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LETTER

Addres&ed to

Two GREAT MEN.

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L E T T E
Addressed to
Two GREAT MEN,
O N T H E
Prospect of PEACE;
And on the Terms neceffary to be infilled
upon in the NEGOCIATION.

Mea quidem fententid, pud, qua nihil habit ura fit infidiarum,
femper eji conjulendum. De Offic. Lib. i.
There is a Tide in the Affairs of Men,
Which taken at the Flood, leads on to Fortune ;
Omitted, all the Voyage of their Life
Is bound in Shallows and in Miferies.
On fuch a full Sea are we now a-float,
And we muft take the Current when it ferves,
Or lofe our Ventures. Shakest.

The SE_COND EDITION, corroded.

I O N D O N:
Printed for A. Millar, in thc Strand.

MDCCLX.

A

LETTER

Addressed to

Two GREAT MEN.

My Lord, and Sir,
YOU will be furprifed at an Addrefs made to
you jointly in this Manner ; but as I have
not the Honour to be much acquainted with ei
ther of you, (though I efteem you both, at leaft
while you remain connected) I hope you will for
give me for troubling you, in this public Way ;
and the rather, as I think the Matters I fhall
Write upon, to be of very great Importance ; and
as you will difcover by what I am going to fuggeffc
to you, that I am a true Friend to Old England,
and a fincere Lover of my Country.
1 have long thought that our Minifters of State
may be much affifted, in their Deliberations, by
Perfons who have not the Honour of fitting at the
Council-board, The wifeft Meafures have often
B been

[ 2 ]
been pointed out, in the Courfe of parliamentary
©ebate ; and Members of either Houfe, perhaps
thofe leaft confulted by Government, have fre
quently been earlieft in fuggefting fuch Plans of
public Policy, as Government itfelf has been glad
to adopt. The Extinction of factious Oppofition,
the Unanimity of every Party, and the Acquief
cence of every Connection, in whatever Scheme is
propofed by his Majefty's Servants, w,hile it hath
produced ir: finite Advantages to- the Public, hath
deprived thofe who direct the Cabinet, of all fuch
Parliamentary Inftruction, as their Predecefibrs in
Power ufed to receive. You, my Lord, of late,
fcarcely hear any Speech in the Houfe of Lords,
but that of a Lawyer on a Scotch Appeal ; and the
hereditary Council of the Nation rarely afiemble
for higher Purpofes than to alter Settlements and de
liberate on Bills oi Divorce. And you, Sir, in the
other Houfe, where fo many fkilful Champions
ufed formerly to engage and ftruggle for Victory,
remain fingle in the Field of Battle ; and your
Speaker takes the Chair only to vote Millions and
levy Thoufands, without the leaft Debate or Op
pofition. The Channel of Parliamentary Inftruction being
thus ftopt, no other but that of the Prefs is left
open, for thofe Heads of Advice to which it may
be worth your while to attend. For this Reafon
it is, that 1 have thought of addreffingyou in this
Manner. Who 1 am, it matters nor. Let it fuf-
fice, that, unpenfioned and unemployed, I can vie,
in Zeal for the Public, with thofe who tafte the
Sweets of exorbitant Salaries, and unfathomed Per-
quifites. Whether my Knowledge be equal to my
Zeal; whether my Acquaintance with the- World,
and Experience in Bufinefs, have enabled me to
offer any Thing that may be of real Utility, muft be

[ 3 ]
be determined by you, and by the Public. This
I arri certain of, that my Intention is honeft ; and
while I pleafe myfelf, I fliall endeavour, at the fame
time, not to offend either of you. Some Produc
tions, in which you have, of late, been jointly taken
Notice of, proceeded from a faflicus Difpofition,
which I am unacquainted with, and detelt. For,
far from wifhing to difunite and feparate your In-
terefts,. 1 am fully perfuaded that without your per
fect Harmony and Union, the great Events which
have happened .under your Adminiftration, will
not haye thofe permanent good Confequences fo
much to be wifhed for : And it is only from your
joint Concurrence, that we can hope for any of
thofe prudent, fpirited and national Meafures con
cerning whtch I propofe to offer you a few Hints,
in this Addrefs.
Confidering the prefent diftrefied Condition of
..France, fallen from its alarming Power, and Great
nefs, into the loweft State of Diftrefs and Impotence ;
unfortunate in its military Operations in every Quar
ter of .the Globe ; beaten all Europe over by Sea and
Land; its Fleets failing, only to be defiroyed ; its
Annies marching, only to run away ; without Trade;
no Credit; flopping Payments, protefting Bills, and
to all Intents and Purpofes a Bankrupt Nation ;
their King, the Princes of the Blood, the Nobility,
and the Clergy carrying in all their Plate to be
coined, for the prefent extreme Exigency of their
Affairs ; difappointed and baffled in all their
Schemes on the Continent, and taught to think
no more of Invafions, by the Deftruction of the
only Fleet they had left •, — I fay, confidering all
thefe Circumftances, which I have not exaggerated,
in the leaft, it is not unnatural to imagine, that
a Period will foon be put to the Troubles of Eu
rope. France, unable, to carry on the War, muft
B a foon

[ 4 I
foon be reduced to the Neceffity^ of fuing for
Peace. We have had Bloodfhed enough. God forgive
thofe. who have occafioned this terrible Deftruction
of the human Species, and fpread Mifery, and De-
vaftation, for fo long a Time, in almoft every
Corner of the Globe. The great Succefs with
which the Arms of Britain have been bleffed, puts
it in our Power to give Peace to Europe : and it
is to the Honour of his Majefty and thofe who di
rect his Councils, that the Diftrefles of our Ene
mies have only enabled him to give the World a
Proof of his Moderation ; and to fhew that his In»
clination to make Peace, keeps Pace with the Ina
bility of France to prolong the War.
" As his Majefty entered into this War, not
" from Views of Ambition, fo he does not wifh
" to continue it, from Motives of Refentment.
" The Defire of his Majefty's Heart is, to fee a
" Stop put to the Effufion of Chriftian Blood."
What was declared, in the above Paragraph of
his Majefty's Speech from the Throne, to our own
Parliament, at the Opening of this Seffion, has fince
that, been notified in Form to our Enemy. The
Readinefs of England, and Pruffia, to enter into a
Treaty, and to give Peace to Chriftendom, which
Prince Lewis of W olfenbuttle hath been authorized
to communicate to the French Minifter at the Hague,
will, no doubt, open the Door for a Negotiation,
in a Manner the moft likely to be embraced by the
Court of Verfailks ; whofe Difgraces and Diftrefles,
too great to be difTembled, and too extenfive to
be remedied, will difpofe them to liften with At
tention to every Propofal of Accommodation, made
to them by an Enemy whofe Sword was unfheath-
ed only to punifh Perfidy ; and whofe Succeffes,
as appears from their making their firft Advances towards

[ 5 I
towards a Treaty, have not infatuated them to
prefer unneceflary and ruinous Conqueft, to a rea
fonable and folid Peace.
It is, therefore, to be hoped, and to be believed,
that Peace is not at a great Diftance ;' and upon
this Suppofition I fhall beg Leave to offer a few
Confiderations to you, as to the Perfons on whom
the Fate of this Country depends ; Confiderations
which are equally important as they are feafonable ;
and an Attention to which, before you enter upon
any Negociation, may, perhaps, affift you (if I
may be allowed to fuppofe you ftand in Need of
any Affiftance) in directing this Negociation to
fuch an Iflue, as may be equally honourable to
yourfelves, and ufeful to the Public.
In this Situation of Affairs, one of the firft Mat
ters relative to the future Negociation, which, no
doubt, muft occur to you, will be, the Choice of
thofe Perfons who are to be trufted with the
great Concerns of this Nation as Plenipotentiaries.
As much will depend upon this Point, I
fhall beg Leave to begin with giving you my
Thoughts upon it, and the other Topics on which
I propofe to trouble you will naturally arife from
each other without obferving any other Order, or
Connection, befides that in which they fhall pre
fent themfelves to a Mind intent upon its Subject.
With regard then to the Choice of Plenipoten
tiaries, I cannot but lament the Difficulties you
have to encounter, before you will be able to find
fuch as the Public will have Reafon to thank you
for. — I am not totally unknowing in the Charac
ters and Capacities of many among the great. But
when I eaft my Eyes around me, I own that I am
furprized, greatly furprized, but ftill more grieved,
to find fo few among us, capable of conducting the
arduous Tafk of making a Peace. Whether this
hath

[ 6 ]
hath arifen from Neglect in the Education of our
Men of Quality ; or whether the Qualifications
which fit them for Statefmen, have been neglected,
in Comparifon of fuch as fit them for Arthur's or
Newmarket ; or whether it be owing to the State
Policy fo fyftematically adopted, of late Years, of
giving Places, not to thePerfons who can beft exe
cute the Bufinefs— but to thofe who can beft do a
Job ; whatever be the Caufe, the Fact is certain; and
it is Matter of Amazement that there fhould be fo few
in this Ifiand, who have given any Proofs that they
are capable of conducting with Ability, much lefs
with Dexterity, this important Bufinefs of a Nego
ciation with France. Men who are verfed in Trea
ties, knowing the Interefts, Pretentions, and Con
nexions of the feveral Princes of Europe ; fkilled in
the Principles of public Law, and capable of ap
plying them on every particular. Occafion ; ac
quainted with the Commerce, the Colonies, the
Manufactures of their own .Country, Matters of
all the Inftances of Infraction of former Treaties,
which occafioned the War we are now engaged, in:
In a Word, Men whofe Rank and Confequence
amongft ourfelves, may command Refpect, and
procure them Authority, amongft our Enemies ;
and who to every other Qualification, already
enumerated, can boaft of an Integrity not to be cor
rupted, and a Steadinefs in fupporting the Inter
efts of their Country, which no Difficulties can dif-
courage, and no Temptations can fhake : ¦ 
Such are the Men, whom you muft endeavour to
employ, in the approaching Negociation, and fuch,
1 hope, ye will be able to find ; though, I own,
I am puzzled to guefs on whom the Choice will
fall, none being, as yet, pointed out by the pub
lic Voice, nor, perhaps, fixed upon by yourfelves.
Times have been, when we might have expected, to

r[ ,7 ,3
tofee£>»£ named to fuch an important Office, meerly
becaufe he was a Favourite, or a Favourite's Fa
vourite; becaufe he was connected wit.h this Mini
fter, or was a Relation of that great Man. But if
we have too frequently trifled with our national
Concerns, by trufting them in fuch Hands, I need
not fay that there are Circumftances at prefent
which give us reafonable Ground for hoping that
the fame Sagacity, and Defire to ferve the Public
which hath found out, and employed the propereft
Perfons to conduct the Operations of the War, will
be exerted to find out the propereft Perfons (few
as. there are to be found) to conduct the Delibera
tions of the Treaty.
Very deplorable indeed muft be the Inabili
ties ofthe Perfons we fhall employ, if their Nego
ciations for Peace be conducted fo awkwardly as to
rob us of the Advantages we have gained by the
War. If we may judge from late Events, France
feems as little to abound with Wifdom in the Ca-.
binet, as it doth with Courage and Conduct in the
Field. And if the Negociations at Utrecht, in
which almoft all the Advantages of a War equally
fuccefsful with the prefent, were given up, be urg
ed as an Inftance ofthe fuperior Dexterity of French
Politics, jt ought to be remembered that this was
more owing to our own Divifions, than to their
Sagacity, and the Inabilities of our Plenipotenti
aries at Utrecht, tho' we had no great Reafon, God
knows, to brag of them. What, therefore, ma^
we not expect from a Negociation to be begun in
very different Circumftances ; when there exifts no
Faction whofe Intereft it may be to perplex and de
feat it ; and when that national Unanimity to which
we, in a great Meafure, owe the Succefs of the
War, will ftill continue to exert it's blefled Fffectsj
till it make us happy with a fafe and honourable Peace ?

[ * J
Peace? — However, favourable as thefe Circum
ftances are, the Choice of fuch Plenipotentia
ries as may be likely to conduct the Negociation,
with Dignity, Dexterity and Integrity, becomes a
Confideration which the Public will expect fhould
be weighed with the utmoft Attention. And, if
fuch Perfons cannot be found amongft us (which I
hope may not be the Cafe) there is a very defirable
Alternative ftill in your Power. Fix the Scene of
Negociation, where, indeed, for the Honour of
our Country, I could wifh to fee it fixed, name no
other Plenipotentiaries to conduct the Peace but
thofe Minifters who directed the War: And a
Treaty of London, in fuch Hands, will make ample
Amends for our wretched Management at Utrecht.
But let Peace be never fo well made ; let Mi
nifters plan Treaties with the greateft Sagacity, and
Plenipotentiaries negotiate the Articles with the ut
moft Skill and Dexterity, yet we know from Hifto
ry and Obfervation, that they never can be perpetual,
and, moft commonly, are not lafting. Princes, too
frequently, feem to own no other Rule of Action,
than prefent Convenience ; and the Law of Nations
is feldom appealed to, but to fanctify Injuftice, and
fave Appearances. Nor are the pofitive Compacts
folemnly agreed upon between Nation and Nation,
better obferved. For how feldom do we fee a
Treaty religioufly adhered to, by the Parties whofe
Intereft it is to break it, and who think they are in
fuch Circumftances as to be able to break it with
Impunity ? —If fuch Infidelity be too common a-
mongft Princes in general, Experience, long Ex
perience teaches us, that the Nation with whom
we are foon to treat, excel us, at leaft, in this
Part of Policy. For no Cords are ftrong enough
to bind them. % Gallic

r 97
Gallic Faith is become proverbial, and the Neigh
bours of France can reproach her with innumerable
Inftances of a moft profligate Difregard to the moft
: fblemn Treaties. And the Reafon feems to be ob
vious, without fuppofing that Nation more perfi
dious than others. The Power, the Populoufnefs,
the Extent, the Strength .of the French Monarchy,
free them from thofe Apprehenfions which bind the
weaker Side to be faithful to it's Engagements;
and depending upon the Inability of their Neigh
bours, confidered fingly, to procure to themfelves
Juftice., this, too frequently, has tempted them to
the moft fhameful and barefaced Inftances of na
tional Breach of Faith.
It well becomes us, therefore, at this Juncture
when the Diftrefles ofthe French, we may hope, will
oblige them to confent to Terms of Peace, unfa
vourable to the Intereft, and difgraceful to the Glo
ry of their Monarch, to take every Method in
our Power to fecure the Obferyance of thofe Con-
ceffions they may make ; and to infift upon their
giving us fuch Proofs of their Sincerity, before any
Negociation be entered upon, as may give us fom«
Affurance that they mean to be more faithful to
their future Engagements.
What Proof of their Sincerity, I would recom
mend it to you to demand, what Conceflians it will
be neceflary to infift upon, I fhall beg Leave to
mention ; after having firft fatisfied you by a De
tail of fome Particulars, that fuch Demands as I
would propofe cannot be looked upon as the In
folence of a Conqueror,but as the wife Forefight of
a People whom dear - bought Experience hath
taught the proper Way of doing itfelf Juftice.
It may not, therefore, be unneceflary to place
before your Eyes, fome of the moft remarkable In-
ftanees of French Perfidy, which have given Rife
C to

[ 10 J
to all the Troubles oi Europe for above thefe hun
dred Years.
The Peace of Weftphalia *, while it fecured the
Liberties and Religion oi Germany, alfo laid the
Foundation of that Power which hath made France,
ever fince, the Terror of Europe. By this Treaty %
the Upper and the Lower Alface, a Country of
great Extent, and of infinite Confequence in Point
of Situation, was ceded to France. In this Country
there were Ten Imperial Cities, whofe Privileges
and Liberties were in the moft folemn Manner fe
cured by the fame Treaty, which exprefly fays,
b that they fhall preferve their Freedom, and that the
King of France fhall not affume over them, any 'Thing
more than the bare Right of Pretention. How was
this Article obferved ? The ten Imperial Cities
have been humbled to receive the French Yoke, e-
qually with the reft of Alface, and remain now,
lafting Monuments, what others may expect from
Power unreftraihed by Juftice.
The Treaty f of the Pyrenees ftill enlarged the
Boundaries oi France, efpecia/Vy on the Side oi Flan
ders; and the Spaniards thought themfelves fafe
from farther Lofles, by the Marriage of their In
fanta to Louis the XIV. who upon that Occafion,
jointly with her, made a formal Renunciation of
all her Rights, to fucceed to any Part of the Spanifh
PofTeffions. And yet, with unparalleled Infolence,
feven Years had fcarcely elapfed before Flanders was
again attacked, on Pretence of thofe very Rights
which had been fo lately renounced, and which
even tho' they had not been renounced, muft have
» V^8, r. " Article 73' & fe1- ' b ArticIe 88.
Le Roi de France ne s'arrogera, fur les villes de la Prefecture,
3ue le fimple Droit de Proteaion, qui appartenoit a la Maiforl
'Autriche. f i6$9-
4 appeared

L « ]
appeared chimerical, unlefs a Sifter can have a
Right to fucceed in Preference to her Brother.
The Peace of Nimeguen -f- reftored the Tranquil
lity of Europe, which the InvafiOn of Holland
by the French had difturbed. But fcarcely was the
Peace figned before it was fhamefully violated. The
Decrees of the Chambers of Re-union, by which
Lewis the XIV. feized fo many Territories, to
which he had not the leaft Right ; the Surprifal of
Strafburg, and the Blockade of Luxemburgh, fhew-
ed fuch a Wantonnefs of Perfidy, as no Hiftory of
trie moft barbarous and unpolifhed Savages could
well exceed; and juftly drew upon the common
Oppreflbr, the joint Vengeance of offended Eu
rope. Who is ignorant of the Story of the Partition
Treaty ? Solemnly entered into to preferve that
Tranquillity which the Treaty of Refwick had
juft reftored to Europe, it was no fooner made than
it was fhamefully abandoned by the Court of
France •, and for fuch Reafons as will, upon every
Occafion, juftify every Injuftice. The Letter of
the Treaty, indeed, was violated, they muft own 5
— but the Spirit of it was what ought to be attend
ed to. And by fuch a Comment, worthier of a
pitiful Sophifter, than of a moft Chriftian King, his
Grandfon was affifted in placing himfelf on the
Throne of Spain.
The Politics of Lewis the XV. have been faith •
fully copied from thofe of his Great- Grandfather ;
and the Behaviour of France, upon the Death of
Charles the VI. is a frefh Proof, of how little Ufe
are the moft folemn Treaties, with a Power tha t
knows no Ties but thofe of Intereft.— The Treaty
of Vienna had but two or three Years before *, an ;
nexed to the Crown of France, the Dutchy of Lor-
t "679, * In 1738.
C z rain

r « j
tain , a Ceffion which was purchafed, and purchaf
ed cheaply, by the Guarantee of the J Pragmatie
Saitclion. By this Stipulation, France was under
the moft folemn Engagements to fupport theQueert
of Hungary in the Poffeffion of all her Father's Do
minions. Bat how was the Engagement fulfilled ?
Pofierity will fcarcely believe fuch bare faced Per
fidy was poffible, as our Times faw was actually a-
vowed upon that Occafion. Germany was, inftant-
Jy, covered with the Armies of France, to affift
the Elector of Bavaria, in an Attempt to overturn
the Pragmatic Sanction fo lately guaranteed by France,
and to dethrone that Princefs whom the French
were bound by a Treaty, fworn to in the Name of
the Holy Trinity, to protect and defend from all
her Enemies.
I have brought down this Sketch of French Faith
to the prefent Times ; imperfect indeed ; but, as
far as it goes, ftriflly conformable to Hiftorical
Truth.-— What Confidence, then, can France ex
pect any of its Neighbours will put in her, after
fo many and fuch flagrant Inftances of national Per-.
jury, as fhe appears to be guilty of ?  The Ca
talogue of her Infidelities will ftill be encreafed ;
and the little Reafon that our Ifland, in particular,
has to truft Her, will ftill be more apparent, by
reminding you bf fome ofthe many Proofs, which
Great Britain itfelf can appeal to, of French Inge
nuity in Treaty-breaking.— I fhall go no higher
than the Peace of Utrecht, becaufe the Inftances in
which it hath been violated by France, have produ
ced the prefent War ; and becaufe the Enumera
tion of them will lead me, naturally, to thofe Hints
which I mean to throw out, as neceffary to be at
tended to, in our future Negociations ; and which,
^f neglected, will lofe to this Nation all the Fruits
J Treaty of Vienna, Article 10,

L 13 J
of thofe Succefles, to gain which, we have ftrainect
every Nerve, and loaded ourfelves with a Burthen
under which it is a Miracle that we have not alrea
dy funk.
The War which was clofed by the Peace of Utrecht
had been> undertaken with Views confined, altoge
ther, to the Continent of Europe, and carried on,
though at an immenfe Expence,more to gain Con-
quefts for our Allies, than for ourfelves. However,
in the Treaty of Peace, fome Advantages andCon-
ceffions were ftipulated in Favour of the Crown of
Great Britain, and its commercial Interefts.
By the 12th Article, All Nova Scotia or Acadia,
with it's ancient Limits, and with all its Dependencies,
is ceded to the Crown of Great Britain.
And by the 15 th Article, The Subjects of France*
Inhabitants of Canada, and elfewhere, Jhall not difiurb
or moleft, in any manner whatever, the Five Indian
Nations which are fubjeSi to Great Britain, nor it's
other American Allies,
Let us now fee how thefe Articles have been ob
ferved. The French feem to have had two Capital
Views in all their American Schemes, ever fince
they have thought Trade and Commerce an Object
worthy of their Attention. The firft was to ex
tend themfelves from Canada, Southwards, through
the Lakes along the Back of our Colonies ; by
which means they might anfwer a double Purpofe,
of cutting off our Communication with the Indian
Nations, and of opening a Communica|ion for
themfelves, between the Rivers St. Lawrence and
Miffifippi, and thus to join, as it were, their Colo
nies of Canada and Louifiana. The other Part of
their Plan, equally important, and more irr medi
ately fatal to our Interefts in North America, was
\o gain a Communication with the Ocean ; the only
Accel's

L H I
Accefs they now have to Canada, through the Ri
ver St. Lawrence, being fhut up half the Year.
Full of this favorite Project of American Em
pire, foon after the Treaty of Utrecht, they began
to enlarge their Boundaries on that Continent, in
direct Violation ofthe folemn Conceffions they had
fo lately made.
. As long ago as 1720, they feized and fortified
the moft important Pafs in America, at Niagara j
in that very Country of the five Indian Nations,
from which the 15th Article of the Treaty of U-
trecht had excluded them. The infinite Confe
quence of Niagara made them lefs fcrupulous, no
Doubt, about Treaties; For by means of this U-
furpation they, in a Manner, became Mafters of
the Lakes, and could, at Leifure extend them
felves to the Ohio, and carry their Chain of Forts
and Settlements.down to the Miffifippi.
The Plan of Ufurpation on the Back of our
Colonies went on gradually and fuccefsfully from
Year to Year ; the Indians owned by the Peace of
Utrecht to be our Subjects, were debauched from
our Intereft, and fpirited up to maflacre, and fcalp
the Englifh; and in 1731, the Infolence ofthe
French grew to fuch an Heighth, that they erected
their Fort at Crown-Point, in a Country indifput-
ably ours ; whether confidered as in the Center of
the jJ'W Nations, or as actually within the Limits of
New-York. And whoever calls his Eye upon the
Situation of this Fort, in the Map, will lee how
greatly the Poffeffion of it facilitated the Comple
tion of the great Object of opening a Communica
tion with the Ocean ; and how much it expofed
our moft valuable Colonies to Indian Mafiacres and
French Invafions.
If it fhould be afked, what was our Miniftry in
England employed about, during fuch Inftances of
French

[ *5 ]
French Perfidy — the Anfwer muft be, (tho^ I wifh
I could draw a Veil over this Period) that our Af- '
fairs were then conducted by a Minifter who was
awake, indeed, to every Scheme of Corruption ;
eager to buy a Borough, or to bribe a Member ;
but flow to every Meafure of national Importance
and Utility, His firft, his only Object, was to
preferve himfelf in Power ; and as, in Profecu-
tion of fuch interefted and mercenary Views, he
had actually engaged this Nation in an Alliance
with France, in Europe, (to pull down the exorbi
tant Power of our old and natural Ally) it was no
Wonder that he heard unmoved, and fuffered with.
Impunity, the French Ufurpations in North America.
Let us next trace the French Infidelity with Re
gard to Nova Scotia or Acadia. Tho' that Pro
vince had been yielded to us at Utrecht, we had
taken very few Steps to fettle it effectually, till
1749, after the Peace of Aix la Chapelle. And
then the French Court gave us a Specimen of Chi
cane worthy indeed, of thofe whom no Treaty
ever bound, in Oppofition to their Convenience.
They began to fpeak out, and to tell us, nay to
infift upon it ferioufly in Memorials, that the
Country ceded to us under the Name of Novd
Scotia, comprehended only the Peninfula, and did
not extend beyond the Ifthmus. Whereas "the
Charters of King James I. to Sir William Alexan
der; and Sir William's own Map as old as the
Charter, demonftrate that the ancient Limits of the
Country fo named included a vaft Tract of Land,
- beyond the Peninfula, reaching along the, Coaft till
it joined New England ; and extending up the
Country till it was bounded by the South Side of
the River St. Lawrence. Of fuch an Extent of
Country they had formed a Plan to rob us ; hop
ing, no Doubt, to find the fame Supir.enefs in the
. Britijb

Britijb Adminiftration which had overlooked their
former Encroachments. With this View they de-
fired that Commiflaries might meet to fettle the
Limits, promifing not to act in America, till thofe
Commiflaries fhould agree,or the Conferences break
up. But how was this Promife obferved ? While
the Commiflaries trifled away their Time at Paris,
-the Ufurpations went on in America ; Incurfions
were frequently made into the Peoinfula of Aca-
„dia, the Poffeffion of which they did not pretend
to difpute with us ; Forts were built by them in
feveral Places, and particularly a moft important
One to command the IJlhmus ; thus deciding by
the Sword, in Time of full Peace, that Contro
verfy which they themfelves had agreed fhould be
amicably adjufted by their Commiflaries ; and fur-
nifhing a laftirtg Warning to us, that a Treaty
which leaves Points of Confequence to be de
termined by any After- Conferences, only ferves to
light up another War.
While the French Ufurpations went on fo info-
Jently in Nova Scotia ; the Plan was carrying on
with equal Perfidy on the Banks of the Ohio ; a
Country, the Inhabitants of which had been in Al
liance with the Englifh above an hundred Years
ago ; an Alliance frequently renewed ; to which
alfo we had a Claim as being a Conqueft of the
Five Nations, and from which ; therefore, the
French were excluded by the 15th Article ofthe
Treaty of Utrecht above recited. But what avail
Treaties when Intereft comes in Competition ? The
Poffeffion of the Ohio was abfolutely neceffary,
that the great Plan of connecting Canada with
Louifiana might fucceed: And, therefore, they
began their Hoftilities againft us, in that Country
very foon after the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle ; in
fulted ourTraders, plundered, and made them Pri
soners i erected fortreffes, and efiablifhed Settfe-
ments;

[ *7 1
ments ; and our Governor of Virginia having fent
Wajhington, in 1753, to complain of thefe Hoftili-
ties, he returned with an Anfwer from the French
commanding Officer on the Ohio, which only
fhewed how much in earneft they were to main
tain themfelves in their new Ufurpations.
From this Period we may look upon the War as
begun. Our Governors in North-America had
Orders from England, to oppofe the French En
croachments by force of Arms; and, in 1754,
Wajhington was fent agajn to the Ohio, with fome
Troops ; but being defeated, by the fuperior Num
bers ofthe Enemy, who had juft before taken the
Englifh Fort, they made themfelves Mailers of this
important Country.
No Doubt the French Minifters flattered them
felves that England, inattentive to the Interefts of
its Colonies for fo many Years before, and who,
fo lately, had fubmitted to a Difadvantageous
Peace, would not have the Spirit to oppofe Force
to Force, and do itfelf Juftice by other Weapons
than the Complaints of Lord Albemarle, and the
Memorials of Mr. Mildmay. But the Hour of
Vengeance was, at laft, come ; the Interefts of the
Kingdom were attended to by thofe in Power ; the
infinite Importance of our American Colonies was
underftood, and a Refolution taken to have Re-
courfe to Arms. And thus England, which, for
half a Century, had been wafting its Millions, and
lavifhing its Blood, to obtain a Barrier in Flanders,
which thofe for whom we conquered it could not
defend, or rather did not think it worth while to
keep ; began the prefent War, a War truly NA
TIONAL.
If there be Merit in this fpirited Conduct of the
Britijb Adminiftration, from the Peace of Aix-la-
Chapelle, to therbreaking out of the prefent War,
D tdl

L >8 ]
tell your Enemies, A2y Z-^J, that you, and a near
Relation of yours (whofe Memory * will always
be refpected) had then the chief Direction of public
Bufinefs. And you, Sir, will pardon me for pay
ing this Compliment to thofe who began the War
with Spirit -, while I, at the fame Time, declare it
as my Opinion that your coming into Power after
it was begun, has contributed to its being carried
on with a Succefs equally glorious and important
to the Nation.
But before I make the Application of the above
Deduction concerning -f our American Complaints
(which I fhall, by and bye, make Ufe of, when I
come to fpeak to the Terms which it will be ne
ceffary to infift upon at the approaching Treaty) it
will be proper to mention another moft important
Inftance of French Perfidy in Europe.
• * Though this great Minifter died in 1754, and .the prefent
War was not declared in Form till 1756, he certainly has a Claim
to lhare in the Merit of the jfiirited Conducl here fpoken of. Our,
American Concerns were properly attended to, in his Time ; oar
Colony of Nova Scotia liberally fupported,and its ancient Limits
tjferted; the Complaints of our Colonies, in general, againft the
French Encroachments were not fti<$ed or neglected, but Orders
Were fent from England to repel Force by Force ; in confequence
cf which Orders, Wajhington's ' unfortunate Expedition to the
Ohio in 1754, was undertaken. I leave this Note to the Confi-
fideration of thofe minute Critics, who though^ they had detected
an Anachronifm here. Perhaps I cannot fo welljuflify my hav
ing omitted (though it was not by Defign) to give a Share of
Commendation to 'the great and learned Lord (who retired from,
the higheft Station in the Law, after having filled it with fo re
markable Abilities and Integrity)whofe Behaviour, upon this Oc
cafion, deferved as well of his Country, as it had done many
Tears before, when his Spirit, in contributing, jointly with
tlie two Relations here meant, to call forth national Ven
geance, procured him, from the Wags of thofeDays, the military
Title 0f C  IT — ke.
f For the Particulars of the French Encroachments' in Ame
rica, which I have only given a Sketch of, fee the Memorial*
of our CommifTaries,* Dr. Mitchell's Conteft in America; the
Doftor's and Mr. Evans's Maps, and many other Treatifes. Tilitltirlr

[ »9 J
Dunkirk, by its Situation almoft oppofite the Mouth
ofthe Thames, had done amazing Mifchief to the
Trade bf England, during King William' 's and Queen
Anne'\ Wars. The Demolition of Dunkirk, therefore,
very naturally became a favourite Object of the
Nation; the Parliament, in 1768, addreffed her
Majefty to make no Peace without this Condition f ,
and though after a War fo fuccefsful, much more
might have been obtained for England than really
was, this Point was carefully infilled upon, and the
Ninth Article of the Peace of Utrecht obtained.
By this Article, -The French King engages to de-
mdltfh all the Fortifications of the City of Dunkirk ;
to ruin the Harbour ; to break the Dykes and Sluices. —
The Works towards the Sea to be defiroyed in Two
Months, and thofe to the Land in Three Months af
ter ; all this to be done at his own Expence ; and the
Fortifications, Harbour, Dykes, and Sluices, never af
ter to be reftored. Could Words be deviled in all
the Extent of Language to flipulate, in a ftronger
Manner, the effectual and fpeedy Demolition of
this Place ? And yet all Europe faw with Amaze
ment, and England beheld with Indignation, the
Peace of Utrecht violated, with Regard to this im
portant Condition, almoft as foon as it was figned.
' By the Article above-recited we fee that Dunkirk
was to be demolifhed within five Months after the
figning the Peace ; and yet, near an Year after, I
f March 2d, 1708. The Lords having fent down an Addrfe's
to the Commons for their Concurrence, relating to certain Con- '
ditions to be infifted upon, as thejiae qua non, of a Treaty with
France, Mr. Secretary Boyle reprefented, That the Britijb Na- '
tion having been at a vaft Expence of Blood and Treafure, for
the Profecution of this neceffary War, it was but juft they fhould
reap fome Benefit by the Peace : And the Town of Dunkirk
beingaNeft of Pyrates, that infefted the Ocean and did infinite
Mifchief to Trade, He, therefore, moved that the demolifh-
ing of its Fortifications and Harbours be infilled upon, in thc
enfulng Treaty of Peace, and inferted in the Addrefs, which
\vas unanimoufly approved of, and carried back to the Lords.
Sec Chandler's Debates of Parliament, Vol. -vii. P» 122. find

r 20]
find Mr. Walpole, in our Houfe of Common, in*
filling that the Peace had already been broken
with Regard to Dunkirk ; Since inftead of ruining
the Harbour, the French were then actually repairing
tbe Sluices, and working on a new Canal *. And
though the pacific Inclinations of the Miniftry ifi
1 713, when Mr. Walpole pufhed this Affair, over
ruled the Inquiry, the Facts on which it would
have proceeded were certain.
The fpirited Remonftrances of Lord Stair at
Paris, on the Acceffion of George I. concerning
this Infraction of the Peace, were the laft Inftances
of Humiliation which Lewis XIV. faw himfelf
expofed to ; and, perhaps, he would have found
himfelf obliged to do us that Juftice, by Necef-
fity, which the Regent, who foon after came into
Power, willingly agreed to from Views of privatt
Intereft. Tho' the Peace of Utrecht had obliged
the Spanifh Branch of the Bourbon Family to re
nounce their Right of Succeffion to the Crown of
France, the Duke of Orleans, who, by this Regu
lation, faw only an Infant's Life between him and
the Throne, knew well, that tho' the Renunciation
had been folemnly fworn to, the Doctrine of its
Invalidity, of its being an Act, void, ab initio, had
been publickly avowed. Torcy, as appears by
his -f Correfpondence with Lord Bolingbroke, very
* Chandler's Debates, Vol. 8. p. 69.
f See the Report of the fecret Committee, p. 13. The fol
lowing Extract from a Letter of Monfr. Torcy to Mr. St. John
is remarkable. " The Renunciation defired would be null and
" invalid by the fundamental Laws of France ; according to
" which Laws the moft near Prince to the Crown is, ofNe-
" ceffity, the Heir thereto  This Law is looked upon, as the
" Work of him who hath eftablifhed all Monarchies, and we
" are perfuaded in France that God only can abolifh it. No
" Renunciation, therefore, can deftroy it; and if the King of
"Spain fhould renounce it for the Sake of Peace, and in Obe-
t' dieni e to the King his Grandfather, they would deceive them-
•» felves |hat received it as a fufficient Expedient to prevent the*
t* Mifchief we propofe to avoid,"

[21 j
frankly made no Scruple of telling the lEnglijh be
fore Hand, that this Expedient, which had been
devifed to prevent the Union of France and Spain
under one Monarch, would be of little Force, as
being ihconfiftent with the fundamental Laws of
France ; by this Declaration giving us a very re
markable Inftance of the Weaknefs or of the
Wickednefs of our then Minifters, who could
build the Peace of Europe on fo fandy a Founda
tion, and accept of Terms which France itfelf was
honeft enough to own were not to be kept.
However, the Regent was refolved to fupport
his Claim to the Crown of France, in Exclufion
to the SpanijQ Branch ; and, as the Support and
Affiftance of England was neceffary for this Pur
pofe, it is not to be wondered at that he fhould
court the Friendfhip of a Nation from whom he
had fo much to expect ; and, therefore, he was
wife enough to do us Juftice, by carrying into
Execution, in fome Degree, the Article relating
to Dunkirk.
The perfonal Intereft of the Regent was the on
ly Reafon for this Compliance ; But fucceeding
Adminiftrations in France not being influenced by
the fame private Views to adhere to Treaties fo-
lemnly ratified, Dunkirk began gradually to rife
from its Ruins ; its Port again received Ships ;
its Trade flouriflied ; England faw itfelf deprived
of this favourite Advantage gained at Utrecht ;
and fuch was the Afcendancy of FMrch Councils
over thofe of this Ifland, at the Period I fpeak of,
that we were actually engaged in Alliances with
France, while that Nation was thus openly infu It
in g us, and infulting us, without Obflruction, in
fo effential an Article. We all remember what
paffed in Parliament in 1733, relating to the Point
now before us.  Such was the tame Acquief
cence of the Britijb Adminiftration, that Dunkirk,
by this Time, flood upon our Cuftom^Houfe
Books as a Port, from whence great Imports were
made ;

[ 22 ]
made, j and when an Inquiry concerning this was
propofed in the Houfe of Commons by a great
Parliament Man f fince dead, the then Minifter
hung his Head, in the Houfe, for Shame. And
who could have believed it poffible, that the fame
Perfon, who had been , fo ready to promote a Par
liamentary Inquiry into this Violation ofthe Peace
in 1 7 13, fhould. obftruct fuch an Inquiry, when he
himfelf was in, Power, though the Reafons for it
had become much ftronger ? Who could fee Him,
without Indignation;, fhuthis Eyes to the Re-efta-.
blifhment of Dunkirk, and obftruct the propofed
Inquiry, by getting from Cardinal Fleury (who
then governed France, and, I blufli to fay it, England
too) a delufive,. miniflerial Letter, promifing what
he knew would not be performed;--, and obtained,
perhaps, only becaufe the Cardinal was affured, that
the Breach ofthe Promife would not be refented.
While England remained fo averfe "to do itfelf
Juftice, no Wonder that Prance improved the
Opportunity, At the Time when that Minifter
was obliged to retire from Power, the Re-eftablifh-
ment of Dunkirk was completed. For, in a little
"more than a Year after*, we find a Memorial
prefented by Lord Stair to the Dutch, com
plaining of this Violation of the Peace of Utrecht,
and urging it as a Reafon for their joining us
againft France. And as it was for the Honour
of the new Adminiftration, that they began with
Meafures fo fpirited and national, it is equally
remarkable, that the fame Perfon, who had threat
ened Lewis XIV. in his own Palace, for his Slow-
nefs in demolifhing Dunkirk, lived to be again
employed by his Country at the Diftance of near
thirty Years, when the Reftoration of Dunkirk be
came an Object of national Refentment.
The two Nations had not, as yet, begun the
late War, when we faw, in One Inftance, both a
f Sir W. Wyndham. * The Memorial is dated July 1, 174?,
Proof

t*n
Proof that Dunkirk was again a Port,' and a Port
which may be made Ufe of, to endanger the Safe
ty of Britain. At the Time 1 now fpeak of -fy we
beheld the Harbour of Dunkirk crowded with
Tranfports to embark Count Saxe and the Preten
der' to invade us. And, if that Invafion had then
taken Effect, from that very Port which was to be
¦no Port (happily the Winds were contrary to the
Fleet from Breft) the infinite Mifchief which this
Nation may fuffer from its Re-eftablifhment, would.
have been fatally experienced.
Though we have no great Reafon to brag of. the
Treaty made at the Conclufion of the laft , War
(which I am afhamed to call a Peace, as it fettled
nothing that was before in Doubt between the two
Nations) the Peace of Utrecht concerning Dunkirk,
.was, neverthelefs in its moft effential Part, re-?
ftored to its full Force. I fay, in its moft Effen
tial Part ¦, becaufe, though the 1 7 th Article of the
Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle left Dunkirk in the State
it then was, with Regard to its Fortifications to the
Land ; the fame Article revived our Right, to the
Demolition of its Port, by ftipulating That ancient
Treaties are to be objerved in regard to the Port, and
the Works on tbe Sea- fide.
Little or nothing was done between the Conclu
fion of the Peace, and the breaking out of the pre
fent War, towards carrying into Execution this
frefh Promife. On the contrary, the enlarging of
the Fortifications of Dunkirk, is mentioned in his
Majefty's Declaration of War, three Years ago,
as one of the frefh Heads of Injury offered to Eng
land. And whoever reflects upon the Tranfactions,
fince that Period, will fee that Dunkirk is reftored
to its original Importance. Its Privateers have!
done infinite Mifchief to our Trade ; a Squadron of
fiis Majefty's Navy, in vain blocked up its, Han.
hour lately, to . prevent the failing of Thurot'j

Fleet ; and, it is well known, that the long
threatened Invafion of thefe Kingdoms, which
France, in Defpair, certainly meditated, would
have been attempted from this Place, if the De
ftruction of their Ships of War by Hawke, had not
taught them the Abfurdity. of invading us in their
much celebrated^ bottom Boat j,< which; we may well
fuppofe, will hardly be tried, when their Fleets, really
formidable, have been defiroyed in the (Attempt.
The above Enumeration of French Infidelities, in
general, and in particular their Behaviour to England
with regard to Dunkirk, and with regard to North -
America, fo naturally points out the Expediency and
Neceffity. ofthe Hints I fhall now offer, that, in pro-
pofir/g them, I may well hope not to have them ridi
culed as the Reveries, of a chimerical St. Pierre, but
rather attended to, aS the fober Dictates of Prudence,
and of a Zeal not altogether devoid of Knowledge.
Firft, Then; my Lord and Sir, before you enter
upori any New Treaty, or liften to any plaufible
Propofals whatever, infift that Juftice may be done
this Nation, with regard to former Treaties. Shew
France the ftrong, the folemn Engagement fhe
entered into at Utrecht to demolifh Dunkirk ; put
her in Mind of the amazing Perfidy with, which
Ihe, from Time to Time, eluded the Perfor
mance of that Engagement; and demand imme
diate Juftice on that Article, as a preliminary Proof
ofher Sincerity in the enfuing Negotiation.
Be not deceived any longer in this Matter. The
French will, no doubt, affure you that the Demo
lition of Dunkirk fhall '''be an Article in the New
Treaty. But let them 'know, you are not to befo
impofed upon. They will, to be fure, when this
becomes a new Article, reckon it a new Concef-
fion on their Side, and expect fomething in return
for it,— perhaps Guadaloupe, or fome fuch Trifle,
as they will call it. But tell them with the Firm-
jiefs of wife Con,

C 25 ]
Dunkirk is what you are intitled to by Treaties
made long ago, and violated ; and that it fhall not
be fo much as mentioned in the bluing. Negocia
tion, but complied with, before that Negociation
fhall commence.
Or, admitting that no Conceffion fhould be re
quired by France in the New Treaty, in Conside
ration of a new Article, to demolifh Dunkirk, place
to them, in the ftrongeft Light, the unanfwerable
Reafons we have againft putting any Confidence in
them, that fuch an Article would be better executed,,
than that, in the Treaty of Utrecht has been.
If they refufe doing us this immediate Juftice,
previous to the Peace ; afk them how they can ex
pect that we fhould have any Reliance on their Sin
cerity to fulfill the New Engagements they may
enter into, when they afford us fo ftrong, fo glar
ing art. Inftance of Infidelity, in an Article of fuch
Confequence, made fo many Years ago ? Can you
have any Dealings with a Power, who, if he refutes
this, at the very Time he. is treating, affords you
fuch mahifeft Proof, that his Word is not to be re
lied upon, and that you cannot truft to the Execu-!
tion of any Promife ever fo folemnly made?
Perhaps, France may think it a Difgrace to them,
to comply with any Thing previous to the Begin
ning of a Negociation. Tell them, that acting
honourably, and doing what Juftice requires, can-
never be difgraceful. But if it be a Difgrace, tell
them, with the Spirit of honeft Men, that we owe
it them, for the greater Difgrace they put, not long
ago, upon us, by requiring us to fend two Peers
of this Realm to remain in France as Hofiages, till
we furrendered Louijbourg ; an Indignity which I
cannot call to mind, without Pain ; and which, I
always thought was fubmitted to without Necef
fity. E It

t 26 ]
It is now our Turn to vindicate the Honour of
our Nation ; and as Dunkirk'wzs put into our Pof
feffion before the Treaty of Utrecht, as a Pledge ofthe
French Sincerity, and to continue in our Poffeffion, till
the Demolition fhould be completed ; let fome fuch
Expedient be now agreed upon; "with this Diffe
rence only that inftead oi five Months ajter ihe Peace,
the Time fixed, for the Demolition, at Utrecht^
let no Peace be figned, at prefent, till this Right
acquired to us by former Treaties, and of which
we have been fo perfidioufly robbed, be actually
carried into full Execution-
However, if any infuperable Difficulties fhould
attend the doing ourfelves Juftice, on this Head,
befpre the Peace ; if, for Inftance, which perhaps
may be the Cafe, it fhould be found that it cannot
be complied' with, unlefs we cpnfent to a Cejfation.
of Arms, during the. Time "of Negociation; rather
than give France that Opportunity of recovering
from its DiftrefTes, and of being protected from the
Superiority of pur Arms, before we have, finally,
pbliged thpm to accept of our own Terms of Peace
(which was onejCaufe ofthe Ruinof our Negpc'ation
at Utrecht) I would wave infilling upon the Demoli
tion of Dunkirk, before the Treaty, and think it
fufficient to demand Hdftag.es from them, as a Secu
rity that it fhall be faithfully complied with, within
a limited Time after the Treaty fhall be concluded.
The Parijians had two Englijh Milords to flare at,
upon the laft Peace ; and I do not fee why the Cu-
riofiry of our Londoners fhould not be gratified, in
the fame Way; and Two Dues and Pairs oi France
be fent as Hoflages to England, till Dunkirkiceaie
to be a Port.
I know Weil, that Political Opinions, concerning
the Importance of any particular Object, are as
frequently, dictated by Whim and Fafhion, as buijt "on

[ 27 ]
on folid Reafon and Experience. Perhaps, fome
may think, that this is the Cafe, with Regard to
the Neceffity of demolifhing Dunkirk. But, tho'
it may not at prefent be fo /avorite an Object of
National Politics, as it was in the Queen's Time ;
this has not been owing to, any real Change of Cir
cumftances ; but to another Caufe, to the American
Difputes between the two Nations, which have
been the great Object of the prefent War, and
fcarcely permitted us, hitherto, to reflect, in what
other Inftances, the1 Infidelities of France muft be
checked at the infuing Peace.  But as this defir-
able Event now approaches, we cannot forget, or
forgive the Behaviour of our Enemies with Regard
to Dunkirk; and it will be equally neceffary for the
' Honour and for the Intereft of this Nation to make
no Peace, without obtaining full Satisfaction on
this Head. It. will be neceflary for the Honour of
the Nation to infift upon this, if it were only, to
fhew to Europe in general, ,arid to France in parti
cular — 'That we have too much Spirit not to refent
Injuries; and too much Wifdom not to take Care,
when we have it happily in our Power, to prevent
them for the future.- -But the Demolition oi Dun
kirk, is alfo neceffary, if we would take Care of
the Intereft of the Nation. Such hath been our
Succefs, in deftroying the Navy of France ; and fo
unable doth that Kingdom now appear, to carry on
'its ambitious Projects by Land, and. to vie at the
fame Time, with England, for Dominion on the
Sea; that we may reafonably fuppofe, there is an
End Of Breft and Toulon Squadrons, to face our
Fleets ; and a future War with England, will leave
the French no other Way of diftreffing us by Sea,
than to lie in watch for our Merchant Ships, with
numberlefs Privateers. In fuch a piratical War,
Dunkirk, if its Harbour te not now defiroyed,'
E 2 Will,

[ 28 ]
will, too late, be found to be of infinite Confe
quence ; and we fhall fatally experience it again,
,what it was in the Queen's Time, and in the Lan
guage of her Parliament, a Neft of Pyrates, in-
fejting the Ocean, &nd doing, infinite Mifchief to
'¦Trade *.
For thefe Reafons, therefore, I am fo old-fajhion-
1 ed as to expect that our Plenipotentiaries will have
this Point properly flated to them in their Inftruc-
tions, and that Delenda eft Carthago, Demolifh Dun
kirk, will be a Preliminary Article in the enfuing
Negociation. The War having begun, principally, with a
View' to do ourfelves Juftice in North America, the
Regulation of Matters, on that Continent, ought
to be, and no Doubt, will be, the .capital Article
relating to England, in the coming Treaty. It
will be neceffary, therefore, to give you my Senti
ments, on this Head ; and while I do it, with all
becoming Diffidence, I fhall, at the fame Time,
fupport what I may offer, with Reafons appearing
fo ftrong to me, as may perhaps recommend it to
your farther Consideration, though it fhould fail of
• producing Conviction.
Now it is with the greateft Pleafure, I would
obferve, that with Regard to North America, we
have nothing to afk, at the Peace, which we have
not already made ourfelves Mailers of, during the
War. We have been bleffed by Heaven, with a
Succefs, in that Part of the World, fcarcely to be
paralleled in Hiftory. The Rafhnefs of Braddock,
the Inexperience of Shirley, the Inactivity of Lou-
dbun, and the Ill-fuccefs, of Abercrombie, feem only
to have been fo many neceffary Means of producing
that Unanimity in our Colonies, that Spirit in our
* See above, p. 18. Troorjs 1

[ 29 1
Troops ; and that fteady Perfeverance in our Mini-
Iters, as hath not only recovered from the Enemy
all his Ufurpations, but Louifbourg is an Englifh
Harbour; Quebec, the Capital ot Canada, is al
ready in pur Poffeffion; and the Reft of that
Country will fall of Courfe. t It is a Profpect ftill
more agreeable; that by deftroying the Naval
Force of Frances our North American Conquefts
cannpt be retaken ; and the Principle I would now
|ay down, and which I would recommend it to you
to adopt, is, not to give up any of them. And I
fhall now endeavour to prove to you, that fuch a
Demand may be infifted upon, without giving the
Enemy any Pretence for accufingus of Infolence to
wards them ; and cannot be omitted without giv
ing the Nation juft Reafon to complain, that we
have confented to a treacherous and delufive
Peace. It cannot, furely, ever enter the Imagination of a
Britifh Adminiftration, to make Peace, without,
at leaft, keeping in our Poffeffion, all thofe Places,
where, the French had fettled themfelves, in Viola
tion of former Treaties, and from which we have,
fortunately, driven them. Upon this Plan, then,
we fhall, at the Peace, be left in Poffeffion not only
of the Peninfula of Acadia, but of all Nova Scotia,
according to its old Limits ; the Bay. of Fundi, and
the River St. John. — The important Conquefts of
Crown Point, and Niagara, will not be relinquifh-
ed ; and Fort du Quefne, and the Country near the
Ohio, will remain Ours. — They are already Ours;
the French know they cannot get them back during
the War, and they do not expect that we fhall give
them up at the Peace.
But though Care fhould be taken to keep all
thofe Places juft mentioned ; fomething more muft
be done, or our American Colonies will tell you you
hai£

[ 30 ]
have done Nothing, In a Word, you muft keep
Canada, otherways you lay the Foundation of ano
ther War.
The Neceffity of this may be placed in fo ftrik-
iogia View, as to filence the French Plenipotentia
ries, and to convince .all Europe, of the Juftice of
our Demand.
Afk the French, what Security they can give
you, if we reftore Canada to thqm, however re-
ftrained in its Boundaries, that they will not again
begin to extend them at our ¦ Expence ? If the
Treaty of Utrecht could not keep them from En
croachments, what Reafon can we have to fuppofe
the future Treaty will be better obferved ? If the
Frenchare left at. Montreal, and the three Rivers, can
we be certain they will not again crofs the Champlain
Lake, and attack Crown-Point ? If the North Side of
the River St. Lawrence be ftill theirs, what is to in-
fure us againft an Expedition to Niagara ?¦ Can we
flatter ourfelves, that a People, who in full Peace,
erected thofe two Fortreffes, in direct Violation of
their Faith plighted at Utrecht, will be reftrained,
by any future Treaty, from attempting, alfo in
full Peace, to recover them ? After having feen the
French carrying on a regular Plan of Ufurpation,
in North America, for thefe Forty Years paft, fhall
we be fo weak as to believe that they will now lay
it afide ? No, depend upon it, if the French think
it worth their while to afk back that Part of North
America, which was their own, they mean to take
a proper Opportunity, of Elbowing all our Colonies
round about, and of refuming the fame ambitious
Views of Enlargement which the moft facred Ties
of former Treaties could not r-eftra n. *
The Truth of the Matter is, they were tired of
Canada. The Inclemency of the Climate, the
difficult Accefs to it j and a Trade fcarcely defray

ing

C 3> 3
ing the Expence of the Colony, would long ago
have induced them to abandon it, if the Plan of
extending its Boundaries, at the Expence of the
Englijh; and of opening its Communication with
Louijiana and with the Ocean, had not made them
perfevere. — Canada itfelf is not worth their afk-
ing ; and if they do defire to have it reftored to
them, it can only be with a View to repeat the fame
Injuries and Infidelities, to punifh which, we en-
faged in the prefent War. Unlefs, therefore, we,
e refolved, with our Eyes open, to expofe our
felves to a Repetition of former Encroachments ;
unlefs we would choofe to be obliged to keep great
Bodies of Troops, in America, in full Peace, at an
immenfe Expence ; we can never content to leave
tlie French any Footing in Canada. If we do
not exclude them, abfolutely and entirely from that
Country ; we fhall foon find we have done nothing.
Let the Treaty be drawn ever fo accurately ; let
the Boundaries between Canada and our Colonies,
be defcribed even fo precifely, and regulated ever
fo much, in our Favour ; what has happened al
ready, ought to teach us what we may expect a-
gain ; the future Treaty will be obferved no bet
ter than the former have been ; Ufurpation and
Encroachment will gradually revive; and thus fhall
we have thrown away all our Succefles ; fo many
Millions will have been expended to no Purpofe;
and the Blood of fo many thoufands of our brave
Countrymen fpilt, only to remind us, that though
we knew how to conquer, we knew not hpw to im
prove, perhaps, the only Opportunity we fhall ever
have, of putting it out of the Power of France to
violate its Faith:
I take it for granted that, in the future Nego
ciation, the Ifland of Cape Breton will follow. the
Fate of Quebec ; I Jhall only obferve with Regard to

t 3* J
to it, that though the Harbour and Fortification
of Louifbourg be of infinite Service' to France; it
can be of little or no Ufe to England, if Canada
be left to us. It is of Contequence to France, as
a Retreat to their Ships fifhing on the neighbour
ing Banks of Newfoundland ; and as a Security to
the Entrance of the Gulph oi St. Laurence. But the
Poffeffion of Newfoundland itfelf, makes Louifbourg
of no Utility to the Englifij, in the former Refpect ;
and Halifax, where we have a good Harbour, an
fwers very nearly the latter Purpofe. Upon this
View therefore, may we not hope and expect, that,
the Neceffity of garrif >ning Louifbourg having "end
ed with the Conqueftof Quebec, its Fate will be de
termined, without troubling the French Plenipoten
tiaries ? Without waiting for a Congrefs, let Orders1
be forthwith fent to demolifh it^ fo as not to leave
one Stone upon another, of the Fortifications ; to
remove the Inhabitants to Nova Scotia, a better
Country ; and to leave the Ifland, a bare and bar-;
ren Rock ; the State it was in, before the Peace of
Utrecht gave Leave to France to fortify it. If the
Right given to the French by the 13th Article of
the fame Peace, to Fifh in fome Parts of thofe Seas
fhould be continued (and 1 could wifh to fee it
continued, as the Refufal of it would be rather un
reafonable) let Cape Breton unfortified, and ungar-
rifoned be left open to them ; and- a few Men of
War kept at Halifax, will effectually prevent Lou-
{tbcurg's bein'g again made a Place of Strength.
If you adopt this Meafure, I fhould be inclined
to think, France will fee that you know your true
Interefts ; and that you are refolved fteadily to pur-
fue them. And if they fhould make any Remon-
ftrances againft it, tell them they may follow our
Example, and den.olifh, if they pleafe, the Forti
fications of Mahon ¦, which we fee them poffefs with

[ 33 J
with as .great Indifference as we remember the Cir
cumftances of its Lof , with Shame : Which, 2
being of no Ufe to them they will not defire to keep,
and which, having been kept, by us, at an Ex-
pence, not counterbalanced by its Utility, we fhall
not be very fanguine about recovering. Or, rather
tell them, that in demolifhing Louifbourg, before
the Peace, we only copy a former Example given
us by themfelves, when their Troops were employ
ed in difmantling the Frontier Towns in Flanders, ac
the very Time that their Plenipotentiaries at Aix
la Chapelle were contenting to give them up.
The Plan which I have had the Honour of fketch-
ing out to you, befides being fo reafonable in itfelf
is perfectly agreeable to that Moderation expreffed
by his Majefty in his Speech, of not having entered
into the War with Views of Ambition. , The Pof
feffion of Canada, is no View of Ambition ; it is
the only Security the French- can give us, for their
future Regard to Treaties. We have made other
Conquefts, of gre'at Importance, our Management
of which will give us fufficient Means of fhewing
our Moderation. And though I fhall not prefume
to give any Opinion about the future Difpofal of
them, I think, however, I may be allowed to hint,
that " the Poffeffion of Guadeloupe," an additional
fugar Ifland, when we have fo many of our own,
ought not, to be infifted upon fo flrenuoufly as to
make it a neceffary Condition of the Peace. And
though " Senegal and Goree," are of real Import
ance in the Slave and Gum Trades, our own Afri
can Settlements have hitherto fupplied us with
Slaves, fufficient for ouv American Purpofes : And
the Trade for Gum is,' perhaps, not of Confe
quence enough to make us Amends for the annual
Mortality which we already lament, of our brave
Countrymen to guard our African Conquefts. The
• F People

t 34 1
People of England, therefore, will not, I believe,
blame the giving them back, for a valuable
Consideration, — provided Canada be left to us.
To confider this Affair in its proper Light/ it
will be neceflary to reflect on the infinite Confe
quence of Nsrtb America to this Country. Our
Colonies there contain above a Million of Inhabi
tants, who are tnoftly fupplied with the Manufac
tures of Great Britain ; our Trade to them, by em
ploying innumerable Ships, is one great Source of
out maritime Strength; by fupportmg our Sugar
Iflands with their Provifions, and other Neceffa-
ries, they pour in upon us all the Riches of the
Weft Indies; we carry their Rice, and Tobacco,
and Fifhj to all the Markets of Europe ; they pro
duce Indigo, and Iron ; arid the whole Navy of
England may ht equipped, with the Products of
Englijb America. And if, notwithstanding our
having loft feveral Branches of Commerce, we
formerly enjoyed in Europe and to the Levant, we
have ftill more Commerce than ever; a greater De
mand for our Manufactures, and a v aft Increafe
of our Shipping; what can this be owing to, but
to the Trade to our own American Colonies ; a
Trade which the Succeffes of this War, will render,
every Day, more and more advantageous? If this
Matter, then, be confidered, in the above Light,
by thofe whom Inow addrefs, they will make our
North American Conquefts, the fine qua non of the
Peace, as being the only Method of guarding our
invaluable • Poffeflions there, from Ufurpations and
Encroachments; and they will look upon every
bther COnqaeft, we have made, or may make, in
prher Pares of the World, as Inftruments put into
oiif Hands by Providence, to enable us to fettle
Affairs on the Continent pf Europs, as advantage-
Sully ro our Allies, as cur Gratitude could wif&i
and -as thar Fidelity doth defetve.

[ 35 ]
Here, then, let me change the Scene, and hav
ing fettled our Affairs in Canada (would to God
they were fo fettled at the Peace!) permit me to fi
nifh my Plan of Negociation, by giving my Senti
ments on the Part we ought to Act, to obtain a pro
per Settlement of Affairs in, Germany.
If a great Number of Allies can make them
felves formidable to a common Enemy, during
the Operations of the War, they are apt to ruin
every Advantage they may have gained, by quar
relling amongft themfelves, when they begin their
Negociations for Peace. Like an Oppofition, in
our Parliament carried on againft an overgrown
Minifter, all Sorts of Parties and Connexions, all
Sorts of difagreeing and contradictory Interefts,
join againft him, at firft, as a common Enemy ;
and tolerable Unanimity is preferved amongft them,
fo long as the Fate of this Parliamentary War con
tinues in Sufpence. But when once they have dri
ven him to the Wall, and think themfelves fure
of Victory; the Jealoufies and Sufpicions,. which,
while the Conteft depended, had been flirted, break
out ; every one who fhared in the Fatigue, expects
to fhare in the Spoils ; feparate Interefts counter
act each other ; feparate Negociations are fet on
Foot ; till at laft, by untimely and mercenary Divi-
fions, they lofe the Fruits of their Victory, and
the Object of the common Refentment is able to
make Terms for himfelf*.  This was exactly
the Cafe in the Conteft between Lewis XIV. and
the Princes of Europe united againft him, before
the Peace of Utrecht : and the unhappy Divifions of
the Allies (Divifions too likely to have fprung up,
* The true Hiftory ofthe Tranfa&ion here alluded to, may,
poffibly, fome Time or other, appear ; though, as yet, we are
perfuad,ed, the World knows very little of it.
F 2 even

[ 3^ 1
even tho' there had not been a Party in England,
who to gratify their private Retentments, blew up
the Coals of Diffention) gave the French the Means
of procuring more favourable Terms of Peace, than
they could well have hoped after fo' unfuccefsful a
War. '
I have mentioned this with a View to obferve,
that the Circumftances of the prefent War on the
Continent are very different ; no fuch unfortunate
Difunion feems poffible to happen to us, though it
may happen amongft the Conlederates who are en
gaged on the fame Side with France, againft Hano
ver and the King of Pruffia.
It may be collected from more than one Hint
dropt in the Courfe of this Letter, that I am no
Friend to Continental Meafures in general ; efpeci-?
ally fuch continental Meafures as engaged us dur
ing the three laft Wars, as Principals ; when we
feemed eager to ruin ourfelves, in Support of that
A^uftrian Family whom we now find, with unparal
leled Ingratitude, and incredible Folly, in clofe
Alliance with France. — But the Continental Mea
fures now adopted by England were neceffary, both
with Regard to Our Honour and our Intereft.
Hanover has been attacked by France, on a Quar
rel entirely Englifh ; and tho' Care was taken, by
the Act of Settlement, that England ihould not be
involved in Wars on account oi-jHanover ; yet Gra
titude, Honour, the Reputation of our Country,
every Motive of Generofiry, bound us, not to al
low the innocent Electorate to be ruined for Eng
land's American Quarrel with France. In Regard
to our Intereti, no Englifh Minifter, however inr
flexible, in his Attachment to his native Country,
could have devifed the Means of making the beft
Ute of our American Conquefts, if the French could
have treated with Hanover in their Hands. It was
with

C 31 1
with a View to prevent this, to oppofe the French
in their Projects in Germany, the Succefs of which
would have been fo detrimental to England, that
we honeftly and wifely have formed anp have main
tained the Army now commanded by Prince Fer
dinand; and have entered into an Alfiance with the
King of Pruffia.
But tho' this was a Meafure of Prudence, it was
fcarcely poffible for the wifeft Statefmen to forefee
all thofe great Confequences which it hath already
produced . The Efforts which the French have made
in Germany, and the Refiftance they have there
met with by the Care of the Britijb Adminiftration;
have contributed more than perhaps we could ex
pect, to our Succefs in America, and other Parts of
the World. Full of the Project of conquering Ha
nover, France faw herfelf obliged to engage in ex
orbitant Expences ; Armies were to be paid, and
maintained in Weftphalia and on the Rhine; vaft
Sums were to be advanced to the Court of Vienna
always as indigent as it is haughty ; the ravenous
Ruffians, and the degenerate Swedes, ' would not
move, unlefs allured by Subfidies ; and the Mouth
of every hungry German Prince was to be ftopt,
with the Louis D'ors of France. Involved in Ex
pences thus enormous, our Enemies have been pre
vented from ftrengthening themfelves at Sea, where
England had moft Reafon to dread their becoming
ftrong. The infinite Advantages which this Nation hath
reaped from the German War, are indeed now fo
well underftood, that we have feen the greateft E-
nemies of this Meafure acknowledge their Miftake.
They now confefs that if we had not refifted
France, in her Projects of German Conquefts, her
beft Troops had npt been defiroyed ; her own
Coafts would have been better protected ; fhe would
¦» have

[ -3» 1
have been able to pay more Attention to her Ame
rican Concerns ; England might have been threat
ened, fo ferioufly, with Invafions, as to be a-
fraid : of parting with thofe numerous Armies
which have conquered at fuch a Diftance from
Home, In a Word, that, univerfal Bankruptcy,
which hath crowned the Diftrefles of France, and
gives England greater Reafon of Exultation, than
any Event of the War, might have been prevent
ed. It is entirely owing to tbe German Part of the
War that France appears thus low in the political
Scale of Strength and Riches ; that fhe is found to
be a finking Monarchy, nay a Monarchy already
funk. And, perhaps, it might be an Inquiry worthy
of another Msntefquieu, to affign the Caufes of
ihe Rife and Fall of the French Monarchy ; and to
point out thofe fiient Principles of Decay which
have, in our Times, made fo rapid a Progrefs,
that France, in 1712, after upwards of twenty
Years, almoft conflant War, maintained againft all
Europe, was ftill more refpedtable, and lefs exhauft-
ed than fhe now appears to be, when the fingle Arm
of Great Britain is lifted up againft her, and the
War has lafted no more than three or four. Years.
If this then be the State of the War, in Germany,
if England be bound to take a Part in it, by every
Motive of Honour or Intereft ; and if the infinite
Advantages it hath already produced, be ftated by
me fairly — the Inference I would draw, and which I
believe the whole Nation will alfo draw, is, that we
fhould continue to exert thofe -Endeavours which
hitherto have been fo effectual, in defeating the De-
figns of France to get poffeffion oi Hanover.
His Majefty, as Elector of Hanover, has no
Views of Ambition : His Country has been attacked
only becaufe. it belonged to the King of Great Britain-:
and nothing more is required of us, but to be true
to ourfelves, by neglecting no Step that may pre-.
vent

t 3^1
vent Hanover from falling again into the Hands of
France, after having been .fo miraculoufly refcued
from the Contributions of the rapacious Richlieu,
and faved from the Military Defert of Belkifle. — I
need not fay any Thing of the Glory acquired by that
Army, which notwithftanding it's great Inferiority,
hath driven the French twice from the Wefer to the
Rhine. I fhall only obferve, that the next Cam
paign (if another Campaign fhould preceed the
Peace) will, in all Probability, lofe us none ofthe
Advantages we hive gained, on that Side ; if our
Army, ftill headed by Prince Ferdinand, who has
already gained fo many Laurels, be rendered more
formidable, as 1 hope it Will, by fending to it fome
Thoufands more of our national Troops ; who now,
fince the Conqueft of Canada, and the Defeat of
the long threatened Invafion, have no other Scene
of Action left, but to contribute to another Victory
in Germany.
It would be a very pleafing Profpect, if we could
fpeak with equal Confidence, and Probability of
Succefs, concerning the future Operations of the
King of Pruffia. However, when we reflect on the
amazing Difficulties he has had to ftruggle with ;
attacked on every Side by a N umber of Confederates,
each of whom, fingly, one would have thought,
an equal Match for his whole Strength ; bearing
up, at the fame Time, againft the formidable Power
of the Houfe of Auflria ; the brutal Ferocity of the
Ruffians; the Attacks' of the Swedes; the Armies
of the Empire ; and, at one Time, having the ad
ditional Weight of the French Arms upon him j
when, I fay, we reflect on the uncommon Difficul
ties this magnanimous Prince has to refill, we muft
rather exprefs our Wonder, and our Satisfaction
that his Situation is ftill forefpectable, than indulge our'

[ 40 ]
our Fears, that is likely to be worfe. The fever*
eft Checks he has met with during this War, have
only ferved to fhew how calm he poffeffes himfelf
under' Diftrefs, and how ably he can extricate him
felf. The Flour of Adverfity has called forth all his
Abilities, and if he has failed fome times, from too
great an Eagernefs to conquer, he has always been
able to retrieve his Affairs, and like Anteus, gain
ed frefh Strength from every Overthrow.
, And, upon this Principle, I flatter myfelf, his
Pruffian Majefty will ftill be able to fecure to
himfelf the greater Part, if not the whole of
Saxony for his Winter Quarters, and to recruit
his Army, no Doubt much fhattered with it's
Loffes and Fatigues, before the opening of an
other Campaign. It is to be hoped alfo, that
befides the amazing Refources He has ftill left
in his own unbounded Genius, and the generous
and effectual Support which his Connexion with
England, affords him ; the Power of the Confede
racy againft him may be broken, by difuniting the
Confederates. Hiftory fatisfies us how feldom a Con
federacy of many Princes, has ever ruined a fingle
Power attacked. I have given one Inftance cf this
already, when I fpoke of the Grand Alliance againft
'Lewis XIV. and the League of Cambray againft the
Venetians, in the 16th Century, is an Inftance ftill
more remarkable.
But, if contrary to our Hopes, our Wifhes, our
Endeavours, this fhould fail; if his Pruffian Maje
fty, like a Lion caught in the Toils (after a Re-
fiftance already made, which will hand him down
to Pofierity as the greateft of Men,) fhould at laft
be unable to defend himfelf ; let him not defpair
while he is in Alliance with Britain : For I would
inculcate a Doctrine, which I think will not be
unpopular

[ 4i 1
unpopular amongft my Countrymen, and which,
therefore, I hope, will not be oppofed by our Mi^
nifters, That whatever Conquefts we have made, and
whatever Conquefts we may fiill make, upon the.
French, except North America, which muft be kepi
all our own ; fhould be looked upon as given ,back to
France for a moft important Confider ati on, if it can
be the Means of extricating the King of Pruffia from
any unforefeen Diflreffes.
Perhaps my Notions on this Subject may teem
to. border on Enthufiafm ; but, however, I can
not but be perfuaded, that Things are come to
that Pafs in Germany, that the Ruin of the King
of Pruffia will be foon followed by the Ruin of the
Proteftant Religion in the Empire. The blind Zeal
of the bigotted Auftrian Family will have no Check,
if the Head and Protector of the German Prote-
ilants be defiroyed ; and the War begun only to
wreft Silefia from him, will, in the End, be found
to be a War that will overturn the Liberties arid
Religion of Germany. If, therefore, the noble
Perfeverance of the King of Pruffia deferves the
Efteem of a generous People ; if his Fidelity to
his Engagements, which has contributed to fave
Hanover and to ruin France, can demand our Gra
titude , if the Danger of the only Proteftant So
vereign in Germany, able to preferve the Privileges
of his Religion from being trampled under Foot,
can call forth the warm Support-of this Proteftant
Nation ; may I not hope, may I not be confident,
that our Minifters will dictate, and our People
approve of Terms of Peace in his Favour, tho'
they fhould be purchafed by relinquifhing fome
of our Conquefts ; while the Poffeffion of Canada
will be fo reafonable a Bound to the Demands we
may make for ourfelves ?
G I

t 42 ]
I have ftated this Point, upon a Suppofition
-that the Event of the War may turn out to the
Difadvantage of the King of Pruffia. But if the
Fortune, the Capacity, the Perfeverance of that
Great Prince, fhould enable him (as I think we
may fti'l hope) tb extricate himfelf from the Dan
gers that furround him  it may be afked. What
is to be done with the Conquefts which, befides
Canada, we fhall'be in Poffeffion of when we treat
of a Peace ? — My Propofal is honeft, and per
haps will not be treated as chimerical : Employ
them to recover out of the Hands of France thofe
Towns oi Flanders, gained for the Auftrian Family
by the Valour, and at the Expence of England;
and which have been fo perfidioufly facrificed. A
Britijb Adminiftration muft tremble at the Prof-
peel of feeing Newport and Oft end become French
Property, and, therefore, fhould ufe their utmoft
Endeavours to prevent this at the Peace ; tho'
thofe Endeavours may ferve the Court of Vienna,
whofe Ingratitude to Britain never will be forgot
ten ; tho', at the fame Time, I muft own we fhall
draw no fmall Advantage from it. We fhall learn,
for the future, to prefer our own Intereft to that
of. others ; to proportion our Expences on the
Continent to the immediate Exigencies of our own
Country, and never to affift a new Ally, without
remembering how much we did for our Old one,
and what Return we have had !
I have, now, nearly executed my principal De
fign, in the prefent Addrefs ; which was to give
my Thoughts on the important Bufinefs of the ap
proaching Treaty. And if it be conducted with
as much Ability, as the War has been carried on
with Spirit and Succefs, there is great Room for
flattering ourfelves, that the Voice of the Publick
demands no Advantages or Ceflions, in Favour of
Eng-

t 43 ]
England, which the Minifters of England are not
refolved to infift upon.
But amidft the fignal Succeffes of our Arms,
which give us fo reafonable an Expectation of an
honourable Peace, and have exalted our Country
to the higheft Pinnacle of Glory and. Reputation
abroad — 1 wifh it could be faid that our Conftitu
tion was not greatly in Danger of being hurt, and al
moft loft, at Home. — I fhall beg Leave to take this
Occafion of touching this equally melancholy and im
portant Subject ; with a View, not to blame, but to
lament; not to bring any railing Accufation againfi
thofe who are now in Power, but to exhort and to
excite them to endeavour, before it be too late, to
add to the Services they have done their Country,
in faving it from the open Attacks of France, the
ftill more important Service of faving our Confti
tution, which fome unhappy Circumftances of our
prefent Situation have already greatly changed, and
feem to threaten with entire Deftruction ; — Nay, I
may fay, would have actually defiroyed, if it were
not for the' good Heart of our gracious Sovereign,
who fcorns to take Advantage.
Confiderably above an hundred Millions of Debt,
the Sum we muft be ob'iged to fit down with, at the
End of the prefent War, is the Burthen which,
however immenfe, Experience has taught us, con
trary to all Theory, we fhall be able to bear with
out Bankruptcy. As our Expences have increafed,
we have found, contrary to the Predictions of
gloomy Politicians, that our Abilities to bear them
have increafed alfo. — But tho' our Debts be not too
great for the Riches of our Country, they are
much too great for the Independenty of its Confti
tution. For, when I confider the infinite Depen-
dance upon the Crown, created by Means of Them,
throughout the Kingdom, amongft all Degrees of
G 2 Men j

[ 44, 3
iVTen ; when I reflect on the many Thoufands of
Placemen, of every Denomination, who are em
ployed in the Collection of the vaft Variety of
Taxes now levied on the Public; and take a Re
view of a far greater Number of Servants of the
Crown, both Civil and Military, for whofe Sup
port fo confiderable a Share of the public Revenue
is fet apart, too many of whom, I fear, might be
tempted to affift in extending the Influence of the
Prerogative to the Prejudice of public Liberty;
when I confider our vaft Load of Taxes, in this
Point of View, I cannot help pbterving theamazt
ing Revolution in our Government which ,thjs An
gle Article has brought about ; nor enough lament
the unhappy Circumftances of Affairs, and the
Neceffities of the War which have forced us to an
annual Expence, unknown to former Times, and
which will almoft be incredible to Pofierity. I
believe I can venture to fay upon Memory, that
the Expences of the War, for all King William's
Reign, about 13 Years, were not, at a Medium,
above 3 Millions and a half a Year ; and Queen
Anne's, tho' the laft Years were exorbitant, were
little more than 5 Millions. "What they are now I
figh to think on. Twelve or fourteen Millions
are demanded, without Referve ; and, what is ftill
more, voted without Oppofition. Nay, of fo. lit
tle Confequence is it now thought, by our.Repre-
fentatives, te deliberate on. the weighty Bufinefs
of raifing Money on the Subject, that fcarcely can
Forty of them be got together, to hear the Efti-
mates for at leaft One hundred and four fcore'Thoufand
Men, for fo many have we now in our Pay ; and
to borrow Eight Millians, the Sum of which our
Expences exceed our Income.
Thefe are alarming Confiderations; but another
Objeft, no lefs threatning the Ruin of our Confti-
tutipn,-.alfo prefents itfelf.^,
lam

[ 45 ]
I am old enough to remember what Uneafinefs
and Jealoufies difturbed the Minds of all true Pa
triots, with regard to Handing Armies, and milk
tary Eftablifhmeots. Principles of Liberty in ge
neral, and, in particular, Whig Principles,., excited
*his Uneafinefs and produced thofe Jealoufies, which
from Time to Time, have been a fruitful Source
of Parliamentary Debate. It wps no longer ago
than the late King's Time,, that the veiling Courts
Martial, in Time of Peace, with the Power of pu-
nifhing Mutiny and Defertion. with Death, was car
ried in the Houfe of Com mons by a fmall Majority*.
Nay, that a Court Martial, however limited in its
Jurifdiction, was inconfiftent with the Liberties of a
free People, in Time of Peace, was the Doctrine of
Whigs in thofe Days ; it was the Doctrine, in par
ticular, of Sir Robert Walpole then in Oppofition ;
whofe remarkable Expreffion, in this great Debate,
" That they who gave the Power of Blood, gave
" Blood," never can be forgotten. And though
afterwards when he came to be a Minifter, he was
better reconciled to Handing Armies and Mutiny
Bills, in Time of Peace, feventeen Thoufand Men,
was all the Army he durft afk; yet even that
Demand produced an annual Debate ; and the
annual Reafon, on which he founded the Necef
fity of his Demand — being the Danger from the
Pretender and the Jacobites ; was the ftrongeft
Proof, that even in Sir R. Walpole' & Opinion, the
.Reduction in the Army fhould take Placf, when
this Danger from Difaffection fhould ceafe. But
how are Things changed ¦? — I own indeed that a-
midft the Dangers of this War, and the Threats
of an Invafion, the vaft Army now on our Efta-
* In 1717-18 the Numbers on the Diviiion were 24.7 to 229.
blifh-

[46] ,
blifhment, is neceffary : But what I lament is to
fee the Sefltfniefits of the Nation fo amazingly re
conciled to the Profpect of having a far more nu
merous Body of regular Troops, kept up, after
the Peace, than any true Lover of his Country in
former Times thought, could be allowed without
endangering the Conftitution. Nay, fo unaccount
ably fond are we become of the military Plan,
that the Erection of Barracks, which, twenty Years
ago, would have ruined any Minifter who fhould
have ventured to propofe it, may be propofed fafe-
ly by our Minifters now a-Days, and, upon Trial,
be found to be a favourite Meafure with our Patri
ots, and with the Public in general.
But what I lament as the greateft Misfortune
that can threaten the public Liberty, is to fee the
Eagernefs with which our Nobility, born to be the
Guardians of the Conftitution againft Prerogative,
folicit the Badge of military Subjection, not meerly
to ferve their Country, in Times of Danger, which
would be commendable, but in Expectation to be
continued Soldiers, when Tranquility fhall be re
ftored, and to be under military Command, during
Life. When I fee this ftrange, but melancholy
Infatuation, fo prevalent, I almoft defpair of the
Conftitution. If it fhould go on in Proportion as
it has of late, I fear the Time will, at laft, come,
when Independence on the Crown, will be exploded
as unfafhionable. Unlefs another Spirit poffefs our
Nobility ; unlefs they lay afide their Military Trap
pings ; and think that they can ferve their Coun
try more effectually as Senators than as Soldiers,
what can we expect but to fee, the Syftem of mili
tary Subordination extending itfelf throughout the
Kingdom, univerfal Dependance upon Government
influencing every Rank of Men, and the Spirit,
8 nay

i 47 3
nay the very Form of the Conftitution defiroyed ?
We have generally beaten the French, and always
been foolifh enough to follow their Fafhions ; I was
in Hopes we fhould never have taken the Fafhion
of French Government ; but from our numerous
Armies, and the military Turn of our Nobility, I
am afraid we are running into it as fall as we can.
;Andv unlefs. fomething can be done, to bring back
our, Cpnftitution to its firft Principles, we fhall find
that we have triumphed, only to make ourfelves
as wretched as our Enemy ; that our Conquefts are
but a poor Compenfation for the Lofs of our Liber
ties; in a Word, that, like Wolfe, falling in the
Arms of Victory, we are moll glorioufly — undone!
But though I have drawn fo melancholy a Pic
ture, of the Dangers which threaten us with the
Lofs of our Liberties, it is with no other Defign,
than to exhort thofe who are placed at the Helm,
to fet about the Repairs of our fhattered Veffel,
as foon as fhe can be brought fafe into Har
bour. After the Peace is once fettled, it ought to
be the great Object of our Minifters, to devife
every Expedient, and to adapt every Plan, that
may extricate this unhappy Conftitution from the
Dangers I have defcribed. Confidering the low
Ebb of France, we have fome Reafon to hope that
when Peace is once reftored, upon folid Terms, it
will not foon be interrupted. Much, therefore,
may be done during thofe Years Of Tranquility ;
if our Minifters be diligent and faithful in this
great Work of reviving the Conftitution. The
facred, and inviolable Application of the Sinking
Fund, which the Increafe of our Trade, and other
Circumftances, have fo greatly augmented, and
muft ftill augment, will operate gradually, and ef
fectually. Univerfal and unvariable CEconomy, muft

C 48 ]
muft be introduced into every Branch of Govern
ment ; the Revenues of the Kingdom may be
vaftly increafed by adopting Schemes that will pre
vent Frauds, and leffen the Expence of Collec
tion ; innumerable unneceffary Places may be abo
lifhed, and exorbitant Perquifites, in thofe we leave,
may be reflrained ; Attention muft be had to the
Morals and Principles of theNation,and the Revival
of Virtue and of Religion will go hand in hand,
with the Revival of Liberty. But no Object will
deferve more Attention, than our Military En
croachments on Conftitutional Independance.
When this War fhall be over, there will be lefs
Reafon, than ever, for numerous Armies. The
Kingdom now happily' being united, and Difaffec-
tion to the Royal Family at an End, we need fear
no Rebellions among ourfelves ; and Invafions from
France are lefs likely than ever. Befides, by the
Care and Perfevefknce of fome Patriots, we have
acquired a new internal Strength, a Militia trained
up to be ufeful, and confequently, we may without
any Danger to the Public, reduce the Number of
our Guards and Garriforis, fo low, as to deftroy
great Part of the huge Fabrick of Military Influx
ence and Dependance. But whatever you do, if
you mean to reftore the Conftitution, you muft
fecure the Dignity and Independance of Parliament.
After paffirtg fuch Laws as may ftill be neceflary to
preferve the Freedom of Elections, from Influence
of every Sort ; to punifh Bribery both in the Elec
tors and in the Elecled ; fomething, perhaps, may
ftill be done by Way of Place-bill, to leffen Mini
flerial Influence over Parliaments, without having
Recourfe to an Oliverian Seli-'denying Ordinance ;
or to fo total an Exclufion of Placemen, as was
eflablifhed, in the original Act of Settlement. And

[45]
And an Houfe of Commohs thus chofen, and
thus made independent, now that Jacobitifh is
rooted out, Can never be formidable but to thofe
who haye Reafon to tremble. Such an Houfe of
Commons, will co-operate with the Adminiftration
in every Plan of publick Utility, and at the fame
Time inquire carefully into the Abufes of Govern
ment ; Supplies will be voted ; but only in Pro
portion to the real Income and Abilities of the Na
tion ; and We may expect to fee, what we have
not feen above thefe forty Years, a Parliamentary
Commiffion of Accounts erected to inquire into the
Difburfement of near Two Hundred Millions And
unlefs We fee this foon, I fhall look upon our Con
ftitution, as loft, for ever.
Thefe, and many fuch Regulations, as thefe,
may, under an honeft and virtuous Adminiftration,
be adopted when once Peace is reftored : And the
Profpect of feeing them adopted, and fteadily pUr-
fued, keeps me from defpaifing altogether of the
Commonwealth. To you, therefore, whofe Power, moft likely,
will not terminate with the War; and whom I
have prefumed to addrefs with Regard to the
Terms that fhould be demanded, to fecure us from
a perfidious Foe ; To you, My Lord,' and Sir,
let me earneftly recommend, the ftill more impor
tant Care, of faving us, from ourfelves ; and as you
have with an Unanimity, that doth you both great
Honour, directed our Councils, fo as to humble
France, let me intreat you to preferve your Union,
till it re-invigorate the almoft loft Powers of the
Britijb Conftitution.
If you have any Regard to Virtue, to Liberty,
to your Country ; if you would live great, and die
lamented; if you would fhine in Hiftory, with our
H C&-

I Sol
Clarendons and Southampton ; let not ,this Oppor
tunity,, perhaps, this laft Opportunity of faving
Britifh Liberty, and Independence, be thrown a-
way. You, my Lord, whofe Rank, whofe exten-
five Influence, and perfonal Authority, have given
you the Preeminence, in public Affairs, as it were
by Prefcription ; much will depend upon you, in
the carrying on this important Work. But when
I direft my addrefs to you, Sir, you muft be con-
fcious that befides the general Expectations we have
from you, as a Lover of your Country, we hav#
your own repeated Promifes and Declarations, to
make us flatter ourfelves that you will not flop
fhort, in your Schemes of national Reformation.
Not tutored in the School of Corruption, but lifted,
from your earlieft Years, under the Banner of Pa-
tfiotifm ; called into Power, by popular Approba
tion, and ftill uniting, the uncommon Characters
of Minifter and Patriot ; Favourite of the Publick,
and Servant of the Crown ; be not offended, Sir,
if I remind you, not to difappoint that Confidence
the Public places in your future Endeavours to
prop the finking Conftitution. Nor let it ever fall
from your Memory, that the Nation expects from
your V irtue, your GEconomy, your Plans for Li
berty, during the future Peace, as great Advantages
as we have already gained, from your Spirit, your
bold Councils, and vigorous Efforts, in carrying on
the prefent War.
Perhaps I grow too warm, on a favourite Sub
ject ; and, therefore, from Schemes which cannot
take Effect, till the War be clofed, let me turn
your Attention again, for a little while longer, to
the Object immediately before our Eyes the in-
fuing Conferences for Peace. And, with Regard
to thefe, though I fuppofe, they will begin, before the

'[ 5» 1
the Winter be over, I think there is fome Reafon
for being of Opinion that we muft have another
Campaign, before they can be finally clofed.
France is too low, to think ferioufly of a Peace,
without making fome defperate Effort. She never
would have expofed her Weaknefs to all Europe,
by fo fhameful and fo humbling a Bankruptcy ;
She never would have ruined her public Credit,
and melted her Plate, the laft Refource, when
every other has been exhaufted, only to receive
Terms from England. No, fhe knows fhe is un
done, for ever, if fhe gets no footing in Hanover ;
and, therefore, we may expect to fee another At
tempt made for that Purpofe. But, if we are not
wanting to ourfelves, another Attempt, will end,
as unfortunately for her, as the former have done ';
and her Ruin only be more confirmed. In the mean
while, I make no Doubt, the Plenipotentiaries will
meet at a Congrefs ; but the Events of the Field,
muft regulate the Deliberations of the Cabinet.
We, no DOubt, fhall be firm in our Demands,
whatever they are; and the French will endeavour
to gain Time, to know whether there is any likeli
hood of obliging us to offer them better. In this
Situation, then, France muft hear with Terror,
that without breaking our national Faith, without
injuring private Property, without giving exorbi
tant Premiums, we have already provided immenfely
for the Supplies of another Year (and Supplies for
Tears may ftill be had) to meet them — not in Ame
rica ; there they are no more ; — not on the Ocean —
the Deftruction of their Fleets leaves that Empire
free to us — but once more, on the Plains of another
Minden, again to feel and to confefs the Superiority
of Britijb Valour.
H 2 I

[ V J
I have only a Particular or two, to add, be
fore I conclude. And I cannot help congra
tulating the Public, on the Wifdom of our
Manner of Opening the Negoeiation for Peace.
I mean to obferve, that our Minifters have hap
pily got rid of a Set of very ujelefs, or very per
nicious Gentlemen called Mediators, by applying
directly to the Enemy himfelf. Nothing can
be more ridiculous than the Figure of the Pope's
Nuncio, and the Ambaffador ot Venice, acting the
Farce of Mediation at Munfter, for feveral Years,
while the War went on, till its Events regulated the
Terms of Feace. The Mediation of infignificant
Powers is therefore abfurd ; and the Danger of cal
ling in a powerful Mediator, who may threaten
to declare againfi you, if you do not fubmit to his
partial Decifions, is too obvious to be infilled upon.
You have done wifely, therefore, to keep the Ne
gociation in your own Hands ; the Nation, from
this Inftance, has a full Confidence that her Inte
refts are fkilfully conducted ; and, therefore, I fhall
only add, another Particular, which however fub-
ordinate, will, no Doubt, be attended to by you ;
though fome late Negotiators of ours, with France,
neglected it.
The French, by taking the Lead in Europe
of late, have, of Courfe, beeri able to introduce
their Language in all public Negociations ; fo
that, perhaps, the French is the only Tongue,
by the Channel of which Plenipotentiaries and Mi
nifters of different Countries, can converfe. But
when the Negociation is to be put into Writing,
to be drawn up in that Form which is to be
binding upon all the Parties, and figned jointly by
the treating Powers, neither the Honour, nor the
Intereft of the State, ought to allow us, to accept cf

[ 53 1
of the Original Treaty in the Native Tongue bf our
Enemies. The Honour of the Nation forbids this;
as it would be a Confeffion of Superiority, to which
Britain, at no Time, much lefs after fo glorious a
War, fhould fubmit ; efpecially as we cannot fub
mit to it, without giving the Enemy a real Ad
vantage, and laying the Foundation for future
Cavils. — Cardinal Mazarine, in his Letters, boafts,
that by a latent Ambiguity and Nicety in the French
Stile, he had been able to out-wit Don Louis de
Haro, in the Conferences at the Pyrenees. And a
much later Inftance, in which we ourfelves were
partly concerned, fhould confirm us, in our Refu
fal to treat with the French in their own Language.
— I mean the famous Capitulation of the Dutch
Garrifon of Tournay in 1 745 ; which, though only
reftrained from acting, for a limited Time in any
of the Barrier Towns *, as the Dutch believed,
when they accepted of the Capitulation, was foon
after interpreted by France, as tying them up from
acting in any Part of the World ; and might have
been fatal to this Country, if the Rebellion in Scot
land, to affift in quelling which the Dutch lent us
thofe very Troops, had been fo fuccefsful, as to
oblige us to put our foreign Allies to the Teft.
We have no great Reafon, no more than other
Nations, to truft Gallic Faith, as appears from the
many Inftances of their unpalliated Perfidy which I
have collected above. Let us not, therefore, be
* I have not the original Capitulation before me, but I
remember, pretty exaftly on what the Cavil turned. The
Troops were not to aft, I think, for two Years, in any of the
Places les plus reculees de la Barrkrt. The Dutch, no doubt, un
derftood, de la Barriere to be the Genitive Caf«, but the French
faid they meant it in the Ablative. fo

[54]
fo weak as to give them Room for,obtruding upon
us, any fallacious Interpretations of the Words, in
which they plight their Faith. They are too ready
to break it when the Terrrts, are ever fo clear ; and,
therefore, let us take Care not to give them that
Advantage which fuperior Skill in their own Lan
guage, naturally confers, and which upon Ibjne
tuture Occafion, they may improve to our Detriment.
Let the original and authentic Copy of the Treaty,
therefore be in a dead Language, the Phrafes of
which cannot vary, and whofe Meaning is equally
underftood by both Parties. We ha3 once a very
learned Plenipotentiary in Queen Elizabeth's Time,
who, in a Negociation with Spain, when it came
to be debated in what Language the Treaty fhould
be made, ludicroufly enough propofed to the Spa
niard, who was giving himfelf Airs of Superiority,
to treat in the Language of his Mailer's Kingdom
of Jerufalem'. But, leaving the Hebrew for our
Divines,T would only have our Negociators treat
in Latin : Which feemed, as it- were by Prefcrip-
tion, to have a Righj: to be the Language of the
Public Law of Europe; till fome late Inftances
have fhewn that the French was beginning to be
fubftituted in its Room ; by the Lazinefs or Ne
glect of thofe who treated. As we are fanguine in
Pur Hopes of a much better Peace than we had
at Utrecht, with Regard to the Terms, let it not
be worfe than that at Utrecht, which preferved the
Old Cuftom of fettling the Negociation in Latin.
We then had a Bifhop indeed, as Plenipotentiary; but
without having Recourfe to the very learned Bench,
or choofing a Plenipotentiaryjfrom Cambridge (1 hope
in a little Time one may join the other Univerfity,
without giving Offence) the Negociators at the en-
fuing

C 55 1
fuing Peace, may be accommodated with Latin
enough for the Purpofe I mention, at a very mode
rate Expence — If their Secretary or Chaplain can
not affift them.
But when I begin to be ludicrous on fo ferious a
Subject, it is Time to have done : And my Ad
drefs has already fwelled to fuch a Size as furprizes
myfelf, as much, as I fear it will tire the Reader.
However, the vaft Variety of Facts and Particulars
which naturally offered themfelves to me, and which
could not be omitted without hurting the Connexion,
and weakening my Argument, will, perhaps, pro
cure Indulgence for fo long a Pamphlet : And,
for the fame Reafon, I flatter myfelf, that if I
fhould happen to have been miftaken in any Thing
I advance, to have erred in a Date, or to have
mif quoted a Treaty, fome Allowances will be
made to me, as I have been obliged to truft much
to my Memory, for want of a proper Opportuni
ty of confulting many of thofe Books, which fur-
nifh the Materials I have made Ufe of. However,
I believe a candid Reader will find no capital, at
leaft, no wilful, Miftake.
I am far from the Vanity of thinking that my
Notions on the important Subject of the Peace,
are a regular Plan or Syftem for the Adminiftra
tion to proceed upon. I throw them out, only
as loofe Hints for my Superiors to improve as they
may think proper. Should there be any Weight
in all, or any of them, you, my Lord and Sir,
will be able to work them into Utility for this
Kingdom. If they are not worth your Notice;
as I am an anonymous Writer, and hope never to
be known, I can neither loofe nor gain Reputation by

% them. All I can fay, if they are neglected, is,
Operant et oleam perdidi.

I am,

My Lord and Sir,
Yours, &c. &c:

FINIS.

>