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THE NAVAL BASE AT KEY WEST IN 1898

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By Commander Reginald R. Belknap, U. S. Navy

Reprinted from the
United States Naval Institute Proceedings
Vol. 41, No. 5, Whole No. 159
Sept. -Oct.. 1915

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[copyrighted]
U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE, ANNAPOLIS, MD.

THE NAVAL BASE AT KEY WEST IN 1898
By Commander Reginald R. Belknap, U. S. Navy

One cannot study the composition, administration, movement,
and use of a fleet's train ; nor picture the activity at an advanced
naval base during the hurried visit of a naval force ; nor, above
all, consider the procedure necessary for making all of a train's
resources immediately available wherever the fleet may stop
en route and demand them, without becoming interested in the
question of how to organize to meet these many requirements.
Some personal experiences at Key West during the war with
Spain have suggested themselves in this connection, they having
made a strong impression at the time. Safe to say, the conditions
of that war will never be repeated so far as the supineness of
the enemy is concerned. It is imperative, therefore, that the
unmilitary, at times almost paralyzing, conditions then prevailing
in our midst shall not, for lack of recognition and remedial
preparation, again arise, to bring disaster upon our forces when
again under the stress of war-time activity. A brief account of
some features of the work at Key West may give some useful
hints, and it certainly should not wholly fail of interest, since no
previous account, official or unofficial, has ever been published.
Had the Spanish War armistice of August 13, 1898, not been
followed so quickly by demobilization of the Key West base, a
report could have been written of the operations at that base
which might have contained much information of future military
value. As it was, pressing current work left the base staff no
time for the preparation of a report; and upon the pressure
ceasing, these officers were at once dispersed to other duties.
Consequently, in the official history of the war, the work of the
naval base at Key West is all but ignored. The following account

1444 The Naval Base at Key West in 1898
of experiences there is written from recollection, supplemented
by a few notes, of which copies are attached. At the time, I was
an ensign of nearly five years' service, one of which had been
spent at the War College, a fact which often caused wonder why
some things were done or why some questions were asked from
Washington, which I knew had already been well considered and
answered at the college. It had long been in mind to write this
account, and a recent study of logistics made the occasion.
On May 7, 1898, Commodore George C. Remey, with Lieut.
John H. Shipley as flag lieutenant, arrived in Key West, hoisted
his broad pennant on board the monitor Miantonomah, Capt. M.
L. Johnson, and assumed the superior naval command at Key
West afloat and ashore. A week later, May 14, I was detached
from the gunboat Newport, Comdr. B. F. Tilley, and reported to
the commodore as his secretary.
This was three weeks after war had begun, but no preparations
nor facilities had been made for a superior officer at Key West.
Temporarily, the office of the light house inspector was borrowed
for use, the inspector, Commander Cornwell, having joined the
blockade. From somewhere a marine orderly was obtained as
messenger. There was no telephone. We borrowed stationery
and a typewriter from the inspector's clerk. The office was in the
Federal Building, which stood always open, in charge of a watch
man. Our offices were locked at night, and he kept the key.
The one cipher code belonged to the commandant of the naval
station, Commander Forsyth, and was kept in his house, under
his bed. The house stood open, day and night, and as the
commandant had no family, access within would have been
quite easy for a stranger. In the many times I went to get the
code, only once did I encounter a single person in the house.
That was the commandant himself, who lay reading long after
midnight. So accustomed had he become to intrusions at all
hours everywhere, my entrance and dive under the bed caused
him no more than a glance of recognition. With no orderly nor
other guard on the premises, for an intruder to sandbag, throttle
or shoot the commandant and escape, would have been easy.
My first day on duty was the last one for three weeks on which
both Lieutenant Shipley and I had three meals. There being no
quarters afloat, we had to find them ashore, and rented a pair of
adjoining rooms with a bath in a private house in Key West and

The Naval Base at Key West in 1898 1445
took our meals at Mme. Bolio's eating house, opposite the crowded
Key West Hotel. I can to-day repeat that bill of fare, word for
word. Incidentally, I may mention, as bearing on the question
of physical condition, that drinking the shore water nearly dis
abled both staff officers in two days, before we discovered what
the trouble was. Dr. Wasdin, of the marine hospital service,
prescribed tea, and the trouble disappeared. Generally we could
start the day fair with breakfast at 7. Office hours began at 7.30
a. m., and finished between 10 and 11.30 p. m. One of us always
got off for lunch, but almost invariably one missed either lunch
or dinner. We had no clerk, not even to run the press-copy ; no
office help but one naval cadet for a few days.
After the day's work had finally been disposed of, we would
take turns on the night duty. The Strategy Board in Washington
would complete its labors in time for their cipher man to get a
message down to us by i .30 a. m. Almost as regular as the clock,
the telegraph messenger would at that hour rouse the whole
neighborhood, thundering on our front door. After a while I,
the lighter sleeper, would hear, go down and get the message,
then wake Shipley, if it were his turn, or else go down to the office
and translate it myself. Messages came from all directions, and
three times in a night I have got up and gone down to that office-
only to find the message of no urgency. Once as I sat translating
one, three more messages were brought in, one after another,
keeping me nearly two hours steadily at work. Frequently, imme
diate action was necessary ; and then one of us had to go out to
the commodore, who lived on some ship in the harbor, and then
to some other ship with orders, or back to the office to encipher a
dispatch. One early morning a message received at 3 o'clock
kept me on the go until 8.30.
By 6 o'clock every morning the fierce mosquitoes of Key West
and the dazzling tropical sunhght made further sleep impossible,
no matter how little rest one had had. So it was not difficult,
after a bath, to be in the office again by 7.30. After three weeks
of such unnecessary discomfort on shore, the old Lancaster came
in and we all moved aboard. There the prospect of rest at night
seemed better. But unfortunately, despite all I could do, my bunk
was persistently shared by intruders; and whether or not tele
grams disturbed me, these little bedfellows always did, two or
three times every night. The result was, by moming I was so
54

1446 The Naval Base at Key West in 1898
heavy with sleep that it would take the boy 15 minutes to get me
out of bed. This procedure lasted three months, during which I
had not a single unbroken night's rest, coupled with continuous,
confining office work averaging 14 hours a day. The pressure
of the work, however, its interest, and the celerity of its dispatch
acted as a powerful stimulant. An hour after the day began, the
feeling of fatigue would have worn off and it was possible to
keep at work all day, and day after day, with undiminished speed
and accuracy. All the cipher work, for instance, was done with
but a single minor error, in the whole three months. Had I been
considerably older than I was (27), or had the same pace con
tinued much longer, the strain might have told on the wofk, as
well as on me.
The foregoing details are rather personal to be so lengthy, but
I mention them as bearing on the number of staff officers that a
base commander and a flag officer must have, for a protracted
campaign. War conditions require an officer's best powers. Staff
officers can seldom work in watches to good advantage. The
majority must be continuously at work or on call; and to avoid
deterioration through overwork, their numbers must be sufficient
from the start. A staff officer familiar with his work is a mine
of information, much of it not to be found in any file case, how
ever complete. To lose an experienced staff officer in the midst
of a campaign might be a great inconvenience in the flag officer's
work. The base office was established just as all forces were concen
trating towards Key West, after the bombardment of San Juan.
A large demand for coal had to be anticipated, besides provisions,
water, and other supplies. The local laboring class were being
encouraged in idleness by the distribution of free food by some
mistaken charity. Prize vessels were being sent in daily. Block
ading vessels were in and out continually. There was a night
patrol offshore to keep up. Drafts of enlisted men, small and
large, were arriving every few days. Some Spanish prisoners
had to be looked out for. Convoy for minor expeditions was
several times ordered, to land supplies and men for Cuban forces.
All the time a steady stream of information flowed in and out.
The press correspondents were -everywhere about, eager and
insistent. And in addition, there were local disturbances in Key
West beyond coping with by the police. Some indication of the

The Naval Base at Key West in 1898 1447
variety of business handled is contained in a memorandum of the
principal heads under which the office records were filed. (See
Appendix C.)
Had the necessity for a base commander been recognized and
provided for even but one week earlier, all things could have been
much better ordered. This extreme of pressure at the outset had
one great advantage, however, in forcing the way to short cuts.
The general result was that, throughout the existence of the base
administration, all its business was transacted with a minimum of
paper work. Probably nowhere else in the navy was there in
actual practice a simpler system of direct and equal association
of responsibility and authority. There were very few base orders
issued. On July 4, a reissue of all existing orders, together with
certain information, was published, which shows how well the
effort for simplicity was observed. This, too, has a bearing on
the number of staff officers, as well as on the organization of a
base in general. (See Appendix A.)
The Key West base organization, if it may be so called, con
sisted of the commodore and two staff officers; the commandant
of the naval station ; a lieutenant and a boatswain at the station ;
one pay officer, with one pay clerk ; no doctor, I think — certainly
not more than one ; and three tugs, under boatswains.
The pay officer. Paymaster Joseph Foster, besides being yard
paymaster and general storekeeper, had also been charged with
the accounts of all vessels carrying no paymaster. More of these
craft, already numerous, were arriving daily, and all were clamor
ous for ration money, provisions, clothing and small stores, and
money, besides coal, water, and supplies. Almost my first recol
lection is of the pay officer coming to the commodore, in great
agitation and distress, to protest that he could not discharge any
duty among so many. He was a man well on towards 60 years,
and should never have been sent to frontier work in the first
place. The department had promised help soon, but was non
committal as to date and evidently did not appreciate the situation.
Meanwhile conditions grew rapidly worse. Once a day the pay
officer came to protest. The fourth time, he was pallid white
and could hardly speak. The commodore gave some encourage
ment, and he turned to go. One step on the stairs, and he fell the
rest of the way. That, and that alone, seemed to arouse the
department.

1448 The Naval Base at Key West in 1898
Although enough had already been telegraphed and written to
inform the department fully, the commandant said he would tele
graph again. I asked to write the message, and produced one
that made a sensation in the department, as Paymaster General
Kenny afterwards told me. It started four paymasters to Key
West inside of 12 hours, and within three weeks there were 14
pay officers performing duties that had at first been shoveled upon
one. Meantime all system had gone to pot. Officers and petty
officers took whatever they could lay their hands upon, and the
most that could be attempted towards accounting was to obtain
memorandum receipts.
. In the course of a fortnight, the supply of material became as
well systematized as possible in the circumstances. The com
mandant of the station attended to all the details, and applications
for all kinds of supplies were made to him or his subordinates.
Whenever any one in good old navy fashion brought his tale of
needs to the senior officer present, he' was steered away to the
commandant. The commandant's indoor force had been brought
up to needs; and outdoors he had an assistant, Lieut. Webster
Doty, retired, who in ability, energy, force, and tirelessness was
exactly fitted to the place. (Appendix A, pars. 4, 24, 25.)
What the base commander did require to know of each vessel's
material condition concerned only her military qualities and readi
ness. Each captain, upon reporting his arrival, would fill out a
small blank form which was handed to him; and then, in the
ordinary course, he was done with the base commander, and the
base commander was done with him, until the time came for his
sailing orders. (See Appendix B'.)
It is possible that the absence of departmental instructions
defining the commodore's authority worked to advantage, in caus
ing him to exert an authority wider and more absolute than per
haps the department would have given in advance. In the
absence of any senior in rank, he actually exercised the powers of
a commander-in-chief, except as to general courts martial. No
case arose requiring a general court ; but there can be no doubt
that the base commander should have had full disciplinary powers.
This power can be conferred under existing law by designating
him " commander-in-chief of base squadron."
In regard to local order on shore in Key West — soon after the
commodore's arrival a prominent citizen, accompanied by the

The Naval Base at Key West in 1898 1449
United States marshal, applied to the commodore for a regular
night patrol of the town. The mayor was understood to be of the
same mind, but unwilling, for reasons unstated, to join in the
request. The Key West police, two or three in number, were
unable to deal with the rough gangs, colored and white, that
infested the .water front saloons. Some of these unruly ones had
murderously attacked enlisted men, and retaliation had been
promised for that night. A patrol was accordingly ordered, and
was kept up as long as the Panther's marine battalion remained
at Key West. Later, a small guard was regularly attached to the
station. In the interim, some kind of a patrol was maintained
whenever men were available from ships in harbor. For a week
or two, however, there was no patrol. Under these circumstances,
of course, no men available for guard meant none on shore in
large numbers to feel concerned about, none to cause trouble;
but it also meant that during two weeks there were no guards for
the station storehouses, containing $3,000,000 worth of material.
Two or three watchmen were the only protection ; and it would
have been a very simple matter, with a stick of dynamite, to do
great damage without detection. There were two companies of
army troops in garrison, held in readiness ; but these were some
distance from the town, and they did not take part for local secur
ity. No doubt they would have done so if urged. No request
was made, except one night that they stand by ; but the command
ing officer was made aware of the situation.
Before the arrival of a regular station ship, the handling of
drafts of men was an embarrassment. All kinds of shifts had to
be made, especially as the station paymaster was over his head in
work. After the Lancaster, Capt. Thomas Perry, arrived, the
difficulty disappeared. She had two regular Une officers beside
the captain, and all details could be safely left to the ship. (See
Appendix A, pars. 13-17, 19, 20.)
The Lancaster had been promised to Commodore Remey by
May 25, supplied with all necessary equipment for a flagship. She
had only recently returned from a flagship cruise in the South
Atlantic. She arrived at Key West on May 31, and we moved on
board next day ; but, though fresh from Boston, she was almost
completely stripped of everything. The wardroom used news
papers for tablecloths and drank water out of champagne glasses.
The flag office was a bare, empty room, with not so much as a

I450 The Naval Base at Key West in 1898
table in it. No office supplies of any kind, not even a pencil And
the ship's electric plant had been taken out. Slowly and very
grudgingly the necessary stationery and office outfit were sent.
Although office work had to go on far into the night, the reinstalla
tion of an electric plant was refused by the Bureau of Equipment,
as unnecessary and unsafe, until the commodore wrote in terms
that admitted no denial.
For yeomen, vain search had been made, in the Lancaster's crew
and in a large naval militia draft. One man had been found who
could run a copying press and deliver simple messages. At the
end of four weeks, I was still doing all the other work of the
office. Upon the Lancaster's disappointing arrival I telegraphed
my uncle, a clergyman in Boston, to find a clerk for yeoman, have
him enlisted on board the Wabash and sent down to me, which
was done. Then, barring the absence of lighting suitable for
protracted night work, and no night signaling apparatus for the
base station ship, the minimum equipment for a base commander
in home waters may be said to have been complete at Key West
by seven weeks after war began.
Key West was the main center of communication until about
the middle of June for the battle fleet, and all the time for the
blockading force. Excepting messages via San Nicolas Mole and
the like, all information and orders, by wire or mail, from Wash
ington had to be f oirwarded by vessel from Key West. All reports
from incoming vessels came to the base commander's office. The
control of the telegraph and cable communications was, however,
independent of the commodore. An army signal corps officer
(Captain, now General James Allen) was in charge, and his men
were continuously on duty in the instrument room. The censor
ship was in his hands, and by all accounts he made judicious use
of this power. Certainly the military information that came in
through his hands was very interesting and often important.
Early on the moming of May 19, just as Admiral Schley was
sailing for Cienfuegos to ascertain whether Cervera were there
or not. Captain Allen came into the office and intimated that he
wished to speak privately. When the room was clear of other
visitors, he produced a little slip of yellow paper, reading:
" Teresa, Vizcaya, Oquendo, two destroyers, anchored in port
this morning." One's impression on reading it was as if the
names had been put down as the vessels were seen coming in.

The Naval Base at Key West in 1898 1451
The absence of the fourth cruiser, Colon, from the dispatch
strengthened the belief a few days later in the existence of the
reported " phantom fleet," which caused a week's delay of the
Shaffer expedition.
After some consultation. Captain Allen left the office to forward
the news in cipher to the War Department. The commodore sent
the information to Admiral Sampson by his flag Heutenant, Lieu
tenant Staunton (now rear admiral), who happened to be in the
adjoining office at the time. In the presence of Admiral Sampson's
flag, Commodore Remey was no longer the senior officer present,
his orders explicitly placing him under the commander-in-chief
afloat; and so, having communicated Cervera's arrival to his
chief, the commodore did not further concern himself with it — •
having plenty else to do. This was about 9.15 a. m., and Captain
Allen's cipher must have reached the War Department by 10.30
at the latest. Later in the afternoon (as Admiral Remey ascer
tained some years afterwards, in a personal investigation of this
incident), the Western Union's Washington manager, strolling
into the Navy Department, casually inquired as to the Cervera
news, of which he was already aware. The reply was that no such
news had been received by the Navy Department up to that
hour, 5 p. m.
On the whole, the control of what went over the wires was
satisfactory, in the circumstances of the general situation ; and as
the army signal officer took pains to keep in touch with the com
modore, there was good cooperation. But surely, such important
service as information, communication, and censorship, at a place
primarily a naval base, ought to be under the base commander.
It is the foundation of all that concerns his duties beyond his
immediate range of vision; while to local security information
is essential.
The local night patrol offshore, intended to guard against
surprise of Key West harbor, was maintained for some days, by a
single vessel. There was no force in readiness, nor able, usually,
to back it up, nor was there any plan to oppose a raid. Fortu
nately, this impUcit confidence in the security of Key West was
rewarded by inaction of the enemy. There was no control of the
anchorage, no harbor regulation, day or night. Vessels not
belonging to or serving the navy came and went at will, at any
hour of the twenty-four. The only restriction on movement was

1452 The Naval Base at Key West in 1898
on the part of a wharf owner, who once ordered a naval supply
ship to leave his wharf immediately, threatening to cut her lines
if she delayed. When he produced an axe, the master of the
offending vessel casually displayed a revolver, so no overt step
was taken ; but the incident was characteristic of local conditions
and of obstacles that should not have existed for a moment.
This absence of harbor control caused difficulty in controlling
the press correspondents. In connection with some movement, I
think of the first troop convoy, Washington ordered, some days
in advance, not to let any press tugs leave Key West after a
certain time. Preparations were made accordingly. No sus
picion was aroused, and a guard was ready to hold all press
vessels about 12 hours ahead of time. But they must have got
wind of it from Washington, for in spite of our secrecy, when the
time came there were none to hold. To allow the unrestrained
movement of vessels in the vicinity of a naval base in time of
war seems inconceivable, yet we did it.
Not merely had the base commander no definite control over
any but naval vessels ; but naval movements were hampered by
local civil authorities. State quarantine was enforced, and all
vessels incoming were required to await, and fee, the state quar
antine officer. Ordinarily he was prompt. Occasionally a delay
of two or three hours occurred. The base commander did not
allow this rule to apply to captains of naval vessels from the
blockade, or which had not made a port since leaving Key West.
They came to report at once, so that news might not be delayed.
One intolerable instance arose over pilotage. The Florida laws
make pilotage compulsory. A large coal schooner was ordered
from Key West to Guantanamo in tow of the Lebanon. The day
before sailing, the collier's master reported that his vessel had been
libeled in the United States Court for outward pilotage, and that
a deputy marshal was on board to prevent her saiUng without
paying. The situation was at once fully explained to the clerk of
the court and to the marshal — vessel under government charter
and to be towed by a commissioned naval vessel. But they would
not dismiss the libel, said they could not ; only the judge could,
who was in Jacksonville. The commodore telegraphed the judge,
who never repUed. Also he informed the Navy Department of
the interference. Secretary Long repUed in indignant terms, con
cluding, " Send the vessel to sea." Next day, just before the sail-

The Naval Base at Key West in 1898 1453
ing hour, fixed when the vessels would be pointed fair by the
tide, the flag lieutenant boarded the collier and offered the deputy
marshal passage ashore, which he accepted, rather than be carried
to Guantanamo. Technically, the commodore had made himself
liable for the libel and for contempt of court, but of course that
ended the incident. But this, and other local irregularities, and
the probability of having to enforce strict sanitary measures in
the event of yellow fever breaking out, caused the base com
mander, with the concurrence of the army officer in local com
mand and the army senior medical officer, to urge in the strongest
terms that Key West be placed under martial law. This was one
of the few subjects treated by letter. Secretary Long replied by
telegraph that he and the Secretary of War strongly approved
and urged favorable action, but the Administration would not
authorize martial law, stating that they (in Washington) did not
consider it necessary, and that it might be construed as a reflection
on Key West and the authorities of Florida.
Before the base office was established, a considerable portion
of the best anchorage area for vessels obtaining supplies had been
sown with electrically controlled mines. Vessels could traverse
this mine field freely, and they sometimes anchored on its edge,
or even in it. One evening the monitor Puritan, Capt. Frederick
Rodgers, about half-past 6 o'clock, weighed for sea, and picked
up a mine with her anchor. She let go the other anchor while
clearing the first ; then hove up the second anchor — and a second
mine. And still a third mine was brought up in the same way.
About this time Shipley arrived on board to inquire- as to the
trouble, finding the captain quite unable to express his feeUngs.
Then, as it had grown dark, he decided to await daylight to get
clear of the mine field.
No naval hospital had been established at Key West. The army
had one, where naval patients were cared for. This arrangement
worked well enough until the army wounded began to flow in.
Anticipating this, the base commander had urged the establish
ment of a naval hospital, for which a suitable place was available.
The surgeon general did not approve. Consequently, one day, on
short notice, to make room for army wounded, twenty-odd naval
patients were turned out, with no place to put them but the
Lancaster, already well filled as a receiving ship. One incident
in this connection is not easily forgotten. Engrossed in work

1454 The Naval Base at Key West in 1898
though we were, it was impossible to shut out of our ears the
ravings and finally the harsh rattle of one poor fellow who
lay dying of pneumonia, on the half-deck, just across from the
office. It was no place for him, but the navy had no better at
the time.
The fear of yellow fever brought about a complication that
was very annoying to the officers of the fleet, and might have
been serious. In the absence- of suitable supply vessels to ply
between the base and the fleet, use had to be made of any and
every vessel going from Key West to Guantanamo, to carry mail,
express, government stores, mess supplies, and clothes from the
various Key West laundries. Very many express packages and
all of the wash clothes were delivered to these carriers only upon
payment of charges. The commander-in-chief had ordered the
base commander to have all these prepaid, against future reim
bursement. The local paymaster protested, but complied. A
large accumulation had been placed on board the Yankee, Com
mander Brownson, and she was about to sail, when one of ber
crew developed symptoms of yeUow fever. The doctors dis
agreed in diagnosis ; but there was enough suspicion to keep the
patient on board the Yankee. Had there been a naval hospital,
the base commander could have ordered the patient transferred
there at once and sent the ship on her duty. As it turned out, the
man died, the report of yellow fever was sent to Washington, and
the Yankee was ordered by the department to go to New York
at once, with strict injunction not to discharge nor transfer any
thing thaf had been taken on board at Key West. (This took
place before the discovery of the mosquito as the yellow fever
carrier.) . For weeks afterward, until the base was disbanded,
complaints kept coming in about packages shipped by the Yankee;
and three years later the commodore was checked over $400, for
private charges paid at Key West, and never reimbursed. Ex
planation of the facts was made to the department (not for the
first time), which then took up the matter and settled it in the
appropriation bill.
At the same time with Commodore Remey had come Commo
dore Watson, his junior in rank, to command the blockade.
Before the latter proceeded to the blockade, and when he returned
to Key West, the presence of two seniors afloat at first caused
confusion. In the absence of any semblance of tactical or admin-

The Naval Base at Key West in 1898 1455
istrative organization, all captains would apply for everything to
the nearest senior; and as Commodore Remey's office was on
shore, many found it only natural, as well as more convenient, to
apply to the commodore who was always afloat. No instructions
defining spheres of authority having been promulgated by the
department, and no permanent designation for particular duties
having been made of the many ships basing on Key West, it was
inevitable that conflicting instructions should be given; and in
the first few days several instances did arise. One concerned the
Merrimac, then in a leaky condition with pumps not working.
Her captain. Commander J. M. Miller, strode into Remey's office
early one morning, rather disturbed, saying : " Commodore, what
am I to do? You tell me to stay in Key West and Commodore
Watson orders me out. I am between the devil and the deep sea ! "
" Which am I ? " said the commodore, with a quiet smile. And
then, after disposing of that case, he took upon himself to issue
definite instructions, so that thereafter no movement order to any
naval vessel in Key West was issued by any other than himself,
except by another commodore or flag officer to his own flagship.
These instructions did not apply to squadrons, as the base had no
concern with their movements.
It was on account of this difficulty and because of his para
mount responsibility conceming things afloat, that Commodore
Remey never accepted the designation by which the department
first addressed him, of " Commandant," which our regulations
specified as indicating a shore command. He signed and referred
to himself officially as the " Commodore Commanding Naval
Base, Key West." Such a limitation in meaning of the word
commandant seems to be peculiar to our service ; but because our
custom is so fixed, and because the functions of the senior officer
at a base must concern things afloat as well as facilities on shore,
it has always seemed to me that Commodore Remey's position was
well taken. From that I would deduce that we should always use
the term " Base Commander," instead of " Commandant." It
may seem a small point, but it has caused confusion once and
might do so again.
Not only duties local to the base, but also expeditions came
under the base commander's cognizance. To meet the demands
for vessels in various directions, he had often to divert some from
the blockade. No orders for these side expeditions came from

1456 The Naval Base at Key West in 1898
Admiral Sampson; all were from the department. It may be
said of them generally that it was wasted effort. It was fili
bustering, the time for which had passed. These diversions con
tinued even after the arrival of Commodore Howell, to command
the blockade. He was senior in rank to Commodore Remey. It
would then happen occasionally that the base commander would
have to take vessels of a senior's command temporarily absent
from his presence and divert them to other duties from which the
senior would never get them back. This particular senior appre
ciated the situation, and never while in Key West attempted inter
ference in the base affairs ; but another might have done other
wise, in the absence of definition of spheres of authority; and
certainly the arrangement was loose and haphazard in the extreme,
fatal to any large scheme of operations.
One such expedition had some influence on the fame of one
officer. " Don't you think," the commodore wrote, in comment
on the original manuscript, " it would add interest to it to relate
how near the Gloucester, Lieut. Commander Wainwright com
manding, missed being in the battle of Santiago, where he so
highly distinguished himself? As I remember, I was about to
order the Gloucester to the blockade of Havana, where vessels
were very much needed, when I received an order from the
department, marked important, to land a Lieut. Colonel Her
nandez and another Cuban officer, who would soon report to me,
at a designated place near the eastern end of Cuba, to communi
cate with General Gomez, the Cuban commander-in-chief. I
ordered Lieut. Commander Wainwright, commanding the Glou
cester, to perform this duty, and after its completion to report to
Rear Admiral Sampson, the commander-in-chief. I did this on
account of their then being in the near vicinity of each other, but
the vessel was needed off Havana." ,
A special mission for the rescue of two newspaper men was
asked for by one Mr. Scovell, who was afterwards.made conspicu
ous at Santiago by the forbearance with which General Shatter
treated him after a personal assault. The commodore, not think
ing very much about correspondents in those days, gave him little
encouragement, but Scovell persisted until he was given an
appointment to discuss the matter. The two men in trouble had
been arrested near Havana as spies. Concerning one, a photogra
pher, Scovell professed to care little ; but he was very anxious

The Naval Base at Key West in 1898 1457
lest the other man, for whose safety he felt responsible, should be
" garrotted on short notice." The commodore replied that he
cared no more for the correspondent than for the photographer.
Action must apply to both, if any were taken. Scovell's repre
sentations were so urgent that a dispatch to Washington was
drawn up, resulting in the exchange of several telegrams, and
finally the despatch of the tug Uncas, Lieutenant Brainard, to
Havana. The Spanish authorities agreed to exchange the men
for a Spanish colonel and one other officer, who were taken over
by the tug.
As soon as the Uncas's mission became known — for of course
it was impossible to keep it dark — a number of correspondents
importuned to go in her, which was refused, on general grounds
as well as because the agreement with Havana expressly forbade
it. Among the eager ones was an EngUshman named Knight, of,
I think, the London Daily Mail. We had a suspicion afterwards
that one or more did stow away on board the Uncas. It would
have been easy to do so, amid the generally prevailing confusion,
as the tug left Key West in the darkness of early morning. No
proofs came to light, however, and although Knight did reach
Havana soon after, it was not by one of our vessels. Three years
later, on some occasion during the then Duke of York's visit in
Australia, a one-armed man recalled himself to Admiral Remey
as the same Knight. He had lost an arm in South Africa. He
hoped the admiral harbored no ill-feeling — as of course he did
not — for his escaping our vigilance.
The case reminds one of Mr. Bock's. The Navy Department
had directed that the French steamer Lafayette, from Vera Cruz,
should she call at Key West, be given a pass through the blockade
into Havana, it having been agreed that she would land only the
mails. Mr. Bock had evidently heard of this, and he appUed for
permission to go on her. He seemed over-anxious to get to
Havana. The commodore decUned permission, upon which Mr.
Bock produced a letter from Admiral Sampson — something like
a letter of introduction — and asked if that would make any
difference. The commodore replied no ; that he could obtain
permission only through Washington. We thought no more of
the matter, until two hours later a telegram came from Secretary
Long, approving the commodore's action in not granting permis
sion. We were at first somewhat mystified at his telegraphing at

i4S8 The Naval Base at Key West in 1898
all on a matter about which we had informed him nothing, but
later concluded that tbe urgings in Washington were strong
enough to make the Secretary fear lest Mr. Bock finally prevail
over the commodore. It was our impression that Mr. Bock had
strong sympathy with the Spanish side, natural enough for one
so long resident in Havana. And after all, the Lafayette never
came to Key West.
A great deal might be written about the prizes brought in, but
a single case may suffice. The British steamer Restormel, loaded
with coal for Cervera, was sent in by the St. Paul, Captain Sigs-
bee. The prize arrived in a leaky condition, and it was feared she
might sink and obstruct the fairway or anchorage, none too large
at best. Accordingly, after the judge of the prize court had been
consulted and given assent, the cargo was taken over by the naval
station for naval use, the price to be fixed later. There were
about 3000 tons of picked Welsh coal, the sum involved being
about $14,000. This seemed to us a good haul, as well as a good
precaution ; but in the press of affairs, the matter escaped being
reported to the Bureaii of Equipment early. They leamed of it
only after several weeks, in the course of routine reports from the
naval station. Then they inquired for particulars, and when the
commodore wrote them, his action was approved, but in terms
that were intended to make it clear that the Bureau of Equipment
was buying all the coal for the navy.
The mail service to the fleet became an embarrassment, espe
cially after the troops reached Santiago. The postal authorities
were swamped and appUed for assistance. Finally the Fern was
designated as a mail steamer, the only vessel available of practi
cally no military value. The accumulation of mail for a large
force assumes such proportions in a few days as to exceed the
available safe stowage space of the average vessel. Official mail
may be considerably reduced in time of war, where so much is
done by wire and radio or omitted altogether. All that which is
important enough to send ought to be registered or else enclosed
in an odd colored bag, easily distinguishable. If sent in the ordi
nary first class bags, it is liable to be snowed under or delayed by
an accumulation somewhere en route.
In addition to the distribution of personnel, the base com
mander had to order examining boards in several cases for the
admission of officers to commissioned grades. This seemed to us

The Naval Base at Key West in 1898 1459
at the time like an imposition on a busy office, besides taking the
time of officers of active ships. Nevertheless, considerable pains
were taken to make the examinations thorough. Later, when
some of the volunteer officers described the nominal examinations
they had had, our work still more appeared supererogatory. One
junior lieutenant from a Middle Western state said that he
applied to be an ensign and was offered a commission as junior
lieutenant. He declined, on the ground of wishing for some
experience. He had never seen blue salt water. But the junior
lieutenant commission was given him just the same. In one ship,
commissions to the volunteer officers seemed to have been given
in inverse proportion to their experience. A senior lieutenant
had had no sea experience ; a junior lieutenant had been two years
at Annapolis; and of two ensigns, one had formerly been an
ensign and the other had been a master of vessels for several
years. Truly, rank here was no assurance of experienced ability.
Outline of a Proposed Base Organization
What has gone before dealt mainly with the wasteful, demoral
izing, or obstructive effects and untoward incidents resulting from
lack of preparation. What follows aims to bring out some prin
ciples that should apply in the preparation and organization of a
naval base.
Experience at Key West in 1898 indicates that the base com
mander should have supreme powers over all in the vicinity, both
on land and sea, subject to orders only from the department and
the commander-in-chief. Perfect cooperation of these two must
of course be assumed. Existing regulations already forbid divert
ing forces of the commander-in-chief's other subordinate com
manders that may visit the base. Naturally a base commander
would not detain, divert, nor interfere with the forces of active
commands without imperative reasons, since the function of the
base is to aid and supply such forces, not hinder their operations.
But he should have the power, ex ofhcio, to detain and divert such
forces in emergency, so that he may coordinate all effort in resist
ing attack, and so that conversely there may be no interference
in base affairs by any senior except, the commander-in-chief.
Compare the authority of the German station chiefs of the great
naval home bases, Kiel and Wilhelmshaven:

1460 The Naval Base at Key West in 1898
Over the regular independent commands afloat the station chiefs have
ordinarily no authority, but for the defence of the military ports they, as
governors of fortresses, have absolute control over everything ashore and
afloat, within the lines of defence; and they may also, in other cases of
emergency, assume command over all forces afloat.
The location of the base commander's office is a detail of some
importance. The office on shore in Key West was as convenient
to the water front as could be desired, but the Lancaster, moored
in mid-harbor, proved much better. The only drawback there
was the delay in receipt and dispatch of telegrams. This was
minimized by having a steamer always in waiting at the dock,
night and day. A better arrangement, which should be provided
for, would be to have telegraph and telephone cables brought on
board the base commander's flagship, for direct communication
with all parts of the base, and with the world's cable and radio
system. Circumstances must govern the base flagship's location.
Alongside a wharf or quay might be more suitable than moorings
near mid-harbor. In such case, a building on the sea wall might
serve for offices and quarters instead of a ship. The desiderata
are direct accessibility to ships' boats and direct signal communi
cation with vessels in harbor.
Whether the base office be afloat or on the water front, the
base commander and all his staff should live on board or close at
hand. Office hours must be all the twenty-four, and the staff be
in numbers sufficient for reliefs in some duties. Some staff
duties, however, cannot be done in alternation. One mind must
be in continuous charge. Hence there should be no time wasted
in going between office and living quarters. The staff must live
on the job. The staff and base commander should all mess
together, also ; or at least the staff should mess apart from offi
cers not of the staff, in order to lessen the risk of leaks through
careless speech.
The foregoing regards the base commander's location from the
view-point of active forces visiting the base. Looking inwardly,
the constituent parts of the base organization require close knit
ting together, for efficient cooperation, and above all, for saving
time. In Key West, the base commander, after the first rush,
divested himself almost entirely of control over material supply.
He could do so there without hesitation, because supplies were
almost unlimited in dmount, and all comers were on the same

The Naval Base at Key West in 1898 1461
footing. Yet even in Key West the commodore felt it necessary
to keep a hand on the water supply, which the navy obtained
largely from the army. The tank vessel Maverick, with 1,000,000
gallons of water for army transport use, had arrived while we were
still struggling to obtain a supply from nearby sources and from
our half-completed evaporating plant at the naval station. The
commodore telegraphed to Washington for its transfer to us.
The Bureau of Equipment refused to take over the steamer or to
charter other tankers ; but granted the water, and we afterwards
obtained a second cargo in the same way. The quartermaster in
local charge. Major Sawyer, facilitated things ; and altogether
we used four-fifths of the army's water supply. It was a godsend,
as the bureau would not be convinced that their arrangements fbr
water were inadequate. This, together with Key West's Umited
repair facilities, explains why the very simple report required of
an arriving vessel by the base commander was not even briefer.
(Appendix A.)
In an advanced base, or any extra-continental base whereto
communications might be distant or be partly exposed, the base
commander would keep a comparatively close hand on resources,
so as to insure their being disposed to the best advantage for the
plans of the commander-in-chief. An important branch of the
base commander's staff work would therefore be the material
control. For every incoming naval force, the decision would have
to be made as to how its wants should be filled ; i. e., whether in
whole or only in a specified proportion ; whether immediately or
in its turn ; etc. Decisions of this character are military. They
do not put the administrative details upon the base commander,
but they facilitate the handling of such details by subordinates.
With the possibilities of stating wants in advance by radio, and
assuming reasonable intercommunication within the base, no
delay, no " referring," should be necessary. Moments may be
precious; and crews ought not to suffer any unnecessary effort,
nor tedious, wasteful standing by, which good administration can
spare them. To attain expeditious, harmonious interworking
there must be close accord between tbe base commander's material
control staif ofiicer and the actual issuing officers. The former
must know what is the state of the current stock, and the latter
must have advance instructions for serving out. The accumula
tion of moments saved by anticipatory methods of administration

1462 The Naval Base at Key West in 1898
often amounts to a considerable gain in time for even a single
ship. To meet the requirements fully, there should be one central
office for incomers' reports, authorization of supplies, and sailing
orders. This marks out the scope gf the functions of one impor
tant branch of the base commander's staff work. For active
vessels, this is the only branch which normally concerns them.
The base commander, on the other hand, will have miUtary as
well as material "interest in the visiting vessels and squadrons.
Consequently, the base commander, his chief of staff, and his
material control staff officer must be in the closest association and
proximity of location. The same applies to repair facilities.
Between the functions of the control of material and the issuing
of material there shpuld be no intermediary. The material con
trol officer, having decided whether, in what proportion, and at
what time a certain vessel or other unit shall receive supplies,
decides further as to what supply vessels in the base shaU furnish
them ; whether the supply vessel shall go alongside of the other,
or vice versa; or whether, if boats are to be used, the base facili
ties or the ship's own boats shall do the transporting. Arranging
for these details with timeliness is possible only through close
coordination and close proximity of offices, of the base staff,
including chief of staff, material controller and harbor master.
With good organization and intercommunication, incoming ves
sels would normally receive, before or upon entering, their direc
tions where to anchor, or alongside what collier or supply vessel
to moor, so as to eliminate delays and unnecessary movements
inside the harbor.
The " reasonable intercommunication " which has been twice
alluded to is a requirement of importance easily underestimated.
During the several weeks before the declaration of war, when
vessels at Key West were clearing for action, some of them left
many of their boats at the naval station. Distances were not
great at Key West, especially for the vessels which visited there
repeatedly. Most were small enough to lie within easy reach of
the wharves. Yet one after another they found it necessary to take
their boats back again. The same short distances made getting
about on naval base business comparatively easy, but still it was
occasionally embarrassing not to have more means of transporta
tion. Compared to a war time of real pressure, conditions at Key

The Naval Base at Key West in 1898 1463
West were leisurely. At an advanced base near the active theater,
expeditious dispatch will be indispensable. The means to insure
it are simple, direct organization ; attentive, anticipatory adminis
tration ; and an outside management and follow-up system that will
prepare the way, keep things moving, and enforce the full execu
tion of orders. There must be good signal, radio, and wire service
for verbal communication; but the minor water transport will
none the less be a factor of large importance. The question of
boats for the fighting ships is a matter for careful consideration.
The quota of boats for the base must include ample provision for
ships reaching the base without any boats of their own or with
none serviceable. The subject is too detailed for further treat
ment here, beyond noting the importance of a liberal provision of
tugs, motor-boats — some for speed, some for carrying — and
weight carriers, such as our large sailing launches. In order to
carry out the arrangements of the material control, there must be
good communication with the issuing officers, who would be the
captains and masters of the various supply vessels. Signals alone
will not suffice. The base staff and messengers on the base com
mander's business must always be able to get about on the water
quickly and without waiting.
In connection with supply comes the maintenance of communi
cations, the replenishment of the base stock and the return of
empties. To what extent the supply-conveying force shall be
under the base. commander will vary with circumstances. It is a
military function, to be handled by the staff with others of like
nature. For lookout and picket duty, and for convoying supply
ships in and out, clear of local exposure, an advanced base will
need a number of armed vessels, depending upon the enemy's
possible reach. The management of these vessels, which may be
classed as Mobile Defence, will form a distinct naval branch of
staff work.
The fortifications, mine fields, torpedo floats, and their infantry
supports form another distinct sphere, which may be denoted by
the inclusive term Fixed Defence. This is a sphere for the
marines and army troops. With the marine corps' present limits
of 10,000 men, or even allowing for its expansion in the advocated
ratio of 20 per cent of the navy, there would not be available
enough marines alone to garrison a single base so salient as
Guam. In the absence of a marine corps reserve, there would

1464 The Naval Base at Key West in 1898
have to be army troops to complete the number required. That
would immediately raise the question of command. The base
commander must be placed in supreme command of all by special
order of the President, empowering him to command army troops
at the base. Between army and marine corps combined in service
there is no question ; the senior commands. An objection here
to an army officer being in command on shore would be that
marine officers are trained in advance base work and are familiar
with navy administration.
The base commander should be a rear admiral. Otherwise he
would not outrank the troop commander on shore, who would
have the strength of a division under him. In any selection, fit
ness of the individual, rather than rank, should be the criterion,
within reasonable limits ; and until our flag officers' list is much
expanded, probably the choice for base commander would fall
upon a captain. In that case, he should be immediately commis
sioned a rear admiral, under the authority of statute already
existing for a state of war.
Security and police on shore naturally fall under the military
commander. Security and police afloat inside the defences^
together with control of anchorages, belong to the harbor master
or port captain. Security afloat inside will depend largely on the
guard and patrol outside. Hence there must be close connection
between the port captain and the Mobile Defence branch, and
since the harbor craft may often be drawn upon to augment the
outside patrol, and the outer patrol vessels would come under the
port captian upon entering inside, the logical arrangement would
seem to be to place Mobile Defence and harbor control together
under the port captain.
The Information or InteUigence Service forms a distinct staff
branch which touches all other branches. It should embrace all
cable, wire, radio and signal service, secret service and censor
ship. The official head is the chief of staff ; but under him there
should be an expert in secret service work as the real head of that
part. One cannot read of past wars without amazement at the
magnitude of the part played by secret agents. With the greater
frequency and facility of communication of our day, and the
characteristic indiscretion of our press in miUtary affairs, the
IntelUgence Service must be strong, firm and active. It must
be alert, especially against enemy secret agents.

The Naval Base at Key West in 1898 1465
Finally, there must be provision for the dispatch of disciplinary
matters. There is little time near the area of active operations
for many officers to drop other work in order to sit on courts
martial ; or in the staff office, to draw up technically correct court
papers. There is likelihood of considerable business in war time
with offenders or suspects ; and the more thoroughly the machin
ery can be prepared in advance, the less difficulty and fewer mis
carriages of justice and of military operations will there be. The
base commander needs at least one officer experienced as a judge
advocate; and he should have available an officer of captain or
commander rank, as a permanent president of G. M. C. These
officers need not be on the active list. With such a nucleus, and
the officers of the base and marine corps to draw upon, there
would seldom be a time when a court of five could not be easily
assembled, if not actually in continuous session.
The experience of Key West bears here also. There happened
to be one officer of experience (thirty-two years) nominally
assigned to duty afloat, but whose command afloat did not prac
ticably exist. He thus became available for other duty, and many
kinds of assignments were given him. He was like a spare right
hand to the commodore, always ready and capable to give his
undivided attention personally and immediately to whatever new
requirement the day tumed up, and the commodore could act
upon his reports with confidence. It is to meet needs of this
kind — courts, boards, personal investigations, and missions requir
ing rank and experience beyond the average lieutenant's — that in
assigning the staff of a base commander, " additional aids "
¦ should be allowed him. One there certainly should be of rank
not lower than lieutenant commander, and preferably two, or
more, according to the saliency and extent of the base. Such an
unclassified position may strike some as superfluous, but the billet
is far from being a sinecure. It calls for energy, adaptability,
judgment, decision, and tact, all to a high degree.
Recapitulating, the base commander's work divides into
branches and subdivisions, with officers to manage them, as
follows : Base Commander
Rear admiral, with responsibility and powers of a war-time commander-in-
chief, afloat and ashore.

1466 The Naval Base at Key West in 1898
Base Commander's Staff
Chief of statf, a captain or commander.
General direction and supervision.
A. Reports and orders, a lieutenant.
Incoming and outgoing orders, instructions, and reports.
B. Material control, a pay officer.
Fuel, lubricants, and water.
Ammunition, ordnance, and munitions.
Provisions and clothing.
General supplies and equipage.
C. Repair control, a lieutenant commander or lieutenant, a naval constructor.
D. Port captain, a commander or lieutenant commander.
Mobile defence.
Harbor control — harbor master — a lieutenant commander.
E. Intelligence and communication, a lieutenant, a marine officer, an army
officer.
F. Disciplinary affairs, a commander or lieutenant commander (may be
retired).
G. Sanitation, a medical inspector.
H. Important miscellany, a lieutenant commander.
The foregoing lettered subdivisions should form a so-called
" Central Office." In reality, the central office would be the
chief of staff's office. The officers in charge of subdivisions
would be in immediate accessibility, all on board the base com
mander's flagship, or in his water front office. Only one officer,
the harbor master, under subdivision D, would be an outside or
field worker.
The remainder of the base organization would be apart from
the staff, as follows : Personnel Control
Base flagship's captain in charge.
Receiving ship.
Hospital and hospital ships' sick rolls, of officers and men likely to
return to duty. Fixed Defence
A general or brigadier in command.
Fortifications. Support. Shore-controlled mine and torpedo defence.
Local security and police on shore.

The Naval Base at Key West in 1898 1467
Thus, to be the principal officers of the base commander's staff
there would be required :
I Captain,
2 Commanders (i retired),
S Lieutenant commanders and lieutenants,
I Medical inspector or surgeon,
I Pay inspector or paymaster,
I Marine officer,
I Army officer,
12 Total.
This seems a large staff until one considers the volume of their
business and the importance of handling it with accuracy and
dispatch and security. These are the heads of departments. They
would need assistants, some of whom would be suppUed by the
vessels of the train and at the base. There would also have to
be several lieutenants for current executive duty, just as a ship
needs watch officers as well as department heads :
Signal and radio watch, at least 3 lieutenants ;
Personal aids, 2 lieutenants or junior lieutenants.
Outline of a Proposed Train Staff Organization
In organizing the business of the fleet's permanent train, con
sisting of coUiers, supply ships, ammunition ships, tank ships,
repair ships, hospital ships, and refrigerator ships, not to mention
mine-depot ships and torpedo and submarine tenders, which
might often accompany the train, many points of similarity to the
base commander's business appear.
The train commander's status should include supreme author
ity within his command. He should have a commander-in-chief's
disciplinary powers. The admiral of the fleet should be served
by the train, not burdened with any details of its administration.
The train commander should relieve him' of all that. All the
train personnel should be accustomed to look solely to their
own commander, not at all beyond him. The power to act sum
marily in all cases would be especially important in deaUng with
the comparatively undisciplined personnel that might, probably
would, be found in large proportion in the train.
The train business divides as follows :

1468 The Naval Base at Key West in 1898
Train Commander
Rear admiral, with responsibility and powers of a war-time commander-in-
chief. Train Commander's Staff
Chief of staif, a captain or commander.
General direction and supervision.
A. Reports and orders, a lieutenant.
Incoming and outgoing orders, instructions, and reports.
B. Material for issue, a pay inspector.
C. Fleet engineer work, a lieutenant commander or lieutenant.
Ci. Hull repair, a naval constructor.
D. Tactical control, movements, station keeping, formations for steaming,
defence, and anchoring — a commander or lieutenant commander.
Di Troop affairs, a marine officer.
E. Communication (signals, radio, etc.), and intelligence, a lieutenant.
F. Disciplinary affairs, a commander or lieutenant commander (may be
retired).
G. Sanitation, a medical inspector.
H. Miscellaneous inspections, examination, etc., a lieutenant commander.
The foregoing may not be all the officers required for staff
work. On the contrary, assistants will be indispensable in every
subdivision except two, F and G, DiscipUne and Sanitation. But
the work divides naturally in a way parallel to that of the base
commander. When a permanent base exists, as intended at Pearl Harbor,
for instance, the base organization would be complete and estab
Ushed before war broke. At such a base, the stay of the train
would be temporary ; it would be prepared to move, and although
its resources might be drawn upon by the fleet, the local facilities
and stocks would feel the principal draft.
Advanced beyond the permanent bases, however, no local
organization would be found established. Consequently, a base
organization, additional to that for the Fixed Defence, must be
carried by the train or be supplied from its personnel. The
summaries that have been made of the train commander's business
and of the base commander's business show that a transition from
the former to the latter status would be a convenient and natural
procedure. That is, upon occupying a base, the train commander
would become the base commander, he and his staff carrying on,
without a break, their business at the base corresponding to their
duties en route.

The Naval Base at Key West in 1898 1469
In the event of the detachment of a portion of the train to
accompany a detachment of the fleet, the managing would fall
under the ordinary procedure for control by the senior officer
present. Should practically the whole train leave the base, to
accompany the fleet, it could do so with least disturbance of
administration, ashore as weU as afloat, since the Fixed Defence
interior organization is independent of the remainder of the base
organization, and would be complete for local defence and control
on shore in the absence of the train.
There is finally one detail deserving mention by reason of its
importance to continuity of military administration at the base.
Considering the physical drain of a tropical cUmate and other
causes that might lead to the disablement of the base commander
for duty, his chief of staff should be expressly empowered to
succeed him. Assuming that the base commander and his chief
of staff are chosen for their qualifications, it would not be con
ducive to smoothness of working for the temporary command to
devolve upon a chance senior. The base chief of staff should
therefore be fumished with a provisional commission as acting
rear admiral, antedated, for use during the' disability of his chief.
Such a measure would preserve the authority and prestige of the
base commander's office unimpaired and unbroken — ^not a small
consideration in a heterogeneous organization, especially when it
is remembered that the majority of persons on duty at the base
are inwardly, if not outwardly, chafing or disappointed at not
being " at the front." APPENDIX A
Naval Base Naval Base, Key West,
Order No. 2 U. S. Flagship " Lancaster," July 4, 1898.
I. Vessels in port using steam launches will send to the flagship for mail
at 10 a. m. and 4 p. m. daily; other vessels will send once daily, at their
convenience. 2. Commanding officers will compare their signal books with those of the
flagship upon each return to the naval base.
3. Immediately on arrival in Key West, commanding officers will send a
written report to this office of coal, water, repairs, and supplies needed,
and the probable duration of stay in port.
4. Hospital tickets and requisitions should be sent to the commandant
of the naval station for action. Requisitions should never be sent by mail,
but should be personally fpllowed up until the articles required are secured.

1470 The Naval Base at Key West in 1898
The limited facilities at this base demand that every ship's needs be
diligently looked after by her own officers.
5. Under no circumstances will ashes be dumped overboard from ships
or steam launches in Key West Harbor.
6. The inspector of the 7th Light House District offers facilities in his
office, 3d floor of Custom House, to officers of vessels desiring to plot on
their charts the position of the new buoys near the main ship channel, Key
West. 7. When vessels coal alongside chartered colliers, immediate report will
be made to this office of any claim for damages received by the collier.
Commanding officers will make sure whether the master of the collier
intends to make a claim.
8. Naval vessels will deliver to the nearest postoffice, to be held subject
to orders of the postoffice department, any sacks of mail that may be found
on board captured vessels, except when some military reason interferes
with such a course.
9. The department warns vessels flying flag of truce that, if they approach
Spanish coasts nearer than six miles, they will be fired on.
10. The department directs that under no circumstances will the reserved
pay of undergraduate cadets be encroached upon. Five dollars of each
month's pay must be transferred to the reserved pay.
II. All enlisted men, when liberty is allowed, will be required to return
to their respective vessels at ten o'clock or earlier. Stragglers will be sent
for next morning by the ship's police.
12. The list of officers and men on board ships when prizes are taken
must be made out with great care ; the full name of every officer and man
and the exact rank or rating held at the time the prize was taken must be
stated. The lists must be in duplicate, one for the Navy Department and
one for the Auditor for the Navy Department ; they must be certified by the
commanding officer ; and must be submitted with claims for prize-money.
13. Applications for men to fill vacancies in the complement of any ship
will be made direct to the commanding officer of the Lancaster, in writing.
Exchanges also are permitted, with that ship. When the required ratings
cannot be supplied, the total number of the complement will be filled by men
of other ratings.
14. Commanding officers are directed to keep the total number of their
respective complements filled, and will also, until further orders, keep as
many men in excess as can be accommodated without detriment to health
and efficiency. Most of the men now available as reserve for the fleet being
inexperienced, it is desirable that they see as much service as possible in
vessels where they may have instruction and drill.
15. Applications for men for a vessel will be made immediately on
arrival at the base ; if more men are needed later, a second application will
be made the day before the commanding officer expects to report his vessel
ready for orders to sea. Vessels long in port will avoid asking for men
oftener than once a week.
16. Vessels that have not received from the department their war comple
ments will make immediate application for them, recommending such addi
tions to their ordinary complements as they deem most advisable.

The Naval Base at Key West in 1898 1471
17. When men are transferred to hospital, their accounts, papers, and
effects will be transferred immediately to the Lancaster; and the vacancies
in complement so made will be at once filled.
18. The rating of electrician has been established, with the view of taking
all gunner's mates out of dynamo rooms, as far as practicable, in order
that they may be distributed among new ships. Gunner's mates are not
to be given acting appointments as electricians, and should not be detailed
for electric plant, if electricians are available. The Bureau of Navigation
desires that gunner's mates, where possible, be relieved from duties that
can be performed by electricians.
19. Naval vessels visiting Port Tampa are authorized to enlist men for
general service, for one year unless sooner discharged, in the ratings of
seamen, ordinary seamen, machinists, and firemen, first and second class,
and any other ratings necessary for the fleet. Men may be enlisted in the
ratings specified without regard to the necessities of the fleet, and will be
transferred to the Lancaster or vessels needing them.
20. Men of vessels in Key West whose terms of enlistment are about to
expire will, if possible, be sent north by public conveyance for discharge.
Before a vessel leaves the base for her station, all such men will be trans
ferred to the Lancaster, provided an opportunity is soon to occur for
transfer north.
21. Vessels to which no medical officer is attached may obtain needed
medical service from the Lancaster.
22. Commanding officers of vessels whose accounts are kept by the pay
officer in charge of accounts of auxiliary vessels will send him immediate
information on any occurrence or transaction that affects their respective
accounts ; and upon each return to the base they will promptly confer with
him on all such matters.
23. Newly commissioned vessels must send in a descriptive muster roll
before first leaving port; and all vessels must without fail send in the
reports of changes of officers and men, before sailing.
24. Vessels will keep their supply of ammunition as near the full allow
ance as practicable, transferring to the naval station all empty ammunition
cases, to be sent north.
25. Any U. S. naval vessel requiring a pilot will apply to the commandant
of naval station.
26. Commanding officers will aid in every way possible in preventing the
introduction of yellow fever into the United States, through the medium
of small craft containing persons and baggage, landing surreptitiously on
the Florida coast. Such vessels should be apprehended, if the circum
stances of the service permit, and sent in to the nearest of the following
quarantine stations : Mississippi River, Ship Island, Mississippi, Mobile Bay,
Mullet Key (Tampa), Dry Tortugas, Brunswick, Sapelo, and Savannah,
Georgia, Charleston, Cape Fear, Cape Charles.
27. No baggage, clothing, merchandise, or other material, not of a
strictly military or naval character, that is capable of conveying infection,
will be received on board U. S. vessels; and any vessel arriving in Key
West with any Cuban or Spaniard aboard, of whatever rank or character,
will hold herself in quarantine until regularly granted pratique.

1472 The Naval Base at Key West in 1898
28. The freight or express charges on mess stores or other goods ordered
from the north should be prepaid, as the forwarding of such matter is
greatly facilitated thereby.
Geo. C. Remey,
Commodore, Commanding.
APPENDIX B
Report required by Par. 3, U. S. S  ¦  ,
Naval Base Order No. 2. Key West  '98.
From  Probably stay .... days. Can go
(how soon). Coal on hand, .... days ordinary steaming. Require 
tons. Water required, for boilers,  gals. ; for drinking  gals.
Supplies needed : 
Repairs : Boilers 

Engines,

Commanding.

APPENDIX C

Condition.
7. Vessels A-N.
Hospital.
Deaths.
8. Vessels 0-Z.
Revenue cutters.
Naval base and station.
Repairs.
9. Boards.
New equipment.
Courts.
Damage.
Commander-in-chief.
Sentences.
Squadrons.
Blockade.
10. Men.
Men-named.
Mail.
Men-reports.
Freight and transportation.
Telegrams confirmed. 11. Miscellaneous.
Miscellaneous personal.
S. Officers — i. Convoy and expeditions.
Officers — 2.
Officers — personal. 12. Prize vessels — i.
Prize vessels — 2.
6. Ammunition. Prisoners.
Coal.
Water.Various supplies.
The Naval Base at Key West in 1898 1473
Naval Base Naval Base, Key West,
Order No. 4 U. S. Flagship " Lancaster,"
August IS, 1898.
30. All enlistments except of continuous service men, will be discontinued.
Paragraph ig. Naval Order No. 2, is therefore revoked.
31. Hereafter, men in excess of a vessel's complement will not be retained
longer than is necessary to transfer them to the Lancaster, or a vessel
whose crew is short of the allowed complement, nor will any men be
furnished in excess of complement.
32. Men whose terms of enlistment have expired will be immediately dis
charged in Key West. When a man is discharged in Key West at his own
request, the fact of such request will be noted upon the enlistment record
and the discharge.
33. Commanding officers will be particular to send with men's transfer
papers a letter, stating specifically the authority and reason for transfer
and calling attention to any unusual attendant circumstance.
34. The temporary entry in the navy secret code to be made in May last,
in Table Bi, 08x45, and 08146 respectively " Flying Squadron " and " Com
mander-in-Chief of Flying Squadron " will now be removed.
Geo. C. Remey,
Commodore, Commanding.
Naval Base Naval Base, Key West,
Order No. S U. S. Flagship " Lancaster,"
August 16, 1898.
35. Hereafter vessels will carry the usual running lights.
36. Vessels arriving at Norfolk are to proceed to the quarantine- station
and to comply with the quarantine regulations ; and vessels going to other
northern ports will be careful not to transgress the local quarantine restric
tions.
Geo. C. Remey,
Commodore, Commanding.