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YALE
UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

A CRITICAL HISTORY

OF THE LATE

AMERICAN WAR,

Af MAHAN.

WITH AN INTRODUCTORY LETTER
BY
LIEUT.-GENERAL M. W. SMITH.

A. S. BARNES & CO.,
NEWJORK, CHICAGO, AND NEW ORLEANS,

1877.

Copyright, 1877, by A. S. Barnes &• Co.

United Servick Club, Pall Mall,
2Sth November, 1876.
My dear Sirs, —
According to Dr. Mahan's wish I have read over
the portion of the proofs of his work which you have
furnished me with.
It seems to me that his book will prove both interesting
and instructive to those who wish to trace out the causes
which have led tp the success or failure of campaigns, and
how battles have been lost and won.
Although the Doctor is not a military man, he seems to
have studied carefully the science of strategy as it has
been developed at different periods, and applies his know
ledge in indicating where established principles have been
deviated from.
He compares, plainly and practically, what he conceives
might have been done in accordance with such principles,
with what was actually done ; the results in the latter case
having now become matters of history.
The author appears to have been familiar with the
ground and scenes he describes so graphically, and
to have been also fully furnished with all details relating
to the strength, positions, etc., of the forces engaged.

IV introductory letter.
As to his comments upon and criticism of the conduct
and capabilities of those who occupied prominent positions
during the years of the last American War, I am not
prepared to offer any opinion. Whether the readers of
the present work agree with all the views of the author
or not, its perusal may lead them to think out the matter
for themselves, and to consider at least one phase of
military combinations on a large scale; and in these
critical and uncertain times this may prove a beneficial
exercise of the intellect, with reference to both military
men and civilians. Yours faithfully, M. W. SMITH.
Lieut.-Genkral.

PREFACE.

Science, like its divine Author, is "no respecter of per
sons." This is equally true of impartial criticism, and
especially so when such criticism pertains to the deeds
and character of men of world notoriety, — men who con
sent to assume the conduct of enterprises and interests
upon the issues of which the destiny of nations depends.
In assuming such responsibilities, such men invite, and
even challenge, such criticism, and will receive it from
every "wise and understanding people." In the prepara
tion of the following work, it has been a fixed aim of the
author, not only to furnish needful information to his
countrymen, but to exemplify the ideal represented by the
words impartial historic criticism. He lays no claim to
infallibility in the statement of facts, or in his deductions
from the same; and will gladly confess, and promptly
correct, any errors of any kind into which partial or im
partial criticism may prove him to have fallen. In his
criticism of the deeds and character of our Generals, of
their campaigns and the conduct of the war, he claims to
have known no man as a member of this or that political
party, but to have contemplated and presented all in
common from one exclusive standpoint, the military. If
any of my countrymen regard any military commander as
faultless, or void of merit, becaufee he belongs to this or
that political party, this history was not written for them,
but for American citizens — citizens who would know that
they are Americans who have occupied high places of
trust and power, and under whose conduct oceans of
American blood and treasure have been poured out;
Criticism, when honest especially, is an important disci
pline of thought. Historic criticism not only furnishes

Vl - PREFACE.
the means of such discipline, but enables even those who
may differ from an author in his statements and deductions
better to understand the subject treated of than were
otherwise possible. All my countrymen who would under
stand this war as really conducted, will, it is believed, read
this treatise with interest and profit. Nor was the work
prepared for Americans alone, but for all friends of truth,
of every clime, into whose hands this treatise may fall —
friends of truth who take an interest in what concerns this
great nation, and who would understand events which
have for all future time shaped its destiny. With these
suggestions, the work before us is commended to the
consideration of my countrymen especially. • THE AUTHOR.
Oct. 22>rd, 1876.

CONTENTS.

«HAP. PAGE
Introduction .......i
I. The Bull Run Campaign - - - - - 19
il Administration of General G. B. McClellan in the
Department of Washington - - - - 35
III. The Command of General Fremont in the Western
Department - - . . . - 7 43
IV. General McClellan as Commander-in-Chief - - 59
V. The Spring Campaign of the Army of the Potomac - 76
VI. General Halleck's Measures and Campaign in Missouri 113
VII. General Plan of the Union and Confederate Authori
ties for the Conduct of the War - 118
viiL The Campaign in Kentucky, and Events which followed 126
IX. General Halleck at Pittsburg Landing and at Corinth 139
X. General Halleck appointed Commander-in-Chief of the
Armies of the United States - - - 144
XI. General Pope and the Army of Virginia - - 146
xiL General Lee's Invasion of Maryland - - - 179
XIII. The Army of the Potomac under General Burnside - 209
XIV. Movements in Tennessee, Kentucky; and Mississippi - 216
XV. Expeditions on the Seaboard and Ocean - - - 223
XVI. My Visit to Washington in the Month of January 1863 231
XVII. Winter Campaign of General Rosecrans - - 244
XVIII. The Siege of Vicksburg and Port Hudson - 248
XIX. General Hooker in Command of the Army of the
Potomac -------- 256
XX. General Lee a Second Time on Free Soil.— Gettysburg - 279

Vlll CONTENTS.
CHAP. PAGE
XXI. The Chattanooga Campaign - - - - , - 308
XXII. Minor Campaigns during this War - - - 334
xxin. Our Naval Expeditions around the Southern Coasts 340
XXIV. Operations of the Army of the Potomac prior to the
Appointment of General Grant as Commander-in-Chief 343
XXV. Appointment of General Ulysses Grant as Lieutenant-
General and Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of
THE United States , - 351
XXVI. Campaign of the Army of the Potomac under General
Grant - - 360
XXVII. Sherman's Atlanta Campaign - - 390
XXVIII. Operations West of the Mississippi - - 406
XXIX. Results of the Great Campaigns of 1864 ; Plans for the
Future of the Union and Confederate Commanders 408
XXX. General Price's Last Invasion of Missouri - - 316
XXXI. The Campaign of General Hood in Tennessee - 422
XXXII. Sherman's March through Georgia 431
XXXIII. Sherman s March from Savannah, Georgia, to Goldboro',
North Carolina; the Surrender of Lee and John
ston ; and the Close of the War ... ^^g

INTRODUCTION.

I PURPOSE, from a standpoint hitherto unattempted, to
write out a History of the War of the Rebellion. In the
multitudinous works now before the public, all that is
needful has been said in regard to the causes which led to
that memorable scene of " terror, tears, and blood," and
to matters of detail in respect to our battles and campaigns,
and to our unexampled national expenditure. My plan
pertains, not at all to the causes and details of facts as they
actually occurred, but to the conduct of this war. In this
war the nation lost more than half a million of precious
lives, accumulated upon its hands hardly less than a mil
lion of its maimed and pensioned soldiers, expended many
billions of treasures, and has loaded itself down with a
present debt of upwards of two thousand millions of
dollars. What the nation needs to be informed about is,
not how this war was, but how it should have been, con
ducted, and whether such an appalling expenditure of
time, life, limb, and treasure was needed in bringing the
conflict' to a successful termination. One fact is undeni
able, that another such war — a war as protracted and as
wasteful of life and treasure — as this would ruin the nation.
It is hardly to be expected that our national patriotism, or
prudence, would endure such another draft upon time,
blood, and treasure, and a doubling up of the debt under
which we are now groaning. Yet, amid the possibilities
of the future,- it would imply infinite presumption to
affirm, or calculate upon, the impossibility of another such
a national catastrophe. If the war was wisely, and es
pecially most wisely, conducted, the nation needs, as her
guides in the future, to understand the facts and the
reasons for the same. If, from its beginning to its close,
I

2 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
it was badly conducted, as badly especially as can be
conceived, this fact also should be known, with a full
disclosure of the reasons thereof — that, as a nation, we may
become wise and prudent through the knowledge and
appreciation of past errors.
We need, also, to, understand clearly the conduct of this
war, as the immutable condition of knowing and appreciat
ing the character and merits of the men whom we have
elected, or may elect, to rule over us, and the wisdom, or
unwisdom, which has induced the nation to elect these
men to the high places which they occupy.
No free people can become " a wise and understanding
people," and as moral as they are wise, unless by their
votes they shall fill our chairs of state and represent
ative halls with statesmen, — statesmen " with Atlantean
shoulders fit to bear the weight of mightiest monarchies,"
— statesmen, too, whose integrity and trustworthiness are
as visible as their greatness. None but diminutive bodies
can revolve around a small central orb. As long as this
nation shall fill our chairs of state with small specimens
of human nature, minds characterised by ignorance of
national affairs, by greediness for filthy lucre, and in
difference to official corruption, — statesmen fit to sustain
the weight of the mighty interests of this great Republic,
statesmen whose integrity and trustworthiness shall be as
manifest as their great talents and wisdom, will be invisible
in our Cabinets and halls of legislation. Had I a voice
which could command the attention of the nation, that
voice should break "trumpet tongued" upon the ear of
every individual who is under the weight of the responsi
bility of the elective franchise ; charging him, as he regards
the best interests of his country, if he would save our
Government from misrule and corruption, and prevent
general demoralization, to shake off, at once and for ever,
the shackles of party, to step out from the circles of party
rings, and enter into a solemn covenant with his con
science and his God never again to cast a vote for any
man to fill any important office, — any man whose high
talents, wisdom, integrity, and trustworthiness are not
" known and read of all men." When manifest wisdom
and trustworthiness shall become the sine gud non con-

INTRODUCTION. 3
ditions of cornmanding the votes of the people of this
nation, then shall "wisdom and integrity be the stability
of our times," and this great Confederacy shall be God's
pillar of fire in the forefront of all nations. To do some
thing to ensure this " consummation so devoutly to be
wished " has been the prime motive which has induced
the preparation of this history.
WHAT I PROPOSE TO RENDER DEMONSTRABLY EVIDENT IN
THESE FUTURE PAGES.
Having made the science of war a subject of careful
study from my youth up, having critically read the history
of the great campaigns of past ages, and done so for
the specific purpose of a clear understanding and com
prehension of the principles on which they were con
ducted, and the wisdom and unwisdom of successfiil and
unsuccessful commanders; having most carefully studied
the conduct of this war from its commencement to its
close ; having as carefully considered the relative strength
and resources of the two parties in the conflict, and the
comparative advantages and disadvantages of each for
attack and defence ; and having contrasted the duration of
this war with others in which the cases were at all similar,
— I have from the beginning maintained, and Will now
proceed to render undeniably evident to every candid
reader of these pages, the following propositions : that
this war ought not have been of a single year's continu
ance after our armies were organised ; that it ought not
to have cost this nation a hundred thousand lives, or a
thousand millions of dollars ; that within any eight months
of the continuance of the war, after the middle of October
1 86 1, any Commander-in-Chief of ordinary ability and well
instructed in military science, would have brought that
conflict to a final termination ; that had General Grant been
such a commander, he would have brought the conflict to
a practical termination during the interval which occurred
after he received his commission as Commander-in-Chief
and the opening of his spring campaigns. I am well
aware that these are bold and will be to many presumpt
uous propositions ; I am equally well aware that in these

4 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
propositions I distinctly and correctly represent the de
liberate judgment of the best thinkers iri the country,
thinkers civil and military, to whom my views have been
presented, together with the united opinions of the best
military authorities in Europe. The conduct and con
tinuance of this war, and the oceans of blood and treasure
poured out in carrying it through, have no parallel in the
history of the world, and are matters of wonder and as
tonishment to Christendom. We shall have real ground
for national self-respect, and shall command the highest
respect of the civilised world, when, and only when, we
shall evince our wisdom, our candour, and integrity by a
revealed comprehension and appreciation of the real facts
of the case. All I ask of my countrymen is a candid
hearing of my facts and arguments. If, after such a
hearing, my proofs shall not be found " perfect and entire,
wanting nothing," I freely consent to suffer any amount of
national reprobacy which my worst enemies can devise.
I would here remark that the main portions of the
criticisms which will be found on these pages were, during
the progress of the war, expressed verbally to my own
pupils, and to leading minds around me ; and in communi
cations addressed to such individuals as Secretary Chase,
and Messrs. Sumner, Chandler, etc., and members of the
Committee on the Conduct of the War. In along commu
nication addressed to Secretary Chase, near the close of
the year 1862, after giving quite an extended criticism on
the conduct of the war, I made the statement that " if our
military authorities had made it their supreme object to
devise and carry out the worst system presented in history,
or known to the science of war, they could not, in my
honest judgment, have succeeded better than they had
done." In his reply, after commending my criticisms,
and requesting me to continue the correspondence, saying
that my "suggestions would be very instructive to him,
and might be beneficial to the nation," the Secretary
added: — "The opinion which you heive expressed about
the conduct of the war thus far is an exact expression of
.apprehensions which have frequently suggested themselves
to my own mind." It was impo.ssible for him to conceive,
he added, " of a war conducted upon worse principles

INTRODUCTION. 5
than this had been." In a note received from Mr. Sumner
about the same time, this paragraph is found: — "I have
from the beginning been profoundly impressed with your
views. An administration more quick and positive than
ours would have adopted them early, and the war would
have been ended long since." "I fully endorse all your
views," said Senator Chandler, in a similar note, "and
have done all I possibly could to induce the Administra
tion to adopt them."
I would further state, in this connexion, that an
epitome of all my criticisms on the conduct of the war up
to January 1863 is contained in two long communications
read to President Lincoln in the early part of that month,
and read in the presence of Senators Wade and Wilson,
and other leading members of Congress. The substance
of these communications was at first verbally presented
to the President, in the presence of Senators Wade and
Wilson, and was then, at his special request, committed tc
writing. After the reading of the papers, it was unani
mously agreed that they should be submitted to some
military man especially qualified to judge of their cha
racter; and General McDowell, with unanimous approval,
was selected. The papers, it should be borne in mind,
contained a special criticism of the previous conduct of
the war, and a detailed plan for the conduct of future
campaigns. After a full hearing of the documents, and
a careful discussion of their essential features. General
McDowell certified in writing that " the plan presented
was the best that he had heard suggested." "With this
plan adopted," he remarked to me, " we can finish up the
campaign here in Virginia during the present winter."
In one of my calls upon Mr. Sumner, at his own rooms, I
found there the celebrated historian, Bancroft. After our
mutual introduction, Mr. Sumner remarked to his friend
that he was in the presence of an " individual who had
studied the science of war from his youth, and who had
presented certain papers on the conduct of the present war
which have made a profound impression on all to whom
they have been read. These papers, also," Mr. Sumner
added, " contain a detailed plan for the conduct of our
future campaigns. As a historian can be relied on to

6 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
keep a secret, I suggest that Dr. M. present to you the
plan referred to." When I had done so, Mr. Bancroft
promptly replied in these words, " Adopt that plan, and I
am ready to write out a history of this war. Such has
been its conduct thus far, that I have felt I could not
endure the pain of writing- out its history." He then
expressed an earnest desire that the papers designated
should be given to the public.
After I left Washington, one of our senators went
down to the army of the Potomac, and laid the plan
under consideration before General Burnside and his corps
commanders. Every one of these commanders earnestly
advocated the adoption of the plan. General Burnside
fully endorsed the wisdom of the measure, but remarked
that he had a plan of his own which he desired to test,
before adopting the new one. He tried his own, failed,
was superseded, and then expressed to that senator his
deep regret that he had not followed the advice of his
Generals. In regard to the criticisms contained in those
communications, no individual in Washington, then, nor
has any individual to whom they have since been pre
sented suggested a doubt of the strict correctness of
those criticisms ; while the best authorities, military and
civil, all agree that had that plan been adopted the war
would have been brought to a final close within the space
of eight months from January ist, 1863. What that plan
was, and how and why its adoption was prevented after
the accomplishment of the event was rendered apparently
certain, will be disclosed hereafter. The above facts and
statements will evince, I judge, that I have reasons for the
assurance of which I am possessed of the correctness of
my criticisms on the conduct of this war, and that the
public have reasons equally valid for giving a candid hear
ing to my presentations.
FACTS OF A GENERAL NATURE WHICH CHARACTERISED
THE CONDUCT OF THIS WAR.
As preparatory to a full appreciation of particular
criticisms, I would direct very special attention to certain
facts of a general nature, facts which characterised the

INTRODUCTION. 7
conduct of this war from its commencement to its close.
A careful consideration of these facts will evince the strict
correctness of my estimate of the matter, iiamely, that in
badness of conduct this war has hardly a parallel in the
history of the world. Consider, in the first place, —
A fundamental fact stated by President Lincoln.
In the papers read before President Lincoln, this state
ment was made, that we had had at least from six to
eight hundred thousand men called into the field, and
yet these immense forces had been so distributed over
the whole country that our central armies were always
too weak to do any effective service. When that sentence
was read, the President interposed for a time, and made
the following statements : — ^" 1 confess to you, gentlemen,
that there has been^ connected with the conduct of this
war one fact which I have never been able to compre
hend. It is true that we have had all these vast forces
in the field, and yet in no battle that has thus far been
fought have there been 70,000 men engaged on our
side. When I visited Antietam, after the battle there,
I found between 92,000 and 93,000 effective men under
the immediate command of General McClellan ; yet, take
all the forces that were under fire in that battle, and add to
them all that had previously fought at South Mountain,
and the aggregate does not amount to 70,000 men. So
it has been from the commencement of the war to the
present time. Such facts as these, gentlemen, I admit
to be beyond my comprehension." " But one inference
can be drawn from such facts," I replied. " Your
Commanders-in-Chief, President Lincoln, evince a pal
pable ignorance of their business. The world knows of
no parallel to the facts you have just stated." What was
true of the conduct of this war from the beginning
up to January 1863, characterised, as we shall see here
after, its conduct to the end. With the amount of available
forces under their command, our Commanders-in-Chief
never ought to have lost an important battle, and never
ought to have fought one without an amount of force
which outnumbered the Confederate as three to two, or

8 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
two to one. In all the important battles actttally fought,
on the other hand, the forces were so evenly balanced as
to render victory on either side a matter of doubt, and
victory and defeat so bloody as to appall the nation and
the world. Relative strength of the hostile forces during this war.
In judging correctly of the wisdom, or unwisdom, of
military commanders in conducting their campaigns, we
need to take distinctly into account the character and
number of the forces under their command, as compared
with the character and amount of the armies under hostile
commanders. During the progress of this war, Napoleon
sent the Adjutant-General of France to this country to
learn, and report on his return, the actual condition of the
Union army. That General was required to doff entirely
his uniform, and to appear wholly as a private gentleman,
revealing to nobody in this country his official character.
In this state it was wiselyjudgedthathe be would be in the
best circumstances possible to ascertain the facts as they
really were. Having obtained the desired information, he
made this report to the home Government, that " the Union
army was the best constituted and worst commanded
army in the world." In that report, he correctly expressed
the known judgment of the military authorities of Europe.
Of the correctness of that report, as far as the soldiery of
both the Union and Confedel-ate armies are concerned,
there can be no doubt whatever. Braver, stronger, more
self-sacrificing men, or men more capable of enduring the
hardships of war, the world never saw. But what shall
we think of the second item in that report? Was, or was
not, ours the worst commanded army in the world ? No
other judgment seems admissible if we adjudicate the case
in the light of the comparative amount of the forces which
constituted the Union and Confederate armies. Accord
ing to official rcicords, more than 2,600,000 men entered
the Union armies during the progress of this war. After
the middle of October 1861 our forces were never less
than 800,000 and often exceeded 1,000,000 men, upwards
of the number last designated being mustered out of ser
vice at the close of the war. According to the most

INTRODUCTION, 9
reliable Confederate authorities, there never entered their
armies much, if any, over 600,000 men, while their effec
tive forces actually, at any one time, in the field never
exceded 200,000. I give the figures pertaining to the
Confederate armies as furnished by General S. Cooper,
ex- Adjutant- General of the Confederacy, and endorsed as
correct by Dr. J.Jones, Secretary of the Historical Society.
These statements are also confirmed by the testimony of
the ex- Vice- President of the Confederacy, Alexander H.
Stevens, who says : — " The Confederates, all told in like
manner, could not have much, if any, exceeded 600,000."
If we consider the fact that the number of the white popu
lation of the eleven States which first entered into the
Rebellion was, according to the census, less than 6,000,000
or less than 3,000,000 of males, the strict verity of the above
statements becomes self-evident. Out of such a population
not more than 600,000 men capable of bearing arms could
have been drawn. Nor could such a population as con
stituted these States, especially in their circumstances,
have equipped and kept in the field an effective force of
more than 200,000 men. It must also be borne in mind
that it was only in the early part of the war that men or
provisions of any account were furnished by Tennessee,
or Arkansas, and none from Western Virginia. In less
than two years after the commencement of the war, also,
soldiers from the States west of the Mississippi refused
utterly to cross that river. Hence all the forces opposed to
us east of said river, and where all the real issues of the
war were located, had to be drawn from seven States whose
white male population was less than 2,500,000. Such are
the real facts of the case. The actual forces of the
Confederacy during this war cannot have been under
estimated by Messrs. Cooper and Stevens. Undeniably,
the Union armies outnumbered those of the Confederacy,
in all cases, as two, commonly as three, and during the
entire period in which General Grant was our Commander-
in-Chief, as four to one ; yet, in almost all important
battles the forces engaged were nearly equal, the issues
of quite as many battles and campaigns were against us
as in our favour, quite half a million of lives were sacrificed,
and oceans of treasure, and between four and five years of

lO THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
time were expended, in subduing a rebellion where such
overwhelming odds were on our side.
The relative position of the Confederate and Union States.
The validity of such a deduction becomes still more
palpable when we consider the relative position of the
Union and Confederate States, and consequently of the
hostile forces of the same. Leaving Western Virginia,
Tennessee, and Arkansas out of the account, the nine
remaining Confederate States lay in a comparatively nar
row strip, between the Potomac and Rio Grand, with the
Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico on the south, and the
Union States on the north; the Gulf and the Ocean being
wholly under our control. No country could have been
more fully exposed to perfectly crushing blows, both on
its water and land sides, than were these States during the
progress of this war. On the water side, any amount of
force could, at any time, have been conveyed to any point
we chose, while the Union and Confederate armies always
lay in the near vicinity ,of one another. Whenever any
one of our central armies desired to find the enemy, it had
to march but a very few miles to attain the object desired.
No commanders of armies ever enjoyed such advantages
as did ours to encircle, crush, and capture forces so far
inferior to their own. At any period after the middle of
October 1861, our Commander-in-Chief, leaving the army
of the Potomac intact, and from the forces actually in the
field could have collected an army of 80,000 or 100,000
men, have conveyed them by water to Hilton Head, from
thence by an inland movement have captured Charlestown
and Willmington, have crushed the rebellion in the Caro-
linas, and by moving up on General Lee's rear, and
assaulting him, in combination with the army of the
Potomac, have destroyed or captured the Confederate
army in Virginia, and thus wiped out the rebellion in the
States east of Savannah river. Or the same end could
have been better accomplished by first moving the body
r-^ferred to round by Fortress Monroe, landing them where,
at the command of General Grant, General Butler landed
20,000 men, — that is, at Burmuda Hundred ; and from
thence seizing all General Lee's communications south of

INTRODUCTION. 1 1
James river. In that case, between this body of men and
the Potomac army, the entire army of General Lee would
have been crushed or captured in a very few weeks. A
very few weeks more would then have sufficed, through a
general combination of all our armies, to wipe out the
entire rebellion in all the States west of the Mississippi,
and to ensure its speedy collapse everywhere. No man
with any acquaintance with military affairs, or of common
information, will for a moment doubt the validity of these
statements. Important facts connected with the army of the Potomac.
During the entire progress of this war, the objects of
central regard on the part of the Union and Confederate
States were the army of the Potomac, under its successive
commanders, on the one hand, and that of Virginia, under
General Lee, on the other. The exclusive mission of the
former army was to strike a deadly blow at the heart of
the rebellion by the capture of Richmond, and the dis
persion, the annihilation, or capture of the army of General
Lee. All parties were well aware that the accomplishment
of this one mission would necessarily involve the speedy
death of the Confederacy. And what was this army of
Virginia? In the character of its soldiery, and in its
management upon the field, it has seldom, if ever, been
surpassed. In numbers, however, it never reached 1 20,000,
and generally fell quite below 100,000 men. When it en
countered the army of the Potomac under General Grant, it
never had more than 70,000 men in all, being outnumbered
by the actual forces opposed to it on the field of conflict,
as quite three to one. The single mission of General Lee,
with the small band of brave men under his command, was
to perpetuate and establish the Confederacy by defending
the Confederate capital and the State of Virginia against
the overwhelming masses of men as brave as his own,
masses arrayed against him. If any one, after a careful
comparison of the relative numbers of these two armies,
and after, considering the forces which our Commanders-
in-Chief might, at any time, have concentrated and com
bined for the conquest of Virginia, will take a map and
contemplate the field on which these two armies operated,

12 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
he will perceive at once that no army could have been
more exposed to crushing blows from forces which were,
or might have been, combined against it, than was that of
General Lee, and that no city can be more easily approached
by superior hostile forces for purposes of assault or siege
than was Richmond during that entire war; facts, also,
which will be rendered demonstrably evident in the future
pages of this history. What was actually accomplished
on this field by this Potomac army ? In its various cam
paigns, despite all its efforts, and that from no fault of its
brave soldiery, the soil of the Union States was three times
invaded by the little army of Virginia ; in a large majority
of the great battles fought, victory perched upon its
standards, more than 200,000 Union soldiers were slaugh
tered, and the grand army of the Potomac never ap
proached within seeing distance of the city which it was
its supreme mission to reach and capture — never got in
sight of that city, I say, until it was abandoned by the
Confederates, and taken possession of by a small band of
coloured troops. We may search all history for a parallel
to such facts, and search in vain.
Periods of active service in our campaigns during this war.
The latitude and climate of the Confederate States per
mitted and required active service on the part of our armies
during the entire year. Such service was also required
by the examples of the great military commanders of all
Christendom. Suwarrow, for example, marched the Rus
sian army over the Alps in midwinter. The campaigns of
Eylau and Austerlitz were carried on, the one amid the
deep snows and terrible frosts of a Poland, and the other
amid those of a Bohemian winter. The campaign of the
Allies in France, the campaign which resulted in the cap
ture of Paris, and the banishment of Napoleon to Elba, was
wholly a winter campaign, and that in one of the most
marshy provinces in Europe. The Germans, in their late
French campaigns, never suspended operations for a single
day on account of snow or frost. This has been true in
all ages in regard to great armies under great military
commanders. Our great armies, however, uniformly rested during

INTRODUCTION. 1 3
the winter months and in midwinter. After the first
Bull Run campaign, " all was quiet on the Potomac," and
everywhere else, until the next spring, when the Confede
rates retreated from Manassas, leaving behind them that
fearful array of "Quaker guns" which during the prior
fall and winter months had so fearfully frightened our
"young Napoleon," the great Commander-in-Chief of all
our armies. After the victory at Gettysburg, the capture
of Vicksburg, and the lesser advantages gained at Lookout
Mountains and Knoxville, our immense forces lay for ten
months in a state of perfect idleness, either within , or directly
upon, the borders of the Confederacy, and that in accordance
with the decision of a Council of War, a council held by our
Commander-in-Chief, with his leading generals. Such was
the general character of the conduct of this war during its
continuance. Here we have one of the main reasons why
the war " dragged its slow length along " through so many
years. If our spring or fall campaigns were successful,
the practical suspension of hostilities during the summer
and winter months enabled the Confederacy to repair all
damages, and to adjust itself fully to the new state which
affairs had assumed, — we losing more men, in the meantime,
through disease resulting from idleness and dissipation,
that would have been lost through active service. Had
our Commanders-in-Chief followed the example of success
ful warfare in other nations, the Confederacy would have
had " no rest day nor night," winter or summer, after the
full opening of hostilities to their final close.
Our unimproved victories.
The real test of generalship is, not the mere gaining
of victories, but a subsequent improvement of the advan
tages thereby secured. In the war under consideration,
it seems to have been the deliberate plan of our Generals
to give their opponents full opportunity, after a defeat, to
repair their losses, and readjust their armies to the new
exigencies which had arisen. At Antietam, for example,
our commander claimed a great and signal victory on
the part of the army under his command, while not two-
thirds of his forces had taken any part at all in the battle,
—-the entire corps of General Porter, for example, not

14 THE AMKRICAN REBELLION.
having fired a gun. Yet, with 30,000 fresh troops,
and 60,000 more who were as ready to renew the
fight as they had been to commence it the day before,
our commander stood still, and saw General Lee pass his
defeated army, without loss, over the Potomac. When
absolutely commanded by the supreme authority at
Washington to pass his army over the river in pursuit of
the retreating foe, our "young Napoleon " absolutely re
fused obedience, under the plea that his army was in want
of 10,000 pairs of shoes, and thus lay still for upwards of
forty days. After the great victory at Gettysburg, General
Lee retreated in one direction and our army moved off
in another. When excessive floods delayed the retreating
army, on its arrival at the Potomac, until ours came up,
the latter then stood still, and did nothing whatever,
until General Lee had manufactured a bridge and passed
his army safely over. A signal victory on the 4th
July required that our army should rest until the opening
of the ensuing spring campaign. Such was the uniform
policy of our commanders during this war. After the
fall of Vicksburg, I wrote a communication to the New
York Times, — a communication not published, of course.
In this paper I remarked that any one at all acquainted
with military affairs and the state of our country would
perceive at once that the advantages to be derived from
the victory at Gettysburg and the opening of the
Mississippi, depended wholly upon the use which should
be promptly made of the army under General Grant.
If that army should be at once combined with that of
the Potomac or Tennessee for a finally decisive move
ment upon Generals Lee or Johnston, the war might be
brought to a speedy termination. I would venture, how
ever, to give a prediction in respect to what would be
done — Nothing decisive will now be attempted until
the opening of the spring campaign next year ; unim
portant advantages will be magnified into signal victories ;
while the Republican papers will continually flood the
country with reports that " the Confederacy is on its last
legs," and is about to suffer a final collapse. During this
wide interval, the Confederacy will repair the damages
it has received, reorganise its armies, perfect its defences.

INTRODUCTION. 1 5
and adjust itself to existing circumstances. In the spring,
consequently, our campaigns will open as if no hostilities
had before existed. These were the exact statements
made in that communication ; the reader will readily
call to mind how absolutely those predictions accorded
with the events which followed. When I came to com
prehend the principles on which that war was conducted
on our part, nothing almost gave me so much pain and
apprehension as a signal victory gained by one of our
armies in some particular locality, — a victory of an in
decisive character in respect to main issues. The reason
was that that victory would so completely satisfy our
Commander-in-Chief, whoever he happened to be, that
active operations would everywhere be suspended for
some six or ten months. This, as we shall see hereafter,
is no caricature of facts as they actually occurred through
out this war.
The tiineof the continuance of this war, as compared with others
ifi Olher countries.
In the history of the world, when armies have encoun
tered each other in the open field, as was true of our war,
hostilities have been of short continuance. In what a
hmited period, for example, did England convey her
armies half round the globe, and subdue the Sepoy rebel
lion among 150,000,000 of people in India; a rebellion in
which the English forces had to encounter a soldiery which
had been trained and armed by England herself The cam
paign of Austerlitz, in which Napoleon marched his army
across the entire empires of France and Germany, fought
several battles, captured Vienna, struck off northwards into
Bohemia, and in midwinter ended the war by the famous
battle which gave name to the campaign under considera
tion, was begun and ended in the space of ninety days. In
ninety days after Austria joined Russia and Prussia against
Napoleon in Saxony, the campaign, which involved many
and bloody battles, was finished by the victory of the
Allies at Leipsic. The winter campaign of the Allies in
France, the campaign which resulted in the capture of
Paris and the banishment of Buonaparte to Elba, was but
of ninety days' continuance. In ninety days after the Allies

1 6 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
declared war against Napoleon on his return from Elba,
Wellington and Blucher, all being taken by surprise, col
lected their armies, moved them to Belgium, quartered
them there for several weeks before Buonaparte opened
the campaign, fought four world-renowned battles,
marched their armies from their last bloody field to Paris,
captured that city, and sent the Emperor of France a
prisoner to England. Wellington was longer than this in
finishing up his Peninsular campaigns, because France had
possession of all the strongholds of Spain, and the armies
opposed to him were generally twice or three times as
numerous as his own. Yet, with all these odds against
him, he never lost a battle ; and in a wonderfully short time
drove the central army of France over the Pyrenees, and
with his own invaded the French territory. Let us now
compare a case which occurred in still more modern times.
On the 15th of July, 1870, France declared war against
Prussia. On the 29th of January following, an armistice
was signed at Versailles, among the terms of which was
the surrender of all the fortifications about Paris, together
with all the military forces in the city. On the first day of
March in the same year, a treaty of peace was ratified by the
National Assembly of France. By this treaty she ceded to
Germany all Alsace and one-fifth of Lorraine, and agreed
to pay to that Government i| 1,000, 000,000 on account
of the expenses of the war. During this brief period, the
German armies had captured upwards of 700,000 prisoners,
France losing upwards of 250,000 men in battle and by
disease, together with the leading fortified places of her
empire, such as Paris, Sedan, Metz, and Strasburg. In
short, in less than seven months the Germans collected
their armies, moved them into France, crushed the military
power of that great nation, consisting of 40,000,000 of
people, captured and destroyed not less than 1.000,000 of
its soldiery, took its capital and leading strongholds, and
compelled it to pay the expenses of the war. It took
our Commanders-in-Chief with effective forces far more
numerous than those of Germany, between four and five
years to prostrate the military power of less than 6,000,000
of people ; a people who could never keep in the field an
effective force of over 200,000 men, and whose territories

INTRODUCTION. 1 7
were incomparably more accessible to our land and sea
forces than was France to the armies of Germany or of
the Allies. Can any one, in view of the palpable facts
before us, doubt that within any ninety days after the
middle of October 1861, it was clearly within the power
of any one of our successive Commanders-in-Chief, had he
understood his business, to have made such combinations
of the forces under his command as to have secured the
capture and the surrender or destruction of the army of
Virginia ? " My life upon the issue," I often remarked to
President Lincoln during the inferviews referred to, " if
Richmond shall not be in our hands, and the army of
General Lee captured or utterly dispersed, within three
months from the present time, provided you will order the
combinations proposed to be made." In my opinions upon
the subject, such men as General McDowell, the corps
commanders of the army of the Potomac, and leading
thinkers in Washington, perfectly agreed. The reason
why our war was thus protracted beyond all recorded ex
amples is obvious. The Germans, for example, wherever
the armies of France were collected, made that spot their
centre, and made all their movements with fixed reference
to one end — the encircling and capturing those forces.
When a victory was gained, the retreating foe was relent
lessly pursued until all possible advantages were reaped
from said victory. After hostilities were commenced, they
were never intermitted on account of heat, rain, snow, or
frost, until the end proposed was secured. In our war, on
the other hand, the armies of the Confederacy were never
made our centres of operation, and their capture, or utter
dispersion, the object of our aims. We were perpetually
employed in assaulting strongholds, always approaching
them on their strongest sides, leaving their communica
tions intact, in conquering and holding territory, opening
and guarding water communications, and " plugging up
the Southern ports," — always resting after our victories
until the Confederacy had full opportunity to repair their
losses. In short, our war on our part very much resembled
a conflict between athletes, in which each aims exclusively
to hit the other on his extremities, and in which the brave
combatants rest twenty-four hours between each round. 2

1 8 ¦ THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
Without further preliminary statements we now advance
to a direct consideration of the actual conduct of this war ;
simply indicating the opinion that few facts in history
will surprise the nation and the world more than will a
disclosure, now for the first time made, of the real causes
which actually brought this war to its sudden, unexpected,
and bloodless termination.

CHAPTER L
THE BULL RUN CAMPAIGN.
CAPTURE OF FORT SUMTER.  RESULTS FOLLOWING.
On Friday, April 12th, 1 861, at twenty minutes past four in
the morning, and by special command of the supreme
authorities of the Confederacy, the bombardment of Fort
Sumter, from the forts and batteries in and about Charles-
town Harbour, commenced. The fortress was at the time
garrisoned by the brave Robert Anderson, with such stern
patriots for under officers as Captain Doubleday, General
A. Snyder, and seventy men as brave and patriotic as
their commanders. At nine o'clock Sabbath morning,
April 15th, the little band were taken from the fort by
the United States steamer Isabel ; one man having been
killed, and three wounded, by a premature explosion aftet
the bombardment had ceased. The eventful drama of
Sumter was immediately followed, on the one side, by
the addition of four States to the Confederacy, making in
all eleven States which entered into the Rebellion ; the
transfer of the capital to Richmond; and a second levy
upon the seceded States for troops, a levy which increased
the army of the said States to an equality in numbers to
those which were called into the field by the Federal autho
rities. On the occurrence of the same event. President
Lincoln, on the other side, called upon the Union States
for 75,000 volunteers for three months' service, and subse
quently for the enlistment of an indefinite number of volun
teers whose term of service was to extend during the war.
As the result of these successive calls, the Union army
amounted on the 4th July, 1861, as given in the report

20 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
of the Secretary of War to Congress met in special
session, to 310,000 men. Deducting from these the three
months' volunteers, whose time of service was about to
expire, " there will," says the report referred to, " be still
an available force of volunteers amounting to 180,000;
which, added to the regular army, will constitute a total
force of 230,000 officers and men." At the period of the
Bull Run campaign, our army in the field consisted of
an effective force of 3 10,000 men. Of these, as we shall
also see, upwards of 150,000 were located in and about
Washington, and within the State of Virginia, under the
immediate command of General Scott, our Commander-
in-Chief, and all fully available, and admirably located for
an immediate and successful movement upon the Confede
rate army and capital. Having furnished all these vast
forces for the specific purpose of putting down the Re
bellion, the public sentiment of the Union States called for
prompt and decisive action. It was, also, intuitively mani
fest to all, that if the Confederate army in the great State
of Virginia was annihilated, and the Rebellion was here fully
subdued, and the capital of the Confederacy was occupied
by the Union armies, there would be a speedy collapse of
the Rebellion everywhere. Hence the cr}' which from all
parts of the Union States broke continuously upon the ears
of our military authorities at Washington — " On to Rich
mond! " It was under the pressure of this united sentiment
of the Union States that the Bull Run campaign occurred.
Before proceeding to our criticisms of this campaign, it
may be important to notice certain
Interesting and important events in Missouri.
Among the most interesting and important events of a
military character which preceded the campaign under
consideration were those which occurred in Missouri
under the direction of the immortal Captain (afterwards
General) Lyon, aided in all his measures by the most
efficient services of Colonel F. P. Blair, who assumed
command of the First Missouri Volunteer Regiment,
April 25th. The manner in which, by order of the War
Department at Washington, Captain Lyon and Captain
Stokes on the night of April 25 th removed about 30,000

THE BULL RUN CAMPAIGN. .¦> T
stands of arms and other important war materials from
the arsenal at St. Louis, first to Alton, and then to Spring
field, Illinois, must command the admiration of all who
read the account of these transactions. This event was, on
the loth May ensuing, followed by another of still greater
importance, the capture of Camp Jackson by Captain
Lyon at the head of 6,000 volunteers. This camp had
been formed in the outskirts of St Louis, under the direc
tion of the Adjutant-General of the State, and was oc
cupied undeniably in the interests of the Confederacy by
a full brigade of armed men. Finding themselves sur
rounded by a force which could not be resisted, the whole
brigade surrendered. The following note from Victor's
" History of the Rebellion " will fully evince the importance
of this transaction : — ~-
Among the articles enumerated as found in the camp were
three 32-pounders, a large quantity of bombs and balls, several
pieces of artillery in boxes, twelve hundred rifles of a late model,
six brass field-pieces, six brass mortars (6-inch), one lo-inch iron
mortar, three 6-inch iron cannon, several chests of muskets, five
boxes of canister shot, ninety-six lO-inch, three hundred 6-inch
shells, twenty-five kegs of powder, a large number of musket stocks
and barrels, between twenty and thirty boxes, and a considerable
quantity of camp tools. On the steamer jf. C. Swan, seized, by
order of Captain Lyon, for carrying contraband of war, was found
the register, showing that most of these arms and equipments had
come up the river from the Baton Rouge arsenal.
On May 31st, General Harney, who had, during a
command of a few weeks, fully evinced his utter incapacity
to meet the exigencies of the then existing crisis, was
superseded, and General Lyon substituted in his place as
Commandant of the Western Department. An interview
was heW between the latter and C. B. Jackson, Governor,
and Ex-Governor Sterling Price, in St. Louis, Colonel
Blair and Major Conant being present as advisers of General
Lyon. The parties failing utterly to agree, the Confede
rate representatives retired. Governor Jackson immediately
calling the people of Missouri to arms, to " Rise, and drive
out ignominiously the invaders who had dared to dese
crate the soil which their labours had made fruitful, and
which is consecrated by their homes." The place of ren-

22 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
dezvous of the Confederate volunteers was Booneville.
No sooner was General Lyon in full command, than he was
after Jackson and Price. Putting his little army on board
steamers and transports, he sailed June 13th for Boone
ville, having on the day previous issued a most stirring
proclamation to the people of Missouri. On the morning
of the 15th he landed at Jefferson C ty, and installed
Col. Boersistein as Military Governor. On the next day,
reinforcements having arrived from St. Louis, he sailed
for Booneville, and on the 17th defeated the Confederates
there, and drove what remained of them undispersed
towards the southern part of the State. Pressing forward,
and acting in concert with Colonel Siegel, who moved
out from Rolla, his forces, having performed most orilliant
feats of arms, were concentrated, July lOth, at Springfield ;
while Jackson and Price fled from the State. The visible
results of prompt and decisive action in putting down the
Rebellion in Missouri, intensified the desire of the nation
for the adoption of similar measures in Virginia. If a few
thousand of hastily collected and imperfectly drilled
troops could do such things in the former State, what
ought not to be expected from 150,000 men, perfectly
disciplined troops, in the latter? Hence the cry, "On
to Richmond!" became too loud and strong to be alto
gether disregarded.
Events in the State of Virginia. — The invasion.
Before the movement which we are soon to consider,
however, was attempted, several events of more or less
importance had occurred in the State of Virginia and in
connexion with the army of the Potomac. In the depart
ment at Washington, an early movement of no little impor
tance was effected — the open invasion of " the sacred soil
of Virginia." This occurred on the 23rd June. Over the
Long Bridge at Washington, and over the Chain Bridge
at Georgetown, 10,000 men were conducted, those over the
former under General Mansfield, and those over the latter
under General McDowell, and safely established on the
soil referred to. In the meantime. Colonel Ellsworth, with
his Fire Zouaves, being conveyed thither by steam, took
possession of Alexandria. The assassination of the brave

THE BULL RUN CAMPAIGN. 23
Colonel at this place caused deep grief to the whole nation.
All the above results were accomplished without loss on
our part, Colonel Ellsworth excepted, while some 30CT
prisoners, mostly civilians, were captured in an attempt
to escape on a railroad train.
In the department of General Butler an affair ill-con
ceived, and very badly executed, occurred at Big Bethel,
an affair in which a body of our troops, consisting of several
thousand men, commanded by General Pierce, was defeated,
with the loss of about 100 on our side; one being killed
and seven wounded on the part of the Confederates. A
transaction of similar importance occurred in the depart
ment of General McDowell. We cite from Mr. Greeley's
" History of the American Conflict" : —
Late on Monday, June 17th, General Robert C. Schenck, under
orders from General McDowell, left camp near Alexandria, with
700 of Colonel McCook's ist Ohio, on a railroad train, and pro
ceeded slowly up the track towards Leesburg, detaching and
stationing two companies each at Fall's Church and at two road-
crossings as he proceeded. He was nearing Vienna, thirteen
miles from Alexandria, with the four remaining companies, num
bering 275 men, utterly unsuspicious of danger, when, on emerging
from a cut and turning a curve, eighty rods from the village, his
train was raked by a masked battery of two guns, hastily planted
by Colonel Gregg, who had been for two or three days scouting
along our front, with about 800 rebels, mainly South Carolinians,
and who, starting that morning from Dranesville, had been tearing
up the track at Vienna, and had started to return to Dranesville,
when they heard the whistle of General Schenck's locomotive.
Several rounds of grape were fired point blank into the midst of
the Ohio boys, who speedily sprang from the cars, and formed
under the protection of a clump of trees on the side of the track.
The engineer, who was backing the train, and, of course, in the
rear of it, instantly detached his locomotive, and started at his best
speed for Alexandria, leaving the cars to be burnt by the rebels,
and the dead and wounded to be brought off in blankets by their
surviving comrades. The rebels, deceived by the cool and un
daunted bearing of our force, did not venture to advance, for fear
of falling into a trap in their turn ; so that our loss in men was but
twenty, including one captain. The rebels, of course, lost none.
Each party retreated immediately — the rebels to Fairfax Court
House. Events in Pennsylvania and Northern Virginia.
Events of still greater interest were transpiring in

24 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
Southern Pennsylvania and Northern Virginia, where
General Robert Patterson held command. On the 7th
June he advanced with quite 20,000 men from Cham-
bersburg to Hagerstown, General Wallace on his right
taking possession of Cumberland and Romney. On the
occurrence of these events. General Joseph E. Johnston, in
command of the Confederates, burned the bridge at Point
of Rocks, destroyed the superb railway bridge over the
Potomac, made destruction of the armoury and shops at the
Ferry, and retreated from Harper's Ferry to Winchester.
While General Patterson remained at Hagerstown, the
Potomac, at his command, was crossed and recrossed at
Williamsport by General Thomas ; the Confederates, in the
meantime, returning to the river, completing the work of
destruction at Harper's Ferry, thoroughly dismantling the
Chesapeake Canal and the several railroads in that region,
and made a conscription of Union men as well as Con
federates to fill their ranks. Finally, on the 2nd July,
General Patterson recrossed the Potomac at Falling
Waters, encountering a slight resistance from General
Jackson. On the 7th orders were given, but not executed,
for an advance on Winchester, whither General Johnston
had again retreated. On the 15th, the energetic com
mander of the Union forces, now increased to upwards
of 30,000 men, moved through Martinsburg to Bunker
Hill, nine miles from Winchester, having received specific
orders from General Scott to make " a forward movement
as rapidly as possible." The part which this important
arm)'^ took in the movement upon Manassas will be pre
sented hereafter. Events in Western Virginia.
In Western Virginia, in the. department of General
McClellan, events of the very highest importance were
transpiring just at this time. By plans most wisely devised,
and vigorously executed, the entire Confederate forces in
this department, those in Kanawha Valley excepted, were
either dispersed, or captured. The Confederate camps
most strongly fortified at Rich Mountain under Col.
Pegram, and at Laurel Hill under General Garnett, were
captured, with most of their artillery and camp equipage.

THE BULL RUN CAMPAIGN. 25
After lying in the woods for two days in a starving con
dition. Colonel Pegram, July 17th, with 600 men under his
command, surrendered at discretion. At a final stand
made by General Garnett in his retreat, he was himself
killed, and his whole force dispersed and disorganized,
a portion of them escaping to join General Jackson at
Monterey. Of the result of these victories, General
McClellan thus speaks in his despatch to Washington : —
General Garnett and his forces have been routed, and his baggage
and one gun taken. His army are completely demoralized. General
Garnett was killed while attempting to rally his forces at Carricks-
ford, near St. George.
We have completely annihilated the enemy in Western
Virginia. Our loss is about thirteen killed, and not more than forty
wounded ; while the enemy's loss is not far from two hundred killed ;
and the number of prisoners we have taken will amount to at least
one thousand. We have captured seven of the enemy's guns in
all.

ADVANCE ON MANASSAS, OR THE BULL RUN CAMPAIGN.
All these events occurred prior to the advance on
Manassas, and present to our consideration an army little
less than 35,000 men at perfect liberty to be employed
in a grand advance upon the State and capital of Old
Virginia. The advance that was made we are now fully
prepared to consider. The events above detailed abso
lutely evince one essential fact — the perfect reliability of
the soldiery of the entire forces under the direction of our
Commander-in-Chief for any service which the interests of
the nation might require. In Missouri, in the Peninsula,
before Washington, in Northern and Western Virginia, our
newly-disciplined troops evinced all the courage, steadi
ness, and energy of disciplined veterans. The promptitude
with which those Ohio volunteers re-formed after their
surprise at Vienna is an honour to the State and nation.
In no instance was there a reverse on account of the bad
quality of the men engaged. Let us now advance to a
direct consideration of the Bull Run campaign ; our aim
being, not merely to present what was, but what ought to

26 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
have been, done under the circumstances. As a means to
this end, let us consider, in the first place,
THE COMPARATIVE AMOUNT ANp RELATIONS OF THE UNION
AND CONFEDERATE FORCES AVAILABLE FOR OFFENCE AND
DEFENCE ON THE SACRED SOIL OF VIRGINIA.
The campaign under consideration was, professedly,
but the opening scene of a great drama, the finale of which
was to be the subversion of the Rebellion in Virginia, and
the capture of its capital ; and in it that of the Confederacy.
The nation did not demand or expect a battle, but a con
quest, which should be visibly decisive of the fate of the
Confederacy. A view of the situation and comparative
amount of the forces in the two armies immediately opposed
to each other will enable us to form a correct judgment of
the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the demand and
expectation under consideration. The amount of effective
forces under the direct supervision and control of our
Commander-in-Chief, and fully available for the contem
plated movement, could not, as we have stated, have been
less than 150,000 men. Those under General Butler
amounted to 15,000 men, those under the immediate
command of General McDowell to quite 75,000, and those
under Generals Patterson and McClellan to upwards of
30,000 each.
According to the best Confederate authorities, the entire
forces under the command of Generals Beauregard and
Johnston amounted to less than 30,000 men, Mr. Stevens
puts their united forces at 28,000 ; 20,000 under the former,
and 8,000 under the latter. Johnston had under his com
mand, for example, but nine regiments, with a few hundred
cavalry under General (Stonewall) Jackson . No Confederate
authority places the forces of General Beauregard above
the sum designated. In all the rest of the State it is quite
safe to affirm that there were not over 20,000 organised
troops that could have been rendered available against the
Union armies. Our armies, then, outnumbered those of
the Confederacy as three to one. If we adopt the relations
of two to one we shall be far within the circle of real facts ;
and this last estimate is all that is asked, as the basis of

THE BULL RUN CAMPAIGN. 2,7
our statements of what was undeniably practicable through
a wise use of the forces under our Commander-in-Chief.
Nor can we conceive of armies in better relations for
offensive operations than were ours at the time. Equally
unfavourable was the condition of the Confederate armies
for successful defence. The latter armies were within a
semicircle of forces, divided into four parts ; by each of
which. General Butler's excepted, they were outnumbered,
and which could have been concentrated upon them with
perfectly annihilating force. Let any one take a map and
mark the location of the Confederate forces at Manassas
and Winchester, at Yorktown, Richmond, and other parts
of Virginia. Then let him notice the location of the armies
under General Butler at Fortress Monroe, under General
McDowell at Arlington, under General Patterson at Bunker
Hill, and General McClellan in Western Virginia ; bearing
in mind that all these forces were perfectly free for effective
service. But one judgment can be passed in view of the
facts before us, namely, that no armies could be in a worse
condition for defence than were those of the Confederates,
nor in a better condition for offensive operations with over
whelming masses than were these Union forces. Let us
now consider
What might have been, and ought to have been, done under
the circumstances.
Let us suppose that 20,000 men had been detached
from General McDowell and sent round to General Butler,
the forces of the latter being thereby increased to 35,000
men ; that when all things were in readiness the army of
General Butler was moved to Burmuda Hundred, as it
was in the campaign under General Grant; that those
under General McClellan were by rapid marches moved to
Stanton ; those under MrDowell having moved out in front
of Manassas ; while Patterson had moved down the Shen
andoah and occupied a central position between the right
of McDowell and the left of McClellan. The result of such
dispositions, as every one at all acquainted with military
affairs, or possessed of common understanding, cannot but
perceive, would have been such as the following : — Rich
mond, being then unfortified, would have been captured by

28 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
General Butler with little or no resistance ; his presence
in that vicinity would have prevented any reinforcements
being sent to Generals Beauregard and Johnston ; while
his occupancy of all communications south of James river
would have rendered the retreat of the Confederate forces
into North Carolina impossible. On the other hand, the
Confederate generals at Manassas, finding themselves en
circled by forces more than three times as numerous as
their own, and finding all hope of escape cut off, would
have surrendered without a battle, or after too feeble a
resistance to be called one. Thus the Rebellion would, in
a few days, have been totally suppressed throughout the
entire State of Virginia, and that with very little bloodshed
on either side. These advantages being promptly followed
up, the Carolinas, with all their seaports, would, in a few
weeks more, have been in our hands, and the almost imme
diate collapse of the Confederacy everywhere else would
have been fully assured. This we affirm, in the open pre
sence of the nation and world, and that with no fear of
intelligent contradiction, that had the army of 310,000
effective forces under the command of our Commander-
in-Chief on the 4th July, 1 86 1, been promptly and wisely
employed, the duration of the Rebellion would but a little
have exceeded the period assigned to it by Mr. Seward, — to
wit, " ninety days." We have suggested but one plan for
the disposition and movement of our forces for the sup
pression of the Rebellion in Virginia. Other dispositions
and movements equally felicitous will readily suggest them
selves to every reflecting mind. Who can doubt that the
civilians were right in calling for an onward movement,
and a decisive one, under the circumstances then existing ?
Let us now consider What was done at this eventful crisis.
The affair at Bull Run, as it actually occurred, can
be told in few words. On the i6th July, General Irwin
McDowell, under the direction of Lieutenant-General
Scott, moved out from his cantonments south of the
Potomac, and near Washington, and moved in the direc
tion of Manassas. For the service assigned nearly 35,000
men were detailed. This column consisted of four divisions :

THE BULL RUN CAMPAIGN. 29
the first under General Tyler, the second under General
Hunter, the third under General Heintzelman, the fourth
under Colonel Miles, — the fifth, under General Runyon,
being left in the works south of the Potomac. On the
1 8th a sharp conflict, mainly with artillery, occurred be
tween our advanced forces under General Tyler and a
body of Confederate forces under General Longstreet, at
Blackburn's Ford on Bull Run ; we losing eighty-three and
the Confederates sixty-eight men. This reconnoissance in
force revealed the fact that the Confederate army was in
a position where they intended to give battle, a position
along the wooded valley of Bull Run, about midway
between Centerville and Manassas Junction. On Satur
day, General McDowell had brought up his forces, and
made all preparation for battle on the next day. In the
meantime. General Johnston, to be followed by his army,
had arrived at Manassas, and, being the senior officer,
had assumed the command of the Confederate forces, —
following out, in full, the plan previously arranged by
General Beauregard. General McDowell had arranged to
have the battle commence at six o'clock the next morning.
It was two or three hours later than this, however, before
the flanking divisions reached the position at which fighting
in earnest was to commence. In the early part of the day,
all things seemed propitious for a decisive victory of the
Union forces, the Confederates being driven, by 3 p.m., at
least one mile and a half At this'juncture, the battalions
of General Johnston, under Colonels Elzey and Early,
appeared upon the Union right, and outflanked the
same. Several of our regiments first recoiled under the
unexpected fire poured upon them, and then broke in
confusion and fled from the field. The result was a
general panic of the Union forces, and a confused retreat
in the direction of Washington. The Confederates, with
their fresh reinforcements, and a splendid Cavalry of 1,500
men, pursued our forces but a short distance, having dis
covered our first division drawn up in good order on the
slope west of Centerville, and calmly, if not eagerly, await
ing their advance. Another and very important reason
f»r such a short pursuit was afterwards assigned by the
Confederate commander, — to wit, that they did not desire

30 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
to reveal to the Union generals the small forces available
for pursuit. Immediate results of this battle.
The direct results of this tragico-comic affair was the
loss, on the part of the Confederates, according to the
report of General Beauregard, of 269 killed and 1,533
wounded, with two or three hundred prisoners taken in the
early part of the battle, and sent on to Washington, not
reported. After stating that 1,460 wounded and other
prisoners had been sent to Richmond, the report adds : —
"The ordnance and supplies captured include some twenty-
eight field pieces of the best character of arms" (our re
ports make the number 17-22), "with over one hundred
rounds of ammunition for each gun, thirty-seven caissons,
six forges, four battery waggons, sixty- four artillery horses,
completely equipped, 500,000 rounds of small-arms ammu
nition, 4,500 sets of accoutrements, over 500 muskets,
some nine regimental and garrison flags, with a large
number of pistols, knapsacks, swords, canteens, blankets,
a large store of axes and intrenching tools, waggons, am
bulances, horses, camp and garrison equipage, hospital
stores, and some subsistence."
General McDowell states our losses as 481 killed and
1,011 wounded, giving no account of how many wounded
and others were captured from us by the enemy. The
greatest loss of all was the prestige of an expected victory,
to be followed by a triumphant advance upon Richmond.
The peculiar character of the battle accounted for.
All histories of this war agree in respect to the fact
that this battle was " without form or order," and with no
unity of action among the various divisions, as far as the
Union forces were concerned. General McDowell himself,
during the day, did not seem to know what the various
portions of his army were doing, or to have any control
ling influence in directing their movements. Each divi
sion, brigade, and even regiment seemed to act by and
for itself, and not as a part of an unified whole. During
the progress of the battle, on various parts of the field,
single regiments would be sent out, and after firing a cer-

THE BULL RUN CAMPAIGN. 3 1
tain number of rounds, would be retired, and others sent
forward to act in their places. Such want of system has
been recorded as a fault of the General in command. On
the other hand, during our visit to Washington in January
1863, we found this to be the general opinion of him on
the part of those best qualified to judge. President Lincoln
included — that we had no better read General in our
army, no better judge of the character of a proposed cam
paign, and few, if any, better qualified to plan one, or to
manage a corps anywhere. During the sickness of General
McClellan, after he became Commander-in-Chief, and when
the 'President was greatly perplexed as to what should
be done in the pressing crisis. General McDowell,
with General Franklin, was sent for, for special counsel
and advice. What were the difficulties which encircled
him, as commander of the Potomac army ? We state them
as we received them personally from General McDowell
himself. When he took command of this army, he
made immediate arrangements to manoeuvre them, and
train them to act as harmonious parts of a systematised
whole. All such measures were absolutely prohibited by
General Scott. In urging their importance. General
McDowell was charged with desiring to make a show.
Hence it was that the regiments which constituted his
brigades, his brigades which constituted divisions, and
the divisions which constituted his army, never had the
least discipline in concerted action, the army being, in
reality, constituted of independent parts, with a nominal
commander, who could by no possibility command in any
proper sense his own forces. The battle had to be fought
by regiments at a time, these being the only compact and
systematized bodies in the army. Nor was it possible for
any General to have given real system to such a body of
men on a battlefield, or to be really cognizant of what was
going on during its continuance.
In addition to all this. General Scott absolutely refused
to furnish General McDowell an adequate cavalry force,
though there was an abundance of such troops in Wash
ington. This part of the army was obstinately kept on
the north side of the Potomac, the most of those who
accompanied the advance on Manassas having been got

32 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
over by stealth. Hence it was that all reconnoissances
had to be made by infantry, with no adequate amount of
cavalry to improve an advantage or to cover a retreat.
Such are the real facts of the case before us. Under com
mand. General McDowell took command of this army.
Under positive command, he fought an important battle
for which he had been absolutely prohibited giving his
army the preparation necessary to render success a pro
bability ; the cavalry necessary to render a compaign what
it should be being also arbitrarily withheld from him.

THE PART WHICH GENERAL PATTERSON DID, OR RATHER
DID NOT, ACT IN THIS TRAGIC COMEDY.
In the campaign under consideration, Beauregard
counted on the co-operation of Johnston, and McDowell
on that of Patterson. How Johnston met the expectations
reposed in him we have already seen. The reliance of
McDowell, on the other hand, turned out to have been a
" broken reed." General Patterson had received positive
orders from General Scott to attack and beat Johnston if
he (Patterson) was in sufficient force to do it, and if not,
to so employ his army as to prevent his Confederate anta
gonist joining Beauregard. Deeming himself too weak
for offensive operations, nothing remained for our com
mander, then at Bunker Hill, but to keep Johnston where
he was, at Winchester. As a means to this end, General
Sanford, on Patterson's left, had made all dispositions to
occupy the only roads on which Johnston could move to
Manassas, so as to be there in time to be of service to his
colleague. Sanford' s movement was to have been made
at four o'clock in the morning. A little after twelve
o'clock the same night he received a detailed order
from Patterson, to move promptly, not in the direction
intended, but at right angles to the same; to make all
dispositions on the way, by which our whole army at
Bunker Hill should move, not towards Winchester, but
make a safe retreat to Charlestown, near Harper's Ferry.
So indignant were the men at what they were compelled
to do, that when Patterson appeared before them the next
day he was received with a loud and universal groan.

THE BULL RUN CAMPAIGN. 33
The reason for this movement was that a rumour reached
the ears of our veteran commander that he was to be
attacked by Johpston reinforced by 20,000 men. Thus,
while the Confederate General moved on to Manassas, the
Union commander, terror-stricken by a rumour, fled
precipitately to Charlestown, and from thence brought his
disappointed and indignant forces in safety to Harper's
Ferry, where he was superseded by General Banks. Thus
ended this farcical campaign.
What should have been done in the circumstances.
This campaign smote the North with horror, electrified
the Confederacy, and was a presage of the final results of
the war in the judgment of Europe. But one thing was
required of our supreme military authorities in the crisis
—a prompt disposition of all the available Union forces
in all parts of the country for a most decisive movement
upon the Confederate armies in Virginia, and for the
capture of the capital of the Confederacy itself The
action of the army of Manassas after its victcry, their
retirement especially before a single division in regular
array at Centerville, clearly revealed the utter impotency
of that army, if assailed by the united forces under the
command of our military authorities. Had the three
months' volunteers retired, sufficient forces remained to
accomplish what the crisis demanded. Nor would these
volunteers have retired, as they were to do, under the
disgrace of ignominious defeat, had they been assured
that by another month's service they could crown them
selves and their country with deathless honour.
What was done under the circumstances.
Instead of this, " the great and exceedingly bitter
cry" of our Commander-in-Chief everywhere broke upon
the ear of the nation, that " the civilians had compelled
him to fight a battle before he was prepared for it." As
a consequence, popular clamour was turned away from its
proper object, military imbecility, and vented itself upon
the civilians. From that time onward, civilians were to
have nothing to say about the conduct of the war. All
was to be left to the uncriticised direction of the Generals, 3

34 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
whether they might chance to be wise commanders or
fools. To this cry the press succumbed ; and hence from
this time onward the conduct of the war was without
impartial criticism, even what the European military
authorities thought of it not being permitted to meet the
national eye. This was one of our national calamities
during the progress of this war. None but partizan
criticisms had place in the columns of the national press.
In respect to the conduct of war, as well as other subjects,
the unbiased judgment of the people is generally correct,
and should have free and full expression through the
press. Otherwise, stupidity is about as likely to lead
armies as wisdom. The civilians being silenced, however,
another and still worse result followed, namely, with few
and slight exceptions, the total inactivity of our great
armies from the end of July 1861 to the ist March of the
year following; when, with similar exceptions, the con
duct of the war, as we shall see, was everywhere as bad
as it could have been.

CHAPTER II.
ADMINISTRATION OF GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN
IN THE DEPARTMENT OF WASHINGTON.
The campaign of Bull Run convinced the Administration
of the utter incapacity of General Scott to act as Com
mander-in-Chief of the armies of the United States in
the then existing crisis.. Yet, in deference to his former
services in the cause of his country, he was not formally
superseded until the last of October of that year. In
addition to the facts already stated, he was informed, by
telegram from Patterson, of the latter's retreat to Charles
town. On the 20th, the day previous to the battle of
Bull Run, he was informed, by another telegram from
Patterson, that Johnston had actually retired from
Winchester to reinforce Beauregard at Manassas. Yet
no order was sent to recall McDowell from a battle in
which defeat, under the circumstances, was almost certain.
General Scott was, de facto, superseded by the appoint
ment of General George B. McClellan to the supreme
command of the department of Washington, then created
as preparatory to such appointment. At this time, he
found under his immediate command in his department,
aside from the depletion of the forces previously there,
by desertion, defeat, and the mustering out of the three
months' volunteers, — he found under his immediate com
mand, we say, 50,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry, 650 artil
lery, with 32 field guns. This force was, leaving out
of view the army he had left behind him in Western
Virginia, that under General Banks in the Shenandoah
valley, and under General Butler at Fortress Monroe,
more than sufficient to defend the national capital

36 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
against any force which the Confederates could bring
forward to capture the place. It was, indeed, as we shall
see, more than twice as large as he proposed to leave
for the protection and defence of the same place when
he took the army of the Potomac down to the Peninsula.
He was, however, left but a few weeks in this condition.
On the 15th October he reported, as in and about Wash
ington, at Baltimore, and on the Potomac, within the
State of Maryland, an army of 152,051 men, 8,404 of
these being absent. With such a force under his com
mand, he repeatedly assured the nation, not that he in
tended to make any aggressive movements at all, but
that he could hold the capital against any force which
the Confederates could bring against him. The Con
federate General, Johnston, in the meanwhile, was lying in
a state of perfect and fearless security at Manassas, with
a force under his command amounting to less than 50,000
men. It may be well, as preparatory to future references,
to give here the number of the forces present for duty at
Manassas and in Northern Virginia under the command of
General Johnston. As officially reported to the War De
partment in Richmond, the number present October 31st,
1 86 1, was 44,131 ; December 31st it was 62,112 ; February
28th, 1862, it was 44,617.

NATIONAL SENTIMENT IN REGARD TO GENERAL McCLELLAN
WHEN HE WAS APPOINTED COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.
On the ist November, 1861, General McClellan as
sumed the command' of the armies of the United States.
" General McClellan," as Mr. Swinton has well said,
"brought to his high trust proofs of talent which, though
not sufficient to show him a proper captain of a great
army, were yet enough to inspire the best hopes of him.
He had served with distinction in Mexico, had studied war
in Europe, was in the flower of his youth, and, above all,
had just finished a campaign that, by its success amidst
elsewhere general failure, seemed to furnish at once the
presage .arid prophecy of victory. ' ' Yet, as has been equally
well said by Mr. Caville J. Victor, " A greater trust never
was confided to a younger man ; nor does history show a

ADMINISTRATION OF GENERAL G. B. MCCLELLAN. 37
greater trust reposed in one who had done comparatively
so little to prove his fitness for the trust." One fact is
undeniable, however, to wit, that no other young or old man
was ever advanced to successive high commands with more
universal approval of the press and people. All parties ap
proved and applauded his appointment. Nobody enquired
to what party he had belonged, or questioned the wisdom
of the authorities which advanced him to his high office.
In anticipation of what he was to do, he received the
cognomen of our "Young Napoleon." For his prompt
organization of the army of the Potomac he was justly
applauded. His long inaction in all departments under his
command was seconded and applauded under the assurance
" that he had a plan the development of which would, with
absolute certainty, astonish and electrify the nation, and
ensure the sudden collapse of the Confederacy." His fickle
ness in changing his plans ; the transfer of the main portion
of his great army from the front of the Confederate
army, which had retreated from Manassas, to the Penin
sula; his stopping four weeks with 130,000 men in front
of 10,000 at Yorktown, when any commander of common
understanding would, as we shall see, by a flank move
ment, have captured the place in four days : all these by
the Republican press were presented to the country as
masterly acts of strategy. Even his disastrous retreat from
Chickahominy to Harrison's Landing was represented by
the same class of papers as a prudential change of base,
from a bad to a good position. Never did the Republican
papers cease at all to uphold and eulogize him until his
utter want of real capacity as a General became too
manifest to be denied, and too calamitous to the nation to
be further apologised for or endured.
At a very early period of his command the author of
this treatise lost all confidence in our " Young Napoleon."
One of the first facts which induced this distrust was an
extract from a criticism of his published after his return
from Europe, a criticism on the Crimean campaign. The
extract referred to went the round of the papers, and was
presented as a proof to the nation that we had at the
head of our armies a tactician of the very highest order.
In the extract, a fundamental error is professedly disclosed

3S THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
in ihe conduct of that campaign on the part of the Allies.
They besieged Sebastopol but upon one side, and that on
the side which left the Russians perfectly free to send into
the city any munitions of war, reinforcements, and pro
visions they pleased. Instead of this, as our strategist
•rontended, they should have opened the siege on the
other side, cutting off" all communications between the
empire and city, and thus ensuring the early surrender of
the place. Now the prominent characteristic of a great
tactician is that, in the presence of great armies, he will
readily detect the plans of their respective commanders,
comprehend their excellences and defects, and suggest
important improvements in said plans. The defect, as I
at once saw, in this criticism, was a total misapprehension
of the real plan of the Allies, representing its fundamental
excellences as essential defects, and presenting in the
place of the one that was adopted the very worst that
could have been adopted. The real and specific plan of
the Allies, and the very best that could have been adopted,
was not to capture the city and fortress before them a
day earlier than they did. They desired to leave all com
munications between the place besieged and the Empire
which was to defend it, perfectly open. The military
authorities which developed the plan of the campaign on
the part of the Allies understood perfectly that in the
harbour of Sebastopol was the fleet of Russia, the idol of
its Emperor ; that the city with its harbour was the eye of
the Empire looking towards the south and east ; and that
if besieged in a certain manner, such was the character of
Nicholas that he would exhaust the army and treasury of
his Empire in its defence. In carrying on the war on this
plan, the Allies could convey their armies, munitions, and
provisions, by water and rail, directly to the places where
they were needed, and that at the least expense possible ;
while Russia would be necessitated to march her armies,
convey all her munitions, materials, and provisions, wholly
by land, from the centre of that vast Empire, and over the
worst roads in the world. The plan of the Allies, then,
as avowed by the French Emperor, was, not to capture
Sebastopol at all, but to besiege it in such a form as to
exhaust the treasury and military resources of Russia in

ADMINISTRATION OF GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN. 39
its defence, — one of the wisest plans known in the history
of war, as the results fully demonstrated. In that war
Russia lost upwards of 600,000 men, — almost its entire
regular army ; while the loss of the Allies was but about
150,000. In this war, also, the treasury of the Empire
became so exhausted that its credit was gone ; while the
expense of the Allies was so small as not to burden the
nations which entered into the alliance. Russia, almost
without an army or credit, was necessitated to sue for
peace, and accept it on the terms which the Allies pro
posed. Had the plan proposed by our tactician been
adopted, Sebastopol would indeed have been soon cap
tured, and the Allies have been necessitated to prosecute
the war at a great distance in the interior, where the power
of Russia would have been far greater than theirs. Two
fundamental defects, as a consequence, became manifest
to my mind in the criticism under consideration — an utter
failure to comprehend the plan which he criticised, and
the presentation, as an essential improvement of that
which could not have been improved, of the very worst
that could have been devised. In view of such facts, I at
once located our Commander-in-Chief among fourth-rate
tacticians. If I should suggest my honest judgment of
General McClellan and his successor General Halleck, as
leaders of great armies, I should say that they never
evinced any capacity in planning campaigns but to
blunder, and that they never blundered upon a plan that
ought to have been adopted. Whether this impression
is or is not correct will be rendered fully manifest in the
sequel.
FUNDAMENTAL DEFECTS IN GENERAL McCLELLAN, AS THE
LEADER OF A GREAT ARMY.
It may help the reader to comprehend more perfectly
than otherwise the facts to be hereafter presented, if we
stop here and consider some of the essential defects
of our Commander-in-Chief, as the leader of great armies.
One of the most prominent peculiarities of a great com
mander is an ability to determine, from facts which he can
gather, the amount of forces in the army opposed to him.

40 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
On such points such commanders seldom err. On a
particular occasion, for example, Buonaparte saw a small
body of men take a position in his front, and remarked to
his staff" that there was an army of 60,000 men advancing
to that position. The facts turned out to be just as he
stated. The manner in which that small body took posi
tion revealed to the discerning eye of the great Emperor
the precise amount of the advancing army. Now one of the
fixed peculiarities of General McClellan was an amazing
overestimate of the number, discipline, and furnishment
of the army opposed to him. In his official report, given
March 8th, 1862, he puts the number of the Confederate
forces at Manassas and in Northern Virginia at 115,500,
when the entire number as revealed from official sources,
as affirmed by all Confederate and by English officers
visiting Confederate armies, and the avowed opinions ot
the best informed generals in our army, — that number was
less than 50,000. When he arrived at the Chickahominy,
he sent a message to the President saying that the army
opposed to him was quite as numerous as his own, and would
fight well. He always laboured under a similar delusion
in regard to the discipline, equipment, and provisions ot
the hostile forces. As his fixed maxim was never to fight
a battle without the consciousness of overwhelming odds
on his side, and as in the presence of an enemy his imagi
nation always presented the opposing force as greater and
better disciplined and provided than his own, his great
skill consisted in avoiding general and decisive engage
ments, and hence he never brought anything important
to pass. Another essential defect in our "Young Napoleon" is
what may be called self-distrust — distrust of his own plans
after they had been adopted and partially executed. We
state this from a leading officer in the Potomac army, and
one of the most ardent admirers of General McClellan.
He would adopt a plan, said this officer, as, of all others
conceivable, the very best, and with great energy would
enter upon its prosecution. At length, as difficulties ac
cumulated upon him, he would think of some other and now
impracticable plan. In the light of the new suggestion the
defects in the existing plan would become more and more

ADMINISTRATION OF GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN. 4 1
palpable to his mind, until the sentiment of distrust would
become so overpowering that he would be utterly unable
to arrange or order any decisive movement. Such was his
mental state, when he saw the difficulties before and around
him, when he had lain for a time with his army on the
Chickahominy. He here saw how much better it would
have been to have moved his great army at Washington,
in front of the enemy on the Rappahannock, and with his
right wing reinforced, flanking them by a movement down
the valley of the Shenandoah. Hence, he remained in
palsied inaction until his disastrous retreat to Harrison's
Landing. No nation can be more unfortunate than one
whose armies are under such leaders as this.
We mention but one other serious defect in General
McClellan as the leader of a great army. We refer to
his overestimate of the necessity of universal and absolute
readiness and order, as the condition, sine qua non, of
moving a great army. This characteristic of our General
was thus presented to us by a distinguished United States
senator. The fixed rule in the army is that each wheel
of each army-waggon shall have an extra linch pin. If
General McClellan should learn on the eve of a great
advance that a single wheel of a single waggon lacked
the required pin, he would stop his whole army for ten days,
if that were necessary, to have the deficiency supplied.
Hence it was that he was never ready to make an impor
tant movement. He could not obey an absolute order
from the Commander-in-Chief to move his army across
the Potomac, because he had just discovered that out of
upwards of 90,000, some 10,000 of his men were not ade
quately shod. Hence it is that but for the absolute com
mand of the supreme authorities nobody can divine when
our army would have been moved from before Washington.
The above characteristics will throw light upon all our
campaigns which were conducted under the lead of General
McClellan. Before proceeding further in our criticisms
of the administration of our youthful commander, we will
now devote a short chapter to noticing some important
events which were at this time transpiring in Missouri in
the department of General Fremont.

CHAPTER III.
THE COMMAND OF GENERAL FREMONT IN THE
WESTERN DEPARTMENT.
On the loth July, as we have seen, General Lyon ar
rived at Springfield, and formed a junction there with the
forces of Colonel Siegel, who had advanced from Rolla.
Here we left this brave little army before whom Governor
Jackson and General Price, with their forces, had fled from
the State of Missouri. On the 9th of this month. General
Fremont was appointed to the command of the Western
District, which included Illinois, Kentucky, Missouri, and
Kansas. Tarrying some time in the city of New York to
obtain necessary arms, equipments, and munitions, he
arrived at St. Louis on the 25th of the same month, and
assumed the command of his department. As General
Lyon was doing all that could be done, and that in the
best manner, in and about Springfield, General Fremont
did not interfere with the arrangements of his predecessor.
In the meantime, the Confederates, largely reinforced,
particularly in cavalry, re-entered and overran Southern
Missouri, and confined General Lyon to Springfield, who
was waiting for reinforcements. The general mustering
out of the three months' men, however, prevented any
being sent to his aid. Learning that the enemy was
advancing upon him in two strong columns, one from
Cassville on the south, and the other from Sarcassie on
the west, he determined to advance upon the former and
stronger body, and strike that before it had formed a
junction with the latter. Leaving Springfield August ist,
with 5,500 foot, 400 horse, and 18 guns, he at Dug
Springs met and defeated on the next morning a detach-

THE COMMAND OF GENERAL FREMONT. 43
ment of the advancing force. General McCuUoch, who
commanded this force, now moved west, and formed a
junction with the column which was moving up from
Sarcassie, while General Lyon returned to Springfield.
The Confederates now advanced with great caution, and on
the 7th reached Wilson's Creek, ten miles south of Spring
field. At this point, our brave General knowing well that
the opposing force outnumbered his as more than two
to one, determined to surprise the Confederates now under
the command of General McCulIoch, and this by a night
attack. He accordingly on the 9th left Springfield with
two columns ; the main one commanded by himself, and the
less, 1,200 strong, with 6 guns, by Colonel Siegel. At 4
a.m. August loth, the battle commenced by a front attack
on the enemy's front by Lyon's forces, while the rear of
McCulloch's right was attacked by Siegel. Taken by
surprise, the Confederates at first recoiled in disorder.
Becoming at length aware of the smallness of the force
assaulting them, they returned and fought with desperate
courage. On the enemy's right, Siegel at first gained
a great advantage, and with his guns made terrible
havock among the men opposed to him. Being at length
suddenly assailed by a large force which had been mis
taken for Unionists, his column was thrown into remediless
confusion, and fled in disorder, five of his guns being
taken. The entire weight of the Confederate columns now
fell upon the devoted band under General Lyon. By the
terrible fire of this band the enemy was, time and again,
driven in confusion from the field, and driven but to return
with greater force and determination. In the last onset,
our brave commander, the idol of his army, and one of the
most worthy of our nation's perpetual remembrance, fell,
but with his army in possession of the field.
Major Sturgis now led back the Union forces in good
order to Springfield ; from whence, under the conduct
of Colonel Siegel, a safe retreat, with a baggage train
five miles in length, was effected to Rolla, and the south
of Missouri was again in the hands of the Confederates.
[n this battle, which was fought by General Lyon contrary
to his own judgment, he being over-persuaded by General
Sweeny and others, the Union loss, as officially reported,

44 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
was 223 killed, 721 woundec^, and 108 missing. General
McCulloch reported the entire loss on the other side as
265 killed and 800 wounded. The Unionists throughout
the country lamented the death of General Lyon, as did
the Confederates that of General Jackson, and for similar
reasons. The former was, unquestionably, in all respects,
one of the best Generals known in the Union army. His
great merits are confessed even by the Confederates.
" The death of General Lyon," says Pollard, in his
" Southern History," " was a serious loss to the Federals
in Missouri. He was an able and dangerous man — a man
of the times, who appreciated the force of audacity and
quick decision in a revolutionary war. To military educa
tion and talents he united a rare energy and promptitude.
No doubts or scruples unsettled his mind." Mr. Pol
lard, we would add here, thus explains the reason why
our army was totally unmolested in its retreat to Spring
field and from thence with its long train to Rolla: — " Shortly
after the battle, the Confederate army returned to the
frontier of Arkansas, Generals McCulloch and Price hav
ing failed to agree on the plan of a campaign in Missouri."

EVENTS IN THE WESTERN DEPARTMENT, UNDER THE
IMMEDIATE DIRECTION OF GENERAL FREMONT.
On the 25th July, as we have seen, four days after
the disaster at Bull Run, General Fremont arrived in St.
Louis, and assumed command in the Western Department.
Nothing can exceed the confusion and peril which every
where encircled him. On the South, Louisville, Cairo,
Cape Girardeau, fronton, and Springfield, were threat
ened by large Confederate forces ; while Lieutenant-
Governor Reynolds was operating in Northern Missouri
with an army approaching 5,000 in number, and the spirit
of St. Louis was decidedly insurrectionary. From every
direction the loudest calls for help reached him. In addition
to the advance of McCulloch and Price upon Springfield,
and the occupancy of North Missouri as stated, 20,000 men
under General Pillow, for example, were advancing on
Cairo, and General Hardee with 5,000 troops, 2,000 being
excellently mounted and equipped cavalry, was advancing

THE COMMAND OF GENERAL FREMONT. 45
upon Ironton. At Louisville and other assailable points, the
Union forces were being confronted by superior hostile
armies. Another difficulty which he had to contend with
was the fact that the largest portion of the troops, which
in great numbers arrived in St. Louis, were unarmed, and
no means existed to arm them until arms and accoutre
ments should arrive from the east ; all exertions which
any commander could employ being used to hasten this
consummation. Under the circumstances, the first thing to be done
was to render the most vital points which were about to be
assailed, secure. To this end our commander accordingly
addressed himself Having received a letter from General
Lyon which convinced him that there were no pressing
necessities at Springfield, and having reinforced Ironton,
and. Cape Girardeau, he, in five days after his arrival,
collected 3,800 men, and transported them to Cairo ; find
ing a force of only 1,200 men under General Prentiss at
this place. The sudden appearance of this reinforcement
induced General Pillow, who had landed at New Madrid, a
few miles below the place, to make a hasty retreat. Thus
this vital point was rendered permanently secure. On
the 7 th August he was back again at St. Louis, and
took immediate measures, amid other pressing calls, to
reinforce General Lyon ; sending orders to Colonel Steven
son to march with his regiment from Booneville, and
Colonel Montgomery to move with his from Kansas to
Springfield. From St. Louis he could, at the time, send
no reinforcements, because his recruits there were un
armed. Before any of the troops ordered for the relief
of General Lyon, however, could reach him, the battle at
Wilson's Creek had been fought, the brave General was
dead, and his little army was in safe retreat to Rolla.
To hold General Fremont responsible for the defeat of
General Lyon's army at Wilson's Creek is to hold him
responsible for an event which did not occur; for there
was no defeat, but a real victory, of our army there, — a
victory which left the little band master of the field, which
occasioned a backward movement of the Confederates to
the borders of Arkansas and a division of their forces
there ; the Texans and Arkansas troops under McCulloch

46 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
moving south, and the Missourians under Price moving
east, while, what was really expected, a safe retreat for
our forces was secured. Should it be said that the
orders to Colonels Stevenson and Montgomery should have
been issued before the voyage to Cairo was commenced,
the answer is ready: — i. It might not have appeared safe,
or even necessary, to have issued these orders at that time.
2. A sufficient reply is disclosed in the reason assigned
by Wellington for his oversight in not reinforcing and
furnishing needful ammunition to the little band at La Haye
Sainte, namely, that under such circumstances it is im
possible for any finite mind to think of everything. The
only matter of wonder is that our commander, in the un
tried and perplexing circumstances which surrounded him,
and in so few days, thought of and provided for so many
things as he did, and did everything so perfectly. Such a
rapid comprehension of the complicated situation of affairs,
such quick and accurate discernment of the means requisite
to the varied ends to be secured, such promptitude and
decision in action, and such efficiency in accomplishing
predetermined results, have few parallels in history.
Let us contemplate, for example, the startling facts
which came before him on the 13th and 14th August.
At one and the same time, on the day first designated,
came the news of the battle and death of General Lyon
at Wilson's Creek, of Colonel Mulligan's arrival with the
Irish Chicago Brigade, 2,800 Union soldiers in all, at
Lexington, of Price's advance to Warrenton with from
5,000 to 15,000 men, threatening Colonel Mulligan, with
the fact that General J. C. Davis, commanding at
Jefferson City, a district including Lexington, was carefully
watching the movements of General Price, and in addition
to all these, a most pressing demand from General Grant,
commanding at Cairo, for reinforcements to render that
point secure. On the next day came an absolute order
from General Scott 'to " send 5000 well armed infantry
to Washington without a moment's delay." At the same
time there came from General Anderson, commanding in
Kentucky, a most pressing call to send reinforcements to
Louisville, which was seriously threatened by the Con
federates- who were rapidly annexing that State.

THE COMMAND OF GENERAL FREMONT. 47
Let us now stop for a moment and contemplate this
requisition from Washington. It was well known to the
military authorities there that all was in imminent peril in
this Western Department, and that "all was quiet on the
Potomac," that the withdrawal of 5,000 well armed in
fantry from the Western Department might be fatal to our
interests there, while so small a force could do nothing
really for our security in and about Washington. If
50,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry, 650 artillery, with thirty
field guns, with the many thousands of men who had been
hastened to the national capital during the twenty-four
days since the disastrous affair at Bull Run, could not
enable our " Young Napoleon " to hold Washington, of what
avail could the mere addition of "5,000 well armed infantry"
be to prevent the fall of that city ? While it is safe to
affirm that this cowardly order did not originate with
General Scott, it is equally safe to affirm that it did
originate in a mind of unparalleled stupidity, or in one
inspired with a base desire to render unsuccessful the
efforts of a dreaded rival to prevent one of the greatest of
national calamities, the ruin of our interests in Kentucky
and Missouri. The bad order, however, was promptly
obeyed, 2,000. troops being dispatched from St. Louis,
2,000 from Kentucky, and 1,000 from other sources.
The measures which General Fremont did adopt under
the circumstances now claim our attention. For the relief
of Colonel Mulligan he at once dispatched two regiments
to Jefferson City, with orders that two others should be
sent from that place to Lexington. Orders were also
sent to General Pope, in command of 5,000 men in North
Missouri, to move his forces to the same point. Similar
orders were sent to General Sturgis and others, to co
operate in the concentration of forces for the relief of
Lexington. The forces ordered to the city were quite
equal to those by which it was threatened. None of these
reinforcements, however, arrived in time to save the
beleaguered force, which, after one of the most wonderful
defences known in history, did surrender August 20th.
The censures heaped upon the General in command, on
account of the fall and temporary occupation by the Con
federates, clearly indicates a forgetfulness of the fact that

48 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
all great enterprises are attended with some disasters,
that all that the best commanders can do is to order ade
quate forces for the defence of important points threatened
by the enemy, that unlooked-for occurrences, as was true
in this case, may prevent the success of the wisest disposi
tions, and that when commanders in the management of
vast and most complicated interests can only be censured
for small disasters, the like of which attend all vast
enterprises, we have, in the censures themselves, the best
possible vindication of the superior wisdom of the conduct
of such commanders. In the light of these undeniable
facts and principles. General Fremont is more than vindi
cated against the only charges really brought against his
administration. To General Lyon he did, before leaving
St. Louis for Cairo, order the only body of forces which
were in a condition to be moved. As soon as he returned
to St. Louis, his first care was to forward to Springfield all
the reinforcements needed. Before any such forces could
reach that point, however, the blow was struck. At the
same time we may safely challenge the world to designate
any specific forces which should have been ordered to
Lexington, that were not ordered to move to that one
point, or to show that such orders were not as promptly
sent as possible.
The general measures which General Fremont now
adopted for defensive and offensive operations claim our
special attention. A part of those measures are thus
stated by Mr. Greeley : — " News of General Lyon's repulse
and death reached St. Louis on the 13th. General Fremont
thereupon decided to fortify that city with all possible
despatch, as a permanent and central base of operations,
to fortify and garrison, likewise, Cape Girardeau, Ironton,
Rolla, and Jefferson City; using for this purpose hired
labour as far as possible, so that his raw recruits, even
though unarmed, might be drilled and fitted for service
as rapidly as might be ; when on the receipt of sufiicient
arms, he would take the field at the head of a numerous and
effective army, and speedily regain all that should have been
meanwhile lost." Another measure, not stated in the above
extract, was to connect all the railroads entering the city
of St. Louis, that there might be no hindrance in passing

THE COMMAND OF GENERAL FRElMONr. 49
troops, munitions, and provisions through it to any place
where they might need to be conveyed. The most im
portant of all his measures was the plan of having the
Mississippi and all the rivers connected with it commanded
by ironclads. At his suggestion this plan was adopted
by the Government. From this one suggestion greater
results followed than from any other made by any com
mander of any department during the war. It was under
the protection and by the aid of these vessels that Forts
Henry and Donelson were captured, that General Pope
succeeded in the capture of Columbus and the Hundred
Islands, that the Confederate fleet was destroyed at
Memphis, and that city captured, and that General Grant
succeeded at Vicksburg. But for the ironclads, our army
at Shiloh would, no doubt, have been taken. These benefits
the nation owes to the comprehensive foresight of General
Fremont. While every energy was being put forth to render
perfect all defensive arrangements, equal diligence was
observed in preparing an offensive force for a final destruc
tion of the Rebellion in Missouri. To put all assailable
points in a state of security, ii,ooo men were stationed in
Fort Holt andPaducah, Kentucky; to prevent any advance
upon Cairo or St. Louis, 10,000 were stationed at Cairo,
4,700 at Rolla, and 3,000 at Ironton. For offence and
defence he had 7,000 men at St. Louis, 9,600 at Jefferson
City, 5,500 in North Missouri, and 2,200 under General
Lane on the borders of Kansas ; while his recruits which
were daily arriving were being as rapidly disciplined as
possible for active service. By almost superhuman efforts,
he was, in the latter part of September, enabled to take
the field with an organized army of some 40,000 troops.
Late on September 22nd he received from General Pope
a telegram announcing the fall of Lexington, and the
surrender of Colonel Mulligan and his immortal brigade.
On the 22nd he left St. Louis for Jefferson City, expecting
that General Price would make a stand somewhere on
Missouri river. In this he was disappointed, General Price
making a backward movement towards the south-west part,
of the State, stopping some time at Neosha, where he
found General McCulloch with some 5,000 Confederates 4

50 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
from Arkansas. On finding that General Fremont was
on his track, our Confederate commander retreated still
farther south to Pineville, the extreme south-west corner
of the State. General Fremont having advanced from
Jefferson City, some thirty miles, to Tipton, the terminus
of the Pacific Railroad, spent some time there in putting
his army in perfect order, as preparatory to a rapid pursuit
of Price and Jackson. Here, on October 13th, he was
visited by our most trustworthy and sagacious Secretary
of War, Simon Cameron, in company with Adjutant-General
Thomas and suite. It happened to rain just at this time.
Our visitants from Washington of course saw everything
in the very worst light possible, and carried back the
report that all was managed badly in the Western De
partment, and that General Fremont would never be able
to move his army over the roads which had, just before,
been traversed by General Price and his army. What
seemed to burden the mind of our immaculate Secretary
most heavily was the financial condition of this depart
ment. He imagined that he discovered some want of in
tegrity in one individual who had principal charge of the
commissariat of the army. As evinced by the resolution
passed by the House of Representatives in Washington, in
regard to our Secretary on his retirement from his high
office, he was as jealous of the integrity of all who had
charge of army funds as Caesar was of the reputation of
his wife. Our Secretary had in his pocket, when with our
army, an order from the President to supersede General
Fremont, should this be deemed expedient. As the army
was fast in the mud, however, Mr. Cameron thought it
best to leave it there under an affirmed incompetent
commander. We must stop here for a moment, to notice a somewhat
brilliant affair which had just occurred at Fredericktown,
in the south-east part of Missouri ; a portion of the State
which had hitherto been under the almost exclusive control
of the Confederates. At the place designated above,
General Jeff. Thompson, with a large force, occupied a
very strong position. Here he was assailed by superior
forces, sent. by General Grant under Colonel Plummer from

THE COMMAND OF GENERAL FREMONT. 5 1
Cape Girardeau, and by Colonel Carlile with another force
from Pilot Knob. After a fight of two hours, Thompson
retreated, leaving sixty of his dead behind, among whom
was Colonel Lowe, his second in command. Being hotly
pursued for twenty miles, Thompson's band was wholly
dispersed and broken up. Nothing now remained but for
Fremont to disperse the force concentrated under Price at
Pineville, and Missouri would be totally free from Con
federate insurrectionists and invaders.
We will, also, in this connexion, consider the corn-
position of the army which General Fremont had collected
for the work before him. The army concentrated at
Tipton, other bodies which were to co-operate in the great
movement being in other localities, consisted of 30,000
men. Of these, 5,000 were cavalry, while the number of
cannon was eighty-six, a large number of them being
rifled. Among the cavalry was a squadron known as
"Prairie Scouts," a body of selected men commanded by
Major F. J. White, who after a forced march of sixty miles,
had just, without loss, recaptured Lexington, taking there,
as Mr. Greeley states, " sixty or seventy prisoners, con
siderable property, and releasing a number of Unionists
captured with Mulligan, including two colonels." There
was also another bbdy of horse equally noticeable, the
Fremont ' Body-Guard,' under the command of one of the
most chivalrous heroes of the age, Major Zagonyi. The
army was divided into five divisions, commanded respec
tively by Generals Hunter, Pope, Siegel, McKinstry, and
Asboth. The model after which this army was organized
was, in the proportions of infantry, cavalry, and artillery,
the most perfect then known in Europe ; the proportion of
cavalry being about the same, and that of artillery being
greater, than those in Wellington's army at Waterloo, the
proportion of the latter being more nearly conformed to
that in the army of Napoleon on the same occasion. The
army under Grouchy sent after the Prussians from Ligny
consisted of 31,969 men, of whom 4,350 were cavalry,
2,919 artillery, with ninety- six guns. When General
McClellan first took command in the department of Wash
ington, he found there, as we have seen, 50,000 infantry.

52 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
i,ooo cavalry, and 650 artillery, with thirty field-guns,
this army having been organized under our then Com
mander-in-Chief. Among those high in command in this
army were individuals like Asboth and Siegel, who were
well acquainted with the provisioning and movements of
such bodies.
If we should refer to the morale of the army, it is safe
to affirm that no other ever went into the field with more
assurance of hope, with more devotion to the sacred cause
which they were to defend, with more determination and
patience to do and to dare, or with more confidence in
their commander, than was true of this army at Tipton.
To these statements there was one exception, General
Hunter, the second in command, who was certain to suc
ceed General Fremont, if the latter should be superseded.
" General Hunter," says General Thomas, in his report,
" expressed to the Secretary of War his decided opinion
that General Fremont was incompetent, and unfit for
his extensive and important command." No man in a
high position ever had immediately under him, and with
in one step of his place, a small and ignoble mind who
did not regard his superior as utterly disqualified for his
place, and himself most amply qualified to fill the high
position. A large number of intelligent men in Missouri,
the report states, gave a similar opinion. It is a singular
fact that all the Confederate prisoners while General
McClellan was at the head of our armies, unitedly testified
that he, in the united judgment of the Confederacy, was
the greatest general we had, and was more to be feared
than almost all others.
Contrary to the prediction of Mr. Cameron and his
associates, the army of General Fremont did move, and
did advance — quite rapidly too. By the ist November,
four divisions of the army were in Springfield, — all but that
of General Hunter ; General Pope's division having marched
seventy miles in two days. When on the way, one of the most
chivalrous exploits known in the history of war was per
formed by the Prairie Scouts and Guardsmen, a force of
300 men under the command, at the time, of Major Zagonyi,
Major White being detained by sickness. As this small
force approached Springfield, they found well posted there

THE COMMAND OF GENERAL FREMONT. 53
a body consisting of 1,200 foot and 400 horse, and an
adequate supply of guns. By a sudden charge all this
force was utterly routed and dispersed. All this was done
with a loss of but eighty- four killed and wounded. Zagonyi,
of course, evacuated the place. Major White, however,
having been first captured and then escaped, taking the
leader of the capturing force in turn, improvised a home
guard of twenty-four men, and re-entered and took posses
sion of the place. Stationing twenty-two of this force as
pickets on the outskirts, and holding the rest in reserve,
he received a flag of truce from the Confederate com
mander, asking leave to bury their dead. This request,
he replied, must be referred to General Siegel, who was
approaching the place. Leave having been obtained, the
Confederates, under the eye of the brave Major and his
guard, quietly buried their dead. The victory of Zagonyi
has been censured as a deed of desperate daring. By not
dissimilar acts, however, Murat laid the foundation for his
fame. Such deeds, when of occasional occurrence, impart
new power to a whole army. Such was the impression of
this victory upon the army of General Fremont. Certain
it is that no army was ever better prepared for a decisive
battle than was his, when all his dispositions were perfected
for a great movement upon the Confederate army, now
concentrated in force at Wilson's Creek. Just at this
time, however, November 2nd, a messenger of ill omen
arrived in camp, bringing an order from General Scott
removing General Fremont, and ordering him to turn over
his command to General Hunter, and report himself by
letter to Washington. As General Hunter had not come
up, it was determined, in a council of war, to march the
next morning, and fight the battle contemplated. In the
evening, however. General Hunter did arrive", assumed
command, and ordered, not a battle, but a retreat with all
possible haste, to the nearest railroads that could be reached
by different divisions of the army. The excuse for this
order was that it accorded with instructions received from
Washington. Now commenced a scene which gives us a palpable
illustration of the extreme shortness of the step from the
sublime to the ridiculous— the spectacle of one of the

54 THE AMERIC.\N REBELLION.
bravest and best ordered armies in the world, an army of
about 40,000 men, running for dear life from 20,000 badly
furnished and dispirited foes. General Price, by his scouts,
soon became aware of the dastardly retreat of our army,
and commanded a hot pursuit, captured not a few prisoners,
and not a small amount of baggagc> until our retreating
general halted his breathless troops at the places desig
nated, surrendering all South-western Missouri to the
Confederates. This retreat, we believe, has but one parallel in history.
We refer to the famous retreat of Admiral Field-Marshal
Tschichagofif down the Beresina. When the French army in
its retreat from Moscow reached this river, a Russian army
under the Marshal named lay in their front, on the opposite
side of the river, rendering a passage over and a farther
retreat of the enemy strictly impossible, as Buonaparte after
wards affirmed. " Not a man of us," he said, " could have
escaped had the Russian army remained where it was."
As soon as the French army came in sight, however,
Tschichagofif ordered a hasty retreat to another passage
twenty miles below, and permitted the French to pass on just
where and as they desired So when our army was within
striking distance of the enemy it had been so earnestly
seeking, and was in the very act of inflicting upon him a
crushing blow, which would have permanently delivered
Missouri from the Confederates, our new commander beat
a sudden retreat, and fled, terror-stricken, — fled before an
enemy whose forces were hardly half as numerous or half
as well provided as his own. Buonaparte would never
pronounce the name of the Russian commander, always
calling him " that ass of an Admiral."
No excuse or apology can be offered for the conduct of
General Hunter in two particulars — assuming command
when he did, and making any order from Washington, or
any other consideration, a reason for not fighting a battle
before his retreat, in the crisis then existing. There is not
a law of our country, nor an usage known to war, which
required him not to permit his predecessor to continue in
command until after a battle then immediately pending,
and determined on by the unanimous decision of a council
of war, had been fought. On the other hand, all the

THE COMMAND OF GENERAL FREMONT. 55
known usages of war prohibited his immediate assumption
of command under the then existing circumstances. The
same remarks apply to any orders which General Hunter
may have received from Washington. Discretion in regard
to the time when command shall be assumed, and a retreat
ordered, is always expected in such cases. During the
battle of Austerlitz, for example. Marshal Sault received
a positive order from his Emperor to charge instantly upon
the enemy's line. The Marshal, who was then carefully
observing certain movements of the Austrians in his front,
paid no seeming regard to the order. The same order was
sent a second time, and a second time was disregarded.
A third time the same order was sent, and that in the most
absolute form. " Tell the Emperor," was the reply, " that
I will obey his order, but not now." When the right
moment arrived, the movement was made, and with
such results that the Emperor, when he came up, thus ad
dressed the Marshal, who had thus three times disobeyed
an absolute order : " Marshal Sault, you are the greatest
tactician of modern times." Admiral Nelson gained the
victory at Copenhagen by continuing the battle after
having received from his superior in command an abso
lute order to retreat ; and received for his disobedience the
approval of his Government and country. In regard to
orders received from authorities which cannot be cog
nizant of what is rendered necessary by immediate exi
gencies, discretion is demanded by the higher laws of
nature and nations, and by the known usages of war is
demanded in regard to the time when and the manner in
v/hich orders shall be obeyed. In some circumstances,
as in the case of Nelson, this higher law demands actual
disobedience. Had General Hunter, before assuming com
mand, permitted that battle to have been fought as
arranged, his name would have gone down to posterity
" as ointment poured forth." For having presumptuously
assumed command, and ordered that retreat, his name, if
it descends to posterity at all, must go down side by side
with that of Admiral Field-Marshal Tschlchagoff.
The motive which dictated the order from Washington
suspending General Fremont and ordering that retreat,
becomes perfectly palpable when contemplated in the

56 THE AMKRICAN REBELLION.
light of these palpable facts. On the 13th September,
when General Fremont received the absolute order to
"send 5,000 well armed infantry to Washington without a
moment's delay," it was well known at the national capital
that all was in the greatest peril in the Western Depart
ment, and that the greatest difficulty then was the want
of arms to supply the recruits. " Reliable information,"
General Fremont telegraphed to Washington, " from the
vicinity of Price's column shows his present force to be
11,000 at Warrensburgh, and 4,000 at Georgetown, with
pickets extending toward Syracuse. Green is making foi-
Booneville, with a probable force of 3,000. Withdrawal of
force from this part of Missouri risks the State ; from
Paducah, loses Western Kentucky." In the face of these
appalling facts, "the 5,000 well armed infantry" were
remorselessly forced from this department. When this
was done, "all was quiet on the Potomac," with no more
peril of an attack from the enemy than there was of " the
falling of the sky ;" while reinforcements were so rapidly
coming in that, one month later. General McClellan
reported 152,051 men under his command. On the 15th
August, according to official reports, there had entered
the Union army, our regular force included, an aggregate
of 499,250 men. Deducting from these the three months
recruits, an aggregate is left of about 420,000 men ; and
this number was vastly increased by September 13th, when
the order under consideration was issued. Outside of the
Department of Washington there were more than 100,000
unemployed troops nearer that city than was the eastern
boundary of the Western Department. Why were all
these passed by, and the requisition made from the only
spot where real danger was known to exist ?
We must also bear in mind here that when Mr.
Cameron and his portege. General Thomas found General
Fremont, as they thought, stuck fast in the mud, with the
impossibility of extricating himself, he was left in com
mand; "a bad name" being given him at Washington.
As soon as our veteran commander had extricated him
self, however, and was known to be about to precipitate his
army with crushing force upon Price and McCulloch, and
thus permanently free Missouri from the Confederates,

THE COMMAND OF GENERAL FREMONT. 57
an order was hastened on suspending General Fremont,
putting Hunter in his place, and ordering Instant retreat.
In the light of all these facts, we may safely challenge
the world to assign any other motive or cause for those
under consideration but a deliberate choice that the
nation should endure eternal disgrace, and the people of
the Western Department should suffer untold evils, :ather
than that a victory and conquest should occur, — a victory
and conquest which should crown with immortal honour
General Fremont.
The evils which immediately resulted from this disgrace
ful retreat from Springfield are thus truly depicted by Mr.
Victor : — " That last retreat from Springfield let loose all
the wild elements of disorder, rapine, and murder. The
longsuffering Unionists of the south-western section
offered up their homes, many of them their lives, as a
sacrifice to a cause which could return them only suffering
for devotion." Had General Fremont been continued in command, and
had he been supported as he might have been, the follow
ing results of national importance would unquestionably
have occurred. In the first place, the world-wide dishonour
which our nation was enduring from the disaster at Bull
Run would have been more than wiped out by an anni
hilating victory over Price and McCulloch, and the imme
diate wiping out of the rebellion in two States, Missouri
and Arkansas. Our army under Fremont undeniably out
numbered that under the hostile commanders, and the
former was far better appointed and equipped, and was In
far higher spirits, than the latter. How, we ask, could those
raw troops from Missouri and Arkansas have withstood for
an hour the fire of those eighty-six field, guns, and all this
followed up by crushing masses of infantry and cavalry ?
As was truly said by Major Dorshelmer, then in our army,
" a victory such as the country has long desired and sorely
needs — a decisive, complete, and overwhelming victory —
was as certain as it is possible for the skill and valour of
man to make certain any future event." Such a victory,
also, with the advantages of pursuit which General Fre
mont possessed, would undeniably have been followed
by the utter dispersion or capture of those Confederate

58 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
forces. This would have resulted in the immediate
suppression of the Rebellion, not only in Missouri, but
Arkansas, and the turning of the enemy's positions on
the Mississippi.
Other events of still greater importance would have
followed in other departments of General Fremont's com
mand. An army at least 100,000 strong would have
been precipitated upon the 40,000 Confederate forces oc
cupying Central Kentucky, on a line extending from the
eastern to the western borders of the State. These forces
would, of course, have been driven at once out of this
State, and beyond the southern borders of Tennessee. By
the opening of the spring campaign, with the Rebellion
effectively suppressed in the States of Missouri, Arkansas,
Kentucky, and Tennessee, and with our ironclads in
readiness, an army under the protection of the ironclad
fleet would have passed down the Mississippi, captured
New Orleans, and thus cut asunder the Confederacy, ren
dering its speedy collapse a matter of certainty. Such
was the actual plan of the great commander of this depart
ment. Our military authorities at Washington, however,
could not at that time endure the spectacle — (we record it
with shame, but as a demand of integrity) — the spectacle
of a great and energetic commander in any department,
that commander being General John C. Fremont. Subse
quent events fully vindicated the wisdom of Fremont's order
pertaining to slaveholders, and the great mistake of our
venerated President in reversing that order. The act of our
President was, in effect, a proclamation to all the people in
the border slave States, that Unionists should risk every
thing by devotion to, and Rebels nothing by their treason
against, their country. It became, consequently, a common
maxim in those States that Unionists were the only real
sufferers from the war.

CHAPTER IV.
GENERAL McCLELLAN AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.
We are now prepared to contemplate the military status of
the nation under the administration of General McClellan,
first as commander in the department of Washington, and
practically of all our armies, and then as our actual
Commander-in-Chief Immediately after the disaster of
Bull Run, as we have seen, he was called to the supreme
command in the department designated, and Nov. ist he, as
announced by himself, " assumed command of the armies
of the United States." Immediately after his appointment
to the supreme command. General Henry W. Halleck was
appointed Commander of the Western Department, and as
sumed command there November 12th. On the 15th of the
same month. General Don Carlos Buell arrived at Louisville,
and assumed command in Kentucky. These two generals
were appointed in accordance with the express wishes of
the Commander-in-Chief, and had fully developed with
him, before leaving Washington for their respective spheres
of action, a plan for the future conduct of the war. All
these facts were announced to the country through the
press at the time.
RELATIVE POSITIONS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE
FORCES AT THIS TIME.
To appreciate the conduct of the war under these
generals, upon whom all issues, then pending, depended, we
need, first of all, to attain to a clear understanding of the
then existing relative positions of the Union and Confede
rate armies which were confronting each other at the time.
In the department of Washington, the Confederates

6o THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
held possession of the entire territory of the present State
of Virginia, the small portion of "the sacred soil" occu
pied by our forces immediately south of Washington
excepted. At the same time their batteries on the Lower
Potomac so commanded that river as to utterly cut off
all communication between the national capital and the
Chesapeake Bay and the ocean, by means of this most
essential channel of communication. All our armies in this
department lay immediately south of Washington, and
north and east of the Potomac, we having abandoned to
the Confederates all the places occupied by our previous
advances, such as Centerville, Fairfax Court House,
Winchester, Bunker Hill, Charlestown, Harper's Ferry,
etc. At this time, the Confederates had advanced into Ken
tucky, and on a line of some two to three hundred miles
in extent, occupied the entire central and southern por
tions of the State, their line from the eastern border at
Polntvllle, Johnson County, through Bowling Green,
Donelson on the Cumberland river, and Henry on the
Tennessee, these lying in the north of Tennessee, and
Columbus on the Mississippi, in Kentucky. At Louisville,
and opposed to the main Confederate force of Bowling
Green, lay our main forces in this State, under the im
mediate command of General Buell. Strong forces in
entrenched camps were also located at such important
points as Cairo In Ohio, and Paducah, Kentucky. In all
the places above designated, the Confederates were very
strongly fortified, particularly at Bowling Green, Forts
Donelson and Henry, and at Columbus. By occupying
the three places last named, they fully commanded the
navigation of the Cumberland, Tennessee, and Mississippi
rivers. In Missouri, on his arrival there. General Halleck found
the Union forces safely entrenched, as General Fremont
had directed, at Cape Girardeau, Ironton, Rolla, St. Louis,
Jefferson City, and other localities, with the 40,000 men
who, under the v"eteran Hunter, had fled from Spring
field. This army General Halleck found "all snug"
at the various railroad points to which they were directed
to flee. From the beginning he had forces fully armed

GENERAL McCLELLAN AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. 6 1
and equipped, and ready for the field; forces perfectly
adequate to all the necessities of the Union cause in that
State. General Price, on the other hand, with a force which
had fled precipitately before General Fremont when only
30,000 strong, occupied Springfield as his centre, and
from thence had absolute control In the central and south
eastern portions of the State.
A careful survey of the field before us will absolutely
evince that no armies ever were, or could be, in worse
circumstances for offensive or defensive operations than
were the Confederates, or in more propitious relations for
both kind of operations than were the Unionists, at the
period under consideration. In Virginia, for example, the
Confederate forces lay in scattered fragments over that
great State — fragments at totally unsupporting distances
from each other. What, for example, could the forces at
Yorktown, Norfolk, Petersburg, and Richmond do for the
relief of the army at Manassas and Northern Virginia,
provided the latter were suddenly assaulted ? How easy
it was, by an advance in force by Dranesville, to divide
hopelessly the forces at Manassas from those at Leesburg,
Winchester, and Harper's Ferry, and cut up all these
forces in detail. From Fortress Monroe, from Western
Virginia, on the Upper Potomac, and, above all, from
Arlington, the Confederate forces were directly under
our strokes, and helpless there.
No general could ask to have an enemy in a condition
more exposed to have his line cut asunder, to be cut to
pieces, routed, and destroyed piecemeal, than were the
Confederate forces as seen from the central position of
General Buell at Louisville; forces distributed on a line
some 300 miles in extent, and consequently strong no
where, easily flanked everywhere, and perfectly helpless
where their line was at any material point cut asunder, or
where any of their central positions were flanked, and
assaulted with superior forces. At the same time, no
general could have an army In a position from whence he
could more readily concentrate his forces upon any point
he should select than had General Buell at this period.
The circumstances of the case render all these statements
undeniably evident.

62 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
In the State of Missouri, General Halleck, as previous
and subsequent facts absolutely evince, had but to advance
the forces under his immediate command to Springfield
in order to clear that State utterly of Confederate forces,
and to free the Union inhabitants in it from all the intoler
able sufferings to which they were subject in consequence
of their fidelity to their country.
COMPARATIVE NUMBERS OF THE FORCES CONFRONTING
EACH OTHER IN THESE DEPARTMENTS.
It may help us to understand still more perfectly the
conduct of this war while General McClellan held supreme
command, if we should now take into distinct considera
tion the comparative number of the hostile forces then
confronting each other in these departments. As we have
seen, according to the official report of the Secretary of
War, December ist, 1861, the Union army then amounted
to 660,971 men. Of these immense forces, nearly, or
quite, 200,000 were under the immediate command of
General McClellan. On September" 15th, as officially
reported, there were in this department, not including
those in Fortress Monroe, 180,000; on the ist December,
198,213; January ist, 1862, there were 219,767; and
February ist, 222,196. Directly in front of these forces,
at Manassas and other parts of Northern Virginia, the
Confederate forces were less than 50,000 strong. In all
Virginia, their forces at this time were, undeniably, but a
little if any more than 100,000 in number. In the de
partment of Kentucky, General Buell commanded, soon
after he entered his department, nearly 100,000 men, his
force in January amounting to quite 114,000; to wit, 102
regiments of infantry, ten of cavalry, and sixteen batteries
of artillery. In front of these forces. General Sidney E.
Johnston, who commanded all the Confederate forces in
Tennessee and Kentucky, never had in his command, at
the various points on his line of about 300 miles in extent,
a larger force than his namesake then commanded at
Manassas and Northern Virginia, a force varying from
40,000 to 60,000 men, and never exceeding the latter
number. So all Confederate authorities and all known

GENERAL McCLELLAN AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. 63
facts fully evince. At all times. General Buell' s command
outnumbered that of his opponent as three to two, and
uniformly as two to one ; while the forces of the former
were always more centrally located and more readily con
centrated than those of the latter.
Of the comparative number of the hostile forces in
Missouri, little need be added to what has already been
said in former connexions. While General Halleck had
in Missouri, when he entered the State, a movable column
of about 40,000 men, — a body which could, in any two
weeks, have been increased to 60,000 or 80,000, if that
number were needed,' — General Price, as none will deny,
never had under his command over 30,000 or 35,000 men.
Such are the real facts In regard to the relative amount of
the forces under the Union, on the one hand, and the
Confederate commanders on the other.

ESTIMATES OF THE UNION COMMANDERS OF THE NUMBER
OF THE HOSTILE FORCES TO BE ENCOUNTERED.
One of the most striking peculiarities of our generals
in command in the departments under consideration is
their fabulous over-estimates of the number of forces in
the ranks of their opponents. General McClellan, during
the fall of 1 86 1, estimated the forces at Manassas and in
Northern Virginia at 150,000. Just before the opening
of the spring campaign. In an official report he estimated
their number, as we have seen, at 115,500. General
Wadsworth, then in command in Washington, and other
generals whose positions gave them opportunities to gain
accurate information, — these commanders, by enquiries from
prisoners, deserters, fugitives, and others, determined
the number and names of the regiments in the Con
federate army before them, and gave what turned out to
be a true estimate of the number of said forces. Annoyed
by such revelations. General McClellan at length pro
hibited all .such enquiries, and arbitrarily adhered to his
own opinions. General Sherman, who commanded in
Kentucky prior to Buell, wrote on to Washington that
200,000 men were required, to drive back the Invaders in
his front. General Buell was ever oppressed with the

64 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
belief that the forces confronting him were too strong to
be attacked. General Halleck was so appalled by his
estimate of the vastness of Price's armies that he dared
not move out of any of his entrenchments, and touch his
opponent, anywhere. As soon as General ~ McClellan
approached the Chickahominy, he telegraphed to the
President that the forces of the enemy were as large as
his own, and would fight well. Such were the facts in all
these departments.
WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN DONE, AND OUGHT TO HAVE
BEEN DONE, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
The question may now arise as to what might have been
done, and ought to have been done, with the 660,000 men
constituting the Union army at the time we are consider
ing. Take one supposition, namely, 240,000 are assigned
to the department under the immediate direction of General
McClellan, 120,000 are placed under General Buell, and
80,000 under General Halleck, 200,000 being reserved
for any exigencies required. Of the forces under General
McClellan, 60,000 are placed under General Banks near
Harper's Ferry, and 60,000 more under General Wool at
Fortress Monroe, all the forces in Western Virginia being
concentrated and held in readiness to move at a moment's
warning. When all was in readiness here. General Banks
would cross over by Harper's Ferry and other convenient
places, and move dowm the Shenandoah valley, and thus
flank the Confederates at Manassas and in Northern Virginia;
the forces in Western Virginia being, in the meantime, com
manded to move down to Staunton, and reinforce General
Banks when he might arrive in that vicinity. While
General Banks should make this movement. General
McClellan should have moved out with more than 100,000
men in front of the central Confederate force under
General Johnston at Centerville and Manassas ; while
General Wool, landing 60,000 men at Burmuda Hundred,
should seize all the Confederate communications south of
James river, and capture, if deemed expedient, Richmond
itself. All the Confederate forces, being thus encircled by
forces greater than their own. would inevitably, by a con-

GENERAL McCLELLAN AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. 65
centric and simultaneous movement of the Union armies,
have been crushed and captured. No military man, or
civilian of ordinary understanding, will doubt the prac
ticability of such an arrangement and movement of our
forces, or of the certainty that thereby the Confederate
army in Virginia would have been annihilated and Rich
mond captured before the close of i86r.
In the Western Department, General Buell, of course,
should not have moved until after the ironclad fleet was
in readiness. General Halleck, however, should have
promptly moved his heavy columns upon Price, and driving
him headlong out of Missouri, and freeing that State from
all invaders, should have passed down through Arkansas
to the Mississippi, thus flanking all the Confederate posi
tions on the river above, and necessitating the evacuation
of such places. As soon as the fleet was in readiness, the
identical move of Commodore Foote and General Grant
upon Forts Henry and Donelson should have been made.
These places having been captured. Grant and Foote, the
former reinforced, should have passed up the Cumberland,
and stopped, not, as they did under command and protest,
at Clarksville, but should have pushed forward to Nashville,
and captured that city, — an event, as afterwards appeared,
perfectly practicable. Having accomplished this object.
General Grant should have moved north, and confronted
General Johnston in his retreat from Bowling Green, with
General Buell in hot pursuit. But one destiny could have
awaited this Confederate army under such circumstances,
— its utter capture or dispersion. The way would now have
been prepared for a movement of our fleet and a large
army down the Mississippi, New Orleans being its last
stopping place. While this should have been going on, all
available forces east and west should have been precipitated
upon the Carolinas and the Confederate States east of the
Mississippi. By such dispositions and movements of our
great armies, who can doubt that there would have been a
total collapse of the Rebellion by the 4th July, 1862 ? The
plan which we have sketched for the Western Department
is, as we have intimated, and as will appear hereafter, iden
tical with that formally developed by General Fremont for
the conduct of the campaign in this department. Plans like
5

66 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
that above indicated would very readily have suggested
themselves to any commander at all familiar with the great
campaigns of ancient and modern times ; and during this
war, as all whom I corresponded with by letter or verbally
upon the subject are aware, it was a matter of the deepest
grief to my mind that for the want of a proper plan for
the conduct of the war, a million of lives were being sacri
ficed when not a hundred thousand should have been, and
thousands of millions of treasure were being expended when
but a corresponding number of hundreds of millions should
have been.

WHAT WAS DONE IN THESE DEPARTMENTS.
The mighty armies of which we have been speaking
were raised and trained for a specific purpose — the putting
down of a rebellion, and the doing of this with a prompti
tude and energy which would be an honour to the nation,
and a lesson, never to be forgotten, for all who might be
disposed to repeat such outrages in future. While the
nation furnished these leaders such immense forces, Provi
dence, up to January 1862, favoured them with the best
conceivable weather for the movement of armies. General
McClellan promised the President, on assuming his com
mand, that " the war should be short, sharp, and decisive."
In the presence of a body of soldiers, the President and
Secretary of War standing by, he said, " Soldiers, we have
had our last retreat. We have seen our last defeat."
The same sentiment was intimated in his General Order
on assuming command of the armies of the United States.
These pledges were spread out most approvingly by the
press before the nation, and "assurance of hope" glad
dened the people. Their expectations were heightened
by the announcement that Generals Halleck and Buell
were the men whom our young chief had selected, on
account of the accordance of their views and purposes
with his. What qualities did these men reveal during the
following months ? The power of pre-eminent and unex
ampled immobility. " Their strength was to stand still," —
and here they evinced a power seemingly omnipotent-
Day after day, national expectation was outraged by the

GENERAL McCLELLAN AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. 6j
dull announcement, " All is quiet on the Potomac." All,
too, was equally quiet under Buell and Halleck. Not an
inch of the " sacred soil " was arrested from the Con
federates by the immense forces under the immediate com
mand of our " Young Napoleon ; " nor was there a single
movement made which looked in that direction. Not a
single battery held by hostile forces on the Lower Potomac
was silenced, though all those batteries lay in the imme
diate presence of our immense fleets and armies, the fleet
asking but 4,000 troops to insure the free navigation of
the river. Forty thousand Confederates, distributed over a
line of about 300 miles in extent, held undisturbed posses
sion of Central and Southern Kentucky, and that in the
presence of more than 100,000 centralized forces under
General Buell. Less than 30,000 men, under General
Price, held quiet possession of more than one-third of the
State of Missouri, and that in the presence of an immense
army under General Halleck. Nor were there the remotest
indications that this stolid immobility would ever have
been disturbed, in any decisive manner, had not an abso
lute order from the President compelled our armies to
move by the 22nd February, 1862. Our Commander-
in-Chief and his two.conferrees have, in one fundamental
respect, the high merit of perfect originality in the science
of war, namely, the origination of the doctrine that the
true method to "conquer a peace," or subdue a rebellion,
and this in a " quick, short, and. decisive " manner, and
with no backward movement or loss of- a battle, is to raise,
organise, and discipline immense and overwhelming armies,
and then to keep " all quiet on the Potomac " and every
where else, and permit the enemy to do everywhere just
as he pleases. It was during these months of stupid
inaction that the Adjutant-General of France visited this
country, and, after a careful scrutiny of the status of our
armies, made to his Government at home the report given
in the Introduction. It is only within the circle of our
own national history that events at all parallel fo those
under consideration can be found.

68 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
EVENTS WHICH DID TRANSPIRE IN THESE DEPARTMENTS
DURING THIS PERIOD OF INACTIVITY.
Little events become objects of national interest when
the public mind is in a state of wakeful expectancy in
respect to important occurrences. Three events, at the
time we are considering, did occur in the department of
Washington, events which have place in history. One is
the unfortunate affair at Ball's Bluff", on the Virginia side
of the Potomac; an affair in which, on October 2 ist,
we lost, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, upwards of
i,ooo men, — the lamented Colonel Baker, Senator from
Oregon, being among the killed. A careful reader of all
the facts of the case will find himself utterly at a loss to
determine upon whom to lay the main responsibility. An
order from General McClellan to General Stone, in com
mand of our forces in Maryland, opposite Leesburg, in
formed the latter that General McCall was at Dranesville,
and desired General Stone to " keep a good look-out on
Leesburg, to see if this movement has the effect to drive
them (the enemy) away." The order is concluded with
this suggestion, " Perhaps a slight demonstration on your
part would have the effect to move them." Under this
suggestion. General Stone ordered Colonel Devens to
cross over "opposite Harrison's Island," and make the
demonstration suggested. This order contained every
caution which prudence could demand in the making
reconnoisances, and this with a positive command to
" return to his present position, unless he shall see one on
the Virginia side, near the river, which he can undoubtedly
hold until reinforced, and one which can be successfully
Held against largely superior forces. In such case, he will
hold on and report." Thinking that he had found such
a position, he did report, and was reinforced by Colonel
Baker with a California regiment. In their final position,
they were attacked by overwhelming odds, and slaughtered,
as stated. If any one can discover real blame anywhere
here, they can find what the writer cannot. Such disasters
are common in war under the most prudent commanders.
One fact connected with this unhappy affair involves
somebody in infinite criminality. As the affair was re-

GENERAL McCLELLAN AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. 69
garded, the entire facts not being known, as a disgrace
to our armies, twenty-four hours after the event General
McClellan telegraphed to the President from General
Stone's head-quarters, that he had investigated, and
" General Stone is without blame." As much discussion
arose in Congress on the subject, and charges of wrong
thrown at one and another individual, on the 8th Feb
ruary, by order of General McClellan, General Stone
was arrested, and confined, in Forts Lafayette and
Hamilton, until the i6th August, when he was released
by an order from the War Department. On returning
to Washington, search was rhade in vain in the War and
Adjutant-General's Departments for any order for the
arrest of General Stone, or any record of his arrest.
General Halleck, the Commander-in-Chief, knew nothing
of the matter. As the affair now stands, General
McClellan appears before this nation as having arbi
trarily, on his exclusive responsibility, arrested and held in
durance vile a worthy General whom the man who made
the arrest and caused the imprisonment had declared to
be innocent. On the 20th December a party of about 4,000 men,
on a foraging expedition in the direction of Dranesville,
and under command of General Ord, were attacked by
General Stuart with a brigade about 2,500 strong. The
Confederates were defeated, with the loss, on their part,
as they stated, of 230 men ; we losing nine killed and
sixty wounded. The bravery evinced by our troops in
this battle, and the chagrin occasioned by the Ball's Bluff
affair, together with a desire to finish up the war and
return home, excited throughout the Union army an
almost irrepressible dem.and to be led against the enemy.
Finding this feeling too strong to remain unheeded, our
commander did put his great army in array, and marched
out into the open country in front of the enemy's fortifica
tions, thus challenging them to come out and fight him.
As they remained quiet in their stronghold, our grand
army marched back again, and " all was quiet on the
Potomac." While the expedition under General Burnside was bein ;
fitted out, our Commander-in-Chief was requested to em-

70 THE AMERICAN RKliELLION.
ploy the fleet, and a military force only 4,000 strong, to open
the Potomac by destroying the Confederate batteries,
to which I have referred. The force required was posi
tively promised, and then withheld under the plea that
they could not be landed on the Virginia shore at the
place required. On the admiral in command of the
fleet affirming that he would be responsible for the land
ing of the men, provided they were furnished him, another
absolute pledge was given that the required force of 4,000
men should be furnished at a specific time. Again the
promised force was withheld, under the plea that the
measure would bring on a general battle. Just as if a
general battle in front of Washington could be occa
sioned by the destruction of a few batteries on the Lower
Potomac. Just as if, also, our Commander-in-Chief, with
his great army, was not in Washington for the specific
purpose of ending the war by fighting a great battle. The
commander of our fleet now requested the privilege of
going to sea, and not suffering the mortification and dis
grace of remaining idle where he was. Thus during that
autumn and winter the Potomac remained closed, and
our immense army, and all the population of Washington,
were held in dependence for all provisions and supplies
upon a single railroad.
Events most humiliating to our country now remain
to be told. The Confederates, representing themselves as
200,000 strong, boldly pushed their lines forward, and
occupied Centerville, Fairfax Court House, and finally
Munson's Hill, an elevation which overlooks the city.
In these localities, particularly at the place last named,
the nation was informed that there were present at
least 100,000 men, that their fortifications, which were
mounted with the heaviest ordnance, were of the most for
midable character. After long delays and painful hesita
tions, however, our Commander-in-Chief did resolve to
" take up his legs," and move upon the enemy at Munson's
Hill. On the night, however, of darkness and terror,
tears and blood, when the formidable movement was to
have been made, the enemy was informed of the fact by
signals from the city, and beat a mocking retreat. When
our forces took possession of the place, what did they find

GENERAL McCLELLAN AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. 7 1
there ? A low line of breastworks, with no ditch or any
thing else to protect them ; works mounted with terrific
engines of war, namely, one immense gun constructed out
of a large stove pipe, and large logs of wood painted
black, and so shaped as to appear to be huge cannon. So
when the Confederates retreated from their advanced posi
tions at Centerville, their fortifications were found to have
been of a similar character, and to have been mounted with
a terrific line of huge quaker-guns. General McClellan did
not discover in all these revelations how illusive were his
ideas of the numbers of the forces before him ; nor did his
mind seem at all to appreciate the humiliation and chagrin
which the nation suffered from such facts. Our "Young
Napoleon" turned out to be, not, what the nation supposed,
"a mighty man, a man of renown," but, like Seraiah of
old, " a quiet prince," whose stagnant imperturbability no
thing, not even the spectacle of national dishonour, moved.
In the same state of stagnant immobility did the immense
forces put under Generals Halleck and Buell remain. If
the Confederates had planned our campaigns throughout,
our 660,000 brave men, who were praying to be led against
their foes, and thus enjoy an early return to the bosoms of
their families, could not have been held in a state of more
perfect inactivity than they were, an inactivity which we
have never been able to explain but upon one hypothesis —
an immutable determination, on the part of the three com
manders under consideration, not to end the war by the
collision of armies.
While these events were transpiring, public attention
was being turned from what was not being done at the
points where the only real issues of the war lay, to an
unimportant expedition which was being fitted out under
General Burnside for some southern locality. On the nth
and 1 2th January, this expedition sailed, an expedition con
sisting of thirty-one steam gunboats, carrying ninety-four
guns and some 11,500 men. The results of this expedi
tion, ably conducted as it was, were the capture of Roanoke
Island, of Newbern, on the Neuse river, and other places
in that part of North Carolina. In a short time, however,
the little army was dispersed among so many places
deemed necessary to be held, as to be utterly powerless

72 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
for aggressive movements in the interior. So matters
remained, with the necessity of continuous reinforcements
at each point, until the close of the war. This expedition,
however, is instructive in many points of view. Som.e of
them we will now refer to.
This expedition, like the many others which were pro
jected during this war, had no bearing upon any issue
on which the finale of the conflict depended. Instead of
accomplishing any important purposes for the Union
cause, they all in common acted as terrible irritants upon
the surface of the Rebellion, increasing the intensity and
endurance of its spirit, and multiplying the forces of the
Confederacy. The results of this expedition, we remark in the next
place, fully explain a mystery which hangs over this war —
the fact that we had such immense forces in the field, and
yet that our central armies were always too weak to settle
the issues pending upon their movements. As General
Burnside, for example, entered North Carolina, and
captured Roanoke Island, Newbern, Beaufort, and Fort
Macon, their permanent occupancy became, it was
thought, a necessity. Hence, in a short time, his army
was broken up into small bodies located at unsupporting
distances from one another, and the central force was
rendered by continuous depletion too weak for aggres
sive action. So it was with our armies advanced into the
Confederate States. The permanent occupancy of each
place taken was thought a necessity. Hence it was that
in a short time after the war commenced, our weakness for
offensive movements was in exact proportion to the amount
of territory we had conquered. At the time we visited
Washington, in January 1863, for example, we had,
according to the official report of the Secretary of War,
upwards of 800,000 men, "well armed and equipped," in
the field. Yet, when it was required, in order to accomplish
a movement which, as all admitted, would finish up the
campaign in Virginia that winter, — when it was required,
for such a movement, that some 60,000 men should be
drawn from all this immense force and concentrated at
Fortress Monroe, our Secretary of War, Commander-in-
Chief, and even the President, were at an utter loss to

GENERAL McCLELLAN AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. 73
know where such a force could be found. The reason was
the vast amount of conquered territory occupied by our
forces located everywhere at unsupporting distances from
one another. Wise commanders never thus disperse their
armies. When hostile armies are in the field, places are
never occupied but exclusively for strategic purposes.
Such commanders act with exclusive reference to one
fixed purpose — the destruction of the opposing army.
This end being accomplished, places are easily taken
possession of Such, however, is not the form of wisdom
which dwelt with our commanders. We told President
Lincoln, at the time referred to, that it would require
2,000,000 men to subdue the Rebellion on the principles
on which the war had, up to that time, been conducted,
whereas 500,000 properly employed were all that were
needed, — a statement fully verified by subsequent
events. In judging of this North Carolina expedition as a
military measure, two additional considerations should be
taken into account — the number of men at the time
in the Confederate armies in Virginia and the Carolinas,
according to the estimate of our Commander In-Chief,
and the use which might have been made of the forces
under General Burnside. The Confederate army in front of
Washington, and in North-eastern Virginia, amounted at
that time, according to the avowed estimate of General
McClellan, to about 150,000 men ; the position at Manassas
being then connected with North Carolina by ample rail
road communications. If so many men were confronting
Washington, what vast numbers of additional forces must
there have been in all the rest of Virginia and the Caro
linas. With such an estimate of the Confederate forces
available for offence and defence, what infinite folly and
presumption are Implied in sending off" 11,500 men to
capture and occupy such places as Roanoke Island, New
bern, Beaufort, Washington, and Fort Macon. The fact
that so small a force was perrriitted to capture and hold
undisturbed possession of so many places in such an
important part of so great a State, would have convinced
any commander of ordinary capacities that he had funda
mentally erred in the estimate referred to. The veil,

74 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
however, before the face of our commander remained as
before. Before General Burnside sailed south, we wrote on to
Washington proposing that the first use made of his
armament should be the following — that as soon as the
fleet and army were ready he should be reinforced by all
the forces at Fortress Monroe that could possibly be
spared ; that he should then sail, -not south, but up the
Potomac, and disembark his land forces at a point near
Hoes' Ferry; that while the land forces should flank the
batteries, to which we have before referred, on the land,
the fleet should do the same on the river, side ; that these
batteries being captured. General Burnside should push
on and capture Fredericksburg, that he should then march
west, and when, at a point designated, he should be joined
by a force of at least 60,000 men sent secretly down from
Washington, should move on and capture the Confederate
communications between Manassas and Richmond ; and
that, while this was being done, General McClellan should
move his whole remaining army to the front of the Con
federate position at Manassas, making this movement
in such a manner as to separate the enemy's forces
there from those in the northern part of the State. Who
can doubt that if these measures had been adopted the
annihilation of the Confederate army under consideration,
and with that the overthrow of the Rebellion in Virginia
and the Carolinas, would have been a question of but
a few weeks' time ? We are well assured that this plan
was promptly laid before the military authorities at
Washington. Our Commander-in-Chief, however, was
of too quiet a spirit to entertain any question of such a
character. To represent still further the state of things in our
army at Washington, we would here refer to a plan of
operations submitted to General McClellan during this
waiting period by General McDowell. In the communi
cation which we read before President Lincoln and others
in January 1863, we remarked that at any time during
the fall or winter of 1861 an army of 80.000 men might
have been secretly moved down to the vicinity of Aquia
village, and from thence, by a march of some fourteen

GENERAL McCLELLAN AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. 75
or fifteen miles, to Bealton, where they would seize and
hold all the Confederate" communications south of Man
assas. While this was being done. General McClellan
might have moved out, with the remainder of his army,
into the front of the place designated, and thus have
placed the Confederate army there between two resistless
masses, between which it would have been inevitably
crushed, or have surrendered without a battle. When we
read this statement to General McDowell, he remarked,
" This is very singular," and then took from his desk and
read a document containing the identical plan above in
dicated, specifying the same precise number of men to
be sent down, and the same places to which they should
be sent, with the identical front movement specified.
This plan was laid before General McClellan, when the
condition of the Potomac army was well nigh intolerable,
the previous rains having rendered the narrow lanes
between the lines of huts and tents occupied by the
soldiery almost impassable. The plan, if adopted, would
have brought the army out upon dry land, where their con
dition would have been infinitely improved, and all military
movements unimpeded. Our Commander-in-Chief, how
ever, seemed to have had an infinite tenafcity for mud, and
never seemed more qui(;t that when his army was too
deeply mired to be moi ed at all, or was lying still amid
the marshes of the Chickahominy, and dying piecemeal
from drinking swamp water.

CHAPTER V.
THE SPRING CAMPAIGN OB THE ARMY OF THE
POTOMAC.
The longest period has its termination. So it was with
the listless quietude of our armies. A general order
issued by the President January 27th, 1862, absolutely
required "that the 22nd day of February, 1862, be the
day for a general movement of the land and naval forces
of the United States against the insurgent forces." The
particular day was specified because it was the birthday
of the father of our country, — a very inadequate reason,
surely, for a determination of the time for the movement of
great armies. On the 31st of the same month the Presi
dent issued another order absolutely requiring a movement
of the army of the Potomac upon the Confederate forces at
Manassas prior to "the 22nd day of February next." These
orders disturbed the stolid immobility of our Commander-
in-Chief A movement In some direction must be made,
and " that right early." But whither, and in what form,
shall the movement be made, were questions about which
the sagacious mind of General McClellan seemed to have
come to no positive decision. Up to a short time previous
he had avowed an intention to let his first blow fall upon
the Confederates at Manassas. But when the period for
action drew near, another plan suggested itself — a surprise
of the enemy, by moving his great army, by water, around
to Urbana on the Rappahannock, or to Fortress Monroe,
and from thence move upon Richmond before the enemy
at Manassas could know what was being done. The chief
matter of surprise in such a case is that the suggestion
that such an army could be moved by such means, and the
enemy not know it, did not convince the President and his

THE SPRING CAMPAIGN OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 77
advisers of the utter Incompetency of the General in com
mand to plan a campaign or move an army anywhere.
The Idea of the new movement, however, took full posses
sion of the mind of its originator, and in a council of war
with his twelve division commanders he gained a vote of
eight in its favour ; one given conditionally and four
against it, — Generals McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman,
and Barnard voting in the negative, and General Keyes
conditionally in its favour. The great impediment now
arose — to gain the assent of the President and his
immediate advisers to such an obviously ill-advised mea
sure, a measure to which their repugnance was well nigh
irresistible. That repugnance, however, was at length
overcome, the President and Secretary of War, Mr. Stan
ton, consenting on the express conditions — that the navi
gation of the Potomac should be previously opened ; that
a sufficient force should be left behind to render the city
of Washington perfectly secure against effective attacks
from the enemy ; and that the contemplated movement
should "begin as early as the i8th March instant." This
permission, dated March 8th, was accompanied with an
absolute order " that the army and navy co-operate in
an immediate effort to capture the enemy's batteries upon
the Potomac between Washington and the Chesapeake
Bay." This order was accompanied by another of the
same date, requiring that the army of the Potomac, now
consisting, according to official report, of 222,196 men, be
divided into five army corps, to be commanded by Generals
McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, Keyes, and Banks ; and
that this order should be executed with such promptness
as not to " delay the commencement of the operations
already directed to be undertaken by the army of the
Potomac." While these matters were going on, the army and the
authorities and people at Washington were startled with
rumours that the enemy had wholly withdrawn their forces
from Manassas and Northern Virginia. Careful recon
noissance soon verified these rumours, and our grand army
moved out and took possession of the formidable places in
their front;, thereby gaining important experience, as our
commander stated, in the business of breaking up camps

78 THE AIMERICAN REBELLION.
and making marches. After reposing for four days amidst
" the Quaker guns " by which this great General had been
previously overawed, that grand army marched back again
to their former cantonments.
While our army lay at Manassas, we wrote on to a
member of the Committee on the Conduct of the War the
following plan for the coming campaign^- that General
Banks should move his corps rapidly down the Shenan
doah valley; that when he had arrived opposite our grand
army he should be reinforced by another corps of sufficient
numbers to render his force from 60,000 to 80,000 strong ;
that while the grand army should move directly upon the
army in their front, the right vwing of our central force
being kept in constant communication with that under
General Banks, the latter force should, by forced marches,
move down the valley, capture Staunton, and then seize
the Richmond and Tennessee railroad. This being done,
all our forces, flanking the enemy on both wings, should
press his forces into Richmond, when their capture would
be only a question of time. In the same communication
we stated definitely that no important movement should
be made up the Peninsula from Fortress Monroe. To do
this, we remarked, was to make a movement of greater
peril than any other, and one also which, if effective, would
merely drive the Confederate armies off into the country
and render their capture more difificult than now. When
we made this suggestion, we had never heard even a
rumour that any fundamental movement in that direction
had been thought of. At that time, also, we were ignorant,
though we had often inquired upon the subject, that Bur
muda Hundred was left unfortified by the Confederates.
As soon as we learned this, we ever after contended that
all movements upon Richmond should be made by a central
army moving down as above indicated ; while another army,
60,000 or 80,000 strong, should be landed at the point
designated, and, by a movement westward from thence,
should seize all the Confederate communications south of
James river. Every reflecting mind will perceive at once,
however, that had the plan which we suggested and stated
above been adopted, and executed with vigour, the whole
Confederate army in Virginia would have been at our

THE SPRING CAMPAIGN OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 79
mercy in four weeks' time. Our great army, upwards of
200,000 strong, would have been kept together; all its
movements and actions would have been unified and cen
tralized for the one great issue before it ; and success would
have been as certain as anything future, and dependent
upon human agency, can be. When we learned that the
plan of transporting our central army down to that Lower
Peninsula had been adopted, we wrote on to Washington
that no parallel could be found for such a measure in the
history of all past ages, and that I was quite sure that the
future of the world would furnish no event at all like it.

FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIONS TO THIS MEASURE.
We are now fully prepared to consider the character of
the measure under consideration ; a measure which, as all
now admit, the question " Who is to blame for the results ? "
aside, did, in fact, issue most calamitously to the nation.
While we may safely challenge the world to offer a single
valid consideration in favour of the movement, multitu
dinous objections of the most obvious and weighty charac
ter lie against it. One of its main merits, as presented by
its author, was, that it would be a surprise to the Confede
rate commanders. In one respect it was a surprise to
them, and to all the world, viz., that so crazy a plan could
ever have dawned in the brain of any rational man. In
the respect intended, the folly of our commander's calcula
tions becomes manifest in the fact that three days after
President Lincoln assented to the movement, the whole
programme was discussed in the Richmond Enquirer. Let
us now look directly at the fundamental objections which
lie against this movement. We give these objections
almost in the words in which they are found in the paper
which we read before President Lincoln and others in
January 1863.
I . While time was then most precious, and while, by the
movement we have indicated, our army could have been
brought in decisive collision with the enemy in less than
two weeks, nearly one month passed before the army,
transported to Fortess Monroe, was able to begin a move
ment towards Richmond. In the absence of considerations

8o THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
of the most weighty character — and none such existed —
such delay is inexcusable.
2. By this measure, the grand army of the Potomac,
one of the grandest that ever existed, was, instead of being
unified and centralised in the relations of its parts, wholly
broken up, and its independent fragments located at un
supporting distances from each other, and this on a line of
nearly 300 miles in extent. When the movement by the
Lower Peninsula was determined on. General McClellan,
we must bear in mind, was relieved from his responsibility
as Commander-in-Chief, and assigned to one exclusive
command, the forces sent with him to Fortress Monroe;
his authority not even extending to General Wool, who
commanded at this fortress. Let us, for a moment, con
sider this new status of this grand army. At Fortress
Monroe we have one independent command under General
Wool; in the Peninsula, a second under General McClellan
south of Washington, under General McDowell, a third
in the Shenandoah valley, a fourth under General Banks
in Western Virginia, a fifth under General Fremont
and at Washington, a sixth under General Wadsworth.
Let any one take a map and look over the situation here
presented, and compare it with the status of this grand
army before this senseless dispersion occurred, and he will
.perceive at once that no army can be conceived to be in a
better condition for offensive action than ours was before
this dispersion occurred, or in a worse condition for offence
or defence than was ours after it was thus broken into
fragments. Only two of these bodies, those at Fortress
Monroe and Washington, were safe for a moment from a
concentrated assault from all the united armies of the Con
federacy, armies located anywhere in Virginia and the
Carolinas ; while the body assaulted could not be aided
at all by any other portion of the grand army. Any one
can perceive, also, the absolute impossibility of unity of
action in the parts of an army thus broken up, and thus
distributed, — action for offensive or defensive operations.
For this unparalleled dispersion of this army. General
McClellan is to beheld exclusively responsible, the arrange
ment being reluctantly assented to by the President and
his advisers, and protested against, in the council of war

THE SPRING CAMPAIGN OF THii ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 8 1
above referred to, by all the corps commanders present,
General Keyes excepted, and he assenting only provisionally.
3. By this measure nearly one half of our grand army
was detached for mere defensive, while the whole burden
of offensive, operations was thrown upon the other half, the
forces under the immediate command of General McClellan.
The detached forces under Generals McDowell, Banks,
Fremont, and Wadsworth, amounting in all to nearly
100,000 men, were avowedly detained for one exclusive
purpose, the defence of Washington and Western Virginia.
The only portion that could act offensively was the single
body about 130,000 strong, the body that was with General
McClellan in the Peninsula. In the state in which that
army was, "before the captivity" to the Peninsula, all its
parts could, as we have seen, have been employed for one
united service — offensive operations ; the army, in all its
movements, being always between the enemy and the
national capital. When Buonaparte left Paris to meet the
Allies who had invaded France, he left behind him, in
the city, but 2,000 soldiers. Had our army, as a unity,
moved upon the enemy, a larger number would not have
been required to tarry behind at Washington. The Penin
sula movement required that nearly 100,000 be left behind
to protect the national capital. Such was the strategic
wisdom of our "Young Napoleon," deliberately choosing
to meet his foes with one half of the force at his command.
4. This movement, we remark, in the next place, per
mitted the Confederate generals to concentrate at will all
their forces upon McClellan, or to detach, at any time,
one or more of their army corps, and precipitate such
bodies upon the unsupported forces under McDowell,
Banks, or Fremont. If we had submitted to a council of
Confederate generals the plan of dispersing and locating
the broken fragments of our grand army so as to render
the state of affairs the best possible for them, and the
worst possible for us, the said council could not have:
devised a plan better adapted to those ends, than was
that developed by General McClellan. Such was the
actual division and location of the fragments of our army,
that had the Confederate generals been able to have con
centrated in Virginia a force of 125,000 men, the army of
6

82 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
McClellan would undeniably have been utterly routed,
with the most of it captured ; and this to have been fol
lowed by the dispersion of the army corps under McDowell
and Banks, and the national capital in their hands. In less
than two months' time. Their first measure would have
been, probably, to have drawn McClellan into a position
where his defeat and rout would have been certain — a
measure perfectly practicable. Then they would have pre
cipitated crushing masses, first upon Banks or McDowell,
and then upon the other, and finally moved upon Wash
ington. Or they might have sent 55,000 men to hold our
army in the Peninsula in check, and with the remaining
70,000 have crushed Banks and McDowell, then have cap
tured Washington, and, lastly, have disposed of McClellan.
Nothing but the weakness of the Confederacy prevented
the results under consideration, in one or the other of the
forms indicated.
5. General McClellan was permitted to carry out the
plan which he had developed, on the express condition
that he should leave behind him a sufficient force to render
Washington perfectly secure against any attack from the
Confederates. Two most essential facts should be taken
into the account here, in forming our estimate of his
character as a general, and also of the plan of operations
under consideration. We refer to his estimate of the
amount of the Confederate forces immediately opposed to
him on the one hand, and to the forces which he purposed
to have left for the defence of Washington on the other.
According to his own official statement, made a short time
before he left for the Peninsula, March 8th, the Confede
rate army near and north of Manassas was 115,000
strong. According to another estimate made by himself,
the Confederates had, under General Magruder at York-
town, from 15,000 to 20,000 men, and 20,000 more under
General Huger at Norfolk. If we place the remaining
forces in Virginia and the Carolinas, forces available for
the defence of "the sacred soil," at 30,000 (and General
McClellan's estimate would have been larger than
this), there stood opposed to our grand army a force
not less than 180,000 strong. Such was the estimate of
General McClellan of the amount of the Confederate forces

THE SPRING CAMPAIGN OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 83
opposed to him, when he devised and executed his world-
famed Peninsula campaign. Under such circumstances,
no prudent general in command of a force no greater
comparatively than that commanded by General McClellan
at the time, would have divided his army at all ; much
less would he have separated that army into fragments
located at unsupporting distances from each other, every
one of which being less than the force which might, at any
moment, be concentrated upon it. The best that can be
said of the plan under consideration is, that a worse one
is inconceivable, and that this wears but one aspect — a
deliberate purpose to put that grand army into the hands
of its enemies. No plan conceivable can be more abso
lutely adapted to that end than the one under considera
tion. But what was his plan for the protection of WA,shing-
ton against that army of 115,000 men, which, as he
reported, lay within a few miles of that city ? Lie pur
posed to take to the Peninsula four entire corps of the
Potomac army, leaving for the protection of the national
capital the corps of General Banks, and 20,000 of the
most poorly furnished and least trained troops in that
army, under General Wadsworth. General McClellan
affirms that he left for the end under consideration, in
cluding 35,467 men under Banks, in the valley of the
Shenandoah, 67,428 men, with eighty-five pieces of field
artillery. Yet, he left in front of these, according to his
own estimate, a hostile force 115,000 strong; and that with
the separate forces under Banks and Wadsworth at such
distances from each other that they could have been
separately assaulted and crushed by overwhelming forces.
Judged by his own estimates. General McClellan can, by
no possibility, be defended against the charge of the most
senseless and absurd blundering known in war, or of a
deliberate intent to put the national capital Into the
hands of the Confederates. Such an uncovering to over
whelming odds, of such a post as Washington, has no
parallel in history.
But the forces which he intended to have left for the
protection of Washington did not, by any means, amount
to the number above stated, but to less than 55,000 men.

84'' THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
Granting to General Banks all that he is affirmed to have
had, but 19,022 men were, according to the official report
of General Wadsworth, present with him, and fitfor duty.
Nearly all of these were new and imperfectly disciplined,
while three of the regiments in this small force were under
orders from General McClellan to join divisions on their
way to the Peninsula, and 4,000 more of these troops were
ordered to Manassas to relieve General Sumner,- so that
he could embark to Yorktown. Judged by his own esti
mate of facts around him, and by other facts of the most
palpable character, and on the hypothesis that it was the
deliberate purpose of the commander of the army of the
Potomac to put Washington into the hands of the Con
federate generals, is it possible to conceive of a plan
better adapted to that end than the one our General did
adopt ? We choose to impute to him ineffable stupidity
rather than deliberate treason, — the only alternative which
the case presents.
6. The circumstances' in which this movement was
planned and executed demand special attention in this
connexion. At that very time it was a matter of painful
doubt with the nation which should command James river
and the Chesapeake, the Memmac or the Monitor. The
former had just, in a crippled condition, been towed up to
Norfolk for repairs, and was expected out, in a few days, for
a second round with its puny rival. With our army in the
Peninsula, with all the Confederate forces concentrated in
front, and the Merrimac in command of the river and bay
designated, the capture of McClellan and his army could
have been only a question of time. What must we think
of a General who needlessly puts a great army in such
circumstances of peril as these ?
7. The next consideration which requires attention
relatively to the plan of this campaign, pertains to the
route selected for a movement upon Richmond. This
route, as any one will perceive who will consult the maps
apd acquaint himself with the facts of the case, is the most
difficult arid perilous that could have been selected. First
of all, awide marsh extending quite across the Peninsula
east of Yorktown had to be crossed, a marsh which could
be readily defended against immense odds. Farther up.

THE SPRING CAMPAIGN OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOJIAC. 85
there were narrows which were necessary to be passed,
and which were of the most defensible character. Next,
the dull stream of the Chickahominy presented still an
other formidable obstacle. Then the whole march of the
army was through the most sickly region known in the
United States, a region in which the army would be ne
cessitated, by drinking swamp water, to become very
generally affected with the most wasting disease. By
this route, also, our army, if so happy as to reach its
doubtful destination, would find itself before Richmond,
on the side where, of all others, it was most defensible
and most strongly fortified.
8. It was the only possible direction in which, we
remark again, the city could possibly have been ap
proached and all its important communications be left
untouched. To besiege a place effectively, the end being
its capture, it must be so approached that the besiegers
shall hold all the essential communications of the place,
and thus ensure its capture by starvation, if by nothing
else. In the case before us, the place to be besieged was
to be approached on the only side which would leave open
every one of its important communications. The possi
bility of capturing the place under such circumstances was
a matter of extreme doubt ; while its capture, should the
siege be a success, would be as utterly barren of decisive
results as was that of Philadelphia by Lord Howe. The
best that can be said of this route is that it was the very
worst that could, by any possibility, have been selected.
9. This plan, we remark finally, was based throughout
upon a totally false idea of the only true and proper
mission for which the army of the Potomac was created,
and put under the command of General McClellan. The
mission of armies is, not to capture cities or fortresses, but
to put down the military power by which such places are
defended. Suppose that all the important cities and fort
resses of the Confederacy had fallen into our hands, the
armies of the Confederacy being, at the same time, intact
in the field, and animated with the hope of success. We
should have been in the worst condition conceivable, as far
as final results were concerned. The armies of France In
Spain, for example, always outnumbered those of Welling-

86 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
ton as three to one. Yet in all collisions in the field he
was invariably successful. The reason is obvious. The
great armies of France were distributed all over the Penin
sula, and occupying their important cities and fortresses,
thus rendering it impossible for them to keep large forces
in the field, — the exact cause of our weakness during the
war we are now considering. What was the exclusive idea
which determined, in the mind of General McClellan, this
Peninsula campaign ? The delusive and fatal idea that
the great mission of the army which he commanded was
to get to Richmond, and besiege and capture that. On
the other hand, the exclusive mission of that army was
to annihilate the Confederate forces in Virginia, and thus
insure the fall of Richmond, and with it the collapse of
the Confederacy itself Had his mind been possessed of
the true idea of the exclusive mission of his great army,
the conception of this Peninsula route to Richmond would
never have approached his thoughts. The main reason
assigned by General McClellan for the adoption of this
idea was that the new route was the shortest and most
practicable route to Richmond, — clearly evincing the
fact that he was under the control of a totally false and
vicious idea in regard to the mission of the army which he
commanded. The most fundamental defects of the plan
under consideration are twofold — that it had its exclusive
origin in a totally false and vicious idea of the mission of
this grand army, and that the army route selected to realize
this vicious idea was the worst that, by any possibility,
could have been selected.

THE MANNER IN WHICH GENERAL McCLELLAN EXECUTEt),
OR RATHER FAILED TO EXECUTE, HIS PLAN.
We shall best understand, not only the character of
this campaign, but the conduct of the war in general, by
an immediate consideration of the manner in which this
Peninsula campaign was executed, or rather finally
collapsed by that disgraceful retreat to Harrison's Land
ing.

THE SPRING CAMPAIGN OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 87
Relative amount of forces opposed to each other in this campaign.
In regard to the amount of forces furnished for the
campaign — a most material fact to be considered — we need
but to refer to the official statements of the General in
command. His official report April 30th, 1862, when he
was before Yorktown, gives the aggregate of his forces
as 130,878, of which 112,392 were present and fit for
duty. This, we suppose, does not include Franklin's
division of 12,448 men, which was in the meantime sent
to him. He thus had, on the arrival of this division, an
effective force upwards of 124,000 strong, with a co-opera
tive force 10,000 strong, under General Wool. When our
army was lying on the Chickahominy a reinforcement
10,000 strong was at one time added to it, under General
McCall. On the 20th June his returns to the Adjutant-
General's office gave the total strength of his army as
consisting of 156,838 men. Of these 115,102 were pre
sent for duty, 12,225 being reported as absent on special
duty, sick, or under arrest, and 29,511 as absent on leave.
If we put his losses prior to this date, losses in battle and
by sickness, at 10,000 (a very small estimate), then it is
safe to affirm that General McClellan took with him, and
subsequently received from Washington, for his Peninsula
campaign upwards of 165,000 men. If we add to these
the co-operative force ever available for any important
exigency, of 10,000 under General Wool, we put down the
army furnished him at 175,000 men. Some very high
authorities place the army actually furnished him, General
Wool's division not reckoned, at 180,000 men. No
authority places the number below the estimate which
we have given. According to the highest Confederate
authorities, authorities sustained by the most palpable
facts, this immense army was never confronted by a force
100,000 strong.
Difficulties which presented thi mselves on the arrival of our
army at Fortress Monroe.
On the 2nd April our commander arrived at Fortress
Monroe, finding there his advanced force, consisting of
some 58,000 men in all. All things on his arrival were

88 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
found to be mixed up and confused. The means of trans
portation, so desirable when a surprise is calculated upon,
were found to be insufficient ; information with respect to the
force and position of the enemy was "vague and untrust
worthy," and the maps which he ordered to be in readiness
were imperfect, and in essential respects erroneous. All
such facts, given in detail in our General's report, reveal
most clearly that this route for an advance upon Richmond
was selected on the basis, not of accurate information pre
viously obtained, but upon a blind guess that the unknown
would present less difficulties and greater advantages than
the known. To these natural difficulties, however, a far
greater one was superadded, that which lay in the consti
tution of our General's mind, the sentiment of fear and ap
prehension, which gave to the forces confronting him an
overwhelming magnitude. While before Washington he
feared to advance " with 20,000 men, against an enemy who
confronted him with 10,000." Here, in the Peninsula, he
feared to advance with 56,000 men against an enemy who
confronted him with but 11,000. When outnumbering
his antagonist as more than ten to one, he dared not turn
the enemy's position by a flank movement, which could
have been easily done in three days ; he dared not attempt
so hazardous an experiment, lest he should suffer another
Ball's Bluff disaster.
The advance and the check of the grand army.
On the morning of April 3rd the grand army moved
out in two columns : one on the old Yorktown road, and
led by the divisions of Generals Porter and Hamilton of
the Third Corps, and Sedgwick's division of the Second
Corps, all under the command of General Heintzelman ;
and the other column, led by General Keyes, and consist
ing of the divisions of Generals Couch and W. F. Smith,
on the Warwick road. A slow and continuous march of
two days brought both these columns to a sudden stand
still before the formidable fortifications which the inde
fatigable Confederate commander. General Magruder, had
erected across these roads, the one on Warwick river, and
the other in front and around Yorktown. After a careful
survey of the situation, our commander gravely concluded

THE SPRING CAMPAIGN OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 89
that a line of fortification thirteen miles in extent could
nowhere be forcibly broken through, or safely flanked, and
that, consequently, the enemy must be driven from his
position by counter fortifications. This was mainly at
tempted at the point where the opposite fortifications were
most formidable, in front of Yorktown. A full month was
spent in erecting batteries and getting the ordnance in
place, when the enemy, having gained all the time de
sired to get everything in order in and about Richmond,
retired, and left our grand army and great commander
" alone in their glory." It should be borne in mind here,
that while upwards of 1 12,000 men lay thus Idle, and held
at bay, in the presence of ii,ooo enemies, Franklin's
division, upwards of 12,000 strong, lay in transports near
the mouth of York river, and might have been landed on
the north shore of that river, and by a flank movement
have rendered the position at Yorktown untenable.
Nothing can be more humiliating to any nation than
was such a check of such an army before such a line of
fortifications, and these defended by such a contemptible
force. Yet, in these circumstances, as in all others, the same
apparition haunted the mind of our "Young Napoleon"
of overwhelming forces in his front, and we hear also the
same "great and exceeding bitter cry" for reinforce
ments. In his communications to the President he
affirmed, while lying with upwards of 100,000 men around
him, and not one-tenth as many in his front, that he would
probably have the whole Confederate army on his hands,
" probably not less than 100,000 men, and possibly more."
To quell this crying, Franklin's division was detached
from McDowell, and sent down to the Peninsula. This,
however, was not enough. Soon after, as we shall see,
the apparition of opposing forces swelled to 200,000, and
would unquestionably have swelled to 300,000 had his
own army been under 250,000 strong.
The effect of this month's delay amid those deadly
marshes was as great a loss of life to our army as would
have been occasioned by an important battle, and upon its
7norale as bad as a defeat. Rev. J. J. Marks, D.D., In his
account of this campaign, says, " In a short time the sick
in our hospitals were numbered by thousands, and many

1 1

90 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
died so suddenly that the disease had all the aspect of a
plague." General J. G. Barnard, General McClellan's
Engineer-in-Chief, in his report, says, "We lost few
men by the siege, but disease took a fearful hold of the
army ; and toil and hardships, unredeemed by the excite
ment of combat, impaired their morale. We did not carry
with us from Yorktown so good an army as we took there.
Of the bitter fruits of that month gained by the enemy,
we have tasted to our heart's content." In the judgment
of our general, however, the matter at Yorktown was a
great triumph to our arms, a triumph so great that he sug
gested to the President the idea that the regiments consti
tuting the army of the Potomac should be permitted to have
inscribed upon their banners the word Yorktown.
The advance from Yorktown.
As soon as it was known that Yorktown had been evacu
ated, a vigorous pursuit was ordered, a pursuit headed by
General Stoneman, with four regiments, a squadron of
cavalry, and four batteries of horse artillery. This advance
was followed by the divisions of Hooker and Kearny on the
Yorktown, and by those of Casey, Couch, and W. F. Smith,
on Winn's Mill road. In front of Williamsburg, the advance
was checked by the Confederate forces occupying Fort
Magruder, which was located at the junction of all the roads
leading farther up the Peninsula. The fortifications here
presented were quite formidable, and every preparation had
been made for a strong resistance, this being done by cutting
down the forests on the right and left, and by filling the
open ground in front with rifle pits. Had General McClellan
been with the advance we should probably have had an
other delay here, such as we had before Yorktown. As it
was, the next morning after the pursuit was commenced
found the advanced division under the dauntless Hooker in
the immediate presence of the enemy. Knowing that there
were at least 30,000 of our troops in supporting distance
from him, not over two miles away, and that the main army
was just in their rear. Hooker opened the battle at 7.30
a.m., and, strange to relate, had to sustain the fight single
handed until 4.30 p.m. At this time General Kearny
arrived with his division, pushed to the <'ront, and allowed

THE SPRING CAMPAIGN OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 9 1
Hooker to act as a reserve. Before night set in, the several
advanced divisions had gained such advantages as to render
the place untenable. In this battle we lost 456 killed,
1,400 wounded, and 372 missing, — 2,228 in all; 1,575 of
these being from the single division of Hooker. Towards
evening General McClellan arrived at the front, and at
10 p.m. sent to Washington the following lugubrious dis
patch : — " After arranging for a movement up York river,
I was urgently sent for here. 1 find Joe Johnston in front of
me in strong force, probably greater a good deal than my own,
and very strongly entrenched. Hancock has taken two
redoubts, and repulsed Early's brigade by a real charge
with the bayonet, taking one colonel and 150 prisoners,
killing at least two colonels and as many lieutenant-
colonels, and many privates. His conduct was brilliant
in the extreme. I do not know our exact loss, but fear
Hooker has lost considerably on our left. I learn from
prisoners that they intend ^o dispute every step to
Richmond. I shall run the risk of at least holding them
in check here, while 1 assume the original plan. My
entire force is, undoubtedly, considerably inferior to that
of the Rebels, who will fight well ; but I will do all I can
with the force at my disposal."
While our commander was writing such Jeremiads,
"the Rebels" whom he hoped to "hold in check here"
were leaving with such precipitation that they left all
their badly wounded as prisoners of war. On awaking
the next morning, and learning the real facts, he announced
a complete victory, with " some 300 uninjured prisoners,
and more than a thousand wounded in our hands."
The distribution of our army on the Chickahominy.
With no incidents worthy of special regard in a history
like the present, our entire army, on the 22nd May,
found itself quietly located on the Chickahominy ; Norfolk
in the meantime having been abandoned by the Con
federates, and taken possession of by our forces under
General Wool. We now have a special opportunity to
judge of the real generalship of General McClellan. For
the first time since he assumed the command of a great
army we find him in circumstances in which a decisive

92 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
collision was certain to occur between his and the concen
trated forces of the Confederates, and in which he was
expected to assume the offensive. One of the special pecu
liarities of a great commander will be found in a wise
disposition and arrangement of his forces for offensive and
defensive operations. No opportunity will be allowed for
a surprise, and no one part of the army will be left in a
readily assailable position out of the reach of a ready and
adequate support from the rest of the army. It is a well-
known principle in the science of war that when a river
separates the parts of an army from one another, that said
stream should be covered with such a number of bridges
that the army can be moved back and forth over the
stream as readily as if it were not there. For a General
to place his arm.y on the two sides of a stream, when and
where these conditions of support do not exist, is to
leave the parts exposed to attack at the mercy of the
enemy. In all the respects indicated, and they are all
fundamental, the arrangement of our army in the position
under consideration was in utter violation of the known
principles of the science of war. This line, extending from
Mechanlcsville down the Chickahominy, and across the
river to Fair Oaks, was at least twenty-five miles in extent.
This is a capital error in war, the error which occasioned
the defeat of Archduke Charles at Wagram, an error which
creates a liability to have the line broken in the centre,
and the sundered parts destroyed in detail, or to have
the whole line rolled up by overwhelming assaults upon
either wing. But the most fundamental error of General
McClellan's line remains to be designated. As soon as
his line was established on the Chickahominy, and a single
bridge on his extreme left was erected, two entire corps,
Keyes's first, and then Heintzelman's, were passed over and
established on the south side of that stream. The two
divisions of Keyes were advanced, far beyond any imme
diate support, to within about six miles of Richmond ;
Casey's division being stationed at Fair Oaks on the York
River Railroad, and Couch's at Seven Pines, about one
mile to the south-east on the Williamsburg road. At
.'^ome three to four miles east of Keyes lay the corps of
Heintzelman ; Kearny's division on the railroad back of

THE SPRING CAMPAIGN OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 93
Savage's Station, and Hooker on the Williamsburg road.
The nearest support to these troops, the only body from
which help in any important exigency could be received,
was the Central Corps under General Sumner, a corps
which lay some six miles off, on the north side of the
Chickahominy. At Richmond lay the centralised Con
federate army, more than 150,000 strong according to the
avowed estimate of General McClellan, its real number
not being then over 50,000.
The following facts will enable the reader to form a
distinct apprehension of the state or distribution of our
army at this time. The Chickahominy is a sluggish
stream, nowhere fordable except at very low water. It
runs through a swampy, miry bottom from one half a mile
to a mile wide, the bottom being bordered by low and
irregular bluffs. This stream, at a distance of from ten
to fifteen miles north of Richmond, runs in a direction a
little south of east, and enters the James river some
twenty to thirty miles distant from the location of our
army, which was distributed north of Richmond. Our
army, of course, found all the bridges over the stream
broken down. As soon as a single bridge on our left was
completed, the two corps named were passed over and
located as stated, that of Keyes about midway between the
crossing and Richmond, and that of Heintzelman some
three or four miles nearer the bridge ; the two corps being
out of supporting distance from each other, and their
nearest support being, as stated, some six miles distant on
the opposite side of the stream. The formation of our
army corresponded to two sides of a triangle : the apex
being at the bridge designated ; the northern side consist
ing of the centre and right wing, extending some ten to
fifteen miles in a north-western direction to Mechanlcs
ville, a place located some five or six miles north of this
stream ; while the other side terminated, as stated, at Fair
Oaks, — the fuH extent of our line being upwards of twenty-
five miles. There was no bridge at all, be it remembered,
between the separated parts of our army ; the only bridges
over the stream being the one at the apex referred to and
the railroad bridge, which was near this. Can we conceive
of a worse distribution of forces than we have in this case ?

94 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
Had it been the deliberate purpose of our General — no such
motive being attributed to him — to ensure the capture
of the two corps located south of that stream, that of
General Keyes especially, it is impossible to conceive of
dispositions better adapted to that end than were those
actually made. Battle of Fair Oaks.
General Johnston, who commanded at Richmond at
this time, was too wise a commander not to discern the
opportunity thus put into his hands, and made instant
arrangements to avail himself of it. Before General Keyes
had time to fortify his position, the main body of the Con
federate forces were in motion. According to the original
arrangements, the battle was to have been commenced
early in the morning. May 31st. The excessive rains of
the previous afternoon and night, however, rendered it
impossible for the attack to be made before i p.m. At
this time, Casey's division being suddenly and unex
pectedly assailed by overwhelming forces. In front and on
both wings, was, after a most heroic and obstinate resist
ance, thrown into confusion, and in utter rout driven
back upon "General Couch's division at Seven Pines. This
body, after a similar resistance, was hurled back in a
similar state, while the whole corps rushed, a mingled
masi, the Confederates in hot pursuit, in the direction of
that of General Heintzelman.
As soon as the roar of the guns at Fair Oaks was heard,
General Sumner, who was constructing two bridges over
the Chickahominy, one having been carried away by the
floods, made every possible effort to cross his corps over
the remaining one. This bridge was in such an imperfect
state that only infantry, a few in a line, and a few field
guns, could be got over. At about 6.30 p.m., just as the
Confederates were interposing between Keyes and Heint
zelman, for the purpose of first capturing the former and
then destroying the latter, Sumner, with Sedgwick's
division of his corps, came upon the field and filled the
gap which the Confederates were about to occupy. By
this interposition, the battle was protracted until darkness
terminated the conflict.

THE SPRING CAMPAIGN OF THE ARMY OF TPIE POTOMAC. 95
In the morning, after two or three hours' indecisive
fighting, the Confederates retired unpursued from the field,
and after stopping for the rest of the day to gather up the
spoils on the grounds which had been occupied by the
corps of General Keyes, leisurely returned to Richmond.
In this battle. General McClellan admits a loss, In killed,
wounded, and missing, of 5,739 men ; the Confederates
admitting a loss of upwards of 4,000. The rain and flood,
which necessarily delayed the advance of the Confederates
from Richmond, prevented the destruction of the corps
of Keyes and Heintzelman, — that of the former without a
question. In his despatches. General McClellan, as if to
divert attention from his own errors, charged that "Casey's
division gave way unaccountably, and discreditably."
That division did not give way until more than one-third
of its number lay dead or wounded upon the bloody field ;
Keyes's corps losing 4,000 out of 12,000 men. In this
battle General Johnston was severely wounded, and
General Lee succeeded him as Commander-in-Chief of the
armies of the Confederacy. Soon after this, the bridges
being completed, our whole army was established on the
south side of the Chickahominy ; the corps of General
Porter and the division of General McCall located at
Mechanlcsville, excepted.
What should have been done when General McClellan lay before
Yorktown, or when he arrived upon the Chickahominy.
Success in war depepds fundamentally upon what is
denominated economy of forces. A great commander so
plans his campaigns that every form of force under his
:;ontrol is made available and efficient for the grand
result at which he aims. All small bodies are brought
into requisition, and so located as to render efficient help.
Wellington, for example, so disposed of the parts of his
army at Waterloo, that cowards who could not be made
to stand a direct fire or charge at all, performed a part of
service as important as that rendered by veterans. Let
us apply this principle to the case under consideration.
When General McClellan lay at Yorktown, he asked for
the addition to his army of General Franklin's division ;
making that army upwards of 130,000 strong. Suppose

96 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
that Franklin had been retained where he was, and that
the contingent asked for had been made up from the com
mands of Burnside and Wool, — a measure perfectly practic
able. With this force. General McClellan moves up and
establishes himself on the Chickahominy. While this was
being done, all the forces under Generals McDowell,
Banks, Fremont, and Franklin (General Wadsworth and
his forces being left in the garrisons at Washington), are
combined into a second army for a co-operative move
ment upon the army of General Lee, and Richmond. All
these combined would constitute an army at least 90,000
strong, and these could have been readily increased to
100,000 by forces brought in from other departments.
This army should have moved upon the Confederates from
the west and north-west of Richmond ; while McClellan,
passing his over the Chickahominy, should have moved
direct upon the city, keeping his right wing in communi
cation with the left of the co-operative forces. Here we
should have had a real economy of all the forces available for
this Virginia campaign ; and who can doubt the practica
bility of such a disposition of our armies, or the certainty
of their speedy success? As it was, nearly 100,000 men
were held in stupid idleness, and more than 175,000, after
being wasted with disease, were driven in disgrace from
the Chickahominy down upon James river. To us, it
has ever been a matter of unutterable wonder that such
obvious combinations of the national forces as that above
indicated did not occur to our Generals in command, and
that when the necessity of just such combinations was
continuously and importunately urged, and backed up by
the highest influence, upon our military authorities in
Washington, the Importance of said combinations could not
be appreciated. Our leading commanders and military
authorities manifested infinite skill in one direction only —
the art of scattering and wasting, instead of economising,
the forces intrusted to their direction.
Events which preceded the retreat to HarrisorC s Landing.
We have already stated the facts pertaining to the
separation of the portion of the Potomac army which did
not follow McClellan to the Peninsula, — a separation and

THE SPRING CAMPAIGN OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 97
distribution which left the disunited parts exposed to be
slaughtered in detail, as the enemy might choose. No
sooner was McClellan established in the Peninsula than
General Johnston concentrated the main portion of his
army at Richmond, leaving Jackson to guard against any
advances from Western Virginia and down the Shenandoah
valley. As soon as General Banks, in his advance down
the valley referred to, had left one of the divisions of his
corps under General Shields in front of Winchester, and
taken the other to Manassas to relieve the corps of
General Sumner, that it might go with General McClellan,
General Jackson precipitated the force under his com
mand upon the division under General Shields. In a
battle fought March 23rd, the former was signally de
feated, by the superior generalship of the latter, and com
pelled to retire precipitately back to his former position.
Becoming apprehensive of a combination between the forces
of Fremont and Banks for a flank movement such as we
have indicated should have been made, Jackson determined
to anticipate the event by a sudden advance, first against
Fremont, and then against Banks. Having been largely
reinforced, he left General Ewell to hold General Banks
in check, and moved, May 7th, with the rest of his com
mand, via Staunton, up into the mountain region.
General Milroy, whose force was nearest the advance of
the invaders, retreated to McDowell, and there awaited
reinforcements. At about 8 or 9 a.m., May 13th, a
friend of ours. Dr. Dorsey, a surgeon in our army, from
whom we received the following account, had, with several
associates, ascended to the roof of the house where they
were stopping, and were surveying the scene around them.
They had been there but a few moments when Dr. Dorsey
called the attention of his associates to certain dark lines
which had become visible, and which were circling the
elevations but a few miles distant. General Milroy was
instantly sent for, who pronounced the moving forces
before them to be the advance of General Jackson's army.
At 10 o'clock the same morning. General Schenck arrived
with several thousand reinforcements, having marched
his brigade from Franklin, thirty-four miles distant, in
twenty-three hours. Being the senior officer, Generar
7

98 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
Schenck assumed command. At a council of war, which
was immediately called, it was deemed unsafe to attempt a
retreat before evening. Learning that the enemy were
planting a battery on the mountain, from whence our
whole encampment would be commanded. General Milroy
proposed that they should be assaulted on the high
plateau where they were encamped. On being asked
whether he would lead the assault, the veteran Milroy
replied that " that was just what he wanted to do."
Four regiments, one from Virginia, and three from Ohio,
were accordingly detached for the perilous service. The
assault of this body was, to the Confederates, a perfect
surprise in the day time. Before they were fully aware of
the advance, the bold Milroy with his dauntless regiments
was in close range. For one hour and a half a most
destructive fire was poured into the ranks of the enemy,
when Milroy retired in good order, bringing with him our
entire killed and wounded. Our loss was 256, of whom
145 were slightly wounded. Jackson reported a loss on
his part of 71 killed, among whom were three colonels
and two majors, and 390 wounded, among whom was
General Edward Johnston. In the evening our forces
were quietly withdrawn in the direction of Franklin ; while,
early the next day, the main force of Jackson, a show of
pursuit having been made by a small body, was found
some fourteen miles away on their return to Staunton. It
is .said that this surprise by Milroy was a source of deeper.
chagrin to Jackson than any event of his military life.
He was the hero of surprises, and hence his bitter chagrin
at being so signally surprised himself.
On his return to the Shenandoah valley he united all
his forces for an advance upon General Banks, who had
retreated from his advanced position to Strasburg. In
this advance, with an admitted Idss on his part of 68
killed and 329 wounded, Jackson claimed to have cap
tured two guns, 9,354 small arms, and 3,050 prisoners.
General Banks admits a loss in his retreat through
Winchester to Williamsport of 38 killed, 1 55 wounded,
and 711 missing. This does not include the loss of
the sick and wounded necessarily left behind, and that
occasioned by the total rout of Colonel Kenly near

THE SPRING CAMPAIGN OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 99
Front Royal. In this unfortunate affair our loss was
quite 700 prisoners, a section of rifled lo-pounders, and a
large amount of stores. By special orders from Washing
ton, General Fremont, by a march which none but such
men as he was could have made, moved 15,000 men
down from the mountain region into the valley; while
General McDowell moved out two divisions of his army at
Fredericksburg, into the same region, to intercept Jackson.
It was now the turn of this bold and daring commander
to run a race for dear life himself By a succession of
wonderful dodges between his two assailants, and after
losing a battle, but gaining an opportunity to retreat, at
Cross-Keys, and gaining one in a fight of some 8,000
Confederates against 3,000 Unionists, he finally escaped
from the toils in which he was ensnared. Two circum
stances, as General McDowell testifies, however, pre
vented his capture — the want of energy in General Ord in
pushing his division on to Strasburg, and that of General
Shields, under false information subsequently obtained,
moving upon the same place upon a different road from
that on which he had been specifically commanded to
move. But for these two circumstances, two divisions
from McDowell's command would have intercepted Jack
son at Strasburg, and with forces larger than his would
have held him in check until the arrival of Fremont with
an army 15,000 strong. These would have' rendered the
capture of the Confederate forces a certainty. General
Fremont, it should be remembered, reached Strasburg
June ist, but a few hours after Jackson had passed
through the place. The facts we here state were sources
of the deepest regret to both McDowell and Fremont.
A grand mistake.
At the time when General Jackson advanced up the
Shenandoah, General McDowell, with an army most admir
ably trained, and fully 41,000 strong, was in readiness to
move down from Fredericksburg, and assume a position
before Richmond on the right of General McClellan, and
had advanced to some distance one division of his army
for the purpose designated. At this time the President
and Secretary of War came down to Fredericksburg, and,

loo THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
contrary to the most earnest remonstrance of General
McDowell, required him on their return to Washington
to detach two divisions of his army to co-operate with
General Fremont in disposing of General Jackson, and
thus suspend his movement upon Richmond. "This
order," says General McDowell, "was a crushing blow for
us all." He had, as he informed us in a personal inter
view, given his army a special training in reference to
rapid marches, and had everything in readiness for a most
speedy movement upon Richmond. The presence of Jack
son and Early with the best portion of the Confederate
army, away off from its proper centre, and at such a dis
tance as Winchester, was all that could have been desired
for an effective movement and assault upon Richmond
and the Confederate forces remaining there. In short, the
presence of Jackson at Winchester was the golden oppor-
"iinity for the Union army. In these veiws General
McDowell is unquestionably correct, and the fears of our
President and his Secretary dictated an order most calami
tous to the destiny of the campaign. Had McDowell
been permitted to make the movement which he had
planned, and which, with the full consent of the President
and his advisers, had been determined on, Jackson would
have passed up the Shenandoah more rapidly than he
dici when flzeing from the meshes which his antagonists
were throwing around him.^ He would have been too late,
however, to aid in the defence of Richmond. General
Fremont, also, with the 1 5000 men whom he brought with
him from Western Virginia, and with 10,000 more from
General Wadsworth's command, might have been speedily
sent after McDowell, and thus rendered our army about
Richmond all powerful for offensive or defensive operations.
All that could have been required for the protection of
"Washington under the circumstances would have been the
forces under General Banks located at Manassas, and what
would have remained under General Wadsworth in- and
alDOut the. city.
There is but one consideration which throws doubt over
the results of the dispositions under consideration, had
they been made in full, as we have indicated. This con
sideration is found in the palpably revealed character of

The spring campaign of the army of the potomac. ioi
General McClellan. Would he have consented to have
co-operated with General McDowell, the latter retaining a
separate command, even supposing his forces to have been
rendered 65,000 strong? Would he have moved at all,
and acted efficiently, had all these forces been placed under
his command ? We confess to candid and serious doubts
relatively to each of these questions. He had previously
sent on to Washington an absolute request that McDowell
should not be sent down at all unless he was placed under
his (McClellan's) entire command. Would he have co
operated with an independent auxiliary force imposed upon
him in opposition to such remonstrance ? Then what
act of his previous command presents the remotest indica
tion that, with the addition of 40,000 or even 60,006
men to his army, he would have acted at all against the
Confederates ? Palpable non-fidelity to absolute pledges
previously given annihilated all rational confidence in any
pledges he might give. When before Yorktown, for ex
ample, he sent an absolute pledge to Washington that If
Franklin's division should be sent to him it should be
promptly employed in a flank movement north of York
river. When that division did arrive, it was suffered
to lie two whole weeks in the transports at the mouth
of the river without doing anything at all. When
lying on the Chickahominy, he sent a similar promise
that as soon as General McCall's division should arrive
he would move upon Richmond. When that division
arrived, it was sent off to Mechanlcsville, and settled down
there as if for a year to come, and no intent to move as
promised was manifested. An addition of 40,000 .to his
army would raise his effective force to about 155,000 men,
and this with upwards of 200,000 in the army opposed
to him. Would he have acted against such imagined
odds ? The idea that he would have done so is rendered
absurd by all the facts of his previous military history.
But one deduction remains to us, to wit, any army,
however large, under such a commander as George B.
McClellan, is doomed ; and our military authorities ought
to have perceived this before he had remained three
months under their immediate observation. More of this
in another connexion.

I02 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
Statement of some immaterial and material facts.
When General McClellan was lying before Yorktown,
and we had looked over the distribution of our forces under
the separate commands of Generals McDowell, Banks, and
Fremont, we expressed the full conviction that the Con
federates would employ the leisure afforded them in
falling separately upon these isolated bodies, and that
the first effective blow would fall upon Banks. Hence,
our breathless inquiry on going down from the college to
the city was, " Have you heard from Banks ? Any news
from Banks? " When the blow predicted had fallen, and
Jackson had returned to the vicinity of Richmond, we
predicted that the im.mobility of McClellan and the sickly
state of his army would induce the Confederates to take
the initiative, and precipitate themselves upon our forces ;
and gave it as a positive opinion that their first blow
would fall upon McCall at Mechanlcsville. All the corps
of our army but that of General Porter had been trans
ferred to the south side of this stream ; and this single
corps, like those of Keyes and Heintzelman on the other
side, was distributed as if on purpose to be suddenly
assaulted and " gobbled up " by the enemy.
We now invite very special attention to some interest
ing facts, and to the explanation of the same facts, which
had a material bearing upon the calamitous events which
followed. It will be remembered that General Stuart,
with 1,500 cavalry, crossed the Chickahominy June 12-13,
and passed quite round our army north of this stream,
and after dispersing a body of 1 cavalry, burning two
schooners laden with forage, and fourteen waggons,
taking off 165 prisoners and 260 mules and horses,
recrossed the stream below our army, and returned in
safety ; and that the forces which moved out from Rich
mond crossed this stream, and having formed a junction
with Jackson coming from the west, fell unexpectedly to
our army upon McCall's division at Mechanlcsville. It
will also be remembered that one of our regiments of
cavalry, the Illinois 8th, was left, after the retreat of our
army to James river, in an isolated position up the
Chickahominy, and escaped capture by passing round the

THE SPRING CAMPAIGN OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. IO3
Confederates via Yorktown. It was between this body
of cavalry and our main army that Stuart, in the first
instance, and then Longstreet and his divisions, crossed
unopposed and unnoticed that stream. How did these
singular events occur ? Soon after McClellan arrived
upon the north side of this stream. General Stoneman
with a brigade of cavalry was stationed to our right up
this stream. After acquainting himself with the state
of things around him, he informed the General in supreme
command that if reinforced by a body of infantry, he
(General Stoneman) could not only accomplish what was
expected of him, but do much essential service for the
general cause. Instead of being reinforced as requested,
one regiment after another was taken from him, until he
was left alone with the one above referred to. In passing
down to make his reports. General Stoneman also noticed
that between him and the main army there was an in
terval of quite four miles, which was left wholly unguarded
in any form, no pickets even being there. Impressed
with the peril in which the right wing of our army was
left. General Stoneman urged at head-quarters that such
exposure be remedied. No notice whatever being taken
of his suggestions, he went to a division commander
whose forces lay so near that he could readily supply, and
urged him to supply the perilous deficiency. After re
peated solicitations to do so, this officer replied that if
General Stoneman would attend to his own duties, other
Generals would care for theirs. Thus matters were left
until, finally, Longstreet and Jackson's forces were united
against the single corps of General Porter, on the north
side of that stream, before our commanders were at all
aware of the presence of an enemy in that vicinity, the
forces under Longstreet passing through the unguarded
interval above referred to. We are indebted for the
above information to Rev. L. C. Matlack, chaplain of the
Illinois 8th Cavalry. Such fac s in connexion with the
early exposure of Keyes and Heintzelman on the south
side of this stream, palpably indicate the reckless care
lessness with which our affairs were managed under the
command of General McClellan.

I04 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
The seven day s^ fight, and the cowardly flight.
On the 26th June General McClellan awoke to a dis
tinct consciousness that the Confederate army was divided
into two parts, and located at a distance of more than
twenty miles from each other : the one part, as it turned
out, consisting of the divisions of Huger and Magruder,
lying between him and Richmond ; and the other, and by
far the greater and most important part, consisting of the
divisions of Jackson, Ewell, Longstreet, and the two Hills,
on the north of the Chickahominy, and about to fall with
crushing force upon General McCall and the single corps
of General Porter, — in all, about 27,000 strong. Now
was the golden opportunity for our " Young Napoleon."
The enemy was in the precise condition in which all wise
and energetic commanders desire to find antagonists.
Here lay our army, 115,000 strong, between the divided
parts of the enemy's forces, and one part, June 27th, in
inseparable collision with Porter's corps, and at but a few
miles from our main army, nearly 90,000 strong. Suppose
that, early in the morning, June 27th, two corps of our army
had been passed over to the north side of the Chicka
hominy with orders that as soon as the battle was fully
joined between the Confederates and General Porter, said
corps should participate themselves upon the enemy. The
certain result undeniably would have been the utter rout
and capture of this one part of the Confederate army.
The other part, and with it Richmond, would then have
been at our mercy. There is not a commander of ordi
nary capacity and energy on earth who would not, under
the circumstances, have promptly adopted the measures
above indicated. The stupid inactivity of McClellan
on that occasion is an exception in the history of war ;
an advantage being put into his hands, ' of which no
other General in the history of the world is known to have
neglected. Equally stupid and cowardly was his order for a flight
of his whole army on the next day. The battle of the
27th had revealed the fact that a force which had been
held at bay by less than 30,000 men for nearly a whole
day, a force exhausted by long marches and two days'

THE SPRING CAMPAIGN OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. IO5
fighting, and this with their ammunition nearly expended,
could have made no effective resistance to two of our army
corps sent over from the south side of this stream, and
falling upon the said forces on the morning of the 28th.
In such an arrangement. Porter's corps would have been
held as a reserve to aid the two on each side of the
stream, as exigencies might have required. Suppose that
while the annihilation of the divisions of Jackson, Ewell,
Longstreet, and the Hills was being perfected, the two
corps south of the Chickahominy had been attacked from
Richmond, and even compelled to retreat over that steam,
— preparations for such an event having been previously
made. Our army, flushed with victory, would have been
prepared to recross the stream and plant our flag on the
Confederate capital at Richmond. The spectacle is horri
ble as it is humiliating, the spectacle of a great army
nearly go,ooo strong standing idly by while 9,000 out of
27,000 — the number stated by General Porter In our hear
ing in his defence before the court marshal — while 9,000
of their brave associates were being ruthlessly slaughtered.
Still more humiliating is the spectacle which facts present,
after the withdrawal of all our forces to the south side of
the Chickahominy, and breaking down all the bridges
across the stream, — the spectacle of upwards of 100,000
men retreating with all precipitation from the presence of
25,000; the only force which, according to the highest
Confederate authority, lay between the former and Rich
mond. " Had McClellan," says General Magruder,
" massed his whole force in column, and advanced it
against any point of our line of battle, as was done at
Austerlitz under similar circumstances by the greatest
captain of any age, though the head of his column would
have suffered greatly, its momentum would have insured
him success, and the occupation of our works about Rich
mond ; and consequently the city might have been his
reward. His failure to do so is the best evidence that
our wise commander fully understood the character of his
opponent." The entire movements of the Confederates
in the case under consideration are characterized by
infinite folly and presumption, but upon the condition that
they were made against a General known to possess the

I06 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
precise characteristics which peculiarise General McClellan.
In this case, those dispositions evince the highest wisdom.
It does not fall in with the plan of this treatise to detail
the facts of that retreat from the Chickahominy to Harri
son's Landing, with the various battles on the way; battles
in which our forces were invariably victorious, and as in
variably made a precipitate retreat before a defeated foe ;
battles in every one of which the smallness of the Con
federate army was made undeniably manifest, and the
illusion of the immensity of the forces opposed to us
passed from before every eye but that of Gen. McClellan.
As far as he is concerned, we have no evidence but one
form, hereafter to be presented, that he is not yet under
the vivid • impression that the Confederates in his front
were always at least 115,000 strong when he was in com
mand at "Washington, and that their army had swelled to
200,000 when he arrived at the Chickahominy. Such was
his conduct during the retreat under consideration that
such a General as the brave Kearny openly affirmed that
the army of the Potomac was controlled by cowardice or
treason. It induces heart-sickness to call to mind the
amount and the uselessness of the slaughter of our brave
men during those memorable seven days. About the 20th
June General McClellan reported 115,102 as present for
duty. After his whole remaining force was collected at
Harrison's Bar, he reported, as " present for duty," 88,665
men, — making a difference of 26,437 '
Causes of the failure of this campaign.
That this campaign was a total and disastrous failure
no one doubts. But two causes have ever been assigned
for that failure — the failure of the Administration to grant
the promised reinforcements, on the one hand ; and the
indecision and incapacity of the General in command,
on the other. In respect to these causes we invite here
special attention to the following facts and considerations.
I. No person can show, and no one pretends, not even
General McClellan himself, to furnish, evidence that the
Administration ever promised to send him a single soldier
more than he actually took with him when he left Washing
ton for the Peninsula. The army of the Potomac was

THE SPRING CAMPAIGN OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. IO7
before him, and he was told, before he started on his
expedition, just how many men he could take with him,
and how many must be left behind for the defence of
Washington ; and there was no intimation given him that
any of the reserved forces should afterwards be sent to
him. Nor did General McClellan furnish any new informa
tion of the strength of the Confederates, information
rendering necessary the sending forward of additional
fordes drawn from those reserved. Generals Burnside and
Butler had each a known and specific amount of force put
under their command when they sailed on their respective
expeditions. In case of failure, either or both of them
might as properly have charged their failure to infidelity
in respect to promised support, as General McClellan.
When he knew what forces he could take with him, and the
amount he must leave behind, then was the time, and the
only time, for him to make his election between going for
ward or turning back, and giving the .direction to the
campaign which the Administration had previously advised
and still, as he well knew, preferred. In choosing to go
forward, and to do so with the forces entrusted to his
command, he assumed, for himself alone, the responsibility
of results, and deserves the deep reprobation of the nation
for charging the disgraceful failure of his expedition to
infidelity to its pledges on the part of the Administration,
when that failure had but one cause, a criminal neglect
on the part of the General in command to employ the
forces committed to his care as he had in a special order
promised the army, the Administration, and the nation
that he would do.
2. The Administration ' actually furnished General
McClellan more men than he asked for before he left
Washington. All that he asked or planned for, in addition
to what he did take, were Blenker's division and the corps
of General McDowell. Had all these been furnished him,
his army, at the utmost, would not have amounted to over
160,000 men. According to an official report, made June
26th, the aggregate of his army consisted of 156,838. Add
to this sum all that had died of disease, all that had been
killed in battle, and all that had been taken prisoners, and
no candid mind will estimate the forces furnished General

I08 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
McClellan at less than from 175,000 to 180,000 men.
The infidelity of the Administration to its promises is
manifest in this, that it had furnished this man more than
60,000 men over and above all it had ever pledged him, and
about 20,000 more than he asked when he started on his
campaign. A General that under such circumstances will
endeavour to excuse his own inexplicable and criminal
inactivity by a graceless endeavour to fasten upon the
Administration which had committed to him the most
important and honourable of all its trusts the charge of
infidelity to its sacred pledges, we confess that we hold in
very low esteem.
3. Had General McDowell been finally sent down as
intended (his only excuse for not acting at that time).
General McClellan's relative strength against the Con
federates would not have been as great as it was when he
first arrived on the Chickahominy, and his actual effective
force would have been less than it was before his army had
been diminished more than one-third by sickness and death.
Had McDowell come down as intended, the effective force
under General McClellan would have been about 155,000
strong. When he arrived on the Chickahominy, he had
under his immediate command upwards of 125,000 men,
with 10,000 more within calling distance from the com
mands of Wool and Burnside. During the interval be
tween the period last designated and that in which
McDowell was expected, the Confederate army had un
deniably been, from all sources, reinforced by more than
30,000 men. Granting, then, that McDowell had come
down, the relative strength of our army would have
been less than it actually was when it first came into the
presence of the enemy.
Another important fact here presents itself. By this
stupid and criminal inactivity nearly or quite as many
men were lost to our army by sickness and death as could
have been made up to it by the addition of McDowell's
corps and the 15,000 whom Fremont brought down from
the mountain department. On the 20th June, 41,763, a
few excepted under arrest and on special duty, were in the
hospitals, or absent almost or quite exclusively on account
of sickness. Of those who had been brought down by

THE SPRING CAMPAIGN OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. IO9
sickness in those swamps, with little but swamp water to
drink, it is safe to affirm that one in four had died. It is
perfectly safe to affirm, therefore, that while lying before
Yorktown, and on the Chickahominy, the effective force of
bur army had been diminished by the loss of upwards of
50,000 men. Our only son, who was there as a First Lieu
tenant, assured us that hardly one in three in that army who
were reported as present for duty were, in reality, fit for any
hard service. He himself, on the morning of the battle of
Gaine's Mill, arose from a sick bed, and, contrary to the
absolute prohibition of his physicians, went with his com
pany into the scene of. carnage. There he stood with his
men during that day, until all his fellow officers, and 40
out of 56 of his men, were dead or disabled around him.
As soon, after the order to retreat was given, as he had
led those i6 survivors beyond the enemy's fire, the strength
of the brave boy gave way, and he fell helpless upon the
ground. He was saved from capture by the kindness of
his Major, who placed upon his own horse his helpless asso
ciate. Eternal thanks for that act to that benefactor I To
return from this digression. W^e would here say that we
regard with unspeakable reprobation the conduct of a
General who will compel his army to remain idle for more
than two months in a condition when it was, and could not
hut be, far more diminished by disease than by two general
battles. Here we find, and not in the infidelity of the
Administration, the real cause of the disastrous failure of
this campaign, as far as the want of men is concerned.
Take one other item, as illustrative of the above statements.
On the 20th July, such had been General McClellan's re
inforcements, his army numbered in the aggregate, accord
ing to the returns in the Adjutant-General's office, 158,314
men. Of these, including the few on special duty and
under arrest, 46,623 — more than one-third of the whole —
were, in hospital, or absent almost exclusively from sickness.
Is it not just to charge the Administration with grave faults
for not putting more men under the command of such a
General ?
4. If there was any failure on the part of the Adminis
tration, as we have seen that there was not, in sending
reinforcements to General McClellan, he alone, by his

no THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
fabulous representations of the number of men in the Con
federate army, is responsible for that failure. The lowest
estimate, as we have seen, which he ever put upon the
amount of forces confronting him at Washington was
115,000 men. The forces which confronted him before
Richmond he uniformly estimated as 200,000 strong. This
was the estimate submitted to the President by McClellan
and his Generals when the President visited the army at
Harrison's Bar. Now the preservation of Washington was
a matter of far greater importance to the nation than the
capture of Richmond. In view of the data furnished by
McClellan himself, and these were- the only data for the
Administration to act upon, the wonder is, not that so few,
but that so many reinforcements were sent to the army of
the Potomac. "Why, the question is often asked, was not
McDowell sent down, after the retreat of Jackson down the
Shenandoah ? If there was an army 200,000 strong before
Richmond, every prudent military man would have con
cluded that Jackson's raid was made by the advanced body
of an army of 100,000 men, that he had merely fallen back
upon the m.ain body, and would soon be back again in full
force for the capture of the national capital. To send
McDowell away under the circumstances would have been
most presumptuous. The perpetual cry of McClellan for
more men looks far more like a deliberate intent to uncover
Washington to the Confederates, than the call of a prudent
commander for what should have been granted.
To understand rightly this whole subject, we need to
ponder carefully here the question whether General
McClellan did, in reality, credit his own avowed estimates
of the number of men in the Confederate armies. To
suppose him sincere in those estimates, I, for one, am
compelled to regard him as one of the most stupid Generals
that ever commanded an army ; palpable facts which were
constantly presenting themselves always demonstrating
the real number to be less by one half, at least, than the
estimated one. Now facts quite significant pretty clearly
indicate that he had one estimate for the Administration
and the public, and quite another and different one for
his own private use. On the 8th March, for example, he
gave a formal estimate of the Confederate forces in his

THE SPRING CAMPAIGN OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. I I I
front as consisting of 115,000 men. According to
General Barnard's pamphlet on the Peninsula Campaign,
in the council of war held six days previous to this date
General McClellan located, " in the language of Victor,
vol. iii., page 48, the enemy's force with such precision as
to prove himself to have been in possession of full informa
tion of the enemy's disposition and strength. In that
exhibit he figures 50,500 men as the utmost aggregate of
the troops in his front." When at Harrison's Bar, for ex
ample, he proposed to move directly upon Richmond,
provided he could be reinforced by 20,000 men ; the Con
federate forces there being, at the same time, estimated by
him to have been 200,000 strong. Would he, assuming
him not to have been demented, have seriously entertained
the idea of moving with 120,000 men against an army
really estimated as 200,000 strong, and such an army
behind most formidable entrenchments, and commanded by
such a General as Lee ?
5. But one real cause can be rationally assigned for the
failure of this campaign — the unaccountable indecision of
its General in command. No man had ever before been
placed over such an army as that of the Potomac, and
no General ever had more golden opportunities to cover
himself and army with immortal honour, than General
McClellan ; yet whenever such opportunity presented it
self, he was not ready to avail himself of it. In every
exigency his army was too small, and that of the enemy
too large for him to risk a battle. His mental state,
when such opportunities occurred, is well illustrated by
that of a certain hunter the first time he stood in the
presence of a deer. The man had in his hands a splen
did rifle, and there stood a splendid buck in open day
light, but a few rods away, and with his broadside fully
confronting his antagonist. As soon as the hunter saw
the majestic animal, however, he began to soliloquise
thus with himself: "Oh, my good fellow, if I only had
a gun now, would I not send a blue pill through your
sides, about the quickest? I tell you, if I only had a
gun, how soon would I bring down that deer! " Well,
the animal standing until his patience was quite exhausted,
" took up its legs " and moved off, leaving the hunter to find

I I 2 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
his gun as best he could. So with General McClellan.
When before Washington with 200,000 brave men around
him, and an enemy well known to him to be not more
than 50,500 strong, he was, as he felt, without an army.
He must have at least 240,000 before he could safely
advance. When before Yorktown with more than 100,000
men, and but 1 1,000 In his front, he could not turn the posi
tion by a flank movement. He had not an army with which
to make the movement. If McDowell could be sent down,
at least Franklin's division, then he should " have a gun,"
and all would go right. As soon as Franklin did arrive,
however, our veteran commander again forgot that he "had
a gun," and all was qtiiet before Yorktown until the enemy
chose to retire. The same farce was repeated before
Williamsburg and on the Chickahominy. If McCall's
division should come down, he would act. As soon as
McCall had arrived, however, he forgot again that he had
an army, and called for McDowell. When about to take
final leave of the Chickahominy, he sent this querulous
message to the President : — "Had I 20,000, or even 10,000,
fresh troops to use to-morrow, I could take Richmond ; but
I have not a man in reserve, and shall be glad to cover my
retreat and save the material and personnel oi the army."
When he sent this he was encircled with more than
100,000 men, not one-third of whom had been in battle for
a long time ; and the enemy was less than 50,000 strong
in his rear, and wearied out at that, and not over 25,000
strong in his front. Yes, General McClellan, when the
occasion presented itself, you always forgot that you " had
a gun," and this was the sole cause of the sad failure of
your great campaign.

CHAPTER VL
GENERAL HALLECK'S MEASURES AND CAMPAIGN
IN MISSOURI.
On the 1 2th November General Halleck assumed com
mand in the Western Department ; General Buell about
the same time assuming command in Kentucky. But for
the absolute order of the President requiring our armies
to make a positive advance by the 22nd February, 1862, we
have, from what was actually done, no good reason to
suppose that had McClellan, Halleck, and Buell been con
tinued undisturbed in their respective commands, and had
the war been thus protracted, all would not have remained,
even unto this day, " quiet on the Potomac," quiet in
Kentucky, quiet in Missouri, and all the West. That
either of these men seriously intended, without absolute
compulsion from their superior in command, to move against
the enemy, cannot be shown from any of their acts. In
Missouri, after Hunter, with more than 40,000 men, had^
fled from the presence of Price, who had been retreating
before General Fremont, and had in command an army
less than 30,000 strong. Price was allowed to re-take and
hold quiet possession of all South-western and Central Mis
souri, to re-occupy Lexington, burn Warsaw, and to break
up nearly 100 miles of railroad in the southern part of the
State, and to perpetrate untold barbarities on the defence
less Union citizens in all the territory referred to. In
addition to all this, the spirit of rebellion instigated by the
presence of Price in the State became so general that
martial law had to be declared even in St. Louis ; and the
burning of bridges, breaking up of railroads, and destruc
tion of property, became so general that an order was
8

114 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
issued by General Halleck to shoot any individual found
engaged in such outrages. Yet, while Price was allowed
to remain for long months in undisturbed possession of
the territory of which he had repossessed himself, the
available forces under General Halleck outnumbered those
under General Price as three to one at least, and the
former had merely to lead an army 40,000 strong, from
Rolla, or on the track pursued by General Fremont, to
Springfield, to free the State totally from all Confederate
armies and disturbances, as previous and subsequent
events absolutely verify. Yet, as these long months
dragged their slow lengths along, not a movement was
made, or projected even, to disturb the Confederate com
mander ; while he was recruiting and sustaining his army,
and, through his subordinates, soldiery, and adherents,
perpetrating untold outrages upon men, women, and chil
dren, for the exclusive reason that they were Unionists.
Similar was the aspect of affairs in Kentucky. " About
th(; middle of September," says Mr. Pollard, " General
Buckner, with a small force of about 4,000 men, which
was increased the 15th October to 12,000, entered Ken
tucky. The enemy's force then," he adds, "was re
ported at the War Department at 50,000." Of the truth
of these statements no one doubts. Forces less numerous,
as we have before stated, advanced into Eastern and
Western Kentucky ; their entire force on all this line, of
nearly 300 miles in extent, always falling below 40,000
men. Yet these small forces made themselves to appear
to our Generals in command as most formidable hosts.
General Sherman, who commanded in this State from the
early part of October until the arrival of General Buell,
assured the Secretary of War and General Thomas, when
they visited him on the i8th of this month, that "it
would require 200,000 men to recover and hold Kentucky."
General Buell acted upon the truth of this estimate after
his arrival, and, consequently, let the Confederates hold
quiet possession of the vast territory which they had taken
possession of. Hence it was that an army 660,000
strong lay listlessly idle in the immediate proximity of the
enemy, lay listlessly idle during all these fall and early
winter months, and this while our forces everywhere out-

GENERAL HALLECk's CAMPAIGN IN MISSOURI. 1 15
numbered the Confederates more than two to one. A true
patriot, pained, as he must be, when his country is dis
honoured, and afflicted in all her afflictions, is at a loss to
determine which sentiment should predominate, contempt
or reprobation, at such stolid immobility of Generals who
have been entrusted with resources more than ample for
the accomplishment of all that was expected and required
of them. What a humiliating fact it is that the aggregate
of all the forces which, during all these long months, con
fronted McClellan, Buell, and Halleck, and kept at bay an
army upwards of 600,000 strong, did not amount in all to
120,000 men.

AGGRESSIVE MOVEMENTS IN MISSOURI.
After " the stagnant idleness " of our great armies
had rendered the national heart sick with the pains of
"hope deferred," a ripple upon the dead-level surface of
events in Missouri excited universal attention. On the
7th December General Pope was put in command of all
the national troops between the Missouri and Osage rivers.
At this time General Price was coming up from the south,
and 5,000 volunteers were advancing from the northern
parts of the State to join him. General Pope's first object
was to prevent the junction of these converging forces.
In his command he found a considerable portion of Fre
mont's forces, which had fallen back from Springfield.
Uniting with these such other forces as he had in hand,
General Pope swept in between the bodies referred to, and
at Blackwater and other places put to flight all resisting
Confederate forces, captured upwards of 1,500 prisoners,
and large quantities of arms and supplies, prevented the
junction of Price with his expected reinforcements, occa
sioned the dispersion of the latter, and Price's retreat
south. In this raid the Union infantry marched more
than 100 miles, and the cavalry twice as far, in five
days. Such energetic action, with its marked results,
occurring, as it did, amid the general stagnation of military
affairs, secured for General Pope a very high position in
national regard.
As the time drew near when the order of the President

Il6 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
rendered further inaction criminal. General Halleck, about
the middle of February, collected at Lebanon, north-west
of Springfield, an army composed of four divisions, com
manded respectively by Generals Asboth, Siegel, Davis, and
Prentiss, all commanded by General S. R. Curtis. As Curtis
advanced. Price fled before him, until, passing through
Springfield and over the Arkansas line, he left Missouri
to its fate. These facts clearly evince what would have
occurred had Fremont, in the early part of November 1861,
been permitted to pursue Price as Curtis pursued him in
the middle of February 1862; and what would have
occurred in two weeks after Halleck assumed command in
Missouri, had he promptly recombined Fremont's forces,
and did what Curtis afterwards performed, and that with an
army no larger than that which Fremont led to Springfield.
In pursuing Price over the line into Arkansas, General
Curtis at length found himself, March 3rd, in the presence
of forces much larger than his own, forces commanded by
General Van Dorn, who outranked General Price. Find
ing himself in command of forces outnumbering those of
General Curtis nearly as two to one. General Van Dorn
assumed the offensive, and in successive conflicts of three
days' continuance fought the memorable battle of Pea
Ridge. In his advance he first struck at General Siegel,
who was holding Bentonville, some eight to ten miles from
General Curtis's centre near Mattsville, on the road from
Fayetteville to Springfield. The retreat of Siegel, sustained
by his unconquerable Germans, constitutes one of the most
signal events of the war. Assaulted by overwhelming odds,
the dauntless German, sending his train ahead under escort,
would make a stand on a favourable position, and send a
tempest of grape and shell and bullets into the pursuing
masses, until they would recoil in disorder. Then he would
limber up and advance to the next position, where the first
scene would be repeated. So he continued from morning
until near 4 p.m., when he was reinforced by General Curtis,
and rested for the night.
G;eneral Curtis, as the night drew on, perfected his dis
positions for the conflict, which was certain to commence
the next morning, his position being on an elevated plateau,
cut by ravines, and cocupying a bend of a stream called

GENERAL HALLECK S CAMPAIGN IN MISSOURI. II7
Sugar Creek. On awaking in the morning, however, he
found the enemy, not in his front, as he expected, but
practically in his rear, and holding all his communications.
Promptly changing from front to rear, he fell upon the
Confederates before they had time to perfect their disposi
tions. The battle, which continued with terrible fury
during the day, resulted with no ithportant advantage on
either side, the lines of the enemy being somewhat ad
vanced beyond where they were in the morning. All their
forces, however, had been engaged, while one-third of ours
had not come up. The next morning all our army was
on the ground, and the fire, particularly of the artillery,
was such that Van Dorn soon drew off his forces, and
retreated in the direction of portions of the country not
exhausted by his previous advance ; and General Curtis
returned to Missouri. Our entire loss was 1,351 ; 701 from
the single division of General Carr, the division which bore
the brunt of the entire battle of the first day. While the
Confederate loss must have been as numerous as ours, it
was greatly enhanced by the death of Generals McCulloch
and Mcintosh, Generals Price and Slack also being among
the wounded. After his return to Missouri, General Curtis,
'largely reinforced, returned to Arkansas, took a zigzag
route through the State, and finally brought up, nearly
30,000 strong, at Helena on the Mississippi,, Such ex
peditions in Arkansas, and elsewhere, expeditions which
characterised the conduct of this war, we do not give in
detail, because they were useless in themselves, and had
no bearing upon any of the main issues.

CHAPTER VII.
GENERAL PLAN OF THE UNION AND CONFEDE
RATE AUTHORITIES FOR THE CONDUCT OF
THE WAR.
The immutable condition of understanding a campaign
is a comprehension of the idea in which the plan of the
campaign had its origin. The aim of the Confederate
authorities was to protect their territory against the,
invasions of the Unionists. The aim of the Union au
thorities was to restore the unity of all our States by sup
pressing the Rebellion In the States which constituted the
Confederacy. In respect to the end proposed, each party
had its idea in regard to the plan by which that end
should be accomplished. We have now arrived at a stage
in our discussions where we can understand and appreciate
the original plan of the Confederate, on the one hand, and
that of Union authorities on the other. To a consider
ation of these plans, their merits and demerits included,
very special attention is invited.
Original plan of the Confederates.
The original plan of the Confederates is quite manifest,
and may be very readily comprehended. It was to make
the border slave States, such as Maryland, Northern and
Western Virginia, Kentucky, Northern Arkansas, and
Missouri, the battle-ground of the war. The fundamental
element of the original idea was the capture of Washing
ton, and making it the centre of operations east of the
Alleghanies. Failing in this, their plan was to keep all
military operations as far north and west of Richmond is
possible. The original plan in regard to Washington as
manifest in the early attempts of the Confederates, and in

general plan for the conduct of THE WAR. I ig
the successive invasions of Pennsylvania and Maryland by
General Lee. In view of the above suggestions, we can
understand the principles on which the invasion of Kentucky
was made, together with the movements of General Price
and his associates in Arkansas and Missouri. This plan had
but two features worthy of commendation — the rendering
the army of General Lee the central force of the Confede
racy, and the securing the command of the Cumber
land, Tennessee, and Mississippi rivers, by means of the
fortifications of Donelson, Henry, Columbus, and Island
No. lo. Had the army which invaded Kentucky expended
all its strength in rendering Cumberland Gap Impassable
to our armies, and thus secured Eastern Tennessee from
invasion, and in rendering Forts Donelson and Henry
and the other fortifications impregnable, most essential
service would have been done to the Confederate cause
As it was, that invasion turned out to be a great calamity
to that cause. The entire Confederate plan was, in such
particulars as the following, fundamentally defective.
Fundamental defects in the Confederate plan.
I. It rendered their line so extended that it could not
but have been weak at every point, and strong nowhere,
and thus always liable to be broken at essential points,
leaving their armies to be destroyed in detail. Think of
an army broken up into parts, and those parts located at
unsupporting distances on a line extending from the sea
board, through Virginia, Kentucky, Northern Arkansas,
and "Western Missouri as far north as the Missouri river ;
and think of such dispositions made as the best means
of defending the Confederacy from the invasions of the
\jnIon armies. Had it been the object of the Confederate
authorities to have ensured the collapse of the Rebellion at
the earliest period possible, they could not have adopted
a plan better adapted to this end than the one under con
sideration. 2. This plan located the main Confederate forces at
the greatest distances from their own proper centres, and
brought them into immediate proximity to the Union
armies, which always outnumbered their antagonists as
two to one at least. Thus, wnen on a line so extended

I20 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
that they could be strong nowhere, the Confederates were
always exposed to be broken up, and destroyed in detail,
by the least possible efforts on the part of the Union forces,
on the simple condition that our armies were skilfully and
energetically employed.
3. In respect to life and treasure, this plan was the
most expensive, for the conduct of the war, that could
have been adopted by the Confederate authorities. For
the reasons here indicated, armies should always be kept as
near as possible to their bases of supply. The Confede
rates, in the worst form conceivable, reversed this principle,
and that to the fatal injury of their cause. The defects
of this plan are too palpable to require further elucidation.
The plan which the Confederates should have adopted.
The plan which the Confederate authorities should
have adopted, the one the like of which they would have
adopted had the highest wisdom determined their counsels,
may be stated in few words. It embraces, among others,
the following elements : —
I. Having rendered their seaboard at most essential
points perfectly secure, points such as Willmington,
Charlestown, Savannah, and New Orleans, they should
have rendered their fortresses at Donelson, Henry,
Columbus, Island No. 10, and other points on the Cum
berland, Tennessee, and Mississippi, as nearly impregnable
as possible ; rendering by such means their exterior and
interior secure from invasion by means of water communi
cations. 2. In the interior, they should have fortified but a very
few, and these fundamental strategic, points, such as
Richmond, Nashville, Chattanooga, and Knoxville; and
these should have been most strongly fortified, the
fortified posts being permanently occupied by as few
men as possible, forces always being in readiness to be
thrown into any one of them, as exigencies might require.
3. With the exceptions indicated, the entire military
power of the Confederacy should have been combined into
two central, and ever movable, armies; the one located in
Virginia, covering Richmond, and the other in Tennessee,
in the vicinity of Nashville. Both of these armies should

GENERAL PLAN FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR. 121
have been rendered exceeding strong in field artillery,
and overpoweringly so in cavalry.
4. In every advance of the Union armies, the object
should haye been to have drawn them as far as possible
into the interior, and away from their own proper centres
and bases of supply. While their advance should have
been embarrassed by every possible means, in breaking up
of roads, breaking down of bridges, etc., and while resist
ance should have been offered at every favourable point,
and decisive battles fought but when and where success was
most probable, the cavalry' should have been omnipresent
in front, on the flanks, and in the rear of the invading
force, capturing stragglers, cutting off supplies, and break
ing up communications.
5. At a point selected and proposed beforehand, and
at which all possible forces had been collected, a general
battle should have been fought, and that under circum
stances in which a defeat of the invading army would
have ensured its destruction.
Had the war been carried on upon such principles by
the Confederacy, the Union armies being guided by such
blank stupidity as did command them, 1 do not see how
the union of the States ever could have been restored.
The plan of the Union authorities.
The plan of the Union authorities, as far as they had
any, may now be stated in few words. It embraced,
among others, the following items: —
I. That the enemy should be everywhere confronted
by superior forces, and ori a line parallel to, and co-exten
sive with, his own. As the Confederate main line extended
from the seaboard through Virginia, east and west,
through Kentucky, Northern Arkansas, and Missouri, as
above stated, our forces were to confront theirs over a
line of corresponding length.
^ 2. Our advance upon the enemy was to be simultaneous
on this whole line. This evidently was the plan agreed
upon by Generals McClellan, Buell, and Halleck, prior to
their assumption of their respective commands. Hence
" all jvas quiet on the Potomac," and on the whole line,
because the time for concerted action had not arrived.

122 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
The 22nd February, for the reason that it was Washington's
birthday, was fixed upon by the President for the grand
and simultaneous advance. This idea of a simultaneous
advance on a line of immense extent obtained with the
Union authorities throughout the war. After General
Grant, for example, assumed supreme command, it was,
as we shall see hereafter, agreed in a council of war that
all our armies should rest during the winter, and on the
opening of spring should, on a line some 1,500 miles
in extent, move simultaneously upon the enemy. As our
line was to be longer than that of the Confederates, our
forces were to draw round theirs and crush them all to
gether. This was the "Anaconda Idea" of which so
much was everywhere said during the first years of the
war, and which had its origin with General Scott.
3. Another element of this plan, the only additional
feature of it to which we now refer, was that as far and
as fast as the enemy was driven back, the territory ac
quired should be permanently occupied by our armies,
and this with such forces as to render future insurrections
and invasions impossible. Hence it was that after we
had redeemed Missouri and Kentucky, and taken posses
sion of Tennessee and portions of Louisiana, Virginia
east and west, the Carolinas, and Florida, quite two-thirds
of the 1 ,000,000 of men we had in the field were employed
in doing nothing else than guarding the immense extent
of territory referred to.
Essential defects in this plan.
No plan conceivable Is more utterly defective than that
above indicated. One of the best known principles of
weakness in war is operation upon a widely extended line ;
while the known condition of strength Is concentration of
force so as, in the language of Napoleon, " to be the
strongest at the essential point." An army 100,000 strong
distributed on a line like that occupied by the Confederates
in Kentucky and Northern Tennessee, would be readily
?routed by a concentrated and ably commanded force of
one-half their number. Nothing, also, can be more absurd
than the Idea of a simultaneous advance of half a mill'on
or a million of men on a line more than a thousand miles

GENERAL PLAN FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR. 1 23
in extent, and especially to determine the time of such
movement by the day on which some celebrated man
happened to have been born. The time and the form of
army movements should always be determined, as all
strategists well understand, by the circumstances of each
particular case. Circumstances may present themselves
absolutely demanding the prompt movement of one army
upon an enemy, and as absolutely require another army,
500 or 1,000 miles distant, to defer, for a time, any such
movement. The "Anaconda Idea" has place in regard
to single armies, and only thus In cases where a vast army
moves upon a far inferior one. Nothing is more absurd,
however, than the idea of drawing an army round half a
continent, and after driving the enemy in upon a common
centre, to crush them there. It was one thing, for example,
for Napoleon to draw his army around that of General
Mack, and coop it up and capture it in Ulm. It would
have been quite a different affair had he attempted In a
similar manner to encircle the whole kingdom of Prussia,
and coop up and crush all its armies at once. When
General Scott would make a circle with his hand, thumb, and
fingers, and add, " Thus let us encircle the Confederates,
and then crush them," suddenly clenching his fist to illus
trate the idea, he seemed to those who did not duly con
sider the facts to have announced a very sublime and
practicable conception. Yet, as we stated in the paper read
before President Lincoln, our anaconda, when stretched
around the whole Confederacy, would be found to be a
miserable tapeworm, that would be broken into a thou
sand fragments the first wrench it should make. It was
(thus that, from beginning to end, the conduct of this war
was under the control of a totally false idea. Extension of
line on the part of an invading army has all the elements
of weakness and exposure to defeat, by breaking the line
and destroying the dissevered parts in detail, that a similar
line has for defensive operations. Nor is it possible to
conceive of a worse policy in war than that which obtains
when armies are divided and scattered for the occupancy
of acquired territory, while the main armies of the enemy
are in the field. It was for this reason mainly that we
were necessitated to bring into the field at least 2,500,000

124 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
men to put down this Rebellion ; whereas an able General
would have accomplished this end in less than one-third
the time which we spent in doing it, and with one-fifth of
the forces which we employed.
The plan which should have been adopted by our military
authorities.
We are now prepared to indicate distinctly the essen
tial elements of the plan for the conduct of the war, the
plan which the highest wisdom required that bur military
authorities should have adopted. War, in all its forms,
is, in reality, a conflict of military forces, and always ends
when the military force of one enemy succumbs to that of
the other. Hence a wise General contemplates and deter
mines all dispositions and movements as a means to one
exclusive end — the destruction of the military power of his
opponent. Fortresses are besieged or passed by, and
territory is occupied or not, with exclusive reference to
this one end. The Germans, for example, stopped with a
great force to besiege Metz, because the central army of
France was within those fortifications. Had the French
escaped, as they intended to have done, but a very few, if
any, men would have been left behind by the invaders to
besiege the place. The Crown Prince moved away from
Paris when the city lay at his mercy, because the second
army of France was concentrated at Sedan. With every
wise commander, the locality of the main army of the
enemy is his centre. Such commander, also, always
distinguishes between what may be called the main and
the mere «(afe issues of war. With Wellington and Blucher,
for example, the main issue of their campaign, as they well
and wisely understood, lay, not at Waver, but at Waterloo.
Hence, but very few forces were left at the former place,
while all their main ones were concentrated at the latter.
Nothing is more unwise than the idea that wherever any
forces of the enemy may happen to be located, there he
must be sought out and assaulted.
Had either of our Commanders-in-Chief been a great
strategist, he would have perceived at once that the soul
and strength of the Confederacy lay, not in its seaports
or inland fortified places, but in its armies, and that the

GENERAL PLAN FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR. 1 25
end of all his dispositions and movements should be, not
the capture of Willmington, Charlestown, Savannah, Rich
mond, Vicksburg, Corinth, Chattanooga, or Atlanta, not to
take or hold territory, but to crush out the military power
of the said Confederacy. He would also have perceived.
with equal distinctness, that that war had but two main or
central issues — the main army commanded by General
Lee, the army the mission of which was to defend Virginia
and the Carolinas, on the one hand ; and the army com
manded by General Johnston and his predecessors, the
army whose mission was to defend the Confederate States
lying between the Savannah and the Mississippi rivers, on
the other. Hence he would have made no raids into
North Carolina, Florida, the interior of Louisiana, Texas,
and Arkansas. All his forces, on the other hand, would
have been mainly centralized into two great armies for the
crushing out of the two Confederate armies referred to.
Under such a commander, furnished with an army 500,000
strong, the war would not have continued six months after
our forces were put into the field, inasmuch as the entire
Confederacy would have collapsed at once as soon as
these two armies were destroyed. In the conceptions of
our Commanders-in-Chief, the power of the Confederacy
lay, not in its armies, but in Richmond, Willmington,
Charlestown, Savannah, Vicksburg, Corinth, Chattanooga,
Atlanta, and in its vast territories ; and that their great
mission was to capture these places, and take piecemeal
and hold the Confederate territory. Hence the long con
tinuance of this war, and the unexampled expenditure of
life and treasure in bringing it to a close.

CHAPTER VIIL
THE CAMPAIGN IN KENTUCKY, AND EVENTS
WHICH FOLLOWED.
Defeat of Marshall and Crittenden in Eastern Kentucky.
In the early part of the year 1862 some events occurred in
Eastern Kentucky which deserve a passing notice. Colonel
Garfield, with two regiments of infantry and a squadron of
cavalry, assaulted Humphrey Marshall near Prestonburg,
Floyd county, and put to flight the General and his force,
2,500 strong, driving them into Virginia, where Marshall
dropped into a long oblivion. About the same time,
January 17th, General Thomas, at Mill Spring, in Wayne
county, was attacked by greatly superior Confederate
forces commanded by General Crittenden. After a terrible
resistance, Crittenden's forces were totally routed, and on the
following night escaped capture by crossing the Cumber
land, leaving behind them, in addition to two previously
abandoned, ten guns, with caissons and many small arms,
nearly 1,500 horses and mules, with tents, blankets, and all
the material of their army. Our loss was 39 killed and
207 wounded. The Confederates lost 192 killed, 62
wounded, and 89 unhurt prisoners, aside from the many
wounded which they carried from the field. General ZoUi-
coffer, shot by Colonel Fry, was left dead upon the field.
The conduct of this battle marked out General Thomas
as one of the best Generals in our army; and its results
were the disappearance of the Confederates from Eastern
Kentucky, and the full preparation for the opening of the
campaign in the middle and western part of the State.
The campaign in Middle and Eastern Kentucky, and in
the States farther south.
We have already referred to the occupancy on the part

THE CAMPAIGN IN KENTUCKY. 1 27
of the Confederates of Bowling Green, Forts Donelson and
Henry, Columbus, and Island No. lo. These constituted
the Confederate line after their discomfiture In Eastern
Kentucky. No campaign was ever better planned than
was that of the Union commanders for breaking this line,
and putting the enemy to rout. The plan embraced
these simple elements : first of all, to capture the two
central positions at Donelson and Henry, and then to
strike, on the right or left, at the enemy in Bowling Green
and Columbus, as occasion might require. The opening
of the campaign was entrusted to General Grant, in com
mand of the land forces, amounting to about 30,000 men,
and to the ironclad fleet, got in readiness at the close of
January 1862, and commanded by Commodore A. H.
Foote, of whom Mr. Prentiss truly said that " in all this
nation there is no better soul than the soul of our
Foote." We stop here for a moment to answer the inquiry as to
the originator of this plan. That the nation owes the fleet
which did so much service to the Union cause to General
¦ Fremont, no one doubts. Two considerations render it
evident that to him, also, the nation is indebted for the
original idea of the plans under consideration. In the
first place, in a communication dated September 8th, 1861,
and addressed to the President, General Fremont gave in
detail the substance of this Identical plan. In the next
place. General Smith, who originally suggested the plan to
General Grant and Commodore Foote, and aided them in
fully developing it, affirmed that he was indebted to General
Fremont, when the latter was in command of the Western
Department, for the Idea. When history shall do full
justice to facts and men, it will be universally acknow
ledged that General John C. Fremont/was the only real
strategist who had command of any great department
during the progress of this war ; that he only evinced the
capacity to look over and comprehend a' vast field of
operations, to determine all the means and appliances
requisite on such a field for the production ot the best
results, and then to plan a vast campaign and determine
the dispositions and combine the movements of a great
army so as to ensure the results referred to.

128 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
To give efficiency to operations. General Halleck
assigned to General Grant the territory east of the Missis
sippi and west of the Cumberland river, and to General
Buell the territory east of the river last named. Commo
dore Foote would, by this arrangement, co-operate with
General Grant.
I When Generals Grant, Smith, and Commodore Foote
had fully developed their plan for the capture of Fort
Henry and Donelson, they communicated the said plan
to General Halleck, with an urgent request for permission
to make the contemplated movement at once. After a
tedious delay, no answer being received, a joint communi
cation from the individuals above named was sent, and
leave was obtained for the movement desired. As a means
of deceiving the Confederates, threatening demonstrations
were first made in the direction of Columbus, and other
points, when the united fleet and army sailed up the Ten
nessee river to assault Fort Henry. The army, with the
expectation of advancing by land and investing the fort
ress, disembarked several miles below it ; while the fleet,
advancing with much caution, came within firing distance.
After a cannonade of several hours, General Tilghman,
commander of the fort, surrendered at discretion, having
previously sent the most of his men to Fort Donelson.
In the fight a 24-pound shot pierced the ironclad Essex,
burst her starboard boiler, and filled the vessel with
burning steam, killing her two pilots, and seriously scald
ing her commander. Captain W. D. Porter, and 40 of
-his men. In the rest of the fleet, but one was killed,
and 9 wounded. Among the prisoners taken were the
General and his staff, 143 men, with barracks and tents
and other material for the accommodation of 15,000 men.
The most important of all the captures was the fort itself,
securing to us, as the event proved, the uninterrupted
navigation of the river for many hundred miles. In the
capture of this fort, the army took no part ; and the manner
in which the ironclads withstood the fire of the 1 2 heavy
guns from the two batteries at the bank of the river, one
of these guns being a lo-inched columbiad, three of them
64-pounders, and the rest 32-pounders, in addition to the
heavy guns of the fort, and the field batteries of the

THE CAMPAIGN IN KENTUCKY. 1 29
garrison, evinces most clearly the perfection with which
they were built.
As the army had taken no part in this conflict, and
as Fort Donelson, some twelve miles distant, was a far
more important position than that just captured. General
Grant most wisely determined to move at once upon the
former place. Crossing over the Tennessee General
Smith's division, and moving with this directly upon the
road leading thither, he completed the investment of the
fort on the land side ; while the fleet, with the rest of his
army, passed down the Tennessee and up the Cumberland
river, to reinforce and aid the division referred to. The
force occupying the fort has been variously estimated at from
13,000 to 18,000 men, all under the command of General
John B. Floyd. The force under General Grant, in addi
tion to the armed fleet, amounted, according to the best
authorities, to from 30,000 to 40,000 men. If anybody can
discover any material fault In the plan or conduct of the
assault, either on the land or water side, they are possessed
of more wisdom than the author of this treatise. In their
advance, the ironclads, after they had driven most of the
enemy's gunners from their batteries, were obliged to
retire for repairs. On the land side, the fight having
been continued from the 12th to the night of the 15th
February, General Buckner, left in command by the flight
of Floyd, who took with him some 1,500 men on two
steamboats. General Forest having also escaped with
about 600 cavalry, — General Buckner on the i6tli surren
dered at discretion. The Confederate loss in prisoners,
including some 2,000 killed and wounded, approached
10,000 men, with 40 pieces of artillery, and a large amount
of horses, mules, and stores of various kinds. Our loss
in killed and wounded, though not accurately reported,
must have been quite as large as that of the Confederates,
we having been the assailing party. We would here re
mark that Pollard gives the Confederate loss in prisoners
at 5,079, giving the number of regiments, and the number
of men in each regiment. In this he may not have included
the wounded. As we have no official statement to rebut
this, the correctness of Pollard's statement remains un
disputed.

130 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
The situation, and the course which events should have taken,
after the fall of Forts Henry and Donelson.
By the fall of the forts above designated, the Confede
rate army in Kentucky was dissevered and divided into
two widely separate parts, the one located at Bowling
Green, and the other at Columbus, with the rivers Cum
berland and Tennessee, and our fleet and army which had
captured the forts, between the dissevered parts referred
to. South of Bowling Green, and directly in the rear of
General A. S.Johnston, who now commanded at this place, lay
Nashville, in an almost totally defenceless state, and con
taining, it is said, provision and stores for the Confederate
army, amounting in value to some ^10,000,000. West of
Fort Henry lay Columbus, which could have been invested
on the land side by the army of General Grant, crossing
over from the vicinity of said fort, and on the water side
by the fleet. What any wise commander in the .position
then occupied by General Halleck would have proposed
to himself, would have been the capture of the tw.o Con
federate armies under consideration, and especially that
under General Johnston. As a means to this end, the fleet
with General Grant's army on board, and reinforcements
,sent after them, would have been ordered to proceed at
once to Nashville, and, having captured the city, to have
faced Johnston in his retreat south, with General Buell
pressing upon his rear. Johnston having been crushed
between these two masses, Columbus, if not previously
abandoned, should have been invested as above indicated.
Nothing short of, or diverse from, these two results would
any commander of common judgment have proposed to
himself; and none can doubt the full practicability of such
a plan. The course which events did take in the circumstances.
The plan above indicated, the plan by which all pos
sible fruits of prior advantages might have been reaped, was
the identical one proposed by Commodore Foote, General
Grant, and their advisers. Commpdore Foote, while tarry
ing with his brother at Cleveland, Ohio, after his wound,
expressed the deepest reprobation that those who advised

THE CAMPAIGN IN KENTUCKY. 131
were not permitted to carry out this plan. Such' a course
on the part of the Union fleet and army was actually
expected by the Confederates. Every possible effort, as
soon as the fall of Donelson was known, was made to
remove from the city all the materials and supplies desig
nated. Instead of ordering what the circumstances re
quired, our commander retained the main portion of the
fleet, and of the army of General Grant, where they were ;
sent forward Commodore Foote with two gunboats up the
Cumberland as far as Clarksville ; while General Smith with
his division moved by land to the same place, and while
General Buell, General O. M. Mitchel In advance, was sent
after General A. S. Johnston, who had retreated from
Bowling Green. To the least reflecting mind it must be
perfectly evident that had it been the specific design of our
Generals to induce General Johnston to retreat, and to
render that retreat perfectly safe, measures better adapted
to that end could, by no possibility, have been adopted.
The result was as might have been anticipated. Johnston
did make a perfectly safe retreat, all the Confederate stores
both at Bowling Green and Nashville having been pre
viously removed or destroyed ; and passing through the
latter place, assumed a new position and concentrated his
forces at Corinth, Mississippi, a position on the Tennessee
and Charlestown railroad east of Memphis, and a few miles
west of the point where the Tennessee river turns from its
western in a northern direction. To reach this point from
Bowling Green requires a six weeks' march over muddy
roads of more than 300 miles. On the 24th February our
forces took possession of Nashville, where General Buell
arrived soon after, and quartered his army around the city.
From Nashville General Mitchel was sent, with a force in
adequate to any permanent and important results, down
into Alabama, where he did considerable damage to the
Confederate interests, capturing Huntsville and other
places, and manifesting such energy that he could not be
endured in Buell' s command, and was hence transferred to
Port Royal, S. C, where he died October 20th.
After a few days' rest. General Grant, with his main
army reinforced to nearly or quite 40,000 men, passed by
land over to the Tennessee river, where his troops were taken

132 iTHE AMERICAN REBELLION.
on board the fleet, and conveyed finally, no notice being
taken of the Confederates at Columbus and vicinity, to a
place called Pittsburg Landing, a place located on the
west side of the river about twenty miles north-east from
Corinth, where the Confederate forces under General
Johnston were concentrated.
The battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg Landing.
At this place occurred, April 6th and 7th, a scene, the
battle bearing each of the above designations, — a scene for
the leading characteristics of which, with the preceding
facts, no impartial historian can offer a single excuse or
apology for the General in command of our army. That
army, it must be borne in mind, had lain in this position
from March 12th to April 6th, a position but about twenty
miles distant from the central western army of the Con
federacy, an army commanded by one of their ablest
Generals, and who was concentrating his forces at Corinth
to resist and repel the invasion of which the army of
General Grant was the advanced force. No army was
ever in a position where it was more likely to be assaulted
by superior numbers than was ours in the circumstances
under consideration. General Johnston would deserve the
contempt of the world, if he had not taken advantage of
the opportunity which the advanced and isolated position
of our army presented, to strike a crushing blow before
the expected reinforcements should arrive. No com
mander, therefore, had more constraining motives to so
fortify his position as to render it as secure as possible
against assault, and to keep such a perpetual and sharp
outlook as to render surprise impossible. Nor was there
ever a position which could have been rendered impregnable
with less labour, or more readily guarded against sudden
and unexpected assault. The country around was an
almost unbroken wilderness, and covered with such a
thick growth of underbrush that, in a few hours, the
approach of the enemy, except by the open roads, might
have been rendered nearly or quite impossible, while a few
batteries judiciously located would have effectively barred
all approach on said roads. The absolutely known princi
ples of the science of war, as well as its most common and

THE CAMPAIGN IN KENTUCKY. I33
invariable usages, demanded of our General in command
every precaution against surprise and successful assault.
What was done in these very peculiar and perilous
circumstances ? Everything, we answer, to render sur
prise, defeat, and capture most practicable, and nothing
whatever to prevent such a catastrophe. In front, as all
witnesses and historians fully agree, not a single entrench
ment or abatis was raised, nor a single tree or shrub in
the surrounding forests and groves cut down to impede or
hinder the approach of the enemy in any direction what
ever. The divisions of the army were also as carelessly
distributed as possible. " Sherman's divisions," says an
eyewitness, the correspondent of the Cincinnati Gazette,
and his testimony is undisputed, " extended from the ex
treme right to extreme left of our line, while four other
divisions had been crowded in between, as they arrived."
The state in which the enemy actually found our army on
the morning of April 6th is thus very correctly and im
pressively described by Mr. Greeley : —
" Though the vicinity of the enemy was notorious, not
an entrenchment nor defence of any kind, not even an
abatis, here so easily made, covered and protected our
front; no reconnoitering parties were thrown forward to
watch for and report an advance of the enemy; and even
the pickets were scarcely a musket-shot from the tents of
our foremost regiments; some of which, it was asserted, had
not even been provided with ammunition, though the woods,
scarcely a mile away, had suddenly been found swarm
ing with Rebel scouts and sharp-shooters in such strength
as to forbid observation on our part. Low but ominous
whispers and meaning glances of exultation among the
Rebel civilians in our rear had already given indications
that a blow was about to be struck; and alarmed Unionists
had sought the tents of our Generals with monitions of
danger, which were received with sneering intimations
that every one should stick to his trade. General Grant
was at Savannah, superintending the reception of sup
plies. Such was the condition of our forces on Saturday
evening, April 5th." The utter neglect of all precautions,
universal in all well-regulated armies, to prevent surprise,
was a matter of utter astonishment to the Confederates.

134 THE AMERICAN REBELLION
Under such circumstances, it is not at all surprising that
that night the eriemy, more than 40,000 strong, their pre
sence not being even suspected, encamped within less than
four miles of our lines, — that, by a very early advance,
those lines were surprised when our men were just en
gaged in dressing or getting ready their breakfa.sts ; that
when General Grant arrived upon the field at about 8
a.m., his army was, in reality, beaten; that by I2
o'clock the camps of all the divisions of our army but one
were in the enemy's hands, and two out of five divisions
were driven back, and the other three routed ; that, in the
language of Mr. Greeley, "at half-past 4 p.m., our sur
prised but over-matched army, apart from Lew. Wallace's
division, had. been crowded back into a semicircle of three
or four hundred acres immediately around, but rather to
the left of, the Landing;" that when this position was
assaulted at 6 o'clock, nothing saved our army from utter
rout or capture but the timely arrival of Lew. Wallace
and one of General Buell's divisions, together with the aid
of two gunboats ; and that nothing but the aid of General
Buell's army, which came up in force during the night,
enabled our forces to drive the enemy off from the field on
the next day; while nearly 15,000 men, in killed, wounded,
and prisoners, were lost on our side, and upwards of 10,000
on the part of the Confederates, whereas no battle at all
would, in all probability, have been fought but for the
reckless carelessness of our General and his subordinates
in command. We should add here that the death of
General Johnston, which occurred about 2 p.m. of the
first day, prevented a more vigorous subsequent advance
of the Confederates on that day. On each of these 'days
our commanders and their men did all that could have
been done to prevent defeat, rout, and capture, and to en
sure the victory which was finally gained. Such facts,
however, offer no excuse whatever for the reckless dis
regard of all the prudential measures which devofve
most sacredly upon all commanders of armies, or free
them from full responsibility for the lives and limbs of
thousands of brave men sacrificed through criminal neglect
of known duty. There is not a military power in Europe
which would, for a single day, continue in command a

THE CAMPAIGN IN KENTUCKY. 1 35
General who had done, and neglected to do, what our
commander did during the three weeks which preceded
this battle.
The following extract from an article on Sherman's
"Memoirs," an article which appeared in the Washington
Capital, deserves a place in history, as throwing clear
light upon the criminal conduct of Generals Grant, Sher
man, and others, — conduct which occasioned the slaughter
of about 15,000 of our brave men. History does not state
the actual condition of some of those men in that Bachana-
lian feast referred to in the extract which follows : — '
" The unnecessary slaughter of thousands, that sent
desolation to householders throughout the land, was due
to reckless incapacity of the General in command. The
most striking illustration of this is to be found in his treat
ment of the battle of Shiloh. While advancing on to that
fatal locality, separating his force so as to allow the enemy
to attack it in detail and to make a disaster inevitable,
placing the advance on the wrong side of the river in the
presence of the enemy, we come upon the following para
graph, page 226, vol. i., which reads: — 'Among my
colonels 1 had a strange character — Thomas Worthington,
colonel of the 46th Ohio. He was a graduate of West
Point, of the class of 1827 ; was therefore older than
General Halleck, General Grant, or myself, and claimed
to know more of war than all of us put together. In
ascending the river he did not keep his place in the
column, but pushed on and reached Savannah a day before
the rest of my division. When I reached that place I found
that Worthington had landed his regiment, and was flying
about giving orders as though he were Commander-in-
Chief I made him get back to his boat, and gave him to
understand that he must hereafter keep his place.' This
is all. The ' strange character ' thus briefly described
comes and goes in this mysterious manner, so far as the
Memoirs are concerned. The reader unacquainted with
the ugly events that followed wonders why the ' strange
character ' is introduced at all. But the mystery vanishes
before those who know that Old Tom of the 46th Ohio was
thereafter to be an ugly shadow, haunting through life the
hero of these lame reminiscences. Old Colonel Tom was

136 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
a queer character, but this was not his worst feature — he
was an ugly customer, who did know something of war, and
knew that Sherman and Grant were pushing their divisions
into the jaws of a bloody defeat. The night before the
battle, so called, of Shiloh, he found himself on the ex
treme right, and going into camp, found that no precaution
whatever was taken against a surprise, and, uneasy and
restless, he went to head-quarters to remonstrate. He
found head-quarters under the influence of a hearty dinner
and utterly oblivious to all danger. Returning, this
' strange character,' who thought he knew so much of war,
threw out his own pickets, and constructed, as well as he
could, a rough breastwork. The next morning the Con
federates were upon them, and the only point held during
the day and until Buell came to the relief, by the startled,
confused, and slaughtered army, was that commanded by
this 'strange character.' His obstinate absurdity saved all
that was saved of that badly-handled army. But Old Tom
had not sense enough to keep silent. He was disgustingly
loud and offensive in his denunciations, and instead of
being promoted for his gallant conduct, was cashiered for
telling the truth."
General Pope and Commodore Foote at New Madrid and
Island No. 10.
The fall of Forts Henry and Donelson rendered, in
the judgment of the Confederate commanders, Columbus
no longer tenable. It was accordingly abandoned, and,
under the direction of General Beauregard, one of the
best engineers in the country, very strong fortifications,
very heavily mounted, were erected at more favourable
points still farther down the river, especially at Island No.
10, New Madrid in Missouri, and Tipton ville in Ken
tucky. The capture of these strongholds was entrusted
to General Pope with an army about 40,000 strong, and
to Commodore Foote with his ironclads. This expedition
was conducted with the same energy and skill as was that
against the forts on the Tennessee and Cumberland. The
first place to be assaulted was New Madrid, which was
defended, not only by strong fortifications on the land
side, but by formidable floating batteries or armed

THE CAMPAIGN IN KENTUCKY. 1 37
Steamers on the river side. These vessels were so located
that they swept the whole country for several miles round,
and rendered the retaining the fortifications, if captured,
impracticable. Under these circumstances, four 24-pound
size guns were sent for, and with these, March 13th, a fire,
at 800 yards range, was opened upon the works and vessels,
and with such power that the vessels were drawn off and
the place surrendered on the following morning. So pre
cipitate had been the retreat of the enemy that very little
of their material was taken away or destroyed, even their
tents being left standing. Thirty-three cannon, several
thousand small arms, and a large amount of other mate
rial, were left behind uninjured.
To understand the situation now, it must be borne in
mind that while New Madrid is about 20 miles north
of Island No. 10, the former place is this distance farther
down the river than the latter; the river, at the island,
turning northward, and at the former place taking a
directly southern course. On the capture of New Madrid,
General Pope consequently found himself wholly destitute
of transports to take his army in any direction, the fortifi
cation on the island keeping our fleet in the river above
them. To remedy this evil, nineteen days were spent in
cutting a canal twelve miles long across the Missouri
peninsula, one of the wonders of engineering ; Commodore
Foote being employed in the meantime in bombarding,
with no decisive results, the forts on the island. By
means of transports brought over through this canal, two
ironclads having also passed down by the island, one in
a thick fog and the other during a thunderstorm in the
night. General Pope pushed across the river one division
of his army, at a point several miles below Tiptonville,
thus completely flanking all the Confederate fortifications
above the point of crossing. While our commander was
preparing, April 7th, to cross with the remainder of his
army, the Confederates, sinking their gunboat Grampus
and six transports, abandoned Island No. 10 and all their
other fortified places near, and retreated eastward. General
Pope was in time, however, to make important captures.
In a report of the fruits of all these victories, he gives the
following summary : — " Three generals, 273 field and

138 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
company officers, 6,700 prisoners (troops),. 123 pieces of
heavy artillery — all of the very best character and latest
patterns — 7,000 stand of small arms, several wharf-boat
loads of provisions, an immense quantity of ammunition
of all kinds, many hundred horses and mules, with wagons,
harness, etc., are among the spoils."
These events, while they added much to the glory of
Commodore Foote, and elevated General Pope to a very
high place among our Generals, spread consternation
throughout the Confederacy. One fact is now quite evi
dent, namely, that had General Grant, instead of being
prematurely sent south, been sent west to the point where
General Pope crossed the river, and been sent there to
co-operate with him in the capture of all forces and forti
fications above that point, not merely 7,000, but from
15,000 to 20,000, prisoners would have been captured, and
a disgraceful loss of nearly 15,000 men at Pittsburg
Landing would have been prevented. The bloodlessness
of the victories under consideration is one of its most
wonderful peculiarities, less than 50 being killed and
wounded at New Madrid, and hardly more than this
elsewhere.

CHAPTER IX.
GENERAL HALLECK AT PITTSBURG LANDING
AND AT CORINTH.
About the time when General Pope and Commodore Foote
had completed their conquests at New Madrid and Island
No. lo. General Halleck left Missouri and passed up to
Pittsburg Landing, and assumed direct command of the
army, whose mission it was to seek and defeat the enemy
in the vicinity of Corinth. Before making an advance, he
awaited the arrival of General Pope, whose coming, April
22nd, rendered our army concentrated at this point some
what upwards of 100,000 strong. Before proceeding to
detail and criticise the events which did follow, we will
consider what a real strategist would have proposed to
himself under the circumstances, and the means and dis
positions by which he might have accomplished his plan.
What should have been done in the circumstances then existing.
Immediately after the arrival of General Buell at Nash
ville, and General Grant at Pittsburg Landing, it became
perfectly manifest that General Johnston had selected
Corinth as the point where he would concentrate his main
army for repelling the threatened invasion. What a real
strategist would have proposed to himself would have
been, not the driving of the enemy from this position,
not his mere defeat, but capture there ; and never was an
enemy in a position more exposed to such a catastrophe
than was General Johnston at the point under considera
tion, and never was a strategist in circumstances more
favourable to ensure the accomplishment of his plan than
was General Halleck at this time. By the union of Pope

140 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
with Grant at Pittsburg Landing, an army 80,000 strong
might have been concentrated at that point. By sending
Buell down to Decatur, and uniting him with Mitchel there,
another army 50,000 or 60,000 strong, Buell in com
mand, could have been assembled in that vicinity. , John
ston would thus have been exposed to the strokes of two
armies, one of which was equal and the other much
superior to his own. By ordering Buell to move upon
Johnston's flank and rear, so as to cut off his retreat to
the east or south, and precipitating Grant and Pope upon
him from the north, nothing could have saved his army
from being driven to the Mississippi and captured there. It
was by just such dispositions that the Prussians were cooped
up and captured at Ulm, and the French at Metz and
Sedan, and by which General Bourbaki, with about 100,00a
men, was driven into Switzerland by Marshal Manteufel.
By a single stroke wisely directed. General Halleck could,
without failure, have ended the Rebellion as far as the
States between the Mississippi and Savannah rivers are
concerned ; an event which would speedily have terminated
the war. Prior to the final accomplishment of these dis
positions, General Pope, with Commodore Foote, might,
or might not, have been sent as they were down the Mis
sissippi, there being but little choice between the two
arrangements. The plan which was adopted.
What our General did propose, as the highest end
which he hoped to reach, is quite manifest. It was simply
this, and nothing more or less ; to wit, to capture the post
at Corinth by expelling Beauregard from the place. The-
ultimate aim of our leading commanders during the war
seems to have been, not to wipe out the armies of the
Confederacy, but to take and hold , territory, to capture
fortified places irrespective of their stategic relations, and
simply to take the positions at any time occupied by the
enemy's armies. The movements of General Halleck upon
Corinth were as if himself and army had been smitten with
a paralysis. For about two weeks after the arrival 01
General Pope, he stood still where he was; for three weeks

GENERAL HALLECK AT PITTSBURG. 141
more he crept along at a less rate than one mile a day ;
our nearest batteries, at the end of this period, being three
miles distant from Corinth. Having held our army at bay
thus long. General Beauregard, now in command, com
pleted the evacuation of the post on the night of May
29th. On entering the place our army found some piles
of provisions in flames, and one full warehouse undamaged,
but no guns or small arms. On the barracks they found
everywhere written, " These premises to rent. Enquire of
G. T. Beauregard." General Pope, with no material re
sults, pursued for a short distance the enemy in his retreat,
and then rejoined the army. While our army remained at
Pittsburg Landing, and more especially during its advance
amid the marshes which He between that place and Corinth,
a horrid pestilence, more destructive than a battle could
have been, broke out among our men. While many died,
and many more lay in hospitals, at least 500 per day
were sent down the river for their homes, presenting
everywhere through the Western States the most ghastly
appearance conceivable. Nothing could have given the
people such a horror of the war as the aspect of these men
did. What was singular about the matter was the common
sentiment of reprobation in which they all held the General
in supreme command. We never saw, or heard of, a man
from that army who spoke well of him. One of our
captains, sent home on account of sickness, gave to us
personally this statement, as illustrative of the spirit with
which our army was governed in the interest of slavery : —
"At one time," he said, "I was sent off into the country
in command of two companies. We started after break
fast, taking no provisions with us, being told that the
provision wagons would overtake us In the afternoon.
They did not arrive, and we encamped at night dinnerless
and supperless. In the afternoon of the second day the
hunger of the men became intolerable, and perceiving a
flock of sheep on a slave plantation near by, a sufficient
number were taken for present relief On the third day
the promised provisions arrived. When the facts became
known to the General in command, we, the officers of these
companies, were fined two hundred dollars, which we paid,
for not restraining our men from thus satisfying the crav-

142 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
ings of hunger. On another occasion, when on a march
where the men had no opportunity to fill their canteens
but from the brooks which they passed over, they stopped
to fill them at the well of a planter, a well which stood in
his yard near the road. The proprietor stepped out upon
his piazza, and imperiously ordered the intruders to leave
his premises. The officer in command bid them get what
water they needed, but do no damage to the place. For
that order, or permission, that officer was tried by a court
marshal. He was cleared, however, because tried by
patriot associates. Such was the spirit with which our
armies were ruled by General Halleck and his chief sub
ordinate in command." Here we have one among the
many reasons why the commander of the Western Depart
ment was held in such disesteem by his army and in the
Western States.
In regard to the benefits which resulted from the cap
ture of Corinth — an event which cost us the disaster at
Pittsburg Landing, and many thousand lives through sick
ness — we have this to say, that the place was about as
valuable to us, in a strategic point of view, as a cow-pen ;
that the event simply changed the locality of the Con
federate army from a position where they could do us the
least harm, and the Confederates the least good, to another
locality from which it invaded Kentucky a second time,
and on its return south fought, among others, the bloody
battles of Murfreesboro' , Chattanooga, Atlanta, and Na.sh-
ville, and did the Union cause infinite evil. To magnify
the idea of the advantages resulting from the event, it
being impossible to designate any real benefit. General
Halleck telegraphed to Washington that it was " reported
that General Pope had taken 14,000 prisoners," and avast
number of stands of arms, and that "all was going as he~
could desire."
The final dispositions made after the capture of Corinth.
If events did take the course which our General desired,
they certainly did not eventuate in accordance with the
requirements of the Union cause. After the capture of
Island No. 10, the army and fleet moved down the river
and laid siege to Fort Pillow (Wright), some 40 miles above

GENERAL HALLECK AT PITTSBURG. 1 43
Memphis. After remaining before the place for about two
weeks, the army being unable to do anything on account
of the high water, and the fleet effecting little. General
Pope was called to Corinth, and after four weeks of ineffec
tive cannonade on both sides, Fort Pillow, on the fall of
Corinth, was abandoned. During this interval, however,
there was a severe battle between ours and a Confederate
fleet of four vessels, one of them a very powerful ironclad
ram, and the others boats of less power. The result of the
battle was the disabling of the Confederate fleet, with the
sinking of the ram, the burning of one of the boats, and the
drifting of the others in a crippled condition under the pro
tection of the forts. At this time. Commodore Foote was
necessitated to retire from his command, on account of the
wound received at Fort Donelson. Commodore Davis, left
in command, steamed down to Memphis, where he encoun
tered and destroyed a Confederate fleet of eight vessels
with which he was there assailed ; but one vessel escaping.
Memphis was now surrendered. The capture of this city,
with the fall of Corinth and the opening of the Mississippi
thus far down, seemed to have fully accomplished the plan
of General Halleck. His army was, accordingly, in reality
dispersed ; General Buell being sent back to his command,
General Grant placed in command at Memphis, and the
rest of the army being distributed at intervals on lines ex
tending nearly or quite 200 miles. In other words, this
army, more than 100,000 strong, was so distributed as to
be rendered powerless for any offensive operations what
ever.

CHAPTER X.
GENERAL HALLECK APPOINTED COMMANDER-IN-
CHIEF OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED ST A TES.
While our army lay at Corinth, an event occurred which
determined the conduct of the war for another eighteen
months. We refer to the appointment of General Hal
leck, July 23rd, as Commander-in-Chief of the armies of
the United States; General Grant being thereby left in
command of our army at Corinth. This event, which did
more than anything that had previously occurred to para
lyze the hope of the army and people, an appointment more
universally reprobated than almost any other that could
have been made, occurred in this manner. We give the facts
as we received them directly from Mr. Sumner ; he receiv
ing them with the same directness from President Lincoln.
Soon after the arrival of our army under McClellan at
Harrison's Landing, the President visited the place. In
a council of war General McClellan and certain of his
corps commanders advised a movement from that point
upon Richmond, General Lee's army there being repre
sented as 200,000 strong, and General M. offering to
make the movement provided he could be reinforced by
20,000 or 30,000 men. After the council broke up, a
General in command of a division (his name we cannot
recall) assured the President that it would be absolute
presumption to make that movement unless the army of
the Potomac was increased by at least 100,000 men ;
this assurance being rendered exceedingly plausible and
impressive by the estimate previously given in the council
of war, that there was at that time in Richmond under
General Lee an army 200,000 strong. Under such cir
cumstances, " My mind," said the President to Mr.

GENERAL HALLECK APPOINTED COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. 1 45
Sumner, " became perfectly perplexed, and I determined
right then and there to appoint a Commander-in-Chief who
should be responsible for our military operations, and I de
termined further that General Halleck should be the man.
I accordingly, as soon as I arrived in Washington, tele
graphed to him to come here, and assume the responsibilities
of that office." These are the identical circumstances
under which that disastrous appointment was made, an ap
pointment which never should have been made but after
the maturest and most careful consultations with the wisest
men in the nation had been taken. The determination of
the President was taken under the perplexed impression
that circumstances demanded instant action, and that the
Administration of the individual selected for the high office
had been a comparative success. " So much do circum
stances tend to make us what we are."
We are now to consider the movements of our armies
as mainly directed by one mind, that of the individual
under consideration. The visit of the President to Harri
son's Landing was on the 8th July. Three days after this,
July nth. General Halleck was called to Washington to
assume " the command of the whole land forces of the
United States as General-in-Chief."

10

CHAPTER XL
GENERAL POPE AND THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA.
The raid of General Jackson, and the confusion resulting
from the action of three independent commanders upon
the same field, with no controlling mind to unify their
forces, at length convinced the Administration of the great
error which had been committed in the arbitrary divisions
and separations which had been made of the army of the
Potomac. It was accordingly determined to unite the
corps of Fremont, McDowell, and Banks, and other reserve
forces In and about Washington and in Northern Virginia,
into one body under a single commander. To such com
mand General John Pope was called, June 26th, the day
preceding that on which occurred the battle of Gaines'
Mill. This appointment was exceedingly offensive to the
three Generals above named, and indeed to the entire
army of the Potomac. This fact, together with the
meagreness of the means placed under his command,
induced General Pope to request to be relieved from his
new position and be restored to his old command. This
request being denied, he set about the work of reorganiza
tion and cL new disposition of his forces, so necessary in
existing circumstances. The new organization took on
the name of the Army of Virginia. As a field force, it
amounted, in all, to about 42,000 men, — an army quite too
small for any effective offensive service. The very first
measure of the Administration, and of our new Com
mander-in-Chief, who was appointed fifteen days ^fter
General Pope, after the organization of this new army
should have been to render its strength quite double what
it then was. All this could readi)y have been done, one

GENERAL POPE AND THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA. 1 47
half the number required being furnished by the union of
General Cox's division with the corps of General Burnside,
and the remaining 20,000 drawn from other departments.
Before the close of July a force 80,000 strong might
undeniably have been concentrated in the vicinity of
Culpepper. With this army at this point, and the army
at Harrison's Landing, then consisting, by official re
port, of an effective force 101,691 strong, no new dis
positions could have been required for an advance upon
Richmond. The true policy unquestionably was to have
kept the army under McClellan where it was until that of
Virginia was prepared as above stated. All things being
in readiness, McClellan should have crossed the James
river at Burmuda Hundred, we think, and having fortified
that point, have seized Lee's communications south of
Richmond; our forces being so disposed that McClellan's
left should, as early as possible, have been brought into
communication with Pope's right wing. The results of
the campaign thus conducted, cannot be a matter of
rational doubt. If any one is disposed to doubt the
practicability of reinforcing the army of Virginia as above
indicated, let him consider the following facts. At this
very time there lay at Helena, Arkansas, on the Mississippi
river, an army wholly unemployed, and numbering upwards
of 20,000 men — the army commanded by General Curtis.
This army could have been put upon the transports, then
in readiness, and forwarded to "Washington by the time
when their presence was required. At the same time
20,000 more men could have been spared from the army
assembled at Corinth, and this without endangering any
interests in that quarter. Consider, still further, the
strength of the American army at this time. According
to the report of the Secretary of War, submitted to Con
gress on the ist December of that year, our army con
sisted, according to the last returns, of upwards of 750,000
men, all " well armed and equipped." In the July pre
vious, that army must have been not far from 700,000
strong. We should stiltify ourselves if we should question
the fact that from all these immense forces 40,000 men
could have been drawn for the army of Virginia, and
20,000 or even 30,000 more for that of the Potomac.

148 TIIE AMERICAN REBELLION.
There can have been no valid excuse for not having
rendered both these armies fully adequate in numbers to
all the responsibilities devolved upon them. While the
reinforcements above referred to were being brought up,
the army of Virginia, with absolute directions to fight no
important battle, should have been employed in making
threatening demonstrations in the direction of Richmond,
and all for the purpose of drawing off to the north as
many of General Lee's forces as possible. At the same
time. General McClellan's army should have made no
demonstrations in any direction, the newspapers being
filled with reports that he was to be speedily united with
the army of Virginia for the protection of Washington.
Should General Lee show a disposition to move north
still farther, into Ma'-ylat^i and Pennsylvania, none but an
apparent resistance to such a movement should have been
made. Any General having the forces at his command
that General Halleck had, would have built all the bridges
above Harper's Ferry that General Lee could desire, pro
vided the latter would have agreed to pass his army over
them. In neither of those invasions would any wise Com
mander-in-Chief, as we shall see, have permitted a single
division of General Lee's army to have recrossed the
Potomac. The campaign of the army of Virginia.
Let us now consider the campaign of the army of
Virginia as actually conducted by General Pope. In
judging of the merits and demerits of a General, vve must
consider, not only what he accomplished, and failed to ac
complish, but more especially the amount of forces put
under his command, together with the character of the
commanders opposed to him, and the amount of forces
which they brought into the field. We must bear in
mind that General Pope was compelled to take the field
with an army but about 40,000 strong ; that at no time
did he have under his immediate control over 60,000
men ; that he had opposed to him the best Generals
known to the Confederacy, with the crushing masses of
General Lee's army under their control. The public
generally have the impression that the army of the Poto-

GENERAL POPE AND THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA. 1 49
mac came to the aid of that of Virginia, and that, with the
united forces of both armies under his command. General
Pope suffered an inglorious defeat. We must bear in
mind here that while an army consisting of 101,691 men
present for duty did, two corps excepted, come up with
General McClellan, but 20,500 of these were ever present
under General Pope's command, and that quite one half
of these. General Porter's corps, in consequence of what
General Pope truly designated as "unnecessary and un
usual delays, and flagrant disregard of his orders, took no
part whatever except in the action of the 30th August."
When he first took command. General Pope issued a
number of imposing orders which needlessly offended the
army of the Potomac on the one hand, and the Con
federates on the other. When asked, at the time, what we
thought of these orders, our reply was, that the proper
answer depended very much upon the number of men
General Pope had under his command. If his force was
ioo,coo strong, those orders were boastfully ostentatious,
but endurable. If, on the other hand, his army numbered
but about 50,000 men, then the same orders were con
temptible. To judge rightly of these orders, we must take
into account, not only the forces under his Immediate com
mand at the time, but the reinforcements pledged him
from the army of the Potomac. It should also be borne
in mind that the issuing of just such orders has been a
quite common infirmity of great commanders of all ages.
Such facts, therefore, should be left out of the account
when we would judge of the real merits of any General as
a military man.
The specific mission of the army of Virginia when
General Pope took the field, it having been then deter
mined to remove the army of the Potomac to the vicinity
of Washington, was to hold the army of General Lee in
check until our two armies were united, when, with their con
centrated force, they might fall upon the Confederate army
and ciush it. What were the successive dispositions and
movements directed by General Pope for the accomplish
ment of these ends ? The first position which he assumed
was on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, south of the
Rappahannock, having called the corps of Banks and Fre-

150 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
mont, that of the latter now commanded by Siegel, from
the Shenandoah valley, to the east of the Blue Ridge.
The avowed object of this disposition of his forces was to
prevent an advance of the Confederates into the Shenan
doah on the one hand, and in the direction of v/ashington
on the other. While these are the very ends at which he
should have aimed, a careful examination of the maps
furnished by the Committee on the Conduct of the War
will most fully evince that no disposition of his forces
better adapted to ensure these ends could have been made.
Prior to the battle of Cedar Mountain, General Banks, with
his corps, some 8,000 strong, was sent forward to this point;
General McDowell, with one division of his corps, that of
Ricketts, was placed three miles in the rear of General
Banks ; while General Siegel was ordered to move from
Sperryville to Culpepper Court House : all parts of his
army being placed in easy supporting distances from each
other, and the whole on a line best adapted to secure the
ends above designated. On August gth. General Jackson,
having crossed his army over the Rapldan, advanced upon
General Banks's position. Up to nearly 5 p.m. nothing
occurred but desultory firing between the outposts of
General Banks and the advanced forces of General Jack
son. About this time. General Banks made an Imprudent
advance of quite one mile from the strong position which
he had occupied, and fell upon the Confederates, who had
come up with far greater force than was anticipated. At
first the enemy, was driven back with great slaughter. At
length numbers prevailed, and General Banks was gradu
ally pushed back to his original position, where, after the
most terrible fighting for the space of about an hour and a
half, General Pope with Ricketts's division came up, when
the Confederates in their turn were driven backward. That
evening and early the next morning the whole of General
Pope's forces were on the field, and ready to renew the con
flict. On account of the excessive heat of the day, neither
army assumed the offensive. In the evening and night
following, however. General Jackson made a precipitate
retreat back to Gordonsville, " leaving," in the language
of General Pope, " many of his dead and wounded on the
field and on the road from Cedar Mountain to Orange

GENERAL POPE AND THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA. I5I
Court House." Thus, when Jackson and Pope first met,
the former found himself outgeneraled and overmatched
by his new antagonist. For the generalship manifested in
thus foiling Jackson In his first advance upon our lines, and
compelling him to make a precipitate retreat to the position
from which he started, General Pope, and most justly,
received the warmest commendations of the military
authorities at Washington, General Halleck very promptly
sending him a most congratulatory letter.
General Popi s dispositions north of the Rappahannock.
After this battle. General Pope was reinforced by a
division, 8,000 strong, from General Burnside's command,
a division commanded by General Reno. In one of his
cavalry raids, the Adjutant of General Stuart was cap
tured, and with him was found, in the language of
General Pope, " an autograph letter of General R. E. Lee
to General Stuart, dated, at Gordonsville, August 15th,
which made manifest to me the position and force of the
enemy, and their determination to overwhelm the army
under my command before it could be reinforced by any
portion of the army of the Potomac." This important,
revelation induced General Pope to withdraw at once from
the position he then occupied, and redistribute his army
behind the Rappahannock. The fundamental object of
this new disposition and location of forces was to hold
back, for the time being, the army of General Lee, on the
south of that river, on the one hand, to keep open his
communications with Aquia and Alexandria, from whence
his reinforcements from the army of the Potomac were
anticipated. Another object was to render his line so
short and compact that the enemy could not break through
it and thus destroy our army in detail. These are the
identical ends which good generalship demanded. How
did our General accomplish these results ? On this sub
ject we will permit General Pope to speak for himself: —
"I directed," he says, "Major-General Reno to send
back his trains on the morning of the i8th, by way of
Stevensburg, to Kelly's or Burnet's Ford, and as soon as
the train had gotten several hours in advance, to follow
them with his whole corps, and to take post behind the

152 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
Rappahannock, leaving all his cavalry in the neighbour
hood of Raccoon Ford, to cover this movement. General
Banks's corps, which had been ordered on the 12th to take
position at Culpepper Court House, I directed, with its
train preceding it, to cross the Rappahannock at the point
where the Orange and Alexandria Railroad crosses that
river. General McDowell's train was ordered to pursue
the same route, while the train of General Siegel was
directed through Jefferson, to cross the Rappahannock at
Sulphur Springs. So soon as he had been sullciently
advanced, McDowell's corps was directed to take the
route from Culpepper to Rappahannock Ford ; whilst
General Siegel, who was on the right and front, was
directed to follow the movement of his train to Sulphur
Springs. These movements were executed during the day
and night of the i8th, and the day of the 19th; by which
time the whole army with its trains had safely recrossed
the Rappahannock, and was posted behind that stream,
with its left at Kelly's Ford, and its right about three
miles above Rappahannock Station ; General Siegel hav
ing been directed, immediately upon crossing at Sulphur
Springs, to march down the left bank of the Rappahan
nock until he connected closely with General McDowell's
right." It is hardly conceivable that an army nearly 50,000
strong could have been moved with more prudence and
dispatch than this was, or how the new disposition of
forces could have been improved. Hence, when General
Lee had brought up his whole army, and attempted to
force a passage in his front over the Rappahannock, he
was everywhere readily repulsed. The position of General
Pope, however, while it rendered his left secure against a
flank movement in that direction, was manifestly exposed
to a similar movement on his right. The distance from
General Lee's position to Warrenton, via Sulphur Springs,
Thompson's Ford, and Waterloo, was but a few miles
greater than by the several routes in his front. To this
liability General Pope was fully awake, and made before
hand all needful preparations to meet it, should it occur.
Still, the question arose whether it was not best to retire
still nearer the reinforcements expected from the army

GENERAL POPE AND THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA. 1 53
of the Potomac and other sources, and there await the
approach of General Lee. On forwarding such questions
to Washington, he received positive instructions to remain
where he was, instructions accompanied with the absolute
assurance that in forty-eight hours all the reinforcement
needed both for defensive and offensive operations would
reach him. On the i8th General Halleck, by telegram,
said : " Stand firm on the line till I can help you. Fight
hard, and aid will soon come." On the 21st General
Halleck sent again : " Dispute every inch of ground, and
fight like the devil till we can reinforce you. Forty-eight
hours more and we can make you strong enough. Don't
yield an inch if you can help it." Such instructions and
promises left no alternative but to wait and fight as re
quired. Yet, up to the 25th, four days later, all the
reinforcements received amounted to only 7,000 men, —
a brigade 2,500 strong under General Reynolds, and
Kearny's division, 4,500 strong. Finding that the enemy
was moving in force upon Warrenton, via Sulphur
Springs, a choice remained between two courses, — to
cross the Rappahannock, and assail the forces still remain
ing in his front ; or, by a movement lo his right, to move
his forces upon that portion of Lee's army which had
crossed the river. The former, though hazardous, was
determined on. Accordingly on the evening of the 22nd
all arrangements were perfected for crossing the river the
next morning. During the night, however, a heavy storm
¦ of rain raised the river some seven or eight feet, carried
off the bridges, and rendered crossing in either direction
impossible. This event, while it precluded the possibility
of a passage of the river on the part of either army for at
least thirty-six hours, exposed, during this period, the
portion of the Confederate forces which had crossed at
Sulphur Springs and Waterloo, to the crushing blows of
all the forces under General Pope's command. To accom
plish this result. General Pope at once moved his whole
army still farther up the river ; his advance, under Siegel,
supported by the corps of Generals Reno and Banks, occu
pied Sulphur Springs, while a cavalry force took possession
of Waterloo. It was now found that the forces of the
enemy which had crossed the river at these places had

154 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
retired, their advance being but a feint to mask a detour
still farther north.

RELATIONS EXISTING AT THIS TIME BETWEEN THE ARMY
OF VIRGINIA AND THAT OF THE POTOMAC.
As all the future operations of the army of Virginia
were connected with those of that of the Potomac, we
now invite special attention to certain facts connected with
the movements and dispositions of the army last de
signated. On the 5th August General McClellan received
an absolute order, which he was assured would not be
revoked, to remove his army " with all possible prompt
ness" to the vicinity of Washington. That this end
might be accomplished with all practicable dispatch.
General McClellan was authorised to avail himself at once
of all the vast fleets of war vessels and transports on the
James river and in Chesapeake Bay. How was the order
obeyed ? It was an order, to be sure, which General
McClellan disapproved. This fact, however, made no
change whatever in respect to his duty.
Important statement of Rev. Lucius C. Matlack.
Perhaps the following stateriient, made to the author
of this treatise by Rev. Lucius C. Matlack, who up to the
time when General McClellan received the order above
referred to had been the chaplain of the Illinois 8th
Cavalry, and afterwards accepted the office of Major in an
Illinbis infantry regiment, may be of interest to my country
men. Mr. Matlack, permit us to add, is now a leading
minister in the Methodist Episcopal Church, and is a man
whose veracity has not yet been questioned. On board a
steamer from James river to Baltimore, our chaplain found
himself in company with two other officers from the Poto
mac army, one of these having been a clerk on the staff of
General F. J. Porter. This clerk remarked to his asso
ciates that there were four Generals in the Potomac
army who would net co-operate with General Pope, nor
obey his orders, when they should come within his depart
ment. We refrain from giving the names of these Gene
rals. The reader, however, will be able to determine their

GENERAL POPE AND THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA. 1 55
names, in view of facts hereafter presented. This clerk
affirmed that he had heard these men converse together
upon the subject, and knew that they had agreed together
to act as above stated. After the close of General Pope's
campaign, this clerk remarked to his associates that they
could now understand how perfectly his statements cor
responded with the facts which had just occurred. We do
not here affirm that any such agreement ever existed be
tween these Generals. We think, however, that the testi
mony of Rev. L. C. Matlack is adequate evidence that
the existence of that agreement was affirmed prior to
the facts referred to, and that the occurrence of the facts
was afterwards presented in verification of said affirma
tion. The question now before us is this : taking that state
ment as one of our guiding lights, how far will it enable
us to explain the facts before us ? The plan of the Con
federates to move upon Washington and capture the city
before the army of the Potomac should be removed thither
for its defence, was, through spies in Richmond, early
communicated to the authorities in Washington, and urged
upon General McClellan as a most imperative reason for the
greatest possible despatch in pushing forward his army to
the threatened capital of the nation. How far did he fulfil
these pressing obligations ? We must bear in mind that,
according to his own statements, he transferred his army,
120,500 strong, in about thirty days. With the most abun
dant means of transportation at his command, it took him
full twenty days to transport to Alexandria and push for
ward to Bealton and Warrenton, so as to co-operate with
General Pope in the defejnce of the national capital, 20,500
men ; and that these were all that were brought forward so
as to fire a gun in any of the battles in which they were
expected to take a part. When these forces did arrive,
they were in as bad a condition as can well be conceived,
The corps of General Heintzelman when it arrived at War
renton was destitute of artillery, and was furnished with
only four rounds of ammunition per man ; the corps of
General Porter being furnished with only forty rounds for
each man. It would seem as if they were sent into the
field with the deliberate intention that they should do as
little effective service as possible. Yet these two corps

156 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
were sent into the field thus powerless for any service in
open opposition to an express order sent on from Washing
ton, namely, " By all means see that the troops sent have
plenty of ammunition," and to the pledge implied in
McClellan's own reply, to wit, " I have ample supplies of
ammunition for infantry and artillery, and will have it up
in time." One of the difficulties which Heintzelman's
corps suffered was the want of the promised supply of
ammunition. But why this unheard-of tardiness in getting his forces
into the field ? On the first day of August, McClellan
received positive instructions to remove his sick and
wounded, their number, according to his own report, being
about 12,500, 4,000 of whom were able "to make short
marches." Not one of these had been removed on the
5th, when he received the absolute command to transport
his entire army to the department of Washington. When
this order was received, the entire fleet put under his
control was put into exclusive requisition to send off the
12,500 men referred to. On the i6th, at 11 p.m., he
telegraphed that " all the sick will be away to-morrow
night," and that " the movement had commenced by land
and water." The movement referred to was not the
embarking of troops, but the commencement of an up
wards of three days' march to their places of embarkation.
Prior to the 12th August, as General McClellan was
informed by a telegram from General Halleck, " Burnside
moved nearly 13,000 to Aquia Creek in two days, and his
transports were immediately sent back to you." Yet,
notwithstanding all that could have been said by com
mand, urgency, and reproof, all being intermingled in the
telegrams sent down from Washington, and notwithstand
ing the revealed peril of the army of Virginia, and the
national capital, not a single division could he be induced
to put aboard one of these, or any other transports, until
about the 20th of the month ; while the 20,500 that were
then sent forward, the only troops that he could be^
induced to send into the field at all, were, in opposition to
absolute command and promise, sent forward In the help
less condition above stated. We challenge the world to
explain these facts but upon one of two hypotheses — that

GENERAL POPE AND THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA. 1 57
General McClellan is a blind and self-willed imbecile, or
that he deliberately intended that the army of Virginia
should be crushed by that of General Lee, and that what
ever the consequences pertaining to the national capital
might be. These deductions will become still more
evident in the sequel.
The new movement of the Confederates, and the new distribution
of forces made by General Pope.
We now return to a consideration of the new move
ments made by General Lee on the one hand, and of
General Pope on the other, from their respective positions
on the Rappahannock. Having been foiled in his attempt
to force a passage across the river in his front, and to turn
General Pope's right wing by crossing said^ river at
Sulphur Springs and Waterloo, General Jackson was
commanded to move several miles west of the places last
designated, then to march north, via Salem, then turn to
his right, and passing through Bull Run mountains by
Thoroughfare Gap, to move from thence directly east in
the direction of Gainesville ; General Lee in the meantime
making all practicable arrangements to move his whole
army as soon as possible in the same direction, it being
necessary, for the protection of his flank and rear, to
retain on the Rappahannock the main body of his army
as long as he was confronted by General Pope. The
movement of Jackson was no surprise to his wakeful
antagonist. From signal stations the number of regi
ments (36) which Jackson had with him was accurately
determined, together with his batteries and cavalry, and
also the specific direction of his column. From these
facts, the plan of General Lee became perfectly manifest ;
which was this, to interpose Jackson between the army of
Virginia and Washington, to hold Pope in check until
Lee should come up in full force, then to fall upon the
former and crush him, and, lastly, to make a rush for the
national capital. The counter plan of General Pope was
'instantly taken, and all the requisite arrangements were
promptly ordered. His own plan, which was communi
cated to Washington, was, in substance, this : to throw his
own army upon Jackson's rear, and cut off his retreat,

158 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
thereby also preventing any reinforcements reaching him
from General Lee ; to confront and hedge in Jackson with
adequate force sent out from Alexandria and Wash
ington, and then crush him between the two forces thus
advancing upon him ; and, last of all, with the united
armies of Virginia and of the Potomac to fall upon
General Lee and make a final disposition of him and of
his army. Such, in fact and form, was the plan of
General Pope, a plan worthy of the greatest General of
the age. "What were the dispositions and arrangements
made and ordered by him for the accomplishment of this
plan ?
Dispositions and arrangements made and ordered by General
Pope for the consummation of his plan.
These dispositions and arrangements may be stated in
a few words. He had just received word (August 23rd and
24th), direct from head-quarters, that reinforcements, con
sisting of Sturgis's division, 10,000 strong. Cox's, 7,000
strong, and the corps of Generals Heintzelman and Franklin,
10,000 each, 37,000 in all, would be forwarded to him that
afternoon or early the next morning. Of the forces thus
promised he forwarded an order that one of the strongest
divisions (10,000) should stop at Manassas and hold the
fortifications there, and that Franklin's corps should be
forwarded with all despatch to Gainesville ; the remainder
promised, with Porter's corps already on the ground, being
deemed sufficient for the work which General Pope had
immediately in hand, as the forces with him would be
much superior to those under Jackson. Of the other
forces promised, none but the single corps of General
Fleintzelman and General Piatt's brigade of Sturgis's
command did arrive at all ; and this body came out from
under the direct cognizance of General McClellan, without
artillery and without ammunition, as above stated. How
and why all the remainder were kept back from moving at
all we shall see hereafter. The forces under his immediate
command were, in the language of General Pope, to " be
assembled along the Warrenton turnpike between Warren
ton and Gainesville, and give battle to the enemy on my
right or left, as he might choose." Suppose now tha*

GENERAL POPE AND THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA. 1 59
Gainesville and Manassas had been occupied as directed,
and that General Cox had been forwarded as promised,
and consequently calculated upon, we may ask any military
man to point out a single defect in the plan under con
sideration, or to show how it 'might have been improved.
Can there be a reasonable doubt that had these directions
been complied with Jackson would have been utterly
routed, and that Lee would never have seen, with his
army, Maryland or Pennsylvania ?
Movements of General Jackson.
The distance which General Jackson, on account of the
obstructions which GeneralPope presented by his dispositions
on the north side of the Rappahannock, was necessitated to
march in reaching Gainesville, was nearly or quite twice as
great as the direct one which lay open to the latter. As
long as General Lee with his main army, however, con
tinued In General Pope's front on the south side of the
river, the latter was necessitated to keep his main army
where it was. Had General Pope turned upon Jackson
while he was in his (Pope's) immediate rear, Lee and
Jackson would, both in front and rear, have fallen upon
the army of Virginia and " ground it to powder." Be
coming fully satisfied, by the evening of the 26th and early
the next morning, that General Lee had gone in the direc
tion which General Jackson had taken. General Pope set
his entire army in motion for the accomplishment of his
plan for the destruction of the army of the latter.
While General Pope had been thus detained. General
Jackson had proceeded by forced marches for the accom
plishment of his masterly flank movement. On arriving
in the vicinity of Gainesville, he found no enemy at all con
fronting him in the direction of Washington or Alexandria.
He accordingly divided his army, sending Ewell to the
south-east to cut the Orange Railroad, near Kettle Run,
some five or six miles east of Warrenton Junction, and
from thence to move towards Bristow Station and Manassas
Junction, destroying the bridges and breaking the railroad
in his course ; while Jackson himself proceeded directly to
the junction last designated. In both directions his move
ments were a success. No enemy was encountered by

l60 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
Ewell. At Manassas Junction the Confederates found
themselves opposed by but a feeble garrison, which was
easily captured, and with it, as one of their historians
states, " several trains heavily laden with stores, ten first
class locomotives, fifty thousand pounds of bacon, several
thousand barrels of flour, and a large quantity of oats and
corn." Such was the position of Jackson's forces on the
evening of August 26th.
General Popi s movements in the direction of Jackson,
By the morning of the 27th General Pope's army, now
54,000 strong, with an enfeebled and worn-out cavalry
amounting to 4,000, was in motion in the direction of
Gainesville and Manassas Junction. General McDowell,
with his own and the corps of Siegel, and the division of
Reynolds, was directed to move -upon Gainesville on the
Warrenton turnpike, and to reach his destination that
night; which was done. On the same evening, Reno,
followed by Kearny, was required to be at Greenwich, a
point a few miles south-west of Gainesville, and from
thence to communicate with and support McDowell. With
Hooker's division. General Pope marched in the direction
of Manassas Junction, directing General Porter to remain
at Warrenton Junction until the arrival of General Banks,
who was coming up from Fayetteville, some six or eight
miles distant, and then to move upon Gainesville, where it
was then expected that the great battle would occur.
About four miles west of Bristow Station, Hooker encoun
tered Ewell's division, and by severe fighting drove it
back to Broad Run, a short distance east of the station
referred to. About 300, killed and wounded, were lost on
each side, Ewell " leaving his dead, many of his wounded,
and much baggage on the field of battle." An absolute
»rder was, about dark, sent back to General Porter at
Warrenton Junction, where his corps had rested all that
day, to march at i o'clock that night for Bristow Station,
and report to General Pope there at daylight the next
morning ; the officer who carried the order being directed
to wait and act as guide to Porter in his march. This order
Porter totally disregarded, not marching even at early dawn,
and arriving at Bristow Station at half-past 2 o'clock. Had

GENERAL POPE AND THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA. l6l
Porter come up as required, he and Hooker united would
have been moved upon Ewell and Jackson, and held them
back until they would have been fallen upon and defeated
by Pope's centre and left, which were advancing for that
purpose. As it was, Jackson made a safe retreat to
Centerville. The following are the positions of the Union and Con
federate forces on the evening of the 27th August : Jackson,
with his own old and Hills' corps, was at Manassas ; while
Ewell was on the east side of Broad Run, at a short dis
tance east of Bristow Station. On the opposite side of the
stream lay Hooker's division. At Warrenton Junction,
some eight or nine miles west, lay Porter's corps, with Banks
in his immediate rear. Near Greenwich, some six or seven
miles north-west of Hooker, lay the divisions of Reno and
Kearny. At and near Gainesville, on Pope's extreme left,
lay McDowell and Siegel. A better distribution offerees,
under the circumstances, is inconceivable ; Jackson being
completely separated from Lee, and the Union forces being
in the best conceivable condition to render the destruction
of the former complete. Suppose, now, that Franklin had
been at Centerville, and Sturgis and Cox at Bull Run (and
a not difficult day's march would have brought all their
forces to the places designated), — where would have been
the hope of General Jackson ? Had he attempted to retreat
south, he would have been easily intercepted by Porter,
Banks, Reno, Kearny, and Hooker, and finally by Sumner,
then at Aquia Landing. Had he turned north, he would
have been crushed between the forces of Sturgis, Cox,
and FrankHn, on the one hand, and those of Hooker,
Kearny, Reno, McDowell, and Siegel, on the other.
Had he given battle where he was, he would have been
overwhelmed by the crushing forces precipitated upon him
from all directions. Why were not these forces in the
positions designated, to say nothing of others m.ore favour
able, which might have been secured for Franklin, Sturgis,
and Cox? For no other reason, as we shall see hereafter,
than flagrant and treasonable disobedience on the part of
General McClellan, to absolute orders from General Pope
on the one hand, and General Halleck on the other.
" At 9 o'clock," says General Pope, "satisfied of Jack-
II

1 62 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
son's position, I sent orders to General McDowell to push
forward at the very earliest dawn of day towards Manassas
Junction from Gainesville,' resting his right on Manassas
Gap railroad, and throwing his left well to the east. I
directed General Reno to march at the same hour from
Greenwich direct upon Manassas Junction, and Kearny to
march at the same hour upon Bristow Station.' Kearny
arrived at Bristow about 8 o'clock in the morning ; Reno
being on his left, and marching direct upon Manassas Junc
tion. I immediately pushed Kearny in pursuit of Ewell
towards Manassas, followed by Hooker." It is perfectly
evident that had the order sent to McDowell been as
promptly and energetically followed as were those sent to
Kearny and Reno, Jackson would have been caught at
Manassas, and forced to fight a great battle there. At
half-past 7 o'clock in the morning, however, General Siegel,
who commanded McDowell's advance, and who had re
ceived an order to move at 2 o'clock upon Manassas, was
at Gainesville. McDowell had also, without Pope's know
ledge, sent one division of his corps, Ricketts's, in the direc
tion of Thoroughfare Gap.
At about 3 o'clock in the morning Jackson began to
evacuate Manassas, directing his flight to the north, towards
Centerville. At 12 o'clock, August 28th, General Pope,
with Kearny's division and Reno's corps, reached Ma
nassas Junction, one hour after Jackson himself had left.
These forces, with Hooker's division, were pushed forward
in pursuit of Jackson towards Centerville ; word being sent
to McDowell to move his whole force in the same direction,
while an order was sent to Porter to advance to Manassas
Junction. Near evening, Kearny drove Jackson's rear
guard out of Centerville, and occupied the place, with his
advance beyond It. In retreating from this place Jackson's
forces divided, one part moving north-west towards Sudley
Springs, and the other part taking the Warrenton turnpike
towards Gainesville. On this road Jackson's advance en
countered the forces of McDowell moving upon Centerville,
and at 6 o'clock in the evening a severe action occurred,
each party maintaining its ground.

GENERAL POPE AND THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA. 1 63
Positions of both armies on the evening of August 2Sth, and
the battles of the day following.
The following are the positions of the opposing armies
on the evening of the 28th August. The main forces of
General Jackson were distributed along the turnpike from
Centerville to Gainesville. Heintzelman and Reno consti
tuted General Pope's right wing, at and near Centerville
confronting Jackson's left and left centre. Siegel on the
Warrenton Road confronted Jackson's right centre; while
McDowell was still farther on Pope's left, with Ricketts's
division some seven or eight miles in the direction oi
Thoroughfare Gap. General Porter, who had been com
manded to advance to Manassas Junction, and was, of
course, supposed to be there, was about midway between
that Junction and Bristow Station, about seven or eight
miles in the rear of Pope's left. At daylight, August
29th, General Pope learned that King's division, which
occupied his extreme left, had fallen back In the direction
of Manassas. This rendered new dispositions and move
ments of his whole line necessary. Heintzelman, with the
divisions of Kearny and Hooker, and these supported by
Reno, was directed to move at early dawn towards Gaines
ville, establish communications with Siegel, and fall upon
the enemy wherever found. Siegel, supported by Rey
nolds's division, was directed to make an attack as soon
as the dawning light rendered the enemy visible. A joint
order was sent to McDowell and Porter, to move with all
their forces and with all speed upon Gainesville, and assault
Jackson's right. A special order to the same effect was
sent to General Porter. The attack made by Siegel and
Heintzelman was a great success, Jackson being driven
back several miles, and yet so closely pressed that about
noon he was compelled to make a final stand,, with his left
in the neighbourhood of Sudley Springs, and his right at
some distance south of the Warrenton turnpike ; every part
of his line being confronted by that of General Pope.
Waiting for McDowell and Porter to come up on his
extreme left. General Pope suffered his men from twelve
until after four o'clock to rest in their positions, and re-
supply themselves with ammunition ; several skirmish-

1 64 THE AMERICAN REBELLION. /
ings occurring all along the lines whenever the enemy
showed the least disposition to retreat. At half-past 4
General Porter was absolutely ordered to assault the
enemy's right, and if possible to turn his rear. An hour
later, when Porter should have been engaged, and General
McDowell was on the field, an attack on the whole line was
ordered. The attack on the enemy's centre, and right
especially, was made with such fury that Jackson's left was
doubled up on his centre, and our forces " occupied the
field of battle with the dead and wounded of the enemy in
our hands." When McDowell had advanced about three-
fourths of a mile in front of our lines, he encountered a
determined and effective resistance from the advance of
Longstreet. Thus matters stood at the close of the day.
Jackson's left and centre had, by dint of hard fighting, with
the most terrible bayonet charges, been driven back some
three or four miles, with his dead and wounded as above
stated. At no point had our line bden forced back beyond
its position in the morning. During the night, the enemy
fell back, and were nowhere visible along our front in the
morning. If we raise the enquiry. Who were the victors on this
day? we have but one answer to give, namely, that we
have higher reasons for claiming a victory for General
Pope on this day, than we have for a similar claim in
behalf of General McClellan at Antietam. In the former
case, both the enemy's left and centre were driven much
farther back than his left was in the latter. In the former
case, the enemy withdrew from our front in the night ;
whereas, in the latter, he remained where he was the
evening before until the next evening, and leisurely
retired. If we should call both of them drawn battles, we
should not greatly err. In view of all the facts, however,
we cannot but agree with General McDowell's remarks
upon the winding up of the bloody conflict : — " These were
the finishing strokes of the day, which we could now safely
claim as ours."
If we enquire still further. Why was nqt this victory
consummated into a Waterloo defeat of the Confederate
forces ? but one answer can, in truth and justice, be given.
All was owing exclusively to one cause, to wit, the

GENERAL POPE AND THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA. 1 65
cowardly and treasonable disobedience to absolute orders
on the part of General Porter, deliberate disobedience by
which full 12,000 fresh troops were held back and retired
from attacking the enemy's right at the critical moment,
when his left was being rolled up upon his centre. Porter
was then upon the field with his own full corps, and
General Piatts's brigade of Sturgis's division left under
his command. Mr. Swinton offers this poor apology for
Porter: — " Before he arrived upon the field, and by lo in
the morning, the advance of Longstreet had come up,
and, taking position on Jackson's right, drew an extension
of the Confederate line across the Warrenton turnpike and'
Manassas Gap Railroad, thus covering all the lines of
approach by which the column of Porter might advance
towards Gainesville." The facts were, indeed, as here
stated, and here we have the most absolute reasons why
Porter should have done what he had been absolutely
ordered to do, namely, assault this extended line, and pre
vent its flanking Pope's left, and rolling it up upon his
centre. He stood still, however, and when he knew that
his brave associates were falling by thousands, basely
refused to take a step, or strike a blow, for their relief.
In a dispatch to Porter, at 4.30 p.m.. General Pope says : —
"Your line of march brings you in on the enemy's right
flank. I desire you to push forward into action at once,
and, if possible, on his rear, keeping your right in com
munication with General Reynolds." "I believe — in fact,
I am positive," says General Pope, " that at 5 o'clock
in the afternoon of the 29th General Porter had in his
front no considerable body of the enemy." Again, if
"he had made a vigorous attack upon the enemy, as
he was expected and directed to do, at any time up to
8 o'clock that night, we should have utterly crushed or
captured the larger portion of Jackson's force before he
could have been by any possibility sufficiently reinforced
to have made any effective resistance." Who is right
here, Mr. Swinton or General Pope ? Let it be borne in
mind that when General McDowell, after finding tnat
Porter would not advance, had taken from the latter King's
division and, uniting it with that of Ricketts, had come
upon the field at , half- past 5 p.m., this extended line

1 66 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
which Mr. Swinton would have us believe was sufficiently
strong to resist the advance of 12,000 men, had made no
move whatever to turn General Pope's left. We must
also keep In mind that when McDowell on his arrival
assaulted this line, King's division drove it back nearly
three-fourths of a mile, before that division met with a
stubborn resistance. We stultify ourselves when we enter
tain the idea that this line had sufficient strength to have
resisted for an hour the united corps of McDowell and
Porter ; that is, a force of upwards of 20,000 men. Whether
there were few or many men in that line. Porter's duty
as a soldier was to have made the attack ordered. For
refusing to do it, in connexion with his other acts of
flagrant disobedience to orders, he has been justly pro
nounced by an impartial court martial unworthy of a
place In the army of his country, and of any office in the
gift of the nation.

THE BATTLE OF THE 3OTH AUGUST.
Two events occurred on the morning of this day, events
which demand special attention, as evincing most palpably
the spirit of the men who determined the destiny of this
campaign. When Porter was moving up into position,
early this morning. General Griffin, who commanded one
of Porter's divisions,— Griffin, without the knowledge of
General Pope, without the knowledge of, or authority
from, any one but himself and Porter, turned aside, and
sneaked off to Centerville, taking with him Piatts's brigade,
which had been placed under the command of the former!
Thus about one half of Porter's corps was secretly placed
where it could, by no possibility, be of any use whatever
on that day. When General Sturgis perceived the treason
able trick which was being played, he promptly took from
Griffin Piatts's brigade, reported to General Pope, and did
excellent service during the day. On the morning of this
day also. General Pope received fiom General Franklin, at
Anandale, some six miles from Alexandria, the following
epistle, — a letter which, in the language of Byron, had
nothing but"^" a laughing devil in its mein " : —

GENERAL POPE AND THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA. 1 67
" August 2()tk, 1^62. 8 p.m.
" I have been instructed by General McClellan to In
form you that he will have all available waggons at Alex
andria loaded with rations for your troops, and all the
cars, also, as soon as you will send in a cavalry escort to
Alexandria as a guard to the train.
" Respectfully, " W. B. Franklin."
Had the escort been sent down, which would have
occupied quite one day, McClellan would unquestionably
have been as long in getting the waggons and cars off as
he had been in getting Franklin off to Anandale.
During the night after the battle on the 29th, and up
to half-past lo o'clock the next day. General Pope, and
the commanders under him, fully believed that the enemy
was retreating. Two courses were now before the army
of Virginia — to follow up the enemy, who was obviously
falling back upon his own reserves ; or to fall back upon
Centerville, where our own reserves were at last concen
trating. The latter undoubtedly was the course demanded
by the highest wisdom, and would have corresponded to
"Wellington's retreat from Quatre Bras to Waterloo. The
former course, as was natural in the circumstances, was
adopted, although we had but about 40,000 fighting men
upon the field. Hence the second battle of Bull Run,
which was commenced about 2 p.m., and raged with terri
ble fury until darkness separated the deadly combatants.
"By dark," says General Pope, "our left, where the
heaviest fighting was, had been forced back about half
or three-quarters of a mile, but still remained firm and
unbroken, and still covered the turnpike in our rear."
At 8 o'clock, in accordance with written instructions, our
army retired in perfect order to Centerville, to which point
the corps of Sumner and Franklin had advanced. Here
the campaign of the army of Virginia really ended, the
enemy afterwards only making demonstrations, as feints,
to cover his ultimate designs, which now were, the idea
of capturing Washington being abandoned, to move across
the Upper Potomac into Maryland and Pennsylvania. In

1 68 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
justice to General Porter, it should be said that on the last
of these days of horrible fighting he was himself again,
and with the one half of his corps which he had not sent
off where they could do nothing, he did effective service
on the field. Up to this time his presence had been nothing
but an eating cancer upon the body of that army, and the
morning of the 30th he had, as stated, recklessly sent
away 5,000 men, whose presence, at the crisis of the
battle, might have changed materially the fortunes of the
day. The losses during these three days, though not
accurately stated, were fearful on both sides ; General Pope
estimating our loss on the 29th at about 7,000, the loss
on the side of the Confederates being supposed to have
been greater than on ours. To flagrant disobedience to
orders, disobedience by which 12,000 men were prevented
firing a gun for two days, and 5,000 rendered useless for
the third, — to such disobedience one half, at least, of this
loss must be charged.
Causes of the disasters of this campaign.
No candid mind can entertain a doubt that had General
Porter been as prompt in obedience to order, and as ener
getic in action, as, for example. General Heintzelman was,
and had 10,000 men been placed in the" fortifications of
Manassas Junction, and 12,000 been sent to Gainesville, as
Pope positively directed, Lee would never have reinforced
Jackson, nor Jackson rejoined Lee ; nor would Lee have
crossed the Potomac, unless as a prisoner of war. Nor
can any such mind doubt the perfect practicability of the
full accomplishment of every order which General Pope
gave. His orders to Porter were just as plain as were
those to Heintzelman, and obedience in one case was just
as practicable and sacredly binding as in the other. We
should stultify ourselves if, for a moment, we should enter
tain the idea that 10,000 men might not have been placed
in the fortifications at Manassas Junction, before Jackson
arrived there, and that 12,000 men might not have been sent
to Centerville or Gainesville, as General Pope ordered. Who
can believe that it was needful to employ, for eighteen
days, all the available fleet and transports of the United
States, in transporting from McClellan's quarters to a

GENERAL POPE AND THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA. 1 69
place of safety 12,500 sick and wounded men, 4,000 of
whom were reported able to make short and easy marches ?
Who can believe that after orders had been given to
remove that army with the greatest possible dispatch,
fifteen days need to have transpired before a single man
capable of taking the field was sent off to the place
required ? Say not that the fleet was employed in carrying
off the sick and wounded The portion of the fleet which,
in two days, conveyed Burnside's corps, 13,000 strong,
from that vicinity to Aquia, was immediately sent back
to McClellan, and was not needed to carry away the sick.
By availing himself of this fleet, he, might, undeniably,
between the 12th and 20th August, when his first rein
forcements were sent off, have forwarded to Aquia and
Alexandria at least 50,000 men. Who, let us ask again,
can believe that in twenty-five days, after the absolute
order was given to forward reinforcements with all possible
haste, but 20,500 men could have been sent to the army of
Virginia? We are not fools ; and we should make fools of
ourselves, if we should admit that there was all diligence,
that there was anything but intentional delay, in this case.
Look now at the facts which transpired after the arrival
of McClellan at Alexandria. He was specifically directed,
as we have seen, to be certain that all the men he sent off
were well supplied with ammunition, and had avowed him
self well able to comply, and absolutely pledged himself
to comply, with the requisition. Yet, not a corps or divi
sion did he send off that was furnished with ammunition
adequate for a single battle, the uniform average being
but forty rounds per man. On the 23rd August, General
Pope received a message from the Commander-in-Chief
that " heavy reinforcements would begin to arrive at
Warrenton Junction the succeeding day." On the 24th,
General Pope received word from Colonel Haupt, railroad
superintendent at Alexandria, " that 30,000 men had de
manded from him transportation, and that they would all
be shipped that afternoon or early the next morning."
The forces specifically promised " consisted of the division
of General Sturgis, 10,000 strong; the divit.ion of General
Cox, 7,000 strong; the corps of General Heintzelman,
10,000 strong; and the corps of General Franklin, 10,000

170 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
Strong," — 37,000 in all. Of these, General Pope directed
that 10,000 should stop at Manassas Junction, and 10,000
be forwarded to Gainesville. To accomplish these direc
tions required no change of railroad arrangements what
ever. The cars containing the first 10,000 would stop at
Manassas ; those containing the second would diverge
from thence on the Manassas Gap Railroad to Gainesville ;
while the remainder would have moved directly on to
Warrenton. Of all these 37,000 reinforcements thus in
fact and form promised, not a man, with the exception
of Heintzelman's corps and a single brigade of General
Sturgis's division, ever came to Warrenton, or was sent out
of Alexandria as pledged ; and Jackson took unresisted
possession of Gainesville and Manassas Junction both.
Why were all the rest of these forces kept back ? The
men were on the ground, and had demanded transportation.
Ample means of transportation were on hand, as Colonel
Haupt affirmed. Yet about 25,000 of the promised rein
forcements remained in Alexandria. For this fact but one
cause can be assigned — flagrant, if not treasonable, dis
obedience to orders from the Commander-in-Chief on the
part of General McClellan. Not a man could move until
the latter ordered it. What were the orders which he did
receive on this subject ? On the 27th, at 10 a.m., he re
ceived from General Halleck an order " to have Franklin's
corps march in the direction of Manassas Junction as
soon as possible." At 10.40 a.m., McClellan replies:
" I have sent orders to Franklin to prepare to march with
his corps at once, and to repair here in person to inform
as to his means of transportation." At meridian. General.
Halleck telegraphs again, " Porter reports a general battle
imminent. Franklin's corps should move out by forced
marches, carrying three or four days' provisions, and to
be supplied as far as possible by railroad." To this, the
following reply was immediately sent : " My aid has just
i'-eturned from General Franklin's camp; reports that
Generals Franklin, Smith, and Slocum are all in Washing
ton. He gave orders to the next in rank to place the
corps in readiness to move at once." August 28th,
General Halleck sent the following order to Franklin :
"On parting with General McClellan, about 2 o'clock

GENERAL POPE AND THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA. 171
this morning, it was understood that you were to move
with your corps to-day towards Manassas Junction, to
drive the enemy from the railroad. I have just learned
that the General has not yet returned to Alexandria. If
you have not received his order, act on this." At
I p.m. McClellan, not Franklin, replies: " Your despatch
to Franklin received. I have been doing all possible
to hurry artillery and cavalry. The moment Franklin
can be started with a reasonable amount of artillery,
he shall go." To this. General Halleck replies : " Not
a moment must be lost in pushing as large a force as
possible to Manassas, so as to communicate with Pope,
before the enemy is reinforced." At 4 p.m. McClellan
replies: "Franklin's corps has been ordered to march at
6 o'clock to-morrow morning." At 10 30, August 29th,
McClellan telegraphs Halleck again : " Franklin's corps is
in motion : started about 6 a.m. I can give him but two
squadrons of cavalry." " I do not think Franklin is in a
condition to accomplish much if he meets strong resistance.
I should not have moved him but for your pressing orders
last night." Under what orders, as far as General Halleck
was concerned, did Franklin move ? We know, in view
of those orders, how the message " Franklin's corps is in
motion " was understood by the authorities at Washing
ton. Under what secret orders from McClellan did he
move ? This, and nothing more — to march, not for Ma
nassas, or Pope's army, but as far as Anandale, some six
miles from Alexandria, and then stop. Was not the declara
tion, made as it was in reply to an absolute order that
Franklin should move on to Manassas, and accompanied
as it was by the secret order under consideration, — was not
the declaration "Franklin's corps is in motion" a black
and treasonable falsehood ? We can make nothing else out
of it. With what coolness was the following telegram to
General Halleck, a message sent at noon of this same day,
dictated : "Do you wish the movement of Franklin's corps
to continue? He is without reserve, ammunition, and
without transportation." The facts, and the telegrams
before us, render it palpably evident that in the face of
absolute orders from the supreme authorities, orders given
both to McClellan and Franklin, on the one hand, and

172 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
absolute pledges and affirmations on the other, nothing
whatever had been done even to prepare Franklin to
move, that there had been a deliberate intention not to get
him ready, and not to have him move at all. Franklin was
" without reserve." Yet, Cox was there with 7,000 vete
rans, with whom he would gladly have directly moved upon
the field, or as a reserve to any force that was thus moving.
Nearly or quite 7,000 of Sturgis's division were there, and
these could as readily have been sent out as the division
of Cox. Franklin "was without ammunition." Yet,
McClellan, as he himself had affirmed, had an abundance
of ammunition, and had been absolutely commanded, and
had as absolutely promised, not to send any into the
field not abundantly furnished with ammunition. Franklin
"was without transportation." Yet, as the master of
transportation affirmed, the means of transportation were
abundant in Washington, and Franklin or McClellan
could, at any moment, have had all that was needful by
simply " asking for it." Franklin "was without reserve,
without ammunition, and without transportation," simply
because McClellan deliberately intended that if he moved
at all he should go out in this identical state, a condition
in which he could have been of no use anywhere. Can we
wonder that when General Halleck was informed that
General Franklin was at Anandale in that state, and with
no intent to go any farther, he charged McClellan to his
face with open and flagrant disobedience to orders ? In
any military country on earth but this, any General who
should be thus guilty would be promptly tried at court
martial and shot. On the 28th, for example. General
Halleck sends this telegram : " Not a moment must be
lost in pushing as large a force as possible towards Ma
nassas, so as to communicate with Pope before the enemy
is reinforced." At this moment, aside from thousands of
other forces not designated, those of Franklin, Cox, and
Sturgis, as above designated, with large forces at Falmouth,
weie under McClellan's immediate command, and all in a
movable condition. Yet all, in the face of such orders as
the above, were deliberately held back.
McClellan's telegram to the President, August 29th,
and his message through Franklin on the same day, de-

GENERAL POPE AND THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA. 1 73
mand special notice here. " I am clear," he says to the
President, "that one of two courses should be adopted;
first, to concentrate all our available forces to open com
munication with Pope ; second, to leave Pope to get out
of his scrape, and at once to use all our means to make the
capital perfectly safe." Learning from Washington that
the army of Virginia was suffering from want of provisions,
he directs Franklin to write to General Pope that if he
will send a cavalry escort to Alexandria, General McClellan
will, on their arrival, "have all the available waggons at
Alexandria loaded with rations for your troops, and all the
cars also." The army of Virginia, of whom the above was
said, and to whom the above message was sent, an army
which was within twenty-five or thirty miles distance from
McClellan's quarters, and was then in a death-grapple
with superior forces, and in this condition was hunger-
smitten, — this army, we must bear in mind, was an American
army, and was composed wholly of McClellan's old com
panions' in arms, or of men who had been trained and
had acted under him ; and he was in full hearing of the
thunder of the cannon by which these men were being
slaughtered. To say that a commander under such cir
cumstances can coolly talk of such an army "getting out
of its scrape" the best way it can, and can mock at their
hunger by such a message as the above, — to say that such
a man has, or can have, a human, an American, or a
soldier's heart in him, is to belie human nature, to vilify
American patriotism, and to slander the heart of every
true soldier on earth. Multitudes of facts of the same
character as the above might be adduced. But we for
bear. Of this we are perfectly confident, that no candid
mind can take into full account all the facts of the case
without coming to this immutable conclusion, that the dis
asters which did finally befall the army of Virginia are
wholly attributable to one exclusive cause — a deliberately
predetermined plan on the part of certain commanders, a
plan carried out with remorseless fidelity, to withhold
from that army the aid which it needed, and which was
ordered to it ; not to co-operate with General Pope, or to
obey his orders upon the field, but to leave him alone, and
solitary, to the tender mercies of Jackson and Lee, and

174 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
let the nation endure the consequences. _ There are, in the
cold and gloomy recesses of certain minds, capacities for
such plans and purposes as the above, and such capacities
did undeniably exist in certain leading minds in the army
of the Potomac. Retirement of General Pope.
After the bloody and unfortunate battle of the 30th at
Bull Run, and the orderly retirement of our exhausted and
bleeding forces to Centerville, General Pope found himself
at last in the presence of reinforcements which enabled
him to turn round and boldly face his antagonist once
more ; the corps of Generals Sumner and Franklin having
at last been sent forward thus far. While our army lay
here, Lee made no attack in front, but attempted to turn
our right by a movement by Chantilly, a village some five
or six miles north of Centerville. At this place the enemy
was assaulted by General Pope, and amid a terrible
thunder-storm a battle was fought, with the advantage
decidedly on our side. In this battle, aside from the loss
of about 500 killed and wounded, we suffered an irre
parable loss in the deaths of Generals Kearny and Stevens.
After this no fighting of any importance occurred, the
army of Virginia being brought within the fortifications
about Washington ; while General Lee was left free to
carry out the second feature of his plan, the first, the
capture of Washington, having been defeated, namely, to
carry the war into Maryland.
Having fully accomplished his mission, the saving of
Washington, General Pope requested, and at length ob
tained, permission to retire from a command to which he
was called in opposition to his own urgent request, and to
reassume one at the West, where his services had always
been appreciated. How many are to be reckoned among
the killed, wounded, and missing in the army of Virginia
while it existed under his command, only a proximate
estimate can be made, no complete official returns ever
having been published. The Confederates confess to a
loss on their side of upwards of 15,000 men, and their
estimates were never too high, being made, at the time,
for effect upon the Southern mind. Our los.«- from all

GENERAL POPE AND THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA. 1 75
causes, must .have been considerably upwards of 20,000
brave men. In the winding up of the campaign of this
army, we have to confess, in a certain form, a second Bull
Run defeat, — a defeat, however, in which nothing can be
designated which is not most honourable to the army
which suffered. Of the campaign of this army we would
say that of no other campaign which occurred during the
war is the national mind so little informed and so strangely
misinformed as of this. With very few exceptions, we
believe that our best read citizens, in common with the
people generally, conceive, for example, that in this second
battle of Bull Run General Lee "actually met and defeated
the united armies of Virginia and of the Potomac. What
a different aspect is put upon the whole case when we
become distinctly aware that even in this battle there were
not 15,000 rrien from the latter army actually engaged,
and in no other were there as many as 12,000. It is
literally true that with the exception of this " little help,"
and in circumstances in which the army of Virginia miglit
have had, and but for treasonable disobedience to orders
would have had, the aid of at least 50,000 veteran troops,
it was ruthlessly left to " tread the winepress alone; " and
never did an army with more patient endurance and self-
sacrificing fidelity pour out its blood for its country.
In regard to the commander of this army, and it never
had but one, we would say, that he is not the first eagle
that has been " hawked at and killed by a mousing owl."
General Fremont, to whom the Western Department is
more indebted than to any other man, was suddenly cut
short in his most brilliant career. Yet history, though
the people more than surmised, does not tell us for what,
or for whom, this was done. It was at the suggestion of
General McDowell that all those railroad connexions be
tween the north and the south of Washington were perfected,
connexions so beneficial during the war. While General
McClellan was Commander-in-Chief, and confined by sick
ness in Washington, General McDowell, as directed by
President Lincoln, proposed a specific plan for the future
campaign, a plan which if carried out with vigour would
have insured the capture of Richmond, and the destruction
of the Confederate army in Virginia, within the space of a

176 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
few weeks. When our vast army was lying before Wash
ington "rooted and grounded in mud," and its commander
was awe-struck with the fearful array of quaker-guns at
Centerville, Fairfax, and Manassas, General McDowell
submitted in writing a definite plan, not only for the
bringing out of ours upon dry land, but for the capture of
the Confederate army. When the removal of our army
from the front of the enemy down to the Peninsula was
determined on. General McDowell and other corps com
manders submitted a written protest against the measure.
"For having, out of regard to the best interests of my
country, dared to do such things," said General McDowell
to us personally, " I, a ruined man, am hereunder the dark
cloud which hangs over me." When General Pope, at the
close of his campaign, reported in person to the General-
in-Chief, the Secretary of War, and the President, " Each
of these high functionaries," said General Pope, " received
me with the greatest cordiality, and expressed in the most
decided manner his appreciation of my services and of the
conduct of my military operations.
" Great indignation was expressed at the treacherous
and unfaithful conduct of officers of high rank who were
directly or indirectly connected with those operations ; and
so decided was this feeling, and so determined the purpose
to execute justice upon them, that I was urged to furnish
for use to the Government immediately a brief official
report of the campaign." Notwithstanding these palpable
facts, and notwithstanding a minor offender was after
wards punished. General McClellan was reinstated in full
command of the army of the Potomac, and General Pope
was sent in apparent disgrace to the Western Department.
Yet, when history shall present the facts of this war as they
were, it will be " read and known of all men " that no one
of all our other campaigns was conducted with more
consummate ability than this, and that to no General does
the nation ow^e a deeper debt of gratitude than to Major-
General John Pope. But for his masterly dispositions,
watchful diligence, and tireless energy, the national
capital would undeniably have been in the hands of the
Confederates before a man would have been got up for its
defence from the army of the Potomac. The object of

GENERAL POPE AND THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA. 1 77
Jackson's advance from Gordonsville across the Rapidan is
obvious ; to wit, to seize the fords and bridges across the
Rappahannock, and thus secure for the entire Confederate
army an uninterrupted advance to Washington. Had this
end been secured, or had General Lee been able to force a
direct and immediate passage across the river last named,
the army of Virginia would have been scattered before him
as chaff before the whirlwind, and Washington would
have been at his mercy. Nothing but General Pope's
masterly dispositions, first north of the Rapidan, and then
north of the Rappahannock, held back the advance of
the Confederate army in its entireness from the 5th to
the 30th August, and thus rendered it impossible for Mc
Clellan's .slowness, and the " treacherous and unfaithful
conduct" of himself and certain of his subordinates to
prevent the successful protection of Washington. When
General Pope's plans, and the special dispositions and
movements of his forces, shall become the subject of full
and impartial criticism, none but very poorly read strate
gists and tacticians will pretend to discover any sf cial
defect in them, while all who understand the subjec, V.H11
award them their deep and almost unqualified admiration.
No General ever conducted a campaign under greater
embarrassments, or made a better use of the forces under
his command. When, for example, Jackson made his
detour round through Thoroughfare Gap to Manassas
Junction, his object was to intervene between the army of
Virginia and that of the Potomac, an^ to hold them apart
until the arrival of Lee with his whole army, when both
should fall, first upon Pope and crush him, and then turn
upon the forces of the army of the Potomac, and crushing
that, seize Washington. The plan of General Pope, on the
other hand, was to throw his army between those of Jackson
and Lee, and while the latter was coming up, to crush the
former between his own and the army of the Potomac, and
then, with both united, to fall upon Lee and crush him.
The duty of Lee as a soldier, on the one hand, and of
McClellan as a soldier and under absolute orders, on the
other, is obvious. The duty of the former was to push his
army with all possible dispatch to Jackson, that the plan of
the Confederate commanders might have been a success.
12

178 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
That of the latter was to do all he possibly could to
forward adequate reinforcements to Pope, and to perfect
the dispositions requisite to consummate the plan which he
had propounded. Lee did all that human energy could
have done to reinforce Jackson. McClellan, on the other
hand, did all he could to prevent adequate reinforcements
reaching General Pope, and to prevent all dispositions
requisite to the carrying out of his plans. In the final
result, Lee, while he did inflict bleeding wounds upon his
antagonist, failed to crush either the army of Virginia or
of the Potomac, and in his ultimate plan for the capture
of Washington. General Pope, on the other hand, while
treachery and disobedience to orders prevented his doing
.all that he had most wisely planned, did inflict terrible
blows upon Jackson, rescued his hungry, weary, and bleed
ing army from the encircling folds of the entire Confederate
forces, brought that army in order and safety to Centerville,
where he found himself encircled with forces which his an
tagonist dared not meet, and thus placing an impregnable
bulwark between the national capital and the Confederacy,
rendered his campaign a glorious success. These facts are
undeniably true of General Pope in the conduct of this
campaign. When he had forces under line, forces adequate
to the accomplishment of what was needed, his plans for
the accomplishment of that end were faultless, and were
executed with the quickness and force of the thunderbolt.
When new and unexpected exigencies arose, exigencies
demanding new dispositions of his forces, his adjustments
were of the promptest and most unerring character.
When help was promised, expected, calculated upon, and
not received, he never in a single instance, d la mode Mc
Clellan, stopped in his career, and did nothing but show
his teeth at the supreme authorities, but instantly set about
making the best possible use of the resources actually
under his command.

CHAPTER XII.
GENERAL LEE'S INVASION OF MARYLAND.
At the commencement of our civil war, the sentiment of
the State of Maryland was almost exclusively with the
South. It was from the first the fixed belief of the Con
federate authorities that the presence of General Lee with
a large army, more especially if Washington were pre
viously captured, would induce a general rising of the
people in favour of the Rebellion. Failing in his direct
attempt upon the national capital, the Confederate com
mander still believed that by an advance into this State
his army would be so increai^ed that he might yet capture
Washington by moving upon it from the north. With this
end in view, he turned aside from General Pope, moved
his army to Leesburg, crossed it over the Potoma'c near
that place, and on the 6th September concentrated his
forces at Frederick, meeting with no resistance anywhere.
From this place he issued a most stirring and seductive
address to the people of Maryland, calling upon them to
rally around his standard, and thereby vindicate for them
selves and their State their proper and desired place In
the sisterhood of the Confederacy. While the people of
Maryland were in heart as disloyal as General Lee sup
posed, they had, by the hard instruction of adamantine
facts, learned discretion. Hence the appeal of the Con
federate commander, while it excited universal sympathy,
failed to draw volunteers around his standard, the number
of desertions from his ranks surpassing the increase from
enlistmenti, For this reason General Lee, before our army
approached to drive him on, determined to retire back to
Virginia, and had, as we shall see, given his orders
accordingly.

l80 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
When the fact of General Lee's invasion became known
to the authorities in Washington, General McClellan, the
army of Virginia being blended into that of the Po,tomac,
was put in full command of all our forces, now known
again as the army of the Potomac. The mission of
McClellan now being the expulsion of Lee, all our forces
in and about Washington, at and in the vicinity of Fort
ress Monroe, and within calling distance everywhere, were
placed under the command of the former, the only excep
tion to the above grants being that none of the forces
under General Heintzelman, now left in command at
Washington, should be withdrawn without leave of the
President. What should have been done in the circumstances.
Before advancing to a consideration of the course which
events actually did take, we will stop for a moment to
consider the course which they would have taken under
the directions of any able strategist. The army which
General Lee had with him In the State of Maryland con
stituted, with few exceptions, the entire army of the Con
federacy that had been collected in the State of Virginia ;
all the important corps and divisions, and all the leading
Generals in that army, being present with General Lee,
and this army, even according to the extravagant estimate
of General McClellan, numbered, while at Antietam, less
than 100,000 men. What was the amount of available
forces under the control of our commander? When General
McClellan moved out from Washington, he took with him
an army quite 100,000 strong. At the same time, up
wards of 100,000 veteran troops were left behind under
General Heintzelman, as stated to us by himself per
sonally, for the defence of the national capital. As con
firmatory of these statements, we notice the fact that on
the 30th September, thirteen days after the battle ot
Antietam, General McClellan officially reported as pre
sent for duty in the army of the Potomac 173,775 rnen.
During this month, he had lost, at Harper's Ferry, South
Mountain, and Antietam, between 30,000 and 40,000 men.
At the same time, there was left two full corps, quite 30,000
men, in the vicinity of Fortres" Monroe. Nor will any one

GENERAL LEe's INVASION OF MARYLAND. l8l
doubt the practicability of assembling at Harrisburg, from
the Western Departments, in time to have taken an effec
tive part in the campaign, at least 30,000 regular troops.
Such was the field before our commander, and such were
his resources on that field. What would a strategist have
done under such circumstances ? By his advance into
Maryland, General Lee had most fully uncovered Rich
mond, just as Buonaparte uncovered Paris by moving his
own between the armies of Blucher and Scwartzenburg, in
his attempt to fall upon their communications. A strate
gist in General McClellan's circumstances would, first of
all, have turned his thoughts towards Richmond. Under
the command of Generals Wool and Keyes, there were
present in the Peninsula about 30,000 men. By sending
20,000 men to Yorktown, and ordering General Wool to
move thither with all his available forces. General Keyes
would have marched into Richmond with about as little
loss as General Lee suffered In his advance from Leesburg
to Frederick. The capture of Lee would then only have
been a question of time.
Suppose, however, that the first movement determined
on had been upon General Lee. What would have been
the single end which a strategist would have proposed
here? Not the expulsion of Lee from Maryland and
^Pennsylvania, but the prevention of his return to Virginia
-> the one hand, and the capture of his army on the other ;
3.11 movements and dispositions would have been
orufcix, ' with exclusive reference to this one single end.
In moving out from Washington, his left would have been
advanced to Harper's Ferry, and at least 40,000 men
would have been stationed there. His centre and right,
the former kept in supporting distance with the force first
designated, would have been extended in the direction of
Baltimore and Frederick. Having thus placed an impas
sable barrier between Lee and Richmond, nothing now,
in the matter of direct assault, would have been hurried.
Every available force from every part of the country
would have been, with all possible dispatch, hastened to
the scene. Those from the east and south would have
been brought up directly to the army of the Potomac.
Those from the west would have been hastened on to

l82 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
Harrisburg ; while volunteers, as in the case of the in
vasion of Burguoyne, would have been concentrated at the
same point. As soon as all was in readiness — and all could
Jiave been done in a few days — our great army would have
drawn its folds around the invading force and crushed it.
Not a division of General Lee's army would have escaped
into Virginia. We very cheerfully submit the above sug
gestions to the verdict of our countrymen and the world.
We boldly affirm, what we did affirm at the time, that had
ordinary strategic wisdom controlled our military councils
at Washington at this time, the termination of this Mary
land campaign would have been the collapse of the Rebel
lion, the life of the Confederacy being indissolubly linked
with the existence of the army of General Lee.
What General McClellan and our military authorities did
propose.
In the presence of this golden opportunity, an oppor
tunity which almost never occurs to a commander during
the progress of the ages, what did General McClellan and
our military authorities propose to do ? Just this, and
nothing more. Not to inflict any positive injury upon the
Confederate army at all, much less to capture it, but
simply to prevent the capture of Washington and Balti
more, and the invasion of Pennsylvania, and to drive the
•invading force out of Maryland. Such is the specific in
terpretation which McClellan himself gives of the plan
under consideration. " The movement from Washington
into Maryland," he says, " which culminated in the battles
of South Mountain and Antietam, was not a part of an
offensive campaign. Its object was to preserve the
national capital and Baltimore, to protect Pennsylvania
from invasion, and to drive the enemy out of Maryland.
These purposes were fully and finally accomplished by
the battle of Antietam." In other words, a set of unruly
cattle had broken through our inclosures. The object of
our movement upon them was, not to hurt, capture, or
pound the cattle, — compassionate creatures that we were! —
but to head them, and get them out of our fields, put up
the fence behind them, and let them do as they might,
and break into our inclosures again as opportunities might

GENERAL LEe's INVASION OF MARYLAND. 1 83
present themselves. W"e blush with shame for our country.
when we call to mind the fact that such a mind as that, for
so long a period, planned our campaigns, and determined
the movements of our great armies.
The campaign as conducted by General McClellan.
The carrying out of the plan under consideration was
a very plain and simple affair. All that our commander
had to do was to select from the immense forces around
him an army out-numbering that of General Lee, to pass
up between him and Baltimore, and thus head him back
towards the sacred soil, to follow him at a respectful dis
tance, to strike him only when he should stop or move too
slow, and to continue the process until the enemy had
passed over from ours into his own borders. Historians
greatly err in their representations that the forces led by
General McClellan in this campaign were selected from two
wearied and dispirited armies. That of the Potomac had
had full two months' quiet rest and recuperation. We, of
course, except the small part that had acted with General
Pope. The army of Virginia had had several days of severe
marching, and two of terrible fighting. The perfect order
in which it came off from the bloody field of Bull Run, how
ever, evinced anything but dispiritedness and demoraliza
tion. Neither army had endured hardships not common to
all regular armies In times of war. No General had ever led
a better army, or one better able and prepared to do and
to dare, than that led by General McClellan when he went
forth to drive General Lee out of Maryland. The army
led forth on this mission, the forces under Colonel Miles
at Harper's Ferry included, amounted, according to its
commander's reckoning, from 110,000 to 120,000 men.
At Antietam, he had, as he officially states, a force of
87,164 men. Quite 14,000 arrived the next morning.
Add to these the 11,583 captured at Harper's Ferry, and
what had been lost at South Mountain and other places,
and the number remains as above stated.
In moving out from Washington, the march of our
army was very slow, averaging about six miles a day.
The reason assigned for this was the uncertainty of the
enemy's whereabouts and plans. In the early advance a

1 84 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
difference of opinion obtained between Generals Hailed
and McClellan, not, as Mr. Swinton states, in regard to the
rapidity of the movements of the latter, but in respect to
the disposition to be made of the forces under Colonel
Miles at Harper's Ferry; the former requiring that they
should be left where they were, and the latter that they
should be united with his forces. If the final object of the
campaign was the capture of General Lee's army, then the
last thing that should have been done was the abandonment
of the fundamental strategic point under consideration.
The force at this point, instead of being removed, should, as
we have stated, and as it might, have been rendered at least
40,000 or 50,000 strong. If, on the other hand, the object
of the campaign was as General McClellan understood it,
viz., to drive Lee out of Maryland, then the last place that
should have been retained was Harper's Ferry. Every ford
and bridge over the Potomac and north of Leesburg should
have been left free for General Lee to retreat over. Gene
ral Halleck, the Secretary of War, and the President, did
believe that heavy blows, at least, should fall upon General
Lee while he was being driven out of Maryland. Hence
they unitedly contended that the troops at Harper's Ferry
should be reinforced, and not removed. When the plan
of McClellan was fully understood, and when it was too
late to remedy its defects, full power was given him over
the forces under Colonel Miles. Nor did General Halleck
ever complain, as General McClellan and Mr. Swinton
state, that the latter moved too fast, or too far from Wash
ington. "In respect to General McClellan going too fast,
or too far from "Washington," says General Halleck before
the Committee on the'^onduct of the War, "there can be
found no such telegram from me to him. I telegraphed him
that he was going too far, not from Washington, but from
the Potomac ; that he was pushing forward his right too fast
relatively to the movements of his left, not that the army
was moving too fast or too far from Washington. The only
telegram from which the story that General McClellan was
complained of as " moving too fast, and too far from Wash
ington," is the following, bearing date September 14th:
" Scouts report a large force still on the Virginia side of the
Potomac, near Leesburg. If so, I fear you are exposing

GENERAL LEE'S INVASION OF MARYLAND. 1 85
your left flank, and that the enemy can cross in your
rear." On the 1 2th the advance of General McClellan's army,
after a severe skirmish with General L^e's rear, entered
Frederick. While here, September 13th, our commander
obtained a copy of a general order from General Lee, an
order giving, in detail, the direction which every corps and
division of his army was to take in a general retreat from
Maryland back Into Virginia. The plan of General Lee in
cluded two essential features, both being distinctly stated or
implied in the order — the capture of Miles's force at Har
per's Ferry, and the concentration, after that, of his entire
army at some point where a general battle might be safely
risked with our army, future movements to be determined by
the results of said battle. The carrying out of his plan
necessitated General Lee to divide his army into two
nearly equal parts, the parts to be located for a time on
opposite sides of the Potomac, and at a distance of from 30
to 40 miles, as the forces must march, from each other. In
accomplishing the plan of capturing Harper's Ferry, Jack
son moved with four divisions of Lee's army, those of Ewell,
A. P. Hill, Jones, and Lawton, moving with these through
Boonsborough, and crossing the Potomac at Williamsport,
and advancing upon Miles from the west. The divisions
of McLaws and Walker were to move down from Lee's
left ; the former to take possession of Maryland Heights
on the west side of the river, and the latter to cross at
Cheek's Ford below, and seize Loudon Heights south of the
junction of the Shenandoah and the Potomac rivers. Thus
quite one-half of Lee's army was to be concentrated at this
one point. The other portion, under Longstreet's command,
the divisions of Anderson, D. H. Hill, a.nd Stuart's cavalry,
were to move to Hagerstown and Boonsborough, to which
points Jackson was to return, after having disposed of our
forces at Harper's Ferry. Such were the startling facts
which suddenly presented themselves to our commander.
His main forces were at Frederick, Franklin's corps at the
south-west of this point, between it and the point where
Jackson, McLaws, and Walkef were to meet. Nearly mid
way between the distant points where the divided forces of
Lee were to be located, ^id buf about 23 miles directly in

1 86 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
front of ours under McClellan, lay Sharpsburg, connected,
as we shall see, with Frederick by highroads over which
our army could march by day and by night. All this is
rendered absolutely evident by the following fact, stated in
his report, by General McClellan himself: " Humphrey's
division of new troops," lie says, " in their anxiety to par
ticipate in the battle which was raging when they received
the order to march from Frederick at about half-past 3
p.m. on the 17th, pushed forward during the entire night,
and the mass of the division reached the army the following
morning." By a single day's march then, McClellan might
have occupied Sharpsburg, and rendered the reunion of
Lee's separated forces an utter impossibility. This, un
deniably, is just what a skilful strategist would have done.
Miles would have been commanded to hold out to the last
possible moment, and this for the purpose of keeping Jack
son, McLaws, and Walker at Harper's Ferry, until the move
ment to Sharpsburg was perfected. This end having been
accomplished, the last white elephant that Jackson and his
coadjutors would desire to have upon their hands would
have been Miles and his forces, and all hopes of reuniting
their divided armies would have totally died out of the
minds of Jackson and Lee both.
Another and perhaps a still better movement was prac
ticable to General McClellan. While he had sent a small
portion of his forces after General Lee, he might with his
main army have moved by his left, have crushed the divi
sions of McLaws and Walker, have rescued our forces under
Miles at Harper's Ferry, and then have moved, the distance
being but 10 or 12 miles, on the east side of the Potomac
up to Sharpsburg, and there interposed his army between
those of Jackson and Lee. Each movement would have
been equally fatal to the Confederacy. What did Gene
ral McClellan do under such propitious circumstances?
Instead of making any attempt whatever to interpose his
army between Jackson and Lee, instead of advancing his
main army in the direction of Harper's Ferry and crushing,
as he might have done, McLaws and Walker, who were
moving thither on the north and east side of the Potomac,
he directed his main forces on the highroads which the
main army of Lee had taken, all of that army but the divi-

GENERAL LEe's INVASION OF MARYLAND. 1 87
sions under McLaws and Walker; and he advanced his right
wing so as to compel Lee to move on through Hagerstown
and Boonsborough to Sharpsburg ; Franklin being left to
care for Harper's Ferry. The advance of our army upon
the heels of General Lee being more rapid than the Con
federate commander had anticipated, brought on a severe
engagement between Franklin's advance and the force of
McLaws at Crampton's Gap, and that of McClellan's
centre and right at Turner's Gap, in South Mountain.
In the engagements at both these points, the enemy was
finally driven back with great loss ; that on our side also
being quite severe. Our loss in both engagements
amounted in killed and wounded to 2,101 ; that of the
enemy from similar causes being nearly as large, with the
addition of nearly 2,000 prisoners. These engagements
occurred on the 14th, and by the evening of that day the
passes of the mountains were in our hands. Franklin failed
to push on to Harper's Ferry in time to save Miles ; whose
force, he having been previously killed, surrendered at
8 a.m., the enemy capturing 11,583 men, 73 guns, 13,000
small arms, 200 waggons, and a vast quantity of tents and
camp equipage. By 8 a.m. of the 15th, Franklin learned
from the cessation of the firing that Miles's command had
surrendered, and so informed General McClellan.
The victory of South Mountain had an extactic effect
upon the mind of General McClellan, and greatly.insplrlted
his army. At 3 o'clock in the morning of the 15th, being
fully aware that he had defeated the forces of D. H. Hill,
Longstreet, and McLaws, and that they had disappeared
in his front, he sent the following telegram to General
Halleck : " The enemy disappeared during the night ; our
troops are now advancing in pursuit." At 8 o'clock the
same morning he sends the following telegram : " I have
just learned from General Hooker, in the advance, who
states that the information is perfectly reliable that the
enemy is making for Shepherdstown in a perfect panic,
and General Lee last night stated publicly that he must
admit they had been shockingly whipped. I am hurrying
everything forward to endeavour to press their retreat to
the utmost." At 10 the same morning he telegraphs
again : " Information this moment received completely

1 88 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
confirms the rout and demoralization of the Rebel army.
General Lee is reported wounded, and Garland killed.
Hooker alone has over i,ooo more prisoners. It is
stated that Lee gives his loss as 15,000." When these
telegrams were circulated throughout the country, the
nation, of course, was electrified. This excitement was
somewhat cooled by the intelligence which immediately
followed, that we had lost in prisoners, in one body, nearly
12,000 men, making our admitted loss in killed, wounded,
and missing, nearly as large as the falsely reported one of
General Lee. General McClellan had just before assured
the authorities that Lee had in his army at least 1 20,000
men. Yet, our commander absolutely assures us, a few
hours after the battle, that an affair between merely our
advance and the rear of the enemy, an affair in which not
30,000 men had been engaged on either side, and In which
we had lost but 2,000 men, had involved the utter panic,
rout, and demoralization of that great host. More than
this. At early dawn after that battle. General McClellan
gives a professedly authentic report of the substance of the
speech which his wounded rival had publicly made imme
diately after the battle, and of Lee's estimate of his losses
in the same. The amazement which we felt, at the time,
at the credulity of our military authorities, and of the
nation, in crediting such absurd reports, and the disesteem
then induced in our mind for the commander who sent
them forth as reliable verities, have not yet suffered any
diminution. Grand movement proposed and urged by General Heintzelman
at this crisis.
When General Heintzelman learned of the facts per
taining to our victory at South Mountain, and of the retreat
of General Lee, he proposed to the military authorities in
Washington that he should be permitted with 60,000 of
the more than 100,000 troops In the city to move into
Northern Virginia and seize all Lee's communications
across the Potomac, our forces then to close in upon him
from all directions, and capture his army. Of the wisdom
of the plan proposed, and of its full success had It been
adopted, there can be no reasonable doubt in any reflect-

GENERAL LEE's INVASION OF MARYLAND. l8g
ing mind. This plan, however, was rejected by the Secre
tary of War, under the advice of the military authorities
around him ; and to General Lee, after the battle of An
tietam, was kindly granted an unimpeded retreat back to
his old position. We m^e these important statements on
the authority of General Heintzelman himself.
The judgment which we must form of Gtneral Lee in view
of the facts before us.
The carrying out of the general order issued to his
army by General Lee on the gth September, involved, as
we have seen, the separation of that army into two nearly
equal parts, and the separation of the same at a marching
distance of from 30 to 40 miles from each other. To
accomplish this separation required nearly a four days'
march on the part of the corps of General Jackson, and
a latteral movement of the divisions of McLaws and
Walker in the direct front of our army. While this sepa
ration placed the Potomac between the divided parts of
his army, General Lee was fully aware that by a march
of 23 miles over highroads. General McClellan could
place his army between the parts referred to, and render
their reunion impossible. What must we think of a
General that in such circumstances will thus divide his
army in the presence of a hostile force known to be
superior to his own ? We must regard him as being what
Buonaparte would have called an " ass of a General ; " or
we must suppose him one of the great commanders who
perfectly understands and holds in utter contempt his
antagonist. No other alternative is left. On one or the
other of these hypotheses we must explain the fact that
General Lee, in the immediate presence of our ar|«"^^ first
placed the Chickahominy and then the Potomac ween
the divided parts of his own army. No General com
mon understanding ever did thus divide his aro a the
presence of a General whom he respected.
What should have been and what was done immediately after
the battle of South Mountain.
By 9 o'clock on the morning of the 17th, Franklin
made known to McClellan the fact of the capture of our

I go THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
forces at Harper's Ferry. At this time, it was known to
our commander that Jackson, McLaws, and Walker were
at Harper's Ferry, and that Lee, with the remainder of
his army, was retreating through Boonsborough towards
the Potomac. At this time, a march of but from six to
eight miles on a highroad would have brought Franklin's
corps to Sharpsburg. Directly in front of McClellan, on
another road, at not more than six or eight miles distance,
lay Keedysville, a place about half-way between Sharps
burg and Boonsborough. By ordering Franklin to move
by a forced march upon the former, that place would have
been in our hands before Lee could have advanced as far as
to the latter, and Franklin would have been free to act
from that fundamental position, as exigencies might re
quire. By moving his main forces, not after Lee to
Boonsborough, but directly to Keedysville, McClellan
would have anticipated Lee at the latter place, or would
have struck him there when on his line of march, — the
most unfavourable condition of an assailed party possible ;
and in connexion with Franklin moving out from Sharps
burg, would indeed have produced an utter " panic, rout,
and demoralization of the Confederate army." Of not
one of these great and palpably manifest advantages did
our commander avail himself On the other hand, while
Franklin occupied the day in moving up in front of Sharps
burg. McClellan followed directly after Lee in a detour
round through Boonsborough and down the valley of
Antietam ; Lee, late in the afternoon, taking position on
the heights of Sharpsburg, west of the valley designated
and the stream of the same name, and but about two
miles east and north of the Potomac ; while our army took
post in front of Lee, and on the east side of the stream
and valley referred to. Thus matters stood at the close of
September 15th, and thirty-six hours prior to the famous
battle of Antietam.

THE BATTLE OF ANTIETAM.
The battle of Antietam was one of the most bloody
which occurred during the war, and, as far as the
Union cause is concerned, one of the most useless that

GENERAL lee's INVASION OF MARYLAND. igl
ever occurred In the history of war. To the Confederates
it secured a safe passage across the Potomac back into
Virginia, and an undisturbed repose of nearly three months,
in which to repair their losses, reorganize their forces, and
make full preparation for any new exigencies that might
arise. To them, certainly, this was nota lost battle. Tous,
its final results were a succession of disasters which issued
in a second invasion of our territories, and another equally
bloody battle.
At lo o'clock on the morning of the 15th Septem
ber, General McClellan electrified our military authorities
at Washington, and the nation, by the announcement that
in the battle of the previous day General Garland had been
killed and General Lee wounded, and that the wounded
Confederate commander and his army, with the confessed
loss of some 15,000 men, were flying, panic-stricken,
routed, and demoralized, through Boonsborough towards
the Potomac, and that his own army were on the heels of
the flying foe, in hot pursuit. This retreat and pursuit
were continued without interruption, our forces capturing
some 250 prisoners at the place last named, until, a little
past the middle of the afternoon, when on the heights in
front of Sharpsburg, our wounded Confederate, with his
panic-stricken, routed, and demoralized little army, sud
denly turned round, faced his pursuers, and boldly defied
them to advance another inch in their hot pursuit.
Every commander of ordinary intelligence would have
perceived at once that a more propitious opportunity to
annihilate an enemy never presented itself to any General
than Providence had now thrown into the hands of General
McClellan. More than one half of the Confederate army
was far away on the other side of the Potomac. Here, in
a corner where defeat was utter annihilation, were, as our
commander well knew, merely Longstreet's corps and the
division of D. H. Hill, with a majority of Stuart's cavalry;
a force which had never during the day been able to stand
for a single hour against our advance. What did prudence
demand under the circumstances, our army having pre
viously ma,rched but some ten or twelve miles ? We should
bear in mind that A. P. Hill's division, after an almost quick
step march of seventeen miles, arrived at about the same

192 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
hour in the afternoon of the battle of Antietam, and imme
diately entered and did effective service in that battle.
Our forces, after their march of ten or twelve miles, could
certainly have, at least, opened the conflict that afternoon
and evening. None but a General of the feeblest capacity
would have deferred the general assault, in full force, after
the dawn of the next morning. Our commander, however,
as he had ever done before, as soon as the great prize
stood out in full view before him, forgot that he had a
gun. With him, it was far more safe to fight the whole
of Lee's army with the whole of his own, than to fight less
than one-half of that army with two-thirds of his own.
Hence the whole of what remained of this afternoon, and
all of the next day, a slight affair just at evening excepted,
were spent in getting up reinforcements, and making pre
paration for the conflict which was to open in terrible
earnestness on the morning of September 17th. This was
all that General Lee desired ; and the interval allowed him
was well improved in getting his whole army together,
raising his entrenchments, digging rifle-pits, locating his
batteries, and distributing his forces. Hence, by the morn
ing of the day of the battle, within the Confederate lines
"there was a place for every thing, and every thing was
in its place;" General Lee, by the evening of the 15th,
having fully recovered from the wounds which he had
received on the preceding day. Nor was our commander
idle. By the evening of the i6th all his forces which were
expected to take part in the coming battle had come up,
and all the corps and divisions were in the positions from
whence they were to advance upon the enemy, and all the
batteries of heavy guns were fully prepared for the death-
doings to which they were assigned. The battle, it should
be understood, was to be wholly defensive on the part of
the enemy, and as exclusively offensive on our part.
Relative amount of the hostile forces engaged in this battle.
In considering the case of any considerable battle, one
of the first questions which interests the reader is the rela
tive amount of the hostile forces engaged in the conflict.
Of the number present on our side there can be no doubt ;
that number, as officially stated by General McClellan,

GENERAL LEe's INVASION OF MARYLAND. 1 93
and with unquestionable correctness, was 87,164 men.
General McClellan gives the number of the Confederate
army present on the occasion as 97,445, a number given
as the result of information obtained by General Banks in
Washington prior to the battle, and gained from deserters,
prisoners, and spies. The account bears upon its face the
clear marks of utter incredibility. How could General
Banks have obtained such specific information about the
exact number of men Lee had at Frederick, and then just
how many he had lost by death, wounds, capture, and
desertion, on his way from that city to Sharpsburg ? If
the estimate had been given in general terms, it would not
appear so absurd as it now does. Pollard, in his "Southern
History," says of this battle, " It was fought for half the
day with 45,000 men on the Confederate side, and for the
remaining half with no more than an aggregate of 70,000
men." No Confederate account intimates that their army
was larger than this, and, in general, all give a lower esti
mate. Lee, when he claims to have fought the battle with
40,000 men, unquestionably refers to what he had under
his command in the early part of the day. It is quite safe,
then, to state that our army on the field outnumbered the
Confederates as 87,000 to 70,000, or, more near the truth,
to 60,000, The Battle-field.
To understand the field on which this battle was fought,
let the reader conceive a village standing upon a some
what elevated position, which may be called, for the want
of a more definite term, a plateau, or hill. Several miles
west of the village comes down the Potomac, running with
a serpentine course, almost due south. Near a village
called Shepherdstown, the river takes an east and south
east course for several miles, and then turns south again,
passing by Harper's Ferry. About one mile east of
Sharpsburg passes down, from the north, Antietam Creek,
which passes centrally through a valley which takes its
name from the creek referred to, the creek entering the
Potomac some distance above the point where the river
takes the last southern direction designated. Above the
river, and for some miles above Sharpsburg, the creek is
13

194 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
too deep and muddy to be forded, and is crossed by four
stone bridges. The southern one, on the turnpike road
from Frederick, and which is joined by the road from
Harper's Ferry, crosses the stream about a mile to the
south-east of the village. About one mile north of this is
the bridge on the highroad from Keedysville and Boons
borough. About one mile farther up the stream is the
third, and at about the same distance still farther north is
the fourth, bridge. Directly from the north of the village
comes down the highroad from Hagerstown. On the
heights in front, and to the south-east and north-east of
Sharpsburg, General Lee had located his army, with Long-
street on his right, D. H. Hill in the centre, J. Jackson with
his divisions on his left, and McLaws in reserve. Lee's
right extended about one mile below the road which
crosses the south bridge designated. At his extreme left,
about one mile west of the Hagerstown road, and near a
bend in the Potomac, were stationed Stuart's cavalry. Of
our line, Burnside occupied the left; Cox's division, on his
extreme left, being located south of the Frederick turnpike.
Porter with his corps was in the centre, in front of Sharps
burg. On our extreme right was Hooker with his corps,
and between him and Porter was Sumner, in command of
his own and Hamilton's corps. Franklin, not yet up, was
to ^ct as exigencies should demand. Such was the field,
and in general the distribution of the forces of these two
armies on the evening of September i6th. The line of
General Lee, from his extreme right to the position oc
cupied by Stuart' s cavalry, was upwards of four miles ; the
length of ours being quite as great.
The Battle.
The three bridges directly in front of our line were too
strongly defended and too much exposed to the fire of the
enemy's batteries to be taken by a direct assault. It was
accordingly determined that Hooker, followed by Mansfield,
should cross the stream at the upper bridge, which was
wholly unguarded, and after turning Lee's left, should so
press his centre that the other portions of our army
might effect a passage over the bridges in their front.
The passage over the upper bridge Hooker and Hamilton

GENERAL LEE' S INVASION OF MARYLAND. 1 95
made on the evening before the battle, and after a severe
conflict with the enemy's left advance occupied positions
more than one mile west of the place of crossing. The
battle, which opened with such fury the next morning, and
ended with the closing in of the darkness of the night
following, — the battle, as conducted on our part, has very
singular peculiarities, which seem to have been taken from
the first battle of Bull Run. The latter was fought by
sending regiments in succession, regiments who should
fight for a time and then retire for the advance of others.
In the battle of Antietam, very much the same thing was
repeated by army corps. At early dawn, Hooker, sus
tained by Mansfield, assailed Jackson, whose men were
greatly aided and protected by woods and outcropping
ledges of rocks, and whose batteries, advantageously
located, made fearful slaughter among the assaulting force.
Notwithstanding all these difficulties, our men, after various
advances and reverses and waverings first of ours and then
of the Confederate lines, at length pressed the enemy back
quite across the Hagerstown road. Jackson now brought
up his reserves under Lawton, and fell upon our forces with
such fury that they were driven back in a quite demoralized
condition. In an attempt to rally his men. Hooker was
wounded, and soon after had to retire from the field, — a
great calamity to the Union army at that crisis of the
battle. Mansfield's corps now advanced, took the place of
Hooker's, and after meeting with similar successes and
reverses, was driven back, with its commander mortally
wounded and in as bad a condition as that of its pre
decessor. At this juncture Sumner advanced, and after
successes and reverses like those who had gone before
him, found himself, with the loss of near 5,000 men, in
as crippled a condition as his predecessors. Thus, in the
language of Mr. Swinton, " three out of six corps of the
army of the Potomac, and they the strongest, had been
drawn into the seething vortex of action on the right ; and
each in succession, while exacting heavy damage of the
enemy, had been so punished as to lose all offensive
energy ; so that noon found them simply holding their
own." All accounts of the battle agree in the above
statements. In the course of the afternoon, General

196 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
Franklin, contrary to the original plan to have him act
upon our left, was sent forward to regain what Hooker,
Hamilton, and Sumner had gained and lost. In his early
advance Franklin was successful ; but when he had
formed his line and organized his forces to capture the
rocky woodland west of the Hagerstown road, he was
recalled by Sumner, who held command of our right.
Thus the battle, in this part of the field, the principal part,
ended with the setting in of darkness; we having this
advantage, that our forces occupied the largest portion
of the battle-field in this quarter.
On our left, Burnside delayed his advance until after
I o'clock, at which time all of Lee's right had been with
drawn to support his left, the single division of General
Jones, 2,500 strong, excepted. "With a heavy loss, the
bridge was carried, and two hours later, the crest above ;
one battery, from which our line had suffered not a little,
being also taken. At this time, when matters looked dark
for the Confederates in this part of the field, the division
of A. P. Hill, which Jackson had left behind at Harper's
Ferry to receive the surrender of our forces there, came upon
the ground, and being united with the troops under Jones,
assumed the offensive, recaptured the battery, and forced
Burnside back over all the ground he had gained, to the
shelter of the cliff beyond. Thus the battle closed all
along the line. On our right, we had gained considerable
ground, but had been brought to a stand. On our left we
had also gained much ground, but finally were forced back
over the ground we had gained, Burnside's forces, how
ever, remaining on the west side of the bridge which they
had carried. Both sides claimed the result as a victory,
each for itself, and with equal truth and equal error ; the
battle, as almost or quite all authorities now agree, being
a drawn one. To understand more fully the tactics of our
commander in this battle, we state the following fact, not
before related by any historian. At the time when General
Burnside began to be pressed back, General Pleasanton,
with 4(000 veteran cavalry, and upwards of 20 pieces of
field artillery, stood on the heights east of the bridge over
which Burnside had passed, and observed, the whole scene
^eing perfectly visible, that between him and the Potomac

GENERAL LEe's INVASION OF MARYLAND. ig7
west of both armies, there were no Confederate forces
whatever. He accordingly went to General McClellan,
and asked leave to pass his cavalry over the bridge, and
take the enemy in flank and rear, and thus roll up the
whole of the right wing of General Lee's army ; there being
an abundance of troops present, and unengaged, to fill the
vacancy which would be made by the advance of the cavalry
force. This movement, which would have rendered inevi
table the utter rout, if not capture, of the right wing of the
Confederate army. General McClellan absolutely prohibited.
Essential errors in the conduct of this battle.
There was one very grave error common to the com
mands of both armies, an error which writers who have
visited the field and carefully examined Its localities have
all noticed. At the right of Hooker's position when
he opened the conflict, and on Jackson's left, there is an
elevated position which completely commanded our right
and the Confederate left. Had Hooker, or Sumner after
him, occupied this position, and planted his batteries there,
it would have been utterly impossible for Jackson to have
continued where he was for a single hour, and our right
would have advanced with very little loss. Had Jackson
occupied in force this same position, his batteries would
have enfiladed the whole field over which our right must
have advanced, and rendered a successful assault of the
Confederate left and, consequently, of their whole line,
impossible. That position, visible to all, was, strange to
relate, wholly neglected by our commanders during, and by
those of the Confederate army to near the close of, the day.
So vain is human foresight ! This oversight is more dis
creditable to the Confederate Generals than to ours, the
position having been visible to them all the while they
were laying their plans and distributing their forces for
the battle ; whereas the advantage presented could not
have been known to ours until after they had come upon
the field.
The sending forward of our forces "in driblets," as
General Sumner expressed it — that is, a corps at a time —
as was done all day upon our right, where the main issue
was joined, was a capital error not only of the grossest

198 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
but of the most uncommon character. All our cOrps but
the two of Burnside and Porter should, as General
Sumner also affirmed, have been at once pushed over after
Hooker and Hamilton. Our extreme right should then
have passed round and closed up upon the Confederate
left, and rolled it up on their centre and right, and thus
cornered up Lee's whole army between the Potomac and
the Antietam valley and creek. No well-informed tactician
will question the fact that such a use of our army would
have resulted in the destruction or capture of that of
General Lee. As it was, the battle occasioned a great
loss to both sides, with no decisive advantage to either.
The retreat of the Confederates over the Potomac was not
caused by this battle, but would have resulted had no
battle been fought.
In our judgment, also, no attack across the lower bridge
and upon Lee's right, while it should have been threatened,
to induce an extension of his line in that direction, should
have been contemplated or made. Suppose that both
wings of the Confederate army had been turned, — an event
which could in no contingency have occurred until late in
the day, as the battle was conducted. In that case, a safe
retreat would still have existed on the highroad from
Sharpsburg, south-west, to the crossings of the Potomac
at shepherdstown. On the other hand, the divisions of
Porter's corps should have occupied our left and centre,
and Burnside with Franklin should have been united with
Hooker, Mansfield, and Sumner in bearing down with a
crushing force upon the enemy's right and right centre.
In that case, our extreme right, in closing round upon
Lee's left, would have seized the Shepherdstown road, and
cut off all retreat from the Confederate army. The battle,
thus conducted, would have been in full accordance with
the tactics of Moltke, Buonaparte at Ulm, and Washington
and his French allies at Yorktown, and we should never
have had a second invasion of Maryland.
Union and Confederate losses in this battle and i?i the
Maryland campaign.
General McClellan gives officially, and we have no
reason to question the correctness of his report, — gives

GENERAL LEe's INVASION OF MARYLAND. 1 99
officially, we say, our loss in the battle, in killed, woundedj
and missing, as 12,469, and in the whole campaign in
Maryland as 15,220. Among the killed and wounded
are included, as General McClellan states, ten Generals,
and a vast number of officers of lowtfr grades. If we add
to these the 1 1,583 who surrendered at Harper's Ferry, and
the 250 subsequently captured and parolled by Stuart, our
total loss in this campaign will be 27,053 men ; quite as
many as the army of Virginia lost under General Pope.
The Confederate official reports give the Confederate loss in
killed and wounded In the Maryland battles as 10,291 men.
The reports of Lee's corps and division commanders give
their aggregate loss in killed and wounded as 11,241.
If we estimate their loss in prisoners and desertions at
5,000 or 6,000 micn, probably the estimate would not be
far from correct. We must bear in mind that, in both the
battles of this campaign, we were the assailing party, and
fought the enemy under circumstances in which nothing
but a miracle could have prevented our losing three in
killed and wounded where the enemy lost two, To admit
the fact that our loss in killed and wounded was thus
much greater than that of the Confederates, while it re
veals the courage and endurance of our soldiery, presents
nothing whatever to their discredit, or to that of their
commanders. Events after the battle. — The exit of McClellan.
The character of generalship is always most clearly
manifested by what is done after a battle, and especially
after a victory. After the battle, September igth, 3.10
a.m.. General McClellan sent this telegram to Washington :
" Our victory was complete. The enemy is driven back
into Virginia. Maryland and Pennsylvania are now safe."
On the morning after the battle he received an accession
of about 14,000 fresh troops. Of those present with him
on the field. Porter's corps, acting as the reserve, had
hardly fired a gun, while the corps of Franklin and Burn
side had done little until the after part of the day. All of
Lee's forces, on the other hand, had, the most of them,
been engaged during the whole day, and all the strength
he had was well known to have been put forth. Yet, our

200 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
commander, notwithstanding some of his leading Generals
strongly advised a renewal of the conflict on the morning
of the 1 8th, suffered the day to pass away with hardly a
reconnoissance. On the morning of the igth he awoke to
find that his adversary with his army was safely over the
river, and was there coolly awaiting an advance on our part.
The reasons which General McClellan assigns for not renew
ing the battle on the morning of the 1 8th were, the weari
ness of his troops, the indecisive results of the conflict on
the day preceding, the demoralization of two of his largest
corps, the doubtful issue of a second battle, and the dis
astrous results of a defeat of his army. He failed wholly
to weigh duly the palpable facts and considerations which,
on the other side, demanded the promptest action, as, for
example,, that now at least his army far outnumbered that of
the enemy; that he had upwards of 25,000 fresh troops,
while Lee had none ; that however weary a part of his
forces might be, all of Lee's were in a far more exhausted
condition ; and that while a defeat of our army would be a
great calamity to us, a defeat of Lee's would not only be
the annihilation of his army, but the ruin of the Confede
rate cause. Such considerations, however, had no weight
with our "Young Napoleon," 'who was found at 8 o'clock
on the morning of the 18th at Keedysville, some four or
five miles from the battle-field. Napoleon always, so he
said, slept upon the field where his army had fought the
day previous.
But not only did McClellan fail to avail himself of the
advantages which Providence put into his hands on the
morning after the battle, but in the face of palpable facts
demanding an onward movement, of the encouragements,
exhortations, entreaties, and absolute orders of the autho
rities at Washington, he suffered the remaining portion ot
September and all of the month succeeding, the best part
of the year for the movement of armies, quite forty days, to
pass by before he could be induced to pass his army over
the Potomac, and then his movements were as slow and
measured as if he and his army had been lame in their feet
and palsied in their limbs ; the night of the 7th November
finding him at Rectortown, where and when he received a
dispatch from Washington superseding him and appointing

GENERAL LEe's INVASION OF MARYLAND. 20I
General Burnside in his place, — one deadening incubus
being thus removed from the breast of the nation.

CHARACTER OF THE EVENTS WHICH OCCURRED BETWEEN
THE BATTLE OF ANTIETAM AND THE RETIREMENT OF
GENERAL McCLELLAN.
When General Lee had crossed the Potomac, he kept
his army at no great distance from the river until ours
had passed over, his head-quarters being in the vicinity
of Charlestown and Winchester. He waited here, un
doubtedly under the expectation that as our army was
crossing, he might fall upon it, when one part was on
the north and the other on the south side of the river.
Our army, however, was in little peril of such a contingency
as that while it remained under the command of Mc
Clellan, the only peril to which it was subject under him
being dissolution from inaction. To understand fully the
character of the events which occurred during the period
under consideration, two fundamental facts must be set in
the clearest light before the mind. We refer to
The relative strength and location of the hostile forces during
this period.
The location of General Lee's army we have indicated
with sufficient distinctness. The army of the Potomac was
divided into two great central forces : those with General
McClellan centrally located at and near Sharpsburg, with
small bodies on the river at different points from Williams
port down to Harper's Ferry ; and those under General
Heintzelman in the vicinity of Washington. Lee's army
consisted of the forces which he took with him in his
retreat from Maryland and the very small reinforcements
which he may have subsequently received from Richmond.
No rational estimate will give him an army of over 70,000
men. What was the strength of the army of the Potomac
at this time ? On the 20th September, three days after
the battle of Antietam, General McClellan, as certified to
by the Adjutant -General of the United States, S. Thomas,
officially reported the army of the Potomac as consisting
of 2g3,7g8 men. Of these 1 64, 35g were present for duty.

202 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
24,315 were sick, on special call, or under arrest, and
105,124 absent by leave. This force does not include the
command of General Wool at Fortress Monroe and those
left behind in the Peninsula under General Keyes, nor the
corps, about g.ooo strong, under General Dix at Baltimore.
On the 30th of this month this army, according to official
reports made and certified to as above, consisted of 173,745
present for duty, 28,458 sick, etc., and 101,756 absent by
leave ; making a sum total of 303,g59 men. On the 20th
of the next month, according to a like report, 207,036 were
present for duty, 42,298 sick, etc., and 91,275 absent on
leave ; the aggregate being 304,609 men. One fact pecu-
liarizes this army from all others that ever existed — the
comparative number of its absentees, this number uniformly
equalling quite one-third of the whole army. This army
presents the spectacle of the continued average absence
of 100,000 men, all doing nothing and yet receiving the
full pay of men on the field. What must have been the
character of the commander of this army and of the
military authorities over him ? Nowhere else but in
connexion with the command of this one General can such
appalling facts be found. We must bear in mind also
that the number of absentees was greatest just at the
very time when all the forces the nation could command
were most imperiously needed, and when the commander
of the army in which this evil assumed such monstrous
proportions was most beseechingly calling upon the mili
tary authorities for reinforcements, and was charging said
authorities with delinquencies in duty for withholding the
aid asked for, it being uniformly true that his absentees
far out-numbered all the forces he required.
What ought to have been done under the circumstances.
We must bear in mind that during all the fifty days
which intervened between the battle of Antietam, a period
in which, aside from quite 30,000 men at Baltimore and in
the Peninsula, there were always present for duty in the
army of the Potomac from 164,000 to 207,000 men, and
never in the army of General Lee over 70,000, Richmond
still remained completely uncovered ; and a force 70,000
strong moving out from Washington, with a simultaneous

GENERAL LEe's INVASION OF MARYLAND. 203
advance on the part of McClellan, would have rendered
the retreat of the Confederate army to that city impossible,
and its capture a certainty. A two or three days' march
of 70,000 men from Washington would have enabled them
to reach Warrenton, where they would have had full com
mand of all General Lee's lines of retreat.
Two most propitious opportunities here once more
presented themselves to the commander of the army of
the Potomac and our military authorities — a move upon
Richmond, and the capture of the Confederate capital,
while its protecting army was too far away to do anything
for its defence ; or, what would have been better, a direct
and simultaneous movement upon this army and the
destruction of it, leaving Richmond to fall of itself, as it
must have done after that. Nor did it require great mili
tary capacity to discern these advantages, the facts being
so palpable that nothing but uncommon stupidity could
have overlooked them. Stupidity prevailed, however,
and the opportunities were lost, and, as a consequence,
hundreds of thousands of lives and billions of treasures
were lost to the nation.
The course which events did take under the circumstances.
In contemplating the course which events did take
during the interval under consideration, this fact will not
fail most deeply to impress the mind of the thoughtful
reader, that nothing whatever was done, or appeared to
have been contemplated, to capture Richmond while it
remained thus visibly uncovered, or to capture, or even
to inflict a serious wound upon, the army of General Lee
while it lay openly exposed to deadly blows from our over
whelming forces. As soon as the Confederates had gone
over the river, on the other hand, one thought seemed' to
have taken exclusive possession of the mind of our General
in command — the providing of clothing and shoes for his
great family for the coming fall and winter. As the
spectre of the overwhelming power of his antagonist had
done before, so now the idea of the approaching cold and
frost chilled his military ardour, blighted his courage, and
froze up all his activities. Hence his cries for clothing
and shoes for his men and horses for his cavalry were

204 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
now just as great and bitter and constant as were his former
calls for reinforcements. To every exhortation and entreaty
and absolute order to cross the river and assault the enemy,
he replied by sending back the monotonous call for shoes,
and coats, and vests, and pants, and army blankets, and
horses. Shortly after the battle of Antietam, for example,
the President visited our army at Sharpsburg, and finding
the troops full of ardour, and in a good condition for an
advance, gave, through General Halleck on his return to
Washington, this order, bearing date October 6th: "I
am instructed to telegraph to you as follows : ' The Presi
dent directs that you cross the Potomac, and give battle to
the enemy or drive him south. Your army must move
now, while the roads are good.' " To this General
McClellan replies by making an inquiry about the troops
that he might be reinforced by on the two routes, one of
which, after passing Winchester, he must take; and request
ing the Commander-in-Chief to make special inquiries
about the Alexandria and Leesburg and Manassas Gap
railroads. On the next day he sends down the following
cool enquiry : " What arrangements are in progress in
regard to supplying the army with hospital tents ? Are
there any on hand in Washington ? If so, be pleased to
let me know the number. If there are none, how long
would it take to have them manufactured and delivered
here in considerable amount, say three or four thousand?"
By just such replies, all entreaties and orders for an on
ward movement were bluffed off until the 2nd November,
forty-six days after the battle of Antietam, when the pas
sage of his army over the river was perfected. He then,
without an attempt to strike the enemy at all, moved
slowly down on the east side of the Blue Ridge ; General
Lee moving leisurely in parallel lines down the valley
beyond, until our advance approached Warrenton, when,
November 7th, at Rectortown, the command of the army
was passed over to General Burnside. During all the
preceding interval General McClellan appears to have
formed no definite plan whatever for the future conduct of
the campaign. On the other hand, he states definitely in
his communications that when he should arrive at Warren
ton he would be able to determine whether his army could

GENERAL LEE S INVASION OF MARYLAND. 205
be supplied by means of the Orange and Alexandria Rail
road. If this could not be done, he should transfer his
army to the Fredericksburg road, or back again to the
Peninsula. What was to be hoped from such a General?
Yet he would have us understand that his removal was a
great calamity to the nation, because he was then about
to attempt an important movement against General Lee,
as the old scientists all died just at the moment when they
were on the eve of discovering the philosopher's stone.
Concluding reflections upoti General McClellan as a military
commander.
In our introductory remarks upon General McClellan
we expressed the opinion that neither he nor his successor,
General Halleck, ever revealed a capacity in planning a
campaign to do anything but to blunder, and that neither
of them ever blundered upon a plan that ought to have
been adopted. Nothing in the history of General
McClellan's military life indicated in the remotest de
gree that he ever had, in his own mind, a well-digested
plan of operation. All his seeming plans were only guesses
in the dark. When lying among the quaker-guns at Ma
nassas, he guessed that it would be best to transfer his army
to the Peninsula ; but what specific movements should be
made after he was there, he appeared to have had no idea
at all. After he had lain for a time on the Chickahominy,
he guessed again that a change of base from that place
to some point, what one he knew not, on James river,
would improve his situation, and accordingly made the
change to the point on which he happened to fall ; but what
should be done when the situation was changed, of this he
seemed to have been utterly ignorant. When at Harri
son's Landing, he guessed a third time that his situation
would be improved by removing his army from the north
to the south side of the river. When passing down from
Sharpsburg south, he guessed that he would be able to
determine, on his arrival at Warrenton, whether he could
support his array by means of a single railroad, — not con
sidering at all what might be done in addition by means
of waggons, the only mode of supplying armies known sixty-
years since ; and that if this means should be inadequate, it

206 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
would be best to transfer his army to the Fredericksburg
Road, or to the Peninsula. Beyond the idea of such
changes, his mind seems never to have, in reality, planned
anything. In executing a campaign and ordering a battle his
imbecility Is equally manifest. Here almost everything
was entrusted to his subordinates. Not one of the seven-
days battles of the Peninsula was fought under his immediate
direction. The same was true of those at South Mountain.
At Antietam, the battle commenced in earnest at early
dawn ; yet he did not leave his night quarters, and look
over the field, until quite 8 o'clock in the morning. This
is the only battle which, for the most part, really did accur
under his Immediate direction, and this, as we have seen,
is, on his part, one of the worst conducted battles known
in history. When he moved his army, he did so with un
exampled slowness, and stood still for the greater portion
of his time, and that for the seeming reason that he did not
know what steps should next be taken.
His weakness — and he never seemed to have conscious
ness of power to accomplish anything worthy of a soldier, —
his conscious weakness always resulted from one and the
same cause, an appalling over-estimate of the amount of the
hostile forces in his immediate front, those forces uniformly,
in his terror-stricken Imagination, outnumbering his own as
three to two, and commonly as two to one. What was worst
of all in his management of his forces was the fact that while
hewas continuously calling upon the authorities to reinforce
his weakened army, hewas perpetually diminishing that army
by leave of absence to such an extent that a real increase
of his forces by any reinforcements which could bs sent
him was nearly or quite impossible. Of what use is it
to send 10,000 men to a commander, for example, when on
the arrival of them 10,000 are sent away on a visit to their
homes ? He bitterly complained that McDowell's corps
was not sent to him, when his absentees nearly or quite
outnumbered that corps. When, in reply to his bitter
complaints that he was not adequately reinforced, the
President asked him to give an account for the vast
number of his absentees, McClellan coolly replied that he
thought that at least one half of said absentees might be

GENERAL LEE S INVASION OF MARYLAND. 207
properly called back to the army. Yet he made no effec
tive call for that purpose, but depleted his army by this
very means, as we have seen, to the number of upwards
of 101,000 men.
In his example of want of respect for authority, and
of palpable disobedience to absolute orders from his
superiors, he is undeniably, we judge, without a parallel
in history. One of the specific reasons assigned by Gene
ral Scott for his resignation of his post as Commander-in-
Chief, was the utter disregard manifested for his wishes
and orders. A command received on the 6tlj October, to
pass the river at once and fight the enemy or drive him
south, was coolly met, as we have seen, by the inquiry how
soon some 4,000 hospital tents could be made or furnLshed,
while no attempt was made to obey that order during the
space of about twenty-five days. Full twenty-five days
elapsed after he received an absolute order to transport
his army at the shortest period possible from the Peninsula
to the vicinity of Washington before a single man was
embarked. These are but examples of his relations to
the supreme authorities of the nation. McClellan, in short,
was the spoiled child of the Union army,, and come what
might, his will was his law.
No commander of ancient or modern times ever made
such a show, or ever moved amid such " pomp and circum
stance " as did our " Young Napoleon." The sons of
ancient kings "prepared but fifty men to run before them."
The staff of General McClellan numbered between 2,500
and 3,000 men, and more than one-third of these were
uniformly at home on leave, visiting the ladies, and that
during the period which intervened between the invasion
of Maryland and his removal from command. On the
30th September, for example, he reported of his staff
1,171 present for duty, 266 on special duty, sick, or under
arrest, and 1,037 absent.
No General was ever petted by a Government as was
General McClellan. The idea propagated by the opposers
of the Administration, that it was jealous of his growing
reputation, and therefore withheld from him promised aid,
is one of the absurdest and grossest slanders ever uttered.
When McClellan, for example, forwarded his flaming dis-

208 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
patches after his victories at South Mountain, what was
the prompt reply he received from the President ? It was
this: "Your dispatches received. God bless you, and all
with you. Destroy the Rebel army if possible." All that
the President ever exhorted or commanded him to do was
to act so that his reputation with the nation and the
world might be "as ointment poured forth." No man
ever had a brighter future opened before him, and no man
ever commenced his career with the more unqualified and
universal good-will of the Government and people, than
was true of General McClellan ; and because, and only
because, he utterly and hopelessly disappointed the just
and fond expectations reposed in him, this must be said of
him, that " he departed without being desired."

CHAPTER XIIL
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC UNDER GENERAL
BURNSIDE.
On the 8th November, 1862, General Burnside very reluc
tantly assumed the command of the army of the Potomac.
At this time this army, as officially reported on the 20th
of the month preceding, numbered 304,609 men. Of
these, 207,036 were present for duty, 42,298 were sick,
etc, and 91,275 were absent. Whether General McClellan
communicated the plan which he was about to put into
operation, or kept the same concealed in his own mind,
we do not know. Whether the new commander was, or
was not, informed upon the subject, one fact must be con
fessed, that the plan which General McClellan affirms him
self to have developed was the very plan which should
have been adopted in the circumstances ; while that which
General Burnside did adopt was one of the last that should
then have been thought of To understand the subject
we must call to mind the fact that General Lee had, at
this time, divided his army into two grand divisions, the
first commanded by General Longstreet, and the second
by General Jackson. Longstreet with his grand division
was at Culpepper, while Jackson, with his, one /division
excepted, was, at quite a distance off, over the Blue
Ridge in the valley of the Shenandoah. The plan of
General McClellan, as he avows, hi* army being now in
the vicinity of Warrenton, was, by 7 ipid march, to inter
pose between Lee's divided army./-^ "he carrying out of
this plan with proper vigour would \ ^e secured the event
intended, or would have brought on \ general battle. The
result in either case could hardly have Leen a matter of doubt,
and would have been ruinous to the Confederate army. 14

210 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
General Burnside, forgetting that the mission of his
army was, not the mere capture of Richmond, but the
overthrow of the army which defended the city, and over
looking the fact that his great prize was in his immediate
presence, determined to transfer his army from its only
true position and direction, to another line of advance,
the very worst possible, excepting that originally selected
by his predecessor. One of the most fundamental prin
ciples known in the science of war is that, in advancing
upon an enemy, our line shall be so directed that, while
our own communications shall be protected, we may seize
those of the enemy ; that our point of attack shall be where
he is weakest, and where our blows shall fall with the most
fatal effect. All these conditions would have been most
obviously fulfilled had General Burnside moved right on
in the direction in which his army was then moving. In
that case, his own communications and Washington itself
would have been practically in his rear. Any attempt on
the part of the Confederates to disturb his communications
or attack the national capital must have been in the direc
tion of Fredericksburg, the most difficult line of advance
possible; while the enemy, if he should make an attack
upon Washington, would approach it at the point where
it was most impregnably fortified, and where the raiding
force would be always exposed to be cut off and annihilated
by the left wing of our army. As soon as our army, on
the other hand, had arrived at Gordonsville, it would have
completely commanded all the Confederate communica
tions on the north of James river, and as soon as our right
wing should have passed over the river we should have
held all his communications in every direction, that single
one through Petersburgh excepted. In our closing up
upon Richmond, then. General Lee would either be shut
up in the city and captured there, or he would have made
a precipitate retreat down the eastern shore of North Caro
lina, leaving the city of Richmond, and all west and north
west of the same, in our hands.
In taking the Fredericksburg road or the Peninsula
route, we, of necessity, advance upon a line where we are
certain to receive the greatest annoyance and damage from
the enemy, with the least sacrifice on his part, — where we

THE POTOMAC ARMY UNDER GENERAL BURNSIDE. 211
approach Richmond on the side where it is most strongly
fortified, and where all its important communications are
left perfectly intact ; on the side, consequently, where the
most prolonged siege would be certain, and where egress
for a perfectly safe retreat is always open, when the
siege can no longer be endured. By moving on either
of these lines, also, Washington must be left so uncovered
that we should have been necessitated to leave behind a
protecting force almost as great as the one in the field.
The first step of General Burnside, then, involved a funda
mental strategic error. The question which now arises is.
How did he execute his own plan ?
The immediate measures of General Burnside.
After assuming the duties of his high office, General
Burnside spent some ten days in re-organizing his army,
and getting the mastery of his new situation. His first
measure was to consolidate the six corps of his army into
three grand divisions. General Sumner being placed in
command of the first. General Hooker of the second,
and General Franklin of the third. His plan was, to move
from the position he then occupied to Fredericksburg,
and to act from thence upon Richmond as circumstances
might permit. His divisions, Sumner's in advance, were
directed to move to Falmouth, on the north side of the
Rappahannock, opposite Fredericksburg. The army was
then to pass over on pontoon bridges to the city last-named,
Sumner receiving specific orders " not to cross." But here
was the difficulty. Our army, before it moved, was near
Warrenton, and the materials for the bridges were at
Harper's Ferry. Arrangements were made between
Burnside and Halleck at Warrenton, — arrangements, as it
afterwards appeared, misunderstood by each, — by which
the army and the materials for crossing the river were to
be at Falmouth at the same time. As it was, Sumner
arrived at the place designated on the 17th, and Hooker
and Franklin two or three days later, while the pontoon
train was a week later still in arriving. General Sumner
was very desirous of taking possession of Fredericksburg
at once, and expressed that desire to his superior in com
mand, there being then several fords just above the city,,

212 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
at the time, where our whole army, had it been necessary,
might have crossed. General Burnside replied " that he
did not think it advisable to occupy Fredericksburg until
his communications were established." This enabled
General Lee to locate his whole army on the heights south
of the city, and to erect there all the fortifications he
desired, before our commander was ready to attempt a
crossing-; full twenty days being spent in getting open the
communications referred to.
The battle of Fredericksburg.
What might have been done without firing a gun on
the 17th November had become most palpably impossible
on the nth, 12th, and 13th December following. What
General Lee feared above all things at the first period
mentioned, he as strongly desired on the second, namely,
a crossing over of our army in front of his bristling
fortifications. When, before any rumour of the results of
the battle had reached us, we heard of the manner in
which the laying of the pontoon bridges was resisted, we
said to our pupils, and to not a few individuals in the
community, that one of two things was true, — that Lee had
retreated and left only his rear guard to delay our cross
ing, or that he was making a feigned resistance to decoy
Burnside over ; and that if General Lee was, with his army,
on those heights, a most disastrous and bloody defeat was
just #s sure to Burnside as anything future. Nothing bu
the infatuation of patriotic ignorance can shield our com
mander from the voice of the blood of those 13,771 brave
men so senselessly slaughtered in that presumptuous battle.
It is to the credit of General Hooker that he required
repeated and most imperative orders from General Burn
side before he would order his men across into the field of
the dead.
To form an apprehension of the field of battle, let the
reader conceive of the Rappahannock as running for some
distance an almost due east course, and then at the village
of Falmouth, located on the north side of the river, turning
a south-easterly direction. From one to two and a half
miles below Falmouth, and on the south side of the river, is
the city of Fredericksburg. In the river, from one to two

THE POTOMAC ARMY UNDER GENERAL BURNSIDE. 2IJ
miles west of Falmouth, is located Beck's Island. Oppo
site, and just south of this island, commences a series of
irregular heights running parallel with the river for the
distance of about four miles, until they are broken by the
valley formed by the Massaponase Creek. On these heights,
which were capable of being impregnably fortified. General
Lee located his army, and had diligently employed the
twenty days allowed him by Burnside's delay in perfecting
his defences, placing in position his 300 heavy guns, and
locating his forces. This period Burnside had spent in
perfecting his communications with the Potomac at Aquia
village. By the loth December all was in readiness
for the fatal crossing, which was favoured by the near
ness of the banks to the brink on the north side of
the river. One entire day, the nth, was spent in laying
down the pontoon bridges, the delay being occasioned by
the hot fire of the sharpshooters located in the brick
houses in the city, houses near the shore. These being
dispersed by troops ferried over the river, by. the morning
of the 1 2th the means of the passage of the army were
perfected. Sumner's grand division passed over opposite
the city, and deployed into the ri.sing plain beyond for the
purpose of storming the heights above them ; Franklin
with his own grand division and one of Hooker's corps,
about half the army, passed over about two miles below
the city ; while Hooker with his other corps remained as
a reserve. The most essential features of the plan of General Burn
side were that the first and most effective assault should be
made by Franklin, who was to turn Lee's right, and having
carried the heights near Massaponase Creek, was to roll
up the enemy's line upon his centre and left, when Sumner
was to advance and storm the remaining portion of the
position. This was the only plan that presented the re
motest promise of success. The order to Franklin, how
ever, was so indefinite as to imply that he was to act as
above stated, or to make a demonstration in his front, and
wait for final orders. He and his two corps commanders
adopted the last and cowardly exposition as the true mean
ing, and hence one half of the army did not even attempt
anything effective during the day. The absolute duty of

214 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
Franklin was, the meaning of his order being uncertain,
to have sent a currier to Burnside for definite instructions,
which could have been done in less than one hour. Such
acts, however, were not to be expected from such a General
as Franklin, especially after "his master," McClellan, "had
been taken from his head." Burnside, also, when he found
that his intended instructions were not obeyed, should have
hastened to his left, and seen that the vital movement was
made ; at least, he should have sent a special and positive
order to that effect. The only movement which rendered
success possible was not made, and hence, if for no other
reason, the disasters which everjrwhere followed.
On our right, Sumner's division was deployed opposite
a stone wall which ran along near the bottom of the heights
in their front. Behind this wall Longstreet's forces were
securely located, and shot down our men at their leisure,
while the artillery above completed the death-doings of
the day. Our only son held his company in one of those
lines until he was hit by a rifle bullet, and was then thrown
ten feet into the air by a large clod of earth hurled against
his breast by a cannon ball which struck the ground near
him. For some time he lay upon the spot where he fell,
apparently dead. At length, a fellow officer, observing that
his associate was still breathing, had him put into an am
bulance and sent across the river ; that officer then going
back to the ranks, probably to fall as his associate had
done before him. Our son lingered on till the next June,
and then died from the internal injuries received as above
stated, and when dying expressed his full satisfaction that
his life had been sacrificed for his country. On the failure
of Sumner's efforts. Hooker with his remaining corps was
ordered over. After crossing the river and surveying
the field around him. Hooker hastened back, and en
treated Burnside to call off his army, and not to continue
the useless slaughter any further. Burnside was inflexible,
and ordered an onward move. Hooker's corps then went
in to be slaughtered as Sumner's had been. Thus ended
this dreadful day. Through a strange infatuation, our
commander determined to renew the battle on the next
day. That determination was met by such an unanimous
remonstrance from the Generals under him, that he finally

THE POTOMAC ARMY UNDER GENERAL BURNSIDE. 215
desisted ; and after the two hostile armies had confronted
each other for two more days, ours recrossed to their
original position.
Subsequently, General Burnside made an attempt to
cross his army above Fredericksburg, and turn Lee's posi
tion by falling upon his communications, — the only proper
movement which should have been attempted at all.
When his army had arrived at the banks of the river, and
when success seemed certain, crossing, and a further pro
secution of the enterprise, were rendered impossible by a
fearful winter's storm and flood. Finding afterwards that
leading Generals of his army had secretly leagued together
for his removal, and had visited Washington to secure the
result, he prepared a general order to dismiss or relieve from
service Major-Generals Hooker, Franklin, Smith, and
Brig. -Generals Brooks, Newton, Cochrane, Ferrero, and
Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor. The President, however, after
consultation, relieved General Burnside, appointed General
Hooker in his place, silently relieved General Franklin, and
General Sumner at his own request. General Burnside being
continued as a Major-General in the army.
That General Burnside was a pure patriot, an honest
man, and an able corps commander, facts render quite
manifest. That he had any capacity to plan and execute a
great campaign, or fight a great battle, we have no evidence
from any facts know» to history.

CHAPTER XIV.
MOVEMENTS IN TENNESSEE, KENTUCKY, AND
MISSISSIPPI.
The appointment of General Halleck as Commander-in-
Chief of all our armies, July 23rd, 1872, left General Grant
in supreme command of our army, then concentrated at
Corinth, Mississippi. The utter fruitlessness of our con
quest in the capture of that place soon became manifest
by the events which followed. Our army, instead of
attempting anything effective against the enemy, who had
quietly retreated from the place, was, as we have formerly
stated, scattered in various directions, and so located as to
be rendered everywhere too weak to be of service to the
Union cause. The Confederate army, intact, had moved
south, and was soon ready to recommence operations.
Through their cavalry under Forrest and Morgan, raids were
everywhere made in the rear of our army, raids in which
such places as Murfreesboro' and Clarksville, Tennessee,
and Lebanon, Henderson, and Cynthiana, Kentucky, were
captured, and with these several thousands of prisoners
and an immense amount of provisions, military stores,
and other property ; just what always occurs when places
are taken by armies advancing on single lines into an
enemy's country, and the hostile army escapes unhurt.
Had Halleck merely shut up Bragg and Beauregard in
Corinth, and confined them there with their forces, we
might have been the raiders, and ultimately starved out
the enemy. As it was, we, after capturing a place utterly
useless to us, and after scattering our forces as stated,
were powerless for offensive operations, while the enemy
could swarm all around us, and inflict upon us almost any
injuries he might desire.

MOVEMENTS IN TENNESSEE, KENTUCKY, ETC. 217
During the month of June, General Buell left Corinth
and moved in the direction of Chattanooga. General
Bragg, now in supreme command, moved from Tupelo,
Mississippi, and with his army raised by conscription to
some 45,000 men, took post in Chattanooga before our
army arrived there. Was it not a great gain to us to have
secured, through the loss of thousands of brave men, a
transfer of the Confederate army, and that with increased
strength, from Corinth to Chattanooga ? We shall now
be able to gain a full knowledge of the value of the con
quest referred to. General Bragg, after lying at the place
last named long enough to induce a retirement from it of
General Buell, determined upon a new invasion of Kentucky,
his army being now nearer the State than ours. As pre
paratory to this campaign, he organised his army into
three corps, commanded respectively by Hardy, Bishop
Polk, and Kirby Smith. The General last named moved
his corps from Knoxville over the Cumberland range into
Eastern and Central Kentucky. Near Rogersville, he
encountered and utterly routed a Union army nearly or
quite as large as his own, an army under command of
General Manson. Smith puts our loss at i,oco killed and
wounded, and 5,000 prisoners, and his own total loss at
500 men — a near approximation, no doubt, to the truth.
He then entered in triumph, and with the shoutings of
Confederate sympathisers, Lexington, and from thence
moved through Paris to Cynthiana, where Louisville and
Cincinnati' lay, for some time, in appearance, at his mercy.
General Bragg having thus completely turned General
Buell's left and passed into his rear, now moved, with the
main portion of his remaining corps, qjaite to the east of
Nashville, and passing Glasgow, Kentucky, seized the
Louisville and Nashville Railroad, which was our chief
means of supply and reinforcements for our army, now far
off at the south. At Mumfordsville, where the railroad
crosses Green river, as he claimed, with a loss of 50 killed
and wounded, he captured some 4,000 prisoners, as many
muskets, with many guns and much ammunition ; we
having previously lost in killed and wounded upwards ot
700 men. From thence he marched, nobody resisting, to
Frankfort, the capital of the State, where, as General Lee

2l8 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
did at Frederick, Maryland, he issued a flaming appeal to
the people of Kentucky, and inaugurated a sham Govern
ment for the State, placing a feeble old man, Richard
Harris, over it as governor. All this even Pollard admits
to have been " a pretentious farce."
This invasion stirred the lethargy of General Buell.
Leaving a strong garrison, September 15th, at Nashville,
, , he marched to Louisville, 1 70 miles, in from ten to fifteen
days, where his army was rendered by reinforcements
about 100,000 strong. Here he remained, after the ex
ample of his prototype McClellan, until October 6th, to
reorganise his army. Under the assurance that if he did
not move his command would be taken from him, he
moved with steadiness to Springfield, 62 miles from Louis
ville ; General Bragg harassing his advance, but not
risking a battle, the object of the latter being to gain time
for a safe retreat with his immense train, consisting chiefly
of Union army waggons, which were very heavily loaded
with spoils gathered up at our depots and in the State.
At Perryville, General Bragg turned round, and with a
part of his army faced our advance under General
McCook. Here a battle was fought, in which the advantage,
on the whole, was on the side of the Confederates, but
which was terminated by the darkness setting in. General
Bragg admits a loss of quite 2,500 men, but claims to have
forced our army back for two miles, and inflicted upon us
a loss of 4,000 men and 15 guns. General Buell admits
a loss on our part in all of 4,348, — the real number, no
doubt. General Buell has been greatly blamed for re
maining in his tent within hearing of the battle, a few
miles distant, and not until 4 p.m. sendirig reinforce
ments, which when sent arrived upon the field only at
nightfall. During the night. General Bragg drew off his forces,
and never turned round again until he was safe back in
Tennessee. In his retreat he left at Harrodsburg some
1,200 of his sick and wounded, with 25,000 barrels of pork
and other stores. Such, and justly so, as all candid
minds most admit, was the deep dissatisfaction of the
authorities at Washington with such a fruitless termination
of this campaign, that, October 30th, General Buell was

MOVEMENTS IN TENNESSEE, KENTUCKY, ETC. 219
relieved from command, and Major-General Rosecrans
put in his place.
There is but one place in which General Buell did
effective service during his entire command, and that was
on the second day of the battle of Shiloh. Everywhere
else he manifested an irrepressible reluctance to strike the
Confederates but with feeble and ineffective blows, and
everywhere acted as if he had a special mission to protect
the persons and property of acknowledged Rebels, and
particularly to enable them to hold fast to their slaves.
It would seem that the progress of events in the his
tory of this war up to the time of which we are now speak
ing, must have revealed to our commanders in the field,
and to the military authorities at our national capital, just
wherein the great strength of the Confederacy did lie,
and what was necessary to be done in order to destroy
that power. The military eye of Europe looked on, saw
just where this power lay, and the world wondered that
our commanders and military authorities did not compre
hend the situation. Europe saw that the power of the
Confederacy lay, not in Richmond, Nashville, Corinth,
Chattanooga, or Vicksburg, nor in its seaports, but wholly
in two armies — the one commanded by General Lee, and
the other, at the time of which we are now speaking, by
General Bragg ; and that all we had to do was to wipe out
these two armies, and the war was ended. With us, on
the other hand, the great power under consideration lay,
not in these armies, but in the cities and ports referred to.
Hence our vast armies and navies and national resources
were occupied and expended for years in vain endeavours
to settle mere side issues, without a serious attempt to
settle the two main ones upon which all others depended.
On this account our war has no parallel in history. In all
others, the issues of war have had but two centres, the
locations of the hostile armies, each making the other its
issue and the location of the other its centre. With us,
the repossession of territory and the capture of all the
enemy's strongholds was the first issue to be attended to,
and the wiping out of the armies the very last, if that were
thought of at all. Take the palpable facts of this Western
Department in illustration. When the Confederates held

220 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
Central and Southern Kentucky, one thought held exclu
sive possession of the minds of our commanders, — not the
capture of these scattered forces, which could most readily
have been done, but the pushing of them out of Kentucky
and Tennessee. When these forces were concentrated at
Corinth, the capture, not of the enemy there, but of the
mere position it occupied, became the exclusive aim of our
authorities. When that post was occupied, two objects of
supreme importance now presented themselves, objects
neither of which was the Confederate army at Tupelo, just
south of us, but Chattanooga, away off to the west, and
Vicksburg at the south. Hence our great army, three or
four times as numerous as that of the enemy, was divided
into three parts ; one sent in the direction of Chattanooga,
the other in the direction of Vicksburg, and the third was
broken up and scattered about and located in distant
localities, and in such small bands as to be powerless for
anything, leaving the enemy perfectly free to make raids
all around us, to break up our communications, to make a
second invasion of Kentucky, and there to inflict upon us
a loss of more than 20,000 brave men, and property to an
untold amount. What were the results of the policy that
was pursued ? After a campaign of more than a year
subsequent to the capture of Corinth, having lost in such
bloody battles as Murfreesboro' and Chickamauga, in
marches, and sieges, by sickness and accident, not far from
100,000 men, we found ourselves the triumphant possessors
of Chattanooga, Vicksburg, and Port Hudson, with the
Confederate army intact and strong as ever. We had
succeeded in opening the Mississippi, and created thereby
the necessity of keeping in garrisons, on its banks, 100,000
men to keep it open ; but we had not settled a single issue
of the war.
Suppose, now, that when General Bragg had invaded
Kentucky, all our forces south of the State had been turned
upon his rear, and that for the purpose of preventing his
return and capturing his • army ; we placing upwards of
100,000 men between him and his 45,000 troops and
Tennessee, — moving, at the same time, upon him from the
north with all the regular and volunteer forces that could
have been collected. We know well that in such a case

MOVEMENTS IN TENNESSEE, KENTUCKY, ETC. 221
not a debris of that army could have escaped. We know,
also, that that army being captured, all the Confederate
States between the Mississippi and Savannah rivers, with all
their strongholds and rivers, would have been at our mercy.
So. at any time, if all our vast forces in this department
had been concentrated upon this one army, with the abso
lute determination not to rest, nor let it rest, until it was
swept out of existence, the same results as above indicated,
our forces being so overwhelmingly superior to those of
the enemy, must have followed in a very short period.
Then the Carolinas, with all their ports, would have fallen
at once into our power, as our great western army would
have turned to the east, where, as it entered Virginia and
came up on Lee's rear, the only remaining army of the
Confederacy would have been taken, and the Rebellion
would have collapsed at once.
MOVEMENTS OF GENERAL GRANT.
It is with pain that we turn from such considerations as
these, to notice the course which the campaign did take
under, the immediate direction of General Grant. From
the time when the command of the Western Department,
of Tennessee and Mississippi, specially fell into his hands,
Vicksburg was the central object of all his aims. After
the delay caused by the invasion of Kentucky by General
Bragg had been terminated, our commander bent all his
energies to the settlement of what he and most of our
military authorities regarded as the main issue of the war.
All things being ready. General Grant moved his main
army from the Grand Junction to Oxford, Mississippi.
While he lay here preparing to move upon Vicksburg, the
Confederates, under General Van Dorn, did what might
have been expected, their armies being left intact — made
a damaging movement upon our communications. Holly
Springs, on the railroad between Grand Junction and
Oxford, had been made our present depot of provisions,
arms, and munitions. Van Dorn captured this place, and
with it nearly 2,000 prisoners and some ^4,000,000 worth of
provisions and other property, which they carried off or
destroyed before our forces arrived to retake the olace.

222 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
By this disaster General Grant was, or supposed himself,
necessitated to retrace his steps, move west to Memphis,
and take his army down the river to Vicksburg.
The day following our disaster at Holly Springs,
General Sherman moved from Memphis down the river,
by our fleet, with our right wing, about 30,000 strong,
sailed up the Yazoo some twelve miles, and having landed
his forces there, moved them up to attack Vicksburg on the
land side. Deploying his army into line, he sent his
men, as Burnside led his at Fredericksburg, directly upon
the fortifications in his front. As was inevitable, about
2,000 brave men were vainly slaughtered in the mad
assault, the Confederates losing in all but' 207. After
obtaining leave to bury our dead and remove our wounded.
General Sherman, all hope being abandoned of capturing
the city by even a combined attack with the fleet from
below, embarked his army, and sailed down to Milliken's
Bend. When he had returned to this point, his superior in
command. General McClernand, arrived, and while waiting
the coming of General Grant with our main army, made
an expedition up the Arkansas river, and captured and
dismantled Fort Hindman, taking there, as he reports,
about 5,000 prisoners. Thus matters stood until General
Grant arrived, and commenced the siege in due form. As
the conduct of this siege belongs to the order of events in
1863, we turn to consider our naval operations up to the
close of the year 1862.

CHAPTER XV.
EXPEDITIONS ON THE SEABOARD AND OCEAN.
Expedition to North Carolina.
We have already noticed General Burnside's expedition
into North Carolina. Others of greater or less importance
now claim attention. August 26th, 1861, General Butler,
with three 50-gun frigates, four smaller vessels, and two
steam transports having on board 800 soldiers, sailed from
Fortress Monroe on a secret expedition. At the entrance,
through Hatteras Inlet, of Pamlico Sound, they captured
Forts Hatteras and Clark, with 715 prisoners, 25 cannon,
1,000 stand of arms, and a considerable quantity of pro
visions and stores. Such expeditions as these, while they
affected little for the general cause, acted as irritants upon
the surface of the Rebellion, and sent far more volunteers
into the field against us than we captured from the enemy.
Expedition to Port Royal, South Carolina.
On the 29th October of the same year, an expedition
of great importance sailed from the same point as that
above designated. This expedition consisted of a land force
of 10,000 men commanded by General T. W. Sherman,
and a naval force under Commodore Dupont, consisting
of the steam frigate Wabash, 14 gun boats, 22 first-class
and 12 smaller steamers, and 26 sailing vessels. After
a stormy passage our fleet approached Port Royal, South
Carolina, and after proper soundings and reconnoissances,
found the entrance to the harbour barred by a fort on each
.side, that on Hilton Head Island, called Fort Walker, and
that on Philip's Island, named Fort Beauregard. On the
7th November, at 9 a.m., the bombardment commenced,
and presented one of the most sublimely awful spectacles

224 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
of war. With Commodore Dupont on the Wabash in
the lead, the fleet moved in due order, one vessel after
another, first by Fort Beauregard on the right, each
vessel delivering its fire and receiving that of the enemy
in return, and then wheeling round, paid to and received
from Fort Walker the same terrible compliments. The
smaller gunboats at length found positions where they
could deliver an effective fire at the weaker points of the
enemy's positions, and where they were subject to very
little damage in return. Thus the battle continued for
about five hours, with dreadful carnage to the Confederates,
and very little loss on our part. Finding all resistance
vain, the forts were abandoned by their defenders, and left
in our possession. In a short time, all the islands from
the Tyler, which with Fort Pulaski commanded the en
trance to Savannah river, to the Edisto, some miles west
of the entrance to Charlestown Harbour, fell into our
hands. Our forces found these islands entirely abandoned
by their white inhabitants. Some 7,000 or 8,000 slaves,
all the efforts of their masters to induce them to leave
proving vain, remained behind, and became independent
labourers in the raising of Sea Island cotton, and finally
owners, for the most part, of the soil which they
cultivated. Aside from the occupancy of these islands as stated,
and the establishpient of a naval depot at Hilton Head,
no improvement was made of the advantages we had
gained, improvement at the time or during the war. At
the time, both Charlestown and Savannah were unfortified
on the land side, and either of them lay at the mercy of Gene
ral Sherman. Had he been reinforced by 10,000 or 20,000
men from our vast army lying idle near Washington, both
of these cities might have been permanently captured and
held by our forces. Nothing of the kind, however, was at
tempted, or seems to have been thought of. What is still
more singular, and unaccountable but upon the hypothesis
of a strange stupidity on the part of our military com
manders, not the least use, excepting as a mere naval depot,
was made during the war of this most favourable point
a'appui for a most effective movement into the heart and
centre of the Confederacy. But a few miles north of our

EXPEDITIONS ON THE SEABO.A.RD AND OCEANS. 225
forts, there ran the great railroad between Savannah and
Charlestown, and constituting for a long time after we
captured Knoxville the only available avenue of communi
cation between the Confederate States east and west of
Savannah river ; yet even this road was never touched by
our forces from the period when we took possession of
Hilton Head until Sherman moved out of Savannah in his
advance from Georgia into the Carolinas, a few weeks be
fore the surrender of Lee and Johnston. Such was the kind
of foresight which characterised the conduct of this war
from its commencement to its close. The communications
of the enemy seemed to have been, in the judgment of our
commanders, sacred things which were never to be touched.
When, in January 1863, we pointed out to President Lincoln
the strange fact that this only remaining artery of com
munication between the eastern and western portions of the
Confederacy, — when we pointed out the fact that this road,
which lay almost in sight of our forces at Hilton Head,
and always directly and readily accessible to them, had
never been touched, his reply was that we took and held
the place merely as a means of naval supply. That is,
inasmuch as the post was held for one special purpose, it
would be a sin to use it for any other, however important.
So our military authorities seemed to have regarded the
subject. Suppose now that the 100,000 brave men so
stupidly lost in the Peninsula, in the army of Virginia, in the
Maryland campaign, and at Fredericksburg, etc., had been
sent down to Hilton Head, and while the army of the Poto
mac was confronting General Lee, this force at Hilton Head
had moved out into the Carolinas, and after capturing
Charlestown, Willmington, and Columbia, had, as Sherman
finally did, moved up upon Lee's rear. Before the midsum
mer of 1S62 the Rebelhon would have been utterly wiped out
in the Carolinas and Virginia, and all this with the loss of
not over 30,000 men. God took wisdom from our military
authorities, not to destroy our nation, but to' make us the
free people we now are.
While our forces at Port Royal were engaged in reduc
ing Fort Pulaski, which fully commanded the entrance
to Savannah river. Commodore Dupont sailed with a land
orce to the coast of Florida, captured St. Augustine, 15

226 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
Jacksonville, and other important places, together with
the principal forts on that coast, such as Forts Clinch and
Marion, McKree, Barrancas, and others, almost the entire
coast of Florida being abandoned by the Confederates,
and its most important ports occupied by the Union -troops.
EXPEDITION IN THE GULF OF MEXICO '. CAPTURE OF
NEW ORLEANS.
During the autumn of 1861, General Butler, in com
mand of the department of New England, bent all his
energies to raise a volunteer force for an expedition still
farther to the south-west. New Orleans being his central
aim. In the latter part of February 1862 he set sail
with a large fleet commanded by Commodore Farragut,
and a land force nearly 15,000 strong, to which afterwards
was added a fleet of bomb vessels commanded by Com
modore Porter. This force first took possession of Ship
Island, on the coast of Mississippi, and regained and garri
soned Fort Floyd, re-naming it Fort Massachusetts, on the
same island. "When all things were in readiness, the fleet
and armament sailed up the Mississippi river, until they
were stopped by Forts Jackson and Philips, located on
opposite sides of a bend of the same about 75 miles
-above its passes. These forts were manned with 150
heav}' guns each. After the bombardment of these forts
had continued for several days with no material results on
either side. Commodore Farragut determined to run the
gauntlet between the two forts and the batteries on the
shores ; his fleet consisting, in the language of Mr. Greeley,
"of 47 armed vessels, 8 of them large and powerful steam
sloops-of war ; 1 7 heavily armed steam gunboats, 2 sailing
sloops-of-war, and 21 mortar schooners, each throwing
a 215-pound shell," — the whole number of guns and
mortars being 310. As preparatory to the final passage,
the obstructions in the river above the forts having been
removed, the mortar sloops were towed up nearer Fort
Jackson, and for several days continued such a fire upon it
that it was almost disabled. At length, at i o'clock a.m.
April ^4th, the fleet, in three lines, the night being very
dark, started on their perilous enterprise. When they

EXPEDITIONS ON THE SEABOARD AND OCEANS. 227
came within range of the fire of the forts, one of the most
terrible scenes known in the history of war ensued, all the
guns in the ships and in the forts and in the batteries
doing all that could have been done by powder and ball
and shell for mutual destruction, even the fish in the river
being killed by the convulsion of the elements above and
around them. While this scene on land and water was
going on, the Confederate fleet, their fire ships being first
sent down, came down and mingled in the strife, two of
their vessels being powerful ironclad rams. The fight
was as short as it was terrific, the morning revealing the
hostile fleet in flames, or wrecked, and our main fleet
safely above the forts. In the meantime. General Butler,
landing some 6,000 men on Sable Island, 12 miles in the
rear of Fort Philips, and landing them with small crafts
on the main shore, joined our fleet at the quarantine above.
The comm.ander of the forts. Colonel Huggins, perceiving
that all was lost, surrendered to Commodore Porter. Our
armament now sailed up the river and captured New
Orleans, the Confederate forces having first destroyed
what cotton and sugar they could, retreating with the
silver and gold in the banks and national treasury, and
other movable stores. General Butler now assumed com
mand of this new department, and held the people in^
subjection to the national authority with great ability, as
all admit, and, as some affirm, with an iron rule, until
December nth, 1862, when he was superseded by General
Banks. The above survey of our maritime operations evinces
the fact that from Fortress Monroe all along the shores of
the entire Confederate States we, by midsummer of 1862,
held possession of almost all the most important points for
assailing the Confederacy on its water side. At that time
we, having absolute command of the ocean, and being pos
sessed of fleets capable of conveying any amount of force
to any point desired, had only to land an army, 80,000
or 100,000 strong, at Newbern or Port Royal, and the
Carolinas, and with them, as we have shown, Virginia and
its capital and army, would have been at our mercy. By
landing an army 50,000 or 60,000 strong at any important
point which we held on the coast of Georgia or Florida,

228 THE A^tERICAN REBELLION.
or at New Orieans, and with these forces acting in concert
with the army of the Cumberiand, and other forces in its
vicinity and on the Mississippi, all the Confederate forces
between this river and the Savannah could have been cap
tured or utterly scattered in a very few weeks. From the
points referred to, also, most important and effective winter
campaigns might have been always carried on. Yet, no use
whatever, such as above designated, was made of these
advantages, though their palpable use was most persistently
urged upon the military authorities, — no use, excepting in a
single instance, to be hereafter noticed, just at the close of
the war. While no proper use was made of the advan
tages which the holding of these positions gave us, it re
quired the perpetual employment, in scattered fragments, of
from 100,000 to 150,000 men to hold these places and keep
open our communications on the Mississippi ; a force which,
if concentrated and employed in co-operation with our
other armies, would, in a very few months, have subjected
the whole Confederacy to our control. We were always,
during this war, weak at our main points and issues,
because a vast majority of our forces were ever located
at unsupporting distances, in positions where they could do
nothing to settle the main issue of the conflict.
General results of the conduct of the war thus far.
Two results followed from the palpable facts which the
conduct of the war thus far revealed — a very extensive dis
trust of the ability of the Administration, and of the party
which sustained it, to carry the war to a successful issue ;
and the Proclamation of Emancipation sent forth on the
first day of January 1863. The sentiment of distrust re
ferred to manifested itself in the fall elections of the year
preceding. In these elections the States of New York and
New Jersey elected democratic governors, and the ten States
west of New England gave a majority of ten representa
tives in Congress on the same side ; the solid vote of New
England, and that alone, securing for the Administration
a working majority in the House of Representatives, so
near had palpable imbecility and unwisdom in the conduct
of the war brought the Union to final dissolution. Under
this influence, extensive conspiracies were organized

EXPEDITIONS ON THE SEABOARD AND OCEANS. 22C5
throughout the Northern States to put down the war by
force, conspiracies which issued in the year following in the
New York riots. General Lee's second invasion of Pennsyl
vania and Maryland was induced by the expectation and
assurance received that such invasion would be attended
with a general uprising against the Administration. This
conspiracyhad its organized ramifications throughout all the
Northern States, out of New England. So assured had the
conspirators become, that during the sessions of the legisla
ture of the State of Michigan In February 1863, a member
of each House affirmed, before the body of which he was a
member, that within a very few weeks the war would be ended
by a general uprising of the people throughout the Northern
States. When called to order for such treasonable utter
ances, they were repeated with the defiant declaration that
in a very short time blood would flow In torrents throughout
the nation. We were in Lansing when those utterances
were given forth. A single fact will indicate the extent and
spirit of these organizations. With an Irishman who had
for years been employed about the college, we had formed
quite a strong friendship. At length he began to talk
ominously about the uprising that was soon to occur, and
of the blood that was then to flow. After this he stated
that in a few days blood would be shed. "Well," T re,-
plied, to test his spirit, " if such an event should occur, you
would not injure me, your friend ? " With a wolfish growl
he replied : "I would take your life, sir, as soon as 1 would
that of any other man." We immediately hastened down
to the city, and stated the facts and our apprehensions
to Major Cole, who had retired from the army on account
of wounds received. " It is true," he replied, " that these
conspiracies exist, and that these uprisings are contem
plated. But do you knew what exists on the other side? "
" No," we answered. " Let me assure you that Unionists
throughout the Northern States are perfectly organized,
armed, and equipped, with all their officers appointed and
their signals and places of rendezvous all agreed upon.
Should a rising occur in this city, for example, at certain
strokes of the bell every man will be in his place ; and let
me assure you that after the first blow shall fall, the treason
will never be repeated." It was, we repeat, with a full

230 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
knowledge of these treasonable organizations, and of their
promised uprisings, that General Lee made his second in
vasion, and fought the desperate battle of Gettysburg.
But the most important result of the conduct of the war
was the Proclamation of Emancipation, and the Constitu
tional Amendments which followed that event. It has
been said that " if we had not had a McClellan, we should
not have had a Grant." It is equally true that if McClellan,
Halleck, and Buell had not been substituted for Fremont
and others of kindred spirit and ability, we should never
have suffered the unexampled defeats and calamities which
rendered that Proclamation, in the judgment of the Ad
ministration, and that contrary to all previous plans and
expectations, an absolute national necessity. But for the
calamities which followed. In the year 1863, under General
Halleck as Commander-in-Chief, the coloured man would
not have become a soldier, and up to this time we should
not have had more than the Thirteenth Amendment. A
letter received from Mr. Sumner in the latter part of the
year 1862, we having fully expressed to him, in successive
letters, our views of the conduct of the war, and who
had laid the same before the President, — a letter from Mr.
Sumner, we say, contains these words (the first sentences
Jiave been given before) : — " I have, from the beginning,
been profoundly impressed with your views. A Govern-
iTient more quick and positive than ours would have
adopted them early, and the war would have been ended
long since. Perhaps, however, these delays and disasters
may result in consequences which you and 1 value more
than we do any present victories and advantages." These
were considerations which, all along, rendered us hopefully
patient, in view of the events which we have detailed.

CHAPTER XVL
MY VISIT TO WASHINGTON IN THE MONTH OP
JANUARY 1863.
Having, as stated in the Introduction, made the science
of war a subject of careful study from my youth, and
having fully acquainted myself with the characteristics
of the leading campaigns of past ages, particularly those
of the present century and of the preceding one, and
having done so for the specific purpose of attaining to a
clear understanding of the chief causes of the successes
and failures of such campaigns, and having observed that
the entire conduct of the war under consideration was, on
our part, in palpable violation of all the known principles
and examples of successful warfare, and in equally palpable
accordance with the very worst principles and examples
known to the science of war, or represented in history,
or representable in thought, I felt it a sacred duty to pre
sent my views of the subject to the military authorities at
Washington. I accordingly, immediately after the first
disaster at Bull Run, entered into correspondence with
such individuals as Secretary Chase, senators Sumner,
King, and Chandler, and members of the Committee on
the Conduct of the War. In these communications,
special criticisms were made upon the general conduct
of the war, developing its fundamental errors, and show
ing what ought to have been done. Similar criticisms
were presented of the different particular campaigns as
they occurred. These views were laid before the President
particularly, and pressed upon his consideration. The
following communication from Secretary Chase will in
terest the reader. It was sent in reply to a very long

232 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
communication containing the main criticisms found in
the preceding pages. In this communication I made this
general statement, that if it had been the fixed and deli
berate aim of our military authorities to conduct this war
in accordance with the worst principles condemned in
military science, and the worst examples known in history,
or representable in human thought, they could not have
succeeded, in my honest judgment, better than they had
done. To this communication the Secretary sent the
following reply. The letter was, of course, confidential
at the time, reasons for privacy being now removed : —
"Treasury Department, Oct. 2^th, 1862.
" My DEAR Sir, —
" I have attentively read your letter, and agree
with you entirely in regard to the management of the war
hitherto. In my judgment, no General has a right to be
continued in service an hour after it becomes evident that
success cannot be achieved under his lead. I have often
expressed views substantially similar to yours to the
President, but other counsels have better approved them
selves to his judgment. I think that experience has
wrought some change in his views, though not so com
plete a change as I could wish. The substitution of
Rosecrans for Buell is a beginning. The appointment of
Mitchell to the department of the south is also good.
Other changes, I think, will be made, and a greater
vigour in every direction may be expected. If disap
pointed in this, I shall almost despair ; but I do not ex
pect to be disappointed.
" I shall be glad to receive any practical suggestions
you may make. They will be instructive to me, and may
be useful to the country. " Yours very truly,
" S. P. Chase."
After receiving such communications, and after the
terrible defeat at Fredericksburg, I determined to visit
Washington, and through the influence of my friends there,
lay my views before the President and Secretary of War.

MY VISIT TO WASHINGTON IN JANUARY 1863. 233
I arrived there on the last day of December 1861, and
spent most of the next forenoon with Secretary Chase.
Through him a hearing was obtained with Secretary
Stanton. In the opening of our communication with the
latter, we commenced a criticism on the past conduct of
the war. This the Secretary interrupted, saying that he
had understood from Secretary Chase that I had de
veloped a plan for the future conduct of the war and he
wanted to hear that. We then gave him a full statement of
the plan. " Where is your General," exclaimed the Secre
tary, " to carry out such a plan as that ? " "I did not
come here, Mr. Stanton, to furnish a General, but to de
velop a plan by which this war can be brought to a speedy
and almost bloodless termination." "Well, give us a
General," responded the Secretary; " the best plan that
can be proposed is the worst, if you have not a General
capable of carrying it out." " I should suppose, Mr.
Stanton," I replied, " that if a definite and practicable
plan were submitted, a General capable of carrying it out
might be found." " Give us a General; name your man,"
was the reply of our Secretary of War. So the Interview
ended, and with it all hope of any favourable results from
that department. I then spent a full half day with
senators Wade and Wilson, laying before them my
criticisms on the conduct of the war thus far, and
my plan for the future. Both the criticism and plan
were unqualifiedly endorsed by both, each saying that
he now understood the whole subject as he had never
done before. By agreement, we spent the next evening
with the President, who, with great interest, listened to
all I had to say. He then requested that I would re
duce my views to writing, saying that he would give
them a most careful investigation. After preparing the
document, and, reading it to the senators, they accom
panied me a second time to the President's office.
After an attentive hearing of the document, and a full
discussion of its presentations, the President addressed
Mes.srs. Wade and Wilson in these words : " Gentlemen,
I am in earnest in what I am now about tb say to you.
If you senators advise it, I will adopt this plan, and
appoint a new Commander-in Chief to carry it out," —

234 the AMERICAN REBELLION.
naming the same individual whom the senators had pre
viously designated as the man to accomplish the result.
It was understood that certain other senators were to
be consulted before final measures were adopted. In
the meantime, another paper was prepared and read
before the President ; a paper the object of which was to
demonstrate the utter unwisdom of the measure which
was then avowed as the next great movement of the war,
namely, " the opening of the Mississippi and the plug
ging up of the southern ports." What was urged in
this paper was that the next movement should have one
supreme end, the wiping out of the armies of the Con
federacy, the armies of Lee and Johnston particularly.
At this meeting it was unanimously agreed to submit
these papers to the careful scrutiny of some leading
General ; and General McDowell was as unanimously
selected as the officer best qualified to give judgment in
such a case. After hearing the papers read, and spend
ing four or five hours in discussing the principles and
facts presented. General McDowell gave a written en
dorsement of the plan developed, as being the best that he
had heard suggested. All now felt sure of securing the
arrangement desired. One ominous fact became known
during the day prior to the evening for a final interview with
the President, to the senators who were in consultation, a
fact which, in their judgment, threw dark shadows over
the future, the fact that the Secretary of War and General
Halleck were closeted, during the. day, with the President,
he receiving no other company.
On meeting with the President and handing him the
paper from General McDowell, we were all, the senators
excepted, surprised at the change which had occurred in
the views of. our supreme executive. Of the plan under
consideration, he assured us, his views were unchanged.
It was, unquestionably, the best plan that had yet been
submitted. It was attended, however, with one funda
mental difficulty — the utter impossibility, in the existing
state of our railroads, to concentrate at Fortress Monroe
the needful forces, and to do this in time to render the
movement effective. "In the present state of these roads,"
he added, " it is impossible to transport over them an army

MY VISIT TO WASHINGTON IN JANUARY 1 863. 235
of 10,000 men in the space of four weeks." I reminded
him of the fact that Mr. Covode, the superintendent of the
Pennsylvania Central, and the master of transportation on
the same road, had each, but a few days before, submitted
to the Committee on the Conduct of the War an indepen
dent opinion, based upon the most careful calculations,
that by putting all their rolling stock in requisition they
could convey over that single road an army of 50,000
men, with all their appointments, and that in the space of
four days. Members of the Committee present fully con
firmed the above statements. In the face of all this
evidence, the President absolutely adhered to the opinion
which he had before expressed, the opinion which Stanton
and Halleck had fixed in his mind. At length, he said to
us : " Gentlemen, I have pledged to you my word that if
you advise it I will adopt this new plan. I hold myself
still bound by this pledge. I assure you, however, that I
have no confidence whatever in the practicability of the
plan." Thus the meeting broke up, the senators deeming
it unadvisable to recommend a plan to which the Secretary
of War was avowedly opposed, and the practicability of
which the President thus distrusted. On taking leave of
the chairman of the Committee, he expressed himself, on
account of the immobility of our military authorities, in
almost blank despair of the Republic. One of the senators,
after I left, went down to Falmouth, and in a council of
war held by General Burnside with all his corps com
manders, laid the plan before them. Every such com
mander strongly advised the adoption of the plan.
General Burnside replied that he fully endorsed the plan.
He had one of his own, however, which he desired first to
try. If that failed, he would adopt the new one. He
tried his own, failed, and was superseded ; but afterwards
expressed to the senator his regret that he had not fol
lowed the advice of his corps commanders. One year
from the next July, a Major-General from the army of the
Potomac, made, in the city of Rochester, New York, this
statement to Mr. Lawrence, proprietor of our principal
hotel, then on a visit to that city : — " A year ago last
January, a gentleman from your State, I forget his name,
came to Washington, and laid before our military autho-

236 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
rities a plan for the future conduct of the war. All our
corps commanders strongly advised the adoption of that
plan. Secretary Stanton and General Halleck, however,
prevented its adoption, Halleck saying that " it^ would
never do to have a civilian plan our campaigns." The
reader may now be somewhat interested to know some
thing of the papers under consideration, together with the
plan therein developed. The papers were divided into
two parts, a criticism on the conduct of the war up to that
time, and a fully developed plan for the future conduct of
the same. After giving the specific criticisms which have
been so greatly expanded in the preceding portion of this
treatise, I gave the following general summary of the
fundamental defects in our campaigns as conducted up to
that time.
" Fundamental errors in the conduct of the war thus far.
" Were I to sum up in few words the fundamental
defects which have obtained in the conduct of the war
thus far, 1 should specify the following as among the
more prominent : —
" I. Making it a fundamental aim to capture and hold
places, instead of aiming our blows at the heart and centre
of the Rebellion, the ar?ny of the Confederacy. The move
ment upon Corinth, all our movements upon Richmond,
and our expeditions south, wear but one and the same
aspect — the taking and holding some particular places.
Now we may overrun the whole Confederacy, and occupy
all its chief cities and strongholds, and as long as the
army of the Confederacy remains intact, and presents the
prospect of ultimate success, we have done really nothing
in putting down the Rebellion. Smite its armies, on the
other hand, and the Rebellion is dead, and all its chief
places fall Into our hands without further bloodshed.
" 2. Scattering our forces, and locating them in unsup
porting localities for mere defence, instead of centralizing
and concentrating them for main issues, is an error which,
to an alarming extent, has characterised the conduct of
the war thus far. I have often said that it would require
2,000,000 men, distributed as our army has hitherto
been, to put down this Rebellion ; whereas 500,000 effec-

MY VISIT TO WASHINGTON IN JANUARY 1863. 237
tive forces properly centralized is the utmost amount that
was ever required for this purpose.
" 3. Aiming our blows at the extremities instead of the
vital centres of the enemy's power is another error equally
fundamental and equally common in the conduct of this
war. Victories gained upon the borders, and localities
gained and held, over which the nation has so often
exulted, and in fhe results of which It has, of course, so
often been disappointed, what are they, as determining
final issues, so long as the army of General Lee moves
before us with victory crowning its banners ?
"4. Moving upon fortified places, and attacking them
in front when they can be successfully turned by flank
movements in which all the communications of such places
can be taken and held, is another error equally common
and fundamental in the conduct of this war. Never were
positions more exposed to this form of attack than were
those of the enemy at Manassas, Bowling Green, Colum
bus, Corinth, and Richmond, for example. Yet they were
all approached on their strongest sides, and their com
munications left intact. I cannot recall one single move
ment of any importance to which the above remarks are
, not strictly applicable.
"5. Moving our forces on single lines into a hostile
country, where we, by advancing from our own centres,
and that under the necessity of guarding our communica
tion, become, of necessity, weaker and weaker, and the
enemy, by falling back on his, becomes relatively and
really stronger and stronger, — moving on such lines, instead
of concentrating our forces upon him from different points,
and this when he is in "positions from whence he cannot
escape, has characterized thus far the conduct of this war.
A movement yet remains to be made, which has the
appearance of a design to capture any one army of the
Confederacy. This capital error I have fully elucidated
in my preceding criticisms.
" 6. Another of the most noticeable and capital errors
which has characterized the conduct of this war thus far,
is the attempt to strike the foe, scattered, as he is, over
half a continent, — endeavouring to strike the foe, I say, at
all points at one and the same time, instead of centralizing

238 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
our forces upon some one great and central issue, and
doing a finishing work there, and then concentrating upon
other vital centres until the whole work is finished. We
may realize the idea of the anaconda in respect to mere
localities and single armies ; but when we attempt thus to
encircle half a continent, and by a single wrench or two
to crush the enemy, we shall find, as we have hitherto
done, our fancied constrictor to be a miserably rotten
tapeworm, that is itself broken into fragments the first
contraction it makes. Instead of acting for the realization
of such an absurd idea, had our main forces been concen
trated for the finishing up, by one great movement, the
work in Virginia-, and then in some other central locality,
the Rebellion would long since have been wholly wiped
out. No war was ever conducted to a successful issue
that was waged upon the principle of extension and
simultaneous action over half a continent, such as has
obtained in the conduct of this war. In taking up this
idea our Commanders-in-Chief have wholly ignored and
repudiated all the principles by which all successful
Generals have obtained their victories.
" 7. The want of systematic unity and co-operation of
forces is still another fundamental error which has, to a
very great extent, characterised the conduct of this war.
In the campaign of Bull Run, for example, forces enough
lay within calling distance to have rendered, had they
been called in, that campaign a glorious success, and that
beyond a contingency. Yet all these multitudinous forces
were left in inglorious inaction, while a single mass was
precipitated, alone and unaided, upon the enemy. The
same, as we have seen, was true of the campaign in Mary
land, and so, with exceptions few and far between, every
where. All great commanders concentrate their forces
before fighting a decisive battle. We leave ours scattered
as before, and suffer those who happen to be present on a
given field to decide the destiny of the nation.
" 8. I refer to but one other fundamental error which
has, thus far, characterised the conduct of this war. Our
army has being for one exclusive purpose, not defensive,
but offensive operations — the putting down of the Rebellion.
Yet a majority of our forces have been scattered over the

MY VISIT TO WASHINGTON IN JANUARY 1 863. 239
country, and employed exclusively for the former purpose.
More than 200,000 men, for example, were, in this vicinity,
employed for the space of eight months for no other pur
pose than mere defence and protection against fancied
attacks from less than 70,000 ; and our army here was as
badly distributed for such an absurd purpose as any 1 ever
read of. The same holds true of our forces at the West..
At the present time masses of disciplined troops which
might be effectively employed in offensive operations for
vital issues, are simply holding territories, and guarding
particular localities against imaginary raids, when offen
sive operations for central issues would be effectual pre
ventatives against such evils. It is only when armies are
lying still that raids occur. On the other hand, whenever
they are striking crushing blows at the central power of
the enemy, then an universal concentration of forces
occurs, and raids are impossible.
" The errors above enumerated are perfectly funda
mental, and must be abandoned, or we are for ever a
divided people. Of these errors the nation complains,
and for their correction earnestly prays to the God of
heaven, and turns beseechingly to our supreme executive.
" To escape the appalling consequences of such en-ors,
entirely new principles must obtain In the future conduct
of this war. Every movement must be directed in accord
ance with some well-digested and all-comprehending plan,
a plan in which our entire forces shall be unified and
centralized for the final settlement of main and funda
mental issues. One fixed and exclusive aim must deter
mine all dispositions and movements, the destruction of the
armies of the Confederacy. Places and territory must be
taken, held, and abandoned, and raids and invasions pre
vented or endured for the time being, as this one great
issue demands.
" In accordance with these principles and aims, I will
now propose a plan for the finishing of this war and a
total suppression of this Rebellion, by two short and
decisive campaigns, one to be accomplished first, and
then the other. It will be admitted as self-evident that
if the army of General Lee and the forces of the Con
federacy now in the valley of Mississippi were annihilated.

240 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
the Rebellion would be practically ended. I propose, then,
as the object of the first campaign, the destruction of the
army of General Lee, and, as that of the second, the
annihilation of the other forces referred to."
The plan proposed for the campaign against the army of
General Lee.
The plan of the first compaign was a very simple one,
one readily comprehended, and which can be stated in few
words. At Fredericksburg lay General Lee with an
"army less than 80,000 strong. At Falmouth, on the
opposite side of the Rappahannock, lay General Burnside
with an army outnumbering that of his opponent as more
than three to two. No addition to our forces, nor any
change In their dispositions, here was required. At and
near Fortress Monroe were two army corps, numbering in
all from 20,000 to 30,000 men. It was proposed simply
to increase this force, by a reinforcement of at least 60,000
men, to upwards of 80,000, rendering our army, at this
point, quite equal to that of General Lee at Fredericksburg.
When all things were in readiness, this army was to be
landed at Bermuda Hundred, or at some point selected,
and -seize all Lee's communications south of James river.
As soon of General Lee should divine this movement, he
of course would retreat from Fredericksburg. In anticipa
tion of this event. General Burnside was to move the main
body of his army to the near vicinity of the convenient
crossings above the place, to press the enemy, with all
energy, as soon as his retreat should commence ; Burnside
keeping his right wing so advanced as to compel Lee to
fall back into Richmond. At the earliest possible mo
ment, the right of Burnside was to be brought into com
munication with the left of our army south of James river.
By such an arrangement Richmond, and Lee in Richmond,
would be encircled by an army two or three times as
numerous as that within the city, and so encircled that
all parts of our two armies should at all times be in sup
porting distances from one another.
Under such circumstances, should General Lee have
fought a battle he would have been crushed at once by
the over- whelming forces precipitated upon him ; should

Mi- VISIT TO WASHINGTON IN JANUARY 1 863. 24 1
he remain in the city, famine then would have compelled
his surrender in a few weeks. In any event, the destruc
tion of his army would have been a fixed certainty. No
military man, nor any individual of common intelligence,
to whom the plan has been unfolded, has expressed to me
the remotest doubt of the validity of the above deduction.
General Rosecrans, when the plan was unfolded to him,
promptly replied that that plan ought to have been
adopted. Rev. W. W. Lyie, a chaplain in the western
army, and author of the " Lights and Shadows of Army
Life," stated to me that officers in high command in that
army had often expressed to him their astonishment that
a plan identical with this had not been adopted for the
destruction of the army of General Lee.
The last feature of this plan was this. In case a
portion of Lee's army should perchance escape into North
Carolina, their only possible line of retreat, a fleet was to
be held in readiness to move a sufficient force round to
Hilton Head to intercept the retreat of the body under
consideration, and preventing their crossing the Savannah
river. Between this force and the army of the Potomac
in pursuit, the capture of this body would result. Will
mington, Charlestown, and Columbia, etc., would then be
at our mercy, and the Rebellion in the Carolinas and
Virginia would be for ever suppressed.
The plan for the second and finishing campciign.
Equally simple and practicable was the plan for the
second and finishing campaign. While the operations
against General Lee were going on, provisions and means
of transportation necessary for the movement of an army
of 40,000 or 50,000 men were to be conveyed round to
Pensacola, or to some point most convenient for the move
ment of said force into Georgia, Alabama, or Mississippi, as
circumstances might require. When General Lee should
be disposed of, and matters settled as above stated, an
army, as above indicated, was to be sent round to Florida,
while the array of the Potomac, after reinforcing that of
the west, was to moor through the Carolinas, cross the
Savannah river, and capture Savannah and Augusta. All
matters being arranged, this army, with that in Florida
16

242 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
and the army of the west, were to move simultaneously
upon the army then under General Bragg and other forces
co-operating with him, and crush out these between the
immense masses precipitated upon them. These forces
being finally disposed of, all ports and fortified posts be
tween the Savannah and Mississippi rivers would at once
fall into our hands, and the Rebellion in all the States east
of the river last named would be completely suppressed.
A proclamation was then to be issued promising amnesty
to all who would lay down their arms and return peace
ably to their homes within a designated period, and
rendering it a capital crime for any officer to remain, in
command of any body of men in rebellion after the ter
mination of that period. Such was the plan for the sup
pression of the Rebellion, as fully developed in the papers
read before the President as above stated, and which now
lie before me. Was the carrying out of the plan possible ?
The only objection urged against the plan, even by
Messrs. Stanton and Halleck, was the utter impossibility
of carrying it out. If they were right here, their memory
.should be to the nation " as ointment poured forth," be
cause they alone prevented its adoption. If they were
wrong, and palpably so, then no nation ever suffered
more from the errors of two men than ours in this case.
What are the real facts bearing upon our inquiries here ?
According to the report of the Secretary of War,
made to Congress December ist, 1862, the army of the
United States then in the field " constituted a force of
775»336 officers and privates, fully armed and equipped.
Since the date of the returns," the report adds, "this
number has been increased to over 800,000 men. When
the quotas are filled up, the force will number a million of
men, and the estimates for next year are based upon that
number." At the time when the above plan was sub
mitted, we had then an army in the field, an army between
800,000 and 1,000,000 strong, '• fully armed and equipped."
What must we think of the idea that out of this immense
army 60,000 men could not have been furnished to rein
force the two army corps at and near Fortress Monroe,

MY VISIT TO WASHINGTON IN JANUARY 1 863. 243
and that the railroads and fleets of the United States
could not afford facilities to convey these 60,000 men to
their desired destination ? It was not denied by the
Secretary of War at the time when the facts were stated
to him that all the forces needed to make up this amount
were then in the Carolinas, in the Kanahway valley, in
the State of Kentucky, and other localities equally near.
Let us now consider the army of the Potomac itself.
According to official returns made, as we have seen,
October 20th, 1862, the army of the Potomac, exclusive
of the forces at Baltimore and Fortress Monroe, consisted
of 304,609 men. Of these 207,036 were present for duty,
42,298 sick, ect., and 91,27^ absent. The deduction is
quite safe that by January 1863 this army consisted of
from 210,000 to 220,000 men present for duty, and that
over and above those lost at Fredericksburg. Of these,
about 120,000 lo 130,000 were with General Burnside,
leaving about 80,000 doing garrison duty. A force
60,000 strong might undeniably have been taken from
these and sent down to Fortress Monroe, the places of
those sent being supplied by others brought in from
abroad, in time to prevent any peril to the national capital.
The forces required for the, consummation of the plan
under consideration, might, undeniably, have been brought
to the point where they were needed in less than three
weeks after the plan was agreed upon. The certain result
would have been, the termination of the War of the
Rebellion during the first six months of the year 1863,
and that with the loss of but a very few thousand lives.
Had this plan been adopted, Fredericksburg would have,
unquestionably, been our last defeat, and our last very
bloody battle, and our national debt would now be less
than $1,000,000,000. We shall see, hereafter, how the
idea developed in the plan under consideration influenced
the subsequent campaigns of the army of the Potomac,
and finally brought the war to a successful termination.

CHAPTER XVn.
WINTER CAMPAIGN OF GENERAL ROSECRANS.
On the 30th October, 1862, General Rosecrans assumed
the command of what was afterwards designated the army
of the Cumberland ; General Buell having been previously
reheved from the command of this army. On entering
upon his duties, the new commander found that under his
predecessor • that army had been subject to depletion in
the same form in which that of the Potomac had been
diminished under General McClellan, 26,482 of the former
army being found to be " absent by authority," and 6,484
"absent without authority." General Rosecrans, on
assuming command, found his army, formerly 100,000
strong, now reduced to about 65,000 men, and located at
Bowling Green ; General Bragg's army, in the meantime,
making, with its immense trains, a circuitous retreat
round through East Tennessee. As our army was de
pendent for its supplies upon the Louisville and Nashville
Railroad, our commander was not able to reach the latter
place and assume the offensive until after General Bragg
had concluded his long march and reappeared in our
front at Murfreesboro'. In the meantime the Confederate
cavalry, greatly superior to our own, and commanded by
Generals Morgan and Wheeler, swarmed in all directions
around our forces, breaking up our communications, cut
ting off our supplies, gobbling up stragglers, and at Harts-
ville capturing about 2,000 prisoners.
When General Rosecrans was ready to take the field,
he found himself at the head of 46,910 men, divided into
three grand divisions commanded by Generals McCook,
Thomas,and Crittenden. After three or four days marching,
with some severe skirmishing and fighting, the two armies.

WINTER CAMPAIGN OF GENERAL ROSECRANS. 245
on the evening of December 26th, confronted each other,
their main forces lying between two streams. Stone river
and Overall creek, which united with each other several
miles north-east of our position ; the battle-field being
located from two to four miles north-west of Murfrees
boro', the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad running
nearly through the centre of both armies. Our line,
stretching from nearly north to south some three to four
miles, was deployed in the following order : Crittenden,
about 13,000 strong, on our left; Thomas, with an equal
force, in the centre; and McCook, with about 15,000, on
our right. Of the Confederate line, Hardee occupied their
left, Polk the centre, and Breckinridge the right north
and west of Stone river. The plan of General Rosecrans
was to have McCook hold his own if possible, fight
desperately, and retreat slowly, if too hard pressed ; while
our left and centre were to fall upon Breckinridge, crush
him, and rolling up the Confederates upon their centre
and right, to interpose between them and Murfreesboro',
and thus cut off their retreat. The counter plan of General
Bragg was to concentrate a crushing force upon McCook,
roll up his divisions upon our centre and left, interpose
between our army and Nashville, and thus insure its final
capture. Each plan was well conceived, and, what was
singular, each commander became, during the night, fully
possessed of the other's intentions ; General Bragg, unfor-
tunatety for us, making the earliest move. At four o'clock
in the morning, December 31st, Hardee, greatly reinforced
and sustained by the central division under Polk, suddenly
emerged from the thickets in McCook's front, while another
force assailed his right division in flank, soon hurled his
divisions in mingled masses upon our centre, even his left
divisions, under J. C. Davis and Sheridan, after the most
desperate resistance, being driven back into the rear of our
centre. By n a.m. more than one-third of our army was
almost utterly routed and demoralised, and about half the
ground held by us at daylight was occupied by the Con
federates, while their cavalry was making sad havock
among our stragglers and supply trains between our rear
and Nashville.
Our centre, under the indomitable Thomas, now felt the

246 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
full force of the Confederate left and centre, even McCook's
left division, under Sheridan, falling back, its ammunition
being exhausted, behind Thomas. Such was the force of
the attack here that Thomas was necessitated to withdraw
his two right divisions, under Negley and Rousseau, to a
more open and favourable position behind his centre ; a
movement very ably executed, but with heavy loss, a
battalion of regulars losing 530 men. The new ground
taken, however, like Thomas's last position at Chicka
mauga, was held against every effort of Bragg to take it.
So matters stood at nightfall, when darkness put an end
to the conflict.
At the close of the day our army, while it held its final
position, had lost half the ground it occupied in the morn
ing and, including its killed, wounded, and missing, full
one-fourth its number, and quite an equal proportion of its
'guns ; while the Confederate cavalry held full possession
of our communications, and were plundering at will our
baggage and supplies. "
The next day both armies remained quiet in their
respective positions, a few artillery duels excepted. The
second battle, January 2nd, was in most respects a repeti
tion of the first ; the Confederates in this instance assailing
in great force our left and left centre, and driving them
back as they had before done wuh our right and right
centre, until they encountered our batteries, which ploughed
through and through them, and compelled them to fall
back with the loss of four guns and a considerable number
of prisoners. Night seltlng in prevented any pursuit on
the part of our commander. Heavy rains prevented any
special movements of either army until the evening of
January 3rd, when General Bragg retreated so quietly
that even our pickets did not suspect the movement until
the next morning. On the day following, our army
entered Murfreesboro', where it found about 1,500 of the
enemy's sick and wounded left, with medical attendants,
in hospitals there.
In these two days' battles Rosecrans admits a loss
on our part of ",778 killed and wounded. Bragg puts his
loss at 10,000 in killed, wounded, and missing, and claims
to have taken from us on the field and by his cavalry raids,

WINTER CAMPAIGN OF GENERAL ROSECRANS.' 247
between Murfreesboro' and Nashville, 6,273 prisoners,
30 guns — he losing 3 — 6,000 small arms, and vast stores of
valuable spoils, besides burning upwards of 800 army
waggons, with all their contents. The loss on our part
was undeniably far greater than on that of the Confederates.
Their retreat, however, leaves the claim of victory to our
brave army and its able commander. During the winter
following, raids were the order of the day on both sides ;
the Confederates, on account of their superiority in Cavalry,
doing us far more injury than they received from us.
Aside from the honour of final mastery of the field, the
battle of Murfreesboro' was wholly barren of results on
either side. The armies, being nearly equal in number
and discipline, slaughtered each other to more than one-
fourth their number, and then the Confederates went on
their way, and the Unionists returned to Nashville. Yet,
with no blame whatever to General Rosecrans, no other
excuse can be offered for such a battle than the most
stupid ignorance on the part of our Commander-in-Chief.
We had, as we have seen, at the time when, with an army
less than 50,000 strong, Rosecrans moved out from Nash
ville, — we had in the field quite i ,000,000 men, " fully armed
and equipped; " and next to the sphere of the army of the
Potomac, that of the Cumberland was the most important
in the war. What excuse was there, then, in compelling,
as he was really compelled to move, the commander of
this army to fight a great national battle with an army
less than 100,000 strong. Had this amount of force
been furnished our General, the battle of Murfreesboro'
would practically have ended the Rebellion, as far as
the Confederate States between the Savannah and Mis
sissippi rivers are concerned. But with the stupid un
wisdom which controlled our war counsels, 60,000 men
could not be at the time furnished for the army of the
Cumberland, or for that of the Potomac.

CHAPTER XVIII.
THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG AND PORT HUDSON.
On the i6th October, 1862, the department of General
Grant was enlarged, so as to include both West Tennessee
and Mississippi. On receiving this command, he at once
commenced preparations for the capture of Vicksburg.
On the 4th July, eight and a half months from that time,
our army entered the city, and took possession of its
strongholds. The capture of this post has been regarded
by perhaps a majority of the people of this country as a
feat of masterly generalship, and did, in connexion with
the short command of General Grant at Chattanooga,
elevate him to the supreme command of our armies>^ and
finally secured for him two elections to the Presidency of
these United States. We have never agreed with the
estimate placed upon the military character of this trans
action. To us, it wears, for the most part, the same
dull aspect which generally characterized the conduct of
this war. Leaving, in his advance from Grand Junction
to Oxford, his depot of arms, munitions, and provisions,
containing property valued at ^4,000,000, at Holly,
Springs, guarded but by an effective force of about 1,000
men, when it was well known that the enemy was watch
ing every opportunity to fall upon our communications
and cut off our supplies, cannot but be justly regarded
as a very gross blunder. Then, on account of such a
disaster, which was at once repaired, to abandon the
important line of advance by Jackson, and make that long-
detour round to Memphis and down the Mississippi, seems
indicative of a palpable want of military wisdom. Then,
Sherman's assault upon Vicksburg, an assault in which

THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG AND PORT HUDSON. 249
column after column of infantry were hurled against im
pregnable defences, involved not only a useless but im
prudent and most excuseless slaughter of brave men.
In his criticisms on the siege of Vicksburg, General
Sherman remarks that had General Grant continued,
as he undeniably might have done, his advance upon the
place, in the direction in which he was moving when he
retreated back from Oxford, and made the detour round
through Corinth, Memphis, and down the Mississippi, he
would have captured the place in January instead of the
following July. In this statement. General Sherman
is undeniable correct. These fundamental errors deprive
General Grant of all just renown in this campaign, namely,
leaving his immense supplies behind him under guard of
but about 1,000 men, where his guard and supplies were
certain to be seized by the enemy; making the loss of
those supplies the occasion for the abandonment of the
only proper line of advance, and taking the wide detour
under consideration ; and, finally, locating his great army
where it could do nothing whatever having the remotest
tendency to secure -the object of the campaign, and then
utterly wasting six months' time in doing, as we shall
see, the most senseless and absurd things of which a
commander can conceive.
We must bear in mind also that the investment of
Vicksburg was effected on the morning of the igth May,
and that prior to this time the city had in no sense or
form been besieged, the siege proper continuing but forty-
five days. What had our great army been doing during
the previous six months ? Without making any ap
proaches towards the city, or erecting batteries which
could reach any of its defences, our immense forces
during this entire period were lying in idleness, dreaming
of some "good time coming," or were most senselessly
employed in canal and ditch digging, for the purposes
of cutting the city off from the mainland by flanking the
fortifications at Haines's Bluff on the Yazoo, or conveying
our fleet round through dead lagoons into the Mississippi
below the city. The number of these ditches and canals
thus built is too numerous to be described. A notice of
one, and that the most important, must suffice. Some

250 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
160 miles in direct line above the city, quite 200 by the
river. Moon Lake approaches within a few miles of the
Mississippi on the east side. Out of this lake the Yazoo
Pass enters a small river named Cold Water. This, a few
miles below the Pass, uniting with another stream, forms
the Tallahatchee, and this some sixty or seventy miles
below unites with the Yallabusha, and forms the Yazoo
river. All these are narrow and slow streams, suffi
ciently deep, however, to float ironclads. At the expense
of months of time and immense labour, a ditch was dug
from the Mississippi into the lake designated, and a
passage was opened for our vessels into the Cold Water.
The object of opening this new line of communication
was to flank the Confederate fortifications at Yazoo City
and Haines's Bluff, fortifications too strong to be captured
by assaults from our fleets and land forces by a movement
from near Vicksburg up the Yazoo. At length, after
untold labour and the loss of months of time, the expe
dition sailed, or rather steamed off; three toilsome days
being spent in getting through Moon Lake and Yazoo
Pass. The armament consisted of a division of land forces
5,000 strong under General Ross, of two large gunboats,
five smaller ones, and eighteen transports ; two mortar-
boats being afterwards sent down. This expedition, whose
preparation had been long before announced to the nation
and world through the press, and was fully understood
throughout the Confederacy, was expected, after " finding
out its uncouth way" for more than 150 miles down
these narrow and tortuous rivers, to capture, right in
the presence of General Johnston's army, first Fort
Pemberton, at the junction of the Tallahatchee and
Yallabusha rivers, then the strong fortifications at Yazoo
City, and finally to move down, and in connexion with the
fleet from below, to assault and capture the still stronger
fortifications at Haines's Bluff. The Confederates of
course looked on and laughed at the folly, and our grand
flotilla, with its 5,000 land forces, at the point where it en
countered the first battery erected to resist its progress, was
driven back, with two of its ironclads not a little crippled,
and slowly returned from its "Tom Fool's errand" to
its point of departure. This was the third and most de-

THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG AND PORT HUDSON. 25 1
termined effort made to flank the defences of Vicksburg.
We may claim the merit of having put a stop to these
stupid proceedings. A letter written to Mr. Sumner
contains these statements : " This whole ditch-digging
business is a disgrace to us, in the just judgment of the
Confederacy and the world, and is an insult to the
intelligence of this century ; and President Lincoln is
bound, from respect to the honour of the country which
he represents, to put a stop at once to such senseless
proceedings." Immediately after that letter reached
Washington, an absolute order, so the papers announced,
was sent on to stop all works of the kind.
What now remained, after six months had been thus
worse than wasted, was to do what might have been done
in less than four weeks after our fleet and forces reached
Milliken's Bend — the running of a sufficient number of
ironclads and other vessels by the Confederate fortifica
tions, and crossing our army over the Mississippi below
Vicksburg. Why this movement, as the only one proper
to be made, had not before occurred to Commodore Porter
and General Grant and other officers in the army and
navy, appears singular ; especially when we consider the
facts that ironclads had safely run by the formidable for
tifications at Island No. 10, above Memphis, and a fleet of
ordinary war steamers had safely run the gauntlet of Forts
Jackson and St. Philip below New Orleans. The experi
ment was made on the night of April i6th, and accom
plished with great stillness and success; and eight
ironclads and a sufficient number of transports safely
passed the forts and batteries on the hostile shore, and
our army, at a distance of 60. or 70 miles below Vicks
burg, was safely landed on the eastern side of the great
river. Too much can hardly be said of the conduct of
our army and its commanders in the advance now made
in the direction of Jackson, the capital of Mississippi, and
from t;hence directly west to Vicksburg. In the successive
battles of Port Gibson, Fourteen Mile Creek, Raymond,
Jackson, Champion Hills (the most important and bloody
of all), and Big Black river, where Pemberton made a final
stand before his retreat into Vicksburg, our total loss in
killed, wounded, and mi.-^sing was upwards of 4,000 men.

252 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
Nowhere did the enemy, even when in the strongest posi
tions, resist, hardly for an hour, the fire and charge of our
forces. During this march of twenty days, our army lived
almost wholly upon provisions picked up on the way, not
more than five days regular rations having been dealt out
to them. On their arrival at Vicksburg, our forces found
the fortifications at Haines's Bluff and Yazoo City soon
after, abandoned, and full communications with our fleet at
the mouth of the Yazoo, and thus a readv supply of pro
visions and other necessities, were secured.
As soon as our forces were drawn completely around
the city from the line of the river on the north to the
south side, a scene occurred. May igth, and was repeated
three days after, — a scene at the thought of which every
true patriot is affected with heart-sickness. We refer
to the successive assaults made by infantry columns upon
the lines of Confederate fortifications in our front. The
first assault was made mainly by General Blair's division
of Sherman's corps, and resulted in capturing several
outer works and holding them until nightfall, when our
men retired by word of command. On the 22nd, the
assault was made by our army in force along the entire
Confederate lines. Sustained by a heavy cannonade in
their rear, our infantry climbed up the heights in their front,
until they stood in open form before the impregnable
batteries of the enemy. Here they received a deadly fire
which no troops could withstand, and fell back under cover
of the heights which they had ascended, some 3,000 of
their companions being left dead or weltering in their
blood upon the field. The siege now commenced in due
order, with few casualties on either side, until, on July 4th,
the day after the battle at Gettysburg, the place, as we
have before stated, was surrendered, and occupied by our
army. Upwards of 30,000 prisoners, 213 cannon, 35,000
stand of arms, and a vast amount of military stores, were
the results of this surrender.
The surrender of Vicksburg was followed, four days
after, by that of Port Hudson. This ¦ place was fully in
vested by General Banks May 26th, a few days after
General Grant had completed the investment of Vicksburg.
The siege in the former, like that in the latter, case was

THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG AND PORT HUDSON. 253
characterised by a vain and bloody assault upon the
enemy's lines, we thus losing upwards of 2,000 men. In
this assault, two regiments of coloured troops so distin
guished themselves as to receive, from the General in com
mand, the highest commendations before the nation. In the
surrender of this place, 6,458 prisoners, 15 heavy siege
pieces in good condition, 6 1 field pieces, about one half in
reparable order, 10,000 muskets, 5,000 of these being fine
English rifles, and a vast amount of ammunition, fell into
our hands ; the Confederates losing in the two places
Vicksburg and Port Hudson about 40,000 men surrendered
as prisoners of war.
The immediate and ultimate results.
The victory of our arms at Gettysburg, and the fall of
Vicksburg and Port Hudson, all occurring within the space
of five days, of course electrified the Union States, and
induced the general belief that " the end had come," and
that but a few weeks could elapse before a final collapse of
of the Rebellion must occur. We did not sympathise at
all in these apprehensions. The victory of Gettysburg had
simply ended, not the war, as we saw, but an invasion.
The opening of the Mississippi had ceased to be a matter
of any great moment in deciding the issues of the war.
In the early era of the war, the armies of the Confederacy
had been to a great extent supplied with men and pro
visions from the States west of the river. These supplies
had now almost totally ceased. Neither soldiers nor pro
visions were, to any great amount, now being drawn for the
eastern armies from those States. We were practically,
on the other hand, carrying on a war with two peoples
who had but little intercourse with one another, and
neither of whom received much aid from the other. Hence
it was that while it required the continuous presence of
from 50,000 to 100,000 men to keep the river open, it was
not to us a channel of commerce, nor a means, to any
great extent, for the transportation of our armies, or their
supplies, while the. real damage done to the Confederacy
was the loss of men and munitions of war. This damage
was immediately repaired on the part of the Confederates,
by a professed exchange of the prisoners whom they and

254 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
we had captured and released on parole, and by a conse
quent immediate reconscription of these men into their
army. Thus it was that the 40,000 men whom we had
cooped up in Vicksburg and Port Hudson, became an
active force against us in the field ; while the main part of
our forces which had been employed in the field had to be
kept stationary to guard the widely-extended communica
tions which we had opened.
But what, in our judgment, threw the most lurid glare
over the future, as far as these results were concerned, was
the full assurance which we felt that the advantages which
these successes had given us would be wholly unimproved
under the authorities which then controlled our military
affairs. As soon as we heard of Lee's second invasion
of our territories, we instantly wrote a letter to Secretary
Chase, a letter containing the following statements : " Now
is the golden opportunity for the nation. Not a division
of the invading army ought to be permitted to recross the
Potomac. If our military authorities in Washington do
not know how to secure such a result, I am ready to give
them a plan which will ensure it. I -will now venture to
predict what will occur under these authorities, if no higher
wisdom is sought to determine their counsels. No impor
tant reinforcements will be called up from Fortress Monroe,
or anywhere else ; nor will any plan be devised to capture
the army of General Lee. All that will be done, on the
other hand, will be to gather up the troops that happen to
be available in and about Washington, to s6nd these round
and head the invaders, and drive them back into Virginia,
just as we drive out a herd of unruly cattle who have
broken into our grain field ; and while General Lee shall
escape with all his plunder, his expulsion will be proclaimed
as one of the great events of the war, and as the sure pre
sage of the speedy fall of the Confederacy."
Immediately after the victory at Gettysburg and the
fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, we wrote a long com
munication to the New York Times, a letter containing
among others on the then existing status of our national
affairs, the following statements, the substance of which
we gave in the Introduction : " Any individual well ac
quainted with military affairs must be aware that the

THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG AND PORT HUDSON. 255
advantages which should be reaped from our recent
victories will depend almost wholly upon the use which
shall be promptly made of the army under General Grant.
If this army shall be at once united with that of the
Cumberland for a crushing movement upon the forces
under General Bragg, or with that of the Potomac for a
similar movement against General Lee, the war will soon
be ended. I will venture a prediction, however, as to
what will occur under our present military authorities.
All our vast armies will now remain in comparative idle
ness, no effective movements being attempted until the
opening of the campaign next spring. While this general
inactivity shall continue, indecisive advantages gained
here and there will be magnified into great and decisive
victories, while the papers will be crowded with statements
that the Confederacy is ' on its last legs,' and is * on the
eve of a final collapse.' While this dull status of our
affairs shall continue, the Confederacy will have full time
to recover from the stunning blows it has received, and to
readjust itself to its new situation. As a consequence,
after an interval of nine or ten months of stupid inaction,
the war will be recommenced as in the beginning." All
who will call to mind the events of the period under con
sideration will readily recognise the accuracy with which
those events were foreshadowed. We never found it
difficult, as soon as we understood the direction of any of
our leading campaigns, to predict the results ; and in such
predictions, as multitudes will bear us witness, we never
erred. We always, even in the darkest hours of the Re
public, predicted the ultimate collapse of the Confederacy;
but always affirmed that the end would be reached with
a most needless, exhaustive, and wasteful expenditure of
blood and treasure. This expenditure was what we per
petually endeavoured to prevent

CHAPTER XIX.
GENERAL HOOKER IN COMMAND OF THE ARMY
OF THE POTOMAC.
On the 26th January, 1863, Major-General Joseph Hooker
assumed the command of the army of the Potomac. Such
facts as the following will sufficiently indicate the state of
this army at that time. Desertions were occurring, it is
affirmed authoritatively, at the rate of 200 per day, while
the number absent from their regiments from various
causes, mostly by permission, amounted to 2,g22 com
missioned officers, and 8i,g64 non-commissioned officers
"and soldiers. The elation of the Confederates and the
depression of the Union army at this time is manifest in
the frequency and boldness of the raids of the cavalry of
the latter quite within our lines, and the almost unresist
ing apathy with which such insults were endured on the
part of our commanders. On this subject Mr Greeley thus
speaks. " One of these raids was made by J. E. B. Stuart'
.across the Rappahannock to Dumfries, when 25 waggons
and some 200 prisoners were taken ; anc thence towards
Alexandria and around Fairfax Court House, burning the
railroad bridge across the Accotink, and returning in
triumph with their spoils ; another by a party of Imboden's
troopers, farther west from the valley to Romney, where
the guards of a supply train were surprised and routed,
72 men, 106 horses, and 27 waggons taken and carried
off; a third by Fitz Hugh Lee, across the Rappahannock,
near Falmouth, surprising a camp and taking 150 prisoners,
with a loss of 14 men; a fourth by General W. E. Jones,
in the valley, routing two regiments of Milroy's cavalry,
and taking 200 prisoners, with a loss of 4 men only ; while

GENERAL HOOKER IN COMMAND OF THE ARMY. 257
a more daring raid was made by Major White, of Jones's
command, across the Potomac at Poolsville, taking 77
prisoners. Lee further reports that Captain Randolph,
of the Black Horse cavalry, by various raids into Fanguier
county, captured over 200 prisoners and several hundred
stands of arms ; and that Lieut. Mosebey (whose name now
makes its first appearance in a bulletin) " has done much
to harass the enemy, attacking him boldly on several
occasions and capturing many prisoners." One or two
minor cavalry exploits, recited by Lee in " General Order
No. 2g," read too much like romance to be embodied in
sober history ; yet such was the depression on our side in
Virginia, such the elation and confidence of the other, such
the very great advantage enjoyed by Rebel raiders in the
readiness of the white inhabitants to give them informa
tion, and even to scout in quest of it, throughout that
dreary winter, that nothing that might be asserted of
Rebel audacity and Federal imbecility is absolutely in
credible." The reason for the Confederate elation and the
Union despondency will appear truly mysterious when
we compare the amount of forces in General Lee's with
that of the army of the Potomac, and of the entire Union
forces of the nation at this time. When I was in Wash
ington in Januaiy of this year, none of the authorities there
entertained the idea that the entire available forces of
General Lee for the defence of Richmond and " the sacred
soil of Virginia" amounted to over 120,000 or 130,000
men at the utmost ; and subsequent official information
evinces the truth that this estimate was much too high.
According to official report made to the Adjutant- General
of the United States, October 20th, 1862, the army of the
Potomac, as we have seen, consisted of 304,609 men of
all arms. Of these, 207,036 were present for duty, 42,2g8
sick, under arrest, and on special duty, while gi,275 were
absent on leave. These did not include the corps, about
g,ooo strong, under General Dix at Baltimore, and the
forces at Fortress Monroe, and the two corps under
Generals Keyes and Peck in the Peninsula. According
to the report of Mr. Stanton, our Secretary of War, the
report made to Congress December 4th, 1872, the entire
17

258 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
Union army would amount by January 1863 to quite
1,000,000 men, "well armed and equipped." With all
these forces at command, our Commander-in-Chief and
Secretary of War, as we have also seen, persuaded Presi
dent Lincoln that 60,000 or 70,000 men could not be
brought to the vicinity of Fortress Monroe to ensure the
conquest of Virginia and the destruction of the army of
General Lee. The forces under the immediate command
of General Hooker, and available for active service,
amounted to from 125,000 to 140,000 men. All the
above facts should be kept distinctly in mind, as a means
of forming a correct judgment of the events now to be
considered. As soon as he assumed command. General Hooker set
about, with all diligence, making all necessary prepara
tions for the great campaign to be opened in the early
spring. As a means, and a fundamental one, to this end.
General Burnside with the gth corps, the command of
which he had reassumed, was sent down to Fortress
Monroe, to conduct the projected movement on the south
side of James river. The plan which I had laid before
the President and others in the early part of January 1863,
of seizing General Lee's communications, by an adequate
force, on the south side of this river, while his position at
Fredericksburg should be turned by a flank movement of
the army of the Potomac, was most heartily approved by
General Hooker, as soon as he was made acquainted with
it, and was adopted by him, on assuming command, as a
fundamental feature of his plan. Hence the transfer of
General Burnside and his corps, as above stated.
By the middle of April, full preparation was made for
the great movement under consideration. On the 26th of
the month preceding, however, an event occurred which
changed the whole face of affairs, and rendered it necessary
for General Hooker to readjust his whole plan for the cam
paign. At the date designated. General Burnside was
appointed over the department of Ohio, which includes
Kentucky, and was ordered to take his corps with him. By
this one order. General Hooker's left arm was violently
broken, and all his prior calculations were defeated ; it being
utterly impossible in the absence of this corps to make any

GENERAL HOOKER IN COMMAND OF THE ARMY. 259
effective movement on General Lee's communications south
of James river. The available force of General Hooker
was also rendered 30,000 less than it was when he took
command. In view of the palpable facts of the case, but
one motive can be assigned for this order, a deliberate
intent to defeat, or rather prevent, this great movement
upon General Lee's communications. This movement, or
one of this identical character, had been by myself per
sonally, as we have seen, submitted to the Secretary of
War, and by him and General Halleck had been con
demned and reprobated and argued against before Presi
dent Lincoln. Now this very plan was about to be visibly
carried out under the eye of the nation ; and the success of
the plan, if permitted to be carried out, rio sensible man
will doubt. The ostensible reason for this order was an
anticipated invasion of Kentucky. Who can doubt that
out of the 1,000,000 men in the field, 30,000 could have
been furnished to prevent that invasion had it occurred,
which it did not, and this corps have been left where it was ?
It is undeniable that not a shadow of necessity existed for
that order ; and I challenge the world to assign any motive
for it but that under consideration. This, also, may be
added, that General Halleck was a personal enemy of
General Hooker, and for this reason, as we shall see here
after, acted as his "evil genius." It is a noteworthy fact
that when the proposition to concentrate some 60,000 to
80,000 men at Fortress Monroe was under consideration,
the utter impossibility of furnishing the means of trans
portation was urged upon the President by General
Halleck and the Secretary of War, as an absolute reason
why the invasion should not be attempted. The ready
removal, in a very few days, of 30,000 troops from Fortress
Monroe to Cincinnati, and that under the orders of these
very men, absolutely demonstrates the hollowness of their
reasonings in the former case. This, also, should be con
sidered here, that as soon as General Burnside arrived with
his corps at Cincinnati, that corps was taken from him and
sent down to Vicksburg ; the great irhrasion of Kentucky
which did occur, the invasion to repel which he and his
corps were professedly taken from their proper sphere,
having been repelled by a few hundred cavalry and infantry

260 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
then in the Interior of the State. In judging of General
Hooker as the commander of a great army, we should bear
in mind the fact that just as he was on the eve of carrying
out the only plan of a great campaign which he was ever
permitted to attempt to realize, that plan, in one of its
most essential features, was defeated by his Commander-
in-Chief. To plan and successfully execute a new cam
paign under such circumstances is one of the most difficult
and perilous tasks that any General can be required to
undertake. Had the plan which he originally projected
been carried out, and Burnside's corps been united with
those at Fortress Monroe and the Peninsula, an army
nearly or quite 60,000 strong would have been organized
for the fundamental movement south of James river, and
General Lee would have found himself assailed, in front
and rear, by forces outnumbering his own about two to
one. As it was, he had only the single army under General
Hooker to dispose of. How General Hooker did conduct
himself under his new and most unfortunate circumstances,
unfortunate to himself, and far more so to his country, re
mains to be considered.
The first problem to be solved by General Hooker was
the transfer of his army from its camp at Falmouth on the
north side of the Rappahannock river, and directly oppo
site to General Lee's position at Fredericksburg on the
opposite side of the same river, to a position favourable
for future operations on the south side of said river. As
preliminary to his immediate and ultimate purpose, he,
April 13th, despatched, on a surprise expedition. General
Stoneman with almost the entire mass of the Union cavalry,
13,000 men, as General Hooker stated before the Com
mittee on the Conduct of the War. General Stoneman
was ordered to move up on the north side of the Rappa
hannock, cross over, at discretion, above the Orange and
Alexandria Railroad, and, in the language of Mr. Greeley,
" strike Fitz Hugh Lee's cavalry brigade (computed at
2,OQo) near Culpepper Court House, capture Gordonsville,
and then pounce on the Fredericksburg and Richmond
Railroad near Saxton's Junction, cutting telegraphs, rail
roads, i.burning bridges, etc., thence towards Richmond,
fighting .at every opportunity, and harassing by every

GENERAL HOOKER IN COMMAND OF THE ARMY. 26 1
means the retreat of the Rebel army, which, it was cal
culated, would now be retiring on Richmond." " Let
your watchword be fight," ran the order, "and let all
your orders he fight, fight, fight ; bearing in mind that
time is as valuable to the General as the Rebel car
casses. It devolves upon you. General, to take ihe ini
tiative in the forward movement of this grand army ; and
on you and your noble command must depend, in a great
measure, the extent and brilliancy of our success. Bear
in mind that celerity, audacity, and resolution, are every
thing in war; and especially is it the case in the command
you have, and the enterprise in which you are about to
embark." There was a cavalry officer in General Hooker's army,
an officer to whom such an important command and such
an order might have been given with the rational expec
tation of realizing the intended results. We refer to
General Pleasanton. "It is hard," as Mr. Greeley justly
remarks, " to repress a suspicion that Irony lurks In such
language, when addressed to an officer like George D.
Stoneman." "Without stirring the suspicion of the enemy, this expe
dition moved for two days up the river, and had com
menced crossing over when excessive rains, flooding all
the streams and rivers, not only necessitated the recall of
the troops which had crossed, but a delay of further ad
vance, and also of the intended movement of the grand
army until the 27th of the month. Stoneman's great. raid,
the greatest of the kind, we believe, made during the war,
while it should have been a great success, was, in fact, in
all details a most miserable failure, accomplishing little to
the injury of the enemy, and less for the interest of the
Union cause.
Here we would beg leave to submit a very important
question to the military authorities of our country. It
was one of the striking features of this war, as conducted
equally by both sides, '¦&. feature which peculiarizes it from
the wars carried on by other nations, that in very few, if
any, of our important battles did the cavalry act an
essential part. With the exception of Fremont at Spring
field, and, through General Pleasanton's special influence.

(262 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
I at the battle of Gettysburg, General Sheridan was the first
if not the only General who made essential use of this
arm on the battle-field. On such occasions, with very few
exceptions, our cavalry were off on raids and similar
expeditions. Now the question which we would submit
is this : Is it wise at the opening of a great campaign,
and especially on the eve of a great battle, to send off, for
any purpose, the mass of the cavalry of an army ? Should
not, with exceptions very few and far between, the entire
army be kept present and intact, for the settlement of
such issues? "With 13,000 cavalry present and well used
at Chancellorsville, and that in connexion with a proper
force of infantry and artillery, not only would the rout of
our nth corps have been prevented, but the annihila
tion of that of Jackson and the utter defeat of Lee's army
would have been insured.
The manner in which General Hooker transferred his
army from the north to the south side of the Rappahannock,
utterly deceiving and out-generalling such a commander
as General Lee, and getting his command, without loss, over
all the fords of the river, evinces the former as possessed
of masterly military ability. The moment selected for
the full opening of the campaign was most propitious.
General Longstreet, with three divisions of General
Lee's army, was absent on an expedition against a Union
force 14,000 strong at Suffolk. Thus an effective force
of but about 50,000 men was present with General
Lee at Fredericksburg. Preparatory to the passage
of his main army over the river above Fredericksburg,
General Hooker sent General Sedgwick with the 6th,
and General Sickles with the 3rd, corps, with orders
to lay pontoons, and make a crossing some two or
three miles below the city, and at Pollock's Mill, still
lower down. Under the impression that it was Hooker's
intent to pass his whole army over at these points, Lee's
attention was wholly diverted in this direction, and our
commander was left free to pass his main force across
the river at Banks, U.S., and Ely's Fords, and establish
himself on his enemy's flank at Chancellorsville, some ten
or twelve miles west of Fredericksburg. In another
fundamental respect was General Lee deceived and out-

GENERAL HOOKER IN COMMAND OF THE ARMY. 263
generalled. As soon as the movement upon Chan
cellorsville was perfected. General Sickles was ordered
to follow with rapid marches, and form as a reserve in
the rear of Hooker's immediate command. This move
of Sickles, which was visible from Fredericksburg, induced
Lee to infer that the show below the city was a mere feint,
and that all our forces at that point had gone to Hooker.
Hence Lee, leaving his rear almost wholly unprotected,
moved his whole army to Hooker's front. This was as
the latter desired and anticipated.
So far the success of our commander was complete.
On April 30th matters stood thus. Hooker had under his
immediate command, at and near Chancellorsville, a force
of nearly 70,000 men. At the same time, Sedgwick was
safely established on the south side of the river, with a
force consisting of his own corps and 6,000 men left
under his order at Falmouth, a force nearly or quite
30,000 strong. General Lee in the meantime, now fully
aware of his enemy's real designs, had moved his entire
army, a very small force excepted, out of his fortifications
at Fredericksburg, and established himself midway be
tween that city and Hooker's position at Chancellorsville.
The plan of General Hooker was a very simple, and not un
wisely projected, one. It was to form his own lines in front
of the enemy, wait there until Sedgwick should move up,
a distance of but six or eight miles, and open the battle
by an attack on Lee's rear. Hooker was then to pre
cipitate his whole army upon the enemy, and crush him
between these two masses. Nothing appeared more
practicable than the accomplishment of such a result.
How could 50,000 men in an open field where the ad
vantages were equal for either party, sustain the shock
of 70,000 men on one side, and 30,000 on the other?
It was not without seeming good reason that our
commander said to his associates, as he rode up to the
spacious brick mansion and tavern at Chancellorsville,
" I now have Lee's army in one hand, and Richmond in
the other." The blasphemous utterance with which this
boast is affirmed to have been accompanied, however,
would have led any prudent man, who believes in God
and in an overruling Provi'dence, to anticipate the disasters

264 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
which followed. When the elder Napoleon faced the ad
monition, "Man proposes, but God disposes," with the
impious boast, "I propose, and I dispose," the utterance
itself revealed the fact that his mind had lost its balance,
and that his fall was near.
General Hooker's plan, we would say, has very im
portant precedents in its favour, one of Buonaparte's most
signal victories in Italy having, for example, been gained,
and that in very perilous circumstances, in accordance
with this identical principle. The plan, however, unless
prosecuted with very great vigour, and unity of action on
both sides, is obviously a most perilous one. How it was
carried out in this case will be seen hereafter. There is
still another plan which deserves special consideration,
provided we would correctly understand what is best to
be done under similar circumstances. After the safe
crossing of his main army had been secured by the feint
of Generals Sickles and Sedgwick below Fredericksburg,
suppose that the corps of each of these Generals, instead
of that of the former, had been brought around to Chan
cellorsville. General Hooker would, in that case, have had
all his forces under his immediate command, and would
have been able to precipitate an overwhelming force
directly upon his antagonist, and would have saved all
peril of having his subordinate first and then himself
assaulted successively by the army of General Lee. This,
under the circumstances, was, unquestionably, the prefer
able plan of the two. Buonaparte, when he ordered the
movement to which we have referred, knew his men, and
knew well that his orders would be obeyed implicitly, and
executed with the utmost vigour. Hooker did not know,
and had good reasons for not intrusting too much to his
subordinates, and hence would have done better had he
kept all his forces under his immediate command.
There was still another plan submitted to and urged
upon the adoption of General Hooker, a plan submitted
by General Pleasanton, which our commander should have
very deeply pondered. In passing with his cavalry in
advance of the army over the Rappahannock, he captured
a number of prisoners, and among them an officer of
General Lee's staff and board of engineers. In the

GENERAL HOOKER IN COMMAND OF THE ARMY. 265
pocket of this officer was found a journal containing a
record of the doings of the Confederate army for a long
time previous. In this journal was recorded a visit of
General Lee and his Generals to Chancellorsville, and of
the conclusion to which they arrived, namely, that the
next great battle would, in all probability, be at that
place. In this journal, also, was an account of the pre
paration of a circular road, commencing at a point mid
way between this place and Fredericksburg, and running
round to the west of Chancellorsville. Apprehending, at
once, that the object of the road was a military one, he
conjectured, very naturally, that said object was to enable
the Confederates, by a flank movement around our right
wing, to attack our army in front and rear at the same
time. He accordingly went to General Hooker, and
urged that the nth with another corps should be de
ployed on the road from Chancellorsville to Spottsylvania;
that, this latter place being taken possession of, our line
of battle" should be formed, with our left resting upon the
Rappahannock, and our right upon Spottsylvania. By
this disposition, all our forces would have been in proper
battle array, for purposes of offence or defence, and could,
at the proper moment, have been as a united force con
centrated upon the enemy in front. As matters stood, our
various corps lay about in scattered fragments hardly
capable of united action. As our line would then have
lain directly across the road referred to, the possibility of
any flank movement upon our right, or anywhere else,
would have been rendered impossible. By our occupancy
of Spottsylvania, also, the retreat of General Lee in the
direction of Richmond, in case of defeat or a desire to
escape from his present position, would have been rendered
impossible. While our forces were thus arranged, I
remark once more. General Hooker could have held his
position until Sedgwick, had he been defeated, as he was,
could have been brought up with 30,000 men from Falmouth
and united them with our army at Chancellorsville. The
preponderance of force on our side would then have been
so great as to render the total defeat of General Lee a
certainty. Every consideration demanded the prompt
adoption of this wise advice. General Hooker's mind.

266 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
however, was too much occupied with what was imme
diately before him, as he was waiting the hearing General
Sedgwick's guns in General Lee's rear, to give heed to
any such advice. The results can be readily detailed.
On May ist. General Hooker, having ascertained, by
reconnoissance, that for three miles in his front no Con
federates could be found, advanced Syke's regulars (3rd
division, 5th corps) down the old 'pike towards Fredericks
burg. This force was followed by a part of the 2nd
corps, and by two other divisions of the 5th corps, on a
road still farther north. The nth, followed by the 12th,
were deployed still farther in a westerly direction from
Chancellorsville. The intention of General Hooker was to
have advanced his main forces some two or three miles
forward in the direction of Fredericksburg. General
Sykes had not advanced one half this distance, however,
before he met the enemy advancing in numbers far greater
than his own. After a severe conflict, in which there was
considerable loss on both sides, our forces were, under
orders from General Hooker, required to fall back. The
initiative was thus in favour of the Confederates. This,
however, was a matter of no concern to our commander,
as he was waiting for the time to make the contemplated
assault upon the enemy in conjunction with General
Sedgwick, who was expected, in conformity with the plan
of the campaign as understood by him and General
Hooker, to cross his entire force over the river, and move
without a moment's delay to the rear of General Lee's
army and open the battle as soon as the required position
was reached. During all the day. May 2nd, our com
mander waited in breathless expectation to hear the sound
of his subordinate's guns, when 30,000 men were to be
precipitated upon the enemy by a front attack. The day
passed, however, without anything being heard from
Sedgwick. At g in the evening, a positive order, re
ceived two hours later, was forwarded, requiring General
Sedgwick to move instantly, or at 12 in the morning,
upon Chancellorsville, and open the battle as above stated.
General Warren, the bearer of Hooker's message, made
known to Sedgwick the former's critical condition, and
urged an immediate movement. At 3 o'clock in the

GENERAL HOOKER IN COMMAND OF THE ARMY. 267
morning. General Warren found General Sedgwick across
the. river, but with his army motionless. It was quite ii
a.m., however, before Sedgwick's arrangements were com
pleted for storming the heights of Fredericksburg, although
at an early hour he was reinforced by General Gibbon with
6,000 men, who had crossed over and entered the city.
The heights referred to were readily carried, but a small
force having been left. So was an advanced position,
Marye'shill, beyond, where the enemy had concentrated all
his available forces. 200 prisoners and some guns were
captured by these movements. The way now being open,
our General, with strange stupidity leaving General Gibbon
with his 6,000 men at Fredericksburg, moved forward to
Salem church, some three or four miles in the direction of
Chancellorsville, arriving at this point at 5 p.m. instead of
6 a.m., as he was ordered to do, and undeniably might have
done. The night, it must be borne in mind, was a very clear
moonlight one, a night in which troops could be moved
about as readily as in the daytime. Yet no movements
whatever were made until quite eleven hours after it was
required to be commenced. At 5 p.m.. General Lee,
released from all heavy pressure in his front, was able, by
forces sent to his rear, not only to stop the farther ad
vance of our General, but, on the next day, to drive him,
with the loss of 4,601 brave men, across the Rappahan
nock. Thus 30,000 of our best forces were worse than lost
to our army in this campaign, and that on account of
inexcusable dilatoriness on the one hand, and open dis
obedience to positive orders on the other; and these at
the most critical moment of said campaign. In any
country but ours, such acts would be treated as high
crimes and misdemeanours. In ours, however. Generals
high In command became, d la mode McClellan, schooled
to a stolid indifference to orders received ; such acts, also,
being no real crimes with our supreme military authorities.
While numbers of our commanders were reeking with such
crimes, and the nation was bleeding at every pore as a
consequence, but one such criminal received even the
semblance of punishment. General Sedgwick was a brave
and able corps commander on the field when under the
immediate control of a superior in command. For a

268 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
separate command, to say the least, he most palpably
evinced fundamental disqualifications. Had General
Sedgwick promptly obeyed the order under consideration
when that order was first presented to him, — that is, at 1 1
p.m.. May 2nd, or at 3 o'clock the next morning, when
compliance was urged upon him by the most weighty
considerations possible, and urged by such a messenger
as General Warren, — and had the former kept his forces
intact, as he should have done, it is undeniable that by
8 or 10 o'clock. May 3rd, 30,000 men would have been
precipitated upon the rear of General Lee at a moment
when, in consequence of Jackson's corps, 25,000 strong,
being miles away on our right flank, the latter could have
had but little if any more than 30,000 men under his
immediate command, and when the mass of these were in
a death-struggle with superior forces in their front. The
deduction is undeniable that but for disobedience to
positive orders and inexcusable delay on the part of
General Sedgwick, the destruction of General Lee's army
would have been inevitable.
Let us now direct our attention to the events which did
occur, May 2nd, on the field at Chancellorsville. In our
immediate front very little fighting occurred, as General
Hooker was, as we have said, waiting to hear the sound of
Sedgwick's guns In the rear of General Lee. Early in
the day. General Jackson, with his veterans, 25,000 strong,
commenced his celebrated flank movement to the rear
of the right wing of our army. His forces marched, of
course, on the wide circular road to which we have referred.
To mask this great movement, a considerable force, but
very much smaller than the main one, moved, parallel with
the latter, on the old road which lay between our army and
the circular one on which Jackson's main force was moving.
With this smaller force, and with it only, our scouts and
reconnoitering parties came in contact, and sharp fighting
on both sides ensued. At 10 a.m. a rifled battery opened
upon this body, threw it into confusion, and compelled it
to abandon the road on which it was moving. At i p.m.
General Birney, with his division, followed by another, of
the divisions of Sickles' s, corps which had been advanced
between the 4th and 12th corps, charged the passing

GENERAL HOOKER IN COMMAND OF THE ARMY, 269
column with such force that he captured and brought off
500 prisoners. At sunset Birney formed his division in
hollow squares on this interior road, all supposing that the
advance of any other forces of the enemy was effectively
barred. While these minor conflicts were going on on
this interior road, the Confederates were marching without
the least molestation, or suspicion, on our part, of the main
movement which was being made. Never was a great
movement more skilfully planned, more wisely and per
fectly worked, and more effectively executed, than was
that under consideration. While our commander and his
subordinates were aware that a flank movement in the
direction of our right wing was being made, none had the
remotest suspicion of its gigantic proportions, until the
avalanch descended with crushing weight upon the nth
corps of our army. Early in the morning, as Hooker rode
along in front of his right wing, he expressed an appre
hension that It was too far extended, and not strongly
posted. Generals Slocum and Howard, however, assured
him that they were ready and adequate for any emergency.
Still later, as he states, he cautioned General Howard to
be on his guard against a flank attack.
Thus matters stood till about 6 p.m., when Stonewall
Jackson fell with his corps, 25,000 strong, upon the exposed
flank of that of Howard. At Shiloh, the Confederates, as
they emerged from the forest and opened the attack, found
the commands of General Sherman and others quietly
cooking their breakfasts. At Chancellorsville, Jackson
found portions of the first division which he struck, that of
General Devens, as quietly and unsuspiciously, with their
arms stacked, preparing their suppers, and all without any
apprehensions whatever of approaching danger. In neither
case were any pickets or reconnoitering parties out to
guard against the possibility of a surprise. Such palpable
and culpable negligence, however Generals may afterwards
have redeemed their reputation, deserves the deep repro
bation of the nation. This division was, of course, over
whelmed at once, its commander being wounded, and every
one of its Generals and Colonels either killed or disabled,
and one-third of its number slaughtered or captured. As
the fugitives rushed over the ground occupied by the next

270 TIIE AMERICAN REBELLION.
division, that of General Schurz, they found that that divi
sion had fled without waiting to form to shoot, or be shot
at, at all. All attempts to rally proved abortive, and despite
Howard's frantic efforts, on rushed the confused mass upon
the third division which lay in their way, that of General
Steinwehr. Here the semblance of an organization was
maintained. The mass of the nth corps, however, wildly
rushed down the Chancellorsville Road, spreading every
where a panic and threatening a stampede of ourwhole army.
The corps of General Sickles, originally located as a
reserve behind Chancellorsville, and subsequently, as we
have seen, far advanced between the nth and 12th corps,
was placed in a very critical position by the stampede of
the nth corps and the rapid pursuit of Jackson — the
liability of being wholly cut off from our army. Birney,
with his division, was too far away to be of present use,
and Sickles' s 3rd division was employed by General
Hooker, and could not be withdrawn.
At this crisis General Pleasanton, with his cavalry,
500 men, and field artillery, appeared upon the scene, and
threw himself directly in front of Jackson's advance.
Picking up, as far as he was able, the guns and ammuni
tion abandoned by Howard's corps, and adding these to
his own, he formed a battery of twenty-one guns, all
doubly and some trebly shotted with canister, and care
fully pointed, so that every shot was likely to take effect ;
the open ground in front of this battery, the ground over
which the Confederates must advance, being about 200
yards wide. This was a little before dusk. Perceiving
that his guns could not be got into position and made
ready before the Confederates would be upon them, and
that nothing but a charge of cavalry could keep the
enemy in check for the time needed. General Pleasanton
turned to Colonel Keenan of the 8th Pennsylvania, and
gave out this order: "You must charge into those woods
with your regiment, and hold the Rebels" (25,000 strong)
" until I can get some of these guns into position. You
must do it at whatever cost." With a calm smile, the
brave Colonel, well knowing what obedience would' pro
bably cost him and his equally brave associates,— with a
calm smile, the old patriot replied, " I will," " and into the

GENERAL HOOKER IN COMMAND OF THE ARMY. 27 1
jaws of death rode the five hundred." In ten minutes he was
dead, and very many of his associates lay dead or bleeding
around him. The time requisite for full preparation was
gained, however, and the Confederates emerged in force
from the woods. They appeared at first with a Union
flag, and cried out, " Don't fire. We are your own men."
On discovering, which they soon did, that they were
known, they took down this colour, raising half a dozen or
a dozen of their own flags, and poured fire upon our men.
At this moment, on the word of command from General
Pleasanton, our whole line of guns was simultaneously
discharged. The turn had now come for the Confederates
to bleed and to run. Their whole advance disappeared In
an instant, the few that remained standing fleeing back
into the woods. Three times Jackson's column advanced
upon those guns, once approaching within fifty yards of
them ; and three times the masses of those who were
pushed forward were mowed down by the annihilating fire
to which they were subjected. At length, as darkness
closed over the scene, the enemy, weary with being
slaughtered, and that to no purpose but self-destruction,
fled precipitately and in confusion. For a considerable
distance they were pursued by our infantry, who, on
coming upon forces far outnumbering their own, returned,
bringing quite a number of prisoners with them.
It was directly under and within full range of this
fearful fire of our artillery, the fire above described, that
the brave General Jackson fell. When being borne off on
a litter, one of the bearers was shot down, and the General
fell heavily to the ground, receiving very severe injuries
in addition to his previous wounds. The Confederates
claimed that their General fell through an accidental fire
of their own men. A Confederate officer, one of Jackson's
staff, and who was near him when he fell, stated to
General Pleasanton after the war, that there was no
reasonable doubt that their General, as well as his litter
bearer afterwards, received his mortal wounds through the
fire of the Union guns. Be that as it may, the loss to the
Confederates in this one man overbalanced all their gains
through this celebrated movement. Through the prisoners
above referred to. General Pleasanton was informed of the

272 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
fall of Jackson and other of his leading officers. Dark
ness now put an end to the conflict until the next morning.
To General Pleasanton belongs the high honour of having,
at the most critical moment of the conflict, stopped and
driven back Jackson's advance, and inflicting such an irre
parable loss upon the Confederate army and cause. Not
long after this. General Sickles returned from his advance,
and posted his corps behind General Pleasanton's battery,
increasing the number of its guns to upwards of forty.
While this flank movement of Jackson had been in
progress, General Lee had been drawing his main forces
near to our front and left flank, filling the forests with
sharp-shooters, and stationing his artillery upon elevations
favourable for effective service in the conflict which was
expected on the next day. At dawn the next morning,
while heavy columns were pushed forward, and a teazing
fire was opened along our whole front, no decisive attacks
were made in these directions. General Lee was waiting
for a decisive effect, through the attack on our right rear,
just as General Hooker was waiting to hear the sound of
Sedgwick's guns. No body of men ever made more
strenuous efforts to accomplish the part assigned them
than did the remainder of Jackson's corps on the morning
of May 3rd, led as that corps now was by General J. E.
B. Stuart, General A. P. Hill having been disabled soon
after Jackson was, and that under the fire of Pleasanton's
guns. Time and again did those veterans rush upon
Pleasanton's battery, now, as we have said, increased to
upwards of forty guns,- all managed with the greatest
determination and ability. Those columns, however, as
often as they came within the sweep of those guns were
shattered and broken to pieces, and scattered, with dread
ful slaughter. Thus the carnage continued, regiment
after regiment melting away, as they charged up to the
muzzles of those guns, until, his ammunition beginning to
fail. General Sickles sent to General Hooker for reinforce
ments. When Major Tremaine, who bore this message,
arrived at head-quarters, he found that our army was
without a commander, and returned without an answer.
General Hooker lying senseless, and by his staff supposed
to be dying, on account of a stunning shock which he had

GENERAL HOOKER IN COMMAND OF THE ARMY. 273
received by means of a cannon ball striking a pillar
against which he was leaning. Sending for help a second
time, and receiving no response, the ammunition of his
guns being now totally exhausted. General Sickles with
drew to his second line of defences. The Confederate
forces had been so shattered and broken to pieces in their
previous assaults, that a full half hour passed before they
approached our forces in their new position. In his
testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the
War, General Sickles affirmed, and that for the best of
reasons, that had aid, as requested, even 10,000 of the
30,000 troops that stood idle near him, been sent to him,
a signal victory would have been obtained. This aid
General Couch, who ranked next to General Hooker, and
who now had full command, refused or neglected to send,
hesitating to assume the authority now actually in his
hands, and which no one but himself could assume.
All the aid which General Sickles received was from two
divisions of Couch's corps, those of Generals French and
Hancock, who forced back the left of the attacking force,
then threatening General Meade's front. Aside from this
little help the whole that remained of Jackson's corps bore
down upon Sickles. After sustaining the shock until his
ammunition was almost wholly exhausted, and after, with
five terrible bayonet charges, repelling the advances of the
enemy and capturing eight flags, our General drew off his
corps a second time. In this dreadful conflict, this single.
corps which "bore the burden and heat of the day"
had two of its division commanders. Generals Berry and
Whipple, killed, and one other General wounded, General
Mott, of the New Jersey brigade, and lost in killed and
wounded upwards of 4,000 out of 18,000 of its brave men.
It lost, however, not a single gun, save one at daylight,
and no prisoners ; while it took several hundred, and
not a few flags from the enemy. At length, General
Couch, who failedMn resolution and bravery to order need
ful help, help lying directly before him, to his associates
who were being pressed by overwhelming forces, did
evince the sublime courage to order a retreat of our main
forces, one mile from Chancellorsville, back towards the,
Rappahannock. 18

274 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
At noon General Hooker was restored to consciousness,
and reassumed the command of his army. At this time this
memorable battle of Sunday was practically ended, and
General Lee felt himself at liberty to turn his attention to
Sedgwick, holding him in check for the remainder of the
day, and on Monday, May 4th, assaulting him in force and,
as we have seen, driving him headlong and at a fearful
loss over the Rappahannock, at Bank's Ford. At evening
General Hooker held a council of war with his corps
commanders, with no decisive results. On the morrow,
apprehending a flood which might carry off our pontoon
bridges and occasion a total failure of provisions, our
army was safely recrossed to the north banks of the river
which, a few days before, it had passed over with such high
hopes and assurances. In their return they brought back
one more gun than they took with them, and inflicted upon
the enemy an injury which they were less able to bear than
we were to endure what we received. Our loss, in killed,
wounded, and missing, amounted to the enormous sum of
17,197 men, just 83 more than one half of this number
being lost by two corps, those of Sickles and Sedgwick.
One of the most remarkable events connected with this battle
is the fact that an army 70,000 strong stood by and saw a
single corps of 18,000 men, bleeding at every pore, bearing
up against overwhelming odds, and sustaining the main
burden of the conflict ; and all this without sending any
needful aid, though often solicited to do so. How great
was the numerical loss of the Confederates is not known.
On the field at Chancellorsville, they must have suffered
more than we did, they, for the most part, being the
assailing party, and in their assaults the masses of their
forces were pushed forward, as if for the purpose of being
slaughtered. Of the extent to which General Hooker is to be held
responsible for the failure of this campaign, we are now
able to approach a correct judgment. The error of
sending off the mass of his cavalry at the commencement
of the campaign, while it should be set down as a capital
error, was an error equally common with the ablest Con
federate and Union commanders, an error which pecu-
liarized the conduct of this war, in almost all the armies on

GENERAL HOOKER IN C0MMA^D OF THE ARMY. 275
both sides. The fact that General Hooker at the opening
of the campaign fully out-generalled such a commander as
General Lee, evinces the former as a strategis*- ¦oi no ordi
nary character. Had General Sickles been in General
Sedgwick's place, there can be no reasonable doubt that
the campaign of General Hooker would have been,
throughout, a great and most decisive success, and the
plan of the latter In dividing his forces as he did would be
set down to his great credit in history. Nor can it be
set down to his discredit that he misjudged Sedgwick, all
that was known of this General marking him as trustworthy
as far as energy and obedience to orders are concerned.
Nor can he be held responsible for Howard's error. The
misfortune which happened to our army in consequence of
its being without a head for so many hours during the
forenoon of May 3rd, cannot be charged as a fault in its
commander, but must be set down as a great calamity
incident to war everywhere. Nor, we remark finally, did
he act unwisely, but prudently, in withdrawing his army to
the north side of the Rappahannock, at the time and under
the circumstances in which he ordered that movement.
The rising flood threatened to carry off all the pontoon
bridges in his rear, and to render fording and all other
means of crossing impossible. He had not provisions to
subsist his army four days longer in the place where he
was, and could not have drawn the necessary supplies
from the country around him. Every consideration of
wisdom and prudence required him to act as he did, and
to leave his reputation to posterity. One mistake he did
make, and that was not complying with the advice of
General Pleasanton to extend his right wing across that
circular road, and thus prevent the possibility of Jackson's
raid. Three causes adequately Aaccount for the failure of this
campaign, causes for neither of which can General Hooker
be held responsible. The first and most important of
all, and one which is fatal in any great movement, is
Sedgwick's disobedience to orders and excessive dilatori
ness. To say that he could not have got his corps in
marching order in four hours, and have been ready to
have started at three in the morning, is to evince blind-

276 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
ness to the most palpable facts of energetic warfare.
Wellington's army was in motion in one hour after he
heard of Buonaparte's advance. Such is the promptitude
of action in war generally. Four hours is the utmost that
can be asked for General Sedgwick. Had he started thus
early, he would have encountered less obstacles in his ad
vance than he did meet, and would not have found McLaws
across his path on his arrival at Salem church. In other
words, had he started as he might have done, he would,
by 8 or g a.m., have fallen directly upon General Lee's
rear, and insured his disastrous defeat. The second cause
was the rout of the nth corps by means of Jackson's raid.
The character of General Howard as a soldier and a man we
hold in deep esteem. That he brought a great calamity upon
our army by permitting his corps to be taken by surprise,
is undeniable. The last cause is the criminal failure, or
refusal, of General Couch, at the critical moment when
General Hooker was disabled, to assume command and
order needful help to a corps which was contending against
such fearful odds, and when the fate of the day obviously
turned upon sending the help asked for. Either of these
causes is, of itself, sufficient to account for the loss of a
battle. All taken together, most fully account for the
failure of a great campaign.
No historian with whom we are acquainted has ex
plained the secret of the wonderful success of this celebrated
raid of General Jackson. To give the reader a distinct
understanding of the subject, we will now recur to it again.
For the special information which we have received upon
the subject, we are indebted to General Pleasanton. In
the next movement of our army upon Richmond, General
Lee of course understood that there would be an attempt
to turn his position at Fredericksburg by a flank movement
over the river, either above or below the city. Several
miles above the city are three fords, at no great distance
from each other. Over each and all of these an army can
be readily passed when the water is not high, and at all
times, excessive floods excepted, by means of pontoon
bridges. At these points it was obvious that our army,
should it cross above the city, would attempt at least a
passage. All the roads from these fords unite at Chancel-

GENERAL HOOKER IN COMMAND OF THE ARMY. 277
lorsville, as their common centre. Hence the Confederate
commanders concluded that should our army cross at these
fords it would be concentrated at this one point, and that
almost of necessity. They accordingly surveyed with the
greatest care all these grounds, calculated the probable
location of the parts of our army, their facilities for offensive
and defensive operations, and their exposures to successful
assaults. It became manifest to those commanders that
on the arrival of our army at Chancellorsville the main and
almost exclusive attention of our commander and his asso
ciates would be fixed in the direction of Fredericksburg,
the only point from which the remotest danger would be
anticipated; that, as a consequence, our rear would be
very likely to be left, for the first day or two at least, care
lessly guarded ; and that if our forces, our right wing
especially, could be eff'ectively assaulted in the front and
rear at the same time, the most fatal results to the Union
army would most probably arise. It became obvious that
on the old road running westward, and south of Chan
cellorsville, from the point to which General Lee's first
advance from Fredericksburg would be made, a contem
plated flank movement could not be eff'ected, that road
lying too near our army. If, on the other hand, a new
road should be prepared, a road circling round from the
point referred to, to the west of the position where our
army would be located, this great flank movement might
be made, and our army might be kept In perfect ignorance
of what was being done until the crushing avalanch should
descend upon us. It was in view of such a contingency
that this road was fully prepared long before our army
crossed the Rappahannock. It was on this road that
Jackson moved his columns, keeping, at the same time,
small bodies moving on the old road referred to, and this
as means, which proved effective, of diverting the attention
of our Generals from his main movement. When these
small forces were assaulted and driven off, and Birney' s
division was formed in hollow squares across this old road,
all suspicion of any peril to our rear was wholly allayed.
This was as General Jackson anticipated. Here we have
the only apology or excuse for General Howard for the
unguarded state in which all his outposts, ?»*^, e found when

278 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
Jackson's assault was made. The above facts render fully
evident the great wisdom and foresight of the Confederate
commanders, on the one hand, and as fully explain the
secrets of Jackson's success in the movement under con
sideration, on the other.
Here we have fully evinced the fundamental error of
our commanders in their attempted movements in single
lines upon Richmond, in the directions taken by Generals
Burnside, Hooker, and Grant. At every defensible point
on the roads where their advances must have been made,
they Were certain to be confronted by the whole Confede
rate army located behind the most formidable fortifications,
prepared long beforehand for such contingencies. When
General Grant, for example, arrived at Spotsylvania, he
found General Lee there with his army distributed behind
impregnable earthworks prepared long before, and sodded
for future preservation. So it was, as we shall see here
after, at every point at which General Grant met General
Lee, in the march of the former from Culpepper to Peters
burg. Our commander literally led forth his great army
as " sheep for the slaughter," to be "killed all the day
long," and that for no available purpose. Had General
Burnside, with an unavoidable sacrifice of much of his
army, succeeded in driving the Confederates from Frede
ricksburg, he would, immediately after, have encountered
General Lee at Spotsylvania, behind fortifications just as
formidable as those which had been previously carried,
and so on at every defensible point on our advance to
Richmond ; the certain result being, that before its arrival
at the city named it would have melted away and become
powerless for effective service, just as that of General
Grant did in its wild and stupid and desperate march
above referred to. The excuse for General Hooker is
that by moving his army as he did to Chancellorsville he
necessitated General Lee to fight a decisive battle in the
open country, a battle in which a defeat of the Confede
rates would have insured their capture, or rendered them
powerless for future resistance. We should also bear in
mind that Richmond was always approachable from other
directions, where no such obstacles existed.

CHAPTER XX.
GENERAL LEE A SECOND TIME ON FREE SOIL.—
GETTYSBURG.
Immediately after the triumph of the Confederates at
Chancellorsville, General Lee determined on a second
invasion of Pennsylvania and Maryland. The immediate
considerations which determined him to adopt this bold
measure were the mustering out of about 20,000 of our
forces under General Hooker, in consequence of the ex
piration of their term of service, on the one hand, and the
addition to his own army of about 25,000 men, in conse
quence of the return of General Longstreet's corps, on the
other. The main consideration was the assurance which
the Confederate authorities had unquestionably received,
that should they advance into Pennsylvania and gain a
signal victory over the Union army there, there would be
an immediate uprising of the Copperhead element of the
Northern States, the element so bitterly opposed to the
war itself, and to the emancipation measures of the
Government. To these considerations General Lee refers
in his report, In which he gives his reasons for the measure
under consideration. Having given the military con
siderations, he adds : " In addition to these results, it
was hoped that other valuable results might be attained by
military success." Having perfected all preparations, the
Confederate commander, June 3rd, put his army in
motion ; A. P. Hill, with his corps, being left behind,
with instructions to make all possible demonstrations to
mask the great movement which was being made with all
possible expedition on and up the south side of the Rappa
hannock. Our commander, however, was soon made

280 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
aware that General Lee was moving in force to the west,
and around our right. General Pleasanton, now in com
mand of our cavalry, was sent with his cavalry and an in
fantry force to Catlett's Station, on the Alexandria railroad,
to ascertain what was going on in that quarter. Passing
his force over the Rappahannock, and moving in the
direction of Culpepper Court House, he soon found him
self confronted with the main army of General Lee. In a
very severe engagement with General J. E. B. Stuart, in
command of the Confederate cavalry, aided by a large force
of infantry, a conflict occurred in which we lost about 500,
and the Confederates, as they officially acknowledged, lost
upwards of 600 men. Having fully accomplished the
object of his bold and hazardous reconnoisance. General
Pleasanton recrossed the Rappahannock, and reported the
facts to General Hooker. Still our commander, yet in
doubt about the real intent of his antagonist, remained
stationary, leaving General Pleasanton to watch the foe,
determine his movements, and hold terrible fights with his
cavalry. On June 14th and 15th, however, events occurred
which revealed the purpose of the enemy and the peril of
the Union cause to the eyes, not only of our commander
and the Government, but of the whole nation. At this
time our army, 10,000 strong, under General Milroy, at
Winchester, was suddenly assaulted by the Confederate
army and driven headlong, with the loss of quite half its
number, across the Potomac. Immediately after this, the
Confederate army, from 70,000 to go,ooo strong, passed
over from the sacred soil of Virginia on to the free soil of
Pennsylvania. At this time, our Government taking the
alarm., the President fssued a call to the States of Pennsyl
vania, New York, Maryland, and Ohio, for 1 20,000 militia
to drive back, or to aid in driving back, the invaders ; about
50,000 in all responding in time to have been effectively
employed in the campaign. On June i8th General Hooker
began to move his army northward, keeping between the
enemy and Washington, which the former showed some
disposition to attack. On the 26th he crossed the Poto
mac near Edward's Ferry, and moved to Frederick.
As soon as the fact of this invasion became known, I
wrote a communication to Secretary, the late Chief Justice,

GENERAL LEE A SECOND TIME ON FREE SOIL. 28 1
Chase, a communication containing the following state
ments : "Now is the golden opportunity for this nation.
Not a debris of the invading army ought to be permitted
to recross the Potomac. If our military authorities do not
know what to do to insure that result, I will myself, if re
quested to do it, present a plan which will, with perfect
certainty, secure this end, and thus, at one blow, close up
this war. I will now, however, frankly tell you what will be
done under the ruling of the military authorities at Wash
ington. The thought of capturing General Lee's army will
not be entertained at all. Nor will there be any concentra
tion of the national forces ; not even a man will be brought
up from the vicinity of Fortress Monroe, or from any other
point, for this or for any other purpose. On the other hand.
General Hooker's army, just as it is, and ' be the same
more or less,' will be sent round to head that of General
Lee, and drive it back again over the Potomac, at the
points where it crossed. General Lee will thus escape with
all his plunder. In other words, our military authorities will
do with the invading army what our farmers do when herds
of unruly cattle break into their fields of grain, namely,
head the intruders and drive them out at the places where
they entered, and then send them forth to repeat the mis
chief as opportunities may present. This is just what and
all that will be done in the presence of this golden oppor
tunity." Such is the statement which we made in that
communication. We shall .see how the prediction con
tained therein was afterwards verified.
Every reflecting mind must perceive that as soon as
General Lee's army crossed the Potomac, the heart and
soul and all the vitality of the Confederacy lay, under the
eye of the nation, in the State of Pennsylvania. Had this
one army been annihilated or captured, the Confederacy
must of necessity have collapsed in less than three months,
as it did immediately after the surrender of Generals Lee
and Johnston, two years subsequent to this. All the Con
federate forces in the Caroljnas and Virginia, a few ex
cepted to do garrison duty, were with General Lee, on free
soil ; only a single brigade under General Wise having been
left in Richmond for the protection of the capital of the
Confederacy.

282 THE AMERICAN REBELLION,
What was the amount of forces within calling distance,
and fully available for the accomplishment of the results
referred to ? General Hooker's army, reduced as it had
been from the causes designated, still numbered quite
go,ooo men, the number that fought at Gettysburg. In
the fortifications in and about Washington were quite,
60,000 more, kept there to protect the capital in case our
army was defeated in the expected battle with General
Lee. A force 1 1 ,000 strong was then located at Maryland
Heights, Quite 6,000 men were located in Baltimore. At
Suffolk, as we have seen, were 14,000 men under General
Peck, and another quite as large at Yorktown, and the
White House above, in the vicinity of Fortress Monroe.
Then from 5,000 to 10,000 more might have been brought
up from the Carolinas, and sufficient forces have been
left behind for garrison duty. It is perfectly undeniable
that, at the least, 30,000 men might have been drawn from
the Carolinas and the vicinity of Fortress Monroe, and
brought up to Baltimore in full time to have taken an
effective part in this campaign. If to these we add the
1 1 ,000 at Maryland Heights, and the amount which might
have been furnished at Baltimore, we have a force of be
tween 40,000 and 50,000 men, a force with which our army
that fought at Gettysburg might have been reinforced at
that point, and prior to the time when the battle there oc
curred. While the 50,000 militia were being called into
the field, no sensible man will deny that at least 30,000
of the regular army might have been drawn from the
Western Departments, brought to Harrisburg, and united
with the Pennsylvania militia force, in time to have
acted an essential part in a grand movem.ent upon the
army of General Lee. In a single week. General Pleas
anton brought a considerable body of infantry, cavalry, and
artillery from St. Joseph, Missouri, to Washington. We
should stultify ourselves if we should question the fact
that from an army of 1,000,000 men 30,000 could have
been furnished by the Western Departments, and brought
to Harrisburg in the time designated. Suppose now that
while an army of 140.000 men had been concentrated under
General Hooker, or Meade, in the vicinity of Gettysburg,
and another 60,000 strong under another General had been

GENERAL LEE A SECOND TIME ON FREE SOIL. 283
organized at Harrisburg, both armies ready at the right
moment to be precipitated upon the enemy on our soil,
40,000 men had been sent from Washington up the Poto
mac, and had seized all the passes where General Lee could
have recrossed that river back into Virginia. Surrounded
by such a circle of fire as this, what would have become of
his army ? That army entire, we say, without fear of con
tradiction, would have been inevitably captured, and that
without the loss of 10,000 men on both sides. Nothing in
war can be more practicable than the combination of forces
above indicated, and this was the identical plan we had
distinctly in mind when we wrote to Secretary Chase.
Such a plan, however, no plan of any kind for the capture
of an army, whatever the facilities for that end might be,
ever had a place in the mind of our Commander-in-Chief,
or in that of any of his immediate advisers in our national
capital. Hence, all things occurred in exact accordance
with the predictions contained in the communication under
consideration. By not a single regiment was our army
under Hooker, and then under Meade, reinforced by men
called in from any of the departments around, 2,100 from
the middle department excepted. Not a man was moved
out from Washington to impede the retreat of General Lee. ,
Nor was any effective use made of the militia that were
furnished. The entire burden, as we stated it would be,
was, in fact, rolled upon the single army that fought at
Chancellorsville, an army reduced to a little over go,ooo
men. One thing was done. General Dix, commanding at
Fortress Monroe, was directed to make a demonstration on
Richmond. General Keyes accordingly sent about 5,000
men from the White House above Yorktown ; more than
that number, for what reason nobody can conjecture, being
reserved and kept back. This force moved out a short
distance, sent a body of cavalry to burn a railroad bridge
over the South Anna, which was done, and then beat a
hasty retreat. After this grand demonstration, " all was
quiet" in the Peninsula and in the Confederate capital.
It is absolutely undeniable that had General Peck with
his corps, 14,000 strong, and all other available forces in
the Peninsula, been brought up, Richmond, defended as
it was but by a single brigade, might have been captured

284 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
and occupied by an Union army 25,000 or 30,000 strong
on the day on which Vicksburg was surrendered or General
Lee was defeated at Gettysburg. In this case, also, the
destruction of the Confederate army in Pennsylvania would
have been insured, all excuse being taken away for not
employing our whole force at Washington for this end.
"Blindness in full always happened" to our military
authorities whenever such decisive opportunities presented
themselves. The Campaign.
We will now consider the campaign as actually con
ducted by the only array that was allowed to raove against
the invaders. On the 26th June, General Hooker, as we
have stated, crossed the Potoraac, and advanced to Frede
rick. On the march he visited Maryland Heights, and
found General French there with an effective force of
1 1 ,000 men. He accordingly requested of General Halleck
that this force should be placed at his (Hooker's) disposal.
This request was, June 27th, half-past 10 a.m., positively
refused ; whereupon General Hooker requested to be relieved
from his command. He was relieved accordingly, and, less
than one week before the commencement of the great battle
then pending, the command was transferred, June 28th, to
Major-General G. Meade. What the historian will find
himself utterly unable to account for, but for the basest of
reasons, is the fact that the order transferring the com
mand to General Meade placed him in full control of the
1 1 ,000 men who, less than twenty-four hours previous, had
been, for reasons affirmed to be permanent and funda
mental, denied to General Hooker. The refusal of this
force to one and granting it to another, under the circum
stances, the transferrence of command from a General
whom the army knew, confided in, and desired to fight
under, and who had a national reputation, to one of whom
said army knew but little, and could not have had con
fidence in, and who was comparatively unknown to the
nation, and all this when there was a daily expectation of
a great battle on which the destiny of the nation depended
so much, are " facts stranger than fiction."
On assuming command. General Meade committed two

GENERAL LEE A SECOND TIME ON FREE SOIL. 285
fundamental errors, and would, as we shall see, have com
mitted a third but for the most earnest remonstrance of
General Pleasanton. Having withdrawn the 11,000 men
under General French from Maryland Heights, he brought
them up to Frederick, and "left," in the words of Mr.
Greeley, " 7,000 of them standing idle there, sending the
residue as train guards to Washington, and actually apolo
gised to General Halleck, on meeting him, for having
moved them at all." Of the militi'a force furnished him,
a force of which from 30,000 to 40,000 might have been
made effective, he refused to make any use at all. As
soon as he assumed command, he also issued an order to
General Pleasanton to go off with the main body of his
cavalry on a raiding expedition, just as Stoneman had
been sent off by General Hooker. Against this order
General Pleasanton most earnestly protested, and finally
refused obedience to it, unless, what he had a right to
require, he was furnished with written directions In respect
to where he was to go, and what he was required to do.
To these expostulations and reasonings General Meade
finally yielded ; and thus, as will appear, the defeat of our
army was prevented, and its victory consequently secured
at Gettysburg. Suppose, now, that the 11,000 men under
General French, and 30,000 of the militia under General
Couch, had been brought up, as all might have been, to
the vital point, prior to the battle, a skilful commander
would have made such use of them during the battle as
to have secured a decisive victory without the fearful loss
which our army did suffer on that occasion. Nor would
our army, at the close of the battle, even in the judgment
of General Meade, have been so exhausted as to have
prevented its being precipitated upon the Confederates
after their defeat, and insdred their utter disorganization.
But suppose that this force, upwards of 40,000 strong in
all, had been held as a reserve, and not employed at all
during the battle. At its close, and when our victory was
insured, with this force, our cavalry, quite 12,000 strong,
and our other reserves which had not been engaged, and
such portions of the army as were not in a greatly ex
hausted condition, might have been united, and upwards
of 60,000 men might have been precipitated upon General

286 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
Lee's exhausted and disordered columns, their ammuni
tion also being nearly expended, and insured the capture
or utter dispersion and demoralization of his army. As it
was, when the victory was gained — and it was barely gained
¦ — our army was deemed to be in too exhausted a condition
to reap the proper fruits of this advantage. So much for
incapacity in war.
That we may understand the facts pertaining to the
great national battle in respect to which we are about to
speak, we need to recur here to the use which General
Pleasanton did make of his cavalry. Having, at Frederick,
perfected the organization of his command, and appointed
over his brigades and divisions such Generals as he could
depend upon, he first of all enquired the whereabouts of
General Stuart and his cavalry, and promptly determined
on movements which would defeat the plans of his skilful
antagonist. After General Lee had entered Pennsylvania,
he, very unwisely, as he afterwards admitted, detached
General Stuart with the mass of the Confederate cavalry on
a raiding expedition. Stuart passed between our army and
Washington, and having collected an immense amount of
plunder, and captured a large number of negroes, was
moving with his long train of waggons, etc., around east of
our army, with the intent of joining General Lee at or near
Gettysburg. General Pleasanton, anticipating this plan,
and for the specific purpose of defeating it, sent Generals
Custer and Kilpatrick with a large body of cavalry, directly
east or nearly so, from Frederick to Hanover, Pennsylvania;
this latter place being on the line of Stuart's detour. Gene
ral Kilpatrick, who was in advance, entered Hanover before
General Stuart did, and was assaulted there ; General
Farnsworth's brigade losing loo men. When General
Custer came up, however, Stuart was driven off, losing
about loo of his waggons and much of his plunder. This
rebuff necessitated the Confederate leader to move still
farther east, and make a far wider detour than he had in
tended, a detour round near Flarrisburg and by Cariisle.
On this account Stuart did not join General Lee until the
three days' fight was too far advanced for the former to be
of much use to the latter in the battle. By this one move
ment of General Pleasanton, General Lee was, in fact,

* GENERAL I,EE A SECOND TIME ON FREE SOIL. 287
deprived of the essential aid of the main portion of his
cavalry in that battle, while ours was there, and did, as
we shall see, most essential service in it. Mr. Greeley
tells us that our cavalry were " considerably astonished "
at meeting General Stuart at Hanover. We have the
highest authority for affirming that Generals Custer and
Kilpatrick were sent to that point for no other purpose
than encountering General Stuart as they did there.
Nor was this all that was done by our cavalry. Another
body moved out, and struck and repulsed another column
at Littlestown. Another division moved directly to Gettys
burg, and there held back, as we shall see, the advance of
the enemy to occupy the place until our advance came up,
and prevented that catastrophe. In all these movements,
which were most wisely ordered, and efficiently executed,
our entire cavalry force was constantly kept within calling
distance of the main army, and were, hence, present, and
did, as we will show, fundamental service in the great
battle. While General Hooker remained in command, he
manoeuvred in the direction and with the intent of taking
General Lee's communicatio'ns, and thus compelling him
to fight at a disadvantage, and on a field which our com
mander should select. This was, unquestionably, the plan
demanded by the highest wisdom. As soon as General
Meade assumed command he changed the plan of his pre
decessor, moving several of his corps to the north-east,
with the intent to head off General Lee, and driving him
back to Virginia, on the one hand, and, on the other, ot
fighting the expected battle on the line of Pipe Creek, about
fifteen miles south-east of Gettysburg. Unexpected events,
however, brought on the encounter earlier than was antici
pated, and rendered the latter place the scene of one of
the greatest and most bloody battles of the whole war.
General Lee, having for some time traversed south
eastern Pennsylvania, was advancing eastward, July ist,
with the intent, as some supposed, of crossing the
Susquehanna river and capturing Philadelphia. As he
was approaching Gettysburg, a rural village in Adams
county, his advance, under General Heth of General Hill's
corps, encountered and was driven back on its division by

288 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
a body of General Pleasanton's cavalry, under the com
mand of General Buford. On approaching the main body
of the advanced Confederate forces, nearly 30,000 strong,
our cavalry was, of course, in Its turn, driven back. General
Buford, being aware that General Reynolds, with the ist
and nth corps, 22,000 strong, was rapidly approaching,
made in his retreat, at every favourable point, masterly
dispositions of his small force for the purpose of delaying
the advance of the enemy. At every such point he would
station his artillery and deploy his cavalry, dismounted,
behind stone walls, and other defences which the country
afforded, and as the enemy approached, would open upon
them a vigorous fire. This would induce the Confederate
General to stop and deploy his forces in battle array. As
soon as the attack was commenced. General Buford would
retreat to another like position, where a similar scene
would be enacted. Thus was the Confederate advance
retarded for quite four hours, until General Reynolds with
his command arrived, and opened the conflict in good
earnest. As General Wadsworth, who led our advance,
was deploying his division, 4,000 strong. General Rey
nolds, who went forward alone .to reconnoitre, fell and died
in a few moments, having been shot in the neck by a
sharp-shooter. Half-an-hour after the death of General
Reynolds, General Doubleday, arriving with another divi
sion of the ist corps, assumed command. The Con
federates now advanced in force, driving back Wadsworth,
who, by suddenly whirling his right around the pursuers,
brought off General Archer and 800 prisoners. Doubleday
fell back to Seminary Ridge, a range of hills lying west
and north-west of Gettysburg, and here made a determined
stand. Here he was joined soon after by the residue of
the ist and the whole of the nth corps under General
Howard, who assumed command, placing his own corps
under General Schurz. In the fight which now ensued,
Doubleday with the ist corps occupied the ridge referred
to; two divisions of the nth being placed on an elevated
position to the right of Doubleday, and the third. General
Steinwehr's, as a reserve in Gettysburg. In the early part
of the fight, our forces, having the advantage of position,
had matters almost altogether their own way, there being

GENERAL LEE A SECOND TIME ON FREE SOIL. 289
also but one corps of the Confederates, that of General
Hill, on the field. At length General Ewell arrived with
his corps, and with overwhelming forces assailed our right,
the Confederates on the field now outnumbering us more
than two to one. Howard's advanced divisions, not in
this instance to their dishonour, but by mere force of
numbers, were a second time overwhelmed, and driven
back in confusion by Jackson's veterans, now under Ewell.
By the rout of the nth corps, the ist, which had thus far
stood firm against immense odds, was obliged to fall back
also. In their retreat to Gettysburg the two bodies became
intermingled, and, under a heavy fire from the enemy,
rushed tumultuously through the village, leaving their
wounded and many prisoners in the hands of the enemy.
The retreat of our forces was covered by General Buford
with his cavalry, he everywhere showing so bold a front
that the enemy, though they had still two hours of day
light, did not pursue their advantage beyond the village.
On Cemetery Hill, just south of the village, and at the
apex of our position in the great battle two days after,
General Howard halted, and reformed his broken columns ;
General Sickles, with the 3rd corps, having just at this
time arrived by a forced march from Emmltsburg, and
taken a strong position on Howard's left. The conduct
of General Sickles entitles him to a perpetual and grateful
remembrance on the part of his country. He, in common
with the other corps commanders, had received orders
when at Emmittsburg, to move to the line of Pipe Creek,
and was preparing to move his corps in the required
direction. At 2 p.m., when on the eve of moving in the
opposite direction, he received a despatch from General
Howard saying that the ist and nth corps were at
Gettysburg, and there in danger of being overwhelmed by
superior forces. Meade was ten miles away, and to wait
for counter orders from him would expose two corps of
our army to almost certain destruction. Without hesita
tion our brave General promptly moved his corps for the
point of danger, and arrived in time to prevent the catas
trophe that was feared Our loss on this day, in killed,
wounded, and missing, was indeed fearful. Of the 4,000
whom General Wadsworth led into the field in the morning,
19

290 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
he brought but about 1,600 back. Other divisions suffered
very severely, but not so badly as this. On this day, the
nth corps and its brave commander fully regained the
credit which they had lost at Chancellorsville.
During the afternoon of this day, and the night follow
ing, all our army, Sedgwick's corps, which was quite thirty
miles away, excepted, was concentrated at Gettysburg, the
corps referred to arriving by a forced march at 2 p.m. July
2nd. That the reader may form some apprehensions of
the character of the successive conflicts which occurred on
July 2nd and 3rd, the following description of the field
raay be deemed expedient. Gettysburg, as has been
stated, lies on the northern slope of a hill, which rises just
south of the village to an apex called Cemetery Hill.
From this point branches off two ridges, one to the east,
and the other to the south-east ; the latter, which is much
the longer, from two to three miles in extent, terminating
in a rise called Round Top, and the former in one called
Culp Hill. Through a valley to the east of the village
and the ridges referred to, runs a stream called Rock
Creek. Beyond this creek, to the south-east of the village,
and north-east of Culp Hill, is a ridge called Senner's Hill,
a ridge running parallel with the creek. Still farther
south is another rise named Wolf Hill. North of the
village is a rise called College Hill. Through a valley
west of the village and Cemetery Hill, a valley which
finally winds around between the village and College Hill,
flows Stevens's Run, which enters Rock Creek to the
north-east of the village." West of the valley through
which Stevens's Run flows rises Seminary Ridge, which
commences at the north-west of the village and terminates
some distance to the north-west of Round Top. Near
Cemetery Hill branches off another ridge running more
to the west of south, and uniting with Seminary Ridge.
Between the ridge last described and Cemetery Hill and
Round Top is a valley through which passes the Emmitts
burg road and a small stream called Plum Run, flowing
to the south. About six miles south, on the Baltimore
railroad, was the general depot of our army. The
following was the disposition of our army, as perfected
July zr\^. and 3rd. Howard occupied Cemetery Hill.

GENERAL LEE A SECOND TIME ON FREE SOIL. 29!
On his right was General Slocum with the 12th corps,
occupying Culp Hill, with one division east of Duck Creek,
and south of Wolf Hill. On Howard's left the other
corps were distributed in order. General Sickles occupying
the centre, and General Sedgwick Round Top on our
extreme left.^/General Hancock commanded on General
Howard's immediate left. General Sickles next, and
General Sedgwick last. The cavalry corps under General
Pleasanton was divided into three divisions, commanded
respectively by Generals Custer, Kilpatrick, and Buford.
After the close of the first day. General Pleasanton with
drew Buford' s division and placed it as a guard at the
depot referred to, and brought his two fresh divisions to
the field. It being well known that one essential part of
General Lee's plan was to flank our army on its right or
left, and seize our depot of supplies, and that the valley
and roads east of Senner's and Wolf Hills were most
favourable to such a movement, General Pleasanton lo
cated Custer's and a portion of Kilpatrick's divisions in
this most exposed position ; while the latter with the re
mainder of his division was placed on our left, in the valley
between the Emmitsburg road and Plum Run.
The Confederate line was thus constituted. Their
right, consisting of Hill's and Longstreet's corps, occupied
Seminary Ridge ; the former on the extreme right, and the
latter in the more central position. A portion of Hill's
corps extended across Emmitsburg road. Ewell, on the
left, stood opposed to Slocum, while several divisions were
stationed in Gettysburg, directly opposite to Howard.
A careful survey of the field occupied by these two
armies will convince any reflecting mind that ground
better adapted to fight a successful battle could hardly
have been selected than is that occupied by our army on
this occasion. Nor can we well conceive a better disposi
tion of forces than was that raade by General Meade on
this field. The position itself, and the arrangement of the
forces, afforded the greatest facilities for the best possible
use of the reserves, for perfect unity of action of all the
parts of the army, and the ready transferrence of adequate
forces to any point where our line might be too hardly
pressed. In case of defeat, however, it was one of the

292 THE AMl-RICAN REBELLION.
worst positions conceivable, a position on which a defeated
army could hardly avoid being pressed into a mingled
mass, and becoming utterly demoralized. The Confede
rate position, on the other hand, while far less favourable
than ours for fighting a successful battle, was far more
favourable for a successful retreat in case of defeat.
In the early part of July 2nd, Sickles advanced his
command from the ridge on which it, in common with
those of Hancock and Sedgwick, had been located, to the
interior ridge above described. This advance was made
without orders, and was censured by General Meade
when he came upon the ground. There was no remedy
ing the mistake, however, because the battle had already
been opened by the fire of General Lee's batteries, hardly
half a mile distant, on Seminary Ridge, and the advance
of Longstreet's columns, which assailed ours under Sickles
in front and on both' flanks, the enemy making desperate
efforts also to reach and occupy Round Top. The result
was, of course, to our no small disadvantage. Sickles's
corps was driven back in confusion to the place it at first
occupied, and Round Top was saved but by the most
desperate fighting. At length Hancock closed in from
Sickles's right, and parts of the ist, 6th, and 12th corps as
sailed the enemy In front. These combined assaults were
successful, the Confederates in their turn being driven
back with great slaughter. On the withdrawment of a
division from Slocum, the remainder of his corps was as
sailed by Ewell with superior forces, and some portion of
his rifle-pits were taken. The right of Howard was also
assaulted, and the right face of Cemetery Hill was oc
cupied by the enemy. No decisive advantage, however,
was gained by the Confederates in this part of the field.
General Custer also had very severe fighting in his position
to the east of Duck Creek, the enemy attempting by a
flank movement to get possession of our supplies. Here
the Confederates were at length driven back with such loss
that they ceased from all furthur attempts in this direction.
At the close of this day, July 2nd, our army stood, in
order of battle, in the exact positions originally intended
by General Meade. On the part of the Confederates,
Longstreet occupied the ridge from which Sickles had been

GENERAL LEE A SECOND TIME ON FREE SOIL. 293
driven, and Ewell was in advance of the position he occu
pied in the morning, considerably nearer our right. Thus
far, the advantage was, as all admit, on the side of the
Confederates, our losses having been much greater than
theirs. Still, the advantage of position, and the greater
facility for unity of action, and, as the facts of this day
demonstrated, the ready employment of the different parts
of the array for the support and relief of each other when
any one part was too hardly pressed, was most obviously on
our side, and far more than over-balanced the advantages
gained by the enemy. Being fully satisfied that all danger
of an attempted flank movement on our right, and east of
Duck Creek, was passed. General Pleasanton on the evening
of this day moved the main portion of Custer's command
over to our left, and thus greatly reinforced Kilpatrick, where
the principal peril in the great battle to be fought the next
day obviously lay. The collection of so large a force on
his right, a force the character of which General Lee could
not, in the wooded state of the country there, distinguish,
and the bold demonstrations which this large body made,
with its artillery especially, induced him to infer that General
Meade had massed a very large force there for the purpose
of a great and decisive flank movement round the right
wing of the Confederate army. To prevent such a catas
trophe. General Lee, as he stated in his report of the
battle, kept in reserve and held back from the main con
flict a large reserve force, a force believed to be about
10,000 strong. The keeping back of this reserve relieved
our weakened line from a pressure which would, very pro
bably, have been too strong for it. Thus it becomes un
deniably evident that one of the chief causes of our final
victory at Gettysburg was the action of our cavalry there,
during each of the three days in which the battle continued.
During the battle this day General Sickles had a leg
shattered by a cannon ball, and was thus disabled for
further service in this campaign. It has been asserted by
some, that the real object of General Sickles in the unfor
tunate advance which occasioned the conflict and our re
verses on this day was to prevent the retreat of our army
from, and to ensure the final battle on, this field ; the retreat
which was undeniably contemplated, if not determined on,

294 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
by General Meade. Whatever the facts of the case may
be, that advance did necessitate the fighting of the final
battle on this field, it being obviously too late for a retreat,
after the conflict on this day had commenced. In his
report. General Lee thus speaks of the results of this day's
battle : — " After a severe struggle, Longstreet succeeded
in getting possession of and holding the desired ground "
(the ground to which Sickles advanced, and from which he
was driven). " Ewell also carried some of the strong
positions which he assailed ; and the result was such as to
lead to the belief that he would ultimately be able to dis
lodge the enemy. The battle ceased at dark. These partial
successes determined me to continue the assault next
day" On the next day, July 3rd, Slocum, having received
back his division from our left, opened the battle by a for
ward movement to recover his lost rifle-pits After a sharp
conflict, this end was attained, and our line on this part of
the field was restored to its original position. In the early
part of the day General Lee reinforced Longstreet with one
division from Ewell, three brigades under Pickett, who on
the day before arrived from Chambersburg, and two others
from Hill's corps. Thus the day wore on, each commander
being busily employed in stationing his batteries and
organizing his infantry for the final issue.
At I p.m. 115 guns from. Hill's and Longstreet's
front, and as many more from the batteries on Seminary
Heights, Senner's Hill, and other localities, opened upon
our position, the centre of which was Cemetery Hill.
Our guns were fewer in number than those of the enemy,
but replied with terrible effect upon their exposed positions.
For about two hours this dreadful fire continued. At
length the firing on our part nearly ceased, orders having
been given to cease firing and cool the guns. During this
period our infantry concealed themselves as best they
could behind projections and in the hollows, awaiting
.there the expected advance of the columns of the Con-
' federates. Nor did they wait long, after the fire of our
guns had ceased. From behind their batteries, their lines,
from two to three miles in length, emerged into view, and
moved, directly, fearlessly, and confidently, upon the bat-

GENERAL LEE A SECOND TIME ON FREE SOIL. 295
teries and seried the ranks in their front ; their right
extending near to Round Top, and their left to Cemetery
Hill. As these ranks, mostly in three lines, passed the
Confederate batteries, and were well in the fight, their guns
ceased firing, while quite fifty of ours ploughed through
those columns with a terrible fire of shell, grape, and
canister. As General Pickett with his division leading
the columns of the enemy, the large division of Pettigrew
on his left, reached the Emmitsburg Road, they encoun
tered a heavy fire from a line of our skirmishers stationed
behind a stone wall. This impediment was soon overcome,
but not without great loss, our men holding their ground
with great tenacity, retreating slowly, and keeping up a
deadly fire upon the advancing foe. When the enemy
reached the Emmitsburg Road, they opened a withering
¦fire upon our forces, those of Hancock especially, in their
front. Soon our guns were silenced, and on moved
Pickett's splendid division, with the best of Hill's corps
in support, upon our infantry. Hancock having been
wounded. Gibbon commanded now in this part of the field.
The brave Gibbon walked along our line, requiring his men
to reserve their fire until the Confederates, three lines deep,
should approach within point-blank range. "At last," to
adopt the language of one of our most distinguished cor
respondents. Agate, as cited by Mr. Greeley, "the order
came. From thrice three thousand guns, there came a
sheet of smoky flame, a crash, a rush of" molten death.
The line literally melted away ; but there came the second,
resistless still. It had been our supreme effort — on the
instant, we were not equal to another. Up to the rifle-
pits, across them, over the barricades — the momentum
of their charge, the mere machine strength of their com
bined action — swept them on. Our thin line could fight,
but it had not weight enough to oppose to this momen
tum. It was pushed behind the guns. Right on came
the Rebels. They were upon the guns— were bayoneting
the gunners — were waving their flags above our pieces. But
they had penetrated to the fatal point. A storm of grape
and canister tore its way from man to man, and marked
its track with corpses straight down their line 1 They
had exposed themselves to the enfilading guns on the

290 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
western slope of Cemetery Hill : that exposure sealed their
fate, "Pettigrew's large division, on the left, was the first
to recoil under this dreadful fire. In a short tirae the
whole body broke, and fled in confusion in the direction
of the rear of that of Pickett. Strong bodies of our
infantry in rapid pursuit begin to close round the ranks
of the enemy, who are holding possession of our batteries.
Their whole lines consequently retire, with ours in pursuit.
A whole regiment of infantry at once laid down its arms,
and passed within our lines ; all along our front, — smaller
bodies surrendered in a similar manner. " Webb's
brigade," said Agate, "took 800; taken in as little
time as it takes to write the simple sentence that tells
,it. Gibbon's old division took fifteen stand of colours."
With this decisive repulse the battle was over, as no hope
remained to the Confederates of reaping victory by any
thing that could have been done on any other part of the
field. As a raatter of fact. General Lee had deliberately
staked the issue of the day upon this one movement, and,
to render its success certain, had drawn so heavily upon
all other of his array corps as to render them powerless
for decisive action.
After this repulse of General Lee's main forces, almost
all fighting ceased at once, our army resting upon their
arms, and the Confederates falling back and preparing for
their final retreat. From Round Top a single brigade,
under General Candless, did advance for one mile over
the ground which had been occupied by General Hill,
drove off an unsupported battery, captured 260 prisoners,
and recovered all our wounded, who, up to that time, since
Sickles's repulse, had lain upon the field uncared for.
This slight advance made manifest the fact that this wing
was left almost totally defenceless, the main portion of
Hill's corps having been withdrawn to support the main
attack. The remainder of this day, and all the night.
General Lee lay undisturbed in the presence of our army,
and then, as morning dawned, moved off, " a sadder and a
wiser man," in the direction of "the sacred soil," from
which he had made such an imposing advance. Our
army, with the exception of sending at length a portion

SENERAL LEE A SECOND TIME ON FREE SOIL. 297
of cavalry in pursuit of the retreating foe, remained four
or five days stationary upon the bloody field which it had
so bravely and so dearly won.
In this battle of three days our loss, as officially re
ported by General Meade, amounted to 23,186 killed,
wounded, and missing; the latter being 6,643, "who were
mostly lost on the first day of the conflict. He reports
also three guns, forty-one flags, and 13,621 prisoners, a
majority of them wounded, captured from the enemy. If
we suppose the Confederate loss in killed and wounded to
be equal to ours, which is a very safe reckoning, then their
loss amounted to quite 23,000 men. This invasion un
deniably cost the Confederates little if any less than one-
third of all the forces which they had in "Virginia and the
Carolinas ; and, with the loss of quite 40,000 men at Vicks
burg and Port Hudson, rendered the fijial collapse of the
Rebellion only a question of time. "^^
As we have intimated, the plan of the battle on the
part of our commander was faultless, the nature of the
ground occupied by our army almost necessitating such a
plan. The plan of the Confederate commander, we are
constrained to say, was fundamentally defective, and in
sured his defeat. The issue of the conflict was, by him,
staked upon the results of a single attack made by infantry
moving upon a line of from two to three miles in extent ;
infantry who, in their advance, were first subject to the
direct fire of all our batteries in front of their extended
line, had then to receive the deliberate fire of our
whole line of infantry, and finally, when they had forced
their way into our line, were subject, in addition to the
continual fire of our infantry, to be swept off by the
enfilading fire of batteries most favourably located for
such purposes. Under such circumstances, a line <ji battle
of the extent of that under consideration could not fail to
be broken somewhere; while such a catastrophe would
ensure the defeat of the whole attack, and the consequent
loss of the battle. In no battles under the conduct of
great commanders of other nations can we find any prece
dents to justify the plan of attack adopted by General Lee
on this occa.sion.
Great commanders are not more distinguished for

298 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
winning battles than for improving victories when
gained. Tried by this last test, our commander undeni
ably ranks quite low in the scale of generalship. What
was the state of the two armies at the crisis when the
defeat of the Confederate line became manifest, to wit, at
5 p.m. on this memorable day? Tt must be borne in
mind that none of our soldiery, artillerists excepted, were
in a wearied condition, none of our infantry having been
engaged much, if any, over two hours. While no part of
our line had been broken at all, the entire left of that of
the Confederates was utterly routed and disordered. On
our left were two corps, the 5 th and 6th, the latter of
which had hardly fired a gun during the day, while the
former had done very little fighting at all ; and these corps
were not confronted by any force which would in the
least have retarded their advance. The validity of these
statements is fully verified by the fact that, as we have
stated, a single brigade under General McCandless passed,
as ordered, along the entire front of these corps, and was
confronted by no forces which seriously impeded its ad
vance. The mass of General Lee's retreating army was in
the immediate front of our centre, with their wings thus
open and exposed. Suppose now that, while our centre
had been precipitated upon the retreating foe, our
right and left had been as promptly closed up around the
exposed wings of the enemy's line; our cavalry in the
meantime, after the example of Wellington at "Waterloo,
being thrown between the defeated mass and the reserves
behind. Not a shadow of doubt can for a moment rest
upon the results of such a combination of our forces. The
main body of Lee's army must inevitably have been
rolled up into a mingled mass, and utterly demoralized, if
not captured ; the capture of the largest portion being
certain. What remained would have been pushed off into
the country, away from their only lines of retreat — pushed
off into the country, destitute of provisions, where their
final capture would be only a question of tirae. Another
-squally inevitable result would have been the capture of
the main portion of Lee's guns, then located on the inner
ridge fiom which the infantry advance was made. Finally,.
by a proper use of the army on the field, of the militia at

GENERAL LEE A SECOND TIME ON FREE SOIL. 29g
command, of our forces at Frederick, Washington, and
in the Peninsula and elsewhere, all the remainder of
the Confederate army might have been captured, and the
war in fact ended, before that army could have raarched
150 miles from that battle-field. It was in view of such
results — results so palpably manifest — that General Plea
santon, standing by the side of General Meade at Round
Top, at the time when the defeat of the enemy became
manifest, urged our commander to precipitate at once
his whole army upon the retreating foe, saying to him
at the same time, — " Now is your time. General Meade,
not only to gain the greatest victory of the war, but to
assure for yourself a place in history among the great
Generals of the age." " The Lord, however, kept back
our General from honour." Feeble commanders are
always paralyzed by the spectacle of victory, and as a
consequence never improve the advantage gained.
what was done by the commander of our victorious
army, after his victory was insured, reminds us of the
utterance of a celebrated prize-fighter, as he, yet in the
full vigour of his strength, saw his bleeding and fainting
antagonist reeling up to the scratch. Turning to the
seconds of the poor creature, the strong man exclaimed :
" Take your man away, I don't want to mall him any
more." So our commander practically said to General
Lee : " Do take your fainting, bleeding army off from this
field. ' Must the sword devour for ever ? Will it not be
bitter in the latter end ? ' * All my mother comes into my
eyes, and gives me up to tears,' at the thought of inflicting
upon your weakened and discomfited forces another blow."
In the same spirit, and that by word of command, was the
entire pursuit of the retreating army conducted, as far as
our infantry were concerned. Never did soldiery act
more bravely than did ours during that battle of three
days' continuance, and never were soldiery more eager to
be permitted to render their victory a crushing defeat,
than were ours when their final success became manifest.
Masses of troops rushed up to the commander of our
central corps, and begged the privilege of being per
mitted to pursue the retreating foe. By absolute word of
command, however, our brave army was held back, and

300 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
the enemy was permitted a quiet retirement to their can
tonments, there to determine, at their leisure, upon a sub
sequent renewal of the conflict, or a final retreat.
During the entire day after the battle, our army re
mained in position. General Meade wishing to know with
certainty whether the eneray intended to retreat or not.
This he did, notwithstanding he was absolutely assured,
at 8 a.m., and at later periods, by cavalry reconnoissances
which General Pleasanton sent out, that, on all the roads
leading from the battle-field, the enemy was in full retreat,
destitute of ammunition, and in a very demoralized con
dition. General Gregg, for example, made such report,
at the time designated, after he had moved out from our
right twenty-two miles on the Chambersburg road. He
found the road, as he reported, strewn with wounded men,
stragglers, ambulances and caissons, and had captured a
large number of prisoners. General Birney, who had suc
ceeded General Sickles in command of the 3rd corps, thus
reports: — "I was ordered to send out a reconnoissance
at daybreak (on the 4th) to ascertain the position of the
enemy. I did so early on Sunday morning, and reported
that the enemy was in full retreat. I also sent back for
permission to' open upon the enemy with my rifled batteries
as they were crossing a point very near me, upon the
turnpike going towards Hagerstown ; and the staff officer
brought me permission to do so. I had commenced the
movement to attack, when another staff officer arrived
from General Meade, with a written order from him to
make no attack, which was done. My skirmishers ad
vanced and took possession of their hospitals, with a large
number of their wounded. I had sent some twenty
orderlies with a staff officer, who led the reconnoissance ;
and I reported these facts constantly to General Meade;
but this peremptory order from him not to open fire at all
prevented any pursuit of the enemy." On the morning of
the 5th, when the retreat of the Confederates could no
longer be doubted. General Pleasanton, with his cavalry,
was sent on one road, and General Sedgwick, with the
6th corps, on another, in pursuit of the enemy. The
cavalry of course, under such a commander as Pleasan
ton, acted with full vigour, harassing the enemy on their

GENERAL LEE A SECOND TIME ON FREE SOIL. 30I
rear and flank, capturing many prisoners, and many
waggons, and everywhere finding demonstrative evidence
of two fundamental facts — the demoralized condition of
General Lee's army, and the exhaustion of its ammuni
tion ; facts which, in due order, were reported to General
Meade. The following statement of General A. P. Howe, who
commanded a division under General Sedgwick — a state
ment made before the Committee on the Conduct of the
War — will fully indicate the manner of the pursuit under
the commander of the 6th corps. " On the 4th of July, it
seemed evident enough that the enemy was retreating.
How far they were gone we could not see from the front :
we could see but a comparatively small force from the
position where 1 was. On Sunday, the 5th and 6th corps
moved in pursuit. As we moved, a small rear-guard of
the enemy retreated. We followed them, with this small
rear-guard of the enemy before us, up to Fairfield, in a
gorge of the mountains. Here we again waited for them
to go on. There seemed to be no disposition to push this
rear-guard when we got to Fairfield. A lieutenant from the
enemy came into our lines and gave himself up. He was
a Northern Union man, in service in one of the Georgia
regiments. Without being asked, he unhesitatingly in
formed me, when I met him as he was being brought in,
that he belonged to the artillery of the rear-guard of the
enemy, and that they had but two rounds of ammunition
with the rear-guard. But we waited there without re
ceiving any orders to attack. It was a place where, as I
informed General Sedgwick, we could easily attack the
enemy with advantage. But no movement was made by
us until the enemy was away. Here one brigade of my
division, with some cavalry, was sent to follow on after
them, while the remainder of the 6th corps moved to the
left. We moved on through Boonsboro', and passed up
on the pike road leading to Hagerstown. After passing
Boonsboro', it became my turn to lead the 6th corps.
That day, just before we started. General Sedgwick
ordered me to move on and take up the best position I
could over a little stream on the Frederick side of Funks-
town. As I moved on, it was suggested to me by him to

302 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
move carefully. ' Don't come in contact with the enemy;
we don't want to bring on a general engagement.' It
seemed to be the current impression that it was not
desired to bring on a general engagement." In this
manner the whole pursuit was conducted. One crowning
wish evidently held full possession of the mind of our
General in command and of his subordinates, as far as
they sympathised with him, namely, to get the invaders as
quietly as possible back upon the "sacred soil of Virginia."
After he had sent a small portion of his army in pur
suit of the retreating foe. General Meade remained some
two or three days longer where he was, employing his tirae
in bur\ ing our dead, caring for the wounded, and refurn-
i.shing his forces for the campaign before them. We need
not detail the movements of the two armies up to July
1 2th, when they were brought again face to face, at
Williamsport on the Potomac. To this point. General
Lee had conducted his discomfited army, and was detained
there four days before our army, in its varied wanderings,
through miscalculation, and want of energy in its com
mander, arrived, and compelled the enemy to face about
to the north once more. The cause of the delay referred
to was twofold. In the first place. General French, who
had been left behind with his corps at Frederick, had, with
out orders, sent a body of cavalry to Falling Waters and
Williamsport, and had thus, after capturing the weak guard
which General Lee had left at those points, destroyed the
bridges over which he had passed his army on his advance
into Pennsylvania, all his means of recrossing the river
being thus cut off. Then, the excessive rains which had
fallen had so swollen the river as to render fording, or
restoring the bridges, until after this delay, impossible.
When our army, reinforced by General French's corps and
a large body of militia, arrived at last in front of that of
General Lee, he was found in a position which, in expecta
tion of being able to cross the river before the arrival
of General Meade, the Confederate commander had neg
lected to fortify in any important particulars, and where a
defeat would have absolutely insured the capture of the
entire invading army. Another important fact, in respect
to the condition of the Confederate army, had become raore

GENERAL LEE A SECOND TIME ON FREE SOIL. 303
and more evident, that it was so short of ammunition as to
be utterly unable to fight another important battle. From
long and careful observations. General Pleasanton affirms
that he had becorae able, as he listened to the early fire of
the enemy, to judge unerringly whether they were well
supplied with or short of ammunition, and that all the
firing from the Confederates which he heard during their
retreat, and especially as he approached their position on
the Potomac, rendered it perfectly evident to his mind that
their ammunition was short, and that, after fighting a short
time, they would be compelled to surrender. The most
important of all considerations were these : while defeat on
the part of the Confederates rendered their entire surrender
an absolute necessity, a safe retreat was open to our army,
should our attack fail of success. Nothing but chicken-
heartedness, and blindness to the most palpable and
.weighty facts, would deter a comraander from fighting a
battle under such circumstances.
I Having, at the close of July 12th, got his army into
position, General Meade called together his corps com
manders, and to them submitted the question whether the
final battle of the war should then and there be fought, or
not. After a full discussion of the reasons for and against
the measure, three — Generals Howard, Pleasanton, and
Wadsworth, successor of General Reynolds — voted for,
and five — Generals Sedgwick, Slocum, Sykes, French, and
Hays, in place of General Hancock, wounded at Gettys
burg — voted against fighting a battle. General Meade,
after hearing all parties, agreed in judgment with the
minority, but deferred to that of the majority, and our
great army stood subliraely and bravely still, and per
mitted General Lee, at his leisure, and without molesta
tion, to finish his bridges, and pass his array over the
river, leaving, as he states, two stalled guns, some broken-
down waggons, and some few weary stragglers to the
keeping of the standstillers. On our sfde, it is affirmed,
thanks to our cavalry, whose brave commanders every
where permitted and required their brave men to do their
duty, General Kilpatrick, on our left, having learned at
3 a.m. that the pickets in his front were retiring, gave
chase, and after severe fighting captured upwards of

304 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
1,500 prisoners. In this fight Major Webber lost his life
while leading the 6th Michigan in a desperate and open
charge over the enemy's earthworks.
Thus ended this memorable invasion. That General
Lee was permitted, with such a force as he commanded,
and in the presence of forces which might as well as not
 ligve been brought against him, — forces outnumbering his
as two to one, — that he should have been permitted to
advance to such an immense distance from his own centre
and into our territory, to suffer such a defeat as he did,
and then to return unmolested to the point from which he
started, losing, in all the campaign and its battles, but
three guns, two of these voluntarily relinquished as stalled
ones, and so few of his trains, is a mystery which nothing
but the most unaccountable imbecility and irresolution
and inertion in our military authorities in Washington,
and in our commander in the field, can account for. No
battle ever did more honour to the soldiery in both armies
than did that of Gettysburg. No campaign stands more
to the dishonour of the militar}'- authorities who planned
and executed it, than does that of which this famous battle
constituted a part.
The victory at Gettysburg, and the fall of Vicksburg
and Port Hudson, following one another in such quick
succession, of course electrified the entire Northern States,
and changed the deep general despondency into universal
"assurance of hope." The writer of this treatise is, very
probably, about the only individual in the United States
who ardently desired the triumph, and early triumph, of
the Union cause, who did not share in "the general joy.
No individual rejoiced more than we did in the advan
tages gained. We were saddened in view of coming
events which we clearly foresaw, and others did not
apprehend, namely, the real suspension of hostilities until
the opening of the campaigns in the spring of the next
year. We understood the character of our ruling military
authorities, and knew well, and so affirmed to all around
us, and so wrote, as we have stated, for the New York
Times, that these imposing victories would so completely
paralyze the minds of these authorities that our vast
armies would be left to rest in demoralizing idleness for

GENERAL LEE A SECOND TIME ON FREE SOIL. 3O5
nearly a year to come ; when, by a proper and prompt
use of these forces, the war might be brought to a close in
a very few months, and that with a far less loss of life
than would be occasioned by disease while our armies
were doing nothing. The detail of subsequent events will
absolutely verify our worst apprehensions.
On the 18th of July, General Meade crossed the
Potomac at Berlin, and passing down the east side of the
Blue Ridge, arrived on the 25th of the same month at
Warrenton. From this time and onward, the remainder
of summer and all the autumn ensuing were spent in
marches and countermarches, in which Meade would
advance, and then run as soon as Lee would look our
brave commander in the face. At last, the two armies went
into winter quarters; the Confederate at Hanover, and ours
at Culpepper Court House, the latter located south of the
Rappahannock, and about twenty miles north of General
Lee's head-quarters. The utter contempt with which General
Lee regarded his antagonist is manifest In this strange fact,
that while the two armies were confronting each other, the
Confederate commander, in the latter part of August or
the early part of September, sent General Longstreet, with
his entire corps, to Georgia, to aid General Bragg against
General Rosecrans. Thus the entire Confederate army for
the defence of Richmond was, as General Meade himself
estimated, reduced to the small force of 50,000 men. We
must bear In mind here, that Meade's army, in addition to
a force quite 60,000 strong In Washington, amounted at
least to from 80,000 to 100,000 men, while another veteran
force, nearly 30,000 strong, lay confronting Richmond in
the vicinity of Fortress Monroe. Suppose now, that
30,000 men from our vast armies in the field had been
sent down to this latter point, and with the force already
there, had been landed at Bermuda Hundred, Petersburg
being recaptured, and all Lee's communications south of
James river being seized ; while the great army of Meade
had, at the same time, been pushed directly upon the Con
federate position at Hanover Court House. It is demon
strably evident that in less than six weeks Richmond
and Lee's army would have been in our hands. Yet
nothing whatever was done to take advantage of Long-
20

306 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
Street's absence, and dispose of the puny force left with Lee
for the defence of Virginia and the capital of the Confede
racy. The nation looked on, contemplating the spectacle of
200,000 men lying idle, and that when confronted by a
little band 50,000 strong. The cause of these mysterious
facts, the reader, we judge, will find in the following
testimony of General A. P. Howe, given before the Com
mittee on the Conduct of the War. Speaking of the
judgment of those officers who were dissatisfied with
General Meade's management. General Howe says : —
" I do not think they have full confidence in the ability
or state of mind of General Meade. What I mean by that
is the animus that directs the movements of the army.
They do not think there is that heart and energy and
earnestness of purpose in the war to make use of the
means at his command to injure the eneray and carry on
the war successfully. I do not think they have, I will not
say confidence, but faith in him. They do not expect
from him what the crisis seems to call for. They believe
that, if attacked, he will do all he can to defend his
position ; but that, he will act with zeal and energy, or
that his whole heart and soul are in the bringing all the
means successfully to bear to break down the enemy, so
far as I can judge, they do not look for that, — they do not
expect it. So far as I can judge, a great many officers
think he can do very well in a defensive fight. If he were
called upon to guard the Potomac or Washington, he
would make good marches to stop the enemy ; but that he
will be active, zealous, energetic, in using his means to
strike successful offensive blows against the enemy, not at
all ; he is not the man for that — at least, that is my im
pression." Question : " The same observation you apply to General
Meade will apply to the corps commanders you refer to,
will it not?"
Answer: " I think so. I do not know that it would be
proper for me to state here the terms we use in the army.
However, we say there is too ranch Copperheadisra in it.
There is so for different reasons: with some there is a
desire to raise up McClellan ; with others there is a dislike
to some of the measures of the Government ; they do not

GENERAL LEE A SECOND TIME ON FREE SOIL. 307
like the way the Negro question is handled. And, again,
the impression is made upon ray raind that there are some
who have no faith in this war, who have no heart in it ;
they will not do anything to commit themselves ; but there
is a wide difference between doing your duty so as not to
comrait yourself, and doing all that raight reasonably be
expected of you at these tiraes. I do not know that I can
express ray self better than saying that there is Copper
headisra at the root of this matter."
Here we have a look into the secret of the conduct of this
war. Ignorance, irresolution, Copperheadism, and the lust
of gain on the part of generals and party leaders, so con
trolled our campaigns as to cause the war to drag its slow
length along during those dreary years, and that at such an
enormous expense of life and treasure. Here we have also
an explanation of the fact that our vast armies lay idle at
such long intervals of time, that none of our victories
were improved, and that all opportunities to end the war
by single crushing blows were let slip. We now, for the
present, leave the array of the Potomac, to consider an
important event in another part of this field of war.

CHAPTER XXI.
THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN.
From the early part of January to the last of June of this
year. General Rosecrans had remained at Murfreesboro',
provisioning and recruiting his army, as preparatory to
a decisive movement against General Bragg, who held
Middle and Eastern Tennessee, Chattanooga being his
main strategic point, and the consequent special aim of
our authorities at Washington. At this time our army
numbered about 60,000 men of all arms ; the force under
General Bragg being about two-thirds that number.
While our army, that of the Cumberland, was a united
body in one place, that of Eragg was divided into lour
parts, and these at unsupporting distances from each
other. A body, 18,000 strong, was, for example, in a very
strongly fortified position under General [Bishop] Polk at
Shelby ville. Behind this, and commanding a mountain
region traversed by narrow roads and most difficult
passes, lay another equally strongly entrenched camp, at
Tullahoma. On the right of Shelbyville, at Wartrace,
covering the railroad and the raountain passes in his front,
lay General Hardee, with a corps 12,000 strong. Another
division under General Buckner occupied Knoxville and
Chattanooga. The difficulties in the way of General
Rosecrans's advance are obvious. Before him lay formid
ably entrenched camps, and more formidable mountain
passes ; the enemy being thus enabled to compel him to
fight at the greatest disadvantage, and also to impede his
advance by breaking up railroad communications and ob
structing the narrow mountain passes through which that
advance rnust be made. Then, in every position gained,

THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN. 309
he was necessitated to leave large forces behind him to
guard his rear. Thus our forces would be all the while
suffering diminution, while those of the enemy, in falling
back upon his reserves, would be on the constant increase.
Another important difficulty had thus far prevented effec
tively any important active operations on the part of the
army of the Cumberland. While our infantry greatly out
numbered that of General Bragg, his cavalry equally out
numbered ours, and hence in all advances rendered our
communications liable to be broken up. Of this General
Rosecrans complained, and made the strongest appeals to
the authorities at Washington, for an adequate supply of
cavalry. To all such calls. General Halleck refused to
respond, assigning this as the specific reason, that there
was not forage in that region for more horses. To this
General Rosecrans replied, and with perfect truth, that for
age in abundance existed, and that the want of horses was
the only impediment to his obtaining it. Such consider
ations had no weight with our Commander-in-Chief
Under the circumstances with which he was palpably
encircled. General Rosecrans protested against an advance
upon the eneray without reinforcements, and e'^^^^_^^lly
without being supplied with an ade^" 'te force, ui cavalry.
While all such aid was denied 'l..iii,-Tre received an abso
lute order to advance upon the enemy, and take possession
of Chattanooga. Just at this time, a fundamental error of
General Bragg — an error the like of which was so common
in this war — relieved our commander of the difficulty last
named. In the latter part of June, the celebrated raider. Gene
ral Morgan, with a cavalry force upwards of 2,000 strong,
was sent past our army, and across the States of Ten
nessee and Kentucky. Crossing the Ohio river, some forty
miles below Louisville, Morgan passed on through Southern
Indiana, into Ohio, where he, with the men he had left, —
some very few excepted, who swam their horses across the
Ohio river — was captured in the south-western part of the
State. By this foolish division of his cavalry force on the
part of General Bragg, and through the most strenuous
efforts of our commander to supply himself with horses
and means of conveyance. General Rosecrans found him
self able to take the field with some hope of accomplish-

3IO THE AMERICAN REBELLION,
ing the burdensome task so imprudently imposed upon
him. State of aflairs in the Valley of the Mississippi.
Let us now, prior to a consideration of the campaign
before us, contemplate the actual situation of affairs in the
valley of the Mississippi — the situation when the Union and
Confederate authorities were making preparation to strike
a great and decisive blow, through the army of General
Bragg on the one hand, and that of General Rosecrans on
the other. By a combination of forces on an immense
scale, the former authorities were collecting, under General
Bragg, by far the most formidable army which they had
ever brought into the field In this valley. As a means to
this end. General Longstreet, with his corps 20,000 or
25,000 strong, was detached from General Lee, and sent
round to General Bragg. The entire division under
General Buckner was also brought down, leaving Knox
ville to be taken quiet possession of by General Burnside.
In all places where regular troops were stationed they
also were brought forward, their places being supplied by
militia called out for the purpose. Finally, a large part of
*,he forces captured and paroled at Vicksburg and Port
Hudson were reconscripted, rearmed, and united with the
grand army under the Confederate commander. By all
these means, this army was increased to from 80,000 to
100,000 men, all to be concentrated for the destruction of
the army of the Cumberland. What was the state of our
forces in this valley at this time ? An army quite 60,000
strong was under the immediate command of General
Rosecrans at Murfreesboro'. In the interior of Kentucky,
upwards of 20,000 troops available for active service were
under the command of General Burnside ; and this force, by
the return of the gth corps after the surrender of Vicks
burg (July 4th), might have been, and was soon after, ren
dered 50,000 strong. By a combination of our forces on
and west of the Mississippi, after the fall of Vicksburo-
and Port Hudson, an army more than 100,000 strong'-
might have been concentrated at Memphis, and by raif-
road and other means sent inward to Georgia, to combine
with Rosecrans and Burnside for the final destruction of

THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAKJN. 3II
the grand army under General Bragg. No intelligent
reader will question the fact that all these combinations
were perfectly practicable at that time. When all was in
readiness, and while General Grant was moving his army
to the vicinity of Decatur, Burnside, 50,000 strong, should
have moved through the mountain passes, and taken pos
session of Knoxville, as he did with 20,000, September
3rd. Suppose now, that while Grant was moving as
stated, Burnside had moved upon Chattanooga, and Rose
crans upon the forces in his front. The immediate result
would have been a most rapid flight of Bragg's forces from
Shelbyville and other points to Fayetteville, twenty-five
miles south-east of Chattanooga; while our Generals would
have quietly united their forces in the vicinity of the place
last named. Thus united, and forming an army of upwards
of 100,000 men, a perfectly crushing force might have been
precipitated upon General Bragg prior to the arrival of
Longstreet. Before this force the Confederate commander
would have fled to Atlanta. At this point, even when
reinforced by General Longstreet, he would have found
himself confronted by two armies, each greater than his
own — to wit, by Burnside and Rosecrans from the north,
and Grant's from the west.
Under such circumstances, the Confederate commander
would have surrendered at once, or, in a few days or
weeks at the farthest, would have been so encircled with
resistless forces as to compel his surrender. The inevita
ble result would have been, that all the Confederate States
east of the Mississippi, Virginia excepted, would have a(
once fallen into our hands. As the final result. General
Lee, perceiving the absolute hopelessness of the cause he
was maintaining, and the criminality of further effusion of
blood, would have surrendered, and the Rebellion have
been wiped out. Perceiving, and avowing at the time, the
perfect practicability of all these combinations and results,
and knowing well, because we fully understood the spirit
and capacities of our military authorities, that no com
binations or unity ..of action of our great armies for the
realization of these or any other desirable ends would be
made, and that the single army of Rosecrans would be
thrown into the circle of fire with which it was afterwards

312 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
encompassed, — these were the reasons why we did not share
in the public joy at the great victories gained at Gettys
burg, Vicksburg, and Port Hudson. These were the
reasons why we wrote at this time that unpublished letter
to the New York Times, the letter in which we clearly
stated what might be done, and as clearly and definitely
foreshadowed the events which did follow. Never did the
idea have place in the raind of either of our commanders-
in-chief during this war, that the only possible condition of
putting down the Rebellion was the annihilation of the armies
or military power of the Confederacy, that the immutable
condition of accomplishing this result was the combination
and concentration of the national forces for this one end,
and that while this end was being accomplished, territory
and positions should be taken and held, but for strictly
strategic purposes. The policy, on the other hand, which
determined the entire conduct of this war on our part,
was the principle that the only method for an effec
tive accomplishment of the end under consideration was
to have in the first place as little to do as possible with
the armies of the Confederacy, to lend all our energies in
the next place to the one end of conquering and holding
territory, capturing and garrisoning fortresses, villages,
and cities, driving the enemy from any positions he might
assume, leaving him then to go where and do as he pleased,
until he should choose to locate again in some particular
position, and finally, in no case to make any combined
movements for the accomplishment of these or any other
results, but to compel each army and each separated part
of every army to act by itself, and that without reference
to what any other part was doing. No comprehensive
mind can contemplate the facts of this war, just as they
occurred, without perceiving the strict verity of the above
statements. After the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson,
for example, nothing whatever hindered the prompt union
of our great armies on the Mississippi with that of General
Rosecrans for a grand movement upon General Bragg.
Instead of this, however, all these forces lay Idle, Sherman
only being sent on a vain and senseless raid into the inte
rior. When Burnside, with 20,000 disciplined troops, took
possession of Knoxville, that city and all North-Eastern

THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN. 313
Tennessee being intensely loyal, and in no need of being
guarded, Rosecrans was in the act of driving Bragg's
forces from Shelbyville and other places named above, and
this as preparatory to his final move upon Chattanooga.
At this tirae this place was abandoned by General Bragg,
and all his forces between there and Knoxville were with
drawn to Fayetteville. Had Burnside moved down a
distance of less than 150 miles, and taken possession of
Chattanooga, he would have been able to have moved
out and reinforced Rosecrans, and thus have enabled our
combined forces to inflict a crushing defeat upon General
Bragg at Chickamauga and driven him back to Atlanta.
Instead of doing any such thing, Burnside, as soon as
he got possession of Knoxville, scattered his forces all
over North-Eastern Tennessee, where they were of no use
for any purposes of the war. So much for the wisdom
of our great Generals. Never could a nation (let me
say here what I have said before) boast of a braver or
more patriotic soldiery than ours, nor of abler Generals and
under officers than held inferior command in these armies.
The whole difficulty lay with those who held supreme
command. One of the most intelligent chaplains in the
army of the Cumberland, for example, told us, when I
informed him of the plan which I had submitted in Janu
ary 1863 for the conduct of the campaign in Virginia,
that he had often heard corps, division, and brigade com
manders in the army where he was, express their astonish
ment that that identical plan had not been adopted, that
plan having independently suggested itself to their minds.
Equally surprised were these men that no combinations of
the national forces were anywhere made for the ends
demanded by the exigencies of the war.
The Campaign under General Rosecrans.
Let us now direct our attention to the campaign as
conducted by General Rosecrans. Here palpable facts
at once reveal him as a General of no ordinary capacity.
The plan he adopted was this. A feint was made in the
direction of Shelbyville, which lay on our direct route—
a feint which induced General Bragg to concentrate his
forces at this point. While this movement was being

314 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
made, our main forces were moved by rapid marches lo
Manchester, on the ehemy's right, thus jeopardizing
all his communications with Chattanooga and the valley
south of that place. Finding all the forces under his
immediate command in danger of being surrounded and
captured. General Bragg fled precipitately, first to Tulla
homa, and then over the mountains to Lafayette, leaving
all his strongholds behind him, to be taken peaceable pos
session of by his rival. Thus, by as skilful combinations
as the history of war presents, Rosecrans in the short space
of nine days succeeded, with the loss of 560 men on our
part, in destroying quite as many of the enemy, and in
capturing 1,634 prisoners, three guns, several very
strongly fortified positions, a vast amount of provisions
and other spoils, and clearing Middle Tennessee of all
Confederate forces. Such facts clearly' evince what this
skilful commander would have done had adequate forces,
as he requested, and which might have been done as well as
not, — had adequate forces been put under his command.
Just at this time, the further advance of our forces,
and a rapid pursuit of General Bragg, were prevented by
seventeen days of incessant rain, which rendered the roads
in those mountain passes quite impassable. The almost
impassable state of the roads was not the only difficulty
which General Rosecrans had to encounter. His further
advance was now through a mountainous region in which
all food and forage were destroyed or devoured, and in
which the railroad communications were broken up by
General Bragg In his retreat. All that could be done was
to harass that General by means of our light troops, and
that while the railroad from Nashville to Bridgeport,
where the road crosses the Tennessee river twenty- eight
miles below Chattanooga, was being repaired. By July
25th, this end was attained, and our army was in a
condition to pass the river. By means of bridges con
structed above and below, and at this point, the passage
was commenced August 28th and completed by Sep
tember 8th. The several corps now pushed forward
across the mountains and concentrated at Trenton, in the
narrow valley of Lookout Creek, which runs in a north
easterly direction Into the Tennessee river, a few miles

THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN. 315
below Chattanooga. Two courses were now before our
commander. He might pass his whole array down this
valley to the point designated, or send a division down,
and take possession of the place, while our main forces
were pushed forward over Mission Ridge into - the far
wider valley traversed by the Chickamauga Creek, which
enters the Tennessee river a short distance above Chatta
nooga, and from thence move his army down to the place
referred to. General Bragg, perceiving that if he re
mained at Chattanooga his communications would be
seized and his army starved out, abandoned this strong
hold, and retreated south to Lafayette. General Rose
crans, misled by a despatch which he received from
General Halleck, concluded that General Bragg had re
treated to Rome or Atlanta, and consequently adopted
the latter of the two courses above indicated. The follow
ing is the despatch to which we refer: —
"Washington, Sept. wth, 1875.
' Burnside telegraphs from Cumberland gap, that he
holds all East Tennessee above Loudon, and also the gap
of the North Carolina mountains. A cavalry force is
moving towards Athens to connect with you. After
holding the mountain passes on the west, anc ~~TI7>
or some other point on the railroad, to prevent the return
of Bragg's army, it will be decided whether your army
shall move farther south into Georgia and Alabama. It
is reported here by deserters, that a part of Brag^s army
is reinforcing Lee. It is important that the truth of this
should be ascertained as soon as possible.
"H. W. Halleck,
" Commander-in-Chief.^''
Had General Rosecrans moved his whole army from
Trenton direct to Chattanooga he would have taken peace
able possession of the stronghold, and also of Mission
Ridge and Lookout Mountain, and thus have been able
to guard all his communications with Bridgeport and
Nashville, and to bid defiance to any forces that might
have been brought against him. Under the impression.

3l6 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
however, that Bragg was reinforcing Lee, instead of Lee
reinforcing Bragg, with the best commander and corps
then in the Confederate army, Rosecrans sent General
Crittenden to Chattanooga, and with the remainder of his
army passed over the mountain into the broader valley
referred to, expecting here to be reinforced by the main
portion of Crittenden's forces, and to move south in pur
suit of General Bragg. To his amazement and consterna
tion, however, our brave commander found himself about
to be assailed by veteran forces quite one-third raore
numerous than his own, and that before he could have full
time to get his army in readiness for the conflict. General
Bragg, instead of retreating to Rome or Atlanta, was
quietly waiting the arrival of General Longstreet, who was
approaching as rapidly as the railroads could bring him
forward. Of the two armies which now confronted each
other, ours was about 55,000 strong, while that of the
enemy numbered from 80,000 to go,ooo men. Not a
moment was to be lost on either side. Our army, Sep
tember 20th, was concentrated at a point midway between
Chattanooga and Lafayette, and on the main road between
the two places. General McCook's corps was on our
right, that of General Crittenden in the centre, and that of
General Thomas on our left ; General Polk held chief com
mand of the Confederate right, and General Hood, with
Longstreet's veterans, held their left, until the arrival of the
latter on the morning of the day above designated. On
the igth, a decided attempt was made by Polk to turn our
left, and by seizing possession of the road to Chattanooga,
to cut off our retreat to that place, and thus secure the
capture of our entire army. General Thomas, anticipating
such a design, opened the battle early in the morning by
assaulting a Confederate brigade which seemed to be in
an isolated position. This brought on a fierce conflict, in
which at one time our forces, and then those of the enemy,
were worsted. The conflict ended, however, by the rout of
the Confederate advances, and the driving back of the
entire right upon their defences on the creek. Thus the
day closed with a decided advantage on our part in this
portion of the field. On our right the enemy, after a
severe cannonade, made several very determined attacks,

THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN. 317
in which they gained temporary advantages, but were
finally driven back with the loss of many killed and
wounded, and quite a number of prisoners. On all parts
of the field the advantage was decidedly on our side, and
inspired our army with bright hopes of success in the great
battle to be fought on the day following. Such hopes,
however, turned out to be illusory. Early the next morn
ing Longstreet, with the remainder of his corps, was on the
ground, and assumed command of the Confederate left.
The attack on the part of General Bragg was intended
to have been commenced at daylight. A dense fog filled
the valley, however, and delayed the battle until half-past
8 a.m. According to the plan of the Confederate com
mander, the conflict was to have been opened by a flank
movement of General Polk around our left, and by an over
whelming assault upon our left centre. Knowing that here
would be the most decisive p'f^ oi attack, Thomas was
reinforced until he held comnj'and o/ quite one-half of our
army. The advance of Polk was delayed, first by the fog,
and then, when ready to move, by finding a full division
of the Confederate left wing (Longstreet's) directly in his
front, and thus rendering an advance impossible until this
obstacle was removed. Two hours of precious time, as
he affirms, was lost by this strange accident. At length
Breckinridge, on their extreme right, uNjed Thomas
with a full division, pushing his forces acroN the main
road ; and then, facing to his left, attempted by desperate
fighting to roll up our left wing upon its centre. This
movement was taken up by successive divisions towards
the Confederate centre, and all with the design which had
been defeated the day before^to cut off our army from
Chattanooga. Thomas, however, was on this as on the
day previous, fully equal to the occasion. Breckinridge,
assailed by superior forces, was soon hurled back in utter
confusion ; two of his Generals, Helm and Deshler, being
killed. Major Groves, chief of his artillery, mortally wounded,
and General Adams wounded and taken prisoner. In a
similar manner were all attempts of General Bragg to turn
our left and break our centre frustrated.
While all things were thus prospering in our centre
and on our left wing, a disaster occurred to our right

3 1 8 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
which put in jeopardy our whole army. As Rosecrans
early in the morning passed with his staff along the rear
of his right wing, he perceived that McCook's right was
too far extended, and that Davis with his division was too
far to the right, and that the same was true of Crittenden's
corps in reserve, and ordered the necessary changes. The
raovement of these several divisions from right to left was
attended with the most fearful consequences. In these
movements a gap was opened in our front, in consequence
of the withdrawment of one of our divisions to the rear, its
place not being closed up as was intended. Into this gap
Longstreet instantly threw Hood's division, pushing at the
same time that of Buckner on our right flank. By these
assaults our whole right wing was utterly disordered, and
rushed in a mingled mass in the direction of Rossville and
Chattanooga. In this mass Rosecrans was borne along and
separated frora the rest of the army. He accordingly has
tened on to Chattanooga to reform the fugitives and make
preparations for the reception of the rest of his army.
Matters, however, were not, in reality, as desperate as
at first sight they appeared. Almost our entire centre
and all our left wing under Thomas were unbroken and
stood firm. So was Crittenden's small corps, stationed, as
we have stated, as a reserve, at Rossville. Thomas, alive
to the perils which encompassed him, with cool deliberation
moved back our centre and his own right, and reformed
the forces under his command on a ridge directly across
the road on which the Confederates were advancing in the
full assurance of an easy and triumphant march upon
Chattanooga, there to make prisoners of the entire army of
the Cumberland. Before the assault of the enemy com
menced. Granger, with his corps of two divisions, came
up. So did several brigades of our centre and right, which
had retreated, but had remained unbroken, or had been
reformed. These unexpected reinforcements Thomas so
distributed as to protect his wings and strengthen the
weak points in his line, his own batteries, with all the guns
that he could collect — guns abandoned by McCook's corps
in its flight — 'being placed in positions where they could
do the greatest possible service. The first service which
General Granger did was to send two of his brigades under

THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN. 3 ( g
General Whitaker and Colonel Mitchell, and hurl a full
division of Confederates from a ridge on Thomas's right,
where a decisive flank movement was intended. By the
capture and the holding of this ridge our right was fully
protected. At 4 p.m. the tempest, in terrible fury, burst
upon our devoted columns, the entire Confederate army
moving upon them in solid masses. These masses boldly
moved up in front of our line, where they were first mowed
down by a discharge of grape and canister from our bat
teries, and were then compelled to recoil before the still
more destructive fire of our infantry. When reformed,
they would raove up again and recoil as before, and for the
same reasons. These useless and destructive advances and
recoils were repeated, until at dark the enemy retreated
south, and our divisions, in regular order, and by word of
command from General Rosecrans, retired to Rossville,
encamped there for the night, and the next day moved
without being disturbed to Chattanooga. It is a singular
fact, that one of our soldiers, who happened to be sepa
rated from his company, slept for the night quietly upon
the field held by Thomas, and was advised the next morn
ing, by a Confederate surgeon who was passing alone
over the field, to follow on as quickly as possible after his
own regiment. This incident clearly evinces the fact of
the retreat of General Bragg at the close of the battle, our
army being in reality left victors upon the bloody field.
In his official report. General Rosecrans admits a loss,
in killed, wounded, and missing, of 16,351 men, thirty--six
guns, twenty caissons, and 8,450 small arms, while he claims
to have brought off 2,288 prisoners. General Bragg admits
a total loss of 18,000 men in all, of whom about 16,000
must have been among the killed and wounded. It was
thus that, for want of proper combination and concentration
of forces on our part, brave men were so recklessly
slaughtered during this war. While, in all the great
battles, our forces ought to have outnumbered those of the
Confederates as two to one, or, at the least, three to two,
the forces actually engaged were so brave and so deter
mined, and at the same time so nearly matched, that one-
third of the number on each side would be uniformly
slaughtered before either would retreat.

320 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
The conduct of General Thomas on this occasion has
but one parallel in the history of this war, that of Generals
Pleasanton and Sickles at Chancellorsville, and but few
parallels in the history of war anywhere. The cool and
self-determined deliberation with which he reformed our
line after nearly one-half of it had been utterly broken to
fragments, the precision with which he stationed his own
forces and those which providentially came to his relief,
and the steadiness with which he held his lines under the
terrible fire and crushing assaults of the disciplined and
seemingly overwhelming forces of the enemy, and all this
while he was in constant peril of defeat from the ex
haustion of his araraunition, fully evince him as one of the
greatest of military coramanders. In all his career, he
never lost a battle, while he often plucked a victory out of
the hands of defeat ; and never in any battle were his
ranks broken, though those of other Generals were shat
tered on both sides of hira.
General Bragg immediately followed our army as it
retired to Chattanooga, took possession of Mission Ridge
and Lookout Mountain, by which he fully commanded all
our communications by railroad and the river, with our
depots of supply, and drew up his array around the for
midable fortifications which the Confederates had pre
viously erected for their own defence. Knowing well that
our army could not be captured by assault, the object of
the enemy was to compel Rosecrans to surrender through
exhaustion of his supplies.
The capture of Chattanooga, and with it the possession
of East Tennessee, was a heavy blow upon the Confederacy.
"Chickamauga," says Pollard, " had conferred a brilHant
glory upon our arms, but little else. Rosecrans still held the
prize of Chattanooga, and with it the possession of East
Tennessee. Two-thirds of our nitre-beds were in this
region, and a large proportion of the coal which supplied
our foundries. It abounded in the necessaries of life.
It was one of the strongest countries in the world, — so full
of lofty mountains, that it had been called, not inaptly,
the Switzerland of Araerica. As the possession of Switzer
land opened the door to the invasion of Italy, Germany,
and France, so the possession of East Tennessee gave

THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN. 32 1
easy access to Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, and
Alabama." Such were the obvious advantages which General
Rosecrans had, by his very superior strategy and energy,
secured to the nation in the course of a few weeks ; and
far greater advantageous results, bringing hostilities to a
speedy termination, and all this with no reverses, would have
arisen, had his wise counsels been heeded by our military
authorities at the national capital. Yet for a single mishap
— a mishap occasioned wholly by false information con
veyed by these authorities — was he, immediately after his
great success, and that by the authorities through whom
his misfortune had been occasioned, suspended from his
command, and openly disgraced before the nation. On
the igth October, he (we cite from Mr. Greeley now)
" received an unheralded order relieving him from com-
raand, which he at once obeyed, leaving for the North the
next day — ^just a year having elapsed since he left Corinth,
the theatre of his then recent victory, to find himself
assigned to command in this department."
Deeming it best for the service that he should depart
before it was known to the soldiers that he was superseded,
he bade adieu to his comrades in the following order : —
" Head- quarters. Department of the Cumberland,
Chattanooga, Tenn., October ii)th, 1863.
" The General commanding announces to the officers
and soldiers of the Army of the Cumberland that he leaves
them, under orders from the President.
" Major-General George H. Thomas, in_ compliance
with the orders, will assume command of this army and
department. The chiefs of all the staff departments will
report to him,
" In taking leave of you, his brothers in arms, —
officers and soldiers,— he congratulates you that your new
commander comes not to you, as he did, a stranger.
General Thomas has been identified with this army from
its first organization. He has led you often into battle.
To his known prudence, dauntless courage, and true
patriotism, you may look with confidence that, under God,
he will lead you to victory. 21

322 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
" The General commanding doubts not you will be as
true to yourselves and your country in the future as you
have been in the past.
" To the division and brigade commanders he tenders
his cordial thanks for their valuable and hearty co-opera
tion in all that he has undertaken. To the chiefs of the
staff departments and their subordinates, whom he leaves
behind, he owes a debt of gratitude for their fidelity and
untiring devotion to duty,
" Companions in arms — officers and soldiers — fare
well ; and raay God bless you.
" W, S. Rosecrans, Major- General."
Of the Generals who held high commands during this
war, Rosecrans ranks among the three or four who
evinced capacity to plan and execute important cam
paigns. In every instance, the single one excepted in
which he was misled by false information from our Com
mander-in-Chief, his strategy was faultless. The same
remarks hold equally in respect to his dispositions upon
the battle-field. It was he who, in the absence of the
General in command, planned — and, in fact, executed —
those movements which annihilated the Confederate forces
in Western Virginia, prior to the first Bull Run disaster ;
and it was the General in command of the department
who, by his flaming dispatches, appropriated to himself
all the credit of those splendid victories. Prior to the
disaster referred to. General Rosecrans submitted a plan
for the conduct of a great campaign in Virginia — a plan
which, if it had been adopted, would have ensured as com
pletely the annihilation of the military power of the Con
federacy in Eastern as the plan above referred to did in
Western Virginia. What that plan, in all its essential
features, was, has been shown in the former parts of this
treatise, — the same plan having suggested itself to two
minds who were total strangers to each other's thoughts
A raore disinterested, patriotic, or braver soldier, and one
who deserves a warmer place in the hearts of his country
men, never had a place in our armies.
The condition of the Army of the Cumberland did at
length stir the dull brain of our Commander-in-Chief, and

THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN. 323
did suggest to his mind the idea of a concentration of the
national forces, — a concentration, however,' not for offen
sive, but defensive measures. Dispatches were accordingly
sent to Burnside, now strengthened by the return of the
gth corps, in East Tennessee, to Pope in the north-west, to
Schofield at St. Louis, to Hurlbut at Memphis, and to
Grant at Vicksburg, to hasten on all the troops they could
spare for the relief of our army at Chattanooga. Finding
that from none of these sources could the needed aid be
got forward in time, the nth and 12th corps of the Army
of the Potomac, 20,000 men, were in an almost incredible
space of time, sent, under General Hooker, to Middle
Tennessee, to hold General Rosecrans's communications.
In eight days, this force was debarked, in fighting order,
on the Tennessee River, at the point of their destination.
In January 1863, General Halleck, in connection with our
Secretary of War, did, as we have seen, persuade President
Lincoln that no such force could be conveyed oncrhalf
that distance in four weeks. To give unity to all opera
tions for thcc end under consideration. General Grant, on
the retiremefit of General Rosecrans, was appointed to the
supreme command of all the western departments. He
was, however, at the time, sick at New Orleans, and was
unable to assume command at Louisville until October i8th,
when he telegraphed General Thomas to hold Chattanooga
at all hazards, and received the reply, " I will hold on till
we starve." While these events were transpiring, General Bragg
sent the main portion of his cavalry, under Generals
Wheeler and "Wharton, across the Tennessee, between
Chattanooga and Bridgeport, into Middle Tennessee, with
orders to fall upon and destroy General Thomas's supplies
and supply trains. In the Sequatchie Valley this force
captured and destroyed a train of from 700 to 1,000
waggons. At McMinniville they captured 600 prisoners,
destroyed a large waggon and car train, and burned a great
quantity of provisions. These forces were finally pursued
by our cavalry and infantry, and escaped into North
Alabama, losing upwards of 2,000 of their own number,
but capturing and parolling raore of our men, and destroy
ing millions of dollars of Union property. On his wav to

324 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
Chattanooga, General Grant found General Hooker, with
all his forces, at Bridgeport, preparing to cross there, and
dispute with General Bragg the right to compel our army
under Thomas to supply itself with provisions by means of
waggon trains dragged round through the mountain passes
in Middle Tennessee, — a service in which 10,000 horses
were soon used up, while the autumn rains would ere long
render the roads so impassable that our army could be
supplied but a few days longer.
On the 26th Hooker passed his whole army over
the Tennessee at Bridgeport, and on the 28th reached
Wauhatchle, a small station on the railroad in Lookout
Valley, about twelve miles frora Chattanooga, — here
threatening General Bragg with a flank attack on his left
wing. This raovement was made intentionally in full view
of the Confederate forces on Racoon and Lookout Moun
tains, the object being to conceal or divert the eneray's
attention from certain corresponding raoveraents to be
made by Generals Grant and Thomas from Chattanooga.
While General Hooker was moving from Bridgeport up
the river, on its south, a division under General Palraer
moved down the river, from Chattanooga, on its north side.
Both movements being in full view of the enemy, com
pletely diverted his attention from what was being done
elsewhere. In the meanwhile. Palmer, having crossed the
river, and joined Hooker in his advance to Wauhatchie,
4,000 men under General Smith, chief engineer, 1,800 by
boats, and the remainder on the north side of the river,
passed down to Brown's Ferry, some three or four miles
below Chattanooga. Those on the boats landed on the
south side, and seized the hills which overlook the ferry.
The remainder, who had marched down to the same point
on the north side, were ferried over, and by daylight all
the heights which rise from the river on the one side, and
from Lookout Valley on the other, were firmly secured.
By 10 a.m. an excellent pontoon bridge was completed,
and a free communication was opened between Hooker
at Wauhatchie . and our army at Chattanooga. With
Hooker's left resting upon Smith's force and bridge.
Palmer being in his rear as a support, a safe waggon
route of twenty-eight miles over a good road from Bridge-

THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN. 325
port was secured for our army supplies, and eight miles
by using the river from Bridgeport to Kelly's Ferry.
Thus all peril to our army from want of supplies was com
pletely removed, and the defeat of General Bragg, as our
army was being so effectively reinforced, was rendered
only a question of time.
But one attack was made upon any part of General
Hooker's line. This was done by General Law's division
of Longstreet's corps, who held Lookout Mountain. General
Geary's division, as was judged, lay exposed to surprise
by a night attack, which was made at about i a.m.,
Oct. 2 gth, and that with loud yells and terrible impetuosity,
driving in our pickets at a run, and charging Geary's
division in front and on both wings. His brave men,
however, stood firm, returning as deadly a fire as they
received, until Carl Shurz with his division of Howard's
corps came rushing from Hooker to their aid. The fight
was soon over. One brigade under General Tyndale
carried the hill from whence our men were enfiladed on
their left, while another brigade under Colonel C. Smith,
73rd Ohio, charged up another very steep hill still farther
behind, and carried that at the point of the bayonet,
taking some prisoners. The Confederates accordingly
fled, leaving 153 dead in Geary's front, and admitting a
total loss of 361 men, that of General Hooker being 437
in this affair and since he crossed the Tennessee River, —
to wit, 76 killed, 33g wounded, and 22 missing. Imme
diately after this. Racoon Mountain, with all west of
Lookout Valley, was wholly cleared of Confederate forces,
and all the positions of our entire army were rendered
perfectly secure, — so obviously secure, that General Bragg
made no more efforts to disturb them.
From this tirae to the 23rd November, when Sherman
and his corps had arrived from Vicksburg and Memphis,
nothing was done by either of the armies In and about
Chattanooga. General Grant was waiting for reinforce
ments, and General Bragg was in suspense in respect to
the question what he should do. Learning, however, that
Burnside's forces were in a helpless and exposed condition,
in consequence of being separated into small detachments,
and scattered, as we have stated, all over East Tennessee,

326 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
the Confederate commander detached General Longstreet,
with his corps, for the purpose of destroying our forces
there, and regaining that portion of the State. No excuse
can be furnished for the conduct of General Burnside after
he entered Tennessee. In his advance, he passed through
Kingston and Loudon, September ist, neither of which was
over a three or four days' easy march from Chattanooga.
At the former place, he came into communication with the
pickets of General Rosecrans, and was consequently in
formed of the critical condition of the Army of the Cumber
land. He was also, as General Halleck affirmed, under
a specific order to move from Loudon westward to the
Tennessee River, and form a junction with Rosecrans. In
disregard of all these considerations. General Burnside,
after taking possession of Knoxville, and capturing 2,000
prisoners and fourteen guns at Cumberland Gap, scattered
his forces, as already stated. In his advance, which was
made with great secrecy and despatch. General Long-
street found matters very much as he desired, until he sat
down before Knoxville. Before he arrived at Loudon, he
inflicted a loss upon our forces, as officially stated, of 650
men, and several of our batteries. From this point he
had several encounters with inferior forces under the
immediate command of General Burnside, the latter being
driven from position to position, losing heavily at each
one, until he finally threw himself into Knoxville, and
from within its fortifications confronted his foe, until, as
we shall see. General Sherman came to the relief of our
beleaguered forces, and General Longstreet, retired.
On the arrival of General Sherman, he, with his corps,
was placed on the left of our army, and above Chattanooga.
Thomas, in the centre at that point, was strengthened by
detaching General Howard, with his corps, from Hooker,
and uniting him with the forraer. General Hooker's cora-
raand was thus reduced to less than 10,000 men, and no
two of his divisions had ever before fought together in the
same battle. They were united now, however, under a
General in whom all confided, and felt siire of victory,
"^k initiative was taken in the centre. Granger moving
out at 2 p.m., November 23rd, driving the enemy back, and
seizing a hill in front of the Confederate line, a hill known

THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN. 327
as Orchard Ridge, capturing about 200 prisoners. This
onward movement was supported by one made by Howard
on the left of Granger, so that the important advantage
gained was held through the night. Hooker, at 4 a.m.
the next day, made an advance upon the north face and
west side of Lookout Mountain. The object of this move
ment was to attract General Bragg's attention in this
direction, while Sherman should pass his corps over the
Tennessee above Chattanooga, and constitute our advanced
left wing in that direction. As he reached Lookout Creek,
Hooker found it so swollen by the recent rain that a delay
of three hours was occasioned in building bridges and
crossing his several brigades over. By n a.m. the cross
ing of his entire force was effected. At this time his
batteries were so located on all available hills as to enfilade
the Confederate infantry as they came down from their
camp on the mountain to man their breastworks and rifle-
pits below. As these forces fell back, our infantry followed
them, " climbing," in the language of Mr. Greeley, "over
ledges and boulders, crests and chasms, and driving the
Rebels through their camp without allowing them to halt
there." General Hooker, knowing that General Bragg
had reinforced this wing of his army, ordered the men to
be halted and re-formed as soon as they should reach the
suipmit where the Confederate camp was laid. The men,
however, disregarding all such orders, by whomsoever
given, rushed on, hurling all the enemies they encountered
down the eastern declivity, and Lookout Mountain was
in Union hands. Hooker's line was now formed on the
eastern declivity of the mountain, his left extending near
the mouth of Chattg,p^a Creek, At 4 p.m. he informed
General Grant that his position had been rendered un
assailable. For the capture of this mountain, the soldiery
and under- officers are to be accredited, that capture being
made by a spontaneous movement of the men, — a move
ment made, not only without orders, but in opposition to
an express order for a halt. To the Confederates, as one
of their officers afterwards said, "the capture was a sur
prise in the daytime, and that in the immediate presence
of forces abundantly sufficient to repel any attack that
could have been made upon the position, could thos*^

328 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
forces have been formed in time to resist the per
fectly unexpected attack." In their advance our forces
took many prisoners, and on the mountain they found
20,000 rations, and the camp equipage of three brigades,
which the Confederates had left behind them in their
sudden flight. The next morning Hooker continued his
advance across Chattanooga Valley, and at night bivouaced
on Mission Ridge, which the capture of Lookout Mountain
had rendered indefensible. In this advance the ridge was
assailed on the east by the division of Osterhaus, on the
west by that of Garey, and in front by that of Cruft, By
these combined raoveraents the enemy on the ridge was
so hemmed in that but few escaped slaughter or capture,
the division of Osterhaus alone taking upwards of 2,000
prisoners. Our forces also held Rossville, quite in the
rear of General Bragg's left wing, and rendering his entire
position no longer tenable.
After these decisive advantages gained by Hooker,
the task imposed upon Thomas in the centre, and Sherman
on the left, was a very easy one, Bragg's exclusive solici
tude being to withdraw his army in safety — that is, what
remained of it — out of the crushing coil with which he was
being encircled. On the morning of the 25th, Sherman
was ordered to open the attack at daylight, and did so. He
found the enemy in his front so strongly entrenched, how
ever, that up to 3 p.m. his columns had won no decisive
success. At 2 p.ra. Thomas received orders to advance.
The position of the enemy here was on a steep ridge
running along the front of the attacking column. Three
divisions, commanded respectively by Generals Baird,
Wood, and Sheridan, advanced, with double lines of skir
mishers in their front, directly into the enemy's rifle-pits at
the foot of the ridge. These were soon cleared, and the
Xnes, re-formed, followed the retreating foe so closely up
the steep declivity that they received but little injury from
the fire of the batteries above them. Near sundown, the
ridge was in possession of our brave soldiers. The near
ness of night, and the stern resistance which Thomas
received on his left, prevented any further advance. In
the night, Bragg withdrew from the field. He was fol
lowed by General Hooker as far as Ringgold, where,

THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN. 329
between our advance and Bragg's rear, a sharp action
occurred, followed by the retreat of the enemy. At Ring
gold, Hooker was required to suspend pursuit.
Thomas returned at once from the battle-field to do for
Burnside, in his extremity, what the latter had failed to do
for Rosecrans in his, namely, to hasten on Granger's corps
for the relief of Knoxville. This corps was joined by that
of General Sherman, who assumed command of the whole
expedition. On his advance, the last eighty- four miles
were passed over, on Tennessee roads, in the month of
December, in three days. On the approach of Sherman,
Longstreet decamped from Knoxville, retreating unresisted
to Russellville, just east of the Tennessee line, where he
wintered his corps, mostly upon resources drawn from the
loyal inhabitants of East Tennessee. As soon as Knoxville
was relieved, Sherman, with his command, returned to
Chattanooga. During the siege of Knoxville, Burnside lost about
1,000 men; and Longstreet, in the different and fruitless
attacks made upon our fortifications, must have lost quite
three times that number.
According to official report, our losses in and about
Chattanooga amounted to 757 killed, 4,52g wounded, and
330 missing, — 5,616 in all. "We captured," says the
report, " 6,142 prisoners, of whom 289 were commissioned
officers ; 40 pieces of artillery, 69 artillery carriages and
caissons, and 7,000 stands of arms. The entire Con
federate loss may be safely set down as quite 10,000 or
12,000 men. In addition to this, in the language of Mr.
Greeley, "their losses in guns, munitions, supplies, and camp
equipage, were seldom paralleled." If we grant the cor
rectness of the estimate of General Ro.secrans, that the
Confederate commander fought at Chickamauga with
92,000 men, he must have retreated from Chattanooga,
Longstreet having withdrawn his corps, with considerably
less than 40,000 dispirited and comparatively disorganized
troops. In contemplating the events before us, we are con
strained to affirm that the main, credit of rescuing our
army at Chattanooga from its perilous condition, together
with the defeat of General Bragg, must be awarded to

330 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
General Hooker. He it was that, prior to the arrival of
General Grant, planned and afterwards executed those
masterly movements which brought his army over the
Tennessee River at Bridgeport to Wauhatchie, and then
brought his left wing into communication with our army in
its beleaguered condition, and not only wholly freed that
army from all its perils, but ensured all the advantages
which it afterwards gained. It was he who afterwards,
with less than 10,000, men, and in the presence of a
watchful and powerful foe, gained those positions on
Lookout Mountain and Mission Ridge, — positions which
rendered General Bragg's position wholly untenable. Had
not these heights been secured, there is no probability at all
that General Bragg's position could have been successfully
carried. It was Hooker that, with his immortal 10,000,
and after all their prior hard fightings, — very little of such
fighting having been done by the rest of the army, — it
was he, and his imraortal 10,000, I say, that pursued the
enemy in his retreat, and inflicted the final blow upon him
that he was allowed to inflict at Ringgold. I refer to one
fact which ought to be stated in this connection, — I refer
to the fact that the main part of the forces that he had
brought with him from the army of the Potoraac, was
taken from him, and he was compelled to act the most
important part in the whole drama with so small a force,
and that constituted of three divisions who had never
before acted together on any battle-field. This I say
before the nation and the world, that the order which took
from Hooker more than one-half of his force, to strengthen
Thomas, who had more than 40,000 men under his imme
diate command, and was in a condition of no peril at all, —
the order which placed Sherman with his corps intact on
our left, and then required Hooker to act the part assigned
him, — was dictated by a form of stupidity which has few
parallels in the history of war. The part which Hooker did
act in this campaign, in connection with his former history,
absolutely evinces the fact that had he been continued in
command of the Army of the Potomac, instead of being
superseded by such a man as Meade, and had he been
permitted to employ the forces immediately put under
the command of his successor. General Lee would never

THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN. 33 1
have set his foot upon "the sacred soil of Virginia"
as commander of an army, nor would General Longstreet
ever have seen Georgia or Tennessee as commander of
of a Confederate army.

MEASURES ADOPTED AFTER THE DEFE.\T AND RETREAT
OF GENERAL BRAGG.
In judging of the military character of a General, we
must take into account, not merely his victories, but the
uses which he subsecjuently makes of such advantages.
Judged by this standard. General Grant will stand very low
in the scale of merit as a military commander, as far as
this Chattanooga campaign is concerned. What was the
condition of General Bragg's army when he retreated from
Chattanooga? Undeniably he took with him less than
40,000 men, and these in as visibly dispirited and dis
organized a condition as an army well could be. At
the same time, he left behind him nearly or quite one-half
of his guns, caissons, and munitions, and the greater
portion of his provisions and supplies. In short, he was
in no condition at all to offer any effective resistance, or
make a rapid flight had he been pursued. No army, on
the other hand, was ever In a better condition for an
effective pursuit than was ours. Its morale, as all its deeds
evinced, was perfect. Nor was any part of the army
in a state of physical exhaustion, the whole command of
General Thomas having been resting for months. The
state of the roads, as evinced by Sherman's march of
eighty- four miles in three days, over far worse roads than
those between Chattanooga and Atlanta, were not in an un
favourable condition for pursuit. Besides, if Bragg could,
as he did, retreat. Grant might have pursued. As a
motive of infinite weight for a prompt and vigorous
pursuit, the fact was palpable at the time that the military
power of all the Confederate States between the Missis
sippi and Savannah rivers was then present in that
defeated and dispirited and helpless army, and the de
struction of it involved the destruction of that power, and
the complete subjugation of all these States. Nothing can
be m.ore obvious than is the fact that before General

332 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
Grant, at that tirae, lay an unimpeded march to Atlanta,
and that on that march the only array these Confederate
States could have raised raight have been utterly dis
organized and dispersed, and the war brought to a final
close, as far as all the Middle States of the Confederacy
were concerned, — an event which would have speedily
terminated the war everywhere. All this might have
been done, and all needed aid have been sent to Burnside.
Thoraas and Hooker united could have crushed Bragg on
any field where they raight have encountered hira. We
affirra, without fear of contradiction, that nothing but
blank stupidity, or an unaccountable blindness to the raost
palpable facts, can present the least excuse for the neglect
of the golden opportunity of a raost effective pursuit then
presented. Let us now consider the case of Sherraan and Burnside
at the tirae of Longstreet's retreat frora Knoxville. The
united forces of these two Generals outnumbered those of
their antagonist, nearly or quite, by two to one. The
forces of Burnside east of Knoxville could have been so
concentrated in Longstreet's front as to have most
materially retarded his retreat, while Sherman and Burn
side might have fallen upon his rear and perfectly crushed
him. Longstreet's corps never ought, but as paroled
prisoners of war, to have seen Virginia again.
What was done under the circumstances ? No pursuit
whatever, either of Bragg or Longstreet, was attempted,
that of Hooker to Ringgold excepted. On the other hand,
as soon as Burnside was relieved, Sherman marched back
to Chattanooga, and an army of 100,000 men lay idle there
until the opening of the next spring campaign, while the
Confederate armies moved off at their leisure, and as a
recuperated and reorganized force met us upon the deadly
field the next year. It took General Sherman from three
to four months, the next year, to move from Chattanooga
to Atlanta, a distance of 138 miles; and on his bloody
march he lost from 50,000 to 60,000 brave men. In less
than three or four weeks. General Grant might have fol
lowed General Bragg over the same road, and not have
lost 10,000 men on the march, and would have annihilated
the power of the Confederacy while on the way. To reap

THE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN. 333
the advantages of victory, however, was not the policy of
this war. The non-pursuit, of Longstreet on the one
hand, and of Bragg on the other, and the repose of our
army for quite five months at Chattanooga, would have
been in accordance with the conduct of Wellington and
Blucher, had they rested at Waterloo for five months after
the defeat of the French army on that neid.

CHAPTER XXII.
MINOR CAMPAIGNS DURING THIS WAR.
The whole science of war, according to the elder Napoleon,
consists in this, in knowing how to be strongest at the point
where the main issue lies. No more important utterance
relatively to this science was ever given forth. The im
mutable condition of knowing how to be strongest at the
point referred to, is a prior knowledge of what the main
issue is, and where it lies. Here we have the peculiarity
which distinguishes great commanders from those of an
inferior order. The former intuitively apprehend what the
main issue is, where it lies, what combination of forces is
requisite to settle that issue, and then determine their
arrangements and movements in fixed subordination to
the one end under consideration. The latter either mis
take the real issue or confound the main with the minor
ones, and hence do little or nothing effective. Blucher,
for example, saw clearly that the issue of the campaign in
Belgium did not lie between Thielman and Grouchy at
Wavre, but between Wellington and Buonaparte at Water
loo. Hence the great Prussian commander did not turn back
upon Grouchy, but precipitated his main army upon Buona
parte. When Lord Cornwallis concentrated his forces and
fortified himself at Yorktown, Washington saw at once that
the whole issue of the war lay at that one point, and with
that one commander. Cornwallis was accordingly cap
tured, and peace followed, and the independence of the
United States was acknowledged. After the War of the
Rebellion assumed a definite form, we contended, and in
all our coraraunications with the leading minds in Wash
ington so affirmed, that that war had, in reality, but two

MINOR CAMPAIGNS DURING THIS WAR. 335
issues — the army under General Lee, and that of the Con
federates in the valley of the Mississippi east of that river ;
and that the annihilation of these armies, or either of them,
would be followed by a speedy collapse of the entire Con
federacy. In the judgment of our military authorities, the
real issues of the war, as far as they thought of any such
questions, lay not at all with the armies of the Confederacy,
but with its vast territories, leading cities, seaports, rivers,
and strongholds ; and hence all military combinations and
movements were directed to the settlement of these minor
instead of the main issues. When we visited Washington
in January 1863, the great issues of the war, as definitely
stated by our military authorities, lay in the seaports of
the Confederacy and on the Mississippi river, and hence
the main direction of the war resources of the nation were
determined with reference to two ends — "the plugging-up
of the Southern ports," and " the opening of the Mississippi
river." We read at that tirae, before the President and
leading members of Congress, a carefully prepared paper,
the exclusive object of which was to demonstrate the fact
that the issues of that war, as then pending, did not lie in
those ports, or on that river, but with the army of General
Lee, an army then lying in a raost exposed condition at
Fredericksburg. To the validity of the argument the
President at first fully assented, but was afterwards over-
persuaded by the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary
of War. When General Lee had crossed his army over
the Potomac in the summer of 1863, the war had but one
issue, and that issue lay with that army in the State of
Pennsylvania. That one army captured, and the war was
in reality at an end. Nothing could be more manifest.
The fact that 20,000 men were transported from Washing
ton to Bridgeport, Tenn., in eight days, demonstrates the
deduction that, while more than 30,000 might have been
brought from the Carolinas and the vicinity of Fortress
Monroe to Gettysburg, a still larger force might have been
brought from our great armies at the west to Harrisburg,
in time to have taken an effective part in securing the end
under consideration. Our Commander-in-Chief, however,
saw but one issue in the circumstances, the issue involved
in the single question. How can the invading army be got

336 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
out of Pennsylvania, and back again upon " the sacred
soil " from whence it came ? When less than 40,000 men
under General Bragg, and nearly 100,000 under General
Grant, confronted each other at Chattanooga, the great
issue of the war lay then in the immediate presence of
our General. He had but to destroy that single array
which lay in his immediate presence, an end which he
might have accomplished in a few weeks, and the war
would have been terminated in three months from that
time. The only issue which General Grant then saw was
involved in the single question. How could General Bragg
be driven frora the position he then occupied ? When
General Sherman raised the siege of Knoxville, a great
national issue was presented to him and General Burnside
for their settlement, — an issue involved in the question
whether the eneray present before thera should be crushed,
or permitted to retire in peace to Virginia. Had that one
corps been captured or dispersed, Lee's power would have
been broken, and the Confederacy would have received
"a deadly wound" which would have ensured its speedy
dissolution. When that siege was raised, all issues which
presented themselves to Sherman and Burnside's appre
hensions were settled, and nothing more was to be done
but for the former to lead his forces back to Chattanooga.
The eye of the commander is the eye of the army which
he leads. If the vision of that eye is dira, or of a limited
compass, that army will be constantly employed in settling
issues which determine nothing relatively to the main ends
for which the army has being. Here lay the misfortune
of our armies and nation, during this war.
From its commencement to its close, our Commanders-
in-Chief, and for the most part our Generals in immediate
coraraand of our great arniies, never knew what the real
issues of the war were, or where those issues lay, and con
sequently never made their campaigns or their victories
conducive to the ends for which the armies they com
manded had being. We now refer, in the first place, in
illustration of the principles above stated, to the various
expeditions which were so frequently sent out from New
Orleans and vicinity into the interior of Louisiana, and
into the State of Texas, — expeditions generally consisting

MINOR CAMPAIGNS OF THIS WAR. 337
of from 30,000 to 40,000 men. After the capture of New
Orleans, the expulsion of the Confederates from Missouri,
and especially after the opening of the Mississippi by the
capture of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, none of the real
issues of the war lay west of that river. All that was
needed to be done, as the event finally demonstrated, was to
capture the two armies of the Confederacy east of this river.
This being done, the war was ended at once everywhere.
In all the expeditions to which I have referred, our forces
were defeated. Had they all been successful, however,
nothing effective would have been done to bring the war
to a termination. Yet so blind were our Commanders-in-
Chief to the real issues of the war, that so late as the
spring of 1865, an expedition was planned for the subju
gation of the State of Texas, — an expedition to consist of
from 60,000 to 80,000 men. Without sending any army
at all into that State, the war was, as we shall see hereafter,
brought to a close, by diverting one-half of this expedition,
leaving the rest to do nothing, — by diverting one-half of this
expedition from its intended destination to the point where
the real issue of the war did lay. Thus far, my countrymen
have honestly supposed that General Grant, by his great
military talents and energy, devised and executed the plan
by which the war was brought to a close, and that by a
sudden final collapse of the Confederacy. It will appear
demonstrably evident, before this treatise is completed, that
while the war was suddenly and unexpectedly brought to a
close, this end was accomplished by an unexpected disposi
tion of the national forces, — a disposition of which he had
never formed a conception, — a disposition the idea of which,
and the duty of ordering which, was brought to his mind by
an order from the President ; and that at the very time when
General Grant received this order, he had planned and was
in the very act of carrying into execution the wildest and
most absurd scheme that ever danced in the brain of a Com
mander-in-Chief — a scheme the execution of which would
in all probability have led to great national disasters, and
without a question would, as General Grant expected, have
protracted the war on to the spring of 1866. The nation
has yet to learn how much it owes to the immortal Sumner,
as the heaven- appointed mediura of communicating to oar
22

338 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
then President, and inducing him to adopt, the plan which
suspended and reversed that of General Grant, and secured
that unexpected disposition of the national forces which
led, and that without bloodshed, to the surrender of the
armies of Generals Lee and Johnston, and to the sudden
termination of the war. We shall suspend our further
criticisms upon these absurd, useless, and disastrous expe
ditions into Western Louisiana, and up the Red River into
Texas, until we shall come to speak of that last most
absurd and gigantic of all expeditions that ever was
planned, and which was in the act of being carried out in
the spring of 1865, when a sudden order from the President
induced those final dispositions above referred to.
The remarks above made have an obvious application
to the various expeditions sent round and landed on the
coasts of the Confederate States, These expeditions were
too small to make any extended, and but very few per
manent, conquests, and everywhere acted as vexatious
irritants upon the surface of the Rebellion, provoking the
people everywhere to the most determined resistance. As
soon, for example, as McClellan became Commander-in-
Chief, instead of employing the vast resources under his
control for the settlement of the great issues directly before
him, he fixed the attention of the nation upon a contemp
tible expedition, under General Burnside, around the coasts
of North Carolina, This expedition made some seemingly
important and extensive conquests in the eastern parts of
the State, — conquests which were of no value at all to us,
which were maintained at an enormous expense, and were,
Newbern and Roanoke Island excepted, almost entirely
lost to us, by and during the year 1864, At another time
an expedition was sent out which destroyed salt-works in
West Bay, near St. Andrew's Sound, — works owned by
the Confederate Government and private individuals, and
valued at ^3,000,000. Expeditions of a similar character
were, from time to time, sent around to the coast of
Florida, and into the interior of that State, and did suffi
cient, and no more, damage than to madden the people
against the Union cause. These expeditions were so
numerous that, had they all been combined into one, and
sent to localities where important issues lay, they would

MINOR CAMPAIGNS OF THIS WAR. 339
have rendered valuable service. In the form in which
they were sent, they simply weakened our central forces,
and did nothing but injury anywhere. To any person
who has made the science of war a careful study, and
has comprehended the principles on which the great and
successful campaigns of the world have been conducted,
nothing can be more painful, and even agonizing-, than
the spectacle which this war everywhere presented, the
spectacle of all main issues utterly misapprehended and
neglected — of the vast resources of the nation directed
to minor ends which had no bearing whatever upon the
objects for which those resources were called forth — of
victories unimproved, and golden opportunities let slip as
if from design — and of the most reckless and lawless
expenditure of life and treasure. With great satisfaction
we record the fact that at length we did gain a hearing,
and did secure the adoption of measures which stopped
the outflow of blood and treasure, by terminating the
Rebellion. Of this the reader will be fully informed as
he progresses onward in the study of the contents of this
treatise.

CHAPTER XXIII.
OUR NAVAL EXPEDITIONS AROUND THE
SOUTHERN COASTS.
After the capture of Beaufort, Hilton Head, and New
Orleans, the only ports of vital importance in the posses
sion of the Confederate States were Wellington, Charles
town, Savannah, and Mobile. To "plug up," in the
first place, and to capture these ports, in the next, became
from the comraenceraent of the war a prime object of our
naval and military authorities. All these ports were open
to attack on two sides — on their water and land sides, or
from both at the same time. The only peril to which any
one of these ports might be subject was, in the estimation
of our Government, from its water side, and that in case of
a foreign war. Hence, upon this side every one of them
had been almost impregnably fortified prior to the War of
the Rebellion. After they were taken possession of by the
Confederates, they were all, in every form which science
could suggest, strengthened on the sides under consider
ation, by additional fortifications of the raost formidable
character. On their land sides, however, all these ports
were almost utterly defenceless ; and after we had obtained
possession of Hilton Head, Savannah, Charlestown, and
even Wilmington, were perfectly open to successful
attack, and bloodless capture, by an army sent inward from
the point first named. Indeed, no places were ever more
assailable than were all these in the direction under con
sideration. At any period of the war, 80,000 men sent
down to Hilton Head, and moved out from thence for the
purpose under consideration, would have captured all
these ports in a very short time. The validity of this

OUR NAVAL EXPEDITIONS. 34 I
judgment was rendered demonstrably evident by the fact
that, as soon as General Sherman approached Savannah,
with from 50,000 to 60,000 men, on its land side, that
stronghold was abandoned without a show of defence ;
that Charlestown, as soon as it was threatened with an
attack on the same side, by the presence of Sherman in
Savannah, was evacuated without being approached at all ;
and that Wilmington was captured at once, when assailed
by General Scofield, on the side under consideration.
Yet while our military and naval authorities put forth
untold efforts, with naval and land forces, to "plug up "
and capture these ports, they were always, until the
period designated, assailed on the sides where they were
strictly impregnable, and this with no attempt whatever
to approach them in the direction where they were per
fectly defenceless, and most readily approachable, and
when we had an abundance of unemployed forces that
might have been sent forward for that purpose. These
useless and most expensive efforts were, in the face of the
most earnest expostulations, persevered in from the begin
ning up to near the close of the war, — and that when it
was well known and acknowledged that, deprived of these
ports, the Confederates would be immediately rendered
powerless for self-defence. When, in January 1863, we, in
the presence of leading members of Congress, expostulated
with President Lincoln on the subject, and inquired of him
why the advantages which the possession of Hilton Head
furnished us were not improved to sunder into two parts
the Confederacy, on the one hand, and to capture these
ports by assailing them on their land sides, on the other,
his only reply was that the exclusive object of taking and
holding that port was to use it as a depot for the supply of
the na-vy around the Southern cbasts. Our reply was, that
while that port was of great use for such purposes, it pre
sented the most obvious advantages for Inflicting the most
crushing and deadly blows at the vital centre of the Con
federacy. No such considerations, however, were of any
avail to induce our military and naval authorities to
adopt any effective measures for putting a stop to the
fearful effusion of blood and treasure, by bringing the
conflict to a termination by capturing these ports. When

342 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
we take into account what was done, for example, to
" plug up " and capture the port and city of Charlestown,
the heart sickens at the details of the expenditure of blood
and treasure in abortive attempts to gain the ends under
consideration. As soon as our ironclad fleet was in
readiness, it was pushed directly into that harbour, and
there subjected to the concentrated fire of all the forts and
batteries around, until one vessel was sunk, and the
others forced out in a shattered condition. Then, after
untold efforts, a position was secured on an island from
whence Fort Sumpter and the city could be reached
by guns of the longest range. Years were now spent in
bombarding the fortress and city, and assailing, with
unsupported infantry, fortifications which could be readily
defended by a few men against ten or a hundred times
their number. All this was persevered in during these
long years, when 80,000 men, sent out from Hilton Head,
and approaching the city on the land side, would have
captured it and its fortresses in a few weeks' time.
Charlestown and the other ports and cities named could be
seen and thought of by our military and naval authorities,
however, but upon the sides where they were obviously
unassailable. "We shall recur to this subject again, when
we come to consider the progress of events under the
administration of General Grant as Commander-in-Chief
of the armies of the United States.

CHAPTER XXIV.
OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC
PRIOR TO THE APPOINTMENT OF GENERAL.
GRANT AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.
In the early part of September, General Meade became
aware that Longstreet's corps had been sent to Georgia,
and that Lee's force was, consequently, reduced to two
corps, in all not over 50,000 men, — the army of the Poto
mac, under General Meade's immediate command, then
consisting of five corps, numbering in all, nearly or quite,
100,000 men present for service. Our army was at the time
in the vicinity of Warrenton, and that of General Lee at
Culpepper, a few miles south of Rappahannock station. At
this time. General Pleasanton submitted to General Meade
the following plan for a grand movement upon the enemy.
The plan presented was this : General Pleasanton would
divide his cavalry corps into two parts, and with these
would cross the Rappahannock above and below Lee's
position, threaten his two wings, and thus divert his atten
tion in these directions. While these feints were being
made, two corps were to be moved to the railroad' crossing
at Rappahannock station, and threaten Lee with a front
attack. The other three corps were in the meantime to
be moved to Kelly's Ford, four miles below, passed over
there, and then, by a forced march over the Rapidan, seize
Gordonsville, in the rear of the Confederate army. When
the three corps were sufficiently advanced, the remaining
two were to move down to Kelly's Ford, and follow on and
join their companions at Gordonsville. By this movement,
Lee, with his little force of 50,000 men, would be perfectly
insulated, a force twice as numerous as his own being in his

344 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
rear, holding all his coraraunications, and separating him
hopelessly from all his supplies, while an iraportant river
would lie between him and the array in his rear. At the
same time, an army nearly as large as that under General
Meade would move out from Washington to attack the Con
federates from the north. Nothing was more feasible than
the plan proposed, and in its accomplishment the capture
of General Lee's army was inevitable. General Meade
adopted the plan, and ordered proraptly all the initiatory
movements. General Pleasanton crossed the Rappahan
nock as proposed, and drew an impenetrable veil between
General Lee and all that was going on in the direction of
both his wings. The two corps moved to the crossings in
their front, and the other three crossed at Kelly's Ford, as
proposed. This was just at evening, and an open road for
an unsuspected night march to Gordonsville was before our
commander, every item of the plan having thus far been
raost fully carried out. As soon as he had got his three
corps over the river, however, Meade's courage or his
patriotism failed him. He accordingly ordered a halt, and
during the whole night compelled one division of his
army to march as rapidly as possible back and forth over
the four-mile road between him and the two corps on the
river above him. The object of this strange measure seems
to have been to discover whether General Lee had become
aware of what was going on. Without finding the remotest
indication that such was the fact, our veteran comraander
turned from the course intended, and, moving up the
river, placed his three corps on its south, opposite the two
on its north side.
In conversation with General Pleasanton in respect to
the farce which our army had thus been compelled to
enact. General Meade admitted that he had no heart to
assault his antagonist, and proposed that General Pleasan
ton should assume the command, and order the move
ments he desired. To this General Pleasanton replied that
he had no authority to do any such thing ; nor would the
authorities at Washington confer any such power if requested
to do it. While remaining in this position, two corps, the
nth and 12th, were, as we have before stated, detached
from the Army of the Potomac, and sent, under General

OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 345
Hooker, to that of the Cumberland. The places of these
were soon supplied, and our commander addressed himself
to do something effective for the public service. While
making preparations to do this something, — nobody, and
probably not even Meade himself, knows what,; — he was
startled by a report brought to him by General Gregg, who
commanded a division of cavalry on our right, namely,
that that division had been driven back, and that the
enemy were now crossing in force at Sulphur Springs and
Waterloo. Frightened out of his senses by the spectre
which had thus suddenly lifted its horrid form before our
General's mind, he crossed his army over the river; and then
ran, for dear life, 80,000 to 100,000 rnen, before less than
50,000, — fled, we say, precipitately, first to Catlett's Station
and then to Centerville, — to Fairfax Court House, as the
Confederates affirm, — before he dared to look behind him,
or permitted his army or himself to take breath. General
Lee of course took advantage of this fright of our com
mander, and in the pursuit took several thousand prisoners
with very little loss to himself, and did much damage by
the destruction of Union property. There was nothing
that any General of even ordinary courage and capacity
would have desired more than that General Lee should
have passed his army to the north side of the Rappahan
nock at the very points where General Meade supposed
that the crossing was being rriade, such a movement giving
our commander an opportunity to cut off the whole Con
federate army from their communications and supplies, and
render its speedy capture a perfect certainty. To General
Meade, and to such Generals as he is, such an opportunity
by such a movement on the part of the enemy, was as the
sound of Gideon's trumpets to the hosts of Ammon, Such
Generals not only disgrace their country, but humaci nature
itself During Meade's flight and Lee's pursuit, some inci
dents of a truly laughable character occurred. When
General A. P. Hill, for example, with his corps, struck
our line of retreat, he, supposing himself in the rear of
our whole army, and being about to fall uj^on the fugi
tives before hira, perceived, as he looked behind, that
General Warren, with his entire corps, was also adv^anc-

346 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
ing, with an immutable determination not to be stopped in
his flight. After some severe skirmishing. Hill withdrew
from the road into the woods, and Warren continued his
retreat. Stuart, also, with a body of cavalry numbering
some 2,000 men, in making a flank movement, got ahead
of Warren, who was acting as our rear-guard, and became
so completely hemraed in, that his entire force might
have been captured, had our men been aware of the prize
within their grasp. Stuart succeeded in concealing his
cavalry in an old thicket — so near the road where our men
passed by, that every word they uttered was distinctly
heard by the enemy. While the rear of Warren's corps
was encamped for the night right by this thicket, Stuart
succeeded in getting three of his men through our ranks,
and thus conveying a knowledge of his condition to
General Lee. At daylight, the sound of Lee's guns indi
cated the approach of relief, when Stuart opened with
grape and canister upon our astonished rear, and threw it
into confusion. Taking advantage of the panic, he dashed
by and joined his commander, we suffering considerable
damage, while the Confederates suffered almost none
at all. As soon as our army faced about, at Centerville, or
Fairfax Court House, some twenty-five or thirty miles from
Washington, General Lee, destroying the railroads, and
leaving desolation behind him, delibei-ately and at his
leisure moved back over the Rappahannock. Ashamed
of what he had done, and under rebuke even from our
Commander-in-Chief, General Meade at length moved
back again to the point from which he had so shamefully
retreated, and recrossed the Rappahannock, having cap
tured on the north side of it some 1,600 prisoners, who
were cut off from the river by two of our brigades. After
waiting at Rappahannock station until his communications
were put in order, and he was assured that he was not
likely to be assailed by General Lee, our commander
ordered an advance. Crossing the Rapidan, and moving
in the direction of Orange Court House, on two parallel
roads. Orange Plank and the Orange Turnpike roads,
our forces found themselves at length confronted by the
army of General Lee, in a strong position behind a small

OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 3 17
Stream called Mine Run, a stream which crosses both the
roads referred to at right angles. After spending three
or four days in reconnoitring the enemy's position, and
thus giving him full opportunity to render it impregnable.
General Meade concluded that the position was too strong
to be assailed, retreated over the Rapidan, and entered
into winter quarters at Culpepper Court House, General
Lee retiring to Orange Court House, about twenty miles
nearly south of our position. Thus ended the mission of
the Army of the Potomac for the year 1863.
While our army lay at Culpepper, an event occurred
which ought to go into history. Among the officers of
the army who were called before the Committee of Con
gress on the Conduct of the War, was General Pleasanton.
"While before the Committee, he was requested to present
a plan for the conduct of the campaign in Virginia. To
such a request it was, of course, the plain duty of the
General to reply. The plan submitted was in substance
this, and was thus presented. "I will suppose," said Gene
ral Pleasanton, " that one of you represents General Lee,
and myself the commander of the Army of the Potomac,
you being located at Orange Court House, I at Culpepper.
I will assume, as the basis of my calculations, that yon
concentrate, for the defence of your position, 100,000
men. I select as my centre, and the basis of my opera
tions, Culpepper. I do this for the obvious reason that
it is a very important railroad centre, on the one hand,
and that holding this position, on the other, I, in connec
tion with the army in the Peninsula, hold the control of
Eastern, Central, and Northern Virginia, and cut you, as
General Lee, off from the main sources of supply for your
army. Having selected Culpepper as my centre, I pro
pose to concentrate there, an army 250,000 strong — to
fortify the place so that 25,000 men can hold it against
your whole army — to complete the necessary railroad con
nections with this point, and then make it the depot of
supply for my army. All these ends can be accomplished
in a few weeks, and when three months' provisions for the
army shall be collected, all things will be in readiness to
open the campaign. My first movement will be to flank
your position at Orange Court House, by sending out

348 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
150,000 men to the vicinity of Stanton, thus threatening
all your communications. Under such circumstances, you,
as General Lee, will be necessitated to take one of three
courses. You will, in the first place, move out from your
fortified position to attack me in the open country, — the end
which I desire to secure. In case of your making this
movement, I will move out 75,000 men from my position,
throwing this force upon your right wing, while I shall
precipitate 150,000 upon your centre and left. The result
cannot be a matter of doubt. In moving out from your
position, you will also be drawn off from your railroads,
your present means of supply, and will soon be necessi
tated to surrender from want of provisions, your means of
conveyance by waggons being very limited. Or you may
remain in your position, and wait coming events there :
in that case, I shall soon capture Linchburg, your main
line of supplies, and, moving east on the south of James
river, shall seize all your communications, cut you off
from your supplies in every direction, and compel you, by
starvation, to surrender. Or you may retreat upon Rich
mond, as you probably will do : in that case, I will move
up with my whole army, and in connection with the forces
in the Peninsula besiege you there with an army nearly
three times as numerous as your own. Your surrender
through starvation will be only a question of tirae. To
finish up the campaign in Virginia, with the total annihila
tion of General Lee's army, I ask, at the farthest, but six
months' time."
Such are the substance and form of presentation of the
plan submitted by General Pleasanton, — a plan perfectly
practicable, and most clearly evincing, on the part of its
author, great generalship. This plan embraced, as its
prime object, not the capture of Richmond, or any other
position, but the end for which the war was prosecuted,
the overthrow of the Confederacy by the destruction of its
central military force, the army of General Lee, — an end
never contemplated by any of our Commanders-in-Chief,
or, with one or two exceptions, by any of the coramanders
of our leading armies. Positions, not armies, were the
ends towards which all their combinations and movements
were directed. Had ^he armies of the Confederacy been

OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 349
the centres towards which all combinations and movements
of the national forces had been directed, one year would
have been all the time requisite to have put down for ever
that Rebellion. When we stated to President Lincoln that
the destruction of the armies of the Confederacy, and not
the capture of its territory, cities, and strongholds, should
be the end of all military operations, the suggestion startled
him as a new revelation to his mind. Such an idea, we
repeat, had never been entertained at Washington. We
refer to our military authorities. After General Pleasanton
had presented the above plan, measures were taken by
members of the Committee to whom it had been presented
to have him appointed a Major-General in the army, he
having long acted in that capacity, but never having
received his appointment. As soon as it became known
to the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of War
that he had presented that plan, some member of the
Committee betraying confidence, our brave General was
arbitrarily suspended from his command in the Army of
the Potomac, and sent to the Western Department. Of
General Pleasanton, justice demands that this should be
said : a braver, more energetic, and skilful commander
of cavalry was unknown in either army. In counsel he
always advised measures which subsequent events demons
strated to have been the wisest and the best. On the field
his dispositions were faultless, he there proving himself
more than a match for the best cavalry commander known
in the Confederate army. No single General can be
named to whom the nation owes more than to him, he
undeniably having, by one of the most wonderful feats
known, in war^ saved our army at Chancellorsville, and by
his wise counsels and dispositions secured for us the
victory of Gettysburg. It was an unpardonable offence,
however, in the judgment, not of our venerated President,
but of our Commander-in-Chief, and his immediate and
controlling advisers, to perform such deeds, give such
counsels, and even, when required to do it, to present
such plans as the above. He was not the only General
that was practically deposed for deeds and counsels which
promised to bring that war to a speedy termination.
Hooker, for example, was never permitted to have an

350 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
active command in the field after his wondrous exploits
at Chattanooga. This I know to have been the judgment
of the wisest statesmen in Washington, that the men who
actually controlled matters in the high places of military
authority there, had no desire — but an opposite one — to
bring that war to a speedy termination. The reason is
obvious. The emoluments of office were too great, and
the annual dispersion, in untried relations, of from
,^500,000,000 to ^1,000,000,000, presented too multiplied
opportunities to amass untold private fortunes, to allow
controlling minds to be willing that their opportunities
should pass away by the early termination of that war.
To show how everything was subordinated to private
emolument, take into consideration one single fact. By
a fixed order at Washington, whenever a cavalry horse
was killed, or disabled from any cause, its rider was to be
sent to Washington to be remounted there. No expostu
lations of the commander of the cavalry could induce a
change of this order, by having the horses sent forward
to the army, so that the ranks might not be perpetually
diminished by absentees at the capital. This order became
a controlling motive among cavalry- men to neglect their
horses, or so expose or use them that they should becorae
unfit for service, the riders by such means gaining coveted
opportunities for vacations, suspensions from active service,
and visits to the national capital. By this one measure, a
large amount paid for each horse and his new furnishment,
went into the pockets of speculators. Such facts coming
to the surface of observation, indicate the ocean current of
corruption and fraud which prevailed through that war,
and perpetuated it through those long years of wasteful
expenditure of treasure and blood.

CHAPTER XXV.
APPOINTMENT OF GENERAL ULYSSES GRANT
AS LIEUTENANT-GENERAL AND COMMANDER-
IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED
ST A TES.
The act of President Lincoln in appointing General
Halleck Commander-in-Chief of the Armies df the United
States, was, as we have stated, regarded with regret
and reprobation by the armies which he was appointed
to command, and by the people of all parties, without
exception. Nobody welcomed him to his high office, and,
like his predecessor, " he departed without being desired."
During the long period in which he held command, he
originated no plan for the conduct of our campaigns, and '
suggested no combination of forces — a combination which
promised to give efficiency to our arras for the suppression
of the Rebellion. While he uniformly had nearly, or quite,
1,000,000 brave and disciplined soldiers under his com
mand, — one of the largest armies ancient or modern war
fare ever, knew, — these immense forces were under his
immediate direction, so scattered and dispersed, and that
at unsupporting distances from one another, and located
where most of them were of no use whatever to the
national cause, that on the fields where our great battles
were fought, the Confederates, with their few and feeble
forces wisely concentrated, were in a majority of cases
successful ; and our forces were too few, or our commanders
too ignorant, when we gained a victory, to improve
it. During the period of his command, also, golden
opportunities, as we have shown, frequently presented
themselves, when, by a proper combination of the forces

352 THE AMERICAN REBELLION
under his command, he might have brought the war to an
immediate termination ; yet every such opportunity he
failed to discern and improve. Permit us here to notice
one such opportunity which lay directly under his vision
during the last months of his command. It was well
known in the Army of the Potomac, and in Washington,
that after the departure of Longstreet to Georgia, all the
available forces under General Lee's command for the
defence of Virginia amounted to less than 60,000 men,
while forces more than 200,000 strong lay under the
immediate control of our Commander-in-Chief, — forces
which might have been combined for the destruction of
that little army. Suppose, now, that Burnside's corps at
Annapolis had been reinforced by 20,000 men, and that
these had been sent down to Fortress Monroe, and united
with the 30,000 under command of General Butler in
that vicinity. An army at least 80,000 strong might have
been landed at Bermuda Hundred, and have taken
possession of all Lee's communications south of James
river, and have captured Richmond too, if he had not
moved to its rescue. Between the 80,000 under Butler,
and the 100,000 under Meade, how long could Lee have
kept the field ? None but demented minds can fall to
perceive that, under such circumstances, in a very few
weeks Lee's army, Richmond, Virginiar, and the Carolinas,
would have been in our possession. Our Commander-
in-Chief, however, had no capacity to perceive such an
opportunity, or to conceive the combination of forces
requisite to avail himself of it. Either this was the case,
or he lacked the patriotism which would prompt the
ordering of the combinations and movements demanded by
the circumstances. One or the other of these deductions
must be adopted.
In view of all the facts and experiences of the war thus
far, the conviction had become absolute among leading
members of Congress, that under the administration of
General Halleck and his immediate and controlling ad
visers, the prospect of bringing the terrible conflict to a
successful termination was most distant, if not hopeless.
At the same time they were assured with equal absolute
ness, that President Lincoln could not be induced, such

APPOINTMENT OF GENERAL GRANT. 353
was the influence of the Secretaries of State and of War
particularly on his mind, to supersede Halleck by appoint
ing any other Major-General in his place. Hence the
necessity, in their judgment, of adopting some measure
which would, under the pressure of national sentiment
openly expressed through Congress, impel the President
to make the change obviously demanded by existing
exigences. After mature deliberation, the following
measure to secure these results was adopted by over
whelming majorities in both Houses of Congress, namely,
" the revival of the grade of Lieutenant-General of our
armies, and the recommendation of Ulysses S. Grant for
the post." This measure received the prompt approval
of the President, and General Grant was appointed to
the supreme command, to which his new and high office
most obviously entitled him. These measures were con
summated on the 8th March, 1864. The most obvious
considerations render it undeniably evident that such a
measure can receive the approval of impartial history but
in view of the most imperious national necessity. No man
but General Washington had ever been honoured by such
an appointment. General Scott having only occupied the
post by brevet. All the known facts of General Grant's
life prior to the war revealed him as utterly disqualified to
command a great army, and especially of one numbering
more than 1,000,000 men. Nor can the impartial but
critical historian find anything in his military career
during this war, thus far, to justify his elevation to such
a pre-eminence. His first essay, after he held an inde
pendent command, his essay at Belmont, was undeniably
rash, — a measure in which much was lost, and vastly more
risked, and all with no prospect whatever of any important
advantage. At Donaldson he won deserved honour. At
Shiloh, as we have seen, his conduct was most inexcusably
censurable, not to say criminal. His campaign at Vicksburg,
as we have also seen, was, though a final and marked suc
cess, most awkwardly conducted and needlessly protracted.
All the measures which led to the relief of the Army of the
Cumberland at Chattanooga were in full operation when
he assumed command there, while the measures which he
then adopted were indications of military wisdom of a
2i

354 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
very low order. Yet no General who had held a high
command, had, as a matter of fact, gained such advantages
and captured so many prisoners as he had. One quality
he undeniably did possess — the will to act and the courage
to fight. He would, on assuming command, hold in his
hands a club of untold weight, and was sure to strike
somewhere, even though blindly. It remains for impartial
history to reveal the manner in which he " demeaned him
self in his high office."
The plan of the grand campaign under the direction of
General Grant.
On receiving notice of his appointment, he at once
repaired to Washington, and was, March 8th, formally in
vested with his office as Commander-in-Chief of the
armies of the United States. Paying a mere flying visit
to the Army of the Potoraac, he started back to Chatta
nooga to concert with General Sherman, who had been
invested with the command of the entire Western De
partment, the plan for the great campaign about to be
inaugiirated. According to the plan agreed upon, three
great movements were to be commenced at one and the
same time. The Array of the Potomac was to act against
General Lee for the capture of Richmond ; that of the
Cumberland was to move against General Johnston, who
had superseded General Bragg, for the capture of Atlanta;
and that of the Western Army, under Geneal Banks,
was to move into the heart of Texas, for the purpose of
ending the war in that quarter. The reason assigned for
the simultaneous movement of the Army of the Potomac
under the immediate command of General Grant, and of
that of the Cumberland under General Sherman, was to
prevent Lee reinforcing Johnston, and Johnston reinforcing
Lee. Let us stop here for a few moments, and consider
carefully the essential elements and characteristics of this
plan. Any well-informed military critic will at once detect
in it at least five fundaraental errors.
I. The plan itself involves a fundamental misappre
hension of the real issues of the war at the time. But
two issues then presented themselves, — the army of
General Lee on the one hand, and that of General John-

APPOINTMENT OF GENERAL GRANT. 355
Ston on the other. It was perfectly obvious that, these
armies being disposed of, the war was at an end every
where. There was no more occasion, in settling the actual
issues of the war, — and this was afterwards fully verified, —
there was no more occasion, we say, to send an army into
Texas than there was to send one to Alaska. All the
national forces should have been combined and concen
trated for the final settlement of the two issues above
designated. 2. This plan was also based upon a contingency which
did not exist, and was not at all likely to occur. In the
absence of Longstreet, who was separated at an un
supporting distance from both the Confederate armies.
General Lee had under his command less than 50,000
men, while the army under General Johnston very little, if
at all, exceeded that number. Where was the peril of
either of these Generals dividing his own forces to re
inforce the other, and that while each was confronted by
an army more than twice as strong as his own ? We can
hardly conceive a more obvious or essential blunder in
planning a campaign than we have before us.
3. This plan involved a delay in the movement of the
Army of the Cumberland of quite two months, a period
which General Johnston was certain to improve, and did
improve, to the \ittermost, to reinforce, and reorganize, and
his disorganized forces re-supply with guns, and to employ
his army, and all the able-bodied slaves of Georgia, in
fortifying every defensible position in those mountain
gorges between Chattanooga and Atlanta — ^gorges through
which Sherraan would be necessitated to force his uncouth
way. Nothing but the raost imperious necessities — and no
necessities at all existed in this case — could excuse such a
delay under such circumstances.
4. This delay, we remark again, kept this army in
demoralizing idleness during these two spring months, and
threw forward the campaign, in that unhealthy and pesti
lential region, into the hot summer months, the most
enfeebling and fatal period of the year for northern sol
diery, — months in which the least sickness, and very slight
wounds, as it was affirmed during that campaign, could
hardly result in anything but death, and did most com-

356 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
monly thus result. We feel quite safe in expressing the
opinion, that of the more than 50,000 men which were
lost during that summer march of 128 miles, the loss of
more than 30,000 should be put to the account of this
most imprudent delay in opening the campaign.
5. Finally, the known circumstances in which the
armies of Lee and Johnston were at the time, demanded
most imperiously the immediate and prompt opening of
the campaign on the part both of the Army of the Poto
mac and of that of the Cumberland. Before General
Sherman lay an almost unobstructed road to Atlanta, and a
defeated and demoralized army not half as numerous as
his own, — an army, too, which had just lost nearly or quite
one-half of its guns. While there was no prospect that,
during these two months, Sherman's army would be in
creased, from I a, 000 to 20,000 men were certain to be
added to that of Johnston. While it was certain that the
condition of Sherman's arrqy would in no respects, during
these months, be improved at all, that of Johnston was
certain to be brought from a disorganized to a well-
organized state. At the beginning of these months Sher
man, as we have said, had an open way before hira to
Atlanta. At their close, he was certain to find every
defensible position on his march bristling with the most
formidable fortifications. Nothing but the most perfect
blindness to the most palpable facts can account for this
two months' delay in opening the campaign in Georgia.
The case is still worse for General Grant in Virginia.
By a flank movement in the direction of Stanton he could
have placed an army of from 80,000 to 100,000 men
between Lee and Longstreet, and rendered it impossible
for them ever to reunite their forces. By sending Burn
side, reinforced by 10,000 or 20,000 men, down to Fortress
Monroe, an army not less than 70,000 strong could have
been landed at Bermuda Hundred, and the immediate
capture of Lee's army been rendered an absolute certainty.
In the circumstances in which Lee's army was at the time
when General Grant received his commission as Com
mander-in-Chief, a WelHngton, Napoleon, Moltke, or any,
military commander of ordinary capacity, would not have
asked for more -than two months' time to finish up fully the

APPOINTMENT OF GENERAL GRANT. 357
campaign in Virginia, and thus put a speedy end to the
war. When the armies of Wellington and Marmont lay
in the vicinity of one another in Spain, and each com
mander was waiting for the other to make some mistake,
Marmont made a movement by which one of his wings
was separated to a considerable distance from the rest of
his army. The moment Wellington was informed of the
fact, he exclaimed, " Marmont is ruined," and by In
stantly precipitating the English army upon that wing,
Marmont was ruined. Had a General of one- fourth of
Wellington's ability received Grant's commission, he
would never have gone to Chattanooga to lay out a plan
for the general campaign. Within twenty-four hours after
receiving his commission, his orders would have been
issued for the movement of our armies to secure the most
decisive advantages then most palpably existing. This 1
have affirmed before the nation, and this I here repeat
before my country and the world, and do so without fear
of being contradicted by any candid reader of common
sense, and especially by any competent judge of military
matters, — that in the interval between the, reception of his
commission and the opening of his campaigns. General
Grant ought to have totally finished up the campaign in
Virginia, and thus practically ended the war: that what the
nation is really indebted to him for, is a needless protrac
tion of the war for more than a year after the period in
which it might have been ended — a needless loss of more
than 150,000 brave men — and a needless increase of the
national debt to the amount of from ^500,000,000 to
j^ 1, 000,000,000.
Comparative amount of the Union and Confederate forces
at this time.
There is still another aspect of this subject which must
be fully taken into account, before we can form an ade
quately correct judgment of the campaigns in prospect.
"We refer to the relative amount of forces in the Union
and Confederate armies at the time. According to
the official report of the Secretary of War, the report
submitted to Congress the ist of December, 1862, the
Union army, according to the report of the Adjutant-

358 TJlE AMERICAN REBELLION.
General, submitted some months previous, "amounted to
750,000 men, well armed and equipped," a force which, as
the same report affirms, would, during the month of
January of the following year, be increased to quite
1,000,000 men. This immense force was diminished,
during the year 1863, through losses in battle, and the
expiration of terms of enlistment, by more than 200,000
men. These vacancies, however, were more than sup
plied by the addition of upwards of 50,000 conscripts,
83,242 recruits by voluntary enlistment, and upwards of
50,000 coloured troops, — a force which was increased to
quite 180,000 while General Grant held supreme com
mand. Of the veterans whose term of service expired in
the fall of the year 1863, according to the official state
ment of the Provost-Marshal-General, " over 136,000
tried solders, who would otherwise, ere this, have been dis
charged, were secured for three years longer." The army
subject to General Grant's orders, at the time when he
assumed supreme command, was quite equal in number
to that which existed one year previous, and amounted
to an effective force of quite 800,000 men. On the
ist February, 1864, the President, under a special law
of Congress, issued a call for a draft of 500,000 men;
on the 14th of the next month, he Issued another similar
call for 200,000 men; on July i8th, 500,000, and on
December 20th, 300,000 were called for ; making in all a
draft of 1,500,000 men during this year. In the spring
and summer of this year, a temporary addition was also
made to our armies of 100,000 men, furnished by the
several States by voluntary enlistment for one hundred
days. When we affirm, therefore, that during his
supreme command General Grant had constantly under
his control an effective force of quite 800,000 men, we are
undeniably within the circle of truth. At the time when
McClellan was superseded by Blirnside, the Army of the
Potomac, as we have seen, numbered upwards of 300,000
men, and that exclusive of the large force under General
Butler in the vicinity of Fortress Monroe, and the forces
under General Dix at Baltimore, and in the Middle
Department. At the tirae when. May 5th, General Grant
opened the campaign from Culpepper, this army was in

APPOINTMENT OF GENERAL GRANT. 359
all respects much superior to what it ever was under
General McClellan.
Since the above was written, we have found in the
volumes recently published by General Sherman, not only
a verification of the statements which we have made
relatively to the amount of force under the command of
General Grant, but full proof that our estimate Is far
within the circle of truth. General Sherman states that
the forces under his command numbered about 340,000
men, and that of these upwards of 180,000 were present
and fit for duty. It is well known that the Army of the
Potomac outnumbered that of the Cumberland by up
wards of 50,000 men. That this was the case, we have
been assured by a General who held a high command
in the former army up to a few weeks of the time when
General Grant was appointed Coraraander-in - Chief From
the time when General Grant assumed command up to
the close of the war, our armies undeniably numbered
upwards of 1,000,000 of men.
How numerous were the armies of the Confederacy
during this period ? According to official and reliable
historic statement, these armies in the field, in all the
Confederate States, did not amount in all to 200,000 men.
General Lee was never able to confront General
Grant's immense forces with an army over 70,000 strong;
while all the forces which the Confederate States could
furnish General Johnston, against General Sherman,
amounted to less than 60,000 men. The Union army,
during the entire period under consideration, undeniably
outnumbered that of the enemy as quite four or five to
one. Yet the war, under these unheard-of circumstances,
dragged its slow length along for upwards of one year, and
would, as our Commander-in-Chief expected, have been
protracted during the year 1865, and even longer still,
had not the execution of the plan which he had definitely
laid down, and was putting into execution, been, by in
fluences outside the army, fundamentally changed.

CHAPTER XXVI.
CAMPAIGN OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC
UNDER GENERAL GRANT.
On the 4th May, 1864, the Army of the Potoraac moved
out from Culpepper, and that of the Cumberland from
Chattanooga, on their respective campaigns ; while, about
the same time, General Banks moved upon his unfortunate
expedition up the Red river.
The original plan of the campaign of the Army of the Potomac.
The original plan of the campaign for the army first
designated was the following. The corps of General Burn
side, about 40,000 strong, was to be conveyed by water
from Anapolis to Fortress Monroe, and incorporated with
that of General Butler, an army quite 60,000 strong being
thus organized in that vicinity. "When Grant should raove
out from Culpepper, Butler, with his array of 60,000 men,
was to land at Bermuda Hundred and seize Petersburg, on
the one hand, and all Lee's communications south of James
river, and Richmond if possible, on the other.
This plan, it will be at once perceived, is an exact copy
of the one we laid before the President and other leading
minds in Washington, in January, 1863, — a plan fully
approved at the time by the corps commanders of the
Army of the Potomac, and, as we have been informed, by
General Butler, who had then returned from New Orleans.
It was General Butler, as we have also been informed, who
submitted the plan to General Grant and secured its adop
tion by him. Had the plan, as originally projected, been
carried out, and especially with the addition of 10,000 or
20,000 raen, brought up from the Carolinas and sent down
from Washington, which could have been done as well as

CAMPAIGN UNDER GENERAL GRANT. 36 1
not, it would have been, most obviously, the grand move
ment of the war, and would soon have ended the Eastern
Campaign, by the capture of Lee's army, of Richmond,
and the ready conquest of Virginia and the Carolinas.
Just before he was ready to move, however. Grant ordered
Burnside to move from Anapolis to the vicinity of Cul
pepper, and at the same time issued an absolute order to
Butler to land with 20,000 men at Bermuda Hundred, and
accomplish, or attempt the accomplishment of, the great
flank movement above Indicated. General Butler did move
as commanded, and seized the railroad between Petersburg
and Richmond, and in his despatches affirmed himself
able to hold the advantage he had gained. The nation
received the intelligence with ecstatic joy, and inferred
from it the great success of the campaign which was being
inaugurated. We openly spake of the movement with
deep regret and reprobation. Our views were soon the
topic of general remark in the community, and the late
Judge Barbour called upon us, and thus remarked : " Dr.
Mahan, the Republicans are saying very hard things of
you, and I have called to advise you to be cautious about
what you may say. We know very well that ever*since
the war began you have advocated the identical move
ment which General Butler has made, and now, when it
has been successfully made, you speak of it with reproba
tion. Such inconsistencies appear mysterious and inex
cusable to us, and I would seriously advise you to restrain
further remarks upon the subject." " Please say to the
Republicans and Democrats too. Judge Barbour," we
replied, " that Dr. Mahan will continue to utter what he
thinks on this and other subjects. It is true, as you state,
that I have advocated such a movement, and that to secure
such a movement was a known object of my visit to Wash
ington in the winter of 1862-3. While I have thus advo
cated this movement, I have, as you and the Republicans
and Democrats around you well know, ever maintained
that this movement should not be made with an army less
than from 70,000 to 100,000 strong. Now that it has been
made with 20,000 men, I pronounce it a ridiculous and
tragic farce. Please say to our Republican and Demo
cratic friends, that Dr. Mahan affirms that General Butler

362 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
will be driven back with loss the very first blow he shall
receive, and that that blow will fall within two or three
days. Say to them, further, that Dr. Mahan expresses the
sad belief that, in ordering this absurd and tragic farce.
General Grant has revealed an utter incapacity to lead a
great army in a campaign of vital importance such as this
is, and that the campaign which he has inaugurated will be
a disastrous one." " But General Butler says that he can
hold his present position." " I know that he says so„ I
tell you, however, that he can't do it, and that events will
issue as I have foreshadowed them." We all know now
that the blow did fall, and that General Butler was driven
back as predicted, and was " bottled up at Bermuda Hun
dred." For the credit of General Butler, it should be said
that, prior to this event, he made the atterapt, with a force
20,000 strong, to capture Richmond by surprise, and was
only prevented doing so by a culprit who, by bribery,
escaped from prison, and gave the Confederates timely
notice of the impending peril. In this expedition our
commander marched his infantry the astonishing distance
of 80 miles in fifty-six hours, and moved his cavalry 150
miles in fifty hours. A plan proposed.
When we learned that Burnside was ordered to Cul
pepper, instead of being sent to Fortress Monroe, we
forwarded to Washington the following plan for the con
duct of the campaign, — a plan which was laid before the
President and his advisers, — namely, nothing should be
done within the circle of Butler's command. He, with his
forces, on the other hand, should be brought up to the
Department of Washington, and there united with the
corps of Burnside. With 10,000 to 20,000 men added to
this body, a second army should be constituted and secretly
located at the crossings over the Rappahannock above
Fredericksburg. When all things should be in readiness,
this army, under General Butler, for example, should cross
the river, and by a rapid march through Chancellorsville
and Spottsylvania, move directly upon Richmond, — General
Grant, with his army, in the meantime, moving directly
upon Lee's position at Orange Court House. In this double

CAMPAIGN UNDER, GENERAL GRANT. 363
movement, the contiguous wings of our two armies should
be kept in continuous communication with one another, so
that, in an exigency, either army could go to the other's
help. Under such circumstances. General Lee would be
necessitated to adopt one or the other of the following
courses. He might remain where he was, and await there
the approach of General Grant. In that case, Butler
would capture Richmond and seize all Lee's communica
tions south of James river. Being thus cut off from its
supplies, the capture of the Confederate army would be
only a question of time. Or, General Lee might move out
to attack Butler. In that case, in the open country, Lee
would encounter an army as large as his own, while Grant,
with a still larger force, would fall upon the Confederate
army and crush it. In the next place, Lee might retreat
to Richmond. In that case, he would soon find himselt
surrounded with a circle of fire, through which it would be
impossible for hira to break, and, by starvation, he would
soon be forced to surrender. Or, finally, Lee might at
tempt a retreat Into the Carolinas. In that case, while
hard pressed by our forces, he would be thrown from his
railroad communications, cut off from his supplies, and
from want of provisions be necessitated to disperse or sur
render his army. It is perfectly obvious, that had this, or
the plan previously suggested by General Pleasanton, been
adopted, the destruction of General Lee's army would have
been accomplished in a short time, and at a very small
expense of human life. All the known principles of military
science, and all the examples of successful warfare, required
that Grant should have made Lee's position at Orange Court
House his objective point, or centre, and that he should
have approached that position in connection with a great
flank movement upon Lee's right or left wing, and it
mattered little which.
The campaigti as actually conducted.
It now remains to consider how a campaign inaugurated
by a false and tragico-farcical movement south of James
river, in the first instance, and directed towards a totally
wrong centre, in the next, was conducted by our Com
mander-in-Chief

364 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
Moving out from Culpepper, advancing on a single
line, and making Richmond his objective point. General
Grant was necessitated to cross the Rapidan, and pass
through a region of country known as the Wilderness, 'an
almost totally uninhabited region, from which the timber
had often been cut off for mining purposes, and had con
sequently become a densely overgrown thicket. This
Wilderness, which Is situated directly east of General Lee's
position at Orang^e Court House, extends south from the
river named to the vicinity of Spottsylvania Court House,
and is crossed, among others, by two excellent highroads
which branch off from the village where the Confederate
army lay, and tonsequently furnished its ever-vigilant
commander the best , possible opportunity to assail and
strike through ours when on its line of march. It was
over this river, and through this Wilderness, and in the
form stated, that General Grarit made his advance upon
Richmond. What, judging it from the military stand
point, shall we think of that advance ? It was made,
permit us to say, in the first place, upon one of the most
perilous and universally condemned and reprobated prin
ciples known to the science of war. We refer to a lateral
movement, on a single line, directly in front of the position
occupied by a powerful and ever-vigilant foe. It was
just such a movement, on the part of the forces of the
Coalition, that gave Buonaparte his world- renowned vic
tory at Austerlitz, and Wellington his great victory over
Marmont In Spain. This lateral movement of General
Grant was made, we add, in the most perilous circum
stances conceivable. No spot in the wide world can
be selected where such a movement would give greater
advantages to the enemy than General Grant's movement
through that Wilderness presented to General Lee, The
roads diverging from Lee's position, and cutting our line
at different points, gave him the best possible facilities to
advance his army upon that line, while the Wilderness
itself gave him the best possible opportunities to conceal
his movements, and to deliver his blows at the very times
and places when and where the effects would be most fatal
to our army. Nor is it possible to conceive of such a bad
movement made In a more careless and stupidly presump-

CAMPAIGN UNDER GENERAL GRANT. 365
tuous manner than was this of General Grant. It cannot
be shown, while he was moving on the worst principle, and
in the most perilous circumstances conceivable, that he
took any proper caution at all to guard his extended line
against .surprise. On the other hand, he moved on, into and
through that Wilderness, almost exclusively, as he would
have done had he known that no enemy whatever existed
to disturb his march. No wonder that Lee's attack was
a surprise, and that it cost us the horrible loss of between
20,000 and 30,000 brave men. A commander of common
intelligence and prudence, if he had resolved on such a
movement, would have stopped a division at each of the
roads referred to : the first that touched them, would have
deployed those divisions in battle array, sent out his
pickets in the direction of the enemy, rendering a surprise
impossible, and then led the rest of his forces in the rear of
those divisions. Our army, however, moved blindly on,
as if their commander had lost his reason, or never had
any. Let us now consider the facts of the case.
Having reduced his army, Burnside's corps excepted,
from five to three corps, General Hancock being put in com
mand of the 2nd, General Warren of the 5th, and General
Sedgwick of the 6th, the grand movement commenced May
4th. Warren, followed by Sedgwick, crossed the Rapidan at
Germania Ford, and pushed on in a serpentine course into
the Wilderness. Hancock, crossing at Ely's Ford, several
miles below, moved in the direction of Chancellorsville.
The first day our advance was almost wholly, as General
Lee intended it should be, unimpeded, the Confederate
pickets falling back without hardly firing a gun. As soon
as our line was well extended into the Wilderness, a region
unknown to our commanders, but well known and carefully
studied by the enemy, the Confederate army, which had
been looking northward in the direction of our position
at Culpepper, faced to the right, moved up on the roads
above referred to, and formed their line of battle parallel
to that of our carelessly moving columns. The Confede
rate line was formed in most propitious circumstances,
very strong defences lying at Mine Run, some six miles
east of their position, — defences to which they could safely
retreat in case of defeat. This army, like ours, was divided

366 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
into three corps, commanded respectively by Generals
A. P. Hill, Longstreet, and Ewell. What saved our army
from a total rout was the fact that Longstreet's corps,
lately arrived from Tennessee, was stationed at Charlottes
ville, two marches distant from Orange Court House, and
only came up in time to take part in the battle of the
second day. The Confederate line was directly parallel
to that on which Warren's and Sedgwick's corps were
moving, — that of Hancock, who moved on another road,
being miles distarit, and quite in advance of Warren's most
advanced division. The arrangement of the Confederate
line brought Hill, who was on their right, in conflict, June
5th, with Warren, while Ewell, with his corps, struck
Sedgwick. As Warren was moving unsuspiciously along,
Hill suddenly drove in the 5 th New York Cavalry with
loss, and struck our advancing column heavily in front
before our array was in position to make or receive an
attack. The shock was irresistible, of course, and one
brigade after another was driven back with great slaughter.
About 3 p.m., Hancock, who had received orders to close
up on Warren's left,- was seen approaching. Hill, who
had closed round Warren's left flank, threw a strong force
between our two corps, which were endeavouring to form
a junction. This brought on a most terrible conflict,
in which our columns were saved by the mo.st obstinate
fighting from being utterly routed. A little after i p.m.,
Ewell opened upon Sedgwick. In the early part of the
conflict, only a small part of Ewell's corps having come
up, the advantage was on our side, and the enemy were
compelled to give ground. At length, the Confederates
having come up in force, our line was charged and driven
back with loss, we not 'only losing heavily in killed and
wounded, but also about 1,000 prisoners, having in our
prior advance captured about 300. Thus the battle ended
for the first day, our loss being exceedingly heavy as
corapared with that of the eneray.
The morning of the next day, June 6th, the battle
opened early, Longstreet having come up on the part of
the Confederates, and taken position between Hill and
Ewell ; while Burnside, by a forced march during the
night, had arrived on our side, his corps being thrown in

CAMPAIGN UNDER GENERAL GRANT. 367
between Sedgwick and Warren. The intention of Grant
was to have opened the battle by an advance on our
side, Sedgwick being ordered to advance at 5 a.m. This
advance was anticipated, however, by an attack from
Ewell, he attempting to turn our right flank. This
attack, which was twice repeated during the forenoon,
was only a feint to mask the real assault which was to
be precipitated upon Hancock. At 5 a.m. Hancock
moved forward and pressed Hill back nearly two miles,
capturing a large number of prisoners. Here our ad
vancing line was struck by Longstreet's veterans, who
had just come up, and our whole front was thrown into
confusion, and was saved from a complete rout by the
aid of Burnside's men. Longstreet, in turn, was driven
back, and himself was disabled by a severe wound. The
enemy now massed upon Warren, and drove him back to
his entrenched line. Still farther to the right, the lamented
General James S. Wadsworth fell in an endeavour, by his
division, to stem the tide of death that was rolling over
our devoted ranks. During a short lull, our centre was
strengthened by throwing Burnside's corps between those
of Hancock and Warren. While this was being done.
General Lee assuming direct command, after the fall of
Longstreet, of Hill's and Longstreet's corps, fell with
crushing weight upon our left and left centre, forcing
them back, and striking so heavily upon Stevens's division
of Burnside's corps, that it fled in disorder, and the
Confederates rushed through our broken line. Carroll's
brigade of Hancock's corps now assaulted the enemy In
flank, and they in their turn were driven back. This
ended the conflict on our left and centre.
After our coramanders supposed that the battle was
over for the day, the Confederates suddenly massed upon
Sedgwick, routing two of his brigades, and taking and,
leading off about 4,000 prisoners, including the commander
of one of thera. General Seymour. For a time it seemed
that our whole right wing, and with it our army itself, was
likely to be routed, and this might have been the case, had
not darkness put an end to the conflict.
What added inconceivable horror to the scene on that
field of blood, was the fact that while the wounded and

368 THE AMERICAN REBELLION
dead of both armies, lay, like autumn leaves, scattered all
through the Wilderness, the dry rubbish there at length
took fire, and added suffocation and burning to the agony
which those wounded sufferers were already enduring.
War itself can hardly furnish a parallel to the spectacle
then and there presented.
In this battle. General Lee carried out to perfection
his favourite and peculiar method of attack, massing his
columns first upon one part of our line and then upon
another, finding a weak point in this line and breaking
through that, and, finally, suddenly rushing through any
opening which might be discovered between any of our
divisions or corps, and rolling up our line in both directions.
Never was a battle fought on a field which afforded the
assaulting parties better facilities for practising this system
of tactics, than did this Wilderness, in which our army was
so helplessly shut in, all of Lee's movements being concealed
from our commanders, while his command of our entire front,
together with our ignorance and his full knowledge of the
grounds themselves, enabled him to strike when and where
and in what form he pleased, and to render all his assaults
a surprise. The Battle of the Wilderness was to our army,
undeniably, Shiloh repeated, with this difference, that the
former was a surprise from beginning to end. A recon
noissance the next day discovered that Lee, having en
trenched his whole front, awaited our attack, without showing
any disposition to take the offensive himself In this state
the day was spent. In the evening a council of war was
held at the head-quarters of our Commander-in-Chief It
is affirmed by those who profess to know, that, in the judg
ment of most of the corps commanders present, our army
had suffered such a defeat as rendered a retreat necessary.
In the council nothing positive was determined on, at least
avowedly so, and each General left carrying in his hand
an order, not for a retreat, but for an advance out of the
Wilderness in the direction of Spottsylvania Court House.
Our loss in this terrible battle could not have been
much, if any, less than 25,000 men. General Meade admit
ting a loss of quite 20,000, exclusive of the losses in Burn
side's corps, which could not have been much less than
5,000. The Confederates admit a loss of 7,000, which is

CAMPAIGN UNDER GENERAL GRANT. 369
probably riot far from the truth. We have great occa
sion for thankfulness that a campaign conducted upon
such a false principle, and in such a recklessly careless and
presumptuous manner, cost us no heavier disaster. Of
Grant's plan of the campaign, and especially of the march
through the Wilderness, we may safely challenge every
military critic on earth to designate a single feature or
circumstance demanding commendation, a single feature
or circumstance that was not in flagrant and presumptuous
and most stupid violation of all the known and universally
acknowledged principles of strategy. As thus far developed
and conducted, this is about the only campaign known in
history of which something cannot be said in its justifi
cation, but must, in strict justice, be pronounced totally
wrong, and most flagrantly so, in every solitary particular.
Impartial history has but one single apology to make for the
horrid slaughter of those thousands of brave men — the blank
ignorance and stupidity of our Commander-in-Chief.
In the movement out of the Wilderness, Warren took
the lead," commencing his march at g p.m., a body of
cavalry moving in advance. On his way, his march was
impeded by obstructions of the road, and a cavalry fight.
As he emerged from the Wilderness at a place called
Alsop's Farm, he found hims elf anticipated by Longstreet,
who had drawn up his line behind the small river Ny, and
had placed his guns upon a ridge so as to sweep our
columns as they passed After a mutual cannonade,
Warren advanced Robinson's division to the assault. Our
forces being outnumbered, Robinson was driven back, and
was himself severely wounded. Later in the day. May 8th,
a portion of the 6th corps having come up, the assault was
resumed with success, and the advance was renewed.
The Battle at Spottsylvania Court House.
The next day our army emerged from the Wilderness,
and drew up its lines in front of Spottsylvania Court
House, the Confederate fortifications then being occupied
by Generals Hill and Ewell, General Lee moving upon the
cord, while our army moved upon the circle, of an arc, he
having anticipated our advance. At our first formation,
Hancock took position on our right, Warren in the centre.

370 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
and Sedgwick on the left. While in the act of placing
his guns, Sedgwick was struck in the face by the bullet of
a sharpshooter, and instantly fell dead; General H. G.
Wright succeeding him in the command of the 6th corps.
We should bear in mind here, that our army drew up in
front of formidable batteries which had all been prepared
beforehand and sodded for preservation. When Burnside
came into position on our left, two divisions, Barlow's and
Gibbon's, — our batteries having previously opened fire, —
charged upon the rifle-pits in front of the 2nd and 5th
corps. This brought on a general engagement, in which
various attempts were made to dislodge the enemy, but
with no decisive success anywhere. Our loss in the battle
of this day, May gth, was severe, — that of the enemy in his
rifle-pits, and behind his batteries, being, of course, com
paratively small.
The following despatch from General Grant to the War
Department is explicable but upon the hypothesis that he
was ignorant of the facts of the case, or paid no respect to
them : —
" Head-quarters in the Field,
May wth, 1867, 8 a.m.
" We have now ended the sixth day of very hea-vy
fighting. The result, to this time, is very much in our
favour. Our losses have been heavy, as well as those of
the enemy. I think the loss of the enemy must have been
greater. " We have taken over 5,000 prisoners by battle, whilst
he has taken from us but few except stragglers.
" I propose to fight it out on this line, if it takes all
summer. " U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General
Commanding the Armies of the United States."
Near the close of the battle of the second day in the
Wilderness, the enemy captured, at one time, about 4,000
prisoners, — all our missing during the battle being about
7,000, as officially reported. Had the loss of the enemy
been " ranch greater " than ours, as General Grant affirras
it "raust have been," General Lee would, in fact, have been

CAMPAIGN UNDER GENERAL GRANT. 371
without an army of any account. He had at this time, as
we shall see, an army sufficiently strong to defeat General
Grant at this place, at North Anna, at Cold Harbour, at
Petersburg, "Weldon Railroad, and other places, and hold
him stationary at Petersburg until the spring of 1865.
About the line to which he refers in his famous utterance,
the historical critic may properly ask whether our Com
mander-in-Chief, in that utterance, referred to the line
which he did pursue, namely, the outer line of an arc
extending round from Culpepper to Petersburg. If this
is the line referred to, the utterance is to the perpetual
discredit of its author. If the line referred to is the direct
one from Culpepper to Richraond, then General Grant
fought but a single battle, his first, on that line. The
prudence of giving forth such an utterance at all may
well be questioned, as it could not have been concealed
' from the enemy, and revealed to hira the fixed plan of
our commander.
May I Ith was spent in preparation for the great battle
which was to be fought the next day. At midnight, Han
cock moved from our extreme right and took post between
Burnside on our left, and Sedgwick's corps, now com
manded by Wright, Warren occupying our right opposite
to Hill, who occupied the extreme left of the enemy's line,
Ewell being in their centre, and Longstreet occupying their
extreme right. The Confederate line conformed to two
sides of a triangle, the centre and point of which, con
sisting of a mass of earthworks, which were occupied by a
portion of Ewell's corps, the division of General Johnson.
Under cover of a dense fog, which had succeeded the
heavy rain of the previous afternoon, Hancock the next
morning moved, in two lines, four divisions of his corps.
Barlow's and Birney's, and Gibbon's and Mott's, directly
upon the salient angle of earthworks referred to. The
enemy, as we were in the Wilderness, was taken by sur
prise. The two front divisions, those of Barlow and
Birney, rushed over those works, and captured Johnson,
and Brigadier- General G, H, Stewart, with about 3,000
prisoners, and thirty guns, — Lee himself barely escaping
being taken prisoner. This signal advantage induced a
simultaneous advance of our entire line. At all points.

372 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
the dreadful charges made were unsuccessful, and Han
cock, though strongly reinforced, was unable to advance,
as was hoped, beyond the position he had gained. After
repelling five desperate charges which Lee made to recover
his lost ground, Hancock retired, getting off but twenty
of the guns he had captured, — after Lee had ceased
his attacks, and had fortified and held a line in front of
the position he had lost.
From May 12th to May i8th was spent in endeavours
to find some weak point in the enemy's line; but all to no
purpose. On this day, four divisions, as at the first, — to
wit, Gibbon's and Barlow's, supported by those of Birney
and Tyler, — were pushed upon the Confederate defences
near those where Hancock's attack had been made. The
assault was, of course, repulsed with hea-yy loss. On the
afternoon of the next day. General Lee, under the impres
sion that our army was retiring in the direction of its
left flank, made an assault upon our right, now weakened
by the movement referred to. This attack, by the aid of
the 2nd' and 5th corps, was repulsed, and the next night,
May 20-21, our army resumed its raarch.
Our losses up to this time, on this fatal march,
amounted, according to General Meade's official report,
to 39,7gi men. This does not include the losses of Bum-
side In the Battle of the Wilderness, nor those of General
. Butler at and near Bermuda Hundred, nor the losses of
our cavalry in their various raids. Putting all these
¦together, they constituting parts of one campaign, and our
losses during the fourteen days from May'6th, when the
Battle of the Wilderness commenced, to May 20th, when
that at Spottsylvania Court House ended, amounted to
somewhat more than 50,000 men. From the circum
stances in which these battles were fought, and from the
known strength of Lee's army after this period, as well as
from the Confederate reports, we are bound to conclude
that the losses of the enemy did not amount to much, if
any, more than one-fifth of ours.
Sheridan' s Raid.
As our army emerged from the Wilderness, what we
have referred to as a peculiarity of this war, the main part

CAMPAIGN UNDER GENERAL GRANT. 373
of our cavalry was sent off, under General Sheridan, on
a raid in the direction of Richmond, — a raid in which con
siderable damage was done to railroads, bridges, and
depots ; and in a fight with Stuart and his cavalry, this
famous cavalry commander and General Gordon were
mortally wounded, the Confederate cavalry driven off,
and the road to Richmond left open. We were assured
by a Confederate officer who was in the city at the time,
that it was defenceless, and might have been captured,
had Sheridan assaulted it with the entire force under his
command. Custer, with a single division, made an assault
upon the outer defences, captured a hundred prisoners, and
was then repulsed. Sheridan, however, with his corps
united, crossed the Chickahominy, and moving up by the
White House, rejoined our army.
Movement to North Anna.
The next movement of our army, by its left flank, was
by a circuitous and difficult detour eastward, around to the
point where the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad
crosses the North Anna River. To this point, our move
ment being readily discoverable from the high position
held by General Lee, the Confederate army was, by the
direct and excellent road from Spottsylvania to that point,
moved at easy marches. When our army arrived at its
objective point, it found its old and terrible antagonist
in an admirable position on the south side of the river,
and there fully prepared to question our right to move
another step in that direction towards the Confederate
capital. In his attempt to advance, upon the enemy's
position, General Grant soon got our army into as
complete and ridiculous a limbo as can be imagined. As
the river approaches the Confederate position, it deflects
from its eastern to a south-eastern direction. After
running in this direction for about a mile, it turns to the
north-east, and, running in this direction about a mile and a
half, turns again in a south-eastern direction. The river
thus forms curves like two oxbows, with the corners of
each widely extended, — the point of the first nearly touch
ing the Confederate centre, the south side of the penin
sula formed by the other being covered by their right

374 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
wing. His left wing was formed on a road running a
little west of south. At this time, also, Lee was rein
forced by the corps of Breckinridge, who had defeated Sigel
in the valley of the Shenandoah. In his endeavour to get
within striking distance of his antagonist. Grant passed
Warren's and Wright's corps, and a division of Burnside's,
over the river in front of the Confederate left, while the
remainder of Burnside's corps and the right of that of
Hancock were located within the oxbow first described,
and in front of the Confederate centre. The remainder of
Hancock's corps was formed over the river, and within
the other oxbow, and in front of the Confederate right
wing. Thus our army was divided into three parts,
separated from each other by the river, and so separated
that neither could help the other in case of a disaster.
The Confederate army, on the other hand, was not only in
a strong and fortified position, but was so situated that it
could, in its entireness, act as a unity, and concentrate
upon either of our wings as it chose. The river, which
cut and separated our army into three parts, it should be
borne in mind, is fordable only at different points, and
barely fordable at these, while its banks are high and rocky.
The formation of General Lee's army very much re
sembled ours at Gettysburg, the wings being thrown back,
the right being protected from being flanked by marshes,
and the left by Little river, while in the centre all advance
on the part of Burnside was barred most effectually by the
river with its rapid current and steep banks. The nature
of the ground, also, presented the greatest facilities for
mutual support, and concurrent action on the part of every
portion of Lee's army with every other. The position of our
army, when the intended crossings were made, and that
with very little loss, — resembled that of General Lee at the
same place, with this difference, that the parts Into which
our army was divided could not support one another, and
in case of disaster on the part of either wing, a retreat
was impossible. When our line was formed, and Burnside
attempted a crossing in his front, the attempt was repelled
with heavy loss ; and when Warren sent a division down
the south side of the river, that division was at once
assailed with crushing force, and with much difficulty

CAMPAIGN UNDER GENERAL GRANT. 375
saved from being wholly annihilated or captured. The
limbo into which our army had been so stupidly and
presumptuously led, became at length so palpable as to
command the regard of even our Commander-in-Chief.
On the evening of May 26th a retreat was accordingly
ordered, and by the next morning our army was in safety
on the north side of the river. In this affair our loss is
reported as amounting in all to 1,607 men.
Movement to Cold Harbour, and battle at that place.
Falling back to some distance. General Grant moved
a considerable march to the east, and then faced south
again. In the progress of this march, our army crossed the
Pamunkey river, and came upon or approached the ground
occupied by the portion of McClellan's army which lay
north of the Chickahominy two years previous. There, in
front of a village called Cold Harbour, General Grant
found himself confronted by General Lee, in a strong and
fortified position, about a mile north of another small
place called New Cold Harbgur, and of another place
called Gaine's Mill, where the battle which goes by that
name was fought before McClellan's retreat to Harrison's
Landing. Our line, now strengthened by 10,000 men sent round
from General Butler, was thus constituted : Hancock
was on the left; Wright first, and then Smith — from
Butler's command — in the centre; next Warren, with Burn
side on his right and rear. In gaining this position, an
attempt was made on our left to force our way across the
Chickahominy. This attempt, which brought on a severe
coriflict, failed with the loss of quite 2,000 men on our
side, we capturing from the enemy about 600 prisoners.
Nothing, in the judgment of General Grant, remained but a
simultaneous advance of our whole line directly upon that
of the enemy, we moving up in open and helpless exposure
upon rifle-pits and breastworks behind which the Confede
rates, in quiet and conscious security, waited our presump
tuous approach. When General Rawlins, Grant's chief of
staff, saw the advance, he cried out in blasphemous horror
at the spectacle. At about sunrise the advance was made,
naked infantry helplessly exposed, in circumstances where
1

376 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
nothing but ineffable stupidity could expect success,-^
helplessly exposed, to be slaughtered by every engine of
destruction which military science has invented. The
result could not have been otherwise than it was. Nowhere
was a permanent advantage gained. Everywhere, on the
other hand, our ranks, as they came within range of the
enemy's fire, were swept away by a desolating tempest
of death missiles. In twenty minutes after the first shot
was fired, our columns were seen flying back in utter con
fusion, leaving behind them more than 10,000 of their
comrades dead, weltering in their gore, or prisoners in
the hands of the enemy, the Confederate loss being less
than 1,000 men. Some hours later, that stupidity might
reach its consummation, and make itself fully manifest
to the world, — some hours later, we say, when our ranks
were re-formed, every corps coriimander r-eceived an abso
lute order to renew the assault imraediately, and that in
the exact form in which the first had been made. To this
mad and stupid order, the array unanimously and abso
lutely refused obedience, every portion of our line remain
ing stationary.
Our loss on this bloody field and vicinity, amounted,
as officially reported, to 13,153 men, that of the Confede
rates being about i ,000. We fully believe that the battle
of Cold Harbour, except in the campaigns of General
Grant, has no parallel in history. Let the reader conceive
of an army of nearly, or quite, 100,000 infantry, drawn up
in a line of battle of from three to four miles in extent,
and standing there in front of a line of batteries of cor
responding length — batteries bristling with all the enginery
of death which the science of modern warfare has ever
known, and behind which more than 50,000 veteran troops
are waiting in quiet security the approach of our death-
devoted line. Let the reader now conceive that, before a
cannon has been fired from our position to disturb the
enemy in his, that line of infantry is pushed up within the
range of fire of all these batteries, and of those 50,000 sharp
shooters, that as soon as our line can be re-formed, after
it has recoiled and fled in disorder from the deadly tem
pest to which it was subject, it receives an absolute order
to move up a second time, and be slaughtered as it had

CAMPAIGN UNDER GENERAL GRANT. 377
been' before. We affirm, without fear of contradiction from
any well-informed and candid mind, that such orders could
have originated but from a blind and dogged stupidity of
which the history of war furnishes no parallel.
Movement across fames River to Petersburg.
General Grant had now tried in vain, and that with the
sacrifice of upwards of 50,000 men, to find, between Cul
pepper and James river, some line on which he could
advance his army to Richmond. To a mind as blank as
his, but one alternative remained, namely, to seek a road
to the Confederate capital, south of that river, — ^that. is,
via Petersburg. He accordingly passed his army, over the
James, and advanced upon the city last named. From
the first, a fatality seemed to attend the approach of our
array to this city. The policy of our commander was to
capture the city before Lee could arrive to defend it.
General Smith, who with his corps had been returned by
water to Butler, was sent promptly forward to seize the
place. When -he approached the city, and found it
wholly undefended, he, as Meade did when Lee's whole
army was within his grasp, hesitated and delayed until
the Confederate army began to arrive. When Hancock
with his corps arrived, and put all his forces at Smith's
disposal, the weak man still hesitated and delayed, until
Lee's veterans came up, and Petersburg was rendered
impregnable. At length — Lee, as usual, being before us —
our army came up in force; and now, June i6th, an oppor
tunity presented itself to General Grant to repeat, in the
same form, the tragedy of Cold Harbour, Spottsylvania,
and other places, — that is, in three successive assaults,
in which, in all but the last, lines of naked infantry were
stupidly pushed up in front of impregnable and destructive
batteries, to lose, nearly or quite, 20,000 more brave men.
It is useless to detail the form in which such senseless and
raadly presumptuous assaults were raade. Cold Harbour
being the proper example of the rest. In the first, before
Petersburg, we lost g,665 men, in the second 5,316, and
in the last 4,008, independ ent of 868 in the trenches. The
last of these assaults was on this wise. General Burnside
had run a mine under the central fort of the Confederate

378 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
line, and had all arrangements perfected for the assault,
as soon as the mine should be sprung. Immediately
before the time for the explosion and the assault, General
Meade assumed the authority to change the whole pro
gramme. At 4.30 a.m. the mine was sprung, and the
fort, with its 300 occupants, was lifted 200 feet into the
air, and a deep chasm was left in its place. At the same
moment our batteries opened all along the line in the
vicinity of the explosion. In consequence of the disar
rangement referred to, the assault was delayed, or rendered
ineffective, for quite two hours, during which time the
enemy fully recovered his lost self-possession, and rushed
to the defence of his broken line. The result was, that
our attacking columns were driven back and huddled to
gether in that chasm, where they were slaughtered as the
Confederates willed. In this abortive effort we lost quite
4,400 men, the entire loss of the enemy being less than
1 ,000. General Grant, fully convinced at last that Petersburg
could not be captured by an assault in front, attempted to
turn the enemy's right by a flank movement in the direc
tion of Weldon Railroad. In the various conflicts in this
direction, we lost about 14,000 more men. At length, all
efforts in that direction were abandoned, and our whole
army, in the latter part of October, returned to its entrench
ments before the city.
Our army as distributed in front of Petersburg, and our
prior losses.
To understand the situation of our army from the
middle of June 1864, when it crossed James river, to the
last of March 1865, when the great movement which led
to (general Lee's surrender was made, we must take into
account the following facts. Our line of defences ex
tended from the south front of Petersburg north to James
river, and then a corresponding distance north of that
river, making an almost straight line of fortifications from
twenty to thirty miles in extent. This position General
Grant had gained by months of tedious marching and
terrible fighting, in which he had, directly under his own

CAMPAIGN UNDER GENERAL GRANT. 375
eye, as furnished by one of his staff to the author of
"Grant and his Campaigns," lost the appalling sum of
88,387 men. If we add to these what is not therein
included, namely, the losses in Burnside's corps before it
was incorporated with the Army of the Potomac, in the
various cavalry raids, and in the Army of the James, the
amount will far exceed 100,000 men, that of the Confede
rates being not over one-third, if they were one-fourth, of
that number.

What the country lost and gained by this campaign.
Let us stop ,for a moment and inquire what we have
lost and gained by this enormous and appalling sacrifice
of men and treasure. When the Army of the Potomac
lay at Culpepper, we held full command of all Eastern,
Central, and Northern Virginia. Our national capital, and
the Shenandoah' Valley, were also so perfectly protected,
that all our forces at the places named, in the Peninsula,
in the Valley, and in Washington, those necessary for
mere garrison duty excepted, could have been effectively
employed for a combined movement upon General Lee
and the Confederate capital. When our arrny sat down
before Petersburg, we had surrendered all Central Virginia,
and had fully exposed tlfe national capital, the valley re
ferred to. Western Virginia, Pennsyl-vania, and Maryland.
All the railroads south of the Rappahannock and east of
Richmond were also surrendered ; while all north of that
river, with their bridges, were constantly exposed to be
broken up. Just as the great harvest was coming on, the
largest and richest portion of the great State of Virginia
was given up to be drawn upon for the support of the
Confederate army. - Before our army moved, the Govern
ment had in its own hands the chief means of transport
for provisions and supplies. In its new and insulated
position, these provisions and supplies had to be conveyed,
at the most enormous expense, by vessels hired of specu
lators at their own prices. In consequence of the new
position of our army, also, we were necessitated to keep two
additional ones of large magnitude for mere defence — one
for the protection of Washington, and the other to defend

380 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
the Shenandoah Valley, Pennsylvania, and Maryland.
But this was not the worst of the case. These three
great armies — that at Petersburg, that at Washington,
and that in the Shenandoah Valley — were so located that
co-operative action between them was impossible, while
neither could by itself do any effective service whatever.
The two last-named could, of course, do nothing but stand
on the defensive. How was it with that immediately
under Grant ? There was nothing in its rear to be done.
In front it was everywhere stopped by impregnable fortifi
cations. All attempts to move south had been defeated,
and to move north was to retreat. Thus all these three
armies were perfectly paralyzed for any offensive service —
that under Grant being as completely " bottled up " and
corked up as was possible. It is impossible to con
ceive armies in a more helpless condition than were those
under consideration, while all General Lee's communica
tions were most open and secure. The worst feature of
Grant's position at Petersburg yet remains to be stated.
When he located one part of his army on the south and
the other on the north side of the James river, three
powerful ironclads, with other war vessels, were in pro
cess of construction at Richmond. January 23rd, 1865,
when our army was divided as stated, when our war
vessels were, with very few exceptions at distant stations,
and when the portion of our army that lay before
Petersburg had a supply of provisions but for a very
short time, the Confederate fleet, consisting of three iron
clads — the Virginia, Fredericksburg, and Richmond, five
wooden steamers, and three torpedo boats, dropped down
the river in the darkness of night. At midnight they
passed Fort Brady, and in returning its fire disabled one
of its loo-pounders. They then broke the chain in front-
of the obstructions placed in the river by General Butler
at the lower end of Dutch Gap. The Fredericksburg
passed through ; the Virginia, Richmond, and another
vessel called Drewry, fortunately for us, grounded. The
vessel last named was blown up ; and the Virginia, before
it could be got off, was fatally injured by a 300-pound
bolt from one of our monitors. This rendered the accom
plishment of the Confederate plan impossible, and the

CAMPAIGN UNDER GENERAL -GRANT. 38 1
remainder of the fleet returned to Richmond. Had the
plan under consideration been successful, and our army,
as a consequence, inseparably divided. General Lee with.
his whole army — all preparations being made for the
purpose — would have fallen upon General Grant's left
wing with the intent of rolling it up upon the centre
and right of our divided forces, and thus capturing them.
If this assault should not succeed, another part of his
plan was to stop all supply of provisions, and thus compel
Grant's surrender. The conquest of our army north of
the river would then have been only a question of time.
From all this peril that army was delivered by this pro
vidential accident, the grounding of those vessels. The
stupid presumption involved in selecting a position so
insulated, and which so palpably exposed our army to
such perils, is too obvious to require further comment.
The last result that we notice of Grant's leaving Culpepper
as he did, and conducting the campaign as he did, is the
additional loss of between 40,000 and 50,000 men in the
Valley of the Shenandoah and in Northern Virginia.
General Grant's conduct of his Virginia campaign un
deniably cost us the loss of nearly or quite 150,000 men,
an army more than twice as large as General Lee com
manded at the opening of that campaign— a campaign
protracted through quite eleven months of stupid fight
ing and ' demoralizing idleness, attended by an enormous
expense of treasure to the nation. All this occurred
when no strategist of ordinary capacity would, with
Grant's resources when he lay at Culpepper, have asked
more than two months to have finished up the campaign
in Virginia and the Carolinas, and would readily have
accomplished all this with a loss of less than 20,000 men.
The history of all wars, since gunpowder was invented,
absolutely verifies these statements. A view hereafter to
be presented of General Grant's actual advantages to have
brought the war to a speedy termination, during all the
nine months, or nearly, that he lay in idleness before
Petersburg, will evince, if possible, beyond any facts we
have yet presented, his utter ignorance of the whole
science and art of war, and of even ordinary common
sense in its conduct.

382 THE AMERICAN REBELLION,
A general and specific view of General Grant' s plan of the
entire campaign.
The plan of General Grant, as far as he had any, — a
plan which Mr. Greeley calls " General Grant's compre
hensive plan of campaign," but which, as we shall see, in
the mind of its originator really comprehended nothing,
this plan involved concentrative and co-operative move
ments on a larger scale and over a wider extent of
country than we have yet indicated. Simultaneously with
his own movement through the Wilderness, and Butler's
advance via Bermuda Hundred, General Sigel was
required to move up the Shenandoah, and General Crook
up the Kanawha ; the Generals last named being directed
to meet and unite in the vicinity of Stanton and Lynch
burg. The fundamental vice of the plan was this, namely,
that while the central force at Culpepper was much larger
than was needful in a proper conduct of the campaign, all
the others were too contemptibly small and feeble to
render any but abortive services in any direction. While
General Butler was ordered to move, via Berrauda
Hundred, with 20,000, Sigel was required to move up
the Shenandoah with 10,000, and Crook up the Kanawha
with 6,000 men. In connection with the fatally tragic
march of the Grand Army through the Wilderness, the
simultaneous movement of the three other feeble bodies
could not have failed to render the whole campaign an
abortive and calamitous one. A raore vicious plan for
the conduct of a great campaign, we may safely defy
human stupidity, or ingenuity, to invent than was the
one under consideration. Let us suppose that before any
moveraent at all had been raade, Butler, as was originally
intended, had been reinforced by Burnside's corps of
about 40,000 men, and also by the two corps subsequently
brought up from the Carolinas, and that the forces under
Sigel and Crook had been united in the Shenandoah,
and raised to an army 50,000 strong by reinforcements
sent out frora Washington, which might readily and
safely have been done. We should then have had a
grand central force at Culpepper of upwards of 180,000
strong. We should have had an army in the vicinity of

CAMPAIGN UNDER, GENERAL GRANT. 383
Fortress Monroe of about 80,000, and another in the
Shenandoah of 50,000 men. Suppose now that the
campaign had opened in the following manner. While
Grant, with the central force, had moved directly upon the
Confederate position of Orange Court House, Butler had
moved his array to Bermuda Hundred, and Sigel had, by
forced marches, moved up the Shenandoah, and seized
Stanton and Lynchburg. Such a plan for the conduct of
the campaign was perfectly practicable, most obviously
demanded by the circumstances, and was so palpably
suggested by existing facts, that any commander of
ordinary capacity would have apprehended and adopted
it. The certain result is undeniable. In six weeks, or
two months at the furthest, Lee's army, with Richmond,
would have been captured, and the campaign closed up in
Virginia and the Carolinas. All this would have been
accomplished with a loss of less than 20,000 instead of
150,000 men, and a protraction of the campaign for
nearly a year.
Let us now consider some of the further results of this
stupidly devised and presumptuously and awkwardly
executed campaign. On May 15th, General Breckinridge
assaulted and routed Sigel' s army, we losing 700 men,
six guns, 1,000 small-arms, our hospitals, and part of our
train. Having thus removed all fear of an advance of
Sigel's force up the valley, Breckinridge hastened, as we
have seen, to the aid of General Lee against General
Grant. •
Still more calamitous was the advance of General
Crook. Having divided his forces, they were at length
cut to pieces in detail, and dispersed. Thus on both ot
the wings of our army, — that is, on the part of Butler on
the one hand, and Sigel and Crook on the other, — less than
nothing was achieved, and the campaign, in all its raove
raents, became a great national calamity.
General Sigel was promptly superseded by General
Hunter, and our forces in the Shenandoah were consider
ably strengthened. General Hunter accordingly made an
advance, and at Piedmont defeated General Jones, the
latter losing his life. In this battle our array captured
some 1,500 prisoners, three guns, and 3,000 small-arms.

384 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
Moving on to Stanton, General Hunter was there rein
forced by Generals Averill and Crook, with what was left
of his men. and our commander found himself at the head
of an army quite 20,000 strong. General Hunter now
made a forced march for Lynchburg, hoping to be able to
capture the place before It could be relieved by reinforce
ments sent up from Richmond. In this hope he was
sadly disappointed. General Lee, having rendered Peters
burg secure, sent Early, with a large portion of Ewell's
corps, for the relief of the place, which was hardly second
in importance to Richmond itself Early, with most of
his forces, arrived before Hunter did, and thus placed the
latter in a most precarious condition. With his provisions
quite exhausted, and his ammunition fast failing, nothing
remained for our commander but a precipitous retreat.
As a return by the way he came was too hazardous, our
army moved on the railroad west to Solun, where pursuit
was suspended. From thence General Hunter moved by
a circuitous route down the Kanawha, and around to
Grafton, his array suffering beyond conception from want
of provisions. "We have heard soldiers say that they
were often glad to gather up the kernels of corn which
the horses dropped from their mouths while feeding, and
with these, having washed the same, allay the gnawings
of hunger. By this absence of our army, the Shenandoah, Northern
Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Maryland were left defence
less, an advantage to the enemy which such a General as
Early was certain to improve. Moving rapidly down the
Shenandoah, he captured from Sigel, who retreated to
Maryland Heights, a large amount of stores, crossed the
Potomac at Williamsport, and having done much damage
to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, invaded the free
Union States above noticed. The main object of this
invasion was to capture horses, cattle, provisions, and
goods for the supply of the Confederate army. Hence,
they scoured the country in all directions for the objects
designated. The invasion was everywhere so wisely
masked by cavalry, that the amount of Early's command
was imraensely exaggerated, and a panic in all directions
spread among the people,— the Government, in fear of

CAMPAIGN UNDER GENERAL GRANT. 385
Washington and Baltimore, calling upon the States of
Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts, for militia
to repel the invaders. During this invasion, but one
battle of any importance was fought, and that was near
Frederick in Maryland. In this battle a few thousand
men under General Wallace were defeated in a sanguinary
fight, we losing about 2,000 men, and the Confederates
about one-third that number. In a cavalry raid into the
interior of Pennsylvania, villages and farmhouses were
plundered, and two-thirds of the city of Chambersburg
was burned to the ground, because the Inhabitants failed
to furnish in time ;$^ 100,000 in gold, or ^500,000 in paper
money. Early, at length, moved south ; and approaching
within a few miles of Washington, recrossed the Potomac,
with his cavalry remounted, with 2,000 to 3,000 spare
horses, upwards of 5,000 cattle, and an immense amount
of provisions and goods which he had gathered up. Soon
after his return to Virginia, he encountered and defeated
General Crook near Martinsburg, — the latter, with our
defeated forces, having imprudently moved out from
Harper's Ferry. In this affair, the Confederate loss being
very small, we lost upwards of 1,200 men, with Colonel
Mulligan killed, the brave defender of Lexington, in
Missouri, in 1S61. In one of these cavalry raids. General
Averil, after pursuing the raiders up one branch of the
Potomac, captured upwards of 500 prisoners, with their
guns and waggons, with a loss of but fifty men on our
side. Thus ended the last invasion of Pennsylvania and
Maryland. At length. General Hunter having returned from his
long detour, was superseded by General Sheridan, who soon
found himself at the head of an army quite 30,000 strong.
After completing the necessary organization of his forces,
Sheridan took the field, and in a pitched battle of great
severity on the banks of Opequan Creek, covering Win
chester, defeated Early, September i6th, with the loss of
about 3,000 men on each side. The Confederates now
abandoned the valley, pursued in their retreat by our
forces, who captured near Fisher's Hill 1,100 prisoners,
sixteen guns, and seventy-five waggons, etc. Sheridan,
in passing up and down the valley, obeyed to the letter
25

386 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
a command which he had received from General Grant,
namely,— "In pushing up the Shenandoah Valley, where
it is expected you will have to go first or last, it is desir
able," says Grant, in the order referred to, " that nothing
should be left to invite the enemy to return. Take all pro -
visions, forage, and stock wanted for your command: such
as cannot be secured, destroy." We must bear in mind
here, that among the people upon whom this brutally
savage order was executed with raost brutally savage
ferocity, were not a few Union men who were then fight
ing in the Union army, while more were Quakers and
Dunkers, who frora conscientious regard to what they held
to be raoral and religious obligations, took no part in the
war whatever. Of the manner in which he executed this
order. General Sheridan (October 7th, 1864, g p.m.) thus
reports to Lieutenant General U. S. Grant: —
" I commenced moving back from Port Republic,
Mount Crawford, Bridgewater, and Harrisonburg, yester
day morning.
" The grain and forage in advance of these points had
previously been destroyed.
" In moving back to this point " (Woodstock, Va.), " the
whole countr}?- from the Blue Ridge to the North Mountain
has been made untenable to the Rebel army. I have
destroyed over 2,000 barns filled with wheat and hay and
farming implements, over seventy mills filled with flour and
wheat, have driven in front of the array over 4,000 head of
stock, and have billed and issued to the troops not less
than 3,000 sheep. This destruction embraces the Luray
Valley and Little Fort valley, as well as the main Valley.
" A large number of horses have been obtained, a
proper estimate of which I cannot now make.
" Lieut. John R Meig.s, my engineer officer, was
murdered beyond Harrisonburg, near Dayton. For this
atrocious act, all the houses within an area of five miles
were burned."
We must bear in mind, that when the above order
was given and executed, all the Confederate forces that
could have been concentrated for the defence of Virginia,
and the invasion of Pennsylvania and Maryland, did not
amount to over 70,000, while General Grant had under his

CAMPAIGN UNDER GENERAL GRANT. 387
control upwards of 1,000,000 men. At any period, our
Commander-in-Chief could have assembled an army — to
protect ours cooped up in the Peninsula, to render secure
our national capital, and to preserve our territory from
invasion — outnumbering all the Confederate forces that
could have been concentrated in the State of Virginia,
as more than six to one. Yet, "in the deep recesses of
a mind capable of such things," — " the deep recesses " of
the mind of our Commander-in-Chief — the only means by
which the States of Pennsylvania and Maryland could be
rendered safe from another invasion by the great army of
General Lee, was, after the example of Hyder Ali in India,
to " place perpetual desolations " between those States and
the 70,000 men referred to. Still furthur, as our com
mander "revolved in the deep recesses of his mind" the
widespread desolations which his stupid order had so
savagely consummated, he was not yet satisfied that these
States were secure from invasion. By his grave advice,
that " surety might be rendered doubly sure," 100,000
volunteers, enlisted for one hundred days, were armed and
equipped, and brought forward, and the most of them
added to the Army of the Potomac, All this was done for
no offensive purposes whatever, but exclusively to save
from capture our army before Petersburg and Richmond,
to render secure our national capital, and prevent the
States referred to being invaded by forces sent out from
an army 70,000 strong, and having upon its hands the
defence of the Confederate capital and the great State of
Virginia. Subsequent to the events above referred to, another
quite famous battle occurred. Sheridan, supposing that
the desolation he had created had rendered the condition
of his army perfectly secure, had gone on a visit to Wash-
.'/igton ; and his Generals in command, deeming danger
out of the question, had suspended all precaution. " Our
forces," says Mr. Greeley, " were encamped on three crests
or ridges ; the Army of West Virginia (Crook's) in front ;
the 19th corps (Emory's) half a mile behind it; the 6th
corps (Wright's) to the right and rear of the igth.
Kitching's provisional division lay behind Crook's left; the
cavalry under Forbut, on the right of the 6th. It is a fact.

388 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
though no excuse, that they had no more apprehension
of an attack from Early than from Canada,"
It was the known absence of Sheridan, and the equally
known supposed security of his army, that Early took
advantage of to attack it by surprise. Nor were measures
for such an end ever more wisely and promptly adopted
than by the Confederate General on this occasion. Sepa
rating his army into two bodies, so as to strike our right
and left wings at the same moment, he made his approach,
not by the main road, but over rough mountain passes,
where his men had to hold on to bushes to preserve their
standing, and twice to ford the Shenandoah. That no
noise might be made, his soldiers were required to leave
their canteens in camp, lest their striking against their
guns should create an alarm among the Union forces.
As the enemy drew near, a rustling as of the trampling
of many feet in the underbrush was heard by our
pickets, and the news sent to head-quarters. A good
look-out was ordered, but no reconnoiterers were sent out.
At one hour before dawn, both bodies of Early's com
mand were in their desired places, both our wings being
flanked, while the muskets of many of our soldiers were
unloaded, and all our men, with the exception of those on
duty, were resting in deep slumber. As soon as the dawn
ing light revealed the distant hill-tops, volleys of musketry
on our flanks and in our rear startled the sleepers. The
next moment, with multitudinous yells peculiar to the Con
federate soldiery, Early's forces leaped into our trenches,
and charged into our camps. In a few minutes after the
first dawn. Crook's entire coraraand was a mingled mass,
flying they knew not whither.
The igth corps made a short and bloody resistance, but
waS'Soon driven back in confusion. The 6th, finding resist
ance yain, retreated in good order. The victory was with
the Confederates, with the loss on our part of quite 1,200
prisoners, our camps, defences, and twenty- four guns. Had
Early's army been in a condition to follow up his advantage,
our defeat would have been complete and most disastrous.
His men, however, were too weary, hungry, and thirsty, and
eager for plunder, to enable hira to reap the full results of
his easy victory. Hence the pursuit was not rapid, and

CAMPAIGN UNDER GENERAL GRANT. 38g
our broken columns at length began to re-form behind
Wright's unbroken ranks.
At lo a.m. Sheridan, who had slept at Winchester, on
his return to his army, was, after his famous ride, at the
front. Just at this time Wright had halted, and the pres
sure of Early had ceased to be severe. As soon as our
broken forces could be rallied and re-formed, our army
took the offensive, and the Confederates, in their turn, fled
from the field, leaving in our hands quite as many prisoners
as theyhad taken from us, and twenty- three of their own guns
in addition to the twenty-four which we had previously lost,
and then recovered. Such is the difference which the pre
sence or absence of a single individual often makes upon the
battle-field. Our loss in this double battle was quite 3,000
men, and that of the Confederates considerably larger.
With this battle, the campaign in the Shenandoah, and
until next spring throughout the sphere of the Army of
the Potomac, ended. For about six months from this time,
October i8th, "all was quiet on the Potomac," in the
trenches before Petersburg and Richmond, in Washington,
and in the States which had been three times invaded
by the Confederate armies. This unheard-of quietude of
more than 1,000,000 of armed men, the small portion under
Sherman and Thomas, and under Pleasanton in Missouri,
excepted, will be the subject of remark in future portions of
this treatise. All that we need to say here is that all this
needless and useless slaughter and desolation in connec
tion with the Array of the Shenandoah was wholly occa
sioned by General Grant's vicious plan, and more vicious
conduct, of the campaign in Virginia in the year 1864.

CHAPTER XXVII.
SHERMAN'S ATLANTA CAMPAIGN.
The object of this history, as the reader is aware, is' a
peculiar and special one — an exposition of the leading
facts of this war from one single standpoint, its military
aspect. The object of the work is to subject each cam
paign to a most rigid and impartial criticism, that its
excellences, errors, and blunders may be distinctly under
stood ; my fixed aim being to enable my countrymen to
know the past as it was, to comprehend fully and truly the
real merits and demerits of the commanders of our armies,
and the character of the soldiery whom they led and so
mercilessly slaughtered ; and this as a means to a still
higher end — that the errors and blunders of the past may
never be repeated in future. We are conscious of no
seujiment in regard to General Sherman, or any other
individual that ever held command in our armies, that
would conceal or eclipse one of his excellences, or hide,
diminish, or magnify in public estimation one of his
defects, our object being criticism in that form which,
in all future time, will stand the test of criticism. What
General Sherman actually accomplished reveals him as a
military man of whom our nation has no reason to be
ashamed. While we freely admit and affirm this, we are
also most fully persuaded that there were errors in the
plan of his compaigns, and blunders in their conduct,
which no future commander should copy. Let us advance
to a direct consideration of the subject before us.
According to his own statements, he had at his dis
posal an available force amounting to upwards of 180,000

SHERMAN S ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. 39 1
men, all the forces in his department amounting to
upwards of 340,000. The forces by which he was
directly opposed, no well-informed individual estimates
at over 55,000 men. When Generals Grant and Sherman
were assigned to their respective commands, they met
at Nashville, and passed in company together to Louis
ville. During this interval, the plan of their respec
tive campaigns was definitely settled. One fixed ele
ment of the plan was, as we have already stated, that
both Generals should move at the same time, and that
their campaigns should not be opened until the month of
May. The openly avowed reason for this simultaneous
movement was to prevent General Johnston dividing his
little army of 55,000 men, and reinforcing General Lee,
on the one hand, and General Lee dividing his small force
of 70,000, and reinforcing General Johnston, on the other,
and this when it was well known that these two little
armies were from 600 to 1,000 miles distant from each
other, and each commander of the same was confronted
by forces quite three times larger than his own, and much
raore numerous than both the Confederate armies united.
Here, undeniably, was " a step from the sublime to the
ridiculous." Neglected opportunity.
When General Sherman moved out. May 6th, from
Chattanooga, what did he find in his immediate front?
At Dalton, about thirty miles from the former place, at
the junction of the railroads from Chattanooga and Knox
ville to Atlanta, he encountered General Johnston in a
position strong in itself, and very strongly fortified. At
Resaca, about fifteen miles farther on, upon the Oos-
tenaula river, in a still stronger and more formidably
fortified position, he encountered the Confederate army
a second time. After the retreat of General Bragg,
General Hooker, with only 10,000 men, captured Dalton,
and would have held it but for the fact that he was posi
tively commanded to return to Chattanooga. From the
latter part of November, 1863, to the 6th May, 1864, our
army, quite 100.000 strong, lay in perfect idleness at
Chattanooga, allowing General Johnston to advance with

392 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
his little army into our immediate presence, and there, on
our known and predetermined route to Atlanta, raise up,
at his leisure, the forraidable fortifications above desig
nated, and that without the reraotest atterapt on our part
to disturb his operations. What excuse, but the baldest
ignorance of what is essential to the proper conduct of a
great campaign, can be offered for such neglect ? Any
General well Instructed in the science of war, and half
awake to his duties as the commander of a great army,
would, if he had determined to advance no farther until
the May following, have promptly seized Dalton and
Resaca both, and prepared the latter as his advanced
depot of supplies. The location of this place upon the
river designated rendered it most obviously the proper
position for the purpose named, and for opening the
spring campaign, A correspondent in our army in
"Western Virginia, when McClellan was in command there,
made this statement, naraely, " that the fixed policy of
our commander seemed to be this, to suffer the enemy to
approach as near to us as he chose, select his position,
and at his leisure fortify it to his own full satisfaction.
Then our comraander would set his wits to work to dis
lodge the enemy," This seems to have been the equally
fixed policy of our General in command at Chattanooga.
The campaign as it should have been conducted.
The advance of General Sherman from Chattanooga to
Atlanta, the time spent in capturing the latter place in
cluded, occupied just four months, and those, the last three
especially, the worst of the year, the three months of
summer, and was attended, as we have already stated,
with the loss of upwards of 40,000 men, almost as many
as General Johnston had in his army. We now lay down
this proposition, the validity of which we expect to render
demonstrably evident, to wit, that this campaign ought not
to have been, at the farthest, of more than four weeks' continu
ance, and ought not, by any means, to have been .attended with
the loss of ^,000 men on our part. History furnished any
number of precedents from which our comraander might
have drawn a proper plan for the conduct of his campaign.
Among these precedents, we specify but one, the famous

Sherman's Atlanta campaign. 3g3
march of the Duke of Wellington up the Ebro and over
the mountains into the plains of Vittoria, where he gained
that world-renowned victory over the French army under
King Joseph. During the winter, while the Duke was
making preparations for the intended campaign, the
French commanders, correctly divining his plan, and the
line of his march, erected all along that line, at every
defensible point, — and no line ever presented more posi
tions of this character than did this, — the French com
manders, we say, erected at every defensible point along
that line a succession of the most formidable fortifications
which military science could plan. The route before the
English army was, to all appearance, an absolutely im
practicable one. Here was a route precisely similar to
that which lay before General Sherman in his advance
upon Atlanta. "What did the English commander do in
the circumstances in which he was placed ? He did not
do as General Sherman afterwards did, — that is, advance
his whole army directly upon those fortresses, and spend
the whole spring and summer in capturing them one
after the other, losing, in doing so, more than one-third
of his army. The grand Duke, on the other hand, as
soon as full preparation was made for his advance, sent
forward his left wing under General Graham, and flanked
each of those fortresses In succession, while with the re
mainder of his army he moved directly upon those
strongholds. The result was, that each position in suc
cession was abandoned without firing a gun,— abandoned
as soon as it was flanked by General Graham's advance.
Wellington's army contemplated with utter amazement the
strength of the successive fortifications which they entered
and found empty in their unresisted advance. On all
that march, " not a drum was heard, nor a funeral note,"
over a single officer or soldier fallen in battle in that army.
The march was literally an uninterrupted and bloodless
one, and the great conqueror of Napoleon brought his
whole army intact over into the plains of Vittoria. Had
General Sherman equal facilities for an equally uninter
rupted and bloodless advance for himself and his army
from Chattanooga to Atlanta ? He had, as we will now
proceed to demonstrate. Let us suppose that, of the

394 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
effective force of more than 180,000 men under his
command, he had reserved 70,000 at Chattanooga for
the advance upon Atlanta, a force abundantly sufficient
to act against 55,000. Having done this, we will suppose
that he had located another array 60,000 strong under
General Thomas at Decatur. This latter army would
have been superior to Johnston's by 5,000, and the former
by 15,000 men, so that each would have been safe from
an effective assault from the enemy, we having still in
reserve upwards of 50,000 men to guard our communi
cations, and to succour either army, if needful, — a body
abundantly sufficient for all such purposes. When all
was in readiness to open the carapaign, Thoraas, we will
suppose, had moved by forced marches directly for
Atlanta, there having been nothing at the time in his
way to impede his march, as the subsequent advance of
Hood from Atlanta to Decatur, and then west of it, demon
strated. When Thomas had been about one week on his
march, we will suppose, once more, that Sherman had
moved directly upon Johnston at Dalton. How long
would the latter, under such circumstances, have remained,
in those mountain passes to resist the advance of the
former? The retreat of the Confederates back to Atlanta,
we answer, would have been instantaneous, and Sher
man's march thither would have been as uninterrupted
and bloodless as was Wellington's from Portugal to the
plains of Vittoria. And when the Confederate army had
emerged from those passes, and arrived at Atlanta, it
would have found itself in an infinitely worse con
dition than was that of France when it was assailed by
Wellington on those plains. Johnston would have found
himself encircled by forces nearly three times as numerous
as his own, and could not have kept the field for six weeks
longer. There is no escaping these deductions. We
affirm it before the nation and the world, that both Grant
and Sherman ought to have finished up totally the cam
paigns before them, and terminated the war, in two months,
at the farthest, after those campaigns were opened. Ever
^ince we have considered what General Sherman did do,
and contrasted that with what he might have done, we, as
our most familiar acquaintances will testify, have affirmed

SHERMAN S ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. 395
that he was, at the time, either an unread commander, or
that he was wholly destitute of capacity to plan an important
campaign. The campaign as it was conducted.
When we consider the conduct of the Atlanta cam
paign as executed by General Sherman, and that irre
spective of the plan of the same, we shall be constrained
to award him no little praise, and that praise a grateful
country should not withhold. The manner in which all
General Johnston's strong, and more strongly fortified,
positions were flanked, — and he was compelled to abandon
each one of them in succession, — must command the
admiration of every well-informed individual. The Con
federate prisoners of the lower order of rank and file
were accustomed thus to speak to our soldiers upon the
subject : " The you-uns don't treat the we-uns fair. When
the we-uns draw up behind our fortifications, the you-uns,
instead of coming right up and fighting the we-uns, as
the you-uns should do, the you-uns go away round, and
then come up and take the we-uns eend-wise like. That
arn't fair." As examples of the manner in which those
strongholds were flanked, we cite the two following from
Mr. Greeley, our object being criticism, and not mere
detail : —
" The country between Chattanooga and Atlanta is
different from, but even more difficult than, that which
separates Washington frora Richmond. Rugged moun
tains, deep, narrow rivers, thick primitive woods, with
occasional villages, and more frequent clearings, or
irregular patches of cultivation, all traversed by mainly
narrow, ill-made roads, succeed each other for some forty
miles ; then intervenes a like distance of comparatively
open, facile country, traversed by two considerable rivers ;
then another rugged, difficult region of mountains and
passes reaches nearly to Chattahoochee, across which, eight
miles distant, lies the new but important city of Atlanta —
a focus of several railroads, having some 20,000 inhabit
ants, and then the seat of extensive manufactories of
Confederate supplies. It had been well fortified early in
1863.

3g6 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
" Johnston's position at Dalton was covered by an im
passable mountain known as Rocky-Face Ridge, down by
the passage of Mill Creek called Buzzard's Roost Gap.
The railroad traverses this pass, but our army could
not, it being naturally very strong, and nOw thoroughly
fortified. Hence, while Thomas menaced and feebly
assailed it in front, McPherson flanked the enemy's left,
moving down by Ship's Gap, Villanow, and Snake Creek
Gap, to seize either Resaca or some point well in its
rear, while Schofield should press on Johnston's right.
In executing these orders, Thomas was compelled td
bear more heavily on the Rebel front than he intended.
Newton's division of Howard's 4th corps and Geary's of
Hooker's (20th) corps, assaulting in earnest, and even
carrying portions of the ridge; whence they were soon
repelled with loss. Meantime, McPherson had reached
the front of Resaca, scarcely resisted ; but he could not
carry it, and dared not remain between it and Johnston's
main body ; so he fell back to a strong position in Snake
Creek Gap, which he could hold for some hours against all
gainsayers. Sherman now, leaving Howard's corps and
some cavalry to threaten Dalton in front, moved the
rest of his forces rapidly in the track of Schofield, and
through Snake Creek Gap, which compelled Johnston to
evacuate his stronghold, and fall back rapidly to Resaca ;
advancing in force against which, Kilpatrick, fighting the
enemy's cavalry, was disabled. Sherman had calculated
on seriously damaging Johnston when he retreated, but was
unable to reach him, Johnston having the only direct good
road, while our flanking advance was made with great
difficulty. Howard entered Dalton on the heels of the
enemy, and pressed him sharply down to Resaca.
" Sherman forthwith set on foot a new flanking move
ment by his right to turn Johnston out of Resaca ; which
Johnston countered by an attack on Hooker and Schofield,
still in his front and on his left ; but he was rather
worsted in the bloody fight thus brought on — Hooker
driving the Rebels from several hills, taking four guns
and many prisoners. The Rebels retreated across the
Oostenaula during the night, and our army entered
Resaca in triumph the next morning."

SHERMAN S ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. 3g7
In this manner quite two months were spent, Johnston
retreating from position to position in consequence of the
skilful manceuvrings of his shrewd antagonist, the Con
federates losing about 10,000 men, and we, of course,
more than twice that number. In capturing strongholds
by skilfully turning the position of an enemy, Sherman
has revealed the possession of a very essential form of
military talent of which General Grant is wholly destitute.
General Grant knows but one method of attacking a
strong position which cannot be besieged, the very worst
form of attack known to the science of war, namely,
moving his lines up directly in front of the enemy's
batteries, and there letting his men be mercilessly slaugh
tered, until endurance ceases to be a virtue, and a con
fused retreat becomes a necessity. The idea of moving
round a position, and taking the enemy " eend-wise like,"
never had place in the brain of our Commander-in-Chief.
Grant's prisoners from Georgia, if he had taken any,
could with truth have said to our soldiers, " The you-
uns do treat the we-uns fair. When the we-uns are
drawn up behind the we-uns' strong fortifications, the
you-uns always come right up in front of the we-uns, and
suffer the we-uns to shout the you-uns down just as the
we-uns want to. That is fair."
When our army, June 27th, had arrived at Kenesaw
Mountain, within about twenty miles of Atlanta, however.
General Sherman acted a tragical scene which clearly
revealed the fact that he was possessed of the quality so
conspicuous in his illustrious predecessor. The Confede
rates having made, under General Hood, an unsuccessful
attack upon a portion of our line, General Sherman deter
mined to return the compliment. Having made careful
preparations at two points, to the south of this mountain,
and in front of Thomas and McPherson's position, he
ordered each of these Generals to make the assault upon
the enemy's line. The attack, in both cases, was of course
repulsed with great slaughter, we losing upwards of 3,000
men; Generals Harker and Daniel McCook were also killed,
and many brave officers were badly wounded ; the loss
of the Confederates being 442 in all. The reason assigned
by General Sherman for thus assaulting a position raost

3g8 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
obviously impregnable, is very singular. "I perceived,'
he says, "that the enemy and our own officers had settled
down into a conviction that I would not assault fortified
lines. All looked to me to outflank. An array, to be
efficient, must not settle down to one single mode of
offence, but must be prepared to execute any plan that
promises success. I wished, therefore, for the moral effect
to make a successful assault on the enemy behind his
breastworks. I yet claim that it produced good fruits, as
it demonstrated to General Johnston that I would assault,
and that boldly ; and we also gained and held ground so
close to the enemy's parapets that he could not show a
head above them." Perhaps General Sherman had in
remembrance, when he gave the presumptuous order for
the above attack, a scene which was enacted under his
command at Jackson, Miss., in July of the previous year.
At least he should have remembered this event, and also
his own experience in another like assault at Vicksburg,
when he was sent down to capture that city. Sorae rainds,
however, are slow to learn from experience. We refer
to these facts because the reckless sacrifice of human
life and limb in such mad assaults cannot be held in too
great reprobation. Let us now recur to the assault at
Jackson, when General Sherman was making his advances
upon the position of General Johnston at that place. Our
citations are from " Personal Recollections of Army Life,"
by James D. English. The length of the citations will
not be a matter of regret to the reader, and may we not
hope that such experiences will deter future Generals from
repeating such mad assaults upon fortified positions ? Now
to the citations : —
" Early on the morning of July 12th, General Hovey
advanced his lines to within eight hundred yards of the
Rebel works, after some sharp fighting, and hastily erected
a barricade of logs to protect the men from a sudden rush
of the besieged.
" By this move a gap of nearly half a mile was created
between the two divisions, which if the enemy should dis
cover, would enable them to pour a heavy force through
the opening, and force Hovey to retreat from his barricade
to save his rear

Sherman's ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. 399
" To remedy this an order came to General Lauman to
push forward with his division, drive back the enemy, and
connect with General Hovey on a straight line, great
stress being placed on the words on a straight line, which,
strange to say, if done, would place the parallel to be established
twenty feet inside the Rebel lines on the right, as General
Hovey' s line was then within musket range of the enemy.
"It was unmistakably evident that the 'Star' that
sent that order could not have known the nature of the
ground, or the exact position of the Rebel works, or it
would have never been issued, or at least would have been
modified to suit the nature of the case.
" However, it was ' orders,' and nothing remained but
to obey. Accordingly, General Lauman selected for the
task the ist Brigade, Brevet Brigadier-General J. C. Pugh
commanding, consisting of the 3rd Iowa, 28th, 41st, and
53rd Illinois Volunteers, and two 12-pound howitzers of
the 5th Ohio battery.
" The brigade moved down the hill, across the bottora,
halted and formed in column. Unfurling the colours, the
line moved slowly forward through a field of green corn
that had been carefully put down by somebody, and beyond
the field the ground was covered with brush piles, logs, and
abattis, rendering it extremely difficult to move in anything
like order. The Rebel works were in full view, the brigade
still advancing. As yet no one could be seen in the works,
and not a shot had been fired. What did it raean ? Could
the eneray have retreated ? Surely it seeraed so !
" Ah I raost unfortunate conclusion ; the brigade had
--reached within 300 yards of the ditch, and were congratu
lating themselves on a bloodless victory, when suddenly
there burst forth a deafening chorus of yells, as if a Pan
demonium had emptied its legions upon earth, and the
next instant there arose frora the heretofore silent works
a double rank of the enemy, and poured upon the heads
of our column a deliberate, murderous, staggering fire of
musketry that was absolutely awful in its destructfulness.
The killed and wounded fell almost in heaps. Great open
ings were torn out of the ranks, by the hissing death-sleet
that streamed from the Rebel line. Although staggered
by the suddenness of the attack, the regiments bravely

400 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
returned the fire (braver men never handled guns than
were the ist brigade boys), but it was no use, for the Rebels,.
sheltered behind their works, fired deliberately, every shot
taking effect, while our boys, without stick or stump to
shelter thera, and appalled at the frightful destruction that
was fast thinning their ranks, fired wildly. A few of the
raen reached the ditch under the Rebel battery, but were
alraost instantly shot down or captured. Deeming further
effort useless. General Page ordered the survivors of this
murderous contest to fall back. When the brigade .fell
back, and the survivors re-formed and were numbered, it
was found that the loss was appalling.
"The brigade went into action 803 strong; killed,
wounded, and captured, 508 ; came out of action with 295
survivors. Third Iowa went into action with 241 men;
killed, wounded, and captured, 157; came out of action with
84 survivors. Forty-first Illinois went into action with 234
men ; killed, wounded, and captured, 162 ; came out of
action with 72 survivors. Twenty-eighth Illinois volunteers
went into action with 128 men; killed, wounded, and cap
tured, 55 ; came out of action with 73 survivors. Fifty-
third Illinois volunteers went into action with 200 men ;
killed, wounded, and captured, 134 ; came out of action
with 66 survivors.
" General Hovey, who had witnessed the battle, rode
up to where the brigade was halted, and when he learned
the extent of the loss, declared it the most unprecedented
loss for the length of time (forty- eight minutes by his
watch) that he ever heard of. Checking his horse in front
of the brigade, and lifting his cap gracefully, the General
said : ' Soldiers of the First Brigade ! I know you ; I have
heard of your bravery and devotion before ; I know you
are true to every instinct of patriotism and love of country,
but what better evidence need 1 ask than those historic names
— Donelson, Shilo, Big-Hatchie, and Vicksburg — I see
emblazoned upon your flags, yet begrimed by the smoke
of the battle just closed, and your shattered ranks before
me ? They speak, my brave fellows, in silent but eloquent
praise of your heroism and devotion to our cause. Indeed,
gentlemen, to illustrate your case briefly, you remind me of
old-rye whisky — the older it gets the better it is,'

SHERMAN S ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. 40 1
" With a few more clever words. General Hovey rode
back to his division.
" The Rebels were 4,000 strong, and one battery and
6 guns. Loss: 27 killed and 55 wounded."
General Sherman, now fully convinced of the inex
pediency of assaulting his opponent's positions by direct
attack, resorted to his hitherto successful expedient of
accomplishing his purposes by the less costly one of flank
movements. By movements of this character — movements
very skilfully planned and executed — Johnston was again
necessitated to move back, first from the Kenesaw, and
then quite across the Chattahoochee river, within about
ten miles from Atlanta. After getting his own army over,
and in a state of readiness to recommence operations as
soon as the proper time should arrive. General Sherman
gave his soldiers a few days of necessary rest. While
thus waiting, he was joined by General Rousseau with
2,000 cavalry, this General having come in twelve days,
and by a long circuit, from Decatur, Ala., — verifying
the practicability of readily moving an army from that
point to Atlanta.
During this interval, also, an event occurred which
changed the whole aspect of the campaign, and finally
annihilated the last hope of the Confederacy. We refer
to the substitution of General J. B. Hood, of Texas, in the
place of General Johnston, as commander of the army
opposed to General Sherman. Of General Johnston,
justice requires the historian to affirm that, as a General,
he probably had no superior in ability In the Confederate
army. He had courage, energy, and prudence, of by no
means an inferior order. His successor, on the other
hand, had courage and energy, without prudence. He
had fighting qualities of a high order. These, however,
were all under the control of one fixed idea — acting on the
offensive, attacking the enemy in whatever position he
might be found, and that with a reckless disregard of the
inferiority of force on the part of the assailing party. He
was, consequently, the very man needed to waste away
the small force wliich remained under his command in the
shortest time possible, and thus ensure a speedy collapse
of the Confederacy. His predecessor had, up to the time
26

402 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
of his supersedure, acted, and that very prudently, upon
the only policy which wisdom dictated in his circumstances,
namely, to fight only when it could be done with small
expenditures of his own forces, and large draughts upon
the resources of his opponent — to draw away his enemy
from his base of supplies, always necessitating him to
diminish his own forces by leaving large bodies behind
to guard his rear — to continue this process until the pur
sued should be stronger than the pursuer ; and then fall
upon the eneray and crush hira in detail. Atlanta was the
position fixed upon by General Johnston for a final stand,
the raost formidable position which General Sherraan had
yet approached, lying between that city and the Chatta
hoochee, while the city itself was, on all sides, most im
pregnably fortified, and prepared for a long siege.
From all perils of this character, the blind giant with
his little club — the giant who succeeded Johnston, soon
relieved us. He received his command for the known
purpose of assuming the offensive, and he immediately
acted under the impulse of his native instincts. His
effective force, when he assumed the command, says
Pollard, was 41,000 infantry and artillery, and 10,000
cavalry. During the nearly two months which inter
vened between this period and the time when he aban
doned Atlanta, he fought with our army no less than three
pitched battles, in which he was the assailant, — in which he
was, of course, defeated, with losses to us which we could
afford to endure, but with a loss to himself of quite one-
third of the forces under his coraraand — losses which ruined
the cause which he was appointed to defend. If we bear
m raind that it took Sherman, within four days, as much
time, after he had crossed the Chattahoochee, to capture
Atlanta, as he had spent in all his prior campaign, and
this when opposed to such a blind giant as Hood, we shall
at once be impressed with the apprehension that that
campaign might have had a very different outcome had
Johnston been continued in command. In that case, the
probabilities would evidently have been fearfully against
us, and might have presented another verification of the
fundaraental error on which all advances into the Confede
rate territory were made, namely, an advance on one line by

SHERMAN'S ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. 4O3
a single force. By an advance on this principle, the
enemy, by threatening coraraunications, can necessitate the
advancing army to weaken ' itself by constantly leaving
large forces behind to protect its rear, and thus at length
becoming so weakened that the enemy will be the strongest,
and then defeat in detail the invading force. By advanc
ing into Russia on this principle, which he proclaimed as
the only proper one, Buonaparte found himself but a little
stronger than his enemy at Borodino, and too weak to do
anything effective at all when he arrived at Moscow.
Hence that disastrous retreat which,cost him his empire.
Had the French army escaped from Metz, Paris would not
have fallen. The communications of the German army
would have been so exposed, that they could not have
been provisioned around the city. In our discussions
before President Lincoln in January 1863, we fully con
vinced him, and drew from him a distinct avowal of the
conviction, that the principle, — that under consideration, —
on which all our invasions of Confederate territory, up to
that time, had been made, is a totally false one. The
principle on which the carapaign under consideration was
made is wholly of this bad character, and but for a change
in the command of the Confederate army would in all
probability have resulted in a national disaster. General
Johnston, as we have been informed on authority which we
deem perfectly reliable, calculated that at the opening of
the campaign the relative amount of the forces of the two
armies was as twelve to seven. At the tirae when he was
superseded, he calculated that the ratio stood at seven to six.
At that time Sherman was in circumstances where he would
be compelled to fight at great disadvantage. One or two
battles fought under such circumstances would change
the relative strength of the armies, so that the Confede
rates would be the strongest, and our array would be at
their raercy, and would be crushed by superior forces.
Such were the definite plans of General Johnston when he
was superseded.
On the morning of September ist. General Sherman,
who was then twenty miles from Atlanta, heard sounds
which clearly indicated that soraething of the greatest
moment was transpiring in that city. Three days after, he

4C4 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
received intelligence from General Slocum that the sounds
heard were the result of the explosion of the Confederate
magazines in the city — an event which had been followed
by the retirement of Hood and his army, and the peaceable
entrance of ours into that same stronghold. Between
Septeraber 5th and 7th, Sherman returned, and sent a. tele
gram to Washington that "Atlanta has been fairly Mjpn."
In capturing the city, but very few prisoners fell into our
hands. The loss to the Confederates, however, was
immense. The position itself was of great importance;
and the munitions, guns, cars, locomotives, manufactories,
and machinery, all together constituted a loss truly irre
parable. One fact occurred at this tirae which does not add to
the credit of General Sherman as a general. The Con
federate army was now divided into two parts, and these
were separated quite a distance from one another, while
our army was so located that any amount of force which
our commander might deem requisite might have been
readily thrown in between the separated parts referred to,
and have fallen with crushing weight upon either, or both
in succession. Movements might obviously have been
made which would have rendered it impossible for General
Hood ever to have reunited his army. General Hardee, for
example, as Sherman was from careful reconnoissance fully
aware, was about twenty-five miles to the south of Atlanta,
at a place named Lovejoy, in a strongly entrenched camp,
while General Hood with the other half of his army had
retired in quite another direction. By placing a strong
force between Hood and Hardee, the one half of the Con
federate army under the latter must inevitably have been
defeated and captured. This golden opportunity, however,
was neglected, and the Confederate army was reunited
near Jonesboro', it being the fixed policy of our Generals
to capture positions, and not armies. Here, by forced
conscription, that army was raised to nearly its primal
strength, consisting now of 35,000 infantry and 10,000
cavalry. The policy of the Confederate commander, at this crisis,
was certainly very shrewd. Passing his entire array over
the Chattahoochee, he moved directly upon Sherman's

SHERMAN S ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. 4.O5
communications. As soon as our commander became
aware of this fact, he sent General Thomas to Nashville.
giving him full command of all forces in that department ;
while General Sherman himself, leaving Slocum with the
20th corps at Atlanta, hastened with the rest of his army
to protect his imperilled rear. Hood made unsuccessful
attempts to capture Altoona, then Kingston, Rome, and
finally Resaca, to all of which places Sherman pursued the
enemy in hot haste, without, however, being able to bring his
antagonist to a stand-up fight, an event which, by this time,
misfortune had taught Hood sufficient wisdom not to desire.
At Fayetteville all movements and dispositions to bring on
a general engagement having failed, and the enemy, passing
round our front, and moving by our left, having suddenly
become invisible, and gone our commander could not divine
whither, the pursuit was given over. Halting finally near
Galesville, Ala., and searching in vain for his vanished foe,
our commander concluded that Hood had passed over
Sand Mountain, and was moving in the direction of Nash
ville. This conjecture was confirmed by information that
Hood, passing Decatur, had crossed the Tennessee at
Florence, and was marching, or making preparation to
march, into Tennessee. Detaching the 4th corps under
Stanley, and the 23rd under Schofield, with the mass of his
cavalry under Wilson, with orders to march to Chattanooga
and report to Thomas, Sherman, with a single division of
cavalry under Kilpatrick, and the rest of his army, returned
to Atlanta to prepare for his famous march across the
State of Georgia. Thus ended this Atlanta campaign, a
campaign which, as we have seen, involved a fundamental
error in its plan, was prosecuted with much skill and
energy, and at a vast expenditure of men and treasure, and
produced comparatively small results to the benefit of the
nation. Of the verity of this statement, the reader will be
rendered fully aware when we shall have noticed certain
operations west of the Mississippi, and then presented a
general view of the state of affairs, together with the plan
of the Confederates at this time.

CHAPTER XXVIII.
OPEliA TIONS WEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI.
"The comprehensive plan" of General Grant compre
hended, as we have stated, the idea of a nearly simul
taneous movement upon the enemy, on a line quite 1,500
miles in extent, — namely, that of the Potomac, under Grant
himself, in Virginia; that of the Cumberland, under Sherman,
in Georgia ; and two others, one under Banks, and another
under Steele, in Texas and Arkansas. The results of the
first two campaigns are before us. Let us now turn our
thoughts to the current of events west of the Mississippi.
As early as January 1864, General Banks had planned
a campaign in Texas, by way of Galveston, — a plan to
enter the State from the sea-coast. This plan was super
seded by another and different one, a movement up the
Red river for the capture of Shreveport, and the general
conquest of the State. This plan was to sorne extent
matured before General Grant assumed supreme com
mand, but was after that adopted as a part of his " com
prehensive plan." The force set apart for this movement
amounted to quite 40,000 men. Of these, some 15,000
were under the immediate command of General Banks at
Franklin, Louisiana, and 15,000 under General Steele at
Little Rock, Arkansas, while 10,000 were to be sent frora
Vicksburg, up the Red river, under General A. J. Smith.
These forces, attended by Admiral Porter with a fleet of
fifteen ironclads and four lighter steamers, were under
four distinct and independent commands, neither reporting
or accountable to the other. " While four forces," said
General Banks, before the Committee on the Conduct of
the War, — " General Steele's, Sherman's (under General

OPERATIONS WEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 4O7
Smith), Admiral Porter's, and my own, — were operating
together, neither one of them had a right to give a com
mand to the other. General Smith never made any report
to me, but considered his as substantially an independent
force. It took us twenty days to communicate with General
Steele ; and then we could only state our position, ask
what he was doing, and give advice ; but we could not
tell whether he followed the advice or not, or what he was
doing." The result of a grand expedition thus conducted
could not but be a failure. Steele's army never came upon
the field at all. Of the 10,000 sent from Vicksburg, 3,000
marines were soon recalled to guard the Mississippi. At
Alexandria, some seventy or eighty miles up the Red
river, 3,000 more troops had to be left to guard the depot
of supplies. After getting up some distance farther, to
Natchitochis, the river was found to be too low to float
safely the heavy ironclads, and all means to remedy the
evil proved ineffectual ; while in an important crisis.
General Franklin, as might have been expected, failed to
come up in time. After fighting several bloody battles,
in the raost important of which, that at Pleasant Hill, both
parties claimed the victory, the expedition returned with
the acknowledged loss of quite 5,000 men. General Banks,
who had to bear the blame of the blunders of his superiors,
was now superseded. General Canby being put In command.
General Steele, after making ineffectual efforts to enter
into communication with General Banks, gave over all
attempts to reach Shreveport; and, on hearing of the
latter's reverses, faced in the opposite direction. The
efforts of the Confederates were now directed mainly to
two ends — the recovery of Arkan.sas, and a grand invasion
of Missouri. In both respects those efforts were successful.
After various battles of greatoi and less importance,
battles in some of which one party, and in others the
other, was successful, Arkansas was practically recovered to
the Confederacy, and about the middle of September,
General Price, having been reinforced by General Shelby,
entered South-Eastern Missouri with an army from 20,000
to 30,000 strong, and met with no resistance until he
encountered a single brigade under Generall H. S. Ewing,
at Pilot Knob.

CHAPTER XXIX.
RESULTS OF THE GREAT CAMPAIGNS OF 1864;
PLANS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE UNION AND
CONFEDERATE COMMANDERS.
We have deemed it essential to a full and correct under
standing of the conduct of this war, to devote a single
chapter to a consideration of the results of the great
campaigns of this year — results up to the ist October,
on the one hand, and of the plans of the Union and Con
federate military authorities for the future, on the other.
The results of these campaigns may be stated in a few
words. The relative strength of the hostile forces, we
must bear in mind, was, at the beginning of May, as
1,000,000 of men on our side, to not over 200,000 against
us, on the other. In the Eastern Department, where our
forces, at the time referred to, outnumbered those of the
Confederacy there as more than three to one, the results
of the campaign may be thus summed up. On the ist
May, the main portion of our Grand Army lay at Cul
pepper, holding full control of by far the largest part of
the territory of Virginia, and all parts of that army so dis
tributed that they could act together as a perfect unity.
On the ist October, we find the main portion of this
territory reconquered to the Confederacy, and the Grand
Army of the Potomac separated into three parts, and
these located at unsupporting distances from each other, —
namely, the main body under Grant "bottled and corked
up" in that narrow peninsula in front of Petersburg;
another great force at Washington, — a force lying idly
there to preserve the city from the grasp of the enemy ;
and a third army, 30,000 to 40,000 strong, under General

RESULTS OF THE GREAT CAMPAIGNS OF 1 864. 409
Sheridan in the Shenandoah, with a wide strip of territory,
barbarously desolated, in its front, — and all to guard Penn
sylvania and Maryland against a fourth invasion. These
great results have been gained at a loss of from 140,000
to 150,000 brave men. We must bear in mind, also,
that all these immense forces, increased by more than
70,000 one-hundred-days' men, lay, from this period
until the opening of the next spring campaign, as im
movable as " a sea of stagnant idleness," and this
while all the Confederate forces in our immediate front
numbered less than 70,000 men, and could at no time
have numbered more than that, a blank ignorance sitting
as a nightmare upon the brain of our Commander-in-Chief
as to what use ought to be raade, under the circum
stances, of the immense and overwhelming forces under
his command.
In the grand centre of the great movement we find
General Sherman, after a four months' campaign, in
which we have lost upwards of 40,000 of our best
troops, advanced from Chattanooga to Atlanta, and here
located in a city made as desolate as Herculaneum, and
that for reasons which neither humanity nor national
necessity can justify, while Tennessee is invaded by
a hostile array 50,000 strong, and General Sherman
is sending back a large portion of his forces to save
that State from being reconquered to the Confederacy.
West of the Mississippi, the campaign, up to the period
under consideration, was a series of disasters to the
national cause. We have only to think of the defeats of
Generals Banks and Steele, the expulsion of our army from
Texas, the recovery of Arkansas to the Confederacy, and
the imposing invasion of Missouri to recover it to the
enemy, to apprehend at once the strict correctness of the
above statement.
Such, up to the time under consideration, were the
results of our grand campaigns conducted under " the
comprehensive plan" of our Commander-in-Chief, — results
gained at the most enormous expenditure of the national
treasury, and at the loss on our part of nearly or quite
200,000 men. In view of such results. — results gained
through the controlled agency of i,ooo,coo me'n against

4IO THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
200,000, — a large portion of ray countrymen will have it
that in this Commander-in-Chief we have a greater than
a Wellington or a Napoleon — a Caesar " corae again."
Plan of the Confederate authorities.
Let us now turn our attention, for a few raoraents, to a
consideration of \!a.& plans of the Union, on the one hand,
and on the other, of the Confederate, military authorities, at
this time. In respect to that of the latter, we would say
that, in two fundamental respects, it resembled the original
one of General Grant, — namely, that as far as mere extent
was concerned, it was very comprehensive ; and as far as
the idea of combination of forces for the realization of
desired ends is concerned, this plan in reality corapre-
hended nothing, and miscalculated everything. A mind
of the feeblest intelligence can determine to act upon a
widely extended field, and can make certain dispositions
for such action. To comprehend the entire situation,
however, and to understand the combination of forces
demanded by existing circumstances, is quite another
matter. When, in the fall of 1861, it became evident that
an inflexible determination existed in the Government and
people of the North to put down the Rebellion, its leaders
ought to have dissolved their Government and army, and
returned to their homes. Nothing in the future was more
certain, whatever errors in the conduct of the war might
exist, than the restoration of the union of these States. The
teraporary advantages gained by the Confederate armies
were in fact disastrous defeats, because such advantages
were secured by sacrifices which assured the ultimate
extinction of those armies. Whatever of lost territory was
reconquered, merely attenuated the feeble power of the
Confederacy over a wider extent of country than before, and
thus rendered the conquest of the whole rebellious States
a matter of greater ease and certainty. The machinery
of the Confederate power may be compared to a machine
which an individual, many years ago, submitted to critical
inspection in the city of Boston — a machine in which the
inventor affirmed that he had solved the problem of perpetual
motion. The machine was of strange and admirable struc
ture, and seemed perfect in all its parts. There was one.

RESULTS OF THE GREAT CAMPAIGNS OF 1 864. 41I
and only one, difficulty about it — it would not go. There was
no " living spirit" in its wheels to set it in motion, or keep
it going when started by power from without. So it was with
the Confederacy. There was from the beginning a friction
in all its motions, a friction which rendered its continued
action impossible, — " a sentence of death in itself," which
rendered its dissolution at no distant day a necessity.
All the plans of the Confederates, consequently, had in
them the element of the absurd, — the attempt to realize
the impossible. This was true, however those plans might
give promise of temporary success.
Their plan for the two campaigns under consideration —
that in Missouri, on the one hand, and that in Tennessee,
on the other — looked in the direction of vast results, and
bore as fair promises of success as characterized any of the
important aggressive movements made by the Confederacy
during the war. In November ensuing, the Presidential
election was to occur, an election in which the national
choice lay between President Lincoln and General
McClellan. The results anticipated from the invasion of
Missouri by General Price, were„ Arkansas having already
been recovered, that by a general rising in Missouri, not
only to recover that State permanently to the Confederacy,
but by an invasion of Iowa to prevent all these three States
fromx taking part in the election, and thus to ensure a
majority of Presidential votes for the Democratic candidate.
Among the documents which General Pleasanton captured
while repelling this invasion, he found one in which this
identical plan was specifically laid down. Such was the plan
of the Confederate campaign west of the Mississippi.
As far as Tennessee was concerned, it was fully believed
that if General Hood should, with an army 50,000
strong, cross the Tennessee river, and capture Franklin
and Nashville, there would be a universal uprising through
out the State in the interest of the Rebellion, an uprising
which would be at once followed in Kentucky, and these
two States would be recovered to the Confederacy. Nor
was this all that was hoped from these invasions. The
idea of an uprising In the Free States, to stop the effusion
of blood, and prevent the success of the emancipation
measures of the Government, — the idea which induced the

412 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
invasion of Pennsylvania and Maryland by General Lee, —
still had place in the plans and hopes of the Confederate
authorities, and induced them to put forth all possible
efforts to secure signal success, especially in the States of
Tennessee and Missouri. Judged in the light of such con
siderations, the advance of General Price into Missouri,
and that of General Hood into Tennessee, were as wise
and prudent as were those of General Lee into Pennsyl
vania and Maryland. The idea entertained by General
Price, however, of forcibly preventing an election in Iowa,
gives the appearance of the ridiculous to his whole scheme.
Plan of the Unionists.
We now turn to a consideration of the plan of our own
commanders, the plan of which General Sherman, with truth
no doubt, clairas to have been the originator. General
Sherraan is now at Atlanta, with an effective force, accord
ing to his own statement, of 62,000 veteran and able-
bodied troops, under his immediate command. General
Hood, with an army upwards of 50,000 strong, had crossed
the Tennessee river to recover the State of Tennessee
at all events, and Kentucky if possible, to the Confederacy.
To repel this invasion. General Thomas, in command
there, had an effective force under his immediate control of
less than 30,000 men. The poSsibiHty of preventing the
capture of Nashville, and all the consequent evils that
might arise, depended upon a contingency to which the
greatest uncertainty attached, namely, the timely arrival of
adequate reinforcements from Missouri. We must bear in
mind here, that General Smith, with a corps 20,000 strong,
had gone down as far as Cairo, and had been recalled
from thence to repel the invasion of General Price. The
only rational hope of success on the part of our com
mander was the early defeat of Price, and the subsequent
timely arrival of Smith to aid Thomas against Hood.
Another fact of fundamental importance lay out with
perfect distinctness before the mind of General Sherman —
the fact that in the army of General Hood lay the entire
military power of the Confederacy, as far as all the States
lying between Virginia and South Carolina and the Mis
sissippi river are concerned. To raise that army to its

RESULTS OF THE GREAT CAMPAIGNS OF 1864. 413
existing strength, all the reraaining resources of those
States had been put forth. To destroy that army was, in
fact, to annihilate the military power of the Confederacy in
the States of Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Florida, and
Tennessee. This end being accomplished, a Union army
10,000 strong could have marched at will in any direction
over and through any of these States. Another fact equally
obvious presented Itself at that time, the fact that this army
lay within the visible grasp of General Sherraan, and might
have been utterly annihilated by him in four or six weeks'
time at the farthest. Within the space of ten days. Hood
moved his army from the vicinity of Resaca over the moun
tains to the front of Decatur. In two weeks, as none will
deny, Sherman might have marched his array from Atlanta
to the same point, or to any other point that might have
been selected. It would have been perfectly easy for
Sherman to deceive Hood into the belief that the former
had started on his southern raarch, and thus to induce
the latter to advance into the interior of Tennessee,
in the direction of Nashville. This end being gained,
Sherman should have suddenly changed his course, and
by forced marches have moved upon D'ecatur, all his prior
dispositions having been preparatory to this one grand
movement. On arriving at this point. Hood would have
been before Nashville, and would have been there between
two armies each greater than his own — Thomas having been
reinforced by General Smith from Missouri. Under these
circumstances, the capture or annihilation of the entire
Confederate army would have been an inevitable certainty.
With Hood's army disposed of as it should have been, the
last movement that would then have been thought of would
have been that famous march across the State of Georgia.
On the other hand, while to Thomas would have been
assigned the care of the States above designated, Sherman
with his veterans would have been transported round to
Washington, or Anapolis, to finish up the war by an over
whelming movement upon General Lee. Sherman on his
arrival might have moved out frora Washington to Cul
pepper, being there reinforced by Sheridan, and his army
thus raised to about 100,000 men, and then, with a crush
ing force, have raoved upon Lee's rear. Under such

414 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
circumstances, the latter would have surrendered, and the
war have been terminated without fighting a battle. The
same end, though not so soon, would have been accom
plished by moving Sherman's army round from Anapolis
to Wilmington, as Schofield's afterwards was, and moving
it up upon Lee's rear through North Carolina. Undeniably,
General Sherman had it in his power to have finished up
the war in a few weeks during the autumn of 1864.
Instead of discerning and availing himself of all these
most palpable advantages, what were the visions which
opened upon our General's mind and fixed his determina
tions? A thousand mile march of 62,000 men, first down
to t^ie ocean across one State, and then up through two
other States, to the rear of General Lee's army before
Petersburg. The advantages which such a march proraised
¦ — feasting his army upon the hams, and pigs, and turkeys,
and chickens of the Confederates on the way — outweighed,
in the judgment of our General, all the palpable considera
tions and facts above indicated. Let us hear General
Sherman himself upon this subject. " I only regarded
the march from Atlanta to Savannah as a ' shift of base,'
as the transfer of a strong army which had no opponent,
and had finished its then work, from the interior to a point
on the sea-coast, from which it could achieve other irapor
tant results. I considered this raarch as a raeans to an
end, and not as an essential act of war. Still, then as
now, the march to the sea was generally regarded as
something extraordinary, something anomalous, some
thing out of the usual order of events ; whereas, in fact, I
simply moved from Atlanta to Savannah, as one step in
the direction of Richmond, a moveraent that had to be
met and defeated, or the war was necessarily at an end.
Were I to express my measure of the relative importance
of the march to the sea, and of that frora Savannah north
ward, I would place the former at one, and the latter at
ten, as the maxiraura." General Sherman is unquestion
ably right in his estimate of the relative importance of
that famous march across the State of Georgia. Except
ing as a raeans to an end, " a step in the direction of
Richraond," that march had, in reality, no bearing upon
the real issues of the war. The idea that feeding an array

RESULTS OF THE GREAT CAMPAIGNS OF 1 864. 41c
of 62,000 men upon the people of a narrow territory across
the State of Georgia, divided in sunder the Confederacy,
as had often been affirmed, only betrays ignorance. The
only real good proposed to be accomplished by that land
raarch of i,ooo miles, was to get what might then remain
of those 62,000 men into the rear of General Lee's army
at Richmond. Here, undeniably, is a blunder of the
gravest character. He might, by facing to the north
instead of the south, and moving his army, not on foot,
but by rail and steam, have reached that point, not after a
wearisome and destructive march of five raonths, but in
less than four weeks, and that without wearisomeness or
loss of life on the way.

CHAPTER XXX.
GENERAL PRICES LAST INVASION OF MISSOURI.
When General Rosecrans assumed the command in Mis
souri, he found all things there in a state of confusion and
agitation. Oath bound secret organizations existed, not
only in this State, but over the north-west — organizations
prepared for an uprising as soon as the favourable oppor
tunity should present itself. Not less than 23,000 in
dividuals were, in this State alone, found to have been
bound together under oath to join General Price as soon
as he should appear with a force which promised success.
In a meeting of " the Order of American Knights," in St.
Louis, a resolution was proposed and laid over, to com
mence operations in that city by the assassination of the
Provost- Marshal, and seizing the head-quarters of the
department. By order of General Rosecrans, the State
Commander, Deputy Comraander, the Grand Secretary,
Lecturer, and from thirty to forty infl'uential members of
the Order, were seized and lodged in prison. The State
Commander turned out to be the Belgian Consul in
that city. An order for his release was sent on from
Washington — an order which, by a disclosure of facts,
General Rosecrans got reversed. While such a state of
things existed, our commander found his embarrassments
greatly augmented by the want of a military force adequate
to the preservation of peace. Under such circumstances.
General Price,, with an army from 20,000 to 30,000 strong,
mostly cavalry, entered the State at the south east, and
advanced without resistance to Pilot Knob. There, as
formerly stated, he met his first resistance from a single
brigade commanded by General H, S, Ewing, In the

GENERAL PRICE' S LAST INVASION OF MISSOURI, 417
battle which there occurred, the invaders lost upwards of
1,000 men, Ewing losing about 200. Having inflicted
this loss upon the invaders, and after bravely repulsing
two determined assaults. General Ewing made a safe
retreat to Rolla, having at Harrison been joined by a body
of cavalry sent to his assistance, the IlHnoIs 17th, under
Colonel Beveridge. In his retreat. General Ewing moved
his forces sixty-six miles in thirty-nine hours. At Harri
son, our wearied forces were fiercely assailed by General
Shelby. For thirty hours that brave band, under their
brave commander, resisted the far superior forces precipi
tated upon thera, until Colonel Beveridge arrived and
Shelby drew off.
General Price having, as he intended, threatened St.
Louis, and fixed attention in that direction, turned to the
north-west, obtained a ready control in the interior of the
State, and advanced in force against its capital, Jefferson
City, having burned Herman, a Union settlement of Ger
mans, on his way. In his advance. Price was vigorously,,
but with much care, pursued by General A. J. Smith,
brought up, as formerly stated, from Cairo, while on his
way to reinforce General Thomas. General Smith had under
him some 6,000 men, and 1,500 cavalry. At this time
an iraportant accession of strength to our forces was made.
General Mower, with quite 5,000 veteran troops, had fol
lowed in the rear of General Price out of Arkansas, having,
over exceeding bad roads, marched upwards of 300 miles
in eighteen days. This force was brought by steam
boats from Cape Girardeau to St. Louis, and frora thence
hastened on to Jefferson City to aid in its defence against
General Price.
At this time " the indiscretions " of our mllitaiy
authorities at Washington brought upon the scene a man
adequate to the occasion. General Pleasanton having been:
dismissed from the Army of the Potomac, and sent to the
Western Department, arrived, and assumed command of
the forces in the interior of the State. On his arrival,
he found 12,000 raen in Jefferson City, General Mower
having arrived. Of these, about 5,000 were cavalry.
These forces, commanded by General Fisk, were acting on
the defensive, and were cutting down even the shade-trees 27

41 8 THE AMERICAN REBELLION,
about the city to strengthen the defences. General
Pleasanton, having, as forraerly stated, captured docu
ments which revealed the plans of the enemy, deterrained
upon a prompt and vigorous assumption of the offensive,
combining with those before him the forces under General
Smith, and others available for his purpose. Price's army
was in no condition to meet such a moveraent. While
his central force was before Jefferson City, nearly one-half
of his army was north of the Missouri under General
Shelby, Two circumstances now occurred which prevented the
utter annihilation of Price's array, — General Smith was
detained with our supplies, and by the destruction of the
railroad bridge at Romine, where he was joined by General
Mower. At this tirae Pleasanton and Sraith both received
positive orders frora General Rosecrans to move in force
to Lexington. This delay, on the one hand, and deflection
from the proper line of pursuit on the other, enabled
Price to widen the distance between him and his pursuers,
to bring back his forces from the north of the Missouri,
and to concentrate them for retreat, defence, or attack, as
circumstances might require. Having as far as possible
remedied the evils of a false raove, which absolute orders
from his superior in coraraand corapelled him to make,
and having got his cavalry into a moving condition,
General Pleasanton made a direct and most vigorous pur
suit of the enemy. The detour referred to, however,
rendered it impossible for General Smith with his infantry
corps, all possible efforts to that end being put forth, to cut
off Price's retreat south. All that could be done was by a
vigorous pursuit. Now commenced a series of the most
brilliant movements known in the history of this war. In
three days General Pleasanton moved his cavalry quite
1 20 miles, fought four battles, and gained as raany
important victories on the way. His first encounter was at
Little Blue, at 10 a.m., October 22nd, Driving the enemy
frora a strong position at this point, he pressed hardly
upon his flying footsteps until nightfall, when Independence
was captured by a brilliant charge of cavalry.
The next morning the pursuit was renewed. On
arriving at the crossings of the Big Blue, the enemy, who

GENERAL PRICe's LAST INVASION OF MISSOURI, 419
had the day before made at this point an unsuccessful
attack upon General Curtis, was found drawn up in order
of battle, and fully prepared for a most stubborn resistance.
The battle opened at 7 a.m., and at i p.m. the enemy was
routed and fled frora the field. At first General Curtis,
with his Kansas forces, took up the pursuit. He soon
gave place, however, to Pleasanton's cavalry. At
Marais-des-Cygnes, after a march of sixty miles, the enemy
was again overtaken. Aroused in their bivouac, at 4 a.m.,
by the booming of cannon, the Confederates sprang to
their horses, and fled without their breakfasts. After being
chased to Little Osage, they faced northward for a final
stand against their relentless pursuers. Their line of battle
displayed eight guns, the only cannon they had brought
back with them. General Pleasanton instantly ordered a
charge by two brigades, commanded by Generals Benteen
and Phillips. The charge was, of course, most splendidly
made, and resulted in the quick rout of the enemy, with
the loss of their eight guns, and more than 1,000 prisoners,
besides many colours, a great amount of small-arms, and
the most of their waggons. Among their prisoners were
Major-General Marmaduke, Brigadier- General Cabell, and
five colonels. A fresh brigade under General Sanborn
now came up, and took the lead in the pursuit. A few
miles farther south, the enemy made another stand. Here
they were again put to rout, and driven headlong onward
until darkness rendered further pursuit impossible. Burning
their waggons and other materials, the enemy now took to
their horses, and fled for life. Here, from mere exhaustion.
Generals Pleasanton and Smith gave rest to the raain
portions of their forces.
General BliRrt, with a body of Kansas troops, and
General Benteen' s brigade, followed by that of General
S-'^'born, raoved upon the trail of the foe to Newtonia, in
the south-western portion of the State. Here General Blunt
encountered a stubborn resistance, and would have been
worsted had not General Sanborn, after a raarch of 102
miles in thirty-six hours, come up and secured a victory.
With little left, as Mr. Greeley truly says,—" with little left
to lose but their bodies and worn-out horses," the enemy
escaped into Western Arkansas. General Curtis followed

420 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
on as far as Fayetteville, Arkansas, where he routed, with
great loss to them and none to us, a body of 2,000 men,
who were besieging a small Union force under Colonel
Brooks. Long before this last of that memorable series
of victories, which sent General Price a returnless fugitive
and exile from the State of which he was Governor at the
beginning of the war. General Smith, with a corps about
20,000 strong, was on his way to Tennessee to aid Thomas
in destroying the army of General Hood at Nashville.
We shall speak of the cause and bearing of this event after
we shall have considered the campaign in the State last
referred to. Reflections on this campaign.
According to the fixed principles and precedents of all
prior campaigns during this war. Generals Pleasanton and
Smith, and their bold coadjutors, deserve the deep repro
bation of the army arid nation. We refer to the relentless
pursuit by these men and their forces of General Price
and his raiders, after the first signal defeat of those in
vaders had rendered their prompt retreat from the State of
Missouri a certainty. After that defeat, all heart to fight
was taken out of Price and his subordinates, and they
became possessed of but one desire, and that was the
privilege of a peaceful departure from the State which
they had invaded, taking along with them the plunder
which they had gathered up during their invasion, and
which they would so much need in their banishment. All
such considerations their relentless pursuers utterly dis
regarded, not suffering the pursued to carry back one of
the guns which they brought with them out of Arkansas
and Texas. What, in all the precedents of all leading
commanders during the war up to that time, can be pleaded
in justification of the reckless conduct of General Sanborn
in -pushing his command upwards of a hundred railes in
thirty- six hours, in order to perfect the disorganization of
the debris of that flying foe? Even this did not satisfy
the hungry maw of Curtis, but he must press forward into
Arkansas, and perfect the paralysis of the Confederate
cause there by the cruel defeat of that besieging force
at Fayetteville. In this censure, General Rosecrans must

GENERAL PRICE S LAST INVASION OF MISSOURI. 42 1
come in for his full share ; because he, from his high
watch-tower at St. Louis, witnessed that relentless pur
suit, and might have stopped it. Yet he never uttered
a prohibition, rebuke, censure, or expostulation, — and that
when it was perfectly manifest that the pursuers not only
grudged the invaders the plunder they were endeavouring
to escape with, but the food which the men were endeavour
ing to collect to satisfy their famishing stomachs, and even
the wild grass with which they were endeavouring to keep
their horses from falling under them, and to keep upon
the reeling bodies of those animals the flesh they had on
when the invasion began. And then, what shall be said
of the promptitude with which General Smith, as soon as
the ruin of Price was secured, was sent off to Tennessee
to enable Thomas to inflict upon Hood the same relentless
form of ruin which Pleasanton and his coadjutors had
perpetrated upon Price ? What, finally, can be said in
apology for Thomas in his palpable departure from the
precedents of his illustrious predecessors, and copying
such a new and dangerous example as had just been set
him in Missouri ? No historian can find in the campaigns
of those predecessors a single example that can be pleaded
in excuse for the two campaigns under consideration. It
is absolutely undeniable that those predecessors ought to
have been dismissed for their incompetency or neglect of
palpable duty, or Pleasanton and Thomas should have
been cashiered for their reckless and cruel innovations.

CHAPTER XXXI.
THE CAMPAIGN OF GENERAL HOOD IN
TENNESSEE.
We now turn to a consideration of the celebrated cam
paign of General Hood in Tennessee. We here notice
two existing misapprehensions in regard to this campaign.
As commonly represented, its prime object was to draw
General Sherman back out of Georgia. If this was so,
why did Hood tarry upoa the Tennessee river, crossing
but a part of his army over until he had definite informa
tion that Sherman had broken from all his communications,
and was considerably advanced on his march through that
State ? And why did Hood, as soon as he was fully assured
of Sherman's real purpose, commence his advance upon
Nashville ? The truth is, that nothing was less desired
than Sherman's return to Tennessee, and nothing was
more desired than that he should continue his march south.
The plan and purpose of Hood's invasion was, undeniably,
what we have represented it to have been, a part of a great
moveraent to restore Tennessee, Kentucky, and Missouri
to the Confederacy, to secure a general uprising in the
north-west against the eraancipation policy of the national
administration, and, if possible, to prevent Iowa taking part
in the then approaching Presidential election.
The other mistake is that the advance of Hood to
Decatur was " a feint to cover his crossing farther west."
General Hood, on the other hand, advanced to that point
with the serious intent of crossing there, and was induced
to change his plan by the prompt and wise dispositions of
General Granger, then in command at that place. Know
ing that his forces were too small to withstand a general

THE CAMPAIGN OF GENERAL HOOD IN TENNESSEE. 423
assault from the army of General Hood, and being well
aware of the importance of time to the~ Union cause.
General Granger, to impose upon his antagonist, advanced
his entire force, with all his guns, into his front line, every
where putting on a bold face, making a sortie on his left,
and capturing 120 prisoners. Hood, inferring from what
was visible in his front that a very large Union force was
in Decatur, drew off, and passed the river at Florence.
We shall not stop to detail the senseless folly which
characterized this war as conducted by both sides. We
refer to those cavalry raids in which this portion of these
armies did a great deal of material damage, but accom
plished nothing decisive any way. We shall only refer to
the essentials of the campaign itself. When he became
fully assured that all danger of General Sherman's return
to Tennessee was past. General Hood entered In right
good earnest upon his intended campaign. His army
was divided into three corps, under Generals Cheatham,
A. P. Stewart, and S. D. Lee, while his splendid cavalry,
12,000 strong, was commanded by General Forrest. To
meet the invading force, quite 55,000 strong. General
Thomas could send forward but Ave divisions of infantry, —
their number, as we shall see, being greatly increased near
the close of the campaign. Falling back, as Hood ad
vanced, first from Pulaski to Columbia, and from this
place to Franklin, our army, all its parts being concen
trated, made a determined stand here. General Schofield
in command, to resist and turn back the further advance
of the invading force. Battle of Franklin.
To understand the nature of the battle-ground at this
place, we would state that the Harpeth river, coming down
from the south, passes the place on its east side, and then,
turning due west, passes it on its north side, the river thus
forming two sides of a square. Our army was so drawn
up, that, with the river, it formed a hollow square, with
Franklin near its centre,' our right wing touching the
river at the west, and our left at the north-east of the
village. One division of our forces was located over the
river to the east of the village ; while Fort Granger, from

424 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
whence General Schofield observed the battle, lay still
farther south on the same side of the river, near the point
where it was touched by our left wing. Our army num
bered nearly or quite 20,000 men. Hood was present
with his whole army, which had corae down mainly on the
Columbia and Nashville turnpike, which passes through
the centre of the square above described. The entire
force of the Confederate army thus confronted our left
wing and part of our centre, where our raain forces were
drawn up, with defences very hastily constructed in their
front. In the forraation of Hood's army, Stewart was on
his right, next the river, Cheatham on his left, and Lee in
reserve, with the cavalry on both wings. As Hood looked
upon the slight breastworks before him, he exclaimed to
his men, " Break those lines, and there is nothing more
to withstand you this side the Ohio river." The first
assault of the enemy was irresistible. The Confederate
forces rolled as a torrent over our breastworks, and cap
tured eight of our guns, with many prisoners. The hill
was lost to us, and the enemy was closing up his ranks
within our lines, our raen rushing to the bridges under the
idea that all was lost. At this crisis, a coraraand rang out
from General Opdycke : " First brigade, forward to the
works!" In a moment, that fearless brigade advanced
to the charge. The conflict was fearful ; but in a few
minutes the enemy, taken perfectly by surprise, recoiled
before that charge, and abandoned the works they had
carried, leaving behind them 300 prisoners, ten battle
flags, and all the guns they had taken from us. In vain
did Hood continue, until 10 p.ra , to push his columns
upon the works which he had won by force, and lost by a
surprise. During the night our army retired, and by noon
the next day lay down to rest and sleep within the defences
at Nashville. In this bloody battle, our losses, as officially reported,
were, in killed, wounded, and missing, 2,326, while General,
Hood admits a loss in all, on his part, of 4,500 men.
After spending the next day in caring for the wounded,
and burying his and our dead, the Confederates raoved,
on December 2nd, to Nashville, It is singular that in
this battle, none of our Generals were killed, and but one,

THE CAMPAIGN OF GENERAL HOOD IN TENNESSEE. 425
Major-General Stanley, wounded. The Confederates
lost, in killed, Major-General P. R. Cleburne, " the
Stonewall Jackson of the West," and Brig.-Generals Gist,
Adams, Strahl, and Granbury. Among their wounded
were Major-General Brown, and Brig.-Generals Carter,
Manlgault, Quarles, Cockrell, and Scott; Brig.-General
Gordon being taken prisoner. Such a victory is, in fact,
a defeat. Siege and battle of Nashville.
When Hood sat down before Nashville, the relative
strength of the two hostile armies was very soon most
materially changed. While the Confederate forces had
been, in the various battles, reduced below 45,000, the
Union forces, by the arrival of General Smith's corps from
Missouri, and of 5,000 men, with a black brigade, from
Chattanooga, had been rendered quite 50,000 strong.
Wisdom now demanded a prompt retreat of the invading
army, and its precipitation upon General Sherman. Mili
tary prudence, however, had no place in the mind of
General Hood. With an army obviously larger than his
own, and a city quite strongly fortified in his front, what
but ruinous defeat awaited him should he remain where
he was ? By following on the track of Sherman, however,
the Confederate commander had it most obviously in his
power to inflict a great disaster upon the Union cause.
On account of deficiency in cavalry, and that he might
mount a few thousand of his men. General Thomas
delayed action for a few days. This greatly perplexed
and offended General Grant, as he looked out upon pass
ing events from the centre of the bottle in which he was
corked up. Despatch after despatch was accordingly sent
on, demanding of Thomas that he should open upon the
enemy. To all such messages, one reply was sent, that
the fight should begin as soon as the army could be
prepared for it. Then a providential interposition rendered
a fight on the part of Thomas, or an assault or a retreat
on the part of Hood, nearly or quite impossible, — the
occurrence of a week's cold of the greatest severity. This
perplexed and irritated our Commander-in-Chief to- the
utmost. Thomas was threatened with displacement;

426 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
Logan was sent on as far as Louisville, to assurae the
command, and push our forces upon the enemy. Finally,
Grant himself came on to Washington with the deter
mination to hasten to Nashville and force the battle. To
all commands and messages, Thoraas replied that the
authorities raight displace him, if they chose. One thing
he should not do, and that was, open the fight before his
army was ready for it.
At length the anxiously-looked-for event arrived. The
weather became warm, and the organization of the army
was perfected. Our array at first lay around the south
side of the city in a semicircular form, our right touching
the Cumberland river west, and our left at the east of the
city, the river itself leading in a semicircle from our left
around to our right. In our line. Smith held our right ;
Wood, now commanding Stanley's corps, held the centre,
and Schofield our left ; while Steed man, with the forces
brought up from Chattanooga and other points, occupied
several positions to the east of Schofield. Hood's line
confronted our centre, and the main portion of Schofield's
line. Thomas, December 14th, ordered an advance of his
right and right centre, on the next day, the weather now
being propitious. As a means of diverting attention from
this movement, Steedman was ordered the raorning before
to assail, and roll up. Hood's right wing, and thereby
cause a movement from his centre to repel the assault.
This movement proving a success. Smith the next morning
being sustained on his right by Wilson's cavalry, ad
vanced up the Hardenpike, and flanked Hood's left.
Hatch's division of Wilson's cavalry first struck, and
drove back the enemy from one of his positions, capturing
a number of prisoners and waggons. The cavalry were
now dismounted, and carried by assault, and in succession,
two more redoubts. The result of these exploits was,
not only the capture of three important redoubts, but eight
guns, and upwards of 300 prisoners. In these assaults.
Smith's infantry rendered all the aid which the rapid
action of the cavalry permitted. About i p.m. Wood
came into action on Smith's left, and carried, first. Hood's
central, and then forced him back from his entire line to
the foot of Harpeth, Hills, south of his first position. The

THE CAMPAIGN OF GENER-AL HOOD IN TENNESSEE. 427
result of this day's action was the capture of the enemy's
whole line, 1,200 prisoners, sixteen guns, and forty wag
gons, our losses being very small. While these operations
were going on, Schofield advanced to the right of Smith,
and came into action just at nightfall. Our new line, as
readjusted at evening for the next day's operations, was
thus formed : Wilson, with his cavalry, was on our
extreme right, and ready for a flank movement around
Hood's left; Schofield v;as next; Smith in the centre; and
Wood on our left, with Steedman, as before, still farther in
that direction.
The operations of the next day commenced with a
simultaneous advance of our whole line. Wilson, on our
extreme right, closed round the Confederate left and gained
their rear. Schofield, facing to the east, threatened to roll
up and close round their left flank. Smith confronted
their centre, whilst Steedman and Wood assaulted and
flanked Hood's right at a place called Overton Hills. The
assault upon this position was repulsed with a terrible
slaughter of our forces. The attack on our right and
front, however, was successful, all the works of the enemy
being carried, while Wilson's cavalry seized and held one
of the enemy's main lines of retreat. Wood's and Steed-
man's corps, hearing the shouts of victory from our centre
and left, and being fully re-formed, charged a second time,
and carried every position before them. The rout of
Hood's entire army was now complete. Abandoning most
of their guns and materials, and leaving many prisoners
behind them, they fled in all directions south as best they
could. Now commenced a relentless pursuit of the flying
enemy — a pursuit like that which we have detailed as
having occurred in Missouri. For several days the pur
suit was prosecuted, the enemy being driven from position
to position, and from bivouac to bivouac, until the state
of the roads, and the flooded streams, — the enemy destroy
ing all bridges behind them, — rendered further pursuit
impossible. In this campaign, frora its commencement to its close,
our loss amounted in killed, wounded, and missing to
about 10,000 men. According to the official statement of

428 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
General Thomas, the prisoners captured from the enemy
amounted in all to 11,857 men. If we add to these 1,332
who were exchanged, and 2,207 deserters who received
amnesty, the loss of the enemy, aside from their killed, and
wounded who were carried off, araounted to I5,3g6. We
captured, also, 72 serviceable guns, and upwards of 3,000
sraall-arms. Among the prisoners were, one raajor-
general, seven brigadiers, thirty colonels and lieutenant-
colonels, twenty-two majors, 813 captains and lieutenants,
and eighty-nine surgeons and chaplains. If we take into
account the killed and wounded, and the numbers who
had joined the campaign only for temporary service, the
fact becomes obvious that the army with which Hood
invaded Tennessee was practically annihilated. On his
arrival at Tupelo, Mississippi, Hood was " relieved at his
own request," the Confederate army having lost while
under his command between 30,000 and 40,000 men ;
the ruin of the Confederate cause in Tennessee, and the
four States south of it, being consuraraated through his
instruraentality. We must here put on record our decisive protest
against the conduct of Thoraas, after Hood's last defeat
at Nashville, our protest being based upon all prior pre
cedents from the comraenceraent of this war, the prior
campaign in Missouri excepted. We write in no prejudice
against General Thomas, or his illustrious predecessors in
whose footsteps he refused to follow. What we say is
dictated by one motive, to enable our countrj'^men rightly
to understand the past, and to guard against its errors and
blunders in the future. ' The obvious motive and plan of
General Thornas was not only to defeat General Hood,
but to annihilate his power for further mischief In
all prior victories under our leading commanders, those
in Missouri excepted, this latter end seems to have been
most carefully guarded against. After a victory over the
enemy, the defeated army appeared to become a sacred
thing in the regard of our Generals. We have heard it
gravely asserted, that on the evening after the battle of
Antietam, General Lee sent one of our captured officers
to General McClellan, with a letter requesting the latter,
in the name of humanity, not to press upon the Confede-

THE CAMPAIGN OF GENERAL HOOD IN TENNESSEE. 429
rates in their disorganized and weakened condition. All
this was pure fiction, of course, and was invented merely
to illustrate the conduct of our Generals after a victory..
Lee understood the state of facts too well to send such
a request. He was well aware that, after a defeat, the
Confederate armies were as safe from the perils of pursuit
as from the falling of the sky.
After the victory of Thomas in Eastern Kentucky, and
the capture of Forts Henry and Donaldson, the entire
Confederate army at Bowling Green, as we have shown,
lay within the easy grasp of Halleck and Buell. All ad
vance of our forces, and that against solemn protestations,
was held back, until the enemy had full time to retire with
all their ill-gotten plunder, to take with them ,$10,000,000
worth of material from Nashville, to concentrate at Corinth,
and then raove up and slaughter thousands of our brave men
at Shiloh. When Halleck had compelled the Confederates
to retreat from Corinth, he stood still again until the enemy,
by reorganizing his forces, could pass round our army and
invade Kentucky a second time. When Buell had hastened
back to that State, and by a defeat of the enemy had
necessitated his retirement, he then prohibited pursuit,
permitting the Confederate commander to retire at his
leisure, driving off his immense droves of hogs and cattle
and his long trains of waggons loaded with plundered
provisions and goods, and afterwards to slaughter more
than 50,000 of our men in the battles of Murfreesboro',
Chickamauga, and on other fields. After his so-called
victory at Antietam, McClellan retired back miles into the
countr}'- to sleep, prohibited all disturbance of the enemy
while passing over the Potomac, and for raore than forty
days refused all pursuit, thus permitting General Lee to
recuperate his forces, and afterwards destroy more than
50,000 of our men in the battles of Fredericksburg,
Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg. After our great victories
at Gettysburg, Vicksburg, and Port Hudson, nearly
1,000,000 men, "well armed and equipped," with the
exception of the single movement of Rosecrans with the
Army of the Cumberland, and the relief of our forces,
at Chattanooga and Knoxville, nearly i,ooo,coo mgn lay
" in stagnant idleness, from July until the beginning of

430 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
May of the next year, the Confederacy being thus allowed
full time to recover from the blows it had received, to adjust
itself to its new relations, and with renewed energies and
reorganized armies to enter the field of slaughter for the
year 1864, that most bloody year of all the war. As
soon as the Confederate lines were broken at Gettysburg,
and the power to crush Lee, and end the war, was put into
the hands of our General, he ordered an immediate stand
still of our forces, until the enemy had leisurely retired
beyond the reach of danger. How tenderly, and by
word of command, was subsequent pursuit conducted.
And when Providence, by a swollen river, had again put
the entire Confederate army into our hands, how sacred was
that army in the regard of our commander, until the flood
had subsided, and the enemy had passed safely and undis
turbed over upon his own " sacred soil," with full leisure
there to recover strength to slaughter upwards of 150,000
Union soldiers. When Bragg, with a large portion of his
guns and material, and his army but a little raore than
30,000 strong, retreated before Grant and Sherman at
Chattanooga, 100,000 men were compelled to lay idle on
the Tennessee, until that defeated and disorganized army
had recovered strength to "beat down to the ground "
more than 50,000 of our "strong and lusty" men. Had
Sherman improved his three victories over Hood as Thomas
did his two, the Confederate army would have been destroyed
at Atlanta, instead of Nashville. It was, undeniably, by
the utter and palpable i^eglect of our Generals to improve
the manifest advantages which their victories so often put
into their hands, that, more than any one cause, occasioned
the amazing protraction of the war, the appalling slaughter
of hundreds of thousands of our brave men, and the
creation of that Atlantean debt with which our nation is
now so oppressed. It was by a departure from such pre
cedents that the military power of the Confederacy was
annihilated in the States of Missouri, Arkansas, and in
fact in Texas, on the one hand, and, on the other, in those
east of the Mississippi, and west of Virginia and the
Carolinas.

CHAPTER XXXII.
SHERMANS MARCH THROUGH GEORGIA.
On the nth November, General Sherman, having sent
his sick and wounded back to Chattanooga, having
destroyed the railroads and all property which might be
used to his injury, having sent his last message to Wash
ington, and cut off all telegraphic communications between
himself and the Northern States, commenced his famous
march from Rome and Kingston to Savannah, a march
of some six weeks' continuance, — a march which was
made without fighting a battle worthy of being recorded,
and in which almost the only impediment encountered was
rains, swamps, and bad roads, — a march of 255 miles, and
in which we lost in all less than 600 men. Before entering
upon his raarch. General Sherraan divided his army, up
wards of 60,000 strong, into two grand divisions, com-
raanded by Generals O. O. Howard and H. W. Slocum,
each division being constituted of two corps, the four
being commanded respectively by Generals P. J. Ooster-
haus, F. B, Blair, J. C. Davis, and A. S. Williams; the
cavalry being led by General J. Kilpatrick. When the
army moved frora Atlanta, it was furnished with bread for
twenty, and meat, sugar, etc, for forty, and forage for
three days, — supplies for the rest of the march being drawn
from the country. As no incidents worthy of notice
occurred during this march, we deem it important merely
to direct special attention to the following statements and
reflections in respect to it.
The dismantling and depopulation of Atlanta.
On taking possession of Atlanta, General Sherman sent
off in different directions, at Government expense, and as

432 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
the people elected, all the inhabitants of the city, rendering
its habitations tenantless. " This unprecedented measure,"
General Hood affirmed, " transcends, in studied and
ingenious cruelty, all acts ever brought to my attention in
the dark history of war." Of the truth of that statement
posterity will judge. That it is difficult, if not irapossible,
to find a parallel for it in modern warfare, we deem
undeniable. Nor can it be defended, or apologized for,
on the ground of expediency. After the destruction of its
fortifications and manufactories and railroad communica
tions, and its abandonment . by our army, it had no im
portance as a military post to us, or to the Confederates.
Nor did the depopulation of the place give us any facilities
for its reoccupation, should we ever have desired to return
to it. Just as valid reasons can be offered for the depopu
lation of Rome, Kingston, Macon, or Savannah, as for
Atlanta. To be sure, the people were sent off at Govern
ment expense. After being thus conveyed to a certain
distance, however, they were left homeless, and without
provisions, or the means of obtaining them. We cannot
regard the act in any other light than that of needless
barbarism, like the desolation inflicted upon the defence
less population of the Shenandoah Valley.
What the highest wisdom demanded of the Confederates at the
time of Sherman's invasion.
The same fundamental blunders characterized this war
as conducted by the Union, on the one hand, and the Con
federate military authorities on the other. We refer to
a want of discernment oi golden opportunities. When Hood
lay at Florence, his army, as we have seen, was at the
raercy of Sherman. As soon as Sherman advanced from
Atlanta into the interior of Georgia, his army, most obvi
ously and undeniably, lay equally at the mercy of the
Confederates. Practicable dispositions on their part would
have rendered the capture of the entire invading force an
absolute certainty. Had Lee, as he might have done,
with 10,000 men, reinforced Hardee, who confronted Sher
man, and had Hood, with his 45,000 infantry and artillery,
and his 12,000 splendid cavalry, pressed upon our wings
and rear, Sherman could, by no possibility, have sustained

Sherman's march through Georgia. 433
himself for two weeks, after he was assailed in his front
and rear. This was the golden opportunity for the Con
federates, and, failing to discern it, they, in a military
point of view, deserved most richly all the disasters that
subsequently befell them. Viewed from the strategic
standpoint, that famous march is one of the most pre
sumptuous movements known in history, a movement from
the disastrous consequences of which we were saved but
by the palpable want of discernment on the part of the
Confederates. Such is the judgment which, as is well
known, we passed upon the movement when it was being
made, and which we have entertained ever since. When
asked at the time what we thought of the movement, our
reply was this : " If the Confederate military authorities
are as blind to existing facts and exigencies as ours have
thus far proved themselves to be, and Sherman is clearly
aware of the facts of the case, and is acting upon such
knowledge, then this campaign may be justified as the least
eligible of two good measures which might have been deter
mined on. If, on the other hand, he is not thus informed,
this campaign is one of the most presumptuous blunders
of which we can form a conception. We record it as our
deliberate judgment, that that famous march is a precedent
which all future commanders should avoid. Success never
changes a blunder into a precedent.
What Sherman failed to do.
One fact connected with this famous raarch appears to
all Confederate generals and officers with whom we have
conversed an inexplicable mystery. In the same light,
we have been informed, has the raatter ever stood in
the regard of all well-informed generals in their army.
Augusta, which lay but a few miles east of General
Sherman's line of march, was, and was universally known
to be, a place of more vital importance to the Confederacy
than Atlanta, while Savannah was, at the time, the least
important of the three, Augusta lying on the direct and
main route between Virginia and the Carolinas, and the
central and western States of the Confederacy, and being
also the great central depot for cotton, provisions, and
suDolies for the Confederate armies east and west. No
^^ 28

434 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
Other position was of such vital importance to the Con
federacy as Augusta, and its fall would have, of necessity,
involved the speedy ruin of the cause of the Rebellion,
inasmuch as their means of supply and of united action
would have been cut off. The route through Augusta to
General Sherman's objective point, Petersburg, was raore
direct, and from 150 to 200 miles shorter, than that through
Savannah. By taking the forraer route, and advancing
frora Augusta through Colurabia, he would not only have
divided the Confederacy into two parts, but would have
rendered their reunion impossible. He would, at the same
tirae, have ensured the surrender of Lee, and the final fall
of the Confederacy itself, some months earlier than they
did occur. By passing Augusta, and moving round
through Savannah, he permitted Johnston, with what
remained of Hood's forces, to reinforce Hardee in front
of our army, and to make dispositions which, but for an
event hereafter to be designated, rendered the destruction
of that army almost, or quite, inevitable. Besides, the
capture of Augusta, which was then defended by less
than 5,000 men, and the consequent hopeless prostration
of the Confederacy, would have delayed the advance upon
Savannah but a very few days, had such an advance been
deterrained upon. The neglect to avail himself of this
most propitious opportunity, involves, not only a palpable
blunder, but a mystery which the present generation will
probably be wholly unable to solve, whatever may be true
of the disclosures of the future.
What the Confederates sujff^ered in regard to provisions and
supplies from this march.
The common impression is that by this march the
Confederacy was not only divided, but so impoverished in
provisions as to render a further prosecution of the war
impossible. That the march did not divide the Con
federacy at all is rendered fully evident by the advance
of Johnston with Hood's array through Augusta into
Sherman's front in North Carolina. Indeed, until our
army arrived at Columbia, railroad communications be
tween Virginia and Mississippi were not essentially dis
turbed. That what our army devoured, and carried off.

Sherman's march through Georgia. 435
during the march did not impoverish the Confederacy, is
evident from the abundance which they found on the
narrow strip of territory over which that army passed.
If so much was found here, what must have remained on
the other portions of the fertile territories of Georgia,
Alabama, and Mississippi. It is undeniable that the
damage done by this march was a matter of trifling
concern to the Confederate cause. We raust find the
effects of this raarch in other directions than its immediate
results. What material and provisions we gained, and the Confederates
lost, as the results of this march.
During the march itself, almost nothing, but provisions
were gathered up. In the capture of Savannah, however,
the case was different. The results of the march are thus
sumraed up by Mr. Greeley : — " We had lost in that march
of 255 miles, which was substantially the conquest of
Georgia" (a great mistake, as we have ' seen), "six
weeks' time and 567 men ; whereof 63 were killed, 245
wounded, and i5g missing. To offset these, we had
taken 1,328 prisoners, and 167 guns. Our ammunition
expended was very inconsiderable; while our 65,000 men
and 10,000 horses had lived generously off a State wherein
our captives in thousands had died of virtual starvation
and kindred agonies because (as was alleged) their captors
were unable to subsist them. Aside from sheep, fowls,
sweet potatoes, and rice, whereof they had found an
abundance, 13,000 beeves, 160,000 bushels of corn, and
over 5,ocKD tons of fodder, had been gathered from the
country and issued to our men and animals ; while 5,000
horses and 4,000 mules had been pressed into the
national service. Of cotton, 20,000 bales had been
burned, while 25,000 were captured in Savannah." Two
or three tiraes that nuraber, with untold araounts of pro
visions and supplies, would have been found in Augusta,
had that place also been captured.
The resistance Sherman received from the Confederate forces.
While the neglect to capture Augusta raust remain as
the mystery of the carapaign as conducted by General

436 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
Sherman, the absence of all real resistance to his march
from Rome and Kingston to Savannah must remain a
mystery equally inscrutable in the campaign as conducted
by the Confederates. Hardee's cavalry under Wheeler, out
numbered, it is affirmed, those of Kilpatrick under Sher
man. It is a well-ascertained fact that on his march
Sherman was confronted by an army 30,000 strong, and
that about 10,000 of these were cavalry, while his line of
march compelled hira to pass two important rivers, the
Oconee and the Ogeechee, and on narrow roads, over
many smaller streams, and through multitudinous marshes.
Yet nowhere was there a serious resistance to his
advance. At many points he might obviously have been
compelled to concentrate his forces and fight battles at
the greatest disadvantage. To all human appearance, his
front of, for the raost part, upwards of thirty miles in
extent, might at different points have been successfully
assaulted and broken through, and that with disastrous
results to our army. Yet nothing of the kind was even
attempted. Our men were permitted to forage and raove
at will, as if no hostile forces were near. When Fort
McAlIster was captured, and Hardee was summoned to sur
render Savannah, the only reply returned was that the
¦surrender could not be properly made, because the city
was not then sufficiently invested. While Sherman was
on his way to Hilton Head to concert measures to cut off
Hardee's retreat in the direction of Charleston, the latter
evacuated Savannah, and left it, with all its forts, guns,
munitions, and cotton, to be taken peaceable possession of
by our forces. Great generalship did not always charac
terize the campaigns as conducted by the Confederate
any more than by the Union commanders. But one con
ceivable explanation of the facts before us suggests itself
to our mind, namely, after the defeat of Hood, Generals
Lee and Johnston, divining Sherman's final purpose,
developed the plan of concentrating in North Carolina
Hood's and Hardee's forces, with all others that could be
collected there, for the purpose of crushing Sherman,
when he should have advanced to the vicinity of Golds-
boro', and then confronting Grant with a combination of
force which he could not overcome. This hypothesis

SHERMAN S MARCH THROUGH GEORGIA. 437
renders all Hardee's conduct fully explicable, he having
been Instructed to risk nothing, and to do nothing but
impede Sherman's advance, until the combination above
suggested could be perfected. If this was the plan of the
Confederate Generals, — and we have very good reasons for
the statement that it was their real plan, — then, notwith
standing the final result, we must give them credit for
strategic talent of a very high order.

CHAPTER XXXIII.
SHERMANS MARCH FROM SA VANNAH, GEORGIA,
TO GOLDSBORO', NORTH CAROLINA; THE SUR
RENDER OF LEE AND JOHNSTON; AND THE
CLOSE OF THE WAR.
We now approach the closing scenes of the eventful
tragedy which has thus far occupied our attention, — scenes
in respect to which our nation and the world have thus
far, and in many important respects, been most essentially
misinformed, and in respect to which we will at this late
period furnish the needed Information. Contrary to all
expectation, to the great surprise of our military authorities
and the nation at large, the war, by the unexpected sur
render of Generals Lee and Johnston, and of the entire
Confederate armies throughout the United States, came to
a sudden and bloodless termination. The surrender of
Generals Lee and Johnston, at the time when it occurred,
was as unexpected to them and to the whole Confederacy as
it was to the rest of the nation and the world. Two weeks
prior to this surrender, these Generals, as we shall see, were
in the most sanguine expectation of a great victory — a
victory in which, and by which, Sherman would be crushed
and captured. Grant be rendered powerless for future
aggressive movements, and the whole aspect of the war
fundamentally changed.
The real cause or causes which brought about this unexpected
consummation.
What were the causes which so suddenly blighted these
hopeful expectations. Induced the unexp-cteJ surrender of
the two central armies of the Confederacy, and brought the

THE CLOSE OF THE WAR. 439
war to this sudden and bloodless termination? The masterly
strategy, wise dispositions, and timely and energetic action
of General Grant, is the present response nearly or quite
universally given to such a question. It is this impression
which. In the general regard, has given him a place among
the great commanders of the world, has for two successive
terms rendered him President of the United States, and,
until quite recently, was likely to put him upon the course
for the occupancy of that high office for a third term. Of
the correctness of this impression, the nation and the
world will. In the light of the facts which we are about to
present, be able to form a correct jiidgment. What, then,
was the immediate cause which did occasion this unexpected
consummation? The Hon. Alexander H. Stevens, ex-
Vice-President of the Confederacy, assigns, as the definite
and exclusive reason why Generals Lee and' Johnston
surrendered without fighting a battle, the fact that, at
Goldsboro', Sherman was reinforced by the corps of
Generals Schofield and Terry, the Union army thereby
being rendered nearly or quite 100,000 strong, and thus
becoming irresistible to any force which the Confederate
Generals could bring into the field against us. Between
such an army under Sherman, and a still greater one under
Grant, these Generals saw themselves utterly powerless.
For them to fight a battle under such circumstances, would
be to throw away thousands of precious lives to no purpose.
But one thing remained, unless they would involve them
selves in the crime of a murderous and unavailing slaughter
of their brave troops, and that was to surrender on the best
terms that could be secured. Such is the definite cause
assigned by Mr. Stevens for the unexpected and bloodless
termination of the war, and nobody questions the accuracy
of his information. In assigning his reasons for his approval
of the surrender of Lee and Johnston without a battle, Mr.
Stevens (vol. ii., p. 624 of his History) says: "I saw
nothing to prevent Sherman himself from proceeding
right on to Richmond and attacking Lee in the rear, to
say nothing of any movements by Grant, who then had an
army in front of not much, if any, under 200, 000 men . Lee's
forces were not over one-fourth of that number. Sherman's
army, when united with Schofield's and Terry's, which were

440 THE AMERICAN REBKLLION.
joining him from Wilmington, North Carolina, would be
swelled to near 100,000. To meet these, the Confederates
had in his front, nothing but the fragment of shattered
armies amounting in all to not one-half the number of
the Federals." We have good reason for affirming that
Johnston's army was at this time greater than Mr. Stevens
supposes, as that army was being rapidly reinforced, and
had become so large, and brought into a state of such
organization, that its commander had no doubt whatever of
being fully able to defeat the army which Sherman brought
with him frora Savannah to North Carolina. The case
was widely and appallingly different in Johnston's regard,
after Sherman had been reinforced by Schofield and Terry.
To fight Sherman then would imply infinite presumption.
The fact is undeniable, that at the time when this reinforce
ment did arrive, the battle was being joined between the
armies then confronting each other — that had this battle
been fought, it would have been one of the bloodiest of the
war — that, in the united judgment of two such Generals as
Lee and Johnston, who perfectly understood the amount
and character of the force in each army, the result of the
conflict would have been the defeat and destruction of the
Union army, and a sudden and total change in the status
and prospects of the war itself. The fact is equally obvious
and undeniable, also, that in consequence of the arrival of
these reinforcements at that critical moment, Johnston
retreated, and he and Lee afterwards surrendered, and the
war was terminated without further bloodshed.
Now, if we would know the real cause of this sudden
and bloodless termination of the war, we must find the
reasons and influences which brought Schofield and Terry
to Goldsboro' at the critical moment when they appeared
at that place. On the evening of January 14th, General
Schofield, then at Clifton, on the Tennessee river, received
by telegram an order to report, with his entire army, as
soon as possible at Annapolis, Maryland. He was at the
time at Clifton, under special orders from General Grant
to transport that army by water, down the Tennessee,
Ohio, and Mississippi rivers, to Eastport, Mississippi, and
this for the purpose of another expedition up the Arkansas
river for the subjugation of Texas ; and had all things in

THE CLOSE OF THE WAR. 44 1
readiness to embark his army on that expedition the morn
ing after the telegram referred to was received. The
order conveyed in that telegram turned the army of
Schofield from its intended destination, and brought it
round, in connection with the corps of Terry, to Goldsboro',
and by that means brought the war to its unexpected and
bloodless termination. After the presentation of a few
important facts and considerations, the causes which
occasioned that order will be presented, and then all mis
apprehensions which have hitherto hung over the subject
will be for ever removed.
What General Grant did, and might and should have done,
while he was " bottled and corked up " in the Peninsula
before Petersburg and Richmond.
Between the 12th and 15th of June, 1864, General
Grant passed his army over James river, and commenced
operations before Petersburg. After many vain efforts, in
which he lost upwards of 30,000 men, he remained idle
there until the opening of the next spring campaign. The
only excuse or apology that we ever heard offered for this
idleness is that the policy of Grant was to threaten Lee,
and thus prevent his injuring Sherman by reinforcing
Johnston. In other words, our great Commander-in-
Chief kept for more than half a year 1,000,000 men in
stagnant idleness, for no other reason than to enable an
army 60,000 strong to make a safe march around a semi
circle of 1,000 miles in extent, and at the end of that
march to come upon General Lee's rear. If this was the
real motive for such inaction, then we affirm that our
General ought to stand lower in national and world regard
than any other General that ever commanded a great
army. Let us for a few moments contemplate the facts of the
case. During this year, aside from all the forces then
in the field, the Government made successive calls for
conscriptions amounting in all to the vast sum of 1,500,000
men, and it is quite safe to conclude that from 600,000 to
800,000 of these entered the army. In addition to the
180,000 coloured troops enlisted during this and the year
preceding, 100,000 volunteers, enlisted for a hundred days,

442 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
were " fully armed and equipped." Of these coloured troops
and volunteers more than 100,000 joined the Army of the
Potomac. All these — with, no doubt, a still larger number
from the regular army — were added to Grant's forces in
Virginia. With all these immense forces under his imme
diate command, he lay in perfect torpor for more than
six months, watching, in his wisdom, it is said. General
Lee, to prevent his dividing his little army of 60,000 men,
and sending reinforcements to Johnston, Hood, or Hardee,
and waiting for Sherman to make with his 60,000 men his
march of 1,000 miles, round from Rome and Kingston, in
Georgia, through Atlanta, Macon, Savannah, Columbia,
and over Johnston's army into Lee's rear at Petersburg.
We leave the facts, which cannot be denied, and their
explanation, to speak for themselves. The only explana
tion which meets our honest judgment is the conclusion
that our General remained thus idle because he did not
know what to do.
Let us now consider what might have been done, and
what any General of even ordinary knowledge and capacity
would have done, in General Grant's circumstances. We
will suppose, to instance no other case, that he had moved
an army 70,000 or 80,000 strong to Warrenton or Cul
pepper, had reinforced these with the 30,000 troops under
Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley, and had given Sheridan
the command of all these combined forces. All this cOuld,
undeniably, and at any time, have been done in two or
three weeks. While Grant had concentrated all his army
at Petersburg, and. held his forces in readiness to move as
soon as the proper moment should arrive, suppose that
Sheridan, driving Early before him, or more probably
having captured his little army, had moved through
Gordonsville into Lee's rear, as Sherman was expected to
do, after his march of 1,000 miles. The inevitable con
sequence would have been that General Lee would have
surrendered, as he afterwards did, without a battle.
Between the crushing forces of Sheridan and Grant he
would never have assumed the criminal responsibility of
sacrificing his soldiery to no purpose. Had he retreated
into the Carohnas, he would in his retreat have been con
fronted with the superior forces sent round to Hilton

THE CLOSE OF THE WAR. 443
Head, on the one hand, while he was relentlessly pursued
by Grant on the other. The war would thus have had a
bloodless termination quite six or eight months earlier
than it did, and numberless precious lives, and not less
than $500,000,000 of national debt, would have been
saved to our country. To us, it appeared at the time, as
is well know to our then students and friends with whom
we communicated, an inexplicable enigma, that some
such raost obvious combination of the national forces
in and about Virginia did not occur to our military
authorities; and more than all, that they could by no
possibility be persuaded to order such combinations when
they were .suggested by others.
The plan of the campaign devised and ordered by General
Grant while General Sherman lay at Savannah.
Let us now turn our consideration to General Grant's
plan of the campaign while General Sherman lay at
Savannah, — ^the plan which was being carried into exe
cution at the tinie when the telegram referred to above
reached General Schofield at Clifton. After the defeat
and demoralization of Hood's army. General Grant
ordered the following disposition of General Thomas's
forces. The corps of Generals Schofield, Smith, and
Wilson were ordered to move to Clifton on the Tennessee
river, to be conveyed by water to Eastport, Mississippi,
for a campaign in that direction, while General Wood's
corps was ordered to Huntsville, Alabama, for a winter
campaign in the latter State. While the forces first
designated lay at Clifton for the purpose named, Scho
field received his telegram — the order which brought him
and Terry to Goldsboro', The first order which General
Grant gave forth to Sherman, when the latter arrived at
Savannah, was that he should move his army by water
round to Petersburg, and reinforce ours there. This,
then, was the original plan of our Commander-in-Chief —
the movement of Thomas's army as stated, and a move
ment of the Army of the Potoraac, reinforced by that of
Sherman from Petersburg, — a campaign which, if carried
out, would inevitably, and as Grant calculated at the time,
have protracted the war far into the year 1866, By the

444 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
visit of Sherman to Petersburg, General Grant, after the
most earnest entreaty, was induced so far to modify his
original plan as to allow Sherman to make, as he had at
first determined, his march through the Carolinas. In all
other respects the original plan of the campaign reraained
unchanged. The counter-plan of the Confederate commanders.
After the final defeat of General Hood, it becarae per
fectly raanifest to the Confederate Generals that all hope
for their cause then depended upon the destruction of
Sherman's army, and a subsequent union of their forces
against Grant. At this time, however, Sherman was too
far advanced upon his march to be injured through the
forces of Hardee and Hood in the State of Georgia.
Assuming that the ultimate plan of Sherman was to move
through the Carolinas into Lee's rear at Petersburg, they
determined to organize in North Carolina a new army
under Johnston — an army consisting of Hardee's and what
remained of Hood's forces, of all that Johnston would
bring with him from the States of Mississippi, Alabama,
and Georgia, and all that by any possibility could be
drawn together from the Carolinas. This army, reinforced
by General Lee so as to be rendered entirely superior to
Sherman's, was to await his approach to North Carolina,
and there, at a place which the Confederates should select,
fall upon and crush him, and having captured his forces,
corabine with Lee against Grant. That this was the
definite plan of the Confederate Generals is perfectly
obvious frora the facts before us. That it was their plan,
we have also been assured by General Ripley, who joined
Johnston with the forces which retreated from Charleston,
and enjoyed his full confidence. It is perfectly obvious
that had the campaigns as originally devised by the Con
federate Generals on the one hand, and by Generals Grant
and Sherman on the other, been carried out, by far the
most bloody battle of the war would have been fought in
the vicinity of Goldsboro', and that with the almost certain
defeat and ruin of our army. Johnston was there with
an army reinforced by Lee, and thereby rendered superior
to Sherman's in infantry, artillery, and cavalry; and the

THE CLOSE OF THE WAR 445
plan was, as we have been positively assured, for Lee
with his entire army to join Johnston, leaving Richmond
to its fate, if that should be deemed necessary. Further
more, Johnston's army was perfectly fresh, fully organized,
in the best spirits, and on ground well known to its com
mander ; while the army of Sherman was wearied, and not
a little demoralized, by its long and marauding march, and
was upon a field of which its commander was wholly igno
rant. It is perfectly obvious, also, that, in case of defeat,
the utter ruin of Sherman's army was inevitable, because
it would have been driven back into a region rendered by
our advance devoid of the means of sustaining our army
for a single week. The reader will perceive at once that
the Confederate Generals had the best of reasons for the
sanguine hopes which they entertained, until their expecta
tions were blasted by the union of Schofield and Terry
with Sherman at Goldsboro'. Justice also compels us to
affirm that, while the plan of Sherman and Grant was most
obviously presumptuous, that of the Confederate cora
manders was one of the most perfect known in history.
The originating cause of those dispositions of the national forces
which broke up the plans of both the Union and Confede
rate commanders, and brought the war to its unexpected and
bloodless termination.
The way is now prepared, and that fully, for a dis
closure of the real origin of those dispositions of the
national forces, — dispositions which so suddenly changed
the course of events as they were progressing under the
direction of the Union and Confederate commanders, and
brought the war to its unlooked-for and bloodless termi
nation. We shall disclose the facts as they actually
occurred, although in so doing we may seem to be aiming
at self-glorification. To all who would impute such a
motive, our reply is, "Strike, but hear me." Truth has
a right to be heard everywhere, — a right especially to
supplant misleading error on the page of history. The
following are the facts of the case under consideration.
While the array of General Sherman was resting at
Savannah, we carefully contemplated the situation, and felt
appalled at the facts before us. The plan of Grant and

446 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
Sherman, on the one hand, and of Lee and Johnston, on
the other, were each perfectly obvious. Sherraan was to
move out from Savannah with the intent of pushing John
ston back upon Lee. Then Grant was to move out from
Petersburg, and push Lee back upon Johnston. Thus, as
it was anticipated, the two Confederate armies would be
crushed between the two masses which should at the same
time be precipitated upon them. Such was the plan of
our Generals. In accordance with the counter-plan of the
Confederates, Lee, keeping sufficient forces to hold Grant
in check, or moving with his entire array, if need be, was
to reinforce Johnston until he should be far stronger than
Sherman. When the latter should advance over the line
of North Carolina, Johnston, with an overwhelming force,
was to fall upon and annihilate him, and then unite with
Lee against Grant. The plan of the Confederates we
saw to be perfectly practicable, and of certain execution,
should the movements contemplated by both parties be
made, and be made as contemplated. The force under
Sherman, as we know must have been the case, was well
known to the Confederate comraanders ; and it was perfectly
practicable for them to concentrate in his front a force so
far superior to his as to render his defeat and capture
inevitable. Yet our comraanders were manifestly blind to
the catastrophe before them. We accordingly, to prevent
such a disaster, wrote a letter to Mr. Sumner, who was at
his place in Washington, a letter containing the following
statements : —
" You have now got our army into the worst condition
possible. Never were we in such peril of a great national
disaster as at this present time. Our army, as you per
ceive, is divided into three parts, and these parts located
on the angles of a great triangle, as Thomas at Nashville,
Sherman at Savannah, and Grant at Petersburg, with the
enemy in the centre, and ready to concentrate with 'Crush
ing force upon the portion of our army which shall make
the next raove, — and that raovement will be raade by
Sherman He evidently is to raove out frora Savannah,
capture Columbia, and then assail Johnston, with the
intent of forcing him back upon Lee, and crushing them
between our two armies. The counter-plan of the Con-

THE CLOSE OF THE WAR. 447
federate commanders is to allow Sherman to move, with
very little opposition, through Colurabia into North
Carolina; and then, by a union of the armies of Johnston
and Lee, to precipitate, suddenly and unexpectedly to us,
an overwhelming force upon our insulated army, crush
and annihilate it, and then turn back upon Grant. Such,
you may rest assured, is the catastrophe before us if
Sherraan shall make the movement now contemplated.
" In existing circumstances there is one, and but one
thing to be done. If that one thing shall be done, the
war will be ended at once. If this one thing shall not be
done, you may depend upon it that the greatest catas
trophe that has yet occurred since the war commenced is
immediately before us, and this to be followed by a long and
bloody campaign."
What the moveraent hinted at was, we did not indicate
at all, and that under the belief that it was best not to
disclose this, unless it should be inquired for. There is
one raistake in the extract above cited, the location of the
army of General Thomas. Myself and- the public were
at the time ignorant of the fact that his army had moved
from Nashville.
Mr. Sumner did with the above letter as we supposed
he would do. He took it directly to the President, and after
a consultation with him and the Secretary of War, who
had now come to respect our judgment, wrote back, under
instruction, a letter from which we take the following
extract, namely : "We wish to know immediately, here in
Washington, what the moveraent is which, in your judg
ment, ought to be made. We think that General Sherman
has under his coraraand more troops that you suppose.
His army is between 50,000 and 60,000 strong. Please
answer without delay."
The following is an extract from our reply : —
" General Sherman has the identical amount offeree that
I had supposed, as the basis of my calculations. But this
force is by no means sufficient for the raovement contem
plated, because Johnston, reinforced as he may and will be
by Lee, will command an army more numerous than this.
Our army, on an unknown field, — wearied, as it will be, by
its long march, and not a little disorganized by the manner

448 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
of that march, — will be in no condition to encounter an
army superior in number, commanded by such a General
as Johnston, and who is also perfectly acquainted with the
country around him. Bear this in mind, that if Sherman
shall make the movement under consideration, a great
national disaster and a long and bloody campaign are
before us.
"The measure that should be adopted under such
circumstances is the following. The defeat and rout of
General Hood has rendered it unnecessary that anything
should for the present be done by the army of General
Thomas in that department. Leave him, then, on the
defensive, with no forces greater than are indispensable for
present security, and bring all the remainder around, and
unite them with the army of Sherman, thus making him
invincible and all-powerful against any amount of force
that the enemy can bring against him. With such forces
under his command, let him come out, capture Columbia,
and raove upon Lee's rear, and the war is at an end at
OP<^e. If this is not done, the events which I have fore
shadowed will inevitably occur. Now, Mr. Sumner, if you
have any love to your country, go at once to the President,
and say to him that this must be done. Press upon him
also the consideration that there is no time to be lost."
Such was the reply given to the request forwarded to us
through Mr. Sumner. As soon as the reply was received,
a consultation was had with the President, the Secretary
of War, and how many others we were not specifically in
formed. As the result of that consultation, the resolution
was adopted that the measure recommended should be
carried out, and. that General Grant should be directed to
order the dispositions requisite to that end. That direction
was complied with by the Commander-in-Chief, — the order
directing General Schofield to report at Annapolis, Mary
land, Instead of Eastport, Mississippi, being forwarded as
above stated. After we became aware that our advice
had been complied with, and that General Schofield was on
his way to reinforce General Sherman, we wrote to Mr.
Sumner a letter from which I take the following extract :
" I am of course ignorant of the amount of force which
is being brought round, and this is the only consideration

THE CLOSE OF THE WAR. 449
about which I feel any concern, being absolutely assured
that if this force is adequate to the end intended, the war
will be ended in a very few weeks." The reply to this
letter, the last communication we ever received from that
venerable patriot and statesman, contained this sentence :
"We are very glad, on account of the confidence we have
in your judgment, to have you speak thus encouragingly
of the prospects."
Results of the new movements occasioned by this correspondence.
The results of the movements occasioned by the above
correspondence may be told in a few words. Sherman, as
intended, moved out from Savannah, captured, and occa
sioned (by accident) the destruction by fire of Columbia, and
advanced, almost without the show of resistance, into North
Carolina as far as Goldsboro'. Schofield, on his arrival at
Annapolis and Washington, was taken round by water
to Wilmington, captured that city and its fortifications, and
joining his forces with those of General Terry, who was
holding Fort Fisher, moved up to Goldsboro', and there
reinforced Sherman, rendering his army, as stated, nearly
or quite 100,000 strong. Johnston, who was in the act of
falling upon Sherman, and had captured two of his regi
ments when Schofield arrived, finding that by this arrival
he (Johnston) had two armies to fight instead of one, and
that he was utterly powerless in the presence of the over
whelming forces now combined against him, retreated with
out fighting a battle at all. Gerieral Lee now attempted
to reinforce Johnston with the entire forces left under his
(Lee's) command, and that in the vain hope of yet being
able to crush Sherman, and then turn back upon Grant.
In this attempt the Confederate commander was foiled by
the timely advance of General Grant, on the one hand,
and by the authorities at Richmond on the other. General
Lee had ordered supplies from Danville, to meet him by
cars at Amelia Court House. When he arrived with his
army In a famishing condition at the place last designated,
he found that the train had been ordered to Richmond to
aid in conveying from thence the fugitives, and that, in
obeying this order, the train had passed Amelia Court
House without unloading. This calamity necessitated a
2y

450 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
halt of two full days to collect provisions, and enabled our
advance, uitder Sheridan, to interpose between the two
Confederate arraies, and render their junction impossible.
The Confederate commanders perceiving clearly, such
being the overpowering odds against them, that further
resistance was vain, surrendered their respective armies, —
Lee surrendering to Grant, and Johnston to Sherman;
the conditions granted by Sherman to Johnston being
reversed by our supreme authorities at Washington. Ag
a final consequence, the surrender of these two main arraies
was iramediately followed by that of all the other Con
federate forces in all the States then In rebellion, and, as
we affirmed it would be, provided the one movement re
ferred to above was made, " the war was ended at once."

CHAPTER XXXIV.
LESSONS TAUGHT BY THE STRATEGY WHICI
BROUGHT THE WAR TO ITS UNEXPECTED
SUDDEN, AND BLOODLESS TERMINATION.
The iramediate results of the strategy which brought
Schofield round frora Clifton to Goldsboro', were the
prevention of a great and bloody battle, then imminent,
and the sudden and bloodless termination of the war, by
the iraraediate surrender of all the Confederate armies,
and the submission of the States in rebellion to the national
Government. The results which would have arisen had
this movement on the part of General Schofield not been
made, are obvious. The great battle referred to would, in
that case, have been fought, — a battle in which, including
losses on both sides, there would undeniably have been a
slaughter of from 30,000 to 50,000 brave raen. Had
Sherraan been victorious, the war would have been
brought to an iramediate close, — a close, however, attended
with this fearful sacrifice of human life. Had Sherman
been defeated, as in our judgment he unquestionably
would have been, a long and bloody campaign would have
followed, with the war protracted ihto the year 1866, and
the addition of from $300,000,000 to $500,000,000 to our
present national debt. The lessons taught by the strategy
which prevented such evils, and brought about such results,
are too important to be forgotten by the nation. Among
these lessons, we specify the following :
Wisdom of the strategy urged upon the national authorities
from the beginning of the war.
We have, in the first place, an absolute verification of
the wisdom of the strategy which we urged upon our naval

452 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
and military authorities from the beginning to the close
of the war. We contended and urged from the first, that
the Confederate ports should be attacked by adequate
forces on the land as well as on the water sides. The
nation exhausted its naval resources, and spent untold
millions of tn.isure, in blockading those ports, and assault
ing them exclusively on their water sides. The capture of
Savannah by Sherman, of Wilmington by Schofield, and
the abandonment of Charleston as soon as it was flanked
by an adequate land force, demonstrate the practicability,
as we maintained, of their early, easy, and cheap capture,
had they been attacked on both sides instead of one and
that their impregnable side.
We contended and urged, also, that General Lee, for
example, should be assaulted, not as he always was, — to
wit, merely in front, and In positions where he was
impregnably fortified, — that he should be assaulted by
adequate forces, which were always at command, both in
front and on his flank or rear. Our nation spent four long
years in continuous fighting, sacrificing thereby more than
a quarter of a million of our citizen soldiers in fruitless
and bloody assaults upon that small Confederate army,
and that because it was always assaulted merely in front,
and generally when behind impregnable fortifications. As
soon as that army was approached as we contended it ever
should have been, — that is, by adequate forces both in front
and rear,^ — it surrendered without fighting a battle. During
all these long years of reckless slaughter, that army was,
and that most obviously, approachable in this the only
effective form, and might have been captured, and the war
brought to a termination, with very little bloodshed. Such
wisdom, however, had no place in the stolid brains of our
Commanders-in-Chief Suppose that General Grant had
sent the 60,000 men whom he so stupidly sacrificed in the
Wilderness, at Spottsylvania, and Cold Harbour, down to
General Butler, thus rendering the army of the latter quite
80,000 strong ; that this army had been landed at Bermuda
Hundred and then moved out upon Lee's communications
south of James river; while Grant himself had moved
directly upon the position of the Confederate army at Orange
Court House. There is no person at all acquainted with the

j.E:;soN'y ta-ught. 453
history of military affairs who will doubt for a moment that
Lee's army, Richmond, Virginia, and the Carolinas, would
have been ours one year sooner than they were, and that In
gaining all these ends we should not have lost 20,000 men,
in the stead of the 150,000 which we did lose In Virginia
during the year 1864. Had Sherman, with adequate forces,
as he might have done, moved upon Johnston from Chatta
nooga and Decatur at the same time, instead of the 60,000
which we did lose, we should not have lost 15,000 men in
the conquest of all the Confederate States between the
Savannah and Mississippi rivers. The fundamental dis
positions which occasioned the bloodless surrender of Lee
and Johnston absolutely verify all these statements.
From the commencement of the war onward, we con
tended that it was attended with a fearful sacrifice of
human life, and a corresponding expenditure of the
national treasury, — a sacrifice and expenditure for which
no excuse or apology could be offered but the blind igno
rance and reckless obstinacy of our military authorities ;
and that at any time, by an obviously wise combination of
the national forces, the war could, in a very few months,
be brought to an almost bloodless termination. We finally
succeeded in securing the identical combinations which we
had all along urged upon our military authorities, and to
secure which was the specific and exclusive object of our
visit to Washington in January 1863. The result is before
the nation and the, world. Let it stand as a beacon of
admonition and warning against past errors, and as a light
for present and future generations, should the eclipse
of peace ever again shed disastrous twilight over our
country. There never was an Important Confederate army
that might not most readily have been placed between two
of our armies, each of which was equal, or superior, to that
of the ejiemy, just as the armies of Johnston and Lee were
placed between those of Sherman and Grant, and so located
that it could not escape the crushing folds in which it was
involved. Any prudent General, when he finds himself
thus involved, will surrender without the effusion of blood.
We have often said, and now repeat before the world, that
this war ought by no means to have continued one year
af er October ist, 1861 ; that it ought not to have cost us

454 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
over 50,000 lives, nor to have burdened the nation with a
debt amounting to over ,^500,000,000. We now, in verifica
tion of such statements, confidently present the dispositions
by which the war was brought to a close. Precisely similar
dispositions, as we have already demonstrated, raight have
been made relatively to every important array which the
Confederates ever brought into the field, and this without
compelling one army to raarch a thousand miles, in one, and
another to be conveyed, by rail and water, a much greater
distance, in another direction.
False views of conducting the war.
Another lesson, taught by the facts before us, demands
very special attention. We refer to the idea which generally
obtained in respect to the method by which the war was
to be brought to a termination. When General Grant, for
example, took supreme command, it was well known, and
was everywhere spoken of to his great credit, that "he
despised strategy," that he held to but one methcd, fall
ing directly upon the enemy wherever he might be found,
and by precipitating upon him an overwhelming force,
crush him outright, and all this without regard to the
sacrifice of life and Ji™b which such a blind method raight
involve. Hence it was that, under the irapression that
while one Confederate was killed at the loss of three or
raore on our part, the war was being wisely conducted,
and on account of the immense odds on our side, was sure
to terminate in our favour, "Peg away" was the word
sent down to Grant, when it was well known that, as a
little blind giant with a great club, he was recklessly
wasting our army " at the rate of 10,000 a day," and
inflicting only small loss upon the enemy. We can, and
the enemy cannot, continue the conflict for ever, it was
thought, even at this difference of rate of loss. As
no other method was thought of, the ocean-current of
blood was permitted to roll on, and would have desolated
the nation, had not wiser counsels finally obtained a hear
ing. Now no idea can be more false and perilous to the
interests of a great nation than that under consideration.
None but a great strategist should ever be placed over a
great army. A General with " a baswood brain," and the

LESSONS TAUGHT, 455
spirit of bull-dog fight in him, — such a commander, at the
head of vast armies, will hardly fail to prove himself " an
abomination of desolation " to the armies he may cora
raand, and to the nation who has stupidly put its destiny
in his hands. A vast army blindly conducted is one of
the most helpless and readily defeated bodies " ever set in
motion. Who can estimate the disastrous results which
Grant's blind and reckless conduct of the war would have
entailed upon our couritry had not that conduct been
interrupted just at that eventful crisis of our history?
Advice given to President Lincoln, January 1863.
It was on account of the prevalence of this false idea,
and in view of the disastrous consequences which had
resulted, and were certain to continue to result, from the
existing method of conducting the war, that in our visit to
Washington, January 1863, we advised, and most earnestly
urged. President Lincoln, in accordance with the example
of Great Britain in view of the palpable failures of its
various early expeditions in Spain and Portugal, to appoint
a Military Commission, whose business it should be to
inquire into the causes of past failures, to devise proper
methods for the future, and, above all, to find a man who
comprehended the causes referred to, and the true method
for the future conduct of the war, — a man who fully under
stood the situation, and who could show how to put a stop
to the reckless slaughter of our citizen soldiery, and how
this desolating conflict might be brought to a speedy and
comparatively bloodless termination. " Your generals,"
we remarked, " are untried men, and know little or nothing
of the science of war, and especially about vast campaigns,
and the movements of great armies. The first duty you
owe to your country, as its Chief Magistrate, is to inquire,
at least, for such a man ; and when he is found, if Provi
dence shall present one, place your armies under his
control. The Military Commission in England found
Wellington, secured his appointment to supreme com
mand, and thus ensured the ruin of the cause of France in
the Peninsula. Your Commission may, and probably will,
furnish you a man of similar capacities. In such a case,
this war will be brought to a speedy termination, and that

456 THE A.MERICAN REBELLION.
with very little further effusion of blood." Such adyice
failed with our Executive and his advisers, and hence the
desolation continued, until the cry of our country was like
the wail of Egypt, because "there was not a house where
there was not one dead." Let such facts stand as a
beacon of Wcirning and admonition to future generations.
Concluding Reflections.
It does not comport with the plan of this treatise to
trace the progress of events which followed the surrender
of the Confederate armies, and the dissolution of the Con
federacy itself, nor to detail that tragic event which deprived
us of our venerated President, just after, by an overwhelm
ing majority, he was elected and inaugurated a second
time to the office of President of these United States.
The end I have aimed at will have been attained, provided
the war itself, and those who, for the most part, miscon
ducted it, shall be understood, arid the people who, not
withstanding such unheard-of misconduct, so "patiently
endured to the end," shall better understand themselves,
and better comprehend their duty to themselves and to
their country.
Taking all the facts of that war into account, two
deductions are undeniable, namely, that no people ever
won for themselves higher claims for real self-respect, and
for the deep esteem of the world, than did the people of
these United States during that terrible conflict, and that
no people can have less occasion to glorify, and raise to
the highest offices in their gift, the chief leaders of our
great armies, and the noisy politicians who controlled our
national affairs during that memorable period. Think of
a people who uncomplainingly furnished for that war up
wards of 2,600,000 men, enduring, in a single year, a
conscription of 1,500,000 of its citizens! Think of the
uncomplaining patience with which that people endured,
not only such calls for the army, but the weight of taxa
tion suddenly heaped up, " Pelion upon Parnassus," upon
their shoulders, and the rivers of blood perpetually flowing
out from the hearts of their husbands, fathers, sons, and
brothers ! Think of the sacrifices, voluntarily endured.

concluding reflections. 457
during that war, by famihes at home, while their fathers,
husbands, sons, and brothers were in the field marching,
fighting, or suffering and dying in hospitals from wounds
or sickness, our entire families all unitedly labouring to
provide comforts for the sufferers in the army! Then
think of the unselfishness with which that people, on the
return of peace, themselves having endured all the hard
ships of the war, and receiving none of its emoluments,
honoured with their highest civil gifts the men who had
led — may I not raore properly say misled, and recklessly
slaughtered our soldiers ? Our people, being an unmilitary
people, naturally fell into the illusion that the individuals
who happened to be at the head of our armies at the time
when the war terminated, must have brought to us the
blessings of peace, by their superlative military wisdom,
and hence deserved the highest civil emoluments in the
gift of a free people.
The most important fact to the honour of this people
yet remains to be adduced. I refer to the sentiments of
those who suffered most, in respect to the sacrifices at which
peace and national unity were procured. On the one hand,
and in regard to the people of the Confederate States, on
the other. I never yet met with an individual who had
lost a father, husband, son, or brother, in that war, who
expressed regret that the sacrifices by which those blessings
were procured were made, or a sentiment of bitterness
towards the people who, by the rebellion, had occasioned
those sacrifices. Much has been said and done since the
war to perpetuate in the Northern heart the sentiment of
bitterness towards the people of the former Confederacy.
An appeal to that sentiment was one of the leading influ
ences employed in the last Presidential election. Poli
ticians wielded that weapon — politicians who had enriched
themselves by the war, and sought by such savage
means to secure for themselves the emoluments of peace.
In one speech, for example, this utterance was found :
" This we hear said, — ' Let us shake hands over the
bloody chasm made by the war.' I protest against such
a sentiment." The author of that utterance had, it was
said, made an immense fortune out of the war, and was
then " coveting earnestly " a residence of" at least four

458 THE AMERICAN REBELLION.
years' continuance in the White House. One of the
" pictorials " which was during that canvass spread all over
the Northern States, was of this kind. In the centre was
represented the field of Andersonville, with its real and
imagined horrors. On one side of the field stood Horace
Greeley, and on the other Jefferson Davis. The former,
extending his hand to the latter, says, "Let us shake
hands over the bloody chasm made by this war." It is
with much gratification that I am able to record the fact
that the author of that representation was not an American,
and knew not the heart of an American. Permit me here
to allude to my own case, and I claira no special merit in
what I am about to utter. In that war, as I have stated,
my only son, after painfully suffering for more than six
months, died of injuries received in the battle of Frede
ricksburg. The wife of my youth, the mother of all my
children, from no other cause than over-fatigue around
that bed of pain and death, returned home -with rae to die.
A blooming daughter, on account of the shock received by
the death of her brother and mother, drooped in spirit, and,
despite all our efforts to save her, " dropped into the lap
of God." Another daughter, through excessive labours
in the service of the Sanitary Commission, brought on a
lingering disease of which she afterwards died. In the
Army of the Potomac, a noble youth, the only living child
of my only own sister, lost his life, and so did one of two
sons of the only sister of my first wife. Such were my
bereaveraents from this war. And here let me say, that
were the remains of all these lying side by side, in the
centre of the field referred to, standing at one end of that
line, that would be a sacred spot to me, the spot which, of
all others, I would select, from whence to extend my hand
over my dead, and grasp that of any individual, whatever
the past may have been, who now bears in his bosom a
genuine American heart. And this I well know to be the
common sentiment of my fellow-citizens who have been
bereaved, as I have been, by this war. For one, I would
as soon give my vote for Benedict Arnold, were he now
living, as I would for any man who shall hereafter attempt
by means of these bloody and vengeful remembrances to
influence our elections.

CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS. 459
Such are some of the reasons which the facts of this
war present to the people of this nation for self-respect,
and for the high regard of the world. How far they find
reasons from such facts, to seek out, or to have sought out,
among the leaders of our great arraies, the past or the
future rulers of this great Republic, raay be gathered from
the preceding pages of this history. I rejoice in being
able to record the fact that the appalling evils which have
arisen frora the direction which "hero-worship" took after
the close of the war, begin to be appreciated. Years
ago, after we had, as the then avowed choice of two evils,
helped by our influence and vote to elevate the present
Chief Magistrate to the highest office in the gift of a free
people, and after the results of that election began to
appear, we wrote a letter to Mr. Suraner, containing these
statements, namely : " The national raind is being dwarfed
by the worship of small men. j^We can have no reasonable
hope that our countrymen will become, and be known to
the world as, "a wise and understanding people," and as
morally virtuous as they are wise, while national thought
and regard revolve around small specimens of human nature
— small minds especially in whose character corruption is
added to littleness. As events are progressing, after the
few relics of the past shall have disappeared, relics which
now stand as vanishing towers amid the desert of true
/ greatness around thern, real wisdom will have no place in
our Cabinets, and little but the babble of small voices will
be heard in our halls of legislation. Under such circum
stances, our mothers, instead of giving birth, to " pillars of
state," will give us a posterity " after the iraage and like
ness " of what passes before their rainds as the highest
forms of true wisdom and greatness. What can be done
to give back to our nation the real idea of what greatness
and excellence are? The nation elected our Chief
Magistrate to his high office under the illusion that he
was not only our Washington, but " our Caesar come
again." Hence all the offensive protuberances which
have appeared upon his character and administration,
seen as all have been through the imagined halo of mili
tary renown and national deliverances, have appeared as
superlative excellences, or, at the worst, as mere specks on

460 THE AMERICAN RtBELLIOX.
the face of " the excess of glory." Revivals of religion
which prevailed, many years ago, in the States of Ken
tucky and Tennessee, were attended with peculiar forms of
physical convulsions called "the jerks." A certain old
lady denounced the jerks, in all their forms, as from the
devil. Her standing argument for her belief was the fact
that her favourite' minister. Dr.  , never had the jerks ;
and if they were from heaven, such a godly man as he
would certainly have them. At length Dr.  had the
jerks, and his were, in every respect, like other people's.
" What do you think now, madam ? " asked a neighbour.
" Dr.  has the jerks." " Well," replied the prudent
matron, " I like such jerks as Dr.  has. They are
from God. But common jerks I don't believe in at all.
They are all from the devil." " How can wisdom enter
into the heart and knowledge be pleasant unto the soul "
of such a mind as that ? Just as readily as " wisdom and
knowledge can become the stability of our times," as long
as such jerks as are continually appearing in the most con
spicuous character that lifts its form before the national
mind, are held up before the rising generation as forms
of beauty, grace, and perfection. Take a single example
in illustration of what has appeared generally among
the eulogists of this individual. In a communication
addressed to the President, one of his leading magnifiers,
Mr. Welsh of Philadelphia, says : " Every suggestion I
ever made to you was promptly responded to, save only
the investigation of frauds allowed by your appointees."
Here is an admitted crime of the most atrocious character.
Every wise and righteous ruler holds, of all others, his own
appointees to the strictest account. How does this mon
strosity appear when viewed as an undeniable characteristic
of the administration of our President ? " Even this
lamentable trait, I believe," adds the blind eulogiser,
" springs from a distorted virtue." Yes, Mr. Welsh, et id
omne genus, " you like such jerks as your President has."
They cannot, in your regard, be anything worse or anything
else than "distorted virtues." "Common jerks," the same
as those appearing in any other individual, "you don't like
at all. They are all from the devil." My countrymen ! has
not this debasing folly gone far enough ? Does not self-

CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS. 46 1
respect, and a regard for the best interests of posterity,
require of us that henceforth character and deeds, as they
lift their forms before us, shall be seen andyappreciated as
they are in themselves ; that real excellences, wherever,
and in whomsoever, they appear, shall receive our high
approval, while deformities and corruptions shall bear
their real names? Bear this in mind, that in present and
future elections the main issue to be settled is, and will be,
not whether this or that party shall have the majority, but
whether stupidity and corruption, or wisdom and integrity,
shall control our state and national legislation. There are
in all the parties which, divide our nation men of wisdom
and integrity in sufficient numbers to fill all the offices in
your gift. In the hands of such men, to whatever party
they may happen to belong, our country's honour and
interests are safe. When- any party asks for your suf
frages, look directly at their candidates. Ask yourselves
the question whether they are men whom you do and
ought to esteem for their wisdom and integrity, and
whether you can point them out to your children as " pillars
of state." When such men are presented, honour them
with your votes. If, on the other hand, you are asked to
"say to the bramble. Rule thou over us," repudiate their
candidate as an insult to your knowledge, manhood, and
patriotism.

THE END.

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