life of man in any visible way. Sin can
make the vovs powerless, and thereby restrict it to
the domain of the hidden inner hfe, while it posi
tively controls the adpP^ and incites it to an action
antagonistic to God, which becomes visible through
the members of the body." 1
5. Wliile St. Paid undoubtedly represents the
adp£ as the seat of sin, thereby associating sin
with man's creaturely nature or the creaturely side
of that nature; and while he presents vividly its power
in and over man, depicting especiaUy its relation to
the law as the occasion of developing it in Rom. vii.,
he has not there, or elsewhere, given any explanation
of thejpsychejp^icul^rigin of_ sin. As Wendt re
marks, his design was to set forth not the origin of
sin from the adpP^, but the power of sin in the
adpP^. He has nowhere pronounced the crappy in
itself sinful ; he has nowhere declared it even to be,
as such, the source of sin, though we sometimes find
1 Weiss, Bibl. Theol. d. N. T, p. 252 ; comp. Wendt, p. 209f.

316 SELFISHNESS RATHER THAN SENSUOUSNESS.
this proposition imputed to him ; and still less has he
propounded any theory, such as his philosophic ex
positors would ascribe to him, as to the principle or
ground-form of sin consisting either in bodily matter,
or in that aggregate of feelings and impulses asso
ciated with the bodily organism which constitutes
the sensuous side of man. We have shown that
crappy is not resolvable into mere sensuousness any
more than into mere matter : and that much of the
Apostle's language is incompatible with any such
restriction as is imposed on it 1 iy those who attribute
to him an exclusive reference of sin to the sensuous
nature, either as a philosophical principle or, as in the
case of Schmidt, on the lower ground of an induction
from experience of its practical operation in life.
The very fact that the Apostle more than once
lays it down as the characteristic principle of the new
life of the Christian, that he no longer lives to or
for himself (Rom. xiv. 7 : " for none of us liveth to
himself"; 2 Cor. v. 15) rather warrants the infer
ence that the root and principle of sin is to be found
in man's thus licing to himself — in the selfishness
that converts his creaturely position into a self-
asserting independence, and makes himself the sole
object of his thought and care — a view which
derives some confirmation from the circumstance
that in 2 Thess. ii. 4 sin reaches its culmination
in the arrogance of the " man of sin who opposeth

HISTORICAL ORIGIN OF SIN. 317
and exalteth himself against all that is caUed God,
or that is worshipped ; so that he sitteth in the
temple of God, setting himself forth as God."
6. But, while the Apostle has not explained the
psychological origin of sin, he has indicated pretty
distinctly its historical origin in Rom. v. 1 2 ff. ; and
we are not warranted by any canons of exegesis in
explaining that passage away after the manner of Dr.
Pfleiderer — who finds in it a suggestion of the specu
lative idea that " properly {eigentlich) not the
individual first man, but man as such {der Mensch
an sich) is the subject of the fall," and recognises "the
historical beginning as the mere form for the gene
rality of a principle that has no beginning {einer
anfangslosen Prinzips) " — even if we should " thereby
ensure the essential material agreement of Rom. v.
12 f. with the mode of view of Rom. vii." When
St. Paul uses words that clearly affirm a historical
beginning, we are bound to take him at his word,
and have no right to impute to him anything else.
It can only be regarded as an illustration of what Dr.
Pfleiderer calls " theartificeof theidea{List der Idee),"1
1 Paulinismus, p. 91 : " There is no other means of reconciling
the faith still formally subsisting in the absolute truth of the
letter with the material progress of the ideal conviction, than
just that " artifice of the idea," by means of which the religions
spirit conceals from itself its new developments, until the
fruit gaining strength is able to dispense with and throw off
the protecting husk of the old."

318 ROMANS V. AND VII. NOT INCOMPATIBLE.
when, after frankly admitting the verdict of exegesis,
and asking that its results should be recognised in
dependently of each other, he conceives that he can
settle the matter by first asserting a formal contra
diction and then resolving it by an alleged " specu
lative idea " lurking beneath St. Paul's words, of
which St. Paul was himself unconscious.
But exegesis not only declines to accept Dr.
Pfleiderer's resolution of the difficulty which his as
sumed formal contradiction creates ; it demurs to the
suggestion that such a writer as St. Paul could have
allowed himself to fall, within the compass more
especially of one and the same Epistle, into any such
contradiction, and it may reasonably maintain that
such a result is a strong presumption of the error of
the process by which it has been reached. There is
not, in reality, any incompatibility between St. Paul's
account in Rom. v. 12 of the origin of sin in the
race, and his description in Rom. vii. of its develop
ment in the individual. The alleged variance
arises only, when the passages are interpreted
in the light of imported philosophical conceptions,
such as that of objective d/xaprla, of which the
Apostle probably knew nothing — certainly has said
nothing. 7. St. Paul's doctrine of sin has its basis not in
speculation, but in experience. He deals with the
facts as they are given to him in man's life and

BASIS OF EXPERIENCE. 319
history.1 The adp£ is not necessarily in itself sin
ful, for the creature, as originally constituted by God,
and adapted to the conditions of earthly existence,
could not but be recognised by St. Paul, in. accord
ance with the Biblical teaching, as " very good."
But the adpP^, as it has actually existed from the
time of the introduction of sin in Adam's transgres
sion, is recognised by the Apostle as tainted with
sin, in accordance with the generalised experience re
presented in Gen. vi. 12, " All flesh hath corrupted its
way upon the earth " ; and the term, which in itself
denoted the distinction of man from God, carries
accordingly, in the Apostle's use, the connotation not
merely of contrasted weakness, but of self-willed anta
gonism (Rom. viii. 7: "the mind of the flesh is enmity
against God"). It is this broad basis of universal expe-
1 Dr. Gifford, iu his clear and concise excursus on " the
Flesh,'' subjoined to the Introduction of his Commentary on
the Epistle to the Bomans ("Speaker's" Commentary), pp.
48-52, has called attention to the form of the expression in
Bom. vii. 18 : ' I know that in me, that is in my flesh, dwell
eth no good thing.' " It is important to observe that St. Paul's
judgment is the result of practical experience (oTSa), not of
any speculative analysis of the ideas of 'flesh' aud 'sin.'
He found as a fact sin dwelling in his flesh ; we may add that
he regarded this as a fact of universal experience (iii. 9-20) ;
but we have no reason to suppose that he regarded sin as in
separable from the very essence of ' the flesh ' ; we are still
far from the conclusion that in the Apostle's mind ' the flesh
is by its nature and from the beginning the principle of sin'
(Pfleiderer, p. 62)."

320 WF.NIIT'S DISTINCTION OF JUDGMENTS.
rience that forms the explanation of the Pauline use of
adpP^ in so close relation to sin, and of the strong-
expressions used to characterise it. The creature as
subsisting in distinction from God has become prac
tically equivalent to the creature opposing itself to
God ; and adpp, which marks creatureship, connotes
also its invariable empirical accompaniment of
a/xaprta. Wendt has an interesting discussion1 of the lead
ing passages in which the Apostle seems to indi
cate a judgment as to the value or non-value of
the crdpp, classifying them according as they bear on
the intellectual, moral, or religious value thereof,
and according to the character — analytic or synthetic
— of the judgment so expressed; and conceives himself
to have established the distinction that, wliile the
adpP^, on account of its creaturely weakness, is inca
pable of knowing what is divine and of fulfilling the
law, it only errs and sins (hypothetically), when it
would know the divine and fulfil the divine will
with its own -powers. But, ingenious as his distinc
tions are, and ably as they are worked out, they are
liable to the criticism of AVeiss that such refinements
are alien to the Apostle's habits of thought and alter
the true point of view. And it seems sufficient to
take up the ground occupied by the latter, when, in
opposition to an objection of Schmidt that the ab-
1 Occupying the latter portion of his book, p. 167-2 1C.

EMPIRIC DOMINION OF SIN  EXCEPTION. 321
sence of the article in such expressions as /caret
aapxa ireptirareiv, ev aapKi etvat, must be held to
point to human nature generally rather than to hu
man nature as receiving its qualitative definition
from experience, he remarks that " St. Paul does not
phhosophise over adpP^ and d/xaprla in the abstract
{an sich), but discusses the fact as it stands {den
Thatbestand) of the dominion of sin within empiric
humanity. Now within this sphere of fact there is
only a adpP^ ruled and perverted by sin. St. Paul
may therefore very well speak of the nature of the
adpP^ generally, and yet be throughout thinking only
of the aapp^ as it is constituted in empiric humanity."1
8. To this category of d/xaprla as universally in
experience predicable of the adpP^ there is one ex
ception. Christ Jesus appeared ev aapKi, and yet
was sinless. The sinlessness of Christ, which indeed
forms the necessary presupposition of all His work
in condemning sin and redeeming men from it, is
expressly affirmed by the Apostle in 2 Cor. v. 21 :
rov /xtj yvovra a/xapriav, virep rgxwv a/xapriav
eirolr/aev, where the form of the negation /xr] un
doubtedly points to a subjective judgment, but the
judgment can only be exegetically that of the subject
of the sentence, namely, God.2 But, notwithstanding
iBibl. Theol. d. N. T, p. 247, note.
2 The peculiar interpretation put upon this passage by Hol
sten, in which he has hardly been followed by any one

322 SINLESSNESS OF CHRIST.
this explicit statement, Holsten, Liidemann, and
Pfleiderer have strangely enough found evidence of
Christ's having had a adp£ d/xaprlas in a passage
which has been generally taken by interpreters as
implying, if not affirming, the very opposite, namely,
Rom. viii. 3 : " God sending His own Son in the
likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin, condemned sin
in the flesh." Here it is asserted that the words ev
6/xoiw/xari aapKos d/xaprlas denote not a similarity
to the flesh characterised as having d/xaprla, but
such an exact copy or reproduction of it that the
adp£ which the Saviour had may be itself described
as crapP^ d/xaprias.
This opinion which is maintained by its champions
with great confidence not only in opposition to the
great bulk of interpreters, but even in opposition to
the adverse voice of such iUustrious chiefs of theh
own school as Baur and Zeller and Hilgenfeld, rests
except Hausrath — viz., that it refers to the pre-existent Christ,
who, as TrvtvpaTiKOs, knew no dpapria, but was made
dpapria by God, when at his incarnation he assumed with the
adp£ the objective sin-principle thereto belonging — has been
conclusively refuted by Schmidt (Paulinische Christologie, p.
98 ff.) and by Pfleiderer, who pronounces it " erroneous, 1st,
because the whole context speaks not of the incarnation, but
only of the death of Christ; and, 2nd, because of the analogy
with SiKatoo-vvrj Oeofi, under which, according to Pauline
usage and to the connection (comp. especially verse 19 :
prj Xoyi£6pevos . . . o.vtZv), there can only be understood
imputed ideal righteousness, and therefore the dpapria of
Christ can only be a merely imputed ideal one."

CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF ROM. VIII. 3. 323
on two assumptions — 1st, That 6/xolw/xa signifies, as
Holsten puts it, " not a similarity which posits, but
a hkeness which cancels, distinction {nie auf eine
dhnliclikeit geht, welche den unterschied setzt, sondern
auf eine gleichheit, welche den unterschied aufhebt)";
and, 2nd, That aapKos d/xaprlas must be taken to
gether as one inseparable conception : sin-flesh, flesh
inherently sinful. For neither assumption is there
sufficient ground.
As regards the first position, our confidence
in it is considerably shaken at the outset by the
fact that hardly any two of the expositors who have
examined the meaning of 6/xolw/xa are agreed in
defining it, or in applying their definition. With
Baur, ZeUer, and Hilgenfeld, 6/xolw/xa means " that
which is made similar {Aehnlichgemachtes)" — a sense
most naturally suggested by the relation to o/xotos,
and by the form of the verbal noun ending in -/xa ;
but, while Zeller holds that the similarity ascribed to
Christ consisted in His possession of a real human
adpjr, which merely lacked d/xaprla, HUgenfeld
conceived it to consist in His having a semblance of
crappy d/xaprlas (in a Docetic sense). With others,
the stress is laid on the notion of hkeness {Gleichheit) ;
but, while Holsten brings into prominence the
element of form {Gestalt), and assigns to Christ a
visible "sin-flesh-shape" altogether agreeing with that
of men, Overbeck drops the very idea oi form which

324 MEANING OF HOMOIOMA.
Holsten had treated as essential, and emphasises the
abstract idea of congruence, so that the 6/xolw/xa of a
thing is constantly that which is "essentially {im
Wcsentlichcn) nothing else" than the thing itself, and
Christ's flesh was in his view essentially nothing else
than human sin-flesh. Pfleiderer again prefers to fall
back on Holsten's element of form, and makes
6/xolw/xa " the sensible form, the visible appearance,
so that Christ appeared in a form which was that of
sin-flesh and consisted of sin-flesh, as in the case of
other men." And lastly, Ludemann declares him
self not satisfied with any of these views, especially
finds fault with Pfleiderer for returning to Holsten's
view as regards the prominence of form, pronounces
the latter to be utterly irrelevant in this case where the
hkeness spoken of has reference not to form but to
matter, and propounds a solution of his own, which i.s
to this effect : " Substantives ending in -/xa denote the
result of an action, and preserve throughout the
mark of origination by action. '0/xolwp.a accordingly
signifies ' copy ' or ' reproduction ' in the sense of
that which is copied or reproduced after an original
(Xachbddung in the passive sense ci-ncs nachgebil-
deten)." He claims for this definition the merit of
bringing' out the ' tendency to similarity, to repetition
of the original,' and at the same time leaving open
the question wherein the similarity consists. "What
the Apostle here says is that God sent His Son in a

L demann's VIEW. 325
copy [Wachbildung] of the sin-flesh. If it is asked
why he does not say merely ev aapKi d/xaprlas,
the answer is simple. In the sin-flesh of mankind,
which through community of descent (Geschlechts-
gemeinschaft) is a self-subsistent whole forming an
unity {einheitliches Ganze) and as such belongs to the
aggregate {dem Complexe) of the -^o'ikoi alone, the
pneumatic celestial man could not come to have
{bekommen) any share at all without some further
process {ohne weiteres). If he was to appear withal in
a body of such matter, this matter had to become in
a special way newly formed — as it were, mingled
anew — for Him in particular after the subsisting
original of sinful flesh. If this matter was really to
be the same as that of mankind — and this was, as
will soon be evident, unavoidably necessary — he had
of necessity to be {so musste er . . . sein) a 6/xolw/xa,
a copy, a repetition of the same." 1
It is not at all necessary to enter on any detailed
examination of the arguments — largely one-sided —
by which these opinions are respectively supported,
because the incongruous results arrived at serve to a
1Anthropologie des Apostel Paulus, pp. 116-121. Liidemann
has given in a note (p. 116 f.) an abstract of the leading views,
from which we have partly derived the statement given above.
The question was fully discussed by Overbeck, Zeller, Hilgen
feld, and Pfleiderer, from their several points of view, in
articles contributed to the Zeitschrift fiir wissenschaftliche
Theologie in 1869, 1870, and 1871.

326 CHOICE OF TERM BASED ON FITNESS.
great extent to neutralise or refute each other. A
considerable amount of research and a far greater
amount of ingenuity and refining have been ex
pended on the discussion of St. Paul's use of
6/xolw/xa in the other passages where it occurs,
and of its use in classical Greek and hi the
LXX. (as e.g. at Ps. evi. 20 : ko.1 rjXXaP^avro
rr)v SdPav avrwv ev 6/xotw/xari /xoa^ov eaOovros
X^dprov, where, if we should apply the principles
contended for by some of the writers we have
named, we should have to maintain that the
6/xolw/xa reproduced the living calf and the eating
of grass) ; but rarely have such efforts been made
with so entire and so obvious a missing of the
mark. Let it be granted that in most cases 6/xolw/xa
approaches more to our conception of " likeness "
than to that of mere " similarity " — although, as it
seems to us, Wendt and Cremer have too readily
conceded the validity of the position contended for
in this respect, and it is, in point of fact, absurd to
attempt the laying down of a rigid rule as regards a
conception so varying, if we may so speak, in the
percentage of its strict application according to the
objects of which it is predicated — the plainest prin
ciples of exegesis, coincident with the dictates
of common sense, require us to assume in each
instance that the term is chosen because of its

DISTINCTION DENOTED ALONG WITH RESEMBLANCE. 327
special fitness to convey the meaning, or shade of
meaning, that the writer would express. We are
bound to suppose in the case before us that, when
St. Paul used the peculiar phrase ev 6/xoiw/xari
aapKos a/xaprlas, he had a reason, and a sufficient
reason, for using it and each part of it. If he had
wished merely to say — what some expositors prac
tically assert to be all that he meant — that Christ
was sent " in the flesh," or " in sin-flesh," he would
most naturally have expressed that meaning by ev
aapKi or ev aapKi d/xaprlas. But he has used the
more complex expression, and has used it presum
ably to convey an idea different from what is con
veyed by either of the simpler forms.
Now, to determine what is the real sense
of 6/xolw/xa, we must bear in mind not only
— what is so strongly insisted on — that it denotes
something more than mere resemblance (not to say,
semblance), but also — what is too often forgotten — •
that it denotes something faUing short of, or different
from, identity. It is this latter side or aspect of the
word that Holsten and his supporters practically
ignore. To affirm " likeness " is at once to assert
' similarity' and to deny 'sameness'. The proposition
laid down and so strenuously maintained by Holsten
— that the conception of "likeness" in 6/xolw/xa cancels
distinction — is, I venture to say, sheer absurdity, and
would, if true, utterly destroy the raison d'itre of the

328 ASSUMPTIONS OF PFLEIDERER
word, which must, in the very nature of the case,
imply a distinction, such at least as to preclude its
being interchanged with terms more strictly ex
pressive of parity, equality, or identity.
When Pfleiderer treats it as " beyond doubt that, if
the expression ev 6/xoiw/xart aapKos merely occurred,
no one would hesitate to translate it simply : in flesh-
shape = in a shape, form of appearance, which was
that of all human flesh and itself consisted of flesh,"
we should certainly hesitate to accept his statement
as a fair or full account of our procedure in such a
case. We should not at once assume that 6/xolw/xa
aapKos meant a shape which consisted of flesh any
more than we should assume that 6/xolw/xa /xoaypv
means a shape that consisted of and was calf ; for,
if " in flesh-shape " meant merely " in a shape of
flesh, winch was flesh," we should certainly won
der why the writer had not at once used " in flesh."
We should on the contrary naturally credit the
writer with purpose and with judgment in the use
of his words, and we should set ourselves to ask
why he had chosen the phrase " in a shape made
like to flesh," or, in other words, to inquire not
merely wherein lay the resemblance, but also
wherein lay the difference — logically inseparable
from the form of the expression — between the o-dpP
and its 6/xoiw/xa.
Moreover, if we were disposed to look very

AND LUDEMANN CRITICISED. 329
minutely into Liidemann's application of his defini
tion — which seems to us in itself to come closest to
the original import of the word — we might venture to
ask, whether a copy formed after an original can,
without risk of misunderstanding, be termed a repe
tition of it ? whether, on his own showing, the mat
ter which had to be newly made or newly mingled
did not by that very new making differentiate itself
from what previously existed ? — and whether, if it
was inevitably necessary (though the necessity exists
only for Dr. Liidemann's theory) that the matter
should be really the same as that of sinful flesh, the
Apostle might not have been expected to use some
word other than the one which — whatever it may
mean^certainly does not quite denote sameness ?
We cannot — if we have regard to the ordinary
principles of exegesis — but proceed on the assump
tion that the Apostle chose his expression because it
best expressed his thought ; and we cannot do jus
tice to the import of the word 6/xolw/xa by looking
merely at one, even if it be the main, aspect
of it, and ignoring its element of differentiation — its
implication of a difference that precludes identity.
When we keep these points in view, the only
natural and reasonable explanation is seen to be that
which has commended itself to the great majority of
exegetes, namely, that Christ appeared in a body which
was like that of other men in so far as it consisted

330 REPLY TO LUDEMANN'S OBJECTION.
of flesh, and was unlike in so far as the flesh was
not " flesh of sin." To this Liidemann objects that
it is an arbitrary course and tantamount to a pet it io
ririncipii, thus to place the element of likeness on
the side of the o-dpP^, and the element of unlikeness
on the side of the d/xaprla. We reply that, apart
from all reference to the analogy of the Pauline
doctrine elsewhere, and apart from the explicit
assertion in 2 Cor. v. 21, the immediate context in
the verse before us practically necessitates this read
ing of the Apostle's meaning, for it explicitly
states that Clirist had the adp£ as the element or
sphere wherein the condemnation of sin took place,
and it implies that He had not personally the d/xaprla,
seeing that He was sent to achieve, and did achieve,
what was impossible otherwise for man in conse
quence of the weakness of the flesh which was the
seat of d/xaprla — namely, its condemnation. How
coidd one, who Himself had d/xaprla, condemn it ?
And this brings us to the other assumed ground
for the interpretation given by Holsten and Pfleiderer
— namely, that aapKos d/xaprlas must be taken as
one conception, and d/xaprla must be held insepar
able from the adp£. We have already pointed out
that the very fact of the addition of d/xaprlas pre
cludes the conception of sin being essentially part
and parcel of the flesh. It may be predicated of it ;
empirically it may be constantly associated with it ;

HOLSTEN'S ATTRIBUTION OF ' SIN-FLESH ' TO CHRIST. 331
but it is not necessarily involved in it ; and the very
circumstance that St. Paul has in this same verse
so markedly dissociated the two is itself a cogent
argument against the alleged necessary connection
between them.
But Holsten, who contends that this passage
really attributes to Christ a ' sin-flesh ' — that is,
a bodily substance which had in it the objec
tive principle of sin, although in his case it
did not pass into Trapdftaais, into subjective con
sciousness of actual sin, in consequence of its energy
being kept in check by the divine Trvev/xa of the
pre-existent Christ — has adduced four grounds for his
position. One of these we have already disposed of
— namely, the peculiar exegesis by which he makes
St. Paul assert d/xaprla as an attribute of Christ in
the passage where he himself describes Christ as /xr)
yvovra d/xaprlav, 2 Cor. v. 21 — a position so ob
viously untenable, that Pfleiderer has expressly
disclaimed it.1 Another — namely, that St. Paul's
whole anthropology knows no flesh that is
not a ' sin-flesh ' — is a mere petitio principii, the
question being precisely whether the case of Christ
here mentioned is not a distinct evidence to the con
trary. A third ground is put by him in the form of a
question : How could God have condemned to death
1 See above, p. 321, note.

¦332 EXAMINATION OF HOLSTEN'S GROUNDS.
the d/xaprla ev r/j aapKi on the cross of Christ,
if the adpP^ of Clirist had not been a adp£
d/xaprlas ? But — to say nothing of the fact that
the words ev tu aapKi, if thus bound up with d/xap
rla, would seem a somewhat meaningless repetition
of the thought already, according to Holsten's view,
covered by aapKos d/xaprlas — it has been well pointed
out by Wendt that we must on purely grammatical
grounds set aside Holsten's construction. " If St.
Paul had wished," says Wendt, " to express at the
close of the verse the thought that God has con
demned sin which had its seat in the flesh, he must
have distinctly written : KareKpivev rr/v a/xapnav
rr)v ev rr/ aapKi (comp., e.g., Gal. iv. 14, rov iretpaa-
/xbv rbv ev ru aapKi). Here, where he has not so
written, we are grammatically required to connect the
more precise definition ev ru aapKi, not with the
substantive d/xaprlav, but with the verb KareKpivev,
so that it designates the sphere or arena where
the condemnation was accomplished (comp., e.g.,
Rom. v. 21, e/3aaiXevaev r/ d/xaprla ev tw Oavarw)."
The last ground on which Holsten holds that
Christ had ' sin-flesh,' and the one on which, in com
mon with Pfleiderer, he lays the greatest stress, is that
the current interpretation, which takes the crappy of
Christ to have been without d/xaprla, goes in the
face of the whole course of thought (der ganzen Aus-
fiihrung) from chapter vi. to chapter vih. 3 (Holsten

ALLEGED POSTULATE OF ST. PAUL'S ARGUMENT. 333
has " bis 7. 3," but he evidently means viii. 3),
which has laboured to prove that, because man is
in bondage to d/xaprla only through his flesh, the
cross of Christ, as the death of this very o-apP^
d/xaprlas of man, has delivered him from the bond
age of sin. 1 Pfleiderer thus expresses the same
idea : " We must remember that, according to the
whole context of the passage, and generally of the
section Rom. vi.-viii. the existence of d/xaprla in
the adpp^ of Christ is so much a logical postulate
that with the denial of it the whole argument of
the section would be destroyed, and the peculiar
doctrine of St. Paul as to the cancelling of the power
of sin in the flesh by Christ's death would be
deprived of its basis." 2
These are strong words, and all the more so that
the " peculiar doctrine " here ascribed to St. Paul has
only been discovered to be his of late years, and that
the great majority of expositors have not at all ex
perienced the need of any such key as is now pro
nounced indispensable to the value or validity of the
Apostle's argument. It might be sufficient to say
in reply, 1st, that St. Paul has nowhere assumed or
proved that man is in bondage to d/xaprla only
through the adp£, in the sense in which these terms
are understood by the discoverers — or inventors — of
1 Holsten, Zum Evang. des Paulus und des Petrus, p. 436 f.
2 Pfleiderer, Paulinismus, p. 154.

334 WENDT'S EXAMINATION OF THE THEORY.
this key to his meaning ; and, 2nd, that the doctrine
of objective d/naprla in their sense of it, so far from
being indispensable to the grasping of his argument,
is not even compatible with his language at the two
points on which it has been specially sought to en
graft it.1
But Wendt has so pointedly called in ques
tion the bearing and significance of this boasted
theory, even from the point of view of its
supporters, that we cannot but quote his words.
" Would it not really be a thoroughly clear and
luminous thought of the Apostle, if he were thus to
chscern in the simple objective process (Vorgange)
of the destruction of the cra'^ of Clirist along
with the objective d/xaprla therein contained the
cardinal act (den principiellen Akt), whereby the
longed-for deliverance from the sin-dominion of the
crappy should be brought about ? That process would
certainly be simple enough — only it appears to me to
be quite too simple really to meet the object aimed
at in accordance with St. Paul's apprehension of it.
In other words, we cannot weU see^and it is no
where clearly expressed even by the theologians who
would discern this meaning in St. Paul's words —
how it is held to be possible for that objective pro
cess in the death of Christ to bring about the very
object, with which the Apostle in his discussion
1 See above pp. 83-86.

HOW DOES THE PROCESS BRING ABOUT THE RESULT ? 335
was solely concerned. Granting in the first instance
that the question really related to the conquest and
destruction of objective sin, the Apostle would
have needed to specify — because it could not other
wise be at all discerned — how [hterahy, in how far]
the death of Christ could have a cardinal value for
this destruction. The putting to death of the o-a^
of Christ is withal not an unique process, in which
an extraordinary and hitherto unheard-of blow
against the adpp^ and sin in the crappy would have
been struck, but it is merely an individual instance
of a process quite general and regular in its occur
rence. With the same warrant any other case of
the destruction of a adpi~ in death might be pointed
to, and a judgment of condemnation over objective
sin in the adpP^ he discerned in it ; with much
greater warrant would the general fact of the death
of the adpp^ be urged as a cardinal judgment of God
over sin in the adp£. Indeed, if the question were
as to the higher or lower value which the individual
case of death has as evidence of the cardinal destruc
tion of objective sin, we should be inchned a priori to
ascribe to the death of Christ in this respect even a
specially low, if not the lowest, value. For, if in
Christ's case the objective sin was and remained as
harmless and ineffectual as it can at aU be conceived to
be, seeing that it never became subjective and actual
transgression, we should conjecture its destruction to

336 POSSIBILITIES CONCEIVABLE.
be — alike as regards difficulty and relative value —
inferior to the destruction of objective sin in the adp£
of other men, in whom it had attained to vigorous
manifestation and exercise.
If we view the matter apart from reahty,
there are only two possibihties conceivable, in
which the putting to death the adp£ of Christ
and the d/xaprla in this crappy would have had a
cardinal value. The first possibUity would be in
the event that no destruction of the adp£ had taken
place before Christ, and that the death of Christ had
been the cardinal commencement of this destruction,
which would thenceforth repeat itself in every case of
death as a renewed conquest of objective sin in
the adpP^. The second possibihty would be in the
event that the destruction of the d/xaprla and the
crdp^ oi Christ had really been an ultimate valid
destruction of the adp£ or at least of sin in the
adpP^, and that not only in reference to the adp£ of
Christ, but in reference to the o-dpp^ generally, so
that subsequently to this cardinal destruction there
would have been no more objective sin. Only these
two possibilities are conceivable, and neither of the
two has, according to the Apostle's clearly expressed
view, reaUy occurred.
But the difficulties hitherto encountered are con
siderably increased, when we consider that in the
whole connection of the Pauline discussion, in which

NO BEARING ON SUBJECTIVE SIN. 337
our passage is embraced, there is in fact no question
at aU about the cancelling of that aUeged objective
sin. Assuming even that St. Paul knew such an ob
jective sin — a question to be considered apart — the
discussion in the connection before us at any
rate concerns not the point that this sin shaU be
broken in itself or in its objective subsistence, but rather
the point that it shall be destroyed in its control
of the subjective whl, in its actual energy. The felt
need of redemption {JErlosungsbediirfniss) which the
Apostle describes in chapter vii., has reference merely
to deliverance from this power of subjective sin, and
the achieved result of redemption {Erlosungserfolg)
which the Apostle describes in chapter vih. likewise
concerns merely deliverance from this subjective
power of sin notwithstanding the continued subsis
tence of the adpP^, in which the objective sin would
be inclosed. The destruction of objective sin in the
crappy of Christ would therefore neither have met
that need, nor have been able to explain the result
achieved. If it was well nigh impossible to see how
the destruction of objective sin in the death of Christ
could have the significance of a cardinal defeat of
objective sin generally, it is even far less clear how
that destruction can have the value of a cardinal
victory over subjective sin. The process accom
plished in the death of Christ always remains com
pletely apart from the process to be accomplished in

338 pfleiderer's ADMISSION of THE INCONGRUITY.
the individual man; a rational reason why the former
should have an influence on the latter, can hardly
be conceived. At most there prevails an outward
analogy in form between the two processes: but it
would prevail just as exactly, if instead of the putting
to death of the adp£ of Clirist there were named the
putting to death of any other adpP^ whatever.
Pfleiderer has become aware of the great incon
gruity (Incongrucnz) which we should have thus to
assume in the connection of Pauline thought. He
expresses himself at the close of his discussion of our
passage as follows (p. 118): ' On the likeness of the
cdpp^ condemned in Christ's body to ours rests the very
conception that that death has been immediately in
itself the destruction of the sin-principle for men
coUectively — no doubt a difficult conception withal,
inasmuch at any rate as the destruction of the
flesh in the case of Christ has quite a different sense
than it has in the case of Christians; in the former
it is the flesh as the natural substance of the body,
in the latter it is the flesh as the moral principle of
sin — consequently the same subject, doubtless, on both
sides, but according to two wholly different points of
view.' Pfleiderer finds the solution of this difficulty
in the Apostle's 'immediate mysticism of faith'
(unmittelbaren Glaubensmystik). But if it is aUow-
able to speak of a mysticism of St. Paul, we are cer
tainly far more warranted in speaking of his

VALUE OF THE ALLEGED KEY. 339
dialectic ; and we must be very careful lest under
cover of that word of many meanings ' mysticism,'
we impute to the Apostle lines of thought which
would run directly counter to all the acuteness —
elsewhere so weU attested — of his dialectic.
It would thus appear that this lately found key
to the Apostle's argument ends, by the confession of
Dr. Pfleiderer himself, in placing that argument on a
footing of undoubted obscurity and of very dubious
relevancy or cogency, in which Dr. Baur can only
see one of his ' unsolved antinomies,'1 and which
Dr. Pfleiderer can resolve into nothing better than
mysticism leaving all argument far behind it !
The key is declared to be indispensable to the
right apprehension of the Apostle's meaning — " to
deny this assumption," says Dr. Pfleiderer, " is to
cut the sinew {Nerv) of the argument " — but the
meaning that results from its application is declared
practically to be no meaning at all ! — a reductio
ad absurdum, which is of itself sufficient to dispose,
not certainly of the validity of the Apostle's argu
ment, but of the value of the alleged key to it.
If it should be asked why St. Paul has added the
word d/xaprlas to aapKos, and has not contented
himself with the simple ev aapKi, or ev 6/xotw/xan
aapKos, we may fairly reply, with Weiss, that " the
express bringing out of that condition of the em-
1 Vorlesungen iiber Neutest. Theologie, p. 191.

340 REASON FOR THE EXPRESSION CHOSEN.
piric o-a'jo£ could not be dispensed with in a con
nection, where the point under discussion was the
reference of the mission of Jesus to the sin that
ruled there, in so far as it could only be conquered
iu the sphere of its previous sway," Or we may
quote the fuller expression of the same idea in the
words of Wendt : " The erdpP^ is designated crdpP^
d/xaprlas, in order to indicate, not wherein, but
wherefore Christ became quite like the adpP^. The
fact that Christ was fully creature has, for St. Paul
and his discussion, an interest, only in so far as the
creature — according to his previous discussion of
the subject — is regularly sinful and needs a redemp
tion from the condemnation associated with sin.
What is indicated by the simple genitive d/xaprlas
is yet more definitely brought out by the express
addition Kat irepl d/xaprlas. We may reproduce the
thought of St. Paul approximately by paraphrasing
his words thus : ' God sent His Son so, that he in
his nature fully answered to the conception of the
creature, which, as experience shows, is for the most
part sinful and on account of this very sin formed
the object of Christ's manifestation as creature.
And the bearing of Christ's creaturely manifestation
on this sin is specified by the Apostle in the last
words of the verse, where he says that God through
the mission of His Son had pronounced a judgment
1 Bibl. Theol. d. N. T, p. 293, note.

CHRIST, AS FLESH, A JUDGMENT OVER SIN. 341
of condemnation within the creature itself over sin.
This thought becomes inteUigible only on the pre
supposition that Christ as adpP^, as creature, was
quite free from sin. If, forsooth, Christ was fully
vapP, and, notwithstanding, the sinless Son of God,
He was Himself precisely as adpP^ a judgment pro
nounced by God over sin, to the effect that sin does
not belong to the conception of the adpP^, that the
creature does not, as such, stand in moral dualism
overagainst God, but rather that, as in Christ, so
also in the community associated with Him notwith
standing of all creatureliness a fulfilment of the
divine will has become possible (verse 4)."

The inquiry which we have now brought to a
close has, we trust, served to show that, wlhle the
treatises by recent German scholars of which we spoke
in the outset are unquestionably marked by great
acuteness and subtlety, they present a somewhat mot
ley combination of exegesis, criticism, and speculation,
dubious in methods and incongruous in results ; that
the leading idea common to them of St. Paul's having
partially drawn his thoughts or language from Greek
philosophy — apart from its threefold improbability, in
view of the readers to whom he addressed himself,
in the light of his own pre-eminently Jewish nation
ality and culture, and in the face of his special

342 GENERAL RESULTS OF THE DISCUSSION.
disclaimers of dependence on, or alliance with, the
wisdom of the world — has no foundation in the facts
of the case ; and that, on the contrary, the Apostle's
language rests throughout on the precedent of Old
Testament usage and finds therein at once the war
rant for its employment, and the key to the variety
of its shades of meaning.
We have seen that there is no adequate exegetical
ground for the distinctive positions which these
writers have laid down as to adp£ carrying every
where a fundamental reference to the matter of the
earthly body or' implying a necessary element of sin,
and as to irvev/xa involving the conception of sub
stance, any more than for the special distinctions
drawn by them between adp£ and aw/xa, or — more or
less in common with certain Bibhcal psychologists —
between irvev/xa and v^wy//. We have traced, on the
other hand, as regards irvev/xa, its origin from, and
affinity to, the Hebrew ruach, its paramount place in
the Pauline system as the divine power initiating
and sustaining the Christian life, and its connotation
of a religious aspect and interest even when applied
as a designation for the mind of man ; while we have
found the leading senses of the Old Testament basar
reproduced in the case of adpp^, and the significance
of the latter term — in its most characteristic Pauline
use of contrast to irvev/xa — to lie not in the concep
tion of material substance, nor in that of man's

CONCLUSION. 343
lower sensuous nature, but in the contradistinction
of the creaturely nature of man — or creaturely side
of his nature— to the new life wrought by the
power of the divine Spirit in Christ.
And, if we have been in any measure successful
in establishing these conclusions, it would seem that
in this field at least theology may well dispense with
such gratuitous hypotheses and fanciful refinements
as those which we have passed in review ; that it
may with advantage fall back on the principle that
"sacred Scripture is its own best interpreter"; and
that it may find in the general results of a process
conducted in accordance with the methods and canons
of a sound exegesis a fresh confirmation of the well
known judgment of Winer, that " the controversies
among interpreters have usually led back to the ad
mission that the old Protestant views of the meaning
of Scripture are correct."

APPENDIX.
A.— VIEWS OF HOLSTEN, SCHMIDT, AND
LUDEMANN.
We have given in the first and second Lectures (pp.
18-62) an outline of the main positions taken up in the
discussion of the subject by Baur, Holsten, Schmidt,
Liidemann, and Pfleiderer. Here we present a fuller
abstract of the views of Holsten, Schmidt, and Liide
mann, who have dealt at length with the questions
concerned in works not yet accessible to the English
reader. It is less necessary to adopt a like course with
those of Dr. Baur who preceded them, because he has
not worked out the investigation so fully ; or with those
of Dr. Pfleiderer whose work is the most recent,
because it has been already translated. Our purpose
here is simply to state the views of the writers ; and we
shall do so, as far as possible, in their own language.
For brevity's sake we shall represent adp£, irvevpa, $vxfi,
vovs, and KapSla by their respective initial letters, and
dpapria by dp.
I. Dr. Carl Holsten.
Dr. Holsten's dissertation, entitled Dk, bedeuhmq des

wortes crap£ im lehrbegriffe des Paulus, was published in
1855, and reissued with some additions in 1868 in a

346 HOLSTEN
volume bearing the title Zum Evangelium des Paulus und
des Petrus. Our abstract is taken from the latter.
At the outset he tells us that his aim in the inquiry is
to disclose the basis of Paul's theological speculation ;
that he conceives this basis to be found in an in
vestigation of the import of o-dp£ ; and that he has set
himself the special task of tracing the manifold variety
of its use back to its fundamental (prmrApielle) signifi
cation. He draws his materials only from the four
Epistles that arc Homologoumena, not as pronouncing any
judgment adverse to the genuineness of the Antilegomena,
but as basing a contribution to a critical question only
on grounds accepted by criticism.
The first section is entitled "o-. and the nature of
man." The Pauline view of human nature is based on
that of the Old Testament, and distinguished only by
the precision and consistency with which it is maintained.
According to Gen. ii. 7, man is x°^s a""0 T')s 7>7S> mt°
which God breathed the life-breath whereby, man
became \pv\V (wo-a. The first man as such (der Mensch
an sich), the type of pre-Christian man (Rom. v. 19), is e/c
rijs yrjs x°'Kos (1 Cor. xv. 47). Earthy and earthly
matter is the ground-element of his nature — one of the
forms in which the matter of this visible world appears
(Gal. vi. 14). Such a material is the o\, as is shown by
1 Cor. xv. 35 — a passage which, rightly understood,
supplies a further decisive element for the conception.
There the sinew of the argument is the difference of
substance between earthly and heavenly bodies. The
deniers of the resurrection had doubted its possibility on
account of the earthly material substance of the o-. Paul
answers that, as on earth there are differences in the
material substance of animal organisms, so is there
difference as to substance between heavenly and earthly

ON 'FLESH' AS SENSUOUS LIVING MATTER. 347
bodies. Under the idea of o-£>pa they are posited as
identical ; in respect of substance they are distinct. The
substance of the awpara liriyeia is the earthly material
substance of the o-. ; while that of the awpara
k-irovpdvia is conceived as a heavenly light-substance
(verses 41, 47, 2 Cor. v. 2), with corresponding diversity
of appearance — 8o£<x.
The result is that o-. is the earthly, material living sub
stance of the animal organism, distinguished from earthly
matter generally only by the element of life. The cause
of this life is the indwelling of ^., which, in Paul's view,
has as close relation to the a. as in the Old Testament the
nephesh has to the basar, without the two being coinci
dent. All the passages where \p. occurs with Paul do not
carry us beyond the conception of vital power, of life.
And as the life of the cr. has its expression through the
senses, man as a. is sensuous-living matter, that is, flesh.
But cr. has always its qualitative characteristic in the
conception of substance. By this it is specifically dis
tinguished from the conception of awpa, which is that of
form, and especially the form under which the living sub
stance shaped into an articulate organism subsists — that
is, body.
We have thus gained the cardinal signification of the
word, but to get at its significance for Paulme theology,
we must ask : What in Paul's view was the bearing of
this definition of man's nature, as being sensuous-living
matter, on the religious relation of man to God 1 And as
in this relation the question at stake is the difference and
unity of man and God, we must ask, first, Has man in
Paul's view, as an element immanent in his nature and
contributing to define it, aught like or akin to the nature
of God, the inlevpa ? The answer to this question requires
us to look into Paul's conception of jr. We must make

348 HOLSTEN ON ' PNEUMA '
it out from sparing hints. The proper natural basis of
the idea, " breath, wind," has disappeared. But we are
reminded of it by the conception of invisibihty (doparov,
Rom. i. 20) as a contrast to visible sensuously-palpable
matter. On this immateriality rests the freedom from
all that is natural — primarily, the d(p9ap-ov and
dtSiov. But that this immateriality is not freedom from
all substantiality is evident from the very circumstance,
that Paul can only have conceived to himself the com
munication of the Spirit of God to believers as a radiation
oi something substantial combined with real effect (1 Cor.
ii. 12, Rom. v. 5, 2 Cor. iv. 6, Gal. iv. 6). In this way
a certain materiality slips again into the conception, and
the immateriality of the ir. becomes at bottom merely the
negative of " cosmic " earthly matter. He next passes in re
view the conceptions associated with the nature-basis of ir.
as self-movement. The rr. evepyei, is Svvapis, and works
Svvapis. It stands related above all to the will, and the
standing word for its effect is dyeaOai. It is a fiery
power radiating warmth, a vital flame newly kindled at
the centre of the inner life, the KapSla — which is in
Paul's view its standing recipient. It is the principle of
absolute truth (1 Cor. ii. 6), light in contrast to dark
ness, shining in the hidden interior. It is the principle
of holiness, pre-eminently a dyiov ; and by holiness is
originally meant the negative of the natural — a freedom
from all that springs out of the sensuous nature (natiir-
lichkeit) of man. In all these elements the rr. is thought
of as substantial, but also as transcending earth and the
earthly. Returning to the question, Whether man, according to
Paul, stands in any sort of unity of nature. (Wesen) with
God, whose substantial nature is -rr., Holsten holds, from
the view of a. already given, that man, being in respect of

AS TRANSCENDENT. 349
his nature-basis a., stands purely in contradistinction to
God. Nor has man in the \p. anything identical with the
nature of God. The ip. is at all events, doubtless, non-
material, and, in so far, must be pneumatic in the most
general sense of the term. It is a life-principle too, and
as such analogous to the ir. But, so far as the if-, stands
in absolute relation to the natural, as the life-power
of what is material, it is in turn purely opposed to the tt.
But Paul distinguishes a higher element in man's
nature, an eaw dvOpwiros designated in Rom. vii. 9
by vovs. Have we in this an element essentially akin to
the divine ir ? After a review of the chief passages (1
Cor. xiv. 14 ff, Rom. vii, Rom. xii. 2) it is concluded that
v. is merely the subjective consciousness, the form, in which
the subjective mind comes to know what is given to it as
contents, and which may have opposite contents. It is not
an element identical with, or analogous to, the nature of
God. But is not the ir. itself for Paul an element in the con
ception of man ?
Although the clear statement at 1 Cor. xv. 44 that the
first man Adam was only a -f-. £waa, the whole Pauline
view of the world — which is simply an explication of the
saying : ov 7rpwTov to irvevpariKov dXXa to -^tv-^ikov, eirena
t6 -irvevpariKov — and the absolute sway of sin from Adam
to Christ might seem to indicate that the ir. had been
until Christ purely transcendent, and had only become
immanent in humanity through Christ, expositors have,
on the basis of various passages in the admitted Epistles,
thought themselves entitled to assume also a "human-
creaturely " ir., although no one has yet specified what
sort of conception Paul has associated with it, or what
sort of significance it has for the nature of man. To
determine the question we must go through all the pas-

3 5 0 HOLSTEN ON ' PNEUMA '
sages that bear on it, and accordingly, after mentioning
those where the reference to the transcendent tt. is clear,
Holsten proceeds to examine the otliers on which the
opposite view is usually rested. Ho thinks that at 1 Cor.
v. 3, 4, but slight reflection suffices to discern the divine
ir. conferred on the Apostle as the source of his apostolic
dignity and power. Whence else could he have had the
power, or wished to take the right, of irapaSovvai t$
Caravel ? The passage shows the arbitrariness of the
canon that the addition ipov or r/pwv or the like makes
the t. human. At Rom. i. 9 ev rw irvevpan pov denotes
the same apostolic -n-., the spirit specially conferred on
him and enabling him to render pneumatic service. Had
Paul meant the sincerity of his service in contrast to
hypocritical semblance, he would have said ii< KapSias.
In accordance with this passage we must explain 2 Cor.
ii. 13; xii. 18; vii. 13; 1 Cor. xvi. 18; Rom. xii. 11;
xv. 30, of the divine ir. at work in the preachers of the
gospel (and believers). At Gal. vi. 18 the express promi
nence of the tt. is only to be explained by its being under
stood of the divine ir. become immanent in the Galatians,
which was in danger of being quenched in the carnal
nature. So with 1 Cor. vii. 34 and 2 Cor. vii. 1— a
passage, however, very difficult to be explained in keep
ing with Pauline conceptions, according to which the <r.
is the principle and source of pollution and so cannot he
the object of it, which could only be the awpa. The
whole passage vi. 14-vii. 1 is probably not genuine.
In all these passages ir. is used only of believers, in
whom the transcendent has become immanent. As con
trast thereto stands in 2 Cor. xi. 4 a tt. erepov, where the
Xapfidveiv itself shows the conception of transcendence.
Passing to the cases of ir. being defined by a genitive
of quahty, he holds that passages like Rom xi. 8, viii. 15

AS AN ALLEGED ELEMENT OF MAN. 351
show that the modern view of a subjective "disposi
tion " of the human mind is quite alien to them. ir. here
denotes, quite in keeping with its idea, an objective — as it
were, hypostatically presented — pneumatic power, which,
as the expressions eXd/3eTe and eSmxev show, is conceived
as in itself transcendent, and is therefore set forth as
bestoWed by God on man at a definite time and as being
felt at work in the KapSla (Rom. viii. 15, comp. Rom.
viii. 26 f.) to impel man to a definite action. Thus are
to be explained Rom. i. 4 ; viii. 15 ; xi. 8 ; 1 Cor. iv. 21 ;
Gal. vi. 1 ; 2 Cor. iv. 13. But Rom. viii. 16 and 1 Cor.
ii. 11 are said to be decisive in support of a human ir.
Now at the former passage interpreters vary, and Baur
is evidently right in taking the -rr. rjpwv as the ir. vtoOealas,
ev <$ Kpd(opev 'A/3 /3d 6 iraryp, which again, according to
Gal. iv. 6, is the transcendent divine Spirit, the same ob
jective ir., which in Rom. viii. 26 virepevTvyydvei arevdy-
pois dXaXriiois, whose effect God discerns in our hearts
in which it has become immanent. At the latter passage,
after a view of the connection, it is admitted that there
is mention of a pneumatic element in man as the principle
of his self-consciousness. But so far is this ir. from being
one akin iu nature to the ir. of God, that it is only by
communication of the divine ir. that man is enabled to ap
prehend the pneumatic, and to discern that even with
thisir., and notwithstanding of it, he remains an dvOpwiros
xpvxiKos, who certainly has a ir., but only the ir. toC Koapov.
For it is evident that for Paul what he calls to it. tov
dvOpwirov here coincides with the ir. tov Koapov, and this
coincides with the ^x1?; *he spirit of sensuousness which
in the vo€s comes to consciousness — that is, the contrast
to the ir. This </-. is, like the v., doubtless a pneumatic
element, because everything non-material is ir. in the
most general sense of the word ; it doubtless falls under

352 HOLSTEN ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ' SARX'
the conception of ir. as abstract generic conception for the
non-material ; but it has nothing in common with the
concrete tt., the to irvevpa, the sole reality of the abstract
generic conception. So at Rom. ii. 29 the irepiropi)
KapSias is ev irvevpan, but this does not mean the sphere
of the subjective spirit, which is correctly designated by
KapSias in opposition to iv T<j) </>avep£i ev aapKi. It is a
circumcision of the inner subject, which has its existence
in the objective sphere of the non-natural, non-sensuous,
non-external, because it transcends the letter of Scripture,
that is, the external carnal understanding of the word,
according to which irepnopg certainly refers to the ex
ternally visible material element of the subject, the
adp£. An accurate analysis of all the passages thus shows that
there does not, according to Paul's conception, exist
in man an organ corresponding to the divine ir., a hu
man ir. receptive of the divine. That organ is the
KapSla ; the principle of self-consciousness is the vovs ;
anything higher is the divine ir. The essential elements
of man as such are for Paul only a., \p., v., which have
the appearance (Erscheinung) of an individual Ego in the
awpa, the organic form for the substance of the cr. This
result is substantially in keeping with the distinction, not
always adhered to, in the Old Testament between ruach
and nephesh.
With this result we are now in a position to determine
the significance of the a. for Paul's religious anthro
pology. As there is no essential element in man like to
the essence of God — to the ir. — and the contrast between
ir. and cr. is thus not an anthropological but a meta
physical one, and as the v., as a mere theoretic form
indifferent to its contents, is no essential peculiarity
characteristic of man overagainst God, we may see {so

AS EXPRESSION FOR THE FINITE. 353
begreift es sich) how in the religious relation of God and
man the nature of the latter may for Paul coincide
with the cr. animated by the ip. ; how the religious rela
tion generally may be presented as that of the ir., the
non-material mental substance, to the cr., the material
sensuous substance; and, if that relation in abstract
generality is that of the finite to the infinite, we may see
that for Paul the conception of a. is the expression for
the conception of the finite. In this conception of the finite
the o-. has its most proper (eigenilichste) significance ; hence
may be explained its comprehensive use and the variety
of its applications.
Hence, first, dvOpwiros as finite subject in religion is
identical and interchangeable with o\ (comp. 1 Cor. iii. 4
with iii. 1, 3) ; dvOpwirivos and /cctTa dvOpwirov are parallel
with aapKiKos and Kara adpKa. (Rom. vi. 19 ; 1 Cor. iii.
21 comp. with 1 Cor. i. 26 ; 2 Cor. xi. 18 ; and 2 Cor. i.
12 comp. with 1 Cor. ii. 13). Mankind in this sense of
finiteness is called Tracra o-. (Rom. iii. 20 ; 1 Cor. i. 29 ;
Gal. ii. 16) and man a. ko.1 atpa (Gal. i. 16 comp. with 1
Cor. xv. 50). Now God as ir. and man as a., infinite and
finite, stand in absolute contrast. Physically the cr. is
identical with <p0opd (1 Cor. xv. 50, 42). As <f>0apr6s
man is also Ovgros. The cr. is the principle of perishable-
ness. In the intellectual sphere the a. is the prin
ciple of error. The ao<f>ol Kara adpKa are pwpol. The
jr. alone is the principle of the knowledge of absolute
truth (1 Cor. ii. 10, 14). The vovs ttjs aapKos (Col. ii.
18; Paul in the four Epistles has the thing, but not
the expression) clings to the material, the sensuously
perceptible. But the contrast reveals itself above all in
the practical domain — the will. The a. is, in virtue of
its indwelling ip., material substance having sensuous
life, which expresses itself in eiriOvpla, sensuous impulse,
z

354 HOLSTEN ON DUALISM OF SUBSTANCES.
desire. This is the Svvapis immanent in the flesh, the
necessary manifestation of the sarkic substance. Its
manifestations are iraO/jpaTa (Rom. vii. 5 ; Gal. v. 24),
because man in them has not the freedom of self-deter
mination, but is given up powerlessly to a nature-power
and nature-necessity. The eiriOvpla is a vd/xos in the o\ ;
the a-, obeys not the law of God, ovSe ydp Svvarai. The
kiriQvpia is in Paul's view the most especial (eigenste)
self of man, in which is displayed the most complete
contrast between man and God, cr. and rr. The contrast
of substances becomes a contrast of their effects, when, as
in Gal. v., the epya rrjs aapKos are set overagainst the
fruit of the Spirit. The cr., as the sensuousness of man's
living material substance, is at the same time evil. All
evil has its principle only in it. All sins, which we ap
prehend as sins of "the finite spirit" — the spiritual
sins of idolatry, heresy, variance, envy — are derived by
Paul from the a. (Gal. v. 19-21). This follows con
sistently from the dualism of substances, and from the
fact that they in Paul's view are a power completely
dominating the subject, which is at bottom merely meet
ing-point and form for the workings of the finite and in
finite substance (comp. Gal. v. 17). The a. thus stands in
absolute contrast to the jr., the nature of God ; but, if it is
the true nature of man, it follows that, in Paul's view,
man as such (an sich) stands simply in contradistinction to God.
This is only one of the forms of the dualism pervading
St. Paul's doctrinal system. [Here comes in the passage
as to the grounds and limits of this dualism, quoted in the
text at p. 26 f.]
He then proceeds to follow out a., thus defined, in its
relation to the vd/xos, as to which he holds that the forms
of the ritual law are treated by Paul as purely ex
ternal, relative to the a., and not properly belonging to

THE 'FLESH' NECESSARILY 'SIN-FLESH.' 355
the vd/xos as 7rveu/xaTiKds ; 1 and thereafter in reference
to the conception of sin, which is essentially bound up
with it. Man as such is evil. The a. is essentially a a.
dpaprias, and man of himself is, as such a., in respect of
his substantial nature dpapria, which, however, is not to
be taken as equivalent to our conception of sin as accom
panied by consciousness and sense of guilt. These are
subjective elements ; dp. denotes merely sin in the objective
sense, all that, in purely objective relation to the idea of
God, reveals itself in the eiriOvpia as unholiness of the
sensuous-material substance. Subjective sin, sin in the
proper sense of the word, only arises through the revela
tion of the holy will of God in the evroXg dyia or the
vd/xos irvevpariKos ; under which dp. becomes irapdpla-
o-is, conscious transgression. The cr. is the nature-ground,
the dp. the objective presupposition, of all subjective sin.
Sin is a necessity without freedom; man is a slave
determined to sin ; but he has the consciousness of the
sinful deed as his own ; and it is this dualism, the con
sciousness of his own act with the feeling of being abso
lutely determined to it by the substance of the body, that
brings man to that exclamation of despair, " 0 wretched
man that I am ! who shall deliver me from this body of
death?"1 1 Perhaps, Holsten says, Paul reckoned the ritual law among the
iraTpiKal ira.pa.d6{rei.s. At any rate, in his polemic he ignored it
and dealt only with the moral law.
1 Holsten regards the controversy as to whether Rom. vii. 14 ff.
refers to the state of the regenerate or the unregenerate as alto
gether superfluous [durchaus miissiger) so far as Paul is concerned.
The connection shows it to be " a representation of the religious
history of the Hebrew subjective spirit, carried back from the
apparent reality to its idea (hegriff), and expressed by the indi
viduality, which must be in plain language (ohne phrase) called
the Hebrew Ego attaining to clearness respecting itself."

356 HOLSTEN ON ROMANS V. 12-21.
But how is this doctrine of sin and death as a necessary
consequence of the finiteness of man's nature to be recon
ciled with Rom. v. 12 ff, where they seem presented as
the consequence of the one sin of the one first man,
Adam ? Without entering into the particulars of Holsten's
discussion, which in this field, as in those of Christology,
the new life of believers, and the resurrection, passes be
yond our limits, suffice it to say that Holsten regards
Rom. v. 12-21 as forming a transition from the first
great section of the Epistle, i. 18 — v. 11, to the second
section, ch. vi.-xii. The first section deals with the ob
jective righteousness brought through Christ, presup
posing the non-righteousness of man, and conferred as a
gift of grace apart from the law ; and the second seeks
to obviate objections to the new doctrine from a Jewish
or Jewish-Christian point of view, based on its apparent
incompatibility with the legal requirement of subjective
righteousness. The passage v. 12-21 delineates in a few
broad traits the new form in which the history of the re
ligious development of humanity reveals itseh to the
Christian consciousness, setting forth the world as deter
mined (bestimmte) by Adam and by Christ respectively,
and the law with its intermediate position and relative-
absolute aim of leading the old over into the new. And
he comes to the conclusion that Paul views the develop
ment of the world-order from a double standpoint— from
that of objective necessity, the idea and will of God,
and from that of free subjectivity, the nature of man.
The two modes of view are not logically reconciled, but
run separately side by side, and fall dualistically apart ;
and Paul utters the contradictory elements equally as
truth. We too must therefore in the sense of Paul think
the contradiction and the two together, the objective and
the subjective form of world-development. Although

DR. RICHARD SCHMIDT. 357
men were objectively made sinners and given up to death
through an act of God by means of Adam's transgression,
yet at the same time their subjective nature — their a.- —
makes them sinners and drives them into death.

II. Dr. Richard Schmidt.
In a treatise on " the Paulme Christology," published
in 1870, Dr. Schmidt devotes his first chapter to "the
contrast of Flesh and Spirit." While agreeing in the main
with Holsten, he deems it not superfluous to subject to
critical examination the different views entertained on
the question.
The usual course is to start from the fact that the
flesh appears with Paul as the seat, if not the source, of sin,
and from the conviction — otherwise acquired — that the
Apostle may not be regarded as supporting the so-called
theory of sensuousness ; and to assign to the conception
of cr. a contents transcending or altogether leaving the
sphere of sensuousness, so as to facilitate the reference
to it of phenomena essentially mental (geistiger). Before
investigating the warrant for such an extension or trans
formation of the original conception, we have first to
assure ourselves of what is the proper meaning of the ex
tension. The answers to this question are not so distinct
as could be wished, when almost in one breath cr. is
defined as the seat of sinful inclination, or sinful human
nature, and then as this sinful inclination itself, or the
tendency of the will as opposed to God, or human sin
fulness in general (as by Neander, Schmid, Messner).
As if these were not quite disparate conceptions, or as if
we were at liberty to impose on a word, whose primary
sense is — rightly or wrongly — dropped, any signification
we please, to be applied in each case according to the

358 SCHMIDT'S CRITICISM
fancy of the expositor. Even assuming the technical use
of the word in Paul to prove an extension beyond its
original import, we may not without arbitrariness discard
the idea of an unity underlying that use ; and we may
reasonably claim that each signification so assumed shall
make good not only its general motive, but also its asso
ciation with the original contents of the conception.
The latter demand, if admitted as valid, is fatal to the
view which takes cr. as denoting sin itself according to
the ground-form which conditions its individual manifes
tations : for Schmidt at least cannot see what connection
of ideas is held to subsist between the material substance
of the body, which a. originally denotes, and a tendency
of the mental life. This objection remains in force, even
when the sensuous element is so far retained as to define
that tendency speciaUy as " fleshliness," that is, as con
ditioned by a preponderance of the material side (as by
Ernesti); for that which has its peculiarity determined by
the flesh is not on that account itself flesh. Nor does it
mend the matter to fill up that sensible gap by a series
of stages of development (Julius Mulier), so long as there
inevitably remains at the decisive spot a chasm through
an utter abandoning of the connection previously in
somefashion retained. But apart from such general consi
derations the view in question cannot be maintained in the
face of the definite distinction which Paul makes (Rom.
vh. 17f., 25) between the a. and the sin dwelhnginit, as
indeed on such an assumption the combination o-. dp.
(Rom. viii. 3) would be absolutely meaningless. The
attempt of Julius Mulier to get quit of this difficulty by
retaining for such passages the morally indifferent
anthropological import of a. is not consistent with the
close connection between the seventh and eighth chapters
of the Epistle to the Romans, which precludes our

OF ERNESTI, JULIUS MULLER, AND WEISS. 359
assuming such a difference of sense as that explanation
demands. It might seem as if the objections urged against the
identification of cr. with sin did not apply to the other
more usual view, under which a. is held to denote human
nature, so far as it is a source of sinful conduct for the
Ego. But here, too, we must ask : What is precisely
meant ? Does the a. denote directly sinful human
nature, so that the element of corruption adhering to it
forms an immediate constituent of the conception ? Or
is it meant that the word is in itself merely an expression
for human nature in general, but that the latter empiri
cally exists only in such a shape as to produce a sinfulness
of the personal conduct conditioned by it ? Against the
former nearly the same exegetical objections may be
urged as were adduced before ; the statements of the
Apostle that in his flesh dwells nothing good, or that he
with his flesh serves the law of sin, would contain a truth,
hut a truth so indubitable as hardly to be distinguished
from a platitude ; and a combination hke a. dp. would be
a hardly conceivable pleonasm. Besides, we ask how
could a cr. in that case be ascribed to Christ, and yet His
sinlessness retained ? Hardly any other course would be
left than to take the word in such cases in a morally
neutral sense ; and then we may ask with what warrant
there has been introduced into the conception an element
which may thus be laid aside at pleasure 1 This leads
accordingly to the modification, under which the element
of sinfulness belongs, not to the conception in itself, but
only to its empiric reality (Weiss). But in that case
how should the formulae irepiiraTeiv Kara adpKa, ev aapKi
eu/at involve, as unquestionably in Pauline usage they
do, a moral censure 1 They would of themselves mean
" a walk according to human nature," but not according

360 SCHMIDT ON THE CONCEPTION
to human nature so and so determined— the general
character of the formulae not leading us to seek in them
such a more precise definition. Hofmann strikes out a
middle course not liable to the previous objections. He
takes cr. as denoting not human nature in itself, or as
sinful, but as in its present state conditioned by the sin
of the first man. This is explained to mean that man is,
after Old Testament usage, called " flesh," as a being
dependent and perishable ; it designates him on the side
of dependence, not of sinfulness. " But," says Hofmann,
"liable to such perishableness, he is also liable to sin. A
will placed in such conditions cannot be righteous, life in
so impure a body cannot be pure." But, apart from the
question how far Hofmann is warranted in speaking of
the body a priori as " impure," we are naturally led to
ask how, assuming that Jesus has taken the present
human nature, it stands with His sinlessness, if the two —
perishableness and sinfulness — are to be so closely con
nected ? And, even if we hold the personal conduct of
Jesus not to havo been conditioned by this His nature,
as is the case empirically with us, we may still ask on
what Hofmann's definition is based ? and what entitles
us at all to find in cr. an expression for collective human
nature, whether in itself or with any sort of de facto
qualification 1
This question seems all the more called for, the less
that the current application of the conception is of itself
natural. Long ecclesiastico-ascetic usage of the word
" flesh " associated with the world and the devil, makes
it difficult for us to recall the original meaning that lies
under its technical application ; but, if we consider the
matter apart from this traditional habit, we cannot but
think it a far from obvious, and indeed a pretty strange,
usage to designate human nature as a whole simply as

OF ' FLESH ' AS HUMAN NATURE. 361
flesh. It has no doubt been claimed already for the
Old Testament, and asserted as a general Biblical
usage, inasmuch as there the whole man is designated
absolutely as flesh, even in connections which are far
from bearing exclusively or preponderantly on the sensu
ous side of his being. . . . With the restriction that the
latter statement applies at bottom only to the kol-basar,
which has become in the strictest sense technical, the
fact must be undoubtedly recognized as correct ; but we
must deny that any inference may be drawn thence for
the correctness of the view in question. In all such cases
basar denotes the concrete "man," not the abstract
" human nature " or the " human " generally ; and it
seems to betoken an inadequate attention to the distinc
tion, when the transition from the one to the other is
accounted quite easy and obvious (Luthardt). For the con
crete man is actually flesh in the strictest sense, although
animated by a personal life-spirit ; in view of others
he exists only as such, belonging as such to the phe
nomenal world. It would not even be correct to find
here an extension of the original conception, seeing that
the sole difference from its application elsewhere amounts
to this, that in the one case the Ego is distinguished from
its material body as something belonging to it, while in
the other this body itself as animated by personal life is
elevated into the subject. Again, it is not an extension
but an abandonment of the original sense, when " flesh "
is held to denote human nature, inasmuch as the general
conception of substance or material, which the word
involves, is exchanged for the quite heterogeneous one
of " nature " or " kind." Granting ever so duly that this
nature is that of a corporeal, material being, the material
body and the nature characteristically conditioned by it
are none the less different things ; and it is not easy to

362 Schmidt's grounds for retaining
explain how the substance of the former could become
an expression for the latter. Where, besides, basar is
predicated of man absolutely, it is in no other sense than
that in which the formula " all flesh " relates at times
also to the animal world (e.g. Gen. vi. 19 ; vii. 16), or in
which it is said of the horses of the Egyptians that they
are flesh and not spirit (Is. xxxi. 3) ; whence we may see
how little the analogy of the Old Testament use can be
appealed to for the sense ascribed to a. of " the human
with the accessory idea of weakness and sinfulness "
(Tholuck). Nor in the New Testament writings other
than those of Paul is there any necessity for going be
yond the bounds of Old Testament usage and enlarging
the proper idea of adp£ into that of empiric human
nature, — not even at Matt. xxvi. 41, where the tempta
tion, into which the disciples are in danger of faihng,
threatens them from an outward need which affects the
sensuous man, and the flesh may be conceived accord
ingly as subject to it, in so far as it is animated and
accessible to sensuous impressions.
After all this it would require very cogent grounds to
make us in Paul's case recognize a signification of o-.,
for which no sure warrant can be found elsewhere. But
not only are the arguments adduced for it not so cogent,
but indications telling against it are got rid of by its
supporters after a very unsatisfactory fashion. Schmidt
reviews the chief passages, maintaining that at Rom. i. 3 ;
ix. 5 ; Gal. ii. 23, 29 ; 1 Cor. x. 8, where Kara adpKa is
used as regards Christ, Israel, and the people of Israel
respectively, there is no necessity for enlarging the con
ception beyond its original limits ; that at other pas
sages, where the flesh is represented as the peculiar
sphere and characteristic determining element of non-
Christian being and conduct (such as 1 Cor. iii. 3, where

THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE WORD. 363
KaTa dvOpwirov irepiirareiv is obviously equivalent to koto
o-ap/ca irepnraTeiv elsewhere, 1 Cor. i. 26 f. where ao<pol
Kara o-ap/ca are identical with aocpol rov Koapov, and
Philem. 16 : Kal ev o-an/u /cat ev Kvplw), it is of the utmost
importance to distinguish between what is on each occa
sion involved in the thought, and what is implied in the
conception of the flesh itself (as in the latter passage,
where, so far as the general sense goes, we might render
haapKi; "in the human-natural relation in which he
stands to thee as a slave," but a. itself does not denote
a relation any more than Kvptos does) ; and that, even
where the proper notion may seem indefinitely enlarged
(as in the apparent equivalence of a. to Koapos), we must
bear in mind that a-, denotes not so much the body as
the material substance of this body, that this substance
is in keeping with the Old Testament view (Gen. ii. 7 ;
comp. 1 Cor. xv. 4, 7), essentially identical with that of
the earthly world generally, sharing its common character
of materiality ; that, as flesh, man is a member of the
phenomenal world ; that flesh is the medium of all his
relations with this world; and that it may therefore
denote as well the sphere within which the purely
natural being and action of man is carried on, as that
which determines the peculiarity of such being or action,
without renouncing the category of substance or matter
originally underlying it.
The original meaning of the word is to be retained,
even where it emerges in definite ethical relations.
Great stress is laid by Wieseler and Ritschl on the fact
that when Paul opposes the jr. to the a., he is to be
understood as speaking not of the human, but of the di
vine ir. ; and so a. cannot denote the bodily nature of
man only, but must denote his being as a whole (das ge-
sammte Wesen). But, even granting the correctness of

364 SCHMIDT ON THE SENSE OF 'FLESH'
the premiss, the stringency of the inference drawn from
it may be questioned. When Paul opposes the non-
Christian and Christian conduct as a irepiiraTeiv Kara
adpKa and irepnrareiv Kara ir., he wishes to describe them
according to the principle or determining power which
empirically characterises each ; if this is for the Chris
tian's walk the indwelling Spirit of God, why should the
Apostle not oppose to this the flesh in the proper sense,
in so far as it may be otherwise shown that he de facto
discerned in it the power determining the non-Christian
hfe 1 We see easily that this argument must at bottom
assume what awaits proof as proved alreadjr. So we
may admit that the formulae Kara dvOpwirov irepiirareiv
and koto, adpKa irepiirareiv ultimately amount in substance
to the same thing, without allowing the inference of a
coincidence in conception. Lastly, if appeal is made to
Gal. v. 19 ff, as including not merely sensuous sins, but
also such as hatred and envy among works of the flesh,
it is not necessarily involved in the consistency of a view
which finds the empiric ground of sin generally in the
material body, that all individual sins should admit of
being with equal directness traced back to it. At any
rate, two questions require to be kept quite distinct — the
one whether such a view, objectively regarded, is really
adequate for an explanation of sin in its various shapes ;
and the other, whether it is actually to be found in the
Apostle's writings. The negation of the former is no
reason for denying the latter, at least so long as we do
not come to the inquiry with the absolute presupposition
that there cannot be found in the Apostle's cycle of
thought anything at variance with the view we ourselves
deem correct — a presupposition, which purely historical
research cannot make without depriving itself beforehand
of its freedom, and which strict orthodoxy (Schrift-

IN ETHICAL RELATIONS. 365
glaubigkeif) cannot make without practically renouncing
its own principle of unconditional submission to the
Apostolic utterances.
The less may we evade the weight of the positive indi
cations, which bring the proper signification of a., else
where demonstrable, definitely enough into prominence
also in its ethical relations. When Paul places the law
of sin in the members (Rom. vii. 23), when he speaks
of a destruction of the body of sin (Rom. vi. 6), or of a
mortifying the mischievous (rdnkevoll) activity of the
body (Rom. viii. 13) he lays a stress on the bodily na
ture, which must be at least surprising for those who
defend the view hitherto considered. . . . Evidently the
conceptions " flesh '' on the one hand and " body " or
" members " on the other are treated as essentially equi
valent: to the o-. in which sin dwells (Rom. vii. 18)
correspond the peXrj, in which the law of sin has its seat
(verse 23), just as at Rom. viii. 13, to the KaTa adpKa {fjv
is opposed the Oavarovv ras irpd^eis rov awparos. Both
are to be explained from cr. being the substance of this
material body itself, consisting of members.
After some remarks controverting the view of Ritschl,
who had questioned the practical equivalence of the two
conceptions in dealing with Rom. vii., Schmidt finds him
self now in a position to judge what warrant there is for
speaking of cr. as used in several significations, as is done
by Ernesti, who distinguishes a physiologico-anthropo-
logical, a historico-anthropological, and an ethico-anthropo-
logical standpoint. Such a viewis only got by either raising
collateral conceptions associated for us with the idea
into immediate constituents of it, or by attributing what
is implied in the general thought of a passage simply to
one notion contained in it. Paul's peculiarity is not to
be sought in his having remodelled the notion in ques-

366 Schmidt's view of the antithesis.
tion, but only in the equally comprehensive and precise
significance which, with contents unchanged, it holds in
his doctrinal system. 2. with him is neither the whole
undivided human nature, nor is it one side thereof in
distinction from another ; it never means anything else
than the material substance of the animal, including the
human, body.
Having thus fixed the signification of the one member
of the antithesis, we may acquire a more precise insight
into the peculiar nature of that antithesis. As the con
ception of cr. is not simply tantamount to that of the hu
man, the divine as such cannot form the immediate con
trast to it. Even where the Spirit of God stands defi
nitely overagainst the flesh, the emphasis will rest not so
much on the genitive of more precise definition, as rather
on the chief idea which is thereby more precisely defined.
In other words, the question turns on the contrast of
flesh and spirit, not immediately on that of God and man
(the latter conceived of as he exists naturally in experi
ence). The distinction thus made, which it is of decisive
importance to keep in view, leads us on at once to dis
tinguish between the general conception of spirit and
the reality existing in ir. Oeov, even in the event of
Paul's being supposed not to know another reahty of spirit.
This may be tested by the fact that we cannot by any
means, wherever the idea of ir. appears in an antithetic
relation, mentally supply at once the more precise
definition of the divine, without altering somehow the
sharpness of the contrast. Especially instructive in
this respect are the passages in which not a. hut
ypdppa forms the contrast (Rom. vh. 6 ; Rom. ii. 29 ; 2
Cor. iii. 6) ; but the same holds true of cases where a.
forms the antithesis, such as Gal. iv. 29 ; Rom. viii. 9,
and throughout this earher part of the eighth chapter.

CRITICISM of holsten AND WEISS. 367
where there are not expressly more precise definitions
added ; as well as at Gal. v. 16ff. In all these cases the
expressions are to be left entirely in their generality.
In this light the question much discussed and diversely
answered — Whether in the passages adduced we have to
think of the divine or the human ir. — has become for us
one without an object, as it concerns a conception which
"desires to be left entirely general." But we may not
escape the other question, Whether in the Apostle's
opinion the divine Spirit is the sole reality of this con
ception, in such a sense that the ir. stands overagainst
man as such in absolute transcendence ? or whether it is
in any way a constituent part of his nature 1 The former
is energetically maintained by Holsten, according to whom
man in himself, as conceived by Paul, is held to have
absolutely no element in himself really opposed to the a.;
and Weiss maintains that, though occasionally the Apostle
follows a popular use of language, this may not be looked
on as at all a criterion for his anthropology, which ex
cludes the specific conception of ir. But the number of
passages, where to all appearance there is mention of a
spirit of man, is far from inconsiderable (Rom. i. 9 ;
2 Cor. ii. 13, vii. 13; 1 Cor. xvi. 18; Gal. vi. 18; Phil.
iv. 23 ; 2 Tim. iv. 22 ; Philem. 23 ; 1 Cor. v. 3 ff.; ii. 11 ;
vii. 34 ; 2 Cor. vii. 1 ; Col. ii. 5) ; and the defenders of
the view in question find themselves compelled to deviate
from . the current explanation of them in a way not very
happy. In almost all these passages Holsten would
have us understand the ir. of the divine spirit become
subjective, and Weiss of a spiritual life of higher origin
produced by that spirit. Holsten thinks himself able to
show that the addition of the personal pronoun does not
make the ir. human at 1 Cor. v. 4 and Rom. i. 9. He
tells us that at the former passage it needs "but

368 Schmidt's criticism of holsten
slight reflection " to recognise in the jr. the divine Spirit,
" the source of apostolic dignity and of apostolic power " ;
but it likewise needs but little reflection to see that Paul
could not possibly regard something common to him
with all Christians as such a source of his specific apos
tolic standing. Besides, the "power" of the Lord Jesus
appears alongside of the ir. of the Apostle as something
different from it, which would have hardly been the
case, had Paul understood under the latter the Spirit of
Christ himself. Lastly, at verse 3 the contrast : cbnuv t£
awpan, irapwv Se tu irvevpan can hardly be taken as
other than anthropological, and, as it is plain that the
mention of ir. in verse 4 looks back to these words, the
ir. must be the same in the two cases. That the passage
yields no natural sense in the ordinary view, is a mere
groundless assertion. As to Rom. i. 9 the objections
urged by Holsten against Philippi's view are certainly well-
founded ; but he has not observed that the addition ev
t<iT irvevpan pov admits of a more satisfactory explanation
than is given by him. The Apostle calls God to wit
ness that he serves him in the cause of the gospel not
merely by the outward activity of preaching, but also
inwardly (the words ev nf irvevpan pov affirm this) in so
far as all his thoughts are applied to advance it in the
churches (so Hofmann). At other passages too, where
the personal pronoun occurs, Holsten's view is inadmis
sible. At 1 Cor. v. 5 to take the jr. to be saved of the
communicated Spirit of God yields no effective meaning
— unless we should for iv t§ r/pepa read ek tt)v f/pepav in
the sense that the Spirit should remain preserved for the
sinner till the day of judgment. As here, so at 2 Cor.
vii. 1 the spirit is contrasted with the cr., at 1 Cor. vii. 34
with the awpa; and at these passages the impossibility of
Holsten's explanation becomes apparent. For in the

AND OF WEISS. 369
case of the Holy Spirit of God even become subjective
there can be no talk of a defilement, or yet of a sancti
fying ; and, even if with Holsten we question the genuine
ness of the former passage, there remains the latter, in
which the parallelism with awpan precludes us from
thinking of aught else than a sanctifying of the spirit
(not through the Spirit). No less clearly is the distinc
tion of the human ir. from the divine apparent at Rom.
viii. 16, where Holsten's identification of the ir. rjpwv
with the previously mentioned ir. vloOeaias is hardly
anything else than a renunciation — forced upon him by
his theory — of the natural exegesis, which points clearly
enough to the referring the words a^To to jr. to the im
mediately preceding ir. vloOeaias. Besides, the thought
which Holsten gets from the passage has too much of a
modern abstract character to commend itself as Pauline.
The view of Weiss is not so much affected by these ob
jections, but is, regarded purely in itself, the less natural,
as it occupies an intermediate position between the ordi
nary view and that of Holsten. According to it the ir.
in the passages in question is a higher spiritual life
wrought in believers, which is distinguished from the
divine Spirit even as having become immanent in man, so
that we should have to assume in the redeemed a two
fold communicated ir. But Paul knows only of a re
ceived Spirit ; and the higher hfe possessed by the
Christian is only a hfe led in the power of this Spirit ;
besides, it would be difficult to form a really clear
conception of what is meant, if, on the one hand, the
objective power, as communicated to us (N. B. !), of the
divine Spirit is by no means to be entirely merged into
that subjective spiritual life produced by it, and, on the
other hand, alongside of this latter, the natural spirit-
life is regarded as continuing to subsist. Paul certainly
2 A

370 SCHMIDT ON THE PLACE OF ' PNEUMA '
distinguishes the divine ir., even as having ah-eady become
immanent, always in some way from the tt. which lie
designates as that of man; but for that very reason
under the latter can only be understood the human inner
life generally, which, as but relatively penetrated by
the Spirit of God, continues also relatively distinct from
it. If, on the other hand, this latter side is expressly
marked off, that which remains behind is no longer
to be distinguished from the divine become immanent ;
else we should — seeing that in fact the Spirit as com
municated has thereby at the same time become a
subjective spirit — be obliged to assume a Ihreefuld
sphere in which the life of believers is accomplished.
Weiss remarks quite correctly that in R om. viii. 16 the
Spirit which gives the certainty of childship is dis
tinguished from our spirit, " in which the childlike con
fidence is wrought ; " but, if this latter is ajjprehended
as a " higher spirit-life " first wrought in us, it cannot
be thought of from the outset as devoid of that childlike
confidence ; and there will therefore be no proper meaning
in saying that this is for the first time called forth "in
it." Still clearer is the passage Rom. viii. 10, whore (in
Schmidt's conviction) under the irv. is to be understood
the human as distinguished from the divine. For evi
dently the intention is to express what takes place in
man when Christ, that is, more specially Christ's Spirit,
dwells in him ; and likewise the contrast to awpa,
which at any rate denotes only one side of human nature,
naturally requires that overagainst it something should
be affirmed of another side of that nature. It is obvious
accordingly that we cannot think of a something simply
wrought by the divine Spirit itself.
It cannot well be questioned that Paul was quite
accustomed to speak of spirit as a constituent element of

AS ANTHROPOLOGICAL ELEMENT. 371
man's nature. But it has been alleged that this anthro
pological usus loquendi does not stand [in any inner rela
tion to the specific conception of the jr., which dominates
the Apostle's whole religious thought ; and it has been
urged that the element of Spirit in the specific sense is
one absolutely transcending natural humanity, on the
ground of 1 Cor. xv. 45 ff.,.and of the fact that in Rom.
vii. 22 ff. it is not the jr. but the v. that is opposed to the
flesh. As to the former passage, Holsten ought not to have
left unnoticed the specialty of the utterance, which lies
in the concrete sense in which the conceptions of jr. and
ip. are here used. The passage doubtless directly asserts
that the first man as distinguished from the second was
not spirit, i.e., a nature of spirit ; but this by no means ex
cludes spirit as something pertaining to him. According
to the Biblical account man becomes a living soul just
by the combination of a life-breath issuing from God
with the material body formed of earth — a view, which
may be recognised in Paul's familiar juxtaposition of cr.
or awpa and tt. ; but for this very reason man in the
unity of his earthly being cannot well be designated as jr.,
although it may be said that he possesses a ir. Further,
as regards the distinction between w. and xp., it is in the
main correctly put (by Hofmann) to the effect that the
former denotes the moving life-power, the latter the indi
vidual life in its state as conditioned. Now such a con
ditioned character is given for the individual human life
by the very fact of its being linked to a material body ;
and from this is explained the close relation in. which
with Paul the ip. stands to the a., so that in this respect
¦tyvyiKds may be used as synonymous with aapKiKos (1 Cor.
ii. 14). But that between the conceptions of a \pv\iKos
and a \p. £waa on the one hand, and a irvevpariKos and a
ir. faowoiovv on the other, there subsists an essential dis-

3 7 2 ' SCHMIDT ON NOUS '
tinction, need hardly be mentioned after what has been
said. In the Apostle's view Christ has become a ir.
(wo-owvv only through the resurrection ; hence this pre
dicate does not belong to the earthly Jesus, who may
rather fall under the conception of a \p. (waa. As
little can believers, though possessing the Spirit in
the specific sense, be called irvevpara ; and so the passage
adduced is far from fitted to prove the absolute tran
scendence of the irvevpa. Verse 46 itself would not really
yield this, even if the whole connection did not make it
probable that we should there supply awpa from
verse 44.
As to Rom. vii. the prominence given to voiis at the
close is certainly not accidental, but is accounted for by
the course of thought. For its meaning 1 Cor. xiv. 14
is rightly compared, where v. denotes the intelligent
reflecting consciousness. Certainly it cannot be limited
in Rom. vii. to the intellectual (das theoretische), for there
is ascribed to it a awijSeaOai and even a OeXeiv ; but as
little may we in the case of the latter think of a practi
cal willing complete in itself, else it would remain in
conceivable why the action should thus fail to be
accordant with this willing. The whole thought of the
section requires rather the conception of an inward
movement (Regung), which, immediately conjoined with
that avvqSeaOai tw vopw rov Oeov, must be thought of as
practical impulse, but does not completely carry itself
out into real energetic willing ; that joy in the law itself
can only denote in substance such a complaisance
(Wohlejefallen) as accompanies the inwardly wrought
knowledge of the excellence of the law's contents.
Though the question here therefore is not that of a
merely intellectual knowledge, the starting point of the
whole conception lies on the side of consciousness ; in no

IN ROMANS VII. 373
case at least can the v. be an expression for the whole
inner life. Doubtless the mode of expression seems as if
the Ego were set simply overagainst the cr. as the
impersonal side ; but this representation is evidently
one to be understood cum ejrano salis, seeing that the Ego,
in fact, participates in the acting just as well as in the
OeXeiv. And for that very reason it is not correct
simply to identify the conception of v. with that, pre
viously used, of the law dvOpwiros ; the former expres
sion is rather to be apprehended as the more exact, or as
iu some way limiting the latter : for there is no occasion,
so far as Schmidt can see, to take the latter in another
sense than it has at 2 Cor. iv. 16, where it denotes the
life within in contrast to the outside. A comparison,
moreover, of the passage just adduced with 1 Cor. v. 5
readily shows that the contrast of the inner and outer
man coincides substantially (sich sacldich deckf) with that
between 7r. and a. (or awpa), and accordingly it will also
be clear that, even on the assumption of a ir. ascribed to
man and falling under the conception of spirit when
viewed in its unity, the choice of the designation in this
case by v. is sufficiently accounted for (motivirte) by the
thought of Rom. vii. 14 ff.
There is the less reason for our placing the Apostle's
anthropological terminology out of relation to his specific
conception of the ir., that the conception of spirit is, as
we convinced ourselves, contrasted in a quite general
sense with that of the flesh. If the latter finds its essen
tial quality (Bestimmiheit) in the element of the material,
the spirit on the other hand denotes primarily the non-
material, conceived of at the same time in a positive
aspect as moving power, just as with the notion of mate
rial substance is associated that of being at rest. So far
it may be said that the contrast of flesh and spirit is

374 sciimidt ox st. paul's
essentially a metaphysical one ; but this does not exclude
its becoming in a definite relation an anthropological
one, since the same contrast, as it has just been generally
characterised, evidently underlies the Biblical view of
man. Holsten himself veiy correctly remarks that the
dualism of spirit and matter in this strictly metaphysical
form is not met with in Paul, inasmuch as with him in
place of the latter comes the narrower conception of the
flesh ; but, when he defines the contrast accordingly re
sulting simply as that between God and man, his view
rests on presuppositions which Schmidt cannot regard
as really proved. Holsten himself must admit that so
far as ir. denotes the non-material, the human \p. falls
under this as abstract generic notion, and that in this
respect Paul certainly knows a " human-cieaturely " jr.
Xo doubt he immediately adds that this latter has abso
lutely " nothing in common with the concrete ir., the to
-., this sole reality of the abstract generic conception"; but
what at bottom is meant by this 1 li, on the one hand,
the immaterial element of human being falls under the
general conception of spirit, and on the other hand the
human -. is, as cannot rationally be denied, not less a
concrete than the divine, how should it not then be like
wise viewed as "a reality of the abstract generic concep
tion"? or conversely, if the divine Spirit is the sole reality
of the same, with what right is another thing likewise real
subsumed under the same general conception 1 It is
surely not very probable that Paul should have on the
one side restricted the sphere of the material to the
bodily nature of man, but on the other side should have
quite excluded the immaterial element of his being from
the conception of spirit ; on the contrary, it is of itself
very natural to seek the proximate basis for his peculiar
view in the reality which that contrast, generally con-

USE OF 'PNEUMA.' 375
ceived, has within human nature itself. By this Schmidt
does not mean, indeed, that anywhere, where Paul con
trasts flesh and spirit in the moral sphere, he would have
the latter understood as the human : but there is every
where meant either the general conception of spirit, or
the concrete reality which it has in the divine ir.
The grounds on which Schmidt conceives that the
Apostle, looking to reality, could take little account of
the human ir., and the general conclusion to which he
comes, are sufficiently indicated in the text (pp. 34-37).
III. De. Hermann Ludemann.
The elaborate treatise, extending to 217 pages, pub
lished in 1872 by Dr. Ludemann on the "Anthropology
of the Apostle Paul and its place in his doctrinal system,"
discusses, first, the physical anthropology. He sets
out from the division of human nature into an e^w dv
Opwiros and an eawOev dvOpwiros, in 2 Cor. iv. 16, follow
ing it without asking, in the first instance, its warrant.
The outer man embraces, 1st, the conceptions of o-. and
ip., the former being the material substratum of the
earthly body, the latter the life animating it. 2. occurs
in the purely material sense in 1 Cor. xv. 39, 50, and 2
Cor. iii. 3. But it is not to be conceived as matevia bvuta,
but as living, animated matter, which it is not necessary
to explain, as Baur does, from the analogy of the ancient
idea of matter. The cr. without a \p. is no a., and the
ip. is only conceivable within a cr. This cr. is susceptible
of pain and pleasure (1. Cor. v. 5 ; 1 Cor. vii. 8). The
close connection between a. and \p. is confirmed by their
promiscuous use (identical sense of xpvxiKos and aap-
kiko's). The use of the expression KaTa adpi<a in

376 ludemann on the constituents
matters of descent rests on this primary sense (Rom.
i. 3, etc.).
But with this restriction to bodilymatter anotheruseofo-.
or ip. conflicts, when they denote the whole man, particu
larly in the phrases jracra cr. and jracra ip., Hebraic turns
of expression certainly used in the sense of " every one,"
but always from the connection employed of human na
ture in a state of subordination and humiliation. So,
too, the formula cr. Kai at/xa (Gal. i. 1 6) with the acces
sory sense of frailty. The sister-conception -f-. likewise
denotes individual existence (1 Cor. xv. 45 ; Rom. xi. 3 ;
2 Cor. i. 23). To this Old Testament extension of mean
ing the Pauline usage attaches itself, according to which cr.
denotes anything belonging to the natural mode of man's
existence, but never without a certain purposed degrading
connotation [Beigeschmack], e.g., Gal. iii. 3, Gal. vi. 12.
This seems to carry us beyond the category of the e£w
dvOpwiros ; and we must ask whether we can still follow
it. But the remembrance of passages where it is de
cidedly confined to the body, as well as the consideration
that it is used in classical Greek (though mostly in the
plural at adpKes), and that the conception a. in later Greek
is used with strict limitation to the body (as shown by
Zeller), appear to require us to keep by this category,
and to set aside for a time the Old Testament extension
of the conception. And in this we arc confirmed when
we glance at another conception, that of awpa, which is
used by Paul not as identical with a., but as denoting the
form by assuming which the a., as substance, is in a
position to constitute the human body.
That awpa resolves itself into bodily form is plain from
its being applied entirely irrespective of any particular
matter (1 Cor. xv. 35-50), where the pith of the proof for
a resurrection-body lies in the fact set forth of diverse

OF THE 'OUTER' MAN. 377
bodily substances, and ultimately in the assertion of a
celestial body-substance. Iwpa, thus used for bodies of
quite opposite matter, has nothing to do with materiality.
It is a form, into which any matter may enter, though, as
verse 40 shows, the character of the matter is of essential
influence on the shaping of the form. At 1 Cor. xii. 12
Paul defines the awu.a as unity in multiplicity — in short,
under the conception of organism ; and hence it is applied
to social organisms, especially the Church. The teleolo-
gical idea here is that of being the organ of action gene
rally — so at 2 Cor. v. 10. The use of awpa in sexual
matters is noted (Rom. iv. 19; 1 Cor. vi. 13-20), and also,
as form conditions appearance, its use to express " aspect "
(2 Cor. x. 10 ; 1 Cor. v. 3).
The combination awpa rr/s aapKos is not (doubtless
accidentally) carried out in the larger Epistles (it occurs
at Col. ii. 11). But we find awpa xpvygKov, which means
the same, for it can only be so called as awpa aapKi-
kov, and presupposes this formula. Iwpa may be often
employed instead of a., but cr. can never come in place of
awpa, for cr. cannot express, or even include, the concep
tion of form. . . .
When at 2 Cor. iv. 16 it is said of the "outer man"
SiacpOeipeiai, and this perishableness procures for man
elsewhere the name <p0aprbs dvOpwiros (Rom. i. 23),
so that the adpg as (pOopd characterises it, it might appear
as if we must revert to the view that a. is an expression
for human nature generally, or, as Holsten puts it, for
the conception of the finite. But when we recall the
fact that the Sia<pOeiperai is expressly affirmed only of
the e£w dvOpwiros, it is clear that the element of finiteness
and perishableness is in the first instance limited to the
body, and, whatever may be the case with the Old Testa
ment, in Paul's case where the adpg is pronounced perish-

3 i 8 LUDEMANN ON THE CONSTITUENTS
able as matter (1 Cor. xv. 42, 50, 53, 54 ; Gal. vi. 8), the
teaching seems strongly akin to the Greek or Hellenistic
conception of the principle of matter, to which perishable
ness or non-being (pi) ov) was ascribed. What, if the
Hellenistic negativity of matter here appears ? But it is al
leged that all this separation of an egw d.vOpwiros has with
Paul no strict anthropological value. For at 2 Cor. iv. 16
he is speaking of the redeemed man, in whom an eaw and
egw dvOpwiros may be distinguished ; but in the natural
man it has no place. We reply that there is mention of
the eaw dvOpwiros also at Rom. vii. 22 ; and there the
discussion concerns not the redeemed, but the natural
man, who is simply longing for redemption. What is the
"inner man " there 1
The expression at Rom. vii. 22 is interchanged with vovs,
which must accordingly be a chief constituent of it. IV.
denotes self-consciousness (1 Cor. xiv. 14), and thence all
the mental activities in which it is presupposed, and
which we comprehend under the term "understanding"
(Vcrstund) ; the result of which is yiyvwaKeiv and elSevai,
and its outcome the vdr/pa. It is in this respect a purely
formal activity of the thinking mind, dealing with any
contents at pleasure. It is primarily the faculty which
distinguishes good and evil (Rom. xiv. 5, xii. 2). In
Rom. vii. there is clearly ascribed to it the OeXeiv itself;
but for the practical attitude of will resting on judgment
and appreciation and influencing life Paul uses <ppoveiv,
(ppovrjpa, ippovr/ais.
The conception KapSla, which recurs in the New Testa
ment with the many-sided variety of aspects which it
bears in the Old, and which Paul frequently makes use
of, is to be arranged under the category of the inner
man; and, one might say, constitutes with Paul the inner
man directly as a whole. But, when from this it is

OF THE 'INNER' MAN. 379
inferred (by Beck, Delitzsch and Weiss) that the v. is to
be assigned to the k. as organ and classed under it, the
prominence given to it by Paul would seem to preclude its
being thus simply merged in the latter. The conception
of k. carries with it a reference to subjective feeling, to
the concrete inner life of the Ego, and, when a cognitive
faculty is associated with it, it is pre-eminently a recep
tive one, coincident with susceptibility. It is the seat of
feeling also and of will. When «. was too indefinite for
the Apostle's purposes, he had recourse to v.
With the terms v. and k. we have exhausted the
materials that may be applied for a view of the eaw
dvOpwiros without prejudging certain controversies. On
these we have now to enter, and to discuss first how
far that division of the inner and outer man in the
Apostle's view is justified. Fritzsche and Meyer have
long since pointed out that the formulae used by Paul
for designating these two parts of human nature were
naturalised at that time in a more or less similar form
by the usage of the Platonic school. It seems hardly
possible to avoid granting that Paul here appropriates
the language of his historical environment. But in
so speaking we do not yet decide whether he employs
it in the spirit of its philosophic authors. In reality
it is denied that he does so. And' in fact when we recall
those expressions which we meet with in Paul of the a.
or \p. comprehending the whole man, and add to them the
k. which stands in so close relation to the cr. (2 Cor. iii. 3)
that it cannot be substantially different from it, the
separation of an eaw dvOpwiros in any such cardinal
sense as that of Philo's statement as to the vovs: os,
Kvpiws elireiv, dvOpwiros iarlv iv dvOpwirw,1 seems not prac
ticable. Here we encounter the view of Holsten, who
1 Philo, de Congressu, p. 533.

380 LCDEMANN's CRITICISM
finds man's unity summed up in the notion cr. and its
pure antithesis in the ir. ; and we are led to investigate
the latter conception. This contrast is undeniably pre
sented at Gal. vi. 8, and still more clearly at 1 Cor. xv.
40-53, in the various attributes assigned to 7r. and cr. re
spectively as the two poles of being. The jr. is not
merely called tjnoiroiovv and identified with £w-ij (Rom.
viii. 2) but it is more precisely defined as ir. BeoiS or
Xpiarov. It belongs to the nature of God, and what is
affirmed of God is affirmed of it, and conversely. Power
and might are ascribed to it. And there belongs to it
an outward nature, as is to be seen from the — it must be
admitted — somewhat fluctuating use of the conception
Soga. On several occasions Soga seems to denote a finer
luminous matter (Lichtnuiterie), which belongs to the jr.,
and of which the awpara irrovpdvia consist. . . . The
ir. is consequently at the same time expressive of a higher
materiality. The question, What is meant by this contrast of cr.
and ir. is answered by those who identify the cr. with
human nature to the effect, that it is essentially the con
trast between man and God ; while from Holsten we
get the answer, that it is the contrast of the non-material
spiritual substance with the material sensuous substance,
or in other words of the infinite and the finite. The
former represents the Jewish-religious point of view ; the
latter that of Hellenistic dualism. In examining Holsten's
position, we must first inquire : Can the speculative cate
gories of Hellenism serve to express the religious cate
gories of the Jewish consciousness thus offhand, so as to
yield unity of thought 1 And, to answer this, we must
attempt definitely to answer two further questions, What
is dualism ? and how is the Jewish-religious consciousness
related to it 1 To the former it is replied that a dualis-

OF HOLSTEN S DUALISTIC THEORY. 381
tic contrast can only be formed by two notions, which
are at the same time co-ordinate, disjunct, contrarily op
posed ; and illustrations of this dualism and of the diffi
culties attending the attempt to carry it out consistently
are adduced from Plato and Philo. To the second it
is replied that there is nothing corresponding to this
dualism in the Jewish-religious consciousness. The ab
solutely transcendent place of power, which the Creator
of the universe occupies for the Hebrew, precludes the
latter from hghting on the idea of opposing to God any
co-ordinate principle or contrary opposite. He feels
himself indeed penetrated by the deepest sense of the
inferiority of all that is finite in presence of the Exalted
One, who has His throne in heaven ; but there is here
no dualism. There is merely a contradictory contrast of
the finite and the infinite, in which all " position " and
activity fall to the latter, while the notion of the former
never gets beyond the merely privative predicates of the
frail, the weak, of complete or partial non-being. While
in Hellenism man consists of a material element and a
spiritual akin to the divine, which are dualistically
separated, and are only brought to agree at the expense
of one of them, in the Old Testament man is a unity of
spirit and body, ranking with the finite under the desig
nation basar, sometimes in intercourse with the divine in
finite and receiving the divine re bation (Ps. xvi. 9,
lxiii. 2, Ixv. 3; Is. xi. 5, lxvi. 23, / ; Joel iii. 1), some
times — with emphatic extension / this designation, so
as to embrace his whole being — iii a relation of humblest
subordination to the Deity (Jer. xvii. 5 ; Deut. v. 23 ;
Ps. Ixxviii. 39; Is. xi. 6, xvi. 16). It is clear therefore
that those two general contrasts — the Hebrew of infinite
and finite and the Hellenistic of spirit and matter — do
not, and cannot, coincide. Holsten's view of the cr. is

382 LUDEMANN'S MODIFIED HYPOTHESIS.
neither Jewish nor Hellenistic —not Jewish, for the Old
Testament basar may never lie taken so literally as to
denote man as a, purely materia! unit}- ; not Hellenistic,
for the Hellenistic category of a. does not profess at all
to denote the whole of human nature, and to merge it as
a whole in dualistic contrast to the pneumatic-divine,
but confines itself only to the body — man's material
element. But, while we cannot accept Holsten's definitions, the
discussion has perhaps paved the way to our under
standing the Apostle's position. There may bo con
ceived, alongside of a Judaism but slightly brought into
contact with Hellenism, a third relation of the two
spheres of consciousness as possible, under which Hellen
istic dualism may have so penetrated into a conscious
ness originally purely Jewish, that within the framework
of Jewish conceptions there is evolved a really contrary
contrast, and the religious contrast of the finite and
infinite undergoes dualistic remodelling and consolidation
(sich dvalistisch umbildet und verfestigt), with which at
the same time there must emerge a dualistic element
in the anthropology. In that case the Hellenistic cate
gories would never be met with quite pure, but partly
alongside of a purely Jewish way of looking at things,
partly mixed with the Jewish categories, perhaps even be
coming advanced in opposition to them and thereupon in
their consequences more and more abandoning (aufhebend
wid durchbrechend) that basis of Jewish consciousness
that at first appeared so pure. Is not just such a form
of consciousness apparent in the Paulinism of the four
Epistles 1
In the sense, laid down at the outset, of cr, as man and
finiteness we have already recognised an element of the
Old Testament rehgious view. Paul at times actually ex-

GROUNDS IN SUPPOiy OF IT. 383
presses the sense of the inferiority of all that is human by
the contrast of a. and ir. (Gal. i. 11, 16 ; Gal. ii. 17 —
Rom. iii. 20 ; 1 Cor. i. 29 expressly, quite in the Old
Testament 'manner, by ivw-mov avrov). Reverting to the
proper signification of a., we find it set overagainst
jr. at Rom. i. 3, 4 ; ii. 28, 29 ; also at Rom. ix. 27 ; 1
Cor. ix. 11 ; 2 Cor. x. 4. Gal. iv. 23, 29. We find the
contrast advancing to the sense of what is human gene
rally after the analogy of 1 Cor. ii. 5 (ao<pla dvOpwirwv —
Svvapis Oeov, comp. verse 13); possibly also 2 Cor. i. 12
(aorpia aapKiKij — x"/3'5 Oeov), although here another point
of view may emerge. We may likewise see this con
trast in 2 Cor. iii. 6 (ypdppa — irvevpa) ; and cr. stands in a
more comprehensive signification as a whole aggregate of
relations of man's outward life (the Mosaic law) over
against ir. at Gal. iii. 3. Doubtless to some extent the
Old Testament contrast underlies the passage 1 Cor. xv.
34 ff. But a characteristic element of this passage lies in
the predicates almost throughout purely privative — ex
pressing passive weakness — that are assigned to the finite
overagainst the jrverxiaTtKo'v, and appear to denote the
nature of the dvOpwiros x°'K0S — of the \p. twaa as
respects its unity as a whole. For that very reason
a dualism in the proper sense cannot be formed
from these predicates, for the cr. as <p0opd, dnpia,
daOeveia, does not attain to life or reality as confronting
the transcendent glory and absolute reality of the ir. But
the intentional accumulation of opposite attributes, and
the strict carrying out of the contrast through all its ele
ments points, in connection with the expressed doctrino-
metaphysical and physical character of this section, de
cidedly to the conclusion that that Old Testament reh
gious contrast is here on the eve of becoming consolidated
into a really doctrinal dualism. The impression of such

384 ludemann's arguments
a metamorphosis is strengthened, when we observe that
the pith of the argument lies in the proof of differences
oi matter, and that, while at verse 45, on the basis of a
Biblical citation, the whole nature of man is adduced as
proof, at verse 50 the expression o-. h-at aTpa, used at Gal.
i. 16 of man generally, sinks quite to the sphere of the
mere material side of his being. And the attention here
given to cr. as mere matter in contrast to jr. leads us to
repeat the question, Whether the purely physical use of
the word, claimed for it at the outset, is not much more
fitted to place the Pauline conception of cr. in analogy with
the Hellenistico-speculative dualistic category of matter,
than the other, embracing emphatically after Old Testa
ment usage the whole man, with which Holsten makes the
attempt. It will lend support to such an attempt, if we
find passages where the cr. emerges as an independent
dualistic principle, as in Rom. viii. 6, where the cppovgpa,
the goal of an active effort of the cr., is Odvaros ; and Gal.
v. 13, 17 (the passage where, be it observed, this concep
tion of the cr. first appears in Paul and in Christian litera
ture) where cr. and tt. are designated as principles, which
dXX-ijkois dvr'iKeirai  In point of fact, there are not
a few instances where the conception of cr. is restricted
and does not cover the whole man, such as those where
man distinguishes himself as such from his a., reckons
it not so much his Ego as his possession, speaks of it as
his (Rom. vi. 19; vii. 18; xiii. 14 ; 2 Cor. vii. 5; Gal.
iv. 14 ; vi. 13), where the a. appears as the matter merely
of the awpa, and this awpa tjjs aapKos is so far from con
stituting man's proper nature, that it appears as the
" outer man " whose Sia<p0eipea0ai does not hinder the re
newal of the " inner man," and as a mere tabernacle to be
left, a dress to be put off, or where the cry is for deliver
ance from the awpa rov Oavdrov (Rom. vii. 24). Such a

IN SUPPORT OF HIS VIEW. 385
separation of the eaw dvOp. from the egw dvOp. must
consequently be possible ; and human nature cannot be
simply coincident with the cr. as sensuous-material sub
stance. After criticising acutely the idea of Holsten that Paul,
when entering, as in the passages quoted, on dichotomous
distinctions, simply shares the view of his time as to a
purely external relation of the spirit to the body, and
after showing that Paul's view is not to be identified
either with the Platonic Hellenism of Philo, who presents
purely the dualism of spirit and matter, or with the posi
tion of the Palestinian Jews, who, so far from sharing
Paul's view of the fleshly body as a non-constituent element
in human nature, treat it as so essential that man is not
to be conceived of without it, Ludemann comes to the con
clusion that Paul does not simply share the view of his
time, but occupies a peculiar position ranging him on the
side of Hellenism rather than of Judaism. While Paul
keeps on Jewish ground as to his use of jr., he employs
cr. sometimes in the wider Jewish conception as equiva
lent to " man," sometimes in the narrower Greek sense
of the earthly matter of his body. The awpa aap
Kos is separable from man himself, and the category of
the egw dvOpwiros is thus restored.
But if that is so, how does it stand with the eaw dv
Opwiros as to- its more precise definition? and in what
way is the subject proper of man to be sought in it ?
This question is not cleared up by the previous discussion
of v. and k., which are not so much parts as organs and
functions of the spirit ; we have to inquire, according to
Paul's way of thinking, after a real subject of the inner
man, which acts in and through these. "*"., which has
been suggested for this purpose, cannot be taken, for
while it occasionally has — particularly in the phrase 7rao-a
2B

386 ludemann on the place
ip. — the sense of the personality of man corresponding to
the wider sense of a., it elsewhere restricts itself, like the
latter, to the material-animate side of human nature;
and its indissoluble connection with a. is a sufficient rea
son for giving to it, as regards its idea, an essentially
external position towards human nature proper — a view
confirmed by the synonymous use of ipvx'Kos and aapKiKos.
The substance of the eaw dvOpwiros is to be found in that
tu -. dvOpwirov which the Apostle brings clearly enough
forward at 1 Cor. ii. 11, and which, in his view, forms
the contrast to awpa in 1 Cor. v. 3 ; 2 Cor. xii . 34. Liide
mann cannot accept the view of Krumm and Delitzsch,
which assigns to the ir. the v. as organ of cognition, and
the *. as organ of feeling. He cannot see how one and
the same conception can be taken now as the mind itself,
now as one of the mental faculties. To Holsten's decla
ration that " Paul distinguishes yet a higher element in
human nature, an ' inner man ' opposed to the ' outer,' "
he replies that it is not easy to see how a " higher ele
ment " can belong to man who, by Holsten's account, is
essentially only cr.; or how the v., if it is only an organ
of the o-.-substance, can take up an attitude of contrast
it, as Holsten holds it to do; or how it can even be in a
position to establish the fact of its impotence overagainst
the o-., if it essentially and indissolubly belongs to it.
The very possibility of a renewal of the v., to which Holsten
points as a main ground for the distinction of v. from
ir. 6<rov, would rather make good the essential diversity of
the v. from the cr. The very concession of distinctions
such as Holsten makes breaks up with the sharpness of
a wedge that unity of the cr. he had formerly laid down.
He cannot accede to Holsten's interpretation of the7r. tov
dvOpwirov in 1 Cor. ii. 11 as equivalent to the ir. rov
Koapov in verse 12, which Paul expressly denies having re-

OF THE HUMAN ' PNEUMA.' 387
or of the latter as coincident with the \p., which
Holsten elsewhere treats as a purely physical conception,
but here treats as something non-material, pneumatic !
He infers from 1 Cor. v. 5 : 'iva to it. awOrj, that it is not
to be identified with the divine 7r., for dd>0apaia does not

belong to it in virtue of its nature — if it still needs to be
saved, it may also perish — nor is it to be associated as re
spects its nature with <pOopd, for it may be saved.
If it be asked, Whether this jr. belongs to the side of cr.
or of jt. Oeov, he answers : in respect of nature to neither
of them. This jt. of man — which has its outward manifes
tation in the awpa as the form for opposite contents of
substance, and its cognitive (gegenstandliches) conscious
ness in the v. as the form for opposite contents of
knowledge, and lastly its reflective (zustandliches) con
sciousness in the k. as the form for opposite contents of
experience — this ir. must itself be a substance so purely
capable of being determined and variously affected that we
cannot wonder, when, under the influence of a stronger
substance, it, as it were, disappears from our view. Yet
it is a necessary element for connecting the conceptions
of the anthropology. Only under the supposition of this jr.
dvOpwirov is it possible to vindicate for man, in Paul, a
spiritual (geistigen) character, and yet withal, 1, to leave
the ir. Oeov, as absolute spiritual substance, in its tran
scendence ; 2, to take the a. in contradistinction to it
quite according to its hteral sense as matter of the body ;
3, really to uphold the categories awpa, v., k., as forms for
different contents, not essentially bound to the cr. It ap
pears therefore that this conception, which brings unity
and fixity into the whole system, is directly required by
it, and would need to be hypothetically supplied to the
Apostle, if he had not himself presented it with such
clearness as is desirable.

388 LUDEMANN ON THE
Looking back, we see in the anthropology the result of
Hellenistic influence operating on an originally Jewish
consciousness, and manifested in the evolving of two
conceptions, that of the .-., and that of the cr. as bodily
matter. The abiding basis of the Jewish view manifests
itself, (1) in that, although fleshliness is recognised as not
constitutive for human nature, yet corporeality (awpa) is
still retained as constitutive, as necessary for the exist
ence of the jr. dvOpwirov, (2) in that we do not reach the
Platonic-Hellenistic conception of the human mind as a
ir. Oeiov so as to get an absolute dualism within human
nature, but the dualistic contrast to the cr. -matter is only
found in the ir. Oeov. This anthropology, with its ir. dv
Opwirov standing in need as well as capable of redemption in
the awpa aapKos, is out and out dichotomous, and
thereby no longer Jewish ; but not dualistic, and thereby
not yet Hellenistic. It is the first Christian, anthropology.
The second part is entitled the Ethical Anthropology.
Here the conceptions of a. and jt. take upon them the
marks of good and evil, and we encounter a conflict be
tween the two principles — which is presented, so far as
the individual is concerned, in the utterance Gal. v. 17 :
" The flesh lusteth against the Spirit " and, so far as
history is concerned, in the two phases or periods, 1
Cor. XV. 46 : irpwrov to ipv^iKov, eiretra rij irvevpariKov.
The first section treats of " the cr. as principle of sin, and
its relation to the conceptions ip. and awpa." Here we
must hold strictly by the physical conception in connec
tion with the mark of dp. that is now associated with it
(Rom. vii. 18: "sin dwells in my flesh"; vii. 14:
adpKivos, consisting in substance of flesh — from which
seemingly mere physical basis sin is derived, for the
ireirpapevos viro rr/v dp. is placed as quite synonymous by
its side). Sin dwells in the flesh with a necessity of

ETHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY. 389
natural law (vd/xos, vii. 21, 23, 25). The views of Julius
Mulier, Ernesti, and Weiss, are reviewed and criticised at
considerable length. If cr. by itself denoted a tendency
of life (Lebensrichtung), Kara adpKa irepiirareiv would mean
"to take the direction of a direction," and Rom. vii. 14
would be a tautology. Such expressions as : " we are
debtors to the flesh to live according to the flesh"
(Rom. viii. 12), "the flesh lusteth," has iiriOvpias and
OeX-qpara (vi. 12, 13, 14; Gal. v. 16, 17), ets dtfioppvv
rrf aapKi (Gal. v. 13), clearly present the a. as an inde
pendent operative principle, not as a mere "tendency of
life." The objection, that some of the epya i-ijs aapKos
in Gal. v. 17 f. have absolutely nothing to do with the
flesh as " sensuousness," is met by pointing out the
ambiguity of the latter expression, which sometimes is
used to denote the bodily, earthly-material existence,
sometimes to signify a direction of the will and the
affections to the sensuous and its needs. We do not
need to refer all sins as such to sensuous desire ; for the
impulses of the cr. make their way throughout the v. and
k. ; and the classification of the works of the flesh given
by Meyer admits of the whole being traced either to the
purely bodily desire of the a., or to the v. rijs aapKos
(sins of spiritual aberration — idolatry, witchcraft), or to
the k. enslaved by the cr. (e-xOpai . . . <k6voi). Man thus
determined by the cr. is filled throughout, saturated, by
its quality. He is aapKiKos, ipv^tKos; and the conception
"man" may be interchanged simply with a., although it
mayat times be matter of doubt whether it is the character
istic of the Old Testament cr. passive -weakness, that is
predominant, or that of the Hellenistico-dualistic, sinful
energy. The two modes of view run into one another,
especially in the Epistles to the Corinthians. Holsten
holds the connection of the cr. with dp. to be essential

390 LUDEMANN ON OBJECTIVE SIN
and incapable of being done away, so that Weiss could
use no simpler argument against him than the question,
If dp. is essential to the cr. as the whole human nature in
itself, where remains for Paul the possibility of a redemp
tion of man from sin ? Ludemann holds the dvOpwiros
aapKiKos, or the saturation of human nature with the
quality of the a., as the de facto result of the operation
of that spontaneous sin-principle ; but it is not in his
judgment essential, or constitutive for the idea of man
according to Paul. The eaw dvOpwiros is a domain only
occupied by sin, only conquered, and to be taken from it
again. Rom. xii. shows how the eaw dvOpwiros comes to
be awakened by the vd/xos 7rvcn/xaTiKos. The vofis — the
self-consciousness — appears in that classic passage so at
variance with the dp. in the a. that dp. cannot essentially
have its seat in the v. — which wills it not, yea, rather hates
it — but only in the cr. Now, as man has not given to him
self the a., but has got it as an appointed condition of his
existence, it follows that sin is given to him without his
own action. The conception of dp. is therefore to be
understood not subjectively of a direction of the human
will, but objectively oi a quality (Beschaffenheit) of man's
earthly nature. . . . The vd/xos is, as it were, the wedge
driven into the joints of human nature, and breaking up
the apparent unity of the dvOpwiros aapKiKos. The ex
position of this subject fits into the frame-work of Rom.
vii. 7 — viii. 30. The pure objectivity of the dp. in human
nature is required by the conception of vd/xos, and is ap
parent from the expressions that indicate how sin is
subjectivised in man by the law — a thought which is
formulated concisely in Rom. iii. 20 : Sid yap vopov
iiriyvwais dpaprias. The key-note of the section is Rom.
vii. 9: rj a p. v e k p a . . . iXOovarjS Se rrjs ivroXrjs g dp.
dv e ^i/a ev. Alan comes to know sin, so soon as it has

IN ROMANS V. 12, AND VII. 9. 391
through the cvtoAjj come to consciousness and by its re
action against the commandment presented itself as
vapdplaais. Paul does not expressly reflect on the free
decision of will, which for us constitutes sin, wherein
we regard the element of evil design as essential.
Objectively looked at, he indeed very decidedly denies
it in Rom. vii.; but he does not propose to himself
the question as a problem proper, dp. does not mean
either sin in our sense, or " sinfulness " as only the
potential ground of sin ; it embraces completely the
element of actuality, and corresponds most nearly to
our notion of "evil." The maintenance of the pure
objectivity of dp. gives the key to Rom. vii. . . . The
entire equality of nature of the first and of all other
men is clearly enough intimated by 1 Cor. xv. 45 ff.
where the first man is described as mere ip. (waa and as
Xoikos, and then it is said (verse 48) : otbs 6 \oik6s,
toiovtoi ot x0'*01'; which is to be regarded as an axiom
of the Pauline theology. Need we supplement Rom. vii.
from Rom. v. 12ff. ? "We beheve that we do not go
beyond the cycle of Pauline thought, when we conceive
of the matter thus : Upon the creation of man, when the
XoOs was combined with the irvorj £wrjs, the cr. with the \p.
came at once into existence. Along with it immediately
emerged the fact, that i) dp. elarjXde ets rbv Koapov. But
this is not the only mode of the elarjXOe. For this ob
jective dp. — (veKpd) — ' dveljjaev ' already in the first man.
Already here there was introduced a positive command
which is, (1) eVtyvucrts ttjs dp., (2) Svvapis rijs dp.
Therefore, rj dp. Kareipydaaro rrjv iiriOvpiav, and —
because oij oijk eo-Tt vd/xos, ovSe irapd[3aais — there arose,
just because a law was there, already in Adam the irapd-
/3ao-ts, as the Apostle sharply brings out at v. 14. We
have here exactly the same state of things as at vii. 7-13."

392 LUDEMANN ON THE PROCESS
The objectivity of the dp. is even in Adam the causal
ground of his irapd/3aais. Paul recognises as an axiom
the natural (not merely positive-legal) connection of
death with sin, which underlies the threat of the law and
the feeling thereby produced in the subject of guilt
and fear of punishment. . . . The doctrine of a status
integritafis is then discussed, and it is held improbable
that Paul could have adopted such a view of the fall as we
find in the Wisdom of Solomon and Philo, linked as it is
in their case with anthropological premisses which are
foreign to him. That Paul did not accept the interven
tion of the devil, is inferred from a comparison of Rom.
v. 12 with Wisd. ii. 21, where "the verbal accord is in
part so striking (der Wiwtlaut so iihnlich) that the variation
can only be intentional." Paul's anthropological specula
tion has purposely taken a way of its own. The first
man was like the rest; in him too was posited from the
first the cr. with the dp. Returning to Rom. vii. it is
held that in the state of things presented in verses 14-2 t
the irapa/3daeis continue still, just as they broke out at
verse 9, and were full-blown in verse 13. But the inward
conditions of the wapd/3aais are no longer the same as in
7-13. The process here described passes through two
stages, in the former of which the voPs has the better
knowledge, while in the second it has this as well as also
the better will. We may describe as the two poles of
this development the oijk eyvcuv and om -fiSeiv of verse 7
on the one hand, and the ov OeXw of verse 16 on the
other. The process may be called the gradual (successive)
emancipation of the v. from the cr. It is characteristic
of this that the Apostle at vii. 14 does not use aapKiKos,
but adpKivos. The former is here a standpoint already
transcended. It was done away with the ceasing of the
ou'k ySea-. The v. is already awakened and discerns the

DESCRIBED IN ROMANS VII. 393
ground of its death-suffering more clearly in the sarkic
quality which by nature attaches to its body. But this
emancipation as only affecting the knowing and willing of
the eaw dvOp. remains here in the first instance a purely
inner fact; it does not extend to action; it cannot yet
attain to the KaXov. The vd/xos as irvevpariKos possessed
the power, and had the task, of thus awakening the v.,
estranging it from the a. and filling it with hatred
towards its bondage. But although the better willing of
the v. was already an effect of the pneumatic-divine
factor that had appeared in the law, man could not accom
plish more by its aid. For the law was only a preliminary
manifestation of the Spirit of God, not yet the divine ir.
itself; it could not introduce the period of the irvevpariKov,
but could only pave its way. The cr. was the hindrance
weakening the law ; the a. must be removed. The law
could go no further; it was weak through the cr. But
the Apostle, before proceeding to ch. viii. which deals
with this topic, and the relief of which he partially
anticipates in vii. 24, recapitulates calmly the result of
ch. vii. in the 25th verse.
The anthropological result of ch. vii. is that the eo-co
dvdp. remains such an entity (Wesenheit) as was formerly
indicated, in itself quite void of contents, but fitted to
receive any determining influence. Ludemann does not
share the views of those who from different standpoints
see in Rom. vii. a proof of the originally good character of
the v. (Baur, Beck, Usteri). The distinctions within man,
which vanished for us in the dvOp. aapKiKos, are now
brought out in all their sharpness of relief by the inter
vention of the law and the thereby accomplished sever
ance of the eaw dvOp. from the cr. For the dualistic formula
by which Paul here expresses the struggles of the moral
consciousness he was indebted to Hellenism. We find,

394 LUDEMANN ON THE 'PNEUMA.'
especially in Philo, the a. used just as Paul brings it in at
Rom. vii. No doubt Philo is not fond of using the word
cr. — making use rather of awpa, or rd iraOij, gSovai,
eiriOvpiai. It is comparatively seldom that he employs
it of his own motion ; he uses it mostly when he gets it
given to his hand by the Old Testament text. But, so
far as it appears, it has the same twofold function as with
Paul, of oppressing and blunting the vojjs in its powers,
and of stifling and corrupting the moral consciousness.
The points of analogy and difference between Paul and
Philo in this respect are reviewed. ... In ch. viii. the
vd/xos Trvei'/xaTiKos gives place to the ir. itself, which Paul
designates as dyiov, and which liberates man from the
dominion of the a. The human ir. by virtue of its
neutral formal nature on the one hand, and of its belong
ings to the genus ir. on the other, is capable of receiving
the divine ir. We have already seen a pneumatic ele
ment, the vd/xos, enter into the human mind. So man
cannot well be left under the cr. ; he must be saved from
death and sin. And this could not be done more effec
tually than by the jr. £woiroiovv itself. We have first to
ask in what way and form the jt. enters into the develop
ment of human history.
In the vision at Damascus God had shone into the
Apostle's heart to give the light of the knowledge of the
glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ. The person,
death, resurrection, and existence in glory of Jesus were
the problems that presented themselves to the specula
tion of the Apostle. The following is a summary of the
results of this speculation. That in the mission of Jesus,
culminating in his death and resurrection, a heavenly
factor had come into human history, was plain. Of what
nature 1 First of all, a pneumatic factor, as the law had
been, but a more powerfully effective embodiment of the

CHRIST AS PNEUMATIC PERSON. 395
pneumatic principle, yea, this very principle concentrated
in a pneumatic person. As such, the Christ who ap
peared on earth as Jesus had already pre-existed in
heaven, with God, from the beginning of the ages.
Hence he is the immediate image of God (2 Cor. iv. 4),
for, like God, he is ir. (Rom. viii. 9, 10). God created him
as such, when He after His own image created that man
(Gen. i. 26) who, according to 1 Cor. xv. 45, iyevero els ir.
faoiroiovv. Paul there names him after his emergence in
history — in which not the pneumatic but the psychic is
first, — the ecrxaros 'ASdp. But in himself he must have
preceded his counterpart, the irpwros 'ASdp, who became
only ip. (waa, for the principle of verse 46 cannot possibly
¦ — even apart from history — hold absolutely, and to ipvyj.-
ko'v be posited as first being generally. He was opposed
in his whole nature to the earthly Adam. . . . This
dvOp. iirovpdvios as eiKwv rov Geox" created els ir. £woiroiovv
is in virtue of this, his essential equality with God, the
vlos Geoij (Gal. ii. 20, al.), organ of the creation for God in
the beginning (1 Cor. viii. 6), and taking part in the
gracious guidance of Israel (1 Cor. x. 1). This heavenly
person was 6 Xpiaros, an expression which Paul uses
throughout as a proper name. All this, therefore, Christ
was already before he came down from heaven to
become man and inaugurate the new period of the jrveu-
pariKov. When he had become " man," he had a awpa aapKos
in which, instead of the jt. dvOpwirov in other men, there
dwelt the jt. Geoil, and this formed the substance of its
inner nature, the proper subject of His personality. In
that a. of course the \p., the sensuous life, was included.
. . . But had Jesus Christ with the a. also dp. % So '
far as Rom. viii. 3 is concerned, the question turns on
the import of opoiwpa. Is it " similarity " admitting a

396 LUDEMANN OX THE RELATION
percentage of dissimilarity ? or is it " likeness '" ? The
result of a careful investigation of the formation and
Pauline use of the word gives as its meaning " copy "
(Xaclibildiing) ; and this meaning is to be retained here :
" God sent His Son in a copy of sin-flesh." If we ask why
he does not say merely iv aapKi dp., the answer is simple.
In the sin-flesh of humanity, the common characteristic of
the \oi'Kot, the pneumatic celestial man could not at once
have a share. If he was to appear in a body of such mat
ter, the matter had to be, as it were, formed anew for him
in accordance with the extant original of sinful flesh. If
this matter was really to be the same as that of mankind
— and this was inevitably necessary — it had to be a
bpoiwpa, a copy or repetition, of it. . . . If it is asked how
we have to conceive the existence of dp. in Christ accord
ing to Paul, we reply that dp. is an objective quality of
the flesh-substance. This latter, because living, is not
merely habitually, but actually sinful, where it does not
find within its sphere of operation an opposing principle
to counterbalance it. In man's case it dominates the jr.
dvOpwirov, at first without its knowledge, after the inter
vention of the law with its knowledge, as producing irapd-
[Saais. But in Christ, instead of the jr. avOp., there was
the jt. Geoi), in which the cr. from the outset encountered
a principle, which was a match for it and must during
Christ's earthly life have, as it were, paralysed it and
kept it in a fettered state. In Him irapdjiaaeis could not
occur, because their real ground, the dp.., lacked opera
tive power. In this case it simply remained in part objec
tive, and in part mere habitual quality of the a. But as
such it could not be wanting, if Christ was to be really
incarnate. The object for which Christ assumed the a. ap. was
(Rom. viii. 3) that God might thereby " condemn sin

OF CHRIST TO SIN. 397
in the flesh," that he might in the bodily death' of Christ
annihilate the dp. in and with the a., and thereby liber
ate the v. That the reference here is to the death of
Christ, is obvious from other passages connecting this
destruction and liberation with the passion of Jesus
(Rom. vi. 10 ; vii. 4 ; 1 Cor. v. 7, al), and from the irepl
dpaprias =" sin-offering, " subjoined. The passage could
not be understood, if Christ's flesh were not the same as
that in which sin is condemned, The blow which is
now to light on the a. would fall beside it, if Christ had not
had a real and true cr. ap. If Christ, by special arrange
ment (opolwpa), shares in the human a., and thereby the
complex unity of that a. is fatally struck at one point,
its paralysis in all its parts can only be a question of
time. This effect of the bodily death of Christ presup
poses his pre-existence as ir. {woiroiovv • and the continued
existence of the ir. enclosed in that annihilated a., and
its victory over the latter, are made apparent by the
resurrection, which is fundamentally important as the
necessary correlate to Christ's death.
The next question is, How does what is objectively
accomplished in Christ's death and resurrection obtain
effect for the individual human subject enslaved by the a. 1
Every one will have the answer on his tongue : by irians ;
but the Apostle puts baptism foremost (Rom. vi. 3. ff).
So intimate is the union of the baptized with Christ
that it appears to fall almost nothing short of a real
identification. The connection is such that what has
taken place in Christ's case (an Christo) is eo ipso
accomplished also in the case of the baptized. The old
man, the a., shares in the crucifixion, and the awpa
dp. of the baptized is thereby removed, cancelled. So
real and certain a thing for the Apostle is this putting
to death of the a., that it, and it only, is to him the

398 LUDEMANN ON CHRIST'S DEATH AND RISlNU
guarantee for the possibility and reality of a moral
renewal. Many expositors here interpret Paul as speak
ing " figurativelj-." Certainly he cannot be here speaking
of bodily death, but he speaks of a death which for him
has not in the least a less reality, namely of the death of the
a. as the sinful principle in man.
As an immediate postulate of the dying with Christ,
the Apostle designates the rising with Him (Rom. vi. 5).
But while we see a real ground for the dying, we as yet
lack it in an equal measure for the rising. Looking to
Rom. vii. 25, a positive change is not eo ipso involved in
the negative abeyance of the cr. With the abeyance of
the cr. there remains only the v., and, considering its
want of independence, it is very doubtful whether from
itself there would issue a vigorous action in place of the
previous weak crwi/8ecrc5ai. In fact, a new dytaOai is
needed to impel the human subject into the new path.
By baptism we become one with Christ, i.e., with the ir.
fuojroiow itself. This ir. has accordingly entered into
believers, and effects in them the rising, just as in
Christ himself it rose from the dead. At Rom. viii. 2
this new power is presented as the law (that is, the com
pelling necessity) of the "spirit of life," delivering from
the compulsory service of sin, and enabling man to fulfil
the SiKaiwpa rov vopov. At Rom. viii. 4-8 the two
principles and their working are contrasted ; and still
more clearly as regards their ethical sides, dp. and
SiKaioavvg, at Rom. vi. 18-23.
How quite objectively the jt. is present in man, without
losing its self-subsistent nature, may be seen from such
passages as Rom. viii. 9, 1 Cor. iii. 16, where the Spirit
is presented as dwelling in believers — ovtojs 1 Cor. xiv. 25
—and other passages where the Spirit is spoken of as
given and received. As this ir. is also the jt. Xpiarov, and

IN RELATION TO THE REDEEMED. 399
indeed the Xpiaros himself, the expressions as to " put
ting on Christ " (Gal. iii. 27) and " Christ in man " (2
Cor. xiii. 3) refer to this ; and in connection therewith
the religious relation to the risen One as " Lord " and
the most frequent designation of Him as Xpto-rds find
their explanation. The ir. is now the element "in
which" all takes place. Man is irvevpariKos, and there
with SiKaios, aytos ; and the more precise result of its
presence is specified at Rom. viii. 10 : " the body is dead
on account of sin, but the spirit is hfe on account of
righteousness," where the first effect is the putting to
death of the a., for awpa stands here as including the
latter ; and the second is the putting of hfe into the jr.,
which must be taken of the jt. dvOpwirov, partly because
of the hypothetical ascription to it of the predicate
far] — which would not be intelligible were the divine 7r.
the subject — partly because of the correlative awpa.
The abstract-dogmatic description of the pneumatic
redeemed man briefly runs thus : to awpa (dpaprias)
veKpov, to irvepva fag. But how stands the matter in
real life 1 How is the awpa as veKpov to be reconciled
with the awpara Ovgrd (so not yet dead) of verse 11, and
with the fact that after all in verse 13 the mortifying the
works of the body is apparently left to the subject him
self 1 Before we can answer these questions, we must
determine more exactly the sense of the " jt. fag." If
jr. in verse 10 is the human spirit, may it be so like
wise in verse 1 3, or is it the divine Spirit that is there re
ferred to ? Liidemann decides in favour of the latter ;
but it is necessary to avoid arbitrariness, and the fol
lowing criteria are suggested for determining whether
in the passages discussed by Holsten the reference is to
the divine or to the human jr. : — (1) Where something
is conferred on, or wished for, the ir., which the divine

400 CRITERIA FOR THE IMPORT OF 'PNEUMA.
already from its nature has, or where something
befalls the jt., for which the divine has naturally no
place, this -. is always the human. This rules such
passages as 1 Cor. vii. 34; 2 Cor. vii. 1; Gal. vi. 18;
Rom. xii. 11. (2) When adpa and jr. are in juxtaposi
tion, and adpa is simply to be understood of the human
body as it appears, the jr. is the human. So at 1 Cor. v.
3, 4, and also 1 Cor. vii. 34, as above. (3) If again awpa
stands pregnantly — that is, of the awpa dpaprias or
aapKos — jr., unless something inteivene to hinder it, is
the divine. So at Rom. viii. 13. Rom. viii. 10 is an
exception on account of the hypothetical attribution of
the faf Contrasted with o-., jr. is always the divine,
except at 1 Cor. v. 5 ; 2 Cor. vii. f. At other pas
sages discussed by Holsten, we see with him the divine
ir., with the exception of Rom. viii. 16, where Holsten
thinks the jt. gpwv is just the jr. vloOeaias of verse 15 ;
but how can witness be first borne to this jr., that we are
sons ? And by whom ? By itself ? If verse 16 is clearly
only epexegesis of verse 15, so that iXd(3ere is explained
by avppaprvpei, and the jt. vloOeaias by aiiru to -jr., it only
remains for ir. r/pwv to be epexegesis of gpeis. This pas
sage gives us a glimpse into the life of the irvevpariKos,
showing that an intercourse subsists between his self-
consciousness and a divine element in him, of which, as
a Christian, he is aware ; and it receives confirmation
from Rom. viii. 26, and illustration from 1 Cor. xiv. in
the distinction between the AaAtfv yAwo-crats, in whom
the divine ir. is alone active while the v. is quiescent
(aKapiros), and the irpotprjrevwv, who also acts under the
influence of the jr., but maintains his state of reflective
consciousness. The effect of the immanence of the ir. 6eoi5 in the
human jr. appears as gradual heightening of the powers of

EFFECTS OF IMMANENCE OF THE 'PNEUMA.' 401
the latter in different ways — of the powers of thought, in
an avaKutviocrts Tofi voos ets to SoKipdfav n to OeXvpa rov
Geou (Rom. xii. 2), the effects of which are expressed by
yv<3o-is, Adyos, o-ocit'a (the remarkable phrase "being
known of God" is only another expression for that im
manence, 1 Cor. viii. 2, al), and of the affections of the k.
which is the special seat of its operation, shedding abroad
the love of God, and generating the various fruits of
religious experience, peace, joy, hope, the rich harvest of
the Kapiros toC 7rvei!/xaTos. . . . But all this points to
the gradual completion of a process ; and what is to be
said of the awpa veKpov, in view of the fact that the awpa
aapKos remains after baptism as before, that the a. does
not even appear to cease subsisting ? It is true that the
Apostle frequently gives exhortations which point to a
continuance of the cr. , and prescribe the Christian's atti
tude to it. But let us consider what is implied in such
exhortation. The state of Rom. vii. 23-25 can no longer
exist in the man to whom such exhortation is addressed.
It presupposes that radical changes have taken place,
that the v. has become free and strong, that the cr.
has had its power broken and received its death-blow.
But the nature of the case implies that what faith in
abstract-dogmatic form boldly anticipating posits and
sees as a fait accompli is but slowly realised (comp. the
expressions in Rom. vi. 11 ff. and Rom. viii. 13). . . .
Here we have a glimpse of the distinction between the
Hellenistico-Pagan and the Pauline-Christian mode of
thought, for the former of which the conflict is continu
ally being renewed without prospect of definitive deci
sion, while for the latter the result of the struggle is
definitely secured by the conquest of the cr. through
Christ — by the characteristic idea of redemption from the
o-. which separates Paul from the dualism of the time.
2c

402 DUALISM CANCELLED
The <r. is in the course of dying off; and Paul exhorts
that this process be not interrupted by any revival of its
iiriOvpiai. This idea is at the root also of Paul's freedom
from any ascetic way of regarding the sensuous nature.
But the objection may recur, whether it is not merely
the dp. that is hit, while the cr. without it continues to
subsist 1 Various expressions seem to favour this view, as
at Rom. vi. 2: direOdvopev rrj dp.; at verses 7, 10, 11, 12,
13 ff. it is always merely the dp. that the death concerns ;
the awpa remains everywhere intact ; at 2 Cor. vii. 1
we are warned against defilement of the a., and at 2 Cor.
iv. 10, 11 it even partakes of the life of Jesus. But all
this is mere seeming ; there is here also pure solidarity
of the dp. with the cr. . . . The position of the a. at all
in the jrveryxaTiKos can only have been conceded by Paul
in the sense of an interim arrangement, pending the
approach of the Parousia. . . . Here comes in the dis
tinction of cr. and awpa, the latter capable of emancipa
tion from the former, though for this life still sharing its
matter ; having as an organism a part in the dyior-ns
(1 Cor. vii. 34), and serving generally as an instrument
for the jt. Geof! in man (1 Cor. vi. 13-19; Rom. vi. 13, 19,
al.). After a review of several passages bearing on this
distinction — such as 2 Cor. vii. 1 ; 2 Cor. iv. 10 ff.; 2 Cor.
i. 4ffi; Rom. viii. 19-21, 26, 27 — comes the concluding
section as to the resurrection, whereby the djroAijT/jcoo-ts
rov awparos is completed, when the earthy body has
been taken away, and the awpa irvevpariKov is bestowed.
Paul, in keeping with his conception of the cr., knows no
resurrection of the flesh. He never uses the verb which
might point to an independent rising of the body, dva-
orijvai. The a. is (pOopd, and abides in death. Nor does
he know any resurrection of the unredeemed. The

BY DESTRUCTION OF THE ' SAKX.' 403
identity of the awpa as such before and after the resur
rection enables us to explain the apparently so confused
Pauline usage, in virtue of which he at Rom. viii. 10
calls the awpa "veKpov" then at verse 11 contemplates
the (o)ojroteto-c5at of the awpa Ovgrdv, and at verse 23
again longs after the ci7roAiJTpo)crts of the awpa. This
d;roAijT/>a)o-is is the faoirolgais, and the latter is the taking
away of the o-dp£-substance from the awpa-iorm, and the
filling of the same with the jrvefj/xa-substance. . . . The
dualism is cancelled not by conciliation of its parts in
virtue of a dialectic bridging over of the gulf, but by the
violent destruction of the one principle that succumbs,
the cr. ; and in this respect the Apostle separates himself
sharply from the Jewish consciousness, for which the cr.
is, and remains, quite unobjectionable.
The third part, entitled " the Position of the anthro
pology within the doctrine of salvation," is mainly de
voted to a discussion of what Dr. Ludemann calls " the
problem in the first eight chapters of the Epistle to the
Romans," in which we deem it the less necessary to
follow him, partly because it carries us beyond the limits
of the subject with which we are here specially concerned,
aud partly because the views therein set forth have not
commended themselves — so far as I know — to any one
else than their author (See pp. 48, 49, 67 and 86-89).

404 DR. WENDT ON THE

B.— DR. WENDT ON THE OLD TESTAMENT
USAGE.
The following is a translation, occasionally somewhat
abridged, of the portion of Dr. Wendt's work in which
he treats of the use of basar and ruach.
I. The Conception of Basar.
The word basar in its original and most frequent signi
fication denotes the flesh as the muscular constituent por
tion of an earthly animal organism in distinction from skin,
bones, blood (e.g. Num. xix. 5 ; Job x. 11 ; xix. 20 ; Ezek.
xxxvii. 6-8). It is so used of the fleshy portions of the
living body as well as of that which is already dead ; tho
latter especially in the many passages where it appears
either as means of nourishment in general (alongside of
bread or wine: Exod. xvi. 3, 8, 12 ; Is. xxii. 13, al), or as
the chief material for the sacrificial meals (Lev. vii. 15; Hos.
viii. 13, al). This sacrificial flesh is as such called holy
(Ex. xxix. 33 f. ; Hagg. ii. 12), in sharp contrast to
which stands flesh from whatever cause unclean and
withheld from use (Lev. xi. 8 ff. al) ; evidently therefore
the flesh in this literal sense is of itself indifferent as to
cleanness or uncleanness. The fleshy parts lend to the
body its fulness and beauty (Gen. xii. 2ff; Dan. i. 15).
The transition to a second and extended use of the word
is found in its employment to express relation of kindred
conceived as based on community of bodily substance,
most fully hi the phrase " bone of my bone and flesh of
my flesh" (Gen. ii. 23, al), more briefly " thy bone and
thy flesh" (2 Sam. v. 1, al), also simply in that of "our

DIFFERENT USES OF 'BASAR.' 405
flesh" (Gen. xxxvii. 27; Is. lviii. 7). In this latter case
the flesh alone represents the substance of the body
generally ; the fuller formula is she'er besaro (Lev. xviii. 6 ;
xxv. 49), where basar as body is distinguished from she'er
as flesh in the narrower sense. Sometimes the other
chief element of the body — the bones (~etsem)— is also used
to denote the whole body (Lam. iv. 7 ; Ps. cxxxix. 15)
This use oi flesh for body is not to be spoken of as a
real change of meaning, but as merely an extension of
use, resting on the synecdoche of the part put for the
whole. The word itself is not to be conceived as carry
ing the general signification of animate matter of which
the body consists, so that the signification of simple flesh
would be merely a special apphcation of the general
sense. For, 1st, no Old Testament passage can be
pointed out, where basar really means merely animate
matter in general ; and, 2nd, it is to be noted that we
meet the designation of the body by basar mainly at
places where the surface oi the body is dealt with — where
the body comes precisely into view not as regards its
material substance, but as regards its organised outward
form (comp. Lev. vi. 3; xv. 13, 16; xix. 28; xxi. 5;
xxii. 6 ; Num. viii. 7 ; 1 Kings xxi. 27 ; 2 Kings vi. 30 ;
Job iv. 15; Is. xvii. 4). This latter circumstance puts
us on the more correct track, and leads to the conclusion
that the designation of the body as flesh owes its origin
not to the consideration of its materiality, but to that of
its outward appearance. Because it acquires its aspect,
shape, and colour mainly from the fleshy parts, it is
named from what is most important for appearance ; and,
as this aspect of flesh applies only to the human body
not covered by skin, feathers, or the like, it is perhaps
by no mere accident that not a single passage occurs
where basar denotes the body of an animal, while the

406 THE PART PUT FOR THE WHOLE.
word is used with comparative frequency of that of
man. In this enlarged signification we find the flesh fre
quently placed in contradistinction to the nephesh or the
lebh, those natural constituents of earthly hving beings,
which form the seat of the higher vital and mental func
tions, not coming under the cognisance of the senses and
not subject to the laws of outward nature (Ps. lxiii. 2 ;
Job xiii. 14; Ezek. xxxvi. 26; Ps. xvi. 9 H'.ai.). . . .
We encounter a third application in the oft recurring
phrase kol-basar, as well as in a small number of other
passages (Gen. vi. 3 ; Is. xxxi. 3 ; Jer. xvii. 5 ; Ps.
lviii. 5; Ixxviii. 39; Job x. 4; Dan. ii. 11; 2 Chron.
xxxii. 8). Here we perceive at once that it is no longer
used either of the flesh on the body, or of the whole
body taking its name from the flesh. When it is affirmed
of " all flesh " as subject, that it has corrupted its way
upon earth (Gen. vi. 12), or that on the ground of the
divine revelations of judgment it comes to know that
Jehovah is the Saviour and Redeemer of Israel (Is. xlix.
26 ; comp. xl. 5 ; Ezek. xxi. 4, 5), or that it comes up to
worship Jehovah (Is. lxvi. 23 ; comp. Ps. Ixv. 2 ; cxlv.
21), it is evident that it is meant to designate not merely
the outward bodily side, but living beings generally, inclu
sive of their inner mental nature. And the way in which
this designation comes to be thus used seems quite similar
to that in the second use of "flesh" for the whole " body "
— a synecdoche by which the part is put for the whole,
and man is spoken of according to what constitutes his
outward aspect. And just as we saw formerly " bone "
employed also for the body as a whole, so here we find
the other phrase drawn from the inner man, kol-nephesh,
similarly applied to denote not merely all souls of living
beings, but the hving beings generally, inclusively of their

GROUND FOR THE SELECTION. 407
bodily nature. Each of these phrases rests on a synec
doche ; only the parts chosen to designate the whole are
different. Now when we come to ask what are the grounds for
the selection of "flesh" in the passages in question as the
most fitting part for such synecdochic use, the answer is to
be obtained by a comparison of the passages adduced, in
which we encounter a peculiarity common to them and
most significant. Wherever living beings are expressed in
terms of this synecdoche, they stand in a clear contrast to
God. In the majority of the passages the designation is
met with, where God is Himself the speaker, so that in
these that contrast is already expressed, if it is not
further emphasised ; at all other passages the contra
distinction to God is sharply and expressly brought into
prominence (comp. Num. xvi. 22 ; xxvii. 16; Deut. v. 23;
Ps. Ixv. 3 ; cxxxvi. 25 ; cxlv. 21 ; Job xii. 10 ; xxxiv. 15
al). Under such circumstances we can hardly doubt
that we have to seek the main motive for this usage in
that intentional contradistinction to God. Living beings
were to be designated not simply as such, but so, that this
contrast to God should find clear expression; and that
purpose would be most readily accomplished by describing
them in terms of the part in which that contrast was
most directly apparent.
If we further ask of what nature was the contrast thus
brought out between God and living beings on earth, we
get a sure basis for a decision in the passage, Is. xxxi. 3 :
" Egypt is man and not God, and their horses are basar
and not ruach." The parallelism shows that the notion
of basar stands in the same relation to that of man as the
notion of ruach to that of God. But the ruach of God de
notes — as may be here assumed by anticipation — through
out the Old Testament not the Spirit as a separate Divine

408 CONTRAST OF THE CREATURE WITH GOD,
Person, or as the celestial substance of the Divine Being,
but the supernatural operation of power, by virtue of
which God makes Himself known in the world of nature
and of spirit. This is confirmod by all the other passages
in which the divine ruach is opposed to the " flesh " (Gen.
vi. 3; Numb. xvi. 22; xxvii. 16; Job, xii. 10; xxxiv.
14 f . ; Joel iii. 1). Here, therefore, when living beings
on earth are named flesh overagainst God, so far as He
works by His Spirit, we easily see that they are so termed
not as regards the distinction of their substance, but as
regards their power and mode of working. That basar it
self conveys the notion of substance, and not of power, is
certainly beyond doubt ; but this term is here applied to
them by way of synecdoche, to characterise them not
merely as possessed of this substance as such, but as pos
sessed of the peculiar power of this substance. This re
sult is not at all invalidated by the fact that they are so
named to bring out their ivant of power, their utter im
potence ; for, whether the existence of power is to be as
serted or denied, in any case the stress rests on the notion
of power as determining the choice of the word. And it
is easy to explain why it should be so chosen ; for it is
in the corporeal nature falling under the cognizance of
the senses, and especially in the flesh-portions which so
readily fall a prey to corruption, that the perishableness
and nothingness of man come most clearly to hght,
whereby he stands in absolute contrast to God. The
word thus denotes living beings -with the connotation of the
absolute weakness and perishableness of their nature in dis
tinction from the power and living operation of God — a sense
which we shall perhaps best express by the word " crea
ture " (" Gescltopf" oder Kreatur).
This sense is vouched for by all the passages at which
this use of basar occurs. The formula M-basar is opposed

AND CONNOTATION OF WEAKNESS. 409
to the spirit of God, on which the creature depends for
existence, and the withdrawal of which involves its de
struction (Job xii. 10; xxxiv. 14 f . ; Is. xl. 6£); for
this reason Jehovah is called " God of all flesh "
(Numb, xxvii. 16 ; Jer. xxxii. 27) or more fully
"God of the spirits of all flesh" (Numb. xvi. 22).
Hence the folly of making the creature one's arm
(Jer. xvii. 23), while they who trust in God may
not fear, because flesh cannot harm them (Ps. lvi. 5 ; 2
Chron. xxxii. 8). We meet with the expression basar at
passages which treat of the reverence of the creatures
confronting God's power and majesty (Ps. Ixv. 3 ; cxxxvi.
25 ; cxlv. 21 ; Zech. ii. 17 ; Deut. v. 23). The " all
flesh" recurs with especial frequency where the destroying
judgments of God are spoken of (Gen. vi-ix. ; Is. xl. 5 f. ;
xlix. 26 ; lxvi. 16 ; Jer. xii. 12 ; xxv. 31 ; xiv. 5 ; Ezek.
xxi. 4 al.), less frequently when the converse — the salva
tion of the last time — is referred to (Joel iii. 1 ; Zech. ii.
17). At most passages the expression doubtless embraces
under it men and animals (e.g., Gen. vi. 17 ff. ; Lev. xvii.
14 ; Num. xviii. 15 ; Ps. cxxxvi. 25 ; Is. xl. 6), but else
where the connection shows that only men are meant (e.g.
Gen. vi. 12 f. ; Is. lxvi. 23 ; Ps. lvi. 5 [comp. verse 12
"man"]; Ixv. 3; Job xii. 10; Joel iii. 1) — a diversity
springing from the fact that the phrase is used not merely
as a collective notion to denote the whole mass of earthly
creatures, but primarily to denote the peculiar character
(Beschaffenheit) common to them in contrast to God.
The question next arises whether, in addition to the
connotation of natural weakness, it does not sometimes in
clude an element of moral blame, a suggestion of sinfulness.
This question has often been answered in the affirmative
with an appeal to Gen. vi. 5 and to Ps. Ixxviii. 39. In
the former passage— which belongs to an apparently iso-

410 IS SINFULNESS IMPLIED AT GEN. VI. 5?
lated fragment probably first inserted here by the redac-
teur of the Pentateuch, and not specially connected with
the history of the deluge that follows— the point with
which we are now concerned is the inserted clause, which
contains at any rate the specification of a ground for the
divine judgment, rendered in the A. V.: "for that ho
also is flesh," which admits of being interpreted differ
ently according to a slight change in the pointing of
the first word. The view recently defended by Dillmann,
who points it beshaggdm, deriving it from shagag, and
makes it mean : " on account of their transgression or
aberration he is flesh, that is, still merely flesh," is liable
to the objections, that there is no mention of sin in the
context, which speaks rather of an increase of the natural
vigour of life, that might, it is suggested, be compensated
by a restriction of its duration ; that the words " still
merely" [nur noch] are imported without warrant, and the
sense assigned to flesh is drawn from the New Testament
rather than from the Old ; and that the endllage numeri in
the suffix of the beshaggdm is very harsh, if not impossible,
while Dillmann's reference of it to the " sons of God "
lessens the linguistic harshness only to increase the dif
ficulty of the contents, for the main matter, " the thereby
developed tendency to the sensuous," would, as Dillmann
admits, have to be supplied. The other interpretation,
which takes it as = ba'asher gam, and renders : "for that he
too is flesh," has the support of all the old translations.
The objections to it may be reduced to two, that the » =
asher, is foreign to the usus loquendi of the Pentateuch,
and that the gam is altogether superfluous. The former
must be granted ; but the passage stands isolated, and
the occurrence of the a in the book of Judges and even
in Deborah's song (v. 7 ; comp. vi. 17 ; vii. 12 ; viii. 26)
attests the possibility of the form even for the older

EXAMINATION OF OTHER PASSAGES. 411
language. The other again has little relevancy, for the
order of the words suggests a reference of tbe gam to hu
and not to basar ; and the passage seems to give the ap
propriate sense, that, notwithstanding any impression to
the contrary that might be produced by the emergence
of a Titanic race, man too belongs to the general category
of the creature, and has his life not as his own and in
capable of being lost, but as given by God and subject to
withdrawal at such term as He appoints.
In Psalm Ixxviii. 39, the whole clearness and beauty of
the passage would be lost, if we should assume in the
phrase : " and he remembered that they are flesh " the
transition completed from the conception of weakness into
that of sin, as Tholuck does. Immediately before it is
said that God " covers " iniquity ; and how could it be
added that God remembers the Israelites, so far as they
are flesh, that is, so far as in their nature lies the seat
and origin of sin ? and what is to be made in that case
of the apposition to basar: " breath that passeth away and
returneth not " 1 Obviously the words contain not a
reason explaining on God's part the sin of the Israelites
from their being flesh, but rather a motive for His cover
ing of their sin, for His forgiveness, based on their weak
and transient nature. The same motive appears at
Psalm xxxix. 14 ; ciii. 13 f; Amos vii. 25.
On the other hand, various passages in the book of Job
seem to assert man's inability to justify himself before God,
and connect that inability with his being dust (such as
iv. 17 ff; xv. 14 ff; xxv. Iff.) ... To understand the
argument in these cases, we must look at the question
not from our Western notions of right, but from the
Oriental point of view, according to which the question
of right was primarily a question of might. "As in the
gate, that is, in the judicial assembly, that man is not

412 DR. WENDT ON THE
put to shame in the process with his enemies, who
appears at the spot with the due number of stalwart
sons in his train (Psalm cxxvii. 5), so conversely, when
contending with God, man is from the outset and abso
lutely in the wrong, because, confronted with God, he is
absolute weakness." . . . The references to the frailty
and affinity to dust of man, so far from being in
tended to explain human sinfulness, are merely adduced
to make good man's utter destitution, of right (Re.chtlosigkcit)
in presence of God, notwithstanding even of possibly existent
sinlessness. Nor can the references to Lovitical unclean
ness occasioned by contact with certain forms of disease,
or with a dead body, be regarded as vouchers for natural
frailty and mortality being viewed at the same time as
moral defect. For this Levitical impurity has nothing
to do with sinfulness in the proper ethical sense 
Nor is there any trace of an allusion to this sort of im
purity in the conception of basar, as it denotes in the Old
Testament creaturely beings.
II. The Conception of Ruach.
The remarkably varied applications of this conception
in the Old Testament find the explanation which binds
them into unity in the original signification of " wind."
Its chief marks to be here taken account of are those of
movement and of invisibility.
First, the wind presents itself as a moved and moving
nature-force, seizing moveable objects, sweeping them
before it, and spreading destruction. With the Orientals
it was regarded primarily as a destructive agency ; very
seldom is it wished for, as when it brings rain (2 Kings
iii. 17; Prov. xxv. 14); otherwise it appears every
where dreaded, partly for its destructive power intensi-

DIFFERENT SENSES OF 'RUACH.' 413
fied in southern climates (Job i. 1 9 ; Psalm xlviii. 8 ;
cvii. 25 ff.) ; partly for its withering effects (Isaiah xl. 7 ;
Ezek. xvii. 10; Hosea xiii. 15, al). It is very often
symbol of annihilation (Isaiah xvii. 13 ; Jeremiah xiii. 24;
Psalm i. 4, al).
As regards its other significant peculiarity of invisibility,
it may be judged of from two points of view — either as
unsearchable in its origin, or as immaterial in its nature.
Closely as these come into contact, they give occasion to
two very divergent chains of thought. So far as the
wind in its enigmatical origin lies beyond the sphere of
experience (Eccl. xi. 5), it is referred directly to God ; it
is God who creates the wind (Amos iv. 13), brings it
out of his treasure-chambers (Jer. x. 1 3 ; Psalm cxxxv. 7) ;
determines the weight for it (Job xxviii. 25) ; sends,
turns, or directs it (Gen. viii. 1 ; Ex. x. 13, 19 ; xiv.
21; xv. 10; Num. xi. 31, al). The winds are his
messengers, executing His word (Psalm civ. 4 ; cxlviii. 8) ;
He is himself described as travelling on the wings of the
wind (Psalm xviii. 11) ; and it plays a remarkable part
in the passing of God before Elijah (1 Kings xix. 11), in
the night- vision of Eliphaz (Job iv. 15, "a wind," not
" a spirit"), and in the vision of Ezekiel (i. 4).
On the other hand the Hebrew has a vivid conscious
ness of the fact that the wind lacks sensuous visibleness
and the other marks by which the reality of a thing
is wont to be tested. " To grasp the wind " is a pro
verbial expression for an impossibility (Prov. xxvii. 16 ;
xxx. 4), and so ruach becomes emblem and expression
for what is empty, null, unreal, so that the sceptic illus
trates his sermon of the vanity of all human existence
and action by comparison with the " pursuit of wind "
(Eccl. i. 14, 17 ; ii. 11, 17, 26, al.). Under this point of
view, it may mean the very opposite of what it means

414 'RUACH' AS WIND, BREATH,
when regarded as of divine origin ; and ruach, in this
sense of windy nothingness, may form a contrast to
almost all the other significations of the word. [Of this
several interesting illustrations are given.]
With the sense of wind is immediately associated that
of breath, as bearing essentially in its invisible motion
the form under which the wind manifests itself. As the
seat of the breath are named the nostrils (Job xxvii. 3;
Lam. iv. 20, al), or the mouth (Ps. cxxxv. 17, al), or the
lips (Is. xi. 4), or the interior of man generally (Zech.
xii. 1 ; Heb. ii. 19, al). And as the breath presents
itself as a wind in man, the wind ma}' conversely be
apprehended as the breath of God, which issues (anthro-
pomorphically) from his nostrils (Ex. xv. 8 ; 2 Sam.
xxii. 16, al). A further step makes the breath of man
appear directly as the breath of God, so that in Ps.
civ. 29, 30, rucham "their (men's) breath," and rucheka
" thy (God's) breath" may be interchanged. The ruach
belongs to man, so far as it stirs and works in him ; to
God, in so far as he has sent or breathed it forth. . . .
From these combinations between the wind, the breath
of God and the human breath arise manifold, and in their
turn opposite, relations for the ruach. As the wind is
chiefly a destroying and dreaded nature-force, so the
breath, resembling in its snorting movement that of
stormy wind, gets the sense of anger ( Judg. viii. 3 ; Ezek.
iii. 14; Job xv. 13; Prov. xvi. 32). God's ruach in this
sense of blast of anger is always destructive of life (Job
iv. 9; Is. iv. 4; Zech. vi. 8, al). Where the point of
view of impetuous movement falls into abeyance, the
process of breathing is felt to be the proper mark of all
that lives, and so the ruach becomes transformed into the
opposite sense of the creating and preserving life-breath,
which is altogether of divine origin. This life-breath of

AND LIFE-SPIRIT. 415
God it was, which moved over chaos (Gen. i. 2) and created
the host of heaven (Ps. xxxiii. 6). . . . We have seen
in discussing basar how it is the communication of the
divine life-spirit to the creature, that forms the ground
on the one hand of all possibility and power of creaturely
existence, and on the other of its entire dependence on
God ; it remains that we now notice the further passages
where there is not the word basar as opposed to ruach.
God forms or gives the life-spirit to man and to all that
walk on earth (Zech. xii. 1 ; Is. xiii. 5) ; by this life-
breath the creatures are made, and by it what is already
dead may be recalled to existence (Job xxxiii. 4 ; Ps.
civ. 30; Ezek. xxxvii.), while on the withdrawal of
the breath by God the creature falls unto death and
earth (Ps. civ. 29 ; cxlvi. 4). The basis of the conception
here clearly is, that the life-breath of the creature, as it
was in its origin a communication of God's own breath,
returns at death to the fulness of the divine breath —
which is described as a being-gathered-in-again by God
(Job xxxiv. 14 ; Ps. civ. 29). The same thought occurs
in the celebrated passage Eccl. xii. 7 : "The dust returns
to the earth in keeping with its nature, and the life-
breath returns to God, who has given it." . . .
To the divine ruach in man are referred all the several
states under which his life-power subsists and shows
itself. When impressions of terror or surprise overwhelm
man, it is said, the life-breath no longer subsists (Josh.
ii. 11 [A.V. "courage"]; v. 1 ; 1 Kings x. 5); under
opposite refreshing or reinvigorating influences, it is said,
that the life-breath revives or comes back (Hab. i. 1 1 ;
Gen. xiv. 27 ; Judg. xv. 19 ; 1 Sam. xxx. 12) ; the failing,
extinguishing, or emptying of the breath is the proper
designation for the ceasing of the vital power (Is.
lvii. 16; Ps. Ixxvii. 4; cxliii. 4; Ezek. xxi. 12; Is.

416 RELATION OF ' BUACII ' TO ' NEPHESH.'
xix. 3, al). The same sense of the word appears in tho
phrase he ir-eth-ruaeh — "to stir the life-spirit," i.e. to
instigate any one (Hagg. i. 14 ; 1 Chron. v. 26 ; 2 Chron.
xxi. 16 ; xxxvi. 32 ; Ezra i. 1, 5).
In what relation does this ruach stand to the nephesh,
the soul ? Are the two notions equivalent, or are they
so different as to denote two co-ordinate parts of the
nature of living beings 1 There is unmistakeably
great likeness between them. The soul is treated also
as seat and centre of the vital powers ; all things that
promote or hinder the life are placed in relation to it
(Ps. vi. 4 ; xvii. 13 ; xxii. 21, 30 ; xxvi. 9 ; xxxiii. 19, al),
and the like predicates are used of it as of the ruach,
when the renewal or dying out of the life is spoken of
(comp. Ps. cvii. 5 ; Jon. ii. 8 with Ps. Ixxvii. 4 [hil/tatteph] ;
1 Kings xvii. 22 with 1 Samuel xxx. 12 [shubh] ; Gen.
xxxv. 18 with Ps. cxlvi. 4 [yatza~\). But there are other
marks pointing to a not inconsiderable difference.
First it is to be noted that the -nephesh is primarily the
seat of individuality, personality, or self-consciousness.
Hence it is often, especially in poetic diction, merely a
fuller designation for the Ego. While other things are,
or might be, more or less common to man, each man's
soul belongs to him as his own most special property,
which cannot be exchanged or, in the event of loss, reac
quired. Hence it is the dearest possession that man has,
and the poets may well interchange it with "my darling"
(Ps. xxii. 21; xxxv. 17), or "my glory" (Ps. xvi. 9;
xxx. 13 (12); lvii. 9 (8); cviii. 2 (1). For the same
reason, all natural and mental impulses, in which the
individual self asserts itself, are apprehended as imme
diate functions of the soul To it is ascribed e.g. the
activity of longing [ivvah] (Deut. xii. 15, 20; 2 Sam.
iii. 21 ; 1 Kings xi. 37 ; Is. xxvi. 8 f. al.) ; " to lift up the

POINTS OF DIFFERENCE. 417
soul" is equivalent to "to desire " (Jer. xxii. 27; Hos. iv. 8;
Ps. xxiv. 4; xxv. 1); hence in the sense of censure
nephesh probably signifies also selfish greed (Ps. xxvii. 12;
xxxv. 25 ; xii. 3). This signification of individuality so
characteristic of the nephesh is entirely wanting to the
ruach. The life-spirit is in all creatures of like character
and effect; it forms a preponderantly common mark of
hving beings, while the nephesh is individual.
But this first difference is but the consequence of ano
ther and deeper one. The ruach stands in quite a
different relation to God than the nephesh. It is viewed
as an immediate outbreathing of God ; it is but a part of
the general divine ruach, which creates and preserves life
everywhere, and does not lose its character as such, even
when at work in an individual earthly creature. Quite
different is it with the nephesh in presence of God. No
doubt at several places there is mention of a nephesh of
God, where in manifest anthropomorphism certain emo
tions are ascribed to God (Ps. xi. 5 ; Prov. vi. 10 ; Is.
xiii. 1 ; Jer. vi. 8, al.) ; but the soul of the creatures is
never regarded, like the ruach, as an efflux or portion of
that divine nephesh. The soul depends on God, because
it is given by God (Gen. ii. 7 ; Jer. xxxviii. 16) ; but the
life-spirit depends on God, because it is itself divine.
A third difference turns on the dissimilarity of their
fate after death. The spirit of the finite creatures returns
to God. But we nowhere read in the Old Testament of
the souls of the dead coming to God. The nephesh is by
death absolutely severed from God. When the conception
of a continued existence of the departed in Sheol, remote
altogether from the divine presence, is expressed, it is
the nephesh that is the subject of that shadowy sad ex
istence (Ps. xvi. 10 ; xxx. 4 ; xlix. 15 ; Ixxxvi. 13) ; nay,
even the corpse, which stands in sharpest contrast to God
2d

418 DIVERSITY, NOT OF CONTENTS,
and the hving spirit, may be designated as nephesh, pro
bably because it bears, and so long as it bears, the linea
ments of the individual personality (Lev. xxi. 11 ; xxii.
4 ; Num. v. 2 ; vi. 6 ; Hagg. ii. 13).
How are we on the basis of these distinctions to con
ceive the mutual relation of ruach and nephesh 2 First,
it is plain that they do not stand side by side simply
co-ordinate, so that we can derive from them the usual
trichotomous scheme. For, as the differences exhibited
between them essentially concern their origin and issue,
which do not admit of being established by experience,
they are to be taken as diversities, not of contents and of
mode of operation, so much as of value. Further, we must
distinctly reject the view, which would regard the spirit
as the collective expression (Inbegriff) of the higher
powers that form the ground of the divine image in man,
and thereby at the same time of his distinction from the
animals consisting only of body and soul. The Old Tes
tament does not enter upon a demarcation of human
and animal psychology ; and least of all is the ruach com
mon to all creatures fitted to furnish the principle for
such a demarcation.
Much more deserving of attention is the view (of
Oehler) that, according to the Old Testament, the whole
man only consists dichotomously of basar and nephesh,
while the diviw ruach is the power, which by its very
union with matter produces animate beings, and then
as divine power continues to subsist in those two anthro
pological constituents as its organs and objects of its opera
tion. Nevertheless, even this interpretation seems to me not
admissible. If any Old Testament author applied the
two conceptions side by side in such a way as to show
clearly that he referred them to an unity of psychological
system, or if we should be led to suppose that such an

BUT OE THE POINT OF VIEW. 419
unity of system must have lain ready to the hand of all
the authors who use the two terms, then that combination
might perhaps commend itself. But in reality there is no
ground for such assumptions. We may shape the answer
to our question more correctly to this effect : the two con
ceptions denote the same quantity {Grosse), but with a dif
ferent estimate of value, because from different points of view.
The nature of hving beings may be judged in a twofold
way, either by comparison with God, or by comparison with
inanimate nature ; in the former there prevails the religious
point of view, which distinguishes what in the creatures
is earthly and what divine ; in the latter there prevails
the physical (or anthropological) point of view, which
distinguishes what in them is of material bodily nature
and what is of an immaterial mental nature. The mental
life-powers are called ruach, so far as they connect the
creatures with God and place them in dependence upon
Him; they are called nepliesh, so far as they separate
the creatures as animate individuals from one another
and from the lifeless impersonal world of sense. A clear
confirmation of this distinction is yielded by the words
of Job xii. 10: "in whose hand is the soul of every
living thing and the spirit of all flesh of man." The
parallelism of the two portions of the verse shows that
the notions nephesh and ruach are related to one another
just as the phrases " every living thing " {kolchay) and "all
flesh" (kol-basar). Now, as the two latter expressions de
note as regards contents quite the same thing, but under
the different points of view, that in the one case the hving
beings are placed in contrast to inanimate nature, and in
the other the creatures in contrast to God, it is clear that
we must assume for our notions of nephesh and ruach a
diversity not of the contents, but of the point of view.
Let us turn now to the comparison of ruach with lebh,

420 RELATION OF ' RUACH '
which at once suggests itself when we look at a new,
often used signification of our term. The passages are
quite isolated, at which ruach without addition appears to
denote the thinking activity of the mind, e.g., Ezek. xi. 5
(xx. 32), in the combination ma'aloth ruchcykhem, " that
which cometh up in your mind," while elsewhere is
regularly found the phrase, 'alah 'al lebh (Jer. iii. 16 ;
vii. 31 ; xix. 5, al.) or Psalm Ixxvii. 7, where a diligent
search is affirmed of the spirit. But with great fre
quency we find the word ruach combined with some
designation of quality, where, generally speaking, a
definite mental state is to be characterised. This quali
tative notion is attached to the ruach either attributively
(e.g., ruach nedhibhah, Psalm li. 14), or constructively
(e.g., rnorath ruach, Gen. xxvi. 35), or lastly predicatively
(e.g.,.tiktsar ruach, Job xxi. 4). The origin of this new
signification may easily be discerned. When the ruach
is spoken of as " shortened," what was originally thought
of was the short rapid drawing of the breath, and only
thence was it transferred to the impatient disposition
therein expressing itself; in the opposite conception
'erekh appayim (Prov. xiv. 29 ; xvi. 32) the original sense
is more clearly apparent. Similar is the case with the
ruach kehah (Isaiah lxi. 3), where the breath dying out
is primarily the sensuous expression of the depressed
mental state. In the use of other such expressions as
shebher ruach (Isaiah Ixv. 14), shephal-ruach (Prov. xvi. 19;
Is. lvii. 15) that original signification has already quite
disappeared. For most of these designations there may be shown
parallel phrases formed with lebh, e.g., " hard of spirit "
(1 Sam. i. 15) and "hard of heart" (Ezek. iii. 7), " err
ing in spirit " (Is. xxix. 24) and " erring in heart "
(Ps. xcv. 10); "grieved in spirit" (Is. liv. 6) and

TO 'LEBH.' 421
" grieved in heart " (Prov. xv. 13) ; " breaking of spirit "
(Is. Ixv. 14) and "broken in heart" (Ps. xxxiv. 19);
"a firm spirit" (Ps. li. 12) and "a firm heart" (Ps.
Ivii. 8 ; cviii. 2). Ruach and lebh are also found side by
side, each with such a designation of quahty : as " broken
in heart and contrite in spirit" (Psalm xxxiv. 19); "a
clean heart and a firm spirit" (Psalm li. 12; and so at
Ex. xxxv. 21 ; Deut. ii. 30 ; Is. Ivii. 15 ; Ezek. xi. 19 ;
Prov. xvii. 22) ; lastly, at the two passages, Ezek.
xviii. 31 and li. 19, the two words stand side by side,
joined with the same attributes — a clear proof that ruach
and lebh have in all these cases a signification nearly
akin but yet not synonymous. To determine the dis
tinction, let us first examine shortly the signification
of lebh.
The lebh is in general seat of all mental conscious
activities of living beings, especially of the thoughts,
plans, and resolutions (Gen. vi. 5 ; Ps. xxxiii. 11 ;
Prov. vi. 18, al.) ; so the lebh stands specially in con
trast to the words of the mouth or the deed of the
hands, in which the inward plans and thoughts ex
press themselves (the former, e.g. at Isaiah xxix. 13 ;
Ps. xix. 15; xl. 11; xii. 7 ; lv. 22; the latter at
Ps. xxiv. 4 ; xxxiii. 15). But desires and wishes
(Ps. xx. 5 ; xxi. 3 ; xxxvi. 4), and especially feelings
of all sorts— of joy (Ps. iv. 8 ; xiii. 6 ; xvi. 9, al.) ; of
confidence (Ps. xxviii. 7) ; or of fear and apprehen
sion (Ps. xiii. 3 ; xxv. 17) — have their root in the
lebh. To this very comprehensive sense of the Hebrew
word, the German " Sinn " [mind] would probably best
correspond, as we in the term " Herz " think mostly of
the seat of the feelings, and besides are inclined to assume
a favourable connotation (comp. "hearty, heartless")
which is entirely wanting in the new conception. From

422 'RUACH' AS ENERGY.
the lebh proceed good thoughts and plans just as the bad
(e.g., Jer. hi. 17 ; Gen. vi. 5), " to walk or speak accord
ing to his heart " is used to describe the opposite of a
conduct willed by God (Num. xvi. 28 ; Is. Ivii. 17 ; Jer.
xxiii. 16). It is the lebh that according to its character
gives to man the direction in which his thoughts, re
solves, and actions move (Psalm xxxvii. 31 ; xhv. 19 ;
Jer. iii. 17 ; vii. 24 ; xvii. 5) ; and this especially when
it is combined with definite adjectives, intimating that
the mind of man, i.e., the contents of his activity of
thought and will, is of this or that nature, follows this or
that direction. So e.g., yeshar-lebh, he who with "up
right mind" grasps the right thoughts, purposes, &c,
that correspond to God's will ; nishbar-lebh, he who, break
ing his " wilfulness," subordinates himself to the designs
of God ; 'anav-lebh, he who renouncing high and selfish
thoughts readily suits his mind to the relations given
by God.
Ruach, in an analogous use, has a somewhat different
significance : it denotes not the mind, which determines
the different kinds of mental exertion and indirectly of
external action in point of contents ; but it is the energy
(Gemuthskraft) which, partly as disposition, partly as
character, stamps on all individual expressions of the life
of feeling, as of the activity of thought and will, their
definite form. The two sides, the natural disposition and
the moral character, are for the Hebrew consciousness
not yet separated ; it is only our later reflection that
separates them. The Hebrew conception is, I believe, most
completely covered by our [German] word " Muth " in the
older signification, which still cleaves to it, when used as
simple, only in particular phrases (e.g., "mir ist so oder
so zu Muthe, getrosten, traurigen Muthes sein " ), but in
substantive -and adjective compounds answers quite

TRANSCENDENTAL 'RUACH.' 423
closely to those compound Hebrew expressions, hkewise
without distinction of natural disposition and ethical
character (e.g., ruach kashah = Schwermuth ; ruach ne-
dhibhah = Freimuth ; gobhah-ruach = hochmuthig ; shephal
ruach — demiithig). The result, moreover, is that strictly
speaking there prevails no substantial difference between
the designations formed with ruach and those with lebh,
just because the contents of the mental activity given in the
"mind" is conditioned throughout by the peculiar form
of the ruling natural or moral tone. As between ruach
and nephesh, so between ruach and lebh there subsists a
distinction not so much of the object, as of the point of
view, of the designation.
A new and last signification of ruach presents in some
degree a blending of the most essential marks resulting
from the two already considered. In the foreground
comes here first the mark of divine origin, which had been
no longer apparent in the last discussed use of ruach.
Formerly we perceived it both in the signification of
"wind" and in that of "life-spirit" ; in both of which
cases there were denoted by ruach supernatural operations
of God, but yet such as we might regard as comparatively
usual and regular. But now it becomes a designation
for all the wwusual and eaifraordinary phenomena, in
which an influence of God operating on man shows itself.
It is usual, but not strictly quite warrantable, to describe
this ruach simply as the prophetic. The prophetic ruach,
which expresses itself in prophetic speech or deed, is in
reality only a single, though perhaps the most important,
species of a far more comprehensive class of phenomena.
In all spheres of human working, physical or mental,
achievements, which in prominence of gifts and in signifi
cance transcend the measure of ordinary human ability,
are referred to the communication of such a divine ruach.

424 PREDICATES OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL 'RUACH.'
So the extraordinary specimens of strength of a Samson
are manifestations of the ruach which seizes him (Judg.
xiii. 26 ; xiv. 6, 19 ; xv. 14) ; so with the successful gifts
of the ruler, especially in war (Judg. iii. 10; vi. 34 ; 1
Sam. xvi. 13 ; Is. xi. 2) ; so even a single wonderful act,
like the dry passage of Elisha through the Jordan, may
show the presence of the ruach (2 Kings ii. 14f). Men
tally, all distinguished theoretical or practical ability is
proof of a ruach chokhmah ubhinah communicated by God ;
so with artists and poets (Ex. xxviii. 3 ; xxxi. 3 ; xxxv.
31 ; 2 Sam. xxiii. 2), or in men of special powers of
judgment and understanding (Gen. xii. 38 f. ; Deut.
xxxiv. 9; Is. xi. 2 ; Prov. i. 23; Job xx. 3, al). But
especially are gifts in the religious sphere, which can
least of all be understood from merely natural presupposi
tions, a manifestation of such a God-sent ruach, whose
organ is the nabhi and whose effect is the nibba or hithnab-
be (Num. xi. 25 ff. ; 1 Sam. x. 6, 10 ; Is. lxi. 1 ; Ezek.
xi. 5; Joel iii. 1 f. ; Mic. iii. 8; 1 Chron. xii. 18;
2 Chron. xv. 1, al). Accordingly the revelation of
God in the Torah, as well as all further witness
of God among the people on the basis of the Tcrrah,
has taken place in the divine ruach through the
medium (beyadh) of the prophets (Zech. vii. 12 ; Neh.
ix. 20, 30).
The predicates used of this extraordinary divine ruach,
which we may briefly hereafter designate as the tran
scendental, are : labhasli, " to put on " (Judg. vi. 34 ; 1
Chron. xii. 18, al), tsalach-al, "to fall upon "(Judg. xiv.
6, 19 ; xv. 14 ; 1 Sam. x. 6, 10, al), nuach, not " to rest,"
but "to settle itself" (Num. xi. 25 f. : 2 Kings ii. 15 ;
Is. xi. 2), mille (Ex. xxxi. 3 ; xxxv. 31 ; Mic. iii. 8),
hayah'al (Num. xxiv. 2; Judg. iii. 10; 1 Sam. xix. 9,
20 ff, al). When God is named as communicating sub-

CONSPECTUS OF THE FACTS. ' 425
ject, there is used nathan (Is. xiii. 1 ; Ezek. xxxvi. 27 ;
xxxvii. 14) or sim (Num. xi. 17 ; Is. lxiii. 11) or shaphakh
(Joel iii. 1 f. ; Zech. xii. 10 ; Ezek. xxxix. 29). Two
main marks of our ruach may be recognised from these
predicates. [The substance of what follows is sufficiently indicated
in the text, pp. 122-126.]

C— CONSPECTUS OF THE FACTS OF
PAULINE USAGE.
The facts, readily accessible for reference through the
excellent Concordance of Bruder or the smaller volume of
Schmoller, are brought together and classified in the seve
ral lexicons of New Testament Greek, especially in those
of Grimm and Cremer. But it may be convenient for
the reader to have them presented here at one view with
a reference to the chief passages falling under each group
or illustrating each variety of meaning. My object here
is simply to tabulate, not to discuss, them. For a fuller
statement I may specially refer to the new (third) edition
of Dr. Cremer's Biblisch-Theologisches Worterbuch der Neu-
testamen'Uichen Grcicitdt, which has just been completed,
and has come into my hands as these Lectures were being
passed through the press. The article on adpg in parti
cular, to which I should have been glad to have had
earlier access, has been so greatly enlarged — in no
small degree under the influence of Dr. Wendt's
mvestigations — that from the four pages devoted to

426 * FACTS AS TO ' SARX.
it in the second edition it has grown to eleven in the
third. The following are the chief uses recognised by lexico
graphers in the Epistles of St. Paul as to
1. 2dp£.
A. Flesh proper, cairo, substance covering the bones,
1 Cor. xv. 29 (the only Pauhne passage where a. is used
of the other creatures) ; associated with do-Tea at Eph. v.
30 ; but the words there are of doubtful genuineness.
Kpeas used of dead flesh : Rom. xiv. 21 ; 1 Cor. viii. 13.
B. The body itself, designated (by synecdoche oipart-
for the whole) from the flesh as its main substance and as
characterising it : 1 Cor. vi. 16; vii. 28 ; 2 Cor. iv. 11 ;
vii. 5 ; x. 3 ; xii. 7 ; Gal. ii. 20 ; iv. 13 ; iv. 14 ; Eph. v.
29 ; Phil. i. 22 ; i. 24 ; Col. ii. 1 ; as also Rom. ii. 28 ;
Eph. ii. 11 ; Gal. vi. 13 ; Col. ii. 13 ; Phil. iii. 3, 4. But,
as in several, if not most, of these passages it may be
doubtful whether the Apostle's choice of the term does
not rest on the value associated with it under his more
general point of view, Cremer rightly urges that it ought
to be translated " flesh," and not to be rendered as
" body." C. The medium, in and through which the natural re
lationship of men manifests itself as regards descent, fa
mily and national affinity — the obvious bond oi community
between them [based on Gen. ii. 23, 24, quoted at 1 Cor.
vi. 16 and Eph. v. 31 : els adpKa piav\; Gal. iv. 23, 29 ;
1 Cor. x. 18; Rom. i. 3 ; ix. 3, 8; xi. 14; Eph. ii. 11;
Philem. 16.
D. Human nature designated from the common visible
form in which it appears : Col. i. 22 ; 1 Tim. ih. 16.
Akin to this is the use of a. in the phrase iraaa

FACTS AS TO 'SOMA. ' 427
adpg, reproducing the Hebrew M-basar: 1 Cor. i. '29;
Gal. ii. 16 ; Rom. iii. 20. The same idea is more fully
expressed by the association of the blood as vehicle
of life .with the adpg in the phrase (Matt. xvi. 17) adpg
Kat at/xa; 1 Cor. xv. 50; Gal. i. 16; Eph. vi. 12.
E. The natural state, or natural side of man, as contrasted
with his Christian state or pneumatic side — an ethico-
religious conception in which cr. appears interchangeable
with dvOpwiros or with iraAatos dvOpwiros, in specific
contrast to irvevpa, and in close association with sin : 1
Cor. iii. 3, 4; Rom. vi. 6, 19 ; viii. 4-13 ; 2 Cor. x. 3 ; i.
17*; Gal. iii. 3 ; v. 13 ; v. 16-26; vi. 8; Rom. vii. 17,
18,25; viii. 3; Col. ii. 18, 23, al.
The Apostle uses two adjectives derived from adpg —
aapKiKos and o-apKtvos, although in consequence of their
similarity in form and affinity of meaning there is some
variety of reading in the MSS. and some doubt as to the
reading to be preferred.
"EdpKivos — composed of flesh, fleshy, is undoubted at
2 Cor. iii. 3, where it is to be taken in the strict hteral
sense ; and it probably deserves the preference at Rom.
vii. 14 and 1 Cor. iii. 1.
2a/>KtKos — belonging to the flesh, fleshly, is employed
{a) in reference to the a. put for the body in Rom. xv. 27
and 1 Cor. ix. 11, and (6) in reference to the a. as human
nature per se in contrast to God, at 2 Cor. x. 4.
2. Sco/Aa.
2tf/xa is the general term for " body," as an organism
composed of parts or p'eX-q, and serving as organ for the
<pvxg or irvevpa -with which it is associated. It is* used
(a) in the proper sense, at the locus classicus, 1 Cor.
xii. 12-26, where the word occurs sixteen times ; 1 Cor.

428 FACTS AS TO 'PNEUMA.'
xv. 35 ff.; Rom. vi. 12; viii. 13; xii. 4; 1 Cor. v. 3;
vi. 18; vii. 34; 2 Cor. v. 6, 8, 10; ix. 27; x. 10; Phil. iii. 21;
Col. i. 22; ii. 11, al; (b) in a figurative sense, of the Church
as the body of Christ : 1 Cor. xii. 27 ; Rom. xii. 5 ; Eph.
i. 23 ; Col. i. 18 et al. (especially frequent in the Epistles
to the Ephesians and Colossians). 3. Jlvev/xa.
A. The breath, anhelitus narium: 2 Thess. ii. 8. [Hence
naturally transferred, in classical Greek and in other
Biblical books, to denote the vital principle — anima qua
viviiur ; but this physiological sense is not found in St.
Paul.] B. In the psychological sense of the spirit or mind of
man, the inward self-conscious principle which feels,
thinks, and wills : 1 Cor. ii. 11 ; v. 3; vii. 34; Col. ii. 5
accompanied by a personal pronoun in the genitive
Rom. i. 9; viii. 16; 1 Cor. v. 4; xvi. 18; 2 Cor. ii. 13
vii. 13; Gal. vi. 18 ; Phil. iv. 23 ; 1 Thess. v. 23 ; Philem.
25 ; 2 Tim. iv. 22.
C. Of the spiritual nature of Christ : 1 Cor. xv. 45 ;
1 Tim. iii. 16 [Rom. i. 4 ?].
D. (Most frequently in the special sense of) A divine
power or influence belonging to God, and communicated
in Christ to men, in virtue of which they become irvev-
pariKol : 1 Thess. iv. 8 ; Gal. iv. 6 ; Rom. viii. 9. It is
designated as : —
(a) irvevpa GeoC : 1 Cor. ii. 10, 11, 12, 14; iii. 16 ; vi. 11;
vii. 40; xii. 3; 2 Cor. iii. 3; Rom. viii 9, 11 (bis), 14;
Eph. iii. 16.
(b) 'irvevpa Xpiarov : 1 Cor. hi. 17, 18; Gal. iv. 6; Rom.
viii. 9; Phil. i. 19.
(c) irvevpa dyiov : 1 Thess. i. 5, 6 ; iv. 8 ; 1 Cor. vi. 19 ;

FACTS AS TO 'PNEUMA.' 429
xii. 3 ; 2 Cor. vi. 6 ; xiii. 13 ; Rom. v. 5 ; ix. 1 ; xiv. 17 ;
xv. 13, 16, 19; Eph. i. 13; iv. 30; 2 Tim. i. 14; Tit. iii. 5.
{d) irvevpa with, or without, the article, but with its defi
nite reference to the jtv. Geou or irv. dyiov clearly indicated
by the context: 1 Thess. ii. 13; 1 Cor. ii. 4, 10, 13; xii. 4, 7,
8, 9 (bis), 11 ; xii. 13 ; 2 Cor. i. 22 ; iii. 8 ; v. 5 ; Gal. iii.
2, 5, 14; v. 16, 18; Rom. viii. 16, 23, 26, 27; xv. 30;
Eph. iv. 3 ; vi. 17 ; Phil. ii. 1 ; 1 Tim. iv. 1.
E. A power or influence, the character, manifestations
or results of which are more precisely defined by quali
fying genitives : 1 Cor. iv. 21 and Gal. vi. 1 jt. jrpaoTr/Tos;
2 Cor. iv. 13 jr. 7rto-Tecos; Rom. viii. 2 ir. faijs; 15 ir.
vloOeaias; Eph. i. 17 jt. ao<plas Kat aVoKaAiJi/'ecus ; 2 Tim.
i. 7 Jr. Svvdpews Kal dydirgs Kal aw<ppoviapov ; or, in the
absence of any such adjunct, are to be gathered from ex
press or implied contrast : e.g. Gal. v. 5, 25; Eph. v. 18.
In several cases jr. is contrasted with ypdppa : Rom.
ii. 29 ; vii. 6 ; 2 Cor. iii. 6 ; and in numerous others
with adpg; especially at Gal. v. 16-24 and Rom. viii. 1-13.
F. The plural irvevpara, used of the \apiapara or spiri
tual gifts : 1 Cor. xiv. 12, or of the persons who are or
profess to be under spiritual influence : 1 Cor. xii. 10.
G. Powers or influences alien from, or adverse to the
divine jt. are designated by the same term with some
qualifying adjunct; 2 Cor. xi. 4 jt. erepov ; 1 Cor. ii. 12
jr. Koapov ; Rom. viii. 1 5 ?r. SouAei'as ; xi. 8 jr. Karavvgeios ;
Eph. ii. 2 ; 2 Tim. i. 7.
nveu/xaTtKos, belonging to, or characterised by, irvevpa,
le. the divine ir., is apphed (a) to things : 1 Cor. ii. 13 ;
ix. 11 ; x. 3, 4 ; xii. 1 ; xiv. 1 ; xv. 44, 46 ; Rom. i. 11 ;
vii 14 ; xv. 27 ; Eph. i. 3 ; v. 19 ; Col. i. 9 ; iii. 16 ; (b)
to persons: Gal. vi. 1; 1 Cor. ii. 13; iii. 1; xiv. 37. nvev-
fxariKws occurs at 1 Cor. ii. 14. [The expression to.
irvevpariKa rijs irovgpias, Eph. vi. 12, seems related to the

430 'PSYCHE '  ' KARDIA.'
use of irvevpa elsewhere in Scripture, but not with St.
Paul, to denote spiritual existences or powers higher
than man, but inferior to God — whether angels or
demons.] 4. ^vxi/.
A. The individual life, the seat of the personal Ego :
1 Thess. ii. 8 ; 2 Cor. i. 23 ; xii. 15 ; Rom. xi. 2 ; xvi. 4 ;
Phil. ii. 30.
B. The subject of the life, the person in whom it
dwells, named a parte potiori : 1 Cor. xv. 45 ; Rom. ii. 9 ;
xiii. 1.
C. The mind as the sentient principle, the seat of
sensation and desire, the soul : Phil. i. 27 ; Eph. vi. 6 ;
Col. iii. 23. Associated with irvevpa and awpa at 1
Thess. v. 23.
The adjective i/^x"™5 (in contrast to irvevpariKos) :
1 Cor. ii. 14; xv. 44. 5. Ka/oc5/a
Is throughout the inner central seat and organ of the
personal life in man, regarded in and by himself, and so
almost constantly accompanied by the genitive of the
possessive pronouns pov, aov, avrov, r/pwv, ipwv, avrwv.
It represents the Old Testament lebh and is more com
prehensive in meaning than our " heart " : 1 Cor. ii. 9 ;
iv: 5 ; xiv. 25 ; Rom. i. 24 ; ii. 29 ; viii. 27 ; 1 Thess. ii. 4;
contrasted with aropa -. Rom. x. 10 ; 2 Cor. vi. 11 ; with
7rpdcra)7rov : 1 Thess. ii. 17 ; 2 Cor. v. 11 ; appearing as the
seat of intelligence : 2 Cor. iii. 15 ; iv. 6 ; Rom. i. 21 ;
Eph. i. 18; iv. 18; as the receptacle of impressions:
Rom. ii. 15 ; 2 Cor. iii. 2 ; as the seat of moral choice and
decision : 1 Cor. vii. 37 ; 2 Cor. ix. 7 ; Rom. ii. 5 ; as the

FACTS AS TO ' NOUS ' 431
seat of feeling and emotion .: 2 Cor. ii. 4 ; vii. 3 ; Rom. ix.
2 ; Phil. i. 7 ; as the source of actions which take thence
their character : Rom. vi. 17; Eph. vi. 5 ; Col. iii. 22 ;
1 Tim. i. 5 ; 2 Tim. ii. 22 ; as recipient of the divine
irvevpa : Gal. iv. 6 ; 2 Cor. i. 22 ; Rom. v. 5 ; Eph. iii. 16 ;
as the object of the various operations of the divine
influence : 1 Thess. iii. 13 ; 2 Thess. ii. 17 ; iii. 5 ; Eph.
vi. 22 ; Col. ii. 22 ; Phil. iv. 7 ; as the seat of faith : Rom.
x. 9 ; and as the inward organ of spiritual praise : Eph.
v. 19 ; Col. iii. 16. KapSla = eaw dvOpwiros : Eph. ih. 16.
6. Noi/y.
A. The mind as consciously exercising its reflective
faculty and pronouncing moral judgment : 1 Cor. xiv.
14, 15, 19 ; Rom. i. 28 ; vii. 23, 25 ; xii. 2 ; xiv. 5 ; 1 Cor.
v. 10; Eph. iv. 17 ; Phil. iv. 7 ; 2 Thess. ii. 2 ; 1 Tim. vi.
5; 2 Tim. iii. 8; Tit. i. 15.
B. As apphed to God or Christ, it denotes, after human
analogy, the divine counsels or purposes that are the
result of the divine thought : Rom. xi. 34 ; 1 Cor. ii.
16 {Ms).
At Eph. iv. 23 occurs the peculiar expression t<£ rrvev-
pari toC vods, and at Col. ii. 18 to£! vods rrjs adpKos. [See
Appendix E.].

432 DR. WENDT ON 1 COR. XV. 35 F.

D.— DR. WENDT ON THE ARGUMENT OF 1 COR.
XV. 35 f. AND 44 f.
(P. 191 and 250.)
According to the view of Holsten and the inquirers
associated with him, the whole discussion of the Apostle
in this passage turns on the conception of substance.
The opponents, whom Paul combats, had drawn their
argument against the possibility of a resurrection of the
dead from the sarkic substance of the present human
body. Their first premiss had been that the risen must
at any rate have an organism, a awpa, for which an or
ganised substance is requisite ; their second premiss was
that the sarkic substance, of which men are composed,
could confessedly not rise ; thence they had concluded
that no risen awpa, and consequently no rising of the
dead at all, is conceivable. This conclusion has, of
course, only a meaning, if with the second premiss there be
tacitly implied either the one presupposition, that there
cannot be a substance of another kind than the earthly-
sarkic, or else the other presupposition, that identity be
tween the dead and the risen must take place through
the awpa of the latter containing the substance of the
former. As Paul concedes the correctness of the two
chief premisses of his opponents, but nevertheless does
not acknowledge the conclusion thence drawn, it follows
that he must turn against the two tacit presuppositions
which condition their mistaken conclusion. The latter
of these presuppositions Paul refutes in verses 36-38 ; it
is not at all necessary, he says, that a resurrection should
take place only on the basis of there being an identity
between the substance of the risen and that of the dead ;

ALLEGED BASIS OF THE ARGUMENT. 433
on the contrary, the analogy of the plant-world shows
that the naked seed-germ obtains quite a new substantial
organism ; and so God may communicate to the resur
rection-germ of the dead man an organism, whose sub
stance has nothing to do with the substance of the dead
sarkic organism. But the former presupposition must
also be invalidated, namely, that no other substance than
an earthly sarkic one is possible ; and this is alleged to
be done by the Apostle in verses 39-41 through the fol
lowing argument : As on earth the material substance in
different animal organisms is different (verse 39), so are
heavenly and earthly bodies substantially differentiated
from one another, inasmuch as the heavenly bodies consist
of a heavenly light-substance (verse 40), and in their turn
on the ground of the very diversity of this light-substance
present a different appearance or Soga (verse 41). I must
confess that this second part of the argument neither
satisfies me thoroughly as to its contents, nor appears to
be even outwardly expressed with clearness in the verbal
tenor of the verses mentioned. At the best, Paul would
only have repeated the assertion, the accuracy of which
was the very thing denied by his opponents. In the
first place, it is not at all easy to see what he would at
tain by the adduced analogy of the diversified substance
of animal organisms on earth. Possibly, his opponents
might take exception to the fact itself, seeing that it is
at any rate not easily perceivable, and it is not added by
Paul himself, wherein such substantial differences consist.
And then, even conceding the correctness of this fact, it
might be objected that it was not relevant to the ques
tion in dispute, for the point under discussion was not
whether there are different substances within the circle of
the adpg, but whether there are different substances out
side of the adpg ; with the utmost substantial diversity
2 E

434 INADEQUATE BEARING OF THE
of sarkic organisms one from another, they still retained
the decisive substantial unity expressly owned by Paul,
that they belonged, all of them, to the adpg, and the
question now was merely whether, alongside of this
adpg, there could exist another substance for organisms.
The proposition in verse 40, therefore, which was to be
inferred from verse 39, and which it could not but con
cern the Apostle above all to prove — that, namely, there
are heavenly organic substances beside the earthly —
remained in fact for the opponents just as improbable
after as before. And if we now look at the very words
of the text, it is obvious that it cannot have been at all
the design of Paul to put forward the substantial diver
sity of sarkic organisms as a proof or analogy for the
possibility of non-sarkic organisms. Had the Apostle
wished to express the thought which Holsten (p. 375)
thus formulates : " as already, here on earth, the material
substance of animal organisms is diverse, so are heavenly
and earthly bodies distinguished as regards their sub
stance," he would doubtless have begun the first clause
of verse 40 with a sharply pointed ovrws. This, however,
he has not done ; but on the contrary, his declaration
that there are bodies of heavenly substance is by a simple
Kat attached to tbe preceding clause as an introductory
presupposition for the chief thought following there
after (verse 40b.-41), which is here, just as in verse 39,
brought into prominence by a prefixed dAAa. And what
is expressed in this chief thought 1 Is it that the hea
venly bodies are different as respects substance as well from
earthly bodies as from one another ? By no means ; but
we are told that the heavenly bodies are distinguished
from earthly bodies and from each other as regards Soga —
aspect. For, when Ludemann (p. 8) renders 6o£a simply
by "light-matter," he attributes to the word a sense

ARGUMENT AS THUS UNDERSTOOD. 435
which would doubtless be very suitable for the connection
of his views, but which the word withal has not. Hol
sten translates more cautiously : appearance of light-
substance ; on which we have merely to remark that
the more precise definition " of light-substance " added
by Holsten, which necessarily was of decisive importance
for the connection of the Pauline thought, is not added
by Paul. The word Soga simply signifies appearance
alone or, as the case may be, " brilliant appearance " ; but
that this appearance issues from a lightrsubstance, is a
synthetic judgment which is not at all contained in the
notion of Soga itself. We should therefore reach the re
sult, that Paul would not have touched at all the proper
difficulty of his opponents ; he first adduces an analogy
of such substantial diversity as can prove very little for
the substantial diversity of quite another kind that is
sought for ; then he annexes the chief point doubted of
in some measure as a conceded presupposition, in order
at length to speak of a diversity of appearance, which
was not at all in question. The starting-point of the op
ponents was, according to Holsten's statement, the sarkic
substance of the present body ; the goal which the dis
cussion of Paul reaches is not, however, as Holsten
says, the heavenly light-substance of the resurrection-
body, but the aspect of the resurrection-body, assuming
it to exist in heavenly light-substance. That starting-
point and this goal do not, therefore, duly correspond
with one another.
In view of these perplexities we shall the rather be
induced to attempt an explanation of our section on the
footing of assigning to the word adpg a signification
which has its analogies in the usus loquendi of the Old
Testament, of the LXX., and of the other New Testament
writers ; i.e., we shall no longer apprehend adpg as

436 EXPLANATION OF THE ARGUMENT
" earthly animated matter," but instead of this notional
extension of the original sense of the word shall assume
the mere extension of use, according to which the word
" flesh " is synecdochically employed to denote the whole
body, and that not only so far as it is material, but also
so far as it is organised. The meaning of our passage
becomes thereupon not immaterially altered ; the investi
gation turns no longer on the question what substance,
but on the question what form, what aspect, the risen will
have. The question of the opponents : irotw awpan ep-
Xovrat; signifies not "Of what material will these bodies
consist ? " but rather " What organisation will they
have 1 " The subject of doubt is not the possibility of
the existence of a heavenly material {Stoffes), but the pos
sibility that this material, which at any rate is quite of
another sort than earthly matter, should not be fitted to
become in a similar way somatic organ for a risen irvevpa
as here on earth the body is organ of the 4>vxg. This
doubt arises in the minds of the opponents from the cir
cumstance that they cannot form a clear conception to
themselves how such a body of another kind would look ;
on account of this impossibility of clearly conceiving the
thing, they deny the possibility of the thing itself. Psy
chologically such doubt is quite intelligible ; the man who
does not think philosophically acquiesces in the declara
tion of a thing which he realises in his mind's eye (welche
ihm anschaulich ist), and asks no further as to the possi
bihty of its origin and subsistence; whereas mere notional
discussions can only with difficulty convince him of the
possibility of a thing, so long as it cannot be in any
way brought before his mind's eye (zur Anschawung).
Against such narrow-mindedness (dcppwv verse 36),
which on account of its own subjective incapacity to
conceive a thing thinks that it may be allowed to deny

AS BASED ON FORM OR ASPECT. 437
the objective existence of the thing itself, the Apostle
turns with his elucidation. He proves first, by the adduced
analogy of plants, that the necessity of thinking of the
resurrection-body as organised in quite a different way
from the earthly body, and that in a way such as we
cannot infer from the shape of the earthly body, contains
nothing at all improbable; for the plant-germ in like
manner receives an entirely new organism, the nature
and shape of which cannot at all be inferred from the
seed-grain deposited in the earth. And then the Apostle
points to the singularly great variety of organisation in
the case of all the bodies which fall within our experi
ence, in order to show that there cannot fairly be any
difficulty in assuming a new and different organisation in
the case of bodies that do not fall within the vision of our
experience (unsere anschauliche Erfahrung). Thus above
all verse 39 now gains a clear meaning ; adpg here de
notes simply the body of an earthly hving being, inclu
sive of the bodily form ; only in respect of this form
are earthly bodies different one from another; and to
draw attention to this diversity of organisation was
immediately in the interest of the Apostle's proof. But
as between the earthly bodies cognate to each other dis
tinctions of organisation take place, so such distinc
tions likewise occur between the earthly and heavenly
bodies foreign to each other; and the heavenly bodies
themselves in turn are different one from another as to
their form. We do not therefore need either to suggest
for the word Soga in verse 40 f. a heterogeneous sense, or
to supply the chief conception to it ; on the contrary the
argument of the Apostle turns precisely on the notion
of appearance, of aspect, and on nothing more. The cor
respondence desiderated above between the starting-point
of the opponents and the goal at which Paul arrives

438 1 CORINTHIANS XV. 44 FF.
seems to me to be in the fullest compass secured by
this explanation.
On 1 Cor. xv. 44 ff. Wendt refers to the explanation
which we have just given, and proceeds : —
Paul had been engaged in discussion with his oppon
ents as to the new form and organisation of the body, in
which the risen must be conceived, and had proved to
them that this newness was no argument against its
possibility. Now the Apostle takes a further step and
shows that the complete diversity of appearance between
earthly and heavenly bodies is grounded on the complete
diversity of the whole (gesammten) nature in the state
before and in the state after the resurrection. He first
concisely puts forward three points, in respect of which
earthly beings are distinguished from the risen, namely
in respect of their duration (cpOopd — a<pOapaia), in respect
of their value (dnpia — Soga), and in respect of their power
(do-c5e'veta — Svvapis). To this he adds as a fourth point
of distinction, that the former have a awpa \pv\iKov, the
latter a awpa irvevpariKov. What is meant by this dis
tinction 1 Those theologians who think that the whole
explanation of Paul in this section turns on the notion
of substance and on the substantial diversity between
earthly and heavenly bodies, explain in keeping there
with the adjectives irvevpariKov and ^pv^iKov as designat
ing on the one hand the heavenly light-matter, and
on the other the earthly, psychico-sarkic matter of the
awpara. But against this mode of apprehending the
distinction we may urge the following considerations.
The analogy of 1 Cor. ii. 14 shows us that the adjective
ipvxiKos is used of a being in which there dwells as
mental (geistige) power an earthly fvxg, while the ad
jective jrvei'/xariKos, when put in contrast to it, is used of

'psychic' and 'pneumatic' body. 439
a being in which dwells the divine Spirit. According to
this, at our passage the awpa \pvxiKov signifies a body
which encloses an earthly ipvxg, and the awpa irvevpariKov
a body in which a divine irvevpa fills the place of the
earthly \pvxg.1 The thoughts of Paul move here not in
the categories of form and substance, but in the categories
of substantial form and mental (geistigen) contents ;2 the
conception awpa denotes the bodily organism, the
substantial diversity of which in heavenly and earthly
bodies is not at all thought of (garnicht reflektirt wird) in
our words ; and the conceptions ipvxiKos and irvevpariKos
denote the mind-power (Geisteskraft), either creaturely or
divine, which animates the bodily organism. Although
the ipvxg does not come into view here, as in ii. 14,
directly as human organ of cognition, it is clear withal
that we may not except this faculty in any case from the
ipvxg ; it is here a brief designation for the whole com
pass of the non-corporeal side of the earthly man. For
the fact that man's earthly mode of existence is really
thus definitely characterised by the ipvxq in distinction
from the heavenly mode of existence in the resurrection-
1 There does not seem to me much force in the objection of
Weiss (Bibl. Theol. d. N. T. p. 242) to Wendt's view of a&iia.
\pvxa<6v — viz. that, when the <rwtta o-iretpeTai, i.e. is laid in the
grave, the soul has already "departed from the body," — because
the Apostle is speaking of what had been the characteristic mark
of the body now laid in the grave, as contrasted with what was
to be its character when raised. If the words are to be thus
strictly construed, it is clear that the body as " sown " could no
longer be called ipvxiKbv in any sense, when the ^vxn had left it,
2 1 render the passage literally, though I do not like the expres
sion "substantial form.'' Moreover, while the German language
labours under occasional disadvantage from the use of Geist to de
note both "spirit" and "mind," the English has no word reproduc
ing exactly the force in such a case as this of the German 'geistig.'

440 meaning of reference to gen. ii. 7.
state, the Apostle now appeals to the expression in the
beginning of Genesis (ii. 7) : "the first man Adam became
a living ipvxv" To him it appears to be not without sig
nificance that at this important passage precisely the
expression " soul " is used and not " spirit " ; he sees
therein a veiled antithetic reference to the second Adam,
whose divine nature is characterised by the fact that he
is hfe-making irvevpa. And only now, after the distinc
tion set up between a psychic and pneumatic mode of exis
tence has been applied (ausgefuhrt ist), the Apostle comes
at the close to point also to the diversity of substantial
constitution (Beschaffenheit) of the bodies here and here
after, attaching it to the comparison between the first
and the second Adam (verse 47 f.) ; the former is of
earth, the latter is of heaven, so are those associated
(Genossen) with Adam earthy (yoikoi) and those associ
ated with Christ heavenly (iirovpdvioi). But on this
very occasion it comes once more very clearly to light
that the whole discussion of Paul has for its subject not
the diversity of substance, but the diversity of form and
shape in the case of earthly and risen beings. For here at
the close, when for the first time he brings expressly into
prominence the diversity of substance, it serves him
withal merely as a further proof, that the appearance of
the risen is other than the appearance of those living
on earth: "and, as we have borne the image of the earthly
(man), so shall we also bear the image of the heavenly "
(verse 49). Thus, very far from wishing to establish
the diversity of substances through the diversity of forms
of appearance, the Apostle rather pursues the converse
course, and reaches the goal to which his argument,
starting from the doubting question of his opponents,
had from the outset tended.

INTERPRETATIONS OF EPH. IV. 23. 441

E— ON THE MEANING OF EPH. IV. 23.
(Note to page 212.)
The peculiar expression here used dvaveovaOai tcjJ
irvevpan rov voos i>/xfiv, which places irvevpa in an unique
relation to vovs, has occasioned some difficulty to ex
positors. Several explanations have been suggested.
Augustine took the genitive by way of apposition : " the
spirit which is called mind," but this may be at once set
aside as inadequate and improbable. Many have been
disposed to construe the genitive as possessive, and to
regard irvevpa as the dative of the instrument : " by the
Spirit which the vous is endued with " — the divine Spirit
dwelling in it as the source of renewal. Bishop Ellicott
adopts this view as consonant with the predominant
usage of Scripture as regards irvevpa, and complains of
the strong language in which Dr. Eadie has described it
as "an evident error" and a "blunder." But, wliile it
is true that irvevpa would naturally receive this interpre
tation if standing by itself alongside of dvaveovaOai, it
cannot well be taken to mean directly the divine agent,
when it is associated with the genitive tou voos vpwv
which marks it as belonging to the readers. Meyer
rightly holds, in opposition to this view, that " the Holy
Spirit bestowed on man is never in the New Testament
designated in such a way that man appears as the subject
of the Spirit (never to irvevpa vpwv)." A second reason,
however, urged by him against it — namely, " that it was
the object of the Apostle to put forward the moral self-
activity of the Christian life" — seems the less cogent, as he
has just before maintained that dvaveovaOai is to be con-

442 EXPLANATION BY MEYER AND DELITZSCH.
strued as passive, not as middle. Meyer, with De Wette
and Eadie, prefers a third explanation which takes the
genitive as partitive, and the dative as that of reference :
" in respect of, as regards, the spirit by which your vois
is governed," and he quotes with approval the pithy gloss
of Bengel: "spiritu mentis, 1 Cor. xiv. 14, Spiritus est
intimum mentis." The irvevpa is, in Meyer's view, " the
human spirit, different from the divine"; and he describes
it as " the higher life-principle in man, the moral power
akin to God in him," "the substratum of the inward
man." And Delitzsch, who finds in this passage, taken
along with his interpretation of 1 Cor. xiv. 14, a main
support for his theory of the irvevpa of man as "the
innermost sanctuary of the heart," complains that "the
important psychological conception " which underlies it
has not received any satisfactory or at least thorough
explanation (Bibl Psychol, p. 185 f). He quotes in an
Appendix (p. 394 f.) an interesting extract from a work
entitled " Scriptural Thoughts as to the powers of the
human soul," — published in 1760 by Professor Heinrich
Wilhelm Clemmens — as the only attempt within his
knowledge to determine exactly (festzustellen) the con
ception of irvevpa rov vods — an extract, which has at least
the merit of being relatively more clear than the exposi
tion of Dr. Delitzsch who has disinterred it, and which
seems to me to suggest, on the part of Clemmens, a
different and simpler interpretation of the unique
expression than that which Dr. Delitzsch has read
into it.
The passage runs as follows : — "The powers of grace that
work in the soul and regenerate the man constitute
[machen aus, not ' determine,' as Dr. Wallis renders it]
the spirit of man, which thereupon penetrates the whole
soul, and, inasmuch as it dwells in the innermost recess
of it, is termed the spirit of the mind, irvevpa rov voos.

VIEW OF CLEMMENS. 443
As such a spirit, it is then in turn (wieder) specially sub
ject in a pleasantly passive manner to the Holy Spirit
and his gracious operations, which are always continued
and advanced in the hearts of believers, and it is related
to these operations of the Holy Spirit as human feeling
viewed in itself is related to the general assistance of
grace or to the first grace common to all men [not, as Dr.
Wallis oddly renders : ' that grace which is common to
the first man and to all men']. Spiritus est facultas
animae, Bengel says in this sense, quum ea Spiritus clivini
operationem suaviter patitur; et vovs est facultas animae foras
progredientis et cum proximo agentis, 1 Cor. xiv. 14.
With the reason, so far as it rules alone, the word
irvevpa, which points to a foreign power, is riot once asso
ciated [not, as with Dr. Wallis : 'which points to a foreign
power, not for one time only'] — a manifest proof that
man has in reason a ground determining his actions,
which is peculiar to him doubtless, but is quite corrupted
by sin. When, on the other hand, the reason is used in
good understanding and by those who are under grace,
it happens that now and then such an adjunct as irvevpa
is attached to it, inasmuch as believers, precisely be
cause they are under grace, allow their reason and
all their thoughts to be animated by the workings of
grace, and come to have (bekommen) a spirit in themselves,
which may thereupon receive and retain in the inmost
depth of the soul the impressions of the Holy Spirit, that
only now (erst) rightly carries forward and completes the
state of grace. So at least speaks Holy Scripture ; for
otherwise we could not understand why at 1 Cor. xiv. 14
irvevpa and vovs, spirit and understanding, are dis
tinguished, and why, according to Eph. iv. 23, the
believer is daily to let himself be renewed in the spirit of
the understanding, irvevpa rov vods.
When the reason works under grace, it becomes ever
more skilled in comprehending with all saints what is
the breadth and the length and the height and the depth
of the knowledge of God, which is in Christ Jesus.
At the beginning it attaches itself (halt sich) to the first
all-present grace which is near to all men; and, if it
shows fidelity here, it will become from time to time sur-

444 VIEW OF clemmens examined.
rounded with new grace and so pervaded, that a spirit of
the powers of understanding (ein Geist der Verstandskrafte)
animates its working and makes it acceptable to God;
and that these powers are, to the praise of the wisdom
and glory of the great God and Saviour Jesus Christ,
daily renewed, awakened, set in motion, and by the help
of the good Spirit that completes the work of grace and
his constant influence
Even in the innermost depth of men's souls
Are wedded with the most child-like sighs.
Thus then in this inmost depth of the soul (Seelengrund)
the irvevpa rov voos, the spirit of the mind and of all the
powers of the soul comes to have (bekommt) its dwel
ling." Now this passage, although not throughout equally
precise and discriminating in its language, does not seem
to convey the idea of the irvevpa as something belonging
to man as such, as a part of human nature — " a spirit
within the mind," forming its background or substratum —
which becomes the seat and sphere of the renewal, and
of which psychology may claim to take cognisance as
within its domain. It is not, in Clemmens's view, the
human, but the divine, basis for the operations of special
grace. It is not a thing which man has, but which he
comes to have (bekommt). It is itself not natural faculty
or potential aptitude, but a result and product oi first
grace, whereby the mind is prepared for, and made
receptive of, the more definite operations in which the
Spirit carries forward and completes His work. Nothing
could be more plain than the opening statement that the
powers of grace at work in the soul and regenerating the
man constitute the spirit, which thereupon pervades the
soul ; and the whole passage savours more of grace than
of psychology. But for that very reason — because it
deals with the matter under the rehgious aspect — it sug
gests a better key to the interpretation of the words, than

DR. GOULD ON 'SARX.' 445
that duplication of the mental machinery maintained by
Delitzsch and others, which, as M. Reuss remarks, we are
"tempted to regard as a pleonasm." The irvevpa is not
an inner aspect of the mind itself, nor, as M. Reuss
would have it, ' the direction or tendency which the
mind takes ' in the renewal, but is the influence by
which it is guided and governed — the new motive power
which comes into it, directs it, rules and effectively con
trols its action. And the vo5s, having the divinely given
irvevpa as its animating and impelling principle, stands
thus diametrically opposed to the voCs rrjs aapKos — the
mind as directed and controlled by the adpg — at Col. ii.
18 : (pvaiovpevos virb rov voos rijs aapKos aurov, where,
looking to St. Paul's use of vous to denote the intellect
as exercising moral judgment, it is hardly necessary to
have recourse to Bishop Lightfoot's ingenious suggestion
that the Apostle is here taking up some watchword of the
false teachers, who doubtless boasted that they were
directed virb toO vods, and are answered by the Apostle,
" Yes ; but it is 6 vous Trjs aapKos vpwv."

F.— DR. EZRA P. GOULD ON THE NEW TESTA
MENT USE OF 'SARX.'
(Note to p. 246.)
In an article contributed to the Bibliotheca Sacra,
1875, vol. xxxii., p. 36 ff., Dr. Gould states that his ob
ject is " to present a view of this use, that the writer has

446 REASON ASSIGNED BY DR. GOULD
not seen elsewhere, and which, if warrantable, removes
grave difficulties in the matter of New Testament psycho
logy." His theory is that the use of the term as applied
to humanity and to sinful humanity rests on " a recog
nition of the adpg as the basis of human descent and
propagation " — a meaning which most directly appears
in the passages expressive of relationship classed by us
under C.
The New Testament passages are classified by him as, 1,
Those in which adpg is used quite literally, at least with no
greater departure from the original meaningthanis involved
in the confusion (?) of adpg and the wider awpa ; 2, those
in which, as the medium of descent, it is the basis
of relationship ; 3, those, in which adpg Kal dlpa
is used as equivalent for man, never the individual,
but the genus homo, always contrasted with something
greater, and so denoting weakness; 4, those where pia
adpg denotes the union in marriage; 5, passages in which
it is used for the human race or humanity, where it is
observed that " adpg evidently in the Hebrew mind
stands in constant contrast with irvevpa, and man, as
habited in flesh, although endowed with spirit, is de
scribed by that which distinguishes him from the world
of purely spiritual beings " ; and 6, its most impor
tant use to denote man's sinful nature, meaning by
that the entire man before conversion, or the sinful part,
'the old man,' after conversion.
He objects to the common explanation, which supposes
the fleshly or sensual nature of man to be the seat or
starting-point of sin, as involving an unwarranted and
superficial psychology. . . He thinks that a wide in
duction of facts would show that in children the sensual
passions were the very last to be sinfully excited, and
that the first outbreaks of sin were in the region of

FOR THE NEW TESTAMENT USE OF 'SARX.' 447
spiritual things, especially selfishness and anger. Then,
as far as we can understand the probably allegorical ac
count of the fall of man, it was not through his bodily
appetites that the tempter reached him. . . The ap
peal was rather to his spiritual nature, to which was
offered the tempting bait of knowledge. If we attempt
to find a class of sins which generally lead to the rest, or
a principle universally inherent in sin, he thinks that
" we shall fail equally in supporting the charge against
the flesh that it is pre-eminently the sinful part of man.
It is true that these fleshly sins sometimes furnish the
occasion for others through which they reach their ends
or revenge the thwarting of them. But such a relation
as this is not fundamental enough to warrant the pro
minence given to adpg. . . The mere occasion has no
essential connection with the result. . . If any pre
eminence among sins is to be named it belongs to such
sins of the spirit rather than of the sensual nature, as
selfishness, malice, revenge, and the like." And he con
cludes as follows : —
"What then is the reason of this use oiadpg to denote
man's sinful nature ? I think that we may find the key
to an explanation of it in the preceding discussion of its
other uses. We have seen that it is used to denote hu
manity, both in the concrete and the abstract, partly
at least because through it the race is propagated. Hu
manity, which on the natural side owes its continuance
to the adpg, is itself called adpg. Natural and sarkical
are therefore convertible terms in reference to man. On
the other side the spirit, irvevpa, is that through which
man is connected with the divine and supernatural, and
especially in the new birth. It is there that the divine
Spirit works implanting the germs of a new life, and so
spiritual and divine or supernatural are also convertible

448 THEORY WITHOUT ADEQUATE EXEGETICAL BASIS.
terms in regard to man. To this let it be added that
the natural man connected with the race through the adpg
is sinful, while the new man, connected with God through
the irvevpa, is holy; and does it seem strange that
adpg should itself be used to denote the sinful natural
man, and irvevpa the holy renewed man 1 It is simply
resolved into this : the former is that through which man
in his natural state is descended from a sinful race, and
inherits a sinful nature, and it is used to denote that na
ture; while the latter is that, through which and in
which God implants a new divine life of hohness, and it
is used to denote that hfe."
This theory seems based on very slender exegetical
grounds. The number of passages in which the element
of descent comes directly into prominence is but small, and
it is only by apetitio principii that the conception of sin is
specially associated with that descent, while it is not easy
to see in what sense Dr. Gould would make his suggested
analogy of irvevpa to bear. The designation of mankind
as adpg is much more naturally explained by synecdoche
of the (visible and conspicuous) part for the whole ; and
the association of sin with the humanity so designated is
with more probability referred to an induction of experi
ence than to a special theory of hereditary transmission.
Whatever grounds there may be elsewhere for imputing
such a theory to St. Paul, Dr. Gould has by no means
adduced sufficient warrant for engrafting it on adpg.

SPECIAL LITERATURE. 449

G.— SPECIAL LITERATURE.
The following is a list of the monographs, or special
discussions, that I have had opportunity of consulting,
exclusive of the works already mentioned in the text or
notes, and of books of a more general character that
have occasion to deal more or less fully with the questions
concerned.Ackermann (Dr. Carl) : Beitrag zur theologischer Wiirdig-
ung und Abwagung der Begriffe irvevpa, vovs und
Geist. [Studien und Kritiken, 1839. iv. 873 ff]
Auberlen (Dr. Carl August) : article " Geist des Menschen
im Biblischen Sinne " in the first edition of Herzog's
Encyklopadie, iv., 728 ff.
Cremer (Dr. Hermann) : articles " Fleisch im Biblischen
Sinne;" and "Geist des Menschen im Biblischen
Sinne," in the second edition of Herzog's Encykl.
Eklund (P.) : ~2dpg vocabulum quid apud Paulum Aposto-
lum significet. [Acta Univ. Lundensis, 1871.]
4° Lund, 1871-72.
Griethuysen (Theodoras Joannes van): Disputatio exege-
tico-theologica de notionibus vocabulorum awpa et
adpg in Novi Testamenti interpretatione distinguen-
dis. 8" Amstel. 1846.
Hausrath (Dr. Adolph) : " Die dualistischen Voraussetz-
ungen der Paulinischen Theologie." [Neutesta-
mentliche Zeitgeschichte, ii. 463 ff]
Kahnis (Karl Friedrich August) : Die Lehre vom heiligen
Geiste. Erster Theil. 8° Halle, 1847.
Kleinert (Dr. Paul) : Zur alttestamentlichen Lehre vom
Geiste Gottes. [Jahrbiicher fiir Deutsche Theologie,
xii. (1867), 1 ff.]
Kluge (Dr.) : Der Nous. [Jahrbiicher f. D. Theol. xvi.
(1871), 319 ff]
2 F

450 SPECIAL LITERATURE.
Kupff (Emile) : Sur la signification du mot adpg dans le
Nouveau Testament ; these. ... 8° Strasb. 1853.
Menegoz (Eugene) : Le Pech6 et la redemption d'apres
Saint Paul. 8° Paris, 1882.
Nees von Esenbeck : Zur pastoralen Seelensorge ; Ex-
egetische Andeutungen zur Biblischen Psychologie.
[Stud. u. Krit. 1865, iii. 490 ff]
Roos (Dr. Magnus Friedrich) : Fundamenta psychologise
ex Sacra Scriptura . . . collectae. 12° Tubing. 1769.
Sabatier (Auguste) : articles " Chair " and " Esprit," in
Lichtenberger's Encycl. des Sciences Religieuses.
Schoeberlein (Dr. Ludwig) : Ueber das Wesen der geist-
lichen Natur und Leiblichkeit. [Jahrbiicher f. D.
Theol. vi. (1861) 1 ff]
Smeaton (Dr. George) : The Doctrine of the Holy Spirit ;
Cunningham Lecture. 8° Edin. 1882.1
Stirm (C. H.) : Anthropologisch-exegetisch Untersuch-
ungen : ein Beitrag zur neutestamentlichen Anthro
pologic. [Zeitschrift fur Theologie, 1834, iii. 1 ff.]
Tholuck (Dr. Friedrich August Gottreu) : Erneute
Untersuchung iiber adpg als Quelle der Siinde.
[Stud. u. Krit. 1855, iii. 477 ff]

I have received, through the kindness of the Editor,
a volume and several numbers of the " Chrysanthemum,
a Monthly Magazine for Japan and the Far East," con
taining a series of papers by the Rev. H. Waddell, B.A.,
" On the Rendering into Japanese of some Theological
and Psychological Terms.'' The chief object of the
writer is to call in question the principle on which irvevpa
has been rendered in "the standard Japanese version"
by a variety of terms according to the variety of its use,
and to maintain that the aim of the translators should be
1 The limitations which I have imposed on myself (see Lecture
I.) preclude me from touching otherwise than incidentally on this
doctrine of the Personal Source of the Wvevfia, to the exposition
and defence of which Dr. Smeaton has devoted his valuable work.

TRANSLATIONS FROM THE GERMAN. 451
to find a single word which shall correspond as nearly
as possible in its physical and physiological senses to the
Hebrew ruach and the Greek irvevpa. The discussion is
interesting, and Mr. Waddell supports his views in an
ingenious and elaborate argument; but he has barely as yet
(so far as I have seen his papers — up to No. 14) reached
the stage of deepest interest, and, I should apprehend,
difficulty — namely, the transition to the psychological,
and, above all, to the distinctively Christian, use of the
term.

In a note subjoined to my General Preface to the
translation of Meyer's Commentary (Rom. I. p. xiii. f.)
I gave some illustrations of the mode in which German
theological works are too often rendered into English. I
add a few specimens, out of many that I have met with
in the course of reading on the subject of the present
volume: eine Werthbestimmung, "an intentional accu
racy"; zur Erscheinung bringt, "brings about"; die
Erscheinung der menschlichen Natur bestimmt, " affects
the nature of the man"; wird bestimmt, "is described"
or "is spoken of"; gleichbedeutend, "of kindred signifi
cance"; wie hier verbunden (viz., awpa and ipvXV a* Matt.
x. 28), "are identified"; fast haufiger, "much oftener";
ohne dass jedoch, "though of course there is"; eine
besondere Abhandlung, "a remarkable treatise"; inner-
lich, "entirely"; neben, "united to"; innewerden,
"inner being;" nach biblischen Anschauung, "according
to a Biblical inspection"; pneumatische Anlage, " a spiri
tual beginning"; gliedlich, "material"; Verwechselung,
"mistake"; Geist, "soul"; das Gesetzgemasse, "the propor
tion of the law"; personlich angelegte, " personally inter
ested"; dass mir das Bose vorliegt, "that evil is foremost
to me"; Zwecksatz, "the point in view"; s. v. a. ich

452

SPECIMENS OF TRANSLATION.

bedeute, " means as an equivalent I"; Urhab des Kosmos,
" origin of the Kosmos " ; sohdarische Einheit, " a sub
stantial unity"; es ist also ohne Widerrede gegen die
Schrift, " it is thus no contradiction against Scripture " ;
Nebenordnung, "regular ordination"; die Hauptsache
worauf es ankommt, "the principle in which it results."
I subjoin a literal rendering of three sentences, and place
overagainst it the form in which they appear in the
English translations, where the meaning is either obscured
or reversed.

To designate a being which
is without bodily vesture for
its inward nature, so that, if
we may so speak, it is merely
the living [thing] that presents
itself, it is natural to use just
the word which denotes this
inward nature (perhaps in
some association with the
fundamental signification
"breath"). Thence sprang the dogmatic
form, the fixed idea ; but the
deep religious and moral con
tents, which soon widened into
a speculative stream, eman
ated here too from Paul's in
most emotional nature and
most thoroughly personal ex
perience. The law, when it heightens
sin, serves as a foil [als Folie]
to the power of grace.

' ' The word thus comes to
denote an essence without, or,
not requiring any corporeal
garb, or especially any corporeal
medium for its inner reality, so
that it is only as we simply
utter the word which denotes
this that the living essence is,
so to speak, present {irv. being
here perhaps akin to its deriva
tion breath. ")
" Hence it was that the dog
matic form, the fixed idea, and
also the deep religious and
moral content were derived,
which soon widened into a
river of speculation ; here also
was the source of the innermost
affections and most personal
life of Paul."
" The law, as enhancing sin,
treats the power of grace as
folly."

INDEX.

'kfrnprla: viewed as objective
sin by Holsten, 26, 28, 354;
Ludemann, 44, 390; Pfleid
erer, 54 ; without support
from passages adduced, 83-
86, 318 ; meaning of <rdp£ axe.
discussed, 330-341. See Sin.
American revised version, 241 .
Anthropological conclusions, di
vergent, 64.
Augustine: definition of 'flesh,'
10.
Basar: different uses of the
term, 109-115.
Baur (Dr. Ferdinand Christian) :
earlier view, 19; later, 20-23;
judging Holsten, 65.
Beck (Dr. Johann Tobias): Bib
lical Psychology, 174; tricho
tomy, 176.
Body. See 2£,ua.
Calvin: definition of 'flesh,'
11 f. ; on Rom. viii. 10, 223 f. ;
on 2 Cor. iii. 17, 228.
Charismata of primitive church,
151.
Chrysostom: definition of 'flesh,'
13.
Clemmens (Heinrich Wilhelm),
on irvev/j,a rov vobs, 442 f .
Corinthians, first Epistle to the:
ii. 14, 187-190; ix. 27, 248;
xiv. 14, 206-210; xv. 35 ff.,
191, 251, 432-440.

Corinthians, second Epistle to
the, iii. 1-iv. 6, 164-167; iii.
17,227-230; v. 21, 321 f.: vii.
1, 259 f.
Cremer (Dr.Hermann): his Lexi
con, 130; quoted, 115, 141;
on Plutarch's use of adpt;, 291;
on o/jioioj/ia, 326.
Delitzsch (Dr. Franz): on Is.
xiii. 1, 153; his Biblical Psy
chology, 175 ; on trichotomy,
176-8; definition of crdp% ex
amined, 303 f . ; view of Eph.
iv. 23 examined! 441-445.
A6£a: view of Ludemann, 39
380; of Pfleiderer, 59; of
Holsten, 347; import at 2
Cor. iii. 18, 163-167.
Dualism: as defined by Holsten,
26; by Ludemann, 39 f.;
Pfleiderer, 52; in Book of
Wisdom, 282; not in 0. T. or
in St. Paul, 312.
Ellicott, Bishop : on human
Truedfia., 97, 194; on imevfia
toO po6s, 441.
Ephesians, Epistle to the, iv. 23,
211, 441-445.
Exegesis, specimens of, 82-91,
138 f.; principles of, 94-112.
Flesh and Spirit as used by St.
Paul: interest of inquiry, 1 f.;
difficulties, 3-7; scope and

454

INDEX.

limits, 7-9 ; recent German
theories stated, 18-62; diver
gent and incongruous, 64-67;
ex facie improbable, 6S-73 ;
criticised as to methods and
results, 74-92 ; discussions of
meaning of terms, 130-308 ;
general conclusions, 341-343.
Flesh. See 2dp|.
Gifford (Dr.) : on Rom. vii.
18, 319.
Godet (Dr. Fr<5d<5ric): on Rom.
vii. 14 ff., 214; on Si\ea> in
Rom. vii., 219; on Rom. viii.
10, 221 ; definition of crdpt,
306.
Gould (Dr. Ezra): explanation
of the use of <rdp%, 246 and
445 ; set aside, 448.
Grimm (Dr. C. L. W. ) : Lexicon,
130 ; quoted 159, 278, 279.
Hilgenfeld (Dr. Adolf) : on Rom.
vii. 9, 86 ; on 6/xotap.a, 323.
Hofmann (Dr. J. C. von): on
Rom. viii. 10, 222 ; reviewed
by Schmidt, 360, 367.
Holsten (Dr. Carl): leading po
sitions stated, 23-28, 346 ff.;
criticised by Baur, 65 ;
Schmidt, 66, 367 f., 374; Lude
mann, 66, 381 f., 385, 400;
want of consistency, 6S ; elas
ticity of categories, 75, 77,
79 ; interpretation of Rom.
v., 12ff. examined, 83f.;
irvedjxa as material substance,
161 f. ; explanation of passages
as to human irv., 169 f. ; dis
tinction between trdpf and
awfia examined, 247 ff.; re
jection of 2 Cor. vii. 1, 75,
260 ; theory as to <rdp% exa
mined, 274 ff.; on 2 Cor. v.
21, 321 f. ; on bixoloiixa, 323; at
tribution of ' sin-flesh ' to
Christ, 331 f. ; grounds for it
examined, 332 ff.
Hort (Dr. F. J. A.): conjecture
as to 2 Cor. iii. 17, 229 f.

Hyle: currency as philosophic
term, 280; use of ii\-q in N. T.
and LXX., 280; not employed
by St. Paul, 279 f.
Immer (Dr. A, ) : on correla
tion of divine and human
irvedixa, 238.
Interpretation, principles of,
94-112.
Jowett (Dr. Benjamin): on St.
Paul's psychology, 6 ; on
double meaning of words, 97-
102; on 1 Thess. v. 23, 181.
KapSla: use of the term, 198 f.,
430 ; comprehensive import,
198 ff. ; seat of intelligence
and volition, 200 f. ; charac
teristics and contrasts, 202 f . ;
relation to vom, 204.
Laidlaw (Dr. John): his Bible
Doctrine of Man, 40, 174,
175; view as to Rom. vii.,
214 f. ; on definitions of trdp|,
303.
Lebh: distinction from ruach,
120 f., 420-422.
Le Clerc (Jean): definition of
'flesh,' 14.
Lightfoot, Bishop; quoted, 97,
182, 296, 445.
Literature, special, 449 f.
Ludemann (Dr. Hermann): his
views stated, 37-49, 375-403;
criticising Holsten and
Schmidt, 66; criticised by
Pfleiderer, 67, 85; on Rom. v.
2, 86 f . ; on firi yivoiro, 89 f. ;
alleged parallel, 90 f. ; on 1 Cor.
xiv. 14, 208 ; on the 0-Q/j.a as
' form,' 256 f . ; alleged parallel
between St. Paul and Philo
examined, 287-293 ; on am
biguity of " Sinnlichkeit,"
295; on sphere of operation
of the adp%, 297 ; on adp£ as
'tendency of life,' 302; on
Alexandrian Hellenism im-

INDEX.

455

ported into O. T., 312; on
6/j.olaj/j.a, 324 f . ; his view exa
mined, 326 f.
Lunemann (Dr. Gottlieb): on
distinction of irvev/m and
i>vxn, 176.
Luther: view of 'flesh,' 11.
Matter: elasticity of the cate
gory, 76; not mentioned as
such, or as evil, 280 f. ; not
identified with evil, 311.
Meyer (Dr. H. A. W.): 98, 135,
296, 389; on 1 Cor. xiv. 14,
209; on 2 Cor. iii. 17, 227;
his definition of adp%, 307 ;
recent revision of his ' ' Com
mentary," 307 f.
Middleton, Bishop: on use of
the article with irvevpa, 134.
Mulier (Dr. Julius): definition
of <rdp%, 12, examined, 301 ;
criticised by Schmidt, 358 ;
and by Ludemann, 388.
Neander (Dr. August): defini
tion of adp£, 12, examined,
299.
Nephesh in distinction from
ruach, 118 f., 416-419.
NoOs: use of the term, 431 ; as
defined by Baur, 21 ; Liide
mann, 38, 378; Pfleiderer,
56 ; relation to KapSla, 204 f . ;
sense in 1 Cor. xiv. 14, 206 f . ,
faculty of judgment, 209 f.;
field specially ethical, 211 f.;
irveSfia tou vo6s, 211 f., 441-
445 ; use of poOs in Rom. vii. ,
213-219.
Oltramare (Dr. Hugues): exe
getical caprices of, 138-140,
220.
'0/j.oid>/M. (Rom. viii. 3): conflict
ing views of its meaning, 323;
Liidemann's view, 324 f., 396;
asserting similarity but deny
ing sameness, 327 ; assump
tions of Pfleiderer and Lude
mann criticised, 328-330.

Overbeck (Dr. Fr.
bfiotwfw,, 323.

view of

Paul, St. : relation to philoso
phy, 70 ; declarations and
disclaimers, 71-73 ; original
readers, 94 f . ; Jewish culture,
105 f. ; teaching compared
with that of Philo, 283-294 ;
doctrine of sin, 309-340.
Pfleiderer (Dr. Otto): views
stated, 50-62 ; repudiation
of Holsten's view as to cdpi, ,
66; and of Liidemann's view
as to Rom. i. -viii. 67 ; presump
tion against his theory of
' ' unreconciled antinomy, "70;
elasticity of categories, 76 f.,
80; rejects Holsten's exegesis
of Rom. v. 12, 85; explanation
of Pauline doctrine of irveu/m,
150 ; conception of irv. as
material substance, 161 f. ;
on 1 Thess. v. 23, 181; on
relation between divine and
human irved/j.a, 233; solution
examined, 234 ff.; view as to
aSfia examined, 257 f. ; ex
plaining away of Rom. v. 12,
317; 'artifice of the idea, '317;
on Holsten's view of 2 Cor. v.
21, 322; view of 6/j.otoi/j.a, 324,
examined, 328; alleged key to
St. Paul's argument at Rom.
viii. 3 examined, 333-339.
Philo: teaching compared with
St. Paul's, 283-294; main
points of agreement and dif
ference, 285 ; on the body,
286 ; alleged parallel use of
<jdp£,, 287 ff. ; a foil to St.
Paul, 294.
Philosophy: St. Paul's alleged
relation to Greek, 70-75; cate
gories of, imported into exe
gesis, 74-80.
Xlvev/ia: uses of the word, 131 f.,
428; meaning of, at Rom. viii.
10, 219 ff; at 2 Cor. iii. 17,
227 ff. ; irvev/Ma rov vois, 211 f.,
441-445.

456

INDEX.

Ili/ei/jact.the Divine: 133 ff. ; effect
of the article, 134 f.; charac
teristics, 136 ff. ; identity in
all, 143 ; diversity of opera
tion, 144 f.; relation to 0. T.
ruach, 146 ff. ; apocalyptic con
ception too narrow, 150 ;
"gifts" of primitive church,
151 ; ethico-religious charac
ter, 152 ; promises in Is. and
Ezek., 153 ff; with genitival
adjuncts, 157 f.; adverse in
fluences similarly designated,
159; passages adduced as im
plying substance, 161 ff.; re
lation to human irv., 230 ff.
— the Human: 168 ff.; passages
implying, 168 ; suggested
explanations, 169 f.; difficul
ties, 171 f. ; distinctions sug
gested, 175 ff.; relation to
'pvxn, 182ff.; Wendt's view
of the distinction, 191 ff.;
objections to his peculiar posi
tion, 193 ff; term chosen to
express religious value, 194-
197; relation between human
and divine irv. , 230 ff. ; correla
tion as presented by Immer,
238 ; mode of marking the
distinction, 239.
Psyche: use of term, 430; place
and function, 182 f.; seat of
Ego, and value as such, 184 f.;
meaning of ^vxik6s, 187 f.;
relation to irveO/xa, 191 f.
Psychology, Biblical: tendency
to systematise, 6; trichotomy,
173 f.; Beck and Delitzsch,
174; psychological origin of
sin not explained by St. Paul,
315.
Reuss (Dr. Edouard) : definitions
of 'flesh,' 14, 306; Histoire
de la Theol. Chret., 93; on
the sense of irv. and duplica
tion of man's spiritual nature,
137 1.; on Is. xiii. 1, 153; on
1 Thess. v. 23, 152 ; on rela
tion between divine and hu

man irvev/i.a, 232 ; on 1 Cor,
xv. 39, 248 ; freedom of his
rendering of o-dp^, 306.
Revised version of N. T., 185,
269 ; twofold rendering_ of
irvevpa, 239-241 ; American
revision preferable, 242.
Ritschl (Dr. Albert): his view
stated, 15-17, 260 ; modified,
271 ; criticised by Schmidt,
368 f.
Romans, Epistle to the, v. 2,
87f.;v. 5, 162; v. 12ff., 83 f.,
317; vii. 9, 85; vii. 14-25,
213-219; viii. 3, 323-332; viii.
10, 219-223 ; viii. 15, 138.
Ruach: uses of the term, 116-
127; relation to nephesh, 116-
120; relation to lebh, 120 1;
transcendental, 122; qualities
of, as promised to Israel,
123 f. ; " spirit of the holiness
of God," 126; precedent and
warrant for N. T. concep
tion, 152 ff.
2dp% : chief lines of interpreta
tion, 10-18; recent German
theories, 18 f. ; 0. T. use of
basar, 109-116; does it imply
sinfulness? 113-116 ; uses by
St. Paul, 224 f., 426; distinc
tion between crdp^ and o-(ajia.,
246 ff. ; Wendt's view, 250-
262, 432 ff.; iraaa tr. , 263; c.Kal
al/ia, 263; used for 'creature '
or 'creaturely side,' 264 f.;
prominent features of this
use, 267 ; interchanged with
'man,' 267; with 'the old
man,' 268; contrast to irvevpia,
269 f.; result arrived at, 271 ;
other interpretations and defi
nitions examined, 272f . ; theory
of bodily substance examined,
274-294; theory of ' sensuous
ness,' 294-298; definitions of
Neander, Tholuck, Julius
Miiller, Delitzsch reviewed,
299-303; views of Meyer and
Weiss, 307; definition pre-

INDEX.

457

ferred, 308; relation to sin,
309-340; <xdpi a/xaprlas, 330-
339 ; view of Dr. Gould, 445.
Schmidt (Dr. Richard) : his view
stated, 29-36, 357-374; judg
ment on Holsten's positions,
66, 367 f., 369, 371; criticised
by Ludemann and Pfleiderer,
66 f. ; presumption against his
view, 69; on Rom. viii. 10,
223; objection to taking odpi
as an abstract notion exa
mined, 265 f. ; referred to,
316, 322.
Sensuousness: definitions rest
ing on, 13 f. ; theory of, exa
mined, 294 f . ; ambiguity of
' Sinniichkeit, ' 295 ; sin not
associated exclusively with,
313 f.
Septuagint: usage of, 127 f.; but
slightly influenced by philo
sophical leanings, 282.
Siegfried (Dr. Carl): comparison
of St. Paul and Philo, 284 f .
Sin: relation of the a dpi to, 309-
340 ; not associated, exclu
sively with the body, 313 ;
psychological origin not ex
plained, 315; referable to sel
fishness rather than to sen
suousness, 316 f. ; historical
origin, 317 f. ; Rom. v. 12 and
Rom. vii. not incompatible,
318; doctrine of, based not
on speculation but on experi
ence, 319; empiric dominion
of, 321 ; exception of Christ,
321 ff. ; Holsten's theory exa
mined by Wendt, 334 ff. See
'Apiapria.
Sinlessness of Christ, 321 f. ;
discussion of Rom. viii. 3,
322 ff'.; grounds for attribut
ing adpi afxaprlas to Christ
examined, 33 i f.
Sw/ia: usage of the term, 427 ;
distinguished from adpi by
Holsten, 24, 247, 347; Liide
mann, 38, 256, 3761.; Pfleid-
prer, 50, 257 ; Wendt, 250, 2

432 f. ; positions examined,
247 --G2; ethical connections
of, 255; at 2 Cor. vii. 1, 2.VJ;
outward executive organ,
260 f.; prominence given to
it, 262 ; relation to sin not
as source, but as seat or organ,
313 f.
Spirit. See Jlvevp-a.
Substance: alleged conception
of, as to ruach, 122 f. ; as to
irveupM,, 161 f.
Thessalonians, first Epistle to
the, v. 23, 179 f.
Tholuck (Dr. F. A. G.): defini
tion of irdpi, 12, examined,
300.
Translations from the German,
451.
Trichotomy, 175 f.
Tubingen School: doubts of,
103 f. ; divergent conclusions,
641, 322 ff.
Usteri (Dr. Leonhard), defini
tion of o-dpi, 14 ; speculation
of, as to relation between
divine and human irued/m,
230 f.
Weiss (Dr. Bernhard): his Bib
lical Theology of N. T., 93 ;
criticised by Schmidt, 33,
369; Ludemann, 43, 389; on
irvevp.a as source of "gifts,'
150; view as to human irvevp.a
examined, 170-172; on IThess.
v. 23, 179; on 64\eii> in Rom.
vii., 219; on Rom. viii. 10,
221 ; his revision of Meyer,
307 ; definition of o-dpt; , 307 :
on the reference of sin to the
body, 315; on adpi without the
article, 321; on Rom. viii. 3,
339.
Wendt (Dr. H. H ): his mono
graph, 92; on the O. T. usage,
109 ff., 404 ff.; exception taken
to his position as to passages
implying sinfulness, 113 f.;
G

458

INDEX.

and to certain positions as to
ruach, 126 f.; on ethico-reli
gious character of the irvedfia,
152: on 0. T. conception of
spirits of evil, 160; on alleged
conception of substance,
161ft'.; on 2 Cor. iii. 18, 164-
167; on 1 Thess. v. 23. 181 f.;
on relation of adpi and i/'i'X'J,
1SS; on tpvxv as seat of the
Ego, 1 84 f . ; on i/<i>xik<5s in 1
Cor. ii. 14, 187 f. ; on dis
tinction between irvev/j.a and
i^i'X?), 191 f. ; objections to his
position as to St. Paul's pecu
liar use of irvedjxa, 193 f. ; on
KapSia, 202; and vous, 204, 20S,
21O;on0AeiyinRom.vii. ]5ff.,
216 f.; on 2 Cor. iii. 3, 245;
view of distinction between
adpi and au/m, 250-262, 432 f . ;
on relation of the a&fia to sin,
260 f. ; answer to Schmidt's
objection regarding abstract
use of adpi, 265 f.; on Rom.
vii. 23, 314 ; classification of

St. Paul's judgments as to the
adpi, 320 ; exception to his
view of bpioloifxa, 326; on Rom.
viii. 3, 332 ; examination of
theory of Holsten and Pfleid
erer as to Christ's cancelling
of adpi d/xaprias. 334-339 ;
reason for choice of this ex
pression, 340 f.
Westcott and Hort (Drs.): con
jecture as to 2 Cor. iii. 2f.,
201.
Winer (Dr. G. B.): on use of
anarthrous irvev/xa, 135.
Wisdom, Book of: alleged re
miniscence of, 90; its dualism,
281 f.
Zeller (Dr. Eduard) : on alleged
early traces of Jewish-Greek
philosophy, 282 ; on use of
adpi by Greek philosophers,
291 ; on meaning of op-olufia,
323.
Zeschwitz (Dr. von): on tricho
tomy, 177 f.

GLASGOW: ROBERT MACLEHOSE, PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY.

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