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THE THEEE PANICS

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RICHARD COBDEN, Esq., M.P.

FOURTH EDITION.

lo;ndon:
WARD & CO., 27, PATERNOSTER ROW.
1862.

London:
PitlNTBD BY J. WERTHEIMER AND CO.,
FINSBURT CIRCUS.

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THE THREE PANICS.

THE FIRST PANIC.
1847—1848.
As the question involved throughout these pages turns mainly
upon the comparative strength of the English and French
navies, the reader's attention will be frequently solicited
to the preceding tables of naval expenditure, etc., in the two
countries. They comprise : —
1. Accounts, in parallel columns, of the total yearly expen
diture on the English and French navies, for the twenty-five
years, from 1835 to 1859.
2. Accounts of the expenditure, during the same period, for
wages in the English and French dockyards.
3. Lists of the numbers of seamen maintained in the two
navies in each year for the same time.
There is also a list of the number of vessels in commission
in each year during the same period in the French navy,
for which there is no parallel list available in the English
accounts. It should be understood, however, that a comparison of the
total expenditure in the two countries, for any one year, would
be a very unfair test of the cost or strength of their respective
navies. There are several very large items charged in the
British navy estimates, as, for instance, the half-pay and
pensions, which are found under other heads in the finance
accounts of France. On the contrary, there are some smaller
sums charged to the navy in France, which come under other
categories of expenditure in England. The chief use of this
table is to furnish an unbroken comparison of the progress

THE THREE PANICS.

[PANIC

of expenditure in the two countries during a series of years ;
and with this view, the accounts of the Ministry of the
Colonies, in which some changes have taken place to break the
continuity, have been omitted.
For comparing the naval expenditure of the two countries
for any one year, especially in what a French writer has called
the " aggressive " outlay, a more accurate test is afforded by
the second table, giving the amounts expended for wages in
their respective dockyards.
But the truest comparison of the strength or cost of the two
navies, in any given year, is afforded by the numbers of the
seamen. The official representatives of the Admiralty in the
House of Commons have always laid down the rule, that the
vote for men is decisive of the whole amount of expenditure.
In the words of the highest authority of our day : "It has been
well ascertained with respect to the naval branch, and still more
with respect to the other branches of our defensive force, that
the number of men rules the amount of money voted on all the
other branches of the various estimates."* Again, in a Report
laid before Parliament, on the " Comparative State of the
Navies of England and France," f to which further allusion
will be made, it is stated : " But, as in the case of the Army
Estimates, nearly every vote is affected by the number of men ;
so, in the Navy Estimates, it will be found that almost every
vote is influenced by the same consideration ; as an increase in
the number of seamen involves a corresponding increase in the
force of ships, in the expense of bringing them forward and
fitting them for service, and providing for wear and tear."
Before proceeding, it may be well to meet an objection.
It has been said in the House of Commons, J that the public
accounts are unreliable in France. That the estimates of the
expenditure for the different ministerial departments are less
reliable in France than in this country is universally admitted.
This arises from two causes : the facility with which supple
mentary credits have been granted by the Executive— a
privilege which has recently been renounced by the Emperor •
and from the circumstance that the Estimates are prepared a

* Sir James Graham, Hansard, cxxiv.312. f Par. Pap. 182  1859
% Mr. Bentinck, Hansard, clxi. 1765.

1847  1848.] THE THREE PANICS. 3
year in advance of ours. For instance, our Navy Estimates, for
1862, are prepared in December, 1861 ; whilst in France the
same process is going on for 1863. Hence, when the war
between France and Austria broke out in the spring of 1859,
as the navy expenditure for that year had been fixed in
December, 1857, it followed necessarily that all the extra ex
penses for that war had to be met by supplementary credits.
But it must not be inferred that no record is kept of those
supplementary expenses. Every franc is inserted in the Bulletin
des Lois, and afterwards appears in the Reglement definitif des
Budgets. Each item is allocated to the various ministries, and
the Compte General des Finances comprises absolutely every one
of these items. Had it not been so, how could M. Fould,
in his late programme, have exhibited the exact amount of the
difference between the estimates and the expenditure over a long
series of years ? Ought not the recent unfavourable expose of
French finance to satisfy the most sceptical that those in
power have not the unchecked control of the public accounts ?
The system of public accounts in France is the most exact in
principle, and the most rigidly sustained in practice, in the
whole world ; and as the Auditors (La Cow des Comples) are
irremovable judges, an error or a fraud is all but impossible.
But it requires a delay of more than a year to obtain the
audited accounts, and hence the above tables are only brought
down to 1859.
There is one other point requiring a preUminary observation.
It might be supposed, from the tone frequently assumed by our
officials, when speaking in the House on the subject of the Navy
of France, and from the pretended revelations which some
times appear in a portion of the public press, that the
government of that country is in the habit of taking sudden
and secret resolutions respecting its naval armaments. So far
is this from being the case, that every body acquainted with
the subject knows that the French are far more open than our
selves in discussing and defining, publicly, beforehand, the
amount and character of their naval force. With us, the
inquiries of Committees of Parliament, or Royal Commissions,
are confined to the details of administration ; they are restrained
from considering and pronouncing an opinion on the amount of
force to be kept up, on the plea that that is the prerogative of

4 THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC I.
the Sovereign, to be exercised on the Tesponsibility of the
Cabinet. Not so in France, where Commissions, appointed by
the Chambers or the Crown, discuss the future strength and
organisation of the Navy for many years to come ; and the
result of their deliberations, with their recommendations, is
published to the world.
It must not, however, be supposed that these plans are
always carried to completion, for no country, perhaps, produces
a greater number of abortive paper projects than France ; but
the government more frequently fall short of than exceed the
recommendations of the Committees. For instance, at the
present moment, the French government is regulating its
expenditure, under the chief heads of its Naval Budget, by an
Imperial decree of 1857, issued in consequence of the report of
a Special Commission, appointed in 1855, and which fixed the
outlay for fourteen years ; but it is certain that new dis
coveries in naval architecture, if not the state of the finances,
will lead to a modification of this programme.
There is something very puerile in the recent attempts to
frighten the country with stories about secret preparations in
the French dockyards. It would be just as possible to build a
great hotel in secrecy in Paris, as to conceal the process of
constructing a ship of war at Toulon or Cherbourg. Such
tactics on the part of the alarmists are novel, and not com
plimentary to the intelligence of the public. The subject was
treated with greater candour formerly. In introducing the
Navy Estimates, in 1839, Mr. "Wood (now Sir Charles Wood),
the Secretary of the Admiralty, said: — "The French annual
estimates contain the fullest information. The French carry
publicity to a fault. They carry it, as Sir John Barrow has
mentioned in his late life of Lord Anson, to their own detri
ment. There is no disguise about the state of their navy."
In comparing the expenditure of the two countries, it will be
observed that they almost invariably rise and fall together. In
the long run, this must be the case, because it has always
been the recognised policy of the governments to preserve a
certain relation to each other. Looking back for nearly a
century, we shall find that in a time of peace France has been
accustomed to maintain a naval force, not greatly varying from
the proportion of tworthirds of our own. If, however, we turn

1840 — 1841. J THE THREE PANICS. 5
to the tables, in the first page, we shall find that in 1840-41,
this proportion underwent a great and sudden derangement,
and that, instead of being content with two-thirds of our force,
the French navy approached almost to an equality with our
own. Though remotely antecedent, this incident is not wholly
unconnected with the first panic.
It was under these circumstances, that Sir Robert Peel's
government was formed in 1841. The earliest utterances of
that statesman, in the House of Commons, when at the head of
a large conservative majority, indicated the line of policy
which he was desirous of pursuing. " Is not the time come,"
said he, " when the powerful countries of Europe should reduce
those military armaments which the3r have so sedulously raised ?
Is not the time come, when they should be prepared to declare
that there is no use in such overgrown establishments ? What
is the advantage of one power greatly increasing its army and
navy? Does it not see that other powers will follow its
example ? The consequence of this must be, that no increase
of relative strength will accrue to any one power ; but there
must be a universal consumption of the resources of every
country in military preparations. They are, in fact, depriving
peace of half its advantages, and anticipating the energies of
war whenever they may be required." And he thus proceeded
to indicate a practical policy to the civilized world. " The
true interest of Europe is to come to some one common accord,
so as to enable every country to reduce those military arma
ments which belong to a state of war rather than of peace. I
do wish that the councils of every country (or that the public
voice and mind, if the councils did not) would willingly pro
pagate such a doctrine."
The more than official earnestness of these remarks leaves no
room to doubt that the speaker yearned for the opportunity of
carrying into effect his peaceful and cosmopolitan policy. But
the relations of England and France were, at that moment,
peculiarly unfavourable to his views. During the previous
year, whilst his political opponents were still in power, and
when M. Thiers was at the head of the French government, the
groat diplomatic rupture had occurred between the two govern-

* Hansard, vol. lix. pp. 403-4.

6 THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC I.
ments on the Eastern question -the effects of which have
descended in increased armaments to the present time. Two
rival statesmen, who wielded with consummate skill the
combative pride, and the soaring vanity of these grea* nations,
had encountered each other on the shores of Syria, where France
was especially sensitive to defeat and loss of influence. The
consequence was a deep popular irritation and sense of humilia
tion throughout the French nation.
It was under these circumstances, that these two statesmen,
passing from office into opposition, became, from 1841, the
persistent advocates, in their respective countries, of a policy
that led to a constant increase of armaments. The genius of
both belonged less to the present than to the past. The one
revelled in the historical glories of the first Empire, exulted in
being the author of the fortifications of Paris, talked of 800,000
soldiers for a peace establishment, and forced upon successive
governments an increase of the navy. The other inherited the
traditions of Pitt, saw in our great neighbour only the ag
gressive and warlike foe of our fathers, and urged on the vexed
and unwilling ear of Sir Robert Peel the construction of
fortifications, the augmentation of the navy, and the formation
of the Militia.* The following extract from a speech, delivered
July 30, 1845, might almost betaken for the utterance of 1860 :
— "Now, Sir, France, as I had occasion to state on a former
occasion, has now a standing army of 340,000 men, fully
equipped, including a large force of cavalry and artillery, and,
in addition to that, 1,000,000 of the National Guard. I know
that the National Guard of Paris consists of 100,000 men,
trained, disciplined, reviewed, clothed, equipped, and accus
tomed to duty, and perfectly competent, therefore, to take the
internal duty of the country, and to set free the whole of the
regular force. Now, Sir, if France were a country separated
from our own by an impassable barrier ; if she had no navy ;
or if the Channel could not be crossed, I should say that
this was a matter with which we had no concern. But that is
not the case. In the first place, France has a fleet equal to
ours. I do not speak of the number of vessels actually in
existence, but of the fleet in commission and half- commission in

Vide, post, p. 20.

1846.] THE THREE PANICS. 7
both which respects the fleet of France is equal to that of this
country. But, again, the Channel is no longer a barrier.
Steam-navigation has rendered that which was before im
passable by a military force nothing more than a river passable
by a steam bridge."*
These accents of mistrust and defiance were echoed from the
Tribune of the Chamber of Deputies the following year, when
M. Guizot was compelled by his active and brilliant opponent
to enlarge his project for increasing the navy : — " We pay
England," said M. Thiers, "the compliment of thinking only
of her when determining our naval force ; we never heed the
ships which sally forth from Trieste or Venice ; we care only
for those which leave Portsmouth or Plymouth." f
Although we have been in the habit of assuming, for the last
ten years, that our naval ascendancy has been endangered by the
policy of the successor of Louis Philippe, it was during the last
eight years of that king's reign, and especially for a year or
two subsequent to the Syrian dispute, that a serious effort
seemed really to be made to rival us at sea. The vast projects
for extending the dockyards of France, especially Toulon, arose
out of this diplomatic rupture. It seemed as though the
government of that country sought to console the nation for the
wounds which had been inflicted on its self-love, by enormous
and costly preparations for future wars. But since nobody now
believes that the " Citizen King," the " Napoleon of Peace,"
ever contemplated a descent on our shores, it would be a waste
of time to enter into lengthened details respecting the first
panic, which terminated with his downfall. Some of the in
cidents which preceded that event have, however, exercised so
much influence on the two succeeding panics, that they cannot
be altogether passed over without notice.
At the time to which we are now more particularly referring
(1845-6), the first of these great political delusions had acquired
no hold of the public mind. The principal contribution to the
first panic, previous to the publication of the Duke of
Wellington's letter, was the pamphlet of Prince Joinville.
It is difficult now, after a calm perusal of this tract, to under-
* Lord Palmerston, Hansard, Lxxxii. 1223.
T Chamber of Deputies, 1840.

THE THREE PANICS.

[PANIC

stand how it could have been pressed into the service of the
alarmists. It is filled throughout with complaints of the in
feriority of the French navy, and offers not a few probably un
merited compliments to the superior management of England.
Here are its concluding words :— " I have been obliged, in the
whole course of this little pamphlet, to make my country un
dergo an afflicting comparison with a country that is advanced
so much before it in the knowledge of its interests ; I have been
obliged to expose the secret of our weakness compared to the
greatness of British power ; but I should think myself happy
if, by the sincere avowal of those sorrowful truths, I were able
to dissipate the illusion, in which are so many clever persons, as
to the real condition of the navy of France, and to decide them
to ask with me those salutary reforms which alone can give our
navy a new era of power and glory."
The feelings of irritation which had been kept alive by por
tions of the press, in the interests of certain political parties in
the two countries, from the time of the Syrian difficulty, and
throughout the dispute on the Tahiti affair, in 1844, now found
fresh aliment in the rupture of the two governments on the
question of the Spanish marriages. It was in the midst of the
alienation and suspicion with which the public mind regarded
these proceedings of the French Court, that towards the end of
1847, the Letter of the Duke of Wellington on our National
Defences made its appearance, — an event which led to an im
mediate invasion "panic," and furnished a never failing
argument to successive governments for increased warlike
expenditure. Nor was this the only evil produced by the
Letter. It unfortunately gave rise to a host of imitators ; for
how could a military man, of whatever rank, be more patrioti
cally employed than in following the example of the Com
mander-in-Chief, and proclaiming to the world the necessity
for increased armaments ? And, unhappily, this task could
only be accomplished by rousing the hostile passions of two
great nations, by appeals to the fears and resentment of the one
and accusations of meditated violence and treachery against
the other.
The public has never been fully informed of the circum
stances which led to the publication of this famous Letter. In a
pamphlet which appeared in France, just previous to the

1847.] THE THREE PANICS. 9
opening of the session of 1848, written by M. Chevalier, who
ha dalready devoted his accomplished pen to the cause of the
Anglo-French alliance, the Duke's letter had been treated
in the character of an answer to Prince Joinville's publication.
This drew from Lord John Russell an explanation in the
House, on the authority of the Duke himself, in which he said
that, " nothing could have given greater rpain," to the writer,
" than the publication of sentiments which he had expressed
confidentially to a brother officer."* It was stated by Lord
Palmerston, at a subsequent date, that the- letter was written
" in consequence of an able memorandum drawn up by Sir
John Burgoyne."f Whoever gave it to the world must have
assumed that it would possess an authority above criticism ;
otherwise, it contains passages which would have induced a
friend to withhold it from publication. The concluding sen
tence, where, in speaking of himself, he says, " I am
bordering upon seventy-seven years of age, passed in honour,"
affords sufficient proof that it was not intended for the public
eye. The entire production, indeed, gives painful evidence of
enfeebled powers. One extract will be sufficient ; the italics
are not in the original :
" I am accustomed to the consideration of these questions,
and have examined and reconnoitred, over and over again, the
whole coast from the North Foreland, by Dover, Folkestone,
Beachy Head, Brighton, Arundel to Selsey Bill, near Ports
mouth ; and I say that, excepting immediately under the fire of
Dover Castle, there is not a spot on the coast on which infantry
might not be thrown on shore at any time of tide, with any wind, and
in any weather, and from which such body of infantry so thrown
on shore, would not find within a distance of five miles a road
into the interior of the country, through the cliffs, practicable for
the march of a body of troops."
Now, any person who has been in the habit of visiting
Eastbourne and Hastmgs, knows that for half the year no
prudent mariner brings his vessel within several miles of that
coast, and that there is a considerable extent of shore where a
landing is at all . times impracticable. It may be safely

* Hansard, xcvi. 909. t Hansard, clx. 18.

10 THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC 1.
affirmed, that if any one but the Duke of Wellington had stated
that there was any shore in the world, on which a body of
troops could be landed " at any time of the tide, with any wind,
and in any weather," the statement would have been deemed
undeserving of notice. The assertion, however, passed un
challenged at the time, and the entire Letter was quoted as an
unanswerable proof that the country was in danger. To have
ventured on criticism or doubt would have only invited the
accusation of want of patriotism.
Few people now remember the incidents of the invasion panic
which culminated in the spring of 1848. It was the first occa
sion on which the attempt had been made to terrify the public
with the idea of a sudden invasion from France in a time of
peace, without a declaration of war, and without the hope of
conquest, or even the glory of honourable warfare. The theory
degraded our civilised and polite neighbours to the level of
pirates. And yet so generally was it proclaimed by the London
journals of the time, that the editor of that staid and philosophi
cal print, the Spectator, drew on himself a remonstrance from
his friend, the late Sir William Molesworth, in a letter dated
January 17, 1848, from which the following is an extract : —
" You say that ' the next attack on England will probably be
without notice ; that 5000 Frenchmen might inflict disgrace on
some defenceless post ; 500 might insult British blood at Heme
Bay, or even inflict indelible shame on the empire at Osborne
House !' Good God ! Can it be possible that you whom I
ranked so high among the public instructors of this nation —
that you consider the French to be ruffians, Pindarees, free
booters — that you believe it necessary to keep constant watch
and ward against them, as our Saxon forefathers did against the
Danes and the Nordmen, lest they should burn our towns,
plunder our coasts, and put our queen to ransom," etc., etc.
It naturally followed, since the greatest military authority
had proclaimed the country in danger, that it should be the
fashion for civilians in high places to echo the cry of alarm.
Even the peerage, that body which views all other agitations
with so much serenity, partook of the excitement. Lord Elles-
mere published a letter, bearing at its head the motto, " Awake
arise ! or be for ever fallen !" in which he foretold, in case of an
invasion, that the Guards would march out at one end of the

1848.] THE THREE PANICS. 11
metropolis as the French entered at the other, and that on the
Lord Mayor would be imposed the duty of converting the Man
sion House into a place where billets would be found for the
foreign army ; upon which Sir Robert Peel dryly remarked,
that " he would defy the Lord Mayor afterwards to show his
face in Cheapside."*
It was under these circumstances, that Parliament assembled
in 1848. The Whig Government, which had succeeded to
power in 1846, on the disruption of the Conservative party,
consequent upon the repeal of the Corn Laws, found themselves
with a deficient revenue, arising from the late famine in Ireland,
and great depression in nearly all branches of trade and in
dustry. On the 18th February, Lord John Russell made his
financial statement for the year. For the better understanding
of what is to follow, it may he well to give his opening remarks
on the state of the nation : —
" I shall proceed, Sir, at once, by reminding the House that
the year which has passed over our heads, or I should perhaps
say, the period of the last eighteen months, has been one which,
excepting cases of foreign war or domestic insurrection, is with
out a parallel, I think, in the history of this country. The
changes and vicissitudes of prices — the difficulties of commerce
— the panic which more than once prevailed — the extreme dis
tress of a part of the United Kingdom — the extraordinary
efforts that were made to relieve that distress — altogether affected
the state of this country to a degree, that I believe it would not
be easy to find an example of such distress in our his-
tory."f After alluding to the great increase that had taken place in
the French navy, he proposed, in order to meet the necessity
for increased defensive armaments, and in accordance with the
advice in the Duke of Wellington's letter, to re-organise the
militia, and to slightly modify, without materially increasing,
the regular forces. To cover the deficiency in the revenue, and
to meet the increased charges for militia, etc , the minister pro
posed an addition of 5d. in the pound to the income-tax, thus
raising it from 7d. to a shilling. The proposition, so far as
concerned the increase of our armaments, appeared so moderate,
* Hansard, xcvi. 1074. t Hansard, xovi. 900.

12 THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC I.
when viewed in connection with the excitement that had
reigned out of doors with respect to the designs of our neigh
bours, that it led Sir Robert Peel to remark —
" After the panic which prevailed in this country about a
month since, I am glad to find the tide has ebbed so fast, and
that the alarm on the subject of invasion has visibly abated. I
was afraid the Government might have been unduly influenced
by that alarm ; and I am relieved when I learn that it is not
intended to make any increase in the military or naval force."
But the budget met with no favour from any part of the
House, and it soon became evident that the intended addition
to the income-tax would prove fatal to the whole scheme. The
proposed increase of expenditure for militia, etc., was denounced
by the reformers, who demanded a reduction of the existing
establishments ; whilst it was still more ominous to hear Mr.
Bankes, the representative of the country gentlemen, declare,
that "that was not the moment to talk of valour and triumph,
but the time for reflecting how they could remedy the evils
which pressed so heavily on the great mass of the com
munity."* Whilst the Government measure was still under discussion, a
portentous event occurred in France, which, if it had not in
volved the gravest consequences to Europe and the world, would
have imparted a character of burlesque to the closing scene of
the first invasion panic. On the evening of the 24th of Feb
ruary, 1848, whilst the House of Commons was in session, a
murmur of conversation suddenly arose at the door, and spread
throughout the House, when was witnessed— what never oc
curred before or since, in the writer's experience— a suspension
for a few minutes of all attention to the business of the House,
whilst every member was engaged in close and earnest conver
sation with his neighbour^ The intelligence had arrived of
the abdication and flight of Louis Philippe, and of the procla
mation of the Republic. The monarch and his ministers, whose

* Hansard, xcvi. 932.
t The writer of these pages was sitting by the side of the late Mr
Hume when the tidings reached their bench. Sir Robert Peel was on the'
opposite front seat, alone, his powerful party having been broken and
scattered by his great measure of Corn-Law Repeal. "I'll go and tell
Sir Robert the news," exclaimed Mr. Humo, and, stepping across the floor

1848.] THE THREE PANICS. 13
ambitious projects had furnished the pretexts for our warlike
armaments, and the gallant prince, whose pamphlet had sounded
like a tocsin in our ears, were now on their way to claim the
hospitality of England.
Under any other circumstances than those in which the
country now found itself, this astounding intelligence would
have probably caused an increase rather than a diminution of
the invasion panic. There was, indeed, a momentary effort, in
certain quarters, to turn to account the apparition of the dread
Republic, with all the grim reminiscences associated with its
motto of " Liberie, Egalite, et Fraternite." But the nation
was too much harassed with its internal difficulties to listen to
the suggestion of those who would revive the terrors of an
invasion. Bad as had been the condition of the country, it was
now felt that there was a worse state of things impending, from
the destruction of confidence, the suspension of trade, and the
interruption to labour, which the revolutions, now spreading
over the Continent, were sure to produce. Public meetings
were called ; men of influence, of different political parties,
mingled on the same platform, to denounce the increase of
taxation, to repudiate the desire for the Militia, or any other
addition to the defensive armaments of the country, and to call
for a reduction of the public expenditure. Petitions, in this
sense, poured into the House. The Government took the
alarm ; and on the 28th February, the Chancellor of the
Exchequer withdrew the budget for amendment. The Militia
Bill was heard of no more for four years. A Committee of the
House of Commons was appointed to examine into the Military
and Naval expenditure, with a view to greater economy in the
Estimates. Before the close of the session, considerable reduc
tions were announced. The Income-tax remained at its
previous amount of Id. in the pound for the remainder of the

he seated himself by his side, and communicated the startling intelli
gence. On returning to his place, he repeated, in the following words, the
commentary of the ex-minister : — " This comes of trying to carry on a
government by means of a mere majority of a Chamber, without regard to
the opinion out of doors. It is what these people (pointing with his
thumb over his shoulder to the protectionists behind him) wished me to
do, but I refused."

14 THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC I. 1848.
year; and, on the meeting of Parliament, in 1849, notwith
standing that a Bonaparte had just previously been elected Pre
sident of the French Republic, and that the Continent generally
was in a state of revolutionary disquiet, the Queen's Speech
contained the following announcement : —
" The present aspect of affairs has enabled me to make large
reductions on the Estimates of last year."
The advocates of a system of direct taxation may profit by
the admission : — there can be no doubt, that the proposal to add
5d. in the pound to the Income-tax, mainly contributed to put
an end to the first invasion panic.

THE THREE PANICS. 15

THE SECOND PANIC.
1851—1852—1853.
In ordinary years, when nothing occurs to concentrate public
attention on this branch of the budget, it will be observed that
the expenditure on the " Services " has a tendency to increase
in proportion to the prosperity of the country.* Taking the
amount of our foreign trade as the test of the progress of the
nation, we shall find, looking back over the last ten or twelve
years, that the amount of exports, and the amount of Military
and Naval Estimates, have been augmented in nearly an equal
ratio, both having been about doubled. It would seem as if
there were some unseen power behind the Government, always
able, unless held in check by an agitation in the country, to
help itself to a portion of the national savings, limited only by
the taxable patience of the public. A combination of circum
stances, however, counteracted this tendency at the period to
which we are now referring, the most influential of which was
that " the landed interest was in a dissatisfied and uneasy state
from anticipations of the great change in the commercial policy
of the country, which was to come into full effect at the com
mencement of the present year " f (1849) . Moreover, the party
* " I have observed, that there is always a great deal of pressure for an in
crease of the army and navy, and a great complaint about the defencelessness
of the country, whenever there is a surplus income over expenditure. Why, it
is a tempting thing, a large heap of money at the table of the Exchequer,
and the knowledge, on the part of the ' Services,' that if John Bull can be
sufficiently frightened into the cry for increased defences, there is a very
good chance of some of the money being divided among them and theirs.
Now, they have an eye on the surplus at this moment. I have an eye also
on that surplus, which makes me peculiarly interested in this question ; I
want to apply it to the repeal of the taxes on knowledge ; and by spread
ing sound information among the people, doing something for their future
happiness and prosperity." — Speech of Rt. Hon. T. Milner Gibson, M.P,
Manchester, January 26, 1S53.
t Annual Register, vol. xci. p. 2.

16 THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC II.
which had been for many years engaged in the struggle for the
overthrow of the Corn-Laws, threw its energies into the agita-
tation for a reduction of expenditure ; whilst the approaching
year of the Great Exhibition tended to hold in cheek ideas of a
warlike nature, and to make it the fashion, for a time at least,
to profess a faith in the tendency of the world towards peace.
The consequence of this state of things was a constant re
duction of the military and naval expenditure from 1847 to
1851, as will be seen on reference to the preceding tables.
During this time, with the exception of the usual letters from
Admiral Napier in the Times on the state of the navy, and a
volume published at the close of 1850, by Sir Francis Head, on
" The Defenceless State of the Nation," which was calculated
to throw ridicule on the subject by its exaggerations, little was
said about a French invasion. Even the Great Duke's letter
was for a time forgotten. But only for a time, the occasion
alone was wanting to revive the panic with increased "violence.
The country had been rapidly advancing towards that state of
prosperity when its timidity and pugnacity seem equally sus
ceptible of excitement. Under the influence of free trade and
the gold discoveries, our exports, which in 1848 had been
£52,849,000, amounted in 1851 to £74,448,000 : they were
destined to reach, in 1852, £78,076,000 ; and to rise in 1853
to £98,933,000 ; thus being nearly doubled in five years. The
revenue was in a satisfactory state, and the landed interest had
nearly recovered from the despondency into which it had been
thrown by the repeal of the Corn Laws.
It was under these circumstances, that the coup d'etat of De
cember 2nd, 1851, and the re-election of Louis Napoleon as
President of the Republic, with augmented powers, furnished
the occasion for the outburst of the second invasion-panic.
From that day to the meeting of Parliament, on the 3rd Feb
ruary, a large portion of the metropolitan journals teemed with
letters and articles of the most exciting character. The course
pursued by these writers was inconsistent enough. They com
menced by assailing personally, with unmeasured invective, the
author of the coup d'etat, and heaping contemptuous epithets
on the French people who had rewarded him with their suf
frages ; and then forthwith they raised the cry of invasion, and
proclaimed our defenceless condition !-Conduct which as will

1852.] THE THREE PA3TCCS. 17
be seen, drew on them the animadversions of the leading states
men, on the meeting of Parliament. At the same time, there
was the usual eruption of pamphlets, written chiefly by military
and naval officers, containing projects for every variety of xle-
fensive armament.
In the debate on the address, on the first night of the session
of 1852, almost every speaker alluded with disapprobation to
the inflammatory language of the press.
" I say that it is more than imprudent," said the Earl of
Derby, " that it is more than injudicious, that it is more than
folly, that it is perfect'madness, at one and the same time to
profess a belief in the hostile intentions of a foreign country,
and to parade before the eyes oi that very people the supposed
inability of this country to defend itself; to magnify the re
sources of your supposed assailant, and to point out how easy
would be the invasion if not the subjugation of this country
(though, thank God ! the most violent have not yet spoken of
subjugation) ; but to speak of that invasion, accompanying it
with details of the fearful amount oi horror and bloodshed
which, under any circumstances, must attend it, and then, in
the same breath, to assail with every term of obloquy, of vitu
peration, and abuse, the publie and private character of the
man who wields that force which you say is irresistible."*
And again, speaking of the disposition of the President, he
said: —
" My Lords, I will go further, and I will say that I firmly
believe that the French President personally is fully disposed
to entertain friendly relations and to maintain a pacific policy
towards other nations. But, my Lords, I think that if any
thing could divert him from that course, if he were a man
likely to be worked upon by his own personal feelings— if any
thing were likely to divert him from that course of policy which
I believe his inclination and his sense of the interests of France
are likely to make him take, it would be the injudicious and, I
may add, unjustifiable language which has been made use of by
a large portion of the public press of this country, in com
menting on the character of the French Government and
people."t • Hansard, cxix. 22. t Hansard, cxix. 21.

18 THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC II.
In the House of Commons, on the same occasion, Lord John
Russell, then Prime Minister, observed : —
" But really, to hear or read some of the letters, some of the
language used by some portions of the press, one would imagine
that these two great nations, so wealthy, so similar in enlighten
ment, were going to butcher one another, merely to try what
would be the effect of percussion caps and needle guns."*
Both these statesmen, however, afforded substantial justifica
tion to the alarmists whom they thus eloquently rebuked, by
intimating their determination to "prepare our defences," in
order to make " invasion impossible." The public, of course,
attributed their language to diplomatic reserve, whilst their
action was quietly accepted as proof of impending danger.
As we were destined during the year 1852 to witness the re
organisation of the militia, and an augmentation of our army
and navy, and as the arguments by which these increased arma
ments were voted will be found to have exclusive reference to the
danger of an invasion from France, it will be well to turn
for a moment to the tables, and see exactly what the French
Government had been doing since the downfall of Louis
Philippe. Though it is rather beside the question, for we have
never professed to match our land forces against those of France,
it may be premised, that the French Army was undergoing some
reduction, and that the National Guard, whose million of
armed men had been referred to with such alanning emphasis
by Lord Palmerston in 1845, was being rapidly disbanded, and
was destined ere long to disappear, with the exception of a
nominal force kept up in a few large cities.
A reference to the tables will show, that, during the years
1849, 1850, and 1851, the period which intervened between the
first and second panic, the strength of the French navy,
whether measured by the total expenditure, the number of men,
or the number of ships in commission, was considerably less
that in any three years since 1840. It will be seen, that the
French expenditure, with the number of men and of ships in
commission, both absolutely and in proportion to the British,
was at the lowest point in 1851, the year which witnessed the
renewal of the panic. These facts were stated at the time by

Hansard, cxix. 102.

1852.] THE THREE PANICS. 19
those who resisted the increase of our armaments and confronted
the alarm of invasion ; but their statements were discredited.
On the 16th February, 1852, Lord John Russell explained to
the House his proposed Militia Bill. He alluded, at the outset,
to his measure of 1848, the failure of which he frankly attri
buted to the necossity he was then under of proposing an in
crease of taxation. To demonstrate that he was not now
acting under the pressure of the panic, he thus referred to the
state of things under which he had formerly brought forward a
similar project,— " At the time at which I then addressed the
House, Louis Philippe was on tho throne of France ; there was
no apparent revolution at hand ; tho disposition of that king
was known to be pacific; his counsels were moderate and
wise."* This is an illustration of that curious feature in these
political delusions, that we aro always called on to forget them
as soon as they have served the purpose for which they are
created. A convenient veil is here drawn over the panic caused
by Prince Joinville's pamphlet, the Duke of Wellington's
letter, the Spanish marriages, the predicted flight of the Guards
from London, and every other incident that had played its part
prior to 1848. Lord John Russell now proposed a plan by
which it should bo possible to enrol for the first year not less
than 70,000 men ; in the next year, 100,000 ; in tho third,
about 120,000 ; with tho possibility of increase to 150,000.
But tho Militia Bill was destined to be fatal to the ministry of
which he had been premier since the fall of Sir Robert Peel's
Government in 1846.
A word of explanation is necessary to throw a light on what
followed. During the recess of Parliament, Lord Pahnerston,
the Foreign Minister, had withdrawn from the Government,
From the explanations which now took place, it appeared that
although there had been anterior differences between him and his
colleagues, indeed between the Sovereign and her Foreign
Secretary, the immediate cause of his retirement was the un
authorised expression of his approbation of the coup d'etat of
December 2nd, 1851. It was foreseen that this secession
menaced the existence of a Cabinet already weak, and a few
days only were required, after the meeting of Parliament, to

Hansard, cxix. 551.

20 THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC II.
verify this view. On the motion to bring in the Local
Militia Bill, on the 20th February, 1852, Lord Palmerston
carried an amendment for giving a more extended scope to the
measure, which was followed by the resignation of Lord John
Russell's Government, and the advent of Lord Derby to
power. On the first exposition of his views as Prime Minister, on
the 27th February, the Earl of Derby spoke as follows :—
" My Lords, I believe that our naval forces were never in a
better or more effective condition than at this moment. I be
lieve that for all purposes, whether as regards the protection of
our own shores, the defence of the numerous and distant colonies
which form our empire, or for the protection of that extended
commerce which crosses every sea and fills every port in the
wide world, I believe that, for all such purposes, our navy was
never in a more effective state than it is now."
As soon as the new ministry were constituted, they prepared
another Militia Bill, which was introduced into the House by
the Home Secretary, on the 29th March. This measure met
the approval of Lord Palmerston, to whose energetic support it
mainly owed its success. He could almost, indeed, claim to be
its author ; for it transpired, incidentally, in the course of the
discussion, that his frequent questions in the House, in the
time of Sir Robert Peel's ministry, had had the effect of in
ducing them to prepare a measure for revising the Militia laws,
but a change of ministry had prevented them from bringing it
forward, f Lord Palmerston, moreover, in the course of the
debates, identified himself more exclusively with the policy of
the Bill, by stating that he had pressed on Lord John Russell,
in 1846, the necessity of a similar measure. J To him, also,
was left the task of finding arguments for the Bill, and it must
be admitted that he fulfilled the duties of an advocate with a
courage, at least, that could not be surpassed.
The reasons assigned by Mr. Walpole for introducing the
measure, however ably stated, were so cautiously guarded by
disavowals of any special ground of alarm, and so prudently
seasoned with pledges for our peaceful foreign relations, that

* Hansard, cxix. p. 894. t Mr. Sidney Herbert, Hansard, cxix. 587.
X Hansard, cxix. 575.

1852.] THE THREE PANICS. 21
they were almost as good arguments for his opponents as his
own party ; whilst the more general motives assigned, founded
on vague and shadowy assumptions of possible danger, would
have been equally indisputable if our existing navy had been
ten times as efficient as it had just been declared to be by
Lord Derby.
Lord Palmerston took a much bolder course. Falling back
on his own idea of steam-navigation having given an advantage
to our neighbour, or, to use his favourite phrase, having " thrown
a bridge across the Channel," he now insisted on the practica
bility of fifty or sixty thousand men being transported, without
notice, from Cherbourg to our shores in a single night. Such a
declaration had not been before heard from one holdino- hio-h
rank m that House. It overleapt all reliance on our diplomacv,
or our fleets ; and, strange enough in one who had offered
such eager congratulations to the author of the coup d'etat, the
assumption of such a danger as this implied that our neighbour
was little better than a buccaneer. But this hypothesis of
sudden invasion is absolutely indispensable for affording the
alarmists any standing ground whatever. Take away the
liability to surprise, by admitting the necessity of a previous
ground of quarrel, and the delays of a diplomatic correspondence,
and you have time to collect your fleet, and drill* an army.
Admit the argument of suddenness of danger, and the only
way of preventing your coasts and metropolis from being
invaded by an araiy of fifty or sixty thousand men, is by being
always prepared with an organised and a disciplined force to
repel them.
It was natural that such views should not pass unquestioned
by intelligent professional men; among whom the veteran
General who represented Westminster was prominent in
showing the practical difficulties of sending large expeditions
over sea, and in demonstrating that " the sudden arrival of a
French army in this metropolis was simply an impossibility, "t
Here is a specimen of the undaunted courage with which Lord

* " Give us a good stout man, and let us have him for sixty days to train
him, and he will be as good a soldier as you can have." — Evidence of Lord
Hardinge, Commander-in-Chief, before Sebastopol Committee.
t Hansard, cxx. p. 1040.

iJ2 THE THREE TANTCS. [ PANIC II.
Palmerston sot at nought the experience of tho hew of a soore
of battle fields :—
"My km. and gallant Mend (Sir Do Lacy Evans) stated,
that in oollceting a largo foroo for the purpose of crossing the
Channel, such mi extensive preparation must bo made as would
give us ample notice; but he is mueli mistaken with regard lo
the want of facilities which neighbouring countries possess for
collecting together a formidable foroo and bringing it. over to
this country, without our having lengthened, or, indeed, ovou
timely notice. Tho very ship despatched to convoy to this
country intelligence of tho threatened tinmunent would pro
bably not reach, our shores much sooner than tho hostilo ex
pedition." *
Tho naval authorities in the House wore also hoard on a
question in which tho character and efficiency of their service
Wore so much involved. Admiral Berkeley, who had been a
Lord of the Admiralty under the previous Government, re
marked that, "Lord Palmerston had spoken of tho French
being enabled to raise 50,000 or 60,000 men in Cherbourg ; but
ho did not tell the House how these men wore to bo transported
across tho Channel ;" and tho gallant speaker went on to say,
" he would tell the noble Lord, tho member for Tiverton, that
it would take fifty or sixty vessels to embark thoso men ho
spoke of as being ready for action at Cherbourg, and it would
take as many more vessels to proteot them in the Channel."
lie added, with a view to allay tho " absurd pauio that had
lately run through tho country," that with an addition of
4,000 men and 1,000 boys to tho navy, ho would undertake to
say that they would have a fleet of thirty steamers in the
Channel, none of which would bo under 900* or 1,000 tons, and
that in the presenoe of suoh a force, ho would doty any onoiny
to attempt a surprise; adding, characteristically, that "he
should like to see thorn attempt to disembark on our shores in
tho face of suoh a foroo."-f-
Tiioidontal to these debates, was a motion made on the 30th
March, by Mr. Anderson (the head of tho great Peninsular and
Oriental Steam Ship Company), "to show how invasion might
be rendered impossible," in which he called attention to tho

* Ilawu-d, oxx. p. 203. t Hansard, oxx. pp. 1130-7.

1852.] THE THREE PANICS. 23
Report of a Committee, appointed at his instance in 1849, which
had recommended the Government to retain the services of our
numerous merchant steamers as a reserve force for the defence
of our shores. He pointed out the great advantage this country
possessed over all others in the number of its merchant
steamers ; that for every horse-power possessed by France, we
had twenty (in sailing vessels our superiority in tonnage being
only as five to one) ; he stated, from evidence before the Com
mittee, that upwards of a thousand of these vessels could be
made available in case of war, and pledged himself to produce a
private tradesman, who, for £200 would fit the largest steamer
to carry the heaviest pivot gun ; and he alleged that the
private Company with which he was connected could alone
furnish vessels enough to form a line within signal distance of
each other from the Channel Islands -to the North Foreland.*
Mr. Anderson went into the subject with a thorough practical
knowledge of all its details, and carried the House, as he had
carried his Committee, with him. His motion was accepted by
the Government, but never acted on.
This motion was, however, only an episode in that great
debate of the session, which reflected the panic that had been
excited in certain quarters out of doors. In spite of the oppo*
sition of the liberals and the free-trade party, the Militia Bill
was passing through its various stages ; and Lord Palmerston's
theory of a nocturnal invasion, by a large army, continued to
be the pivot of the debate. The weight of professional authority
having gone so strongly against this theory, civilians were now
encouraged to speak out ; and Lord John Russell, towards the
close of the debate on the second reading, remarked, with un
wonted bluntness, that " he did not wish to be mixed up with
those who entertained apprehensions of the sudden arrival in
this country of 50,000 hostile troops in a single night, without
notice of any kind being received in this country ; or that we
should hear of an army marching up to London without our
having had any previous symptoms of hostility. Those were
notions which' were founded upon panic rather than on reason
able calculation."-)- It was natural, too, that those members of
the House who were identified with that body of British repre^

Hansard, cxx. pp. 369—379. t Hansard, cxx. 1090.

24

THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC II.

sentatives residing at foreign capitals, whom Burke has
designated " licensed spies," should have revolted at such an
imputation of want of vigilance on their part as was implied in
this argument of sudden invasion, and they found an ardent
and eloquent defender in the present Sir Robert Peel, who had
just previously withdrawn from the field of diplomacy :—
" What, I should like to know," said he, " is meant by the
term ' sudden invasion ' which is so often used, but with little
consideration? The noble lord, the member for Tiverton
(Lord Palmerston), has defined it thus : ' We have to provide,'
he says, ' not against a danger which may happen in six or
eight months, but which may happen in a month or a fortnight,
from the time when it is first apprehended.' I ask the House,
and I ask the country, is it possible to admit this definition of
the noble Lord ? Let the House for one moment figure to
itself, the noble Lord sitting in Downing-street, with all the
threads of European diplomacy, concentrated, like so many
electric wires in his cabinet ; and let the House then figure to
itself the surprise of the noble Lord, on being told that that day
fortnight 150,000 men were to be landed on the shores of Britain.
Do you think the noble Lord believes this to be possible ? Not
at all." *
Following after nearly the whole of these speakers, and on
the last night of the debate on the second reading of the
Militia Bill, Lord Palmerston thus manfully stood his ground : —
" The application of steam to navigation has in effect made a
bridge over the Channel, and has given the means of quick
attack — an attack on a scale of magnitude such as did not exist
before. Again, it is said we should know beforehand, if any
preparations were being made. I say you might not know,
because by the internal arrangements of railways, the distribu
tion of troops is such that 50,000 or 60,000 men might be
collected at Cherbourg before you knew anything of the matter ;
aad those who have seen what those immense works are, must
be perfectly aware that such a number of men could walk from
the quay into their vessels, as easily as they could walk into
their barrack-yard. A single night would bring them over,
and all our naval preparations, be they what they might, could

* Hansard, cxx. p. 1078.

1852.] THE THREE PANICS. 25
not be relied on to prevent the arrival of such an expedition, as
no batteries or gun-boats we might have on our shores could be
relied on to prevent the landing of the expedition when it had
arrived."* With what a grim smile of incredulity would the threat of
this nocturnal apparition have been received by both sides of
the House if it had been urged in support of the Militia Bill of
1848, when the country gentlemen were too much haunted with
the free-trade spectre, and the commercial members too
seriously preoccupied with their distresses to have allowed them
selves to be scared by so fantastical an appeal to their imagina
tion ! But the " Country Party " were now in power, their
protectionist alarms were dissipated, and they welcomed the
Militia Bill with acclamation. An increasing revenue, with a
surplus in the Exchequer, and a prosperous trade, insured the
success of the bill ; which, however, was not passed without a
determined opposition, led on by the free-trade party. In the
course of the struggle, it was mentioned by Mr. Moffatt,t as a
proof of the unpopularity of the bill, that nearly 800 petitions
had been presented against it, and not one in its favour. It
was certainly a singular spectacle, to see the representatives of
the great centres of population and wealth, with the metropoli
tan members at their head, resisting a measure which had been
brought forward on the plea that it was indispensable for their
security !
Where then could have been the "panic"? will be the
obvious inquiry. This question was frequently and sarcastically
asked in the course of the debate ; and it was answered in
terms not over complimentary to the parties referred to. Mr.
Hume bluffly remarked, that, " our present panics were not due,
as in times past, to the old women, but to our having too many
clubs about London, containing so many half-pay officers, who
had nothing to do but to look about for themselves and their
friends. These were the people who wrote to the newspapers,
anxious to bring grist to the mill somehow or other.":): And
Captain Scobell, alluding to the same subject, said—" If he
added a remark not very complimentary to the other branch'of

* Hansard, cxx. p. 1104. t Hansard, cxx. p. 1116.
% Hansard, cxx. p. 285.

26 THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC II.
the service, it should be jocularly ; but the alarm about invasion
was chiefly expressed by soldiers, from the illustrious Duke
downwards. Sir Francis Head was a soldier ; and so was the
< Swiss Colonel' ; and many of them had, by their writings,
helped to raise and keep up the alarm. And the reason was
plain ; they could not comprehend the capabilities of resistance
that might be made on the ocean, and especially the resources
that had been put into our hands by the power of steam."*
Lord Derby's Government having passed their Militia Bill,
empowering them to raise 80,000 men, besides other measures,
a dissolution took place on the first of July, and the new Par
liament assembled for a short session before Christmas.
In the meantime, two events had taken place— the death of
the Duke of Wellington, and the announcement of the ap
proaching re-establishment of the Empire in France — which
were exercising a considerable influence on the public mind.
The former occurrence had naturally attracted universal atten
tion to the biography of the Great Warrior, whose military
exploits filled the pages of the public journals, became the
engrossing theme of our public speakers, and resounded from
even many a pulpit. Public attention was thus carried back to
the long and mutually destructive wars which we had waged
with France, and it was but natural that some of the old
national animosity should have been revived. This feeling
received a great impulse from what was occurring on the other
side of the Channel. By a singular coincidence, the imposing
national tribute of a public funeral in St. Paul's, on the 18th No
vember, 1852, was followed by the votingfor theEmpire inFrance
on the 21st. The historical painter might have represented the
third Napoleon rising from the yet open tomb of the vanquisher
of the first ! What wonder, if in some minds there was the
irritating consciousness that all the great deeds of the departed
hero had not borne permanent fruits ? The feeling of appre
hension, however, predominated. The traditional terror con
nected with the name of Bonaparte was revived ; people began
again to talk of invasion, and before Christmas the alarmists
had more complete possession of the field than at any previous
time.

* Hansard, cxix. p. 1449.

1852.] THE THREE PANICS. 27
On the 6th December, 1852, Lord Malmesbury formally
announced, in the House of Lords, the election of the Emperor
of the French. He spoke in terms of the most unqualified
confidence of the friendly and pacific intentions of the ruler
and people of France. " I believe," said his lordship, " that
the Emperor himself, and the great mass of his people, deeply
feel the necessity, for the interests of both countries, that we
should be on a footing of profound peace ; and, on the other
hand, they see the great folly and crime which it would be on
either side to provoke war. They must know that a war, as
far as it would lead to the subjugation of either country by the
other, is an absurdity ; that neither country, so great, so power
ful, and so independent, could in any manner subjugate the
other, and that, therefore, war must be as useless as cruel, and
as inglorious as useless."*
Nothing could have been more satisfactory than this an
nouncement, had it not been accompanied by a practical com
mentary elsewhere, which, in the eyes of the unsophisticated
public, converted these excellent sentiments into hollow diplo
matic phrases. On the very same evening on which this com
munication was made to the Lords, the Government proposed
in the Commons an addition of 5,000 seamen and 1,500 marines
to the navy, on the ground, as alleged by the Secretary of the
Admiralty, that " the time had arrived when, with the most
pacific intentions, it was absolutely necessary that we should
put our Channel defences in a new position, and man the
Channel with a large force."f Had it been his studied purpose
to furnish arguments to the alarmists out of doors, nothing
could have been contrived more calculated to swell the panic cry
of invasion than the tone of mystery and reserve with which
the naval secretary deprecated all discussion on this vote :—
" He trusted, that if he should then decline to enter into any
detailed information with respect to that vote, no gentleman
would attribute such a course to a desire to treat him indi
vidually with discourtesy, but would feel that it was owing to
the determination at which the Government had arrived, after the
most serious consideration, that it would be better, under existing cir
cumstances, not to enter into uny particulars with respect to that

Hansard, cxxiii. 975. t Hansard, cxxiii. 1006.

28 THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC II.
course. He asked the present vote from the House of Com
mons, not as a vote of confidence in any particular ministry,
but as a vote of confidence in that Executive which, whatever
party might be at the head of the Government, must necessarily
be charged with the defence of the country, must necessarily be
in possession of secret and important intelligence, and must neces
sarily be the fitting and only judge how far that intelligence ought to
be communicated to the House."*
If any thing could add to the mistrust in the public mind
which this was calculated to produce, it was the readiness with
which the leading statesmen on the opposition side of the
House accepted the doctrine of implicit confidence in the Exe
cutive. Sir Francis Baring, in expressing his approval of the
proposed increase, remarked, that " no one knew more than him
self how difficult it was to state the grounds for any increase.
It was for the Government to state, on their responsibihty,
what they thought necessary for the service of the country, and
he was not one of those who would oppose what they thought
necessary/'f This doctrine, which, if generally acted upon,
would be an abdication of one of the chief functions of the
House of Commons, proceeds upon a double fallacy — First, in
assuming that the Executive can, in these days, be in possession
of secrets unknown to the public respecting the warlike prepa
rations or the political attitude of other countries ; and, secondly,
in assuming, that, if the Government possessed any such secret
information, there could be half as much inconvenience from
disclosing it to the House of Commons as from the adoption of
this principle of abject confidence in the Ministry.
The proposed increase in the navy was, however, carried
without a division. An addition of 2,000 men and 1,000 horses
for the artillery was also voted. There had been 3,000 men
previously added to the army, and, as we have seen, power was
given to the Government to raise 80,000 men for the militia,
50,000 for the first year, and 30,000 more for the second. All
this was achieved during their few months of office by the Earl
of Derby's Government, who, so long as they were engaged in
making these additions to our establishments, met with support
from their opponents ; but, that task achieved, thenceforth the

* Hansard, cxxiii. 1006 — 7. f Hansard, cxxiii. 1013.

1852.]^ ram rnivm panics. 29
dootrine of implicit confidence In the Executive was no longer
extended to them, and they were overthrown a few days after
wards in a division on the budget, whioh was virtually a vote
of want of confidence. They were succeeded by Lord Aber
deen's administration.
This increase in our armaments failed to allay, in the slightest
degree, tho agitation of the ularmists. It seems to be the pecu
liar oharaotoristio of these pcinios, that they who fall under
their influence are deprived of all remembrance of what has
been already done ion? their security. This state of mind is
natural enough in those 'who embrace the hypothesis that we
are in nightly danger of an invasion, without notice or provo
cation, by an army of 50,000 men. These persons do not
employ, their minds in . discussing the probable grounds of
quarrel with, France, or; in speculating on the ohanoes of a
rupture ; but they assume the constant disposition for war on
tho part of our neighbour, as well as his oomplete preparation
for attaok. From the moment that suoh it theory of invasion
as this is adopted, any plan of defence must neoessarily be in-
sufficient for seourity. It is to this state of mind that all the
writers and speakers on the subject addressed themselves,* as may
* Tho following are spsotoisns s—
A Letter on the Defence of England by Corps of Volunteers and Militia,
by: Sir Omas, J as. Nahub. ,
The Invasion of England, by m Englishman and a Civilian.
National Defences, by Mootaot Goiun, E*q,v
A Ltttef to Lord John Russell, containing" Suggestions for finning a
Reserve Foroo, slgnod "GtMORam Paom."
Memorandum on the Motility of a Secretary of State for our Defence
and War Establishments,
Proposals fer the Defence of the Country by means of a Volunteer
Foroo, by John Kinloch, lata Captain Saoond Life Guards.
Defensive Position of England, by Captain Ceab. Khos.
Tho Peril of Portsmouth, by Jas, Fihrsosson, Esq.
A Plan for the formation of a Maritime Militia, by Captain 0. Elliot.
Observations on Commissariat, Field Service, and Home Defences, by
Sir Bandoim I. Roots.
The National Dofenct of England, by Baron P. E. Translated by
GaptJ. E. Addison.
Thoughts on National Defence, by Raav-Admival Bowlis. N'
Brief Suggestions on the Subject of War and Invasion,
Notts on the Defensive JS»sourm of Great Britain, by Captain Ixwt,
Halfrpay Eoyal Artiikry.

3Q THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC IT,
be seen by a mere glance at the titles of the pamphlets, which
issued in unprecedented numbers from the press in the present
year (1852).
The alarm was constantly stimulated by startling paragraphs
in the newspapers. One day the French army at Rome was
reported to be chafing and dissatisfied, because it could not share
in the invasion of England and the sack of London ; the next,
there were whispered revelations of a secret plan divulged by
General Changarnier for invading England and seizing the
metropolis (which he publicly contradicted) ; then we were told
of a plot for securing a naval station in the West Indies ; next,
the French Government had sent an order for steam frigates to
Messrs. Napier, of Glasgow (which was contradicted on the
authority of those gentlemen) ; there was a cry of alarm at the
apparition of a French ship of war at Dover, which, it afterwards
turned out, had been driven in by stress of weather ; then there
were small French vessels of war seen moving about the Isle of
Wight, to the surprise of some of our authorities, who should
have known that the French Government are bound by con
vention to send cruisers into the Channel to see that the fisheries
regulations are observed by their fishermen; and then came the
old story of French vessels being seen taking soundings in our
waters, though, as every body knows, the most perfect charts of
the Channel, published under the authority of the Admiralty,
may be purchased for a few shillings.
But these little paragraphs, which flew from journal, to
journal, would have fallen harmless on the public ear, if they
had not been accompanied by alarming reports from " our own
correspondents " in Paris, of the immense increase going on in
the French navy. Besides, there was the eloquent silence of our
own Secretary of the Admiralty when he proposed the aug
mentation of our navy. What could that reserve and secrecy
mean, but something too frightful to reveal ? True, the French
army had been reduced 50,000 men, and the National Guard
was practically dissolved, but that did not concern us ; — what
object could a Bonaparte possibly have in doubling the strength
of his navy, if it was not to attack England ? To show to
what an extent this delusion gained credence, let us quote from
an article in that generally accurate historical record, the Annual

1852.] THE THREE PANICS. 31
Register for September. 21, 1852 :-— " Tho French have been
making gigantio oflbrts to raiso their navy to a formidable
strength ;" and, after entering into many details to show the
largo additions made to their fleet, the article thus concludes : —
" Their navy seems to have doubled in ofl'eotivo strength within
the two years of the Prince President's power."* So strong
wore tho feelings of suspicion, jealousy, and apprehension on
this subject at tho re-assembling of Parliament in February, 1853,
that Mr. Ewart, with a view of offering a public denial to these
alarming rumours, took the extraordinary course of addressing
a letter of inquiry to M. Ducos, the Minister of Marine, whose
answer, which obtained general publicity at tho time, is hero
reproduced ; — " Paris, February 25, 1853.
" Sir, — The questions which you do me the honour to put in
your letter of the 19th of February might perhaps appear to
me unusual, if my mind really ontertained tho strange ideas
which some persons appear to ascribe to me in England.
" But, far from considering these questions indisoreet or
inopportune, I rejoice at them, because they afford me an oppor
tunity of giving you the complete assurance of my peaceful
sentiments. " I should consider it as tho greatest of misfortunes if a
serious misunderstanding should break out between the two
nations ; and I clesiro with all my heart, that tho best intelli
gence may continue to prevail between them.
" Your newspapers make much stir about our presumed war-
liko preparations. I confino myself to declaring to you that I
have not armed a single gun-boat, stirred a single cannon, or
equippod a single sailor. I remain the calm spectator of the
enormous expenses which you are malting to conjure away an
imaginary clanger ; and I admire tho facility with which you
augment your budget when no real neoessity prescribes it.
" If tho members of your Parliament, who are so pre-oceupied
with our projects of invasion, would give themselves the
trouble of paying us a short visit, they would be moro surprised

* Annual Register, p. 148, " Chronicle,"

32 THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC II.
than I am myself, perhaps, at the extreme readiness with which
the rumour (almost amounting to a pleasantry) of our supposed
warlike preparations has been received among you.
" I thank you, Sir, for allowing me to establish a certain
degree of intercourse between us ; and I beg you to accept the
expression of my most distinguished sentiments. " Theodore Duces.
" Monsieur Ewart, Membre de la Chambre
des Communes, &c."
With M. Ducos, the writer of these pages had not the honor
of a personal acquaintance ; but he happened to be on
terms of very intimate friendship with one of his colleagues,
with whom he was in correspondence at the time, and from
whom he received the following note, which had been written
to him by the Minister of Marine, at the moment of receiving
the letter of inquiry from Mr. Ewart. As this letter was penned
by M. Ducos under circumstances which precluded any idea
of concealment or misrepresentation, it will be read with pro
bably greater interest than the more formal communication,
especially that part which refers to the cabinet device, common
to both countries, of resorting to imaginary terrors as a means
of swelling budgets and strengthening majorities : —
" My Dear Colleague,
" Do you read the English journals and the debates in Par
liament ?
" Yerily, I am astonished at the din they are making on the
other side of the Channel. Will you believe that I have just
received a letter from a Member of the House of Commons,
asking me seriously if the armaments we are preparing are des
tined for a war with England, and if we are pushing this con
stant augmentation of the forces of the two nations in a spirit
of rivalry ! I send you the letter, that you may not doubt my
veracity. Will you answer it, or shall I ?
"Our armaments! forsooth. What does it mean? You
know as well as I that to this day we have not armed a poor
little boat beyond our ordinary fleet. With a budget reduced
by forty millions (francs) compared with the budgets of Louis
Philippe, we are obliged to confine ourselves within the nar
rowest limits.

1852,] THE THREE PANICS. 33
"England increases her budget of this year by sixteen
millions (francs) ; she forms her militia ; she recruits her
sailors ; she makes her coasts bristle with heavy artillery. We
look on tranquilly, without comprehending all these eflTorts, and
without having for a single instant the idea or the apprehension
that she is going to invade us.
" Mr. Ewart asks me in confidence, and whispering in my ear,
if we are actuated by sentiments of rivalry in pushing our
armaments ! I deelare that I cannot understand it. We have
not armed one vessel, we have not touched one gun, we have
not equipped one soldier, we have not recruited one cabin-boy :
and they ask us seriously if we are a very thunderbolt of war ?
It seems to me, that the question might be more seasonably
addressed to the members of the English Cabinet, who are
covering themselves with armour, and who possibly may not be
very muck distressed by these imaginary terrors (as ice have some
times seen among oitrsehes), inasmuch as they enable them to swell
their budget, and serve to strengthen a someichat uncertain majority
in Parliament.
" Ah ! my dear oolleague, yon see that all the geese do not
come from the United States, or swim in the Seine. You per
ceive that the question from London makes me quite merry.
For«ive me, my dear colleague. I conclude by asking whether
I must write to Mr. Ewart, and tell him, for his great satisfac
tion, that I am a greater friend to peace than himself, and that
I look upon war between France and England as a universal
calamity, which every wise man ought to exert himself to
prevent. '•Theodore Dreos."
But this excellent attempt of Mr. Ewart to allay the public
excitement produced no apparent effect. Nothing could surpass
the child-like simplicity with which any of the above absurd
and improbable rumours respecting the hostile preparations of
the French were believed, unless it was the stolid scepticism
with which all offers to demonstrate their falsehood were re
jected. It will be well to turn for an instant to the tables in the first
page, and bring the question of the state of the French navy
at this time to the test of those authentic figures. Let us take
the specifie allegation in the Annual Register for 1832 (Sept. 21),
D

34 THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC II.
that during tho two years of iho Prinoo President's power, tho
French navy was doubled in eilectivo force. Louis Napoleon
Mas declared President of tho Republio on tho 20th Dooember,
1848, and was proclaimed Emperor on the 2nd December, 1852.
His term of presidency may therel'oro bo said to have extended
over tho years 1S19, 1850, 1851, and 1852. Tho following
figures give tho total expenditure, tho amount of wages in dock
yards, tho number of seamen, and tho number of ships in com
mission, for each of those years, and also for the two preoeding
years, 1847 boing tho last year of Louis Philippe's reign, and
1848 the first year of tho Republio : —
Wages in Total No. of No. of Ships
Dookyards. Expenditure. Seamen, in Commission,
£ £
448,333 5,145,900 82,169 240
444,085 4,985,872 28,760 242
456,155 8,923,276 27,068 211
432,837 3,406,866 24,679 181
416,773 3,293,737 22,316 166
425,811 3,462,271 25,016 175

1847 18481849185018511852

Taking 1851, the third year of tho presidency of Louis
Napoleon, when it will be admitted his policy must have hud
timo to develop itsolf, and comparing it with the sixteen pro-
vious yoars comprised in the table given in the first page, it
will be seen that thero is only one year (1835) when Franco
had so fow ships in commission, only two years (1835-6) in
which sho maintained so fow seamen, and only fivo years
(1835-0-7-8-9) when tho total oxpondituro had boon so low.
And, instead of tho offectivo foroo boing doublod, it will bo scon
that a continual reduction had been going on during -the first
three years of tho President's rule, with only an insignifioant
nso hi 1852. Tho diminution in tho dockyard expenditure
was, in both countries, proportionately less than in tho other
itoins^ owing to the more oostly nature of the now naval con
structions. If wo take the average of the four years, 1849 to 1852, it will
be found to bo very much less than tho average of the last ten
years of Louis Philippe's reign, and in looking back over the
tables of both countries for tho whole period, it will bo found

1853.] THE THREE PANICS. 35
that scarcely at any time was the French navy so weak in com^
parison with that of England, as in 1851. M. Ducos, in the
above private letter to his colleague, asserts that his expenditure
was forty millions (£1,600,000) less than that of his predecessor
in the time of Louis Philippe ; and if we compare the year
1852 with that of 1847, it more than verifies his state-*
ment. It is now very well known, apart from the proofs afforded
by these figures, that, owing to the embarrassed state of the
French finances during the Republic, and the struggle, in
volving the very existence of social order, then going on, very
little attention was paid to the Navy. A Parliamentary Com-,
mission, of which M. Dufaure was named " Reporter," was ap-.
pointed by the National Assembly in 1849, to inquire into the
state of the navy, and two goodly quarto volumes were the
result, with minutes of the evidence and the discussions ; but its
proceedings were brought to an untimely end by the coup d'etat
of the 2nd December, 1851, and they led to but few practical
results. It was under circumstances so little calculated to provoke our
fear or resentment, that the cry of alarm and defiance was
raised more loudly than ever through the winter and spring of
1852-3, Men of the highest political and social rank resigned
themselves to the excitement. Two cabinet ministers, who had
gone to their constituents for re-election on taking office in
Lord Aberdeen's government, Avere afterwards called upon by
their opponents in the House, to explain the violent language
uttered by them at the hustings in allusion to the ruler and
people of France.*
" I tell you," said the Lord Lieutenant of Yorkshire, ad-*
dressing the militia of that county, " the time is coming when
everybody throughout this realm will have reason to be
thankful that you have come forward to defend your hearths and
homes."f Lord Mount-Edgcumbe, through the columns of a public
journal, thus added fuel to the flame :— " I have received posi
tive information, which cannot be doubted, that the French are

Hansard, exxiv. 267. t Hansard, exxiv. 293.quoted.
D 2

36 THE THJ*E*E PANICS. [PANIC II,
now striving to the very ¦utmost to increase their naval force in
every manner, and thai; arrangements have now been officially
decided upon, to continue, year after year, similar exertions, I
cannot give my authority, but trust that I shall be believed
when I say that this information may be most thoroughly reHed
upon." And the writer adds, by way of emphasis, " I repeat,
that the information I have received, of preparations, which can
only be made for aggression, may be relied on."*
At the same time, the strictures of the leading journals as-
sumed a more virulent tone towards the Chief of the French
people. Such had been the withering influence of legislative
restrictions and fiscal exactions upon the periodical press, that
the publication of daily newspapers was restricted to the three
capitals of the United Kingdom, and their circulation among
twenty -six millions of people did not exceed, in the aggregate,
sixty or seventy thousand copies daily. A monopoly of pub
licity was, indeed, virtually possessed by one London journal,
whose conductors had thus the power of giving the impress of
public opinion to whatever views they chose to espouse, The
columns of this paper now teemed with the most violent
denunciations of the French ruler, not unmixed with expres
sions of contempt for the people of France. One writerf of a
series of impassioned invectives was betrayed into expressions
not obscurely suggestive of assassination.
A reaction was at length produced in a quarter supposed to
be peculiarly influenced by this journal. That part of the com
munity most slow to enter upon any public movement, the
merchants and bankers of London, convened a meeting by cir
cular of those " who feel called upon at this time publicly to
express their deep concern at witnessing the endeavours con
tinually made to create and perpetuate feelings of mistrust, ill-
will, and hostility between the inhabitants of the two great
nations of England and France," and they took the unprece
dented step of sending to the Emperor of the French a depu
tation of leading citizens, carrying with them an address bear
ing more than a thousand signatures.
On the meeting of Parliament, Mr. Disraeli took an oppor-

* Times, February 7-12, 1853.
t Letters of " An Englishman," in the Times.

1853.] THE THREE PANIC'S.' 37
tunity of drawing attention to these manifestations of hatred
and terror towards France, declaring that it was " extremely
strange and startling, that, under such circumstances, an idea
should have seemed to enter into almost every man's brain, and
an expression into every man's mouth, that we are on the eve
of a rupture with that country." And, alluding to the gross
attacks that had been levelled at the ruler of France, he said : —
" Remember, that all this time, while the French Government
were quietly and diplomatically working with our Government
for great objects of public benefit and advantage — that French
Government was painted as corsairs and banditti,* watching to
attack our coasts without the slightest provocation and without
the slightest warning." f
Such was the state of feeling in the Spring of 1853. The
nation had grown rich and prosperous with a rapidity beyond
all precedent. Our exports had risen from £52,849,000 in
1848, to £98,933,000 in 1853, having nearly doubled in five
years. History shows that such a condition of things is fruitful
in national follies and crimes, of which war is but the greatest.
The time is not yet, though it will come, when people will be
able to bear the blessings of prosperity and liberty, with peace.
Whilst it seemed only a question upon whom we should ex
pend our exuberant forces, — whether on France or some other
onemy, — we " drifted " into hostilities in an unexpected
direction. The Turk was allowed to declare war for us against
Russia, after we had agreed to the terms of peace offered for us
on behalf of the latter country ! Could this have happened
amid the commercial depression and gloom of 1848 ?
The sudden change which was now to be witnessed in the
temper of the public and the action of the Government was so

» Take, as a specimen, the similitude of burglars, under which, when
speaking of the danger of invasion, our brave and polished neighbours
were described by a well-known writer of the day— a man of rank and a
clergyman :— " When burglars are about, we examine the scullery and
cellar windows ; we try the fastenings of our doors, hang up bells to warn
us, get dogs and police to watch for us, and go to bed in confidence that
wo are so prepared against an attack, that few are likely to attempt it."—
S. G. O., in Times (Hansard, exxiv. 290.)
t Hansard, exxiv. 263.

38 THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC II.
unlocked for, and so utterly beyond all rational calculation, that
it might be compared to the shifting of the view in a kaleidos
cope. By way of bringing clearly, and in the fewest words,
home to the reader's apprehension what took place, let us illus
trate it by an individual case. Let us suppose an invalid to have
been ordered, for the benefit of his health, to make the voyage
to Australia and back. He left England in the month of
February or March. The Militia was preparing for duty; the
coasts and dockyards were being fortified ; the navy, army, and
artillery were all in course of augmentation ; inspectors of
artillery and cavalry were reported to be busy on the southern
coasts : deputations from railway companies, it was said, had
been waiting on the Admiralty and Ordnance to explain how
rapidly the Commissariat and military stores could be trans
ported from the Tower to Dover or Portsmouth ; and the latest
paragraph of news from the Continent was that our neighbours,
on the other side of the Channel, were practising the em
barkation and disembarkation of troops by night ! He left
home amidst all these alarms and preparations for a French
invasion. After an absence of four or five months, during
which time he had no opportunity of .hearing more recent news
from Europe, he steps on shore at Liverpool, and the first
newspaper he sees informs him that the English and French
fleets are lying side by side in Besika Bay. An impending
naval engagement between the two powers is naturally the idea
that first occurs to him ; but glancing at the leading article of
the journal, he learns that England and France have entered
into an alliance, and that they are on the eve of commencing a
Sanguinary war against Russia !
Leaving our imaginary individual to recover from his sur
prise, it may naturally be inferred, that he would feel some
misgivings as to the prudence of placing ourselves at the mercy
of a Ruler whom he had so recently heard denounced as little
better than a bandit and a pirate. It would have certainly
required a much smaller effort of the imagination to have
suspected a plot between our ally and the enemy, by which the
two Emperors, having joined their forces at Sebastopol, taken
our army captive, and destroyed our fleet, should have seized
on Constantinople, and Egypt, and made a partition of Turkey,

185o\J THE THREE PANICS. 39
than to have believed in the possibility of an invasion by an
army of fifty or sixty thousand Frenchmen in a single night,
without notice or provocation.
No such doubts, however, seem to have troubled the minds of
our alarmists. They who had been the most vehement in their
denunciations of the French Government, were now the
strongest supporters of the Anglo-French alliance, and the
loudest in clamouring for a war with Russsia ; and for the next
five years no more was heard of a French invasion.

40

THE THIRD PANIC.
1859—1860—1861.
" We must have one more war with Russia for the independence
and freedom of Em-ope, and, then, all will unite in favour of a
reduction of armaments," was the language with which some
friends of peace reconciled themselves to the Crimean war.
They have since seen additions made to the permanent armed
forces of Europe, equalling probably in numbers the armies
engaged in the Crimean struggle. So true is the saying of
Bastiat, that " the ogre, war, costs as much for his digestion
aa for his meals."
It 'was formerly said of us, that we were a warlike, but
ilot a military nation. The Russian war has gone far to make
us both.
At the close of the great French war, in 1815, there were
not wanting members of the Whig aristocracy, and a phalanx
of distinguished popular leaders, to call back the nation to its
old maxims against large standing armies in time of peace ; and
Who not only kept alive the jealousy of permanent camps and
barracks, but opposed the formation even of clubs set apart
exclusively for the " Services," and denounced the whole para
phernalia of a military organization. They did not aocept war
as the normal state of mankind ; nor did they, discarding all
reliance on the spirit and patriotism of the people, attempt to
drill them like Russians or Austrians into mere warlike
machines.* But at the termination of the Crimean war, the

* The following is a specimen of the language in which our fathers were
addressed by their great political leaders nearly half a century ago. And
these were the sentiments of the Hollands, Miltons, Lansdownes, Tiemeys,
Broughams, Eussells, and even the Qrenvilles, and Wellesleys, of those
days : — "In despotic countries, it may be necessary to maintain great
armies as seminaries of warlike spirit. The mind, which in such
wretched countries has no noble object to employ its powers, almost

THE THREE PANICS. 4l
governing powers of this country seemed to be possessed but of
one idea,— how Englishmen could be drilled and disciplined into
a state of constant readiness for future continental campaigns.

necessarily sinks into languor and lethargy, when it is not roused to tho
destructive phrenzy of war. The show of war during peace, may be
necessary to preserve the chief skill of the barbarian, and to keep up the
only exalted feeling of the slave. The savage soon throws off habits of
order ; and the slave is ever prone to relapse into the natural cowardice of
his debased condition. But in this mightiest of Free Communities, where
no human faculty is suffered to lie dormant, and where habitual order, by
co-operation, gives effect to the intense and incessant exertion of power,
tho struggles of honourable ambition, the fair contests of political party,
the enterprizes of ingenious industry, the pursuits of elegant art, the
fearless exercise of reason upon the most venerable opinions, and upon the
acts of the highest authorities, the race of many for wealth, and of a few
for power or fame, are abundantly sufficient to cultivate those powers, and
to inspire those energies which, at the approach of war, submit to disci
pline, and quickly assume the forms of military science and genius. A
free nation like ours, full of activity and boldness, and yet full of order, has
all the elements and habits of an army, prepared by the happy frame of
its society. We require no military establishments to nurse our martial
spirit. It is our distinction, that we have ever proved ourselves in time of
need, a nation of warriors, and that we never have been a people of soldiers.
It is no refinement to say, that the national courage and intellect have
acted with the more vigour on the approach of hostility, beoause we are
not teazed and worried into petty activity ; because a proud and serious
people have not been degraded, in their own eyes, by acting their awkward
part in holiday parade. Where arms are the national occupation, the in
tervals of peace are times of idleness, during which a part, at least, of the
people must fit themselves for the general business, by exercising the
talents and qualities which it requires. But where the pursuits of peace
require the highest activity and the nature of the government calls forth
the highest spirit, the whole people must always possess the materials
and principles of a military character. Freemen are brave, because they
rely on themselves. Liberty is our national point of ionour. The prido
of liberty is the spring of our national courage. The independent spirit,
the high feeling of personal dignity, and the consequent sensibility to
national honour, the true sources of that valour for which, this nation has
been renowned for ages, have been, in a great measure, created and pre
served by their being accustomed to trust to themselves for defence against
invasion from abroad or tyranny at home If they lean on an army for
safety, they will soon look to it with awe ; and thus gradually lose .those
sentiments of self-respect and self-dependence, that pride of liberty
which are the peculiar and the most solid defences of this country." —
Sib James Macintosh, House of Commons, February 28, 1816.

42

THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC III.

Hence we have seen a military activity never before known in
England in a time of peace, as witness the columns of the daily
press, filled with "Military and Naval Intelligence." The
object of those, who, by their rank and influence, have mainly
contributed to produce this state of things, has not been con
cealed. "What I want to see," said Mr. Sidney Herbert,
" is a military spirit pervading all classes of the community ;
but especially the influential and intelligent middle class. I
believe the volunteer corps will effect that object to a large
extent ; and, therefore, if for that alone, I think they ought to
be encouraged." * The consequence has been, not only an enor
mous increase of our military estimates, but such an outlay for
permanent barracks and camps as to imply a complete abandon
ment, for the future, of our old habits and maxims as a self-
relying and free people. The unfinished works at Aldershott
alone, have already cost £1,421, 153, f — on amount, for the time
and purpose, perhaps unexampled in the world's history. Our
business, however, must still be mainly with the navy.
At the conclusion of the war, a grand Naval Review took
place at Spithead, which is thus recorded in the Annual Register,
for 1856, with the accompanying remarks, that the "steam
gun-boats formed the novel feature of the review."
" The vast naval force reviewed on this occasion, consisted oi
22 steam-ships of the line, of from 60 to 131 guns, 53 frigates
and corvettes, 140 gun-boats, 4 floating-batteries, and 50 mortar-
vessels and mortar-boats : the aggregate power of the steam-
engines, 30,671 horses, aud the number of guns, 3002."
Addressing the House, May 8, 1856, after the ratification of
the Treaty of Peace, Lord Palmerston said, that, " having begun
the war with a fleet of comparatively small amount, we were
enabled, at the end of the war, to present at Spithead the
spectacle of such a fleet as called forth from the Earl of Derby
the eulogy, that ' no country ever possessed so mighty a naval
armament.' We had, at the beginning of the war, a total
force of 212 ships ; and at the end of the war we have 590."J
The greater portion of this increase consisted of gun-boats
and mortar- vessels ; and, with a view to a due appreciation of

* Hansard, olv. p. 699. t Parliamentary Paper, No. 327, 1861.
X Hansard, cxli. p. 226,

1856. j THE THREE PANICS. 43
the systematic manner in which they are destined henceforth to
pass into oblivion, when successive " First Lords," or Secre
taries of the Admiralty introduce the Navy Estimates, it is
necessary that we should fully apprehend the importance which
competent judges attached, at the time, to this addition to our
defensive armament. A few weeks later, the First Lord of the
Admiralty himself, when alluding to the fact of these gun-boats
having been completed too late to be employed in offensive
operations against the enemy, remarked : —
" Happily, however, the means thus provided for attack can
now be made equally available as a part of our permanent
establishment for purposes of defence. The gun-boats and
floating-batteries, recently constructed for other objects, will
constitute a valuable and effective armament for protecting our
shores from assault. The expense incurred in their equipment
will, therefore, be money not ill-spent. I think it required the
stern experience of war to teach us the value of such a force ;
for I do not believe the House of Commons could have been
induced, in a period of uninterrupted peace, to vote the addi
tional funds requisite for creating it."*
" We commenced the war," said Captain Scobell, on the same
occasion, "with only large ships; and it was only after two
years' experience, that we discovered^ the gun-boat tribe. If,
some time ago, we had had that magnificent fleet of gun-boats
which had recently been reviewed at Spithead, something would
have been done in the Baltic, which would have been re
membered for centuries."f
Let it be borne in mind, that we were at the close of a war
in which we had destroyed the Russian fleet in the Black Sea,
and by the terms of the Treaty of Peace, had prohibited its
reconstruction. The Russian power, in that remote region, had
been hitherto invested with a certain mystery, and the fleet of
Sebastopol had often, in the speeches of our alarmists, been
made to assume mythical proportions. The Secretary of the
Navy, in 1852, the year before the Crimean war, when seeking
to justify his comparatively moderate expenditure for that year,
appealed to the Russian force in the Black Sea, which,
according to his statement, comprised 18 line-of-battle ships.

* Hansard, cxlii.p. 1423. t Hansard, cxlii. 1435.

44 THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC IlK
12 frigates and corvettes, and 19 smaller vessels.* These ships
were now lying sunk in the harbour of Sebastopol.
It was under these circumstances, that in proposing the Navy
Estimates, on the 18th May, 1857, the First Lord of the
Admiralty declared, that he could hold out no prospect of being
able to reduce the expenditure to the level of former years
previous to the war.f This drew from the vigilant Mr.
Williams the remark, that they were the most extravagant
Estimates since the termination of the great French war ; and
he added that, "the Estimates for 1852-3, the last year of
peace before the Russian war, were £2,175,000 less than the
Estimates for the present year ; and yet this was the second
year of peace. J
The First Lord of the Admiralty proceeded to justify his in
creased estimates by a reference to the navy of our ally and
neighbour : — " France," said he, " had been paying the greatest
possible attention of late years to the efficiency of its navy ;"§
and in order to compare the forces of the two countries, he gave
the numbers of screw line-of-battle ships and frigates possessed
by each, omitting the gun-boats and smaller vessels, in which
we possessed an overwhelming superiority, and which had been
described the previous year, as " a valuable and effective arma
ment for protecting our shores from assault." They were now
alluded to only with the disparaging remark, that " no great
naval engagement could be maintained in the middle of the
Atlantic between line-of-battle ships and gun-boats." The com
parison was stated as follows : — ||
Line-of-battle ships with screws,built and building, 1857.
English, 42. [ French, 40.
Frigates with screws, built and building.
English, 42. | French, 37.
Lord Clarence Paget, who attracted attention by the ability
and professional forethought which characterised his remarkson

* Hansard, cxx. p. 382. t Hansard, cxlv. p. 417,
X Hansard, cxlv. p. 442. § Hansard, cxlv. 418.
|| Hansard, cxlv. 426.

1857.] THE THREE PANICS, 45
the comparative value of small and large vessels of war, took
exception to the above figures, and said that he held in his hand
a list of French sorew line-of-battle ships furnished him by the
Minister of Marine, and that they amounted altogether to 31 ;
and he reminded the " First Lord " of a great omission in his
statement,— that the "nine screw block-ships which he had
omitted from his enumeration of British ships of the line, were
among the most effective of our screw line of battle ships.
They were the only ships which fired a shot in the Baltic, where
the great line-of-battle ships were of no use whatever, and lay
off looking on ;"* and he added, that, taking into account these
vessels, our force was nearly double that of France.
It may be well here to say a word or two respecting the
origin and purpose of these block-ships, to which repeated allu
sion will hereafter be made. It was explained by Sir George
Cockburn in the House, in 1846, that Sir Robert Peel's Govern
ment was induced, in consequence of the creation of a steam
navy by France, to appoint a commission to visit all the ports,
and see what was necessary to be done for their protection,
when it was recommended that a certain number of sailing
line-of-battle ships and frigates should be furnished with screws,
so as to be able to shift their position, and aid the different
batteries if they should be attacked, f This was, in fact, our
first application of the screw propeller to ships of the line, and
these block-ships were expressly designed for the protection of
our naval arsenals, and the vulnerable points of our coast against
the steam ships of our neighbour. But it will be curious to
observe, how systematically these vessels are ignored by success
sive " First Lords " and Secretaries of the Admiralty, in enu
merating our naval resources, even when estimating our means
of defence against invasion. The opinions expressed on this
subject by the same statesmen when in, and when out of office,
will be found to present a singular contrast.
Lord Clarence Paget also called the First Lord's attention to
the small vessels which he had forgotten, and declared that " he
believed, that had Sir Charles Napier been supplied with gun
boats, he might have damaged Cronstadt very considerably.
AU his own experience went to show that line-of-battle ships

* Hansard, cxlv. 438. t Hansard, Ixxxvii, 1456.

46 THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC III.
were not now so important an arm in war aa they formerly
were. Formerly, line-of-battle ships carried heavier guns than
other ships, but now every corvette, sloop, and gun-boat carried
heavy guns, and he was convinced that no force of large ships
could withstand the legion of gun-boats, sloops, and corvettes
which they saw at Spithead last year."* Again recurring to
the subject he said, " in his opinion, line-of-battle ships were
not the instruments by which in future the fate of empires
would he decided ;" and he proceeded to administer comfort to
the alarmists, by showing how different our situation now was
to our " case in the time of Napoleon, who had observed that,
if he could only command the Channel for forty-eight hours,
he would subjugate this country. He might, however, come to
our shores at the present day with seventy or eighty ships of
the line, and yet not be enabled to effect a landing in the face
of that noble fleet of small vessels which the right-honourable
baronet had given within the last few years." He added that,
" he had the best authority for saying that there was sitting at
the present moment in France, an EnquSte, or Commission, tho
great object of whose inquiry was to ascertain whether line-of-
battle ships were or were not the most efficient class of ships
which could now be employed." And he advised the First
Lord to " rest upon his oars, and take the opportunity of con
sulting members of the naval service before he proceeded to add
to the number of those vessels ;"f — advice to which unfortu
nately, it may be necessary to recur, when the noble lord is
himself filling the office of official representative of the Admi
ralty in the House of Cummons.
In reply to these remarks, Sir Charles Wood, the First Lord
of the Admiralty, observed :— " The noble lord (Lord C. Paget)
had srid that the block-ships were the most efficient ships in the
Baltic. It was true that, on account of the light draught of
water, they and the gun-boats were so in that case, and that they
would be so in the case of operations on our own coast; but they
would not be safe vessels to send across the Atlantic— they
could not keep their place in a cruising squadron. J
In the course of this debate, Sir Charles Napier, referring to

Hansard, cxlv. 438. f Hansard, cxlv. 438-9.
X Hansard, oxlv. 450.

1857.] THE THREE PANICS. 47
the comparative numbers of line-of-battle ships as enumerated by
the First Lord, but forgetting the block-ships and floating
batteries, and overlooking the gun-boats and mortar-vessels
which had been bmlt at his own suggestion, thus raised the
cry of alarm :— "The First Lord of the Admiralty," said he,
" had told the House that France had forty ships, and we had
forty-two only ; France was equal to us, therefore, in ships, and
superior in the means of manning them. She had an army of
300,000 or 400,000 men, and we had but 20,000 in Great
Britain. What would the consequence be if the war were to
spring up? Why, there would be an invasion imnie.
diately."* A few days after, he thus improved upon this version of the
official statement : — " The First Lord of the Admiralty had told
them the other night— a thing which no First Lord had ever
told them before— that France, in its naval steam power, was
equal to ourselves, and that she was able to bring together any
number of disciplined men to man her fleets quicker than we
could. We were, therefore, no longer the first naval nation in
the world."f A week later the danger is more menacing : —
" Let the House look at our condition at the present moment.
We had no channel fleet. In a few months we should not
have a line-of-battle ship in England ; and, in case of a sudden
war with France and Russia, he did not believe the Queen's
throne would be worth six months' purchase." J
The course pursued by this remarkable man towards the close
of his career, and the great extent to which his writings and
speeches contributed to the creation of the invasion panics, call
for a few special observations. On his return to the House of
Commons, after being superseded in the command of the Baltic
fleet during the Crimean war, he became possessed with a mor
bid apprehension, amounting almost to a state of monomania,
respecting the threatening attitude of France, and our insuffi
cient means of defence. It was not peculiar to his case, for it
is common to all who share his delusion about the danger of an
invasion, that he always lost sight of all that was already done,
and called for something else as the sole means of security.
* Hansard, cxlv. 434. t Hansard, cxlv. 770.
J Hansard, cxlv. 966.

48 THE THREE PANICS, [PANJC Itr,
Thus, he demanded more line-of-battle ships, and ignored th?
existence of the new force of small vessels ; then he called for
a channel fleet, whilst he threw contempt on the hlook-ships ;
when the channel fleet was completed, he declared that the
crews were in mutiny from mismanagement ; when the num
ber of line-of-battle ships was so great as to extort from him
expressions of satisfaction, he asked what was the use of ships
without seamen; when the number of seamen voted for our
royal navy exceeded that of the entire sea- going population of
France, he called aloud for a reserve ; and when he had been
triumphant in all his demands, he reverted to the opinion
which he had been one of the first to proclaim, that the whole
navy must be reconstructed, for that " a broadside from the
modern shell guns would tear holes in the sides of our wooden
ships through which it would be easy to drive a wheel-
barrow."* Simultaneously with these calls for defensive armaments arose
incessant cries respecting the enormous increase of the French
navy. France was always described as in a superior state of
preparation, and always menacing us with invasion. To those
who sat near him in the House, and shared in his conversation,
he would sometimes almost predict the very month when the
French might be expected on our shores.
Cherbourg had been always described by him as the chief
source of our danger, until the great public visit to that port
dispelled the phantom-ships with which he had been haunted ;
but still he would expatiate on the facilities which its enormous
docks and basins offered for embarking an army, declaring on
one occasion that, " the troops could walk on board ; cavalry,
mounted on their horses, could ride on board s and artillery could
easily be shipped, for thirty sail-of-the-line could lie alongside
of the wharves alone."f Notwithstanding that he drew on
himself occasionally the censure of his brother officers for dis
paraging our naval strength, and was more than once rebuked
for encouraging insubordination among the seamen, he still
persevered ; and such is the force of reiteration, that he was at
last justified in the boast that, although " he had been called an

* Hansard, clvi, 1138. t Hansard, cl. 1928.

1857.] THE THREE PANICS. 49
alarmist, and laughed at for many years on that account, he
had lived to see his views adopted."*
The question has been asked, whether one whose antecedents
had exhibited such reckless courage could have been sincere
when raising the cry of alarm on such vague and shadowy pre
texts, or whether he was actuated by mere professional motives
It was, however, impossible for those who were in the habit of
conversing with him to doubt his earnestness ; and the fact of
his having recommended an arrangement between the English
and French governments for putting a limit to their naval
rivalryt is an answer to the suspicion of insincerity. Tho
question admits, perhaps, of a different solution. On the
occasion of his bringing his grievance before Parliament, and
moving for an inquiry into his conduct in the Baltic, he was
answered by Sir Maurice Berkeley, one of the Lords of the
Admiralty, who stated, in his presence, that he had advised the
removal of Admiral Napier from his command in the Baltic
because "he thought he was totally and physically unfit, — that
his nerves were completely gone."J This declaration, from
sailor to sailor, was at the moment thought to partake of some
what too much professional bluntness ; but it probably offers
the true solution of the above question. And this view is con
firmed by the fact, that, to the last, on all matters connected
with his profession, excepting where the question of invasion
was involved, the remarks and suggestions of the naval veteran
displayed much sagacity and sound sense.
Debility of mind, in one or other of its faculties, like physi
cal decrepitude in some particular organs of the body, is the
natural and inevitable accompaniment of old age. It has been
observed, too, that, as in the present case, the very faculty for
which a man has been most distinguished may, by an excessive
and continued strain, be the first to give way. This, whilst
teaching us charity in weighing men's motives, should also in
duce us, when taking counsel in important matters, to prefer
the judgment of those who are in the vigour of their powers,
and to mistrust quite as much the timidity of the old as the
rashness of the young.

Hansard, clvi. 939. t Hansard, clvi. 989.
% Hansard, cxli. 102.
E

50

THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC III.

The year 1857 passed without any revival of the excitement
out of doors respecting our defences. Scarcely a pamphlet
issued from the press on the subject of an invasion, let, if we
look at the circumstances of the time, there could hardly be
imagined a conjuncture when they who believed in the proba
bility of an attack from the other side of the Channel ought to
have been more on the alert.
The commencement of 1S5S found us involved in a war with
China, and in the midst of that formidable rebellion which
threatened the overthrow of our dominion in India. Just at
the opening of the parliamentary session of that year, occurred
the attempt on the Emperor's life, which led to some in
temperate manifestations of feeling towards England on the
part of certain French colonels. This was followed by irritating
discussions in the press. One of the first measures of the
session was a proposal to alter our law of " conspiracy to
murder," with the view of meeting the complaints from France.
This conciliatory step led to the fall of Lord Pahnerstou's
ministry in February, and to the return to power of Lord
Derby, whose party was at that time considered not so favour
ably disposed as their predecessors to the French alliance.
When we consider that, in addition to these personal elements
of .provocation, there was the temptation to wrest from us that
eastern empire which is regarded, however mistakenly, on the
Continent, as the great source of our wealth and power, we have
a combination of motives, and of favourable ch'cumstances, to
invite an attack such as could never be expected to occur again.
Well might Mr. Horsman exclaim the following year, that,
" when he looked back to their condition when the mutiny
broke out in India, he must say it was fortunate that at that
time it never entered into the mind of any enemy to take ad
vantage of the position of this country :"* — what marvel that so
intelligent a mind could fail to draw the only rational deduction
from such a fact ! Instead of taking advantage of our position,
the Emperor's Government offered the facilities of a passage
through France for our Indian reinforcements.
A complete calm prevailed in the public mind, through the
greater part of the year 1858 ; and the pamphlet literature
* Hansard, civ. 691.

1857, 1858.] THE THREE PANICS. 51
scarcely takes note of the topic of a French invasion. The
House of Commons was not, however, so entirely quiescent.
Lord Derby's Government, on their accession to office, had
found the Navy Estimates already prepared by Lord Palmer-
ston's administration, comprising an increase of about 2,000
men. These Estimates, with slight diminutions in the items
for building and stores, were adopted and proposed to the House
by the new First Lord (Sir John Pakington) on the 12th
April. In the debate which followed, there was the usual
reference made by Sir Charles Napier, Mr. Bentinck, Mr.
Drummond, and others, to the formidable preparations going
on in France, and to the risks of an invasion : when Lord
Clarence Paget renewed the advice he had before urged,
saying that, "he believed it to be the opinion of the Navy,
that it would be wise to pause in the construction of these
enormous vessels. That opinion was gaining ground in this
country, and much more was it gaining ground in France. He
had been lately at Paris, and had conversation with French
officers on the subject ; and, whatever reports the late First
Lord of the Admiralty (Sir Charles Wood) might have heard
respecting the French Navy, he could give him positive inform
ation, that, so far from there being any activity in building
large ships, they were waiting to see what would be done in
this country. He was persuaded, and it was the general
opinion of the naval profession, that line-of-battle ships were
not destined to play an important part in future naval wars.
It was believed that these ships would be superseded in tho
line of battle, and more particularly in attacking forts, by ships
with one tier of heavy guns, and their sides cased with iron.
He believed with the hon. and gallant Admiral, the member
for Southwark (Sir C. Napier), that in ten years three-deckers
would be unknown, being cut down into single-deck ships ; and,
holding that opinion, he thought it was a wasteful expenditure
of the public money, to go on, year by year, constructing that
class of vessels."*
These views were controverted by Lord Palmerston, who
alluded to the measures which the French Government were
taking to give France a fleet of screw line-of-battle ships, very

* Hansard, cxlix. p. 929, 30.
e2

52

THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC III.

nearly equal to our own ; he also spoke of Cherbourg as being " as
large as many of our dockyards taken together ;" and twitted
Lord Clarence Paget with his credulity, telling him that he was
"not sure that opinions, coming from what must be called the rival
service of other countries were exactly the opinions by which
the Government of this country ought to guide their conduct."*
He deprecated any reduction in the Estimates for bunding ;
and urged, that, " the most pressing apphcation of the funds
voted for the naval service, was in providing ships which, when
once built, will remain, rather than in employing men, who,
after the year is over, will not add to your strength next year,
unless the expense is continued :" f — a doctrine which, as the
recent transitions in our navy show, ought to be received with
great caution.
These allusions to the preparations of our neighbours met
with no response out of doors ; and Httle more was said during
the session, — with one constant exception : — Sir Charles Napier,
on the 11th June, addressed a speech to the House, in the form
of a long question to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, on the
subject of our national defences, in which, among other terrors
of the imagination, he pictured a Russian fleet coming up the
Channel, and exclaimed, amid the laughter of the House,
" what would become of the Funds, God only knew."J The
Minister, in reply, complained that he had had to listen to
three speeches in the session, on the same subject, from the
same speaker.
The year 1859 witnessed the apparition of the third panic.
Towards the close of 1858, and up to the meeting of Parlia
ment in February, there had been some efforts made by a
certain portion of the press, to excite apprehensions respecting
the magnitude of the naval preparations of France ; but they
produced little effect on the public mind. Unlike its pre
decessors, this panic had its origin chefly in elevated and
official circles. It was from the first a parliamentary agitation;
nor was it confined to the Lower House, for; as will be seen, the
most successful agitators were of the patrician order, who
played with consummate skill on the most sensitive chord

*¦ Hansard, cxlix. p. 936. t Hansard, ib. p. 938.
X Hansard, cl.p. 1930.

1859.] The three panics. 53
in the national heart, by raising the cry of alarm for our
naval superiority.
The Queen's Speech, at the opening of Parliament, announced
an increase of expenditure for the "reconstruction of the
British Navy."
On the day previous to that fixed for bringing on the Navy
Estimates, Sir Charles Napier rose in the House, and said, he
" wished to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty, whether it
was true that a French steam aviso, with two French cutters,
had entered Spithead a few nights ago ; and, after the exchange
of a few words of courtesy, these vessels had proceeded to
Stokes Bay in the night, and had taken soundings there ?
Also, whether he knew that these vessels had more than the
usual complement of officers?"* The reply, of course, was
that they were employed in the performance of their duty, in
looking after the French fishermen.
Before we come to the proposal for a sudden and large
increase of the Navy, on the plea^that the Government had
discovered, in the summer of 1858, that the French were
making extraordinary progress in their naval armaments, it
will be well to recur for a moment to the tables in the first
page. The following is an extract of the number of men, the
amount of wages in dockyards, and the total expenditure for
the Navy in England and France, for the year 1858 : —

Seamen.

Wages, etc., Total
Dockyards. Expenditure.

£ £
England . . 55,883 991,592 10,029,047 1858
France . . . 29,602 640,954 5,337,060 1858
It will be seen, that our total expenditure amounted to nearly
double that of France ; but, owing to the difference in the
modes of keeping the accounts in the two countries, as already
explained, this is not a fair mode of comparison. The amount
expended for wages in dockyards is a better test ; and under
this head, the English expenditure is fifty per cent, more than
that of France. But the truest standard of comparison is the
number of seamen, in which we had nearly double the French
force. If we cast our eye back over the French tables, we

* Hansard, clii. p. 771.

54 THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC III.
shall find that the number of men maintained in 1847, the last
year of the reign of Louis Philippe, amounted to 32,169, or
2,567 more than in 1858. The average number of the French
Navy for the last ten years of Louis Philippe's reign, was
31,335, or 1,733 more than in 1858. It will be seen, also, that
the number of ships in commission, in the latter years of the
monarchy, exceeded those of 1858. On the other hand, looking
back over the British accounts, we shall find no year, previous
to the Crimean war, in which our seamen approached within
10,000 of the number voted for 1858. And, more important
than all, it will be seen that during the whole preceding period
of twenty-three years, the number of our seamen had never
been so much in excess of those of France as in 1858.
The above statement is more than confirmed by an official
document, which was in the hands of the " First Lord," when
he brought forward his Estimates, but which was not laid on
the table of the House until the following April. It is entitled)
" Report of a Committee, appointed by the Treasury, to enquire
into the Navy Estimates, from 1852 to 1858, and into the
Comparative State of the Navies of England and France." In
this document, it is said, that, " France founds her calculations
upon a return to her peace establishment of 1852 ; the number
of her ships in commission for 1859 being 152 against 175
in the year 1852 ; and the number of seamen afloat being 25,784,
against 25,016, in 1852." This gives an increase of 768 men. The
Report then proceeds to give a corresponding comparison of the
British Navy : — " Our position is very different. On the 1st of
December, 1858, our ships in commission, and their comple
ments, as compared with 1852, were as follows : —
Ships. Guns. Seamen.
1st December, 1858 267 4649 47,953
1st December, 1852 203 3584 36,372

Increase. 64 1065 11,581
This number is exclusive of a further increase of 3,302
marines on shore, including 1,800 employed on shore in China ;
also of 3,880 seamen, employed in the coast-guard on shore ;
making a total increase, in 1858, as compared with 1852, of

1859.] THE THREE PANICS. 55
18,763 seamen and marines."* Thus, it appears from our own
official Report, that whilst France had added to her force, afloat,
in six years, 768 men, we had added to ours, afloat and on shore,
18,763 ; and that whilst, on the 1st December, 1858, the navy
of England numbered 55,135 men, that of France, afloat, con
tained only 25,784, or considerably less than one-half. When
viewed by the light of these facts, the tone of excitement and
alarm which pervades the following statement becomes simply
incomprehensible. On the 25th February, 1859, the Navy Estimates were
brought forward by the First Lord of the Admiralty (Sir John
Pakington), who asked for an addition of £1,200,000 for ship
building, and proposed a vote of 62,400 men and boys, being
the largest number ever maintained in a time of peace. He
stated, that when he succeeded to office, he " did not find the
navy of this country in a proper and adequate state for the
defence of our coasts, and the protection of our commerce " ; he
invited the House to " aid him in his attempt to restore the
naval supremacy of England " ; spoke of our having " fallen to
the lowest amount ever known in our history — an amount not
exceeding that of a neighbouring power, (!) without anything
like the same demand upon its force " ; f he pleaded " the present
aspect of public affairs" in justification of his proposal, alleging
that, " the Government would not have done their duty to the
country, if they had not boldly asked for the increase of
force."J But, not confining himself to these generalities, he stated
that during the summer the Government had thought it their
duty to ascertain the state of the French navy. They had
heard much of the progress made by France in increasing her
naval armament during the last few years, and having taken
means for ascertaining the facts, they had found that the line-
of-battle ships in France were exactly the same in number as
our own, namely twenty-nine. He calculated that, at the pro
gress then making, France would, at the end of the year 1859,
have forty§ line-of-battle ships, and England only thirty-six.
* Parliamentary Paper. No. 182. 1859, p. 22.
t Hansard, clii. p. 882—912. X Hansard, ib.
§ On the 11th April, 1861, more than two years later, we shall find
Lord Clarence Paget, then Secretary of the Admiralty, stating in the

56 THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC III.
When this was brought under his notice in July, he consulted his
colleagues, and they determined that it " was a state of things
which could not be allowed to continue " ; and they resolved
immediately to withdraw sufficient workmen from other occu
pations to convert four sailing line-of-battle ships into screws,
and he now proposed to the House that five additional liners
should be forthwith converted.* At the same time, he entered
into a similar statement respecting frigates, in which he was
sorry to say that our position was, in comparison, still more
unsatisfactory ; and that in the course of the autumn, he had
found that whilst we were in possession of thirty-four of these
vessels, France had forty-six. f
Now, it was not this statement in itself — incomplete and in
accurate as it will be shown to be — so much as the manner of
making it, which tended to produce the subsequent alarm and
panic. A tone of mysterious revelation pervaded the speech,
the effect of which was heightened by repeated protestations
of frankness ; whilst a portentous significance was imparted to
the proposed naval augmentations by such assertions as, that " it
was inconsistent with our naval power, and with our national
safety and dignity, that we should allow such a state of things
to continue/'J and still more by the solemn adjurations
which followed, invoking the Anglo-French alliance, " for the
sake of England and for the sake of the world." And yet, in
fact, there was no secret to reveal, for the French Govern
ment had, in 1857, published to the whole world the programme
of its future naval constructions for a period of thirteen years,
founded on the report of a commission appointed in 1855.
" The ' First Lord ' and his coadjutors," says the author of a
volume containing much valuable information, when commenting
on this speech, " had only discovered six months previously
what was long before patent enough to anyone who had taken
the trouble to investigate the subject."^ The House of Com
mons, however, offered no opposition when the " First Lord "

House that France had only thirty-seven screw line-of-battle ships built
and building. — Hansard, clxii. 442.
* Hansard, clii. 882-912. t Hansard, clii. 908. % Hansard, ib. 906.
§ " The Navies of the World}' by Hans Busk, p. 85.

I859-] THE THREE PANICS. 57
finally announced his intention to add twenty-six men-of-war
to the navy in one year.*
This speech furnished arguments for the following twelve
months to those who were employed in exciting the invasion
panic. The statement which was most frequently quoted, and
became the favourite text for the alarmists, was that which
placed England and France on an equality of twenty-nine
line-of-battle ships each. This was arrived at by a departure
from the invariable mode of comparison, by which the ships
built and building are taken into account. On referring back
to the comparative numbers of these vessels given by Sir Charles
Wood on the 18th May, 1857, it will be seen, that he states the
English at forty-two, and the French at forty, f They are now
reduced to twenty-nine each, by taking only the numbers actually
completed at the moment. Had the comparison been made in
the usual manner, it would have stood as follows, according to
the Parliamentary paper in the "First Lord's" handsj :—
Line-of-Battle Ships built and building, December, 1858.
English. French.
Complete, hull and machinery . . 29 29
Receiving engines  4 2
Converting  7 4
Building  10 5
Total  50 40
Adding the nine coast-guard blockships to the English coliunn,
it gives fifty-nine, to forty French.
The total omission of the coast-guard vessels from the " First
Lord's " numerical statement of the line-of-battle ships and
frigates possessed by the two countries calls for a few words of
remark. It has been already shown that nine line-of-battle
ships have been set apart for the protection of our arse*
nals and harbours. They mount, in the aggregate, about
600 guns, each vessel being " armed with 8-inch shell guns

* Hansard, clii. 942. t Ante, p. 44.
X Parliamentary Paper, 182, 1859, p. 15.

58 THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC III.
and 32-pounders, together with two 68-pounders and four 10-
inch shell guns."*
These vessels are assigned to particular stations on the coast,
though occasionally a paragraph in the newspapers informs us
that they are mustered as a squadron in the Channel.t But
wherever they may be, it will be found, on turning over the
pages of the Navy List, and referring to the " Majestic,"
" Blenheim," " Cornwallis," etc., that these block-ships carry
their full complement of captain, lieutenants, chaplain, staff
surgeon, paymasters, engineers, etc. ; and we are told that
crews of picked seamen, the veterans of the fleet, are provided
for them. Yet these vessels, with their satellite fleet of gun^
boats, are left altogether out of the numerical comparison of
the English and French navies ; they are not counted as line-of-
battle ships, or even thrown into the scale to weigh against our
neighbour's paddle frigates !
Now, if it could be shown that these ships are worthless, as
some of our officials would seem to imply, what must be thought
of the wisdom of those who incur from year to year all the
current expenses of officering, manning, and arming in the
most efficient manner, vessels which are afterwards to count for
nothing ! The French form a very different estimate of the
value of our coast-guard fleet, as the following extract from a

* Paper read at th'e Society of Arts, by Mr. E. J. Heed, late of H. M.'s .
Dockyard, Portsmouth, 15th Dec, 1858, p. 15.
t The Blockships. — Commodore Yelverton's fleet of coastguard block-
ships, consisting of the Majestic, 80, Capt. Mends, C. B. ; Blenheim, 6ft
Capt. Tatham ; Cornwallis, 60, Capt. B&ndolph ; Edinburgh, 60, Capt.
D'Eyncpurt ; Hawke, 60, Capt. Crispin ; Hogue, 60, Capt. Macdonald j
Russell, 60, Capt Wodehouse ; Ajax, 60, Capt. Boyd ; and the screw steam-
frigate Dauntless, 34, Capt. Heath, C.B., after being duly inspected, as pre
viously announced, by Admiral Eden and Capt. Frederick, two of the
Lords of the Admiralty, left Portland harbour on Wednesday and Thurs
day for their respective stations. The Colossus, 80, Capt. Scott, C.B., still
bearing the flag of Commodore Yelverton, remains at anchor in that har
bour, but is expected to leave for the Isle of Wight in a day or two. The
Biter gunboat, tender to the Colossus, is also at Portland. — Times.
The Channel fleet of blockships were observed at Plymouth at noon on
Sunday, approaching from the eastward. At five p.m. they were near the
Eddystone, going down Channel under three foresails, jib, and spanker.
Wind, north-west. Eleven ships in all ; ono a frigate.— Herald.

1859.] THE THREE PANICS. 59
work published under the sanction of their Government will
show* : —
" The service of the coast-guard is placed under the general
direction of a Commodore of the first class, having the ' Pem
broke' for his flag-ship. It includes seventy-three vessels,
twenty-seven of which are steamers, and forty-six sailing
vessels. All the coast has been divided into eleven districts,
each commanded by a captain, having under his orders a cer
tain number of officers ; — this staff amounts altogether to more
than 250 officers of all grades. Nine ships-of-the-line and two
frigates watch the eleven districts. With the exception of one,
all these vessels are mixed, that is, old sailing vessels, having
had machinery adapted to them ; their armaments and masts
have been reduced, so aa to diminish their draft, and render
them more manageable. The ships-of-the-line have sixty guns,.
the frigates fifty. Sixteen steam gun-boats and forty-seven
vessels of light draft have been distributed between the eleven
districts. It is quite a fleet, destined to a special service, and
on board of which the manoeuvres and the gun practice take
place as regularly as on board of other vessels of war. The
blockships offer to England, for the defence of her harbours
and dockyards, means of defence which are entirely wanting
in France."
It was by the total omission of this powerful fleet, in the
enumeration of the forces of the two countries, that the state
ment of the First Lord startled the country, and furnished the
" cry " to the alarmists — the echo of which has hardly yet died
away — that France was our equal in line-of-battle ships, and
was aiming at the supremacy of the seas.
The comparison of the number of frigates possessed by the
two countries was hardly less fallacious than that of the ships
of the line. In stating that England possessed fewer of these
vessels than France, the faintest possible allusion was made to
the immense superiority in tonnage and horse-power of the
majority of our frigates ; whilst the numerical comparison alone
reached the eye of the general public. The French Navy List

* " The Army and Navy Budgets of France and England," by M.
COCHEVAL CliARIGNY, p. 67.

60 THK THREE PANICS. [VAS1V UI.
oontains fifteen vessels classed as paddle-frigates, whiolx were
built nearly twenty years ago for tho transatlantic packet ser
vice, and on the failure of that enterprise were transferred to
the Government navy in 1844-5.* Tho very age of these
vessels renders it unnecessary to speak of their quality. They
carry sixteen guns, and, for oonrparison, they are put on an
equality with our screw frigates of forty or fifty guns, somo of
which are of a larger tonnage than tho lino-of-hattle sliips of
half a century ago ! And whilst these antique tubs are thus
paraded to the terror of Englishmen, no oredit is taken for our
own splendid packet ships, whioh would be available, in case of
omergenoy, in a few weeks, and some of which, as the Persia,
for example, are more than double tho tonnage, and of for
greater speed, than these converted " frigates " of the Frenoh
navy. But tho gravest fallacy in the First Lord's statement has
still to be noticed. Why was the comparison restricted to ships
of the line and frigates P The old nomenclature no longer
servos for an aoourate definition of the strength of sliips of
war. Wo had at the time fourteen vessels oolled soiw-oor-
vettes, of from 20 to 22 guns each, in our Navy list, for mora
powerful than the above 16-gun frigates, whilst the Frenoh had
only two of this olass ; and wo had a dozen screw-sloops, of
from 12 to 17 guns, of whioh the French had none ; but theso
vessels were wholly kept out of view. Had the comparison
been extended to all steam vessels, wo should have shown mi
overwhelming superiority in these smaller ships, whioh wove
tho pride of the Spithead Review, and had extorted so many
eulogies from professional men. The " First Lord" didnot omit
to offer a passing oompliment to this portion of our navy ; but
ho found no plaoe for it in his numerical comparison of tho
forces of the two nations, and it was this ntunerioal comparison
whioh was seized upon to promote the panic out of doors. Tho

* "Frauoo had, about the close of 1844, grafted into thoir navy twenty
or twenty-two ships, varying from 1600 to 1700 tons, and about 400 horao
power. Those ships had been built for Transatlantic paokets."— Hvidmw
of Sir Thomas Hastings before Committee on " Army, Navy, and Ordfumos,"
1848, Qu. 9707.

1859.] THE THREE PANICS. 61
following figures, taken from the Parliamentary Paper* to which
attention has been already called, will show what the com
parison would have been if it had embraced the smaller vessels :
— England had eighty-two corvettes and sloops, and France
twenty-two : England had 162 gunboats, and France twenty-
eight. If, after comparing the line-of-battle ships and
frigates, there had been a comparison of the whole of the other
steam vessels, the result would have been 380 English and 174
French. The fact of our having built so many more small vessels than
the French will partly, but not wholly, account for our not
possessing a larger proportion of screw line-of-battle ships.
England had, for a long series of years, been spending, at the
very least, fifty per cent, more on the effective of her navy than
France, and this ought to be a sufficient answer to the assertion
that France had been aiming at an equality with us at sea.
We build ships, construct steam-engines and machinery, and
obtain coals and other stores twenty or thirty per cent, cheaper
than our neighbours, and we ought, therefore, to secure a
proportionately larger return for our outlay, f But these ad
vantages are more than counterbalanced by the superior manage
ment of the naval department in France, by which they are enabled
to avoid the waste of money which is always going on in this
country upon unnecessary and useless constructions. This will be
illustrated by a brief examination of the valuable parliamentary
document to which reference has already been repeatedly
made. It was stated to the House by the First Lord of the Ad
miralty, that a Confidential Committee had been appointed in
the winter of 1858, by Lord Derby's Government, to inquire
into the comparative state of the navies of England and France.
The Report of this Committee, dated January 6th, 1859, and

* Parliamentary Paper, 182, 1859.
f The late Mr. Sidney Herbert, who had been three years Secretary to
the Admiralty, in his evidence before the Select Committee on the Navy,
in 1848, said, "I should never dream of instituting a comparison between
our expenditure and that of France ; because their expenditure is so
lavish, and the result for the money spent so very small, that you cannot
institute a comparison between them."— Q. 10126.

62

THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC III.

intended, originally, for the eye of the Ministry only, was laid
on the table of the House on the 3rd April following. The
inquiry extended from 1852 to 1858. The reader may be
reminded that Lord Derby's Administration was succeeded by
that of Lord Aberdeen in the autumn of 1852 ; and that on the
fall of Lord Palmerston's ministry, in February, 1858, the
Conservative Chief again returned to power. The Report
embraces this interval, and is, therefore, an inquiry instituted
by one body of politicians, into the management of the navy
during nearly six years by their opponents ; and it would not
imply any great ignorance of the inner play of party, to
suppose that, under such circumstances, we might find some
hints or disclosures, which would not be met with in a Report
of one of the ordinary Commissions appointed by a Government
to inquire into its own conduct. It is difficult to believe, that,
if this document had been in the hands of members of Parlia-
ment before the " First Lord " had made his statement on the
25th February, they would have allowed their attention to be
diverted across the Channel to the aots of a neighbouring
government, instead of being directed towards their naval
administration at home.
Shortly previous to 1852, the English and French Govern
ments had been, brought to the conviction that sailing ships of
the line could no longer be depended on for purposes of war ;
and after the experience of the Crimean campaign, they ceased
to be taken, into account in a comparison of the forces of the
two countries. From 1852, to 1858, was, therefore, a period of
transition, from a sailing to a steam fleet. In 1852, England
had 73 sailing-vessels of the line ; and France, 45.* In 1859,
the country was startled with the " First Lord's " statement,
that France had 29 screw liners, whilst England possessed only
the same number. How did this arise ? The Report, after giving
a mass of most valuable facts and statistics, goes straight to the
point, and states, that, "the large increase of the French
steam navy, since 1852, in line-of-battle ships and frigates, has
been effected mainly by the conversion of sailing ships " ; that
" the number of men required to convert a three-decker into a
90-gun steam-ship is stated to be five-eighths of the number
* Parliamentary Paper. No. 182. 1859. p. 18.

1859.] THE THREE PANICS. 63
required to build a new 90-gun steam-ship. The chief differ
ence in the cost of conversion arises from the saving in materials.
The cost of converting a line-of-battle ship of 90 guns, is esti
mated at £25,000, and the cost of building the same, at
£105,000 ; but the latter will, of course, be a far more efficient
and durable vessel " ; that, " the process of conversion, on the
other hand, is speedy as compared with that of building. The
present seems a state of transition, as regards naval architecture,
inducing the French Government to suspend the laying down
of new ships of the line altogether, and it is more especially so
with respect to artillery."* The Report states, that, " no line-
of-battle ship has been laid down since 1855, in France, and there has
not been a single three-decker on the stocks since that year " ; and
that of the forty- five sailing vessels, which France possessed in
1852, and of which ten remained in 1858, there were two only
which were not " too old to be converted."-!-
In the mean time, England had pursued the double process
of building new, and converting old ships of the line. Between
1852, and 1858, we launched twenty-three liners. " Of the
line-of-battle ships now building in the English dockyards,"
says the Report, " one was laid down in 1855, two in 1856, one
in 1857, and four in 1858." % At the time when these last
four were laid down, we had thirty-five sailing-ships of the line
afloat, of which nineteen are reported by the Surveyor of the
Navy to be convertible into screw liners or frigates ; he states,
also, that we possessed seventy sailing frigates, of which twenty-
seven were convertible.§
Now, inasmuch as the fitting of steam-engines into existing
sailing-ships is a much cheaper and more expeditious process
than the building of new ones, and leaving sailing vessels to
rot in ordinary, it was only natural that the conversion of a
sailing into a steam fleet should proceed more rapidly in the
French than in the English dockyards. The obvious remedy was
to follow the thrifty example of our neighbours ; and this was
the recommendation of the Report, which, in language sufficiently
intelligible, contrived, at the same time, to convey a censure on
the conduct of the previous administration : — " We, therefore,
venture to suggest, for your Lordships' consideration, whether,

Parliamentary Paper, p. 21. t Ibid, p. 19. X Ibid, p. 19. § Ibid, p. 20.

64

THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC HI,

if the force in the dockyards were to be used next year in the
conversion of ships of the line and frigates, as far as the
available dock accommodation will admit, the most useful
results might not be attained at a comparatively small expen-
diture."* We have seen, that, in conformity with this Report, the " First
Lord" announced to the House his intention to convert nine
sailing line-of-battle ships into screw steamers, and he reserved
other four for the next year. If this had been done, as it
should have been, at the time when the French were similarly
employed, and if the nine Coast-guard vessels had been taken
into account, where would have been the pretext for a panic ?
But, it is hardly reasonable to hold the French Government
responsible for a state of things which arose out of the mal
administration of our own affairs, and which the Minister of
Marine could have no power of remedying, except by lowering
his management to the level of that of our Admiralty.
In order to illustrate the foregoing statement, the following
figures are extracted from this Report.
As it has been the custom to estimate the strength of a navy
by the number of its line-of-battle ships, it will be well, in the
first place, to give the particulars of this class of vessels.
Comparative Numbers of English and French Line-of-battle Ships,
in the Tears 1852 and 1858.f
1852. English.
Sailing Yessels ....... 73
Steam Yessels, afloat and building . . .17
Block Ships ....... 4
Total  94
French.
Sailing Yessels ....... 45
Steam Yessels, afloat and building ... 6
Total  51

Parliamentary Paper, 182, 1859, p. 21,
f Ibid, pp. 17—19.

1859.]

THE THREE PANICS.

65

1858.

Sailing Yessels .
Steamers Complete
„ Receiving Engines,

29) H

English.
. 35

,, Building
„ Converting .
Block Ships

,1;

. 50
. 9

Total .

•

. 94

Sailing Yessels .

French.
. 10

Steamers Complete . . 29
„ Receiving Engines, 2 1
„ Building . . 5 1
„ Converting . . 4
Total .

40

. 50

It will be seen, by comparison, that, instead of our having
lost ground in ships of the line in six years, the total number
of French vessels, sailing and steam, bore a smaller proportion
by one to the English, in 1858, than in 1852. As an illustra
tion of the economical example which the Minister of Marine
had given to our Admiralty, by the conversion of sailing-ships
into steamers, it will be observed, that whilst France had reduced
the number of her sailing vessels from forty-five to ten, or
more than three-fourths, England had only diminished hers
from seventy-three to thirty-five, or little more than one-half.
It should be always borne in view, that we are not discussing
the process of creating a navy, but of substituting one kind of
ship for another. The following list of the numbers of line-of-
battle ships possessed by the two countries at various epochs is
interesting, as showing the number of sailing vessels formerly
maintained by France. It appears that the French force, as
measured by this class of vessels, has generally been equal to
rather more than the half of our own ; and this seems to have
been tacitly accepted by the two countries as a fair propor
tion for nearly a century, with the exception of that period of

66

THE THREE PANICS.

[PANIC III,

humiliation for France, which immediately succeeded the resto
ration of the Bourbons.

Numbers of Line-of-Battle Ships in the English and French Navies

at the foUowing Dates : —

British.

French

1778

. 126

68

1794

. 145

77

1830

. 106

53

1840

. 89

44

1850

. 86

45

1858

. 94

50

The totals of the steamers of all sizes in the two navies were
as follows in the years 1852 and 1858 : —
1852 British Steamers of all sizes . 176
1858 „ „ . 464

British Increase .

. 288

1852 French Steamers of all sizes

. 122

1858

. 264

French Increase

142

Thus, whilst in six years, the French added 142 steamers of
all kinds to their navy, we added more than double the number
to ours.
The following are the totals of both steamers and sailing
vessels of all sizes in the two navies at the same dates : —

1852 British Steamers of all sizes
„ „ Sailing vessels, ditto
Total .
1858 British Steamers of all sizes
„ „ Sailing vessels, ditto

Total .
British Increase

176
299475 464
296 760
285

1^590 THE THREE PANICS. 67
1852 French Steamers of all sizes . 122

Sailing vessels, ditto
Total .
1858 French Steamers of all sizes
» » Sailing vessels, ditto
Total .
French Increase .

258
380
264 144
408 28

It is very instructive to observe the above numbers of sailing
vessels in the two countries at both periods. In 1852, England
possessed 299 of these vessels, which were reduced to 296 in
1858, being a diminution of three only: France possessed
258 sailing vessels in 1852, which were reduced to 144 in
1858, being a diminution of 114. These figures show that
whilst France was engaged in converting her sailing vessels
into steamers, England continued the processes of building and
converting;, the consequence was that we had as many sailing
vessels within 3 in 1858, as in 1852 ; and whilst France had
increased the total number of her vessels, of all kinds, by 28
only, England had augmented hers by 285. That these
figures* prove an enormous amount of misapplied capital and
labour in our dockyards, and place us, in point of management,
in humiliating contrast with our neighbour, there can be no
doubt. Sir Charles Wood, the preceding "First Lord," felt probably
that some of Sir John Pakington's statements glanced obliquely
upon him, and on the 6th April, he entered at length upon a
vindication of his management. It is interesting to find him,
in opposition, not only gathering up all the elements of our
naval strength, including block-ships and gun-boats, which had
been overlooked, when the Estimates were brought forward in
1857, but disputing the pretensions of our neighbours, who
had received such flattering eulogies on that occasion. "I
would, however," said he, f " remind the House that they must

* They have been wholly taken from the Report. Parliamentary Paper
No. 182. 1859. t Hansard, cliii. p. 1462.
f2

68

THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC III.

not suppose that all the French ships are as fine sea-going
ships as our new line-of-battle ships. There is one of them, I
know, the Montebello, which has only 140 horse-power ; while
the weakest of our block-ships* has 200 horse-power. I say,
that for the defence of our coasts, at least, these block-ships are
good and efficient, and as available for that service, as many of
the French ships of the line are for attack. In considering our
means of defence, I must, however, be allowed to take into
account the numerous vessels of a smaller class, which we
possessed, and which, as the noble member for Sandwich (Lord
Clarence Paget) said, no line-of-battle ships could resist."
Here was an excellent case established against any addi
tional armaments : but as the speaker gave a ready approval
to the proposed increase of the Estimates, his argument was
only calculated to inspire the public mind with still greater
mistrust. The better to understand the state of feeling in 1859, it is
necessary to recur to the events which were then passing
around us. Hostilities had commenced between France and
Austria. The operations of the French army in Italy were
watched with no friendly eye by the upper and conservative
classes of this country, whose sympathies were generally on the
side of Austria. On the contrary, with the mass of the people,
the government of Yienna was supremely unpopular, whilst
a universal enthusiasm prevailed in favour of Italian inde
pendence. And although, undoubtedly, some mistrust was

* There is something almost dramatic in the transformation of opinion
which is sometimes produced by the removal from the official to the
opposition benches, and vice versa. On the 18th May, 1857, Sir Charles
Wood, the First Lord, in bringing forward the Navy Estimates, stated that
France had forty and England forty-two screw-liners. On the 12th April,
1858, Sir John Pakington, who had just succeeded to the office of First
Lord, alluding to this statement of his predecessor, said — " it was not fair
to exclude the block-ships, as you must do when you say that you have
only two line-of-battle ships more than the French." On the 25th
February, 1859, Sir John Pakington, in moving his Navy Estimates, stated
that France had twenty-nine, and England had twenty-nine screw line-of-
battle ships, totally omitting the block-ships. On the 6th April following,
Sir Charles Wood, then in opposition, reminded the First Lord of this
omission, and contended that the block-ships were good and efficient for
the defence of the coast.

185#.J THE THREE PANICS. 69
entertained towards the absolute Ruler of France, in his new
character of champion of the nationalities, still, for the sake of
Italy, the popular sympathy followed the march of the French
armies. At the same time, a suspicion arose (the despatches of
Lord Malmesbury had not been published) that our Conser
vative government were pledging us to the side of the
Austrians ; and hence was witnessed the strange spectacle, for
England, of public meetings called to proclaim the principle of
non-intervention, — which, truly interpreted, meant a protest
against the interference of our Government on the wrong
side. This explanation may help to account for the fact, that the
loudest notes of alarm and hostility against France resounded
from that usually serene and impassive body, the House of
Lords. They did not avowedly espouse or defend the cause of
Austria ; public opinion was too strong in the opposite
direction. But to proclaim the danger of an invasion of
England, and thus rouse the hostile passions of the country
against the French Emperor, operated, to some extent, as a
diversion in favour of his antagonist ; and he is said, by those
who were in a position to be well-informed on the subject, to have
been so far influenced by the hostile attitude manifested in high
quarters in this country, that it operated, among other causes,
disadvantageously to the Italian cause, in bringing the cam
paign to a precipitate close. The most inveterate alarmist
might have rested satisfied, that, as the Emperor had allowed us
to escape two years before, when we were involved in our
Indian difficulty, he would not seek a rupture just at the
moment when his own hands were so fully occupied in Italy.
He knew that a war with England meant a campaign on the
Rhine, as well as the Mincio, with British subsidies to Austria
and Germany, and a naval war extending to every sea. Yet
this was the fate to which, in the eyes of panic-struck peers, he
was rushing, impelled — in the absence of every rational motive
—by his destiny !
On the first of July, the Volunteer Corps and the Navy
Estimates became the subjects of discussion in the Upper House.
So much did the debate turn upon the question of invasion, that
at the first glance, it might be concluded we were not only at
war with our next neighbour, but at the very crisis of a long

70 THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC III.
struggle. Lord EUenborough called for seventy line-of-battle
ships, but declared that no increase of the Navy could, under
present circumstances, protect us against invasion ; that, for
" six months in the year, an enemy may land 60,000 to 80,000
men on any beach on the south coast of England " ; and with
his wonted proneness to strategy, he called for forts to protect
" all the ports, and all the roads in which it would be possible
for an enemy to place a fleet, with any degree of security ; and
where he might form tetes-de-pont that would assist his future
operations " ; and he particularly pointed to Portland, " that
port which the late French ambassador went down to recon
noitre, and which he took the trouble of visiting at the end of
last summer in order to see the particular advantages it
possessed. He trusted that whenever that respectable gentle
man went to that port again, he would find it in a better
position than when he saw it last."*
Lord Howden, who said "he resided in France, and his
social relations were chiefly in that country," declared that the
entire population of that empire were eager for the invasion of
England, regardless of the consequences : —
" He did not believe that the idea of conquering this country
had ever entered into the head of any sane Frenchman, any
more than any sane Englishman had ever entertained the
notion that we should allow ourselves to be conquered by
France. He felt assured that no Frenchman had ever dreamt
of taking possession of this island ; but he felt almost equally
certain that every Frenchman living dreamt both by day and
by night of humiliating this country, and robbing her of the
position which she alone maintained among the nations of
Europe, that of possessing an inviolate soil. Thousands of per
sons in England scouted the very thought of an invasion. They
asked, ' What is the use of it ? — it could have no permanent
result.' The people of France were aware that it could not ;
but then they did not adopt the same mode of reasoning on the
subject. A forlorn hope might enter some miserable village,'
inhabited by six fishermen and a ploughboy ; a bulletin might be
signed on British soil, proclaiming the glorious triumph of French
arms ; the French eagles might stream from every steeple from

Hansard, cliv. 532.

1859.] THE THREE PANICS. 71
Acton to Ealing, and from Ealing to Harrow — the very pros
pect was enough to throw every Frenchman into a transport of
joy, and that, too, although he might be perfectly aware that
not a single one of his countrymen would return home to tell
the tale." He declared that a war against England would
unite in one body, Republicans, Imperialists, Orleanists, and
Legitimists, and in conclusion said : — " Such a war was the
only one which would ever be universally popular in France,
and, however recklesa the attempt to invade England might be
— however devoid of all rational hope of success — there was
not a single widow in France who would not give her last son;
or a single beggar who would not give his last penny to carry
out such a project."* Lord Brougham controverted this view,
and said he believed, on the contrary, that no act of the French
Government could excite greater indignation among all classes
of the French people than a quarrel with England. But he,
too, called for increased preparations by land and sea.f Lord
Hardwicke, with natural professional gallantry, would not listen
to the plan of land defences, or tolerate the idea of an invasion ;
he was for carrying the war to the enemy's coasts : — " He held
that it was the duty of the Government to render the navy of
England sufficiently powerful not only to maintain the British
Channel as the British Channel, but to. enable us to insist that
the boundaries of this country in that direction should be the
low- water mark on the French shore." J
But the great speech of the session on this subject, and which
for a fortnight fluttered the fashionable world and agitated the
clubs, has yet to be noticed. On the 5th July, Lord Lyndhurst
brought forward the subject of the national defences. He began
his argument by repeating the statement of the First Lord of
the Admiralty, that " France exceeded us the year before in a
small proportion in line-of-battle ships, but she exceeded us in
an enormous proportion in steam frigates." Without one word
of reference to the coast-guard fleet or floating batteries, or the
small vessels, in which our superiority could be reckoned by
hundreds, and which, as the naval authorities only two years
before declared, rendered a landing on our shores impossible, or
the scores of large ocean steamers in the employ of private
* Hansard, cliv. 517. t Hansard, ib., 524,
X Hansard, ib., 528.

72 THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC III,
companies, he brings the two " fleets " into combat in the
Channel, and argues, in case of defeat, that we have no reserve
to prevent an immense military force from being landed on our
shores. The "fleets" are brought also into collision in the
Mediterranean and elsewhere ; but no allusion is made to the
existence of any other than ships-of-the-line and frigates. He
cites Lord Palmerston's " very emphatic words, that steam has
converted the Channel into a river, and thrown a bridge across
it" ; and he argues that " a large army may within a few hours
— in the course of a single night — be landed on any part of our
shores." "I know," said he, " from information which I have
received, and the accuracy of which I do not doubt, that the
French are at the present moment building steamers for the
purpose of transporting troops, each of which is constructed to
carry 2,500 men, with all the necessary stores. This, therefore,
is the description of force which you must prepare yourselves
to meet." He called for an establishment of 100,000 troops
and embodied militia, and the same number of disembodied and
trained militia, " in order to be prepared for any emergency
which may arise." He avowed that he felt something like a
sentiment of humiliation in going through these details. "I
recollect," said he, " the day when every part of the opposite
coast was blockaded by an English fleet. I remember the vic
tory of Camperdown, and that of St. Yincent, won by Sir John
Jervis ; I do not forget the great victory of the Nile, nor, last
of all, that triumphant fight at Trafalgar, which almost annihi
lated the navies of France and Spain. I contrast the position
which we occupied at that period with that which we now hold.
I recollect the expulsion of the French from Egypt; the
achievement of victory after victory in Spain ; the British army
established in the south of France ; and, last of all, that great
victory by which that war was terminated." Interspersed with
these irritating reminiscences were such remarks, as— "I will
not consent to live in dependence on the friendship or forbear
ance of any country ;" "are we to sit supine on our own shores,
and not prepare the means necessary in case of war to resist
that power ?"*-remarks which, considering our overwhelming
naval superiority at the time, can be compared only to the act
of brandishing a weapon in the face of a friendly neighbour.
* Hansard, cliv. 617 — 27.

1859.] THE THREE PANICS. 73
Fully to comprehend the scope and temper of these utterances,
which were received by the assembled peers with a rapturous
welcome, it is necessary to consider for a moment the circum
stances under which the speech was delivered. The speaker
represented more than any other peer the legal and constitu
tional character of the Upper House. His judicial mind and
great age tended naturally to impart a tone of moderation and
caution to his observations, and he was commenting on the
policy of a nation with whom we were at peace, and from
whose Sovereign our Government had received numerous proofs
of friendship. Nor must the circumstances in which the two
countries were at the moment placed be overlooked. France
had hardly emerged from a war for an object in which the
British nation had long felt the deepest sympathy, and for
the outbreak of which the statesmen of both our political
parties held Austria responsible, and she had incurred an ex
haustive sacrifice of life and treasure which contributed, with
other considerations, to bring the struggle to an early and un
expected close. At the same time, our own naval preparations
were on a scale of unparalleled magnitude for a time of peace.
Taking the average of the years 1858-9, it will be seen, on
reference to the accounts in the first page, that the number of
our seamen was more than double that of the French navy — a
disproportion quite unexampled during the last thirty years.
It was under these circumstances, and when not an act or word
on the part of the French Government indicated a hostile dis
position, that the foremost man in the highest assembly of
Englishmen delivered, amidst enthusiastic plaudits, the speech
of which the above is a brief outline. If England had been a
weak country, threatened with invasion by a powerful enemy,
nothing could have been more calculated to stir the patriotism
of its inhabitants than to remind them of the exploits of their
fathers ; but to declaim of Trafalgar and the Nile, to taunt with
their reverses a brave people who were no longer our enemies
but our friends, was more derogatory to ourselves than to the
object of those taunts. It must be acknowledged, that the dig
nified calmness with which such gratuitous insults as these
have for many years been borne, bespeaks the possession of a
large share of self-command on the part of our neighbours.
From the remarks which fell from other peers, it might have

74 THE THREE PANIC'S. [PANIC III,
been supposed that England was at the time completely dis
armed. Forgetting our 464 steamers, our 62,400 seamen, the
Militia Act of 1852, and the "very little short of 200,000
fighting men which, in the event of war, we could put into the
field,"* Lord EUenborough exclaimed — " My Lords, it is not
safe for this country to remain unarmed in the midst of armed
nations. When, of two neighbouring nations who have ever
been rivals, and have often been engaged in desperate hostilities
against each other, one determines to apply all her energies to
making money, and the other to making preparations for war,
it is obvious enough with which of the two nations all the
money must ultimately remain. "f
And Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, after expressing his grati
tude to Lord Lyndhurst " for calling attention to this most im
portant and solemn question at so anxious a time as the
present," and reminding his hearers, that, " although the sup
plies necessary for taking the precautionary measures now sug
gested could not originate in that House, that, nevertheless,
those measures had first been brought under consideration
there," proceeded to remark on the unwillingness of free coun
tries to prepare for defence in anticipation of war, and declared
" that it was a just cause of shame and an intolerable humilia
tion, that a great empire like ours should appear, though it
were only for one hour, to exist by sufferance, and at the good
pleasure of a forbearing neighbour. "J
The Government was on this occasion represented by Lord
Granville, (the administration of Lord Derby having in the
previous month been displaced by that of Lord Palmerston)
who, in allusion to the tone of Lord Lyndhurst's speech, said : —
" If a feeling of hostility does exist, as he says it does, not on
the part of the Emperor Napoleon, but on the part of the
French people, I doubt that his speech will tend to allay it.
When he points out in the most marked way, the defenceless
character of our shores — when at the same time he boasts of
our former victories, and when he makes something like insinu
ating and sneering allusions both to the government and people
of France — I am afraid that, coming from such lips as his, such

Lord Palmerston, Aug. 5, 1859, Hansard, civ. 1079.
t Hansard, cliv. 645. J Hansard, ib., 627—8.

1859.] THE THREE PANICS. 75
language is not well calculated to promote the object of un
broken friendly alliance," The Duke of Somerset, who had
succeeded Sir John Pakington as First Lord of the Admiralty,
was still more plain-spoken on this point : " He greatly
regretted the exciting language which their lordships had just
heard. If such language were persevered in, it would be
necessary to have not only a peace, but a war establishment.
There was no peace whatever in the language of the noble and
learned lord (Lord Lyndhurst). That language was calculated
to excite the passions of England and France ; and he thought
it most unwise to talk as the noble and learned lord had done
of two great nations,"
It was not the speeches of individuals, however high their
rank or eminent their ability, but the constant augmentation of
our armaments, by successive Governments, which mainly
tendedto excite feelings of alarm and resentment towards France.
In this policy, the administration which had now returned to
power will be found to surpass all preceding Governments.
Parliament had reassembled, after the dissolution by Lord
Derby's Government, on the 31st May, 1859; and in the
following month Lord Palmerston's Ministry resumed office,
Just previous to the dissolution, Lord Clarence Paget had
brought forward a motion on the Dockyard Expenditure, when
he adduced a very elaborate series of figures and estimates to
prove, that during the past eleven years there had been an
unnecessary expenditure, "a deficit or a discrepancy,'' of
£5,000,000 of money in the Government yards, or equal to
twenty-two line-of-battle ships, with all complete, ready for
sea ; he spoke of an extravagance in the ship-building depart
ment, which " really appalled him ;M said he could account for
the reason why we had so little to show for such an enormous
expenditure, and that, if Ms motion were accepted, " such
statements as that of Sir John Pakington which had pro
duced such a painful sensation out of doors, namely, that
after laving out £20,000,000 on a steam navy simply for the
construction of the ships, and exclusive of the costs of their
engines and machinery, we were, both in numbers and quality,
inferior to the French in line-of-battle ships, would be im
possible." The following graphic description of the manner in
which our dockyard artificers amuse themselves might help to

76 THE THREE PANICS. [PAKIC IIL
account for some superiority in the French navy, without
implying any great merit on the part of our neighbour : —
" He did not think the House had the smallest notion of
what had been going on in our dockyards in the way of tinkering
vessels, amputating them, and performing all sorts of surgical
operations upon them. They had their heads cut off, they had
their tails cut off, they were sawn asunder, they were maltreated
in every possible way. Ships built ten years ago by Sir William
Symonds were not in fashion at the present day, and nobody
could blame the Admiralty for lengthening and altering them,
because, as originally constructed, they were not now fit to go
to sea ; but he wished to speak of the reckless alteration of new
ships. Their name was legion ; almost every ship was altered;
there was scarcely one that had not undergone some frightful
operation some time or other."
He characterised Sir John Pakington's speech on moving the
Navy Estimates, as being " the truth and nothing but the truth,
but not the whole truth" ; and he proceeded to say " that it was
a very able statement to make out his case, first to attack the
right horn gentleman who preceded him in office, and secondly,
to induce the House to grant a large sum of money to increase
our line-of-battle ships ; but he must also say that it tended to
create an alarm, which he for one did not share. The First
Lord, for example, did not tell the House of an admirable class
of vessels, in which we possessed an immense superiority over the
French — a superiority measured according to the right hon.
Member for Halifax (Sir Charles Wood) by 200 excellent small
ships. He was not going to enter into a discussion upon the
comparative merits of line-of-battle ships and gun-boats. But
if he had a large sum of money to lay out he would prefer, not
gun-boats exclusively, but certainly small vessels."*
In the course of the discussion, Mr. Lindsay said: "He
believed that £7,000,000, properly applied, would go as fax as
£10,000,000 how went in building our ships of war, and in our
naval expenditure generally."-}- And on a previous occasion it
had been stated by Mr. Bentinck that, " He had asked many of
the most eminent owners of private yards in the country the
question : ' Supposing you were to carry on your vards upon

Hansard^ cliii. 39 — 48. t Hansard cliii 72.

1859] THE THREE PANICS. 77
the system on which Her Majesty's dockyards are conducted,
what would be the result ?' and the invariable answer had been,
If we were to approach that system, with the Bank of England
at our back, we should be ruined in six months."*
On the 8th July, Lord Clarence Paget, baring in the mean
time accepted the post of Secretary of the Admiralty, intro
duced the Navy Estimates to the House in a long speech. The
independent irresponsible critic had been suddenly metamor
phosed into the Government Official. The soimd precepts
recently uttered by the naval reformer were brought so abruptly
to the test of practice that the transformation had almost a
touch of romance in it. It was as though Haroun Alraschid
had seized a malcontent in his audience-chamber, thrown the
pelisse of Grand Yizir over his shoulders, and said : — " Thou
sayest well, — Do as thou sayest." As the Secretary had only
been a few days in the department, and as the Estimates were,
with some additions, those of his predecessor, which had been
virtually passed, his speech may be fairly exempted from
criticism. It has all the candour and hopefulness which generally
characterise the first utterances of Officials before they have
occasion to apply to the House for money. He put in the fore
ground the coast-guard fleet which had been entirely ignored by
his predecessor, declaring that " he could not speak too highly
of those block-ships." He expatiated also upon our resources
in merchant-steamers aud private dockyards : —
" Why, Sir, we have got, I take it, from a return that was
moved for a few days ago, by my hon. friend the Member for
Penryn (Mr. T. G. Baring), 159 steam vessels over 1,000 tons
each, and 72 between 1,000 and 700 tons each, together 231
merchant steam vessels, most of which might be quickly
adapted to carry Armstrong guns, and thus prove a most valu
able addition to the defences of the country. There is yet
another source from which we can very largely increase our
navy at any moment with regard to ships, and that is our com
mercial yards. Here is another return, which I think will be
interesting to the Committee, according to which there are, in
addition to the shipwrights employed in the royal dockyards,
about 10,000 shipwrights in Great Britain. Now, it is an old

Hansard, cliii. 62.

/*

THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC III.

shipwright's maxim, that 1,000 shipwrights can build eight
men-of-war of 1,000 tons each in twelve months ; consequently,
10,000, which is the number that we have in the commercial
yards of this country, could build 80 corvettes of 1,000 tons
each in twelve months, or at the rate of between six and seven
per. month."*
He stated that the number of men then actually employed in
the Government dockyards was 17,690, as against 14,128 in
the beginning of March ; and he added : —
" During the past vear, we have built in tonnage of line-of-
battle ships, 10,604 tons ; in frigates, 5,851 tons ; in corvettes,
1,193 tons ; and in sloops and gun vessels 1,511 tons ; making
the total tonnage built, up to the end of the^Rst financial year,
19,159. * * * *
During the present year, supposing that our scheme is carried
out, and that no unforeseen contingency should arise, we shall
build of line-of-battle ships, 19,606 tons ; of frigates, 15,897
tons ; of corvettes, 5,130 ; and of sloops and gun-vessels, 5,651
tons ; making a total of 46,284 tons which will be built this
year, against, 19,159 tons last year."t
It may be concluded, from his reiterated declaration in favour
of small vessels, that he administered with much repugnance to
this enormous outlay on line-of-battle ships ; but he most not
be held responsible for the engagements of his predecessor.
Hitherto, the invasion agitation had been confined almost
exclusively to the Peers. With the exception of the indefati
gable Sir Charles Napier, very little had been said on the sub
ject in the House of Commons since the startling speech on the
introduction of the navy estimates. Indeed, the gallant
Admiral could not help lamenting the want of that enthusiasm
which had characterised the debates in the Upper House : " He
had derived great satisfaction from the speeches delivered in
another place by Lord Lyndhurst, Lord Hardwicke, and Lord
LTlenborough, with every word of which he perfectly agreed,
and he only wished they could hear such speeches in the House
of Commons." j His wish was speedily to be gratified. But
before coming to the occasion, it may be well to note a straw in
* Hansard, cliv. 905. t Hansard, 3>. 914. % Hansard, ib. 993.

1859.] THE THREE PANICS. 79
the wind. On the 15th July. Lord William Graham, addressing
himself to the Foreign Minister, said, "he wished to ask the
question of which he had given notice, whether the Government
had received any information respecting the formation of a large
channel Fleet at Brest, with gun-boats and means for em
barking and disembarking troops, and, if so, whether they had
demanded any explanations from the French Government
on the subject."* To which Lord John Russell replied,
that our Consul at Brest had informed him, that " there were
no extraordinary preparations going on either at Cherbourg or
Brest." That which, without offence, may be called the great panic
speech of the session — for no other epithet will so properly
describe it— has now to be noticed. On the 29th July, 1859,
Mr. Horsman brought forward his motion for raising money by
loan " for completing the necessary works of national defence
projected, or already in progress." Tho most desponding and
terror-stricken invasion theory was put forth on this occasion.
The motion assumed that all other modes of defence, whether
by fleets, armies, militia, or volunteers, were insufficient, and
proposed to borrow a sum of nioney which ultimately took the
formidable proportions of from ten to twelve millions, to be ex
pended on fortifications. The speech delivered on the occasion,
unexceptionable as a rhetorical performance, was absolutely
destitute of one fact or figure to prove the danger against which
we were called upon to arm. There were vague assertions of
" enormous preparations" and " increasing armaments," on the

part of France, and she was described in her naval preparations
to have " got ahead of us, and was making every effort to pre
serve that start," whilst, on our part, there was with the same
sweeping vagueness, said to be a " want of all plan or prepara
tion for defence on this side of the channel" : but, from the
first word to the last, the speech did not contain one syllable
respecting the comparative strength of the English and French
navies. France might at the time have had 100,000 seamen,
and 100 ships of the line in the channel, judging from the tone
of the speaker, and for any information which he imparted to
the contrary. Let it not, however, be thought, after this

Hansard, cliv. 1293.

80 THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC III.
description, that too much space is devoted to the following
extracts; for although the motion did not succeed at the
moment, it required only a twelvemonth, as we shall see, to
make the speaker the triumphant master of the situation. The
country has, in accordance with his views, been committed to a
plan of expenditure more likely to reach twenty millions than
ten, unless arrested by the good sense of the people, or by a re
curring reverse in the revenue ; and the future advocates of the
scheme may be defied to show any better grounds for the out
lay, than will be found in the splendid declamation before us : —
" The Emperor of the French," said he, " acted for the
interests of France ; it was ours to guard the safety of England,
and if he were asked, ' Why do you suspect the French Emperor
of designs of war ?' and still more, ' Why do you insult him
by suspicions of invasion ?' he should be driven to answer by a
reference to facts as notorious in France as in England — that
he apprehended war, because he saw the Emperor of the French
preparing for it; and he anticipated invasion, because an
attempted invasion must be a necessary accompaniment of the
war ; and as they saw unmistakeable proofs of preparation for
war, so also those who were not wilfully blind, must see the most
unmistakeable proofs of preparation for invasion ; and as to our
insulting him by the suspicion, he replied, that no man could be
insulted by our believing what he himself openly, publicly, and
ostentatiously told us he would probably do.
* * *
"They (the Emperor's writings) afforded the key of what
would otherwise be a mystery, and enable people to interpret
what would otherwise be unintelligible, namely, that those vast
preparations, the extension of the navy, the fortification of the
coast, the enlargement and increase in the number of transports,
and the conscription for the marine, all indicated preparation
for a gigantic enterprise, to be undertaken some day or another
against a gigantic naval Power, and that Power need not be
named."* He did not, however, confine himself to a description of these
mighty preparations, but, warming as he proceeded, and giving
a free rein to his imagination, he thus pictured a descent on our

* Hansard, civ. 688 —9.

1859.] THR TURKU PANICS. 81
shores : " That army would loavo its own ports an oxultant,
and, by anticipation, a victorious army. From tho moment it
landed on tho shores of England, it would havo to tight its way
with tho desperation of a forlorn hopo, and, within two or throo
weeks of tho landing of tho first; Zouave, cither it would ho
completely annihilated, or London would bo taken."* Having
passed a glowing eulogy on Lord liyndhurst, declaring, " that
ho esteemed it a good fortune and a privilege to havo hoard tho
speech of that veuorablo poor, whoso couragoous exposition of a
national dangor had caused so much sensation, "f ho called for
measures of immediate protection, in languago moro suited to a
Oommitioo of Publio Safety than, under tho circumstances, to
tho llouso of Commons : —
" Not a moment must bo lost in making tho country safe
against every accident; and until it was so, wo must act. as if
tho crisis were upon us. No human tongue could tell how soon
or how suddenly it might arrivo, and that it might still bo
distant, was our good fortune, of whioh wo should mako the
most. Every publio or private yard should bo put into full
work ; ovory artificer and extra hand should work extra hours,
as if tho war were to begin next week. As gun-boats could bo
built moro rapidly than men-of-war, gun-boats should be
multiplied as fast as possible ; as voluutoors oould bo onrollod
faster than the lino, thoy should at onoo bo raised; as rillcs
could not bo mado fast enough in England, wo should renew
that order in Bolgium, even though thoy should cost sixpence
a piece moro than tho Horse Guards' regulation; and night and
day, tho proooss of manufacturing, constructing, arming,
drilling, should go on fill the country was mado safe, and then
wo might desist from preparations, and return to our peace ex
penditure, with tho cortainty that thoso humiliating, lowering,
and degrading punio-orios of invasion would never disturb our
country or our Govomnient agaiu."J
Tho following is tho only approaoh to a faot in thowholo speech
rospooting the Fronoh naval armaments. " While wo were only
oxporimonting, Franco had alroady built iron-casod vessels,
armed with rifled artillery— [Sir Charles Napier: hear, hear !]
—and could, at short notice, bring into tho Channel a fleet moro

* Hansard, olv. 685. t Hansard, ib. 67H. J Hansard, ib. (iS;!-7.

82

THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC III.

powerful than ours, and could man it more easily with practised
seamen."* This was spoken on the 29th of July, 1859. On
the 6th of February following, the writer of these pages visited
Toulon, and found workmen employed in hanging the
armour on the sides of the still unfinished La Gloire, the first
sea-going iron-clad ship ever built (for England had, at the time,
more iron-cased floating batteries than Francef), and she did not
make her first trial trip in the Mediterranean till August, 1860,
or more than a year after these terrified utterances.
The only way of opposing reason to declamation is by ex
posing its want of argument and supplying its deficiency of
facts. The eloquent alarmist called for the multiphcation of
gun-boats, forgetting that we had at that time 162, whilst
France had only 28 ; he required that " every artificer and
extra hand should work extra hours," and he had been told
three weeks previously that a system of "task and job-work and
over hours of working had been established in the dockyards |
to build 46,284 tons, this year, against 19,159 tons last year ;"
and he totally lost sight of the enormous and almost unprece
dented superiority of our navy in commission at the time as
compared with that of France.
As the agitation now about to break forth out of doors respect
ing the National Defences, and for the promotion of Rifle Corps,
was the result of the cry of alarm which was raised in the two
Houses respecting the naval preparations in France, it may be
well here to give the official accounts of the two countries for
1859, the last year for which, at the time of penning these pages,
the French accounts are definitively audited. The following
figures, taken from the tables in the first page, will show the
number of men, the amount expended in dockyard labour,
and the total expenditure for the navies of the two countries : —

* Hansard, civ. p. 684.
t " The hon. member for Inverness-shire had stated that the building
of iron-plated batteries had been neglected in this country. But the fact
was, that in the year 1855, the French sent two of those floating-batteries
to the Crimea, and we also sent two ; while, in the following year, we had
not less than eight of them, to the two possessed by the French."—
Sir Charles Wood, Hansard, clxi. p. 1158. X Ibid, cliv. p. 912.

1859.] THE THREE PANICS. 83

1859.
Number Wages in Total
of Men. Dockyards. Expenditure.
England . 72,400 £1,582,112 £11,072,243
France . . 38,470 772,931 8,333,933
It must be borne in mind that this was the year of the war
in Italy, when the French navy was called into requisition to
aid the operations of the army, and especially to assist in the
transport of troops to Genoa. Yet, it will be seen, that our
total expenditure exceeded that of France by the amount of
£2,738,310. The disproportion is, however, still greater, if we
compare the other items : in men, our force was nearly double,
whilst in dockyard expenditure, which has been called the
"aggressive outlay," it was actually more than double. If we
compare the two years 1858 and 1859, we shall find, that
whilst France added 8,868 to the number of her men, we
added 16,517, or in nearly double the proportion to ours. It
will be found, also, by a comparison of the expenditure in the
dockyards for the same years, that whilst our increase was
£590,520, that of France was only £131,977. This shows that
tho increased cost of the French navy was for the current ex
penses, in materials, coal, provisions, pay, etc., consequent upon
employing 300 vessels in 1859, as against 199 in 1858, and not
for building new ships to create a permanent increase of force.
And this view has been verified by an examination of all the
details of the French naval expenditure for 1859. If the reader
will carry his eye carefully back over the whole of the tables in
the first page, he will find that at no time, for twenty-five
years, had the naval preparations of England, as measured by
the number of men, or the expenditure for building ships, been
so disproportionately great, as compared with those of France,
as in 1859. The alarm on this occasion, as in the case of the
previous panic of 1851, was excited at the very time when it
happened to have the least foundation, which might appear
strange, did we not know that panic is not the product of
reason but passion, and that it is quite as liable to occur under
one state of circumstances as another.
Although little allusion will be made to the increase in our
g2

84

THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC HI.

land forces, because it has not, as in the case of the navy, been
generally justified by an appeal to the corresponding prepar
ations in France, yet it must not be forgotten that the army,
militia, and ordnance, had undergone augmentations simul
taneously with those of our fleets. Da a subsequent debate on
the National Defences (5th August), Lord Palmerston said : —
" I hold that in the event of war, we could put into the field
something little short of 200,000 fighting men. We have the
regular force of, I hope, not less than 60,000 men. Then we
have the Militia, the establishment of which is 120,000 men ;
and if that Militia be well recruited and supplied, as, in the
event of emergency, I am sure would be the case, I reckon
upon 100,000 there. Then we have 14,000 yeomanry ; 12,000
or 14,000 pensioners ; and then we have those men who have
served their ten years, with whom my right hon. friend the
Secretary for War proposes to deal to-night. We have, also,
always at home a certain force of marines ; and we could, if we
chose, re-organise our dockyard battalions for the defence of
those establishments. Putting all these forces together, I say
that an enemy contemplating an attack upon us must reckon
upon not less than 200,000 men to resist him."
Such was the state of our preparations, by land and sea,
when Parliament was prorogued, after having laid the train for
an agitation which spread throughout the country during the
recess. The Rifle Corps movement, which now arose, is of such
recent origin, and the subsequent proceedings to promote its
success, are so fresh in the memory of all, that it is unnecessary
to dwell on the subject. Not only were special meetings called
to forward the object, but at every public gathering, whatever
its origin or purpose, the topic was sure to be obtruded. Espe-
pecially was it so at the Agricultural Society's meetings, whose
orators, instead of descanting on the rival breeds of cattle, or
the various kinds of tillage, discussed the prospects of an in
vasion and the best mode of dealing with the invaders : — "How
much will you charge the French for your corn when they
land ?" cried one of his audience, to a sturdy Somersetshire yeo
man who was on his legs addressing them ; and his reply — " They
shall pay for it with their blood " — elicited rounds of applause.
The assumption everywhere was — founded on the declarations
made in Parliament — that France was surpassing us as a naval

I860.] THE THREE PANICS. 85
power, that she was our equal in the largest ships, and was- now
providing herself with an iron-cased fleet, in which description
of vessels we were quite unprepared, and that we must, there
fore, be ready to fight for freedom on our own soil. The am
bitious designs of the third Napoleon were discussed in
language scarcely less denunciatory than that which had been
applied to his uncle fifty years before. To doubt his hostile
intentions was a proof of either want of patriotism or of saga
city : — had not venerable peers proclaimed their alarm, and
would they have broken through their habitual reserve without
sufficient cause ? And did not successive Governments make
enormous additions to our Navy Estimates: thej^ were in a
position to command exclusive information, and was it likely,
unless they had positive proofs of impending danger, that they
would have imposed such unnecessary expense on the country ?
This last appeal was quite irresistible, for the good British
public defer, with a faith amounting to a superstition, to the
authority of official men. All this tended to throw the
odium of our increased taxation on the Emperor, who was
supposed to personify our national danger; and the ominous
words were eometimes heard : " We had better fight it out."
Such was the state of fear, irritation, and resentment, in which
the publio mind was thrown towards the close of 1859 ; and
probably at no previous time, within the experience of the
present generation, had an accident afforded the occasion,
would the country have been so resigned to a war with
France. It was under these circumstances, that the writer of these
pages visited Paris* on an errand whioh detained bim in
France for more than a year. For several months afterwards,
the reports of speeches at Rifle Corps meetings continued to
reach the French capital, having for their invariable burden
complaints of the hostile attitude of the ruler of France,
* The following incident will illustrate the state of public feeling. On
his way to Paris, the writer passed a day or two at Brighton, where he met
a friend, certainly one of the last men to be charged with a deficiency of
courage, who, on learning the writer's destination, avowed that he had been
deterred from taking his family, for the autumn, to the French metropolis
by the fear of a rupture with France, and the risk of being detain§d
prisoner by the Emperor, after the precedent of 1803.

NO

THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC III.

whose character and designs, it must be confessed, were
portrayed in not the most flattering colours. The effect pro
duced, by the invasion panic in England, was very dissimilar
upon different classes in France. Statesmen, and men of
education and experience, did not give the British Govern
ment credit for sincerity, when it made the alleged naval arma
ments of France the plea for extraordinary warlike preparations.
Their opinion could not be better expressed than in the words
of M. Ducos (already quoted), who, when writing privately to,
one of his colleagues during the former panic, observed, that,
" the English cabinet may possibly not be very much distressed
by these imaginary terrors (as we have sometimes seen among
ourselves) , inasmuch as they enable them to swell their budget,
and serve to strengthen a somewhat uncertain majority in
Parliament." * And some pungent remarks in this sense were
frequently heard in the circles of Parisian society, t But
among the less intelligent masses of the people, the effect was
different. Their ears had caught the echo of the voice of Sir
Charles Napier, who had been for years incessantly proclaiming
our naval inferiority, until there was at last a wide-spread
popular belief that France had become the mistress of the
Channel. With the exception of an occasional article in a
semi-official journal, giving a comparison of the naval expen
ditures of the two Governments, with perhaps a self-complacent
commentary on the superior economy of the French administra
tion, nothing was done to disabuse the publio mind on the
subject. And this popular delusion might have been an element
of danger to the peace of the two countries, had it not been
for the character of the Emperor, who, throughout these provo
cations, displayed a perfect equanimity and self-control, — the
rarest quality to be found in those who have climbed the dizzy
heights of power.
During his residence in France, the writer profited by the
best possible opportunity for making himself acquainted with
the naval preparations of that country. The arsenals were open
to him or his friends, and there was no official information

* Ante, p. 33.
t " Ah, pauvre John Bull !" exclaimed a lady in the presence of the
writer, "quand en veut lui cnlever son argent on lui faitpeur denous."

I860.] THE THREE PANICS. 87
which he sought and failed to obtain. The result of this
investigation was merely to confirm the conviction which had
been previously derived from our own official documents. Had
it been otherwise, these pages would not have been penned ;
and yet the writer asks no credit for any statement they contain,
on the ground of his private or exclusive sources of information.
The facts contained in the following, as in the preceding pages,
must owe all their value to the public and official sources,
equally accessible to everybody, from whence they are derived*
In the citations from Hansard, it has been thought fail- to allow
the statesmen who officiate in that great laboratory of our
history, the British parliament, to be heard ns much as possible
in their own language.
On the 13th February, I860, the Navy Estimates were pro
posed to the House ; but before the Secretary of the Admiralty
was permitted to commence his task, the ever-watchful and
indefatigable Mr. Williams entered his protest against " the
enormous increase in the Estimates for the present year,"
asserting that, " the grand total, which exceeded £12,800,000,
was larger in amount by more than £1,000,000 than any that
had ever been presented to that House in a time of peace " ;
and he proceeded to remark that " the number of men required
for the navy this year of peace was 85,500, being 6,000 more
than they required when they were actually at war with
Russia." Mr. Lindsay, and Mr. Bentinck rose successively to
acquit the Secretary of the Admiralty of all responsibility for
not being able " to carry out in office the economical views he
had expressed in opposition." It will be necessary not only to
accept this generous theory, but still farther to enlarge the bill
of indemnity, and assume that the statement now made was
not the speech of Lord Clarence Paget, but that it was prepared
for him bv those who were responsible for the Estimates.
To reconcile the country to this enormous expenditure, it was
necessary that the French navy shoidd be made to assume very
alarming proportions. But how was this to be accomplished by
any ordinary mode of comparison ? If the expenditure in the
dockyards had been compared, ours would have been shown to
be double that of France ; if it had been a comparison of sea
men, the number voted, together with the reserve, woidd have
been found nearly three times as great in England as in France ;

CO

THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC HI.

had the ships in commission, or the ships afloat in the two
navies, been compared, the effect would have been the reverse
of what was desired. A very ingenious and perfectly original
mode of comparison was adopted. The number of ships in
commission in England was compared ¦with the number afloat in
France ; they chanced to be 244 in each case,* and this equality
was, perhaps, the temptation to adopt the new method. Had
the numbers afloat in both cases been given, they would have
been, as afterwards incidentally appears in the statement, 241
French and 456 English ,f In justification of this mode of
comparison, by which all the British vessels not having crews
were left out of the account, it was alleged that, " while all the
French ships that were afloat could be manned at a very short
notice, it was only those which we had in commission which
were in a similar position."! It is to be regretted that there
was no Lord Clarence Paget in opposition to ask — " of what use
could it be to build ships and launch them, if they were after
wards to count for nothing ?" But it is curious to observe, in
another part of the same statement, how this difficulty is sur
mounted, for, in speaking of the facility with which seamen had
been obtained, it is said —
"And perhaps I had better add a more practical assu
rance, that, if we wished, we could not enter them (seamen)' in
the navy, because the number is complete, and, except for
casualties, we have no means of entering any considerable
number of men over and above what we have at present. I
think that is a very satisfactory state of things, and that the
house will be glad to hear that there is no difficulty in getting
men. This vast force of ships, only the creation of the last
few months, is wholly manned."§
Now, it is high time that we shook off this bugbear of the
difficulty of manning the navy, and learnt to rely on the in
fallible law of demand and supply. Formerly, we trusted to
the press-gang to steal the men ; in future we shall find it a
cheaper and safer method to pay the market price for them.f

* Hansard, clvi. 966-9. t Hansard, ib., 966-9.
X Hansard, ib., 967. § Hansard, ib.,974;
If " If they wanted men in the navy they must resort to the same means
as a mercantile man or a millowner— namely, offer a good market price

I860.] THE THREE PANICS. 89
This is illustrated by the case before us. At the moment when
this statement was made, there was a bounty payable of £4 for
able and £2 for ordinary seamen. It had been fixed at £10 the
year before by Sir John Pakington, but it was soon found not
to be necessary to pay so high a bounty to bring our navy up
to 80,000 men. Now, we will suppose that a war was im
pending, and that the country required the services of 150,000
instead of 80,000 seamen, — is there any doubt that England
could afford to pay the necessary price for them ? There is no
kind of skilled labour so available, because there is none so
migratory and so free from local ties as that of the sailor. Let
us assume a sudden and urgent necessity to arise, and that our
Government offered to pay £40 a-year, to able-bodied seamen,
which would be £10 or £15 more than the present pay, taking
care that, the wages be paid monthly, in order to avoid.
the temptation to desert, which would be offered by paying
a bounty in advance, — unquestionably such an offer would give
the Admiralty the pick not only of our own merchant service,
but of the seamen sailing out of American, German, and Scan
dinavian ports. Now, £40 each for 150,000 seamen amounts
to just £6,000,000 a-year. It is about sixpence in the pound
of the income-tax, or half the amount paid in excise and cus
toms duties by the consumers of ardent spirits. A nation so
rich as this would cheerfully pay such an amount for its defence
in case of danger. It would be but the most fractional per
centage of insurance on th6 thousands of millions worth of
property in these islands, and would be only about five per
cent, on the estimated average value of the ships and cargoes
afloat belonging to British owners. But if it be admitted that
at least on these, if not on cheaper terms, the seamen will be
forthcoming in case of an impending war, what becomes of tho
argument that we can only calculate on manning those ships
which are already in commission ?
for labour. If they wanted sailors they must offer to pay sufficiently high
to induce them to come forward and enter the service. To expect men to
enter for low wages would only lead to disappointment ; it would be found
to be impossible to get them without high wages. That was the only
fair and just way of obtaining them, — but hitherto the House of Com
mons had refused to adopt it." — Sir Charles Napier. Hansard, clvii.
1810.

90

THK TI1RKK PANICS. [l*\NK III.

If wo pursue tho statement of the Secretary of the Admiralty
n little more into details, wo find, on comparing the whole of
the screw lino-of-battle ships, built and building, in the two
navies, that whilst France is stated to possess thirty-seven,
England is put down at fifty-nine, with tho nine blockships
making sixty-eight. Tho English frigates arc set. down at
forty-five, and the French at forty-sovou, including tho fifteen
old transatlantic paddle steamers. In tho smaller descriptions
of vessels, our number was double that of the French.
Tho striking fact is given in this statement that wo had still
twelve sailing lino-of-battle ships fit for conversion into screw
steamers. Now, considering that, tho Admiralty hud, over
since 1850, professed to lay down no vessels of this olass which
wcro not expressly designed for steam machinery, thus recog
nising that soiling vessels wcro for tho futuro obsolete, what
shall bo said of tho policy of continuing to build now ships, and
leaving twelve sailing vessels still fit to bo converted in 1860,
to say nothing of those which had in tho interval been decaying
in ordinary, and rondorod unfit for conversion. And what
must, bo thought of those who, when this mismanagement
becamo apparent, directed tho cry of alarm and resentment
against Franco, because, by pursuing a more provident course,
sho had, in a shorter time, and at less expense, attained moro
satisfactory rosults than ourselves? Tho following is (lie
account of tho tonnago built in the past, year, and catiumto for
tho year following :-*-
" It may possibly bo romomboved that, in proposing tho
estimates last, year, we announced our intention, of course
subject to contingencies, of building 46,000 tons of shipping
in the dockyards. [Sir J. Pukingl.on : ' Exclusive of
conversions?'] We said wo would convert, four lino-
of-baftlo ships and five frigates in addition. What wo havo
actually built amounts to 19,730 tons in ships of tho lino,
13,054 in frigates, 5,436 in corvettes, and 5,224 in sloops and
gun- vessels. Wo havo not fulfilled our promiso as to frigates,
in which class I stated that wo would build 16,000 tons, tho
reason being that there was an insufficiency of timber for the
purpose ; but wo have made up for the deficiency in another
way, for we have gone beyond our undertaking in the conver
sion of sailing into steam frigat.es and screw ships. What wo
propose doing in the present, or, as my right, hon. friond

I860.] THE THREE PANICS. 91
reminds mo, the ensuing financial year, is to build 13,216 tons
of ships of the line, 13,500 tons of frigates, 4,871 tons of cor
vettes, 8,045 tons of sloops and gun-vessels, and 302 tons of
gunboats, making a total of 39,934 tons. In addition, we
propose to convert four more line-of-battle ships and four
frigates."* The estimated constructions for the ensuing year are thus
explained in ships instead of tonnage : —
" Supposing the Committee is pleased to consent to these
estimates, wo hope to add to the navy, before the end of the
next financial year, eight line-of-battle ships, twelve frigates,
four iron-cased ships, four corvettes, fifteen sloops, and twenty-
three gun- vessels and gunboats. That includes the conversion
of four line-of-battle ships and four frigates."t
It is impossible to deal with this proposal of the Secretary
of the Admiralty to add eight line-of-battle ships and twelve
frigates to our steam navy, without referring to the part he had
previously taken in opposition to the further construction of
largo ships, for he was the first and ablest opponent of the
polioy which he now followed when in office. So long ago as
May, 1857, he expressed his opinion that line-of-battle ships
were " not the instruments by which in future the fate of
empires woidd be decided. "J He then advised the First Lord
to "rest on his oars," § and stated that "anEnquHie or Com
mission was sitting in France to inquire whether line-of-battle
ships were or were not the most efficient class of ships which
could now be employed."! Every circumstance which had since
occurred tended to confirm the views then expressed by Lord
Clarence Paget. As each new experiment with artillery dis
played tho destructive effects of detonating shells, or of molten
iron, even the oldest admirals raised their hands and exclaimed,
" There is an end of wooden ships of the lino !" The Enquete
or Commission appointed in France was known to have decided
against line-of-battle ships, for in the report upon the compara
tive state of the English and French navies presented to the
House in 1859, it is stated that naval men in France " were of
opinion that no more ships of the line will be laid down, and
* Hansard, clvi. 978. t Hansard, clvi. 969.
X Ante, p. 46. § Ibid. || Ibid.

92 THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC III,
that in ten years that class of vessels will have become obso
lete."* This had reference to the successful experiments in
iron-cased ships.
But, independent of this innovation, the opinion of the
highest nautical authorities had been pronounced against the
policy of exposing such a huge target as a line-of-battle ship,
with perhaps a thousand men and thirty or forty tons of gun
powder on board, to the fire of modern shell guns. The
Americans had abandoned these large ships before the iron-clad
vessels were thought of, and it is stated that when their greatest
authority, Captain Dahlgren, visited our ports more than three
years ago, although he was much struck with the gun-boats, to
which he devoted particular attention, he looked upon line-of-
battle ships as all but obsolete, and considered that, so far as
America was concerned, her naval policy " would render the
construction of such vessels almost useless."t The condemna
tion of wooden ships of the line by intelligent naval men had
found utterance in very emphatic phrases : — " They will be
blown to lucifer matches," said one ; " they will be mere human
slaughter-houses," said another ; whilst a third declared that,
in case of two such vessels coming into collision, at close
quarters, the only word of command for which there would be
time would be, " Fire, and lower your boats."
. The comparative numbers of these vessels possessed by
England and France deprived the Admiralty of every pretext
for this increase. The Secretary, in his statement, informs us
that we had at the time sixty-eight ships of the line, including
blockships, whilst France had only thirty-seven ; and as Sir
Charles Wood had stated the French force in 1847atforty,:f,and
as they were put down also at forty in the report of 1859,§ it
was clear in 1860, that our neighbour had abandoned the further
building of these vessels. All these facts were well known to
our Government, when they were pushing forward the construc
tion of large wooden vessels at a rate of expenditure un
paralleled even at the height of the great French war. It will
presently be seen, that so manifest did the impolicy of this

* Parliamentary Paper, 182 of 1859, p. 15.
t The Naolnt of the World, by Hans Busk, p. 1 16.
X Am, ii. 4 Ante, 57.

I860.} THE Tiinra panics. 98
oouno at length beoomo to everybody except the Admiralty)
that the oommon nemo of the House of Commons rose in revolt
the following union, and extorted from tho minister a pledge to
discontinue tho further building of ships-of-the-line, and to
abandon, unfinished, thoso on the stocks. Tho gigantio saorifloe
involved in this outlay of publio money will, in a very few
years, be brought homo to tho appreciation of tho British
publio, in tho possession of hundreds of wooden vessels of dif
ferent siees whioh .will be acknowledged to be valueless and
ovon dangerous to their possessors, and then only will bo fully
estimated the system of management whioh .could have oroated
such a ooitly monument to its own reoklessness and want of

It is impossible to doubt that tho Seoretary of the Admiralty
remained unchanged in tho views he had expressed when in
opposition, indeed, any intelligent and unprejudiced mind
must have beoomo oonflrmod by experience in thoso sound
opinions. Whilst extending to him the full, benefit of that
'dispensation from individual responsibility which is olaimed
for those who become members of a government, it is to be
desired, in the interest of tho oountryy whioh has also its claim
on tho talents and judgment of publio inon> that some oasuist,
skilled in political ethics, would define the limit of inoon*
sistonoy beyond whioh politicians shall not be allowed to
wander. Tho navy estimates, tho unparalleled amount of whioh was
ftoourately desoribed in tho brief protest of Mr. Williams, were
agreed to without further opposition ; and it is in connection
with this fact that the reader is asked to regard tho demon
stration whioh now calls for notice.
On the 1st May, 1880, Lord Lyndhurst rose in the House of
Peers, pursuant to previous notice, to call for explanations from
the Government respecting the progress of tho naval reserve*
when ho delivered a speech identical ia spirit and objeot with
that of the previous year.
Of tho many voices that havo been raised to agitate tho
publio mind on the subjeot of our armaments, nono has found
a louder echo on tho Continent than that of this learned pew.
It is only the natural result of his high position and great
ability. To him in tha Lords, and Mr. Horsnian and Sir

94 THE THHKR PANICS. [PANIC TTT.
Charles Napier in tho Commons, and to the connivance of suc
cessive Governments, are mainly attributed, in France, the
success of the invasion panic. " The motions of Lord Lynd-
hurst and of Mr. Horsman," says M. Cuohovul Clarigny, " the
speeches and letters of Sir Charles Napier ; tho exaggerations,
sincere or pretendod, of tho orators of the Government and of
the opposition, about tho forces of Franco — all had contributed
to create a kind of panio in England."*
Lord Lyndhurst had, on n previous occasion, resented tho
remarks of an adverse critic in the House of Commons, who
had alluded to his great age. It must be allowed that his
speeches invite no suoh allusion, unless to elicit ovon from nn
opponent the tribute of admiration for their groat intellectual
merits. The close and logioal reasoning of his latest speeches,
so freo from the garrulity, or tho tendency to narrative, whioh
generally take tho plaoe of argument in the discourses of the
aged, presents an instance of the late preservation of the mental
powers for which it would ho diflioult to find a parallel. In
oonoeding to him, however, all the authority whioh attaches to
the possession of unimpaired faculties, he booomos divested of
that privilege by which the venerable in years are shielded from
an unequal oonfliot with other men, and ho must oonsont to bo
held amenable to criticism for his publio uttoranoos, and for
the proper oxeroise of the influence whioh his learning and rank
confer on him.
England and Franoe had been at penoo for forty-five years,
and just previously a treaty of conimoroo had been entered into
which was designed to strengthen the ¦ bonds of friendship
between tho two countries. Passing over this event, with a
sneer at, " tho further exohange of pottery and cotton for silks
and wine," he seized this inopportuno moment for going back
half a oentury to disinter the buried strife of our fathers, and
again to taunt our bravo neighbours with their naval reverses :
— " Tho Frenoh navy," ho said, " was, by tho great viotory of
the Nile, the viotory of Lord Duncan, that of Lord St. Vin-
oent, and tho great and splendid viotory of Trafalgar, reduced
at the termination of the war to suoh a state that for twenty
years after that period wo remained, as far ns our navy was
" The Navy Budgets of England and Francs," p. 09.

I860.] THE THREE PANICS. 95
concerned, in a state of perfect tranquillity." The aim of
the speaker was to show that the restoration of the French navy
was the work of Louis Napoleon. He must be allowed to be
heard in his own language : —
" Such, my Lords, was the result of the efforts made during
the great French war. Very little change took place until after
the memorable event which I now beg to call to your attention,
I mean the accession to supreme power of the present Emperor
of the French. In the year 1848 he was elected President _of
the Republic ; and in the following year that celebrated Com
mission was appointed for the purpose of considering the re-or
ganisation of the navy of France. That Commission was
composed of fifteen or more of the most able men selected
from the navy and from the civil service of France, and they
have framed a code of regulations of the most complete kind,
for the purpose of stimulating and directing the efforts of
the French navy. I have stated one remarkable date with
respect to the issuing of that Commission. There is another
date equally remarkable. No report was called for from that
Commission until after the celebrated event of the 2nd of
December. About twelve or fourteen days after that coup
d'etat, namely on the 15th of December, a report was called
for by Louis Napoleon, and from that time the most strenuous
exertions have been made to carry all the recommendations
of that Committee into effect."*
Now, here are specific and tangible facts, which are not often
found in speeches on this topic. In the first place, it is alleged
that there was very little change in the relations of the
English and French navies until after the election of Louis
Napoleon as President of the Republic. It has been shown in
the preceding pages, that the French navy bore a much larger
proportion to that of England during the latter part of Louis
Philippe's reign, than it has done since Louis Napoleon has
been at the head of affairs. If the reader will give himself the
trouble to turn to the tables in the first page, and compare the
period between 1840 and 1848, with that between 1849 and
1859, he will see how much more largely the disproportion has

Hansard, clviii. 425.

96 THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC III.
been to the disadvantage of France during the latter than the
former period.
Next, there is an allusion to a Commission appointed in 1840,
the year after tho election of Louis Napoleon as President, to
consider the reorganisation of tho French navy, and it might
be inferred that this Commission was named by the President.
It was, however, an Enquete Parlementaire, emanating from the
National Assembly, by a law of tho 31st October, 1849, at a
time when Louis Napoleon had acquired no ascendancy over
that body.
Then, we have the portentous revelation, that this Commission
had framed " a code of regulations of the most complete kind,"
that no Report was called for until after the 2nd December,
1851 (the date of the Coup d'Etat) that about twelve or four
teen days after, "namely on the 15th December, a report was
called for by Louis Napoleon, and from that time the most
strenuous exertions have been made to carry all the recom
mendations of that Committee into effect." Now, this is not
only an ingenious argument, but an effective appeal to our
imaginations. Hero was an ambitious man who had just
thrown down the gauntlet to the National Assembly, which he
had dissolved, and had appealed to the country to arbitrate be
tween him and that body : and yet, while his fate was trembling
in the balance, and it was still to be decided whether he should
take a step towards the throne, or be again driven into exile,
the one great dominant purpose of his hfe was never for a
moment forgotten, the only absorbing thought of his mind
was vengeance to England! How deep and enduring must
have been his hate, that, even whilst the vote by universal
suffrage was going on, instead of thinking of the state of the
poll, he should call for the Report on the state of the navy !
The argument was worthy of the speaker in his best days, in
Westminster Hall ; but, unluckily for the noble and learned
lord, he departed from the usual vague declamation on this
topic, and appealed to facts and dates. It is really almost in
credible that a judicial peer, speaking in the highest assembly
in the kingdom, conscious of the weight that would attach to
his words, and accustomed to weigh and examine evidence,
should havo permitted himself to bo the medium for making
this extraordinary statement. These are the simple facts :—

I860.] the TTinmi! tanios. 97
Tho Commission, or Enqutito ParMmontaire, was, as has boon
stated, appointed by tho AmmbUa Nationak, on tho 31st
October, 1840. It pursuod its labours for upwards of two
years, oxamining witnesses, visiting tho dookyards, and oalling
for aooounts and papers. Tho result of thoso investigations
waH printod iu two thick quarto volumes, whioh wo should call
" blue books," comprising the minutes of ovidonoe, and an
appendix of official documents. Tho preface to thoso volumes,
dated 80th January, 1852, gives a brief and simple narrative
of tho singular fate of tho commission, which was out off, at
tho most oritioal momout of its oxistonce, by tho coup d'Slat of
tho 2nd December, 1851, when tho National Assembly itself
was dissolved.
It appears that M. Dufauro, tho Eoportor— or, as wo should
say in England, tho Chairman — of the Commission had road to
his oolleaguos a part only of his Report, which was ordered to
be printod, and to bo distributed among tho members previous
to their deliberations, but tho preface proceeds to say, " This
was rendered impossible after tho 2nd Dooombor. Neither tho
Commission nor tho Assembly from whioh it omanated oould
meet again. Its task, thorofore, remained unaccomplished."
It furthor states that, " tho whole of tho resolutions of the
Commission wore only provisional, and on some important
points thoy had not ovon doliboratod " : and it adds, in con
clusion, that, " If the lloport should bo published, with tho
dooumonts which ought to accompany it, it will not havo been
submitted to tho Commission; it will only bo tho production of
tho individual Reporter, who alono wiU be responsible for tho
opinions oxprossod in it."
Upwards of 200 "provisional" votes of tho Commission are
reoorded in tho minutes of proceedings. Tho first on tho list,
after the routino votes, and tho most important us afiboting
ourselves, is a rooommondatiou that tho maximum of tho
number of lino-of-battlo ships should thonooforth bo forty-five ;
namely, thirty afloat and fifteen on tho. stooks, and that thoy
should all bo furnished with sorows. It was a moderate limit
compared with tho old naval establishment of Franoe. " From
that time," says Lord Lyndhurst, " tho most strenuous exertions
have been mado to carry all tho rooommondations of tho Com
mission into effect." Thoro wcro no rooommondations of the

98 THE THREE PANICS. |_PANIC III.
Commission, for it never made a Report. But, so far was the
Government from taking prompt measures to carry out the
" provisional " resolution respecting screw line-of-battle ships,
that in 1854, in the height of the Crimean war, the French
had only ten screw liners ; * and Sir Charles Napier stated that
they had but one in the Baltic in that year, -j- Indeed, it is now
universally agreed, that it was subsequently to that period that
serious efforts were made to convert the French sailing ships
into a steam navy : " the great inorease in the naval force of
France," says a writer already quoted, " may, therefore, be con«
sidered to date from the Crimean war." J
But the gravest inaccuracy in Lord Lyndhurst's statement
remains to be noticed, where he links the present state of the
French navy with the labours of the Commission of 1849.
" The result of that Commission," he said, " and of the ad
mirable system which was formed under it, has turned out to
be a formidable navy— a formidable navy of steam- vessels, to
which alone I confine my observations." § He was clearly not
aware of what had taken [place subsequently to the untimely
dissolution of that body. In 1855, a Commission was ap
pointed by the Emperor's Government, to consider the organisa
tion of the navy ; and the result was a Report from the Minister
of Marine, which was approved by a decree of the Emperor, in
1857, fixing the number of ships to be built, from year to year,
until 1870 ; and this decree was published to the whole world.
The line-of-battle ships were to reach a maximum of forty,
instead of forty-five, as recommended by the resolution of the
Commission of 1849. The Report contains the exaot nomen
clature of French shipping, with the strength of each ship in
guns and horse-power. In fact, if it were not for the inno
vations which science is incessantly making, involving the re
construction of her navy, all Europe might know, from this
decree, for nearly ten years to come, what ships of all kinds
France would possess.
If we turn to that part of Lord Lyndhurst's speech, which
referred to the state of our own navy, we shall find that, instead
of dealing with the Estimates of the year in which he spoke,
* Navies of the World, p. 88. t Hansard, civ. 702.
X Naviesofihe World, p.89. § Hansard, clviii. 426.

I860.] THE THREE PANICS. 99
he preferred to revive those figures of Sir John Pakington,
which had done such good service the previous year. Leaving
totally out of view upwards of 300 of our steam ships of war
afloat, ranging from corvettes to gun-boats, aU capable of
carrying the heaviest guns, and the hundreds of large merchant-
steamers which would be available in case of war, and omitting
all allusion to the great increase in our ships of the line and
frigates during the preceding year, he thus proceeded to lay
before his audience the state of our navy ;¦-¦ —
" At the beginning of last year, our fleet consisted of
twenty-nine sail of the line, and the French fleet, of pre
cisely the same number ; while we had twenty-six frigates,
they had thirty-four." And he added, with singular candour,
that " what addition has been made to our fleet, since the com
mencement of last year, I am not informed." It would have
been only an act of ordinary prudence to have perused the
speech of Lord Clarence Paget, delivered more than twp
months before ; or, at least, to have possessed himself of a copy
of the Navy Estimates for 1860, He would have then learnt
that England had 456 steamers of all kinds afloat, against 244
in France ; and it would have saved him from falling into the
erroneous opinion which he expressed, in proceeding to say;
" Ido not imagine that at this moment our fleet exceeds, or if it
does, only in a small degree, the steam naval force of France," ,
The object of the speech, however, was to show the danger
we were in from want of seamen,— a point on which the noble
speaker would also have been better informed, if he had perused
the speech of the Secretary of the Admiralty, who had taken a
vote for 85,500 men and boys, and had declared that more
seamen were offering than the Admiralty required. " In point
of material," said Lord Lyndhurst, " that is to say in ships,
you are far below the requirements of the country ; while, so
far as the manning of the ships is eoneerned, you are in a
situation the most deplorable. I do not miace the matter.
Our position, in this respect, ought to be known throughout:
the oountry. No man ought to be ignorant of the real facts of
the case."* Now, considering that he was, by his own con-

* Hansard, clviii. 435.
h2

100 THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC III.
fession at the moment, in ignorance of all that had occurred in
the navy since the previous year, this confident tone of the
speaker implied, at least, a strong belief in the favourable temper
of his audience.
And it was undoubtedly to this favourable state of feeling in
the Peers that the success of these speeches, both indoors and
without, was mainly due ; for they did not contain one fact
that would bear the test of fair examination. The Upper
House had, indeed, been the platform whence this invasion
agitation spread throughout a large portion of the middle ranks
of society. The Peers had made it fashionable to believe in the
hostile designs of Louis Napoleon, and it became, to a certain
extent, a test of respectability to be zealous in the promotion of
rifle-corps, and other means of defending the country. To
contend against the probability of invasion was to take the side
of the enemy, to be called anti-English, or accused of being for
peace at any price ; nay, to require even proofs or arguments
to show the reality of the danger, was to invite suspicion of
want of patriotism. There was a kind of genteel terrorism
exerted over everybody in " society," which, for a time, put
down all Opposition to the invasion party, —which was tacitly
understood to be the aristocratic, anti-radical party. This
animus (reminding one of 1791) reveals itself in the speech
before us in a manner which would have been to the last
degree impolitic, if there had really been any danger from a
foreign enemy, requiring " every class to unite in support of
the honour and independence of the nation." In his con
cluding sentences, the noble speaker, who is too logical to have
introduced such irrelevant matter had it not been to conciliate
those he was addressing, protests against a reform of Parlia
ment, and animadverts severely on those whom he characterises
as being in favour of direct taxation or desirous of introducing
among us the social " equality, without liberty, that exists in
France," or who are seeking to " pull down the wealthier and
aristocratic classes."
The Duke of Somerset, the First Lord of the Admiralty, in
his reply to Lord Lyndhurst, gave the following account of
the labour which the Government was employing in the
construction of those large wooden vessels which had been

I860.] THE THREE PANICS. 101
oondemned as worse than useless by some of the highest naval
authorities in Europe and America* : —
"And I can say that during the last eight months more men
have been employed in our dockyards than at any previous
period of the history of the country. I do not exclude the
time of the great war, down to 1815 ; and in this statement, I
exclude the factories altogether, which form another great
division of our naval establishments. I speak of the ship
building department only."
# * # #
" The noble and learned lord referred to the ships which we
have now afloat. I find that we have built, and that there are
now afloat, fifty ships of the line.
" Lord Lyndhurst. — Do you include block-ships ?
" The Duke of Somerset.— I am not taking the block-ships into
account." t
The little question and answer, at the close of the above
extract, illustrates the manner in which the Coast-Guard block-
ships are, by all Governments, left out of the numerical list of
our ships of the line. It is true, they are sometimes alluded to,
incidentally, as being fit for guarding harbours or mouths of
rivers. But the question always recurs: seeing that these
ships have the full complement of officers, the most complete
armament, and picked seamen provided for them, seeing that
they have a fleet of fifteen to twenty steam gun-boats attached
to them, besides sailing vessels, and that they are all placed
under a flag-officer, — why, during the time when scores of good
sailing line-of-battle ships were decaying in ordinary, were not
some of them fitted with screws and substituted for such of the
block-ships, as are alleged to be not fit for Channel service ?
Some people will be uncharitable enough to suspect that the
object is to have an excuse for another Channel fleet.
The following is the manner in which the "First Lord"

* Lord Clarence Paget bad, a fortnight previously stated, in the House
of Commons, that " the total number of persons employed in the dock
yards, on the 1st March, was 20,032"; and he stated subsequently
(8th June), that the greatest number employed during the great war with
France, was only 14,754."— Hansard, clvii. 2014,
t Hansard, clviii. 438-9.

102 THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC III.
replied to Lord Lyndhurst upon the progress which had been
made since the previous year in manning the navy : —
" The noble and learned lord sap we have the ships, but the
ships are not half maimed ; but it so happens, that it is just the
contrary difficulty under which we have laboured. On coming
into office, I found certain estimates prepared, and a £10 boimty
in existence. I adopted these, and before the month of August
I found that the niunber of men voted by Parliament was ex
ceeded by 1000. The news of the Chinese disaster arrived in
September, and I did not think it was prudent, under these
circumstances, to put a stop to the enrolment of seamen ; the
result is that, for the last six months, we have been 5000 in
excess of the vote. This year we determined to cover that
larger number by a larger vote, but they were still coming in so
rapidly that I was obliged to come to the determination only to
take able seamen, or ordinary seamen who had already served
on board the fleet and been drilled to the guns. When the
noble and learned lord says, that, if we look to the last month or
so, it will be found that we were not getting men ; of course
that was so. The men we have are included in the estimates,
and it was not likely I should be taking additional men Avhen I
had already 5,000 men more than had been provided for."*
This statement completely cut the ground from under the
feet of Lord Lyndhurst ; — but it did more, — it showed that the
Government had no excuse for entertaining the question of a
reserve at that moment at all. The formation of a reserve
would be a legitimate measure in connection with a peace
establishment ; but our navy was not on a peace footing. Let
the reader be good enough to turn to the accounts in the first
page, and placing his finger on the number of men in tho
English navy in 1852, the year before the Russian war, let him
run his eye back over the table to the commencement in 1835,
and he will find only four years in the eighteen in which the
Seamen were one half the number (85,500) voted for 1860 ; and
the highest number on record in a year of peace previous to the
Russian war was 44,960.
The French state their complement of men for 1860 at
30,588, namely 26,329 afloat, and 4,259 in reserve. But as the

* Hansard, clviii. 440.

I860.] THE THREE PANICS. 103
accounts for 1860 are not yet definitively audited, this estimate
as it may be called, is open to the objection which has been
recngnised from the first. It will be better to take an authority
which will not be disputed on this side of the water. In the
month of March following, Lord Carence Paget* states the
number of French seamen at 34,000, of which 10,000 were
from the military conscription or landsmen. This statement
was repeated by Lord Palmerston. f The reader is now asked
to refer to the accounts in the first page, and casting his eye
over the table of men in the French navy from 1852 back to
the commencement, to compare the 34,000 maintained in 1860
with the numbers in each of those eighteen years. He will not
find an increase comparable with that in the English table. In
more than one of those years, the number exceeded that of 1860,
and in many years of Louis Philippe's reign the numbers ap
proached very nearly to that of the above year.
The more important test, however, is the proportion of force
maintained by each of the two countries in 1860 and at former
periods. The reader's attention is especially asked to this point,
for it involves the whole question at issue as to the alleged
responsibility of France for the great increase in our naval arma
ments. Turning to the accounts, we find, on looking down the two
columns of seamen, that England generally had about twenty-
five or thirty per cent more men than France. In portions of
Louis Philippe's reign the superiority was much less on the side
of England. In 1840-41, for instance, France approached very
nearly to an equality with us. Taking the average number
maintained by France for the whole period of eighteen years
down to 1852, the year before the Russian war, and comparing
it with the average number maintained by England, they were
27,962 French and 38,085 English. In 1860, as we have seen,
they were 34,000 French and 85,500 English. In other words,
in the former period our navy had 10,123 more seamen than
France, and at the latter date the excess was 51,500.
But we are told, that the Maritime Inscription gives to the
French Government the right of calling upon the whole of the
merchant seamen to serve in the imperial navy. This power
was, however, equally possessed by the Government of Louis
* Hansard, clxi. 1774. t Hansard, ib., 1789,

104 THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC III.
Philippe. The Maritime Inscription is an institution nearly
two centuries old. It is a register which comprises every youth
and man following a sea life, or employed on rivers running to
tho soa, or working in dockyards, etc., who are all liable to
serve in tho Government navy. Tho number of available sea
men is apt to be much exaggerated, owing to the large propor
tion of landsmen included in the Inscription. The best way of
comparing the naval resources of the two countries is by a
reference to tho amount of their merchant shipping. England
possesses at least four times the tonnage of Franco, exclusive of
colonial shipping ; and although the ships of the latter country
carry larger crews than thoso of the former, on the other hand
the English people take more freely to the sea for boating,
yachting, and fishing, than their neighbours. It is quite cer
tain, then, that England has four times as many sailors to draw
on as France, and against the power of impressment possessed
by her, wo must put tho ability to pay for the services of our
seamen which is possossed by England. If France has 60,000
merchant seamen from whence to draw by impressment the
crews of her imperial marine, we have 240,000 to supply tho
men for tho royal navy, in case of real emergency, by the
equally suro process of voluntary enlistment for high pay.*
Lord Hardwickc, who ought to be well informed on the sub
ject, remarked, in tho course of this debate, that "it was stated
that the French had a reserve of 60,000 ; but he believed it
was known to officers of their own fleet, that not more than
half that number was at any time available to man the navy.
30,000 trained seamen was, however, a most formidable force,
etc."t But let us supposo the whole of these 30,000 men added

* The following statement of tho loss and gain by impressment, made
by Lord Clarence Paget, shows, that it is a very unreliable mode of man
ning the navy:— "During the years 1811, 1S12, and 1813, the closing
period of tho great war with France, there were pressed into the service
29,405 men, while the number of those who deserted was 27,300— so that
tho total gain to the country, during those three years, by impressment
was 2,100 men. But, in order to bring those men thus compulsorily into the
service, 3,000 good sailors had been employed on shore as press-gangs.
Therefore the country actually lost about 1,000 mon during those three
years under the system."— Hansard, cliv. 909.
t Hansard, clviii. 449.

1800.] THU TH1WK PANTOS. 105
to the French imperial marine, nay, let us oven empty every
merchant ship of their able-bodied crows, and supposo that
50,000 in addition to tho present 34,000 wore plaood at tho
service of tho French Government, and it would still leave the
number less by 1,500 than the 85,500 men that had been
already voted by our Parliament for 1860 j and wo woro told
the men wow pressing to enter tho sorvioo faster than tho
Admiralty rcquked them.
That, under suoh oiroumstanoos, a Government should lend its
sanation to tho ory of the alarmists, and protend to be oooupied
in scouring a reserve to proteot us against Franoe, was some
thing like an abuse of publio oonfidenoe, AU this costly and
oomplete preparation to moot some hypothetical danger implies
a total want of faith in thoso latent resources of the nation
whiolx patriotism would evoke in the ovont of a real omorgenoy.
It has boon frequently said by thoso most oompetent to judge,
that, in cose of actual danger to our shores, the merohant
seamen, of whom about one-third are estimated to be
always in port, would como forward to a man for the defence
of tho oountry.
Tho opinion of tho soamon themselves on this subject was no
doubt correctly expressed in a few words of manly common
sense quoted by tho Duke of Somerset, as the declaration of tho
sailors of Hartlepool :— They say, "Wo aro doing well in the
merchant service, and wo do not wont to be sent out to any of
your little wars, to China or tho River Plato, or any of those
places where you are always carrying on some small hostilities ;
but when it comes to a regular European war, wo will toko our
share in it with any men."*
Suoh wore the naval armaments of the two oounrries in 1860.
England had added to her navy since 1857 nearly aa many men
as wore ooixtained in tho whole marine of Franoe. Yet, during
the spring and summer of this year, the ory of alarm was still
heard, and, with a view to the greater security of our shores,
the Rifle Corps movement was actively promoted under the
most influential patronage Already it was annonnoed, that the
numbers enrolled in the Corps amounted to 130,000, and it was
said that the foreigner had been impressed ina salutary manner

* Memmnft olviu. 444

106 THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC III.
by this martial demonstration. All this was, however, insuf
ficient ; and we now approach the climax of the third panic in
the gigantic project for fortifications shortly to be initiated in
the House of Commons.
A passing notice must, however, be taken of one or two of
the little episodes in Parliament, which reflected the nervous
excitement of certain classes out of doors. Mr. Einglake
" had been informed that great prepara tions were being urged
forward for the supply of horse transports on the north coast of
France."* Sir Charles Napier had heard from an American
traveller that there were 14,000 men at work in Toulon dock
yards, besides 3.000 convicts. f Both Houses of Parliament
were simultaneously agitated upon the subject of a report which
had appeared in the newspapers, announcing that English ship
wrights were finding employment in Cherbourg and other
French dockyards. Numbers of artificers were crowding to the
police magistrates to obtain passports. The subject was brought
under the notice of the Lords by Yiscount Dungannon, and of
the Commons by Mr. Johnstone, the latter said, " from inform
ation he had received, there were at this moment between 1,200
and 1,300 of our skilled artisans employed in the French dock
yards," and he added, that " it was a very grave matter that
some of our best shipwrights should be employed in building
French ships." $ Lord Clarence Paget replied that the regula
tions did not allow foreigners to work in French dockvards.
The Duke of Somerset stated, in answer to the question in
the Lords, that the only vessel now being built in Cherbourg
was a transport ; that so far from the French taking on fresh
hands, several hundreds of their own workpeople had been
lately discharged ; and that the British shipwrights who had
gone there in consequence of the statements which had ap
peared in the English newspapers, not being able to find work,
had " fallen into a pitiable condition, and bitterly repented their
credulity. "§
On the 23rd July, 1860, Lord Palmerston brought forward
the Government measure, for " the construction of works for the
defence of the royal dockyards and arsenals, and of the ports

Hansard, clvi. 519. f Hansard, clviii. 1309.
X Hansard, clix. 209. § Hansard, clix. 844.

i860.] THE THREE PANICS. 107
of Dover and Portland, and for the creation of a central
arsenal," when he delivered what was pronounced by Mr. Hors-
man to be one of the most serious and alarming speeches he
ever heard delivered by a minister of the Crown in the time of
peace," and which he declared he had heard with " satisfac
tion,"* This must bo admitted to have been only natural, for
Mr. Horsman found himself and his views in the ascendant,
A Commission had been appointed (at tho pressing instance, as
he informed us, of Sir De Lacy Evans) to devise a scheme of
fortifications, whose report, now laid before tho House and
adopted by the Government, recommended an expenditure,
spread over a scries of years, of £11,000,000, but which the
opponents of the scheme predicted would, according to all
analogous preoedent, result in an outlay of double the
amount. The most striking feature of this speech is, that it does not
contain one syllable of allusion to the navy — for which nearly
£13,000,000 had been voted this year — as a means of defending
our shores.'f The only supposition of a naval battle is, that it
occurs after the successful landing of a considerable force for
the purpose of destroying our dockyards, and " cutting up our
navy by the roots ;" and then we are told that, if any naval
aotion were to take place, whatever the success might be, " our
onemy would have his dockyards, arsenals, and stores to refit
and replenish, and reconstruct his navy ; whilst, with our dock
yards burnt, and our stores destroyed, wo should have no means
of refitting our navy and sending it out again to battle. "J

* Hansard, olx. 565.
f If the Secretary of the Admiralty keep a private diary, there will
be found, probably, inserted a commentary on this speech not unlike the
following, made on a similar oooasion by his predeoessor in the reign of
Charles II. : —
" March 22, 1667.— The Duke of York, instead of being at soa as ad
miral, Is now going from port to port, as he is this day at Harwioh, and
was the other day with the king at Sheerness, and hath ordered at Ports
mouth how fortifioations shall be mado to oppose the enemy in case of
invasion, which is to us a sad consideration, and shameful to the nation,
especially for so many proud vaunts as we have made against the Dutch
[French }]."— Pepys1 Diary. i Hansard, oh. 25.

108 THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC III.
There is then a description of our large exports and imports,
" our 10,000,000 quarters of corn imported annually, besides
enormous quantities of coffee, sugar, tea, and of cotton, which
is next in importance to corn for the support of the people " ;
followed by a picture of the consequences which would result
from " such places as Liverpool, Bristol, Glasgow, and London,
that is to say the Thames, being blockaded by a hostile
force." But not only is it assumed, that an enemy has landed, but
that an army is menacing the metropolis itself, and the fortifi
cations of the dockyards are described as the " means for the
defence of London, because they will set free a large amount of
force for the defence of the capital by operations in the field,"
for it is contended that, " if large forces are required to defend
your dockyards, you cannot concentrate for the defence of Lon
don that amount of force which would be necessary to meet an
invading army." And again — " The only defence for London
is an army in the field ; and any means which enable you to
make that army as large as your military establishments will
allow are directly subservient to the defence of the capital it
self."* There is not one syllable to indicate that we had at
that moment a fleet with 85,500 seamen, whilst, according to
the authority of the Prime Minister himself, the French navy
contained only 34,000 men.
It must, however, here be stated, that Lord Palmerston
has a peculiar theory respecting the effect of steam navigation
on our maritime strength, which he proceeds to develop. He
contends, that as long as the movement of ships depended on
the chances of the weather, " and as long as naval warfare was
carried on by means of sailing ships, we were in a position, by
our superior skill and aptitude for the sea and for naval combat,
to rest upon the strength which we then had afloat."— And he
proceeds to say : —
" The same difficulties which interposed in 1804-5 to prevent
a large army drawn up on the opposite coast of the Channel
from crossing over to this country, continued to exist; and,
therefore successive Governments were justified in abstaining
from any great effort for the purpose of artificial protection to

* Hansard, clx. 25, 26.

I860.] THE THREE PANICS. 109
our dockyards and other vulnerable points. But the intro
duction of steam changed this state of things. The adoption
of steam as a motive power afloat totally altered the character
of naval warfare, and deprived us of much of the advantages
of our insular position. Operations which, if not impossible,
were at least extremely difficult while sailing vessels alone were
employed, became comparatively easy the moment that steam
was introduced ; and, in fact, as I remember Sir Robert Peel
stating, steam had bridged the Channel, and, for the purposes
of aggression, had almost made this country cease to be an
island."* They who have sat for the last twenty years in the House of
Commons, have observed throughout the successive debates on
our National Defences, the constant reiteration of the opinion,
on the part of the present Prime Minister, that the application
of steam to navigation has supplied greater facilities for offence
than defence ; that it has, in fact, deprived us of our great
bulwark, by throwing what he has repeatedly called a " steam
bridge " over the Channel. It has been remarked, also, that
many other speakers have adopted his view, at the same time,
assigning to him the merit of its authorship. Thus, for
instance, in the long debate on the Militia Bill of 1852, Mr.
Walpole quoted this argument, as "so forcibly urged, on more
than one occasion in the course of the debate, by the noble
member for Tiverton " | ; and Lord Lyndhurst urged the same
view, with a similar acknowledgment of its origin.J It would,
however, be difficult to adduce the testimony of one eminent
authority in favour of this opinion, whilst a host of naval
officers and others might be quoted on the other side. Two or
three examples must suffice : —
Admiral Berkeley, a Lord of the Admiralty, in his evidence
before the Committee on the Navy, in 1848, said, " I believe,
myself, that the power which steam has given us, if we make
use of it properly, is the best guarantee we have against in
vasion, if we choose to make use of our resources, and organise
those resources in the best manner." §
Sir Thomas Hastings, President of the Commission for Coast
* Hansard, clx. 18. t Hansard, cxx. 1176.
X Ante, 72. § Minutes of Evidence, 3850.

110 THE THREE PANICS. [PANICIII.
Defences, under Sir Robert Peel's Government, in his evidence
before the Ordnance Committee, of 1849, expressed the same
opinion, and almost in the same terms.*
The opinion of Sir Charles Napier was thus expressed :—
" With regard to the effect of steam, it had been said that it
made blockading impossible ; but, on the contrary, he believed
that steam had, for the first time, made blockading effectual ;
for with a steam fleet it would be impossible for the ships
blockaded to escape without the knowledge of the blockading
squadron, as they had done in former times, when they landed
in Ireland, and when the great portion of the fleet escaped from
Brest unknown to those who were watching them."f
Captain Scobell, late member for Bath, whose utterances on
Naval questions were characterised by a robust common sense,
stated in the House that " he remembered being employed in
blockading Boulogne, where the invading army of Napoleon
was to have embarked, and his opinion was that this country
was more vulnerable then than now, the agency of steam had
done so much to strengthen it ; for calms and fogs would have
assisted the enemy much more then than now." J
Sir Morton Peto thus gives expression to the scientific view
of the question : — "We live in eventful times. The future of
any nation will no longer be determined by its courage alone ;
science and its practical applications will decide our future
battles ; and surely this should not be a source of weakness, but
of strength. We have unlimited supplies of iron and of coal ;
we have the best practical and scientific engineers. Our
country has been the birth-place of the steam-engine itself.
The rest of the world have copied us in its application to the
thousand ways in which it has contributed to the advancement
of civilisation and progress. It is a new thing that has
happened to our country, that in naval affairs, instead of leading,
we are taught by France and the rest of Europe." §
In a quotation given above, from Lord Palmerston's speech,
there is a very curious error in attributing to Sir Robert Peel
an opinion on this subject the very opposite of that which he

* Minutes of Evidence, 5021 . f Hansard, clx. 545.
X Hansard, cxix. 1448. § Hansard, clxii. 437

I860.] THE THREE PANICS. Ill
entertained. It is a singular illustration of the fallibility of
even the best of memories, that there should have been put
into the mouth of that minister, in perfect good faith, no doubt,
language, respecting a " steam bridge," which he emphatically
repudiated, so long ago as 1845, when uttered by the very
statesman who now assigned to him its authorship. The inci
dent is so curious, that, for correct illustration, the quotations
must be given textually, and in juxtaposition : —
Lord Palmerston (July 30, 1845.) " In reference to steam-
navigation, what he said was, that the progress which had been
made had converted the ordinary means of transport into a
steam-bridge."* Sir Robert Peel (same date in reply). " The noble lord
(Lord Palmerston) appeared to retain the impression that our
means of defence were rather abated by the discovery of steam-
navigation. He was not at all prepared to admit that. He
thought that the demonstration which we could make of our
steam-navy was one which would surprise the world ; and as
the noble lord had spoken of steam-bridges, he would remind
him that there were two parties who oould play at making
them."f Lord Palmerston (July 23, 1860.) " And, in fact, as I re
member Sir Robert Peel stating, steam had bridged the Channel,
and for the purpose of aggression, had almost made this country
cease to be an island." J
The above citations, if they do not warrant the conclusion,
that the theory of steam-navigation having rendered our shores
more vulnerable to attack originated exclusively with the
present Prime Minister, prove at least, beyond dispute, that in
the costly application of that theory to this plan of fortifications,
he has been acting in opposition to the recorded opinions of the
most eminent statesman, and the highest professional and prac
tical authorities of the age.
But to return to the speech before us. There is one striking
resemblance between all the oratorical efforts on the invasion
question, in their total omission of all allusion to the numerical

* Hansard, lxxxii. 1233. t Ibid.
% Hansard, clx. 18.

112 THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC III.
strength of our own forces. If the reader will take the trouble
to refer back to the speech delivered by the noble lord on the
30th July, 1845, when urging Sir Robert Peel's Government to
an increase of our armaments, it will be found that our peril
then arose from the existence in France of an army of
"340,000 men, fully equipped, including a large force of
cavalry and artillery ; and, in addition to that, 1,000,000 of the
National Guard."* The danger on the present occasion is owing
to " an army of six hundred and odd thousand men, of whom
four hundred and odd thousand are actually under arms, and the
remainder are merely on furlough, and can be called into the
ranks in a fortnight." t The million of National Guards of
France had disappeared ; but there is no allusion to the
addition which we had in the mean time made to our own force
of more than 200,000 volunteers and militia, besides the large
increase of regulars.
" But this characteristic omission will be more apparent in the
case of the navies. In 1845, we were told that, the French had
a fleet in " commission and half commission " equal to that of
this country. We are now informed, that " the utmost exer
tions have been made, and still are making, to create a navy
very nearly equal to our own — a navy which cannot be required
for purposes of defence for France, and which, therefore, we are
justified in looking upon as a possible antagonist we may have
to encounter — a navy which, under present arrangements,
would give to our neighbours the means of transporting, within
a few hours, a large and formidable number of troops to our
coast." J To bring the statement, that the French Government
had been, and still was, striving to create a navy very nearly
equal to our own, once more to the test of figures, let us
compare the increase which had taken place in the two navies
in the interval between 1847, the last year of Louis Philippe's
reign, and 1860, the year in which this speech was made.
The comparison is limited to the men, because the definitive
audit of the French accounts not being yet published for
1860, it will avoid all dispute to take the present number of

-<*«<«> P- 6. t Hansard, clx. 22.
J Hansard, clx. 23.

I860.] THE THREE PANICS. 113
French seamen on the authority of the Prime Minister at
34,000,* although the French Estimate admits only 30,588.
Strength of the English and French Navies in Number of Seamen,
in the Years 1847 and 1860.

1847.

1860.

T

No. of Men.

No. of Men.

increase

English .

. 44,969

85,500

English 40,531

French .

. 32,169

34,000

French 1,831

It will be seen, by the above figures, that whilst England
had increased her force 40,531 men, France had augmented hers
only 1831 . If the French estimate of the number of their seamen
be correctly given, which has not been disproved by any state
ment of facts, then the force maintained by them is actually
less in 1860 than it was in 1847. Nor must it be forgotten,
that in proposing the Navy Estimates, the Secretary of the
Admiralty had informed us a few months before that we had
456 steamers afloat to 244 French. It has been shown, too,
that our dockyard expenditure for wages in 1859 was
£1,582,112, whilst in France it amounted to £772,931, or less
than one-half; and in proof that this activity in the Govern
ment yards had been unabated in 1860, it is only necessary to
refer to the First Lord's statement on the 1st May, already
quoted, t that during the preceding eight months more men
had been employed in our dockyards than at any previous time,
not even excepting the period of the great war with France
which terminated in 1815.
It must here be mentioned, that this state of things led to the
publication of a semi-official French pamphlet, in the summer
of 1860, under the sanction of the Minister of State, with a
view to expose the unprecedented and disproportionate increase
of our navy, as compared with that of France. This pamphlet J
oontains a detailed comparison of the English and French
naval expenditures, accompanied with elaborate statistics of
their respective forces. The writer of these pages has, how-

* Hansard, clxi. 1789. t Ante, p. 101.
X The Navy Budgets of France and England. By M. Cuohbvai,
Olabiont.

114 THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC III.
ever, preferred to rely exclusively upon official sources of infor
mation ; namely, the definitively audited accounts of France,
and our own parliamentary reports, and the statements of our
official men.
Such were the comparative forces of the two countries, when
the speech under consideration was delivered. Englishmen
had a perfect right, if they saw in the act no derogation from
the attitude of their fathers, who boasted of needing " no bul
warks, no towers along the steep," to ensconce themselves behind
fortifications, in addition to a fleet of more than double the
strength of that of France. It was purely a question of security
and national honour, and in itself was not an aggressive measure
towards other countries. It was made an act of offence towards
France, solely by the speech which accompanied it, and which
was an amplification of the invasion-speeches of 1845 and 1851.
The objects of the invaders were now more minutely described ;
they were to make a sudden descent on our shores, to burn and
destroy our naval arsenals, and this not with a view to con
quest, for the speaker " dismissed from his mind the idea that
any foreign power would dream of conquering this country with
the view of permanent possession ;" nor did he believe that an
invasion would " ever be likely to be attended with permanent
advantage to an enemy, except in so far as it might inflict
injury on this country." The argument, in fact, assumed that
we were in precisely the same state of insecurity as if our
neighbours had been a barbarous tribe whose actions were
inspired by mere love of vengeance and plunder, without any
restraining forethought or calculation of consequences, and who
afforded none of those hostages for peace which are to be found
in the possession of great wealth, or extensive manufactures and
commerce. There was a tone of assumed defencelessness on our part
pervading the whole speech, which found repeated utterance in
such phrases as, "You cannot, you are not entited to rely upon
the forbearance of a stronger neighbour," or, " For the sake of
peace, it is desirable that we should not live upon forbearance,
but that we should be able fully and effectually to defend our
selves." The speaker then assumes that a difficulty has arisen
with some foreign power, and says, " With the utmost desire
that such matters may be amicably adjusted ; yet, if one country

I860.] THE THREE PANICS. 115
is greatly the stronger, and another country greatly the weaker,
it is very difficult for any arrangement to be made " ; and then,
that there may be no doubt which is the feebler party, it is
assumed that, " the weaker power consists of a high-spirited and
patriotic nation, with free institutions and with the popular
feeling manifested on every occasion by means of a free press."
Now, if such language had been addressed to a people whose
shores were really in danger from a more powerful neighbour,
this would have been a legitimate appeal to their patriotism,
but when it emanated from the Prime Minister of a nation,
whose ability to defend its coasts was double that of its
neighbour to assail them, such an attitude was very similar to
what, in individual life, would be represented by a man, in
possession of both his hands, taunting and accusing another,
possessing but one, with the design of assaulting him.
There was a remarkable contrast between the present speech,
and those delivered by the same speaker in 1845 and 1851 — a
contrast all the more significant that he was now Prime
Minister, whereas on former occasions he spoke only as an
opposition member of parliament ; namely, that it did not
content itself with an abstract hypothesis of a possible invasion,
but pointed to France as the menacing cause of actual danger.
The cry of "Wolf!" had been so repeatedly heard for fifteen
years, that it seemed as though it was necessary not only to name
the wolf itself, but to depict the scowling aspect and crouching
attitude of the beast of prey. The following passage leaves no
doubt about the quarter from whence the attack was to be ex
pected : —
" Now, Sir, as to the necessity for these works, I think it is
impossible for any man to cast his eyes over the face of
Europe, and to see and hear what is passing- without being
convinced that the future is not free from danger. It is diffi
cult to say where the storm may burst ; but the horizon is
charged with clouds .which betoken the possibility of a tempest,
The Committee of course knows, that, in the main, I am speaking
of our immediate neighbours across the Channel, and there is no use

in

¦<»*

* Hansard, clx. 21.
i2

HQ THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC III.
To appreciate fully the scope and bearing of these words, it
is necessary to refer to the precise circumstances under which
they were spoken. The speech was delivered on the '23rd July,
1860. At that moment, the negociation of the details of the
Commercial Treaty with France, upon the liberal arrangement
of which depended the whole success of the measure, was at its
most critical and important stage. The public mind was under
considerable misapprehension respecting the progress of the
measure, owing to the systematic misrepresentations which
were promulgated in certain political circles, and by a portion
of the press* The British ministry alone knew that, up to that
time, the French Government had manifested a disposition to
carry out the details of the Treaty with even unexpected
liberality, and they could not have been unaware how important
it was, at such a juncture, to preserve a conciliatory tone
towards that Government. It was, at this critical moment,
that the speech burst upon the negociations in Paris. Had its
object been to place the British Commissioners at, the greatest
possible disadvantage, it could not have more effectually accom
plished the purpose. It cut the ground from under their foot,
in so far as the French Government had been actuated by the
poHtical motives (apart from politico-economical considerations) of
seeking to strengthen the friendly relations of the two countries
as represented by their governments. This plea of high state-
policy, with which the Emperor's government had met the com
plaints of the powerful interests which believed themselves com
promised by the Treaty, was in a moment silenced and turned
against itself. The offensive passages in the speech were
instantly transferred to the pages of the protectionist organs,
accompanied with loud expostulations addressed to their own
government : " You are sacrificing us," they said, " in the hope
of conciliating the political alliance of our ancient rival ; and
now, behold the reward you are receiving at the hands of the

* In justice to the newspaper press, which almost universally took a
hopeful view of the Treaty, and gave a generous support to the negocia
tions, the notorious exception must be mentioned. The Timet persisted
in its attacks and misrepresentations, until silenced by the all but unani
mous expression of opinion on the part of the manufacturing and com
mercial community in favour of the Treaty.

I860.] THE THREE PANICS. ' 117
Prime Minister of England." These taunts resounded in the
salons of the enlightened Minister of Commerce, and murmurs
were heard even in the palace itself. A profound sensation was
produced among all classes by this speech ; and no other words
could adequately express the emotions experienced by the
French negociators, but astonishment and indignation. Had
the Emperor seized the occasion for instantly suspending the
negociations, he would have undoubtedly performed a most
popular part ; but on this, as on other occasions, his habitual
calmness and self-mastery prevailed, and to these qualities
must be mainly attributed the successful issue of the Treaty.
It is impossible to construct any theory of motives to account
for this speech, consistent with a wise or serious statesmanship,
and it probably met with the only appropriate commentary,
in the following remarks which fell from Mr. Bernal
Osborne : —
"At the commencement of the session, I gave my humble
support to a Commercial Treaty with France, under the idea
that I was promoting good and substantial relations with that
country. The noble lord (Lord Palmerston) has told us that
we should not speak of this Treaty with levity ; but his actions
are inconsistent with his words, for the resolution before us is
the oddest sequel imaginable to a Commercial Treaty. After
taking off all the duties on French manufactures, we are asked
to vote nominally £9,000,000, though I believe it will ulti
mately be nearer £20,000,000, for the construction of defences
to keep out our friends and customers. Why, Sir, if this was
not an expensive amusement, it would be the most ludicrous
proceeding ever proposed to a deliberative assembly." *
This project was voted by the House on the 2nd August, after a
few hours' debate, in which scarcely any of the leading members
spoke. Mr. Sidney Herbert, who took a prominent part in the
discussion, declared that it was unwise in England " to leave a
great temptation — to leave her vast property and her reputation
at stake, and at the mercy of any nation which may choose to
send an expedition in consequence of some diplomatic quarrel" ; f
-totally oblivious of the 456 Government steamers, the 85,500

» Hansard, clx. 553. t Hansard, ib. 506.

118 THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC III.
seamen, and upwards of 300,000 armed men, including volun
teers, then ready to meet an invading enemy !* This was
spoken ten days after the delivery of the Prime Minister's
speech, which had, of course, produced its natural effect out of
doors, and to which Mr. Herbert could thus triumphantly
appeal, in replying to Mr. Bright : —
"Is it not a fact, I ask him, that the whole nation is full of
alarm and suspicion ? The people feel that they ought to obtain
security at any price. We have, therefore, spent a large sum
in putting our stores and munitions of war in order. We have
an increase of the army — not a large increase, it is true, but
still an increase. All these things are cheerfully borne by the
people, and more is called for — more, perhaps, than the Govern
ment are willing to do. Is not that an indication that there
must, in the minds of an immense majority of the people, be
some cause for alarm ? The country feels that it is not in a
proper state of defence, and that, if we deal with the question
at all, we should deal with the whole of it if we can. Such
are the feelings which I believe animate the public out of
doors."-)- This is a fair illustration of the manner in which panics are
created and sustained. A Government proposes a large expen
diture for armaments, on the plea that France is making vast
warlike preparations ; and the public, being thereby impressed
with a sense of impending danger, takes up the cry of alarm,
when the Minister quotes the echo of his own voice as a justifi
cation of his policy, and a sufficient answer to all opponents.
This mode of argument was thus commented upon on a subse
quent occasion by Mr. Bright, when replying to another
speaker : —
" But he knows perfectly well that what is called the country
must necessarily take its opinions at second-hand. Manu
facturers, farmers, professional men, shopkeepers, artisans, and

* With a similar obliviousness of our own armaments, the Fortifications
Bill was thus greeted by the Earl of EUenborough in the Lords :— " I have,
during the last thirteen years, endeavoured to draw the attention of this
House and the country to the almost defenceless state of the realm,
earnestly desiring that we should not remain unarmed in the midst of an
armed world."— Hansard, clx. 1563.
t Hansard, clx. 502.

I860.] THE THREE PANICS. 119
labourers do not con over these blue-books of ours, and read the
accounts minutely given in the French votes. They know very
httle of this. They take their opinions from what is stated in
this House and in the public press. And, of course, when there
are men of the high position of the noble lord at the head of
the Government and others associated with him, who have been
in the service of the country for twenty, thirty, or forty years,
it is only reasonable that the opinions which they express, and
the statements which are made in their hearing, but which they
do not take the trouble to contradict, should sink into the minds
of the people, and become with them a fixed belief, although
founded upon no knowledge whatever."*
This gigantic scheme of fortifications is without a parallel in
any single project of the kind ; and, judging by the analog) of
Keyham and the Channel Islands, it may be predicted that, if
allowed to go on, it will eventually involve an expenditure of
double the amount of the original estimate. In the course of
the debate Mr. Sidney Herbert stated that " it was chiefly on
the advice of Sir Howard Douglas that the Grovernment acted
in making the proposition they now made." J Now it is known
that this officer entertained to the last a faith in large wooden
ships, and even believed that sailing line-of-battle ships would
play a part in future naval wars. He could form no idea of
Portsmouth, Plymouth, and the other dockyards, hut that which
was suggested by the past appearance of their harbours, crowded
with wooden vessels, some in commission or half commission,
some afloat in ordinary, and others in process of construction,
with timber enough in store for two or three years' consump
tion, at the rate of thirty or forty thousand loads a-year. The
scheme of fortifications approved by bim might be very con
sistent with these views.
But if in accordance with the advice of Sir William Ann-

* Hansard, cbri. 17S5.
t Hansard, clx. 562. It is one of the evils of our day that men are
often retained in the direction of great national undertakings long beyond
the period of life when they are considered eligible for employment in
conducting private concerns. — Sir Howard Douglas was, when consulted by
the Government on this occasion, in his SSrdyear : an age when men may
be said to live only in the past, and to retain, for the affairs of tins life,
scarcely any interest in the future.

120 THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC III.
strong, Mr. Fairbairn, Sir Morton Peto, and other high author
ities, on whose engineering skill the Government profess to
rely, our ships of war are henceforth constructed entirely of
iron (not wood cased in iron), and if they are built, as they will
be if the country be wise, by contract in private yards, the
" roots " of our navy will henceforth be on the Clyde, the
Thames, the Mersey, and the Tyne, and not in Portsmouth or
Plymouth. As for repairs, a vessel built wholly of iron four or
five inches thick will, like an iron bridge, be practically inde
structible. With railroads running from the interior into all
our dockyards, perishable stores for the navy may be kept
at the Tower, Weedon, or other inland dep6ts. It is, be
sides, notorious that great waste and abuse of various kinds
arise from the unnecessarily large amount of these stores kept
on hand.
With the revolution thus glanced at now going on in naval'-
armaments, it is possible that when the grand scheme of fortifi
cations for Portsmouth, extending to the South Downs, are
complete, to prevent the "cradle of our navy from being
burnt and destroyed," an enemy will find very few combustible
materials in that arsenal except the coal. Our dockyards will
then possess, comparatively, only a traditional importance, unless,
indeed, we adopt the dishonouring theory that our fleets
require fortified places in which to take refuge from an
enemy. The first proof to be offered by the Government, to whatever
party it may belong, of the triumph of common sense in the
conduct of our national affairs, will be the suspension of this
panic-begotten scheme.
The speech of the Premier was calculated to give a renewed
impulse to the agitation out of doors ; but, owing to a cause
which will be immediately explained, a reaction was taking
place on the invasion question in the manufacturing districts,
and the most exciting of the martial demonstrations which were
witnessed during the ensuing autumn and winter occurred in
obscure agricultural places.*

* The following specimen will suffice to recall to the reader's recollec
tion the scenes that were passing at the close of 1860 : 
" Dinner to Major Watlington, M.P. for South Essex.— On Wednesday

I860.] THE THREE PANICS. 121
During the negotiation of the details of the French commer
cial treaty, which extended over nearly the whole of 1860,
deputations from our manufacturing districts, and from the
metropolis, paid repeated visits to Paris, to afford information to
the British Commissioners respecting their various productions.
These intelligent capitalists returned to England impressed
with the conviction that a great commercial revolution was
being inaugurated in France ; and this conviction found expres
sion in the reports which the deputations made to their con
stituents. A natural revulsion from the state of panic followed.
Eeflecting men began to ask themselves if it could be possible
that the most logical people were contemplating at the same
time a policy of free trade and of unprovoked hostile aggres
sion, — that the Emperor, whose great intelligence no one dis
puted, could really be aiming at pursuing, in his own person,
the incompatible careers of the first Napoleon and Sir Robert
Peel! But the warning voice of the Prime Minister, which still
rang in the public ear, coupled with the gigantic project of
fortifications, made even intelligent men pause in their final
judgment upon the designs of the ruler of France. This con
flict of public opinion induced several members of parliament to
institute a personal inquiry into the naval preparations of
France. Mr. Dalglish, M.P., for Glasgow, who had served on

afternoon, Major J. W. Perry Watlington, M.P., was entertained at dinner
at Harlow Bush House by the members of the B troop of West Essex
Feomanry Cavalry, on his promotion from the rank of captain of the
troop to the rank of major of the regiment. Major Watlington having
thanked the company for the compliment paid him, and made some
remarks regarding the character of the yeomanry cavalry and the volun
teer rifle movement, proceeded to say, if this country was in danger it
would be necessary to make preparation ; but when such a man as Lord
Palmerston, who had the command of all the resources of knowledge and
information to enable him to know correctly the state of the pulse of the
Emperor of the French, and tell rightly to what end each pulsation
of that pulse tended, asked the House of Commons to grant millions
for our defence in fortifications — when he pointed to the other side
of the Channel, and held the Emperor of the French up as the bug
bear, then it would be positive madness to doubt there was danger,
and it would be culpable negligence not to be prepared for it. (Hear,
hear.)"

122 THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC 111.
a Commission* for inquiring into the management of the dock
yards, visited France to examine the system of government
accounts, and to inform himself as to the progress making in
her naval armaments ; and he took an opportunity of saying in
the House, that, "having been to Toulon and Cherbourg,
within the last fortnight, he could assure the hon. gentleman,
the member for Norfolk, who appeared not to have got over the
panic about a French invasion, that all his fears were ground
less, so far as the preparations connected with shipbuilding, in
those quarters were concerned." f Sir Morton Peto, who had
been largely connected with industrial undertakings in that
country, despatched an intelligent agent to report to him the
state of its various dockyards. Every facility for these inves
tigations was afforded by the French Government ; and the re
sult was invariably to disprove the statements of the alarmists,
and to corroborate the accounts contained in the semi-official
pamphlet of M. Cucheval Clarigny.
Mr. Lindsay, M.P. for Sunderland, also visited Paris, and
sought an interview with the Minister of Marine, to obtain in
formation respecting the actual state of the French navy, and
he was so convinced, by the frank and unreserved explanations
of that Minister, of the erroneous impression which prevailed in
England, that he comunicated the information, in the first place,
by letter, to Lord Clarence Paget, and afterwards to the House

* This Commission reported as follows : —
The Iloyal Commission, appointed in 1860, to inquire into the manage
ment of the dockyards, report that the control and management of dock
yards are inefficient from the following causes : —
1 . The constitution of the Board of Admiralty.
2. The defective organisation of the subordinate departments.
3. The want of clear and well-defined responsibility.
4. The absence of any means, both now and in times past, of effectually
checking expenditure, from the want of accurate accounts.
" The want of accurate accounts,'' seems to be a chronic malady at the
Admiralty, if we may judge by the following penitent confession of the
quaint Secretary, in the time of Charles II. : —
" Nov. 10, 1666.— The Parliament did fall foul of our accounts again
yesterday : and we must arme to have them examined, which I am sorry
for ; it will bring great trouble to me, and shame to the office." — Pepys'
Diary. f Hansard, clxii. 465.

I860.] THE THREE PANICS. 123
of Commons, soon after the opening of the session. It seems
from the following extract from his speech, that the French
Minister, imitating the example of his predecessor, M. Ducos, in
1853, invited our Secretary of the Admiralty (but in vain) to
make a personal inspection of the French dockyards : —
" The Minister of Marine was anxious that the feeling of
alarm in England on that subject should be got rid of. He
aaid ' I have shown you everything ; I have given you official
documents ; I will do more if you desire. Will you go and
visit our dockyards and arsenals ? I will send a gentleman
with you, who will throw open everything to you, and you may
see with your own eyes everything.' He (Mr. Lindsay) de
clined, saying he was tired of wandering about ; but the state
ment which he had received, confirmed by these books, was so
different from what was commonly believed, that he had sent
the figures of the Minister of Marine, to his noble friend the
Secretary of the Admiralty, and extended to him the invitation
of the Minister of Marine to visit the French dockyards and
arsenals. He had received a reply, in which the noble lord
pleaded want of time and pressing engagements, but still
seemed to entertain doubts as to the accuracy of the state
ments." *
On the 11th March, 1861, the Secretary of the Admiralty
introduced the Navy Estimates for the ensuing year. He
stated, " that in consequence of the termination of the China
war, the number of seamen actually borne in the previous year,
had not exceeded 81,100, being 4,400 less than the 85,500
voted ; and he now asked for 78,200, which he considered to be
only a reduction of 2,900 upon the force of the previous year.
" But," he added, " the House would be glad to hear that there
was a force of something like 25,000 reserves, available at a
moment's notice if an emergency should make it necessary to
man a large fleet."
With respect to ships, he proceeded, "We have expended
during the present year, or, at least, shall have expended by the
end of the month, no less than 80,000 loads of timber— more
than double the ordinary rate of consumption," and he laid
before the House the result in vessels : " We have built during
Hansard, clxi. 1147.

124 THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC III.
this year 9,075 tons of line-of-battle ships, 12,189 tons of
frigates, 4,138 tons of corvettes, 6,367 tons of sloops, 1,409
tons of gun and despatch vessels, and 102 tons of gun-boats,
making a total of 33,280 tons." He announced that for the
ensuing year it was the intention of the Government to confine
themselves to the construction of frigates and smaller vessels,
adding, " I may further observe, that so far as large vessels are
concerned, we are in a very satisfactory position." * At a sub
sequent stage of these naval discussions, he defined more clearly
this position by a comparison with other countries, showing
that we had seventeen more of these large ships (besides block-
ships) than all the rest of the world — " We have," he said,
" 67 line-of-battle ships built or building. France has 37,
Spain 3, Russia 9, and Italy 1, making 50." f The nine coast
guard block- ships have again passed entirely into oblivion !
Bearing in mind, that this prodigious increase in large
wooden vessels had been going on after actual experiment had
verified the success of iron-cased batteries in resisting com
bustible shells, it is really a waste almost unparalleled for reck
lessness and magnitude. It may be illustrated in private life,
by the supposition that a large proprietor of stage-coaches
doubled his stock of vehicles and horses at the very time when
the locomotive and the railroad had entered into successful
competition with the traffic of the turnpike-roads ! A reaction
against this policy now manifested itself in the very able
opposition speeches delivered by Mr. Baxter, Mr. Lindsay, and
Mr. Bright.
Lord Palmerston took a part in the debate. " The French,"
he said, " make no secret of their preparations ; but when some
well-intentioned gentleman asks them if they really mean to
invade this country, if they really have any hostile intentions
towards us, of course, they say ' Not the least in the world,' their
feeling is one of perfect sympathy and friendship with us, and
that all their preparations are for their own self-advancement." J
And, again, " Really, Sir, it is shutting one's eyes to notorious
facts, to go on contending that the policy of France of which
I certainly do not complain— has not for a great length of time

* Hansard, clxi. 1747. f Hansard, clxii. 442.
X Hansard, clxi. 1791.

THE THREE PANICS. 125
been to get up a navy which shall be equal, if not superior, to
our own."*
For the last occasion let us bring this statement that the
French had for a long time been trying to be our equals, if not
superiors, at sea, to the test of figures — not French, but British
figures. In this very debate, both Lord Palmerston and Lord
Clarence Paget give the French naval force at 34,000 seamen,
which shall be accepted as correct, though the French estimate
is under 31,000. The Secretary of the Admiralty had, just
before the Premier spoke, proposed a vote of 78,200 men for
our navy for 1861. Now let the reader turn once more to the
table in the first page, and he will seek in vain for any year,
except 1859 and 1860, when the same noble lord was Prime
Minister, when our force was double that of France, or even
approached to such a disproportionate number. And it must be
remembered, that the French consider that the reserve of 25,000
brings our force up to 100,000 men.
But, in order to test the statement, that France had been
trying to get up a navy equal to our own by a comparison of
ships as well as men, the following extract is given from the
speech, delivered the same evening by the Secretary of the
Admiralty : —
" He assumed that hon. gentlemen would accept the statement
of the British navy he had laid before them as correct, and that
showed that we had 53 screw line-of-battle ships afloat and 14
building and converting, making a total of 67. The French had
35 afloat and two building, making a total of 37. We had
31 screw and 9 paddle frigates afloat and 12 building, making
a total of 52 ; the 'French had 21 screw and 18 paddle frigates
afloat and 8 building, making a total of 47. He did not think
that the discussion had extended to the smaller classes of steam
ships ; but including them, the French had 266 vessels afloat
and 61 building, making a total of 327 ; while we had 505
afloat and 57 building, making a total of 562." f
Now let us take, for comparison, the large ships ; for our im
mense superiority in smaUer vessels has been admitted from the
first. The constant cry of alarm has been founded on the asser-

* Hansard, clxi. 1788. t Hansard, ib. 1773

126 THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC III.
tion that France was attempting to rival us in ships of the line.
The date at which we have now arrived, and when the speech
from which the above extract is given was delivered, is the 11th
March, 1861. It is here said, that France has thirty-seven line-
of-battle ships built and building. On the 18th May, 1857,
nearly four years previously, Sir Charles Wood, then First
Lord, stated that France had forty liners built and building.*
The same number is given for 1858 in the Report already
quoted, presented to Parliament by Lord Derby's Government.!
And on the 25th February, 1859, the country was startled by
the statement of Sir John Pakington, that England and France
were on an equality of twenty-nine J each " completed " ships of
the line. What, then, has been the progress made by the
French in nearly four years, during which we had the great
invasion-speeches of Lord Lyndhurst, and Mr. Horsman, the
almost incessant agitation of Sir Charles Napier, the rifle corps
movement, the unparalleled expenditure in the dockyards, the
gigantic fortification scheme, and all on the pretext that France
was making great efforts to rival us at sea ? Why, — it turns
out, on the authority of our own Government, that France had
fewer line-of-battle ships in 1861 than she was alleged to possess
in 1857 ; she had forty built and building in 1857, and thirty-
seven in 1861, or less by three ; — the French Government, be it
remembered, state officially their number to be only thirty-five.
Our own liners, which were fifty in 1857, were now sixty-seven
in 1861 (besides the block-ships), being an increase of seventeen.
The number of French frigates is given at forty-seven in 1861,
and they were stated by Sir John Pakington, in 1859, at forty-
six^ being an increase of one only in two years. Our own
frigates were put down at thirty-four in 1859, || and fifty-two in
1861, being an increase of eighteen.
It would be a waste of the reader's time and patience to offer
any further evidence in a case which, having been subjected to
so many tests, is at last demonstrated to be utterly groundless
on the authority of British officials and our own public docu
ments. In the above quotation from Lord Palmerston's speech, the

Ante, 44. t Parliamentary Paper, 182 1859, p. 16.
X Ante, 55. § Ante, 56. || Ibid.

1861.] THE THREE PANICS. 27
allegation, that the French had for a long time been trying to
equal or surpass us at sea, is accompanied with the remark, " of
which I certainly do not complain." If such a design on the
part of the French Government really did exist (which has been
disproved) , it would be a matter of grave concern, and even of com
plaint, to the tax-paying people of this country : — for with what
legitimate or peaceful object could that Government be seeking
to disturb the immemorial relations which England and France
have borne to each other as maritime powers ?
France possesses less than a fourth of our mercantile marine ;
she has not, perhaps, the hundredth part of our possessions to
defend beyond the seas. She has more than double our mili
tary force ; and whilst her land frontier gives her access to the
Continent, and thereby to the whole world, we have no means
of communication with any other country but by water. She
has, therefore, no necessity for, and no legitimate pretensions to,
an equality with us at sea ; nor is there in her history any pre
cedent for such a policy. J£, under such circumstances, the
present French ruler attempted for the first time to equal if not
surpass us in naval armaments, the reasonable conclusion would
be, that either he had some sinister purpose in view, or that he
was a rash and unreflecting, and therefore a dangerous neigh
bour. K, after the offer of frank explanations on our part, with
a view to avert so irrational a waste, that ruler persisted in his
extraordinary preparations, there is no amount of expenditure
which this country would not bear to maintain our due supe
riority at sea. But such a state of things would be accompanied
with a sense of grievance ; and it would make it quite incon
sistent with all serious statesmanship to attempt to unite the
two Governments in alliances for peace or war in other parts of
the world, until the vital question respecting our own security
at home had received a better solution than is offered by the
maintenance of a war-establishment to protect us from an
invasion by a so-called friend and ally.
The reaction which had taken place in intelligent minds
against our injudicious naval armaments found expression in the
House on the 11th April, 1861, when Mr. Lindsay, after an
able speech, carried a resolution for putting an end to the
further construction of large wooden vessels. The speech of
Sir Morton Peto in support of this measure contains much

128

THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC HI.

valuable advice for the guidance of Government in iron ship
building, and Sir Joseph Paxton and Mr. Dalglish spoke with
practical force for the motion. Not one word could be said, in
any quarter, in behalf of wooden ships of the line, and a pledge
was extorted from Government that no more of these vessels
should be built, and that those still on the stocks should remain
unfinished, thus tacitly admitting that the immense fleet of
line-of-battle ships now afloat were worse than useless, and
that if they had not been built, under the excitement of the
panic, they would not now have been ordered to be constructed.
This might be inferred from the remark which fell from Captain
Jervis. " The shell," said he, " now acted as a mine ; it burst
in passing through the side of the vessel, and would so shatter
it that wooden line-of-battle ships would be nothing better than
mere slaughter-houses."* In fact, it is doubted by intelligent
naval authorities whether, in case of a war between two mari
time powers, wooden ships of the line would be ever subjected
to che fire of modern shell guns.
We now arrive at the last, and not the least, characteristic
scene of the third panic.
On the 31st May, 1861, Sir John Pakington rose in the
House, and addressing the Speaker said, " Sir, I now rise to call
attention to a subject, the importance of which no one will deny.
I have received information with respect to the French Go
vernment, in building armour-covered ships, to which I think
it my duty to call the attention of the House and of her
Majesty's Government without any loss of time." The right
hon. gentleman then proceeded to say, that he was about to
make his important statement on the authority of a British
naval officer of high professional reputation, who, during the
last three weeks had visited all the French ports and arsenals
with the exception of Toulon ; but he weakened the zest of the
coming disclosure, by adding that Admiral Elliot did not wish
to be under the suspicion of having acted as a spy : — " I should,
therefore," said the speaker, " state that whatever information
he has obtained was obtained in an open manner, and he visited
the French dockyards with the advantage of having received
the permission of the Minister of Marine. [Mr. Lindsay ;
Hansard, clxii. 460.

18610 THE THREE PANICS. 129
hear, hear !] I understand the motive of that cheer, and it is
only due to the French Government to state that on the part of
the French Admiralty there has been nothing like any intention
to conceal its preparations." There is a curious resemblance, in
the tone of this speech, to that which was delivered in moving
the Navy Estimates of 1859 ;— the same disavowal of the idea
of alarming ; the like absence of any exclusive information ; and
yet the apparent disposition to invest the whole proceeding
with the character of a revelation. " I have no wish," he said,
" tojexcite alarm by making this statement. I make it, because
I think it my duty to communicate to the Government and the
House, in this public manner, information of so startling a
character." The statement thus heralded was, that the French were pre
paring to build fifteen armour-plated ships, besides nine gun
boats, and floating batteries. There was not a word of informa
tion as to the precise stages in which these twenty-four vessels
and batteries had been found ; it was admitted that some (it was
not said how many) "were only lately laid down." Lord
Clarence Paget* spoke subsequently of nine having, during the
last few months, been " laid down, or prepared to be laid down" ;
and, on the same occasion, Lord Palmerstonf said the French
Government were " beginning " to lay them down. No test of
accuracy can be applied to the vague statements respecting
those projected vessels. But the allusion to the Magenta
and Solferino, two ships which everybody knew to be building
as the companions to La Gloire, is more precise. " These two
vessels," said the right hon. gentleman, "are to be launched
the ensuing month, and to be added immediately to the strength
of the French navy." At the time when these pages are going
to press (March, 1862), these ships are still unfinished, and are
expected to remain so for several months. Throwing aside all
dependence on the wooden fleets, which the Admiralty had just
completed, he proceeded, for the second time, to proclaim the
danger of French maritime ascendancy : —
" Why are these preparations being made in France ? I will
not enter into the motives by which the French Government
may be influenced in making such efforts. Every one is able to

* Hansard, clxiii., 425. t Hansard, ib., 535.
K

130 THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC III.
judge for himself for what ultimate end these preparations are
intended. The point to which I invite attention is, that what
ever may be the motive of France, the practical result is that
we are rapidly becoming the second maritime power of Europe,
It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of this statement.
Is it true, or is it not true ? If it be true, what are the inten
tions of the Government." *
Admiral Walcott confirmed the statement of the preceding
speaker, and said, "he felt quite convinced that a neighbouring
country was at that moment in command of a most formidable
number of iron-cased ships." And Sir James Elphinstone, also
a naval officer, followed in the same strain, declaring the report
they had just heard " ought justly to alarm the Government
and people of this country."
It is a curious feature in this discussion, that the alarm was
chiefly confined to the naval officers, whilst those members who
resisted, what Mr. Dalglish designated the " attempt that had
been made by the right hon. member for Droitwich, to startle
the country " represented precisely those constituencies whose
interests would be the most compromised by the loss of the
protection which our navy is designed to afford. Mr. Lindsay
(Sunderland), Mr. Dalglish (Glasgow), and Mr. Baxter
(Dundee), who had spoken previously, all represent important
commercial sea-ports.
But to return to the question put by Sir John Pakington—
" Why are these preparations being made inFrance " ? There was
not one of his audience so competent to answer this question as
the right hon. gentleman himself: for when he was First Lord of
the Admiralty, he laid on the table of the House, on the 4th
April, 1859, that Report on " The Comparative State of the
Navies of England and France," to which allusion has been so
frequently made, drawn up by his own confidential officials for
the special information of the Government, in which the fol
lowing passage occurs, with reference to the future policy of the
French Government : —
" It is stated that these iron-sided ships, of which two- are
more than half completed, will be substituted for line-of-battle
ships ; their timbers are of the scantling of a three decker •

Hansard, clxiii.417.

1^61.] THE THREE PANICS. 131
they are to have thirty-six heavy guns, most of them rifled
50-pounders, which will throw an 801b. hollow percussion shot;
they will be cased with iron ; and so convinced do naval men seem
to be in France of the irresistible qualities of these ships, that they
are of opinion that no more ships of the line will be laid down, and
that in ten years that class of vessels will have become obsolete."*
With this document in his hand, the right hon. gentleman
commenced, in 1859, with frantic haste, the reconstruction of
our wooden navy, which was carried on still more frantically
by bis successor, notwitiistjmding that the Report of 1859 in
formed them that "no line-of-battle ship had been laid down
since 1856, in France, and there had not been a single three-
decker on the stocks since that year." f And now, on the 31st
May, 1861, when, as Mr. Lindsay stated in the course of this
debate, England possessed a greater number of efficient steam
ships of war than all Europe, and when the Secretary of the
Navy, himself, admitted we had seventeen more line-of-battle
ships than all the rest of the world (besides the nine block-
ships), | the House was startled with the declaration that we
were rapidly becoming the second maritime power of Europe,
because France had one iron-clad frigate (La Gloire) at sea,
whilst our much more powerful ship, the Warrior, still wanted
a few months for completion !
Now, let us see whether France had taken any clandestine or
precipitate steps to justify her being teased and worried by
such demonstrations as these : for it must not be supposed that
the sensibilities of the French people are not wounded § by

* Parliamentary Paper, No. 182— 1S59, p. 15. t Ibid, p. 19.
J Hansard, clxii. 442.
| The following is extracted from an article on this subject in the
Journal des Dibats : — "Is there not something calculated to try the
patience of a less excitable people than ours, to find ourselves constantly
denounced as plotting an invasion of England— and denounced by whom ?
By thosa whom we have not invaded— by those who for three centimes
have hired all the coalitions formed against us— by those who for three
centuries have always marched in tie front ranks of the invaders of our
national territory. Is there nothing calculated to wound the just pride of
a people, not wanting in self respect, to find ourselves incessantly called to
account respecting our navy-and by whom t By those who maintain
upwards of 80,000 men in active service, whilst our fleet does not contain
more than 35,000— by those who are actually expending, on an average,
k 2

182 THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC lit.
thoso imputations of sinister designs, reiterated by mombors
of parliament who have filled tho highest publio offices. Tho
valuo and efficiency of iron-cased vessels wore proved (as will
bo soon immediately) to tho knowledge of both England and
Franco in 1854. t England immediately possossod horsolf of
double tho number of iron-oased floating batteries built by
Franoe. Tho keel of tho first sea-going frigate of this class,
La Gloire, was laid down by tho Frenoh Government in Juno,
1858. In tho parliamentary report, dated January 6th, 1869,
so frequently quoted, it is stated that this vessel is half com
pleted. She mado her first trial trip in August, 1860. And
she was the only completed iron-clad sea-going vessel possessed
by France on the 31s/ May, 1861, when Sir John Pakington
made his startling statement to the House, and when terrified
admirals talked of her possessing a "most formidable number"
of these ships. There is certainly nothing in thoso facts to
warrant the suspicion that our neighbours wore endeavouring
to steal a march on us in the construction of an iron fioci
Throe years in the acquisition of only ono soa-going iron-cased
ship is surely a leisurely rate of progress, with whioh even our
Admiralty might have kept pace !
As there has boon a systematic, and to Homo extent a suc
cessful, effort mado by the invasionists to keep alive th© panic,
by attributing to tho French Government, secret; and extensive
preparations of iron-clad vossols, it will bo well, before con
cluding, to add a few words respecting tho origin and progress
of this innovation in ship-building.
Moro than fifteen years ago, when the mode of projecting
combustible shells horizontally was adoptod, it was forosoenthat
the nature of maritime warfare would bo entirely changed. In
his evidence before tho Ordnanoo Committee, of 1849, Sir
Thomas Hastings* said, that in coiiscquonoo of tho adoption of
Paixhan's guns, in case of a naval action between two fleets,
"instead of lasting ten hours, its duration will bo nearer ten
minutes." Hero, then, was a clear necessity for some contri
vance to moot this new danger : and tho objects to bo aimed at

I 12,000,000 sterling annually on their navy ; whilst for several years we
have been spending, on an average, 128,000,000f,, or ^6,000,000 rtorling.'
* Minutes, 5023.

1861.] THE THREE PANICS. 133
in clothing the ships' sides with iron armour, are very clearly
defined in the following extract from a Lecture by Mr. Reed,
formerly of Her Majesty's Dockyard, at Portsmouth, and now
editor of the Mechanics' Magazine :—
" It is time that all those who concern themselves with this
great question of how iron may best be rendered available for
the defence of ships' sides, should recur to the circumstance
which gave rise to it, and to [the true end to be at present
attained. That circumstance, undoubtedly, was the introduc
tion of Paixhan's shells into naval warfare ; and the end desired
is the application of means by which the entrance of those
terrible missiles through the side of a ship may be avoided.
The attainment of this end would leave us subject only to the
entrance of solid shot, to which all our ships were exposed
during the wars in which we won our supremacy, and from
which no practical system of iron-plating can at present be ex
pected to save us. The attempt to build ships which shall be
proof to solid shot — at least, to wrought-iron solid shot — is an
altogether illusory one ; and such ships are not urgently re
quired. It is as a defence against shells, and hollow charged
projectiles generally, and against these only, that iron plating
can yet be made available. By applying iron of very great
thickness, between wind and water, we may reduce the liability
to injury by shot at that important part, and it may be well to
do this ; but if the upper works are made shell-proof, we can
expect no more." — p. 21.
The first trial in actual combat of these destructive missiles
was at Sinope, November 20th, 1853, when the Turkish
squadron was attacked by a Russian fleet, and when " their whole
force of fourteen ships was, to a great extent, silenced in a few
minutes, and utterly crushed in little more than an hour." *
The Russians were well supplied with shell guns, while the
Turks had nothing more effective than 24-pounders. During
the progress of the Crimean war, an opportunity was afforded
to our fleet of experiencing the effects of shells in the attack on
the forts of Sebastopol, when some of our vessels were severely
injured ; and when the whole affair, which was lost sight of in
face of the more absorbing operations on shore, was viewed

Lecture, bv Mr. E. J. Reed, p. 13.

134 THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC III.
with even less satisfaction by our navy than by the public. It
was during this war, too, that the first trial of iron-clad
batteries was witnessed at Kinburn. Our own batteries arrived
too late, but those of our allies reached the scene in time to
take a part in the siege. And Sir James Elphinstone, a prac
tical authority on naval subjects, said, "When the French
batteries, which had fortunately arrived, got an opportunity of
acting at Kinburn, they showed that an iron-cased ship was
impregnable; yet, after that, we spent three or four years
experimenting on iron plates, while we had much better have
been employed in building iron ships. We had, perhaps, found
out what description of iron would stand hammering the longest,
but the great fact of the impregnability of iron ships had been
proved at Kinburn."*
The invention of these iron-clad batteries has been attributed
to the Emperor of the French. Mr. Scott Russell, however,
tells us that the introduction of iron plates originated with
Mr. Stevens, the great steam-boat builder, of New York, who
was in this country ten years ago, and who then communicated
to him the results of some experiments that had been made by
the United States' Government with regard to these plates.
And Mr. Reed, in his Lecture, quotes an article in the
Mechanics' Magazine, published in 1824, in which the writer,
whilst noticing a memoir on this subject by M. de Montgery,
a Captain in the French navy, attributes the use of plates of
iron or brass, for covering ships and battering rams, to Archi
medes, upwards of two thousand years ago.
There is but little merit due, in any quarter, for the adoption
of this very obvious and necessary reform in ship-building.
Foreign governments might, indeed very naturally shrink from an
innovation, which, by substituting iron for wood in the construc
tion of vessels of war, would confer such an immense ad
vantage on England ;— for whilst in the purchase of timber,
and the raw materials of sails and rigging for our navy, we
were only on a footing of equality with France, and were
placed at a disadvantage, as compared with Russia and
America, where those materials were produced, no sooner does
iron take the place of wood, and steam of sails, then it gives us

* Hansard, clxi. 201.

1M1-] THE THREE PANICS. 135
a natural advantage over the whole world. The British
Government did not, howevor, seem to roulizo this view ; for,
instead of proceeding with the construction of iron-cased
vessels for resisting combustiblo shells, for which purpose every
body admitted they were perfectly successful, successive Boards
of Admiralty amused themselves for several years with the
comparatively useless experiment of trying to penetrate an iron
target a few inohes thiok with solid shot ; and this, whilst the
engineering and naval authorities were loudly proclaiming that
it was for protection against oombustion and explosion, rather
than penetration, that the iron armour was required.* A
volume might be compiled of the letters in the newspapers, tho
pamphlets, and tho speeches, not omitting a series of Lectures
by Captain Hoisted, which havo been published, to stimidate the
tardy movements ot our Board of Admiralty.
In the meantime, the French Government have, for several
years, professed not to lay down a vessel of war, intended for
actual combat (as distinguished from avisos, transports, etc.),
whioh is not designed to bo clad in iron armour.
That portion of the naval expenditure of France, set apart for
dockyard wages and materials for ship-bmlding which was
formerly laid out upon wooden vessels, will, therefore, hence
forth bo devoted to the construction of iron-cased ships : and it
being the practice, as we hove already seen, for the Minister of
Marine to tako a long prospective range in 4he publication of
his plans, when wo are told that fifteen or twenty iron-cased
vessels are to be built, it is merely an announcement of what
will be tho future production of the French dockyards, spread
over a series of years. Seeing that this is only a substitution of
one class of ships for another, rendered necessary by the pro
gress of science, in what respect eon it be said to indicate
hostility to us ? Our government does not protend to be in
ignorance of the course Franco is pursuing, or of the motives
which decide her poHoy. We choose to pursue another course.

* At the kto meeting of the Scieutifio Association, at Manchester, Mr,
Soott Eussell gave utterance to the opinion of nautical men, in a brief and
pithy sentence : " The whole practical part," bo said, " was incorporated in
one expression of a great sailor, 'Whatever you do, for God's sake, keep
out tho sholls.'"

136 THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC III.
Our Admiralty perseveres in building wooden line-of-battle
ships, until compelled to desist by the House of Commons-.
Then "My Lords " throw all their energies into the construc
tion of wooden vessels of a smaller size, having yet to learn that
small wooden ships are as combustible as large ones. And
then we are startled with the cry of alarm for the safety of our
shores, because the French are said to be building more iron
clad vessels than ourselves ! What can our neighbours do to
put an end to these periodical scoldings, so trying to their
national temper, and so lowering to our own dignity and self-;
respect? Nobody will expect the Minister of Marine to
descend, with his eyes open, to the level of the wasteful mis
management of our Board of Admiralty. His only hope of
peace must, therefore, be in an improvement in our naval
administration; and this is the view of the ablest writer in
France on the state of the English and French navies, as ex
pressed in the following extract from a private letter, written in
consequence of the above incident in the House of Commons : —
" The great cause of the irritation, and of the disagreeable
discussions which have taken place on this subject, I don't
hesitate to say, is the ignorance, the incapacity, and the abso
lutely false organisation of the Board of Admiralty in England.
Whatever increase of power the English may derive from it, I
believe, in the end, it would be better for us to see something
reasonable established in England, in place of that inactive,
blind, wasteful, expensive machine, which is called the Ad
miralty, rather than to serve as the scape- goat, as we always
do, when they discover that we, not having fallen into all the
blunders that have been committed at Somerset House, have
obtained results which displease British pride, and which serve
as a pretext for railing at our ambition, when, in justice, John
Bull ought to blame himself for his own short-comings."
"Bien n'est plus dangereux qu'un imprudent ami,
Mieux vaudroit un sage ennemi."
Before the close*of the session, two incidents occurred which
were calculated to impart®renewed life to the panic during the
recess. On the 19th July, Mr. Kinglake moved a resolution
respecting a rumoured intention of the Piedmontese Government
to cede the Island of Sardinia to France. Owing to the known
views of the hon. member for Bridgewater, this motion would

18610 THE THREE PANICS. 13*
have excited little interest, had it not derived substance and
vahdity from the speech delivered on the occasion by Lord
John Russell, the Foreign Secretary, who, whilst in possession
of the disavowals of the governments concerned, contrived to
leave the public mind in doubt and uncertainty, by weighing
probabilities, speculating on possible dangers, uttering hypo
thetical threats, and advocating the maintenance of armaments,
with a view even to " offensive " operations, in certain undefined
contingencies. This speech, which found a subsequent echo
out of doors, drew from Sir James Graham, afterwards,
the remark that, "Whatever alarm has been created re
sulted from the speech of the noble lord the Foreign Secretary
when the question of Sardinia was brought forward." *
On the 26th July, 1861, Lord Clarence Paget, Secretary of
the Admiralty, moved for a vote of £250,000, in addition to
the ordinary estimate, as the first instalment of an outlay
which it was calculated would ultimately amount to £2,500,000,
for building iron, andiron-cased vessels, and for supplying them
with machinery.
This mode of bringing forward unexpected supplementary
votes, on the plea that other nations were making sudden
additions to their navies is admirably contrived for keeping
alive a sense of uneasiness and panic. The present proceeding
could only have been rendered necessary by the useless appli
cation of the estimates previously voted for the construction of
wooden ships. On the 23rd May, a vote for £949,371 for
timber had been carried by the Secretary of the Admiralty, in
spite of the strenuous opposition of Mr. Lindsay, who described
it as an unprecedented amount, and said that the sum voted the
previous year had only been £722,758, and that for a long
period of years, prior to 1859, the average amount did not
exceed £350,000. This was, perhaps, the most extravagant
proposition ever made by the Admiralty ; for the year before
the Secretary had declared that " it was the line-of-battle sliips
which required the large establishment of timber, for there
never was any difliculty in finding timber for frigates, corvettes.
and vessels of a smaller class." | The further construction of
line-of-battle ships was now arrested : the success of the iron

» Hansard, clxiv. 1636. + Hansard, clvii. 2029.

138 THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC III.
ships had been estabUshed, and yet more timber than ever was
wanted ! Had one-half of the amount been applied to iron
ship-building, there could have been no pretext for this startling
supplementary estimate.
In the course of the exciting discussion which followed, Lord
Palmerston said, "We know that France has now afloat six
iron vessels of various sizes, two of them two-deckers, not
frigates, all large vessels." And the Secretary of the Admiralty
gave a list of nine iron-cased ships "afloat," including La Gloire.
There is an inexactness in the word afloat, calculated to convey
an erroneous impression. Iron ships are not launched with
their armour on, but are cased in iron after they are afloat.
This is a slow process. The keel of La Gloire, for instance,
was laid down in June, 1858, she was floated in November,
1859, and made her first trial trip at sea, in August, 1860.
She was the only completed sea-going iron-clad vessel at the
time when this discussion took place. To give the name of
iron ships to the floating hulls of wooden vessels (sometimes old
ones), intended, at some future time, to be clad in armour, is
obviously an inaccuracy of language, calculated to excite
groundless suspicion and alarm.
It has already been shown that the French Government had
abandoned the construction of wooden ships of war, and that in
future all her vessels would be cased in iron. " We know,"
said Lord Palmerston, " that they have laid down lately the
keels, and made preparations to complete, ten other iron vessels
of considerable dimensions. The decision as to these vessels
Was taken as far back as December last, but was not carried
into effect until May, because they were waiting to ascertain
what were the qualities and the character of La Gloire, and
other ships afloat." And, he added, " there is no illusion about
them, for we know their names and the ports at which they are
being built." * In the course of the debate Lord C. Paget
gave a list of these vessels. All this proved the very opposite
of concealment or suddenness of determination on the part of
the French Government, and that they were pursuing precisely
the same course with iron as they had done with wooden ships.
It has been seen that in 1857, consequent on the report of the
* Hansard, clxiv. 1672, 1673,

1861 •] THE THREE PANICS. 139
Commission appointed in 1855, the French Government
published a programme of their future naval constructions, with
the nomenclature of all the vessels in their intended fleet,
extending over a period of twelve years. The progress of
science had rendered it necessary to substitute iron for wooden
ships ; and again the plans of the Minister of Marine are fixed
for a series of years, and the whole world is acquainted with his
plans. The marvel is at the ingenuity with which our states
men could find anything in these proceedings with which to
produce an evening's sensation in the House of Commons !
But the most remarkable incident in this debate remains to
be noticed. Mr. Disraeli, on this, as on a former occasion,
recommended an arrangement between the English and French
Governments, for putting some limit to this naval rivalry,
asking, "What is the use of diplomacy? What is the use of
governments? "What is the use of cordial understandings, if
such things can take place" ? * There is a vacant niche in the
Temple of Fame, for the ruler or minister who shall be the first
to grapple with this monster evil of the day. " Whatsoever
nation," says Jeremy Bentham," " should get the start of the
other, in making the proposal to reduce and fix the amount of
its armed force would crown itself with everlasting honour."
On the 28th August, 1861, on the occasion of a mediaeval
holiday ceremonial, the Prime Minister stood on the heights of
Dover, surrounded by a force of regular troops, sailors, and
volunteers, when reviving the reminiscences of the projected
invasion, from the opposite coast, more than half a century ago,
he made an eloquent appeal to the volunteers of England, to
improve and perpetuate their organisation. There was no one
in the United Kingdom, or in Europe, who, in perusing his
speech, doubted the Power to which allusion was made, when he
said : " We accept with frankness the right hand of friendship
wherever it is tendered to us. We do not distrust that
proffered right hand because we see the left hand grasping the
hilt of the sword. But when that left hand plamly does so
grasp the hilt of the sword, it would be extreme folly in us to
throw away our shield of defence."
In the last week of November, 1861, news reached England

* Hansard, ib., 1679.

140 THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC III.
that Captain Wilks, of the American navy, falling into the error,
not uncommon to men on land or sea, of constituting himself
his own lawyer, had carried off four American citizens from the
deck of a British vessel, in violation of international law.
During the intervening period, between the arrival of this
intelligence and the time when an explanation could be received
from the government at Washington, that party which had for
years been the promoters of the invasion panics sounded the
tocsin of alarm at the prospect of a war with America. The
circumstances of the case were certainly not favourable to the
alarmists. The people of the United States were plunged in
civil war, and the President, beleaguered at Washington, had
demanded half a million of men to defend the Union against
nearly as large a force of Confederates. The Federal Govern
ment had, therefore, every possible motive for wishing to avoid a
rupture with England. To meet this objection, the alarmists
had recourse to an expedient which had been employed in
the case of the French invasion panic. A theory was invented,
which the credulous were expected to accept for a fact. Nay,
two or three theories were propounded which were in direct
contradiction to each other. In the case of France, it was
one day the Emperor, whose blind "destiny " was to hurl him on
our shores ; the next day, we were told thafThis wise and pacific
policy would be overruled by the army and the populace.
In the case of America, we were asked, one day, to believe
that Mr. Seward (who possesses no more power or responsibility,
under the American Constitution, than one of President Lin
coln's clerks) had a long cherished scheme for closing the war
with the South, and turning it against Canada ; the next day,
we were informed that the government at Washington was
disposed for peace, but that it would be overruled by the
" mob." * These assumptions furnished the ground for warlike

* The writer, who has twice visited the United States at an interval of
twenty-four years, and travelled through nearly the whole of the free States,
never saw any mob there, except that which had been imported from Europe.
Ina few of the large cities, where foreign immigrants are very numerous, they
constitute an embarrassment in the working of the municipal governments,
owing to theft- inaptitude for the proper discharge of the duties of free
citizens. But this foreign element exercises no sway over the policy of
the Federal Government at Washington, or even of the separate State

18610 THE THREE PANICS. 141
prognostications, and for appeals to the combative passions of
our people throughout the month of December. Meantime, it
is more important to consider the course pursued by the British
Government. A despatch, courteously worded, dated November 30, 1861,
was forwarded by the British Cabinet to Washington, ex
pressing the belief that Captain Wilks had acted without the
authority of his Government, and requiring the surrender of
the captured envoys. It was calculated that an answer to this
despatch could be received in about a month. It arrived, in
fact, on the 9th January. It is to this interval of six weeks
that the following statement of facts applies. On the 3rd
December, three days after the date of the British despatch, the
French Government forwarded a communication, through
their minister at Washington, expressing their disapproval of
the act of Captain Wilks, accompanied with the courteous
intimation that all the neutral powers were interested in the
disavowal of the proceeding on the part of the United States'
Government. This despatch was formally communicated to
the British Government on the 6th December. On the 19th
December, Mr. Adams, the American Minister, waited on our
Foreign Minister to say that, " no instructions were given to
Captain Wilks to authorise him to act in the manner he had
done. Neither had the United States' Government committed
itself with regard to any decision upon the character of that act.
The government would wait for any representation the British
Government might make before coining to any positive de
cision." On the 18th December the Austrian, and on the 25th
the Prussian Government sent despatches to Washington sup
porting the claim of the British Government. The Russian
Ambassador, at London, wrote to his colleague at Washington,
condemning the conduct of Captain Wilks, and this was con
firmed by the Russian Government. These proceedings of the
three great powers were immediately made known to the British
Government.*

legislatures. The United States, like England, is governed by landowners,
with this difference, that they are numbered by thousands in one country,
and by millions in the other.
* These extracts and dates are taken from the Parliamentary Paper,
"North America, No. 3, 1862."

142 THE THREE PANICS, [PANIC III.
This was tantamount to the Arbitrators giving judgment in
our favour before they were called on for their award ; and as it
was known to our Cabinet (but concealed from the public), that
the President's Government had not authorised the act of
Captain Wilks, the chances of war were removed almost
beyond the bounds of possibility. There was thus every motive
for waiting in calm confidence the reply from Washington.
It was but a question of a month or six weeks. Even if the
Congress of the United States, which alone can declare war,
had, without debate, thrown down the gauntlet to Europe, a
campaign, in the depth of winter, on the frontiers of Canada, is
as impracticable as in the Gulf of Finland. So long as peace
continued, the Convention between the two countries remained
in force which prevented any addition being made to the arma
ments on the Lakes which separate the United States from
Canada, until after six months' notice ; and the highest military
authority * has declared that the fate of a war in that region
will depend on the superiority upon the Lakes.
All this, however, did not prevent our Government from
employing the interval between the 30th November, and the
9th January, in hurrying forward preparations for war, as
though an immediate rupture was all but inevitable. The
country was startled by the instant appearance of a proclama
tion, prohibiting the exportation of the munitions of war.
Expedition after expedition was despatched across the Atlantic.
In three weeks, as we were afterwards informed by the Secretary
of the Admiralty, from 10,000 to 11,000 troops were on their
way to America, and our naval force on that station was nearly
doubled. These proceedings were trumpeted to the world, amid cries
of exultation, by the organs of the invasion party, not one of
whom seemed to occupy himself for a moment with the reflec
tion that we were exposing our flank to an attack from that
formidable neighbour against whose menacing attitude, even
whilst extending the right hand of friendship, we had been so
eloquently warned from the heights of Dover. This is the
more remarkable, when we recollect that the Report of the
Commission on Fortifications had completely laid bare all our

* Duke of Wellington,

18610 THE THREE PANICS. 143
weak places, and, had drawn from Sir Charles Napier a cry of
alarm :— " And what," he exclaimed, " were we to do while
these fortifications were building? Would the French wait
three years before they went to war, while we built, our fortifi
cations ? * * * * The Commissionei-s ought to be brought
to trial for high treason, seeing they pointed out to the
Emperor of the French all the possible places at which he might
land an army." *
The difficulty in which we found ourselves, when under the
sudden necessity of providing warm clothing for our troops,
brought the disposition of the French Emperor to a singular test.
Such is the severity of the winter in Canada, that sentries are often
required to be relieved every half hour to avoid being frozen,
and there is frequently a fall of seven feet of snow during the
season. For such a rigorous climate, a cori"esponding equip
ment of clothing was indispensable. Among other articles of
necessity were long boots, in which we found ourselves defi
cient. The following little incident must be given in the words
of Sir G. C. Lewis, the Secretary for War, delivered in the
House of Commons, on the 17th February, 1862, and, as it is
taken from the newspaper report of the speech, the expressions
of feeling, as they were elicited from the House, are also re
tained: —
" There was one article that was not used by any of our
regiments, and which was not in store in this country, — the
article of long boots. The French Government having been
informed of our difficulty, undertook the supply of 1,500 pairs
of boots, which came over in forty-eight hours from Paris
(cheers), and at a cost for which they could have scarcely been
obtained from our contractors. (Hear, hear.) I am happy
to mention this as a proof of the friendly action of the French
Government (hear, hear)."
And thus ends the third panic !
It has been demonstrated in the preceding pages, by evidence
drawn from our own official statements, totally irrespective of
the French accounts, that as a nation we have borne false
witness against our neighbours, — that without a shadow of

* Hansard, clx. 545. 6.

144 THE THREE PANICS. [PANIC III.
proof or justification we have accused them, repeatedly, during a
long series of years, of meditating an unprovoked attack on our
shores, in violation of every principle of international law,
and in contempt of all the obligations of morality and honour.
This accusation involves an impeachment of the intelli
gence, as well as the honour of France. In attributing to the
government of that country the design of entering into a naval
war with England, and especially in a clandestine or secret
manner, we have placed them on a par, for intelligence, almost,
with children. There is not a statesman in France that does
not know, and admit, that, to provoke a contest with England,
single-handed, for the supremacy of the seas, would be to em
bark in a hopeless struggle ; and this, not so much owing to our
superiority in government arsenals, where notorious mis
management countervails our advantages, as to the vast and
unrivalled resources we possess in private establishments for the
construction of ships and steam-machinery.
In inquiring into the origin of these panics, it would be folly
to conceal from ourselves that they have been sometimes pro
moted by those who have not themselves shared in the delusion.
Personal rancour, professional objects, dynastic aims, the
interests of party, and other motives, may have played their part.
But successive governments have rendered themselves wholly
responsible for the invasion panics, by making them the plea
for repeated augmentations of our armaments. It is this which
has impressed the public mind with a sense of danger, and
which has drawn the youth of the middle class from civil
pursuits to enrol themselves for military exercises — a movement
not the less patriotic because it originated in groundless appre
hensions. If the people of this country would offer a practical atone
ment to France, and at the same time secure for themselves an
honourable relief from the unnecessary burdens which their
governments have imposed on them, they should initiate a frank
proposal for opening negotiations between the two governments
with the view of agreeing to some plan for limiting their naval
armaments. This would, undoubtedly, be as acceptable to our
neighbours as it would be beneficial to ourselves. It would
tend to bring the attitude of the French Government into
greater harmony with its new commercial policy, and thus save

1861"] THE THREE PANICS. 145
them from a repetition of those taunts with which they were,
with some logical force, assailed, a few weeks ago, by M. Pouyer-
Quertier, the leader of the Protectionists in the Corps
Legislatif: —
"If, indeed," said he, "in exchange for the benefits you have
conceded to England, you had only established a firmer and
more faithful alliance 5 Had you been only able to effect a
saving in your military and naval expenditure ! But see what
is passing in England, where they are pushing forward, without
measure, their armaments. * * * * Can we be said to be
at peace while our coasts are surrounded with British gun
boats, and with iron-cased vessels ? Are these the fruits of the
alliance ; these the results of that entente cordiale on which you
calculated as the price of your concessions ? Let the free-trade
champions answer me. The Treaty has not only inflicted on us
commercial losses, but its effects are felt in our budget as a
financial disaster. The measures of the English Government
compel you to increase your armaments, and thus deprive us of
all hope of retrenchment."
It must be remembered, that such is the immense superiority
of our navy at the present time, so greatly does it surpass that
relative strength which it was formerly accustomed to bear
in comparison with the navy of France, that it devolves on us,
as a point of honour, to make the first proposal for an attempt
to put a limit to this most irrational and costly rivalry of
armaments. Should such a step lead to a successful result, we must not be
surprised if the parties who have been so long employed in
promoting jealousy and discord between this country and^
France should seek for congenial occupation in envenoming our
relations with America, or elsewhere. There is but one way of
successfully dealing with these alarmists. Speaking in 1850,
at the close of his career, the most cautious and sagacious
of our statesmen said, "I believe, that, in time of peace, we
must by our retrenchment, consent to incur some risk. I venture
to say, that if you choose to have all the garrisons of all your
colonial possessions in a complete state, and to have all your
fortifications secure against attack, no amount of annual expen
diture will be sufficient to accomplish your object."
If, hereafter, an attempt be made, on no better evidence than
i

146 THE THREE PANICS.
that which has been subjected to analysis in the preceding
pages, to induce us to arm and fortify ourselves against some
other power, it is hoped that, remembering the enormous ex
pense we have incurred to insure ourselves against imaginary
dangers from France, we shall meet all such attempts to frighten
us with the words of Sir Robert Peel, "We consent to incur
some risk."*

Note. — It may perhaps be permitted to add a few words of
explanation, of a personal nature. The writer took a part, both
in the House and out of doors, in opposition to the first two
panics, and to the expenditure to which it was attempted to
make them subservient. At the dissolution, in the spring of
1857, consequent on the vote of the House against the China
war, he was not returned to Parliament, but was elected for
Rochdale during his absence in America, and took bis seat on
his return home, in June, 1859. In the following autumn, he
went to France, and remained there, and in Algiers, till May,
1861. The only occasion on which he spoke in the House,
during the interval between the spring of 1857 and the spring
of 1861, was in opposition to Mr. Horsman's fortification
motion, on the 31st July, 1859, when he gave expression, at
some length, to many of the views contained in this pamphlet,
and when he analysed the contents of the Parliamentary Paper,
No. 182, 1859, to which reference has been so frequently
made. * Hansard, cix. 76*1.

APPENDIX.

Since the preceding pages were written, the news of the single
combat between the two American iron-clad vessels, the Monitor
and the Merrimac, has reached this country, and has been
followed by something like an attempt to create an America*
invasion panic. Again the cry has arisen from the old qprartersfor
precipitate preparations, and again, as in the case of France, there
is a disposition to forget all that we have already done. The
United States' Government, being actually at war, have, we are
told, determined to spend fifteen million dollars on armour-cased
vessels. England, being at peace, had already incurred, or
committed herself to, a much larger expenditure for the same
purpose. A\s nearly the whole of the projected outlay in
America is for gun-boats, or coast batteries, and not for vessels
adapted for crossing the Atlantic, there is nothing in their pre
parations that is menacing to Europe ; and we may, therefore,
wait in safety whilst the Americans are subjecting to the test of
actual warfare the rival powers of artillery and iron shields.
Under the intense stimulus now imparted to the mechanical
genius of that inventive people, every month will probably
witness the production of some new contrivance for aggression
or defence ; and should the eivil war unhappily continue, it may,
not improbably, lead to discoveries which will supersede existing
armaments altogether.
Meantime, the experience which we have already gained from
this deplorable contest has proved that our existing wooden
fleet is worse than useless,— that it is absolutely dangerous.
When, in the pursuits of private industry, a manufacturing
capitalist discovers that his -machinery has been superseded by
new inventions, and that he can only continue to wort it at a
serious loss, be does not hesitate at once to throw it aside,
however cautious he mav be in ™»l=r*ng choice of a new invest
ment to replace it. Precisely the same principle is applicable to
nations. The foUowing Memorandum, which was forwarded to the
Prime Minister in October last, will be, probably, in some

148 APPENDIX.
quarters, considered to have acquired increased force from the
late American news.
Memorandum.
" The present peculiar and exceptional state of the English
and French navies, the result of scientific progress in maritime
armaments, offers an opportunity for a reciprocal arrangement
between the two governments of the highest interest to both
countries, " During the last century, and down almost to the present
day. the relativo naval strength of tho two countries has been
measured by the number of their line-of-battle ships. But,
owing to the recent improvements in explosive shells, and other
combustible missiles, and in the modes ol projecting them, these
large vessels have Ixxm pronounced, by competent judges, no
longer suited for maritime warfare, and warning voices have
even proclaimed that they will henceforth prove only a snare to
those who employ them.
"This opinion has found utterance in several emphatic
phrases. " ' Wooden ships-of-the-line,' says one, ' will, in a future
naval war, he nothing but human slaughter-houses.* 'They
will be blown to luoifer matches,' savs another. A third
authority tells us, that in caso of a oollision between two such
vessels, at close quarters, the only words of oomnuuid for whioh
there will be time will be, ' Fire, and lower your boats !' Whilst
a fourth declares that c any government that should soud suoh a
vessel into action against an iron-plated ship would deserve to
be impeached.'
"' It hardly required such a weight of evidence to oonvinoo
us, that to crowd nearly a thousand men upon a hug© wooden
target, with thirty or forty tons of gunpowder at their foot,
and expose them to a bombardment with detonating shells and
other combustible projectiles, must bo a very suicidal pro
ceeding. " The governments of the great maritime states have shown
that they share this opinion by abandoning the construction of
lin>of-battlo ships.
" America, several years since, gave the preference to long
low vessels, possessing tho utmost possib e speed, and being
capable of carrying the largest guns.
" Franoe was the next to ceaso building ships of the line.
" The British Government have come to the same decision,
and they gave a pledge last session, with tho approval of Par
liament, that they would not complete the vessels of this class
whioh were unfinished on the stocks.

APPENDIX. 149
" It is undor these circumstances, that the two oountries find
themselves in possession of about one hundred wooden ships of
the lino with sorew propellers. England has between sixty and
seventy, and France between thirty and forty of these vessels,
the greater part of them in commission ; and their maintenance
constitutes one of tho principal items in the naval expenditure of
the two oountries.
" It will be admitted that, if these vessels did not exist they
would not now be constructed, and that when worn out they
will not be renewed. It is equally indisputable, that they have
been built by tho two governments with a view to preserve a
certain relative force towards each other.
" In proof that this rivalry has been oonfined exclusively
to England and France, it may be stated, on the authority
of the official representative of tne Admiralty in the House of
Commons, that Spain has only three, Russia nine, and Italy one,
of this class of ships. America has only one.
i" Theso circumstances suggest, as an obvious course, to the
two governments, that they should endeavour to come to an
amicable agreement by which the greater portion of these ships
might be withdrawn and so disposed of as to be rendered in
capable of being again employed for warlike purposes. This
might be effected by an arrangement which should preserve to
each country precisely the same relative force after the
reduction as before. For instance, assuming, merely for the
sake of argument, England to possess sixty-five, and France
thirty-five, then for every seven withdrawn by France, England
should withdraw thirteen ; and, thus, to whatever extent the
reduction was carried, provided this proportion were preserved,
the two oountries would still possess the same relative force. The
first point on which an understanding should be como to is as to
the number of ships of the line actually possessed by each — a
very simple question, inasmuch as it is not complicated with the
comparison of vessels in different stages of construction. Then,
the other main point is to agree upon a plan for making a fair
selection, ship for ship, so that the withdrawals on both sides
may be as nearly as possible of oorresponding siee or value.
If the principle of a proportionate reduction be agreed to, far
fewer difficulties will be found in carrying out the details than
must have been encountered in arranging the plans of co-opera
tion in tho Crimean and Chinese wars, or in settling the details
of the Commercial Treaty.
•' And is this principle of reciprocity, in adjusting the naval
forces of the two countries, an innovation P On the contrary,
it would bo easy to cite the declarations of the leading states
men on both sides of the Channel, during the last twenty
years, to prove that they have always been in the habit of regu-

150 APPENDIX.
lating the amount of their navies by a reference to each other's
armaments. True, this has been invariably done to justify an
increase of expenditure. But why should not the same prin
ciple be also available in the interest of economy, and for the
benefit of the taxpayers ? A nation suffers no greater loss of
dignity from surrendering its independence of action in regu
lating its armaments, whether the object be to meet a diminu
tion or an increase of its neighbours' forces.
" Although this reduction of the obsolete ships of the line
presents a case of the easiest solution, and should, therefore, in
the first place, be treated as a separate measure, it could hardly
fail to pave the way for an amicable arrangement for putting
some bruit to those new armaments which are springing out of
the present transition state of the two navies.
" The apphcation of iron plates to sMp-building, which has
rendered the reconstruction of the navies necessary, must be
regarded as the commencement of an indefinite series of changes ;
and, looking to the great variety of experiments now making,
both in ships and artillery, and to the new projects which in
ventors are almost daily forcing upon the attention of the
governments, it is not improbable that, a few years hence, when
England and France shall have renewed their naval armaments,
they will again be rendered obsolete by new scientific dis
coveries. " In the mean time, neither country adds to its relative
strength by this waste of national wealth ; for, as both govern
ments aim at only a proportionate increase, it is not contem
plated that either should derive exclusive advantage from the
augmentation. An escape from this dilemma is not to be sought
m the attempt to arrest the march of improvement, or to dis
courage the efforts of inventive genius ; a remedy for the evil
can only be found in a more frank understanding between the „
two governments. H they will discard the old and utterly
futile theory of secrecy, — a theory on which an individual
manufacturer or merchant no longer founds his hopes of suc
cessful competition with a foreign rival, — they may be enabled,
by the timely exchange of explanations and assurances, to
prevent what ought to be restricted to mere experimental trials
from growing into formidable preparations for war. If those
who are responsible for the naval administration of the two
countries were consulted, it would probably be found that they
are appalled at the prospect of a rivalry, which, whilst it can
satisfy neither the reason nor the ambition of either partv, offers
a boundless field of expenditure to both.
" Nor should it be forgotten that the financial pressure, caused
by these rival armaments, is a source of constant irritation to
the populations of the two countries. The British taxpayers

APPENDIX. 151
believe, on the authority of their leading statesmen, that the
increased burden to which they are subjected is caused by the
armaments on the other side of the Channel. The people of
France are also taught to feel similarly aggrieved towards
England. The feelings of mutual animosity, produced by this
sacrifice of substantial interests, are not to be allayed by the
exchange of occasional acts of friendship between the two
governments. On the contrary, this inconsistent policy, in in
cessantly arming against each other at home, whilst uniting for
common objects abroad, if it do not impair public confidence in
their sincerity, tends at least to destroy all faith in an identity
of interests between the rulers and the ruled, by showing how
httle advantage the peoples derive from the friendship of their
governments. " But the greatest evil connected with these rival armaments
is, that they destroy the strongest motives for peace. When
two great neighbouring nations find themselves permanently
subjected to a war expenditure, without the compensation of its
usual excitements and honours, the danger to be apprehended
is that, if an accident should occur to inflame their hostile
passions — and we know how certain these accidents are at in
tervals to arise — their latent sense of suffering and injury may
reconcile them to a rupture, as the.only eventual escape from an
otherwise perpetual war taxation in a time of peace.
" Circumstances appeal strongly to the two governments at
the present juncture, in favour of a measure of wise and safe
economy. In consequence of the deplorable events in America,
and the partial failure of the harvests of Europe, the commerce
and manufactures of both countries are exposed to an ordeal of
great suffering. Were the proposed naval reduction carried
into effect, it would ameliorate the financial position of the
governments, and afford the means for alleviating the fiscal
burdens of the peoples. But the moral effect of such a measure
would be still more important. It should be remembered that
although these large vessels have lost their value in the eyes of
professional men, they preserve their traditional terrors for the
world at large ; and when they move about, in fleets, on neigh
bouring coasts, they excite apprehension in the public mind,
and even check the spirit of commercial enterprise. Were
such an amicable arrangement as has been suggested accom
plished, it would be everywhere accepted as a pledge of peace,
and, by inspiring confidence in the future, would help to re
animate the hopes of the great centres of trade and industry,
not only in France and England, but throughout Europe.
" Will not the two governments, then, embrace this opportu
nity of giving effect to a policy, which, whilst involving no
risk, or sacrifice of honour, or diminution of relative power, will

152 APPENDIX.
tend to promote the present prosperity and future harmony of
the two countries, and offer an example of wisdom and modera
tion, worthy of this civilised age, and honourable to the fame
of the two foremost nations of the earth ?"

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