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A,

REVIEW

OF THE

REV. THOMAS ANDROS'S ESSAY

ON

The Doctrine of Divine Efficiency,

BY OTIS THOMPSON, A. M.
Ill
Pastor of the Congregational Church in Rehoboth, Mass.

PROVIDENCE :
Printed by Miller & Hutcbens, No. I, Market-Square.
1821.

Mpp73
T~37

PREFACE.
Mr. Andros's Essay made its appearance in Au-
gust, 1820. It remained a doubt, for some time,
whether it was best to take any publick notice of it.
Though it assumed an air of much assurance, and
contained many positive assertions ; yet, it was not
perceived, that it shed much light on the point dis
cussed, or exhibited any arguments likely to carry
conviction to the minds of those, who are acquainted
with the grounds and reasons of the doctrine, which
it opposes. Indeed, the Essay seemed to comprise
so many concessions, and so many contradictions, as
in a good degree to carry with it its own refutation.
But, as it was observed, that the piece was circulated
with no small degree of zeal and industry ; that it was
^kely to fall into the hands of some but partially ac
quainted with the ^subject, or strongly prejudiced
against the truth; and that " the foes of sound doc
trine" had already begun to take occasion from it, to
exult and speak reproachfully ; it was not thought
advisable to let it pass without some animadversion.
After it had been deemed expedient to make some
remarks upon the Essay, it was still a question, what
method it was best to adopt. Had Mr. A. confined
himself to the simple question, whether Divine Agen
cy be the efficient cause of moral evil, he might have
been answered in a concise and systeraatick manner.
The arguments for and against the doctrine, lie in a
narrow compass. But, he has seen fit to introduce
much extraneous matter, especially of a metapbysi*
cal nature, some of which is considered dangerous in
its tendency ; and to make many incidental observa
tions, some of which are calculated to give wrong
views of truth, others to excite improper feelings, and
others to nourish unreasonable prejudices. It was

4
deemed most advisable, therefore, to follow him, step
by step, through all his meanderings and aberrations
Jrom the point at issue. This course has been adopt
ed, and the term Review assumed, as the most proper
title to the observations, which it is proposed to
make. If it should be thought, that any thing, in th£ fol-
lowing pages, has too much the air of pleasantry and
humour, for the seriousness and importance of the.
subject, the apology is, that it is extremely difficult
to set error and inconsistency in a true light without
making them Ibok ridiculous.

REVIEW.

SECTION I.
Review of the Introduction to the Essay.
Mr Andros professes to be a strict and con
sistent Calvinist. He regards, ' with respect
and honour, many of the writings of New-Eng
land divines ; and has been as much attached to
these, as any mere human compositions, and
has read them with much delight, and as he
hopes, real profit.'
This orthodox, New-England divine, who
regards with so much respect and honour, and
has read with so much delight and profit, the
writings of his fathers and brethren, thus be
gins his Essay :
" It is well known to the christian publick,
that New- England, for more than half a centu
ry, has been famed for discussing the plainest
evangelical subjects, in a deep, abstruse, meta
physical way ; so that simple, honest, and well
informed christians, have oft been perplexed and
confounded with incomprehensible mysteries
and difficulties, where none seem to have been
apprehended by the sacred writers." If this
sentence had escaped the pen of a supercilious,
British reviewer, who looks down upon the re
volted colonies of New-England, with about as
much contempt, as upon the rude settlements
1*

at Botany Bay ; it would not have appeared so
strmge. If what is here represented, as well
known to the christian publick, were a fact, it
would not be wonderful, that *' a New- England
divine, in Europe, had well nigh become a term
of reproach."
'So show the estimation in which our divines
are held in England, Mr. Andros adduces the
testimony of one, who " writes from London."
By turning to the Theological Magazine for
December, 1798, to which he refers us, we find,
thit this American in London, was complaining
of a siirreptitious publication in the Magazine, of
some hasty observations of his, upon Dr. Hop
kins' Enquiry into the Nature of true Holiness,
in a familiar letter to an English friend ; which
observations, he acknowledges* had " the ap-
pearaace of carping and snarling, rather than of
fairly estimating the worth of the work." And,
as much as this writer apprehends danger to the
" religious people in North- America," from
" the pride of reasoning and confident specula
tions," he confesses, that he has "been much
indebted to Brainard, Edwards, Bellamy, and
others, ' and still regards them " with venera
tion, as writers of deep discernment and emi
nent piety ;1' and observes, " had I been writing
to some of my countrymen, I could and should
have filled my paper with observations on the
excellency -of that kind of religion contained in
Dr. Hopkins s work, when compared with the
laxity of principle too prevalent here." It is
not very unaccountable, that a writer from Lon -
«!*?«, where, as he" suggests, " Antinomian lax-

ity and selfishness" were prevalent, should com
plain a little of the "speculation and philoso
phy" of American divines, as highly as he esti
mates their strength of intellect and worth of
character. As a writer in the Magazine, above
referred to, observes, 'We must allow good
divines in England to have a spice of what we,
on this side of the water, call British pride.''''
But what, after all, are those " plainest evan
gelical subjects," which ' New- England has
been so much and so long famed for discussing
in a deep, abstruse, metaphysical way ?' They
are not " the nature of original sin, the nature
of holiness, the highly important distinction be
tween natural and moral inability, the nature of
the atonement, and the sinfulness and inefficacy
of unregenerate doings." How much soever
Mr. Andros may differ in opinion from the old
or modern Caivinists, on this or the other side
of the Atlantick, he sees nothing too deep, too
abstruse, too metaphysical, or even too philo
sophical, in the manner in which New- England
divines have treated of these evangelical sub
jects. " These subjects, says he, were never
more justly stated and clearly illustrated, than
by American divines " After this confession,"
it would seem difficult to conjecture, what those
" plainest evangelical subjects' can be, which
New England divines have discussed so meta
physically, upon which they ' have attempted to
graft new, philosophical theories, and upon
which they haye extended their speculations so
far as to savour of an awful intrusion into the
unsearchable depths of the ways of God.' But

8
we are not left to the uncertainty and perplexi
ty of conjecture. Some of these points have
been " hinted at," in the Dedication ,of the first
edition of the Lectures of the Rev. Dr. Griffin.*
The points are, " the origin of sin ; a condition
al consent to be dunned ; taste and exercise."
To these, Mr. A. says, he "might add many
more." He has not seen fit however to add them.
This was the less needful, as he meant to limit
his present essay to the single point, first men
tioned by Dr. Griffin, viz :* 'the origin of sin,"
or, the efficient cause of moral evil. And even
upon this one point, such Was his " conscious
ness of the want of ability,'" such " the pressure
of family afflictions and cares, and professional
duties," and such his conviction, that no " oth
er divines, or divinity schools needed his poor
efforts to vindicate their principles or practice,"
that it was with " great reluctance," that he was
" induced to obtrude his thoughts upon the
christian publick." He proceeds to state the
peculiar " circumstances, which drew him re
luctantly into the discussion." These are the
following : That the sentiment, which he op
poses, has been magnified into an important ar
ticle of Christianity, contrary to the practice of
*that " able and judicious divine, the Rev. Sam
uel Niles"— that this " new theory," as he loves
to call it, is sometimes ^represented as an im
provement in divinity, the truth and importance
of which, must be discerned by all who are not
deficient in wisdom and discernment j — that he
* Mr. A. does not inform his readers, that the Rev. Doctor left
thjg hint out of his second edition.

has a " strong conviction," that this " princi
ple" tends to prejudice multitudes against the
gospel, and to aid the cause of Infidelity, Ar-
minianism, and Unitarianism ; — that candidates
have been perplexed with this question before or
daining councils ; — that he has heard it affirmed,
that this " notion of divine agency" has become
" the line of demarcation" between' the friends
and the foes of sound doctrine ; — that, to deny
this doctrine, has been represented as opposi
tion to the government of God, and little better
than atheism ;— "that it has been suggested, that
the silence of "great theologians," who deny
this sentiment, is owing to a conviction, that it
cannot be refuted ; that some thoughts of his
on this- point, in a volume of sermons, had ex
cited the frowns of some he esteemed ; —andi
last, though not least, that his lot was unhappiv
ly east in such a *' theological atmosphere." that,
possibly, a thought might be generated in the
minds of some of his parishioners, that, because
he did not advance this doctrine, he could hard
ly be fit to instruct them in other things. Such
were the imperious circumstances, which con
strained him to assume the pen of controver
sy. And, after all this, and though his mot
to is, " speaking the truth in love," he does
not expect to be read, by anrc, who have " com
pletely surrendered up theirunderstanding, and
even the Bible, to hurnan systems," and think
it enough to refute all he'ean say, barely " to
recollect the name (not the arguments) of a far
vouiite writer."

10
Upon this statement of circumstances, I
would remark, that, whether the doctrine in
question, rightly understood, be an important
point in divinity, whether it be a novel doctrine,
whether a denial of it be a virtual denial of the
government and providence of God, and wheth
er a belief or rejection of it tends most to infi
delity, may be matter of inquiry in the follow
ing sections. That candidates for ordination
have sometimes been perplexed with questions
on this point, as well as many others, is highly
probable ; especially such as have not studied
with some * great theologians," or been long in
some " divinity school." The reason why the
ologians, who deny this doctrine, so seldom at
tack it, is, perhaps, best known to themselves.
But, that the doctrine in question, has been
made, in this vicinity, a "line of demarcation
between the friends and the foes of sound doc
trine," is a surmise, which I should be inclined
to suspect, as Mr. A. seems to think possible,
arises from "an unhappy, jealous sensibility in
his own temper." It seems to want the evi
dence of fact. Though Mr. A. has been known,
for years, to differ from several of his brethren,
upon this, and some other important points ;
yet no one has, on that account, declined ei
ther christian fellowship, or ministerial inter
course with him.^^VVhen it was understood.
that he had preparedjl|i,s sermon on Coll. ii. 8,
now printed, by way of appendix to the Essay,
several of his brethren in the ministry, dissua
ded him from printing it ; as it seemed un
necessary that the publick should know, that

11
such a diversity of sentiment existed among di-
rines reputed evangelical ; and as it might lead
to an unprofitable controversy. When the ser
mon was, at length, printed ; no publick notice
whatever was taken of it. While Mr. A. preach
ed zealously on the subject, in various pulpits,
the advocates of the doctrine of divine agency
did little more than discuss it, privately, in the
Association. Whether they may not have been
too backward in defending the doctrine, and
too tender of the feelings and reputation of its
opposers, is a question, which, at this time, wHl
be waved.

SECTION II.
Containing remarks upon Mr. JiSs statement of the
question, in his first section,,,p. 13 — -31.
Mr. A. says, p. 14, "The question may be
thus stated, Does God operate directly oh the
heart of fallen man, and excite him, by an in
ward positive influence,, to yield to the motives
and allurements to sin, which, in the course of
Divine Providence, are presented to his view <"'
To this statement, there are two or three objec
tions :
1. The phcase, " operate directly on the
heart," is objectionable. This is a mode of ex
pression very frequently used by Mr. A. in the
course of his essay. But, what does he mean
by it ? Does he suppose there is a faculty or
substance in man called the heart, antecedently
to the divine operation, upon which God acts,
hardening or softening it, as the smith does the
iron ? What is a hard heart, besides selfish af
fections and volitions ? And what is a soft heart,
besides disinterested affections and volitions /
The scriptures speak of hardening the heart,
turning the heart, fashioning the heart, and of
making, giving, and creating a heart ; but they
never speak of a divine operation on the heart.
And sound philosophy, in morals and divinity
' consists in speaking with the scriptures.'
2. The question, thus stated, as Mr. A. ob
serves, " assumes human nature in its state of

\i
deep and awful depravity," and has no concern
with " the manner, how moral evil first gained
existence in the mind of angels, once perfectly
pure and blessed ; nor how moral corruption,
or sinful desires first entered into the heart of
the primitive parents of our race, who were
originally formed in a state of perfect moral rec
titude-" And is there, then, no cUsPute re"
spectingthe origin or efficient cause of the first
sin of angels and of men ? Is it well Understood
and agreed, on all hands, how sin first entered
the universe, and how it first gained existence
in_ this world ? It would, doubtless, be very
convenient for the opposers of the doctrine of
divine agency in the production of moral evil,
to put out of the question, and if possible, out
of mind, all consideration of the first sin of both
angels and men, and ' to assume human nature
in its fallen state;' as the utter impossibility of
the entrance of moral evil into the universe,
without the agency of the First Cause of all
things, is a plain and powerful argument, in
proof of the doctrine in question. To admit
that the question has any relation to the first sin
of man would spoil Mr. A.'s fine argument, to
prove that the doctrine of divine agency is con
trary to analogy, p. 51. His argument 'as
sumes the tiger, with all his ferocious appetites
and thirst for blood.' But, here the question
is not only, why the tiger, with such a ferocious
appetite and thirst for blood, leaps upon hi«
prey : But. how he came by such appetite and
thirst. The question before us, respects the
first sin, as much as any subsequent sin ; and
2

14
has as much relation to falling man, as to fallen
men. 3. The word excite, in the above statement,
is liable to objection. To txcite, often means,
to persuade, to instigate, to tempt, which we are
far from attributing to the Holy God.
Mr. A. has heard divines state the question
differently, thus, " Does God as directly move
persons to sin, as the Holy Ghost moves saints
to holy exercises ?" To this statement of the
question we have no material objection ; and it
seems, Mr. A. has none ; for he adds, " The
fact, whether God does thus move sinners, is
the question." This being the true state of the
question, it is easy to see,
First. That the advocates of the doctrine of
divine efficiency may affirm truly (and not in
words only, as Mr. A. insinuates, p. 15) "that
God does not bring into existence the evil exer
cises or volitions of men, without the use of mo
tives, or means adapted." For though the mind
be not " governed and determined By motive ;"
yet motives may be used in governing and de
termining the mind: though no "external
means were sufficient of themselves to form
Pharaoh's character;" yet God might use
means in forming his character : and though
" an object preserved to the mind be a motive
to choose ;" yet the positive agency of Gfed-may
be necessary " to cause the mind to act, when
the motive is presented." Mr. A. admits,
" that a direct and positive divine efficiency is
necessary to turn a heart of enmity and rebel
lion against God, into love and obedience ; and

15
that light and all other means are incompetent
to produce this effect." And yet, it is presum
ed, he will not maintain, that God does not work
by means in regenerating sinners; since it is
written, " of his own will begat he us, by the
word of truth." James i. 18. Supposing, then,
a positive divine efficiency be necessary to turn
a heart of love and obedience into enmity and
rebellion ; why may not God work by means in
this case, as well as the other ? It is difficult to
perceive any respect, in which the two cases are
not exactly parallel. On this point, Mr. A. does
not appear to have clear and distinct ideas. He
seems to have imbibed the notion, that whatev
er God produces, by his direct, positive agen
cy, he cannot produce in the use of means. He
asks, " Do we know exactly how far God works
by instruments, or by his own immediate agen
cy?' p. 17. And again, " Does God execute
his will or purpose in turning the king's heart,
or the heart of Other sinners, ~whitherseever-he
will, by a direct operation on the mind, or by
the intervention and agency of second causes ?"
p. 39. It is here implied, that just so far as
God works by instruments, so far his immediate
or direct agency is excluded. That we do not
mistake his meaning, is evident from his repre
senting those, who hold that " God moves men
to sin, by a direct operation on the heart," as
denying that he does it "by the instrumentality
of second causes." But, what right has Mr. A.
to charge them with such a denial ? Do they
not uniformly assert, that God uses motives,
means, and instruments, as much and in the

16
same manner, in hardening, as in softening the
human heart, in producing sinful, as holy ex
ercises ? That they admit the use of means in
words only, and not in reality, is Mr. A.'s in
ference, which he had no right to draw ; and,
in drawing which, he seems to have lost sight
of his own observation, that " it is too common
a thing for persons to connect with one question
a great many others, and to consider a writer as
denying all those, if he denies this one." p. 13.
By denying that means have " any efficiency in
themselves," we are by no means bound to de
ny, that God uses them in forming the hearts
and moving the wills either of saints or sinners.
The simple " fact," that it is God, who, as the
primary, efficient cause, hardens the hearts and
inclines the wills of sinners, is the thing as
serted, and to be proved, or disproved. Which
leads to another remark, on the statement of the
question. . _ Secondly. T-hose^ irfro advocate^ the affirma
tive of the question under consideration, have
an unquestionable right to say, that they do not
undertake to explain the manner, ' in which
God operates in the production of moral evil.'
The single question is, whether God does ope
rate in the production of moral evil ? It is not,
whether he uses means? This is acknowl
edged by all. But, the question is, whether the
means used, or the will or agency of God, he
the efficient, or producing cause of moral evil !
Those, who affirm, that divine agency is the
cause, "do not undertake to explain the man
ner in which this direct and positive agency h

17
applied to the heart." But this, says Mr. A.
" is something utterly foreign to the question."
It is so ; and this is a good reason why the ad
vocates of divine efficiency should not meddle
with it. We entirely agree with Mr. A. that
" the fact, whether God does thus move sin
ners, is the question ; and not the manner of
his moving them :" just as the question be
tween Arminians and Calvinists, is riot, how the
Holy Spirit operates in changing the heart ; but
whether he does change it, by his special, di
vine influence. How God operates, how his
will produces effects, either good or evil, either
in the natural or moral world, we do not pre
tend to explain. ' Here, we take it, God is in
comprehensible.' But, it is difficult to see, how
this is " really denying, or evading the matter
in debate ;" or, with what consistency Mr. A.
could say, that " the manner, in which they as
sert God moves the wills of sinners to choose
evil, is the substance of all, about which there
is any question ;"' when he has himself granted,
that there is no question at all about it ; and
that 'the fact, whether God does as directly
move persons to sin, as the Holy Ghost moves
saints to holy exercises, is the question, and
not the manner of his moving them." It is
equally difficult to see, with what justice Mr.
A. charges those, who maintain the affirmative
of this question, with impertinence, in saying,
that " they do not undertake to decide how God
moves the will of fallen men to sin." To sup
port this charge, he indeed asserts, that " they
have already declared how, on the one hand, he
*2

18
does not do it by the instrumentality of second
causes." But, they have made no such decla
ration. They say, that moral evil is an effect^
not which God produces without means ; but,
which means cannot produce without God>
an effect, produced through the intervention of
second . causes, by the positive and efficient
agency of the First Cause. No reason, there
fore, is perceived, why the advocates of this
doctrine may not affirm, with as much truth and
propriety, that they do not attempt to explain
the manner in which God operates to produce
moral evil, as the advocates of the doctrine, of
the special agency of the Holy Spirit in regen
eration, may affirm, that they do not attempt to
explain the manner in which God operates to
produce holiness. But, it requires no great sa
gacity to perceive, why the opposers of the doc
trine in question, should be so anxious to fas
ten upon its advocates the charge of attempting
toexplain the mode or manmr of the divin eagen-
cy : for, unless this be effected, all their com.
plaints of speculative reasoning, abstruse philos
ophy, mefaphy sicks, and " an awful intrusion
into the unsearchable depths of the ways of
God," must be estimated as empty declamation,
or, a disingenuous appeal to vulgar prejudice.
Let it be remembered, that the question is
not, whether God uses means and second causes
or how he produces effects by his agency ; but,
whether it is He that operates, making means
and second causes effectual; " whether he as
directly moves men to sin, as the Holy Spirit
moves them in their holy exercises ?" II Mr. A.

19
means to maintain the negative Of this question,
I would not ' arrest his discussion' by any
"sage inquiry." I am willing to admit, that
the question is of sufficient importance, to de
mand the most serious and thorough investiga
tion. That he does mean to maintain the neg
ative of the question before us, he expressly de
clares, " h is not the mode of such a direct op
eration, but the operation itself we deny." p. 75.
And, indeed, if he did not mean to deny this,
he might have spared himself the labour of wri
ting his essay.
We entirely agree with Mr. A. that " it may
be with divine truth, as with a divergent line ;
though its obliquity be at first scarcely perceiv
able, yet if you pursue such a line, it will at last
recede to an immense distance, and produce in
teresting results." p. 22. But, his illustration
of this just observation, though but very re
motely related to the main subject of his essay,
yet is thought to comprise three mistakes, which
ought not to pass without notice. His words
are, " The difference between the Trinitarian
and the Unitarian, begins in a distinction abso
lutely incomprehensible. One affirms, God is
absolute unity in his essence. The other affirms,
there is a distinction of persons in this essence,
though to define it, mocks all the powers of the
human intellect." The first mistake here, is,
that " the difference between Trinitarians and
Unitarians, begins in a distinction absolutely in
comprehensible." The distinction meant, is that
of Three Persons. But, what is there incom
prehensible in the distinction of Three Persons

20
in the Godhead, more than in the distinction of
any other three persons ? The incomprehensi
ble mystery of the Trinity, lies, it is conceived,
not in the distinction of persons, but in the un
ion of Three Persons in One Being, Essence,
or Godhead. The second mistake is that of
supposing, that unity of essence in Deity, is in
consistent with a distinction of persons. This
is plainly implied in the words quoted : " One
affirms, God is absolute unity in his essence. — ¦
The" other affirms, that there is a distinction of
persons in this essence." But, is it orthodox
to concede, that these two affirmations are re
pugnant to each other ? Do not all consistent
Trinitarians maintain, that, while the Godhead
comprises Three Persons, the Divine Essence
is absolutely One ? If it be not so, Trinitarians
are justly chargeable with Tritheism. The
third mistake is, that to define the distinction of
persons in the Divine Essence, " mocks all the
powers of the human intellect." As there is no
difficulty in conceiving the idea of the personal
distinction in God ; so there is no difficulty in
defining it. The difficulty lies, in defining or
describing that, in the One Divine Essence,
which lays a foundation for the distinction of
Three Persons. This, whatever it may be,
is truly incomprehensible, and beyond the
powers of the human intellect to define.
It is a matter of much regret, that orthodox
divines, by such incidental inaccuracies, should
give undue advantage to the propagators of fun
damental errour.

SECTION III.
Containing remarks upon the second section of the
Essay, concerning the Standard of Moral and
Theological Truth, p. 24 — 31.
We agree with MrvA. that all questions in
theology and morals, are to be decided by " the
reasoning faculty, of man," properly disciplined
and duly exercised, and " the volume of reve
lation. " But, with respect to reason, we should
think Mr. A. assigns it quite too narrow a
sphere, in the investigation of divine truth. He
says, " In regard to Revelation, there are but
two points, in respect to which the reason of
man is called to exercise itself." Now, instead
of two, we should think there are as many as
six points, upon which reason may be properly
exercised, in regard to Revelation. It belongs
to reason ;
1. To examine and weigh the evidences of
Divine Revelation.
2. To investigate its true meaning.
3. To collect and arrange in a system, the
doctrines, which Revelation teaches, and the du
ties, whii h it enjoins.
4. To show the consistency of those doctrines
and precepts, with each other, and with the na
ture and relations of things, or the dictates of
sound philosophy ; and thus to answer the ob
jections of scepticks and hereticks against them.

22
5. To draw inferences from the positions of
the sacred writers, for '• doctrine, and instruc
tion in righteousness." And,
6. To" make application of the truths and
precepts of scripture, to the consciences and
hearts of men, for their " reproof and correc
tion." _ ]t
We are happy to have no material objection
to the rule of interpreting the scriptures, laid
down by Mr. A. p. 26. " The plain, mostnat-
tural, and obvious sense, which, considering the
nature of language and the scope of the writer,
would most readily offer itself to the mind of a
sober, judicious and upright inquirer after truth,
is the true sense." This rule is considered cor
rect, as far as it goes. We should suppose, how
ever, that the situation in which a writer was
placed, the occasion on which he wrote, the
views and apprehensions of the persons whom
he addressed, and the manners and customs of
the people among whom he; lived, might he ta
ken into consideration, as well as " the nature of
language and the scope of the writer," in order
to ascertain his meaning.
With a few remarks upon one or two instan
ces of Mr. A. 's application of his rule of inter
pretation, we shall dismiss this section.
Mr. A. applies his rule- first to the " reason
ing" of Dr. Clark ; and, secondly, to the " opin
ion" of Dr. Emmons.
According to his rule, he considers the met
aphysical argument of Dr. Clark, to prove the
Unity of God, as false ; because it contradicts
the testimony of the scriptures, " that God ex-

23
ists in F"'\-:r, Son, and Holy Ghost." But,
how Dr. Clark's argument contradicts this tes-
tira ny of scripture, is not seen. Dr. C. 's con
clusion is- that God mu?t be " one, simple, in
finite, absolutely united essence." This con
clusion Trinitarians do not hesitate to admit,
and think it not at all inconsistent with the scrip
tural doctrine of "¦ a distinction of persons in the
Godhead." I it be absurd to say, that the
Godhead comprises Three co-equal Persons, in
One, simple, undivided Essence, then there is
no avoiding either Unitarianism on the one hand,
or Tritheism on the other.
Dr Emmons in his sermon on Rom. vii. 1 8,
has expressed *' the opinion, that sinful and ho
ly affections cannot co-exist in the human
mind." " But. says Mr. A. although the reas
oning, by which this theory seems to be defend
ed, does not admit of being overthrown by an
opposite course of abstract arguments, yet we
reduce it to absurdity and falsehood, by a very
easy process ; it is contrary to what is written."
The process, by which he supports this high
charge of absurdity and falsehood, is simply to
set down three passages of scripture, without
note or comment. This is an easy process tru
ly. If such processes were deemed conclusive,
a mere novice, who has a concordance, might,
in a few hours, explode the opinions of all the
Doctors in the world. But. let us attend to the
texts in Mr. A.'s brief process. It would have
been ingenuous, if he had not only quo'ed these
texts, but offered some reasons against the ex
planations, which Dr. Emmons gives of them.

24
But this perhaps, might have led him into "• ab
stract reasoning." in which he has lost " all con
fidence."' and by which he had acknowledged,
the Doctor's " theory does not admit of being
overthrown." The two passages first quoted by
Mr A. follow Dr. Emmons' text, in the same
chapter. On these, the Doctor thus comments :
" Here the apostle tells us, that he had good af
fections sometimes, and then he really desired
and in ended to do good ; but yet he did not
fulfil his reso' utions. The reason was, that when
the time came in which he intended to do certain
good deeds^ e\ii affections were present with
him. and prt vented him from doing the duties
which he h.u' pre vicusiy resolved to do. His bad
affections prevented his having good affections.
For, if his good affections had continued, noth
ing could have prevented him from performing
what he had intended to perform. According
to his own account of the exercises of his heart,
his good exercises excluded bad ones, and his
bad affections excluded good ones." Sermons,
vol. 1. p. 338. The other passage'. I. John iii.
9 is incidentally brought into view by the Doc
tor in answering ,m objection. Upon this he
observes in substance, that if it proves any
thing to the purpose for which it is brought, it
proves too much. It proves that when once
the good seed is sown in the heart, it remains
and produces nothing but good fruit. But all
acknowledge, ttjat saints are in a state of imper
fection Hence he concludes, that this text
supports' the very sent'ment which it is sup
posed to refute. " If he that is born of God

25
sinneth not, because his seed remaineth in him ;
then that seed, which our Saviour calls spiriti is
totally distinct from such sinfnl exercises, as all
must allow more or less prevail in the best of
saints. Ser. vol. 1, p. 344 — 346.
3

SECTION IV.
-Containing remarks upon the former part of the
third section of the Essay, p. 32! — 38.
The question being clearly stated, and the
standard by which it is to be decided being fix
ed, Mr. A. proceeds, with ardour and confi
dence, to the discussion. And here, it seems,
he was aware, how much easier it is to demol
ish, than to build. The greater part of what
follows in his essay, is designed to subvert the
doctrine of his opponents, and but a small part
to support his own. It is not a little curious,
that one, who, in his youth, found a difficulty in
metaphysical writings, and as it would seem, on
that account, threw them aside, and who, hav
ing lately, at an advanced age, amidst many
cares and avocations, ' reviewed some of these
speculations, has lost all confidence in abstract
reasoning,' should nevertheless, deal. so largely
in metaphysical reasoning, as Mr A has done
in this and the following sections. But, we
shall not complain of this ; as we are convinced
that metaphysical reasoning m*y be as sound,
and metaphysical deductions as conclusive, as
mathematical. Mr. A. first takes hold of what he terms the
two " main pillars of the system of direct effi
ciency ;" persuaded, no doubt, like Sampson in
the house of Dagon, that, by pulling down
these, he shall overthrow the whole edifice.

27
The first of these pillars is a negation, viz ;
" that the mind is not governed or determined
by motive." For attacking this negative pillar,
Mr. A. thinks some apology due ; as there is
something "¦ abstract and metaphysical" in it.
But, he found it indispensably necessary to sub
vert this prop ; since, while it stood, it gave a
firm support to the doctrine he opposes. " If it
was a real fact, he admits, that motives do nev
er determine, move, or excite the mind to ac
tion ; then, indeed, the philosophy we oppose
must stand good. For, if these do not deter
mine the will, we shall not surely contend that
it is governed by any other second cause ; and,
if not by a second cause, then, without all con
troversy, it must be by a direct act of the great
First Cause." How, then, does our author over
throw this position, on which so much depends ?
It is done with as much ease and expedition,
as Dr. Emmons's " opinion" was shewn to be
" absurd and false." It is only to "cite Dr.
Stephen West's own words against himself,"
make a few comments upon them, and then
roundly assert, notwithstanding ' all confidence
in abstract reasoning is lost,' that " the doctrine
of Locke, Edwards, and others, respecting the
will being determined by the strongest motive,
is sound philosophy.'1'' Now, we cannot but think
that a mere opinion of Dr. West's, without his
reasons, and in contradiction too, to the whole
argument of his book, is slender grourid, on
which to erect a battering ram, that is to de
molish a main pillar of our doctrine. But, we
are not yet convinced, that such an acute and

28
able metaphysician as Dr. West, has so palpa
bly contradicted himself. Mr: A.'s first quota
tion from him, is but a fragment of a sentence.
Had he produced the whole, he might have been
ashamed of 'citing the Doctor's own words
against himself.' " It hence appeareth, says the
Doctor, that there is an utter impropriety in say
ing, that the mind is governed and determined 'by
motives if the expression is designed tp repre
sent motive as the cause, and choice or volition
as its effect.'1'' Now, where is the inconsistency
between this, and his saying, that " so strong
and insuperable are these mutual tendencies of
motives, and the will of moral beings, to each
other. ; and so inseparable the connexion be
tween the influence of the former, and the exer
tions of the latter ; that no object, with quali
ties suited to the state, temper or disposition of
the mind, ever cometh into its view without be
ing actually chosen, Sec." Essay on Mor. A.
p. 72. Is it here conceded, that motives cause
the tendency of the will towards them, or pro
duce the temper and disposition of mind adapt
ed to them, or create the volitions by which
they are chosen -? This is not the Doctor's
meaning ; as must be evident to every one, who
reads the whole section from which this quota
tion is made. Es. on M. A. part I. sec. III.
What Dr. West meant by mutual tendencies be
tween the will and motives, he thus explains :
"Thereisafoundation in the nature of things, aris-
ingfrom some certain quality in objects, and from
the particular state, temper and complexion of
the mind, for their being chosen, whenever ihev

29
shall be known and perceived, and as soon as
they shall come into the view of the mind. Or,
to speak more agreeably to strict, philosophick
truth ; it is agreeable to the constitution of God,
and the law of constant divine operation, that
such peculiar effects should invariably take
place under such certain circumstances, and
come into existence in such a particular series,
connexion and order." lb. p. 76. This being
Dr. VV.'s meaning, Mr. A.'s tart question to
Mr. Weeks, and all his reasoning from the
Doctor's words, " cited against himself," are
spoiled. If Mr. A. means to maintain any thing to his
purpose, m this section, it must be 'this ; that
motive is the efficient cause of volition in men.
But, did either Locke or Edwards, hold this
unphilosophical doctrine ? This is not to be as
sumed without proof. President Edwards says,
" Every act of the will whatever, is excited by
some motive — Motive is the cause of the act of
the will — Volitions are properly the effects of
their motives, and necessarily connected with
them." Treatise on the Will, part II. sec. 10.
This is the amount of what Mr. Edwards has
said on the subject ; and this, incidentally, in
refuting Mr. Chubb's notion of a self-determin
ing power in the will. What then, does he
mean, when he says, that motive is the cause of
the act of the will ; and that volitions are prop
erly the effects of their motives ? Does he mean,
that motive is the efficient cause of every act of
the will ? Was it his idea, that motive, by a
power or energy inherent in itself, produces
*3

30
each act of the will ? And when he says, that
volitions are necessarily connected with their
motives; does he mean, that motives them
selves, by their own agency or efficiency, estab
lish the connexion between themselves and vo
litions? This does not appear, from any thing
he has written. From what he has observed in
P. II, sec. 3, it appears quite evident, that he
did not consider motive as producing volition,
though necessary to the existence of it. " The
word cau <e- is often used in so restrained a sense,
as to signify only that which has a positive effi,
chncy or influence to produce a thing, or bring
it to pass. But there are many things which
have no 'such positive productive influence;
which yet are causes in that respect, that they
have truly the nature of a ground or reason why
some things are, rather than others ; or why
they are as they are, rather than otherwise. —
When I speak of connexion of causes and effects,
I have respect to moral causes, as well as those
that are called natural in distinction from them.
Therefore I sometimes use the word cause, in
this inquiry, to signify any antecedent, either
natural or moral, positive or negative, on which
an event, either a thing, or the manner and cir
cumstance of a thing, so depends, that it is the
ground or reason, either in whole, or in part,
why it is, rather than not ; or. why it is as it is,
rather than otherwise ; or, in other words, any
antecedent with which a consequent event is so
connected, that it truly belongs to the reason
why the proposition which affirms that event, is
true; whether it has any positive in-

31
fxuence, or not." Iii the sense here ex
plained, we find no difficulty in admitting that
motives cause volitions, and are inseparably
connected with them.
Mr. A. has represented that distinguished
metaphysician, Mr. Locke, as advancing the
doctrine, th it motives efficiently produce voli
tions. It would have been a favour, if he had
referred us to the place ;n which this doctrine is
advanced ; for we have looked through Locke's
Essay on the Understanding without being able
to find a word on the suoject.
That motives are second causes of human vo
litions, and that they have "all the causality,
that any second causes in nature cm be sup
posed to possess, is granted. But, it is not
granted, nor do we think it can be proved that
any second cause is an efficient cause, or has
power, as such, to produce any effect, either in
the natural or moral world. To suppose this,
is viewed as absurd, for the following reasons :
1. To say that second causes are efficient
causes, is a contradiction in terms. The very
idea of & first cause, is. that which not only pro
duces second causes with all their properties,
but, by its own inherent energy, gives second
causes all their influence in produ ing effects.
If then, the first cause be an efficient cause, and
second causes be efferent c.uses, where is the
difference between them? As it respects their
influence in producing effects, they are one and
the same. To say. therefore that second causes
are efficient causes is the same as to say. that
second causes are first causes ; which is a pal
pable contradiction.

3%
2. To say that second causes are efficient
causes, is the same as to say, that God has com
municated to them a power of acting indepen
dently. Mr. A. supposes, that besides creating
and upholding second causes, God has impart
ed to them '' an influence, energy, or activity"
sufficient to produce their appropriate effects ;
and that, having this influence, activity, or en
ergy imparted to them, they can now produce
their effects, without any direct, positive, or im-
medhte agency of the First Cause. Is not this
as much as to say, that second causes, act inde
pendently ? If, after their energy is once im
parted to them, they need no further agency or
influence of the Deity in producing their effects;
do they not produce them independently of any
such agency or influence? As, according to
Mr. A. God has given permanent existence to
second causes, with all their properties and en
ergies, which cannot be annihilated without an
exertion of his infinite power ; it clearly follows,
that should He now cease to operate, and even
cease to exist, second causes would remain and
continue to produce their effects, just as they
do at present. And if this be not independent
action, what is ? But, Mr. A. does not think,
"that any man, who believes the Bible, would
advance such an idea, as that God ever made
any creature to exist and act, independently of
himself." p. 16.
3. To say that second causes are efficient
causes, is virtually to say, that they are intelli
gent voluntary agents. To act as an efficient
cause, is to produce something, which did not

33
exist before. * Now, we ask, can any new thing
be produced, without the voluntary exertion of
some intelligent being ? To say that inert mat
ter may produce an effect, is to destroy the dis
tinction between matter and mind. And to say
that mind may produce an effect, without a vo
lition, without putting forth any act to produce
it, is absurd. If, then, second causes produce
their effects, without the agency of the First
Cause, and ljy their own inherent energy and
activity, they must put forth volitions and, be
voluntary agents. But,. Mr. A. if we under
stand him, maintains, that all second causes
produce their effects, without any direct and
positive agency of the First Cause. Will he,
then, strike from the list of second causes, all
material things, and limit such causes to beings
endued with mind and volition ?
4. To say that second causes are efficient
causes, saps the foundation of the evidence,
from the works of creation and providence, that
.God created and governs the world. If God
may imp"art " an influence, energy and activity"
to second causes, sufficient to produce one thing
or event, why not anodierj^whyjuo^ali things
and everifs ?"Ahd^what evidence, then, have we>
from " the things that are made" and the events
that take place, that " He, who built all things"
and governs the world. " is God ?" And how
does the ascription of the work of creation to
Christ, prove th.it He is a Divine Person ?
5. To say, that second causes <:re efficient
causes, is contrary to sacred scripture. It is
the express declaration of the apostle, that God

34
" worketh all things after the couhsel of his own
will ;" and that He " worketh all in all."
But, if it be absurd and unscriptual to repre
sent second causes as efficient causes ; then mo
tives are not efficient causes, and do not govern
the mind, or cause voluntary exercises in men,
without the direct agency of the Great First
Cause. And hence we may see, who is charge
able with the highest degree of " presumption,"
and who is most to be " admired for his humil
ity and reverence for the Deity ;" he who as-
serts, or he who denies, that God " can give any
such efficiency to second causes and instru
ments, as to turn the hearts of men what way
he pleases, without any other influence." p. 41.
Besides the general reasons mentioned above,
I would suggest two or three others, to refute
the notion, that the will of man is governed by
the efficient energy of motives.
1 . If motives governed the human will, the
most weighty motive would always prevail By
motive, in this connexion, is meant, something
perceived by the mind, without itself,* suited to
be the object of choice or volition. Now, if
such external objects or motives governed the
will, it is obvious, that the strongest motive, the
most weighty and important object, when seen,
must always move the will, or cause it to choose.
But, is this the fact ? It will be granted, that
eternal happiness and misery are more weighty
and powerful motives, than any temporal good'
and evil. But when Mr. A. with all his elo-'
quence and pathos, sets before his hearers the
joys of heaven and the pains of hell, does he

35
find them uniformly moved, by these most
weighty of all motives, to deny themselves and
seek first the kingdom of God ? But, perhaps,
Mr. A. will say, they are not moved by these
motives, because the state or diposition of their
hearts is such, as to prefer temporal good to
eternal. When it is asserted, then, that the will
is governed by motive, that motive is the effi
cient cause of volition ; is this all that is meant,
that motive produces volition, when the heart
is disposed to choose it ? That motives govern
the will, when .the will consents to be governed
by them? This, it would seem, is a very gentle
kind of government, and altogether inefficient.
But, what disposes the heart to choose the motive?
What inclines the will to consent to be governed
by it ? This is the question. And Mr. A. up
on his scheme, must answer, It is the motive,
the object presented, that disposes the heart to
choose itself, and inclines the will to consent to
be govered by it : and so the most weighty mo
tive will always prevail, contrary to what is well
known to be the fact. It is not seen how he
can consistently answer otherwise, while he
holds, that motives have an efficient " energy
and activity" imparted to them. If motive gov
erns the will, then, when the Serpent presented
the apple to our mother Eve, as 'pleasant to
the eyes, good for food, and to be desired to
make one wise,' this motive produced in her
mind a disposition to choose the apple, and caus
ed- her to < onsent to eat it ; or, in other words,
changed her holy heart into a sinful one, in op
position to the more, weighty motive of life on

36
the one hand, and death on the other. And that
too, when the state, disposition and inclination
of her heart were altogether againstjhis weaker
motive, and wholly in favour of the stronger one.
Which leads me to observe,
2. That no motive whether weak or strong,
ever produces a corresponding volition, unless
the heart be previously disposed or inclined to
wards it. By the >:eart is meant here, not a dor
mant taste, appetite or principle, but the affec
tions, in distinction from volitions, the imma
nent, in distinction from the emanent exercises
of the will. While the heart, understood in this
sense, remains holy, all motives to the exercise
of a sinful volition, are spurned ; and while the
heart remains sinful, all motives to the exercise
of a holy volition, are equally spurned. Sup
posing Satan to have been the first sinner, while
his heart remained pure and benevolent, he re
jected, indignantly, every motive, which could
come into the view of his mind, to excite him
to rebellion against his Maker. And while the
hearts of our first parents, remained uncorrupt,
they rejected, with disdain, every motive, which
the arch tempter set before them, to excite them
to eat the forbidden fruit. And so, on the oth
er hand, while the hearts of fallen men, remain
" full of evil," they reject all the motives, which
can be set before them to " cease to do evil and
learn to do well." This proves not that " means
are absolutely nothing; and that motives are no
means of moving rational creatures to act ;'' but
it does prove, and we think, demonstrably, that
motives have no "efficiency" in them to pro*

37
duce the volitions of the will ; or, that the will
of a rational creature, is, in no case, governed or
determined by motives. Motives are means, as
they always intervene between the efficient cause
and volition, and every voluntary act. Motives
are second causes, i. e. causes sine qua non, or
without which the will never acts. But, they
are not efficient causes of voluntary exercises.
These can be produced only by the direct ope
ration of some intelligent, voluntary agent, mov
ing the will itself. It follows, from what has
been advanced,
3. That, if the wills of men were, governed
by motives, their actions would be as uniform
as the operation of the elements in the natural
world. God governs the natural world by gen
eral laws ; from which he never deviates, except
in the case of miracles, to attest the special rev
elations of his will : In the system of nature,
therefore, as soon as we learn the properties and
combinations of second causes, in any particu
lar instance, we may conclude, with certainty,
what will be the result. From what has been,
we may accurately calculate what will be. It
would be the same in the moral world, if mo
tives governed the will. Upon this supposition, .
volition would follow the exhibition of motives,
as invariably, as fire consumes wood, or water
runs down a declivity. And this Mr. A. be
lieves now to be the fact. He says, p. 37, " we
do fer^mily know how men in general will act
in any given case, if we can first discover what
motives will there be brought to operate on the
mind, or be presented to its view. There is no

38
other cause and effect in nature, between which
the connexion is more evident and certain;
whether we judge as philosophers, ojr as men of
common discernment and prudence." But,
whether there be such uniformity in the voli-;
.tions and actions of men ; whether they as in
variably act according to the motives presented
to tlje view of their minds, as the laws of nature
produce their effects; we are willing to submit
to the decision of any politician, of any moralist,
of any man of " common discernment and pru
dence," and, with the single exception of Mr*
A. of any "philosopher."

SECTION V.
Containing remarks upon the latter part of the third
section of the Essay, p. 38 — 50.
We come now to the " other position," which
Mr. A. calls the other main " pillar" of the doc
trine which he opposes ; and which is derived
from " most express and solemn declarations of
scripture." This is, indeed, the main pillar of
the doctrine. of Divine Agency, in the produc
tion of moral evil ; and, in Mr. A.'s opinion,
sufficient, if it will stand, for ever to support the
doctrine. He says, p. 38, " If the scriptures
taught any such doctrine as this, the question
would be decided, and here we ought to stop
and be silent for ever." Let us, then "to the
law, and to the testimony."
Mr. A. quotes six passages, which, he says,
"are some of the most plain and forcible texts,
which ascribe the production of moral evil to a
divine agency." He might, perhaps, have quo
ted as many hundreds, all equally " plain and
forcible ;" and some of them more so. The
doctrine of Divine Agency upon the active pow
ers of men, causing them to choose and refuse,
love and hate, will and do, in view of the vari
ous motives presented to their minds, runs
through the whole Bible. It is presumed, that
no person of common understanding, can read
the scriptures through in course, with a candid,
unprejudiced mind, without a deep conviction

4©
of the truth, that God governs the moral, as
well as the natural world ; that all creatures and
things are as dependant upon Him for their mo
tions and actions, as for their existence ; that
his hand brings to pass whatever his counsel
designed ; and that his agency is not more im
mediately concerned in producing any effect
whatever, than it is in forming the hearts and
characters of men, and moving their wills in all
their conduct, whether good or bad.
" Mr. Weeks, says Mr. A., has produced a
very long list of texts of this description." The
list is, indeed, long, too long to be quoted here.
The reader is requested, before he proceeds, to
peruse this list, in the volume of Nine Sermons
on the Decrees and Agency of God, by William
R. Weeks, p. 43-68. " But what, says Mr. A.,
is all this to his purpose ?" Whether all this be
any thing to Mr. Weeks's purpose, the intelli
gent reader will judge for himself. But, why
is all this nothing to his purpose ? Because,
continues Mr. A. "he has still to prove, that
these texts relate, not to the providential gov
ernment of God, but to an immediate divine
agency upon the hearts of sinners." In order,
then, to prove, that these texts relate to an im
mediate or positive agency upon the minds of
sinners, must Mr. W. prove, that they do not
relate to the providential government of God?
Is there such an opposition between the provi
dential government and the agency of God, that
they reciprocally exclude each other ? What
would the Providence of God be, without his
Agency? Would it be any thing more than

41
bare permission ? We have always thought, that
the Agency Of God was concerned in all the
events of his Providence. And this appears to
have been the idea of the assembly of divines at
Westminster. They say, " God's works of
Providence, are his most holy, wise and power
ful, preserving and governing all his creatures
and ^all their actions.'''' Does God govern the
actions of creatures, and that powerfully too,
without his agency, without an exercise of his
will, without an exertion of his power ? It is be
lieved, that the universal Providence of God,
is his universal Agency. If it be proved, there
fore, as Mr. A. grants, that the texts in ques
tion relate to the providential government of
God ; this is the same as to prove, that they re
late to the agency of God, fashioning the hearts
and moving the wills of men.
" But still, says Mr. A,, the question remains
to be decided, Does God execute his will or
purpose, in turning the king's heart, or the
hearts of other sinners, whithersoever He will,
by a direct operation on the mind, or by the
intervention and agency of second causes ?" A
more impertinent question, than this, could not
have been asked. By maintaining that God
turns the heart by his direct agency, do we de
ny his doing it by the intervention and agency
of second causes ? Does the doctrine of Di.
vine Agency, causing the affections of the heart
and the volitions of the will, necessarily exclude,
not only the Providence of God, but all use of
means, motives and second causes? I should
think "a person must be hardly pressed for
4*

42
matter of cavil," to insist upon this, again and
again, without exhibiting " a shadow of proof"
of it. If Mr. A. had said, ' But still the ques
tion remains to be decided, Does God execute
his will or purpose in turning the king's heart
and the hearts of other sinners whithersoever he
will, by a direct operation on the mind, causing
it to act in view of motives, and thus giving ef
fect to second causes; or, by the instrumentality
and efficient agency of second causes, without his
own agency, and independently of it ?' His ques
tion, in this case, might have been proper ; but
at the same time, it would have shown his no
tion of second causes to be both absurd and re
pugnant to the plain meaning of the passages
of scripture, which he had quoted, and of many
others, which he might have quoted. For proof
of the absurdity of Mr. A.'s notion of the 'ef
ficient energy imparted to second causes,' the
reader is referred to our last section, p. 23-25.
For proof that this notion is unscriptural, I will
quote a few of the many passages of scripture,
which assert the direct and positive agency of
God in governing the hearts and wills of men.
I will first quote a few of the passages which
assert the universal agency of God, forming,
moving and governing the hearts of men. Ps.
xxxiii. 13, 14, 15. " The Lord looketh from
heaven ; he beholdeth all the sons of men.
From the place of his habitation he looketh up
on all the inhabitants of the earth. He fash-
IONETH THEIR HEARTS ALIKE." In the
Greek translation it reads, " He fashioneth their
hearts each one." Here it is expressly asserted,

¦43
that God fashioneth, i. e. forms or moulds the
hearts oi mankind, without exception. Noth .
ing is said of means and second causes. But,
whatever means may be used it is God who
fashioneth their hearts ; the efficient agency is
his and not that of second causes. Prov. xvi.
9. " A man's heart deviseth his way ; but the
Lord directeth his steps." The expression,
here, is universal. " A man's heart, i. e. every
man's, "directeth his way." Men are volun
tary in walking ; every step they take, is prece
ded by a volition. If, then, the Lord directeth
his steps, it must be, by governing his volitions.
If a man steps to the right or the left, it is be
cause God produced in him a volition to walk
in that direction. But, Mr. A. may here say,
" This is nothing to the purpose ;" for God pro
duces this volition, not by his immediate agen
cy, but by imparting to some second cause, an
energy and activity to produce it. We may,
then, ask in our turn, how does Mr. A know
this ? There is not a syllable, in the text, about
any second cause. This explanation of the
manner, in which God directs the steps of men,
Mr. A. derives from "his philosophy," which
rejects ," the plain, most natural, and obviou6
sense" of the passage, which " would most read
ily offer itself to the mind of a sober, judicious
and upright inquirer after truth ;" and, by "an
effort and refinement," puts a construction upon
it, which renders it absurd. Prov. xxi. 1. " The
king's heart is in the hand of the Lord ; as the
rivers of water, he turneth it whithersoever he
will." Here it is asserted, that the king's heart

44
is in the hand, not of some second cause or in
strument j but, of the Lord; and that He, not the
imparted energy of means, or motives, turns it,
whithersoever He will, whether to good or evil.
Isaiah xlv. 7. "I form the light, and create
darkness : I make peace, and create evil : I, the
Lord, do all these things." Light and darkness,
peace and evil, evidently comprehend all good
and evil, both natural and moral. This, it is
presumed, Mr. A. will admit : For, it has been
demonstrated by Dr. Hopkins, whom he es
teems a " great writer," and ' one who com
monly reasons with much correctness and pow
er.' System, v. 1, p. 14'J-152. And, vyhat is
more, " the judicious and candid Dr. Smalley,"
who ' exactly coincides. with Mr. A. in senti
ment,' has said, "It is evident, that by light
and darkness, peace and evil, we are here to un
derstand, every thing that takes place, in the
natural and moral world : and that this text,
thus understood, asserts no more than the com
mon doctrine Of scripture." Sermons, p. 90.
Here, then, God expressly asserts, that He crem
ates darkness, as well as forms the light ; and
that He creates evil, as well as makes peace.
Now, will Mr. A. say, that in the work of cre
ating, God does not put forth a direct and pos
itive agency, but only imparts such an agency
to some second cause or instrument ? Did God
thus create the world, and the first thing that
was created ? Acts xvii. 28. " For in him
(God) we live, and move, and have our being."
In the Greek it is, "By him we live, and are
moved, and have our being." So says the leanv

•45
ed and candid Dr. Doddridge on the placet
Here the efficiency of all second cause is deni
ed, and men are expressly said to be moved by
God, in all their actions. I only add, II. Cor.
hi. 5. •'•Not that we are sufficient of ourselves
to think any thing as of ourselves ; but our suf
ficiency is of God." Here the insufficiency of
men, without the agency of God, even to think,
and much more to will, not some things, but
any thing, whether good or evil, is expressly
taught. , Omitting those passages, which represent
God as producing holiness in the hearts of men,
and which Mr. A. acknowledges, imply an im
mediate and direct agency ; I will next men
tion a few of the numerous passages, which
more particularly represent God as causing the
sinful exercises and actions of men. Exod. x.
20. " But the Lord hardened Pharaoh's heart,
so that he would not let the Children of Israel
go." Here, as in many other places in this
book, it is expressly said, the Lord hardened
Pharaoh's heart ; and, in hardening it, caused
him to refuse to obey the divine command to
let Israel go. But, here, no doubt, Mr. A. will
say, for he has said it, p. 124. " As a provi
dential event God determined that the heart of
Pharaoh should be hardened ; but does this
warrant us to say God stood by Pharaoh, and
moved him by an inward moral influence on his
mind to disobey his order ? By no means." To
this we reply • If God be every where, as all
but Atheists believe, then He doubtless stood
by Pharaoh, when his heart was hardened. And

46
that He moved him, is asserted in the words be
fore us, as plainly as words can express. It is
said, the Lord hardened his heart ; and, as the
effect of this hardening, he is said to have re
fused to let Israel go. This is the plain and ex
press assertion of this and other similar passa
ges ; whatever " natural horror at the idea,"
there may be in the minds of those who natur
ally hate God, and do not like to retain Him in
their knowledge, but say unto Him, depart from'
us. Deut. ii. 30. " But Sihon king of Heshbon
would not let us pass by him ; for the Lord thy
God hardened his spirit, and made his heart ob
stinate, that he might deliver him into thy hand,
as appeareth this day;" The refusal of Sihon
to let the Israelites pass by him, was a wicked
act, for which he was condemned and punished*
This act is here ascribed to the agency of God,
as the efficient cause. He refused to let Israel
pass by him, because the Lord God hardened
his spirit and made his heart obstinate. This
wicked act of the king of Heshbon, is so far
from being ascribed to means and instruments,
as the producing cause, that means and instru
ments are not so much as mentioned. II. Sam.
xxiv. 1. "And again the anger of the Lord
was kindled against Israel, and he moved Da
vid against them to say, Go, number Israel and
Judah." Here it is expressly and unequivocally
declared, that God moved David to do a very
wicked act; for which, afterwards, his own
heart smote him ; and God severely punished
him. Respecting this act of David, Mr. A.
says, p. 125, 126, " As an event in providence,'

47
He (God) no doubt, determined and brought it
about." One would think, then, that so far at
least as this passage is concerned, the dispute
was at an end. What more does Mr. Weeks,
or Dr. Hopkins suppose to be here taught, than
that this wicked act of David was determined in
God's counsel, and brought about in his provi
dence ? Does God determine and bring about
things, without a volition of his wijl, or an ex
ertion of his power ? If divine agency be not
concerned in what God brings about, it seems
difficult to conceive in what it should be con
cerned. "• But, adds Mr. A- did he (God) stand
by him (David) and work inwardly upon his
heart and induce him to sin ? No, the Devil did
this ; for, in another place we read — And Satan
stood up against Israel, and provoked David to
number Israel." Here Mr. A. asserts, that Sa
tan, and not God, was the efficient, producing,
or moving cause of David's giving orders to
number the people : The Devil, and not God,
worked inwardly upon his heart and inclined him
to th s sin. But, let me ask, is this " the plain,
most natural and obvious sense" of the passage,
that " which would most readily offer itself to
the mind of a sober, judicious, and upright in
quirer after truth ?" So far from it, that it is a
palpable cpntradiction to the plain and obvious
Sense of the passage which asserts, that the
Devil provoked David ; while it was God who
moved him to number Israel. If Mr. A. had
undertaken to prove, that the passage before us
was an interpolation, or that. the translation is
incorrect, however difficult the task, it might

43
have had the credit of ingenuity, if not of hon
esty. But, while he admits the passage to be
canonical, and the translation good, it certainly
savours neither of humility nor consistency, for
him to discard its plain meaning, and assert,
without an attempt to prove, that what is here
attributed to the agency of God, was wrought
by the agency of the Devil. Psalm, cv. 35.
" He turned their heart to hate his people, to
deal subtilly with his servants." This is said
with reference to Pharaoh and the Egyptians.
Thty were unquestionably sinful in hating
God's people and dealing subtilly with them.
But this sinful conduct of theirs was the effeqt
of God's turning their hearts. If this passage
does not assert the direct and positive agency
of God, turning the heart to sin ; in what terms
could it be asserted? Isa. lxii 17. " O Lord,
why hast thou made us to err from thy ways,
and hardened our heart from thy fear ?" In this
passage, the holy prophet, speaking in the name
of all the people of God, and that too in a sol
emn address to the throne of grace, does not
hesitate to attribute the criminal departure of
the Israelites from the ways and the fear of the
Lord, to a direct and positive divine influence,
as its efficient cause. Zech viii 10. " For be
fore these days there was no hire for man ; nor
any hire for beast ; neither was there any peace
to him that went out or came in, because of the
affliction : for I set all men every one against
his neighbour.'' For men to be set against their
neighbours, is a criminal violation of the second
great commandment in the law. And yet God

49
Says that, he set all men every one against his
neighbour* I wil}mention but one passage more,
out of the many that might be quoted to the
same purpose. Rev. xvii. 17. "For God hath
put in their hearts to fulfil his will, and to agree,
and give their kingdom unto the beast, until the
words of God shall be fulfilled" This is spo
ken of the ten horns., i. e. the ten kings, who
were devoted to the beast, i. e. the apostate, pa
pal hierarchy. The criminality of their agree.?
ing to give their kingdom to the beast, will not
be questioned. * But the apostle here declares,
-not only that their doing this was agreeable to.
the will, i e the decree of God ; but that God
put it in their hearts to do it. Mr. A. may here
undertake to show us how God put it in their
hearts; that it was by ' creating, imparting,, or
causing to exist, energies, activities and effi
ciencies, distinct from his own ;' but it is to be
hoped, he will not assert, that the Devil put it
in their hearts ; when the revel tor expressly
declares, that God put t in their hearts.
We now come to Mr. A.'s reply to Dr. Hop
kins's argumentum ad hominem, as he terms it;
The argument is this : " If the scriptures which
have been mentioned, where hardening the
hearts of men, blinding and shutting their eyes,
and inclining and turning their hearts, when
they practice moral evil, he. — if these scrip-
tures are to be understood, as meaning no more
than that God orders their situation and exter
nal s circumstances to be such, that, consider
ing their disposition, and the evil bias of their
minds, they will, without any other influence,
5

50
be blinded and hardened, Sec. — then all those
scriptures, which speak of G«&'s changing and
softening the heart, taking away the hard heart,
and giving a heart of flesh ; opening the eyes
of men, and turning them from d rkness to
light, and from sin to holiness, working in them
to will and to do, and causing them to walk in
his way, Sec. may and must be understood in
the same way, as not intending any special di
vine influence on the mind, as the origin and
cause of virtuous, obedient, holy volitions ; but
only his using means with them in an external
¦way ; putting them under advantages, and set
ting motives before them ; so that if they be
well disposed, or will dispose themselves to obe
dience, they may be holy, Sec. To be sure it
cannot be argued from the expressions them
selves, that the. latter express or intend any
more real influence on the minds of men, or di
vine agency, by which God is the origin and
cause of virtuous exercises ; than the former do
with respect to men's sinful exercises ; for the
expressions are as unlimited, plain and strong,
which speak of the former, as those which are
used for the latter."
" The Armenian, and all of his cast, under
stand the latter, as they do the former, as in
tending *no internal, decisive influence on the
mind, turning the heart or will one way, or the
other; but ordering external circumstances,
&.c. And are they not herein more consistent,
th m the professed Calvinist, who insists that the
1< tter cannot be understood as expressing less,
than that God, by his agency and influence on

51
the minds of men, does actually produce all
virtuous volitions, as their real original and
cause ; while he as confidently asserts,, that the
former cannot mean any sUch thing; but un
derstands them as the Armin'an does . W~ere
they consistent, they would give up the cause
to the Arminian, and own that the latter expres
sions may well be understood, as he under
stands them, and must mean ho more, if the for
mer do not. - This is mentioned, it must be ob
served, as argumentum adhommem, to convince
those professed Calvinists, or whatever they
choose to call themselves, that they are really
inconsistent ; and, in this point, are taking a
measure to strengthen their oppossers, father
than to convince or confute them" System,
vol 1, p. 163.
On this reasoning of Dr. Hopkins, which,
for aught we can see, is perfectly conclusive,
Mr. A. " with all due deference to so great a
writer, atid fone who commonly reasons with so
much correctness and power,' remarks, p. 40 :
If '' there was as much said in the one c;se as
the other, about the necessity and reality of a
divine influence, his argument would be good."
This, however, Mr. A. denies. But this we
do not hesitate to affirm. Indeed, there are
many more passages of scripture, which assert
the reality of a divine influence in hardening and
turning the hearts and moving the wills of sin
ners, than in softening and chtnging the hearts
and moving the wills of saints. But, we will
hear Mr. A. He says :

52
Pirst. " In regard to saints, it is declared of
them, when considered in themselves, that their
hearts are fully set in them to do evil ! Here
then is a necessity of a divine influence to in
cline them to good, that does not exist, in re
gard to inclining them to evil For their whole
nature is previously bent this way." Here Mr.
A. finds the benefit of having put out of the
question " the manner, how moral evil first
gained existence in the mind of angels once
perfectly pure and blessed ; and how moral cor
ruption, or sinful desires, first entered into the
heart of the primitive parents of our race, who
were originally formed in a state of perfect
moral rectitude ; and of assuming human na
ture in its state of deep and awful depravity."
p. 14, But, does the entire depravity of men
by nature, prove, that there is less necessity of
a divine influence to produce their sinful, than
their holy exercises ? In answer to this ques*-
tion. I would observe,
I . If the native depravity of men will account
for their sinful exercises, without a divine ?gen-
cy, why will it not equally well account for
them, without human or diabolical agency?
Why need Mr. A. ascribe such an "influence,"
energy and activity"to means and second causes,
and- such a " moral influence" and powerful
agency to the Devil, in order to account for the
sins of men, whose "whole nature is previous*
ly bent this way ?" If the natural bent of men
to evil proves that their sins nv..y exist without
divine agency, it must be because they may ex
ist without an efficient c^utse to produce them.

53
And, if they may so exist, Mr. A might have
spared himself all the pains of weaving his fine
spun metaphysical thvory of second causes, en
ergetic means, and efficient instruments. But,
2. Is it true, th it the natural depravity of
men renders it unnecessary that their sinful ex-
ei cises should have a cause without themselves?
Th t they are effects and have a cause, it is pre
sumed Mr. A. will not deny ; as it is implied
in many parts of his Essay. It is thought prob
able, also- that he will admit, that the sinful ex
ercises of men do not cause each other ; and
that they are not caused by,a self-determining
power in the will, as Arminians absurdly talk.
If, then, the sinful exercises of men have a
cause, that cause must be something without
them, some being besides themselves. And if
so, the agency of that cause, whatever it may
be, is as necessary to produce the second, or any
subsequent sinful exercise, as the first. There
is no natural or necessary connexion, between
one sinful exercise and another. Sinful exer
cises do not stand in the relation of cause and
effect to each other. How, then, does the nat
ural depravity of men diminish the necessity of
a divine influence, to cause their sinful exerci
ses? But,
3. This ' bent of nature,' their ' having then-
hearts fully set in them to do evil,' is the very
thing to be accounted for. And here, accord^
ing to Mr. . A.'s own reasoning, a divine influ
ence is as necessarily supposed,' as in the re T
generation of saints. The hearts of angels and
of Adam before the fall, were ' fully set in them

54
to do goer1 ; their whole nature was bent the
right way. ' If, therefore, the perfect sinfulness
of mankind renders a divine influence necessa
ry to their conversion; then the perfect holi
ness of angels and of Adam, rendered a divine
influence necessary in their fall. And, it is just
as proper and lawful to explain away those pas
sages of scripture, which speak of divine agen
cy in regeneration ; as those, which speak' of
divine agency in the production of moral evil.
Secondly. Mr. A. asks, " Is it not expressly
declared in regard to the good exercises of
saints, that the effect is not of themselves ?"
We grant it. "¦ But where, adds Mr. A. is it
declared, that all the wicked exercises of sin
ners are not of themselves, but of God ?" We
answer, in all those passages of scripture, which
we have quoted on the subject, in this section ;
and in all those passages, which represent God
as hardening and turning the hearts and mov
ing the wills of wicked men, in their sinful ac
tions. The scriptures, which represent men as
dependant upon God for their sinful exercises,
are more numerous than those which represent
them as dependant upon Him for their holy ex
ercises ; and for this reason, probably, that men
are more disposed to deny their d;vpendance in
the former case, than the latter. The passages
which Mr. A. here quotes, are nothing to his
purpose. The one from the Epistle of James,
will be considered in another place. What is
the meaning of these words of Christ, respect
ing Satan ? " When he speaketh a lie, he speak-
oth of his own." Is not the meaning obviously

3J

this ; that he speaks according to his character ?
To suppose the meaning to be, that he speaks
independently oi divine agency, or causes him
self to speak is to give a sense to the passage,
which it by no means requires, and to beg the
question in debate. What is the meaning,
when it is said, fiosea, xiv 9. w* O Israel, thou
hast destroyed thyself ?" — Is it not obviously
meant, that by their voluntary, sinful conduct,
they h-d brought deserved destruction upon
themselves ? If this passage proves any thir.g
to the purpose for which it is he e quoted by
Mr. A. it must prove what we charitably hope
he does not believe, that the Israelites caused
their own sinful actions, in the exercise of a
self-determining power ; which, of all absurdi
ties, is the most absurd.
Thirdly. Mr A. says, " It is expressly de
clared in the divine word, that no means,
motives, or second causes, are sufficient of
themselves, though applied in the course of di
vine providence, to produce the holy and gra
cious exercises of the new creature. But, where
do we find it written, that no argument, no en
ticements, no temptations to sin, are sufficient
to lead men into evil conduct ?" Upon this we
remark, that though it is not expressly declared,
yet it is plainly taught, in the divine word, th t
no means or second causes are sufficient, of
themselves, to produce the holy exercises of
saints ; and it is as plainly taught, that no means
or second causes are sufficient, of themselves,
to produce the sinful exercises of sinners. In
the divine word^ the divine agency is- repre-

56,
sented as equally the efficient or producing cause-
of both sinful and holy exercises. In both cases,
God works by means ; but, in neither case, do
the scriptures represent means as having power
to produce moral exercises or actions, without
the positive agency of the Deity. As has been.
observed, the positive agency of God, in caus
ing the sins of men, is more frequently men
tioned in scripfure, than his positive agency in
causing their good deeds.
Notwithstanding Mr. A.'s three evasions of
Dr. Hopkins's argument, we are still of opin
ion, with the Doctor, that the Armenian-, who
attributes both the sinful and holy exercises of
men to means and second causes, is more con
sistent, than the professed Calvinist, who admits
the positive agency of God in the production of
holy exercises, but denies it in the production
of sinful exercises, attributing them to the effi
cient energy, of second causes.
But here Mr. A. with threatening solemnity,
asks, " Is it not presumption, in a high degree,
to say, the infinitely wise and powerful Jehovah
cannot give any such efficiency to second causes
and instruments, as to turn the hearts of men,
what way He pleases, without any other influ*
ence ?" We answer, no. It is no more pre
sumption to say this, than to say, that Gad can
not make second causes firs' causes ; or, that
He cannot impart to instruments, a power of
act ng ndependently ; or, that He cannot deny
his word, which represents all second causes as
producing their effects by his efficent opera
tion. It is not presumption to say, that God

5%
cannot work contradictions, communicate his
own attributes to his creatures, and thus destroy
the evidence, that either his works or his word
came from his hand.
Mr. A. again asks, " Is it not customary, in,
the language of scripture, to ascribe to an agent
a work which he executes by the instrumental
ity of others, merely because it took place ac
cording to his counsel and design ?" Well ;
and what then? Why, says, Mr. A., " So we
conceive, that the wickedness which takes place
in the world, hardening hearts, &c. is ascribed
to God, because it is agreeable to his infinitely
wise counsel and design." And so, says the,
Arminian, more consistently with himself, and
quite as consistently with scripture, " We con
ceive, that all the goodness that takes place in
the world, softening hearts, &c. is ascribed to
God, because it is agreeable to his holy will,
that it should be produced by means and second
causes.' And that man is equally " guilty of
misrepresenting the ways of God" and pervert
ing his word, who ascribes evil, as he who as
cribes good, to the mere instrumentality of sec
ond causes, to the exclusion of the "direct,
agency" of the great First Cause. God says,
" I form the light and create darkness ; I make
peace and create evil ; I, the Lord, do all these*
things.'''' Isaiah xlv. 6.
Mr. A. adds, that the passages of scripture,
adduced to prove the agency of God in the pro
duction of moral evil, " relate, not to the ordi
nary, but specid providential dealings of the
Most High. Hardening the hearts, blinding

58
the eyes, &c. is a judgment inflicted upon men
peculiarly wicked, for former sins and trans
gressions." Here Mr. A. has fallen into a mis
take, popular indeed, but not the less egregious,
not that account. No instance is recollected, and
it is believed, no instance can be found in which
God is represented as hardening the hearts of
men, turning their hearts to evil, making their
hearts obstinate, making them err from his ways
and moving them to sin, as " a judgment," or
punishment, inflicted upon them " for former
sins and transgressions." The scriptures do not
thus absurdly represent sin as the punishment
of sin. The single passage, quoted by Mr. A.
II. Thes. ii. 11, 12, is nothing to the purpose.
To Send men strong delusions, and to harden their
hearts, are two distinct things. Delusion be
longs not to the heart, but to the understanding,
A sinful heart may be the occasion and instru
mental cause of mental delusion ; but it is a
distinct thing from such delusion itself ; which
consists in taking darkness for light and light
for darkness, error for truth and truth for error.
When it is said of the idolator, Isa, xliv. 20,
" A deceived heart hath turned him aside," the
expression is obviously figurative, and the
meaning is, that the deception, or false, belief,
occasioned or produced by a corrupt heart,
turned him aside from the worship of the only
living and true God.
it is now submitted to the candid reader to
judge, whether Mr. A. has fairly rid himself of
Dr. Hopkins's argumentum ad hojninem ; and
whether he is a§ consistent as the Afmiwan,

59
who maintains, that moral good, as well as mor
al evil, is produced by second causes, without
any positive, divine agency forming the heart
and inclining the will ?
It is pleasant to hear Mr. A. say, p. 44,
"That confidence in any opinion is no proof of
its truth ;" as this supersedes the necessity of
any further reply to his confident assertions,
which nearly cover his 43d page.
We might here dismiss the third section of
the Essay ; as the remaing seven pages are fill-
ed with abstruse, metaphysical Speculations,
which have little or no relation to the question
at issue. But, to pass over all Mr. A.'s di
gressions and aberrations from the point in
hand, would be to neglect about one half of his
book ; which though it might be lawful in a
disputant, would hardly be justifiable in a re
viewer. Mr. A. ' having read Milner's Ch. History,
reviewed some metaphysical speculations, and
lost all confidence in abstract reasoning which
he now views as a dangerous snare, the bait of
which is the pride of being wise beyond what is
written,' feels himself furnished with weapons'
to attack the positions of three of the greatest
metaphysical giants, that modern times have
produced; viz. Bishop Berkeley, President
Edwards, and Dr. Stephen West.
We shall not undertake to defend Berkeley's
"Principles of Human Knowledge." We will
dismiss these, with simply observing, that,
Whether the Bishop believed his ideal scheme,
or not ; he reasoned in support of it, as correct-

60
ly at least, as Mr. A. does, from the principles
of Locke, and "the opinion of the most pro
found researches of preceding philosophers;"
and, by his writings, did more, probably, than
any other man, to expose the absurdity of the
docriw of ideas derived from the Schoolmen^
and to pave the.wy for the splendid improve
ments of Reid, Beatti, and Stewart.
Having despatched the Bishop of Cloyne with
a few words, Mr. A. proceeds to attack the doc
trine of President Edwards, that " God's pre
serving created things in being, is perfectly
equivolent to a continued creation." Though
we believe this doctrine ; yet we have neither
time, nor room to enter into a laboured proof
of it . we shall only make a few remarks upon
Mr. A 's o! jc'tions against it.
First. He objects, th t, " according to their
reasoning this material'globe and all the beings
th it exist upon it, are, to day, not the same that
existed yesterday." But, we ask, how does
this follow ? Suppose the constant exercise of
creative power is necessary to preserve the
globe in existence, how dres it from hence fol
low, that it is not the same globe ? What dif
ference1 can Mr. A point out, between the globe,
which existed yesterday, and that, which exists
to day, except in point of time ? And there
will be this difference, whether we suppose the
tause of the globe's continuance in existence,
be within, or w thout itself. As to the identi-
ty, or sameness of the globe, and other created
beings, it matters not, whether they exist inde
pendently, or are continued in existence by the

61
constant operation of the#same power that crea
ted them at first.
Secondly. Mr. A. asks whether it " does not
follow from this mode of reasoning, that though
God may always be creating, yet he cannot
form 1n his own mind the plan of any particu
lar system, bring it into being, and cause that
very system to continue in being, through a
succession of age's ?" We answer, that does not
"follow, if the continued exercise of creative
power does not destroy the identity of the sys
tem. That the system remains the same, and
has a permanent existence, is not denied. But,
the question is— - What causes it to be the same ;
what gives it a permanent, continued existence ?
Is it a power of independent existence imparted
to it ; or, the constant agency of the Creator ?
Mr. A. here quotes Psalm xxxiii. 9. '• For he
spake, and it was done ; he commanded, and
it stood fast." His argument from this pas
sage, we suppose to be this : -" If the created
system be done, and standfast, then how can it
be dependant upon the constant exercise of di
vine power, for its continuance in' being?"
This reminds one of an argument, found in Ca-
rylls's exposition of the book of Job. In eh.
ix. v. 6, of that book, we read, " Which sha>-
keth the earth out of her place, and the pillars
thereof tremble." 'Here, says Mr.Caryll.it.
is expressly declared, that the earth stands upon
pillars; and who, then, will have the temerity
to say, that it turns round upon its axis P7i
Thirdly To overthrow President Edwards's
doctrine, that preservation is creation continued,
6

62
Mr. A. advances this position : " It requires as
great power to annihilate, as to create." But,
is this position tenable? If it is ; then, should
the Deity cease to be, as well as cease to ope
rate, the created system would remain for ever.
Hence it follows, that the created system? hav
ing once gained existence, is no longer depen
dant upon God : But, is not independent exist
ence one of the incommunicable attributes of
Divinity ? We admit, that it would require as
great a power to annihilate the world, as it did
to create it, and even a greater power, so long
as God shall exert his power to preserve it. But
we do not believe, that, if God should with
draw his upholding, almighty hand, the world
would exist a moment longer. No power is
necessary to annihilate a created, dependant be
ing : this must ever follow the cessation of cre
ative power.
We are glad Mr. A. proposes "to quote but
one example more," as we are as heartily tired
as he, or our readers can be, of " speculations
so profound." The example is from Dr. Ste
phen West ; who says, " Moral agency consists
in spontaneous, voluntary exertion." Upon this
definition, Mr. A. in the first place, has a quib
ble. ' If, says he, spontanedu&anQ. voluntary are
perfectly synonymous, then one of them is su
perfluous. This may be true, upon supposition
that synonymous terms are always superfluous.
But we question the correctness of such a sup
position. Two synonymous terms may often
be joined, with propriety and advantage, to il
lustrate each other, as one of them may be bef-

63
ter understood, by some readers, than the oth
er. Examples of this use of synonymes, might
be found in the Essay under review; In the
second place, Mr. A. asks, "Does not moral
agency consist in a power or capacity to put
forth moral action ?" We may be incorrect ;
but we have ever thought, that agency was ac
tion. And if it be so, then to say that moral
agency consists in a power or capacity to put
forth moral action, is the same as to say, that
moral agency consists in a power or capacity to
put forth moral agency. Such a proposition we
must consider as identical, whether it be super
fluous or not. We agree with Mr. A. that
" voluntary exertion may do for the definition
of moral action:'" and, of course, we think it
will do for the definition of moral agency ; for,
says Mr. Walker, " Agency is the quality of
acting ; the state of being in action." Dr. West
therefore, it would seem, has not " entirelv
mistaken the point." But, Mr. A. seems to
have mistaken the point ; and, instead of show
ing in what moral agency consists, he has only
attempted to show in what a moral agent con
sists. I only add. that Mr. A does Dr. West
great injustice, in representing him as saying,
that '• the soul of man consists in voluntary ex
ertion." That very acute, learned, and pious
divine, has not advanced, nor is it believed that
he entertained such an absurd sentiment.
We close our review of this section, with
congratulating our author upon his happy es
cape, from " metaphysical deeps," and with ex
pressing our desire, that he would net plunge

64
into them again, until he has again and more
critically " reviewed some of these speculations,
with which the young student in divinity is so
liable to be "charmed."*
*It may, perhaps, be proper and useful, to drop a word
here respecting the science of Melaphysicks. It has not been
uncommon lor those who have found themselves foiled by
close and cogent reasoning, to raise the cry of " Metaphys
icks,''' to the no small terror of many, who know not the
meaning of the word. To show that a doctrine ought not
(o be preached, or that a book ought not to be read, it has
been thought sufficient to say, it is metaphysical. But, what
is melaphysicks ? Mr. Walker defines it lo be, " the doc
trine of the general affections of beings." According to this
definition, the questions, whether a being exists or not,
whether it be material or immaterial, whether it be caused
or uncaused, mutable or immutable, like or unlike other
things, limited or universal, temporary or eternal, are all
metaphysical questions. A\l the properties of spirits, all
the laws by which they are governed, and all the changes
which they undergo and relations which they sustain to each
ether, belong to the science of melaphysicks. There is no
other science so comprehensive. Almost the whole of our
knowledge and of our reasoning, is necessarily metaphysi
cal. Without some acquaintance with this science, it is im
possible to go a step in the investigation of any subject, or
the demonstration of any truih.
If, with some modern writers, we limit Metaphysicks to
spirilual substances, and define it to be " the science of
rru'nd ;" still it will be more comprehensive, a« well as more
important, useful and sublime, than any other science. Thus
defined, Metaphysicks will comprehend every truth, rela
ting to the being, perfection, character and designs of God,
to the existence, properties and character of angels, and to
the nature, faculties, operations, relations and duties of the
human soul. Hence, it is easy to see, that almost all the
doctrines of the Bible, are metaphysical.
That eminent divine and christian philosopher, President
Edwards, writes, in his Enquiry on the Will, p iv. sec.
xiii. " If it be made an objection against the foregoing rea

05
son'mg, that il is metaphysical, or may be properly reduced
lo the science of vtetaphysicks, it is a very hnpeilinent ob
jection : whether it be so or no, is not worthy of any dis
pute or controversy, if the reasoning be good, it is as friv
olous to inquire what science it is properly reduced to, as
what language it is delivered in : and for a man to go abou'
-to confute the arugments of his opponent, by telling him his
arguments are metaphysical, w-ould be as weak as to tell him,
his arguments could not be substantial, because they were
written in French or Latin. The question is not, whether
what is said be metaphysicks, physicks, logick, or mathe-
maticks, Latin, French, English, or Muhawk? But, wheth
er the reasoning be Rood, and the arguments truly conclu
sive : — It is by metaphysical arguments only ,ve are able
to prove, that the rational soul is not corporeal ; that lead
ai sand cannot think ; that thoughts are not square or round,
or do not weigh a pound. The arguments by which we
prove the being of God, if handled closely and distinctly,
so as lo show their clear and demonstrative evidence, must
be metaphysically treated. It is by melaphysicks only,
that we can demonstrate, that God is not limited to a place,
or is not mutable : that he is not ignorant or forgetful ; that
it is impossible for him to lie, or be unjust.; and that there
is one God only, and not hundreds or thousands. And, in
deed, we have no strict demonstration of any thing, except
ing mathematical truths, but by metaphysicks. We can
•have no proof that is properly demonstrative, of any one
proposition, reTaling to the being and nature of God, his cre
ation of the world, the dep^ndance of all things on him, the
nature of bodies and spirits, the nature of our own souls, or
any of the great truths of morality and natural religion, but
what is metaphysical."
A writer in the Theological Magazine, vol. iii. p. 199,
has these pertinent observations : " Metaphysicks stands for
that species of investigation, discussion, or science, which
extends beyond the narrow circle of weights and measures,
the composition and decomposition of matter, squares and
cubes ; and respects moral relations, moral causes and effects,
spiritual substances, intelligent agents, and the moral plan
of divine government. Now, it is here to be asked, is it
worth while to value ourselves upon the idea that we are
rational creatures, if we withdraw our inquiries from objects
#6

66
of this nature? Nay, can we determine that we are rational
agents, and not on a level with the cabbages in our gardens,
unless we will step a little way, at least, into this region of
melaphysicks ; or, to use language less offensive, into the
region of spiritual and moral inquiry 1 Fie, then, upon the
loud cry, metaphysicks ! Awake, ye sons of carelessness; to
inquiry. If your adversary be ignorant, instruct him. If
he reason erringly, detect his fallacies. But against inge
nuity which you cannot equal, or demonstration which you
cannot disprove, do not, if you would respect your charac*.
t«ra, cry out, metaphysicks .'"

SECTION VI.
Containing remarks upon the fourth section of the
Essay, p. 51 — 57.
One would think that Mr. A. had lately re
viewed his divinity, as well as his melaphysicks,
upon reading the first paragraph of his fourth
section, which contains this sweeping sentence :
" A vast proportion of the most boasted reason
ings of men on divinity, are (is) a vain and per
nicious philosophism " If it be indeed so, it
would be useless and dangerous for young
men, preparing for the sacred office, to read
much of what has been written on divinity : and.
it need not appear so strange, as some have
thought it, that a student, in six weeks after
leaving College, should have read enough to
receive license to preach. But, it is some con
solation to know, that, vain and pernicious as
Mr. A esteems most of the boasted reasonings
of men on divinity, he " regards many of the
writings of New-England divines, with respect
and honor," and has read them with " delight
and profit" on almost all points, except a few,
which Dr. Griffin saw fit to denounce, as " for-
eign to godliness."
In the section before us, Mr. A. proposes to
show, that the doctrine, which he opposes, is
tmphilosophical. And if it be so in reality, we
should suppose he would like it the better on
that account ; for he says, p. 121, " If it be

¦68
philosophy, we must beware of it." But, let us
see how he proves the doctrine in question to
£>e unphilosophical.
First. He says, " It is contrary to analogy."
And, what if it is ? Can nothing be philosoph-
leal, but what is agreeable to analogy ? A Swe-
denborgian might be expected to say so. But,
how<ioes Mr. A. make it appear, that the doc
trine in question, is contrary to analogy ? He
says "it is quite different from the common
train of human reasoning in cases which bear a
strong analogy to this." And what if it is ? Is
it certain that the common train of human rea
soning in such cases, is always agreeable to
sound philosophy ? The only case mentioned
by Mr. A. as analogous to that of wicked men,
is that of a ferocious tyger, with a lamb before
him. Now, suppose it were admitted, which
it is not, that the tyger, thirsting for blood,
might leap upon the lamb, without being " mo
ved by a special divine power :" the analogy, in
this case, however1 strong, would only prove,
that men " disposed to nothing but sin" might,
without any special divine influence, commit
some overt act of wickedness, such as robbery
or murder. But, in deciding the question be
fore us, we are to account, not merely for the
overt, acts of wicked men, but for their disposi
tion to s n, their evil affections andvoltions from
•which their external actions flow, and in which
all their moral ev /lies. Here Mr. A.'s strong
analogy is very weak. He assumes the tyger,
with his ferocious thirst for blood, just as he
did human nature in its state of awful depravi-

69
Ly ; i. e. he assumes the existence of the very
thing, for which he ought to assign an adequate
cause. Because divine power may be necessa
ry to restrain the ferocity of the tyger and the
wrath of man ; does it hence follow, that a di
vine agency is not the efficient cause of the fe
rocity of the one and the wrath of the other ?
' Would not a philosopher, who should reason
in this way, make himself ridiculous?'
Secondly. To make it still more clearly ap
pear, that the tloctrine of divine efficiency is un-
philosophical, Mr. A. says, "It annihilates the
whole system of second causes in the moral
world." This is a broad and bold asertion, and
as destitute of truth, as it is of candour. Are
second causes annihilated, unless they are al
lowed to be efficien can es, and as such, to
usurp the place and perform the work of the
First Cause ? What if no " second cause, or
created agent" can " move the mind of man to
the least inclination or choice ?" Does it hence
follow, that, in moving the minds of men to
choose arid will, God may not make use of sec
ond causes, means, motives, and created agents?
Mr. A- admits, that all holy exercises in the
hearts of men, are produced by the immediate
agency of God. And does he, then, mean to
annihilate all the means of grace ? Nothing can
be more unphiiosophical and uncandid, than to
insist, as Mr. A. does, throughout his E^say,
that the doctrine of the efficient agency of God
in the production of human volitions, excludes
the use and subordinate agency of means, mo
tives and instruments,

70
• Thirdly. As additional evidence.that the doc
trine of divine efficiency is unphilosophical, Mr.
A says, " This theory is doing violence to the
universal opinion of mankind and the dictates
of common sense." Mr. A. is here a little too
fast, in using the term universal ; for no vio
lence is done to the opinion of Dr. Emmons, or
of Mr. Weeks, or of thousands besides, by the
theory in question. But, perhaps, these men
have been so long plunged in " metaphysical
deeps," as to have lost their common sense. Mr.
A. adds, " To make this appear, we will state a
case." The case is that of a man, with his hand
in a kettle of boiling lead. That the agehcy of
God should be necessary to cause in this man a
desire or volition to pull out his hand, Mr A.
says, " shocks all common sense." How does
this appear? Why should it be more shocking
to common sense, to say that this man's voli
tion to withdraw his hand, is caused by divine
agency ; than to say that the fall of a sparrow
or the ascent of vapours is thus caused? If a
man, in such a predicament, should not have a
desire to withdraw his hand,, it would, indeed,
bhock common sense ; because it would be con
trary to common observation. But, if to sup
pose that the desire, in such a case, as well^as
others, has a cause and that the cause is the
agency of God. shocks common sense; then
common sense is shocked with the doctrine of
the Bible, which teaches us, that men are not
$uffic en> of themselves even to think a 'houghf ;
that by (rod they are moved ; and that Godworkr
f'h all in all. But, suppose the doctrine of di'

71
Vine agency did shock'common sense ; would"
it certainly follow, that it is unphilosophical ?
If so, then the doctrine that the earth is a sphere
and turns upon its axis, should never have been
received as sound philosophy!
Four'hly. Mr. A alleges against the doctrine
of divine efficiency, that it " insists upon more
causes, than are necessaiy to account for the ef
fect." But, how so if second cause's can never
act as effic enf causes ? And, to say they can, is
a " prostrate begging of the question."
Ffthly. Mr. A says, " The theory under
consideration destroys the idea of God's having
any proper creation at ; ;11.'" But, how so? Can
not God make creatures distinct from himself,
without making them independent of himself?
If He can, then all Mr. A. says under this head
is impertinent, and unworthy of notice, except
his charging Mr. Weeks with "abolishing the
agency and influence of all second causes in the
moral system," which is too gross a misrepre
sentation to pass without censure. Mr. Weeks
attributes all the agency and influence to second
causes, which it is possible they should have,
without acting independently, and producing
effects by their own efficiency ; to suppose
j which, islaoth absurd and unscriptural.
Sixthly andjastly. Mr. A. says, that the doc
trine of divine agency is "unphilosophical, as it
tends to destroy all real and rational philoso
phy." This is as much as to say, it is unphilo
sophical, because it is unphilosophical. But,
we are unable to see how the doctrine in ques
tion has this destructive tendency. May not

n
the properties of things * be as permanent, and
the course of events as un form, both in the nat
ural and moral world, upon supposition they
are produced by divine efficiency, as upon sup
position they are produced by ' the imparted
energy and activity of second causes V And,
why, then, may there not be equal room " to
trace out the nature of things their mutual re
lations and dependence, and the energy or ac
tivity they have to produce effects and to frame
rules and systems for the application and direc
tion of these energies to useful purposes ?"
which Mr. A. s.-ys. " is the substance of '-dl phi
losophy worthy our notice. ' W ill he still in
sist, th t created things c^n h ive no nature or
properties, unless they h >ve an independent ex
istence; and no energy or activity, unless they
have a creative energy, and c?n act without
being moved by the First C use ? We. should
not think that he would insist upon this, >fter
conceding, as he does, p. 56, th?;t the h-ws of
nature " may be the mode of operation ass gned
to imparfed powers md energies upheld, di
re ced, and governed by the infinite wisdom
and power of the great Fikst Cause." Does
the power efthe jfiRST Cause, impart, uphold,
direct and govern, without ;¦ volt on, without
an exercise of power, without actmg?
Mr. A is happy, in closing .tins section, ' to
strenghten his own views by the authority' of
the 1 >te very popul r Dr. Dwight. He might,
if he h<d token the trouble h ve strengthened
his views by the authority ofm.nymore Doc
tors of the modern Calvinistick school, and

73
many more still, of the Arminian and Unitarian
schools. But, it would have served only to
show, in a manner " striking"* to himself, how
much he has thought like great men ; without
adding much to the strength of his views : since,
as he justly observes, " Nothing like infallibili
ty is to be attributed to the opinions of any
mere man."
I have only to add one remark upon the quo
tation from Dr. Dwight, p. 57. If the Doctor
was acquainted with a theology in this country
which " denies, with Spinoza, the existence of
finite, intelligent beings," we confess we know
not where this theology is situated ; for we have
never seen it written or heard it said, in this
country, either by philosopher or divine, that
" Minds, or spirits, are no other than continued
ahains, or successions of ideas and exercises."
* We think Mr. A. will be struck, if not gratified, with
the coincidence between his views, and the following of the
Rev. Gborge Savage White. " Dr. Emmons' ideas on
Divine Influence appear to me to be -objectionable on several
accounts, and to be expressly against James' Epistle : " Let
no man say, when he is tempted, I am tempted of God,
&c." " Sinful extreises are as natural to us, as it is for us to
breathe j but holy exercises are produced by the special in
fluence of the Holy Spirit, and persons under that influence.
may be said to be partakers of the divine nature. Yet God
does not produce, nor is- he the author of sinful exercises, in
the same way, nor id the sense, in which he is the author of
holy >xercises. "—[Letter to Rev. T Andros, from George
S. Wkite, in the Spiritual Magazine, Vol. 1, ./Vo. 2, p. ¦*.
. 7

SECTION VII.
Containing remarks upon the fifth section of the
Essay, p. 58-64.
We have now passed the middle of the Es
say ; and have, as yet, encountered little besides
" metaphysical arguments and abstract reason
ing." We are happy, at length, to meet our
author on the ground of scripture.
In this section, Mr. A. proposes to adduce
texts, '' which solemnly warn us, not to ascribe
to God. our being inwardly excited and moved
to impiety and wickedness." The texts are
three in number ; all from the short Epistle o£
James ; an epistle to which many have resorted
for weapons to combat the doctrines of the apos
tle Paul. The first text quoted by Mr. A. is
that noted one, James i. 13, 14. "Let no man
say when he is tempted, I am tempted'of God :
for God cannot be tempted with evil, neither
tempteth he any man : But every man is tempt
ed, when he is drawn away of his own lust, and
enticed." This text, if it had been the apos
tle's intention, might well warn us against as
cribing to God, our being inwardly or outward
ly £ excited to impiety and wickedness," To
excite commonly means to instigate, persuade,
or tempt- But, it is not perceived, that this
text warns us against ascribing our being in
wardly moved to impiety and wickedness, to di
vine agency, as the primary, efficient cause. If

it does, the term tempt must here mean, in
wardly to move ; which is a sense, in which the
term, is no where used in any other speech or
writing, either sacred or profane. Mr. A.'s la
boured argument, to prove that the word
tempt has such an uncommon and strange sense
in this passage, is altogether inconclusive. He
says, " the sense, in which the apostle meant to
clear God of tempting men to sin, is that, in
which it is impossible he himself should be
tempted." And what sense is this ? Is it to be
inwardly moved to sin by the agency of another
being? In this sense, God cannot be excited or
inclined to holiness, any more than to sin. How
ever mysterious it may be, it is as evident that
God is self-moved, as it is that he is self-exist
ent. Mr. A. says again, that the " actual in
clination, or being drawn away to sin, which the
apostle ascribes to man's own lust as the cause,
is the kind of tempting he solemnly warns eve
ry man not to impute to God." But, is this
kind of#empting the same as inwardly moving
one to sin ? Does every man's own lust inward
ly move him to sin ? Is lust or sin the efficient
cause of sin ? We should be loath to think that
Mr. A. entertains this absurd sentiment. In
what sense, then, does the apostle James here
use the word tempt ? We answer, that, in his
sense, to be tempted of God, is obviously the re
verse of being druwn away of one's own lust.
Now, to be drawn away of one's own lust, is to
yield, voluntarily, to the temptation. To be
tempted of God, then, must be, to be constrain
ed or compelled, against one's inclination or

76
choice, to perform the act to which he is tempt
ed. In this sense, it may be true, that God
tempteth no man ; while it is equally true, that
He turns the hearts of all men, as the rivers of
water, For even Mr. A. admits, p. 14, that
<b God has power, consistently with the moral
freedom of man, to produce evil volitions in his
heart, by an immediate, inward, positive effi
ciency. For, if the holy exercises, which God
produces in saints, be morally good and praise
worthy ; we see not why the evil exercises of
sinners would not be criminal, though produced
in the same way." The object of the text be
fore us, evidently is, to show, that God is not
in such a sense the author of the sinful conduct
of men under temptation, as to deprive them of
their free agency, or free them from their crim
inality. This text, therefore, is neither "im-
pertinent nor useless," should we even suppose
that there neither " then was a class of men,
who, to excuse or palliate their iniquities, pre
tended that God tempted, solicited, inclined, or
inwardly moved them to all the wickedness they
perpetrated," nor that " it was foreseen that
such mistaken and deluded men would arise in
some future period. " This text has no refer
ence to soliciting, inclining, or inwardly moving
men to sin ; nor does it imply "¦ the existence
of such ungodly men. as attribute these things to
God." It implies, that there might be, and we
have higher authority than that of Dr. Mack-
night, to prove, that there were men, who, " to
excuse or palliate their iniquities" inferred,
from the doctrine of divine decrees and agency,

77
that God compelled them to sin ; and that,
therefore, they were not to be blamed. That
there were persons of this description in the
apostolick age, is implied in the words of Paul,
Rom. ix. 18, 19. " Therefore hath he mercy
on whorh he will have mercy, and w horn he will
he hardeneth. Thou wilt then say unto me,
wjiy-doth he yet find fault ? for who hath resist
ed his will?" Mr. A. well knows, that it has
been the practice of ungodly men, from the
apostle's day to the .present, to make this reply,
whenever the doctrine of divine decrees and
agency has been clearly exhibited. And, in
answer to them, James reasons, much as Dr.
Emmons, or any other ^consistent Calvinist
would reason. He does not 'deny the fact of
a divme agency in hardening the heart, as an
impious falsehood ;' and thus flatly contradict
his beloved brother Paul. He says, in effect,
/Let no man pretend, that the decrees or agen
cy of God, compel him to yield to temptation
against his will ; for this is not true. As God
is never overcome and constrained to do evil;,
by the provocations of his wicked creatures ; so
He never constrains or compels any man to sin.
But whenever any man is drawn into sin by
temptation, he is drawn. of his own lust, he vol
untarily yields to the temptation. For when
lust hath conceived it bringeth forth sin. When
lust, or selfish affection has entered the mhxlj
a .compliance with outward temptation is the
natural consequence. Whenever any one, there^
fore, is enticed to commit a sinful act, the fault
is all bis own.'' This appears to be the plain'and

78
important meaning of the often quoted, often
perverted and much abused passage under con
sideration ; a meaning entirely consistent with
the agency of God in hardening the hearts and
producing all the voluntary exercises of men.
But, as Mr. A. expounds the passage, he makes
it imply, that men are inwardly moved by their
own lust, to sin, or, that sin is the efficient cause
of sin ; which is as absurd, as the long- since
exploded notion of a self-determining power.
Another passage, which Mr. A. quotes, as
" solemnly warning us not to ascribe to God,
our being inwardly moved to wickedness," is
within one verse of the preceding, James i. 16,
17. " Do not err, my beloved brethren. Every
good gift, and every perfect gift, is from above,
and cometh down from the Father of lights,
with whom is no variableness, neither shadow
of turning." It seems difficult to perceive,
what relation this text has to the subject in
hand. But the sagacity of Mr. A. can perceive,
without a " doubt," that the apostle here ' cau
tions his brethren against the error of imputing
our being drawn away to sin, to a divine influ
ence.' Some, however, may doubt, whether
the apostle had any such intention ; and that
too, while they agree with Mr. A. that " Dr.
Mackriight's paraphrase is very just." His
paraphrase is this, if Mr. A- has correctly quo
ted him : "Be not deceived, my beloved breth
ren, into the belief, that God is the author of
sin," i. e. the author (or doer) of the sinful ac
tions of men ; as he says the unbelieving Jews
and judaizing teachers suggested. " So far is

79
God from seducing men to sin, thate very good
gift, &c. is from above, &c" Whether this
paraphrase be just or unjust, there appears to
be nothing in it, any more than in the words of
James, against the doctrine of divine efficiency.
To harden the hearts of men and move them to
do evil, is a very different thing from seducing
them to sin, or being the doer of their sinful ac
tions. The last passage of ' solemn warning,' is
James, iii. 14—17. "But if ye have bitter en
vying and strife in your hearts, glory not, and
lie not against the truth. This wisdom de-
scendeth not from above, but is earthly, sensu
al, devilish." Here, says Mr. A. the principal
question is, what is meant by the phrase from
above ? It is so. This phrase, or single word,
as it is in the original, literally means from a
higher place, and figuratively, from higher au
thority. In this passage it seems to have ref
erence to iplace-, and to mean from heaven.
Here, then, arises a question — in what sense
does the apostle assert, that one kind of wisdom
is from heaven, and the other not ? Does he
mean, that one kind of wisdom is of a heavenly
nature, and the other of an earthly- dev I sh na
ture ? Or, does he mean, that one kind of wis
dom is caused by divine agency, and the other
caused by human or diabolical agency ? Mr.
A. is very confident, that he means the latter.
But, "confidence in any opinion is no proof of
its truth." The apostle's mode of expression
seems clearly to imply, that the former was his
meaning. " This wisdom descendeth not from

80-
above, but is earthly, sensual, devilish." De
scending from above is contrasted with being
earthly, sensuak devilik. As if he had said, this
wisdom is not of a heavenly nature, but of an
earthly, carnal, diabolical nature. If Mr. A.
should call this a "laboured criticism," I
should think his construction at least equally a
"strained comment ;" for it constrains the apos
tle to say. in opposition to the current of scrip
ture, that the divine agency is not concerned in
hardening the hearts of men, and turning and
moving them in all their sinful as well as holy
actions. "Who can possibly believe" that the
apostle would deny that God is, in any sense,
the cause of sinful wisdom, had " he confidently
believed, at the same time," as Mr. A. does,
f that God predetermined all the volitions and ac
tions of men, whether good or evil ; and by an
infinitely powerful and wise arrangement and
direction of second causes, turns their hearts
whithersoever he will,and governs their thoughts,
passions and actions ?'

SECTION VIII.
Containing remarks upon the sixth section of the-
Essay. p. 15 — 68.
Here, again, Mr. A, quotes three texts, which
he says, " positively declare, that moral evil
does not come from God."
The first text is James i. 13, 14, which was
particularly considered in the last section.
The second text is I. John ii. 16. "For all
that is in the world, the lust of the flesh," the
lust of the eyes, and the pride of life, is not of
the Father, but is of the world." Mr. A. is ex
tremely confident, that the apostle's meaning,
in this place, is, " It is not the Father, who
worketh in you the lust of the flesh, the lust of
the eyes, and the pride of life." He is so sure
that he understands the passage, that he would
as soon believe John was an infidel, when he
penned these words, as that he was a believer in
the doctrine of divine agency. While we would
express no doubt of Mr. A.'s sincerity, we must
be permitted to entertain some doubt of his cor
rectness. He says, " that in these words, the
whole body of sin, every corrupt affection, ev
ery sinful desire and practice is comprehend
ed." Now, this is more easily said, than prov
ed. It seems not unreasonable to suppose, that
by the terms, the lust of the flesh, the lust of the
eyes and the pride of life, the apostle means, not
sinful desires and affections of the heart, but

82
those things which are suited to be the objects
of such desires and affections. This appears
quite evident from the preceding verse, with
which this is intimately connected, v. 15. "Love
not the world, neither the things that are in the
world. If any man love the world, the love of
the Father is not in him." Here is an exhorta
tion, "JLove not the world, neither the things
that are in the world." This exhortation is en
forced by a weighty truth. " If any man love
\he world, the love of the Father is not in him, "
But, why is the love of the world and of the
things in it, inconsistent wijth loving God ? The
answer is in the text : " For all that is in the
world, the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the
eyes, and the pride of life, is not of the Father ,
but is of the world." The argument of the
apostle appears to be this : " The things that
are in the world, and that are suited to be the
objects of criminal desires and passions, are not
of the Father ; .they are created objects, of a
nature totally different from God and infinitely
beneath Him ; they tire not fitted to be the ob
jects of supreme love ; and to love them so, is
idolatry, and utterly inconsistent with true love
to God.' See Dr. Giiise on the place.
But, if it should still be thought, that, by the
lust of the file, h, &c sinful desires and affections
themselves, and not the objects of them are in
tended, the passage presents no difficulty. Such
sinful desires and affections are not of the Fa
ther, but of the world ; i. e. they are not after
God, not conformed to Him, not like the holy
feelings of his heart, but are after the world, or

83
conformed to the spirit of the. world, which is
enmity against God. It is now left for the can
did reader to judge, whether this text does not
require, or, to say the least, admit,, an exposi
tion entirely consistent with those numerous
passages, which so plainly teach the universal
agency of God. If this passage were any thing
to Mr. A. s purpose, it would prove more than
we should think he could consistently believe ;
it would prove that he world is the efficient
cause of " the whoie body of sin, of every cor
rupt affection, of every sinful desire and prac
tice ;" and thus, that powerful agency," which
Mr A in his eighth section, ascribes to the
Devil, would be entirely excluded.
The th rd and last of the passages, which our
author quotes, as * positively declaring, that
moral evil does not come from God,' is, I. Cor.
xiv. 33. " For God is not he author of confu
sion." It is very doubtful whether by confu
sion, in this place, any thing . morally evil is
meant. The apostle is correcting an irregular
mode of speaking, into which the preachers in
the Corinthian church had fallen, inadvertently,
perhaps, and innocently , that of speaking sev
eral at a time. This he calls confus'on ; but he
does not say that God is not the author of it.
The word author is not found in the original,
but was inserted by the translators. And, we
have n© less right, and much more reason, to
insert the word approver, or commander, or lov
er, than they had to insert the word author.
Mr. A. closes the section under review, with
a singular observation : " And wherein lies so

84
great a distinction between author and efficient
cause, I have 'yet to learn." Has he still to
learn, that the word author is often understood
to mean the same as doer, or actor ? And when
it is thus understood, can he not perceive, that
its meaning is essentially different from that of
efficient cause?

SECTION IX.
Containing remarks upon the seventh section of t/ie
Essay, p. 69 — 81, in which an attempt is made, to
show, that " the language of scripture, in which all
holiness in saints, is ascribed lo the agency of the
Holy Spirit, necessarily excludes the idea of a di
rect inward divine, efficiency, in the production of
sinful exe¦rcises.'',
This argument, Mr. A. says, " seems to be
perfectly decisive of the question." We admit,
rhat it not only seems to be, but must be deci
sive ; if it be founded in truth and fact. But, of
this we are not yet convinced. Mr. A. pro
poses t© present his argument in " four particu
lars." Let us consider each of these in their
order. 1. The first particular is a " Contrast."
Great things have been done by contrasts. We
remember Mr. Ely's Contrast ; in which it is
rnade to appear, with the greatest facility im
aginable, that Hopkinsiamsm is anti-calvinis-
tick, and near akin to Sabelianism, Arminian-
ism, and Universalism. It is no difficult thing
to construct seeming contrasts, by putting
scraps of passages together, according to their
sound, without regarding their connexion and
sense ; and thus to frame arguments seemingly
conclusive. Such is the contrast before us.
Here are twenty passages, or parts of passages,
placed in opposite columns, over against each

86
other, by way of contrast. We request the
readers patience, while we examine them.
The two first are from Galat. v. 18-23.
Here is, to be sure, a contrast, between the flesh
and the spirit. But, it will be at once perceiv
ed, upon reading the passage in its connexion,
that, by the flesh, is here meant, the sinful heart ;
and by the spirit, the holy heart. This con
trast, has not the least reference to " the produc
tion of exercises," either holy or sinful ; and is
nothing at all to Mr. A.'s argument.
The second pair of texts, is from the parable
of the tares, Mat. xiii. 38. Here is a contrast,
as far as it goes ; but it stops too soon for Mr.
A.'s argument. The good seed is contrasted
with the I ares, and (he children of the kingdom
with the children of the wicked one. But, there
is not a word, yet, respecting the production of
either sinful or holy exercises. And here the
contrast ends.
The third pair of texts, set against each oth
er, is from the simile of our Lord, to illustrate
his divine power in casting out devils. Here,
to be sure, is a contrast, or comparison, between
the strong man armed and a stronger than he.
But, if Mr. A. will show, that this comparison
his the most remote relation to the cause of
either sinful or holy exercises, we will give him
the credit of great ingenuity and a most fertile
imagination. In the fourth place, we have the two clauses
of the 29th v. of the 7th chap, of Ecclesiastes,
placed opposite each other, by way of contrast.
In the first clause, the agency of God, in pro-

87
during holy exercises in the first man, is assert
ed. " God made man upright." In the sec
ond clause, there is no mention made of the ef
ficient cause of sinful exercises. It is only said
that men act voluntarily in their sinful conduct.
" They have sought out many inventions."
What contrast is there here ? In order to make
a contrast, it must be understood, that by men's
seeking out many inventions, is meant, that men
cause their own sinful exercises by a self deter
mining power. But, does Mr. A. really be^
lievethis? Though he has said what implies
such a belief, at the bottom of his 85th page ;
yet we cannot think, that, upon a second and
more thorough review of his metaphysical spec
ulations, he will seriously undertake to maintain
a position, which President Edwards, for whom
he has great respect, has demonstrated to be so
perfectly absurd. See Edwards on the Will,
Part II. sec. 1 , 2.
In the fifth place, we have, not two parts of
the same passage, but two passages from dis
tant parts of the Bible, placed in opposition.
The first, Psalm viii. 5, asserts the divine agen
cy in the creation of man. The second, Rom.
v. 12, asserts the fall of Adam and its deleteri
ous consequences. Now, who can perceive a
contrast between God's creating man, and Ad
am's beginning sin in the world by his fall ? And
what relation has Either the one or the other to
the cause of either holy or sinful exercises ?
The sixth contrast consists of the two parts of
a single verse, Hos. xiii. 9. " O Israel, thou
bast destroyed thyself ; but in me is thine help."

88
By Israel's destroying himself is obviously
meant, not his being the efficient cause of his
own sinful exercises ; but, his bringing upon
himself divine judgments by his voluntary, sin
ful conduct. By his help's being in God, may
be meant, that divine power was necessary
either to relieve or reform him. Here, then, is
no contrast to the purpose of Mr. A.'s argu
ment. For, if the last clause teaches the agen
cy of God in producing holy exercises, which
is very doubtful ; it is manifest, that the first
clause has not the least reference to the efficient
cause of sinful exercises.
The seventh contrast is formed by putting
together John i. 12, 13, and II. Cor. iv. 3, 4.
In the former of these passages, the agency of
God in regeneration is taught ; in the latter, the
agency of the god of this world, in blinding the
minds of unbelievers. If there is a contrast
here, it must be understood, that Satan blinds
the minds of sinners, by producing sinful exer
cises in their hearts, just as the Holy Spirit pro
duces holy exercises in the hearts of saints.
This Mr. A. supposes. But, whether this sup*
position be founded in truth, will be a subject
of inquiry, in reviewing his eighth section.
The eighth contrast is composed of I. John
iv. 12, and I. John iii. 8. The former passage
teaches, that God dwells in saints ; no doubt as
the efficient cause of their holy love. Jn the
latter passage, sinners are said to be of the Devil.
Jfherebea contrast to Mr. A.'s purpose, it
must be taken for granted, that the Devil is the
efficient cause of the sinful exercises of sinners.

89
But this is a point of so much importance, and
so likely to be controverted, that Mr. A- should
not have taken it for granted, but should have
waited till he had attempted to to prove it.
Whether he has succeeded in that attempt, may
appear, perhaps, when we come to his eighth
section. In the ninth place, we have I. John iii. 9 and
10; two contiguous verses, in the same chap
ter. In the former verse, saints are represented
as born of God; and, consequently, as having
the seed of holy love habitually in their hearts,
which lays them under a moral inability of sin
ning. In the latter verse, sinners are called
children of the devil, and are said to be not of
God. Now, we ask, whether to be a child of
the devil, be the opposite of being born of God ?
. If so, then the devil must be the efficient cause
of the sinful exercises of sinners, just as God is
the efficient cause of the holy exercises of saints.
We ask again, what is here meant by the phrase
not of God? Does it mean the same as indepen
dent of God, or not subject to his efficient agency ?
Is it not obviously meant, that a sinner is not
one of God's spiritual children, not one Of his
peculiar people, not a subject of the sanctifying
influence of his Spirit? But, because sinners
are not born of the Spirit, does it hence follow,
that they will and act independently of divine
agency ? . This, we should think, could not be
Mr. A.'s belief: for he says truly, p. 75, " By
the general agency of God, all things are con
stantly held under the absolute dominion arid
government of Jehovah, and, in his Providence,

90
so directed and managed, as that they never move
or act, but in conformity to his designs. To
this agency, the apostle ailuctes in these words :
For in him (God) we live, and move, (i. e. are
imved,) and have our being. In regard to this
kind of agency, all objects in the universe are
equally dependant."
We come, at length, to the tenth and last pair
of texts, which are, I. John iv. 4 and 5. In
these texts, saints are said to be of God, and
sinners of the world; the obvious meaning of
which is, that the one are conformed to God,
and the other conformed to the world. But,
should we admit, as Mr. A. seems to suppose,
*that the former verse conveys the idea, that
God' is in saints, and Satan in the world ; we do
not see how it would even thus follow, that Sa
tan is the efficient cause of the sinful exercises
of the wicked. Satan may be in the world, as
a tempter and seducer, without governing the
hearts of sinners, like a Manichean god.
" It would be next to endless, says Mr. A.
to produce all the contrasts of this kind." Here
we fully concur with him. The whole Bible
might be contrasted after this manner. And,
after all, what would it prove, except the indus
try of the compiler of .such a contrast, and the
weakness of his cause ? Here we would iriterro-
gate, after the manner of Mr. A. " How can an
upright, honest man, who believes the plain,
obvious sense of the scriptures t© be the true,
suffer himself to be so seduced by metaphysical
subtilties, as to imagine, that the meaning, in
tended to be conveyed in all these contrasts,

91
by the Holy Ghost, is this ;" that as God is the
efficient cause of all holy exercises, so wicked
men, or the world, or the Devil, is the efficient
cause of all sinful exercises?
Mr. A. asks, " How is he greater, who is in
saints, than he that is in the world ; if God
works as directly and really in the one, as in the
other ?" I answer, that the supreme agency of
God does not exclude the subordinate agency
of the Devil. He is in the world tempting and
deluding men ; while God turns their hearts as
the rivers of water. But, here we mav retort
the question, and ask, if the Devil works in
sinners, as directly and efficiently, as God works
in saints ; how then, is He greater, who is in
saints, than he that is in the world ? We see
not, why this supposition does not give the
same power to Satan, as to the Holy Spirit ;
and as completely deify the Devil, as the doc
trine of the Magi and Manichses.
2. " The next branch of the argument, con
tinues our author, is, the positive declarations
of the Bible, that the Spirit of God does not
dwell in, and produce evil exercises in the
hearts of the wicked." But where are these
positive declarations found? Mr. A. has not
produced one. His first passage is Gal. v. 18-*
23. Here the flesh and spirit are contrasted.
And as the flesh evidently means, in this place,
the unsanctified heart, so the spirit of course
means, the new or holy heart. There is no ref
erence, in this passage, to the Divine Spirit.
His next passage is Rom. viii. 9. " Now if
any man have not the spirit of Christ, he is none

92
of his. " It seems pretty evident, from the eon-
text, that by the spirit of Chris', is here meant,
not the Divine Spirit, but the temper and mind
of Christ. But, if we suppose, with some ex
positors, that the Divine Spirit is meant, still
we do not see how a declaration that^He is pos*
sessed by every believer, amounts to a positive
declaration, that He does not dwell in, and pro
duce exercises in the hearts of the wicked.
The last passage, under this particular, is
Jude v. 19. " These be they which separate
themselves, sensual, not having the spirit."
Here, to be sensual, is opposed to having the
spirit. The spirit, therefore, in this connexion,
evidently means, not the third Person in the
Trinity, but the spiritual mind and holy heart.
" Now, says Mr. A.
3. This plain scripture doctrine, that the
Spirit is the author of no volitions or exercises,
but such as are holy, ought in our view, to be
perfectly decisive as to the question." But, he
has not, as yet, exhibited proof that this is a
scriptural doctrine ; and, if he had, we should
not allow his inference. We do not believe;
that the doctrine which we advocate, obliges us
to " assert, that the Holy Ghost is equally the
author of sin in God's enemies, as of holiness
in his friends." It is a strange assertion of Mr.
A. and one, which, like several he has made,
shows that his views of the' doctrine of the
Trinity are very confused and inaccurate, that,
" if you affirm, that God the Father works in
sinners to will and to do evil, you necessarily
affirm the same thing of the Holy Ghost ;" and,

93
that the Persons in the Trinity " cannot be rep
resented as acting separately.* If. to say. that
the Persons in the Trinity may act independent
ly, be to resolve this high mystery into three
distinct Gods, we should think, that, to s^y,
the Persons in the Trinity cannot act separate
ly, is to resolve this high mystery of Three
Persons in the Godhead, into one individual
Person. The one seems to approach quite as
near to Sabelianism, as the other does to Tri-
theism. The words of Christ, which Mr. A.
quotes, John v. 19, are not chargeable with this
absurdity. In these words, Christ teaches his
dependance, as man, and his independence, as
God. As man, he was the Son of God, and
could do nothing of himself : as God, he was
equal with the Father, and eould perform equal
ly divine works. This is the obvious meaning
of the passage. But, neither this, nor any oth
er passage in the Bible, teaches, that the Per
sons in the Trinity cannot act separately ; and
that the appropriate works of any one Person,
are equally the works of the other two. Christ,
the second Person in the Trinity, " made him
self of no reputation, and took upon him the form
of a servant :" Did the first, or third Person
ever do this ? Christ prayed, " Holy Father,
* How is this to be reconciled with Mr. A.'s concessions
in his Letter respecting " Bible News ?" In that Tract, he
admits, ' lhai the highest nature of Christ was begotten of
llip Father ; — that the Divine nature of Christ is, in some
sense, a distinct being from the Father ; — and that, in re-
JClrd lo his most exalted nature, Christ was sent of the Fa-
,lher, and acted in subordination to tin will and authority."
Pib.'e Netcs-.Vot Correct, pp. 4, 15, 20—2dedifU>it.

94
keep through thine own name, those, whom
thou hast given me." John xvii. 11. Were
these persons given to Christ by the Holy Spir
it, or by Christ himself? It is expressly said,
John v. 22, " The Father judgeth no man, but
hath committed all judgment unto the Son."
Would it, then, be scriptural to say, that the
world will be judged by the Father, or by the
Holy Spirit ? If, then, the scriptures represent
it as the appropriate work of the Holy Spirit, to
produce holy exercises in men ; it is not prop
er to attribute this work either to the Father, or
to the Son. It is, indeed, proper to attribute
this, or any other divine work to God ; because
all the Persons in the sacred Trinity are equal
ly D vine. But, if there be a distinction of Per
sons in the Godhead, as the scriptures teach, to
ascribe the appropriate and official work of one,
to either of the others, is as manifestly improper
as to ascribe the appropriate and official work
of a legislator, to & judge, or to an ambassador.
Leaving Mr. Williston to explain and vindi
cate himself, as he is well able to do ; and
leaving our author to set as little value as he
pleases upon Dr. Hopkins's " palliative," as he
diminutively calls it, we pass to the fourth par
ticular of his argument, p. 75.
4. " The theory under consideration appears
to be a great corruption of the Gospel, as it con
founds the work of the Holy Spirit on the hearts
of saints, with the physical, or general agency
of God." And, what if it does ? This is pre
cisely what Mr. A.'s theory does. His theory
maintains, that, whatever any one Person in the

95
Trinity does, is done, not independently, nor
even separately, but equally by the other two
Persons. And, if so, it is very difficult to see,
how ' one Person in the Trinity should: act a
more official or prominent part in any divine op
eration, than the other Persons.' But, suppos
ing, what may be true, that it is the peculiar and
appropriate work of the Holy Spirit " to pro
duce in men virtuous and holy exercises ;" we
admit, that our theory confounds this work with
the general agency of God ; but deny, that it
confounds this, or any other official work of
the Spirit, with the official work of either the
Father or the Son. The general agency of God
comprehends all the works of all the Persons in
the Sacred Trinity. God worketh all things
after the counsel of his own will ; some of
which things are the official works of -the. Fa
ther, some the official works of the Son, and
others the official works of the Holy Spirit.
That the general agency of God is thus exten
sive, we have the authority of Mr. A. to prove.
In p. 75, he quotes these words from his Appen
dix, p. 121, which, though last, was printed
first ; "By this agency all things were origin
ally created, &c. — and are constantly held un
der the absolute dominion and government of
Jehovah, and in his Providence, so directed and
managed, as that they never move or act, but
in conformity to his infinitely wise and benev
olent designs. To this physical agency, the
apostle alludes in these words : " For in him
we live, move, (or are moved) and have our be
ing." And it is in respect to the same agency,

96
God thus speaks in the prophet : " I form the
light and create .darkness ; I make peace and
create evil ; I the Lord do all these things." In
regard to this kind of agency, all objects in the
universe are equally dependant. The largest
globe, and the smallest atom, the highest ser
aph, and the meanest insect, the most perfect
saint, and the vilest sinner, the brightest angel,
and blackest devil, all here stand upon a level."
After reading this description of the general, ojr
rather, universal agency of God, we confess,, we
were not a little surprized to find Mr. A. con
tending, that this agency does not include that
" moral influence or agency," as he calls it,
which consists in ' operating upon the moral
and active powers of men, and causing them to
think, feel and act, agreeably to the will, and
pleasure of the agent.' Is not this moral influ
ence or agency included in God's forming light
and making peace, creating darkness and evil,
moving men in all their actions, and having all
creatures so under his government, and so di
rected and managed by his Providence,, as that
they never move or act, but in conformity to his
infinitely wise and benevolent designs ? In the
Appendix, p. 121. these passages, " Why hast
thou hardened our heart from thy fear ?" " He
turned their heart to hate his people," are refer
red to the general agency of God. We acknowl
edge ourselves utterly unable to see what pecu
liar work of the Holy Spirit, or of any other Di
vine Person, there can be, which is not included
in an agency, so general as this. Here, instead
of things being confounded by our theory,

97
Which the scriptures represent as distinct ; Miv
A.'s theory makes a distinction, where, accord
ing to the scriptures and his own statements,
there is no conceivable difference. We donot
perceive why 'the Gospel may not he under
stood by those, who have no idea of any other
divine agency,' but that general agency which
has been described, and which comprehends
that official agency of the Holy Spirit, which re
news ' men, dead in trespasses and sins, and is
one of the essential glories of the Gospel, as
the words of eternal life.' The agency of the
Spirit, in'renewing and sanctifying men, is not
more distinct from the general agency of God,
than the agency of the Father, in governing the
world and sending his Son to redeem it, or the
agency of Christ, in taking on him the seed of
Abraham and making his soul an offering for
sin. " In order to leave the Holy Spirit any
thing to be his peculiar work," there is no need
of supposing " something, to which the general
agency of God does not extend." When the
Divine Spirit renews the heart of a sinner, or
wOrks in a saint that which is pleasing to God,
He performs a peculiar work. He produces a
peculiar effect, which requires & special opera
tion- He dwells in saints, as neither he, nor
the Father, nor the Son dwells in ony other
men ; even by those special influences which
produce holiness. This we might, with propri
ety, call a peculiar work, even if we .maintain-
, ed, as we do not, that the Holy Spirit js the
agent in hardening the hearts of the wickecLand
causing;all their voluntary exercises. Though
9

98
the Holy Spirit ought not to be viewed as act
ing " independently ;" yet He ought to be view
ed as acting officially, and as having his appro
priate work, which is that Of renewing smners
and sanctifying saints. "So that it «m with
truth be said, that, although God works all
Vickedness in men, yet the Spirit works no
evil in them, but good only." Mr. A. says,
that "the peculiar work of the Holy- Spirit is
confined to saints." But, how is his producing
holiness in saints,' a peculiar work, if He cannot
act independently, or even separately ; and if
all He does, is done equally by the Father and
the Son? Mr. A.'s theory leaves nojpeculiar or
official work, for either the Father, Son, or Spirit,
and entirely confounds the distinction of Persons
in the Godhead ; which does not arise so much
from their being called by separate names, as
from their being represented as performing sep
arate Works, and acting as distinct divine agents.
According to Mr. A. the distinction between
the agency of the Spirit in sanctification, and
the agency of God, does not "relate merely to
the effect produced," but to the manner in which
it is produced, viz. " by direct operation on the
heart." But, if the Holy Spirit, in sanctifica
tion, operates directly on the heart ; then, ac
cording to Mr. A. the Father and the Son op
erate directly on the heart, in the same work :
for, as he says, p. 72, " When we speak of the
Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, as purely Di
vine Persons, it is impossible to deny any thing,
as to counsels or operations in relation to one
person, without denying it of the, others., — Nor

99
can we ascribe to one, any operation or effect,
without ascribing it, at the same time, to the
other." J Though we have no apprehension that
Mr. A. means to be a Unitarian, yet his un-
scriptural theory leads him, throughout this
section, to reason upon Unitarian ground, and
to advance what appears to us subversive of the
scriptural doctrine of the Trinity.*
Mr. A. says, that Mr. Weeks's doctrine " is
equal to a positive assertion, that God, by his
immediate agency, causes not only all the virtu
ous exercises of saints, but all the impious ex
ercises of sinners and devils;" and consequent
ly, "that there is no room to assert, that God
operates in one, more than another." From
whence he infers, that, " as an agent, sinners
have the Holy Ghost dwelling in them, as much
as real Christians." But, how does thisfollow,
if the Holy Ghost be an agent distinct from the
Father and the Son ; and if it be His peculiar,
official work to produce holy exercises in men ?
" The Christian world have hitherto supposed,
that God (the Spirit) dwelt in a peculiar man-
* Mr. fa. uses similar expressions in his " Letter to a
Friend." He there says, " Trinitarians hold, that God is
but one being or peison, in the primary, literal sense of the
term. Though the Father, Son, and Spirit are but one
God, as body, soul and spirit, are but one man, yt they
are three in a mysterious, incomprehensible sense. The
Holy Spirit is not strictly another person, but a person in a
peculiar and_ mysterious sense."
Bible News Arot Correct, pp. 16, 17, 20 — 2d edition.
This, says Noah Worcester, is what Dr. Cudworlh calls
•*' S.abellian Jargonry."

100
ner in saints ;"- and what does Mr. Weeks say,
that implies the contrary ?'
I close this section with a remark upon a sin
gular mode of speaking adopted by Mr. A. in
the section .under review, and in other places.
He calls the general agency of God his physical
agency ; and the operation of the Spirit in pro
ducing holiness, His moral agency. But, where
did Mr. A. find this distinction ? Is there any
intimation of it in the sacred scriptures ? The
scriptures teach, that God worketh all things,
and worketh all in all. But, do the scriptures
any where teach, that God worketh some things
by one kind of agency, and other things by an-}
other kind of agency ? It is believed, that such
a distinction is a fabrication of a kind of philos
ophy, which has no foundation in the sacred
writings. Besides; does not God act as a
moral agent in all He does ? And is not all He
does, therefore, moral action F If there be any
ground to distinguish the agency of God by the
terms physical and moral, it must lie, not in the
mode- of his operation, "but in the nature o£ the
subjects upon which He operates. In this re
spect, when He operates upon matter, his agen
cy may be called physical; and, when He ope
rates upon mind, his agency may be called mor
al But, this is not the ground upon which Mr.
A makes his distinction between the physical
and moral agency of God : for he attributes
' God's harden ng the hearts and blinding the
minds of sinners, his moving and governing-
wicked men and fallen spirits, and turning their
hearts zvhat way He pleases,' all to his physical

101
agency. Mr. A.'s distinction respects the mode
or manner, and not the subjects of Divine agen
cy. But, who knows the mode of Divine ope-
•ration, in any case ? Who knows that the agency
of God is ever more or less, than a volition of his
will ? " Here, we take it, God is incomprehensi
ble." p. 17. *9

SECTION X,
Containing remarks upon the eighth section of the
Essay, concerning the power and influence ascribed
to Satan, in the production of moral etd, p. 32-§9.
To what is said in the introductory part of
this section, respecting the being, capacity,
character and dependance of the Devil, we have
no material objection ; and shall pass over it,
without. any remarks. Our concern, in this
section, is with the ' extent of the power' as
cribed to this malignant agent, in ' producing
moral evil.' We will, first, inquire, what is
the extent of the power, which Mr. A. ascribes
to the Devil, in the production of moral evil ?
And, then, secondly, inquire, whether it be
agreeable to reason and scripture, to believe,
that he possesses and exercises such a power ?
First What is the extent of 'the power, which
Mr. A. ascribes to the Devil, in the production
of moral evil ?
And here it must be evident to every dis
cerning reader, that he attributes to Satan, a
power, not only to tempt men to sin, but to
cause them to sin ; a power, not Only to exhibit
motives to their minds to persuade them to do
evil, but to produce evil exercises in their minds,
and to move them to sin, as efficiently and ef
fectually, as the Holy Spirit moves saints to love
and serve God. He represents the Devil as
the efficient cause of the first sin of man. He

103
says, " The introduction of sin and wickedness
into this world, is ascribed to his agency. The
Scriptures mention no other ugent.or cause, in this
lamentable affair." He represents " the agency
Of the Serpent or Devil" as " effecting the fall
of man." p. 84. Again, he says, '• When Ad
am first sinned, how do the scriptures account
for it ? The awful event is ascribed to Satanick
influence." p, 125. Now, if Satan was the only
agent or cause concerned in the fall ; and if this
event was effected by his agency and influence ;
then he was the efficient or producing cause of
the first sin of man.
Again, Mr. A- represents the Devil as the
efficient eause, not of the first sin only, but of
all the sins of men. He says, "In the Divine
volume, there is much said respecting a moral
influence or agency. The object of this is, not
to create or uphold creatures in being, but pure
ly to operate upon ihetr moral and active powers,
and to impel them to think, feel and act, agree
ably to the will and pleasure of the agent, who
exerts this kind of influence. Of this influence
there are two grand sources mentioned in the
Bible. The first is the agency of the Holy
Spirit, in the production of holy affections, vo
litions and actions. The second is the agency
of Satan." p. 121, 122. The language here, is
too plain to need comment, The J3evil, in these
quotations, is represented, as having "power to
-operate upon the moral and active powers of
men, and to impel them to think, feel, and act,
agreeably to his will and pleasure ; and as be
ing equally and in the same sense, the cause of

104
sinful exercises in men, as the Divine Spirit is
of holy exercises. But, Mr. A. has informed
us, p. 79, how, the Holy Spirit exerts his moral
influence or agency : f' The peculiar, appropri
ate work of the Holy Spirit is to produce vir
tuous and holy moral exercises in saints, by a
direct operation on the heart." If, then, the
Devil exerts the same moral influence or agen*
cy, he must operate directly on the hearts of sin
ners, and be the efficient cause of all their sin
ful exercises and actions. Accordingly, Mr.
A. represents the scriptures as teaching, that
Satan is the efficient cause of all the sins of
men; He says, that Satan "holds the whole
world of ungodly men under his influence;"
meaning that moral influence, which he had de
scribed. After describing the general agency
of God, the agency of the Holy -Spirit, and the
agency of the Devil, he says, " By these three
kinds of influence, all effects are produced, and
all operations are carried on, that transpire, .ei
ther in the natural or moral world." The gen
eral agency of God he describes as physical,
and as having no concern in producing moral
exercises, whether sinful or holy : the agency
of the Holy Spirit he describes as the producing
cause of all holy exercises in men : of course it
follows, that all sinful exercises in men, are pro
duced by the agency of the Devil. Hence, he
expressly says, that ' the scriptures place the
evil exercises of sinners to the account of the
gdd of 1 his world, and positively deny that sin,
error, and wickedness, proceed from a Divine
moral influence.' pp. 122, 123. These general

105
•assertions he endeavours to corroborate by par
ticular instances. He says, that Ananias " was
moved" to lie to the Holy Ghost, by the agen
cy of " the malignant spirit." He says, ' Did
God stand by David and work "inwardly upon
¦his heart and incline him to the sin of number
ing the people ? No; THE DEVIL DID THIS !
He speaks of the Devil as " the cause of all
wickedness that prevails in the world," and as
having power " to produce wickedness, and to
draw men into sin."***
Finally, in showing the extent of Satan's
power in producing sin, he represents this apos
tate spirit as the efficient cause of his own sin-
* " If we Would ndt misunderstand" our author, ' it roust
be carefully observed, that, in his view, no motives, means,
or second causes, have any power to produce sinful exer
cises in men, without this inward/ direct influence of the
Devil. The mind of a sinner can only look.at these mo
tives ; it cannot move a step to choose them, until this choice
is excited try a positive, direct influence of Satan on the
heart. ' But, is not this unphilosophical? To say that a
special, positive act' of the Devil's ' power upon the heart,
is necessary to excite sinful exercises in a heart previously
disposed to nothing but sin, is quite different from the com
mon train of human reasoning, in cases which bear a strong
analogy to this-' Does not this sentiment, that the Devil is
the efficient cause of moral evil, " annihilate the whole sys
tem ol second causes in the moral world ;" at least in the
sinful part of it? " Is there no reality" in all that is believed
by men and taught in the Bible, of second causes and ef
fects ? In truth, according to this theory, no motive, no second
cause' can move the mind of man to the least sinful inclina
tion or choice. Nothing but the immediate agency of" the
Devil alone ''can do this." ' If God can give to mind and
motive such strong mutual tendencies, as Dr. West justly
concedes; if the antecedent temper and disposition of the

106
Ail exercises and actions. He says, p. 85,
" When Christ says of the Devil, ' when he
speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own, for he is
a liar and the fither of it," does he mean by
hii own and the father of it, that such an ex
ercise was his own exercise ? Does it not ap
pear, that it was our Lord's design to caution
his disciples against looking beyond the agency
of second causes, to account for the existence
of falsehood and wickedness ?" If this was our
Lord's design, then, in fecounting for the first.
sin of the Devil, we must not look, beyond his
own agency : " Regardless of all that philoso
phy may suggest, respecting the absurdity of a
self-determing power," we must admit, that the
Devil was the efficient cause of his own first sin,
as well as of all his subsequent sins. That we
do not mistake Me.. A.'s meaning is evident

mind may be so constituted, and the qualities or motives so
adapted to please the mind, that they will certainly be cho
sen as soon as they come within its view ; then why may
not God govern and determine the wills of fallen men, at
least as to all their sinful actions, by motives and second
causes, without a direct operation of the Devil on their
hearts T " In regard lo Adam's choice of the forbidden
fruit," according to Mr. A. no external means, motives, or
temptations were sufficient. But, bow did Mr. A. make this
discovery ? Isany thing mentioned, in the history of the
fall, but the exhibition of motives'hy lhj>. Serpent ? Is there
a word said about the direct agency of the Devil upon the
hearts of our first parents? Not a word. "But how came
Mr. A. lo discover a thing, which none of the Inspired Wri
ters ever advanced ? Is there not something, artfully pre-
.sumpluous and 'unbecoming creatures who are of yesterday
and know nothing, to talk of the agency" of the Devil, * and
the insufficiency u( means, as this Writer does,?" -

107
from what he says in his Appendix, upon the
same passage of scripture : " The Devil, in all
he does, is never represented as being under
r.ny moral influence out of himself." This is
the same as to say, that Satan is self- moved, in
all his wickedness, and the efficient cause of all
his own sinful exercises.
Thus we have Mr. A.'s view of the extent of
the Devil's power, in the production of moral
evil. He views him as the efficient cause of all
the sins of men, and of all his own sins. The
way is now prepared to inquire,
Secondly. Whether it be agreeable to reason
and scripture, to believe, that the Devil posses:
ses and exercises such power in the production
of moral evil ? Well might Mr. A. call this " a
mighty power." It is, indeed, such a power,
as we believe is possessed by none but the
Mighty God. But, let us see, whether there is
any foundation in reason or scripture, for as
cribing such a power to the Devil.
1. To suppose that Satan is the efficient
cause of his own sinful exercises, is a gross ab
surdity. What philosophers have said on this
subject, is not so unworthy of regard, as Mr.
A. suggests. We did suppose, that they had
set the absurdity of a self-determining power,
in so clear and strong a light, that all who have
read them must see it, and be ashamed to ex
press a doubt of it. If Satan causes all his owa
exercises by his own agency ; then he caused
his first sinful exercise by his own agency ; i.
e. by an act of his will, he produced his firs! sin
in himself. Was this act, then, by which he

108
produced his first sin, a sinful, or a holy ^ct ?
To say it Was a holy act, is absurd ; and to say-
it was a sinful act, is to say, that he had one sin
before his first.
2. To suppose, that Satan has power to act
as an efficient cause, is to suppose, that he has
power to act independently. However he might
obtain this power, if he now possess it, he can
act, without being acted upon by the First
Cause ; he can move, without being moved by
"any moral influence out of himself." And,
if this be not independent a-.ifm, what is ? But,
Mr. A. says, "The Devil is dependant." He
may be so for his be-ng, but not for his agency,
if he be self- moved. But, it is thought, that a
dependant self-moved creature, is as fabulous as
a Centaur. 3. To suppose the Devil acts as an efficient
cause, is to suppose him endued, with Divine
power. To act as an efficient cause, is to act
independently ; which is the Divine mode of act
ing. Besides, is it not as great an exertion of
power, to produce effects in the moral, as in the
natural world ? Is it not as great an exertion of
power, to cause sinful exercises, as to cause ho
ly exercises ? Does it n^t require as much pow
er, to cause moral good and evil, as to cause
natural good <?nd evil ? We can form no con
ception of Divine Power, if it be not that, which
acts independently, and produces effects by its
own en rgy and efficiency. And did I believe,
that God had communicated such power to the
Devil, I could easily excuse the Manichees for
representing; him as a god.

109
4. It is expressly asserted, in sacred scrip
ture, that God is the efficient cause of moral
evil. It is asserted in all those passages, which
we have already quoted, and which teach, that
God fashions, turns and hardens the hearts of
men ; that He moves them to do evil ; that' He
makes them err from his ways ; that He creates
darkness and evil ; and that He works alt things
in all. And, though it is notr expressly said,
that God hardens and turns the heart of Satan,
yet, as he is a dependant creature, like men, an
alogy requires Us to believe, that his sinful ex
ercises 'are caused, like theirs, by that Divine
agency, without Which, not a sparrow falls, not
a body moves, nor any creature thinks or acts.
I add, 5. There is nothing in sacred scripture,
which implies, that the 'Devil is the efficient
cause of either his own sins, or the sins of rrieri.
There is nothing, which implies, that he is the
efficient cause of his own sins. Mr. A. quotes
one solitary passage, which, he thinks, teaches
this absurd doctrine ; but if he had quoted the'
Whole^ verse, it Would have appeared evident,
that he' mistakes the meaning of the passage.
John viii. 44. " Ye are of your father the devil,
arid the lusts Of your father ye will do. He Was
a murderer from the beginning and abode hot
in the truth, because there is no truth in him.
When he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his
own : for he is a liar, and the father of it " By
the Devil's being the father of the unbelieving
JeWSj is obviously meant, that his moral char
acter "Was the prototype of theirs, that there was
10

lid
a moral likeness between them, as there is a
natural likeness between a parent and his chil
dren. His being a murderer, from the begin
ning, may mean, that he was the first murderer^
or that he has prompted mankind to murder
from the beginning of time, or that he had a
murderous spirit from the commencement of
his apostacy. By his speaking of his own, is
obviously meant, his speaking agreeably to his
character : this appears from the reason assign
ed, " for he is a liar, and the father of it," i. e.
his character is that of a liar from the begin
ning, and he was the original liar, and the pat
tern after which liars copy. See Dr. Guyse on
the passage.
There is nothing in sacred scripture, which
implies, that Satan is the efficient cause of the
sins of men. Mr. A. has produced a number
of texts to support this strange sentiment ; but
they are all, either foreign from it, or against it.
He has quoted several passages, relating to the
fall of our first parents ; as Gen. iii. Matt. xiii.
38, and II. Con xi. 3. But, what do these pas
sages prove ? They prove merely, that the Ser*
pent, by which it is supposed the Devil is meant,
beguiled or tempted Eve to eat the forbidden
fruit. " God himself, says Mr. A. charged the
mischief upon the Devil;" What did God
charge upon him ? Producing the aVt of disobe
dience ? No such thing. "Because thou hast
done this" — said God to the Serpent. What
had he done? He had beguiled the woman-
There is not the least intimation in these pas
sages, or any others, that God charged Satan,

Ill
or that he was guilty of moving, causing,' or irn-
pelling our first parents to eat the forbidden
fruit. — The parable of the tares, which Mr. A.
quotes, proves, indeed, that the Devil has some
concern in forming the characters of the wick
ed : but the figurative expression used in this
parable, is slender ground, upon which to build
the doctrine of Satan's efficiency in the produc
tion of moral evil. . The design of parables is,
to illustrate and impress, and not to prove doc
trines. By stretching them beyond their prop
er limits, any thing, however absurd, may be
extorted. Mr, A. represents the third chapter
of Genesis as designed to account for the fall ;
whereas, it is designed merely as a brief history
of that event. And, in such a brief history, it
is not strange, that the efficient cause should not
be brought into view. But, this deficiency, if
it be one, is amply supplied in other parts ©f the
scriptures. ; Mr. A. quotes Matt. xii. 28, 29, to prove
that * all sinners of mankind are under the pow
er and influence of the Devil ? But, this pas
sage relates to the peculiar case of Demoniacks ;
and asserts nothing respecting the cause of sin
ful exercises, either in them, * or others. The
Devil, it would seem, had possession of the
bodies, rather than the hearts of these diseased
and lunatick persons.
In II. Tim. ii. 26, and Eph. ii. 2, we are
told, that some of mankind are. ' taken captive
by the Devil at his will,' and that ' he worketh
in the children of disobedience.' But, what
more do these passages prove, than this ; that

U2
sinners voluntarily yield, to -the suggestions, of
the Tempter, and that he works upon the nat
ural faculties of their minds, by. suggesting evil
thoughts and'presenting. motives to sin? It is
not said, in these passages, as Mr. A. asserts, p.
122, that Satan " works in the hearts of the chuV
dren of disobedience." If it were said, in scrip
ture, that Satan works in the heart, we do not.
see with what consistency it could be denied,
that he " has ability to search the heart." Does
he not know, what he produces by his own im
mediate agency ? If the above passages taught,
that the Devil works in the hearts of the wick
ed, and causes all their sinful exercises, inde
pendently of the agency of God, when it is so
often, and so expressly, said, that God hardens
and turns their hearts, and moves and stirs them
up to do wickedly ; the Bible would, indeed,
appear to be written " jn a strange style."
Mr. A. alludes to I. Sam. xvi. 14, in which
it is said, that an evil spirit from the Lord,
troubled Saul. But, who knows, that this evil
spirit was the Devil ? And, suppose it was ; and
that, when he troubled Saul, he instigated^ or
tempted and urged him on to kill David ; would
it hence follow, that he moved, or impelled him
to attempt murder, by ' operating on his moral
and active powers ?'
The next passage adduced by Mr. A. is, I.
Chron. xxj, ', in which it is said, " Satan stood
up against Israel, and provoked David to num
ber Israel." Now, what is the meaning of the
word provoked, in this place ? Does it mean,
* moved, caused, influenced, by a direct opera-,

113
tion on the heart ?' If this be its meaning, the
Bible 'is written in a strange style,' surely.
Mr. A. is aware, that it is said, II. Sam. xxiy.
1, that the Lord moved David to number Is
rael. But, here he is able to explain, and tell
us how the Lord moved him : " It was by suf
fering him, in a degree, to fall under the power
and influence of the Devil." To move a crea
ture, then, to do an action, is, to suffer him, in
some degree, to be influenced to do it, by some
Other creature ! In this exposition, it is believ
ed, that Mr.. A. ought to have, at least, the cred
it of originality. But I confess, that "such in
terpretations of scripture, are, to me, mon
strous !"
Mr. "A. incorrectly quotes the words of Pe
ter to Ananias. They read thus : Acts v. 3,
"Why hath Satan filled thine heart, to lie to the
Holy Ghost ?" It is observable, that Peter here
charges it upon Ananias, as his fault, that Satan
had filled his heart. " Why hath Satan filled
thine heart ?" As if he had said, ' why have you
listened to the suggestions of Satan, and form
ed the impious design, with your whole heart,
to lie to the Holy Ghost ?' The peculiar mode
of expression here, which occurs in no other
place in the Bible, should be understood in
agreement with those numerous passages, which
speak of God, as hardening, turning, and mov
ing the hearts of the wicked ; and with all those,
which limit the power of Satan to tempting, se-
xlucing and beguiling men, by suggesting
thoughts to their minds, and exhibiting motives
to their wills. The same observation applies to
*10

114
John xiii. 2, in which it is said, " The Devil
having now put into the heart of Judas Iscariot%
Simon's son, to betray him." This is the only
place, in which it is said, that Satan ever put any
thing in any one's heart. And this text, and
Acts v. 3, are the only places, in scripture, in_
which Satan is mentioned, as having any thing;
to do with the heart at all. It is no where writ
ten, in scripture, that the Devil hardens, or turns,
or inclines, or moves, the hearts of sinners.
Comparing scripture with scripture, therefore,
we oUght to conclude, that all he did, in the.
case of Ananias and Judas, was, to suggest
thoughts and exhibit motives to their minds,
and thus to furnish the occasion of their exer
cising sinful affections and volitions-; and not,
that he ' operated upon their moral and active
powers, and impelled them to act agreeably to
his will and pleasure,' contrary to his nature as
a dependant, creature, and contrary to the ex
press declaration of scripture, that God creates.
e> il, and wprkejth all in all.

SECTION XL
Containing remarks upon the ninth section of the
Essay, p. 90 — 94.
Mr. Andros begins this curious section thus :
" It has been usual with the most eminent di
vines and pious Christians, to speak of the sins
and crimes of men as taking place by divine
permission." But this, it appears, was not the
usual mode of speaking adopted by the eminent
divines assembled' at Westminster. In their
Confession of Faith, as quoted by our author,
p. 2Q, they say, " The Almighty Power, un
searchable Wisdom, and infinite Goodness of
God, so far manifest themselves, in his Provi
dence, that it extendeth itself even to the first
fall, and all other sins of angels and men, and
that NOT BY A. BAKE PERMISSION, but SUCll
as hath joined with it, a most wise and powerful
bounding, and otherwise ordering and govern
ing of them, in a manifold dispensation, to his
own holy ends." This Confession was approv
ed by the General Assembly of the Church of
Scotland, and adopted by the Synod of the
Churches of New- England; and is received by
Mr. A., as " the Calvinisticlt view of the sub
ject." And this, unquestionably is the Calvin-
istick view of the subject. For it was usual with.
Calvin and his followers, to discard the word-
permission* and to speak of the sinful exercises

116
and actions of men, as caused by the agency of
God. This is made sufficiently evident by Mr-
W. R. Weeks, in his Eighth Sermon, p. i 69-
174. But, after all, it is not so importarit, what
eminent divines and pious christians, have been
used to say, as what they ought to say, in order
to ' speak with the scriptures.'
In regard to the phrase Divine permission, Mr,
A. has three observations :
1. " It is well adapted to that modesty, diffi
dence, and reverence, which becomes frail chil
dren of the dust, when they speak of the awful
mysteries, of the counsels, ways, and provi
dence of the Most High." We grant that the
phrase in question, is well adapted to the end
here mentioned, if it be true that the sinful ex
ercises of men are merely permitted, and not
caused by the Most High. But, if, as has been
shewn, the scriptures represent God as the Cre
ator of moral, as well as natural evil, and the ef
ficient cause, as well as the last end of both ;
then to deny this, or to be ashamed to say it,
and to use the ' soft, palliating' term permission,
savours not of true modesty and reverence for
the Word of God, but, of that fear of man,
which bringeth a snare. Mr. A. does "not
know what that is in a good man's mind,
which causes him to delight to speak of God as
the efficient cause, that moves the hearts of
men to all wickedness." I will undertake to tell
him : It is a belief, grounded on reason and sa
cred scripture, that God is the efficient cause of.
all things ; and that an opposite mode of speak
ing is absurd, and unscriptural, and dishonour-

117
able to the Sovereign of the universe, * of whom,
and through whom, and to whom, are all things ;
to whom be glory for ever. '
2. "This language," viz. that the sins and
crimes of men take place by divine permission,
.". is agreeable to sound reason and philosophy."
We are pleased to see our author admit, that
there may be such a thing as sound philosophy :
for we had received the impression, from read-
ind his Appendix, before the Essay was print
ed, that he considered Paul as warning us to
beware >of all metaphysical and moral philoso
phy, as pernicious. But, how does Mr. A.
make it appear, that* the language in question,
isj agreeable to sound reason and philosophy ?
It is simply by defining the word permit.
"When a thing is said to be permitted, all that
is .meant, is, that from preceding acts of creat-
ingpower, and providential direction, an event
wili take place, except it be prevented by an
other divine act, put forth for that purpose."'
In this sense, it is undoubtedly true, that all
things and events are permitted ; for God does
not, by a Divine act put forth for the purpose,
prevent any thirrg that exists or takes place.
But, is this what is meant, when it is said, that
thesins of men take place by Divine permission ?
Does any one believe, that such a bare permis
sion will account for the existence of moral
evjl ? Would it be considered as agreeable to
sound reason and philosophy, to say, that the
world came into existence by Divine permis
sion ; or that the planets revolve, the sun
shines, the showers descend, plants and animals

' . . i
grow, by Divine permission ? Is this the usual
mode of speaking, among " eminent divines and
pious christians?" The scripture says, that
God forms the light and ^creates darkness^
makes peace and creates evil ; and that He
fashions, turns, hardens and makes obstinate
the hearts of men. Does all this mean no more
than bare permission, or not hindering their sin
ful exercises ? To illustrate the reasonable and
philosophical idea of permission, Mr. A. says,
*' When Satan entered paradise, and all the cir
cumstances of the temptation were brought
about, if God did not interpose by another act;
Adam would be seduced." But, why so ?
Was there any thing within Adam, to give the
temptation effect, while he was perfectly holy ?
And, what was there without him, that could
"impel him to eat the forbidden fruit, while all
the feelings of his heart revolted at the idea ?
Had the circumstances of the temptation such a
compulsory power, that Adam could not help
yielding, unless God interposed, by an act of
his^;- Divine Power, to prevent it ? How, then,
was he to blame for his fall ?
3...J' This language, adds Mr. A. is conform
able "to the style and manner, in which the scrip
tures oft speak of the ways of God." He has
produced six passages to confirm this observa
tion, which, he thinks, "will suffice -such as
have a due respect for the authority of the in
spired writers." We admit, that the number
of the texts would suffice, if the meaning of
them were at all to his purpose. Three of these
texts speak of God's suffering or permitting,

119
and three of his restraining or preventing, not
sinful exercises of heart, in which sin properly
consists ; but outward actions, such as natural-,
ly flow from sinful affections. This is plain
from the face of the passages : "I gave them
up to their own 'hearts' lusts ; and they walked
in their own counsels. — He suffered no man to
do them wrong.— He suffered not the devils to
speak. — Who, in time past, suffered all nations
to walk in their own wavs* — I also withheld
thee from sinning against me ; therefore I suf
fered thee not to touch her. — What if God —
endured, with much long-suffering, the vessels
of wrath," i. e. suffered, or bore with, their dis
obedient and provoking conduct. Now, what
are these passages, and all others of a similar
nature, that might be adduced, to Mr. A.'s
purpose ? Is God's permitting men to act out
the wickedness of their hearts, the same thing
as permitting the evil exercises of their hearts
to come into existence ? Or, when " eminent
divines" speak of the sins and crimes of men as*
taking place by Divine permission, have they
reference to their external actions only ? • We
cannot perceive the least inconsistency, between
saying, that Divine Agency causes the internal
sinful exercises of men ; and admitting, that
Divine Power restrains their outward wicked
conduct. And this is precisely what the in
spired writers do say. Psalm, cv. 25. -'He
turned their heart to hate his people, to deal
subtily with his servants." Deut. ii. 30. "But
Sihon king of Heshbon, would not let us pass
by him; for the Lord thy God hardened his

120
spirit^ and made his heart obstinate:" Ii Chron.
xvi. 20, 21. " And, when they went from na
tion to nation, and from one kingdom to anoth
er people ; He suffered no man to do them wrong ;
yea, He reproved kings for their sakes."
In commenting upon Rom. ix. 22, 23, Mr.
A. has 'given a wrong turn to the passage ; as
though it taught, that God is active in preparing
the vessels of mercy for glory, but passive in
fitting the vessels of wrath for destruction. It
is not s^id, in this passage, that God fits some
for destruction^ either by his agency j or his per
mission. It is said that God endures the ves
sels of wrath ; and that they are fitted to de
struction ; but, it is not said that God fits them.
This is learnt from other passages of scripture.
This passage, rightly viewed, gives no coun
tenance to the absurd notion, that God fits the
reprobate for destruction, by permitting their
sin to take; place. It only informs us, that,
while the reprobate are fitting for destruction,
God bears with their hateful and provoking
conduct. Mr. A. says, that the expressions, giving
men up to their own hearts' lusts, giving^ them
over to a reprobate mind, &c, imply, " that they
naturally possess powerful propensities to that
which is evil, and that God has only to forbear
to renew, or restrain them, and they will run in
to all manner of wickedness. " We admit, that
such expressions do imply this ; but, we ask,
how does it from hence follow; that divine agen
cy is not the efficient cause of those powerful
propensities ? We see not the least connexion'

121
here, between the premises and the Conclusion.
We find it equally difficult to see the force of
Mr. "A.'s logick, when he infers, from God's
being said to suffer the wickedness of sinners,
and not the goodness of saints, that divine. agen
cy is not equally the efficient cause of both. If
the goodness of saints were odious in its nature,
we presume God would be said to suffer it, as
well as to suffer wickedness ; let the cause of
either be what it may, or whether they haye any
cause or not. Mr. A.'s last syllogism is equal
ly inconclusive, but not so harmless. He says,
'¦ If the exercises of wicked men are the effect
of a constant inward divine operation, then sin
ners are led by God, and so by the Spirit, as
much as saints." Here he again confounds the
distinction of Persons in the Trinity. If it be
the peculiar and official work of the Holy Spirit
to lead men into truth and to sanctify their
hearts; then sinners are not led by the Spirit,.
nor does the Spirit dwell in them ; although
their hearts are in the hand of God, and He turn-
eth them as the rivers of Water. What found
ation, then, is there, for all the " shocking rep
resentations," which Mr". A. has made ?
We entirely agree with our author, p. 93,-
that " there is surely no need of going any fur
ther than the scriptures do, in speaking of the
greatness of the power of God or the extent of
his agen:;y." But. we may ask, is there not
need of going as far as the scriptures do, if we
would declare all 'the counsel of God, and keep
back nothing that is profitable ? If, tht-n, the
scriptures go so f^r as to declare, that God
11

122
moves men to do wickedly, inclines their hearts
to evil, stirs them up to do wrong, turns their
hearts to wickedness, makes them err from his
ways, and hardens their hearts and makes them
obstinate ; it is a question, that ought to be se
riously considered by those, who say, that He
only perrriits the sins of men to take place,
whether they do not take " a soft and cautious
way to keep the truth, respecting the Divine
agency, out of sight ?"

SECTION XII.
Containing remarks upon the tenth section of the
Esssay,in~which Mr. A. attempts to make it appear
that "the idea of ditiine efficiency is a novel doc*
lrlne.n Mr. A. seems to take such a pleasure in call
ing the doctrine of Divine efficiency, " a novel
doctrine, and a new theory," that he must needs
*all it so several times, before he came to this
section, in which he makes an attempt to prove
its novelty. He acknowledges, however, that
" the antiquity of a religious opinion is no cer
tain evidence of its truth ••" and, he might have
added, that the novelty of a religious opinion,
is no evidence of its falsehood. In one sense,
indeed, all religious opinions, that are ^founded
in truth, are equally antient ; as they are all
contained in the sacred scripture, the oldest
book in the world. If, therefore, we were con
vinced, as Mr. A. modestly asserts, that "the
voice of the most enlightened and virtuous part
of the Church of God, in all past ages, is en
tirely against the doctrine of positive efficiency
in the production of moral evil," we would give
it up, as of human invention. But, as it is a
doctrine plainly and fully taught by the inspir
ed writers, who were as virtuous, and as much
enlightened, as any part of the Church of God,
in any age ; we would not relinquish this doc
trine, even if it could be proved, that it had lain

124
concealed from the whole Christian Church,
from the -days of the Apostles, to the present
time. We know, that the mystery of iniquity
began to work, before Paul ceased to write.
The lustre of divine truth began to be obscur
ed by superstition and error, immediately af
ter the apostolick age, and soon underwent an
almost, total eclipse, from which it did not
emerge, till the long, dreary night of papal usur
pation was passed, and the reformation dawned,
under Luther. From that time to the present,
light has been gradually increasing in the
christian world, New truths have been drawn
from the exhaustless mine of the scriptures, and
others cleared of the rust of f*ges, and restored
to their original brilliancy. Luther and Calvin
and their coadjutors achieved wonders ; but there
is no reason to believe, that they discovered all
the truths contained in the Bible, or ascertained,
in every instance, the best method of explain
ing and defending the truths, which they had
discovered, Though they embraced and hold*
ly taught the leading doctrines of the Gospel ;
yet they sometimes failed in their attempts to
illustrate them, to show the consistency be,
tween them, and to answer the objections against
them- By the labours of succeeding divines,
much light has been shed upon the doctrine of
Original Sin, the doctrine of Total Depravity,
the doctrine of Regeneration, the doctrine of
Atonement, and other peculiar doctrines of the
Gospel. And to suppose, that no further im
provements ought to be attempted, or can be
made, in Christian Theology, is evidence cf a

125
bigotted and contracted mind. The views of
Robinson, the venerable Pastor of the first
Planters of New-England, and President Ed-
Wards, that original and profound theologian,
were more liberal. The latter resolved not to
reject a sentiment, merely because it was new,
as he had observed was the practice of some el
derly men ; but to keep his mind open to in^
struction and conviction. See his Resolutions.
Mr. Robinson, in his Farewell Address to those
members of his Church about to sail for Plym
outh, in N. E. thus4fexhorts them- : " If God
reveal any thing to you, by any other instru
ment of his, be as ready to receive it, as ever
you were to receive any truth by my ministry ;
for I am verily persuaded, I am very confident,
that the Lord has more truth, yet to break out
of his holy word. For my part, I cannot suf
ficiently bewail the condition of the reformed
churches, who are come to a period in religion,
and will go, at present, no farther than the in
struments of their reformation. The Lutherans
cannot be drawn to go beyond what Luther
saw. Whatever part of his will our good God
has revealed to Calvin, they will rather die than
embrace it. And the Calvinists, you see, stick
fast where they were left, by that great man of
God, who yet saw not all things. This is a
misery much to be lamented. For though they
were burning and shining lights in their times,
yet they penetrated not into" the whole counsel
of God ; but were they now living, would be as
ready to embrace further light, as that which
they first received. I beseech you, remember
*11

12Q
it is an article of your church Covenant, " that
you be ready to receive whatever truth shall be
made known to you, from the written word of
God." Bur, I must exhort you to take heed
what you receive as truth. Examine it, con
sider it, and compere it with other scriptures of
truth, before you receive it ; for it is not possi
ble, that the christian world should come so
lately out of thick antichristian darkness, and
that perfection of knowledge should break forth
at once "
Though the reformers^n answering objec
tions against the doctrine of divine efficiency,
endeavoured to make a distinction between the
actions of men, and the moral quali'ies of those
actions, which led them sometimes to write ab
surdly and inconsistently ; yet, that they believ
ed and taught the doctrine, is capable of dem
onstration. We believe this has been demon
strated by Mr. Weeks. The reader is request
ed to review the "strong expressions respect
ing the decrees and agency of God as directing
all events," which Mr. Weeks has quoted in
his Eighth Sermon, p. * 66-480. These ex
pressions are too strong to allow Mr. A, to say,
that " it never entered into their hearts to adopt
it as their system, that God was the inward ef
ficient cause of all moral evil." It is not seen,
that he has exhibited evidence of this. The
similitude, quoted from Augustine, p. 96, is
but a similitude ; and if Calvin was, * at that
time, satisfied with it, for want of a better,' it
does not prove, that he believed the Devil to be
the efficient cause of sin. In the two quota-

127
tions from Calvin's Institutes, p. 97. Mr. A.
mistakes his meaning. It is presumed, from
what Calvin has written in other places, that he
did not mean, that God did not create, or cause
the actions of the Devil ; but only, that He did
not create or cause the snful quality of his ac
tions : a distinction, which the Reformers made,
where there was no difference. In the second
quotation, Mr. A. understands Calvin as saying,
that 'the wills of the rc*probate, are slirred up
by Satan.' But, his words do not convey this
idea. The words are, " for the executing his
judgments by Satan, the minister of his wrath,
He (God) both appointeth their purposes to
what end it pleaseth him, and stirreth up their
wills." Calvin,- here, evidently represents Satan
as only an instrument, and God as the efficient
cause of the hardness of men's hearts.
Mr. A. p. 98, quotes Luther as saying, "God
is not the cause of evil." Here, if Luther be
correctly quoted, we must suppose he meant to
make the nice distinction, between causing evil
as a quality and causing the actions, which bear
that quality. Thus understood, he meant not
to contradict his own declaration, that " God
worketh all things in men, even wickedness in
the wicked." It is a want of due attention to
this distinction between net and quality, com
mon to the Reformers, which makes Luther ap
pear so '• flatly to contradict himself. "—Mr. A.
would have it, that Mr. Weeks is " precisely"
as uncandid, in quoting from Luther, as Mri
Merril was, in quoting from Calvin. But, has
Calvin any where said as expressly, " that im-

128
mersion is the only valid mode of baptism," as
Luther has, that " God worketh all things in
men, even wickedness in the wicked ?"
Mr. A. next introduceds Witsius, and af
firms, that he "reprobates, in the strongest
terms, the doctrine he is quoted to support."
If so, it must be manifest, that he " flatly con
tradicts himself:" for he has said, " A second
cause cannot act, unless acted upon, and previ
ously moved to act, by the preventing and pre
determining influence of the First Cause." But
how does Witsius reprobate the doctrine in
question? He says, according to Mr. A.'s quo
tation, " To make God the author of sin is —
dreadful blasphemy." And, what does Wit-
siiis mean by the word author, in this connex
ion? Does he not mean, causing the .sinful
quality of actions, and not the actions them
selves ? Witsius advances, what Mr. Weeks
quoted him for, viz. that God is the efficient
cause of the actions of men. Whether he was
consistent in advancing this, and yet denying
that God is the author of moral evil, is another
question. He teaches the doctrine of Divine
efficiency ; and the Book, in which he teaches
it, was recommended, without reserve, by the
" distinguished names," mentioned by Mr.
Weeks : and neither " honour nor integrity"
required Mr. W- ' to let the world know,*^vhat,
probably, he did not know himself, if Mr. A.
does, how many • of those great names were ori
the side of his doctrine.' If these great names
have acted inconsistently, was Mr. W. bound

129
in honour and integrity, to expose them to the
World ? .. •
It has been the uniform doctrine of the Re
formers and their successors, with the excep
tion of Arminius and his followers, that all the
volitions and actions of men, take place accord
ing to the eternal purpose, and are caused by
the positive agency of the First Cause of all
things. It is not a little surprizing, that any
one at all conversant with their Confessions of
Faith and Systems of Divinity, should call this
in question. The doctrine of Divine efficiency
is, unquestionably, one of the leading " Doc
trines of the Reformation."
In the year 1614, there was published, in
London, an English translation of a work, en
titled " A full Declaration of the Faith and
Ceremonies professed in the dominions of the
most illustrious and noble Prince Frederick V;
Prince Elector Palatine." In this declaration
of some of the original and most distinguished
Churches of the Reformed, we find the doctrine
of efficiency very fully expressed. " The per
mission of God, when he permitteth that which
is evil, is not a bare permission, but God hath
always his hand in the work, and he turneth and
ordereth every action. — The same is found in
the writings of Dr. Luther : as saith he, " when
God worketh all, in all things, he also worketh
in the ungodly, &c." Almighty God — hath
the motions of all creatures in his hands, and
turneth them which way he will, according to
the work, which he will accomplish by them.
There is nothing exempt from such a disposing

130
God — not even the hearts and thoughts of ment
as it, is writteri, " From the habitation of his
dwelling he Ijeholdeth all them that dwell on
the earth; he fashioneth their hearts every
one." In a work of Theophilus Gale, on " Divine
Predetermination," London, 1678, we find the
following sentence, and much more to the same
effect : " The efficacious concourse of God,
modifies, and according to its mode, determines
all actions of second causes, not only necessari
ly, but freely.— The-Divine Will may and must
determine the human will to all its natural acts."
p. 171. On this subjeet, the author quotes a
number of the most eminent English Divines
of the day, in confirmation of his doctrine.
The Rev. Samuel Willard's Body of
Divinity was published at Boston, 1726. The
author was Pastor of the Old South Church,
and Vice-President of Harvard College. This
work was highly recommended by Rev. Messrs.
Prince and Sewall, of Boston, and was gener
ally approved and admired. A few extracts
follow : " God's Efficiency is that whereby He
worketh all things, and all in all things. What
God foreordained in his Decree, that He brings
to pass in his works ; these, therefore, are of an
equal latitude. — As to the special nature of Ef
ficiency, 1, It is that, whereby God works all
things. Eph. i. 11. He worketh all things. —
If we look all over the world, and see any thing
effected or made ; any operation wrought, or
thing brought to pass : we may say as the Ma
gicians once said, This is the finger of God.

131
2. He works, all in all things. I. Cor. xii. 6. It
is the same God, which worketh all in all, i. e.
The whole efficiency of all things depends up
on the First Cause. Isa. xlv. 7. I form the
light and create darkness ; I make peace and
create evil ; I, the Lordj do all these things; —
He himself is the Cause of all causes, and first
Mover of every thing that moves. Acts xvii.
28. In Him we live^ move, and have our be
ing*. If we take a particular account of things,
we shall discern that this Efficiency is in them
all— 5. In the disposing of the freest actions of
the freest creatures, viz. Angels and Men.—.
They have a free will of their own, but yet He.
doeth all here too. He preserves this will of
theirs, and He inclines it too, to be sure to all
that is good. He hath an hand also in sin,
thqugh without sin : He hardens the heart and
blinds the mind, &c." pp. 105-106. " All(cre->
ated) beings depend upon the First Being, not
only for entity, but for operation too. Dan. v.
23. Whose are all thy ways. Prov. xxi. 1. The
king's heart is in the hand of the Lord, as the
rivers of water; He turneth it whithersoever
He will. — The concurrence of the First Cause,
is the cause of the activity of the second cause."
&c, p. 143.
President Edwards was a " great and excel
lent man," and, we doubt not, understood and
embraced the doctrine of the Reformers, re
specting the Decrees and Agency of God. Of
this any one may be convinced, who will read
his Enquiry concerning the Will, P. 4, sec. 10.
And where Mr, A. quotes him as denying that

132
God is the efficient cause of sin, it is evident
he means to make the same distinction, made
by the Reformers, between the act which is sin
ful, and the sinfulness of the act.
Dr. Scott and the Editors of the Christian
Observer, are very modern writers ; and if they
agreed with us, their opinion would hardly re
lieve us from the imputation of novelty. We
are inclined to admit, that they differ, very ma
terially, from the Reformers, on the subject'of
Divine Efficiency ; as they do from American
divines, respecting the Nature of Holiness, the
Nature of the Atonement, and the Sinfulness
and Inefficacy of the Doings of the Unregmer-
ate: subjects, in Mr. A.'s opinion, " never more
justly stated and clearly illustrated," than by
American divines.
We agree with Mr, A. " that the Christian
ought to be satisfied with such light as the
scriptures impart ;" and that, of course, with
out ' attempting to explain the mode of Divine
operation upon the principles of abstract rea
soning' about the ' efficiency of motives, and
the imparted influence, energy and activity of
second causes, means and instruments ; the
Christian ought to be willing to see the Agency
of God in the light in which the inspired wri
ters set it, when they say, that God creates
evil, hardens and turns the hearts of wicked
men, and moves them and stirs them up to do
wickedly '
We also believe with Mr. A. that the pious
and godly in the Church of Christ, will contin
ue to believe on the subject before us, in ages

133
to come, in the main, as they have in ages past ;.
and we believe further, that such as make no
pretensions to vital godliness* and many that
do, together with Deists, Infidels and Hereticks
of all sorts, as yi time past, so in time to come,
will ' keep aloof from the Doctrine of Divine
Decrees and Agency, with a kind of natural
horror' arising from ' the enmity of their carnal
minds against God.'
As Mr. A. does not offer his story of Bona
parte's General and the thievish Arabian Boy,
" as an argument," I shall take no further no*
tice of it, than simply to observe, that as the boy
was educated a Mahometan, and taught the doc
trine of fate, he no doubt meant to be under
stood, that he was so moved, as to be compelled
to steal, and was, therefore, blameless ; which
might well be a " shocking idea," even to a
"wicked man," of common sense.
12

SECTION xur.
Containing remarks upon Mr. ASs Conclusion, p.
104—114.
In his concluding observations, Mr. A. pro
poses to point out the ' interesting advantages,
gained, as he conceives, by his view of the sub
ject' under consideration. We will review
these, in the order in which he has stated them.
1. " The purity and simplicity of the Gospel
of Christ is hereby preserved.". The purity
and simplicity of the Gospel, Mr. A. repre
sents as consisting in the ideas and views of di
vine things revealed, and iti the language and
style in which they are expressed. To this
statement we have no objection ; and, on this
ground, we are perfectly willing to submit the
question, whether his view, or ours, of the sub
ject before us, best preserves the simplicity and
purity of the Gospel ? And,
First. As to the ideas and views of the sub
ject of Divine Agency in the production of
moral evil, revealed in the scriptures : It is
written, that God fashioneth the hearts of all
the children of men ; that He hardeneth whom
He will ; that He turned the heart of some to
hate his people ; that He moved David to num
ber Israel; and that He creates evil, and work
eth all in all. Now, what is the idea conveyed
by such words as fashion, harden, turn, move*

135
create, and work ? Is it not that of direct arid
positive agency ? But, this is precisely our view
of the subject. We say, that Divine Agency
moves men in their wicked actions, and causes
their sinful exercises ; how, we pretend not to
explain. Does Mr. A.'s view of the subject ac
cord better with this scriptural idea ? He main
tains, that the Divine Agency does not touch the
hearts of wicked men, to move them to wicked
actions ; that what God is said in scripture to
do, He does not do himself, but employs sec
ond causes and instruments to do for him ; that
when it is said, God moved David, the mean
ing is, that the Devil moved him ; and that,
when it is said, God put it in the hearts of the
ten kings to do his will, we are to understand,
that Satan put it in their hearts !
Secondly. As to the language and style, in
which the scriptures speak on this subject : —
They are just the same that we use, without
comment, or paraphrase. We want no other
words to convey our idea of the Divine Agen
cy, than those, which " the Holy Ghost teach -
eth" in the sacred volume ; such as fashion,
harden, turn, move, create, &re-
Let us now see, in what language and style
Mr. A. conveys his view of the subject of Di
vine Agency in the production of moral evil.
"Under the infinitely wise and powerful ar
rangement and disposal of second causes and
instruments, the effect is produced, without any
positive Divine efficiency. — Since man comes
into the world with an heart fully set in him to
do evil, God does no more than uphold him in

136
this nature, and so dispose, and manage the af
fairs of the world, that motives, and temp
tations to sin, fall in his way, and that by
these he is moved to all the evil he commits. —
We conceive that the wickedness which takes
place in the world, hardening hearts, &c is as
cribed to God, because it is agreeable to his in
finitely wise counsels and designs, to order
things in his Providence, so that it will come
to pass; — In operating to harden the hearts of
men, God works by means or second causes,
and gives to these means a power competent to
the effect, without any direct operation on the
heart of sinners. . The agency of the Serpent,
Or Devil, effected the fall of man.— Satan is a
Strong man, holding possession of the heart as
his residence.— Satan is represented as tfe^
agent, who moves sinners.— The Devil is emi
nently the cause of all wickedness that prevails
in the world.— To speak of the sins and crimes
of men as taking place by divine permission,, is
agreeable to sound reason and philosophy, and
to the style and manner in which the scriptures
oft speak." Such is the language and style, in
which Mr. A. expresses his view of the con
cern God has in the sins of men. If there be
any gain here, in point of preserving the sim
plicity and puri y of scrip ;uial language, Mr. A,
is entitled to all the praise of it. This, howev
er, appears to us "a very inconvenient style,"
in which to express the simple, scriptural truth,
that God hardens and hirns the hearts of the
wicked, whithersoever he will. Between Mr.
A.'s style and language on this subject, and the

137
plain, precise and artless phraseology of the sa:
cred writers, there is a striking contrast. But,
" a material departure from the language of in
spiration in speaking of divine things, tends to
introduce incorrect views of those things. And
if any one has any thoughts on religion, which
will not bear a scripture dress, they are to be
suspected as fallacious."
' We proceed to Mr. A.'s second " interesting
advantage" gained by his view of this subject :
2. " We avoid one great occasion of stirring
up the hearts of men to speak reproaclrfully of
the ways of God and the ministry of his word."
Here we agree with our author, that " the na
tive enmity of the human heart against God and
divine truth, is sufficiently great." But, we
would ask, whether this enmity will be dimin
ished, by exhibiting the. ways of God in such a
light, that wicked men will not speak reproach
fully of them ? If there be real enmity in the hu
man heart by nature, against God and his truth;
we should hence infer, that nothing would have
such a tendency to awaken that enmity and stir
up men to speak reproachfully, as the most
clear, full, and^criptural exhibition of the De
crees, Works and Character of God. And, if
there be a. mode of talking about the Decrees
and Agency of God, which does not excite the
enmity of the natural heart, we suspect it must
be such a mode, as either distorts or conceals the
truth on this subject, and " darkens counsel by
words without knowledge."
If Mr. A. by his peculiar views, gains an ad
vantage, in the above respect, over us, and
*12

138
"some preachers in N ew- England ;" the Ar-
minian, Unitarian, or Universalis!, gains an
equat advantage over him .' and, in this respect,
it must be confessed, we all have greatly the ad
vantage of the Prophets, Apostles, and even
Christ himself. When the Prophets preaehedv
the people said, " speak unto us smooth things?
— Cause the Holy One of Israel to cease from
before us." When the Apostles preached, the
people were ready to stone them. And when
Christ preached, "the whole synagogue were
filled with wrath."
Whether *' judicious: and sober Christians"1
would be willing to contribute to the support of
a Missionary, who should preach as Paul did in
his first sermon to the Pagans at Athens, that
lf God hath determined the times before ap
pointed and the bounds of the habitations." of
men, and that ' in Him they live, and move (tare
moved) and "have their being,' we shall leave for
the christian publick to decide. But, should a
Hindoo, or any other Pagan, say to such a Mis.
sionary, " Why doth he yet find fault, for wha
hath resisted his will ?" ' Instead of using the
softerftng term " permission," *pr any other
*' palliative," he might answer, in the words o£
Paul, " Nay, but, Q man, who art thou, that
fepliest against God." Such an " appeal to the
understanding and conscience," Mr. A. thinks,
would be sufficient, if any thing would, to " si
lence the voice of objection 5" whether the hear
er should be able or not, to follow the preacher
" through the whole system of wire-drawn met
aphysicks," to prove, what,, be sure, Mr. A. be*

139
lieves, that " though God be the immediate au
thor (cause) of all our most abominable lusts ;
yet this does not at all militate against responsi
bility, or the criminality of such exercises ;"
since, as he ingenuously says, p. 14, « If the
holy exercises, which God produces in saints,
be- morally good and praiseworthy, we see not
why the evil exercises of sinners would not be
criminal, though produced in the same way."
3. " Another important point gained, says
Mr. A, is, we avoid running the scriptures into
a plain and irreconcileable contradiction." This
is truly an important point, if it be gained. But,
if the passages referred to by Mr. A,, under this t
head, are to be understood in his sense, the
point, however important, is lost. If these pas£.
sages all relate to the primary, producing cause,.
of moral evil, there is a palpable contradictions
between them, which Mr. A.'s view of the sub
ject can never reconcile. It is said, in these
passages, that ' God creates darkness, creates
and doesevW ;' and, on the other hand, that 'the
lust of the flesh, &c. is not of the Father ;. and
sinful wisdom descendethnot from above.' Now,
if the latter passages must be understood to as
sert, as Mr. A. maintains, that God is not the
primary,, producing cause of moral evil, they
contradict the former, which, assert, as Mr. A.
allows, that God is the primary, producing cause
of moral evil. "There can be no doubt, he
says, p. 35- as to what the first cause of volition,
is; all contemplative minds know this to be
God :" and again, p. 18; " It is a plain declar
ation of scripture, that God hardens the hearts,

140
&c But, this is to produce moral evil ; and
this fact we readily admit." — The only way to
remove this "seeming contradiction- in the
scriptures," is, to give a correct exposition of
I. Johnii. 16. and Jam. iii. 15. These passages
relate to the nature, and not to the cause of the
corrupt passions and criminal lusts of men.
See p. 79, 81, of this Review.
We come, at length, to the last of the "in
teresting advantages," which Mr. A. thinks he
gains, by his view of the subject of Divine
Agency. 4. " We reserve to ourselves a method of
explaining this awful dispensation of Jehovah,
Krdening the hearts of men, sending them
ring delusion, &c. by which the judgment
and conscience of the sinner is most easily gain
ed and his objections silenced."
It is true, as Mr. A. says p. 110: "There
is nothing in the Divine conduct, that more
commonly provokes the cavils of wicked men,
than God's being said to harderi the heart, to
blind the eyes, &c." Let us, then, see how
Mr. A. would " deal with the objector," accord
ing to his " view" of the subject. And first,
he would give up the doctrine objected against :
secondly, he would show the objector, that the
means, by which his heart is hardened, are very
good in themselves : and, thirdly, he would give
an answer, which would be much more perti.
pent, according to our view of the subject, than
,his own.
First. He would give up the doctrine, with
which the objector cavils. The doctrine is j that

141
God, in some sense, does harden the hearts of
all sinners, and by his Agency, mediate or im
mediate, produce all their sinful exercises and
actions. This doctrine Mr. A. would relin
quish, by saying, that ' hardening the heart, &c.
is a special, and not a general dispensation of
God — a punishment for former disobedience.'
p. 110.* But if hardening , the heart, &c. be a
special and judicial, and not a general and sove
reign dispensation of God, then it is doubtless
limited to a few enormous and incorrigible sin
ners, and is by no means common to all the
impenitent. The objector, therefore, not view
ing himself as a flagrant and incorrigible trans
gressor, will no longer see any reason to appre
hend, that God hardens his heart, and caring lit
tle for others, will cease to cavil. This manner
of dealing with objectors, would not only gain
* We. repeat, that the scriptures no where represent
God's hardening the heart, &c. as a punishment fur former
disobedience. The sacred writings are not chargeable with
the absurdity of representing moral evil as the punisliment
of moral evil.— On the same page, Mr. A. Says, 'Calvin
considered the original depravity of all mankind, as thepwi-
ishment of Adam for his firsi act of disobedience ; and that
this is as consistent with tbe Justice and Goodness of God, as
that children should now be exposed to Divine judgments
for their parents' ' sins.' How could Mr. A. say this, con
sistently with his unqualified approbation ol what American
divines have written upon the doctrine of Original Sin ? And
how will he reconcile this, with the Divine threatening of
punishment to Adam, *' In the day thou eatest thereof, thou
shalt surely die ?" and with tbe Divine declaration, "The
soul (hat sinneth, it shall die. The son shall not bear the,
iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the issi-
quity of the son." Esek. xviii. 2Q.

142
the judgment and conscience of a modern Cal
vinist; but silence the objections of an antient
Arminian. Secondly. Mr. A would show the objector,
thut the means, by which his heart is hardened,
are very good in themselves. He says, p. 11 0,
' The ordinary means, by which sinners, in the
Providence of God^ are hardened, are such as
these : — His great love and bounty, in bestow
ing on them worldly prosperity ; deferring the
punishment of their sins, and with much long-
suffering, giving them space to repent ; sending
his prophets and ministers to tell them their er
rors and mistakes in religion, and solemnly to
gjCall them to repentance.' These, to be sure,
are extraordinary means to be used, in the
Providence of God, to harden men's hearts ;
we should have thought, that they were rather
the appropriate means of softening their hearts.
These means are doubtless, as Mr. A. observes,
"acts of great mercy and kindness" in them
selves. But, will this consideration silence the
objector ? Will he not still say, ' If God devised
these means, with a design that they should har
den my heart and fit it for destruction, and gave
to these means such an " influence, energy and
activity," as He knew would make them effect
ual ; how am I under such mighty obligation to
thank Him for these means ? How is it the bet
ter for me, to be fitted for destruction by these
means, than by any other, or without any means
at all ? And, how is it more just and righteous
in God, to give efficacy to these means, in hard
ening my heart, than to harden it by his direct

143
agency ; if these, indeed, do not amount to
much the same thing ?' Thus, it would seem,
that the objector has not yet done with Mr. A.
And he is not ignorant of it. " We know very
well, the sinner, though foiled by the blow just
now given, may rise again, and with vehemence
urge, Why did God'originally give me an heart,,
that should be capable of being hardened in the
way you have stated ; or why did He not exert
his omnipotent power and grace to soften my
heart into repentance under these dispensations
of love ?" p. 112. Accordingly, Mr. A. would
give, Thirdly, An answer, which would be much
more pertinent, according to our view of the
subject, than his oivn. The answer is that given
by Paul, Rom. ix. 20, 21. " Nay but, O man,
who art thou that repliest against God ? Shalt'
the thing formed say to him that formed, Why
hast thou made me thus ? Hath not the potter
power over the clay, of the same lump to make
one vessel unto honour, and another unto dis
honour?" This answer is, unquestionably,
" pungent and powerful." But, it is much more
pertinent, as we view the doctrine objected
against, than as Mr. A. views it. For,
1. It was the same view of the doctrine, which
we have, against which the objection, which the
apostle answers, was made. The doctrine is
thus stated by him, in the 18th v " Whom he
will h e hardeneth." Here the direct and posi
tive Agency of God is expressed, without the
least suggestion of means, instruments, second
causes , or imparted energies and activities. This

144
#iew of the doctrine is carried into the objection
and answer. "Who hath resisted his will?
Why has fhou made me thus ?" This implies,
thr^t God, and not any created instrument, makes
men what they are. "Hath not the potter pow
er, &c. to make one vessel unto honour, &c. ?"
This implies, that the Agency of God, in fash
ioning the hearts of men and farming their char
acters, is as direct and positive, as the potter's
in moulding the clay.
2. If the Apostle's answer were designed to
meet an objection against Mr. A.'s view, that
God does not directly harden the heart himself,
but only gives power to means and instruments
to do it. without his positive agency ; the mode
of expression seems improper and irrelevant.
It should rather have been. ' Hath not the pot
ter power over the clay, to use an apprentice or
employ a journeyman, to make vessels for
him ?'
3. If the objection h id been made against
Mr. A.'s view of the subject, the Apostle's an
swer would not have met it. The objection, in
this case, would not have been against God's
hardening 'he heart ; fortius is not Mr. A 's
view ; but against God's permitting the heart
to be hardened by a train of second causes,
adapted and arranged in his providential gov
ernment. But, the answer is so constructed,
as directly to meet the objection against our
view of the doctrine, which is, that God hardens
the heart, himself, and causes all the voluntary
exercises and actions of men. " Shall the thing
formed say to him that formed it, why hast thtnt

14S
made me thus ? Hath not the potter power over
the clay, of the same lump, to make one vessel
unto honour, and another unto dishonour ?'?
This answer, though concise, yet implies what
ever might be said, with truth, respecting " the
nature of moral agency, human liberty, and the
sinfulness of moral exercises, as being in their
nature, and not in their cause ;" how much so
ever these things may be neglected or despised,
by such as ' have had their confidence in ab
stract reasoning completely destroyed.' And,
in Mr. A,'s opinion, this answer is perfectly
conclusive : for he says, p. 113, " He that
knows that God doesia certain thing, and is not
satisfied that it is just, is not to be reasoned
with any further."
We have Gome, at length, to the ' period' of
our author's ' labours ;' which, of course, brings
us to the end of our cursory review. Wfe are
happy, in the retrospect, to find, that we 'have
attempted, by abstract reasoning, to prove Mr.
A.'s metaphysical discussions incorrect;'* and
that we have not attempted, by any kind of rea-
* Mr. A. says, p. 113, "Should any one object to the
metaphysical discussions contained in this volume, and at
tempt by abstract reasonings to prove them incorrect, I shall
take no notice of it. I have not introduced them to estab-
lisljany point, except this, that by- them no point in divinity
can be established." Is it not a pity, then, that he should
have so much swelled the size and enhanced ihe price of
his book, with abstract arguments and metaphysical discus
sions, to prove, that motive governs the will, that ¦preserva
tion is not creation continued, that moral agency consists in
a power or capacity to put forth moral action, and that God
has imparted an influence, energy and activity to second
13

146
soning, to prove, that, when James says " This
wisdom descendeth not from above, &c and,
The wisdom, that is from above, is pure, &c."
he rrieans, " that sin and holiness come both
alike from a direct divine influence on the heart
of man;" since, by these faults of commission
and omission, we shall, according to Mr. A.'s
positive declaration, in the last sentence of his
Essay, save him the labour of writing again,
and ourselves the labour of reviewing what he
might write.*
pinis. ,
causes, sufficient to produce moral .evil ; without his own
Agency ? when he had no design in all this, but to. show,
that no point in divinity can be established by such argu
ments and discussions ; and when, having lately reviewed
some metaphysical speculations, he has really 'lost all con
fidence in abstract reasoning,' and views ' metaphysical
deeps, as a dangerous snare, baited with pride.' p. 50.
* It was in contemplation to add an " Appendix," con
taining, 1. Some further observations on the nature, impor
tance and utility of Ihe science of Metaphysicks. 2. A col
lection of Mr. A.'s concessions. 3. An illustration of Mr.
A.'s motto, " speaking the truth in love," by sundry quota
tions from his Essay. And, 4. A Contrast," showing how
Mr. A.'s views and representations of the doctrine of Divine
Agency, canlradict one another. But, as our review has
unexpectedly .filled so many pages, that we fear the reader's
patience will never bring him in sight of this Note ; we
have concluded to postpone the Appendix, and especially
the Contrast, until Mr. A. shall furnish us with one mote
contradiction, by publishing an answer to what we ha\e
written.

ERRATA.
Page 16, 1. 31, for f read ? — 18, 1.-21, read divine agen
cy — 23, 1. 9, for I, read If — 37, 1. 5, for and volition, read
of volition— 45-, 1. 2, for cause, read causes — 58, 1. 5, for
not, read on — 128, 1. 4; for introduced?, read introduces,—.
130, 1. 9, for concourse, read converse.

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