YALE UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

MEMOIRS

FOR THE

HISTORY OP THE
WAR OF LA VENDEE.
IN WHICH THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS OP THAT
WAR ARE ACCURATELY RELATED, FROM ITS
ORIGIN, UNTIL THE 13TH FLOREAL, OF THE
SECOND YEAR OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC.
TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH
OP
LOUIS-MARIE TURREAU,
COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE WESTERN ARMY.

FROM THE PRINTING-OFFICE OF BAYLIS, GREVILLE-STRBET.
Printed for M. PELTIER, 231, Piccadilly; and sold at
DEBRETTs, Piccadilly ; FAULDER, Bond-street ;
OWEN, Piccadilly ; and MURRAY and HIGHLEY,
Fleet-street.
1796.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE present Work has been compleated these
six months. The publication has been deferred, be
cause I wished to present to tbe Public in a more
ample manner the. Principal Events of the War in
la Vendee. The great alteration in my healthy
which hindered me from too serious an application,
and the deprivation of my papers which I expecled
would be restored to me. every day, has at length
forced me lo abandon this projecl, and although.
these Memoirs offer no great interest with regard
to their style, yet they merit great attention on
account of the importance of the subjecl.
TURREAU.

PREFACE.

A Complete History of the Was of la Ven
dee, would be, perhaps, in our political situa
tion, a work the most interesting and the most'
useful that could be presented to the French Na
tion. Such an enterprise was, without doubt,
above my capacity ; however, listening to my
: A 1 zeai

( viii )
zeal and attachment for the public welfare, and
besides disengaged from the inquietudes a3 well
as the illusions pf self-love, I should have dedi-
cated myself wholly to the composition of that
work, had I not been deprived of the greatest part
* - f,
of the materials necessary for its completion.
However imperfect in every point of view, this
may be which I now offer to the public, yet I
think it, will not be without utility % and,, if some
regard is due to the misfortunes, and to the purity
and intentions of a man, whose love for his coun
try and truth guides his pen, I shall obtain,
easily, the indulgence of all friends to their
country ; I care little f©r the judgment and opi
nion of others.
This historical essay, Solely intended to fix the
attention on a. War which ia not yet known, wilt
»ot contain any thing relative to the justification^
of the conduct I held when I had the command oft
the 'forces, of, the West 5 a justification which the-
discernment and justice of those who know the..
secret

( ix )
secret of ray political and military life, ought to
spare me.
But,, when it will be necessary to defend my
self, I shall do it with that superiority of means
which an upright man receives from a frank and
open canducl:, and the full conviction of his in
nocence. I shall answer by positive fa&s, by
interesting proofs, to alh the false* &nd indeed
frequently absurd; imputations, which have been*
made against me; nor shall I find much trouble
in destroying such a heap of vague accusations5
and charge* without proof, entertained and pro*-
pagatedby malevolence^ and which alone p.ersonafc
hatred has raised against me. ¦>
I shall banish from my defence every thing that
may satjsfyc resentment, provoked continually,
against me by the production, of falsehood and
the spirit of party. I. shall write* : I shall speak
without animosity r without illxhumour, aoid with*
out partiality or private hatred. Private affairs,
as we.ll as general interests, , ought ta be dis-.
•cussed

'( x )
cussedin the absence of the passions; neither
should misfortune, nor even injustice, be pleaded
as sufficient motives for introducing bitterness
or passion irtto one's speeches or writings. *
I am but little affected at the outrages of ca
lumny, because, in reflecting within myself in
running over the history of my life, I perceive
nothing but actions which honour it. It is suffi
cient for me-to'be without reproach, and to have
foreseen for some time the blow which is now
aimed at me, to render me indifferent on the fate
reserved for me. Exempt from remorse, as well
as fear, which belong only to the guilty or to
cowards, I wait with security the term of my
afflictions ; and when, after having been the vic
tim of the error of government, I shall be again
that of my judges, shall Inot leave to my friends:
the means of rescuing my memory from oppro-;
brium and ignominy ?t— But let us return to myt
work. It may be read with confidence; truth.'
and impartiality the most severe have presided,
over and dictated its contents.
2 . The

( a )
The greatest part of the details on the causes of
the prosperity and decline of the Vendeans, were
transmitted to me by M. d'Elbee, their Gene.
ralissimo, who became my prisoner at the reduc
tion of the island of Noirmoutier. TURREAU,

MEMOIRS

FOR THE

HISTORY

OP THE

WAR of LA VENDEE.

PART THE FIRST.
I N order to discover the origin of the War of
la Vendee, we must go back to the beginning of
the Revolution. This assertion, however aston
ishing or bold it may appear to many, is not
the less just, and I could bring evident proofs of
it, if, in order to deduce the true causes of this
war, I were not obliged to enter into particu
lars ill suited to the present work. However, it
B is

( 14 )
is erroneous to attribute the general and sponta
neous revolt of the inhabitants of Lower Poitou
to the raising of three hundred thousand men :
this is but an incidental cause to the birth and
existence of a party, which could never have been
so successful, nor have assumed all the qualities of
an invincible power, without the concurrence of
infinite resources, plans, and means, long since
prepared. Those who are acquainted with the country,
and have observed the conduct of the Priests and
Nobles since the commencement of the Revolu
tion, the steps taken by the constituted autho
rities, and the moral disposition of the inhabi
tants, will readily discover, in interior events,
the original causes .of the revolt, and the first
elements of which this political volcano is com
posed, which, by its sudden and terrible explo
sion, has more or less shaken, in proportion to
their distance, all the Western Departments.
The intrepid inhabitants of le Bocage and le
Loroux (1,) who have obtained so many decisive

(1) Le Bocage is a part of Lower Poitou, now divided in
to several districts belonging to the department of la Vendee.
Le Loroux is that part of the left bank of the Loire, im
mediately bordering the river, and which is comprised, ac
cording to the new division, within the departments of the
Juoice Inferieure and the Mayenne and Loire. advan-

( 15 )
advantages when left to their own strength, were
not to have acted by themselves, if the plan of
their chiefs had been fully executed ; for the
party which has desolated the left banks of the
Loire, was only a branch of that belonging to the
celebrated Laroyerie, whose extensive conspiracy •
had taken root in many parts of the Republic,
even in the departments lying at the greatest dis
tance from its center (2) : and if, whilst the left
bjmkjvas constantly the theatre of the most bloody
battles, and that each day was signalized by a
fresh victory on the part of the Vendeans, there
had been more unison and regularity in the par
tial movements made on the right bank ; or, ra
ther, if the rebels of that party had joined thf
others, and had simultaneously directed and con
tinued their incursions towards the South, we *>¦
may judge what terrible effects would have re
sulted from the junction of these parties, from
the coincidence of their movements, then ope
rating in a body, and upon points very near each
other, and how many dangers a handful of ban
ditti, (3) as they are called, might have threatened
the Republic with.
(2) It is well known that the center of this conspiracy was
in Brittany.
(3) It has been often said during the war, " it is astonish*
ing that cf handful of banditti should resist so long."
B i How.

( »6 )
However, without enlarging further upon the
causes of the war of la Vendee, concerning
which I have data sufficiently positive to prove
all that I shall advance (causes which I shall de
velop in another work) ; without examining here
what were the ramifications and extent of 'this
horrid conspiracy against liberty, let us see what
degree of consistency and ^prosperity the Royalist
and Catholic party has attained (4) ; what great
strength and means this truly colossal power has
all at once exhibited, still less astonishing by its
successes than by the obstinacy and continuance of
its resistance.
It is wrong to comprehend all the rebels, who
have successively disturbed most of the Weftern
departments, under the general term of Chouans
or Vendeans. The rebels beyond the Loire must
not be confounded with those on the right bank,
nor the rebels of Morbihan with the Vendeans,
or the banditti of the Marais, because the events,
the locality, and the political existence of the
insurgents have assigned very different charac
ters to these wars.
The inhabitants of twenty or five and twenty
villages within the districts of Ploermel and Pon-

(4) The chief army of the Vendeans called itself the
Caibolh and Royal Army, tlvy,

( 17 )
tivy, led on by fanatic. Priests, assembled in re
mote churches, or in the woods, to hear mass.
The appearance of two or three companies of vo
lunteers sufficed to disperse them : those were
the rebels of Morbihan (5).
Three brothers called Chouans, formed meet
ings in the environs of Laval and la Gravelle.
The places where they committed their robberies,
and the information that has been obtained, leads
us to suppose that the original profession of these
chiefs was that of smuggling ; this is the origin
of the rebels called Chouans. Originally few in
number these banditti seldom went far from the
forests of le Pertre and la Guerche, their usual
places of resort. ,.
. But they were soon reinforced by some rebels
from the departments of Calvados, la Manche,
(5) We must not thence infer that we ought to remain
tranquil upon the situation of Brittany. There have been
disturbances in the Morbihan for a long time past. They
get supp'ressed, but break out again. Hitherto government
does not appear to have attended so seriously to the rebels of
Brittany as to the Chcruans and Vendeans. Nevertheless
they should take care ; for if other means are not employed
than those already used to restore peace to that unhappy
country, which fanaticism has disturbed ever since the be
ginning of the Revolution, it may become a second la Ven
dee. Above all things, it is necessaiy to prevent the Chouans
from penetrating there. 1 have reason to think that it is the
plan of their chiefs to do so, and

( 18 )
and Brittany ; by the broken remains of a body
of the army, escaped from la Vendee, under the
command of the Prince de Talmont, after the
-% battle of Chollet, and totally routed in that of
Savenay, by some scattered mal-contents in the
vicinity of Chateau-Gontier, Sable, &c. where
they had previously excited commotions, and
finally by a considerable number of young men
who had withdrawn themselves from the first
requisition. The Chouans, become more numerous, soon
had less obscure chiefs, and amongst those who
commanded them after the death of the Prince
"*de Talmont (6), have been observed a Chevalier
-# de Puisaye (7), a Comte de Boulainvilliers, &c.
&c. The country infested by the Chouans is very
extensive, and forms nearly a square ; of which
Nantes^ Angers, Mayenne, and Rennes, are the
angles. They sometimes shew themselves upon
the roads of Fougeres, and from Dol to Rennes.
Their meetings in general consist of from thirty

(6) He commanded them but a short time after the defeat
of Savenay. He was soon arrested near Erne, tried at Ren
nes, and executed at Laval.
(/) Formerly Adjutant General, attached to General
Wimpffen, to

( '9 )
to forty men (8), and they seldom dare make .re
sistance against the Republican troops of equal
force (9).
Le Marais is that part of Lower Poitou adja^*)
cent to the sea. It is a flat and very open coun
try, and the passes are impracticable during
winter, and. very difficult in other seasons. — r
It is intersected at all points of its circumference
by canals, or salt marshes, a species of natural
fortification which renders any attack against it
very dangerous, and consequently is favorable
for defence, particularly for the inhabitants.
Few carriage roads are to be met with, the
greatest part are bye-ways or raised paths, and
made between two canals. These canals are in

(8) Their chiefs have ordered them to continue thus di
vided, until more favourable ciicumstances will admit of their
joining their brethren in la Vendee.
(Q) In perusing this work, the reader must not recur to
the time when I wrote it, but to the time when I commanded
the Western army, that is to say, from the 1st Nivose to th?
4th Floreal, in the second year. I am ignorant of the events
which have since occurred, and whether the state of things
is changed. At rliat time the banditti had but very little
firmness. I was so fortunate, wljen I commanded in the West.
as to prevent their joining the Vendeans. They were never
in a situation at thai time to undertake any operation ip a
body. The roads from Nantes, Valines, and Angers, were
free and secure. general

( 20 }
general from thirty to forty feet wide, from the
upper extremity of one bank to the other. The
banditti carrying his musket in a bandoleer,
leans upon a long pole, and leaps from one bank
to the other with amazing facility. If the pre
sence of the enemy will not admit of his perform
ing this exercise, without exposing himself to
his fire, he throws himself into his niole (10),
and crosses the canal with very great rapidity,
being always sufficiently shut up to hide himself
from the sight of his pursuers. He soon appears
again, fires at you, and disappears in an instant,
very often before you have time to answer his
fire. The republican soldier, to whom this mode
of fighting is unknown, is obliged to be con
tinually upon his guard, to march along the
shores of the canals, and to follow slowly their
circuitous track, supporting at the same time
frequent skirmishes : thus it costs him several
hours to traverse over a space which the ban
ditti most commonly accomplishes in a few mi
nutes (ll).

(10) A kind of small boat, very fiat and very light.
(11) After you have surmounted all these obstacles, and
arrived at the plain, after having followed all the zig-zags
formed by the canals which surround it, the enemy present
themselves in all parts ; they seem to rise out of the land and
water. Notwithstanding which we must at any rate take post

( 21 )
. The inhabitants of le Marais formed a division
of the army of Charette, and followed it very
regularly in its expeditions, at the time it occu
pied all the neighbouring points of their country;
such as Challans, Machecoul, Sec. and afterwards
the isles of Bouin and Noirmoutief. But after
it. had been driven from all these posts, and
forced to abandon successively all the frontier
boroughs and towns of le Marais and le Bocage, as
Lege, Palluau, Aizenay, Bauiieu (12), &c. &c.
then the banditti of le Marais remained at home
and confined themselves to a defensive war, for
which nature seems to have formed their country.
This war was the more dangerous as the situation
of le Marais (] 3) placed the inhabitants in a state
to receive succours from abroad, or to facilitate
and protect the debarkation of such as they
wish to procure for the rebels of la Vendee. — The
coasts in those parts of the Wefiern Departments
being extremely flat and easy of access by sea,(l4)
post there, and support ourselves at it j fof orie may judge
of the dangers of a retreat in this country by the difficulties
of penetrating it.
(12) I request the readef to follow me with the map.
(13) According to the new division a part of le Marai»
is in the district of les Sables, and the other in that of Chal
lans, in the Department of la Vendee.
(14) Although shoals may be found along these codstsj
ithey are less difficult of access that if they were steep,
G par.

( 22 )
everything was to be dreaded from the conse
quences which might ensue from the communi
cations and enterprizes of domestic and external
enemies; and we may judge of the perilous situa
tion of the republican troops destined for the de
fence of these coasts, in case of a combined at
tack from both, as they would have found them
selves between two fires, and their local disposi
tion necessarily preventing them from being but
weakly and slowly supported (15).
But the object would have' been but imper
fectly accomplished, if, in order to attack and
clear this den of banditti, the operations had
been confined to the defence of the coasts against
the invasion of foreigners. It was necessary to
cut off the communication with Charette, and
prevent him from giving or receiving assistance
from the banditti of le Marais. Thus, and in
this respect only, can the war of le Marais, that
of the Chouans, and even that of Morbihan (l6),
particularly if the inhabitants' favour the descent of the.
ejiemy. (15) I have stated the reasons in describing the country.
(16) What I here advance does not cancel what I have
said above concerning the want of stability of the inhabi
tants of Morbihan. This war is not yet serious; but it will
become so if not guarded against. The public spirit is detest
able in Brittany. The, Priests and Nobles which infect it,
and who certainly do not like the Republic, have long
sought to excite a general insurre&ion. be.

( 2a )
be compared to that of la Vendee, in whatever
situations the republican troops may be placed^
whatever direction may be given to their active-
columns, they are every where surrounded by
enemies. From what I have said of the banditti of le Ma
rais we may , be able to judge of those on the fight
bank of the Loire (the Chouans), and the rebels
Of Morbihan, "of the necessity of separating (17)
these wars in order to terminate them; of cutting
off all communication and cojanection between
the different parties, whose greatest efforts tend to
operate a junction between them ; of preventing
or destroying every plan which they might be
able to concert ; and finally to keep them insu
lated, in order to destroy them. We shall be
convinced of this when we are acquainted with the
war of la Vendee. And if we have attained this
end, if we have prevented the union of these dif
ferent parties of rebels, we must not dissemble
that we are less indebted to our efforts and success
for it, than to local circumstances, the ambition
and inability of the chiefs of the banditti, and
above all to that rivalry which has continually
divided them.
{}?) This was, as will be seen, the first object of my plan.
C2 Let

( 24 )
Let us now speak of the Vendeans ; let us
speak of those truly extraordinary men, whose
political exiflence, whose rapid and extraordinary
successes, and above all their unheard of ferocity,
will form an epoch in the republican aera; of
those Vendeans who want only humanity and
another cause to support, to unite every heroic
quality. A mode of fighting hitherto- unknown, and
perhaps inimitable if it be really practicable in
that country alone, and peculiar to the genius
of its inhabitants ; an inviolable attachment to
their party ; an unlimited confidence in their
chiefs ; such fidelity in ' their promises as may
supply the want of discipline ; an im'incible
courage which is p*oof against every kind of dan
ger, fatigue, and want ; these are what make the
> Vendeans formidable enemies, and which ought
to place them in history in the first rank of mi
litary people. Finally, the Vendeans are French-.
men animated with the double fanaticism of Re
ligion and Royalty, who have for a long while
fixed victory on their side, and who could not
have been conquered but by Frenchmen.
To enter into a long account of the topography
of Poitou, and the ancient and modern manners,
pf the inhabitants, belongs only to a work of very
great extent ; and as,, in this historical and very-
corjcisg

( 25 )
concise essay, I consider la Vendee only in a
military point of view, and that my only object is
to publish the events which have occurred during
the course of this singular war, concerning which
nothing has yet been written that is either'sup-
pbrtable or true, I shall refer such of my readers
as wish to know what were the customs, the cha
racter, and the prejudices of the ancient Poicte-
vins, to the history of their country and the civil
wars which have desolated France, and particu
larly to a work entitled Annales d'Acquitaine.
They will find even in the nature of the country,
in the ignorance, the habits, the superstition of
the people, the cause of their evils, and the ori
gin of the t religious and party wars, of which
Poitou has ever been the theatre and cradle. -
Le Bocage and le Loroux form the country #
which may be called la Vendee, as it is that in
which the war has been constantly the most vi-
' gorOus and bloody. They are two great cantons, •— ¦
one of which (le Bocage) formed part of Poitou,
and die other a part of Anjou and Brittany. They
are now divided, according to the new division,
into, the Departments of la Vendee, les Deux
Sevres, la Loire Inferieure, and Mayenne and
Loire. It is the most fertile country belonging
to the Republic ; it Was also the most populous
befpre the horrors of war and the calamitous do
minion

( 26 )
minion of the rebels had driven away the patriots,
and a resolution (18) of the representatives of the
people on mission in the Western Departments had
compelled Such of the inhabitants as wished to
remain, to quit that perfidious country, on prej
tence of a neutrality dangerous to them and their
troops, and which always turned to the advan
tage of the rebels (19).
But in order to Be enabled to know the true
theatre of the war, the fpllowing is , the territory
which they occupied during their prosperity : for
their Northern boundaries, they had the Loire ;
to the- West, the sea ; to the South, Fontenay,
Luqon, les Sables, and Niort ; and to the East,
Parthenay, Thouars, and Doue (20.)
 -_  :  ,  '- — J.
(18)' It is dated the 2d Veritose ; and is in substance,
" that the inhabitants of la Vendee shall quit the country,
" otherwise they shall be considered as making a common
"cause with the rebels, and shall be treated as such.'' I
shall observe, that without this resolution, and other steps
taken by these representatives, in order to cut off all commu
nication between the banditti and their secret accomplices,
disseminated throughout la Vendee and the neighbourinc
towns, I saw no bounds to the contagion, nor end of the
War. (19) I shall state the reasons.
(20) The banditti have sometimes gone beyond these
bounds. They have taken Fontenay, Thouars, Dou6, Sau-
niur>

( 27 )
The locality of le Bocage is a perfect contrast
to that of la Marais. Le Bocage (21) is a coun
try very much intersected, although there are no
large rivers ; very uneven, although there are no
mountains ; and very woody, although there are
but few forests, and the woods, which are nume
rous, are but of a moderate extent. It is very
uneven, and much intersected by reason of many
little hills, valleys, ravines, small rivers, almost
always fordable, even rivulets which one may
often pass over dry-shod, but which the least
rain transforms- into torrents. It is much inter
sected, because all the estates are divided into-"
small inclosures or fields (22) -surrounded with
ditches. It is very woody, because the fields are1
inclosed with strong hedges planted on the banks

mur, and Angers ; but having miscarried before Nantes, they-
repassed the Loire, and did not return to the right bank till
after the affair of Chollet.
(21) It is the same with le Lorous, rather less woody,
however, than le Bocage, ih that part which, is nearest the"
bank of the Loire.
(22) These fields are commonly not more than fifty or
sixty perches in extent, and are frequently surrounded by-
ditches. It is principally owing to this subdivision of land
into small fields, and to the ditches and drains which sur
round and intersect them, that the ground is so extremely
fertile, which otherwise would be, exceedingly watery. Ofy

( 28 )
of the ditches, sometimes with trees, disposed in
such a manner that they have the effects of palli
sades round a fortification.
What still contributes to render this country
very woody is, that, the soil being very rich and
fertile, shrubs, heath, thorns, broom, and in,
general all wild and spontaneous productions, as
well as those obtained by industry, are of an im
mense size and strength.
Such a country will not admit, pf goocLcoad^
(23) ; in fact, they are very bad in la Vendee.
The convoys can scarcely travel three leagues
during the whole day ; and, for conveyance, it
is necessary to make use of oxen, and the carts,
of the country, which are not of the usual breadth.
The roads (24) are not wider than these carts.
Spaces or cross roads where carriages can turn are
(23) There are only two great roads in la Vendee ; that
from Nantes to Saumur by Chollet, and that from Nantes to
la Rochelle by Montaigu, Saint Fulgent, &c. These great
Ifoads, which can only be followed by chance, are not more
favorable for military operations than the cross roads. They
only admit of greater order in marching. They are flanked
by wide and deep ditches ; their banks are obstructed by
hedges, trees, bushes, &c.j and it is generally upon the bor*
derS of these great roads that the enemy prepare their am
buscades, and plan their attacks.
(24) They are sometimes sunk ten or twelve feet below
the surface of ths earth, seldom

( 2Q )
seldom to be found ; and, when the escort o^ a
convoy is defeated, it becomes infallibly a prey
to the banditti. If you were able previously to
make a disposition for a retreat, it would neces
sarily be so slow that it could not be saved (25).
Thus la Vendee, that asylum of robbery and
crimes, is like an extensive fortress, where the'5'
agents of royalism and aristocracy can conceit
their plots and meditate their horrid projects in
security.; and nature misled, seems there to have
exerted all her power to protect the guilty resist-'
ance and the fatal independence of the domestic
enemies of the Republic.
• It is doubtless very difficult to carry on a war
in a country like that of which I have just drawn
a hasty description. In a country which opposes
every thing to an attack, and presents so many
resources for defence, how is a column to be led
on and its movements regulated ? how is order

(25) Wc may thence infer, that a general acquainted with
la Vendee ought not only to decline taking artillery with
him, but also all equipage belonging to his columns, medical
staff, camping effects, &c. An army desirous of penetrating
into la Vendee wants only soldiers and pioneers. Every thing
called impedimenta should be suppressed, if one is desirous of
not suffering a defeat. A general officer in this country
ought, as much as possible, to assimilate his mode of carry
ing on the war with that of the enemy,
D and

( 3D )
and union to. be. preserved in its marches. ; ma
noeuvres, signals, in forming the line, disposi-i
tions for an attack or a retreat, to be executed ?
How can the artillery and cavalry have fair play,
and all that action which is congenial to these two
arms, in the midst of. obstacles by which the
haunts of la Vendee are protected ? How can .a
line of battle be instantly formed (2(3),. the dis
tances measured with the,eye, the advantages, and
disadvantages of a forced position hastily.taken be
calculated, that of the enemy known* their pro
jects foreseen,, their position; understood; by' a
quick perception, like that occupied, by your
army, when frequent undulations of land, hedges,
trees, and bushes, which, obstruct, the surface,
will not admit of your seeing fifty paces around
you ? How can youitake advantage of .fortunate
occurrences, or speedily remedy contrary events ?.
or observe, or at.ieast.be, soon enough informed
of, any check or partial event that may have
taken place during, a battle, when you .are often
longer in receiving; a report, or in sending, an

(20) Against rebels yon can never unite in order of battle.
You know not at what point you shall- engage ; whether you
shall be attacked in front, in flank, or in the rear, or what
dispositions the ground will allow you to make. order

( 31 ):
order (from one end of the line' to the other, than
is required to decide the fate of a battle ? '.?
¦r The 'banditti, fjy^jared_by^ every natural ad
vantage, have a peculiar tactic, which they know
perfectly how to apply to their position and local
circumstances. Confident in the superiority
which their mode of attack gives them, they ne
ver suffer themselves to be anticipated; they never
engage but w£en and whe'te they please. Their
dexterity in the use of fire-arms is such, that no
people wc are acquainted with,' however warlike
or well skilled- in: manoeuvring, can make such
good use of a gun as the huntsman of le Laroux}
atodtbe poacher of le Bocage. .Their attack is 'a
.dreadful, sudden, and almost unforeseen irrup
tion, -because it is very difficult in la Vendee to
reconnoitre well, to get good information, and>
consequently, to guard against a surprise. Their
order of battle is in the form of a crescent, and
their . winga, thus directed en fieches, are com-"'
ppfced; of their best marksmen, soldiers who never
.fire without taking aim, and who seldorrumiss a
-mark .placed at a common distance. /You are
routed, .before you ;have had time to look about
you, by a heavy, discharge, which surpasses that
of our orddnnances, the effects of which cannot
be compared with/ theirs. They. wait not for the
word of, conxmand to. fire,- they, are unacquainted
ciir>;i-<7 D2 with

( 32 )
with batallion, rank, and platoon firing ; and yet
that which you experience from them is well
directed, well supported, and more destructive
than yours. If you resist their violent attacks,
the rebels seldom dispute the victory with you ;
but little advantage can be derived from it, as
they retreat so precipitately that it is difficult to
come up with them, the country scarcely _ever
admitting of the use of cavalry. They disperse,
-escape from you through fields, hedges, woods,
and bushes, knowing all the bye-roads, secret
escapes, straits, and defiles ; ahd being ac
quainted with all obstacles which could obstruct
their flight, and the means of avoiding them. If
you are obliged to give way to their attacks, you
find as much difficulty in retreating, as they easily
escape when defeated, When conquerors, they
completely rout you, and cut you off in all parts ;
they pursue you with an inconceivable fury, ani
mosity, and swiftness, They run in an attack
and in a victory as they do upon a defeat ; but
they charge whilst marching, even in running,
and the vivacity and justnesss of their musketry
loses, nothing by this constant state of mobility.
Jn genera], this war has so many singularities
that it must be pursued a long time before one can
be well acquainted with it ; and every well in>-
fortned general officer, who has made ten cam
paigns.

( 33 )
paigns upon the frontiers, will find it very diffi
cult to act with success on his arrival in la Ven
dee. I call to witness all the general officers
who, after having served upon the frontiers, have
been employed in this hideous la Vendee, to say,
whether they had an idea of this war before they
entered into it ; whether the Prussians, the Aus
trians, regular troops inured to the discipline of
a Nassau and a Frederick, are so dreadful in battle,
have so much address, cunning, and audacity, as
the ferocious and intrepid marksmen of le Bocage
and le Loroux (27) *, whether it is possible there $
can be a' war more cruel, more fatiguing for mi
litary men of every rank, or more bloody than
this ; also, whether it does not destroy order,
discipline, and subordination, in an army, and
whether the soldier, soon enervated, depraved in
this infamous country, the pestiferous air of which
seems to corrupt even the moral complexions of
individuals, whether the soldier, disgusted and t
discouraged with this war, and whose opinion of
it seems to have alienated his glory (28), loses not
(2/) I affirm, that every thing I have said concerning their
method of fighting,, however extraordinary it may appear, is
strictly true.
(28) Ought not the Republifcans who have been engaged
in the war of la Vendee, 'to partake of the glory which ap
pears to be exclusively reserved for their brethren in arms
employed

( 34 )
that energy, that firmness, that invincible cou
rage, which has so frequently caused him to
triumph over the English and Austrian slaves }
in fine, whether they would not prefer making a
six months campaign upon the frontiers than one
in la Vendee.,
I think I have said enough to . prove that the
chief, obstacles to all military enterprises in la
Vendee arise from locality. The impossibility
of securing ¦ a correspondence with the interior
parts, and avoiding the delays it-meets with ; of
keeping up communications ; of sufficiently C0r
yering your posts, when, the- enemy is in all parts
and surrounding you on every side ; of establish
ing, and guarding against their invasion, the
depots, the formation of which is necessitated by
the distance from the magazines, and the slow<-
ness of the convoys ; the difficulty, and above a\\
the danger, of transporting w^rfike. stores and
provisions in a country where,, the roads are un

employed on the frontiers ? Upwards of two'hundred battles
which have been fought on -both sides of the Loire since the
commencement of the war, prove that it was sufficiently
severe, sufficiently important, }o attach some merit to those
who carried it on. It appears, however, that it has been
meant to cast some disgrace; upon, the military wh0 have
served in la Vendee. I could wish theiy detractors rmo-ht
be sent to make a campaign there. , passable,

. ( 35 )
passable, where every thing is ih ambush, where
a column of 2000 men is ' necessary to escort a-
Waggon ladfen with provisions or cartridges : (the."
enemy particularly confining themselves to at
tacking parties and escorts.) {29) These are what
defeat your means and incessantly shackle your;
operations; Where- is the general officer who,
having formed a plan, can answer for its execu
tion, or exactly follow it, in a war where every
thing is irregular and dependant upon circum
stances ; where the reports are always uncertain
and treacherous, because your spies are either
timid or traitors ; where the evefite of the day-
destroy or counteract the measures which the
preceding one seemed to require- ; where all, ap
plication- of the principles of the plah to the local-
situations become useless Or dangerous ? In a'
country where the enemy: is -in all parts, and every

(29) This ought to be particularly applied to the time
when the war was to be carried on in the woody country,-
in the heart of la Vendee. Then the rebels, having lost
•some of their political stability, no longer shewed themselves
in theimmenseplains which surround thern. Shut up again
in their dark retreats, they confined themselves to surprising
th'e troops that endeavoured to penetrate there, and the posts
which had so imprudently been kept up in the midst.of the
rebellious country. Moreover their method of attacking
and fighting/has always been the same. where

( 36 )
where ftrong where you are weak; free" from
eveiy surprise, who are even invisible^, when you
march at the head of a strong and well regulated
column ? If your column ceases for a moment to
be on its guard, and its order and union be
broken, the enemy, soon collected, form them
selves again into a body, attack you with, fury,
and make ypu repent the least negligence you
may have been guilty of in your march. Every
thing is in favour of the rebels in a country which
they occupy, and every thing against the Repub -
licans. Moreover, the former being well re
ceived, find provisions and resources of every
kind, whilst the latter are obliged to carry every
thing with them. If any soldiers should^ stray
from the army and fall into. , the . iiands of the
banditti, they are torn tp pieces,., tortured..; to
death by degrees, or burnt by a slow ..fir,©-; and
when any stragglers stop at their houses, they
only relieve them in order to retain them and
put them to death by tortures. A thousand in
stances would prove, if necessary, what I here
assert. But a general officer who commands a body of
troops in la Vendee, after he has led them on in a
military manner, directed well his march, avoided
the enemy's ambuscades, resisted all their at
tacks, or has attacked them himself with success he

( 37 )
he has done nothing : he must find a position tO
spend the night, and give repose to his army ;
and such positions are not common in la Vendee,
or rather there are no real military positions.
The general must establish himself in such man->
ner as to be able to take jspeedy^ measures, on
whatever side, he may be attacked ; and he must
not depend too much upon his advanced posts,
which are always insufficient in this country,
however well they may be formed, to guard
against a surprise. You are very seldom attacked
in front : the enemy usually fall upon your flank
and rear. They even often direct their attacks
upon you at every point at once ; and I repeat
it, they are sudden, violent, and accompanied
with hideous cries and howlings.
Above all things the general should be cautious
not to canton (30) his troops, or halt in any

(30) A general officer who, after having carried on a re
gular war upon the banks of the Moselle and the Scheldt, is
employed in la Vendee, ought to become a noviciate for two
or three months, in order to make himself acquainted with
the locality and method of Waging war in this country ; if
not, he will learn at his own expence. This is not without ,
example. I found, on my arrival in la Vendee (I was then com
mander of a brigade), a general officer commanding a division
of the army, and whom I had seen command a considerable
advanced guard upon the frontiers with ability. Without
E considering

( 38 )
towns, boroughs, or villages situated in the in
terior part of the country. (31) It is impossible
to make a victorious resistance there. They are
cut throat places, where one runs the risk of
being surprised, or surrounded by the enemy ;
strong hedges, goss bushes, and sometimes woods,
hide all the avenues. In other respects, the perfi
dious designs of the inhabitants render the stay
of the troops so dangerous, that the obstinacy
of some generals in leaving them there has oc
casioned us twenty defeats, and cost us thirty
thousand men.
The rebels derived great advantages from the
amicable dispositions of* the inhabitants that re
mained in la Vendue. Too weak to take up jirms_

considering the nature of the ground, he formed his regular
dispositions, march, and order of battle, as he would have
done in the plains of Belgium. He took with him a ivi-
merous artillery, camp equipage, baggage, and immense
train; his advanced guard was always at a great distance
from the main body of the army, &c. &c. However, some
fortunate events at first procured him success, but which.
was followed three days after by a dreadful disaster ; and his
defeat surprised me much less than his victory.
(31) The evil disposition of the inhabitants was no doubt
a sufficient reason for abandoning all the posts situated in
the centre of la Vendee ; but the local inconveniences alone
made me give them up, even after the resolution of the 2d
Ventose.

with

( 39 )
with them Jthey_ru)_less secretly favoured their
cause : they acted as their spies : the women,
and even the children, were faithful and intelli
gent agents, who minutely informed the rebel
chiefs of the slightest movements made by the
republican army. Our generals were desirous
also of having spies belonging to the country ;
they have always been betrayed or badly served
by them-; and they have never been able to
organize a plan in the Western army for ob
taining information by spies. It was after they
had discovered the certainty of these facts,
it was after having been convinced that ' the
greateft part of the inhabitants of«.la, Vendee,
without taking up arms, were not less the ac
complices, the secret .partizans of the rebels,
that'the representatives of the people with that
army took the resolution before mentioned. (32)
We have just seen what were the means, the
resources, the advantages, which la Vendee af- i
forde.d the rebels : we shall now prove that they
also derived some from the neighbouring towns '
(*32) I shall perhaps cite it again : I must be pardoned,
these repetitions. I would avoid them ; I wish to be clear..
and precise ; but all this exceeds my ability : and however
my det.ract.ers may have irrevocably decided upon the inva
lidity of my military powers, I could inake a better use of
my sword than my pen.
E 2 and

( 40 )
and cantons ; and that these succours have not
a little contributed to the support of this unhap
py war, and to weaken eyery measure employed
to terminate it.
It is certain that the greatest part of the inha
bitants of the towns, boroughs, or villages, situ
ated upon the frontiers of la Vendee, had their
estates in this country; that their tenants, or
farmers, were with the banditti, or at least fa
voured them, either through fear, conformity of,
opinion, or private interest. Hence the con
tinual communications, and the innumerable and
indispensable connexions, between the rebels and
the inhabitants bordering upon the theatre of
the war : both being united by the ties of parent-^
age, friendship, mutual interest, and even pre
judices, mixed and confounded together, con
nected as they were by these moral circumstances,
The rebels attended all fairs and assemblies ; their
wives filled the public markets ; hence innumer
able connections, cautious contrivances, commer
cial relations, and private agreements ; hence the
cause of the Vendeans and their neighbours be
came common ; hence the system of indulgence
and moderation adopted by the greatest part of
the administrations ; hence the imperfect execu
tion pf the new laws, and fresh motives of at
tachment

( 41' )
tachment to antient habits and prejudices ; hence
the effeminacy and inertness of the public func
tionaries, both civil and military, who have
sacrificed the public good in that part of France,
by giving way to local considerations and affec
tions ; hence the calumnious denunciations, the
libels and pamphlets, which have issued from all
parts against the energetic generals,, against gene
rals truly republican, who, cool and impassible
in the midst of dangers, and the snares of aristo
cracy which surrounded them in every shape,
resisting : all kind of seduction, listening neither
to the reclamations nor the interested wishes of
individuals which necessarily counteracted the
effects of general measures, have had the courage
to obey the voice of their duty alone, and to fol
low invariably the line traced out for them by
government. Thus, whilst our general officers fought against
the armed -banditti, they found themselves, in
the towns adjacent to the theatre of war, in the
midst of the accomplices of the rebellion. These
were the more dangerous as they were the more
concealed, They often covered themselves with
the cloak of patriotism : they crept into the po
pular societies, into the administrations, and even
into the republican army, where they managed, so

( 42 )
so ably as even to organise its defeats (33). The
rebel chiefs took care to preserve the property of
their secret agents from the horrors of war ; and
when they wished to invest a town upon the con
fines of la Vendee, they marked out, previous to
the attack, such of the public functionaries as
Ought to be spared (as being useful co-operators
and faithful correspondents of their party,) from
such as were destined to he, sacrificed to their
vengeance. The Vendean Generals derived a double ad
vantage from their correspondence with" the adja
cent towns ; they facilitated their military ope
rations (34), and prepared conquests for them
by opinion. The apostles of Royalty and the
Catholic religion ceased not to corrupt the pub
lic spirit and to fan the flames of fanaticism,
which, from some particular causes, was sure to
succeed in the Southern part of the Department
of la Vendee, and in that of the Deux-Sevres(35).
»
(33) Among others the Marquis de Sanglier, a volunteer
in one of the battalions. He was guillotined at Tours.
(34) When the. rebels besieged Saumur, a person named
Erangois, employed in the public offices, spiked several
pieces of cannon in the town during the siege.
(35) Where there are many Protestants; and among other
means which the agents and Catholic missionaries employed,
there is one which has often succeeded, and its result may
be considered as one of the first causes of the rebellion.' Ever

( 43 )
Against so many means which militated in fa
vour of the rebels, and which so powerfully se
conded the force of their arms, what had the
republican generals to oppose ? Plain militarv *
measures, always insufficient in this species of
war, if not supported by measures of polic\r, of
administration, and of interior police. For it is
not sufficient to fight the armed banditti, the ra
vages of opinion must be checked, the progress
of a moral epidemical disease which, threatening
all the adjacent Departments with its contagion,
will not allow us a distant prospect of the termi
nation iof the successes of the Royalifts. If vi
gorous and friendly administrations, in concert
with -the armed force, had seconded its efforts;
if our general officers could have depended upon*
the concurring aid, the coaction of their respec
tive means, they would have established without
difficulty a line of demarcation between the re
volted and neighbouring country ; they would
by that means have cut off all vicinal commu
nication, all connexion^ between the rebels and
their exterior accomplices who nurtured and pro-
Ever since the beginning of the revolution they have excited
simple and superstitious men to regret the destruction of the
ancient order of things, by causing them tp .see and dread,
by the efFefts of the measures of the new government, the
heinous triumph oi that sedt overtlie Catholics, ^-ji^. pagated

( 44 )
pagated the revolt. The Vendeans, deprived of
all foreign aid, and reduced to their own resources
alone, would soon have exhausted them (36), and
each of our victories would have carried with it a
mortal blow. But what success could the invita
tions and solicitations of the chiefs of the armed
force have with the constituted powers, which
were weak, inert, or ill disposed, when frequently
the Representatives of the People themselves could
not obtain the full and entire execution of their
mandates ? Thus our generals, compelled to con
tract their means, were only able to take half
measures, which produced fruitless victories or
disastrous checks (37).
(36) Particularly their warlike stores. It has never been
positively known how they were able to procure any after
the destruction of their establishments.
(37) The experience of more than twenty battles, which
I have witnessed in la Vendee, has convinced me that the
real advantages gained by six victories over the banditti, were
not equal to the evils suffered by a single defeat. In our vic
tories we kill but few rebels; but they kill many of our
troops in their retreats, (I believe I have mentioned the rea
son of it). Masters of the field of battle, we there find
nothing but wooden shoes, and some slain, but never any
arms or amniunition. The Vendean, pursued, hides his
gun ; if too closely pressed upon, he breaks it ; ancl, in sur
rendering his life, he very seldom leaves you his weapon.
I have seen two retreats of the Western army ; (I was
adjutant-general in the first; and a general of brigade in the
second).

( 45 )
I think I have proved, that, in order to termi
nate the horrid war of la Vendee, the first step

second). We lost many men, a prodigious humber of mus
kets, about sixty pieces of cannon, and eighty waggons.
During the first five months of the war of la Vendee, we gave
the rebels upwards of three hundred pieces of cannon, and
five hundred waggons.
We kiiow, and we ought to know, that great or decisive
battles scarcely ever owe their success to the efforts of the
artillery, which is much more dreadful than mortal.
We know that the nature of the country rarely admitted
of its use ; and that, when it could be employed, at least it
was generally impossible to give it sufficient play to promise
any great effects from it.
We know that cannon produced but little fear in the re
bels, as in the first battles, at a time when the greatest part
of them were armed only with bludgeons, they ran upon our
pieces and carried them off, even sometimes before they had
been fired.
The loss of our cannon was still nothing when compared
to the loss of the waggons. The scarcity of powder was al
ready felt by the Republic ; and we carried ours to the
enemy, who had yet no establishments where they could
make any.
The rebels, consulting locality, and being more dextrous
than us, carried scarcely any artillery with them ; -four or
five pieces sufficed for an army of thirty or forty thousand
men ; they were generally eight pounders, the most proper
calibre for a campaign war. Sparing of ammunition, they
took but few waggons with them; one alone served to suppjy
two or three pieces. They well knew that it was not artil
lery that would procure them the victory ; and they have
F long

( 46 )
necessary to have been taken was to establish a
Mine of demarcation between the country in re
bellion, and those where example, fear, and con
formity of opinions and prejudices, might cause
the revolt to spread, and increase, by an inevit
able junction, the main body of la Vendee.
The object, then proposed by the Represen
tatives of the People on mission in the West,
after their resolution of the 2d Ventose, was, not
only to separate the rebels from their accomplices,
who remained in the country under pretence of
neutrality; but also, by military operations, to
cut off all communication between them and their,
partizans, who were dispersed throughout the
neighbouring cantons of la Vendee.

long since determined it without these accessary means, to
which generally too much importance is attached, and which
causes courage to degenerate, because it accustoms to fight
at a distance and in disorder.
Hence it results, that, when we Had met with a disasterous
affair, we lost fifteen, twenty, pr twenty-five pieces of can
non, and waggons in proportion, (the banditti employed our
gun cartridges to the use of their muskets) ; and that, when
we gained in a victory two or three pieces of cannon, it was
without any ammunition.
After these cpnsiderations, how happens it that all our
general officers who have served in la Vendee, and, no doubt,
.gome of them are well informed, have persisted in carrying
artillery there ? It

( 4; )
It must be allowed that this measure, adopted
by the Representatives Hentz, Garrau, Prieur,
and Francastel, is, of all those Which have been
employed since the beginning of this war, the
only important one, and ¦ the only one, I think,
which could terminate it. All others^ after ex
perience, have been acknowledged to be inade
quate, some impossible to execute, and most of
them dangerous for those charged with their exe*
cution. For such is the nature of things, and
the power of circumstances, in the infamous coun
try too well known by the name of la Vendee, that
a public functionary, either civil or military,
who rapidly performed his duty, always found
himself exposed to danger ; and I speak here of
every agent, whatever might be his rank in the
hierarchy of powers, whose gradations they could
rarely follow to secure a clear responsibility.
Thus the fear entertained by honest but timid
functionaries on account of a dreadful and, per
haps, exaggerated responsibility, which it was
impossible not to be exposed to (39) when in
such difficult and imperious circumstances,

(39) Such of my readers as are acquainted with la Ven
dee, Swill understand me : perhaps, an explanation may be "
due to others ; but that explanation would lead me too far.
F 2 obliged

( 48 )
obliged the public functionary to take an ener
getic and speedy resolution, which the urgency
of the case, and the distance of the first authori
ties (40) would not admit of being submitted to
their sanction ; thus, and in this uncertain hy
pothesis, the fear of exposing himself, made al
ways the weak, timid, and irresolute agent,
adopt half measures, sometimes useless, more fre
quently contrary to the public interest, but which
secured his personal safety. The uncertain and
timid course pursued by subordinate persons, was
partly the effect, and the necessary consequence
of the half measures (41) so long practised, in
order to stifle the war in la Vendee, and to which
we may principally attribute the amazing success
of the rebels.

(40) It will be readily understood that I here speak of the
Representatives on mission.
I have more than once observed, that the presence of the
Representatives of the people impressed a kind of awe, salu
tary no doubt if only equivocal and evil minded men had fel*
it; but which, sometimes, faithful and honest agents have
not known how to repel.
(41) We shall see, in the subsequent part of this work,
that the rebels were indebted to the supineness of the agents
of government and the administrators for their first successes,
and that the use of half measures and palliatives had nearly
ruined the public cause. It

( 49 )
It may easily be judged, by the disclosure of
my general plan, whether the military measures
I had adopted, supported the views of the Repre
sentatives of the People ; if in other respects they
were combined according to the nature of the
ground, the political situation of the Vendeans,
the discouragement, the kind of inertness to
which they were reduced by the successes of my
predecessors, and, I dare say, my own. One
shall judge whether these measures could be easily
put in execution ; whether they did not tend,
above all things, to spare republican blood,
which has sometimes been so uselessly lavished in
la' Vendee ; whether they united the operations
of the different fragments of the army ; whether
they did not impress upon them that coherence,
that simultaneousness in the motions never
known, or at least never practised in the WestP
I appeal to all who are acquainted with la Vendee,
particularly to able officers, and those who are
acquainted with the locality of the country, to
pass judgment upon this plan, which, being
unacquainted with it, they have censured so
much, because they rather wished to accuse the
author than his work.
But, before I present the analysis of my ge
neral dispositions in the West, I shall just
take

( 50 )
take a cursory view of the different periods of
the war, relate the principal events of it, and
exhibit the clearest causes of the prosperity and
decline of the Royalist party in this. part of the
Republic.

END OP THE FIRST PAET.

MEMOIRS

FOR THE

HISTORY

OF THE

WAR of LA VENDEE.

PART THE SECOND.
JT ROM the moment that the white flag was
hoisted in la Vendee, (March 10 1 703,0. S.), revolts
broke out in all parts. ITwas even general among
the inhabitants of the, country, who fell upon the
cities and towns, where they experienced little or
no resistance. The constituted authorities, a-
larmed at this terrible irruption, which ought to
be attributed pardy to the improvidence of some,
and the treachery of others, and without the
means of repression, were obliged to yield to the
rebels. Some patriotic administrators abandoned
the country ; others, more courageous, remained
at their posts, and vainly opposed to the arms of
the

( 52 )
the insurgents the force of their character and
the shield of the law. Weakness and corruption
became the principal agents of the Royalist party.
The rebels not meeting with any sort of resist
ance made such rapid progress, that in less than
two months they were masters of le Marais, Lo-
roux, and the greatest part of le Bocage. Already
they had taken possesion of Machecoul, Lege,
Clisson, Montaigu, Saint-Fulgent, les Herbiers,
Mortagne, Tiffauges, Beaupreau, Saint-Florent,
Chalonnes, Chollet, Maulevrier, Chatillon, &c. &c.
They made recruits in these towns and found in
them arms (l) and some military stores. They
then formed several corps of ten and twelve thou-

(1) The people of la Vendee began the war with pitch
forks and bludgeons ; but they were not long before they had
muskets. Several communes had been disarmed at the period
of the first movements, which had taken place in 1791 and
1 792 '¦ those municipalities, which preserved their arms were
attacked the first and compelled to deliver them up. Besides
these the rebels found a considerable quantity in the country
houses of the nobility. Many were armed with double-bar
relled fowling pieces, carabines, blunderbusses, arquebuses,
&c. Of these they procured a great number by their victo
ries over the national guards sent against them at the com
mencement of the insurrection, and afterwards over our re
gular troops. It has been said that they had also received
some arms from abroad : I have on this report no positive
knowledge of the faft. sand

( 53 )
sand men each ; they attacked different points at
the same time and always with success. (2)
' A croud of priests, of 'nobles, of mal-contents
©f every description soon united together in the
principal of the conquered cities. Deserters,
both Frenchmen and foreigners, antient custom
house officers, game-keepers, smugglers, servants
prompted by their masters, or whom their emi-

(2) He must be very ignorant or very {knavish, who
assigns an, accidental and instantaneous cause for the
revolt of Bas-Poitou. The Royalists had nourished it in
the 'bud for a long time. Was it the raising of 300,000
men that occasioned partial insurrections, in 1791 and
1792 : Was it the raising of 300,000 men that had
united, from the commencement of the revolution, so many
priests and nobles in different parts of Poitou ? Was it the
raising of 300,000 men which from the year 1791 had de
stroyed all commercial connections^ prevented the circula
tion of -assignats, retained in la Vendee every article of sub
sistence, that was destined to support the neighbouring coun
try, and particularly our 'coasts from Brest toGironde, and'
which had organized famine in all the places bordering., upon ¦
the revolted" Department? &c. &c. Certainly, he must be
difficult in .proofs who does not find in these preparatory
means the indications of a plan profoundly conceived ; of a
plan the execution of which has been obstructed by various-
unforeseen events, among' others the death of La Royerie ;
of a plan which yet exists and which is connected with that
«f our exterior enemies. G oration

( 54 )
gration had left without any employment ; in 'a
word counter-revolutionists of all classes flocked
from all parts of the Republic into la Vendee,
and prodigiously encreased the Royalist party, to
which its first successes had already given a dan
gerous consistency.
However, as the rebels (3) had not yet seized
upon the chief town of any Department the sUt
perior administrative bodies appeared willing
to oppose their progress. They united at dif
ferent points several batallions of national guards.
Some of the superior officers were selected to
consult about operations with the constituted au
thorities, who, presuming to entertamjdjmbtS' of
the Republic, uncertain of thej&nseque^ceXJriSI
those insurrectional movements, manifested from
that time by their irresolutipn, or the weakness
of their measures, if not their being accomplices
of the rebels, at least their desire to be neutral
and to await the result of subsequent events be
fore they took an avowed determination. The
leaders of the armed force, become generals with
out the appointment of government, necessarily

(3) That is to say before the 29th of May 1793, O. S,
a day on whiph the banditti, after a signal viftory, took jpos-
session of Fontenay-le-Peuple, chief towp of the Department
of la Vendee. influenced

( 55 )
influenced by the civil authorities, which directed
them, obliged to make war without plan and
with soldiers raised in haste, who could neither
have been disciplined, nor inured to hardship,
nor practised' in manoeuvre, and besides very
inferior in number, were constantly beaten by
the rebels,, who derived great advantages from
those easy victories by the quantity of arms
and ammunition which the vanquished troops
abandoned (4) to them.
At last the government, from whom Undoubt
edly the true state of things must have been till
then concealed, fixed their attention on la Ven
dee, and sent there a few general officers with
some detachments of regular troops. These
succours, which a month sooner would have re
pressed the revolt, were then insufficient to ex
tinguish it. They were rendered still more feeble
by scattering the good troops and mixing ambnj
them the newly formed batallions composed
(4) Why were these victories so advantageous to the re
bels ? Because the soldiers whom we then employed in la
Vendee, broken at the first shock of the enemy, began by
throwing away their firelocks and cartouch boxes, and the
field of battle was covered with arms and accoutrements : so
that in an affair in which we lost 200 or 300 men, the Ven
deans gained 1200 or 1500 muskets, &c. &c.
G2 in

( 56 )
in part of fathers of families ; whereas at this
crisis the most warlike troops, would have been
necessary to balance' only the advantages which
the rebels owed to local situation, to their supe
riority in the habit of using fire-arms, in fine to
the habit of victory.
We ought to attribute in part the astonishing
progress of the Vendeans to their submission
and their^entirej^Mifidejac^in. their generals and
their priests. The latter, then confined to hold
a secondary rank, were most useful co-operators
to the party. They assisted the chiefs powerfully
by all the manoeuvres familiar to the apostles of
fanaticism. They presented them every, where
as the. saviours of Religion and of .Royalty; as
men appointed by God himself to guide his peo
ple and protect his worship. Thc^se - priests, had
of course the gift of prophecy. They, em
ployed also the resources i of magic to convince, -
by means of impostures, , minds that were heated,
and already too much disposed to enthusiasm.
and to the wonderful, by ignorance and supersti
tion. Miracles were soon spoken of in la Ven
dee : here the Virgin had-appeared in person to.
consecrate an altar provisionally erected in the
woods ; there the Son of God himself had des"-.
cended from heaven to assist at a benediction of
the"

( 57 )
the colours ; in another place Angels had been
seen, adorned with their wings and rays (5), an
nouncing a,nd promising victory to the defenders
ef the^ltar jmdjheJThrjgne. (6)
These supernatural occurrences always hap
pened at night, and often on the eve of an expe
dition. They formed the chief subject of the
sermons of the day, in which the preachers, the
missionaries of the party, warranted to the victims
of battle a glorious resurrection in this life (7) as
(5) Many of these ridiculous scenes took place in the"
woods near Chemille, since the year 1792 ; that is to say
nine or ten months before the war. It should be remembered
that at this epoch there had been movements in la Vendee.
The government sent commissioners there who only palliated
the evil, and who, supposing they were faithful, were, how
ever too ignorant of the place and of the arts employed for
a long time by the enemies of the Republic to suppress the
germ of the revolt. The immediate presence of a consider
able armed force was then requisite to bridle that wretched
country. The commissioners made fine speeches which could
not, however, counteract in the minds of the Vendeans the
effect of the sermons and- pastoral instructions of their
priests ; and these commissioners thought they left la Ven
dee in peace,
(6) This was the favourite qualification of the chiefs of,
la Vendee. (7) It is proved that the Vendeans believed for a long
time that they would revive three days after their death.
Wives and mothers used to preserve the bodies of their chil
dren and their husband?,
well

( 56 )
well as in the other. To all this was added the
celebration of mass, and the Vendeans intoxicated
with all the poisons of fanaticism, quitted their
churches only to rush upon the enemy, faced
with audacity the greatest dangers, sure to con
quer or to receive in death the palm of martyr
dom. Another cause contributed to give the chiefs of
la Vendee this despotic influence which was ne
cessaiy to enable them to govern a party com
posed of so many heterogenous elements. In
this croud of counter-revolutionists which the re
volt had rallied in Poitou, there were found jndi
viduals of high name, titled men of quality. Those
who had directed the first movements of the re
bels, and Who, for the most part were but simple
^-^country gentlemen, knew how to avail themselves
of circumstances to maintain themselves at the.
head of the party ; and they were much sought
after and caressed by these men of high nobility,
of whom they we-re only the feudatories, the
vassals in the order of the feudal hierachy, and
who- in other times would have, without doubt,
disdainedtheir succour and assistance. Thus we
saw the Talmonts, the d'Autichamps, the Les-
cures, &c. closely connected with obscure beings,
such as Pyron, Joly, Stoffiet, Charette, &c. and the

( 50 )
the former, as well as the latter, happy to be the
lieutenants of the Beauchamps and the d'ElbeeS.
We ought to place in the number of the causes
of the astonishing prosperity of the rebels the
species of madness, of ebriety, which they derived
from unexpected successes. These would serve
but to augment their confidence in their generals,
whose efforts and talents were each day crowned
with victory. Add to this the critical situation
of the Republic, whose misfortunes these chiefs
took great 'care to exaggerate; the rapid and
victorious march ofjthe Austrian and Prussian
armies on our frontiers ; the little consistency of
our military forces in the West ; the hope to
bring over to the Royalist party the firft generals
employed by the Republic .in la Vendee/ or at
least to disperse them, to lead them to inacti
vity; (8) the frequent desertions of the troops of
the line ; even of considerable parts- of different
Corps sent to the banks of the Loire ; (g) the
public mind corrupted in all the neighbouring
(8) Such as the commander in chief Biron, I dont know
if it was good policy to send a man of the. highest rank,
whom his connexions ought to have rendered justly sus-
jpected, to attack a party that wished for a King, for Priests
and Nobles.
(9) I speak of the Legion of Rosental and of the Germanic
Legion, The latter was disbanded at Touts during the last
days

( 60- )
Departments,, in consequence of the correspon
dence and manoeuvres of the agents whd were
secret accomplices of the revolted citizens ; about
200,000 soldiers, half of -whom were armed with-
firelocks, and already inured to warfare by twenty
battles, or rather by twenty brilliant victories, se
connected by local situation and by the dispo
sition of their posts that, if I may be allowed so
tp express myself, ' they seemed to form but one
square batallion, placed on a central point, the
diagonals of which they traversed alternately in
masses of 30,000, • 40,000, ^ 50,000 men, &c. &c.
These were the principal motives of hope and en
couragement that animated the people of la Ven
dee. Such was the confidence of the chiefs of the
Royalist party in their forces, their means, their
resources, that they disdained in the time of their
prosperity to demand foreign succour. They
did not call for it until they had lost their political
consistency. (10)
days of June. The greatest part of the soldiers (especially
those of the cavalry) who composed it, went over to the
enemy with arms and baggage.
(10) It is when a party is fortunate that it should seek
auxiliaries to maintain its power. Misfortune does not
niake allies for iis.
The'

( 61 )
•^The defenders of the Altar and the Throne,
seeing the mass of their proselytes augmenting
daily, perceived the necessity of establishing a
government, to regulate the political movements
of their new state> to direct alike all its parts, to
repress all ambition distinct from the general
causey and to prevent so many various interests
from dividing themselves, from counteracting
and crossing each other, and from injuring by in
dividuals .pretensions the harmony of military
operations and of administrations. They formed
g Sovereign council^ composed of several general-
officers (l l), of priests, and of some other agents,
Strangers to the profession of arms. This sove
reign council united in itself all authority ; the
acts which emanated from it . were made in the
name of Louis the Seventeenth. The ancient
laws, substituted in place of the new ones, pre
served to la Vendee monarchical forms, The
national money was proscribed, and an assignat
could not have currency unless invested with the
Signatures. of several members of the council.
"* The sovereign council made frequent procla-
- fhations, to nourish in the Vendeans hatred to the

(11) Among others, of d'Elbee, Lescure, des Essarts, Stof-
flet, Fleurlot, Beauchamp, &c. Bernard of Marigny pre*
gidedi The council was held at Chatillon.
H Republic,

{ 62 )
Republic, attachment', to the Catholic religion,
and to Royalty.,; they, jelated in them, ikey exagT
gerated the successes of our exteriqr^ enemies, and
they dissembled our factories.
( , They .supposed that . most of the provinces
were in open revolt against the National .Conven
tion and the Republican Government. The, cir
cumstances which took place on the subject, of
Federalism (12), and the divisions in the French

(12) It is not for a soldier,' ' or cupied solely in his profes
sion, and who has not' quitted the army since the beginning
of the war, tp'decide, to pronounce concgrningjgreat party
disputes, in which tlie Commonwealth, is too often, forgotten.
Two words, however, upon Federalism. From the time it
became the subject, of discussion, some pretended'partizans
of the unity of the Republic, animated with- a zeal which
6 ught to have been suspefted, because it was exclusive,
sought for j every where, and of 'course found every where,
abettors of-.tliis new faction. A multitude of men, who
were called Federalists, were pursued, persecuted, impri
soned, transported, guillotined. It'scemed as if they were
known -by their countenances. -It was then said — -the Hydra
of Federalism is cast down, and the Republic is saved. Very well.
At'present, they say that Federalism is but a name,; that Fede
ralism has never existed: Be it so ; although it does, not appear
to me'to be well proved. But for this, is it necessary to re
vive -all -the-causes- of- hatred, to- exercise new vengeance ?
Must the persecuted become persecutors, and the^onqnprors
of the day be as little generous, as those of yesterday ? True
patriots lament the- mournful effetts, which, the turps of po-
,":. .: , t H litical

( 621 )
senate at this epoch, had' shaken the public con
fidence. This was a favourable occasion for the
chiefs of the rebels to increase their power, and
to give to la Vendee some influence over pur' po
litical system. From hence the project of several
members of the council, and particularly of the
Generalissimo d'Elbee "to direct military opera
tions, to atte'mpt conquests towards the 'South,
where most of the Departments, agitated, wrought
upofl in every way by the agents of the different
parties that rent the Republic, not decided on the
conduct they should pursue in such difficult con
junctures, seemed to seek a fallying point. " Let
us turn to "these wretched times, let us recollect
the violent crisis, the terrible convulsions that
France experienced, and the cruel uncertainty of
her destinies, and we may judge how many
Chances these deplorable circumstances offered
to" the Royalist party. Oh liberty !_Ohj_ my
c6^nttYj_How niany dangers ye^menac_Q,.$QU.J.
'May God avert them 1 — But let us return to la
Vendee,

liticaj chance, and the. sanguinary struggle of parties, have
hitherto produced, Is it not time to adjourn, or rather to
smother our quarrels, aud to occupy ourselves a little more
ajbout the public cause > I hope I shall be pardoned this di
gression. ¦
H 2 The

:< 64 )
The-sovereign council determined •tha.s.g mili-
tary plans, the execution of which had been . al
ways so successful, until the ambition and rivalr
ship of some general officers had fettered it, and
their obstinacy in thwarting the projects of the
council, and eluding it's orders, had occasioned
several important expeditions to fail, J shall
speak again pn this prime cause qf the decline of
the party. _,_p; , . . » ,
The principal object pf the chiefs of the rebels
was, and ought to be, tp, organize the army;
without which, the. crpwd pf adventurers scat
tered through la Vendee, whose number wa$-
daily augmented, might give offence tp the inha^
bitants of the country, atjandqn t-hemselyes to the
excesses which follpw from want of discipline and
prganizatjon, and. this armed mags, composed of
so many different elements, might be nq more
than a principle of disorder, and .cqnfusjom They
formed different corps. of infantry>(l3), of ca-:
valry, and even pf artillery, from among the fo
reign recruits : it was the troops who were paid
(14) and disciplined that formed the strength of
(13) They had, among others, a corps of infantry, com
posed chiefly of foreign deserters, who bore the name of
Avengers cf the Crown.
(14) There were some corps which were not paid, rnostly
the free companies : but every thing necessary for them waa-
p'rovMed in abundance. - ' the

( 65 )
the ;army, All the natives of the country,, in
whom consisted its chief force, on account of
ifheir numbers, were classed into companies, the
companies into communes, the communes into
divisions. This troop was never assembled but
to go on expeditions. One or more divisions of
it were united at the point nearest to that which
was intended to be attacked : to these were joined
3 part, a strong detachment of the regular troops,
and they marched against the enemy. When the
expedition was finished, the activity of the inha
bitants ceased, who, whether conquerors or van
quished, returned to their own homes (15). But
they were easily assembled next day, if necessary.
In most pf the villages, relays were prepared for
the couriers (16) who carried the orders of the
sovereign council and of the generals, and the
Vendean at the least signal, on the first notice,
quitted his hoe for his musket, and appeared at
the rendezvous full pf audacity and confidence.
They went to battle as to- a feast : women, old
men, priests, even children of twelve or thirteen

(15) It was spldom they were kept together two or three
successive days, and never for a longer time.
(16) Orders were circulated with the greatest facility,
all the commanding situations being near each other, and the
pommunicatipia open. years

( 66 )
years of age (1.7), (and Ihave seen some of fherrt
slain in .the ifirst ranks, of the army) excited and
partook of the fury .'of the soldiers.' It was this
species -pf madness 'andr enthusiasm that, in the'
3ges io£ darkness and ignorance, nrged our first
crusaders to the burning plains of Africa and Asia.1
The defenders of the Altar and the Throne seemed
to have itakea ¦ our ancient worthies for models.-
Their -banners were .brnanxented with device*
which recalled, the- high deeds of chivalry. Their
wives, Jrheii mistresses, signalized themselves- by
a courage: above their sex,- arid, -above all, by a
ferocity which' disgraced it.' r 'New Camillas, new
Penthesileas, were seen - braving every ' danger,:
and bearing terror and death into the. ranks of
the republican army (i a) ; and, after victory, as*
¦ ¦¦ '¦ ¦¦ -' ¦ ¦ ~'i  :  -  i  -,
(17) Neu, pueri, neu tanta animis assuescite bella, *
Neu patrj^Kalidas in -viscera vertite vires. ---
-,.it.4;-V \>(,.: ..,i;li\: :o .il :^n.eid, 1. 6.
, ( ! 8) Among others one la Rochefoucauk, and a young wih
man named Lescure, sister of one qf the chiefs, , who, gave in, .
several combats' 'examples of intrepidity. The latter was at
the attack. of Thouars (Sept. 14, 1/-92, O. S.) which her bro-:
ther dire£ted, and where he was vanquished.. At this battle,
there was a woman who served af. an eight pounder during
the whole of the a&ion, and who did not abandon it but
With life. They assure us it. was la Lescure.
" There were many women killed 'in different affairs.. In
that of Geste (Pluviose, second year) one ojf the chiefs of the
s. bandit^

( 67 )
sistihg with z barbarous joy at the long and san
guinary tortures which the unfortunate prisoners
were made to ¦.undergo (19).
Among the chiefs of la -Vendee H were distin
guished d'Elbee, elected Generalissimo, Bon-
champ, Lescure,. Bernard : of Marigny^ Pyron,
Domanie (20), the Prince devTalmoat, d*Auti-
ohamp, Stofflet, la Roche Jacqiielin, the two
Fleuriots; the two de Bruc, Langremere, la
Haye • des OrmeSy Saint Hilaire, d'Auterive, Gas1-
ton, la Roche-Saint-Andre, Rostaihg^ Souleyrac,

banditti army was a woman dressed in man's apparel. Three
times' she rallied' her broken troops, and led them back to
battle j then she found death. '<¦'¦'¦ "¦'"•
(19) Among the .acts, of perfidy and atrocity which have
been committed in la Vendee by women, there is one which
I cannpt help relating^ General Dufour passed through. a
wood at the'head of a column': his flanking parties brought
him two ' young girls, whose rappcarance bespoke a gen
teel. '-education. They inEtfctted the". General to proteft
their honour and their lives ; and he, to render both more se
cure, sends them under an escort to an habitation not far
offff, -Tdn *or twelve stragglers . stop there :'; these, two girls
myite the'm to rest themselves>':give ithem drink, and, after
the departure of the republican column, the^ make a party
of the banditti surround their house, and massacre the vo
lunteers whom they had detained in it.:
(20) Killed at the. siege of Saumur. He commanded the
cavalry, . ; : -;. ; ¦. .. • . ¦:
. . ; ./¦ Berard,

t 68 )
Berafd, Savin, Catelinau, Charette, la' Catheli^
niere, Joly, Sapineau, Baudry, la Roberie, &c.
&c. They had all in view the same end, the re-
establishment of the Catholic religion, of the No
bility, and of Royalty : but all possessed ambi
tion, and some had pretensions to the supreme
command, chiefly Talmont and d'Autichamp,
who thought their birth entitled them to it ; and
Charette, who was supported by a numerous
party. Nevertheless, d'Elbee was elected Gene*
ralissimo, and from thence Charette separated
himself from them in discontent. He had
40,000 men under his command: he brought
with him Joly, Savin, la Roberie, and some other:
chiefs of less note, and was joined by la Catheli-
niere, who commanded 12,000 men in the neigh
bourhood of Machecoul and Prince\ Bon-
champ, whom his military talents rendered him
a worthy competitor of d'Elbee (21), remained
with him, as well as the other general officers.

(2 1 ) During the. five first months of the war, d'Elbee pre*
served, his prisoners ; many of them suffered themselves to be
corrupted, and joined the army of the rebels. The others,
and they were the greatest number, underwent the severest
treatment. They were often threatened with being sent to^
Charette, the most ferociouaof all the chiefs, which would
have been to send them, to die. Some perished, and the rest-
were

( 69 )
There were then two very distinct armies.
The principal army called the Catholic and Royal
army, otherwise the army of Anjou and of Up
per Poitou, commanded by d'Elbee, and the
other called the army of Lower Poitou, or tlie
army of Jesus, directed by Charette, much less
considerable than the other, under the command
of the Generalissimo, but he could not dispose
of it as he pleased, because the hatred that Cha
rette bore to him made that chief always separate
his plans and operations from those of the grand
army. Both armies had, as I have said, two kinds of
troops ; but the army of d'Elbee (22) much

were delivered by the Republican army after trie viftory
at Chollet, (Odtober 1793, O. S.). From this- period no more
prisoners were made on either side ; with this difference
that the Republicans were contented with shooting the Ven
deans, and that the Vendeans made our soldiers suffer un
heard of punishments.
When Charette took Machecoul the second time, . he
caused all the patriots of the city to be assembled, added to
them some prisoners he had taken in the^battle, and thus
seven or eight hundred men were shot together. They were
thrown confusedly into a ditch, which was immediately filled
up. The greater part of these unfortunate persons were only
wounded and were buried alive.
(22) D'Elbee was a, nobleman of Poitou. Born' to a slen
der fortune, he went very young into Saxony, where he
I had

( 70 )
ftronger than the other, and particularly so in the
regular troops composed of foreigners. There
followed it, also, a great number of men, whose
name, fortune, or more particular connections
with the leaders, separated them from the crowd,
and who served as volunteers.

had some relations, (I believe I have heard him say his mo
ther was a Saxon) and there he entered into the service,
but not making silch rapid progress as he might have ex
pected from being 'a foreigner and from his talents, here-
turned to France, and entered as Lieutenant in the Dauphin
regiment of cavalry. In a little time afterwards he solicited
a company, and discontented at being refused, he quitted
the service and retired to his estate near Beaupreau. He
possessed the confidence of his district. He knew how to
augment it at the epoch of the revolution by making connec
tions that prepared for him such influence in the country
as was necessary to direct, the meditated insurrection. He
did not however take any part in the first movements, which
he considered as premature; nor was it till the first days of
April, when a strong party of the rebels came to seek him,
that he put himself at their head. D'Elbee thought the re
volt had broke out too soon in Poitou, because according to
his plan, which was also that of la Royerie, it ought to have
manifested itself at the same time' in Brittany and in Anjou.
To an agreeable and distinguished appearance, d'Elbee
united the character and the talents necessary for the leader
of a party. A consummate soldier he formed the Vendeans
to fight in such a manner as was most conformable to the
nature of the. place, and the genius of that people. Con
vinced that the success of most battles depends on the vio
lence

( 71 )
In organising the military force, great atten
tion was paid as well to the persons who composed
it as to the means of providing them with every
necessary supply.
lence of the first shock, and consequently that the chances
are in favour of a violent and impetuous attack, above all iu
a broken and covered country, where it is almost impossible
to rally a broken army, he always procured to the rebels the
advantages of aggression He never suffered himself to be
attacked; though in superior force, and even in a situation
favourable for defence. This is the art with which he com
bined and directed his attacks : he knew how to give to the
charge of his troops an action, an impulse so rapid that it
was, I may say, irresistible ; although he almost always
fought in a parallel order, it was his skill in advancing to
wards and turning the flanks of the enemy, in avoiding to
engage his cavalry, always too weak to promise success, in
placing it in the second line and in rendering ours useless by
his dispositions, in employing but little artillery, in forseeing
and calculating so well the consequences of an affair that
defeat occasioned him but little loss, and that victory pro
cured him considerable advantages. In fine, it was his sys
tem of acting always in a mass against the Republican army,
which circumstances and sometimes the ignorance of its ge
nerals obliged to act only in detachments, that occasioned
him to gain twenty signal victories. His lieutenants were
beaten every time they departed from his principles.
D'Elbee was gifted with eloquence. He expressed himself
with grace and facilitv. His eloquence was soft and per
suasive. He knew well how to vary his action and his tones.
With the rebels, he often assumed the' manner pf a person
I 2 inspired,

( 72 )
It had its commissaries, its treasurers, its agents
of every kind, very active, very intelligent, and
above all very faithful. (23)

inspired, and he had so far acquired their confidence "and
their attachment that after his death I have seen the Ven
dean prisoners shed tears when they heard his name pro
nounced. Wounded in the affair of Chollet, he took refuge in the
Island of Noirmoutier. His chagrin and the little care he
had taken pf his wound had rendered it mortal. He was shot
according to the sentence of the military commission.
D'Elbee was 42 years of age, He was so weak that he was
obliged to be carried to the place of his punishment.
Bonchamp was the only general officer of whom d'Elbee
made particular account. He looked upon Stofflet and
Pyron as very useful officers. He seemed to entertain no
thing but contempt for Charette.
(23) There is no example of an agent of the Royalist party
having betrayed it, or even quitted it voluntarily.
A gentleman of la Vendee of the name of Dupuis, who
had served in the regiment of Bearn, and had become Aide-
de-camp to Langreniere, was suprised in'Argenton-le:Peuple'
by a party of hussars.
I knew this young man had been much with the gene
ral-officers of the rebels, and that he could give me im
portant information. I employed every possible means to
engage him to make known to me the projects of the enemy.
I went so far as to promise him life, which some tender
connections might cause him to regret ; but it was impossi
ble for me to draw a word from him. He was guillotined
at Saumur, and died with great courage. .Magazines

( 73 )
Magazines of warlike stores and establishments
for the fabrication of arms were formed. A great
quantity of gun-powder was made every day in
several towns, particularly at Mortagne and at
Beaupreau. It is astonishing that all the opera
tions of administration and of interior organi
zation, which seemed to leave no time to the
leaders for other occupations, did not slacken the
course of military operations ; for they fought
almost every day, and often in several places at
once. Ii is also astonishing that in the midst
of this agitation and continual movement, in
separable from the daily events of this terrible
war, the fields were cultivated and agriculture
did not seem to suffer from the frequent but
always momentary absence of the Vendeans.
While the chiefs of the Royalist party laid in
la Vendee, the foundations of a formidable power,
which, attacking the Republic in its center, se
conded, by this interior diversion, the irruption
of foreign satellites on our frontiers ; the army of
the West, then the army of the coast of Rochelle,
began to assume consistency and force. Some
troops had been detached from the army of the
North, out of which were formed several batal
lions, called the batallions of Orleans, the city
in which they were organized. The army was
also augmented with some batallions sent sponta
neously

( 74 )
neously into la Vendee by several Departments,
and lastly with some cavalry and a few batallions
of chasseurs. These troops were divided over
different pqints of the semi-circle (24) which
was formed by the Republican army about la,
Vendee. This system might have been good to
stop the progress of the rebels, but we should
have confined ourselves then, and until the army
had been more considerable, to a defensive war ;
to fortify all the posts that were occupied by us,
chiefly those of the first line, and to organize in
them means of resistance proportioned to the
means of attack, to the audacity, and the intrepi
dity of the assailants.
The Republican army, thus dispersed over an
immense extent, did not present at any point
sufficient force to act offensively : yet this was
done. Attacks were made alternately on all
sides without order, without plan, without con
cert or unanimity in the operations ; and by this
partial and successive movement of different di
visions and sub-divisions of the army, we forced
(24) The territory in charge of the Western army was
divided by the Loire into two parts nearly equal. The army
formed a circle round the revolted country, and the river
was the diameter of it. But at this epoch the right bank
giving no uneasiness, almost all our forces were directed to
the left. the

( 75 )
the enemy to make counter-movements on the
offensive. We were beaten every where, and
indeed nothing less could be expected.
This partial and solitary aggression of each
detachment of the Republican army, was attended
with melancholy consequences. It was weakened
in men, and so much discouraged that it was im
possible to preserve all the posts of the firft or
even of the second line, which were successively
carried by the Vendeans. These people, attacked
in their haunts by inferior forces, soon passed the
bounds which they would not perhaps have
been able to break, if, as I have said, the Repub
lican Generals had adopted, at least for some time,
the defensive system (25), and had endeavoured
(25) In standing on the defensive, you would have forced
the banditti to leave the strong country to attack you on the
plain or in your entrenched positions, then you would have
prevented the extreme inequality of your forces : you could
have brought forth a great part of your artiUery; you would
have preserved the superiority of your light cavalry who.
beat the rebels upon every occasion where they were able to
act and to spread themselves ; you would have given encou
ragement and confidence to your soldiers) chiefly to your
new levies (whom the verv cry of There are the banditti, made
them run away ten leagues) by making them fight in places
of resistance, in fortified posts ; the more so as the Vendeans
never knew how to attack the leaft work of a fortification.
Of this we have been since convinced, by seeing them mis
carry before les Sables, Nantes, Angers, Granville, &c. to

( 76 )
to cut off all communications with the rest of the
country, the effect of which, when open, was to
augment daily the strength of la Vendee.
The banditti, after haying carried all the out
posts which covered Fontenay, Niort, Parthenay,
Thouars, Doue, &c. shewed themselves in the
plains at several points, in masses of 40, 50, and
60,000 men : and many very sharp and bloody
affairs happened. Some corps of the Republican
army, victims to the inexperience of the Gene
rals, and of the disastrous system which was then
followed, were cut to pieces. A short resistance
was made in some unfortified posts, but the con
test was too unequal. The rebels were conque
rors every where, and, in less than fifteen days;
carried Fontenay-le-Peuple, Parthenay, Thouars,
Doue, all the intermediate posts, and at last Sau
mur (26), June Q, 1793: and, whilst they ob
tained these advantages in 'the East and South-
Eastern parts of la Vendee, they conducted them
selves with the same audacity and the same supe
riority in the Western part, and the divisions of
Charette's army menaced Nantes, and advanced
even to the cannon of ks Sables.

(26X.I shall enter into some details concerning the capture
of this town. It

( 77 )
It was in this general inundation of la Vendee
over the surrounding plains, that it became easy to
know the immense resources of a party which we
appeared to disdain. Its power and its forces
could no longer be dissembled; and certainly
they were very culpable who, being spectators of
its terrifying progress, deceived government with
regard to the political and military situation of
the rebels ; or the government itself (27), who

(27) But, I shall be told, that, -at this time, all Francp
was not armed ; we had not 1,200,000 men formed into regi
ments : the enemy menaced our frontiers on all sides ; and
if, in the origin of the war of la Vendee, the government
did not send more and better troops there, it was from ina
bility. I mention this objection, because" it was made to
me. It is not difficult to overthrow it.
I know that, at the time when civil war wSs kindled in
the West, our principal military forces were divided between
the two armies acting on the Moselle and in thi -North ; that
the plan, of General Bournonville, and the disastrous cam
paign of Treves, which was the consequence of it, had
ruined the first; that the second, directed by Dumourier,
(who is not perhaps such a stranger to the war of la Vendee
as he is believed to be), were entirely disorganized, and, be
sides, diminished one -half by four successive defeats, &e;
But still our frontiers were not broke through ; none of our
fortresses of the first line were attacked, and seven or eight
thousand good troops sent into la Vendee at the end of
March would have been enough to repress the insurrection, es
pecially as the leaders had not been able to effedt a revolt in
,K Brittany,

( 76 )
knew all the extent of the evil, ought to reproach
itself for having taken such feeble measures to
contend in la Vendee with the Royalist party, the
fury and exertions of which, always successful,
threatened France with a total subversion-
I ought to place here some observations on the
reproach so often made against our General Of
ficers who have been employed in the Army of
the. Coasts of Rochelle, of having divided their
forces too much. Let us see how far this reproach
is well founded. Let us examine if those who
have accused the Generals knew precisely what
they meant by this pretended division, of forces.
By following me with some attention, it will be
found, that what I am going to advance does not
destroy what I' have already said concerning the
danger pf partial attacks. If the reproach be ad
dressed, to the different Commanders in Chief who
have succeeded each other in the West, for hav
ing made the army take up too great an extent
of territory, and for having divided it into sec
tions and posts round la Vendee, this reproach
does not appear to us well founded. Place in any
Brittany. I will say more. In all cases, it would be better
to ungarrison our frontiers, than to suffer a party of rebels to
acquire consistency ; for whatever may have been the pro
gress of Austria on our territory, without doubt it was, not
so dangerous as that of la Vendee. point

( 79 )
point you please of the interior of France a party
of insurgents, it will be necessary that the forces
destined to destroy them be divided on the dif
ferent posts surrounding the revolted country,
to preserve its' Vicinities from conquest or con
tagion ; and unless you are favoured by some
local circumstances, such as a river, "%' chain
of mountains, or some other natural barrier, of,
in fine, unless you can rely upon the dispositions
of those who are in the neighbourhood of the
theatre of revolt, you will be obliged to form a
circle with your army (it being understood that
the line shall not be without interstices). It will
then be necessary that your army occupy several
posts on the whole circumference. It will be ne-
cesssary that each of these posts be sufficiently
strong either from its position or by its fortifica
tions, or from the number of troops • it will con
tain, or in' the facility with which it can be
speedily assisted by the flanking posts, to resist
the united forces of the rebels, who will make all
possible efforts to break your line, especially .if,
as in la Vendee, they are encouraged by the secret
wishes, or seconded" by the connivance or treach--
ery of- the inhabitants of the adjoining countries.
From whence w'e must .conclude, that the army
pf the Coasts of Rochelle should have been al
ii 2 ways.

( 80 ,)
ways stronger (38) than the Catholic and Royal
armies (and it has been always much weaker),
since the principal posts of a- very extensive semi-r
circle should have been, occupied, and, besides
^« this, the coasts protected from foreign invasion,
• and all communication cut off with -the interio?
ennemies. This is enough to prove,, that local
dispositions obliged the Commanders in Chief of
the army of Rochelle to form with the army a
Jcind of line of circumvallation round la Vendee.
But this reproach may have some foundation if
addressed to the Generals of division of this army.
The desire of preserving equally all the points of
his position, led a General to subdivide his forces
too much, and the posts became weak, because
they had been made too numerous, having been
frequently taken one after .another. In general,
to make war in la Vendee, with, advantage,, thci
chiefs of the principal divisions, of the army should
always keep their forces collected. To be even
with the banditti, every precaution must be taken
to prevent a surprise ; consequently, patroles are
preferable to advanced posts, and, indeed, ad-.
 .  .  r — p— — ,_  _
(28) This must not be understood literally. I say stronger,
if not in number, at least in the kind of troops. It is not
recruits that will do in la Vendie, nor those soldiers who are
called Heroes qf 500 livres. vanced

( 81 )
Yanced posts ought not to be considered as points
of resistance, but only of pbservation and notice :
the result would be, that few men would be re^
quired for theni, and a general officer might ear
sily guard and protect the whole of his force., ;
Masters of Fontenay^e^Pemple and Thouars,,
9»fter two complete victories, the rebels (22) ap
proached their centre, and appeared. to direct their
efforts to the posts which covered Saumur and the
borders of the Loire.
, The battles, and, consequently, our defeats,
succeeded witli a dreadful, rapidity. Ligpnier,

: (2Q) It was- General Cfialbot who commanded the division
of Niort, heat nnder the- walls of Fontenay, He lost fifteen
or eighteen hundred men, a p^odigions quantity of muskets,
twenty-five or thirty pieces of .cannon, and tumbrils in pro
portion. General Gluetineau, the friend and creature of
Dumourier, defended Thouars. Although that town was
not fortified, it was capable of making resistance. It is sur
rounded by a wall, and has Its gates, &c. &c. Some works
might have been added, which would have augmented
the means of defence, and, I have already remarked, the
banditti knew not how to attack a post slightly fortified.
Queteneau had more than six thousand men, and he resisted1
only two hourss. With Thouars Was lost 7 or 8,000 muskets,
12 pieces of cannon, 20 tumbrils, aud all the garrison, &c.».
It is necessary to observe, that, when the rebels take a town,
they pillage all the public coffers, and frequently the citizens
who are pointed out to them as patriots. General

( 82 )
General of the Republican army, after having
been repulsed with considerable loss at Vezins,
Coron, Vihiers,, &c. occupied Done, a post easy
of defence (30), and the only one that coujd save
Saumur. He there disposed his division as if
he wished to be beat, and which he was com
pletely, and obliged to retire in disorder upon
Saumur. It was not with an army so discour
aged, and so often beat, without confidence in
its chief (31), and withal so unequal in strength ;
it was not' in Saumur, which offered no means of
resistance on the side of Doue, that it was pro
bable the rebels could be stopped. It was re
solved, but too late, to concentrate the different
divisions, and, in consequence, General Salomon,
who commanded 5000 men at Thouars, evacuated
by the Vendeans a few days after its capture, was
'¦  ..,¦—,.  ;  T—  .  —  ;  ; 
(30) Although I mention this post as easily defended, it must
not be understood to be fortified. Doue is open on all sides,
but surrounded with, plains and heights, presenting some ad-t
vantageous positions. And, in general, I consider every.
open country extremely favourable for engaging with the
rebels of la Vendee, when a general officer knows well, the
management of his troops, and, particularly, how to derive a,
proper effect from the use of artillery and cavalry.
(31) I am mistaken; for Ligonier was superseded imme-j
diately after the affair of Doue. It was General Menou that,
defended Saumur, and who had never done any thing to lose
thejconfidence of the army. ,, ordered

( 83 )
ordered to the relief of Saumur ; but Salomon
met at Montreuil the right wing of the enemy's
army, consisting of more than twenty thousand
men, who obliged him to retreat after a long
and bloody battle, which took place in the night.
-Dispositions equally bad were made at Sau
mur as at, Doue, besides having the disadvantage
of position. Too great an extent was given to
the line ; and much strength was supposed to be
acquired in occupying the heights of Bournant,
and the means of defence, according to custom,
were dispersed. The rebels attacked, (32)
where they ought to have been expected, by that
chain of heights which commanded the castle
and consequently the town!, and took, in flank all
the advanced posts stationed on the road_ to
Doue. Thus a new and splendid victory was
obtained by the rebels ; the capture of Saumur
and the free passage of the Loire became the
result of this fatal day (June Q, 1793, O. S.).
(32) I have been assured the besieging army was 80,000
strong, I think it was an error in obstinately defending Sau
mur ; for it would have been better to have evacuated it, de^
stroyed the bridges, and directed every effort in defending the
passage of the.Loire. In resisting at Saumur, we fought when
we could little-hope for victory; our forces were diminished,
discouragement in the army augmented, Angers and lesPonts
de Ce, &c. taken, and in short the fate of Nantes com
promised. , , After

( 84 )
After resting eight or ten days at Saumur, the
rebels directed their views towards the right bank
of the Loire, menaced Tours and Mons, and took
Angers. They gained several recruits, but they
did not excite in Anjou and the adjoining pro*
vinces such movements as they had flattered
themselves with, and this no doubt was the prin
cipal reason which induced d'Elbee and some
of the members of the Sovereign Council not to
Carry back the war on the right bank, when they
had failed' before Nantes, which they attacked
the 29th of June, 17Q3, O. S.
^ The siege of Nantes is perhaps the most im-
portant event of the Revolution. Perhaps the
fate of -the Republic depended on the resistance
of this town. Every thing preceding that me
morable day seeemed to guarantee success to
the Royalist party. Nantes, open at all points
on this side the Loire, presented a contraval-
lation for near two leagues in extent, and seemed
incapable of resistance. Its only fortifications
were a few ditches, some parapets or mounds
thrown up in hafte. The cannon had been aug
mented by some pieces of large calibre taken from
the navy ; but the outer parts and the avenues to
the town offered, no positions, no advantageous
situations, to promise any great effect from the
artillery. The garrison consisted of ten thousand
- '- men,

( 85 j
men, mostly composed of the national guards :.
the besieging army on the right side were forty
thousand, to whom victory had been continually
faithful from the commencement of the war : an
army of equal force, commanded by Charette,
invested Nantes on the left side, and their nu
merous friends and communications with the
town seemed ftill more to facilitate the entry of the
rebels. — Notwithstanding Nantes was saved,- and
it must be confessed never was an attack worse
combined or worse directed than this ; whilst on
the contrary the defensive measures were ex
ecuted with order, concord and unanimity : the
enemies within were carefully restrained from
revolt, and a victorious resistance on all points
was opposed to the fury and obstinacy of the
assaillants. (33)
The safety of Nantes was owing to General
Canclaux who commanded there, as well as
to the zeal, talents and incredible activity of
General Bonvoust who directed the artillery, and

(33) I have not been informed whether d'Elbee com
manded the attack of Nantes,
The events which might have followed the capture of that
jtown were beyond calculation, It was the signal for general
insurrection in Brittany. We should have lost all the point?
which he had kept at the Loire ; the castle of O, Paimboeuf,
the magnificent establishment of Jndret, all the posts situat-
L ed

( 86 )
above all to the intrepidity of the volunteers,
who, deprived of the protection and support of
every kind of fortification, had only their native
courage to oppose as means of defense against the
numerous means of attack and terrible efforts qf
the rebels — Immortal glory to those generous de
fenders of their country, whose heroic devotion
to the cause saved Nantes from becoming the
tomb of Liberty ! (34).
Thus circumstanced General Biron, who had
long been expected, came and took the command
of the coasts of Rochelle ; he established his
head-quarters at Niort, where he united between
eighteen and twenty thousand picked men, se
lected from the army, consisting of about sixty
thousand regular troops. He confided his ad
vanced guard to the famous Westermann, who
had lately arrived from the North with his legion;
whilst on the other hand the division of Saumur,
so often beat under Ligonier and entirely dis
persed after the affair which took place under the
ed on the coast, from the Loire to les Sables, the islands of
Bouin and Noirmoutier, would necessarily have fell into the
hands of the Vendeans.
(34) I regret not recollecting the names of the different
corps who defended Nantes. I remember the 109th regi
ment gained great glory. The battle lasted from, three
o'clock in the morning until four in the afternoon. walls

( 87 )
walls of that'town, was reorganized at Tours (35),
by the activity of the representatives of the peo
ple and the general officers. The losses it had
sustained were repaired by the arrival of nine or
1 ten batallions of new levies brought post from
Paris by citizen Santerre. Dispositions were
made to re-enter Saumur and Angers, evacuated
by the rebels ; when Westermann, borne by his
audacity and inexperience, surprised Lescure in
Parthenay and gained possession of this advanced
post of the enemy. This little success made this
general officer conceive the hopes of traversing
the whole of the revolted country and entirely
destroying the Vendeans. He came back to
Saint Maxent, joined several batallions to the
main body of his army left at Parthenay, and
followed by seven or eight thousand men and ten

(35) It was in this town, and after the capture of Saumur
that the Germanic legion was disbanded. In my opinion
this was a great error. We had not troops sufficient, and
yet we deprived ourselves of a body of 1800 men, which
would have been of the greatest utility. — But it was tinc
tured with aristocracy ; in that case the officers might have
been changed. — What was the result of disbanding this
corps ?— Why three-fourths immediately passed over to the
enemy with arms and baggage. If it had been even neces
sary to suppress this corps it surely was not the time when
we were unfortunate and beat every where.
L 2 OS

( 88 )
or twelve pieces of artillery he proceeded as far.
as Chatillon, which he .took.- This advantage,.
like our other victories as they were called, was
made so much of that the army gave way to the
most extravagant notions, eagerly expressing, who
should be the first to enter la Vendee ; every one
was fearful lest Westermann should conquer it be
fore they Could have a share in the glory and re
compense destined for the conquerors of the rebels.
Unfortunately however the triumph of Wester
mann was of short duration : two days after the
capture of Chatillon he was surrounded, all his
infantry cut to pieces, nor could he save a single
cannon, or tumbril,, and it was with the greatest;
difficulty he escaped himself with' his cavalry.(36)

(36) Almost all the field pieces which Westermann had
with him consisted only of flying artillery. It must be re
membered that whilst he was routed at Chatillon, General
Biron remained quietly at Niort, twenty-five leagues from
Chatillon, with sixteen or seventeen thousand excellent
troops, instead of approaching his advanced guard and sup>-
portinghim.. Westermann, in augmenting the army which
he commanded for the purpose 'of attacking Chatillon,
obliged eleven or twelve hundred fathers of families to
march, belonging to..St. Maxent and Parthenay, almost all
of whom perished in the- expedition, whilst M. de Biron
and his division Were encamped and inactive under the waUs
of Niort ! I never

( 89 )
This check, one of the most disastrous experi
enced in the West, did not render us the least
wiser ; and notwithstanding the disproportion of
forces and means, dispositions were made for
fresh attacks as insulated and as badly concerted
I never knew Westermann, although both of us were em
ployed in the Western army for some time ; we Were always
at a distance from each other, as we served in different divi
sions, and he quitted the army at the moment I took the
command, having obtained leave of absence from Carrier,
the representative of the people.
What I say of this general officer, to whom certain men
have raised a colossal reputation, is no more than the result
of opinion of forty officers who served with him, and some
of them even in his own legion.
Of all, the qualities necessary for a general officer, Wester
mann was in possession only of bravery. Fitted perhaps to
command a squadronof hussars, he never owed his success to
any well concerted dispositions of his own, but to the intrepi
dity of the volunteers which on many occasions he uselessly
sacrificed. He was long an object of scandal to the Repub
lican soldiers, in setting an example of indiscipline and dis
obedience to superior orders. More than once he compro
mised and suffered the army to be beat, when he directed
the advanced guard on the right bank of the Loire (in Bru-
maire and Frknaire of the second year) and exposed the
several generals in chief, whom he treated with the greatest
possible contempt, to reproaches /on their unsuccessful ope
rations, which frequently were caused by his ignorance, by
the. false movements he gave to the advanced guard, and to
the low jealousy and aversion which he bore to the ..general
officers pf the army, to the head of which he was aspiring. General

( 90 >
as the preceding. Notwithstanding so many
melancholy proofs, it was imagined We were in
a state to go and fight and vanquish the Vendeans
in their strong holds, in their Covered country ;
so strongly did we deceive ourselves.-— Even
supposing the Republican army considerable
enough to act offensively, it was at least neces
sary that all the different divisions should move
forward at the same instant, so as to operate
various diversions on the part of the rebels and
oblige them to divide their forces — the division
of Niort, the strongest in number as well as in
the excellency of the troops, should have made
the principal attack — it was necessary, as we were
determined for attack, for the other divisions to
approach and second that of Niort, and thereby

, General Grignon, one of my fellow companions in arms
and misfortunes, has published a Memoir, justifying his mi
litary conduct in the West. His officious defender, consult
ing the circumstances of the day, has not failed to insert a.
pompous eulogy on Westermann, and he believes himself
pot far from truth when he places Hannibal under this ge
neral 1 We will not withold the great justice due to Grignon,
who was very useful in la Vendee by his local knowledge, as
to imagine that he co-operated in this ridiculous eulogy, so
foreign from the objefit of the Memoir. In other respects this
is only another proof of the extreme complaisance of certain
Officious defenders and their happy manner in using the
style and colours of the day. render

( 91 )
render the offensive movement perfectly general,
at the same time to secure points sufficient for
escape, for preventing the enemy from falling
on our flank column. But instead of this, what
was done ? Biron remained with his division
inactive at Niort : that of Tours commanded by
general laBarolifere, instead of attacking by Doue!,
Thouars or even Parthenay, which would have
enabled him to have been supported by the army
of Niort, Saint Maxent, Sec, entered la Vendee
by les Ponts de Ce, more than thirty leagues from
Niort, and encamped in the environs of Martigne-
Briand (37), where he was attacked by forty
thousand rebels, and where his advanced guard
was broke in ten minutes ; notwithstanding, some
lucky circumftances, and the vigprous charge of
three squadrons of hussars, procured victory to
the Republicans. The army pushed on and en
camped at Vihiers (38), where it was attacked
the same 'day at four o'clock in the afternoon,
when night put an end to the battle and left the
victory undecided ; but the next morning the
banditti charged with redoubled fury and with
P" ' ' I I ¦ I I I ¦ ... MIHI ¦ I I I .... I I
(3?) 15th 1703, O. S. This was the first affair at which
J was present in la Vendee. I arrived the day before from
£he army of the Mosejle. I served iu quality of Adjutant-
General, chef de brigade.
08) July 17, 1793, O.S, fifty

( 92 )
fifty thousand men, and the day finished with
the most dreadful defeat of the Republican
troops. (39) In comparing this day with that
of the fifteenth where we obtained the advantage,
I am sufficiently convinced that whilst our vic
tories brought us little to rejoice at, our defeats
occasioned Us most horrible loss. In endeavour
ing to rally the army at Chinon (fifteen leagues
from the field of battle) three days after the
action, only four thousand men could be mustered j
but let it not be imagined the rest were taken
or killed, for in all the neighbouring towns
some were to be found, whilst others never rested
till they arrived at Paris.
, We have seen the divisions of the army of the
Coasts of Rochelle successively beat in the East
and South JEast part of la Vendee, by the grand
-Catholic and Royal army ; that of Lower Poitou,
directed by Charette occupied the whole of the
, country separating Nantes from les Sables, ex
cepting a few posts, which we had kept along the
coasts and at the mouth of the Loire, at the castle
of O, Paimboeuf, Pornic, Bourgneuf, St. Gilles!,

^39)' The representatives Bourbotte and Turreau, as well
as la Chevardiere, commissary of the Department of Paris,
may recollefit that I foretold the defeat of the army if the
position of Vihiers was kept. 'the

( 93 )
the islands of Bouin and Noitmoutier/ and which
wc certainly could not have kept with the trifling
force we had, if d'Elbee and Bonchamp had acted
in that: part. The Republic had scarcely any
regular troops at these different points ; the- ma
jority of those employed on many occasions,
consisted of national guards, principally from
Nantes ; so that Charette's army, although much
inferior in. every consideration than the grand
Catholic and Royal army, having less force to
contend with, and fewer obstacles to overcome,
obtained success at an easy rate, but of less im
portance ; for the objectof Charette should have
been to get possession of some fortified posts
on the coast to have enabled him to have received
support from abroad, if the checks the Royalists
might receive should force him to that resource.
Thus I cannot account for the operations of
Charette, (40) which seem reduced to a mere
trifle, because at the capture and re-capture of
Machecoul, he had scarcely any thing to do (an
terior to August, 1793, O. S.) than to overrun
the, whole, country and render himself master of

(40) I do not mean that Charette had. not many battles,
but that he never had a general battle, which he carefully
avoided. It will be seen "in the? course of the work what was
Ws' manner of making war,
' M what

( 94 )
what he;pleased. It must be confessed likewise
that the Republican generals were guilty on the
same side of the same faults as the divisions of
Niort, Saumur and Angers had been on the other
.side. Marce, Petit-Bois, and the famous Beysser
(41 ), as ignorant and not less presumptuous than
Westermann, acted partially and mutually suf
fered themselves to be beat by Charette 's lieute^
riants ; at last Canclaux(42) arrived, and judging
(41) This was another who enjoyed the momentary repu
tation of being a great general. There was some analogy
between him and Westermann. He had Httle successes like
him, but he had frequently" the most disgraceful defeats,
The battle of Montaigu, described in the Third Part of these
Memoirs,, resembles greatly that of Chatillon, which I have
mentioned. In both places the enemy was in the town, be
fore the general was beat.
(42) I do not know Canclaux, nor shall I pronounce upon
his political dpini'ons. But judging from his military opera
tions, I am convinced he has more talents than any of the
general officers employed in the West.
I am obliged, in speaking of- the War pf la Vendee, to
name several general officers who have served in the West,
to judge, and often to blame their operations. I shall al
ways give my opinion with caution and politeness ; but as
the progress of the rebels ought in some nature to be attri-*
buted tp the false military measures employed to destrpy
them, it is impossible for me to dispense making thein
known. Npr shall I hide my own faults, nor spare them
that censure' I give to others; for indeed it is high time
the language of truth should be spoke on this unfortunate
/ war.

( 95 )
with reason that the forces with "which he" saved
Nantes were not sufficient to "attack the rebels in,
a covered country, contented himself with har
assing them at the gates df that town, with keep
ing the important posts which Chafette would
not ;take, and repairing the follies of his prede-^
cessors. The deprivation of a volume of notes, which I
had collected on the War of la Vendee', from' its
very commencement urttil the moment I quitted
War. Until now the War of" la Vendee1 has been discussed
only with the accent of passion and according to the spirit
of faction. All the writings hitherto published carry
with them that spirit of party which dictated them — They
are either libels or tales, ftay, sometimes dreams. Of
such a nature at least is the work, answering perfectly well
its title, "which we owe to the leisure hours of Adjutant
Legros, during his imprisonment in the Concierg'erie. Ci
tizen Hector Legros does not fail to lay at my door the
causes pf the duration of the war of la Vendee, and in daring
to advance that I have misled the government on the events
which took place whilst I had the command, lie endeavours
to exculpate the ancient committee of Public Safety, who
has been reproached with having deceived the National
Convention on our situation in the West.
The work of citizen Hector Legros is a complete libel
against me. It is terminated *by a vast plan of campaign
sufficient to evince the military talents of citizen Hector Le
gros. Amongst other dispositions he would cover the Sevre
(a very small river running through la Vendee,) with float
ing batteries to destroy the banditti and their haunts.
M2 the

( 96 )
the command of the West, prevents me from
enlarging upon the original causes and motives
of this extraordinary war. Moreover, indepenr
dent of the first ideas after which the chiefs of
the Royalist party had concerted their vast con
spiracy, there are a thousand other local, secret,
and unaccountable causes, even to the most at
tentive observer, which have equally contributed
to the prodigious increase of the partizans of la
Vendee. It is owing to these secondary and
eventual causes that my perceptions are too vague
and uncertain to permit me to dwell long upon
this, subject ; but some cannot be passed over, as
they principally owe their existence to that un
lucky system followed by the army of the Coasts
of Rochelle, of partial attacks, and of the in
sufficiency of the repressive means adopted by the
government, as well as all the half measures
adopted by its subalterns.
. It was in the space of six months that the Roy-
l alist party gained the maximum of its power in
la Vendee. The chiefs began to act their parts
in the political world ; their names were advan
tageously known, and cited in the different courts
of Europe. Several emigrants had quitted the
frontiers of Austria and Holland to join the de
fenders of the Altar and the Throne. A great
number waited in the islands of Jersey and Guern sey

(. 97 )
sey the result of the last efforts of the rebels, to
enter their native country, and rend its bosom.
The deplorable situation of the Republic gave
each day fresh hopes to its enemies. But the ge
nius of Liberty, who watched over the fate of
France, the energy, the constancy, and the cou
rage of the patriots, were destined to make it
triumph over its internal and external enemies.
Such was the consistency of la Vendee, such
were the resources of the Royalist party, that,
notwithstanding the terrible, and perhaps indis-
pensible, measures employed to destroy la Ven
dee ; notwithstanding our ten successful general
battles, and more than sixty partial ones, gained
on the borders of the Loire, from August in the
first year until Floreal following ; notwithstanding
the loss of 120,000 soldiers, the Royalists still had
means left to continue the war, although weak, it
must be confessed, when I quitted the army ; and
our victories, as I shall demonstrate in the third
part of this work, were not the only causes of
their decline.

HNB OF THE SECOND PAET.

MEMOIRS ;for the
HISTORY

QF THB .,, v ^1f

WAR of LA VENDEE.

PART THE THIRD.
JL HE Chiefs of la Vendee were arrived at the
highest degree of ascendancy possible ; and their
means of preserving themselves in this state of
prosperity were so much the more powerful in
proportion as they were more concentrated. The
territory occupied by-the rebels, being but of
small extent, gave them more firmness, and
seemed, as one may say, to constrain them to act
always in a body ; a system to which they owed
their success, Each party was eager to collect
the fruits of the earth,, and the war for a moment
seemed to suspend its fury. During the end of
July and the beginning of August, there only oc
curred a few skirmishes, affairs of parties, and of
advanced

( loo )
L -- -
advanced posjs, except the siege of les Sables,
where the banditti miscarried, and the attack on
Lucc-n, where they were likewise beaten and
sustained great loss. I shall speak ¦" of this affair
hereafter. ' '
The army of the Coasts of Rochelle was in a
state of observation ; the division of Niort had
continually been so ; that of Saumur, so worsted,
at^Vihiers in the battle of the 1 8th of July, was
compelled to remain inactive ; the troops of Lu-
con had kept themselves continually upon the
defensive, and this wise measure gave them the
victory, although they were very weak. A great
revolution then took place in the army of the
eodsts^ofRbchdl© ; it began by the fall of a great
maii : -Biron was deprived c&f the command1. The
Executive Council appointed a Sans-eulotte Ge
neral for his successor. Rossignol came to take
the command of the army, and established his
Read-quarters at Saumur.- This- promotion,-
Tfehich was opposed by> so -many .powerful men,
and occasioned by party intrigue, was no less a
very happy event in the West. The- rebel chiefs
were alarmed at it; they clearly found that they
had nothing to hope from a- Republican General,
whose principles were a©* equivocal, and that
Rossignol would not be s©> complaisant as his pre
decessor.. ••".., ,1 i,
i! The

( ioi )
The elevation of Rossignol to the' first rank in
the army, produced also a salutary effect upon
the public mind. It stopped that moral' defection
which daily drew off numerous partisans from the
Republic : people clearly saw that they must de
cide ; that neutrality was no longer allowed ;«
that patriotism could not compound with aristo
cracy. The greatest part of the administrators,
and agents of every kind employed in the country
bordering upon la Vendee, and who till then had
sought (and had but too well succeeded) to ren
der themselves neuter, and to live well with both'
parties, were obliged to declare themselves:
Many of those who had secretly favoured the
Vendeans, and who dared hot act with them, be
came Republicans through fear ; and if all .the.
ill-disposed were not suppressed, at least their in
telligence with the rebels was no longer so fre
quent, their means so easy, nor their succours so
powerful, Rossignol (l) reunited at Saumur, the wrecks
of that division ; his forces were not considerable ;.
(l) I am the friend of Rossignol, and I glory in it; butf
this OUghtoiot to prevent me from delivering my opinion oh
his account : magis arnica Veritas. Brave, frank, loyal, disin
terested, Rossignol Jias all the qualities- of a Republican, and
has not the necessary talents for a General Officer. And this
(ioes npt contradict wliat I have said above concerning the"
'¦> N happy

( J02x )
he employed them USefnUy, and his first operation
was to attack a strong party qf banditti which oc
cupied J)oue, and to carry that post. This little
success reanimated the tjroops, discouraged by so
many successive defeats. The General insensibly
led on aU the division (a) to Doue, wheje, how
ever, we had but six thousand infantry and four-
hundred cavalry, of which citizen §anterre took
fhe command iff the capacity of commander in
Chief of the division, Rossignol being ill re
mained at Saumur ; he had thrown some troops.
jnto Thquars, and w.e were master? of the impof u
fint post of Ponts-de-Ce,
Whilst we endeavoured to repair the evil suffered
from so many fruitless attacks ; whilst we acted Up-

happy effect produced upon the public mind tjy theproinptiQil
pi a plebeian to fhe cqmrnand of; the army. The on)y thing
for which Rossignol can be reasonably reproached is, jn suf
fering himself to be surrounded by such indifferent officers,
^yljerj he stood in much, greater need of having able qne?
near him} and, being often ill, he could neither atft nor ob
serve any thing by himself. The checks he met with wheH
he pursued the rebels upon the righf: bank, have been attri
buted tp his unskilfulness : they might also be attributed tq
$fce enyy which some general officers had against him, and to
the disobedience and the contempt of his piitrs, whiph were
£be epnseauence of it.
(2) j. belonged to this division in. cjuajity of General of
grigade. m

( m )
•oh the defensive, expecting the powerful reinforce
ments which government intended sending to the
Westj a cause; then Unknown, prepared the way
for our successes^ and might j rridre than the efforts
of -our arms, draw the Royalist party towards its
decline and ruin.
Aspiritof division arid quarrel sprung afridng thci^^-- •—
rebel chiefs. I know not whether it was a poli
tical manoeuvre df our government 5 but every
thing induces me to think they merit not the ha*
ndur of it ; and, by' what d'Elbee told me, it
shduld seem to have been nothing more than the
effect of individual passions^ and thee ambition
of his competitors.
They forgave not d'Eibde for being the genera^
in Chief 5 they forgave him still lesi for' having
talents for it. Lescure, d'Autichamp; and above
all the Prince? de Talmont, were ambitious! of the
supreme command ; Charette* equally ambitious,-
had usurped the command of the army of Lower'
Poitou, which ought; as well as the grand Catho.-
lic and Royail army* to be under the command of
the Ge&eralissimo. They Were not jealous o£
Charette; but they Were &nviou9 of d'Elbee^
Bonchamp, and the Chief of the Council. This
leaven of intestine division had fermented for a
considerable time ; and, since the taking of Sau^
mur, several parties had been formed among the
N 1 General

( . 104 )
.General Staff Officers of the rebels. The constant
success of the Catholic armies only augmented the
individual pretensions, and raised the ambition of
the inferior officers. They intrigued on all sides ;
.they became angry ; the dissension soon reached
as high as the Supreme Council, . ancl troubled its
deliberations ; the party opposed to:d'Elbee often
predominated, .and caused the plans resolved up
on, and which were conformable to the system
which had succeeded so well, that of operating in
a body, to be changed ; each was desirous of act
ing with the troops, lying within' his own limits,
and "formed projects, according to his own mode:
Their operations thus became private ; d'Elbee
and Bonchamp were excluded from all expedi
tions ; by that means they reserved to themselves
all the honour of success, and success could alone
give them the necessary ascendancy in order to
destroy these two chiefs, who owed' their credit
and influence to nothing but their talents, their
services, and their victories.
This- division produced) the most fatal conse
quences to the rebels, and,' by .following with me
the succession of events which have happened, we
shall resit satisfied . that it is the primary cause of
the decline of the Royalist party in la Vendee.
Charette had just been beaten under the walls
of les Sables, a place sufficiently strong to afford;

( 103 )
a shelter against a sudden attack, and . conse
quently impregnable against the banditti, who
attack a fortified town as they do an army in order
of battle.
Charette hoped to take his revenge at Lucon,
and prepared to attack it. A commander of a divi
sion of the grand army was desirous of being of
the party, and to second the army of Lower
Poitou. Lucon is without defence, but sur-.
rounded by immense plains, where artillery and
cavalry can be used; its out- works present also;
some points of support, which can supply the in- 7
equality of force and procure the advantages of
position to a very inferior: army. There were
nearly, seven thousand men at Luejon, and some,
pieces of flying artillery. It was attacked on the
Gth of August ; and Charette, who had promised
the pillage of it to his soldiers, exhorted them to
press forward to the attack, in order that, they,
might become, masters of the town before the ar-;
rival of the division of the grand army, and so .
prevent' them' from sharing part of the booty,;
Charette's troops were completely beaten ; and*
the division of the other armyy which: did not ar--
rive till.after this check, , was defeated in its, turn, t
This action was very bloody, and cost the rebels,
seven or eight: thousand men. The advantage of
this day was chiefly owing to the flying artillery*, which

( 100 )
which was perfectly well served, changed its pdf*
aition frequently and rapidly, and produced art
astonishing effect upon all points.
These two checks experienced by the rebels^
and those that immediately followed them, were
likewise owing to another cause, which I shall
explain. D'Elbee was desirous pf discontinuing all mi
litary operations in the season wherein the labour?
in the fields were carrying on in full activity, in
order that the Vendeans might not be drawn from
them ; it was difficult then to take them away
from their daily employment; indeed, many;
knew how to elude the order, and failed to appear
at the general rendezvous. This was a proof of
their repugnance to carry on the war at a time
when their interest required them to stay at
home, and this was no doubt less a powerful-
reason for deferring the expeditions. Not only
the division which existed among the Chiefs ad
mitted no other than partial operations, but each
principal section of the army which acted seclu-
dfedly, found itself also weakened by the desertion
of a great number of men, who absolutely refused
to march, and by the discontent even af . those
that obeyed.
• The defenders of the Altar and the Throne
divided themselves at the moment when they
stood

;( -107 )
stood in the greatest need of co-ope ration and
union ; for measures were taking to give the Roy
alist party a most dreadful How. The garrison
,©f IVJentz arriyed ; that of Valenciennes was to
follow it ; some corps also were added to our
Western jirmy, and these military means were
supported by extraordinary measures; fire arid
sword w,ere to be carried into the recesses of la
Vendee ; the banditti were to be pursued to their
most secret retreats, their habitations burnt ; in
line, the country was to be entirely destroyed^
and nothing was to be left in those perfidious
parts but heaps of slain, ruins, and ashfes, dread*
ful monuments pf national vengeance. More-!
over, the local circumstance?, the difficulty of
parrying on a war in the woody country, the ob
stinate resistance of the banditti, the horrors they
exercised towards the prisoners and patriots that
fell into their hands, the danger of suffering therrt-
to continue their political existence any longer^
fthe acknowledged insufficiency of the means hi
therto employed to destroy it, and the experience
pf the past, and the fears for the future, seeme4
to justify the severity of these measures.
The Representatives of the People on mission
with the armies of the Coasts of Rochelle and
|3rest, met at Saumur, convoked a council of
W.ar. The Qenerals in Chief, Canclaux and Rosr
signol,

— %

( JOS )
signol, as also the Generals of -©ivision of both
armies, were summoned to attend it ; the/Gene
rals Of Brigade had no deliberative voice in it.
Eleven Representatives, and eleven General Offi
cers, attended this council. The object was to
agree upon a plan for a general attack (3), and to
determine whether the principal attack should be
made by Saumur or by Nantes. The march of
the garrison of Mentz, upon which the greatest
hopes were reasonably founded, was submitted to
the determination of the council of war. It was
to enter la Vendee by Doue, if it were to be at
tacked by the East ; or to go to Nantes, if it
were to be attacked by the West. In the- first
case, it was to be under the command of Rossig
nol ; in the second, under Canclaux ; and what-*
ever might bathe determination, the troops at
Mentz were to compose a part of the division
which should form the principal attack.
Some General Officers insisted that the attack
should be made by Doue ; citizen Santerre pre-
(3) I was General of Brigade. I observed to the council,
that, as military operations alone, were to be agitated, it ap-.
peared to me that the General Officers only ought to delibe
rate, saving that the result of their deliberations should be
submitted to the Representatives of the People, &c. &c. My
proposition did not succeed. This council of war was held
the 2d pf September, sented

( 109 )
sented a plan which was rejected, and one
presented by General Canclaux was adopted,
who, having planned that the attack should be
.made by the West, naturally found himself
charged with the direction of all the operations.
It was Rossignol's generosity that turned the scale
in favour of Canclaux ; for the division was equal
upon the question concerning the side upon
which the attack should be made (4). Thus it
was decided that the principal attack should be
made by the West, and the garrison of Mentz ^y
repaired to Nantes,
The object of the council of war, in my opinion,
absolutely failed ; for, in the first place, before #—
a plan for a general attack was formed, it seems '
to me, that a general plan for a campaign ought
to have been determined on ; the complete exe
cution of which would necessarily lead to the ter
mination of the War of la Vendee. ; This project
of a campaign, this preliminary plan which ought
(4) It was well understood, that it was not the plan of
citizen Santerre which diyided theopinions ; the plan was not
a military one, But Genera} Menou opposed with reason
Canclaux's system for attacking by the West. The latter
pretended that it would take the enemy in the rear : this was
knowing very indifferently the position of the rebels, wh*
formed a front in every direction, and had no other rear than
a square' battalion. 0 to

( no )
to have had several branches, once resolved upon
and considered as a fundamental system, would
have served as a basis for every operation which
would have successively concurred in its com
plete execution. Every plan, therefore, for a
general or partial attack, was only a secondary
one. That of Saurnur was certainly not a plan
for a campaign, and yet it was a plan for a cam
paign that was to have been resolved upon.
In the second place, if they would have con
sulted locality, and have only cast their eyes upon
the map, they would have been convinced that
.the dispositions for an attack were not combined
according to local circumstances, and that they
diminished their strength in attacking by the
West. In fact, what ought to have been the end in
tended by an offensive system, by a general plan
against the banditti ? it should not have been to
drive them from their retreats, but to destroy
them there ; and, under this consideration, to
have so combined the dispositions that as few as
possible might escape. Now, the country occu
pied by them forming a kind of square, of which
the sea and the Loire, those two insurmountable
natural barriers (5), formed two sides, it is clear
(5) I suppose the Loire to have been guarded, which
might easily have been accomplished. that

( 111 )
that they should have endeavoured to have closed
upon and driven the enemy into the angle formed
by the Loire and the, sea, and, consequently, to
have attacked by the opposite angle.
In attacking by Nantes, many of the- banditti
escaped, and innumerable openings, were left,
and upon points not fortified : in the contrary
hypothesis, there was only the passage of. the
Loire to be defended. Nantes is impregnable on
that side towards the river. Should the rebels
have thrown themselves again into the South
western parts, they would have found only
plains, which are not favourable to them, and the
town of les Sables, which they would not have
attacked, or at least to no purpose.
We boldly affirm, that it was neither ac
cording to local circumstances, nor according to
die principles of the war, nor according to the
topographical situation of the rebels, that they
decided. The true motive for the determination *—*-
was, to deprive Rossignol of the command (6).

(6) It might be very well to prefer Canclaux ; but it was-
no reason for making the attack by Nantes. I enter into
some details concerning this resolution of the council of war
of Saumur, because it has had much influence upon ulterior
operations, even after it was executed. If it were a fault to
attack by Nantes, it was a still greater one to give so small a
O 2 force

( na )
According to the plan of Canclaux, the divi
sions of the army of the Coasts of Rochelle
remained upon the defensive, and only advanced
in order to join him under the walls of Mor-
tagne at a time agreed upon (the 4 th of Sep
tember), whence he was to march with this
united force against Chollet, the central point of
la Vendee. The march of Canclaux was very well planned ;
but that this order of march might be executed,
we must suppose that Canclaux ought not to meet
with any obstacles from the enemy from Nantes
to Mortagne, or that he would surmount them all
within the time determined on.
However this may be, the council of war of
Saumur produced much good ; the danger of
partial attacks was acknowledged ; our defeats
were attributed to the little union hitherto ob
served in our operations ; and the plan for a ge
neral attack proved that the system was changed.
Canclaux at last entered la Vendee with three
columns formed from the division of Nantes, of
which the division of Mentz composed the majof
force to Canclaux, in order to make the principal attack (he
had but 18,000 men). It will be seen in the course of this
work now prejudicial this has been to us. part.

( 113 )
part. He carried, after some severe conflicts, all
the first points occupied by the enemy. The
post of Sainper, Machecoul, Lege, and some other
intermediate posts, were carried by our troops :
soon after, Beysser, who commanded the right
column, entered Montaigu, where the rebels
made but a feeble resistance.
But Beysser met with the same fate at Mon
taigu as Westermann did at Chatillon. He made
such bad dispositions, and was so briskly at
tacked, that his troops were broken before -he had
arranged them in battle, and the banditti con
ducted them back to the gates of Nantes. Can
claux, who occupied Clisson, was no sooner in
formed of the defeat of Beysser, than he prepared
to retreat ; but, attacked himself by the enemy,
he could make his retreat no otherwise than in
disorder. He saw his baggage and equipage car
ried off, his wounded strangled, and was. forced
to rejoin Beysser under the guns of Nantes.
They were obliged to abandon the plan of
being at Mortagne on the 14th, and of forming,
at the time agreed upon, the union of the division
of the army of the Coasts of Rochelle with the
division of Nantes. It was also necessary to ap
point a fresh general rendezvous for these divi
sions, which it was dangerous to lead on without
being certain of the position of that of Nantes? Ros-

( 114 )
Rossignol, who was ignorant of it, could not rea
sonably direct his columns to the place agreed
upon ; for, if the division of Nantes made no di
version, he would then have had to fight, in the
woody country, the whole mass of the banditti.
We were in this state of uncertainty, when we
were forewarned at Doue, in the night between the
13th and 14th of September, that we should be
attacked the next day by a division of the grand
Catholic and Royal army. The battle began at
day-break (7), and without the town. We reck
oned there were about 7000 combatants, of
which 500 were cavalry, and without including
5 or 6000 men raised in a mass, armed with pikes
and placed in the rear, because they would only
have been useless or in the way. The whole of
our artillery consisted of two twelve pounders,
two field mortars, and some pieces belonging to
the battalions. The rebels advanced in one co
lumn by tne road of Angers, and displayed them
selves under the fire of bur cannon. I saw by the
uncertainty of their motions, and the weakness of
their attack, that the good appearance of our

(7) The success of this a6tion wras due to the dispositions
of General d'Ambarere, an officer belonging to the army of
Genie, and who did not quit the division of Doue. It was
he who planned the position, and formed the line. troops

( U5 )
troops and our advantageous situation surprised
them, and I considered them as conquered. They
directed their chief efforts against our left wing,
which they compelled to give way by a dreadful
discharge of musketry ; but our cavalry having
taken them in flank upon that point, and at the
same time our right wing, which I commanded,
having charged and broken their left wing, they
were completeley routed, and pursued for up
wards of three leagues by our cavalry, which
made great slaughter amongst them.
I was in several engagements wherein the ban
ditti were commanded by d'Elbee or Bonchamp.
It was easy to be perceived that neither of them
was in this action. The first manoeuvres of the
rebels, their bad dispositions, and their false mo
tions during the battle, proved that d'Autichamp
and the Prince de Talmont, who commanded
them on that day, were still very young in the
art of war.
The same day Lescure attacked Thouars with
ten thousand 'men, and met with the same fate as
Talmont and d'Autichamp (8). These two im-
(8) D'Elbee assured me that it was contrary to his advice
that the affairs of Thouars and Doue took place, which
compelled Lescure, Talmont, and d'Autichamp, to under
take these expeditions with such forces alone as were at their
own disposal. portant

( n6 )
portant victories, that of Luqon (9), &c. &c.
ought to have made us sensible of the advantage
we should have had in fighting in the plains, and
acting upon the defensive upon the open points,
so long as we were not sufficiently strong to pene
trate into la Vendee.
Rossignol being ighorant of the true situation,
and the operations of the acting columns in the
Western part, imagined they had succeeded, and
that the attacks on Thouars and Doue were only
a consequence of their progress, which had com
pelled the rebels to proceed against him. Un
happily this conjecture proved false. The grand
Catholic and Royal army had as yet only exposed
itself by parties • and it was very wrong to ad
vance into the woody country with drvisions of
five or six thousand warriors, embarrassed with
artillery, and by a heap of men raised in a mass,
which weakened them still more. It was also
wrong to give the command of the columns to
General Officers of but little experience. Ros
signol committed these errors ; and, encouraged
by the success of the affairs of Doue and Thouars,
and otherwise excited by the advice of Ronsin,
(9) The division of Lucon, after its victory of the 6th of
August, wished to enter la Vendee ; it advanced as far as
Pont Charon, where it was completely defeated.
whom

( 117 )
whom the result of the council of war had dissa
tisfied, and who wished to be the first to pene
trate as far as Chollet ; Rossignol, I say, suffered
himself to be led on. Citizen Santerre, who com
manded the division of Doue, and General Du-
houx, at the head of that of Angers, received
orders to go before and direct their march towards
Chollet ; and what appeared extraordinary was,
that the division of Niort and Lucon, which
should have followed our motions, according to
the resolution of the council of war, and which
were already in motion, received counter-orders.
We fell again into the wretched system of sepa
rate attacks ; a fresh experiment was wanting to
correct this error in us.
Citizen Santerre set off from Vihiers, his troops
disposed in one column only, and marched against
Coron (10). The brigade which I commanded

(10) I have read in a work, entitled, The Posthumous Works
of Philippeaux, Representative of the People, that a division of
the army of Rossignol, forty thousand strong, was beaten at
Coron by three thousand of the banditti — and that is the way
they write history ! Citizen Santerre had not above six thou
sand five hundred regular troops in his division; it is true, .
we must add eight or ten thousand men raised in a mas.s, but
which ought at least to be considered as useless. The Re
presentatives of the People could affirm, if it were necessary,
fhat I had been to reconnoitre the enemy, and I declare that
P their

( 118 )
was at the head. I learnt by the heights of the
iron grate, that is to say, within gun-shot of the
village, that it was occupied by the rebels ; there
was, however, only a weak patty, which gave
way to the charge of some hussars, and evacuated
it. I gave an account of it to citizen Santerre ;
I asked for orders, but received .none.
I insisted upon our halting at the pallisades^
and that, before we advanced, we should recon-

their force amounted to upwards of thirty thousand men. I
shall enter into some particulars relative to this affair, be
cause citizen Santerre, being sent for by government to give
an account of his conduct, has taken the liberty to cast upon
me, in some degree, the ill success of that day. The presence
of the Representatives of the People, who were at the head,
qf the column, would be sufficient to exculpate nie, as they
have never reproached me; Moreover, without daring to
contend in military opinion with citizen Santerre, let me be
permitted to tell him, that a General Officer ought to be at
the head of the column he commands; that, upon the first
news of the enemy's approach, he ought immediately to go
4_nd reconnoitre them, to point out the position the army
ought to take, and to order the expanding of his columns j
for I must observe to citizen Santerre, that they do not
usually fight in columns, &c &c. &c. Now, it is a fact,
that I did not see citizen Santerre during this affair, nor did
I receive any order from him, although I was in my place ; I
was obliged to obey those of a General of Brigade who was
older than myself (Ronsin), and to spread my brigade, with
out which it would have been defeated in a column like the
res£ of the army, &c. &c, noitre

( H9 )
noitre the Cnemy, whose precipitate retreat frorri
Coron might be a snare in order to attract us
there, and cause us to quit the advantageons
heights of which we were, masters. Ronsin dis
dained this advice, and ordered me to marchs
Having descended into the village of Coron, I
observed by my glasses that the enemy were
advancing rapidly and in force. There were no
meahs left of retreating, and regaining the posi-*
tion we had just abandoned. We instantly seized
upon an elevation above Coron. I informed citi
zen Santerre of our motions, and of the approach
of the rebels, whom I was going to reconnoitre.
Their dispositions for an attack were already
fnade ; they formed a crescent, and counteracted
the effect of our two twelve pounders and the two
mortars, placed in a battery upon the high road,
by three eight pounders placed in their centre ;
I judged their number to be about thirty thou
sand. I told Ronsin that there was not a moment
to be lost in making preparations. The battle
did not last an hour (l 1 ), and the republican
(11) During the action my horse fell upon his back, and
rolled over me. I was carried off. I had scarcely quitted
the line a quarter of an hour before disorder began to appear
in every part,' &c.
I quitted the West a few days after the defeat at Corort,
and was obliged to set off immediately, although wounded;
P 2 to

( 120 )
army was broken and put to flight. We lost but
few men, because there was only my brigade that
suffered ; but the enemy seized upon almost the
whole of our artillery, some muskets, and an im
mense number of pikes, which the men, raised
in a mass, struck in the ground as they retreated.
The next day, at Saint Lambert, the rebels fell
upon the division of Angers ; General Duhoux
was completely beaten, lost all his artillery, his
baggage, and a greater number of men than
citizen Santerre ; he had, like him, 'a great num
ber of men raised in a mass, who left their pikes
and wooden shoes for the enemy.
In the mean time, our affairs were recovering
on the side of Nantes. Canclaux had recom
menced his motions, and retook all the posts
wliich Beysser's ignorance had caused him to lose.
Become master of Clisson and Montaigu, he had
pushed on as far as Syphorien, and had there re
sisted a powerful attack from the rebels, when he
was dismissed the command. I am ignorant of
the motives for his dismission ; but certainly
there must have been very powerful ones for it,
and it could not have happened at a more unsea
sonable time. If Canclaux did not deserve con-

to take the command of the army of the Eastern Pyrenees,
having received the appointment of General in Chief with
my brevet of Commander of a Division. ,
fidence,

( 121 )
fidence, they should not have given him A gene
ral command ; but ought it to have been taken
from him, ought he to have been removed from
the army, at the moment when he was executing a
plan approved by the Representatives of the Peo
ple, at the moment when his absence might have
retarded the operations of it, and even have en
dangered its success ? Happily the new General
in Chief, Lechelle, incapable, as it was said, of
commanding, had at least the wit to pursue the ¦
plan traced out by his predecessor. The army
preserved all its energy ;* and this event, which
might have produced fatal consequences, deferred
only for a few days our progress and our victories.
The General in Chief of the army of the Coasts
of Rochelle endeavoured to repair the loss which
two of his divisions had met with in the engage
ments of the 18th and 19th of September, and to
second, by a better regulated march, the opera
tions of the divisions of Nantes, the progress of
which he was then acquainted with.
The divisions of Niort and Dou$ had joined
each other at Bressuire ever since the beginning
of October (12), from whence they dislodged
(12) According to a resolution of the new council of war
held at Saumur on the 2d of that month. At that time the
army of the Coasts of Rochelle took the name of the West
ern Army. the

( 122 )"'
the rfcbelsj in order afterwards to attack Chatil
lon, which was taken, retaken by the enemy,
who overthrew one of out columns, and again
retaken by the republican troops, who from
thence directed their march towards Mortagne,
the general rendezvous, where they found the
division of Lucon and that of Nantes.
This last, in penetrating as far as Mortagne,
met much fewer obstacles than might have beeri
expected. It had not yet had to combat the mass
bf the grand Catholic and Royal army ; and aU
though it had every day very bloody actions
With the febelsj it was only against detached di
visions from their chief army, whose partial de
fence indicated its disunion and its approaching
disorganization, provoked by the ambition of its
Chiefs and the rivality which had divided them.
The army of Nantes wanted reinforcements.
The daily and very bloody battles it had had
to sustain almost at every step, had conside
rably diminished it ; so that, after its junction
with the column of Doue, Niort, and Lucon, it
amounted in all but to twenty-eight thousand
men, when it appeared before Chollet, which the'
rebels evacuated in the night.
I gave an account upon the spot of the disposi
tions made by General Lechelle under the walls
of Chollet, after the town was taken ; they were not

O23 )
not very military. He was attacked by d'Elbee,
Bonchamp, Lescure, Pyron, Stofflet, ,and several
other chiefs of the grand Catholic and Royal,
army, which, in spite of the checks it had met
with, and the privation of several corps drawn off
by those of their chiefs who were preparing to
pass the? Loire, amounted still to forty thousand
fighting men. The shock was dreadful ; the Re
publicans gave way, and victory for two hours.
declared in favour of the Vendeans. But the
firmness of the Representatives of the People,
the coolness and ability of some general officers,
t-he re-union of the different parts of our army,
which the nature of the ground and the disad
vantageous position Tendered slow and difficult,
a.nd above all the disappearance of d'Elbee, Bon
champ, and some other of the Royalist Chiefs,
mortally wounded, gave the advantage to the,
defenders. of the Republic, and decided the fate
of this famous day.
Before we speak of the consequences of this
important affair, though doubtless less decisive
than it was generally thought to be, let us return
to some anterior events.
I have said, and it may be seen in the course
of this work, that it was. a principle with the
rebels never to. suffer themselves to be attacked,
particularly not to defend the towns ; to abandon them

( 124 )
them upon the approach of the Republican
troops, but after the next . day, and sometimes
even on the day they quitted them, to attack
such of our generals as were so imprudent as to
continue there. Thus we ought not to be sur
prised at seeing them- successively surrender all
those before which the garrison of Mentz .made
its appearance ; but we might reasonably be so
at seeing them retire as far as Chollet without a
general engagement, and without appearing in a
mass before the division of Nantes, and attacking
it with afi their forces.
It is not difficult to explain the causes of this
conduct, if we recollect that the chiefs of the
> Vendeans were disunited. Divisions and party
spirit had only increased since their first reverses.
Talmont insisted more than ever upon passing
over to the right bank of the Loire, and making'
Laval the common centre and rallying point of
the different parties formed against the Republic.
Although d'Autichamp might not have precisely
the same object, he yet wished that the war
might be carried^back again to the right bank,
in order to march against Paris ; and in case of
failure, to seize upon one of the posts in Britanny
or upon the Channel, to offer their hands to the
foreign enemy, and, if necessary, to receive suc
cours from them. In fine, both agreed that the.
party

( -135 x)
party could not support itself upon ,the left
bank. Some checks, for which d?Elbge could not be
blamed, and above all the intrigues of his rivals,-
had insensibly diminished his power and influ
ence. Thence resulted that division -in their
forces, that want of unity and co-action in the
operations, and above all the defensive system,
(so little favourable, or rather so contrary to the
mode, of fighting used by the, Vendeans) which
facilitated our success. The, chiefs were desirous
of facing in every pa rt ; each of them obstinately
revolving to defend his circuit, opposed his divi
sion to a -Republican column- The same steps
were pursued against the invincible garrison pf
Mentz,. against wliich all their efforts ought to
have,b,een united "• and although victory might
often appear to vary ;, an.4 that the rebels had
resisted with.: advantage, or at least counter
balanced ours at Torfou, St. Christophe, Quatre-
Chemins, Chatillon, &c. yet it was nothing more
than, tijifling success which, momentarily retarded
the, march of our columns, but which did not
cause them to retreat.
Such was the blindness of the concurrent
parties of the enemies of d'Elbee, that the pas
sage of the Loire was determined upon before the
affair of Chollet ; and troops had been disposed
Q. upon

'"( 126 )
upon different points of the shore destined to
embark themselves, as well as to protect the
embarkation, and landing on the opposite side,
of that multitude of priests and nobles, their
wives, their children, and their suite, who, at the
approach of the Republican columns abandoned
Ja Vendee where they had settled themselves, and
went to seek new habitations upon the estates of
the Prince de Talmont.
Thus when the junction was formed between
the army of the coasts of Rochelle and the gar^
•rison of Mentz, and the: chiefs of la Vendue
had perceived, though too late, the dangers
which threatened them, and the necessity of a
general action, d'Elbe'e could no longer oppose
-fill his forces against the Republican army.
- But it is more particularly .to Charette's con-?
duct that this succession of disasters, which have
accelerated the downfall- of the Roj'alist party,
should be imputed. This general, at the head of
a numerous army/ made no movement when the
¦division of Nantes, which he might have : taken
in the rear, daily fought against d'Elbee' s troops.
I have seen the latter convinced that Charette
was desirous that the chiefs of the grand army
might pass over to the right bank, in order that
fie might remain master of the whble of la VendCe
&n4 direct its forces, In effect, always removed from

( m )
from the Centre of operations, he made no efforts
to succour or second the grand army 5 even at the
time of the affair of Chollet. He never would
art for the interests of the partyj the ruin of which
was inevitable by his desertion and the foolish
project of Talmont and d'Autichamp*
When the division of Nantes seized Upon the
port Sainper, Machecoul* Lege5 Montaiguf &Ca
it met with no very great resistance, because
hitherto it had only to contend against the troops
of Charette, who always endeavoured to avoid
it ; but when it had passed the heights of Mon-
taigu the battles became frequent and terrible*
It was then upon the territory ( 13) of the army
of Upper Poitou, more warlike artd above all
better commanded than that of Charette, and
which was not less defeated than his, because, as
I have before said, it acted only in detachments;
and Charette," who, as well as the other Royalist
Chiefs, knew that the object s of the combined
(13) La Vendee was divided into two circuits : each arm0P"
had its own. That of Charette occupied the districts of
Chalans, Machecoul, la Rochersur-Yon, les Sables, a part
of the districts of Paimboeuf, Clisson, Montaigu, &c. The
army of Upper Poitou comprehended the districts of St.
Florent, Vihiers, Chollet, Chatillon, la Chataig^neraie, a
great part of the districts of Clisson, Montajgu, Thouars,
Parthenay and Fontenay-le-Peuple.-
Q. 2 march

( 128 )
march of the Republican columns was to pene
trate to Chollet, suffered the division of Nantes
to pass, advanced towards its right wing, and re
mained a spectator of its conflict with the grand
Catholic army^
Vanquished at Chollet, the Vendeans dispers
ed, according to custom, and re-entered their
hiding places ; but all strangers that were in the
country, who formed a part of the Catholic
armies, being united under the command of
Talmont, passed tite Loire with many useless
followers, who did not belong to the army, whom
the dominion of the rebels had fixed in la Vendee,
and whom the presence of the Republican troops
drove from it ; and although nearly thirty thou
sand individuals (14) crossed the river, there
were not twenty thousand warriors among them;.
However, information was sent to the Convention'
that there was an end to the war in la Vendee ;
that the left bank was completely purged of rebels,
and that the small number of those that survived

(14) There was seen upon the right bank following
this army, which increased prodigiously, a multitude of
bishops, priests, monks, religions persons, old countesses^
barohesses, &rc. &c. who were carried off by cart loads, and
which did nothing but embarrass the army. There were a
great many killed in the action of Mans. ' the

( 129 )
the battle of Chollet, had passed over to the
right bank, with four ox five thousand Women;,
&c. (see the Journals of the day.) Extraor
dinary couriers were sent into all parts of the
Republic to announce this happy event ; : and all
Prance imagined no more would be heard of la
Vendee.
It must be allowed that it was the division of
Nantes, in which was the garrison of Mentz;
which gave the most dreadful blow to the rebels*
Its march, however, was too rapid for it to be so
destructive as has been said. It was doubtless an
advantage to force the main springs of the grand
Catholic and Royal army, that heap of foreign
soldiers who formed a rallying point for tJhe Ven
dean militia to cross the Loire ; the depriving
the rebels of their best chiefs, whom death or
flight had carried off, was another advantage^ aud
it was a still greater one to have destroyed all the
establishments which furnished them with iwar4«
like stares (15). Notwithstanding, all this did not
(15) But the greatest perhaps of all the advantages which
this succession of 'victories procured, was the effect produced
upon the public opinion by the march of the troops of
Mentz ; a girdle of fire enveloped the revolted country j
fire, terror, (shall I 'be pardoned for this word ?) and death,
preceded our column.
The execution of these dreadful and salutary measures or
dered by the National Convention, removed from the Ven
deans

( 130 )
terminate the war : the mass of banditti was di^
persed but not destroyed. The;garrison of Mentz
had not traversed the third part of their territory i
it had passed through a part of la Vendee like a
torrent : its march had been constantly victori
ous; but let us frankly declare, without fearing
contradiction from military men who are strangers
to all party spirit, even by the officers still at
tached to the glorious wrecks of that immortal
troop, the garrison of Mentz had only made in
la Vendee a successful opening. The greatest
part of the elements of which the Royalist party
was composed still existed ; it was necessary to
prevent its reassuming the political consistence of
, which it had been just deprived, and to attain
that end, Government, instead of saying to the
"^^ generals, finish the war in a month : finish the war

deans all those who had secretly favoured them, but who
dare not range themselves under their colours j it particularly
stopped that moral defection which daily made alarming
progress in the neighbouring departments, many inhabitants
of which being seduced, and^led astray by the emissaries of
the Royalist party, began to look upon the Vendean power
as a political counter-force, and to be dreaded by the Re
public. In displaying the national vengeance against the
perfidious Vendee,, all the .ill-disposed who were scattered
about the adjacent country were terrified. It determined
all doubtful and neuter persons in favour of the Republic. ..'
¦ • in

.( 131 )
in a fortnight-, (lfj) Government, I say, "should
consider that it required time, patience, a con
tinuation of operations combined according to
those measures which had already been employed
with success, in "order completely: to destroy
every root of the Vendean conspiracy.
Charette took advantage.' of the distance of the
' Republican troops, in order to take sottie^posts,
although indeed of but little importance j but he
undertooktwo expeditions, which he hitherto had
not dared to attempt He attacked and took the
islands of Bouin and Noirmoutier. This new con
quest of the army of Lower Poitou provedthat the
. Council of War at Saumur was wrong in not send
ing more troops to Canclaux(l7), when it was de
cided that the principal attack should be made by
-Nantes. • Canclaux, obliged to penetrate. into the
(16) As if a general officer who commanded in the' West
could assign a prefixed term to this war, in the same manner
as an officer of engineers, who, with proportionate means of
attack, ought always tO'deterrrrine' the duration of the" re
sistance of a regularly fortified place."
(17) The Isles of Bouin' and Noirmoutier were a great
loss to us; but Canclaux cannot be' -reasonably reprdached
for the loss of them, not having sufficient troops to spare to
guard all his postsand to have at the same time strong- co
lumns to oppose the enemy's masses- with. ; Charette like
wise was partly indebted to treason for the capture of Noir
moutier. Howeyer that maybe, We'sh-all see in the last
part

( 13.2 )
bosom of la-Vendee with' a small force, could not
divide it so -as sufficiently to strengthen aU his
posts ; so that in advancing into the enemy's
country he necessarily left in his rear several poinds
uncovered and defenceless. Moreover, Charette
knew not how to profit by a circumstance so fa
vourable ; he wished to preserve his two new
conquests, without having made himself maste'r
of. the posts which would secure them to him ;
and having re-entered le Bocage, he endeavoured
to join his army with the ruins of that beaten at
Chollet (IS).
After this- affair of Chollett, (lg) the Vende
ans, who were not yet ; accustomed, to disasters,

part of this work of what importance it was to us to be in
possession of Noirmoutier ; when J retook this island,
powerful succours were daily expected from -England, wliich
an officer, sent there by general d'Elbee, solicited rnuch to
(havesent.i.,. ,
;. (18) He, could not attain this object. In general, the Ven-
_ deans who were attached, to the grand army had but little
confidence in Charette. ; ,.
(19) The affair of Ch°Uet happened between the 15th
and 16th October (1793, O. S.). After thi? event it was ge
nerally believed that all the Vendeans had gassed the Loire,
_and that the army, having been destroyed on the right bank,
_the Vendean, war no longer existed. With a little reflexion,
.they would not nave given credit to these reports, circulated
jbv some rprfidions agents,. some of whom were desirous of
diverting

( i?3 )
deprived of their best generals, arid, of eyery
rallying point, remained for some time dispersed
diverting the attentioh of the National Convention from la
Vendee, and others, of arrogating to themselves the glory
of having, terminated this atrocious war. If they had well
known the kind of troops which the rebels had, and the
habits pf the natives of the country, they would not have
given credit to these false reports.
It is known, that in general men quit their country with
reluctance. The inhabitants of the country parts in partij
cular have more local attachment than those belonging to
citieSi The inhabitants of Poitou feel more repugnance
than other peasants to quit their habitations, eithej on ac
count of the extreme fertility of their country, their attach
ment to their estates, or their confidence in their.lprds and
priests j, who there, more than any where ehet have> pre,-
served, arid still prefefve, their fatal ascendancy. The pro
found ignorance of the Poictevin, Iris absurd prejudice^, so
fortified and rooted, that for, several ages he has not advanced
one step towards reason, render Ma existence purely mecha
nical. He is so fohd of home, that even for his own interest,
he finds it difficult to lose sight qf his steeple. . It was only the
delirium of fanaticism that Could carry him far from his
cottage in order to fight the enemies of his priests and his
king ; it was als6 impossible to keep him under his colours
for two or three days ; and this is one of the causes, as I
shall prove hereafter, which stopped the progress of their
victories. In order to keep the Vendean to a campaign,
you must always shew him his enemy. If the Vendean gej
nerals wished to remain in a town during twenty-four
hours, they lost the fourth part of their soldiers. I will
site an instance j when 'Saumur was taken, the besieging
R army

( 134 ')
-. ¦ -. t-. ,- n. '*' '-* • r>
and concealed, and only shewed themselves when
the victorious arkiy had crossed over to the right
bank. , 4,
_*- — .— — ,  j~— — T+n  —  -"  *-
army Was about 80/000 men'. ' The chiefs remained a week
at Saumur ; and this was the greatest error they committed,
it' was this that saved Nantes; and when -they marched
against Angers, they had not more than 30,000 men, who
were joined by sorne rebels from the right bank. '
But another motive, .perhaps more powerful and which
¦seems to be the effect of judgment, causes the Vendeans to
quit the woody country with reluctance. He knows that he
owes -a part of his strength .to the nature;.of tbe ground, arid
to the advantages of locality. At ihome he. is the best soldier
i'ti-'Europe ; he is no longer the same; when ditt :of his
country. V
Among other contrasts which appear in the character of
, the Poictevin, there is one truly extraordinary ; it will be
recolle&ed what I llave- said concerning the courage of the
-Vendeans ;"!rfeverthele§srPoitou was the province of -France
¦which furnished the smallest number of soldiers. Few
rP6iS:evins engaged themselves, but when it was necessary
<to defend rheif political -and religious opinions,, there were
found, as-one may' say, as many soldiers as there were Ven
deans; ¦ -i-- . ' «¦ .. .' . .'jrrci c: , ,- -
The disinclination- of the Pbictevfn : to the 'profession of
arms, his aversion to travellings -much more to emigration,
v his attachment to his priests, (and we must allow5 that tire
¦ greatest part of these led an. exemplary life, andpreserved
the patriarchal .manners) '; inline, the extreme fertility of
¦ the soil, these avere, I .believe, the chief causes of the im-
. mense population of this country..
\ ¦ - Not

( iff )
¦ AVe could then perceive the error of the coun
cils of war held at Saumur, in not having settled
Not only the time Vendeans had not passed the Loire, but
even a part of the troops composed of strangers, and destined
tp advance upon the right bank, were no.t able, to cross the
river. The passage took place on the l/th, 18th and 19th
pi October ; hut, on the last day, the Republicans opposed
them wifh, advantage, took eleven pieces of cannon from
them, and compelled them to return to the left bank in their
boats. This event happened at. the height of Vayade. li the
,army that, crossed the Loire fpupd,itself 80,000 strong under
tlie walls, of Cpnvilie.and Angers, it was by the numerous
recruits which.it raised-, upon the right bank, and particu
larly in the environs of Laval, Mayenne, 8cc, where- the pub
lic, spirit was lost, and where likewise the Prince de Talmont
had the greatest influence. I convinced myself at the places
where that army passed through of the causes of its progres
sive increase ; I discovered them to be in the voluntary and
forced recruiting which it made from Varade, Ancenis> Ou-
don, and other points upon the shpre of the Loire, until its
. arrival at Laval,, where the recruiting was generally sponta
neous, .. . , ,
|f J3ut it was easy to judge that this army could nqf long
pxist ; that it would disperse itself still more rapidly than it
had recruited itself; and that the more it should, augment its
. force by men, the more it would advance its ruin,, It had
but lew warlike stores, and it spon wanted provisions. This
multitude famished all in its passage, and famished itself;
it could not subsist but by travelling every clay into a fresjj
country, and it must have perished, with hunger by re-enter -
_,jng tbosei which it had devastated, as it had devoured. every
tiling upon it-; passage. The rebels being obliged to walk
JI 3 about

( 136 )
the plan for a campaign, That bf a general attack
being executed, it was necessary to pursue the
operations. A new plan then was wanted; or,

about from town to town, In order to obtain subsistence, the
first enterprise they should fail in would bring famine,' dis^
couragenient, and necessarily desertion, in the army. It also,
diminished two-thirds (a) when it was repulsed at Granville
and Angers; and when the Chiefs, despairing (after the
affair pf Mans), at not being able tp pass the Lpife at Ance-!
nis, led back the wrecks of the army to Savenay, it consisted
pnly pf sixteen or seventeen thpusarid men, half dead with
hunger and misery, and of which 'the major part was ester*
'minated by' the Republicans. The rest dispersed themselves
throughout the country, and jpined the Chouans, except the
cavalry, which repassed by a few at a rime tq the left bank.

(a) And doubtless the whole of this did not perish by fire ot
sword \ for rational aud military men give no credit to these pompous
accounts of battles, in ivhich fools kill a prodigious number qf the
enemy, whilst we lose only . ten or a dozen Republicans, At Chol
let, for instance, where it was said that the Vendean army had
hen almost entirely destroyed, the rebels lost three thousand men.
They lost but fmv men at the sieges of Granville and Angers. They
had but five thousand killed at the affair of Mans, amongst whom
were many women. In fine, at the affair of Savenay, where the
Republicans had scarcely any thing to do but tq kill, the loss of the
enemy was computed at seven or eight thousand men ; and I would
pot answer for it that there were no exaggerations in these reports,
always less surprising than that of ipestermdnn. (Se'e the Second,
Part.} ' •

( 137 )
rather," a previous plan was necessary, in order to
profit, without interruption, from the advantages
of our victories, and the terror and dispersion of
the rebels.
The heart of the grand Catholic and Royal
army having passed over to the right bank of
the Loire, and increasing itself daily, the Re
publican army was obliged to pursue it, whilst
weak garrisons were left in some of the re-con
quered towns, and those which chance had saved
from 'the general conflagration. Some battalions
were dispersed at different points, the most ad
vantageously situated, and the least susceptible of
defence. All these posts, besides the weakness
of their position, had such a small force, that
they could not act offensively and engage with the
rebels in that state of compression to which our
frequent successes had reduced them. All these
posts, I say, insulated, and continually threatened
by the enemy that surrounded them, and cut off
at all points, were unable mutually to support
one another, or even to inform each other of their
respective dangers. The orders and reports could
not be circtilated without sacrificing the regula
tions and exposing the secrets of out operations.
Jn fine, these posts were disposed in haste, and
at hazard; and in establishing them, as well as in
'their formation, neither locality, force, nor the

remaining

remaining resources of the rebels,, were „ con
sidered. .....
What contributed still '; more to destroy the"
union and the harmony between the. different
fractions, of the Republican army left upon
the left banks, was the distance of the Staff
Officers, who, infatuated with victory, andTpurr-
suing the rebels oil this side the Loire, at the.
head of a body of the army, could no longer, be
the common centre, the only spring of all the^
operations upon the two banks ;-so that the Ge
neral Officers remaining in la Vendee, left to
themselves, were obliged to act upon the defen
sive, at that time very, dangerous, for want- of
plan, orders and forces,.
This inertness of the, Republicans upon the left
.bank re-animated the hopes of the . rebels, and
restored their audacity. They shewed themselves
at several points in parties of three, four, and five
hundred men. They beat different detachments
that were going from one post to another, car
ried off the patroles, convoys, &c. and every day
killed some of the volunteers, who were going to
or returning from the hospitals. The Vendeans
seemed only to-expect the return of their Chiefs,
in order to form themselves into bodies. Strong
detachments were no where discovered; -and the.ir
posts

( 13Q )
posts Were not sufficiently strong in any place to
be held or repressed.
Such was the state of affairs during Brumaire
and Frimaire (in the second year), on the terri
tory occupied by the army of Anjou and Upper
Poitou, •Otherwise the grand Catholic and Royalist
-army;' ":We must, however, observe, their meet
ings became every day mote considerable, on ac
count of the small number and inactivity of the
Republican troops.
'Charette, after having in Vain sought to unite
under his command the different dismembered
parts of the grand army, over-ran le Bocage, and
continued the war with vigour. ' Several engage
ments took place, and most of them to his disad
vantage ; he was successively beaten by Haxd,
Dutruy, Dufour, &cl He lost also the Isle of
Bouih, which he wished to defend personally, and
where he was near being taken.
Whoever has carried on, and is' acquainted^
with war, particularly that of la Vendee, will
allow that it was a great fault to abandon the left
bank without giving an uniform system of opera
tions to the General Officers left there. We
should have profited by the ascendancy which
our victories had acquired, to act offensively,
and not to leave the banditti at rest for" a moment;
'yet it was precisely under such favourable cir
cumstances?

( 140 )
cumstances, it was from the end of October to
the beginning of Niv'ose, that the. mo?t timifl
defensive measures were observed upon the left
bank ; so that, with the exception of some towns
continually threatened and insulted by the rebels,
they were still masters of their territory. . Thus,
by a continuation of inattention, or gather of
fatality, attached to our conduct in the West, we
constantly pursued the offensive system when the
weakness of our means and the mass of the enernyi's
forces required us to rest upon the defensive ; and,
on the contrary, we acted on the defensive whep
we should have incessantly attacked and ^pursued
the rebels.. It seems as though it had been wished
to suspend the last, blow that would, have com
pleted their ruin.
I have related in this Third Part of my Me
moirs, the most important events that, have oc
curred in la Vendee since the first -of ¦ August
(1793, O, S.) till the 1st of Nivose, in the second
year. I have not spoken of the operations of the
respective armies upon the right ,bank^ being
foreign to, the war of la Vendee, and because
they were not true Vendeans who fought on this
side the Loire. >
• The fourth and last Part (20) of the work will
(20) I have not related several affairs which tpo% place
in la Vendee, where we fought ' almost every day, as I
wished

( 141 )
contain the time during which I had the com
mand, that is to say, from the 1st Nivose till
Floreal following. I shall exclude all prejudice
from this account. I shall speak of my disasters
as well as my successes. I shall describe my
faults and errors, without concealing those of
the government, which sometimes- were the cause
of mine. Government, who Was never well ac-
quainted with the war of la Vendee, lessened the
effect of the only measures which could terminate
it, by its impatience to see it finished. They
soon rendered them null, less no doubt by my
suspension, than by the total and sudden change
of the system, according to which I acted, and
which met with its approbation (21).

wished to speak only of the most interesting facts. I have
commanded upon some occasions wherein I have been fortu
nate. Let me be. permitted to say, that I had the esteem an4
confidence of the Representatives of the People then on mis
sion, and of those of my comrades who were enabled to judge
of my attachment for the Republic and my profession. I
quitted the army on the 21st of September; I returned to it
at the end of Frimaire following, in order to take the com
mand. (21) The government of that time had approved of a sys
tem of encampment in the West ; 1 took measures to execute
it, when the command of the army was taken from me (4th
Floreal, in the second year). I know not how the rebels
were able, in Fru&idor-and Vendemiaire following, to accvuire
S sufficient

*f

(( 142? ))
•sufficient firmness again so as to obtain several sigaal'victpriesy ¦
and to be able to treat with the Republic ; what is astonish
ing^ is, that, when the banditti appeared to resume their ca
reer of success, and that in Vendemiaire they gave uneasiness
to the- National Convention, a decree of arrest was issued
forth against me, as though T had then been the General in
Chief of the army of the West (and I had commanded at
Belle-Isle at sea during five months) j whence it follows that
I have been arrested for the faults of my successor (supposing
thp fresh revolt of the rebels ought to be attributed to him)
or for those of trie government.
; The- former Committees always appeared to' me to attach
top little importance to the intestine war; if 'they occupied
themselves seriously concerning the Vendeans, it was only
when they had made very great progress, and we have proved
how difficult it was to stop tliem. The Chouans and the
rebels of Morbihan have been neglected • however, expe
rience has demonstrated to us the necessity of -compressing".
the revolt from the beginning, if we are desirous that these
local and partial insurrections should not acquire stability,
and soon form numerous, formidable armies. It' is acknow
ledged, that, in this kind of war, military means alone are
insufficient, if riot to check the rebels, at least to choak the
seeds of the revolt, particularly when its principles are
founded upon prejudices, ignorance, and superstition. The'
party of the Chouans and the Morbihans is riot very conside
rable, and their local situation gives them great advantages
in' enabling them to secrete themselves. The fiver of la Vi-'
laine confines the rebels of Morbihan, and serves also to
keep the Chouans on that'side, whilst la Mayenne can block
up the passage on tlie opposite side, and the Loire cut off all
their communications with la Vendee ; but if the military
force, seconded by these natural advantages, easily represses
these robberies, it' cannot, alone, destroy tlie causes of them. This

( 148 )
„ This isolated state of the rebels must be considered of im;
portance, if we wish to suppress Chpuanry, to calm Morbi
han, and deprive the Vendeans of every hope oi foreign aid
ibr, in fine, the immediate presence of an army iu each re
volted country cannot always continue, and so long as other
means are not employed than those which have been hitherto
used to terminate these wars (that of la Vendee excepted, thej
¦ destruction of which his been ordered) ; so long as a kind of]
moral regeneration is not produced in this country, thel
Priests and Nobles not expelled from it, or that they cannot!
be rendered incapable of conspiring ; in fine, so long as we
shall be unable to dissipate, by the aid of instruction and
public reason, the darkness of ignorance which envelopes
these superstitious and fanatic countries, I shall always be
apprehensive of a general commotion in the West.
These observations are not foreign to the War of la Ven •
dee, with this difference, however, that the rigorous mea
sures, which have been taken for the complete destruction of
the rebels of the left bank, would have been impolitic upon
the right bank. I think they were necessary against the
Vendeans; because their first motions were not checked ; be
cause they were more seconded by the nature of the ground ;
because time had been given them to organise themselves ;
and because they.had very able and enterprising chiefs. But
if the greatest part of these advantages have been hitherto
wanting by the Chouans and the rebels of Morbihan, may
they not occur ? May not a successor to la Royerie be found
who, profiting by his plan, his means, and even by his er
rors, may rekindle a flame hardly extinguished, and renew
in Brittany and upon the right bank of the Loire, the fury
of the civil war that has desolated the left bank ? Will it
then be the time to employ other measures than that of mi-
Jitary force ? and, with these military means, will it again
S 2 he

( 144 )
be necessary to have recourse' to the system of devastation
adopted in order to reduce the Vendeans, and transform into
deserts the richest and finest countries of the Republic ?
Many people will doubtless find my fears exaggerated ; but
I believe they will appear to be just to every man who is
honest and who has studied 'the country.

ENn OF TH? THIRD PART,

MEMOIRS

FOR THE

HISTORY

OF THE

WAR of LA VENDER

PART THE FOURTH.
AT is necessary to have served in la Vendee, in
order to form an idea of the fatigue which our
troops experience there, the sickness which en
sues, and the discouragement and disgust they
feel at this kind of War. Ask such of the van
quishers of Gemmappe and Watigny, who have
been sent from the banks of the Sambre and the
Scheldt to the borders of the Loire ; ask them if
they have suffered so much during three years in
the plains of Belgium, as they have in four months
in the hideous retreats of la Vendee.
Ask all military men, all agents in the Western
army, with what difficulty and dangers the ser
vice

( 146- .)• , • r
vice there is attended ? how much it is* shackled
by the constituted bodies, and even by the inha
bitants residing near tlie theatre of war ; above
all, by the perpetual conflict, and. sometimes the
formal as well as the illegal 'opposition of those
parasitical authorities, produced by anarchy ; of
those men without any true political character,
whose indeterminate powers were a sufficient mo
tive for them to usurp the whole ; who,- under- the
name of Commissaries of this or that"' governing
power, caused all the springs of opinion to act
according to their- pleasure ; and, under pretence
of forming or nourishing the public spirit, spread
insurrection and disorder in the army, by pro
fessing- therein the doctrine of absolute equality j
which is necessarily repugnant to. military order*
These unruly propagators of the principles of
liberty transformed it into licentiousness. Consi-f
dering themselves the only, patriots,; they were
desirous of having the command; they conti
nually laboured to cause civism to be suspected^
and to raise contempt against the General Offi4
cers. The least check was always, according td
them, a proof of treason or incapability. They
unceasingly disapproved, threatened, * and de
nounced ; in fine, such was the audacity of these
ephemeral rulers, and their confidence in the
strength, of the connections wliich attached them
-• . to

'{ 147 )
:to the principal agents of government, that, more
than once they were desirous of counterbalancing
the pOwer of the representatives on mission and
braving their authority, (l)
But the agents which government sent to the
armies, were not so dangerous to the general of
ficers in the Western army as the leaders of the
pretended popular societies, composed of indivi
duals who, necessarily suffering from the execu
tion of measures ordered by the Convention and
its committees, endeavoured to shackle them, and
shot forth their arrows against the agents which
they dare not direct against government. The
denunciations, the libels, and the calumnies,
both written and spoken, poured down from "all
parts upon the military chiefs. They were fre
quently received by some subalterns of the army,
previously disposed to receive and to propagate
them, and who^ in other respects, had an idea
of promotion upon every dismission of a superior.
Aristocracy mingled itself in these manoeuvres,
and could not fail of profiting by them. The

(l) I must except from this account, in other respecte
perfectly true, the citizen la Chevardiere, Commissary of
the Department of Paris, and citizens Bessou and Biusley,
Commissaries of the Executive Power, whose conduct in la
Vendee always appeared to me to be praise worthy. consti-

( 148 )
constituted bodies (2), animated by the Same
spirit as the popular societies, excited by the
same motives, and having the same interests to
defend, laboured towards the same end, and con
spired mistrust, resentment, hatred, and venge
ance, upon the head of the general. One may
judge after this, what was the moral situation of
the army,: let us see what its physical situation
was. (2) I shall only relate one trait which will give an idea of
the method of proceeding of the authorities in the towns
bordering upon la Vendee. Suspended from my functions;
in the Western army, I took the road from Nantes to Or*
leans, in order to conform with the law concerning General
Officers that are dismissed, I stopped at Saumur to sleep :
the next morning, and at the moment I was about to set off
again, a corporal, fpllowed by four men, ordered me to fol
low him to the Revolutionary Committee, Nat which a phy-
fician presided, I judged, from the sullen and severe re
ception I met with from him, that he was going to treat me
as he would bis patients. He ordered away from me, in the
most imperative and indecent tone, my secretary, and one
of my aides-de-camp, who was returning to his corps ; and
after having given me a long ahd pompous ettlogium upon
the Revolutionary Committees in general, and particularly
upon that at Saumur, he asked me why, on my arrival in
that town, I did not present myself to" the commit tee; ' in
order to give an account of my journey and of my conduit. I
answered the President that I thought it was perfectly re
gular in shewing my passport to the officer of the post, when
I entered Saumur ; that I was ready to give him the most
exact

( 149 )
The corps of -the army which had pursued on
this side of the Loire the party of banditti es
caped frorn la Vendee, was composed of a divi
sion of the Western army, and of two other di
visions detached from the armies of the coasts of
Brest and Cherbourg. After the battle of Save
nay and the total dispersion of the rebels upon
the right bank,- these divisions rejoined their re
spective armies. The troops detached from the
Western army were considerably diminished, and
weakened with fatigue by the continual and
forced marches which they had made for three
months : the cavalry was wearied to death, and
would have wanted remounting again ; the corps
exact account of my military conduct in the West, and that
px the mean time I laid before him a fresh passport which I
had received in the night from the Commission at War : (it
was the order to go and take upon me the command of
BeUisle at sea). At the sight of this new passport the Presi
dent substituted a tone of mildness for the most acrid forms
he had employed in my interrpgatofy. He observed to me,
that it was his duty to conduct himself thus, because an
officer dismissed was at least suspected, &c. &c.
This Revolutionary Committee took upon itself a few-
days before to order an Adjutant-General, whom I had sta
tioned at Saumur, to leave the town within 24 hours, which
the officer had the weakness to obey. I cannot conceive
why, since the beiginning of the war, the . towns adjacent
to la Vendee have not been put in a state of siege.
T had

, ( 150 )
had scarcely any fimness left ; there were some
wherein the number of officers and subaltern
officers exceeded that of the soldiers ; so that
one hundred and fifty-seven squadrons, battalions,
or regiments, formed scarcely forty thousand
men. We must add to these forces a division
of nearlyten thousand men sent from the army
of the North, much fatigued by the useless
marches and counter- marches which they had
sustained. Out of the fifty thousand men of which the
Western army consisted, twelve thousand filled
the hospitals, the depots, or were in their own
country on leave for recovery. Two thirds of
those remaining with their colours were covered
with the itch; all were without shoes, part of
them had bad guns, and there were not ten
thousand bayonets in the army.
These means were no doubt weak, above aH
on account of the extent of a command' which
included the whole country from Angouleme to
Alencon, and from Rochelle and Nantes to Or
leans inclusively. The proteclion of the coasts
and the neighbouring island&was very important;
where not only posts of observation were re
quisite at intervals from the iriouth of la Vilaine
to that of la Charen.te, but also considerable

garrisons

( 151 )
garrisons' in the Ides of Re, Oleron, Noirmou
tier, &c. &c.
If it were difficult to employ all the branches
of such a colossal command to a good effect, it
was not less so to guard all its interior parts from
the partial or united incursipns of the rebels, as,
a few fortifications erected upon the coasts ex
cepted, it presented not throughout its immense
extent any point of support, post, or fortified
town. The Western army, although victorious, had
never been so near its total disorganization as
at the moment when I took the command.
We were in a season of repose, and the troops
stood much in need of it ; but it was necessary
to ait ; for if we had not taken the advantage of
our ascendancy over the rebels they would have
again assumed a dangerous firmness and counter
balanced our successes upon the return of fine
weather. The disorder which pervaded the Western
army (3) and the want of harmony in its opera-
(3) There never has been order or subordination in thte
army. I thought that I had discovered the causes, in pil
lage and the manner in which it was formed. I began to
restore discipline in it, and 1 found more ease in doing it
-than any ©ther person, for at the time I took the com
mand there was scarcely any thing more to pillage in la ,
Vendee, T 3 lions

( 'isa >
tions was less owing (although it had beien said)
to the indifference or ignorance of some generals
in chief, than to their frequent change (4), the
kind of war they carried on, and, above all, to
the local inconveniences. The younger Marceau,
who had commanded ad interim, and who shewed
great talents (5) had not time to comprehend the
whole of it : incessantly pursuing the rebels
upon the right bank, he neglected the left, and
was not able to give all the Western forces that
union, that pOintediiess, if I may so express my
self, which belongs to discipline and the proper
¦organization of an army. In this situation every
thing was to be established inthe Western army,
and doubtless it was impossible to organise and
discipline whilst carrying' on the war, land above
-all a war of movement ': but let us again continue
the military- operations in la Vendee.
On my arrival in the West my. -first' object was
to go and concert with the general in chief of
J  :  „  :  ,  _£  ) ¦ 
(4) In three mprlths there were three generals in .chief,
and three intermediate ones.
(5) This eulogium cannot be suspected ; for I know
that general Marceau, now employed in the army of the
Sambre and the Meuse, sought to injure me in the opinion
of several of our brethren in arms. There is but little ge
nerosity in acting thus with a man who is in chains: in
s.ich a situation quarrels should at leastbe postponed. the

( 153 )
the army of the coasts of Brest, in order to pro
duce -a coincidence in our measures against the
Chouans, recruited from the ruins of the army
beaten at Savenay; the territory, which they occu
pied being partly comprised within the command
of the coasts of Brest. The result of our inter- •
yiew was, that I should undertake to confine
these rebels in the center of the country where
• they exercised their depredations, that. is to say,
in the environs of Chateau-Briand, Chafeau-
Gontier, Segre, &c. -and ta drive them from the
banks of the Loire, in order that they might not
be able to communicate with the Vendeans. The
general in chief of the army of the coasts of Brest^
was to guard the right bank of the Vilaine, in or
der to prevent them from penetrating into le
Morbihan ; he was also to employ a division of
his army to clear the forests of le Pertre and la
, Guerche, their chief retreats, and where the
origin of their most numerous meetings still ex
isted. My operations upon the right bank being
determined on, I went immediately to Nantes,
and afterwards upon the coasts lying near Noir
moutier, in order to attack that island, Which it
was very dangerous to suffer the Vendeans to
occupy any longer.
Preparations had been made for a month in
,£jrder %o attack Noirmoutier. The minister of
war

t 154 )
far intimated to me his impatience to see us
masters of it, even before my arrival at the army.
I felt myself the necessity of undertaktng this
expedition without delay, in order to deprive the
rebels of the hope of obtaining succours from
England. General Haxo, who/ had prepared it,
had but a small force and was fearful- Df being
disturbed in his rear by Charette, whenever he
should attempt a descent. General Carpentier
received orders to occupy Challans, to observe
the movements of Charette, and to prevent him
from cutting off the troops destined for the attack
of Noirmoutier, (6)
In the mean time I learnt -at Beanvoir, on the
evening preceding the day on which I was to at>
tack Noirmoutier, that Charette had entered
Machecoul, at the head- of six thousand chosen
men ; that he was to be joined there by GatheH-
niere, and that they were to proceed, united, to
the relief of tlie threatened island. They could
avoid general Carpentier in passing by Chateau-
neuf, and attack us at la Crouilliere and la Barre-
du-Mont, at the moment of our embarkation.
General Haxo judged that the expedition ought

(6) The dispositions for the attrck and descent in the
island are due to generals Haxo and Dutruy. to

(- 155 )
to be deferred (7) ; I, on the contrary, thought
it might be a reason for accelerating it, if it had
hot been fixed for the next day. Carpentier, ac
cording to my orders, attacked Charette at
Machecoul, previous to his junction with Cathe-
lini&re, and we marched against Noirmoutier.
We had scarcely three thousand men, but they
were all light troops. No artillery had been sent
over, and it was absolutely necessary the island and
town of Noirmoutier should be taken in the cOurse
of the day. The greatest difficulty was not in ef
fecting a descent, which, in effect, cost us only
reft- oT twelve men, and a few wounded, but iii
tarrying the town defended by eighteen hundred
men, and upwards of twenty pieces of cannon ;
knd above all by its position in the midst of salt
pits, which render all its avenues narrow and dif
ficult. The impossibility of spreading' the army
in a country so intersected and where one can
only march by the flank, made us increase the
number of our columns ; and, favoured by some
small hills, which did not admit of the enemy
discovering their weakness, we appeared to them
to be in considerable force: they were in order

(7) Haxo was right. It was great imprudence to attack
the isle of Noirmoutier with so small a force : it was relying
too, much upon fortune. of

( 156 )
of battle under the walls of the town; I saw
some uncertainty in their motions ; they demand
ed a parley ; we advanced ; arid after having
passed the first batteries, I summoned the rebels
to surrender at discretionj and we entered the
town. I learnt in the night that Charette, beaten
at Machecoul by general Carpentier, had been
obliged to quit the coasts and to re-enter le
Bocage. I took several prisoners of distinction in the
island of Noirmoutier : d'Hauterive? Vieilland>
and some other chiefs, and the famous d'Elbee1,
Generalissimo of all the forces beyond the Loire*
confined in his bed by a mortal wound. -T|$
cowardly conduct of the garrison, which aban
doned the lines without firing a gun, embittered
his last moments.
The conference which I had with this chief of
the Royalist party concerning the political situa
tion of the. rebels, their means, their resources,
the foreign succours they might expectj, &c. &c.
determined the greatest part of my ulterior- ope
rations ; and what that general officer (8) told
me was confirmed in part by a considerable num-
(8) Let it not be imagined that d'Elbee gave me all
th? information he could have communicated. " You do
" not intend, General," said he in answer to my first ques
tion, " to obtain from me all the secrets of my party ?as to
"the

. ( 157 )
ber of prisoners, and -particularly by the Cheva
lier de la Catheliniere, one of Charette's lieute
nants, who fell into my' hands two months after
the taking of Noirmoutier.
" the rest I believe it is lost." — You have still a great/number
of men: — " Of What use is it' to Have soldiers where there
" are np; chiefs, nor ammunition., — We have been very ill se-
" cpndedrby the gentlemen of'.Britanny. — There was only
" one man there capable of great things." — Of whom then
do you 'speak? — rt Of Monsieur de la Royerie." — You ex
pected succours from England ? — " I sent an officer there a
" week ago : he will return too late." — You have already
received some, no doubt, since the beginning of the, war,.'
— " No j we did not want foreign aid- to re-establish the
" throrie, to restore to the clergy all their privileges, and to
" the nobility all their rights. We alone could have re-
" stored to the kingdom all its splendor ; the interior of
" France offered us sufficient resources, to execute these glo-
,f rious designs ; but having miscarried before Nante/s it was
" necessary to abandon the project of carrying on the war
" upo'n the right bank of the Loire.— We were to have di-
>' re6ted our operations towards the South, and this was
" always my advice in the Supreme Council. We have lost
" ourselves ; it is ouxjlisj2*^.p_which_jhas.. caused you to
" triumph. The Bretons were to have made a powerful
" diversion, and there has been nothing but uncertainty and
"weakness, in their motions. Messieurs d'Autichamp and
" Talmont wished to repass the Loire ; the first, to seize
" upon a sea-port or to march against Paris ; the second, to
" establish himself in what he called his estates of Laval,
" to become the chief of a party : these project's were ex •
ff travagant. It is. the ambition of these two general officers
U «' which

y

I learnt in this island that Stofflet and. Laroche-
Jacquelin, who had followed the Prince de Talr
mont on this side the Loire, had repassed to, the
left bank ; that after an interview which, had
taken place in Noirmoutier between Charette
and Laroche-Jacquelin before d'Elbee when
dying, (who exhorted them to join each other in
order to raise up the-party again, whose disunion
and that of the other general officers had accele
rated its ruin) these two chiefs separated, being
discontented with each other, and disposed more
than ever to divide their operations. I was in
formed that Laroche-Jacquelin aided by Stofflet
and Bernard de Marigny, travelled through
all the country occupied by the ruins of the
grand Catholic army, in order to reorganize it ;
that they only waited for the return pf fine wea
ther, and particularly the warlike stores which
England gave them reason to hope for, and those
which their new establishments, were to produce,
in order to attack in a mass our posts dis-

" which has caused all our disasters; it is that of M. de
" Charette, his ignorance, his obstinacy in secluding him,-,
" self and separating his operations from those of the grand
" army, which have caused our most important expeditions
" to fail ; and, to compleat our misfortunes, we lost at
" Chollet the brave M. de Bonchamp, the best officer of the,
" army, &c &c." persed

( 159 )
persed in the, center of la Vendee ; thaf. during
winter they confined their efforts to a petty war
fare, and only employed themselves in cutting
off the communications between these posts-, in
seizing uptin our parties^ our patroles, our escorts,
Our convoys, and particularly our Warlike stores.
This war of chicanery was what suited us the
least, all circumstances considered. It was, how
ever, what was carried on during three months,
and what restored the audacity and the hopes of
the rebels.
The daily reports which reached me from all
quarters, and those from a great number of pri
soners, all agreeing, (those even of spies whom
I tried in the employment without hopes of reap
ing any advantage), 'confirmed every thing'
that d'Elbee had told me, and what he had
caused me to presume by his refusal to answer
certain questions which I put to him concerning
the interior situation of la Vendee. I learned,
moreover, that the rebels carried on the war like
desperados, and with an atrocity unexampled in
the history of the most ferocious people. The
Republicans, whether soldiers or not, who fell into
their hands, finished their lives in dreadful and'
prolonged tortures. Every torment that the most
ingenious barbarity could invent was executed in
the name of the Catholic Religion and Louis the
U 1 Seven-

( 160- y
Seventeenth, and more frequently executed by
women upon the prisoners of war, and indiscri
minately upon all persons who remained faithful
to the Republic.
The blind and incurable attachment of the re
bels to their chiefs and their priests ; the connec
tions and intelligence which the latter kept up in
the country bordering upon the theatre of war ;
the ravages they made in the public opinion by,
the effect of their proclamations, profusely circu
lated ; their plots, so well woven and so ably
combined, that: they were not known till it
was too late to counteract them ; the fresh move
ments which they excited in le Morbihan and
among the rebels on the right bank of the Loire,
wwhose succours and union they urged ; the recent-
passage of several detachments "of cavalry, who,
having abandoned the Chouans, daily and in.
small parties, rejoined the assemblies on the left,
bank, by the imprudence of the Commanders
at Saumur, Angers, &c. &c. ; some checks which
we had just experienced in different affairs of
posts, which took place within the circumference
of the grand Catholic army ; the ^experience of
events which had assigned^ such dreadful qualities
to this horrid war ; the fear of seeing tjjeem re
newed whilst the greatest part of the inslluments
of the revolt still existed, and afforded to an able
chief^

( 161 )
chief (the least delay to whom would have enabled^
him to re-assemble them) every means of giving
again that intenseness to the Royalist party which
it had lost, and which had long rendered it so
formidable ; the .firmness, preserved by the army
of Charette, who, truly carrying on the war like
a robber, had never compressed the, whole of his
forces in a general engagement, on which thirty
successive defeats had scarcely made any impres
sion, over which, in fine, we had not acquired,
rior have yet been able to acquire, that ascendancy
which. bloody and long-disputed victories pro
duce, the infallible result of which is to remove
from and deprive the conquered enemy of every
kind of resource ; the succours which the enemy
expected from England, and -which, in spite of
all the precautions taken to intercept them, might
reach them by the least negligence in the service
upon the coasts, by the effect of the least fortui-
tous1|vent, which sometimes renders the wisest
dispositions useless, and which all human pru-
derice cannot foresee ; finally, a thousand parti
cular and local circumstances, difficult to be well
explained, and which perhaps could not be com
prehended, nor even perceived, but by those
who have a perfect knowledge of the country :
-^these arc the result of the information which I
had collected, and the fruit of my observations
,.,<• ' upon

( 162 )
ttpoh the' War of la Vendee, which J had studied
from its commencement. As to my instructions^
, I drew them from several decrees of the-Conven-
tion, divers resolutions of the Committees of go
vernment, and those of the Representatives on
mission in the West ; I could even have received
them from the example of my pfedecessors, who
had carried fire and death into the revolted coun
try, particularly from those who commanded the
garrison of Menta. The government Was silent
respecting the proposition I made to it to try
gentle means, and, by publishing a proclamation
for an amnesty, to make the rebels hope for par^
don, who would have spontaneously surrendered
and laid down their arms. This measure at that
time would have infallibly succeeded with the
compressed Chouans, who were frightened, at the
recent sight of several dreadful engagements,
which had happened upon their territory, and
after which the banditti had been pursued without
intermission, and exterminated without quarter (gj.
(9) In the terms of a' decree of the Convention. See iri
Mie Journals of that time the different decrees of the Conven
tion, and the resolutions of its Committees', relative to la
Vendue : those of the Deputies on mission were conformable .
thereto. What then is the cause of that inconceivable fury
with which the agents and very passive executors of the will
of government are pursued ? You have substituted" mild
' " measures

( 163 X
The government, by its disapprobation of every
system of indulgence, and which the decrees of

measures for the dreadful means which you thought it neces
sary to employ to put an end to the War;, it is well and
good : but acknowledge at least that you wished the entire
destruction of la Vendee ; and do not persecute your agents
which the least refusal — wliat do I say ? the least negligence,
conducted to the scaffold. See the constitutive law cf the Revo^™""
lutionary Government. What can have been the object of go
vernment (this work was written in Nivose, in the third year)
in suffering the organisation of a system of defamation and
persecution against the General Officers which have served
in la Vendee? (There nevertheless are some t who have been
excepted from the proscription by an entirely peculiar favour).
Was it to offer motives of consolation to the rebels, in ex
piating by the commanders under government, by the forced
agents pi the sovereign will, the inseparable excesses of civil
wars, particularly the most horrid war that ever existed ?
excesses wdiicb, whatever may be said of them, have been
uncommon ; excesses which authorised the soldier to make
use of the dreadful but universally acknowledged right, the
right of reprisal j excesses to which our volunteers were in
cessantly provoked and excited by the spectacle presented by
the interior of la Vendue, where they found, as one may
say, at every step', the bodies of thair armed brethren who
had been tortured, mangled, torn to pieces, or burnt by a
slow fire, or hung up to the trees by the feet, or buried alive,
&c. ; excesses, in fine, which must necessarily have produced
the viplent measures that were ordered, reiterateiy ordered,
incessantly prdered, by the National Convention, its Com:
mittees, and the Deputies on mission in the West. Was it
" wished,

f 1 64 )
the Converitibn effectively resisted, left no doubt
concerning its intentions, already fully declared,

wished, in imputing pretended horrors to the Generals, that
tbe true, well-known, completely proved horrors committed
in la Vendee, all those atrocities of which the pride of human
.barbarity offers no example, but which are now considered
as venial offences, as the errors ef these good men, should be
forgotten ? If, not content with rebuilding their houses, fur
nishing them with cattle and aratory instruments, lavishing
our gold and assignats in order to engage them not to receive
tlie proffered amnesty, but to consent to treat with us as one
power would' with another ; if, I say, it has been judged
that, for the more ample indemnity, the complete satisfac
tion, the reparation so legitimately due to the illustrious de
fenders of the Altar and the Throne, to their generous dis
ciples, to all these erroneous men who have1 (and it is no longer
.doubtful) taken arms against the Republic Only to support
themselves against the system of terror, which lay heavily on
, France; if it has been judged that,"iu order to leave nothing
'more to be expected by these new Republicans in general,
and particularly by the Patriots Stofflet, Charette and Com
pany, it was necessary, and above -all things jaist, to drag
through the mud, and to coyer- with opprobrium and public
contempt (whilst expecting; something better) the General
Officers who have fought against them, Officers whose pa
triotism is of earlier date, and who have not ceased to give
proofs of it since the commencement of the Revolution, sol
diers of liberty, who defended it by sacrificing their fortunes,
their repose, their dearest affections, who, particularly during
these four years past, constantly sought for the most danger
ous posts,., in order to seal' the triumph qf the Republic with'
their

( 165 )
of completely destroying by fire and sword the
foots bf the conspiracy in the West, and to Con
tinue the War to the utmost extremity^ in order
to attain the end ; also^ although they gave me
neither plan nor" instructions, which I continually
solicited, they sanctioned all my measures, whichj
besides^ had been approved by the Representa
tives with the army.
After these considerations, and a due exami
nation of the only military measures which could
be employed in la Vendee, in combining them
with the, nature of the ground; the local obstacles,
the mariner of fighting of the Vendeans, their
audacity, and their strength, the following were
the basis of my general plan ; the object of which
was to deprive the rebels bf every kind of resource
both of warlike stores and provisions, and to leave
them only the choice of death in the centre bf
the revolted country, by strongly occupying the
chief points of its circumference.
1°. To prevent the Vendeans receiving any
foreign aid.
1°. To cut off all their communications with
the Chouans and the banditti of le Marais. j

their blood, &c. &c. ; certainly one must give up every idea
cf justice and reason, if we find either the one or the othef
in this conduct of government.
X &. To

( 166 y
3°. To remove from the revolted courrtfy alt
those of its inhabitants who had not taken up
arms ; because some, under the appearance of
neutrality, secretly .favoured the banditti ; and
others, who formed the smallest part, although
faithful to the Republic, . furnished them also
with aid, which they could not- refuse from com
pulsion (10).
A°. To carry off the <¦ cattle, corn, and every
article of subsistence, from the interior of Ia
Vendee, and to evacuate all the posts the; re (l l).
h°. To destroy the retreats of the banditti, and
in general all places which could afford them an
asylum and resource.
6V To encircle the whole theatre of war upon
the left bank of the Loire ; first, -by posts placed
upon the principal points of, its circuJnference ;
afterwards^ and upon the return of fine weather,
by entrenched camps. .
7°. To over-run, in every sense, la Vendee, by
columns • which should incessantly pursue, the

(10) The remaining inhabitants of la Vendee, under pre
tence of neutrality, wore alternately- tlie white and tri-co
loured cockade. They came before our columns with a tri -
coloured flag, and before the rebels with a white one.
(11) The carriages and carts of the country must be un
derstood here supplying their assistance. rebels,

( 167 )
rebels, destroy their retreats, and protect the
carrying off the articles of subsistence.
8°. To occupy and fortify St. Florent (now
Mont-G16ne) situated upon the Loire in the
center of its diameter, where the acting-columns
would always find provisions, ancl, in case of ilj
success, a retreat and a point of support, which
likewise by its situation upon the river would
protect its navigation, and receive by that means
every thing necessary to supply the wants of its
garrison and the different corps of the army
which might approach its walls in consequence
pf their operations.
9°. To attach no kind of artillery to the co*
lumns, nor camping effects, military equipage,
baggage, &c. &c.(l2)

(12) This was an indispensable measure and to which
they will be obliged to return, if the war be not terminated
by gentle means. Moreover, I should have reason to be
astonished (if one can now be astonished at any thing,) at
the knavery introduced in the greatest part of the denunci
ations directed against me in the sitting of the 8th Vende
miaire, in the year 2, I am accused of having set fire to
la Vendee. I shall answer by a dilemma, the solution of
which will exhibit my entire disculpation to every good
logician. You either did or did not order la Vendee to be
-burnt. In the first case you doubtless will' not punish the
agent of your will, to whom it was so dangerous not to
execute it literally : in the other case, you cannot yet rea-
X 3 sonabiy

< 168 >
10°. To remove the magazines, and even the
depots, from all the posts of the first and second '
line. 11°. Frequently to change the troops of the
columns by those of the garrisons or canton
ments. 12°. Never to transmit orders nor reports -by
the interior of la Vendee.
13°. To establish upon the Loire in the midt
die of its stream from Angers to Nantes twenty-
sonably accuse me, for I have constantly acted under the
eyes of the Representatives of the People on mission. Therf
presence had doubtless been a sufficient sanction for my ope
rations. Nay more, they approyed in wi'iting the general
ordei; of the 30th Nivose, of which all the others, were only
the consequence. Still farther; which is, that I am accused
of having burnt la Vendee, and, amongst all the Generals
nvho commanded after the decree of the 1st of August, J am
the person who burnt the least. It was not me that burnt
Lege, Machecoul, Clisson, le Port Sainper, Montaigu, Beau-
preau, Mortagne, Vihiejrs, Maulevrier, Chatillon, S, Ful-
gens, &c. &c— I will add that I was die first tp stop the
conflagratioq, when I judged that the rebels were sufficiently
weakened, sp that the war might be terminated without
employing these measures. It has been said that to burn la
Vendee was organising want, it haying been always con
sidered as the granary of the Western coasts : this merits
explanation. La Vendee, properly ?° called, or rather what
ought to be called la Vendee, the wpody country, is, for the
major part, composed of woods, yinp-yards, and mcadpw§. It

( 169 )
four gun boats, in order to watch, protect the
navigation, inspect, and visit the vessels passing
up and down the river, particularly those which
might pass from one side to the other.
14°. To change at least twice a year all the
troops of the Western army, with those of the
coasts of Brest and Cherbourg, and never
to change the general officers belonging to
them..(13) 15°. To disarm all the Communes near th6
theatre of war, as the enemy might make fresL
incursions there, snatch from the patriots their
arms and ammunition, or receive both from
those of the inhabitants attached to the Royalist
party. ' The first part of this general system of opera
tions in the West, consisted in the establishment
of cantonments upon the right bank, disposed so
as to keep the Chouans within bounds, to prevent
them from making any diversion, and from at-
It is not le Bocage which produces the most corn, but the
immense plains that surround it : it is the extensive fields of
le Marais, Lucon, Fontenay, Niort, Thouars, Doue, &c.
whose, rich productions feed twenty departments. Let us not
then make the evil greater than it is, and let us endeavour
to speak of la Vendee without passion.
(13) The motives for this disposition are the disgust and
fatigue experienced by our volunteers in this kind of war.
tempting

( 170 )
tempting any auxiliary; movement whilst we were
fighting the Vendeans. - . , , : . .?
The second, to take the. same measures against
the banditti, of le Marais, , who, not being sepa-;
rated from the Vendeans by any natural obstacle ;
might receive assistance from them, or join, the;
army of Charette. ' > ,d . ¦ ,
The third, in the -simultaneous : eruption of
twelve columns upon the territory occupied- by
the ruins of the' grand Catholic army, then di
vided into three circles.(l4)
The fourth, in the marches and particular ope-%
rations against Charette. , ¦ ;
The fifth, in the execution .of. a plan of a ge
neral attack upon le Marais,,
The sixth, in the establishment of intrenched
camps. This general plan (15), this project which con
tains .several branches, and of which I only' give
(14) Commanded by Stofflet, Bernard de Marigny, and
la Roghe-Jacquelin j the latter was killed at the end of Plu-
viose ; and then there were only two armies in that part,
that of Anjou and Upper Poiiou, conducted by Stofflet, and
that of the center commanded by Bernard de Marigny.
(15) Among other difficulties which the execution of all
military plans meets with in la Vendee, and of which one'
may judge froi',. the local dispositions arid the kind of war
carried on by the rebels, there is one whicli'-is Invincible,
anil "which singularly retarded' our operations. Whenever you

< 171 )
an analysis, considered1 in all its relation's; ap
peared to me capable of terminating the War of
la Vendee ; and although I could not but ob
serve the obstacles thrown in the way by all those
whose ' interests it offended, and who however.
ought to have concurred in its execution, I
judged that the indifference of sortie, their un
willingness to second me, and the secret means
of opposition and the inertness of others, and the
secret manoeuvres also of some 'who were not en
tirely strangers to the revolt, might retard the
effect of my measures but not render them
fruitless. Thus, in spite of the dreadful coalition
of -the departments, districts, municipalities,
societies called popular, tribunals, commissions,
committees, &c. &c. ; in 'fine, the thousand au
thorities which, first individually and then col
lectively inveighed against me ; in spite of the

you were desirous of sending an order from the head quar
ters to a division at the distance of twelve or fifteen leagues,
the messenger was often obliged to travel fifty or sixty, in
order to avoid passing through the revolted country. Thence
the impossibility of attempting expeditions, which circum
stances may give birth to, but which ought to be undertaker!
without delay. The rebels appear one day at a point to the
•number;of five or six thousand men : you concert an attack
for the nextd«y, and they are eight or ten leagues distant
from the place where they shewed themselves theday befoait
1 twa

( 172 )
two thousand written denunciations (lG), their
reproaches, and their clamours, at the tribune and
in the streets ; in spite of the use of all the means
of discordance which they sought to excite
among the troops,(l7) but the progress of which
a severe repression would soon have stopped ; in
spite of the hundred thousand physical and moral
obstacles ;which the locality, the rebels and their
accomplices, and that crowd of men and corpo
rations united in order to ruin me, opposed
against the execution of my plan, I changed not

(16) I was assured of it by a Representative, of the People.
(17) At Lucon, the popular society went so far as t»
cause all the troops of the division to revolt against the ge ¦
neral officer that commanded there, and to concert with the
municipality to cause him to be arrested by an Adjutant-
General. A Captain of Infantry was also arrested, against
whom no other reproach could be made than having ex
ecuted the General's orders, and who was no less traduced
for it at Fontenay, and guillotined immediately. It would
be too long to relate here all the facts which evidently prove
the counter-revolutionary conduct of the established autho
rities ; but here is an observation which I have made, and
¦which doubtless cannot have escaped tlie Representatives of
the People, who have traversed the Western Departments.
Who was the leader of a popular society? one who had
formerly been a priest. Who was the principal actor in ad -
ministration ? One who had formerly been a priest. Who
presided or influenced a Committee ? One who had formerly
Wen a priest, &c. &c. the

{ 173 )
the least disposition in it ; and I effaced not a
syllable of my superibr orders^ or those sanctioned
by .the first authorities.
Master of Noirmoutier, and easy, concerning
the safety of the coasts, I fixed my cantonments
upon the right bank Of the Loire ; I Was. par
ticularly attentive to render the roads free ahd
, secure,(l8) so that my orders might be speedily
-.circulated ; and that the secret of our operations
might not be exposed, I entrusted the command
of this party to young de Lage, adjudanf-generalj
an officer of great talents and activity. I could
: be equally easy respecting any movements which
Charette might make in le Marais^ the approaches
to which were defended by the posts of Challans
and Machecoul, commanded by generals Haxo
and Dutfuy. Thus, I thought of nothing more
• than the execution of the third part of my general
plan; that is to say, the combined march of
twelve columns, composed of about fifteen thou-*
sand men of the best and least fatigued troops;
(18) I can affirm, and, if it were necessary 1 could easily
prove, that during the time I commanded the Western
army, the travelling upon the roads was free and without
danger from Nantes to RCnnesi from Nantes to Angers,
from Angers to Mans, &c. &c. 'I know not if travellers can
pass there now (.1Mb Messidor in the year 3,) with ths
same security. -¦ /»<-
Y The

( tu )
The concurrence of all the civil authorities,
of all the authorities adjacent to the revolted
country, was indispensable towards the execu
tion of this plan, and above all to accelerate its
success. Also, the general order of .the 30th
Nivcfse, in virtue of which the columns put them
selves in motion, wais preceded by a resolution of
the representative of the people la Planche, who
ordered all the administrative bodies to carry
off all the provisions, (19) and which afforded
(19) There was an immense quantity of provision's in la
Vendee, because all the productions of the country had been
retained in it since the year 1790. The principal land
holders, the greatest part of whom were at the head of the
Insurrection, required not the amovint of their rents from
their farmers, ancl easily engaged them to preserve trie
fruits of their harvests: The Vendean, who, like all coun
try people,-, loves npt paper money, preferred keeping las
wines, corn, and cattle, rather than barter them for assig
nats, which he had been taught to discredit. All exterior
commerce has ceased in la Vendee since the beginning of tne
year l/Qi. I have these details, and many others, frotVi
several persons who carried on considerable business in Poi
tou, and who were obliged to renounce all commercial' con
nexions with the Poictevins when the metallic currency dis
appeared.. ':!
What must be the result of this monopoly of provisions hi
the revolted countries? The Vendeans had abundance, arid
their neighbours were in want. This single', csretttnsfcamre
has made a great number of proselytes te tlie Royalist
party.
them

( 175 )
them the greatest latitude respecting the choice
of the means to be employed, in Order that
it might be speedily executed, and that they
might take advantage of the protection of the
marching columns, to execute it in safety: but
this measure wounded all private interests ; and
although it might be salutary and still more
urgent, as all the country bordering upon the
rivers and forests in la Vendee already began to
feel the scarcity, yet they endeavoured to elude
It in order to weaken all the others, they pre
tended there was danger, they excused themselves
by the want of carriages,(20) they deliberated,
and they gained time ; in fine, however impera
tive the circular order of the representative of
the people might be, it was but very imperfectly
executed ; and if I happened to get any provi
sions from la Vendee, it was solely owing to the
care of the commissary of provisions for the
army. (20) I passed at the beginning of Germinal by la Motte-
Achard, a small borough in the district des Sables. I asked
the Mayor of that Commune if, conformably to various re
solutions of tlie Representatives of the People, he had car
ried off and conducted any corn to les Sables ? he answered
that he had not been able to do it for want of carriages.—
Three hours after there were upwards of sixty carts to carry
pff the good3 of the inhabitants who evacuated the place,
Y2 In

( 178 )
In the mean time I could not delay the march
of the troops. All the commanders of the posts
in the interior- communicated to me their uneasi
ness at the reassembling of the banditti, who be*
tame every day more numerous since the return
pf their- chiefs. We had had several engagements
during Frimaire and Nivose, of little importance
indeed, bat in which the rebels had had some*
times the advantage, particularly against the ads
judant-general Desmares, whose cowardice led
htm to the scaffold.
The columns, already disposed at different
places in the East for this general and offensive
movement, entered into la Vendue, according ta
the order abqye stated. I shall give some details
in order to prove that this order of march
ought not to have taken place until they had
reached the heights of Chollet ; that is to say,
that the columns ought to have passed through
about half the revolted country only, and not to
have preserved their first disposition on entering
the other part of la Vendee, for it was to be pre?
sumed that the rebels, being hard pressed, and
Consequently approached again by. these various
corps qf the army who droye them from every
point where they wished to make resistance,
would present themselves in certain masses, which
\t rnighf: have been dangerous to have fallen upo.fi Wtfh

( m- y
with such weak .columns; that, in other respect^
if I had passed beyond the heights of Chollet, in
continuing the same order of march, the left
columns soon entering upon the territory oc
cupied: by Charette's army, whose forces were
considerable and united, might have been easily
broken, on account of their instability.
But, well informed that the rebels, being scat
tered, appeared on this side Chollet in partial
assemblies only, I thought it right to ~take ad
vantage of this circumstance to destroy them
separately. It was. not necessary to oppose the
enemy in masses, who had none in these parts
themselves, because this disposition would have
been more profound, and would have employed
a force at that time useless to the columns ; be
cause it might have diminished the number of
them, and have increased the spaces which sepa*-
rated them too much ; and that in taking from
them that connection, that adherence which they
pught to havevaccording to the general order, it
might have rendered it more easy for the rebels
to have avoided them, by passing through the
interstices, or by considerably expanding those
which formed the wings. Thus it was necessary
that the- march of the twelve columns should be
a kind of inarch in front, and that, by their re
spective flank companies crossing at intervals, it
might

( 178 )
might produce the effect of a march in order of
battle. It was not neces"sary that these columns,
thus directed, should act very forcibly, as they
had no strong points of resistance to vanquish,
and were not likely to meet any parties of more
than four, five, or six hundred of the banditti to
act against; but that they should make an ex
tensive opening, and encircle a considerable ex
tent of ground, as the banditti were in all parts.
The two central columns directed their march
against Chollet, and were to remain there. Those
on each flank advancing in parallels to nearly an
equal distance from each other, and determined
by the general order, were also to stop at dif
ferent points above the town, the line of which
was ordered not to be passed.
According to the information obtained by the
parties, the patroles, the discoveries, the reports
of the chiefs of the columns, and a considerable
number of prisoners, this march produced the
expected effect, of making- known the real state
of the two corps of the army formed from the
wrecks of the grand Catholic army ;• the one
under the command of Bernard de Marigny,
which was called the central army ; the other,
commanded' by Stofflet, and which preserved the
name of the army of Anjou and Upper Poitou.
Some of the enemy's detachments wliich had en
deavoured

( m )
deavbured to pass upon our rear, Were dispersed^
and a great number of rebels fell on all sides by
the sword of the Republicans ; but more con*
siderable meetings were formed in front of the
, columns, and it would have been dangerous to
have attacked them without bringing our forces
closer together.
It was then that Laroche-Jacquelin, at the
head of 1200 men, passed between two of the
columns on the right, which he did not dare to
attack, and fell upon Chemille, tlie garrison of
which being but weak, were, according to the
general order, to join the, body of the army
which had passed through that town, which I
wished to evacuate, and which the commander
cowardly abandoned. without firing a gun.
Laroche-Jacquelin, in falling upon_.my rear*
wished to make a diversion, but his march made
no alteration in the continuance of my operations";
and in quitting Chollet, where I left a very strong
garrison under the command of a general, of bri
gade, I, prepared to attack two points where, ac
cording to every information, I should find the
enemy in force, between Tiffanges and Gest'e. ",'"
General Cordellier, at the head of the two
united columns on. the right, marched against
Geste, and. I advanced against Tiffanges with
the two central columns". . The enemy had only
three or '.four hundred men at Tiffanges, who^
1 evacu-

( iso )
evacuated.it after some discharges a£ 'musketry*
which wie answered by a dozen from an howitzer
(21) ; but Cordellier meeting* with some resistance
in the neighbourhood of Geste, had three serious
actions with the rebels, in which he beat them*
and received orders to pursue them. " ¦
In the mean time, the whole cf the army suf*
fered from my absence. It was necessary for me
to fix my head-quarters (22) : Nantes afforded
every advantage for the free circulation of orders
and intelligence upon both banks ; but I found
myself at too great a distance from the columns
acting in la Vendeej where the operations re
quired the tgreatest activity. I thought to ac
complish both objects, by leaving the Chief of
the General Staff at Nantes, and fixing myself at

(21) This is the only time that I carried artillery into Ia
Vendee. I had an. howitzer and an eight ppunder. Whoever
is acquainted with Tiffanges, knows that it ia very difficult
to be taken on the side of Chollet.
(22) This is also one of the 'difficulties experienced by the
General in Chief of theforces of the West. I left the Chief
of the Staff at Nantes, which was the centre of thfe corre-'
spon dence, and where the Representatives of the People'
•were, and I was always at Montaigu or on the march ;. but
one may judge how many inconveniences and delays resulted
from the distance of my Chief of the Staff,' See. Sic. The
mode of carrying on war in la- Vendee resembles not, in ariy
¦jespect whatever, that which is carried on upon the frontier^.
-Montaigtt,

( 1-81 >
Montaigu, a town which had been burnt at an
improper time ; as its castle might have pre
served, and rendered it a very important and
secure post, although enfleche.
It may be perceived that I had already expe
rienced obstacles in the execution of the third
part of my general plan. It has been seen that. I
stopped my left columns above Choflet, where I
left them inactive : they were then to form two
corps of the army, and to attack Charette by the
East, whilst two other considerable columns were
to attack him by the West : but this combined ,
march could not be effected without evacuating
the posts of the interior, particularly Chollet,
the most dangerous of all, which was to be
preserved, conformable to a decree of jthe-Na-
tional Convention, and the Representatives with
the army opposed its evacuation. Its preservation
required that of several adjacent posts, such as
Mortagne, Tiffanges, &c. and I then found my
self under the necessity of placing in these garri
sons a part of the troops which I had destined to
act offensively. It must be observed, that, in
obliging me to guard all these interior posts, I
had scarcely ten thousand men left to form the
-acting columns.
Charette, sq often defeated in Frimaire and
Nivose, by Generals Haxo, Carpentier, Dutruy,
Z Dufour,

( 16,2 )
Dufour, &c. continued at the extremity of le
Bocage.* . General Duquesnoy, to wfipm I gave
some fight troops, received orders to go in quest
of him (23), and to pursue him. Charette, in.
avoiding him, fell upon Lege, the advanced post
of Haxo, carried it, and abandqned it immedU,
ately after. He was overtaken at two leagues
from thence, at PpntrJames ; and, being cpiriT:
pelled tq give battle, was vanquished., and, lost
800 men, and conducted the wrecks of his army
back again into the retreats of le Bocage,
Whilst General Duquesnoy pursued and fought
Charette, Chollet was threatened. The General
of Brigade, Moulins, jun.. whom I had placet}.
there wjth 5,000 ehqsen men, and three foiif
pounders, knew the projects of , Stofflet (24),
-r*  ' '• ' ¦ ¦¦-•y*-i -. '-"I. .'-  r—  ¦-. — " — . — ...  *—?.. 
; (23) It was not an easy matter to find Chafette, particur
larly to bring him to action, To day at the head of ten
thousand men, thp nejjt dtry wandering with a score horse
men, it is very rare that one can come up with' him. When,
you believe him to be in your front, he is in your rear.
Yesterday he threatened, sitch or such post, to-day he is ten
leagues from it. More aqje to avoid than fight you, he al
most always discoqcerts, and often without knowing it, all
your combinations, fie endeavpurs to surprise you, to carry
off your patrqles, and to kill your stragglers, &c. &c. This
Chief has neither the necessary talents nor audacity to make
conquests ; but it will be difficult to destroy him.
(24) Stofflet, formerly game-keeper to the Marquis dp
M.a.tileyrier, is, better skilled in military affairs than, Charette. "
Que

( 183- )
#hd, having united to. his army tlie wrecks of-
that defeated at Geste, under the command of
LarorJhe-Jacquelin (who was killed four days
after that affair), prepared to attack Chollet.
Moulins^ previously knowing it, was: very easy
concerning the event, I was not so ; ,'arid What*
ever might be my confidence in -this General
Officer^ iri the one' that sccohdcM him (25)> and
in the Strength of the garrison of that town* the
poskieh of it was so bad, the rebels- preserved Set
much intelligence with it,, and were so well in
formed of/eveiJy thing that passed f here, that I
dreaded art action under >its walls; I felt that
Cholltt,r: to Which, hadoubt>?by far too much!
kbportamice .Was attached^ and the voluntary eva--
cuatian of which might rather produce a good
effect thart GfthtrWise, under every consideration^
would do us much mischief in the public opinion,
if we were compelled to surrender it by forc6 of
arms ; and this was a sufficiently powerful motive
to engage the rebel chiefs to attack it, arid to
,,,> ...
, : — — — — —rj—
One hundred and fifty actions have much habituated liim ttf
*ar 5 and he very seldom refuses to fight, in endeavouring tc*
secure to himself the' advantages of an attack. His army i#
more warlike' and better commanded than that of ChatettiS.
(25) CafBfr, General o-f ' Brigade'/ who was VP-ottaded? in
fhfe affair--,' ¦ *>U j
Z 2 iit:,r,.- milt(f

( I S* )
ttnite all their efforts to render themselves masters
of it.
I gave orders to Cordellier, who had not
quitted the environs of Geste . since the victory
gained by him there, immediately to draw rtear
Chollet with his division, in order that I might
be ready .to support him. Being arrived within
half a league of the town, Cordellier found all the
garrison retreating upon the high road of Nantesv
He could scarcely manage to make his way
through the fugitives, ,in order to get at their
pursuers; The action began : the. rebels, -wha
thought themselves . certain of victory, were
broken in their turn hy a vigorous charge/ were
severely handled in Chollet, the' houses of which
frere already filled with a part of their army, and
were pursued to the distance of two leagues by
our light troops.
After having restored the gasrison of Chollet^
and named a successor to the unfortunate Mou~,
lins (26), who was not able to survive his defeat,
(26) Moulins enraged at the cowardice of his troops, who
had taken flight at the first, discharge of musketry, was mak
ing every exertion to rally them, when he was struck by a
eouple of balls,; Fearful of falling into the. hands of the ban
ditti, he blew out his brains. Thus he terminated his glo
rious; career, carrying with him to the grave the regret and
asteem of all the heroes of the army ; and covering with*
shame and opprobrium the cowards that had abandoned him.
1 I

( 185 )
I recalled Cordellier to Montaigu, and rejoined,
with his division, that of General Duquesnoy,
who was continually at the heels qf Charette,
then occupying the small and great Luc. I
marched in order, to attack him there, when I
learned that he was in my rear at Saint- Philbert-
derBoue ; a rapid counter-march brought me
near him, and I was going to force him to action
in St.- Philbert ; but he had already . quitted the
place : at last, a fresh counter-march brought me
upon his; army, "and I began the action with my
marksmen ; but Charette took advantage of the
protection of la Boulogne, which separated us,
and fled again, with my cavalry at his heels." I
was preparing to follow him, when an order from
tlie Minister (27), enjoined me to send off imme-

(27) Every thing seemed to conspire to destroy my means
gnd , shackle ,mj operations. At the ' moment the Minister,
deprived me of 5000 men from the division of the North,'
two resolutions of the Committee of Public Safety ordered
me, the one to send 1200 men to Rochefbrt, where they were
to be embarked; the other, to keep 2000 regular troops in
garrison at la Rochelle. La, Rochelle is secured from sur
prise, and only wants for its defence a few companies of
gunners and citizens, of the national guard ; moreover, in
twenty-four hours, I could assemble there 12 or. 15,000
jnen : , it is true, that,, in. order to replace these forces, the
Minister informed me he had sent 300Q cavalry ; but the
greatest part of them did. not arrive till Germinal,, and there

( 186 )
diateiy 5000 men for the army of the coasfs df
Brest, and to detach them from the division of
the North, which formed the greatest part of the"
corps of the army Which I then commanded irt
person. This ill-timed order ruined me ; but 1
was obliged to obey. I left Cordellier upon the
borders- of Boulogne, to observe the movements
of Charette, and ordered him not to risk an acj
tion till I sent fresh forces into le Bocage, in or
der to second him.
During these circumstances, General Huche,
who commanded at Chollet, where there was a
strong garrison, ;sent out dally large detachments,
which made successful incursions in the neigh
bourhood of Bernard de Marigny. I had some
troops to dispose of by the evacuation of several
of the central-posts, such as les Herbievsy Chan-
tonay, le Roche-sur- Yon, which I had gained
possession of Finally, the Representatives of
the People with the army of the West, took two
resolutions which I had .long since solicited,, arfd
were scarcely 800 of thew fit fo» service ¦. the rest wanted
Worses, accoutrements, or arms. They thought to mcreas*
my strength by sending me 30,000 men of the first requisi
tion, destined to fill up the complements of the army. Ther*
was not one of them armed, or who had shoes.-: It was said
that I commanded 80,000 men in the West ; but they did
sot say that half of them were uafit-for service. which

( w >
which would accelerate the termination of the
war as much as all the military operations. One
of them ordered Chollet to be evacuated ; the
other, that all the inhabitants of la Vendee should
quirt the country ; if not, that they should be re-^
pined as rebels, and treated as such. This new
disposition gave still greater activity to the ope»
rations, by augmenting the number of troop*
acting offensively. Charette being soon pursued,
and pressed upon by three columns, was overtaken
and defeated by that commanded by General
Haxo, who on that day lost his life. On the
other side, Stofflet, after having defeated General
Grignon, was, in turn, twice vanquished by the
lattdr. The rebels being continually harassed, and pur
sued into the centre of la Vendee, sought some
points of support upon different parts of the bor
ders of the Loire : I drove them from Lire, Cha-
lonne, and Mont-Dejean, which they occupied ;
J did not allow them time to unite nor to form
numerous assemblies, and they endeavoured only
to escape apd to avoid the columns. They soon
hid themselves in the woods, and endeavoured to
form establishments there, particularly hospitals
for their sick and wounded. I scoured the forests
pf Toufou, Mondebert, Lepo, Prince, Roche-'
Serviere, VezinSj &c. &c, and there hew esta
blishments

( 188 )
felishrnents'wefe no sooner formed than destroyeS*
We found in these retreats some armed detach*
ments, monks, religious persons, church orna
ments, a small quantity of warlike stores, and a
considerable quantity of provisions buried urtSer
ground.' .
But without giving any farther details concern
ing roy various operations in the months of Plu-
viose and Ventose, I shall relate a fact that will
suffice to prove the distressed state to which I had
reduced the rebels. By chance, the . Chevalier
de la Cathelini&fe, first Lieutenant to Charette,
fell into my hands., He said to one ef my
Aides - de- Camp, who had him. in custody,
whilst waiting to be carried, before the military
tribunal : ' "~ The measures adopted by your
" General have- reduced us to the last extre-
(( mity ; my party is lost without resource. M.
" de Charette wished not to carry on the war
li this winter ; and, if time had been allowed us
(l to recover ourselves, we should have had fifty
ff thqusand men (28) in the spring, proof against
" every kind of danger, fatigue and distress.
'•' We want warlike stores ; and the destruction

(29) It must be observed that Catheliruere speaks, here
only of the forces of Charette. I knew that the rebels wefe
still very numerous, but they: were in .want of warlike stores. " of

( m )
" of ouf mills and ovens will deprive us of our
" remaining succours in provisions*" &C;
La Cathelini&re niade the same declaration be
fore four Representatives bf the People, -then on
mission with the army of the West,. Garrauj
Prieur, Hentz, and Francastel.
In comparing this declaration with, every thing
related by d'Elbee concerning the situation of la
Vendeej ahd in following the events Which justi.-*-
fied it, e*Very impartial reader will be able toap-
preciate the measures taken by me in order to ter-*
minate this unhappy war, the most terrible of all
the scourges which have afflicted the Republic.
He can judge of the many obstacles I had to sur
mount, in order to arrive at- the complete execu
tion of a plan, which the constant opposition of
so many various and contrary interests might cause-
to miscarry.
Whilst all parts of the army of the West Were
in the greatest activity ; whilst the operations up
on the left bank succeeded each Other with such
rapidity that the rebels had not time to recollect
themselves; whilst the cantonments .upon the
right bank confined the Chouans, and rendered
all the communications free and secure, particu
larly the high roads of Nantes, Angers, Saumur,
&c. ; I prepared -a new expedition,: a general at
tack upon le Marais. Charette,- who suspected
A a 'it,

( • 190 )
it, attempted a final effort, and united- all his5
strength against Challans. The action was long
amd very brisk. General Dutruy, who com
manded in this part, compelled Charette to re
turn into le Bocage, after having left a great
number of dead under the walls of the town.
Two strong columns crossing upon the frontiers
of le Bocage and le Marais, that is to say, in the
environs of Roche-Serviere, Lege, and Freligne,
prevented Charette from discovering any of his
motions, and from coming to disturb the troops
destined for the projected expedition. I caused
le Marais to be attacked (29) at all points ; and
after having, experienced and overcome a resist
ance, and obstacles which the constancy and va
lour of the Republican soldiers alone could sur
mount, they forced their way into the centre of
the country, seized upon Perier (30), and esta
blished themselves there in force. This operation
was long, and le Marais was not entirely purged'
when I quitted the army.
We had attained such a degree of superiority
in the West, and the Vendeans were reduced to

(29) At the beginning of Germinal ; it was impossible te
attack it in the winter.
(30) Le Perier is a very large borough, situated in the
plain iu the centre ef le Marais.
1 such

( 191 )
such a state of weakness, that it might be said it was
no longer necessary to fight in order to finish the
War ; and although at this time (in Germinal)
the Adjudant-General Dusirat suffered himself to
be beaten in the environs of Mont-Glone by
Stofflet and Marigny, upon whom he neverther
less took revenge, the interior of la Vendee no
-longer affording an asylum to the, rebels, attacked
at once by all the* scourges which their fury and
their crimes had provoked, the only measure to
be employed in order to complete their destruc
tion was, to confine them within the desolated
circle, where a cruel epidemical disease (31-), the
want of subsistance, and the avenging steel of the
Republicans, left them nothing but the choice of
death. Had I not learned the desperate situation of the
rebels by the reports- of a great number of prison
ers, who all agreedconcerning it, the last enter
prises of their Chiefs (32) would have been suffi-

(31) The banditti were attacked with a kind of leprosy,
arising from an inveterate itch, which caused agreat number
of them to perish ; and the more so, as they had no asylum
where their sick and wounded could be taken care of.
(32) Stofflet, at this time, obliged the women who fol
lowed his army, and who fought with an inconceivable and
cruel obst'inacy, to dress themselves in men's clothes— «and
yet they have been surprised that women were killed in. la
Vendue. _ ,
A a 2 cien'tj-

(192 ).
cient to convince me of the weakness of fheif
remaining resources. Stofflet and Marigny being
united, attacked la Chataigneraye ; the gdjudant
Lapierre who commanded there had only 1 200
infantry and 100 cavalry ; he nevertheless re-r
pulsed them : being informed that he was to be
attacked' again in a few days, I reinforced him
with fJOO infantry and 120 horses.' The rebels
presented themselves in far greater numbers than
at first, and .after a pretty long and very warm
action, they were broken and put to flight,
leaving upon the field of battle a heap of killed
arid Wounded, and four flags.
It was then that I thought the war sufficiently
advanced and the circumstances favourable for
commencing the execution of the sixth and last
part of my general plan, the establishment of in
trenched camps. I shall give ap account of the
principal motives which determined me to adopt
this measure, without which the war may perhaps
be checked, but can never be terminated, nor
can a fresh insurrection in Poitou be prevented.
However impetuous and bold might be the
general mode of attack and fighting observed by
the rebels, they have been observed during the
war to miscarry almost always before the for
tified posts, however weak might be their fortifi-
cationsj Thus, whilst our various corps of the
array

( 193 )
army of the West were by , turns harrassed by
these impetuous hordes, whose shock was still
more violent by their impetuosity than even by
their density, you might see these masses break,
and, in a manner dissolve before a,town sur
rounded .by a simple wall, before the smallest
lines, and before the smallest intrenchments :
the sieges of Sables, Granville, Angers, &c. and
particularly that of Nantes,, are incontestable
proofs of it.
However important the *. possession of Mont-
Glone (St. Florent) might have, been to them,
they never daredHo attack it whilst I commanded
there ; although the onlyfortifications.of this post
were a shallow ditch and a parapet badly flanked
by some weak redans very distant from each
other. : I have observed that the fire of the rebels was
always very brisk and destru<tive, but not well
supported.. They would begin a battle with^five
qr six. cartridges. . Many were obliged to sub
stitute pikes for muskets for want of ammuni
tion (33) ; and it is known that the attack of a
fortified point requires a fire of musketry well
supported, particularly when there is no artil
lery. - .
(33) I was confirmed in this by all the prjsqriers.
»'"%jfl»» The

( 194 )
n - The camps also produced the advantage of ac
celerating the return of order and discipline < in
tlie army, which already began to appear in it
by withdrawing our troops from the towns, where
they are exposed to every species of corruption,'
and by accustoming the soldiers, particularly the
new levies which the necessity of completing the.
corps- caused to be sent by crowds into the West,
to intrench, barricade > and accustom themselves
to the service and regimen of camps.
The intrenched camps -enabled us, to the' pre
judice of the rebels, to make use of the greatest
part of the means of defence presented to us by
the nature of the ground in la Vendee, and the
labours of their own industry, means from which'
they had derived so many advantages.
But ,the most powerful of all my motives for
determining upon a system of encampment in the
West was, to preserve to the Republic, if not
the whole, at least the greatest part, of the rich
productions which the crops already promised ;
to afford security and protection to the husband
men, whom the wishes of government or the
horrors of war had removed from its theatre,
and who might be recalled upon every point °f
its circumference in proportion as the progressive.
and combined march of the camps towards the
center of la Vendee sfipuld confine the circle and
' - secure

. ( 195 )
secure peace and tranquillity upon all its exterior
parts ; in fine, to substitute for destructive mea
sures restorative means which might insensibly
restore this purified country to its original pros
perity. Moreover, by establishing intrenched camps
round about la Vendee, I did not give up the
offensive S3rstem, the ascendancy we had acquired
over, the rebels promising us fresh successes.
Two strong columns would incessantly have over
run the interior part of the revolted country.
Their chiefs would have confined themselves par
ticularly to prevent the reassembling of the
enemy, or fighting them, or I should rather
say,' to destroying the parties of banditti who to
the last moment attempted to unite again and to
form themselves into bodies.
The general oificer who, would have had the com
mand of an acting column, would have concerted
with the commander of such, or such a camp, ac
cording as circumstances might have occasioned
him to approach it. They would .have commu
nicated to each other their respective knowledge
concerning the position, the force, and the mo
tions of the different parties of rebels. They might,
according to information obtained from positive
reports, have agreed upon some partial operation,
have attempted some soups de main, some of those?
sudden

( 196 )
sudden expeditions which sometimes the" most
trifling event gives an opportunity to attempt,
which should be undertaken as soon as conceived,
and which are almost always successful- when
secrecy and celerity concur in their execution ;
but even supposing that the acting columns had
been suppressed and thit I had confined' myself to
defensive plans, which, in other respects, accord
ing to' the disposition, the organization of the
camps, and the habitual service I prescribed ih
them for the troops, would never have beenr an
absolute and determined defensive, but certainly
an active defensive, a defensive of movements,
supposing, I say, that if from the moment the
camps should have been established, no- ulterior'
success had been expected ; in fine, the termina
tion of the war, but from their advancing, their
progress upon the enemy's territories without the
concurrence of secondary measures, I still believS
that the success was infallible, provided always
that the general officers had not swerved from the
circular instruction indicating the conduct they
were to observe in the formation of the camps,
in the interior and exterior service of the troops
which composed them, in the just distribution of
the different kinds of arms, in the direction and
the activity given to the labours of the pioneers
charged with clearing the country and opening the

( 197 )
the roads. upon the. points, and particularly upon
tlie line which tlie .camps were to pursue in
changing their position, in securing by the same
proceedings the communications between the
camps iforming the first line arid the, cantonments
forming the- second, &c. &c. and above all in
submittirig jn these different dispositions to local
circumstances, so imperious in la Vendee that it
is necessary t.o abandon the customary means and
sometimes to m^ke; a sacrifice of principles. , ,
I have thought it useless to relate several other
military events (34) which took place whilst I
(-3,4), There, is nevertheless one of wjhicji I shall speak, and
that is, the evacuation of IVlortagne. I wasjon the march
when the, .garrison of Mortagne, <jbliged:tp sustain a daily1
fire against the rebels, that gurrqundedf it, had exhausted its
ammunition. The commander dispatched a messenger to
m^ whom. I neyer saw. It wouldVhave been, much better to
ha^pj sent him to Nantes, where theichief of the staff always
resided. The garrison, not being able to hold out any
longer, evacuated the town, forced their way through tJi^
enemy with fi^ed .bayonets, and performed their retreat with
order and courage. Some officers came to the popular sor
ciety a,t Nantes, and there, spoke against the general officers.
They afterwards circulated a writing whjch they signed :
this was a libel which' might occasion the greatest mischief
in,, the ai;my. The Representatives of the People entered in
to a resolution ,in winch they gave a brilliant proof of their
confidence, and caused the authors and signers of this
writing to be imprisoned; Bp Mortagne

( 198 )
commanded the forces in the West, as they are
less interesting than those I have related, and
would have contributed nothing to the informa
tion which this part of my work may give re
specting the true situation of the rebels at the
time the command was taken from me, that is to
say, when the camps were establishing.

Mortagne was the oply post remaining In the interior of
la Vendee. I wished to evacuate it ; the Representatives of
the People opposed it, and they required me to retake it.
We entered it again without firing a gun, and I left a strong
garrison in it.
1 ought to have been the less concerned respecting the
fate of Mortagne, as general Cordellier was in the neigh •
bourhood with his division, and ready to succour it. More ¦
over, this event, wliich has caused so much noise, was a very
trivial affair, and could not be considered as a disgrace.
But if I cannot be reasonably reproached for the evacu
ation of Mortagne, military men, and men acquainted with
the country, will find, that I did not take every advantage
offered by the march of the twelve columns provided I had
given them another direction.1 In fact, my first operation
should have been to drive the enemy beyond le Laybn,. and '
to have defended the right bank of it, when the columns '
wliich had marched from the Ponts-de-Ce, Brissac, &c. be- '
coming useless at those points would have' strengthened the
columns on the left; and I should- have 'occupied less
ground, &c. &c. ; in fine, instead of marching the columns
from East to West, their direction ought to have been from
the South East to North West : in this respect. I arn inex
cusable. I partook of the impatience of the Representatives
I oi

( 199 )
It would be equally useless to enlarge further
upon the general dispositions which I was not
able to execute : I believe the' result of them
would have proved fortunate ; I may doubtless
be deceived ; and I shall very willingly submit to

of thfc Pfeople, who, according to thti orders of tlie Commit
tee of Public Safety, gave me only a month to finish the
war; and acting with precipitation in the measures taken,
for its termination was only prolonging it.
The former Committee of* Public Safety gave plans to all
thdr Generals in Chief : I never received any thing from it
but threats to send me to the scaffold ; and yet it has. been
said that I was a creature of the former Committee;
Few men are possessed of such a mild disposition as my
self (for which I appeal to all who have known me) ; and
yet I have been described as a Vandal, a cannibal, &C. &c.
No general officer has had in the army a more modest
train than myself ; yet M. Heclor-le-Gros pretends that I
had the pageantry of a Marshal of France) because he saw
3t my doot a sentinel and a messengat on horseback.
1 Was never intoxicated in my life, yet M. Lequinio, ac
cording to M. Gannel, pretends that I was inebriated when
with the army : and this is M. Lequinio who reproaches me
with drunkenness !
The Representatives of the People Hentz and Francastel,
in the printed report of their mission in the We'st^ speak of
me as a proud and ignorant man. How shall I answer these
reproaches? No person }s more meek than myself; as to
my military abilities, I agree that they are very weak, and I
will not appeal from the judgment of the representatives
Hentz and Francastel : but let me be permitted to tell them,
B b 2 that

( 200 )
reasons of experienced and impartial military
men, who, being well acquainted with the coun
try, shall demonstrate to me the errors of my
plan and the insufficiency of the measures 1
adopted in order to terminate the1 War" of ia
Vendee. But if this Work, which has no other merit
than that of proving the paucity of the author's
pretensions, his love for truth, and the indepen
dence of his opinions, should be attacked by
men who are strangers to the profession, or by
some who possess nothing military but their
epaulettes ; if, in the new productions which this
may give birth to, malice and ignorance be
added, and they endeavour to refute me by gross"
abuse and false reasoning, I most assuredly shall

fhat ift -writing they often swerve from the truth, and that
the greatest part of the events related by them are delivered
in such a manner as does but little honour to their memory
er integrity..
One word more and I have done. A stranger to all parties
and factions, I have never asked, or obtained any thing by
intrigue. I have never intruded myself into any rank, and
could only owe my advancement to my attachment to my
profession, and to some actions which are not without glory.
1 have served my country like an hopest man,, and a loyal
Republican, and I defy all my enemies to prove the contrary.
I have been ten months in irons : but I know how to suffer. not

( 201 )
riot answer theffl ; but I shall not be Convinced
that my plan is good for nothing.
What is preferable to every military plan is,
the project of finishing the War of la Vendee by
gentle 'means : this measure does honour to the
National Convention. It is time to stop the
streams of blood which for these twenty months
past have inundated this wretched country. The
Commissioners charged with this important mis
sion will doubtless know how to reconcile the.
measures which the public safety commands with
those required by humanity. They will rightly
judge that an excess of clemency will infallibly
endanger the safety of the Republic.
TURREAU.

FINIS.

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