YALE UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

THE EASTERN QUESTION

" The first time I had the misfortune to differ with
my friends was about the year 1683, when the Turks
were besieging Vienna, and the Whigs in England,
genemlly speaking, were for tlie Turks taking it —
which I, having read the history of the cruelty and
perfidious dealings of the Turks in tlieir wars, and how
they had rooted out the name of the Christian religion
in above three score and ten kingdoms, could by no
means agree wilh : and though tlien but a young man
and a younger author, I opposed it and wrote against
it, which was taken very unkindly."
* Daniel Defoe.*
* " Life of Defoe" by George C/talmers.
Defoe's Works, Edin. 1869.

THE EASTERN QUESTION
FROM THE TREATY OF PARIS 1856 TO THE
TREATY OF BERLIN 1878, AND TO THE
SECOND AFGHAN WAR

By THE DUKE OF ARGYLL

TWO VOLS.— If.

STRAHAN & COMPANY LIMITED
34 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON
All rierhts reserved.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER X.
PAGE
Negotiations subsequent to the Declaration of
War, down to the Memoranda which passed
between the Emperor of Russia and the
British Government, in July and August, 1877 1
CHAPTER XI.
The War down to the Conclusion of an Armis
tice, and Relative Negotiations, in February,
1878  35
CHAPTER XII.
Negotiations for a Congress  95
CHAPTER XIII.
The Congress and the Treaty of Berlin . . . 136
CHAPTER XIV.
Our Relations with Afghanistan from the first
Afghan War to the Agreement with Russia
IN 1873  215

viii CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XV.
PAGE
From the Agreement with Russia in 1873 to
the Frere Note in January, 1875  3IZ
CHAPTER XVI.
From January, 1875, to the Beginning of the
Viceroyalty of Lord Lytton in April, 1876 . 363
CHAPTER XVII.
From the Beginning of the Viceroyalty of Lord
Lytton, in April, 1876, to the Opening of the
Peshawur Conference on the 30TH January,
1877  409
CHAPTER XVIII.
From the Peshawur Conference in January,
1877, to the War in November, 1878 . . . . 455

CHAPTER X.
NEGOTIATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO THE DECLARATION
OF WAR, DOWN TO THE MEMORANDA WHICH
PASSED BETWEEN THE EMPEROR OF RUSSIA
AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, IN JULY AND,
AUGUST, 1877.
IT is necessary to follow in some detail the feeble
attempts which were made even after the Russian
declaration of war to shield Turkey from the conse
quences of her own conduct In these attempts the
English Cabinet as usual took a helpless part, useless
for any purpose except that of showing that the
Queen's Government stood alone in its estimate of the
course which was consistent with the dignity of Europe,
and with the absolute necessity of reform in Turkey.
It is needless to say that the English reply to
Russia was received with gratitude by the Turks.
On the 1 2th of May the Turkish Chamber of Depu
ties voted an address of thanks to her Majesty's
Government and to the English people. " We have
seen with joy," says this address, " that in their reply
to the Circular of Prince Gortchakow, they embraced,
as is their wont, the cause of justice, and have judged
VOL. II. B

2 NEGOTIATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO
with equity the conduct of the two parties. ....
This decision has given us courage and satisfaction,
so that the Representative Assembly, and all who
sacrifice themselves for their country, must feel that
they owe the above-named Government a great debt
of gratitude for having done an act of justice at a
moment of such difficulty and delicacy."*
Mr. Layard had arrived at Constantinople on the
20th of ApriLf and had an interview with the
Grand Vizier on the same evening. At this inter
view the British Ambassador urged that Turkey
should do something to neutralise the effect of her
rejection of the Protocol, which had placed her in
the wrong in public opinion. He pointed to the 8th
Article of the Treaty of Paris, which bound each
Power before going to war to apply for the mediation
of others. The advantages which Turkey gained by
taking this step were farther explained by Mr.
Layard in a memorandum which was submitted to
the Porte. In this Paper it was pointed out that as
matters then stood, "public opinion in England
would not support or approve any Government that
was prepared to help Turkey." It was farther urged
to be " of vital importance that she should seek to
change or modify this opinion." Then followed a
very curious passage, which ran as follows: " If Turkey
is anxious that the present state of things should
* Turkey, XXV., 1877. No. 349, Inclos., p. 266.
t Ibid., No. 205, p. 151.

THE DECLARATION OF WAR. 3
cease, and that Russia should be compelled to de
clare war, a proposal for mediation on her (Turkey's)
part would be more likely than anything else to
make Russia come to a decision, and to avoid loss
of time. Russia would have either to accept media
tion or to refuse. In the first case she would be
placing herself under the control of the Powers, who
might call upon her to disarm, and Turkey might
either disarm of her own free will, relying on the
support of the mediating Powers, either making a
condition on the subject or not, as might appear
most prudent, or she might propose an immediate
simultaneous disarmament as the first condition of
the mediation. If Russia refused this condition, she
would undoubtedly place herself in the wrong before
public opinion."* Mr. Layard was careful to explain
to the Porte that in thus offering to submit her cause
to the consideration and decision of friendly media
ting Powers she need not run any risk of compro
mising her independence as guaranteed to her by the
Treaty of Paris, and especially recognised and upheld
by England, because the Porte "might reserve all ques
tions affecting it in the case submitted for mediation."
Although this very elaborate and ingenious
scheme for making the worse appear the better
cause, and for enabling Turkey to reserve everything
on which she professed to appeal, was at first resisted
by the Grand Vizier as inconsistent with the dignity
* Ibid., No. 211, Inclos. 1, p. 162.
B 2

4 NEGOTIATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO
of the Porte, yet by the exertions of Mr. Layard with
various members of the Government and of the
new Chamber, it came ultimately to be favour
ably entertained, and on the morning of the 24th
the British Ambassador learned that the Council
of the Porte had finally decided on accepting his
advice* One motive which probably prevailed in
the adoption of this course had been indicated by
the Grand Vizier in his conversation with Mr. Layard
on the 20th. That astute Turk, on being asked by.
the Ambassador whether he had anything to suggest
which might " stave off the danger of war," answered
" that . had Turkey money — only (even) five million
sterling — she might prolong negotiations, and time
gained was always in favour of peace." Like every
thing else done by the Turks, even this determina
tion to re-open negotiations came too late. Mr.
Layard, as we have seen, had suggested to Turkey
the expediency of forcing the hand of Russia, of
putting an end to suspense, and of " compelling her
to declare war." But then he had calculated that
Turkey would have time to make her nominal appeal
first. For he had also pointed out to the Turks
that if hostilities had once commenced, the eighth
article of the Treaty of Paris was no longer in
vigour. But this little game of the British Am
bassador was spoilt by the dilatoriness of Turkey

* Ibid., No. 2ii, p. 161.

THE DECLARATION OF WAR. %
and by the promptitude of Russia. The Russians,
as we have seen, declared war on the 23 rd, and
it was not until the 24th, when the Turks were
called on to reply to the Russian Declaration, that
they made a formal appeal to the Powers to re-open
negotiations, founding that appeal on the eighth
article of the Treaty of Paris.* Even if the motive
of this appeal had not been sufficiently apparent, it
was obviously too late to be entertained.
Nevertheless, when the proposal was communis
cated to the English Foreign Secretary on the 26th
of April, he intimated his opinion that it was " in
strict conformity with the Treaty," although he did
not anticipate that any success could attend the
proposal, f
The reply of France to the Turkish application was
conceived in a very different spirit. The Turks in this
new appeal made no offer of conceding that which had
been demanded by the Powers, all of whom had just
been united in a joint mediation which had been frus
trated by nothing except the pride and obstinacy of the
Turks. Accordingly, the Foreign Minister of France
had at once told the Turkish Ambassador in Paris
that " in order to put the other Powers into a position
to mediate, the Porte must set itself right with them.
In short, the first step for the Porte to take was to
signify its acceptance of the Protocol." J
* Ibid., No.' 140, pp. 89, 90. f Ibid., No. 147, p. 93.
% Ibid., No. 144, p. 92.

6 NEGOTIATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO
This was the only reply that could be given by
any one of the European Governments which
desired to preserve even the appearance of sin
cerity in the demands which they had made in
common on the Porte. In the Memorandum from
Turkey in which this new appeal was made there
was no hint of any disposition to concede what the
Powers had asked. There was, on the contrary, a
defence of the refusal which had been given, and a
reassertion of those doctrines of absolute indepen
dence which, under the circumstances of the case,
was only a renewed insult to Europe. It is evident,
however, from the language of the English Foreign
Secretary, that if there had been the slightest hope
of success, none of these considerations would have
prevented the Cabinet from acting on the appeal of
Turkey. The Porte had all along counted upon the
support of the British Government, and Mr. Layard
reported, on the 29 th of April, that at his first
official reception of the Turkish Ministers on the
previous day he found among them "a conviction
that in the end England would not abandon
Turkey."* On the supposition that Russia had been playing
a game of selfish ambition, her success was now
complete. It is difficult to say which of three pro
minent agencies had most effectually contributed to

* Ibid., No. 2 15, p. 165.

THE DECLARATION OF WAR. 7
this result The pride and obstinacy of the Porte,
together with its weakness and corruption, stand first.
The timidity and helplessness of the English Cabinet
come next These two causes had reacted on each
other. It is only fair to the Turks to admit that the
effect of English weakness had been to expose them
to that kind of menace which was most offensive to
them, and to which it was most difficult for them to
yield. If all Europe had threatened to use com
pulsion they might have yielded at least without loss
of dignity. But as we have seen that England had
threatened not in her own name or in the name of
Europe, but in the name of Russia alone, the effect
was inevitable. It is impossible, indeed, to read
without some sympathy and compassion the account
given by Mr. Layard of his " solemn audience" with
the Sultan on the 24th of April. The Turkish
Sovereign spoke throughout as if Russia were really
the only Power with which he had to deal. His
language was : — " A great Power is determined to
force me into war. He did not want war. It was
Russia that was intent on driving him into it.
Turkey was only defending herself from wanton
aggression from an ancient hereditary and implacable
enemy." This was the tone throughout It was a
perfectly natural tone, under the circumstances in
which he was placed. And for those circumstances
British Diplomacy was largely responsible. It had
been doing nothing else for months than trading on

8 NEGOTIATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO
the threats of Russia, presuming on the Porte's sense
of weakness, and declining to give to that sense of
weakness the way. of escape which might have been
afforded by a really determined union of the Powers.
On the other hand, the skill with which the game of
moderation had been played by Russia herself took
the best advantage of all these conditions of the case.
She had carefully cut down her demands on the
Porte to the basis which had been proposed by
England, and had been accepted by the other
Powers. She had done this by successive conces
sions on other demands which those Powers had
confessed to be reasonable in themselves. She had
helped to elicit from the English Plenipotentiary
at the Congress emphatic declarations that, as a
remedy for the evils of the country, the Turkish
Constitution was a sham, and Turkish promises were
illusory. She had farther drawn England into the
signature of a Protocol, and into the approval of a
separate Declaration by Russia, which two docu
ments, when " taken in conjunction," threw the
whole blame of the consequences of refusal upon
Turkey. The result of the whole of these' trans
actions was that Russia was free to declare war,
with the knowledge, and with the confession of the
Cabinet of London, that neither England nor any
other Power was in a position, however much they
might desire it, to defend the Turks against their
hereditary enemy. Thus, that very consummation

THE DECLARATION OF WAR. g
was brought about which was most hostile to the
legitimate interests of the rest of Europe — that con
summation which the Crimean war had been fought
to prevent — namely, the consummation that Russia
was left undisturbed to deal, separately and alone,
with the fate of Turkey.
There was just one more advantage and one
more credit which it still remained for Russia to
secure, and this was now afforded to her by the next
step of the Government of the Queen. Hitherto
England and the other Powers had at least professed
to consider the cause of the subject populations of
Turkey as at the root of the matter, and as a cause
which they were bound to promote. Russia had,
indeed, long appeared as the only Power which was -
prepared to prosecute this cause at the expense of war.
But, up to this time at least, no confession had been
made that this cause might be dropped out of the
account altogether, or that it was esteemed of no value
as compared with other interests purely selfish. That
Russia should be enabled to say not only that she was
the only Power which would fight for this cause, but
that she was the only Power which even professed to
care for it, was a triumph which she could not have
expected. Yet this, too, was given to her. The
English Government gave it by the publication — the
ostentatious publication — of a despatch setting forth
the position of Great Britain in the contest which
was now approaching, and in so framing that despatch

io NEGOTIATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO
as to eliminate all reference, however remote, to the
cause of reform in Turkey, or to the welfare and
interests of the subject populations.
Celebrated as this despatch became, as the official
definition of "British interests," it is not half-celebrated
enough. Its ingenious impolicy was sufficiently appa
rent at the time, but it acquires additional lustre in the
light of subsequent events. I give it here in full : —
The Earl of Derby to Count Schouvalow.
-" Foreign Office, May 6, 1877.
" M. l'Ambassadeur, —
" I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt
of your Excellency's letter of the 6th instant, in
which you inform me that you are about to proceed
to Russia on a short leave of absence.
"As your Excellency will then doubtless have
an opportunity of personally conferring with your
Government, I take this occasion of placing before
them some considerations of importance to the
future good understanding between Great Britain
and Russia.
" Her Majesty's Government do not propose again
to enter on the question of the justice or necessity
of the present war ; they have already expressed
their views with regard to it, and further discussion
would be unavailing. They have accepted the
obligations which a state of war imposed upon them,
and have lost no time in issuing a Proclamation of
Neutrality. They, from the first, warned the Porte

THE DECLARATION OF WAR. «
that it must not look to them for assistance, and
they are determined to carry impartially into effect
the policy thus announced, so long as Turkish interests
alone are involved.
" At the same time they think it right that there
should be no misunderstanding as to their position
and intentions. Should the war now in progress
unfortunately spread, interests may be imperilled
which they are equally bound and determined to
defend, and it is desirable that they should make
it clear, so far as at the outset of the war can be
done, what the most prominent of those interests
are. "Foremost among them is the necessity of keep
ing open, uninjured and uninterrupted, the comT
munication between Europe and the East by the
Suez Canal. An attempt to blockade or otherwise to
interfere with the Canal or its approaches would be
regarded by them as a menace to India, and as a
grave injury to the commerce of the world. On
both these grounds any such step — which they hope
and fully believe there is no intention on the part of
either belligerent to take — would be inconsistent
with the maintenance by them of an attitude of
passive neutrality.
" The mercantile and financial interests of European
nations are also so largely involved in Egypt that an
attack on that country, or its occupation, even
temporarily for purposes of war, could scarcely be
regarded with unconcern by the neutral Powers,
certainly not by England.
'• The vast importance of Constantinople, whether
in a military, a political, or a commercial point of

12 NEGOTIATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO
view, is too well understood to require explanation.
It is, therefore, scarcely necessary to point out that
her Majesty's Government are not prepared to wit
ness with indifference the passing into other hands
than those of its present possessors, of a Capital hold
ing so peculiar and commanding a position.
"The existing arrangements made under the
European sanction which regulate the navigation of
the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, appear to them wise
and salutary, and there would be, in their judgment,
serious objections to their alteration in any material
particular. " Her Majesty's Government have thought it right
thus frankly to indicate their views. The course of
events might show that there were still other
interests, as, for instance, on the Persian Gulf, which
it would be their duty to protect ; but they do not
doubt that they will have sufficiently pointed out to
your Excellency the limits within which they hope
that the war may be confined, or, at all events, those
within which they themselves would be prepared, so
far as present circumstances allow of an opinion
being formed, to maintain a policy of abstention and
neutrality " They feel confident that the Emperor of Russia
will appreciate their desire to make their policy
understood at the outset of the war, and thus to
respond to the assurances given by his Imperial
Majesty at Livadia, and published at your Excel
lency's request, when he pledged his word of honour
that he had no intention of acquiring Constantinople,
and that, if necessity should oblige him to occupy a
portion of Bulgaria, it would only be provisionally,

THE DECLARATION OF WAR. 13
and until the peace and safety of the Christian popu
lation were secured.
" Her Majesty's Government cannot better show
their confidence in these Declarations of his Imperial
Majesty than by requesting your Excellency to be so
good as to convey to the Emperor and the Russian
Government the frank explanations of British policy
which I have had the honour of thus offering to
you. " I have, &c.
(Signed) " DERBY."*
It will be observed that in this despatch, not only
is there the total omission of all reference to the
welfare of the subject-populations of Turkey, but
also that there is a most inadequate account even of
those larger political interests which were clearly
endangered by the possible action of Russia. The
interests enumerated are those which concerned
England alone, or England especially, to the total
omission of many other Interests which were com
mon to Europe. Not one word is said of the
ultimate disposal of the European provinces of
Turkey, exclusive of Constantinople. The Emperor
is indeed reminded of his promise that his military
occupation of a portion of the country would be only
temporary. But not one word is said of the danger
of exclusive Russian dealing with the institutions of
Bulgaria and of Roumelia, or the establishment
of a Russian protectorate over these provinces.
Nothing that did not touch England to the exclusion

* Russia, IL, 1877.

14 NEGOTIATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO
of other Powers, and especially the real or supposed
interests of her Indian Empire, is even mentioned in
this extraordinary despatch. And this is the more
remarkable as in the very nature of the case a Paper
which professed to set forth and enumerate the
interests which might affect the future action of
England, implied that all other interests not
enumerated (except as covered by a saving clause of
the vaguest character), were left to be dealt with
according to events. It is indeed the fitting close of
that long series of negotiations which we have traced
in the previous chapters.
It is needless to say that Russia took immediate
and effective advantage of the opportunity thus
afforded to her. On the 1 2th of May the Despatch
setting forth the position of England was answered by
another Despatch setting forth the position of Russia.
Her sole championship of all that was of interest to
the subject populations, and through them to the
ultimate peace of Europe, was brought prominently
into view. This position was expressed and defined
with undeniable truth and with conspicuous modera
tion in the following despatch from Prince Gort-
chakow to the Russian Ambassador in London : —
(Translation) " St. Petersburg, May £&, 1837.
" M. LE COMTE, 
" Your Excellency has been entrusted by
Lord Derby with a letter which develops the views

THE DECLARATION OF WAR. 15
of the English Cabinet as regards the questions which
might be implicated in the present war, and would
affect interests that England ought to defend.
" His Majesty the Emperor has perused it with
deep interest, and appreciates the frankness of expla
nations, the object of which is to remove misunder
standings between the two Governments.
" Our august Master instructs me to respond with
complete reciprocity by putting you in a position to
develop with equal frankness and equal clearness our
own views, both on the points raised by Lord Derby
and on those that affect interests which his Imperial
Majesty is bound on his side to protect.
" The Imperial Cabinet will neither blockade, nor
interrupt, nor in any way menace the navigation of
the Suez Canal. They consider the Canal as an in
ternational work, in which the commerce of the world
is interested, and which should be kept free from any
attack. " Egypt is a part of the Ottoman Empire, and its
contingents figure in the Turkish army. Russia
might, therefore, consider herself as at war with
Egypt. Nevertheless, the Imperial Cabinet does not
overlook either the European interests engaged in the
country or those of England in particular. They
will not bring Egypt within the radius of their
military operations.
" As far as concerns Constantinople, without being
able to prejudge the course or issue of the war, the
Imperial Cabinet repeats that the acquisition of that
capital is excluded from the views of his Majesty the
Emperor. They recognise that, in any case, the
future of Constantinople is a question of common

16 NEGOTIATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO
interest, which cannot be settled otherwise than by a
general understanding, and that if the possession of
that city were to be put in question, it could not be
allowed to belong to any of the European Powers.
" As regards the Straits, although their two shores
belong to the same Sovereign, they form the only
outlet of two great seas in which all the world has
interests. It is, therefore, important, in the interests
of peace and of the general balance of power, that
this question should be settled by a common
agreement on equitable and efficiently guaranteed
bases. " Lord Derby has alluded to other British interests
which might be affected by the eventual extension of
the war, such as the Persian Gulf and the route to
India. The Imperial Cabinet declares that it will
not extend the war beyond what is required for the
loudly and clearly declared object for which his
Majesty the Emperor was obliged to take up arms.
They will respect the British interests mentioned
by Lord Derby as long as England remains
neutral. ^ " They have a right to expect that the English
Government will, on their side, in like manner take
into fair consideration the particular interests which
Russia has at stake in this war, and in view of which
she has imposed such great sacrifices on herself.
" These consist in the absolute necessity of putting
an end to the deplorable condition of the Christians
under Turkish rule and to the chronic state of dis
turbance provoked by it.
" This state of things, and the acts of violence re
sulting from it, excite in Russia an agitation caused-

THE DECLARATION OF WAR. 17
by the Christian feeling so profound in the Russian
people, and by the ties of faith and race which unite
them to a great part of the Christian population of
Turkey. The Imperial Government is the more
obliged to take account of this since it reacts both on
the internal and external situation of the Empire.
At each of these crises the policy of Russia is
suspected and accused, and her international relations,
her commerce, her finances, and her credit are
affected. " His Majesty the Emperor cannot leave Russia
indefinitely exposed to these disastrous accidents,
which check her peaceful development and cause her
incalculable injury.
" It is in order to dry up their source that his
Imperial Majesty has decided to impose upon his
country the burden of the war.
" The object cannot be attained unless the Chris
tian populations of Turkey are placed in a position
in which their existence and security will be effec
tually guaranteed against the intolerable abuses of
Turkish administration. This interest, which is a
vital one for Russia, is not opposed to any of the
interests of Europe, which suffers, too, on her side,
from the precarious state of the East.
" The Imperial Cabinet endeavoured to attain the
desired end with the co-operation of the friendly and
allied Powers.
" Forced now to pursue it alone, our august Master
is resolved not to lay down his arms without having
completely, surely, and effectually guaranteed it.
" Be good enough to lay these views before Lord
Derby, stating to him that the Imperial Cabinet has
VOL. IL C

18 NEGOTIATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO
a right to hope that the Government of her Britannic
Majesty will appreciate them with the same spirit of
fairness that induces us to respect the interests of
England, and that they will draw from them the
same conclusion as ourselves — namely, that there is
nothing in the views that have been exchanged with
reciprocal frankness between the two Governments
which cannot be reconciled so as to maintain their
amicable relations, and the peace of the East and of
Europe. " Receive, &c.
(Signed) " GoRTCHAKOW."
So far as this correspondence goes it cannot be
denied that Russia appears as taking the highest
ground, and that the Queen's Government on the
contrary appears as taking the very lowest. Every
interest in the great Eastern Question which was
general and European, as distinguished from interests
predominantly or purely English, was neglected and
abandoned. Russia was left the immense advantage
of appearing as the only Power able and willing to
redeem the subject populations of Turkey from the
curse of centuries, and the not less conspicuous ad
vantage of being able to advance her own interests
without let or hindrance in the execution of this
work. Two months elapsed between the declaration of
war and the successful passage of the Danube by the
Russian army That passage was not effected till the
last week in June. During this interval diplomacy

THE DECLARATION OF WAR. 19
was not wholly silent. The Ministers and Am
bassadors of England had one more opportunity
of exhibiting their sense of the political situation.
On the 8th of June the Russian Ambassador had a
confidential conversation with the Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs, and made to him a most im
portant communication. This was no' less than an
explanation, made with the utmost frankness, of
certain conditions on which Russia would still be
willing to conclude a peace, and a farther explana
tion equally frank of the very different conditions upon
which she might insist if she were compelled to fight
her way across the Balkans.
In the first place, it was distinctly explained to
the Cabinet of London that in this last event Russia
would not bind herself against advancing on the
Turkish Capital. All that she was willing to give a
pledge against on this subject was the " taking posses
sion of the town or occupying it permanently." It was
pointed out that the obstinacy of the Turks might
compel Russia to pursue the war to the walls of Con
stantinople ; and if the Turks knew beforehand that
they were to be guaranteed against such a result it
would only lead to a prolongation of the war. England,
however, might be fully assured that under no circum
stances would Russia remain at Constantinople. It
would depend very much upon England and the other
Powers to relieve Russia from the necessity of even
approaching that city. Let them induce Turkey to
C 2

20 NEGOTIATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO
accept reasonable terms of peace, and this object
would be effected.
The Ambassador then proceeded to indicate what
these terms were, and in doing so, he took care once
more to set forth in the plainest terms the narrow
aims of the policy avowed by England, as contrasted
with the broader and larger interests of which Russia
was the champion. It is not pleasant for any subject
of the Queen to read the definition given of British
policy by the Russian Ambassador in this . conver
sation, as contrasted with the accompanying definition
of the policy of Russia, and to find that it appears
to have been received without one word of remon
strance by the Secretary of State. There was no
affectation or pretence that Russia had not her own
legitimate interests to secure. Her military honour
and her position as a great Power must be vindicated.
But these are carefully connected with the interests of
the subject populations, and through them with objects
which all the other Powers had admitted and declared
to be objects of general desire. "What is necessary
to England," said Count Schouvalow, " is the main
tenance in principle of the Ottoman Empire and the
inviolability of Constantinople and the Straits."
"What is absolutely necessary to Russia," said the
same authority, " is that she should put an end to
the continual crises in the East, firstly, by estab
lishing the superiority of her arms so thoroughly that
in future the Turks will not be tempted to defy her

THE DECLARATION OF WAR. 21
lightly ; and secondly, by placing the Christians,
especially those of Bulgaria, in a position which would
effectually guarantee them against the abuses of
Turkish administration."
This general description of the Russian basis was
further developed by specific explanations of the
terms demanded. And it is very remarkable to
observe that these terms would have avoided any
exclusive Protectorate of Russia over the provinces
whose liberties would nevertheless have been en
tirely due to her firmness. They demanded au
tonomy for Bulgaria north of the Balkans. But it
was still to be vassal to the Porte,, and it was
to be under the guarantee not of Russia, but of
Europe. Bulgaria, south of the Balkans, was also
to be assured, under the same guarantee, such
securities for good Government as might be agreed
upon with the other Powers. Bosnia and Herzego-
vina were to be dealt with on the same principle, and '
the preponderating interest of Austria-Hungary in'
the organisation of these provinces was recognised..
Montenegro and Servia were to receive some increase
of territory. Servia. was to remain as it had been,
vassal to the Porte ; and the ambition of Roumania
to be declared independent was to be considered by
Europe as a whole. On these terms — terms identi
fied with the acknowledged interests, not of Russia
only, but of Europe — the Russian Ambassador inti
mated that Turkey might even then have peace.

22 NEGOTIATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO
One only further reservation was made, and the
early communication of it to England was at least
frank and candid on the part of Russia. As com
pensation for the costs of war already incurred,
Russia would stipulate for certain special advan
tages, which, however, would not exceed the retro
cession of that part of Bessarabia which had been
taken from her by the Treaty of Paris in 1856* and
the cession of Batoum, with its adjacent territory.
These terms were confidentially communicated at
thesame time to Germany and to Austria-Hungary.t
It was, however, expressly stipulated by Russia that
if England refused to enter upon a negotiation on
this basis, it was not to be communicated to the
Porte at all. Russia did not profess to entertain the
smallest expectation that Turkey would assent to
these terms unless compelled to do so. But she did
wish to assure herself of the neutrality of England
by an open declaration both as to the terms with
which she would be content if peace were made
then, and by a declaration equally open that if com
pelled to fight her way across the Balkans, she could
not be bound by the same terms.
The course taken by the English Cabinet was to
express no opinion of its own, but to consult Mr.
Layard as to what he thought of the probability of the

* Turkey, XV., 1878, No. 1, pp. 3, 4.
t Ibid., No. 4, p. 6.

THE DECLARATION OF WAR. 23
Porte consenting to the Russian terms* This was
done by telegraph on the 12th of June, and the
reply of Mr. Layard was written on the following
day. That reply was that it would be " even dan
gerous to suggest the Russian terms to the Sultan or
his Ministers at the present moment" He then en
tered into an analysis of the terms, pointing out the
objections which Turkey would entertain to every
one of them. These objections were stated from
the Turkish point of view with force and fervour.
To establish an autonomous Bulgaria north of the
Balkans, with the Danubian fortresses destroyed, with
the Turkish armies excluded, and the province placed
under the guarantee of Europe, would be to lay
the foundation not only forjts speedy and complete
independence, but for its union with Servia, and
the consequent extension of Russian influence over
the whole Slav population of Turkey. Greece would
be encouraged to invade Thessaly and Epirus.
A large Mohammedan population would be handed'
over to Christian government. Bosnia and Herze
govina would be cut off from the rest of Turkey,
and with their new institutions would be practically
lost to the Empire. The cession of Batoum would
be handing over to Russia the key of Armenia and
of all Asia Minor. To propose such terms would be
fatal to whatever influence yet remained to England

* Ibid, No. br p. 6.

24 NEGOTIATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO
at Constantinople. " We should be looked upon as'
greater enemies to Turkey and to Islamism than
Russia herself, as false friends, and traitors."*
In the meantime, on the 14th of June, before
this reply had been received in England, the
Russian Ambassador had intimated that on recon
sideration Russia must make one important modifica
tion of the terms to be demanded. She found on
examination that the separation of Bulgaria into
two provinces was practically impossible. Local
information proved that it must remain one province,
otherwise the most laborious and intelligent part of
the Bulgarian population, and notably that which
had suffered most from Turkish maladministration,
would remain excluded from autonomous institu
tions. The calmness of the Foreign Secretary was not
much disturbed by this communication. But when
it was reported to Mr. Layard, it drew from that
diplomatist, on the 19th June, a vehement despatch,
denouncing over again the terms as a whole, and
this addition in particular. To do Mr. Layard
justice, he had clearly an intelligible policy of his own.
His contempt for the merely negative and listless
attitude of his Government is but thinly veiled. He
would have supported Turkey: and he would have
supported her on the good old doctrine that whatever

• Ibid., No. 8, pp. 7, 8.

THE DECLARATION OF WAR. 25
might be her faults or vices, the maintenance of her
power was necessary to the interests of England.
The passage in which this superstition is expressed
is so vigorous, and is so probably the last and latest
expression of it by an able man, that I reproduce it
here : —
" I would venture to urge most earnestly upon
her Majesty's Government not to be the medium of
communicating, or of suggesting, any such terms as
those proposed by Prince Gortchakow to the Sultan
or to the Porte. The Russian Chancellor's language
does not admit the possibility of a mediation. It is
simply that of dictation. The terms offered are to
be accepted at once, or the consequences will be a
further dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire.
Let some other Power accept this task. It is vital
to our gravest interests, to interests the importance
of which no words can adequately describe, much
less exaggerate, that we should be ready to interpose
to save the Turkish Empire from complete dissolu
tion. If we have even determined to abandon it to
its fate, we have not determined to abandon to the
same fate the highest interests of the British Empire.
Surely the policy which has hitherto made us support
Turkey for our own purposes and safety, and for no
abstract love of Turks or their faith, a policy approved
and adopted by the greatest statesmen that England
has produced, is not one which the events of the last
few months, having no relation whatever to it, are
sufficient to reverse. That policy was partly based
upon the belief that Turkey is a barrier to the ambi-

26 NEGOTIATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO
tious designs of Russia in the East, and that the
Sultan, the acknowledged head of the Mohammedan
faith, is a useful, if not necessary, ally to England,
which has millions of Mussulmans amongst her subjects.
He may be deprived of his Empire, and may be
reduced to the condition of a fifth-rate Asiatic Poten
tate ; but he will still be the Caliph of Islam, and
the Mussulman world, in a struggle for very exis
tence, may turn upon England as the principal cause
of the danger that threatens it. Some persons, not
without authority, are, I am aware, disposed to treat
this consideration lightly ; but I am persuaded from
what I see passing around me, and from what I have
learnt, that it is one which we ought seriously to bear
in mind. " It is scarcely necessary to dwell, in this place,
upon the result of the breaking up and partition of
the Ottoman Empire on the balance of power, or
upon the great danger to liberty and civilisation of
the establishment of a vast military Slav Empire in
the east of Europe.
" If her Majesty's Government are of opinion that
there is nothing to be done to oppose the designs of
Russia, we should, at least, be prepared to mediate
when the time comes. In order to be in a position
to do so, we should make Turkey feel that although,
as we have warned her, she cannot expect any help
from us in her struggle with Russia, we shall be
ready, at a favourable moment, to do our best to see
that she be treated with justice and moderation, and
her Mohammedan and Christian subjects alike with
impartiality and equal humanity. It has been my
object to raise such hopes, as I have none others to

THE DECLARATION OF WAR. 27
give, without committing in any way her Majesty's
Government, whose views and policy it is my duty
to consider and carry out. It is the only course left
to us if we are not prepared to give Turkey even
such indirect aid as the preservation and maintenance
of our own national and imperial interests may render
necessary. By following it we may recover and
maintain a part of that great and preponderating
influence — I hesitate to use a word which has been
so indignantly denounced as 'prestige' — which
England once enjoyed amongst the Mussulman, and
even Christian, nations and communities of the East,
and which she was able to use most effectively for
their good and her own."*
There is only one opinion of Mr. Layard, as ex
pressed in these despatches, in which we can all
agree. "Were Russia over the Danube," he said in
his reply of the 1 3th of June, " and at the Balkan
"Passes, and were she in possession of Armenia, there
might be grounds for forming a different opinion to
that which I have now expressed." This was quite
true. It meant that nothing short of the military
success of Russia could bring home to the mind of
Turkey, and of the Turkish party in England, that
the time had come to abandon her claims to abso
lute independence. The knot was left to be cut by
the sword. But it is not the less important to ob
serve that from this early date, before as yet the

* Ibid,, No. 10, pp. 9, 10.

28 NEGOTIATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO
Russians had crossed the Danube, England and
Europe were offered the opportunity of enforcing on
the Porte, in so far as they could or would, terms of
peace which were generally in accordance with the
demands which they had themselves made upon the
Porte ; and, moreover, that the Powers of Europe had
due notice given to them that even then Russia had
determined to demand the restoration of her old Bes-
sarabian frontier, and in Asia the cession of Batoum.
Moreover, it is equally important to observe that
this intimation had been received by the English
Government without, so far as appears, one word of
remonstrance or protest.
And now once more we find the Cabinet of the
Queen waiting on the steps and relying on the
strength of Russia. On the 2 7th of June the Russian
armies had, at three separate points, completed the
passage of the Danube. Possibly this success might
make the Turks more willing to concede what had
been required by England and by Europe. It was
as well to try. Accordingly on the following day
the Foreign Secretary authorised Mr. Layard to
sound \he Sultan on the subject of terms of peace.
He was to be assured that he might rely on the
friendly offices of the Queen's Government with a
view to obtain for him " the most favourable possible
terms under the circumstances."*
Probably it is fortunate for Europe that this
* Ibid., No. u, p. 11

THE DECLARATION OF WAR. 29
attempt also failed. The " most favourable terms
possible" for the Turks could not have been the
most favourable terms possible for the subject popu
lations, or for the permanent interests of peace in the
east of Europe. Mr. Layard, however, was not
called upon to answer this instruction till the 2nd
of August, and in the meantime important military
events had occurred. On the 7th of July, the
Russians had captured Tirnova, and a week later
General Gourko had made his celebrated dash across
the Balkans. But, on the other hand, Osman Pasha
had entered Plevna on the 19 th, and on the 21st
had established himself so firmly within his now
famous lines that he was enabled to repulse the first
Russian assault. On the 30th of July the second
attack had been repelled with still more disastrous
results to the army of the Czar. In Asia, also, after
the capture of Ardahan so early as the 1 7th of May,
the Russian forces had met with serious reverses.
When, therefore, on the 2nd of August, Mr. Layard
had to reply to the instruction he had received
on the subject of peace, he was obliged to report
that the Turks were confidently expecting to drive
the enemy out of Bulgaria and Roumelia, as he
had already been driven out of Armenia. It is not the
first time in the history of the world that the foregone
conclusions of a great contest have been obscured
by temporary causes suggesting idle expectations of
a different result.

30 NEGOTIATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO
It was during this period of the contest that some
important communications took place with Russia
through Colonel Wellesley, who represented the Eng
lish War Office at the head-quarters of the army
of the Czar. On the 20th of July, the Emperor, in
referring to some false accusations made by the Turks
against the Russian army, took occasion to intimate
to that officer that, although he would not suspend
military operations, he was still ready to treat for
peace, if the Sultan would make suitable pro
positions. This message was received in London on the
27th of July, the very day on which the Russian
army crossed the Danube. On the following day
the Cabinet of the Queen responded by communica
ting to the Russian Ambassador a Memorandum of
their views. In this Paper the same tone was con
tinued which we have traced throughout — the tone,
namely, of representing the whole quarrel as one
between Russia and Turkey In this tone her
Majesty's Government assured the Emperor that
they would be " ready to use their influence in con
cert with the other Powers to induce the Porte to
terminate the present disastrous war by acceding to
such terms of peace as shall be at once honourable
to Russia, and yet such as the Sultan can accept."*
It was then farther intimated that the Queen's

* Turkey, IX., 1878, No. 2.

THE DECLARATION OF WAR. 31
Government looked with much anxiety at the pros
pect of disorder, bloodshed, and even anarchy at
Constantinople, if the Russian forces should draw
nearer to that Capital. England was fully deter
mined not to depart from the line of neutrality which
the Government had declared their intention to ob
serve, unless any deviation from it should be neces
sary for the preservation of interests which had already
been defined. But the Queen's Government would
not consider that they were departing from neutrality,
nor would Russia consider that they were doing so,
if they should find themselves compelled to direct the
British Fleet to proceed to Constantinople and " thus
afford protection to the European population against
internal disturbance." It was anxiously explained at
the same time that no decision had then been taken
in favour of such a proceeding. But her Majesty's
Government was desirous that " in the event of its
being necessaiy no misunderstanding should arise as
to their intentions, and that the Government of Russia
should not be taken by surprise."
Again, on the 30th of July, the Emperor of Russia
made some further remarks to Colonel Wellesley,
which he authorised that officer to communicate to
his Government. These remarks conveyed the fol
lowing important declarations : — 1st, That the object
of the war was solely the amelioration of the con
dition of the Christian population of Turkey ; 2nd,
That the conditions of peace then demanded by

32 NEGOTIATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO
Russia remained the same as those lately explained
to the British Cabinet by Count Schouvalow ; 3rd,
That the Emperor had no idea of annexation beyond
perhaps the territory lost in Bessarabia by the Treaty
of 1856, and a certain portion of Asia Minor ; 4th,
That the Emperor would not occupy Constantinople
for the sake of military honour, but only if such a
step were rendered necessary by the march of events;
5 th, That the Emperor was still ready to treat for
peace if the Sultan would offer suitable proposals,
but that he could not accept the mediation Of any
Power on behalf of Turkey ; 6th, That Europe would
be invited to a Conference for the formal settlement
of the conditions of peace ; 7th, That the Emperor
had not the slightest wish to interfere with any one
of the British interests which had been specified —
Constantinople, Egypt, the Suez Canal, or India;
8th, That a temporary occupation of Bulgaria would
' be necessary ; 9 th, That the Emperor feared that the
present policy of England only tended to encourage
the Turks, and consequently to prolong the war,
whereas if the influence of England were brought to
bear upon the Porte, the Sultan would be ready to
come to terms, and thus a war regretted by all
Europe would be brought to a speedy conclusion.*
The reply of the English Government to this
message was in the same form — namely, in that of

* Ibid., No. 3, Inclos., p. 2.

THE DECLARATION OF WAR. 33
a Memorandum to be communicated to the Emperor
by Colonel Wellesley. It was dated August 1 4th*
The only sentence of any importance is the first —
in which the Queen's Government intimate their satis
faction that the Emperor disclaimed any "extensive"
ideas of annexation — a sentence which involves tacit
acquiescence in those not " extensive" annexations
which were then very clearly indicated, and which
were afterwards so violently denounced in England.
This sentence was as follows: — "They have re
ceived with satisfaction the statement made by his
Majesty as to the object of the war in which he is
engaged, his disclaimer of any extensive ideas of
annexation and his readiness to enter into negotia
tions for peace. They are grateful for the assurance
which he has given of his intentions to respect the
interests of England." The Queen's Government
then proceeded to disclaim the influence with the
Porte which had been attributed to them by the
Emperor, and pleaded that since the Turks had
ceased to hope for the military support of England
" the position of the British Government, in Turkish
opinion, is no longer that of protectors who must be
conciliated at any cost, but of neutrals from whom,
neither assistance nor hostility is to be anticipated."
The Memorandum then proceeded thus, in direct
allusion to the defeats which Russia had sustained : —

* Ibid., p. 3.
VOL. II. D

34 NEGOTIATIONS.
" The military events which have occurred since the
date of the communication made by the Emperor to
Col. Wellesley will have necessarily indisposed the
Turkish Government to entertain any propositions of
peace except on conditions such as it is unlikely that
the Russian Government could accept"
Here, again, it will be observed, the whole stress
is laid not on the justice or necessity of the proposed
terms with reference to the condition of the subject
populations of Turkey, but exclusively on the accepta
bility of those terms to Russia.
The principal importance, however, of these Memo
randa lies in the proof which they afford that Russia
was, even at this early period of the contest, singu
larly open and unreserved to us, as regarded the
probable extent of her demands, if her arms should
be attended with success. So far as cessions of
territory were concerned, these Memoranda show
that the British Government had from this time
full notice of the Emperor's intentions. The retro
cession of Bessarabia speaks for itself. The "certain
portion of Asia Minor" might mean anything. It
could only mean, at least, the acquisition of Batoum.
It might mean a great deal more. In full posses
sion of this knowledge, the Cabinet of the Queen was
silent.

CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE. 35

CHAPTER XI.
THE WAR DOWN TO THE CONCLUSION OF AN
ARMISTICE, AND RELATIVE NEGOTIATIONS, IN
FEBRUARY, 1 878.
THE check which the Russian armies had sus
tained both in Asia and Europe, during the months
of July and August, was indeed quite sufficient to
inspire with hope the Turks and their friends in
England. These hopes, however, were doomed to
speedy disappointment. In the beginning of Sep
tember the tide began to turn, and in the middle
of the following month the main current of this
eventful history became visible to all observers.
The bombardment of Plevna began on the 7th
of September, and on the nth the Gravitza re
doubt was taken. But it was not till the 15 th of
October that a great victory, secured in Asia, gave
token of the end. On that day the Turkish army
was overthrown on the Aladja Dagh, with one of
those great routs which are decisive of the fate of
more than a campaign. This triumph in Asia was
D 2

36 THE WAR DOWN TO THE
followed on the 29th of October by the complete
investiture of Plevna. Another period of twenty
days brings us down to the fall of Kars, which was
taken by the Russian forces on the 1 9th of Novem
ber. But it was not till the 1 oth of December that
the gallant Osman Pasha marched a captive out of
the lines of Plevna, after a defence perhaps as brilliant
as any recorded in the history of war.
It forms no part of the object of this work to
follow the events of the war in so far as these were
of a purely military character. Some of them,
however, have a bearing more or less important
upon the" fundamental question of the condition and
character of the Turkish Empire. The decline of
its military power has been but a symptom and a
consequence of its- decline in all that constitutes the
vitality of nations. Nobody, perhaps, will now con
tend that the events of the late war, taken as a
whole, gave any indication that this decline had
been arrested. But, unquestionably, during the
months of July, August, and part of September, the
friends of Turkey were jubilant over her military
successes, and loudly declared that these were of
such a character as to indicate a great revival. It
was denied that the ability of Turkish generals was
confined to the defence of strong positions. It was
asserted that they had shown vigour, and had attained
success in the open field. It was triumphantly pre
dicted that the Russians would be compelled to retreat

CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE. 37
across the Danube. And even now, when this tone
lias been silenced by ultimate results, the impression
remains on many minds that the defeat of Turkey
was due entirely to the overwhelming forces which
Russia was able to hurl upon her, and that in the
conduct of her defensive campaign Turkey showed
not only a courage but a skill which was deserving
of a better fate.
That the men of the Turkish armies, and in many
cases their officers also, displayed great courage, and
great powers of endurance, is unquestionably true.
Nor is this fact to be treated lightly, or with undue
depreciation of all that it may involve. Mr. Bright,
in a recent speech, spoke of physical courage as an
article of which more might be had for a shilling
a-day than of any other article with which he was ac
quainted. The sarcasm, though strictly founded upon
fact, cannot affect the universal feeling of mankind.
That feeling rests upon an instinct which, like all
other instincts, has its seat and its justification in
the nature of things. The willingness of men to
sacrifice their lives at the call of duty, or, in other
words, at the command of legitimate authority, is
the highest witness both to the value of human life,
and to the still higher value of that which may call
us to lay it down. Physical courage, however
common it may be, and however capable of it
almost all men, under drill and discipline, are found
to be, has never failed, and will never cease to be

38 THE WAR DOWN TO THE
the object of sympathy and admiration. In this
war it was displayed with equal brilliancy by every
one of the races which were engaged. The Servian
and Roumanian contingents, which ultimately joined
in the contest, displayed it as remarkably as the
Turks and Russians. They displayed it, too, under
conditions which of all others are perhaps the
most trying. The attack on strongly fortified
positions defended by men armed with the modern
weapons of precision, is a kind of attack in which
the probability of death is at a maximum, and
in which the incitements to courage are at a
minimum. The foe is unseen and under shelter.
The storming parties are entirely uncovered. They
have often considerable distances to traverse during
which the carnage is visible and dreadful. In this
war there was the prospect — much more dreadful than
that of being killed in battle — of a cruel death inflicted
by the Turks in cold blood upon the wounded, in the
event of the attack being repulsed. That this was
the habitual practice of the Turkish soldiery is attested
by eye-witnesses without number. Yet under all
these aggravated circumstances, not merely of danger
but of horror, whole columns of men, unused to war,
flung themselves unflinchingly against the redoubts
of Plevna, The Turks, exposed to the same danger,
but not under -the same risks of cruelty, dashed with
equal determination, and with equal slaughter, against
the Russian fortifications in the Shipka Pass.

CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE. 39
So far, therefore, as the mere quality of physical
courage is concerned, no inferences can be drawn
either comparatively favourable or unfavourable to
Turkey from the events of the late war.
When, however, we come to review the military
conduct of the war as a whole, it is vain to deny
that it confirmed in a most striking degree the
decline of Turkey as a military Power. Some of the
very best generals in the service of the Porte, with a
large part of its regular army, were not only kept at
bay for many months, but were at last completely
defeated by the little bands of indomitable Monte
negro. It is not too much to say that this is a
result discreditable, if not actually disgraceful, to
the arms of the Sultan. Even in the war with
Servia in 1876, although the Turkish forces were
ultimately victorious, the triumph cannot be rated
very high, considering the raw and untrained levies
to which alone they were opposed. As regards
questions of purely military strategy it would be
absurd for a civilian to express any opinion, except
that kind of opinion which rests upon the proof
furnished by events. But this is a kind of proof which
does justify conclusions of the most important kind.
I recollect hearing Macaulay on one occasion give an
effective reply to a critic who objected to an opinion
he had expressed on a military question. "You
are judging," said the critic, " by the event." " Of
course I am judging by the event," Macaulay replied ;

40 THE WAR DOWN TO THE
" how do I know that Wellington was a better
general than Soult except by the fact that Soult
was beaten by Wellington ?" And surely in the case
of this Russo-Turkish war there were some results
which leave no doubt as to the conduct of the cam
paign by the Turkish generals. When the Russian
army was so seriously defeated in its first attack on
Plevna that for a time at least it seemed to be
demoralised, it was confidently expected that the
Turkish army which rested upon Schumla would have
pressed on the left flank of the Russian position and
compelled a retreat across the Danube. So great was
the failure in this expectation, and in others of a like
kind, that it has been ascribed to corruption or
treachery on the part of the Turkish generals, or to
their jealousy of each other. It was observed with
apparent truth that if the columns which during weeks
and weeks were dashed in vain against the Shipka
Pass had been used to reinforce the army of the Lom
very different results might have been attained. And
even as regards the action of Osman Pasha in seizing
and fortifying Plevna, the brilliancy of his defence
must not blind us to the grave doubts which attend
his strategy. It does not seem to be a great triumph
of military genius to place a whole army in such a
position that in the event of defeat there could be
no retreat, and no other resource than unconditional
surrender. . Or if Osman Pasha had any good reason
to hope that he could be relieved by any force so

CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE. 41
large as to enable him to take the offensive, or even
to cover his retreat, what becomes of the reputation
of that military Empire which suffered these hopes
to be disappointed ?
On the whole, then, the result of the war has been
to show that whilst there appears to be no deterio
ration in the fighting qualities of the Turkish soldier,
there has been in Turkey no reform of the adminis
trative system on which the success of campaigns
depends, and no revival of that military genius to
which the Turks owed their conquests and establish
ment in Europe.
But there are some of the military events of that
war which cannot be passed over in any narrative
which has in view the light cast by those events on
the character and condition of the Turkish Empire.
And especially amongst its most terrible and in
structive episodes, it is necessary to refer to the
dash across the Balkans which was made by
General Gourko in the middle of July, 1877. It is
difficult to know how far officers of this class, in the
midst of a campaign, act under the immediate direc
tion of the Commander-in-chief. It is still more
difficult to know how far even the Commander-in-
chief of an army engaged in active operations in
the field feels himself under any obligation to take
into consideration the political consequences of any
given movement. But in a war such as that which
was then being waged by Russia against Turkey — a

42 THE WAR DOWN TO THE
war in which political considerations were all impor
tant — a war undertaken with the express aim and
object of relieving subject-populations from a corrupt
and oppressive Government, — it was the bounden
duty of the Russian authorities to abstain from any
military movement not absolutely essential to the
safety of the army, which ran any serious and
needless risk of aggravating the horrors of the war.
It has been said, indeed, in a very interesting letter
from Lord Melgund,* who was at that time present
with the Turkish Army, that Raouf Pasha's force,
which was at first the only force opposed to General
Gourko, was thoroughly demoralised, and that if the
Russian General had made his attack one week
earlier, he would certainly have succeeded in the
capture of Adrianople. He was only compelled to
retreat by the timely arrival of Suleiman Pasha
with the battalions which had been vainly employed
against Montenegro. But the Russians had no right
to count upon such a chance as this ; and it was their
duty to consider the terrible and the certain results of
failure. This duty was grievously violated by sending
across the Balkans, into Southern Bulgaria, a Russian
force which was wholly insufficient to occupy or to hold
the country — which, in fact, could do nothing but make
a raid — and which, having first compromised a large
* Published in the Times newspaper about the 12th or 13th of
October, 1877.

CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE. 43
native population, had then immediately to retreat
and leave them to the vengeance of the Turks. This
was the character and the result of General Gourko's
expedition, and the worst horrors of the war were
directly due to it.
I shall not enter here into the continual dis
putes which have arisen whether the Cossacks and
armed Bulgarians did or did not commit cruelties as
aggravated, in proportion to their opportunities, as
those committed by Turkish Irregulars — the Circas
sians and the Bashi-Bazouks. This is the favourite
hunting-ground of men, who, in the great pursuit Of
politics, are ever running upon false scents, and stop
ping to dig out all the little vermin that cross the field
of view. In the present case they think they are defend
ing the policy which delivered up the Eastern Ques
tion into the hands of Russia, if they can prove that
Russians are as barbarous as Turks. If this were
so, it could only serve to aggravate the censure due
to the Cabinets who abandoned their own duties in
the East of Europe, with the effect of enabling and
entitling Russia to take them up. But, even in this by
path of inquiry, the friends of Turkey are not successful.
The civilisation of Russia is indeed very far behind our
own. But it is two centuries at least in advance of the
civilisation of Turkey I say nothing of the sap which
is flowing in the one, and of the rot which is visibly
affecting every fibre of the other. Those who read the
accounts from all sides, which have been furnished by

44 THE WAR DOWN TO THE
Mr. Layard, and who remember as an absolute rule
that nothing is to be believed on either side except
such facts as are vouched for by the direct or
indirect evidence of European witnesses, will have
no difficulty in making up their minds as to which of
the two parties was the most savage throughout the
contest. The united testimony of all the foreign
officers at the head-quarters of the Russian army
proves that as a rule and on the whole it conducted
the war humanely to the wounded and to the captives.
The same evidence proves that the Turks habitually
killed the wounded, whilst the correspondents of the
European press united on more than one occasion
to testify to the barbarous mutilations which were
practised by the soldiers of the Sultan upon the
dead, and too probably also on the dying. The
insignificant number of prisoners who ever came
under the charge of the Turkish Government is a
sufficient indication and a crucial test of the
barbarous conduct of its soldiery. These facts
were so well established that they became the
subject of formal remonstrance with the Porte
from other Powers. On the 18th of August the
German Ambassador in London called on the
Foreign Secretary and "read a telegram from his
Government stating that the German officers at the
Russian head-quarters have corroborated the state
ments made that in the battles at Plevna and in the
Balkans the Russian soldiers who fell into the hands

CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE. 45
of the Turkish regular troops were mutilated and
killed. The German Government thinks this con
trary to the Genevan Convention, which was adhered
to by the Porte."* It will be observed that this
charge does not refer to one battle only, but to many,
and that it does not refer to the Irregulars, but
expressly to the Regulars of the Turkish army. But
the consequences of General Gourko's raid are of a
special kind. They involve the direct action of the
Turkish Government during a long period of time ;
and they cast light upon the most important of
all questions — namely, the question : What would
have been the result of the defeat of Russia' in the
war, and of the establishment of unrestrained
Turkish power over the subject-populations of
Bulgaria ?
The facts so far as attested by direct European
evidence may be very shortly stated — first, as given
in the letter of two American missionaries to Mr.
Layard, dated August 14th, 1877;! and secondly, as
given by the reports of Consul-General Fawcett, and
others who visited the districts at a later date. The
two American missionaries were present at Eski-
Zaghra ; and from their narrative the facts seem to
have been these : —
General Gourko crossed the Balkans on the 14th

* Turkey, I., 1878, No. 216, p. 167.
f Ibid., No. 228. Inclos. p. 195.

46 THE WAR DOWN TO THE
of July, at the Hain Pass. This news reached the
city of Eski-Zaghra on the same day The Turkish
authorities sent out irregular troops, which were the
only troops at their disposal, to meet the Russians.
On the 1 7th the Russians took Kyzanlik, and the
worst classes of Turks in Eski-Zaghra gave token of
their intention to plunder the Christians of the town.
The Turkish Governor seems to have done all he
could to prevent this. But the Christians, believing
that they would be attacked on the 23 rd, sent a secret
message to the Russians to urge them to advance.
Accordingly, the Russians entered the city on the
22nd of July, and " were welcomed by the Bulgarians
with unbounded demonstrations of joy." Some
plundering of Turks by Bulgarian villagers followed
the Russian occupation, although this was opposed
by all the respectable Christian inhabitants, as the
better class of Turks had before resisted their own
countrymen in plundering the Christians. On the
23rd some Turkish villages in the surrounding plain
were deserted by their inhabitants, and the Bulgarian
neighbours then burned and plundered them. On the
25 th there were some military executions of Turkish
men, and of one Turkish woman by the Russians, the
crime being the possession of arms and the firing at
Russians in the streets. But as the Russians held
nothing of the country except the spots where their
troops were stationed, the Circassians and Bashi-
Bazouks had, by this time, begun the work of fire

CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE. 47
and slaughter on the surrounding Bulgarian villages*
On the 26th of July, waggon-loads of wounded
Bulgarian peasants, men, women, and children, were
seen coming into Eski-Zaghra. It was on the day
following this event that a massacre of Turks
was begun by men who are styled in the letter
of the American missionaries " the Bulgarian police."
"On the 27th, a large number of Turks were exe
cuted by these men ; and on the 28 th, the worst class
of Bulgarians began to take it on themselves to seize
obnoxious Turks and despatch them with sword and
musket at the border of the city." This was a
massacre. But it was a massacre by no means either

* Since this passage was written I have seen the evidence
given by Mr. W. K. Rose, correspondent of the Scotsman
newspaper, who crossed the Balkans with General Gourko's
force. This evidence proves beyond the possibility of doubt
that the devastation of the country into which that General
penetrated had begun, and had gone great lengths, befoie his
expedition was undertaken. Mr. Rose states that he almost
invariably accompanied the avant-guard, and that everywhere,
they met bands of refugee Bulgarians flying from the ravages
of the Turks. He states that in the town of Jeni-Zaghra, a
week before it was entered by Gourko, there had been a mas
sacre of 600 men, women, and children, and that he saw horrid
evidences of the work. Mr. Rose also saw the wasted bodies
of Bulgarians, numbering over sixty men, women, and children,
in one house, where they had taken refuge, and in which they
had been burnt by the Turks. This was in the village of
Dalboka. Farther, Mr. Rose saw the town of Eski-Zaghra
fired by the Turks when it was evacuated by Gourko on his
retreat. This important information from an eye-witness must
be taken as modifying, to a considerable extent, some of the
observations in the text.

48 THE WAR DOWN TO THE
on the scale or of the kind with which we have be
come familiar as perpetrated by the Turks. " From
what we saw and heard," add the missionaries, " we
judge that, perhaps, ioo Turks may have been cut
down during those three days." The temporary
Government of the city tried to stop these murders —
and on Sunday punishment was denounced in all the
churches against those who participated in them.
It is, however, expressly added by the missionaries,
" We do not believe that any Moslem woman or
child was killed in the city by Bulgarians, though
for several days Christian women and children were
brought in wounded in a frightful manner. We heard
of one Jewess being injured."
On the 31st of July, the city was retaken by the
Turks under Suleiman Pasha. It was immediately
given over to plunder, "and from the frequent
reports of muskets heard in our neighbourhood, and
from the dead bodies which we saw, we judge that
large numbers of Bulgarians were massacred in the
houses." Such is the most authentic account — indeed, the
only account which seems at all authentic — of the
outrages committed by Bulgarians, which brought
down upon a large district of country the indiscrimi
nate vengeance of the Circassians and Bashi-Bazouks
who swarmed around the advancing forces of the
Porte. Nothing seems to have been done by the
Turkish generals or by the Turkish Government to

CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE. 49
restrain these wretches, and in many instances they
attacked and destroyed villages and massacred the
inhabitants, who were wholly outside the line of the
Russian march, and had taken no part directly or
indirectly in those displays of Bulgarian feeling which
invariably attended the arrival of Russian troops.
During a great part of the' month of August, one
of the richest and most beautiful countries in Europe
was the scene of cruelties and orgies as bad as, or
worse than, those which signalised the operations of
the Turkish Government ih May, 1 876. Early in Sep
tember, the district was visited by Consul-General
Fawcett, whose accounts are as dreadful as those of
Mr. Baring from Batak. " If the aspect of Carlova,"
he says, "was appalling, that of Sopot was really
awful. The same beautiful country, the same running
streams, trim gardens, but not a house standing, half
the place burnt, and every house and shop ransacked
from top to bottom, and everywhere a horribly
mingled smell of attar of roses and putrefying human
flesh."* These had been towns respectively of about
20,000 and 10,000 inhabitants.
Writing some days later on the 1 9th of September,
Mr. Fawcett declared that the "present war has
probably caused more human misery than even the
invasion of the Visigoths, who, fourteen centuries ago,
desolated these same fertile countries. From Sopot

* Turkey, I., 1878, No. 368, Inclos. p. 330.
VOL. II. E

50 THE WAR DOWN TO THE
to Yeni-Zaghra, a distance of 150 miles, the country,
as far as the towns go, is a desert, and, in my opinion,
it is a country almost unequalled in Europe for
fertility. It lies between the Great and Little Balkan,
and it is, in fact, one great garden." In this letter,
Mr. Fawcett supplies us with a very important cor
rection of a statement which he had made in a former
report, namely, that "the Bulgarians had fallen on
their Turkish neighbours and massacred them." He
now explains that, " from more minute inquiries he
had made on the spot, he was inclined to think that
an organised band of Bulgarians from the North of
the Balkans, carrying a sort of badge or uniform,
accompanied the Russian column, and that when the
Russians retired, it was this corps (calling themselves
'Vengeurs') who commenced the hellish work." It
will be observed that this agrees with the account of
the American missionaries, who ascribe the slaughter
of about 100 Turks at Eski-Zaghra to a body of men
which they call " Police." It has been said that this
corps was largely composed of men who had fled
from Bulgaria after the insurrection of 1876, and who
had lost their families in the massacres of May. If
such a corps, composed of such materials, was really
formed under the authority of the Russians, a heavy
responsibility indeed rests on those who organised
General Gourko's reckless expedition. Bad, however,
as the conduct of this Bulgarian corps was, the
account given of it by the American missionaries does

CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE. 51
not accuse them, but, on the contrary, expressly exo
nerates them from the charge of indiscriminate
slaughter, or of the massacre of women and children.
This, not in one city or town, but in many, was the
familiar work of the Circassians and Bashi-Bazouks,
who were armed and sent forth by the Turkish
Government. Besides which, it is to be recollected,
that the Russo-Bulgarian corps had a very short
time, and a very small area of country in which to
operate. Gourko's expedition was a flying one.
There was no rest for the sole of his foot. We have
seen that Eski-Zaghra was recaptured by Suleiman
Pasha a few days only after its occupation by the
Russians. The widespread and terrible devastation
described by Mr. Fawcett was therefore unquestionably
due to the Turks. It is remarkable, also, that it is
generally the higher official representatives of the
Porte who are everywhere represented as exhibiting
especial brutality. Local Turks were often humane.
There were two Turkish officers at Sopot, of whom in
particular Mr. Fawcett reports that they were a " credit
to their race" — doing everything they could to protect
the wretched women and children who still cowered
among the ruins. But of the Turkish Mudirs his
report is strongly condemnatory. At Carlova, where
8000 women and children were dying of hunger and
fear, Mr. Fawcett had to remonstrate most strongly
with the Mudir "on the infamy of allowing these
helpless creatures to be nightly visited and tortured,
E 2

52 THE WAR DOWN TO THE
or worse, by roving bands of Bashi-Bazouks."* In
like manner the Mudir of Sopot told Mr. Fawcett
that if the Bulgarian men who had fled should
return, he would send every one of them to Philoppo-
polis, "which," says Mr. Fawcett, "as far as I can
see, means to be hanged."f
And this brings us to transactions in which, at
least, there can be no doubt of the direct responsi
bility of the Government of the Sultan. It might have
been supposed that this Government would have
been satisfied with the sweeping and indiscriminate
vengeance which had been and was then still being in
flicted on a whole country and a whole population by
its armed bands. But this was not to be. A Military
Commission was sent to Philippopolis, armed with
summary powers of execution, and presided over by
two men, Ibraham and Rifaat Pashas, of both of
whom Mr. Layard had to report, on the 29th of Sep
tember, that " he heard a very bad account"! We
know what this means. It means that the most un
scrupulous avarice and the most callous indifference
to human life were enthroned on the Seat of Justice.
It is not too much to say that the revelry in massacre
of such savages as the Circassians, is less, guilty than
the deliberate murders of a Tribunal such as this.
The seizure and judicial murder of Bulgarians was
* Ibid., No. 400, p. 348.
t Ibid., No. 368, Inclos. 2, p. 331.
J Ibid., No. 43s, p. 391.

CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE. 53
not determined by any evidence of participation- in
revolt, but simply by the fact whether the prisoner
had property and wealth enough to pay the con-
fiscators well. In the midst of his terrible accounts
of the devastation of Bulgaria, Mr. Fawcett had to
add that at Adrianople and Philippopolis, batches
of thirty and forty had been hanged during the last
few days* "As to the men," he says, " I can only
think that the authorities have come to the conclu
sion that they will exterminate the Bulgarian race
in those parts. I am aware the Turks have had
great provocation, but such deeds as have been, and
are going on here, must, if known, bring down on the
perpetrators the execration of the world ; and looking
at them from a political point of view, it is suicidal if
the Turkish Government wish to have the sympathies
of Europe."
It was not till the 20th of October, after about
300 Bulgarians had been hanged under this mockery
of justice, that Mr. Layard succeeded in procuring the
recall of Ibraham Pasha, the military governor of
Philippopolis. f
But it was not the British Ambassador who really
prevailed. It will be observed that this date — the
20th of October — is just five days after the great
rout of the Turkish army, under Mouktar Pasha, at

* Ibid., No. 368, Inclos. 2, p. 331.
t Ibid., No. 502, p. 455.

54 THE WAR DOWN TO THE
the Aladji Dagh, near Kars. This is no mere coin
cidence. The supporters of Turkey in England have
always been connecting the danger of massacre and of
cruelty to Christians, with the disposition of the Turks
to revenge defeat. But it has ever been in the hour of
triumph that the Turks have shown the worst ferocity.
In defeat they show a prudent regard to consequences.
The truth is, that all the concessions of the Turkish
Government in the direction of justice and humanity
can, throughout the whole of these transactions, be
traced to fear, and to external pressure. Up to the
overthrow of their army in Asia Minor, the Turks
had been so successful, both in Europe and in Asia,
that they had the fullest confidence in their prospect
of finally resisting and defeating Russia. It is always
under such conditions that the real nature of their
Government comes out without alloy. Mr. Layard
had been interceding for the Bulgarians for weeks
and weeks. But his intercessions had no effect till a
terrible disaster to the Turkish arms shook the con
fidence of the Porte in its immunity from punishment.
Mr. Layard's success, like all the other successes of
British diplomacy in this deplorable history, seems to
have been entirely due to the action and to the arms
of Russia.
, When, therefore, we recollect that a large party in
England, embracing apparently all the supporters of
the Government, were for some two months rejoicing
in the prospects of Turkish success and of Russian

CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE. 55
defeat, we can judge of the results which would have
followed the attainment of their desires. The in
famies of the Philippopolis Commission, which was
in action during the sittings of the Conference of
Constantinople, are eclipsed by the doings of the
Military Commission which sat during the months
when Turkey thought she was triumphant, and when,
therefore, she was free to act according to her own
bent It must not be supposed that the suffer
ings inflicted by this great Turkish judge, Ibraham
Pasha, were measured by the number of persons
whom he condemned to death. Exile and con
fiscation, determined by the same corrupt motives,
and supported by narratives of notorious false
hood, were added in still larger proportion to the
capital executions. A fortnight after the great
Russian victory in Asia Minor, we have a glimpse
of the iniquities which had been going on, afforded
to us by Vice-Consul Calvert, writing from Philop-
popolis on the 1st of November, 1877. He says :
" The telegram recalling him reached Ibraham Pasha,
at Carlova, where he had been for some days pre
viously, in command of the troops in that district,
and where I now see by the English papers he has
sent to the Porte accounts of engagements with
insurgents which I can only describe as fictitious,
all traces of insurrection on this side of the Balkans
having disappeared more than two months ago."
Even at that date, when Ibraham had been removed,

56 THE WAR DOWN TO THE
and capital executions were stopped, — when a new
President of the Court-Martial had been appointed,
"who was reported to be a just man, and inclined to be
lenient," — even then, Mr. Calvert gives us this further
indication of the Turkish methods of proceeding : —
"The principal Bulgarian merchants of Hasskeui
and Tchirpan, to the number of about forty, who
are probably fully as innocent as these Bulgarians of
Tatar-Bazardjik, have just been brought here under
arrest. Like the Bazardjik merchants they have
never borne arms or had any dealings with the
Russians, though I could not, of course, undertake
to say that none of them entertain pro-Russian
feelings ; they have regularly paid all the extra
ordinary contributions which they were called upon
to furnish towards the war expenses, and though I
am not acquainted with any of them personally, I
think it may safely be said that they, being engaged
in commerce, were not the kind of persons likely to
countenance insurrectionary schemes. Yet they
have been torn from their homes and families without
a moment's warning, and I hear that it is contemplated
to send them all into confinement in Asia Minor."*
Such was the Government which, when the rout in
Asia had been followed on the ioth of December
by the capture of Plevna, addressed Europe in these
words : — " In the name then of humanity, we appeal
to the Great Powers, and to their feelings of justice."t

* Ibid., No. 576, Inclos. p. 526.
f Turkey, II., 1878, No. 1, p. 3.

CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE. 57
The audacity of this was great. But it was, if pos
sible, still greater audacity that in the framing of
this appeal, the determination of the Porte to persist
in refusing the one great demand of Europe, was
expressed as clearly as in all previous negotiations.
What Turkey called upon the Powers to do was —
not to consider some concession of guarantees such
as had been asked — but once more to accept Midhat
Pasha's Constitution as all that could be desired. It
was again declared that special guarantees granted to
special Provinces could not be admitted, for they
would simply be "a premium offered to rebellion."
It was gravely added that if any doubt remained in
any minds, however sceptical, as to the validity of
Turkish reforms, " this doubt ought to disappear in
view of the formal and solemn declaration which we
make of the sincerity of our resolutions."
The reply of the English Cabinet to this wonder
ful appeal was as benevolent to the Turks as usual.
Mr. Layard conveyed to the Porte the assurance of
the British Government that, " whenever negotiations
for peace were set on foot, they would do what lay
in their power to obtain favourable conditions for
Turkey." The Turkish Government thanked the
Foreign Secretary, on the 14th of December, for
this message.
It was on this occasion that a remarkable
episode occurred. The Turkish Ambassador in
London intimated the impression of his Govern-

5 8 THE WAR DOWN TO THE
ment, that the Cabinet of the Queen knew what the
probable demands v of Russia would be in regard to
Bulgaria, and were acquainted generally with the con
ditions on which Russia would agree to the re-establish
ment of peace. This was repudiated by the Foreign
Secretary in the following words : — "I explained to
Musurus Pasha, in reply, that his Government were
mistaken in supposing that I knew what were the
¦conditions' of peace likely to be insisted on by Russia."
Now, considering the communications which had taken
place in July through Colonel Wellesley — the formal
Memoranda which had been exchanged between the
Emperor and the English Government — this was a
statement which it is difficult to explain. The only
possible solution of the difficulty would seem to be that
the Cabinet could not feel sure that the terms which
Russia had explained in July were terms which would
still be open to Turkey in December. Even this
explanation fails, however, when we recollect that
although the Emperor had said distinctly that
farther terms would be demanded in certain events,
His Majesty had clearly indicated the passage of the
Balkans as the military contingency which would
operate to enlarge the terms he might demand. But
the passage of the Balkans had not been effected on
the 14th of December, when this conversation was
held. And then what are we to say of the farther
declaration made to the Turkish Ambassador on the
same occasion : " I had no information on the

CONCL USION OF THE ARMISTICE. 59
subject ?"* Surely this was a great stretch of diplo
matic licence.
Very different, as usual, in tone was the reply of
Germany to the new appeal from Turkey — an appeal
which only afforded fresh evidence of her obstinacy
and impenitence. It was dignified and decisive : —
" The German Emperor declines to accede to the
Sultan's request for mediation."t
On the 2 1st of December, Musurus Pasha renewed
a declaration of the unyielding attitude of the Porte.
That Government would allow no interference of
the Powers in its independent administration. J It
knew that this would be no matter of offence to the
Queen's Government, and so it again appealed to the
good offices of England. The Foreign Secretary
said, with very proper caution, that it would be con
venient to know the general conditions of peace which
the Porte would be prepared to accept. It was,
indeed, high time to know how far Turkey had come
to a consciousness of her position since the fall of
Plevna. No reply, however, seems to have been given
to this inquiry; but on the 25th of December, the
Porte intimated that it would gladly know through
England what terms would be offered by the Emperor
of Russia. Turkey again declared. that it trusted to the
friendly mediation of the Queen's Government, which

*

Ibid., No. 2, p. 3. f Ibid., No. 3, p. 3.
% Ibid., No. 4, p. 4.

60 THE WAR DOWN TO THE
the Porte was convinced " would not be refused by our
ancient and constant friend."* Accordingly, on the
27th, Lord Augustus Loftus was desired to make
the inquiry of the Russian Government. Prince
Gortchakow replied on the 28th, in a courteous and
friendly spirit, that the Porte must now address itself
to the Imperial Commanders-in-Chief in Europe and
in Asia, who would state the conditions on which an
armistice would be granted.f
On the 4th January, 1878, the Queen's Govern
ment remonstrated with Russia against this reply,
and argued that as an armistice must include
operations both in Asia and in Europe, and must
farther involve the operations of both Servia
and Montenegro, it was clearly indispensable that
the conditions of it should be discussed between
the two belligerent Governments, and not merely
between Generals commanding a portion of the
contending forces. J This argument was, as usual,
confidentially communicated to the Porte. By this
time, however, the Government of the Sultan was
beginning to have its eyes opened to its real position.
Sofia had been taken. The Balkans had both
been turned and traversed. The Russian army
was pouring down . their southern slopes upon the
Roumelian plains. On the 5 th of January, the

* Ibid., No. 9, Inclos. p. 6. f Ibid., No 15, p. 8,
% Ibid., No. 16, p. 9.

CONCL USION OF THE ARMISTICE. 61
Ottoman Government telegraphed that it " accepted
in principle the armistice proposed by Russia," and
begged the Queen's Government to ask the Govern
ment of Russia to stop the progress of its armies.
On the 7th of January, the Foreign Secretary was
obliged to explain to the Turkish Ambassador that
England had not accepted the position of a mediator,
and that she could take no step which it was evident
would be useless. She had declared her neutrality,
except under conditions afiecting her own interests.
These interests, moreover, had been specified and
defined ; and unless they were affected she could not
interfere. It was necessary to repeat this, that no
false hopes might be raised* On the 8th of January,
the Cabinet desired Lord Augustus Loftus to intimate
to the Russian Government that England would
advise the Porte to send delegates to the Russian
Head-quarters to negotiate an armistice with the
Russian Commanders. But Russia was now wisely
determined to push her military advantage. She
knew the skill of the Turks in the arts of delay.
She knew that the British Government had already
promised to help the Turks in reducing to a minimum
the results of negotiation. The whole fruits of a cam
paign very dearly won might be lost by procrastina
tion. On the iothof January, therefore, the Grand Duke
Nicholas replied to the Turkish Foreign Minister that

• Ibid., No. 21, p. io-n.

62 THE WAR DO WN TO THE
" there cannot be any question of an armistice at this
moment without bases of peace." The English
Cabinet, when informed of this reply, telegraphed to
Lord Augustus Loftus that they could not reconcile
it with the declaration of Prince Gortchakow that
the Russian Military Commanders were instructed to
state the conditions upon which an armistice would
be agreed to. The alleged inconsistency is not
apparent. It was quite within the terms of this
declaration to require the signature of a basis of
peace as one condition of granting an armistice:
Prince Gortchakow knew well that the British
Government would befriend Turkey to the utmost,
and would put every iron in the fire to procure for
her the best possible terms. He was not bound under
these circumstances to show his hand. He explained,
accordingly, that the instructions as to the terms of
peace which had been sent to the Imperial Com
manders were too important to be confided to the
telegraph. They might reach their respective des
tinations in about fifteen days from the 4th of
January Under these circumstances the Foreign Secretary,
on the 1 2th of January, advised the Porte to inquire
of Russia what would be the nature of the conditions
demanded as the basis of peace* On the 13th of
January, the Grand Duke Nicholas telegraphed to

Ibid., No. 37, p. 15.

CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE. 63
the Porte that he would communicate the basis of
peace " to a person sent to him with full powers to
accept them, and to conclude thereupon the principles
of an armistice, which will afterwards be carried out."
On the same day a prolonged Council of Ministers
was held at the Porte, the result of which was a
decision to send Servet Pasha, the Foreign Minister,
with a colleague, to Kyzanlik on the next day, to
meet the Grand Duke, " for the purpose of accept
ing bases of peace and concluding an armistice."
It will be observed, from this rapid narrative of
events, that the disposition of the Porte to accept
terms of peace underwent a rapid development
during the four weeks which elapsed between the
14th of December, 1877, and the 14th of January,
1878. As usual, this favourable change was due
entirely, not to English diplomacy, or to English
effort of any kind, but exclusively to the arms of
Russia. The moment Plevna had fallen, the Rus
sian army resumed its march to the south. Its
passage of the Balkans in the middle of winter was
unquestionably one of the most brilliant operations
of modern war. By rapid movements, effected
simultaneously on several lines of attack, in mid
winter and in severe weather, the great mountain
barrier of Bulgaria was traversed with complete
success ; the very flower of the army which was
yet left to Turkey was captured at the southern
entrance of the Shipka Pass ; and the broken

64 THE WAR DOWN TO THE
remnants of Suleiman Pasha's army were chased
and driven to the ^Egean coast. The Russian
army advanced upon Adrianople and took it without
a struggle. These were the events which had at last con
vinced the Porte that it was no longer safe to defy
Europe, to slaughter its subjects by Bashi-Bazouks,
and to hang them by military Commissions. But
the Turkish Government was not the only one
which was deeply agitated by the success of the
Russian arms. The Cabinet of the Queen began to
be seriously uneasy from the moment that Plevna
fell. Three days after that event, on the 13 th of
December, 1877, the Foreign Secretary communi
cated to the Russian Ambassador a new Memoran
dum explanatory of its views. A misgiving had arisen
that the previous definition of " British interests,"
given on the 6th of May, was perhaps just a little
defective, In this new Memorandum the despatch
of that date was referred to as a definition only of
those British interests which might be affected
" most directly." The contingency of Constantinople
" passing into other hands" was recalled. Prince
Gortchakow's assurance that Russia did not aim at
the " acquisition" of the Turkish Capital, and that the
fate of that City must be matter of common interest
and of general agreement — this also was recalled,
with due appreciation of the " courtesy and friendly
character" of such assurances. But it was now

CONCLUSION -OF THE ARMISTICE. «S
<urged that "the occupation of Constantinople by
the Russian forces, even though only of a tem
porary character, and for military purposes only,
would be an event which it would, on all accounts,
be most desirable to avoid," Were such an occu
pation to appear imminent, it was represented that
public feeling in England, " founded on a just appre
ciation of the consequences to be apprehended,
might call for measures of precaution on the part of
Great Britain from which Her Majesty's Government
have hitherto felt justified in abstaining." The Foreign
Secretary was therefore charged by the Cabinet to
express its earnest hope that, should the Russians ad
vance to the south of the Balkans, no attempt would
be made to occupy Constantinople or the Dardanelles.
" In the contrary event, the Queen's Government must
hold themselves free to take whatever course might
appear to them necessary for the protection of
British interests." All this was conveyed under the
grave intimation that it was "with the view of
avoiding what might seriously endanger the good
relations happily maintained between the two
countries."* It will be observed that this intimation was a
complete departure from the tacit understanding which
had been previously established. For five months —
ever since the communications in July through

* Turkey, III,, 1878, No. 1.
VOL. IL F

66 THE WAR DOWN TO THE
Colonel Wellesley — the British Government had
remained silent under the emphatic and repeated
declarations of the Emperor that he could not and
would not absolutely bind himself to abstain from
occupying the Turkish Capital. What he would pro
mise, and what he did promise, was that he would
not occupy Constantinople for the sake of mere
military honour, but only if compelled to do so by
the march of events. To this intimation no re
joinder had been made by the Cabinet of London.
They did not any farther press for an assur
ance which the Emperor had thus pointed out
he could not safely give. They had watched the
struggle in silence when it appeared to be going
against the Russians. But now, when the fortune
Of war had declared itself against the Turks, the
British Government came forward to . impose on
Russia an absolute limit on her belligerent opera
tions which might involve her in serious military
and not less serious political complications, and
which was in violation of the previous under
standing. It was not likely that Russia would submit to
such a threat, conveyed under such conditions.
Accordingly Prince Gortchakow replied in a Memo
randum, dated December 16th, in which, indeed, the
former assurances were repeated respecting fhe
"acquisition" of Constantinople, but in which also
any farther engagement was repelled with firmness.

CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE. 67
It was all the more imperatively necessary that
Russia should keep her military freedom as, at that
very moment, even in professing to seek for peace,
the Porte, as we have seen, was declaring anew its
determination to resist the one essential demand
of Europe. " His Majesty the Emperor," said the
Russian reply, "considers that it is his right aiid
his duty to oblige Turkey to conclude a solid and
real peace which shall offer effectual guarantees
against the return of the incessant crises which
disturb the peace of Russia and that of Europe.
These crises can only cease with the state of things
which gives rise to them. The whole of Europe has
recognised the impossibility of allowing them to
continue. It is with the view of finally putting a stop
to them that His Majesty the Emperor has taken up
arms and exposed his people to heavy sacrifices.
These sacrifices, borne with devotion, render it all the
more the duty of His Majesty not to stop before
having achieved a result which shall preserve Russia
from the renewal of similar trials, which shall satisfy
her Christian feelings, guarantee her repose, and at the
same time consolidate the peace of Europe. This
end must be attained. If the obstinacy or the illusions
of the Porte shall oblige His Majesty to pursue his
military operations in order to dictate a peace re
sponding to the openly proclaimed object of the war,
His Imperial Majesty has always reserved to himself,
and still continues to claim in regard to this point, the
F 2

68 THE WAR DOWN TO THE
full right of action, which is the claim of every
belligerent." Finally, the British Government was
courteously asked "to have the goodness to define more
clearly what are the British interests which they con
sider might be touched by the eventualities of the
war within the limits to which the assurances of the
Imperial Cabinet have restricted them, with a view
to seeking in common the means of reconciling these
interests with those of Russia, which it is the duty
of His Majesty to protect."*
It is remarkable that no reply was returned to this
inquiry of the Russian Government, and no rejoinder
to their Memorandum for nearly \a whole month.
That paper was dated December 16, 1877 ; and the
next communication from the British Cabinet was
dated the 1 2th of January, 1 878.f It is true, indeed,
that the. text of the Russian Memorandum does not
seem to have been placed in the hands of the Foreign
Secretary till the 2nd of January But the substance
of it must have been communicated by telegraph,
and must have been known at once. The truth is,
as subsequently appeared, that at this time the
Queen's Government, from internal dissensions, did
not know its own mind from day to day. About the
21st of December it was intimated that Parliament
would be assembled. Even this, however, was not
to be done at once, but only about three weeks

* Ibid., No. 2, p. 3-4. f Ibid., No. 3, p. 4.

CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE. 69
earlier than the usual time. This was a measure
which could be assented to by opposite opinions,
because it gave time to feel the pulse of the country.
The beat of that pulse was not responsive to the
party which desired, but did not yet dare, to interfere
in support of the Turkish Government. During the
next three weeks, Chambers of Commerce, Town
Councils, and public meetings in more than one
hundred and fifty different places, gave expression to
the general feeling against such a policy*
In the meantime the inquiry of the Russian Govern
ment remained unanswered. At last, however, on
the 1 2th of January, the Cabinet of the Queen
replied to Prince Gortchakow's request that it
would define more clearly the British interests sup
posed to be endangered, by desiring Lord Augustus
Loftus "to state to Prince Gortchakow that Her
Majesty's Government are of opinion that any opera
tions tending to place the passage of the Dardanelles
under the control of Russia would be an impediment
to the proper consideration of the terms of the final
settlement between Russia and Turkey. You will
ask His Highness whether he is willing to give an
assurance to Her Majesty's Government that no
Russian force shall be sent to the Peninsula of
Gallipoli." It will be observed that this reply did not press

* Sequence of Events in the Eastern Question, p. 28.

70 THE WAR DOWN TO THE
the former representations of the Cabinet against the
possible military occupation of Constantinople. It
made no rejoinder to the arguments by which the
Emperor had defended his refusal to bind himself
farther on that subject. Yet it was expressly framed
in answer to the Memorandum in which those argu
ments were set forth. It specified a military opera
tion wholly distinct from the occupation of the
Capital as the one to which England must still
object. It was a tacit acquiescence therefore in the
refusal of Russia to give any binding engagement
against the possible occupation of Constantinople.
On the day following this telegraphic reply of the
English Government, Lord Augustus Loftus had an
interview with Prince Gortchakow, in which he made
the new, but more restricted, demand in respect to
the occupation of Gallipoli.
The Prince replied formally, but verbally, on the
1 5 th, in these words: — "The Russian Government
have no intention of directing their military opera
tions on Gallipoli, unless the Turkish regular troops
should concentrate there. They farther hope that,
in putting the question, Her Majesty's Government
do not contemplate an occupation of Gallipoli, which
would be a departure from neutrality, and would
encourage the Porte to resistance."*
At the same time, when these communications were

* Tufkey, III., 1878, No. 8, p. 6.

CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE. 71
going on, the British Government became alarmed by
sensational reports from their Ambassador at Constan
tinople as to the terms of peace which Russia was likely
to demand ; and in view of these reports they desired
Lord Augustus Loftus to intimate to Prince Gort
chakow " that in the opinion of Her Majesty's Govern
ment any Treaty concluded between the Government
of Russia and the Porte affecting the Treaties of
1856 and 1 87 1 must be an European Treaty, and
would not be valid without the assent of the Powers
who were parties to those Treaties."* On the same
day, January 14th, this opinion was conveyed to the
Porte through Mr. Layard.f
It was not till the 21st of January that the
Foreign Secretary replied to the request of Russia
that England would give an assurance corresponding
to her own against the occupation of Gallipoli. But
on that day this assurance was given through Lord
Augustus Loftus : — :" You are authorised to inform
Prince Gortchakow that Her Majesty's Government
do not, under present circumstances, contemplate any
occupation of the position in question." J
On the same day, January 21st, the Russian
Ambassador in London informed the Foreign Secre
tary that as false reports prevailed on the subject, he
thought it right to inform the British Government

* Ibid., No. 6, p. 5. f Ibid., No. 7, p. 5.
X Ibid., No. 21, p. 11.

72 THE WAR DOWN TO THE
that in the bases of peace sent from St. Petersburgh
to the Grand Duke Nicholas, " no mention was made
of either the Bosphorus or Dardanelles."*
On the 23 rd January, Mr. Layard forwarded a
telegram from the Vice-Consul at GaJlipoli, dated
the 22 nd, stating the Russians had advanced to
Demotica, and that fears were entertained that by
the occupation of Keshan, Gallipoli would be cut
off from direct communication with the Capital.
Although another telegram was received on the same
day, showing that there was exaggeration in this
report ; and although, if It had been all perfectly
true, it would have involved no breach on the part
of Russia of the understanding come ta in respect
to the occupation of Gallipoli, the Cabinet seems to
have taken the utmost alarm, and the dignity of the
British Government was sustained by transactions of
which the official record is as follows l —

" Most secret.

Admiralty, 23rd. January, 18.78, 7 p.m.,,
to
Admiral. Hornby, Youxlah.

" Sail at once for the Dardanelles, and proceed with
the fleet now with you to Constantinople. Abstain
from taking any part in the contest between Russia
and Turkey, but the waterway of the Straits is to
fee. kept open, and in the event of tumult at Cbn-

* Ibid., No. 22,p, iu

CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE. 73
stantinople you are to protect life and property of
British subjects.
" Use your judgment in detaching such vessels as
you may think necessary to preserve the water
way of the Dardanelles, but do not go above
Constantinople. " Report your departure, and communicate with
Besika Bay for possible further orders, but do not
wait if none are there.
"Keep your destination absolutely secret —
Acknowledge." "¦Admiral Hornby, Vourlah, 24th January, 1878,6.10 P.M.,
to
Admiralty (received 5.12 A.M., 25th January, 1878.)
"Orders received. Sail at 5 PJVL to-day for the
Dardanelles and Constantinople. Orders left for
Alexandra and colliers to follow."

Then, twenty-four hours later we have the follow
ing:— "Admiralty, 24th January, 1878, 7.2.5 P.M.,
to ( Vourlah.
Admiral Hornby { Koumkaleh.
( Chanak.
"Annul former orders, anchor at Besika Bay and
await further orders. Report arrival there."
The result is recorded thus : —
"Admiral Hornby, Dardanelles, 25th January, 5.45 p.m.,
to
Admiralty (received 25th January, 11.5, p.m.).
"Received your telegraphic communication to
anchor Besika Bay when abreast Dardanelles Forts.

74 THE WAR DO WN TO THE
Firman received there for passage of Straits. I
returned to Besika Bay immediately, as ordered."

It is remarkable that the order which sent back
the fleet to its former anchorage, when it was already
" abreast of the Dardanelles Forts," was immediately
followed by the receipt of information from Mr.
Layard which, if it had been correct, would have
been really alarming. For that diplomatist on the
24th of January- announced that, "he had just
heard" the Russian conditions of peace, and the fifth
of these was reported thus : " The question of the
Bosphorus and Dardanelles to be settled between
the Congress and the Emperor of Russia." In this
first form the news was reassuring, and made it more
easy for the Cabinet to send back the fleet. But on
the very next day, the 25 th, it was discovered that
in the telegram as first deciphered the word " Con
gress" had been substituted for " Sultan." There
fore, the British Ambassador's message remained to
the effect that Russia demanded the great question of
the settlement of the Straits to be regulated by a
Treaty between herself and the Sultan alone. Never
theless the return of the fleets to. Besika Bay was
suffered to remain. When, three days later, on the
28th of January, the Government had to explain to
Parliament the dangers of the situation, they were
obliged to confess that at that very moment they
believed the Russian basis to include a separate

CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE. 75
agreement between Russia and the Porte on the sub
ject of the Straits. Yet even under this belief they
did not repent of having sent back the fleet. There
could be no clearer indication of distracted councils.
It was not until the 25 th, that the Queen's
Government had any fresh and authentic informa
tion as to what the Russian bases really were. On
that day they were communicated to the Foreign
Secretary by Count Schouvalow. They were as fol
lows : —
"Bulgaria, within the limits of the Bulgarian
nationality, not less than that of the Conference, to
be an autonomous tributary Principality, with a
national Christian Government, a. native militia, and
no Turkish troops, except at some points to be
determined. " Independence of Montenegro, with increase (of
territory) equivalent to the military status quo ; the
frontier to be decided hereafter.
"Independence of Roumania, with sufficient terri
torial indemnity.
"Independence of Servia, with rectification of
frontiers. "Autonomous administration, sufficiently guaran
teed, to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
" Similar reforms for the other Christian provinces
of Turkey in Europe.
"Indemnity to Russia for the expenses of the
war ; in a pecuniary, territorial, or other form, to be
decided hereafter.

76 THE WAR DOWN TO THE
" Ulterior understanding for safeguarding the rights
and interests of Russia in the Straits.
" These bases being accepted, a Convention, an
Armistice, and the despatch of Plenipotentiaries to
develop them into Preliminaries of Peace."
On the same day Count Schouvalow, in the name of
Prince/ Gortchakow, repeated the assurance that " we
do not intend to settle by ourselves European ques
tions having reference to the peace which is to be
made."* On the 26th Mr. Layard telegraphed another
version of the Russian terms of peace, with his own
comment at the close : " It is scarcely necessary to
say that this amounts to destruction of Turkish
Empire in Europe."t
In the meantime, on the 17th of January, 1878,
Parliament had met. The Ministers opened the
Session by a Speech from the Throne, in which as
usual the war was treated solely as a contest between
Russia and Turkey. Not one word of anxiety or of
interest was spoken in the cause of good government
and of freedom in the East of Europe. Again.
therefore, and this time from the most exalted place
in the civilised world, Russia was exhibited as the
only Power which even professed to care for that
cause. It was a cause which assembled Europe
had recently declared to be one affecting both its

* Ibid., No. 39, p. 15. f ibid., No. 4o,.p. 15.

CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE. 77
interests and its honour. But England Tiad nothing
to say about it. Exclusive stress was laid upon the
risks which the war was supposed to involve as
regarded British interests. " I cannot conceal from
myself," the Sovereign was advised to say, "that
should hostilities be unfortunately prolonged, some
unexpected occurrence may render it incumbent on
me to adopt measures of precaution. Such measures
could not be effectually taken without adequate
preparation, and I trust to the liberality of my
Parliament to supply the means which may be
required for that purpose."* In this Speech, how
ever, it was expressly admitted that so far as the war
had then proceeded neither of the belligerents had
infringed the conditions on which the Queen's neu
trality was founded.
Upon the determination of the Cabinet, on the
23rd of January, to order the fleets to proceed to
Constantinople, both the Foreign Secretary and the
Colonial Secretary had tendered their resignation. But
the Colonial Secretary alone persisted in this resolu
tion. The Foreign Secretary consented to remain
when the fleets were countermanded on the following
day. The countermanding of the fleet, however,
was expressly rested by the Prime Minister, in his
speech in the House of Lords on the 25 th of January,
not on any desire to conciliate and retain his

* Hansard, vol. 237, p, 5,

78 THE WAR DOWN TO THE
colleague, but on the very important conclusion which
had been arrived at by the Government — that the
Russian conditions of peace which had then been com
municated by Count Schouvalow "furnished a basis.
for an armistice."* But, strange to say, notwithstand
ing this formal and public admission that the Russian
demands constituted a reasonable basis of peace, the
Cabinet on the same day communicated to Parlia
ment its resolution to ask for a vote of six millions
sterling for warlike preparations.
On the 28th of January, 1878, a vote of credit for
six millions was moved in the House of Commons by
the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The speech of
the Minister on this occasion marks an important
change in the altitude and language of the English
Government. Hitherto, as we have seen, since the
beginning of the war, it had been declaring that
nothing but danger to British interests as these had
been defined in the despatch of the 6th of May, 1877,
would induce England to interfere in the contest
which had arisen. It could not be alleged that any
one of these interests had been as yet endangered.
The Queen's speech, eleven days before this date,
had expressly said so. A suspicious ambiguity
indeed rested on one of the Russian terms of peace,
which might be interpreted to contemplate some
separate dealing with the question of the Straits

* Ibid., p. 436.

CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE. 79
between Russia and Turkey alone. But the
Government did not even pretend to feel much
alarm on this point. So little, indeed, did they
seem to regard it that, as we have seen, they
had not repented of their countermand of the
fleet. The Cabinet, probably, were of opinion
that there was no real danger of any modification
being effected in the Treaty of 1856 on the question
of the Straits, without the general consent of the
Powers. The Russian Ambassador had informed
them on the 21st of January that no such demand
formed any part of the bases of peace sent from St.
Petersburgh to the Grand Duke. Nicholas* The
mere intimation on the part of England that she
would not acknowledge any such modification would
be enough to render any such arrangement nugatory.
It- was not, at all events, and for whatever reasons,
considered worth while to resume that forward
movement of the fleets which had already very nearly
cost them the resignation of an important colleague.
All this, however, showed the vacillation of the
Government, and added to that feeling of helpless
irritation which is the best of all preparations in the
public mind for foolish and hasty action. Moreover,
it compelled the Ministry to hoist some other signal
of alarm. Since it could not be alleged that
Russia had attacked, or was likely to attack, any

* Turkey, III., 1878, No. 23, p. 11.

So THE WAR DOWN TO THE
one of the British interests of which she had been
warned — since it was not even thought worth while to
move up the fleets to defend the waterway of the
Straits — it was necessary for the Government to take
up some new ground on which to rest a vote for
warlike preparations. Accordingly it was now dis
covered, apparently for the first time, that the British
interests which had been defined in May were by
no means the only interests which might induce the
Queen's Government to interfere. Suddenly the
Cabinet had opened its eyes to the fact that the
Russian terms of peace, although, not touching
any one of those interests, would be very, dama
ging to the interests of Turkey. The whole
sentiment and feeling of the Government had all
along been in favour of the good old doctrine that
the interests of Turkey were the interests of England.
They had been obliged to suppress this sentiment,
and even to declare the opposite, by the revolt of
public feeling in the autumn of 1876. But a re
action had now begun. The triumphant success of
the Czar had evoked, as it was quite sure to do, that
fear and dislike of Russia which is a predominant
feeling among large sections of the British people.
The Cabinet, or a portion of it, had been watching
for this awakening as men watch for the morning.
Advantage might be taken of it. That desire
to uphold the Turks, which hitherto had been
whispered only to the ear in closets, or worked

CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE. 81
only through unacknowledged and unofficial agen
cies, might now be proclaimed on the house-tops.
Accordingly, the Chancellor of the Exchequer dis
sected the Russian terms of peace, and pointed out
all the dangers they involved. In particular he
attacked the formation of a Bulgarian Province. He
referred to the fact that it crossed the Balkans and
would extend probably to the iEgean. Now there was
one good objection to such a Bulgaria, namely, that it
might deal unjustly with the interests of the Greek
race — one important section of the Christian popu
lations whose redemption was drawing nigh. But
this was not the objection felt by the English
Minister, and pointed out by him to the House of
Commons. It was the effect of the new Bulgaria, not
on any section of the subject populations, but on
Turkey, that he dwelt exclusively. It amounted,
he said, to a dismemberment of Turkey. So again
of the war indemnity. In regard to this, also, he
pointed, out how it might be worked to the detriment
of the Ottoman Empire. Against all these results it
might be necessary for England to contend in the
coming Congress— and it was useless to contend in
Congress, unless she was also prepared to contend
in arms. The Government, therefore, desired to
enter into Congress "armed with the strength of an
united nation" — having for its great end and aim to
support Turkey, and to save her from dismember
ment. VOL. II. G

82 THE WAR DOWN TO THE
If it had been the desire of the British Minister to
second the most selfish designs imputed to Russia, he
could not have made for that purpose a more effective
speech. It seemed to identify her action and her
policy with the interests and the feelings of the whole
subject races in the East of Europe. It tended
to identify the action of England with everything
which they detested. Those races might be jealous
of each other ; but they were at least united in the
desire to get rid of the Government of Turkey. The
speech of the British Minister represented England
as desirous, above all things, of preventing this great
deliverance. Russia therefore was held up to them
once more as the only Power which had the will and
the strength to secure it. Such an exhibition of the
relative position of the two countries was worth a
great deal more to Russia than an additional army
of 100,000 men.
Then let us look at this speech from another point
of view, quite as important and quite as serious.
Let us look at it in its relation not only to good
policy, but to honour and good faith. Was it a new
thing to the English Cabinet that Russia would
demand the establishment of a Bulgarian Province
stretching across the Balkans, and extending far down
into the district of Salonica ? No, the Queen's Govern
ment had known this since the 14th of June, 1877.*

* Turkey, XV., 1878, No. 6, p. 6.

CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE. 83
England's own Plenipotentiaries at the Conference at
Constantinople had demanded the establishment of a
Bulgaria which included both sides of the Balkans.
Russia had told them that this would be her demand
before she crossed the Danube. The English Cabinet
knew very well that this demand was not likely to
be departed from after Turkey had been defeated
in a bloody contest to prevent it For seven long
months not one word of remonstrance or even of
objection had been intimated to Russia in reply.
More than this — the confidential communication
made by Count Schouvalow to the Foreign Secretary
on the 8th of June, 1877, and the personal but formal
communications from the Emperor of Russia, which
passed through Colonel Wellesley in the end of July,
1877, had not only made this intimation, but had
even explained in some detail the very terms which
were' now being demanded from Turkey in January,
1878. These had been for many months in the
possession of the Government. Yet at this critical
moment they were concealed from Parliament. The
daily telegrams from Mr. Layard repeating the excited
reports of a panic-stricken city were served up, hot
and hot, to the two Houses of Parliament to fan the
excitement and intensify the passions of the hour.
But the evidence which would have shown the long
silence of the Government when it was in full posses
sion of Russia's intentions — all this was carefully kept
back, till at last, when it was produced, it failed, in
G 2

84 THE WAR DOWN TO THE
the prevailing excitement, to attract attention.* If
it had been produced at the opening of the Session
it would have served to allay irritation and to prevent
alarm. It would have shown that Russia was adhering
strictly to intentions long announced and long tacitly
acquiesced in. When the Chancellor of the Ex
chequer expatiated on the dangers involved in fhe
indemnity, and pointed to the possibility of part of
it, or the whole of it, being taken in the shape of
territorial cession, no member of the House of
Commons could have supposed that the Minister
had for months been in possession of a document
explaining that Russia would probably limit her
demand for territorial cession to the restoration of
her old Bessarabian frontier, and to the cession " of
a certain portion of Asia Minor," including the district
of Batoum. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, in
his speech of the 28th of January, went the length
of saying, " On this subject (territorial cession) I
have no information to guide me." The Ministry
had a right to disbelieve the Emperor if they saw
cause to do so. Or they might expect him to be
more exacting now that he had achieved such
victories. But they had no right to conceal from

* The Paper containing the Memorandum of Colonel
Wellesley is No. 9 of the Session : whilst that containing the
communications of June, 1878, through Count Schouvalow, is
No. 15. Thus Papers much less important were allowed a long
precedence.

CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE. 85
Parliament at such a moment the assurances which
had actually been given, and which, as it turned out,
were fairly adhered to by the Russian Government.
The "portion of Asia Minor" had never been
defined, except by the explanation that it would
include Batoum. But this was the very cession of
which there was the greatest jealousy in England.
Parliament did not then know, and Parliament was
not told, that the intentions of Russia in respect to
this port on the Euxine had been frankly intimated
long ago, and that this intimation had been received
by the Queen's Government with silent acquiescence.
Lastly, let us look for a moment at the time
when this vote for six millions was asked as a
warlike demonstration. If it had been intended to
resist the establishment of autonomous provinces in
Turkey as equivalent to her dismemberment, the
necessity of taking military precautions against such
a result might have been taken with advantage just
a little earlier. Before the Russians crossed the
Danube — or after they had crossed it, when they
were held at bay for months before the earthworks
of Plevna — when Mouktar Pasha seemed to be tri
umphant in Asia — such a. policy might have had
some chance of at least a temporary success. It is
possible even that at a much later period it might
have been attended with some result. If, when
Pleyna fell, active measures had been taken to save
the Turks, their fate might have been at least post-

86 THE WAR DOWN TO THE
poned. There is no saying what they might not
have done under the guidance of English officers in
opposing the passage of the Balkans. But it Was
twelve days after the fall of Plevna before it was
determined even to call Parliament together. Then
when Parliament was summoned it was not
called at once, but for a date three weeks later.
Then, when it actually met, the Government had
nothing to propose. Ten days before that time they
heard that Sofia had fallen, and that Adrianople
was to be abandoned. The truth is that the
rapidity of the Russian advance, as the Chancellor of
the Exchequer candidly confessed, " had been enough
to take their breath away." It took away more than
their breath ; it took away their common sense. The
result was that this new policy of preventing the
dismemberment of Turkey was announced at a mo
ment when Turkey was prostrate at the feet of her
foe, and when an army of 200,000 men were at the
gates — the undefended gates — of Constantinople.
The inadequacy, too, of the proposed preparations,
even when they were made, ought not to escape
remark. If Turkey was to be saved from being cut
up into autonomous or tributary provinces, and if
Russia was to be prevented from taking back her
Bessarabian frontier, or acquiring a new frontier in
Asia Minor, which was to include Kars and Batoum,
a vote of six millions represented a puny effort
indeed for the attainment of such results.

CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE. 87
Let us now return to the progress of events. The
Turkish Plenipotentiaries, for the conclusion of an
armistice, and for the acceptance of the bases of
peace, left Constantinople on the 14th January. But
they did not reach the Russian headquarters till the
2 1st More than another week elapsed, and
on the 29th of January Mr. Layard telegraphed to
his Government, that although the Porte had, on the
23rd, sent full powers and instant orders to accept
the bases of peace as submitted to them by the
Grand Duke, nothing had as yet been heard from
them.* The drift of this telegram, of course, was to
throw the blame of intentional delay upon the
Russians. It appears, however, from a previous tele
gram of the 27th, that at first, at all events, the Turkish
Plenipotentiaries had played the usual game of the
diplomatists of the Porte — the game of delay. Like
the Government of England, they objected to the first
article of the Russian bases relating to Bulgaria, and to
the second part of the fourth article respecting reforms
in the Turkish provinces.f It was only under the last
and latest instructions of the Porte, issued on the 23 rd,
that the Plenipotentiaries were authorised to accept
the whole. Still nothing had been heard of the
result. . In the meantime the Russians were advanc
ing on Constantinople, as Mr. Layard reported on
the 28th: "in two, or, perhaps, three columns in

Turkey, IV., 1878. t Turkey, V., No. 4, p. 1.

88 THE WAR DOWN TO THE
great force."* The English Cabinet became more
and more uneasy in sympathy with the Porte. On
the 29th the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg
was desired to inquire the cause of the delay. But
Prince Gortchakow could not explain. This was on
the 30th of January.f Under these circumstances
the anxieties of Her Majesty's Government relieved
themselves by a renewed intimation to Russia that
England could not recognise any treaty concluded
between Russia and Turkey alone, in so far as it
might modify European treaties, or affect general
interests. J To this declaration Prince Gortchakow
at once replied that to effect an armistice certain
bases of peace were necessary, but they were only to
be considered as preliminaries and not definitive as
regarded Europe. " His Highness stated categori
cally, that questions bearing on European interests
will be concerted with European Powers, and he had
given Her Majesty's Government clear and positive
assurances to this effect."§
On the day following, the 31st of January, the
Russian Government further intimated that it had
abandoned that Article in the Bases of Peace which
referred to " an understanding between Russia and
Turkey in regard to the Straits," and had no objec
tion to suppress it altogether.!

* Ibid., No. 7, p. 2. t Ibid., No. 12. + Ibid., No. n.
§ Ibid., No. 14, p. 4. || Ibid., No. 15.

CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE. 89
It was constantly represented at this time that the
continued advance of the Russians during these
negotiations was hardly consistent with good faith.
But the papers presented to Parliament do not bear
out this imputation. On the 15th of January the
Emperor of Russia had told the Sultan that " he
could not consent to a suspension of military opera
tions during the negotiations," and this had been
communicated on the same day to the Cabinet of
London.*. And when the Turks did at last accept
the whole terms offered to them, those terms provided
for the complete occupation by the Russian army of
the defences of the Capital. It was not till the 3 1 st
of January that the Protocols were actually signed at
Adrianople, and orders were issued for the suspension
of hostilities to all the armies, both in Europe and in
Asia. It is, however, quite true that the Russian
armies continued to advance after that date. But
they did so, not in contravention of the armistice,
but in fulfilment of its terms. On the 5 th of Feb
ruary Mr. Layard telegraphed that the Russian forces
were to occupy Tchataldja on that day, and on the 6th
the final result of the campaign was announced by the
Ambassador in the following terms : — " The Russians
have occupied Tchataldja in considerable force. The
Russian General insisted on the abandonment by the
Turks of the Tchekenedje lines, as one of the condi-

* Turkey, III., No. 9, p. 8.

90 THE WAR DOWN TO THE
tions of the armistice, and the Turks have been
compelled altogether to retire from them, leaving
Constantinople quite undefended."*
It will be observed that the whole of these proceed
ings were in strict accordance with the openly
declared intentions and with the assurances of the
Emperor of Russia as announced to the Queen's
Government when they had urged him not to occupy
Constantinople. He distinctly declined to give any
promise on the subject, except one — that he would
not occupy the Turkish Capital for the mere sake of
military honour, but only in the case of being com
pelled to do so by the march of events. It would,
however, have been the height of imprudence if he
had halted before securing the defences of the Capital.
Three considerations were conclusive against such a
course. In the first place, the experience of Plevna
had shown what a power of resistance lay in fortified
positions armed with modern weapons of precision.
In the second place, a like experience had shown the
infinite resources of Turkey in the arts of diplomatic
fence. In the third place, indications were not want
ing that the Cabinet of London were as ready as ever,
at any moment, to adopt the interests of Turkey as
identified with the interests of England. Under
those circumstances it was the policy and the duty of
the Russian Government to take effective advantage

* Turkey VII., 1878, No. 11, p.

CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE. 91
of the brilliant military successes which had rewarded
its arms after the fall of Plevna. Whether the
motives and aims of Russia were as purely selfish
as her enemies asserted them to be, or whether they
were mixed in as fine and just proportions as her own
diplomatists had described them, the course then
imposed upon her was the same. Nothing short of
a position placing Constantinople at the mercy of
her army could secure Russia from the danger of
great military embarrassment, and of a great political
defeat. Accordingly, the armistice not only secured to
Russia the power of occupying Constantinople at any
moment, but it placed in the hands of her forces
almost all Bulgaria, Roumelia, and Thrace, up to the
lines of Constantinople and Gallipoli. They occu
pied also Bourgas and Media on the Black Sea.
All this having been successfully accomplished by
Russia, the English Government resumed its fitful and
feeble action in a manner involving the utmost danger
to the interests of the Turks, and serving no other pur
pose, as regarded the interests of England, than that
of showing useless and undignified irritation. Not
the Fleet, but, as it was specially explained, a portion
only of the Fleet, was again ordered to proceed to
Constantinople. This was on the 8th of February.
The pretext was that the object of the measure was
to secure British life and property in case of tumults
in the Capital. When in the Session of 1877

92 THE WAR DOWN TO THE
the Cabinet was blamed for not having occupied
the waters of Constantinople in combination with
the other European Powers, when Russia and
Austria had invited them to do so for the pur
pose of compelling the Turks to adopt the re
forms which the Powers had recommended, Lord
Salisbury had replied that Fleets were in that
position really powerless. They could do no
thing but bombard Stamboul. This was by no
means true of the time when that measure was
proposed by the Powers. But it was perfectly true
of the time when the measure of sending the English
Fleet was now actually adopted by the Cabinet.
At the beginning of the war the occupation of the
Bosphorus and Dardanelles would have laid an
effectual arrest on some of the most necessary
measures of the Turkish Government for the recruit
ment and reinforcement of their army. It would
have stopped the passage of troops from the
Asiatic Provinces. But now, when Constantinople
might be occupied at any time by the Russian
Army, the British Fleet would have been absolutely
helpless to prevent it. Accordingly the Russian
Government at once replied that this step obliged
them, on their side, to consider the means of pro
tecting — not British or Russian subjects only, but all
Christians, and in order to obtain this result to
contemplate the entry of a portion of their troops into
Constantinople. The Foreign Secretary, of course,

CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE. 93
protested that the two measures were entirely different
in their nature. But, whether different or not, it
cannot be denied that it was precisely such a step as
Russia would have desired if she had wished an
excuse to occupy Constantinople. The Turks were
therefore in great alarm. They protested against it ;
and declared that its ostensible excuse had no founda
tion in fact, as the Government of the Porte was
perfectly competent to maintain order in the Capital.
It served, however, for the moment, to satisfy in some
little degree the irritation of the many sections of
English political society who longed to see their coun
try involved in a war with Russia in defence of
Turkey Most fortunately Russia, on reflection, saw
that no good purpose would be gained by taking any
serious notice of the presence of the English Fleet.
She did, however, actually advance her troops
beyond the lines fixed by the armistice, and con
tinued to hold this advanced position in spite of the
remonstrances of the British Government. In a few
days the war party in England were disgusted by
finding that, as usual, the Cabinet had compromised
its attitude of menace by entering into a new under
standing with the Government of Russia. Prince
Gortchakow agreed to assure the Cabinet of London
that the Russian forces had no intention of occupying
the Peninsula of Gallipoli, or the lines of Bulair. In
return for' this assurance the Foreign Secretary pro
mised that England would not land troops at any

94 CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE.
point on the European side of the Straits, and with
effusive generosity added, that he would give the same
assurance as to the Asiatic side if Russia would give
a corresponding assurance on her part.* This was
at once agreed to by Prince Gortchakow, and so the
matter ended.
And now we come to a new episode in this
strange and eventful history, which must be told in
another chapter. * Turkey, XVII., No. 2, p. 1.

NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CONGRESS, 95

CHAPTER XII.
NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CONGRESS.
When men have been weak and vacillating on
great questions they are apt to take revenge upon
themselves and others by being obstinate on small
points. Perhaps there has never been a more signal
illustration of this tendency than in the transactions
which followed in respect to the proposed Congress
for the final establishment of peace.
The greater part of the month of February was
occupied by those negotiations between Russia and
Turkey, which converted the bases signed at Adria
nople into the Preliminary Treaty of Peace, which was
signed at San Stefano on the 3rd of March. In the
meantime, however, on the 4th of February, the Austria-
Hungarian Government had invited the Government
of the Queen to an " International Conference" to
be held at Vienna. This invitation was immediately
accepted.* On the 7th the Austria-Hungarian
Government amended its proposal by substituting
a Congress for a Conference, and Berlin for Vienna

* Turkey, XXIV., No. 1.

96 NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CONGRESS.
as the place of meeting. It was explained that at the
Congress the Powers should be represented by their
Prime Ministers. On the following day this amended
proposal was also accepted by the Queen's Govern
ment, and on this occasion the Foreign Secretary
explained it to be the opinion of Her Majesty's
Government " that it would be desirable to have it
understood, in the first place, that all questions
dealt with in the Treaty of Peace between Russia
and Turkey should be considered as subjects to be
discussed in the Congress, and that no alteration
in the condition of things previously established by
Treaty should be acknowledged as valid until it has
received the assent of the Powers."*
As this sentence is the first beginning of a dis
pute in which the British Government chose to
maintain an inflexible obstinacy, and which went
very near to prevent any Congress being held at
all, it is worth while to look at it somewhat care
fully. And in order to do so it is necessary, in the
first place, to recollect what is the real nature of a
Congress such as that which was now proposed. It
is not a Court of Justice, nor is it even a Court of
Arbitration. It is not a Court with any coercive
jurisdiction, or a Court in which any matter can
be conclusively settled by vote, or by majority. It
is essentially' a Court of Conciliation — an assembly

* Ibid., No. s, p. 3.

NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CONGRESS. 97
in which an endeavour is made to settle high
matters in dispute by discussion and mutual con
cession. On the other hand, it is not less necessary
to recollect what was the real nature of the Treaty
which was then being drawn up between the two
late belligerents. It was the result of a war between
two independent Powers, each perfectly entitled to
wage that war, and to obtain from it such results
as its success might warrant. Those results must
necessarily alter the previous status quo. Other
Powers had of course a right to object to any one
of these results if they thought it their interest to
do so. But it was an extravagant assertion of that
right to maintain that there was no alteration what'
ever of the previous status quo which the bellige
rents were competent to settle between themselves.
At all events, it was an extravagant expectation
that the successful belligerent would admit this
doctrine expressly, and v/ithout any limitation. It
was still more extravagant to suppose that the
successful belligerent would admit not only the right
of the other Powers to object to everything it had
obtained by war, but to declare also its own willing^
ness to give way to such objection if that should be
the result of discussion. There were obviously some
stipulations enforced by the victorious Power upon
the defeated Power, which the victor had an absolute
right to stand to against all objectors, and at any cost.
For example, Russia had" not secured her victory
VOL. II. H

98 NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CONGRESS.
without allies. Those allies were to have some
reward in the victory they had helped to secure. It
touched Russia's honour that the stipulations which
affected them should not be negatived in any
Congress. Yet these stipulations did in a very
important matter affect the previous status quo
as it had been established by European Treaties.
There was nothing unusual or unnatural in this.
Treaties always are affected by the result of
war. The Powers which looked on whilst the
contest was being fought out between Russia and
Turkey knew perfectly well that in its result it must
affect largely the previous condition of things. To
assert their right, therefore, after it was over, to set
aside the whole of these results if it pleased them
to do so, was to assert an abstract proposition which
was of no theoretical value, and which in a practical
point of view was unreasonable and even absurd.
But to demand from Russia an assent to the meeting
of the Congress under a form which not only would
have implied her assent to that abstract proposition,
but would have implied her willingness to this
claim being carried into operation, was a demand
which Russia could not rationally be expected
to concede. Yet this was the demand which
the English Cabinet was pleased to make, and to
persist in with verbose tenacity for weeks together.
Not one of the other Powers supported the Govern
ment of the Queen in this demand. Russia reso-

NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CONGRESS. 99
lutely refused to accept the Congress under any
form of words which would have carried her assent
to the proposition that any other Power, or all
Europe combined, could replace matters in the East
of Europe exactly as they had been before she had
sacrificed so much blood and so much treasure to
amend them. She did not deny or dispute the
right of the other Powers to " discuss" what they
pleased. The Treaty, and the whole Treaty, would
be laid before fhe Congress. But allowing other Powers
to discuss the whole and every part of the Treaty was
a very different thing from admitting beforehand that
she considered everything without exception as open
to discussion. Such an admission might beheld to
imply that Russia bound herself to accept the
results of that discussion even on points most really
affecting her interests and her honour.
The Austria-Hungarian Government took the
reasonable view of this dispute, when it said, in
commenting on the English demand, " The Austrian
Government maintains that all the stipulations which
affect European interests ought to be discussed at
the Congress, and that Europe will decide upon
them ; but as Prince Gortchakow has declared to
Austria that it was the Congress which would decide
what are the Preliminaries of Peace which affect the
interests of Europe, and that all the points which
were found to be of European interest would be sub
mitted to its deliberation, and could not be considered
H 2

ioo NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CONGRESS,
as valid until they obtain the assent of all the Powers,
it appears to Austria that the object of the English
Declaration — that is to say, the reservation of full
liberty of action, a point of view which Austria
entirely shares — is thereby attained ; and Count
Andrassy thinks that under these circumstances it is
neither for the interest of England nor of Austria to
raise difficulties in regard to this question."*
The truth evidently is, that the obstinacy of the
English Cabinet on this question of form arose out
of its position at home. Its supporters in Parliament
and in the Press had become thoroughly disgusted
and alarmed by the results of its vacillation. It was
absolutely necessary to stick to something. An
ambiguous formula which had a plausible sound was
better than any other for the purpose. It involved
no danger of immediate action, either in one direction
or another. It was something . on which a divided
Cabinet could agree, and it could be easily manipu
lated so as to convey the impression of great
resolution. An excellent example of this use of
ambiguous words is to be found in the form in
which the demand of the Cabinet of London was
expressed in a despatch to Sir H. Elliot, on the
1 3 th of March : — " Her Majesty's Government desire
to state that they must distinctly understand before
they enter into Congress that every article in the

* Ibid., No. 9, p. 5:.

NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CONGRESS, ioi
Treaty between Russia and Turkey will be placed
before the Congress — not necessarily for acceptance,
but in order that it may be considered what articles
require acceptance or concurrence by the several
Powers, and what do not"* In this formula the
words " not necessarily for acceptance" have a very
resolute air. They seem to say to Russia, " Don't
suppose that acceptance of any one of your articles
will be a matter of course. Don't suppose that there
is even any part of your Treaty which you can bring
for mere registration. The whole and every part
must be open to our decision." Accordingly, this
was the defiant sense and tone in. which these words
were accepted and explained with shouts of triumph
by supporters of the Government The real truth
was that no such bravery was intended. What it
•really meant was, "We don't pretend that every part
of your Treaty needs our acceptance at all. But
other parts do : and in order to discriminate, we must
see and discuss the whole." This was a most
reasonable proposition, and if this had been said in
plain words, there would have been no dispute at all
Russia never pretended to keep back any part of the
Treaty from sight, or from such discussion as others
might choose to raise. But "accepting discussion"
was an ambiguous phrase which might mean accepting
the results of discussion. In this sense she could

Ibid., No. 8, p. 4.

102 NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CONGRESS.
not admit it. She would only pledge herself to
"accept discussion on those portions of the Treaty
which affected European interests." "The liberty
which she did not dispute to others, Russia claimed
for herself. It would be to restrict this liberty, if
alone, among all the Powers, Russia contracted a
preliminary engagement."*
This frivolous dispute lasted the whole of March.
At last, on the 26th, the Russian Ambassador de
fined the position of his Government to be as
follows : — " It leaves to the other Powers the liberty
of raising such questions at the Congress as they
may think it fit to discuss, and reserves to itself the
liberty of accepting or not accepting the discussion
of these questions."t
This final reply of Russia was received on the
2 7th of March ; and on the same day the Foreign
Secretary resigned his office. He did so on account
nf decisions come to by the Cabinet, some of which
were soon revealed, but in regard to others of which
there is a direct conflict of testimony between Lord
Derby and his former colleagues. What is certain is
that these decisions looked in the direction of
warlike preparations against Russia : the calling
out of the Reserves at home — the novel employ
ment of Indian troops in European operations — and
the occupation of Cyprus, if not also of some part
of the Syrian coast.

Ibid., No. 15, p. 7. f Ibid., No. 19, p. 9.

NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CONGRESS. 103
It is not my intention here to enter upon the con
stitutional argument which was raised by the
announcement of the intention of the Government
to bring some 7000 men of the Indian army, without
the previous consent of Parliament, to take part
in military operations in Europe. That it was a
novelty is admitted. That there is a strong pre
sumption under our Constitutional system against
all measures of novelty, except in cases of ex
treme necessity, cannot be denied. On the other
hand, in any contest involving the highest issues of
national safety, the Crown could not wisely be
refused the right of using its Indian army. Early in
the present century it was used in a contest which
was virtually European, when Abercromby's ExpedL
tion was sent to Egypt. Moreover it is to be recol
lected that as both Russia and England are Asiatic
as well as European Powers, there can be no absolute
separation between Asiatic and European operations
in the event of a war between them. Each Power
would naturally use both European and Asiatic
troops wherever it may be convenient to do so. In
the present case the measure must be viewed with
reference to the fact that it was a time of actual
peace, and with no immediate prospect of war,
that Parliament was sitting, and that no sufficient
reason was ever alleged for the secrecy which
was maintained.
The conduct of the Government, however, in

104 NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CONGRESS.
this matter must be mainly judged by the pur
pose which was really in view. If it was
seriously contemplated to count on 7000 Indian
troops as a competent reinforcement of the British
Army with a view to military operations against
the Russian forces in complete possession of the
Balkan Peninsula, it may safely be left to the
judgment of later times. In all probability it had
no more definite purpose than to satisfy that clamour
and craving for warlike resolutions which had alter
nately been fomented and mortified by the fitful and
abortive policy of the Government, and which found
a temporary satisfaction in the occupation of Cyprus.
It cannot be doubted that the disclosures of Lord
Derby, though discredited by his remaining colleagues,
reveal a good deal of the atmosphere in which this
movement was conceived. The best thing that can
be said of it is that it pleased the Indian Army,
and may have stimulated its military spirit. Against
this benefit, however, if it really accrued, there are
heavy counter weights of which this is not the place
to estimate the value. It is enough to say here that
the judgment to be passed upon all the military pre
parations of the Government must depend on the
wisdom of the policy which they were intended to
support. What that policy had been up to this,
date has been traced in the previous chapters. What
it still continued to be and what were the results to
which it led, remain for us yet to follow.

NEGOTIA TIONS FOR A CONGRESS. 1.05
We have seen that the very first of the Russian
conditions of peace was the establishment of a new
Province of Bulgaria. We have seen, also, that this
was the very first condition which the English
Minister specified to the House of Commons on the
28th of January as a source of danger and a subject
of alarm. He did not say that it would be a
danger to British interests, as these had been defined
on the 6th of May, 1877. Still less did he say that
it would be a danger to the population. What he
did say was that it would be a danger to the Porte.
It was an approach to the dismemberment of
Turkey. For many months — since the outbreak of
the war — the original " diapason" of the " integrity
and independence" of Turkey had been professedly
abandoned. Instead of that venerable formula, there
had been substituted the new diapason of "British
interests." But the first fundamental note had, in
reality, never been silenced, in the ears or in the
hearts of fhe Queen's Government. Once more the
old drone was sounded. The new Bulgaria, it was
only too apparent, could not be easily reconciled
either with the integrity or independence of the
Ottoman Empire in Europe. It was further ex
plained to the House of Commons that the danger
arose especially from the great size and geographical
position of the new Province. It was not at that
time absolutely known what its boundaries were to
be. But Russia had long ago given the alarming

106 NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CONGRESS.
intimation that these boundaries would not be less
than those which had been assigned to the new
Province at the Conference of Constantinople. Mr.
Layard had already telegraphed, referring his
Government to the Protocols of that Conference,
as indicating the probable extent of the Russian
demand. It did not need all the sagacity of the
British Ambassador to be sure that the extent which
all Europe had agreed upon as necessary for the
new Bulgaria before the war, was not likely to be
less than the extent with which Russia would be
content now that she had triumphed in a bloody
contest. The new Bulgaria would be found to
extend into the district of Salonica. It would not
embrace that town ; but it could scarcely be doubted
that at some other point it would reach the ^Egean.
This reference by Mr. Layard to the Conference of
Constantinople, and the repetition of it to Parliament
by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, recalls us to
that happy time when England had made a show of
union with the other Powers of Europe ; when she
had held a Preliminary Conference with them, from
which the Turks were excluded ; when the Russian
Embassy had been the place selected for this
dictatorial assembly; and when the British Pleni
potentiary and the Russian Ambassador were, like
twin stars in the firmament of diplomacy, never
seen except in continual apposition.
Let us then accept the reference of Mr. Layard

NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CONGRESS. 107
and of Sir Stafford Northcote, and let us trace the
history of this new Province of Bulgaria.
When the Cabinet of London had first suggested
the idea of a Conference of the Powers, it had also
suggested the basis of a settlement. The first and
most important item in the basis was that Bulgaria
should be granted "Administrative Autonomy" under
the guarantee of the Powers. No geographical
description was given of this new Province, and no
political definition was given of this new ConstU
tution. These were the details to be filled in by
the work of the proposed Conference. General
explanations, however, were given, which made it
plain that the new Province could not exclude those
districts south of the Balkan, in which the massacres
had occurred; and that "autonomous administration"
must greatly limit if not exclude that direct govern
ment by the Sultan which had been so long and so
grievously abused.
Accordingly, when the Preliminary Conference
had done its work at the Russian Embassy, and
when, on the 20th December, 1876,* its proposals
were confidentially communicated to the Grand Vizier,
the Turks found that the scheme of the Powers was
one which would establish a new Province in the
heart of their Empire in Europe — a Province not
only stretching across the Balkans, but extending

* See ante, Chap. VII., vol. i., p. 319.

io8 NEGOTIATIONS FOR A. CONGRESS.
from the. Danube to a point far south in the district,
of Salonica. It did not actually touch the iEgean,
but it left between its southern boundary and the
Mediterranean coast only a narrow strip of territory
in which Turkey might still misgovern or ravage as
before. It is true that this Province was to be
subdivided into two "Vilayets" or Administrative
Districts, each with a Governor of its own. But
these Vilayets, thus nominally separated, were
to be united by common privileges of the most
important kind, and were to be separated from the
rest of the Turkish Empire in Europe by large and
semi-independent powers of administration. The
Governors must be Christians. They might be sub
jects of the Porte ; but they might also be foreigners.
The Sultan was not to be free in his right of ap
pointing those high officers. His selection was to
be subject to the approval of the Powers. And
when once appointed, they were irremovable by the
Turkish Sovereign. They were to hold their office
for a fixed term of years. They; were to have the
exclusive right of appointing all the subaltern
officers of the new native militia, and the Porte had
no right of appointing even the superior officers
except in the case of more than a thousand men
being concentrated in a single place. Moreover,
this militia was to be. organised under the super
intendence of a Foreign International Commission,
on the principle that officers, non-commissioned

NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CONGRESS. 109
officers and soldiers to the extent of from 2000 to
4000 men should be taken from European armies,
who were to act as cadres.* The Sultan was not
allowed to station his army in any part of the
Province except in the fortresses and the chief towns.
It was to be employed only in the defence of
the frontier, and all operations in the interior of the
Provinces were interdicted unless in the case of war,
or in the case of the Governors calling for the troops.
Quite as important as these stipulations, and quite
as significant of the future, were the financial
demands of the Conference on behalf of the new
Bulgarian provinces. The Sultan was no longer free
in the collection of the revenues, or in the imposition
of taxes. A sum which was to be fixed by a
Commission of Supervision, but which was not to
exceed thirty per cent, of the revenue of the
Province, was to be payable to the- Imperial
Treasury, for the wants of the central Govern
ment. The whole remainder of the revenue was
to be appropriated to the internal needs of the
Province. All these were indispensable conditions
in the opinion of the Conference. Without them
the abuses of Turkish administration could not be
terminated, and the liberties of the Bulgarian
populations could not be established. More
over, these exceptional privileges and exceptional

* Turkey, XXIV., p. 167,

no NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CONGRESS.
powers were to be secured by a European
guarantee, whilst the inauguration and establishment
of this separate Constitution was to be under the
protection, for a time, of foreign troops, and under
the guidance of an International Commission.*
Such was the general nature of the proposals
which the Turks found cut and dry for their accept*
ance when the doors of the Russian Embassy were
opened to admit them at the close of the Preliminary
Conferences. Against these proposals the Ministers
of the Porte resolutely set their face, and from the
Turkish point of view they were quite right They
were absolutely incompatible with any reality, or
even with any show of independence as belonging
to the Sultan. They would have established an
imperium in imperio in the heart of his dominions.
They were not only a step, but a very long step
towards the independence, not of Turkey, but of the
new province. The Porte had ample experience of
the inevitable results of such special privileges. It
was by similar steps that Wallachia and Moldavia
and Servia had at various dates worked their way,
first to the position of vassal Principalities, then to
the expulsion of the Turkish garrisons, and to a
position of virtual independence, and had now too
clearly assumed- the position of hostile States. The
Turks were too sharp to be deceived ; and the expecta-

* Turkey, II., 1877, p. 163-4-5.

NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CONGRESS, in
tion that they would admit such terms, except under
the determined pressure of united Europe, was an
expectation childish in the extreme. In the sittings
of the Conference which succeeded, the Turkish
Plenipotentiaries had fought every inch of ground —
and they fought it with arguments which, from their
point of view, were of undeniable force. They
astutely observed that the limitation of the Sultan to
the enjoyment of a fixed sum out of the Provincial
Revenue, was virtually the restriction of the right of
that Sovereign to the receipt of a Tribute. They
argued that if the proposal of the Conference was
not this avowedly, it was this in reality ; and would
inevitably come to it in form as well as in sub
stance. They objected to the geographical expansion
given to the Province of Bulgaria. They pointed
out that the Province known to them by this
name lay wholly to the north of the Balkans.
They objected to the constitution of a Province
entirely new, which, though divided into two
Vilayets, was specially intended to include, as far as
possible, all the Bulgarians in European Turkey.
The very aim of such a scheme was incompatible
with maintaining the integrity of Turkey, whose
Empire was, and always had been, an Empire over
many nationalities. Least of all could the Sultan
consent to give especial reward to that one nation
ality which (as the Turks alleged) had been specially
favoured, and had only been incited to rebellion by

112 NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CONGRESS.
foreign intrigue, The proposal to single out this
one nationality because of the very fact of its con
sanguinity or sympathy with the hereditary enemy
of Turkey, and to cut across all the established
divisions of Turkish administration in order to create
a new Province for this favoured population, was a
proposal not only involving everything which could
be most offensive to Turkey, but involving every
thing which could be most dangerous to her Empire.
It was in the face of all these considerations, and
in defiance of all these arguments, that England and
the other Powers persisted in their demand for this
new Bulgaria. At the meeting of the Conference
which was held on the 8th of January, 1877, the
Italian Plenipotentiary was empowered by his col
leagues to explain and to enforce the reasons of their
demand. In that explanation the Cabinet of London
was put forward as the main agent in the Bulgarian
proposal. "The principal motives for the initiative
of her Britannic Majesty's Government are found in
the deeds that had taken place in the localities
situated outside the vilayet of the Danube : that
from that time no abstraction could be made from
the southern slope of the Balkans : that the measures
on which they agreed are thus brought to extend
over all, or parts of, the vilayets of the Danube, of
Sofia, of Prizrond, of Monastir, of Adrianople, and
of Salonica." Such was the deliberate decision of
the European Powers as to the geographical ex-

NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CONGRESS. 113
tension which ought to be given to the new Province
of Bulgaria, with its special privileges and its special
political position.
When the Plenipotentiaries of the European Powers
had left Constantinople, " bag and baggage," and,
when the Turks had again defied them by the in
dignant rejection of the Protocol of London, we have
seen that the British Government had warned the.
Turks that Russia would be left alone to deal with
them, and that for the war which then became in
evitable the Porte was alone responsible.
When that war was as yet only beginning, and
before the Russians had crossed the Danube, we
have seen that the Emperor of Russia had explained
to England that he must continue to demand the
establishment of a Bulgarian Province embracing
both slopes of the Balkans, and that if compelled to
fight his way to Constantinople, he might have to
insist on terms even somewhat larger than those
which had been offered to the Turks by the Con
ference. Under these circumstances the true policy of Eng
land and of the other Powers of Europe was not to
be mistaken. That policy was to show no hostility
to those terms which they had themselves already
demanded in the interests of the subject-populations
- — to show no hostility even to such extension
of those terms as were the natural and inevitable
consequences of the war, but carefully to separate
VOL. II. I

n4 NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CONGRESS.
between these and any needless adjuncts or additions,
such as could fairly be charged with being conceived
in the exclusive interests of Russia. It is quite true
that the very same terms which had been asked by
all the Powers united, necessarily acquired a new mean
ing when enforced by Russia alone. But this was the
inevitable effect of having allowed Russia to be the
solitary champion of a common cause. It was an
evil which could only be aggravated by England
even seeming to go back on her own footsteps, and
objecting to the Russian terms, not in the interests
of Europe, nor in the interests of the Christian
populations, but in the interests of the Turks. Such
a course could have no other effect than that of con
firming the subject-populations in the belief that
Russia was their only friend,- that England not only
cared for nothing but her own selfish interests, but
had returned to the folly of identifying these interests
with the interests of the Porte.
If, therefore, on the 28th of January, when the
English Ministry asked Parliament to enable them
to go into Congress " armed with fhe authority of a
united nation," they had declared that they would
gladly support ariy proposition which was really
necessary to secure the well-being of the subject-
populations of Turkey, and that they would oppose
-only such conditions of the approaching peace as
might tend to establish an exclusive protectorate on
the part of Russia, they would have stood on solid

NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CONGRESS. 115
ground, and would have placed their country in
the position of seeking nothing but the perma
nent interests of liberty and of peace.
It pleased the Queen's Government to make no
such announcement ; but, on the contrary, to intimate
that the size and the privileges of the new Bulgaria
were the special objects of their hostility, and to
intimate farther that they had reverted to the policy
of saving Turkey as far as they could from the con
sequences of her crushing defeat.
With what perseverance this suicidal policy was
pursued, we shall now still farther trace.
The Russian basis for an armistice and a peace
which had been communicated to England on the
25th of January, 1878 — was not fully drawn out
into the form of Treaty till the end of February, and
was only signed at San Stefano on the 3rd of March.
It bore on the face of it that it was only a " Prelimi
nary Treaty" between the belligerents, thus formally
admitting that the final pacification of the East
of Europe must be matter of Conference with the
other Powers.
Let us now go at once to Art. VI. of this
Preliminary Treaty which provided for the extent
and for the constitution of the new Bulgaria.
Its extent corresponded generally with that in
dicated by Mr. Layard in the telegram quoted by
the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the 28 th of
January. It did enlarge the boundaries which had
I 2

116 NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CONGRESS.
been traced by the Conference of Constantinople.
But the enlargement was by no means very great.
That enlargement, however, included a portion of
the coast line of the ^Egean. It left out Salonica
and Adrianople, passing both of them to the north.
Speaking generally, the Bulgaria of the Conference
had extended from the Danube to within a short
distance of the Mediterranean. The Bulgaria of the
Preliminary Treaty extended from the Danube to
the sea-shore, and gave a maritime outlet on the
Mediterranean to the new Province.
The new Bulgaria, moreover, was to have some
thing more solid and definite than Administrative
Autonomy. It was to be erected into a tributary
Principality with a Christian government and a
national militia.
By Art. VII. the Prince was to be freely elected
by the people and confirmed by the Porte with the
assent (not of Russia) but of all the European Powers.
No member of the reigning families of the great
European Powers was to be eligible.
On the other hand, by the same Article, Russia
claimed for - herself special privileges in estab
lishing, and giving their first impulse and direction
to the new institutions. An assembly of Bul
garian Notables was to draw up the organisa
tion of the future administration, and this was
to be done " under the superintendence of a
Russian Commissioner." Moreover, an Imperial

NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CONGRESS. 117
Russian Commissioner was to be charged for a
period of two years with the duties and the powers
of introducing and superintending the new system.
At the end of the first year two other European
Powers might associate special delegates with the
Russian Commissioner. But this could only be done
if an understanding had been established " between
Russia, the Porte, and the Cabinets of Europe."
Apparently, therefore, it would have been in the
power of Russia to put a veto even on this degree of
European influence. It was, specially explained
that this stipulation was drawn in conformity with
the precedents established in 1830, after the peace
of Adrianople, in respect to the Danubian Prin
cipalities. There was at least no deception here. It
is well known that up to the Crimean war Russia
had the exclusive right of protectorate over the
Danubian Principalities. Russia might seek, but she
could hardly expect that Europe would consent to
give to her a similar exclusive protectorate over the
new Bulgaria.
By Art. VIII. the Ottoman army was no longer
to remain in Bulgaria, and all the ancient fortresses
were to be razed. Until the new Militia should be
organised, which was to be done by agreement
between Russia and the Porte, the Russians were to
continue in occupation with an army of 50,000 men.
By Art. IX. the amount of tribute was to be
settled with the assent of the European Powers.

n8 NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CONGRESS.
By Art. X. the Porte was to have the right of
sending by fixed routes its regular troops through
the Principality to the remaining Turkish Provinces
which lay to the West.
Without going one step farther into the Treaty
of San Stefano, than suffices to make us acquainted
with these Articles touching the new Province of
Bulgaria, it is manifest at a glance that it was
perfectly easy to object to several of their provisions
without incurring the odium, and without commit
ting the impolicy of opposing the interests of the
subject-populations, and without identifying the
objections of England with a desire to support the
Turks. The articles of San Stefano looked in two
directions, which, if not wholly opposite to each
other, were at least completely different. They
provided, in the first place, more effectual securities
for the Christian populations than could have been
obtained previous to the war. They provided, in the
second place, for very large and predominant
influence over these populations on the part of
Russia. Moreover, the stipulations which belonged
to this second object, seemed to be not a«cidental,
but deliberate. If there had been no provision at
all in the Treaty of San Stefano for any association
whatever of the other Powers, it would have been
less objectionable in this respect than it actually
was. Russia might fairly and consistently have said
that in the Preliminary Treaty between herself and

NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CONGRESS. 1.19
Turkey it was not her business to make any
provision in the interest of the other Powers. She
might have said, and said with truth, that it remained
for them to make such demands as they pleased in
their own interest, and that this work must be left to
the Powers themselves, when, in Congress assembled,
it would become their duty to consider a Treaty
which was to be not preliminary but definitive.
Russia certainly owed nothing even in the shape of
courtesy to the English Cabinet. The language of
Ministers, and of the whole Ministerial press, was
the language of violent suspicion, of hostility, and
occasionally almost of insult She had a perfect
right to frame her own Preliminary Treaty* on the
principle that it should provide for her own
demands, and for nothing more. If Russia
had taken this ground, there would have been
no cause for jealousy or even for suspicion in the
stipulations which gave her powers of protectorate
which were apparently exclusive. In that case they
would have been avowedly exclusive only until the
other Powers had made their demand to be equally
associated. But, unfortunately, this was not the
principle on which the Treaty was actually framed.
It did not abstain altogether from stipulations
affecting to represent the interests and the rights of
the other Powers. It contained, on the contrary, as
we have just seen, several stipulations in great detail,
which did affect to represent those interests and

J2o NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CONGRESS.
those rights, but which manifestly did so in a
manner most unsatisfactory and incomplete.
There could not possibly have been a position of
affairs lending itself more favourably for the English
Government. They had nothing to do but to draw
firmly and distinctly the line between stipulations in
the interest of the subject-populations of Turkey,
and stipulations in the interest of Russia alone.
They had nothing to do but to take their stand
upon that line, and to say that every provision lying
on one side of it they would heartily support, and
every provision lying on the other side of it they
would require to be amended. By pursuing this
course they would have put themselves in harmony
with the cause of justice, liberty, and humanity —
with the inevitable tendency of events in the East of
Europe — and with the true honour and interest of
England. On the other hand, if this dividing line between
the two kinds of stipulation in the Treaty of San
Stefano were not respected, if indiscriminate hostility
were shown to everything which Russia had done,
and to everything which Russia had demanded, there
could be no possible result but dishonour and defeat.
In respect to honour, it was discreditable to range
England on the side of Turkey against the subject-
populations. In- respect to policy it was most
inexpedient to confirm and intensify Russian
influence by letting those populations see that they

NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CONGRESS. 121
could trust to nothing else. Surely these considera
tions hardly belong to the region of mere opinion.
They come under the category of axioms and in
evitable deductions. Yet over all these considera
tions, involving as they did both the honour and the
interests of England, passion and prejudice were
suffered to prevail. The friends of Turkey have
been accustomed to say that their opponents were
swayed by "' sentiment." And so they were. In the
region of sentiment lies the home of the highest
political truth. But it is equally true that in the
same region are to be found the dens of every
political folly. Sentiment inspired the conduct and
the language of the friends of Turkey, quite as much
as it inspired the conduct of the language of those
who denounced the Pashas. The only difference
was that in the one case the ruling sentiment was
in harmony with justice and with the real interests
of Europe, whilst in the other it was opposed to
both. Let us now see how this Turkish sentiment
worked in practice, and what were the results to which
it led. We have seen that the Treaty of San Stefano
was signed on the 3rd of March. It was not, how
ever, officially communicated to the British Govern
ment till the 23rd of that month.* It probably

* Turkey, 1878. No. 22.

122 NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CONGRESS.
contributed to produce in the Cabinet some of those
obscure and critical resolutions in the direction of
warlike preparations which led to the resignation of
Lord Derby on the 28th. Lord Salisbury replaced
him as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and
thus it fell to the lot of the British Plenipotentiary
at the Conference of Constantinople to utter the first
voice of England on the natural consequences which
had now followed that memorable triumph of Turkish
diplomacy. Within a few days of his accession to office the new
Foreign Secretary had issued, on the 1st April, a Cir
cular Despatch* to all the Ambassadors and Ministers
of England at the Courts of Europe, which, at least
as regards its momentary effect, is one of the most
memorable documents connected with the history of
the Eastern Question. His predecessor in office had
been occupied, as we have seen, for several weeks in
the unprofitable dispute whether Russia would or
would not agree before going into Congress, to de
clare that she admitted the whole and every part of
the Treaty of San Stefano to be equally and un
reservedly " subject to discussion." We have seen also
that the final reply of Russia in this dispute was
received on the very day of Lord Derby's resigna
tion. It was a resolute refusal to be bound in the
Congress by any previous declaration not exacted

* Turkey, XXV., 1878.

NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CONGRESS. 123
from other Powers. Under these circumstances there
was no prospect of a Congress. The English
demand had put a stop to it. This on the face of
it was a heavy responsibility, and required justifica
tion and defence. Accordingly, the new Circular of
the new Foreign Secretary was intended to give this
explanation and to supply this defence.
It obviously fell naturally and necessarily in the
way of an argument directed to this end, that it
should examine the Treaty of San Stefano with a
view to show that almost every stipulation in it did,
more or less, affect European interests. In the con
duct of such an argument it was perfectly fair to
bring forward every conceivable objection to the
stipulations of the Treaty. It was even fair to strain
these objections to the utmost, and to put interpreta
tions on the Treaty which were of doubtful validity.
The putting forward of such objections, and of such
interpretations, did not in any way commit the
Government to maintain them if a Congress should,
after all, be held. In that Congress these objections
might be all successfully refuted, and the British
Government was in no way bound to maintain them,
if, as the result of discussion, such refutation could be
given. But in the meantime they were fair arguments
in support of the proposition that discussion of the
whole Treaty was really required.
Viewed in this light, and restricted to this pur
pose, the Circular of Lord Salisbury was drawn up

i24 NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CONGRESS.
with the skill of a good debater. The funda
mental proposition which it put forward, and
which it supported by an elaborate analysis,
was the proposition that "every material stipula
tion which the Treaty of San Stefano contains
involves a departure from the Treaty of 1856."
It did not need the ability of Lord Salisbury to
establish this conclusion. The Circular did esta
blish it with superabundant force. Many of the
objections which it urged against the Treaty of San
Stefano were unquestionably sound. Others, though
less valid, were fairly ancillary to the general con
tention. A few of them were founded on
mistakes and on interpretations of the Treaty.
But taken as a whole they represented with
truth, if with some exaggeration, the various
European interests which were affected more or
less directly by the provisions of the Treaty
of San Stefano. The only objection to them,
in this point of view, is that the inference in sup
port of which they were ranged in such formidable
array was an inference which Russia had never dis
puted. She had never contended that in the Con
gress, England and the other Powers were to be
precluded from discussing any and every stipulation,
which in their opinion might affect the general
interest of Europe. What she had refused to admit
was that Russia could fairly be called upon to
declare beforehand that she would hold every stipu-

NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CONGRESS. 125
lation in the Treaty to be " subject to discussion."
This was a very different thing.
The effect of this Circular in England was very
curious. It was taken not for what it was, and for
what it professed to be — an argument in favour of
free discussion. It was taken to be the announce
ment of conclusions which were to supersede dis
cussion or at least to forestall it. It was taken to be
the statement of objections which England would not
only put forward, but to which she would inflexibly
adhere. The whole and every bit of the Treaty of
San Stefano was arraigned and condemned. All the
sections of English society which desired to involve
the country in war in support of the Turks were in a
transport of delight. Editors reprinted the Circular
in extenso, as the best leading article they could
publish in exposition of their own views. It was
exactly what "we" had always said. Here was a
Foreign Minister, at last, who would assert the
position of England, and put a stop to the aggressions
of Russia. Perhaps the Government were not to
blame for all this. Perhaps the Foreign Secretary
himself was not wholly indifferent to the pleasure of
writing a slashing Despatch which might obliterate
some of the impressions made upon the friends of
Turkey by certain passages in the life of the British
Plenipotentiary at Constantinople, and by the entente
cordiale with General' Ignatieff. It must be con
fessed too, that any explanation of the popular

126 NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CONGRESS.
mistake would have been difficult at the time. It
might be awkward publicly to point out that in the
Circular the Foreign Secretary bound himself to
nothing. On the whole, it was better to be quiet
and enjoy the adulation of the hour. When men
are sitting as in a Temple, with worshippers before
them, and amidst clouds of incense, it is hardly to be
expected of them that they should blow away the
smoke. But now the curtain rises on a very different
scene. The Temple and the worshippers vanish like
a dream. The Foreign Secretary is once more seen
" arm in arm" with Russian diplomatists — secretly
bargaining for interests supposed to be British —
yielding to almost every one of the demands of the
Czar — consenting to sacrifice much of the integrity,
and the whole of the independence of Turkey — and
absolutely abandoning our previous demand that
the whole Treaty of San Stefano should be bond, fide
submitted to the Congress.
In all this the Cabinet was consistent. Through
out the whole of these transactions it had never
taken a step forward in any one direction without
carefully preparing the way for a strategic movement
to the rear.
I do not hold that the Government were to blame
for endeavouring to come to some understanding
with Russia. Quite the contrary. They ought to have
adopted this course long before. If they had done

NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CONGRESS. 127
so after the failure of the Conference of Constan
tinople, or when both Austria and Russia were willing
to co-operate in coercing Turkey, all the miseries of
the war would almost certainly have been averted-
But at that time they shrank from any alliance with
Russia, partly from jealousy and partly from moral
cowardice. Now, at last, under most unfavourable
conditions, they were driven by sheer necessity to
make some bargain with the Czar. They were quite
right in doing so. The situation had become in
tolerable and absurd. Clever Despatches cutting
up the Treaty of San Stefano could not abolish or
nullify the work of big battalions. Neither could they
bring back health and life into the bones of Turkey.
The Government were not quite so insane as most
of their supporters, both in Parliament and in the
Press. Much as they may have desired to turn
back the handle of the clock, they knew that
they could not arrest the day. Much as they
may have desired to neutralise the results of war,
they knew that they were too late. They knew, too,
that to refuse to go into Congress except upon con
ditions which represented little more than verbal
quibbles, was a course which would simply leave
Russia in possession of the field, and England with
out an ally in Europe. Not even 7000 Indian
troops, not even six millions of money, could extricate
the Government from this dilemma. Under these
circumstances it was perfectly reasonable to get out

128 NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CONGRESS.
of the dead-lock into which we had been brought by
vacillation on every great question of policy, and
by obstinacy in little things. It was reasonable,
too, as it always must be, not to go into Congress
without some previous understanding with the Powers
to be there assembled. Every man conversant with
the conduct of affairs knows very well that public
and formal discussions cannot be conducted with any
hope of a successful issue unless such preliminary
understandings have been arrived at
But what the Government now did was something
widely different from this. Their Circular dissecting
the Treaty of San Stefano was dated, as we have
seen, on the 1st of April. But during that month
and the month of May they were busy in escaping
from the position in which it left them. They entered
into a separate negotiation with Russia, kept secret
apparently, not only from the public, which was wise
enough, but from the other Powers of Europe. Yet
the main ground of opposition to the San Stefano
Treaty, and the main hope of success in modifying its
provisions, lay in the argument that the whole of it
affected more or less directly the interests of the other
Powers. It was impossible to enter into a secret en
gagement with Russia alone without tying our own
hands upon questions on which those other Powers
might be entitled to our support. To judge of
the force and sweep of this objection it is only
necessary to apply that great test of all moral

NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CONGRESS. 129
considerations — namely, the test of considering what
we should have thought of any similar secret negotia
tion, kept secret from us, between Germany and
Russia, or between Austria and Russia, or between
Greece and Russia. Russia may have made some high
handed demands in the Treaty of San Stefano. But
when England was insisting upon her submitting the
whole of it to Congress, she could, and she did, make
the proud reply, " We have nothing to conceal." It is
indeed humiliating to think that when the Plenipo
tentiaries of England entered the Congress doors at
Berlin, they could not, if they had been asked, have
given the same assurance. They entered those doors
with a concealed instrument in their pocket, which
might indeed leave them free to discuss the "whole"
Treaty of San Stefano with a show of earnestness
and sincerity, but which really bound them to be
contented with this show, and nothing more.
Let us now examine the nature of the Secret
Agreement with Russia, which has never been com
municated to Parliament, and which, if the Govern
ment could have helped it, would never have seen the
light. The " Anglo-Russian Agreement," as the result of
this secret negotiation was called, was contained in
two Memoranda, dated and signed at London on the
30th of May. The very first article of the first
Memorandum went straight to the question of the
geographical extent of the new Bulgarian Province.
VOL. II. K

130 NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CONGRESS.
That is to say, it presented as the head and front of
the offending in the Treaty of San Stefano, not the
special or the exclusive protectorate of Russia, but
the length and breadth of the country which was to
enjoy new securities for freedom. It did not attempt
to negative the erection of a new Principality, which
was to be only tributary to the Porte. It did not
attempt to prevent the destruction of the old mili
tary frontier of Turkey on the Danube. It did not
attempt to save to her the great fortresses on. that
river which had done such good service in many
invasions. Accepting these great changes as irreme
diable — changes which Mr. Layard had denounced
as fatal to the Turkish Empire in Europe — this new
Anglo-Russian Agreement was contented with an
effort to patch up a new military frontier under condi
tions which we shall have to examine presently.
The next provision of the Treaty of San Stefano,
against which this Secret Agreement declared the im
placable hostility of England, was that which gave a
portion of the sea-coast to the new Bulgaria. It was
specially declared that this was no question of detail
or of frontier lines. The object was declared to be
" the exclusion of the littoral of the Mgean Sea" from
any territory connected with the new Bulgaria.
Next, it was specially agreed that the new Bulgarian
Principality should be limited to the country north
of the Balkans. The Province to the south was only
to receive a " large measure of administrative self-

NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CONGRESS. 131
government, with a Christian Governor, named with
the acquiescence of Europe for five or ten years."
Then follows an articlewhich assigns to the Emperor
of Russia the desire of freeing the new Provinces
from unlimited occupation by Turkish troops, and
which assigns to England the wise and honourable
part of giving a grudging and reluctant assent to
this Russian desire. " The Emperor of Russia," says
this wonderful Agreement, "attaches a peculiar im
portance to the retreat of the Turkish army from
Southern Bulgaria. His Majesty does not see any
security or guarantee for the Bulgarian population in
the future, if the Ottoman troops are maintained
there." And then follows the following confession
of English aims and English intentions in the
coming Congress : — " Lord Salisbury accepts the
retreat of the Turkish * troops from Southern Bul
garia ; but Russia will not object to what is settled
by the Congress respecting the mode and the cases
where the Turkish troops would be allowed to enter
the Southern Province to resist an insurrection or
invasion, whether in a state of execution or in a state
of menace." This sentence is very instructive.
England specially reserves her freedom to fight in
Congress for the power of the Turks to keep armed
watch over the liberty of the Southern Bulgarians.
Russia is represented as wishing to restrict their
power as much as possible. England is represented
as desirous of extending it.
K 2

132 NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CONGRESS.
There are other clauses of this Secret Agreement to
the aim and object of which no just objection can be
taken. If they had been made subjects of consul
tation with the other Powers of Europe, as matters
of common understanding before going into Congress,
there would not be one word to say against them.
But, on the other hand, fhe whole scope and purport
of the transaction was to represent England as bent
on setting up again, as far as she could, some sem
blance of a real Turkish Empire in Europe ; and yet
at the same time as yielding up almost everything
which was really substantial in the fatal demands
which the military success of Russia had enabled her
to enforce upon the Sultan.
Let us take, for example, one sentence from
the " Salisbury Circular" of two months before —
the sentence which perhaps, as much as any
other, had inspirited the friends of Turkey —
" The compulsory alienation of Bessarabia from
Roumania, the extension of Bulgaria to the
shores of the Black Sea, which are principally in
habited by Mussulmans and Greeks, and the acquisi
tion of the important harbour of Batoum, will make
the will of the Russian Government dominant over
all the vicinity of the Black Sea. The acquisition
of the strongholds of Armenia will place the popula
tion of that province under the immediate influence
of the Power which holds them ; whilst the exten
sive European trade which now passes from Trebizond

NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CONGRESS. 133
to Persia will, in consequence of the cessions in
Kurdistan, be liable to be arrested at the pleasure of
the Russian Government by the prohibitory barriers
of their commercial system." Now, to every one
of these formidable results of the Treaty of San
Stefano, except the very last, England virtually
gave her assent in this Secret Agreement. It
made it all the worse and not the better that she
reserved her right to keep up a show of remon
strance and of resistance in the Congress. She was
not to push her objections to any decisive issue.. The
restoration to Russia of her old Bessarabian frontier
was expressly acquiesced in. The Armenian fortresses
were not to be rescued from the Muscovite. Batoum,
although not taken by Russia, was to be surrendered
to her demand. Well might those who had cheered
the Circular be ashamed of their own credulity when
they found themselves duped by the Agreement.
There is another point of view in which this
Secret Agreement must be considered, and that is the
relation it, bears to the contention which had been
maintained so long and so tenaciously, that the whole
of the Treaty of San Stefano must be fully and com
pletely "subject to discussion." This position had
been held in a form and to an extent which was
unreasonable. But it was not only reasonable but
essential to the Congress that no two Powers should
enter into it bound by secret engagements to convert
discussion into a mockery, by pretending to argue

134 NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CONGRESS.
against conclusions which had been thus clandestinely
agreed to. Yet after the signature of the Agreement
the British Plenipotentaries were in this position :
they were bound not to persevere in objections
which the Agreement had overruled. We have
only to look at the following paragraph in the first
of the two Secret Memoranda to see that this is
really the result : " Her Majesty's Government, being
consequently of opinion that the modifications of the
Treaty of San Stefano, approved of in this Memo
randum, suffice to mitigate the objections that they
find in the Treaty in its actual form, engage them
selves not to dispute the Articles of the preliminary
Treaty of San Stefano which are not modified by
the ten preceding points, if, after the Articles have
been duly discussed in Congress, Russia persists in
maintaining them." Under this Agreement the
British Plenipotentiaries went into Congress with
their hands bound, and with their tongues only un
tied for the purpose of keeping up an appearance of
freedom. Their colleagues in the Congress, if they
were really kept in ignorance of this Secret Agree
ment, might commit themselves very far in support
of other objections to the Treaty in a manner in which
they would not have committed themselves had they
known the truth. On the other hand, if the Secret
Agreement was confidentially communicated to the
other Powers, then the aspect of it is very materially
changed. It then simply stands as a device by

NEGOTIATIONS FOR A CONGRESS. 135
which the English Cabinet escaped from the un
tenable position it had assumed, that Russia must
go into Congress holding as open to discussion
everything she had gained. By the Secret Agree
ment Russia had, on the contrary, secured that her
principal demands in the Treaty were not to be
seriously contested.

136 THE CONGRESS AND THE

CHAPTER XIII.
THE CONGRESS AND THE TREATY OF BERLIN.
Russia was now as triumphant in diplomacy as
she had been victorious in arms. She had secured
two great advantages. In the first place, she had
secured the final acquiescence of England, after a
mock - discussion, in every one of the substantial
gains which she had demanded for herself. In the
second place, the Cabinet of the Queen had so
managed the whole transaction for her that the con
cessions she made were to be deductions, not from
her own gains, but from the gains of the subject
populations of Turkey It had moreover been so
contrived further in her interests that these con
cessions should be wrung from her in a European
Congress, as the result of a public discussion, in
which England was to be seen contendinsr for the
utmost possible limitation of the privileges of the
enfranchised populations of Turkey.
Let us look for a moment at each of these great
successes. The consent of England to the direct
acquisitions of Russia was very important. In
Europe there was the retrocession of her old Bessa-

TREA TY OF BERLIN. 1 3 7
rabian frontier reaching to the Danube. There was
the destruction of all the great fortresses on the
southern bank of that river. In Asia there, was the
permanent acquisition of Kars, and of Ardahan with
adjacent territories. There was farther the acquisi
tion of Batoum, which Russia had not taken, and
which English and Turkish fleets could have effec
tually prevented her from ever taking. This was,
perhaps, the only important acquisition which it
would have been in the immediate power of England
to prevent. There is some reason to believe that
the English Consul at Trebizond had encouraged
the inhabitants of Batoum, who resented the cession,
to expect the support of the British Government,
and had even gone the length of subsidising, and
therefore organising an opposition to that measure*

* My authority for this statement is a letter from "Five
Merchants of Batoum" to the Governor-General of Trebizond,
in which they say :-—u Congratulate the Consul (English) on our
behalf, and tell him that we have made good use of his sub
sidies." This letter appears in an article published in the Gentle
man's Magazine for October, 1878. The article is signed by
the Rev. Malcolm MacColl. The letter he gives has all the appear
ance of authenticity, and is stated to have been attached to the
original copy of a document forwarded by Mr. Layard, and pub
lished in "Turkey xiii., 1878." The genuineness of the docu
ment is farther corroborated by an allusion in the " Protestation
des Habitants de Batoum," published in " Turkey xiv., 1878."
This " Protestation" refers to the particular manifestations of
English solicitude for their rights, and then states that they had
deputed twelve of their notables to the British Consul at Trebi
zond to solicit his assistance. (P. 27-28.)

138 THE CONGRESS AND THE
If this was really done, it must have been done
with the sanction of the British Ambassador at
Constantinople, though probably without any direct
authority from the Government at home. There
is no doubt that the cession of Batoum was the
Russian demand most unpopular in England, and
one of those most vehemently denounced by Mr.
Layard. But under the. Secret Agreement it
was to be sanctioned after the usual mock discus
sion. Such being the direct gains of Russia, let us now
look at her indirect gains involved in the concessions
on which England had insisted. She was to concede
to the Queen's Government that the Bulgarians
south of the Balkans should not enjoy the privileges
of the new Principality. She was to concede farther,
that such remaining privileges as Russia was to be
allowed to retain for them should be narrowly re
stricted in the interests of the Turks. England was
to be free to contend in Congress for a variety
of limitations. In particular, England was to be
allowed to secure, if she could, for the Ottoman
Government the largest powers as to the occupation
of the country by Turkish soldiers. It was specially
provided that the Government of the Sultan should,
under English patronage, be free to use those troops,
not only to repel foreign aggression, but to suppress
political insurrection, and this, too, whether these
evils were "in a state of execution" or only In a

TREATY OF BERLIN. 139
" state of menace."* Not even the native militia —
the whole object of whose existence was to protect
the liberties newly established — not even the militia
was to be securely organised in the interests of the
Christian population. England was to contend for
the nomination of its superior officers by the Porte.
It is needless to dwell on the general aspect and
result of these Russian concessions. They all went
to identify her action and her resistance to us, with
the hopes and aspirations of the subject populations
of Turkey. They went in a corresponding degree to
identify the action of England with the interests
of the Turkish Pashas, and all this they did at
a time and under conditions which made it ob
viously futile to revive Turkey with effect, or to
trust to her as representing, even in a remote degree,
those common interests of Europe which the Otto
man Empire had once been supposed to serve.
This position having been now secured for England
by the Secret Agreement, the Cabinet of the Queen
was no longer unwilling to enter Congress. But
how was the old ostensible contention to be got rid
of — the contention that there must be a full and free
discussion of the whole Treaty ? Diplomacy was
equal to the occasion. A form of invitation was
devised, which came from the German Government
on the 3rd of June, under which both England and

* Article V. of the " Secret Agreement."

Ho THE CONGRESS AND THE
Russia equally pretended to accept the condition of
complete discussion. On the same day this invita
tion was accepted. The Prime Minister and the
Foreign Secretary were appointed Plenipotentiaries
of England : and the Congress was constituted at
Berlin. It is needless to say that the Secret Agreement
with Russia constituted the real instructions under
which the British Plenipotentiaries went to Berlin.
But by a constitutional usage, which in this case
was grotesque enough, the Prime Minister and the
Foreign Secretary received some formal instructions
from the Cabinet through Mr. Secretary Cross. It
is remarkable that in these instructions the Cabinet
was obliged to confess that, in the famous step of
sending up the fleets to Constantinople, it had made
a false move. The very first task assigned in the
despatch of Mr. Secretary Cross to the Plenipoten
tiaries, was the task of offering to retrace it. We
have seen that this measure had very nearly resulted
in the Russian occupation of Constantinople, and
that it did actually result in a considerable advance
of the Russian army beyond the line which had been
agreed upon by the armistice. Russia had continued
to hold this advanced position. Thus the much
vaunted movement of the British fleet had produced
no other effect than that of tightening the grip of
Russia on the throat of Turkey The Plenipoten
tiaries were therefore directed to offer a new retire-

TREATY OF BERLIN. 141
ment of the British fleet as the price of a similar
retirement on the part of Russia from her proximity
to the gates of Constantinople,* There was one
other instruction somewhat ostentatiously put forward
in the despatch of Mr. Cross — namely, that the
British Plenipotentiaries should urge the claims of
Greece to admission to a portion at least of the
sittings of the Congress.
Further instructions, however, were given in the
form of a despatch from the Foreign Secretary to the
third Plenipotentiary, Lord Odo Russell. In this ,
document the general outline of the Secret Agree
ment was followed, just so far as it was possible to
follow it, without betraying the fact that such an
Agreement had been made. But in order to avoid
this betrayal it was absolutely necessary to pretend
that many discussions would be free, the results of
which were in fact foreclosed. Thus, for example,
the great cessions in Asia were referred to as cessions
on which " it was possible that the arguments of
England would not be able to shake the resolution"
of Russia ; but Lord Odo was " not on that account
to abstain from earnestly pressing upon the other
Powers and upon Russia" the arguments of England. f
The hollowness and insincerity of character which
thus necessarily attaches to this document, deprives it

* Turkey, XXXIX., 1878, No. 2, p. 2.
t Ibid., No. 3, p. 3,

142 THE CONGRESS AND THE
of much of the interest which would otherwise attach
to it. There are, however, some declarations in it
which fairly represent the policy of the Cabinet. Of
these, accordingly, it may be well to take notice
here. In the first place, it was declared that all the
stipulations of the Treaty of San Stefano touching
Servia and Montenegro, as well as the Turkish
Provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, were stipula
tions which, though altering the Treaty of Paris, did
not interest England in a primary degree. Two
principles, nevertheless, were laid down for the
guidance of the Plenipotentiaries in any contention
they might raise. The first was, that the welfare and
good government of the subject populations should
be assured. The second was, that tlie ancient
alliance between England and Austria, and the
general coincidence of their interests, should be borne
in mind. It was, however, distinctly added, that if
Russia should be determined to adhere to the Treaty
of San Stefano on any or all of these matters, the
opposition of England was not to be pushed so far
as to endanger the results of the Congress.
A similar declaration was made in respect to the
retrocession of the Bessarabian frontier.
In one matter the despatch was candid. The
provisions of San Stefano, which gave, or seemed to
give, an exclusive Protectorate to Russia, were, of
course, to be opposed. But it was added, that

TREA TY OF BERLIN. 1 43
probably " these would not be maintained in argu
ment." This is a great admission. It proves that
the only real and fundamental objection in point
of principle to the Treaty of San Stefano, was
one which it was well known Russia Was willing to
admit On the great question of Bulgaria the conclusions
of the Secret Agreement were indicated in general
terms. The new Principality was not to pass the
Balkans. The Southern Province was to have the
protection of institutions generally similar to those
which had been proposed at the Conference of Con
stantinople. Great jealousy even of these was, how
ever, distinctly indicated : and in particular it was
intimated that " England could not acquiesce in the
institution of any local militia in that province,
unless its principal officers are nominated by the
Sultan." " The Greeks were to be preserved from the danger
of absorption in a Slavic population. The whole
shore of the iEgean must be kept in the hands of
Turkey ; and the main end and object of ia.ll these
contentions was explained to be that " the Sultan
should be made strategetically so secure as to enable
him to discharge independently the political duties
which he has to perform."*
It would be needless in this work to follow in

* Ibid., No. 3, pp. 3, 4.

144 THE CONGRESS AND THE
detail the various Protocols of the Congress. Two
circumstances deprive those Protocols of more than
a secondary interest. In the first place, the Secret
Agreement reduces them to the position of discus
sions which were ostensible, and nothing more. In
the second place, any reality which did really attach to
the discussions at Berlin, attached to those discussions
not as they appear in the Protocols, but as they were
held in private. Whenever any propositions were
made which were likely to raise serious discussion,
the President, Prince Bismarck, was accustomed to
tell the rival Plenipotentiaries that they had better
go and settle the matter at a private meeting between
themselves, and when they had arrived at an under
standing it might then be discussed in full Congress.
In this way the discussions recorded in the Protocols
are but the echo of an echo. There are, neverthe
less, some incidents which appear in the Protocols
which signally illustrate the attitude taken by the
English Cabinet and the aspect in which their
country was presented to the world.
The first meeting of the Congress took place on
the 13th of June, 1878. At this meeting Lord
Beaconsfield made his concerted objection to the
advanced position of the Russian troops at the gates
of Constantinople. Count Schouvalow replied that
this advanced position had been taken up by the
Russian army in consequence of the entry of the
English fleet into the Bosphorus. It had now been

TREATY OF BERLIN. 145
held for three months without any serious collision.
What Lord Beaconsfield appeared to want was the
retreat of the Russian army, not merely to the lines
indicated in the armistice, but to some unknown
point much behind them. The proposition of Lord
Beaconsfield does not seem to have met with any
support, and Prince Bismarck, the President of the
Congress, expressed himself satisfied with the
Russian reply. He doubted, moreover, whether the
question was not one " beyond the scope of the task
of the High Assembly."*
The second meeting of the Congress took place
on the 17th of June. "The order of the day" was
the great question of Bulgaria. At the very open
ing of the discussion on this question the English
Foreign Minister made a declaration which at once
exhibited England in the position of contesting the
whole arrangement in the interests of the Turks. It
was a declaration, moreover, which implied that the
British Government would have been glad if it were
possible to get rid of the Treaty of San Stefano
altogether. This declaration was conceived in the
following terms : — " It is our task to replace her
(Turkey), not upon the footing of her former inde
pendence, for it would be impossible entirely to
annihilate fhe results of the war, but to restore to
her a relative independence which shall permit her

* Ibid., p. 14.
VOL. II. L

146 THE CONGRESS AND THE
efficaciously to protect the strategical, political, and
commercial interests of which she is to remain the
guardian." With this view, England laid down as
her demand these two propositions — ist That the
tributary autonomous Principality of Bulgaria should
be restricted to the part of European Turkey
which is situated north of the Balkans ; 2nd. That
the Province of Rqumelia, and all other territory
south of the Balkans, shall be under the direct
political and military authority of the Sultan ; all
necessary precaution being taken that the welfare of
the populations shall be protected by sufficient
guarantees of administrative autonomy, or in some
other manner."
This second proposition conveyed the first public
intimation of a profound effort of diplomacy. The
country to the south of the Balkans had hitherto
been always referred to as Southern Bulgaria. Even
in the Secret Agreement it was so called. But now
it had occurred to the English Plenipotentiaries that
a new name would be more convenient. It is won
derful what faith in names and phrases can be
harboured in diplomacy. It was the object of the
Queen's Cabinet to divide countries which were really
united in blood, in language, in religion, in the
endurance of common injuries, and in common aspi
rations for freedom. Conscious of the inherent
weakness of this arrangement, the British Plenipo
tentiaries had recourse to the wonderful device of con-

TREATY OF BERLIN. 147
cealing it by a name The country of the Southern
Bulgarians was not to be called Bulgaria — it was to
be called Eastern Roumelia.
This, however, is a small matter ; but the last
words of this second proposition ("or in some
other manner") obviously admitted of any lati
tude of action in sacrificing or in securing the
liberties of the Roumelian people. Two great
uncertainties therefore attached to these propositions
as a whole. First, they left entirely uncertain the
area of country which was to be admitted to new
securities. Secondly, they left in absolute uncer
tainty whether these securities were to be substantial
or illusory.
Accordingly, the first of these uncertainties was
urged by the Russian Plenipotentiaries ; and the
second of them was fixed on by Prince Bismarck.
Was England willing to include in the new Rou
melia all that had been assigned to the Bulgarian
Province at the Conference of Constantinople ? It
appeared not ; and Russia urged that the former
delimitation of the Conference would be the proper
basis to discuss.
Then the President pointed out that the assent of
Russia would probably depend on the nature of the
institutions which England was willing to give to the
southern Province.
As the English Minister was not prepared to enter
into these details, Prince Bismarck hoped the Cabinets
L 2

148 THE CONGRESS AND THE
most especially interested would meet in private,
and then the Congress might hqlp in completing the
understanding* Of the private meeting which followed on the
1 8th of June we have, of course, no record ; but
when the curtain rises again upon the sitting of
Congress held on the 2 and, we find that the British
Plenipotentiaries had been contending for the limita
tion of the area of the northern Principality and for
the restriction of the privileges of the southern
Province. They seem to have driven as hard a
bargain as they could. The other Powers, or at all
events Russia, had demanded that the important
town of Sofia, which is well known to be a place
from which the Balkans can be turned upon the
west, should belong to the new Principality. The
English Ministers would consent to this only if the
port of Varna were to be given back to Turkey, or
if the basins of the Mesta Karasou and the Strouma
Karasou were abstracted from Eastern Roumelia.
We find, farther, that our Ministers had insisted
on the unlimited right of the Sultan to quarter his
troops in any part of the sea or land frontiers of the
new Roumelia, and that he should have the exclusive
nomination of all the officers even of its own militia.
The only qualification of this right consisted in the
vague and perfectly nugatory declaration that the

* Ibid., pp. 24, 25.

TREA TY OF BERLIN. 1 49
Sultan "shall take into consideration the religion of
the population." It will be observed that this
was a demand in the interest of the Turks, which
went far beyond the bargain of the Secret Agree
ment. The stipulation there was that the Sultan
should appoint only the principal officers. It is
needless to point out that this new demand was a
still more violent departure from the conditions
which had been laid down on this subject by united
Europe at the Conference of Constantinople.
The Russian Plenipotentiaries now took due
advantage of the position in which they were placed
by the conduct of the British Cabinet. They publicly
advertised the fact that Russia had given her most
reluctant assent to many of the limitations and restric
tions thus demanded by England on the privileges she
had desired to confer on the subject populations of
Turkey. There were, however, one or two of the
English demands in this direction on which she must
really appeal to the other Powers in Congress.
Russia must contend against the unlimited power of
the Sultan in respect to the employment of
troops on any part of the frontiers of Eastern
Roumelia. There must be some European check
on this power. The mere institutions of the new
Province would not be enough to protect it
against the excesses of the military, " since institu
tions alone, however good they may be, have never
protected a people when these same institutions have

150 THE CONGRESS AND THE
remained under the protection of a military force
which had no national interest in maintaining and
protecting them." Russia therefore suggested that
a European Commission should be charged with the
duty of fixing on the points upon the frontier which
were to be occupied by the Ottoman army. What
was the reply of the English Prime Minister to this
argument ? Lord Beaconsfield said that it had been
agreed unanimously "that the Sultan, as a member of
the political body of Europe, was to enjoy a position
which should secure to him the respect of his sove
reign rights." For this purpose the Congress had
given him (first) " a real frontier," and (secondly) " a
military and political power sufficient to enable him
to maintain his authority and to protect the life and
possessions of his subjects." The Russian contention
was inconsistent with these two resolutions. Lord
Beaconsfield especially looked on a European Com
mission as evidently derogatory to the rights of the
Sovereign. The tone of the President, Prince Bismarck, was
almost always that of a lofty impartiality. But as
an International Commission had been one of the
principal demands of the Conference at Constanti
nople, and a demand to which all the Powers had
implicitly adhered as an indispensable security for
reform in Turkey, this speech of the English
Minister was too much for him. Accordingly, in
the protocol of this sitting of the Congress we have

TREA TY OF BERLIN. i 5.1
the following refreshing outburst of manly common
sense : — " His Serene Highness thinks it his duty to
add that on this question he cannot, as German
Plenipotentiary, remain neutral. The instructions
which he has received from the Emperor, his august
master, previous to the opening of the Congress,
enjoin upon him to seek to maintain for the Chris
tians at least the degree of protection which the
Conference at Constantinople had desired to secure
for them, and not to consent to any arrangement
which would attenuate the result obtained for that
important object" His sympathies, therefore, were
with fhe Russian amendment*
At the same sitting Germany also gave her vote
for keeping the port of Varna in the Principality of
Bulgaria. Lord Salisbury had offered as a compro
mise that it should belong to New Roumelia. The
meaning of this is obvious. It was the next best
thing to keeping it for the Turks.
Again, at the sitting held on the 25 th of June, we
find that important points in the interest of the
subject population of Roumelia were carried, if not
against the vote and influence of England, at least
at the suggestion and on the initiative of other
Powers. The Queen's Plenipotentiaries had apparently
been obliged to agree to a modification of the
unlimited power which they had proposed to lodge
* Ibid., p. 49.

152 THE CONGRESS AND THE
in the hands of the Governor-General of the
Province, of calling in Ottoman troops in the event
of either internal or external security being threatened.
Three important limitations had been allowed — ist,
The Sultan was not to employ Bashi-Bazouks ;
2nd, The soldiers were not to be billeted on the
inhabitants ; 3rd, They were not to be allowed to
stay in the interior of the Province when on
their way to the frontier garrisons. Moreover,
France had suggested the stipulation, not un
important, that if the Governor-General should
call in Ottoman troops, he must not only com
municate the fact, but his reasons for doing so,
to the representatives of the Powers at Constan
tinople. Russia, however, urged that these arrange
ments should be placed under the superintendence
of a European Commission. This the English
Plenipotentiaries opposed, and Russia took care
once more to declare formally that she gave
way only in consequence, of the determination
with which this opposition of England was main
tained.* It was at the eighth sitting of the Congress, on
the 28th of June, that, an important step towards the
dismemberment of Turkey was sanctioned by the
adoption of the proposal emanating from the British
Plenipotentiaries, that -the Provinces of Bosnia and
* Ibid., p.- 77.

TREA TY OF BERLIN. 153
Herzegovina should be " occupied and administered
by Austria-Hungary."*
This proposal, although it came from England,
seems to have been matter of previous understanding
among all the Powers. It was unanimously accepted —
Turkey, of course, dissenting. It has been publicly
stated by Lord Derby, in a speech in the House of
Lords, that the virtual cession of .Bosnia and Herze
govina to Austria-Hungary was part of the original
agreement between the three Emperors some years
before. The existence of any such agreement has
never been publicly authenticated, and there is no
satisfactory evidence of its reality. The belief,
however, in its existence was one of the causes
of that passionate outburst of national jealousy
which had encouraged the Government in the fatal
step of resisting the Berlin Memorandum. The
antagonism of feeling which was subsequently ap
parent between the Russian and Austrian Govern
ments makes it quite certain that if any such agree
ment existed at all, it was of the vaguest kind, and
left each of these Governments free to pursue its own
course as circumstances might arise. But this par
ticular provision of the reported agreement was
probably the best arrangement that could be made.
It is true that the great object of Europe in respect
to European Turkey ought to be, not its partition

* Ibid., p. 115.

154 THE CONGRESS AND THE
among the great military Monarchies, but the enfran
chisement of the people under governments of their
own. But as regards these two Provinces, there
were special difficulties in the way of establishing
autonomous institutions. Desperate antagonisms of
religion and of race were embittered by antagonisms
still more desperate of economical conditions. Under
these conditions the gift of self-government would
have been simply the gift of anarchy. On the other
hand, International Commissions are essentially a bad
device. They are the hotbeds of political intrigue,
they divide responsibility, and they are incompatible
with a vigorous administration. What was wanted
for these Provinces was a strong Executive Govern
ment ; and in this respect Austria-Hungary had all
the qualifications for the duty which was assigned
to her. Even in the days, now more than thirty years
ago, when Austria was the great representative of
despotism in Europe, it was, at least, a despotism
exhibiting some of the best features of that condition
of things. The Austrian Government suppressed
political liberty, but it took great care of the material
well-being of its people. Nowhere in Europe were
there such splendid roads, such substantial bridges,
greater security for the fruits of industry, or more
evident symptoms of prosperous and generally con
tented populations. What was bad then has been
changed now ; whilst all that was good has been
retained. It is no longer in a position which com-

TREATY OF BERLIN. 155
pelled it of necessity to be the bitter opponent of
every aspiration after political liberty in Europe.
Some portions of its people were indeed thoroughly
selfish and unprincipled on the Eastern Question.
The Magyar party seemed eager to assist in holding
down the Christian population under the Government
of the Turks, simply because that population comes
of a stock different from their own. The great
leader of that party, Kossuth, has lost no opportunity
of reading a great lesson to the world. He has shown
how little we can trust to demagogues in the cause of
real liberty when that cause is traversed by their own
passions of party or of race. There was also another
point in the Eastern Question on which Austria had
a bias in the wrong direction. She was narrow-
minded and ungenerous to the gallant Montenegrins.
Unfortunately, in this matter she was thoroughly in
accord with the temper of the English Cabinet.
Nevertheless, on the whole the permanent interests
of the Government of Vienna are coincident with the
interests of Europe. Austria has long since adopted
the system of Constitutional Government. It has lost
its unnatural hold over countries which had inherited
a civilization higher and more ancient than its own. It
now unites under one sceptre many various races,
and bids fair to give a signal proof to the world that
men of different religions and different nationalities
can live peacefully and prosperously under a Govern
ment in which they are equally represented. More-

156 THE CONGRESS AND THE
over, Austria represents a nationality essentially
antagonistic to that of Russia, and having a natural
tendency, therefore, to oppose and resist the preten
sions of Russia to exclusive influence in the whole
Balkan Peninsula. The sins and blunders of the
English policy had given a tremendous impulse and
an insuperable opportunity to these pretensions. It
was most desirable to have some counteracting
force working from a position of advantage. No
Government, therefore, could be fitter for the place
which was assigned to her by the Treaty of Berlin ;
and whether the proposition came originally from
the much-suspected source of the three Emperors, or
whether it came from the British Plenipotentiaries, it
was probably, on the whole, the best proposition
which could be made.
If, however, we look at this - proposition from the
Turkish point of view, it assumes a very different
aspect. It was a very violent proposition. It went
very far beyond the Treaty of San Stefano. Nor
was there any justification for it in the actual results
of war. Bosnia and Herzegovina had not been
overrun by Russia. It is true, indeed, that the native
insurrection had never been suppressed, but neither,
on the other hand, had it achieved any great success.
There was no reason whatever to believe that the
Turkish Government, when freed from other contests,
would have been unable finally to re-establish its
authority. Nothing, therefore, could justify the

TREATY OF BERLIN.

157

proposition, except the right assumed by the European
Powers to dispose of Turkish Provinces at their will.
It was, consequently, wholly inconsistent with the
arguments by which England resisted other proposi
tions involving the same principle. The independence
of the Porte was urged as a plea by the British
Plenipotentiaries against any proposal inconsistent
with their own plans, but was discarded with some
thing very like contempt when it was pleaded by the
Turks themselves against proposals which suited the
English policy.
In this case, when the Turks remonstrated, they
were told sternly by the President that unless they
submitted to the proposals of the Congress, they
would be left to deal with Russia alone, under the
provisions of the Treaty of San Stefano.*
We now pass to another prominent transaction of
the Congress of Berlin, which affords an excellent
illustration of the whole policy and methods of pro
ceeding of the English Cabinet. We have seen that
in the instructions to their Plenipotentiaries, they
had put prominently forward the claims of Greece to
have her wishes represented and her arguments heard
at those meetings of the Congress in which she had
most natural concern. This was allowed to become
publicly known in England before the meeting of the
Congress. Much was made of it. It elicited general

* Ibid., pp. 118, 119.

158 THE CONGRESS AND THE
approval. The friends of Turkey saw in it, at least,
a handy weapon for use against the Slav. The
friends of liberty in the East of Europe, without
regard to race, saw in it, whatever might be its
motive, a step which must tend to commit the policy
of England in the right direction. Thus, from several
different points of view, our patronage of the Greeks
was ostentatiously paraded. It was not then known
that by one Article of the Secret Agreement the
Cabinet had already assumed that the Greek Kingdom
was not to be allowed to acquire either Thessaly or
Epirus. As this acquisition was the only one,
except that of the Island of Crete, which Greece
could hope to make, our public assumption of the
Protectorate of the Greek Kingdom at the coming
Congress does not seem to have been a very
ingenuous device. Let us now see in what spirit
this Protectorate was carried into effect, and what
came of it.
At the first meeting of the Congress, on the 13th
of June, Lord Salisbury gave notice that at the next
sitting, " he should, on behalf of Great Britain, move
the Congress that the Representatives of Greece
should be admitted to its sittings."* Accordingly,
at the second meeting of the Congress, on the 1 7th
of June, this proposal came on for discussion. In
the written statement of reasons read by the British
Plenipotentiaries in support of this motion, care was
* Ibid., No. 4, p. 5.

TREATY OF BERLIN. 159
taken to dwell upon every point of antagonism
between the Slav and the Greek. It was urged that
the " Greeks feared, and with reason, the subjection
of their Church, the suppression of their language,
and the gradual absorption and disappearance of their
race, if their rivals should gain a preponderant
influence." The two races were not on an equal
footing before the Congress. " The Slavs had as
their defender a powerful military nation, related to
them in blood and by faith, strong in the prestige of
its recent victories." England, therefore, proposes
" that the Hellenic Kingdom should be admitted to
fill this position on behalf of the Greeks, and to take
part in the deliberations of the Congress ; or, at
least, to assist at all sittings in which questions in
connexion with the interests of the Greek race shall
be discussed."*
As on this occasion Prince Bismarck took the
usual course of proposing that the question should
be discussed first in private conferences, before it
should be formally decided in Congress, there could
be but little of a discussion. It is remarkable, how
ever, that the Russian diplomatists took instant care,
as usual, to leave England alone in the position of
desiring to play off one Christian race against the
other. Russia took an interest equally in all. She
therefore cordially supported the English demand on
behalf of Greece.

* Ibid., pp. 22, 23.

160 THE CONGRESS AND THE
The French Plenipotentiary gave notice of an
amendment, having for its object to limit the presence
of the Hellenic representatives to those sittings of the
Congress in which the subject matter of discussion
should be the future of the provinces bordering on
the Greek kingdom.
So far, therefore, England took the position of
asserting on behalf of Greece the right of admission
not only to those sittings of the Congress in which
her own direct interests were to be dealt with, as
affected by the lot assigned to adjoining provinces,
but to all sittings in which the interests of the Greek
race might be subject of discussion, even in provinces
not adjoining the Greek Kingdom.
The curtain now rises upon the third sitting of the
Congress held on the 19th of June, and a remarkable
scene presents itself. Russia had prepared a written
Memorandum on the question of the day. She,
doubtless, knew by this time how hollow were the
pretensions of the English Cabinet to do anything
whatever in the interests of Greece. In particular
she knew by the terms of the Secret Agreement
which that Cabinet had extracted from her, that the
British Plenipotentiaries had no intention of giving
to Greece the only concession which was of any value..
She knew, therefore, that even if the pretensions of
the British Government to be the protector of Greece
had been sincere they had been put forward in a
form which made it easy for the Russian Plenipo-

TREA TY OF BERLIN. 1 6 1
tentiaries to take a course far more generous towards
the subject populations than the Queen's Government
had been or were prepared to take. Accordingly,
Prince Gortchakoff's paper on the question before
the Congress was skilfully directed not to resist but
to stimulate, as well as to give form and substance
to, the proposed demands of England on behalf of
Greece. It was directed at the same time to throw upon
the Queen's Government the exclusive task of using
these demands as a weapon against the Bulgarians.
Again, Russia formally declared that she was in
favour of securing the liberty of both races. She
made this declaration in language of irony which was
unfortunately only too well deserved. " With the
Hellenic race she has a powerful bond of union,
that of having received from the Eastern Church
the religion of Christ. If, in the present war, Russia
has been forced to take up more especially the
defence of the Bulgarians, this is due to the fact
that Bulgaria has, owing to circumstances, been the
principal cause and the scene of the war. But Russia
has always contemplated extending, as far as possible,
to the Greek provinces the advantages which she
might succeed in winning for Bulgaria. She is
gratified to see, by the proposals of the Plenipoten
tiaries of Great Britain and of France, that Europe
shares these views, and she congratulates herself upon
the solicitude which the Powers evince in favour of
the populations of the Greek race, and the more so
VOL. II. M

162 THE CONGRESS AND THE
as she is convinced that this solicitude will equally
extend to the populations of the Bulgarian race. The
Imperial Government of Russia will consequently
willingly adhere to any proposition which may be
laid before the Congress in favour of Epirus, of
Thessaly, and of Crete, whatever may be fhe extent
which the Powers may desire to give to the advan
tages which may be reserved for them."* Here was
a challenge to the English Government to make
a definite proposal in favour of Greece. It elicited
no response.
In the discussion which followed Lord Salisbury,
apparently without wincing, played out his part.
The proposal as it came before the Congress was in
the French, and not in the English form. That
is to say, it contemplated the presence of Greek
representatives only when the lot of provinces
bordering on Greek frontier formed the subject
of discussion. Lord Salisbury pointed out that
this would admit them only when Epirus and
Thessaly was to be dealt with. He desired, on the
contrary, that even when such provinces as Macedonia
and Thrace were to be dealt with, the Hellenic King
dom should be heard. Lord Salisbuiy's account of
his own eagerness for Greece and of the result of his
exertions at this meeting of the Congress is quite
pathetic : " I moved an amendment to the effect
* Ibid., p. 35.

TREATY OF BERLIN. 163
that Greece should be present whenever any Greek
provinces were in question, instead of the frontier
provinces, as proposed in the French version. The
Congress divided, Austria and Italy voting with us,
and Turkey abstaining. There being, therefore, an
equal number of votes on both sides, the amendment
was lost ; and, therefore, with respect to the pro
vinces not bordering on Greece, such as Macedonia
and Crete, it will remain to be discussed in each
individual case whether Greece is, on that occasion,
to be admitted or not"*
This was very sad. But Greece could well afford
to lose that which the British Plenipotentiary had
been refused on her behalf, if only he had been
willing to take due advantage of that which he
had found no difficulty in obtaining. Thessaly and
Epirus were the provinces which Greece most
desired to have, and they were the provinces which
themselves most certainly desired to be joined to
Greece. The accomplishment of this union was of
all others in the East of Europe the change most
likely to give some security for the permanence of
peace The too narrow limits originally imposed on
the new Kingdom of Greece was an error which had
come to be universally acknowledged. In no pos
sible way could the rectification of that error be begun
so easily, so naturally, and with so little danger to

* Ibid., No. 7, p. 15.
M 2

1 64 THE CONGRESS AND THE
what remains of Turkey, as by the annexation to
Greece of Thessaly and Epirus. As a matter affect
ing the interests of Europe this was an arrangement
infinitely more important than the delivery of Bosnia
and Herzegovina into the hands of Austria. It was
one tending to remedy a real evil, and to remove a
constant source of danger. On the other hand, the
evidence in possession of the Government as to the
effects of Turkish misgovernment in Epirus was, as
I have shown, conclusive. Our Consuls had reported
over and over again on its dwindling population,
on its decaying agriculture, and on the insecurity of
life and property. On this subject the claim made
on behalf of the Hellenic Kingdom that she should
be heard had been fully admitted by the Congress.
Let us see what the Power which so ostentatiously
made this claim actually did with it when the time
came. Ten days later, on the 29th of June, the order of
the day at the ninth sitting, of the Congress was the
15 th Article of the Treaty of San Stefano. This
was the Article which dealt not only with the
provinces bordering on Greece, but also with all the
provinces of Turkey which contained Greek popu
lations. It did so by providing for local autonomous
institutions under a Russian Protectorate.
The President intimated that, in conformity with
the decision adopted by the Congress, he had invited
the representatives of His Majesty the King of

TREATY OF BERLIN. 165
Greece to make to the High Assembly during to-day's
sitting the communication with which they may be
charged. Immediately after making this announce
ment, apparently without another moment's delay,
"The President reads Article XV. of the Treaty of
San Stefano."
Then rose the champion of Greece, the second
British Plenipotentiary, the Marquis of Salisbury,
and the record of his motion is thus entered in the
Protocols : —
" Lord Salisbury asks for a modification 'of
the last paragraph (of the Fifteenth Article) which
runs as follows : — ' Special Commissions, in which
the native element shall have a large share, shall be
entrusted with the duty of elaborating in each pro
vince the details of the new arrangement. The
result of these labours shall be submitted for the
examination of the Sublime Porte, which will consult
the Imperial Government of Russia before putting
them into execution;' His Excellency (Lord Salisbury)
would desire that the words ' the Imperial Govern
ment of Russia,' should be replaced by the following,
Words : ' the European Commission.' " After a very
short discussion the Protocol records the result thus :
" Count Schouvaloff accepts the text proposed by
England, to which the Congress equally gives its
adhesion."* After this conclusion had been adopted*

* Ibid., pp. 132, 133.

1 66 THE CONGRESS AND THE
but not before, we read in the Protocol as follows : —
" Mr. Delzannio, Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Greece, and Mr. Rangalie, Minister of Greece at
Berlin, are then introduced."
It thus appears that at the very first moment of that
sitting of the Congress, and before the representatives
Of Greece had said, or had any opportunity of saying,
one single word — before they had even been admitted
at all — the British Plenipotentiaries had concluded,
and had moved the Congress to conclude, against
the only claim which Greece was in a position
to make. The adoption of Article XV. of the
Treaty of San Stefano, with no other change than
that proposed by Lord Salisbury, was the rejection
of the Greek demand.
I do not say that the long vaunted patronage
by the English Cabinet of the Greek claim to be
heard on the lot of the border provinces consti
tuted any binding engagement on the part of
England to adopt and to support the arguments of
Greece after they had been heard. But, on the
other hand, if it had never been really intended to
support them, seeing that they were perfectly well
known both in their course and in their conclusion,
it is difficult to conceive what can have been the
legitimate purpose of such ostentatious efforts to
secure for them a hearing. The only inference is
that the Cabinet desired to gain credit in England
and in Greece for a liberal and enlightened policy

TREATY OF BERLIN. 167
towards that Kingdom, which they never seriously
entertained ; or else that they desired to use the
influence of Greece just so far as it might be
found useful as a weapon against Russia, and then
to east it aside whenever that purpose had been
attained. At least it would have been decent
that any adverse conclusion against the claim
of Greece in respect to Thessaly and Epirus should
have been delayed until the Greek delegates had been
heard. To open- to them the doors of the Congress
only just after it had come, on the motion of the
British Plenipotentiaries, to a conclusion which effec
tually barred their claim, was a publication of
insincerity if not of imposture, from which England
might well have been spared by the representatives
of the Queen.
But the farce was played out. It is needless
to say that the communication of the Greek
delegates asked the Congress to sanction the
annexation to the Hellenic kingdom of the Island
of Crete, and of the provinces of Thessaly and
Epirus. When it was read, the comedy was continued by an
assurance from the President that the statement
which the Congress had just heard would be printed
and circulated, and that the High Assembly Would
examine it with attention. It was not till the
thirteenth sitting of the Congress, on the 5 th of July,
that the question came on again. Lord Salisbury

168 THE CONGRESS AND THE
had one other little amendment to propose on
Article XV. of the Treaty of San Stefano as it
had been modified on his own motion by the Con
gress on the 29th of June. According to that Article
as it still stood, Special Commissioners were in each
province to be entrusted or " charged " with elabora
ting the details of the new organisation. But it
was not specified by what authority this " trust" was
to be given — from whom this " charge " was to come.
Was not the Government of the Porte the safest and
most trustworthy of all authorities ? Could this right
and duty of initiating reforms be in better hands than
in Ministers of the Sultan ? And so, accordingly, Lord
Salisbury's further amendment was this : that after the
words "charged," should be inserted the following
words, "by the Sublime Porte."* To this the Congress
assented — the President humorously indicating that
the mischief of it might be small, since the agency of
a European Commission had already been agreed to.
On this occasion the course which England had
pursued had the advantage of being explained by
the Plenipotentiary and the Minister who was chiefly
responsible for it. Lord Beaconsfield explained that
the attitude assumed by Greece must be attributed to
the false idea which had gone abroad after the
conclusion of the Treaty of San Stefano, as to the
principles which should guide the Congress. The in-

* Ibid., p. 177.

TREA TY OF BERLIN. 1 69
tention of that High Assembly was not, as had been
erroneously supposed, to proceed "to the partition
of a worn-out State." On the contrary, it was to
" strengthen, as the High Assembly had done, an
ancient Empire which it considers essential to the
maintenance of peace." It was true that two Turkish
provinces had been handed over to Austria ; but this
was " no partition." On the contrary, it was a mere
" territorial rearrangement" specially devised for the
purpose of preventing partition.
I abstain from any comment on this sort of lan
guage. But there is one sentence in Lord Beacons-
field's speech on this occasion which was something
more than a mere playing with words and phrases.
It contained an important truth, and an all-impor
tant admission. " Returning to Greece," said Lord
Beaconsfield, after a digression, " no one could doubt
as to the future of this country. States, like in-^
dividuals, which have a future are in a position to
be able to wait."*
This was a public intimation that in the opinion
of the English Minister the accessions of territory
which at that moment it was expedient to deny to
Greece, were not likely to be permanently withheld
from her. It was only that she could afford to wait.
This means that a "territorial rearrangement,"
which was in every way wise, and which it was com-

* Ibid., p. 198.

170 THE CONGRESS AND THE
pletely in the power of the Congress to decide upon
and enforce, was deliberately postponed till it should
be brought about by new revolutionary agitations —
and possibly renewed European wars. For this
result it is only too apparent that England is alone
responsible. Russia had pointedly and emphatically
declared that she would not oppose any larger mea
sure of liberty which the Congress might desire to
secure to the provinces bordering on Greece. There
was no symptom of any serious opposition from
any other quarter. But England had deserted
the cause of Greece after having pretended to
support it.
That these proceedings, as they stand on the face
of the public papers, are creditable to the English
Government, is a proposition which would, I think,
be very difficult to maintain. But there is only too
much reason to believe that the aspect which they
would assume would be very much worse if we knew
the whole. What lay behind the scenes we know
only in part ; but this part is quite enough to throw
a very unpleasant light on the probable motives of
, the Government. Dates go far to prove that they
deserted and betrayed the cause of Greece, because
they sold it to the Turks as part of the price to be
paid for the Island of Cyprus.
For now we have come to the time of the Anglo--
Turkish Convention — to the time of another of
those Secret Agreements and Conventions which are,

TREA TY OF BERLIN. 1 7 1
fortunately, a novel feature in British diplomacy.
Making every allowance which is due for the well-
understood reserve of official language — for the
necessity of having in all great transactions previous
understandings and communications with the Powers
concerned — we have in the Secret Agreement with
Russia, and still more now in a new Secret Conven
tion with the Turks, something entirely apart from
the usual course of English dealing. We feel as if
we were breathing not the atmosphere of negotiation
but fhe atmosphere of conspiracy. The secrecies
maintained were not for the purpose of avoiding
misunderstandings, or of escaping from the influence
of popular passions. They were secrecies maintained
for the purpose of betraying friends and of deceiving
colleagues. On the 30th of May — the same day on which
the Secret Agreement with Russia had been
signed — Mr. Layard had been instructed by the
Foreign Secretary to open a negotiation with
the Porte, the object of which was that Eng
land should guarantee Turkish territories in Asia
against farther Russian aggression. As the price
of this guarantee on the part of England, Turkey
was to do two things — first, to give certain as
surances in respect to the good government of her
Asiatic provinces ; and secondly, to assign to Eng
land the Island of Cyprus. It cannot be doubted
that these instructions, although ostensibly dated on

172 THE CONGRESS AND THE
the 30th of May, had in reality been privately issued
long before ; because the " Convention of Defensive
Alliance," which resulted from it, is dated at Therapia
only four days later — that is to say, on the 4th of June.*
But the Convention, as it was signed on that day, pro
vided only in general terms for the British occupation
and administration bf Cyprus. It also gave a vague
general promise to England as to the better govern
ment of the Asiatic provinces. But it contained no
stipulations providing for the conditions under which
the Isle of Cyprus was to be occupied and adminis
tered. It is quite evident there was some difficulty
in the matter, raising as it does many points full of
complication. The reluctance of the Porte to cede
territory, even under the plausible limitations offered
by England in this case, is well known. On the
other hand, the cession to England of the Island of
Cyprus was the very part of the conspiracy which
it was most important to keep absolutely dark until
the object in view had been fully and formally
secured. The Foreign Secretary was about to sit
at the same table with colleagues in the Congress
of Berlin, whose national susceptibilities would have
been deeply wounded if they had known what was
going on. If the Turks were to " peach," the whole
game might be lost, or it would be gained only at
the risk of serious quarrels. The Turks, therefore,

* Turkey, XXXVI., 1878, Nos. 1, 2,

TREATY OF BERLIN. 173
had a tremendous hold over the British Plenipoten
tiaries at Berlin. Poor M. Waddington, who repre
sented France at the Congress, and whose friendly
disposition to England was of immense service in
framing the "redactions "which smoothed difficulties
and facilitated conclusions — he, above all men, must
be kept in ignorance of plots which directly con
cerned the long-cherished aspirations of his country.
Accordingly, during a whole month after the sig
nature of the Convention — that is to say, from the
4th of June till the end of the first week of July —
profound silence seems to have been kept as to what
England was doing. The Convention was not com
municated to the French Government until the 7th
of July. But the most critical meetings of the
Congress at Berlin were being held during this very
time. Under these circumstances how could the British
Plenipotentiaries seriously contend for farther terri
torial cessions from Turkey on behalf of Greece ?
They had already gone dangerously far in this direction
when they had proposed the occupation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary.
It is to be observed that when the Congress met
on the 13 th of June the Porte had not yet signed
the Annex to the Convention which regulated the
conditions under which Cyprus was to be occupied
and administered by the British Government. The
Sultan seems to have been holding out. On the
29th of June, as we have seen, it became apparent

174 THE CONGRESS AND THE
that Lord Salisbury had thrown over the cause of
Greece. But this seems to have been about the very
crisis of the negotiation with Turkey, for it was not
until three days later — on the 1st of July — that
Sir A. H. Layard was able to announce that an
Annex to the Convention of the 4th of June had
that day been signed at Constantinople, by which
Annex the details in respect to the possession of
Cyprus had at last been finally arranged*
It is with regret that I have traced the apparent
connexion of these dates with the proceedings of
the English Plenipotentiaries at the Congress of
Berlin, as that connexion appears on the face of the
papers presented to Parliament. I should be very
glad indeed to be assured that the facts have not
the significance which has been here assigned to
them. But whatever may have been the real cause or the
real motive of England in abandoning the cause of
Greece on the annexation to that Kingdom of Crete
and of Thessaly and of Epirus, the impolicy of this
abandonment remains the same. The alternative
actually adopted by the Congress, and embodied in
the Treaty of Berlin, was little better than a bad
joke. It relegated to the Porte itself a question
which cannot be settled without the intervention
of Europe, and it recommended a small "recti-

* Turkey, XXXVI., 1878, No. 3, p. 4.

TREA TY OF BERLIN. 1 7 5
fication of frontier," which neither respected the
principle of the integrity of Turkey, nor satis
fied the most moderate and legitimate hopes of
Greece. Let us pass now from the method of negotiation
by which the Anglo-Turkish Convention was secured
to the substance of that Instrument itself. It is
called a " Convention of Defensive Alliance between
Great Britain and Turkey." It engages England
singly and alone to defend the whole of the Asiatic
dominions of the Sultan against any future demands
by Russia of territorial cession. More than this,
it also engages England to defend Turkey against
" any attempt at any future time by Russia to take
possession" of any part of Asiatic Turkey. There
is no limitation of this guarantee to any one or more
provinces of Asiatic Turkey. It covers the whole
Ottoman dominions from Bagdad and Bussorah to
Trebizond, and from Scutari to the flanks of Ararat.
Nor is there any condition limiting this obligation to
cases in which Turkey may be unjustly or gratuitously
attacked. It applies equally to a case in which
Turkey may be the aggressor, or to cases in which
she may'have given Russia just cause of offence and
of war. Turkey may do what she likes — give what
provocation she chooses — but England is to protect
her against the cession of an inch of her present
Asiatic territory. Thus, for example, to take a
practical case which is very likely to arise : she

176 THE CONGRESS AND THE
may harbour on her frontier wild and lawless
tribes of Koords, and her officials, either from
weakness or corruption, or from both, may wink
at the depredations they commit on the adjoining
populations in the Russian Empire. She may repel
all remonstrance and complaint. Russia may have
the most just cause of quarrel, and may determine
to seek her remedy by arms. But England is bound
to keep in the hands of Turkey the mountains in
which these robber tribes are harboured. It may be
impossible to check their predatory habits without
the submission of their country to a strong and
settled Government. But England is to give to them,
through the dominion of Turkey, a permanent
guarantee against any such interference with their
predatory habits. Or, again, the cause of war
between Russia and Turkey may be the contra
vention by Turkey of some other Article of the Treaty
of Berlin. It may arise in Europe and not in
Asia. It may arise at a time when England has
other work on hand, and under circumstances most
unfavourable for success in resisting some new ad
vance by Russia in Asiatic Turkey Already in
possession of the fortress of Kars, of Ardahan, and
of Batoum, her advance upon Erzeroum might easily
be rapid and overwhelming. Close to her own
resources, issuing from impregnable positions, free to
choose her own time, Russia is to be opposed in a
far distant and inland country by England alone, or

TREA TY OF BERLIN. r 7 7
with no other ally than Turkey. And for the per
formance of this very onerous obligation we are to
rely, as a base, on the " proximity " of the Island of
Cyprus. This, and nothing less than this, seems to be the
scope and effect of the first Article of the Conven
tion ; so far, at least, as the first clause of it is
concerned. But there is a second clause in the
Article. In return for this vast guarantee on the
part of England, Turkey " promises to England to
introduce necessary reforms into the government and
for the protection of the Christian and other subjects
of the Porte in these territories." These reforms are
not specified in the Convention. They are to be
"agreed upon later between the two Powers." This
clause is, at least, a formal homage to the principle
that we cannot and dare not keep up the Govern
ment of Turkey at any cost to the subject
populations. The grand old doctrine that the good
government of these populations is a secondary and
quite an independent consideration, not for a moment
to be brought into competition with "British interests"
as identified with the interests of the Sultan — this
doctrine is, at last, formally admitted to be
untenable. In the despatch to Mr. Layard of the
30th of May, directing him to negotiate the Conven
tion, it is expressly declared that " Her Majesty's
Government were not prepared to sanction mis-
VOL. II. N

178 THE CONGRESS AND THE
government and oppression."* So far, the declared
object of the Convention is not immoral, as the
support of Turkey in Europe would have been
immoral, when she had refused every security for
reform. But when we look at the provisions in the
Convention for fulfilling this acknowledged duty of
England towards the subject population of Asiatic
Turkey, we find that they. amount to nothing what
ever, except a renewal of those Turkish promises and
assurances which had been treated by Lord Salisbury
at the Conference of Constantinople with just con
tempt. The directions to Mr. Layard were of the
vaguest kind. England was to be "formally assured
of the intention of the Porte," &c. It is to be remem
bered that, so far as government is concerned, Asiatic
Turkey is simply chaos. The account given of it ¦
by Sir Fenwick Williams in 1854, and which is
quoted in the second chapter of this work.t has been
repeated by every competent authority over and over
again during the four-and-twenty years which have
since elapsed. Official corruption and Turkish bar
barism in every form of development have been
reducing some of the fairest regions of the earth,
and the seat of an abundant ancient civilization to a
state of a growing desolation. If we took military
possession of the country, or administrative posses
sion of it, as we have taken possession of the Island

* Turkey, XXXVI., p. 2. + Vol. I., p. 41.

TREATY OF BERLIN. 179'
of Cyprus, it might be possible to arrest the process.
But this is a tremendous work, and one which there
are no signs of our having been placed in a position
to undertake. We have exacted a promise from
Turkey that she will introduce reforms ; but we have
apparently exacted no promise that we are ourselves
to be entitled to introduce them, if Turkish officials
fail. It is, however, a comfort to interpret the
second clause as an absolute limitation of the first.
Unless the reforms are introduced, the guarantee
does not hold good. If this be so, the Convention
is at least not quite so dangerous as at first sight it
appears to be.
Let us now return to the Congress at Berlin, and
see what our Plenipotentiaries were doing there.
By Art. XVI. of the Treaty of San Stefano the
Porte undertook an engagement to Russia "to
carry into effect without farther delay the improve
ments and reforms demanded by local requirements
in the provinces inhabited by Armenians, and to
guarantee their security from Kurds and Circassians."
Now, as Armenians are scattered over the whole, or
nearly the whole, of Asiatic Turkey, this engagement
was one which gave Russia a separate right of inter
ference in the misgovernment of the country It
was therefore rather a difficult Article for the
British Plenipotentiaries to deal with. They did
not wish to betray their own Secret Convention. It
was impossible to reject the San Stefano Article
N 2

180 THE CONGRESS AND THE
without some pretence of a substitute The result
was that the English Foreign Secretary was obliged,
at the fifteenth sitting of the Congress, on the 8th of
July, to move the adoption of an Article copied from
the Article in the San Stefano Treaty, but with the
addition that Turkey was " periodically to render
account of the measures taken with this intent to the
Powers, who will superintend them." It is obvious,
however, that the adoption of this Article in the
Treaty of Berlin does not in any way effect the
object of preventing Russia having a separate and
concurrent right with all the other Powers to
complain of and to resent any infraction of the
promise given by the Turks. In the first place,
it does not abrogate Article XVI. of San Stefano.
And every Article of that Treaty which stands
unaffected by the Treaty of Berlin stands good as
between Russia and Turkey. In the second place,
even if it did abrogate or supersede Article
XVI. of San Stefano, it substitutes for it another
Article which gives the same right to every one of
the Signatory Powers. In the Treaty of Paris of
1856 there was an express Article, making tlie
Porte the executrix of her own promises, although,
failing such execution, separate action remained to
each and to every Power, at least after mediation
had been tried. But in the Treaty of Berlin there is
no such Article, and therefore it is impossible to deny
that, in spite of the onerous and exclusive obligation

TREA TY OF BERLIN. 1 8 1
undertaken by England in the Secret Convention with
Turkey, we have not acquired any exclusive right
over the Asiatic dominions of the Sultan. All the
Powers, and Russia especially, have secured by
Treaty, each and all of them, a right to call upon
Turkey to reform the administration Of those coun
tries. It is impossible to foresee the complications
which may arise out of these intricate and concur
rent stipulations. But it is quite easy to see that
these complications are nearly inexhaustible. The
form in which Lord Salisbury's amendment of the
Treaty of San Stefano is embodied in the Treaty of
Berlin will be found in Art. LXI. of that instru
ment. It simply copies Article XVI. of San Stefano,
and adds to it the following words : — " It (the
Porte) will periodically make known the steps taken
to this effect to the Powers, who will superintend
their application." No machinery or organisation of
any kind is provided for the joint performance by the
Powers of this duty, or for the joint exercise of the
rights which it involves. It annihilates at a blow
any pretence of independence as belonging to the
Sultan over the administration of his Asiatic pro
vinces. It gives a right of direct interference to all
and to each of the Powers. It leaves this right to be
fought about or wrangled over by the local Consuls
of the Great Powers, or by their respective Ambas
sadors at Constantinople, or by the Cabinets of
each, according as occasion and opportunity may

1 82 THE CONGRESS AND THE
arise for any one of them to take advantage of this
provision of the Treaty.
But perhaps there is no part of the proceedings
at Berlin which casts a stronger glare upon the posi
tion in whicli England was placed by the conduct of
her Cabinet than that part of 'them which relates to
the cession of Batoum to Russia. It is evident that
in the secret negotiations which led up to the
Salisbury-Schouvaloff Agreement, Russia had stood
firm in respect to this demand. On the other hand,
it was precisely the demand of Russia which was
most obnoxious to Turkey, and especially to her
friends and protectors in England. It affected the
great question whether for the future Russia or
Turkey shall have the naval supremacy -of the
Euxine. The Salisbury Circular laid stress on this
demand of Russia as one of those which must be
submitted to the unfettered discretion of the Euro
pean Congress. But the English Cabinet knew very
well that no other Power in Europe attached
the smallest importance to the maintenance of
Turkish maritime supremacy in the Black Sea. The
British Government therefore found itself in the
position of having to choose between the alternative
of agreeing to this cession or of fighting to prevent
it Very wisely they came to the conclusion that
the retention of Batoum in the hands of Turkey
was not an object justifying a war with Russia.
They therefore adopted the alternative of acquiescing

TREATY OF BERLIN. 183
in the demand of Russia, and of throwing on their
successors in all time to come the obligation from
which they shrank themselves— namely, that of
resisting by force all similar cessions for the future.
This being so, it would have been at least dignified
to make the concession frankly, and without any
attempt at concealment. Instead of this, it seems
to have been part of the bargain with Russia that
she was to qualify the apparent harshness and
danger of her demand by announcing that she
would make Batoum a "free port." It is needless
to say that this has nothing whatever to do
with the value of Batoum to Russia as a naval
station. A free port means a port at which no
harbour dues, or perhaps where no custom duties,
are levied. It does not mean a ptirt which is to be
devoted exclusively to commerce, or a port which is
not to be converted into a naval station. A free
port may be a port defended by the most formidable
armaments, and sheltering the most powerful fleets.
Yet the British Plenipotentiaries thought it consistent
with the dignity of their country to pretend not to
see this distinction, and to accept the illusory con
cession of Russia as one of substantial value. It is
impossible to read without some tingling of the
blood the 14th Protocol of the Congress, which
relates the proceedings of the 6th of July The
Prime Minister accepted the Russian concession with
effusive gratitude.. He regarded " as a happy idea

1 84 THE CONGRESS AND THE
the transformation at the conclusion of a great war
of a disputed fortress into a free port, and into a
commercial dep6t for all nations." The word
" transformation" in this sentence is intended to
convey the impression that the condition of a fortress
is incompatible with the condition of a free port.
We may well ask whether it was worth the while of
the First British Plenipotentiary to put forward a plea
which cannot stand a moment's investigation? But
the Prime Minister went on to say that, " Full of con
fidence in the declarations of the Emperor of Russia,
Lord Beaconsfield sees undoubtedly in the advan
tages of the freedom of this port a compensation for
an annexation which he could not approve." Lord
Salisbury went still farther in giving definite expres
sion to this fictitious representation of that which
Russia was really getting, and of that which she
was really promising to do. He declared " that he
had had objections to several points in Art. XIX. of
the Treaty of San Stefano. His Excellency in the
first place feared lest the possession of Batoum
should be a danger to the freedom of the Black Sea. .
The graceful concession offered now by Russia, if he
fully understands it, appears to set aside this appre
hension."* We may well be grateful for a decision ;
which avoided war. But we cannot be grateful for
forms and methods of defending that decision, which-
were so insincere and so humiliating.
* Turkey, XXXIX., 1878, pp. 208, 209.

TREATY OF BERLIN. 185
The only real concession which was obtained from
Russia in respect to the Asiatic conquests she had
made, was that she agreed to restore to Turkey
Erzeroum, Bayazid, and the Valley of Alleckkerd—
the new Russian frontier being thus thrown back so
far as to leave free the principal caravan and commer
cial route between Trebizond and Persia. It is to be
observed, however, that although the new Russian
frontier, as settled by the Treaty of Berlin, does not
include this commercial route, it outflanks it at no
great distance, and in the event of any quarrel be
tween Russia and Turkey, or between Russia and any
of the other Protecting Powers on the subject of the
Treaty, Russia, from her new frontier, and from the
strong places which she has acquired within it, would
be able almost at a moment's notice to repossess her
self of the country through which this route passes.
The general result therefore of the Treaty of
Berlin, so far as the Asiatic Provinces of Turkey are
concerned, was to confirm Russia in all her most im
portant conquests, to give her a new and valuable
harbour on the Black Sea, which she had failed to
secure by arms, and to confer upon her, along
with other Powers, a joint and several right of inter
ference in the internal administration of the country,
which is absolutely incompatible with the indepen
dence of the Sultan.
Let us now return to Europe, and let us see what
our, Plenipotentiaries were doing there. They were

1 86 THE CONGRESS AND THE
always at the same work. Almost wherever we open
the Protocols we find them fighting to restrict the
area of freedom, and to keep as much territory as
possible under the direct Government of the Sultan.
The theory on which they acted was that everything
gained by the Christian populations was so much
gained by Russia. This is a theory which, when acted
upon practically by England, goes a very long way to
fulfil itself. Nothing could be so powerful in esta
blishing the influence of Russia over those populations,
as the spectacle of England contesting every inch of
ground which was to be redeemed from Turkish mis-
government. Yet this is the spectacle presented to us
whenever we open the doors of the Congress at Berlin.
Thus the English Plenipotentiaries always fought hard
to limit as much as possible the area of the new Prin
cipality of Bulgaria, and when they could not succeed
in depriving it of some particular district, the plan
they proceeded upon was to demand as a compensation
to Turkey and to England, that some other district
should be abstracted from the new Eastern Roumelia.
In this way even the limited privileges of "autono
mous administration," which had been the demand of
England at the Conference of Constantinople over a
much wider area, were now to be confined within
geographical limits as restricted as possible. We
have an excellent illustration of this in the higgling
which took place over the western boundaries of the
new Principality. Russia had from the beginning

TREATY OF BERLIN. 187
insisted on including in the Principality the important
town and sandjak (district) of Sofia. At a private
meeting of the Powers, held on the 18th of June,
the English Plenipotentiaries had been obliged to
agree to this, subject to a "strategic rectification"
of the frontier line of the district in the interests
of Turkey. But they had given their consent
very reluctantly, and had driven a very hard bar
gain by way of compensation. They tried to get
the important harbour of Varna on the Black Sea
withdrawn from the Principality that it might be
kept " in the hands of the Turks." Or, failing this,
they insisted that two important valleys — namely,
those of the Mesta Karasou and the Strouma
Karasou — should be abstracted from the new Province
of Eastern Roumelia.* Thus the consent of England
to the inclusion of the Sandjak of Sofia in the new
Principality had to be bought by Russia, either by
giving Varna to be held by the Turks, or by excluding
two fine districts to the south of the Balkans from the
benefits of even autonomous institutions. Russia,
very wisely, accepted this last as the least injurious of
the two alternatives, and the new Principality was thus
secured an outlet to the Euxine. This arrangement
was sanctioned by the Congress at its fourth sitting,
held on the 22nd of June.f

* Turkey, XXXIX., 1878, No. 9, Inclos., p. 27.
t Ibid., p. 50.

1 88 THE CONGRESS AND THE
But the British Plenipotentiaries had not yet ex
hausted their ingenuity in bargaining on behalf of
Turkey. At the fifteenth sitting of the Congress, held
on the 8th of July, we find them 'working hard to
make the most out of the point which still remained
unsettled — namely, the strategic rectification .of the
frontier line of the Sandjak of Sofia. The object was
to bring the Turks as close as possible to this impor
tant town, and to cut off from the Principality as
much as possible to the east and to the south. The
spirit of huckstering in which this contest was carried
on may be illustrated by a single example. England
had consented to give the Sandjak of Sofia to Bul
garia in return for the consent of Russia that the two
valleys of the Strouma and Mesta should be taken off
Eastern Roumelia and restored to Turkey. But on
examination it was found that part of the Strouma
Valley had always belonged to the Sandjak of Sofia.
Consequently, that part of the valley formed no part
of the required subtraction from Roumelia. Conse
quently, also, something remained still due to Turkey,
to be cut off from Bulgaria, south of the Sandjak
altogether. This was the reason why the British
Plenipotentiaries had voted for the larger extent of
"rectification" now complained of by Russia as
amounting to more than a mere rectification — to a
substantial cession of territory which had been agreed
upon as belonging, to Bulgaria. To this very sharp
practice Count Schouvaloff retorted that the bargain

TREATY OF BERLIN. 189
England had driven was that fhe Strouma Valley
should be excluded from Eastern Roumelia. If any
part of it had never belonged to that Province, it
could not be subtracted from it, and no. compensation
elsewhere could be demanded for it. It is needless to
follow farther this petty work. Lord Salisbury in his
despatch to the Government at home, of July 8,
boasted that "the frontier of Roumelia in the direc
tion of Sofia was agreed upon in a manner satisfactory
to fhe Turkish Plenipotentiaries."* Russia, however,
had effected some compromise. The general result is
that Russia succeeded in establishing the new Princi
pality upon ground which outflanks the Balkan —
which lies to the south of that great water-shed, and
which consequently embraces the upper course of
streams falling into the ^Egean.
The same spirit was shown by the British Plenipo
tentiaries throughout the Congress. Whether the
question concerned the area of the new Principality
or the area of the new autonomous Province, or the
amount of territory to be added to Servia, or the
amount of territory to be added to gallant and vic
torious Montenegro, the voice of the English Cabinet
was uniformly given against every enlargement of the
" bounds of freedom," and also, as we have seen, in
favour of every possible restriction even on the
autonomous institutions which it was compelled to
sanction. * Ibid., p. 187.

1 90 THE'1 CONGRESS AND THE
The one dominant idea of the British Government
was to keep as much as possible in the hands of the
Turks. They could not conceal their antipathy to
everything which recorded the triumph of Russia and
her allies in the cause of the Christian populations. If
there was one subordinate agency in that triumph
which might have had the sympathy of Englishmen,
it was surely the Principality of Montenegro; The
splendid gallantry of its people, and the long historic
duration of its contest with the Moslem, ought to have
commanded the admiration and the cordial, acknow
ledgment of the representatives of the British Govern
ment. But it was not so. Montenegro had committed
the unpardonable sin of fighting in alliance with
Russia, and of fighting, too, for the freedom of other
people than her own. Consequently, at the tenth
sitting of the Congress, on the ist of July, when the
Second Article of the Treaty of San Stefano came
under discussion, the English Foreign Secretary
moved an amendment which it is difficult to
interpret otherwise than as a mere expression of
hostile feeling. The Article ran thus : — " The Sub
lime Porte definitively recognises the independence
of the Principality of Montenegro." Upon this
paragraph being read, " Lord Salisbury said that
his Government have never recognised its independ
ence, and demanded the suppression of the word
definitive."* No other Plenipotentiary joined in this
* Ibid., p. 157.

TREATY OF BERLIN. . 191
demand. The Congress seems to have treated it with
indifference, if not contempt. It was referred as a
mere question of form to the " Drafting Committee."
But in this body the sentiment of Lord Salisbury
appears to have prevailed, because in Article XXVI.
of the Treaty of Berlin the word definitive is wanting.
This is one of the diplomatic triumphs of our Pleni
potentiaries at Berlin, for which England has been
called upon to be proud and grateful.
And now we come upon another more important
result of this temper and disposition, which in itself
is highly discreditable to the British Government, and
may not improbably be the cause of great future em
barrassment. By the Treaty of San Stefano Russia
had not only established a much larger Province of
Bulgaria, but she had stipulated for autonomous in
stitutions, more or less effectually restrictive of Turkish
tyranny, in the Provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
of Thessaly and of Epirus. But she had done more
than this. After all the deductions from the direct
dominion of the Sultan which were secured by these
provisions, — by the large Bulgaria, by the enlarged
Servia, and by the autonomous institutions of the
other Provinces above enumerated, — there still re
mained a very considerable extent of territory left to
the Sultan which did not belong to any one of these
Provinces, and which would have remained without
any security whatever against the worst abuses of
Turkish administration. Russia had provided against

192 THE CONGRESS AND THE
this omission. The Emperor had promised in his Pro
clamation, when he crossed the Danube, that he had
come to liberate the Christian population in the whole
of the Balkan Peninsula. Accordingly, in Article
XV. of the Treaty of San Stefano, after providing for
constitutional securities in Crete, and in Epirus, and
in Thessaly, these words were added : — " And the
other parts of Turkey in Europe, for which a special
constitution is not provided in the present Act."
These words covered the whole of European Turkey.
It is needless to point out that the importance of
this provision became immensely greater after the
result of the Berlin negotiations. Large areas of
country were cut off from the Provinces which were
to have independent or semi-independent institutions.
Less than Russia intended was given to Servia, less
to Montenegro, less to Bulgaria, less to Eastern Rou
melia ; and the whole difference went to swell the
bulk of country which was to be restored to the
Sultan, without any stipulation whatever, for a re
formed administration.
At the thirteenth sitting of the Congress, held on
the 5th of July, Article XV. of the Treaty of San
Stefano came under the consideration of the Plenipo
tentiaries. It was impossible to deny its reasonable
ness. It could not be opposed altogether. But the
next best thing to do with any stipulation obnoxious
to the Porte was to insert some condition or qualifica
tion which should have the effect of enabling the

TREATY OF BERLIN. 193,
Turkish Government itself to neutralise its effect.
Accordingly this expedient was resorted to by the
English Ministers. By the San Stefano Article,
" Special Commissions" in each Province were to be
entrusted with the task of elaborating the details of
the new institutions. This was in strict accordance
with the whole contention of the Powers before, and
during, and since the Conference of Constantinople.
That contention was that nothing could be secure which
was left dependent wholly on the Porte. Lord Salis
bury now moved that after the words "Special Com
missions, &c, shall be charged," these words should
be inserted, "by the Sublime Porte,"* That is to
say, the whole stipulation was made dependent on the
pleasure of the Sultan's Government — than which no
Government in the world knows better how to check
mate any movement in favour of purity of adminis
tration by insurmountable obstacles of dilatoriness
and deceit.
At the fourteenth sitting of the Congress, held on the
6th of July, Russia again called attention to the increased
importance of Article XV- of the Treaty of San Stefano,
and expressed some anxiety as to the universal appli
cation of the corresponding Article which had been
agreed to in the new Treaty then under consideration
(Article XXHL). This elicited from Prince Bismarck,
President of the Congress, an "emphatic declaration

* Ibid., p. 197.
VOL. II. O

194 THE CONGRESS AND THE
that Article XV. of San Stefano had been adopted by
the Congress in its entirety,, and that " it extends it
in principle to all portions of the Empire."* It is
evident that, although this declaration is satisfac
tory in itself, it is one which records the intention of
the Congress, and nothing more. Lord Salisbury's
amendment had the effect of depriving the Article of
all self-working power. Yet each and every one of
the Signatory Powers must retain its right to insist
On the fulfilment of the Article by the Porte. The
result is that we have in this Article little more than
a melancholy record of the shortsightedness of the
English Government, and a fertile source of future
contests between all who are concerned.
There remains, however, to be noted one other
illustration of the policy of the British Plenipoten
tiaries which is equally significant, and may very pro
bably be the source of endless future complications.
At the fifteenth sitting of the Congress, on the 8th
of July, the first Russian Plenipotentiary read to the
Assembly an important communication which he had
been ordered by his Government to make. It set
forth that Russia had made great sacrifices during
the1 war, and some sacrifices not inconsiderable since
the war, in order to come to a good understanding
with the rest of Europe. She had a right to expect
that these sacrifices were not to be made gratuitously,
* Ibid., p. 212.

TREA TY OF BERLIN. 1 95
and that the work which had been done should not
be fruitless through want of execution. It was from
this cause that previous attempts at the pacification
of the East had failed. Russia could not accept the
prospect of a renewal of the painful crises such as that
to which the Congress had been summoned to put an
end. The Russian Plenipotentiaries had therefore
been ordered to " ask the Congress before it concluded
its labours by what principles and in what manner it
proposed to insure the execution of its high decisions."*
The consideration of this communication was made
the order of the day for the next meeting of the
Assembly. At that meeting, the sixteenth, held on the9th of July,
the Turkish Plenipotentiary declared that he " could
not grasp the bearing of the Russian document." But
he proceeded to make a speech which showed that he
grasped it well enough. Parts of -the Treaty, he said,
would come into immediate execution, other parts
were to be executed through Special Commissions
appointed for the purpose. And if there were some
parts not falling within either of those categories, for
these the Congress had the assurances of the Ottoman
Government that its resolutions would be put into
execution with the least possible delay. What could
any human being desire more satisfactory than the
renewed promises of the Porte ?

* Ibid., p. 232.
O 2

196 THE CONGRESS AND THE
The President, Prince Bismarck, was very cautious
a nd very adroit. He did not think that each State
separately should be obliged by Treaty to use force
for the execution of the Treaty. If the Powers en
gaged themselves jointly to use force at need, they
would run the risk of provoking among themselves
grave disunion. But, on the other hand, if Russia
would be satisfied by a draft " indicating that the sum
total of the obligations signed in the Treaty should
form a whole, the execution of which the Powers would
oblige their representatives at Constantinople to
watch over, reserving to themselves the right of taking
counsel in case this execution should be defective or
slow," then he, the President, would entertain no
objection to the Russian proposal. The Russian
Plenipotentiaries accepted Prince Bismarck's interpre
tation of that which they desired, and undertook to
prepare a draft by which effect would be given to it.
At the seventeenth meeting of the Congress, held on
the ioth of July, the Russian draft was produced. It
consisted of two propositions. The first declared that
" the stipulations of the new Treaty were regarded by
the Congress as forming a combination of stipulations,
the execution of which the Powers engage to control
and superintend, whilst insisting on their being carried
out entirely in conformity with their intentions." The
second proposition declared that they reserved to
themselves the right to come to an understanding, in
case of need, as to the requisite means to insure a

TREATY OF BERLIN. 197
result which neither the general interests of Europe
nor the dignity of the Great Powers permit them to
leave invalid. Again the discussion was postponed
till the next meeting, — not, however, before Lord
Salisbury had intimated the opposition of England to
any " declaration of this nature."* Prince Bismarck,
on the contrary, intimated his opinion that the idea
expressed in the first of the two Russian propositions
would be unanimously approved by the Congress.
At last, on the 1 ith of July, in the eighteenth sitting
of the Congress, the Russian proposal was finally dis
posed of, and the manner in which it was disposed of is
very curious. Austria at once accepted the principle
involved in the first Russian proposition, but wished
it to be embodied in shorter and simpler terms. Her
Plenipotentiary accordingly moved to substitute for
the Russian form the following simpler draft : — " The
High Contracting Parties look upon the totality of the
Articles of the present Act (Treaty) as forming a col
lection of stipulations of which they undertake to
control and superintend the execution."
Short as this formula was, it involved and sanctioned
the principle, not only that the Powers intended to
give obligatory force to the provisions of the Treaty
.{for this, of course, is involved and assumed in the
very signing of such an instrument), but, also that they
recognised the duty of enforcing compliance with the

* Ibid,, p. 253.

i98 THE CONGRESS AND THE
provisions of the Treaty upon all those who had duties
to perform in virtue of those provisions. Turkey and
her friends immediately perceived the danger. She
might positively be coerced to perform her promises
to Europe. But as this was not an objection which
it was expedient to dwell too much upon, some other
must be found. Lord Salisbury resorted to the truly
Turkish device of declaring that " he could not com
prehend the object of the Russian proposal." He
knew no sanction more solemn or more binding than
the signature of his Government. Prince Bismarck
asked whether the objection of the English Plenipo
tentiary extended to the amended proposition of
Austria-Hungary, and expressed his own opinion that
"it would not be undesirable to express that the
Congress undertakes to superintend and control the
carrying out of its work, and that such a declaration
would be in no respect unusual."* The Turkish
Plenipotentiary did not conceal his perfect compre
hension of the scope and bearing of the declaration.
Turkey would not be so free as she hitherto had been
to break her promises with impunity. "The Porte
would thus find itself obliged to admit within its own
limits the control of other States." Here we have the
same ground taken as in the Conference of Constan
tinople, and before the war. It is impossible not to
admire the imperturbable obstinacy with which Turks

* Ibid., p. 265.

TREA TY OF BERLIN. 199
can maintain their point. This speech of the Turkish
Plenipotentiary on the one hand, and the strong and
repeated declaration of the President that he thought
the Russian proposal a reasonable one, seem to have
made Lord Salisbury more cautious in any farther
development of his objections. He saw that by a less
dangerous course he could probably frustrate the
Russian proposition altogether. France was, above
all things, bent on avoiding any possible entanglement
in the Eastern Question. Her one idea is well known
to be to husband every resource for a contest in which
she is far more vitally concerned. Italy, for. other
reasons, had the same desire of keeping her freedom
of action unembarrassed. The simple abstention from
giving any vote by England, France, and Italy,
together with the hostility of Turkey, would be suffi
cient to prevent the adoption by Congress of the
Russian proposaL Russia agreed, indeed, to modify
that proposal so as to make it very nearly identical
with that of Austria-Hungary. The Austrian Pleni
potentiary then accepted it. But nothing could induce
the British. Plenipotentiaries to vote for any proposal
which looked in the direction of interference with the
free-will of the Turks. Accordingly, when the vote came
to be taken on the modified proposal of Russia, Eng
land, France, and Italy took the course of reserving
their vote. Turkey, of course, was adverse. Russia,
•„ Germany, and Austria were insufficient to carry the
proposition. It therefore fell to the ground, and thus

200 THE CONGRESS AND THE
through the opposition of the British Plenipotentiaries
all executive force is taken from the Treaty of Berlin,
and a great part of its provisions have no other security
than Turkish promises on the one hand, and Russian
promises on the other.
It is time, however, now to stand back a little from
the canvas, and to regard the picture presented by
the work of the Berlin Congress, not in its details, but
in its general effect.
Looking at it from this better point of view, there
is one great general result which is apparent at a
glance. With three exceptions, presently to be
specified, everything which is good and hopeful in
the Treaty of Berlin comes straight from the Treaty
of San Stefano. That is to say, that, saving and
excepting the three points referred to, everything
that has been gained to the cause of human
freedom in the East of Europe by the Treaty of
Berlin, has been gained wholly and entirely by the
sword of Russia. It need not have been so. It
ought not to have been so. But so it is. This is
not a pleasant conclusion to arrive at ; and the facts
which prove it are a serious deduction from the
benefits which the arrangements sanctioned by the
Treaty are otherwise calculated to secure. But the
best remedy for the evil is to be found in the frank
recognition of it as an indisputable fact, and in that
amendment of policy for the future, of , which the
acknowledgment of past errors is an essential part.

TREATY OF BERLIN. 201
Let us now see what are the three good provisions in
the Treaty of Berlin which are not taken from the
Treaty of San Stefano. In the first place, the occupa
tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria- Hungary
is, in my opinion, on the grounds before indicated, a
better solution of the difficulties affecting those Pro
vinces than the solution which was provided by the
Treaty of San Stefano. Institutions framed on the
model which has not worked very well in Crete were still
less likely to be successful in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In the second place, so much of the deduction of
territory from the Bulgaria of San Stefano as was
necessary to exclude from it districts purely or
mainly Greek, was a useful, and indeed almost a
necessary amendment of that Treaty. In the third
place, the insertion of the various words and phrases
which were required to substitute the right of Europe
for any exclusive rights which had been assigned to
Russia in the protectorate of the subject populations
of Turkey, was an amendment still more valuable in
respect to the principle which is involved. All these
• provisions, however, were mere amendments of the
Treaty of San Stefano. To the first of them Russia
gave her cordial assent ; to the second, she does not
seem to have offered any serious opposition ; and to
the third, so far as appears, she submitted without
remonstrance. Putting, then, these three provisions aside, and remem
bering that they are in their very nature nothing more

202 THE CONGRESS AND THE
than rectifications of the substantial work which had
been done by Russia, we find that the whole pith and
substance of the Treaty of Berlin is a mere adoption,
more or less grudging and reluctant, of the great
deliverances effected by the Treaty of San Stefano.
The final redemption of all the Danubian Principali
ties from even the nominal yoke of Turkey ; the en
largement of the Servian territory ; the final and
public recognition of the independence of the gallant
mountaineers who, in the Black Mountain, had for
centuries kept the Turks at bay when all around them
had succumbed; the erection of Northern Bulgariainto a
Christian Principality, owing nothing but a fixed tribute
to the Porte ; the destruction of the great fortresses on
the Danube, which had so long been the strongholds
of Turkish military resistance ; the establishment to
the south of the Balkan of a Province, of which the
governor must be a Christian, in which the Sultan
cannot even choose what Christian he pleases, but
must submit his selection to the sanction of other
Powers — a Province in which the Sovereign cannot
quarter his own army, and in which the militia is to a
considerable extent independent of him ; the public
sanction given, by a European Treaty, to the principle
that Turkey, in eveiy part of her dominions, is under
engagement to the Christian Powers to amend her
administration, and that each and all of them have a
right of interference if she fails to do so ; — these are the
solid gains in the cause of freedom in the East of
Europe which the Treaty of Berlin sanctions, and they

TREATY OF BERLIN. 203
are every one of them due to Russia, and to the
Treaty she extorted by arms from Turkey. Not one
of these great steps in the history of human progress
would have been gained if the policy of the English
Cabinet had prevailed. They all belong to that class
of results of which Lord Salisbury so frankly said, at
the beginning of the Congress, that England " could
not annihilate them."
Unfortunately there is even more than this to be
said. Not only would these great gains to humanity
have been lost if the policy of the English Cabinet
had prevailed, but there is the strongest ground
for believing, as I have shown in the previous chap
ters of this work, that, in that event, the condition
of the Christian populations of Turkey would have
been rendered even more intolerable than before.
The pusillanimous abandonment of duties sanctioned
by Treaty, but resting really upon transactions of
which Treaties were nothing but a record, was
defended ostensibly upon arguments of international
law which would have asserted for the Government of
the Sultan an unlimited right of spoliation and of
massacre. But in reality that abandonment of duty
was prompted by motives having a deeper seat.
Motives of assumed self-interest of the narrowest
kind, as shortsighted as they were immoral, led a
large portion of the political classes of England to
avow and defend the doctrine that the welfare of the
- subject populations of the Porte was quite a secondary
consideration compared with the policy of maintaining

204 THE CONGRESS AND THE
and defending the Government of the Sultan. The
establishment of this doctrine had a direct and
inevitable tendency to make that Government more
and more reckless and corrupt. Fortunately a very
large portion of the people of Great Britain, which,
whether it was a majority or not, was quite large
enough to make its power felt, protested against this
doctrine, and effectually prevented any action being
taken in its sense. But they could do no more than
neutralise the action of the Cabinet : they could not
give it a right direction. The sad result was that in
the great work of liberation in the East of Europe
England has had no share, and that her official attitude
was at least that of sulky and reluctant acquiescence.
Everything was left to Russia, and everything was
done by her.
I am one of those who think that this was a great
misfortune, because Russia, although a civilising
Power in Central Asia, cannot have the same cha
racter in any advances she may make among the
Christian States of Europe. Her ancient and here
ditary hostility to the Moslem Empire of the Turks
has made her power a fitting instrument in the gradual
destruction of the most desolating dominion that has
ever cursed the world. She has made out of the transac
tion some profit for herself, as she could not fail to do.
But the greatest of all her gains was in the attitude of
England at the Berlin Congress. Higgling over every
inch of territory, and over every item of political
freedom which Russia had secured for the Christian

treaty of Berlin. 205
populations of Turkey, the British Plenipotentiaries
did their very best to give to Russia a place and rank
in the affections of that population which will give her
an immense advantage in the contests which are yet
to be. The Russian Plenipotentiaries may well be
envied the opportunity of retort which was afforded to
them by a somewhat vaporous speech of M. Wadding-
ton at the eighteenth meeting of the Congress. He spoke
of the sacrifices which the Congress had imposed upon
Turkey. To this Count Schouvaloff replied with effect,
that the sacrifices which had been imposed upon
Turkey " were not the work of the Congress, but the
consequence of the war." It was not Europe, it was
Russia, by her own unaided efforts, that had wrung from
Turkey those sacrifices which were the hope of the
subject populations. The Congress, and the English
Plenipotentiaries especially, did nothing but sanction
what they could not prevent, and limit to the utmost
those liberties which, for very shame, they could not
altogether refuse.
Looking again at the work of the Congress from
the most important of all points of yiew, — namely,
that in which it is seen in connexion with the probable
future of those countries, — it is impossible to see in it
a work of wisdom. It is true, indeed, that the public
mind of Europe was not yet fully prepared to deal
with the final problem of the possession of Constan
tinople, and the complete exclusion of Turkish Govern
ment from every corner of Europe. So long ago as
1829, the Duke of Wellington was prepared to see that

206 THE CONGRESS AND THE
problem solved, and declared his opinion that it was
a pity the solution of it should be postponed. But
any attempt to dispose of this question in 1878 would
probably have led to an European war, and Russia
herself did not seek or desire to precipitate a decision.
The Congress of Berlin is therefore not to be blamed
if it assumed that something of Turkey in Europe
was for the present to remain. But, on the other hand,
the evidences of her growing corruption and decline
had been accumulating so rapidly in recent years, and
her defeat by Russia had been so crushing and com
plete, that not even the most bigoted victim of ancient
superstitions could fail to see that, though the end is
not yet, it is coming soon. Under these circumstances
it would have been obviously wise to make at once
such territorial changes in the natural direction as
could be made with the general consent of Europe,
and to do everything that was possible to prepare the
way for the gradual and peaceful accomplishment of
such other changes of the same kind as remain to be
effected. First and foremost among the changes
which might have been made at once, not only with
out risk of quarrel among the Governments of Europe,
but with their universal approval, was the transfer of
Thessaly and Epirus to Greece. They are abominably
misgoverned. They yield little to the Porte, and the
chronic discontent of the population compels Turkey
to hold them with a large military force. On the other -
hand, the Greek Kingdom, which it is eminently the
interest of England to support and encourage, is

TREATY OF BERLIN. 207
unnaturally cramped and confined without these Pro
vinces. The postponement of this transfer by the
Congress of Berlin was a political blunder of the first
magnitude, and there is every reason to believe that
this blunder was entirely due to the influence and the
action of the British Government.
Again, as regards the Principality of Bulgaria, the
work of the Congress was not only incomplete, but to
a large extent it was mischievous and most embar
rassing for the future. It was quite right indeed, as
I have said before, to exclude from that Province
districts which were mainly Greek. But the device
of cutting off from it areas of country to the south of
the Balkans which are peopled by the same race, and
with the same political aspirations, was one which can
only end in mischief. The southern Province is to
be endowed with just so much of freedom as must
bring it into constant collision with the Turkish
Government, must inspire it with a determined
desire for more complete emancipation, and must
furnish it at the same time with large opportunities
and facilities for successfully working towards the
desired end. It is an arrangement essentially un
natural, artificial, and ingeniously inexpedient. And
then, what are we to say of the elaborate provisions
to enable the Turks to hold the Balkans as a military
frontier ? Is there any man so blind as to suppose that,
when the day of contest comes, this provision can in
any way determine its result, or do anything but make
the war more bloody than it had need to be ? The

2o8" THE CONGRESS AND THE
possession of Sofia by the new Principality turns the,
Balkans on the west, whilst the Servian State, which,
in any war involving the fate of Moslem power in
Europe, must necessarily take the Christian side,
gives ready access to the heart of the Roumelian
Province. On the east, the Principality of Bulgaria
has been placed in possession of Varna, on the Black
Sea, at which point Russia can co-operate with that
revived and regenerated fleet which she is sure to
establish in the Euxine. Nothing proves more clearly
the unpremeditated character of this last war with
Turkey on the part of Russia, than the fact that,
although she had been free for five years to
reconstitute her Black Sea fleet, she had not done
so, and that Turkey was as predominant in that
sea when the war broke out as if the clauses in the
Treaty of 1856, restricting Russia in this matter,
had never been repealed. But, of course, Russia
will not allow herself much longer to be in this
position of inferiority to a Power which she hates and
despises. It must therefore be counted upon as a
certainty that Russia will construct a fleet in the
Black. Sea sufficient to enable her to cope with
Hobart Pacha and his successors. The Balkans will
then be outflanked at both ends. We know what
the worth of the Balkans has been to Turkey in
the way of enabling her to stop the Russian advance,
even when she held in front of it the line of the
Danube, and the great fortresses of Schumla, Rustchuk,
and Silistria ; when she was in secure possession of

TREATY OF BERLIN. 209
Sofia, on the one flank, and of the Black Sea upon
the other. We can estimate therefore what the value
of it will be for the same purpose when she has none
of these advantages — when She holds nothing but a
long and extended ridge of mountains, capable of being
forced at many points.
And then there is another matter in which the
Treaty of Berlin leaves behind it nothing but con
fusion. Article XIX. of the Treaty of San Stefano
had saddled on Turkey the enormous money indemnity
of 1410 millions of roubles. It had, however, consented
to strike off from that sum 1100 millions of roubles
for value received in the territorial cessions in Asia
and in Europe. There still remained, however, 310
millions of roubles, which was imposed as a debt
upon Turkey. In the bankrupt condition of Turkish
finance — bankrupt before the war, and still more
insolvent after it — this is a very serious obligation.
In the eleventh meeting of the Congress, held on
the 2nd of July, the Turks protested against it,
and pointed out the impossibility of their being able
to. pay such a sum if they were to pay their other
debts, and if they were to spend anything on adminis
trative reforms. Lord Salisbury observed that, if
this indemnity were to be convertible into farther
territorial cessions, the English Plenipotentiaries
would resist it altogether. But the substantial sur
render of this point to Russia had no doubt been
settled beforehand under the Secret Agreement.
VOL. II. P

2io THE CONGRESS AND THE
Russia consented to declare that in no case would
she demand farther territorial cessions on account of
the indemnity, nor would she claim any preferential
security over the previous creditors of Turkey. The
acceptance of this as a solution of the difficulty is of a
piece with the acceptance of the Russian declaration
in respect to the commercial freedom of the port of
Batoum. The Russian declaration may be satisfac
tory to the holders of Turkish Bonds, but it does not
in any degree mitigate the political effect of Russia
being a creditor to Turkey for so large an amount of
debt. The sum due to Russia may not come before
the other creditors of Turkey But it comes before
her own most necessary expenses. It comes before
the payment of her army and navy ; it comes be
fore the payment of a reformed judiciary; it comes
before the expenditure on new roads and bridges ; it
comes before every one of the thousand demands
upon the Turkish Government which are essential to
an improved administration.
It may be true, as the Russian Plenipotentiaries
said, that not more than one-third of the revenues
actually raised from the people ever reached the
Imperial Treasury, the remaining two-thirds being
absorbed by the corrupt and vicious system of
collection. It may be true that reform in this matter
Would yield a margin out of which all obligations
could be discharged. But this observation indicates
the special interest and the special right which

TREA TY OF BERLIN. 2 1 1
Russia has acquired to make herself heard on the
large and wide subject of Turkish administrative
reform. I do not mean to argue that the British
Plenipotentiaries ought to have resisted the San
Stefano Article which imposed the indemnity Russia
had incurred an enormous expenditure to secure
results which all Europe, and England especially,
had at least professed to desire. She did secure them,
and the Congress at Berlin did little but give to them
a formal sanction. Russia had a full right to demand,
after a victorious war, compensation for the treasure
she had spent ; and large as that compensation was,
it is very doubtful whether it covered the outlay. But
it is not to be concealed that the establishment on the
part of Russia of such a debt against the dilapidated
and well-nigh exhausted resources of the Turkish
Government, is one of the grave consequences which
have followed directly from the conduct of the British
Cabinet. It was they, more than any other agency,
who impeded and prevented that common action and
concert of the Powers which could alone take out of
the hands of Russia functions which it was the
common duty and the common policy of Europe, to
discharge. It was too late at Berlin to retrieve the
error. The British Plenipotentiaries were obliged to
yield on every one of the principal demands which
Russia had made on her own account. This indem
nify was one of them. It cannot fail to be a standing
cause of trouble. It is one of the many elements of
P 2

212 THE CONGRESS AND THE
confusion which remain as the monument of perverted
sympathies, of lost opportunities^ of neglected duties.
But although the compulsory acquiescence of the
Berlin Congress, and especially of the British Pleni
potentiaries, in this Russian demand, was in itself
rather a humiliation, it was by no means so great a
humiliation as the boastful or deceptive language
under which all these submissions were concealed.
We have seen from an analysis of the provisions of
the Treaties of San Stefano and of Berlin, together with
the Anglo-Turkish Convention, how much remains of
independence to the Government of the Sultan. Bound
hand and foot by a number of stipulations concerning
her most purely internal concerns, and bound by
these stipulations to each and to all the Powers under
the most various and complicated conditions, Turkey
is now not only a dependent State, but it is dependent
under bonds which do not even leave it the rights which
have been given to its dismembered Provinces — the
rights of what are called "administrative autonomy."
Yet, in consenting to these stipulations as part of the
Treaty of Berlin, the English Prime Minister thought it
worth his while to declare that it had been established
by unanimous consent that the Sultan, as a member
of the political body of Europe, is to enjoy a position
which shall secure to him the respect of his sovereign
rights,* and again that " the Sultan should be master
in his own dominions."t Prince Gortchakow was

* Ibid., p. 48- t Ibid., p. 89.

TREA TY OF BERLIN. 2 1 3
able to administer to this sort of language a severe
and a proud rebuke. He said that " he and his col
leagues representing Russia had presented not phrases,
but facts to the High Assembly." 1
Looking now at fhe Treaty of Berlin as a whole,
we cannot be too grateful for some of its results. In
the first place, it was a public confession on the part
of the English Cabinet that a war with Russia was
not justifiable for the purpose of preventing her from
securing the substantial gains she had won for herself
by war and in the Treaty of San Stefano. In the
second place, it was a public confession that such a
war was impossible for the purpose of supporting
Turkey against the main provisions secured by the
same Treaty on behalf of the subject populations of
Turkey. In the third place, it took a long step for
wards in the direction of the final partition of the
Sultan's European dominions, redeeming from even
the forms of vassalage the old Danubian Principalities,
and establishing in two other important Provinces
institutions which must lead to future independence.
In the fourth place, it embodied in the public law of
Europe the fertile principle that the Sultan is under
pledge to the other Powers in respect to the good
government of all the dominions that remain to him,
whether in Europe or in Asia. All these great ele
ments of good ought to be acknowledged, although
most unfortunately every one of them has been due
to the interests and to the power and to the policy of
Russia. On the other hand, there are some great evils

2 1 4 THE TREA TY OF BERLIN.
connected with the Treaty and the proceedings of
the Congress, which constitute serious deductions from
the good it has effected. In the first place, it has
postponed the settlement of some points which were
ripe for solution, which can only be settled in one
way, and which it is only too probable cannot now
be settled without another war. In the second place,
it clogged the institutions of autonomous administra
tion, which it professed to confer upon Eastern
Roumelia, with provisions conceived in the interests
of the Turks, which are incongruous and inconsistent,
and are sure to be the source of future trouble. In
the third place, the Treaty has left the joint and
several rights of the Signatory Powers in respect to
the Protectorate over the subject populations of
Turkey in a state of utter confusion, without the
indication even of any methods of operation, or any
provision whatever against the intrusion of selfish and
exclusive action as opportunities may arise. In the
fourth and last place — and this, perhaps, is the crown
ing evil of all — the whole proceedings of the Congress
have exhibited the English Government as jealous of,
and hostile to, the growing power and advancing free
dom of the Christian populations, and Russia as the
only Power which is heartily on their side. For all
these deductions from the value of the Treaty of
Berlin the Cabinet of the Queen is mainly, if not
exclusively, responsible. They are results, in my
opinion, damaging to the interests of England, and
to the honour of the British Crown.

RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN. 215

CHAPTER XIV.
OUR RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN FROM THE
FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO THE AGREEMENT WITH
RUSSIA IN 1873.
OUR Indian Empire is having a very marked effect on
the national temper. We regard if with a passionate
pride and with a passionate jealousy. These feelings
are but slightly founded on any deliberate estimate of
the good we may be doing there. That good may be
very great, but the contemplation of it is an after
thought. It has been so with conquering races in all
times. The spread of the Roman Empire carried
with it the spread of Roman civilisation, and scattered
wide over the world the seeds of Roman law. But
this thought was not in the mind pf Roman senators
or of Roman generals. It did not inspire the march
of Caesar, or build the walls of Trajan. Many of those
who are most proud and most jealous of India would
be the first to disclaim, almost with disgust, the
purely humanitarian estimate qf our position in the
East- They are not thinking, unless in a very
secondary degree, of extended civilisation, — of the
diffusion of Christian knowledge, — of the wider area

216 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
given to just and equal laws. Neither the School
master, nor the Missionary, nor the Jurist, is the
symbol of that which we adore. It is the Imperial
Sceptre of the Moguls. It is the Throne of Delhi.
The small group of clever Englishmen who call
themselves Positivists, and who bow down before the
dry bones of Comte's Philosophy, have lately been good
enough to intimate that they disapprove of our Indian
Empire. It is always inspiriting to see the courage
or the audacity of small minorities. If these writers
would help to make their countrymen a little less
nervous and a little more just, in questions affecting
our interests in India, they would be doing good
service. But if they preach the doctrine that we
ought to have no interests and no duties there — then
dogs baying at the moon are creatures employed in
an avocation quite as useful and quite as hopeful.
The pure Instinct of Dominion, unadulterated by any
other feeling more rational than itself, is one of the
very strongest of human passions. It has always
been strongest with the strongest races ; and through
them it has been the most powerful of all agencies in
the history of human progress. Never perhaps has if
had a more legitimate field of application than in the
British conquest of India. That conquest came upon
us unawares, without forethought and without design.
It was begun by a few servants of a " Company of
Merchants trading to the East Indies," and its strong
•foundations were laid by men who acted against the

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 217
orders of Directors, against the policy of the Crown,
and against the jealousy of Parliament. It grew out
of the pure ascendency of superior mind. It upset
nothing which was worth preserving. The Maho
medan conquerors of India had spent their force, and
the Empire they founded had sunk far in that irre
mediable decline which is now visibly affecting every
Moslem Government in the world. The thrones of
Hindostan had long been the prize of every Palace
intriguer, or the prey of every soldier of fortune. Our
conquest of India has not been effected by foreign
troops, but mainly by the native races yielding them
selves to our cause, and fighting for it with incor
ruptible devotion. The power of inspiring that
devotion, and of yoking it to our service, are the best
title and the best justification of the Empire which it
has won.
But the pride of possession and the instinct of domi
nion, like all other primary passions of the mind, are
liable to irrational excesses and dangerous abuse.
And never has this abuse been more signally illustrated
than in the temper of mind which has been engendered
in a very large section of English politicians. In
particular, the jealousy and the fear of Russia have
become a mania. It dictates towards that Power a
policy of chronic suspicion, only varied by paroxysms
of undignified alarm. This is bad enough, but it is
not the worst. The fact that Russia is a Power
possessed of an Asiatic Empire much older than that

218 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
of England, that she is advancing her possessions
there from analogous causes and with like effects,
and that she may therefore ultimately come into a
geographical position co-terminous with our own —
this is a fact and a prospect which it is wise to bear
in mind, and which must influence our conduct
in many ways. But that influence ceases to be
safe or legitimate when it overbears every other
consideration, and sits like a nightmare on every
conception we have of our duties in foreign policy,
whether in Europe or in Asia. It is not too much to
say that this is what the fear and the hatred of Russia
have come to be. On account of it, the Government
of Lord Aberdeen was seriously blamed for not having
widened the area of bloodshed in the Crimean contest,
and for not having aimed at raising revolutionary wars
in Poland and in the Caucasus. On account of it, we
have a man so able and so experienced as Sir Henry
Rawlinson implying regret that we had not then spent
the blood and the treasure of England in securing the
assistance and in establishing the independence of the
most ruthless savages that exist in any portion of the
world.* On account of it, we think it legitimate to
support in Europe the corrupt and desolating Govern
ment of the Turks, and to proclaim openly that we con
sider the welfare of the subject populations of Turkey
as a matter of secondary consideration. On account of
* See Memorandum, No. 12B, p. 31, in Afghanistan Corresp.,
1878.

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 219
it, forty years ago, we plunged into a most unrighteous
war beyond the boundaries of India, shedding the
blood, and interfering with the independence, of a
people with whom we had not even a decent pretext
of quarrel. On account of it, we desire that the
vast spaces of Central Asia, with their few swarm
ing areas of population, should be kept the per
petual hunting-ground of tribes whose whole busi
ness is to rob caravans and to steal men. On
account of it, we exhibit ourselves to the princes and
peoples of India as in a state of constant trepidation
whenever some Kaufmann moves, and when he sub
jects to a Government comparatively civilised some
barbarous Khan who has hitherto lived upon the
Slave Trade. On account of it — and this is,
perhaps, worst of all — we are now to see English
Secretaries of State instructing the Viceroy of India
to practise deceit in our dealings with a neighbour,
and to make " ostensible" demands upon him which
are to cover a direct breach of faith.
In the preceding Chapters we have traced the
working of this spirit in the politics of Europe. Let
us now trace its workings in the politics of India.
Two separate narratives have been given to us on
the authority of her Majesty's Government, of the
events and transactions which I am about to review.
One of these is contained in Lord Lytton's Despatch,
dated May 10th, 1877* It was written at Simla when
* Afghan Corresp. I. 1878, No. 36, p. 160.

220 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANIS! AN ,
it became necessary for the Viceroy to give an account
of his policy. The other of these narratives is con
tained in the despatch of Lord Cranbrook, dated
November 18th, 1878.* It was published in the
newspapers a fortnight before the Session of Parlia
ment which began on the 5th December, 1878, when
it became necessary for the Cabinet to present its
policy in the most favourable aspect, and when, for that
purpose, it was very important to anticipate the pro
duction of the Papers. Both of these narratives are
misleading on matters of fundamental importance.
Fully to expose all the inaccuracies woven into the
very texture of these documents, it would be neces
sary to occupy much more space than I can here
afford. But the narrative now presented will traverse
both those other narratives at many points ; and these
will be noticed as we proceed. For convenience, and
to avoid personality as far as it may be possible to
do so, I shall refer to Lord Lytton's Despatch as the
" Simla Narrative," and to Lord Cranbrook's. Des
patch as the " London Narrative."
The lesson on Frontier Policy which during many
years most powerfully impressed the Anglo-Indian
mind was the lesson read by that solitary horseman
who, on the 13th of January, 1842, staggered, half-
unconscious, into the gate of Jellalabad.t He was

* Ibid., No. 73, p. 260.
t Kaye's War in Afghanistan, vol. ii. p. 217.

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873". 221
the sole survivor of a British army — the only man who,
out of that army and out of all its followers, had escaped
captivity or death. It may be true that the terrible com
pleteness of this memorable catastrophe was due to
the incapacity of the officers in command of the British
Army of Occupation in Cabul. It is certainly true
that, so far as the mere military honour and reputation
of England is concerned, these were speedily re-asserted
and vindicated with complete success. But it was im
possible for the Indian Government of that time, and it is
impossible for any historian of it now, to look back upon
the political struggle in Afghanistan which had been
gallantly maintained by Sir William Macnaghten and
Sir Alexander Burnes, without seeing and feeling
that the position in which we had been placed by Lord
Palmerston's or Lord Auckland's Afghan expedition
had been a thoroughly false position. We had inter
fered with the independence of a people with whose
independence we had no right to interfere, and whose
independence, moreover, it was above all things our
interest to maintain. The particular object of our
interference had been as foolish as it was unjust. We
had opposed ourselves to a brave and an able Prince,
and we had sought to set up in his stead a man who
was naturally weak, and whom we had induced to be
a traitor to his country and to his race. For this
miserable purpose we had been drawing heavily on
the resources of the people of India, and were involved
in an undertaking which must have taxed those re-

222 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
sources more and more. Above twenty millions of
money had been spertt out of the revenues of India,
first in inducing, and then in retrieving, a great dis
aster. It is possible, indeed, that by reckless perse
verance, and byan enormous military expenditure, we
might have completed the conquest of Afghanistan.
But the cost and the embarrassment of such a con
quest, so far in advance of our own frontiers, of our
resources, and of our bases of operation, had been
brought home to the convictions of every statesman
both in India and at home. With universal appro
bation, and with complete success, confession was
made of the great error we had committed. We soon
found it to be our best policy to swear friendship with
the gallant man whom we had for a time expelled
from his throne, and we made him during the rest of
his life our firm and faithful ally.
But if that terrible Afghan expedition made an
indelible impression on the mind of English and of
Indian statesmen, we cannot wonder if it made an
impression not less indelible on the minds of the
Afghans. Not to dwell on the personal grievances
which many of them had borne from the conduct of
our men and officers when resident in the country—
grievances which the historian of the war, however
unwilling, has been compelled to mention — the proud
chiefs of a proud race had seen us disposing of the
Government of their country at our pleasure, pulling
down one and setting up another. They had seen us

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 223
conferring the Crown upon a man who at our instiga
tion had consented to make her people tributary to
their great enemy, Runjeet Singh, and to his Sikh
Empire. Our Political Agents, wherever they were
stationed, assumed to be, and actually were, the
supreme governors of the country. It was impossible
that the Afghans could assign this conduct to any
other motive than a desire to subjugate their country,
and reduce it to the condition of a province of our
Empire. And if this impression was strong at the
close of the Afghan war, there was much to keep it
alive in subsequent events. We talk coolly of the
gigantic strides— this is the stock phrase — made by
Russia in her career of Asiatic conquest. But her
gains have been as nothing to the gains of the British
Empire during the same period in conquests and
annexations. The strides must be gigantic which an Empire
takes when it has to cross deserts which are two
thousand miles long by more than a thousand miles
in breadth .* But the gigantic length of such strides
takes something out of the vigour of the organism
which is impelled to make them, and does not neces
sarily bring it much nearer to new sources of vitality.
During the forty years which have elapsed since the
first Afghan war, we have conquered and annexed
provinces containing many times more millions of

* Rawlinson Memorandum, Afghan Corresp. I. 1878, p. 31.

224 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
men than exist in all the Khanates of Central Asia
between the Volga and the Wall of China.* Afghans,;
who in their youth may have assisted in the massacres
of Macnaghten and of Burnes, are not now old men.
But they have lived to see the Government of British
India annex Oude with eleven millions of population:;
conquer the Punjaub, with a population of more than
seventeen millions ; and subdue the country of the
Ameers of Scinde, with a population of more than two
millions. That is to say that within a period of less
than forty years we have absorbed and conquered coun
tries with a population of upwards of thirty millions.
These are "gigantic strides" indeed, not "gigantic"
like the strides of Russia, in the width and in the
poverty of the distances traversed and of the regions
gained, — but gigantic in the resources they have
opened up, and in the treasures of which they have
put us in possession. They are all annexations and
conquests lying well into our former possessions,
filling up and consolidating the boundaries of
Empire. They are Provinces prolific as recruiting
grounds, and some of them rich in the resources
of revenue. The Afghans have seen from their

* The whole population of the immense stretch of country
inhabited by the Tekeh Turcomans, which extends from Kizil
Arvat to beyond Merve, is roughly calculated at about one
million souls. See Article VIII. m Quarterly Review, January,
1879, which I think I cannot be wrong in assigning to the
authorship of Sir Henry Rawlinson.

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 225
hill-tops all these leaps and bounds of British
dominion, bringing that dominion close up to
the foot of their own mountains, and giving ready
access to the defiles by which their Capital is ap
proached. Nor have they been unobservant spec
tators of the method by which some of these
annexations have been brought about. They must
have seen that this method has often stood in
close connexion with the previous establishment
of resident British officers, political or military, in
the States which have been absorbed. The demands
these officers have made on the Native Governments,
the interferences they have practised with Native
rule, the reports they have sent up of Native abuses
and of Native maladministration, have been the
usual and regular preliminaries of British annexa
tion. And even where the internal independence of
tributary or protected States is professedly respected
it is notorious in India, and is well known to all our
neighbours, that the presence of British officers in an
official position in Native States — however necessary
it may be for our purposes— is an arrangement which
generally ends in making those officers the centre of
authority. It is in the light of these facts and of these
memories that we are to estimate every jealousy of
the Afghans, and every promise given to them in
the way of reassurance by ourselves. It was our
object to convince them of the reality of our
VOL. II. Q

226 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
reformed intentions, and of the sincerity with
which we desired to avoid for the future every ap
proach to interference. The pledges on this subject
which we gave with a view to regain tlieir confi
dence are to be construed in the spirit as well as in
the letter. We knew what they had in their minds,
ahd they knew what we had in ours. The Treaty
concluded by Lord Dalhousie with Dost Mohammed,
in 1855, was signed and negotiated by Sir John Law
rence as Chief Commissioner of the Punjab. In him
•the restored Sovereign of Cabul had to deal with one
whose powerful character, and whose resolute sincerity
of purpose, constitute the very type of all that is best
and noblest in the Indian Services. Through him
mainly the confidence of the Ameer was securely
gained ; and it is important to observe what the
engagement on our part was which Dalhousie and
Lawrence knew to be the one most desired. The
first Article of the Treaty may be considered formal ;
but the second contains the promise which was the
price of friendship. We promised to respect the
territories then in the possession of the Ameer, " and
never to interfere therein."* In the third Article a
similar engagement on the part of the Ameer towards
us and towards our territories, gave a sort of diplo
matic reciprocity to the transaction : but in the third
Article the Ameer gave a pledge to us for which in

* Ibid., No. 1, p. 1.

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 227
reality there was no other return on our part than the
promise we had given in the second. For at the con
clusion of the third Article, after the words of mere
reciprocity, these words were added as a special
engagement on the part of the Ameer, — " and to
be the friend of the friends and enemy of the
enemies of the Honourable East India Company."
This was a really onerous undertaking on the part
of the Ameer, and one which was of great value
to us. It was a Treaty binding him to assist us
against all enemies, whilst on our part it was a Treaty
involving no similar obligation towards the Ameer.
As against the Ameer it was a Treaty of alliance,
offensive, and defensive. As against us, it had no such
character. In this respect the covenant was essentially
one-sided. And yet the Ameer did not hesitate to
sign it — under no other inducement than the one great
promise we gave him in the second clause, that we
should never interfere in his dominions.
The next Treaty which we concluded with Dost
Mohammed was one which arose out of a temporary
cause, and the greater part of which ceased to be
operative when that cause had been removed. Eng
land in 1857 went to war with Persia on account of
the seizure of Herat by that Power, and on account of
the farther intentions which were ascribed to it of
attacking the possessions of Dost Mohammed. We
agreed to subsidise the Ameer largely during the war
with Persia to enable him to defend his territories. But
Q2

228 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
we gave this subsidy on conditions. The object of these
conditions was to see that the money was properly
applied to the purposes of defence for which it was
given. There was no other possible method of doing
this than that of sending British officers with suitable
establishments to the cities and frontiers of Cabul,
wherever an Afghan army might be assembled to act
against the Persians. Accordingly, a Treaty was
concluded for this purpose on the 26th of January,
1857. By the fourth Article, British officers were
to be our Agents in Afghanistan for the prose
cution of that particular war. But this was strictly
the limit of their Mission, both as regarded their
duties, and as regarded the spots at which they
were to be stationed. Three places, and three
places only, were specifically mentioned as points
where British officers might be stationed. These
were Cabul, Kandahar, and Balkh. But the sole
purpose of the Mission was still more clearly indi
cated in the words which followed — " or wherever an
Afghan army may be established against the Perr
sians." Their duty was specified with equal jealousy.
" It will be their duty to see generally that the sub
sidy granted to the Ameer be devoted to the military
purpose for which it is given, and to keep their own
Government informed of all affairs."* But even this
was not deemed enough. Lest it should be construed

* Ibid., No. 2, p. 2.

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 229
as even approaching "interference," the same Article
limited the information which the Ameer promised
to give our officers to "all military and political
matters connected with the war." And yet,
although this mission of British officers into Cabul
was for the purpose of defending the Ameer, or
of assisting him at least to defend himself, so clearly
was it recognised as an arrangement which in itself
would be distasteful to the Ameer, and a departure
from the promises given in the previous and perma
nent Treaty of 1 85 5, that a special Article, the seventh,
was inserted in the new Treaty, expressly providing
that, " Whenever the subsidy should cease the British
officers were to be withdrawn from the Ameer's
country." There could be no more emphatic testimony
than this as to the understanding both of the
Ameer and of the Indian Goverment as to insepa
rable connexion between the residence of British
officers in the Afghan country and the " interference"
which we had promised never to repeat. But the
seventh Article does not end there. It proceeds to
indicate another arrangement which would be in con
sonance with the promises of 1855, and which, there
fore, it was agreed by both parties might be adopted
instead of that which was forbidden. The Ameer did
not desire to be without official intercourse with the
British Government. But he did desire, above all
things, that such intercourse should not be carried

230 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
on through a British, that is to say, an European
officer, resident in Afghanistan, Accordingly, the
seventh Article concluded by declaring, it to be
understood that the British Government might at its
pleasure appoint an Agent (Vakil) at Cabul, with the
express reservation and condition in respect to the
nationality of such Agent, that he was " not to be a
European officer."*
There could be no more conclusive evidence than
this of the complete understanding of both contract
ing parties as to what was, and as to what was not,
consistent with the solemn promise we had given to
Dost Mohammed "never to interfere" in his dominions.
And it is the more important to observe this evidence,
as it is contained in an Article of the Treaty of 1857,
which necessarily survives all the Articles which
were of a purely temporary character. It remained
as binding on us in 1878 as it was in 1857.
There are few parts of the Simla Narrative more
inaccurate than the paragraphs in which it refers to
this Treaty of 1857. I must add that there are few
parts of it in which the inaccuracies have a more
bbvious bearing upon the object with which that Nar
rative was composed. That object was to defend a
policy of insisting on the residence of British officers
as Political Agents in Afghanistan. For this purpose
it is, of course, convenient so to represent the transaC-
* Ibid., p. 2:

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 231
tions recorded in the Treaty of 1857 as to give them
the aspect of a precedent. But in order to support
this view it is necessary either wholly to suppress, or
to throw into the shade, those parts of the Treaty which
define and limit so very strictly the duties assigned
to the British officers who were then to be sent into
Afghanistan. Accordingly, in the Simla Narrative
{paragraphs 3-4) all this is boldly, and at the
same time dexterously done. There is no mention
whatever made of the principal duty of the officers
— namely, that of seeing that the subsidy was ap
plied to the purposes for which it was given. This
limitation of the Treaty is suppressed. Next, in
obvious connexion with the same purpose, exagge
rated prominence is given to the duty of " keeping
the Indian Government informed of all affairs" — this
duty being so represented as if it were the principal
one, — as it would be the principal duty of officers sent
as Residents. Again, no mention is made of the
limitation of the Article at its close — a limitation
which distinctly points to " matters connected with
the war" as the only matters on which the Ameer was
to keep our officers informed. But, lastly — and this
is worst of all — in the Simla Narrative a duty is,
expressly assigned to our " officers" under the Treaty
of 1857, which is not only not included in the Treaty,
but which is therein expressly excluded. It so hap
pens, moreover, that is precisely the kind of duty for
which it was most desirable to assert a precedent.

232 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
The words of the Simla Narrative are these :— -
"' Their duty (in the performance of which the Ameer
Was expected to afford them every facility) being
simply to give advice when required, and to obtain all
the information needed by our Government."* Now,
the words of the Treaty carefully and expressly exclude
this duty of " advice," which the Simla Narrative as
carefully and as. expressly asserts. The words of the
Treaty are these : — "They will have nothing to do with
the payment of the troops, or advising the Cabul
Government." (Art. 4.)t It cannot, therefore, be too
emphatically asserted, that so far from the Treaty
of 1857 affording any precedent for attempting to
force European officers upon the Ameers of Afghan
istan, as our Agents in the country for any purpose
whatever, the Treaty of 1857, on tne contrary, proves.
to demonstration that we bound ourselves not to do
so, and placed on record in a solemn Treaty our full
and free acquiescence in that well-known, policy of the
Afghan Government, which made them irreconcilably
hostile to any such arrangement.
We have the evidence of Lord Lawrence, that when
he personally met Dost Mohammed at Peshawur in
February, 1857, immediately after the conclusion of
this Treaty, the Ameer showed no inclination to
regard with any favour even such interference on the
part of the British Government as might be required

* Ibid., p. 160. f Ibid., p. 2.

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 233
to secure his own dynastic succession, aud thus avert
the evils of civil war. He told Sir J. Lawrence " that
it was his wish and the earnest desire of all Afghans
that we should not interfere in their quarrels, but
should allow them to manage their own concerns and
to fight out and settle their own domestic broils in
their own way."* The attempt to settle those feuds in
our way had, indeed, not been so successful as to hold
out any inducement to the Indian Government to try
the experiment again.
It was in compliance, therefore, not only with the
settled policy, but with the definite engagements of
the British Government, that when in June, 1863,
Dost Mohammed died, and a contest arose among the
members of his family for the vacant throne, the Indian
Government acknowledged the right of the Afghan
Chiefs and people to settle the right of succession for
themselves. It was impossible for us to settle it.
We had not the knowledge enabling us to do so with
justice, or with any prospect of success. Even, if we
could be sure of the best man, he might very easily
become the worst on account of our patronage. The
Afghans had not forgotten the disgraceful conditions
to which we had forced Shah Soojah to submit, as
our client, and as the vassal of the Sikhs. Presum
ably fhe best Ruler of Afghanistan would be the man
who in such a contest, should, without any help from
us, prove himself to be the strongest.
* Ibid., p. 60.

234 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
There is, however, in such matters no possibility
of acting upon any rule so absolute as to dispense
with the exercise of some discretion. It is obvious
that the policy of recognising every Ruler of Cabul
who was able to make good his position, and had
secured the allegiance of the people, was a policy
wliich left open to the Government of India the
exercise of a very important, and, it might be, of a
very difficult discretion, namely, that of deciding on
the measure of success which was to be regarded as
conferring on any one of the contending Princes a
fair claim to be recognised as de facto Ameer. In
the condition of society which prevails in Afghan
istan, it is impossible to be sure of the permanence
of any victory, or to foresee the counter-revolutions
which may arise. Defeated Chiefs have: the habit of
retiring to the protection of neighbouring and rival
Governments, and of thence emerging as opportuni
ties may arise, to gain or re-establish their ascendency.
It was therefore perfectly consistent with the declared
policy of the Government of India to prolong or to
cut short, in each particular case, the period of sus
pense, and to confer the benefit of its recognition,
whatever that might be, upon any Ruler whom it
could fairly regard as having won his crown.
The' action taken by the Government of India on
the death of Dost Mohammed, and during the civil
war which followed, was governed by an honest desire
to do what was just and prudent. The severe illness

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 235
of the Viceroy, Lord Elgin, at the moment when
Shere Ali announced his father's death, and his own
succession to the throne, together with the doubts
entertained as to the security of his position, led to
some delay in acknowledging him as Ameer of Cabul.
But as he had been designated to the succession by
his father, and as he was in actual possession of
Cabul, this recognition was accorded to him by the
acting Governor-General, Sir William Denison, on
the 23rd of December, 1863*
When Sir J. Lawrence assumed the Government
of India, in the same month, as successor of Lord
Elgin, he found this question, settled and this recog
nition given. After nearly two years and a half of civil
war, however, the fortunes of Shere Ali were reduced to
so low an ebb that the British native Agent at Cabul,
overstepping the limits of his functions, was induced to
make overtures of friendship on behalf of the British
Government to Sirdar Azim Khan, one of the rival
brothers. For this act he was recalled by the Govern
ment of India, and Sir J. Lawrence recorded in a
despatch, dated the 21st April, 1866, his opinion that.
" the cause of the Ameer Shere Ali was by no means
finally lost, and that the Government considered that
until such a result was reached, they were bound
equally by good faith and by considerations of policy
to recognise no other chief as Ameer, of Afghan-
* Ibid., p. 8.

236 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
istan."* At last, however — in February, 1867 — Shere
Ali was driven from Cabul, and took refuge in Herat.
The Government of India then thought it necessary;
to recognise the successful brother as Ameer of Cabul.
and Candahar, but continuing to recognise Shere All
as Ameer of the Province of Herat, of which he still
held possession.f
Sir J. Lawrence explained to Ufzul Khan that the
British Government deplored the dissensions of the
great Barukzye House, and the calamities they had
brought on the Afghan people : that though the Vice
roy felt pity for Shere Ali Khan, he was disposed to
hail hopefully any event which might bring Afghan-,;
istan nearer to the attainment of a strong Government.
He assured Ufzul Khan that he had not interfered by
any secret aid to Shere Ali, as had been falsely
alleged. He gave him to understand that the recog
nition of the British Government was due to nothing..
but his own gallantry and success ; and he declared
that if, unhappily, the struggle for supremacy was not
concluded, the Viceroy would pursue the same course
of siding with neither party.
It is important to observe that in this official
communication to the new Ameer, Ufzul Khan, the
Viceroy of India was careful to intimate still more in
detail his own scrupulous adherence to the promises
given in 1856 and in 1857 to Dost Mohammed. He

* Ibid., p. 9. f Ibid., No. 7, pp. 12, 13.

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. m
reminded the Ameer of the seventh Article of the
Treaty of 1857, which entitled the British Govern
ment to accredit to Cabul " a Vakeel," not a European
officer; he intimated that in accordance with this
provision of the Treaty, "a Mahomedan gentleman
of rank and character would be deputed as represen
tative of the Viceroy at his Highness' Court."*
It has been represented in recent controversy that
this policy of abstention and non-interference in the
internal affairs of Afghanistan was a policy founded
entirely on local considerations, and did not take into
contemplation the questions which were looming in
the distance beyond the farthest boundaries of that
country. But there is no truth whatever in this repre
sentation. The advances of Russia in Central Asia,
and also the possibility of her acting as she had already
done through the agency of Persia, were contin
gencies not only present to the mind of Sir J. Law
rence and of his Council, but expressly referred to as
an important element in the consideration of the best
and safest course to be pursued. With reference to
both contingencies, he considered non-interference in
the Afghan civil war expedient, because whatever Ruler
might gain the upper hand would be disposed by the
necessities of his position to rely rather upon the British
Government than upon any other Power ; and because
whatever temporary alliances he might have been
* Ibid., p. 14.

238 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
induced to form during the contest would probably be
abandoned when he had attained success. But in the
contrary event Sir J. Lawrence did not intend to
bind himself to the same course. On the contrary,
the Viceroy never had it out of view that any
external interference on the part of other Govern
ments with the affairs of Afghanistan, or any intriguing
on the part of its Rulers with our enemies be
yond, would of necessity bring the policy of
abstention to an end, and would compel us to
adopt counter-movements. Accordingly, when in
September, 1867, reports reached the Government
of India that Shere Ali, then Ameer or Ruler of Herat,
was entering into intrigues with Persia, the Viceroy
and his Council at once expressed their opinion in
an important despatch to the Government at home,*
that it " might be highly for the interests of British
India to declare the Treaty then subsisting between
us and Shere Ali at an end," and openly to assist his
opponents at Cabul, with money and with arms, if
they were at all likely to form a stable rule. In pur
suance of this policy, — not of abstention, but of active
interference, — Shere Ali was warned by the Viceroy,
that if he allied himself with Persia, the British
Government would at once take part against him.t
It was in this despatch that the Government of India
first drew special attention to the advances of Russia in

* Ibid., No. 10, pp. 18, 20. t Ibid., paras. 6, 7, pp. 19, 20.

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 239
-Central Asia, which Sir J. Lawrence and his colleagues
said had been lately rapid, and which had from time to
time been forced upon their notice. It was pointed out
that the influence of Russia would soon be, or had
already become, paramount in Samarcand and Bok
hara, as for some time past it had been in Kokhand.
It was in this despatch also that the Viceroy sug
gested to Her Majesty's Cabinet the expediency of
coming to some understanding, or even some engage
ment with the Government of Russia, which would
enable us to look without anxiety or apprehension
at the proceedings of Russia on her southern frontier,
and to welcome the civilising effects of her Government
on the wild Turks of the Steppe, and on the bigoted
and exclusive Governments of Bokhara and Kokhand ;
while Russia, on the other hand, assured of our loyal
feeling in the matter, would have no jealousy in
respect of our alliance with the Afghan and neigh
bouring tribes. The principle indicated as the basis
of such an agreement was this : " that up to a certain
border the relations of the respective Governments
should be openly acknowledged and admitted as
bringing them into necessary contact and Treaty
with the Tribes and Nations on the several sides of
such a line."*
In the face of this despatch it is impossible to con
tend that the Government of India, under Sir J. Law-

* Ibid., pp. 20, 1.

24o RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
rence, was not fully awake to the contingencies arising
out of the progress of Russia in Central Asia. And be it
observed, that no subsequent event has brought these
contingencies nearer home than the events indicated
by Sir J. Lawrence and his colleagues. Bokhara is a
country actually marching with Afghanistan for many
hundred miles, and the paramount influence of Russia
there is a much more significant fact than her advance
on distant Khiva, or the absorption of a part of that
Khanate into her own dominions. In all the revolu
tions of Afghanistan Bokhara had played an impor
tant part. It has been the refuge of every fugitive
Ameer, and the two States have with each other many
hereditary causes of difference and quarrel. Yet the
Minister, who was my own immediate predecessor
in the India Office — Sir Stafford Northcote — after
a cordial and intelligent approval of Sir J. Law
rence's policy in respect to our relations with
Afghanistan, replied on the 26th December, 1867,
to the Government of India in a spirit of the
utmost incredulity as to the existence of any
danger from the advances of Russia : " Upon this
point Her Majesty's Government see no reason for any
uneasiness or for any jealousy. The conquests which
Russia has made, and apparently is still making in
Central Asia, appear to them to be the natural result
of the circumstances in which she finds herself placed,
and to afford no ground whatever for representations
indicative of suspicion or alarm on the part of this

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 241
country. Friendly communications have at various
times passed between the two Governments on the
subject, and should an opportunity offer, Her Ma
jesty's Government will avail themselves of it for the
purpose of obviating any possible danger of mis
understanding, either with respect to the proceedings
of Russia or to those- of England. This is all that
it appears necessary or desirable to do."* It will be
seen that this confidence was expressed not only in
view of the fact that Russia had made rapid advances
in Central Asia, but also in the calmest contempla
tion of the probability that she was likely to make
more. It was all in the natural course of things, and
Her Majesty's Government had no anxieties on the
subject. In the meantime — on the 7th of October, 1867 — the
Ameer Ufzul Khan died at Cabul, and his brother
Azam Khan was elected in his stead. This succession
was at once acknowledged by the Government of
India on the 13th of November, 18674 It was
followed, however, by an immediate renewal of
the civil war, by a sudden revival of the cause
of Shere Ali, and by a revolution which, in the
course of nine months, restored him to his father's
throne. On the 8th of September, 1868, he took
triumphant possession of Cabul, and lost no time in
announcing to the Viceroy of India his desire to con-

* Ibid., No. 12, pp. 24, 26. f Ibid., p. 24.
VOL. II. R

242 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
tinue the relations of amity and friendship which had1
been established between the two States*
The Viceroy replied to this intimation on the
2nd of October, in a frank and friendly letter,
expressing his sorrow that the family of his great
father, Dost Mohammed, should have been broken
up into contending factions, advising him to deal
leniently with those who had opposed him, and
assuring him that he was prepared not only to maintain
the bonds of amity and goodwill which had been
established with his father, but " so far as was practic
able" to strengthen fhem.t In proof of this disposi
tion Sir John Lawrence very soon after, in the same
month of September, 1868, proceeded to assist Shere
Ali with money to the extent of ;£6o,ooo, as well as
with a supply of arms. This assistance was so im
portant at the time that Shere Ali publicly acknow
ledged at a later time that it materially contributed
to the completion of his success and to the consolida
tion of his power.
It is curious that a little more than two months
before this event, but at a time when the success of
Shere Ali had become probable, Sir Henry Rawlinson
had written an able and elaborate Memorandum, in
which he endeavoured to arouse the languid interest
and the slumbering alarms of the Secretary of State
for India on the Central Asian Question. From his

* Ibid.,. No. 13, Inclos. 2, p. 43. f Ibid., Inclos. 3, p. 43.

JFROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 243
well-known point of view, he urged the immediate im
portance which attached to the Russian victories in
Bokhara, and the necessity of taking certain mea
sures of precaution. Of these measures, the first was
simply the immediate recognition and active support
of Shere Ali, by subsidies and by the close asso
ciation of British representation at Cabul ; the
second Was the re-establishment of our lost in
fluence at the Court of Persia; and the third
was the completion of our Indian military lines of
railway leading to the frontier. A fourth measure was
indeed suggested, and that was the occupation of
Quetta at the western end of the Bolan Pass. But
the distinguished author of this Memorandum dis
tinctly declared that unless this step could be taken
with the cordial approval of the Ruler and Chiefs of
Afghanistan, he was not prepared to recommend it,
and considered that if the tribes in general regarded it
as a menace, or as a preliminary to a farther hostile
advance, we should not be justified for so small an
object in risking the rupture of our friendly inter
course.* This Memorandum, dated 20th July, seems to
have been forwarded on 21st August, 1868, to the
Government of India by Sir Stafford Northcote, the
Secretary of State, unaccompanied by any expression
of his own opinion, or of the opinion of her Majesty's

* Ibid., p. 41.
R ?<

244 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
Government .* That opinion, therefore, so far as known
to the Government of India, remained as it had been
set forth in the despatch of December, 1867. This is
yery remarkable, because the Memorandum of Sir H.
Rawlinson was full not only of what Russia had done,
but of the alleged violation of promises which had been
involved in doing it. It referred to the pacific ManU
festo published by Prince Gortchakow in 1864,
declaring that recent annexations had taken place
against the will of the Government, and asserting with
categorical precision that the expansion of the Empire
had now reached its limit. It assumed — or without
directly assuming, it implied — that these declarations
or intimations of policy and of intention were " pro
mises '' in the sense of being engagements taken
towards other Powers. It reminded the Government
that the " ink had been hardly dry with which this
Manifesto was written before its specific promises
were completely stultified." It pointed out how hos
tilities had been almost immediately resumed in the
valley of the Jaxartes ; how Chemkend and Tashkend
and Khojend had been captured in succession ; how
Romanofski had proceeded to invade Bokhara, and
had established the Russian power within hail of
Samarcand. All these proceedings were denounced
in the Memorandum as " flagrant departures " from
Prince Gortchakow's Manifesto, and as having been
adopted under " various pretexts."t Nevertheless
* Ibid., p. 31, foot-note. f Ibid., pp. 31, 32.

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 245
under all this fire of warning, and a perfect tempest of
prediction, the Cabinet of Mr. Disraeli gave no sign,
— allowed their expressed confidence in Russia to
remain on record as a dissent even from the guarded
suggestions of Sir John Lawrence, and simply for
warded the Rawlinson Memorandum to form the
subject of elaborate Minutes by the Viceroy and his
Counsellors. Sir H. Rawlinson, in a late edition of his work
" England and Russia in the East," has indicated his
impression that the action of Lord Lawrence in subsi
dising Shere Ali was due to the influence of his
Memorandum, and he describes that action as one
which " threw to the winds at once and for ever the
famous policy of masterly inactivity."* The dates,
however, do not favour this view, because the
Memorandum was only sent from England on the
2 1st of August, and does not seem to have been
under tne consideration of the Government of India
when Lord Lawrence determined to subsidise the
Ameer. The truth is that Sir H. Rawlinson has
always misconceived what the Lawrence policy was,
and very naturally regards as departures from it, acts
which were reallyin complete accordance with its funda
mental object and intention. We have already seen
that so early as 1867 Sir J. Lawrence had spoken of
subsidising any Ruler at Cabul whom, for any reason,

* Chap. VI., p. 302.

246 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
it might be our interest to support. The aid he gave
to Shere Ali in September, 1 868, was in perfect con
sistency with the plan of helping any de facto Ruler,
and of keeping ourselves free to judge according to
circumstances, of the measure of success which suffi
ciently indicated possession of power, and the assent
of the Afghan people* Sir J. Lawrence was not the
man to lay down for himself any such wooden rules as
have been ascribed to him by ignorant friends and
zealous opponents.
Such was the position of the Central Asian Ques
tion in connexion with the declared policy of the
British Government when the Cabinet of Mr. Glad
stone came into power. In that Cabinet I had the
honour of being Secretary of State for India, and was
the organ of the Administration in Indian affairs
during the whole of the Viceroyalty of Lord Mayo,
and during two years of the Viceroyalty of Lord North-
brook. In Lord Mayo we had to deal with a new
Viceroy who had been sent out by our predecessors
in office, and who had actually left England to assume
his government before we had ourselves received our
appointments from the Queen. I had not therefore
the advantage of having any personal communication
whatever with Lord Mayo, or of ascertaining from him
any one of his opinions on any Indian question, or of
expressing to him any opinions of my own. I mention
this not at all by way of complaint, for it was the
result of peculiar and accidental circumstances ; but

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 247
for the purpose of explaining how it was that of neces
sity more than usual remained to be done by means
of private letters. I call these letters private letters
only to distinguish them from formal despatches,
because they were not the letters of a private friend
on the personal aspect of public questions. It so
happens that I had never enjoyed the honour and
advantage of Lord Mayo's acquaintance. Our com
munications, therefore, were essentially of an official
character, although in a form which admitted of the
more free handling of delicate affairs, sometimes con
taining passages which were confidential then, and
must remain confidential still. Some of these letters
are referred to in the despatches which have been
lately published as essential parts of our official
intercourse. The Viceroy's letters to me were very
full, and as I soon found that our views were in com
plete accordance, I am able to present the following
account of our policy, and of what was done in pur
suance of it, drawn mainly from the circumstantial
details given by himself.
And here I must begin by pointing out another of
the innumerable inaccuracies of the London Narra
tive. It is one which concerns a very important
point, and one which, as usual, has a direct connexion
with the views which it was convenient for the
Government to present. They have departed as I
am about to show, from Lord Mayo's policy, quite as
much as from the policy of Lord Lawrence. In order

248 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
to defend this departure it is their interest to make
out that circumstances have greatly altered, and in
particular, that Lord Mayo had not to deal with those
" gigantic strides" of Russia which, it is implied, are
of later date. I have already pointed out that there is
no foundation whatever for this representation of the
historical facts. Yet in the fourth paragraph* of the
London Narrative this erroneous representation is
made in the broadest terms. Referring to the period
of Lord Lawrence's administration it says : " The out
posts of Russia were then distant from the borders of
Afghanistan." The fact, on the contrary, I believe to
be, that the Russian outposts which are nearest to
Afghanistan — namely, those which she acquired in
the subjection of Bokhara — were then almost exactly
where they are now. When Lord Mayo succeeded
to the Viceroyalty of India, Russia had completed
every one of those conquests which were most formid
able as regarded the interests of India. During no
previous period had her " steps" been more gigantic
than during the four years from 1864 to 1869. In
1865 the Russians had taken Tashkend. In 1866
they had taken Khojend and had broken the power
of the Khanat of Kokhand. In 1867 they had in
vaded Bokhara, and had established fortified positions
far south of the Jaxartes. In the same year they had
established the new Province of Turkistan, and had

* Afghan Corresp. I. 1878, No. 73, p. 261.

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 249
erected it into a separate Viceroyalty with Tashkend
for its Capital. In 1868 they had taken Samarcand,
and had established complete power over the Khanate
of Bokhara.
This conquest, and the establishment of this
power, virtually brought Russia into contact with
Afghanistan. No later Russian movement in Cen
tral Asia is to be compared in importance with this
movement which had been completed in 1869-
Sir Henry Rawlinson was quite right when he
pointed out in his Memorandum the peculiar
significance of Russian domination in Bokhara.
It meant Russian domination over . a Govern
ment which marched with Afghanistan along the
greater part of its northern frontier, and which had
special relations with the people and Rulers of Cabul.
What, then, are we to say of the accuracy of the
London Narrative when (para. 7) it says, speak
ing of the early days of Lord Mayo's Government,
" The advances of Russia in Central Asia had not, up
to this period, assumed dimensions such as to cause
uneasiness to the Indian Government ?" No doubt
there is an ambiguity in this phrase. It might be con
strued to mean that the Indian Government had not, as
a matter of fact, felt uneasiness. Even this is not correct,
as Sir J. Lawrence's Despatch of 1867 proves. But its
real meaning evidently is that the advances of Russia
had not then " assumed dimensions" sufficiently large
to attract much attention, and that later advances have

250 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
wholly altered the position. The fact is that no later
advances have been made by Russia comparable in im
portance to those which made her mistress of Bokhara
and Kokhand. And another fact is that the Indian
Government had its eyes wide awake to the signifi
cance of these events, and that Lord Mayo's policy
was deliberately adopted in full contemplation of all
the possible dangers they might involve. If the
Government of India felt no serious alarm on account
of these events it was because that Government.
consisted at that time of men with some nerve, and
with some common sense.
It is a curious illustration of the historical accuracy
as well as of the argumentative value of this 7th para
graph of the London Narrative, that the leading ex
peditionary columns which were directed in 1878 by
Russia towards the frontiers of Afghanistan, moved
from territories which had been either actually or
virtually acquired in 1869, and that no military move
ment was found practicable from the Caspian base.*
Although the specific measures which were sum
marised in the last paragraph of the Rawlinson
Memorandum were not in themselves of any very for
midable kind, and although the first and most impor-

* One of the columns was to move from a point on the
borders of Kokhand, and a small remnant of this once-powerful
Khanate was allowed by Russia to remain nominally indepen
dent till 1876. But this remnant had been completely at the
mercy of Russia since 1867.

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 251
tant of them, — the recognition and support of Shere
Ali, — had actually been adopted by Sir J. Lawrence
and his Government before or about the time of the
arrival of the Memorandum in India ; yet the general
tone of the Memorandum, and the ulterior mea
sures which it indicated for the future, led to its
being closely criticised by the Government of India,
and by many of the most able and experienced
officers to whom it was referred by the Viceroy.
The general result was summed up in a despatch,
signed by Sir John Lawrence and his Council
addressed to me, and dated the 4th of January, 1869.
They were strongly adverse to any advance, beyond
our own frontier, on political, on military, and on
financial grounds. They declared for the policy of
husbanding the resources of India, and not wasting
them on costly and difficult expeditions, or in the-
maintenance of distant outposts. They objected to any
active interference in the affairs of Afghanistan by
the deputation of British officers, or to the occupation,
whether forcible or amicable, of any post or tract in
that country, as a measure sure to engender irritation,
defiance, and hatred, in the minds of Afghans. On the
other hand, they agreed with the Rawlinson Memoran
dum in desiring that, greater attention in the interests of
India should be paid to the strength and character of
our Mission tq Teheran. They announced that the
Government of India had already conferred upon
Shere Ali a subsidy of six lacs of rupees, and was pre-

25 2 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
pared to give him arms. They requested authority to
repeat this kind and measure of support at the discre
tion of the Government of India. With regard to the
advances of Russia in Central Asia, they repeated the
recommendation that some clear understanding should
be come to with the Court of St. Petersburg as to its pro-
jects and designs in those regions. They complained
that this subject had been pressed on Sir Stafford
Northcote without any result, except his despatch of
December, 1 867. And, finally, they advised that Russia
should be told, in firm but courteous language, that she
cannot be permitted to interfere, in the affairs of
Afghanistan, or in those of any State which lies con
tiguous to our frontier*
Such was the policy which Lord Mayo found the
Government of India had declared to be its own
when he assumed the functions of his great office.
It was a policy distinct and definite both in its negative
and affirmative aspect ; both in the things which it
proposed to do, and in the things which it resolutely
refused to undertake. It was in pursuance of this
policy that Lord Clarendon began those negotiations
with the Cabinet of St. Petersburg which had for
their object some understanding and agreement
respecting the limits not only of our respective posses
sions in Asia, but also, beyond these, of our respective
fields of predominant influence. It was in pursuance

* Ibid., No. 14, pp. 43-5.

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 253
of the same policy in its Indian branch that Lord
Mayo had immediately to prepare for a personal
meeting with the Ameer of Cabul, a meeting which
had been suggested and sought by Shere Ali, and
which Sir John Lawrence had recommended to the
favourable consideration of his successor.
On the 26th January, 1869, Lord Mayo wrote to
me the first letter in which he indicated his views in
respect to our policy towards the Ameer. It is re
markable as indicating incidentally (1) that he recog
nised the utility of having a European official in Cabul,
if this measure could properly be adopted ; (2) that
he did not consider the difficulties in the way of it as
difficulties that would be necessarily permanent ; and
(3) that he was fully aware of the fact that, as matters
then stood, it would be inexpedient to attempt it.
On this subject his language was as follows : — " With
the friendly feelings that Shere Ali entertains towards
us in consequence of the assistance in money and
arms that we have given him, we may, without send
ing at present any European official to Cabul, exercise
sufficient influence over him to keep him on the most
amicable terms with us." It is clear from this passage
that Lord Mayo had this question fully before him,
and that what he was about to determine in regard
to it, was so determined on overruling considerations
of policy or of good faith.
On the 30th of January, 1869, a letter was addressed
to the Viceroy by Sir Donald Macleod, Lieut-Governor

254 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
of the Punjaub, informing him that the defeat of
Azim Khan, and of his nephew Abdul Raman Khan,
had terminated the civil war in Afghanistan, but that
the portion of country north of the Hindoo KoOsh,
commonly Called Afghan Turkistan, remained but
imperfectly subject to the Ameer Shere Ali. Macleod
added that " this district was likely ere long to become
the area of intrigue on the part of the Russians,
whose high officials avowed that their projects com
prised the whole Country up to the Hindoo Koosh."
He further informed the Viceroy that the Ameer was
most anxious to arrange an interview, and that he
was so set upon it that, in all probability, if it were
necessary, Shere Ali would even be prepared to under
take a journey to Calcutta.
This communication was forwarded to me by Lord
Mayo in a letter, dated the 7th of February ; in which
he informed me that he expected to be able to
arrange for the desired interview, and that, if it were
prudently conducted, he anticipated great good as its
result. In particular, he explained that he anticipated
that a considerable effect would be produced " through
out all Central Asia."
This letter, added to the facts which have been
already narrated, puts a filial extinguisher on the plea
which has been already dealt with on a previous
page, that Lord Mayo's policy is out of date
because it was before the advances of Russia in
Central Asia had become serious, or had attracted

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 255
the attention they deserved. The recent establish
ment of Russian influence in Bokhara, on the \ ery
borders of Afghanistan, the Memorandum of Sir H.
Rawlinson. and the discussions in India to which it
had given rise, the alarming intimation freshly con
veyed by Sir D. Macleod that Russian high officials
were claiming Afghan Turkistan as one of their
legitimate fields of operation, and Lord Mayo's own
explanation above given of the importance he attached
to his coming interview with the Ameer — all prove
conclusively that the Central Asian Question in its
most urgent aspects was fully before Lord Mayo in
1869, and that the policy he pursued was the policy
which he considered the wisest and the best in full view
of all the contingencies of a close Russian approach
to the borders of India.
Nor is this all : the same letter of the 7th of
February shows that Lord Mayo was exposed to all
those influences of an excited atmosphere of opinion
which, under such circumstances, are apt not only to
disturb the judgment, but to pervert the moral sense.
In that letter, Lord Mayo informed me that the Press
of India was teeming with articles representing Shere
Ali as " completely in the hands of Russia and of
Persia." Reports and assertions of this kind, the Off
spring of Barracks and of Bazaars, are never
Wanting. They have very often a tremendous
effect upori nervous politicians, inspiring them
with silly fears and incurable suspicions. Let

256 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
it then be clearly understood what were the circum
stances under which Lord Mayo went into the
Umballa Conference, and in the full contemplation of
which he deliberately shaped his course. He knew
all the dangers — when he determined not to bully He
knew all the suspicions — when he determined to be
himself perfectly truthful and sincere. He knew all
the fresh advances which Russia had been making,
and the farther advances she had still to make — :
when he resolved to keep with absolute good faith
all the promises, whether verbal or written, which had
been given by those who had preceded him in the
great office of Viceroy of India.
On the 2nd, and again on the 8th of March, Lord
Mayo addressed to me farther communications on
the approaching Conference, which had then been
arranged for the 25th of that month. In the first of
these he repeated an expression of the importance he
attached to it, not only as likely to have the most
beneficial effect on public opinion in Central Asia,
Persia, and Hindostan, but also as likely to lead to
some definite arrangement with the Ameer. The
nature of that arrangement he explained to be, that
we should assist him to form a strong and durable
Government, whilst he, on the other hand, was to give
facilities to our trade, and to maintain order on those
portions of our frontier over which he had any
influence. Lord Mayo, however, declared himself to
be entirely opposed to any attempt being made " to

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 257
take any direct part in the internal affairs of Afghan
istan." In the second letter, the Viceroy specified,
further, as one of the objects he had in view, " the
obtaining of accurate information as to the events
that occur in Central Asia." So that this aspect also
of the value to be attached to the presence of British
officers in Cabul, was fully in the Viceroy's mind
before he went to the Umballa Conference.
Two days later, on the 10th of March, Lord Mayo
wrote to me another letter on the same subject, enter
ing more fully into an explanation of his views :
" With regard to the approaching interview with the
Ameer, my intention is to avoid any engagements of
a permanent character. I am opposed to Treaties
and subsidies. Sir J. Lawrence gave him 60,000/.,
and had engaged to give him 60,000/. more. This
probably placed him on the throne, as it enabled him
to pay his army, which his rival could not do, and he
is, I am told, very grateful  I believe his visit
will do much good. It will show him that we have
no other wish than to see a strong Government in
Afghanistan, where we have no thought of interfering
with him in any way. We want no resident at Cabul,
or political influence in his kingdom." Here we see
coming, link by link, more distinctly into view, that
chain of evidence which connects the subsequent
transactions of the Conference with Lord Mayo's
knowledge of the promises and engagements which
would be most valuable to the Ameer. We have
VOL. II. S

258 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
seen him indicating how well he knew that British"
residents would be useful if they were acceptable to
the Ruler and people of Cabul. We see him now
indicating his perfect knowledge that those favourable
conditions did not exist, and that one of the great
advantages to be derived from the approaching Con
ference would be the opportunity it would afford the
Viceroy of satisfying the Ameer that we did not want
to press any residents upon him.
But further evidence is not wanting, even during the
few days which yet remained before the Conference.
In every letter I received which was written by Lord
Mayo about this time, further links in the same chain of
evidence are supplied. On the very day on which he left
Calcutta, and, as he told me, just as he was about to
step into the train, he addressed to me a letter, in
which it might almost seem that he spoke as a prophet
on the sad transactions of recent years. After assur
ing me of his entire agreement with the opinions I had
expressed to him on the policy to be pursued towards
Afghanistan, he proceeded thus : — " I see that there
is to be a Central Asiatic debate in the House of
Commons. I hope that sensible men will not advo
cate the extreme lines of absolute inaction, and the
worse alternative of meddling and interfering by sub
sidies and emissaries. The safe course lies in watch
fulness, and friendly intercourse with neighbouring
States and Tribes."
At last, in the early morning of the 27th of March,

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 259
the Viceroy of, India rode into Umballa, where the
Ameer- had already arrived two days before. . Every
pains had been taken to give to the meeting something
more even than the usual pomp and state of an Indian
Durbar. As an important part — or, at least, as an
important indication — of the policy to be pursued, Lord
Mayo endeavoured, in all matters of reception and
ceremonial, to give the visit the character of a meeting
between equals, and to show to the world that we
looked on the Ameer as an independent, and not as a
feudatory Prince. With this view former precedents
were so far departed from as to show that an occur
rence of a precisely similar kind never took place
before in India. At first the old Sikh chiefs of the
Punjaub, who detest an Afghan, were disposed to be
jealous of these proceedings. But when it was explained
to them that the Viceroy expected them to, aid him;
in welcoming to their country a distinguished guest, 1
they entered heartily into the position in which they
were placed.
When the Conference began it was Lord Mayo's
first object to find out what it. was that the
Ameer really expected and desired. After the
dignified reserve which seldom deserts an Oriental
had been somewhat overcome, the Viceroy found no
difficulty in understanding the feelings of Shere Ali.
He gave expression to them at last with much vehe
mence. They were perfectly natural feelings ; and
looking at the facts from his point of view, it is
S 2

26a RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
impossible not to regard them with much sympathy.
His fundamental grievance was the " one-sided "
character of the Treaty of 1855. The terms of this
Treaty have already been explained. They were ex
tremely unequal as regards the obligations imposed
on the two contracting parties. The Indian Go
vernment promised nothing except to respect the
territories of Afghanistan, and never to interfere
therein. But the corresponding obligation on the
Ameer was very different. He promised to be
" the friend of the friends, and the enemy of the
enemies, of the Honorable East India Company."
Thus, on the part of the Ameer, it was a Treaty
of Alliance, offensive and defensive. On the part
of the Indian Government it had no such character.
Accordingly, the moment Shere Ali opened his
mouth at Umballa, this inequality was the burden
of his song. He complained that our friendship with
his father had been a " dry friendship," and " one
sided." We had not helped Shere Ali himself, as we
ought to have done, to secure the throne. We had
simply acknowledged him when, by his own good
sword, he had secured it, or at least had very
nearly secured it, for himself. We had equally
recognised others when they had gained temporary.
success., What he now wanted was that we should
guarantee, not himself only, but his lineal descendants
on the throne which he had won. He could not be
content with our system of recognising any de facto,

FROM FIRST AFGHAN. WAR TO 1873. 26 1
Ruler. But if the British Government would recognise
himself and his dynasty as the de jure Sovereigns of
Afghanistan, then he would be our friend indeed.
For this purpose, what he desired was, that we should
accept the same obligation as that which the Treaty of
1855 had imposed upon his father. We must make
with him a Treaty offensive and defensive. His
enemies must be our enemies, and his friends must
be our friends. He required, also, that we should
give him a fixed subsidy, in the form of an annual
payment. Lord Mayo refused all these demands. He inti
mated to the Ameer that they were altogether
inadmissible. They would have bound us to support
the Ameer 'against internal insurrection, however
much rebellion may have been justified by his own
misgovernment They would have bound us to
support his own nomination of a successor, however
unjust his selection might be, and however obnoxious
to his people- But this result, which was most objec
tionable to us, was precisely what Shere Ali most
m
desired. It was not against external attack that he
was really anxious to secure from Lord Mayo, a
binding guarantee. He and his Minister fought his
case with pertinacity, and always with one great end
in view — a British guarantee for himself and for his
family, as the rightful rulers of Afghanistan. Foreign
aggression was hardly present to his mind at all.
t"It is most remarkable," said Lord Mayo in his

262 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
private letter to me, giving an account of the Umballa
Conference, " that during all the Ameer's conversations
here, he has hardly ever mentioned the name of Russia.
Whether it is that he is so wrapped up in his own
affairs, or knows little of their proceedings, he does
not give them a thought, and when we have casually
referred to them, he generally says that we shall not
hear much of them in Afghanistan for a long time."
It is needless to say that the offensive and defensive
Treaty which he desired would have been equally
open to objection in its relation to foreign affairs. It
would have placed the resources of India unreservedly
and unconditionally at the disposal of Shere Ali. He
would have been far more than the Foreign Minister
for England in the politics of the frontier. In either
point of view it was impossible to give him what he
asked, and the only course left open to Lord Mayo
was to offer him everything which it was safe to
give. Accordingly, in the letter which the Ameer finally
accepted from Lord Mayo as the utmost in the direc
tion of his wishes which could be conceded to him,
the phraseology is such as to have little or no special
reference to the case of external attack. " Although,
as already intimated to you, the British Government
does not desire to interfere in the. internal affairs of
Afghanistan, yet considering that the bonds of friend
ship between that Government and your Highness
have lately been more closely drawn than heretofore>

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TQ 18.73. 263
will view with severe displeasure any attempt to
disturb your position as Ruler of Cabul, and rekindle
civil war; and it will further endeavour, from time to
time to strengthen the government of your Highness
to enable you to exercise with equity and justice your
rightful rule, and to transmit to your descendants all
the dignities and honours of which you are the lawful
possessor,"* It will be seen that this sentence " sailed Very near
the wind." It caused some uneasiness at first to the
Government at home lest it should have led the
Ameer to suppose that he had actually got the
guarantee which he desired. But Lord Mayo's ample
explanations set this anxiety at rest, and I had the
satisfaction of conveying to the Viceroy in a despatch
dated the 27th August, i869,f the full approbation of
her Majesty's Government of the course which,- under
very difficult circumstances, he had taken. . Lord
Mayo had carefully and repeatedly explained to the
Ameer that " under no circumstances was he to expect
that British troops would cross the frontier to put
down civil war or domestic contention."
General assurances were given to Shere Ali that
from time to time we should give him such assistance
and support as the circumstances of the case might
seem in our judgment to justify or require. As an

* Ibid., No. 17, Inclos. 3, p. 90,
f Ibid., No. 20, p. 100. .

¦264 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
earnest of our friendly intentions in this matter a
considerable sum of money, and a further supply of
arms, were given to him.
It may well be asked if this was enough to satisfy
the Ameer as a substitute for all the demands he had
made — for the treaty offensive and defensive, for the
guarantee against domestic enemies, for the assurance
of his succession, for the annual subsidy. No ; there
was one more concession which Lord Mayo made,
and made willingly — he promised to the Ameer "that
no European officers should be placed as Residents in
his cities."
It has been since contended on the evidence of Cap
tain Grey, who acted as the Viceroy's interpreter at the *
Umballa Conference, that in the course of that Confer
ence "the Ameer did freely consent to the appointment
of European British officers in Balkh, Herat, or any
where but actually in Cabul."* Even if there were no
evidence against the accuracy of this impression on
the mind of Captain Grey, — even if it were strictly
and undeniably accurate, — it could have no bearing on
the question of our obligations to the Ameer. That
which alone is binding on the parties to such a Con
ference is the conclusion arrived at. It must happen
in every negotiation that suggestions and proposals
are made on both sides which are set aside in the
course of the discussion. The utmost use that can be

* Ibid., No. 32, Inclos. 12, ,p. 144.

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 265
made of such suggestions, even when all the circum
stances and conditions under which they are made
are correctly recollected and. reported, is to throw
light on the processes of elimination by which the
final results were reached. The fact of any particular
suggestion having been made, coupled with the fact
that it was not adopted, but, . on the contrary, was
thrown aside, can have no other effect than to prove
that the rejection of it did not arise from accident,
but from a deliberate decision.
So far, therefore, very little importance attaches to
Captain Grey's impression that at one moment during
the Conferences, and probably on conditions which
were never granted, the Ameer evinced a willingness to
admit European officers as Residents in his dominions.
It so happens, however, that there is the strongest,
and, indeed, conclusive evidence, that Captain Grey
must have misconstrued the language of the Ameer.
In the first place, it is not borne out by the only
documents upon which he himself relies. These
documents are (1) a Note submitted by himself
to Lord Mayo, reporting certain conversations held
on the 29th of March with Noor Mohammed, the
confidential Minister of the Ameer, and (2) a rela
tive passage in his own private memoranda. Now,
on turning to the words of that Note, we find
that the reported conversation had reference to
the supposed case of Russian aggression against the
Northern frontier of Afghanistan. The Minister is said

266 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
to have expressed doubts of any Russian power of
aggression for years to come, but still thought precau
tions should be taken. He is then reported to have
said that he would construct forts on his own part or
under British superintendence, and admit European
garrisons, "if ever desired;" and further, that he "would
be glad to see an Agent or Engineer Superintendent in
Balkh, Herat, or anywhere but actually in Cabul."
These words, even if reported with perfect accuracy
not only in themselves, but in their connexion, do not
at all justify the construction put upon them by
Captain Grey. That the Ameer should have been
willing to admit English garrisons into his forts
in the event of a Russian attack upon his frontiers, is
probable enough, and all the more probable from the
fact that Noor Mohammed evidently regarded such a
danger as not a very near contingency. But this has
nothing whatever to do with the proposal to station
European officers as permanent Political Agents in his
dominions. Neither have the succeeding words quoted
from the Note, any reference to this proposal. He
was willing to see" an Agent" or "Engineer Superin
tendent" in Balkh, or anywhere else except in Cabul.
The Ameer never objected to British "Agents" any
where, so long as they were not Europeans, and this
passage of the Note does not specify the nationality
of the Agent. But even if this passage did distinctly
refer to an European, it probably referred to one who
should be in charge of the fortifications previously
referred to, and this connexion of ideas is still more

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 267
plainly indicated by the alternative expression which
is used, " or Engineer Superintendent."
As regards the second document relied upon by
Captain Grey — viz., his own private memoranda, the
passage he quotes is- still more insufficient for the
heavy superstructure he builds upon it. Indeed such
evidence as it affords seems to me to point strongly
the other Way. The Ameer was asked to " accede to
our deputation of Native Agents wherever we
pleased " — a demand, on our part, plainly indicating
how well we knew his objections to European Agents.
The Ameer is then said to have been asked if he would
be "agreeable to the deputation of an Envoy at some
future date." This question is obviously of the vaguest
kind, and it was clearly impossible for the Ameer to say
that never at any future time, or under any possible
circumstances, could he receive an Envoy. But the
reception of an Envoy does not necessarily mean the
reception of a permanent resident Envoy. On the
contrary, the wording of the question rather implies
a special Embassy. "At some future date" is
hardly the expression that Would be used to de
scribe the establishment of a permanent Mission.
Yet even to this very vague question Captain Grey
reports a very cautious answer : — " The Ameer ex
pressed his willingness to receive an Envoy as soon
as things had somewhat settled down, anywhere except
at Cabul, where he thought it would affect his power
with the people."
It appears, then, that even in the entire absence of

268 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
any extraneous evidence against the assertion of
Captain Grey, it is one which is not justified ,by the
only documentary witness which he can summon in
support of it.
But we have abundant other evidence in refutation
of Captain Grey's interpretation of the facts. Mr. Seton
Karr, who held the high office of Foreign Secretary to
the Government of India, and who filled it for many
years with acknowledged ability, was present during the
whole of the Umballa Conferences, and has declared
that neither the Ameer nor his Minister ever expressed
any willingness to receive British officers as residents
in his Kingdom. If this evidence stood alone it would
be quite enough. On a question of such capital im
portance, which was the subject of Treaty stipulations
of subsisting force — a question, as I have shown, on
which the mind of the Viceroy had .been specially
dwelling for several weeks up to the moment of
the -Conference — it is not possible that such a com
munication can have been made either by the
Ameer or by his Minister without attracting the
attention of the Foreign Secretary to the Govern
ment of India.
But this is not all. On the 4th of April,, before
Lord Mayo had left Umballa, and when every
minutest feature of the Conferences was still fresh in
his recollection, he addressed to me a very long and
very minute account of every important circumstance
connected with his own communications to the Ameer,

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 269
and of the Ameer's communications to him. In par
ticular, he gave a detailed narrative of what passed at
tiie Conference on the 29th of March— the very day
to which Captain Grey's note refers. There is not a
word in that account to indicate that the Ameer or
his Minister made any such intimation as that to
which Captain Grey refers. It was at this interview
that the Ameer insisted not only with Vehemence, but
with great excitement, on the one object which he had
most at heart, namely, that of an absolute dynastic
guarantee from the British Government in favour of
himself- and his heirs of blood. To obtain this it is
possible that he might have consented, or might
have proposed to consent, to very hard terms. But
the very hardest of those terms would have been the
admission of resident British officers in his dominions.
Lord Mayo was determined not to give him a dy
nastic guarantee, and he was equally determined not
to press upon him a demand which would have been
in violation of a subsisting engagement, and which
the Viceroy had apparently come to regard as likely
to be really injurious, under existing circumstances,
to the authority of the Ameer. It was in this spirit
that he assured Shere Ali that whilst the British
Government desired to support him, and had already
done so in a most effective way, it did not desire that
this support should be manifested in a form which
might suggest the idea of his "being maintained
mainly by extraneous aid." And so, having felt himself

270 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
obliged by imperative considerations of public policy
to decline giving to the Ameer that on which he had
set his heart, the Viceroy wisely determined to give,
him every compensation in his power, and instead of •
pressing on him the acception of European officers,
he promised him, on the contrary, that no such
demand would be made at all.
The extreme jealousy of the Ameer and of his
Minister on the subject of European Agents of the
British Government was strongly shown at the Con
ferences which were held on the ist and on the 3rd of
April, of which notes were appended to Lord Mayo's
letter to me of the 4th. One of the questions asked
on the ist was, " Would the Ameer sanction native
Agents in Afghanistan, either as visitors or as perma
nent residents, supposing the British Government
wished it ?" Even on this question Noor Mohammed
did not wish to commit himself, and showed the sus
picion and the fear which was deeply rooted in the
mind of every Afghan, by " asking, rather anxiously,
whether European Agents were intended ?" Before
the close of the day's proceedings the Foreign Secre
tary assured the Minister that he "had reserved
nothing, and had nothing to reserve."
The Viceroy continued his correspondence with me
on the subject of the Conferences for several weeks
after he left Umballa. One of his letters, which was
written on the 1 8th of April, is remarkable, as that
which contained the summary of the results arrived

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 271
at in the Umballa Conferences, which is quoted irt the
public Despatch dated July 1, 1869.* The summary
arranges those results on the principle which has been
explained in the Preface of this work, — that, namely,
of giving a separate list, first of the proposals which
had been negatived, and next, of the proposals which
had been affirmed. Among the proposals which had
been negatived were those of sending into Afghanis
tan either troops, or officers, or Residents. Troops the
Ameer might sometimes have liked to get — provided
they were to be entirely at his own disposal. Officers
also he might sometimes have desired to get— pro
vided they were to be nothing more than his drill-
sergeants, and to retire when he ceased to need them.
" Residents," that is to say, officers resident in his
country as Political Agents were, above all things, his
dread and his abhorrence. But as he was not to have
the things which he might have accepted as a boon,
so neither was he to have thrust upon him a burden
which he disliked. All those proposals, therefore,
some for one reason, some for another reason, were
equally negatived.
But this letter of the 18th of April is further
remarkable as containing expressions of opinion
which throw an important light on the reasons for
Lord Mayo's silence with the Ameer regarding
causes of anxiety which, nevertheless, he had

* Ibid., No. 19, p. 95, parag. 22.

272 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
full in view. In that letter he expressed it as his
opinion (in which I did then and do now entirely
agree) that our policy towards Afghanistan "ought
to be the basis of our Central Asian policy .": But one
of the most essential parts of that policy, in the Vice
roy's opinion, was not to feel and not to exhibit
nervous anxiety and unreasonable fears. In his letter
to me of the 4th of April Lord Mayo had, as we
have seen, explained to me that the Ameer
hardly ever mentioned Russia at all. Under these
circumstances it was the Viceroy's wise policy
not to exhibit ourselves in the light in which
too many English and Indian politicians are never
weary of exhibiting themselves to the world. They
are perpetually assuring us that they do not dread the
actual invasion of India by Russia, but that they do
dread the disturbance and unsettlement of mind which
the advances of that Power will occasion in the minds
of the Indian Princes and people. But it is plain that
this evil, whatever it may amount to, is aggravated by
nothing so much as exhibitions of alarm on the part
of the English Government. Lord Mayo was deter
mined that no such apprehensions should be exhibited
by himself. In this same letter he said upon this subject,
" Sanguine politicians at home will be disappointed
that what is termed the Central Asian question did
not prominently appear at Umballa. I am sure you will
agree with me that it was a great blessing it did not.
I certainly determined not to broach it, because I am

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 273
of opinion that it is most desirable to show the Ameer
that we have no apprehensions from the North.
He, on the other hand, is so intent on establishing
himself on the throne of Cabul, that he appears to
think very little at present of either Russia or Persia."
The result was in one respect most important
with respect to the whole scope and effect of the
engagements made at Umballa. It dissociated those
engagements entirely from the contingency of foreign
aggression on Afghanistan. We have seen that
Sir J. Lawrence, when Shere Ali was reported to
be acting in alliance with Persia, at once intimated
to the Government at home that his policy of absten
tion would not apply to such a case. In like manner
Lord Mayo pointed out to me that, " as the question
of the invasion by a foreign European Power of his
territory was never alluded to by the Ameer or by
me, our course of action in the event of such an
occurrence taking place is not affected by anything
that took place at Umballa."
I now come to one of the most important of this
series of letters, dated June 3rd, 1869. It was written
by the Viceroy expressly to explain various misappre
hensions which he found had arisen respecting what
he had said and done at the Umballa Conferences,
and was, indeed, intended to anticipate, among others,
those misconceptions which led to my Despatch of
the 14th of May* In fact this Despatch and Lord
* Ibid., No. 18, p. 91.
VOL. II. T

274 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
Mayo's letter of June 3rd crossed each other. In
this letter he says emphatically, "The only pledges
(to the Ameer) given were : that we would not inter
fere in his affairs ; that we would support his inde
pendence ; that we would not force European officers
or Residents upon him against his wish." There is no
ambiguity here. We have here Lord Mayo's distinct
declaration that at Umballa he did renew and repeat
that " pledge" to the Ameer which had been embodied
in the 7th Article of the Treaty of 1857 with his
father. It was a pledge which he and his family had
always valued almost above all others, and the fulfil
ment of which was doubly due to him now when
Lord Mayo had felt himself compelled to refuse so
much that he had eagerly desired. This letter of
June 3rd places beyond all doubt Lord Mayo's esti
mate of the binding character of those promises which
he had given to the Ameer, and of the rank and place
among those promises which had been assigned to
the engagement on the subject of the residence of
European officers in Cabul.
And now having concluded my account of the Um
balla Conferences, taken from the most authentic of
all sources, I must express my opinion, as the Secre
tary of State under whom the sanction and approval
of the Crown was given to Lord Mayo's conduct, as
to the binding character of the promises which were
given by that Viceroy. Sir James Stephen, in a letter
lately communicated to the Times, has put forward

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 275
the doctrine that in our relations with semi-barbarous
States like that of Afghanistan, we are not bound by
the somewhat technical and elaborate code of rules
which go by the name of International Law, and which
are recognised as binding between the more civilised
nations of the world. In this general proposition I
agree. I have too sincere a respect for the high cha
racter as well as for the great abilities of Sir James
Stephen to suppose that in laying down this propo
sition he intended to defend, or even to palliate any
departure from the strictest good faith with such
nations where engagements, direct or indirect, have
been made with them. I am sure he cannot have
intended to " use this liberty as a cloak of licentious
ness." The truth is, Sir James Stephen's doctrine —
in the only sense in which I agree in it, and in the
only sense in which, as I believe, he ever can have
intended to propound it — is a doctrine which leaves
us free to apply to all engagements with haff-
civilised Governments, even a higher standard of
honour than is usually applied to international deal
ings between equal States. For example, there are
technical distinctions, well known and recognised
among them, which establish different degrees of obli
gation as attaching to different forms of diplomatic
documents. It would be dishonourable, in my
opinion, and dishonourable in the highest degree, to
take advantage of any such distinctions, in cases
where they cannot be equally known and equally
T 2

276 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
recognised by both parties. If the pledged word of a
Viceroy of India is not to be held as good and as
binding as any Treaty, there is an end of our claim
to confidence in the East. We ought not to tolerate the
smallest trifling with this absolute demand upon us.
We have only to look at the 54th paragraph of Lord
Mayo's public despatch on the Umballa Conference;*
to see what a high place must be given in the Court
of Honour to the pledges which he gave to the Ameer.
He says, he thought it undesirable to engage in volu
minous written communications with the Ameer,
because " the visit was one of a personal character,
conceived in the spirit of amity and good faith."
The pledges given at the Umballa Conference are
all the more binding on us from the effect which they
actually produced. Except these pledges, there was
nothing to account for the good humour with which
Shere Ali returned to his Kingdom from his conference
with the Viceroy. Beyond the repetition of some
immediate assistance in money and in arms, and
beyond the promise not to embarrass him with the
presence of European Agents, we had given him
nothing that he desired to have. Behind these
promises, indeed, there remained the personal influ
ence of Lord Mayo. His manly presence, his
genial open-hearted- countenance, and his transparent
sincerity of character — these had produced a great
effect, even on an angry and suspicious Asiatic.
* Ibid., No. 18, p. 98.

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 277
It would, however, be a very great mistake to sup
pose that the Ameer was ever really satisfied ; or that,
if he was so for a moment, his discontent did not soon
return. The unhappy relations which he speedily
established with the ablest and most powerful of his
sons, and the usual influence of the harem which
induced him to desire the succession of a later child —
these things kept constantly before him the dangers
of intestine strife, and the prospect of a disputed
throne. An Afghan does not readily abandon any
purpose, and the steady refusal of the British Govern^
ment to pledge itself to one party or another in the
family feuds of Afghanistan, while every day that
refusal became more and more clearly necessary as
well as just, became also more and more a practical,
grievance to the Ameer.
Shere Ali had brought with him to Umballa the
boy Abdoolah Jan, and this young prince had, at all
the Durbars, sat on the left hand of the Ameer,
whilst the Viceroy sat upon the right* This
position seemed to point to the acknowledgment,
by the Ameer at least, of Abdoolah Jan as his heir-
apparent. But no nomination of his successor had
as yet been formally announced by the Ameer. It is
now evident that this was the very matter which
made Shere Ali so bent on obtaining a dynastic
guarantee, and it is probable that if this guarantee

* Ibid.> No. 17, Inclos. 2, p.-90.

278 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
had been given, Abdoolah would have been at once
proclaimed the successor of the Ameer. In this event,
and in the event of the death of Shere Ali, the British
Government would have been committed to the
support of Abdoolah in the civil war, which would
have been immediately raised by Yakoob Khan.
But failing in his demand for a dynastic guarantee,
Shere Ali seems to have hesitated to avow his in
tentions. During one of the Conferences at Umballa,
Lord Mayo did make inquiries of the Ameer
upon the subject, and intimated that it was a ques
tion on which the British Government could
not but feel a friendly interest. The Ameer, how
ever, parried the inquiry, and said that his determina
tion in that matter when it was come to, would be
communicated from Cabul.
The progress of events soon showed the danger
attaching to such guarantees as that which Shere
Ali had desired. In 1870, Yakoob Khan raised the
standard of rebellion; and in June, 1871, had made
himself master of Herat. In the same month Lord
Mayo heard that Yakoob had made advances to his
father for a reconciliation, and he determined to
take the very delicate step of writing to the Ameer,
advising him to come to terms with his son. This
accordingly he did. The letter of the Viceroy
reached our native Agent at Cabul on the 16th of June,.
and was immediately communicated to the Ameer.
The advice of Lord Mayo probably corresponded .

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 279
at that moment with the Ameer's own estimate of the
wisest policy to be pursued towards his powerful and
successful son. He therefore immediately addressed
a letter to Yakoob Khan in the sense of Lord Mayo's
advice, and assured Yakoob that if he came to express
repentance, and make his submission at Cabul, he
would be forgiven and received. The result was that
Yakoob came to Cabul, and that his father deemed it
expedient to send him back to Herat, with the ap
pointment of Governor of that important City and
Province. This result gave much satisfaction to the
Viceroy, and it was indeed a very remarkable proof of
the influence which he had acquired over the mind of
Shere Ali by the pursuance of a perfectly open and
friendly policy.
It is, however, a signal illustration of Lord Mayo's
excellent judgment and good sense that the success,
or apparent success, of this friendly intervention in the
internal affairs of Afghanistan did not for a moment
shake his former views as to the serious danger
and impolicy of anything approaching to formal
engagements with the Ameer in relation to such
affairs. On the contrary, the whole transaction
confirmed him in those views, because they brought
out in a vivid light the essential instability of Shere
Ali's throne, and the still greater instability of any
predetermined order of succession. Accordingly, on
the 7th of July, before Lord Mayo had, as yet, heard
of the final result, but when he knew that his letter

280 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
had been successful, and that Yakoob was then on his
way to Cabul, he addressed to me a letter in which he
reiterated, in the strongest language, his confidence in
the policy which had been pursued by Sir J. Lawrence
and himself, in opposition to the policy which recom
mended more active interference. " It is impossible,"
he. said, " to express in too strong terms how entirely
I disapprove of the policy of interfering in the family
quarrels of the Barukzyes." He proceeds to illus
trate this opinion by illustrations in detail, which it is
unnecessary to quote, because they contain allusions
and references to persons which are among the very
few passages of a really private character which occur
in our correspondence on the subject. Suffice it to say
that Lord Mayo indicated his opinion that Yakoob
Khan would probably be the future Ruler of Cabul,
and that it would be most unfortunate if we were ever
again to be in the position of maintaining on the
throne of Cabul a " hated Sovereign."
Meanwhile, however, the immediate effects of the
Umballa Conference were such as to keep Shere Ali
in good humour. The measure of assistance which
had been given to the Ameer, first by Sir J. Lawrence
and then by Lord Mayo, both in the moral effect pro
duced by the support of the British Government, and
by the actual funds put at his disposal, had enabled
Shere Ali to establish his authority over the whole
of Afghanistan, and of the countiy called Afghan
Turkestan, lying between the Hindoo Koosh and the

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 281
Oxus. So soon after the Umballa Conference as the
ist of May, 1869, Colonel Pollock, the Commissioner
of Peshawur, had reported as the direct and
immediate result of the Umballa meeting, that the
Ameer had been able to recover Balkh without a
struggle, and had secured the submission of
Badakshan. Whilst the opinions and policy of the Government
on the Central Asian question were thus being carried
into execution in India, through the Viceroy, with a
dignity of conduct and a steadiness of judgment which
left us nothing to desire, the same opinions and the
same policy were being prosecuted at home through
the Foreign Office. During the same weeks in which
Lord Mayo was preparing to receive Shere Ali at
Umballa, Lord Clarendon was in communication with
the Russian Ambassador in London, intimating the
desire of the Cabinet to arrive at some understanding
with the Government of Russia on the questions which
might be raised by the rapid advances of the Russian
Empire in Central Asia. In these communications
with Baron Briinow, Lord Clarendon explained that
the main object of such an understanding was to pacify
the public mind both in England and in Asia. So far as
the Government was concerned, we felt that "we
were strong enough in India to repel all aggression."
We made no complaint, and we repudiated any feeling
of alarm. On the other hand, we expressed no such
implicit confidence as had been expressed by Sir

282 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
Stafford Northcote. On the contrary, we pointed
out that the progress of Russia in Central Asia was,
like our own progress in Hindostan, the effect of ten
dencies and of causes which were more or less in con
stant operation, and that certain results would naturally
and almost necessarily follow from them which it
would be wise on the part of both Governments to
foresee and to prevent. In indicating what those
results were, we did not pretend to any right or to any
desire of stopping Russia in her career of conquest
over the desert wastes and the robber tribes of Central
Asia. We did not hint that a large portion of the
world was to be kept in a state of hopeless barbarism,
to save us from having nervous fears. We specified and
limited the demands which we thought we had a fair
right to make, — and these were that measures should
be taken to prevent any aspiring Russian general
from intriguing with malcontent Indian Princes, or
disturbing the States and populations which touch
our frontiers. For this purpose, moreover, a definite
arrangement was suggested, and that was, that " some
territory should be recognised as neutral between the
possessions of England and of Russia in the East,
which should be the limit of those possessions,
and should be scrupulously respected by both
Powers." Baron Briinow concurred with Lord Claren
don in the suggestion. He made a report of it to his
Government, and on the very day on which Lord
Mayo was receiving Shere Ali at Umballa he brought

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 283
to the Foreign Office a letter from Prince Gortcha
kow, specifying Afghanistan as a territory and a
State well fitted to occupy the position which was indi
cated in Lord Clarendon's suggestion. He was there
fore authorised to give a "positive assurance that
Afghanistan would be considered as entirely beyond
the sphere in which Russia might be called upon to
exercise her influence."*
It is of great importance to look closely at the
language of the letter from Prince Gortchakow to
Baron Tirunow, dated on the 7th and which Lord
Clarendon received on the 27th of March. That lan
guage was quite distinct that the object in view
was to be that of keeping "a zone between the
possessions of the two Empires in Asia, to pre
serve them from any contact." It is clear, therefore,
that whatever territory might be fixed upon by
the two Governments as constituting this zone, it was
contemplated that the actual possessions of Russia
and of England might come to touch it on opposite
sides. But Russia was as yet very far from actually
touching any part of the Afghan frontier. Bokhara
touched it, if Afghanistan was fully understood to
extend to the Oxus. And Bokhara was now under the
command of Russia. But if Afghanistan were not
understood as extending to the Oxus on its northern
frontier, then the acceptance of that country and

* Central Asia, II., 1873, No. 1, p. 1.

284 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
Kingdom as constituting the proposed zone would
leave room for a large advance on the part of Russia,
to the south of her then acknowledged frontier, and
might thus possibly be held to sanction her absorption
of the whole territory between Bokhara and the
Hindoo Koosh. Lord Clarendon, therefore, with very
proper caution, in thanking the Russian Government
for the spirit of their communication, and in express
ing general agreement in the principle of the proposal,
reserved his acceptance of Afghanistan as the territory
to be selected, upon the ground that "he was not
sufficiently informed on the subject to express an
opinion as to whether Afghanistan should fulfil the
conditions of circumstances of a neutral territory
between the two Powers, such as it seemed desirable
to establish."*
It was of course at this time my duty to inform
Lord Clarendon upon those political and geographical
facts which were of importance to the question then
under discussion, and which were only known, or best
known, to the Government of India and its officers.
I was at that very time receiving communications
from Lord Mayo which, as I have already explained,
represented Russian officials as holding very suspicious
language on the subject of the limits of the Afghan
Kingdom.t These reports might not be correct. But,

* Ibid., No. i, Inclos., p. 3.
t See ante, pp. 257, 258.

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 18.73. 285
on the other hand, they might be true ; and at all
events, they suggested caution and inspired serious
doubt whether it would be safe to accept Afghanistan
as fulfilling the required conditions, unless it were
clearly understood by both Governments what were
the territories included under that name. Accordingly,
after hearing all that could be ascertained from our
Indian experts as to the somewhat obscure geography
of the northern frontier of Shere Ali's dominions, I
came to the conclusion that it would be unsafe and
inexpedient to accept Afghanistan as the farthest
limit of Russian advances, unless it were at the same
time admitted as a fact that Afghanistan extended to
the Upper Oxus. It appeared to us farther that it
would be best to take that great river as the bound
ary of the "zone" for some distance even beyond
the point where it ceased to touch the Afghan
dominions. The effect of this would have been to
include in the territory which was to be intermediate
between the possessions of England and of Russia,
not only the whole of Shere Ali's dominions, but also
a large tract of country, for the most part desert,
which was laid down in the maps as belonging to the
Khan of Khiva.
Accordingly, these proposals were communicated
to Baron Briinow by Lord Clarendon on the 17th
of April, 1869, and it was specially explained that
they were founded on "the decided opinion of the
Secretary of State for India," after consultation with

286 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
those members of Council who were best acquainted
with the country*
This proposal at once compelled the Government
of Russia to show its cards : and on the 2nd of June
Prince Gortchakow avowed that very opinion of which
the Indian Government had been suspicious, namely,
that Afghanistan did not reach the Oxus, and that,
on the contrary, the territory of Bokhara extended
to the south of that river.f
In the discussions which followed, the last of our
two proposals came to be abandoned. That pro
posal, namely, the extension of the proposed " zone"
beyond the Afghan Kingdom to some point farther
westward upon the Oxus as yet undefined, was a
proposal which was completely overshadowed by
the paramount importance of a clear and definite
understanding as to the extent of territory which
was included in Afghanistan. The discussions
on this subject were protracted during the long
period of three years and a half. The dis
cussion was conducted in a most friendly spirit,
generally of course through the Foreign Office, but
at one time also, in a subordinate degree, through
an officer of the Indian Government, Mr. Douglas
Forsyth. He visited St. Petersburg in October,
1869, furnished with instructions and private letters
from Lord Mayo, in which full explanations were

* Central Asia, II., 1873, No. 3, p. 4. f Ibid., No. 7, p. 6.

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 287
given to the Russian Cabinet as to the views and
intentions of the Government of India. The result
of these communications was an entire agreement
on three important principles : ist, that the terri
tory in the actual possession, at the present moment
of Shere Ali Khan, should be considered to con
stitute the limits of Afghanistan ; 2nd, that beyond
those limits the Ameer should make no attempt to
exercise any influence or interference, and that the
English Government should do all in their power to
restrain him from any attempts at aggression ; 3rd,
that, for their part, the Imperial Government should
use all their influence to prevent any attack by the
Emir of Bokhara upon Afghan territory.
These general principles were for the moment quite
sufficient to have a most useful practical result, in
enabling the Indian Government to give assurances to
Shere Ali, and to give him advice also which tended
to keep the peace, and to prevent any practical ques
tions being raised. They were sufficient also to deter
mine Russia in similar conduct in her relations with
Bokhara, and in her relations also with fugitive
members of Shere Ali's family who were pretenders
to his throne. In all these matters both Russia and
England, acted with good faith on the spirit of the
Agreement, during the whole of the three years and a
half occupied by the discussion. But so long as
there was no clear and definite understanding with
Russia as to what she meant by " the territories in

288 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
the actual possession qf Shere Ali," and so long
especially as she avowed that she did not admit
Badakshan and Wakhan to be a part of those
territories, the Agreement had no permanent value.
Accordingly, after the return of Mr. Forsyth to India,
and after Lord Mayo and his Council had obtained
the fullest information, both historical and geogra
phical, on the northern extension of the Afghan
Kingdom, they embodied their information in a
despatch to me, dated May 20, 1870. It gave a
precise definition to the northern and north-western
frontiers of Afghanistan, emphatically asserted that
they extended to the Upper Oxus, and indicated the
point on the westward course of that river where they
marched with provinces belonging to Bokhara.*
The Russian Government contested this definition
of Afghanistan with some keenness, and especially
insisted on representing Badakshan and Wakhan
as dependencies of Bokhara. So late as December,
1872,1 Prince Gortchakow maintained this view with
extraordinary pertinacity, and offered a compromise
on the western portion of Lord Mayo's boundary,
which would have expressly abandoned the claim of
Shere Ali to the disputed province of Badakshan.
At last the Emperor of Russia personally intervened,
and sent Count Schouvalow on a mission to London,

* Ibid., No. 60, Inclos., p. 45-7.
t Correspondence with Russia, 1873, No. 2, p. 4.

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1.873. ^9
for the purpose of conceding the contention of the
British Government that the Upper Oxus should be
admitted as the northern frontier of Afghanistan.
His Majesty said that "there might be arguments
used respectively by the departments of each Govern
ment ; but he was of opinion that such a question
should not be a cause of difference between the two
countries, and he was determined that it should not
be so."* On the 24th of January, 1873, this admission
of the Emperor was suitably acknowledged by Lord
Granville,t and the discussion terminated.]:
I know it will be asked by scoffers what was
the worth of this understanding when it had been
laboriously attained ? What was the worth of these
assurances when they had been mutually exchanged ?
My answer is a very short one. They were of no
value at all when the foreign policy of England came
to be directed in the spirit of those by whom this
question is asked. Neither international Agreements
of this kind, nor even formal Treaties are worth any
thing in the event of war, or in the event of avowed
preparations for war. Governments are not obliged

* Ibid., No. 3, p. 12. f Ibid., No. 4, p. 13.
X It has been represented by Sir Henry Rawlinson that the
admission by the Emperor of Russia of our contention respect
ing the limits of Afghanistan was conceded in order to secure
our acquiescence in the Khivan Expedition. I see no proof of
this. No British Government in its senses would have gone to
war with Russia to prevent that Expedition.
VOL. II. U

*go RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
to wait till the first actual blow has been struck by
another Government, using, in the meantime, the
language of insult and of menace. When the
Prime Minister, speaking at Russia, boasted after
a Guildhall dinner, that England could stand more
than one, or even two, or even three campaigns;
when the Home Secretary, speaking of Russia,
told the House of Commons with mimetic ges
tures, that she was "creeping, creeping, creeping,"
where that Minister had known for months that
Russia had openly declared she would go if she were
required to do so ; when the Cabinet as a whole had
summoned the Reserves at home, and had ordered
troops from India to enable them to act in the spirit
of these harangues— then, indeed, peaceful under
standings and Agreements became of no avail.
But if it is asked by reasonable men, and in a reason
able spirit, what the actual force and value of the
understanding with Russia was, during the years
when it was unaffected by passionate suspicions, and
by undignified threats, then the question deserves a
much more careful examination than has yet been
given to it.
In the first place, then, it was not an Agreement
which was understood by either party as prohibiting
Russia from having any communication whatever
with the Ameer of Cabul. This has been pretended
or assumed, but it is not true. In the despatch of

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 291
Prince Gortchakow, dated the 7th of March, 1869,*
which is one of the most authoritative documents in
the case, the promise of Russia to abstain from the
exercise of any influence in Afghanistan was given,
indeed, in positive terms. But it was given also with
an explanatory addition, which makes it quite clear
wherein the whole force and meaning of that promise
was understood, to lie. What the Emperor disclaimed
and abjured as "entering into his intentions" was,
any " intervention or interference whatever opposed
to the independence of that State." Communications
of courtesy, or even communication having for their
sole aim the promotion of commercial intercourse, were
certainly not excluded by this engagement.
That this was the clear understanding of both
parties before the passionate jealousy of our Ministers
was roused by their own policy in the Turkish ques
tion, is proved by the whole course of events up to the
appearance of that question above the political horizon.
In June, 1870, after the Agreement had been fully
established between the two Governments, Prince
Gortchakow himselff communicated to our Ambassa
dor at St. Petersburg a letter which General Kaufmann
had addressed to Shere Ali on the very important
and delicate subject of the asylum given at Tashkend
to the fugitive Abdul Rahman Khan, one of the

* Central Asia, IL, 1873, Inclos. p. 3.
tlbid., No. 58, p. 43.
U 2

292 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
aspirants to the throne of Cabul. This letter is a
very full one, entering freely and frankly into an ex
planation of the political relations between Russia and
Cabul, as well as of the relations between both and
the Khanate of Bokhara. It addressed the Ameer,
as " under the protection of the Indian Government,"
intimated that with that Government Russia was in
friendly relations, warned him gently against inter
fering with Bokhara, as being under the protection of
the Czar.* No hint was dropped by the British
Ambassador that this direct communication from the
Russian Governor-General to the Ameer of Cabul
was considered as involving any departure whatever
from the spirit or from the letter of the understanding
between the two Governments. Within six days of
the same date this very same letter came under the
special notice of Lord Mayo, to whom it was referred
by the Ameer as having somewhat puzzled and
alarmed him. Lord Mayo took the trouble of writing
an elaborate letter to Shere Ali, explaining the true
meaning of General Kaufmann's letter, and expressing
the highest satisfaction with it.f In December, 1873,
the Government of India were acquainted with the
fact that a letter of similar purport had been ad
dressed to the Ameer in August of that year, inform
ing him of the Russian conquest of Khiva.J No
* Ibid., No. 58, Inclos., p. 44.
t Central Asia, I., 1878, p. 184.
X Ibid., No. 5, Inclos. 2, p. 8.

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 293
adverse notice was taken of this fact by the Govern
ment of India, or by the Government at home.
These facts, then very recent, were in possession
of the present Government when they succeeded
to office. But as neither Lord Mayo, nor Lord
Northbrook, nor Lord Granville had remonstrated
with Russia on the subject of these letters, so
neither did Lord Derby nor Lord Salisbury. It
is remarkable that the first of these letters from
General Kaufmann which was transmitted to Lord
Salisbury was one dated the 25th of February, 1874,
acknowledging the nomination by the Ameer of
Abdoollah Jan as his heir-apparent, and congratulating
him on this selection.* Not one word of remonstrance
was uttered — not one word of suspicion breathed. In
May of the same year Lord Northbrook drew Lord
Salisbury's attention — not to the mere fact that
Shere Ali had received another letter from the
Russian officer then in command at Tashkend, — but
to the fact that in this letter allusion was made to some
unknown request which the Ameer had made.t Still
I find no record of any warning to Russia that her
officers were violating the Agreement with England.
In the Autumn of 1875 matters went still farther;
not only was another letter sent from < the Russian
Governor-General of Russian Turkestan, but it was

* Ibid., No. 13, Inclos. 2, p. 15.
f Ibid., No. 15, Inclos. 1, p. 16,

294 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
sent by a messenger who is called an " Envoy." It
was a letter informing the Ameer of the return to
Tashkend of General Kaufmann after his absence for
half a year at St. Petersburg. But it contained a
sentence which caught the ever-wakeful attention of
the Cabul authorities. Kaufmann spoke of the alliance
between England and Russia as an " omen for those
countries which under the protection of the Emperor of
Russia, and the Queen of England, live in great peace
and comfort."* The Afghan politicians seem to have
put the somewhat overstrained interpretation upon
this sentence that the Russian Government had made
itself partner in the protection of Afghanistan. They
said "this paragraph is in a new tone. God knows what
State secrets are concealed in it." Still no alarm was
taken. This news from the Cabul Diaries was forwarded
to the Foreign Office without note or comment from
the Indian Secretary. The reply of the Ameer was
forwarded in similar silence on the 6th of January,
1876. t On the 25th of August the same ceremony
was repeated,:}: and this time a very long letter from
General Kaufmann to the Ameer was enclosed to the
Foreign Office by Lord Lytton's Government, but still
without any indications, even of uneasiness, on the sub
ject. The letter gave a detailed narrative of the
transaction which had led to the Russian conquest of
Kokhand.§ * Ibid., No. 58, Inclos: 6, p. 65, t -Ibid., No. 60, p. 66.
J Ibid., No. 69, p. 75. § Ibid., Inclos. 6, p. 77.

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 295
It is established therefore by a long series of
transactions, extending over several years, and passing
&mder the view of successive Ambassadors, Viceroys,
and Secretaries of State, that the Agreement with
Russia was not understood by either Power to pre
clude direct communications of courtesy passing
between Russian officials and the Ameer of Cabul.
At last, on the 16th of September, 1876, but not
sooner, the new Viceroy of India, Lord Lytton, tele
graphed to Lord Salisbury that he had sent off a de
spatch expressing a decided opinion thather Majesty's
Government ought to remonstrate with. Russia on
Kaufmann's repeated correspondence with the Ameer
by hand of Russian agents, two of whom were reported
to be then in Cabul. Lord Lytton added words which
imply that the Government of India had before enter
tained objections to this intercourse, but "had not
hitherto asked her Majesty's Government to formally
remonstrate on this open breach of repeated pledges."*
This assertion is unsupported by any evidence so far
as regards the Government of India under previous
Viceroys, and as Lord Lytton had then occupied that
position for only five months, the. self-restraint of the
Government of India under the Russian provocation
cannot have been of long endurance
On the 22nd of September, 1876, Lord Salisbury
forwarded this telegram to the Foreign Office, with the

* Ibid,, No. 71, Inclos. pp. 79, 80.

296 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
wholly new and very important information that he
" concurred in the views expressed by the Viceroy,:
and was bf opinion that, as suggested by his Excel
lency, a remonstrance against General Kaufmann's
proceedings should be addressed to the Russian
Government without delay."*
It is remarkable that the Foreign Secretary, in
complying with the request of his colleague, the
Secretary of State for India, indicated a consciousness
that Kaufmann's letters were not a breach of the
Russian Engagement, and did not constitute a legiti
mate ground of diplomatic remonstrance. He took
care to found his remonstrance not. upon the letters,
but upon "reports from other sources that the in
structions of the Asiatic agent (who took the letter to
Cabul) were to induce Shere Ali to sign an offensive
and defensive alliance with the Russian Government,
as well as a Commercial Treaty." This, of course, is
an entirely different ground of complaint — and a
legitimate one, if there had been the smallest evidence
of its truth. But Lord Derby, without committing
himself to belief in this report, confined himself strictly
to it as the only ground on which remonstrance was to
be made by our Ambassador. Lord Augustus Loftus
was not ordered to ask- from the Russian Government
a promise that Kaufmann should write no more letters.
He was only ordered to ask "a written disclaimer;

* Ibid., No. 71, p. 79.

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 297
of any intention on their part to negotiate treaties
with Shere Ali without the consent of her Majesty's
Government."* It is impossible not to ask when and how this new
light came to flash on the Government of India and
on the Indian Secretary of State. A little attention
to dates, and to the character of contemporary events
may perhaps help to explain the mystery.
It was in December, 1875, that the Cabinet of
London had become aware that Russia was moving
in concert with Austria-Hungary and with Germany
for some intervention on behalf of the Christian sub
jects of the Porte.f On the 30th of that month the
Andrassy Note had been signed at Buda-Pesth. This
union of the "Three Emperors" had excited the
jealousy and the fear of the Turkish party in England ;
and we have seen that on the 25th of January, 1876,
the Cabinet of London had felt itself compelled, but
with extreme and avowed reluctance, to give its ad
hesion to that celebrated Instrument. During the
months of February, March, and April, 1876, further
negotiations were being carried on between the same
dreadful "Three" to secure the peace of Europe, by put
ting some effectual pressure on the Turks for the re
form of their administration. During the month of
April especially, the influence and the power of Russia

* Ibid., No. 72, p. 80.
t See ante, .Vol. I. Ch. iv., p. 159.

298 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
in these negotiations was becoming more and more
apparent, and were leading to some real concert
among the Powers of Europe in spite of the dilatory
and evasive policy of the Cabinet of London. Ihey
did at last produce in May the Berlin Memorandum,
which, as a means of arriving at peace, was destroyed
by the Queen's Government, but which as a means
of fortifying Russia in the alternative of war, was im
mensely strengthened by the solitary resistance of the
English Government.
It was in the midst of these transactions that the
new Viceroy of India was appointed, and was charged
with personal and with written instructions which
will be examined presently. Before the 16th of
September, the day on which Lord Lytton sent off
his excited telegram about Kaufmann's letters, the
European embroglio had become very thick indeed.
Russia by her firm yet moderate attitude and
language, — the public feeling of the British people and
their just indignation against the Turks, — were com
pelling the Government to bow beneath the storm,
and to threaten Turkey with complete abandonment
in the event of Russia declaring war. But the keener
spirits in the Cabinet were restive and fretful under
this position of affairs. On the 20th of September,
Mr. Disraeli had made his celebrated speech at
Aylesbury,* and we can therefore understand with-

* See ante, Vol. I. Ch, vi., p. 270*

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 299
out much difficulty the feelings under which, two days
later, Lord Salisbury declared, for the first time,
and in the face of his own previous acquiescence, —
that Kaufmann's letters to the Ameer were a breach
of the Engagement between England and Russia in
respect to their relations with Afghanistan.
Before proceeding, however, to trace the career of
the new Viceroy of India in the Imperial policy which
he went out to prosecute, I must return for a moment
to the Agreement with Russia, for the purpose of point
ing out one other condition of things, and one other
course of conduct, which was almost as effectual as
warlike threats in depriving it of all force and value.
The course of conduct I refer to is that of dealing
with the advances of Russia in Central Asia' after the
Agreement had been made, precisely in the same way
in which we might have been entitled^ or at least dis
posed, to deal with them, if no such Agreement had
been come to. The whole object and purpose of the
Agreement was to establish a boundary line beyond
which we need not be in a constant fuss about Russian
aggression. If there was any sense or meaning in an
understanding that Afghanistan Was not to be en
croached upon, even by the influence of Russia, that
meaning was that Russian advances which did not come
near that Kingdom should cease to be the object of our
jealousyand resentment. Even before that Agreement
was made I never could see that, internationally, we
had any more right to remonstrate with Russia on her

3oo RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
advances in Central Asia, than she would have had to
remonstrate with us on our advances in Hindostan.
Of course nations may make anything they choose a
ground of quarrel and of war. But it is in the highest
degree undignified on the part of any Government to be
perpetually remonstrating with another upon acts which
it is not prepared to resist, and which it is not in
a position to prevent. For this reason, even before
the Agreement with Russia was made, I have always
regarded with a feeling akin to mortification the
language of those who in the press, or in Parlia
ment, or in diplomacy, have been continually de
claiming against the natural and inevitable advances
of Russia in Central Asia. But since the Agreement
with Russia was concluded, acknowledging Afghan
istan as under our predominant influence, and
as excluded from the influence of Russia, it has
always appeared to me that the continuance of this
language is tainted, in addition, with something
very like a breach of faith. It is not only undignified,
but it is unfair, to accept that Agreement as binding
Russia not to advance, either by actual conquest or
by establishing influence, beyond a certain line, and
at the same time as leaving us as free as ever to de
nounce her operations when conducted far within that
line. Outside of Afghanistan, Russia unquestionably
kept her freedom. We, of course, kept our freedom
also, But there is no truth in representing any
Russian movement beyond Afghanistan as a breach

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 301
of the Agreement of 1873. Yet this has been the
actual conduct, I will not say of the English people,
but of too many who assume to speak on their behalf.
It has appeared even in the official language of Ambas
sadors and of Secretaries of State, and it has led public
writers of high authority with their countrymen,to make
accusations against Russia which on the face of them
are unjust, and which have had a powerful effect in
stimulating national animosities, and inspiring un
manly fears.
Of this a signal example is to be found in the
language we have held upon the subject of Khiva.
It is generally asserted, and widely believed, that
in the conquest of Khiva, Russia has been guilty
towards us of flagrant breaches of engagement. The
papers presented to Parliament disprove this accusa
tion altogether. They do more than this : they convict
those who make these accusations of that kind of reck
less misquotation, which, although often the effect of
mere passion, approaches very nearly to the bad faith
which they charge against Russia. We have habitually
treated certain intimations made to us by Russia of her
intentions, and certain declarations of her policy, as if
those intimations and declarations were in the nature
of binding promises and of international engagements.
But the intimation of an intention is not necessarily a
promise. A declaration, or an assurance as to policy
is not necessarily an engagement. It is not so in
private life, and it is still less so in the intercourse of

302 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
nations. There may, of course, be circumstances
which give a higher value to the intimation of an
intention than would otherwise attach to it. If it is
made, for example, as part of a negotiation, and in
connexion with benefits received on account of it ;
or, again, if it is made by a powerful nation to a weak
one as an assurance on which it may rely, — then,
indeed, such an intimation may assume the character
of a promise. But this character entirely depends on
the context not merely of words, but of circumstances
and events. The mere intimation of an intention by
one Government to another does not in itself amount
to, or even imply, an engagement. This would be
true, even if the intimations of intention, or the
declarations of policy on which we rely, had been
made without express reservations and explanations
limiting their effect. But the intimations of inten
tion, and the declarations and assurances as to policy
which have been made to us by Russia, on the subject of
her relations with the States of Central Asia, have been
almost uniformlymade under express and emphatic re
servations which it is customary with us to suppress
or to ignore. In the Circular Despatch to the Russian
Ambassadors at the various Courts of Europe which
was issued by Prince Gortchakow in November, 1864,
the Cabinet of St. Petersburg set forth, for the in
formation of the world, the principles which would
guide her policy in Central Asia. In this State Paper
not only was everything like a promise avoided, but

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 3°3
declarations were made obviously inconsistent with
the possibility of any such promise being given.
Russia likened her own position in Central Asiatothe
position of the British Government in India, and
pointed out that annexations had been, and might still
be, the necessary results of contact with semi-barbarous
States. It is true that she expressed her desire to
avoid this result if it were possible to do so. But she
expressed also her determination to establish free
commercial routes, and to punish tribes who lived on
plunder. This in itself was tantamount to a decla
ration of war against all the Khanates of Central Asia.
Russia did not conceal the import and the possible
consequences of her determination in the matter. It
demanded, as the Circular very truly said, " a complete
transformation of the habits of the people." But no
such transformation could be effected without " teach
ing the populations in Asia that they will gain more
in favouring and protecting the caravan trade than
in robbing it." Nor was the Circular silent on the
methods of operation which were contemplated for
the purpose of teaching this lesson. " It is a pecu
liarity of Asiatics," it said, " to respect nothing but
visible and palpable force." " If, the robbers once
punished, the expedition is withdrawn, the lesson is
soon forgotten : its withdrawal is put down to weak
ness." Finally, with a downrightness of expression
which leaves nothing to be misunderstood, the Circular
declared in its concluding sentence that " the Imperial

304 RELA TIONS ¦ WITH AFGHANISTAN
Cabinet, in assuming this task, takes as its guide the
interests of Russia."*
Such is the nature of the Manifesto which, it is pre
tended, held out a promise to Europe that Russian
annexations and conquests in Central Asia were to
cease for ever. It would be much nearer the truth to
say, on the contrary, that it was a Manifesto rendering
it certain that those conquests could not and would
not be restrained. Yet public writers of the highest
authority never speak of this document without that
kind of misrepresentation which is the natural result
of strong antipathies or of overmastering hobbies.
Among these writers no one is more justly distin
guished than Sir Henry Rawlinson. With unequalled
knowledge of those regions, and with great powers of
statement, he never loses an opportunity of insisting
on the danger arising to us out of the advances of
Russia in Central Asia. Yet whilst treating the sub
ject much more ably than most other writers, and
whilst trying to state fairly the physical and military
necessities to which these advances are often due, he
never refers to this Russian Manifesto without uncon
sciously misquoting it, and misinterpreting it. Thus
in the Memorandum of 1869, he speaks of it as
" asserting with categorical precision that the expan
sion of the Empire had now reached its limit." I look in
vain in the Manifesto for any such declaration, or for

* Central Asia, No. II., 1873, pp. 72-5.

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 305
anything which is at all equivalent. It is true, indeed,
that the Manifesto speaks of a military line which had
then been established between Lake Issyk-Kaul and
the Syr-Daria River (Jaxartes), as a line which had the
advantage of " fixing for us with geographical precision
the limit up to which we are bound to advance and at
which we must halt." But the very next words de
monstrate that the " must" in this sentence referred
entirely to physical and political difficulties which the
Russian Government were unwilling to encounter,
but which they did by no means promise never to
encounter, if by circumstances they should be led or
forced to do so. On the contrary, the whole tone and
the whole argument of the Manifesto is directed to
reserve to the Russian Government perfect freedom
for the future in her dealings with the States of Central
Asia, and to emphasise with the greatest care the
conditions which rendered it absolutely necessary that
this freedom should be maintained.
Let us now look at the treatment which Russia
has received at our hands in respect to later declara
tions, in their connexion with later conquests.
In 1869 rumours began to get abroad that the
military activities of the Russian Government were
likely soon to take the direction of Khiva. Towards
the end of February in that year, our Ambassador at
St. Petersburg had a conversation with the Emperor
on the general subject of Central Asian politics,
when the Emperor,, whilst disclaiming any feeling of
VOL. II. X

306 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
coveteousness in those regions, took care to remind
her Majesty's Government of their own experience in
India, and to point out that the Russian position in
Asia was " one of extreme difficulty, in which our ac
tions may depend not so much upon our own wishes
as upon the course pursued towards us by the Native
States around us." Nothing could be clearer than
this for the purpose of distinguishing between engage
ments or promises of any kind, and explanations or
assurances of policy, of wishes, and of intentions.
But if anything more clear on this subject were desired,
it was not long before it was supplied. On the 31st
of November, in the same year (1869), Sir Andrew
Buchanan had another conversation with Prince Gort
chakow on the rumoured expedition against Khiva, in
whieh the Russian Minister gave expression to very
strong assurances of his policy and intention against
farther extensions of territory in Asia, and resting the
departures which had taken place from former inten
tions of a like kind, on the force of circumstances.
Our Ambassador reported this conversation in a de
spatch dated December 1, 1869* But as more definite
information soon reached him in regard to the formid
able character of the Expedition which was said to be in
contemplation, he returned to the charge with Prince
Gortchakow on the 29th of December. He placed in
the Prince's hands an extract from his despatch

* Ibid., No. 21, p. 19.

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 307
reporting the previous conversation. The Prince read
it with entire approval of its accuracy, but when he
came to the passage that " he would not consent to an
extension of the Empire" he stopped to observe and
to explain that this " could only mean that he would
disapprove of it, as he could not prevent such an
eventuality, were the Emperor to decide in its
favour."f Under these circumstances, we have no excuse for
the unfairness of representing the repeated intimations
and assurances of Russia on this subject as meaning
anything more than the Emperor and his Minister
carefully explained them to mean. The unfairness is
ali the greater as we are generally guilty of it without
the smallest reference to the question whether Russia
had or had not a just ground of quarrel with the
Khan of Khiva. Yet the case stated by Russia
against the Khan, as reported by Sir A. Buchanan, is
a case of indisputable justice, and even necessity. In
June, 1 871, Sir A. Buchanan explained that the prin
cipal object of Russia seemed to be " to secure a safe
commercial route to Central Asia from the Caspian
and her Trans- Caucasian provinces." This is in strict
accordance with the declared policy of Russia in the
manifesto of 1864. But more than this. The sup
pression and punishment of piracy on land is as just

t Ibid., No. 25, p. 22.
X 2

308 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
a cause of war as the suppression of piracy by sea.
It is not denied that the Khan of Khiva was simply
the ruler of robber tribes, and that he lived upon the
revenues of plunder. But in addition to these just
causes of quarrel the Russian Government asserted
that he held Russian subjects in captivity and slavery.
No attempt is made to deny or to refute this asser
tion. I am informed by my relative, Sir John McNeill,
that as long as forty years ago, when he represented
the British Government at the Court of Persia, he
had to use his endeavours to redeem from captivity in
Khiva a number of Russian subjects. I am also in
formed by Lord Northbrook that the Khivan Envoy
who came to him at Simla in 1873 confessed that the
Khan was in possession of Russian captives. The
assertion, therefore, of the Russian Government, that
it had just cause of complaint against the Khan,
has not only never been refuted, but is one which we
know to be consistent with all the probabilities of the
case. Yet we, a Nation and a Government which
spent some eleven millions in redeeming from captivity
in Abyssinia a few subjects of the Queen, are never
tired of complaining that the Emperor of Russia for
similar reasons and for other reasons quite as good,
and of far more permanent value, sent a military
expedition against Khiva, and finally reduced that
Khanate to a condition under which it could rob no

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 369
more.* It is quite true that in 1873, Russia was
induced by our persistent expressions of jealousy and
remonstrance to repeat her assurances of intention, in
words less guarded by express limitations than they
had been before. These new assurances were given
to Lord Granville on the 8th of January, 1873, by
Count Schouvalow, when he was sent by the Emperof
to London to communicate to the British Govern
ment his Majesty's assent to our long contention on
the boundaries of Afghanistan. This was the main
object of his mission ; and the new assurances of policy
in respect to Khiva seem to have been volunteered as
upon subjects not immediately connected with the
principal matter in hand. But those assurances of
policy and of intention, strong as they were in particular
expressions, have, as usual, been habitually misrepre
sented. Count Schouvalow declared that " not only
was it far from the intentions of the Emperor to take
possession of Khiva, but positive orders had been
prepared to prevent it, and directions given that the
conditions imposed should be such as could not in any

* Sir Henry Rawlinson tells us that one of the consequences
of the Russian conquest of Khiva was that the Khan lost his
revenue from the outlying Turcoman tribes, " whose allegiance to
him, never very willingly paid, has been further shattered by the
abolition of the slave-trade in the Khiva market, and the con
sequent suppression of their means' of livelihood." — England and
Russia in the East, p. 330.

3io RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN
way lead to a prolonged occupancy of Khiva."* These
words, even if they were to be strictly construed as
the record of a definite international engagement,
which they certainly were not, would not prevent the
subjugation of Khiva to the condition of a dependent
State, nor would they prevent the annexation of some
Khivan territory to the Russian Empire. It is pro
bable that neither of these contingencies were then
contemplated by the Emperor. But neither of them
are definitely excluded by the terms of Count
Schouvalow's assurance. It is true that the general
limitations which Russia had so often placed upon
her assurances of intention in Central Asia, were not
repeated by Count Schouvalow when he spoke of the
Khivan Expedition. But most undue advantage is
taken of this fact, when we forget that those limita
tions had always been explained to be inherent in the
nature of the case, and that even if they had never
been formally recorded, as they frequently had been,
they ought to have been understood.
Accordingly, when in January, 1874, Lord Gran
ville had to acknowledge the receipt of the Treaty
with the Khan of Khiva which recorded the results
of the Russian conquest, he very wisely declared that
he saw no advantage in comparing those results with
the " assurances of intention" which had been given
by Count Schouvalow. Lord Granville carefully

* Corresp. with Russia, Central Asia, 1873, No. 3, p. 13.

FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 311
avoided calling them promises. He gave to them the
correct name, and he absolutely refrained from those
accusations of bad faith in which irresponsible writers
have so freely indulged.*
We have now brought the narrative of events, so
far as our direct relations with Russia through the
Foreign Office are concerned, down to the Khivan
Expedition, and to her acknowledgment of our con
tention respecting the boundaries and respecting the
political position of Afghanistan. We have also,
in connexion with this subject, somewhat antici
pated the parallel events which were taking place
in India, by indicating the changed conditions of
feeling under which Lord Lytton was sent out to
India. But in order to understand clearly what
was to follow, we must go back for a little to fill
up the interval which elapsed between the Umballa
Conference in 1869, and the violation of Lord Mayo's
pledges which immediately followed when Lord
Northbrook ceased to be the Viceroy of India, in
April, 1876. * Russia, II., 1874, No. 2, p. 7.

312 FROM THE AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA

CHAPTER XV.
FROM THE AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA IN 1 873 TO
THE FRERE NOTE IN JANUARY, 1875.
We have seen the impression which Lord Mayo
derived from the language of Shere Ali at Umballa, —
that the Ameer thought very little and cared even
less about the Russian advances in Central Asia.
Yet this was at a time when Russia had just esta
blished her paramount influence over his nearest
neighbour — a neighbour intimately connected with
all the revolutions in his own country — a neighbour
whose country had been, and still was, the habitual
refuge of defeated candidates for his throne. But
although Lord Mayo was fully justified in this
impression, and although it was evident that the
mind of the Ameer was engrossed by the contest
in which he had been engaged, and which was not
even then absolutely closed, — so that he thought of
nothing so much as his desire for a dynastic guaran
tee, — it does not follow that he was ignorant of the
place which Russian advances had in the policy of
the English Government. It is a vain attempt to

TO THE FRERE NOTE. 313
conceal anything from Afghans as to the motives of
our policy towards the Kingdom of Cabul. Even if
it were our object to deceive them, it would be impos
sible. Their suspicions outrun every possibility of
concealment. Accordingly, there is curious evidence
that at the Umballa Conference Noor Mohammed,
the trusted Minister of the Ameer, indicated a per
fectly correct appreciation of the position of his
country in its relation both to Russia and to England.
At a meeting held on the ist of April, 1869, he showed
considerable suspicion about our professed eagerness
to promote trade with Afghanistan. Mr. Seton Karr,
the Foreign Secretary, and Major Pollock, the Com
missioner, tried to reassure him. Noor Mohammed
then said, " You have given us guns, treasure, &c. &c.
You would not do so without some special motive.
What is your motive?" The Foreign Secretary
answered, "In order that the Government on our
borders may be independent and strong,- just as
Cashmere and Khotul are ;" explaining further what
had been done in respect to the Cashmere succession.
Upon this Noor Mohammed replied, apparently with
some touch of fun, that he accepted the explanation,
and " would not credit us with ulterior motives," and
then added these significant words : " He hoped we
should have a good understanding, and the advantage
of it to us (the English) would be, that were the
Russians or other enemy to come, even though the
Afghans themselves could not successfully keep them

314 FROM THE AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA
out of the country, they could harass them in every
way"* The inference I draw from this remarkable obser
vation of the Afghan Minister is that he was perfectly
aware of the political object we had in view in sup
porting and strengthening the Afghan Kingdom, and
that the indifference exhibited at that time both by
him and by the Ameer on the subject of Russian
advances, was due not only to the fact that they re
garded foreign aggression as a distant danger, but
also to the fact that they knew they could count on
our own self-interest leading us to assist them if the
danger should ever come nearer.
If, however, the mind of the Ameer had been
under any anxiety on the subject of danger from
Russia, that anxiety would have been removed by
the information which Lord Mayo was able to
communicate to him soon after the Umballa Con
ference — namely, the information that Russia had
agreed to recognise, as belonging to Afghanistan,
all the territories then in his actual possession.
He had further, the friendly assurances of General
Kaufmann, which Lord Mayo himself had taken
the trouble of explaining to him as assurances with
which the Viceroy wag highly pleased. Further,
he had the actual conduct of the Russian Governor-

* Notes of Umballa Conference enclosed in Lord Mayo's
letter, of April 4, 1869.

TO THE FRERE NOTE. 315
General in refusing to allow Abdul Rahman Khan to
excite disturbances in Afghanistan, and also in arrest-.
ing movements on the part of the Khan of Bokhara
which compromised the peace of the Afghan frontier.
On the other hand, Shere Ali himself had shown
that he was fully aware of the condition on which
our support was given to him, namely, the condition
that he would abstain from aggression upon his neigh
bours, and especially on those immediate neighbours
who were avowedly under the influence and protection
of Russia. In compliance with this condition Shere
Ali, under the influence and by the advice of the
Government of India, had refrained from several
frontier operations to which he would have been
otherwise inclined, and in particular from annexing
Kirkee and Charjui.* The Emperor of Russia had
heartily acknowledged the. good faith and the success
with which the Government of India had been acting
in this matter, and considered it as a gratifying proof
of the good effects of the Agreement which had been
arrived at between the two Powers in respect to their
mutual relations in the East.
No occasion for any special communication with
the Ameer arose during the rest of Lord Mayo's
viceroyalty, which was terminated by his calamitous
death in the spring of 1872, nor during the first year
of the viceroyalty of his successor. Only one annoy -

* Afghanistan, I., 1878, No. 22, p. 105.

316 FROM THE AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA
ance to the Ameer arose out of the policy of Lord
Mayo, acting under the direction of the Government
at home: There had been a long-standing dispute
in respect to the boundaries of the Afghan and Per
sian Kingdoms in the province of Seistan. Lord
Mayo, thinking that it might some day lead to com
plications, had readily agreed to a proposal that it
should be settled by the arbitration of British officers,
sent expressly to survey the country, and to adjust the
line of frontier. The duty was assigned to, and was
carefully executed by, General Sir F. Goldsmid, one
of the abiest officers at the disposal of the Govern
ment of India, and having special qualifications for'
the service. General Sir Frederick Pollock lent his aid
to Noor Mohammed, the Afghan Minister in watch
ing the Afghan case. The decision was one which
did not give to the Ameer all that he considered to
be his own. The device of settling such matters by
arbitration, although eminently reasonable in itself, is
one not yet familiar to Asiatics, and not readily
understood by them. They do not easily believe in
the perfect impartiality of anybody, and it is natural
that in such cases they should regard an adverse
decision with mortification and distrust.
Wc now come to the transactions which led to the
Conferences at Simla in 1873 between Lord North
brook and the Prime Minister of the Ameer. As
on these transactions both the Simla Narrative of
Lord Lytton, and the London Narrative of Lord

TO THE FRERE NOTE. 317
Cranbrook, are little better than a mass of fiction, it
«vill be necessary to state the facts accurately, and to
confront them with those Narratives,
Early in March, 1873,* it became the duty of the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to confirm the
award which had been given in the Seistan Arbitra
tion. Under the terms of the Arbitration this con
firmation was final and binding, both on the Shah
of Persia and on the Ameer of Cabul. It was well
known how distasteful the result had been to the
Ameer. In connexion, therefore, with this Seistan Arbi
tration, and also in connexion with the final tran^
sactions between the Cabinets of London and
St. Petersburg on the boundaries of Afghanistan,
it became desirable, in the spring of 1873, that the
Government of India should have some more direct
communication than usual with the Ameer, Shere
Ali. On both these subjects, but especially on
the first, Lord Northbrook thought it would be
expedient to give him personal explanations tend
ing to soothe irritation or to prevent misunder
standing. For these purposes, Lord Northbrook,
through a letter from the Commissioner of Pesha
wur, which reached Cabul on the 27th of March,f
requested the Ameer to receive a British officer at

* Afghan Corresp., II., 1878, p. 4.
t Ibid., p. 5. Enclos. 2 in No. 2.

318 FROM THE AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA
Cabul, or Jellalabad, or Candahar, or at any other
place in Afghanistan which the Ameer might name
— not, of course, as a resident Envoy, but on a
special mission. True to the traditional policy of his
family and race, the Ameer availed himself of the right
which he had by Treaty and by the pledges of Lord
Mayo, to intimate that he would prefer, in the first
place at any rate, not to receive a British officer at
Cabul, but to send his own Prime Minister to Simla.
This reply was not given until the 14th of April, after
long discussions in Durbar, at one of which the
"Moonshee" of the British Agency was permitted
to be present.* These debates showed great reluc
tance to abide by the Seistan award, and a disposition
to use the Ameer's assent as a price to be given only
in return for certain advantages which he had long
desired. They show that the Ameer was reluctant
even to send an Envoy of his own, and that this
¦ measure was referred to as a concession on his
part to the wishes of the Viceroy f They showed
also the usual jealousy and dread of the presence of a
British Envoy in Cabul, and of the pressure he might
put upon the Ameer to accept proposals which might
be distasteful to him. In all this, however, Shere Ali
was acting within his right — standing on the faith of
Treaties, and on the pledges of Lord Mayo. The

* Ibid., Ehclos. 5, p. 7.
f Ibid., Enclos. 5 and 6, pp. 7, )

TO THE FRERE NOTE. 315
Viceroy, therefore, true, on his side, to the engagements
and to the wise policy of his predecessors, abstained
from pressing his request upon the Ameer, and at
once, on the 25th of April, accepted the alternative he
preferred* Let us now see how these facts are dealt with in
the Simla and in the London Narratives. It suited
the purpose with which both these Narratives were
drawn up to represent the Ameer as having been
at this time greatly alarmed by the advances of
Russia, because this representation of the case helps
to throw blame on Lord Northbrook for having (as
alleged) refused to reassure him. Of course the fact
that the Ameer did not seek any Conference at this
time, but, on the contrary, only consented to it rather
reluctantly, when it was proposed to him by the
Government of India — is a fact which stands much in
the way of such a representation of the case. Accord
ingly, both in the Simla Narrative and in the
London Narrative, this fact is entirely suppressed,
whilst, both by implication and by direct assertion,
the impression is conveyed that the Ameer sought
the Conference, — that he did so under the fear of
Russian advances in Central Asia, and for the pur
pose of getting securities against them. The Simla
Narrative, after quoting passages from the Durbar
debate above mentioned, which did refer to Russia,

* Ibid., Enclos. 8, p. 9.

320 FROM THE AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA
proceeds thus (para. 12) : "With these thoughts in his
mind, his Highness deputed Synd Noor Mohammed
Shah, in the summer of 1873, to wait upon Lord
Northbrook, and submit this and other matters to the
consideration of the Viceroy."*
It would be quite impossible to gather from
this that it was the Viceroy who had desired to open
special communications with the Ameer, and that
Shere Ali only offered to send his Minister in
order to avoid receiving a British Envoy. But
the London Narrative improves upon its Simla pro
totype. It not only represents that the Ameer was
moved to send his Minister from his fear of Russia,
but it professes to tell us more exactly how
that fear then specially arose. It was the fall of
Khiva. "The capture of Khiva," says paragraph 8
of the London Narrative, " by the forces of the Czar,
in the spring of 1873, and the total subordination of
that Khanate to Russia, caused Shere Ali considerable
alarm, &c. Actuated by his fears on this score, his
Flighness sent a special Envoy to Simla in the summer
of that year, charged with the duty of expressing them
to the Government of India."t Now it so happens, as
we have seen, that the Ameer's proposal to send his
Minister was made on the 14th of April, whilst the
capture of Khiva did not take place till the 10th of
June. Even if the Ameer had possessed the power of
* Ibid., p. 162. f Ibid., p. 262.

TO THE FRERE NOTE. 321
seeing what was then going on at the distance of some
800 or 900 miles across the deserts of Central Asia,
he would not have been much alarmed on account of
Russian advances. On that very day, the 14th of
April, Kaufmann and all his force were at the point of
death from thirst and fatigue, in their advance on
Khiva. They were saved only by the timely inter
vention of a "ragged Kirghiz," who led them to
some wells. It was not till the 23rd of May, that
Kaufmann reached the Oxus with only 1200 camels
remaining out of the 10,000 with which the
Expedition had been provided* As for the "total
subordination of the Khanate of Khiva to Russia," this
was not effected till the date of the Treaty, which was
not concluded till the 12th of August, and was not
published at St. Petersburg till the 12th of December .f
The statement, therefore, in the London Narrative, as
to the circumstances which led to the Simla Con
ferences of 1873, is entirely misleading, and points to
conclusions, in respect to the Ameer's motives, with
which the real facts are entirely inconsistent. These
facts must have been well known both at Calcutta
and at the India Office, and they ought to have been
correctly given.
The statement made both in the Simla and in the
London Narrative as to the Ameer's condition of mind

* Schuyler's Turkistan, Vol. ii. p. 341.
f Russia, IL, 1874., No. 2, p. 6.
VOL. II. Y

322 FROM THE AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA
when he sent his Minister, Noor Mohammed, to confer
with the Viceroy, is a statement founded mainly on the
reports of the Ameer's conversations with our native
Agent at Cabul, and especially on those which were
reported by that Agent on the 5th of May, 1873* In
the Simla Narrative (par. 1 1), some quotations are given
from this Report of the language held by the Ameer ;
but these quotations are very partial, and avoid any
reference to the most important passages which
best indicate the opinions, the feelings, and the desires
of the Ameer.
When we turn to the account given by our native
Agent of the talk of the Ameer, it will be found
that he referred, indeed, to the probability that Russia
would soon take possession both of Khiva and of
Merve, as one of the well-known sources of British
anxiety and alarm. Any information he possessed
about " the preparations for an advance of a Russian
Army" seems to have been derived from "the English
papers."t From this source apparently, he said that
Merve would be taken by Russia " either in the current
year or the next." This was over-shooting the mark
indeed. But it shows what his mark was. It was his
object and his game to work upon our alarm, and
he dwelt upon the dangers of Russian aggression,
as these had been long known, and long familiar to

* Ibid., No. 26, Inclos. 2, pp. no, m.
t Afghan Corresp., IL, 1878, No. 2, Enclos. 3, p. 6.

TO THE FRERE NOTE. 323
the Ameer, ever since the Umballa Conference, —
to which, strange to say, he expressly referred, as
the starting-point of his communications with the
Government of India upon the subject. Considering
the impression of Lord Mayo that he did not then
attach any importance to it, and considering that Vice
roy's express statement to me that Russia was never
mentioned except incidentally during the whole con
ferences, it becomes clear that in the preceding
narrative I have not over-estimated the significance
of the language — apparently incidental — which was
held on the ist of April, 1869, at Umballa, by Noor
Mohammed, in reference to the real position of the
Afghan Kingdom in the policy of the British Govern
ment. The whole language of Shere Ali in the
first week of May, 1873, was simply an amplifica
tion of the language of his Minister on that occasion
in April, 1869. Shere Ali knew that we should defend
him against external aggression, not for his sake, but
for our own. He indicated unmistakably that he put
thesame interpretation upon all our efforts on his behalf
which Noor Mohammed had put upon our presents at
Umballa of money and of guns. He even went the
length of implying that the security of the Afghan
border was more our affair than his. He declared
that at the Umballa Conference he had said so to Lord
Mayo, " exonerating himself from making arrange
ments for that security."* This conviction that our

* Afghan Corresp., I., 1878, No. 26, Enclos. 2, p. no.
Y 2

324 FROM THE AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA
fear of Russia, and our own interests in resisting her,.
had got for him all he had received, animates the
whole of his conversation. He trades upon our fear of
Russia as a means of getting more. In the handling
of this subject he shows great inteUigence, and a very
considerable extent of information. It may be said
that the whole literature of Anglo-Indian Russophobia
seems to have been familiar to him. All the points
common to that school of opinion are adroitly brought.
to bear. He refers to the Russian denunciation of the
Black Sea clauses in the Treaty of 1856, and founds
upon it the usual inferences about the slipperiness of
Russian diplomacy. He excites our jealousy about
Merve as an approach to Herat, and he uses this
jealousy to denounce our approval of the Seistan
Arbitration. He rather sneers at the long difficulty
which had arisen with -Russia about the definition
of the northern boundaries of his Kingdom, and says,
"he was at a loss to surmise" what that difficulty
was. He warns us that very soon the Russians
would make communications which would exercise
some influence in his country. Alternating with these
stimulants to our fears and to our jealousy, he holds
out certain promises based upon his estimate of our
policy, and that estimate he explains to be, "that
the border of Afghanistan is in truth the border of
India." And again, that the '.' interests of the Afghan
and English Governments are identical." Counting
on the efficacy of these motives, heated to red heat

TO THE FRERE NOTE. 325
by his warnings and exhortations, he expected us to
give him " great assistance in money and in ammuni
tion of war," and " great aid for the construction of
strong forts throughout the Afghan northern border."
But more than this. These anxieties for a frontier
which was "also ours" were associated with other
anxieties about himself personally. Domestic troubles
were never out of his mind ; and his old demand for
a dynastic guarantee betrays itself with little dis
guise. But feeling also that he wanted some personal
security in the event of misfortune, "it was rather
advisable," he said, " that the British Government, for
its own and for his satisfaction, should set apart some
property, either in India or in Europe, for his support,
that he might retire there with his family and children,
and find both accommodation and maintenance there."
Finally, he expresses a wish that we should "com
mence forthwith to organise the Afghan troops, and
to send from time to time large amounts of money
with great numbers of guns and magazine stores, in
order that he might steadily be able in a few years
to satisfactorily strengthen the Afghan Kingdom."*
Such is the condition of mind and such the con
versation on the part of the Ameer, which is repre
sented in the Simla and London Narratives as
indicating on the part of Shere Ali a sincere alarm
on account of the advances of Russia, and an anxiety
* Ibid.- p. iii.

326 FROM THE AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA
to be reassured by fresh promises supplementary to
those which had been already given. This represen
tation of the conversation of the Ameer seems to me
obviously erroneous. It is a conversation, on the con
trary, which demonstrated that Shere Ali relied abso
lutely on our own sense of self-interest as our induce
ment to defend his Kingdom, and that he entertained
an overweening confidence in his power of working
on this motive to get out of us almost anything he
wished to ask.
The inconvenience of this condition of affairs lay
in the fact that the Ameer's estimate of our position
and of our policy was substantially correct. He
was right in thinking that our interest in Afghani
stan was an interest of our own. It was perfectly
natural that he should count upon this, and that he
should desire to discount it also to the largest possible
extent. Although the particular conversation of May was
not known to us at the India Office in the spring and
summer of 1873, we did know quite enough to make
us sure that the Ameer of Cabul had been aware,
ever since the Umballa Conference, that we con
sidered it part of our Indian Policy to maintain the
"integrity and independence" of Afghanistan. The
whole course of negotiations since, and our repeated
communications both to him and to the Russian
Government, had made this clearly understood
between all the parties concerned. General Kauf-

TO THE FRERE NOTE. 327
mann had formally addressed the Ameer as a Prince
under British protection, and two successive Viceroys
had approved the letters and communications between
the Ameer and Russian authorities in which this rela
tion was assumed. We .knew that the Ameer was
disposed to make this acknowledged policy of the
British Government the ground and the plea for
making demands upon us which it would have been
very unwise to grant, — the risk of which had been
indicated by sad experience, — and the impolicy of
which had been denounced at a later period by
the detailed arguments of Lord Lawrence and of
Lord Mayo..
It was under these circumstances that Lord North-
brookj in anticipation of the approaching Conference
with Noor Mohammed, telegraphed to me that he
proposed to inform the Cabul Envoy of the sense
of a paragraph in a despatch which had not then
reached me It was a despatch summing up the
results of the long negotiations with Russia which
had then been concluded, and its 18th paragraph was
devoted to setting forth the fundamental principle of
that negotiation, that the "complete independence
of Afghanistan was so important to the interests of
British India, that the Government of India could not
look upon an attack on Afghanistan with indifference."
It added that "so long as the Ameer continued, as
he had hitherto done, to act in accordance with our
advice, in his relations with his neighbours, he would

328 FROM THE A G REE ME NT WITH R US SI A
naturally receive material assistance from us, and that
circumstances might occur under which we should
consider it incumbent upon us to recommend the
Indian Government to render him such assistance."*
This was the paragraph, of which Lord Northbrook
proposed, by telegraph on the 27th of June, to com
municate the sense to the Envoy of the Ameer, f
It did not appear to me at the time that this proposed
communication to the Ameer would be of much, value.
In its terms, carefully guarded as they were, it seemed
to contain nothing that the Ameer did not know
before, and indeed to fall greatly short of the inter
pretation he had shown signs of putting upon the
assurances already given to him. Having, however,
the greatest confidence in the discretion of the.
Viceroy, I contented myself with replying, by tele
graph on the ist of July, that, whilst I did not object
to the general sense of the paragraph as a fitting
". communication to Russia from the Foreign Office,"
I considered that "great caution was necessary in
assuring the Ameer of material assistance which might.
raise undue and unfounded expectation." I added,.
" He already shows symptoms of claiming more than
we may wish to give."J
Accordingly when, eleven days after this telegram
had been sent, the Conferences with the Cabul Envoy

* Afghanistan, I., 1878, No. 21, p. 102.
t Ibid., No. 21, p. 102. % Ibid., No. 23, p. 108.

TO THE FRERE NOTE. 329
began at Simla, Lord Northbrook fourid that his first
business was to disabuse the mind of the Afghan
Minister of the extravagant and unwarrantable inter
pretations which he and the Cabul Durbar were dis
posed to entertain. Instead of under-estimating, they
immensely over-estimated the sweep and bearing of
the friendly assurances which had been given to them
by Lord Lawrence and by Lord Mayo. They spoke
as if the British Government "had bound itself to
comply with any request preferred by the Ameer."
This is the account given by Lord Northbrook
himself in his subsequent account of the Simla
Conferences* It will be seen that Lord Northbrook found him
self very much in the same position as that in which
Lord Mayo had found himself at Umballa in 1869^
That is to say, he found himself in the presence of
extravagant expectations, and of demands which it
was' impossible for him to concede. The Viceroy
pursued the same wise course which, under similar cir
cumstances, had been pursued by his predecessor. He
determined to offer the Ameer everything that could be
reasonably given, but resolutely to maintain the free
dom of the British Government to judge of every
contingency as it might arise.
The first formal Conference with the Minister of
the Ameer took place on the 12th of July. At this

* Ibid., No. 26, p. 109.

330 FROM THE A GREEMENT WITH R USSIA
meeting the Viceroy explained fully to the Envoy
the terms and the effect of the final Agreement
between England and Russia as to the boundaries
of Afghanistan, and the effect it had in giving
practical force and definite meaning to the long
standing Agreement that the Kingdom of Cabul
was to be outside the sphere of Russian influence
in Asia. He told the Afghan Minister that "the
British Government would be prepared to use their
best endeavours to maintain the frontier intact, so
long as the Ameer or the Ruler of Afghanistan
followed their advice as regards his external re
lations, and abstained from encroachments upon his
neighbours." Again, somewhat more definitely, the
Viceroy told him that " in the event of any aggres
sion from without, if British influence were invoked,
and failed by negotiation to effect a satisfactory
settlement, it was probable that the British Govern
ment would in that case afford the Ruler of Afghanistan
material assistance in repelling an invader." The
Envoy declared that the " rapid advances made by
the Russians in Central Asia had aroused the gravest
apprehensions in the minds of the people of Afghani
stan," who " could place no confidence in them, and
would never rest satisfied unless they were assured of
the aid of the British Government." The further dis
cussion of the subject was reserved for another day.*
* Ibid., No. 26, Inclos. 4, p. 112.

TO THE FRERE NOTE. 331
It now appeared to Lord Northbrook that whatever
might be the real aims or motives of the Cabul Envoy
in giving expression to these fears of Russia, and in
asking for further engagements on the part of the
British Government, it would be possible with safety
to give a somewhat fuller, and more definite, expression
to the settled policy of the Government than had been
given in Lord Mayo's letter of 1869, or in any subse
quent formal communications. Under this impression,
twelve days after the first Conference with the Envoy,
and six days before the next, he telegraphed to me on
the 24th of July that the Ameer of Cabul was alarmed
at Russian progress, was dissatisfied with general
assurances, and was anxious to know definitely how
far he could rely on our help if invaded. The Viceroy
proposed to " assure him that if he unreservedly
accepted and acted on our advice in all external rela
tions, we would help him with money, arms, and
troops, if necessaiy, to expel unprovoked invasion.
We to be the judge of the necessity."* To this I
replied on the 26th, after consulting the Cabinet, that
we thought the Viceroy should " inform the Ameer that
we did not at all share his alarm, and considered there
was no cause for it ; but that he might assure him we
should maintain our settled policy in favour of Af
ghanistan, if he abided by our advice in external
affairs."t The Viceroy interpreted this reply as we

* Ibid., No. 24, p. 108. t Ibid., No. 25, p. 108.

332 FROM THE AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA
intended him to interpret it — namely, as sanctioning
his proposed communication to the Envoy, but with
the important preliminary declaration that we did not
share in those fears, or alleged fears, of Russian aggres
sion, on which he and his master seemed disposed
to found the most unreasonable and extravagant
expectations. At the next Conference, on the 30th of July, Lord
Northbrook soon found that all our caution and his
own were fully needed. He found the Afghan
Minister under the impression that the British
Government were already "pledged to comply with
any request for assistance preferred by the Ameer."
The language of Noor Mohammed seems to have been
almost a repetition of the Ameer's absurd talk to our
native Agent at Cabul early in May. He wanted
supplies of money and of arms. He pretended that the
army he had already raised had been so raised on the
faith of the promises of Lord Lawrence and Lord
Mayo. He demanded that the British Government,
besides promising to assist the Ameer with money
and with arms, according to the circumstances of the
case, should also engage to have an army at his
disposal, to be sent in at his request, to take what
ever route he might require,* and to be immediately
sent out again when it had done his work for him.
No concessions towards the British Government were

* Lord Northbrook's Memorandum, para. 18.

TO THE FRERE NOTE. 333
offered on behalf of the Ameer, in return for these
demands^— no proposal that it should enjoy greater
powers of control, or even larger opportunities of
observation. No offer was made to receive Envoys, or
to let go the hold of the Ameer on Lord Mayo's
pledge on the subject of British officers*
Such were the modest and reasonable demands,
made by Noor Mohammed, and urged upon the
Viceroy by all those appeals to our fear and to our
jealousy of Russia in which, doubtless, he had been
well instructed by the Anglo-Indian press.
It was indeed high time to give some intimation to
the Ameer in the sense of the message from the
Cabinet It was important to let him understand that
we were not quite so timorous as he supposed, and to
remind him that at the close of a long and difficult
negotiation, during which Russia had behaved with
entire good faith towards him and towards ourselves,
we did not consider him justified in the pleas he put
forward for unlimited demands upon us.
On the other hand, not to deal too seriously
with the natural and transparent devices of the
Ameer, the Viceroy determined to give to Noor
Mohammed the fuller and more definite assurance
which he had sought and had obtained our permission
to give; Accordingly, on the 30th of July, Lord-
Northbrook, after having explained to the Envoy that
* Afghan Corresp., I., 1878, No. 26, Inclos. 5, pp. 112, 113.

334 FROM THE AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA
the British Government did not share the Ameer's ap
prehensions in respect to Russia, informed him that in
the event of any actual or threatened aggression, it
would be his duty to refer the question to the British .
Government, who would endeavour by negotiation and
by every means in their power to settle the matter
and avert hostilities. Should these endeavours to
bring about an amicable settlement prove fruitless,.
Lord Northbrook gave the formal pledge that the
British Government " were prepared to assure the
Ameer that they would afford him assistance in the
shape of arms and money, and would also, in case
of necessity, aid him with troops."*
It will be observed that in this assurance the
qualifying word "probably," which had been used
before, was intentionally omitted. Besides1 this
very definite assurance for the future, a present
supply of ten lacs of rupees, besides five lacs more
to be spent in arms, were placed at the disposal
of the Ameer. Moreover, further discussion was by
no means refused on the large and vague demands
made by the Ameer in reference to the frontier
defences of Afghanistan. The subject was one of
great importance, and must necessarily involve many
conditions on our part. But the Envoy manifested
doubt how far his instructions justified him in com
mitting himself to any definite arrangement. It is,
* Ibid., p. 1 14.

TO THE FRERE NOTE. 335
indeed, evident from the debate in the Cabul Durbar,
which had been reported by our native Agent in
April, that the Ameer had sent his Minister mainly
to find out what we had to tell him, and how much
he could get out of us, but with no instructions or
authority to offer anything on his own part. Mr.
Aifchison, who was Foreign Secretary to the Govern
ment of India at that time, and who conducted the
Conferences with Noor Mohammed, has informed Lord
Northbrook in a recent letter (dated Dec. 11, 1878)
that the Afghan Envoy led him to believe that his
master would not receive British officers as residents
in his Kingdom, even in consideration of a guarantee
that we should defend Afghanistan as we should
defend British territory. Mr. Aitchison adds that
Noor Mohammed had no instructions even to discuss
such a subject with the Viceroy. Lord Northbrook,
under these circumstances, had no other course open
to him than to postpone the settlement of any further
questions to a more favourable opportunity.*
Such are the transactions of which, in the London
Narrative, the Government have presented the follow
ing as a truthful account : —
Paragraph 8. — "The capture of Khiva by the forces
of the Czar in the spring of 1873, and the total
subordination of that Khanate to Russia, caused
Shere Ali considerable alarm, and led him to question

* Ibid., No. 26, p. 109.

336 FROM THE A GREEMENT WITH R USSIA
the value of the pledges with reference to Afghanistan
which had been given by his Imperial Majesty, and
which had been communicated to his Highness by the
British Government, actuated by his fears on this
score. His Highness sent a special Envoy to Simla
in the summer of that year, charged with the duty
of expressing them to the Government of India."
Paragraph 9. — " Finding that the object of the
Ameer was to ascertain definitely how far he might
rely on the help of the British Government if his
territories were threatened by Russia, Lord North-
brook's Government was prepared to assure him that,
under certain conditions, the Government of India
would assist him to repel unprovoked aggression.
But her Majesty's Government did not share his
Highness's apprehension, and the Viceroy ultimately
informed the Ameer that the discussion of the ques
tion would be best postponed to a more convenient
season." It will be seen that this statement of the facts is
erroneous in everything except in a few particulars.
Like one of those specimens of quartz in which no
gold is visible, but which is rich in the uniform dif
fusion of the precious metal, this narrative presents no
actual misstatement to the eye, but is permeated with
misrepresentation throughout its substance. It pur
ports to set forth the circumstances which led Shere
Ali to send his Minister to meet Lord Northbrook,
It purports to give us the reply of the Government at
home to a message from the Viceroy. It purports to

TO THE FRERE NOTE. 337
tell us what the action of the Viceroy was when he
received that message. It purports to explain why
certain parts of the discussion were postponed to
another time. Of every one of these things it gives a
wrong account. It is not true, as is implied, that the
Ameer sent his Envoy because he was alarmed by the
Russian conquest of Khiva. It is not true that the
Government reply to Lord Northbrook's message
consisted of a disclaimer of the alleged apprehensions
of the Ameer. It is not true that the Viceroy was
prevented by that message from giving to Shere Ali
the assurance which he had asked leave to give. It
is not true that the final postponement of' certain
questions stood in the connexion in which it is pre
sented. But such mere negations do not at all exhaust the
wealth of these famous paragraphs in the peculiar
characteristics for which they have acquired a just
celebrity. There is in them a perfect union between
the two great elements of all erroneous representation —
namely, the suppression of things which are important
facts, and the suggestion of things which are not facts
at all. The ingenuity of the composition is a study.
In the minuteness of the touches by which an im
mense breadth of effect is produced, we recognise the
hand of a master. The introduction of the single
word "but" just at the proper place, does great
service. It suggests opposition and antagonism where
there was none ; and like the action of a pointsman
VOL. II. Z

338 FROM THE AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA
upon a railway, it turns off all the following train
of facts into the track which is desired. Some of the
devices, however, are rather gross. For example, the
quotation of one half of a telegraphic message, and
the suppression of the other half, exhibits more reck
lessness than skill. In like manner the total sup
pression of the fact that the Viceroy gave any
assurances at all to the Ameer, is an expedient
similar in kind. Perhaps it was too much to expect
that the authors of the London Narrative should have
pointed out the difference between the assurance
which Lord Northbrook gave on the 1 2th of July,
before he had asked and received fresh authority
from the Government, and the much more unqualified
assurance which he gave on the 24th after he had
received that authority. This is one of the facts
which is of the highest importance in itself and in its
bearings. It is one which could not have been omitted
by an historian of those facts who was careful and
conscientious in his account of them. It might, how
ever, be easily overlooked by a careless reader, or by
a heated partisan. But to omit in a narrative which
professes to give an account of these transactions, any
notice whatever of the fact that the Viceroy did give
some assurances to the Ameer in the sense in which
he had desired to give them, is to be guilty of an un
pardonable suppression of the truth. In like manner
the statement that Lord Northbrook postponed certain
discussions on the conditions to be attached to our

TO THE FRERE NOTE. 339
support of the Ameer, and to conceal the fact that
this postponement arose out of the circumstance that
the Envoy doubted his own authority to agree to any
conditions at all, is another very wide departure from
historical fidelity. Finally, the phrase selected to
express the mind in which the Viceroy resorted to
this postponement — the " convenient season" which
carries us back to the words of Felix — is an un
mistakable indication of the animus of the whole.
So far from Lord Northbrook having gratuitously
postponed further discussion with the Ameer on the
defences of his frontier to a " more convenient
season," he expressed in his official despatch his
"trust that the matter might be discussed with
the Ameer in person."* With reference to some
important frontier questions, the Envoy was charged
on his return to his master with a Memorandum,
in which it was suggested that a British officer
of rank, with a competent staff, should be sent
to examine thoroughly the Northern and North-
Western frontiers of Afghanistan, and then should
confer personally with the Ameer regarding the
condition of the border, and might submit the
opinions he had formed on the whole question of the
defences of his frontier .f In forwarding this proposal
to me, Lord Northbrook explained that although the

* Ibid., No. 26, p. 109.
t Ibid., No. 26, Inclos. 6, p. 115.
Z2

340 FROM THE A GREEMENT WITH R USSIA
Government of India thought that the presence of
accredited British officers at Cabul, Herat, and pos
sibly also at Candahar, would for many reasons be
desirable, they were fully alive to the difficulties in the
way of such a measure, until the objects and policy of
the British Government were more clearly under
stood and appreciated in Afghanistan. It was pos
sible that some of those difficulties might be removed
by personal communication.
We have seen that in the private and confidential
conversations which had taken place at Simla with
Noor Mohammed, this subject had been broached. A
very large amount of respect seems to me to be due
to that Minister from the accounts we have of
his conduct on these occasions. He seems to me
to have put the very unreasonable demands of the
Ameer in the least unreasonable aspect which could
be given to them, and to have uniformly ex
plained his own views with truth and candour. In
this matter of the mission of British officers his
language was that, " speaking as a friend, and in the
interests both of his own and of the British Govern
ment, he could not recommend that a specific request
should be preferred to the Ameer for British officers
to be stationed at certain given places." To this
measure it is evident that the Ameer's objections still
continued to be insuperable, and as he knew or sus
pected that Special Envoys would probably enter
upon the subject, and urge upon him a change of

TO THE FRERE NOTE. 341
policy, his objection very rationally extended even to
such temporary missions. On the other hand, the
Government of India knew its own pledges, and was
determined to fulfil its promises. To put upon the
Ameer any pressure upon this subject would have
been an unquestionable breach of these. Shere Ali
did not respond to the proposal of Lord Northbrook,
and it necessarily fell through in consequence. There
was nothing new in this — nothing in the least sus
picious. Shere Ali simply continued in the same mind
upon this question in which Lord Mayo found him at
Umballa, and Lord Northbrook respected the pledges
which had been given there.
On the 13th of November the Ameer replied to the
Viceroy's letter of the 15th of September. It is un
doubtedly rather a sulky letter. But much allow
ance ought to be made for the position of the
Ameer. Considering the expectations which we
have seen that he entertained, — considering the
immense and unconditional advantages which he
had expected to extract from us by playing on
our fear' of Russia, — considering too, the deep mor
tification with which he evidently regarded the
Seistan arbitration, it is not surprising that he should
have expressed dissatisfaction. After all, he only
intimated that if he was to get no more than Lord
Lawrence and Lord Mayo had given him, it was
useless to send Noor Mohammed to Simla. He had
got something more in an assurance which was more

342 FROM THE AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA
distinct. But as compared with what he wanted, the
difference may have been inappreciable to him. He
showed his irritation also by the terms in which he
declined to allow a British officer to pass through
his dominions. He showed, likewise, another feeling,
— that of suspicion, by not taking possession of
the sum of money which the Viceroy placed at
his disposal. There is the best reason to believe
that the cause of this was that he suspected the
money to be the price of some renewed proposal to
send British officers into his country. He accepted
the arms at once, because he had no such fear in
respect to them. Under all these circumstances his
dissatisfaction was not unnatural. But in spite of it
all, in his letter of the 13th November the Ameer
fell back with confidence on the written pledges
which he held from Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo.
" The understanding arrived at in Umballa was
quite sufficient" — a significant observation, which
probably referred to the revival of the question about
British officers. " As long as the beneficent British
Government continued its friendship, we might be
assured of his."*
The Viceroy's answer to this effusion, which was
dated January 23rd, 1874, was the model of what
such an answer ought to be, from a powerful Govern
ment to a semi-barbarous Sovereign, whose irritation

* Ibid., No. 28, Inclos, 1, p. 119.

TO THE FRERE NOTE. 343
was under the circumstances not unnatural, — whom it
was inexpedient to offend, and undignified to bully
Lord Northbrook expressed regret that the Ameer
had not favoured him with an expression of his views
on the proposals made in the Viceroy's former letter.
Passing from this, he reminded Shere Ali that the
assurances of support he had just given at Simla
were " even more explicit than those contained in
the auspicious writings of Lord Lawrence and Lord
Mayo." He reproached the Ameer gently — not for
refusing a passage through his dominions to the British
officer for whom the leave had been asked, but — for
the want of courtesy with which this refusal had been
marked in the absence of any expression of regret. The
letter concluded by a cordial sympathising assurance
that the difficulties of his position in receiving guests
in Afghanistan was fully understood, as well as the
more important political anxieties by which he was
beset* This letter drew from the Ameer a remarkable reply.
It was dated the 10th of April, 1874 It was mUch
more courteous in tone. It gave a reasonable excuse
for objecting to the return of Mr. Forsyth from Yar-
kand through Afghanistan, on the ground that he was
about to commence hostilities against his son Yakoob
Khan. But the most important paragraph seems to
be one in which he again refers to the cherished

* Ibid., No. 28, Inclos. 2, p. 120.

344 FROM THE AGREEMEN1 WITH RUSSIA
memories of Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo. It is
evident that his fears and suspicions had been deeply
stirred by the renewed discussion about the reception
of British officers, even although the Government of
India had carefully abstained from doing more than
suggesting a mission in response to what seemed to
be one of his own requirements. His language of
appeal to the authority and to the promises of his old
friends is almost passionate. " Your Excellency !
Since Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo, especially the
former, possessed an intimate knowledge of Afghanis
tan and its frontiers, and your Excellency must
certainly have also acquired the same knowledge, I,
therefore, am desirous that your Excellency, after full
and careful consideration of the approval expressed
by her Majesty the Queen, the ' Sunnud ' of Lord
Lawrence, and the decision of Lord Mayo, will remain
firm and constant, in order that Afghanistan and its
territories may be maintained inviolate and secure."*
About three months after the Simla Conferences
Shere Ali at last announced to the Government of
India that he had appointed Abdoolah Jan his Heir-
apparent. He had come to this resolution, as of
course he had a perfect right to do, without taking
any counsel or advice from the British Government.
Yet that Government knew that a decision which set
aside Yakoob Khan, to whom the Ameer was mainly

* Ibid., No. 29, Inclos. 1, p. 123.

TO THE FRERE NOTE. 345
indebted for the recovery of his throne, was a deci
sion which in all human probability doomed the
country to another disputed succession, and to
another bloody civil war. Lord Northbrook there
fore sent a letter of acknowledgment, strictly confined
to the language which had been used in 1858 in reply
to Dost Mohammed, when he intimated the selection of
Shere Ali in supercession of his elder brother.*
In November, 1874, the Viceroy had to make a
communication to the Ameer which, though a real
proof of friendship, could not fail to disturb him much.
Shere Ali had invited his son Yakoob Khan to come
•under a " safe conduct" to Cabul : and when the
Sirdar came, on the faith of the safe conduct, it had
been violated, and he had been placed under arrest.
It appeared to Lord Northbrook, as it had before
appeared under less serious circumstances to Lord
MayO, that this was a matter on which it was right
and necessary to express the friendly opinion of the
head of the Indian Government. This opinion was com
municated to the Ameer by our natiye Agent at Cabul.
It urged upon him strongly to keep faith with his
son, and added that by so doing he would maintain
his own good name, and the friendship of the British
Government.f Although this message from the Vice
roy was afterwards referred to as having offended the

* Ibid., No. 27, p. 117.
f Ibid., No. 30, Inclos. 5, p. 126.

346 FROM THE AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA
Ameer, he sent on the 14th December, 1874, through
our Agent at Cabul, a civil answer, and acknowledged
the advice given to him as dictated by " friendship
and well-wishing."
In February, 1874, there was a change of Go
vernment at home. Subsequent to this date I have,
of course, no personal knowledge of the course
of Indian affairs. But as in the preceding narrative,
subsequent to the Umballa Conference in 1869, I
have relied exclusively on the papers presented to
Parliament, or on papers equally authentic, so now
for the period subsequent to February, 1874, I shall
follow the indications of a change of policy as they
are to be found there.
In the first place, then, it is to be observed that the
present Government had been very nearly a year in
office before any such indications were given. The Go
vernment came into office in February, 1874, and the
first despatch of Lord Salisbury, desiring the Govern
ment of India to reopen the question of British
officers as Political Agents in Afghanistan, was dated
January 22nd, 18754
Before examining the terms of that despatch it
is natural to look round us and see whether any,
and if any, what events had happened during
the year from February, 1874, to January 22, 1875.

* Ibid., No. 30A, Inclos. 2, p. 128.
f Ibid., No. 31, p. 128.

TO THE FRERE NOTE. 347
Just before the late Government left office, Lord
Granville was called upon to reply to the Russian
announcement of the Khivan Treaty. He did so in a
despatch dated January 4, 1874. It recapitulated, in
significant but friendly terms, the oft-repeated story
of the Russian advances in Central Asia, acknowr
ledged the good faith with which Russia had acted on
the Agreement about Afghanistan since it had been
concluded, set forth that the Ameer had equally
acted on our advice in restraining Turkomans, and
intimated that Shere Ali was then again disturbed
by rumours of a Russian, expedition against Merve.
Lord Granville then repeated the declaration that
we looked upon the independence of Afghanistan
as a matter of great importance to> the security qf
British India, and to the tranquillity of Asia If Russia,
by any new expedition, were to drive the Turkomans
into the Ameer's dominions) he might labour under
a double hardship, first in the disturbance of his
dominions, and secondly in being held responsible for
the control of those wild tribes.*
To this the Russian Government replied on the 21st
of January, 1874 that they remained as faithful as
ever to the old Agreement. It repeated, the assurance
that the Imperial Cabinet "continued to consider
Afghanistan as entirely beyond its sphere of action."
But here the Russian Cabinet stopped. They would

* Russia, II. 1874, No 2, pp. 6, 9.

348 FROM THE A GREEMENT WITH R USSIA
not import into that Agreement a new and a
different line of limitation than that of the Afghan
frontier. This was what they had agreed to, and
by this they would abide. They declared, indeed,
that Shere Ali's fear of an expedition against
Merve was groundless, inasmuch as they "had no
intention of undertaking an expedition against the
Turkomans." But, warned apparently by accusations
of bad faith, founded on the assumption that
intimations of intention or denials of intention,
are equivalent to pledges, Prince Gortchakow, in
this despatch, took care to add that he spoke of
nothing but a simple intention. " It depended entirely
on them (the Turkomans) to live on good terms
with us ... . but if these turbulent tribes were to
take to attacking or plundering us, we Should be
compelled to punish them. Russia would rely on the
Ameer to warn the Turkomans not to expect protec
tion from him, and she would rely also on the influence
of the English Government to give him effective
advice upon the subject."* There was at least no
deception in this despatch. Russia kept her freedom.
Her Agreement had regard to Afghanistan, and not
to anything beyond it. It concluded by saying that
the " two Governments had an equal interest in not
allowing their good relations to be disturbed by the
intrigues of Asiatic Khans, and that so long as they

* Ibid., No. 3, pp. io, n.

TO THE FRERE NOTE. 349
both acted together with a feeling of mutual confi
dence and good will, the tranquillity of Central Asia
would be sufficiently guaranteed."
Such was the condition of things when the present
Government came into office. It was a condition of
things in which Russia had given ample notice,
that while she held by the engagement with us on the
subject of Afghanistan, she would not extend it
to any part of Central Asia outside that Kingdom,
and in particular, that she held herself free to
deal, as occasion might require, with the predatory
Turkomans, whether in Merve or elsewhere. In
March, 1874, however, Prince Gortchakow directed
Baron Briinow to assure Lord Derby that the Emperor
had given positive orders to stop any expedition
against the Turkomans in the direction of Merve.
This was expressly said in connexion with the
approaching visit of the Emperor to England, and
appears to have been a sort of condescension to a
national weakness, " so that no cloud might be on the
political horizon during his august master's visit to
London."* In June, 1874, tne Russian Government
had its turn of asking us whether certain reports were
true of our giving aid to the ruler of Yarkand, and
this was categorically denied by the Viceroy.
Nevertheless, at this very time, the vigilance of
our diplomatists had discovered a fresh cause of

* Central Asia, I., 1878, No. 9, p. 12.

350 FROM THE AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA
anxiety in the reported proceedings of a General
Llamakin, who was the newly-appointed Governor
of the Russian Provinces on the Caspian (Kras-
novodsk). On the 23rd of June, 1874, our Am
bassador at St. Petersburg had heard that this
functionary had addressed a Circular Letter to the
Turkoman tribes of the Attrek and Goorgan Rivers,
giving them warnings and advice. An account of
this letter had appeared in the Times of the 17th of
June, which pointed out that the Turkomans thus
addressed were tribes which " nomadised" between
the Caspian and the fort of Karis, "the latter being
half-way to Merve." The same account mentioned
as a fact that several Russian caravans had been
recently plundered by the Turkomans of Merve, and
that a Russian soldier was kept in captivity there.
The despatch from Lord Augustus Loftus reporting
the explanations given to him on these matters, was
dated the 23rd, and was received in London on the
29th of June.* No anxiety, however, seems to have
been expressed upon the subject, either by the Foreign
Office or by the India Office. A month later, on the
and of August, a copy of the Circular Letter of
General Llamakin was received at the Foreign Office
from our Envoy at the Court of Persia.t He ex
plained that he was informed on good authority that
this Circular had been addressed to the whole of the

Ibid., No. -18, p. 18. t Ibid., No. 26, p. 19.

TO THE FRERE NOTE. 351
Turkoman tribes occupying the line of country be
tween the Caspian, Merve, and Charjui on the
Oxus. The Circular itself does not say so, but as the
roving tribes of those regions have no fixed limits
to their wanderings, it was probable that it was ad
dressed to "all whom it might concern." Expressly,
however, it seems to be addressed to the Turkomans on
" the Attrek and Goorgan," this being the area over
which the General intimated that he had " supreme
authority." It was simply an elaborate warning
against the plundering of caravans, an exhortation to
peace, and a recommendation of the benefits of
commerce. It implies, indeed, throughout, the asser
tion of supremacy, and of the power and will to
enforce obedience.
Again, no notice was taken of this more definite •
information either by the Foreign Secretary or the
Indian Secretary of State. It does not seem to have
occurred to either of them that the Circular of General
Llamakin could form the subject of remonstrance or
even of inquiry. It was not until it had gone round
by way of Calcutta that anything appears to have
occurred to anybody on the subject. But the Indian
Government, habitually wakeful and susceptible on
Central Asian politics, took alarm. On the 8th of
September, Lord Northbrook wrote a despatch to
Lord Salisbury,' pointing out that if the Circular sent
by Mr. Thomson, from Teheran, were genuine, " the
Persian territory between the Attrek and the Goorgan

352 FROM THE AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA
is now practically annexed to the Russian dominions,
and authority is assumed in respect to the whole
Turkoman country to the borders of Afghanistan."
The Government of India added — " We are of opinion
that these proceedings cannot fail to excite uneasiness
and alarm in the minds of our Persian and Afghan
allies, and that they demand the serious attention of
her Majesty's Government."*
This despatch from Lord Northbrook did not reach
London till the 30th of October, and was at once
formally referred to the Foreign Office "for the
information and consideration of Lord Derby."
The Foreign Secretary was then awakened to the
fact, of which no previous notice had been taken, that
the Circular of General Llamakin, in styling himself
" Commander of the Turkoman tribes of the Attrek
and the Goorgan," involved an assumption of Russian
Sovereignty over a country which had always been
considered to belong to Persia. If this was so, it
ought not to have been left to Lord Northbrook to
point it out. It was no matter of rumour, or of con
structive inference. It was on the face of the docu
ment. Yet it was not until it had been three
months in possession of the Foreign Office, and
not until the Government of India had fastened on
the point, that the Government awoke to it as a
fact of any significance whatever. It was only on

* Ibid., No. 21, p. 20.

TO THE FRERE NOTE. 353-.
the 6th of November, that Lord Derby directed Lord
Augustus Loftus to point out to the Russian Chan~
cellor that the " territory between the Attrek and the
Goorgan was unquestionably Persian territory, in
which General Llamakin would not be justified in
interfering." Finally, he was instructed to " express
a hope that the Government of the Emperor would
impress upon General Llamakin the expediency of
abstaining from molesting the tribes who frequent the
country to the south of the Attrek."*
When this despatch reached St. Petersburg, on the
14th December, 1874, it led to a little sparring be
tween the British Ambassador and M. de Westmann,.
who was the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in
the absence of Prince Gortchakow. M. de Westmann
very naturally observed, that if Russia had done any
wrong to Persia it was the business of Persia, and not
of England, to complain. He did not refuse to
explain that there had been a correspondence between
the Imperial Persian Government on the subject, and
that the explanations offered by Russia had been per
fectly satisfactory to the Shah. Nor did M. de West
mann deny that the Circular of General Llamakin had
given to the tribes he addressed a name or description.
which was liable to misapprehension. But he gave
the not unreasonable explanation that the Turkoman.
tribes referred to, though they might generally inhabit

¦* Ibid., No. 22, p. 20.
VOL. II, A A

354 FROM THE AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA
territories which were Persian, were also in the habit
of dwelling for a part of the year in territories which
were Russian. He repeated, however, that although
he gave these explanations, '' it was not customary to
interfere in the international relations of two inde
pendent States." To this Lord Augustus Loftus
replied that the interests of the neighbouring States
were more or less mixed up with those of our Indian
Empire, and both Persia and Afghanistan might be
considered as " limitrophe States to India." He added,
" that the integrity of Persian territory had been the
subject of a formal understanding and agreement
between England and Russia in 1835 and 1838." M.
de Westmann rejoined that this understanding had
reference to the succession to the Persian throne,
a subject on which he hoped the two Governments
would always be able to come to a common under
standing. But the incident now referred to by the
British Ambassador was one affecting Persia alone,
in Which he could not admit the right of a third party
to interfere. All this, however, was reported by our
Ambassador as having been said in the most courteous
and conciliatory manner.* Lord Derby replied to it
by desiring Lord Augustus to point out to M. de West
mann that he was mistaken in saying that the agree
ment, in 1835 and 1838, referred only to the succession

* Ibid., No. 23, p. 2 1-2.

TO THE FRERE NOTE. 355
to the Persian throne,* and on this representation
being made, M. de Westmann at once said that he had
not meant to deny the validity of that understanding
at the present moment. He denied, however, that
the integrity of Persia had been menaced by General
Llamakin's Circular any more than it had been
menaced by the Seistan Arbitration — a matter which
concerned Persian territory, but on which England
had made no communication whatever to the Govern
ment of Russia.t
I have given this episode somewhat at length, be
cause we shall see some reason to believe that the
Proclamation of General Llamakin to the Turcoman
Tribes "between the Attrek and the Goorgan" was one
of the circumstances which started the Government
on its new line of policy in India, and because it
explains the condition of things down to the end
of the year 1874 — the last despatch of our Ambas
sador concerning it having been dated December 23rd
in that year. It contains a record of transactions which
prove that the Government at home had no need to
call the attention of the Indian Viceroy to any part of
the Central Asian question. Lord Northbrook and
his Council had shown himself far more wakeful than
either the Foreign or the Indian Secretary of State,
and had exercised a vigilance in respect to the most
distant frontiers of Persia, which did not appear in the
despatches even of our Envoy at Teheran.
* Ibid., No. 24, p. 22. t Ibid., No. 25, p. 23.
A A 2

3»56: FROM THE AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA
It was towards the end of these occurrences
that an important event happened. Sir Bartle
Frere wrote a Note. It was dated the nth of
January, 1875, and as it has since been published
by the Government in the Times of November
14, 1878, in anticipation of the late session of
Parliament, it cannot be doubted that it repre
sents, to a considerable extent at least, the argu
ments which had weight with the Cabinet in the
action which we are now about to trace. The Rawlin
son Memorandum-, written in a similar sense, which
had been drawn up in 1 868, had not, as we have seen,
induced my predecessor, Sir Stafford Northcote, to
change his course, — notwithstanding the then recent
conquest of Bokhara, and the occupation of Samar
kand. But the new Note by Sir Bartle Frere fell
upon a mind at once more receptive and' more im
petuous, and it must be regarded as the beginning of
all that followed. It had been preceded by a letter
from the same distinguished member of the Indian
Council, which was written in May, 1874, and was-
addressed to Sir J. Kaye, the Secretary of the
Foreign Department in the India Office. This
letter had recommended the occupation of Quetta,
and the establishment of British officers at Herat,
Balkh, and Cand'ahar. In reply to this letter a
Memorandum had been written by Lord Lawrence,
dated November 4, 1874. The Note, therefore, by
Sir Bartle Frere, dated January n, I-875, is, to be

TO THE FRERE NOTE. 35,7
regarded in the light of, and has all the marks of
being, a controversial reply to Lord Lawrence, and
an elaborate defence of his own opinion. It is re
markable that none of these papers — to one of which
the Government -evidently attaches so much import
ance — were ever -communicated to the Government
of India. It is evident from the dates that the Note
-of Sir Bartle Frere cannot have been communicated
even privately to the Viceroy before action was taken
in the sense it recommended. This is not surprising.
When Secretaries of State take to acting under the .
inspiration of others, who are not in a responsible
position, they do aiot always like the sources of
that inspiration to be known.*
It is one of the advantages of the Indian Council
•that the members of it are generally men of very
different views, who are accustomed to contest each
other's opinions, sometimes with the utmost keenness,
and very often with the most varied knowledge. Thus
the Secretary of State may always hear every question
of importance thoroughly sifted ; whilst, on the other
hand, it is never or very rarely safe to accept without
careful examination either the facts or arguments
which are put forward in such controversies by indi
vidual men. It has always been the favourite device
of Parliamentary tacticians, when Indian questions

* I have taken these facts concerning the Papers referred to,
principally from the explanatory paragraph in the Times of
November 14th, J.&78,

358 FROM THE AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA
happen to become the subject of party contention, to
quote as conclusive on their side the opinions and
arguments of some very able and distinguished man, —
concealing altogether the fact that these opinions and
arguments had been successfully traversed by others
quite equal, or perhaps superior, in weight of metal.
This was the method pursued, I recollect, a good many
years ago, by the present Prime Minister, in a famous
attack he made on the administration of the Marquis
of Dalhousie.
Considering, then, the importance which evidently
attaches to Sir Bartle Frere's Note of the nth
January, 1875, not only on account of the eminent
abilities and many accomplishments of its distin
guished author, but also on account of the effect it
seems to have produced, it may be well to indicate
here some of the statements and arguments it
contains. The first characteristic which strikes me is the
elaborate endeavour which this Note makes to
establish a great distinction between the policy of
Lord Lawrence and the policy of Lord Mayo in
respect to Afghanistan. I have shown in the previous
narrative that .there was no such distinction. Lord
Mayo always represented himself as having acted
strictly on the lines of policy laid down by his prede
cessor. The Umballa Conference itself was in pur
suance of that policy. All that was said and done
there, and, moreover, all that Lord Mayo carefully

TO THE FRERE NOTE. 359
avoided saying and doing, was strictly in pursuance
of the same policy. The money and arms which
Lord Mayo gave to the Ameer was either in imple
ment or in supplement of the assistance which had
been given or promised by Lord Lawrence. The
assurances for the future were confined within the
same general limits of principle which had been
traced by Lord Lawrence, There is not the shadow
of ground for establishing the distinction which Sir
Bartle Frere endeavours to establish, still less for the
contrast to which he points. Sir Bartle is quite mis
taken when he says that " Shere Ali and aU the
Afghans are among those who have shared his
opinion " in the matter. We have seen that Shere
Ali rarely failed to couple the. names of Lord
Lawrence and of Lord Mayo together as those of two
great and equal friends. We have seen that in the
very latest communication to the Government of
India, when he was trembling under communications
which he erroneously interpreted as indications of a
change of policy, he not only made an earnest appeal
to those joint names, but he singled out Lord
Lawrence as his special benefactor, and as the Viceroy
from whom he held a " Sunnud " of the highest value.
This mistake of Sir Bartle Frere is not accidental.
It arises from a fundamental misapprehension of the
principle of Lord Lawrence's policy, and from a kind of
misapprehension concerning it which is one of the
commonest fruits of political controversy In order

36o FROM THE AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA
to combat our opponent's policy, we are very apt,
first, to caricature it. Lord Lawrence's policy has
been in this way absurdly caricatured. It never was
a policy of absolute or unconditional abstention in
Afghanistan. It was not this even in internal affairs ;
still less was it this in external relations. He began
his assistance to Shere Ali before the civil war had>
been absolutely decided ; and Sir Henry Rawlinson,
as we have seen, has actually represented this as a
departure by Lord Lawrence from his own policy.
It was not so, as I have shown. It may have been a
departure from the conception of that policy which
had arisen in the minds of his opponents. But we
must take Lord Lawrence's policy not from his
opponents, but from himself. As regards the external
relations of Afghanistan, it was a policy of abstention
still more conditional. In the event of foreign inter
ference in Afghanistan, Lord Lawrence not only never
recommended abstention, but we have seen that he
emphatically recommended resolute and immediate
action. It was my duty as Secretary of State for India
during a period of five years, to form as clear and
definite a conception as I could of the policy which
Lord Mayo always declared to be his own, and the
conception of it, which I have here indicated, was
that on which Lord Mayo acted, and was prepared
to act.
The next observation which occurs to me on
Sir Bartle Frere's Note is, that he discusses the

TO THE FRERE NOTE. 361
principal measure he recommends — namely, the
establishment of British officers in Afghanistan —
without the slightest reference to the question whether
it had or had not formed the subject of direct engage
ment with the Ameer, either by Treaties, or by the
pledges and promises of Indian Viceroys. Not only
does he omit all reference to this question, but he
assumes on hearsay evidence, and, as I have shown,
quite incorrectly, that the Ameer had expressed his
willingness to receive such officers. He treats with
ridicule, and even with indignation, one of the objec
tions which Afghan Rulers have always put forward —
namely, the difficulty of insuring the safety of such
officers among a fanatical people But, even sup
posing that this objection had been (what it cer
tainly has not been) wholly ostensible, and only
serving to cover the real ground of objection — namely,
the fear entertained by the Ameer that he would
soon cease to rule in his own Kingdom if British
officers were permanently located there — Sir Bartle
Frere does not deal satisfactorily with this fear.
Indeed, by implication, he admits it to have much
foundation. One of the two things which he says we
ought especially to keep in view as the main objects
of our action, is to impress the Afghans with a con
viction that we have no desire " to interfere with their
independence and self-government.'' He admits that
this will require " much self-control and abstinence
from unnecessary interference on the part of our
representatives." It will, indeed ; and no man who

362 THE FRERE NOTE.
considers the position of British officers in contact
with such a condition of political society as that pre
sented by Afghanistan, can reasonably deny that the
traditional fears of the Rulers of Cabul on this subject
have a reasonable foundation.
The occupation of Quetta is recommended, to
. prevent its falling into the hands of any other Power.
But as there was then as little possibility of this as
there is now, Sir Bartle Frere is obliged to argue it as
part of a much larger plan — namely, that of our
meeting Russia on the western frontiers of Afghan
istan — a necessity which, indeed, no Anglo-Indian
politician can exclude from his view as a possible
contingency, but which, on the other hand, considering
all the consequences it must involve, no wise man
would willingly precipitate. This formidable proposal
of " meeting Russia on the western frontier of Afghan
istan" is the principle of the whole argument. It
points to a course of conduct which could not be
pursued without a breach of faith. But this is never
mentioned. It is a course which could not be pur
sued without military expenditure on the largest
scale. Yet the Note gravely maintains that only when
this course has been conducted to its conclusion, can
we hope for Peace Establishments in India. Propo
sitions which seem so careless in respect to our
Treaty obligations, and rash and so extravagant in
respect to policy — are the basis of the Paper on which
the new Policy was founded.

FROM JANUARY, 1875, TO APRIL, 1876. 363

CHAPTER XVI.
FROM JANUARY, 1 875, TO THE BEGINNING OF THE
VICEROYALTY OF LORD LYTTON IN APRIL, 1 876.
It was only eleven days after the date of this
Note — on the 22nd of January, 1875 — that Lord
Salisbury addressed his first despatch* to the Govern
ment of India, directing the Viceroy to take mea
sures with as much expedition as the circumstances
of the case permitted, for procuring the assent of
the Ameer to the establishment of a British Agency
at Herat. When this was accomplished, it might
be desirable to take a similar step with regard
to Candahar. With respect to Cabul itself, the
Secretary of State did not suggest any similar
step, as he "was sensible of the difficulties in
terposed by the fanatic violence of the people."
The reasons for this instruction are calmly and
temperately stated in the despatch, these reasons
being principally connected with the acknowledged
importance of having accurate information from the
western frontiers of Afghanistan. It was admitted
that " no immediate danger appeared to threaten the

* Afghan Corresp., I., 1878, No. 31, p. 128.

364 FROM JANUARY, 1875, TO
interests of her Majesty in the regions of Central
Asia." But "the aspect of affairs was sufficiently
grave to inspire solicitude, and to suggest the necessity
of timely precaution." The effect of the Llamakin
Proclamation seems to be indicated in the opening
sentence, which intimated that " Her Majesty's
Government had followed with anxious attention the
progress of events in Central Asia, and on the fron
tiers of Persia and Afghanistan."
There are two very remarkable circumstances to be
observed about this despatch. The first is that, although
written some eighteen months after Lord Northbrook's
Conferences with the Envoy of Shere Ali, at Simla, it
indicates no symptom whatever of the opinion that
the Viceroy had on that occasion taken an impolitic
course towards the Ameer, or had failed to give him
anything that could have been safely offered. On the
contrary, the whole object of the despatch is to
endeavour to force upon the Ameer a proposal of
which he was known to be extremely jealous, whilst
it did not instruct Lord Northbrook, or even authorise
him, to offer any concession whatever in return. If it
were true that the Ameer was then sulky or estranged,
this was not a very conciliatory, or even a just
method of dealing with him. The only excuse for
Lord Salisbury is to suppose that at that time it had
not occurred to him that any conciliation of the
Ameer was required, or that Lord Northbrook's course
eighteen months before had given to Shere Ali any

LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY. 365.
just cause of complaint. This circumstance is a suffi
cient comment on the candour and the fairness of
the attempts lately made by the Government to
ascribe to the policy of Lord Northbrook the re
sults produced by the new policy inaugurated by
themselves. »
The next circumstance observable about this
despatch is that, like Sir Bartle Frere's Note, it
makes no allusion whatever to the engagements of
the Indian Government with the Ameer on the
subject of British officers resident in his domi
nions. This was excusable on the part of Sir Bartle
Frere, who did not know all the facts,. I venture to
think it was a grave and culpable omission
on the part of a Secretary of State for India, who
ought to have known the engagements by which
it was his duty to abide. Not only does the de
spatch make no allusion to. Treaties or pledges on
this subject, but it dwells on the loose private gossip
which reported the Ameer as having, been willing to
admit an Agent at Herat r and it makes the still
more serious assumption that,. " if his intentions were
still loyal, it was not possible that he would make
any serious difficulty now."*
After the facts which I have narrated in the previous
pages, it is needless to produce any farther proof that
this despatch was written either in unaccountable

* Ibid., p. 129, para. 6..

366 FROM JANUARY, 1875, TO
forgetfulness, or in more unaccountable disregard,
of the plighted faith of the Government of the
Queen. The only indication in the despatch that the Secre
tary of State at all bore in mind the honourable obli
gations in this matter under which we lay, is that he
did instruct the Viceroy to procure the Ameer's
consent. It may be well, therefore, to point out here
what this really involved. It is, of course, true that
it would be no breach of our engagement with
the Ameer, to send British Agents to his country if it
could be done with his free consent. But the whole
essence of Lord Mayo's promise lay in the pledge that
we were not to force that consent by the undue
pressure which a powerful Government can put upon a
weak one. In the case of two Powers perfectly equal
making such an agreement between themselves, it
might be always legitimate for either of them to try
to persuade the other to abandon the agreement, and
to make some other arrangement in its stead. Nor
do I deny that it might be perfectly legitimate for the
Government of India to sound the disposition of the
Ameer from time to time, and to try by gentle means
to ascertain whether he could not be persuaded, freely
and willingly, to let us off from the promises we had
made. This had just been done by Lord Northbrook
when he proposed to send an officer to examine the
frontier, and to seek an interview with the Ameer at
Cabul. The result was to prove that Shere Ali retained

LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY. 367
all his dread and all his suspicion of the consequences
of any change. It was for the very purpose of leaving
the Ameer in perfect freedom to act upon his feelings
and opinions in this matter— -to make him feel com
fortable in regard to it — that Lord Mayo had given him
the pledge at Umballa. No such freedom could be
left to him if the powerful Government of India were
to press him unduly to yield upon the subject. The
application of such pressure was, therefore, in itself a
departure from the understanding ; and to visit a
refusal on the part of the Ameer with resentment or
with penal consequences of any kind, was the dis
tinct violation of a promise, and a direct breach of
faith. The other circumstance connected with this despatch
which deserves notice is the curious Departmental
jealousy which the second paragraph incidentally
displays of the Foreign Office. After noticing the
scantiness of the information which it was in the
power of the Viceroy to supply, the paragraph in
question proceeds thus : — " For knowledge of what
passes in Afghanistan, and upon its frontiers, they (her
Majesty's advisers) are compelled to rely mainly upon
the indirect intelligence which reaches them through
the Foreign Office."
This passage is connected with a very important
part of the whole subject, which has not been suffi
ciently attended to. The observation of Lord Salis
bury seems to have been immediately suggested by

£6S FROM JANUARY, 1875, TO
the circumstance which has been just narrated, namely,
that the information in respect to General Llamakin's
proclamation to the Turkomans, and his reported
movements on the Attrek, had come from our Mis
sion at Teheran, reporting, as that Mission does,
not to the India Office, but to the Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs.* It has, however, been a
favourite doctrine at the India Office, that the Per
sian Mission ought to be now, as it once was, in
direct communication with that Office — that it ought
to represent the Government of India, and be
officered and directed^ from Calcutta. An emphatic
recommendation that we should return to this-
arrangement was a prominent feature of the advice
urged upon the Government in 1868 in the
Rawlinson Memorandum of that year. During the
time I was at the India Office I have heard the
question frequently discussed, and although there
are undoubtedly some arguments in favour of the
Departmental view, I never could agree with my
colleagues who supported it. Teheran is the Capital
where Indian and European politics meet. But the
centre of interest is European. Even as regards
Indian questions, the methods of operating upon them
in Persia, are essentially connected with the main cur-

* I believe that, strictly speaking, the Persian Mission reports
both to the Home Government and to the Government of. India,.
duplicate despatches being sent to Calcutta..

LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY. 369
rents of European diplomacy. I am informed by my
relative, Sir John McNeill, who for many years occu
pied with distinguished ability the post of British
Envoy in Persia, that in the disastrous year of the first
Afghan war, he felt very strongly that he never could
have maintained the influence of England against
Russia, if he had been in the position at Teheran of re
presenting merely the Indian Government, and of not
directly representing the Queen. It is, of course, true
that the Government of India is, and always, has been
in political matters, the Government of the Queen.
But the question depends not on what we know to be
the fact, but on what foreign Governments understand
to be the fact. There can be no doubt on this^-
that at any Court, but especially at such a Court as
that of Persia, the British Representative would lose
in authority and in influence if he were not under
stood to be the direct representative of the British
Sovereign. This, however, is only part of the question which is
suggested rather than raised by the paragraph in
Lord Salisbury's despatch of the 22nd of January, 1875,
in which he refers to the " indirectness" of the informa
tion coming through the Foreign Office. That pas
sage does not necessarily indicate any opinion on the
constitution of the Persian Mission adverse to that
which I have now expressed. But it does indicate an
opinion on the importance and value of the informa
tion upon Central Asian politics which is to be derived
VOL. IL B B

370 FROM JANUARY, 1875, TO
through our intercourse with Persia, which has a direct
and a very important bearing on the new policy which
was about to be pursued towards the unfortunate
Ameer. Although I do not agree with Sir Henry
Rawlinson that the Persian Mission should represent
directly the Government of India, I do most thoroughly
agree with him that it ought to be, and that, geographi
cally, it is specially fitted to be, the main source of our
information on that branch of Central Asian politics
which excites most alarm in the Anglo-Indian mind.
The point on which that mind is fixed with special
anxiety is Merve, and the affection which the very
mention of that word produces is so peculiar, that it
almost deserves a special name, and may be called
" Mervousness." Now what is Merve, and where is
it ? It is a wretched village, or at the best a very
small and poor town of Turkoman mud huts, un
defended, or, if not wholly so, at least defended only
by mud walls. It is. a nest of robbers. This seems
to be admitted on all hands, and the principal cir
cumstance which gives rise to any anxiety about it,
is that its inhabitants are always plundering some
Russian caravan, or kidnapping some Russian sub
jects. Geographically, its importance is represented
to be that it is not in a desert, but in a tract of country
well watered, and more or less cultivated ; and that the
country intervening between it and Herat, the frontier
province of Afghanistan, is of a similar character. The
argument is, that if Russia were once established in

LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY. 371
Merve, there would be no physical impediment to the
march of an army upon Herat. It is one thing, how
ever, for Russia to send a force capable of taking Merve,
and a very different thing for Russia either to collect
at Merve, or to march from Merve, a force capable of
taking Herat — which is a place defended by the
strongest walls of earthwork which exist anywhere
in the world. Sir Henry Rawlinson describes them
as "stupendous." It is stated on the same high
authority that even Merve, if it were defended by a
concentration of the Turkoman tribes, could not safely
be attacked by a smaller force than 20,000 men,
whilst an assault on Herat would require not less than
40,000.* Putting aside, however, all these conside
rations, which after all can only abate our "Mervous-
ness" a little, the point on which I wish to dwell now is
that Merve is within about fifty miles of the Persian
frontier, and not more than about 150 miles from the
Persian City of Meshed, at which we have an Agent
of our Persian Mission. Meshed is much nearer to
Herat than Merve, and an active British Agency at
that important Persian town would command the
earliest and most complete information on every
possible Russian movement even upon Merve, and still
more easily upon every preparation made there for a
further movement upon Herat. Most of the informa
tion forwarded by our Envoy at Teheran on the sub-

* Quarterly Review, Jan. 1879, p. 255.
B B 2

372 FROM JANUARY, 1875, TO
ject of movements in Central Asia has been informa
tion procured by our Agent at Meshed. The whole
line of advance which is feared on the part of Russia,
from the Caspian up the valley of the Attrek river, and
beyond it in the direction of Merve, is a line of
advance parallel with the Persian frontier, along the
whole length of the province of Khorassan. It is in
the country of tribes which have more or less direct
relations with the Persian Government. This was the
reason, and an excellent reason it is, why the informa
tion touching General Llamakin's proceedings, which
aroused Lord Northbrook, but did not arouse Lord
Salisbury till the Viceroy had shaken him on the sub
ject, was information procured from our Envoy at
Teheran. Sir Henry Rawlinson, in his article in the
Nineteenth Century for December, 1878, has informed
us that a Russian expedition of any formidable
strength, attempting to approach the western fron
tiers of Afghanistan along this line of country,
would be dependent for the enormous amount of car
riage requisite for the purpose, upon Persian sources
of supply. We have it, therefore, as a certainty arising
out of geographical facts, and admitted by the highest
authority, that the danger of such a proceeding on the
part of Russia, is a danger in respect to which we ought
always to receive the earliest information from an effi
cient British Agency in Persia. Such an Agency ought
to get, and certainly would get, information of Russian
preparations on the Caspian, and of Russian move-

LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY. 373
ments from that region, long before any such informa
tion could reach a British officer stationed in Herat.
Indeed, it is most probable that the rumours reaching
an officer in that city would be altogether unwOrthy
Of trust, or could only be verified by careful inquiry
through our Agents in Persia.
The result of these considerations is to show that
whilst Lord Salisbury was now beginning to urge
upon the Viceroy a course towards the Ameer
which involved a breach of Treaty engagements,
and a breach of Lord Mayo's solemn promises,
and whilst he was doing so for the sake of a
comparatively small advantage, he was at the same
time overlooking or treating in the ' spirit of mere
departmental jealousy, another course not connected
with any difficulty, or involving any risks, by which •
the same objects could be, and were actually being,
much more effectually obtained. A well-organised sys
tem of intelligence in respect to events in Central Asia
ih connexion with our Missions and Agencies in Persia
would enable us to watch every movement of Russia
in the direction of Merve, and would be exposed to •
none of the dangers and objections attending a breach
of Lord Mayo's engagements to the Ameer.
There is yet another circumstance connected with ¦
this despatch of the 22nd of January, 1-875, on which
it. is necessary to observe. As a justification, of the
new policy about to be pursued it became a great
object with the Indian Secretary to make out that

374 FROM JANUARY, 1875, 10
our native Agency at Cabul was nearly uselesst
Accordingly in this first despatch and in others
that follow, we have this point much laboured, and, as
usual, the evidence of the Indian Government on the
subject not very fairly quoted. Our native Agent at
Cabul was Nawab Atta Mohammed Khan, a Mahome
dan gentleman " of rank and character," appointed
by Lord Lawrence in 1867, as one in "whose fidelity
and discretion" he had "full confidence."* We
have seen that this Agent, or his Moonshee, had
been admitted to hear discussions in the Durbar
of Shere Ali, and had repeatedly conveyed the
most valuable and authentic accounts of the feel
ings and dispositions of the Cabul Government. But
it now suited the policy of the Government, and
was indeed a necessaiy part of it, to disparage this
Agency as compared with that which it was desired
to establish. The truth on this matter is not very far
to seek. There are certain purposes for which a
native Agent, however faithful, is of no use. If it is
authority that we wish to exercise, we can only do it
through a British officer. Even if it be the com
manding influence which is tantamount to authority
that we wish to have, we can only have it by employe
ing a European officer. In short, if we want to
domineer we must have an Agent of our own race.
And it is precisely for this reason that the Rulers of

Afghan Corresp., I. 1878, p. 14.

LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY. 375
Cabul have always' objected to such an Agent. But,
on the other hand, if we want simply to gain inform
mation through an Agent who is at once faithful to
us, and at the same time in sympathy with the Court
to which he is sent, then a Mahomedan gentleman,
such as Atta Mohammed, is not only as good as, but
better than a European. It is inconceivable that a
British officer would ever be allowed to be present at
Durbars as our native Agent seems to have been.
The evidence is indeed conclusive that Atta Mohammed
has reported to us the truth, with just that degree of
sympathy with the Court to which he was accredited,
which, if we were sincere, it was most desirable that
he should possess.
The despatch of the 22nd Jan., 1875, seems to
have given infinite trouble to the Government
of India. There was no difficulty in answering
it, but very great difficulty in answering it with
that respect which is due to official superiors, It
would have been easy to point out that it made no
reference whatever to Treaties and pledges which the
Government of India was bound to respect, — that it
alleged certain things to have been said by the Ameer
which, even if they had been said, had nothing to do
with the agreement ultimately arrived at,- — that it
made this allegation on evidence which was not
quoted, whilst authentic records were left unnoticed,-—
that it made the unjust and very Unreasonable
assumption that if the Ameer desired to claim the

376 FROM JANUARY, iZk, TO
protection of Lord Mayo's promises he could not
possibly be loyal in his intentions to Lord Mayo's
successors in office, — all this it would have been easy
to point out. But, in the meantime, what seemed to
be a positive order must be either obeyed or disobeyed;
Under these circumstances Lord Northbrook tele
graphed to the Secretary of State on the 18th of
February, that in the judgment of the Government of
India it was inexpedient to take the initiative at that
time in the matter referred to— that nothing was trace
able in the records at Calcutta showing that the Ameer
had ever expressed his readiness to receive a British
Agent at Herat, and that he might object to such an
arrangement without being at all disloyal in his inten
tions towards the British Government. Lord North
brook, therefore, asked whether Lord Salisbury's direc
tion was peremptory, or whether a discretion was in
tended to be left to the Government of India.* On the
23rd of February, 1875, Lord Salisbury replied that a
delay of three or four months would be within the dis
cretion contemplated by her Majesty's Government,
and the Viceroy was referred to three officers in India
for the truth of the reports as to what the Ameer
had been heard to say They were now scat
tered in different parts of India and beyond
it — one of them, Mr. Girdlestone, being Resident
in Nepal. The other two were Sir Richard Pollock,

* Ibid., No. 32, para. 4, p. 129.

LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY. 377
Commissioner of Peshawur, and Mr. Thornton,
Secretary to the Governor of the Punjaub. But,
strange to say, Lord Salisbury does not seem to have
made any inquiry of Mr. Seton Karr, who was then
in England, and who, as Foreign Secretary to the
Government of India under Lord Mayo, was of all
men most competent to give trustworthy evidence on
the subject. His evidence has been given since, under
a sense of what he owed "to truth," and to the
memory of the Viceroy under whom he served in
1869. It is characteristic of the spirit in which the
matter has been pursued that on account of this evi
dence he was censured by an Under-Secretary of
State in the late debates in the House of Commons,
and was represented by that official as having been
too imperfectly acquainted with the Native languages
to be accurately informed. Mr. Seton Karr has had
no difficulty in exposing this attempt to suppress or
damage truthful but unwelcome testimony.
The information on which Lord Salisbury was acting
was not confirmed even by the officers to whom he
expressly referred.
That information mainly rested on a note written
by Mr. Girdlestone on the' 26th of March, 1869, pur
porting to report what he had heard " in conversation
with Punjaub officials." But on being asked by Lord
Northbrook to give some more definite information
as to the sources of his impression, that officer very
frankly confessed that he had really none to give.

378 FROM JANUARY, 1875, TO
Mr. Girdlestone did not hear the Ameer say one word
upon the subject. His memory even failed to recall
with certainty the authority from which he had derived
an, impression that Shere Ali had expressed himself
to the effect supposed. His recollection, however,
Was that the information given to him had come "either
from Major Pollock, or Mr. Thornton." The "only
other Punjaub official" whom he could specify was
Colonel Reynell Taylor, who was Commissioner of
Umballa in 1869*
Let us now see what was said by the other two
officers named by Lord Salisbury.
As regarded the present time, Sir R: Pollock was con
vinced that the Ameer would not willingly consent to
receive British officers as Residents in his Kingdom ;
and that " as regarded the past, it was well known to
Government that the strongest objection has hitherto
existed " to any such arrangement.t
Mr. Thornton said that he was not himself at any
of the Conferences between Lord Mayo and the Ameer
in 1869, and could not consequently speak from per
sonal knowledge of what passed on those occasions.
Of Shere Ali's feelings at the present time Mr.
Thornton had no doubt. He believed the deputa
tion of European officers into Afghanistan to be highly
distasteful to the Ameer and his Councillors. As

* Ibid., No. 32, Inclos. 2, 3, p. 136.
t Ibid., Inclos. 5, p. 137,

LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY. 379
regarded the past, he could give no other evidence
than that of a certain mysterious personage, desig
nated as " X. Y.," who is explained to have been an
Afghan, and who, in the secret records of the " Persian
Office," was said to have repbrted the substance of
certain conversations of the Ameer, not at Umballa,
but before the Conferences, when he was at Cabul and
at Lahore. What makes this mysterious " X. Y." still
more mysterious is that he undertook to report private
discussions which are expressly stated to have been
held between the Ameer and his Minister, Noor Mo
hammed, "at which no third person was present."*
This is one of the great privileges of the writers of
fiction. Whether it be of ministers in the most secret
conclave, or of conspirators in the darkest den, or
only of lovers " Sitting in a pleasant shade,
Which a grove of myrtles made,''
the novelist has an equal privilege of reporting all
that is said. And, stranger still, such is the power of
their craft, that it never occurs to any of us to be
surprised by the superhuman knowledge they dis
play It is, however, somewhat new to find grave
Secretaries of State opening their ears to this kind
of fiction, and preferring it to the evidence both of
written documents and of men telling us what they

* Ibid., No. 32, Inclos. 11, p. 143.

380 FROM JANUARY, 1875, TO
knew. Of this more authentic kind of evidence Lord
Northbrook's inquiries elicited abundance. For ex
ample, General Taylor, Secretary to the Government
of the Punjaub, an officer who had exceptional means
of information, not only reported his own opinion
that the Ameer would not be willing to consent to the
proposed measure, and that for many reasons it would
not be just to blame him, — but as regarded the past,
he reported it to be well known that the Ameer and
his advisers had more than once embodied their feel
ings and their opinions on the subject in the very
strong expression, "Do anything but force British
officers on us."*
The result, then, of Lord Northbrook's inquiries
was to leave nothing whatever in support of the gossip
on which Lord Salisbury had proceeded, except the
Note and the private Memorandum Book of Captain
Grey, the value of which has been already analysed
in a previous page.
Having ascertained all this, having gathered the
nearly unanimous opinion of all its ablest and most
experienced officers on the frontier, and having duly
considered and re-considered the formal obligations
under which it lay, the Government of India, on the
7th of June, 1875, addressed to the Government at
Home a despatch setting forth in detail all the argu
ment's upon which it had come to the decided opinion,

* Ibid., No. 32, Inclos. 6, p. 139.

LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY. 381
that there was no evidence of the alleged former
willingness of the Ameer to receive European officers,
sufficient to justify them in founding upon it any new
representation on the subject ; and that on all other
grounds it would not be wise or politic to make the
proposal. Lord Northbrook and the Council denied
that the reluctance of the Ameer to accept it could
be fairly interpreted as indicative of disloyal inten
tions against the British Government. They referred
to the fact that without the same special reasons and
historical causes the same feeling had always been
expressed by the Ruler of Cashmere. They explained
that Sir Richard Pollock, who was intimately ac
quainted with Noor Mohammed, and had confidential
information on the real sentiments of the Ameer, was
convinced that Shere Ali had no inclination whatever
to look for help elsewhere than to the British Govern
ment. They pointed out that, though he had been
displeased at not having got all he wanted in 1873, he
had nevertheless acted on our advice, although most
reluctantly, in accepting the Seistan arbitration. They
recalled to the mind of the Secretary of State. the
recorded and specific assurances given to the Ameer
by Lord Mayo at Umballa ; they suggested that a
change of policy on our part in this matter
might throw Afghanistan into the arms of Russia
on the first favourable opportunity. They admitted
that the presence of a British Agent at Herat
would be in itself desirable : and they emphatically

382 FROM JANUARY, 1875, TO
explained that if the threatened movement of Russia
upon Merve did actually take place, or even if
Russia assumed authority over the whole Turkoman
country, they would then deem it necessary to
make some new arrangement, and to give addi
tional and more specific assurances to the Ruler of
Afghanistan against attack from without ; they indi
cated their opinion that this new arrangement should
probably take the form of a new Treaty, and that
then the establishment of a British officer at Herat
might naturally be brought about. In the meantime,
,they recommended a steady adherence to the patient
and conciliatory policy which had been pursued for
many years towards Afghanistan, and that every
reasonable allowance should be made for the diffi
culties of the Ameer*
The Government at home did not reply to this
despatch until the 19th of November, 1875. By this
time the Eastern Question had risen above the hori
zon in its European aspects. The insurrection, as
we have seen, had begun in Bosnia and the Herze
govina in the month of July.f On the 18th of
August a dim vision of the " Three Emperors" had
appeared in the common action of their Ambassadors
at Constantinople. They were actually seen con
sulting together for the purpose of interfering with
Turkey, and of sending out the Consular Mission.!

* Ibid., No. 32, p. 129-135. f Ante, Chap. IV. Vol. I. p. 131.
t Ibid., p. 136.

LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY. 383
On the 24th of August the Cabinet had been
dragged by the force of circumstances, but most
reluctantly, to join in this first step taken by
the other Powers of Europe. In October it had
become apparent that the insurrection was of a most
serious character — that the Porte was greatly alarmed
— that it was making profuse explanations and pro
mises of reform — that these were being received with
contempt by the insurgents, and by incredulity on the
part of every Cabinet except that of London. In
November it became known that Austria-Hungary
was moving forward in the direction of intervention
or of interference of some kind, and was in consulta
tion with the Governments of Germany and of Russia.
The jealousy and suspicion of the English Ministry
had been aroused, and at the very time when Lord
Salisbury was preparing his rejoinder to Lord North
brook, his colleague at the Foreign Office was in
diting the first despatch which intimated to our Am
bassador at Vienna that the "gravity of the political
situation had been undoubtedly aggravated" by the
rumours that Austria-Hungary was concerting "some
scheme in regard to the Herzegovina without consulta
tion with the Powers, parties to the Treaty of 1856."*
The despatch of Lord Derby was dated November
20th, that of Lord Salisbury was dated November
19th. Written in all probability without any direct
connexion, they were nevertheless contemporary

* Ibid., p. 157.

384 FROM JANUARY, 1875, TO
events, and are alike illustrations of the atmosphere
of opinion prevalent at the time.
To this atmosphere various breezes had contributed.
As in 1 874 Sir Bartle Frere had written a Note, so
in 1875 Sir Henry Rawlinson had published a book
— " England and Russia in the East." In this very
interesting and important work, full of local know
ledge, and marked by great powers of systematic state
ment, everything which had hitherto been said in private
memoranda for official information, was published to
the world. Coinciding with a time when the public
mind was beginning to be excited against Russia on
other grounds, it could not fail to have a considerable
effect. And yet, like every other work full of solid
information and of real ability, it ought not to have
been without its calming influence if it had been
studied and interpreted with care. Although re
presenting Russia as a Power engaged in the attack
of a fortress — which fortress was India^and advanc
ing by "parallels" to the attack across the whole length
and breadth of Central Asia from Orenburg to the
Upper Oxus, it nevertheless set forth very fully not
only the immense spaces she had yet to traverse, but
the still more immense political and military prepara
tions which she had yet to make. Especially in regard
to the " parallel" which started from the eastern shore
of the Caspian Sea, and was directed towards Herat,
it showed how closely connected it was with the
Persian frontier, and how any advance upon that line

LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY. 385
must depend much on securing the goodwill and co
operation of the Persian Government.* So close
was this connexion that the possible ultimate con
tingency was described to be — that Russia might, after
having first taken Herat, launch from that base upon
India a force of 50,000 men of Persian " Sirbaz,"
disciplined and commanded by Russian officers. Men
disposed to be in a panic are neither able nor willing
to estimate with any care either the time required or
the number of steps to be taken before such a con
tingency as this could be brought about. The
Government, in particular, never seem to have
bestowed a thought upon the just importance which
Sir Henry Rawlinson set upon the Persian Mission
as the agency through which all possible Russian
movements in that direction can be most effectually
watched, and without the knowledge of which, if it
is well organised, it is impossible that any movement
towards the capture of such a place as Herat could
be made without months, or perhaps even years of
warning.f The entire neglect of all modifying considera
tions of this kind is conspicuous in the Despatch

* Second Edition, p. 294.
t The Article in the Quarterly Review for January, 1879,
before referred to, sets forth even more distinctly than Sir
Henry Rawlinson had previously done, the dependence upon
Persian complicity and support, of any Russian advance upon
Herat from the Caspian base.
VOL. II. C C

386 FROM JANUARY, 1875, TO
of the 19th of November, 1875. The consequence
was, that treating, as we have seen, all Foreign Office
information as " indirect" and comparatively valueless
to India, Lord Salisbury had come to attach a most
exaggerated value to the establishment of a British
Agency at Herat. Every conceivable cause of trouble
was conjured up in support of the proposal to press
on the Ameer his consent to the reception of a British
officer there. The objection to it as a breach of
engagement with him, and as highly offensive to him,
and the danger of it as liable to throw him into the
hands of Russia, are treated with silence or with con
tempt. The importance of it was argued in connexion
with the fear that Russia might acquire by intrigue a
dominant influence over the Ameer — with the fear
that civil disturbances might arise and lead to the
same result — with the fear that the Ameer himself
might offend Russia by military expeditions on his
frontier — with the fear, above all, of the permanent
occupation by Russia of Merve. The Government of
India had treated that occupation as a contingency
which, if not necessarily distant, could not arise with
out warning, and which, if it did arise, must yet leave
ample time for the British Government to take mea
sures against any possible movement upon Herat.
Lord Salisbury, on the contrary, treated it as if it
might happen at any moment, and as if, when it did
happen, the " time might have passed by when repre
sentations to the Ameer could be made with any

LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY. 387
useful result." Shere Ali already knew that Samar
kand was Russian, and that Bokhara was under Russia,
so that he had Russia on his very borders. But if
the mud village of Merve were ever to be occupied
by the Russians, although it was 100 miles at least
from his most distant frontier, then, indeed, he would
conclude "that no Power exists which is able to stop
their progress." Such is the fever-heat that had been
attained under the influence of that condition of mind
to which, as being something quite peculiar, and
different from anything else, I have ventured to apply
the word " Mervousness."
Accordingly, under the influence of these feelings,
the Secretary of State, in his Despatch of the 19th
of November, 1875, still insisted on his previous
instructions, that measures should be taken to procure
the assent of the Ameer to a British Mission at Herat.
What these measures were to be, I think it safest to
describe in the language of the Despatch itself : —
"The first step, therefore, in establishing our relations
with the Ameer upon a more satisfactory footing, will
be to induce him to receive a temporary Embassy in
his capital. It need not be publicly connected with
the establishment of a permanent Mission within his
dominions. There would be many advantages in
ostensibly directing it to some object of smaller
political interest, which it will not be difficult for your
Excellency to find, or, if need be, to create."*
* Afghan. Corresp., 1 , 1878, No, 33, para. 15, p. 149^
C C 2

388 FROM JANUARY, 1875, TO
The Viceroy was, therefore, instructed to find some
occasion for sending a Mission to Cabul, and to " press
the reception of this Mission very earnestly upon the
Ameer." The Envoy was not directed to make any
definite offers to the Ameer — any new Treaty — any
new dynastic guarantee — or any one of the things
which the Ameer had desired. The only reward to
be given him for agreeing to sacrifice the sur
viving Article of the Treaty of 1857 and the pledges
of Lord Mayo, was an assurance "of the earnest
desire of Her Majesty's Government that his terri
tories should remain safe from external attack." But
as this assurance had been given to him over and over
again, and with special emphasis and formality by
Lord Northbrook, at Simla, in 1873, — as, moreover, he
knew it to be true, because it was an assurance
founded' on our own interests, — this despatch did, in
fact, demand of the Ameer to give up that which he
valued above all the other boons he had received from
former Viceroys, and offered him nothing whatever
that was new in return. But more than this — it
directed that the new demand should be made upon
him, not as a friendly request if he should be really
willing to grant it, but under threats. The Envoy
was, indeed, to maintain a friendly "tone." But
these significant words were added: "It will be the
Envoy's duty earnestly to press upon the Ameer the
risk he would run if he should impede the course of

LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY. 389
action which the British Government think necessary
for securing his independence."*
The Government of India is a subordinate Govern
ment, and owes ultimate obedience to the responsible
advisers of the Crown. But from the traditions of its
history, and from the necessities of its position, its-
subordination is qualified by a large and a well-
understood measure of independence. There were;
some things in this despatch which that Government
could not be made the instrument of doing without
remonstrance In the first place, they objected to the
practice of dissimulation towards the Ruler of Afghan
istan. They objected to make upon him some
demand which was to be only " ostensible," with the
view of keeping back ' the real object we desired to,
gain. They wished to be allowed to speak the truth.
In the second place, they thought that if the thing
were to be done at all, something more definite
should be offered to the Ameer than the mere repeti-,
tion of assurances already given, and which he well
knew to be securely founded on a just estimate of our
own political interests. They thought that the Viceroy
should inform the Ameer that the " condition of
affairs in Central Asia made it expedient that the
relations between the British Government and
Afghanistan should be placed on a more definite
footing than at present."* Ibid., No. 33, pp. H7-9-

390 FROM JANUARY, 1875, TO ¦
Holding these views, Lord Northbrook and his-
Council determined that they could not act on the
instructions conveyed by the Despatch of November
19, 1875, without another reference to the Govern
ment at home, and another full representation of their
unaltered opinion on the impolicy of the whole pro
ceeding. This accordingly they did in a Despatch
dated the 28th of January, 1876. They had to deal
delicately and yet firmly with the suggestion that
the Viceroy of India should begin a negotiation with
the Ameer by an attempt to cajole and to deceive
him. I think it will be acknowledged that they did
so deal with it in the following passage : — " The result
of our deliberations is that we are convinced that if a
Mission is to be sent to Cabul, the most advisable
course would be to state frankly and fully to the
Ameer the real purpose of the Mission." Lord
Northbrook also took occasion, once more, and more
decidedly than ever, to remind the Secretary of
State that the proposal was " a departure from the
understanding arrived at between Lord Mayo and the
Ameer at the Umballa Conferences of 1869." He
declared that he was in possession of no information
which led him to believe that the Russian Govern
ment had any intention or desire to interfere with
the independence of Afghanistan. He pointed out
that the Ameer up to the very latest date, Septem
ber, 1875, had continued to act on the policy recom
mended to him by the British Government, and had

LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY. 391
prevented his people from showing sympathy with a
rising in Kokhand against Russian authority. Finally,
the Government of India declared that they continued
to " deprecate, as involving serious danger to the peace
of Afghanistan and to the interests of the British
Empire in India, the execution, under present circum
stances, of the instructions conveyed" in the Despatch
of November, 1875*
As Lord Northbrook had now resigned, and as the
Government had the prospect of appointing a Viceroy
after their own heart, this resolute resistance of
the Government of India was suffered to stay pro
ceedings for a time.
The instructions to the new Viceroy were signed
on the 28th of February, 1876. t It will be observed
that the date of this Despatch is just one month after
the Cabinet- had been reluctantly compelled to join in
the Andrassy Note.J Whatever fears and jealousy of
Russia had been long affecting the minds of the Govern
ment were not likely at that moment to be working
with abated force. Accordingly, in its very first para
graph, the Despatch set forth that the " increasing
weakness and uncertainty of British influence in
Afghanistan constitutes a prospective peril to British
interests." This was at least quite honest. There is
no attempt here to pretend that the new policy was

* Ibid., No. 34, pp. 149-155-
t Ibid., No. 35, Inclos. pp. 156-9. J See ante, Vol. I., p. 164.

392 FROM JANUARY, 1875, TO
animated by a disinterested anxiety for the welfare
of the Ameer. In his former Despatches, as we have
seen, Lord Salisbury had not even pretended to offer
him any compensation.
But Lord Northbrook's parting remonstrances had
effected something. The new instructions adopted
his suggestion, that an endeavour should be made
to offer to the Ameer something in return for the;
sacrifice we were demanding of him, and that he
should be invited to enter into a larger and more
definite arrangement than had heretofore existed.
So far the Government had profited by the remon
strances of Lord Northbrook and his Council. Their
instructions to him had contemplated no such course,
and had enjoined upon him nothing but to make
an " ostensible" demand upon the Ameer which was
to cover another demand still more obnoxious.
But when we come to examine closely the method
in which the new Despatch worked out the suggestion
of Lord Northbrook, that if this unjust and inexpe
dient demand were to be made at all, it should be
accompanied by some other proposals of a more sooth
ing character, we find nothing but a series of am
biguities, with a strong under-current of the former
tendency to deception. I do not deny that many of
these ambiguities arise out of the insuperable .diffi
culty attending the policy to be pursued. The centre
of that difficulty lay in this — that, the only things
which the Ameer really cared to get, were things

LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY. 393
which no British Government could possibly give him,
whilst, on the other hand, the only things which we
could give him, were things which he knew we must
give him from motives of our own. How Lord.
Northbrook would have overcome this difficulty, if he
had continued to be Viceroy,. it is needless to specu
late, because the policy was one of which he dis-.
approved, — on account, partly, of those very difficulties
which were inseparable from it. But one thing was
clearly indicated in his last Despatch — namely, this,
that everything would have been explained to the
Ameer with perfect openness, in a friendly spirit,
and without aggravating the injustice of violated
Treaties and broken promises, by the still greater.
injustice of menaces and threats.
Let us now see how these difficulties were met by
the instructions to the new Viceroy. On the subject
of the compensating advantages which might be
offered to the Ameer in return for the new demands
which were to be made upon him, we shall find that
the one great object kept in view by the Secretary
of State, was — to offer as little as possible in reality,
and as much as possible in appearance.
The first thing which the Ameer was well known to
desire was a fixed annual subsidy of considerable
amount. Even with this question the Despatch shows
a disposition to fence. It was one of " secondary magni
tude." But on the whole the Secretary of State points
to an adverse decision, and tells the new Viceroy that

394 FROM JANUARY, 1875, TO
he " would probably deem it inexpedient to commit his
Government to any permanent pecuniary obligation"
(par. 1 3). The same liberty, however, which had been
given by former Cabinets to Lord Lawrence and to
Lord Mayo, was given to Lord Lytton, as to occasional
subsidies, to be granted to the Ameer, at discretion,
and from time to time.
Next comes the dynastic guarantee — one of the
greatest objects of Shere Ali's desire — that the British
Government should commit itself to him and to his
family, and should promise to support by arms what
ever nomination to the succession might be deter^
mined by the influence of some favourite inmate of
his harem.
With this question Lord Salisbury fences still more
obviously. The paragraphs dealing with it (pars. 14,
15, 16)* remind one of the action of a heavy fish rising
shyly at a fly, not touching it with its mouth, but
giving it a flap with its tail. The Secretary of State
refers to the passage of Lord Mayo's letter in 1869
which had been the subject of correspondence be
tween that Viceroy and myself, and respecting the
sense of which we had arrived at a clear and definite
understanding. He styles that passage a "solemn
and deliberate declaration ;" and in the next paragraph
he calls it an "ambiguous formula." He says that
former Governments had not based upon that declara-

* Afghan. Corresp., I., 1878, No. 35, p. 158.

LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY. 395
tion any " positive measures." He says that, having
been given "under circumstances of some solemnity
and parade, it appears to have conveyed (to the
Ameer) a pledge of definite action in his favour."
He does not venture to affirm directly that Lord
MayO had bound himself to support by arms any
succession that Shere Ali might determine to appoint.
But he implies it — in the teeth of Lord Mayo's pub
lished explanation, that he' had specially warned the
Ameer that, under no circumstances, should a British
soldier cross the frontiers of India in support of any
such course.
Having got so far in misrepresenting what had been
already done, the Government at last approach the
point where it becomes necessary to say something as
to what they themselves were prepared todo. But again
they come up to that point only to go round about it.
" Her Majesty's Government do not desire to renounce
their traditional policy of abstention from all unne
cessary interference in the internal affairs of Afghan
istan."* The stress here is on the word " unnecessary ."
Had it become necessary to pledge the British
Government to support a nomination virtually made
by the mother of Abdoolah Jan ? Surely it was
possible to say Yes or No to that question. But
neither Yes nor No is definitely spoken. Refuge is
taken in the "ambiguous formula" of an abstract

* Ibid., para. 16, p. 158.

396 FROM JANUARY, 1875, TO
proposition. It is an ambiguous formula, however,
which has a very obvious purpose. " But," says the
Despatch, "the frank recognition of a de facto order in
the succession established by a de facto Government to
the throne of a Foreign State does not, in their
opinion, imply or necessitate any intervention in the
internal affairs of that State." '
The ingenuity of this passage is great. It enabled
Lord Lytton to give to Shere Ali an "ostensible"
dynastic guarantee, without giving him the reality. He
might recognise the order of succession established in
favour of Abdoolah Jan simply as a fact, — just as Shere
Ali's own actual occupation of the throne had been
acknowledged as a fact. But this acknowledgment need
not imply, and ought not to imply, any pledge what
ever to support it by force of arms if ever it came to
be contested. Thus Shere Ali might be allowed to get
the appearance of that which he desired, without the
substance. Having laid this trap for the unfortunate Ameer,
and laid it, I must say, with incomparable inge
nuity and skill, the Government proceeds to deal
with the remaining difficulties of the case precisely
in the same spirit. The next thing which the
Ameer desired was some guarantee against foreign
aggression, which should be practically unconditional
— a guarantee which should place the resources of
England and of India, in money, in men, and in
arms, at his disposal, without any troublesome re-

LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY. 397
strictions or control. The Government were in pos
session of very recent information that such was
really the aim of Shere Ali. The only part of the
Secret Note of that mysterious,individual, " X. Y.," on
which any reliance can be placed — because the only
part of it which is corroborated by other evidence— is
that part in which " X. Y." describes what Noor
Mohammed told his master it would be desirable and
practicable to obtain. It was this :¦— " That the
money and arms be given by the British Government ;
the men composing the troops should be provided by
us, and the power and management should rest with
ourselves."* How was this state of things to be dealt
with in the new instructions ? Let us see.
The first thing to be done, as in the former case,
was to put a suitable gloss upon what had been done
by former Viceroys, — that the contrast with what was
to be done how might be the more imposing. In the
case of Abdoolah Jan, this gloss had to be put upon the
doings of Lord Mayo. It had now to be put upon the
doings of Lord Northbrook. Not much consideration
was due to him. He had thwarted the designs of the
Government, and he had been compelled to do so in
terms which, however respectful, involved reproach.
It was all the more natural to discover now, although
it had not been discovered before, that there had been
something seriously wrong in his proceedings at

* Ibid., No. 32, Inclos. 1 1, p. 143.

398 FROM JANUARY, 1875, TO
Simla in 1873. The Government had been in office
for two years, and had never hinted this opinion to
the Government of India ; but an occasion had arisen
when the expression of it became convenient. Ac
cordingly (in pars. 21, 22), we have the intimation that
the assurance given by Lord Northbrook to the Ameer
in 1873 was only a "personal assurance." This is
the first hint of a distinction between the promise of a
Viceroy and a pledge binding on the Government, of
which we shall find great use made in the sequel. In
this place it is of no other use than to prepare the
way for a disparagement of the proceedings at Simla,
which had become necessary for the purposes of the
Despatch. That disparagement is proceeded with in the
next paragraph (22). Lord Northbrook's declaration
is described as just " sufficient to justify reproaches
on the part of Shere Ali if, in the contingency to which
it referred, he should be left unsupported by the
British Government," and yet as " unfortunately too
ambiguous to secure confidence or inspire gratitude
on the part of his Highness." The suggestion is then
made that on account of this conduct of Lord North-
brook( the Ameer had " remained under a resentful
impression that his Envoy had been trifled with."
If, therefore, Shere Ali were to be frank with Lord
Lytton's Envoy, he could probably renew the demand
addressed to Lord Northbrook in 1873, "that in the
event of any aggression on the Ameer's territories, the
British Government should distinctly state that it re-

LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY. 399
gards the aggressor as its enemy ; and, secondly, that
the contingency of an aggression by Russia should
be specifically mentioned in the written assurance to
be given to the Ameer."*
Here, then, was a suggested demand on the part
of the Ameer, which, though by no means ex
pressed in a very extreme form, did indicate a
guarantee without definite conditions, and tending
to compromise the freedom of the British Govern
ment. It would have been easy to tell Lord
Lytton at once, and without circumlocution, whether
he was to comply with it or not. . But, again, we
have a very " shy rise," and a sheer-off into the safe
obscurity of a foam of words. In the first place,
it is explained that the answer must not be
made identical " in terms" with the answer of Lord
Northbrook. That would be only to prejudice
instead of to improve our relations with the Ameer,
" by the evasion of an invited confidence."! But then
follows a passage which implies that, although the
terms were not to be identical, the substance was
to be the same. It had been Lord Northbrook's
object to keep the freedom of the British Govern
ment, and not to let the Ameer have a guarantee
without conditions. Again, it would have been
easy to say, frankly and openly, whether the Go
vernment did or did not mean to keep this free-
* Ibid., p. 159.
t Ibid., para. 23, p, 159.

400 FROM JANUARY, 1875, TO
dom. But, again, they evade the point by the fol
lowing carefully balanced ambiguities (par. 24) :
" Her Majesty's Government are therefore prepared
to sanction and support any more definite decla
ration which may, in your judgment, secure to their
unaltered policy the advantages of which it has
been hitherto deprived by an apparent doubt of its
sincerity. But they must reserve to themselves
entire freedom of judgment as to the character of
circumstances involving the obligation of material
support to the Ameer, and it must be distinctly
understood that only in the case of unprovoked aggres
sion would such an obligation arise."
It is needless to point out that this is merely a verbose,
obscure, and not very ingenuous repetition of the assu
rance given by Lord Northbrook, — the very same limi
tations being carefully reserved, and Lord Lytton
being simply authorised to. go as near as he could to
the appearance of an unconditional guarantee with
out actually giving it. The whole paragraph is an
elaborate repetition of the expedient by which it
had been suggested that the Ameer should be
cajoled on the dynastic guarantee in support of Ab
doolah Jan.
In return for these illusory and deceptive guarantees,
the largest and most absolute demands were to be made
on the unfortunate Ameer. These demands were con
cealed in terms quite wide enough to cover that which
the Ameer had always dreaded and suspected — the
completj transfer to us of the whole government of

LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY. 401
his country. The British Government was not only
to have for their Agents " undisputed access to the
frontier positions" of the Afghan Kingdom ; not
only were they to "have adequate means of confi
dentially conferring with the Ameer upon all matters
as to which the proposed declaration would recognise
a community of interests ;" but much more — " they
must be entitled to expect becoming attention to
their friendly counsels ; and the Ameer must be
made to understand that, subject to all fair allowance
for the condition of the country and the character of
the population, territories ultimately dependent upon
British power for their defence must not be closed
to those of the Queen's officers or subjects who maybe
duly authorised to enter them."
It is needless to point out that there is nothing in
the way of interference that might not be brought
within the range of this sweeping declaration. The
first Article of the Treaty imposed by Russia on the
Khan of Khiva was a more honest, but not a more
complete, announcement of political subjection. "The
Khan acknowledges himself to be the humble servant
of the Emperor of All the Russias." This is at least
plain and honest speaking, whilst it is to be observed
that in that Treaty Russia did not inflict on the
vassal Khan the additional humiliation of pretending
to respect his independence. The demand to establish
an Agency in Herat, or even at several of the cities of
Afghanistan, sinks into insignificance when compared
VOL. II. DD >

402 FROM JANUARY; 1875, TO
with the intimation that the country might be filled
with European officers and emissaries, to any extent
the British Government might please, and with the
intimation also that the Ameer was expected to pay
" becoming attention" to whatever that Government
might consider to be " friendly counsel," whether on
domestic or on foreign affairs.
Having thus instructed Lord Lytton to make these
tremendous demands upon the Ameer, in complete
contempt and violation of Treaties and of the pledges
of Lord Mayo, it seems to have occurred to Lord Salis
bury that he had not even yet sufficiently guarded
against the possibility of too much being offered in
return. He reverts, therefore, in the 26th paragraph
to the subject of the guarantees to be held out to the
Ameer. He tells the Viceroy that any promise to be
given to Shere Ali of " adequate aid against actual and
unprovoked attack by any foreign Power" must be
" not vague, but strictly guarded and clearly circum
scribed." As if in mockery it was added, that, if a
personal promise — in itself so equivocal — were offered
to the Ameer, it would "probably satisfy his Highness,"
"if the terms of it be unequivocal." But the Viceroy was
free to consider the advantages of a Treaty "on the
above-indicated basis." The Despatch then proceeds to
inform the new Viceroy that the " conduct of Shere Ali
has more than once been characterised by so signifi
cant a disregard of the wishes and interests of the
Government of India, that the irretrievable alienation
of his confidence in the sincerity and power of that

LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY. 403
Government, was a contingency which could not be
dismissed as impossible." This is an accusation
which is not supported by a single proof, or even by
a single illustration. It is in the teeth of the evidence
which had just been given on the subject by the
Government of India The Ameer had given no
other indication of a "disregard of the wishes and
interests of the Government of India" than was in
volved in a desire to keep that Government to the
promises it had given him. It is, however, the common
resource of violent men to traduce those whom they
are about to wrong.
There is one other passage in these Instructions
which cannot be passed over without notice. It is a
passage which refers to what may be called the
Russophobian literature of England and of India. It
states very truly that, translations of that literature
were carefully studied by the Ameer. " Sentiments
of irritation and alarm at the advancing power of
Russia in Central Asia find frequent expression
through the English press, in language which, if taken
by Shere Ali for a revelation of the mind of the English
Government, must have long been accumulating in
his mind impressions unfavourable to its confidence
in British power." The conclusion drawn from this
seems to be, — to judge from the rest of the Despatch, —
that it would be well to convince him of our power
at the expense of giving him the most just reason to
distrust both our moderation and our good faith.
D D 2

404 FROM JANUARY, 1875, TO
How different is the conclusion from that drawn from
the same premises by Lord Mayo ! I have shown
how, in going to Umballa, he wrote to me of the
accusations made against the Ameer by the Anglo-
Indian press, — then in one of its periodical fitsof excite
ment about the " advances of Russia," — to the effect
that Shere Ali was a mere Russian tool. The in
ference Lord Mayo drew was, that it was all the more
necessary for him to show the silence of conscious
strength, — to treat the Ameer with kindness and with
confidence, — to give him every possible indication that
we had a sincere desire to respect his independence,
and to strengthen his Government. In the instruc
tions of Lord Lytton his independence was trampled
under foot, and the new Viceroy was educated in
every sentiment towards him which could inspire a
treatment of distrust and of indignity.
It is the authors and admirers of this Despatch — so
imperious in its tone, so violent in its demands, so
hollow in its promises — who, in the late debates in
Parliament, have pretended that Lord Northbrook in
1873 did not sufficiently favour the Ameer by giving
him an unconditional guarantee.
It is not to be understood, however, that this
Despatch of the 28th of February, 1876, exhausted
the instructions with which Lord Lytton was sent out
to India. In the first place, the Despatch as given, to
Parliament, long and detailed as it is, is only an
" extract." We do not know what other injunctions
may have been laid upon him. But, in the second

LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY. 405
place, Lord Lytton did not leave England till towards
the end of March. During that time he had been in
personal conference with Her Majesty's Government,
and also with the Russian Ambassador in England.*
We know nothing of the results of these conferences,
except by occasional allusions to them in later
speeches and writings of the Viceroy. From several
passages in these we derive one fact which is not" un
important, although, indeed, it is a fact which makes
itself sufficiently apparent from other evidence^ — and
that is, that during these months of conference at
home, every Indian question was regarded from the
one point of view which was engrossing all attention
at the time — namely, the point of view which connected
it with the Central Asian question. Not only Afghan
questions, but all questions affecting what was called
border or frontier policy — however local they Would
have been considered in other days — were canvassed
and discussed entirely in their " Mervous" aspects.f
A remarkable illustration of this was afforded

* Ibid. (Simla Narrative), para. 21, p. 165.
t See Pari. Pap. Biluchistan, IL, 1877, No. 194, para. 17, p.
356. It is here distinctly stated that the Viceroy, " having had the
advantage before leaving England of personal communications"
with the Secretary of State, " was strongly impressed by the im
portance of endeavouring to deal with them (viz., our frontier
relations) as indivisible parts of a single Imperial question mainly
dependent for its solution on the foreign policy of Her Majesty's
Government" It is by this means that the people of India are
o be made to pay for the policy of the Government in the Balkan
'Tehinsula.

406 FROM JANUARY, 1875, TO
by transactions which were going on at the
very time of Lord Lytton's appointment. It so
happened that one of those questions was in a con
dition which lent itself Very handily to their state
of mind. For many years there had been troubles in
Beloochistan — troubles between the Khan of Khelat
and his nobles and chiefs which often threatened civil
war, and were very inconvenient to our trade through
Scinde. The Government of India had long been in
Treaty relations with this " Khanate," which entitled
them to intervene, and to send troops for the occupa
tion of the country. Lord Northbrook had to deal with
this matter, and had been advised by his frontier
officers to occupy the country with a military force.
Instead of this, he had sent an officer, Major Sande-
man, who, by less violent measures, had made some
progress in remedying the evils which had arisen.
But just before he left India, he found it necessary
to despatch this officer again into Khelat, and this
time attended by a considerable escort, — upwards
of 1000 men,— which amounted to at least a mili
tary demonstration. Now, as the occupation of
Quetta, a town in the Khan of Khelat's territory, was
one of the favourite measures always recommended
by those who were nervous on the Central Asian
Question, it was obviously not only possible, but easy
to take advantage of this state of things to make the
occupation of Quetta appear to arise out of a purely
local exigency, and so to gain an important step in a

LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY 407.
new policy, quietly and almost without observation'.
Accordingly, this seems to have been the design of
the Government in the conferences with Lord Lytton
before he left London. The last step taken by Lord
Northbrook did not fit in quite conveniently with this
design, and a somewhat unusual incident occurred1.
The Viceroys of India always continue in the full exer
cise of their powers until their successors are actually
sworn in at Calcutta. Those who succeed them are
generally men not previously well versed in. Indian
questions, and they usually approach the duties and
responsibilities of that great office with a. strong sense
of the necessity of learning, and of not proceeding
hastily on preconceived opinions. Lord Lytton, how
ever, on this occasion, took the unprecedented step of
endeavouring to interfere with the action of the existing
Viceroy in a very delicate matter, before he himself
had been installed in office, if not before he had even
set foot in India* Lord Northbrook very properly
declined to divest himself of his functions whilst it
was still his duty to discharge them. It had been his
duty during a very considerable time to consider
carefully all that was involved in the method of deal
ing with the Khan of Khelat, and he determined to
prosecute the measures on which he and his Govern-

* I owe this fact to a statement made during the late debates
in the House of Commons by Lord George Hamilton. The
interference of Lord Lytton with the then existing Government
of India is stated to have been by telegraph.

408 FROM JANUARY, 1875, TO APRIL, ^76.
ment had decided, notwithstanding the unprece
dented conduct of Lord Lytton in endeavouring
to interfere. But the fact of this endeavour
having been made at all is a sufficient indication
of the impulse under which the new Viceroy went
out, to consider everything in connexion with the
prevalent excitement on the " Eastern Question,"
and to start in India what was called "an Im
perial policy."
Let us now follow the course which was taken in
this spirit with reference to our relations with
Afghanistan.

LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY. 409

CHAPTER XVII.
FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE VICEROYALTY OF
LORD LYTTON IN APRIL, 1 876, TO THE OPENING
OF THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE ON THE 30TH
JANUARY, 1877.
The first thing done by the Government, in com
munication with Lord Lytton, was to select Sir Lewis
Pelly as the Special Envoy who was to be sent to
the Ameer. Sir Lewis Pelly is an active and very
energetic officer. But he is the very type of all that
makes a British Resident most dreadful in the eyes of
an Indian Prince who values or who desires, to keep
even the shadow of independence. His name was at
this time notorious over India, on account of his con
nexion with the very strong measures the Govern
ment of India had been compelled to take in the
case of the Guicowar of Baroda. There have been,
and there still are, many officers in our service in India
who have obtained a great reputation for their in
fluence over native Princes, and over the Sovereigns
of neighbouring States, by virtue of qualities which
seldom fail to secure their confidence. To pass over
all of these, and to single out Sir Lewis Pelly was a

410 FROM LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY
very clear publication to the Indian world how Shere
Ali was to be treated.
The next thing which Lord Lytton did was to revert
to the scheme to which Lord Northbrook refused to
be a party — the scheme, namely, of not telling at
once to the Ameer the truth respecting the real inten
tion of the Mission — of finding some artificial "pretext"
for sending it at all — and of setting forth in connexion
with it certain objects which were to be merely
" ostensible." In the 23rd paragraph of the Simla
Narrative* Lord Lytton gives his account of this
proceeding as if it were one of a perfectly creditable
kind. He tells us that the " opportunity and pretext"
which had hitherto been wanting for the despatch of a
complimentary Special Mission to Cabul were " fur
nished" by two circumstances. The first of these was his
own recent accession to the office of Viceroy of India,
whilst the second was the recent assumption by the
Queen of the title of Empress of India. With this "os
tensible" object, but with "secret instructions" of a very
different kind, the Special Envoy was to be preceded
by a'" trusted native officer, charged to deliver a letter
fo the Ameer from the Commissioner of Peshawur."
This "pretext" was surely rather too transparent. Shere
Ali had seen Lord Lawrence succeeded by Lord Mayo,
and he had seen Lord Mayo succeeded by Lord North
brook ; but neither of these Viceroys had announced

* Afghanistan, 1878, I., No. 36, p. 166.

TO THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE. 411
their recent accession to office in so formal a manner.
There did not seem to be any special reason why
Lord Lytton should blow such a trumpet before
him, which had not been blown by his predecessors.
Then, as regarded the new title of the Queen, unless
it was to make some change, not merely in the form,
but in the substance of our relations, both with our
own feudatory Princes and with neighbouring Sove
reigns whom we professed to regard as independent,
it did not seem obvious why it should be announced
to Shere Ali by a Special Envoy. Under the peculiar
circumstances of the case, such a method of intimating
this event would naturally rather rouse suspicion than
allay it.
The letter of the Commissioner of Peshawur, written
on behalf of the new Viceroy, was dated May 5, and
reached the Ameer on the 17th of May. 1876. It opened
by telling him that at a long interview which he had
with Lord Lytton, his Excellency had " enquired very
cordially after his Highness's health and welfare, and
those of his Highness Abdoollah Jan." It informed
him of the Viceroy's intentions of sending his friend,
Sir Lewis Pelly, for thepurposes alreadyexplained. No
consent was asked on the part of the Ameer — thus de
parting at once from all previous usage and under
standing on the subject. It expressed confidence that
the Ameer would fully reciprocate the friendly feel
ings of the Viceroy. It begged the favour of an
intimation of the place at which it would be most

412 FROM LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY.
convenient for the Ameer to receive the Envoy ; and
it concluded by informing him that Sir Lewis Pelly,
who was honoured by the new Viceroy with his Ex
cellency's fullest confidence, would be able to discuss
with his Highness matters of common interest to the
two Governments.* As it was perfectly well known
that the Ameer thought it unsafe for him to leave
Cabul, on account of Yakoob Khan's presence there,
this letter of the Viceroy was a peremptory message*
not only that a Mission would be sent, but practically
also that it must be received at the Capital.
The Ameer's reply, which was dated May 22nd,
is a model of courtesy and of what he himself
calls "farsightedness." He was delighted to hear
of the interviews of the Commissioner with the
new Viceroy. He was delighted to hear of the
accession to office of his Excellency. He was
delighted to hear that the Queen had become " Shah-
inshah." He added, with much significance, that he
had a "firm hope" that from this most excellent
title of the Great Queen, " an additional measure of
repose and security in all that belonged to the
affairs of the servants of God would be experienced
in reality."
It is never pleasant for any man who is dealing
with a neighbour through "pretexts" to be told so
gently and so civilly that they are seen through. It

* Ibid., No. 36, Inclos. 6, p. 174.

TO THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE. 413
must have been particularly provoking to the new
Viceroy to be assured of a firm hope on the part of
the Ameer that the new Imperial title of the Queen
was to be connected with new securities for a peaceful
and reassuring policy.
But the Ameer now proceeded to make another
intimation which must have been still more provok
ing. It was part of the case, as we have seen, which the
Government and Lord Lytton desired to put forward,
that the assurances given to the Ameer in 1 873 had
not been sufficient, and that on account of this he had
no sufficient confidence in our support. This case
was seriously damaged, by the declaration of the
Ameer, which immediately followed, that he saw no
use in the coming of new Envoys, inasmuch as his
Agent had "formerly, personally, held political par
leys at the station of Simla,'' when " those subjects full
of advisability for the exaltation and permanence of.
friendly and political relations, having been con
sidered sufficient and efficient, were entered in two
letters, and need not be repeated now."* So awkward
was this passage for Lord Lytton that in the subse
quent Simla Narrative we find him compelled to
put a gloss upon it, in order to extract its sting. In
the same twenty-third paragraph of that Narrative to
which I have already referred, the Ameer is repre
sented as having said that he " desired no change in

* Ibid., No. 36, Inclos. 7, p. 175.

414 FROM LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY
his relations with the British Government, which
appeared to have been defined by that Government
to its own satisfaction at the Simla Conference."
The letter of the Ameer does not say this. It does not
say or imply that the satisfaction arising out of the
Simla Conference was a one-sided satisfaction, felt
by the British Government, but not felt by himself.
And when we find the Viceroy resorting to this gloss
upon the words we understand where the words them
selves were found to pinch.
But the next sentences of the Ameer's reply must
have been still more unpleasant. He ventured to
intimate that he knew quite well that the Viceroy
had some ulterior designs, and that the pretexts he
had put forward were "ostensible." He begged that
if any new conferences were intended " for the purpose
of refreshing and benefiting the State of Afghanistan,"
" then let it be hinted," in order that a confidential
Agent of the Ameer " being presented with the things
concealed in the generous heart of the English Govern
ment should reveal them" to the Ameer.
This letter of Shere Ali was accompanied by a letter
from our Native Agent, Atta Mohammed Khan, ex
plaining all that he knew of the motives which had
actuated the Ameer, and all the arguments which had
been put forward in his Durbar, upon the proposals of
the Viceroy. In this letter, the real fundamental objec
tion which has always actuated the Rulers of Af
ghanistan in resisting the reception of European
officers, is fully set forth. That objection is the fear

TO THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE. 415
that these Agents would be perpetually interfering —
making demands or proposals which it would be equally
embarrassing for the Ameer to grant or to refuse. One
of the other arguments put forward as supporting
and more or less covering this one great actuating
motive was the argument that if the British Govern
ment were to urge European officers on the Ameer
the Russian Government might follow its example.
If this argument had been used in the letter of the
Ameer it would have formed a legitimate ground of
some temperate and friendly remonstrance on the
part of the Viceroy ; because it implies a misrepre
sentation of the well-known relative positions of the
British and Russian Governments towards Afghan
istan. But this argument was not used in the
letter of the Ameer. It was only reported as having
been used in the private consultations of the Dur
bar.* Our knowledge of the fact that it had been
used at all is, indeed, a signal illustration of the
fidelity with which we were served by our native
Agency, and of the fallacy of at least one of the
pretences on which the new policy was founded.
The letter of the Ameer must have reached the
Commissioner of Peshawur about the 3rd of June,
1876.-^ But no reply was given to it for more than

* Ibid., No. 36, Inclos. 8, pp. 175, 176.
t I have assumed here that it takes twelve days to send a
letter from Peshawur to Cabul, because in several cases this
time seems to have been actually taken. But I am informed
that four days only are required.

4i6 FROM LORD LYTTON;S VICEROYALTY.
a month. In the Simla Narrative, the Viceroy,
who himself avows that his own letter had been sent
upon a "pretext," and had made proposals which
were only " ostensible," has the courage to describe
the reply of the unfortunate Ameer as a response of
" studied ambiguity;"* the truth being that there was
about it no ambiguity whatever, and that it was a
reply representing straightforwardness itself when con
trasted with the letter of Lord Lytton.
Cajolery having failed, it was now determined to
try the effect of threats. Accordingly, after the lapse
of more than a month, on the 8th of July, the Com
missioner of Peshawur addressed another letter to
the Ameer — the terms of which were dictated, of
course, by the Government of India. We have ho
official information how this interval of a month had
been employed. But we have the best reason to
believe that Lord Lytton had difficulties with his
Council. Three of its most distinguished members,
Sir William Muir, Sir Henry Norman, and Sir Arthur
Hobhouse were opposed altogether to the new
" Imperial" policy. Somehow, the expression of
their opinions has been suppressed. But it is at least
extremely probable, from the time spent in discussion
and from information which has been published, that
their remonstrances had some effect, and that the
letter to the Ameer finally decided upon may have

* Ibid., No. 36, para. 24, p. 167.

TO THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE. 417
been delayed by their resistance. The purport of
this letter, and the spirit which it was intended
to express, was more fully explained in a covering
letter which was not addressed directly to the
Ameer, but to the British Agent at his Court. This
covering letter was written not only to comment.
upon what the Ameer had said in his own official
reply, but also upon the report which had been fur
nished by our Agent of the debates in the Durbar.
It was, therefore, in itself, a very remarkable exposure
of that other pretext so long put forward by the In
dian Secretary, that our Mohammedan Agent at Cabul
did not give us full and trustworthy information as to
what was going on in the Capital of the Ameer. As
suming the perfect correctness of our Agent's informa
tion, it commented with severity and even bitterness
on one or two of the motives and arguments of the
Government of Cabul. Some of these arguments it
misrepresents. For example, it refers to the fear lest
the Envoy " should address to the Ameer demands
incompatible with the interests of His Highness."*
This is not a correct or a fair account of the fear which
had been reported by our Agent. That fear was that
the Envoy might "put forward such weighty matters of
State that its entertainment by His Highness, in view
of the demands of the time, might prove difficult,"
and that the Ameer should find himself obliged to

* Ibid., No. 36, Inclos. 10, p. 177.
VOL. II. E E

418 FROM LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALIY
reject it verbally. There is all the difference in the
world between these two representations. The one
implies a charge against the British Government, or
a suspicion of its intentions, that it might desire to
injure the Ameer ; whereas, the other implies nothing
more than that he feared proposals which might to
him appear inexpedient, and that he desired to keep
his freedom and his political independence in not
being exposed to undue pressure upon such matters.
The letter does indeed give assurances to the Ameer
of a desire to consider in a friendly spirit all that he
might have to suggest. But behind all these assur
ances the Ameer knew that the real object was to
force upon him the abandonment of the engagement
made, and the pledges given, by previous Vice
roys on the subject of British officers resident
in his dominions. He knew, moreover, that this
object was aimed at not by persuasion but by
threats. He was warned of the "grave responsi
bility " he would incur if he deliberately rejected the
opportunity afforded him. But the bitterest passage
of this letter was that which referred to the frank
indication given by the Ameer that he knew there was
some object behind, — which had not been explained to
him in the " ostensible" purport of the proposed Mis
sion. This detection of the truth by Shere Ali rouses
all the indignation of the Viceroy. He has the
courage to talk of the " sincerity" of his own inten
tions. He denounces the " apparent mistrust" with

TO THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE. 419
which his letter had been received by the Cabul
Durbar, and he angrily declines to receive an Agent
from the Ameer who was to be sent with a view of
becoming acquainted with what the Ameer " desig
nated" as the " objects sought" by the British Govern
ment. Finally, the Ameer was warned that the
responsibility of refusing would rest entirely on the
Government of Afghanistan.*
The letter which was addressed personally to the
Ameer, and which bore the same date, was much
shorter. But it is remarkable in several ways. In
the first place it reiterated the " ostensible" pretext
that the Envoy was intended to announce Lord
Lytton's accession to office, and also the assump
tion by the Queen of the Imperial title. But, in the
second place, it gave renewed assurances that the
Viceroy was sincerely desirous, not only of main
taining, but of materially strengthening, the bands of
friendship and confidence between the two Govern
ments, and it gave some obscure intimations of the
benefits to be conferred. It did not distinctly promise a
dynastic guarantee, but it hinted at it. Still less did
it explain the device under which it had been dis
covered how an apparent dynastic guarantee could
be given without involving any engagement what
ever to support a " de facto order of succession"
in case of its being disputed. But it did cautiously

* Ibid, pp. 176-177.
E E 2

420 FROM LORD LYTTONPS VICEROYALTY
and carefully, and in very guarded language, just
suggest to Shere Ali that something might be in
store for him " more particularly affecting Afghanistan
and the personal welfare of His Highness and his
dynasty." Finally, the letter ended with a threat that
if the refusal of the Ameer should render nugatory
the friendly intentions of the Viceroy, his Excellency
would be obliged " to regard Afghanistan as a State
which has voluntarily isolated itself from the alliance
and support of the British Government."*
These communications, which were dated at
Peshawur on the 8th of July, must have reached
the Ameer about the 20th of that month. On re-,
ceipt of the letter to himself, together with the farther
explanations, all conceived in the same spirit, which
our native Agent was at the same time ordered to
give him, the unfortunate Ameer was naturally at
once alarmed and incensed. He saw that the
powerful British Government was determined to
break — and was then actually breakings— the pro
mises made to him by former Viceroys, and he saw
that this determination was unqualified and unre
deemed by any promises which were of the slightest
value. Whenever a Mohammedan Sovereign gets into
a passion, or into a scrape out of which he does not see
his way, — whenever, in short, he is driven to the
wall, — his uniform resource is to appeal, or to con-

Ibid., No. 36. Inclos. 9, p. 176.

TO THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE. 421
template an appeal, to Moslem fanaticism. On this
occasion, Shere Ali was reported to have looked round
about him, and to have consulted " Mollahs " as to
whether he could get up what is called a " Jehad " or
religious war. This, however, was merely a personal
display of temper, and no symptom of it appeared in
his official communications. He took some time but,
under the circumstances, by no means an unreasonable
time, to consider his course. His reply was dated
September 3, 1876 — or six weeks after he had received
the Viceroy's letter. It is characteristic of the spirit in
which the Simla Narrative of these transactions was
written, and of the accuracy of its statements, that the
25th paragraph of that document calls this interval " a
significant delay of two months." Considering that
the Viceroy had himself delayed to answer the Ameer's
former letter of the 22nd of May from about the 3rd
of June, at which date it must have reached Peshawur,
till the 8th of July, a period of five Weeks, — considering
that the British Government had nothing to fear, and
nothing to lose — and considering that the Ameer had,
or deemed himself to have, everything at stake, and had
taken only one week longer to deliberate than Lord
Lytton himself, this invidious misstatement of the
Ameer's conduct is as ungenerous as it is inaccurate
On the 3rd of September the Ameer replied, mak
ing three alternative proposals. One was that the
Viceroy should agree to receive an Envoy from Cabul,
who might explain everything. The next was that

.422 FROM LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY
the Viceroy would send an Envoy to meet on the
frontier a selected representative of the Afghan State.
A. third was that the British Native Agent at Cabul,
who had long been intimately acquainted with all his
wishes, should be summoned by the Viceroy, and
should expound the whole state of affairs, and that on
his return to the Ameer he should bring a similar ex
planation from the Government of India.*
On the 1 6th of September the Viceroy replied
through the Commissioner of Peshawur, accepting
the last of these three alternatives, on the condi
tion that the Ameer should explain his views fully
and confidentially to the British Agent. In that
case the Agent would be as frankly informed of
the views of the British Government, and would
explain them to the Ameer on his return to Cabul.f
Our Agent, Atta Mohammed Khan, was directed to
.make all speed to meet the Viceroy at Simla, and
not to let the object of his journey be known if any
inquiries should be made about it.
The British Agent at Cabul, the Nawab Atta
Mohammed Khan, reached Simla in time to have
a conversation with Sir Lewis Pelly and others on
behalf of the Viceroy, on the 7th of October. The
Ameer had declared that he had nothing to add to
the wishes he had expressed at Umballa in 1869.. and

*¦ Ibid., No. 36, Inclos. 14, p. 179.
f Ibid., Inclos. i6,p. 179.

TO THE PESHA WUR CONFERENCE. 423
through his Minister at Simla in 1873. But the
Agent, on being asked to give his own estimate of
the feelings of the Ameer and of the causes " which
had estranged him from the British Govern
ment," mentioned eight different circumstances or
transactions which were "among the causes of
annoyance and estrangement." At the head of these
was the Seistan arbitration. Our recent doings in
Khelat came next. Our interference on behalf of his
rebellious son, Yakoob Khan, was third in the list.
The fourth was our sending presents to his feudatory,
the Khan of Wakhan. The fifth was the results of the
Conferences in 1873, during which his Minister had
received some personal offence. The sixth was the
terms of certain recent letters from the Commissioner
of Peshawur. The seventh was that the Ameer counted
on our own self-interest as the best security for our
protection of his country. The eighth was our refusal
to give him the offensive and defensive Treaty which
Lord Mayo had refused to him at Umballa, and
which had been refused ever since.
On the other hand, the Agent specified seven things
which the Ameer really desired from us. First and fore
most of these things was an engagement that no Eng
lishman should reside in Afghanistan, or at all events
in Cabul. The second was a renunciation of all
sympathy or connexion with Yakoob Khan, and a
dynastic guarantee of the succession as determined
by himself The third was a promise " to support the

424 FROM L ORD LYTTON'S VICERO YALIY
Ameer, on demand, with troops and money, in all and
every case of attack from without," as well as against
internal disturbance* The fourth was a permanent
subsidy. The fifth was an engagement not to inter
fere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. The sixth
was that in any engagement made, words should be
introduced making the alliance strictly offensive and
defensive on both sides. The seventh was that we
should recognise him by some new title, as he consi
dered himself quite equal to the Shah of Persiat
Having ascertained all this, which showed that the
Ameer adhered closely and pertinaciously to the
very same desires which he had vainly pressed: on
former Viceroys, Lord Lytton determined to see the
Agent himself, and was, of course, obliged to make up
his mind how far he would go in the direction of con
ceding, or appearing to concede, what his predecessors
in office had been compelled to refuse. Strange to
say, he began the conversation by telling the Agent
that his information "was very full and interesting,
but quite new." It will be seen from the narrative
previously given that, on the contrary, there was very
little indeed that was new, and that the Ameer's prin
cipal objects had been perfectly well known, and very
accurately appreciated both by Lord Mayo and by
Lord Northbrook. Lord Lytton then proceeded to

* Ibid, p. 182.
t Ibid.,. No. 36, Inclos. 18, pp. 181, 182,

TO THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE. 425
explain to the Agent that the Ameer was mistaken in
supposing that we should support him unless it were our
own interest to do so, and that if he did not choose to
please us, " the assistance which he seemed at present
disinclined to seek or deserve, might, at any mo
ment, be very welcome to one or other of his rivals."
He further informed the Agent that the moment
we ceased to regard Afghanistan as a friendly and
firmly allied State there was nothing to prevent us
from coming to " an understanding with Russia which
might have the effect of wiping Afghanistan out of
the map altogether." This was very threatening
language. There was a good deal more of a similar
kind, conceived in the worst possible taste. Thus, the
. Ameer was to be told that the British military power
could either be "spread round him as a ring of iron,"
or "it could break him as a reed," — and again that
he was as "an earthen pipkin between two iron
pots." But bad as all this was in tone, it did not
involve any incorrect statement of facts. It was
accompanied, however, by another announcement
for which, so far as I know, there was not the
shadow of justification. " If the Ameer does not
desire to come to a speedy understanding with us,
Russia does ; and she desires it at his expense."* If
this passage has any meaning, that meaning appears
to be that Russia desired to come to some arrange-

* Ibid. p. 183.

426 FROM LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY
ment with England under which the Kingdom of Cabul
was to be sacrificed either in whole or in part. No
papers justifying this statement have been presented
to Parliament. I believe it to be one without the
shadow of a foundation.
The Viceroy next proceeded to make a very satis
factory declaration — which was, that the British
Government was then " able to pour an overwhelming
force into Afghanistan, either for the protection of the
Ameer, or for the vindication of its own interests, long
before a single Russian soldier could reach Cabul." Itis
well to remember this : but the confidence expressed
is not very consistent with the context either of words
or of conduct.
It now became necessary, however, for the Viceroy
to come to the point — how much he was prepared to
offer to the Ameer. As preparatory to this he found
it convenient, as his official instructions had done,
to disparage what the Ameer had got from former
Viceroys. Lord Lytton, therefore, went on to observe
that " the Ameer has hitherto had only verbal under- .
standings with us. The letter given him hy Lord
Mayo was not in the nature of a Treaty engagement,
and was, no doubt, vague and general in its terms." -
I have aheady expressed my opinion on this attempt
to impair the binding obligation of solemn promises
and pledges given by the Viceroys of India, whether
they be merely verbal, or written only in the form of
letters. It is a doctrine incompatible with that con-

TO THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE. 427
fidence which has hitherto been maintained in the
honour of the British Government in India, and cannot
be too severely condemned. It is a doctrine incom
patible with the faithful fulfilment by the Crown of
the assurances given in that very solemn document,
the Proclamation issued on the assumption by the
Crown of the direct Government of India — "We
hereby announce to the Native Princes of India, that
all the treaties and engagements made with them by,
or under the authority of the East India Company,
are by us accepted, and will be scrupulously main
tained." On no other principle can we keep our
ground in India, and no Viceroy before Lord Lytton
has ever attempted to evade it.
Lord Lytton then proceeded to detail the con
cessions he was willing to make. He agreed to the
formula, " that the friends and enemies of either State
should be those of the other." But the very next
concession showed that some reserve was nevertheless
maintained. Shere Ali had always asked for an
absolute guarantee against aggression. But Lord.
Lytton would not omit the qualifying word which all
former Viceroys had insisted upon — namely, " unpro
voked." Of course the insertion of this word kept.
open the discretion of the British Government in each
case, and, moreover, implied some sort of control over
the foreign policy of the Ameer. The Viceroy also
agreed to " recognise Abdoolah Jan as the Ameer's
successor." But this was also qualified with great care

428 FROM LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY
and some ingenuity. The qualification of the Cabinet,
as we have seen, would have reduced this guarantee
practically to a nullity. Lord Lytton tried hard, at a
second interview with the Agent, to express the quali
fication in a manner as little formidable as possible to
the Ameer. " If the Ameer, or his heir, were ever actually
ejected from the throne of Cabul, the British Govern
ment would not undertake a war with the Afghans for
their restoration. If, however, the Ameer gave notice
in due time, while still in possession of his throne, that
he was in difficulties, and needed material assistance,
such assistance would be afforded within the limits of
what might be found practically possible at the time."*
I do not deny that this was quite as much as the Ameer
could reasonably ask. On the contrary, I entirely
agree with Lord Lytton that it was so, and quite as
much as the British Government could safely give.
But it was no appreciable addition to what had been
actually done by Lord Lawrence and by Lord Mayo.
They had both assisted him with money and with
arms — on the very ground that he was in actual
possession of his throne, although still in danger of
losing it. This indeed had been their declared policy,
and to this all their promises and assurances had
pointed. But this was not what the Ameer wanted.
It kept that element of discretion in the hands of the
British Government to judge of the policy to be pur-

* Ibid., No. 36, Inclos. 20, p. 185.

TO THE PESHA WUR CONFERENCE. 429
sued in each case, which destroyed the whole value
of it in the opinion of the Ameer. Lord Lytton
did indeed make one rather shy offer connected with
this subject, which, I venture to think, might have
landed us in a very false position, and in a very unjust
course of conduct. He offered, if Shere Ali wished
it, to keep Yakoob Khan in safe custody in India.
That is to say, the British Government were to act as
jailors for the Ameer of Cabul. If this meant that we
were to bind ourselves by Treaty to prevent Yakoob,
under whatever circumstances, from becoming a can
didate for the throne of his father, it was a most
dangerous offer, and we cannot be too thankful that
it was not accepted.
Lastly, Lord Lytton did agree to offer a yearly
subsidy to the Ameer, the amount of which, however,
and the conditions of which, were left open for
detailed consideration.
On the other hand, in return for these very small
advances on what Shere Ali had already obtained in
the promises and assurances of former Viceroys, Lord
Lytton required him to give up absolutely that on
•which, as we have seen, he set the highest value. His
foreign policy and conduct was to be absolutely under
our control. This control was to be symbolised, if
it was not to be actually exercised, by British officers
resident at Herat and elsewhere on his frontiers.
Afghanistan was to be freely open to Englishmen,
official and unofficial. The result was that the

,430 FROM LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY '
Ameer was offered nothing of that which he really
desired, whilst, on the other hand, he was required to
grant to us the whole of that demand which he had
always regarded with the greatest dread.
Primed with this strange mixture of bluster
and of b^its, our Agent was sent off to Cabul, to
translate it all as best he could to the unfortunate
Ameer. For this purpose he was furnished with an
" Aide Memoire." It summed up the promises as
plausibly as possible ; It maintained the substantial
limitations in terms as subdued and obscure as could
be devised ; but it distinctly made all these promises
absolutely dependent on the new condition about the
reception of British officers— and worse than this, it
plainly intimated that not only were the new promises
to be absolutely dependent on this condition, but the
maintenance of existing promises also. Without that
new condition, the Viceroy " could not do anything
for his assistance, whatever might be the dangers or
difficulties of his future position."*
The Agent was also charged with a letter from the
Viceroy to the Ameer, in which Shere Ali was referred
on details to the full explanations given to our Agent.
But in this letter the Viceroy ventures on the assertion
that he was now offering to the Ameer what he had
vainly asked from former Viceroys. This assertion is
thus expressed : " Your Highness will thus be assured

* Ibid., No. 36, Inclos. 21, pp. 185, 186.

TO THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE. 431
by the Agent that I shall be prepared to comply with
the wishes which you announced through your Agent
at Simla in 1873, and to which you have adhered in
more recent communications."*
But our native Agent was not the only diplomatist
charged with this important mission. The Ameer
had offered, as one of his alternatives, to send a special
Envoy to meet upon the frontier another similar Envoy
from the Viceroy. Lord Lytton would now graciously
agree to this proposal. Sir Lewis Pelly was to be his
Envoy. In anticipation of the Ameer's consent this
officer was furnished with a long paper of recapitula
tions and instructions, dated October 17th, 1876, and
also with a Draft Treaty, t
It is a matter of the highest interest to observe
in these papers how deftly the delicate subject is
dealt with in regard to the difference between what
the Ameer desired to get, and what it was now
proposed to give to him. In the fifth paragraph of
Sir Lewis Pelly's new instructions he is desired to
be governed by the terms of Lord Salisbury's de
spatch of the 28th of February, 1876. J We have seen
how very safe and how very dexterously drawn this
despatch was. But, on the other hand, as it was
desirable to show as fine a hand as possible at this

* Ibid., No. 36, Inclos. 22, p. 186.
f Ibid., No. 36, Inclos. 23 and 24, pp. 187—191.
X Ibid., No. 36, Inclos. 23, p. 187.

432 FROM LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY
juncture, the following audacious statement is made
in the sixth paragraph : — " The conditions on which
the Governor-General in Council is now prepared to
enter into closer and more definite relations With the
Government of Afghanistan are in every particular the
same as those desired by the Ameer himself on the
occasion of his visit to Umballa in 1869, and again in
more or less general terms so urged by him on the
Government of India through his Minister, Syud
Noor Mohammed Shah in 1873."
I call this statement audacious, because, as regards
the transactions of 1 869, it is contradicted in every
syllable by an authoritative document which the
Government of India must have had before it at the
time. In certain paragraphs of Lord Mayo's despatch
to me, of the ist of July, 1869, we have a full ex
planation by that Viceroy of the unconditional
character of the guarantees which were then desired
by the Ameer, and which Lord Mayo had decided it
was impossible to give him.* The assertion that the
assurances which the Viceroy was now willing to offer
to the Ameer corresponded " in every particular" with
those thus described by Lord Mayo, is an assertion
which it is impossible to characterise too severely.
Considering that Lord Lytton had just heard
from the mouth of our own Agent at Cabul how
very different "in every particular" the Ameer's

* Ibid., No. 19, paras. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 45, pp. 95 and 97.

TO THE PESHA WUR CONFERENCE. 433
real demands continued to be from the conces
sions which it was possible for the Viceroy or for any
British Government to make, this broad assertion is
one which is truly astonishing. It is all the more so,
as in the very same document there is another para
graph (25), which seems to lay down the principle
that the British Government could not go further than
was consistent with the principles laid down by Lord
Mayo in 1869, and the next paragraph (26) proceeds
thus: — "For the same reason, the British Government
cannot contract any obligation to support the Princes
of Afghanistan against the opposition of the Afghan
nation, or any large majority of their subjects whose
loyalty has been alienated by misgovernment or
oppression."* In like manner, when we turn to the Draft Treaty
which was placed in Sir Lewis Pelly's hands, we
find the most elaborate precautions taken to pre
vent the assurances given from coming near to the
guarantees which the Ameer really wanted. This
is done by the constant introduction of qualifying
words, and by a perfect wilderness of saving clauses.
Let us take the Articles most important to the Ameer.
First comes the External Guarantee. The Third
Articlet professes to give it. There was less need of
caution here, because this guarantee coincides with
our own interest in almost every conceivable case.

* Ibid., p. 189. t Ibid., p. 190
VOL. II. F F

434 FROM LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY
Nevertheless it was not to operate unless the Ameer
had acted in strict conformity with the previous
Article, which purported to be one of mutually offen
sive and defensive alliance. Nor was it to operate
unless the Ameer had refrained from (i) provocation-
of, or (2) aggression on, or (3) interference with, the
States and territories beyond his frontier. Besides all
this, the succeeding Article, the Fourth, specifies that
the Ameer was to conduct all his relations with foreign
States in harmony with the policy of the British
Government. Next comes the Dynastic Guarantee.
It professes to be given by the Ninth Article. But this
Article simply " agrees to acknowledge whomsoever
His Highness might nominate as his heir-apparent,
and to discountenance the pretensions of any rival
claimant to the throne." But this is no more than Lord
Mayo's promise of "viewing with severe displeasure"
any disturbers of the existing order. There is no direct
promise whatever to support the Ameer's nomination,
if it should turn out to be unpopular in Afghanistan.
But the provisions of the Tenth Article are the best
specimens of Lord Lytton's favours. This Article
professes to provide for our non-interference in
domestic affairs, and yet at the same time to hold out
a prospect to the Ameer of support in the event of
domestic troubles. This required some nice steering.
Accordingly the saving clauses are positively bewilder
ing. There is, first, the promise of abstention. Then
there is the exception — " except at the invocation of

TO THE PESHA WUR CONFERENCE. 435
the Ameer." Then there are limitations on such an
appeal. It must be to avert the recurrence of civil
war, and to protect peaceful interests. The support
may be material, or only moral, as the British Govern
ment may choose. The quantity of the support in
either case was to be measured by their own opinion
of what was necessary for the aid of the Ameer. But,
again, even this aid was to be limited to the protection
(1) of authority which was " equitable," (2) of order
which was "settled," and (3) against an ambition
which was " personal," or (4) a competition for power
which was " unlawful."
I do not say that any one of these limitations was
in itself unreasonable, or even unnecessary. But they
were all elaborately designed to keep in the hands
of the British Government, under the forms of a
Treaty, that complete freedom to judge of each
case as it might arise, according to times and cir
cumstances, which Lord Mayo and Lord North
brook had been determined to maintain. It was,
however, precisely for the purpose of limiting this
freedom that the Ameer had desired to get a Treaty.
To offer him a Treaty which kept that freedom as it
was, could be no response to his desires. It was,
therefore, worse than an " ostensible pretext" to repre
sent such a Treaty as a concession to the Ameer of
that for which he had asked. The Viceroy, however,
did not trust wholly to these illusory representations
of the effect of the offered Treaty. He knew that the
F F 2

436 FROM LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY
Ameer was in want of money. The hooks were there
fore heavily baited. If the Ameer agreed to sell his
independence, he was to get ^"200,000 on the ratifi
cation of the Treaty, and an annual subsidy of
;£ 1 20,000*
But, guarded as the Draft Treaty is in all these ways,
the Viceroy seems to have been haunted by a nervous
apprehension lest, after all, the Ameer should get
some promise too definite and entangling. Sir Lewis
Pelly was therefore also furnished with another " Aide
Memoire," for a " Subsidiary, Secret, and Explanatory
Agreement"! In this document the reservations
limiting our pretended guarantee are re-stated with
laborious care.
In the twenty-seventh paragraph of the Simla
Narrative, a very frank confession is made of
the general result of these elaborate precautions.
That result was that the poor Ameer, in return
for all our demands, was to get practically nothing
beyond what Lord Mayo had promised him in 1869.
" These concessions, sanctioned by your Lordship's
last instructions, would not practically commit the
British Government to anything more than a formal
re-affirmation of the assurances already given by it,
through Lord Mayo, to the Ameer in 1869, and a
public recognition of its inevitable obligations to the

* Ibid., p. 192.
t Ibid., No. 36, Inclos. 25, p. 191.

TO THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE. 437
Vital interests of its own Empire." That is to say —
the Ameer was to get nothing except what former
Viceroys had already given to him, and whatever
more we might find it for our own interests to do on
his behalf. After this confession, it is not to be
denied that all the professions of Lord Lytton that
he was now offering to the Ameer what he had
desired, must be condemned as " ostensible pretexts."
I wish I had nothing more to add to the history
of these deplorable transactions. But, unfortunately;
there is another part of them, which must be told.
Lord Lytton had with him at Simla Captain Grey,
who had been Persian Interpreter at the Conference at
Umballa. As such he had become intimate with
Noor Mohammed Khan, the confidential Minister of
the Ameer. It seems to have occurred to the Viceroy
that this friendship might be used for the purpose of
representing to the Ameer that the Government Of
India was now offering to him all that he had ever
asked or demanded. Accordingly, on the 13th of
October, which was two days after Sir L. Pelly had
been furnished with all these elaborate limitations,
and multitudinous saving clauses, Captain Grey was
employed to write a private letter to his friend Noor
Mohammed. It referred, coaxingly, to the feeling of
the Afghan Minister, that he had ground for annoy
ance at what had passed in 1 873. It did not expressly
say that the writer concurred in this impression. But
Noor Mohammed was asked to " let by-gones be by-

438 FROM LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY
gones." It pointed out to him that the Viceroy had
now " accepted all the propositions which he (Noor
Mohammed) made in 1873," imposing only the con
dition that he should be enabled to watch a frontier
for which he was to render himself responsible, and
that the Ameer, his friend and ally, should receive
his Envoys. It then proceeded to remind the Afghan
Minister of his alleged expressions at Umballa in
1869, and at Simla in 1873, as to the willingness of
the Ameer at some future time to receive British
officers in his Kingdom. It went on to represent the
difficulty in the way at that time as having been the
objection of former Viceroys to assume responsibility
for the Afghan frontier. It represented that the
existing Viceroy had no such objection, and was now
prepared to assume that responsibility. In conclusion
it intimated that hitherto, under former Viceroys,
there had been " vacillation," because in the absence
of a Treaty, " Ministers at home, and Viceroys in this
country, exercised an unfettered discretion," but
" where a Treaty has been entered into everyone
would be bound by its conditions."*
What can be said of this letter — of its representa
tions of fact — of its constructions of conduct — of its
interpretation of the Viceroy's offers ? It seems to
me that nothing can be said which could be too
severe. It is in the highest degree disingenuous and

* Afghan Corresp., II. 1878, No. 3, pp. 9, 10.

TO THE PESHA WUR CONFERENCE. 439
crooked. No part of it is worse than that in which it
re-affirms by implication the distinction between the
binding character of a Treaty, and the not-binding
character of a Viceroy's promises. It represents
former Viceroys as having taken advantage of this
distinction in vacillating conduct. For this accusa
tion, so far as I know, there is no foundation in fact.
Lord Mayo and I had objected in 1869 to a Treaty,
not because it would have made the promises we did
give more binding than we considered them to be
when less formally recorded, but because a Treaty
was expected by both parties to involve other
promises — of a different kind — which we were not
willing to give. But another most objectionable
part of this letter is that in which the Viceroy
endeavours to persuade the Afghan Minister that he
was now offering to the Ameer all he wanted. It is
to be remembered that besides the knowledge which
the Government of India had at its command in
respect to the large expectations of the Ameer in
1873 and in 1869, this letter was written just six days
after our own Agent at Cabul had told the Viceroy that
what the Ameer wanted was that " we should agree
.to support the Ameer, on demand, with troops and
money, in all and every case of attack from without."*
Before proceeding to the next scene in this strange,
eventful history, it will be well, to notice how Lord,

* Ibid, p. 182.

440 FROM LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY
Lytton himself tells his story, in the Simla Narrative,
of the transactions through which we have just passed.
That narrative professes to be founded on the docu
ments which it enclosed, and yet it departs widely in
many most important particulars from the facts which
these document's supply. The account given in the
26th paragraph, of the causes of the Ameer's dis
satisfaction, does not set forth these causes faithfully,
as given by our native Agent, misstating their number,
andy above all, putting them in a new order of rela
tive importance. These deviations are not acci
dental. They appear to be all connected with one
idea, — that of throwing as much blame as the
Viceroy could on his immediate predecessor in
the Government of India, and of keeping as much
as possible in the background, or of suppressing
altogether those causes of dissatisfaction on the part
of the Ameer which were inseparably connected with
the desire of that Ruler to get what no British Govern
ment could give him. There is a total omission of one
cause of complaint mentioned (the sixth) by the Agent,
for no other assignable reason than that this one re
flected directly on the tone and terms of one of Lord
Lytton's own recent letters to the Ameer. In the
presence of much graver matter, it is not worth while
pursuing this characteristic of the Simla Narrative in
greater detail. It is, indeed, of much more than
personal — it is of political importance. The Govern
ment Of India is a continuous body, and does not
formally change with a change of Viceroy. Any

TO THE PESHA WUR CONFERENCE. 441
unfaithfulness to perfect fairness and accuracy in a
narrative professing to give an account of its own
action under former Viceroys, if it is committed
deliberately, is a grave political offence. If it is
committed unconsciously, and simply under the
impulse of a strong desire to make out a personal
or a party case, it is still deserving of serious notice
and rebuke.
The next characteristic observable in the Simla
Narrative of this time is the endeavour it makes to
accumulate charges and innuendos against the unfor
tunate Ameer in respect to his communications with
General Kaufmann. The statement in the 26th para
graph of the Simla Narrative is that the Ameer
had been losing no opportunity of improving his
relations with the Russian authorities in Central
Asia, and that between General Kaufmann and his
Highness " permanent diplomatic intercourse was now
virtually established, by means of a constant succes
sion of special Agents, who held frequent conferences
with the Ameer, the subject and result of which were
successfully kept secret." There is no justification for
this most exaggerated statement in the papers which
accompany Lord Lytton's narrative. On the contrary,
he had been distinctly and emphatically told by our
Agent on the 7th October, at Simla, that "the
Ameer regarded the Agents from Russia as sources
of embarrassment."* All the authentic informa-

* Ibid., Inclos. 18, p. 181.

442 FROM LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY
tion which had reached the Government was con
sistent with this view. Our Agent at Cabul had
indeed reported that on the 9th of June a messenger
had come with a letter from General Kaufmann,
and that this messenger had been received for half an
hour, at a formal interview, by the Ameer. The letter
had not then been seen by our Agent, but he believed
it to be "merely a complimentary one, conveying
information of the fall of Kokhand."*
The only other information in support of Lord
Lytton's sweeping accusations, is a letter from a
native news-writer at Candahar, who retailed, on the
9th of August, certain reports which he had got from
a man who " hired out baggage-animals in Turkestan,
Bokhara, and Cabul." This man, on being asked for
" the news of the country," professed to retail a story
which, he said, had been told him by a certain Sirdar,
who, however, was now dead. The story was that
this Sirdar had taken with him to Cabul, secretly, " a
Russian who came from Turkestan." This Russian,
it was further said, used to have secret interviews
with the Ameer. Shere Ali is then represented, in
the tale, as having, " a few days after the arrival" of this
Russian, sent for a certain Mulla, Mushk Alam,
whom he consulted about a religious war against the
English. What the connexion was between a Russian
Agent and the " Mulla " is not explained or even sug-

* Ibid., Inclos. 12, p. 178.

TO THE PESHA WUR CONFERENCE. 443
gested.* This stupid and incoherent story, founded
on the gossip of a trader in baggage-animals, and
bearing on the face of it all the marks of such an
origin, seems to be the only foundation for the cir
cumstantial accusations made by the Viceroy of
India against Shere Ali in the 26th paragraph of
the Simla Narrative, composed when he was hotly
engaged in running that Ruler down.
There is, indeed, one half-line in that paragraph
which leads us to a very curious illustration of the in
consistencies and inaccuracies which are characteristic
of all Lord Lytton's State Papers referring to the
Afghan question. That half-line refers to the com
munications which had been going on from time to
time for several years, between the Russian Governor-
General of Turkestan and the Ameer of Cabul. It
is, of course, perfectly true that General Kaufmann
had sent letters to Cabul. It was just three weeks
before our Cabul Agent came to Simla that the
Viceroy had sent that alarmed, telegram to the Secre
tary of State, on the 16th of September, touching
the letter of General Kaufmann which had been
received by the Ameer on the 14th of June. That
letter had given to the Ameer a long account and ex
planation of the conquest of Kokhand. We have
seen in a former page how Lord Lytton, in his
telegram of the 16th, and still more in his relative

* Ibid., No. 36, Inclos. 13, p. 178.

444 FROM LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY
Despatch of the 18th of September, had denounced
these letters as a breach, of the Agreement of
Russia with us, and how the Cabinet at home had
taken up this view, and, within certain limits, had
acted upon it. But in order to support this view,
and make it plausible, the Viceroy had been led to
represent the correspondence as one which had been
always objected to by the Government of India,
although they had never before formally remon
strated- The only foundation for this was that
on one previous occasion Lord Northbrook had
called attention to the tone of one of these letters
— an instance of vigilance on the part of that
Viceroy which had been entirely thrown away on
her Majesty's Government, who had taken no
notice whatever of his observation. But with
this exception, it was entirely untrue that the
Government of India had viewed the correspondence
with alarm. On the contrary, as I have shown, both
Lord Mayo and Lord Northbrook had encouraged
the Ameer to welcome those letters, and to answer
them with corresponding courtesy. Suddenly, in the
Simla Narrative, Lord Lytton discovers that this is
the true view of the case, because he Was constructing
a paragraph the object of which was to set forth the
errors of former Viceroys. He, therefore, not only
sets forth this view of the facts, but he sets it forth
with emphasis and exaggeration. He says that the
Ameer, in " losing no opportunity of improving his

TO THE PESHA WUR CONFERENCE. 445
relations with Russian authorities in Central Asia,"
had acted " in accordance with our own exhorta
tions."* It is needless to say that this is in flagrant
contradiction of the representation conveyed in the
despatch, of September 18th, 1876/f It is further
interesting to observe that, in that despatch, the
"baggage-animal" story about the "secret nightly con
ferences" between a Russian agent and the Ameer, —
which reappears in the Simla Narrative as if it were
an undoubted fact, — is referred to as coming from
"an unofficial source of information" which the
Government of India were, "of course, unable to
verify." Havingnowdespatched — and having thus thoroughly
prepared — his Agents alternately to frighten, to
cajole, and to deceive the Ameer, the Viceroy proceeded
on a tour to the frontier, and continued to pursue the
same Imperial policy through some very remarkable
proceedings. The time had come for converting
Major Sandeman's mission to Khelat into the per
manent occupation of Quetta. On the 22nd of
October the Viceroy's Military Secretary sekcted a
site for permanent barracks at that place. Under the
pretext of disposing of Major Sandeman's escort, a
detachment of Punjaub Infantry was posted there,
and in no long time this force was enlarged to

* Ibid., No. 36, para. 26, p. 168.
f Central Asia, No. I. 1878, p. 83.

446 FROM LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY
a small brigade of all arms. On or about the same
day, the 22nd of October, -Lord Lytton reached
Peshawur, and a few days afterwards he gave orders
for the construction of a bridge of boats at Khos-
halgurh on the Indus. This bridge of boats — of which
many months later, in June, 1877, the Indian
Secretary of State declared he had never heard — was
actually made and established in the course of a week.
Officers were then sent to Tui, on the Afghan border,
to inspect the ground preparatory to the establish
ment there of a military force. Military and com
missariat stores were laid in at Kohat, and a con
centration of troops was effected at Rawul Pindi.
Following upon these strange and suspicious pro
ceedings, of which no rational explanation has been
ever given, the fussy activity of the Viceroy found
employment in hribing the Maharajah of Cashmere
to advance troops beyond Gilgit and towards Citval,
so as to establish his authority over tribes which the
Ameer of Cabul claimed as feudatories of his King
dom. The immediate effect of all these measures com
bined was to make Shere Ali feel himself threatened on
three different sides — on the east through Cashmere,
on the south from Rawul Pindi, and on the west from
Khelat. We cannot safely accept the denials of the
Government that these movements were unconnected
with the pressure which they were exercising on the
Ameer. But it is at least extremely probable they
had also a larger purpose. At this very time the
firmness of the Emperor of Russia at Livadia was

TO THE PESHA WUR CONFERENCE. 447
confounding all the feeble and dilatory pleas of the
English Cabinet. It is highly probable that at least
some members of that Cabinet were seriously contem
plating a war with Russia both in Europe and in Asia,
for the purpose of maintaining in Europe the corrupt
government of Turkey. The military preparations
of the Viceroy may very probably have been due to
personal instructions to prepare for an attack upon
Russia in Central Asia — in which attack Afghanistan
would have been used as a base. Under any supposi
tion the Ameer was threatened.
Let us now return to Cabul, and see what was
passing there.
Our Agent returned to that capital in the end of
October, 1876. The consultations and deliberations
which were held by the Ameer lasted two months —
that is, till the end of December. Lord Lytton says,
in the Simla Narrative, that the Ameer evinced a
desire to gain time. Of course he did ; that is to say,
he wished to delay as long as possible coming to a
decision which placed before him the alternatives of
sacrificing finally the friendship of the British Govern
ment, as well as all the promises, written and verbal,
which had been given him by former Viceroys, — or of
submitting to proposals which, as he and all his advisers
firmly believed, involved the sacrifice of his indepen
dence. Lord Lytton again says that he was evidently
waiting for the war which was likely to break out
between Russia and England, in order that he might
sell his alliance to the most successful, or to the

448 FROM LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY
highest bidder. There is not a scrap of evidence in
support of this view, as a matter of fact, and it is
in the highest degree improbable as a matter of
speculation. Shere Ali was far too shrewd a man to
suppose that his alliance would be of much practical
value to either party in such a contest. The whole
idea is evolved out of Lord Lytton's inner conscious
ness. There is plenty of evidence that both the Viceroy
and his official chiefs were all thinking of Russia and
of nothing else. There is no evidence whatever that
Shere Ali was thinking of them at all. There were,
of course, plenty more of those rumours about Rus
sian agents at Cabul which belong to the " baggage-
animal " class. But such direct and authentic evidence
as we have is to this effect — that the Ameer and his
Durbar, and his Chiefs whom he consulted, were en
grossed by one prevailing fear — that the violent con
duct, threatening language, and imperious demands
of the British Government, indicated a design to
assume complete dominion in their country. So
strong is this evidence that Lord Lytton is compelled
to try to damage it, and accordingly he does not
scruple to hint that Atta Mohammed Khan, our
native Agent, who had for many years enjoyed the
confidence of former Viceroys, was unfaithful to the
Government he had so long served. In the 29th
paragraph of the Simla Narrative, in reference to
the delays which the Ameer had interposed on the
ground of health, Lord Lytton complains that the
Vakeel had accepted the excuse " either through

TO THE PESHA WUR CONFERENCE. 449
stupidity or disloyalty^" Again, he says that the
reports of our Agent had become " studiously infre<*
quent, vague, and unintelligible." This is an asser
tion which is not borne out — which, indeed, is
directly contradicted— by the papers which have been
presented to Parliament. The letters of Atta
Mohammed range from the 23rd of November* to
the 25 th of December)- inclusive, and, during a period
of less than a month, the number of them was no
less than eight. Nor is it at all true that they are
vague or unintelligible. On the contrary, they convey
a very vivid and graphic account of the condition of
things which it was the business bf our Agent to de
scribe. The picture presented is one of distracted
councils, and of a sincere desire not to break with the
powerful Government which was already violating its
own promises, and was threatening a weak State
with further injustice. Of course these letters of
Atta Mohammed were not pleasant reading for Lord
Lytton, and it is, perhaps, natural that he should
disparage them.f But no impartial man who reads

* Ibid., No. 36, Inclos. 26, p. 192.
t Ibid., Inclos. 33, p. 194.
% It is a curious comment on this most unjustifiable attack by
the Viceroy on the character of Atta Mohammed Khan, that on
the 13th of October, at the close of the last of the Conferences
with him, Lord Lytton had presented him with a watch and
chain, as well as 10,000 rupees, "in acknowledgment of the
appreciation of the Government of his past faithful service ''
See Ibid., p. 185.
VOL. II. G G

4So FROM LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY
them can fail to see that they convey a very much
more correct impression of the facts than the hap
hazard assertions and reckless accusations of the
Viceroy. In particular, the very first of these letters,
in its very brevity, is eminently instructive. It de- ¦
scribes a sort of Cabinet Council to which the Agent
was admitted, and its general result. That result
was that the Government of Afghanistan was not in a
position to receive British officers within the frontiers of
that State ; and the Agent adds, with great descriptive
power, " The contemplation of such an arrangement
filled them with apprehension."* Again, in the two
letters dated December 21 st, the Ameer is reported —
in observations which described only too faithfully the
hasty and excited action of the Government of India
towards him — to have expressed the natural apprehen
sions with which this action inspired him, and the
difficulty of so defining and limiting the duties of
British Agents as really to prevent them from interfer
ing in the government of his Kingdom. These accounts
are perfectly clear, rational, and consistent, and the un
just account which is given of them by the Viceroy
seems to be simply the result of the fretful irritation'
with which the Viceroy regarded every opposition to,
or even remonstrance with, his new " Imperial Policy."
At last, towards the close of December, 1 876, the

* Ibid., No. 36, Inclos. 26, p. 192.

TO THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE; 45 j
Ameer, frightened by the threats of the Viceroy, and
plied by the urgency of our Agent, — half-forced to
accept the hated basis, and half-hoping to be still
able to escape from it — made up his mind to send his
old confidential Minister, Noor Mohammed, to meet
Sir Lewis Pelly at Peshawur. In the 29th paragraph
of th.e Simla Narrative it is a comfort to find at least
one little bit of fair statement. We are there told
that "the Ameer, finding himself unable to evade
any longer the issue put to him, without bringing his
relations with us to an open rupture, dispatched his
Minister." So much for the assertions, made more
than once afterwards, that the Ameer had sought the
Conferences, and had volunteered to send his Minister.
The Conferences began on the 30th of January, 1877.
Let us now look back for a moment at the result of
the transactions which we have traced.
First, we have the Secretary of State for India
describing, and, by implication, disparaging, the assur
ances given to the Ameer by former Viceroys, as
" ambiguous formulas."*
Secondly, we have the same Minister instructing
the new Viceroy that a dynastic guarantee need be
nothing more than "the frank recognition of a de
facto order in the succession established by a de facto
Government," and that this "does not imply or

* Afghan Corresp., I., 1878, No. 35, Inclos. para. 15, p. 158,
G G 2

452 FROM LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY
necessitate any intervention in the internal' affairs of
that State."*
Thirdly, we have like instructions with regard to
the other guarantees which had been desired by the
Ameer, and which were all to be framed on the same
principle — namely, that of the British Government
" reserving to themselves entire freedom of judgment
as to the character of circumstances involving the
obligation of material support to the Ameer ."f
Fourthly, we have the Viceroy preparing, very ela
borately, a " Draft Treaty,"! and a " Subsidiary
Secret and Explanatory Agreement,"§ for carrying
into effect the instructions and suggestions of the
Secretary of State ; this being done by Articles so
full of qualifying words, and so beset with saving
clauses, that the Government did indeed effectually
reserve to itself the most " entire freedom" under
every conceivable circumstance, to give, or not to
give, to the Ameer the assistance of which he desired
to be assured.
Fifthly, we have the fact that both the Secretary of
State and the Viceroy had before them authoritative
documents proving that guarantees or assurances of
this kind, which were not only conditional, but wholly
made up of conditions within conditions, were not the

* Ibid., para, l6.
t Ibid., para. 24, p. 159.
J Ibid., No. 36, Inclos. 24, p. 189.
§ Ibid., No. 36, Inclos. 25, p. 191.

TO THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE. 453
kind of guarantee or of assurance which the Ameer
had asked for in 1 869, and which he had ever since
continued to desire*
Sixthly, we have the fact that this Draft Treaty,
with its intricate network of saving clauses, was
not to be shown to the Ameer till after he had
accepted the Viceroy's basis, or, in other words,
till he had conceded to the British Government all
it wanted. Seventhly, we have the fact that the Viceroy endea
voured, in the meantime, by every device in his
power, down even to the abuse of private friendship,
to persuade the Ameer that the British Government
was now offering to him conditions " in every parti
cular the same as those desired by the Ameer himself
on the occasion of his visit to Umballa in 1869, and
again, in more or less general terms, so urged by him
on the Government of India through his Minister,
Noor Mohammed Khan, in 1 873;"f
Eighthly, we have the fact that the Viceroy,
through the letterjof Captain Grey to Noor Mohammed,
tried still farther to enhance the value of his own
offers by contrasting them with the " vacillation" of
former Governments both in India and at home ;
which vacillation he ascribed to the absence of a

* Ibid., No. 19, paras. 9, 10, 1 1 and 45, pp. 93, 94, 96 ; also,
Ibid., No. 36, Inclos. 18, p. 182.
t Ibid., No. 36, Inclos. 23, p. 187.

454 TO THE PESHA WUR CONFERENCE.
Treaty, and to the consequent " unfettered discre
tion" retained by Ministers and Viceroys*
Lastly, we have the same Viceroy writing home to
the Secretary of State that the concessions which
that Minister had sanctioned, and which he himself
had offered to the Ameer, "would not practically
commit the British Government to anything more
than a formal re-affirmation of the assurances already
given by it, through Lord Mayo, to the Ameer in
i869."f These transactions are but a fitting introduction
to those which follow. If General Kaufmann had been
detected in such a course of diplomacy towards any
of the Khans of Central Asia, we know what sort of
language would have been applied to it, and justly
applied to it, in England.

* Afghan. Corresp., IL, No. 3, pp. 9, 10.
Afghan. Corresp. I., 1878, No. 36, para. 27, p. 168.

THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE. 455

CHAPTER XVIII.
FROM THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE IN JANUARY,
1877, TO THE WAR IN NOVEMBER, 1 878.
The great object of the British Envoy, from the first
moment of the negotiations at Peshawur, was to fix
upon the Ameer the position of an applicant for a
new Treaty, in consequence of his dissatisfaction with
the previous engagements of the British Government.
Assuming him to occupy that position, it was easy to
represent the new stipulations which he so much
dreaded as necessary and natural conditions of what
he desired.
It will be observed that this misrepresentation of
the relative position of the two parties in the negotia
tion was part of the Viceroy's plan. His difficulty
was this — that the British Government wanted to
get something from the Ameer, whereas the Ameer
did not want to get anything from the British
Government, knowing, as he did, the price he
would have to pay for it. The Viceroy felt the
awkwardness of this position, and he determined
to get over it, if he could, by the very simple ex
periment pf pretending that the facts were other-

456 FROM THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE
wise. In the 27th paragraph* of the Simla Narrative
we have this policy explained under forms of language
which but thinly veil its terrible unfairness. " The
Ameer's apparent object was to place the British
Government in the position . of a petitioner ; and
that position it behoved the British Government to
reverse." Yes, — if it could be done with truth But
the process of " reversing " facts is an awkward pro
cess. Sir Lewis Pelly did his best. He began at
once by pretending that it was the Ameer, and not
the British Government, who was desirous of some
new arrangement.
Against this representation of the facts, from
the first moments of the Conference, Noor Mohammed
resolutely contended. He had one great advantage.
Truth was on his side. The Ameer had indeed at one
time wanted to get some things which had been re
fused him. But he had got other things which he still
more highly valued, and he knew that the great aim of
this new Viceroy was to get him to sacrifice what
former Viceroys had granted, without really giving
him what they had refused. The contention, therefore,
that Shere Ali wanted this new Treaty, and was
dissatisfied with the pledges he had already received
from the British Government, was a contention not in
accordance with the facts. Noor Mohammed saw at
once the true aspect of the case, and the fallacious

» Afghan. Corresp. I., 1878, No. 36, p. 168.

TO THE WAR. 457
pretexts which were put forward by Sir Lewis Pelly.
The very foremost of these was a reference tothedesires
which Shere Ali had at first intimated at Umballa, but
which he had abandoned before he quitted the pre
sence of Lord Mayo. The Cabul Envoy would not
hear of the allegation that the Ameer was dissatisfied
with the promises] of his old and firm friends, Lord
Lawrence and Lord Mayo, and that the engagements
of those Viceroys had any need of being supplemented
by the new proposals of Lord Lytton. He repelled
with firmness every suggestion, every insinuation, every
argument to this effect. It is, indeed, impossible not
to admire the ability and the dignity with which Noor
Mohammed, whilst labouring under a fatal and a
painful disease, fought this battle of truth and justice,
—in what he considered to be the interests of his
master and the independence of his country.
From the first he took very high ground. At a private
and unofficial meeting with the British Envoy on the
3rd of February, Sir Lewis Pelly said, on parting, that
it would depend on the Ameer whether the Afghan
Envoy's departure should prove as happy as he de
sired. The Afghan replied, " No, it depends on you ;"
and then, correcting himself, he added, with a higher
and better pride, " In truth, it depends neither on you
nor on the Ameer, but on justice."* And yet, when
speaking as a private individual, he did not shrink

*.Ibid,, No. 3& Inclos. 37, p. 198.

458 FROM THE PESHA WUR CONFERENCE
from admitting the dependent position of his Sove
reign on account of the comparative weakness of his
country. "Your Government," he said, at the.
close of the first meeting, to Sir Lewis. Pelly,
" is a great and powerful one : ours is a small
and weak one. We have long been on terms of
friendship, and the Ameer now clings to the skirt of
the British Government, and till his hand be cut off
he will not relax his hold of it."* But when speak
ing as the Envoy of the Ameer, and conducting the
negotiations on his behalf, he spoke with a power and
force which evidently caused great embarrassment to
his opponent. Some of his simple questions must
have been cutting to the quick.-. Thus, at the
meeting on the 5th of February, he asked, "But
if this Viceroy should make an agreement, and a
successor should say, ' I am not bound by it' ? " On
this a remarkable scene occurred. The British Envoy,
not liking apparently so direct a question, began to
reply indirectly. Noor Mohammed at once inter
rupted — feeling, as he had a right to feel, that howT
ever inferior his master might be in power, he was
the equal of the Viceroy in this contest of argument.
The Afghan Envoy said he " wanted Yes or No."
The British Envoy took refuge in evasion : " With
the permission of the Afghan Envoy he would make
his own remarks in the manner which might appear.

* . Ibid., No. 36, Inclos. 35, p. 197.

TO THE WAR. 459
to him to be proper." Again, Noor Mohammed
asked, "Whether all the Agreements and Trea
ties, from the time of Sir John Lawrence and the
late Ameer, up to the time of Lord Northbrook
and the present Ameer, are invalid and annulled ?"*
And again, when Sir Lewis Pelly had replied
that he had no authority to annul any Treaty, but
to propose a supplementary Treaty to those already
existing, the Afghan Envoy asked, "Supposing the
present Viceroy makes a Treaty with us, and twenty
years after he has gone, another Viceroy says he
wishes to revise and supplement it, what are we to
do ?" To these home-thrusts Sir Lewis Pelly could
only reply by insisting on the pretext that it was the
Ameer who had expressed dissatisfaction — a reply
which Noor Mohammed had no difficulty in disposing
of by telling the British Envoy that if the Ameer
was dissatisfied, it was " owing to transgression of
previous agreements."t Again and again he repu
diated any wish on the part of the Ameer to have a
new Treaty. He had " returned from Umballa with
out anxiety."J
At last, having maintained this .contest with admir
able spirit for several days, Noor Mahommed intimated
that he desired an opportunity of setting forth his
master's views in one continuous statement, during

* Ibid., Inclos. 38, p. 199. t Ibid., Inclos. 38, p. 199.
X Ibid,, p. 200.

460 FROM THE PESHA WUR CONFERENCE
which he was not to be interrupted. Accordingly,
this speech of the Afghan Envoy began on the 8th of
February. The exhaustion bf anxiety and of disease
compelled him twice to stop, and to resume on another
day. His statement, therefore, extended over three
meetings, beginning on the 8th and ending on the
1 2th of February, 1877.
In this long argument he took his stand at once on
the firm ground of claiming fidelity to the former
engagements of the British Government. " If the
authorities of the British Government have a regard
for their own promises, and act upon them with sin
cerity, in accordance with the customary friendship
which was formerly, and is now (what courtesy !), ob
served between the two Governments, there is no
ground for any anxiety."* He cut off the pretext/which
has since been repeated, both in the Simla Narrative
and in its fellow, the London Narrative, that the
Ameer had shown his desire to get some new Treaty, by
sending his Envoy to meet Lord Northbrook in 1873.
He reminded Sir Lewis Pelly that it was not the
Ameer, but the Viceroy, who had sought that meeting.
He repeated this twice, and asked, " The wishes,
therefore, on whose part were they ?" He objected to
the garbled extracts which had been quoted to prove
his master's dissatisfaction, and spoke with censure
of " one paragraph of many paragraphs being brought

* Ibid., Inclos. 41, p. 203.

TO THE WAR. 461
forward" to support erroneous interpretations. At great
length, and with much earnestness, he contended that
the Ameer had been satisfied by Lord Northbrook s
confirmation of the assurances and promises of Lord
Lawrence and of Lord Mayo, quoted a letter from the
Ameer to this effect, and concluded an elaborate ex
planation on the subject by these words : " Therefore,
till the time of the departure of Lord Northbrook,
that previous course continued to be observed."* The
only complaint he made of that Viceroy was his sub
sequent intercession on behalf of Yakoob Khan. But
so far as regarded the assurances and engagements of
the British Government, he wanted nothing in addition
to those which had been concluded with Lord Law
rence and Lord Mayo.
On the third day of his laborious statement, the
Cabul Envoy entered upon the question of ques
tions — that of the reception of British officers. Here,
again, he took his stand on the Treaty of 1857
and on the promises of Lord Mayo. He depre
cated a course which would " scatter away former
assurances." He declared that the people of Afghan
istan " had a dread of this proposal, and it is firmly
fixed in their minds, and deeply rooted in their
hearts, that if Englishmen, or other Europeans,
once set foot in their country, it will sooner or
later pass out of their hands."t He referred to the

* Ibid., No. 42, p. 206.
f Ibid., No. 43, p. 208.

462 FROM THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE
explanations given by the father of the present
Ameer to Sir John Lawrence, and to the engagements
of the Treaties of 1855 and of 1857. He referred to the
ostensible object put forward by the British Envoy,
that he wished to remove anxiety from the mind of
the Ameer, and he asked whether the new proposals
would not raise fresh anxiety, not only in his mind,
but in the mind of all his people,* and he concluded
by a solemn appeal to the British Government not to
raise a question which would " abrogate the former
Treaties and Agreements, and the past usage."t
In reply to these arguments, Sir Lewis Pelly, on
the 13th of February, reminded the Ameer that
although the Treaty of 1855 was still in force, and
would be observed if no revised Treaty could be
made, it did not bind the British Government to aid
the Ameer against his enemies, whether foreign or
domestic. If, therefore, the Ameer rejected the
present offers, the Viceroy would " decline to support
the Ameer and his dynasty in any troubles, internal or
external," and would "continue to strengthen the
frontier of British India, without further reference to
the Ameer, in order to provide against probable con
tingencies."! It will be observed that this argument and intima
tion pointed very plainly to two things — first, to the

* Ibid., p. 208. f Ibid. p. 209.
X Ibid., p. 210.

TO THE WAR. 46-3
fact that the British Envoy acknowledged no engage
ment or pledge to be binding except the Treaty of
1855. The pledges of Lord Lawrence, of Lord Mayo,
and of Lord Northbrook were all treated as so much
waste paper, or as still more wasted breath. And
secondly, that the British Government considered
itself at liberty to threaten adverse measures on the
lrontier. Noor Mohammed at once took alarm at
both these intimations — asked what the last meant,
and referred to the Treaty of 1857 as also binding.
Sir Lewis Pelly gave replies that can only be con
sidered as evasive. He declined to give definite ex
planations on either point.*
At the meeting on the 19th of February, the Afghan
Envoy gave his rejoinder on the subject of the British
officers in Afghanistan. He again referred to the pro
mises of Lord Mayo. And as regarded the danger of
any external aggression from Russia, he referred to
the Agreement between England and Russia, and the
formal and official communication which had been
made to the Ameer upon that subject by the British
Government. He insisted that, as regarded the obli
gations of the British Government, it was not fair to
quote the Treaty of 1855 as standing by itself. It
must be read in connexion with the writings and ver
bal assurances of three successive Viceroys, and in con-

* This intimation by Sir L. Pelly looks very like a pre-determi-
nation to rectify our " hap-hazard frontier" by picking a quarreL
It is. not easy to see what other meaning it can have had.

464 FROM THE PESHA WUR CONFERENCE
nexion also with the 7th Article of the Treaty of 1857;
That Article was of surviving force, and it required
that any British Agent sent to Cabul should not be an
European. The Government of Afghanistan would
" never in any manner consent to acknowledge the
abrogation of that Article." " But all these engage
ments were not to be read separately, but as con
nected one with the other. " They are one," said
the Envoy.* They constituted one continued series
of engagements. He was very glad to hear of the
desire of the Viceroy for the advantage of the Ameer.
But it was " based upon such new and hard
conditions, especially the residence of British officers
upon the frontiers." Not once, but many times in
the course of this Conference, the Afghan Envoy spe
cified this demand — and not any demand for an Envoy
at Cabul — as the one which he considered dangerous
and objectionable. He said the Ameer had " not en
trusted the protection of those frontiers from an
external enemy to the English Government."
Sir Lewis Pelly had said that if the Ameer
rejected his demand as to British officers, no basis
was left for negotiations. In reference to this, " I
beg to observe," said the Afghan, " in a friendly and
frank manner, that the basis which has been laid for
you by the wise arrangement of previous Councillors
and Ministers of Her Majesty the Queen of England
* Ibid., p. 212.

TO THE WAR.. #$.
in London, of Her Viceroys in India, after mature
deliberation and thought, from time to time, during
the course of all these past years, and has been ap
proved of by Her Majesty the Queen, still exists."
..." The Government of Afghanistan is certain that
the British Government, of its own perfect honesty,
will continue constant and stable to that firm basis."*
This was hard hitting. But it was hard hitting de
livered with such perfect courtesy, that no juSt offence
could be taken. But besides this, it was- irrefutable
argument. Sir Lewis Pelly had to take refuge in the
coarse expedient which was alone possible under the
circumstances, and which was alone consistent with
his instructions. His basis was- not accepted, and he
declined to enter into controversy. He did, however,
try to frighten the Ameer about Russia by asking the
Envoy whether he had considered the conquests of
Russia in the direction of Khiva, Bokhara, Kokhand,
and the Turkoman border. He reminded Noor Mo
hammed (and this was fair enough) of the former
expressions he had made use of in respect to appre
hensions of Russia. He then declared " England has
no reason to fear Russia." Noor Mohammed must
have put his own estimate on the sincerity of this
declaration. He could not have put a lower one
than it deserved. But as Sir Lewis Pelly had
nothing to reply to the weighty arguments Noor
* Ibid., p. 213.
VOL. II. H H

466 FROM THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE
Mohammed had used, and to the appeals to honour-'
able feeling which he had made, the Afghan begged
that they should be reported to the Viceroy, sub
mitted to his consideration, and referred to his written
decision. The Envoy would then be prepared either
to give a final answer or to refer to the Ameer for fur
ther instructions.
It was not till the 15th of March — an interval of
nearly a month — that Sir Lewis Pelly replied to the
Afghan Envoy. This reply, I am afraid, must be
considered as the reply of the Viceroy, as it is drawn
up professedly upon his written instructions. It is
very difficult to give any adequate account of this
document : of its rude language — of its unfair repre
sentations of the Afghan Envoy's argument — of its
evasive dealing with Treaties — of its insincere pro
fessions — of its insulting tone. There are, indeed,
some excuses for the Viceroy. Brought up in the
school of British Diplomacy, he must have felt him
self beaten by a man whom he considered a Barbarian.
This Barbarian had seen through his " ostensible pre
texts," and his ambiguous promises. He had not,
indeed, seen the Draft Treaty with its labyrinth of
Saving Clauses. But our Agent at Cabul had been
told enough to let Noor Mahommed understand what
kind of a Treaty would probably be proposed. He had
not been deceived by the letter of Captain Grey. The
Afghan Minister had challenged, with only too much
truth, the shifty way in which the Viceroy dealt with

TO THE WAR. 467
the good faith of the British Crown, and the pledged
word of former Viceroys. He had even dared to tell
Lord Lytton's Envoy that he expected a plain answer
to a plain question — Yes or No— whether he admitted
himself to be bound by the pledges of his predecessors
in office? He had done all this with the greatest
acuteness, and with perfect dignity. All this was, no
doubt, very hard to bear. But if irritation was natural,
it was in the highest degree unworthy of the British
Government to allow such irritation to be seen. If the
Viceroy really considered the conduct of the Ameer, as
then known or reported to him, as deserving or calling
for the manifestation of such a spirit, it would have been
far better to have no Conference at all. So far as the
official language and conduct of the Ameer was con
cerned there was nothing to complain of. The lan
guage of his Envoy was in the highest degree cour
teous and dignified ; and if Lord Lytton could not
bear the severe reproaches which undoubtedly were
of necessity involved in that Afghan's exposure of the
Viceroy's case, it would have been better to avoid a
contest in which the British Crown is represented at
such signal disadvantage. Let us, however, examine
the answer of the Viceroy a little nearer.
The impression which the Viceroy says he has
derived from the first part of the Envoy's statement is
an impression of regret that the Ameer should feel
himself precluded from receiving a British Envoy at
his Court, " by the rude and stationary condition in
H H 2

4-68 FROM THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE
which Afghanistan had remained under the adminis
tration of his Highness." Returning to this charge, the
Viceroy adds that the " unsettled and turbulent condi
tion of the Afghan population, and the comparative
weakness of the sovereign power, however, appear to
have increased rather than diminished, under the reign
©f his Highness,"* Not only was this a gratuitous
insult, even if it had been true> but it was- an insult in
support of which the Viceroy produced no evidence,
because, as I believe, he had no evidence to produce.
The first approach to argument in reply to the
Afghan Envoy is an assertion that the 7th clause
of the Treaty of 1857 has " nothing whatever to do
with the matters now under consideration."t This
however, is mere assertion — no attempt is made to
support it. It is an assertion, moreover, wholly in
consistent with the facts, and one which, as we shall
presently see, it became necessary to retract.
The next assertion is that the Envoy had taken " so
many pains to explain the reasons why the Ameer still
declined to receive a British officer at Cabul," and had
at the same time as " carefully avoided' all references
to the reception of British officers fn other parts of
Afghanistan." For this assertion there is absolutely no
foundation whatever. The Afghan Envoy had not
only repeatedly stated his- objections as referring to
the. whole country of Afghanistan, but in the able:

* Ibid., p. 214.. f Ibid., p. 215..

TO THE WAR. 469
argument of Noor Mohammed on the 19th February,
which Lord Lytton was now professing to answer, ani
which it concerned the honour of the Crown that he
should answer with some tolerable fairness, the Afghan
Envoy had at least seven times specified the residence
of British officers " on the frontiers" asthe " chief pro
posal of the British Government."* Sir Lewis Pelly
had, with equal precision, referred to this demand as
the one to which the Envoy had objected.
The next assertion is that the British Government
had been induced to believe both from events, and
from many previous utterances both of Shere Ali and
his father, that the advantages of British .Residents in
his dominions " would be cordially welcomed and
gratefully appreciated by his Highness." Can any
body maintain that this is true? Is this a fair repre
sentation of the facts, even if Captain Grey's private
memorandum-book be accepted as the only faithful
record of Umballa ?
The next assertion is that if the Ameer was un
willing, " the British Government had not the slightest
desire to urge upon an unwilling neighbour an
arrangement so extremely onerous to itself." Not
content with this, the Viceroy goes the length of
declaring that "the proposal of this arrangement
was regarded by the British Government as a great
concession."t Again, I ask, was this true ? Could it

* Ibid., Inclos. 45, pp. 211-213. f Ibid., p. 216.

470 FROM THE PESHA WUR CONFERENCE
be said with any sincerity ? Was it consistent with
the despatches and instructions which have been exa
mined in the preceding narrative ?
Next we have a repetition of the unfounded asser
tion that the Envoy had elaborately answered a pro
posal which the British Government had not made,
" and which he had no right to attribute to it," whilst
he had left altogether unnoticed those proposals
which alone he had been authorised to discuss.
The Viceroy has great difficulty in dealing with the
telling and dignified passage of Noor Mohammed's
speech in which he referred to existing obligations as
the true basis for all further negotiations. Lord
Lytton could only say that the existing Treaties being
old, and not having been disputed by either party,
afforded " no basis whatever for further negotiation."
This was in direct contradiction with Sir Lewis Pelly's
language at the previous meetings, in which he had
spoken of the new Treaty as a supplement to those
already existing. At the meeting held on the 5th of
February, Sir Lewis Pelly had expressly declared that
his authority was to propose " to revise and supple
ment the Treaty of 1855."*
The Viceroy then went on to say that if there was to
be no new Treaty, the two Governments " must revert
to their previous relative positions."! But as the Ameer
seemed to misunderstand what that position was, Sir
* Ibid, p. 1991. f Ibid., p. 2i6i

TO THE WAR. 471
Lewis Pelly was instructed to remove a "dangerous mis
conception" from his mind. For this purpose he repeats
at length the previous argument on the Treaty of 1 8 5 5 ,
that whilst it did bind the Ameer to be the friend of
our friends, and the enemy of our enemies, it did not
place the British Government under any obligation
to render any assistance whatever to the Ameer.
He then accumulates against the Ameer charges of
unfriendliness, founded on the non-reception of
Envoys, on ingratitude for subsidies, on refusals to let
officers pass through his country, on alleged inten
tions of aggression on his neighbours, and, finally, on
the reported attempt of the Ameer to get up a
religious war. Some of these accusations mean
nothing more than that the Ameer had stuck to the
engagements of Lord Mayo. Others were founded on
mere rumour, and the last referred to, was conduct on
the part of the Ameer, which was the direct result of
Lord Lytton's own violent conduct towards him, and
which had been quite well known to the Viceroy before
this Conference began.
The Viceroy then comes again to the Treaty of
1857, and is at last compelled to admit that the 7th
Article is " the only one of all its articles that has
reference to the conduct of general relations between
the two Governments."* As, in a previous para
graph, he had said that the Treaty of 1857 had

. * Ibid., p. 217.

472 FROM THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE
" nothing whatever to do with the matters now under
consideration ;" and in another paragraph that the
obligations contracted under it had "lapsed, as a
matter of course, with the lapse of time,"* this was an
important admission. But the Viceroy gets out of it
by evading the force of the 7th Article altogether,
through a construction of its meaning wholly different
from the true one. The force of the 7th Article of
the Treaty of 1857 l'es m t.ms — tnat & stipulates
for the complete withdrawal, not from Cabul, but
from the whole of the Ameer's country, of " British
officers," after the temporary purpose for which they
were sent there had been accomplished. It is, there
fore, a record of the permanent policy of the Rulers of
Afghanistan not to admit British officers as Residents
in any part of it, and a record also of the acquiescence
of the British Government in that policy.
It is hardly credible, but it is the fact, that the Vice
roy proceeds to argue on this Article as if it referred
only to the reception of a British Envoy at the Capital
¦ — at Cabul itself. It almost looks as if the whole
paper had been written without even looking at
original documents — even so very short and simple
an Instrument as the Treaty of 1857. " It is obvious,"
continues the Viceroy, "that no Treaty stipulation
was required to oblige the British Government not to
appoint a Resident British officer at Cabul without the

* Ibid., pp. 215, .216.

TO THE WAR.

473

consent of the Ameer."* In the same vein Lord Lytton
proceeds to argue that it could not bind the Ameer
never at any future time or under any circumstances
" to assent to the appointment of a Resident British
officer at Cabul." All this is absolutely irrelevant,
and has, to use his own previous words, "nothing
whatever to do with the matters now under considerar
tion." The Viceroy then adds one argument which, I
think, is sound, if strictly limited — namely, this, that
there is nothing in the 7th Article of the Treaty
of 1857 "to preclude the British Government from
pointing out at any time to the Ameer theadvahtage,
or propriety, of receiving a British officer as its
permanent Representative at Cabul, nor even from
urging such an arrangement upon the consideration
and adoption of his Highness in any fair and friendly
manner/'f Not only is this true, but I go farther
and say that there is nothing even in the later
pledges and engagements of Lord Mayo and of Lord
Northbrook with the Ameer to prevent this kind
of conduct. But the injustice of the conduct of Lord
Lytton lay in this — that he was trying to force a new
policy on the Ameer in a manner which was neither
" fair nor friendly" — but, to use his own words, under
threats of an " open rupture." We had, of course, a
right to argue with the Ameer, and to persuade him^

* Ibid., p. 217. t Ibid,, p. 218.

474 FROM THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE
if we could, to let us off from our engagements. But
what we had no right to do was precisely that which
Lord Lytton had done and was then doing — namely,
to threaten him with our displeasure if he did not
agree to our new demands — and to support this
threat with the most unjust evasions of the written
and verbal pledges of former Viceroys.
But the Viceroy had not yet done with his strange
perversion of the 7th Article of the Treaty of 1857.
He again assumes that it refers to the reception of an
Envoy at Cabul. He says, tauntingly, that " it so
happened that the British Government had not pro
posed, and did not propose, or intend to propose that
arrangement. Consequently his Excellency's (the
Cabul Envoy's) remarks on the Treaty of 1857 were
not to the point, and did not need to be further
noticed."* Havingthus got rid by misquotations of the real force
and direct languageof the Treaties of 1855 ana* °f I^S7.
the Viceroy proceeds to declare broadly that " neither
the one nor the other imposes on the British Govern
ment, either directly or indirectly, the least obligation
or liability whatever, to defend, protect, or support
the Ameer, or the Ameer's dynasty, against any enemy
or any danger, foreign or domestic."
Lord Lytton next proceeds to deal with the pledges
of preceding Viceroys. He refers to these as "certain

* Ibid., p. 218.

TO THE WAR. 475
written and verbal assurances received by the Ameer
in 1869, from Lord Mayo, and by his Highness's Envoy
in 1873, from Lord Northbrook." He thus starts at
once the distinction between Treaty engagements and
the formal promises of the representative of the Crown
in India. But he does more than this. This would
not have been enough for the purposes of his argu
ment. It was necessary not only to put a new gloss on
the promises of the British Government, but also to
put a special interpretation on the claims of the
Ameer. At the Simla Conferences, indeed, in 1873,
the Ameer had shown a disposition to put an over
strained interpretation on previous promises. But
Lord Northbrook had fully explained all the condi
tions and limitations which had uniformly been
attached to them. Noor Mohammed, who now
argued the case of the Ameer, was the same Envoy to
whom these explanations had been addressed, and in
the able and temperate representation which he had
now made of his master's views he had made no extra
vagant claims whatever. It was this representation to
which Lord Lytton was now replying, and he had no
right to go back upon former misunderstandings,
which had been cleared up, and to assume that they
were still cherished by the Ameer. The Afghan
Envoy had. made no extravagant claim. This con
stituted Lord Lytton's difficulty It would have been
very difficult indeed to make out that the promises

476 FROM THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE
and pledges of Lord Lawrence, of Lord Mayo, and of
Lord Northbrook, taking them even at the lowest
value, did not imply, directly or indirectly, " the least
obligation to defend, protect, or support" the Ameer.
But it was very easy, of course, to make out that they
did not promise him an " unconditional support."
At first, as we have seen, it had been Lord Lytton's
object to fix on the Ameer a condition of discontent
because Lord Mayo and Lord Northbrook had not
given him assurances enough. It now became conve
nient to represent him, on the contrary, as so over
estimating those assurances as to claim them as having
been unconditional. Accordingly, this representation
of the facts is quietly substituted for the other, and
the Ameer is assumed as having claimed this " uncon
ditional support," which he had not claimed, and about
which there had not been one word said in the whole
course of Noor Mohammed's pleadings — except a
single incidental observation* — the purport of which
is not very clear, and which, if it had been noticed at
all, should have been noticed as incidentally as it arose.
Having effected this substitution of the case to
be proved and of the claim to be met;, Lord
Lytton proceeds at great length to argue from the
circumstances under which the previous Viceroys had
given their promises, that, in the first place, "these
utterances," " whatever their meaning, and whatever

* Ibid., p. 2of>.

TO THE WAR. 477
their purpose," were not "intended to have the force of
a Treaty," and, in the second place, that they did not
" commit the British Government to an unconditional
protection of the Ameer." Having established this
last proposition to- his heart's content, he finds himself
confronted with the task of describing what all the
previous promises had meant and had amounted to.
And here, at last, there is a gleam of fairness, like the
sun shining for a moment through a thick bank of
stormy clouds. They amounted, says the Viceroy,
to neither more nor less than this : — " An assurance
that, so long as the Ameer continued to- govern his
people justly and mercifully, and to maintain frank,
cordial, and confidential relations with the British
Government, that Government would, on its part
also, continue to use every legitimate endeavour to
confirm the independence, consolidate the power,
and strengthen the Government of hisHighness."*
The value, however, of this gleam of candour is
much diminished by two circumstances, which are
proved by the context. In the first place, the binding
force of this "assurance" was destroyed by the careful
explanation that it was not equivalent to a Treaty
obligation. In the second place, it was implied that
the refusal of the Ameer to accept the new condition
of Resident British officers was in itself a departure
from the "frank, cordial, and confidential relations"'

* Lbid., p. 218.

478 FROM THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE
which were represented to be among the con
ditions of the " assurance" The first of these
circumstances, as affecting the Viceroy's defini
tion, deprived the " assurance" of all value ; whilst
the second was in itself a direct breach of that
assurance, inasmuch as the whole essence of them lay
in the promise that the reception of British officers
was not to be forced or pressed upon the Ameer by
threats and punishments of this kind.
Lord Lytton next returns to the plan of represent
ing the Ameer as disappointed at Simla by Lord
Northbrook's refusal to give to him a Treaty, and
argues that the " verbal assurances" of that Viceroy
could not be interpreted as assuming in favour of the
Ameer those very liabilities which had been refused
in the Treaty. Of course not ; and Noor Mohammed
had never made any such allegation.
The Viceroy then proceeds to represent himself as
simply the giver of all good things — as offering to
the Ameer what he had vainly solicited from others.
Not very consistently with this, he refers to the
acceptance of his conditions as a proof of " sincerity"
on the part of the Ameer, thus admitting, by impli
cation, that their acceptance was an object of desire
to the British Government. And yet, not to let
this admission stand, he declares that the " British
Government does not press its alliance and protection
upon those who neither seek nor appreciate them."
The Viceroy then retires in a tone of offended

TO THE WAR. 479
dignity, and of mortified benevolence. He harboured
" no hostile designs against Afghanistan." He had
"no conceivable object, and certainly no desire,
to interfere in their domestic affairs.'' The British
Government would scrupulously continue to respect
the Ameer's authority and independence. But in the
last sentence there is a sting. The promise it con
tains is carefully, designedly, limited to " Treaty
stipulations," which, in the opinion of Lord Lytton,
did not include the most solemn written and verbal
pledges of the representatives of the Crown in India.
So long as the Ameer remained faithful to " Treaty
stipulations" which the Envoy had referred to, " and
which the British Government fully recognised as
still valid, and therefore binding upon the two con
tracting parties," he " need be under no apprehension
whatever of any hostile action on the part of the
British Government."*
It is not difficult to imagine the feelings with which
the Envoy of the unfortunate Ameer must have
received this communication of the Viceroy. He
must have felt — as every unprejudiced man must feel
who reads it — that he was dealing with a Government
very powerful and very unscrupulous, — too angry and
too hot in the pursuit of its own ends to quote with
even tolerable fairness, the case which he had put
before it, — and determined at any cost to force cori-

* Ibid., p. 220.

480 FROM THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE
cessions which he and his Sovereign were convinced
must end in the' destruction of the independence of
their country. During the month he had been wait
ing for the answer of the Viceroy, his sickness had
been increasing. When he did get it, he probably felt
under the heavy responsibility of finally deciding
whether he was to' yield or not. His rhaster, who had
probably been kept informed of the tone and of the
demands of Sir Lewis Pelly, had become more and
more incensed by the treatment he was receiving, and
he was acting as most men do when they are driven
to the wall. Noor Mohammed made some despairing
attempts to reopen the discussion with Sir Lewis Pelly.
But that Envoy told him that his orders were im
perative to treat no' more unless the "basis" were
accepted. " The Viceroy's communication"' (with all
its misquotations) " required only a simple Yes or No."
Under these circumstances, it is- not surprising that
within ten days of the receipt of the Viceroy's mes
sage, Noor Mohammed had " gained time" in another
world. The Cabul Envoy died on the 26th of March.
And now a very remarkable transaction occurred,
the knowledge of which we derive and derive only
from' the Simla Narrative.* It appears that the
Ameer, either after hearing of the death of his old
Minister, or from knowing that he was extremely ill,
had determined to send another Envoy to Peshawur,

* Ibid., No.. 36, para. 36,, pp. 170, 171.

TO THE WAR. 481
and it was reported to the Viceroy that this Envoy
would have authority to accept eventually all the
conditions of the British Government. Lord Lytton
himself tells us that he knew all this before the 30th
of March ; on which day he senta hasty telegram
to Sir Lewis Pelly to " close the Conference imme
diately," on the ground that the basis had not been
accepted. And so eager was the Viceroy to escape
from any chance of being caught even in the wily
offers which he had made to the Ameer, that it was
specially added in the telegram that if new Envoys or
messengers had arrived in the meantime, the refusal
of farther negotiations was still to be rigidly main
tained.* "The ostensible reason given for this deter
mination is not very clear or intelligible. It is that
" liabilities which the British Government might pro*
perly have contracted on behalf of the present Ameer
of Cabul, if that Prince had shown any eagerness to
deserve and reciprocate its friendship, could not be
advantageously, or even safely, accepted in face of the
situation revealed by Sir Lewis Pelly's energetic in
vestigations." That is to say, that, having driven the
Ameer into hostility of feeling by demands which had
all along been known to be most distasteful, and even
dreadful, in his sight, the Viceroy was now determined
to take advantage of this position of affairs, not only to
withdraw all the boons he had professed to offer, but

* Ibid., No. 36, Inclos, 52, p. 222.
VOL. IL II

482 FROM THE PESHA WUR. CONFERENCE
to retire with the great advantage of having shaken
off, like the dust of his feet, even the solemn pledges
and promises which the Ameer had obtained from
former Viceroys. There was another result of this
proceeding which Lord Lytton seems to admit that
he foresaw, and which, from the language in which he
refers to it, he does not seem to have regarded with
any regret. That result was that Shere Ali would
be thrown of necessity into the arms of Russia.
'•' Seeing," says Lord Lytton, " no immediate prospect
of further support from the British Government, and
fearing, perhaps, the consequences of its surmised
resentment, he would naturally become more urgent
in his advances towards Russia."* This, therefore,
was the acknowledged result of the policy of
the Government — a result which the Viceroy
was not ashamed to acknowledge as one which
he regarded, if not with satisfaction, at least with
indifference. This feeling could only arise, so far as
I can see, from a deliberate desire to fix a quarrel
on the Ameer, and then to obtain by violence the
objects which he had failed to secure by the pro
ceedings we have "now traced.
One important circumstance connected with the
conduct and policy of the Viceroy at this moment
does hot appear, so far as I can find, in the papers
presented to Parliament, and that is, that he withdrew

* Ibid., para. 37, p. 171.

TO THE WAR. 483
our Native Agent from Cabul — or, in other words, sus
pended all diplomatic intercourse with the Ameer,
after the Peshawur Conference. This measure, indeed,
seems to have been most carefully concealed from
public knowledge both in India and at home. Few
parts of the London Narrative are more disingenuous
than the 18th paragraph,* which professes to give an
account of the conduct of the Government on the
close of the Conference at Peshawur. It says that
no course was open to Her Majesty's Government
" but to maintain an attitude of vigilant reserve." It
refers, moreover, to the " imperfect means of obtaining
information" from Cabul after that event, without
even hinting that this imperfection was due entirely
to the deliberate action of the Government in with
drawing its Native Agent. All this indicates a con
sciousness that it was a step to be concealed, and a
thing to be ashamed of. And so, indeed, it was.
Lord Lytton had no right to fix a quarrel on the
Ameer because he had refused to accept what the
Viceroy declared to be nothing but concessions in
his favour. The rupture of diplomatic relations
was in direct breach of the intimation which had
been previously made at that Conference — that if
the Ameer refused the basis, our relations with him
would revert to the footing on which they stood
before. If this course had been followed, some

* Ibid., No. 73, p. 264.
112

484 FROM THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE
amends would have been made for the unjustifiable
attempt to force the Ameer by threats of our dis
pleasure to give up his right to the fulfilment of our
engagements. But this course was not followed.
Our relations with him were not restored to the
former footing. Not only was our Agent with
drawn, but, as I have been informed, there was
an embargo laid on the export of arms from our fron
tiers to the Kingdom of Cabul. All this must haye
tended to alarm Shere Ali, and to give him the
impression that he had nothing to hope from us
except at a price ruinous to the independence of his
Kingdom. It amounted to an official declaration of
estrangement, if not of actual hostility. It left the
Government of India without any means of knowing
authentically what was going on at Cabul, and it
must have given an impression to the Ameer that we
had deliberately cast him off.
After all the inaccurate statements which have been
already exposed, it seems hardly worth while to point
out that the Simla Narrative is particularly loose
in its assertions respecting the circumstances of this
Conference at Peshawur. For example, it states that
" owing to the Envoy's increasing ill-health, several
weeks were occupied in the delivery of this long
statement."* The fact is thatMhe Conferences began
on the 30th of January, 1877, and that the Afghan

* Ibid., para. 32, p. 170.

TO THE WAR. 485
Envoy's long statement was concluded on the 12th
of February.* Even this period of twelve days was
not occupied by the Envoy's " long statement," but,
in a great measure, by Sir Lewis Pelly's arguments and
explanations. The " long statement" of the Afghan
Envoy occupied only three days — the 8th, the 10th,
and the 12th of February. The two next meetings
of the 15 th and 19th of February were chiefly
occupied by the arguments of the British Envoy ;
whilst the period of nearly one month from that date
to the 15 th of March was occupied by Lord Lytton
himself in concocting the remarkable reply of that
date There is one very curious circumstance connected
with the time when Lord Lytton was on the point of
closingthe Peshawur Conference which does not appear
in the papers presented to Parliament. On the 28th of
March, 1877, two days after the death of the Afghan
Envoy, and something less than two days before the
Viceroy sent the imperative order to dose the door
against further negotiation, there was a meeting at
Calcutta of the Legislative Council of India. This is a
body before which Viceroys sometimes take the occa
sion of making speeches for public information. Lord
Lytton did so on this occasion, and went out of his
way to express his sympathy with the Indian Press
in knowing so little of the policy of the Government.
* Afghan. Corresp., I., 1878, No. 36, Inclos. 43, p. 267.

486 FROM THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE
But there was one thing, he said, which the Viceroy
could do to mitigate this evil. This was to waive
" official etiquette, and seize every opportunity which
comes within his reach to win confidence by showing
confidence, and to dispel fictions by stating facts." In
illustration of this, he gave an account of his policy
towards the Ameer, and of the Conference just con
cluded at Peshawur. He told them that he had
" invited the Ameer to a friendly interchange of
views," and had " complied also with the suggestion
made to us by his Highness that Envoys on the part
of the two Governments should meet at Peshawur
for this purpose." He did not tell them that he had
bullied the Ameer into this suggestion as the only
means he had of postponing or of evading demands
which were new, violent, and in breach of former
promises. He t6ld them that the Conference had been .
" prematurely terminated by a sad event" — the death
of the Cabul Envoy. He did not tell them that
he was himself on the point of closing the Confer
ence in order to prevent a new Envoy coming.
He told them that his policy was to maintain,
as the strongest frontier which India could have,
a belt of frontier States, "by which our advice is
followed without suspicion, and our word relied
on without misgiving, because the first has been
justified by good results, and the second never
quibbled away by timorous sub-intents or tricky
saving clauses." Surely this is the most extra-

TO THE WAR. 487
ordinary speech ever made by a Viceroy of India. At
whom was he speaking, when he talked of "sub-
intents" and "tricky saving clauses?" Of whom
could he be thinking? What former Viceroy had
ever been even accused of such proceedings ? We
seem to be dealing here with a veritable psycho
logical phenomenon. If he had read to the Council
the Ninth and Tenth Articles of the Draft Treaty
which he had just been preparing for the Ameer of
Cabul, together with the "Secret and Subsidiary
Explanatory Agreement,"— then, and then only, the
Legislative Council of India would have understood
the extraordinary observations which were thus
addressed to them*
The Simla Narrative of these events is dated the
10th of May, and was, therefore, drawn up within
about six weeks of the close of the Conferences at
Peshawur. It is important to observe the view which
it expresses of the final result of the Viceroy's policy
and proceedings in reference to our relations with
Afghanistan. It speaks with complete, and no doubt
deserved, contempt of the passionate designs to which
our violence towards him had driven the Ameer. It
admits that - the whole movement had collapsed
even before the Conferences had been summarily

* Abstract of the Proceedings of the Council of the Governor-
General of India, &c, 28th March, 1877. These Abstracts are,
I believe, published in India.

488 FROM THE PESHA WUR CONFERENCE
closed, and that the Ameer had sent a reassuring.
message to the authorities and population of Canda
har, on the subject of his relations with the British
Government. The truth, therefore, seems to be that
the moment the Indian Government ceased to
threaten him with the hated measure of sending
British officers into his country, his disposition to be
friendly returned, thus plainly indicating that any
danger of hostility on his part arose solely from our
attempts to depart from our previous engagements
with him.* The next thing to be observed in the
Simla Narrative is this — that the Viceroy and his
Council did not pretend to be alarmed, or, indeed, to
have any fears whatever of external aggression. On
the contrary, they declared that whatever might be the
future of Cabul politics, they would " await its natural
development with increased confidence in the com
plete freedom and paramount strength of our own
position."! This is an accurate account — as far as it goes —
of that estimate of our position in India which had
inspired the policy of Lord Lawrence, of Lord
Mayo, and of Lord Northbrook. Lord George
Hamilton complained, in the late debate in the
House of Commons, that he could find no Despatch
in the India Office setting forth the view which I

* Afghan. Corresp., I., 1878, para, 38, p. 171.
t Ibid., para. 40, p. 172.

TO THE WAR. . 489
had taken as Secretary of State on the Central
Asian Question* I had no need to write any such
Despatch, because the policy of the Cabinet was in com
plete harmony with the conduct and the policy of Lord
Lawrence, of Lord Mayo, and of Lord Northbrook. In
Europe that policy was represented by the Despatches
of the Foreign Office. But if I had felt called upon to
write a formal Despatch on the Central Asian Question
it would have been based upon that confidence in the
paramount strength of our own position which Lord
Lytton expresses in the paragraph which I have just
quoted. It would have been written, however, under
this difference of circumstances — that the confidence
expressed would have been sincere, and in harmony
with our actual conduct. The sincerity of it in Lord
Lytton's case had serious doubts thrown upon it by
the desperate efforts he had just been making to
persuade the Ameer of Cabul to let us off from our
engagements on the subject of British officers, and by
the transparent insincerity of his repeated declarations
that all these efforts were for Shere Ali's benefit, and
not for our own.
As for the Government at home, it was necessary
for them, at this time, to keep very quiet. They care-

* The policy of the Government on the Central Asian Ques
tion was more than once stated and defended in the House of
Commons, by my honourable friend, Mr. Grant Duff, with all
the knowledge which his ability and his indefatigable industry
enabled him to bring to bear upon the subject.

49° FROM THE PESHA WUR CONFERENCL
fully concealed everything that had happened. It
was on the 15th of June, 1877; that I asked certain
questions in the House of Lords upon the subject.
The impression left upon my mind by the reply was
that nothing of any importance had occurred. Private
and authentic information, indeed, of which I was
in possession, prevented me from being altogether
deceived. But I hoped that it might at least be
the desire of the Cabinet to restrain Lord Lytton.
Certainly, nothing could be more misleading as
to the past than the answers I received. There had
been a Conference at Peshawur, but it had been
arranged at the Ameer's own request. There had
been no attempt to force an Envoy on the Ameer " at
Cabul." Our relations with the Ameer had under
gone no material change since last year. All this
was very reassuring, and whatever may now be said
or thought of the accuracy of the information which
these replies afforded to Parliament, this at least is to
be gained from them, that at that time, which was
two months and a half after the close of the Peshawur
Conference, no alarm whatever was felt as to the
disposition or conduct of the Ameer. Now that we
had withdrawn our proposal to send Envoys, and had
abstained from threatening him, ail was going com
paratively well.
But farther evidence on this important point is to be
found at a much later date, and from the same authori
tative source of information. The time came when the

TO THE WAR. 491
Indian Secretary had to review officially Lord Lytton's
proceedings. This was done in a Despatch, dated
October 4, 1877. In it Lord Salisbury dealt almost
lightly with the whole subject, — dwelt upon the fact
that there were " already indications of a change for
the better in the attitude of the Ameer," — trusted the
improvement would continue, — and indicated that this
end would be " most speedily attained by absten
tion for the present, on the one hand, from any
hostile pressure on his Highness, and, on the other,
from any renewed offer of the concessions which have
been refused."*
This important declaration by Lord Salisbury
establishes a complete separation and distinction
between the Afghan Question as directly connected
with the politics of India, and the Afghan Question
as it came to be revived in an aggravated form by
the action and policy of the Cabinet in support of
Turkey. In the meantime, as we all know, great events
had happened. From the date of Lord Salisbury's
Despatch of the 4th of October, 1877, reviewing the
situation after the Conference at Peshawur, to the 7th
of June, 1878, when the first rumour of the Russian
Mission to Cabul reached the Viceroy, we have not a
scrap of information as to what had been going on in
India in the papers presented to Parliament by the
India Office. There is thus a complete hiatus of eight
* Ibid., No. 37, para. 9, p. 224.

492 FROM THE PESHA WUR CONFERENCE
months, for the history of which we must go to the
papers connected with the Eastern Question in Europe,
and to what are called " the ordinary sources of infor
mation." Some of these are at least as worthy of
confidence as the narratives and the denials of the
Government, and the main facts of the succeeding
history are not open to dispute.
The Russian Declaration of War against Turkey had
followed close upon the termination of the Conference
at Peshawur. Early in October, when Lord Salisbury
wrote the Despatch just quoted, the fortunes of the
Russian campaign were doubtful both in Europe and
in Asia. Probably this contributed to the spirit of
comparative composure which inspires that paper, and
which contrasts so much with the nervous fears ap
parent in the Afghan policy which had so completely
failed. But soon after Lord Salisbury's Despatch of October
4th, 1877, the tide had turned both in Europe and in
Western Asia, and, when it did turn, the reverse current
came in as it does on the sands of Solway or of Dee.
The Turks were defeated : Kars was taken ; Plevna
fell : the Balkans were crossed : and the armies of
Russia poured into the Roumelian plains. There is
reason to believe that the agitation of the Government
at home communicated itself to their representative in
India. Long before this, as we haye seen, he had begun
to play at soldiers, he had been accumulating forces on
the frontiers, building a bridge of boats upon the Indus,

TO THE WAR. 493
inciting border Governments to aggressive movements
on or beyond their own frontier, and formally occupy
ing Quetta, — not in connexion with any mere Khelat
disturbance, but as a part of a new Imperial policy.
All round, it had been a policy of fuss and fear, giving
indications that the obscure threat of Sir Lewis Pelly
at Peshawur would be carried into effect — namely,
that the British Government would adopt some new
measure on the frontier which would be regardless
of the interests of Afghanistan. The tongue of the
Indian press was let loose upon the subject, and the
Indian mind was agitated by the expectation of great
movements and bold designs.
Some of these were soon known to, or surmised
by, Russia. Colonel Brackenbury, the military cor
respondent of the Times, who crossed the Balkans
with the force of General Gourko in July, 1877, tells
us the following curious story : — " One day in Bulgaria,
I think it was the day when Gourko's force captured
the Shipka, and we met young Skobeloff on the
top of the Pass, that brilliant and extraordinary
young General said to me suddenly, ' Have you any
news from India ?' I replied that the Russian postal
authorities took care that I had no news from any
where. His answer was, ' I cannot find out what has
become of that column of 10,000 men that has been
organised by your people to raise Central Asia against
us.'" Possibly the rumour which had reached the
Russian General may have been at that time un-

494 FROM THE PESHA WUR CONFERENCE
founded. Perhaps it may have ranked with the " bag
gage-animal" rumours against Shere Ali, of which
Lord Lytton made so much, But there is reason to
believe that if not then, at least at a somewhat later
period, the busy brains which were contemplating a
call on Eastern troops " to redress the balance of the
West," had it also in contemplation, as part of the
Imperial policy, to make some serious military move
ment against Russia beyond the frontiers of India.
There is a well-known connexion between the
Pioneer, an Indian Journal, and the Govern
ment of India. In the number of that paper, dated
September 4th, 1 878, there appeared a letter, dated
Simla,. August 28th, which stated that in anticipation
of a war with Russia, it was no secret that an army of
30,000 men had been prepared in India, with the
intention of forcing its way through Afghanistan, and
attacking the Russian dominions in Central Asia.
Considering that on a much more recent occasion,
as I shall presently show, Lord Lytton, or his Go
vernment, seems to have communicated at once
to the correspondents of the press the orders sent
to him by the Cabinet, on the subject of his final
dealings with the Ameer, it is not at all impro
bable that the writer of this letter in the Pioneer
had authentic information. The British Government
was, of course, quite right to fake every measure in its
power to defeat Russia if it contemplated the pro
bability of a war with that Power. It is notorious

TO THE WAR. 495
that such a war was anticipated as more or less
probable during the whole of the year previous to
the signature of the Treaty of Berlin. All the
well-known steps taken by the Government in the
way of military preparation had reference to that
contingency, and there is nothing whatever impro
bable that among those preparations, the scheme re
ferred to in the Pioneer had been planned.
But if the Government of England had a perfect
right to make such preparations, and to devise such
plans, it will hardly be denied that Russia had an
equal right to take precautions against them. It is
true she had an engagement with us not to interfere
in Afghanistan. But it will hardly be contended
that she was to continue to be bound by this engage
ment when the Viceroy of India was known or
believed to be organising an attack upon her, of
which Afghanistan was to be the base. The letter
written at Simla, to which I have referred above,
expressly states that the Russian Mission to Cabul
was sent under the apprehension of such a movement,
and having for its object to bribe Shere Ali to oppose
our progress. Sir Henry Rawlinson, in his Article in
the Nineteenth Century for December, 1878, professes
to give an account in some detail of the proceedings
of Russia in connexion with the Cabul Mission. He
does not give his authorities ; but, as he has better
sources of information than most other men upon
this subject, we may take that account as the nearest

496 FROM THE PESHA WUR CONFERENCE
approximation to the truth at which we can arrive at
present. He takes no notice of the intentions of the
Indian Government to attack Russia. But his whole
narrative shows that the Russian movements, of
which the Mission to Cabul was only one part, were
of a defensive character, and in anticipation of a war
with England. He says that they were a mere "ten
tative demonstration against the Afghan frontier," —
that " the force was totally inadequate to any serious
aggressive purpose," — and that the military expedi
tions were abandoned when the signature of the
Treaty of Berlin removed the danger of war .* It is
well worthy of observation, as I have already pointed
out, that of the three military movements then con
templated by Russia, two were movements directed
from territories over which she had acquired com
mand between 1864 and 1869, or in other words,
before the Umballa Conferences. The main column
was to start from Tashkend, and move by Samarkand
to J dm. The right flanking column alone was to
move from a point in the former territories of Khiva,
whilst the left column was to be directed from the
borders of Kokhand, upon the Oxus near Kunduz,
crossing the mountains which buttress the Jaxartes
Valley to the south. The whole force did not exceed
12,000 men. Such was the terrible danger to which
our Indian Empire was exposed.
* Nineteenth Century, No. 22, pp. 982, 983.

TO THE WAR. 497
The Peace of Berlin stopped the whole movement.
It has been stated that the Mission proceeded to Cabul
after that event was known. But as the Treaty of Berlin
was not signed till the 13th of July, and as the Russian
Envoy is stated by the Viceroy to have been received
in Durbar by the Ameer, at Cabul, on the 26th of
July,* it is obviously impossible that this can be
correct. Sir Henry Rawlinson, indeed, places the
arrival of the Russian Envoy on the 10th of August,
but he admits in a note that this date is uncertain.
Even if it were correct, it would by no means follow
that the Treaty of Berlin had been heard of by the
Russian authorities in Central Asia before that time.
We may therefore take it as certain that the
whole of the Russian proceedings, including the
Mission, were taken in connexion with a policy of
self-defence, and that the Mission to Cabul was a
direct and immediate consequence, not of any pre
conceived design on the part of Russia to invade
India, or gratuitously to break her engagement with
us in respect to Afghanistan, but of the threatening
policy of the British Cabinet in Europe, and of its
intention, in pursuance of that policy, to make India
the base of hostile operations against Russia.
This being so, let us now look at the position in
which we had placed the Ameer. We had treated
him, as I have shown, not only with violence, but

* Afghan. Corresp., I., 1878, No. 61, p. 231.
VOL. II. K K

498 FROM THE PESHA WUR CONFERENCE
with bad faith. We had formally declared that we
owed him nothing in the way of assistance or defence
against any enemy, foreign or domestic. We had
founded this declaration on unjust and disingenuous
distinctions between Treaty engagements, and the
solemn promises, whether written or verbal, of former
Viceroys. We had withdrawn our Agent from his
Capital. We had thrown out ambiguous threats that
we should direct our frontier policy without any re
ference to his interests or his wishes.
In spite of all this, there is no proof that the Ameer
had the slightest disposition to invite or even welcome
the agents of Russia. On the contrary, all the evi
dence of any value goes to show that he was quite
as jealous of Russian officers as he was of British
officers coming to his country. Our own Agent had
told Lord Lytton that this was the real condition of
his mind just before the Peshawur Conference, and
there had been distinct indications of the truth of
this opinion in the language of the Ameer just before
that Conference. It was consistent with the frame
of mind of the Viceroy to believe against the Ameer
every rumour which came to him through his secret
agents, of whom we know nothing, and the truth of
whose accounts is very probably on a par with that
of the dealer in " baggage animals " whose narrative
has been quoted on a previous page.
In spite of all this, there is the best reason to believe
that the Ameer received the intimation of the ap-

TO THE WAR. 499
proaching Russian Mission with sincere annoyance and
alarm. There are indications of it, but only indications
of it, in the papers presented to Parliament. One of
our spies, a native doctor, had heard the Ameer tell
his Minister that the Russian Envoy had crossed the
Oxus on his way to Cabul, " refusing to be stopped."*
The Ameer had sent orders to cease the opposition,
but this report does not say under what amount of
pressure, or with what degree of reluctance. Major
Cavagnari, however, dating from Peshawur, on the
2 ist of July, expressly says : " Chetan Shah has
arrived. He corroborates the intelligence I have
recently reported regarding Russian pressure on the
Ameer, and military preparations in Trans-Oxus."t
I must at once express my opinion that under
whatever circumstances or from whatever motives the
Russian Mission was sent and was received, it was
impossible for the British Government to acquiesce in
that reception as the close of our transactions with
the Ameer upon the subject of Missions to his
Court. We cannot allow Russia to acquire predomi
nant, or even co-equal, influence with ourselves in
Afghanistan. The Cabinet was therefore not only
justified in taking, but they were imperatively called
upon to take, measures to ascertain the real object
of that Mission, and if it had any political character,

* Ibid., No. 42, p. 227.
t Ibid., No. 48, Inclos. p. 229.
K K 2

500 FROM THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE
to secure that no similar Mission should be sent
again. But considering that under the circumstances which
have been narrated, the sending of the Mission could
only be considered a war measure on the part of
Russia, and had arisen entirely out of circumstances
which threatened hostilities between the two coun
tries, — considering farther, that, as regarded the recep
tion of the Mission, we had ourselves placed the
Ameer in a position of extreme difficulty, and had
reason to believe and to know that he was not in any
way party to the Russian policy in sending it, — justice
absolutely demanded, and our own self-respect
demanded, that we should proceed towards the Ameer
with all the dignity of conscious strength, and of
conscious responsibility for the natural results of our
own previous conduct and policy
There is, I am happy to acknowledge, some evi
dence- that at the last moment the Cabinet at home
did feel some compunction on account of the crisis
which they had brought about. There is no evidence
that the Viceroy felt any He was all for instant
measures of threat and of compulsion. But as the last
steps in this sad and discreditable history are only in
too complete accordance with those which had gone
before, I must give them in some detail.
Lord Lytton, by his own act in withdrawing our
native Agent from Cabul, had placed the Government
of India in the position of being without any authentic

TO THE WAR. 501
information from that Capital. It could only hear of
what might be going on through spies of untrust
worthy character, or by rumour and report. The
first rumours of the approach of a Russian Mission,
and of the mobilisation of Russian forces in Turkes
tan, reached the Government of India from the 7th
to the 19th of June, 1878.* But it was not till after
the lapse of another month, on the 30th and 31st of
July,f that any definite information was obtained.
Even then, it does not seem to have been very ac
curate, but it was certain that a Russian officer of
high rank, with a large escort, had made his way to
Cabul, and had been received there.
It will be observed that this period of nearly two
months was exactly the period during which we
passed in Europe from the imminent danger of a
war with Russia to the probability of peace. The
Salisbury-Schouvalow agreement was only signed on
the 30th of May, and nothing of it could be known
in India or in Turkestan early in June. But before
the end of July the Treaty of Berlin had been
signed, and peace with Russia was assured. This was
the condition of things when, on the 30th of July,
Lord Lytton telegraphed that he had certain informa
tion of the arrival and of the importance of the
Russian Mission. It is only due to Lord Lytton to

* Ibid., Nos. 39, 40, p. 226.
t Ibid., No. 42, p. 229.

502 FROM THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE
point out that he saw, and that he raised, the obvious
question whether, now that peace with Russia was
assured, the Russian Mission should not be dealt with
directly between the Cabinet of London and the
Russian Government, rather than indirectly between
the Government of India and the Ameer of Cabul.
He did not recommend the first of these two courses
rather than the last — that was hardly his business.
But he did suggest it. The Cabinet, however, simply
replied by telling him to make sure of his facts in
the first place * On the 2nd of August Lord Lytton
proposedf that the Government of India should insist
on the reception at Cabul of a British Mission, point
ing out that now we might probably secure all our
previous demands without paying for them any price
in the shape of " dynastic obligations."
On the 3rd this course was approved by the
Cabinet^ Accordingly, on the 14th of August, the Viceroy
wrote a letter to the Ameer intimating that a British
Mission would be sent to Cabul, in the person of Sir
Neville Chamberlain, who was to visit his Highness
"immediately at Cabul," to converse with him on urgent
affairs touching the course of recent events at Cabul,
and in the countries bordering on Afghanistan.§ This
letter was sent in advance by a native gentleman,
Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan.

* Ibid., No. 43, p. 228. f Ibid., No. 45, p. 228.
J Ibid., No. 46, p. 229. § Ibid., No 49, Inclos. 4, p. 23a.

TO THE WAR. 503
Within three days after this letter was written,
an important event happened at Cabul. On the
17th of August the Ameer lost his favourite son,
Abdoolah Jan. If the unfortunate Ameer had been per
turbed by the conduct of the Indian Government, if
he had been still further troubled by the necessity of
receiving a Russian Mission, this bereavement must
have completed the miseries of his position. When
Lord Lytton heard of this event on the 26th of
August,* he was obliged, out of decency, to arrange
for the postponement of Sir Neville Chamberlain's
departure, so that the Mission should not reach Cabul
until after the expiry of the customary mourning of
forty days. A second letter was also sent to the
Ameer, being a letter of condolence. The intention
here was good, but unfortunately it was hardly carried
into effect. Lord Lytton's impatience could not
be restrained, and indeed he confessed that he did
not think it expedient to relax preparations for the
speedy departure of the Mission " beyond what was
decorous."t The decorum seems to have consisted
in spending as many as possible of the forty
days in despatching a perfect fire of messages
through every conceivable channel, all of them in
a more or less imperious tone. The Ameer was
plied with threats through native Agents that the
Mission would leave Peshawur on the 16th of Sep
tember, so as to time the probable arrival at Cabul

* Ibid., No. 50, p. 233. t Ibid., No. .50, p. 233,

5o4 FROM THE PESHA WUR CONFERENCE
as exactly as possible at the end of the forty
days, whilst at the same time he was informed that
resistance or delay would be considered as an act of
" open hostility." Moreover, these fiery messages
were repeated to the subordinate officers of Shere
Ali at the forts and citadels on the road — so that
no indignity might be spared to the unfortunate
Ameer* It must be remembered that all this was being
transacted at a time when it was known that the
Russian Envoy had himself left Cabul on or about
the 25th of August,f leaving only some members of
the Mission behind, and when it was quite certain that
no hostile movement on the part of Russia could be
contemplated, or was possible. But this is not all.
The Viceroy's messenger, Nawab Gholam Hussein
Khan, reached Cabul on the 10th of September, and
on the 17th Sir Neville Chamberlain was able to
report from Peshawur the result of the first interview
with the Ameer. From this it clearly appeared that
Shere Ali did not intend to refuse to receive a Mission.
What he objected to was the "harsh words" and the
indecent haste. " It is as if they were come by force.
I do not agree to the Mission coming in this manner,
and until my officers have received orders from me,
how can the Mission come ? It is as if they wish to

* Afghan. Corresp., IL, 1878, pp. 16, 17.
t Ibid., No. 51, p. 234.

TO THE WAR. 505
disgrace me. I am a friend as before, and entertain
no ill-will. The Russian Envoy has come, and has
come with my permission. I am still afflicted with
grief at the loss of my son, and have had no time to
think over the matter." On the following day, the
1 8th of September, Sir Neville Chamberlain reported
a farther message from Nawab Hussein Khan, that
he had been assured by the Minister of the Ameer,
on his oath, that " the Ameer intimated that he would
send for the Mission in order to clear up mutual mis
understandings, provided there was no attempt to
force the Mission without his consent being first
granted according to usual custom, otherwise he
would resist it, as coming in such a manner would be
a slight to him." He complained of the false reports
against him from news writers. He denied having
invited the Russian Mission. " He believed a per
sonal interview with the British Mission would adjust
misunderstandings." Some of the Russians were
detained by sickness in Cabul. The Nawab thought
that the Russians would soon be dismissed, and that
the Ameer would then send for the British Mission*
To all this the Viceroy replied by telegraph, on the
19th of September, that it made no change in the
situation, and that the preconcerted movements of
Sir Neville Chamberlain should not be delayed.f If
the Government wanted war — if they now saw their

* Ibid., pp. 242-3. f Ibid., p. 243,

506 FROM THE PESHA WUR CONFERENCE
opportunity of getting by force what they had failed
in getting by a tortuous diplomacy — then they were
quite right. There was not a moment to be lost. It
was evident that at any moment, and in all probability
at the end of the forty days, a message might be
received taking away all excuse for threats. But if
the Government wanted peace, then nothing could be
more violent and unjust than their proceedings, nor
could anything be more frivolous than the pretexts
they put forward. It is said that the Ameer's object
was " to keep the Mission waiting indefinitely." It did
not stand well in the mouth of the Viceroy to attribute
"ostensible pretexts" to others — whose only crime
was that they had been able to detect his own. There
was no evidence and no probability that the Ameer
desired an indefinite postponement. It was only
reasonable and natural that he should wish to see
the Russian Mission finally cleared out of his Capital
before he received the British Mission. And if any
inconvenience arose from the Mission having been
already sent to Peshawur, that inconvenience was
entirely due to the blundering which had sent it there
in such unnecessary and unreasonable haste.
And so — casting aside all decorum as well as all
justice — the Mission was advanced to Ali Musjid on
the 2 ist of September, — five or six days before the
expiry of the forty days of mourning, — and there, as
is well known, by orders of the Ameer it was stopped.
Following on this, on the 19th of October, a letter

TO THE WAR. 507
from the Ameer was received, complaining of the
" harsh and breathless haste" with which he had been
treated, and of the " hard words, repugnant to courtesy
and politeness," which had been addressed to himself
and to his officers * The Viceroy now at once tele
graphed to the Government at home that " any
demand for apology would now, in my opinion, be
useless, and only expose us to fresh insult, whilst losing
valuable time." He proposed an immediate declara
tion of war, and an immediate advance of troops into
Afghanistan.t This was on the 19th of October. The Cabinet
replied on the 25th that they did not consider matters
to be then " ripe for taking all the steps" mentioned
in the Viceroy's telegram. They were of opinion
that, before crossing the frontiers of Afghanistan, " a
demand, in temperate language, should be made for
an apology, and acceptance of a permanent British.
Mission within the Afghan frontiers, and that a reply
should be demanded within a time sufficient for the
purpose."}: In the meantime military preparations
were to be continued.
It will be observed that in this reply the Cabinet
took advantage of the position to put forward a
demand on the Ameer not merely to receive a Mis
sion, but to admit a permanent Mission, and to do

* Afghan. Corresp., I., 1878, No. 61, p. 263.
t Ibid., No. 64, p. 253. X Ibid., No. 65, p. 264.

508 FROM THE PESHA WUR CONFERENCE
this without offering to Shere Ali any one of the
countervailing advantages which, before, they had pro
fessed a willingness to bestow upon him.
A gap — an interval of five days — here occurs in
the papers presented to Parliament. Between the
telegram of the 25th and the Ultimatum Letter to
the Ameer dated the 30th October, there is nothing
to show what was going on. But this gap is in a
measure supplied from a singular source of informa
tion. On the 1st of November a long telegram was
published by the Daily News from its well-known
correspondent at Simla, which professes to give an
account of what had been done, and was then being
done, both by the Viceroy and by the Cabinet at home.
This account is confirmed by the papers subsequently
presented to Parliament, in so far as it relates to par
ticulars which are traceable in them. It is, therefore,
a reasonable presumption that the same account is
not altogether erroneous as regards those other par
ticulars which cannot be so verified. Whether it is
perfectly accurate or not, it gives a striking picture of
the atmosphere which prevailed at the head-quarters
of the Government of India, and is a signal illustra
tion of the truth of Sir J. Kaye's opinion that the
spirit of the Indian services, both civil and military,
is almost always in favour of war. The telegram
published in the Daily News of November 1st is as
follows : —

TO THE WAR. Sop
" Simla, Thursday night (Oct. 31, 1878).
"The formal decision of the Viceregal Council
was made to-day in full self-consciousness of bitter
humiliation. The following is the succinct story of
this blow to its prestige : —
" At the Cabinet Council on Friday last (Oct. 2 5 )
the formal decision was telegraphed to despatch an
Ultimatum to the Ameer. At the Viceregal Council
held here on Saturday (Oct. 26), there was a unani
mous agreement to urge the reconsideration of the
matter on the Home Government.' Representations
were made with an earnestness seldom characterising
official communications, the Viceroy throwing all his
personal weight into the scale. A continuous inter
change of telegrams followed, and yesterday (Oct.
30) there was good hope of a successful issue. The
Viceregal Council assembled this morning (Oct. 3 1 )
to give effect to the final resolve of the Home
Cabinet, which adheres meanwhile to its decision as
telegraphed. "The emissary despatched on Monday (Oct. 28),
bearing the Ultimatum as prescribed by the Cabinet,
was instructed to receive at a point en route a tele
gram bidding him go on or stop, as the final resolve
might dictate. Thus three days are saved. The
emissary proceeds towards the frontier to await his
application for admission to Cabul. It is hoped here
that the Ameer will forbid his entrance, and decline
all communication with him."
It is impossible not to ask how this correspondent

510 FROM THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE
came to be informed on the ist of November of the
decision which we now know was actually taken by
the Cabinet on the 25th of October. It is impossible
to suppose that telegrams so delicate and important
Were sent otherwise than in cipher. Is it possible
that the Viceroy and the Government of India com
municated all these messages to the representatives of
the press, and thus appealed to the popular opinion
of the Indian services against the decision of Her
Majesty's Government ?
But now, once more, we emerge into the light of
official day. When the curtain rises on the work of
those five days we find the Cabinet sending to the
Viceroy, on the 30th of October, an Ultimatum Letter,*
which was to be sent to the Ameer. It does not
seem certain whether the first draft of this letter was
drawn up by the Viceroy or by the Cabinet. The
original authorship of the draft matters not. We
have the " Text of letter, as approved." The Cabinet
is, therefore, responsible for every line, and for eVery
word. Let us see what it says.
The very first sentence sets forth unfairly the pur
poses of the Mission on which the Viceroy had
intended to send Sir Lewis Pelly to Cabul. It is a
repetition of the " ostensible pretexts" which the
Indian Secretary and the Viceroy had together de
vised to cover the secret objects of that Mission. It
pretends that it was a Mission of disinterested friend-

* Ibid., No. 66, p. 254.

TO THE WAR. Sn
ship towards the Ameer, whereas it was a Mission
intended to provide against "a prospective peril to
British interests"* by forcing on the Ameer a measure
which we were pledged not to force upon him.
But the second sentence of this Cabinet letter is a
great deal worse. It asserts, in the first place, that
the Ameer left the Viceroy's proposal " long un
answered." It asserts, in the second place, that the
Ameer refused that proposal on two grounds, one of
which was " that he could not answer for the safety of
any European Envoy in his country."
Neither of these assertions is true. The Ameer
did not leave the Viceroy's letter " long unanswered ;"
and when he did answer it, he did not ground his
refusal on the plea that he could not answer for the
safety of an Envoy.f The facts are these : The letter
of the Viceroy proposing the Mission, dated May 5th,
reached Cabul on the 17th of May, 18764 and was
probably not brought before the Ameer till the 18th.
Shere Ali's answer was dated May 22nd, § and we
happen to know from our own Agent that it was the
result of deliberations in his Durbar, which (apparently
for the very purpose of avoiding delay), we are ex
pressly told, were held " continuously" for the four
days which intervened. ||

* Instructions to Lord Lytton, Ibid., p. 156.
f Simla Narrative, para. 23. • X Afghan. Corresp., I., 1878, p. 166.
§ Ibid., No. 36, Inclos. 7, p. 174-
|| Ibid., Inclos. 8, p. 176.

512 FROM THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE
So much for the truth of the first assertion made
by the Cabinet in the second paragraph of the Ulti
matum. Now for the second.
In the Ameer's answer of May 22nd there is not
one word about the safety of a British Envoy in his
country. His refusal to receive, or at least his desire
to postpone indefinitely, the reception of a British
Mission is put wholly and entirely upon a different
ground — which, no doubt, it was not convenient for
the Cabinet to notice. The reason assigned by the
Ameer was the very simple one, that he was perfectly
satisfied with the assurances given to him by Lord
Northbrook at Simla in 1873, and that he did not
de-sire any reopening of negotiations upon the subject
to which those assurances referred.
The reckless unfairness with which the Ameer of
x
Cabul has been treated by Her Majesty's present
Government throughout the transactions which, have
resulted in war, could not be better illustrated than
by this Cabinet Ultimatum. In this case the Cabinet
has not even the excuse of having been led astray by
similar recklessness on the part of tlie Viceroy. In
the 23rd paragraph of his Simla Narrative he
tells this particular part of the story with substantial
correctness. He does not accuse the Ameer of leaving
his letter " long unanswered." On the contrary, he
speaks of the reply as having come " shortly after
wards." But it is much more important to observe .
that Lord Lytton states, as fairly as the Cabinet

TO THE WAR. ^
states unfairly, the grounds of objection taken by the
Ameer :— " On the ground," says Lord Lytton, " that
he desired no change in his relations with the British
Government."* Lord Lytton also states with fairness
that the argument about the safety of Envoys, which
is not even mentioned by the Ameer, appears only as
one among several " additional reasons" which were
reported by our Native Agent as having been used
in Durbar during the "continuous" discussion of
several days' duration.
But the unfairness and inaccuracies of the Cabinet
Ultimatum do not end even here. It proceeds thus :
" Yet the British Government, unwilling to embarrass
you, accepted your excuses." Was there ever such
an account given of such transactions as those of the
Viceroy, subsequent to the receipt of the Ameer's
reply? So far from "accepting his excuses," the
Government of India, after leaving that reply " long
unanswered" — out of pure embarrassment as to what
to do — began addressing to the Ameer a series of
letters and messages, one more imperious and insulting
than another, until, as we have seen, they ended by
suspending all diplomatic relations with him, and
were now about to declare war against him because
he claimed his right to consider as binding upon us the
pledges of the British Crown.
I confess I cannot write these sentences without

* Simla Narrative, para. 23, p. 166.
VOL. II. L L

1 14 FROM THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE
emotion. They seem to me to be the record of say
ings' and of doings which cast an indelible disgrace
upon our country. The page of history is full of the
Proclamations and Manifestoes of powerful Kings and
Governments who have desired to cover, under plau
sible pretexts, acts of violence and injustice against
weaker States. It may well be doubted whether in
the whole of this melancholy list any one specimen
could be found more unfair in its accusations, more
reckless in its assertions, than this Ultimatum Letter,
addressed to the Ameer of Cabul, by the Cabinet of
the Queen.
I repeat here that, holding, as I do, that we cannot
allow Russian influence and power to be established in
Afghanistan, I hold also, as a consequence, that Her
Majesty's Government could not acquiesce in the posi
tion in which they would have been placed by the accep
tance at Cabul of the Russian Mission, followed by a.
refusal on the part of the Ameer to receive a Mis
sion from the British Crown. But they were bound
to remember that they had themselves brought the
Russian Mission upon the Ameer, and upon our
selves ; and they were equally bound to consider that
Shere Ali was not refusing to accept a Mission from
the Viceroy, but was, on the contrary, expressing his
opinion that " a personal interview with a British Mis
sion would adjust misunderstandings." All that the
Ameer desired was that this Mission should not be
forced upon him by open violence in the sight of all

TO THE WAR. SIS
his officers and of all his people. They knew that
he did not complain of the determination of the In
dian Government to send an Envoy, but only of the
"blustering" messages to himself and to his officers
by which he had been incessantly plied even during
his days of grief. They knew that if ever there had
been real mourning in the world it must have been
the mourning of Shere Ali for Abdoolah Jan. For
this boy he had sacrificed whatever of affection
and of fidelity is possible among the children of
a harem. With this boy at his side, he had sat
enthroned, as an equal, beside the Queen's Viceroy
at Umballa. For this boy he had spent his years
in endeavouring to procure a dynastic guarantee
from the Government of India. Now, all these
memories and all these ambitions had vanished like a
dream. No prospect remained to him but the hated
succession of a rebellious son. Well might Shere Ali
say, as he did say, in his letter of October 6th :* " In
consequence of the attack of grief and affliction
which has befallen me by the decree of God, great
distraction has seized the mind of this supplicant at
God's threshold. The trusted officers of the British
Government, therefore, ought to have observed
patience and stayed at such a time." Unless the
Government desired to force a quarrel, and were glad
of an opportunity to rectify a " haphazard frontier"

* Afghan. Corresp. IL, 1878, p. 18.

516: FROM THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE
by means of war, there is nothing to be said in de
fence of the unjust and indecent haste with which
they pushed up the Mission to Ali Musjid even
before the forty days of mourning: were expired.
It cannot be pretended that there was any danger
from Russia then. In the meantime our own.
position had not long before been described by
Lord Lytton himself as a position in which we were
" able to pour an overwhelming force into Afghanistan
for the vindication of our own interests, long before
a single Russian soldier could reach Cabul."* The
haste with which the extreme measure of war was
hurried has crowned and consummated the injustice
of the previous transactions, and even if the war
had been ultimately inevitable, which it was not, the
Government cannot escape censure for the conduct
from which the supposed necessity arose.
Unjust and impolitic as I think the conchict of"
the Government has been in the East of Europe,
it has been wisdom and virtue itself in compa
rison with its conduct in India. I venture to pre
dict that the time is coming, and coming soon,
when the reply of Lord Lytton to the statement of
the Afghan Envoy at Peshawur, will be read by every
Englishman with shame and confusion of face. In a
way, but in a very humiliating way, the whole of these
transactions carry us back to the days of Clive. We-.

* Ibid., p. 183.

TO THE WAR. ^
are reminded only too much of the unscrupulousness
of his conduct. But we are not reminded, even in
the least degree, of tlie violence of his temptations, or
of the splendour of his achievements. There has not
been, indeed, any such daring fraud as duplicate
Treaties, one genuine and the other counterfeit— one
on white paper and tlie other upon red. - But, in a
timid way, the Draft Treaty which was to be
offered to the Ameer, as compared with the repre
sentations of it made to him in the instructions
to Sir L. Pelly, and in the letter of Captain Grey —
comes very near the mark. On the other hand, the
Government of India has had none of the excuses
which have been pleaded on behalf of Clive. We
have not had to deal with any dangerous villains
whose own treachery was double-dyed, and who
might hold our fate in the hollow of their hand.
There has been no Surajah Dowlah, and no Omi-
chund. Shere Ali is a half-barbarian, but his rela
tions with Lord Mayo showed that he could respond
to friendship, and could be secured by truth. His
Minister was straightforwardness itself when com
pared with the English Viceroy. It seems almost
like the profanation of a great name to compare any
thing lately done by the Government of India with
the deeds done by the genius of Clive. But I speak
of what was bad or doubtful in his conduct, not of
•what was great. In this aspect of them the proceed
ings I have recorded have been worse than his. In the

518 FROM THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE
first place, Clive was only the agent of a " Company,"
and even that Company was not really responsible
for his proceedings. The Viceroy now represents the
Sovereign, and all his doings are the doings of the
Ministers of the Queen. In the second place, the
earlier servants of the Company were not the inheri
tors of obligations of long standing, or of relations
with native Princes well understood and regulated by
solemn Proclamations of the Imperial Crown. Lord
Lytton was bound by all these, and by traditions of
-conduct handed down through a long roll of illus
trious names. From these traditions he has departed
in matters of vital moment. The Government of
India has given way to small temptations — to
ungenerous anger at cutting but truthful answers, .
and to unmanly fears of imaginary dangers.- Under
the influence of these, it has paltered with the force of
existing Treaties ; it has repudiated solemn pledges ;
it has repeated over and over again insincere profes
sions ; and it has prepared new Treaties full of "tricky
saving clauses." Finally, it has visited on a weak
and unoffending native Sovereign in Asia, the natural
and necessary consequences of its own incoherent
course in Europe. The policy which brought the
Russian army to the gates of Constantinople is the
same policy which brought the Russian Mission to
Cabul. It is always in the power of any Executive
Government to get the country into a position out of

TO THE WAR. „_
which it cannot escape without fighting. This is the
terrible privilege of what, in the language of our
Constitution, is called the Prerogative. It is, in
reality, tlie privilege of every Executive, whether of
monarchical or of popular origin. I am not one of
those who are of opinion that it could be lodged else
where with any advantage, or even with any safety-
The majorities which support a strong Government in
power are invariably more reckless than the Ministry.
In this Eastern Question, wrong and injurious as I
think their policy has been, it has been wise and mode
rate as compared with the language of many of their
supporters in both Houses of Parliament. I have too
vivid a recollection of the difficulty which was expe
rienced by the Cabinet of Lord Aberdeen in mode
rating witliin reasonable bounds the excitement of
the country, to place the smallest confidence in any
scheme for checking, through some popular agency, the
action of the responsible advisers of the Crown. They
- are always, after all, through a process of " natural
selection," the ablest men of the party to which they
belong. Except under very rare conditions, they are
more disposed, and are more able, to look all round
them, than any other body in the State. They may
commit— and in this Eastern Question it is my con-
' tention that they have committed— terrible mistakes,
both in Europe and in India. These mistakes— and
errors much more serious than mistakes — I have endea
voured to expose in the present volumes. Some of

520 PESHAWUR CONFERENCE TO THE WAR.
them affect the gravest considerations of public duty.
They affect the permanent interests of this country
and of India, as involved in the good faith and honour
of the Crown. I now leave this review of them to the
conscience of my countrymen, and to the judgment of
later times,.

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