YALE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 3 9002 07223 7432 ¦:¦ :v- ife?S'J"A*'*iii~-v- ¦'¦' ¦ -«-¦ .V.*' ix%=««a ;¦¦¦;¦.:¦•.¦"- »'H!,*A«ffi«' A.*'v;Vb* £**£&?¦ ",..,¦'• ¦ * ¦ •¦.•*vV~--.r^ .-j .. :'>^:' ' • ...'¦'-..'¦:'.'¦ i '",",.' a -V':?:^ y r *v\ ±yiy?y mk®mkM ^ 9 • ».»* '*- th*. %< *"' T r*<* \ r Nfcj *#£:^ If* 3 ^•'i i v4? %."'%'- C&-SL"? OHO NARRATIVE CAMPAIGN IN 1781 NORTH AMERICA. BY Sir HENRY CLINTON, K. B. w PHILADELPHIA : JOHN CAMPBELL, MDCCCLXV. 7.-M Edition of 250 Copies, Of which 75 copies are in quarto, and 25 copies in folio. CtrXJ 0 4 0 PRINTED BY HENRY B. ASHMEAD, No. 1102 Sansom Street. NARRATIVE O F LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR HENRY CLINTON, K. B. RELATIVE TO HIS CONDUCT DURING PART OF HIS COMMAND OF THE KING'S TROOPS I N NORTH AMERICA; Particularly to that which refpe&s the unfortunate Iffue of the Campaign in 178 1. WITH AN APPENDIX, CONTAINING Copies and Extracts of those Parts of his Correfpondence WITH LORD GEORGE GERMAIN, EARL CORNWALLIS, REAR ADMIRAL GRAVES, &c. Which are referred to therein. LONDON: Printed for J. Debrett (fuccefTor to Mr. Almon) oppofite Burlington-houfe, Piccadilly, 1783. E R R A T A. Page. Line. In the note, 8, 3, 1781, vice 1782. 13, 12, either, vice each. 24, 19, probably before be, at the begin. ning of the line. 46, 16, their, vice thus. 52, 20, &c . after accomplifhed. NARRATIVE O F LIEUTENANT GENERAL Sir HENRY CLINTON, &c. T3EING confcious, that during my com mand in North America, my whole conduct was actuated by the moft ardent zeal for the King's fervice, and the interefts of the public, I was exceedingly mortified, when I returned to England, after a fervice of feven years in that country, to find that erroneous opinions had gone forth refpecting it; and that many perfons had, in confe- quence, admitted impreftions to my preju- a duce. ( 2 ) duce. Anxious, therefore, to explain what had been mifinterpreted or mifreprefented, (as indeed might well be expefted, from the publication of Lord C.'s letter of the 20th of October, without being accompanied by my anfwer to it) I had propofed taking an op portunity, in the Houfe of Commons, of faying a few words on fuch parts of my conduct as feemed not to be fufficiently un- derftood : and I flatter myfelf I fhould have been able to make it appear, that I acTred up to the utmoft of my powers, from the beginning to the end of my command; and that none of the misfortunes of the very unfortunate campaign of 1781 can, with the fmalleft degree of juftice, be imputed to me. But I arrived here fo late in the feftion, that I was advifed to defer it; and it was judged that the gracious reception I had juft met with from my Sovereign rendered an immediate explanation unneceffary. I was not, .:# ( 3 ) not, however, apprifed to what degree the public prejudice had been excited againft me elfe, I fhould probably have been in duced to have taken an earlier opportunity of offering to Parliament what I have to fay on the fubject But the late change in pub lic affairs, furnifhing fo much more impor tant matter for their deliberation, deprived me of the opportunity I thought I fhould have had: and, as by the prefent recefs it is probable that I may not be able to exe cute my intentions before a late period, when perhaps peculiar circumftances might force me through delicacy to decline it, I beg leave to lay before the public the following plain Narrative, which will, I truft, remove prejudice and error. I have much to regret that, when this bufinefs was difcuffed in the Houfe of Lords laft feflion of Parliament, the whole of my correfpondence, with the late American Minifter, Lieutenant General Earl Corn- wallis, ( 4 ) wallis, and the Admirals commanding on the Weft-India and American ftations, was not produced, or at leaft fuch parts thereof as, being neceffary to explain my conduft, might have appeared confiftently with ftate policy. Becaufe the letters which compofe that correfpondence, being written to the moment as events happened, are certainly the moft faithful records of my aftions and intentions; and are confequently the clear- eft, faireft, and moft unexceptionable tefti- monies I can adduce in their fupport. I hope, therefore, I fhall ftand exculpated from the neceflity of the cafe, for any im propriety there may be in my annexing to this letter fuch of them as I may judge moft requifite for that purpofe. Three of them indeed will, I prefume, be found very material, (Appendix No. IX.) as they con tain my anfwers and obfervations upon Lord Cornwallis's letters of the 20th of Oftober and 2d of December on the fubjeft of the Mt ( 5 ) the unfortunate conclufion of the laft cam paign in the Chefapeak ; — which latter I am forry to obferve, were given to the public, while mine in anfwer were withheld from it; — I hope without defign. Although I never dared promife myfelf that any exertions of mine, with my very reduced force (nearly one-third lefs than that of my predeceflbr) could bring the war to a happy conclufion; yet I confefs that the campaign of 1781 terminated very dif ferently from what I once flattered my felf it would; as may appear, by the fub- joined extrafts of letters, written in the be ginning of that year, * and which were tranf- * " I am moft exceedingly concerned, my Lord, at the very unfortunate affair of the 17th of January, (Cow- per's.) I confefs I dread the confequences. But my hope is, as it ever will be, in your Lordfliip's abilities and exertions. I have much to lament, that Brigadier- general Arnold's projected move in favour of your Lordfliip's ( 6 ) tranfmitted to the Minifter. I was led, however, into thefe hopes, more by the apparent diftreffes of the enemy than any material fucceffes we had met with. The plan I had formed for the campaign of 1 78 1, (upon the expeftation of a rein forcement Lordfliip's operations will have been ftopt by the appear ance of the French fliips. Difcontent runs high in Connecticut. In fliort, my Lord, there feems little wanting to give a mortal ftab to rebellion, but a proper reinforcement and a permanent fuperiority at fea for the next campaign; without which any enterprize depending on water movements muft certainly run great rifle. Until Colonel Bruce arrives, I am uncertain what reinforce ments are intended for this army. The Minifter has however affured me, that every poffible exertion will be made." — Letter from Sir Henry Clinton to Lord Corn- wallis, March 5, 1 78 1. "I cannot fufficiently exprefs my extreme joy at read ing Wafliington's letter. It is fuch a defcription of diftrefs, as may ferve to convince, that with a tolerable reinforcement from Europe, to enable your Excellency to determine on an offenfive campaign, the year 1781 may ( 7 ) forcement from Europe — from the Weft- Indies — and from the Southward (after opeT ration fhould ceafe in that quarter) — added to what I might be able to fpare at the time from the fmall force under my immediate command at New- York) was calculated to make a fair and folid effort in favour of our friends — in a diftrift where I had fome rea fon to believe they were numerous and hearty ; and where I judged it might be made with little danger, even from a temporary naval fuperiority of the enemy. This plan had been fuggefted to the Minifter in the year 1780, and more particularly ex plained to him in 1781 ; notwithftanding which a preference was given to another, (Appendix, No. I.) which feemed to be forced may probably prove the glorious period to your command in America, by putting an end to the rebellion." — Letter from Major-general Phillips to Sir H. Clinton, Portf- mouth, Virginia, April 16, 1781. ( 8 ) forced (Appendix, No. II.) upon me by Lord Cornwallis's quitting the Carolinas, where I had left him in the command, and marching into Virginia; a meafure, I muft fay, determined upon without my approba tion, and very contrary to my wifhes and intentions. The Minifter directed me to fupport Lord Cornwallis and folid operation in Virginia ; the danger of which, without a covering fleet, I had conftantly reprefented to him. He repeatedly and pofitively pro mifed me a covering fleet;* and when the Admiral * Extracts from Lord George Germain's letters to Sir Henry Clinton: April 4, 1782. "The latenefs of the feafon will, I imagine, prevent Monf. De Graffe's undertaking any thing againft the King's poffeffions in the Weft Indies. But it is probable, as foon as he has thrown fupplies into the feveral iflands, he will proceed to North America, and join the French forces at Rhode Ifland, and endea vour to revive the expiring caufe of rebellion. But as Sir ( 9 ) Admiral arrived with the naval reinforce ment from the Weft-Indies, he was clearly of Sir George Rodney's force is little inferior to his, and he will be watchful of his motions, I am not apprehenfive he will give him time to do you any material injury before he comes to your fuccour." May 2, 1 78 1. "And as Sir George Rodney will bring you three more regiments from the Leeward Iflands before the hurricane months, the augmentation of your force muft, I fhould think, be e'qual to the utmoft of your wifhes." July 7, 1 78 1. "The arrival of the reinforcement will, I hope, enable you to proceed immediately in the execution of your purpofe, without waiting for the three regiments from the Weft Indies; for I do not expedt they will join you before the feafon for offenfive operations there is over; when, I have reafon to believe, the French fleet will pufh for North America, and Sir George Rodney will certainly follow them, to prevent them from giving you any interruption in your operations." July 14, 1781. "The purpofe of the enemy was long known here, and Sir George Rodney has been ap- prifed of it, and will certainly not lofe fight of Monf. De ( io ) of opinion himfelf, and of courfe convinced me, that he had brought that covering fleet. (Appendix, No. III.) Therefore, as Admi ral Graves's fquadron was acknowledged to be fuperior to that under Monfieur de Barras, I could De Graffe. The very proper ftep you took of tranfmit- ting him copies of the letters you had intercepted, muft confirm him in the refolution he had taken in confequence of the former intelligence. But as in a matter of fo great moment, no precaution fhould be omitted, or poffible con tingency unguarded againft, extracts of the intercepted letters will be fent to him from hence, and precife inftruc- tions given to him to proceed direftly to North America, whenever Monf. De Graffe quits the Leeward Mands." July 24, 1781. "And I truft, that as Sir George Rodney knows De Grade's deftination, and the French acknowledge his fliips fail better than their's, that he will get before him, and be in readinefs to receive him when he comes upon the coaft." September 25, 1781. "I truft, before the end of Auguft, Sir Samuel Hood will have been with you, and that after his junction with Admiral Graves our fuperiority at fea will be preferved." ( » ) I could not but fuppofe that the arrival of Admiral Digby (hourly expefted) would give us a moft decifive naval fuperiority. — And here, perhaps, it may not be improper to remark, that though the Minifter direfts me, by his letters of the 2d of May, and 6th of June, to adopt folid operation in Virginia, he fignifies to me his Majefty's approbation of my own plan, in a fubfequent letter of the 14th of July, telling me at the fame time, that "he has not the leaft doubt Lord "Cornwallis will have fully feen the rea- "fonablenefs of it, and has executed it with "his wonted ardor, intrepidity, and fuc- "cefs." Under thefe circumftances, and with thefe affurances, I never could have the moft distant idea that Mr. Wafhington had the leaft hopes of a fuperior French fleet in the Chefapeak ; and I confequently never could fuppofe that he would venture to go there. But if he fhould, I was fatisfied from the reafons already ftated ( " ) ftated, that I fhould be able to meet him there with every advantage on my fide, by having the command of the waters of that bay — without which he could not poflibly feed his army. This opinion has been alfo fince confirmed by a letter from him to Count De Graffe, dated 26th of September 178 1, (No. IV. Appendix) wherein he tells him, if he quits the Chefapeak, the enemy will certainly get poffeflion of it, and he muft difband his army. Had my correfpondence been produced, it would have appeared from it, and the returns accompanying it, that inftead of •feventeen, twenty, nay twenty-four thouf and men, which it has been reported I had at New York (after the very ample rein forcements as the Minifter acknowledges (No. V. Appendix) which I had fent to the fouthward) I had not 12,000 effeftives, and of thefe not above 9,300 fit for duty, re gulars and provincials. But had I had twice ( *3 ) twice that number, I do not know that, after leaving fufficient garrifons in the iflands and pofts depending (which it is ad mitted by all would take 6000) I could, as has been infinuated, have prevented the iunftion between Monf. Rochambeau and General Wafhington, which was made in the highlands, at leaft 50 miles from me; or that I could have made any direft move againft their army when joined (confifting then of at least 11,000 men, exclufive of militia, affembled on each fide the Hudfon) with any profpeft of folid advantage from it. Or if I had as many reafons to believe that Mr. Wafhington would move his army into Virginia without a covering French fleet, as I had to think he would not; I could not have prevented his pafling the Hudfon under cover of his forts at Verplanks and Stoney Points. Nor (fuppofing I had boats properly manned) would it have been ad- vifeable to have landed at Elizabeth town, in ( H ) in the face of works which he might eafily have occupied (as they were only feven miles from his camp at Chatham) without fubjefting my army to be beat, en detail. Nor could I, when informed of his march towards the Delaware, have paffed an army in time to have made any impreflion upon him before he croffed that river. But with my reduced force, any attempt of the fort would have been madnefs and folly in the extreme. With what might poflibly be fpared from fuch a force, nothing could be attempted except againft detachments from Mr. Wafh ington's army, or (when reinforced in a fmall degree) againft fuch of it's diftant ma gazines as might occafionally happen to be unguarded. Two of the latter offered, one againft Philadelphia, which I certainly fhould have attempted in July, had Lord Corn- wallis fpared me any part of 3000 men; but as his Lordfhip feemed to think he could ( *5 ) could not hold the ftations we both thought eligible, if he fpared me any part of the force with him, I was obliged to relinquifh this defign. The other much more im portant, was againft Rhode Ifland. I had difcovered by intercepted letters from all the French Admirals and Generals, that Count Rochambeau's army had marched from Rhode Ifland to join Mr. Wafhington at the White Plains; that their battering train and ftores for fiege were left at Providence under little more than a militia guard; and that their fleet remained in Rhode Ifland harbour with orders, as foon as repaired, to retire to Bofton for fecurity. By private in formation, which I had at that time, I found alfo that the works at Rhode Ifland were in a great meafure difmantled, and had only a few invalids and militia to guard them, and that they were both there and at Providence under great apprehenfions of a vifit from us. From other motives as well as my own knowledge ( 16 ) knowledge of thefe pofts, I had the ftrongeft reafon to expeft the fulleft fuccefs to an at tempt againft them, and I therefore immedi ately propofed to Admiral Graves a joint ex pedition for that purpofe; which he readily confented to. It was accordingly agreed between us, that it fhould be undertaken as foon as he could affemble his fleet, and a fmall reinforcement (hourly expefted) fhould arrive from Europe. The reinforcement joined me on the nth of Auguft, and the Admiral (who had failed on a cruife) having returned to the coaft on the 16th, I imme diately renewed my propofal, (Appendix, No. VI.) The Admiral informed me in anfwer, that he was under the neceflity of fending the Robufte to the yard to be refitted, and that he fhould take the opportunity while that was doing of fhifting a maft or two in the Prudente; and when thofe repairs were accomplifhed, he would give me timely notice, (Appendix, No. VII.) The fhips were ( i7 ) were not ready on the 28th; Sir Samuel Hood, however, arriving on that day, I im mediately ordered the troops to be embarked ; and going to the Admirals on Long Ifland, I propofed to them that the expedition fhould inftantly take place : but receiving intelligence that evening that Monfieur De Barras had failed on the 25th, it was of courfe flopped. Thus, to the Admirals great mortification and my own, was loft an opportunity of making the moft important attempt that had offered the whole war. Early in September, to my great furprife, (for I ftill confidered our fleet as fuperior) hearing that Mr. Wafhington was decidedly marching to the fouthward, I called a council of all the general officers, who unanimoufly concurred with me in opinion, that the only way to fuccour Earl Cornwallis was to go to him in the Chefapeak. Although I had every reafon to difapprove of Earl Cornwallis's march into Virginia, c without ( i8 ) without confulting me, (at the risk of en gaging me in dangerous operations, for which I was not prepared) yet, as I fuppofed he afted with at leaft the approbation of the Minifter, I left him as free as air, when he arrived there, to plan and execute according to his difcretion; — only recommending to him, in cafe he had none of his own, the plan I had offered to the Minifter ; which, notwithftand- ing the opinion given in the letter of July 1 4, before quoted,* I did not, however, find his Lordfhip * Extract from Lord George Germain's letter to Sir Henry Clinton, July 14, 1781. — "It is with the moft unfeigned pleafure I obey his Majefty's commands, in expreffing to you his royal approbation of the plan you have adopted for profecuting the war in the provinces fouth of the Delaware, and of the fuccours you have furnifhed, and the inftru£tions you have given for car rying it into execution. The copies of the very impor tant correfpondence which fo fortunately fell into your hands, (inclofed in your difpatch) fhew the rebel affairs to be almoft defperate, and that nothing but the succefs of ( 19 ) Lordfhip the leaft inclined to adopt. And that letter, which I did not receive till Sep tember, found me deeply and dangeroufly en gaged in the operation he had forced me into. And here, perhaps, it may be proper to give the reafons which induced me to recom mend of fame extraordinary enterprize can give vigour and activity to their caufe; and I confefs I am well pleafed that they have fixed upon New York as the objeft to be attempted, as I have not the leaft doubt but that the troops you had remaining with you, after the ample rein forcements you fo judicioufly fent to the Chefapeak, would be fully fufficient under your command to repel any force the enemy could bring againft you. I cannot clofe this letter, without repeating to you the very great fatisfadtion your difpatch has given me; and my moft entire and hearty coincidence with you in the plan you have propofed to Lord Cornwallis, for diftreffing the rebels, and recovering the fouthern provinces to the King's obedience. And as his Lordfhip, when he received your letters of the 8th and nth of June, will have fully feen the reafonablenefs of it, I have not the leaft doubt but his Lordfhip has executed it with his wonted ardor, intrepidity, and fuccefs." ( 20 ) mend to Lord Cornwallis to fecure a naval ftation for large fhips, if one could be found that was capable of being fortified and main tained againft a temporary fuperiority of the enemy at fea, agreeable to the inftruftions which I had before given to General Phil lips, and which were of courfe to be now confidered as fuch to his Lordfhip, (Ap pendix, No. X.) Although I ought not to have apprehend ed that the enemy could have had a fuperi ority at fea, after the affurances I had re ceived from the Minifter, I yet always wifhed to guard againft even a poflibility of it. Finding, therefore, by Lord Corn- wallis's letters, that on his arrival in the Chefapeak, he had no plan of his own to propofe, and that he did not incline to follow the one I had offered to his con fideration, I recommended the taking a re- fpeftable defenfive ftation either at Williamf- burg, or York (the latter of which his Lordfhip ( 21 ) Lordfhip had informed me in a letter, dated 26th of May, he was inclined, from the reports which had been made to him, to think well of as a naval ftation and place of arms) and left his Lordfhip at liberty to keep all the troops he had in Virginia, (amounting to about feven thoufand men). But thinking that he might well fpare three thoufand; I defired he would keep all that were neceffary for a refpeftable defenfive, and defultory water movements, and fend me of three thoufand men all he could. His Lordfhip mifconceiving my intentions (as will, I truft, be manifeft to whoever reads our correfpondence) and confidering my call for three thoufand men as uncon ditional, tells me that he could not with the remainder keep York and Gloucefter; and that he fhould, therefore, repafs James- river and go to the ftation at Portfmouth. Which refolution (I confefs) furprifed me, as ( 22 ) as he had a little before, in the letter above quoted, reprefented that poft as unhealthy, and requiring an army to defend it. On receipt of his Lordfliip's letter, I immedi ately confulted the Admiral, who was of of opinion, that a naval ftation for large fhips was abfolutely neceffary, and recommended Hampton-road. Therefore in my letter of the nth July, I direfted his Lordfhip to examine and fortify Old Point Comfort, which the Admiral and I thought would cover that Road, and in which there had been a fort for that purpofe for fifty years, though probably then in ruins. But his Lordfhip in forming me in his letter of the 27th of July, that it was the opinion of the captains of the navy, the engineers, and himfelf, that any works erefted on Old Point Comfort, " might "be eafily deftroyed by a fleet, and would "not anfwer the purpofe; and that there- "fore, according to the fpirit of my orders, "he ( 23 ) "he fhould feize York and Gloucefter, as "the only harbour in which he could hope "to be able to give effeftual proteftion to " line of battle fhips ;" I fuppofed his Lord fhip had entirely approved of thofe pofts; and that after examining them with the officers of the King's fhips and his engineer, he would let me know if he fhould fee reafon to alter his opinion; and confequently I did not objeft to the choice he had made; nor indeed had I ever caufe to do fo before I faw his letter of the nth of Oftober, which I did not receive until the 16th, the day before he offered to capitulate, when for the firft time I found his Lordfhip thought unfavourably of them. For on the 16th of Auguft, his Lordfhip told me that he fhould apply to the Commodore for a fhip to send me a ftate of things at York, and bring him back my commands; by which I was of courfe to underftand that his Lordfhip would fend me his own and the Commodore's opi nion ( 24 ) nion of York and Gloucefter, after his en gineer had made a moft exaft furvey, which he told me he was employed in, and of which I expefted a copy, as his Lordfhip had before fent me of the one taken of Old Point Comfort. But not receiving thefe from his Lordfhip, I naturally concluded that the poft of York and Gloucefter was fuch as his Lordfhip and the Commodore approved ; efpecially, as his Lordfhip, in his letter of the 2 2d of Auguft, was pleafed to fay, "the "engineer has finifhed his furvey and exa- "mination of this place, (York) and has "propofed his plan for fortifying it; which "appearing judicious, I have approved, and " direfted to be executed." And in the same letter it was farther implied, that through the exertion of the troops, the works would be tolerably complete in about fix weeks from that period: and from his faying also in the same letter, "I will not venture to "take ( 25 ) "take any ftep that might retard the efta- " blifhing this poft. But I requeft that your "Excellency will pleafe to decide whether "it is moft important for your plans, that a "detachment of a thoufand or twelve hun- "dred men (which I think I can fpare from "every other purpofe but that of labour) " fhould be fent to you from hence, or that " the whole of the troops here fhould con tinue to be employed in expediting the "works,") I naturally concluded that his Lordfhip had not only fufficient to complete his works by the time he mentioned, but that he could fpare that number from the defence of them afterwards. His Lordfhip's letter of the 29th of September moreover told me, " I "have no doubt, if relief arrives in any reafon- "able time, that both York and Gloucefter "will be in poffeflion of his Majesty's troops ;" and again, that of the 3d of Oftober, "My "works are in a better ftate of defence than D ( 26 ) "we had reafon to hope." In fhort, I think his Lordfhip appears to have implied in all his letters, (except that of the 17th of Sep tember, the day he heard from Lieutenant Conway of the navy, that Monf. De Graffe, by the junftion of Monfieur de Barras, had thirty-five or thirty-fix fail of the line) that he could hold out as long as his provifions lafted — which was, by his Lordfhip's own calculation, to the end of Oftober at leaft. From all thefe circumftances, I had flat tered myfelf, that the works at York would have been tolerably complete by the 9th of Oftober, the day Mr. Wafhington opened his batteries againft them : and from the opi nion given me by certain officers of rank, who had lately come from Lord Cornwallis at York, I was under no apprehenfions for his Lordfhip before the latter end of that month; as I could not conceive that the enemy could poflibly bring againft him fuch a powerful ( 27 ) a powerful battering train as would demolifh his defences (fuch as I had reafon to hope they would be) in fo fhort a fpace of time as nine or ten days. Although I never gave Lord Cornwallis affurances of the exertions of the navy before my letter of the 24th of September, when I did it in confequence of a council of war, compofed of flag and general officers; I cer tainly never gave his Lordfhip the leaft reafon to fuppofe they would not be made; as I always took it for granted, before Admiral Graves's letter to me of the 9th of September, that our fleet was fuperior to that of the enemy. Nor, indeed, did I know before I received Lord Cornwallis's letter of the 17th, (which was not until the 23d of September) that the enemy had thirty-fix fail of the line, or that Monfieur de Barras had not already joined Monfieur de Graffe before the aftion of the 5th of September. But even againft this fuperiority, great as it was, the Admirals were ( 28 ) were clearly of opinion, that a joint attempt fhould be made by us to fuccour the fleet and army in the Chefapeak. I certainly, therefore, never could have hinted to his Lordfhip that their exertions would not be made. The whole of this matter may, I think, be fummed up as follows : Lord Cornwallis's march into Virginia, without confulting his Commander in Chief, forced us into folid operation in that province. Being there, as his Lordfhip could not fub- fift his army without having a place of arms to cover his magazines, &c. &c. &c. it became abfolutely neceffary to fix on fome healthy and refpeftable ftation, that could be made fecure againft a temporary fuperiority of the enemy at fea ; and York and Gloucefter feem to have been originally thought of by Lord Cornwallis, and approved by me for that pur pofe. But by his Lordfhip's mifconceiving my orders, he quitted the Neck of York, and confequently relinquifhed every idea of occu pying ( 20 ) pying thofe pofts. Soon afterwards, the Admiral thinking a naval ftation for large fhips abfolutely neceffary, and recommend ing Hampton Road, I direfted Lord Corn wallis to examine and fortify Old Point Comfort in James River; but his Lordfhip not approving of that ftation, made choice of York and Gloucefter. I perfeftly agree with Lord Cornwallis, that to abandon his pofts, after he had once fixed himfelf, (although by doing fo he might fave part of his army) would have been difgraceful, nay, perhaps fatal to our future profpefts of eftablifhment in the Che fapeak, when fuch a meafure fhould be au- thorifed by a covering fleet. But even that misfortune, great as it may be reprefented, would have been preferable to the one which happened ; and therefore I told his Lordfhip, in a converfation I had with him before I fent his letter of the 20th of Oftober to be printed at New York, I had conceived hopes, that ( 3° ) that between the time of the French fleet's arriving in the Chefapeak, and his receiv ing information from me that Sir Samuel Hood had joined Mr. Graves, which was not until the 1 3th of September, or between that time and the junftion of Mr. Wafhington with the Marquis De la Fayette, when his Lordfhip heard from Lieutenant Conway of the navy, that the enemy were thirty-fix fail of the line, he would have tried to efcape with part of his army to the fouthward; a ftep which certainly would have been jufti- fiable, although in the converfation alluded to, his Lordfhip did not feem to think it would, unlefs I had given him affurances that the navy could not attempt to fuccour him; which affurances, however, I certainly could not poflibly have given him. If, therefore, Lord Cornwallis's letter of the 20th of Oftober, giving an account of the unfortunate conclufion of the campaign, by the furrender of York Town, (Appendix, No. ( 3i ) No. VIII.) could ever have been underftood to imply that the pofts of York and Glou cefter were not his Lordfhip's own choice, in preference to Old Point Comfort, which I had recommended to him ; or that I had ever received information from his Lordfhip, that the ground at either was unfavourable, till the day before he had offered to capitu late ; or that I had ever given him any affu rances of the exertions of the navy, before my letter to him of the 24th of September, which he acknowledges he did not receive till the 29th ; or that any affurances whatfo ever given by me could have prevented his attacking the Marquis De la Fayette, before Mr. Wafhington joined that General, which was on the 27th of September; I am per- fuaded it will appear that thofe implications are not founded on any orders I gave his Lordfhip, and cannot be fupported by any part of our correfpondence. And as I took an opportunity of telling his Lordfhip the fame. ( 32 ) fame, in a letter I fent him before he failed from New- York, dated the 2d and 10th of December (which letter, however, did not appear when this part of our correfpondence was produced before the Houfe of Lords) I cannot doubt his Lordfhip is convinced that what I therein afferted is right. Lord Cornwallis was pleafed to tell me that his letter of the 20th of Oftober, was written under great agitation of mind and in a great hurry. No man could poflibly feel for his Lordfhip, and his dreadful fituation, more than I did. And I will venture to fay, no man could be more anxious, or would have gone greater lengths to fuccour him. Nor will this, I truft, be doubted, when it is recollefted that the propofal firft came from me for embarking fix thoufand men for that purpofe on board an inferior fleet of twenty- feven fail of the line, including two fifties, to thirty-fix; and thereby putting the fate of the American war on the joint exertions of the ( 33 ) the fleet and army, to relieve that noble Lord and his gallant corps. I have to lament that thefe exertions could not have been made in time. All the Admi rals feemed of opinion at the council of war of the 24th September that there was every reafon to hope that the fleet would be ready to fail on the 5th of Oftober. The troops intended for the expedition had been for fome time in readinefs to embark, and did aftually do fo early in Oftober. It feemed alfo to be the general opinion of the Admi rals, that the enemy, although fuperior in number, could not obftruft the channel to York-river, fo as to prevent the paffage of our fleet, much lefs both paffages of the Chefapeak. Could the troops, which embarked under my immediate command, have been put on fhore on the Gloucefter fide, a junftion with the part of Lord Corn- wallis's corps on that fide was easy: but if they ( 34 ) they had been put on fhore, even in James River, although a junftion with his Lord fhip in York would have been fcarcely practi cable, it might have been made in fome other part; or at leaft fuch diverfions might have been made by the troops under my command as might have faved part of his Lordfhip's corps, (Appendix, No. XI.) I muft, therefore, repeat that I lament, and ever fhall, that thofe exertions could not have been made in time. Becaufe, from the profeflional merit of the Admirals who were to conduft us, and from the zeal which appeared fo confpicuous when I pro pofed the move to them ; and which, from their example was communicated to all ranks in the fleet ; and with which, it is to be prefumed, thofe of the army kept fully equal pace; I have every reafon to think we fhould have had moft complete fuccefs. But at the fame time, that truth com pels ( 35 ) pels me to impute our misfortunes ulti mately to the want of a covering fleet in the Chefapeak, I think it right to declare that, as a land officer, I do not feel myfelf a competent judge of the propriety and practicability of naval operations. Nor can I, as a fervant of the State, entrufted with an important, but partial command, pre- fume to enter into the counfel of Minifters ; who, from a more elevated ftation, furvey and balance the whole fyftem of the cam paign, and the general fafety and welfare of the empire.* Upon * "I am, however, aware of the difficulties Adminis tration muft neceffarily be expofed to, from the variety of important matters which demand its attention. And far be it from me, my Lord, to impute the delays I have ex perienced to any of the King's Ministers; but I cannot avoid lamenting that they do happen, and I tremble for the fatal confequences which may poffibly fome time or other enfue." — Sir Henry Clinton's letter to Lord George Germain, dated April 30, 1781. ( 36 ) Upon the whole, I am perfuaded, that had I been left to my own plans, and a proper confidence had been earlier repofed in me, the campaign of 178 1 would not probably have ended unfortunately. But though that apparent want of confidence was at laft re moved,* and the fulleft approbation I could with * "The uneafinefs you exprefs on a certain occafion, muft have ceafed long before this reaches you, and, I truft, in full time to prevent your refigning the command to Earl Cornwallis. The meffage I fent you by Lieu tenant-colonel Bruce was taken in writing to avoid any miftakes: for, as I was confcious of your having every reafon to be fatisfied with the protection fhewn to you by the King, and with the conftant defire of his Minifters to give you all poffible fupport, I could not help regretting that there fhould have been the leaft appearance, of that want of confidence between us, which might prejudice the public fervice. Your explanation upon that fubjeft is perfectly fatisfaftory ; and you may depend upon find ing every attention on my part to thofe requifitions which you may have occafion to make. The variety of fervices now carrying on in different parts of the world muft account ( 37 ) with given to the operations I had projefted, my knowledge of the change happened too late to extricate me from the confequences of Lord Cornwallis's ill-fated march into Virginia, and the orders they had probably occafioned. Forefeeing many of the evils which would refult from this fatal move the inftant I heard of it, I immediately at the time communicated my apprehenfions to the American Minifter. And as my letter to him of the 18th of July, 178 1, fpeaks very fully on this and other matters, of which I fear the public has been hitherto equally mifinformeii, I fhall take the liberty to con clude this Narrative with the following ex- traft from it : "I can account for the difappointments you fometimes fuffer. But you may reft affured, that every department of Government is anxious to furnifh you with the moft effectual means of carrying on the war with honour to yourfelf, and with advantage to the State." — Extracx from Lord George Germain's Letter to Sir Henry Clinton, dated July 7th, 1781. ( 38 ) "I can fay little more to your Lord fhip's fanguine hopes of the fpeedy reduc tion of the fouthern provinces, than to la ment that the prefent ftate of the war there does not altogether promife fo flattering an event. Many untoward incidents, of which your Lordfhip was not apprifed, have thrown us too far back to be able to recover very foon, even what we have lately loft there. For if (as I have often before fuggefted) the good-will of the inhabitants is abfolutely requifite to retain a country, after we have conquered it ; I fear it will be fometime be fore we can recover the confidence of thofe in Carolina, as their paft fufferings will of courfe make them cautious of publicly for warding the King's interefts before there is the ftrongeft certainty of his army being in a condition to fupport them. I fhall, there fore, moft cordially join with your Lord fhip, in condemning the bad policy of taking poffeffion of places at one time, and abandon ing ( 39 ) ing them at another; and in the opinion that the war fhould be condufted upon a permanent and fettled plan of conqueft, by fecuring and preferving what has been re covered. But if thefe maxims have been, on any occafion, deviated from in the paft progrefs of the war; I muft, in juftice to myfelf declare, that it has never been war ranted by my orders, except, only in the cafe of Rhode-Ifland. This I doubt not ,will appear from the inftruftions I gave to General Leflie, and the other general offi cers, whom I fent on expeditions to the Chefapeak. For if Lord Cornwallis made a defultory move into North Carolina, , and without a force fufficient to proteft, or pro vifions to fupport them, invited by procla mation, the Loyalifts to join him, and after wards found it neceffary to quit the friendly diftrifts of that province, before he could have time to give them a fair trial, I am perfuaded your Lordfhip will acknowledge he ( 4° ) he did not aft under my inftruftions : — nor were his Lordfhip's retreat to Wilming ton, and fubfequent move from thence to Virginia, in confequence of my orders: on the contrary, as I forefaw all the unhappy confequences of them, I fhould certainly have endeavoured to have ftopt him, could I have known his intentions in proper time. But though his Lordfhip's movements, (which it muft be confeffed have been as rapid as your Lordfhip expefted) have not to my fincere concern been fuccefsfully decifive ; I am convinced he is, as I hope we all are, impreffed with the abfolute neceflity of vigor ous exertions in the fervice of his country at the prefent crifis. If mine, however, have not been equal to my inclinations, I have little doubt they will be found to be at leaft equal to my powers. " I fhall now, my Lord, beg leave to con clude with the ftrongeft affurances, that no man can be more fervently defirous than I am ( 4i ) am to fee an honourable end put to this moft burthenfome war. And if I remain in the command, that no endeavours of mine fhall be wanting to execute, in the fulleft manner, the King's pleafure and commands. Of the 10,000 men I folicited, only 4000 were even promifed; and no portion of thefe, except a few recruits, has yet joined this part of the army. Your Lordfhip's laft letters, however, give me hopes, that three Britifh battalions and two thoufand fix hundred German troops may be immedi ately expefted. If all thefe arrive, I fhall then be able, at a proper feafon to reinforce the Chefapeak corps very confiderably ; and if a reinforcement does not likewife come to the French armament already here, fuch operations may be carried on as may perhaps produce fome advantages in the courfe of the Winter. But if our reinforcement does not arrive, and the French fhould receive theirs, ( 42 ) theirs, I think we fhall have every thing to apprehend. Before I clofe, however, I beg leave to fay a word or two in explanation of two obfer- vations, in the Commiflioners of Accounts Seventh Report; in order to obviate any im plied cenfure, they may be fuppofed to point againft me as Commander in Chief of the army in North America. The Commiflioners are pleafed to fay, "It appears that the number of the forces "decreafed every year, from 1778, but the "iffue for the extraordinary fervices of that "army greatly encreafed, during the fame "period." And again, " In the account of the iffues "to the officers in the four departments, "we find that the warrants iffued to the "Quarter-mafter's-general, fince the 16th "July 1780, and to the Barrack-mafter's- " general fince the 29th June 1780, and to "the Commiffaries-general, fince the 25th "of ( 43 ) "of May 1778, have been all temporary, for "fums on account; and that no final warrant " has been granted fince thofe feveral periods. "So that thefe fums have been iffued, with- "out even the ceremony of a quarterly "abftraft, and the confidential reliance on "the officer, that his vouchers are forth "coming." I arrived in London many days before the Commiflioners of Accounts delivered in their Seventh Report to the House of Commons. Had thofe Gentlemen called upon me, as they did on Sir William Howe, and Lord Cornwallis; had they examined certain offi cers of the different departments, who arrived in England at the time I did, and who an nounced themfelves to them ; and had they read all the Reports of the different Boards of General Officers and Magiftrates, that had been appointed by me at New York, to enquire into the expenditure of public mo ney, (all which reports had been fent to the Lords ( 44 ) Lords Commiflioners of the Treafury many months before) I am perfuaded that their Report would not have appeared on the table of the Houfe of Commons in the fhape it has done. For when they were informed (as they would have been by the means juft ftated) that all the rum purchafed for the fupply of the army during the whole period of my command, was paid for in America by my warrants, whereas before then it ufed to be paid for in England ; that confiderable fums of money were paid on my warrants for expences incurred during the command of my predeceffor, which could not be brought to account fooner; that provifions to a very confiderable amount were purchafed in Ame rica, and paid for in America on my war rants, for the fupply of the army, which might otherwife have been expofed to the greateft diftrefs ; all which together amount ed to nearly 1,500,0001. and that the in- creafe of pofts, during my command, at Savannah, ( 45 ) Savannah, Charles Town, Cape Fear, Portf- mouth, Penobfcot, &c. requiring each their refpeftive eftablifhments, added of courfe to the extraordinaries of my army; and that, befides thefe, and many others which I could enumerate, the peculiar circumftances of my command expofed me to many ex pences unknown to my predeceffor; it is prefumed, thofe Gentlemen would have ad mitted, that the increafe of the iffues for the extraordinary fervices of the army un der my command, was accounted for. This matter, however, went, by my de- fire, through a very full and formal invefti- gation, in Auguft 1781, before a Board of general officers and magiftrates (of which Lieutenant-general Robertfon was Prefident) under the title of a Comparative View of Expences incurred, from the 31ft December, 1775, to the 1 6th of May, 1778 (the time of Sir William Howe's command) and of what was paid by me, between the 26th of May ( 46 ) May 1778, and the 31ft of December 1780. Which produced the following report from that Board. "The great national expence in the "firft period of Sir William Howe's com- "mand, arofe from the whole navy, and "a very numerous fleet of tranfports, be- "ing employed in attending the move- "ments of the army; no part of which "appears in Sir William Howe's war- " rants. "The expence of the Quarter-mafter- " general, Barrack-mafter-general, and En gineer departments, were neceffarily fmall, "while the troops were on board fhips, or "had thus fupplies from tranfports. "During part of the firft period, the "great article of expence, rum, was pro vided for by a contraft made in Eng- "land, and paid for there. Whereas, du- "ring the fecond period, the rum was pur chafed ( 47 ) "chafed by the Commiffary-general, and "paid for by the Commander in Chief's "warrants. A very large quantity of pro- "vifions purchafed alfo, during the latter "period, fwells the amount of the war rants. "But what deftroys a poflibility of draw- "ing any juft conclufion from a comparifon "of the amount of the warrants in thefe " two periods, arifes from this ; that a great "part of the expence incurred by Sir Wil- "liam Howe, was paid by warrants granted "by Sir Henry Clinton." This report having been regularly tranf mitted to the Treafury, I muft fuppofe it was laid before the Commiflioners of Ac counts. Had it been read by thofe Gentle men, it is prefumable it would have, at leaft, accompanied theirs. With regard to the fecond obfervation alluded to, refpefting my not granting final warrants to certain departments from certain periods ; ( 48 ) periods ; if the commiffioners had read all the above papers, I think it would have occurred to them; that as a Commiffary of Accounts had been commiflioned, and was aftually employed in auditing the accounts of the different departments, I could not, with propriety, grant final warrants to any of the departments upon their quarterly abftrafts (as had been before praftifed) untill their accounts had been firft audited and certified by, the Commiffary. As to the mode of fupply which I found eftablifhed, when I fucceeded to the com mand of the army in North America, and which I underftood had been approved by Government, I certainly could not, in pru dence, have made any alterations or reduc tion in it, as long as I had offenfive opera tion in view. The inftant, however, that I received orders to place the army upon a ftrift defenfive, I propofed fuch a reduftion as could take place. And when I obtained his ( 49 ) his Majefty's permiffion to refign the com mand, I recommended it to General Ro- bertfon, who was appointed to fucceed me. (Signed) "H. CLINTON." APPENDIX. 5- ) APPENDIX. NUMBER I. Extract of a Letter from Lord George Ger main to Sir Henry Clinton, dated May 2, 1781. ' Conceiving therefore fo highly as I do of the importance of the Southern pro vinces, and of the vaft advantages which muft attend the profecution of the war upon the prefent plan of extending our conquefts from ' fouth to north; it was a great mortification to me to find, by your inftruftion to Major- General Phillips, that it appeared to be your intention that only a part of the troops he carried with him fhould remain in the Chefa peak; 52 APPENDIX. peak ; and that he and General Arnold fhould return to New York, leaving only a fufficient force to ferve for garrifons in the pofts they might eftablifh in Virginia. Your ideas, therefore, of the importance of reco vering that province appearing to be fo dif ferent from mine, I thought it proper to afk the advice of his Majefty's other fervants upon the fubjeft; and their opinions concur ring entirely with mine, it has been fubmit ted to the King; and I am commanded by his Majefty to acquaint you that the reco very of the Southern Provinces and the pro fecution of the war, by pufhing our conquefts from fouth to north, is to be confidered as the chief and principal objeft for the em ployment of all the forces under your com mand, which can be fpared from the defence of the places in his Majefty's poffeflion, until it is accomplifhed. "The three regiments from Ireland, and the Britifh recruits that went with them, are, I truft, APPENDIX. 53 I truft, well on their way by this time to Charles Town; and as Sir George Rodney will bring you three more regiments from the Leeward Iflands before the hurricane months, the augmentation of your force muft, I fhould think, be equal to the utmoft of your wifhes. NUMBER II. Extract of a Letter from Lord George Ger main to Sir Henry Clinton, dated fune 6, 1781. " I SHALL therefore only obferve in ad dition to all I have hitherto written upon the the fubjeft, that I am well pleafed to find Lord Cornwallis's opinion entirely coincides with mine of the great importance of pufhing the war on the fide of Virginia with all the force that can be fpared until that province is reduced." NUMBER 54 APPENDIX. NUMBER III. Copy of a Letter from Rear Admiral Sir S. Hood to Sir H. Clinton, dated off Cape Henry, Auguft 25, 1781. "S I R, " HEREWITH you will receive a dupli cate of the letter I had the honour to write you by Lieut. Delanoe of the Aftive brig, in cafe any misfortune fhould have befallen her in returning to New York. I am now fleering for Cape Henry, in order to examine the Chefapeak. From thence I fhall proceed to the Capes of the Delaware ; and not feeing, or hearing any thing of De Graffe, or any detachment of fhips he might have fent upon this coaft, fhall then make the beft of my way off Sandy Hook. This I have commu nicated to Rear Admiral Graves, in order that he may determine my anchoring or not, as the King's fervice may require. "I have APPENDIX. 55 "I have the honour to fend you my line of battle, by which you will fee the number and force of his Majefty's fquadron under my command; and, I truft, you will think it equal, fully to defeat any defigns of the ene my, let De Graffe bring or fend what fhips he may, in aid to thofe under De Barras. "I have the honour to be, &c. (Signed) "SAM. HOOD." NUMBER IV. Copy of a Letter from General Wajhington to Count De Graffe, dated Williamjburg, Sep tember 26, 1 78 1. "I AM unable to defcribe to your Excel lency the painful anxiety under which I have laboured fince the reception of the letter you did me the honour to write me of the 23d inftant. The motions of the naval force under your command, which your Excellency fays may poflibly happen, fince the information communicated 56 APPENDIX. communicated to you by the Baron de Clozen, obliges me to point out the confe quences that may follow; and warmly to urge a perfeverance in the plan agreed upon between us. Permit me, in the firft place, to repeat to your Excellency, that the attempt upon York, under the proteftion of your flapping, is as certain of fuccefs as a fuperior force and a fuperiority of meafures can render any military operation; that the duration of the fiege may be exaftly afcertained ; and that the capture of the Britifh army is a matter fo important in itself, and in its confequences, that it muft greatly tend to bring an end to the war, and put our allied arms in certain poffef fion of the moft ineftimable advantages. " If your Excellency quits the Bay, an ac- cefs is open to relieve York, of which the enemy will inftantly avail themselves. The confequences of this will be not only the dif- grace of abandoning a defign on which are founded the faireft hopes of the allied forces, after APPENDIX. 57 after a prodigious expence, fatigue, and exer tions; but. the probable difbanding of the whole army; for the prefent feat of war be ing fuch, as abfolutely precludes the ufe of waggons, from the great number of large rivers which interfeft the country, there will be a total want of provifions, unlefs this in convenience is remedied by water carriage. This province has been fo exhaufted by the ravages of the enemy, and by the support already given to our forces, that fubfiftence muft be drawn from a diftance, and that can be done only by a fleet fuperior in the Bay. "I earneftly beg your Excellency would confider, that if, by moving your fleet from th'e fituation agreed on, we lofe the prefent opportunity, we fhall never hereafter have it in our power to ftrike fo decifive a ftroke, that the Britifh will labour without intermif- fion to fortify a place fo ufeful to their flap ping ; and that then the period of aahonoura- ble peace will be farther diftant than ever. h "The 58 APPENDIX. " The confidence I have in your Excellen cy's manly fpirit and naval talents leaves me no doubt that the confideration of the confe quences that muft follow your departure from the Bay will determine you to ufe all poffible means for the good of the common caufe. From the affurances of the moft expert failors, I am perfuaded that your Excellency may take fuch a pofition in the Bay as to leave no thing to be apprehended from an attempt of the Englifh fleet ; that this pofition will at the fame time facilitate the operations of the fiege, fecure the tranfportation of our provifions by water, and accellerate our approaches by land ing our heavy artillery and warlike neceffaries in York River almoft clofe to our trenches. " The force faid to have arrived under Ad miral Digby, as the news comes from the Bri tifh themselves, may not only be exaggera ted, but perhaps abfolutely falfe; but fuppo- fing it to be true, their whole force united cannot be fuch as to give them any hopes of fuccefs APPENDIX. 59 fuccefs in the attacking your fleet. If the pofition for your fhips to lie at an anchor, which we agreed upon, has fince appeared impracticable, there is ftill another meafure may be adopted; which, though much in ferior as to the fecurity and facility it will give to our land operations, may ftill be of advantage to our affairs. The meafure, I mean, is to cruife off the Bay, fo as to keep the Capes always in fight, and to prevent any Englifh veffels getting in. "Whatever plan you may adopt, I am to prefs your Excellency to perfevere in the fcheme fo happily concerted between us ; but if you fhould find infurmountable obftacles in the way, let me ultimately beg of you not to relinquifh the laft mentioned alternative of preventing all veffels from the enemy entering the Bay of Chesapeak. "The Britifh Admiral may manoeuvre his fleet, and endeavour to draw you from the main objeft we have in view; but I can never 60 APPENDIX. never believe, that he will ferioufly wifh to bring on a general aftion with a fleet, whofe force, I will anfwer for it, is fuperior to the moft exaggerated accounts we have of theirs. Paffed experience has taught them not to hazard themfelves with equal numbers ; and has drawn from them, though unwillingly, the moft refpeftful opinions of their enemy. "Permit me to add that the abfence of your fleet from the Bay may fruftrate our de fign upon the garrifon at York. For in the prefent fituation of matters, Lord Cornwallis might evacuate the place with the loss of his artillery, baggage, and a few men, facrifices; which would be highly juftifiable from the defire of faving the body of the army. "The Marquis de la Fayette, who does me the honour to carry this letter to your Excellency, will explain to you better than any other perfon, or than I can do by letter, many particulars of our prefent pofition. Your Excellency is acquainted with his candour and talents, APPENDIX. 61 talents, which entitles him to your confidence I have ordered him not to pafs the Cape for fear of accident, in cafe you fhould be at fea. If this be fo, he will inclofe this difpatch in a letter from himself, "I have the honour, &c. "G. WASHINGTON." NUMBER V. Extract from Lord George Germain's Let ter to Sir Henry Clinton, dated October 12, 1781. " IT is a great fatisfaftion to me to find your ideas of the importance of fecuring a naval ftation in the Chefapeak capable of giving protection to the King's fhips, ap pointed to intercept the navigation of that Bay, fo entirely coincided with my own ; and that the plan you had concerted for con ducting the military operations in that quarter correfponds 62 APPENDIX. correfponds with what I had fuggefted in my former letters to you on that fubjeft. I truft, therefore that Lord Cornwallis will retain the whole of the troops you fo very properly fpared for the fervice in the Chefapeak : or if he has fent you any part, that you will re turn them to him. And as foon as the heats are abated, tranfport a ftrong detachment to Baltimore, &c. " The provifion you made for the fouthern fervice was certainly moft ample. And I have always confidered and fpoke of it as a circum- ftance highly to your honour; and as an evi dence of your being aftuated by the pureft zeal for the public fervice. And though I lament exceedingly that from a concurrence of untoward events, the fuccefs was not equal to the fanguine expectations I had enter tained, I never imputed any part of the difap- pointment to a deficiency in your fupplies." NUM- APPENDIX. 63 NUMBER VI. Extratt from Sir Henry Clinton's Letter to Rear- Admiral Graves, dated Augufl 16, 1 781. " I CANNOT fay I credit the reports of the French being upon the coaft. Should they prove falfe, and there was little probabi lity of their coming for a week or ten days, I think thofe could not be better employed than in a vifit to Rhode-Ifland. The recruits I have lately received enable me to make this offer, whenever you think it prudent to at tempt it. If you determine, I requeft that Captain Duncan may direft the water-move ments of the army." Extract from Sir Henry Clinton's Letter to Rear- Admiral Graves, dated Augufl 18, ' 1781. "WHENEVER, Sir, you think the fleet under your command is in number and ftate equal 64 APPENDIX. equal to the undertaking, and you will give me twenty-four hours notice, every thing fhall be immediately embarked; and I fhall with pleafure accompany you myself on it." NUMBER VII. Extracts from Rear- Admiral Graves's Letters to Sir H. Clinton, dated 1 8 and 2 1 Augufl, 1781. "IN anfwer to your propofition, I can only affure you by letter, what I had the ho nour to declare in perfon, that I am ready to concur with your Excellency in any enter prize where you found a probability of fuc- cefs; and that I would rifk the fquadron whenever you thought it advifeable to rifk the army. "The Robufte is fo leaky, I am forced to fend her to the yard for reparation; and I fufpeft that her guns and heavy furniture muft be taken out to enable the fhipwrights to APPENDIX. 65 to examine as much of her bottom as poffible. Whilft that is doing, the Prudent will change one of her mafts, if not two. By this ftate you will fee our naval capacity. 21 Auguft, 1 78 1. How foon the Robufte will be ready is yet impoffible to form a judgement upon, as we cannot yet learn the extent of her de- fefts. The Prudent will, I am confident, be ready in much lefs time; and fo will all the other fhips, I have not a doubt. "Your Excellency may reft affured that timely notice fhall be given, and as early as poffible to determine upon the day the fqua- dron will be fit to aft; for I would not wifh that a fingle day fhould be loft." NUMBER VIII. Extract from Lord Cornwallis' s Letter to Sir H. Clinton. Tork Town, Virginia, 20 Oc tober, 1 78 1. " I HAVE the mortification to inform your Excellency, that I have been forced to 1 give 66 APPENDIX. give up the pofts of York and Gloucefter, and to furrender the troops under my com mand, by capitulation, on the 19th inftant, as prifoners of war to the combined forces of America and France. " I never faw this poft in a favourable light. But, when I found I was to be at tacked in it, in fo unprepared a ftate, by fo powerful an army and artillery, nothing but the hopes of relief would have induced me to attempt its defence. For I would either have endeavoured to efcape to New York, by rapid marches from the Gloucefter fide, im mediately on the arrival of General Wafhing ton's troops at Williamfburg ; or I would, notwithftanding the difparity of numbers, have attacked them in the open field, where it might have been just poffible that Fortune would have favoured the gallantry of the hand ful of troops under my command. But, being affured by your Excellency's letters that every poffible means would be tried, by the navy and APPENDIX. 67 and army, to relieve us, I could not think myfelf at liberty to venture on either of thofe defperate attempts. Therefore, after remain ing two days in a ftrong pofition, in front of this place, in hopes of being attacked, upon obferving that the enemy were taking meafures which could not fail of turning my left flank in a fhort time; and receiving, the fecond evening, your letter of the 24th Sep tember, informing me that the relief would fail about the 5th of Oftober, I withdrew within the works on the night of the 29th of September, hoping, by the labour and firm- nefs of the troops, to protract the defence un til you could arrive. Every thing was to be expefted from the firmnefs of the troops. But every difadvantage attended their labour ; as the works were to be continued under the enemy's fire; and our ftock of intrenching- tools, which did not much exceed four hun dred when we began to work in the latter end of Auguft, was now much diminifhed. "A 68 APPENDIX. "A fuccefsful defence, however, in our fituation, was perhaps impoflible; for the place could only be reckoned an intrenched camp, fubjeft in moft places to enfilade; and the ground in general fo difadvantageous, that nothing but the neceflity of fortifying it as a poft to proteft the navy could have in duced any perfon to ereft works upon it." Copy of a Letter from Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, dated 30 November, 1781. [This letter was not produced in the House of Lords.] " My Lord, "AFTER the converfation I had with your Lordfhip before I fent your letter to be publifhed, in which we feemed fo perfectly to agree, I muft beg your Lordfhip's pardon for again troubling you on the fubjeft. But, being informed, perhaps officioufly, that fome people here fuppofe there are paffages in that letter APPENDIX. 69 letter which convey an idea that you had been compelled by my orders to take the poft of York, (though it was not your own preference;) that you had reprefented the defefts of the ground; and were detained there contrary to your own judgement; — and likewife that I had promifed the exertions of the navy before my letter of the 24th of September : I am perfuaded your Lordfhip will readily excufe my requefting a more formal avowal of your fentiments, left I fhould have then miftaken them. Becaufe, if that fhould unfortunately be the case, I may perhaps be under the neceflity of taking meafures to obviate your letter being viewed in the fame light in England. " I have the honour, &c. "H. CLINTON." 70 APPENDIX. NUMBER IX. Copy of Earl Cornwallis' s Letter to Sir Henry Clinton, dated New York, id December, 1781. [This letter was read in the House of Lords.] "SIR, "YESTERDAY afternoon I was ho noured with your Excellency's letter of the 30th of November. " I do not recollect that any converfation paffed between us the other day, before the publication of my letter, relative to my rea- fons for taking poffeffion of the pofts of York and Gloucefter. But, in my anfwers to your difpatches, dated the 8th and nth of July, direfting me fo positively to poffefs a harbour in the Chefapeak for line of battle fhips, your Excellency will fee, that, after finding that works on Point Comfort could not proteft a naval APPENDIX. 71 naval force in Hampton Road, I thought that I acted in ftrift obedience to your orders by taking poffeffion of thofe pofts. I thought it unneceffary to enter into a minute detail of the difadvantages of the ground, either on my firft examination of it in the month of June, or on my return to it in Auguft; becaufe, on the firft occafion, as I have already had the honour of explaining to your Excellency, I did not, after feeing it, entertain for a moment an idea of occupying it, not thinking myfelf at liberty, by the inftruftions under which I then acted, to detain the greater part of the force in Virginia for the purpofe of fecuring a harbour for fhips of the line ; and, on my re turn to it in Auguft, I thought it then became my duty to make the beft of it I could, having no other harbour to propofe in its place. " In regard to the promife of the exertions of the navy previous to your letter of the 24th of September, I can only repeat what I had the 72 APPENDIX. the honour of faying to your Excellency in the converfation to which you allude; that, without any particular engagement for the navy before that date, all your letters held out uniformly hopes of relief; and that I had no reafon, from any of them, to fuppofe that you had loft fight of the poflibility of effecting it. And that, under thofe hopes, after serious re flection, I did not think that it would have been justifiable in me to abandon thofe pofts, with our numerous fick, artillery, ftores, and fhipping; or to rifk an aftion, which, in all probability, would in its confequences have precipitated the lofs of them. "My letter from York, dated the 20th of Oftober, was written under great agitation of mind and in great hurry, being conftantly in terrupted by numbers of people coming upon bufinefs or ceremony. But my intention in writing that letter was to explain the motives that influenced my own conduft, and to nar rate APPENDIX. 73 rate the incidents that preceded the extremity that forced us to furrender. " I have the honour, &c. " CORNWALLIS." NUMBER IX. Copy of a Letter from Sir Henry Clinton to Earl Cornwallis, dated New York, 2d and 10th December, 1781. [This letter was not read in the House of Lords.] " My Lord, " AS your Lordfhip is pleafed, in your letter of this day, to revert to the circumftance of your quitting Williamfburg Neck and re- pafling the James River, fo contrary to the intentions I wifhed to exprefs in my letters of the 1 ith and 15 th of June, and thofe referred to by them, and which I thought they would have clearly explained. Your Lordfhip will, I hope, forgive me, if I once more repeat that I K am 74 APPENDIX. am of opinion, if thofe letters had been proper ly underftood by your Lordfhip, you would at leaft have hefitated before you adopted that meafure. For I humbly prefume it will ap pear, upon a re-perufal of them, that it was my defire to recommend to your Lordfhip the taking a healthy defenfive ftation, either at Williamfburg or York; and, after keeping what troops you might want for the ample defence of fuch a poft, and defultory move ments by water, to fend me fuch a proportion of the corps (mentioned in a lift) as you could fpare, taking them in the fucceflion they are there placed. Your Lordfhip, on the con trary, underftood thefe as conveying a pofitive order to fend me three thoufand men, (by which you fay your force would have been reduced to about two thoufand four hundred rank and file fit for duty; — having, it is prefumed, above 1500 fick;) and was pleafed to tell me, in your answer, that you could not, confiftent with my plans, make fafe defenfive pofts APPENDIX. 75 pofts at York and Gloucefter, (both of which would be neceffary for the protection of flap ping;) and that you fhould immediately re- pafs James River, and take meafures for com plying with my requifition. " I own, my Lord, that my opinion of the obvious meaning of the letters referred to, continues ftill the fame ; and I am exceedingly forry to find, by the letter you have now honoured me with, that it differs fo widely from your Lordfhip's. It is plain, however, we cannot both be in the right. " My letter of the 1 1 th of July direfts your Lordfhip to fortify Old Point Comfort, in the mouth of James River, with the inten tion of fecuring Hampton Road, which the Admiral recommended as the beft naval fta tion, and requefted I would occupy. But your Lordfhip's letter of the 27th of July informs me, you had examined Old Point Comfort, with the officers of the navy^ and the engi neers, and that you were all of opinion, a poft there 76 APPENDIX. there would not anfwer the purpofe; and that you fhould, therefore, in compliance with the. fpirit of my orders, feize York and Gloucefter, being the only harbour in which you could hope to be able to give effectual protection to line of battle fhips. Suppofing, therefore, of courfe, that your Lordfhip ap proved, in every refpeft, of York and Glou cefter, from the preference you had thus given them "to the poft I had recommended, I did not oppofe the choice you had made ; having never received the leaft hint from your Lordfhip that the ground of York was unfavourable, or liable to be enfiladed till after you had capitulated. "With refpeft to your Lordfhip's having been influenced in your conduft, by the hopes of relief, (which you fay was uniformly held out to you in all my letters) your Lordfhip cannot be infenfible, that the poffibility of effecting it muft have entirely depended upon the exertions of the navy ; which, as I was not APPENDIX. 77 not authorifed to promife before the 24th of September, I am perfuaded your Lordfhip will readily acknowledge, that if your letter of the 20th Oftober implies I had done fo before that period, the implication cannot be fupported by any thing I wrote previous to my letter of that date, which you received on the 29th. "As, therefore, my letters of the 2d and 6th of September, which promife only my own exertions, did not reach your Lordfhip before the 13th and 14th of that month, and you did not before then know of Sir Samuel Hood's arrival, or of Mr. Graves's having more than feven fail of the line to combat Monfieur De Graffe's force, which on the 29th of Auguft you had heard confifted of at leaft twenty-five fail of the line ; your Lord fhip confequently could have no hopes of re lief before that time. And with refpeft to your efcape to New- York, immediately on the arrival of General Wafhington's troops at Williamfburg, 78 APPENDIX. Williamfburg, which your letter of the 20th of Oftober implies you were prevented from undertaking, by the receipt of mine of the 24th of September; I muft beg leave to ob ferve, that if it had been ever practicable after the time your Lordfhip mentions (which I am free to own I do not think it was) it muft have been between that period and the time of the enemy's force appearing before your lines. It may, therefore, be prefumed, you could not have been prevented by any thing I faid in that letter, as you did not re ceive it until after the latter event took place. But I readily admit, my Lord, that none of my letters could give you the leaft reafon to fuppofe that an attempt would not be made to fuccour you. "Your Lordfhip will, I am perfuaded, alfo forgive me, if I again take notice of the too pofitive manner in which you are pleafed to fpeak of the opinion I gave you about the failing of the fleet ; as my words were, " there is APPENDIX. 79 "is every reafon to hope we fhall ftart from "hence about the 5th of Oftober." And in my letter of the next day, for fear that fhould appear too pofitive, I fay, "It is fuppofed " the neceffary repairs of the fleet will detain "us here to the 5th of next month; and your "Lordfhip muft be fenfible that unforefeen "accidents may lengthen it out a day or two "longer." With regard to entrenching tools, the want of which your Lordfhip fo much complains of, I can only fay, that by the returns made to me by the Adjutant-general, it appears that two thoufand five hundred had been fent to the Chefapeak by the Engineer, fince General Arnold's expedition, inclufive; and that the firft moment a requisition was made for more, (which was not before the 23d of Auguft) I ordered an additional fupply to be fent, which were prevented from going, by the arrival of the French fleet. I own, however, that I was not at that time very uneafy on this fcore, as I fup- 80 APPENDIX. I fuppofed it poffible for your Lordfhip to have collected a fufficiency from the neigh bouring plantations any time before the in- veftiture was begun. "December 10. 1 had wrote thus tar, my Lord, immediately after the receipt of your Lordfhip's letter of the 2d inftant. But con- fidering that it was poffible you might not have adverted to the implications, which your letter of the 20th of October may be thought to bear, from the great agitation of mind and hurry in which you tell me it was written, I was unwilling to give you at that time more trouble on the fubjeft; — in the honeft hope that your Lordfhip's candour will induce you moft formally to difavow your having any fuch intentions by writing that letter, in cafe you find, on your arrival in England, that the paffages of it (which I have taken notice of) are underftood as I fufpeft they may be. And I therefore intended to have fent this letter to a friend to be delivered to you in London, APPENDIX. 81 London ; but upon confidering your letter of the 2d inftant, (which I have had more leifure to do fince my public difpatches were clofed) I am of opinion, that it is properer your Lord fhip fhould receive my anfwer to it here. " I have the honour, &c. (Signed) "H. CLINTON." " P. S. Having forgot to fpeak to the part of your Lordfhip's letter of the 2d inftant, where you fay, ' I do not recolleft that any 'converfation paffed between us the other 'day, before the publication of my letter, 'relative to my reafons for taking poffeffion 'of the the pofts of York and Gloucefter,' I beg leave to do it here. "It is true, my Lord, no converfation paffed from your Lordfhip on that fubjeft. But when, in the converfation alluded to, I mentioned that I had direfted you to examine Old Point Comfort, and fortify it, but that, difapproving of that poft, you had feized l York, 82 APPENDIX. York, and that therefore York was your Lord fhip's preference ; as you were pleafed not to make me any anfwer, I took it for granted you agreed with me. "H. CLINTON. " Lieutenant-general "Earl Cornwallis." NUMBER IX. Extract of a Letter from Sir Henry Clinton, to Lord George Germaine, dated December 3> i781- "YOUR Lordfhip will have received in my Difpatch, No. 146, the copies of Lord Cornwallis's letter to me of the 20th of Oc tober, his capitulation for the pofts of York and Gloucefter, and the other papers which accompanied it. But your Lordfhip will per ceive, that I declined making any remarks upon his letter until I faw his Lordfhip; knowing that my whole correfpondence with him being in your Lordfhip's poffeffion, every thing APPENDIX. 83 thing which wanted explanation could readily be cleared up. His Lordfhip having arrived here on the 1 9th ultimo, I have had feveral converfations with him ; and I have now the honour to inclofe, for your Lordfhip's infor mation, the copy of a letter I wrote him on the fubjeft, with his Lordfhip's anfwer. "I perceive by Lord Cornwallis's letter of the 20th of Oftober, that his opinion of the poft of York is very unfavourable; and he fince tells me, that he does not think the enemy will be able to make a ftrong one of it. Had his Lordfhip, however, not been fo very decided in his fentiments of the poft, all the accounts I had ever before received of the fituation and defenfibility of the ground would, I confefs, have inclined me to have thought well of it." 84 APPENDIX. NUMBER IX. Copy of a Letter from Sir Henry Clinton, to Lord George Germain, dated December 6, 1781. "My Lord, " I have fo often had the honour of deliver ing the fame fentiments to your Lordfhip, that I muft beg your pardon for again troubling you with the repetition, that I have ever been of opinion that operation fhould not be under taken in the Chefapeak, without having a naval fuperiority in thefe feas; and to the want of it, and perhaps to that alone, are we to impute our late misfortune in that quarter. Therefore, when I did myfelf the honour of fending you a copy of Lord Cornwallis's letter to me of the 20th of Oftober, I did not think it neceffary to trouble your Lordfhip with any remarks upon fome paffages of it, which might feem to imply, that his Lordfhip had been APPENDIX. 85 been forced into a bad poft by my orders, notwithstanding he had reprefented its de fefts, and had been induced to remain there contrary to his judgment by the pofitive affu rances I had given him of relief; efpecially as your Lordfhip was poffeffed of our cor refpondence, which could in the fulleft man ner invalidate every implication of that fort, and I wifhed to have an opportunity of fpeaking to Lord Cornwallis before I faid any thing on fo delicate a fubjeft. "Since Lord Cornwallis's arrival here, I have had a good deal of converfation with his Lordfhip upon this bufinefs; by which, and by the anfwer he has fent me to a letter I wrote him thereon, (copies of which are in clofed) it appears, that his Lordfhip admits this was not the cafe. But as Lord Cornwal lis's difavowal is not fo explicit and direct in bis letter, as I could wifh, and I think juftice to my character requires, I beg your Lord fhip's attention to the following obfervations ; which 86 . APPENDIX. which I hope the anxiety I muft naturally feel on this occafion, will plead my excufe for troubling you with ; though they may not be neceffary to vindicate me with your Lord fhip, who is already fo competent to judge. "I am perfuaded that it will appear by my letters to Lord Cornwallis of the nth and 15th of June, and thofe referred to l>y them, that I recommended his taking a healthy, defenfive ftation, either at Williamf burg, or York; and defired that, after keep ing what troops he might want for its moft ample defence and defultory movements by water, his Lordfhip would fend me fuch a proportion of the corps (mentioned in a lift) as he could fpare, taking them in the fuc- ceflion they are there placed. But his Lord fhip, on the contrary, understanding that thefe letters conveyed a pofitive order to fend me three thoufand men, (by which he fays his force would have been reduced to about two APPENDIX. 87 two thoufand four hundred rank and file fit for duty, having probably at that time a numerous fick) told me in his anfwer, that he could not, confiftent with my plans, make fafe defenfive pofts at York and Gloucefter, (both which would be neceffary for the proteftion of flapping) and that he fhould immediately repafs James River, and take meafures for complying with my requifition. Finding, therefore, that his Lordfhip had fo entirely mifconceived my intentions, I immediately confulted with Rear Admiral Graves upon the fubjeft of his letter; and the Admiral being of opinion that a naval ftation in Chefapeak for large fhips was abfolutely re quifite, and that Hampton Road appeared to be the fitteft for the purpofe, I defired his Lordfhip, at the Admiral's requeft, to exa mine Old Point Comfort in the mouth of James River, and fortify it, upon the fup- pofition that a work there would fecure that harbour ; 88 APPENDIX. harbour; and if his Lordfhip thought a poft at York neceffary to cover Old Point Com fort, he was at liberty to take that alfo. This order was fent to Lord Cornwallis in my letter of the nth of July, and his Lordfhip's anfwer to it is dated the 27th; wherein he informs me, that having exa mined Old Point Comfort with the Cap tains of the King's fhips and the engineers, and being all of opinion a poft there would not anfwer the purpofe, he Should, in com pliance with the fpirit of my orders, feize York and Gloucefter, being the only harbour in which he could hope to be able to give effectual proteftion to line of battle fhips. Copies of thefe letters are inclofed for your Lordfhip to refer to; and I truft it will ap pear from them, that the poft at York was in this inftance entirely his Lordfhip's choice. But never having received any representation from his Lordfhip, by which I could have the APPENDIX. 89 the leaft conception he thought the ground disadvantageous and liable to enfilade, (as ftated in his letter of the 20th of Oftober) and, fuppofing from the preference his Lord fhip had thus given it to the one I had re commended, that he fully approved of York and Gloucefter, I own I did not oppoSe his laying hold of them, as I could not enter tain the fmalleft doubt of their being defen- fible, and fuch a poft as I had told his Lord fhip I wanted. And, indeed, if his Lord fhip had not now informed me that it was a bad one, the eagernefs with which I under stand the French have fince feized and are fortifying it, would incline me ftill to think well of it. "With refpeft to his Lordfhip having been influenced in his conduft by the hopes of relief, (which he is pleafed to fay I uni formly held out to him in all my letters) his Lordfhip could not be infenfible that the pof- m Ability 90 APPENDIX. Ability of effecting it muft have entirely de pended upon the exertions of the fleet, which, as I was not authorized to promife him be fore the council of war held on the 24th of September, I am perfuaded that the implica tion in his Lordfhip's letter that I had done fo before that period, cannot be fupported (as indeed his Lordfhip now feems to acknow ledge) by any thing I wrote to him, previous to my letter of that date, which he received on the 29th. As, therefore, my letters of the 2d and 6th of September, which promife only my own exertions, did not reach his Lordfhip before the 13th and 14th of that month, and he did not before then know of Sir S. Hood's arrival, or that Admiral Graves had more than feven fail of the line to com bat Monfieur de Graffe's force, whofe arrival, it appears from his Lordfhip's letters, he knew of on the 29th of Auguft, and SuppoSed it to be twenty-five Sail of the line, his Lord fhip APPENDIX. 9i fhip confequently did not receive from me - any hopes of relief before that time. "With regard to his Lordfhip's efcape to New York, immediately on the arrival of General Wafhington's troops at Williamf burg, which his letter of the 20th of Oftober implies he was prevented from undertaking by the receipt of mine of the 24th of Sept. I cannot help being of opinion, that a re treat, after Mr. Wafhington joined, was im practicable, and that it was at no time to be effected to the northward, for reafons which I gave his Lordfhip. But had it been ever poffible, after the time his Lordfhip men tions, it muft, I think, have been between that period and the time of the enemy's force prefenting itfelf before the lines of York; and it is confequently prefumabje, his Lord fhip was not prevented by any thing I faid in that letter, as he acknowledges he did not receive it until after the latter event took place. But I readily admit, my Lord, that none 92 APPENDIX. none of my letters could give his Lordfhip the leaft reaSon to SuppoSe that an attempt would not be made to Succour him, though, I muft confefs, I think his Lordfhip fpeaks in his letter rather too pofitively of the opi nion I gave in mine, as to the time of the fleet's failing. My words being, 'There is 'every reafon to hope we fhall Start from 'hence about the 5th of October.' And left even that fhould be thought pofitive, I the next day told him, 'that unforefeen 'accidents may lengthen it out a day or two 'longer.' "The complaint his Lordfhip makes of the want of intrenching tools, I can only anfwer, by faying, that it appears from the Adjutant-general's returns to me, that two thoufand five hundred had been fent by the engineer to the Chefapeak with the different expeditions, fince the one commanded by General Arnold inclufive; and the firft mo ment a requifition was made for more (which was APPENDIX. 93 was not before his Lordfhip's letter of the 22d of Auguft) I ordered an additional fup ply to be fent, which were prevented from going by the arrival of the French fleet. But I muft own, my Lord, that I was not then very uneaSy on this fcore, as I flattered myfelf it was poffible for his Lordfhip to have collected what he wanted from the neighbouring plantations any time before the inveftiture was begun. " No man, my Lord, can feel more fenfibly than I did for the unhappy fituation of Lord Cornwallis and his gallant army, whofe me ritorious conduft, fpirit, and zeal, on all oc- cafions, muft heighten our anxiety and con cern for their prefent fate; and therefore as his Lordfhip is pleaSed to tell me that his letter of the 20th of Oftober was written under great agitation of mind and in great hurry, which might poffibly have prevented his adverting to the implications which it may be thought to bear, I cannot, at prefent, wifh 94 APPENDIX. wifh to give his Lordfhip more trouble on the fubjeft, although his anfwer of the 2d inftant is not So explicitly Satisfactory as I expefted it would have been; for, if the paffages in that letter, which I have taken notice of, fhould be underftood in Europe in any reSpeft to my prejudice, I cannot doubt his Lordfhip will have candour enough moft formally to difavow his having any fuch in tentions. But if his Lordfhip, contrary to my expectation, fhall not be inclined to do fo, I muft be obliged, though reluctantly, moft earneftly to requeft your Lordfhip to render me that juftice, (which I am perSuaded you think I deServe) by publishing this letter. "I have the honour, &c. "H. CLINTON." NUM- APPENDIX. 95 NUMBER X. ExtraB from Sir H. Clinton's Inf ructions to Major-General Philips, dated March 10, 1781. "IF the Admiral difapproving of Portf- mouth, and requiring a fortified ftation for large fhips in the Chefapeak, fhould propoSe York Town, or Old Point Comfort, if pof feffion of either can be acquired and main tained without great rifk or lofs, you are at liberty to take poffeffion thereof. But if the objections are fuch as you think forcible, you muft, after Stating thofe objections, decline it till folid operations take place in the Chefa peak." Extract 96 APPENDIX. ExtraB from the Subjiance of Converfations held with General Philips, fent to that General Officer for his Guidance. " BUT if the heights of York, and thofe on the Gloucefter fide, canndt be fo well and fo foon fortified as to render that poft hors d'infult before the enemy can move a force, &c. againft it, it may not be adviSeable to attempt it. In that caSe Something may pof- fibly be done at Old Point Comfort to cover large fhips lying in Hampton road, which is reckoned a good one. If neither can be fe cured, we muft content ourfelves with keep ing the Chefapeak, with frigates and other armed veffels, which will always find fecurity againft a fuperior naval force in Elizabeth River." NUM- APPENDIX. 97 NUMBER XI. Vide p. 7. 1. 15. ExtraB from Sir Henry Clinton's Letters to Lord George Germain. OCTOBER 30, 1780. "I fhall in a few days fend to Charles-town, all the recruits belonging to the fouthern army, which will be about eight hundred. And then, includ ing the corps under General Leflie, Lord Cornwallis will have full n 306 effective rank and file under his orders. April 5th, 1 78 1. "After the reduction of Charles-town, Lord Cornwallis informed me, that he thought the force I left with him fully competent to the defence of South, and moft probably the reduction of North Caro lina. I had, therefore, at that time no other intention (threatened as we were, by the ex pected arrival of a French fleet and army in Rhode-Ifland) than to Send an expedition into Chefapeak, merely by way of making a n diverfion 98 APPENDIX. diverfion in his Lordfhip's favour, until more folid operation might take place. Which I was in hopes that adequate reinforcements from Europe, would have enabled me to un dertake early in the prefent year. Events, however, notwithftanding the very glorious exertions which were made at Camden, al tered Lord Cornwallis's fituation So much as to make it neceffary for him to call the corps I had fent to Chefapeak with General Leflie, (and which I had put under his Lordfhip's orders) to a nearer co-operation. Being, therefore, ftill defirous to fecure a poft in that bay to cover the King's frigates which might be acting there; and at the fame time wifhing to give Lord Cornwallis every affift ance in my power; I fent thither another detachment, under the orders of Brigadier- general Arnold ; which, though not fo con fiderable as the former met with the fulleft fuccefs, and will, I doubt not, have greatly aided the movements of the army in Caro lina. APPENDIX. 99 lina. General Wafhington having detached a body of troops to the fouthward, and the French having embarked in their fleet, ano ther from their army at Rhode-ifland, with an apparent intention of interrupting our operations in Virginia, and the Carolinas; I was induced to fend to the Chefapeak ano ther expedition (drawn principally from the elite of my army) under Major-general Phil lips. All thefe feveral detachments, your Lordfhip will perceive are acting, either with or in favour of Lord Cornwallis. But, as General Wafhington's letter to Mr. Harrison (a copy of which your Lordfhip will fee amongft the intercepted letters inclofed) inti mates, that there will not be oppofed to his Lordfhip, above two thouSand continentals more than General Green had with him be fore; I am led to hope that, when his Lordfhip has eftablished himSelf in North- Carolina, a very confiderable portion of his army may be fpared to affift in carrying into execution ioo APPENDIX. execution fuch further operations, as Lord Cornwallis may have to propofe; or the whole or fuch part as fhall be found practi cable of thofe I had defigned, and accordingly explained to Major-general Phillips, in fome converfations I had with him before his de parture. " If an attempt upon the forts in the high lands fhall not, on mature deliberation, be thought advifeable, and nothing elfe offers in this quarter; I fhall probably reinforce Ma jor-general Phillips, and direft him to carry on fuch operations as may moft effectually favour thofe of Lord Cornwallis, until fome plan can be determined on for the campaign. For, until I know his Lordfhip's Succefs, the force he can, in confequence of it, fpare from the Carolinas, and the certainty of the arrival of the fix regiments intended to reinforce us, it will be impoflible to decide finally upon it. Your Lordfhip will, however, fee by the in clofed opinions, what were the operations I had APPENDIX. 101 had planned for the enfuing campaign, upon the Supposition, that Lord Cornwallis Suc ceeded in the Carolinas, and was able to fpare a confiderable force from thence. With the ten thoufand men I requefted, I fhould not have had a doubt of fuccefs. But in my prefent reduced ftate and profpefts I dare not flatter myfelf with any. And if the French fhould ftill be reinforced, your Lordfhip will, I am perfuaded, judge our fituation to be even critical. For with regard to our efforts in the Chefapeak, your Lordfhip knows how much their Succefs and even the fafety of the armament there, will depend upon our having a decided naval fuperiority in thefe feas. And I, therefore, cannot doubt that every precaution will be taken, to givd me, at leaft, timely notice of the contrary being likely to happen ; as my ignorance of fuch an event, might be moft fatal in its confe quences. The 102 APPENDIX. "The reinforcement I afked for, was only what I judged to be barely adequate to the fervices required ; and I moft sincerely wifh it had been poffible to have fent it in the full extent of numbers, and in the time I requefted. However, the preSent reduced ftate of General Wafhington, the little proba bility there is, I hope, of an augmentation to the French armament, and the certainty there is, I likewife hope, of the fix Britifh regiments, and one thouSand recruits joining me in a Short time, together, with the ex pectation I have of Lord Cornwallis's SucceSs in Carolina, enabling him to fend me a con fiderable reinforcement from thence, render the appearances of my fituation lefs critical. And I Shall, therefore, only add, my Lord, that while the King does me the honour, to truft me with the command of this army, I will employ it to the utmoft of my poor abilities, for the promoting his fervice; — taking the liberty, however, to reprefent (as I think APPENDIX. 103 I think it my duty) what advantages may be obtained by an additional force, and what evils may be apprehended from the want of a fufficient one. April 30, 1 78 1. "Your Lordfhip will have feen in the paper I had the honour to fend you in my laft difpatch, what force I judged would be requifite for this fervice. Not lefs, my Lord, than 10,000 men rank and file, fit for duty, indeed I wifh they could be more. But the incloSed returns will fhew your Lordfhip that after leaving thefe pofts to their preSent garriSons, and leaving 1000 men in the poft in Elizabeth River (fuppofing it may not be found ne ceffary to occupy another ftation) I fhall not have quite 5000 men for it, unless the three battalions expected from the Weft Indies arrive in proper time and condition for fer vice, or Lord Cornwallis Should be able to fpare from his defenfive in Carolina (when he determines upon it) a confiderable part of the 104 APPENDIX. the army under his immediate command; which, however, his Lordfhip's letter of the I oth inftant, gives me no hopes of, or indeed that he will even fpare me the three regi ments coming from Ireland. "With thefe 5000, however, my Lord, I may poffibly determine to rifk, even by deSultory movements, the trial of this experi ment, fhould I find, the report given me of our friends in that country properly founded. If it fucceeds as fully as our fanguine friends would perfuade us to hope, we may poffibly be able to maintain ourfelves there with a fmall force ; but if we are in a fituation to give the experiment a fair trial, and it then fails, I Shall, I confefs, have little hopes after wards of re-eftablifhing order on this conti nent; which I am free to own I think can never be effected without the cordial affift ance of numerous friends, &c. [Inclofed APPENDIX. 105 Inclofed in the above letter the following extraBs from Sir Henry Clinton' s letters to Major General Phillips. April ib, 1781. " Lord Cornwallis's arrival at Wilmington has confiderably changed the complexion of our affairs to the fouthward; and all ope rations to the northward muft probably give place to thoSe in favour of his Lordfhip, which at prefent appear to require our more immediate attention. I know nothing of his Lordfhip's fituation, but what I have learnt from his letter to me of the 1 oth, which you have read. I had great hopes, before I re ceived this letter that his Lordfhip would have been in a condition to fpare me a confide rable part of his army from Carolina for the operations in Chefapeak ; but you will obferve from it, that inftead of fending any part of his prefent force thither, he propofes to detain a part of the reinforcement coming from Eu rope for his more fouthern operations, even o though 106 APPENDIX. though they fhould be defenfive. I fhall therefore take the opinions of the general of ficers near me, upon the prefent ftate of our affairs, and afterwards fend you fuch a rein forcement from this army, as we may judge can be done with tolerable fecurity to this poft, at leaft, while we remain Superior at fea. April 30, 1 78 1. To the fame. "If Lord Cornwallis propofes no operation to you foon (that is, before the month of June) and you fee none that will operate for him direBly. I think the beft indireB one in his favour will be what you and General Arnold have pro pofed to me in Number 1 o of your joint letter of the 1 8th inftant. The only rifk you run is from a temporary fuperiority of the enemy at fea; it is, however, an important move, and ought, in my opinion, to be tried even with fome rifk. Give me timely information of your intended move, and if poffible I will fol low you into with fuch a fmall rein forcement as I can at the time fpare. "If APPENDIX. 107 " If the next packet does not fatisfy me in I fhall probably retire and leave the command to Lord Cornwallis; to whom it will be my advice to try the only experiment that in my opinion can operate, if the one in Carolina has failed. For as to Virginia, I know none which can reduce that province in one campaign. "As you feemed to think, before you re ceived Lord Cornwallis's letter that all direft operation in favour of his Lordfhip would ceafe by the end of May, &c. pray let me receive General Arnold's, and your opinion as foon as poffible ; I confefs, I am not fan guine, but if the experiment can be tried with out any other rifk than from the enemy's fu periority at fea I Should wifh to do it. "Should Lord Cornwallis determine on a defenfive in the Carolinas, he furely cannot want any of the European reinforcement, and will of courfe, fend it to you, and all fuch other as fhall arrive ; thus reinforced, if after leaving 108 APPENDIX. leaving a fufficient garrifon in Elizabeth Ri ver, you can proceed to I think we fhall be in force to give this a fair trial; and I may leave you in the command there, unlefs things fhould take a more favourable turn in the Carolinas, and Lord Cornwallis's prefence there be no longer neceffary. For until they do, I fhould imagine he will not quit them. N. B. Thefe two letters with other dif- patches fell into Lord Cornwallis's hands on General Phillips's death and were opened by his Lordfhip; and the expedition therein propofed recommended to his confideration. N U M- APPENDIX. io9 NUMBER XII. Vide p. 37. 1. 6. ExtraBs from Sir Henry Clinton's Letters to Lord George Germain. May 20, 1 78 1. "BUT fhould Lord Cornwallis perfift in his intention of joining Major-general Phil lips, as mentioned in his letter to that General Officer, I fhall be under fome apprehenfions for every part of South Carolina, except Charles-town, and even for Georgia, unlefs the fpeedy arrival of the reinforcement ex pefted from Europe, may enable the officer, commanding in South Carolina, to take poft in force in fome healthy ftation in the back country. "May 22. Notwithftanding the purport of thefe letters, I am yet in hopes, from Lord Cornwallis's letter to me of the 24th, that his Lordfhip will not perfift in attempting a junction with Major-general Phillips, as I am no APPENDIX. am apprehenfive it may be attended with fome rifk, not only to his own corps, but to that of General Phillips, fhould that General Of ficer not have been joined in time by the re inforcement I have fent him. And I even have my doubts whether his Lordfhip's march to the northward will draw after him, as he expects, the rebel General Green ; who, I fear, will endeavour either to inveft Camden, or, by Stationing himfelf between that place and Charleftown, render Lord Rawdon's fitu ation very hazardous. I am therefore induced to flatter myfelf, that Lord Cornwallis, when he hears of Lord Rawdon's fuccefs againft Green, will rather march into South Carolina either by the direft route of Crofs Creek and Camden, or by that of George Town ; or even by embarkation, though he fhould be obliged to leave his cavalry behind until veffels can be fent for them, than attempt the propofed junc tion with General Phillips in the way he men tions ; APPENDIX. m tions; which I muft freely own appears to me, for the reafons I have ftated, not only dangerous to both corps in the attempt, but replete with the worft conSequences to our fouthern Provinces in their prefent ftate." NUMBER XIII. Vide p. 37. 1. 11. ExtraBs from Sir Henry Clinton's Letters to Lord George Germain. July 18, 1 78 1. "The extracts from my correfpondence with Earl Cornwallis, which I have had the honour to tranfmit from time to time to your Lordfhip, will fhew, that I left in Carolina a very fair proportion of my army, and fuch as his Lordfhip thought fuf ficient to fecure South, and recover North Carolina. With what was left for me to aft with in this quarter, I took the field immediately upon my arrival here. General Leflie's 112 A P P E-N D I X. Leflie's expedition to the Chefapeak took place afterwards; and fome unfortunate events in Carolina calling for ftill farther reinforcement and co-operation, foon re duced this part of my army to a defenfive, almoft as low in numbers as Sir William Howe left me in 1777. If our fucceffes, therefore, in the fouthern Provinces have not anfwered your Lordfhip's expectations, it cannot, I am certain, be imputed either to the fmallnefs of the numbers I left there, or the tardinefs or fcantinefs with which I have fince fupplied the exigencies of that fervice. Though I am Strongly impreffed with the importance of recovering Virginia, I fear the entire reduction of fo populous a province is not to be expefted from an operation folely there; unlefs our friends in it were more numerous, and were heartily inclined to affift us not only in conquering, but in keeping it. J^y APPENDIX. 113 July 25. "No man, my Lord, laments more fincerely than I do, the long continuance of the wefterly winds, which prevented the failing of the Warwick's convoy ; and I hope your Lordfhip will pardon me for again re peating, that had the reinforcement failed as early as was promifed, and the three battalions not been detained in the Weft Indies, I fhould perhaps by this time have made fuch move ments as would have obliged the enemy to be apprehenfive for their own poffeflions, in ftead of meditating the attack which they now threaten againft this poft." Auguft 9. "I am entirely of your Lord fhip's Sentiments with refpeft to Lord Corn wallis having done as much in North Caro lina as could have been effected with his force. But I have to lament the caufes which reduced it fo low in number; and that his Lordfhip was induced to perfift in his plan, after it became obvious that he was p not n4 APPENDIX. not able to eftablifh himfelf there, 'and fup port and arm the Loyalifts, which were the objefts of his march into the heart of that province." , From Lord Cornwallis's former letters, I had every reafon to fuppofe he thought him felf in fufficient ftrength to command the fuccefs he hoped for. Had his Lordfhip, however, upon Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton's miffortune, called upon me for a reinforce ment, or had I even known it in time, I am perfuaded your Lordfhip will do me the juftice to acknowledge, that it was absolutely out of my power to affift him more than I did; efpecially when it is confidered, that at this moment his Lordfhip has acting with him, and in the different pofts under his command, nineteen Britifh, eight German, and fourteen Provincial battalions, befides detachments from four Britifh battalions, and lagers, artillery and cavalry; whilft in my preSent threatened fituation, I have (through APPENDIX. 115 (through my earneft defire to fupport his operations) left myfelf only eight Britifh, eleven German, and four Provincial bat talions, befides artillery and cavalry, for thofe in this quarter. The END. wV *Nfi \i ^a i . . .-, * V :: : a**- . y V -OUST:.*' r*» 'y?f-i ::¦:,¦ y- y'-yy ¦ - - [ ¦ /' ' '. :¦•"¦-«>*¦ i.' ,-¦ . !;>:'¦. 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