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SPEECH

OF DELAWARE,

IN

THE SENATE OF TSE UNITED STATES,
ON THE
FOURTH DAY OF MARCH,
iN REPLY TO MR. GRUNDY OF TENNESSEE, MR. WOODBURY OF NEW
HAMPSHIRE, AND OTHERS ;

THE

RESOLUTION OF MR. FOOT, OF 'CONNECTICUT,
BEING UNDER CONSIDERATION.

a&asijtugton:

* PRINTED AND PUBLISHED AT THE OFFICl:
OF THE NATIONAL JOURNAL.
1830.

SPEECH OP MR. CLAYTON,
OF DEL A WARE.
l!i SENATE UNITED STATES.^March 4, 1836.

The motion for the indefinite postponement of th#
resolution of Mr. Foot of Connecticut, relative to the
Public Lands, being under consideration,
Mr. Clayton of Delaware, addressed the Chair.
Mr. Phbsident ; If I need an apology for discussing topics extrinsic or
Dot strictly relevant to the subject ofthe resolution before us, I shall find it
in the example of honorable gentlemen, who, In going before me, have
availed themselves, by general consent, of an opportunity to debate on
this motion, the full merits of other questions of momentous interest t»
our country. While the argument was of a sectional character, and chiefly
calculated to excite personal and local feeling, I desired no participation in
.it. But, although generally averse to any deviation from the ordinary
rules of Parliamentary proceeding, and unwilling to originate any new
subject of controversy even in the boundless latitude given to this discus
sion, I cannot be silent while principles are boldly advanced and pressed"
upon us, (no matter how inapplicable or inappropriate they may appear,)
which in my judgment are subversive of the interests of this nation, or
hostile to the spirit of the Federal Constitution.
Tbe resolution of the honorable Senator from Connecticut has nothing
Imperative in its character, it lays down no new principle, and proposes
no new course of legislation ; but simply asks an inquiry into the expe
diency of either hastening the sales ofthe public domain, or of stopping the
surveys for a limited period. Tbe committee to whom the inquiry is pro*
posed to be entrusted, is composed of five members,* all of whom are
Representatives of States within whose limits are contained large portions
of the public lands. Seeing in this fact a sufficient refutation of the ob
jection that this inquiry may create unnecessary alarm in the West— enter-
* Messrs. Barton of Missouri, Chairman, Livingston of Louisiana, Karre of MinoSs,
EUU of Mississippi, end McKieW.y of Alabama.

4
Saining the same confidence in tbe honorable members of that Committee
which others have professed — believing that the subject proposed to be re
ferred to them is important to the country, and that by the adoption ofthe reso
lution we may be furnished with an interesting document in tbeir report, my
own vote will be given against the motion for indefinite postponement. I agree
with my honorable friend from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster) that the com.
rnittee may investigate the whole subject without any express instructions.
By the rules of the Senate, they already have full jurisdiction over the mat
ter. But after all the discussion which has been elicited by the mere pro*
position to instruct them to inquire, it is not probable that the committee
will do so without some further intimation from the Senate that a report on
this subject would be acceptable. I cannot agree with the honorable Sen
ator from New Hampshire, (Mr. Woodbury,) that the motion to postpone
is calculated or intended lo prevent a distinct expression of opinion on the
subject : on the contrary, the postponement of the resolution, after discus-
3100, would announce to the committee our indisposition to have the in-.
quiry made during the present session. The Senator from Connecticut,
(Mr. Foot,) who desires this information, and whose deportment here is dis-
tinguished for urbanity and courtesy to others, may be indulged without any
apprehension of exciting unnecessary alarm in the West, while our refusal
to adopt any measure to throw light on the subject may, possibly, create
suspicion in other parts of our country, that we are wasting this portion of
the nation's treasure, and are afraid that our profligacy may be exposed by
this investigation.
I proceed now, sir, to a brief examination of what I conceive to have
been the origin of this protracted and discursive debate. We have a bill
on our files entitled, a bill " to graduate the price of the public lands, to
make provision1 for actual settlers, and to cede the refuse upon equitable
terms, and for meritorious objects, to the States in which they lie" — the
same, sir, wruch has been alluded to by the Senator from Missouri (Mr.
Benton) under the designation of" my graduation bill." When the gentle*
man from South Carolina (Mr. Hayne) first addiessed the Senate on the
resolution before us, I understood him to have pressed it as a measure of ex
pediency, that the public lands sbould be sold to the States within whose
limits they are situated, for a nominal consideration. The gentleman after
wards corrected this impression when his colleague (Mr. Smith of S. C.)
declared that he also so understood him. Sir, the gentleman has the right
to claim of us all that his statements should be properly represented. I
now understand him to say that his proposition is not to cede away these
lands for a nominal consideration, but to sell them on such liberal terms
that revenue should not be even a secondary object in the sale. He urged
with all his usual ability the impolicy of even considering them as a source
of revenue. Sir, if I now comprehend all this doctrine, it has for its objeer

to make impiessions which shall secure a favorable vote on this same gradua
tion bill ; and, if so, I dissent from the doctrine toto calo. Whether this were
or were not the great object of the debate, with the gentleman from South
Carolina, it was plainly avowed to have been a motive for it by the Senator,
from Missouri, (Mr. Benton,) in the view which he took of the subject. The
bill referred to proposes to limit the prices of these lands at once, to one
dollar per acre, and then gradually to reduce those prices at the rate of
twenty-five per cent, per annum, until the lands shall be offered, after the
expiration of the third year, at twenty-five cents per acre. It further pro
poses to sell lands to actual settlers, whether trespassers or not, at gradually
reduced prices, until, after the expiration of tbe third year, they are to receive
them at five cents per acre. If that miserable pittance be not then paid, it' pro
poses to cede eighty acres to every such settler, "without the payment ofany
consideration, and as a donation" — and finally, by the terms of it all the lands
which shall remain not disposed of by these means at the end of five years,
are to be given to the States in which they lie upon these conditions merely —
that they shall apply them to the promotion of education and internal improve
ment at home, and refund to the Government the expenses of the surveys
of the lands so ceded, at the rate of two hundred and sixteen dellars for
eacb township of twenty-three thousand acres. In consequence of the en
actment of such a law, probably very little would be bought until tbe expi
ration ofthe third year, when, if the interference of these States with a view
to secure the whole to themselves for nothing, should not prevent the sales
altogether, the lands would be purchased at a nominal price. Such a mea
sure, sir, would not only be unjust to the citizens of the old States,
but highly injurious to the Western settlers who have heretofore
bought lands at a full and fair consideration. The value of property
is merely relative, and is either enhanced or diminished by the estimate
placed upon other property of the same kind. If a hundred millions of
acres be thrown into market at twenty-five cents per acre, and a large
quantity of land be offered to actual settlers at the same time at five cents
per acre, the value of that which has been bought by fair purchasers
at two dollars, or at one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre, is at once,
other circumstances being equal, sunk to a level with the selling price of
all the lands around it. We well know the operation upon our real pro
perty, in all parts of the Union, of the exposure at public sale of any very
considerable portion of real property adjoining it. We know that if
a great landed proprietor sells me a tract in the midst of his possessions at
fifty dollars per acre, and then, from pecuniary embarrassment or from any
other cause, exposes the residue to sale, by which he realizes only five dol
lars per acre for lands of equal fertility and advantages, my land, as an ef
fect of this, is reduced to his last selling price. When he puts a million of acres
around mine into market at a nominal sum, he equally diminishes the selling

b
Value of mine by the act, whether his motive for doing so be to augment
population, and improve the country, or wantonly to effect my ruin. And
should this bill become a law, the former purchasers who have paid full
value would, in consequence of the depreciation of the property occasion
ed by the enactment, have a better equitable right to remuneration for losses
by the Government, than many claimants whose demands are annually liqui
dated here without our hearing a note of remonstrance against them. This bill
has been pending here for the last four years ; and the disposition evinced
to entertain it as a subject for future decision, has cherished expectations
which are sedulously encouraged by rumors in the West, that its provisions
will eventually be adopted. If my information be correct, and Western
gentlemen near me can bear witness that it is so, anticipations have been
too generally indulged that these lands will, before long, be offered for
nothing. This must tend to impede our sales, and perhaps to some
extent to suspend the settlement of our Western frontier — a result I sup
pose to be deprecated by none more deeply than by the gentleman from
Missouri (Mr. Benton.) himself. In the meantime, without the final action
of Congress on the subject, the illusion is every year increasing ; and, to
add to the evil, we have now a new doctrine which has been already ad
verted to in this debate — that these lands of right belong to the new States
within which they are situated. The gentleman from Missouri, in reference
to the charge of hostility to the West, to prove or disprove which I would not
myself now offer a single remark, has chosen to inform us that he has never
obtained here more than a single vote for his graduation bill from the repre
sentatives of all the States northeast of the Potomac — and he adds, that
vote was given in 1828 by a former Senator from the State which I have
tbe honor in part to represent here. For' this good deed, the gentleman
from Missouri proceeded to pronounce a panegyric on that Senator,
which was merited on stronger grounds. Though readily according
in the justice which imputes the most correct motives to that gentleman,
who is my neighbor, and with whom I live on terms of friendly intercourse,
exercising as he doubtless did his conscientious judgment on the case, yet
with my views, thus briefly explained, I am constrained to say that I can
not vote for this bill. According to my mode of considering it, it is a pro
position to give away the birthright of our people for a nominal sum ; and
I am yet to learn that the citizens of the Middle States have indicated any
feeling in regard to it differing from that expressed in the vote referred to,
when, with a single exception, all the Senators representing Slates north
of Mason's and Dixon's line, opposed the measure. They do not look to
these lands, as has been unjustly stated, with the eye of an unfeeling land
holder who parts with his acres as a miser parts with his gold. They view
the new States as younger sisters in the same family, upon an equal footing
with themselves, and entitled to an equal share of their patrimony ; bin

/having children to educate, and numerous wants to be supplied, they wiU
think it ungenerous, unjust, and oppressive, should these younger sisters
take away trie whole. Sir, it is the inheritance which descended from out-
forefathers who wrested a part of it from the British crown at the expense
of their blood and treasure, and paid for the rest of it by the earnings of
their labour. It is not for me to say what are the feelings of the people of
the Middle States on this subject. It is their privilege to speak for them
selves, and they will doubtless, when they think if necessary, exercise that
privilege. But I will say, that if they entertain the sentiments of their
fathers, they will never consent to cede away hundreds of millions of acres
-of land for a nominal consideration, or gratuitously relinquish' them to any.
new State, however loudly she may insist on the measure as due to her
rights and her sovereignty, or however boldly she may threaten to defy the
Federal Judiciary, and decide the controversy by her own tribunals, in her
own favor. Those who are conversant with our revolutionary history, will
remember that the exclusive claims of Virginia and of other members of
our political family, to the public lands, were warmly resisted by the States
of New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland, as soon as those claims were
avowed after the rupture with the mother country. The articles of Con
federation were not signed on the part of New Jersey until the 25th of No
vember, 1778, although she had bled freely in the cause of American
liberty from the commencement ofthe struggle. One of the principal objec
tions which caused this delay in the ratification of those articles will be
found in the able representation of her Legislature, presented by her De
legates to Congress, before she acceded to the Union. " The ninth article,"
said 'they, " provides that no State shall be deprived of territory for the
benefit of the United States. Whether we are to understand that by ter
ritory is intended any land, the property of which was heretofore vested in
the crown of Great Britain, or that no mention of such land is made in
the Confederation, we are constrained to observe that the present war, as
we always apprehended, was undertaken for the general defence and in
terest of the confederating Colonies, now the United States. It was ever
the confident expectation of this State, that the benefits derived from a
successful contest were to be general and proportionate ; and that the pro
perty of the common enemy, failing in consequence of a prosperous issue
of the war, would belong to the United States, and be appropriated to their
use. We are therefore greatly disappointed in finding no provision made
in the Confederation for empowering the Congress to dispose of such pro
perty, but especially the vacant and unpatented lands, cnmmonly called
the crown lands, for defraying the expenses of the war, and for such other
public and general purposes. The jurisdiction ought, in every instance, to
belong to the respective States within the charter or determined limits of
which such lands may be seated ; but reason and justice must decide, that

ihe property which existed in the crown of Great Britain, previous to the
present revolution, ought now to belong to the Congress in trust for the use
and benefit of the United States. They have fought and bled for it in pro
portion to their respective abilities} and therefore the reward ought not to
be predilectionally distributed." And when in November, 1778, the Le
gislature of New Jersey determined to attach her to the Union, they did
it, as they then expressed, " in firm reliance that the candor and justice of
the several States would, in due time, remove the subsisting inequality," yet
still insisting on the justice of their objections then " lately stated and sent
to the General Congress." So too Delaware and Maryland, for the same
.reasons, refused' to join the Confederation until a still later period, the for
mer ratifying the articles on the 22d of February, 1779, and the latter on the
1st of March, 1781. The State which I have the honor in part to represent
here had, on the 1st of February 1799, adopted the following resolutions
to authorize her accession to the Union :
"Resolved, That this State considers it necessary for the peace and safe
ty of the State to be included in the Union; that a moderate extent of
limits should be assigned for such of those States as claim to the Mississippi
or South Sea ; and that the United States, in Congress assembled, should
and ought to have power of fixing their Western limits.
" Resolved also, That this State considers herself justly entitled to a right,
in common with the members ofthe Union, to that extensive tract of country
which lies to the westward of the frontiers ofthe United States, the pioperty
of which was not vested in or granted to individuals at the commencement of
the present war ; that the same hath been or may be gained from the King of
Great Britain or the native Indians, by the blood and treasure of all, and
ought therefore to be a( common estate to be granted out on terms beneficial
to the United States."
But after ,the accession of Delaware with this protest, Maryland still
persevered in her refusal to join the Confederation, solely on the ground
" that she might thereby be stripped of the common interest and the common
benefits derivable from the Western lands." She still insisted that some secu
rity for these lands was necessary for the happiness and tranquillity of the
Union, denied the whole claim of Virginia to the territory northwest of the
Ohio,and still pressed upon Congress "that policy and justice required, that
a country unsettled at the commencement ofthe war, claimed by the British
crown and ceded to it by the treaty of Paris, if wrested from the common ene
my by the blood and treasure of the thirteen States, should be considered as
common property." In February, 1780, New York made her cession to
accelerate the Federal alliance, and declared the territory ceded should be
for the use and benefit of such of the United States as should become mem
bers of that alliance, " and for no other use or purpose whatever." And
although Virginia attempted for a while to vindicate her claim, yet other

9
States, feeling a strong attachment to Maryland, and conscious of the jus
tice of her representations, disliked a partial union which would throw ou't
ofthe pale a people standing, as Marj landers have always stood, among the
bravest and most patriotic of our countrymen. The ordinance of Congress
then followed in October, 1780, declaring that the territory to be ceded by
the States should be disposed "of for the common benefit ofthe Union, and
on the 2d of January, 1781, Virginia, in that spirit of magnanimity which has
generally prevailed in her councils, yielded up her claim for the benefit of
the whole Union. It is a remarkable circumstance that Maryland did not
actually join the Union until after these cessions had been made by New York
and Virginia, declaring at the very moment, and by the very terms of ber
accession, that she " did not release, nor intend to relinquish, any part of
her right and interest, with the other confederating States, to the western
territory." These facts, which have now become a part ofthe familiar his
tory ofthe country, furnish curious reminiscences in these latter days, when
a new light bas broken in upon us to show that the new States have title
to all the lands withiu their chartered limits, and when we are told it would
be most magnanimous and becoming in us, who claim to have imbibed the
spirit and sentiments of our forefathers, to cede away our patrimony for a
nominal consideration. Let it be remembered that the feeling on this sub*
ject manifested by the two States of Delaware and Maryland, preventing
their accession to the confederation until so late a period, was with difficulty
repressed, even by that ardent attachment to the cause of liberty for which
they were then so much distinguished, and in which they have never been
surpassed. Their troops went through the whole contest together, flanking
and supporting each other in battle ; commonly led on by the same Com
mander; generally the first to advance and the last to retreat, their bayonets,
like the pikes ofthe Macedonian phalanx, always glittering in front of one
and the same compact mass; and vtht-n they fell, they slept in death
together on the same part of the blood-stained field. It was that same
spirit which promoted the combined exertions of these people in the Ame
rican cause throughout the whole struggle, which also united them in their
resistance against every attempt on the part of any single section of the
country to appropriate for its exclusive benefit the territory which they
were striving to conquer from the British Crown. Sir, I think they will
now combine again; I think they will, when considering this subject, bestow
some reflection upon the millions which have b-en expended in the subse
quent purchase of the Southwestern portion of our public domain, on the
sums which have been profusely lavished in making and carrying into effect
our treaties for the extinguishment of the Indian title, in making the surveys
of these lands, and in the payment of officers and agents for the mainten
ance of our land system. From the feeling which formerly actuated them...
I judge that their co-operation on this subject will be such as to resist every

10
effort to bribe them with promises, or to sway them by means of political
excitement to give up that which could not be wrested from them by ap
peals to their strongest attachments in the darkest days of their adversity.
They will claim, I think, Sir, an equal portion of this territory under the
plain letter of the grants referred to — they may claim a large portion of it by
the paramount title of the right of conquest," which has never been by them
relinquished ; and by that title they can successfully defend it. Whatever
foundation there may be for the imputation of motives in other sections of
the Union, to flatter and to woo the West by the offer to her of this splen
did dowry if she will transfer her influence to a candidate in a Presidential
election, we, I believe, shall not take part in any such bargain. The gen
tleman from Tennessee (Mr. Grundy) says the West has been already
wooed and won. It may be so, but we are not, and I think shall never be,
sub potestate viri, and if we could be bought for any consideration to sign
this release of our birth-right, we should never agree, like Esau, to sell it
for a mess of pottage.
I come now, Sir, to consider a subject which has been discussed in con
nection with this — the right of a Slate to regulate her conduct by the judg
ment of her own self-constituted tribunals, upon the validity of an act of
Congress in opposition to the solemn decisions of the Supreme Court ofthe
United States: and my remarks upon it will be chiefly in reply to gentle
men who have gone before me. I confess I do not discover why the power
of deciding any, and every question, growing out of any circumstances in
which a State may conceive her sovereignty impugned, is not translated to
her own tribunals by the same train of argument which induces the conclu
sion that she may nuilify an act of the Federal Legislature without the aid of
the Federal Judiciary. We know — we are so taught by memorials on our
files — that the doctrine is very current in some States of the West, that the
public territory witbin their limits is their own ; and we have been threa
tened that when the population flowing westward has transferred the
balance of power beyond the Alleghany, or when, as one in this debate has
phrased it, " the sceptre has departed from the old thirteen furever," we
shall find the rights of the new States asserted and maintained, if not by the
force of numbers here, at least by the force of arms at home. In that case,
too, it is said, that to us distance will be defeat. State sovereignty and
State rights constitute the very war cry of a new party in this country. I
would myself be among the last to infringe upon the constitutional powers
of the States. But how far will the new doctrines on the subject carry
us ? Some who have engaged in this discussion have avowed the opinion
that our claim to the public lands is inconsistent with the paramount rights
of Western States, and that upon tbe fundamental principles of government,
the domain within their chartered limits is the property of these new grantees.
Others who stand among the boldest champions of the principle that a

11
sovereign State may constitutionally, and lawfully enforce her declarations
against the validity of an act of Congress, and nullify it whenever by
her judgment it is " deliberately, plainly, and palpably unconstitutional,"
repudiate the whole doctrine of State supremacy, and State title, when
we touch these claims to the public lands. The rule works badly then.
The two positions assumed by the same reasoner are repugnant to each
other. You cannot claim by virtue of your State sovereignty to nullify an
act of Congress, and yet deny to another State the right by a similar opera
tion to tear out of your statute book the leaf containing the Virginia grant,
as well as that which bears upon it the act of Congress declaring the uses of
that grant. By the grant and the act, the estate ceded is " for the com
mon benefit." The new sovereigns, within whose dominions the estate is
situated, asserting their power to decide all questions which, in their judg
ment, touch their sovereignty, may nullify both, and make the land theirs;
or if they cannot, how can any other of these sovereigns nullify a tariff law
or an act for internal improvement, which the Federal Judiciary adjudges
to be valid ! The gentleman from Tennessee says he will admit that the
Supreme Court is the final arbiter in all cases in law and equity arising
under the Constitution, and the laws ofthe United States made in pur
suance of it. But I am not satisfied with this limitation. The words of
the Constitution are, " the Judicial power of the United States shall be
vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may, from time to time, ordain and establish." Then this general transfer
of power is explained by the second section of the same article : " The
judicial power shall extend to all cases in law or equity arising under
this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their authority ; to all cases affecting Am
bassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls ; to all cases of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction; to controversies lo which the United States shall be
a party ; to controversies between two or more States, between a State and
citizens of another State, between citizens of different States, between
citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States, and
between a State or the citizens thereof and foreign States, citizens or sub
jects." All these words ofthe deed are in full force, except so far as it has
been altered by the single amendatory article to prevent suits against one of
the United States by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of
any foreign State. The instrument then contains no qualification of the
judicial power restrictiug its exercise to cases arising out of laws made in
pursuance ofthe constitution.
The reservation is an inadvertent interpolation in the instrument, and the
power granted extends to laws of the United States, whether Constitutionally
or unconstitutionaly enacted. It will be seen, too, that the United States must
"be a party to controversies1,1 concerning a tariff law, as well as to those

which affect the right to the public domain, or any other question touching
State sovereignty ; and that if there be no authority in the instrument by
which the judicial power can be extended to the former class of controver
sies, there is none to extend it to the latter class, or any case which a single
State may consider as presenting an infraction of her own powers. The
gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Rowan) and other Senators have contend
ed that a State cannot surrender any portion of her sovereignty, and we
have been asked to produce an instance in which sovereignty has submitted
itself to any judicial tribunal. Those who formed the constitution, in their
recommendatory letter signed by Washington on the 17th of September,
1787, inform us that l< it is obviously impracticable in the federal govern
ment of these States to secure all the rights of INDEPENDENT SO
VEREIGNTY to each, and yet provide for the interest and safety of all.''
The gentleman from Tennessee, in order to explain and construe the con
stitution, referred to the brief enumeration, contained in this letter, of the
specific objects which made it necessary to establish this government. I
refer to the same authority to overthrow the doctrine which regards all the
rights of independent sovereignty in each of tlje States, and to prove that
some of those rights were, in the view of the convention, ceded to provide
for the general welfare. States are not self-existent : they are created by
the people for their benefit. Those who have conferred stale power, can
take it away ; and for their own good they have transferred a portion of
this mysterious principle of sovereignty, which troubles gentlemen so much
to another place. They have transferred a portion of the Judicial power
to the Supreme Court, which acts as an impartial umpire, and not as an ad
versary party deciding his own cause, as is erroneously supposed by some
reasoners here. The gentleman from Tennessee says the Federal Judici
ary is, when a question of State rights is before it, a portion or part of one
of the parties, created by the Legislative and Executive branches of the
general government, responsible to that government alone, and liable to the
imposition of destructive burdens by that party. Even if all this were
correct, it would be a sufficient answer to it, when discussing this question,
to reply that the States had agreed that the arbiter should be thus created'
and thus responsible, having signed the arbitration bond deliberately and
with a full knowledge of the consequences. But when we look into the in
strument we find that the States, by their representatives in the Senate, must
first consent to the appointment ofthe arbiter, or he is not lawfully chosen.
They can challenge for cause, and they can challenge peremptorily. By
refusing to consent to appointments, ihey might in time vacate eveiy seat
on the whole tribunal. By the Legislative power of their immediate re
presentatives in the Senate, responsible to the Stales as their only masters
they can always prevent the imposition of oppressive burdens on their com
mon arbiters. They alone can try these arbiters on impeachment for *nis"

13
ibehaviour, and without impeachment those arbiters cannot be removed
from office. The Senator from Kentucky objects to the Federal Ju
diciary, that a majority in Congress may by law increase the number of
judges, and thus oppress the minority when they please. It has been said,
too, that large States, with a great representation in Congress, such as
New York and Pennsylvania, combining with others, may by their superior
vote so far increase the number un the bench as to oppress and destroy the
sovereignty of the lesser States. If the objection has any weight, it is 6ne
which could be made to our whole system of republican government.
We are ruled by majorities; and if the majority of this nation should be
come radically corrupt, I admit that the government will soon fall. But
I have sufficient reliance on the virtue and good sense of the people,
whether living in large or small States, to believe that no attempt will ever
be deliberately made by a majority in either, to destroy the independence
and legitimate powers of the other. And I feel no apprehensions on this
subject, for other reasons. Let us inquire into the mode of operating. Sup
posing now (to make out the gentleman's case) that the large States wicked
ly conspire to ruin the small ones. New York, Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsyl
vania, Virginia and North Carolina, being (as would be so probable !) unit
ed for this end, carry a bill through the other House to double the mjinber
of judges. Suppose, too, that they had by their votes elected a President
who would second their views. When the bill comes before the Senate,
if the small States understand your object, they, having an equal
representation here, secured by the only provision in the constitution
which numbers can never change, vote you down at once; and your
combination (as other combinations may be) is consigned to
 " that same anci- nl vjuilt,
Where all the kindred ofthe Capulets lie."
But suppose the Senators representing the small States here, not suspecting
mischief, but relying on your integrity, suffer the bill to pass. Your President
being in the plot, as we will for the sake of argument supp se, it be
comes a law. What then ? The bench is not yet filled. The " modus
operandi" requires that he should nominate, and we should consent to the"
appointment of tbe men who are to adjudge away our independence. We
might be slow to suspect our old friends of dishonest purposes, but we can
learn some things if you give us time. When you bring out your nomina
tions, we cannot fail to understand your plan. You are caught at once,
flagrante delicto, and we check you in the Senate, by rejecting all nomi
nations which do not please us. We have two chances to put an effectual
veto oo your plot, and our veto is a very different affair from your State
veto on an act of Congress. However thankful, therefore, we may be for
tbe kindly apprehensions expressed for our welfare, we say that we are not
yet alarmed. We cannot see, with the honorable gentleman from Tennes
see, that tbe States have been guilty of either folly or weakness in creating

u
tyich a tribunal as we conceive the Supreme Court of the United States to
be— nor do we think with him, that by the easiest operations imaginable
this creature is so competent to the destruction of its creators.
But whatever may have been, in the opinion of honorable gentlemen, the
folly ofthe people of these States in creating such a tribunal, or however
incompeient it may appear to decide these matters, the question still recurs —
Is there any other lorum established with co-extensive, or with appellate
powers? If so, what is it ? There ought not to be a wrong without a
remedy, and the interest and safety of all require the existence of some arbi
ter to grant a remedy. We are warned, however, that if by the Constitu
tion there be not some express grant of power for this purpose, the States
and the people still leserve it. On the other hand, if the grant to the Fe
deral Judiciary be express, the States have not reserved it, andean create
no other without forming a new Constitution or violating this. Sir, I lis
tened with deep interest to the developement of what I thought was an
nounced as a new discovery on this subject. I will consider that adverted
to, and recommended, by the gentleman from Tennessee, (Mr. Grundy.)
After conceding to the Federal Judiciary the powers of a common umpire,
to decide on the constitutionality of all Congressional enactments made in
pursuance of the Constitution, he informed us that there was another tri-
bunal to which a State might resort when oppressed by what she considered
to be a plain, palpable, and dangerous violation ofthe Constitution, with
out throwing herself out of the Union. He admitted that the Legislature of
the State was not this tribunal. That might be misled. He beats the gtound
then which was occupied by the gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr.
Hayne,) but himself takes a new position, not less dangerous. For he in
formed us that a State Convention might be called, and that might nullify the
oppressive law — after which, he thought Congress must acquiesce by aban
doning tbe power. The amount of this is, that one State is to govern all
the rest whenever she may choose to declare, by Convention, that a law is
unconstitutional. The end of this, we say, is war — civil war. We admit that
a State Convention may pronounce any law unconstitutional, as Virginia did
in '98. But the mere declaration comes to nothing, unless it can be enforced.
You may declare a law unconstitutional, and so can I. But what of that ?
It amounts only to this — we have full freedom of speech in this country, may
advocate what opinions we please, and peaceably endeavor to impress them
upon others. But the gentleman says this doctrine does not lead to war.
If Congress will not submit to the State, he thinks there is still a complete
political salvo in another tribunal, and that is a Convention ofthe States
to be called under the provisions of the Constitution. The State then must
exert herself until Congress, two thirds deeming it necessary under the fifth
article, shall propose amendments to the Constitution ; or, on the application
of the Legislatures of two thirds of tbe several States, shall call a Conven-

L5
tibn for proposing amendments, which, when ratified by the Legislatures of
ib-ee-fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three-fourths of
them, shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution.
So far this does not contravene the doctrine which wp advocate, and which
the Senator from New Hampshire, if I rightly understood him, after much
preface, and with some " slips of prolixity," finally settled down upon as a
part ofthe true orthodox creed. The right to amend the Constitution has
never been denied. This was a part ofthe political platform upon which
my honorable friend from Missouri, (Mr. Barton,) invited you to come
and stand with us. If the Convention of tbe States should assemble and
decide by a majority of three fourths against the State, the gentleman from
Tennessee says the State must submit. But if they decide otherwise, or
do not decide at all, Congress must submit to the State. Without assenting
to this last conclusion, which appears to "be arbitrarily assumed, I will only
inquire, if this be so, how is this tribunal to save us from civil war ? The
answer is, only by so amending the Constitution as to warp it to suit the
declarations of the State Convention. This is an excellent remedy for the
complaint ofthe State, but rather difficult to procure. If this is the sover
eign panacea which the honorable Senator from Tennessee has discovered
for healing the diseases of the South — Sir, I fancy she will agree with me
in commending her physician for his ingenuity in finding out the ingredients
of the bolus, but she will still think they are too hard to be obtained to
render the prescription valuable to her. With less experience, I would
recommend to a State groaning under the operation of a law which she
deems unconstitutional, to apply first to the Federal Judiciary, where she
will generally obtain relief, if her complaint be not hypochondria or imag
inary ill. If she fail there, let her pour her complaints into the ears of her
sisters, and use all constitutional means to procure a repeal of tbe obnoxious
law. A bare majority of Congress will be sufficient to give her relief in
this way. Do you object that Congress will prebably persevere in their
course, and refuse to repeal the law they have enacted? It may be so —
and if so, their constituents, being a majority of the people, must concur with
them, that the law is not only constitutional but salutary, or they would, by
the exercise ofthe elective franchise, remove such unworthy agents of their
sovereign will. If they do concur with their representatives, and uphold
them in their refusal to repeal the law, no matter how often by any other
power than the Federal Judiciary declared to be unconstitutional, in my
humble judgment you will hardly persuade three-fourths of them to assem-
ble for the purpose of altering their Constitution, and depriving their own
agents ofthe power of acting on the subject.
It comes at last then to this — that we have no other direct resource, in
the cases we have been considering, to save us from the horrors of anarchy,
than the Supreme Court of the United States. That tribunal has decided

16
a hundred such cases, and many under the most menacing circumstances,
Several States have occasionally made great opposition to it. Indeed it
would seem that in their turn most of the Sisters of this great family have
fretted for a time, sometimes threatening to break the connection and form
others — but in the end nearly all have been restored, by the dignified and
impartial conduct of our common umpire, to perfect good humour. Should
that umpire ever lose its high character for justice and impartiality, we
have a corrective in the form of our government ; but if it is to be had
only by a calm and temperate appeal to the judgment and feelings of the
whole American people, it can never be obtained by such addresses and
resolutions as those of Colleton or Abbeville. Reason receives not in place
of argument violent denunciations or furious appeals to party and passion.
During a period of four or five years past, the complaints of the South
have for this reason met with a cold reception in almost every other section
of the Union. They have been loud and deep — but they have been evi
dently regarded as the transient effusions of party feeling, coming, as they
too often did, couched in language of bitter vituperation, with the now stale
and despicable charges of " coalition, bargain and corruption," that vile and
ptutresceot stuff which has at length, as the Senator from Massachusetts truly
elated, sloughed off and gone down into the kennel forever. The course pur
sued was exactly that which was best calculated to make the whole alleged
grievances, if real, irremediable. Those who loved and admired the charac
ter of the Statesman of the West, indignant at the calumnies will) which he, as
ihey saw, was so unjustly assailed, often regarded the complaints which
came with them as mere secondary considerations, brought in to aid a per
sonal attack. On the other hand, many of those who affected to accredit
these calumnies for political effect, in their hearts never sincerely believed
any part ofthe stor) of southern sufferings, thinking perhaps that they knew
best what weight was to be attached to the political falsehoods which com
monly accompanied them. However different their objects, they were re
ally on the same chase, but to the southern huntsman the game taken has
been of nn benefit. From a recent demonstration, we perceive the South
ern complaint is now not even deemed worthy of a hearing. Sir, when I
witnessed the manly and candid manner in which the Honorable Senator
from South Carolina on my right (Mr. Smith) spoke ofthe grievances of
his constituents, when I saw him evidently soaring above mere party feel
ing, menacing none, debouncing none, and touching with all the delicacy
which characterizes him the subjects in difference between us, the reflection
forced itself irresistibly on my mind — how different might have been the re
ception of these complaiuts,had they always come thus recommended.
South Carolina, though erring in a controversy with her sisters, would by all
bave been believed to have been honestly wrong ; and if under such
circumstances she should ever throw herself out of the pale of the

Union in consequence of such a misconception of the constitution as we
have endeavoured to prevent, I would rather see my own con
stituents stripped of the property acquired under the protection fur
nished by the government to their honest industry, than compelled by
any vote of mine here to drive the steel with which .we should arm our cit*
izeus into the bosoms of that gallant people. And I will now say, without
meaning to express any further opinion on this delicate subject, that, for my
self, whenever pounds, shillings and pence alone shall be arrayed against
tbe infinite blessings of the Union, I shall unhesitatingly prefer the latter—
for the simple reason, that I can never learn how to " calculate its value."
The honorable member from New Hampshire, in the progress of his very
ingenious remarks, discussed, in connection with the constitutional power of
the Judiciary, the whole doctrine of internal improvement, as well as the
tariff. He denounced both as aggressions of the Federal government on
the rights of the States, as measures evincive of and flowing from a dispo
sition on the part of some, to claim for that government unlimited powers;
and endeavoured to make it appear that these acts for internal improve
ment were and ever had been Federal heresies, while the opposite and re
strictive tenets, limiting us to the strict exercise of certain enumerated and
specific powers, had always distinguished your genuine democrat and only
true republican. Tbe honorable member informed us that by tbe preva
lence of his strict construction of the constitution over the latitudinarian
doctrines, the great political revolution of 1800 was effected, and that
his mode of construction had ever since remained " the watch-word of de
mocracy" and the strongest " test of political orthodoxy." He showed
us by these means how " the matchless spirit ofthe West," the great advo
cate of the principles so denounced, had always been a federalist, while on
the other haud he barely intimated that a matchless spirit in tbe Sooth had
perhaps been misrepresented on the same subject. The intimation, that
the views of one statesman had been misunderstood, was accompanied by
the admission that there might be differences, and possibly honest differ
ences, on the same subject, in the same party. This was all well— and my
only reason for adverting to it, is to express my regret that so charitable a
salvo was not extended beyond the party line. But we were afterwards
told by the honourable member, that the resemblance between the political
character of the opposition and administration parties, in 1798, 1812,
and 1828, confers upon bim, and his political friends, " a title to old fashion
ed democracy, as the same democratic States, with one or two exceptions
only, are found, (he says,) at each era, side by side, in favour of JeffersoB,
Madison, and the hero of Orleans. On one side Virginia, and Pennsyl
vania, Carolina and Georgia, Tennessee and Kentucky. On the other
Delaware and Massacbussetts, Connecticut, and divided Maryland." I
shall hereafter take leave to present to the view ofthe honourable member

some coincidences much more striking than that which here appears to have
caught his fancy. Keeping in view now the position assumed by him, in regard
to the federalism ofthe Western statesman, and other advocates of internal
improvement, I would enquire into the title to. " old fashioned democracy"
of Georgia, Carolina, and other Southern States, here designated by him,
on the 14th of March 1818, when twenty one of their representatives in
the other House carried ihe resolution which fully established this " fede
ral" heresy — declaring " that Congress has power, under the constitution,
to appropriate money for the construction of post roads, military and oth
er roads, and for the improvement of water-courses." Four of the seven
representatives from South Carolina, Mr. Lowndes, Mr. Simkins, Mr.
Middleton, and Mr. Erwin, voted for this resolution, the two first named
gentlemen advocating, in the debate 10 which it gave rise, the power of
Congress to construct Roads and Canals. When the resolution was
adopted, Mr. Lowndes declared that the decision then made had settled the
whole question. Two thirds of the Georgia delegation, Mr. Abbott, Mr.
J. Crawford, Mr. Terrill, and Mr. Forsyth now an honourable Senator
from that State, supported the same resolution. Did Carolina and Georgia
then forfeit their " title to old fashioned democracy?" Shall we not try
them too, as well as Delaware and Massachusetts, by the " strongest test of
political orthodoxy." If Delaware is here to be put on trial, she will stand
his test admirably. Though generally Federal until 1826, when the
new parties were formed, she was almost uniformly represented in
Shis Senate, up to that period, by Federal gentlemen holding on
this subject the very tenets of tbe honourable member himself, al
ways confining the powers of the government to the specific and
enumerated objects ; and opposed alike to these acts for internal improve
ment and tariff laws. In 1827 and 1828, she was represented hereby
two able Statesmen of the opposite and latitudinarian creed, both of whom
had been federalists ; but at that time, Sir, they were dyed in the wool by
the Jackson process, and, of course, were genuine republicans, as the
honourable member will admit. They neither changed or concealed their
opinions. Were they not " orthodox?" One of them, standing conspica-*
ous for his talents in the ranks of the orthodox party, now, by their ap
pointment, represents us at tbe proudest court in Europe. It cannot be ne-
cesssary to follow out the inquiry further, to try the truth of his test by a
reference to musty records and by gone events. If the honourable mem
ber Will pursue it, he will soon find himself, by the aid of such a test, in
volved in ihe mazes of a labyrinth, from which he could not escape in
safety, even with tbe thread of an Ariadne toguide him. Sir, ihe whole
of this part of ihe gentleman's ingenious argument is admirably calculated,
ad cavtqndum, as it makes all our Canals, Rail Roads, and Turnpikes,
which have been made by the assistance of Congress, the works of that

19
anathematized "peace party in war," which, as we have been told here,
has been thus struggling, since the earliest period of our history, to confer
upon our rulers absolute power ; and I will now dismiss it, that it may per
form the duties of its mission, with this single remark, that you may perceive 8
peeping through its foregone conclusions, how the bpnt of the gentleman's
mind, in condemning Southern votes, is evidently at this time inclining with
a breeze to the North North-East — though I still suppose that, " when the
wind is southerly, he will know a hawk from -a handsaw."
So far as the State which 1 have the honor in part to represent here,
can furnish evidence to illustrate the title ofthe honorable member, and his
political associates, to " old fashioned democracy," by the fact that a party
odious to them has always prevailed there, he is welcome to the evidence
for his own uses. It will never redound to her discredit. It can never be
a cause of exultation to any man who knows the history of his own country,
and values his own reputation, to find her always arrayed against him.
And as the honorable member has called my attention to the subject, I will
remind him what kind of a " peace party in war" we have always had in
Delaware. We have ever had such a party there as " bewares of entrance
to a quarrel," but, being once engaged in it, puts forth all its energies of
body and soul in the controversy, and for the love of peace fairly fights
out of it. We had a party of this kind at the bloody era ofthe American
revolution, contending against the usurpations of the British Crown — a
party which supplied more warriors in the cause of American liberty, in
proportion to our limited means and population, than were furnished by
any other State in the whole confederation. The bones of many of that
old party were buried on Long Island, and at White Plains, at Princeton,
at Brandywine, at Germantown, at Camden, at Guilford, at Eutaw, and at
Yorktown; and your pension rolls now show but fourteen of them alive and
dependent on your bounty. Many of that party were at Fort Mifflin too ;
and the gentleman from Maryland, (General Smith,) the father of the Am
erican Senate, (himself one of the most distinguished patriots ofthe revolu
tion,) who commanded th^re, when referring in debate a few days since to
the conduct of one of them, (Captain Hazzard,) bore testimony to that
kind of peace-loving disposition in war which we cherish, when, almost
overpowered by the emotion caused by a recurrence to the sad history ofthe
sufferings of his gallant comrades, he described our old peace party troops
as soldiers than whom better or braver had never existed. I am told that
we had Federalists who opposed the declaration of the last war ; but those
very Federalists, like their brethren of the opposite party, supported the
cause of their country through the whole war with unbending firmness and
devoted patriotism. We have national republicans, I am now told; but as
they are made up of the same kind of materials which composed the peace
parties I have been describing, I shall be pardoned if I defer to other

20
judgment than that of the gentleman from New Hampshire, and say that I
am proud to represent them here, even though, by so doing, I am placed in
opposition to an administration which claims to be exclusively democratic,
and yet appoints more Federalists to office than all its predecessors have
done since the revolution of 1801— always, nevertheless, keeping steadily in
view this indispensable qualification, that every Federalist so appointed
must be of the Jackson stamp. I shall ever feel attachment for that party
which seeks in peace to prepare for war, by extending the beneficent action
of this government to increase the means of our defence, makes roads and
canals to transport our munitions in lime of need,fortifiesour coast, improves
our harbours, protects our commerce, and has already built up a navy
which is the glory of our country and the admiration pf the world.
Sir, I must be pardoned for dwelling at length in reply to other remarks
of the honorable member from New Hampshire, whose opinions and rea
soning are regarded, by some of his political friends here, as laying down
the law and fixing the standard of political orthodoxy. When he had
closed his remarks, thn Senator from Missouri near him (Mr. Benton)
arose in his place, and pronounced the honorable gentleman to be his Peter,
the rock on which he would build the great democratic Church. ''
[Mr. Benton having risen to explain, Mr. Clayton gave way for the
, purpose. Mr. Benton. — I did not say "this is my Peter. I said — yes, this is Peter,
and this Peter is the rock on which the Church of New England demo
cracy shall be built. This is what I said aloud, and what the Senate heard.
What I said in a lower tone, and not intended for the Senate, was this,
'¦' and the gates of hell shall not prevail against him."]
Mr. Clayton resumed. Sir, I accept his modification, and wish to pre
sent fairly, not only all the words, whether spoken on a high or a low key,
but the action which was so admirably adapted to them. The gentleman
from Missouri then, in the face of the Senate, extended his right arm over
the head ofthe gentleman frcm New Hampshire, with all the majesty of a
Cardinal, or a full robed Bishop, about to pronounce a benediction on a new
monarch, or to install a new incumbent of the papal see, and, as he now
says, did not merely declare him to be his Peter, but announced him to the
World as the great Pontiff of New England democracy; and, of course, I
suppose, (as that, by his former admissions, is as good as any,} of all other
democracy under the whole Heavens. Sir, I had the right to suppose that
he who thus inducted him to office had full powers, or he would not have
performed the ceremony. Give me leave to say, that when I heard ihe
new Pontiff lay down his law in conformity with my old-fashioned notions
of the powers of the Judiciary, abjuring, as a political heresy, all tbe new
" Carolina doctrine," though seemingly endorsed by the Senator from Mis
souri himself, r thought that I should stand at least one of the new " tests

¦n
jf political orthodoxy," and I sincerely hoped that, on this subject, noib
ing might prevail against him. When he issued this, his first bull, I felt
disposed to register all his rescripts, and I certainly have preached the very
doctrine which it inculcated. But when I heard the American System
denounced as a mere federal measure ; when I heard, too, from the same
source, thai a good officer ought to be removed before the regular expira
tion of his term, for party motives, or personal aggrandizement, and the
whole proscriptive system of the new administration thus justified and
extolled, — then, Sir, I confess (meaning nothing irreverent by my allusions)
that I became a DESSENTLR AND A PROTESTANT, and although
I expect indulgence for such transgressions, I strongly suspect that I shall
carry my abominable heresies to the grave.
The Senator from Missouri, (Mr. Barton,) having, in the range of this
debate, invited the concurrence of others in certain fundamental principles
and important objects, enumerated among the number the preservation of
the freedom and purity of elections, unawed by official punishments, and
uncorrupted by official rewards, in opposition to removals from office for
the exercise ofthe great elective franchise, or to make room for the reward
of partisans in our Presidential Elections, by the bestowal of public em
ployments. He submitted that the power of removal from office by the
President was a high legal trust, to be exercised for the public benefit, in
sound discretion, for cause relating to the official conduct or fituess of the
incumbent; that the Senate of the United States had restraining powers in
the matter of displacing, as well as of appointing Federal officers ; and that,
by the Constitution, the Executive power could never be arbitrarily exer
cised. He advocated " the freedom of inquiry into the exercise of Execu
tive discretion and official trust, in opposition to Executive irresponsibility
and unsearchableness, and to ihe suppression of free inquiry into our politi
cal affairs." The Senator from Maine (Mr. Holmes) merely adverted to
the general proscription in New England. In reply to these gentlemen, the
Senator from New Hampshire says he will not accept the invitation ofthe
Senator from Missouri, (Mr. Barton,) to stand on his new political plat
form, composed, as be considers it, of articles of opposition to the present
administration — defends the whole course of that administration as " demo
cratic and constitutional," and informs us that, in the principle of removal
from office, for even political motives, their policy only follows up the doc
trines of the great revolution in 1800. He speaks of these removals as
mere rotation in office, first made by the people themselves in the highest
office in the land, the Chief Executive of the Union, for political cause,
then inquires, triumphantly, if the same cause should not affect the active
deputies and subordinates, as well as the principal, " Whatever disap
pointments and suffering by removal, (says he,) some individuals may sus
tain ; yet they knew the legal tenure of their offices." He, therefore, thinks

the agents of the people cannot fear the cry of cruelty or persecution, be
cause the power of removal, as now exercised, only " changes one good
man," (that is, for political opinions,) "for another good man," and, there
fore, does no injury to the public. He then proceeds t» say these agents
need not dread the discussion of the constitutionality of their exercise of
this power, thus plainly avowed by him to have been levelled at the
right of opinion. Sir, the honorable Senator from Tennessee, |^Mr.
Grundy,) if I rightly understood him, avowed the same opinions ; for he
denied the right of the Senate to inquire into the causes of removal, and
insisted that' the present administration had not gone beyond his principles
on this subject. He contended that the Senate would transcend their con
stitutional power, and thus violate the instrument which it is their interest
to preserve, by examining into and judging of the propriety of removals
from office, or by controlling the Executive in the discharge of this branch of
hisauthority . He entered into a full discussion of the rights of the President
with great ingenuity, and manfully challenged us " to come out boldly, and
discuss this subject with his friends freely and frankly." The honorable gen
tleman is a formidable antagonist. He wields a lonr/ knife with a strong arm,
in defence of his friends ; but when he throws down his gauntlet to what is
here called the opposition, and defies them to a contest with these princi
ples of this Administration, he will be met freely, frankly, and boldly too.
Mr. President : Another year has rolled away. Our ides of March are
come. This day, which is the anniversary of the Chief Magistrate's Inau
guration, brings with it some strange reminiscences of the past, and some still
stranger anticipations of the future. On the last 4th of March, and at abou'
this very hour of the day, the American Senate followed the American
President in the progress of his stately triumph to that scene where, in the
presence of assembled thousands of his countrymen, he proclaimed to the
world the principles upon which he intended to administer the government.
Independently of the fact, that the whole subject has been thrust into this,
debate, as I have stated, there seems to be some propriety in devoting a
portion ofthe passing hour to the consideration of ijie extent and influence
of executive authority. These on this day would be proper subjects of
reflection for the Chief Magistrate himself; and as we are his constitutional
advisers, exercising, iro one sense, a portion of the executive power, we
may learn our own duty better by the temperate examination of his. I con
cur with the gentleman that in discussing this, or any other subject, involv
ing a question of constitutional law, passion and feeling are to be regarded
as poor auxiliaries. We should go for nobler game than mere party
interests. Principles are to be first settled here ; but then the application
of them must be fearlessly made. The first inquiry ought to be, what are
the true principles ;— not what is the interest of any party. It will be found
that my view of those principles differs, as much, in some respects, from

23
ttiose of some to whose judgment I usually defer, as it does, in others, from
those of some who profess to be politically arrayed against me.
The power of removal is no where expressly conferred by the Constitu
tion, except in the section which provides that all civil officers of the United
States shall be removed from office on impeachment for, or on conviction
of, treason, bribery, or other high ciimes and misdemeanors. A Judge,
the tenure of whose office is dum bene se gesserit, is removeable only by
this means. But where good behaviour is not the tenure of office, the
power of removal is proierly and generally incident to, and a consequence
of, the power of appointment. The power to destroy is ordinarily implied
from the power to create. It is a common axiom of our jurisprudence, that
the authority to dissolve a thing must be as high as that which formed it.
The Legislature which has the express power to pass a law for raising
revenue, for example, has the necessary power to repeal it. The Govern
ors of many ofthe States enjoy, by express provisions in their respective
constitutions, tbe power of appointment to office, and yet exercise by con
struction, and by implication only, the power of removal from it, their State
Constitutions being silent on that subject. The Post Master General, who,
harmonizing with this administration, has removed, within the last year,
his thousand deputies, agents, and clerks, though vested by law with the
express right of appointing them, can point you to no statute conferring
upon him the right to remove one of them. The numerous clerks and
agents appointed under express legal provisions, by other Heads of Depart
ments here, are removeable ODly by the same construction. The law has
conferred upon the Supreme Court the power of appointing its Clerk, and,
although considered removeable by it, yet no law has thus limited the
tenure of his office in express terms. But then this authority, thus derived
from implication and construction, if kept within the spirit of the Constitu
tion and the laws, instead of being used arbitrarily or tyrannically, can
be exercised only for the public welfare.
In two classes of cases the power of appointment is exercised by the
President alone : — first, where Congress have, by law, vested in him the
appointment of such inferior officers as tbey thought proper ; and, secondly,
where he is empowered to make appointments by virtue of the last clause in
the second section of the second article. There are some peculiar consi
derations growing out ofthe manner in which the power of removal in the
first of these classes has been exercised, which it is unnecessary to enter
into now, as tbey are not immediately connected with the executive rights
of ihe Senate. Appointments of the second class are temporary only by
the express provisions of the clause which authorizes them. " The Pre
sident shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the
recess of the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end
•f their next session/' With these exceptions, the second section referred

^4
(a expressly confers the power of appointment upon the President and
Senate, by the words "he shall nominate, and, by and with the advice and
consent ofthe Senate, shall appoint."
Although the Constitution has thus recognised the Senate as an essen
tial component part ofthe appointing authority, yet the power of removal
has been uniformly exercised by the President alone since the Constitution
was established. This then has been a deviation from ihe general princi
ple, that the right to remove can be exercised only where the right to
appoint exists. But I do not concur with the honorable gentlemen
who have viewed this power as unlimited by the spirit of the Con
stitution, and having arrived at the conclusion that sic volo is the legal
tenure of office, would leave it to become the sport of a spirit not less arbi
trary and tyrannical than) that of absolute despotism. Every administra
tion preceding this has professed to exercise this power within certain
established constitutional limitations, regarding removals as expedients to be
resorted to by the President only for ihe purpose of securing a faithful
execution of the laws, or when really necessary for the general welfare.
And if a single instance can be shown in which any President before this
has ever prostituted this authority to party uses, or for personal aggrandize
ment, it will be found that he has, at least in terms, assumed the virtue of
administering the government on different principles, and denied that he
intended to invade the right of opinion, or pervert his power from its legiti
mate object. The history as well of the precedent upon which the Sena
tor from Tennessee so much relies, as of others to which he has not advert
ed, shows that this constructive power would have never been acknow
ledged if it had not been supposed to have been strictly limited and dis
tinctly defined.
When the bill "for establishing an Executive Department, to be called
the Department of Foreign Affairs," was under ihe consideration of the
House of Representatives, during the first session of Congress after the
adoption of the Constitution, the debate to which the gentleman from Ten
nessee has referred, arose upon one of its provisions granting to the Presi
dent the right of removing the Secretary lo whom our foreigu relations were
to be principally entrusted. That provision was then so modified as not to
carry with it the appearance of a grant of something not before given, but to
recognise a constitutional power of removal already subsisting in the Presi
dent The power was strongly denied by Mr. Gerry and Mr. Roger Sher
man, and maintained by Mr. Madison and Mr Baldwin. These gentlemen
had all been members of the Convention that made the Constitution, and
yet were thus equally divided in opinion on the construction of the very
instrument which they had, so recently before that, assisted in forming. The
point then was regarded as extremely doubtful. There were others, who
had not been members of the Convention, who engaged on different sides

25
with equal zeal in the contest, until at length a construction implying the
existence of the power was established, so far as a tribunal which had
no jurisdiction over the subject could do it, by a vote of thirty four to
twenty. It has often been observed, and I apprehend it is inquestionably
true, that the character of Washington, then President oftheUuited States,
had great influence in producing this decision. Add to this, too, that the
question arose in the very strongest case which could have been presented
for the advocates of the Executive — ihe case of a Secretary, between whom
and the President it was absolutely necessary that the most confidential
relations should subsist. These supporters of Executive authority were
then, as men will ever be, influenced in some degree by the circumstances
immediately around them. The statesmen of the day literally vied with
each other in expressions of their high confidence in the man who then
filled the Chair of State, beloved by all, and distrusted by none ; and it is
but too evident from the arguments advanced on this occasion, that they
were beguiled by the imagination that none but beings of such exalted
virtue and spotless purity would ever be elected to succeed him. They
reasoned from an illusion to which human nature is at all times liable. Un
der such circumstances, a principle was decided, which forms a distinct ex
ception to an established general rule ; and it cannot escape observation
that under other auspices a very different result would probably have been
produced by the deliberations of 1789. The discussion to sustain this power
mainly rested on these brief positions — that the Constitution had conferred
upon the President the Executive power — that the general concession.
of Executive authority embraced removals, as well as appointments —
that the power granted to the Senate, being an exception to this general
provision, ought therefore to be construed strictly, and could not be ex
tended beyond the express right (with its necessary incidents) of nega
tiving appointments — and, above all, that the President, being bound to
" take care ' that the laws be faithfully executed," must therefore re
move whenever the public Interest imperiously requires it. The last position,
aided by all the extraneous considerations referred to, was successful. Eve
ry reasoner dwelt upon it as the keystone ofthe argument. It was not
then contended by the fathers of the republic, that the general grant of
Executive power was to be construed alone by the strict specifications of it,
subsequently entered in the same instrument. True, our modern reason-
ers revolt at the thought of extending the powers of Congress beyond the
specific enumeration of them, by a general grant of " all legislative
power ;" and although ihe honourable gentleman from New Hampshire
has informed us that the friends of this administration, claiming the au
thority to remove in its utmost latitude, need not dread the discussion of
their right to do so, yet he has, in this very debate, stoutly denied a con
struction, to the general delegation of power to Congress in the Constitution
4

26
"to provide for the general welfare," similar to the one placed in 1789
upon the general delegation of Executive power " to take care that the
laws shall be faithfully executed." Without this latitudinarian interpre
tation, the power of removal would have remained forever, on the gene
ral principle, in the President and Senate. But it was not urged in 1789,
by any man, that this constructive power was unlimited and absolute ; on
the contrary, guagiog it by the strict standard of the rule which defin
ed while it conferred it, they declared that it was given to the Presi
dent only for the purpose of " securing a faithful execution of the laws/'
as an incident to his great prerogative to preside over his country for
his country's good. They pointed out the very cases for its proper ex
ercise : They said it was necessary to remove a traitor from office, "to
secure a faithful execution of the laws :" They urged that an officer
who should become insane, corrupt, disabled, or in any manner or by
any means unfaithful or disqualified to serve the public to ihe public
advantage, ought to be, and was of right removable, in order " to secure
a faithful execution of the laws ;" and having thus measured and mark
ed down ihe length, tbe breadth, and the depth of the whole principle
recognised by them, they doubtless little expected that any opinion
given, or precedent set by them, would ever be adduced to sanction the
exeicise of uncontrolled aud despotic power. The honourable gentle
man from Tennessee, who has filled the office of a Judge with great cred
it to himself, says that he loves precedents ; and having informed us thai
" Mr. Madison understood the Constitution and structure of the govern
ment as well as any man that ever lived," holds up the Congressional
Register of that day, points to the opinion of that able statesman there
given, and triumphantly announces that there we may see his doctrines,
and there his constitutional lawyer. Sir, we may venture here, I think,
to meet the gentleman on his own grounds. I say, too, that, like others
from the schools of forensic disputation, I love precedents; and that Mr.
.Madison on this subject is also my conttitutional lawyer. But then, when
I like the opinion of a constitutional lawyer so well, I take the whole, and
not merely a part of it. I do not gratuitously reject one half of it, while
I rely so much upon the other. I read from the same volume Mr. Ma
dison's words, uttered on that same occasion, that " the dismission of a
meritorious officer was an abuse of power ABOVE HIS CONCEPTION,
and would merit impeachment." Again, he qualifies the power he ad
vocates, and explains it thus : " The danger, then, consists in this : the
President can displace fiom office a man whose merits require that be
should be continued in it. What will be the motives which the President
can feel for such abuse of his power, and the restraints to operate to pre
vent it ? In the first place, he will be impeachable by this House, before
tye Senate, for SUCH AN ACT OF MAL-ADMJWSTRATION ; for

27
I contend, that the wanton removal of meritorious officers would subject
him to impeachment, and removal from his own high trust." Our consti
tutional lawyer then thinks your President ought to be removed from
office, if he has acted on the principles avowed by his friends here, and
says— the kind of power you contend for is ABOVE HIS CONCEP
TION. This does not seem to work well ; and perhaps you may now
think our constitutional lawyer, " who understood the constitution and
structure of the government as well as any man that ever lived," in an
error. Then let us look into the opinions of others, expressed on the
same occasion, who were aiding in the establishment of this precedent,
admired so much. Mr. Lawrence, though an advocate ofthe same power,
denied that, according to his understanding of it, it was ever to be exer
cised "in a wanton manner, or from capricious motives;" and, with a view
to silence the apprehensions of those who were alarmed lest it might be
exercised without restraint, he puts to them the question which had been
answered by Mr. Madison — " would he (the President) not be liable to
impeachment for displacing a worthy and able man, who enjoyed the con
fidence of the people ?" Mr. Vining, on the same side, remarked " that if
the President should remove a valuable officer, it would be an act of
tyranny which the good sense of the nation would never forget." Such
were the views of all the prominent advocates of this right at that time.
Do I go an inch, then, beyond your own authority when I infer, from the
opinions of the very men upon whose judgment you now build, that the
system of removing meritorious officers bbfore the regular expiration of
their terms of service, for either personal or parly motives, is hostile to
the spirit of the constitution, an " impeachable mal-administration" ofthe
government, and a " tyrannical" encroachment on the liberties of the
people ?
But when we trace the history of the same bill in its progress through
the Senate, it seems not to admit of a doubt that, but for the extraordinary
concurrence of extraneous circumstances then co-operating to produce this
construction, the right of removal would never have been recognised.
While that bill was under consideration in this House, on the 18th July,
1789, a motion was made to strike out of the clause, implying the existence
ofthe right, the words " by the President ofthe United States," the object
•f which was to deny that right altogether. The Senate then sat with
closed doors, and we have no account of the discussion. But we see
from the records how the vote stood. Mr. Madison's constitutional opin
ions were then unpopular in Virginia, as being too latitudinarian; in con
sequence of which he had lost his election to the Senate, that State being,
at the period referred to, represented here by William Grayson and Rich
ard Henry Lee. Both those gentlemen voted against the power and in
favor of the motion to strike out j and I suppose that the doctrine of strict

28
constructions of executive power was at that time, as it often since has
been, the prevailing sentiment of the State. Georgia, South Carolina,
and New Hampshire, were all united, against the power, and they were sup
ported by Johnson of Connecticut, and Maclay of Pennsylvania Among
the friends of the motion we find Johnson, Few of Georgia, Butler of
South Carolina, and Langdon of New Hampshire, who had all been mem
bers of the Federal Convention. Nine voted for the striking out, and
nine against it; and Mr. Adams, the Vice President, having given a casting
vote in favor of the power, the words were retained. So the honorable
gentleman from Tennessee will perceive that he owes the whole of his
favorite precedent at last to that same "elder Adams," the " tendencies
of whose opinions" were, if we are to rely on his friend from New Hamp
shire, " to consolidation and monarchy." I do not call his attention to
this fact, however, because I concur in any of these sweeping denunciations
of that great patriot. The same question arose again in the Senate on
the 4th of August, 1789, on a motion to strike out of the bill " to establish
an Executive Department to be denominated the Department of War,"
the words, " and who whenever the said principal officer shall be removed
from office by the President of the United States;" and again on the same
day, pending the bill " to provide for the government of a territory North
West of the Ohio," which contained a clause recognising the right to
remove the Governor of the territory. Similar decisions followed in
each of these cases ; so that the question was within three weeks thrice
decided here; and these decisions form the grounds upm which ihe
power, under its proper constitutional restraints, has ever since been claim
ed for the Executive. These facts, I submit, leave not a shadow of a
doubt that, without the influence which the character ofthe Father of his
Country was calculated to produce upon the minds ofthe Senators, many
of whom were his old compatriots and most intimate friends, and without
the powerful co-nperation of Mr. Adams, the decisions would have been
different. Under such circumstances, I would pause to inquire whether it
is reasonable to suppose that the understanding of those Senators who so
established this power, was, that the President, upon whom it was confer
red, was to exercise it without limitation ? Is it probable that uncontrol
led and absolute authority would have been acknowledged then, and that,
too, by a body of men whose patriotism and devotion to the cause of liberty
have never been surpassed ?
The opinions of Mr. Adams, on this subject, are probably in a great
measure attributable to a belief which he had indulged in opposition to the
Federal Convention, lhat the power of the Senate, in regard to appoint
ments, ought lo have been entrused to " a council selected by the President
himself at his pleasure"— in fact, a mere privy council without the au
thority to eheck him. He thought that the people would be jealous that

29
the influence ofthe Senate, if it were eutrusted with appointments, would
" be employed to conceal, connive at, and defend guilt in Executive officers,
instead of being a guard and watch upon them, and a terror to them."
These opinions are disclosed in a correspondence which took place be
tween him and Roger Sherman, in the summer of 1789. With these
opinions, thus known to have been entertained by him at the very time
when he decided by bis casting vote, he went far, we now find, to destroy
the lights of the Senate, and to reduce it to p mere privy council without
any effective power. In that correspondence Mr. Sherman, who had been
a member of the Convention, urged against such opinions the views of
that Convention, which ought to have been decisive in favor of the rights
of the Senate. " But," said he, " if the President was left to select a
council for himself, though he may be supposed to be actuated by the best
motives, — yet he would be surrounded by flatterers who would assume
the character of friends and patriots, though they had no attachment to the
public good, no regard to the laws of their country, but, influenced wholly
by self-interest, would wish to extend the . power of the Executive in
order to increase their own ; they would often advise him to dispense with
laws that should thwart their schemes, and in excuse plead that it was
done from necessity to promote the public good— they will use their own
influence, induce the President to use hts to get laws repealed, or the Con
stitution altered to extend his powers and prerogatives, under pretext of
advancing the public good, and gradually render the government a despo
tism. This seems to be according to the course of human affairs, and
what may be expected from the nature of things." The views of Mr.
Adams on this subject appear to have been different from those of any
other man who participated in the decisions in 1789, of which we have
any information now, as well as from those ofthe Federal Convention it
self. It is true that Washington exercised this power during his administration.
The gentleman from Tennessee produced nine cases as the result of his
industrious researches, which had occurred during the whole eight years
in which Washington presided, to justify the hundreds which have been
made in the first year of this administration. But, in every instance,
Washington's removals were made (and it will not be denied) only when
necessary for the public good, exactly complying with the rule which had been
established. In announcing the exercise of this right to the Senate, he
used the word "superseded" instead of "removed" or "dismissed," which
were subsequently adopted by his successors. But whether he did or did
not consider the removals as provisional, and dependent on the future
action ofthe Senate, we have no distinct information. On all occasions he
manifested the highest respect for its concurrent powers in the business of
Executive appointment, and prescribed a duty for a President, which has

30
certainly not been regarded as such by one of his successors, when in his
message of the 9th of February, 1790, containing a few nominations to
supply vacancies which had been temporarily filled in the recess, he says,
" these appointments will expire with your present session, and, indeed,
ought nat to endure lunger than until others can he regularly made."
The gentleman from Tennessee informed us of twenty three cases in
¦which Mr. Jefferson had removed; and then read, to justify the immense
proscription now made, his answer of the 12th July, 1801, to a remon
strance ofthe committee of the merchants of New Haven, on the appoint
ment of Samuel Bishop to the office of Collector at New Haven, then
lately vacated by the death of David Austin. That letter was doubtless
written under some excitement, caused by the memorial itself; and the
fame of Mr. Jefferson is rescued from the imputation oow attempted to be
cast upon it by better evidence. Yet, even in this answer, he places his
removal upon the ground that it was for ihe public good, and to secure
the necessary co-operation with the government, expressly stating, too, that
his general object was to remedy the very evil now complained of. " Dur?
ing the late administration," says he, "the whole offices of the United
States were monopolized by a sect." He considered that the former in
cumbents had been appointed merely for party and personal aggrandize
ment, and not for the public welfare. Try the present abuses of power
by the standard of that letter, and you find youiselves standing on the
very doctrine which he repudiated, and the deleterious effects of which he
says he endeavored to correct. " I shall correct the procedure ; but that
done, return with joy to that state of things when the only question con
cerning a candidate shall be, is he honest ? — is he capable ? — is he faithful
to the Constitution ?" The last Administration removed no man for party
motives, before the regular expiration of his term, and even went beyond
the line prescribed by Mr. Jefferson, by regularly re-appointing political
opponents when their offices had expired. You now rest, therefore, on
the principles which Mr. Jefferson attributed to the elder Adams, and
your policy, as avowed here by the Senator from New Hampshire, does
not " follow up the doctrines of the great revolution of 1800." This
construction of the answer to the New Haven remonstrance makes Mr.
Jefferson consistent with himself. In his letter to Mr. Gerry of the 29th
March, 1801, he says — " officers who have been guilty of gross abuses
of office, such as marshals, packing juries, &c. 1 shall now remove, as my
predecessors ought in justice to have done. The instances will be few,
and guided by STRICT RULE, and not party passion. The right of
opinion shall suffer no invasion from me. Those who have acted well
have nothing to fear, however they may have differed from me in opinion."
In other parts of his correspondence we see the same view taken of his
constitutional power. On the 6th of July, 1802, in a letter to David Hal),

31
then Governor of Delaware, he acknowledges the receipt of communica
tions covering two addresses, the one from a democratic republican
meeting at Dover, and the other from the grand and general juries ofthe
Circuit Court of the United States, both of them praying a removal of
Allen McLane, the father of our present Minister to England, from the
office of Collector ofthe Customs at Wilmington. It appears that Mr.
McLane was objected to by them, on the ground of personal dislike, and
for the alleged warmth of his federal opinions. Mr. Jefferson, in this
letter, replying to those addresses, refuses to remove the incumbent for such
reasons, "lest he should bring a just censure on his administration." He
says, " we are not acting for ourselves alone, but for the whole human
race. We must not, by any departure from principle, dishearten the mass
of our fellow citizens." He then lays down the very principle on which
this power can be constitutionally and properly exercised. " If Colonel
McLane has doiie any act inconsistent with his duty as an officer, or as
an agent of tbis administration, this would be legitimate gruund for in
quiry, into which I should consider myself free to enter." He takes a
distinction between refusing to appoint a political opponent, and removing
him during his term, the last of which he refuses to do: — thus leaving
your thousand removals from the Post Office and other Departments of
the government under the full reprobation ofthe " doctrines of 1801,"
upon which you have attempted to justify them.
Tbe next President whose removals were referred to by the gentleman
from Tennessee, was Mr. Madison, our " constitutional lawyer" under
whose opinions we have already seen there is no shelter to be found for
this administration. Then came Mr. Monroe, who not only disavowed
such policy as is now pursued, but practised political tolerance in its
widest signification. He had a great constitutional lawyer to advise him —
one whose precepts ought to be now adhered to, even as strongly as the
gentleman from Tennessee grasped those of Mr. Madison. That consti
tutional lawyer, air, was Andrew Jackson, whose advice on any question
should not be slightingly passed over by the gentleman from Tennessee,
and especially when we are considering the special force and efficacy of
the second section of this article, in tbe Constitution. ,On the 12th of No
vember, 1816, before Mr. Monroe's election had been officially announced,
he gives this magnanimous view ofthe duties of a Chief Magistrate : " In
every selection, party and party feelings should be avoided. Now is the
time to exterminate that monster, called party spirit. By selecting charac
ters most conspicuous for their probity, virtue, capacity and firmness,
without any regard to party, you will go far to, if not entirely eradicate,
those feelings which on former occasions threw so many obstacles in tbe
way of government, and perhaps have the pleasure and honour of uniting
a people heretofore politically divided. The Chief Magistrate of a great

32
and powerful nation should never indulge in party feeling. His conduct
should be liberal and disinterested, always bearing- in mind that he acts
for the whole, and not a part of the community. By this Course you will
exalt the national character, and acquire for yourself a name as imperish
able as monumental marble. Consult no parly in your choice : pursue
the dictates of that unerring judgment which has so long and so often be
nefitted our country, and rendered conspicuous its rulers. These are the
sentiments of a friend ; they are the feelings, if I know my own heart, of
an undrssembled patriot." It may be said, Sir, that this constitutional
lawyer has since abandoned these views as unsound. But I ask when ?
Why, as late as May, 1824, he maintained the same moral and mental
elevation, confirming the same opinions, and imprinting them more deeply
by the increased authoritative sanction of his own great name. In a letter
to the Hon. George Kremer, of that date, so far from retracting them, he
says, " My advice to the President was, that he should act upon principles
like these : — Consider himself the head ofthe Nation, not of a party ; that
he should have around him tbe best talents the country could Bfford, with
out regard to sectional divisions ; and should, in his selection, seek after
men of probity, virtue, capacity and firmness ; and, in this way, he would
go far to eradicate those feelings which, on former occasions, threw so
many obstacles in the way of government, and be enabled perhaps to
unite a people heretofore politically divided." Those who delight to view
tbe result of the last Presidential election as a verdict rendered by the peo
ple on an issue joined, can besl inform us how far these sentiments and
constitutional opinions should be viewed as having formed a part of that
issue, and how far they were sanctioned by the then expression of pop.
ular approbation.
These opinions and precedents of great constitutional lawyers lead us
to other reflections upon the general expediency of the two doctrines, and
the probable reasoning of those who made our constitution. By the old
articles of confederation, the power of appointment was vested in CoDgress.
Uuder the present Constitution the same power was transferred to the
President and Senate. The House of Representatives, chosen bien
nially, was not entrusted with any portion of this important power. Why
not? Honorable gentlemen have strongly pressed the importance of what
they call the principle of rotation or change in office, to comply with the
popular will. The House of Representatives being entirely subject to the
mutability of popular opinion, would be most apt to change with every
popular breeze, and give effect to that opinion. Did this escape the
intellects of the fathers of the Republic ? Sir, if we are to accredit their
cotemporancous expositions of the Constitution, and the very writings
which procured its ratification, their reason for not investing the Represen
tatives with this power, was to prevent the removal of valuable officers

83
with every popular change, and to give stability to the administration ofthe
government. Moreover, when the gentleman from New Hampshire states
here, that the same political causes which induce the people to change
their Chief Magistrate, should operate upon all the subordinates, agents and
deputies, he forgets that the popular attention never is, and never can be,
while absorbed by the consideration of the merits and demerits of contend
ing candidates for the first office in their gift, sufficiently diverted to decide
upon all the officers in the country. In a State or a small territory where
the people know all their officers, they may act with a view to them.
But hundreds of thousands voted, during the last great political contest, for
men politically opposed to officers whom they had never seen, and of
whom they knew nothing — nay, to their dearest friends whom they neither
wished nor expected should be" removed. You cannot justify your course,
then, by saying it is the popular will, and especially when your President,
with his election in full view, and with a knowledge of the effect ofthe sen
timent on the public, told us that "the Chief Magistrate of a great and power
ful nation should never indulge in party feeling." Under such circumstan
ces, is it not fair to conclude, that if his election must be regarded as any
expression of popular will, in regard to subordinate officers, that will was in
favor of his sentiment, and against the indulgence of party feeling to remove
them. Still I admit that although the great mass of the nation know little
and care less, in the election of a President, about the qualifications of
inferior officers, yet they have in recent practice been too much
guided in their choice by the hopes of Executive patronage, and the love
of office. And it is time to lay before them the true principles of their
Constitution, which teach that for the gratification of personal ambition
or the mere elevation of a party, for private pique or for personal ven
geance, for the free exercise ofthe right of opinion, for hatred or for favor
itism, or for any other cause than to secure a faithful discharge of public
service for the public good, Executive power cannot be legitimately exer
cised; and shall now and forever after be effectually and fearlessly restrain.
ed. The expectants " for dead men's shoes" will then disappear. The
elective franchise will be restored to its pristine purity. Executive pa
tronage will no longer teach us at the polls that " power over a man's sup-
port is power over his will," and the action of our government will, by thus
cleansing the very spring from which it flows, become henceforth refined,
healthful, and,vigorous. But if these principles be now disregarded, despised
and prostrated, our people will be converted into office hunters, the contest
for power will be every where conducted without reference to principle, the
elective franchise will sink under the influence of personal hopes and
personal fears, universal corruption will be substituted for that virtue with
out which a republic cannot exist, and at the expiration of every four years
the tumult will swell, and the venality will fester, until, the depravity of the

34
Whole system of government being no longer tolerable, — disgusted,dejected,
and dispirited by the complete failure of our attempt at self-government,
we shall sink into the arms ofthe first Caasar who shall be willing to strike
a mortal blow at the liberties of his country. Let me not be told, then, that
the mosl sacred of our constitutional privileges is to become the victim of
any slovenly draftsman of a commission or a statute, confounding Executive
power with Executive pleasure. By the paramount law ofthe land, a Pres
•sident can officially know no pleasure but the people's interest, and when
you suffer him to sink the officer in the man, you violate its simplest and
most salutary restrictions.
With this view of the duties of a Chief Magistrate, and of his constitu
tional power, it must occur that as his authority to remove can be exercised
only for cause, there must be some tribunal to inquire into and ascertain
that cause. I regard this right, though denied by the gentleman from Ten
nessee, as a necessary incident of the advisory power of the Senate. We
know well that here is a great dividing line between us in this body. One
party here denies our constitutional right to put such troublesome questions,
or to test any part of the groundwork of our " great and glorious reform."
We want to learn a little ofthe rationale of this operation! We have been
kll along, as you tell us, benighted and in the dark. Give us light, then, we
Say. We consider ourselves bound to advise the Chief Magistrate in his
appointments. We are not restricted to a meie expression of consent tos
or dissent from, his nomination. We may, aye, must go further. If you
ask hie whether I will consent to a choice which you alone can make, I may •
answer, yes. But if you ask me whether I will advise you so to choose, I
Knight point you to a better. The words advice and consent are not
Synonymous — their meaning is essentially different. Consent is the mere
agreement ofthe mind to what is proposed by another. Advice ordinarily
implies the recommendation of some opinion, or the offering of some infor
mation worthy to be weighed and acted upon by another. The gentleman
from Tennessee, expressing an opinion current, as we all know, among his
political friends here, denies the constitutional right of the Senate to exam
ine into and judge of the propriety of removals from office, and declares
that our power is confined to the question of fitness or unfitness of the per
son nominated to succeed. Now, if A be removed from office, and B nom
inated to supply the vacancy, were only our consent asked on the appoint
ment of B, we might possibly, adopting his construction, vote aye ; when, if
We are are asked whether we would advise as well as consent to the appoint
ment, we might answer, "no; we know a thousand better men, though wa
do not think the nominee absolutely unfit. We think the man removed is
a better man." It is said, however, that we must restrict our advice to the
nomination before us, and that, if we go beyond that, it is advice unasked,
I answer that even if I am, as his adviser, to consult the interests of tbe Pre.

35
sideijt alone, I cannot always know whether B will really suit his purposes
until I learn why A has been removed, and thus ascertain what his pur-
poses are. He may be deceived either in the character or qualifications of
his nominee, and we knowing, perhaps, more about them than the President,
if bound to look to his interests alone, ought to advise him of his error. Is
it our object to advise him to appoint such persons as will aggrandize him
self or sustain his party? He may have recommended one ofthe opposite
party to supply the vacancy created by th e removal of his own party man,
With a view to his interest then, as his adviser, we ought, I suppose, to tell
him so. Well, I inform him of it, and he lells me in reply that he knew
that, but has dismissed his old friend because he has lost his influence
Then, if I know it to be a fact that his nominee has lost his influence too, I
should tell him so — should I not ? How then, even according to the views
of those who think the President is to consult his own pleasure, can we be
faithful advisers without asking in our confidential way here, what that
pleasure is, or ferreting out the causes of his removals ? On the other hand,
if I am to advise with an eye single to the public good, which I take to be
•my true standard, I ought not to advise him to appoint B when I know that
A, whom he has removed, and can re-appoint, is a better man for the office.
Is it not then expedient for us — nay, is it not sometimes absolutely neces
sary to the proper discharge of our advisory duties, to learn why our ser
vants have been dismissed? And if so, where is the clause in the Consti
tution which limits us in the exercise of these duties ? If we have, as gentle
men say, no constitutional right to inquire into the causes of these removals,
we have no power to investigate the propriety of appointments to fill the
vacancies; for the first of these principles being conceded, the other will
flow as a consequence from the concession. This makes the President
independent of the Senate in his appointing power, and of course of any
other tribunal established by the Constitution. And the Senator from New
Hampshire has reminded us, in discussing another topic of this debate, that
Mr. Jefferson's "axiom of eternal truth in politics" was, "that whatever power
in any government is independent is absolute also." I apprehend, too, that this
new restrictive construction of our constitutional duties differs entirely from
that adopted by all our predecessors. True, their Executive records show
that the subject has not been moved on every nomination ; yet the right to
exercise the power appears not to have been denied before, and those records
show us that the Senate has often inquired into the propriety of nomina
tions and of removals also. When Robert Purdy memorialized this body
on the 15th of January, 1822, representing, as he did, that his removal from
the army had been improperly . made, and even charging, expressly, that
favoritism, with the President, " had superseded the claims of merit," the
Senate, instead of deciding against their own power, or branding it as
inquisitorial, appointed a committee to investigate the whole subject ; and

36
on the 13th of April afterwards, they, by resolution, called for the report
ofthe board of general officers upon which the ieduction and new arrange
ment of the army bad been predicated. When Mr. Monroe nominated
Gadsden as Adjutant General, and Towson and Fenwick as Colonels, the
Senate looked behind the nominations, and took cognisance of the fact that
other officers were superseded and disbanded as supernumeraries; and
although, as appears by the able reports ofthe committee which inves
tigated the causes and the legality ofthe arrangement, they did ampin jus
tice to the merits of these gallant officers, and admitted them *o be fully
competent for the stations to supply which the President had named them to
the Senate, yet the nominations were not confirmed. Gadsden and Tow"
son were rejected here on the 16th of March, 1822, and the nomination of
Fenwick was then withdrawn. Tbe President afterwards re-nominated
them to the Senate, when the same investigation was again made ; the
committee called on the War Department for more full information; the
President assigned all his reasons in an elaborate message to the Senate;
the committee reported against those reasons, with a full argument to refute
them, and the Senate a second time rejected all these appointments, on the
ground that other persons were entitled to them. Here was no cry of
inquisitorial power, nor did the Senate consider, as the gentleman from
Tennessee now does, that their power was confined to the question of fit
ness or unfitness of the nominees. On the 10th of April, 1822, the Senate,
by resolution, instructed the Secretary ofthe Navy, among other things, ta
communicate to them, in Executive session, " in what situations and for
what reasons acting appointments of officers are made in the Navy Depart
ment." It will not be pretended that the mere fact, that the call was not
directly on the Chief Magistrate, impairs the force of the precedent, as a
demand ofthe causes of Executive action. Cases in which the Senate has
inquired into the causes of appointments have often occurred. On the 4th
of January, 1826, the Senate, by resolution, called "for any information
tending to show the propriety of sending Ministers to Panama ;" and it does
not appear by the Journal that the majority, so much reproached for thei
defence of the then administration, made any objection to the resolution,
but it does appear that the resolution was on that day offered by Mr.
Macon, and was immediately adopted. In the case of William B. Irish,
who was nominated by Mr. Monroe as Marshal of the Western District of
Pennsylvania, the Senate called, by resolution, on " the President of the
United States,lo cause to be laid before them all such letters and petitions, or
other papers, as were presented to him relative to the appointment, as well
those which opposed his appointment, as those which requested it," and
the President complied with the call, without complaining against the
Senate for having exercised power unconstitutionally or improperly. The
first President of the United States, who was also the President of the Con ven>

37
tion that made the Constitution, considered the Senate as entitled to the
utmost latitude of inquiry. When they rejected his nomination of Benja
min Fishbourne, for the place of Naval Officer of the Port of Savannah,
Washington, in his message nominating Lachlan Mcintosh for the place,
says — " Permit me to submit to your consideration, whether on occasions
where the propriety of nominations may appear questionable to you, it
would not be expedient to communicate that circumstance to me, and there
by avail yourselves of the information which led me to make them, and
which 1 would with pleasure lay before you." A committee was then
appointed to wait on the President, and confer with him on the mode of
communication proper to be observed between him and the Senate, in the
formation of treaties and making appointments to offices. This committee,
by their chairman, Mr. Izzard, on the 21st of August after, reported the
very rule of the Senate now to be found in our manual as No. 36,
which, with the very view to give time for these inquiries, provides that
when nominations shall be made, a future day shall be assigned, unless the
Senate unanimously direct otherwise, for taking them into consideration —
prescribes the form of arrangement, when the President shall meet the
Senate to give or to receive information, and even directs their own atten
dance at any other place where he may convene them for such purposes.
With this history of that rule, which has been carefully preserved by all our
predecessors, but appears now to be forgotten, who can doubt that, in their
opinion, the utmost latitude of inquiry was to be allowed to the Senate on
all Presidential nominations? We have high authority in favor of our
constitutional right to inquire, in the report of the committee on Execu
tive patronage made in this body on the 4th of May, 1826 — a committee
which then thought, as they informed the world, that they were " acting
in the spirit ofthe Constitution in laboring to multiply the guards, and to
strengthen the barriers, against the possible abuse of power." The second
section of the second bill reported by that committee provides, " That, in
all nominations made by the President to the Senate, to fill vacancies
occasioned by an exercise of tbe President's power lo remove from office,
the fact of the removal shall be stated to the Senate, at the same time that
the nomination is made, with a statement ofthe reasons for which such
officer may have been removed." Now, Sir, would lhat committee* have re
ported an unconstitutional provision for the adoption ofthe Senate? The pro
position in it was to exercise the right of inquiry in every case, and thus by one
sweeping clause to supersede the necessity of any future resolutions for that
purpose in particular cases. Why now consider the doctrine unconstitutional
which was. thus supported? So highly were the principles of this
-
* The names of those who composed the Committee nn Executive patronage, are
Messrs. Benton, (chairman,) Macon, Van Buren, White, Findlay, Dickersoo, Holmes,
Hayne, and Johnson of Kentucky.

38
report then approved, that six thousand copies were ordered to be printed,
and the arguments contained in it were then declared to be unanswerable.*
These inquiries were all right then,ana the thought that it was wrong "to estab
lish a courtof inquiry" did not occur to the Committee. So, too, the House
of Representatives, in the exercise of its legislative powers, has scrutinized
the motives of the Heads of Executive Departments. That House de
manded, by resolution, on the 8th of May, 1822, from the Secretary of the
Treasury, " a particular and minute account of each transfer ofthe public
money from one Bank to another, which had been made after the first of
January, 1817, and the reasons and motives for making the same;" and
in March, 1822, they obtained the information demanded, in a report.
By us the right to look into the causes of executive action is noi claimed
as an incident ofthe mere legislative power ofthe Senate, but of its execu
tive authority, and therefore stands on much stronger grounds.
In 1821, the Senate thinking a charge d'affaires not a proper representa
tive of this government at Rio Janeiro, interfered to recom nend the ap
pointment of a Minister. Their opinion on that subject had not been re
quested, when, by their resolution of the 3d of March of that year, they
advised the President to appoint such a minister. The act was voluntary
and gratuitous. They did not then regard it as an objection that their
advice was unasked, nor consider themselves confined to the fitness or
unfitness of the charge d'affaires. They did not feel bound to remain si
lent, like the slaves around the throne of a despot, and answer only when
spoken to. And it appears to me that on subjects connected with either
treaties or appointments, before the election of the present Chief Magis
trate, they have considered themselves, in the spirit ofthe Constitution, and
under the solemn obligation to advise the President which it imposed up
on them, equally bound to warn him of approaching danger to the country,
and to consult with him on the means of averting it; equally bound to give
him information which could tend to increase the welfare and prosperity of
that country, and to discuss with him the means of securing and promoting
it, whether he had or had not first asked their advice. Would you, Sir,
regard him as a faithful adviser, and a true friend, who should never warn
you of danger, or give you information until you asked him to do so? And
if not, are we acting in the spirit of the Constitution when we restrict our
advice to the President to the mere fitness or unfitness of his nominee ?
The treaty making, as well as the appointing power, is vested in the Pre
sident and Senate. The advice and conront of this body is an indispen
sable prerequisite to the ratification of all treaties, and is an essential com
ponent part ofthe power to make them. It necessarily looks as* well te the
annulled as to the annulling stipulations with other nations; has always
* By Mr. Randolph.

39
rejected new treaties, when preferring old ones ; and though indulging the
Utmost latitude of inquiry into all the reasons, and all the facts connected
with both, it has never yet been met with objections to the most ample ex
ercise of these powers.
It is well understood, Sir, that within the year of which this day com
pletes the circle, a great revolution has been effected, in the public offices,
by the discharge ofthe former incumbents, and that the representatives of
many of the States are anxious to spread upon the records here, for the
benefit of posterity, as well as of the present age, the latent cause of this great
Executive reform. We have another motive to make the effort to effect
this. We desire that thesimple facts should appear, in justice to all those who
have been dismissed from the public service without charge or accusation
against them. We consider this necessary as an act of justice, not only to
the sufferers, but to their families, their friends and their posterity. We seek
to distinguish the innocent from the guilty, to exhibit to public view, among
the searching operations of this government, how many have been removed
on the representations of secret foes, or vindictive political opponents ;
how many have been dismissed on suspicion, and how many without sus
picion ; and how many have been condemned without having been suffered
to learn the nature of the accusations against them. If rumours, founded
in many Cases on the statements ofthe victims of the prescriptive system, be
true, many have been burled from stations, which they have filled with'
honour to themselves, and with advantage to the public, without the as
signment of any reason for the act ; and in many instances, it is said, the
files of departments here have been filled with foul calumnies, by aspirants-
to office, and their secret agents, without giving the accused even the for
mality of a trial. If this be so, here is a real inquisition, to rack and tor-
lure, not the bodies indeed, but the characters of. men. Is it more than an
act of justice, to the victims, that the truth should appear ? The accusa
tions against them, though strictly ex parte, are yet the avowed foundation o.
official acts of departments here, and are matters of record on file, in those
departments, which may be resorted to, by all future generations, to black;
en the memory of these men, and to disgrace their families, when they
shall be laid in their graves. In a government of laws properly adminis
tered,the discharge of a public servant, without any assigned reason for
the act, must ordinarily cast some imputation upon his character. No mat
ter how innocent he may be — no matter whether any charge has or has
not been preferred against him, yet the existence of such charges will be
presumed. Under such circumstances, the breath of calumny is sure to
stain his reputation, even though acquired by a long life of faithful public
service, and exemplary private conduct. The hireling libeller, the prosti
tuted wretch, who may have gained the very office from which he has been
removed, will sound the tocsin of slander, and if the press has been gen-

40
erally subsidized by the government, surmises of official delinquency will
be carefully propagated, as " proved on file," until the victim loses char
acter, as well as office, by the action of Executive vengeance. To what
tribunal then should he appeal for justice ? I answer, to the Senate of his
country, a party to the contract by which he was employed, and which, by
fairly showing the causes of his dismissal, may repel the imputations rest
ing on his reputation, and " set history right V thus forming a barrier
against the influence of a spirit of malevolence, which in these latter days, as
we have seen, can pursue a man to his grave for vengeance od his pos
terity. No good or honorable man will dismiss a faithful servant from his
private employment, without furnishing him at his request with a certificate
of his fidelity. The same justice, which we dispense in private life,
should be yielded to a faithful public servant, when dismissed from public
employment; and unless as public men we intend to abandon those princi
ples which govern us in our social and domestic relations, we are
in my humble judgment, bound to entertain these inquiries. They
can do no injustice to the Executive. If its power has not been wantonly
abused, the conduct of the government will be presented to the people in
an unexceptionable point of view. But, on the other hand, if the President's
authority has been perverted entirely to party and personal purposes, are
we not bound to correct Ihe evil, and should we refuse to present him to
this nation in his proper character, at the expense of the reputation of all
our fellow citizens, who have been trampled under foot by the arbitrary and
despotic exercise of power ? Will it not be said that, by shrinking from
the investigation, we have distrusted his integrity, and have shown a
belief that his security was in concealment? If all has been rightly done,
do we not treat him ungenerously by refusing him an opportunity of pre
senting the evidence for his acquittal at the bar of public opinion — aye,
Sir, at the bar of public opinion ; for at that bar he must stand and await
his sentence; and his direst foe could not wish him a more certain condemna
tion than inevitably awaits him unless he is heard in his defence.
If I am right in my views of the constitutional powers of the President
and Senate thus far presented, the former can never properly remove an
officer before the expiration of his term, but for cause connected only with
the public interest ; while the latter can investigate that cause, and ascertain
by the facts how far the Constitution has been complied with ; and, if this
authority has been abused, or extended beyond its constitutional
limits, the House may impeach the author of such abuses before the Senate,
and the Senate may remove him and all his minions. An impeachment,
however, requiring a majority of the House to prefer it, and two-thirds of
the Senate to sustain it, can rarely, perhaps never, prevail against the exer
cise of Executive patronage directly on Congress and the influence of
party spirit. Then suppose that a President, regardless of his duty, and of

41
the consequences either of exposure or impeachment, should remove all our
public servants who would not assent to his usurpation ofthe sovereignty
ofthe people, and fill their places with favorites and parasites who should
seek to robe him with the imperial purple ? We have been told that
such a case may occur — that Aaron Burr was once on the verge of this
high office, and it has been said that he would have filled every office in
this way. I do not say so myself, nor do I pretend to decide upon that.
But the question now arises — what checks have the people upon a usurper
who should do these things for his own advancement, immediately after
his accession to the Presidency ? It is certain that, until the expirati n of
his four years' term, a period long enough for the achievement of a revo
lution, the people have no check upon him except through the instrumen
tality ofthe Senate ; and in such a case the question what control has the
Senate upon this poioer becomes one of intense interest to the American
people. We have seen that, by the terms of the Constitution, the President is
authorized to fill up all vacancies happening in the recess of the Senate,
by graining commissions which shall expire at the end of their next Ses
sion. When a vacancy is created by a removal, the question arises, can
the officer removed be reinstated by the direct action of the Senate ?
There are many who maintain the affirmative of this question. Some
for whose judgments I feel great deference, and with, whom [ usually act
here, have so expressed themselves ; and there are certainly strong opinions
to support them. That of Alexander Hamilton, expressed in the 77th
number of the Federalist, is urged with much force as being in accordance
with this construction. After enumerating there, as one ofthe advantages
to be expected from the co-operation of the Senate in the business of ap
pointments, that it would contribute to the stability ofthe administration,
he adds, " the consent of that body will be necessary to displace as well
as to appoint." It is insisted that, the displacing here referred to, is indi
cated by the context to be, not a temporary removal by a temporary
appointment, amounting only to an " attempt to change," but that the
power denied by him to exist in the President alone, was such a displacing
power as could defy the "discountenance ofthe Senate" — and that, there
fore, this great statesman pressed it upon his countrymen as one of the
highest recommendations of the Constitution, that " a change of the Chief
Magistrate would not occasion so violent or so general a revolution in the
officers of government as might be expected, if he were the sole disposer
of offices. Where a man in any station has given satisfactory evidence
of his fitness for it, a new President would be restrained from attempting
a change in favor of a person more agreeable to him, by the apprehension
that the discountenance of the Senate might frustrate the attempt. Those
who can best estimate the value of a steady administration, will be most
disposed to prize a provision which connects^the official existence of public
6

, 42
men with the approbation or disapprobation of that body, which, from the
greater permanency of its own composition, will, in all probability, be less
subject to inconstancy than any other member of the government." The
weight of Hamilton's opinion is here set in full array against the advocates
of constructive power ; and it is true that his exposition of the Constitution
was cotemporaneous with its ratification; that it was then given to, and
pressed upon, our countrymeD, for the purpose of effecting that ratification;
that it was viewed at the time as obviating all objections to the extent of
Executive influence ; and that, perhaps, the only censure which has ever
been cast upon his political writings, charges that he was too much dis
posed not to curtail, but to extend and increase the powers ofthe Federal
Government. Yet, his doctrine, at least to the extent contended for, was
not recognised by the House of Representatives in 17S9 ; and if the deci
sions of that day, which have been referred to, are to be regarded as obli
gatory upon us, the Senate has no direct action upon the removals of the
President. The question recurs then, by what constitutional mode can it
maintain any check upon these abuses of Executive power?
I take the true difference, between the present advocates of thai power
and myself, to consist in this : — they consider the Senate as standing in
the relation of a quasi privy council to the President, who may or may
not abide by their advice, as to him shall seem most expedient. They
deny the doctrine of Hamilton, that " the Constitution connects the offi
cial existence of public men with the approbation or disapprobation of the
Senate." They deny the whole and every part of it, They deny it in
every view which can be taken of it. I consider the Senate as possessing
certain Executive powers, to be exercised in co-operation with the Presi
dent when they approve of the Administration of his coordinate powers,
or in opposition to, and as a salutary check upon him when he has abused
such powers ; and that, as officers of a certain grade cannot be appointed
without their advice and consent, so if those officers be removed to reward
partisans,or for any other unjustifiable purpose, the Senate can reject nomina
tions to supply the vacancies thus occasioned, and thus either compel the
President to reinstate those removed, or leave vacancies ivhich he cannot
supply after the expiration of their session. If this view be sound, the
Senate, by its legitimate, though indirect action upon every removal, has a
check upon the abuse of power, which, if exercised when the public inter
est really demands it, will destioy the motives for that abuse, and may
hereafter save the Republic in her hour of greatest peril. The objects to
be attained by an ambitious and designing President, through the instru
mentality of these removals, will be to displace the real friends of the peo
ple, and to fill up the vacancies with liis own creatures, subservient to his
will, and independent of all other control ; and if the Senate have the vir
tue to reject his propositions to effect these ends, he may he compelled to
retract his removals, or to leave the places vacant. This right of rejecting

43
appointments, with the express -design of acting upon the removals, should
be exercised whenever the removing power has been abused— because
every such abuse is an act of tyranny, and the first approaches of usur
pation, or oppressive and arbitrary power, should be repulsed by those
who ought to stand as the most vigilant and intrepid among the sentinels
of liberty. Ordinarily, he who accepts an appointment to fill a vacancy
occasioned by such an abuse of power, is cognisant of the facts, and con
senting to the abuse. Moreover, this check should be interposed whenever1
the public interest demands the restoration of a meritorious officer, whether
removed through inadvertent error or intentional injustice. The Senate
thought it important to exercise this right in the cases of the military nom
inations in 1822; but the privilege becomes inestimably valuable when
ever the removing power of a President is exerted for the purposes of per
sonal ambition, and in utter contempt of the public interest. It is infi
nitely better to go without an officer than to submit to " an act of tyranny"
in any shape. We have no right to originate bills for raising revenue—
we cannot nominate or propose in the first instance the sums to be levied
on the people ; but when the other House sends here such bills, we can
amend or reject them. Now, whenever we believe that the sum to be
raised is destined for any purpose which is tyrannical or oppressive, or not
really necessary for the public interest, we are bound to negative the whole
bill, if we are not allowed to amend it to suit that interest. We should,
doubtless, refuse any appropriation of public money if we believed it des
tined to advance the interests of an usurper, although satisfied at the same
time that a real evil might grow out of the want of funds to disburse the
ordinary expenses of government. In these and all similar cases the ques
tion must be weighed and decided, whether the object to be achieved is
worthy of the sacrifice it may occasion ; and so long as the spirit of our
ancestors dwells within these walls, we shall rarely think any sacrifice too
great, if made in a successful resistance to the oppressive exercise of arbi
trary power.
But there are some here who maintain that we have no such check on
the Executive, and that the President is authorized to fill all vacancies exist
ing in the recess of the Senate ; so that when we have rejected such ap
pointments as have been proposed to us, and, having been informed by the
President that our services are no longer necessary here ; shall have ad
journed without day, he may fill the vacancies then existing. If this bs
true, he can fill such vacancies as well with one person as another, and of
course can, and will generally, re-appoint the very man whom we have re
jected ; or, he may entirely dispense with future nominations to the San-
ate, granting, on the day after each session, commissions which shall ex
pire with the next, and thus take away from this co-ordinate branch of
power even the miserable subordinate privilege of the old French Parlia
ment whose only glory was to register the mandates of the sovereign.

H
The commentator on Justinian, who has been alluded to, as a jurist, :n
terms of high commendation, in the range of this debate, (Mr. Coopeb,)
after animadverting upon the removing power as formerly exercised by
the Governor of Pennsylvania, says, the analogy between the lights ofthe
Governor and those of the President, in this respect, will not hold, " con
sidering that under the constitution of the United States the exercise of Ihe
right of removal is subject to the formidable check ofthe Senate's concur
rence in the succesor of the President — a difference so important as to
destroy the force of all reas-ning from the one to the other. A power in
every instance controlled in its exercise by the Senate, cannot be compared
witha power in every instance uncontrolled, and exercised as the caprice of
the Governor for the time being, heated by recent opposition, and goaded
by revenge, may dictate." The distinction lies here, — every vacancy ex
isting in the recess is not a vacancy happening within the true construction
of the second article. The appointments to supply such vacancies must
be made " by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of the
next session" — not after the expiration of that session. The com
missions granted during the last recess expire, eo instanti, with the de
termination of the present session ; and if the offices are not filled by the
concurrence ofthe Senate, vacancies will exist at the moment we adjourn,
not in the recess — for that moment can with nomore propriety be said to be
recess, than session — and those vacancies will not exist by reason ofany casu
alty or happening not provided for, but by the expressed will of a co-ordinate
branch of the appointing power. It has never been pretended that the
President alone could fill, by nne of these temporary appointments, a va
cancy happening during the session. In the celebrated report ofthe com
mittee on military affairs, made here on the 25th of April, 1822, which, as
I have already stated, met with the sanction of the Senate in the rejection
of the military appointments, it is urged that " the word happen relates to
some casualty not provided for by law. If the Senate be in session when
offices are created by law which were not before filled, and nominations be
not made to them by the President, he cannot appoint after the adjourn
ment of the Senate, unless specially authorized by law, such vacancy not
happening during the recess." The same construction was evidently adopt
ed by Congress, and by the President himself, when, in the act of the 22d
of July, 1813, they .thought it necessary to insert an express provision in
the second section, to confer upon the President the power to appoint
collectors of direct taxes and internal duties during the recess, if not be
fore made by and with the consent of the Senate. Every vacancy existing
in the recess, is not therefore a vacancy ,! happening in the recess." In
the third section of the first article of the Constitution, touching the
appointment of Senators, it is provided that, " if vacancies happen by
resignation or otherwise, during the recess of- the Legislature ofany State,
the Executive thereof may make temporary appointments, until the next

45
meeting or the Legislature, which shall then fill such vacancies." These
temporary appointments by the State Executive are analogous to tempo
rary appointments by the National Executive. How, then, has this clause
in the Constitution been construed ? The first case which occurred, to
test its construction, was decided on the 28th of March, 1794, on art
appointment by the Executive of Delaware, which appears to have un
dergone a full investigation. The report of the committee appointed to
examine it, sets forth, that a Senator from that State resigned his seat upon
the 18th day of September, 1793, and during the recess ofthe Legislature;
that the Legislature met in January, and adjourned in February, 1794 ;
that upon the 19th day of March, and subsequently to the adjournment of
the Legislature, another was appointed by the Governor lo fill the vacancy
occasioned by the resignation. With these facts, a resolution was reported
by the committee, and adopted by a vote of twenty to seven, that the
appointee was not entitled to a seat here, "because a session ofthe Legis
lature of the said State had intervened between the resignation and
the appointment;" and among those who sustained this resolution, we find
the uames of Langdon, King, Ellsworth, Martin, and Butler, who had
been members of the Convention. Such was the determination on this
question, going ihe whole length of the principle we seek to establish.
In the case of Mr. Lauman, a Senator from Connecticut, the Senate, on
the 7'h of March, 1825, went still further. His term expired on the
3d of March, 1825 ; after which, he produced here a certificate of
appointment by Oliver Wolcot, then Governor ofthe State, dated the 8th
of February, 1825— and although the Legislature of the State was not in
session at the time, and did not sit until May, yet the Senate decided that
there was not in this case a vacancy happening by any casualty not pro
vided for, and therefore Mr. Lanman was not entitled to a seat. We
find among the distinguished names then recorded in favour of this con
struction, those of Messrs. Benton, Berrien, Dickerson, Eaton, Gaillard,
Hayne, JACKSON (now President,) King, Loyd of Maryland, Macon,
Tazewell, and Van Buren. It is not for me to pronounce upon the cor
rectness of a decision thus established ; but if it was right, it not only
covers, but goes beyond my position. It is true that in some similar cases
Senators have been permitted to sit here ; but they all passed without con
sideration, except that of Mr. Tracy, who was held entitled to a seat, by a
party vote, in a period of high excitement— all those who were called
federalists voting for, and all those who were called democrats, against
him. Tempora mutantur. However we may be branded as the feder
alists of this day, our doctrine appears to have been the Republican doc
trine of that period. The constitutions of each of the States, in the
cases referred to, provided that their governors should see that their
laws were faithfully executed; and their laws directed those governors
" to fill up all vacancies happening in the recess" of their respective

46
legislatures by temporary appointments; so that there exists no ground
upon which to build up a construction in favor of the power of the
Federal Executive, which does not equally sustain that of the State
Executive in each of these instances. Without further discussion
of the piinciples connected with this subject, we might regard it
as never to be shaken while the Constitution lasts, that the President
alone can not fill any vacancy occasioned by the refusal of the
Senate to concur in his nominations ; and that if he, having had a fair
opportunity to consult his constitutional advisers, should refuse or neglect
to do so in any case where their consent to the appointment is required,
he has no power to supply the vacancy exisiing at the expiration of their
session. Before I close my remarks upon the constitutional rights of the Presi
dent and Senate, suffer me to say, Sir, that there cannot be, in a free go
vernment, a more dangerous principle than that of implied executive
power. To control it, we cannot keep too steadily in view, that delega
ted authority of this character, should always be either strictly construed,
or strictly defined, and that by the terms of the Constitution power,
not expressly ceded, is reserved to the people or the Slates. I shall be
gratified to see some farther evidences than any yet developed, to make
good the remark of the gentleman from Tennessee, when he expressed
his pleasure at beholding the administration majority of the American
Senate " contending against all those doctrines which are calculated to
increase the authority of men in office." We have also been informed,
that we live in an age when STATE RIGHTS are the great objects of
regard — when a predominating party has taken them into its especial keep
ing — when the President himself is their grand protector — when our hearts
shall be gladdened, and our eyes blessed with the glorious vision of a party
in power no longer warping the Constitution from its legitimate con
struction to increase the strength ofthe Federal head, but paring down all
forced implications of authority, and restoring to their piistine purity and
vigour the sovereign and independent powers of the twenty four States.
Such, we are told, Sir, is the primary object of modern reform. But the
example of this administration is a sad commentary on so fine a text ; and
the principles advanced in this debate to sustain it, sap the whole foan-
dation of these lofty pretensions. Reverencing, as I sincerely do, the con
stitutional rights of the States, 1 view the avowed principles of the
Executive as subversive of the most important powers of that very
body where alone the States, as such, are represented. Rob the Senate of
these, and of what avail is their mere Legislative authority, when the very
laws themselves are to be passed upon by judges, and executed by officers,
in whose appointment they have substantially no concern ? An English
King boasted that while he could appoint the Bishops and Judges, he
could have what religion and laws he pleased j ajid it was the opinion of

47
Roger Sherman, in adverting to that remark, that if the President was
vested with the power of appointing lo and removing from office at his
pleasure, like the English monarch, he could render himself despotic J
A blow at the rights of the States, is a blow at ihe liberties of the people ;
and whenever the period shall arrive for destroying the latter, the first aim
will be to prostrate the powers of the former, in the Senate. Those who
framed the Constitution foresaw this, and, so far as human wisdom could
guard against the evil, they provided for it, by ordaining that no State shall
ever be deprived of her equal suffrage, in this body, by any change of
Constitution. Hie mums aheneus esto ! Here lies the bulwark against
consolidation of the government — the barrier for the protection of the
States against the encroachments of Executive power ; and the American
who shall succeed in breaking down this defence, will bury in its luins the
liberties, with the Constitution of his country. The effort to destroy it, in
order to be successful, will never be made in open and avowed hostility,
but the first approaches of the enemy will be gradual, crafty, and disguis
ed. Many a Sempronius will thunder " war to the knife's blade" against
the foe whom he secretly encourages, until, by successive restrictions upon
the rights of the Senate, the salutary powers of the States are stolen
imperceptibly away, and most probably under this very pretence of en
abling the Executive to see that the laws are faithfully executed.
Let us now, Sir, briefly, in conclusion, while we commemorate the day
which inducted our Clii^f Magistrate to office, review bis administration
of the past year, apply to it the test of these principles, and calmly inquire
whether any constitutional interposition ofthe Senate be requisite to check
the abuses of power. This anniversary recalls the pledges of the inaug
ural address, to keep steadily in view the limitations as well as the extent
of the Executive authority, to respect and preserve the rights of the
sovereign members of our Union, to manage by certain searching opera
tions tbe public revenue, to observe a strict and faithful economy, to
counteract that tendency to private and public profligacy which a profuse
expenditure of money by the government is but too apt to engender, to
depend for the advancement of the public service more on the integrity
and zeal of the public officers than on their numbers, and particularly to
correct those abuses which, it was then charged, had brought the patronage
of the Federal government into conflict with the freedom of elections,
and counteract those causes which had placed or continued power in
unfaithful or incompetent hands. The lateness of the hour warns me
that I ought not to trespass on your attention, by inquiring how far all
these pledges have been redeemed ; and the examination of all the topics
presented by such a general inquiry might lead me beyond the "exiguo fine"
within which I am admonished that an American Senator should confine
himself, when speaking of an American President. But it is true, and ought
to be observed on this day. that our public officers are increased in num-

48
ber, and not diminished in salary; that the promised retrenchment has ter
minated in a recommendation to establish additional bureaus, with more
public agents, and increased demands on the Treasury, to swell to an
almost boundless extent the influence of the Executive by a general ex
tension of the law which limits appointments to four years, and by the es
tablishment of a government bank ; and that a general system of pro
scription for a manly exercise of the right of opinion, under the pretence
of rotation in office, has brought the patronage of the Executive into full
conflict with the freedom of elections. Turning fioni the jnvp.stiga tion of
minor subjects which might by possibility be considered as mere topics for
partisan effect, and with a nobler purpose than to subserve the petty in
terests of any sect, or any party, our attention is forcibly arrested by
some instances in which these pledges have heen so violated, that their
tendency, if not immediately, at least consequentially, and by the force of
example, is subversive of the dearest interests of our people, and of the
most sacred institutions of our republic.
When we look to the manner in which the pledge to observe a strict and
faithful economy has been redeemed, we find ihe expenses of government
increase, through the instrumentality of these rewards and punishments for
political opinion. Outfits, salaries, and all the incidental expenses attend
ing the recall of nearly the whole of our diplomatic corps, and the ap
pointment of others to supply their places, have caused large drafis upon
the Treasury, and laid the foundation for increasing demands upon it.
But without dwelling to estimate how many tens, or hundreds of thou
sands of dollars have been expended in punishing opponents, or inquir
ing how profusely the public bounty has been lavished upon favourites,
we have something moie important to consider. We know that if funds
for such purposes have been taken from the strong box without appro
priations, the President must have dipped his hands into the nation's
treasure in opposition to the Constitution, which it is our duly to support.
Money cannot be drawn from the Treasury except in consequence of
appropriations made by law, and the radical act ofthe first of May,
1820, after limiting the powers of the President, in relation to transfers
of appropriations in the Army and Navy, provides, in the fifth section,
" that no transfers of appropriation from or to other branches of expendi
ture shall thereafter be made." May we not inquire now, from what
fund the money has been drawn to defray the greatly increased expenses
of our foreign missions ? These expenses were not provided for during
the last session of CoDgress by any law, for they were not foreseen or
anticipated. If then the diplomatic fund was insufficient for these pur
poses, either the nation has been brought in debt to accomplish them, or
the Constitution and the law have been violated by unauthorized drafts on
the Treasury. It is certain that we are uow called upon to appropriate
Jargely, either to pay a debt incurred, or to supply a deficiency in some

49
other fund not appropriated for these expenses. If the Executive Can
recall our foreign agents for party purposes, or to promote friends, even
where no Legislative appropriation has been made for these objects, Con
gress has virtually no control over our foreign intercourse, and we may here
after expect that our ministers abroad will be withdrawn on the accession
of every new incumbent of the Presidency ; that new men will be sent to
supply their places, and that the whole relations of the country with
foreign powers will be changed, or thrown into confusion, at the end of
every four years. Admit the power of the Executive, without appropria
tion, to recall and to appoint Ministers, and by the operation to bring the
nation in debt, for the public good, — yet show us how the public good re
quired this increased expense. Take a case for example, and let some
ingenious advocate of the administration assign a reason why our late
Minister near the Court of St. James' was recalled, Mr. Barbour had ac
quitted himself faithfully in every public trust which had ever before been
confided to him, and was at the time of his recall discharging with honour
to himself and his country the high duties of his mission. In what respect
was he thought to be either incompetent or unfaithful ? Was any new
policy to be adopted in our relations with England which he would not es
pouse ? Take another case, and inform us why the gallant Harrison, the
hero of Fort Meigs, the' victor at Tippecanoe, and the Thames; a vete
ran in council, as well as in the field, distinguished for his virtues in all
the relations of the citizen, the soldier, and the statesman — why, I ask, was
he proscribed as unfit to represent his country abroad, and withdrawn from
Colombia, to make room for Thomas P. Moore ? He had scarcely ar
rived at Bogota — the ink was still fresh on the Executive record which in
formed the President that it was the advice of the Senate that he should
represent us there, when the order for his removal was announced. This
could not have been done for any official misconduct. There had been no
time to inquire into that. Was his fidelity distrusted then ? Or how did
the public good require his dismissal ? Think you it will tell well in the
annals of history, that he who had so often periled life and limb, in the
vigour of manhood, to secure the blessings of liberty to others, was punish
ed for the exercise of the elective franchise in his old age ? Sir, it was an
act, disguise it as we may, which, by holding out the idea that he had lost
the confidence of his country, might tend to bring down bis gray hairs with
sorrow to the grave. But the glory he acquired by the campaign on the
Wabash, and by those hard earned victpries for which he received the
warmest acknowledgments of merit from the Legislature of Kentucky,
and the full measure of a nation's thanks in the resolutions of Congress,
can never be effaced ; and any effort to degrade their honoured object will
recoil on those who make it, until other men in better days shall properly
estimate his worth, and again cheer his declining years with proofs of hi.
country's confidence and gratitude. If then these acts, and others of a

50
similar, character, be hostile to the spirit of the Constitution, can we regard
the expenditure of public money they have occasioned as a proper redemp
tion of those pledges which on this day last year so much delighted us,
" to observe a strict and faithful economy, and to keep steadily in view the
limitations as well as the extent of the Executive power ?
The pledge to preserve the rights of the sovereign members of our Union, -
as well as the defence of the administration made by the gentleman from
Tennessee, lead us to the reflection that more members of Congress who
were friendly to the election of the present Chief Magistrate, have been
appointed to office by him, within the compass of a single year, than have
been appointed by any other President during the whole course of
an administration of eight years. The consequences of this were fore
seen and deprecated by the founders of our government ; but the provision
which they inserted in the Constitution to prevent them has proved inade
quate to its object. Such was the opinion of a favorite constitutional law
yer, who, in an address to the Tennessee Legislature on the 7th of October,
1825, explained this subject so fully that I shall be pardoned for pro
ducing a large extract from that valuable state paper — especially after the
gentleman from Tennessee has adverted to it, and made an argument upon
it. " With a view," says he, " to sustain more effectually in practice the
axiom which divides the three great classes of power into independent con
stitutional checks, I would impose a provision, rendering any member of
Congress ineligible to office under the general government during the term
for which he was elected, and two years thereafter, except in cases of judi
cial office. The effect of such a constitutional provision is obvious. By it
Congress, in a considerable degree, would be free from that connection with
the Executive Department, which at present gives strong ground of ap
prehension and jealousy on the part of the people. Members, instead of
being liable to be withdrawn from legislating on the great interests of the
nation, through prospects of Executive patronage, would be more liberally
confided in by their constituents ; while their vigilance would be less inter
rupted by party feelings and party excitements. Calculations from intrigue
or management would fail; nor would their deliberations or their investiga
tion of subjects consume so much time. The morals of the country would
be improved, and virtue, uniting with the labors of the representatives, and
with the official ministers of the law, would tend to perpetuate the honor and
glory of the government.
- " But, if this change in the Constitution should not be obtained, and im
portant appointments continue to devolve on the representatives in Con
gress, it requires no depth of thought to perceive that corruption will be
come the order of the day ; and that, under the garb of conscientious sacri
fices to establish precedents for the public good, evils of serious importance
to the freedom and prosperity ofthe republic may arise. It is through this
channel that the people may expect to be attacked in their constitutional

si
sovereignty, and where tyranny may well be apprehended to spring up, m
some favorable emergency. Against such inroads every guard ought to be
interposed, and none better occurs than that of closing the suspected
avenue with some necessary constitutional restriction."
It is interesting to examine how far this administration has actually prac
tised on these maxims. Why, within the very first year six members ofthe .
Senate,* being one eighth of the whole body as it was composed during the
twentieth Congress, have been appointed to some of the most important
offices within the gift of the Executive. And yet the message of this
session reiterates the principles of the Tennessee letter, with a slight re
servation by way of covering the case as it now exists. By that letter
judges alone might be selected from the members of Congress. By the late
message we are informed that " the necessity of securing in the Cabinet,
and in diplomatic stations of the highest rank, the best talents and political
experience, should perhaps (even here we have a quere) except these from
the exclusion." If it be " perhaps" necessary to change the Constitution
to save us from doing wrong, why not do right without the change ? The
new reservation is a flat departure from the maxims of 1825, and still even
that does not cover the acts of the Executive, for we have not only diplo
matists and cabinet ministers (important officers !) chosen from the mem
bers of Congress " within the term for which they were elected, and two
years thereafter," but important appointments of a very different character,
even in the Post Office and the customs, continue to devolve on them, con
vincing those who have become proselytes to the Tennessee doctrine, with
out any great depth of thought, that corruption may become the order of
the day, and that, under the garb of conscientious sacrifices for the public
good, evils of serious importance to the freedom and prosperity of the re
public may arise. But the gentleman from Tennessee, who called our
attention to the letter, and without whose notice of it I should hardly have
adverted to it, says —
[Here Mr. Grundy explained. He stated that he had alluded to
the letter in reply to the Senator from Indiana (General Noble.]
Mr. Clayton continued. Sir, the honorable gentleman's reply was, that
the people ought to have changed the Constitution, but that, without some
constitutional restraint, the President was under no obligation to practise
what he formerly preached. However valid that defence may appear, it is
not the opinion of my constitutional lawyer, for in that same letter he says,
"It is due to myself to practise upon the maxims recommended toothers."
These, and similar pledges, obtained for him thousands of votes during the
canvass of 1828, and ought to have been redeemed.
" When the blood burns, how prodigal the soul
" Lends the tongue vows."
* Mr Van Buren, Secretary of Slate ; Mr. Branch, Secretary ofthe Navy ; Mr. Bar.
rien, Attorney General; Mr. Eaton, Secretary of War; Mr. McLane, Minister to England:
and Mr. Chandler, Collector at Portland.

52
Moreover, it will require much " depth of thought" to convince us that
a President cannot do what he thinks right without some constitutional
restriction to prevent him from doing what he knows to be wrong; — or that
a man of sound mind and good disposition cannot avoid the 'destruction of
his own family, unless you treat him like a madman, by tying his arms and
depriving him ofthe means of doing injury.
There was, however, no pledge in the inaugural so striking or so impor
tant as the recognition of that obligation, then said to be inscribed on the
list of Executive duties by the recent demonstration of public sentiment,
to counteract those causes which brought the patronage ofthe General
Government into conflict with the freedom of elections. Sir, your Post
master General, wielding the patronage of his Department over clerks, depu
ties, contractors and agents, in numbers amounting to nearly eight thousand
men, has for political effect removed from public employment, in pursuance
of a general system, so vast a proportion of the old and faithful public ser
vants connected with that immense establishment, that its resources and its
energies are impaired, public confidence is diminished, and suspicion,
darkening this great avenue to light, as she spreads her dusky pinions over
it, whispers that some of its recesses have been converted for political pur
poses into posts of espial on the private intercourse of your citizens. The
public press, too, by the instrumentality of which alone this republic might
be orostrated ; by the influence of which a President might be swelled into
a Monarch, has been — not shackled by a gag-law — no, Sir, but subsidized
by sums approximating to the interest on a million of dollars granted in the
way of salaries, jobs and pensions to partisan editors, printers, proprietors,
and all the host directly and indirectly connected with and controlling it.
The appointment of editors to office is not casual, but systematic. They
were appointed because they were Editors. In the days of the French
Revolution, when the press was bought up with the public funds, the coun
try was flooded with envenomed effusions from the Jacobin prints. The
post of profit was then erected in the kennel where a venal pack bayed
like blood-hounds for murder. Marat was distinguished, as the Editor of
a Revolutionary journal, for violence and vituperation; and having pub
lished his demand of two hundred and sixty thousand heads as a sacrifice
to liberty, was soon elevated to one ofthe highest offices of the Republic,
¦where, as a member of the infernal triumvirate which deluged France in
tears and blood, he combined the cunning malice of Robespierre with the
native ferocity of Danton. He was a compound of the vices of both his
coadjutors— of all that on earth was flagitious, mean, inhuman and inex
orable ; for he came from the schools of a faction which trained its disci
ples to cry havoc without mercy when bounty lured them up the path to
blood and death. The examples of that day teach us how easy is the
transition from the hireling libeller to the brutal murderer ; and that he
whose habits have long accustomed him to live upon the ruins of private

53
reputation, would shed the blood of his victim with pleasure, if paid to do
the deed of death. An independent, able, high-minded Editor, is an honor
/to his country and to the age in which he lives. He is the guardian ofthe
public welfare, the sentinel of liberty, the conservator, of morals ; and
every attempt to allure or to coerce him to desertion from his duty should
be regarded as an insult and an injury to the nation whose interests he is
bound to defend. It is less manly in an assailant, and not less indicative
of hostility, to bribe the sentry on the walls of your citadel, than to gag him
and hurl him from its battlements. It is more dangerous to corrupt the
press by the prospect of office, than absolutely to silence it by sedition laws ;
because, although by the latter course it may be destroyed, yet by the
former it may be made the engine of tyranny. The charge of an
undisguised effort to subdue its energies in the days of the elder
Adams, brought down upon the heads of all who were friendly to the
sedition act the full measure of public condemnation; and it yet remains to
be seen what will be the effect produced by an attempt to buy and prosti
tute it. We have a pack in full cry upon the trail of every man whose in
tegrity of purpose will not suffer him to bend before power; and friends,
and character, and happiness, are torn from him by them, with as little re
morse as was felt by the blood-hounds of the old French litter. Can all these
things be justified by the examples of the illustrious Jefferson ? Sir,' his
real friends will at all times spurn the imputation which the very question
conveys. They will remind you that the first prominent act of his ad
ministration was to disembarrass and untrammel the press, to disengage
that " chartered libertine" from the shackles of authority, and leave him
free as mountain air. They will tell you that the great maxim he adhered
to till the latest period of life, was, that " error of opinion should always
be tolerated while reason was left free to combat it ;" that he rewarded
the office hunting libeller who had slandered his predecessors with a view
to gain by his election, with his unconcealed and unmitigated scorn and con
tempt — that he bought no man's services with gold, adopted no system of
pensioning presses with office, offered no lures to libellers, employed no
assassins of character. Three years ago, when the great Western Statesman
who has, for his independence, been hunted like a wild beast, filled
with honour to his country the office of Secretary of State, he became an
object of the bitterest vituperation, by discharging some half a dozen prin
ters from the petty job of publishingthe laws; and although the whole extent
of this exercise of patronage, as it was then called, did not amount to more
than a few hundred dollars, yet it was considered as an exertion of power
vitally dangerous to the country, as tending to establish a government
press. Suchapiess was said to be more alarming to the liberties of the
people, than a palace guard of six thousand men, and the acts of the Secre
tary were denounced, as being culculated to " sap the vigour, degrade the
independence, and enfeeble the vigilance of the sentinels on the watch-

54
tower of liberty, whose beacon lights should blaze with pure and undying
lustre." But now, when so many of those very sentinels have been subsi
dized by office, and the new stipendiaries have formed in battalia about
the throne, presenting their pikes, in close array and forty deep, for its de
fence, the lofty eloquence of these patriot orators is heard no more within
our walls ; their harps hang on the willows, and instead of ringing an alarm
through the land, they are hushed into the deepest silence, and the most
tranquil repose.
Mr. President, in this brief and hasty review ofthe prominent charac
teristics ofthe first year of this administration, we have observed those acts
which in the opinion of the honourable member from Tennessee will have
no ro^r* effect upon the American public than " an attempt to agitate the
ocean by throwing pebbles on its surface." We find, however, that the
removals to which he referred have not amounted only to the dismissal of a
" feT subordinate officers," but to a thorough revolution among the most
important and most faithful functionaries of the government ; and it ought
to be remembered that even the subordinate officers alluded to were freemen.
I may know less of this world than the able and experienced member from
Tennessee — but I still think this nation will look to an act of tyranny which
tramples a faithful servant under foot, or turns him out with scoffs and con
tempt, however humble his condition may have been, with feel
ings very different from those manifested by the advocates of power.
They may not care for the little salaries, — but they will look to the principle
of Executive action — to the motive which makes that action dangerous.
Does the honorable gentleman recollect the reason for which John Hamp
den refused to pay the ship money ? The sum for which he contended
amounted only to a few pence, yet the claim of a British monarch to it
was resisted to the utmost ; and the feelings of an English public were
agitated like the ocean in a storm, not on account of the sums to be paid
under the illegal exaction, but because it was an encroachment on their
rights, and an abuse of power. Every genuine American Republican
carries the spirit of John Hampden in his bosom. Sorely the honorable
member's own high estimate of national character will not suffer him to
entertain the degrading idea that an English public, under an English mon
arch, cherished a loftier sense of liberty, or a more determined spirit of
resistance to the abuses of authority, than his own contrymen. Has he for
gotten the reason which induced our ancestors to resist the tea duties and
the stamp tax ? Was it only the sum to be levied which set this continent
in a flame, or was it the oppressive principle upon which those claims were
founded? If the mal-administration of Executive power has been such as
even to " exceed the conception" of that great patriot whose opinions we
both reverence so highly, why is it that the honorable member views with
such contempt the sum ofthe salaries awarded to Executive partisans, and
all the distress and anguish inflicted en the sufferers by proscription, while

55
he overlooks the principles which have been violated, and the Constitution
which has been trampled under foot ? Here is the ground on which we
have arraigned your administration; and although its friends may laugh its
victims to scorn, they should recollect that what is theirs to day may
shortly be in the power of another ; though they now consider this as a
mere gossamer floating in the political atmosphere, and have even told us
it is a feather which can weigh nothing with the People, they should recollect
that this feather is torn from the plumage ofthe American Eagle, and that
the .trangression which they now regard as so venial, may be a prece
dent to sanction the usurpation of power for the destruction ofthe liberties
ofthe People.
Having closed my remarks in reply to honorable gentlemen, suffer me
now to say, sir, that it has been no part of my object to embitter the feel
ings of my associates by personal allusions to them, although I have
intended, upon the challenge of the gentleman from Tennessee, to speak
out as ' boldly, frankly and freely,' as he might reasonably desire. But if
any luckless arrow of mine, inadvertently shot, rankles in the bosom of
any member here, he is welcome to send it back with his best force, pro
vided he does not poison its point. My objects, I trust, however, have been
above such warfare. I have endeavored to preserve unimpaired the rights
of the tribunal established by our forefathers as the only common umpire
for the decision of those controversies which must arise in the best regu.
lated political families, and to show that without the aid of such a tribunal
we must sink back into that anarchy which, among all other nations and
in all former ages, has been the sure harbinger of tyranny. I have labored
to sustain what I believe to be the right and duty of the Senate — to inter
pose a barrier against the improper exercise of executive power which
now controls, either directly or indirectly, nearly every avenue to every
station, whether of honor or profit, within the gift of twelve millions of
people. But if the sentiments which have been avowed by gentlemen o'
the majority on this floor should be supported by the American people,
their giant party, which has already borne upon its shoulders a weight
greater than the gates of Gaza, will, in the overthrow of both these objects,
wrench the very pillars of the government from their foundations. Then
we shall find how dreadful are the consequences of such doctrines. Upon
their construction of executive power, should one possessed of the temper
and ability which have so often characterized the Consuls and Chiefs of
other republics, obtain the Presidency— such a man as Napoleon meant
to describe when he spoke ofthe Russian « with a beard on his chin"—
exercising, as he may, in the spirit of oriental despotism, perfect command
over the army, the navy, ihe press, and an overflowing treasury, the
merest driveller may foresee that our liberties will fare like the " partridge
in the falcon's clutch." The very sentinels of our freedom will be bribed
bv him with our own gold ; and even many of those who have so triumph-

56
antly borne aloft the stripes and stars amidst the thunders of battle, will
be compelled to " beg bitter bread," or to turn the steel which we have
placed in their hands, against our own bosoms. He will readily gain to
his purposes a flock of those voracious office hunters, whom we have seen
brooding over the spoils of victory after a political contest, like so many
vultures after a battle, perched on every dead bough about the field, snuff
ing the breeze, and so eager for their prey that even the cries of the widow
and the orphan cannot drive them from the roost. It has been
said, and I believe truly, that we can never fall without a strug
gle ; but in the contest with such a man, thus furnished by ourselves with
"'all appliances and means to boot" against us, we must finally sink.
For a time our Valleys will echo with the roar of artillery, and our
mountains will ring with the reports of the rifle. The storm of civil war
will how! fearfully through the land, from the Atlantic border to the wildest
recesses of the West, covering with desolation every field which has been
crowned with verdure by the culture of freemen, and now resounding with
tbe echoes of our happiness and industry. But the tempest must subside, and
be succeeded by the deep calm and sullen gloom of despotism : — after
which, the voice of a freeman shall never again be heard within our borders,
unless in the fearful and suppressed whispers of the traveller from some
distant land who shall visit the scene of our destruction to gaze in sorrow
on the melancholy ruin.

NOTE BY THE PUBLISHER.
" The Postmaster General, who, harmonizing with this Administration, lias remc v
-within the last year, his thousand deputies, agents and clerks, though vested by law with
the express right of appointing them, can point youuto no statute conferring upon him tbe
right to remove one of them." — p. 23. tf M
Since the foregoing Speech was delivered, the 'following report has been made to the
Senate ofthe United States by the Postmaster General.
Post OFFrc'EHDEPARTMENT, March 24, 1830.
To the Hon. John C. Calhoun.
Sir : In obedience to a resolution ofthe Senate ofthe United States, passed March 22d,
1830, directing me " to inform the Senate ofthe number of Deputy Postmasters who have
been removed since the 4th of March last, designating the number in each State and Ter
ritory," I have the honor to report, that ihe whole nun^er of Deputy Postmasters remov
ed, between the 4th day of March, 1829, and the 22d dai of Ma>-cli, 1830, inclusive, is four
hundred and ninety-one ; and that the number thereotin each State and Territory is as
follows : In Maine fifteen, New Hampshire fifty five, Vermont twenty two, Massachusetts
twenty eight, Rhode Island three, Connecticut twenty, New York one hundred and thirty
one, New Jersey fourteen, Pennsylvania thirty five, Delaware sixteen, Maryland fourteen,
District of Columbia one, Virginia eight, North Carolina four, Georgia two, Alahama
two, Mississippi five, Louisiana four,rlennessee twelve, Kentucky sixteen. Ohio fifty one,
Indiana nineteen, Illinois three, Missouri seven, Florida one, Arkansas two, and Michi- '
gan one. 1 have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,
W. T. BARRY.
The number designated in the foregoing report, of removals in the Post Office Depart
ment, between March 4, 1829, and March 22, 1S30, includes, it will be observed, Deputy
Postmasters only. If the Clerks, Messengers and other Agents of that Department, who
have been removed within the aforesaid period, were included, it would probably swell
the aggregate of Post Office removals considerably above a thousand, the number stated
by Mr. Clayton.

ERRATA.— In page 8, line 14, for 1799, read 1779.
page 21, line 10, for " dessenter," read dissenter