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HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
IN LITERATURE RELATED TO THE
NEW TESTAMENT

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Spirit, Soulj and Flesh

Spirit, Soul, and Flesh
The Usage of Tlvevfia, Vvx*], and %a.p£ in Greek
Writings and Translated Works from the Earliest
Period to 225 A.D.; and of their Equivalents
ffll, 12)93, and "lim in the Hebrew Old Testament
VJV ' T T

HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
SECOND SERIES
VOLUME III

Reprinted, with Additions and Revision, from the American
Journal of Theology , 1913-1916

By
ERNEST DEWITT BURTON
Professor and Head of the Department of New Testament
and Early Christian Literature in the
University of Chicago

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

Copyright 1018 By
The Univeesiiy of Chicago

All Rights Reserved

Published June 1918

Composed and Printed By
The University of Chicago Press
Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A.

PREFACE
The subject of this monograph is the use of the words for
"spirit," "soul," and "flesh" in the ancient Greek and Hebrew
writers. The purpose of the study is to lay a lexicographical
foundation for the interpretation of irvevna, ^vxh, and <rapl-, more
especially of irvevna and trap!- in their relation to one another, in the
New Testament.
The ground, especially of the first two chapters, has often been
covered more or less fully, and the present writer makes no claim
to be adding significantly to the sum of human knowledge in this
territory. He writes, indeed, after diligent and repeated study
extending over years, but with a consciousness of the vastness of
the field and of the complexity of the problem, made more difficult
by its ramification into many related fields, which bars any but
the most modest claims. He has not undertaken to write a history
of the psychology and anthropology of the Semites and the Greeks,
desirable as such a history would be as a basis for the study of
the ideas of the New Testament writers on this subject. In full
recognition of the fact that the meanings of words can never be
dealt with adequately except in connection with the history of
thought, these studies nevertheless decline the larger task and
limit themselves to an attempt to set forth from the point of
view of lexicography the usage of the three important words named
above. They justify themselves in the mind of the writer by two
considerations. First, even such a study as is here made of the
usage of the words in literature older than the New Testament
books, or approximately contemporaneous with them, is a useful
foundation for the study of New Testament usage and ideas; and
second, such an assembling of the linguistic evidence as is possible
in a lexicographical study may, by furnishing the material for it,
facilitate the more adequate study of the history of ancient thought
in the field of psychology or anthropology.
The intimation of the title-page that the investigation covers
the usage of Greek writers from the earliest period to 180 a.d., is
5] 5

6 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
substantially correct. Later writers are frequently cited for their
testimony to earlier usage and occasional reference has been made,
especially in Chapters iv and vi, to later literature because of its
reflex light on the usage of the first century. On the other hand
it has been deemed unnecessary to include Christian writers later
than the New Testament, the usage of the latter being the goal of
the study. Otherwise the limits indicated have been adhered to,
and the range of literature examined in each period is sufficient, it
is believed, to furnish a safe basis of induction. Only in the
Hebrew Old Testament, the Apocrypha, and the New Testament
has absolute inclusiveness been attempted. But in the case of
most of the individual writers quoted the lists are believed to be
at least approximately complete.
Having on more than one occasion within the period in which
he has been engaged in this study made it the subject of a seminar
in the University of Chicago, the writer desires to acknowledge
with appreciation the assistance which he has received, both in
assembling and in interpreting the material, from those whom he
has had the pleasure of counting among his students. Among these
he desires especially to acknowledge the assistance of Rev. William
R. Schoemaker, Ph.D., of Des Moines, Iowa, Professor Irving
F. Wood, Ph.D., of Smith College, Professor Frank G. Lewis,
Ph.D., of the Crozer Theological Seminary, Professor Hermon H.
Severn, A.B., of Kalamazoo College, and Professor Arthur Wake
field Slaten, Ph.D., of Chicago. To these it would be necessary
to add a still longer list if all those were included who have aided
by collecting lists of passages.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
Bibliography  9
CHAPTER I. LTveS/ia, tyvxn, AND Sap! EST GREEK WRITERS FROM HOMER TO
Aristotle  13
I. TLvevfw.  13
II. *!?v)(rj  24
III. Sap!  48
IV. Summary and Comparison  50
n. fi*n, 12533, and "1TD21 in the Old Testament  53
1. mV . . .".  53
H. 12533  62
in. *nas  68
T T
IV. Summary and Comparison  71
EEL HveufW., Vvxn, AND Sap! IN GREEK WRITERS FROM EPICURUS TO
Artus Didymus  74
I. TLvev/j/x  80
U. Srvxr)  82
III. Sap!  84
IV. Epicurus and the Epicureans  85
V. The Early Pre-Christian Stoics  93
VI. The Later Pre-Christian Stoics .  116
IV. Uveu/m, *1>X17> AND Sap! IN GREEK WRITERS OF THE EARLY
Christian Period  123
I. LTj/tSpxi  123
II. Vvxo  126
III. Sap!  129
IV. Neo-Pythagorean Usage  130
V. Stoics and Writers Influenced by Stoicism  133
VI. The All-Permeative IlveC/ia  139
7] 7

8 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
CHAPTER PAGE
V. Tlvev/ia, tyvxrj, AND Sap! IN JEWISH-GREEK LITERATURE . . 141
I. LTvevpa  I41
II. Vvxn  146
III. Sap!  151
IV. Translated Works  153
V. Works Written Originally in Greek  156
VI. Summary and Comparison ... .... 168
VI. Uvev/ja, *VX17, AND Sap! IN ETHNIC RELIGIOUS WRITINGS APPROX
IMATELY Contemporary with the New Testament . . . 173
I. The Usage of the Magical Texts . .... 173
II. The Hermetic Literature  175
VII. Uvev/m, *vx^, AND Sap! IN THE NEW TESTAMENT . . . . 1 78
I. llvtxifm. ...  ... 178
II. *VXJ?  183
III. Sap!  184
IV. The Pauline Usage  186
V. The Usage of the Synoptic Gospels and the Acts . . . 199
VI. The Usage of the Johannine Writings  200
VII. The Usage of the Remaining Books  203
VIII. Hvev/mTiKos, ^uxwcos, and SapKixos (Sap/civos) .... 204
LX. Final Summary  205
Index  209

BIBLIOGRAPHY1

TEXTS AND TRANSLATIONS
Apollonius Rhodius, Argonautica. Ed. R. C Seaton. Oxford, 1906.2
Appianus Alexandrinus, Romanorum historiarum quae supersunt. Paris, 1840.
Arnim, H. F. A. von, Stoicorum veterum fragmenta. 3 vols. Leipzig, 1903-5.
Arrianus, Anabasis et Indica. Ed. Fr. Diibner. In Reliqua Arriani. Ed. C.
MUller. Paris, 1865.
Callimachea. Ed. Otto Schneider. 2 vols. Leipzig, 1870-72.
Charles, R. H., The Book of Enoch: Translation with Introduction and, Notes.
New York, 1893.
 , Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament. 2 vols. Oxford,
1913-
Cornutus, Theologiae graecae compendium. Ed. C. Lang. Leipzig, 1881.
Diels, Hermann, Die Fragntente der Vorsokratiker, griechisch und deutsch.
3d ed. 3 vols. Berlin, 1912.
 , Doxograpki graeci. Berlin, 1879.
Diogenes Laertius, De vitis philosophorum. Leipzig, 1895.
Dio Chrysostomus, Orationes. Ed. L. Dindorf. Leipzig, 1857.
Dionysius Halicarnassensis, Antiquitatum Romanorum quae supersunt. Ed.
C. Jacoby. 3 vols. Leipzig, 1885-91.
Epictetus, Dissertationes. Ed. H. Schenkl. Leipzig, 1898.
Epicurea. Ed. H. Usener. Leipzig, 1887.
Galenus, Claudius, Opera omnia. Ed. C. G. Ktihn. 2ovols. Leipzig, 1821-33.
Geffcken, Joh., Oracula Sibyllina. Leipzig, 1902.
Grenfell, B. P., and Hunt, A. S., The Oxyrkynchus Papyri. 12 vols. London,
1898-1916.
Grenfell, B. P., Hunt, A. S., and Smyly, J. G., The Tebtunis Papyri, Part I.
London and New York, 1902.
Hermann, G., Orphica. Leipzig, 1805.
Hermogenes, Opera. Ed. Hugo Rabe. Leipzig, 1913.
Hicks, E. L., and Hill, G. F., A Manual of Greek Historical Inscriptions.
Oxford, 1 901.
1 The more familiar Greek authors, editions of which may be supposed to be known
to every reader, have been omitted from this list, as also the numerous concordances
and lexicons of Greek authors and of the Old and New Testaments of which use has
been made. In the citation of unlisted authors the notation is in general that of the
edition listed in Liddell and Scott's Greek Lexicon.
1 Scriptorum classicorum bibliotheca oxoniensis.
9] 9

10 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
Hippocrates, CEuvres computes. Ed. E. Littr6. Paris, 1839-61.,
Josephus, Flavius, Opera. Ed. B. Niese. 7 vols. Berlin, 1887-95.
Kautzsch, E., Die Apocryphen u. Pseudepigraphen des Alien Testaments.
2 vols. Berlin, 1900.
Kenyon, F. G., Greek Papyri in the British Museum. 4 vols. London, 1893-
1910.
Kock, Theodor, Comicorum atticorum fragmenta. Leipzig, 1880-84.
Maximus Tyrius, Philosophoumena. Ed. H. Hobein. Leipzig, 1910.
Mead, G. R. S., Thrice Greatest Hermes. 3 vols. London and Benares, 1906.
Menandrea, Ed. A. Koerte. Leipzig, 1910.
Mullach, Fr. G. A., Fragmenta philosophorum graecorum. 3 vols. Paris,
1881-83.
Muller, Fragmenta historicorum graecorum. 5 vols.
Musonius Rufus, Reliquiae. Ed. O. Hense. Leipzig, 1905.
Parthey, G. F. C, In Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften,
pp. 117 fi. Berlin, 1865.
Parthey, G. F. C, Ed., Hermetis Trismegisti Poemander. Berlin, 1854.
Philo Alexandrinus, Opera quae supersunt. Ed. Cohn et Wendland. 6 vols.
Berlin, 1896-1915.
Polybius, Historiae, Ed. F. Hultsch, 4 vols. Berlin, 1870-92.
Sextus Empiricus, Ex recensione Immanuelis Bekkeri. Berlin, 1842.
Stobaeus, Joannes, Anthologium. Ed. Wachsmuth et Hense. 5 vols. Berlin,
1884-1912.
Tresp, Alois, Die Fragmente der griechischen Kultschriftsteller. Giessen, 1914.
Wessely, Carl, In Denkschriften der kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften
in Wien, Abt. II, 37. Wien, 1888.
Wotke, K., Epikuraische Spruchsammlung, Wiener Sludien, X (1888), 175-99.
Additional critical notes by H. Usener and Theodor Gomperz, pp. 199-210.
treatises and articles
Adam, James, The Religious Teachers of Greece. Edinburgh, 1908.
Arnold, E. Vernon, Roman Stoicism. Cambridge, 191 1.
Baldwin, James Mark, Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology. New York
and London, 1901.
Baumker, Clemens, Das Problem der Materie in der griechischen Philosophic
Minister, 1890.
Bigg, Charles, The Christian Platonists of Alexandria. Oxford, 1886.
Bousset, Wilhelm, Hauptprobleme der Gnosis. Gottingen, 1907.
Br6hier, Emile, Les Idies philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d'Alexandrie.
Paris, 1908.
Brieger, A., Epikurs Lekre von der Seele. Halle, 1893.
Christ, Wilhelm von, Geschichte der griechischen Litteratur. Munchen, 191 1.
Dibelius, M., Die Geisterwelt im Glauben des Paulus. Gottingen, 1909.
10

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 11
Drummond, James, Philo Judaeus. Oxford, 1888.
Feine, Paul, Das gesetzesfreie Evangelium des Paulus. Leipzig, 1899.
Fuller, B. A. G., The Problem of Evil in Plotinus. Cambridge, 1912.
Gomperz, Theodor, Greek Thinkers: A History of Ancient Philosophy. Eng.
tr. New York, 1901-12.
Gunkel, H., Die Wirkungen des heiligen Geistes. Gottingen, 1888.
Harrison, Jane Ellen, Prolegomena to the Study of the Greek Religion. Cam
bridge, 1903.
Hicks, R. D., Stoic and Epicurean. New York, 1910.
Jones, R. M., The Platonism of Plutarch. 1916.
Murray, Gilbert, Four Stages of Greek Religion. New York, 1912.
Neustadt, E., "Ps.-Aristoteles ncpi LTvevpaTos IX und Athenaios von Attalia,"
Hermes, XLIV (1909), 60-69.
Porter, F. C, "The Yecer Hara: A Study in the Jewish Doctrine of Sin." In
Biblical and Semitic Studies by Members of the Faculty of Yale University.
New York and London, igor.
Rand, Benjamin, The Classical Psychologists. Boston, 1912.
Reitzenstein, R., Die hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen. Leipzig, 1910.
 , Poimandres. Leipzig, 1904,
Schoemaker, William R., "The Use of ffi"l in the Old Testament and of
Hvev/w. in the New Testament," In Journal of Biblical Literature, 1904,
Part I, pp. 13 ff.
Siebeck, H., Geschichte der Psychologie. Gotha, 1884.
 , "Neue Beitrage zur Entwickelungsgeschichte des Geistbegriffs,"
In Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie, XXVII, 1-16. Berlin, 1914.
Siegfried, Carl, Philo von Alexandria als Ausleger des Alten Testaments.
Jena, 1875.
Volz, Paul, Der Geist Gottes und die verwandten Erscheinungen im Alten
Testamente und im anschliessenden Judentum. Tubingen, 1910.
Vos, G., "The Eschatological Aspect of the Pauline Conception of the Spirit,"
in Biblical and Theological Studies by the Members of the Faculty of
Princeton Theological Seminary. New York, 191 2.
Wendt, H. H., Die Begriffe Fleisck und Geist im biblischen Sprachgebrauch.
Gotha, 1878.
Windelband, W., Geschichte der antiken Philosophie. Dritte Auflage, bear-
beitet von Adolf Bonhoffer. Munchen, 1912.
 , A History of Philosophy. Eng. tr. New York, 1893.
Wood, Irving F., The Spirit of God in Biblical Literature. New York, 1904.
Zeller, Eduard, Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Ent-
wickelung dargestellt. Leipzig, 1903.
 , The Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics. Eng. tr. by Oswald J. Reichel.
London, 1892.

11

CHAPTER I
HNEYMA, *YXH, AND SAPS IN GREEK WRITERS FROM
HOMER TO ARISTOTLE
The three Greek words that stand at the head of this chapter
have all had a long history. The earliest instance of irvevna in
extant Greek literature is in Aeschylus, of the fifth century B.C.,
but Diogenes Laertius ascribes it, apparently as a term in familiar
use, to Xenophanes of the sixth century, ^vxh and trdp£ occur in
the earliest Greek writers whose writings we possess. All three
are still in use today. In the period covered by this chapter — to
anticipate the presentation of evidence in detail by a broad state
ment which will find its support in that evidence — irvedfia and
<7dp£ are terms of substance; \l/vxv, prevailingly at least, a functional
term. Hvevna denotes the most intangible of substances — wind,
breath, air. 2dp£ stands at the opposite extreme of tangibility,
denoting the flesh (or body) of an animal, usually of man. In
contrast with both, if/vxh, whatever substantial or physical sense it
may once have had, in prevalent usage finds its definition in its
functions, denoting that element of a living being, usually man,
by virtue of which he lives, feels, acts. In the language of
Aristotle (p. 43) "the soul is that by which primarily we live and
have sensation and understanding." When the fvxv is said to be
irveviicL, this signifies, not that the terms are synonyms, but that that
which functions psychically is composed of the substance irvtvna.
1. IINETMA
TLveupa. does not occur in Homer, Hesiod, or Pindar, but first
appears in Aeschylus. Its meanings are:
1. Wind, whether a gentle breeze or blast. This is decidedly
the most frequent use, being found in Aeschylus, Sophocles,
Euripides, Aristophanes, Herodotus, Thucydides, Demosthenes,
Plato, Aristotle, and is apparently the only usage, so far as
occurrences of the word have been noticed, in Herodotus and
Aristophanes. 13] 13

14 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
Eurip. Suppl. 962 : bvaa'mv 8' 6 j3ios, | irXajKra 8' ucrei rts ve$€\a |
irvevnarwv bird 5iwxip«»' atcrcro}.
Miserable my life; like a cloud hard driven, I am driven by fearful winds.
Herod. 7. 16. 1: Kara, irep rr\v xP^MwrdT?;?' avdp&woun 0dX-
aaaav irvevp,ara <t>a<TL avepcov eftiriirrovra, ov irepiopav 4>voi ry euvrijs
Xpaotiai. Just as blasts of wind falling upon the sea which is most useful to men,
they say prevent it from acting according to its own nature (cf. also Aesch.
Prom. 1086; Eurip. Her. Fur. 102).
Plato Pkaedr. 229B: heel ovcid r' early Kal irvevfia nerpiov.
There is shade and a gentle breeze.
Aristot. ii. 940&. 7 : e<m 7dp irvevfia depos Kivqais.
For wind is the motion of air (cf. i. 387a. 29).
Metaphorically for a force powerfully affecting the mind, in —
Aesch. Prom. 884: e£a> be 8pbfxov <f>epop.ai Xbatnjs | irvevfiari fiap-
yq, ykwcro-qs aKparris.
And I am driven out of my course by a furious wind of madness, with no
control of my tongue.
Aesch. Suppl. 30: Sef<u0', iKerrjv | rbv 6r\\vyevri aro\ov atSoiu \
irvevfiari x&pas-
Receive this suppliant female train with a merciful spirit( ?) of the country.
Aesch. Theb. 708: eirel Saifiuv \ \rifiaros kv rpoiraia xpovla fierak- '
Xoktos 'Iffcos dv 'eKQoi flaXepwre'pqj [some editors read dekefuarkpqi] |
irvevfiari' vvv 8' en fei.
For fortune changed by your tardy change of temper might perhaps come
with fresher [or gentler] breeze; but now it is still raging (lit. boiling).
Soph. Oed. Col. 612: dvfio-Kei 8e irtoris, jSXaordm 8' dxioria, |
Kal irvevfia ravrov oviror' ovr' kv avSpaaiv | 0lXois \3k$T\Kev ovre irpds
¦koKiv 7r6X«.
Faith dies, distrust springs up, and the wind is never the same between
friends or between city and city.
Tempted by the later use of irvevfia in the sense of spirit and by
the use of the English word "spirit" in the sense of disposition, one
might be disposed to find in these passages some such meaning for
rvevfia. • It should be observed, however, respecting Aesch. Suppl.
14

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 15
30, that the words are an apostrophe to the city, land, and water,
the heavenly gods, and Jove, and that they are followed by an
appeal to these same powers to send the "male-abounding insolent
swarm" into the deep with their swift ships and there meet them
with a furious whirlwind. The expression ai8o'u$ irvevfiari x&pas
probably means, therefore, either literally or figuratively, a favor
able breeze from the land. Similarly in Theb. 708 the author has
in mind the figure of a gentle or favoring breeze, and in Soph. Oed.
Col. he is describing the change that comes over everything by saying
that the wind never blows twice the same way. These instances
suffice to show that as early as Aeschylus irvevfia, meaning wind, was
used in figurative expressions referring to disposition, relationship,
or destiny, but not that the word itself had acquired such a second
ary meaning.
See other examples of irvevfia meaning wind in Aesch. Prom.
1047; Suppl. 165, 175; Pers. no; Soph. Aj. 558, 674; Track. 146;
Philoct. 639, 643, 1093; Elect. 564; Eurip. Helen. 406, 1663; Suppl.
554; Her. Fur. 216;. Cycl. 278; Ion 1507; Thucyd. 2. 77. 1, 16;
2. 84. 28, 32 (avefios in immediate context is used in the same sense;
cf . irvevfiara avkfiwv above in Herod., Aesch., and Eurip.) ; 2. 97. 13 ;
3. 49. 35 ; 4. 26. 7; 4. 30. 28; Aristoph. Eq. 441; Pax 175;
Ran. 1003; Nub. 164; Xen. Hellen. 6. 2. 27; Anab. 4. 5. 4 (follow
ing avefios in the same sense); 6. 1. 14; 6. 2. 1; Cyneg. 8. 1. 4;
Dem. 48. 24; 49. 8; 94. 5; 328. 10; Plato Phaedr. 255C; Cratyl.
410B, C; Phaedo 77E; Tkeaet. 152B; Tim. 43C; Legg. 747D;
797E; Pol. 394D; 405D; 488D; 496D. Aristot. i. 146&. 29, 35;
360&. 27; 361&. 13 passim; 3946. 10; ii. 9326. 29, 30, 32, etfreq.1
2. Air, or vaporous substance, tenuity rather than motion being
the chief characteristic thought of.
According to Aristot. {Phys-. ix. 6, cited by Ritter and Preller,
Hist. Phil. Graec, ed. ix. 75a) i. 213&. 22, the Pythagoreans
1 The notation of all references *to Greek authors in this chapter is that of
the editions listed in Liddell and Scott, except that references to Aristotle are to
volumes, pages, columns, and lines of the Editio Borussica, Berlin, 1831; these are
also indicated in the translation of Smith and Ross, Oxford, 1908-, and in the editions
of the irepl ^vxys by E.Wallace, Cambridge, 1882, and R. D. Hicks, Cambridge, 1902.
The lists make no claim to be complete; especially is no attempt made to give
exhaustive lists for Plato and Aristotle. 15

16 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
applied the name irvevfia to that which surrounds the heavens and
from which the heavens derive their space, Kevbv.
etPtH 8' e4>aaav Kal ol TLvdaybpeioi Kevbv, Kal eirewievai avrb rcj?
ovpavcp eK rod aireipov irvevfiaros, cos avairveovri Kal rb Kevbv; cf. pseudo-
Hippoc. ed. Littre, Vol. VI, p. 94, cited p. 80.
In Plato Tim. 49C irvevfia apparently means vapor; water is said
by condensation to become earth and stone, and these latter in turn
by melting and dissolution to become irvevfia Kal ai\p, the air (d^p)
again becoming, by being heated, fire. Aristotle uses irvevfia in a
similar sense, also associating it with arip, in i. 387a, 24-30, but
seems clearly to regard motion as the distinguishing quality of
irvevfia. Distinguishing things that can be volatilized from those
which can be vaporized, he says, eari yap arfils 17 virb Bepfiov Kava-
riKov els depa Kal irvevfia e/cKpieris e| vypov 8iavriKif, but a little lower
down, 'kari he irvevfia pvais <rvvexys kirl firJKOs aepos. Cf. also i. 341&.
22 f. &m yap if (jAbi-jrvevfiaros %r\pov fans.
3. Breath of a living being, man or lower animal. This usage
occurs in Aeschylus, Euripides, Thucydides, Xenophon, Demos
thenes, Plato, and Aristotle.
Aesch. Eumen. 568: Kypvaae, Krjpvi;, Kal arparbv KareipyaOov, \
r) r' ovv Siaropos Tvpo-rjviKri \ crahiriyi; ^pore'iov irvevfiaros irKifpovfievt] \
virkprovov yfjpvfia <f>aLvera} arparcS.
Proclaim, O herald, and call the people to order, and let the piercing
Tuscan trumpet, filled with mortal breath, pour forth its thrilling voice to the
multitude. Plato, Tim. 78A, B: o-irla fiev Kal irora orav els 011x171' epireVjj
areyei, irvevfia 8e Kal irvp ofiiKpofiepiarepa bvra rfjs abrfjs avaracreus
ov hbvarai. rovrois ovv Karexpyo-aro b debs els ri\v eVc rrjs KOtXlas kirl
ras 0Xe/3as vSpeiav, ir\eyfia k!- aepos Kal irvpbs olov ol Kvproi ovvv<f>riva-
fievos. When food and drink are put into it (the belly) it holds them, but air and
fire being of finer particles than its own substance it cannot hold. These ele
ments accordingly God used for sending moisture from the belly into the
veins, weaving a basket-like network of air and fire.
The irvevfia Kal irvp of the first part of the passage is evidently
synonymous with the ayp Kal irvp of the latter part. But in the
first instance irvevfia is definitely thought of as taken into the body
16

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH

17

by respiration, in the second instance ayp denotes the substance
itself. Consistently with this distinction hyp is constantly used in
the ensuing context, which describes the construction of the body,
but in 79B, when the subject of respiration is taken up for discus
sion, the use of irvevfia is resumed and maintained, till in 79D refer
ence is again made to the network above mentioned, when ayp is
again used.
Aristot. i. 473a. 3, 4: dXXd fiyv ovhe rpo<f>ys ye x&pw viroXyirreov
ylveadai rijv avairvoyv, c&s rpe<j>ofievov tcj> irvevfiari rov evrbs irvpbs.
But it must not be supposed that respiration is for the purpose of nourish
ment, as if the inner fire were fed by the breath.
In Eurip. Troiad. 758, irvevfia, meaning breath, seems to be used
figuratively for odor. In Eurip. Hipp. 1391, delov b8fiys irvevfia
signifies the odorous breath of the goddess.1 In Eurip. Phoen.
787, the breath breathed through a tube is called \arov irvevfiara.
Similarly in Eurip. Bacch. 128, $pvyLav avk&v irvevfiari,, and in
Elect. 749. In Soph. Fr. 13, dvOpuirbs kcm irvevfia Kal <tkwl fibvov,
the word irvevfia clearly means air or breath as unsubstantial and
perishable. Other examples of irvevfia meaning breath are found in Aesch.
Theb. 464; Eumen. 137; Eurip. Ipk. in Taur. 1317; Hec. 567;
Or. 277; Phoen. 851; Med. 1075, 1119; Hipp. 1391; Thucyd.
2. 49. 23; Xen. Cyneg. 7, 3; Dem. 60. 24; Plato Tim. 79B, 91C;
Phileb. 47A; Legg. 865B; Aristot. i. 471a. 27; 472a. 35; 587a. 4,
5; 631a. 27; 669a. 13; 718a. 3.
Closely associated with the idea of breath, perhaps not in
reality distinguished from it, is the idea of air as capable of being
breathed in or out.
Eurip. Hel. 867 : cos irvevfia Kadapbv ovpavov Se£co/*e0a.
That we may receive the pure air (breath ?) of heaven.
Cf. Plato Tim. 66E; Phaedo 70A.
1 & Beiov 63/j.rjs irveviia- Kal yap (v KaxoTs
&r jiaBbix-qv aov KaveKoviplnBrtv 8^/ias'
&rr' 4v T6irot(Ti rotalS' "Apre/us Bed.
" O heavenly whiff of perfume. I am aware thou comest to bring me solace. For
thou lightenest my pains. My patroness, the goddess Artemis, is here." '
17

18 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
Similarly, denoting air as necessary to life (yet not precisely the
breath of life) the word occurs in
Plato Tim. 77A: ryv 8e %wyv kv irvpl Kal irvevfiari awkfiaivev e£
avayKys exeiv aftrco (i.e., rco 6vyr$ fco'co).
And it is characteristic of the mortal animal that its life depends on
(consists in?) fire and air. Cf. also Aristot. i. 3946. 10 ff.
In Plato Tim. 84D, E, irvevfia seems to denote air in vari
ous parts of the body, being furnished to these parts by the
lungs, which are designated as b rav irvevfiaruv rcj> a&fiari
rafi'ias. 4. In a comparatively few passages, yet these scattered over a
considerable period of time, Tr^eD^a has a distinctly vital sense,
signifying breath of Ufe (loss of which is death), or Ufe, or even
more generally the primeval principle or basis of Ufe. In the
latter case we may perhaps translate it by the EngUsh word
"spirit," though it must be remembered that the Greek word
remains unchanged and that this change of translation may
exaggerate the change of thought in Greek. The transition of
usage from the non-vital to the vital sense is perhaps Ulustrated
by a passage in Aeschylus in which the expression irvevfia fiiov
occurs. Aesch. Pers. 507 : iriirrov 5' err' dXXi^XoKHj' • evrvxys 8k roi | o<ms
raxiara irvevfi' aireppy^ev fiiov.
And they fell upon one another, and happy he who most quickly broke off
the thread (lit. breath) of life.
But in the same period we find irvevfia without fiiov, having the
same meaning.
Aesch. Theb. 981 : <rco0els 8e irvevfi' air&\eo~ev.
But after having been saved he lost his life.
Eurip. Or. 864: Xey', co yepaie, irbrepa Xeuo-tjiicp xepl | y 81a aiSypov
irvevfi' airoppy^ai fie 8ei.
Tell me, old man, whether by hand raised to stone or by sword I must die
(lit. break off breath). See also Eurip. Troiad. 756, 785; Hec. 571.
Of pecuUar interest are two fragments from Epicharmus, a
contemporary of Sophocles, or, as is more probably the case, one
passage diversely quoted : 18

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 19
126: ZvveKpWy Kal SieKpidy KairyXOev odev rj\dev irakiv, | 70 fiev
els 7&>, irvevaa 8' dvu- ri ruvSe xa^errbv; ov8e 'kv.
Joined it was, is now dissevered and is gone again whence it came; earth
to earth, and spirit above. What difficulty does this occasion ? Surely none.1
(Ahrens, De Dialecto Dorica, II, 457; Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker,
I, 122, quoted from Plutarch Cons, ad Apoll. 15.)
146 : JZvaefiys vbcg ire^wccbs ov iradois k' ov8h> Kamv \ Kardavwv' •
avu rb irvevfia Siauevei /car' ovpavbv. (Ahrens, op. cit., p. 460; Diels,
op. cit., p. 124, quoted from Clemens Alexandrinus Str., iv, 170.
If with pious mind thou shouldst live, thou wouldst suffer no ill at death.
Above the spirit will continue to exist in heaven.
In view of these quotations from Epicharmus, the former of
which is probably nearer to the original than the latter (cf. p. 77),
it is not strange to read the following in Euripides:
Suppl. 531-36: kaaar' ySy 777 Kakvfflyvai veKpovs. \ odev 8' emo--
rov ks rb o~u>fi' [Mss L and P read 0cos] dcikero, | kvravda airyhde,
irvevfia fiev irpbs aWkpa, \ rb awfia 8' ks 717V • ovri yap KeKryfieBa \ yfierepov
avrb, ifKyv kvoiKyaai fiiov, \ Kaireira ryv Opepaaav avrb Set Xafieiv.
Suffer now the dead to be hidden in the earth,_and whence each part
came into the body [or, into the light] thither it departs, spirit to air, and the
body into the earth. For we do not at all possess it as our own, except to live
in for a lifetime, and then the earth that nourished it must receive it.
But Stobaeus (Eel. IV, 55. 3) ascribes these Unes to Moschion, a
writer of the second century a.d., and modern editors such as
Kirchhoff and Nauck (cited by Paley with apparent approval) so
far agree at least as not to ascribe them to Euripides.2
If we may trust the testimony of Diogenes Laertius, writing
in the second or third century a.d., concerning the views of a
philosopher of the sixth century B.C., a century before Sophocles
1 Cf. Eccles. 12: 7: "The dust shall return to earth as it was, and the spirit shall
return to God who gave it." Cf. also Job 34:14; Gen. 2:7.
2 In the traditional text of Phocylides, lines 106-8 (Bergk, Poetae lyrici Graecae,
II, 450 ff.), occur the following sentences, irvevim yip iari ffeov XPW" Bvrrrolai
Kal eUdtv <rQtia yap £k yairjs exofiev K&iretTa irpbs ad yrjv \v6fievot k6vls 4(rp.4v, a-rjp 5'
iva irpev/M S^Scktoi, which, with their most interesting context, would be of capital
importance for our purpose, if they were really from Phocylides (sixth century. B.C.).
But the poem is now universally admitted to be a forgery and is assigned by Bernays
(see Christ, Gesch. der gr. Lit., 4th ed., p. 134) to an Alexandrian Jew writing some
time between the second century B.C. and the middle of the first century a.d.
19

20 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
wrote, Xenophanes declared that the soul was irvev/ia.1 But lack
ing the full context of Xenophanes' statement, or other evi
dence by which to interpret it exactly, we cannot tell precisely
what he meant by irvevfia as a predicate of lf/vxy. The preceding
statement, "everything that comes into being is perishable," taken
with the contemporary evidence as to the use of irvevfia, leads one
to suspect that by irvevfia he meant breath, or air, and that the
statement should be understood to mean that Xenophanes, as
against the views of his predecessors, who maintained that the
\pvxy lives after death as a shade, was the first to affirm that
everything that comes into being is also subject to extinction,
and that under this general law the soul also is but breath or
air. If this is the meaning of the passage it is evident that irvevfia
does not here mean a (Uving) spirit or (Uving) soul-stuff, but
belongs under 3 above (cf. Soph. Fr. 13 cited p. 17), and that, if the
statement of Diogenes about Xenophanes is correct, it had not yet
in the sixth century B.C. acquired the former meaning.2 Apparently,
however, we find in Xenophanes the first definite traces of that
association of irvevfia and ipvxy which was destined to play so large
a part in the subsequent history of the two words.
To Anaximenes, a contemporary of Xenophanes, Plutarch
ascribes the words:
olov y fox'fl, 4>yo-iv, y iffierkpa ayp ovaa avyKparel yfias, Kal SKov
rbv Koo-fiov irvevfia Kal ayp irepikxei.3
As our souls, being air, control us, so wind(?) and air encompass the
whole world.
'Diog. Laert. ix. 2. 3: irpurot t' &Te<p^vaTo Sri irav rb yiv6fievov tp8apr6v £<tti,
Kal t) if/vxl) irvevfia.
' Between this statement and that of Siebeck, Geschichte der Psychologie, II, 132,
that air in motion (irvevfia ?) was from very early times regarded by the Greeks as
more than a blind mechanical power, and the breath as life-giving, there is no
necessary conflict. The latter conception, so obviously suggested by experience,
would naturally precede the conception of the irvevfia as itself alive, either a spirit or
spirit-substance possessing life (cf. the passage from Epicharmus); and between the
two there might easily arise the thought, apparently expressed by Xenophanes, that
the ^vxh is irvevfia, breath or air, life-giving indeed, but not living, and hence the
^vxi perishable, how he does not expressly say, but doubtless through the departure
of the irvevfia from the body and its return to the general mass of unconscious air.
3 Plac. Phil. i. 3. Of course irvevfia was not the only term which the ancient
Greeks used to describe the quality or nature of the ^vX^. Both before and after
20

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 21
While irvevfia is not here predicated of y \pvxy, yet it is evident
that irvevfia and ayp are nearly synonymous terms, and the parallel
ism of the two clauses, together with the affirmation that the \pvx^i
is ayp, throws some Ught upon the question what other writers
mean when they say that the \pvxy is irvevfia.
Aristotle has certain usages which are apparently peculiar to
him, and which demand attention in this connection. He uses the
expression avfKpvrov irvevfia to denote air that belongs in, apparently
is born in, the body as distinguished from that which is inhaled.
He ascribes to it various functions in the body, such as smell,
motion, hearing, and cooling. Thus in i. 6596, 17-19, speaking of
animals that have no nostrils, he says:
ra 8' 'kvrofia 81a rod uirof coparos aladavovrai ruv bcrfiSiv, Kal travra
tc3 ovfKpvTui irvevfiari rod croifiaros &<rirep Kiveirai' rovro 8' virapx^i
<f>vo~ei iracri Kal ov dvpadev kireiaaKrov kcrriv.
And the insects detect odors through the hypozome, and all (animals not
having nostrils) possess the power of smell, as of motion, by virtue of the
inborn air of the body; and this belongs to all by nature, and is not brought
in from outside.
So also in i. 669a. 1, distinguishing animals that have lungs and
those that have not, and the different ways in which they are
"cooled," whether by water or air, he says:
ra 8e fiy evaifia Kal rfi o-Vficpvrq irvevfiari Svvarai Karaif/vxeiv .
And the non-sanguineous animals by the inborn air are able to be cooled.
But in i. 743&. 37 ff., speaking of animals in general, he says:
dXXd to fiev rys a(f>ys Kal yevcrecos eWvs kcrriv awfia y rov a&fiarbs
ri rosv fcocoi', 17 8' ocrcbpycris Kal y aKoy irbpoi avvairrovres irpbs rov
akpa rbv dvpadev, irhypeis avfjufrvrov irvevfiaros.
But while the [sense-organ] of touch and taste is simply the body or some
part of the body of animals, those of smell and hearing are passages connecting
with the outer air and full of inborn air.

Xenophanes there was the view that the soul was fire, the two conceptions, however,
not being sharply antagonistic, irvp being in some cases at least thought of as trans-
mutable into irvevfia, and in others it being affirmed that the fvx^ was irvevfia BeppAv.
The full discussion of this matter, fundamental for the history of psychology, would
carry us too far afield from our lexicographical study. But! see Siebeck, Geschichte der
Psychologie, I, 43 ff .; Arnold, Roman Stoicism, p. 243.
21

22 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
Again in 741&. 37 ff., speaking of the development of offspring
of animals, he says:
Sioplfercu be ra fikpy tS>v fcpcov irvevfiari, ov fikvroi ovre tcJ> rys
yevvovays ovre rco abrov, Kadairep rives ruv 4>vo-ikSiv qjaaiv.
And the parts of animals are differentiated by irvevfia, not however by
either that of the mother or that of the offspring itself, as some physicists say.
Then follows an argument from the case of animals produced from
an egg, and from the fact that viviparous animals do not breathe
till the lungs are produced. Jaeger1 argues that though abfuj>vrov
is omitted, it is the abfi4>vrov irvevfia that is referred to, and that it
is this which, according to Aristotle, differentiates animate beings
from inanimate things. This is not impossible, but neither is vital
power distinctly ascribed to abfufrvrov irvevfia, nor is it definitely
attributed to plants, so far as the present study has discovered.
In the Ilepl Kbcr/iov, however, there occurs a passage in which
irvevfia seems clearly to bear a vital sense:
i. 3946." e/c 8e rys i-ypas birb \{/bxovs fiev osadeicrys ware peiv avefios
kykvero' ob8ev yap kcrriv ovros ir\yv ayp irdKvs pkwv Kal aBpbos' bcrris
dfia Kal irvevfia \eyerai. Xkyerai Se Kal krkpws irvevfia y re kv <j>vrois Kal
fcpois Kal 81a irdvrwv SiyKovcra 'kfivl/vxbs re Kal ybvifios ovaia, irepl 17s vvv
\eyeiv ovk avaymlov.
But from the dry (air ?), when it is impinged upon by the cold so that it
flows, wind arises. For this is nothing but a large amount of air, flowing and
massed together; and it is also called irvevfui. But in another sense the word
irvevfia is applied to the substance which is in both plants and animals and
permeates all and is both living and generative — concerning which it is not
necessary to speak at this time.
One might be disposed to think that Aristotle is here speaking
of the o-bfi(j)VTov irvevfia to which he ascribes so important functions,
but the abfi^vrov irvevfia is apparently limited to animals, while the
irvevfia of which he is here speaking is in both plants and animals;
if indeed it does not permeate all things. It seems clear therefore
that he is here using Tr^eDpo in the sense of a universal principle of
life, if not even of existence.2
1 "Das Pneuma in Lykeion," in Hermes, XXXVIII, 43 ff.
2 Sextus Empiricus, writing in the third century a.d., ascribes to the followers of
Pythagoras and Empedocles the doctrine that there is one spirit {irvevfia) which
22

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 23
From this evidence, though somewhat scanty and not altogether
clear, it nevertheless appears that from the sixth century B.C. irvevfia
was predicated of the soul, and that from the time of Sophocles at
least the idea of life was associated with the term. In Epicharmus
it seems to denote soul-substance, that of which all souls are com
posed, from which they are all taken, and to which they all return,
and in Aristotle's time the notion appears to have been so expanded
that irvevua signified the basis of all life, whether of plants or animals-
It should be observed, however, that in none of the passages
cited is the term individuaUzed, so as to denote the soul of the indi
vidual, nor do the affirmations made concerning it involve the
assertion of individual immortaUty.1 The conception of a soul-
substance out of which souls are made does not indeed exclude per
sonal immortaUty; but the affirmation that at death it returns to the
ether or whence it came is not naturaUy associated with a beUef in
personal immortaUty. That Sophocles and Euripides should use
the expression irvevfia airoppy^ai for death is not surprising, for
here irvevfia means only breath [of Ufe]. We are nearer to an asser
tion of the personal immortaUty of the irvevfia in the statement
ascribed to Epicharmus (p. 19) that the pious man has nothing
to fear because his spirit wiU abide in heaven; but in its
original form the passage probably refers to reabsorption in
the universal irvevfia. It is at any rate significant that Plato and
Xenophon, who speak definitely of the immortaUty of the soul (see
below under faxy), seem never to have used irvevua as it is employed
in these passages from Epicharmus and Sophocles, and that it is in
permeates the whole world like a soul and unites us to the irrational animals (iv yap
iirapxeiv irvevfia to did iravrbs rov Kbfffiov SirfKov Tpvxys Tpbirov rb Kal evovv iffids irpbs
ixeiva. Diels, Vorsohrat., I, 275, B 136). If this view really belonged to Pythagoras
and Empedocles themselves, it would be an anticipation even of the view which,
according to Aristotle, was held in his time. But, in view of the uncertainty as to
the persons referred to as the followers of Pythagoras and Empedocles, it is necessary
to treat the passage along with other post-Christian testimony. Cf. pp. 130, 139 f.
'Even in the Potidaea inscription quoted on p. 30, in which the individualizing
fvx'fl is used, it is affirmed, not that the fvx^i lives as such after death, but that the ether
receives it. Cf. Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, II, 84: "What was cafied in question
[by Epicharmus and Euripides] was the personal, not the conscious, survival of the
soul; for the ether, or heavenly substance, was conceived as the vehicle of a world-
soul identified with the supreme deity." 23

24 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
Aristotle, who distinctly rejects the idea of the immortaUty of the
individual soul, that the usage reappears, though, to be sure, modified
by Aristotle's notion of life as common to plants and animals. It is
indeed not wholly clear, nor is it, for our present purpose, of any
great significance whether in the obiter dictum quoted from Aristotle
he meant for himself to affirm the existence of such a universal Ufe-
substance or only to say that the word was used by some of his
contemporaries in this sense. What is of importance is that in the
time of Aristotle irvevua had not yet come to mean a spirit, the
immaterial element of an embodied being, or an unembodied per
son, but that it had for some two centuries been used to mean spirit
in a non-individuaUzed sense constituting or proceeding from a sort
of reservoir of soul-substance or Ufe-principle. From the quotation
of Clement of Alexandria from Epicharmus we might infer that
this soul-material present in an individual about to surrender it in
death might be called rb irvevfia, but the presence of the article is
probably due to Clement rather than to Epicharmus, and in any
case the individual human spirit conceived of as the seat and organ
of psychic activities was apparently never so spoken of.1
n. *TXH
tyvxy is throughout the history of its use in extant Greek writers
prevaihngly a vital term, i.e., a word carrying with it the idea of
Ufe, and, until Aristotle (who appUes the term to plants), Ufe involv
ing some measure of consciousness or possibiUty of consciousness.
It is found, moreover, even in Homer, both in the more abstract
sense of life-principle, the loss of which is death, and of soul as a
conscious entity existing after death. It is evident, therefore, that
in the earliest extant literature we are already at an advanced stage
in the development of the usage of the word. We cannot, accord
ingly, reason as if the Homeric usages were the original sources from
which all others were developed. Later usages may have their
roots in usage antecedent to Homer or may have arisen from the
1 Completeness of treatment would require a discussion of the usage of the Socratic
schools. See Zeller, Socrates and the Socratic Schools; Mullach, Fragmenta Philoso-
phorum Graecorum; Diogenes Laertius; Book ii and Book vi. Inasmuch, however, as
these schools were largely absorbed either in Epicureanism or Stoicism, and such
influence as they had upon later thought was exerted through these latter schools, in
the interest of brevity completeness is sacrificed. 24 ¦

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH

25

influence of usages first developed in other words. For example,
$vxy meaning soul as the seat of emotions does not appear in Homer.
But dvfibs, which Homer uses to express this idea, also means, as
$vxy does, Ufe, the loss of which is death. The usage of tyvxh mean
ing soul as the seat of emotion may have therefore existed in
Homeric times, though for some reason excluded from Homer by
dvubs; or in post-Homeric times it may have passed over to tyvxy
from dvfibs, which was already a synonym of \[/vxy in the meaning
"Ufe." Tabulating meanings not whoUy on a chronological basis, but
guided partly by kinship in meaning, we have the following exhibit
of usage: i. Life, loss of which is death, sometimes of lower animals, but
usually of men: common from Homer to Xenophon.
Horn. II. xi. 334: tous fiev Tv8e'i8ys SovpiKKeirbs AiofiySys \ dvfiov
Kal i/'i'x^s KeKa8&v Kkvra rebxe' airybpa.
The son of Tydeus, Diomedes, spearman renowned, having deprived them
of soul and life, took away their glorious armor.
Herod. 3. 130: 'ekeyov irpbs ras ywaiKas us fiacriKei ovros ety os
ryv ypvxyv airkSuKe.
And they said to the women that this was the man who had restored to
the king his life.
Xen. Cyr. 4. 4. 10: vvv re on eireWeade, ras ^uxds irepiiroiifaaade.
Because you have now submitted you have saved your lives.
See also Eurip. Troiad. 1213-15: vvv 8k 0-' y deoo-rvyys | d<6elXe0'
'EXeVi7, irpds 8e Kal ypvxyv credev \ eKreive, Kal iravr' oIkov ki-airwXecrev.
And now heaven-detested Helen has bereft thee, and besides taken away
(lit. killed) thy life, and destroyed all thy house. Cf . also Aristoph. Thesmoph.
864: tj/vxal .... idavov.
By metonymy, \[>vxy is used for the joy of Ufe, or, more inclu
sively, for aU the possibilities of good associated with the fact of
Uving. Eurip. Med. 226: kfiol 8' aeKirrov irpayua irpocrireo-bv rbSe \ \pvxyv
8U4>dapn' ' otxofiai 8e Kal fiiov \ xa-pw fiideicra Kardaveiv XPTlfa, 4>i\ai.
And this unexpected event befalling me has ruined my life. I am going,
and having given up the joy of living, I wish to die, my friends. Cf . Mark 8:35.
25

26 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
Similarly, but with a double metonymy, foxy, meaning the
source of the joy of life, occurs in Euripides:
Eurip. Androm. 419: iraai 8' avdponrois dp' yv \ foxy rkKv'.
And to all men, then, their children were their life. Cf. also
Hes. Op. 684.
In certain passages in Homer (II. v. 696) the expression, e\iire
foxy, which elsewhere means to die (Od. xiv. 134; xviii. 91), or
foxw kKairvaaev (II. xxii. 467), is used of one who faints or faUs
into a swoon. Here is perhaps an approach to the meaning of soul
as the seat of consciousness. Yet probably in the thought of the
writer foxy meant Ufe, and the thought as expressed is that his Ufe
left him (for a time).
Other examples of foxy meaning Ufe occur in Horn. II. v. 296;
vui. 123, 315; ix. 322, 401; xiii. 763; xiv. 518; xvi.453, 505; xxu.
161, 257, 325. 338; xxiv. 168, 754; Od. i. 5; in. 74; ix. 255, 423,
523; xix. 426 (of an animal); xxi. 154, 171; xxu. 245, 444; Pind.
Nem. 1. 47 (of an animal); Pyth. 3. 101; 01. 8. 39 (of an animal);
Aesch. Agam. 965 (938), 1457, 1466, 1545; Eumen. 115; Soph.
Oed. Tyr. 94, 894; Oed. Col. 1326; Antig. 559; Elect. 786, 1492;
Ai. 1270; Eurip. Hec. 22, 176, 182; Orest. 643, 845, 1034, 1163,
1171, 1517; Phoen. 1005 (998), 1234(1228), 1291; M ed. g6&; Ale. 301,
704, 715; Rhes. 183; Troiad. 1135; Herac. 15, 297, 530; Her. Fur.
1 146; Ion 1499; Hipp. 440, 726; Aristoph. Acharn. 357; Fes£. 375;
Nub. 712, 719; Pax 1301; Antipho 115. 15; Herod. 1. 24; 2. 134;
7. 39; Thucyd. 1. 136; 3. 39; 8. 50; Xen. Cyr. 3. 1. 36; 4-. 4. 10;
4. 6. 4; Hier. 4. 9; Eq. Mag. 1. 19. I have observed no examples
of this usage in Plato or Aristotle, both writers usuaUy employing
the word in the meaning "soul" indicated below under 3. But it
would be hazardous to say that no instance of the meaning "Ufe"
occurs. 2. A shade, the soul of man existing after death, or departing
from the body in death. This usage, appearing in Homer, clearly
implies the thought of the foxy as existent in the body; since other
wise it could not depart from the body and exist separately. Yet
instances of the term foxy definitely denoting an entity existing in
the body in Ufe do not appear, unless they be found in the passages
cited above referring to fainting or //. ix. 408, cited below. As
26

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 27
denoting a "shade" foxy occurs in Homer, Pindar, Aeschylus,
Sophocles, Euripides, and Aristophanes.
Horn. II. i. 3 : Mijj'iJ' deifie, Bed, ILy\y'ia8ecu 'AxiXiJos | ovkoukvyv, tf
fivpV 'AxctioTs aX7e' WyKev, | xoXXds 8' icj>difiovs fox&s "A'iSi irpo'iafov |
ypwcav, abrobs 8e k\6ipia revxe nbveaaiv \ oliavolai re Saira.
Sing, goddess, the destructive wrath of Achilles, son of Peleus, which
brought upon the Achaeans innumerable woes, and sent to Hades many strong
souls of heroes, and gave them [their bodies] a prey to dogs and a feast for
birds of prey. Cf. Od. x. 560; xi. 65; II. xvi. 856.
Horn. Od. xi. 205 : TQs 'kcj>ar', abrap ky& y' edeXov cfrpeal uepuypi-
l-as | fiyrpbs kfiys foxyv ekkeiv KararedvyKviys. \ rpls fiev kcfxopfiydyv,
ekeeiv rk fie dv/ibs dvcoyeiv, \ rpls 8k fioi e/c xaP&v auy e'UeXov y Kal
bveipu | <eirraT'.
So she spoke, and I anxious in my heart desired to seize the spirit of
my dead mother. Thrice indeed I sprang toward her, and my soul impelled
me to seize her, but thrice she escaped out of my hands like a shadow or a
dream. See also //. xxiii. 65, 72, 100, 104, 106; Od. xi. 150, 222, 471.
Soph. Oed. Col. 999: roiavra fikvroi Kabrbs eiaefiyv Ka/cd, | dewv
aybvrwv' ols eycb obSe ryv irarpbs foxw I df olpcu f Siaav dvreiireiv
kfioi. Into such ills I myself entered, the gods leading; which statement of mine
I believe not even the spirit of my father, if he were alive, would deny.
The close relationship between the two meanings "Ufe" and
"shade" is illustrated in the following passage:
Horn. II. ix. 408: avSpbs 8e foxy irahiv ehdelv ovre \eiary \ ovd'
€kery, kirel dp Kev dfieiforai 'kpKos bSbvruv.
But a man's life (soul ?) comes back again neither by seizure nor by force
when once it has passed beyond his teeth. Cf. also II. xxi. 569; Pind. Isth.
i. 68; Soph. Antig. 559.
Other examples of foxy denoting a shade are found in Horn.
II. v. 654; vu. 330; xi. 445; xvi. 625; xxii. 362; xxiii. 65, 72, 221;
Od. x. 492, 530, 565; xi. 37, 51, 84, 90, 141, 165, 385, 387, 467, 538,
541, 543, 564, 567; xxin. 251, 323; xxiv. 1, 14, 15, 20, 23, 35, 100,
102, 105, 120, 191; Pind. Nem. 8, 44; Pyth. 4. 159; 11. 21; Aesch.
Pers. 630; Agam. 1545; Soph. Oed. Col. 999; Eurip. Hec. 87;
Aristoph. Av. 1557; Pax 829. 27

28 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
3. Soul, as a constituent element of man's nature, the seat of
emotions of all kinds; from Sophocles on, the human mind in the
large sense of the word as the seat of emotions, will, thought, and
character. So used in Pindar, Aeschylus, Sophoclesj Euripides,
Herodotus, Thucydides, Aristophanes, Xenophon, Isocrates, Plato,
and Aristotle.
Pind. Nem. 9. 39: iravpoi 8e fiovXevaai <j>bvov \ irapiroSiov vecfrehav
rpef/ai irorl Svafievkcav avSp&v arixas | X^pvl nal fox$ 8vvaroi.
But there are few who are able with hands and soul to turn back the
cloud of impending war against the ranks of the enemy.
Soph. Antig. 176: auyxavov 8e iravrbs dvSpbs kKuadeiv \ foxyv Te
Kal <f>pbvyfia Kal yvw/iyv.
But it is impossible to learn fully every man's soul and mind and judgment.
Aristoph. Acharn. 375: ra>v r' av yepbvroiv ol8a ras foxds on |
obSev fiXkirovaiv aX\o irkyv focjyySaKetv.
And I know again the minds of the elders, that they care for nothing but
to annoy by their vote.
See other examples in Eurip. Ion 11 70: cos S' kir\ypo£y areyy, \
arecfrdvoiai Koafiydevres, ebbxdov fiopcis | foxW kifkypovv.
But when the tent was filled, adorned with crowns, they filled their soul
with abundant food.
Xen. Cyr. 1. 2. 1: eiSos fiev KaWiaros foxw 8e (juXavdpwirbraros
Kal rf>i\ofiadkararos Kal 4>i\orifibraros.
Most beautiful in appearance, and in soul mdst humane, most eager for
learning, and most ambitious.
Isocr. iC: ra fiev yap aaifiara rots avfifierpois irbvois, 17 8e foxy
rots airovSaiois Kbyois av^eadai irkfoKe.
For bodies grow by moderate labor, but the soul by excellent words. Cf.
also 2C and 4 A.
By metonymy foxy is used for the state or experience of the
soul.1 1 Xenophon puts into the mouth of Araspes the opinion that there are two souls
in man, one good, one evil.
Cyr. 6. 1. 41: 660 ydp, l<pn, & Kvpe, aacpus ?x<« 'pvxds- vvv tovto ire^>iXo<r60i;KO
fieri tov dSUov (rotpurrov toO "Epwros. oi ydp S^ fila ye oSffa &fia ayaffi) ri effTi Kal
ko/ci), 0*5' &fia Ka\wv re Kal alffxpwv tpywv epji, Kal raird ap.a /SotfXeraf re Kal oi /3oii-
28

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 29
Dem. 842. 15: rb' otead' abryv foxw e^eiv;
What state of mind do you think she will be in ?
Other examples of foxy used to denote the soul or mind of man
occur in Pind. 01. 2. 70; Pyth. 3. 41, 61; 4. 122; Nem. 9. 32; Isth.
3. 71; Aesch. Coeph. 275; Prom. 693; Pers. 28, 442, 841; Soph.
Theb. 1034; Oed. Tyr. 64, 666, 727; Antig. 176, 227, 317; Ai. 559,
1361; EJed. 219, 903, 1127; Philoct. 55, 1014; Track. 1260; Eurip.
Hec. 580; Elect. 208, 297; Orest. 525; Med. 474; Hipp. 160, 255,
1006; Ale. 107; Troiad. 11 71; Heracl. 174; Suppl. 1103; fler.
Fmt\ 626; Aristoph. Fes^>. 380, 756; Acharn. 375, 393; Pax 675,
1068; 2V«&. 94, 319, 413, 420, 1049; Ran. 1334, 1468; Hipp. 457,
482; Lycist. 960; Ora. 466; PZw/. 524; Herod. 3. 14, 108 (of ani
mals); 5.124; Thucyd. 2. 40; Isoc. 17B; Xen. An. 7. 7, 43; Ec<m.
1. 19; 10. 4; 20. 15; Hellen. 3. 4, 29; Cyr. 1. 2. 1, 10; 1. 3. 18;
2. 1. n; 3. 3. 18; 5. 4. 11, 35; 6. 1. 41; 6. 2. 15, 28, 33; 8. 2. 20;
8. 7. 4; .Mem. 1. 3. 5; 3. 11. 10; Eq. 11. 1 (of an animal).
4. By natural metonymy, the vital or conscious element in
man standing for the man himself, foxy is used with the meaning
"person." So in Sophocles, Euripides, Xenophon, and Plato.
Soph. Oed. Col. 499: apKetv yap olfiai Kavrl fivpiuv fiiav \ foxyv
rd8' eKrivovaav, yv evvovs iraprj.
For I suppose that one soul expiating these things would suffice for ten
thousand, if it were present with good intent. See also Soph. Ai. 154; Oed . Col.
499; Philoct. 712; Eurip. Phoen. 1305; Med. 247; Hipp. 259; Xen. Cyr.
7. 3. 8; Plat. Rep. 491E, 496 B.
5. Quite by itself is Aristotle's use of foxy denoting the principle
of Ufe or intelUgence in the lower animals, plants, and the uni
verse. Aristot. i. 41 16. See fuller discussion and other examples
of Aristotle's usage on pp. 43 ff.
Concerning the essential quaUties of the foxy, and, in particular,
the possibjUty and nature of its existence apart from the body,
there was much difference of opinion among the Greeks which
\erai irpdrreiv, dWa 8i)\ov Sri Sio iarbv faxd, Kal Srav fiev i) dyaBif Kpar-Q rd Ka\d
irpdrrerat, &rav Sk if irovr/pd, rd alaxpd lirixeipelrai.
But this is evidently to be taken, not as a philosophic statement, but as a descrip
tion in popular language of the fact familiar in every man's experience of the existence
of strongly conflicting impulses in the soul. 29

30 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
cannot be fully reflected in a tabular analysis of meanings. Though
from Homer down there is clear evidence of the beUef that the foxy
survives the death of the body, yet definite affirmations that the
foxy, which in the period of bodily life is the seat of consciousness,
mentaUty, and feeling, Uves after death, retaining its individuaUty,
apparently occur in Greek writers first in the fifth century; and in
the same period we find evidence of the notion that in surviving
death the soul also lost its individuaUty,. becoming absorbed in a
larger entity. Pindar seems indeed to deny immortality altogether:
Pyth. 3. 61: fiy, cj)i\a foxd, fiiov addvarov \ aire\)8e, rdv 8' ZfiirpaK-
rov dvrKei fidxavav.
Crave not, my soul, immortal life, but make the most of things within
your power.
But the context shows that he is speaking here of the unending
continuance of the present life, and in Ol. 2 he indicates clearly that
he beUeved in a Ufe after death in which men were rewarded for the
good or evil done in this Ufe. In a memorial inscription to those
who fell at Potidaea, presumably a half-century or so later than
Pindar, occur the following words:1
A1017P ueu cfravxas bweSkxaaro, au[fiara 8e xQ&v\ I • • • • iralbes
'Adyvaiav <pavx&s 8' avrippo[ira devres] | y\XK]dxaavr' dperyv Kal
irar[pi8'] ebKheiaaav.
Then the air received their souls, the earth their bodies .... Athenian
youths sacrificing their souls [lives?], exchanged them for virtue and glorified
their country.
The language reminds us at once of the words of Epicharmus
(p. 19). It is significant both that, while there irvevfia is used,
here we have foxy, and, on the other hand, that despite this
difference this passage no more than the others impUes personal
immortality.2 Herodotus, writing only a few years before Potidaea, ascribes to
the Egyptians the origination of the beUef in the immortaUty of the
soul and the transmigration of the soul. Apparently he distin-
1 Hicks and Hill, Historical Inscriptions, p. 94; Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, II, 84.
2 Cf. on the former point what is said above on pp. 23 f. concerning the relation
between irvevfia and ^xt, and on the latter the quotation from Gomperz in footnote,
p. 23. 30

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 31
guished between the immortality of the soul and the shadowy kind
of existence which Homer ascribes to the dead, perhaps also between
immortaUty and reabsorption; unless indeed he was thinking chiefly
or exclusively of the beUef in transmigration as that for the origina
tion of which the Egyptians were responsible.1
Herod. 2. 123: irpuroi Se Kal rbvSe rbv \byov Aiybirrioi eiai 01
eiirbvres, us avdpuirov foxy dddvarbs kari, rov aufiaros 8e Kara<f£ivovros
ks aXXo £uov aiel yivbfievov eaSverai, kiredv Se irdvra irepieKdrj rd xeP-
aala Kal rd dakaaaia Kal rd irereivd, avris ks avdpuirov a&fia yivb
fievov kaSbveiv.
And the Egyptians were also the first to affirm that the human soul is
immortal, and when the body dies it always passes into another animal which
is at the moment being born, and so goes the round of all the land and water
animals and the birds, and again enters the body of a man that is being born.
Xenophon ascribes to Cyrus a not altogether unwavering beUef
in the continued existence and consciousness of the soul after death.
Xen. Cyr. 8. 7. 17 ff: ob yap Syirov rovro ye aa<j>us SoKelre
eiSkvai us obSev en kyu eaouai, kireiSdv rov avdpuirivov fiiov reKevryaw
obbe yap vvv roi ryv y' kfiyv foxw eupare, dXX' ols Sieirpdrrero,
robrois abryv us ovaav Kare<j>upare. ras Se ruv dSt/ca iradbvruv ^uxds
oxnru Karevoyaare o'iovs fiev cj>bfiovs rols fiianpovois kufidWovaiv, o'iovs
8k irdKauvaiovs rols avoaiois kiriirkuirovai; rols 8k (pdiuevois ras rifias
Siaukveiv kri dv SoKelre, el fiySevbs abruv ai foxal Kvpiai yaav; ovroi
eyuye, u iralSes, obSk rovro iruirore kire'iadyv us y foxy ecos fiev dv kv
dvyrca aufiari rj, ^77, brav 8e robrov araWayy, riBvyKev. bpu yap on
Kal rd dvyra aufiara, oaov dv kv abrols XP0V0V V V foxy, £uvra
irapexerai. ob8e ye birus d<f>puv earai y foxy, kireiSav rod aqbpovos
aufiaros 8ixa ykvyrai, ob8e rovro ireireiafiai' dXX' brav aKparos Kal
Kadapbs b vovs kKKpidfj, Tore Kal cfrpovifiurarov e'ubs abrbv elvai.
8ia\vofikvov Se avdpuirov SiJXd kanv emara airibvra irpbs to bfib<j>v\ov
irkyv rys foxy*' aVTy ^ fibvy ovre irapovaa ovre airiovaa bpdrai.
kvvoyaare 8', ecpy, on kyyvrepov fiev ruv avdpuirivuv davdru ob8kv kanv
xnrvov' y Se rov avdpuirov foxy to™ Syirov deiordry Karaq^aiver ai, Kal
Tore n ruv fieKKbvruv irpoopq.' rbre yap, cos eoiKe, pdXiora eXeu-
depovrai. el fiev ovv ovrus 'kxei ravra uairep kyu o'louai Kai if foxy
'Paus., iv. 32. 4, says that the first people that he knows of who asserted
that there is an immortal soul of man were the Chaldeans and the Indian magicians.
31

32 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
KaTaXei7rei rb auua, Kal ryv kfiyv foxhv KaraiSobfievoi iroielre a kyu
beofiai' ei 8e fiy ovrus, dXXd fievovaa y foxy kv tcJS aufian avvairo-
dvrjaKei, dXXd deobs 7e tous del bvras Kal iravr' k<j>opuvras Kal iravra
Svvaukvovs, ot Kal T-fjvSe ryv ruv SKuv rd%iv avvkxovaiv drpifiy Kal
ayyparov Kal dvafiapryrov Kal birb KdWovs Kal fieyedovs a8ii]yyrov,
robrovs cj>ofiobfievoi fiyiror' daefies fiySev fiybe avbaiov fiyre iroiyayre
fiyre fiovKevayre.
For you surely do not suppose that you know that I shall no longer exist
when I end my human life. For not even now have you seen my soul, but
from what it did have inferred its existence. And have you never observed
respecting the souls of those who have died unjustly, what fears they create in
their murderers and what avengers they send on the impious? And do you
think that honors would still continue to the dead if their souls had power over
nothing ? For my part, my sons, I have never been convinced that the soul
lives only so long as it is in a mortal body, and when it is separated from it it is
dead. For I see that the soul keeps the mortal bodies alive so long as it is in
them. Nor am I convinced how the soul will be without sense when it is
separated from the senseless body; but it is probable that when the mind
[6 vovs], unmixed and pure, is separated [from the body], then it will be most
intelligent. But when a man dies, every part is clearly seen going to that
which it is like except the soul; but this alone is seen neither remaining nor
departing. And consider, he said, that nothing is more like the death of men
than sleep. But it is then, is it not, that the soul appears most divine, and then
foresees something of the future? For then, as it seems, is it most free. If
therefore these things are so, as I at least believe them to be, and the soul leaves
the body, then, out of reverence for my soul do the things that I request.
But if otherwise, and the soul remaining in the body dies, even then from
fear of the gods who exist forever, who see all things and are able to do all
things, who maintain the existing order of all things unimpaired, undecaying
and without defect, and, by reason of its beauty and greatness, indescribable,
neither do nor contemplate at any time anything impious or profane. (See
also 8. 7. 26.)
According to Plato's Apology, 40, Socrates took an entirely
agnostic position on the future of the soul, uncertain whether
"death is a state of nothingness and utter-unconsciousness, or as
men say, there is a change and migration of the soul from this
world into another" — but confident in either case that it is a good
and not an evil. In Xenophon's Memorabilia he is reported as
affirming that death is no evil, but as saying nothing concerning the
future of the soul. 32

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 33
Plato's own conception of the soul is evidently influenced in no
small degree by his doctrine of ideas,1 as well as by his predecessors,
the Orphics and the Pythagoreans. It is not surprising, therefore,
that he should be not altogether consistent in his definition of its
nature, his explanation of moral character, or his arguments for
immortaUty. He ascribes foxy to the universe and to the sun and
stars (Legg. 897-99) as weu as to man, not thereby, however,
denying life to the human foxy, but ascribing it to the universe.
The human foxy is not only immortal, as Xenophon makes Cyrus
say, but, as Orphism declared, pre-existent, and, as the Pythag
oreans held, transmigratory. He clearly affirms that the soul
determines its own destiny, but also that the body is an evil in the
sense that it is a burden on the soul. Whether he converts the
latter thought into the doctrine that the body is evil in the sense
that it is the cause of moral evil is less clear. From a purely intel
lectual point of view the soul has four faculties, vbyais (or j'oOs),
Siavoia, irians, eiKaaia, i.e., reason, understanding, faith (or convic
tion), and representation (or conjecture). These are arranged in a
descending scale, the first pair belonging to the sphere of concep
tion, the second to that of experience.3 The following passages set
forth the main elements of his teaching:
Tim. 30B: Xo7wdpej'os ovv yvpiaKev ck tuv Kard <f>baiv bparuv
obSev dvbyrov rod vovv exovros oKov 6\ov koKKiov kaeadai iror' 'kpyov,
vow 8' av xwpls foxys dSbvarov irapayevkadai rep. Sid S17 rbv \oyia-
fibv rbvbe vovv fiev kv foxti, foxw S' kv aufiari avviards rb irav abvere
Kraivero, oirus &ri KaKKiarov eiy Kard cpbaiv dpiarbv re epyov aireip-
yaafikvos. ovrus ovv S17 Kara \byov tov eiKora 8el \ijeiv rbvSe rbv
Koaftov fcpoy efifoxov evvovv re rrj a\ydela Sid ryv rod deov yevkadai
irpbvoiav. On reflection, therefore, he discovered that of all things that are by nature
visible, no work that is without intelligence will ever be more beautiful as a
whole than a thing that has intelligence taken as a whole, and again that it is
impossible that anything should have intelligence without a soul [tj/vxy].
Because then of this reasoning, in framing the universe, he puts intelligence in
soul and soul in body, that he might be the creator of a work most beautiful
1 Siebeck, Geschichte der Psychologie, I, 187.
• Cf. Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, III, 86 ff.; Jowett, Dialogues of Plato, V, 514.
33

34 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
and also by nature best. According to probability, therefore, we must say
that this world is a living creature, in reality endowed with soul and intelhgence
by reason of the providence of God. Cf . also Tim. 34.
Men. 81 C: are ovv y foxy adavarbs re ovaa Kal irdXkaKis yeyovvla,
Kal eupaKvla Kal rd kvdaSe Kal rd kv "AiSov Kal irdvra xpyua-TO-, ovk
eanv 6 n ob fiefiddyKev, uare ob8ev davfiaarbv Kal irepl aperys Kal irepl
aXKuv olbv r' elvai abryv avafivyadyvai a ye Kal irpbrepov yiriaraTO'
are yap rys <f>baeus dirdays avyyevovs ovays, Kal fiefiadyicvias rys
foxy* diravra, obSev Ku\vei eV fibvov dvafivyadkvra, b 8y fiddyaiv
KaXovaiv dvdpuiroi, raKKa irdvra abrbv dvevpelv, kdv ns avSpelos y Kal
fiy diroKafivy £rjruv' to yap %yrelv dpa Kal rb fiavdaveiv dvdfivyais
oKov kariv.
The soul then being immortal and having been often born, and having seen
all things whether here or in Hades, there is nothing that it has not learned, so
that it is not to be wondered that it is able to remember the things that it
formerly knew about — virtue and other things. For all nature being akin, and
the soul having learned all things, there is nothing to hinder a man, having
recalled one thing (which is what men call learning), from searching out all the
others, if he be courageous and do not weary of seeking. For seeking and
learning are nothing but remembering.
Phaedr. 249B : evda Kal els dypiov fiiov dvdpuirivy foxy a^iKvelrai,
Kal e/c dypiov bs irore dvdpuiros yv ira\iv els avdpuirov. ob yap y ye
fiyirore iSovaa ryv akydeiav els robe 7;£ei rb axyfia.
Then also a human soul passes into the life of a beast, and from the beast
he who was formerly a man passes again into a man. For the soul which has
never seen the truth will never come into the human form.
Of the relation between soul and body Plato sometimes
speaks as if the latter had no influence upon the former and
the source of evil were quite distinct from the body. Thus in
Gorg. 524D, following the statement that death is nothing but
the separation of the soul from the body (made also in. the
Phaedo 64S., quoted below, where the soul is spoken of as
simple), he says:
010s elvai irapeaKevdaaro rb aufia {uv, 'kv8y\a ravra Kal re\ev-
ryaavros ?j irdvra *) rd xoXXd eVi nva xpbvov. rabrbv S17 fioi SoKel
rovr'^ apa ml irepl ryv foxyv elvai, u KaXXi/cXeis • eVS?7Xa irdvra karlv
kv ry foxy kireiSav yvfivudfj tov aufiaros, rd re rys (frbaeus Kal ra
34

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 35
iradyfiara a Sid rijv kirirySevaiv kKaarov irpdyfiaros eaxev kv ry foxy
avdpuiros. Of whatever character one has made his body to be while alive, these
characteristics will be in evidence either wholly or in part for some time after
death. And the same thing seems to be true of the soul, Callicles. When it
is stripped of the body, all the things come to light that are in the soul, its
natural qualities and its passions which the man has had in his soul by reason
of his devotion to this or that.
Even more significantly, in the famiUar passage in Phaedr.
246 ff., in which he compares the soul to a pair of winged horses
and their driver, and the soul is divided into three, it has these parts
or elements before it acquires a body — the composition of body and
immortal soul constituting a mortal creature. The source of moral
evU seems thus to be definitely located in the soul itself — a fact the
significance of which is all the greater if, as is commonly supposed,
the unruly horse is the symbol of sensual passion, since in that case
such passion is represented as existing in the soul before it takes up
its abode in the body.
In the Republic (439-441; cf. also 550A; Tim. 89E) we have a
similar view of the matter. Here Plato distinguishes within the
soul itself three principles (ei8y), to \0y1ariKbv, rb kiridvuyriKov , and
rb dvfweiSks, which may be rendered in EngUsh by the words
reason, desire, and spirit or passion. Of the third he says that
when not corrupted by bad education it is the natural ally of reason,
but to the second he ascribes the influence that makes for evil.
Apparently, however, the philosopher, struggling with the prob
lem given in every man's experience, wavers between a more and
a less inclusive definition of the soul, and now assigns certain
elements of experience to a faculty or principle of the soul,1 and
now to the body as over against the soul.
Thus in the Phaedo (64-68) Plato seems to represent the soul as
simple in essence, and pure thought as its essential function, and
to ascribe to the body all desire for everything except the vision of
the truth.
Phaedo 66B : ovkovv dvayKy, eqiy, e« irdvruv robruv irapiaraadai
8b!-av roidvSe riva rols yvyaius <j>i\oab<j>ois, uare Kal irpbs ahXykovs
1 See Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, III, 37 f.
35

36 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
roiavra drra \kyeiv, on Kivbvvebei roi uairep drpairbs [ns] kK<j>kpeiv
yuas [uerd tov Xbyov kv ry aKkfoi], on, eus dv rb auua exufiev Kal
avfiirecpvpfikvy y iffiuv y foxy M^rd rod roiobrov KaKov, ob fiy irore
Kryaufieda tiavus ov kirid'vfiovfiev: <f>afiev Se rovro elvai rb ahydks, etc.
Jowett translates the whole passage as foUows:
And when real philosophers consider all these things, will they not be led
to make a reflection which they will express in words something like the follow
ing ? "Have we not found," they will say, "a path of thought which seems to
bring us and our argument to the conclusion that while we are in the body,
and while the soul is infected with the evils of the body, our desire will not be
satisfied ? and our desire is of the truth. For the body is a source of endless
trouble to us by reason of the mere requirement of food, and is liable also to
diseases which overtake us and impede us in the search after true being: it
fills us full of loves, and lusts, and fears, and fancies of all kinds, and endless
foolery, and, in fact, as men say, takes away from us the power of thinking at
all. Whence come wars and fightings and factions ? Whence but from the
body and the lusts of the body ? Wars are occasioned by the love of money,
and money has to be acquired for the sake and in the service of the body, and
by reason of all these impediments we have no time to give to philosophy, and,
last and worst of all, even if we are at leisure and betake ourselves to some specu
lation, the body is always breaking in upon us, causing turmoil and confusion
in our inquiries, and so amazing us that we are prevented from seeing the
truth. It has been proved to us by experience that if we would have pure
knowledge of anything we must be quit of the body — the soul in herself must
behold things in themselves; and that we shall attain the wisdom which we
desire, and of which we say we are lovers, not while we live, but after death;
for if, while in company with the body, the soul cannot have pure knowledge,
one of two things follows — either knowledge is not to be attained at all, or, if
at all, after death. For then, and not till then, the soul will be parted from the
body and exist in herself alone. In this present life I reckon that we make the
nearest approach to knowledge when we have the least possible intercourse
or communion with the body, and are not surfeited with the bodily nature, but
keep ourselves pure until the hour when God himself is pleased to release us.
And thus having got rid of the foolishness of the body we shall be pure and
hold converse with the pure, and know of ourselves the clear light everywhere,
which is no other than the light of truth. For the impure are not permitted
to approach the pure. These are the sort of words, Simmias, which the true
lovers of wisdom cannot help saying to one another, and thinking. You will
agree with me in that ?
Certainly, Socrates.
But if this is true, O my friend, then there is great hope that, going
whither I go, I shall there be satisfied with that which has been the chief concern
36

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 37
of you and me in our past lives. And now that the hour of departure is ap
pointed to me, this is the hope with which I depart, and not I only, but every
man who believes that he has his mind purified.
The last portion of the passage is of importance as showing that
Plato is here putting into the mouth of Socrates an argument to
the effect that death, which he was facing, was in reality no evil.
In such a connection one naturally states at its strongest the argu
ment for the evil of the body, ascribing to it all the evils of Ufe.
Whether Plato not only holds the Orphic doctrine that for the
prenatal sins of the soul embodiment is the punishment,1 but also
that the body thus acquired as the result of sin itself becomes in turn
the cause of sin is not wholly clear. The latter doctrine is commonly
ascribed by modern writers (Adam, Religious Teachers of Greece,
pp. 101, 106), not only to Plato, but to Orphism. The transition
from the body as an evil, i.e., as a burden, to the thought of it as
evil, i.e., as corrupting, is, of course, easy. But when made it
introduces another, if not a contradictory, theory of the cause of
sin; and it is not wholly clear either that Orphism took this step,
or that Plato went beyond the thought that the body was a hin
drance to the soul's highest development. It is significant that in
Phaedo 66, quoted above (see also Phaedo 79; Crat. 400C), he traces
not only the coarser sensual evils to the body, but even ambition
and confusion of mind, and that in accordance with his general
inteUectual point of view he here finds the chief harm done to the
soul by the body in distraction of the mind from the pursuit of
philosophy. MoraUty is largely swaUowed up in intellectuaUty, in
the perception of the truth. So also it is perception or non-
perception of truth that determines the destiny of the soul as it
passes from one incarnation to another.
Even in Tim. 86 he makes the body rather an incentive to
moral evil than matter the effective cause of it.
1 Cf. Windelband, History of Philosophy, E. T. p. 124: "The sin for the sake of
which the soul is ensnared in the world of sense is to be sought in a pre-existent state;
its destiny in the hereafter will depend upon how far it has freed itself in the earthly
life from the sensuous appetite, and turned to the higher vocation — the knowledge of
the Ideas. But inasmuch as the ultimate goal of the soul appears to be to strip off
the sensuous nature, the three forms of activity are designated also as parts of the
soul." 37

38 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
Kal rd fiev irepl rb auua voayuara rainy avufiaivei yiyvbfieva, rd
Se irepl foxy" Sid aufiaros e&v rybe. v'oaov fiev 8y ^ux^s dvoiav avy-
Xupyrkov, 8bo 8' avoias 7^77, rb fiev fiaviav, rb Se dfiadiav. irav ovv on
iraaxuv ris irddos birbrepov abruv i'crxei, vbaov irpoapyrkov, ySovds Se
Kal Xinras birepfidXyobaas ruv vbauv fieyiaras derkov ry foxy' irepi-
XQ-Pys 7dp dvdpuiros uv y Kal rdvavria virb \birys iraaxuv, airebSuv
rb fiev eKelv d/caipcos, rb Se qtvyelv, ovd' bpav ovre aKobeiv bpdbv obbev
bvvarai, \vrra Se Kal Xoyiauov ueraaxelv yKiara rbre 8y Svvarbs' to
Se airepfia bru irdXb Kal pvuSes irepl rbv fiveKbv yiyverai Kal Kadairepel
SkvSpov iro\vKapirbrepov tov avfifierpov ire4>VKbs y, xoXXds fiev Kad'
'kKaarov uSlvas, iroXXds S' ySovds Krufievos kv rals kiridvfiiais Kal rols
irepl ra roiavra tokois, kfifiavys to ifXelarov yiyvbfievos rod fiiov Sid rds
fieyiaras ^So^ds Kal \biras, voaovaav Kal dq^pova 'laxuv biro rov aufia
ros ryv foxyv, obx us voauv dXX' cos e'Kcbj' KaKos So^df erai ' rb Se dXydes
¦y irepl rd d<f>po8iaia aKoKaaia Kara to iroXb fikpos bid ryv evbs ykvovs
e^iv virb fiavbryros baruv kv aufian pvuby Kal bypaivovaav vbaos foxy*
ykvovev. Kal axeSbv by irdvra birbaa ybovuv d/cpdreia /col 6Vei5os cbs
acbvruv \kyerai ruv KaKuv, ovk bpdus bvei8i£erai' Kams fiev yap kKuv
obSeis, Sid Se irovypav el-iv nvd rov aufiaros Kal diraiSevrov rpo<f>yv 6
kokos yiyverai KaKos, iravrl Se ravra kxdpd Kal okovti irpoayiyverai.
Kal irahiv 8y rb irepl ras \biras y foxy Kara rabrd Sid crcopa iroXM/v
iaxei KaKiav.
Thus then the diseases that pertain to the body happen, and those that
pertain to. the soul because of an affection of the body are as follows. It will
be admitted that folly is a disease of the soul, but there are two kinds of folly,
viz., madness and ignorance. Whatever affection produces either of them may
be called disease, and excessive pains and pleasures must be set down as the
greatest diseases of the soul. For when a man is overjoyful or, on the other
hand, is suffering from grief, being unduly eager to grasp the one or to escape the
other, he can neither hear nor see anything aright, and is utterly incapable at
such a time of participating in reason. And he whose seed about the marrow is
excessive and free-flowing like an overproductive tree, has on the one hand many
pains and on the other many pleasures in his desires and their gratifications,
and is for the most part of his life mad because of his very great pleasures and
pains, having his soul diseased and foolish by reason of the body, and is regarded
not as sick but as willingly wicked. But the truth is that sexual intemperance
for the most part becomes a disease of the soul by reason of the moist and fluid
condition of one element, due in turn to the porousness of the bones. And
almost all the things that are called intemperance in pleasure and a disgrace,
38

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH , 39
as if they were the voluntary actions of evil men, are unjustly so charged.
For no one is bad willingly, but the bad man becomes bad because of some
evil quahty of the body and an undisciplined bringing-up, and to every man
these things that are evil happen against his will. And in like manner in
respect to its pains, the soul acquires much of its viciousness because of the
body. But what shall be said concerning Polit. 273B, in which Plato
certainly goes beyond a common-sense theory of the body as
inferior to the soul and a hindrance to the realization of its highest
possibilities, finding in the primeval matter of which the world is
composed a cause of its disorder ?
The reason of the falling off was the admixture of matter in the world;
this was inherent in the primal nature, which was full of disorder, until
attaining to the present cosmos or order. From God, the constructor, the
world indeed received every good, but from a previous state came elements of
violence and injustice, which, thence derived, were implanted in the animals.
While the world was producing animals in unison with God, the evil was small,
and great the good which worked within, but in the process of separation from
him, when the world was let go, at first all proceeded well enough; then, as time
went on, there was more and more forgetting, and the old discord again
entered in and got the better, and burst forth; and at last small was the good,
and great was the admixture of the elements of evil, and there was a danger of
universal ruin of the world and the things in the world. Wherefore God, the
orderer of all, seeing that the world was in great straits, fearing that all might
be dissolved in the storm, and go to the place of chaos and infinity, again
seated himself at the helm, and, reversing the elements which had fallen into
dissolution and disorder when left to themselves in the previous cycle, he set
them in order and restored them, and made the world imperishable and
immortal. Here the evil of the world is ascribed to "the admixture of matter
in the world"; violence and injustice, to be sure, to "a previous
state," but nevertheless to the effect of this previous state upon
matter; While, therefore, it is not affirmed that matter per se
is evil, yet the matter which is used in the construction of this
world has in that previous state become of such character that it is
now the cause of evil.
It is this passage perhaps more than any other which justifies
Aristotle's statement (988A. 14, 15) that "Plato assigned the cause
of good and evil to the elements, one to each of the two." The
context shows that by the two elements Aristotle means Essence
39

40 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
and the Material Cause, or the One and Matter. Baumker
(Problem der Materie, p. 205) says, indeed, that the doctrine of
matter as the source of evil is not found in this form in Plato's
own writings. But this appUes to the form, not to the doctrine
itself, as the passage just quoted from Plato shows.
With this passage should also be compared the statement of
Aristotle 10750. 32-36, that there were those — who he does not
say, but perhaps means, as Baumker (p. 205) maintains, disciples
of Plato — who make one of the two contraries matter, and the bad
itself one of the two principles, which seems to identify matter with
evil as one of the ultimate principles.
But too much must not be built on this one passage of Plato,
as if it represented his prevailing doctrine or controlled his thought.
Most of his utterances on the origin of moral evil in man do not go
beyond a common-sense experiential doctrine that the body is
inferior to the soul, and a hindrance to it in the achievement of its
highest possibilities, and even Polit. 273B does not expressly
connect the moral evil in men with matter as the cause of evil in the
world at large. Nor does he anywhere expressly associate his
theory that the body is a burden upon the soul with the view of
Polit. 273B that the disorder of the world is the result of the
admixture of matter in the world. The evil of which he found
the cause in matter was not sin, but the primordial disorder of the
universe, and even this was corrected by God before the present
order of things began. The body is a hindrance to the realization
of the soul's highest possibilities, but personal moral evil he regarded
as an inheritance from a previous state. With the Orphic doctrine
that the body is not the cause but the penalty and result of sin,
precisely the opposite, therefore, of the theory that it is the cause
of sin, Plato was undoubtedly famiUar, and shows the influence of
it (Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, I, 128; II, 364) in his frequent state
ments about the relations of the body to the soul. Between it and
the rarely expressed view of Polit. 273B he apparently effected no
reconciUation, but left them as unrelated elements.
It is perhaps still a third explanation of the evil in human nature
that is implied in Tim. 41, 42, where man is described as a compound
of mortal body and immortal soul, and it is said that the Creator,
40

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 41
having himself sown the seed of that which is worthy to be called
immortal, committed the task of the creation of the human race
to the lesser gods, i.e., the heavenly bodies.
The doctrine of the immortaUty of the soul (foxy) is, as is well
known, defended by Plato by various arguments and from different
points of view, which it does not fall within the scope of this paper
to expound at length. It must suffice to observe that the argu
ment of the Symposium (206-9), which seems to imply that immor
taUty is achieved only through offspring and the children of the
brain, does not represent the author's usual or deUberate opinion,
and that it is the soul in the narrower conception of it, the rational
element, to which he means to ascribe immortaUty. Such at least
seems to be the thought of the Phaedo, which is so largely devoted
to this subject. But see also Phaedr. 245C; Rep. 608-11. For a
discussion of the argument of the Phaedo and its relation to the
views of the Symposium and the Apology, see Gomperz, Greek
Thinkers, III, chap, x; also Jowett's translation of Plato, Intro
duction to the Phaedo. For a fuller exposition of Plato's idea of
the soul, in general, see Jowett's Plato, V, Index, pp. 512-16.
Aristotle devotes three books of his Metereologica to the discus
sion of the foxy and makes frequent mention of it elsewhere. His
conception of its nature differs in important respects from that of
Plato. Abandoning the Platonic doctrine of ideas (though prob
ably stiU influenced by it in his conception of the vovs) he rejects
with it the conception of the pre-existence of the soul. The foxy
has no existence apart from a body, being separable from it in
thought but not in fact. We must no more ask whether the soul
and the body are one than whether the wax and the image impressed
upon it are one, or generally whether the material and that of which
it is the material are one. Nor is this conception contradicted by
bis use of the word obaia to define the nature of the soul (i. 412&. 10),
as is clearly shown by the context of this statement (Ilepl SFuxfc U-
1. 7, ed. Borussica i. 412b).1 Aristotle's constant term to define the
soul's relation to the body is eVreXexeia, which may itself be defined
as absoluteness, perfect realization, though its meaning may be
1 See the edition of Wallace or that of Hicks; also Rand, The Classical Psy
chologists, Part IV, Boston, 1913. 41

42 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
approximately expressed in modern terms by the phrase "perfect
functioning." The eVreXexeia of anything is its actuality or full
reaUzation as opposed to mere potentiaUty. In discussing the
soul, however, Aristotle distinguishes a first and a second entelechy,
and defines foxy as the first entelechy of an organized body having
potentiaUty of life. In other Words, while body is potentiality only,
and the soul in action is the second or explicit reaUzation of the
potentiaUties of the body, the soul in itself is the first or imphcit
realization of these potentiaUties, comparable to knowledge which
is not at the moment present to consciousness as distinguished from
knowledge actively exercised. As the eVreXexeia of the body, even
though impUcit rather than expUcit, the soul is superior to the body,
being its reality as distinguished from its substance which is
potentiality. i. 412a, b: kirel 5' earl aufia roibvSe, $uyv yap exov, ovk dv e'ly rb
aufia foxy' °b yap kan ruv Kad' biroKeifikvov rb aufia, udWov 8' us
biroKeifievov, Kal v\y. dvayKalov dpa ryv foxyv obaiav elvai us elSos
aufiaros foaiKov Svvdfiei £uyv exovros. y 5' oinria eVreXexeia. roioii-
rov dpa aufiaros eVreXexeia. avry Se \kr/erai Sixus, y fiev us kiria-
ryfiy, 17 S' cos rd deupelv. cbavepbv ovv on us kiriaryfiy. kv yap ru
virdpxeiv ryv foxyv *al virvos Kal kypyyopais kanv, avakoyov 5' 17 fiev
kypyyopais ru deupelv, b 5' virvos rcjj exeiv Kal fly kvepyelv. irporkpa
Se ry 7e?'e'crei kirl roO avroO y kiriaryuy. Sib foxy kanv eVreXexeia y
irpury aufiaros foaiKov Svvdfiei $uyv exovros.
Hicks translates as follows :
And since in fact we have here body with a certain attribute, namely, the
possession of life, the body will not be the soul: for the body is not an attribute
of a subject, it stands rather for a subject of attributes, that is, matter. It
must follow, then, that soul is substance in the sense that it is the form of a
natural body having in it the capacity of life. Such substance is actuality.
The soul, therefore, is the actuality of the body above described. But the
term "actuality" is used in two senses; in the one it answers to knowledge, in
the other to the exercise of knowledge. Clearly in this case it is analogous to
knowledge: for sleep as well as waking implies the presence of soul; and,
whilst waking is analogous to the exercise of knowledge, sleep is analogous to
the possession of knowledge without its exercise; and in the same individual
the possession of knowledge comes in order of time before its exercise.
Hence soul is the first actuality of a natural body having in it the capacity
of life. 42

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 43
i. 4140: 17 foxy Se rovro cp ^uuev Kal aiadavbfieda, Kal Siavoovueda
7rpcorcos" cicrre X670S ris dv e'117 Kal eiSos, dXX' obx v\y Kal rb inroKei-
fievov. rpixcos 7ap \eyoukvys rys obaias, Kadairep eiirouev, uv rb fiev
elSos, rb Se &X77, rb Se e£ ducpolv robruv 8' 17 fiev xihy Svvafiis, to 8e
elSos eVreXexeia' kirel Se to e£ dfi(j)olv eufoxov, ob rb auua kanv eVre
Xexeia foxys, dXX' avry auuarbs rivos. Kal Sid tovto KaXcos wroXap-
fidvovaiv 01s SoKeT fiyr' avev aufiaros elvai fiyre aufia n 17 foxy ' auua
fiev yap ovk eari, aufiaros Se n, Kal Sid tovto kv auuan birdpxei, Kal
kv auuan roiobru, Kal obx uairep oi irpbrepov els crcopa kvypuo^ov
abryv, obdev irpoa8iopi£ovres kv rivi Kal iroiu.
The soul is then that by which primarily we live and have sensation and
understanding. It is therefore a certain idea and form, not matter and the
underlying (substance). For substance being spoken of, as we have before
said, in three ways, of which one is form and the second matter and the third
the combination of the two, matter is potentiality, but form is perfect realiza
tion. Since then it is the product of the two that is animate, the body is not
the perfect realization of soul, but, the soul of some body. They therefore are
right who hold that neither does the soul exist without a body nor is it a body.
For it is not a body, but it is something which belongs to a body. And there
fore it exists in a body, and in such and such a body, and not as the earlier
writers introduced it into a body, but did not determine what or what sort of
a body. In Aristotle's view all things that have Ufe have foxy, plants
included (i. 411&, 4156). But of the several functions or powers
which are possible to souls, viz., nutrition (dpeirriKov), sensation
(aiadyriKov) , desire (bpeKriKov), motion (KivyKrimv Kara rbirov), under
standing, or reasoning (SiavoyriKov) , the plants possess only the
first, animals possess one at least of the sensations (aiadyaeuv),
viz., touch, and some animals various other powers (i. 413&. 29-
414a. 14), and man possesses all of them. The human soul therefore
combines in itself what some modern writers have called the Ufe-
principle and the functions of feeUng, thinking, and willing. It is
evidently the human soul that Aristotle has chiefly in mind in the
foUowing passage:
i. 41 ia. 24 ff . : qtavepbv ovv e*K ruv elpyfikvuv us ovre rb yivuaKeiv
birdpxei ry foxy Sid to eV. rco»< aroixeiuv elvai, ovre rb Kiveladai abryv
KaXus obS' d\ydus \kyerai. kirel Se rb yivuaKeiv rrjs foxys earl Kal rb
aiadaveadal re Kal rb Sol-d^ew, eri Se rb kiridvfielv Kal fiovKeadai Kal
43

44 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
oXcos ai 6pe£eis, 7i»'erai Se Kal y Kara rbirov Kivyais rols f coois virb rys
foxys, 'kri 8' avl-y re Kal aKfiy Kal (frdiais.
It is evident, therefore, from what has been said that neither does knowledge
belong to the soul because it consists of elements, nor can it be properly or
truly said to be moved. But since knowledge is a property of the soul, and also
sensation and opinion, as well as appetite and will and the desires in general,
so also it is to the soul that the animals owe their power of locomotion, and
growth and culmination and dissolution.
In i. 4320. 22-6. 8, he discusses the question whether the soul is
divisible into parts without pronouncing a definite opinion, and here
and in ii. 1260a classifies the functions of the soul under the heads rb
\byov kxov and rb aKoyov, using also in the latter passage the
phrase rd fibpia rijs foxys- But in i. 4116, immediately after the
passage just quoted, he definitely rejects the opinion that the soul
is composite. Nor indeed is it easy to see how he could hold
this view consistently with his general conception of the soul
as an entelechy of the body rather than an objective existence
(cf. Wallace, Aristotle's Psychology, pp. xxxix-xlix, especiaUy xiv;
or more briefly in his Outlines of the Philosophy of Aristotle,
chap. vi). The theory of a universal soul Aristotle expressly
rejects: i. 411a. 7 ff.: Kal kv rep oXcp Se rives abryv fiefilxdai <j>aaiv, odev
'iaus Kal GaX?}s (iydy irdvra ifKypy deuv elvai. rovro 8' exei nvds
airopias' Sid riva yap airiav kv fiev ru depi y ru irvpl ovaa y foxy ob
iroiel £uov, kv Se rols fiiKTols, Kal ravra fie\riuv kv robrois elvai
SoKovaa ;
And some say that the soul is diffused throughout the universe, which is
perhaps the reason that Thales held that all things are full of gods. But this
theory has some difficulties. For why does not the soul produce an animal
when it is in the air or in the fire and yet do so when it is in the compounds of
these, and that too though, as is believed, the soul in the former case is superior ?
Does this statement point to. the conclusion that in the state
ment previously quoted (p. 22), in which Aristotle speaks of
irvevfia as diffused throughout all things and living and generative,
he was not representing his own opinion but that of others, or that
he was speaking only of things that have life, while here he is, as
is evidently the case, denying foxy to things that have no life,
44

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 45
either animal or vegetable; or do the two passages indicate a cer
tain wavering of opinion ? The second seems the most probable.
But in any case it remains that irvevfia is non-individuaUzed, foxy
individualized. Though it Ues outside the scope of this discussion to enter fully
into the difficult question of the relation of the toDs to the foxy in
Aristotle's thought, for the sake of the Ught which it may throw
upon his definition of the foxy we may cite a few passages deaUng
also with the vovs.1 And first a passage which seems to be a defini
tion of vovs and its relation to the foxy '¦
i. 429a. 22 ff.: 6 dpa KaXobuevos rys foxy* vovs (kkyu Se vovv u
Siaroelrai Kal viro\afifiavei y foxy) obdkv kanv kvepyeia ruv bvruv irplv
voelv . . . Kal ev 8y 01 \kyovres ryv foxyv elvai rbirov eiSuv, ir\ijv
on ovre 6X77 dXX' 17 voynicy.
What is called the reason of the soul (and I mean by reason that by which
the soul reasons and understands) is in reality identical with none of the things .
that exist before reasoning  And they are right who say that the soul
is the place of general ideas, only not the soul as a whole, but the soul as exer
cising reason.
In arguing against the doctrine of Empedocles that the soul is
composed of the elements (oroixeia) and that its power of knowl
edge is in accordance with the general principle that Uke perceives
like, Aristotle says:
i. 410&. 12-15: rys Se ^cts elvai n Kpelrrov Kal dpxov dSbvarov
dSvvarurepov 5' eri roO vov' evKoyov yap rovrov elvai irpoyevkararov
Kal Kvpiov Kara <j>baiv, ra Se aroixela cjtaai irpura ruv bvruv elvai.
But it is impossible that anything should be superior to the soul and have
dominion over it, but still more impossible is this in the case of the reason.
For we must believe that the latter is by nature first-born and supreme. And
yet they say that the elements are the primary things of those that exist.
Ibid. 21-26: opoicos Se Kai baoi rbv vovv Kal to aiadyriKbv eV raw
aroixeiuv iroiovaiv • <f>aiverai yap rd re ford £yv ob fierkxovra c5opas
obS' aiadyaeus, Kal ruv $i$uv 7roXXd Sidvoiav obK exeiv. el Sk ris Kal
raOra irapaxupifaeie, Kal deiy rbv vovv fikpos ri rys foxy*, opoicos Se Kal
'According to Aetius iv. 5. 12 (Diels, Vorsokrat., p. 172, 1. 42), Parmenides,
Empedocles, and Democritus say that vovs and ^vx^ are the same thing. See also
Diels, Vorsokrat., p. 105, 1. 36; p. 112, 1. 5. 45

46 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
to aiadyriKov, obS' dv ovru Xkyoiev Kadbkov irepl irdays foxys obSe irepl
o\ys obbe fiids.
So also respecting those who hold that the reason and the sense faculty are
produced out of the elements. For it is evident that the plants live though they
have neither power of motion nor sensation, and of the animals many have no
reasoning power. But if anyone should waive these considerations, and should
make the reason a part of the soul and likewise the power of sensation, not even
thus would he make a comprehensive statement respecting every soul or
respecting the whole or any one soul.
It is evident, therefore, that Aristotle neither admitted that the
foxy was composed of the elements, nor that the vovs was a part
of the foxy, holding rather that the vovs was the foxy itself in
a certain form of its activity, viz., engaged in abstract thought and
reasoning — the 17 voyriKy foxy-
But this is not the whole of his thought. Another phase appears
later. i. 430a. 10 ff.: kirel S' uairep kv dirday ry cj>baei kari n rb fiev vKy
kKaaru 7eVei (rovro Se o irdvra Svvdfiei kKelva), erepov Se to ainov Kal
iroiyriKOv, ru iroielv irdvra, olov y rkxvy irpbs ryv vkyv ireirovdev,
avdyKy Kal kv ry foxy virdpxeiv rabras ras Siacpopds. Kal eanv b fiev
toiovtos vovs rep irdvra yiveadai, b Se ru irdvra iroielv, us e£is ns, olov
rb <j>us' rpbirov yap nva Kal rb <j>us iroiel rd Svvdfiei bvra xpufiara
eVep7eia xpebpara. Kal oSros 6 vovs x^piarbs Kal airadys Kal auiyys
ry obaia uv kvepyeiq. .... dXX' obx ore fiev voel ore 8' ob voel.
Xupiadels 8' earl fibvov rovd' birep kari, Kal rovro fibvov addvarov Kal
dtbiov. ob fivrjfiovevofiev Se', on tovto fiev diradks, 6 Se iradyriKOS vovs
(jidaprbs, Kal dvev robrov obdev voel.
But inasmuch as in all nature there is for each kind of existence the material
substratum, which is potentially all the various things, and on the other hand
the causal and creative element by virtue of its producing all things, standing
in the same relation to the other' as art does to the things with which it works,
these things must necessarily hold of the soul also. And reason is such as it
is on the one hand by becoming all things, and on the other by creating all
things, acting as a kind of permanent quality, like the light. For in a certain
way the light makes the potential colors actual colors. And reason is separate
and unsusceptible to influences from without, being in reality unmixed with
substance  And it does not at one time think and at another not think.
And when it is separated (from the body?) it is the only thing that is, and it
is the only thing that is immortal and eternal. But we do not remember
46

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 47
because this (the reason that is eternal) is unsusceptible (to impressions from
without), but the susceptible mind is perishable, and apart from this (the
eternal reason) does not think.
i. 736&. 27: Xehrerai Se rbv vovv fibvov dvpadev kireiaikvai Kal delov
elvai fibvov.
It remains then that the reason alone comes into man from without and is
alone divine.
Compare also i. 4080, 12-30, where it is affirmed that the vovs is
implanted (in the body) -and is not destroyed (with the body), and
that it is of a diviner character (deibrepov) than the combination
of soul and body and is not susceptible (to impressions from
without). It appears, therefore, that on the one hand Aristotle ascribes
existence to the foxy only in relation to the body, and on the other
makes the vovs eternal, yet identifies them in the sense that the
vovs is y voyriKy foxy- The explanation of this seeming contrariety
of thought may be found (with Grote) in the view that the power
of discursive thought, the vovs, in each individual is the result of
the universal vovs acting upon the noetic receptivity in each indi
vidual, the former perishing with the individual, but the latter
being eternal. A different view, together with some account of the
various ancient and modern interpretations, is given by Wallace,
pp. ciuff.1 For our present purpose it must suffice to observe
that while foxy is an entelechy of the body, and in the conscious
experience of the individual vovs is foxy in the higher intellectual
activities of which it is capable, on the other hand vovs is coeval
with the existence of the universe, coming to man from without,
and yet these two — the vovs dira^s, the vovs iradyriKbs — are not two
but one.
'See also Arnold, Roman Stoicism, p. 61, "What God is to the universe, that the
soul is to the body, which is a little universe. But the reasoning part of the soul
only is entirely distinct; this is of divine nature, and has entered the body from with
out; it is at once its formative principle, its plan, and its end. The lower parts
of the soul are knit up with the body and must perish with it. So far Aristotle's
teaching differs littie from that of Plato." But it may be questioned whether this
interpretation does not take too little account both of the inconsistencies in Aristotle's
thought and of the differences between his theory of the soul and Plato's, while also
directly ascribing to Aristotle an opinion which he rejected — that the toCs is part of the
T-vxt. 47

48 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
The most notable differences between Plato and Aristotle are:
(i) Plato begins with ideas as real existences, Aristotle with the
fact of Ufe as observed in animal and plant; (2) with Plato the
foxy is an entity, with Aristotle it is an eVreXexeia of the body;
(3) with Plato the foxy is pre-existent, with Aristotle it comes into
being with the body, without which the soul could no more exist
than form without matter; (4) to Plato the body is a drag upon
the foxy, which is immortal, and freedom from the body is desirable,
for Aristotle the foxy has its chief, indeed its only, existence in
relation to the body, and dies with the body. There is, indeed,
according to Aristotle, a vovs universal, which is immortal, and
with this the vovs of the individual is in a sense identical, yet the
latter is but the foxy in certain aspects and activities and in its
individuality perishes when the body perishes.
III. SAPS
2dp£ is used by Greek writers from Homer down. In writers
of the classical period it is always employed in a purely physical
sense. It signifies:
1. The soft muscular portion or portions of the body of
man or beast. Homer uses it in the singular in Od. xix. 450 only;
elsewhere in the plural, for the muscles, the soft portion of the
body. The same use appears in Hesiod, Pindar, Euripides, and
Plato; but the singular is also used collectively for the muscular
part of the body in general by Sophocles, Euripides, Plato, and
Aristotle1 Horn. Od. ix. 293: yadie b' us re \kuv bpeairpocpos, obb' airek-
eiirev, | 'kyKard re adpKas re Kal barka fiveKbevra.
So he ate even as a lion of the hills, nor ceased; entrails and flesh and bones
full of marrow.
Eurip Med. 12 17: ei Se irpbs fiiav dyoi | adpKas 7epaids kairdp-
paaa' dir: oarkuv. \ xpbvu 8' dirkafiy koI fiedyx' b bbafiopos \ foxyv.
And if by fwce he drew himself away, he tore his aged flesh from his bones.
And so at length the wretched man swooned away and died.
1 Empedocles (Diels, Vorsokrat., p. 257, 1. 22, B 98, 5) uses the term to include
the blood: iK rtiv alfid re yivro Kal dWijs etSea <rapK6s.
48

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 49
Plat. Tim. 61C: aapKbs Se Kal rcoi> irepl adpKa ykveaiv, foxys re
baov dvyrbv, oviru 8ie\y~Kbdafiev.
But the origin of flesh and of the things that pertain to the flesh, and what
of soul is mortal, we have not yet considered.
Plat. Symp. 207D: oSros peVroi ouSeVore rd aird exuv kv aiirco
8pcos b abrbs KaXeirai, dXXd vkos del yiyvbfievos, rd be diroWvs, Kal
Kara rds rplxas Kal adpKa Kal bard Kal alfia Kal abfiirav rb aufia.
And though man never has the same things in him yet he is called the same,
but is always becoming new, and losing something, in respect to hair and flesh
and bones and blood and the whole body.
Arist. i. 519&. 26 ff.: o-dp£ Se Kal rb irapaifKyaiav exov ryv <f>baiv
ry aapd kv rols kvaifiois iraaiv kari fiera^b rov bkpfiaros Kal rod barov
Kal ruv dvd\oyov rols barols.
Flesh and that which is of like nature with flesh in all the animals that have
blood is between the skin and the bone and the parts that are similar to bone.
See also Horn. II. viii. 380; xiii. 832; Od. xi. 219; xviii. 77; xix.
450; Hes. Th. 538; Sc. 461; Pind. Fr. 150; Aeschyl. Choeph. 280;
Theb. 1035; Agam. 1097; Soph. Philoct. 1157; Track. 1054;
Eurip. Med. 1189, 1200, 1217; Phoen. 1571; Bacch. 746, 1130, 1136;
Hec. 1071; Hipp. 1239, 1343; Suppl. 56; Troiad. 770; Cycl. 344,
380, 403; Plat. Tim. 60B, 74 freq., 82-85, freq.; Phaedo 96D, 98D;
Gorg. 518D; Rep. 556D; Legg. 782C, 797E.
Aristotle sometimes distinguishes the o-dp£ from the fat and the
skin as above and in i. 487a. 4, but elsewhere includes the skin in
the <rdp£, i. 486b. 9; in Plato also the skin seems sometimes to be
included under the term <rdp£ ; Tim. 67D.
By metonymy o-dp£ is used of the pulpy part of fruit :
Theophr. De causis Plant, vi. 8. 5: uv be y trdp§ iroKKri 6 Se
rrvpyv fiiKpbs oKiyoeKaioi.
And those olives whose pulp is abundant but the stone small are not rich
in oil. See also preceding and following sentences.
2. By synecdoche o-dp£ (also in the plural) denotes the body:
Eurip. Hipp. 103 1: Kal pi7re irbvros fiyre 777 5e'£airo fiov [ adpKas
davbvros, el KaKbs irkfoi? dvyp.
May neither sea nor land receive my body when I die, if I am a wicked man.
49

50 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
See also Aesch. Theb. 622; Agam. 72; Eurip. Her. Fur. 1151;
Bacch. 607.
In other passages it is difficult to say whether the term refers
to the flesh only or to the body as a whole. See, e.g., Eurip. Phoen.
1286; Her. Fur. 1269; Troiad. 440.
Plat. Symp. 211D, E: ri Syra, tcj>y, olbfieda, el ru ykvoiro avrb
rb Kahbv ISelv e'CKiKpivks, Kadapbv, dfieiKrov, dXXd fiy dvdirheuv aapKUv
re dvdpuirivuv Kal xpwpdrco^ Kal dWys iroWys q>\vapias dvyrys, dXX'
aiird rb delov KaKbv Sbvairo fiovoeiSes KanSelv;
But what if man should acquire the power to see the beautiful, pure and
clear and unmixed, and not infected with human flesh and color and many
another mortal folly, but could see divine beauty itself unmixed ?
The word apparently does not occur in Herodotus, Thucydides,
or Xenophon. IV. SUMMARY AND COMPARISON
It thus appears that in the classical period irvevua is predomi
nantly a physical term. Yet, signifying always an extremely
refined kind of material, it is employed also for that of which souls
are composed. Its range of meaning includes wind, breath, air,
breath of Ufe; rarely also Ufe or soul-substance, yet never with a
definitely individual or psychical or religious sense.
^fvxy, on the other hand, is from earUest recorded times
employed as a vital term denoting life, or the seat of Ufe, but in
the latter case implying in many cases capacity for inteUectual,
emotional, and volitional experience, or even for moral character.
The constant element of its meaning is its designation of that in a
living being by virtue of which it is (or was) Uving; the meaning
varies according (1) as it is appUed to plants, animals, or men, and
as concerns men, to those Uving in the body or to those dead (i.e.
existing in the underworld) ; (2) as its reference is limited to life
or includes the intellect, emotions, will, or character of the person
spoken of, and (3) as the theory of the particular writer using it
varies as to its objective reaUty, its pre-existence and its capability
of future existence apart from the body. In Homer it is already a
shade. In the tragic poets, though the belief in the existence of the
soul after death continues, the use of foxy for the shade occurs
50

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 51
rarely, being largely displaced by the vital and psychical use. In
Xenophon we meet the distinct affirmation that the foxy survives
death though without the doctrine of transmigration which Hero
dotus teUs us the Egyptians were the first to hold. In Plato, who
holds also to a foxy of the universe, the human foxy is both pre-
existent and immortal. In Aristotle it is an entelechy of the body,
superior to it, as form is to matter, but having no existence apart
from it. From Pindar down it is ascribed, in the sense of life, to the
lower animals, and is used occasionally, but perhaps by conscious
metonymy, in the sense of disposition. In Aristotle it belongs, as
an entelechy of the physical organism, but with the function of
nutrition only, to the plants as well.
2dp£ is throughout the classical period a purely physical term,
adding to the original sense of flesh, only and by easy synecdoche,
the meaning "body." It is appUed to men and the lower animals,
but most commonly the former. It has no psychical or ethical
meaning. It is not surprising, therefore, that no instance of irvevfia and
crdp£ in antithesis has been observed in the classical writers, or
indeed of foxy and o-dp£; for though these latter terms occasionally
occur in juxtaposition (as in Eurip. Med. 1217, 1219, and in Plato
Tim. 61C, cited above under I), yet it is with no intentional antith
esis. Similarly when irvevfia and foxy occur together, as in Plato
Phaedo 70A, where it is said that men are apt to fear that when the
soul (foxy) goes forth from the body (au/ia) it will be dispersed like
smoke or air (irvevfia), and vanish away into nothingness, there is
no direct antithesis between foxy and irvevfia. When auua and o-dp£
occur together, as in Plato Symp. 207D, where it is said that the
hair, flesh, bones, blood, and the whole body are continually chan
ging, the o-wpa is related to o-dp£ as the whole to the part. See also
Aristot. i. 4230. On the other hand the two terms crcopa and foxy
frequently stand in antithesis, instances occurring at least from
Herodotus down, and very frequently in Plato. See Herod. 2. 123
cited above under foxy; Xen. Mem. 1. 3. 5; 3. 2. 20; 3. 11. 10;
Plato Phaedo 64C; 76C; Symp. 207D. Plato suggests that the
aufia is injurious to the foxy, but he holds no consistent doctrine of
the intrinsic evil of matter or of the body as the cause of sin. What
51

52 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
he implies is rather that the body by its sensations and appetites
breaks in upon the tranquiUty of the soul and interferes with its
clear vision of truth, and causing it excessive pain or excessive
pleasure tends to corrupt it against its wiU. In Aristotle, while
the two terms frequently stand in antithesis, they are in his thought,
as already indicated, rather correlates than antitheses. See, e.g.,
i. 403, 6-9; but especially the Ilepi SFiocts, Book U. chap. i.
(i. 412-13), from which passages have already been quoted above.

52

CHAPTER II
fin, 1233, AND 1TB51 IN THE OLD TESTAMENT
VJV T T
It would be highly desirable, if it were also practicable, to
show the development of the meaning of the three Hebrew words
named above chronologicaUy and genetically, and to this end to
exhibit in succession the usage of the several great periods of Old
Testament Uterature. But aside from the fact that such an exhibit
would demand more space than can be given to it here, the problem
itself is comphcated by several facts which place a solution of it
worthy of the attention of scholars beyond the powers of the
present writer. For example, in the oldest extant Uterature it is
evident that we have not the beginnings of Hebrew usage, but a
stage of development in which it is already difficult to distinguish
primitive from derived meanings, and in the later stages . there are
many questions of relative antiquity of different portions of the
Old Testament, and of the interpretation of obscure passages
which stiU further obscure the solution. On the other hand, the
broad facts respecting relationship of meanings seem to be fairly
clear, and whoUy to ignore genetic relationships is to risk a result
ing degree of misrepresentation of relations of meanings which
might affect unfavorably our judgment even respecting the New
Testament usage. The foUowing analyses, accordingly, are an
endeavor to represent the usage of the Old Testament as a whole,
rather than by successive periods, but with the various meanings
so arranged as to avoid any serious misrepresentation of genetic
relations. i. iyn
I. Wind. — This was apparently the earUest meaning of Ffil .
It occurs in all periods of the literature.
i. Proprie. —
Ps. 1:4: :mn Bsnrpiws y'as-ni* *s> o^is-in -p-rib
The wicked are not so; But are like the chaff which the wind driveth
away.53] 53

54 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
Other examples of ffil meaning "wind" are found in II Sam.
22:11; II Kings 3:17; Job 8:2; Ps. 18:11, 43; 83:j<; 103:16;
104:3,4; 147:18; Isa. 7:2; 17:13; 27:8; 32:2; 41:16; 57:13;
64:5; Jer. 2:24; 10:13; 13:24; 18:17; 51:16; Ezek. 5:2, 10;
Dan. 2:35; Hos. 4:19; Zech. 5:9; 6:5; Jon. 1:4; 4:8.
It is sometimes spoken of as proceeding from God, yet not in
such way as to change the meaning of the word.
Hos. 13:15: rib's "isnaa rn'rr t^i n+$> jrtr
An east wind shall come, the wind of the Lord coming up from the wilder
ness. See other examples in Gen. 8 : 1 ; Exod. 10:13, 19; 14:21; 15:10
(?); Num. 11:31; Ps. 107:25; 135:7; Isa. 40:7; Am. 4:13.
Sometimes the writer has in mind the destructive force of the
wind, but this also involves no change of meaning.
1 Kings -19: n: p^sa pjni nbtra rvrf) 13? rrirr nam
rn'rr h3sb D^bo ¦aipm 'cnn '
And behold, the Lord passed by, and a great and strong wind rent the
mountains, and brake in pieces the rocks before the Lord.
See other examples in Ps. 11:6; 55:9; 148:8; Isa. 11:15;
Jer. 4:11, 12; 22:22; 51:1; Ezek. 1:4; 17:10; 27:26.
Because of its illusiveness, rWI , meaning "wind," perhaps
sometimes breath, is the symbol of nothingness, emptiness, vanity.
Isa. 41:29: :DiT3D3 Tfrft ftT\ DlTTOa DBS IlK Db3 in
V •• : - _i t - v •• -: - v_JV 1 VJT T "•. 1 •¦
Behold all of them, their works are vanity and nought : their molten images
are wind and confusion.
See also Job 7:7; 15:2; 16:3; 30:15 (perhaps, however, to be
taken Uterally) ; Ps. 78:39; Prov. 11:29; Isa. 26:18; Jer. 5:13;
Hos. 12:2.
2. By metonymy it is used for the points of the compass, or, in
general, for direction in space.
jer. 52:23: nrni niBiai. d^idfi a^sa-n rrri
And there were ninety-six pomegranates on the sides.
See also I Chron. 9:24; Jer. 49:32, 36; Ezek. 5:10, 12; 17:21;
42:16, 20; Dan. 8:8; 11:4.
II. Spirit.— One might naturally conjecture that T\T\ denoting
spirit was a later development from its use to denote the breath,
54

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH ,55
and that ts appUcation to the spirit of God was an outgrowth of
its use with reference to the spirit of man. Unless, however, the
order of development of meanings was widely different from the
order of appearance in extant Uterature, or the judgment of
modern scholars as to the order of the literature is wide of the
mark, the meaning "spirit" came before "breath," and the applica
tion to God earUer than to man.
i. Spirit of God. From the conception of the wind as con-
troUed by, or proceeding from, God and operative in nature,
apparently arose the conception of the spirit of God, signifying the
unseen but powerful influence or influences by which God affected
or controlled men. The change of EngUsh translation from " wind "
to "spirit" doubtless somewhat exaggerates the change of meaning
in the mind of Hebrew writer or speaker. It was still for them the
BTl'bsf TtT\ , only operative in a different sphere.
a) The spirit of God is spoken of as operating in ways more or
less analogous to those in which the wind might operate; yet in
almost aU the instances it is man who is affected thereby.
n Kings 2:16: tnrrj nnxn Tobias nirr n*n itwji"©
rrisran rnxs. i«
Lest peradventure the spirit of the Lord hath taken him up, and cast him
upon some mountain, or into some valley.
For other examples see Gen. 1:2; I Kings 18:12; Ezek. 2:2;
3:12, 14, 24; 8:3; 11:1, 24; 43:5 [cf. below under b)].
In Isa. 31:3 rm is used qualitatively with special reference to
its powerf ulness in contrast with the flesh as weak :
mi sbi ita dstdwi bx-sbi m» trtszb
: t t -.•¦¦:•• : t t *j- : ¦
The Egyptians are men and not God, and their horses flesh and not spirit.
While the term does, not refer specifically to the spirit of God,
the idea of power associated with it is probably derived from the
use of TOT in reference to the divine spirit. Cf. II Kings 2:16;
Judg. 14 : 6. This generic or quaUtative use of Wl to express the
idea of power is quite isolated and at the opposite pole of develop
ment from ffl"l as the symbol of weakness or emptiness derived
from the more primitive use of ffi"1 meaning wind. In Job 26: 13
also ffi"l is apparently used by metonymy for power.
55

56 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES \
b) The spirit of God (D"nb» or ni?T) is spoken of as operat
ing upon or within men, producing various psychical and physico-
psychical effects, such as physical strength, courage, prophetic
frenzy, a prophetic message. The range of usage is very wide,
from those in which the effect is purely physical to those in which
the spirit is represented as giving to the prophet his message.
judg. 3:10: bjoizr-r-itf daion nirr-rai rby virn
And the spirit of the Lord came upon him, and he judged Israel.
isa. 61:1: ^snb ^nk rrirp rraa ]fl "by nirr -sts r?n
D'nicKbi ni-i^T n^rrab jnpb 3b™naipbb izhrib Tnbio o-'iiy
:mp-nps
The spirit of the Lord God is upon me; because the Lord hath anointed
me to preach good tidings unto the meek; he hath sent me to bind up the
broken-hearted, to proclaim liberty to the captives, and the opening of the
prison to them that are bound.
Other examples of rPH used in similar way are found in Gen.
41:38; Exod. 31:3; 35:31; Num. 11:17, 25, 29; 24:2; 27:i8(?);
Judg. 6:34; 11:29; 13:25; I4:6, 19; 15:14; I Sam. 10:6, 10;
11:6; 16:14a; 19:20,23; II Sam. 23:2; I Chron. 12:19; II Chron.
15:1; 20:14; 24:20; Job 32:8 (by implication the spirit of Jeho
vah); Ps. 106:33; Ezek. 1:12, 20, 21; 11:5a; 37:1 [cf. the exam
ples from Ezek. under a), as illustrating the close relationship of the
two usages]; Hos. 9:7; Mic. 2:7; 3:8.
Volz1 interprets the expression "evil spirit from [or of] God,"
in I Sam. 16:146, 15, 16, 230, b; 18:10; 19:9; and Judg. 9:23,
"God sent a spirit of evil between Abimelech and the men of
Shechem," as referring to a demon, which originaUy had nothing
to do with Yahweh, the phrases "from God," "of God," etc., being
the product of a subsequent desire to make every extraordinary
phenomenon subordinate to God. The expression as it stands
would not in that case exactly reflect the thought of any period, but
would be the result of the blending of ideas due to different periods
and not wholly assimilated. For the purposes of the present paper
it is not essential to determine the accuracy of this judgment.
It is probable in any case that the idea of a demonic spirit arose
in the Hebrew mind within the Old Testament period (see 3 below)
'Volz, Der Geist Gottes, Tubingen, iqio, pp. 4ff.
56

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 57
and that within that period the conception of the supremacy of
God prevailed to such an extent that Hebrew writers did not
shrink from designating the source from which evil came as a
spirit of God. Whether in the latter case those who framed or
those who read such passages as Judg. 9:23; I Sam. 16:14-23
had in mind the spirit of God, and understood the epithet "evil"
as describing simply the result of the divine action, or conceived
that the evil spirits (demonic) were God's in the sense that they
were ultimately under divine control, is not whoUy clear. The
decision of the question depends mainly upon the date at which
the idea of the demonic spirit became current in Israel.
The question also arises, though on different grounds, whether
in Exod. 28:3; Deut. 34:9 the expression "spirit of wisdom"
refers to the spirit of God, called a spirit of wisdom because of the
effect produced, or to the spirit of man, to which God imparts
wisdom, or is simply a pleonastic phrase for wisdom. See also
Isa. 28:6, "spirit of judgment." These passages are in them
selves capable of either interpretation. But such passages as
Gem 41:38 (cf. vs. 39); Mic. 3:8, in which similar results are
ascribed to the spirit of God, expressly so called, favor the first
interpretation. This probably appUes also to Num. 27:18 and
Zech. 12:10. In II Kings 2:9, 15 the conception may be that
the very spirit of Elijah was to come upon EUsha, but vs. 16
again suggests a reference to the spirit of God. So in Num. 11:17,
25, 26, the spirit (with the article) that is upon Moses, though
not defined as the spirit either of Moses or of God, is put upon the
young men by God, and is most probably thought of as the spirit
of God. But both here and in II Kings 2:9, the conception is
quantitative rather than purely individual; and all the other
passages are perhaps somewhat influenced in thought and expres
sion by the fact of the quantitative idea of the spirit.
c) Under the influence of an increasingly ethical conception of
God, the spirit of God, caUed also the spirit of holiness, is spoken
of as operative in the life of the community of the chosen people and
of individuals, guiding, instructing, redeeming, ethically purifying.
isa. 44:3: :*£«2Merb? "wra *gnrb? T*"1 P*$
I will pour my spirit upon thy seed, and my blessing upon thine offspring.
57

58 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
Ps. 51:11 (13): "aaa np.rrba *ppi)3 >?m. *C??ba ^jrbisrrbK
Cast me not away from thy presence; And take not thy holy spirit from me.
For other examples see Neh. 9:20, 30; Ezek. 39:29; Isa. 11:2;
42:1; 48:16; 59:21; 63:10,11,14; Ps. 139:7; i43:i°; Hag. 2:5;
Zech. 4:6; 12:10; Joel 3:12 (2:28, 29).
The line of demarcation between this class and that which
immediately precedes manifestly cannot be sharply drawn, many
cases being on the border line.
d) Rarely, and probably in part under the influence of the con
ception of lji]~i as the breath of life, the spirit of God is spoken of
as the source of physical life. Here, also, as under b) the spirit
is sometimes, at least, thought of quantitatively. Cf. II, 2, d).
job 33:4: iiffl ^12 naiaa"! "Wisy bx-ffii
The spirit of God hath made me, And the breath of the Almighty giveth
me life. See also Gen. 6 : 3 ; Job 27:3; 34:14; Ps. 104:30.
As against the view of Wendt, Fleisch und Geist, pp. 19-22,
that the wind, which forms the basis for the idea of the Spirit, is
conceived of by the Hebrews as immaterial, Gunkel, Wirkungen
des Heiligen Geistes, pp. 48 f., holds that the Hebrews thought of
both wind and spirit as material, but as an extremely refined air
like substance. The possibiUty that spirit was a substance, but
immaterial, is ignored by both of them; probably with reason
in view of the lack of evidence that the Hebrews ever thought of
immaterial substance. As between Wendt and Gunkel, the latter
seems correct. Beyond this and the fact that the Hebrews denied
to spirit the ordinary attributes of matter, it is difficult to go with
certainty. 2. The spirit of man.
a) As the seat of, or as identical with (the latter apparently the
earlier of the two ideas) strength, courage, anger, distress, or the
Uke [cf. examples under 1, b) above].
judg. 8:3: n-Tn impi i-em vbsna utvn nnsi -a
^ ^ v " tt- :-; TT" t t:tt
Then their anger was abated toward him, when he had said that.
job 7:11: Ti^n isn rrsrjH
I will speak in the anguish of my spirit.
58

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 59
Prov. 18:14: nsjwr "a nass rum nbna bsb^ urn mi
T-lV T * * T " ; - ; _i" -; - " ; - • • -
The spirit of man will sustain his infirmity; but a broken spirit who can
bear? See other examples as found in Gen. 26:35; 4I;8; 45:27;
Exod. 6:9; 35:21; Num. 27:18 (?); Deut. 2:30; Judg. 8:3;
15:19; Josh. 2:11; 5:1; I Sam. 1:15; 30:12; I Kings 10:5;
21:5; Job 6:4; 15:13; 21:4; 32:18; I Chron. 5:26; II Chron. 9:4;
21:16; 36:22; Ezrai:i, 5;Job6:4; 15:13; 21:4; 32:18; Ps.32:2;
76:13; 77:4; 142:4; 143:4,7; Prov. 14:29; 15:4,13; 16:18,19,
32; 17:22; 29:11,23; Isa. 19:3,14; 38:16; 54:6; 61:3; 65:14; Jer.
51:11; Ezek. 3:140; 21:7; Dan. 2:1, 3; 5:20; 7:15; Zech. 6:8.
0) With kindred meaning but with special reference to the moral
and reUgious life, the seat of humility and other good qualities.
' isa. 57:15: nrnrjb mi-baiosi «sra-nsi "jisratf isiipi Dlia
: D-K3-J3 =tb tYi-mln trbsia nfi
I dwell in the high and holy place, with him also that is of a contrite and
humble spirit, to revive the spirit of the humble, and to revive the heart of the
contrite ones.
Other examples of this use of ffi"1 are found in Ps. 34: 19; 51:12,
19; Hag. 1:14; Ps. 78:8; Prov. 11:13; Isa- 26:9; 57:16; 66:2;
Ezek. 11:19; I8:3i; 36:26.
c) Rarely, and only in late writers, Ffil is used of the seat
of mentaUty. job 20:3: r^T To-na rfiii ynm ^-labs x^ia
I have heard the reproof which putteth me to shame, and the spirit of my
understanding answereth me.
See also I Chron. 28:12; Isa. 29:24; Ezek. 11:50; 20:32.
Mai. 2:150 (see also 16): D5rfi"Q DrHaip'3 probably, belongs
here, the meaning being, "Be on your guard in [or with] your
minds, and deal not thou treacherously with the wife of thy
youth." Wellhausen and Nowack suggest the possibiUty that
DirPHSl means "on peril of your lives" (BDB, s.v.) ; this is possible
for the preposition but a difficult if not impossible meaning for the
noun. Smith (Int. Crit. Com.) takes ffll in the sense, character,
purpose, or will, which is, however, neither strictly suitable to the
context nor a well-authenticated usage of the word, tiie passages
cited scarcely vouching for it. The more general meaning "spirit,"
59

60 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
as the seat of emotion and will, is less open to objection. The
sentence in that case would mean, Guard yourselves in [the
sphere of] your spirits, i.e., against those feeUngs which might
lead one of you to deal treacherously with the wife of his youth.
d) With approximation to the sense of 1223 , T\T\ denotes the
spirit of man as the seat or cause of life, often with accompanying
reference to God' as its source. Cf. II, i, d).
Num. 16:22: ito bsb nrnin nbx bx
T t t : t :¦:
O God, the God of the spirits of all flesh.
zech. 12:1: ffia-rpn ijfi nx itfn DT212 ntaa rrirp-ae
t t - " : 1 vat *• : •-»- t t : ••. :
Thus saith the Lord, which stretcheth forth the heavens, and layeth the
foundations of the earth, and formeth the spirit of man within him.
See also Num. 27:16; Job 10:12; 12:10; 17:1; Ps. 31:5;
Isa. 42:5; Ezek. 10:17 (?)¦
The passages in Eccl. (3:19, 21; 12:7), which must doubtless
be taken all together, are peculiar in that the term TVH is appUed
to the lower animals along with man, while at the same time God
is represented as its source. The conception seems to be that there
proceeds from God rfl*1 , quantitatively not individuaUy thought of,
which is the source and cause of life for both man and beast, and
that at death this tVT\ returns from both man and beast to the
source from which it came. Cf. II, 1, d), above, and III, 1, below.
There is possibly to be discerned here an influence of the idea
ascribed to Epicharmus: avveKpidy Kal SieKpWy KairyXBev, odev
yhBev, irahiv, yd fiev els YO>, irvevfia 8' dvu. See p. 19.
3. The idea of a demon, a personal spirit neither human nor
divine, which was undoubtedly current in the ancient world,
and is unquestionably found in late Jewish writings, is nowhere
in the Old Testament expressed with that clearness which it
acquires later. It is probable, however, that it is present in such
passages as II Kings 19:7; Zech. 13:2; Job 4:15.
Job 4:15: "nipa rnyis nacn -|'brr -asrb? nn
A spirit passed before my face and the hair of my flesh stood up.
It is perhaps also to be found in" I Kings 22:21-23 and the
parallel passage, II Chron. 18:20-22, in which Zedekiah describes
60

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 61
the spirit by which Zedekiah and others have spoken as a lying
spirit sent forth from God. But in view of the highly dramatic
character of the passage it may be doubted whether the lan
guage is not simply a dramatic way of saying that Zedekiah is
lying. The answer depends in this case, as in those mentioned
under 2, a), mainly on the period at which the idea of the demon
can be shown to have been current in Israel. The same con
siderations apply to Num. 5 : 14, 30, with its reference to a spirit
of jealousy; to Hos. 4:12; 5:4, spirit of whoredom; Mic. 2:11,
spirit of falsehood; Isa. 19:14, spirit of perverseness; Isa. 29:10,
spirit of deep sleep.
III. Breath, which is the sign of Ufe, and the cessation of which
is death. 1. Proprie. — The breath. Instances of this meaning are
found first in the exilic period, and Ezek. 37:5-14 suggests a close
connection between the older meanings, "wind" and "spirit," and
the apparently later meaning, "breath."
Ezek. 37:9, 10: D7»™p arisn rfi-in-bs xasri hbs: ia»»i
rrnri "ifci nirm ysrwa nirr •fr& tmn-fe ij^rrbx rnasn
orn Kiarn *ms "itii'ss Tasini twin nbxri tnrm -ryei
nfca i»a bina'bni orr bavb? srnsn wi nrn
Then said he unto me, Prophesy unto the wind, prophesy, son of man, and
say to the wind, thus saith the Lord God: Come from the four winds, O breath,
and breathe upon these slain, that they may live. So I prophesied as he com
manded me, and the breath came into them, and they stood upon their feet, an
exceeding great army.
See also Gen. 6:17; 7:15,22; Job 9:18; 15:30; 19:17; Ps.
104:29; 135:17; 146:4; Jer. 10:14; 14:6 (?); 51:17; Lam. 4:20;
Hab. 2:19.
In aU of these instances, except those in Job, the breath is
definitely thought of as the breath of Ufe. On Eccl. 3:19, 20;
12:7, see 2, d), above.
2. As the symbol of anger or of power; of man (Isa. 25:4;
33:11 [?]); of the Messiah (Isa. 11:4); but usually of God (Exod.
15:8; II Sam. 22:16; Job 4:9; Ps. 18:15; 33:6; Isa. 30:28;
61

62 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
59:19; sometimes apparently with a blending of the idea of
wind. isa. 11:4: ijuh tva* msia r^-ai rs tnion -ina-rism
He shall smite the earth with the rod of his mouth, and with the breath of
his lips shall he slay the wicked.
Whether by EBlZJa rftl and ^?3 ffi"! in Isa. 4:4 the prophet
means the breath of God as the expression of his anger, or the
spirit of God with an idea similar to that expressed by 12J"ip ri"l
in Ps. 51:11, is not easy to decide. In any case the expression
might easily be taken in the latter sense in later times.
11. 12533
The order of development of meanings is difficult to determine.
The idea commonly held formerly that the fundamental idea is
breath is now generally given up, there being no certain or prob
able instance of the use of the word in that sense. (On Job 41 : 21
[13]; Prov. 27:9; Isa. 13:20, see BDB,1 s.v. ad fin.) The foUowing
analysis, though based on repeated personal study of aU the Old
Testament passages, is largely influenced by BDB, especiaUy in
respect to I, and the order of arrangement.
I. Soul, that entity which, residing in a Uving being, makes it
aUve, and the departure of which is death — -sometimes distin
guished from "IffiS , flesh.
1 Kings 17:2V: rnrr-btf nnpp\ Dhas>B uibis nbrrb? ni'an*i
n'snp-b? rwn nb*rrirs3 araisr) ^ribx hirr naxsi
And he stretched himself upon the child three times, and called unto the
Lord, and said, 0 Lord my God, I pray thee let this child's soul come into
him again.
See other examples in Gen. 35:18; I Kings 17:21, 22; Job
11:20; 31:39; 33:18, 22, 28, 30; Ps. 16:10; 30:4; 31:10; 49:16;
86:13; 89:49; 131:2; Prov. 11:17; 23:14; Isa. 10:18; 38:17; Jer.
15:9; Lam. 3:20; cf. also Job 14:22; 30:16; Ps. 42:5, 7 which
BDB assign to this class.
1 Brown, Driver, and Briggs, Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament,
Boston, 1906. 62

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 63
The soul, as a living entity, is sometimes said to be in the blood
or even identified with it, and on this is based a prohibition of the
eating of blood.
Lev. 17:146: ian nizn-ba 11333 "3 *ibian & miia-bs on
T T T T ¦¦•JV _i" T T T -
Ye shall eat the blood of no manner of flesh: for the life of all flesh is the
blood thereof.
See also Gen. 9:4, 5; Deut. 12:230, 6.
II. Soul, the seat of appetite, emotion, and the Uke, with no
impUcation of a separate entity, or of the possibiUty of separate
existence. 1. The seat of physical appetites, health, and vigor.
Deut. 12:20: -im ntcto ^baa-nk ^Trbtf nirr rrrrr-'s
si!Js3 rfls-bsa Tien bbtfb sided own™*) niin "nb3& Wrasi ib
I : : ~ — t ; t t ¦/: v J : : ~ v ~ : • t t t : t : - t : 1 r
nta bssn
T T 7
When the Lord thy God shall enlarge thy border, as he hath promised
thee, and thou shalt say, I will eat flesh, because thy soul desireth to eat flesh;
thou mayest eat flesh after all the desire of thy soul.
For other examples see Num. 11:6; 21:5; Deut. 12:15, 21;
23:25; Job 33:20; Ps. 78:18; 106:15; 107:5,9,18; Prov. 6:30;
10:3; 13:25; 16:24,26; 23:2; 25:25; 27:7 bis; Eccl. 2:24; 4:8;
6:2,7; Isa. 29:8a, 0; 32:6; 55:2;' 56:11; 58:11;' Jer. 31:14;'
50:19;' Lam. 1:11, 19; Ezek. 7:19; Hos. 9:4; Mic. 7:1.
2. The seat of emotion of aU kinds — desire, courage, hope,
fear, love, hate, sorrow, discouragement, vengeance, or, by me
tonymy, the emotions themselves; frequently but by no means
constantly as the seat of religious experience.
job 30:25: Trasb -wb? rra» Di,-rrapb Tni sb-os
Did not I weep for him that was in trouble ? Was not my soul grieved for
the needy ?
Ps. 86:4: jaiaa ¦'tzjss "5'ik Tb*rh3 snns ids 3 mate
Rejoice the soul of thy servant,. for unto thee 0 Lord do I lift up my soul.
Cant. 1:7: :rtnn nT& ¦'as? rarmo "b ry^r
Tell me, O thou whom my soul loveth, where thou feedest thy flock.
isa. 61:10: vrb&a -"Iran bun nirra tctsj* wito
I will rejoice greatly in the Lord; my soul shall be joyful in my God.
1 But the whole expression is used figuratively for a religious experience.
63

64 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
, See other examples in Gen. 23:8; 34:3, 8; 42:22; Exod.
15:9; 23:9; Lev. 23:27, 32; 26:11, 15, 16, 30, 43; Num. 21:4;
29:7; Deut. 14:26 bis; 18:6; 21:14; 24:15; 28:65; Josh. 23:11;
Judg. 5:21; 10:16; 16:16; 18:25; Ruth 4:15 (?); I Sam. 1:10,
15; 2:16, 33; 18:10, c; 20:4; 22:2; 23:20;' 30:6; II Sam.
3:21; 5:8; 17:8; I Kings 11:37; HKings4:27; 9:15; Job3:2o;
6:11; 7:11; 10:1 bis; 14:22; 16:4a, b; 18:4; 19:2; 21:25;
23:13; 24:12; 27:2; 30:16, 25; 41:13, 21;' Ps. 6:4; 10:3;
11:5; 19:8; 23:3; 25:13; 27:12; 31:8; 33:20; 34:3; 35:9,
12, 13, 25; 41:3/5; 42:2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 12; 43:5; 44:26; 57:7;
62:2,6; 63:1,6,9; 69:11; 77:3; 84:3; 86:4 bis; 88:4; 94:19;
103:1, 2, 22; 104:1, 35; 105:22; 107:26; 116:7; 119:20, 25,
28,81; 123:4; 130:5,6; 138:3; 143:6,8,11,12; 146:1; Prov.
6:16; 13:2,40*5,19; 14:10; 19:18; 21:10,23; 25:13; 28:25;
29:17; 31:6; Eccl. 6:3, 9; 7:28; Cant. 1:7; 3:1,2,3,4; 5:6;
6:12; Isa. 1:14; 3:20 (?); 5:14; 15:4; 19:10; 26:8,9; 38:15;
42:1; 53:11; 58:3,5,106*5; 61:10; 66:3; Jer. 2:24; 4:31; 5:9,29;
6:8; 9:8; 12:7; 13:17; 14:19; 15:1; 22:27; 3I:I2> 256*5; 34:16;
44:14; Lam. 1:16; 2:12; 3:17,20,51; Ezek. 16:27; 23:17,186*5,
22, 28; 24:21, 25; 25:6, 15; 27:31; 36:5; Hos. 4:8; Mic. 7:3;
Hab. 2:5; Zech. 11:8 6*5.
3. The seat of will and moral action, especiaUy when joined
with aib, but occasionaUy alone; not of course sharply distin
guished from the preceding class.
Deut. 30:2: ~ns« bbs ibpa Fwaw1] *£tibs nirr-n? rnisi
jsiDss-brcfl smb-bsn a-Kfl nrta niTi' wiro '"Obs
T r.' : - t : 1 : t : t : I jv t t - a - ' : - : • t
And shalt return unto the Lord thy God, and shalt obey his voice ac
cording to all that I command thee this day, thou and thy children, with all
thine heart and with all thy soul.
See other examples in Gen. 49:6; Deut. 4:29; 6:5; 10:12;
11:13, l8; 13:4; 26:16; 30:6, 10; Josh. 22:5; I Kings 2:4;
8:48; II Kings 23:3, 25; I Chron. 22:19; 28:9; II Chron. 6:38;
15; 12; 34:31; Job 6:7; 7:15; Ps. 24:4; 25:1; 119:129, 167;
Jer. 32:41; Ezek.4:i4; Mic.6:7; Hab. 2:4.
Here also instead of under 2 might be classified Ps. 27:12;
41:2; 105:22; Deut. 23:25; Josh. 23:11.
1 Briggs, Jour. Bib. Lit., XVI (1897), 30.
64

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 65
4. Rarely of the seat of mentaUty.
Esth. 4:13: ^barrrra tibarjb ijosin hann-b«
Think not in thy soul that thou shalt escape in the king's house.
See other examples in Deut. 49:15; Josh. 23:14; I Sam. 2:35;
Esth. 4:13; Ps. 13:3; 35:3; 139:14; Prov. 2:10; 19:2; 23:7;
24 : 14 ; 27:9; Jer. 42 : 20. But in most cases the meaning may be
more general, "self"; it is doubtful, moreover, whether in any case
the Hebrew mind made the distinction indicated by the subdivisions
under the main division II.
III. Life, that element or characteristic which distinguishes a
living being from inanimate objects.
job 2:4: :iizJ33 n?a -n-; in'-sb io» bbi. nir-j?a niy
Skin for skin, yea all that'a man hath, will he give for his life.
jer. 51:6: iiDSD izj^s *iaba*i baa tpna *ic3
Flee out of the midst of Babylon, and save every man his life.
See other examples in Gen. 9:4, 50, 6; 19:17, 19; 32:31;
44:300,6; Exod. 4:19; 21:23, 30; 30:12, 15, 16; Lev. 24:186,
c; Num. 17:3; 25:31; 31:50; Deut. 13:7; 19:21; 24:6; Josh.
2:13, 14; 9:24; Judg. 5:18; 9:17; 12:3; 18:25a, b; I Sam.
18:1c, 3; 19:5,11; 21:1,17; 22:23^,6; 23:15; 24:12; 25:19a,
b, c; I Sam. 26:21, 24a, 6; 28:9, 21; II Sam. 1:9; 4:8, 9;
14:7, 14; 16:11; 18:13; 19:6a, 6, c, d; 23:17; perhaps also
Lev. 17:116; I Kings 1:12a, 6; 1:29; 2:23; 3:11; 19:2a, 6, 3,
4a, 6, 10, 14; 20:31, 32, 39a, 6, 42a, 6; II Kings 1:13a, 6, 14;
7:7; 10:24a, 6; I Chron. 11:19a, 6; II Chron. 1:11; Esth. 7:3,
7; 8:11; 9:16; Job 2:4, 6; 12:10; 13:14; 27:3, 8; 31:30;
Ps. 6:5; 7:6; 17:9; 22:21; 25:20; 26:9; 31:14; 33:I9J 34:23;
35:4,17; 38:13; 40:15; 49:9; 54=5-6; 55:19; 56:7,14; 59:4;
63:10; 66:9; 69:2, 19; 70:3; 71:10, 13, 23; 72:13, 14; 74:19;
78:50; 86:2, 14; 94:21; 97:10; 116:4, 8; 119:109; 120:2;
121:7; 124:4, 5; 143:3; Prov- i:i8, 19; 3:22; 6:26; 7:23;
n:3o(?); 14:25c?); 12:10; 13:3, 8; 16:17; 19:8, 16; 20:2;
22:23; 24:12 (?); 29:10, 24; Isa. 43:4; 44:20; 53:10, 12; Jer.
2:34; 4:10,30; 11:21; 19:70,6; 20:13; 21:7,9; 22:25; 26:19;
34:20,21; 38:2,160,6; 39:18; 40:14,15; 44:300,6; 45:5; 46:26;
48:6; 49 = 37; 5i:6,45; Lam. 2:19; 5:9; Ezek.3:i9, 21; 13:180,6,
65

66 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
20a, 6, c; 14:14, 20; 16:5; 17:17; 22:25, 27; 32:10; 33:5,9;
Amos 2:14, 15; Jon. 1:14; 2:6, 8; 4:3.
In various idiomatic phrases, such as "my Ufe shall Uve,"
"as thy Ufe Uveth," "to smite a life," or "to stay a Ufe," "the life
dies," 1DS3 seems, despite the unusual character of the expression,
to retain the meaning "life."
Gen. 12:13: nrvrn iptiB ¦'b-atr; ]?ab n« "nhs M""ia»
:r;bb:sa "ieeo
Say, I pray thee, thou art my sister: that it may be well with me and that
I may live because of thee.
Lev. 24:17: :nw rvia on» ias3-b3 rssr "3 td'^i
And he that smiteth any man to death shall surely be put to death.
See other examples in Gen. 19:20; 37:21; Lev. 24:18a; Num.
23:10; 31:19; 35:i1, I5, 3°; L>eut. 19:6, 11; 22:26; 27:25;
Josh. 20:3, 9; Judg. 16:30; I Sam. 1:26; 17:55; 20:3; 25:26;
II Sam. 11: n; 14:19; II Kings 2:2, 4, 6, 30; Job 31:39; 36:14;
Ps. 22:30; 119:75; Isa. 55:3; Jer. 38:17, 20; Ezek. 13:18c,
19a, 6; 18:27; Jon. 4:8(?).
IV. A Uving being, a being that possesses Ufe, as distinguished
from an inanimate object.
1. In the phrase TPTl IDS 3, as a general term for any being that
has animal Ufe, whether man or beast.
Gen. 1:24: rm iD33 ynsn isrin D'tfba na*^
And God said, let the earth bring forth the living creature after its kind.
See also Gen. 1:20, 21, 30; 2:7, 19; 9:10, 12, 15, 16; Lev.
11:10, 46a; Ezek. 47:9.
Occasionally TDM without !"FH is used in this inclusive sense.
So Lev. 10:466; Num. 31:28.
2. Much more frequently IBM without the addition of STft is
applied to man only:
a) Meaning person, individual man.
Lev. 17:12: bixmsb asm iraa-bs) b&o'^s¦, nab thbk i3_by
T Therefore I said unto the children of Israel, no soul of you shall eat
blood. 66

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 67
See other examples in Gen. 14:21; 17:14; 36:6; Exod. 12:15,
16, 19; 31:14; Lev. 2:1; 4:2, 27; 5:1, 2, 4, 15, 17, 21; 7:18,
20a, 6, 210, 6, 25, 27a, 6; 17:10, 15; 18:29; x9:8; 20:6a, 6;
22:3, 6, 11; 23:29, 300, 6; 27:2; Num. 5:6; 9:13; 15:27, 28,
30a, 6, 31; 19:136, 18, 20, 22; Deut. 24:7; Josh. 10:28,30,32,35,
370,6,39; 11:11; I Sam. 22:22; II Kings 12:5; Prov. 11:25;
19:15; 28:17; Isa. 49:7; Jer. 43:6; Lam. 3:25; Ezek. 18:40, 6, c, d,
20; 27:13; 33:6.
6) In enumerations.
Exod. 1:5: idm D^yaiD ahr-Tr m1* iBM-bs tn
And all the souls that came out of the loins of Jacob were seventy souls.
Other examples occur in Gen. 46:15, 18, 22, 25, 26a, 6, 27a, 6;
Exod. 12:4; 16:16; Num. 31:35a, 6, 40a, 6, 46; Deut. 10:22;
I Chron. 5:21; Jer. 52:29, 30a, 6.
c) With pronominal suffix it has the force of a reflexive or
personal pronoun.
Ps. n :i: JfiBS nsnn TPQ "'TDMb main 1p»
How say ye to my soul, Flee as a bird to your mountain ?
See other examples in Gen. 27:4, 19, 25, 31; Lev. 11:43, 44!
16:29, 31; 20:25; Num. 30:3, 50, 6, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12; Job
9:2i(?); 32:2; Ps. 3:3; 7:3; 17:13; 35:7; 49:i9; 57=2, 5;
66:16; 88:15; 94:17; 105:18; 109:20,31; 120:6; 141:8; 142:5,
8; Prov. 11:17; l8:7; 22:25; Isa. 3:9; 46:2; 47:i45 5I:23; Jer-
3:11; 6:16; 17:21; 18:20; 37:9; 44:7; S*'-1*! Lam. 3:24, 58;
Amos 6:8 (of Jehovah); Hab. 2:10.
In a few passages it stands for the self as the whole complex of
opportunities and possibiUties that belong to a man while he lives.
Prov. 6:32; 8:36; cf. 15:32; 22:25.
d) OccasionaUy (in Lev., Num., and Hag., only) it is used to
denote a person once Uving, but now dead.
Num. 5:2: JTDMb SEB bbl
J V|T T " T :
Whosoever is unclean by the dead.
So also in Lev. 19:28; 21:1,11; 22:4; Num. 6:6, 11; 9:6,7,
10; 19:11, 13a; Hag. 2:13.
The occurrence of this usage compared with the use of STf! IBM
to denote a Uving creature suggests the possibility that TDB3 alone
67

68 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
properly means a creature (it could hardly be person) whether aUve
or dead. But the whole body of facts (note, e.g., the rarity of its use
for the dead, and the Umited number of instances of !Tlj compared
with the large number of cases in which TDM alone expresses the
idea of Ufe) seems best accounted for by the supposition that t"Isln
when it occurs is pleonastic and that the use of IBM in reference
to a dead body is an offshoot from its use to signify person [TV, 2,0)].
Cf. the use of the English word "person" (the Latin persona origi
nally meaning a mask covering the body) to denote the body as in
the phrase " exposure of the person " ; or the use of the word "soul "
to mean a person, as in the expression "a thousand souls perished."
in. n'aa T T
Whatever the primitive Semitic sense of this term (see Gesenius-
Buhl, which on the basis of the Arabic regards "skin" as the original
meaning and assigns this to Ps. 102 : 6), the meaning which, with the
possible exception of Ps. 102:6, is basal to aU others in the Old
Testament, is clearly "flesh." Usage is as foUows:
I. Flesh, the soft, muscular portions of a body Uving or once
living; used both of man and beast.
job 2:5: rib-D« i"toa-b»i iasy-ba yy\ s,t se-nbip obw
t^na* *jTB-b»
But put forth thine hand now, and touch his bone and his flesh, and he
will renounce thee to thy face.
isa. 22:13: 1^ rYiniBi -iiDa bba ^s ttnizft n^a s'nn
Slaying oxen and killing sheep, eating flesh and drinking wine.
See other examples in Gen. 2:21, 230, 6 (?); 9:4; 17:11,13,14,
23> 24, 25; 40:19; 41:2, 3, 4, 18, 19 (of animals); Exod. 4:7;
12:8, 46; 16:3, 8, 12; 21:28; 22:30, 3i(?); 28:42; 29:14, 31,
32, 34; Lev. 4:11; 6:20 (27); 7:15, 17, 18, 19 6*5, 20, 21; 8:17,
31,32; 9:11; 11:8,11; 12:3; 13:10,14,150,6,16; 15:2,30,6,
7, 19; 16:27; 18:18; 26:29a, 6; Num. 11:4, 13, 18a, 6, 21,33;
12:12; 19:5; Deut. 12:15, 20a, 6, c, 23, 27a, 6; 14:8; 16:4; 28:53,
555 32:42; Judg. 6:19, 20, 21a, 6; 8:7; I Sam. 2:13, 150,6; 17:44;
I Kings 17:60, 6; 19:21; II Kings 5:10, 14a, 6; 9:36; Jpb 2:5;
6:12; 10:11; 13:14 (?); 14:22; 19:20, 26; 31:31; 33:21, 25;
68

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 69
41:15 (23); Ps. 27:2; 38:4, 8; 50:13; 79:2; 102:6; 109:24
Prov. 5:n(?); 23:20; Eccles. 4:5; Isa. 44:16, 19; 49:26; 65:4
66:17; Jer. 7:21; 11:15; 19:9a, t>, c; Lam. 3:4; Ezek. 4:14
11:3,7,11,19; i6:26(?); 23:200,6; 24:10; 32:5; 36:266; 37:6,8
39:17, 18; 40:43; 44 = 7, 95 L>an. 1:15; 10:3; Hos. 8:13; Mic.
3:3; Hag. 2:12; Zech. 11:9, 16; 14:12.
In Gen. 17 : 11 ff. it is used (in its proper sense) in the expression
nb-iynipa, " flesh of the foreskin " (cf . also Exod. 28 = 42). Accord
ing to Gesenius-Buhl and BDB, in Lev. 15:2, 3, 7 the term itself
denotes the male organ, and in Lev. 15:19 the female organ; but
it is not clear that there is here any strict metonymy, but rather
perhaps only the use of a general term when a specific might have
been used. In Ezek. 16: 26; 23 : 20; 44: 7, 9, it is even less certain
that the term is specific.
II. By synecdoche for the body.
1 Kings 21:27: y^\ nban D^anrma a^na y'aip'3 Tn
Dim ¦hta-b* piD-DiD*! rraV
t- T : - f - vjT- t t :
And it came to pass, when Ahab heard those words, that he rent his
clothes, and put sackcloth upon his flesh, and fasted.
Prov. 14:30: :ni«p riias? ap-fl ssna ab D"nta ^n
A sound heart is the life of the flesh, but envy is the rottenness of the bones.
See other examples in Exod. 30:32; Lev. 6:3 (10); 13:2, 3a, 6,
4, n, 13, 18, 24, 38, 39, 43; 14:9; 15:13, 16; 16:4, 24, 26, 28;
17:16; 19:28; 21:5; 22:6; Num. 8:7; 19:7, 8; II Kings 4:34;
6:30; Neh. 5:50,6; Job 4:15; 7:5; 2i:6(?); Ps. 16:9; 119:120;
Prov. 4:22; Eccles. 2:3; 5:5; 11:10; 12:12; Isa. 17:4; Ezek.
10:12; 11:19a; 36:260.
In poetic passages ""lipa is coupled with IBM or ab or both to
denote the whole person even when the things affirmed are strictly
true only of the inner man (Ps. 63 : 2 (1) ; 84:3).
Somewhat similarly the expression "ilDa njl TDSSa is used to
denote the totaUty of a thing which strictly speaking has neither flesh
nor soul (Isa. 10:18).
III. By metonymy for one's kindred, the basis of this usage
being doubtless in the fact that it is the body which is primarily
69

70 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
thought of as produced and producing by natural generation;
most commonly coupled with DS5 , bone.
Gen. 29:14: rm "ntoM ras? *j» -jab ib na^i
And Laban said to him, Surely thou art my bone and my flesh.
See also Gen. 37:27; Lev. 18:6; 25:49; Judg.9:2; IISam.5:i;
19:13,14; I Chron. 11: 1; Isa. 9:19; 58:7.
IV. By further synecdoche, "nfla denotes a corporeal Uving
creature; sometimes with reference to men only, sometimes of
men and beasts.
1. Of men and beasts in common.
Gen. 7:21:' nanaa^i riya -pan-by isa'nn niaa-bs nasi
* .' t - : - It J vjt t - t tt t -; ¦-
:nnsn ban • . . . tvran
T T T ! T -
And all flesh died that moved upon the earth, both fowl and cattle and
beast .... and every man.
See other examples in Gen. 6:17, 19; 7:16, 21; 8:17; 9:11,
15a, 6, 16, 17; Lev. 17:11, 14a, 6, c; Num. 18:15; J0D 34:i5;
Ps. 136:25; Jer. 32:27.
2. Of men only.
Isa. 40:5: tjit liaa-bB wn mrr nias nbasi
t : - tt t t: t: : t : • :
And the glory of the Lord shall be revealed, and all flesh shall see it together.
Joel 3:1 (2:28): araa wast) nisa-bs-by ran-ris ifism
And I will pour out my spirit upon all flesh, and your sons and your
daughters shall prophesy.
Other examples are found in Gen. 2 : 24; 6 : 12, 13 ; Num. 16 : 22;
27:16; Deut. 5:26; Job 12:10; 19:22; Isa. 40:6; 49:266; 66:16;
Jer. 12:12; 25:31; 45:5; Ezek. 21:4 (20:48); 21:9 (4), 10 (5);
Zech. 2:17 (13).
3. Sometimes, especially in predicate, with emphasis on the
frailty which is characteristic of the corporeal being in contrast
with spirit or God as powerful.
Ps. 78:39: Jaw1 Hbi ?ibin im nan TiBa-Ts -qpi
And he remembered that they were but flesh, a wind that passeth away
and cometh not again.
See also Gen. 6:3; II Chron. 32:8; Job 10:4; Ps. 56:5; Isa.
31:3; Jer. 17:5. 70

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 71
IV. SUMMARY AND COMPARISON
Respecting the three terms in the Old Testament, it is to be
noted that ffi"1 , beginning undoubtedly as a term of physical or
dynamic meaning, denoting wind, was already early in the literary
period a reUgious term in the sense that it was used in connection
with the idea of God to denote the invisible power by which he
operated in the world, or for God himself as operative, but not
for a hypostasis distinct from God. Relatively late it became a
reUgious term in the sense also that it signified the power of God
working to produce ethical and reUgious effects in men. As appUed
to men, probably under the influence of the thought that it was the
spirit of the god that produced extraordinary effects in men, such
as strength, courage, anger, ecstatic frenzy, etc., it denoted the seat
of aU such emotions and experiences, and then advanced to denote
the seat of the ethical and reUgious in general. Its use with refer
ence to the breath is probably relatively late and subsequent in
general to the previously named uses.
1353, on the other hand, was from the earUest period of the
Uterature preserved in the Old Testament a psychological and
vital term, denoting the soul, or life, as that in a Uving, corporeal
being which constitutes him Uving as distinguished from the inani
mate, and then the being himself as Uving. Its use with reference
to God is very rare and probably a conscious anthropomorphism.
As used to denote a corporeal Uving being, the IBM is, of course,
hypostatized; and this is also the case in respect to some of the
instances in which it denotes the soul, since this is supposed to
depart from the body and exist apart from it. The latter usage
may also be very early and certainly persists very late. But in the
majority of cases, the IBM (meaning life or soul) is not a hypostasis,
but a quaUty or characteristic of a living being. As the seat of
appetite, emotion, mentaUty, and moral and reUgious experience,
the usage of IBM is closely parallel to that of TjT\ . But while IBM
is often used for life, 1VH is only rarely so used and then chiefly
with reference to God as the source of life.
"ITfla is fundamentally and prevaiUngly a physical term. Its
only departure from this physical sense is in its employment by
metonymy for kindred and for a corporeal living being. At the
71

72 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
latter point, it becomes a synonym of 1BS3 , the one extending its
psychical sense to include the physical and the other its physical
to include the psychical. It never acquires a mental, moral, or
reUgious sense. Its nearest approach to such meaning — and this
still very remote — is its use with the suggestion of weakness and
frailty. Broadly speaking, therefore, fi*n is physical-reUgious-psychical;
IB S3 is psychical-vital; "ITBa is physical.
But an instructive parallel may also be drawn between the
usage of each of the three Hebrew terms and the corresponding
Greek words, viz., between ffin and irvevfia; between IB S3 and
foxy; between lipa and aap£.
The fundamental meaning of ffil and irvevfia is the same, viz.,
wind. The first extant instances of this meaning of irvevfia date
from the fifth century B.C. TO1 appears in this sense in the oldest
Old Testament literature, and is therefore at least as old as the eighth
century B.C. But in the same period also we find TjT\ meaning
spirit, and used of the spirit of God. The appUcation to the
demonic spirit may perhaps be the earUest, but the appUcation
to the spirit of God seems to arise out of its use meaning wind,
rather than from the idea of the demon, and the use to denote the
spirit of man is apparently later than with reference to the spirit
of God. Both these latter ideas retain a quantitative feeling,
even after the terms have come to be used personaUy and indi
vidually. The meaning "breath" is apparently the latest of aU to
appear. The development of the usage of irvevfia is somewhat different.
From the primitive meaning "wind" arises the meaning "breath,"
and from this in a purely physical sense come the meanings "breath
of Ufe," "Ufe." On this basis apparently is developed the concep
tion of a soul-stuff, out of which individual souls come and to
which they return. At the close of the classical period there is the
suggestion of an extension of this idea by which irvevfia becomes the
basis of all existence. In the post-classical period we shaU see this
developing into the conception of divine spirit, irvevfia delov, at
first at least quantitatively thought of. But of the deification of
the irvevua there are no discoverable traces in the classical period.
72

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 73
Alike, therefore, in the starting-point and in the general range
of usage there is a large measure of paraUeUsm between the Hebrew
and Greek terms, ffil and irvevua. But the order in which mean
ings are developed is not the same, a*nd the Hebrews were far in
advance of the Greeks in developing the idea of the divine spirit.
1BS3 apparently begins with the notion of a Uving being resident
in a living animal or man — the ghost, so to speak, within an em
bodied Uving being. The earUest extant usage of foxy is to denote
the shade of a once-Uving being, the ghost that escapes from the
body when it dies. From these kindred starting-points both the
Hebrew and the Greek terms develop with no marked difference in
order, the meanings "life," that quality or element of a Uving being
which constitutes it Uving, and "soul" as the seat of various emo
tions, capacities, etc. The Hebrew writers ascribe a IB S3 only to
man and the lower ariimals (except as it is by anthropomorphism
used of God), and this is also the use of foxy in most of the Greek
writers, but Plato beUeves in a foxy of the universe, and Aristotle
ascribes foxy (in a limited sense of the term) to plants. As to the
capacity of the soul for existence apart from the body and after
death, both Hebrew and Greek writers differ among themselves.
Some of the Psalms affirm it, some seem to deny, Ecclesiastes
is skeptical. So Homer and the tragic poets presuppose a shadowy
existence after death; Socrates is agnostic about the future of the
soul; Xenophon is hopeful; Plato affirms; and Aristotle denies.
Both "ITBa and adp£ are primarily physical terms, both pass from
the meaning "flesh" in the strict sense to the more general meaning
"body." The Hebrew term is used by metonymy to denote one's
kindred, and as a general term for man and animals, or for humanity
as such. Neither term has any ethical significance. Plato regards
the body as a drag upon the soul, conceiving that the latter can
achieve its full freedom and highest development only when
freed from the former, but he apparently never uses aap£ in this
connection, and does not ascribe to the aufia a distinctly ethical
significance. Of any corrupting power of either body or flesh
to drag down the soul there is no trace in the Old Testament.
The "llfla is sometimes spoken of as weak, but never as a power
for evil. 73

CHAPTER III
IINEYMA, *YXH, AND 2APE IN GREEK WRITERS FROM
EPICURUS TO ARIUS DIDYMUS
Before presenting the testimony of the post-AristoteUan wit
nesses to the use of irvevfia, foxy, and adp%, it will be expedient
to examine the views of some of their predecessors by whom they
were in all probabiUty largely influenced, and to present in addition
to the material bearing upon their use of the words under consid
eration some further evidence concerning their fundamental
philosophical notions.
Anaximenes, who wrote about the middle of the sixth century
B.C., declared that just as our soul which is air controls us (or holds
us together) , so irvevfia /cat ayp encompass the whole world. Accord
ing to Diogenes Laertius,1 Anaximenes made air and the infinite
(space) the first principle of things. Plutarch and Stobaeus,2 com
menting in almost identical words on the fact that Anaximenes
uses the words irvevfia and dyp synonymously, declare that he is
in error in ascribing all things to one source, since it is necessary
to assume an active cause as well as a substance, just as we must
have both silver and a silversmith.
Cicero3 says that Anaximenes made air God. If so, then, since
Anaximenes used irvevfia and dyp synonymously, we are very near,
even at this early period, to an identification of irvevua and God.
Anaximenes, however, is a monist and his one substance is material,
1 Diog. Laert. ii. 3 (Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, I, 22) : OBtos ['Arajt-
fiivijs] dpx^v dipa elire Kal rb direipov.
2 Stob. Eel. i. 10. 12 (Diels, Doxographi Graeci, p. 278): ' Kva^ifUvifs Wpvo-rpdrov
MiXiJirios dpxyv riiv ivrtiiv dipa dwe<p-/fvaro, iK ydp roirov irdvra ylyveo-Bai Kal els airrbv
ird\iv dvaXieoSai. olov if tyvx~h, <t>i\alv, if rffieripa d'tfp oiaa avyKparei iffids, Kal S\ov rbv
K6<rp.ov irvevfia Kal di/p irepiixei. \eyerai Si crvvaivifias tW)p Kal irvevpa. i/iaprdvei di ^f
dir\ov Kal fiovoeiSovs dipos Kal irveifiaros SokQv (rvveardvai rd f$a- dSivarov ydp dpxfy
filav \fj\ rijv l)\7jx riiv Svriov iirotrrifvai, dXXa Kal rb 7roiouv atriov xpk iiroriBivai- otov
ipyvpos oiK dpKet irpbs rb iKirufia yevio-Bai, idv p.^ rb iroiovv %, rovriirriv 6 dpyvpoK&iros.
> Cicero De nat. deor. i. 10. 26: post Anaximenes aera deum statuit eumque gigni
esseque immensum et infinitum, etc. 74 [74

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 75
and Cicero's testimony, unconfirmed by that of any earUer writer,
is perhaps an interpretation rather than a quotation. Moreover,
from a lexicographical point of view it is important to observe
that we have no testimony that Anaximenes used the predicate
God of irvevua or irvevua of God. It is the air which Cicero says he
caUed God.1
Empedocles, writing nearly a century later than Anaximenes,
rejected the monistic interpretation of the universe and referred
aU existence to four "roots," fire, water, earth, and air (ykp), the
latter of endless height. These are continually uniting and separat
ing again, love being the force that brings them together, and strife
or hate that which separates them.2 For air he frequently uses
the term "aether" (Adam, Religious Teachers of Greece, pp. 244 ff.),
but not, so far as appears, irvevfia. The six elements, fire, water,
earth, air, love, and hate, are all eternal, yet also all corporeal.
Empedocles beUeves in God or in gods (he sometimes uses the
singular, sometimes the plural) ; but as he deifies the four material
elements, as well as love and hate, it is evident that his beUef in
God does not significantly modify the general materiaUsm of his
view of the world. He does not seem to have employed the word
irvevfia in reference to the air or to either of the active powers love
and hate.
HeracUtus, a contemporary of Empedocles, was, like Anaximenes,
a monist, but found the origin of all things in fire, of which all other
things are variant forms and to which all return after the Con
flagration. All things become what they are according to fate or
necessity (Diog. Laert. ix. 7). According to Aristotle (Be an.
i. 405a, 25), HeracUtus also said that the origin of all things is soul
(foxy), from which it may be inferred that the primitive fire had in
itself the principle of intelligence; and with this in turn agrees the
doctrine ascribed to him by Diogenes Laertius that all things are full
of souls and demons and that no one can possibly find out the limits
of the soul (cf. Pfleiderer, Philosophie des Heraclit, pp. 192-98).
1 Stob. Eel. i. 10. 12 (Diels, Dox., p. 284), says that Xenophanes made earth the
first principle of all things, quoting him as follows: iK yris ydp rd irdvra Kal els yijv
rd irdvra rehevrq.. But the rd irdvra is possibly to be taken with considerable reserva
tion. 2 Diels, Vorsokrat., I, 229, B 17. 75

76 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
Anaxagoras, born before Empedocles, but writing a Uttle later
(about 450), found the creative power in the universe in vovs, and
the passive element in an infinite number of original particles or
seeds. He thus agreed with Empedocles in rejecting the monistic
theory, but presented a simpler and more self-consistent view of
things than his. The term irvevfia apparently played no part in
his theories.1
Diogenes of Apollonia, a contemporary of Anaxagoras and
Empedocles, returned to the monism of Anaximenes, mamteining
that the phenomena of birth and interaction of things cannot be
explained except on the hypothesis of their ultimate unity.
In my opinion all things are produced from the same source [by change]
and are the same. And this is manifest. For of the things that are now in
this world earth and air [ayp] and water, and whatever else is visible in the
world, if of these any one were different from another, that is, different in its
own nature, instead of undergoing numerous transformations and changes
while still remaining really the same, they could not be mixed together, nor
could one either help or harm another, nor could any plant spring out of the
earth, nor could an animal or anything else be born, if these were not so con
stituted as to be the same. But all these things arising by change from the
same [substance] become now one thing, now another, and return again to the
same [Diels, Vorsokrat., I, 423, B 2].
This one substance he maintains is intelligent.
For without intelligence such a division of things would not be possible
as to have proper measures of all things, of winter and summer, night and day,
rain and wind and pleasant weather [Diels, Vorsokrat., I, 424, B 3].
Besides these things, then, are these strong proofs. For men and the other
animals, breathing, live by the air [arjp]. And this is to them soul [vh)xy] and
intelhgence [varyo-is], as will be shown clearly in this writing, and if this be taken,
they die and intelligence ceases [Diels, Vorsokrat., I, 425, B 4].
And it seems to me that that which has the intelligence is that which is
called by men the air [6 ayp], and that by it all men are governed and control
all things. For to me it seems itself to be God, and to go everywhere and
to dispose all things and to be in everything. And there is nothing whatever
that does not share in it, and yet nothing that is different from another thing
shares in it in the same way as that other, but there are many forms both of
the air itself and of its intelhgence. For it has many modes of existence, being
both warmer and colder, drier and wetter, more stable and with swifter motion,
and many other differences there are, and boundless variations of taste and
1 Diels, Vorsokrat., I, 375-410. 76

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 77
color. But of all animals the soul [ij/vxy] is the same, air warmer than that
outside in which we are, yet far colder than that which is near the sun [Diels,
Vorsokrat., I, 425, B 5].
In the view of Diogenes, therefore, the ultimate principle of
existence is a substance, air, which we, with our modern definitions
of things, would consider material, and which he himself so defined,
describing it as warmer or colder, wetter or drier, and comparing
it in temperature with the air outside of us; yet, on the other hand,
he ascribed to this substance intelligence, omnipresence, and
omnipotence. The human soul he regarded as a portion of the
total universal substance. His name for it was ayp, and apparently
he never caUed it irvevfia.
Democritus, a younger contemporary of Diogenes, was an
atomist, who affirmed that soul and mind, foxy and vovs, were
identical, and consisted of material atoms, resembling the atoms of
fire. His doctrine of God is not easy to discover. Cicero says
that he caUed the atoms of mind (principia mentis) God, and
Stobaeus that he found mind, which is God, in the sphere-shaped
fire. Probably, therefore, as Zeller maintains, he meant by God
neither a personal being nor a single being at all, but simply the
ultimate soul-stuff out of which reason eventually arises.1
1 See Adam, Religious Teachers, p. 268; Aristotle i. 4050. 9 ff., quoted in Diels,
Vorsokrat., II, 35; Cicero De nat. deor. i. 43. 120. We should scarcely need to refer
to Democritus, but for the passage ascribed to him by Clement of Alexandria, Strom.
vi. 168, quoted in Diels, Vorsokrat., II, 66: Kal b AiffiiKpiros bfiolus iroiifrfy di daaa
pkv dv ypd<prj fuer ivBovauxapjov Kal lepov irveiftaros, /caXd xdpra iarlv: "And Democ
ritus likewise says that whatever things a poet writes with inspiration and sacred
spirit, are sure to be beautiful." If Clement is not in error in ascribing the words
to him, one would have to suppose that Democritus is here employing for the moment
language out of harmony with his general scheme of things, and using the word in a
popular sense. Even thus, however, the passage would vouch for a use of lepbv
irvevpa in the time of Democritus. But the absence of any other evidence for such a
conception or usage in this period and the fact that the language comes to us
through a Christian author writing centuries later make another explanation more
probable. A comparison of the language which Plutarch quotes from Epicharmus
with that which Clement ascribes to him (see p. 19), strongly suggests that
Clement and Plutarch are quoting the same passage and that Clement's phrase
ology is in part a Christianizing paraphrase of Epicharmus. It is not improbable
that a similar thing has happened in his quotation from Democritus. In Dio
Chrysostom 36. 1 (Hepl 'Ofitfpov) occurs the statement: 0 fiiv Aiffibxptros irepl 'Ofirfpov
ipifalv ovras- Op/ijpos tpiaews \ax&v Bea^oiaifs iirtuv Koapov erexrifvaro iravroluv i's
77

78 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
So far, then, as the evidence which we have been able to uncover
shows, in the fifth and sixth centuries B.C., before the days of
Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, the idea had already been advanced
that the ultimate source of aU things is air, which was conceived
on the one side as a material something, yet to which, on the other,
was ascribed intelhgence and power. By some this was said to
be God, and of this the human soul was said to be composed.
On the other hand, it is to be noted that irvevfia was also often
used in the sense of air, and Xenophanes had said even in the sixth
century that the foxy was irvevfia (pp. 19, 20); yet none of thepre-
Socratic writers seems, taking the next step, to have used irvevfia
for the ultimate basis of things or to have said distinctly that
God was irvevfia or irvevfia God.
Aristotle adopted from the Ionic philosophers the doctrine of
the four elements (aroixela), earth, water, air, and fire, correspond
ing to the dry and the wet, the cold and the hot. He added,
however, a fifth, the aether, which fills celestial spheres.1 But the
elements were not in Aristotle's view sufficient to account for the
universe. They, the four at least, are matter, ii\y, and inert,
and constitute the passive element. The active power is God, the
Creator, who acts upon matter according to his own plan and for
the achievement of his own purpose. It is from Aristotle that the
conception of the inertness, deadness of matter, received its chief
impulse. But Aristotle also had much to say concerning irvevfia, by which
he meant, in general, air (dyp) in motion, or breath. But, as we
have seen (p. 2 2) in one notable passage he says that irvevua is used
of the substance, vital and generative (eufoxos Kal ybvifws), which
is in all plants and animals, and permeates all things. Just how

oiK ivbv &vev Betas Kal Saipovlas <piaews ovrw Kakd Kal aotpa ^irr/ ipydaaaBai. It is
possible, not to say highly probable, that Dio and Clement {Strom, vi. 168) are
quoting from the same passage and that Dio, uninfluenced by Christian ideas, reflects
the terminology of Democritus more accurately than Clement, and in particular that
the words Kal lepov irveifiaros are paraphrastic rather than literal. On the basis
of this passage alone it would be unsafe to conclude that the expression lepbv wvevfui
was used by Democritus or that it was current in his day. The expression Beiov
irvevfia in the pseudo-Platonic dialogue, Axiochus, will be discussed later.
1 Arnold, Roman Stoicism, p. 60, who, however, cites no evidence from Aristotle.
78

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 79
this statement is to be adjusted to his doctrine that the foxy is an
entelechy, or, as we may very freely translate it, a function, of the
body, having no existence apart from it, and, on the other hand, to
his doctrine of the four or five elements, is not clear. Remembering
the previous use of dyp and irvevfia as synonymous terms, and recall
ing Plato's apparent distinction between dyp and irvevua, the latter
denoting the former in motion, we might be disposed to think that
Aristotle meant by irvevua one of the four elements, dyp, but dyp
in a special form or condition. And recalling that Aristotle
ascribed soul, foxy, to plants and animals, as he here does irvevfia,
we should be disposed to think that he would assent to Xenophanes'
assertion that the foxy is irvevfia, meaning by irvevua, however, not
mere transitory breath, but vital soul-stuff. Nor in view of the
irreconcilable differences in Aristotle's doctrine of the vovs and
the foxy are these discrepancies in his idea of the foxy and the
irvevfia too great to be ascribed to him. Yet we must also
reckon with the possibiUty that in speaking of irvevua, the univer
sal vital and generative substance, he was describing the doc
trine of some contemporary rather than his own. What we
clearly know, then, is that in Aristotle's day irvevua was used
by someone of vital and generative soul-stuff; or perhaps we
should say Ufe-stuff, since it is in aU plants and animals, a sort of
soul-protoplasm. But it must not be overlooked that Aristotle speaks of this
irvevua as permeating aU things. If this language jbe taken at its
face value, then he or the writers whose doctrine he is here reporting
made irvevua — vital and generative — the informing principle of all
things. This is pan-pneumatism, though not, perhaps, pantheism.
For neither do those whom Aristotle is quoting, if quoting he is,
nor Aristotle himself say either that irvevfia is God or that God is
irvevfia. With this rapid survey of pre-Aristotelian theories of the ulti
mate substance of things before us, and recalling the exhibit of the
usage in classical writers of irvevfia, foxy, and adpl- given in chapter i,
we may proceed to a general classification of the usage of these
words in the post-AristoteUan Greek writers to the beginning of the
first century a.d. 79

80 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
I. IINEYMA
i. Wind, whether a gentle breeze or blast.
Polyb. Hist. i. 44. 4: uy abv rols iro\euiois virb rys fiias rov
irvevfiaros avyKarevkxduaiv .
Lest they should be carried along with the enemy by the force of the wind.
See also Epicurus1 Epist. ii. 100 (occurring several times), 105,
106, 115; Polyb. Hist. i. 48. 5, 8; 60. 6; x. 10. ,4; Dion. Hal.
Antiq. i. 15, 52, 72.
2. Air, tenuity rather than motion being the chief character
istic thought of.
Polyb. Hist. xxiv. 8 d: Ob uyv &XXA KOfiiaavres abrbv els rbv
Kahobuevov dyaavpbv, diKyua Karayeiov ovre irvevua Xafifidvov ovre <j>us
el-udev, ovre dvpas exov .... kvravda Karkdevro.
Bringing him into the so-called treasury, which was a subterranean
chamber which received neither air nor light from without and which had no
doors .... there they set him down. [See also Epicur. Epist. i. 63, cited
below under Epicurus.]
Kindred with this sense, being rather an extension of appUca
tion than a change of meaning, is the use of irvevfia inclusively to
denote gas, air, aether in pseudo-Hippocrates, Ilepi QvaSsv (ed.
Littre, Vol. VI, p. 94), which perhaps belongs to this period:
Uvebfiara 8k ra fiev kv rolai aufiaai (pvaai KaXeovrai, rd 8k efw ruv
aufidruv dyp  dirav yap rb fieral-b 777s re Kal obpavov irvevfiaros
euirXebv kanv  'AXXa fiyv yXiov re Kal aekyvys Kal aarpuv bbbs
810 rov irvebfiarbs kanv.
3. In a distinctly vital sense, signifying breath of life (loss of
which is death), or Ufe, or, even more generaUy, the primeval
principle or basis of Ufe, soul-stuff.
Polyb. Hist. xiu. za. 2 : droirov yap elvai irdXefiovvras fikv Kal rb
irvevua irpoteadai x<*-Plv rys ruv rkKvuv dacpaXias, fiovXevoukvovs Si
fiySkva iroieladai \byov tov fierd rabra xfibvov.
He said it was absurd to wage war and to yield up their very life-breath
for the sake of their children's safety, and yet when taking counsel to take no
account of the future.
1 Usener, Epicurea, pp. 44 ff . 80

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 81
On a similar passage in pseudo-Demos. Bedlam, fun., see under
foxy, i » below. Cf. also Plut. Be primo frig. 2. 5: ol 8e Zrwuoi Kal
rb irvevfia Xkyovaiv kv rols auuaai ruv fipecpuv ry irepifo^ei arouovadai,
Kal uerafiaXXov kK cpbaeus yiveadai foxyv (cited in ZeUer, Stoics,
Epicureans, and Sceptics, p. 213).
By metonymy, energy, vigor, forcefulness.
Dion. Hal. (Usener et Radermacher, Bionysii Hal. Opuscula,
Bern. 20) : dfoxbs kanv y SidXeKros abrov Kal ob iradyriKy irvevuarbs
re, ov fiaXiara Sel rols kvayuviois Xbyois, kXaxiaryv kxovaa fioipav.
Lifeless is his speech and both unimpassioned and almost devoid of
energy, which is pre-eminently necessary to forensic discourse.
The paraUeUsm of the two expressions dfoxos and irvevfiaros
.... eXax'iaryv exovaa uolpav seems to imply that in the latter
part of the first century B.C. foxy and irvevfia, both having the
meaning life, could both be used by metonymy for energy (of
speech). It does not follow, nor is there evidence to show that
irvevua was at this time used as an individualizing name for the
human soul.
4. Closely related to its use to denote "soul-stuff," but appar
ently associated also with the meaning "air," is the use of irvevua
in reference to the medium or bearer of psychic energy and the
energizing power of the organs of sense. See Galen, p. 251 M
(p. 101 below), and Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 85 (p. 102 below); Plut.
Epit. iv. 8.
5. A demon.
Dion. Hal. Antiq. i. 31: ras fiev ydp uSas KaXovai 'Pufialoi Kap-
ueva, ryv Se yvvalKa rabryv buoXoyovai Saifioviu irvevfiari Kardaxerov
yevofikvyv ra fikXXovra avfifiaiveiv tQ irXydei 8V <$8ys irpoXkyeiv.
The Romans call the odes carmina, and confess that this woman being
possessed by a demonic spirit foretells to the multitudes by an ode the things
that are to happen.
This usage is attested by the LXX (I Sam. 16 : 23 ; I Kings 22:21,
etc.) for an earUer period than Dion. Hal., and it is quite possible
that it was current among non- Jewish as well as among Jewish
Greek writers; but the example quoted above is the earUest instance
that the present investigation has discovered in non- Jewish Greek
Uterature. 81

82 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
II. *YXH
i. Life, loss of which is death.
Polyb. Hist. v. 34. 10: 6 Se irpoeipyfikvos fiaaiXebs bXiyaipcas
eKaara rovruv xilP^^v Sid robs airpeirels epuras Kal rds dXbyovs Kal
avvexels fikdas, eiKorus kv irdvv fipaxel XP°vu Kal rys foxy* dua Kal rys
dpxys kwifiobXovs evpe Kal irXeiovs.
The afore-mentioned king, managing each of these neglectfully on account
of indecent amours and 'senseless and continual debauches, naturaUy found
in a very short time many plots both against his life and against his throne.
See also Tebt. Pap. i, 56. 11.
By a double metonymy foxy is used to denote the source of
the joy of Ufe, or of what is good in Ufe.
Ps.-Dem.1 Beclam. fun. 24 : SoKel Se fioi rts dv eiiruv us y ruvbe
ruv avSpuv apery rys 'EXX&Sos yv foxy rdXydes eiirelv. dfia yap rd
re rovruv irvebfiar' diryXXdyy ruv o'iKeiuv aufidruv, Kal rys 'EXXaSos
d^iuu' dvypyrai.
It seems to me, indeed, that if one should say that the valor of such men
was the soul of Greece one would speak truly, for at the same time that the
breaths of these men departed from their bodies the reputation of Greece was
destroyed. 2. A shade, the soul of man existing after death or departing
from the body in death.
Ar. Did. Fr. phys. 39 (cf. Eus. P.E. xv. 20, Diels, Box., p. 471):
Elrni Se foxyv kv ru bXu cpaaiv, 6 KaXovaiv aWkpa Kal dkpa kvkXu irepl
ryv yijv Kal ddXaaaav Kal e/c rovruv avadvfiidaeis' ras be Xoiirds foxa*
irpoairecpvKkvai rabry, baai re kv £qois elal Kal baai kv tc3 irepikxovri'
biafikveiv yap e/cel ras ruv dirodavbvruv i/'uxas. 'kvioi Se ryv fikv rov
oXov a'ibiov ras Se Xoi7ras avfifiiyvvadai kirl reXevry els kKeivyv. exeiv
Se 7rao-ai' foxyv yyepoviKov n kv abry, 0 8y £uy Kal aiadyais kari Kal
bpuy. They say there is a soul in the universe, which [universe] they call aether
and air in a circle2 round about the earth and the sea, and there are exhala
tions from these. And the other [individual] souls cling to this [universal soul],
both such as are in living creatures and such as are in the surrounding region.
For there the souls of the dead live on. Some hold that the soul of the uni
verse is eternal and that the others are finally united to it. And every soul
they hold, has a ruling part in itself, which is life and perception and impulse.
1 Scrip. Gr. Bib. * The text is corrupt here.
82

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 83
Cf. also Diog. Laert. vii. 79.
3. Soul, as a constituent element of man's nature; the human
mind in the larger sense of the word as the seat of emotion, will,
thought, and character. Sometimes appUed with similar force to
Uving animals in general, and even to the universe.
a) Applied to men.
Epicur. Epist. fr. 200: dcpvawXbyyrov fiybkv yyov fiouays rys
aapms fioav ryv foxyv. aapKos Se tpuvy fiy ireivyv, uif Sifoqv, uy
piyovv. Kal ravra ry foxy xaXeirw fiev KuXvaai, kiriacpaXks Se
irapaKovaai rys irapayyeiXaays (pbaeus abry Sid rys irpoacpvovs abry
abrapKeias Kad' yukpav.
Regard it as nothing inexplicable that the soul cries out when the flesh
cries. And the voice of the flesh is not to be hungry, not to be thirsty, not
to be cold. And it is difficult for the soul to prevent these things [i.e., hunger,
thirst, and cold], and it is perilous for it day after day to disregard the com
mands of nature through the exercise of that autonomy which is inherent in i,t
[the soul].
Note the intimate relation of soul and flesh (=body), but also
the autonomy ascribed to the soul.
Theocr. xvi. 24: dXXd rb fiev fox$, to Se Kai nvi Sovvai db£uv.
But a part [of your money] to your own desire and a part to one of the
servants give.
Polyb. Hist. ni. 81. 3: ovru xpy Kal T°bs birep ruv SXuv irpoea-
ruras aKoirelv, obx birov n rov aufiaros yvfivbv, dXXd irov rys foxy*
ebxeipurbv n irapacfraiveTai rov ruv kvavriuv yyefibvos.
It behooves commanders to notice, not where some part of the body is
exposed, but where some part of the mind of the leader of the opposing forces
appears easy to overcome.
Polyb. Hist. in. 87. 3: dveKryaaro Se ra re aufiara Kal ras
^t»xds ruv avSpuv.
He revived both the bodies and the souls of the men.
Polyb. Hist. xx. 4. 7 : dXX' bpfiyaavres irpbs evux'iav Kal uedas, ob
ubvov rols auuaaiv k^eXbdyaav, dXXd Kai rats foxals.
But being eager for feasting and carousals they became enfeebled not only
in body but also in mind.
See also Epicur. Phys. 314; Sent. 69, 81 (Wotke, Wiener
Studien, X); Epist. iii. 122, 128 (passim), 132 (bis); Ethica 417,
83

84 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
425 (Usener, pp. 59, 62, 161); Theocr. vni. 35; Polyb. Hist. i. 15.
7; 32. 8; 35. 5; 75- 3; 81. 6, 7; 87. 1; n. 20. 5; 23. 7; 30. 7; 53. 3;
iii. 9. 7; 12. 5; 63. 1; 81. 3; 87. 3; 90. 4; iv. 21. 4; 54. 3; vi.
24. 9; vii. 16. 4; vui. 5. 3; 9. 7; ix. 22. 1, 6; x. 7. 2; 14. 12; 19. 5;
22. 6; xii. 12b. 2; 23. 2, 5; xiu. 2. 1, 2; 3. 3; 5. 5; xiv. 6. 8;
8. 8; xv. 4. 12; 16. 4; xvi. 5. 7; xx. 4. 6; 7. 4; 10. 9; xxn.
8. 8; xxv. 9. 2; xxvi. 3. n; xxvdi. 10. 2; xxviu. 17a. 2; xxix. 6.
9, 13, 14, 15; Fr. Gram. 91. Cf. Plut. Non posse suav. 3, p. 1088
(Usener, p. 281); Stob. Eel. iii. 6. 57 (Usener, p. 284); Dion. Hal.
i- i- x3, 33! 38- 34! "• 20. 45; 28. 47; 68. 50; ni. 12. 28; 13. 27;
19. 34; 21. 44; 21. 8 (p. 145); Tebt. Pap. i. 1. 13.
b) Soul is ascribed to the lower animals.
Ar. Did. Fr. phys. 39 (cited in Eus. P.E. xv. 20; see Diels,
Box., p. 471): ras Se ruv dcppbvuv Kal dXbyuv £uuv ^uxds avvairbX-
Xvadai rols aufiaaiv.
But the souls of the senseless and irrational animals perish with their
bodies. c) Soul is also ascribed to the universe. See Ar. Did. Fr.
phys. 39, cited under 2 above.
4. By metonymy, the vital or conscious element in man
standing for the man himself, foxy is used with the meaning
"person." Polyb. Hist. vi. 48. 4: kKarkpuv 8k rovruv 6 nod avvSpafibvruv
els fiiav foxyv y irbXiv.
Each of these [virtues] being combined in one person or one city.
So also perhaps Epicurus Eth. 488 (Usener, p. 306); Dion.
Hal. Antiq. iii. 30. hi. SAPB
1. The soft muscular portion of the body. Instances doubtless
occurred in this period, though the present study has not discov
ered one.
2. By synecdoche o-dp£ (also in the plural) denotes the body,
or is quaUtatively appUed to any part of the body, without distinc
tion of flesh, skin, and bones.
Epicur. Sent, iv: ob xpovi{ei rb dXyow avvexus kv ry aapd,
dXXd rb fikv aKpov rbv kXdxiarov Xfiovov irapkan, rb Se fibvov bireprelvov
84

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 85
rb ySbfievov Kara adpKa ob iroXXas yfikpas avfifiaivei. ai Se iroXvxpbvioi
ruv dppuariuv irXeovd^ov ifxown fb ySbfievov kv ry aapd If irep rb
aKyovv. Pain does not last continuously in the flesh; but its climax continues a
very short time, and that degree which only just outweighs the pleasure in
the flesh exists not many days, and in long-continued illnesses the pleasure
is more than the pain.
See also Epicur. Sent, xviu, xx (bis)? U;2 Eth. 408.
With this general exhibit of the usage of this period before us,
we may now pass to consider the views of particular schools of
thought. IV. EPICURUS AND THE EPICUREANS
Epicurus was born in 341 B.C., and entered upon his work as a
teacher of philosophy while Aristotle was stiU Uving. But he was
far from being a disciple of Aristotle, or of his great predecessors,
Socrates and Plato. In the fundamental features of his philoso
phy he was rather a foUower of Democritus.
The foUowing passages wiU suffice to show those elements of
his thought with which we are most concerned:
Epist. i. 39-41 : dXXd fiyv Kal rb irav kari (aufiara Kal tokos)' au-
fiara fikv yap us kanv, avry y aladyais kirl irdvruv fiaprvpel, Kad' rjv
dvayKalov rb aSyXov ru Xoyiauu reK/iaipeadai, uairep irpoelirov. rbiros
be el uy yv, ov Kevbv Kal x&Pav Kal dvacpy <f>baiv bvoua^Ofiev, ovk dv elxe
ra aufiara oirov ?fv obbk Si' 08 kKivelro, Kaddirep cpaiverai Kivobfieva.
irapd bk ravra obdkv ob8' kirivoydyvai Sbvarai ovre irepiXyirriKus ovre
dvaXbyus rols irepiXyirrols, baa Kad' bXas <pbaeis Xafifidvofiev Kal fiy us
rd rovruv avfiirTUfiara ff avfifiefiyKora Xeyofiev. Kal fiyv Kal ruv au/ia-
tuv ra fikv kari avyKpiaeis, rd 8' e£ uv ai avyKpiaeis ireiroiyvrai' ravra
Se kanv droua Kal auerdfiXyra, etirep fiy uiXXei irdvra els rb fiy ov
tpdapyaeadai dXX' vaxveiv n birofikveiv kv rols SiaXbaeai ruv avyKpiaeuv,
irXypy ryv <j>baiv bvra, ovk exovra biry y birus SiaXvdyaerai. uare rds
dpxds drbftnvs dvayKalov elvai aufidruv <pbaeis [Usener, p. 6].
But the universe consists of bodies and place. For that it is bodies
common-sense itself testifies, and by this it is necessary that whatever is obscure
should be attested to the reason, as I have said before. But if there were no
space, which we call also empty, and place and intangible existence, bodies
1 Usener, Epicurea, p. 75. ' Wotke, Wiener Studien, X.
85

86 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
would not have where to be, or through which to move, whereas it is evident
that they do move. And aside from these nothing can be known either by
apprehension or by analogy with things that can be apprehended. We are
speaking of things that we receive according to their whole natures and not
of the essential attributes or accidental qualities of these. And indeed of the
bodies, some are compounds and some are the things of which the compounds
are made. And the latter are atoms and are unchangeable, if so be all things
are not to be turned by destruction into non-existence but have strength to
continue to be something in the dissolution of the compounds, being full in
respect to their nature, there being no means or method by which they can
be dissolved. So that the first beginnings must be indivisible, corporeal
entities.1 Epist. i. 63-65 : Merd Se ravra Set avvopav dvacpkpovra kirl ras
aiadyaeis Kal ra irddy (ovru yap y fiefiaiordry irians earai), on y
foxy aufia kari Xeirrofiepks irap' bXov rb ddpoiafia irapeairapfikvov, irpoa-
efi4>epkararov Se irvevfiari dep/iov nva Kpaaiv 'kxovn Kal iry fiev robru
irpoaeucpepks, iry Se tovtu, kirl Se tov [read: Se tov] fikpovs iroXXifv
irapaXXayyv eiXycpbs ry Xeirrouepeia Kal abruv rovruv, avuiradks Se
tovtu uaXXov Kal ru Xoiiru ddpoiap,an' tovto Se irav ai Svvdueis ttjs
foxy* Siyyov Kal ra irddy Kal ai evKivyaiai Kal al Siavoyaeis Kal uv
arepbfievoi dvyaKouev. Kal fiyv Kal on exei y foxy Tys aladyaeus- ryv
irXeiaryv olnav, Set Karexeiv ' ob fiyv elXycpei dv rabryv, el fiy biro tov
Xoiirov ddpoiafiaros kareyd^erb irus. to Se Xoiirbv ddpoiafia irapaaKev-
aaav kKeivy ryv alriav rabryv fiereiXycpe /cat avrb toiovtov avfiirrufiaros
irap' eceivys, ob fikvroi irdvruv uv kKeivy KkKryrai' 81b diraXXayeiays
rys ^ux^s ovk kxei ryv a'ladyaiv. ob yap avrb kv iavru rabryv eKkKryro
ryv Svvafiiv, dXX' erepov dfia avyy eyevy fikvov abru irapeaKeba^ev, b Sid
rys avvreXeadeiays irepl avrb Svvdfieus Kara rrjv Kivyaiv abfiirrufia
aiadyriKbv ebdbs diroreXovv eavru aireSiSov Kara ryv bpobpyaiv Kal
avfiirddeiav Kal kKeivu, Kadd irep elirov. Sib S?j Kai kvvirdpxovaa y foxy
obSkirore dXXov nvbs fikpovs diryXXayfikvov dvaiadyryaei' dXX' a dv
Kal rabrys ^vvairbXyrai rod areyd^ovros Xvdkvros el d' bXov el, re Kal
fikpovs nvbs, kdv irep biauevy e£ei ryv aladyaiv' [Usener, p. 19].
And it is necessary after these things to take a comprehensive view of
things that refer to the sensations and the feelings (for thus will the firmest
confidence arise), because the soul is a body composed of fine particles, scattered
through the whole organism, most like to air [irvcujuart], having a certain
mixture of heat, in some ways resembling this and in some ways that, and in
1 Cf. Hicks, Stoics and Epicureans, p. 220.
86

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 87
one part endowed with extreme mobility by reason of the fineness of the
particles of which it is composed, and responsive especially to this part, but
also to the remainder of the organism. And the powers of the soul pervade
all this organism and so also do the feelings and the emotions and the thoughts,
and all those things being deprived of which we die. And that it is the soul
that chiefly has the power of sensation, it is necessary also to hold. Yet it
would not have obtained this power if it had not been somehow protected by
the remainder of the organism. But the remainder of the organism having
given to it [the soul] this power received also, itself from it [the soul] a share
of such property, yet not of all of which it [the soul] is possessed. Therefore
when the soul departs the organism has no power of sensation. For it did not
itself possess the power in itself, but another born with it imparted it to it,
for this other [the soul] through the power that is generated in its environment
immediately producing a capacity for sensation by motion, imparted it also
to the other, as was possible because of their coterminousness and sympathy,
as I have said. Therefore while the soul exists it will never cease to be sensi
tive, because some other part is taken away. But whatever of it perishes
along with the destruction of that which covers it, whether it be the whole
or some part that is destroyed, if it but remain it will have the power of sensa
tion.1 Plut. Epit. i. 3 (Diels, Box., p. 285): 'E7ri/coupos dpxds elvai
ruv bvruv aufiara Xbyu deupyrd, dfieroxa Kevov, dyevyra, dSi-
dtfSdapra, [rd] o5re dpavadyvai Svvdfieva ovre dXXoiudyvai.
Epicurus said that the principles of things are bodies perceptible to reason
non-spatial, unoriginated, indestructible, incapable either of being broken
down or of being altered.
Hippolyt. Phil. 22 (Diels, Box., p. '571): "EirUovpos Se axeSbv
kvavriav iraai Sb^av edero. dpxds fikv ruv bXuv virkdero drbfiovs Kai
Kevbv, Kevbv fikv olov rbirov ruv kaofikvuv, drbfiovs Se ryv vXyv, e£ 17s rd
irdvra. e/c Se ruv drbfiuv avveXdovauv yevkadai Kal rbv debv Kal rd
aroixela Kal rd kv avrols irdvra Kal £ua Kal dXXa, us fiySkv fiyre
aweardvai, el fiy eK ruv drbfiuv ei?;  rds Se ^fxds ruv avdpuiruv
Xbeadai dfia rols aufiaaiv, uairep Kal avyyevaadai abrols riderai.
alfia yap abras elvai, ov k^eXdbvros y rpairevros airbXXvadai bXov rbv
avdpuirov. Epicurus, however, lays down an opinion opposed to nearly all others.
He assumes the principles of all things to be atoms and space; space is the
place of things that are to exist, and atoms are the matter from which all
things [are made]. And from the concourse of the atoms come into existence
1 Cf . Hicks, Stoics and Epicureans, p. 264.
87

88 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
both God and the principles, and all the things in them, both living and other
wise, so that nothing either comes into existence or continues to exist unless
it be from the atoms  And the souls of men perish along with their
bodies just as, he holds, they were also born with them. For they are them
selves blood, which if it departs or is changed the whole man is destroyed.
These passages bring out the central elements of Epicurus'
system of thought. The ultimate realities of existence are atoms,
space, and motion. Bodies are either these atoms, themselves
unchangeable and indestructible, or the compounds of these.
Other than bodies and space there are no existences. And the
only incorporeal thing is space.
Epicurus makes frequent mention of the foxy, often in asso
ciation with, and in distinction from, auuar, foxy and auua to
gether constituting man. But foxy is no exception to the general
principle that everything but space is corporeal; for it also is a
body composed of fine particles, dispersed all over the organism,
most closely resembling wind (or air) having a certain admixture
of heat.1 Those, therefore, that say that the soul is incorporeal
talk f ooUshly.2 What he meant by the predicate aufia is apparently
expressed with essential correctness in the statement of Plutarch that
Epicurus ascribed to body not only size and shape, as Democritus
did, but also weight.3 According to Aetius, the Epicureans did not
ascribe souls to the plants.4
Uvevfia Epicurus seems commonly to have used in the sense of
"air," "breath," or "wind."5 Nor does he use the term in any
specifically different sense when he says that the soul resembles
breath (or wind) with a certain admixture of heat (irvebuan
1 Cf. also AStius iv. 4. 6, p. 390 D (Plut. Epit. iv. 4. 3), cited by Usener, p. 217:
'EirUovpos Sifiepij r^v ij/vx^v, rb fiiv Xoymbv exovaav iv rlf Biipaxi KadiSpvaivov, rb Si
d\oyov KaBi fikifv r$\v avyKpiaiv tou o-ilifiaros Sueavapfiivov.
2 Epist. 1. 67.
3 Usener, p. 196, 11. 1 ff.; cf. Epist. i. 54- where Epicurus says expressly that the
atoms have none of the qualities of visible things except shape and weight aDd size.
See also Gram. Byz., cited by Usener, p. 222.
4 Plut., cited by Usener, p. 216: ol StwikoI Si Kal 'T&iriKoipeioi oix efi<j/vxa (tA
ifivrd). rivd ydp i/svxijs bppririKrjs etvai Kal iiri8vp.riTiKijs, rivd Si Kal \oyiKrfS' rd Si tpvrd
airofidrws irws Kivei<r8ai, oi Sid ^vxvs. But the latter part of the statement is prob
ably Stoic rather than Epicurean.
s Usener, pp. 44-49, passim. 88

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 89
depuov riva Kpdaiv txovn),1 or when, according to Aetius, quoted
by Plutarch and Stobaeus,2 he says that "the soul is a mixture of
four things, one that is of fire-like quaUty, and one air-like, and one
wind-like (irvevfiariKbs) , and the fourth a certain unnamable some
thing, in which is the power of sensation, and of these four the
irvevua produces motion, and the dyp quiet, and the depuov the
apparent heat of the body, and the unnamable element, the power
of sensation that is in us, for in none of the unnamed elements is
there sensation."3 By its mention of the fourth unnamed element
in which is contained the power of perception, this statement
might seem at first sight to ascribe to the soul an element of
immateriaUty. But the unequivocal and repeated assertion that
nothing except space is incorporeal and that all bodies are atoms
or composed of atoms compels the conclusion that even the fourth
element is corporeal, though, no doubt, of the finest and most
impalpable matter. And this in turn emphasizes the materiality
of the element irvevua, for while to the unnamed element, itself
corporeal, is ascribed perception, to the irvevua motion only is
imputed. The soul, composed of the most impalpable elements, is held
together by the coarser elements that make up the body, and at
death perishes as completely as the body, indeed, by its nature is
more quickly dissipated.
~Suua is, as indicated above, used in a broader and a narrower
sense. As a general philosophic term it signifies that which has
extension and weight, and is appUcable as a predicate to all exist
ences except space. See Epic. Epist. i. 39-41, in Usener, pp. 6 f.;
Hicks, p. 220; also Epist. i. 68, in Usener, p. 22. In the narrower
sense it is a complementary term to foxy, denoting the tangible
and visible element of man. See Epist. Ui. 127-31, in Usener,
pp. 62 ff.; Hicks, p. 170.
1 Usener, p. 19, 11. 18 f. 2 Usener, p. 218, U. 20 ff.; Stob. Eel. i. 49. 1.
3 Brieger, Epikurs Lehre von der Seele, contends (pp. 9 ff .) that Epicurus' fourth
element was "Geist." But he seems to mean by this only that to this element
Epicurus ascribes the attributes of "spirit." He adduces, at any rate, no linguistic
evidence that Epicurus called the fourth element irvevfia. In fact, as shown above,
Epicurus expressly distinguished the fourth element, which furnishes the power of
sensation, from the irvevfia, 89

90 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
2dp£ is with Epicurus most commonly a synonym for aufia in
the narrower sense, viz., as complementary to the foxy; though
for some reason he seemed to prefer to use <rdp£ with Sidvoia and
aufia with foxy.1 The <rdp£ has no ethical significance; for, in
the first place, the Une between good and bad runs, not between
the o-dp£ and the foxy, but across the experiences of both, and
between pain and pleasure; and secondly, this distinction itself
is not ethical but hedonistic. It is true that Epicurus assigned a
higher value to the pleasures of the mind than to those of the body,2
but this was not an antithesis but a gradation, and even thus not
of things ethical but of pleasures. If the usage of Epicurus con
tributed in any way to the development of an ethical sense of the
word o-dp£, it must have been, not because he himself or- his fol
lowers made erdp£ the root of evil, but in part because he, first
apparently of Greek writers, used it as a famiUar substitute for
auua, and in part because his opponents, recoiUng from his hedonism
and ascribing to him not wholly unjustly the doctrine that ulti
mately all pleasure is a thing of the flesh, recoiled also from this
term, flesh, as an evil thing.
tyvxy differs therefore from o-dp£ and aufia in two respects.
First, as in Greek writers generally, aufia and <rdp£ are phenomenal
terms, foxy primarily a functional term. The aufia is a visible,
tangible, ponderable entity. The foxy is the name, inherited by
Epicurus from his predecessors and more or less foreign to his
philosophy, but too convenient to be altogether dispensed with,
for that in man by virtue of which he feels, perceives, acts. It is
true that by ascribing to the body also feeling, and by making the
foxy also corporeal, the distinction between foxy and aufia is made
less sharp than in previous writers. Yet it remains that foxy
carries with itself, as a part of its definition, the power of percep
tion — the affirmation of corporeality not being reached by analysis
of the meaning of the word, but affirmed as a dogma by the Epi
cureans — while, on the other hand, aufia by definition has size,
shape, and weight, and the ascription of psychical functions to it
is a synthetic, not an analytic, judgment. The two terms differ,
1 Sent, iv, xviii, xx, Usener, pp. 72 ff.; Hicks, pp. 185 ff.
3 See especially Sent. xx. 90

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 91
in the second place, in that, while the foxy is aufia, in the sense that
it is composed of atoms, and has the essential qualities of a aufia,
yet it is composed of finer particles than those that compose the
auua in the narrower sense, i.e., the o-dp£.
We find no trace in Epicurus of irvevua as a predicate of God,
though such an affirmation would really have been less inconsistent
with the fundamentals of his philosophy than his assertion that the
gods are imperishable. For while as an atomist he might have
found room for gods composed of pneumatic atoms, he could not
consistently explain why they should not, like men, eventually
perish by dissolution.
Among the influential followers of Epicurus was Metrodorus
(330-277 B.C.). He was perhaps even more unequivocal than Epi
curus in his assertions that the seat of pleasure was in the flesh, and
perhaps used o-dp£ as the synonym of auua more freely. But the
quotations which we have from his writings are so brief as to indicate
with certainty no more than that he was m essential agreement in
doctrine and use of words with Epicurus . Thus while Plutarch (No n
posse suav. 4, 6, pp. 1089 D, 1090 f.) ascribes to Epicurus the doctrine
that the healthy condition of the flesh (<rdp£) and the firm expecta
tion of this give the highest and surest joy to those who are able
to reason, Clement of Alexandria (Strom, ii. 131) imputes to Metro
dorus the question: What good of the soul (foxy) is there other
than a healthy condition of the flesh and the firm expectation of it ?
But Plutarch also says (Adv. Colot. 30, p. 1125 B) that Metrodorus
says that aU the good and wise and excellent devices of the soul
(foxy) exist for the sake of the pleasure that is according to the
flesh (rys Kara adpKa ySovrjs eVe/ca) and the hope of the same, and
every work is vain which does not contribute to this end.
In another passage (Non posse suav. 3, p. 1087 D) Plutarch
ascribes the same words to Metrodorus but substitutes belly
(yaaryp) for flesh (adp£). These differences warn us not too con
fidently to deduce from later writers exact conclusions as to the
vocabulary and verbal usage of either Epicurus or Metrodorus.
See Koerte, "Metrodori Epicurei Fragmenta," in JahrbUcher fur
Philologie, Suppl. Band 17 (Leipzig, 1890), pp. 531-97; especially
pp. 540 ff . 91

92 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
That the Epicureans did not differ widely among themselves
in usage may be inferred with some degree of confidence from the
fact that in the first century B.C. Lucretius is still in essential agree
ment with his master Epicurus. His chief peculiarity is that he
introduces a distinction between animus and anima, covering by
these terms what Epicurus expressed by foxy alone. The follow
ing extracts from the third book of his great poem will sufficiently
illustrate his view (Be rerum nalura in):
Now I say that mind [animus] and soul [anima] are held in union one with
the other, and form of themselves a single nature, but that the head, as it were,
and lord in the whole body is the reason [consilium], which we call mind
[animus] or understanding [mens], and it is firmly seated in the middle region
of the breast. For here it is that fear and terror throb, around these parts
are soothing joys; here then is the understanding [mens] and the mind [animus].
The rest of the soul [anima], spread abroad throughout the body, obeys and
is moved at the will and inclination of the understanding [mens] 
This same reasoning shows that the nature of mind and soul is bodily.
For when it is seen to push on the limbs, to pluck the body from sleep, to change
the countenance, and to guide and turn the whole man — none of which things
we see can come to pass without touch, nor touch in its turn without body —
must we not allow that mind and soul are formed of bodily nature ? More
over, you see that our mind suffers along with the body, and shares its feelings
together in the body. If the shuddering shock of a weapon, driven within and
laying bare bones and sinews, does not reach the life, yet faintness follows, and
a pleasant swooning to the ground, and a turmoil of mind which comes to pass
on the ground, and from time to time, as it were, a hesitating will to rise.
Therefore it must needs be that the nature of the mind is bodily, since it is
distressed by the blow of bodily weapons.
Now of what kind of body this mind is, and of what parts it is formed, I
will go on to give account to you in my discourse. First of all I say that it is
very fine in texture, and is made and formed of very tiny particles. That this
is so, if you give attention, you may be able to learn from this. Nothing is
seen to come to pass so swiftly as what the mind pictures to itself coming to
pass and starts to do itself. Therefore the mind bestirs itself more quickly
than any of the things whose nature is manifest for all to see. But because
it is so very nimble, it is bound to be formed of exceeding round and exceeding
tiny seeds, so that its particles may be able to move when smitten by a little
impulse. For so water moves and oscillates at the slightest impulse, seeing
it is formed of little particles, quick to roll 
This fact, too, declares the nature of the mind, of how thin a texture it is
formed, and in how small a place it might be contained, could it be gathered
in a mass; that as soon as the unruffled peace of death has laid hold on a man,
92

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 93
and the nature of mind and soul has passed away, you could discern nothing
there, that sight or weight can test, stolen from the entire body; death pre
serves all save the feeling of life, and some warm heat. And so it must needs
be that the whole soul is made of very tiny seeds, and is linked on throughout
veins, flesh, and sinews; inasmuch as, when it is all already gone from the whole
body, yet the outer contour of the limbs is preserved unbroken, nor is a jot
of weight wanting 
Nevertheless we must not think that this nature is simple. For it is a
certain thin breath that deserts the dying, mingled with heat, and heat more
over draws air with it; nor indeed is there any heat that has not air too mixed
with it. For because its nature is rare, it must needs be that many first-
beginnings of air move about in it. Already then we have found the nature
of the soul to be triple; and yet all these things are not enough to create sensa
tion, since the mind does not admit that any of these can create the motions
that bring sensation [or the thoughts of the mind]. It must needs be then that
some fourth nature, too, be added to these. But it is altogether without name;
than it there exists nothing more nimble, nothing more fine, nor made of smaller
or smoother particles. It first sends abroad the motions that bring sensation
among the limbs: for it is first stirred, being made up of small shapes; then
heat receives the motions and the hidden power of wind, and then air; then
all things are set moving, the blood receives the shock and all the flesh feels
the thrill; last of all it passes to the bones and marrow, be it pleasure or the
heat of opposite kind. Yet not for naught can pain pierce thus far within,
nor any biting ill pass through, but that all things are so disordered that there
is no more place for life, and the parts of the soul scatter abroad through all
pores of the body. But for the most part a limit is set to these motions, as
it were, on the surface of the body: and by this means we avail to keep our
life [Bailey's translation, pp. 110-14, passim].
V. THE EARLY PRE-CHRISTIAN STOICS
For the views of the early Stoics, such as Zeno, Cleanthes, and
Chrysippus, we are dependent upon the quotations from their
writings and the statements about their views made by later
authors. The most important of these are Cicero (60 B.C.),
Plutarch (100 A.D.), Galen (163 a.d.), Diogenes Laertius (200 a.d.).
The last-named, although writing some four centuries after these
early Stoics, seems to have had their works before him as he wrote.
Other testimonies are to be found in Stobaeus (500A.D.), the
resemblance of whose statements to those of Plutarch shows that
both were quoting from an earlier writer. The latter is believed
by Diels to be a certain Aetius who was a contemporary of
93

94 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
Plutarch. The following passages will suffice to set forth the prin
cipal elements of the thought of the early Stoics, especiaUy Zeno,
Cleanthes, and Chrysippus, as reflected mainly in the statements
of later writers. Not aU of the passages contain the words under
discussion, but all of them furnish direct or indirect testimony
to the conceptions which they represented. Incidentally there is
frequent mention of later Stoics, especially of Posidonius. Use
will be made of this information at a later point.
Diog. Laert. vii. i. 68 ff. (1341!.):
68. They [the Stoics] think that there are two general principles [apxai]
in the universe, the active and the passive, that the passive is matter [vkrj\,
an existence without any distinctive quality, that the other is the reason [Xoyos]
which exists in matter, viz., God. For he, being eternal, and existing through
out all matter, makes everything. And Zeno the Citiean lays down this doc
trine in his Concerning Substance and so does Cleanthes in his Concerning
Atoms and Chrysippus in the first book of his Physics, toward the end, Arche-
demus in his Concerning Elements, and Posidonius in the second book of his
Physics. But they say that principles [dpxat] and elements [<ttoix<&>\ differ
one from another. For the former are ungenerated and indestructible, but
the elements are destroyed by the action of fire; yet the principles also are
bodies [a-wfiara] and without form. Now a body, says Apollodorus in his
Physics, is that which has threefold extension, length, breadth, and thickness.
And this is also called a solid body. But surface is the limit of a body and
has length and breadth only, but not depth. But Posidonius in the third
book of his Celestial Phenomena rejects this [surface] as possible neither in
thought nor in fact. And a line is the boundary of a surface, having length
without breadth, or length only. And a point is the limit of a line, which is
the least thing that can be thought of. And they hold- that God is one and
mind [vovs] and fate and Zeus, and that he is called besides by various other
names, and that being in the beginning by himself he turned into water the
whole substance which pervaded the air. And as the seed is contained in the
produce, so, too, he, being the seminal principle of the world, remained behind
in moisture, making matter fit to be employed by himself for the production
of those things which were to come after; and then first of all he brought into
being [airoyevvaai] the four elements, fire, water, air, earth. And Zeno speaks
of these in his On the Universe and Chrysippus in the first book of his Physics
and Archedemus in his Concerning Elements.
69. And an element is that from which originally the things which become
proceed, and into which at last they are dissolved. And the four elements are
all a like substance [oiaia], without distinctive quality, i.e., matter [v\rj\.
And fire is the warm and water is the wet and air [arjp] is the cold, and earth
is the dry, though not so but that in the air also is there the same part [i.e., the
94

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 95
quality of dryness]. Highest is fire, which is also called aether, in which was
brought into being first of all the sphere in which the fixed stars are set, then
that in which the planets are, after that the air, then the water, and the sedi
ment of all is the earth which is placed in the center of the world.
70. They also speak of the world [koo-juos] in a threefold sense, at one time
meaning God himself, who, in distinction from the totality of substance, is
of distinctive quality, being imperishable and unbegotten, being the maker
[Srifuovpyos] of the orderly arrangement, and after certain periods of time he
absorbs into himself the totality of substance and then produces [airoyyevdw]
it again from himself. And the orderly arrangement of the stars itself they
call the world [(cdo-fios]. And the third sense is the combination of both the
preceding  And the world is administered according to intelligence and
providence [voSs Kal irpdvoia], as says Chrysippus in his Concerning the Gods,
the vovs permeating every part of the world, just as the soul [i/w^i?] does in
us, but through some parts more and other parts less. For through some it
is present as cohesion [If is] as through the bones and tendons, through some
as mind [vols], as through the ruling part. So also the whole world, they say,
being a Uving being [£(3ov], possessed of a soul [I/ai/'d^os], and of reason [Aoytxds],
has the aether as the ruling part, as says Antipater the Tyrian in the eighth
book of his Concerning the World. But Chrysippus in the first book of his
Concerning Providence and Posidonius in his Concerning the Gods says that the
heaven is the ruling part of the world. But Cleanthes says that the sun is.
Chrysippus even more differently again says it is the purer part of the aether
in itself, which they call the first God, which is spread abroad throughout all
the things in the air and through all the living creatures and plants. It also
extends through the earth itself as cohesion. And the world [they say] is one,
and it is limited, having a spherical shape. For thus it is most fitted for motion,
as says Posidonius in the fifteenth book of his Physics, and the followers of
Antipater in their Concerning the World. And surrounding it outside is the
boundless void [infinite space], which is incorporeal. And it is incorporeal
because it is such that it can be contained by bodies, but is not so contained.
But in the world there is no void, but the world is unified. For this it is that
secures the harmony and concord of the heavens in relation to the things of
earth. (And Chrysippus speaks about the void in his Concerning Space, and
in the first book of his Physical Arts, and Apollophanes in his Physics and
ApoUodorus, and Posidonius in the second book of his Physics.) And [they
say] these things are incorporeal, being alike; further, that time is incorporeal,
being the measure of the movement of the world. And the past and the future
are infinite, but the present is finite. And they are of the opinion also that the
world is destructible, being brought into being after the manner of the things
that are perceptible by the senses, of which the parts are destructible and the
whole. And the parts of the world are destructible (for they are convertible
into one another); therefore the world is destructible. Now concerning the
genesis and destruction of the world, Zeno speaks in his Concerning the Universe,
95

96 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
and Chrysippus in the first book of his Physics, and Posidonius in the first
book of his Concerning the World, and Cleanthes, and Antipater in Book Ten
of his Concerning the World. But Panaetius says that the world is indestruc
tible, and that the world is a Uving being [£<3ov] and endowed with reason
[Xoywds] and soul [ep.vjvxos] and with power of perception [voepds] both
Chrysippus says in the first book of his Concerning Providence, and Apollodorus
in his Physics; and Posidonius that, being thus a Uving being, it is a substance
possessed of soul [efju/nixos], and with perception [aicr&jTucds]. For the living
is better than the non-Uving. But nothing is better than the world, therefore
the world is a Uving being. And it is possessed of soul, as is plain from our
soul [vhixy] being a fragment broken off from it [the world]. And Boethus
says that the world is a living thing; and that it is one, Zeno says in his Con
cerning the Whole, and Chrysippus, and Apollodorus in his Physics, and Posi
donius in Book One of his Physics. And the whole is called, as Apollodorus
says, the world [(£007*05], or, according to another way of speaking, the system
that consists of the world and the outside void. The world, therefore, is
limited, but the void [space] is infinite.
72. They say also that God is a living being, immortal, rational, perfect,
and intelligent in his happiness, being insusceptible to evil of any kind, having
forethought for the world and for the things that are in the world. Yet he is
not like man; but he is the maker of aU things and as it were father of all.
.... And Zeno says that the whole world and the heaven is the substance
[ovo-ia] of God, and likewise Chrysippus .... and Posidonius. And Antip
ater .... that his substance is air-like [depoeiSifc] and Boethus ....
that the sphere of the fixed stars is the substance of God.
76. And they say that the primitive matter [ij irpibrr/ vXrj] is the substance
of all things, as Chrysippus says in the first book of his Physics, and Zeno.
And matter is that out of which everything whatever comes. And it is called
by two names, substance [ovo-to] and matter [v\r)], the first as it appUes to all
things and the second to these taken severally. The substance of aU things
becomes neither greater nor less, but that which relates to things taken severally
[vkri, matter] both increases and diminishes.
77. And substance is according to them body [o-£pxi], and finite, as says
Antipater, and ApoUodorus. And it [i.e., oixria] is subject to change, as the
same author says. For if it were immutable the things which have been
produced from it could not have been produced. And they say that there are
deities [8cu/toves] that have sympathy with man and demigods [?;pu>«] which
are the departed souls of the good.
84. Another of their doctrines is that nature [c^wis]1 is a constructive
fire, which follows a regular course to production, which is air [mevfui], fire-
1 But Plutarch and Stobaeus quote the statement with Bebv instead of (pfaiv.
The whole passage in Plutarch (Epit. i. 7, Diels, Dox., pp. 305 f.) reads as follows:
ol XruiKol voepbv Bebv diro(patvovrai, irvp rexvmbv, b5$ (3aSl£ov iirl y&veaiv Kbapav,
96

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 97
like and endowed with skill, and the soul [foxo] *s endowed with perception
and is the breath [air?] that is congenital to us [rb avfidjves ¦qpiv irvevpa].1
Therefore also it is body [aS>ua] and continues after death, but is perishable.
But the soul of the universe [ff 8k t&v oW (vjvxq)] is imperishable, of which the
souls which are in living beings are parts. And Zeno the Citiean, and Antip
ater in their treatises on the soul, and Posidonius say that the soul is warm
air [irvexfta ivde.pp.ov], for by this we are able to breathe and by it we are moved.
And Cleanthes says that all souls will continue to exist till the Conflagration,
but Chrysippus that only the souls of the wise will do so. And the parts of
the soul, they say, are eight: the five senses, and the reproductive power which
is in us, and the power of speech and the power of reason.
86. And they say that the supreme part of the soul is dominant, in which
the imaginations and the impulses arise, whence also the reason proceeds,
which is in the breast.
Stob. Eel. i. 17. 4 (Ar. Did. Fr. phys. 28, Diels, Box., p. 463;
Arnim, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, II, 471): Xpvaiiriros Se
roiovrbv n Siefiefiaiovro' elvai rb bv irvevfia kivovv kavrb irpbs kavrb
Kal e£ abrov, y irvevfia kavrb kivovv irpbau Kal biriau' irvevfia Sk
etXyirrai 81a rb Xeyeadai avrb dkpa elvai Kivobfievov' avdXoyov 8e
yiveadai Kdirl rov aidkpos, uare Kal els koivov Xbyov ireaelv abrd.
Chrysippus argued somewhat as follows: that that which is is irvevpa
moving itseU toward itself and from itseU, or irvevpa moving itself forward
and backward; and it has been taken to be irvevpa because it is said to be air
moving itseU; and it is similar to the aether, so that they fall into a common
category. Plut. Epit. i. 4 (Diels, Box., p. 289; cf. Stob. Eel. i. 10. 14.
ibid.): Zyvuv Mvaakov KiTteiij dpxds fikv rbv debv Kal ryv vXyv,
uv 6 fikv kan rod iroielv ainos, y Sk tov iraaxuv, aroixela 8e
rkaaapa. Zeno, the Citiean, son of Mnaseas, says that God and matter are the ulti
mate principles, of which the first is the cause of action, and the second of
passivity, and the elements are four.
Cicero Be nat. deor. i. 14. 36 (Diels, Box., p. 542): Atque hie
[Zeno] idem aho loco aethera deum dicit, si intelUgi potest nihil
ip.Tepiei\i]4>bs irdvras rois aireppariKois \6yovs, KaO' ots 2/caora KaB' elfiapfiivifv ylverar
Kal irvevfia pHv SirfKov 6V S\ov toO Kbo-fiov, rds Si irpoo-riyoplas perdhafifidvov Si' SKtfs rrfs
i\ifs, Si' fls KexdpiiKe, irapa\\d£eis. Beois Si xal rbv Kbo-fiov Kal rois daripas Kal r^v yrfv,
rbv 6" dvurdru irivrwv vovv iv alBipi. [See p. 117; cf. Stob. Eel. i. 1. 29.
1 Cf. rb ffip.<t>vrov irvevfia, Arist. i. 6596, quoted p. 21.
97

98 HISTORICAL and linguistic studies
sentiens deus, qui numquam nobis occurrit neque in precibus,
neque in optatis, neque in votis.
And this same philosopher [Zeno] in another place says that God is aether,
if it is possible to conceive of a God who feels nothing, and who never meets
with us in prayers or wishes or vows.
Cicero Be not. deor. i. 37 (Diels, Box., p. 543; Arnim, I, 530):
Cleanthes autem qui Zenonem audivit .... turn ipsum mundum
deum dicit esse, turn totius naturae menti atque animo tribuit hoc
nomen, turn ultimum et altissimum atque undique circumfusum
et extremum omnia cingentem atque complexum ardorem, qui
aether nominetur, certissimum deum iudicat.
Cleanthes, however, who was a disciple of Zeno, at one time says that
the world itself is God, at another attributes this name to the mind and soul of
all nature, at another concludes that the last and highest fire, everywhere dis
persed, surrounding and enfolding all things to the uttermost, which is also
called aether, is that which is most surely God.
See also i. 15. 39 for similar opinions ascribed to Chrysippus
(Diels, Box., p. 545).
Tertull. Apol. 21 (Arnim, 1, 160) : Apud vestros quoque sapientes
Xbyov, id est sermonem atque rationem, constat artificem videri
universitatis. Hunc enim Zeno determinat factitatorem, qui
cuncta indispositione formaverit; eundem et fatum vocari, et
deum et animum lovis, et necessitatem omnium rerum. Haec
Cleanthes in spiritum congerit, quem permeatorem universitatis
adfirmat. Among your wise men, too, it is plain, Xdyos, that is, word and reason,
is regarded as the creator of the world. This [Xdyos] Zeno says is the creator
who formed all things in regular order, and that the Same is to be called fate
and God, and the mind of Jove and the necessity of aU things. These Clean
thes brought together in the word spirit, which, he affirms, is something which
permeates the whole world.
Ar. Did. Fr. phys. 21 (Diels, Box., p. 458), cited Arnold, Roman
Stoicism, p. 181: rb Sk [irvp] Kar' k&xyv aroixelov Xeyeadai 81a rb e£
abrov irpurov ra Xoiird avviaraadai Kara fierafioXyv Kal eis abrb
'kaxarov irdvra x^bueva SiaXbeadai.
But fire is called the chief element because by means of it from the very
first the other things were compounded through change, and into the same at
last all things, being melted, are dissolved. 98

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 99
Cic. Tusc. i. 9. 19: Zenoni stoico animus ignis videtur.
Zeno held that the soul is fire.
Cic. Ac. i. 11. 39: De naturis autem sic [Zeno] sentiebat, ut
primum [in] quattuor initiis [aroixela] rerum ilUs quintam hanc
naturam, ex qua superiores sensus et mentem effici rebantur, non
adhiberet: statuebat enim ignem esse ipsam naturam quae quidque
gigneret, et mentem atque sensus.
Zeno's doctrine of the elements, however, was such that in the first place
he did not connect this fifth element, from which his predecessors thought
sense and intellect were produced, with the four original constituents of
things: for he postulated fire as that element which produces everything,
both intellect and sense [cf. De fin. iv. 5. 12; De nat. deor. ii. 22. 57, cited in
Arnold, p. 180].
Cic. Ac. U. 126: Zenoni et reliquis fere Stoicis aether videtur
summus deus, mente praeditus, qua omnia regantur. Cleanthes
.... Zenonis auditor solem dominari et rerum potiri putet.
Zeno and almost all of the Stoics regard the supreme God as aether
endowed with mind, by which all things are ruled. Cleanthes, a disciple of
Zeno, thinks that the sun rules and governs affairs.
Nemesius, Nat. horn., p. 96 (Arnim, I, 143): Zeno the Stoic says that the
soul [ipvxyi ^s eight parts, dividing it into the governing part and the five
senses, the power of speech and the generative power [cf. Diog. Laert. vii. 1.
84, above]. Epiphanius Prooem. et Anacephal. (i) (Diels, Box., p. 587) :
"StuikoI aufia to irav Soyfian^ovres Kal rbv aladyrbv tovtov Koafiov
debv voui^ovres. nvks Sk e/c rys tov irvpbs obaias ryv cpvaiv e\eiv abrov
aTe<pyvavro. Kal rbv ukv debv vovv bpi£ovai Kal us foxyv iravrbs rov
bvros kvtovs obpavov Kal yys, auua Se abrov rb irav, us e<f>yv, Kal
bcpdaXuobs robs <f>uarypas. ryv Sk adpKa irdvruv dirbXXvadai Kal ryv
foxyv irdvruv uerayyi^eadai dirb aufiaros «ts aufia.
The Stoics lay down the opinion that the universe is body and think this per
ceptible world is God. Some declare that its nature [<£wr6s] is of the substance
of fire. And they define God as mind [voSs] and as the soul of all that is, con
tainer of heaven and earth, and that the universe is his body, as I said, and that
the stars are eyes. But the flesh of all things, they say, perishes and the soul
of all is poured out from one body into another.
Eusebius Prep. Evang. xv. 20 (Diels, Dox., pp. 470 f .) : Now concerning the
soul Cleanthes, quoting the opinion of Zeno in comparison with the other
physicists, says, that Zeno says that the soul is an exhalation endowed with
99

100 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
power of perception, as Heraclitus says. For wishing to prove that souls,
being exhaled always become perceptive, he compares them to the rivers,
saying, "Other things enter the rivers themselves, and other waters flow
in besides." And souls are exhaled from the moist [things]. Therefore
Zeno, like HeracUtus, calls the soul an exhalation, but says that it is
endowed with perception on this account, because the ruling part of the
soul can be impressed through the senses by the things that are and exist,
and can receive the impressions of them. For these are the peculiarities of
a soul. Stob. Eel. i. 25. s (Ar. Did. Fr. phys. 33; Arnim, I, 120; Diels, Dox.,
p. 467) : Zeno says that the sun, moon, and each of the other stars has the
power of perception and thought [voepos ko.1 <ppovipjos\, being composed of con
structive [rtxyiKOi, workmanlike] fire. For there are two kinds of fire, that
which is destructive [arexvos], and converts its fuel into itself, and the con
structive, which has the power of growth and preservation, such as is in the
plants and animals [£c3a], which is nature and soul [^ verts Kal vh>xv\. And of
this kind of fire is the substance of the stars.
Galen Hist. Phil. 16 (Diels, Dox., p. 608): Plato, then, and Zeno the Stoic,
having discussed the substance of God, were not of the same opinion on this
point. Plato said that God was incorporeal, but Zeno that he was body
[criepa], neither of them saying anything about his form. And Epicurus says
that God is anthropomorphous. But the Stoics say that he does not always
maintain the same form, but is fiery ah [irvevpa irvpcoSes], being easily
assimilated to all things with which it comes in contact.
Hippolytus, Phil. 21. 1 (Diels, Dox., p. 571): Chrysippus and Zeno
who themselves lay it down as a principle that God is the origin [apxyl of
all things, being the purest body [alopa], and that his providence pervades all
things. Nemesius, Nat. horn., p. 33 (cited in ZeUer, Stoics, Epicureans,
and Sceptics, p. 210) ascribes the foUowing argument to Cleanthes:
ovSev daufiarov avfiirdaxei aufiari, obSk daufidru auua, dXXd auua
aufiari' avfiirdaxei 8k y foxy t<$ aufiari voaovvn Kal refivofikvu, Kal
rb aufia ry foxy' aiaxvvoukvys yovv, kpvdpbv yiverai, Kal (pofiovukvys,
uxpbv aufia dpa y foxy.
Neither can the incorporeal suffer with the corporeal, nor the corporeal
with the incorporeal. But the soul does suffer with the body when it is sick
or when it is cut, and the body with the soul. Thus when the soul is ashamed
the body blushes, and when the soul is afraid it is pale. The soul, therefore,
is body. Ibid., p. 32 (also ascribed to Cleanthes): ob fibvov, <j>yaiv,
buoioi rols yovevai yivbueda, Kara rb aufia, dXXd Kal Kara ryv foxyv,
100

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 101
rols iradeai, rols ydeai, rals Siadkaeai' aufiaros 8k, rb ofioiov Kal
dvbuoiov, obxl Sk aaufidrov' aufia dpa y foxy-
Not only, he says, are we born like our parents as to body but also as to
soul, in passions, habits, and dispositions. Now likeness and unhkeness are
matters of body, not of an incorporeal thing. Therefore the soul is body.
Nemesius, Nat. horn., p. 34, ascribes the following to Chry
sippus: 6 ddvarbs kari xupiaubs ^t>x»?s d7r6 aufiaros' obSev 8k
dauuarov dirb aufiaros x03P'LtiTal'' obSk yap kt^dirrerai aufiaros
aauuarov' y Sk foxy «<*£ kcpdirrerai Kal x^pt^ai rod aufiaros'
auua dpa y foxy-
Death is the separation of soul from body. But nothing incorporeal is
separated from a body; for neither is anything incorporeal joined to a body.
But the soul is joined to and is separated from the body. Therefore the soul
is body. Tertull. Be anima, chap. 5 (Arnim, I, 137): denique Zeno
"consitum spiritum"1 definiens animam hoc modo instruit:
"quo," inquit, "digresso animal emoritur, corpus est: consito
autem spiritu digresso animal emoritur; ergo consitus spiritus
corpus est; consitus autem spiritus anima est; ergo corpus est
anima." Accordingly, Zeno defining the soul as inborn air teaches as foUows: that
which, by its departure, causes the animal to die is body. But when the in
born ah departs the animal dies. Therefore the inborn air is body. But the
inborn air is the soul, therefore the soul is body.
Stobaeus, Eel. i. 19. 4 (Arnim, I, 99; Ar. Did. Fr. phys. 23, Diels, Dox..
p. 459) : But a body does not always have weight. But air [&qp] and fire are
without weight.
Galen De plac. Hippoc. et. Plat. ii. 8 (p. 248 M) : But if he [Diogenes the
Babylonian] should foUow Cleanthes and Chrysippus and Zeno in saying that
the soul is nourished by blood, and that the breath [air?] is its substance
[ovrriav 8' avrrjs virdpxeiv rb irvevpa] ....
Galen Be plac. Hippoc. et Plat. iii. 1 (p. 251 M, cited by ZeUer,
Op. cit., p. 211): Xer/u 8y, on 6 Xpbaiiriros Kara rbv irpurov abrov
irepl ^fX'/s Xbyov ruv fiepuv abrys rov yyeuoviKov fivyfiovebeiv dpxb-
fievos, evda SeiKvbvai ireipdrai ryv apxyv rys foxy* & ry KapSia fibvy
irepikxeadai, ovrual Xeyei' 17 foxy irvevfia kari abuepvrov yulv avvexes
1 Consitus spiritus probably is Aristotle's o-ip.<j>vrov irvevpa.
101

102 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
iravrl ru aufiari SiyKOv 'kare dv y rys $uys av/ifierpia irapy kv r<#
aufian. ravrys ovv ruv fiepuv kmaru Siarerayfikvuv fiopiu rb SirjKov
avrys eis ryv rpaxelav aprypiav <puvyv cpafiev elvai, to Se eis bcpdaXuobs
ofov, to Se eis ura dmyv, rb 8k eis plvas bacppyaiv, rb 8k els yXurrav
yevaiv, rb Se els bXyv ryv adpKa d<j>yv Kal to eis bpxeis erepbv riva exov
toiovtov Xbyov airepuarubv, els b Se avfifiaivei irdvra ravra, kv ry
KapSia elvai fiepos bv avrys rb yyefioviKov.
Now I say that Chrysippus in his first essay on the soul, beginning with
the mention of the dominant one of the parts of the soul, then endeavors to
show that the origin of the soul is in the heart alone, and says as foUows:
The soul is ah congenital in us, extending to aU the body continuously as
long as the due proportion of the life remains in the body. The parts of
this being distributed to each portion, that portion of it which extends to the
windpipe we caU voice; that to the eyes, vision; that to the ears, hearing;
that to the nostrils, smell; that to the tongue, taste; that to aU the body,
touch; also that to the testicles having such a special function, we call the
spermatic [part] ; and that which goes where all these come together, viz., in
the heart, we say is the ruling part of it.
Galen Hist. Phil. 24 (Diels, Box., p. 613; Arnim, I, 136): ryv
8k obaiav avrys [sc. rys foxy*] ol fikv daufiarov ecpaaav, us TLXdruv, ol
8k aufiara Kivelv, us Zyvuv Kal oi kl- abrov. irvevfia yap elvai rabryv
birevbyaav Kal ovroi.
And some, like Plato, say that the substance of the soul is incorporeal;
but others that it moves bodies, as Zeno and his foUowers; for these also
suppose that the soul is air.
Plut. Epit. v. 4 (Diels, Box., p. 417) : KevKifiros Kal Zyvuv auua'
foxy* y&P elvai airbairaafia.
Leucippus and Zeno [say that seed is] body; for it is a fragment broken
off the soul. Cf. also Euseb. Prep, evang. xv. 20; Ar. Did. Fr. phys. 39 (Diels,
Dox., p. 470).
Diog. Laert. vii. 1.85: And the seed of man which the man emits is together
with moisture mixed with the parts of the soul according to the kind of mixture
which was that of the parents. And Chrysippus says in the second book of
his Physics that it [the seed] is according to its substance ah [irvevpa], as is
plain from the seeds which are cast into the earth, which if they have be
come old no longer germinate, as is plain, their virtue having evaporated
[BiaireirvevKvun] .'
1 The argument here is that because by evaporation seeds lose their virtue, so
the semen (i.e., the vital part of it) is irvevpa — moisture or air.
102

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 103
Plut. Be prima frig. 2. 5 (cited by Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans and
Sceptics, p. 213) : oi Sk XtuikoI /cat rb irvevua Xkyovaiv kv rols auuaai
ruv fipe<puv ry irepifo^ei aropovadai Kal fierafidXXov e/c cpbaeus yiyveadai
foxyv. The Stoics say that the irvevpa in the bodies of infants is hardened by the
cooling and being changed by the process of generation becomes soul.
Hippolyt. Phil. 21 (Diels, Box., p. 571): ryv 8k foxyv Xkyovaiv
addvarov elvai, aufia 8k, koi yevkadai e/c rys irepifo^eus tov dkpos tov
irepikxovros, Sib Kal KaXeladai foxyv' buoXoyovai Se Kal uerevau-
udruaiv yiveadai upiaukvuv obauv ruv foxuv.
And they [the Stoics] say that the soul is immortal, and is body, and that
it comes into being from the cooling of the air that surrounds it, therefore also
it is caUed soul. And they hold also that a transmigration takes place when
the souls reach the appointed number.
Plut. Epit. iv. 20 (Diels, Box., p. 410) : Ot 8e EtuikoI auua
ryv cpuvyv' irav yap rb Spuv y Kal iroiovv aufia' y Se cpuvif iroiel /cat
5pa" aKobouev yap avrys Kal aiadavbueda irpoairiirrobays ry aKoy Kal
kKTVirobays Kaddirep SaKrvXiov els Kypbv. en irav to kivovv Kal kvoxXovv
auua kari' Kivei Sk yfias y ebfiovaia, kvoxXel 8k 17 dfiovaia. en irav rb
Kivobuevov aufia kari' Kivelrai Sk 17 cpuvy Kal irpoairiirrei eis robs Xeiovs
rbirovs Kal avravaKXarai Kaddirep kirl rys acpaipas rys fiaXXofievys eis
rolxov' kv yovv rals /car' Myvrrov irvpafiiaiv 'kvSov uia 4>uvif pyyvvfikvy
rkrrapas y Kal irkvre yxovs direpya^erai.
And the Stoics say that the voice is body. For everything that does or
makes is body. But the voice makes and does. For we hear it and we under
stand when it falls upon the sense of hearing and makes an impression like that
of the finger on wax. Also that which moves or annoys is body. But refine
ment moves us and rudeness annoys us. Again everything which is moved
is body. But the voice is moved and falls into the hollow places and is reflected
just as in the case of a ball being thrown against a wall. Indeed inside the
pyramids of Egypt when one voice breaks forth it produces four or five
echoes. Plut. Epit. i. 6 (Diels, Box., p. 292) : bpi^ovrai Sk ryv rod deov
obaiav ol EtuikoI oCtws' irvevfia voepbv Kal irvpuSes ovk exov fikv
fiop<pyv, fierafidXXov 8k els 6 fiobXerai koi avve&fioiobfievov iraaiv.
The Stoics define the substance of God as follows: air, inteUigent and
fiery, not having indeed form but changing into what it will and assimilating
itseU to aU things. 103

104 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
Stob. Eel. i. i. 29 (Diels, Box., p. 302): UoaeiSuvios irvevfia
voepbv Kal irvpuSes, ovk 'kxov fiev fiopcpifv fierafiaXXov 8k eis 0 fiobXerai
Kal ovvei-ofioiobfievov iraaiv.
Posidonius says that [God is] air intelligent and fiery, not having indeed
form, but changing into what it wiU and assimilating itseU to aU things.
Stob. Eel. i. 1. 29 (Diels, Box., p. 302): AioyeV??* Kal KXed^r/s
Kal OivoiriSys [rbv debv] ryv tov Kbafiov foxyv.
Diogenes and Cleanthes and Oinopides say that God is the soul of the world.
Galen Hist. Phil. 35 (Diels, Box., pp. 618 f .) : ol Srwt/col 8k
rbv debv irvp evrexvov y irvevfia vopi^ovaiv, oSu fiaSi^ov kirl Koauov
ykveaiv, kfiirepieiXycpbs irdvras robs airepfiariKobs Xbyovs, Kad' ovs eKaara
Kad' eluapukvyv yiveadai, Kal SiyKeiv 81' bXov rod Koauov ras irpoayyopias
fieraXanfidvov [re] Kara ras rys &X77S 6V ys KexupyKe TapaXXd£eis.
deobs Sk Kal rbv Kbafiov koi robs darkpas koi ryv yyv elvai voui^ovaiv,
rb 8k dvurarov irdvruv rbv vovv elvai, rbv debv.
The Stoics think that God is a constructive fire or ah proceeding
methodicaUy to the creation of a world, embracing aU the principles of genera
tion, according to which everything comes into being in its aUotted way, and
it extends, they think, throughout aU the world, receiving names according
to the different forms of matter through which it spreads. And they think
that the world and the stars and the earth are gods, but that the highest of
all is mind, that is, God [cf. also Plut. Epit. i. 7 and Stob. Eel. i. 1, Diels,
Dox., pp. 305-6, where, with minor variations, the same passage occurs].
Plut. Epit. iv. 21 (Diels, Box., pp. 410 f.): oi Srwt/col tpaaiv
elvai rys foxy* dvurarov ukpos rb yyefioviKov, rb irovovv ras (pavraaias
Kal avyKaradkaeis /cat aiadyaeis /cat bpuds' /cat rovro Xoyiaubv
KaXovaiv. 'Airb Se tov yyeuoviKov eirrd ukpy kari rys foxy* kKireqjvKbra Kal
kKreivbfieva els rb aufia Kaddirep al dirb tov iroXbiroSos irXeKravai'
ruv 8k kirrd uepuv rys foxy* irkvre fikv elai ra aiadyrypia, opaais
bacppyais aKoy yevais Kal depy.
'Q,v y fikv opaais kari irvevua Siarelvov dirb yyefioviKov fikxpis
bcpdaXfiuv, aKoy Sk irvevfia Siarelvov dirb tov yyefioviKov fikxpis uruv,
bacppyais Sk irvevfia Siarelvov dirb rov rfyeuoviKov fikxpi fiVKrypuv
[Xeirrvvov], 7euo-ts Sk irvevfia Siarelvov dirb rov yy euoviKOV fikxpi
yXurrys, acpy Sk irvevfia Siarelvov dirb rov yyefioviKov fikxflis kiri<paveias
eis di^iv ebaiadyrov ruv irpoairiirrbvruv. 104

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 105
Tuv 8k Xoiiruv rb fikv Xkyerai airkpua, birep /cat abrb irvevua kari
Siarelvov dirb rov yyeuoviKov ukxpi ruv irapaararuv' rb Sk 'cpuvaev'
birb tov Zyvuvos eipyfikvov, S /cal cpuvyv KaXovaiv, eari irvevfia Siarelvov
diro rod ifyefioviKov fikxfli cpdpvyyos /cal yXurrys /cal ruv oheiuv
bpydvuv. abrb Sk rb ^yefiovubv uairep kv Kbafiu KaroiKel kv ry yuerkpa
a<paipoeibel KecpaXy.
The Stoics say that the ruling part of the soul is highest. It is that which
produces imaginations and sanctions and perceptions and impulses; and this
they caU the logical part. And there, are seven parts of the soul generated
from the ruling part and extending into the body like the arms from the poly
pus. Of the seven parts of the soul five are the senses, sight, smeU, hearing,
taste, and touch. Of these, sight is irvevpa [air ?] extending from the ruling
part to the eyes; hearing is irvevpa extending from the ruling part to the
ears; smeU is irvevpa, extending from the ruling part to the nostrils; taste
is 7rvevpxi, extending from the ruling part to the tongue; feeling is irvevpa,
extending from the ruling part to surfaces, sensitive to the touch of things
coming in contact with them. Of the others the seed is mentioned, which is
itseU also irvevpa, extending from the ruling part to the testicles; and the
utterance, mentioned by Zeno, which also they caU voice, is irvevpa, extend
ing from the ruling part to the throat and tongue and the neighboring organs.
But the ruling part itseU, as in a koo-uos, dweUs in our sphere-shaped head.
Cf. also iv. 8, 15.
Varro Be lingua lat. v. 59: sive ut Zenon Citieus animalium
semen ignis est, qui anima ac mens.
According to Zeno the Citiean, the semen of animals is a fire which is
Ufe and intelhgence.
Rufus Ephes. Be part, horn., p. 44 C: depjiaaiav 8k Kal irvevua
Zyvuv rb abrb elvai <pyaiv.
Zeno says that heat and irvevpa are the same.
Theodoret, Gr. aff. cur. v. 25 (Arnim, 1, 128) : Zyvuv Sk 6 Emeus
b ryabe rys aipkaeus yyyadfievos roidSe irepl foxys So% df eiv robs
o'lKeiovs e'StSa^e (poiryrds' rbv ydp roi dvdpuirivov dopbv, bypbv ovra Kal
uerkxovra irvevfiaros, rys foxy5 efpyaev elvai fikpos re Kal dirbairaafia
Kal rov tuv irpoybvuv airkpfiaros Kkpaafia re Kal filyfia ef airdvruv ruv
rys foxy* fiopiuv £vvadpoiadkv.
Zeno the Citiean, the founder of this sect, taught his own disciples to
hold these opinions about the soul. For he said that the human semen,
being moist, and composed in part of irvevpa, is a part of the soul and a frag
ment and mixture of the seed of the parents, being compounded of all the parts
of the soul. 105

106

HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES

Quotations might be multipUed almost indefinitely, but these
wiU suffice to set forth the main features of the doctrine of the
early Stoics in respect to the matter we are considering. A dia
gram, though necessarily imperfect, will perhaps make the rela
tionship of the various terms and conceptions more clear.

f\6yoz=8tbs \

f^wtuftai} > ipxai <
= aujxa j

TVfl TtXVUltlV <

) KOBpOS irvp [ai0r)p] \
» (Tvevp.a ivBtpppv.
^•v\^=outria^UTOix^\ &VP Wnvpa]] \,
vdcap^

jmx¥

ib yyepofiticbv
rb oltxB^TiKbv '
TO frUVTJTlKbv
rb airtppariKov

Zjiaati t-eh

rb ba&parw

16 uvbv

.0 xjsAwk

saufia [avSpunrov]

According to Stobaeus (Eel. i. 17. 4, Diels, Box., p. 463; Arnim,
II, 471), Chrysippus affirmed that the ultimate reaUty was irvevua
moving itself, i.e., self-moving air (arjp).1 This ultimate reaUty is
also called auua as over against infinite space, which, together
with time, falls into the category of the dauuarov (Diog. Laert.
vii. 1. 70 [140]). This ultimate reaUty consists of two principles
(dpxat), or rather perhaps has two fundamental characteristics or
aspects, viz. : (1) the active, X670S, reason (also called 0e6s) ; and
(2) the passive, i5Xr;, matter (Diog. Laert. vn. 1. 68; Plut. Epit.
i. 4, Diels, Box., p. 289). To each of these various other predi
cates are attached. Thus the first, X670S, is said to be 0e6s, and
0e6s in turn is said to be al0i7p (Cic. Be nat. deor. i. 36; Ac. U. 126),
irvp (Cic. Be nat. deor. i. 37; Arnim, I, 530; Galen Hist. Phil. 35),
j>oCs (Diog. Laert. vn. 1. 68), and an immortal being, £uov dddvarov
(Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 72), but also auua (Galen Hist. Phil. 16, Diels,
Box., p. 608; Hippol. Phil. 21. 1, Diels, Box., p. 571). TertulUan
1 Arnold, Roman Stoicism, p. 89. 106

spirit, soul, and flesh 107
says (Apol. 21) that Cleanthes summed up all the predicates of God
in the word spiritus (= irvevfia), but the accuracy of his statement,
unsupported by other testimony, is perhaps not beyond question.
The second principle, called, as it consists of parts, 'vXy, is, con
ceived as a whole, oucrta. The vXy permeated and controUed by
X670S, which is God, becomes a abaryfia e£ obpavov /cat 777s /cal tuv kv
robrois (pbaeuv (Ar. Did.\F>. phys. 31, Diels, Box., p. 465), or more
briefly stated, 17 SiaKoauyais tuv darkpuv (Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 70
[138]), and is caUed y SiaKoauyais or Koauos. This Koauos is a Uving
being, $uov, endowed with reason, soul, and perception, but is
destructible (ibid.). To it also is appUed the predicate auua (Diog.
Laert. vU. 1. 68; cf. also 70). God also is said to be Koapos (ibid.
70, 72) and in the largest sense of the term the Kbapos includes God
and the universe (Diog. Laert. vU. 1. 70 [138]; Ar. Did. Fr. phys.
31; Stob. Eel. 1. 21, Diels, Box., p. 465). God is said to be the
seminal principle of the world (Diog. Laert. 68) and the Syfiiovpybs
of the orderly arrangement. The vovs permeates every part of
the world just as foxy permeates us. Moreover, God periodically
absorbs the totaUty of substance into himself, then gives it forth
again (ibid. 70; cf. 68).
"TX77 consists of four elements (oroixeta), viz.: 7r0p, dyp, vSup,
717 (ibid. 69). The four elements are interconvertible (ibid. 70).
They are not, therefore, four substances or kinds of matter,
but four forms of one substance. The first of them, 7r0p, is
supreme and is also caUed aether (ibid. 69). The second, dyp, is
nearly identical with irvevfia in its primary sense of wind (Stob.
Eel. i. 17).
The Stoics distinguish two kinds of fire, the irvp drexvov and the
irvp rexviKov, meaning fire that destroys and fire that preserves
and contributes to growth. It is the former, apparently, which
is said to destroy the elements (Diog. Laert. vU. 1. 68). From
the latter spring the plants and animals. It is called also <pticris
(in respect to plants) and foxy (in respect to animals); and of
it is the substance of the stars (Stob. Eel. i. 25. 5; Ar. Did. Fr.
phys. 33, Diels, Box., p. 467).
By the foxy the Stoics commonly mean the seat of life, feeling,
thought, and will. The definition of the word is found in its
107

108 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
functions.1 Of the soul, so defined, Zeno says that it is irvevua
'evdepuov (Diog. Laert. vii. i. 84) or irvp (Cic. Tusc. i. 9. 19). Since
Cicero says expressly that Zeno did not add a fifth element to the
four, but that the Stoics regard fire as that which produces aU things,
even mind and perception (Cic. Ac. i. 11. 39; cf. Be nat. deor. n.
22. 57), it is probable that by irvevfia evdeppjov Zeno means a com
bination of fire and air, or fire on the way to become air, or air
on the way to become fire. Galen also ascribes to Cleanthes,
Chrysippus, and Zeno the opinion that the soul is nourished by
blood and that the breath [air ?] is its substance (Galen Be plac.
Hippoc. et Plat., p. 248 M; cf. also Galen Hist. Phil. 24, Diels,
Box., p. 613).
Galen p. 251 M ascribes to Chrysippus the statement: 17 foxy
irvevfia kari abfiforov yfilv avvexks iravrl ru aufian SiyKov (see
above, p. 10 1). The expression at once recaUs Aristotle's avu-
4>vtov irvevua (i. 6596. 17 ff.; i. 669a. 1; 7436. 39; quoted on p. 21
above).2 It is doubtless the same doctrine and probably the same
1 This is of course true, not of Stoic writers only, but of Greek writers generally.
Cf. p. 91. Less clearly so when it means "life" or "shade," but obviously so when
meaning " soul," tyvxi is by definition a functional term, while wvevpa on the other hand
is substantial. The relation between the two, through a large part at least of their
contemporary use, corresponds to that, e.g., of the terms "knife" and "steel." The
definition of the one lies in that which it does, that of the other — in its elements or
qualities. The second may be predicated of the first; the first cannot be of the second.
One may say ij ^«x^ irvevpd iari, but not rb irvevpa ^vx^ i<rrt. SJ'uxi} never denotes a
substance; only in a relatively late period does irvevpa acquire a functional meaning.
2 The expression o-ip<f>vrov irvevfia occurs also in the Hepi Hveiparos, probably
written about the first century a.d. and erroneously ascribed to Aristotle (see Christ,
Handbuch der klassischen Altertums-Wissenschaft, VII, 736; Neustadt in Hermes,
XLIV [1909], 60 ff.):
rb Si o-ip<t>vrov irvevpa Si' 8\ov, Kal dpx^l dirb tov irveipovos [chap. iv].
Eirel Si rpets al Kivi\<reis toO iv rij dprijpla irveiparos, dvairvoii, o-<pvyp.bs, rplrif S' if
r^v rpoatffv iwdyovja Kal Karepya^opivif, XeKriov trip iKdarrfs Kal irov, Kal irws, Kal
rlvos xdpiv [chap. iv].
Kal ravra piv iis irepl rijv a^i\aiv Kal rpo<f>^v toC irveiparos [chap, ii, fin.].
rb Si irvevpa, rb iK rifs dvairvoijs <pipe<r$at piv els rifv Koi\lav, oi Sid rov aropdxov
(rovro piv ydp dSivarov), dWd irbpov elvai irapd rijv b(rij>iv, Si' ov rb irvevpa tJ dvarvorj
<pipeo-Bai iK rov fipoyxlov els r^v KoiKlav Kal irdXiv l{w rovro Si tJ alaBif<rei ipavepbv
[chap, v, init.].
According to Neustadt (Hermes, XLIV, 60 ff.) the B.epl nveiparos is the prod
uct of a school known as the irvevpariKol, concerning whom we derive a certain
amount of information from Galen, having been perhaps written by Athenaeus, the
108

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 109
passage which Diogenes Laertius has in mind when in vii. i. 84
he says that the Stoics say that the soul is rd avficpvks yfiiv irvevfia.
The soul is also said to be aufia (Galen Hist. Phil. 24, Diels,
Box., p. 613; Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 84; cf. the doctrine of Democ
ritus, Stob. Eel. i. 49. 1, Diels, Box., p. 388; Nem., Nat. horn.,
pp. 32, 33, 34; TertuU. Be anima, chap. v).
The soul has various parts or functions, sometimes four, as
shown in the diagram, sometimes increased to eight by analyzing
rb aiadyriKbv into the five senses and countmg these instead of
that. Plut., Epit. iv. 15, ascribes to Chrysippus the view that we per
ceive darkness by the impact of the intermediate air, adding that
the air is pierced by the visual irvevfia, which proceeds from the
principal part of the soul even to the eyebaU. In iv. 21 (see above,
p. 104) this latter view is expanded into the statement that, accord
ing to the Stoics, there extend from the ruhng part of the soul,
located in the head, seven parts or senses — sight, hearing, etc.
Each of these is said to be irvevfia, though the soul itself is not
here caUed irvevfia.

founder of the school. He draws this conclusion from the parallels which he discovers
between the treatise and the statements of Galen about the views of the school. From
these it appears that the men of this school recognized the four elements, the hot and
the cold, the wet and the dry; but also four qualities to which they applied the same
names. From the four substances and qualities they derived what they called the
bpmopipi) or homogeneous bodies, among which they included bones, flesh, and
arteries, in each of which one of the four qualities predominated and determined the
character. Thus the flesh is wet, the gristle is cold, the bones dry and cold, the fat
wet and warm.
But that which is of special interest for us is their doctrine of the irvevpa and fvxtf.
Galen says that Athenaeus, following the Stoics, introduced, as a fifth element, the
irvevpa which pervades all things (Neustadt, p. 68). Yet this element does not seem
to have been deified for him. For in the Tlepl Xiveiparos, defending the proposition
that there are not, as some maintain, two kinds of fire, one in the organic and another
in the inorganic world, but in the inorganic world different effects of fire according
to the quality of the thing affected by it, and in the organic world, not fire proper,
but warmth, he adds: "But the arts use the warmth only as a tool, but nature both
as a tool and as material. Accordingly this difference offers no obstacle to the view
that nature, which uses the warm and which at the same time produces with the
visible appearances harmonious movement, possesses intelligence. For fire and breath
(irvevpa) do not indeed do it [i.e., do not possess or do not impart intelligence]. Yet
the same capacity meets us also in the soul (tyvxi). It is well, therefore, to ascribe
109

HO HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
In iv. 8 he ascribes to the Stoics the view that the media of
sense-perception are irvebfiara voepd extending from the governing
part of the soul to the organs of the body. These irvebfiara voepd
are manifestly identical with the irvevua of iv. 15 and 21, and
with the irvevua avuforov iravrl rco aufiari Siymv of Galen, p. 251 M,
being pluralized only as parts of that which quantitatively and
generically considered is called irvevfia.
What, then, did the early Stoics mean by aufia and irvevfia as
predicates of foxy ? It is to be noted that the two terms are not
sharply antithetical. Not only are they both predicated of foxy,
but the soul is said to be auua because it is irvevua (Diog. Laert.
vii. 1. 84). Hufia clearly has two distinct uses. First, in the com
mon unphilosophical sense, it denotes that which contains the
soul, and is distinct from it, the two being frequently spoken of in
antithesis (Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 65; Nem., Nat. horn., pp. 32, 33, 34).
It is doubtless composed of the elements, perhaps the four (Galen
Const, art. med. i. p. 251, K; Arnim, II, 405), or possibly the
two lower (Arnold, Rom. Stoicism, p. 257). On the other hand,
as shown above, the soul is said to be body (Nem., Nat. horn., loc.

both to the same source (either in general or specifically in part), which brings it about
that the like movement is always present, for it is nature from which becoming springs."
Apparently, therefore, the irvevpariKol, while finding one source of intelligence
both in the soul and in the universe, and while postulating irvevpa additional to the
four elements or the four qualities, yet did not identify the irvevpa with the all-
pervading intelligence.
In this respect they remind us of what Sextus says of the Stoics, having in mind
perhaps Chrysippus, who, Galen says, was the great-grandfather of the pneumatic
sect (Arnim, II, 311; Neustadt, p. 64): "The substance of things that are, they say,
being of itself incapable of motion and formless, must be moved by and given form by
some cause. Therefore, as when we see a beautiful piece of metal work we wish to
know who was the artist, believing that the material is itself without power of motion,
so also when we contemplate the matter of the universe moving and taking form and
order we should reasonably inquire for the cause that moves it and gives it diverse
forms. And it is probable that this is nothing else than a certain power that permeates
it as soul tyvxty permeates us .... so that this would be God."
Here also the order and motion which the universe shows are ascribed to a power
in itself analogous to the soul in the human person. But this power is not called
irvevpa, though it is not as in the Ilepi TLveiparos expressly said that it is not irvevfia.
From all this it appears that, for whatever reason the irvevpariKol were called
such, it was not because they affirmed that God was irvevpa or because they held any
notion of immaterial spirit. 110

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 111
cit.), and God is said to be body (Galen Hist. Phil. 16, Diels, Box.,
p. 608; Hippol. Phil. 21. 1, Diels, Box., p. 571). Moreover, the
whole universe is divided into body and not-body, the former
term being appUed to the two dpxat and the latter to things that
have no real existence, such as time and space (Diog. Laert. vii.
1. 70 [140]).
It might seem, therefore, that aufia was simply the Stoic term for
a real existence. And this may be thought to be confirmed by the
statement quoted by Arius Didymus from Zeno that the cause is
body (Stob. Ecl.i. 13. 1, Diels, Box., p. 457).1 But, on the other hand,
it is to be noticed that the two senses of aufia are closely related
to one another, so that one may argue from the one to the other, as
in the argument concerning the separation of soul and body (Nem.
Nat. horn., loc. cit.). Moreover, in immediate connection with the
passage from Ar. Did. in which he says that the cause is body,
body is defined as that which has extension in three dimensions;
cf. Galen Hist. Phil. 23, Diels, Box., p. 612. Diogenes Laertius
ascribes the same opinion to Apollodorus (vii. 1. 68).
It is true, indeed, that the Stoic categories, somatic and asomatic,
do not exactly correspond to the modern categories, material and
immaterial. Zeno said, e.g., that bodies do not necessarily have
weight (Stob. Eel. i. 19. 4, Diels, Box., p. 459), referring especially
to fire and air (and it is of these, of course, that the soul is com
posed). It is true also that the Stoic would probably not have
said, "Whatever is aufia is vXy." Yet he excluded from the
somatic only such things as space and time, and neither formed
a third category of immaterial entities nor denied to any part of
the somatic the essentiaUy material quaUties.
It seems necessary to conclude, therefore, that while the
Stoics appUed aufia as a philosophic term to a much larger class
of existences than that of which modern thinkers use it, and
while the emphatic element of its meaning is objective or real
existence, yet it also carried with it the impUcation of materiaUty."
It could be appUed to things extremely tenuous and not sub
ject to most of the laws of physics, indeed was the most inclusive
1 Cf. also the statement in Plut. Epit. i. n, Diels, Dox., p. 310: oi ZtuikoI irdvra
rd atria awpariKd- irveipara ydp. Ill

112 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
term they could use for real existences (being more inclusive, for
example, than substance, obaia), yet affirmed of all such existences
materiality.1 Concerning irvevfia it is important to notice that the early
Stoics still employed the term in its primitive sense of wind2 (see
analysis of meanings). We have seen that Stobaeus says that
Chrysippus defines the ultimate reality as irvevfia or air endowed
with the power of self-motion, being in the same category with
aether, the upper air (Stob. Eel. i. 17. 4, Diels, Box., p. 463). If it
is irvevua in this sense that is predicated of the human soul, the
soul is thereby made fundamentally a physical entity. Or if
irvevfia as appUed to the soul is fire, or air on the way to become
fire, or, as the expression abfiforov irvevfia suggests, breath or inborn
air, it is in that case one of the orotxeta, being interconvertible
with water and earth, and falling under the category 6X17, and so
still more clearly physical. Nor is this conclusion invaUdated by
the fact that the early Stoics probably, as their successors certainly,
said that God was irvevua. For they, also said that he was aether
and body, and identified him with the mafias. In short, if to
predicate mental qualities and powers of a subject having material
quaUties is to be a materiaUst, this is apparently precisely what
the Stoics were. They were, indeed, less pronouncedly materiaUstic
than the Epicureans, in contrast with whom it might almost be
said that they were non-materialists. Yet it seems impossible to
escape the conclusion that their ultimate reaUty had a material
quality. But it is even more clear that they ascribed material quaUties to
the soul,3 than that they used auua in a material sense. Paradoxical
as it may seem, of the two predicates of the soul, auua and irvevua,
the latter affirms its materiaUty more expUcitly than the former.
1 Cf. Hicks in art. "Stoics" in Encyc. Brit., Ed. IX, vol. xxii, p. 592, and Ed. XI,
vol. xxv, pp. 943-4.
2 With this usage may be compared the use of the word by pseud.-Hippoc, Uepl
$vtruv (Ed. LittrS, VI, 94), as a common term, to use modern phraseology, for gas,
air, and aether. See p. 80.
3 It is instructive to observe that Tertullian not only interprets the Stoics in this
way, but himself adopts their view in a sense more obviously material than their
own (Apol., chap. 21). 112

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 113
For while aufia can be applied to anything having real existence,
being a predicate of both the two dpxat, irvevfia as appUed to the
soul seems quite clearly to belong to the vXy. Even the most
spiritual reality had its material aspect.
On the other hand, it is equally important to observe that, if we
may trust the testimony of Plutarch, Galen, and Stobaeus concern
ing the views of Chrysippus and the other early Stoics, the irvevfia, of
which, according to these early writers, the soul was composed, was
not perishable breath, as Xenophanes held, or inert matter — the
passive vXy of Aristotle — but, while material, also, by virtue of its
permeation by X670S, active. The irvevfia in which, according to
Stobaeus, Chrysippus found the ultimate basis of all things is not
simply air in motion, as was the irvevfia of earlier writers, but self-
moving. It is true, indeed, and important to note, that self-motion
does not thereby become a quality of irvevfia as such. It is pred
icated, not of all irvevfia by an analytic judgment, but of the
irvevua which is identified with rb bv, and of this by a synthetic
judgment. Nor is it whoUy clear, by virtue of direct statement or
evidence, that irvevpa in itself implies activity. Yet the soul,
which is said to be irvevfia evdeppav, is active, and it seems probable
that the fact of activity is associated in Stoic thought with the
fact that it is irvevfia, if not also with the self-activity of the irvevfia
which constitutes the rb bv. For before the Stoics irvevpa signified
air in motion; the Stoics say that the individual soul is a part of
the universal soul (Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 84), and, according to Galen,
Chrysippus, affirming that the soul is irvevfia abfitpvrov yp.lv, says
also that it extends to all parts of the body, becoming voice,
vision, hearing, etc., and in the testicles having a special function.
Plutarch, perhaps quoting less literally, says that the Stoics say
that there are seven parts of the soul, each of which proceeds from
the ruling part and is irvevfia. Thus sight, hearing, smell, taste,
feeling, and voice are each said to be irvevfia, and the semen (repro
ductive power) is also said to be irvevfia, "extending from the ruling
part to the testicles." TLvebfia, therefore, of which the soul con
sists, though physical, is endowed with vitality — is soul- stuff ; or,
as it extends from the soul to the organs of sense and repro
duction, a vital nervous fluid. 113

114 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
Of the ultimate reality, accordingly, of God, and of the soul,
it is affirmed that each is aufia and each is irvevfia. As the first
affirms materiality without affirming passivity, so the second
suggests, or perhaps even affirms, activity without denying, but
indeed implying, materiality.
To this evidence derived from quotations from the Stoics
themselves there are two pieces of interesting evidence which come
to us from outside sources. Menander, a comic poet, a contem
porary of Zeno, born later, and dying earUer (342-292), has left
us the following lines:
7raucrao-0e vovv Xeyovrcs' ovhev yap irXeov
avdpmrivos vovs eo-Ttv, dXX' 6 tjJs rvxys
(cit' «tti rovro irvevpa detov eire vovs)
tovt' coti to Kvfiepvwv airavra Kal crrpetpov
Kal 0"<i)£<i>v, 17 irpovow. 8' ^ dvrjTy Kairvbs
Kal <p\-qva<pos. ifeiad-qre k' oi pepxpeadi pe-
iravd' dcra voovpev i) \eyop,ev -i) rrpdrropev
tvx^ 'otiv, rjpeis 8' ecrpev eiriyeypappevoi.

rvrxy Kvfiepva iravra, ravrrjv Kal (ppevas
Set Kal irpovoiav Tifv debv KaXeiv pavrpi,
ei prf Tts aXXais dvdpacriv ^aipei Kevots.
[Kock, Com. AU. Frag., Ill, p. 139.]
Cease talking about vovs. For no other human vovs is there except that
of Fortune (be it divine irvevpa or vovs). This it is that controls and guides
and preserves all things, and human foresight is smoke and nonsense. Be
persuaded and you will not blame me. All that we think, or say, or do is
Fortune, and we are conscripts  Fortune controls everything, and we
ought to call it mind and foresight, the only goddess, unless one likes to use
mere empty words.
The doctrine of the poet is that men have no control of their
lives. The god whom he calls rbxy controls everything; human
foresight is all nonsense. Of human vovs as controlling anything
it is absurd to speak. ParentheticaUy he remarks, "You may if
you like call it [i.e., rbxy] irvevpa delov1 or vovs; it matters not;
1 On the meaning of Beiov in this connection, compare also Stob. Eel. i. 24, Diels,
Dox., p. 466: " Karpov Si ehal <pi\o~iv b U.o<reiSdvios <rwfia Beiov i£ alBipos avveimiKbs,
\apirpbv Kal irvp&Ses. 114

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 115
fortune, rbxy, governs everything." The parenthetical remark
seems to indicate that some of his contemporaries employed these
terms to designate the supreme power that controls all things, and
that though these are not the words that he prefers, he wiU not
quarrel with them about words; the fact is that rbxy rules every
thing. In the pseudo-Platonic dialogue Axiochus, 370 B, C, occurs the
foUowing sentence: ob ydp 817 ye dvyry ye <pvais rbaov Sbova' dv
yparo fieyedovpyias, uare Karacppovyaai fikv birepfiaXXbvruv dypiuv
fiias, Siairepaiuaaadai 8k xeXd7?7, Seiuaadai 8k dary, mraaryaaadai Sk
iroXireias, dvafiXef/ai Sk eis rbv obpavov Kal iSelv irepupopas darpuv
Kal Spbfiovs ifXiov re /cal aeXyvys dvaroXds re Kal Sbaeis kKXeifois re
Kal raxeias diroKaraaraaeis iayfiepias re Kal rpoirds Sirrds, Kal ELXeidSav
xeiuuvas Kal dkpovs dvkuovs, Kal rd tov Koapov iradyfiara irapairyi-aadai
irpbs tov aUova, el fiy n delov 'bvrus kvyv irvevfia ry foxy, 81' ov ryv
ruv ryXiKuvSe irepivOiav /cal yvuaiv kaxev.
For mortal nature at least would not have acquired and maintained so
great effectiveness as to despise the violence of overpowering wild beasts, to
cross seas, to build cities, to found commonwealths, to look into the heavens
and discern orbits and courses of stars and the summer winds, and to chart
out for the future the risings and settings and eclipses of sun and moon, and
the swift return of the equinox, and the two solstices, and the autumn storms
and the summer winds, and the cosmic events, if there were not really in the
soul some divine breath, through which it possessed intelhgence and knowledge
of so great things.
There is much difference of opinion respecting the date and
authorship of this dialogue, some assigning it to the third, others
to the first century B.C. See especiaUy Susemihl, Geschichte der
gr. Lit. in der Alexandrinerzeit, I, 21 ff., who inclines to the early
date, and Heidel, Pseudo-Platonica, pp. 15-17, who ascribes the
dialogue to the first century. The meaning of the expression is
evidently similar to that which it bears in the passage from Me-
nander. But while in Menander 0eto?' irvevpa controls all things,
specifically human destiny, in the Axiochus it gives intelligence and
knowledge and is directly associated with the human foxy- Both
passages testify in a most interesting way to the presence, in Greek
thought of the pre-Christian period, of the idea of divine power or
influence affecting the mind or destiny of men, but the Axiochus
115

116 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
passage much more clearly implies the presence of this power in
the human soul.
Though the precise expression 0etov irvevfia has not been
observed in any pre-Christian Stoic writer,1 we shaU see presently
that Posidonius, writing about 100 B.C., said that God is irvevpa.
This fact raises the question whether he or some of his feUow-
Stoics not only made this affirmation, but employed the phrase
delov irvevfia for the expression of the same thought. But if the ex
pression does come from a Stoic source, then, since Menander at
least was a contemporary of Zeno, these passages would seem to
prove that the phrase did not arise with Posidonius, but with a Stoic
of a much earlier period. On the other hand, the absence of this
expression from the vocabulary of the early Stoics, so far as trans
mitted to us, suggests that it may not have originated with them,
but was either coined by others to express the Stoic idea or belonged
to the terminology of some other school of thinkers. We are ap
parently without sufficient data to decide between these several
possibiUties. We must be content with the evidence, sUght, but
seemingly decisive, that the phrase 0etoi' irvevpa was already in use
about 300 B.C.
It is a separate question precisely how far the term had advanced
on the road toward immateriaUty in the days of Menander. It
is not at all impossible that it represents a further movement in
that direction than is to be found even in Posidonius, and that not
only the Epicurean but the Stoic thought marks a return from the
"spiritual" tendency of Plato. Whether so or not it is to be noticed
that even in the Axiochus it expresses a quantitative rather than
a personaUzed conception. The phrase 0eto»' irvevpa is still without
the article and accompanied by n (contrast ry foxy) and denotes
neither the human spirit nor, apparently personal divine spirit, but
breath (or spirit ?) proceeding from God or having divine quaUty.
VI. THE LATER PRE-CHRISTIAN STOICS
From Panaetius and Posidonius we trace the introduction of
certain modifications of the conceptions of the earher Stoics. Thus
1 In Euripides, Hipp. 1391, occurs the expression <! Beiov bSprfs irvevpa, "0 divinely
odorous breath." Cf. p. 17. But there is no apparent connection between this
phrase and that in Menander or the Axiochus. 116

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 117
Panaetius maintained against his predecessors that the world was
imperishable (Diog. Laert. vii. i. 70; Stob. Eel. i. 20.1), but on the
other hand denied even the Umited post-mortem existence of the
soul which had been held by his predecessors (Cic. Tusc. i. 32. 79).
Posidonius, though a pupil of Panaetius, assumed an eclectic
attitude both toward his teacher and toward the earUer Stoicism.
Of the statements expressly ascribed to him by later writers, there
is none perhaps more important for our purpose than Stobaeus'
(Eel. i. 1. 29, Diels, Box., p. 302) testimony that he spoke of God as
irvevpa voepbv /cal 7rupw5es (cf. Galen Hist. Phil. 16, Diels, Box.,
p. 609). Though it is probable that this expression was derived
from the earUer conception that the ultimate basis of existence was
irvevpa or irvp, yet it is important to observe that this is the earliest
extant express statement by a Greek writer that God is irvevpa.
Plutarch, indeed, ascribes to the Stoics, without mention of
individual names, the doctrine that the substance (obaia) of God
is irvevpa voepbv /cal irvpuSes (Epit. i. 6, Diels, Box., p. 292). But
the context of the two passages shows that Stobaeus and Plutarch
are both quoting from the same passage of Aetius. There can be
no doubt that Stobaeus has preserved in the name Posidonius the
correct reading of Aetius, for which Plutarch has substituted the
more general expression "the Stoics." We cannot, therefore,
from this passage ascribe the doctrine that God is irvevpa to any
writer earUer than Posidonius.
In another passage Aetius, as attested by both Plutarch and
Stobaeus, ascribes to the Stoics the doctrine that God is voepbv
.... irvp rexviKov, 6b<2 fiaSi^ov kirl yevkaei Koapov . ... /cal irvevpa
pkv SirJKov 8i bXov rov Koapov (Diels, Box., p. 306). Diogenes Laertius
makes the, same statement with so much of the same context as to
show that he is drawing from the same source, substituting, how
ever, according to our present text at least, cpbaiv for 0e6j<. Diog.
Laert. vii. 1. 84: Ao/cet Sk abrols ryv fikv qbbaiv elvai irvp rexviKov,
68u fia8i£ov, els ykveaiv, &irep kari irvevpa irvpoeiSks Kal rexvoeiSks-
On the important question thus raised whether, on the basis
of this latter thrice-quoted passage, the use of irvevpa as a predicate
of God can be carried back to the Stoics earUer than Posidonius,
the evidence is conflicting. On the one side the examination of
117

118 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
the passages in which Diogenes Laertius speaks of "the Stoics"
suggests that he does not use the phrase when quoting the view
of one author only, but means by it the Stoic writers from Zeno to
Posidonius inclusive, or a number of them. On the other hand,
though it is probable that cpbaiv in the Diogenes Laertius passage is
a substitute for debv, we are scarcely justified in making this proba-
biUty the basis of an argument, and it is possible that by "the Stoics"
Aetius (Diels, Box., p. 305) means Posidonius in particular, as
Plutarch does in the passage above mentioned (Diels, Box., p. 292).
While, therefore, there is a possibiUty that the older Stoics caUed
God irvevpa, it remains that we cannot by definite evidence attest
this usage for a writer earUer than Posidonius (135-51 B.C.).
The statement that the foxy is irvevpa "evdeppav, which Diogenes
Laertius ascribes to Zeno, Antipater, and Posidonius (vii. 1. 84), is
paralleled in Stobaeus by the statement that the Stoics caU the
soul irvevpa voepbv deppbv. Plutarch, however, in his paraUel
citation from Aetius omits voepbv (Diels, Box., p. 388). While,
therefore, the doctrine that the soul is voepbs is familiar enough,
this passage cannot be used as evidence that the Stoics employed
the phrase irvevpa voepbv of the soul. Stobaeus apparently took
it over from the predicates of God.
It is an interesting variation from the statement that the soul
is irvevpa 'kvdeppov, when we find in Plutarch the affirmation that
the Stoics say that irvevpa in the bodies of infants becomes foxy by
cooling; and in Hippolytus, apparently quoting the same passage,
that they say that the soul arises by the cooling of the air (ayp)
that surrounds if. Though by reason of the difference between the
statements we are left in doubt whether the Stoics conceived of the
soul as produced from 7n<eiip,a or dyp, it is clear in either case that
they held the notion of an airUke soul-stuff.
While the argument from silence is always precarious, it is
worthy of notice that neither Diogenes Laertius, Arius Didymus,
nor Aetius expressly ascribes to the Stoics of the middle or later
period (Panaetius or later) the statement that God is aupa or that
the soul is aupa.1
1 Galen (Diels, Dox., p. 608) says that Zeno says that God is aapa; Hippolytus
(Diels, Dox., p. 571) ascribes the same to Chrysippus and Zeno; Galen (Diels,
118

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 119
Of somewhat similar character is the argument by which
Schmekel, Bie Philosophie der mittleren Stoa, endeavors to show
that the views of Posidonius are extensively reflected in the writings
of later Stoics, especiaUy Cicero and Sextus Empiricus, even when
these writers make no mention of him, and on this basis ascribes
to Posidonius the doctrine that without the soul the body is matter,
useless and defiling flesh. The soul is the bearer of Ufe, it is the
indwelling divinity; as a part of divinity it has autonomy. This
power, as it cannot have originated in conception, so also cannot
perish with death. The soul is therefore both pre-existent and
immortal; the body is a drag upon it, Umiting but unable wholly
to destroy its freedom of action (pp. 247 ff .) . Whether these ideas
were held by Posidonius or not, some of them at least are well
attested as belonging to some of the middle and late Stoics, and evi
dently represent a considerable departure from the views of the early
Stoics and a partial return to Platonism. It is probable that with
this revival of Platonic ideas which made the soul less material
and set it over against the material body, aupa, is connected the
disappearance of aupa as a predicate of the soul. Though the two
senses of o-«p,a were not identical, the sharp antithesis between
foxy and aupa in one of these senses made it difficult to affirm
aupa of foxy in the other sense of the former. With this change,
in turn, is associated a reversal of the relationship between irvevpa
and aupa as predicates of foxy- ILvevpa has become less material;
the use of aupa to denote reaUty with materiaUty only implied
(because whatever is real is material; cf. p. in) has disappeared,

Dox., p. 613) ascribes the view that the soul is o-&fia to Zeno and his followers;
Nemesius, Nat. horn., pp. 32, 33, 34, says Cleanthes and Chrysippus held this; TertulUan
De anima, chap. v. ascribes to Zeno the doctrine that the fvxv is o-upa.
Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 84 says that they (the Stoics) hold that the soul is body; but
in 68, without mentioning particular philosophers, he says that they hold that the
elements are bodies but that the principles are not bodies. From this one might
draw the inference that God is not body, since X67os, which is identified with Beds,
is one of the principles. But the inference is evidently unwarranted; for on the one
hand it would equally prove that V\ri is not body, and on the other, it contradicts the
explicit testimony of Galen and Hippolytus as concerns the Stoic teaching about God.
Hippolytus (Diels, Dox., p. 571) says that "they" say that the soul is body,
leaving it uncertain whether he means the Stoics in general or Chrysippus and Zeno in
particular. s
119

120 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
leaving only the use of aupa in a strictly material sense. The soul,
now considered pre-existent and immortal, is no longer caUed
aupa, nor is God aupa.
What, then, did the later pre-Christian Stoics do for the word
irvevpa ? So far as concerns its use in respect to the. human foxy,
they made Uttle advance upon their predecessors, except perhaps
to associate the two terms more closely together. Xenophanes
had said nearly three centuries before that the foxy was irvevpa,
thereby emphasizing its perishableness and suggestmg that it
ceased to exist at the death of the body. The early Stoics denied,
indeed, that the soul perished with the separation from the body,
giving it a Umited existence after death, and Posidonius made the
soul immortal. But in neither case is this view based upon the
doctrine that the foxy is irvevpa, for irvevpa itself is a material
term. Panaetius denied any after-death existence of the soul
without denying that the soul was irvevp.a; and Diogenes Laer
tius (vii. i. 84) ascribes to the Stoics (without mentioning indi
vidual names) the argument that because the soul is irvevpa,
therefore it is body and not immortal (5id /cal aupa elvai Kal
pera ddvarov kiripkveiv cpdapryv Sk elvai).
Anaximenes in the same century with Xenophanes (the sixth
B.C.) had said that the soul was ayp. A century later Epicharmus,
though not directly predicating irvevpa of foxy, employed the
former of the soul-stuff, and said that at death the irvevpa returned
whence it came. Aristotle also used the term to describe the vital
(epfoxos) and generative material which in his opinion, or in that
of some contemporary of his, pervades all plants and animals.
The Stoic doctrine of the four elements had been anticipated
by Empedocles in the fifth century and by Aristotle in the fourth,
and both had made air one of them and fire another. When,
therefore, the early Stoics described the soul as irvevpa evdeppov,
and then insisted with emphasis that, being irvevpa, it was also
aupa, they probably meant by the former term to deny that it was
mere passive vXy, while by the latter they affirmed that it was
material. That they used dyp when enumerating the elements,
and irvevpa when predicating this same element of the soul was
perhaps because of the usage which we find in Epicharmus, perhaps
120

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 121
because of some association with irvevpa meaning breath, or
with the phrases for death in which irvevpa, and not ayp, was
used, perhaps especially because irvevpa conveyed, or suggested,
as ayp did not, the idea of activity, which they ascribed to the
soul. ILvevpa does indeed less distinctly express transitoriness than
when Xenophanes said that the soul was irvevpa, meaning that it was
as perishable as breath; but it is no less material when used by the
Stoics of the soul than it is in Epicharmus. It is the Stoics who
say that the soul is an exhalation or vapor (Euseb. P.E. xv. 20, 2,
Diels, Box., p. 470) and that it is nourished by the blood (Galen,
p. 248 M), joining with the latter statement the assertion that it
is irvevpa. If in any respect the Stoics have spirituaUzed the
conception of the soul, it is mainly or only by affirming the
same things both of the soul and of God, viz., that both were
both irvevpa and aupa, and by the fact that this term irvevpa
suggested activity more definitely than it had done at an earUer
time. On the other hand, Posidonius was the first whom we definitely
know to have used the word irvevpa as a predicate of God. And
in this perhaps he contributed indirectly to the ultimate develop
ment of the idea that God is immaterial spirit. Yet that he had
not himseU arrived at this thought is made probable by his
coupling with irvevpa the adjective irvpuSes. What he has done by
predicating irvevpa of God is what Xenophanes did in applying
irvevpa to the soul, viz., joined two terms together ready for the
time when the predicate irvevpa should acquire a more distinctly
non-material sense. ILvevpa as appUed both to the soul and to God
was stiU stuff, not God, and ultimately, though not emphatically,
material. 2dp£ is not a frequent term in either the early or later pre-
Christian Stoic writers. When it occurs, it is used in a purely
physical sense, signifying, as shown in the analysis of meanings,
the soft part of the body or the body as a whole. "Zupa is the
common term for the body, but neither aupa nor <rdp£ in any passage
definitely referable to the pre-Christian period bears an ethical
sense. For though, according to Seneca (Epist. 92. 10), Posidonius
121

122 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
says inutilis caro et fluida receptandis tantum cibis habilis, such a
statement involves only ordinary anti-Epicureanism, not a philo
sophic doctrine of the evil of the flesh. Whether the argument
of Schmekel that the conception of the body as a drag upon the
soul, as found in Seneca and Sextus Empiricus, is derived by them
from Posidonius is conclusive or not is immaterial at this point,
for the doctrine of even these later writers does not, in any
instance, amount to an ascription of ethical quality either to the
aupa or to the crdp£.

122

CHAPTER IV
IINEYMA, *YXH, AND SAPS IN GREEK WRITERS OF THE
EARLY CHRISTIAN PERIOD
The present chapter deals with the usage of Greek writers,
others than Jews and Christians, of the first two Christian centuries.
The authors here discussed are historians, geographers, orators,
and philosophers, and include Strabo (24), Musonius Rufus (66),
Cornutus (68), Epictetus (90), Plutarch (100), Dio Chrysostom
(100), Arrian (124), Maximus Tyrius (150), Lucian (150), Marcus
AureUus (160), Hermogenes (170), Pausanias (180). Of the types
of philosophic thought current in the Greco-Roman world in this
period two are of especial importance for the purposes of this study.
These are neo-Pythagoreanism and late Stoicism.
As in the preceding chapters, a general classification of the usage
of the words in the two centuries named will precede the discussion
of the doctrines of the particular groups of writers.
I. IINEYMA
1. Wind, whether a gentle breeze or blast.
Dio Chrys. ii. 115. 23: iroXXov yevoukvov irvebparos, Xidov eis robs
irbSas eKdary Xafiovaa uairep eppa ovru irkrovrai, birus py irapevexduaiv
birb rov irvebparos p.ySk rov apyvovs Siapdpruaiv.
A great wind arising, each [bee] taking a stone in its feet as ballast, thus
they fly, that they may not be carried along by the wind nor miss the swarm.
See also Plut. Timol. xix. 2. 5; C. Grac. xi. 1; Be virt. mor. 12
Dio Chrys. i. 92. 1; 399. 22; 408. 7; ii. 33. 31; 208. 21; 219. 8
263. 12; Luc. ii. 105. 20; 13. 19; 346. 10 (of gas in the bowels)
M. Aurel. iv. 3; v. 33; cf. Diog. Laert. vii. 8 (153, 154); Paus.
ii. 34. 2; in. 3. 6; 22. 11; vii. 24. 8; viii. 27. 14; x. 17. 10.
2. Air, or vaporous substance, tenuity rather than motion
being the chief characteristic thought of.
123] 123

124 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
Corn. 42. 6: arevoxupobpeva ydp ra kv abrfj (yy) irvevpara /cat
e^oSov Xyrovvra KXoveladai Kal pyxwadai abryv iroiel.
For the gases being compressed in it [the earth] and seeking outlet cause it
to be agitated and rent asunder.
See also Plut. Non posse suav. 27; Dio Chrys. i. 334. 15; ii. 2.
31 (cf. ps.-Hippoc, passage cited p. 80) ; Luc. ui. 648. 62; M. Aurel.
ix. 2; x. 7 (bis); xi. 20; xii. 30 (plural).
3. Breath of a living being, man or lower animal.
M. Aurel. iv. 3: kvvoyaas on ovk kiripiyvvrai Xeius y rpaxkus
Kivovpkvu irvebpan y Sidfoia.
Considering that the mind does not mingle with the breath, whether 'the
latter be moving gently or violently.
See also Plut. Bern. vi. 4; xi. 1; Dio Chrys. ii. 205. 4; M. Aurel.
ii. 2; Hermog. 158. 11.
In M. Aurelius irvevpdnov is also used for breath (as adpKiov and
aapdbiov are for flesh). See v. 33; viii. 25, 56; xii. 3, 14. Man
is composed of ra crdp/cia, to irvevpdnov, and rb yyepoviKov (vovs).
Cf. under M. Aurelius, p. 138.
In Hermogenes, who wrote on rhetoric in the time of Marcus
Aurelius, irvevpa is used as a rhetorical term, the exact meaning of
which is obscure, but evidently derived from irvevpa, meaning breath.
See 148, 158 f.
See also Luc. iii. 81. 8; Paus. iv. 8. 5; vii. 24. n.
4. The medium or bearer of psychic energy or power, sometimes
said to proceed from God, sometimes from the ruling faculty of
the mind.
Epict. Biss. ii. 23, 3: eUy ovv aoi b debs bcpdaXuobs eSuKev, eUrj
irvevpa kveKkpaaev abrols ovrus iaxvpbv Kal (piXbrexvov, uare ptKpav
k^iKvobpevov avapdaaeadai robs rbirovs ruv bpupkvuv.
Did then God give you eyes to no purpose ? and to no purpose did he
infuse into them spirit so strong and of such skilful contrivance as to reach a
long way and to fashion the forms of things which are seen ?
See also Dio Chrys. ii. 66. 5. Cf. Plut. Epit. iv. 21 (Diels,
Box., pp. 410-11, cited on p. 104); Galen Be plac. Hippoc. et Plat.
iii. 1 (cited on p. 101); Diog. Laert. vii. 1. 85 (cited on p. 102);
Plut. Epit. iv. 8. 15. 124

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 125
The roots of this usage Ue in the remote past and the process
of its development is gradual. When Xenophanes said that the
soul was irvevpa, he meant that it was perishable breath. When
Zeno said that it was irvevpa evdeppov, he apparently meant that
it was one of the four elements, or a mixture of two, air on the way
to become fire, or fire on the way to become air. When Chrysippus,
according to Galen, affirmed that it was irvevpa abpforov yplv and
that it extended from the principal part of the soul to the various
organs, where it was called voice, vision, hearing, etc., and when,
according to Diogenes Laertius, he made irvevpa the vitalizing
element of human semen (see p. 102), it is clear that, on the one
hand, this irvevpa was air or moisture, but; on the other, that it
was now air or moisture endowed with vitality. By the post-
Christian writers also irvevpa, meaning soul-stuff, was conceived of
as endowed with vital and vitalizing power. If the statements
of Plutarch, Galen, and Diogenes Laertius left this in question,
the passages from Epictetus and Dio Chrysostom would remove
aU doubt. 5. The informing principle of all existence, including the cohe
sive power of inanimate things.
Galen Introd. s. med. 9 (Arnim, II, 716): rov Se kpcpbrov irveb
paros Sirrbv elSos, rb pkv cpvaiKov, to 8k foxiKov. eial Sk oi Kal
rpirov eladyovai, to kKTiKov' e/crt/ccV pkv ovv kari irvevpa rb avvkxov
robs Xidovs, foaiKov 8k rb rpkcpov rd fcpa /cal rd ford, foxiKbv Sk to
kirl ruv kpfoxuv aiadyriKa re iroiovv ra £ua Kal Kivobpeva iraaav
Kivyaiv. Of the inborn irvevpa there is a twofold form — the physical and the psychi
cal. There are those, however, who introduce a third — the cohesive; cohesive
then is the irvevpa which holds together the stones, physical that which nour
ishes the animals and the plants, and psychical that which is found in animate
beings and imparts to the animals powers of perception, and every, kind of
motion. See also another instance in the same passage. Cf. Oxyr. Pap. II.
213, 1. 7. For fuUer discussion of this usage see pp. 139 f.
6. Spirit, a sentient, intelUgent, willing being, or the element
by virtue of which such a being is sentient, etc.
a) The human soul. 125

126 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
Epict. Biss. iii. 2. 22: otoi' kanv 17 XeKavy tov iiSaros, toiovtov y
foxy, olov if abyy if irpoairiirrovaa rcjS vSari, toiovtov ai tpavraaiai.
brav ovv to iiSup Kivydy, SoKel pkv Kal y abyrj Kiveladai, ob pevroi Kivelrai.
Kal brav roivvv aKorudy txs, obx at rkxvai Kal dperal avyxkovrai, dXXd
to irvevpa kcp' ov eiai- Karaardvros Sk Kadiararai KaKelva.
For the soul is like the dish of water and the appearances (events, phenom
ena) are like the ray that falls upon the water. When, therefore, the water
is moved, the ray seems to be moved, but is not moved. And when anyone
becomes blind (or has vertigo), it is not the arts and virtues that are thrown
into confusion, but the spirit upon which they are (projected) ; and when this
is restored, they also are restored.
Epictetus is here deprecating the tendency to confuse things that
are indifferent with those that are good or evil, maintaining
that men should look at things as they are (according to nature).
"The spirit" is apparently equivalent to "the soul." Yet it may
be that even here as in ii. 22. 3 "the spirit" is the nervous fluid
which, proceeding from the soul, imparts the power of vision.
See also M. Aurel. ix. 24.
b) A demon.
The existence of this meaning in Dionysius Halicarnassensis and
Josephus would suggest that it belonged to the usage of the Greek
writers of this period though this investigation has not chanced
to discover an instance.
n. *YXH
1. Life, loss of which is death, sometimes of lower animals,
but usually of men.
Dio Chrys. i. 365. 19: pvpioi 8' eialv oi ras i/o>xds irpoeipkvoi
kavruv birkp rys irbXeus.
Countless are those who have given up their own lives in behalf of
the city.See also Plut. Bern. xxix. 4; Dio Chrys. i. 99. 20; ii. 209. 7;
M. Aurel. iv. 48; xii. 24; cf. also v. 16 (dfoxos, eufoxos); Paus.
i. 30. 1; ii. 5. 8; iv. 10. 3; 21. 11; v. 11. 6; 20. 5; 27. 11; vii.
9. 5; 12. 4, 5; 13. 8; 16. 5;1 19. 5; viii. 2. 3;1 n. 7; 40. 2, 5;
44. 7; 51. 8; ix. 33. 1; x. 2. 4; 21. 3; 22. 4 (bis); 23. 12; 32. 17.
1 Used of animal as well as human life. 126

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 127
2. A shade, the soul of man existing after death, or departing
from the body at death.
Corn. 5. 6: els rovrov yap x^pelv yplv Kara rbv ddvarov at foxo.1
SoKovaiv. For our souls seem to depart from us to this [Hades] at death.
See also Corn. 74. 5; Hermog. 436. 11; Luc. i. 405. 1; 407. 3, 5;
457. 2; 483. 9; 519. 7; Paus. viii. 32. 4; 48. 6; ix. 30. 6; x. 28. 1.
3. Soul as a constituent element of a rational or sentient being;
the seat of vitaUty, thought, and emotion; especially with refer
ence to man, the human mind in the larger sense of the word; some
times used with special reference to the lower powers and capacities
of the soul, such as Ufe and motion, sometimes to the higher powers,
such as thought and emotion, but most frequently inclusively or
without clear discrimination.
a) AppUed to man.
Muson. Ruf. 87. 14-16: ob yap x^pl y ^oSl 4>iXoao(povpev obSk tco
aXXu aupan, foxy Sk Kal rabrys bXiyu pkpei, 0 Sy Sidvoiav KaXovpev.
For we do not philosophize with hand or foot or the rest of the body but
with soul, and with but a small part of this, which we call understanding.
See'also Muson. Ruf. 3. 14; 8. 1; 12. 15-19; 24. 9-11;
25. 5, 12, 14; 26. 9, 10; 38. 1; 44. 14; 58. 13, 17, 19; 69. 13;
74. 8; 95. 14; 96- 7; IX3- 8, 9; 124. 3; 134. 55 Corn. 3. 3, 8, 15;
21. 3; 35. 11; 38. 18; 47. 11; 58. 6; 63. 6; 64. 7; Plut. Timol.
prologue 3; Bern. i. 2; xxii. 1, 2; Sylla xiii. 1; Be lib. et aeg.1 i. 1.
5, 8; 2. 14, 15, 19; Non posse suav. 4. B. 369. 6, 12, 30; 370. 12,
21; 371. 14; 5- B. 372- 1; 373- S, 9; 7- B. 376. 22; 8. B. 378. 12; 9.
B. 380. 12; Be ira cohib. 462. F. 5, 9; Epict. Biss. ii. 10. 21; 12. 21,
22; 15. 4, 20; 17/20; 18. 11; 19. 26; 22. 34; 23. 42; 26. 3, 7; iii.
3. 2, 3, 4, 20; 7. 2, 4, 5, 6, 9; 15. 6; 22. 87; iv. 5. 26;
9. 16; n. 5, 6, 8 (quinquies); 12. 15; Frag. xiv. 5; Dio Chrys.
i. 5. 9; 7. 31; 12. 32; 14. 5; 39. 4; 4i- 2; 45- 4; Si- 4, 6, 9, 12,
16; 58.31; 61. 19; 62. 30; 63. 6; 64. 26; 68. 5; 69. 18, 23, 28; 75.
32; 78. 1, 6; 81. 29; 82. 18; 83. 15; 85. 7, 20; 87. 9, 26; 89. 31;
90.5; 91.28; 92.13; 97.28; 99.20; 133.14,30; 145. 13; 146.25;
148. 32; 149. 23; 154. 25; 223. 7, 11; 225. 18; 229. 30; 233. 29;
235. 19; 236. 1, 9; 244. 12; 250. 17, 23; 256. 15; 270. 7; 280. 1;
1 Bemardakis' edition of the MoraMa has been used.
127

128 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
28l. 12; 290. 3; 292. 2, II, 28, 30; 293. 26; 295. 31; 296. 19;
325. 28; 334. 7; 335. 7, 22; 365. 19; 417- i7, 22; 419. 25, 29;
420. 9; 422. 26; 427. 24; 431. 18; ii. 17. 14; 58. 9; 65. 10;
66. 7; 86. 23; 91. 27; 98. 24; 116. 27; 137. 4; 147- 21; 151. 31;
152. 4; 183. 8; 200. 20; 204. 1; 209. 7; 215. 32; 231. 16; 235.
23; 240. 21; 241. 12, 18; 291. 4, 9; 293. 23; 305. 30; 328. 29;
330. 16, 23; 335. 14; 336"- 21; 338- 45 342. 24, 31; 344. 11; 351.
5; 356. 22; Max. Tyr. freq. especially in vii and x; Luc. i. 14.
10; 15. 2; 42. 7; 43. 2; 54. 9; 55. 10; 57. 10; 59. 10; 64. 3;
67. n; 68. 2; 73. 9; 77. 15, 17; 78. 5; 79. 10; 80. 1; 81. 3; 141.
16; 181. 19; 404- 17; 542- 16; 555. 16; 556. 4; 557. 14; 566. 15;
607. 9; 637. 1; 671. 9; 674. 18; 682. 3; 729. 10; 758. 9;1 M. Aurel.
ii. 6 (bis), 8 (bis), 16, 17 (bis); iii. 4, 6, 7, 16 (bis; cf. ii. 2); iv. 3, 21,
29, 31, 41 (foxdpiov); v. 5, 11 (bis), 16, 19 (ter), 26, 27, 33, 36;
vi. 14 (quater), 25, 29, 32, 52, 53; vii. 16, 63; viii. 28, 29, 45; ix. 3,
8 (bis), 9, 27, 34; x. 1, 36 (foxdpiov); xi. 1 (bis), 3, 12, 16, 18 (bis),
39; xii. 7, 26, 28, 29, 30 (bis); Hermog. 20. 15; 26. 18, 21; 47. 19;
135.15; 221.17; 229.5; 340-9J 343- J9; 345- x; 393-8; 444-14!
Paus. iv. n. 2; 32. 4; vii. 17. 3; viii. 49. 3.
b) Applied to animals :
Dio Chrys. i. 422. 26: wore ryv pyrkpa abrov ~K.aXXibiryv 5td ryv
irpbs rbv vlbv evvoiav Kal cpiXiav airyaapkvyv irapd Aids rd aupara
abruv perafiaXelv eis rbv avdpuiruv rbirov, ras pkvroi i/'uxds Siapkveiv,
olai irpbrepov yaav.
So that his [Orpheus'] mother, Calliope, on account of their [birds and
sheep] good will and love toward her son begged Zeus that their bodies be
changed into human form but their souls remain such as they formerly were.
See also Dio Chrys. ii. 293. 23; Luc. i. 567. 4.
c) Ascribed to the universe.
Corn. 32. 2: irapaSeSopkvov roivvv dvudev on b LLpopydebs kirXaaev
e/c rys yfjs rb ruv avdpuiruv ykvos, birovoyrkov ILpopydka eipyadai ryv
irpopydeiav rys kv rols bXois foxy*, yv kKdXeaav ol veurepoi irpbvoiav.
Since tradition has handed down that Prometheus formed the race of men
from the earth, it is to be supposed that the forethought of the soul which is in
all things, which moderns call providence, is called Prometheus.
1 The second and third volumes furnish some 85 further instances, but it has not
been thought best to burden the list by citing them.
128

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 129
See also Corn. 3. 4, 14(F); Dio Chrys. ii. 58. 9; M. Aurel. iv.
40; xii. 30, 32.
Concerning the quantitative use of "soul" see under Marcus
Aurelius, p. 139.
d) Ascribed to God.
M. Aurel. v. 34: 8bo ravra Koiva ry re tov deov Kal ry rod avdpu
irov Kal iravrbs Xoyimv £uov foxy-
These two things are common both to the soul of God and of man and of
every rational animal.
In Dio Chrys. ii. 66. 7 occurs the statement that Zeus may not
inappropriately be said to consist of soul and body.
4. By natural metonymy, the vital or conscious element in man
standing for the man himself, foxy, is used with the meaning person.
Dio Chrys. i. 85. 20: irXaj'coj'Tai Kara rbv fiiov baai foxal irpbs
pkv irbvovs SetXal /cat dSvvaroi, SeSovXupkvai Sk ifbovals, 4>iXy8ovoi /cal
<piXoauparoi. There wander through life souls that are timorous in respect to labor and
incapable, slaves of pleasure, lovers of pleasure, and lovers of the body.
See also Dio Chrys. i. 417. 17; 419. 29; M. Aurel. v. 32 (bis);
Hermog. 166. 4; 198. 21.
5. Characterized as "irrational" it apparently denotes the
informing principle of inanimate things (cf . irvevpa 5) , yet perhaps
only the soul of the irrational animal (36, above). See M. Aurel.
x- 33, P- 139- m. SAPH
1. The soft muscular portion or portions of the body of man or
beast. Epict. Biss. ii. 9. 18: rb fipudkv kirkcpdy, dveSbdy, vevpa kyevero,
adpKes, barka, alpa, evxpoia, evirvoia.
That which has been eaten is digested, assimilated, becomes tendons,
muscles, bones, blood, good complexion, good respiration.
See also Epict. iv. 7. 32; Dio Chrys. i. 334. 19; Luc. i. 408. 12;
Paus. x. 22. 3.
2. By synecdoche <rdp£ (also in the plural) denotes the body, or
is qualitatively appUed to any part of the body without distinction
of flesh, skin, and bones. 129

130 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
Muson. Ruf. 106. n, 12: ol pkv obv Xeibryra re Kal airXbryra
aapKos 81a tuv aKeiraapdruv pyxo-vupevoi X€'PW T& o'upara Toiovaiv.
Some therefore contriving smoothness and softness of flesh by means of
the coverings render their bodies worse.
See also Plut. Non posse suav. 2. B. 364. 19; 3. B. 365. 18;
366. 17; 367. 8; 368. 1; 4. B. 369. 22; 371. 17; 5. B. 373. 3, 4, 14,
19; 374. 1; 6. B. 375. 9, 13, 14; 7. B. 376. 22 (Ms); 8. B. 377. 24;
9. B. 380. 3; Epict. Biss. i. 3. 5 (aapdSiov, "body"); 20. 17, 18;
ii. 8. 2; 22. 19; 23. 20, 22; iii. 7. 3-10, 24; Luc. iii. 907. 13; M.
Aurel. v. 26; vi. 28 (aapdSiov) ; vii. 66; vUi. 56; x. 8, 24; U. 2
(adpKia). In all the passages from Epictetus cited above the word
is used in a depreciatory sense.
IV. NEO-PYTHAGOREAN USAGE
The Uterature of neo-Pythagoreanism consists of about ninety
writings ascribed to some fifty different authors. It is largely
pseudonymous, its ostensible authors being outstanding represen
tatives of the ancient school, as, e.g., Philolaus, Archytas, and
Timaeus of Locris. Zeller beUeves that it arose chiefly at Alexan
dria and in the two centuries 100 B.C. to 100 a.d. Cicero says that
P. Nigidius Figulus (died 45 B.C.) undertook to revive Pythagorean-
ism at Rome. The material is collected in Mullach's Fragmenta
Philosophorum Graecorum, Vols. I and II.
The neo-Pythagoreans apparently did not employ irvevfia as a
prominent term of their philosophic vocabulary. In the SimiUtudes
"of the Pythagoreans and others" it occurs once, meaning "wind,"
in a passage ascribed to Aristonymus (MuUach, op. cit., I, 489. 19;
Stob. Eel. iii. 1. 97). In the Pythag. Fragg.Varia (MuUach, II, 66. 2,
5) it occurs in an ascription to the Stoics of their famiUar doctrine
that the soul is irvevpa evdeppov. Sextus Empiricus (225 A.D.)
ascribes to the foUowers of Pythagoras and Empedocles the doc
trine, akin to that which Aristotle says was held in his day (see
pp. 139 f. and cf. p. 22), that there is one irvevpa which permeates
the whole world Uke a soul and unites us to the irrational animals.
But his failure to indicate precisely to what writers or period he
means to ascribe this doctrine makes it impossible to affirm
130

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 131
that it was held by the neo-Pythagoreans of the period of which
we are speaking.
Vvxy is commonly used in the sense of "soul," as the seat of
inteUectual and moral Ufe. A typical example is the Pythagorean
simiUtude, Koapyrkov iepbv p.kv avadypaaiv ryv 8k foxyv padypaaiv.
A temple should' be adorned with votive offerings, but the soul with
knowledge [Mullach, op. cit., I, 493. 96].
According to Alex. Polyhistor (Diog. Laert. vii. 19 ff. [28]), they
held that the soul is a fragment of the aether, both warm and cold,
distinguishable from Ufe (fay), and immortal because that from
which it is detached is immortal. It is divided into three parts,
m>0s, (ppyv, and dvpbs (§30), the first and last being found in other
animals, but the second only in man; the reasoning power is
immortal and the soul is nourished by the blood, and reasons are
the winds (dvepoi) of the soul.
2dp£ seems to have played no special part in neo-Pythagoreanism.
In a passage ascribed to Pythagoras (Stobaeus, op. cit., iv. 37. 13;
MuUach, op. cit., I, 500. 20) it apparently means the body without
ethical impUcation. No other instances have been noted in neo-
Pythagorean writers. In the neo-Platonic writers of the fourth
century (IambUchus Adhort. ad Phil. 21; MuUach, op. cit., I,
506. 28) the body is regarded as the prison of the soul, and, since
even Plato taught this, it would not be surprising to find the idea
in the neo-Pythagoreans of the first century. Definite evidence
of it has not, however, been discovered. In the writings of Didy-
mus, a Pythagorean of the first century a.d. (Mullach, op. cit),
body and soul are often spoken of together but without charac
terization of the former as evil. To the Peripatetics he ascribes
the view that the goods of the body are inferior to those of the
soul, but they are still goods, and the body is definitely said to be
friendly to us. These views Didymus does not oppose, and indeed
in one passage in which he is apparently expressing his own opinion
he says:
For if man is desirable for his own sake so also the parts would be desirable
for their own sake. But the parts of a man, completely considered, are body
and soul; so that the body, too, would be desirable [Mullach, op. cit., II,
88. i,fin.\. 131

132 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
The earUest testimony we possess as to the views of the neo-
Pythagoreans concerning the ultimate elements of the universe
is from Alexander Polyhistor, 80-40 B.C. (cf. ZeUer, Philosophie der
Griechen, III, 2, p. 108), quoted by Diogenes Laertius (viii. 19. [24]) :
Alexander says in the Successions of the Philosophers also that he found
these things in Pythagorean commentaries; the monad is the beginning
of all things. And from the monad the indefinite duad arises, so that
matter is made subject to the monad which is cause. And from the monad
and the indefinite duad the numbers arise and from the numbers the
signs 
In this passage nothing is said about the origin of evil. In
pseudo-Archytas, however, quoted by Stobaeus, Eel. i. 41. 2, it is
affirmed that the most general principles are form and substance, the
former corresponding to the ordered and definite, the latter to the
unordered and undefined; the former being of beneficent, and
the latter of destructive, nature. A similar doctrine is in pseudo-
Plutarch ascribed to Pythagoras:
Placita i. 3. 8: Pythagoras says that the numbers are elements; and again
that the monad and the undefined duad are in the elements. And of the
elements the one is according to him directed toward the active and formative
cause, which is mind and God, and the other to the passive and material,
which is the visible world.
Ibid. i. 7. 18: Pythagoras says that of the principles the monad is God
and the good, which is the nature of the one, the mind [6 vovs] itself. And
the undefined duad is a demon and the evil, belonging to which is the material
mass, and it is the visible world.
Vita Horn. 145: He [Pythagoras] held the ultimate principles to be two,
calling them the defined monad and the undefined duad, the one being the
cause (or principle) of good things, the other of evil things.
Here we seem clearly to find the doctrine that there are two
principles, the one beneficent and the other maleficent, and the
latter identified or associated with matter. On the other hand,
these statements manifestly apply, not to Pythagoras himseh, but
to the neo-Pythagorean school, and this in turn raises the question
in what period this doctrine, that the origin of evil is in matter,
was held. Its absence from the earUest testimony concerning
the views of the school, and apparently, indeed, from such writers
as Sextus Empiricus, Simplicius, and Hippolytus, makes it doubtful
when it became a part of the teaching of the school. It is noticeable,
132

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 133
moreover, that the testimony which we have from pseudo-Archytas-,
pseudo-Plutarch, and Epiphanius does not enter into details, nor
define whether physical or moral evil is meant.
V. STOICS AND WRITERS INFLUENCED BY STOICISM
Among post-Christian writers more or less strongly influenced
by Stoicism, none is more important than Seneca, whose Ufe was
almost conterminous with that of the apostle Paul. Although
writing in Latin, he is an important source of information concern
ing the thought of the period. According to Arnold he was the
last Roman who made a systematic study of Stoicism in the original
authorities. Seneca's term animus, Uke the foxy of the earUer Stoics, is a
functional term denoting the seat of feeling, thought, and will.
With the question of its substance he was apparently less con
cerned than some of his predecessors. This investigation has at
least discovered no passage in which he predicates of it either
spiritus or corpus. The body is for him a temporary, decadent
affair, a burden on the soul, a check on ambition (Ep. 120. 17),
but he goes no farther than this into the philosophy of the matter.
There is no suggestion that it is, by virtue of a corrupting quahty
in matter, a positive source of moral evil. He stops short even of
Plato (see p. 40), in his approach to a suggestion of an ultimate
duaUsm of mind and matter, the former good, the latter evil (Bial.
xu. 11. 6, 7; Ep. 65. 16; 92. 10, 33; 120. 17; N.Q. vii. 31. 3, cited
by Arnold, p. 258). Indeed, Seneca speaks strongly of the dignity
of the body as a dwelUng-place, even though temporary, of the
soul (Ep. 92. 13; 95. 33; 120. 14; cf. Cic. Be nat. deor. U. 54-58,
cited by Arnold, p. 259).
Death is foUowed, as with Vergil (Aeneid vi. 724-51), by a period
of purgation, after which the soul finds its way to the higher regions,
eventuaUy being absorbed into the primal elements (Bial. vi. 23. 1;
25. 1; 26. 7; Ep. 57. 8; cited by Arnold, p. 259). The necessity
of purgation evidently arises from the experiences of the soul
in the period of its residence in the body, but Seneca does not say
that that from which the soul requires purgation is a poUution
derived from the matter of which the body is composed. There
. 133

134 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
is nothing in his language to show that he goes beyond the fact of
common experience that men in the period of bodily life commit
sin; while against the view that he ascribes moral evil to the
corrupting influence of the body is a passage in Ep. 65. 16, where,
if poena be taken in its usual and proper sense, he definitely ex
presses the old Orphic theory that the body is a punishment of
the soul,1 the sequel to sin, not the cause of it.
Musonius Rufus, a Stoic philosopher of the time of Nero, does
not use the term irvevpa. He employs soul and body as complemen
tary terms, and once (24. 9-1 1) says expressly that man is a com
posite of soul and body. That foxy was for him a term inclusive of
aU the vital and psychical elements of man is suggested in 87. 14-16 :
For we do not philosophize with hand or foot or the rest of the body, but
with soul, and with but a small part of this, which we call understanding
[Siavota]. When, accordingly, he makes the soul the organ through which
man knows God, saying (134. 5),
Why dost thou tarry, or what art thou waiting for ? Cut out the dead
part of thy soul and thou shalt know God!
the soul must doubtless be understood as possessing this power
by virtue of the understanding, Sidvoia. Musonius uses crap! only
once, and then it denotes flesh in the physical sense.
Cornutus, a Stoic contemporary of Musonius Rufus, uses irvevpa
in the sense of gas or vapor. It has no ethical, vital, or theological
meaning. He employs foxy sixteen times in senses already familiar.
He holds that the soul is composed of fire and located in the head.
Zeus is the all-permeating world-soul. Cornutus also furnishes
examples of the usage, as old as Homer, of ^i>xat used of the spirits
of the dead in Hades. 2dp£ does not occur.
Plutarch, one of the most voluminous and best-known writers
of the first century a.d., who wrote about a generation later than
1 The impression that Seneca ascribes morally corrupting power to the body
by virtue of its materiality seems to have arisen from what is clearly shown by the
context to be a misinterpretation of putre inEp.i 20. 1 7 and of inficitur in Dial. vi. 24. 5
In the former case he is clearly contrasting the body, as a ruinous, ramshackle, and
hence temporary, dwelling of the soul, with its aspirations after eternal things. In
the latter, the words that precede inficitur and those that follow, referring to the
soul as imprisoned and restrained, naturally require, not the derived meaning "stained,"
but the proper sense "submerged." 134

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 135
Seneca and Paul, is somewhat difficult to classify. Though un
doubtedly much influenced by the Stoics and Academics, he was
himseh an eclectic rather than an adherent of any one school.1
In the progress of this study hundreds of passages which illustrate
his use of the terms under discussion have been collected and
examined. In Be defectu oraculorum 50, 51 he uses irvevpa in con
nection with the exhalation that arose out of the ground at
Delphi and was the cause of the inspiration of the prophetess.
When this exhalation instead of inspiring the Pythia produces
disastrous effects he calls it a "dumb and evil irvevpa." Yet he
also affirms that the power of the "spirit" is divine and celestial or
demonic, but not perpetual or incorruptible or capable of enduring
forever. The whole passage iUustrates the ascription of super
natural and psychical effects to a subject itself substantiaUy defined
and materiaUy conceived; irvevpa is throughout vapor, but, as
vapor, is according to circumstances "inspiring" or "dumb"
and "evil."
The passages quoted on pp. 101 f (cf. p. 81), in which irvevpa
denotes the substance of the soul and a nervous fluid extending
from the ruUng part of man to the various organs, though affirma
tions about the views of the Stoics, doubtless reflect a usage still
current in Plutarch's own day. It is still for him a term of sub
stance, soul-stuff. He apparently never uses it in an individuaUzing
or functional sense as a synonym for foxy-
^vxy occurs with great frequency in Plutarch. Prevaihngly,
at least, in the Non posse suaviter, Epit., and Be virtute et vitio,
it means the soul of man as the seat of emotion, thought, and will.
His usage calls for no special discussion.
2dp£ occurs more frequently in Plutarch than in any previous
philosophic writer. It usuaUy has the meaning "body." It might
be expected that in opposing Epicureanism, which he interpreted
as essentiaUy sensuaUsm, he would have been led to ascribe moral
evil to the flesh. But though he constantly disparages the pleasures
of the flesh or body as compared with those of the soul, not even
in his polemic against Epicurus (Non posse suaviter), nor in his
1 R. M. Jones, The Platonism of Plutarch, 1916, maintains that he is really a
Platonist. 135

136 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
essay concerning virtue and vice, does he find in the flesh the root
of moral evil or give to the term an ethical sense.1
In the Consolatio ad Apollonium, indeed, comforting Apollonius
over the death of his son and quoting from Socrates the statement
that death is either like a very deep sleep or a long journey or is
the utter extinction of soul and body, and that, whichever it is, it
is not an evil, he says: "For to live in freedom from the flesh and
its passions by which the mind is distracted and filled with mortal
folly is a happy and blessed thing." Writing for such a purpose he
naturally, like many a Christian writer of later days, emphasizes the
evils of the present Ufe and the advantage of being freed from them.2
But not even this passage furnishes evidence of being rooted in an
ethical duaUsm of mind and matter. That this is not his view is
made more clear by the extended quotation from Plato's Phaedo
(64-68), in which the latter as already pointed out makes the body
a hindrance to the soul's development, but not intrinsicaUy evil.
The teachings of Epictetus, a Stoic contemporary of Plutarch,
though perhaps a Uttle younger, are preserved to us by his pupil
Arrian. He regards man as dichotomous, consisting of body and
soul. The substance of the soul is irvevpa, which is also one of the
four elements (iii. 13. 15); death is the separation of the body
from the irvevpa (iii. 24. 93, 94) ; vision is made possible by the irvevpa
infused into the eyes (ii. 23. 3), a statement which reminds us of
Plutarch Epit. iv. 15. ILvevpa is then to Epictetus a term of sub
stance, "a vital spirit .... a nervous fluid," as Schweighauser
calls it.
^vxy is for Epictetus the seat of Ufe (iii. 22. 87) and thought,
but especially of will. It is the supreme and best element in man.
Thus, in vii. 3. 10:
For that there are three things that relate to man, soul, body, and things
external, scarcely any man denies. It remains then for you philosophers to
1 According to Zeller, Philosophie der Griechen, III, 2, pp. 186 ff., Plutarch, unwill
ing to ascribe the origin of evil to God, and unable to deny its existence — to both of
which expedients the Stoics had resorted — found the source in a world-soul, distinct
alike from matter, itself self-existent, and God. Matter is the sphere of operation
both of good and of evil, in its lowest parts subject to the power of evil, but according
to its true nature yearning after the good and the divine.
* It is a noteworthy fact that alike in Plato, Seneca, and Plutarch the passages
which seem to come nearest to characterizing the body as evil are of this consolatory
character. 136

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 137

\

answer which is best. What shall we say to men ? Is the flesh the best ? . . . .
What, then, do we possess better than the flesh ? The soul, he replied. (See
also i. 3. 5, 6; 20. 17-18; ii. 1. 17; 23. 3, 20-22; iii. 13-15; iv. 7. 32.)
Epictetus, indeed, uses atpeo-ts, irpoaipeais, and rb Kvpievov for the
soul even more frequently perhaps than foxy itself.
2dp£ is sometimes used by Epictetus of the soft part of the body,
more commonly of the body as a whole. Epictetus continually
depreciates the body or the flesh as compared with the soul; but
on the other hand he does not find in the body or the flesh, by
virtue of its character as matter, the source of moral evil. He is
an anti-Epicurean morahst, not a philosophic duahst. Both soul
and body go back at length to the four elements, which are not
sharply distinguished from one another as regards their relation
to soul and body respectively, and not distinguished at all ethically.
There are, indeed, in both Plutarch and Epictetus indications of a
movement in the direction of an ethical duaUsm, especially in the
fact that flesh, which may be described as a middle term between
body and matter (vXy), tends to take the place of body in ethical
discussions. But neither of them actually arrives at an ethical
dualism. In particular it is to be noted that irvevpa and <rdp£ are
not set in antithesis, and that neither of them is an ethical term.
The writings of Dio Chrysostom (50-125 a.d.), an orator with
Stoic tendencies, are extensive and deal with a large variety of
subjects, historical, biographical, Uterary, political, and ethical.
They probably reflect the ordinary Uterary usage of the times,
save as this may have been affected by his conscious efforts to
foUow the earUer classical models. ILvevpa occurs twelve times,.
mostly in its usual senses of wind, air, breath. In a striking pas
sage (U. 66. 5) the formative and active element in generation is
said to be irvevpa. ^vxy occurs over one hundred times meaning
Ufe and soul. It frequently stands in antithesis to aupa, with the
impUcation that the cr<3p,a is inferior. 2dp£ occurs but once, and
wifh the meaning flesh. Hvevpa and foxy are never set in antithesis
to crdp£, and moral evil is never traced either to crdp£ or to aupa.
In the Charidemus two theories are advanced to account for the
iUs of human Ufe: one that men are descended from the Titans,
and, because the latter were enemies of the gods, the gods take
137

138 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
vengeance on men; the other that men are descended, not from the
Titans, but from the gods, and are loved by the gods, the world
having been made for their pleasure, but that evil arises when men
choose to follow intemperance rather than reason (vovs). In the
first instance it is not at all, and in the second not emphaticaUy,
moral evil that is spoken of.
These facts, taken in connection with the relative frequency
and wide range of meaning of foxy, the entire absence of the use
of irvevpa as a psychological term or as a predicate of God, and the
absence of any ethical use of the word adp£,1 tend to indicate that
the New Testament usage of these words has been developed
under influences quite different from those which affected the
common Greek usage of the century, if the latter is adequately
represented by Dio Chrysostom.
In Marcus AureUus we have not a philosopher, strictly speak
ing, but a thoughtful man of affairs, a man of deep moral earnest
ness, who wrote down his meditations for his own benefit. Though
much influenced by Stoicism, he is not to be classed as a Stoic
philosopher, nor can there be found in his writings an altogether
consistent psychology. He wrote a full century after the apostle
Paul, but may legitimately be included in the present study
because he .furnishes to a certain extent an indication of the rate
of movement of philosophic and ethical thought.
ILvevpa in Marcus AureUus sometimes means simply air, but
also (and this appUes to irvevpdriov) breath, breath of Ufe; yet
this is defined as wind (dvepos) and is associated with the adpl-
(aapdSiov, or KpedSiov) as in ii. 2. This investigation has discovered
no clear instance of irvevpa or irvevpdnov as an individualized term
meaning (intelUgent) spirit. Apparently Marcus AureUus is not a
trichotomist, although he employs various trichotomous series, as,
e.g., adpua, irvevpa (or irvevpdnov) , rb ifyepoviKbv (ii. 2); aupa, foxy,
vovs (iii. 16); aupdnov, irvevpdnov, vovs (xii. 3); cf. also aupAnov,
foxy (vi. 32). He regards man as composed of body and soul;
but soul is endowed with life and intelUgence, or the soul is
identified with the self and distinguished as such from the body
(iv. 41; x. 1). As the second term of a trichotomous series,
1 Nor is evil, so far as observed, in any way traced to matter.
138

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 139
irvevpa may approach or equal foxy, including life and the power
of motion. Vvxy denotes all in man that is not body, including both the
Ufe-principle and the element of intelhgence, choice, etc. (vi. 32;
cf. v. 26); the life-principle only (rare, iii. 16); the element of
intelhgence, etc., equivalent to the "ruUng part" (v. n, and fre
quently by impUcation). Soul is ascribed to God (v. 34) and the
universe (iv. 40; cf. viii. 54). Vvxy is also used quantitatively
(ix. 8), as irvevpa is in other writers. Man's, soul is a part of the
universal soul, as are all the souls of beings that have souls
(xii. 1, 26, 30, 32). Incarnated in a lower animal it becomes a foxy
dXoyos (x. 33) ; in man and other rational beings (v. 34), a foxy voepd.
Though distinguished from the body, the soul is Uable to extinction
or dispersion at death, being only an exhalation from the blood
(v. 33). Three possibilities await it: extinction, dispersion, and
continued existence (viii. 25; xii. 3); but he has no expectation of
the last.
Sdpf, usuaUy represented by its equivalents adpKia, aupanov,
aupa, denotes one element of man's nature and this in itseU inert.
There is no trace in Marcus AureUus of the thought that the flesh
is the source of moral evil. Like Epictetus, he is an anti-Epicurean
morahst, not a philosophic duaUst. Equally absent is any asser
tion of the superiority of irvevpa over 1^x17. God has a foxy, but
is never said to be irvevfia, and if there is any difference between
the terms as appUed to man, irvevpa is the more material and foxy
the more psychical. VI. THE ALL-PERMEATIVE nNETMA
A few words may be added concerning iryevpa conceived of as
permeating aU things, whether animate or inanimate. Hints of
this doctrine are found in Plutarch Be virt. mor. 12; Galen Introd.
s. med. 9., p. 726K (Arnim, II, 716); and Be Hipp, et Plat, vi,
p. 561K (Arnim, II, 710); Diog. Laert. vii. 84 (156), and earliest
of aU in Varro (26 B.C.) as quoted by Augustine Civ. Bei vii. 23,
cited by Arnold, Roman Stoicism, p. 190, where, however, anima
is more probably the equivalent of foxy than 7n>e0p.a. FinaUy, in
Sextus Empiricus (225 a.d.) we find a fully developed doctrine of
139

140 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
irvevpa as permeating aU things. In Ad physicos 126-31 he refutes
the Pythagorean objection to the eating of the flesh of animals
because "there is one irvevpa which extends hke a soul throughout
the world, which also unites us to them" by the reply that the
argument proves too much. By the same token we could not cut
plants and stones, he says, because there is a irvevfia that runs
through us and all these. As early as the days of Aristotle there
were those who conceived of irvevpa as the vital and generative
substance that permeated all living things; Chrysippus, as Arms
Didymys testifies, made the world-stuff self -moving irvevpa; by
Seneca's time the suggestion had been made that the universe was
the work of a divine spirit (divinus spiritus) diffused through aU
things great and small; a little later Plutarch and Epictetus, as
did also Galen in the second century, conceive of irvevpa as a vital
and nervous fluid, flowing from the soul to the eyes and other
organs of sense; Galen apphes the term irvevpa eKriKov to what
Plutarch had already called efts ("cohesion"), and finaUy Sextus
Empiricus in the third century definitely identifies the irvevpa
which is in man with that which permeates also the plants and
the rocks. Whenever this doctrine arose, both it and the doctrine
of Chrysippus have this in common, viz., that to both there Ues
close at hand the identification of the irvevpa with God. Yet there
seems to have been a singular reluctance to take the next step and
say that God i&irvevpa. Posidonius is the only~Greek writer earUer
than the author of the Fourth Gospel whom we definitely know
to have made this statement.

140

CHAPTER V
nNEYMA, #YXH, AND 2APH IN JEWISH-GREEK LITERATURE
This Uterature ranges from the middle of the fourth century
B.C., if we accept the earUest date assigned to the Book of Tobit,
to the early part of the first century a.d. In bulk it is three or
four times as great as the Old and New Testaments. Quasi-
historical works written with a moral purpose, books of wisdom,
exegesis, and apocalyptic, psalms, legends, and additions to canon
ical writings are among the types represented. For the exphcation
of terms in the New Testament this closely related literature is of
the utmost value. The following is an exhibit of the meanings of
our terms in this Uterature. I. nNEYMA
I. Wind, whether a gentle wind or blast.
Jos. Bell. iv. 477 :r dcfriKopevos yovv Kad' laropiav kir' abryv Obea-
iraaiavbs e/ceXewe nvas ruv velv ovk kiriarapkvuv Sedkvras biriau ras
Xelpas oupyvai Kara tov fivdov, Kal avvkfiy irdvras kirivyl-aadai Kaddirep
birb irvebparos dvu fiia^opkvovs.
When Vespasian reached it [Lake Asphaltitis], as the story goes, he com
manded certain of those who did not know how to swim to have their hands
bound behind and to be thrown down into the deep, and it came to pass they
all came up as if they were forced upward by a wind.
See also Sir. 39:28; 43:17; Dan. 3:50, 65; Sib. Or. iii. 102.
Wisd. 5:11, 23; 7:20; 13:2; 17:17. Schoemaker2 Usts about
forty-five instances of this usage in Philo, some of which (marked
1 In the supplementary lists of citations references to translated works are given
first. Josephus is counted among original Greek works, despite the fact that the War
was originally written in Aramaic, because the translation is by the author himself.
Citations usually refer to the edition of Niese, Flami Josephi Opera (Berlin, 1887).
Only occasional examples are cited from the Greek version of the canonical books of
the Old Testament, as these would be largely repetitions of the long lists given in the
chapter on the usage of the Hebrew words.
2 "The Use of ITPI in the Old Testament and of ILvevpa. in the New Testament,''
by William Ross Schoemaker, in the Journal of Biblical Literature, 1904, Part I,
pp. 13-67; also issued separately.
41] 141

142 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
below with a *), however, appear to refer to air rather than wind.
The following is his Ust, sUghtly amended:1 Op. mund. 29. 4*; 30.
1*, 2*; 58. 6; 131. 15; Leg. alleg. iii. 53. 6; Cherub. 37. 8; 38. 2;
in. 6; Post. Caini 22. 4; Gigant. 9. 4*; 10. 5*; Quod deus immut.
60. 4; Agric. 174. 4; Ebriet. 106. 2*; Migrat. Abr. 148. 6; 217. 4;
Qwis rer. div. 208. 3; Congr. erud. gr. 133. 5; Somn. ii. 13. 4; 67. 8;
85. 4; 86. 4; 166. 4; .4 Jr. 43. 2; 92. 4; 160. 4; Josepho. 33. 1;
Fito Afos. i. 41. 2; 179. 4; iii. 104. 3; Spec. leg. i. 26. 2; 92. 1;
301. 2; ii. 71. 6; iv. 28. 1; 217. 4(?); Proem, et poen. 41. 7; iwcor.
wwwd. 11. 3; 139. 4; Zi&. in Flacc. 155. 5; Zeg. ad Gai. 177. 2;
Mund. 20 (Richter); Frog, (quater). Examples also occur in Jos.
Ant. i. 27; ii. 343,349; iv. 55; viii. 346; ix.36, 210; x. 279; xii. 75;
xiv. 28; xvi. 17, 20, 62.
II. Breath, or breath of life.
Jos. Ant. iii. 291 : pyKos pkv e\ei iryxvalov bXiyu Xelirov, arevy 8'
kari obpiyl- avXov fipaxel iraxvrkpa, irapkxovaa Sk evpos dpKovv kirl
ru arbpan irpbs biroSoxyv irvebparos ktX.
It [the trumpet] has a length a little less than a cubit, and the narrow
mouthpiece is thicker in size than a flute, but has a breadth sufficient for
receiving breath at the mouth.
See also Jer. 10:14; Enoch 14:2; Bel 36.
Wisd. n : 20 (Ms) ; 15:11; Ep. Jer. 25 (24) ; Letters of HeracUtus2
vii. 63; Philo3 Leg. alleg. K91. 6; Somn. 1:30. 3; Vita Mos. K93. 2;
Exsecrat. 144. 2; Quod deus immut. 84. 2; Incor. mund. 128. 5;
Leg. ad Gai. 63. 6; 125. 6; 188. 2; Frag.; Jos. Ant. xvU. 169. So
apparently figuratively in Philo Spec. leg. iv. 217. 4.
By metonymy, irvevpa fcoijs, breath of life, is used for a Uving
person. Jth. 10:13; cf- Gen. 6:17, etc.
III. Spirit: that of which sentient, conscious beings are com
posed or by virtue of which they are sentient and conscious.
1 Schoemaker employs the notation of the edition of Richter, to which also the
sections of the English translation by Yonge correspond. In these lists, however,
the edition used is that of Cohn and Wendland, the notation referring to sections and
lines of their edition. In the discussion on pp. 157 ff. the notation of the English
translation of Yonge is added in parenthesis instead of the line-number.
' In Bernays, Die herahlitischen Brief e, Berlin, 1869. 3 After Schoemaker.
142

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 143
i. Spirit of God, as the source of power, wisdom, and, rarely,
of life. Wisd. 1:7: ort irvevpa Kvpiov ireirXypuKe rifv o'lKovpkvyv, /cat rb
avvkxov rd irdvra yvuaiv exei cpuvfjs.
Because the spirit of the Lord fills the world and that which holds together
all things has knowledge of (every) voice.
See also Sir. 39:6; 48:12, 24; Jth. 16:14; Sus. 42 (45), 64(62);
Test. XII., Sim. 4:4; Lev. 2:3; 18:7, n; Jud. 20:5; 24:2;
Gad. 4:7; Ben 8:2; Ps. Sol. 17:42; i8:8(?).
Wisd. 1 : 5, 6 ; 7 : 7, 22 ; 9: 17 ; 1 2 : 1 ; ps.-Phoc.,l. 106 (cf .p: 19) ; Philo1
Op. mund. 144. 6;2 Leg. alleg. i. 33. 2,2 4, 5, 6; 37. 4, 5; 42. 2, 5;
Gigant. 19.2, 3; 22. 1, 3; 23. 3,2 4;2 24. 2, 4, 5; 27. i;2 28. i;2
29. 3;2 47. 6;2 53. 2;2 55. i;2 Quod deus immut. 1. $? 2. 3; Plant.
18. 5;2 24. 6;2 44. 4; Quis rer. div. 57. 2;2 265. 3;2 Fuga 186. 5;2
Somn. ii. 252. 2; Josepho. 116. 6; VitaMos. i. 175. 3; ii. 40. 7; iii.
265. 3;2 Becalog. 175. 6; Spec. leg. iv.\49. 5f Human. 135. 8; Nobil.
217. 7; Frag.; Jos. Ant. iv. 108, 118,2 119; vi. 166,2 222,2 223;
vui. 114, 408 ;2 x. 239.
In Wisd. 1:5, 6; 7:7, 22, the term spirit predicated of
wisdom personified might seem to mean a (good) spirit and so
to fall under 4; but in view of the connection between 1:5, 6
and 1:7 and of 9:17 (cf. also Deut. 34:9 and comment on p. 57),
it is better to interpret it as referring to the Spirit of God.
2. Spirit, as the substance of which the human soul, or its
dominant part, is composed,3 usually characterized as divine.
Philo Quis rer. div. 55. 5: e§o£e ru vopodkry Sirryv /cat ryv obaiav
elvai l^ux^s, atpa pkv rys SXys, tov 8' yyepaviKUTarov irvevpa delov.
It is the opinion of the lawgiver that the substance of the soul is two
fold — blood that of the whole soul and divine spirit that of the dominant
part of it.
See also Philo Op. mund. 135. 3; Spec. leg. iv. 123. 4,2 9, 10.
Similarly of the substance which extends from the dominant
part of the soul to the organs of sense. Philo Fuga. 182. 6. Cf.
Test. XII,, Reub. 2:3 ff.
1 After Schoemaker. 2 irvevpa Beiov.
3 Cf. meaning 3. p. 80, and meaning 4. p. 81; also p. 135.
143

144 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
3. The spirit of man.
a) As the seat of various passions, qualities, and emotions.
Jth. 7:19: /cat ot wot 'laparjX avefibyaav irpbs Kvpiov debv abruv,
on uXiyofoxyvev rb irvevpa abruv.
And the children of Israel cried unto the Lord their God because their
spirit was faint.
See also Sir. 31 (34): 13 (14); I Mace. 13:7; I Esd. 2:2, 7(8);
Bar. 3:1; Tob. 4:3(8); Jth. 14:6; Wisd. 5:3; Test. XII. Sim.
5:1; Jos. 7:2; IV Mace. 11:11.
Sometimes seemingly but probably not in reaUty, by metonymy
for an emotion or quality itself.
Jos. Bell. iU. 92 : /cat twos apyiov irvebparos biroiripirXdpevoi ry
fioy avve^aipovaiv ras 5e£tds.
And being filled with a certain warlike spirit, they raise up their right hands
with the battle-shout.
See also Sus. 42 (45) (Th.); Isa. 19:14; Ps. Sol. 8:15. On
Wisd. 1:5, 6; 7:7, 22, see under III. 1.
b) With kindred meaning, but with special reference to the
moral and reUgious life; sometimes associated with foxy-
Sir. 9:9 (13): py irore eKKXivy y foxy gov eV abryv, /cat tc£ irveb-
pari aov bXiadyays eis diruXeiav.1
Lest thy soul incline unto her and with thy spirit thou slide into destruction.
See also Ps. 34:18 (19); 50 (51) 19; Isa. 26:9; Hag. 1:14;
Dan. 3:39, 86; 5:4; Song of three, chap. 16; Wisd. 7:23.
c) As the seat of mentality.
I Chron. 28:12: rb irapdSeiypa b elxev kv irvebpari abrov ruv
abXuv oikov Kvpiov.
The pattern which he had in his mind of the courts of the house of the Lord.
See also Job 20:3; Isa. 29:24; Ezek. 11:56; 20:31; Test. XII.
Jud. 20:2; IV Mace. 7:14.
d) As the seat or cause of life: apparently not always, but
frequently, thought of as an entity capable of separate existence;
sometimes spoken of as pre-existing, sometimes as the cause of life
in the embodied person, sometimes as departing in death, or capable
1 But see the variant reading alipari for irveipari, vouched for by Clem. Alex, and
adopted by Box and Oesterley in Charles, Apoc. and Pseudepig. of the 0. T., I, 347.
144

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 145
of returning, sometimes as existing after death in a more or less
conscious state of misery or happiness.1 Cf. foxy, I.
Jos. Bell. vii. 185: rd 7dp KaXobpeva Saipbvia, ravra Sk irovypuv
kanv avdpuiruv irvevpara rols £uoiv eiaSvbpeva /cat Kreivovra robs
fioydeias py rvyxavovras ktX.
For the so-called demons, these are the spirits of evil men which, entering
into Uving men, slay them unless help comes.
See also Job 10:12; 12:10; Ps. 30 (3^:5; Isa. 42:5; Zech.
12:1; Tob.3:6; Bar. 2:17; Dan. 5:4; Enoch9:3, 10; 13:6; 20:3;
22:3-13; Sir. 38:23.
Wisd. 2:3; 15:11, 16; 16:14; II Mace. 7:22, 23; 14:46;
III Mace. 6:24; IV Mace. 12:20 («).; Test. XII. Gad. 5:9.
4. A superhuman, incorporeal being, but not divine.
a) An incorporeal heavenly being; frequent in Enoch I, and
probably used in the title "Lord of Spirits" applied to God in the
SimiUtudes, though the Greek text of this portion is not extant.
Enoch 15:4: /cat iipets yre dyioi kox irvebpa(ra) ^uvra aiuvia.
And ye were holy and spirits endowed with eternal life.
See also Jub. 2:20; Enoch 13:6; 15:6, 7, 8a, 10a; 20:6 (bis).
b) An evil spirit, which tempts or torments men; a demon;
sometimes conceived of as identical with the souls of the wicked
dead, including the giants above named.
Tob. 6:7 (8): 77 KapSia Kal to yirap, kdv riva bxXy Saipbviov y
irvevpa rrovypbv, ravra Sel Kairviaai kvuiriov avdpuirov y yvvaiKos, Kal
pyKkn bxXydy.
The heart and the liver, if a demon or evil spirit trouble anyone, are to
be smoked in the presence of a man or woman, and he will be troubled no
longer. 1 The range of usage here included is very wide, but it is impossible to divide the
examples into clearly distinguished subclasses. Nor is it easy to distinguish with
certainty the instances properly falling under this head from those which belong under
II, breath of life, for the reason that neither Hebrew nor Greek writers themselves
make a sharp distinction. TVT\ and irvevpa were to them not strictly immaterial
terms, and the "spirit" that departed at death or that came in life was closely
associated with the breath for which they often employed the same term. The pas
sages that are assigned to this head are so placed because it seems evident on the whole
that the writer is thinking of something else and more vital and sentient than the
breath. 145

146 - HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
See also I Kings 22:21-23; II Chron. 18:20-22; Enoch 15:9a,
11, 12; 16:1; 19:1; Test. XII. Reub. 2:1; 3:32.; Jud. i6:ietfreq.
Jos. Ant. vi. 211; cf. Bell. vii. 185 under 3 (d).
c) Without reference to the distinction between good and evil
spirits, or mode or place of existence; an incorporeal being in general.
Num. 16: 22: Geds tuv irvevpdruv Kal irdays crap/cos.
God of the spirits and of every corporeal being.
See also Jub. 2 : 2 fin. ; Test. XII. Jud. 20: 1. Cf. II Chron. 18: 23.
Philo Post Caini 67 (19); Agric. 44 (10).
II. tfYXH
1. Life, loss of which is death.
Jos. Bell. iv. 164: /cat Kaddirep kv epypia ryv kpavrov foxyv
kiriSuau pbvyv virkp rov deov.
And, as it were, alone in a desert I will give up my life for God's sake.
See also I Esd. 4:21; Jth. 7:27; 10:15; 12'-4', *3:2o; Tob.
12:10(8); i4:n(?); Sir. 51:3(6), 6(8); Sus. 55 (Ms); I Mace.
2:40,50; 3:21; 9:9,44; 12:51; i3:S-
Wisd. 14:5; 16:9; II Mace. 14:38; III Mace. 2:32; 6:6; IV
Mace. 9:7, 25; 12:20 (So V; A omits; K reads irvevpa); PhUo Op.
mund. 65. 3; Leg. alleg. iii. 70. 2; 71. 2(?); Quod del. pot. 80. 1, 2;
84. 2; 91. 3; 115. 1; Jos. Ant. i. 102;1 144 (Ms), 148, 159; iv. 278
(Ms); v. 147; vi. 215, 240, 287, 317; vii. 325; viU. 225, 300, 325,
326; ix. 119, 137, 240; x. 26, 53, 203; xi. 52, 255, 278; xii. 431;
xiii. 13, 193, 199, 381; xiv. 67, 369; xvi. 330; xvu. 134, 178, 278;
xviii. 358; xix. 107, 141, 150, 314; xx. 84; Bell.i. 376, 493; U. 153,
201, 450; iv. 164, 191; v. 456; vi. 66, 183, 194, 309, 349; Vita
355; Contra Ap. 2. 202, 203.
Figuratively, in Letters of HeracUtus v. 5.
2. By metonymy, a living being, any being who possesses foxy,
without exclusive reference to men. As in the LXX, following the
Hebrew, so in Philo the word f uys is sometimes added, emphasizing
by separate expression the idea of life.
1 For the meaning of the passage of the Hebrew Bible here referred to see TBS3
I, p. 63. But Josephus probably used the word in the sense of life. If he retained the
Hebrew idea, these and other similar passages should be placed under 2.
146

SPIRIT, SOUL,1 AND FLESH 147
Jth. 11:7; Sir. 16:30; Philo Leg. alleg. i. 18. 2, 3; 31. 3; 32.
5, 6; 34. 10 ( ?); ii. 9. 5; Quod det. pot. 80. 6; Sac. Ab. et Cai. v. 5.
For the simUar use with exclusive reference to men, see 5 below.
3. Soul, that entity which, residing in a living being, makes it
alive and gives it sentiency, which departs from it in death, and
after death is capable of a more or less conscious existence of misery
or happiness.1 Jos. Bell. U. 156: rats Sk tuv irovypuv foxals Kad' qSov rbv
aaefiuv x&pov, ktX.
But to the souls of the wicked [is fated] the region of the ungodly in Hades.
. See also Ps. 49:16; Enoch 9:3, 10; Tob. 14:11 (?).
Wisd. 2:22; 3:1; 15:8, n;2 16:14; IV Mace. 13:21; 18:23;
Alex. Polyhistor3 139. 107 (Ms), 113, 122; Hermippus4 10 (last line);
21. 8; Hecataeus of Abdera5 7. 15; pseudo-Phocylides 105, 112, 115;
Letters of HeracUtus v. 15; Sib. Or. iii. 724. Jos. Ant. i. 231;
vi. 329 (Ms), 330 (Ms), 332, 334; Bell. iii. 374, 375; vii. 354.
In Wisd. 8: 19 foxy is used of a pre-existent soul. So also IV
Mace. 13:13, 21; 18:23.
4. Soul as a constituent element of a rational or sentient being:
the seat of vitahty, thought, and emotion, not usually at least with
the idea of the possibility of separate existence; especiaUy with
reference to man, the human mind in the larger sense of the word.
a) AppUed to man.
Wisd. 1:4: on eis KaKorexvov foxyv ovk eiaeXebaerai aocpia.
Because wisdom will not enter a soul that does evil.
See also Tob. 1:11; 3:1, 10; 6:17; 8:20; 13:6, 7, 15; Jth.
4:9; 8:24; 11:8,16; 14:19; 16:9; Sir. 1:30; 2:1,17; 4:2,6,17,
1 In this usage there is a blending or union of the idea of the shade found in the
old Greek writers and of the Hebrew TBDD as a living creature. Cf. tJE>3 , I, p. 62.
It is difficult to be certain precisely what thought the word represented in the mind
of the Greek translator of a Hebrew passage, in particular to distinguish between
examples of this usage and the meaning self, but the passages cited above seem with
reasonable certainty to belong here. Cf. the similar use of irvevpa, III. 2. d),
p. 144. 2 Notice in this passage (Wisd. 15:11, 12) the occurrence of the four words i/'ux'S,
irvevpa, ftoi}, filos. The whole chapter is instructive on the relation of these terms.
3 In Miiller, Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum, III, 206-44.
« Ibid., Ill, 35-54. s Ibid., II, 384-96.
147

148

HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES

20, 22J 5 = 2; 6:2, 4 (?), 26, 32; 7:11, 17, 20, 21, 26, 29; 9:2, 6, 9;
10:28,29; I2:ii; 14:2,4,8,9,16; 16:17; 18:31; 19:3,4,16;
20:22; 21:2,27,28; 23:6, l6, l8; 24:1; 25:2; 26:14,15; 27:16;
29:15; 30:7, 21, 23; 37:6, 8, 12, 14, 19, 22, 27, 28; 40:29; 45:23;
47:15; 50 = 25; 51:6, 19, 20, 24, 26, 29; Bar. 3:1 (?); Ep. Jer. 7;
IMacc. 1:48; 3:31; 8:27.
Wisd. 1:11; 3:13; 4:11; 7:27; 9:3, 15; 10:16; 14:11, 26;
15:14; 17:8, 15; II Mace. 1:3; 3:16; 5:11; 6:30; 7:12, 37;
11:9; 15:17,30; III Mace. 2:20; 4:4; 5:42; IV Mace. 1 : 20, 26,
28; 2:1; 3:3,15; 5:26; 6:29; 7:4; 8:29; 10:4; 13:15; 14:6a;
, 15:4, 25; Alex. Polyhistor 9, line 5 from bottom; 139. 65-68, 77,
92, 95, 100, 102; Hecataeus of Abdera 7. 15; 12. xlviii. 11; xlix. 11;
14.26; 14.97; pseudo-Phocylides,1 line 50, 228; Letters of HeracU
tus2 iu. 2; iv. 39; v. 24; viii. 37; ix. 54-55; Theodotus (Euseb
P.E.) ix. 22 (=Alex. Pol. 9. 5); Sib. Or. -iii. 230; Philo Op. mund
18. 2; 20. 2; 30. 5; 53. 5; 54. 6; 66. 8; 67. n; 69. 6; 78. 15
79. 7; 81. 5; 117. 4; 119. 5; 128. 10; 136. 2; 139. 2; 140. 2; 141
12; 145. 2; 151. 5; 154. 4, 6; 155. 1, 6; 164. 5; 172. 2. Leg
alleg. i. 11. 1; 16. 5; 24. 6, 9; 38., 1; 40. 3; 41. 6; 45. 5
46. 5; 48. 7; 49. 3; 50. 4; 51. 1, 9; 56. 4; 66. 5, 9; 70. 4; 71
3,55 72-4; 76-3,7; 80.8; 82.9; 91.8; 97-3,55 i°°- 7! 104.7
105. 4, 5, 6; 106. 3, 6, 8; 107. 3, 4; 108. 3, 5; ii. 2. 6; 5. 5, 6
6- 5; 8. 3, 7; 9. 7; 11. 7; 13. 2; 23. 1, 3; 24. 2, 7; 32. 7; 34. 3, 4
53- 5, ,7, 9; 55, 1, 6; 56, 35 60. 3; 61. 2, 4; 62. 2, 5; 63. 2, 6; 67
8; 73- 55 75- 2; 77- 3, 4, T, 84- 6; 85. 9; 86. 4; 89. 4; 90. 3, 5
91. 6; 93. 4; 95, 2, 4; 97. 2, 5; 100. 2; 101. 5; 102. 7; iii
8. 2 (t>«), 4; 11. 1; 12. 6; 18. 10; 19. 2, 4; 20. 7; 21. 5; 22. 6
27. 3, 7; 28. 5; 31. 1; 36. 8; 37. 5; 38. 5; 40. 2, 8; 43. 1, 5; 44
1, 6; 52. 2; 53. 4; 62. 5; 69. 4, 6; 70. 2; 71. 2; 72. 1, 2, 4, 6
74. 1; 75. 4; 80. 2; 81. 2; 82. 2; 84. 2; 86. 5; 87. 7, 8; 88. 6
89. 3; 91. 2; 93. 3; 95. 4, 6; 106. 3; 107. 4, 7; no. 3; 113. 2
115-2; 117-2; 120.5; 124.4,7; 128.4,9; 129-4; 130-2; i3i-5
136-5; 137-35 140.3; 141-3; 148.2,4; 149.4; 150.2,7; 151. 6
152. 2; 158. 2; 160. 4; 161. 3, 6, 9; 162. 2, 6; 163. 2; 165. 1
166. 4; 167. 3 (bis); 168. 2; 172. 2; 173. 8; 174. 6; 176. 2, 6
1 In Bergk, Poetae lyrici graeci, II, 450-75.
2 In Bernays, Die heraklitischen Brief e, Berlin, 1869.
148

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 149
178.6; 179.6; 180.5; 186. Ii; 187.4; I9O.2; 191.4,7; I93.2
200. 8; 203. 2; 212. 2, 7; 215. 3; 219. 7; 224. 15^234 6; 235
5, 6; 236. 9; 238. 2, 4; 239. 2, 4; 242. 8; 243. 3; 246. 5; 247
6, 7; 248. 2; 249. 6; 251. 5. Cherub. 4. 3; 9. 8; 12. 4; 17. 2, 8
27. 1; 32. 2; 48. 2; 50. 4; 51. 1; 52. 4; 57. 7; 59. 2; 60. 3; 63. 6
68. 2; 69. 2, 6; 70. 6; 73. 1; 74. 6; 75. 7; 77. 2; 78. 6; 82. 1
84. 8; 93. 4; 95. 2; 96. 4; 98. 2; 100. 6; 101. 2; 103. 4; 104. 3
106, 6; 114. 6; 117. 6; 128. 6. Sac. Ab. et Cai. 1. 3; 3. 2, 4; 5
2, 55 6- 2; 9- 4; 10. 3; 16. 4; 20. 1; 36. 6; 37. 8; 39. 1, 2; 44. 3
48. 2; 59. 6; 60. 2; 61. 1; 64. 1, 5; 69. 2; 70. 7; 72. 5, 10; 73. 3
78. 7; 79. 8; 80. 2, 8; 84. 4; 85. 2; 86. 6; 87. 5; 94. 4; 101. 7
102. 4; 103. 3; in. 4; 112. 2; 114. 7; 117. 3; 119. 3; 121. 2
122. 3; 126. 3; 127. 3; 130. 3; 134. 7; Qwod. <to. pot. 7. 3; 8. 4
9. 3(6w); 15.5; 16.6; 19,7; 21. 4;. 22. 5; 23.2,7; 29.8; 30.4
33- 2, 4; 34- 8; 35. 4; 42. 2; 43. 8; 44. 3; 48. 1; 50. 2; 58. 6
59.5; 65.2; 74-3,8; 81.1,3; 82.3; 83.6; 84.3; 86.3,7; 91- 1
95. 2, 10; 97. 4; 103. 5; 105. 5; 109. 3; no. 4; in. 4; 115. 1
132- 5; 137- 2; 139- 6; 141- 10 (bis); 149. 3; 159. 6; 168. 2
169. 1; 170. 2, 5; sometimes in Philo the soul is set in con
trast with the body and its divine origin is affirmed, either directly
or contextuaUy: Op. mund. 134. 6, 12; 137. 5; 139. 6; Leg. alleg.
iu. 161. 4; Cherub. 101. 2; Sac. Ab. et Cai. 136. 2; 139. 6; Quod
det. pot. 3. 2; 4. 5; 5. 2; 88. 5; 90. 4 (important); Jos. Ant. i.
34, 46; U. 9; Ui. 208, 260; iv. 153, 210 (bis), 219, 291, 294, 298, 329;
vi. 3, 21, 160 (Ms), 211, 230, 375; vii. 39, 275; viii. 256, 282, 419;
x. 42, 119, 132, 194; xi. 3, 40, 165, 240; xii. 255, 281, 304; xiii. 176;
198, 201,362; xv. 60, 147, 158, 191, 194, 212, 257; xvi. 75, 93, 211,
260, 301, 380, 392, 403; xvii. 177, 238, 354; xviii. 14, 16, 18, 117,
144, 333; xix. 56, 325; xx. 83; Bell. i. 81, 84, 95, 429, 524, 610, 647,
650; U. 31, 60, 136, 141, 154, 156, 158, 163, 165, 357, 377, 476, 580
(Ms), 588; in. 2, 3, 102, 212, 268, 296, 354, 356, 362, 372, 378; iv.
34, 50, 175, 193, 208, 308; v. 126, 222, 368, 525, 526; vi. 11, 13, 19,
38, 46, 47, 55 (bis), 63, 81, 233, 288, 332 ; vii. 241, 339, 340, 344, 345,
348,349,352,355,4i8,45i; Vita 209; 323; 420; Contra Ap. 1. 164,
187, 201; 2. 178; figuratively, ascribed to religion, IV Mace. 14:66.
b) As the cosmic principle of the universe. Philo Leg. alleg.
i. 91. 9, 10. 149

150 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
5. By metonymy, for "person, " or with a possessive limitation,
"self." Bar. 2: 18: dXXd y foxy y Xvirovpkvy kirl rb pkyedos . ... /cat y
foxy $1 ireivuaa Suaovai aoi Sb^av Kal Simioabvyv, Kvpie.
But the soul that grieveth greatly .... and the soul that hungereth will
give to thee glory and righteousness, Lord.
See also Bar. 3:1 (?); I Mace. 2:38; 9:2; 10:33; Sir. 19:3;
Jos. Ant. ii. 144; iv. 179; Bell. vii. 398. »
Wisd. 10:7; 12:6; 17:1; Enoch 16:1 and the passages cited
p. 67, c) ad fin.
A number of what may be called transitional cases, where the
meaning approaches, but has not clearly passed into, that of
"person," have been observed. E.g., Philo Op. mund. 144. 9;
Leg. alleg. i. 34. 10; ii. 83. 2; 86. 7; iu. 27. 3, 7; 82. 3; 88. 6;
173. 2, 6 (60); 213. 3; 215. 5; Cherub. 106. 6; Letters of HeracUtus
iii. 5; Sib. Or. iii. 458, 558,678:
By further metonymy, for the power, possibnities, and interests
of the self, the human person. See Prov. 6:32; 8:36; Sir. 4:20,
22; 10:28,29; 14:14; 19:4; 20:22; I Mace. 2:50.
6. Soul-substance, which, existing in different grades and
qualities, is partaken of by both men and the lower animals.1
Philo Op. mund. 65 . 3 ff . : For of soul the most sluggish and least formed has
been allotted to the race of fishes, and the keenest and in all respects best to
the race of men  Therefore, of the things that have soul he created the
fishes first, which partake more of bodily than of soul-substance (</rux""7 oiaia).
But after all, as has been said, he produced man, to whom he gave an excellent
endowment, viz., mind (vovs), soul of soul, as it were, like the pupil of the eye.
[Cf.73-1 Closely akin to this usage and perhaps identical with it is foxy
as defined in Leg. alleg. ii. 22-23. Here Philo, enumerating the cli
mactic series e£ts, cpvais, foxy, vovs. Sidvoia, says that e£is, "cohe
sion," is common to stocks and stones as well as to animate beings
and is shared by men in their bones; cpvais is efts plus the power of
motion and is found in plants and in us in our nails and hair; foxy
is cpvais plus the power of mentality and (impulse or will) effort,
and is common to men and the lower animals.
1 Cf. irvevpa, pp. 80, 124, 135, 143. 150

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 151
ill. 2APE
i. The soft muscular portion of the body of men or animals.
Alex. Polyhistor 9, Une 35 from bottom: abrbs dir' obpavbdev
KeXer' dvkpa iravrl abv oiku crdp/c' dTrocrvXiJcrat irbadys diro 
He himself from heaven commanded a man with all his house to strip off
the flesh of the foreskin.
Seealso Jth. 14:10; 16:17; Sir. 19:12; 23: 16 (cf. Enoch 15:9);
34 (31): 1; 38:28; I Mace. 7:17; Ps. Sol. 4:21; 13:3; Enoch
8:4 (Syn.); 7:5 (Giz.).
Wisd. 12:5; 19:21; II Mace. 9:9; IV Mace. 6:6; 9:17,20,28;
10:8, 15 (bis), 20. Alex. Polyhistor 139. 75; Letters of HeracUtus
v. 28. Philo Ebriet. 87. 2; Bomn. ii. 216, 3, 6; Josepho 96. 4;
Spec. leg. iii. 115. 3; iv. 103. 1; 122. 5. Jos. Bell. iii. 274; v. 4; vi. 55.
2. By synecdoche, for the body as a whole, without distinction
of flesh, skin, or bones. Often used in the plural.
Sib. Or. Ui. 697: 7rterat Sk re yala Kal abry a'lparos bXXvpkvuv.
Kopkaovrai dypia aapKuv.
And earth shall also herself drink of the blood of those that are slain.
Wild beasts shall satiate themselves with flesh.
See also Ex. 30:32; Sir. 25: 26; 44: 205 Ps. Sol. 4:7; 16:14;
Enoch 16:1 (Syn.); 16:1 (Giz.).
Wisd. 7:2; IV Mace. 7:13, 18; Philo Leg. alleg. i. 76. 4, 8; iii.
152. 5; 158. 4; Gigant. 19. 4; 29. 1, 2; 30. 2; 31. 4; 32. 5 (Ms);
34. 2, 5; 40. 3,4; 45-45 Quod deus sit, i. 6; 56.3; 140.3; 141.2,3;
142. 5;s 143. 5; 144. 1; Ebriet. 69. 3; Migr. Abra. 14. 8; 29. 3;
Quis rer. div. 57. 2; 71. 3; Mutat. nom. 32. 4; 174. 5; Vita Mos.
i. 54. 4; Spec. leg. i. 176. 6; iv. 114. 6. Jos. Ant. xix. 325; Bell.
ii. 155; vi. 47.
In Sir. 23:16; Enoch 15:9 (Syn.): to aupa rys aapKos is used
pleonastically for to aupa.
3. By metonymy, for kindred or the basis of kinship.
II Sam. 5:1: /cat irapayivovrai iraaai at cpvXal 'LapayX irpbs
AavelS eis Xefipuv Kal elirav avrcp 'LSob bard aov Kal crdp/ces aov ypels.
Then came all the tribes of Israel to David unto Hebron, and spake, saying,
Behold, we are thy bone and thy flesh.
See also Lev. 18:6; II Sam. 19:12, 13.
151

152 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
4. A corporeal living creature.
a) Not applied to man exclusively.
Philo Post. Caini 67. 5: Trapd /cat Muvays ebxbpevbs <f>yaiv
kiriaKe^/dadu Kvpios b debs tuv irvevparuv Kal iraays aapKos avdpuirov
kirl rys avvayuyys rabrys.
Wherefore also Moses praying says, Let the Lord God of the spirits and of
all flesh appoint a man over this congregation.
See also Gen. 7:21: Num. 18:15 (P- 7°), etc! Sir. 14:18;
17:4, 31; 18:13; 28:5; 30:29 (33:20); 30:38 (33:29); 39:19;
40:8; 41:3; 44:18; Bel 5; Enoch 1:9 (Giz.); 14:21 (Giz.); 15:4
(Giz.); 15:8 (Syn. and Giz.); 17:6 (Giz.)
With emphasis on the frailty of a corporeal being, Gen. 6:3.
b) Man as a corporeal being.
Jth. 10:13: /cat ob Siacpuvyaei ruv dvSpuv abrov adp!; pia obSk
irvevpa £uys.
And there shall not perish of his men one person, nor one Uving being.
See also Jth. 2:3; Sir. 1:10; 13:16; 14:17; 44:27; 45:4!
46:19. 5. Allegorically used, crdp£ sometimes denotes in Philo the
physical senses.
Philo Leg. alleg. ii. 38. 1: aveirXypov 8k adpKa dvr' avrys (Gen.
2:21), rovrkan avveirXypov ryv Kad' e^iv a'tadyaiv.
And he filled up with flesh instead of it, that is he filled up the sensation
which acts according to habit.
See also Leg. alleg. ii. 20. 5, 7; 37. 5; 38- 35 4©. 2 (Ms); 41.
4(bis). 6. The Uteral sense disappearing, o-dp£ is allegoricaUy interpreted
by Philo as signifying a being living the Ufe of the senses or such a
mode of life.
Philo Leg. alleg. ii. 49. 7: «<e/ca rijs aiadyaeus b vovs, brav abry
SovXudy .... 7rpocr/coXXarat /cat kvovrai ry aiadrjaei /cat avaXverai
els a'ladyaiv, 'iva ykvuvrai pia adpi- /cat eV 7rd0os 01 Stio.
For the sake of sensation the mind, when it is enslaved to it, is joined to,
and united with, and dissolved into, sensation, in order that the two may become
one flesh and one passion.
See also Leg. alleg. ii. 49.- 3; 50. 4, 6.
152

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 153
We are now prepared for a fuller discussion of the facts
exhibited in the foregoing tabulation of meanings, observing the
usage of the various literary groups.
IV. TRANSLATED WORKS
In the canonical books of the LXX translation fi^n is regularly
rendered by irvevpa, the translators avaihng themselves of certain
relatively late meanings of that term which are attested by very
few examples in Greek authors. For the LXX phrases irvevpa deov,
irvevpa Kvpiov, irvevpa dyiov, no earUer Greek vouchers have been
discovered. A probable point of connection appears, however, in
Menander 's expression, delov irvevpa.1 The LXX translators, fa-
miUar with this probably current expfession, apparently coined by
analogy the expression irvevpa dyiov as a translation of IBTp ffil ,
which, UteraUy rendered, would have been irvevpa dyiuabvys. The
expressions irvevpa deov and irvevpa Kvpiov are hteral translations
of the Hebrew.
ILvevpa as denoting the seat of emotion and mentahty in the
individual occurs frequently in the LXX, translating ffi"l in the
same sense; but irvoy and compounds of dvpbs, foxy, and <ppyv are
also used. For this individuahzed sense of irvevpa a basis may
have been found in the usage illustrated, in the Funeral Oration
of pseudo-Demosthenes.2
The LXX use of irvevpa to denote an unembodied being neither
human nor divine finds no paraUel in earUer Greek writers.3 It
originated perhaps in the difficulty the translators felt with the
idea of the Spirit of God working evil in one affected by it, there
being joined to this the influence of such passages as I Kings 22:21;
II Kings 19:7; Zech. 13:2; Job 4:15, etc. (see ffi~i ii.3, pp. 60 f.).
The omission of the phrase "of God" in such passages as I Sam.
16:16, 23 (though it is inconsistently retained in vss. 14, 15) gave
to irvevpa the definite objective meaning, "a spirit of evil."
tyvxy is the standard equivalent of TZJS3 , though it occasionally
represents other Hebrew words and other Greek words occasionally
1 Kock, Com. Alt. Frag., Ill, 139; cf. p. 114.
2 Pseudo-Demosthenes Declam. fun. 24; p. 82.
3 The earliest instance in non- Jewish Greek is perhaps Dion. Hal. Antiq. i. 31;
cf. p. 81. 153

154 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
represent it. It covers all the senses in which the Hebrew
term is used. On the other hand, certain classical meanings of
foxy disappear in the LXX and certain non-classical meanings
emerge. Thus, while still denoting the soul, capable of departure
from and of return to the body (I Kings 17:21, etc.), it is never
used in the LXX strictly for the shade, the disembodied spirit,
this idea being otherwise expressed (I Sam. 28: 12, 13), the tendency
being, as appears in the Enoch Uterature, to transfer this meaning
to irvevpa. For the LXX use of foxy to denote a deceased person
or a dead body (a transfer to Greek of a Hebrew usage of 1DS3)
there is apparently no parallel in Greek writers.
2dp£ represents all the Old Testament senses of "iTBSl (see
pp. 68 f.), though the LXX usually prefer /cpe'as for 1TD2L when the
latter refers to the flesh of sacrifices or to flesh used for food, and
aupa for "ITCS denoting the body as such. 2dp£ sometimes denotes
a kinsman; in the plural, kinsmen (II Sam. 5 : 1 ; 19 : 1 2, 13). Occa
sionally it denotes a living being, usually in the phrase iraaa adp%,
which generally signifies every Uving being, but in Gen. 6:19; 7:15,
16, every hind of living being.
The usage of irvevpa in the Apocrypha and other Jewish
reUgious writings which were translated from the Hebrew is sub
stantially that of the canonical books. Some notable passages
illustrate the persistence, if not the increase, of the tendency to
blur the distinction between the spirit of God and that of man
conceived of as responsive to God's will;1 cf. Sir. 39:6; 48:24;
Ps. Sol. 17:42; 18:42. Examples of irvevpa as the seat of moral
action are found in Dan. 3:39, 86; Sir. 9:9. In Sir. 38:23 irvevpa
is used of that which departs from man in death (as in Eccles. 3:21;
12:7) but without implication of its power to exist apart from the
body, for "the son of man is not immortal" (Sir. 17:30). In
Tob. 6:8 irvevpa is used of an evil spirit. In the Testaments of
1 Thus in Dan. Sus. 45 (LXX) we read, Kal ZSwKev & iyytkos, xaflibs vpoirerdyii,
irvevfia trvvio-eus vewre'pip 6vri AavvZ/X (cf. vs. 62 b), while Theodotion reads, ii-Jiyeipev 6
Beds rb TrpeC^a rb ayiov iraiSaplov vewripov 0} 6vopa AawJJX. The expression irvevpa
avvio-eus, entirely similar to those which in Exod. 28:3; 31:3; Deut. 34 : g denote a spirit
proceeding from God, is, in the LXX version of the Daniel passage, used of that
which the angel bestows by divine command; while Theodotion, using a phrase
which in Ps. 51 : 13 seems clearly to refer to the Spirit of God, applies it to the spirit
of man which God stirs up. 154

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 155
the Twelve Patriarchs sixteen spirits that incite men to evil are
specifically named. Opposed to the spirit of deceit (either a
generic term for the class or a title of Beliar or Satan) is the spirit
of truth (Jud. 20: i, 5), evidently identical with the Spirit of God
(Sim. 4:4; Ben. 8:2), called also a spirit of understanding, love,
holiness, and grace (Lev. 2:3; 18:7, n; Jud. 24:2; Gad. 4:7). In
the Ethiopic text of the Book of Jubilees there is frequent mention
of spirits, good and evil, paraUeling practically all the LXX
usages. In 2 : 2 (Greek text) it is said that on the first day God
created the spirits (irvebpara) that serve him, which are angels
before (his) presence, and angels of the glory, and angels of
blowing winds (irvebpara) , and angels of ... . winter and autumn
and spring and summer, and of all the spirits (irvebpara) of his
creatures that are in heaven and earth. In the Greek text of
Enoch I irvevp.a occurs most frequently in the plural, denoting
(a) incorporeal beings called rd irvebpara rov obpavov (15:7) who
had their dwelling in heaven and were immortal, but who left the
high heaven and defiled themselves with women (15:3); (b) the
offspring born of these spirits and women, called irvebpara irovypd
(15:9, n); (c) the spirits of dead men called ra irvebpara tuv
foxuv tuv veKpuv (in 22:5, 6 in the singular also), and immediately
afterward at ^uxat ruv avdpuiruv (22:3). It is to be noted that
the spirits here spoken of are not so immaterial but that they are
visible and have audible voices.
There are no marked differences between the uses of foxy hi
the LXX version of the canonical books and in the other books
translated from Hebrew into Greek. The leading meanings are
Ufe, and soul as the seat of emotion, etc. — the mind in the larger,
especiaUy the religious, sense. In Jth. 11:7 it is a general term
for a living creature, and in Sir. 16:30 foxy iravrbs £vov is a pleo
nastic expression for every Uving creature. In Sir. 4: 20, 22 (cf. vs.
27); 10:28,29; J4:4; J9:4; 20:22, foxy seems clearly to be used
for the self as the totaUty of powers, possibiUties, and interests
that belong to a human personality, as it is in Sir. 16:17 f°r the
self in a more general sense, and in 19:3 for a person. Of soul as
an entity capable of existence after death or before birth, there
are no quite certain instances, though this is probably the meaning
155

156 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
of the Greek in Sir. 6:4 (not of the underlying Hebrew) and in
Tob. 14:11s (cf . the Homeric eXwre foxy) ¦ Of the meaning "shade,"
a being in the underworld, there are no examples.
2dp£ in this Uterature follows closely the usage of the canonical
books, except that there are apparently no instances of the meaning
"kindred," or of special emphasis on the frailty of corporeal beings.
The word is especially frequent in Sirach, where it occurs in all the
various usages, but most frequently in the sense of a corporeal being,
either inclusively or with reference to men only. Of especial interest
are 13 : 5, 6; 14: 17, 18. In Enoch crdp£ is used of the women from
whom the giants were born, yet designates them simply as corporeal
beings in distinction from the spirits as incorporeal.
V. WORKS WRITTEN ORIGINALLY IN GREEK
The Jewish works written originaUy in Greek show in the main
the same usages as the translated books.
In the Alexandrian book of the Wisdom of Solomon irvevpa con
tinues to be used occasionally for wind (5:11,23; 17:18) and
breath (11:20), but most commonly bears the meaning "spirit."
The Spirit of God (irvevpa Kvpiov) permeates aU things (1:7; 12:1;
cf . Jth. 16:14, where the Spirit of God is the source of hfe) ; the spirit
of man is breathed into him by God (15 : 1 1) , is the seat of Ufe (16 : 14),
and is from God and capable of immortaUty (15:11), though the
ungodly beUeve it to vanish at death (2:3); wisdom is spirit (1:6);
but it is also said that in it is a spirit (7:225.). A spirit of wisdom
comes from God to man (7:7), and God sends his holy spirit to
give wisdom to men (9:17), and a holy spirit of disciphne, itseU
identified with wisdom, dwells in men (1 : 4-5) . There are evident
traces of the Stoic materiahzing conception of spirit, especiaUy in-
7:22f., and nowhere a strict hypostatizing of the divine spirit,
any more than of wisdom, with which the spirit is identified. The
spirit of man is sometimes given objectivity, as capable of separate
existence after death, but it is more commonly spoken of simply as
the seat of Ufe, wisdom, etc., with no sharp distinction between
the spirit of God and that of man. Its use as denoting the seat of
emotion is rare (but see 5:3), corresponding to the rarity of its
use in non- Jewish Greek. 156

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 157
Vvxy is used meaning life, Wisd. of Sol. 16:9; human soul, 2:22;
3:1; 15:8,11; 16:14; person, 10:7; 12:6; 17:1.
2dp£ means flesh in Wisd. of Sol. 12:5; 19:21, and body in 7:2.
In Philo we have an attempt to express ideas of Hebrew origin
in forms derived from and congenial to Greek philosophic thought,
a process which modified both their form and substance. His
writings show a thorough familiarity with the Old Testament and
a general acquaintance with Greek philosophy, especially Platonism,
Stoicism, and neo-Pythagoreanism. His system of thought is
fundamentaUy duaUstic. His ultimate principles are God and
matter. Though rejecting the doctrine of the eternity and inde
pendence of the world as an organized system, he makes matter
eternal, and distinguishes between God as the active principle and
the passive principle on which and with which he works.1 He
takes from Plato the doctrine of ideas and from the Stoics the
four elements, earth, water, air, and fire, and affirms that God
formed first the ideal world (the world composed of ideas), in order
that, using a pattern incorporeal and as hke to God as possible, he
might produce the corporeal world, a younger likeness of the older
one.2 PhUo's use of irvevpa is derived in part, through the medium of
the LXX, from the Hebrew use of HTl, in part from the Greek
phUosphers, but fundamentally from the former. In about forty
instances it means wind. In several (see p. 142) he employs it for
air. His most characteristic use of the term is, in the Hebrew
fashion, with reference to the Spirit of God. In this sense it occurs
nearly fifty times, often in the phrase irvevpa delovt and not infre
quently with quantitative implication. Op. mund. 144 (50).
Philo interprets Gen. 1 : 26 as referring to the prototypal, ideal
man, who is incorporeal. Gen., 2:7, on the other hand, he refers
to the creation of Adam, or, as he says, of the first man. In Op.
mund. 135 ff. (46 f.) he interprets this passage literally, making the
clay refer to the body of Adam and the breathing of the divine
spirit into him to the impartation of the soul. This soul, which
he also calls mind (vovs), is said to be a copy of the reason (X670S)
of God. Because of his double nature man is both mortal and
%0p. mund. 8(2). 2 Ibid. 146(51); 16(4)-
157

158 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
immortal — mortal as to his body, but immortal as to his mind
(bidvoia). From the state of perfection which the first man
enjoyed the race has since constantly degenerated, both in soul
and in body. Yet all his descendants retain some traces of their
relationship to their ancestor. Every man is in respect to his
mind (cudwia) akin to the divine reason, but in respect to his body,
which is composed of the four elements, to the universal world.
(Cf. Op. mund. 146 [51].) In this interpretation of the Genesis
passage Philo approximates to the Greek conception that the foxy
is irvevpa. But the resemblance is more formal than real", for while
with the Stoics the irvevpa which is predicated of the soul is either
one of the four elements which constitute matter, or that ultimate
something which, though it may be predicated of God, is itself
material, with Philo the soul is incorporeal and divine spirit in
distinction from the body, which is matter.
In Leg. alleg. i. 33 f. (13) he interprets the same passage alle-
gorically, making the clay, of which man is formed, signify the
soul and the mind, which is the dominant part of the soul. Into
this mind God breathes his spirit, as a result of which the mind,
which would otherwise be earthly and corruptible, acquires true Ufe
and becomes a living soul.1 With this latter interpretation agrees
the view set forth in the very instructive passage, Quod det. pot.
79 (22) ff., in which two parts of the soul are mentioned, only the
higher being designated as spirit, and this described as coming
from God. Cf. also Quis rer. div. 55 (11), where the substance of
the dominant part of the soul is said to be irvevpa delov. See also
Spec. leg. iv. 123 (11) and Fuga 134 (24), where he used irvevpa
'evdeppov, but not in the Stoic sense.
In these passages, which are undoubtedly more representative
of Philo's habit of thought than the Op. mund. 125 ff. (46 f.), the
transcendental character of the irvevpa possessed by man comes
out more strongly than in the latter. Whether the foxy itself in the
1 In Leg. alleg. i. 33 (13), Philo uses both irvo-ff and irvevpa, making them synony
mous. His explanation of the fact that the LXX uses ttoi} at this point is labored
and obscure. He apparently means that, since God is spoken of as breathing into
the face, it would be unsuitable to use with this physical term the more dignified
and refined irvevpa, and this although he had already used the face as signifying
the mind. 15S

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 159
inclusive sense be thought of as irvevpa or the latter be distinguished
from the former as a donum superadditum, irvevpa is in either case
and always divine.
In view of this evidence Op. mund. 29, 30 (7, 8), in which God
is said to have created seven incorporeal substances — the incorporeal
heaven, the invisible earth, the image of air and space, the incor
poreal substance of water and of irvevpa and of light — and in which
the sixth is called deov rb irvevpa because it is most life-giving and
God is the cause of Ufe, irvevpa must be understood to be the proto
typal life-giving spirit of God; but, since the objective reaUty must
correspond to the idea, the former, whether thought of as the
substance of which the human soul is composed (as in 136 ff .) or
as the donum superadditum, is a quantitative rather than an indi
vidualized conception. Cf. Op. mund. 144 (50).
Of exceptional interest is Philo 's assertion that the Spirit of God
cannot continuously dweU with men, though all men have it at times.
See Gigant. 19-3 1, 53 (5-7, 12). On the other hand he affirms that
the Spirit may remain with us, as with Moses, for a very long time
(Gigant. 47 [n]). Akin to this distinction is the thought expressed
in Quis rer. div. 57 (12) that there are two classes of men, those
who Uve by the divine Spirit, which is reason (Xo7tcrp6s) , and those
who live according to blood and the pleasure of the flesh.
It is to be observed that with the exception of Post. Caini, 67
(19), Agric. 44 (10), which are simply quotations from the LXX,
and possibly Gigant. 26 a (6), irvevpa is not a functional term used
as a synonym for foxy or vovs, but a substantial term denoting the
divine Spirit, wise, indivisible, undistributable, good, everywhere
diffused — see Gigant. 26 b (6) — as that of which the soul, or the
dominant portion of it, is composed. In one passage, Fuga 182
(32), following the familiar doctrine of the Stoics, he uses irvevpa of
the vital nervous fluid which extends from the ruling part of the
soul to the various organs of sense. The irvevpa of Philo is much
less materialized than that of the Stoics, but is still quantitative
rather than individualized. With the exception of a single passage
twice quoted from the LXX, and one other passage of doubtful
interpretation, he nowhere uses rb irvevpa in the sense, common in
the LXX, of the individual spirit of man.
159

160 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
In one exceptional passage, Quod deus immut. 35 (7), Philo
says that God has endowed some bodies with cohesion, others
with soul, and others also with rational soul, and that stones and
pieces of wood are bound together by cohesion, "which is irvevpa
returning to itself." The first part of the statement is quite con
sistent with his prevalent doctrine ; but in the latter part, in which,
like Sextus Empiricus later, he employs irvevpa of the informing
principle of all things, including the cohesive power in inanimate
things, he takes over from the Greeks an entirely un-Hebraic idea
of spirit, which is, moreover, inconsistent with his more common
doctrine, according to which irvevpa is possessed by man only, as
an addition to the irrational soul which he shares with the
animals.1 tyvxy in Philo, as in ancient writers generaUy,is a functional term
denoting the seat of life, feeUng, thought, and wiU. FoUowing the
Hebrew (Lev. 17:14), he affirms that the substance of the soul is
blood (Quod det. pot. 79 [22]). Elsewhere he agrees with the Stoics
in saying that the soul is made of aether (Leg. alleg. Ui. 161 [55]),
adding that it is a fragment of God. These two theories he con
firms and harmonizes in Quod det. pot. 79 (22) ff., in the doctrine that
the irrational soul which men have in common with the irrational
animals is blood, but that the rational soul is spirit. In Quis rer.
div. 55 (n), cited above, he says that blood is the substance of the
entire soul, divine spirit of the most dominant part.2 In Somn.
i. 30 (6), he denies the Stoic assertion that the soul is body, affirming
that it is incorporeal.
JIn Leg. alleg. ii. 22 (7) Philo practically parallels the statement which Plutarch
(de mrt. mor. 12) ascribes to the Stoics respecting the graded series, cohesion, growth,
irrational soul, and rationality, only, carelessly perhaps, he uses "mind" as the
subject to which these powers belong, with the result that he ascribes cohesion even
to the mind. Neither in this passage nor in Quod deus immut. 35 (7) can Philo be
credited either with originality or with thorough assimilation of his sources.
2 In Leg. alleg. i. 33 (13) he affirms that the lower parts of the soul are given life
by the mind, the latter being made both by God and through God, the former by
God but not through God. The mind is to the soul what the eyes are to the body (Op.
mund. 53 [17]); it is the soul of the soul (ibid. 66 [21]), created in the image of God,
being, as it were, the God and guide of the soul (ibid. 69 [23]; Leg. allegA. 40 [13]; iii.
84 [27]). Thus, though formally similar to the Stoic doctrine that the ^v%i is irvevpji,
Philo's doctrine differs in its definition both of subject and of predicate, and, even
160

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 161
Soul being an inclusive term for both that which is rational and
that which is irrational, both that which man derives from God and
that which he shares with the animals, the term may be and fre
quently is used to denote the seat of the ethical and religious life
(Op mund. 79 [26]; 81 [26]; 128 [43]; 154 [54]; Quod det. pot. 170
[46]; Leg. alleg. i. 38 [13]; 49 [15]; 50 [15]; 51 [15]; 97 [31]; Ui. 106
[34]; 107 [35]; no [35]). Consistently with this conception of the
soul it is said to be dependent on God for its best thoughts (Leg.
alleg. i. 82 [26] ; iii. 27 [8]) ; the soul is said to be the proper dwelling-
place of God (Cherub. 98 ff . [29, 30]) ; and the soul that has fellow
ship with God is spoken of as divine (Cherub. 93 [27]).
The adjective foxiKbs seems always to mean "of or affecting the
soul," or "pertaining to life," in either case without derogatory
sense (Leg. alleg. i. 76 [24]; Ad. Gai. 63 [9]). Nor is foxy ever used
in antithesis to irvevpa, ethically or otherwise. Yet it is not impos
sible that in his doctrine that the foxy is common to man and
animals, while the irvevpa is a donum superadditum, breathed into
man by God, Philo lays the basis for the New Testament dis
tinction between the natural (foxiKbs) and the spiritual (irvev-
pariKos), illustrated in I Cor. 2:14; 15:44, 46; Jas. 3:15. He at
least approaches more nearly to such a distinction than either
the Hebrew, with its conception that the beasts also derive the
irvevpa from God (Eccles. 3:19, 21; 12:27), or the Greek writers,
none of whom before the time of the New Testament associate
the irvevpa which they predicate of the human soul with its higher
powers in particular, or put irvevpa and foxy in antithesis. It is
apparently Philo who first of all, deriving from the Greek philos
ophers the division of the soul into the rational or governing part

when the characteristic Stoic expression irvevpa ivBeppov is used, the same is true; the
subject is not the soul, but vovs as the dominant element of the soul, and the predicate,
is not "warm air," but "fervid spirit." See Fuga 134 (24).
But in the division of the irrational part of the soul into seven parts, viz., the five
senses and the voice and the generative part (Quod del. pot. 168 [46]), Philo follows
the Stoics. In the ruling or rational part he places the power of reason, \oyiapbs.
Exceptionally, in Leg. alleg. i. 70, 71 (22); iii. 115 (38), Philo adopts a tripartite
division of the soul into reason, passion (or courage), and desire, the first located in the
head, the second in the chest, and the third in the stomach. This classification is not
easily adjusted to the former, the five senses being associated here with the mind, or
dominant part in the head, voice being omitted and courage added.
161

162 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
and the irrational part, and from the Hebrew the idea that the
spirit as the supreme element of man comes from God, associates the
spirit with the rational part and divides men into two classes — those
who Uve by the divine Spirit, which is reason, and those who live ac
cording to blood and the pleasures of the flesh (Quis rer. div. 57 [12]).
Even he never uses foxiKbs in a derogatory sense in antithesis to
irvevpariKbs, (cf. Op. Mund. 66 [21], 67 [22]) but such an antithesis
is but one step beyond his usage.
Philo 's doctrine of immortality shows the influence both of
Greek and of Hebrew thought. On the one hand, he affirms that
for the sake of bodily pleasure men exchanged an immortal and
happy Ufe for one that is mortal and miserable (Op. mund. 152 [53]).
On the other hand, the mind is said to be (potentiaUy) immortal
(Sac. Ab. et Cai. 8 [3]), and the soul becomes so actuaUy by piety
toward God (Op. mund. 154 [54] and 155 [55]), or by philosophy
(ibid. 77 [25]). Death is spoken of in a twofold sense; the death
of the man is the separation of his soul from his body, but the death
which is inflicted as a punishment for sin is the death of the soul,
which is the death of virtue and the incoming of vice. The latter
is what is meant by the expression "to die the death" (Leg. alleg.
i. 76 [24]; 105-8 [33]; ii. 77 [19]; iii. 52 [17]; Quod. det. pot. 48, 49
[14, 15]). In antithesis to this stands the true Ufe (0X77^17 £017).
Leg. alleg. iii. 52 (17): "And when he offered to you for your
enjoyment the tree of life, that is of wisdom by which you can Uve,
were you carried into the enjoyment of ignorance and corruption
preferring misery, the death of the soul, to the happiness of true
life?" Philo employs o-dp£ sometimes literally, sometimes aUegoricaUy.
Literally it denotes the flesh, or the body, or the material substance
of the body generally, without ethical imphcation. Frequently
body and soul are used as complementary terms, signifying the
constituent parts of a man, but his general disposition is to treat the
body, for which he much more frequently employs aupa than crdp£,
as the seat and organ of the sense-life, and being such, as a force
hostile to the highest interest of the soul; see, e.g., Leg. alleg. iii.
XS8 (53) and Gigant. 19-45 (5-10) passim; also Quod deus immut.
140-144 (30); Ebriet. 69 (16). 162

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 163
In his representation of the source of evil he is not wholly
uniform. On the one side in Quod det. pot. 96-99 (26) he inter
prets the phrase "from the earth" in Gen. 4:11, "cursed art thou
from the earth," as meaning the soil of intention out of which the
deed sprang, and thus makes the guilt of any action lie in a ful
filled intention. So also in 109 (29) he says that the wicked man
never ceases to use his earthy body and the outward senses which
are akin to it, and all the external objects of these outward senses,
injuring his miserable soul and also, what he fancies he is benefiting,
his body. Here the body is depreciated as earthy, but the cause
of evil is the man, and the body is injured as well as the soul through
the man's abuse of it. Nor is this representation of the matter
pecuUar to these passages.
On the other hand, in Quod det. pot. 98 (26) he closely follows
the aUegorical with a literal interpretation of the phrase "from
the earth," saying that of all the most grievous calamities which
happen to the mind the earthy part of us is found to be the cause,
Ulustrating it by the fact that the sexual passions have destroyed
cities, countries, and nations. This is not, indeed, to make matter
the source of moral evil, for it is misery rather than sin which is
traced to .the body, as its cause, and it is the body, not matter as
such, to which it is traced. The idea that the body is the cause
of evils of various kinds finds, however, frequent expression in
Philo. It is the greatest cause of ignorance (Gigant. 29 [7]) ; it is
a leathern mass, an evil thing that plots against the soul (Leg.
alleg. ni. 69 [22]); righteousness and every, virtue love the soul,
but injustice and every evil love the body (Quis rer. div. 243 [50]) ;
the phUosopher is more praiseworthy than the athlete, because
while the latter gives all his attention to the body the former dis
regards it as dead (Leg. alleg. iii. 70, 71 [22]) ; the pale and emaciated
are praised because by the energy of their minds they have become
quite disentangled from the body (Be mut. nom. 33 [4]).
But in none of these passages, nor in any other that this investi
gation has discovered, does Philo express or distinctly imply that
matter (15X17) is, as such, the cause or source of moral evil. The
nearest approximation to this teaching is perhaps in the passages
cited by such modern writers as Dahne, Judisch-Alexandrinische
163

164 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
Religionsphilosophie (Halle, 1834), p. 196; Zeller, Philosophie der
Griechen, III, 2, p. 407. It is evident, however, upon examination,
that these passages affirm no more than the original chaotic con
dition of the universe as taught in Gen., chap. 1, the transcendence
of God, and his contact with the universe through his "power,"
rather than immediately.
Even if one should find in these or other passages of Philo
the definite doctrine that moral evil has its source in matter, it could
not be held that this is the consistently maintained doctrine of Philo.
He has at least three other explanations. Philo's real doctrine of
matter, with which all three explanations are at least consistent,
seems to be found in Op. mund. 15-23 (4, 5), where he sets forth at
length that, just as when a king wishes to build a city the architect
first forms a plan in his mind, so God, purposing to make the world,
first produced an ideal world and then, on the pattern of this, the
objective world out of substance, which is in itself without form or
order and capable of becoming anything. According to this, primeval
matter is neither good nor bad. Though Phflo goes on to describe
the condition of order, harmony, etc., into which it was transformed
as opposite to that from which it was changed, this is only to say,
not that the previous condition was evil, but that neutrality is the
opposite of quality.
In Quod det. pot. 96-99 (26), as stated above, he finds the cause
of evil in man's fulfilled intention.
In Op. mund. 152 (53), having described man as at his creation
of dual nature, resembling both the world and God, and having
referred to the creation of woman as the beginning of disaster, he
continues: "And this desire [the mutual attraction of the sexes]
generated bodily pleasure, which is the source of iniquities and
transgressions, and for the sake of it men exchange their immortal
and happy life for one that is mortal and miserable."
In other passages, on the other hand, he traces it to the agency
of the power employed by God in the creation of man.
Op. mund. 74, 5 (24) : Now to the God and Father of all it was most appro
priate to create through himself alone the good things, because of their kinship
with himself. And the things that are neither good nor evil it is not alien to
him to create, since these, too, do not partake of the evil which is opposed to
164

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 165
¦him. And the things that are of mixed character it is partly suitable and
partly unsuitable for him to create — suitable; because of the more excellent idea
which is mingled in them; unsuitable because of the opposite and worse one.
It is on this account that in respect to the creation of man only Moses says,
"Let us make," which expression indicates that he employs the help of others
as assistants in order that to God, the Governor of all things, might be
attributed all the blameless purposes and deeds of man, doing right, but to
others, his assistants, man's, contrary actions.
Conf. linguar. 179 (35): Very appropriately, therefore, has God attributed
the making of this being to his lieutenants, saying, "Let us make man," in
order that the rectitudes of man may be ascribed to him [God] only, his sins to
others. For it did not seem suitable to God, the ruler of all, to make the road to
wickedness in a rational soul by his own agency, for which reason he committed
to his subordinates [lit. those after him] the making of this part [of the universe].
There is no difficulty in harmonizing this doctrine of the partici
pation of the "powers" in man's creation with the theory that evil
springs from the seductiveness of pleasure or from an act of choice
on man's part, for this participation is set forth, not as the
cause of evil, but as necessitated by the anticipated free choice of
evil on man's part. It none the less makes him a mixed creature
capable of following either the good or the evil, not one committed
by his physical nature to evil. Nor is there any inconsistency
between this view and his frequent statements of the inferiority
and hostility of the body to the soul, for these do not go beyond the
affirmation that the body and bodily* pleasure exercise a seductive
influence on the soul or cause it suffering and misery. But the
theory of ethical dualism, viz., that matter is, as such, the cause of
moral evU, cannot be held consistently with the above views, nor
is it consistent with Philo's statement in the Op. mund. 21 (5-) that
the primal substance was capable of becoming all things, and,
receiving from God a share of his own most excellent nature, was
transformed into the things that are best.
PhUo is a dualist, but not, apparently, an ethical dualist. His
ultimates are God and matter. The former is good; the latter
is in itself ethicaUy indifferent. Originally without order, without
quaUty, capable of becoming all things, it acquired by the divine
world-creation the quaUties that are opposite and best, viz., order,
quaUty, organization, harmony (Op. mund. 21 [5]). His solution of
165

166 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
the problem of moral evil does not go beyond the notion that man's
body tempts him to sin, but man himself is the captain of his soul
and capable of Uving by the divine Spirit.
In Josephus the earUer meanings of irvevpa obtain along with
those of a later time. In numerous passages it denotes wind, and
generally, though not invariably, a strong or violent stormwind.
In a few passages it means breath. In other passages there appears
to be found a trichotomy of spirit, soul, and flesh or body. In one
passage (Bell. vii. 185) it is rd irvebpara (rather than at foxai)
which persist after death, and, in the case of evil men, become
demons. Occasionally irvevpa and foxy are set in juxtaposition,
though not in contrast, as in Ant. Ui. 260, where Josephus men
tions that Moses regarded the blood as "soul" and "spirit," and in
Ant. xi. 240, where Esther tells Artaxerxes that when she appeared
before him uninvited her "spirit" recoiled and she was deserted by
her "soul."1 ILvevpa may also for Josephus denote the seat of emo
tion or passion, as in Bell. iii. 92, where he describes the Romans
as "filled with a certain warlike irvevpa."
Akin to this usage of irvevpa with respect to human beings is
its use to denote superhuman beings. Saul's obsession is traced
to an "evil spirit" or demons (Ant. vi. 211). A moment later
(214) "the demonic spirit" is held to be the cause of his madness.
More frequently, however, Josephus, in keeping with LXX usage,
employs irvevpa for the divine spirit that produces prophetic inspi
ration, the possession of which distinguishes the true from the
false prophet. Whether this spirit is regarded as a subtle substance,
or as an influence, or divine personality is difficult to determine.
In Ant. vUi. 114, Solomon petitions God to "let some portion
of thy spirit come down and inhabit in this thy temple," a pas
sage which shows the persistence of quantitative phraseology and
probably of the corresponding thought.2
Two hundred and sixteen occurrences of foxy have been noted
and examined. The usual significations are represented, ranging
from the life-principle to the soul as the seat of emotions and moral
1 Cf. Dion Hal. Dem. 20. (p. 81.)
2 In this treatment of Josephus I have depended almost wholly upon Dr. W. R.
Schoemaker, Professor H. H. Severn, and Dr. A. W. Slaten.
166

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 167
quaUties. Vvxy denoting a departed spirit or shade occurs with
relative frequency, being more common, perhaps, in Josephus
than in the other writers of this period. As ' ' person ' ' its occurrence
is rare. Denoting one of the two (or three) constituent elements of
which a human being consists, it occurs with considerable frequency.
The meaning "soul," as the seat of emotions and intelUgence, is
in Josephus, as in the writings of his contemporaries, most common
(the f amihar coupUng of foxy with aupa occurs frequently, though
rarely in contrast). It is chiefly in the speeches of Eleazar in
Book vU. of the War that Josephus discusses the relationship of
soul and body. Ordinarily there is no assertion of the superiority
of the soul to the body. There are few traces of the Platonic doc
trine of the Umitation and punishment of the soul through its
connection with the body, these occurring chiefly in the speeches
mentioned above. Instead of dcpikvai rb irvevpa (Matt. 27:50),
we find the expression used in the LXX (Gen. 35:18) and in
classic writers, dcpikvai ryv foxyv.
2dp£ occurs rarely, only six instances being noted. In three it
denotes the human body and refers to the separation (or release)
of the soul from the body. In Bell. vi. 47, the plural is used, but
apparently without difference in meaning. Twice the reference is
to the actual flesh of the human body, and once it refers to the
flesh of a wUd animal. In Bell. ii. 155, it is said that the Essenes
rejoice upon their release from the bonds of the body. Such
depreciation of the body is, however, rare, and insufficient to show
an ethical duaUsm of mind and matter either in the conception of
the Essenes or in that of their reporter.
The closest approach to a doctrine of the evil of matter, or of
the incompatibiUty of soul and body, is found in the second speech
of Eleazar (Bell. vii. 344), where it is said of souls that "while
they are in a mortal body (aupa) they are bound and are fined
up with the evils of the same, to speak most truly, they are dead,
for feUowship with mortality is unseemly for the divine."
In other Jewish works written in Greek irvevpa follows in
general the usage of the writings already discussed. Of its use in
the sense of wind, however, no examples have been observed.
We have noted no iUustration of its use with reference to the Spirit
167

168 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
of God. Of the spirit of man it occurs in the various senses previ
ously noted. In the Greek additions to Esther 5 : i it is used of the
spirit of man as the seat of various passions, quahties, and emo
tions, as also in IV Mace, n: 11. As the seat of mentahty it
occurs in IV Mace. 7:14, and as the seat of Ufe in II Mace. 7:22,
23; 14:46; III Mace. 6:24; IV Mace. 12:20 (x). There are few
examples, so far as noted, of the use of irvevpa for a superhuman
being (other than God), either good or evil, in Jewish-Greek reU
gious Uterature written originaUy in Greek. Cf. pp. 145 f . Some
obscure uses of the term occur in pseudo-Phocyhdes 11. 106 ff.
(cf. p. 19); Sib. Or. iii. 102; Letters of HeracUtus 7:63.
tyvxy occurs in its common senses of Ufe and soul. Illustrations
are given above on p. 146 ff.
2dp£ carries only its proper meaning of flesh, the soft portion
of the body, and its metonymic signification, body. See examples
on p. 151. Other meanings are not represented in Jewish writings
originally composed in Greek.
VI. SUMMARY AND COMPARISON
We may summarize the results of our investigation of the usages
of irvevpa, foxy, and crdp£ in Jewish-Greek Uterature as foUows:
The ordinary classical meanings of aU three words to a large extent
obtain. ILvevpa, in the philosophical sense of the contemporary
and later philosophical and medical writers, viz., as meaning world-
stuff, soul-stuff, occurs but rarely (Philo) . In the LXX irvevpa is
the standard equivalent of HVI . Its use to denote a constituent
element of a human being, viz., as the seat of inteUect, emotion,
etc., is somewhat more than occasional. The use of foxy as the
seat of intellect, emotion, and moral quaUties far exceeds its em
ployment in any other sense, but its use in the early meaning of a
shade is surprisingly frequent. In the LXX it occurs regularly as
the rendering of 1253D . In this Uterature for the first time we
observe a distinct tendency to equate irvevpa and foxy, giving to
the former even the task of denoting the unembodied or disembodied
spirit or shade. 2dp£ occurs infrequently, with the meanings "flesh"
and "body," common in Greek writers, plus the added meaning of
16S

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 169
"kinsman" and "Uving being" in writings translated from the
Hebrew. Toward the problems that have largely inspired this study the
investigation of the Jewish-Greek literature makes only a negative
contribution. Nowhere does there appear a clearly defined or
certainly imphed duaUstic doctrine attributing to matter an evil
quaUty.1 The only instances of sharp depreciation of the body
as compared with the soul which occur in this Uterature are in an
exhortation to courage in the face of death (Josephus Bell. vii.
337 ff.) which repeats if it does not echo the ideas long before ex
pressed by Plato (Phaedo 66, 79; Crat. 400 C) and almost contem
poraneously by Plutarch (Consolatio ad Apollonium), and in certain
passages of Phflo. Cf. p. 163. Nowhere is there any elevation of
irvevpa above foxy, or of irvevpariKbs above foxiKbs, though there is
in Philo a possible starting-point for such a usage. Nowhere is
there the clearly expressed antinomy of crdp£ and irvevpa which we
shall later find in Paul, or the personification of the former as the
principle of evil.
Before passing to the study of the usage of the New Testament
and other reUgious writings of the early Christian period it may
be weU to summarize the results thus far reached, it being remem
bered that our study has not -yet included the Hermetic literature,
the magical papyri, the Gnostics, or any writings influenced by
Christianity. LLveOpa is throughout the classical period and with few if any
exceptions among non- Jewish Greek writers to the end of the
second century a.d. a physical term signifying wind, air, breath,
breath of Ufe. It is throughout this whole period a substantial,
not a functional or individualizing, term. In the sixth century B.C.
1 Cf. Bousset, Die Religion des Judenthums (2d ed.), p. 461. F. C. Porter, "The
Yecer Hara," in Biblical and Semitic Studies, by Members of the Faculty of Yale
University, New York, 1901, has shown that the rabbis do not place the evil impulse
in the body as distinguished from, the soul, still less make the body the seat of the
evil and the soul that of the good impulse (pp. 03-111). In their various efforts to
account for the evil impulse they sometimes ascribe it to God and sometimes to man,
but never explain it as inherent in the matter of which the human body is composed
(p. 123). These results of the study of the rabbinic writers are in evident harmony
with what we have discovered in the Jewish-Greek writers.
169

170 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
Anaximenes said that irvevpa Kal dyp encompassed all things. In the
same century Xenophanes said that the soul was irvevpa, meaning
by irvevpa, however, evanescent breath. In the fifth century
Empedocles found the source of all things in four roots — fire, water,
earth, and air — and Diogenes made air (dyp, not irvevpa) the ulti
mate principle of existence. In Aristotle's day there were those
who found in irvevpa, defined as a vital and generative substance,
the informing principle of all things, perhaps meaning, however, by
"all things" all Uving things, plants and animals. Zeno and his
fellow-Stoics repeat the statement of Xenophanes that the soul is
irvevpa, but add evdeppov and use irvevpa rather in the sense of
Aristotle's day than of Xenophanes'. Chrysippus, on the one side
following the line of Diogenes' thought, says that the ultimate basis
of things is self-moving irvevpa, and on the other, like Zeno and
the contemporaries of Aristotle, makes irvevpa a sort of nervous
and vital fluid or vapor, which, proceeding from the ruling part of
the soul to the organs of perception and generation, becomes sight,
hearing, etc. Some of the Stoics say that the soul arises from the
cooUng of the irvevpa in or surrounding the bodies of infants.
Though in the fourth century B.C. Menander used the phrase
delov irvevpa, Posidonius (150 B.C.) was apparently the first to
make the assertion that God is irvevpa, adding, however, voepbv /cat
irvpuSes- In the early Christian period Plutarch and Galen repeat
the doctrines of Chrysippus with reference to the origin of the soul.
Plutarch also discusses the distinction between the soul of man, the
irrational soul of animals, the principle of growth in plants, and the
power of cohesion in stones, but does not apply the term irvevpa to
either of the latter two. Galen, however, distinctly speaks of the
kKTiKov irvevpa, meaning by this what Plutarch had called e£is, and
finally Sextus Empiricus groups all these things together under
the common term 7n>eDp.a, identifying the irvevpa which is in man
with that which permeates other animals, the plants, and the
rocks. Only in the Greek translated from the Hebrew or written under
the influence of Hebrew thought do we find the expression spirit
of God, irvevpa deov, or holy spirit, irvevpa dyiov (the latter modeled
after the delov irvevpa of the Greeks, but expressing a Hebrew idea).
170

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 171
So also it is in this literature only that we find spirit of man, or
spirit meaning a shade, an angel, or a demon.1 Even in these
writers the word often has a certain quantitative force, inherited
not only from its Greek, but also from its Hebrew ancestry.
On the other hand, with rare and almost negligible exceptions,
^vxi7 is throughout the whole period of this study a functional and
individual, not a substantial term. From the earliest period of
the Greek language of which we have remnants the Greeks believed
that there was in man a something which, existing in the body in
life, departed from it in death. This Homer calls foxy, using it
most frequently for the shade as it exists in the underworld after
death, but sometimes, also, apparently for the life of which it is
the seat whUe it remains in the body. This early meaning, shade,
though somewhat rare after the time of the tragic poets, is found
even down to the end of our period. The meaning, Ufe, Ukewise
persists throughout the period.
The far more common use of the word, however, from Pindar
and the tragedians on is to denote that in the living man which
feels, thinks, wills, and by virtue of which he is ahve. The phi
losophers have their theories as to what it is composed of or the
parts into which it is divided, but the constant meaning of the term,
that about which these theories are proposed, is the soul as the seat
of Ufe, inteUigence, and emotion. Aristotle's definition, "The soul
is that by which we live and perceive and initiate thought" (i. 414a),
would hold for practically all Greek writers. That Aristotle and
other writers after him ascribe soul to animals and plants, meaning,
however, to impute to them not all the powers of the human soul
but only certain lower ones; that some writers ascribe soul to the
universe and to God; that by metonymy man, possessing a soul,
is caUed a soul, the word thus becoming equivalent to "person";
that in Jewish-Greek writers, under the influence of the Hebrew
12395, foxy means any Uving being; and that Philo once or twice
uses foxy as other Greek writers use irvevpa for soul-stuff — all these
exceptional and more or less consciously tropical usages in no way
obscure the fact that the prevailing and all-but-constant use of the
term from Pindar to Sextus Empiricus is to denote the human soul
1 To this statement Dion Hal. Antiq. i. 31. is the only observed exception; cf. p. 81 .
171

172 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
as that in which reside life, emotion, thought, and will, and that the
term is functional and not substantial.
Zap!-, properly meaning flesh, the soft portion of the body of an
animal, living or once living, retains this meaning throughout all
the periods we have been studying. In them all it is also used by
metonymy for the whole body. In Greek writings translated from
the Hebrew it has also two meanings derived from the tropical use of
the Hebrew "lilJSl, namely, kindred, and a corporeal living creature,
a corporeally conditioned living being. Neither in non- Jewish nor
in Jewish writers does the term seem to have acquired any ethical
significance. Like aup,a, it is spoken of in terms of disparagement
as compared with the soul, and in Philo it is once used in some
what remote antithesis to irvevpa. It is nowhere used to express
the notion that matter is the source or cause of moral evil. Plato
regarded the body as a burden upon the soul, and later writers,
perhaps influenced by him, notably PhUo, Seneca, and Plutarch,
express similar views. There are traces in Plato, and much later in
neo-Pythagoreanism, of the idea that the disorder of the universe
is traceable to the matter which enters into its composition. But
in the literature we have been examining these two ideas do not
seem to have been united in a formal doctrine that the moral evU
men do is traceable to the fact, that the body is composed of
matter.

172

CHAPTER VI
nNEYMA, *YXH, AND SAPH IN ETHNIC RELIGIOUS WRIT
INGS APPROXIMATELY CONTEMPORARY
WITH THE NEW TESTAMENT
The previous chapters have dealt with the usage of Greek
writers from Homer down to, and along certain lines a hundred years
beyond, the close of the New Testament period, with the usage of
the corresponding Hebrew words, and with Jewish-Greek usage of
the pre-Christian and early Christian period. Before taking up
the New Testament writers themselves, it remains to consider
briefly certain non-Christian religious writers who, though of some
what uncertain date, reflect usages which may be antecedent to, or
contemporary with, the New Testament.
I. THE USAGE OF THE MAGICAL TEXTS
In the magical texts, which have been brought to light by the
researches of Parthey, Wessely, Kenyon, and others and made
the subject of study by Dieterich, Reitzenstein, Cumont, and
others, the word irvevpa is of frequent occurrence,- sometimes with
foxy hi paraUeUsm or crdp£ in antithesis. Probably none of the
literature is itself pre-Christian in its present form, and much of
it belongs to the third and fourth centuries a.d.,1 but the pos
sibiUty that it reflects a usage coming from as early a period
as the New Testament writers requires that it be taken into
account. ILvevpa is still used in the sense of air. The god is spoken of as
6 kirl /cepcjj irvebpan.2 More frequently, however, it is appUed to
the god (accompanied by an adjective 0etos, tepos, 0710s), either
as a direct attribute or as a possession or manifestation of the god.
So sometimes in connection with the use in the sense of air, or
1 See Parthey, in Abh. d. Akad. d. Wiss. (Berlin, 1865), p. 117; Wessely, in
Denk. d. Akad. d. Wiss. (Vienna, 1888), Abt. II, 37.
2 Wessely, op. cit., II. 54, 1. 1026.
173] 173

174 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
with both uses in reference to the god in close connection.1 In
particular irvevpa is used of the paredros or guardian-spirit by whom
the soul of the initiate is cared for.2 But irvevpa is also applied to
the soul of the initiate.3 It is noticeable here that irvevpa alone
is used as a simple anthropological term, denoting one of the two
elements of man, along with aupa ; but dkpiov irvevpa as appUed to
the soul when separated from the body, and to the irdpeSpos by
whom it is borne into the air. To the former also even the term
0e6s is appUed. The human irvevpa is, sometimes at least, thought
of as coming from God, and as that by the impartation of which
life is created or of which the soul is composed; but, more fre
quently, perhaps, it is identified with the foxy-
It is instructive to find in these writings the two already familiar
phrases irvevpa delov and irvevpa dyiov. The former, occurring in
Menander in the fourth century B.C., in the Axiochus, the LXX,
and Philo, and in the magical papyri, has in aU cases the same
fundamental meaning, "divine Spirit." In the Greek writers it is
the power that controls the actions of men or the source of
mentaUty in men; in the Jewish writers, the source of inspira
tion or of moral uplift, or the substance of which the soul is com
posed; in the magical texts, the source of reUgious ecstasy or
transformation. LLvevpa dyiov, first attested by the LXX, occurs
also in other Jewish writings, including the New Testament, and
in the magical papyri. Its presence in these two apparently unre
lated groups may conceivably be due to an oriental idea and
phraseology (of which even the "Holy Spirit" of Hebrew scripture
may be an early expression) by which the two hteratures have
been independently affected. In view, however, of the absence of
definite testimony to the existence of such an oriental idea and of
the syncretistic character of the religions which gave rise to the
magical papyri, it is perhaps quite as probable that the latter
derived the term from Jewish or Christian writings. There seems
at least little reason to deny that Judaism and Christianity may
1 Cf. passage quoted by Kenyon, Papyri in the British Museum, I, 114; Wessely,
op. cit., I, 146, 1. 243; II, 54, 1. 1029; Reitzenstein, Die hellenistischen Mysterien-
religionen, p. 137; Parthey, 1, 1. 312.
2 Parthey, I, 177, 1. 96. J Reitzenstein, op. cit., p. 136.
174

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 175
have influenced the contemporary reUgions as well as have been
influenced by them. The chief value, accordingly, of the evidence
of the papyri is in showing the wide currency of the word 7rc<eCp,a,
and especiaUy of the phrases irvevpa delov and irvevpa dyiov, rather
than in throwing any considerable light upon the origin of New
Testament usage, Vvxy continues in use and with substantially
unchanged meaning, although irvevpa has become individuahzed
and its practical equivalent. Of any ' antithesis between the two
terms there is but shght evidence. The adjectives foxiKbs and
irvevpariKbs each occur once. Reitzenstein maintains that, in the
reUgious and magical writers of this period, the man who had received
the divine irvevpa was thought of as irvevpariKbs; he who had not
received it was stiU only foxiKbs (op. cit., pp. 42 ff.). This is at
least so far true as that the divine being or influence by which
' man is transformed in nature, reborn, is constantly called irvevpa,
very rarely, it would seem, foxy, and the man who is by the divine
irvevpa reborn is never as such designated foxy, but, in the post
mortem state at least, irvevpa (dkpiov). 2dp£, so far as appears,
took on in the magical texts no meanings different from those
found in the other Greek writings of the period.
II. THE HERMETIC LITERATURE
The so-caUed Hermetic writings have been known to Christian
writers for many centuries. The early church Fathers (Justin
Martyr, TertuUian, Clement of Alexandria) quote them in defense
of Christianity. Stobaeus collected fragments of them. The Hu
manists knew and valued them. They were studied in the six
teenth and seventeenth centuries, and in modern times have again
been dihgently examined by many scholars. Parthey has pubhshed
the text of the Corpus Hermeticum in fuU and Reitzenstein in part,
and G. R. S. Mead has issued a translation of the whole body
of extant Uterature, with extended prolegomena, commentary, etc.1
There is a wide difference of opinion as to the date at which
this Uterature was produced. Mead beUeves that some of the
1 Parthey, Hermetis Trismegisti Poemander, Berlin, 1854; Reitzenstein, Poe-
tnandres, Leipzig, 1904; G. R. S. Mead, Thrice-Greatest Hermes, London and Benares,
1906. 175

176 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
extant portions of it are at least as early as the earliest Christian
writings, while von Christ assigns them to the third Christian
century, and thinks that they show the influence of neo-Platonism.
To affirm that they influenced New Testament usage would be
hazardous but they perhaps throw some light on the direction in
which thought was moving in New Testament times.
In this Uterature the common division of man into soul and body
is retained from the long familiar usage (Corpus Hermeticum 1:30;
2:9; 8:1; 9:2; 11:10). In 10:10, it takes the form, mind and
body. But the favorite conception is of man as consisting of
five elements, arranged in the order of their dignity as foUows:
vovs, Xbyos, foxy, irvevpa, aupa, mind, reason, soul, spirit, body
(C.H. 10:13).
Mind is that which is most akin to God, for God is mind (C.H.
5:11), or the cause of mind (C.H. 2:14).
tyvxy is that which has life. From the all-Soul there spring
souls of creeping things, and these in ascending scale become by
transmigration souls of fishes, land animals, birds, and men, whUe
human souls may eventually become Saipoves or vovs. ^vxy in
man has substantially the same meaning which it bears throughout
Greek literature.' It is the seat of inteUectual and especiaUy of
moral life (C.H. 10:8, 19); an eternal intellectual essence, in
corporeal, pre-existent and immortal (C.H. 8:1; 10:7, 15; Stob.
Eel. i. 41. 6).
The 7n»eDp,a is distinct from the foxy and inferior to it, its gar
ment, an intermediate thing between soul and body, yet also
incorporeal (C.H. 2:8; 10: 13, 16, 17). Elsewhere it is represented
as enveloping the seed (Stob. Eel. i. 41. 7). It is also spoken of as
possessing generative power (C.H. 9:9).
It is apparently conceived of as a rarefied substance. In the
series of envelopes it is that which lies between body and' soul,
preventing their contact and the body's consequent destruction
(C.H. 10:17). As distinguished from foxy it is perhaps thought
of as the seat of life, whUe the latter is the seat of mentahty and
moraUty, never apparently occurring in the sense of Ufe.
This Uterature is permeated with the Platonic idea of the
inferiority of the body to the soul and with the notion that the
176

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 177
body is a burden on the soul, yet it is riot wholly consistent in its
representation. Matter is eternal, yet also has been born, i.e., has
been given form; unborn matter was dpopcpia (C.R. 12:8; Stob.
Phys. 11:2).
Body, as in the Stoics (cf. p. no), is used in a double sense:
(a) that which has extension (C.H. 2:11); and (b) the material
portion of man (Stob. Phys. 35:9; 9:2; C.H.8:3). The passions
of the body befoul the soul, which in infancy is not fully detached
from the cosmic soul, and so is a thing of beauty and purity
(C.H. 10:15).
The vice of the soul is ignorance; and ignorance is induced by
the body (C.H. 10:8). Its highest good, which is to be achieved
by the Ufe of piety, is on being released from the earthly body to
become mind (vovs), which takes to itself a fiery body. According
to one passage the fate of the impious soul is its being turned back
toward creeping things (C.H. 10:8); according to another, which
distinctly repudiates this view, it is to be re-embodied in a human
body and to be scourged with its sins, the punishment being in
flicted by the mind, which has become a demon (C.H. 10:19-21).
But, on the other hand, the natural bodily impulses are not as
such condemned, the begetting of children in particular being
pronounced a pious act, while to die without children is an impiety
punished after death by incarnation in a sexless body (C.H. 2:17).
It appears, then, that despite the occasional pessimistic asser-i
tions that good unmixed with evil is impossible here below (C.H.
6:3), and that the hardest thing of all is that we need evil things
and cannot Uve without them (C.H. 6:6), the real doctrine of this
Uterature is not that the body by virtue of its quality as matter
poUutes the soul, but that the body is a hindrance, its passions
things to be overcome by piety, itself defined as knowing God and
doing men no harm (C.H. 10: 19). On the other hand, bodilessriess,
or rather the possession of a fiery body, is an element of the highest
blessedness along with knowledge of God and active benevolence
and beneficence.
2dp£ is of very infrequent occurrence. When used it signifies
either the muscular portion of the body (C.H. 6 : 6) or the body itself
(ibid., 3:3,4). 177

CHAPTER VII
nNEYMA, *YXH, AND 2APB IN THE NEW TESTAMENT
In considering the usage of the New Testament writers, it will
be expedient in the interest of brevity to present first an exhibit
of New Testament usage in general, and then in a discussion of the
usage of the several writers and groups of writers both to explain,
and justify the conclusions indicated in the general exhibit.
I. HNEYMA
I. Wind:
John 3 : 8a: rb irvevpa birov deXei irvel /cat ryv cpuvyv abrov dmbeis,
dXX' obK olSas irbdev epxerai, Kal irov iiiraYei.
The wind bloweth where it will and thou nearest its voice, but knowest
not whence it cometh and whither it goeth.
See also Heb. 1:7.
II. Breath, breath of life:
II Thess. 2:8: /cat rore diroKaXvcpdyaerai b aVopos bv b Kvpios
['Lyaovs] dveXel rt$ irvebpan tov arbparos abrov.
And then shall be revealed the lawless one, whom the Lord Jesus will
slay with the breath of his mouth.
See also Rev. n: n; 13:15.
III. Spirit: an incorporeal, sentient, intelligent, wUUng being,
or the element by virtue of which a being is sentient, inteUigent, etc.
A. Embodied, viz., human spirit, that element of a living man
by virtue of which he lives, feels, perceives, and wiUs; variously
viewed: 1. As the seat of life, or that in man which constitutes him a
living being.
Luke 8:55: /cat eirkarpefo.v to irvevpa avrys, Kal dvkary irapa-
xpypa- And her spirit returned and she rose up immediately.
See also Matt. 27:50; Luke 23:46; John 19:30; Acts 7:59;
Jas. 2:26.
178] 178

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 179
2. As the seat of emotion and wiU; especially of the moral and
religious life, including thought as concerned with religion.
Mark 14:38: ypyyopelre /cat irpoaebxeade, 'iva py eXdyre eis
ireipaapbv rb pkv irvevpa irpbdvpov 17 Sk trap? aadevys.
Watch and pray that ye enter not into temptation: the spirit indeed is
willing but the flesh is weak.
See also Matt. 26:41; Mark 8: 12; Luke 1:47; John 4:23, 24b;
11:33; 13:21; Acts 17:16; 18:25; 19:21; 20:22; Rom. 1:9;
2:29; 7:6; 8:16; 12:11; I Cor. 4:21; 7:34; 16:18; II Cor. 2:13;
7:1, 13; Gal. 6:1, 8, 18; Eph. 4:23; Phil. 4:23; II Tim. 4:22;
Philem. 25; Jas. 4:5; I Pet. 3:4.
It sometimes seems to denote the human spirit as permeated with
or dommated by the divine Spirit, either ethically (John 3:66), or
ecstatically (I Cor. 14:14, 15, 16).
3. As the seat of consciousness and inteUigence.
I Cor. 2:11: rts yap olSev avdpuiruv rd rov avdpuirov el py to
irvevpa rov avdpuirov to kv aurclj;
For what man knoweth the things of man save the spirit of the man
which is in him ?
See also Matt. 5:3; Mark 2:8; Luke 1 : 80.
4. GenericaUy, without reference to these distinctions.
Rom. 8:10: et 8k Xpiarbs kv bplv, rb pkv aupa veKpbv 81a apapriav,
to 8k irvevpa £uy 81a SiKaioavvyv.
And if Christ is in you the body is dead because of sin; but the spirit is
life because of righteousness.
See also I Cor. 5:3, 4; Phil. 1:27; Col. 2:5; I Thess. 5:23;
Heb. 4:12; 12:9 (?); Rev. 22:6.
B. Unembodied or disembodied spirit: more exactly, a sentient,
inteUigent, volitional being whose mode of life is not conditioned
by a body in the ordinary sense of the' term; used of various
beings so conceived, the specific reference being indicated by limita
tions of the word or by the context; thus of:
1. The Spirit of God, viewed as:
a) The cause of extraordinary phenomena in human experience,
such as prophecy, tongues, healings, etc.
179

180 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
I Cor. 12:4: SiaipeVets Se xapicrpdrav elaiv, rb Sk abrb irvevpa.
Now there are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit.
See also Matt. 10:20; 12:18, 28, 31, 32; 22:43; Mark 3:29;
12:36; 13:11; Luke 1:15, 17, 41, 67; 2:25,26,27; 4:18; 10:21;
12:10, 12; John 7:39 (bis); 20:22; Acts 1:5, 8, 16; 2:4, 17, 18,
33,38; 4:8,25,31; 5:3,9,32; 7:.Si,5S; 8:15,17,18,19,29; 9:17;
10:19,44,45,47; 11:12,15,16,28; 13:2,4,9,52; 15:8,28; 16:6;
19:2, 6; 20:23, 28; 21:4, 11; 28:25; Rom. 15:19; I Cor. 2:10,
126, 13, 14; 7;4o; 12:3, 7, 8, 9, n, 13; 14:2; Gal. 3:2, 3, 5;
Eph. 3:5; IThess. 5:19; I Tim. 4:1; Heb. 2:4; 3:7; 9:8; 10:15;
II Pet, 1:21; I John4:2a, 6a; Rev. 1:10; 2:7,11,17,29; 3:6,13,
22; 4:2; 14:13; *v-y, 21:10.
In Acts 16:7; I Pet. 1:11; Rev. i9:io(?),-the Spirit in this
sense is identified with that of the risen Jesus.
b) Active in an extraordinary way in the conception of a
child. Matt 1 : 18: ebpkdy kv yaarpl exovaa e/c irvebparos dyiov.
She was found with child of the Holy Spirit.
See also Matt. 1:20; Luke 1:35.
c) Operative in the human spirit for the production of ethical.
results. Rom. 8:4: IVa rb SiKaiupa rov vbpov irXypudrj kv yplv rols py
Kara crdp/ca irepiirarovaiv dXXd /card irvevpa.
That the ordinance of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not ac
cording to flesh but according to Spirit.
See also Matt. 3:11; Mark 1:8; Luke 3:16; John 3:5, 6a, 8b;
14:17,26; 15:26; 16:13; Acts 9:31; Rom. 5:5; 8:2,5,6,9,13,
14, 156, 16a, 23, 26, 27; 9:1; 14:17; i5:i3, l6, 3°5 I Cor. 2:4;
3:16; 6:11,19; II Cor. 1:22; 3:3,6,8,17,18; 4:13; 5:5; 6:6;
13:13; Gal. 4:6; 5:5,16,17,18,22,25; Eph. 1:13, 17; 2:18,22;
3:!6; 4:3,3°; 6:17,18; Phil. 2:1; 3:3; Col. 1:8; IThess. 1:5, 6;
4:8; IIThess. 2:13; II Tim. 1:14; Titus3:5; Heb. 10:29; I Pet.
1:2; 4:14; Jude, vss. 19, 20.
In Rom. 8:9c; Phil. 1:19; Heb. 9:14, the Spirit in this sense
is identified with that of the risen Jesus.
180

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 181
d) The mind of God.
I Cor. 2: n : ovrus /cat rd rod deov obSels 'kyvuKev et py rb irvevpa
rov deov.Even so the things of God no one knoweth save the Spirit of God.
e) Operative in the external world.
Acts 8:39: ore Sk avefiyaav e/c rov vSaros, irvevpa Kvpiov ypiraaev
rbv QiXiirirov.
And when they came up out of the water, the Spirit of the Lord caught
away Philip.
/) Genetically, without specific reference to the form of
activity. Luke 4:14: /cat birkar pefov b 'Lyaovs kv ry Svvdpei tov irvebparos
eis ryv TaXiXaiav.
And Jesus returned in the power of the Spirit into Galilee.
See also Matt. 3:16; 4:1; 28:19; Mark 1:10, 12; Luke 3:22;
4:1 (bis); 11:13; J°hn 1:32,33 (bis)', 3 = 345 Acts 1:2; 6:3, 5, 10;
10:38; 11:24; Rom. 8:11 (bis); Gal. 3:14; 4:29; Eph. 4:4;
5:18; Heb. 6:4; I Pet. 1:12; I John 3:24; 4:13; 5:6,8; Rev.
22:17. 2. The spirit of man separated from the body after death:
a) In a heavenly mode of existence.
Acts 23:9: ovSkv KaKov ebpiampev kv tcjJ avdpuiru tovtu. et Sk
irvevpa eXaXyaev abr$ y aVyeAos — .
We find no evil in this man: and if a spirit hath spoken to him, or an
angel —
See also I Cor. 5:5; Heb. 12:23.
b) A ghost, specter, shade, visible on earth.
Luke 24:37: rrroydkvres Sk Kal eptpofioi yevbpevoi kSoKovv irvevpa
deupelv. But they were terrified and affrighted, and supposed that they saw a
spirit. See also Luke 24:39.
c) In Sheol.
I Pet. 3:19: kv § koi to is kv cpvXaK'S irvebpaaiv iropevdels
kxypvl-ev. In which also he went and preached to the spirits in prison.
181

182 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
3. An angel.
Heb. 1:14: obxl irdvres eiaiv XeirovpyiKa irvebpara eis Siawviav
airoareXXbpeva Std robs peXXovras KXypovopelv aurypiav;
Are they not all ministering spirits, sent forth to do service for the sake
of them that are to inherit salvation ?
4. A demon.
Acts 8:7: iroXXol yap ruv exbvruv irvebpara aKadapra fiouvra
tpuvy peydXy k^ypxovro.
For from many of those that had unclean spirits, they came out, crying
with a loud voice.
See also Matt. 8:16; 10:5; 12:43, 45; Mark 1:23, 26, 27;
3:11,30; 5:2,8,13; 6:7; 7:25; 9:17, 20, 25 (Ms); Luke4:-33,36;
6:18; 7:21; 8:2, 29; 9:39, 42; 10:20; 11:24, 26; 13:11; Acts
5:16; 16:16, 18; 19:12, 13, 15, 16; I Tim. 4:1; Rev. 16:13, x45
18:2. 5. Without reference to these distinctions, referring quaUta-
tively to any being not corporeally conditioned, or to aU such,
or to a group (other than any of the above), defined by the context;
used both of beings conceived of as actually existing, and, espe
cially as a descriptive term in negative expressions, of beings
presented merely as objects of thought.
John 4:24a: irvevpa 6 debs, koi robs irpoatcvvovvras abrov kv irvev-
pari /cat dA?70eta Set irpoaKVvelv.
God is a spirit and they that worship him must worship in spirit and
truth. (The first instance only falls under this head.)
Rom. 8:15: oti 7dp kXdfiere irvevpa SovXeias irdXiv els cpbfiov,
dXXd eXdfiere irvevpa viodeaias.
For ye received not a spirit of bondage again unto fear; but ye received
a spirit of adoption.
See also Luke 9: 55; Acts 23:8; Rom. 1:4; 11:8; ICor.2:i2<z;
12:10; 14:12, 32; 15:45; II Cor. 11:4; 12:18; Eph. 2:2; II
Thess. 2:2; I Tim. 3:16;' II Tim. 1:7; I Pet. 3:18; 4:6; I John
4:1 (Ms), 2b, 3, 6b; Rev. 1:4; 3:1; 4:5; 5:6.
C. Genetically, without reference to the distinction between
embodied and unembodied spirit.
John 6:63 (Ms); I Cor. 6:17; Heb. 12:9 (?).
1 Cf. Enoch 20:6, iirl rip irvevfiari. 1S2

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 183
II. *YXH
i. Life, the loss of which is death; used only of men.
Mark 3:4: e^eanv rols adfifiaaiv ayadoiroiyaai y KaKoiroiyaai,
foxyv auaai y diroKrelvai;
Is it lawful on the sabbath to do good or to do harm ? to save a life or
to kill? See also Matt. 2:20; 6:25 (Ms); Luke 6:9; 12:20, 22, 23;
14:26; 21:19 (?); John 10:11, 15, 17; 13:37, 38; 15:13; Acts
20:10,24; 27:10,22; Rom. 11:3; 16:4; II Cor. 1:23; Phil. 2:30;
I John 3:16 (bis); Rev. 8:9.
2. The soul of man as distinguished from the body and existing
separately or capable of so existing.
Matt. 10:28: /cat py cpofiydyre dirb ruv diroKreivovruv to aupa
ryv Sk foxyv pif Svvapkvuv diroKrelvai- cpofielade Sk paXXov rbv 5wd-
pevov Kal foxyv /cat aupa airoXkaai kv yeeWij.
And become not afraid of those that kill the body, but are not able to kill
the soul: but rather fear him who is able to destroy both soul and body in hell.
See also Acts 2:27; Rev. 6:9; 20:4. Less clearly so in I Thess.
5:23; Heb. 10:39; Jas. 1:21; 5:20; IPet. 1:9; 4:19; Rev. 18:13.
3. Soul as a constituent element of man's nature, the seat of
vitaUty, thought, emotion, will; the human mind in the larger
sense of the word; most frequently with special reference to its
religious capacities and experiences.
Matt, n 129: /cat ebpyaere dvairavaiv rals foxals bpuv.
And ye shall find rest for your souls.
See also Matt 22:37; 26:38; Mark 12:30; 14:34; Luke 2:35;
10:27; John 10:24; 12:27; Acts4:32; 14:2,22; 15:24; Eph. 6:6;
PhU. 1:27; 0)1.3:23; Heb. 4:12; 6:19; 12:3; IPet. 1:22; 2jn,
25; UPet. 2:8, 14; III John 2; Rev. 18:14.
4. FoUowing the LXX, foxy £uys signifies a living being.
Rev. 16:3 only. I Cor. 15 : 45 uses foxy £5>aa in a similar sense.
5. More frequently foxy alone denotes a human person.
o) A person, an individual man; sometimes in the redundant
form, foxy avdpuirov.
Rom. 13 : 1 : iracra foxy ki-ovaiais birepexobaais biroraaakadu.
Let every soul be in subjection to the higher powers.
183

184 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
See also Acts 2:43; 3:23; Rom. 2:9.
b) In enumerations.
Acts 2:41; 7:14; 27:37; IPet. 3:20.
c) With possessive limitation, for self.
Matt. 12:18; Luke 1:46; 12:19a; Heb. 10:38. In Luke
12 : 19b without possessive limitation.
d) By further metonymy for the powers, possibilities, and
interests of the self, the human person.
Matt. 16:25a: os yap edv de\y ryv foxyv abrov auaai, dirdXeaei
abryv. For whosoever will save his life shall lose it.
See also Matt. 10:39 (bis); 16:256, 26; 20:28; Mark8:35 (bis),
36, 37; 10:45; Luke 9:24 (Ms); 17:33; John 12:25 (M; Acts
15:26; II Cor. 12:15; IThess. 2:8; Heb. 13:17; Rev. 12: n.
in. SAPH
1. Flesh: the soft, muscular parts of an animal body, Uving
or once living. ,
Luke 24:39: foXacprjaark pe Kal ISere, on irvevpa crdp/ca /cat
barka ovk e'xet Kadus kpk deupelre exovra.
Handle me and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye behold me
having. See also John 6:51 (bis), 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 63; I Cor. 15:39
(quater), 50; Jas. 5:3; Rev. 17:16; 19:18 (quinquies), 21.
2. Body: the whole material part of a Uving being.
II Cor. 12:7: did tVa py birepaipupai, kSbdy poi aKoXoij/ ry crap/ct.
That I should not be exalted overmuch there was given unto me a thorn
in the flesh.
See also Matt. 26:41; Mark 14:38; John 1:13 (?); Acts 2:26,
31; Rom. 2:28; I . Cor. 5:5; II Cor. 4:11; 7:1; 10:3a; Gal.
2:20; 3:3; 4:13, 14; 6:8 (bis), 13; Eph. 2:11ft, 15; 5:29;
Phil. 1:22, 24; Col. 1:22, 24; 2:1,5,13; I Tim. 3:16; Heb. 9:10,
13; 10:20; 12:9; I Pet. 3:18, 21; 4:1 (bis), 2, 6; I John 2:16;
4:2; II John, vs. 7; Jude, vss. 7, 8, 23.
By metonymy, for embodiment, incarnation. Heb. 5 : 7.
With atp.a, the whole phrase signifying the body. Heb. 2 : 14.
184

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 185
3. By metonymy: the basis or result of natural generation.
a) The basis of natural generation and of kinship (the body,
or the body plus whatever is concerned with generation aiid
kinship). John 3:6a: rb yeyevvy pkvov e/c rys aapKbs adpi; kanv.
That which is born of the flesh is flesh. (Only the first instance falls under
this head. Cf. 6 below.)
See also Rom. 4:1; 9:3, 5, 8; I Cor. 10:18; Gal. 4:23, 29;
Eph. 2:11a.
ft) As a coUective term, equivalent to "kindred."
Rom. 11:14: et 7rcos irapa£yXuau pov ryv crdp/ca /cat auau nvds
e§ avruv. If by any means I may provoke to jealousy my kinsmen, and may save
some of them.
In this use the term passes beyond the limits of the physical
and comes to include all the elements of a human being.
4. A corporeaUy conditioned living being: usually referring
exclusively to man, yet sometimes including all corporeal living
beings, and in any case designating the beings referred to not as
human but as corporeal.
Matt. 16:17: paKapios el, liipuv Bapiuva, on aapZ Kal alpa ovk
direKaXv^ev aoi dXX' b iraryp pov b kv [rots] obpavols.
Blessed art thou Simon Bar- Jonah: for flesh and blood hath not revealed
it unto thee, but my Father who is in heaven.
See also Matt. 19:5, 6; 24:22; Mark 10:8; 13:20; Luke 3:6;
John 1:14; 17:2; Acts 2:17; Rom. 1:3; 3:20; 8:3&,c(?); I Cor.
1:29; 6:16; Gal. 1:16; 2:16; Eph. 5:31; 6:12; I Pet. 1:24.
5. By metonymy: for the creature side, the corporeally condi
tioned aspect of Ufe, the external as distinguished from the
internal and real, or the secular as distinguished from the strictly
reUgious. John 8:15: bpels Kara ryv crdp/ca Kpivere, kyu ob Kp'ivu obSkva
(cf. 7:24).
Ye judge after the flesh; I judge no man.
See also I Cor. 1:26; 7:28; II Cor. 5:16 (Ms); 7:5; 10:2;
11:18; Gal. 6:12; Eph. 6:5; Col. 3:22; Philem. 16.
185

186 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
6. The product of natural generation apart from the morally
transforming power of the Spirit of God; all that comes to a man
by inheritance rather than from the operation of the divine Spirit.
The term as thus used does not exclude, may even specifically
include, whatever excellent powers, privileges, etc., come by
heredity, but whatever is thus derived is regarded as inadequate
to enable man to achieve the highest good.
Phil. 3:4: et tis SoKel aXXos ireiroidkvai kv aapd, kyu pdXXov.
If any other man thinketh to have confidence in the flesh, I yet more.
(Note the context.)
See also John 3 : 6ft ; Rom.6:i9; 7:5,18,25; 8:3a; IICor.i:i7;
Phil. 3:3.
7. That element in man's nature which is opposed to goodness,
that in him which makes for evil; sometimes thought of as an
element of himself, sometimes objectified as a force distinct from
him, this latter usage being, however, rather rhetorical.
Rom. 8:6: rb ydp cppbvypa rys aapKos ddvaros.
For the mind of the flesh is death.
See also Rom. 8:4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 12 (bis), 13; 13:14; Gal. 5:13, 16,
17, 19, 24; perhaps Eph. 2:3 (bis); Col. 2:11, 18, 23; II Pet. 2:10,
18, though in all these latter cases crdp£ may itself mean simply
body, and the implication of evil lie in other members of the
sentence. In 6 all the good that comes to man by nature is credited to
the crdp£, the evil of it is its moral inadequacy; in 7 the right
impulses are credited to the vovs or the eau dvdpuiros, and the
crdp£ becomes a force positively and aggressively evU.
From this exhibit of New Testament usage in general we may
pass to consider the usages of particular writers.
IV. THE PAULINE USAGE
One of the marked peculiarities of the New Testament vocabu
lary which is especially characteristic of Paul is the frequency of the
words irvevpa and crdp£ , especially the former, ^vxy is indeed not
infrequent, but while the others rise into a prominence which they
have in no other literature that we have examined, foxy, which
186

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 187
almost everywhere has been far more frequent than either of the
other words, is now much less frequent than either.
The apostle Paul's use of irvevpa is plainly kindred with,
and beyond doubt directly or indirectly influenced by, the Old
Testament usage of nT\ . If one turn to the Greek writers
contemporary with Paul, he will find the meanings "wind" and
"breath" most frequent, the meaning "spirit" rare, and the reli
gious sense of the term as referring to the Spirit of God or the spirit
pi man as the seat of reUgious Ufe almost without example. Even
in the Jewish-Greek writings other than the LXX, these latter
meanings are relatively infrequent. In Paul, on the other hand,
irvevpa never means "wind," the meaning "breath" occurs but
once, and that in an epistle not quite certainly his, while its use
in reference to the Spirit of God occurs on every page, and the
instances in which it denotes the spirit of man are also quite
frequent. Both these uses indeed are much more frequent in Paul
than in any preceding literature, even the Old Testament, a fact
which indicates that in the mind of Paul himself or in a circle of
thought by which he was influenced something occurred to exalt
the importance of the term in the senses referred to.
If one seek for an author later than the Old Testament by whom
Paul may have been ""influenced, there is none more probable than
PhUo Judaeus (see pp. 157 ff.). But Paul's idea of spirit is by no
means identical with Philo's, being simpler and more self -consistent,
and more like that of the Old Testament. It may be doubted,
¦ therefore, whether Paul was very strongly influenced by Philo at
this point.
The occurrence of the phrase irvevpa 07101^ in the magical papyri,
in such a way as to indicate that it is a familiar term in the vocabu
lary of those who wrote these documents, raises the question
whether it is under the influence of this literature that Paul and
the other New Testament writers employ this phrase and use
irvevpa so frequently of the Spirit of God. It may be that further
research will show this to have been the fact. But, as indicated
above (p. 174), the existing evidence falls short of establishing
more than the possibiUty of it, and it must for the present remain
more probable that the development of which the Pauline writings
187

188 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
give evidence has its chief basis in the Old Testament literature
and its chief impulse in the Christian movement. Indeed, in view
of the relative infrequency of the idea and the term in contem
porary Jewish literature and their much greater prominence in
Paul than in most other New Testament writers, with the exception
of the Johannine literature, the most probable hypothesis seems
to be that the apostle himself is largely responsible for the marked
development in the usage of irvevpa with reference to the Spirit of
God and the spirit of man as the seat of reUgious life.
The secular Greek writers, it will be recaUed, very rarely employ
irvevpa of the human , spirit, or soul, but almost uniformly foxy-
Paul, on the other hand, like the LXX and the later Jewish-Greek
writers, frequently uses irvevpa in this sense, and, Uke them, not
infrequently with special reference to its religious capacities or
experiences. Occasionally by a sort of blending of usages he
employs it of the human spirit as permeated or dominated by the
divine Spirit — a usage which has a precedent in Greek translations
of Hebrew works. Cf. p. 154..
In the consideration of the Pauline use of irvevpa to denote the
Spirit of God, and the differentiation of Pauline from earlier usage,
four facts are important to observe. First, the relation of the Spirit
of God to God is analogous to that of the spirit of man to man
(I Cor. 2:11). In other word's, whatever the origin of the phrase,
it has become for Paul anthropomorphic, denoting an existence
which has, in relation to God, powers or functions analogous to
those of the human spirit in relation to man. In this statement
of the apostle we seem to approach very closely to the identification
of God and the Spirit of God. The Spirit is not here something
which proceeds from God, but is the very center of the divine con
sciousness, and 'if we suppose that of the two elements of man
there is in God none corresponding to the material body, the Spirit
of God would seem to be God. Paul, to be sure, does not expressly
say, as the Fourth Gospel does, that God is a spirit, or that he has
no body. To affirm, therefore, that he definitely identified God
and the Spirit of God is doubtless in a measure to substitute infer
ence for evidence. Yet the passage is important as showing how
near the apostle approached this affirmation.
188

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 189
The second notable fact is that in Paul the Spirit as a transitive
force is operative only in men, and in them as a force either pro
ducing extraordinary powers, such as prophecy, tongues, and the like
(see especially I Cor., chap. 12), or regenerating moral character
(see especiaUy Gal. 5:13-25). On the now familiar distinction
between the charismatic expression of the Spirit and his ethical
working, or on the apostle's toleration of the former idea and his
exaltation of the latter, it is superfluous to dwell.
In the third place, it is significant that from the point of view
of reUgious experience Paul identifies the Spirit of God and the
heavenly Christ. Both are alike the indwelling cause, in the soul
of man, of the present religious life and of the future resurrection
and blessedness. There is but one experience and but one cause \
of it, which may be spoken of as the Spirit of God or as the Spirit of
Christ or as Christ. This appears not only from such passages as
Gal. 5:16, 18, 25, compared with 2:20 and 5:6, reinforced as they
are by many others, but most strikingly in Rom._8:_3-ii, where
the interchange of terms with reference to the same experience and
without change of meaning is Unmistakable, and in II Cor. 3:17,
where he seems directly to affirm that Christ is the Spirit.1 Ade
quately to discuss the cause of this duality of expression for a
single idea would require more space than is here available. But
it is evident that the two terminologies have a different historic
origin. The Spirit-phraseology has its roots in those usages which
we have been examining in previous articles. The Christ-
terminology is itself, of course, derived from Jewish thought, but its
employment in the description of the Christian experience and
expectation has its starting-point in Paul's own interpretation of
his Damascus experience as a revelation of the Son of God in him.
Unable to discard either phraseology for the other, he uses now one,
now the other, now both together.
In the fourth place, it must be noted that the apostle has not
altogether left behind those forms of thought and expression which
are inherited from a time when the Spirit of God was thought of
1 If indeed & Kipioi here means God, we have an explicit affirmation of the identity
of God and the Spirit, but this is a less probable interpretation than the one indicated
above. 189

190 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
without clear ascription of personality, and even quantitatively.
See, e.g., I Thess. i : 5 ; Rom. 5:5; 8:23; I Cor. 2:4; II Cor. 1:22;
Gal. 3:5; Phil. 1:19. This type of expression is not indeed the
dominant one in Paul, yet giving due weight to it and to the appar
ent reluctance of Paul directly to identify God and the Spirit, we
may say that in his thought the Spirit of God is the personalized
power of God, operative in the spirits of men, not distinguishable,
in experience at least, from the heavenly Christ. If this is to us a
difficult mid-station between identity with God and personahty
distinct from God, it is nevertheless apparently about the>point
which Paul occupied.
It is probably significant of the reflection which had been going
on respecting the nature of irvevpa that in Paul for the first time
we find the term used genetically to denote the whole class of
intelligent beings who are not conditioned by a fleshly body; and
less frequently in a still more inclusive sense as embracing inteUi
gent beings whether embodied or unembodied. See III, B, 5, and
C in the list of meanings. _ '
The Pauline usage of foxy is, formally at least, almost identical
with that of the LXX, itself largely a reproduction of the Hebrew
use of 12523 . None of the Hebrew senses is lacking, and none of
the senses found in later Greek but not in Hebrew is present. In
one notable passage, however, in which the apostle quotes a phrase
from the Old Testament, he gives to the terms irvevpa and foxy an
antithesis of meaning which they bear neither in the Old Testament
nor, so far as has been observed, in any writer between the Old
Testament and Paul. Discussing the resurrection and the body
which is raised, quoting freely from Gen. 2:7, he says: kykvero 6
irpuros dvdpuiros 'ASdp els foxyv £uaav, and adds 6 ecrxaros 'A5dp
eis irvevpa £uoiroiovv (I Cor. 1 5 : 45) . The contrast is twofold. Adam
is alive; Christ is able to make alive (the dead). Adam became
foxy, which, according to a common usage of the Hebrew 11533
and foxy in the LXX, is a living corporeal being. Christ became
(by resurrection — note the context and Rom. 1:4) irvevpa, i.e.,
not a whoUy unembodied being, for this very chapter maintains
the contrary respecting those who are raised from the dead, but
one no longer having a terrestrial body of flesh and blood (vss. 40,
190

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 191
50). Such a contrast between irvevpa and ^11x17 is wholly foreign
to ordinary Greek thought, to which irvevpa is the substance of
which the soul is composed. Nor have we found in any Greek
writer a placing of the irvevpa above the ^vx^- It is still more
foreign to the usage of the Hermetic writings, which make the
foxy superior to the irvevpa. There is a certain approach to
it in Philo, in that he makes the irvevpa superior to the foxy
and, of course, hke the LXX, sometimes uses foxy of a person,
not simply the soul. The use of irvevpa to denote an incor
poreal being is also not without precedent. But the distinctive
feature of this passage, the use of irvevpa and foxy to describe two
types of beings, the earthly, embodied, and the heavenly, super-
corporeal, and the association with the latter of the idea of Ufe-
giving as contrasted with the simple life-possession of the former,
has no observed precedent.
The consideration of the Pauline use of o-dp£ brings us into the
heart of one of the most difficult and important aspects of our whole
study. That crdp£ sometimes has a physical sense is beyond ques
tion ; that it has in Paul an ethical sense is scarcely less clear. What
is important to determine is whether when it takes on its distinctly
ethical sense, so as to denote a force that makes for sin in the lives
of men, it stiU retains its physical sense, and whether as a force that
makes for unrighteousness, be this physical or non-physical, it is an
influence that may be resisted, or a compelUng and irresistible force.
If the flesh in the physical sense is the latter, then the apostle must,
logicaUy at least, hold that the flesh is essentially polluting to the
soul, and that there can be no salvation except through the release
of the soul from the body. If, however, the cdp£ that makes for evil
is not a physical thing, or if the aap% as physical is only an influence,
an occasion of temptation, not a compelUng force, salyation may be
a spiritual, not a physical, process. These questions are of great
importance. The answer to them will go far toward determining
the whole character of Paul's conception of religion.
It must, of course, be recognized on the one hand that the
apostle has nowhere definitely formulated his doctrine, and on the
other that there are several passages which at least on superficial
reading seem to express a hard-and-fast ethical dualism. Such,
191

192 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
for example, are Gal. 5^: 16-25 and Rom. 8 : 1-11. In attempting to
decide the question thus raised the following facts must be taken
into account:
First, throughout a large part of the whole period covered by
our previous study there have appeared here and there evidences
of a tendency to regard matter, or the human body, as a material
thing, as injurious to the intellectual or moral interests of man.
This persistent conception takes various forms. Sometimes, as
in Plato, the ultimate cause of disorder in the physical universe
is found in the recalcitrancy of the matter of which it is composed.
Sometimes, as-in Plato again, the body is disparaged as a hindrance
to philosophical thought. Sometimes, as in the Orphic teaching,
incarnation is regarded as a punishment imposed upon the soul
for sins committed by it in a previous state. Sometimes, as in
Philo, there is emphasized the ordinary fact of experience, viz.,
that the bodily passions incite men to immoral acts. Nowhere is
this conception expressed in a definitely formulated doctrine of an
ultimate ethical dualism of spirit and matter, or of mind and matter,
or of flesh and spirit, nor is it anywhere affirmed that sin in the
universe is a necessary consequence of the matter in it, or that sin
in the individual is caused by embodiment, or that aU good comes
from the spirit by virtue of its immateriaUty.
That such a view was held by the Gnostics comparatively early
in the Christian period seems to be true. But the evidence does
not seem to show that this development had already taken place
in the New Testament period itself. Palestinian Judaism, which
Paul's use of the word "spirit" suggests had influenced him much
more than had non- Jewish thinking, had not developed the thought
of the evil of the body or of matter as the cause of evil. In the
Old Testament the flesh is weak but not sinful. Weber, indeed, in
his Theologie des Talmud, maintained that rabbinism held an
ethical dualism, finding the evil impulse, the yeqer hara, in the flesh.
But, as mentioned in a previous chapter, Professor F. C. Porter
has demonstrated the erroneousness of this view and shown that
rabbinic Judaism held no doctrine of the evil of matter.1 Even
1 "The Yecer Hara: a Study in the Jewish Doctrine of Sin," in Biblical and
Semitic Studies, by Members of the Faculty of Yale University. New York, 1901.
192

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 193
Philo, who agrees with Plato that the body is a drag upon the soul,
holds no consistent doctrine of the evil of matter or of the body
as the cause of sin. Our approach to the study of the New Testa
ment ought therefore to be with open mind on this point. There
was an intellectual soil out of which there might easily spring the
doctrine that embodied man is ipso facto a sinful man. But appar
ently it had not yet sprung up. If it had, it is not certain that
the New Testament writers would have adopted it; nor, if it had
not, would it have been impossible for Paul to create it. We
should therefore interrogate Paul and the other writers who fol
lowed him without prejudice.
Secondly, the New Testament usage of crdp£ is not simple but
highly developed. There are found here not only the simple
meaning "flesh" and that relatively easy metonymy "body," but
those other meanings derived from the Hebrew, "corporeal being,"
"person," "kindred" (cf. pp. 69-72, with pp. 184 ff. above). Not
only so, but in Paul and in writers influenced by him there appears a
stiU further development of usage. The meaning 3, (a) (see p. 185)
is but a slight departure from the meaning "kindred" which the
word had already taken over from the Hebrew. So also 5 is by easy
metonymy developed from 4. Nor is the case materially differ
ent with 6. When trap? has come to mean the basis of natural
generation (3, a), it is but a short step to using it also for all that
comes by heredity, the whole complex of Ufe's relationships into
which one enters by being born of whatever parents one is born of.
This step Paul seems clearly to have taken in Phil. 3:3-7. By
virtue of the flesh he was not only a circumcised son of the race of
Israel and of the tribe of Benjamin, but an orthodox Hebrew, a
Pharisee, a persecutor of the unorthodox, and, as concerns the
righteousness that can be achieved under legalism, above reproach.
Thus it denotes the whole of his personality and possessions except
that which comes through a distinct personal religious experience.
At this point it is important to observe three facts.
a) The word is at this point of the development no longer an ex
clusively physical term. Indeed, it is not such in any of the preced
ing meanings, 3,4,5, unless possibly in 3 , (a) . But here more clearly
than at any preceding point the term has become super-physical.
193

t^

194 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
ft) The term as used in Phil. 3:3 ft. carries with it no suggestion
of positive evil. All the things that Paul comprehended under the
term "flesh" are in themselves good and so regarded by him, except
the persecution of the church, and even this he cites as an illustration
of his zeal for God. His conversion is not the repudiation of the
evil, but the turning from the good to the better. The doctrine
that underlies the passage is that true life is achieved only when
to all that nature gives, though it has given its best, there is added
the gift of the Spirit of God.
c) Thus the idea of the ordp£ is here brought into definite rela
tion to the irvevpa. The crdp£ can do much; it is the irvevpa only
that can produce the true, the perfect.
But to this step there is added one more, by which for the first
time the term takes on a distinctly ethical sense. Had we only
Rom. 8:1-11 to deal with, it would not be clear that this is the
case. For this whole passage might perhaps be explained from
the point of view of Phil. 3. It is the weakness of the flesh that is
emphasized in vs. 3, and the walking according to the flesh might
be thought of as the conduct of those who are controUed by those
things in life that come by heredity, not by the Spirit, good though
the former are. And even when it is said that the mind of the
flesh is enmity against God, this might mean only that the love
of things that one inherits — the life of the man who foUows the
current of heredity — inevitably issues in the rejection of the wUl
of God. But it is clear that in any case the apostle has here pushed
his thought of the evil consequences of following the flesh much
further than he does in the passage from the later letter to the
Philippians. And when we turn back to Gal. 5:16-25 we seem to
see clearly that the apostle had already come to include in his
thought of the flesh, not only the good things that are inadequate,
but those impulses to evil which also seem to be born in us; in
other words, to let the flesh stand for one aspect of heredity — the
inborn tendency to evil. But if so, there are certain additional
facts that require to be observed.
a) It is almost beyond question that the meaning which we find
in Gal., chap. 5, represents an advance upon that found in Phil.,
chap. 3, not the reverse. As out of the meaning 3, (a), basis of
194

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 195
natural generation, there arises 6, the total product and outcome of
heredity, so out of the thought of the moral inadequacy of the latter
there might spring the conception of the hereditary tendency to evil.1
ft) This relation of the several meanings of the term makes it [/
improbable that the crdp£ which is hostile to God, and the works
of which are evil, is a physical thing, or that it is evil because
it is material. The strictly material sense is left behind several ;'"
steps before we reach the distinctly ethical meaning. To introduce "'>
it at this point is superfluous and illogical.2
1 In Rom. 7 : 1 7 — 8 : 8 we seem to have as it were an epitome of the working of the
apostle's mind. In chap. 7 it is not the flesh that is the evil force, but sin stimulated
by law. " The flesh is inadequate, unable without God's Spirit to respond to the inner
imperative. In 8:3 it is still the weakness, not the power for evil, of the flesh that
is spoken of, and only in the latter part of the passage does the idea of weakness and
unresponsiveness gradually merge into that of hostility to God.
2 Against this interpretation of the apostle's thought there may be urged his .
phrase iv bfioiiipari o-apKbs apaprlas in Rom. 8:3, and the toO o-dparos tou Bavarov of
7 : 24. But the former phrase by no means of necessity involves an analytic judgment
that the flesh in the likeness of which Christ came is by its nature sinful, intrinsically
tainted with sin; nor is the flesh by any necessity of usage or context to be taken in a
purely physical sense. The latter interpretation indeed, with or without the former, 1
would make Paul a docetist, which he certainly was not. The view most consistent! ,
with Pauline usage is that which takes ir<£p| as standing for a corporeally conditioned!
being (referring to man of course) and apaprlas as in effect the predicate of a synthetic)
proposition. The whole phrase then means simply that when Christ came he did not'
differ in outward appearance from sinful men. If 7:24 were an expression of desire
for deliverance from the body in death, one might plausibly argue that Paul conceived ,
of the body as the cause of sin and release from it as the only way of escape from sin. |
But this is manifestly not the case, since Paul never thinks of Christ as the author
or cause of death, as on this view vs. 25 would imply that he did. It is rather a
moral victory which he desires, and doubtless in the present life. That he uses the
word "body" at this point instead of "sin" bears witness to the apostle's deep
sense of the .intimate relation between the evil impulses, which he has previously
personified under the name "sin," and the body (cf. vs. 23 and I Cor. 9:27), and
the addition of rov Bavarov reflects his belief that sin is the cause of death. The
passage is one of several that bear testimony that Paul was not blind to the obvious
fact of human experience that the tendency to sin is closely associated with the
physical nature; but it by no means follows nor is it probable that the body as such
is, in his view, the compelling cause of sin. Cf . Sanday and Headlam, Commentary on
the Epistle to the Romans, p. 181, footnote, in which, commenting upon the claim that
Paul held the doctrine of the essential evil of matter, they declare that the controversy
is practically closed, agreeing with Lipsius on Rom. 7:14 (Hand-Commentar turn
Neuen Testament) that "die paulinische Anthropologic ruht durchaus auf alttesta-
mentlicher Grundlage; ihre angeblich hellenistisch-dualistischen Bestandtheile sind
einfach zu bestreiten." 195

196 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
c) The fact that the ethical, non-physical meaning, which repre
sents the latest step in the evolution, appears in one of Paul's
earliest letters, and that the earlier, non-ethical meaning appears
in one of his latest letters, shows that development of the distinctly
' ethical meaning did not involve the adoption of a new doctrine
and the repudiation of the thought expressed by the unethical'
sense. The ethical is not physical. The physical is not ethical.
d) Not even to the crdp£ as a force that makes for evU does
Paul ascribe compelUng power. In faith with its consequent vital
fellowship with God there is a power adequate to overcome the
force that makes for evil (Rom. 6:1, 2; Gal. 5:16, 22, 23).
e) So far from sharing the feeling expressed by Plato, Seneca,
and Plutarch that true blessedness is achievable only by getting
rid of the body, Paul, retaining in this the point of view of his
Hebrew ancestry, believed that the soul could not be wholly happy
without a body. This thought,- which is somewhat more clearly
expressed in I Cor., chap. 15, and II Cor., chap. 5, and suggested
by I Thess. 5 : 23, is implied in vs. 11 of the very passage now under
consideration. The culmination of the work of the Spirit is that
through it God makes alive our mortal bodies. It is true, indeed,
as I Cor., chap. 15, shows, that the making alive involves a trans
formation into a spiritual body; but a spiritual body is stfll a
body; and that not the transformation of the body but the per
manent possession of it is what the apostle here has chiefly in
mind is shown by the fact that he makes no mention in vs. 11 of
the former, but speaks only of bringing to life again our mortal
bodies. Had the apostle thought of the body as such as the cause
of sin, he must here have spoken, not of its being made alive
(in the resurrection), but of its being destroyed, or of the spirit
as being released from it.1 Had he thought of its materiality as
1 It may be alleged that the usage of the time requires us to understand Paul as
actually personalizing, not simply personifying, sin, that by it he means a demon
and that the abode of this demon is for him in the flesh, in the sense either of the body
or of the whole physical environment. (See Dibelius, Die Geisterwelt im Glauben des
Paulus, pp. 119 ff.). The writer finds himself unconvinced by the arguments that
seem to some to establish this view. But even if it be correct, it does not materially
affect our interpretation of o-dp%, but only requires the substitution of the idea of a
demon for the more vague expression "hereditary impulse" used above.
196

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 197
the cause of sin he must at the least have spoken here of its trans
formation; cf . Phil. 3 : 2 1 .
Thus in three respects the evidence is against the view that >
Paul found in the flesh as a physical thing a, compelUng force for
evfl. The flesh that makes for evil is not the body or matter as
such, but an inherited impulse to evfl. This force is not com
pulsory, but can be resisted by the power of the spirit. The
body is not an evfl, but a factor of the best life. The inherited
evU impulse is, of course, related to the bodily life. The body is
inferior to the spirit and the occasion of temptation. But embodied
man may, by the power of the Spirit, triumph over aU evil
tendencies.1 The foregoing discussion of irvevpa and trap? suggests what
further examination confirms, that when these two terms stand in
antithesis, as they frequently do in Paul, it is by no means always
the same meanings that are contrasted. In Gal. 6:8; I Cor. 5:5;
II Cor. 7:1; Rom. 2:28, 29; Col. 2:5, the contrast is between
the flesh, or the body, and the spirit of man — an antithesis that in
most Greek writers would have been expressed by aupa and foxy
— but in most of the foregoing cases at least with an emphasis on
the reUgious capacity of the irvevpa that would not have been
conveyed by foxy- In Gal. 6 : 8 the sowing to the flesh is the devo
tion of one's goods (see vs. 6) and energies to the satisfaction of
the demands of the body; sowing to the spirit is devoting these
things to the' development of the spirit-Ufe, which is both intel
lectual and reUgious. In Gal. 3:3 the flesh is, as in the preceding
cases (see especiaUy Rom. 2:28, 29), the physical flesh, that in
which the circumcision which they were urged to accept took place;
but the spirit is the Spirit of God, which they received (vs. 2)
when they accepted the gospel and by which miracles were wrought
1 Siebeck, "Neue Beitrage zur Entwicklungsgeschichte des Geist-Begriffs," in
Archiii fiir Geschichte der Philosophie, Band XXVII (1914), 1-16, gives a compact
summary of the history of the usage of irvevpa, including its use in the New Testament
and in later times. In remarking upon the New Testament antithesis of irvevpa and
o-6.pi, however, he does not observe the variety of senses in which aapi is used in the
New Testament and describes the irvevpa as an ethico-supernatural principle whose
operations are directed toward the destruction or suppression of the activities and
influences of the corporeal. Failure to recognize adequately the various uses of ai.pl
issues in creating a false antithesis between <rap$ and irvevpa.
197

198 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
among them (vs. 5). In Gal. 4:23 crdp£, as in Rom. 9:3, 5, 8, is
clearly the basis of natural generation, the contrast being with
the promise in fulfilment of which Isaac was born extraordinarily;
in the application of the allegory 6 yevvydels Kara crdp/ca (vs. 29)
refers to the Jew who depends upon his heredity for salvation
(the word thus verging toward meaning 6) in contrast with one
whose Ufe is according to the Spirit of God, or possibly with
one who has been born according to the Spirit, an idea sug
gested in Rom. 6:4 and further developed in John 3:6. In Rom.
1:3, despite the similarity of the phrases to those in Gal. 4:23, 29,
adp!- is probably to be taken as denoting a corporeaUy conditioned
being, and irvevpa as a generic term for an unembodied being
(III, B, 5), Kard meaning "viewed as" and the whole passage indi
cating the high rank of Jesus, first, among earthly (corporeally condi
tioned) beings, and, secondly, among holy heavenly (not corporeally
conditioned) beings. Somewhat simUar is the contrast in I Tim.
3: 16, but cdp£ probably denotes the body or the corporeally con
ditioned mode of life, and irvebpan, by a further metonymy sug
gested by the desire to parallel kv crap/ct, denotes an incorporeal
mode of being rather than an incorporeal being. In Phil. 3:3
irvevpa manifestly denotes the Spirit of God, and crdp£ , as already
pointed out, all that man obtains by heredity. In Rom. 7 : 5 <rdp£
probably means the totality of the life apart from the spirit (as in
Phil. 3:3), while irvevpa in 7:6 stands for the human spirit as the
seat of religious life. In Rom. 8:4-11 there is, as indicated above,
a gradual transition from this meaning of crdp£ to the more posi
tively ethical sense, while in vss. 12, 13 there is probably a return
to the earlier meaning. Throughout these verses irvevpa denotes
the Spirit of God, and sometimes the Spirit of Christ. The absence
of the article gives the phrases in which it is lacking a quahtative
force, by which irvevpa approximates to the generic sense, as inclu
sive of the divine and human spirit, but probably always retaining in
the apostle's mind a reference to the divine Spirit. In Gal. 5 : 17-25
the flesh is the force that makes for sin, and irvevpa is the divine
Spirit, the omission of the article having the same effect as in
Rom., chap. 8.

198

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 199
V. THE USAGE OF THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS AND THE ACTS
In the Synoptic Gospels irvevpa always means "spirit." The
meanings "wind" and "breath" do not occur. As applied to the
human spirit, the reference to the reUgious life is less frequent
than in Paul, and the idea of the human spirit as permeated by the
divine does not occur. On the other hand, we find here instances
of irvevpa denoting that in man which departs at death, or returns
in revivification, for which Greek writers use foxy only, but Jewish-
Greek sometimes foxy and sometimes, foUowing the Hebrew, Tvevpa.
Cf. I Kings 17:21 (Hebrew and LXX); Jos. Bell, vii, 185, and
U, 156. Akin to this latter is the use of the term of a ghost, a
specter. Akin also, as is shown in Jos. Bell, vii, 185, is the use of
irvevpa to denote a demon. This usage, not found at aU in Paul, is
frequent in the Synoptic Gospels. In the body of the Synoptists
irvevpa, referring to the Spirit of God, is used almost exclusively in
the charismatic sense, referring to the Spirit as the cause of such
extraordinary phenomena as prophecy, and of power over demons.
Only in John the Baptist's prediction of the baptism in the Holy
Spirit by his great successor, and in connection with Jesus' own
baptism and temptation, does the term seem to approach an ethical
reference, and even here there is no sharp distinction of the ethical
from the charismatic.
The use with reference to the conception of Jesus in the womb
of his mother, found only in the infancy sections of Matthew and
Luke, is without paraUel in Uterature earlier than the New Testa
ment or in the earUer parts of the New Testament itself. It
apparently represents a unique development of the charismatic
sense of the word.
The synoptic usage of foxy and crdp£ calls for Uttle comment.
It is substantially that of Jewish- Greek writers generally. There
is no occurrence of- the characteristically Pauline uses of crdp£ or
any suggestion of Pauline influence. The whole evidence of the
Synoptic Gospels tends to confirm the impression gained from the
study of Paul, that his usage is not as a whole a reflection of com
mon usage in his day, but to an important extent the result either
of exceptional influences or of his own thinking.
199

200 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
The only important respect in which the usage of Acts differs
from that of the synoptists is in the non-appearance of irvevpa in
reference to the conception of Jesus, and in the ascription to the
Spirit of God of power in the external world (Acts 8:39; cf . II Kings
2:16). VI. THE USAGE OF THE JOHANNINE WRITINGS
The Fourth Gospel contains one instance of irvevpa meaning
"wind" (3:8), introduced for the purpose of comparing the action
of irvevpa as spirit and irvevpa as wind. Aside from this exceptional
case and the employment of the word of that which departs in
death (John 19:30) the Johannine use of the word is very similar
to that of Paul. It is used neither of a demon, as so commonly in
the Synoptic Gospels and Acts, but not in Paul, nor in reference
to the conception of Jesus in his mother's womb. In reference to
the Spirit of God irvevpa occurs in three ways. In chap. 1 it is
used, in evident dependence on the Synoptists, of the descent of
the Spirit on Jesus at his baptism. In chaps. 3 and 6 it is used,
much as in Paul, of the Spirit as the source of hfe to men. In
chaps. 14-17 it is employed of the Spirit as not yet present, but as
coming to supply the place of Jesus. Here, as in Paul, there is no
clear distinction of function between the Spirit and the heavenly
Christ. The Johannine representation is the Pauline conception
converted from experience into prediction of experience.
To these references to the Spirit of God there must be added
the unique statement of John 4:24 that God is spirit or a spirit.
This, as already pointed out, Paul never says, but this use of the
word as a generic term for incorporeal intelligent being is illustrated
in Paul. The proposition itself had been affirmed two hundred
years before by Posidonius, but with the addition of the expression
voepbv /cat irvpuSes. The absence of these adjectives in John marks
not only the elimination from the idea of ¦> God of the notion of
materiality suggested by irvpuSes (or at least its reduction to a
minimum), but the inclusion of the idea of intelUgence in that of
irvevpa, marked by the fact that it is no longer necessary to add
voepbv to express this idea.
ILvevpa used in reference to men denotes the seat of intellectual
or emotional Ufe, chiefly with reference to its religious aspects.
200

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 201
John 3 : 66 is without exact parallel, but explicable in view of the
use of irvevpa to denote the spirit of man permeated with the Spirit
of God. See I Cor. 14: 14, 15, 16. For the idea of a human spirit
under the ethical domination of the Spirit of God, Paul uses
kv irvevpan (Rom. 8:9) and other similar phrases, but closely
approaches the Johannine use in Rom. 8: 10.
In I John we find the same use in general of irvevpa with reference
to the Spirit of God. The generic use comes out distinctly in its
employment as an inclusive term covering both the Spirit of God
and those other beings which purport to be such, but whose anti-
Christian utterances betray their real character. See I John 4 : 1 ff .,
and cf. Ust of meanings, III, B, 5. Here also we are on familiar
Pauline ground. Cf. I Cor. 12:10.
The Apocalypse has no usages that call for special discussion.
Vvxy in John and I John is used chiefly in the phrase "to lay
down one's Ufe." The instances in the sense of soul are of the
familiar type.
The use of crdp£ in John, chap. 3 (the others require no discus
sion), reminds us of the Pauline use in Phil. 3:3,4. In John, as in
Paul, there is the thought that the Spirit of God is essential to true
human Ufe, and <rdp£ is used in antithesis to irvevpa in a way
to suggest that it denotes that which comes by heredity and is not
dominated by the Spirit. Paul the Pharisee might almost have
sat for the picture of Nicodemus; and the language of Jesus to
Nicodemus, affirming the inadequacy of all that had come to him
by heredity and the indispensableness of the transforming power
of the Spirit, reads like an affirmation in general terms of what
Paul had learned by personal experience.1
1 Considerations of space forbid an extended discussion of all the interpretations
which have been or might be proposed for this verse. It must suffice to call attention
to a few points of importance, (a) There is no presumption in favor of an interpretation
that takes the two instances of crdpl- in the same sense, for this is not the case with
the two instances of irvevpa in the second clause. The first is the Spirit of God; the
second cannot be this, but must refer in some way to man, and indeed quite clearly
in the sense of man filled with the Spirit of God and thus born anew. The two senses
must manifestly be related but not necessarily identical, (b) Aside from objections
to a strict identity of meaning, the interpretation, "that which is born of the body is
body," is foreign to the context; for that which Nicodemus possessed was manifestly
far more than a body, (c) Nor is the meaning "that which is born of a corporeal being
201

202 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
But though there is this clear affinity between the Johannine
and the Pauline thought, neither the Fourth Gospel nor I John
furnishes any certain example of the Pauline use of crdp£ meaning
the force in men that makes for evil. I John 2:16 might seem to
be such a case, but the parallelism of the phrase "the lust of the
eyes," in which no evil sense attaches to eyes in themselves, makes
it probable that there is none such in the word "flesh," but that in
itself it simply means the body, the evil sense of the phrase being
suggested by the word kiridvuia (cf. Rom. 7:7). It is clear in any
case and most important to observe that to the flesh in the physical
sense this writer attached no taint of moral evil. For it is one of
the cardinal points for which he contends that Jesus Christ is come
in the flesh, evidently meaning to affirm the reality of the bodUy
life of Jesus (I John 4:2; cf. II John, vs. 7), yet clearly also
believing in his sinlessness. Of similar purport is John 1:14; for
though the term crdp£ does not mean flesh in the physical sense,
but a corporeally conditioned being, yet no one who believed, as
this writer did, that Jesus was sinless could affirm that he became
a corporeal being if he also believed that to be corporeaUy con
ditioned was ipso facto to be sinful.1

is a corporeal being" more satisfactory, for if the idea of moral deficiency be not
included in the term, it is impertinent to the discussion, and if this idea is associated
with both instances, it would imply what is again wholly out of harmony with the
context, that the moral deficiency of the child was conditioned on the moral state of
the parent, (d) Nor can it be translated "that which is born of a sinful being is a
sinful being," for similar reasons, and because there is no evidence that <rdp{ means a
sinful being. The interpretation which is most consonant with the context and best
sustained by lexical usage may be paraphrased somewhat thus: That which is born
by natural generation is, however good, inadequate to fit one for the Kingdom of God.
Only that which is produced by the Spirit of God is like unto it, being a human spirit
filled with the divine. The whole sentence is a formulation in intentionally sharply
antithetical phrase of the same doctrine that is implied in Paul's experiential statement
in Phil. 3:3s.
1 The abstinence of this writer (or these writers) from such language as Paul uses
in Gal., chap. 5, and Rom., chap. 8, may be due to a wish to avoid words which by
their ambiguity might seem to imply that there was moral taint in incarnation, and
so suggest that Jesus either did not really come in the flesh or that he was not sinless.
It may be due to the disposition to trace all sin to the devil. What is of importance
is that the idea of a necessary moral taint in the body as composed of matter is
definitely excluded. 202

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 203
It may be said, however, that by their opposition to the doctrine
that Jesus Christ is not come in the flesh, those writings testify
to the existence, in their time, of the belief that the flesh is neces
sarily polluting. But not even this is a certain or even probable
inference from the evidence of this letter. For I John 5 : 6-8 shows
that the docetism which this epistle opposes is that which affirmed
that the Christ entered the body of Jesus in the baptism and
withdrew before the crucifixion; and this type of docetism has its
basis, not in the affirmation of the evil of matter, but in the desire
not to affirm that the Christ suffered.
On the one hand, therefore, the evidence of the Johannine
writings shows that in the circle from which they issued the flesh
was not regarded as causing sin, and on the other fails to show
that they were directly in contact and conflict with such a view.
This fact is not without its reflex value in confirming our con
clusion that Paul, who wrote earUer in a similar environment, or
under less influence from Greek thought, did not impute sin to
the body as its cause.
VII. THE USAGE OF THE REMAINING BOOKS
The uses of irvevpa in Hebrews are quite diverse and interesting,
but present no special difficulty. Nor do foxy and crdp£ call for
extended discussion. Respecting irvevpa we may note its use
alongside of foxy as an element of man's nature (4 : 1 2) , as in I Thess.
5:23, but probably neither here nor there as expressive of a tri
chotomous view; its reference to the eternal Spirit of Christ, but
qualitatively spoken of (9:14); and its broadly generic use (1:14;
12:9). 2dp£ has no ethical implications.1
Limitations of space forbid the extended discussion of such
interesting passages as I Pet. 3:18; 4:6; II Pet. 2:10, 18. It
'In Heb. 12:9, it is most consonant with the context and the Alexandrian
character of the book to understand that "fathers of our flesh" refers to our human
fathers as those who beget our bodies, and that " the Father of the spirits " designates
God as the source of the spirits of men. Nor is the absence of a possessive pronoun
in the second phrase a serious objection to this view. See Matt. 26:41; 27 :so, and
cf. John 11:33 witb Mark 8:12. This interpretation need not, however, imply that
each spirit is a fresh product of divine generative power. The phrase probably
means only that the spirit comes eventually from God, and is not a product of
natural generation. See Wisd. Sol. 8:19. 203

204 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
must suffice to call attention to the fact that whatever the precise
sense of the terms or the grammatical force of the datives, the basis
of the antithesis between the crdp£ and irvevpa is the idea of cor
poreality and incorporeality. tyvxy in I Peter is noteworthy because
of its distinctly religious sense and its futuristic aspect. The foxy
is the soul as the seat of rehgion (2:11, 25), capable of existence
after death, and its salvation is to be revealed in the last time
(1:5,9; 4!I9)- Cf. the similar use in Jas. 1:21; 5:20. This usage
has apparently had more influence than any other in the New
Testament in fixing the meaning of the word "soul" in modern
religious terminology. In II Pet. 2:10, 18 adpi, may perhaps
denote the body as itself the cause of sin. It would not be strange
if this writer had already come to hold this view which was held
by others in his day or soon afterward. On the other hand, the
passage does not strictly imply anything more than that the writer
recognizes the fact, recognition of which involves no philosophic
theory, viz., that the body furnishes incitements and temptations
to sin, and to follow these is sin. It is perhaps not without signifi
cance that in the kindred book of Jude it is clear that crdp£, though
used in speaking of sensual sins, itself means only the body. Note
especially vs. 8, in which it is not the crdp£ that defiles but that is
defiled. It is most probable that the usage of II Peter is the same.
VIII. nNETMATIKOS, *TXIKOZ, AND ZAPKIKOZ (SAPKIN02)
The problem of the relation of these adjectives to one another
demands a few words. The difficulty pertains almost wholly to
foxiKbs and the manifestly derogatory sense which it bears in the
New Testament.1
1 The meanings of irvevtiariKbs are clearly associated with those of irvevpa. They
are about as follows: (a) of persons, dominated by the Spirit of God (I Cor. 2:15;
3:1; 14:37; Gal. 6:1); (b) of things, proceeding from, given by, the Spirit (Rom.
1:11 [?]; 7:14; 15:27; I Cor. 2:13; 9:11 [?]; 12:1; 14:1; Eph. 5:10 [?]; Col. i:o[?];
3 : 10 [ ?]) ; (c) pertaining or adapted to the spirit of man (Rom. 1 : 1 1 [ ?] ; I Cor. 9:11
[?]; 10:3,4; Col. i:g[?]; 3:i6[?]; IPet.2:s); (d) pertaining or adapted to a spirit,
i.e., a supercorporeal being (I Cor. 15:44, 46; Eph. 6:12).
The meanings of o-apKiKbs and its synonym a&pKivos are also easily derived from
the meanings of adpi: (a) consisting of flesh (II Cor. 3:3); (6) pertaining to the body
(Rom. 15:27; I Cor. 9:11; II Cor. 10:4; IPet. 2:11; Heb. 7:16); (c) possessing only
the things that come by natural generation, not those that are given by the Spirit
(Rom. 7:14; I Cor. 3:1,3, 4; II Cor. 1:12). 204

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 205
In I Cor. 15 : 44 the ordinary body that men possess in this life is
described as foxiKbv aupa, in contrast with the post-resurrection
body, which is irvevpariKov.1 The term is associated (vs. 45) with
the fact that Adam was a foxy and of the earth earthy (vs. 46), in
contrast with the risen Christ, who is irvevpa and in heaven. The
basis of the antithesis between the two adjectives is in the anti
thetical use of the two nouns. The way in which the words are
introduced seems to imply that foxiKbs in this sense is already
famihar, and this is probably the case, despite the fact that no
earher examples of such a use have been pointed out, and that
there is only a suggestion of a basis for it in Philo. Cf . pp. 190 f .
In I Cor. 2 : 14 foxiKbs occurs in antithesis to irvevpariKbs in
vs. 15, and as a synonym of adpKivos in 3 : 1, which is further defined
by the phrase "babes in Christ." These facts indicate that foxiKbs
denotes one who is not possessed of the Spirit of God — not irvevpariKbs
in the sense of Gal. 6:1. This conception is nearer than that of
15:44-46 to PhUo's view (see pp. 158 f., 161), but neither terminol
ogy nor thought are quite identical with those of Philo. The idea is
still more clearly expressed in Jude, vs. 19, foxiKoi, py irvevpa 'kxovres,
though whether irvevpa refers specifically to the Holy Spirit quali
tatively expressed (cf. vs. 20) or to the human spirit permeated
with the divine is open to doubt. With this use of the term that
in Jas. 3:15 is practically identical.2
IX. FINAL SUMMARY
It remains to state briefly some of the more important results
to which, in the judgment of the writer, this study leads.
1. The New Testament use of irvevpa, foxy, and crdp£ is not
simply a reflection of earUer usage, but has certain marked differ
ences from that of any earlier literature. As respects foxy, these
differences are sUght, being chiefly a retirement of the word into
less prominence, and a certain emphasis on the reUgious aspects
1 Cf. the fiery body in which, according to the Hermetic literature, the soul is
clothed after death.
2 On a usage of the magical papyri which seems to Reitzenstein to point to the
source of the Pauline antithesis of irvevpariKbs and <pvxiKbs, but which seems to the
writer to furnish a. slender support to the view, see Reitzenstein, Hellenistische
Mysterien-Religionen (Leipzig and Berlin, 1910), pp. 42 ff.
205

206 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
of the term. The difference is greater in respect to irvevpa, but
greatest in respect to crdp£.
2. New Testament usage is much nearer to that of Jewish-
Greek writers, and indeed to that of the Old Testament, than to
that of Greek writers in general, or to that of any other literature
of which we have knowledge.
3. The peculiarities of New Testament usage appear most
strongly in Paul, and it is probable that it is to him that we owe
them, either as originator or transmitter, and most likely the
former. 4. Of the characteristics of New Testament usage which dif
ferentiate it either from all previous usage or from that of non-
Jewish Greek, the following are the most important:
a) ILvevpa is no longer prevaihngly a substantial term, as in
Greek writers, but, with few exceptions, individualizing, as in
Jewish-Greek literature, following the Hebrew.
6) Its most frequent use is with reference to the Spirit of God.
For this there is only the slightest precedent in non- Jewish-Greek
writers. New Testament, especially PauUne, usage shows a marked
advance even on Jewish-Greek.
c) As applied to man irvevpa largely displaces foxy, but carries
a suggestion of special reference to the reUgious capabUities of the
soul which was not associated with foxy as used by the Greeks.
d) For the Pauline exaltation of irvevpa over foxy there is no
observed previous parallel. It marks an advance on PhUo, for
which there is no precedent in non- Jewish Greek, and only partial
and imperfect parallels in the magical papyri. It is the reverse of
Hermetic usage.
e) The use of irvevpa as a generic term for incorporeal beings
(inclusive in Paul of those who have heavenly bodies) is found
in Paul and those who followed him. No precisely simUar use is
found in earlier writers, though a basis for it is found in the appU
cation of irvevpa on the one side to God and the angels and on the
other to the demons.
/) The clear distinction between the charismatic and the ethical
work of the Spirit of God and the exaltation of the latter over the
former is probably original with Paul; it at any rate receives from
206

SPIRIT, SOUL, AND FLESH 207
him an emphasis found nowhere else before his time, or in the
New Testament.
g) The extension of the meaning of <rdp£ from the basis of
natural generation and kinship to mean all that one acquires by
kinship and heredity, and its stiU further extension, or rather
limitation, to denote the force in men that makes for evil, the
hereditary impulse to sin, are, so far as we can see, Pauline con
tributions to the usage of this word.
h) The antithesis of irvevpa and o-dp£, which is so marked a
feature of Pauline usage, occurring also in other New Testament
writers, is in large part a new development, there being but slight
precedent for it in earlier literature. By an extension of usage and
an increased frequency of both terms they come to stand in fre
quent opposition to one another, the antithesis, moreover, involv
ing not a single meaning of each term, but several meanings of
both variously opposed to one another. For fuller discussion see
pp. 197 f.
5. Neither the evidence of contemporary usage nor that of the
New Testament itself warrants us in finding in Paul or in the
Johannine writings the notion that the flesh is by reason of its
materiahty a force that makes compelhngly for evil, or that a cor
poreal being is by virtue of that fact a sinful being. It may perhaps
be found in II Peter, but probably not even there.

207

INDEX
The numbers in List I refer to pages of this book on which the author or school
indicated is quoted, cited, or discussed. In Lists II, III, and IV the numbers sepa
rated by a colon and followed by a dash denote chapter and verse of the work referred
to; those after the dash indicate pages of this book. These latter lists cover only
those passages the text of which is printed or discussed. In all the lists the numbers
immediately following the t designate pages on which passages containing irvevpa,
or its Hebrew or Latin equivalent, are referred to; those after J refer to passages
containing ^vxh or its equivalent; those after § passages containing adp\ or its
equivalent. I. GREEK AND LATIN AUTHORS AND SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT
Aeschylus, f 13, 14, IS, 16, 17, 18 \ 26, 27, 28, 29 § 49, 50
Aetius, t "7, "8 % 45, 88, 89, 118
Alexander Polyhistor, { 131, 147, 148 § 151
Anaxagoras, f 76
Anaximines, t 20, 74, 75, 170 % 20, 74, 120
Antipater, f 97, 118 J 97, 118
Antipho, % 26
Aristonymus, 1 130
Aristophanes, 1 13, *S X 25> 20, 27> 28, 29
Aristotle, 1 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 44,' 45, 78, 79, 97, i°i, t°8, 120,
130, 140, 170 1 13, 24, 26, 28, 29, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 51, 52, 73,
75, 79, 130, 171 § 48, 49, 5i
Arius Didymus, t 97, 140 X 82, 84, 100, 102, 107, 118
Athenaeus, 1 1°9 X io9
Augustine, t *39
Aurelius, M., f 123, 124, 126, 138, .139 J 126, 128, 129, 138, 139 § 130, 138,
139
Chrysippus, f 101, 102, 106, 108, 109, 112, 113, 125, 140, 170 5:95, 97, 101,
102, 108, 109, no, 113, 119, 125, 170 § 102
Cicero, X 98, 99, 108, 117, 133
Cleanthes, f 98, 101, 107, 108 J 97, 99, 1°°, I0I> io4, i°8, "9
Clemens Alexandrinus, f 19, 24, 77, 78, 144 X 91 § 91
Cornutus, 1 124, 134 J 127, 128, 129, 134 § 134
Democritus, | 77, 78 X 45, 77l i°9
Demosthenes, f 13, 15, i°> J7 X 29
Didymus the Pythagorean, J 131
Dio Chrysostomus, f 123, 124, 125, 137, 138 X "6, 127, 128, 129, 137, 138
§ i29, 137, 138
209] 209

210 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
Diogenes Laertius, f 13, 19, 20, 81, 96, 97, 102, 106, 108, 109, no, 117, 118, 120,
123, 124, 125, 139 X 75, 83, 95, 96, 97, 99, 102, 107, 108, 109, no, 113, 118,
119, 120, 131
Diogenes of Apollonia, f 77, 170 X 76, 77, 104
Diogenes of Babylonia, f 101 J 101
Dionysius Halicarnassensis, t 80, 81, 126, 153, 171 X 84
Empedocles, f 22, 23, 75, 130 X 45, 13° § 48
Epicharmus, 1 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 30, 60, 77, 120, 121 1 120
Epictetus, f 124, 125, 126, 136, 137, 140 X 89, 126, 127, 136, 137, 140 § 129,
130, 137
Epicureans, t 24, 88, 90, 91 § 91
Epicurus, f 80, 86, 88, 89, 91 X 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 92 § 84, 85, 90, 91
Epiphanius, { 99
Euripides, 1 13, *4, *5, 16, *7, 18, 19, 23, 116 X 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 51 §48,
49, 5°, 5i
Eusebius, { 82, 84, 99, 100, 102, 121, 148
Galen, f 81, ioo, 101, 102, 104, 108, 109, no, 113, 117, 124, 125, 139, 140, 170
X 101, 102, 108, 109, no, 113, 118, 121, 125, 140, 170 § 102
Hecateus, J 147, 148
Heraclitus, J 75, 100
Heraclitus, Letters of, X 142, 146, 147, 148, 150, 168 § 151
Hermetic Literature, 1 176, 191 X 176, 177, 191 § 177
Hermippus, X 147
Hermogenes, f 124 1 127, 128, 129
Herodotus, f 13, U, 15 X 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 51 § 50
Hesiod, 1 13 § 48, 49
Hippolytus, {87, 88, 103, 118, 119
Homer, f 13 X 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, 50, 73, 134, 156, 171 § 48, 49
Isocrates, X 28, 29
Josephus, f 126, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 166, 199 X 146, 147, 149, 15°,
166, 167, 169 § 151, 167
Leucippus, X 102
Lucian, f 123, 124 {127,128 §129,130
Lucretius, J 92
Magical Texts, 1 173, *74, 175, 187 J 173, 174, 175 § 173, 175
Maximus Tyrius, {128
Menander, f 114, 115, 116, 153, 170, 174
Metrodorus, {91 § 91
Moschion, f 19
Musonius, Rufus, 1 134 X 127, 134 § 13°, 134
Nemesius, | 99, 100, 101, 109, no, in, 119
Neo-Platonists, J 131
Neo-Pythagoreans, f 130, 131 X 131 § 131
Oinopides, J 104 210

INDEX 211
Orphics, J33.37, 134, 192
Panaetius, 1 120 1 117, 118, 120
Parmenides, J 45
Pausanias, f 123, 124 t 31, 126, 127, 128 § 129
Peripatetics, J 131
Philo, f 141, 142, 143, 146, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 168, 172, 174, 187, 191
X 143, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 165, 169,
171, 172, 192, 193 § 151, 152, 153, 159, 162, 172
Pindar, f 13 X 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 51, 171 § 48, 49
Plato, f 13, H, 15, 16, 17, 18, 23, 51, 79 X 23, 26, 28, 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37,
38, 39, 40, 41, 47, 48, 49, 51, 73, 102, 131, 136, 169, 172, 176, 177, 193
§ 48, 49, 5°, 5i
Platonists, 1 119
Plutarch, f 19, 20, 74, 77, 81, 97, 100, 103, 104, 105, 106, 109, no, in, 113, 117,
118, 123, 124, 125, 135, 136, 137, 139, 140, 170 X 20, 81, 84, 88, 89, 91, 102,
103, 104, 109, no, 113, 118, 126, 127, 135, 136, 140, 169, 170, 172 § 91,
130, 135, 136, 137
Pneumatic School, f 108, 109, no J no
Polybius, f 80 X 82, 83, 84
Posidonius, f 97, 104, 116, 117, 118, 121, 140, 170, 200 J 97, 118, 119, 120
§ 121, 122
Potidaean. Inscription, { 23, 30
Pseudo-Aristotle, f 108, 109, no 1 1°9
Pseudo-Demosthenes, f 82, 153 J 81, 82
Pseudo-Hippocrates, f 16, 80, 124
Pseudo-Phocylides, 1 19, 143, 168 J 147, 148
Pseudo-Plato, f 78, 115, 116, 174 X "5
Pseudo-Plutarch, f 116
Pythagoras, § 131
Pythagoreans, 1 15, 22, 23, 130, 140 J 33, 130, 140 § 140
Rufus Ephesius, 1 105
Seneca, f 140 1 122, 133, *34, i72 § I21, I22
Sextus Empiricus, t 22, 130, 139, 140, 160, 170 X "°, 122, 130, 140, 171
§ 122, 140
Socrates, J 32, 37, 73, 136
Socratic Schools, f 24
Sophocles, 1 13, 14, 15, 17, 20, 23 X 26, 27, 28, 29 § 48, 49
Stobaeus, 1 19, 74, 97, 104, 106, 112, 113, 117, 118, 130, 176 J 84, 89, 100, 104,
107, 109, in, 113, 118, 176 § 131
Stoics, f 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 108, 109, no, in, 112, 113, 114, 116, 117, 118,
120, 121, 130, 158, 159, 160, 161, 170 t 24, 88, 97, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105,
107, 108, 109, no, 113, 114, 118, 119, 120, 121, 130, 133, 158, 160, 161,
170 § 121
Tertullian, t 98, 101, 107 X 101, 109, 119
211

212 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
Theocritus, { 83, 84
Theodoret, { 105 X io5
Theodotus, X I48
Thucydides, { 13, 15, l(>, 17 X 26, 28, 29 § 50
Varro, { 139
Vergil, X 133
Xenophanes, f 13, 19, 20, 21, 78, 79, 113, 120, 121, 125, 170 t 20, 21, 78, 79,
113, 120, 121, 125, 170
Xenophon, f 15, 16, 17, 23 123,25,26,28,29,31,32,33,51,73 §50
Zeno, f 97, 100, 101, 102, 105, 108, 118, 125, 170 X 97, 99, I0°, I0I> io2> 105,
108, 118, 119, 125, 170
II. OLD TESTAMENT: HEBREW AND THE LXX
Gen. {2:7—157, 19°; 6:17—142; 35:18—167; 41:38—57 {1:24—66;
2:7—190; 12:13—66 §6:19—154; 7:15, 16—154; 7:21—70; 17:11—69;
29:14 — 70
Ex. f 15:8—61; 28:3—57,154; 31:3—154 ti:5—67 §28:42—69
Lev. {10:466 — 66; 17:12 — 66; 17:146 — 63; 24:17 — 66 §15:2,3,7,19 — 69;
17:146—63
Num. f 5:14,30— 61; 11:17,25,26—57; 16:22—60,146; 27:18—57 {5:2—
67; 31:28 — 66 §16:22 — 146
Deut. t34:9—57, 143, 154 { 12:20—63; 30:2—64
Judg. {3:10—56; 8:3—58; 9:23—56, 57! 14:6—55
I Sam. f i6:i4ff.— 56, 57, 153; 16:16—155; 16:23—81, 153; 18:10—56;
19:9—56 {28:12,13—154
II Sam. {22:16— 61 §5:1—151,154; 19:12,13—154
I Kings { 19:11— 54; 22:21—60, 81, 153, 155 {17:21—62, 154, 199
§ 21:27 — 69
II Kings {2:9, 15— -57; 2:16—55,57,200; chap. 19— 60; 19:7—153
I Chron. { 28:12 — 144
II Chron. f 18:20 ff.— 60
Esther {4:13 — 65
Esther, Gr. add. { 5:1—168
Job {4:9— 61; 4:15—60,153; 7:11—58; 20:3—59; 26:13—55; 32:8—56;
33:4—58 { 2:4— 65; 30:25— 63; 41:21— 62 §2:5—68
Ps. ti:4—53; 18:15—61; 33:6—61; 51:11(13)— 58, 62; 51:13—154
{11:1—67; 86:4—63 §63:2(1)— 69; 78:39—70; 84:3—69; 102:6—68
Prov. {18:14 — 59 {6:32 — 67; 8:36 — 67; 15:32 — 67; 22:25 — 67; 27:9 — 62
§ 14:30—69
Eccles. {3:19, 21 — 60,61,161; 3:21 — 154; 12:7 — 19,60,61,155; 12:27 — J6i
Song of Sol. { 1 : 7 — 63
Isa. {4:4 — 62; 11:4 — 61,62; 19:14 — 61; 25:4 — 61; 29:10 — 61; 30:28 — 61;
3i:3—55; 33:n—6i; 41:29—54; 44:3—57; 57:15—59; 59:19—62;
61:1 — 56 {13:20 — 62; 61:10 — 63 §10:18 — 69; 22:13 — 68; 31:3 —
55J 40:5—70 212

INDEX 213
Jer. { 52 : 23—54 {51: 6—65
Ezek. {37:9, 10 — 61 §16:26—69; 23:20—69; 44:7, 9—69
Dan. {3:39, 86—154
Hos. {4:12— 61; 5:4—61; 13:15—54
Joel §3:1(2:28)— 70
Mic. {2:11 — 61; 3:8 — 57
Zech. {12:1 — 60; 12:10 — 57; 13:2 — 60,153
Mai. {2:156 f. — 59
HI. OLD TESTAMENT APOCRYPHA AND PSEUDEPIGRAPHA
Tob. {6:7(8)— 145; 6:8—155 {14:11—156
Jth. {7:19—144; 10:13—142, 152; 16:14—156 { 11:7—155 § 10:13—152
Wisd.ofSol. {1:4, 5,6, 7— 143, 156; 2:3—156; 5:3,11,23—156; 7:7,226 —
143,156; 9:17—143,156; 11:20—156; 12:1—156; 15:11—156; 16:14—
156; 17:18—156 {1:4—147; 2:22—157; 3:1—157; 10:7—157;
12:6—157; 15:8,11—157; 16:9—157; 16:14—157; 17:1—157 §7:2—
157! 12:5—157; 19:21—157
Sir. {9:9(13)— 144, 154; 17:30—155; 38:23—154; 39:6—154; 48:24—154
{4:20, 22—155; 6:4—156; 9:9(13)— 144; 10:28, 29—155; 14:4—155;
16:17,30—155; 19:3,4—155; 20:22—155 §13:5,6—156; 14:176.—
156
Bar. { 2:18 — 150
Susan. {45—154
II Mace. {7:22, 23 — 168; 14:46 — 168
III Mace. {6:24—168
IV Mace. {7:14 — 168; 11:11 — 168; 12:20 — 168
Jub. { 2:2 — 155.
Test. XII. {Sim. 4:4; Lev. 2:3; 18:7,11; Jud. 20:1, 5; 24:2; Gad. 4:7;.
Ben. 8:2 — 155.
Sib. Or. { iii. 102 — 168 § iii. 697 — 151
Enoch {15:4—145; 15:3,7,9,11—1,55; 20:6—182; 22:56.-155 {22:3—
155
Ps. of Sol. {8:15— 155; 17:42—154; 18:42—154
IV. NEW TESTAMENT
Matt. {1:18— 1.80; 26:41—203; 27:50—167,203 {10:28—183; 11:29—
183; 12:18—184; 16:250—184 §16:17—185; 26:41—203
Mark { 8 : 1 2— 203 ; 14 : 38—1 79 { 3 : 4—1 83
Luke {4:14—181; 8:55—178; 23:37—181; 24:39—184 {1:46—184;
12:19—184 §24:39 — 184
John{chaps. 1,3,6, 14 ff-— 200; 3:66—179,198,201; 3:8—178,200; 4:240—
182,200; 6:63—182; 11:33—203; 19:30—200 §1:14—202; chap. 3—
201; 3:60—185; 8:15—185 213

214 HISTORICAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES
Acts {8:7 — 182; 8:39 — 181, 200; 16:7 — 180; 23:9 — 182 {2:41 — 184;
7:14—184; 27:37—184
Rom. {1:4 — 190; 2:28 f. — 197; 5:5 — 190; 6:4 — 198; 7:6 — 198; 8:1 ff. —
192,194,198; 8:36. — 189; 8:4 — 180; 8:9c — 180,201; 8:10 — 179,201;
8:15—155, 182; 8:23—190 {13:1—183 §1:3—198; 2:28 f— 197;
6:1,2—196; 7:5—198; 7:7—202; 7:176.-195; 8:16.-192,194,202;
8:3—195; 8:46.-180, 198; 8:6—186; 8:12, 13—198; 9:36.-198;
9:29 — 198; 11:14 — 185
I Cor. {2:4 — 190; 2:11 — 179, 181, 188; 5:5 — 197; 6:17 — 182; chap. 12 —
-J I 189; 12:4 — 180; 12:10 — 201; 14:146. — 179,201; 15:45 — 190 {chap.
. 15^196; 15:45—183 §S:5—i97; 15:50—191
II Cor. {1:22 — 190; 3:17 — 189 {chap. 5 — 196 §12:7 — 184
Gal. {2:20— 189; 3:2,3—197; 3:5—190,198; 5:66.-189; 5:136.-189,
192; 5:176.-198; 6:8—197 §3:3—197; 4:232— 198; 5:166.-192,
194, 196, 198; 6:8 — 197
Phil. {1:19— 180, 190; 3:3—198 §3:36.-193,194,196,198,201; 3:4—186
Col. { 2 : 5—197 § 2 : 5—197
I Thess. {1:5—190; 5:23—196, 203 {5:23—196, 203
IIThess. {2:8—178
I Tim. { 3 : 16—198 § 3 : 16—198
Heb. {1:14 — 182,203; 4:I2 — 203; 9:14 — 180,203; 12'-9 — 182,203 {4:12
—203; 10:38—184 §2:14—184; 5:7—184
Jas. { 1 : 21—204; 5 : 20 — 204
I Pet. {1:11 — 180; 3:18 — 203; 3:19 — 181, 203; 4:16. — 201; 4:6 — 203
{1:5, 9—204; 2: ri, 25—204; 3:20—184; 4:19—204 §3:18—203;
4:6—203
II Pet. § 2:10, 18 — 203, 204 ,
I John {4:1 6. — 155,201 §1:14 — 202; 2:16 — 202; 4:2 — 202; 5:66. — 203
II John § vs. 7 — 202
Jude § vs. 8 — 204
Rev. { 19:10 — 180 { 16:3 — 183

214

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